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Full text of "Annals"

HAN'DBOUND 
AT THE 






UNIVERSITY OF 
TORONTO PRESS 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 

in 2007 with funding from 

IVIicrosoft Corporation 



http://www.archive.org/details/annalsaa54t56ameruoft 



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Intern ATK )N al KELATiONb 

OF THE 

United States 



THE ANNALS 



Volume uv 



July, 1914 



BoitoB: BMORT R. JOHNSON 

kmmikm Bomm: CLYDB L. KINO 

BorroB Boos Umatnawt'. ROBWBLL C. MoCRBA 

AMoaATS Editom: JAMES C. BALLAOB. O. O. HX7BBNBR. & & BVBBNBB. GAEL 

XBL8BT. J. P. UCHTBNBBRGBR. L. & BOWS. BUBET 

C. 8T0WBLU T. W. VAN MBTBB 





Academy or Political akd Social ScmtcB 

80ni AND WOODLIND AtMNUB 
PBILU>BLPaiA 



1 



Copyright, 1914, by 

ACADBMT or POUTICAL AND SOCIAL SCXENCS 

All rights reserved 



EUROPEAN AGENTS 

England: P. 8. King A 8oo, 2 Qreat Smith St., WMtminster, London, S. W. 
Kkancb: L. LaroM, Rue Soufflot, 22, Parii. 

Gbimaitt:' MAyer A MQller, 2 Prins Louia FerdinandfltrMse, Berlin, N. W. 
Italy : Oiomale DefU Ecooomittt, ria Monte Sayello, Palasso Oraini. Rome. 
Staw: E.Do«ai,OPbu* do 8«oU Ana, Madrid. 



CONTENTS 

I PBMBBNT STATUS OF TUB HON BOB OOCTBJNB 

'»A- ^^IFRICAN POLICY: THE MONROE DOCTRINE MOD- ' 

I) 

Juh: 1 ! tt, l)iroctor(ienrral, Paii-Aa6rl0MlUBioil,WMllUlgtoll«D. 
( 1 < riy rnited States MinintW to ArfBDtillA,PUlMDa Mid Co- 



A STUDY OF I BKRIC- AMERICA 5 

lUAT-Admiral F. K. Cbadwick, U.8.N., Newport, R. I. 

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 20 

Rear-Admiral Colby N. Cheeter, U.8.N., WMhington, D. C. 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO HAITI » 

WilliaiD A. MacCorkle, Former Ciovernor of West Virginia. 

THE LATIN VIEW OF THE MONROE DOCTRINK 67 

Leopold Orahame, New York. 

THE SOUTH AMERICAN VIEW AS TO THE MONROE DOTTRINE 83 
Paxion Hibben, Indianapolia, Ind. 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND LATIN AMERICA -i 

Joeeph Whelees, Attorney at Law, St. Louis, Mo. 

THE EFFECTS OF THE PANAMA CANAL ON OUR RELATIONS 

W ITH LATIN AMERICA M 

John HoUaday Latan^, LL.D., Profeaeor of American History, Johns 
Hopkins University. 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE CANNING MYTH . W 

Charles H. Sherrill, Former Minister to Argentina. 

i HE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE TOWARD THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 90 
A« Maurice Low, M.A., Chief American Correspondent of the London 
Morning Post. 

NVHAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THINK OF THE MONROE DOC- 
TRINE 107 

Dr. Herbert Kraus, University of Leipsig. 

THE MEANING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE US 

Charles M. Pepper, Washington, D. C. 

TTIi: ^^ DOCTRINE: A SOLUTION OF ITS rUoHLIM 119 

ri.-. i own, Former United States Minister to i I oiiUuruA. 

iii 



iv CONTRI^TO 

PAQB 

THK MONROK DOCTHINE AND THE 1Y)HEIGN POLICY OF THE 

UNITED STATES IN THE >\T.STEU\ HEMI8PHEUE 121 

J. J. SleohU, M.A., Fonnrrlv of tlio I'liited Statca roiisular Service. 

COMMUNICATIONS- 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 130 

Prof. Achille LorU, UniTeraity of Turin. Itah 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.. 131 

Prof. A. Pillet, Faculty of Law of the UnivorBity of TarU. 

// THE MEXICAN SITUATION: ITS PROBLEMS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 

THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MEXICO 134 

WiUard Saulabury. Uoitod Sutea Senator from Delaware. 

THE POSTULATES OF THE MEXICAN SITUATION 136 

Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Professor of Government, Harvard Uni- 
venity. 

ERRORS WITH REFERENCE TO MEXICO AND EVENTS THAT 

H AVE OCCURRED THERE 148 

Henry Lane Wilton, Fonner Ambaandor of the United States to 

AlttOCO. 

THE MEXICAN SITUATION 162 

Henry Clews, Ph.D., LL.D., New York. 

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY IN MEXICO: WHAT IT IS 

FIGHTING FX)R 166 

Sefior Don Roberto V. Pesqueira, Confidential Agent of the Carranza 
Ctovemment in the United States. 

THE DVTY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MEXICO 175 

Frank W. Monflrll. Member of Conj^rcss from Wyoming. 

MEXICO 183 

Austen U. iux, Sfw i ork. 

MEXICO AND HER PEOPLE is. 

Alfred Buhop Mason, New York. 

A REVISION OF AMERICAN POLICIES 191 

Simon N. Patten, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, University of 
Pennsylvania. 

MEXICO: ITS PEOPLE AND ITS PROBLEM 201 

Major Cassius E. Gillette, Philadelphia. 

THE REMEDY FOR MEXICO 211 

Leslie C. Wells, Prf>ft»iwor of French and Spanish, Clark College, Wor- 
cester, Mass. 



rAMi 

TflK SCOPE AND UMIT8 OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TOWARD 

MKXICO «• 

L. 8. Row©, PluD., LL.Dm ^mttmor of P«»iJii^«»l Beimee, Univerriiy of 
PenniylvaniA. 
ABCERICAN N' FOREIGN COIM HI I s 236 

Robert J. -. .: » 

/// THB POUCY OF THIS VSITBD STATES !S TUB PACIFIC 

FACTORf* AFFECTING THE TOLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IX 

'1 ' ' 3« 

.1 C. H. StoektoD, U.S.N., WMhingtoD, D. C. 

THE l»OLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 245 

Kllery C. Stowell, Ph.D., AMtsUnt ProfoMor of Intematioiud Law, 
Columbia University. 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIC 

\ND MILITARY PROGRAM 251 

Rear- Admiral Richard Wainwright, U.S.N., Washington, D. C. 

i HE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH CHINA AND 

JAPAN 254 

T. lyenega, Ph.D., Profaasorial Lecturer in the University of Chicago. 

THE RELATIONS BETNVEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. 280 
Jiuji G. Kasai, Harvard University. 

IV THE BLBMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN FOREIGN 

POUCY 

A CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE POLICY FOR AMERICA 270 

J. Pease Norton, Professor of Railway and Trade Statistics Harvard 
University. 

Like FOREIGN POUCY OF THE UNITED STATES 277 

^ T. P. Gore, United States Senator from Oklahoma. 

THE ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN FOREIGN 

POUCY 382 

W. Morgan Shuster, Washington, D. C. 

A PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY 295 

Edward W. Townscnd, Member of Congress from New Jersey. 

COMMUNICATION— 
Till .\BOUT STATE REGULATION OF LTILITIES IN 

^^^ ^iN an 

G. C. Mathewt, Public Utilities SUtistician, Railroad CommissioD of 
Wisconsin. 

BOOK DEPARTMENT 321 

ivnix 350 



Ti Contents 

BOOK DEPARTMENT 

N0TI8 

BABBOim— rA« lnfiuent€ of the Odd Supply on Prices and Profits (p. 321) ; 
CAJmAM— ITtollA— it Brief Explanation of the Causes of Economic Welfare 
(p. S21); CAMvron—ThM Industrial Situation (p. 322); Carson— 3/exico: The 
WomMand it/ ttm South (p. 322); CLEVEhAin>— The Venezuelan Boundary Con- 
triwrtf, Tk» imdtptndtnce of the Executive, The Oovernment in the Chicago Strike 
(p. 922) ; VAHKBAxmmB—A Financial History of California (p. 323) ; Frasbr— 
Panama and What it Means (p. 323) ; HomiKS—The Statistical Experience Data 
of the Johns Hopkins Hospital, 1892-1911 (p. 324); Kbnnedt, et al.— IVoyes and 
Family Budgstt in the Chicago Stockyards District (p. 324) ; Lowry— Teaching 
Sax Hygiene in the Public Schools (p. 324); Monkswbll— T^ Railways of 
Oraat Britain (p. 32i); Nibmbtkr und STRXJPP—Jahrbuch des Volkerrechtt 
(p. 825) ; Property— lU Duties and Rights (p. 325) ; Salin— Die Wirtschaftliche 
Bntwicklung von Alaska und Yukon Territory (p. 325) ; SzABHORE—Psychology 
in Daily Life (p. 325); Smith — Chemistry in America (p. 326); Sowers— rAc 
Financial History of New York StaU from 1789 to 1912 (p. 326) ; Taussig— TAe 
Tariff History of the UniUdStaUs (p. 326) ; Taylor— r/ie Credit System (p. 326); 
Whitlock— For/y Years of It (p. 327); Whitten — Regulation of Public Service 
Companiee in Great Britain (p. 327). 

REVIEWS 

Bbabd— il Contemporary American History, 1877-1919 (p. 328). R. G. Gettell 

BlLOKAM AND Levt— Cau4e of Business Depression (p. 329) R. Ricgel 

Cbandlbr— rA« Express Service and Rates (p. 330) G. G. Huebner 

Danul»— /n Freedom's Birthplace (p. 330) J. P. Lichtenberger 

Dbwinq — Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations (p. 331) Eliot Jones 

X>VHU>r— Ireland under the Commonwealth (2 vols.) (p. 332) W. E. Lunt 

FniLOoro-HALL— rA« Passing of Empire) Koxsovnos— Bureaucratic 

Oooemment: A Study in Indian Polity (p. 334) C. L. Jones 

OaboFalo— Crimtm>^y: Physical Bases of Crime (p. 336) J. P. Lichtenberger 

HAamwTT—M ercantile Credit (p. 338) E. M. Patterson 

H Ui lT Mi — Violence and the Labor Movement (p. 338) A. Fleisher 

Matkkwb— Taxation and the Distribution of Wealth (p. 339) E. M. Patterson 
SEWMAY^n^Medical and Sanitary Inspection of Schools (p. 340) B. D. Mudgett 

Oppbnbbimbs— rA« StaU (p. 340) R. G. Gettell 

Vomh-Pvblic Utilities (p. 341) .E. R. Johnson 

RnrM^rAe United States and Mexico (p. 341) C. L. Jones 

TmowMTon^The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (p. 342) . E. R. Johnson 

VmtLLMm—A Model Housing Law (p. 343). B. J. Newman 

WAU4ifo— Progr«Mtrum and AfUr (p. 344; A. Fleisher 

'^mrr KMMMr-Ownership Tenure and Taxation of Land (p. 345) A. P. Usher 
WiKanBLD-fiTBATfOBO— rA< History of Englieh Patriotism (2 vols.) 

(p. 346) E. R. Johnson 

WoasfOtfr—AteoiMlrtictum of the New Coloniee under Lord Milner; 

MthKWm—The Nation and the Empire (p. 347) C. G. Haines 



A PAN-AM KRICAN POUCY: THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
MODERNIZED* 

By John lUiuinT, 

Ihncior O&atnl, Pao-American Tmon. WMbiofton, D. C; Formerly UoiUd 
SUUt Mioittor to Argfntin*, PAmuna and Colombia. 

I flomeiimee feel that all thb dincuflBion of the Monroe Doctrine 
iM entirely in vain, that there ia nobody who m an ultimate court upon 
ttir su I >j(i*t— nobody who can decide just what in itM interpretation or 
lis aieuiiing or its slKiuficance. I know that I would not for a moment 
pretend that miy vifws which I have upon tlic subject are final. 1 
had at first defidini 1 would not make any remarks, but I will briefly 
summariie some thoughts which I have been going over in my mind 
for many years in my association with Latin America. In my 
humble experience as minister in three American republics and dur- 
ing the seven years that I have had the honor of being the Director 
General of the Pan-American Union, I have striven earnestly to get 
what 1 call the Pan-American viewpoint of the Monroe* I3o(trint*. 
Now I do not ask anyone to accept what I say as final, but perhaps I 
look at this subject from a viewpoint a little different from that 
of many persons, because I have the rather unique position and ex- 
perience of being the only Pan-American officer in America — not 
only one who is an officer of the United States but who is in every 
respect equally an officer of the other Latin-American countries. 
Elach day it is one of the duties of the members of my staff to lay 
before me the consensus of opinion of the newspapers of every impor- 
tant capital of the western hemisphere; and therefore while I am 
actually in this country, I am able to follow closely the views of the 
peoples of other lands upon this subject under discussion. 

As one who has been intimately associated, officially and pri- 
vately, for nearly fourteen years with Latin America and Latin 
Americans, I may be permitted to make a few humble suggestioDB, 
which, if followed, might affect the permanent status of the Monroe 
Doctrine among the American nations, and might not! 

' Remarka aa praaidiog officer of the leMioo of the Academy, Fridigr 
uioming. April 3, 1914. 

1 



2 Tmb Annals of the American Academy 

I believe the time is coming when there may be evolved from the 
Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle and phnise, and thereupon 
substituted for the Monroe Doctrine as a principle and phrase, the 
principle and phnu«o of a " Pan-American policy. " (These ideAs, to 
some ext<>nt, I dovelopo<i last fall at a meeting in Washington of the 
Society for Judicial Settlement of International Questions. What I 
am saying here is really a sublimated form of what I said at tliat time.) 
By that I mean a Pan-American policy acceptable to and approved 
by not only the United States, but all the American republics, a 
policy Monging to each and all on the same basis of attitude and 
action, protecting alike the sovereignty and governments of each — 
which is, after all, the delicate point — without the offensive sug- 
gestion of preponderance, dictation or domination of one nation like 
the United States. It is a common error among some of the states- 
men and essayists of the rnit(»d States, whenever they speak or 
write anything about the southeni republics, to patronize them. 
This is a fatal error — always thus reminding them of the power and 
mightiness of the Unite<l States, as if the United States were lx)th 
''papa" and "mamma,'* and they a group of little children playing 
in the back yard. C*oupled with this are the equally common errors : 
First, that of not recognizing the extraordinary greatness and progress 
of some of Uie republics, even if others are not so progressive; and 
secondly, of classing them all as having revolutionary tendencies, in 
spite of the fact that two-thirds of I^tin America, in area and popuhi- 
tion, has known no serious revolution whatever in the last twenty-five 

This Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the 
Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a 
greater and all-American policy, where each nation would have the 
same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position and the same 
sense of independence as the United States now has. By eliminating 
the attitude of absolute dictation and centralized power, which the 
Monroe Doctrine has been interpreted in Latin America as applying 
to the relations of the nations of the western hemisphere, by the sub- 
stitution of '* Pan-American "for ** Monroe" — thus including all the 
American nations as sponsors — and by the substitution of ''policy" 
for '* doctrine'* and thus removing the hard, unyielding, dictatorial 
and didactic suggestion of the words " Monroe Doctrine, " about which 
every Latin American is a little sensitive, a long step will be taken 



Tub Monroe Doctrine MoDBRiniBD 3 

^iwards a n«*w nrn of Plaii-Amerii*An comitv antl PMii-Amf^rimQ 
OOIlfid0llO6« 

It is not Uio Monroe Doctriue tUelf an a principle, but the i/i/zr- 
pr«telum-'and mark my word— (A« inierjn^iaiiim thtreof, an indicated 
in the recently publiflhod opinionH of mnny prominont Latin Ameri* 
eaos OD this subject, that is not acceptable to the majority of Latin- 
American countries and statesmen. This is a point that has been 
oleariy overioolced by the critics of the Monroe Doctrine in the 
United States. If its liaphasard interpretation can be supplanted 
with responsible and reaiionable judgment, the majority of argu- 
ments against the doctrine in I^tin America, and also in the United 
States, in describing it as obsolete will fail absolutely in their pur- 
pose and logic. 

A distinguished Yale professor, for whom I have profound regard, 
leaving the safe fieldn of archaeological study, and venturing into the 
complex relations of international politics, calls the Monroe Doctrine 
an ''obsolete shibboleth." How in the world any one man can 
assume to pass that judgment upon a great policy or doctrine, I can- 
not possibly understand. I fear that in his academic viewpoint he 
has exaggerated the importance which the Latin-American countries 
attach to the Monroe Doctrine, and he has attributed to that much 
assailed and sufTering Doctrine all kinds of faults which are due to 
entirely other and different causes, such as North American ignor- 
ance and lack of appreciation of South America. 

In conclusion, the Monroe Doctrine in its final analysis, in my 
opinion, and, as I say, I do not for a minute state these things in a 
didactic way and my judgment may be entirely wrong, will con- 
tinue to be a great iniemoHonal principle only to the degree that it 
is evolved into this greater Pan-American policy ; and from a Doc- 
trine of the Unitetl States alone into a policy of all the .American 
republics, and now, if you follow me, though it is a little complicated, 
to the degree that it is evolved from being subjedire on the part of 
the United States alone towanis all the other American republics as 
a6/fc/iir, to being subjectiw on Ww pjirt of each towanis each and 
all the others as objective. That is, making; em-h and every Ameri- 
can republic feel that it is part of its |>olicy towanis i»:ich and every 
other American republic, instcati of bcinj; just Uie policy of the Unit4!d 
States alone towards all these other countries. To be still clearer 
in my idea I would say that I mean to evolve the Monroe Doctrino 



4 Thb Aknalb of the American Acadbmt 

from being nthjedive on the part of the United States towards the 
other American republics in an ohjedwe position, to being subjective 
on the part of each and all towards in turn each and all as ofjjective. 

Then wo will have achieved, in my opinion, that ideal, unselfish, 
fraternal relationship of the American governments and peoples 
which will give a new worth and a permanent, acreptahle significance 
to Pan-American relationship, Pan-American accord, and the status 
of the Pan-American Union. 



I 
I 



A STUDY OF IBERIC-AMERICA 

By Rbar-Admiral F. E. Chadwick, U.8.N., 
Newport, R. I. 

SouU) of uii in thU hemisphere are nearly 8,000,000 square milee 
of land three-quarters of which are within the tropics. This last is a 
great momentous and dominating fact. For this means that there 
are 6,000,000 square miles, an area about twice the sise of the Unttad 
States exclusive of Alaska, which will never in the main be peopled 
by the white man as we understand the phrase. For say what soma 
mi^, the white does not thrive in regions characteristicaUy tropical 
and most of these 6,000,000 square miles are so. There are exoepUons, 
as considerable portions of Mexico and Central America, Venesuela, 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia are so high that such parts have what may 
be called a white man's climate. But even so it is not likely that the 
future inhabitants of these higher regions will differ largely in race 
characteristics from those now there. This fact is at the bottom of 
the Iberic-American question. It is that the races to the south of us 
differ essentially from the Anglo-Saxon in psychic qualities. 

I desire to say that what follows herein is not said in unkindly 
criticism or in unkindly spirit. I have an immense liking for the 
Spanish race wherever found; for its hospitable and generous character, 
for its beautiful family life, its dignity and courtesy. While there is 
something which they can learn from us, there is ver>' much for us to 
learn from them and I ^nsh that we might take this last fact very 
much to heart. 

It is part of our northern make-up (call it stupidity if you will, 
and you will not be far astray), that we view the mental habit of 
all other races as being akin to our own; that the Mexican, Peruvian, 
Braxilian will understand things political in exactly the sense 
that we do. There never was such a thing, for example, as a consti- 
tutional election in Mexico nor do one-tenth of 1 per cent of the Mei- 
ican people know what it means. How can they when a vote in a 
presidential election rarely exceeds 18,000? And how can it be other- 
wise when the upper class, say hut a fif teent h of the population , the only 
class with a semblance of niucation, is it.solf temperamentally unable 



Thv Annals of the American Academy 

to understand a constitutional government? They belong to a class 
tribal by instinct in whose very blood is unrest and inability to coalesce 
into a smgle req)on8ible government carried on on constitutional 
lines. The Spanish and Portuguese races to which the governing 
daases in all the republics to the south of us belong began as Berbers 
and remain essentially Berber-Moor today, scarcely changed at bot- 
tom from their relations across the straits in Morocco and the Atlas. 

It is this lack of comprehension of what race character means 
that causes our trouble. We do not understand the other man, and 
until we recognize our ignorance in this regard, until we accept the 
great fundamental fact of all life, — that every race, every species has 
its special race or specific temperament and habit of thought and 
action, — we shall be unsuccessful in our relations with these our brother 
republics. It is a study of temperament, disposition, outlook on life, a 
study in a word of all that goes to make up character that we need 
for successful dealing with races so essentially diflfcrent from our own. 
Until we shall see this, we are but groping darkly. 

And a word as to the use of the word "Iberic." It has become 
the fashion to speak of Latin- America. This is a phrase almost wholly 
misplaced. There is no "Latin** America in any true sense. There 
is an Iberic-America, and this confusion of terms has caused or has 
helped largely to cause, our confusion of thoughts. The Spaniards 
and Portuguese who settled with whites all to the south of us are not 
of Latin stock, though with some Latin intermixture. I would say 
again to accentuate the fact, that the ancient people of the Iberic 
peninsula which includes Spain and Portugal were, with the ex- 
ception of a remote Celtic strain, Iberians — Berbers — the same in race 
as the Berbers of today, of the African Atlas, akin to the Moor and in 
the distant ages to the Arab. Their occupancy of North Africa 
and of Spain is lost in the mists of history. 

The Greeks established a colony on the east coast of Spain as 
they did in so many other parts of the Mediterranean. The Cartha- 
genian, a Semite, came and took possession of the ports and exploited 
the mines of the region. The Romans expelled these in 206 B.C., 
and then took two hundred years in conquering the original inhabi- 
tants. They governed and admini8tere<l Spain until Rome herself 
fell before the barbarians, but they never colonized in the true sense. 
Roman governors and Roman armies occupied the country and im- 
pnswd upon the whole peninsula their power and language sufficiently 



i 



A Study or Ibbrio-Amsriga 7 

to develop the latiniMd Umguaces of the Spam and Portugftl ol today. 
Undoubtedly, too, there was a Uuie infueioii of Roman blood, aa waa 
but natural. In the long oceupailon of three hundred yean following 
the two hundred of conquest, Spain waa indeed a Roman province 
in a larger sense than almost any other lying beyond the oonfines of 
Italy, but the Goths, Vandals and Visigoths, who eame atop of the 
Romans were with the last all absorbed by the conquered Iberians aa 
were the Norman invaders of England by the English. The people of 
the Peninsula remained Iberian at bottom despite their many con- 
querors. This is markedly so of the south, diminishing somewhat 
toward the nortli, but always true. In Portugal later on came a 
strong negro strain through slaver}'. The negroes thus brought have 
thoroughly coalesced with the native Portuguese who seem never to 
have shown a dislike to so mixing. 

In 700, the Berbers from Africa crossed the straits and made 
an easy conquest, as it was but coalescing with people of their own 
blood. The kindred Moors lent a hand and the peninsula became 
Berber-Moor in dominion as in blood. The Africans swept over 
Spain with wonderful rapidity because of their kinship. For five 
hundred years they held all of Spain and for two hundred more its 
fairest portion, and when their dowTifall came it was mainly through 
difference of religion, Christianity having been brought by the in- 
vaders who followed the Romans; it did not come through essential 
difference of race. 

The tribal tendencies of the race are shown in the long continuance 
of the many separate kingdoms, thirteen in number, which constitute 
the Spain of today. Until the time of Ferdinand and Isabella they 
were largely independent and the largest was still Moorish. After 
the fall of Granada all the petty kingdoms were, in a way, united into 
one, but it was as the kingdom of Las Espafias, the Spains, and not a 
single unified Spain, and the country has always remained regional, 
as the Spanish expression goes.^ 

I have thought it well to give this little bit of history because in it 
lies the very root of our subject, the reason why the Spanish race 
wherever found is ready for revolution or insurrection. It is this Ber- 

. >For A more extended disoussion of this subject see Chadirick, R^U' 
tions of the United States and Spain. (Diplomacy), IntroducUoo. For the 
iDceptioQ and Development of the Monroe Doctrine, [bid., chapters ix 
and X. 



8 The Anxals of the American Academy 

ber-Moonsh blood winch has given it the tribal, separatist, regional in- 
stinct, or whatever one may call the tendency mentioned and which has 
made it impossible for the people of Spanish blood to understand a 
oentraliied constitutionalized government. That there is somewhat 

of this revolutionary and separatist instinct in the Portuguese 
through the mixture in Portugal of negro blood just mentioned 
which has given it softer characteristics, and in this is to be found the 
reason for the less revolutionary character of the Brazilians though as 
we know even from the present unrest in Brazil it is far from absent. 

Leaving Portuguese Brazil aside for the moment, the Spaniards 
through their superior qualities and education over those of the 
native and mixed races have naturally been the governing class of the 
Spanish-American provinces. They came among a mild, barbarous 
people whom they practically enslaved and who have remained till 
now almost without education or uplift in economic condition. They 
have remained as ignorant as the Spanish peasant himself remained for 
ages, the tool of warring factions in Spain as in Mexico, for be it re- 
membered that Spain through a great part of the nineteenth century 
was torn by revolution and factional slaughter as Mexico is today. 
Our minister to Spain, Caleb Gushing, of distinguished ability, wide 
observation and intimate knowledge of the country could say of 
Spain in a dispatch dated July 11, 1876, 

.... my reaidencc in Spain has enabled me to appreciate the true cause 
and character of administration in Cuba. 1 1 is that the governors are incapable 
of conducting and the governed equally incapable of receiving good govern- 
ment. They are all Spaniards alike, as General Prim has so often said, whether 
you call them Peninsulars or Cubans Now has there been maladmin- 
istration in Cuba? So there has been in Spain herself. Have there been rebel- 
hoQsin Cuba, guerrilla warfare, burnings, sacUiug of towns, military executions, 
deportationa, embargo of private property, banishments, suspension of suffrage, 
arbitrary domination of captains-general? So all these things have been occur- 
ring in Spain. She has had naught else for more than sixty years but alterna- 
tions between anarchy and despotism. 

And 80 he goes on, sa}dng near the end, "the misfortunes of Spain 
and of Cuba are conditions of the national character, as manifested 
alike in Spain and in all Spanish America." 

There spoke in this dispatch the true and candid statesman, 
one who recognized that the first element in international questions 
b knowledge of the character of those with whom you are dealing. I 



A Study or I bbrio America 9 

would, had I my way, have every newly appointed eecretan' of iUie 
read and ponder the inner meaning of thia diapateh. 

Now what lA to be the outooma of the preaent and proepccuve 
ronilitionB in UMTic-America? We aee two of the republica in South 
America which have arrived at marked stability, Argentina and Chila; 
to a leoMT degree, Brasil. There can be no queetkm that theae at 
leaat are on the road to greatneas. Greatest in area, at leaat, ia 
Braiil, a country a tenth Urger than the United States, with a popu- 
lation claimed to be 24,000,000 (but largely gueaa-work) or about three 
timea that of Argentina. Rut nine-tenths is within the tropica and 
with a climate but little modified in these nine-tenths by any marked 
elevation of land. Nearly a third of the whole population (7,280,000) 
is in the other tenth which extends from Rio de Janerio to Uruguay, 
and it is in this tenth that the whites largely predominate. It ia here 
that are to be found some 400,000 of Germans the product of an im- 
migration which has been continuous since 1820, and the greater num- 
ber of Italians who outnumber the Germans three to one. The 
Italians however are somewhat migratory, many returning yearly to 
Italy, as they do to a large degree in the United States. This habit 
of migration is even more frequent in Argentina where many thousanda 
of Spaniards and Italians travel yearly the 10,000 miles (to and fro) 
for the wheat harvest. 

About 3,000,000 square miles (or nine-tenths) of Brazil lie to 
the north of Rio de Janeiro which is just within the tropics. In thia 
vast region there are probably not over 14,000,000 people, or leas 
than five to the square mile, made up, with a very moderate number 
of pure whites, of various mixtures of white, negro and Indian blood. 
The state of Pahl with 443,903 square miles has but one inhabitant 
to the square mile. Amazonas with 732,439 square miles (approxi- 
mating three times the size of Texas), has a population of but about 
250,000, or but about one to every three square miles. Matto Groeso 
twice the size of Texas has but 118,000 population or about one to 
every five square miles. BraziFs best showing is San Paulo of 1 12,307 
aquare milee, and with a population of 2,282,279, or 20.3 to the square 
mile. To show how sparse this population is: New ESngland has 108 
to the aquare mile; the Middle Atlantic division (New York, New 
Jeraey and Pennsylvania), 193; the South Atlantic (Delaware to 
Florida inclusive), 45 to the square mile. One has to go to the Saharan 
regions to find any likeness to the sparsity of population in vaai 
stretches of Brasil. 



10 The Annals of the American Academy 

That there can be any reasonable approach to a republican sys- 
tem of government is of course impossible in a population where 80 
per cent can neither read nor write and where the cfTort to increase 
literacy is so slight that but only 634,000 children in a population 
claimed to be 24,000,000 are at school. Were there the same popu- 
lation at school as in the United States there would be about three 
and a half millions in actual school attendance instead of less than a 
fifth that number. Even the reported nimibers are very doubtful. 

Set between Brazil and Argentina is Uruguay a state a little 
larger than New England and with but a million and a half of popu- 
lation perhaps the most truly Spanish in character of any but Chile. 
As the actual number of immigrants coming to settle in the country is 
but about 6,000 a year and many of these are Spanish, it will long retain 
its Spanish character. So situated, between two much more powerful 
neighbors, there is much apprehension among Uruguayans as to the 
political future of their country. This is of course too delicate a sub- 
ject to discuss here and need only be mentioned. 

Argentina, as large nearly as the United States east of the Missis- 
sippi, with a splendid and magnificent capital of a million and a half 
of inhabitants, a population of 8,000,000, rapidly increasing and with 
great present and immense potential wealth, is bound to be one of the 
seats of empire. Nearly the whole is a vast plain bordered on the 
west by the Andes and their foothills and is akin in appearance though 
not in climate to the steppes of Russia. Its northern edge is just 
within the tropics; its capital is in the relative latitude of southern 
Tenneasee, and its southern limit in relatively that of the south edge 
of Hudson's Bay. But as one goes south the continent narrows until 
it is a narrow wedge between the two great oceans, and the climate 
beeomes that of Great Britain instead of that of Labrador. Into this 
vast region with but six inhabitants to the square mile have come to be 
added to the Spanish stock the blood of nearly 3,000,000 immigrants 
who came and stayed in the country from 1857 to 1911. In this last 
mentioned year came 117,723 Spaniards and 58,185 Italians, fully 60 
per cent of whom however came only for the harvests and then re- 
turned. But there were others many of whom stayed ; as 4,916 French, 
1,730 English, 16,694 Swiss, 23,450 Germans and 24,785 Austrians, 
besides Ssrians, Poles, Russians and many other nationalities in 
numbers. 
The inmiigration for 1910, 1911 and 1912 (the last returns avail- 



k 



A Study OF Ibbbio-Amxrica U 

able) waa 500^19; the emigration waa 388,496, or nearly 68 per cent 
of the entriea. The net gain in immigranta in theae three yean waa 
thus but 161,823. 

The population of the country will neoeaiarily be a mixture of 
many raoea. Fortunately it ia free of the negro problem which is auch 
a handicap to Bratil. But whatever the preponderant blood may be, 
Argentina by force of ita economic advanee and the eatabliahment 
of vaat commercial intcrt*8t8 wliich have been controlled by the Ger- 
mane and Engliah, haa long been out of the revolutionary pale, and is a 
aurpriaingly rich, stable and rapidly advancing commonwealth. 

The aame though on a smaller scale may be aaid of Chile, which 
with an area a fourth larger than France, ia a long narrow strip 
2,600 miles long and but a hundred broad, barred from any east- 
ward extenaiona by the Andea. The northern third is a deaert rieh 
however in copper and nitrates; the central third remarkably like 
California in climate and general character; the south like Scotland. 
Again the EInglish and Germans are to the fore conmierdally though 
sixty yeara ago the American Wheelwright was the great promoter 
of Chilian advance, a fact which Chile has recognised in erecting a 
statue to his memory. Ethnically Chile is mainly Spanish with a 
strong Engliah and German strain. In the south are still a hundred 
tliousand of Aruacanian Indians, who now peaceful were never con* 
quered. The whole population is less than 4,000,000, and as the 
immigration is but about 2,000 a year, it will be long before there 
will be much racial change. Twenty-five years has passed ainee 
the revolution due to the liberalising ideas of the Balmaoeda govern- 
ment. The revolution was at bottom moved by much the aame 
ideas as those which are causing Mexican unrest. Madero waa a 
Mexican Balmaceda. Both were the victims of their liberal ideaa 
which continue dimly today in Mexico where the vast ignorant maaa 
follows leaders, some of whom are almost equally ignorant, in the dim 
hope of alleviation, in some way, of their unfortunate lot. 

Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venesuela are all in the category 
of states with a cultivated society of Spaniah deaoent, moderate in 
number and who in general are responsible for the g o v ern m ent and 
conditions of the countr>\ But in the nmin the population of theee 
ia of an Indian and mixed race inert in character, densely ignorant and 
of extreme oonaer\'atiam. Though we are dealing with great atreichea 
it is with populations comparatively insignificant in numbers. Peru 



12 Thi Annals of the American Academy 



is nearly thrif and a half times the size of the German Empire; Colom- 
bia twice the sire of Germany and Venezuela nearly three times, Ecua- 
dor but a half. The populations are: in Peru less than three millions, 
in Ecuador one and a quarter, in Colombia about five and in Vene- 
luela probably about a million and a half. That the Panama Canal 
will have a great effect upon the regions west of the Andes is un- 
doubted, but it will be long before they are built into powerful states, 
with the exception perhaps of Chile. 

Bolivia, but little less in area than three Germanys, with a mixed 
and Indian population of two and a quarter millions, and Paraguay 
the equal of three New Yorks, and with but 800,000, people, are 
practically Indian or semi-Indian states. The latter in its struggle 
against the combined forces of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina in 
1805 and 1866 lost so heavily that it is estimated that there are in the 
country but about a fourth as many men as women. It is thought that 
about 30,000 European immigrants have settled in the country in the 
last 32 years or an average of 1,000 a year. 

We may pass by Central America whose population is made up 
much as that of its neighbors, and come to Mexico. The Almanack 
de Golha, as reliable an authority as any existing, gives for the popu- 
lation in 1912 as 15,445,787. It also gives the nationalities of for- 
eigners within its borders in 1910 as follows: Americans 19,586, 
Spaniards 24,212, French 3,971, English 4,771, Italians 2,068, Ger- 
nians 3,645, Turks 2,563, Chinese 12,769, Japanese 1,922, Arabs 1,338, 
Cubans 2,394, Guatemalans (who can scarcely be looked upon as for- 
eigners), 21,302 — a total of 105,544. In other words as these are 
the totals of those established in the country through many years, 
there is practically no emigration to Mexico. 

But what concerns us more: how are the 15,400,000 Mexicans 
made up? In spite of larger claims, I doubt if more than 1,000,000 
are of pure Spanish blood; the other 14,000,000 and more are Indians 
and cross-breeds in all degrees, who taken generally are perhaps more 
ignorant, immoral, lazy and intemperate than any other 14,000,000 
in the world. As the appropriation for schools is but about three and 
a half millions in American money it is readily seen that the great 
mass go without any education whatever. And this mass is in a state 
of peonage scarcely removed from slavery. It is perhaps the greatest 
minion field in the world, and perhaps the most neglected. I use 
the word mission not in the sense of a reUgious propaganda, but in that 



L 



A Study of Ibkric-Aioduoa IS 

dt edueational, moral and hygienic uplift. The attempt to plant in 
Mexico at thia period of iU development, our Protestant ideaa of 
Christianity, would I believe result in utter failure and would be a sad 
mis-spending of money which would be much better used in teaching 
the a b c's of civiliiation and leaving them to their present reUgkm 
which, in its way, is ingrained in the people. Upon such uplift de- 
|)eudM in large degree our own safety. The staggering quf«tion is 
how to bring this uplift ubout. The impulse muKt come from 
without, apparently it cannot come from within "this poor and 
intensely ignorant mass." 

The stem facts seem to be as I have stated. I would refer to the 
ImmigraHan ProbUm by Messrs. Jenks and Lauch who were members 
of the United States Immigration Commission and who have pot 
forth a sunmiary of the report of that conmiission, in which they take 
a very disheartening view of Mexican immigrants to this country. 
They state that they engage practicaUy only in unskilled work; their 
wages in the railway work are the lowest paid; very few become fore- 
men; th^ can care only for eight acres of beets as against eleven by 
the Japanese; their standard of living the lowest, their lack of thrift 
the greatest of any immigrants; they learn English slowly; the attend- 
ance at school and intelligence of the children are much less than the 
average; they are likely to become public charges; they are quarrel- 
some and inclined to crime; they are leas desirable as citixens even 
than as laborers; their progress is much slower than that of Japanese 
or Chinese. 

A competent observer, Mr. A. W. Warwick, in a very sober 
and thoughtful article on the Mexicans in the Forum for January 
says: 

The pbenominal growth of Mexico from 1900 to 1910 waa not in any leiiM 
due to the progreee of the Mexicans. There was no improvement in agricul- 
tural methods and from the Rio Grande to Yucatan there was not, so far as I 
am aware, a single railroad, factory, or irrigation project foatered by purely 
Mexican capital and designed and executed by Mexican engineers. Furthsr, 
in spite of the long period of instruction by foreigDera it is safe to say that thft 
Mexican engineers and workmen could not efficiently operate the railroadi, 
•leetrio light works, smelters or factories of the country if all the fomgasfs 
were withdrawn.* 



t A W WmrwWlr F.>ru,« January. 1914, p. 4&. 



k 



14 Tm Annals of thr Aiikrican Academy 

The aame writer states that: 

A high aulhortty wan very probably correct when he stated that between 
IOmmI &5 per cent of all births in the republic were outside marriage relations. 
In MNDe atatet the figures arc much higher, in Hidalgo it was 80 per cent; in 
MicboAcaii it waa 75 per cent, and in this same state the district of Zamora was 
eredited with no \em than 93.6 per cent of illegitimate births. Astonishing as 
theie figures are they are entirely worthy of credence. Out Hide the iari^cr towns 
prolMbly 95 per cent of the people would l)e illiterate.' 

This writer sums up the Mexican people as follows: 

1. Mainly of Indian ty|M\ 

2. Illiterate. 

3. Mainly of illegitimate birth. 

4. Inefficient as \v»irk«'rs. 

5. Intemperat<\ 

6. Quarrelsome. 

As long as the people have their present characteristics civil war will be 
more normal than p(*ace and good order .... although there may be 
peace enforced by an iron hand for a few years, the seething forces underneath 
the superficial crust of a commercial and land aristocracy will have their day, 
and it seems inevitable that the Mexican of this generation will live in short 
periods of peace frequently broken by more or less prolonged civil war.^ 

I think the situation is here exactly described. There is an aris- 
tocracy of a certain amount of culture, but itself of a blood which 
means unrest; and in the hands of this aristocracy is nearly all the 
land of the country, some of the estates running to thousands of 
square miles. Below this is a great seething mass largely of another 
blood and temperament, with nothing to aspire to because it does 
not know what aspiration means, but it knows in a dull way that it 
is treated badly and that it wants something better. The Mexican 
periodical unrests are in fact fundamentally agrarian with half- 
conscious efforts to become citizens instead of slaves. The great 
landed class has, as a class, never given a thought to the uplift of 
this mass of misery into citizenship, decency and well beijig. Cer- 
tainly any true effort cannot, as just said, come from these poverty 
stricken ignorant millions. The situation, unless there should be 
developed a lofty patriotism and an almo.st impossible altruism 

* Tbid., p. 41. 

• fbid. 



A Study or Ibbric-Ambrica IS 

amoiiK the great luiidownerM and the rich of Mexico (of which one 
.scarcely seeii a sign), appeara almost hopelem. For such a condi- 
tion one muKt hark back to the Dark Agm or to the Ruioiia of 
Ki'iicrationH nince. And back of ail thirt there utill remaimi lower- 
ing gloomily the greater queKtion as to the posstbility of real de- 
velopmont in the Astec and other Indian racee of Mexico. The 
Indian of ( entral and South America is even more stolid and un- 
adaptable, tM) that wo are in face of one of the great problems with 
no Holution in sight The only one that I can imagine in that he 
and hin low mentality may disappear in the melting pot of a great 
immignition. 

Brasil north of Rio de Janeiro (and I would recall that this 
means a region an large as the United States), is another and even 
more difficult pro!)lem. This va^t region will finally and in- 
evitably be peopleil with a mixture in which the Indian and negro 
will predominate. From this there is no escape. The great basin 
of the Amason with its many gigantic tributaries is a region in 
which the white man may live, but in which he can never thrive. 
This statement in my opinion is beyond question. The hope of 
Brazil lies in its great southern plateau, a region as large as the states 
of California, Oregon and Wa.shington combined and in which the 
chief part of the population, rapidly increasing by immigration 
chiefly Italian, is white. Whether the colored race mixture of the 
north shall in the very distant future develop better qualities than 
those of the Mexican is extremely questionable. Neither the South 
American Indian nor the negro has in him constructive statesman- 
ship. Hayti and Liberia are concrete examples of this truth applied 
to the negro if proof be needed, and surely the mixture of the two 
or of the two with the white to the extent that the last is probable, 
will scarcely give any better. It is very probable that the true Afri- 
can will find in northern Brazil a field of emigration, though the 
present chances are that he will select the United States unless in 
our immigration laws we couple Africa with Asia. Already some 
50,(XX) negroes of alien birth have entered the United States; the 
Cape Verde negro of truest black is coming into New Elnghmd by 
the thousands. These islands are but three hundred miles from the 
African coast, and the day is very near when this fever of tadgnr 
tion will reach the Congo region. Our apathy on this subject is a 
thing I fail to comprehend. We see the effect of the mbcture of 



16 The Annals of the American Academy 

the white and negro races, not alone in Portugal but in Naples, Sicily 
and Morocco. If one nhould wish to know the result in Portugal, 
he should read an article in the Nineteenth Century and After for 
January, 1914.* Whatever the good qualities of the negro, I do 
not think that anyone will claim that his mixture with the white 
will improve the latter, but it is this mixture which we face as surely 
as the sun rises and sets. It is only a question in the long run of 
peroeotage. This I hold should not be allowed to increase by the 
new African immigration already in progress. If wc have not cour- 
age to stop this our decadence has begun. I mention these facts 
of deep significance though they are not in over-close relation to our 
subject, for the earnest consideration of those who wish that our 
own shall not be a negroid people. 

It is sufficiently clear that the whole of this hemisphere to the 
south is peopled b}^ races essentially different from our own ; that the 
ruling element is I bene in blood (Spanish and Portuguese), becoming 
modified somewhat by numerous additions chiefly Italian and Span- 
ish, but with many of nearly all European and some Asiatic peoples; 
that three at least have grown into rich, important and potentially 
powerful nationalities with stable governments. The Monroe Doc- 
trine certainly does not apply to these as in the time of Monroe 
when they were weak provinces of Spain and Portugal, and when 
the Holy Alliance which had taken over the regulating of the con- 
tinent of Europe threatened to extend its power to reduce to 
the dominion of Spain the feeble provinces which had declared 
their independence. One can scarcely imagine more different situ- 
ations than those of 1823 and today. To apply this doctrine in 
the sense of standing by as a protector is naturally an irritant to a 
people in whom pride is a predominant characteristic. We know that 
intimation of such an attitude does irritate. Thus if we desire friend- 
ship, good fellowship and kindly feeling, why hold to an attitude of 
irritation and prevent this very desirable kindly feeling? I certainly 
can see no reason for it. No European or other power is ever going 
to attack Argentina, Brazil or Chile with any idea of establishing 
dominion over thfiin. Such a thing is not within the possible. As 
for Venezuela, Colombia, the Central American states and Mexico, 
these border the Caribbean and for our own purposes of defense we 

» Fr»nci« McCullmgh, "Portugal, the Nightmare Republic." 



A Study or Ibmric-Ambrica 17 

shall never peacefully permit the incorporation by a foraisD power 
of these or any part of the neighboring Pacific comU. The oeoea- 
sity of holding intact the Panama Canal would foroe this attitude 
upon UA did no Monroe Doctrine eiitt 8uoh a policy b by the 
fact of the Panama Canal wholly independent of the Monroe Doc- 
trine. Nor is it poanble that the United States would erer denre 
to incorporate any of these regions. The immensely wide differ- 
ences of race, temperament and character would forbid this even if 
principle were thrown to the winds. For this country to incorporate 
these great spaces with such different populations could only end m 
the overthrow of our Rystem which is wholly unfitted for such a test 
failed; wc 8hould much more surely fail. There is, if I know 
ig of the American people, a strong and deep feeling against 
anything Ravoring of such adventure. Had it been otherwise an 
American army would have been in occupation of Mexico many 
months since. 

I do not sec that there is any wish on our part to play the r61e 
in .\merica of the Holy Alliance in Europe. Tliere can belittle 
doubt that the three f^rcater powers of South America would unite 
against any real foreign aggression. A true reading of the Monroe 
I>>rtrine today would thus be in such case to act as a friendly 
fourth power, as an equal among equals. To assume more would 
defeat our own purposes which, as I have said, I take to be the es- 
tablishment of friendly and more intimate relations among the 
.American republics. 

And let us not forget the subject of manners. From the South 
^ ' point of view we have none, and he is not far from right. 

I n some degree what I mean I would have every one read 
chapter XII of Mr. Charles Macomb Flandrau's most capital book, 
Viva Mexico. We send abroad too many such as he there describes, 
who seem to think that in a foreign country reserve and propriety 
are useless restrictions. The conduct of persons of undoubted good 
standing at home but too often gives one the impression that our 
$400,000,000 spent yeariy on our public schools is spent to very small 
purpoee if a better result be not obtained than that Mr. FUndrau 
describes, and which I am sure he does not exaggerate, for I know 
of worse in much more highly placed of our countrymen than such 
as he mentions. 

Many have looked upon our a«t .-n m liter years m ."nuiIo 



18 The Annals of the American Academy 

Domingo and in some of the Central American states as exceeding 
that which is proper and just. I do not see it in this light. If we 
want prece<lent wc need but look to Europe. I do not pretend to 
justify all or any that the Holy Alliance caused to Imj done in the 
suppreiwion of revolution in Naples, Piedmont and Spain and still 
less lis thought of reducing to Spanish dominion Spain's revolted 
American provinces. Its whole action under the domination of Met- 
temich was hateful. But the action of the Powers in the Greek 
revolution, and in latter years in Crete, of England in Egypt, all 
of which worked for good, and the many cases of interference which 
might be cited which sometimes do not deserve praise are ample 
precedent for such action as we ourselves have taken and which has 
thus been correct diplomatically and has been equally correct ethic- 
ally. It has not been stamped in anywise with selfish interest, but 
has been in the interest of general well-being and most particularly 
of the regions specially concerned. 

Referring again to the Panama Canal we must take into ac- 
count a fact not generally recognized: which is that the canal does 
not bring us commercially nearer to the east coast of South America. 
The great wall of the Andes will always be a barrier to trans-con- 
tinental traffic. There is, it is true, a railway from Argentina to the 
Pacific and in time there may be others across the great range, so 
much more difficult of passage than the Alps, but it will be long 
before they will be in a position to make it preferable to transport 
cargoes between the United States and Argentina and Brazil to 
sending it by sea around Cape St. Roque, though in so doing ships 
must go 2,400 nautical miles east of the longitude of New York. 
The immensely greater convenience and cheapness of water transpor- 
tation will long hold us to the all-sea route from our own ports to 
those of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina which are our chief South 
American customers. An able authority* estimates the cost of land 
carriage as twenty times that by sea; it is thus evident that bulk 
will never be broken so long as the sea will serve. 

As these countries are so much more closely bound to Europe 
by race ties and by the habits, social and commercial, of genera- 
tions, it will require much effort, much tact, a much greater study 
of u.«ia4res and language and a cultivation of much better manners 

* Uibflon Bowles, Sea Law and Sea Power. 



A Study or IbkricvAmkrica 19 

than we unually fthow, baiidet the astablifiiiment of thoroughly good 
diplomatic aiul oonMular aerviooi to obtain an equal footing with our 
European rivalii. 

I repeat that above all else I would pUce the study of the tern* 
peramentM, the piyohios of the South American. In surh Mtudy b 
the crux not alone of thii but of every international problem, or 
of any problem oonoemed with the conduct of men, for in the 
Ktudy of pitychics lies the ittudy of the problem of all human thought 
and action. We have certainly ignored this as far at least as the 
South American Is concerned almost in (oto. It is time we were 
taking another course and knowing something of the soul of other 



L 



THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Bt Rear-Adiiiral Colby N. Chester, U.S.N., 
WaflbingtoD, D. C. 

The Munr. . D.Miriiif is the cardinal principle of the foreign 
policy of the I lui. »1 Suites. It has been so construed for nearly one 
hundred years of our national history, and it so remains today, in 
spite of some statements that have been made to the contrary. ''It 
is," as Jefferson said, ''the offspring of the American revolution and 
the most momentous question offered to my contemplation since the 
Independence." When promulgating the doctrine as the basis of 
our foreign policy, President Monroe said in his message to Congress, 
December 2, 1823: 

It i« LmpoMible that the allied powers (of Europe) should extend their 
poUUcal syatem to any portion of either continent without endangering our 
pesM aod happioess, nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left 

to tbemtelvet, would adopt it of their own accord We owe it, 

therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United 
Statae and thoee Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on 
Uieir part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as danger- 
out to our peace and safety. 

Two distinct and far reaching principles are laid down in the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. The first is the principle of ' ' self-defense. ' ' Self-preser- 
vation is the first law of nature, and it is the first law of nations. In 
the case of the United States the national defense required, when the 
doctrine was enunciated, that the country should hold a protectorate 
throughout the entire western continent. The second principle is that 
South American republics, which followed our lead in declaring their 
independence, should have our protection in maintaining this doc- 
trine for themselves. As Secretary Bayard once said: "The United 
States proclaimed themselves the protector of the western world in 
which she was the strongest Power," as "it was manifest," said his 
suoceesor Mr. Olney, "that it was the only power on this hemisphere 
capable of enforcing the doctrine." 

The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine — self-preservation — 
is a xi o m atic and inimutable, and all other considerations uiust give 

20 



Prbbbnt Status or the Mohrob Docnuini 31 

way to it. The second piindpie, iike the const uuuun of a oountry, 
is amenable to chaofss or amendments that will bring it into aeeoid 
with new conditions that may arise in the country. The quesCkm 
now is, therefore, do the same conditions prevail on the western eoa- 
tinent today, that existed at the time Prerident Monroe sent his mes- 
sage to Congress in 18287 

There have been so many different interpreutiooB pUced upon 
the Monroe Doctrine, by theorists and others, who know but little of 
its practical applications, that it is necessary to recall a little of iU 
history in order to obtain a clear understanding of the subject. In 
the early twenties of the last century, the whole of Europe became 
alarmed at the unsettled political outlook caused by the American 
and French revolutions, which had shaken every throne on the conti- 
nent, and bid fair to undermine monarchieal government. Three of 
the great powers, Russia, Prussia and France (once again a kingdom), 
' "^ nned what is known as the ''Holy Alliance,'' on account of 
>iamon religious affiliation, for the purpose of 8ta>ing the tide 
of freedom which threatened to overwhelm them. They then pre- 
pared to recapture the South and Central American republics, whieh 
had recently severed their connection with Spain, and make them 
appendages to European monarchies. England was, at the time, 
the only constitutionally governed country in Europe, and fearing 
that tlie " balance of power " between the European states might again 
be disturbed by such a combination, she, with no desire to promote re- 
publican institutions, however, proposed an alliance with the United 
States. Naturally neitlier countr>' could harmonize its views on such 
a matter, and no political combination was formed, but an understand- 
ing was reached that England would not interfere with any actioii 
that America might take in the matter, thus giving her quasi approval 
to the message sent to Congress by President Monroe. Had it 
become necessary for the United States to take any overt action, 
at that time, in support of the Monroe Doctrine, this countr>' would 
have had the moral support at least of the British government; but 
we now could hope for no aid from that country, and it is doubtful, 
indeed, if we could count on the approval of the Latin Americans, for 
whom, more than for ourselves, the doctrine was established, unless 
we harmonise some of our conflicting interests with them. 

We should not fail to remember that the South American repub- 
lics were in tlieir infancy at the time the Monroe Doctrine was de- 



22 Trb Annals op thb American Academy 

dared, and were struggling for freedom against great odds. The 
I'nited States proclaimed herself the protector of the western world 
as a matter of necessity, for without her aid the newly formed repub- 
lics were helpless to battle against the great odds opposing tiiem. The 
declaration of the Monroe Doctrine constituted, therefore, the most 
significant and decisive act towards guaranteeing the independence 
of all the American states that could have been devised. It produced 
the prompt recognition of the infant republics of South America by 
the li^ £>M«H- in 1823, and performed a service for Great Britain her- 
sdf , of which Canning, the secretary of British foreign affairs, said : 
" I have brought out a new world in order to reestablish the equilib- 
rium of the old." 

The question today, as far as our own national defense is con- 
cerned is, would it be a menace to interests centered so far away as 
the United States, if a European power, whose political and even 
religious aspirations may be the same as our own, should attempt to 
acquire territory in Argentina for instance? Such an assault would 
of course affect the interests of that country, but should the United 
States attempt to interfere in the matter unless asked by Argentina 
to aid her in throwing ofif the menace that assailed her? In case of 
assisting her we would become her ally, and probably one of many 
powers that might join with her in resisting the attack. It would seem, 
now that the continent is cut in twain by the construction of the 
Panama Canal neutralizing if not destroying the value of the old 
trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans via Cape Horn, 
that it would have no material effect on the ^' vital" interests of the 
United States, if a forcible attempt should be made by some European 
power to take one of the Argentine islands, situated at the extreme 
end of the continent. It is such changed conditions in the politi- 
cal relations with our South American brethren as this, that call for 
some new arrangements concerning the application of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 

The principle tliat the affected country had paramount im- 
portance in its own affairs, unless they related to interests of a com- 
bination of which she was a part, was admitted by President Cleve- 
land, in his celebrated message sent to Congress in 1895, commonly 
known as the " Venezuela case. * ' In this message he stated (with some 
logical defect, 1 think, as far as Venezuela is concerned, as I shall 
WOT to show later on), that if that country wished to sell any 



PRB8BN1 Status or thb Moiibob Docnuini 33 

portion of her territory to Great Britain, she had a perfect rifbi to do 
BO, and the United StatM had no right to interfere in the matter. 
ThiB prindple might ^ply to Argentina, at the preeent time, but 
such an act of aeUing a portion of her territory to a European etate 
would not have been tolerated by the United States in 1823, under 
any circumstances; for Mr. Monroe then said in no uncertain words, 
that, "any attempt on their part (Europeans) to extend their system 
to any porUon of this hemisphere (would be) dangerous to our peace 
and safety." 

On account of changed conditions in South America at the present 
time, there is a growing disposition on the part of some well informed 
Americans to limit the territorial extent to which the Monroe Doc- 
trine should apply to the states that lie to the northward of the AmBr 
zon River ; but such a limitation would be met with difficulties surpass- 
ing, in my opinion, those we should attempt to escape. By holding 
a protectorate over this restricted field only, we throw out of consid- 
eration all fellowship with the states to the southward of this line of 
demarcation, at once causing jealousies among the larger and more 
important of the South American republics, making them enemies 
of our defensive policy as selfish in its nature, and would most likely 
tend to add their moral support to our many commercial rivals and 
antagonists. 

Leading statesmen of Brazil and other South American republics 
have declared that the Monroe Doctrine is discredited in the re- 
publics for whose benefit it was devised, not that they do not appre- 
ciate the good intentions of the United States, but they deny the 
right of this nation to appoint itself a guardian over their welfare. 
A doctrine founded upon the principle laid down by James Monroe, 
but giN-ing the right of a protectorate to the powers in general and 
not to any country in particular, would be the ideal doctrine, in 
the belief of the people of Latin America. 

As exemplifying the interests and aspirations of the South Amer- 
icans in this connection I would relate the following: 

On the 15th day of November, 1894, the fifth year of the foundation of the 
republic of Brmsil, in the presenoe of the representatives of the prineipal Amer- 
ican republics, including the United States, was laid in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, the eomer stone of a monument to American solidarity. Under this 
Btonc this official record lies: "The monument which will be ereeled oo this 
spot in which this stone is laid, and which will symbolise the political union of 



L 



24 The Annals or the American Academy 

the different naiioni of the coDtineni of Columbus, will be surmounted by the 
figure of JaiDM Monroe, author of the celobratod doctrine known by his name, 
which teaches that the nations of the new continent should unite for the pur- 
pote of preventing any undue interference of the nations of Europe in the in- 
ternal affairs of America. Around the principal figure will be grouped the great 
national liberatore of America, Washington, Jefferson, Juarez, Toussaint 
L'OuTerture, Bolirar, Jose Bonifacio and Benjamin Constant." 

I give you this incident and picture to study in contrjist with 
another view depicting the scowling faces of many South Americans, 
frona whom we are just now seeking commercial advantages, who 
spurn the foreign policy of the United States as it now stands, shun 
ito oommercial policy and belittle its domestic policy. 

No, it were better in my opinion, to maintain the original juris- 
diction of the Monroe Doctrine, but to recognize the fact that many 
of the twenty other American republics are no longer the weaklings 
they were when the policy was formulated, unable to defend them- 
selves, but are now strong enough to share in the common defense 
of the continent, and act in consonance with them in maintaining 
the political rights of all. 

We cannot, however, with propriety form an "alliance," for that 
word has been tabooed by an unwritten law of the land; but we can 
engage in an "entente," as foreigners call it, with the republics of 
South America that will give them a share in the responsibility of 
maintaining a policy which looks to the general good of all parties 
concerned. 

Let us form then, not an alliance, but a "concert of action" after 
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, similar to that established 
in Ehirope for the support of the doctrine kno^^^l, there, as "the bal- 
ance of power," which \^nll show that all the states interested hold 
the same opinion regarding this doctrine. The moral effect of such 
an "entente" will be sufficient to stay the hand of any European 
nation, which may seek political annexation of American territory. 

Aside from all considerations of our own self-interests, should 
the United States arrogate to herself the right to dictate a policy to 
the Latin-American states, which concerns their vital interests quite 
as much as our own, and which they resent as "bossism," now so 
universally abhorred, and which is belittling to their self-respect? 
Should we not, on the other hand, urge such powerful nations as 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and such others as may be useful to the 
cause, whenever they may be able to maintain stable governments 



Prkskn't Status of thb Mojthoe DocTRnm 25 

for a mifiicient length of time to warrant it, lo join wiiii ua in carrying 
out a general policy tliat it of mutual advantage to all republioe on the 
continent? Call this part of our international policy by the name oC 
the Monroe Doctrine, if you will, or by the term "America for the 
Americans/' which will probably better please our confreres in the 
south, and at the same time l>e in accord with the general principle 
of the Monroe Doctrine. 

Having made a compact with the South American republics as 
suggested the United States would be in a better position to devote 
attention to thoee matters which more especially affect her inter- 
et)t8 at home and in nearby states, where foreign aggresrion would 
jeopardize its vital interests. 

There is a field, in which the intereeus ot the Lmteii btatcji as 
far as they relate to the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine — 
* st'lf-preservation" — ^are paramount, the protection of which cannot 
^ ^ * ith any other nation. This district comprises the coun- 
•utiguous or adjacent to our own, bordering on the Carib- 
Im an Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. The right of the United States to 
protect these countries from foreign aggression has been recognised 
in many ways by European countries, and the protection of "the 
father of republics" has been called for, and accepted so many times, 
as to establish this policy of the American government as an inalien- 
able right. Notable instances were when the United States drove the 
French out of Mexico in 1865, and again when Spain was forced to 
Rive up her control in Cuba in 1898. 

But aside from the fact that "self-protection,'' the basic prin- 
ciple of the Monroe Doctrine, compels the United States to take 
cognisance of the political affairs of Mexico, the Central and South 
American countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Carib- 
Uan Sea, we have assumed an obligation here in behalf of the interests 
of the whole world, that makes it imperative that these oountries 
and seas shall be under the supervision of the United States, and we 
have also by treaty stipulated that no other country shall share in 
this protectorate. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and the one 
recently made with Panama confirming its main features, the United 
States agrees, not only that the American "canal shall be free and 
open to the vessels of conuneroe and of war of all nations," but, 
guarantees that "the canal shall never be blockaded nor abaU any 
right of war be CKerciaed nor any hostility be committed within it 



26 The Annalb of thb American Acadbmt 

The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such 
militao' police along the canal as shall be necessary to protect it 
against law lo a sne aB and disorder.'' This is a most sweeping assump- 
tion of respomnbility, and the fact b the United States cannot protect 
the world's interests in the Panama Canal, without maintaining 
naval control of the seas that wash her shores on the south, as well 
as holding supervision of the foreign relations of the countries bor- 
dering on those seas. 

The Caribbean Sea holds the base of the American fleet at 
CtU!intanamo, Cuba, and its advance base at Culebra, Porto Rico. 
In fact all the essentials for properly defending the canal lie in the 
region covered by its waters and those of the Gulf of Mexico. For 
all military pur})ose8, therefore, these seas must be considered "The 
greater Panama Canal Zone," and the naval policy of the United 
States the only guide to perfect peace within their limits. 

In defending the continental policy of "America for the Amer- 
icans" the United States will have ample cause for keeping up an 
efficient navy, and to protect the seven thousand miles of coast line, 
including "the greater Panama Canal zone," she will need every 
ship that our non-military people will authorize to be constructed. 

It has been well said that the Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the 
navy of the United States, and in view of the fact that our country- 
men insist on maintaining but a small navy as compared with those 
that might be brought against it in combination, our people should 
avoid creating enemies, who might be tempted, in order to protect 
their own interests, to form an alliance with more power than we could 
bring to bear against them. In this connection I would recall the visit 
of Senator Root to South America in 1906, which, at the time, pro- 
duced a friendly feeling between the North and South Americans, 
that lately has been greatly augmented by the forceful presence of his 
then chief, President Roosevelt, in that country. The sojourn of 
these two greatest of American statesmen in the South, has done more 
to cement the ties of fellowship between the two sections of the conti- 
nent than anything that has occurred in the political lives of its 
people in many years. Dr. Edward Everett Hale once said of the 
first visit, that it was the most important event that had taken place 
in the history of the country during the first decade of the century, 
not excepting the peace of Portsmouth, and nothing has yet arisen 
in the second decade, which, I believe, will have greater influence in 

I 



Pbmbnt Status op the Monbob DocTRoni 27 

HtrcnKthening this feeling than the expedition of Colonel Rooee- 
velt to South Ameriea. Ae this Ust oeeaeion took pUoe el a iif- 
nificantly opportune moment, just before the opening of the Ptoama 
Canal, when we are about to inaugurate a new departure in our 
foreign trade relations, its commerdal value is very important. 

Let the United States follow up these auspidous visits of our 
countrymen to the Southland, and, in the words of the Hon. John 
Barrett, director of the Pan-American Union, "take advantage of 
the opening of the Puiama Canal, to signalise formally, as it were, 
the beginning of a new Pan-American era in which the Monroe Doc- 
trine, which rcpreeents the dictum of one government in the family 
of natjons, shall evolve into a greater Pan-American doctrine, which 
shall represent the mutual interest and protection of all/' 

It is better to make friends than to build guns. 



I 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO HAITI 

Bt William A. MacCorkle, 
Former Governor of Weet Virginia. 

Tbb Orioinal Monrob Doctrine 

In tlie ditcuaiioDS to which this interest has given rise and in the arrange- 
maoli by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for 
■■•nrtinc, aa a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States 
are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent con- 
dition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be con- 
as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers. 



The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this 
respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which ex- 
ists in their respective Governments; and to the defence of our own, which has 
been aehieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the 
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which wc have enjoyed 
unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to 
candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and 
powers to declare that wc should consider any attempt on their part to 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Govern- 
ments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose 
independ e nc e we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowl- 
edfsd, W9 eould not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, 
or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in 
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward 

the United SUtes. 

• • • * 

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of 
the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless 
remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of 
its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government 
for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations 
by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of 
every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those conti- 
nents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impos- 
sible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any por- 

28 



Mmnom Dootbinb as Appusd to Haiti 



lion of either continent without eDdancering our peace and 

any one believe that our aouthem brethren, if left to thnmanlm. would adopt 

it of their own aeeord. 

• • • • 

PreMident Rooaevelt*M int«rpreUUon of the later doctrine: 



We must recognise the fact that in Mcne South Aiserieao eouatriea thart 
haa been much vuapicion leet we fthould tntorpret the Bloofoo Doeirioa aa in 
MXDa way inimical to their intereata, and we muit try to eoOTiaoe all tha oCbar 
nation* of the continent once and for all that no ju«t and orderly go y anu aeot 
haa anything to fear from us. There are certain republiea to the aouth of ua 
which have already reached suoh a point of stability, order, and proaperity, 
that they theroielvaa, though aa yet hardly consoioucly, are among the guar- 
antnni of this Doctrine. Theee republics we now meat not only on a baaia of 
entire m|iiAlitv, but in a spirit of frank and reapaetful friandabip which we 
hope I ' If nil the republics to the south of us will only grow aa thoce 

to will . lo have already Rrown, all need for us to be the especial cham- 

pions of the doctrine will disappear, for no stable and growing American 
republic wishes to see some great non-American military power acquire terri- 
tory in its neighborhood. All that this country desires is that the other 
republics on tho continent shall be happy and prosperous; and they cannot 
l>e happy and prosperous unless they maintain order within their boundariaa 
and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward outsiders. It 
must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use 
tho Monroo Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression. We deaira paaea 
with all the world, but perhaps most of all with the other peoples of the 
\inerican continent. There are of course limits to the wrongs which any self- 
•*8|)octinK nation can endure. It is alwa>'s possible that wrong actions toward 
t his nation, or towards citiscns of this nation, in some state unable to keep 
•r<ier among itn own people, unable to secure justice from outsiders, and un- 
A illing to do justice to those outsiders who treat it well, may result in our hav- 
ing to take action to protect our rights; but such action will not be taken with 
a view to territorial aggression, and it will be taken at all only with extreme 
reluctance and when it has become evident that every other reaouroe has been 
exhausted. 

Tbb Lodob Rbsolution 

Resolvc<l, that when any harbor or other place in the American continents 
in BO situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military pur^MMcts might 
threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Qovom- 
ment of the United States could not see, without grave concern, the poasesnoo 
of such harbor or other plaoe by any corporation or association which haa aueh 
a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government 
practical power of oontrol for national purpoaea 

That the Monroe Doctrine made its ap|)arcnt advent in the his- 
tory' of nations so late as the time of the President of that name, has, 



80 Ths Aktnalb of tvb American Academy 

to a certain extent, diminiahed its importance as a part of the funda- 
mental and international life in the thought of the nations of the world. 
Whilst this doctrine did not form part of the written law of this coun- 
tfy, still it originated in the ver>' life of the American Republic, and 
is not, as a matter of truth, the doctrine of President Monroe but 
rather the doctrine which was part of the actual life of this republic 
in ita inception. It was enunciated as a foundation proposition of 
our government by Washington, was interpreted and insisted upon 
as part of our fundamental life by Jefferson, and finally upon the his- 
toric occasion, established as the Monroe Doctrine. 

Writers are fond of frequently repeating the statement that 
the Monroe Doctrine is not part of the international code, but that 
it is merely a policy of this government and only so understood in the 
law of nations. Whilst this may be the thought among other nations, 
the Monroe Doctrine is as absolutely part of the life of this republic, 
in its dealings with the nations of the world, as any doctrine of inter- 
national law expressed and published as such by the nations of the 
world. It is fundamentally the Doctrine of the greatest and most 
powerful nation on earth, and so understood to be a primary doctrine 
by the hundred millions of people forming the great western republic. 
If it is not technically part of the code of international law, it is the 
belief of our people that it forms an essential part of the structure 
of our national life. 

Secretary Foster stated : 

It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine has no bindinK authority, first, 
becmuie it baa not been admitted into the code of international law; and, 
■eoood, becmuse it has never been adopted or declared by Congress. In reply, 
it may be said that the principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine — the 
right of self-defense, the preservation of the peace and safety of the nation — 

is reeognised as an elementary part of international law It stands 

today as a cardinal policy of our government. 

While this doctrine may be a policy and not a part of the tech- 
nical code of international law, it has for one hundred years held the 
hand.s of the mightiest nations on earth, who have recognized its potency 
equally with the recognition which they have extended to any prin- 
ciple of international law. The law of self preservation is the most 
fundamental and absolute of all the laws of nations. The Monroe 
Doctrine is the one vital doctrine, which in our intercourse with other 



MOKROE DOCTRINC A8 APPUEO TO HaITI Si 

imtioits iiKxst vitaih U "our peace and happiniMs" and 'our 

prarr and safrtv " I for any authority to eootend that a prin- 

ciple >(> \ it:i: not have the real potency and effect of inter- 

natiomtl' by the f athen and k)y thoae 

whoUti . e affect, the one eoQtimiinf 

thread ruiui, tliat underlying thm doctrine are ** the peace and aafety " 
and happinen'' of the American nation. This doe- 
nenae of the word a negative propoaition. With the 
life of the world it has changed, not in itA fundamental idea, for it it 
founded upon the preeervation of the safety and peace of this republic, 
but the change has come, to a certain extent, with the altered condi- 
tion of the timet) and the surroumlingH of our life, in the mode of our 
application of its principles. 

In this discussion we found our argument upon the Monroe 
Doctrine, both in \U original and its later construction. We believe, 
as a cardinal principle of it^ application, that independence is funda- 
mental. To differ with another country in its ideas of government 
will form no reason why we should deprive any country of its govem- 
inental life and existence. We concede tliat because of the difference in 
thought, as to governmental policy, we should not interfere with, or 
cstablisli over any government a suzerainty or control. We do not 
contend that the Monroe Doctrine applies to a countr>', unless the 
acts of that country interfere with the doctrine in our interpreta- 
tion of its principles as to control by European nations, or unless it 
interferes with the preservation of our peace and safety, or unless 
it commits a breach of international law. 

The distinguished president of the Academy has assigned to 
me the subject of "The Monroe Doctrine, Elspecially Considered as 
to its Application to the Republic of Haiti.'' Let us see if the ooodi- 
tions arising in this island interfere with any of the caoons of this 
doctrine. 

The island of HLspaniola, containing Haiti and San^Domingo, 
includes about 28,250 square miles, and the Republic of Haiti about 
10,200 square miles. The ishuid is about the sise of the combbed 
Sutes of DeUware, Massachusetts, New Jers^, New Hampshire 
and Rhode Island. Next to Cuba, it is the most important strategical 
point in the Ciulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. It is directly oo 
and commands the two great passages of the Atlantic Ocean into the 
Caribbean Sea from the eastern coast of the United States to and from 



32 The Annalb of the American Academy 

the canal. It thus practically controls the great bulk of the commerce 
of the United States to the East and the Pacific Ocean. 

This island has within its shores more natural wealth than has 
any other territory of similar size in the world. By reason of its rich 
valleys and splendid mountains it has every temperature known to 
man. All tropical plants and trees, as well as the vegetables and fruits 
of the temperate climes, grow in perfection. The best coffee known 
to commerce grows wild without planting or cultivation. Sugar cane, 
indigo, bread fruit, melons, mangoes, oranges, apples, grapes, mulber- 
ries and figs all grow with little labor or care. Mahogany, manchineel, 
aatiii wood, rose wood, cinnamon wood, log wood, the pine, the oak, 
cypress and palmetto grow in rich profusion in its splendid soil. Here 
are the best dye stuffs known to commerce, and in the earth are silver, 
gold, copper, lead, iron, gypsum and sulphur. We hazard the state- 
ment that tliis island is more capable of supporting life in all of its 
phases, more able to create wealth and diffuse happiness to its peo- 
ple than any other land on the face of the earth. Its harbors are 
incomparable and will float the navies of the world. Its atmosphere 
is salubrious and its climate healthy. It is a natural paradise and the 
description of its beauty and resources by Columbus is absolutely 
true as of today : 

In it there are many havens on the seacoast, incomparable with any others 
I know in Christendom, and plenty of rivers, so good and great that it is a 
marvel. The landa there are high, and in it are very many ranges of hills and 
most lofty mountains incomparably beyond the Island of Centrefei (or Tene- 
rilTe) ; all most beautiful in a thousand shapes and all accessible, and full of trees 
of a thousand kinds, so lofty that they seem to reach the sky. And I am assured 
that they never lose their foliage, as may be imagined, since I saw them, as 
green and as beautiful as they are in Spain in May and some of them were in 
flower, some in fruit, some in another stage, according to their kind. And the 
nightingale was singing, and other birds of a thousand sorts, in the month of 
November, round about the way I was going. There are palm trees of six or 
eight species, wondrous to see for their beautiful variety ; but so are the other 
trees and fruits and plants therein. There are wonderful pine groves and very 
Urge plants of verdure, and there arc honey and many kinds of birds, and many 
mines in the earth ; and there is a population of incalculable number. Espanola 
it a marvel; the mountains and hills, and plains, and fields, and the soil, so 
beautiful and rich for planting and sowing, for breeding cattle of all sorts, 
for building of towns and villages. There could be no believing, without seeing, 
such harlMrs as are here, as well as the many and great rivers and excellent 
waters, most of which contHin fold In the trees and fruits and plants, there 



MoNBOB DocnuKB AS Apfubd to HAin 33 

are greAtor diveraitiet from thorn of Juaoa (CuIm). In ihit there are wmmf 
•lOeeriee aad great mioee of fold mm! oihor neUb. Tbe people of Uile 
and all otheni that I havo aeao, or not eeen, all go naked, men and 
just ae tb«ir moUieni bring tbem foKh. 



The BMB which are today actually and proepecUvely moat im- 
portant to mankind are the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf oC Mexioo 
and the Caribbean Sea. Theae aeaa, in their importance, have waxed 
and waned as have all other lands and seas of the globe. Whilst the 
Mediterranean has been iiiip<)rt4int throughout histor)-. today, aa 
a part of the ehahi of comrouiiicution to the East, it is pro baldly more 
vital tluui ever in its history, for it commands the Sues Canal and is 
virtually part of the Sues route. The two great twin seas, the GiUf 
of Mexieo and the Caribbean Sea, are, if possible, more vital than the 
Mediterranean in their effect upon the commerce of the world. From 
their position they will bo more world-wide in their direct influence 
upon commeroe tlian the Mediterranean, because the^e two seas will 
embrace a greater part of the world. 

It is necessary to our subject briefly to discuss the location of 
Haiti, (see p. 34) both in lU strategical and trade positions. We would 
Hay tliat in the Gulf of Mexieo and the Caribbean Sea there are five 
great strategical positions, the mouth of the canal, the mouth of the 
Mississippi, Cuba, Haiti, and Jamaica. The mouth of the Mississippi 
necessarily will command the great central valley of the United States, 
and here will l>e one of the great positions in the trade of the world. 
From the mouth of the Mississippi to Colon our commerce will have 
a straiglit course, passing Cape Catoche, the outermost point of Yuca- 
tan, and ( 'ape Gracias a' Dios on the Mosquito Coast. Thui route 
will pass the island of Mujeres, which is not important, but will be 
within easy striking distance of the great isUnd of Jamaica owned 
by Great Britain. 

The island of Cuba is the great controlling strategical influence 
in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. It lies aeross the route 
from North America, and largely conmiands the route from the 
mouth of Uie Mississippi to the eastern opening of the canal. It 
controls the passage from the Gulf of Mexico into the Caribbean Sea 
through the Yucatan Channel, and into the Gulf of Mexico from tlie 
Atlantic by the Florida straits. It is the great controlling strategical 
influence in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. 



84 



The Annals of the American Academy 




Monroe Doctriwk ab Applied to Haiti 35 

The second great 8trat«gicai point is the iaUnd of Uaiu. 

The two great routes to the moath of the eanal froiD North ABMfw 
ica are, first, the route by the Windward Fsimp between the island 
of Cuba and the island of Haiti. Second, the route by the Blona 
Passage between the island of Haiti and the island of Puerto Rieo. 
This latter passage will be that chiefly used by the sailing vessels to 
and from the oanal to the eastern portion of North America. Tha 
other important passage to the mouth of the canal is the Annegada 
Passage by the island of St. Thomas and Puerto Rico, and will be the 
route used from the isthmus to the Mediterranean and Central 
Europe. The travel to the British Islands and northern Europe will 
also use the Mona Passage between Haiti and Puerto Rico. In other 
words, every ship sailmg from New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, 
Canada, Baltimore, Newport News or the eastern coast of North 
America on its journeys to the infinite world of conunerce will be 
compelled to pass by the island of Haiti, either through the Wind* 
ward or the Mona Passage, and the travel to the greater part of Europe 
will use the Mona Passage by the East Coast of Haiti. This world- 
wide commerce, in case of stress and storm on its voyage to the com- 
mercial world, must utilize this great island in the necessities of sea life. 
It is the first great harboring place on its way to the canal, and on 
its return it is the last stopping place. It will be as necessary to the 
commerce of this country as Malta or Aden or Gibraltar are to the 
Sues route. It lies athwart the greatest conunerce that will cleave 
the seas. 

In the present governmental condition of Haiti, and with its 
relation to this country, the island of Jamaica will be supremely 
important from a strategical standpoint, if controlled or held by an 
unfriendly power, and it could cripple our commerce passing through 
the Windward or the Mona Passage. With the friendly influenee 
of Cuba and Haiti the commerce of the United States would have a 
tremendous advantage in case of war or unfriendliness on the part 
of any nation, even if Jamaica was held by an unfriendly power. 

It is usual to spealc of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico 
as the American Seas, and to consider them as part of our life and pnie> 
tically within the control of this great nation. It is important to 
glance at these great seas and appreciate how they and the canal 
are environed about and controlled by islands, which would 
vital to our commerce in case of war or unfriendliness of the 



36 The Annals op the American Academy 

of Europe. First, is the island of Jamaica owned by Great Britain, 
which is practically at the mouth of the canal. Of almost equal im- 
portance ia the isUuid of Curacao, which in the Imnds of an unfriend- 
ly power would be disastrous in its effect upon the commerce of the 
canal. To the east and within striking distance are Martinique, 
in the hands of France, Santa Lucia owned by England, St. Thomas 
owned by Denmark, the Bahamas and the Bermudas in the hands 
of England, with Cuba and Haiti in independent control, neither of 
which last two could l>e utilized by the United States in case of con- 
flict with the other nations of the world. %In other words, the Gulf 
of Mexico and the C^aribljcAn Sea are environed by islands in the con- 
trol of the two great nations of the world, France and England, and 
by two great islands, Haiti and C'uba, the latter of which are strateg- 
ically so situated that they could largely control the commerce of 
practically half of the world. In this sea the United States, to which 
this commerce is supremely vital, with the exception of the liarbor 
of Guanatanamo in Cuba, controls only the relatively insignificant 
* 1 of Puerto Rico. Outside of these unimportant exceptions the 
1 States has no right to fortify any of the islands or to use them 
- from which we can protect our commerce and our rights in 
thr fiUiJil. 

I>et us consider, as briefly as possible, the governmental and social 
condition of the republic of Haiti, so importantly located as it is, 
and the probability of its becoming a menace to the fundamental 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine. It is important for us to see if it 
offends against the peace and safety of this country. This is not a 
pleasant subject of discission. No one cares to indict a whole people, 
but the question of the future of this island in its relations to this re- 
public, is one of deep and abiding importance to the American people, 
and surely in the conditions of today worthy of discussion in the pub- 
lications of this society. 

It is practically part of the shore line of our republic, and is in 
control of the avenues of our greatest routes of commerce to the 
world, and lies at the mouth of the canal which has cost us untold 
sums of money. Through its great passages will flow the bulk of our 
com mer ce to the East, and the question for consideration with the 
American people is whether this commerce should oftentimes be 
placed in the control of a government continuously engaged in in- 
ternecine war, revolution and insurrection and sunk in religious 



MONBOB DOCTHINB AS ApPUBD TO HaITI 37 

and governmental deeenerBcy. The question b vital to us, aa to 
whether the condition of this island, so important to us, will ulti- 
mately lead to interference on the part of European nations or com- 
pel us, in order to preserve the peace and eafety of our country, to 
provide, by some means, that its present eondition be changed, and, 
instead of being a menace to the peace and safety of our republic, 
it may heromo a ble«ing to the world and a protection to the com- 
merce, whirh will be the greatest ever witnessed since the keek of 
mankind 8 ships began to eleave the water in their quest for knowledge 
and riches throughout the world. 

Ijoi us, as briefly as may be, answer this question by giving the 
condition of this island as set out by those who have visited its shores 
and who are conversant with its conditions. That which shows the 
real life of a nation is its governmental policy and its religious ideals. 
To these two propositions I invite your attention. 

Since the evacuation by the French, Haiti has been a land of 
beethiug revolution, despotism and crime against religious and gov- 
ernmental law. With the forms of a free government, yet it has been 
a despotism unrivaled in its disregard for human rights. A general 
of a department, with a ragged army of banditti behind him, who by 
1>1«kk1 and rapine seises control of the government, oftentimes without 
tho pretense of the forms of an election, has generally furnished the 
horrid phantasmagoria which since the French evacuation has posed 
in the Haitian Republic under the guise of free government. 

Sa3r8 Ober: 

Founded m it is upon force, with the strongest man at the bead, 
nominally as president, but in reality a dictator, the Black Republic cannoi 
endure another century as it is going now, without calling to it the attention of 
the world, and exciting its strongest reprobation. It is the desire of mora than 
one government that the United States should Uke this irreepons i bte island 
republic in hand and administer to it a salutary lesson. Nothing short of sztar- 
mination, some aver, oould effect a reform in the Haitian body politic; but as 
this age does not tolerate the radical measures of the olden time it is not prob- 
able that the present generation will experience a reformation. 8b Spsoesr 
St. John, who was formerly the English Minister-Resident in Haiti, and who 
wrote an exhaustive account of the doings in the Black Republic, says, of it, 
amongst other things not eomplimentary : "No coontry poaseM 
capabilities, or a better geographical position, or mora Tsrisd soil, sUssal 
production, with magnifieent toenery of every deseriplioii; sad yet it is 
the country to be avoided, mined as it has been by a sooesssioo of 
politicians, without honesty or patriotism." 



38 The Annals or the American Academy 

Says Froude in The English in the West Indies. 

The island being thus derelict, Spain and England both tried their hand 
to raoorer it, but failed from the same cause, and a black nation, with a repub- 
Uean eoiifiitution and a population perhaps of about a million and a half of 
pure-blooded negroes, has since been in unchallenged possession, and has ar- 
rired at the oondition which has been described to us by Sir Spencer St. John. 
Republics which begin with murder and plunder do not come to much good in 
this world. Haiti has passed through many revolutions, and is no nearer than 
at first to stability. The present president, M. Salomon, who was long a refugee 
in Jamaiea, eame into power a few days back by a turn of the wheel. He was 
described to roe as a peremptory gentleman who made quick work with his po- 
litteal opponents. His term of office having nearly expired, he had reelected 
himself shortly before another seven years and was prepared to maintain his 
right by any measures which he might think expedient. He had a few regiments 
of soldiers, who, I was told, were devoted to him, and a fleet consisting of two 
gunboats commanded by an American officer to whom he chiefly owed his 
Mcurity. 

Sa5r8 Rear-Admiral Colby M. Chester, U. S. Navy, a most care- 
ful and distinguished observer, in his article in the Geographical 
Magatine on "Haiti : A Degenerating Island :" 

It is not possible within the limits of this paper to go into details regarding 
the turbulent history of Haiti. The fact that of its twenty-one rulers, from 
DetMlines to the one now holding power, four only have completed their terms 
of ofiUw, the most of them being driven out of the country, will show the general 
tendency of the people to revolution. History is here constantly repeating 
iteelf, summed up in the general statement that the "outs" are always strug- 
gling to get into power, while the "ins" are striving to retain possession of the 
spoils of office. 

It is said that Haiti is getting blacker and blacker, the white element 
having been practically exterminated or removed from the island 

In all its political history, Haiti, the beautiful, has been torn almost to 
shreds by its turbulent inhabitants, led on by a few aspiring chiefs, who 
rarely have had any other object in view than personal gain. 

Says Stephen Bonsai in The American Mediterranean: 

Of eourse, if Haiti were a true republic the people would have an oppor- 
tunity to correct the abuses from which they suffer by exercising the manhood 
franehiee to which, under the constitution, they are entitled, but, of all farces 
end trmvesttee of popular institutions which are so prevalent in the Black 
Republic, that of the so-called popular elections is the most flagrant. Elec- 
tions to the chamber are held or not held, not as prescribed by law and at the 
proper intervals, but simply when and how it may suit the personal convenience 
and private profit of the supreme military chief of the day. If he can secure 



Monroe Doctunb as Applubd to Haiti 90 



more money in bribo* from Um ii«|NiliM aii—dy MttmbUd Mid in umdom iMa 
ic offered by thoee desirous of legbUUTe hoooun and opportunities for oomip- 
tion. then the old chsmber remains on indefinitely. If the new men oflsr to 
the military chief a •ufBeistttly substantial inducement, the leffislaturs ia 
being is dismiseed, although it may have enjojred only a month of life, and new 
elsetions offered. 

Again says Booaal: 

In the winter of 1907-06, when twenty-two of the adherents of Dr. Firmin 
fell into the hands of the administration general at St. Mare, thai ofllear walkad 
them out to the naarest eemetery, and after they had dug a treneh deep taongh 
to hold their bodies, had them shot and buried. He then reported to his eoa- 
mander>in-«hief, President Nord Alexis, the oeeunenee textually as follows: 

" Feeling confident that my proote verbal of the affair, which I ehall have 
drawn up at the earliest possible moment, would meet with your exeeUencjr's 
approval, to save time, I have executed the twenty-two prisonen — provisioo- 
ally." This butcher never received a word of censure, but, on the contrary, 
was promoted by his chief. 

The first effort is to obtain poflseasion of the custom house, so aa 
to provide the sinews of war and to obtain perquisites for those in 
charge of Uie revolution. Then ensues a massacre of those who fol- 
lowed the unsuccessful aspirant for the presidency. 

At its head is a president assisted by two chambers, the memben of which 
are elected and hold office under a constitution of 1889. This constitution, 
thoroughly republican in form, is French in origin, as are also the laws, lan- 
guage, traditions and customs in Haiti. In practise, however, the government 
revolves itself into a military despotism, the power being concentrated in the 
hands of a president. The Haitians seem to poesess everything that a pro- 
gressive and civilised nation oan desire, but corruption is spread through 
every portion and branch of the government. Justice is venal, and the police 
are brutal and inefficient.— ^ncydopedta Britanniea, 

Says Hasard in San Domingo and Haiti: 

But the same causes which tended then to demoralise the eoimtry and oa- 
settle its people are thoee that render it a hotbed of revolution today. The 
bankruptcy of its treasury, the ambition of aspiring chiefs, the hatred of dis- 
appointed ones, and the want of any regular system of eommeroe and agri- 
lilture, with the incubus of an army living in idleness and eating up the sub- 
litance of the land, must have their effect. 

Official peculation, judicial murder, and utter corruption of every kind 
inderlie the forms and titles of civili ed government; the religion, nooainally 
< hristian, is largely vaudoux or serpent-worship, in which actual and horrible 



40 The Annals op the American Academy 



it trtn now a most important element. Instead of progressing, 
tht negro repubUeant have gone back to the lowest type of African barbarism. 
-~v ao NiMrs ottcffaopttho. 

A land of continuous revolution.— i?ncyeIop«dta Britannica. 

A fair illustration of their system of election is exemplified in 
the ao-called election of Nord Alexis in 1902. Being in control of 
the government forces and not having been known as an aspirant 
for the presidency, upon the assembling of the national assembly, 
Alexia demanded that he should be elected president. To his repeated 
demands the national assembly paid little attention. On the eve 
of his so-called election his troops in the field surrounded the palace, 
falling into firing groups. In the palace preparations for a banquet 
wen in progress. Entering the national assembly he notified it that 
its members could elect him president and go to the banquet, or 
face the firing squads being formed in the yard. He was elected by 
acclamation. This is but one of hundreds of illustrations of the hollow 
pretense of free government in this island. An election means nothing 
but a revolution flowing with blood. It is a battle or a massacre, and 
this has been practically a continuous proposition ever since the 
French evacuation. The government is a despotism pure and simple, 
which fattens upon the blood of an ignorant people, and is only a 
horrid pretense of free government. It is gradually and surely degen- 
erating and its conditions must ultimately become worse. Read the 
record of its unstable and gory governmental life: 

1804. Deasalines crowned as emperor. 

1806. He is assassinated ; war between Haiti and San Domingo. 

1807. Christophe becomes king under title of Henry the First, war. 
1811. Petion president of southern part; civil war. 

1820. Boyer declared regent for life ; after tremendous insurrection and flow 
of blood Christophe commits suicide. 

1843. Boyer deposed and exiled after revolution. 

1844. Rivircre exiled after one year; war. 

1845. Guerrier in oflSce one year. 

1845. Pierror abdicated. 

1846. Ricbe proclaimed president; died in one year. 

1847. Soloque declared emperor after many wars and much bloodshed ; exiled 

in 1860. 

1868-60. Geffrard president until 1867, and then exiled. 

186^-417. Dreadful revolution where Salnave revolts, takes refugees from 
British consulates and kills them; English ship drives them out and 
helps Geffrard ; Geffrard banished, Salnave made president with a new 
constitution; revolt suppressed amidst torrents of blood. 



Monroe Doctrinb ab Applikd to Haiti 41 

180^70. Conttnuftl rt-vuiutioo; 8«lBftvo miwffrm bii eaemiai; proelauM 

hinMelf emperor, it finally dofeftled Mid abot. 
\«nh7i. NiMAge Sucet complHtd Us four yMTfl. 
1874. DomiDffue wiMd the fowBiiMOi, and after bloody ravoluUoo «dlod 

in 1876. 
1870. Canal alter bloody revolulioo aolaaa power; after many revoluUooa b« 

b expelled in 1879. 
1879. Salomon eleeted; reelected 1886. 
1886. Salomon deposed and exiled; civil war between Hipdyte and LegiUme; 

Lecitlme plaoed in oAoe for one year and exiled. 
1889-96. Hipolyte after many insttrreeiioos died la oAee; euppoeed to be 



f 



1896. Simon Sam president; trouble with Germany; numerous disordera until 
1899. 

1900. Sam takes all the funds and leaves the country. 

1902. General Nord Alexis proclaimed president. 

1906. Nord Alexis retired by revolution; powers sent warships to stop mas- 
sacre. 

1911. Cincinnatus Le Conte proclaimed president; killed in 1912. 

1912. Tancrede Auguste appointed president; killed in May 1913. 

1913. Michael Orreeti proclaimed president; was retired by revolution January 

27, 1914. 

1914. Orresti Zamor assumed the presidency February 8, 1914, and at last 

accounts was still alive. In other words, the constitutional olBee 
for a president in Haiti is seven years, and President Salomon, who 
held office from 1879 to 1886 is apparently the only Haitian president 
to fill out his term of office. He wss killed, however, within two jrears 
after his re-election for a second term in 1886. 

A writer occupying a high position in the Haitian govermneDt has 
lately put forth a masterpiece of special pleading in defense of his 
government. Any defense of this kind is idle. The island is a land of 
•lespotism and wicked government, which is increasing and not do- 
(Teasing in its terror. Within a month it has reeked with blood under 
t he throes of one of its almost continuous revolutions. Our government 
has been again compelled to intervene and save the lives of many of 
the parties engaged in this internecine war. A number of times, by 
reason of this situation, war has been almost precipitated between the 
Haitian government and the European nations. The action of the 
German government is fresh in the minds of our people, and the war- 
ships of Great Britain and France are only too frequent in the har- 
bora of Haiti, protecting their subjects, demanding redress for griev- 
ances and saving human life. This means, sooner or later, that the 
irresponsible government of the Republic of Haiti will commit the act 



42 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

which will involve us, under the first clause and original application 
of the Monroe Doctrine. It seems that if it was not for the Monroe 
Doctrine, backed by the strong hand of this government, this island 
today would be under the control of a European nation. 

Let us pursue this investigation and consider further the moral 
and religious condition of this island, almost part of our shore line. 
Religion is but a pretense. The worship of the green snake and the 
control of the voodoo are everywhere prevalent. The island has 
degenerated from its once high estate, and there is no pretense but 
what the Papaloi and the Mamaloi are as potent as any of the figures 
in its life. It seems to be true, that on any night the horrid rites of the 
voodoo can be witnessed in the heart of the capital of Haiti, surrounded 
by the soldiers in the uniform of the Haitian government. In the 
book mentioned this statement is denied, and the assertion is made 
that Haiti has been slandered by the book writers and the magazine 
makers, by ** unscrupulous writers and travelers." This assertion is 
unbelievable. I do not quote Spencer St. John, the English minister, 
who resided in this island for many years, who states in detail the 
horror of despotism which governs the island, and who gives the de- 
tails of the dreadful practice of the voodoo, and who charges child 
stealing and cannibalism to these people. I will leave him out of the 
controversy entirely, and quote only a few of the many other proofs: 

Says Stephen Bonsai in The American Mediterranean: 

A man, of course a general, is in prison for treason or a detournement of 
fttuds. (This is a delicate way they speak of stealing in Haiti when they will 
speak of it at all.) It is a question of such minor importance, simply whether 
the man shall live or die, that the president will not defer it to the Papaloi or 
Voodoo priest, who lives in the hills behind the city, so he drops a manikin of 
clay upon the floor. If it breaks, the man dies; if it remains intact, then he 
livee— aa long as the noisome atmosphere of a Haitian prison will let 



Again the doubt, the President would draw a line across the floor of his 
sanctum and then pitch manikins, this time made of wood and attired in the 
gaudy glory of Haitian generals. If the puppets passed the line, it meant one 
thing; if they lagged behind, it meant another, and so the State papers were 
fashioned and the presidential decrees inspired in Haiti. 

But of course upon the graver questions the Papaloi and the Mamaloi, 
the high priest and the high priestess of the Voodoo sect, sat in judgment. 
The Papaloi, or Guinea coast prophet, with his fetich worship and his Congo 
praym, is the one solid, substantial fact in Haiti. Around about him turn 
Haitian life and politics. In some administrations the doors of the Black House 




MOITBOK DOCTRINB AB ApPUCO TO HaITI 43 

have not beeD m wide open to theee propbetn oC the night ne they vere vhik 
Nurd Alexie ruled, but never hnve they been eloeed eietpt in the reign of the 
mulatto Geffrard eome foKy y^mn ago, and hie wm a ahori and little day aad 
*>n<l»d with exile to Jamaica, where, under the guidance of intelligent and 
•tic white men, the Afro-American b accompliahing more, periiapa, 
• where elae. 

The cannibalistic feed la only indulged in on rare oeoMJom and at long 
intervale and ie always ahrouded in mjrttery and hedged about with every pra- 
caution against interlopers; for, be their African ignorance ever so 
thoir canuU fury ever so unbridled, the Papalois and Mamalots, the 
sod head women worshipfwrs never seem to forget that in these vile 
thcra should perhape be found excuse enough for the interferenoe of the 
• tvilit<Hl world to save the people of the Blaek Republie from the further 
(i.-^r:i.i!ition which awaite them. 

\\ tihin the last fifteen jrears human victims have been sacrifieed to the 
great god Voodoo in the national palace of Haiti. Last February there was 
aaaembled in the national palace what might justly be called a eongrsM of 
serpent worshippers. During the life of M me. Nord, which came to an end in 
October, 1006, not a week passed but what a meeting of the Voodoo practi- 
tioners was held in the executive mansion, and her deathbed was surrounded 
by at least a score of these witoh doctors. 

Says Ober in The Wake of Columbus: 

The 8or|>ent is the deity of the Voudous, and he is represented by a high 
priest, called the Papaloi, and a priestess, the Mnmaloi ; meaning the father and 
the mother king. Their denumds are abeolute, and no sectary dnre disobey 
them. In this lies their menace to good government, and it is well known 
that even some of the rulers of Haiti have been dominated by them. The wor- 
ship of the eerpent is carried on as secretly as possible; the sectaries are bound 
by oaths of secrecy, and their incantations take place in the night. The ser- 
pent is consulted, through the priest or prieeteas, and the devotaea then in- 
dulge in dancing and song, generally ending in the grosseat forms of debauehety. 

Froude in The English in the West Indies says: 

But this is not the worst. Immorality is so universal that it almost eeaaas 
to be a fault, for a fault implies an exception, and in Haiti it is the rule. Young 
people make experiment of one another before they will enter into any cloeer 
connection. So far they are no worse than in our own English islands, where 
the custom is equally general ; but behind the immorality, behind the religioe- 
ity, there lies aetive and alive the horrible revival of the Weet African supersti- 
tions ; the serpent worship, and the child sacrifice, and the cannibalism. There 
is no room to doubt it. A missionary assured me that an inatanoe of it oeeorvad 
only a year ago within his own personal knowledge. The facts are noCoriovs; 
s full account was published in one of the local newspapers, and the only re- 
sult was that the president imprisoned the editor for eipoaing the country. 



44 Tbm Annals or the American Academy 

A few years ago pertoni guilty of these infamies were tried and punished ; now 
they ara left alone, because to prosecute and convict them would be to acknowU 
edfB Um truth of the indictment. 

Rear-Admiral Chester further says: 

No accurate history of Haiti can be written without reference to the 
horrible sorcer>', called the religion of Voodoo, which was introduced into the 
country with the slaves from Africa. Its creed is that the God Voodoo has 
the power usually ascribed to the Christian's Lord, and that he shows himself 
to his good friends, the negroes, under the form of a non-venomous snake, and 
tranamits his power through a chief priest or priestess. These are called either 
Utij and queen, master or mistress, or generally as Papalois and Mamalois. 
Tlie principal act of worship consists of a wild dance, attended by grotesque 
gesticulations, which leads up to the most disgraceful orgies. A secret oath 
binds all the voodoos, on the taking of which, the lips of the neophyte are usual- 
ly touched with warm goat's blood, which is intended to inspire terror. He 
promises to submit to death shoujd he ever reveal the secrets of the fraternity, 
and to put to death any traitor to the sect. It is affirmed, and no doubt is true, 
that on special occasions a sacrifice is made of a living child, or the "goat 
without horns," as it is called, and then cannibalism in its worst form is indulged 
in. Under the circumstances of taking the oath of allegiance, it should cause 
no surprise that the Haitians claim that this is not true and defy any white 
man to produce evidence of guilt. But, notwithstanding, no one can read the 
horrible tales published by one of the British ministers to Haiti, which de- 
scribed in detail the revolting practices of the voodoos, together with the 
proofs he brings to substantiate the truth of the allegations, without coming 
to the reluctant conclusion that cannibalism is resorted to in these meetings. 
Of course, no white man could long live on the island after having given testi- 
mony leading to the conviction of culprits in such cases, and therefore the 
DCgroes' demand for proof can never be satisfied. Indeed, it is said that even 
■ome presidents who have openly discouraged the voodoo practices have come 
to violent deaths from this cause. 

The character of the meetings of the voodoos, which take place in secluded 
spots in the thick woods, is well known, and I have been given a description 
of one of them from an eyewitness, who is an officer of our navy, which no one 
could hear without a shudder. He states in brief that one day while out hunting 
he abruptly ran into a camp of worshippers, which was located in a lonely spot 
in the woods, and the horrors he there saw made an indelible impression upon 
hit mind. 

When his presence was discovered he was immediately seized by a fren- 
aied crowd of men and women, and for some minutes there did not seem to be 
a question but that his life was to be forfeited; but the Papalois called a halt 
and a council, apparently, to determine what action should be taken, and while 
this was in secsion a handful of coin, judiciously scattered diverted the thoughts 
of the ne groes for the time being from their captive. The usual sacrifice of a 
Utc white rooster was now brought on, seeing which the people were called 
back to their worship, and the ceremonies went on in his presence. 



Monroe Docrsoni as Afpubd to Haiti 45 



In Um borriblo ttnicgto wfaidi look plAM for pmiMiion, Um Mid wm loni 
literally to piooet, and bo had no doubt thftt it« aeeomponimeot, tbo "gool 
without bores" would toon follow. Whil« tbia wta in procroM bis primnc» 
Memod to be forgotten, and, watcbing a good opportunity, be ran for bla Tory 
life, not itopping until bo reocbod tbt proloelion of bii ibip. 

SayH Prichard in When Black RuUt WkiU: 



But tbere ia one tbing eommon to tbe wbole country, of wbieb every Hai- 
tian deniea tbe existenoe. Vaudoux ia tbe one tbing wbicb tbey declare tbey 
bave not. Tbey tell you tbere ia no anake-worabip (I ani speaking of tbe bighar 
elaaaea) within tbe bounda of tbe republic. But when you betray eoriaia 
knowledge of tbe aubject, tbey admit that though aacrificea and aavage daacea 
nuiy take plaee in other departnienta, no such things are known in that oot in 
which you at tbe moment find yourself. 

Thus in Jaemel tbey told me I should find Vaudoux in Port-au-Prinee and 
tbe Plain of Cul-de-Sac. In Port>au-Prince as I waa actually returning from 
witneaaing a aacrifice within the limiu of the town, I was adviaed to go to tbe 
Cape, where alone such rites flourished. And at the Cape they told me to take 
ship for Jaemel, for there I would assuredly find them. As a matter of plain 
fact, tbe traveller riding aoroas the country in any direction ia quite likely 
to come auddenly in view of tbe ceremonies in full swing. He will aae tbo 
toU-tale dancea, tbe facea ameared in blood, perhaps even tbe body of the blaek 
goat, tbe sacred sacrifice. 

In The Wake oJCdumbue, Ober further says: 

It may bear away the palm of being the most foul-smelling, dirty, and 
eonaequently fever-stricken city in the world. Ever>' one throws his refuse 
before his door, so that heaps of manure and ever>' species of rubbish eneombar 
tbe way. 

As to tbe streeta, they do not seem to have been mended for the last hun- 
dred years. The Haitiana have a saying. " Bon Dieu gAte li; bon Dieu pareA 
li." God spoilt them, and God will mend them. As the "bon Dieu" only 
helps those who help tbemaelvea, and aa the Haitiana bave no deaire to help 
tbemaelvea in the way of making or repairing their roadwaya, their condition 
is frightful beyond description. Tbe gutters are open, poola of stagnant and 
fetid water obstruct tbe streets everywhere, and reeeive eonatant accessions 
from the inhabitanta uaing them aa eeaapoob and aewers. Tbere are few good 
buildings in town, and none in the eountry, tbe torch of the inesodtary baiag 
constantly applied, and no enoourafsment offered to rebuild, throvgli pfotas 
tion of the government or local enterprises. Buildings destroyed by eartb- 
quake or fire are never replaced, and the nearest approaeb to rebuilding is 
seen in the slab shanty leaning against the ruined walls of a large structure 
demolished. 

Rear-Adniiral Colby M. Che^4>r in his article on ''Haiti: A De- 
C^erating Island/' furtlier says: 



46 Thb Annals op the American Academy 

Of the eleyen porU of Haiti open to foreign commerce, Cape Haitian and 
Port-au-Prince are the largest and most progressive. 

Cape Ilaiticn, or "The Oape," as it is commonly called, is situated on the 
northwestern coast, at the foot of a hill that slopes back to the sea, with most 
picturesque surroundings. It has a commodious harbor and supports a popula- 
tion of aO,000 or 40,000 people. Under the French, it was the capital of the col- 
ony, and its wealth, splendor and luxury gained for it the name of Little Paris; 
but now the struetures erected by the French in colonial days arc a mass of 
ruins, the parks overgrown with tropical weeds, the fountains choked with de- 
bris, the gutters filled with filth, all producing pestilential emanations from 
which foreigners speedily run away, if they are forced into its environments. 

Port-au-Prince, the present capital of the Republic, as well as its largest 
and most important city, is likewise most picturesquely located at the foot of 
hills, where one may escape from its blistering and filthy streets to mountain 
resorts that would be popular if located in almost any country of the world. 
Unlike Cape Haiticn, the city is cut off from the trade winds, to which this 
island owes so much of its salubriousness, and therefore it is hot ; but still the 
traToler caught in the town may frequently felicitate himself when he reads 
that cities in our own country have higher temperatures by 10 to 15 degrees 
than is usually found here. The city is well supplied with the most delicious 
mountain water, and if its 60,000 inhabitants used it as freely as do Americans, 
it might be as clean as nature made it. As it is, it may well hold the palm for 
being the most filthy, foul smelling and, consequently fever-stricken city in the 
world. The gutters of the streets, which may be said to cover the whole road- 
beds, are filled with stagnant waters and are used as cesspools by the people. 
But for the torrential rains, which pour down the mountain sides and carry 
off all the filth, into the beautiful bay, even a Haitian could not live there. But 
the bay, thus polluted, is quite as much of a menace to health as the city itself. 
During the visits of American men-of-war to the port, most of the time is spent 
in keeping the people from the pestilential vapors which emanate from the sea 
itself. The water of the harbor is so bad that it cannot be used even for scrub- 
bing the decks of the ship. 

Froude in The English in the West Indies, further says: 

No one can foretell the future of the Black Republic, but the present order 
of things cannot last in an island so close under the American shores. If the 
forbid any other power to interfere, they will have to interfere them- 
If tbey find Mormonism an intolerable blot upon their escutcheon, 
they will have to put a stop in some way or other to cannibalism and devil- 
wonhip. Meanwhile, the ninety years of negro self-government have had their 
IIM in showing what it really means, and if English statesmen, either to save 
themselvM trouble or to please the prevailing uninstructed sentiment, insist on 
extending it, they will be found when the accounts are made up to have been 
no better friends to the unlucky negro than their slave-trading forefathers. 



r 



Monroe DocrumB as Appusd to Haiti 47 

Mining is largely an unknown ooeupalkm in Haiti. Agriculture 
has languished, although it is true that in 1912 the coffee crop in« 
creased and oonceauons have been made to some timber nntdrpiiw, 
but little has been done in the way of enterprise and aelkm fai 
this isUnd, situated athwart the commerce of the worid. If this 
condition was sporadio and lasted but for a time it would be a 
proposition for eonsideration, but when the ishind ijt lapsbg pfao- 
tically into degeneracy, when the government is a continuous revo- 
lution and the state of religion is as the proofs indicated in this pa- 
per, arc not the peace and safety of this country oonstantly in peril 
by reason of the condition of this island, so near to us and so impor- 
tant to our life? 

Theee statements are not pleasant. They are not made for any 
sinister purpose, but rather to bring to the attention of our people a 
condition of affairs at our very doors which is of vital and increasiiig 
importance to this nation. It is easy to apply the Monroe Doctrine as 
to non-interference on the part of European nations with our hemi- 
sphere. The great question is our own position witli the 
of this hemisphere, which may offend against the doctrine which 
sen'es the peace and safety of our government. With the worid move- 
ment of today, with the enormous changes which have taken place 
by reason of the building of the Isthmian Canal, it is idle to say thai 
our peace and safety can be preserved if we sit by and allow an inter- 
national nuisance to bring upon this country the interference of the 
nations of Europe, and compel us by blood and treasure to enforce the 
original application of our doctrine of European non-interferenoo. 
Free Cuba and the free Central and South American states attest the 
fact that one of the great fundamental desires of this republic is that it 
shall be surrounded by free people and governments. Is it not appar- 
ent, however, that the time has arrived when the conditions in and 
along the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea can no bnger be 
tolerated? Theee seas, for many years, have been silent seas. The 
conditions are now reversed and the great trade routes of the world 
will pass about these islands and over theee seas, and th^ will be 
noisy with the whirl of the propeller and bright with the sails of ships. 
This island will be in the midst of a world-wide traffic and oommeroe, 
whose freedom and non-interference are practically guanntoed by 
this country. 



48 The Annals of the American Academy 

Can the peace and safety of this country be preserved unless we 
adopt the measures which arc the inalicnHl)lc right of every nation? 
The worid, with the sliortening of trade routes, the touching of nations, 
and their demands for sure commercial conditions, b arriving at the 
thought that there is no inalienable right on the part of any people to 
control any region to the detriment and injury of the world at large. 
This is not a covert statement, that under the Monroe Doctrine this 
nation can take control of the aflfairs of other states of this hemisphere, 
when the [HyWcy of tliat country does not suit our theories and ideas. 
It means, however, that when a country of this hemisphere persists in 
being an international nuisance, when it shows to the world a condi- 
tion of general degeneracy by which it practically gives notice that 
there will be no improvement, that this government, under the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, will adopt mejisures for its own peace and protection 
and for the preservation of the trade and commerce of these seas, which 
are practically within its commercial life. 

The Monroe Doctrine, I repeat, is nothing more nor less than a 
doctrine of self preservation. To permit the condition of the island 
of Haiti to exist, without interference or protest on our part, is illog- 
ical. Under the Monroe Doctrine we practically say to European 
nations that they shall not for any cause lay their hands heavily upon 
a country in this hemisphere. At the same time, in accordance with 
the views of many people of our day, we ourselves have the right to 
do nothing. Hence, unless we interfere or permit the European 
nations to interfere, there must be a continuance of the status of that 
country. 

The original object of the Monroe Doctrine was to prevent the 
control and colonization of the independent states of this hemisphere 
by European nations. As I have before stated, this does not mean that 
with any orderly or stable government this government should occupy 
the position of suzerainty or implied control. No American believes 
that great states, like Argentina, Brazil or ('hili, with their stable 
governments, should be under our implied or actual control. Still, 
every one who understands the conditions of the day, believes that 
a logical corollar>' of the Monroe Doctrine demands that the nations 
of this hemisphere shall, in their governmental affairs, do nothing 
which would infringe upon or impair the peace and safety of the 
American govcnimont. Since the construction of the canal this con- 
dition has become intensified. This government is practically a 



MoNROB DocTBuni AB Affubd to Haiti 49 

trustee for the world in its poMOWion of the iBthmian Canal. la 
it conceivable, that with our enormously increased interests we 
should sit idly by and allow the peace and safety of this country to 
be interfered with by a country which is a plague spot to the nB^OM 
of the earth? A great part of American commerce and a large part of 
the traffic of the world will be through the AmericBa seas betweeo 
the walls of this canal and by the shores of this island. These aeBS 
will become more populous with commerce than any other section of 
the world. Th^ will be a gathering place and crossing point for the 
east and the west, and theur poss es sion, either forcibly or otlien% ise, 
will carry with it more potentiality tlian the poss ess ion of any other 
body of water on Uie face of the earth. It will be abaoluteiy neces- 
sary that the outposts of the canal shall l>e in the hands of strong 
and stable governments, and it cannot be thought that the harbors 
necessary for that commerce and the islands by which it will pass, 
and in whose broad bays it will be compelled to anchor, sliall be rife 
with revolution and dangerous to that commerce. Is it reasonable 
that this country, which is practically fi^uardian of this ooQuneroe, 
will allow a condition to obtain which will \)c a daily menace to this 
great American commerce, and surely bring about the complications 
which must interfere with the peace and safety of this country? This 
great traffic must be clciir and uninterfered with, and the responsi- 
bility is upon us to see that within these seas the rights of a hundred 
million people and their unborn descendants shall not be interfered 
with by countries which are not able to preserve a stable government 
for themselves. 

The government U'licvcs tlmt the fundamental principles of a 
country's life should be freedom and consent of the governed, yet it 
is idle to speak of the consent of the governed in an ishind which has 
never known anything but a blood stained despotism. 

Ex-President Roosevelt in "Chili and the Monroe Doctrine/* says: 

It is untruthful folly to assert that it is possible for the United Statos, 
or for any other great nation, to treat an anarchic and wrong«doinf country oa a 
footing of real and full equality of which I have above apoken as rapfes en ti n g 
that plane of conduct which should characterise all the deslinp between my 
nation and your own, and my nation and certain other South American repub- 
Ucs. I hope, and I am reasonably confident, that the less advanced natioas of 
the New World will in their turn gradually advance Just aa my nation and yours, 
as well as certain others, have alre&Hv advanced. As soon us snv furh natioo 



50 The Annalb of the American Acadebtt 

in the course of it« advance reaches a position of self-respecting strength and 
orderly liberty and achieved power to do and to exact justice, then it should at 
•tap out from any position of tutelage in any respect. 



A distinguished writer in advocating the abrogation of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine speaks of it as if all danger to the South and Central 
American republics was over. Permit a little plain speaking on this 
subject, for it is sometimes helpful in the great as well as in the small 
affairs of the world. I believe if it had not been for the promulgation 
and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by this republic, there 
would not today be on the continent of South America or in Central 
America a government independent of European control. Let us look 
at the situation of today throughout the world, and ascertain if there 
is any change in the desires of the nations since the promulgation of 
the Monroe Doctrine. The earth hunger of the European countries 
is fiercer than ever in its history. Their vastly increasing populations 
demand an enlargement of their national life, and the peoples of the 
European governments demand more food and more labor than their 
countries can furnish. The great new markets of the world are South 
and Central America, China and some parts of Africa. China has 
been practically delimited into the spheres of influence by the European 
and the Japanese governments, and Mongolia has been raped from 
her boeom. The gaunt breast of Africa has been seized and marked 
out for their o\^ti by the European governments. The whitening 
bones of Italian, Arab and Turk in Tripoli, the fierce anger of France 
and Germany only last year over Morocco, the busy colonization 
plans of Europe in Northern Africa, the strife of the dying Moslem 
Empire, the seizure and occupation of Egypt by England, and the 
tremendous conflict between Russia and Japan, which in its last 
analysis was a conflict for territory, all attest that today the earth 
hunger is not satiated by the peoples of Europe. I say it solemnly 
and with all the earnestness \^ath which I can express it, that I be- 
lieve, were it not for the power of the Monroe Doctrine, within 
ten years, excepting Argentine, Brazil and Chili, there would not 
be a free and independent government in South America. Their 
marvelous natural wealth, their splendor of climate, their richness 
of flora and fauna, and their wealth of precious metals, would more 
surely provoke the desire of the European nations than the gaunt, 
fever stricken and the fierce sunburned wastes of Africa. 



b 



MoHBom DocTRoni as Appukd to Haiti 51 

Those who fed that the Monroe Doetnne it outworn and thai 
it should be abrogated evidently do not reoMmber very modem hi*> 
to^>^ My meaning ia illuftrated by one of the great ABC natkNM 
of Uie South Amerioan eoBtJBant. Many of ui remember tha inei* 
dent as of yesterday, when the revolution against the republie was 
Inaugurated in Brasil. For the purpose of reMablishing the empire 
the navy of Brasil was in favor of the overturning of the republie 
and the restoration of the Bragansa family to the head of an imperial 
Brasilian government. In the harbor of Rio Janeiro was ooogrsci^ted 
an assembly of the warships of the monarchies of Europe and the 
Republic of the United States. The commanders of the European 
squadrons were in sympathy with the revolutionists and unwilling 
to do anything which would interfere with the phms of the Imperial- 
ists. When the Imperialists attempted to establish a blockade, to 
carry out their plans of revolution, the American oonunander, acting 
under the Monroe Doctrine, by direction of our government in Wash- 
ington, was the only naval commander who objected, and he cleared 
for action and forced the admiral commanding the Imperial forces 
to desist from his purposes. It must be remembered that this was 
only in 1803, and happened to the great republican government of 
Brazil, our friend and neighbor. 

Let us take another modem and well known application. So 
late as 1894, the British government attempted to force a situation 
with Venesuehi, which would bring about British control of the Ori- 
noco region and practically shut up in British hands the control of 
one of the greatest rivers of conmierce, a region which has imperial 
potentialities of trade and commercial life. Had it not been for the 
strong hand of this government, acting through and under the pro- 
visions of the Monroe Doctrine, today an important field of com- 
merce, a vast region of South America, a great portion of an inde- 
pendent republic, and the control of a mighty river would be in the 
grasp of the British empire. 

The question of European interference today is not dead. To 
every one who reads, there arises the question of the settlement of 
the position of the great foreign colonies in South America. Eveiy 
well informed student of pubhc affairs and international matters is 
looking forward to the time when friction will develop b et wee n the 
home governments of these colonists and the republics within whose 
territories they live. 



52 Th8 Annalb of the American Academy 

Secretary •Olney says: 

The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience 
to what extent the relations of states to each other depend, not upon sentiment 
nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their 
hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possi- 
bility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of the powers 
with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They 
have yet in mind that France seised upon the apparent opportunity of our civil 
war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that 
had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to 
work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the 
Qraat Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might 
have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the 
past and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure 
but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon 
it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the 
facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved 
both an eaay defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal 
and prosperity. 



We desire to go in peace and equity with the peoples of this hem- 
isphere, to that consummation where all will be kindliness and trust 
between this republic and our neighbors. Still, the great thought of 
this republic is that it is best for all to maintain the Monroe Doctrine 
in all its virility. With our President we expressly disclaim any desire 
of conquest, nor do we wish any suzerainty or control of the stable 
nations of this hemisphere. Here is where the correct differentiation 
is lost sight of in the Latin countries. It is idle to speak of the great 
nations, stable and orderly as they are, as standing on a level witli 
disorderly, revolution-ridden despotisms, such as have been discussed 
and which in many instances obtain in Latin America. This great 
doctrine is fundamentally necessary to the existence of the peace 
and safety of this country, yet we wish the help and the assistance 
of the great and stable nations of South America to carry it to its 
great fruition. 

The application of these propositions to the subject under 
consideration is plain. Whilst this government has no desire for con- 
quest, yet the great advance in the world movement and in the vital 
eommercial affairs of the globe, demands that the peace and safety of 
this hemisphere shall not be needlessly and wickedly broken, and that 
the peace, happiness and safety of this nation and the commerce of 
the worid within the liounds of our governmental life shall not be im- 



MoNBOB DocTBDra AS Afpubd to Haiti 68 



periled in the future m they have beeo in the pMt The 
impetus, which under the world movemeote of today, hae beeneo 
potent and plain, demandi order io all of the allain and detaib ol 
its life. The oonditioni of the thnee and the dependenee of one pari 
of the globe upon the other, brought about by the easy interchange 
between the nations, mean that no disorder in that great world com- 
merce will be again lightly tolerated. 

Under the plainest and fairest interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine it reaches easily the subject under discussion. Under its 
original application it will not allow a situation to obtain which will 
give the opportunity for foreign nations to interfere in the govern- 
mental life of countries of our hemisphere. Under the fundamental 
meaning of Uie Monroe Doctrine, it will imperil the peace, safety and 
happiness of this country if an island, lying at our doors, within 
touch of our daily life, athwart our greatest line of commerce, shall 
continue its life of disorder in the future as it has in the past. This 
position of our country should breed no distrust among our self- 
rid stable neighbors on this hemisphere. We will go along 
iiand in hand, and with their assistance help the nations 
which arc weak, and do what we can to place them on eternal founda- 
tions of freedom, prosperity and order, so that they may become part 
and parcel of this great free brotherhood on the western hemisphere. 

A great writer speaks of the abrogation of the doctrine, and voices 
the distrust and suspicion among the nations of the southern hemi- 
sphere. To this we reply with the pages of history, and ask under 
what government, people, or system, that has ever existed since 
history began to write its pages, have there been preserved, in their 
freedom and governmental life, so many weak nations as have existed 
on this hemisphere, side by side with this powerful republic? He has 
cited as cause of distrust California and Mexico. These were life 
movements, absolutely instinctive in their bcini;. and demanded by 
the very existence of this nation. 

Distinguished writers so frequently discuss the jeakHUQr of the 
South American nations towards the United States by re a son of the 
Monroe Doctrine. One has gone so far as to give in detail the siae 
and strength of South American dreadnaughts, and to deal with im- 
mense paKicuhirity as to the amount of beef and wheat raised and 
shipped by these nations. 

It is true that some jealousy does really exit liiai < iinKt U> 



M Thb Annalb of the American Academy 

avoided. The thinking statesmen of the South American countries, 
however, do not believe in the unjust aggression of the United States. 
Those of them who know the situation and understand it do not fear 
the Monroe Doctrine or its consequences. There are professional 
politicianB in South America who fan the embers of distrust for their 
own uprising and their own purposes, but the great trend of senti- 
ment and thought on the part of the leaders in the great states of 
South America is not in this direction. 

I quote the statement of Sefior Zabellos of Argentina, as a fair 
indication of the thought of those of South America who know the 
real feeling of our country towards its southern neighbors: 

What other countries of America have the same world problems as Panama 
and Mexico, the latter on the frontier of the United States, and the former the 
throat of the continent it«elf? They have nothing in common with the prob- 
lems of the River Plata, or the shores of Brazil, or the coast of Chili. The 
Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United States. The Caribbean Sea 
washee the coMi of the richest part of the United States, and it is necessary 
that it be dominated by them, in order to guarantee the independence and 
security of the United States. Under these circumstances, when there is con- 
stant danger of European intervention, as in the case of Venezuela, the United 
Staiee said to the powers, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, "You can 
urge your claims in accordance with international procedure, but you cannot 
take territority, because if you do you will have to deal with the armed forces 
of the United States." The powers thereupon became less aggressive and the 
matter was settled by arbitration. This action of the United States empha- 
sised once more the doctrine that no European power will be permitted to 
acquire territory on the continent of America. 

Thoughtful men do not agree with the contention in some direc- 
tions that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced under an agree- 
ment with South American states. It seems that this would be im- 
practicable. The Monroe Doctrine necessarily is an emergency 
doctrine. While it is fundamental the demand for its action is imme- 
diate and decisive. It is a doctrine which demands absolute and direct 
action to make it effective. Very many serious questions arise as to 
the practicability of the carrying out of any such agreement between 
the states of South America and the United States. 

In the first place, the interests of this government are greater 
than the interests of any other government on this hemisphere. What 
relative power would this government have as against the other con- 
tracting powers? The Monroe Doctrine is a doctrine peculiarly 



MoNROB Docrmm as Appusd to Haiti 6S 

applying to the United States. When Uiie doetrine it divided, to 
that it applies to other forenunente, ne c essarily the very essence of 
this doctrine is done away with. 

Again, it has been the history of international affaiis, that agrse* 
ments between nations, diverse in thought, life, sentiment, sittiatkNi« 
and race, have never been successful. Here would be an agreement 
for the enforcement of the doctrine between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Latin nations absolutely different in temperament, and also be t w e en 
nationn whose whole financial and local situation is absolutely dif- 
ferent from that of the United States. 

Suppose, for instance, a question should arise between England 

ne of the South American states, and that the contracting pow- 

t he maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine would be the United 

Argentina, Brasil and Chili. Thoee who know the situation 

in Argentina would not suppose for a moment that Argentina would 

oppose England in some controversy as to some minor state, which 

would be important to the United States, but relatively unimportant 

to Argentina. This illustration applies with equal force as to the other 

South American states. The money with which these great states 

are being developed, and the population which is largely engsged in 

developing them, come from Europe and Europe could injure these 

states financially if they opposed European interests in and about 

the enforcing of the Monroe Doctrine. 

This is a mere illustration of the multitude of troubles which 
would come by an agreement that the Monroe Doctrine should be en- 
forced by a joint action of South American states and the United 
States. The questions are so absolutely diverse as between the United 
States and these countries, that no unity of action could be brought 
about so as to make the enforcement of the doctrine effective. While 
this is true the Monroe Doctrine should not be enforced with a strong 
hand, but should be carried out in justice, in courtesy and in fairness 
between our country and the countries of South America. This 
honesty and respect obtain among nations just as among men and by 
the immutable laws of cause and effect, and the action of this govern- 
ment upon a high plane will surely obtain and hold the respect of the 
countries of South America. 

The Monroe Doctrine within its very nature is a doctrine which 
is fundamental and peculiar to the United States. While It should 
be carried out in justice, the mode, the time, the place and the manner 



M Thb Annalb of the American Academy 

of lis operation should be, and I believe will be, directed and controlled 
absolutely by the United States. To place it in other hands would 
be the destruction of the doctrine, which has been vital to this coun- 
try and to this hemisphere, and cause the weakening of the hands 
of this government in the direction where international trade and 
life will demand that our hands should be strong, and absolutely 
free to act decisively in the great international emergencies which 
arise so unexpectedly and which are fraught with such momentous 
consequences. 

The doctrine of Monroe is a doctrine of help and peace. It is 
true that those who love our country believe that this Republic " looks 
hopefully to the time when by the voluntary departure of European 
governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America 
shall be wholly American/' Still these governments and their sys- 
tems are here and are part of the life of this hemisphere. They will 
surely demand that we preserve order and conserve the safety of 
the oonunerce within our sphere. This means absolute order. To 
bring about this order this government will not hurt the self-respect 
or pride of any great and stable nations of our hemisphere. We will 
work with them along the lines of mutual respect and esteem . Touched 
by the new life, which is making them so vital and important a part 
of the world affairs of the day, they will understand that the condi- 
tions of other days cannot continue, and that the responsibilities 
brought about by present world conditions demand that our safety 
and peace, as well as theirs, compel the continued existence of the 
Monroe Doctrine in its full virility. When this is understood there 
will be no distrust. There will be the co-mingling of nations with the 
same governmental freedom. It will be a great brotherhood, and the 
only one, of free people and free nations marching onward hand in 
hand to the consummation of that blessed time when the strong 
will not oppose the weak, and when filled with mutual esteem, con- 
fidence and regard, and touched by the wondrous vitalizing life of 
freedom, the nations of this hemisphere, great and little, Latin and 
An|jo-8axon, will show to the world the splendor of freedom in its 
highest and best development. 



THE LATIN VIEW OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

By Leopold Grahamr, 
New York. 

Although there are many conflicting opinions aa to the ramifi- 
cations of the Monroe Doctrine, it seems to me that the I^ttn view 
' i*h muMt ultimately provnil in defining its status. The 
. n-cut. It ifl whether the Monroe Doctrine is to be unUat- 
(>ral, or continental, in itA operation; and upon this issue the reten* 
lion of the doctrine as an integral part of the national poUcy of the 
Tnited States must alone be detennined. The considerations in- 
volved in this aspect of the question are vital to the commercial and 
|)olitinil interests of the entire continent. Irrespective of the scope, 
or the linutations attaching to the famous pronouncement of Pren- 
iU'ixi Monroe, its application must, in future, be dealt with even more 
' he standpoint of policy than from that of technical or con- 

1 construction. The doctrine was ostensibly conceived and 
formulated exclusively in the interest and for the protection of all the 
American countries; and no selfish motive has ever been attributed 
to its original framers by any of the parties comprehended within 
its provisions. Its position, therefore, rests entirely on the territorial 
integrity of the American republics; and any other interpretation 
would make it an object of antipathy, not only to the Latin-American 
people, but to all the civilized powers of the world. 

It has been urged by many eminent public men, including 
ex-President Roosevelt, that the very conditions which led to the 
adoption of the Monroe Doctrine conferred upon the United States 
not only by implication, but by necessity, the right to extend its 
protection of the Ljitin republics to the point of active interven- 
tion when the existence of disturbing conditions in any one of 
might be thought to jeopardize its natiomil independence. It 
\ie remembered, however, that the United States has never 
responsibility for the acts of those countries, but has, on the contraiy, 
always maintained that, whilst it would not sanction the acquisition 
or occupation of the territory of an American republic by a foreign 
power, it would assist such power to protect its subjects from moral or 

57 



58 The Annalb of the American Academt 

material injur}' in cases of national wrong-doing; and to that extent 
the doctrine, though not incorjwrated into international law, has been 
accepted without reserve by practically all of the European govern- 
ments. Nor, indeed, are there to be found, so far as I am aware, any 
historical records to sustain the contention that the Monroe Doctrine 
IB anything more than a logical cuUnination of an order of political 
ideas initiated by the declaration of American independence to sep- 
arate the interests of the two hemispheres and to prevent European 
intervention in the internal affairs of the countries on this side of 
the Atlantic. 

Let me ask in what cases the relations of a Latin republic with 
a European government might call for the reassertion of the Monroe 
Doctrine by the United States? The answer, I think, would be 
civil wars and insurrections; outrages inflicted upon foreigners; 
failure to fulfil contracts with them; their unlawful expulsion; and 
d^ault in payment of public or private debts. These, in the ab- 
stract, would constitute the most likely reasons for a possible future 
application of the Monroe Doctrine; and within the last ten years 
we have had practical demonstration of the willingness of the great 
powers of Europe to accept the American view and to submit the 
differences arising out of such matters to the judicial methods of 
international courts of arbitration. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine, 
in its original and real sense, is universally established and admitted; 
and I cannot conceive either the moral or legal grounds upon which 
the United States can lay claim, in regard to the Latin republics, to a 
right so admittedly and so strongly denied to the nations of Europe. 

We know from the fully recorded proceedings of the negotiations 
between President Monroe and the British government, preceding 
the formal declaration of the doctrine, that Mr. Canning, whilst ad- 
hering to its principles, steadfastly refused to allow the British 
government to become an official party to its formal establishment. 
The American minister, Mr. Rush, repeatedly informed his govern- 
ment of his belief that Great Britain had suspicions that the United 
States entertained designs of securing commercial advantages and 
of creating a hegemony on the American continent. Is it, then, sur- 
prising that, with latter-day occurrences in mind, the Latin-American 
republics should also entertain saspicions as to the motives underly- 
ing the various and frequently strained interpretations placed upon 
the Monroe Doctrine by many leaders of American thought? 



IjATin View op Momboe Doctrinb fiO 

It must be borne in mind that although ■iirrniinnici PratideoU 
of the United States, in recent yean, have often tiaied, with un- 
doubted sinoerity, that this country has no idea of obtaining an ineh 
of Latin-Amerioan territory by conqueit, etreumetanoee have ariean 
to justify the belief in many of the mailer republies of this conti- 
nent that their complete independence is not quite ao secure as they 
would wish. Common aenae pointa to the oonduaion that if, rightly 
or wrongly, the Britiah government harbored doubts in the matter 
of American policy, m the eariy twenties of the nineteenth century, 
even in the face of the solemn declarations of such men as Monroe, 
CUy, Adams, Madison, Jefferson, Rush, Gallatin, and other equally 
conscientious and patriotic citizens, it can hardly be a matter of 
surprise that the Latin-American sense of security has been weakened 
by what has transpired in the recent past in the policy of the United 
States towards the sister republics. I do not for one moment assume 
or believe, that enlightened public opinion in this country, official or 
unofficial, regards either as desirable, or justifiable, encroachments 
upon the sovereign rights of the Latin-American nations. On the 
contrary, I assume and believe that the main purpose of the policy 
of the United States in relation to the other republics is to mftint4i«n 
and perpetuate their absolute independence. Therefore, I would 
further ask, what advantages are to be secured by the extensk>n of the 
scope of the Monroe Doctrine beyond that so specifically expie aa e d 
by its original founders? 

The people of Latin America are of common origin. Their eman- 
cipation was secured by arduous struggles with their former oppressors; 
and an attack upon the dearly-bought independence of any one of 
the republics is reflected throughout them all. Their view of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine is that, although it has its origin in the United States, it 
is part of the international law of the American continent, where each 
nation is a distinct unit, with equal freedom and sovereignty and 
with no prerogative extended to any single one of them to control 
a continental policy. They regard the Monroe Doctrine as an instru- 
ment designed to proclaim the existence, in the western hemisphere, 
of independent nations, with the right to impkint laws and insti- 
tutions for the government of free people, without interferenee or 
dictation at the hands of the monarchies of Europe; but those re- 
publics would consider their last condition as worse than their first, 
if a distorted interpretation of the doctrine were to lead to any of 



60 The Annals of the American Academy 

them becoming, what, for all practical purposes, would be vassals of 
the United SUtes. 

In a brilliant address recently delivered in Chile, Mr. Roosevelt 
dwelt at length upon the scope of the Monroe Doctrine in relation 
to the acquisition of territory on this continent by a European 
power; and referred specifically to two cases in which its operation 
would supersede treaty obligations. He said: 

It waa announrcd the other day in the South American press that the 
United St4ite8 waa ahout to agree to a treaty with Denmark which should 
provide that all questions, even those affecting national honor and interests, 
should hereafter he arbitrated. Under such a treaty Denmark would have the 
perfect right to sell the island of St. Thomas to any great military nation of 
Europe, and any arbitral court would decide that she had the right. Yet, no 
patriotic American of courage and sound intelligence would hesitate for a 
moment to say that, treaty or no treaty, such action could not he tolerated 
by the United States. In the same way. if Mexico chose to sell Magdalena Bay 
to some great Old World power, any arbitration court would decide that Mexico 
had the right to do so. Yet, it would he a criminal act for the United States to 
permit such a sale. As regards St. Thomas and as regards Magdalena Bay alike, 
not only would the Monroe Doctrine forbid the transfer of either to any for- 
eign power, but, even if it did not, and if no such doctrine were in existence, the 
United States, if it possessed the slightest wisdom, could not permit such trans- 
fer to take place. It is worse than folly, it is mischievous hypocrisy, to make 
promises which ought not to he and would not be kept. 

The same principles were enunciated in the Ix)dge resolution 
adopted by the United States Senate at the time of freely current 
rumors that Mexico was on the point of effecting a sale of Magdalena 
Bay to Japan. I make bold, however, to differ from the view implied 
by the distinguished authors of those pronouncements, for the simple 
and logical reason that the other parties to the arbitration treaties 
are fully acquainted with, and, in most cases, have recognized the 
purposes of the Monroe Doctrine; and so, in the event of such a 
point arising, could not reasonably demand its submission to arbi- 
tration, unless the transaction involved had been carried out with 
the express object of challenging enforcement of the doctrine. But 
it is not in this phase of the matter that the re^l danger exists. The 
doubts and suspicions of the Latin republics as to the ultimate aims 
of the United States are accentuated by the widening of the Monroe 
Doctrine to ends never contemplated by its authors. It is such in- 
cidents as those which have occurred in Mexico, in Nicaragua and in 
Colombia, that have led to a growing belief in the supposed desire on 



Latin View or Movaos DocnuNc 61 

the part of the United SUttai to estabtkh a fuieni .me of 

i\w n*|)ublicii of Central and South America; and, « . . there 

be no payment of a money Qribute, or no open claim io the right 
of veto, or to the right of intervention in the internal affain of 
the other states, the repetition of such acta as are here bdlcated, 
would, to all intents and purposes, confer the power of suierainty 
upon the United States. 

All I jitin-Ameriean publicists eoDoede that the Monroe Doctrine 
1 1 as indirectly conferred benefits upon the world at large and that 
r' '^.lordinary development of some of the countries of South 
is within cerUiin limitM, due to its existence and operation. 
1 lii> recognition may be seen in tlie subsidiary doctrine so ably ex- 
IHiunciiHl in December, 1002, by my distinguished friend, Dr. Luis 
M. Drago, then minister of fon^ign affairs of the Argentine Republic, 
and accepted by the Latin republics, as well as, with very slight modi- 
fications, by the United States. It may also be seen in the address 
(Mivered by the late Mr. Emilio Mitre, to the Argentine Chamber of 
I>eputies, on the occasion of a visit to that country of Mr. Secretary 
Root. In one passage of his speech, Mr. Mitre said: 

^v^ r n President Monroe formulated his doctrine, he decreed peace between 

! ul America. In short, the Monroe Doctrine was the veto of war 

I ountries of the two hemispheres; and from the ■■hea of the coo* 

h had occurred prior to the declaration of that noble poliey, 

>wn up youthful nations which, today, are tbemselvea ttroof 

laim the same doctrine as the motto upon their national shields. 

Ex-President Roosevelt truly describes the situation when he 
>:i> s that the Monroe Doctrine is looked upon with favor and is even 
« I as an American policy by the leading statesmen of South 
; but what they approve and welcome is the Monroe Doe- 
trine as they view it; and not as it is viewed by a great number of the 
public men of the United States. The Argentine Republic has special 
reausons for gratitude for the past existence of the Monroe Doctrine, 
not least amongst which are, tliat it was the first of the Latin- American 
republics to be recognised by the United States; and that it was en- 
abled, Urgely through the re-assertion of that doctrine, to remain 
over a long period in undisturbed possession of the extensive and then 
undeveloped Patagonian territory, which is now becoming such a val- 
uable national asset. Yet, knowing as I do, the honorable and liberty- 
loving character of the Argentme people, I venture to assert that 



62 The Annals of the American Academy 

there ia not a public man of that country who would sanction, for one 
moment, the further endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine, if he be- 
lieved it implied a claim to intervention in the domestic concerns of 
even the least important of the American republics. The comments 
of the Argentine press on Dr. Drago's famous note to the minister 
of that republic at Washington clearly confirmed this view of their 
attitude towards the Monroe Doctrine. Some of the authorities of 
that countr>' went even so far as to assert that if the official interpre- 
tation of that instrument, by the United States, is of such a character 
as to become a menace to the commercial interests of the European 
powers, the Argentine Republic would find itself unable to favor a 
policy whereby it would be drawn into a conflict with the countries 
whence it had derived its immigration and the capital which had 
developed its resources. 

Looking at all these circumstances and at the change of conditions 
in all the American republics from those existing in their early stages 
of nationhood, there would appear to be little reason and less justi- 
fication for the assumption, by the United States, of anything in 
the nature of a protectorate over them. This country has the right 
to adopt measures to secure the fullest protection of its citizens and 
their interests on the borders of a turbulent neighbor, such as every 
nation enjoys in other parts of the world; but it derives no prescrip- 
tive right from the Monroe Doctrine to encroach upon the independ- 
ence of any other sovereign state. 

Briefly summarized, the situation, as already stated, must be 
viewed alike from the standpoints of justice and expediency. Justice 
unquestionably demands the complete independence of all the re- 
publics of the New World. To deny this is to stultify the utterances 
of every President of the United States since the declaration of its 
independence. On the other hand, expediency dictates that " honesty 
is the best policy/' and that moral as well as material loss must 
neoessarily follow the pursuance of a course of action which would 
alienate the sympathies and friendship of the twenty independent 
DAtions described as the Latin Republics of America. In other 
wwds, it would involve the sacrifice of commercial and industrial 
expansion to political considerations that would bring no correspond- 
ing advantages. The really sane view of the Monroe Doctrine is that 
its provisions should be enforced only against those who seek to vio- 
late them and not against those in whose interest they were framed. 



THE SOUTH AMERICAN VIEW AB TO THE MONROE 

DOCTRINE* 

Bt Paxton Hibbbn. 

It IB not my purpoee to speak to you at any length on the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, albeit I have very positive opinions on every phase 
of that most vital international question, which has been so ably 
treated by other speakers. I wish merely to protest, and to pro- 
t rst very earnestly, against what I must believe the impractical ideal- 
' " ^'iew, not only of the Monroe Doctrine, but of the proper 
«>rican policy for the United States to pursue, which seems 
1 irs to have grown like a prodigious snowball, simply 

1 i>u»hed about from hand to hand by the political philoso- 

i this country. I refer to that view so eloquently presented 

lo you this morning by Mr. John Barrett — that the United States 
invite to join them, in their maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, 
those nations of South America which, in Colonel Roosevelt's phrase, 
have "risen to a sufficient point of economic well-being, of stable and 
orderly government, of power to do justice to others and to exact 
justice from others, and therefore of potential armed strength to 
liable them thus to act as guarantors of the doctrine." 

In my own humble opinion the Monroe Doctrine is not and 
hould not be a cardinal principle of Pan-American policy, nor a tie 
to bind us to our sister republics of the south. It has had its privi- 
leges through ninety years that we have been comparatively free 
under its operation from the threat of European aggression in this 
iiemisphere. It has its responsibilities of which I, for one, think 
we may not in honor lightly discharge ourselves. But the privi- 
leges and the responsibilities are ours, and ours alone. We may not 
share them. And, frankly, not one of the three great republics at 
the southern extremity of South America for a moment desires to 
share them with us. Those who claim that the Argentine, Brasil 
and Chili, and perhaps Uruguay, are eager or even willing to join 
with us in any closer bond than that which unites friendly nations, 
have erected in their imagination an alluring mirage which tliey will 
never, I believe, attain. 

* Reourka at the ntsioD of the Aeademy, Friday aft«rnooo, April 3. 1014. 



64 The Annals of the American Academy 

Colonel Ho().-(*v(»lt's words on this subject have been quoted to 
you. Yet curiously enough, those of Dr. Marcial Martinez in reply 
to Colonel Roosevelt's address before the University of Chili, on 
November 22 last, make no part of the record of .these proceedings. 
It is that they shall he rocordod here that I have ventured to intrude 
upon your time. 

For Dr. Marcial Martinez is a very old and a very wise and pru- 
dent statesman. In his lifetime he has himself seen the growth 
not only of his own countr>', but of the Argentine and Brazil as well, 
to a condition of power to do justice to others and to exact justice 
from others, and his words reflect better, I think, than those of any 
other man in the countries of which I speak — a crystallization of opin- 
ion which is the product of the development and prosperity of those 
nations in wha«»e histor>' he has played no minor r6le. 

I quote only part of Dr. Martinez's remarks: 

*'My frankly stated opinion," he says, "is that the Monroe 
Doctrine has lived out its time, has ceased to exist." And again: 
"Clear and definite situations are always preferable to the vagut*- 
nesses, the uncertainties and the anomalies to which the lapsed 
Monroe Doctrine lent itself" — unminced words to address to one 
bearing the suggestion that the Monroe Doctrine be accepted and 
maintained by certain republics of South America in concert with 
the United States! And Dr. Martinez goes on to define very clearly 
that situation which he and, I believe, the ablest minds of Latin 
America consider preferable to the Monroe Doctrine. 

"The eminent Mr. Roosevelt," he continues, "has frequently 
spoken, in the course of his present triumphal journey, of 'confidence.' 
But confidence, like religious faith, can be no matter of agreements 
nor of decrees, nor of contracts, unless it be an actual fact, emanating 
from a reciprocal experience, from individual conviction and personal 
conscience." 

And in regard to all the treaties which we have been at such 
pains to make or the making of which we have been at such pains 
to stimulate, since the idea first occurred to Mr. Elihu Root to legis- 
late peace into the hearts of the denizens of this hemisphere, by 
means of a fine network of conventions of arbitration, Dr. Marcial 
Martinez pronounces this final judgment: 

I believe it will always be a wise counsel to suggest to the American Repub- 
Uca: that they celebrate few if any new treaties with the idea of strengthening 



South Amskicait Vibw or Monbob DocTBoni 65 



their rMiproeftl frioidaUp. Whet b ol raal taIim are eordkl 
<kponrtratioM of pAlpablo good faiUi, of probity aad diaiaimmtMmam bt 
politieAl and oomntreiAl rtlAtioot, which eoodoeo to the reeult for whieh we 
all hope, iaeteed of worde erepoimtiog ioto nnthiinneM . . . 

Another point upon whieh I would toueh briefly ie thet of intemntiooel 
arbitration. My way of thinking, deeply rooted in my mind, brinti nie tothie 
eomplei eooelwion: I think that the very aneient idea of uni fetial pie in. 
whieh nowadajra b enjoying an extraordinary reemdeeeenee, ia a beaotifitl 
illuaion, a noble chimera which lenda iteelf to dangerous aophiatriea. . . . 

One idea whioh ia abeolutely find with me ii that arbitration ia notan 
adequate meene to the conaervation of peace. Eirtentive study and careful 
obeervation have oonTineed me long sinoe that this method euffers from ni 
ous and very grave defeoU. This is not the moment to enlai 
ideas; what I advise, and what I wish is that those distinguished men, who 
busy themselves in recommending arbitration, shall regard with favor ths em- 
ployment of every energy to promote the idea of direct understandings, of 
ooneiUation, of eompromiae and fraternal agreement. This is the great 
formula for friendship, and consequently for international peace. An under- 
standing leaves no bitterness behind it, whereas an adverse decision leavee 
ice on the soul of the loser. . . . 

Whatever must be brought about between this powerful country, the 
United States, and the South American Republics, will come of itself. Sym- 
pathy, loyal and honorable treatment, proximity, an intimacy as 
possible between the men directing the destinies of these peoples, and 
cially reciprocal interests will of themeelves effect a political and an economic 
entente. There is need of no artificial measures, for they are ever fragile and 
often unproductive. The play of the natural laws of human progress must be 
left free. 

As it has seemed to me manifestly inadequate to consider the 
present status of the Monroe Doctrine without taking into account 
this view of the relations between the United States and their sister 
republics of this hemisphere, which I firmly believe is the prevailing 
view in the greater part of what we call Latin America, I am grata- 
ful to this aooe mblage for this opportunity to read into the records 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science a concep- 
tion of our relations with Latin America which has found no other 
expression here. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND LATIN AMERICA 

By Joseph Wheless, 
Attorney at Law, St. Louis, Mo. 

The single purpose which moves me to a discussion of the phase 
of this subject indicated by the title of this paper is to endeavor 
to dear away the obscuring mists of misunderstanding which have 
been blown up around the Monroe Doctrine in its immediate relation 
to Latin America. " Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
you free," is the inspired text of the evangel of better understanding 
which I come to preach. It is the same high desire as actuated Mr. 
Calhoun in his great speech in the Senate on the same subject — "I re- 
move a false interpretation, which makes safe and proper declarations 
improper and dangerous." To accomplish this, I shall rely not upon 
arguments of mine o^ti, and but a few North American interpreta- 
tions, but shall appeal to the best accredited utterances of the most 
authoritative statesmen and publicists of our neighboring states of 
Latin America. 

That a false interpretation and misunderstanding of the Monroe 
Doctrine, and of the policy of the United States thereunder, do exist, 
and have been responsible for no little ill-feeling and irritation, is 
unfortunately true and cannot be ignored. This fact was regarded 
by President Roosevelt as of such importance as to be made the sub- 
ject of special conmient in a message to Congress. In his message 
of December, 1905, he refers to this fact, and seeks to dispel the 
error underlying it in emphatic language: 

In many parta of South America there has been much misunderstanding 
of the attitude and purposes of the United States towards the other American 
republics. An idea has become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe 
Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right 
to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that 
doctrine applies. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet that impression 
continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding^ to friendly intercourse, 
to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. 
The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by 
any ordinary means. 

66 



Monroe Docnums and Latin Amuuca 07 

Certainly no one has been more eanieet or uaed mote rmpharfi 
than ha« Mr. Rooeevelt, in proclaiming the true goepel of the poUey 
and miflrion of the United States in respect to the American nations, 
and in striving to allay the baseless fears of stirnsrimi and aggrin* 
diaement which many profess to feel towards the government at 
Washington. The truth of his so often repeated declarations of tiie 
good will and peaceful dedgns of the United States regardfaig Latin 
America cannot be gainsaid. From hi« repeated utterancen on the 
subject two representative and official statements may be cited, 
hi his message to Congress of Deoeml)or 3, 1001, the President said: 

The Monroe Doctrine ia a declaration that there must be no territorial 
aggrandiseinent by any non- American power at the expense of any American 
power on American soil. It ii in no wtee intended m hostile to any nation in the 

Old Worid This doctrine has nothing to do with the '*'*"'ttr*fftf 

relations of any Ameriean power, save that it in truth allows each of them to 
form such ss it desires. 

Again in the message of December, 1904, President Roosevelt 
states strongly his views of the policy and duty of the United States: 

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains 
any projects as regards other nations of the western hemisphere save such 
as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring 
eountries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct 
tbemaelves well can count upon our hearty friendship. 

One of the most friendly critics of the Latin-American policy 
of the United States is Seizor Alejandro Alvdrez, of Chile, whose work, 
Le Droit InlemtUional Amhicain, is a luminous study of this and lun- 
dred subjects. Frequently, in this and other published wofIls, he calls 
the Monroe Doctrine ''the political gospel of the New World.'' But 
this same writer expresses the further truth that there exists in the 
minds of many persons, even statesmen and writers on international 
law, a serious confusion of ideas as to what is the Monroe Doctrine; 
they confuse with it and attribute to it every action and policy of 
the United States having any relation to Latin America. Sefior Alvi- 
res goes directly to the root of the matter, saying: ''Distinctions 
should be made between (1) the Monroe Doctrine in its primitive 
form; (2) the hegemony of the United States on the American eoo- 
tinent; and (3) the imperialistic policy of that Nation." Fiulure 
to make these very obvious distinctions, due to confusion of thought 



08 Trb Annalb of the American Academy 

or to inadequate knowledge of American history as it relates to 
Latin America, is responsible for the whole unfortunate crop of hos- 
tile critioisma of the Monroe Doctrine and of ill-will towards the 
United States as sponsor for that doctrine, except such part of these 
attacks as is due wholly to the ignorance or malevolence of their 
authors. This fact is clearly recognized by Sefior Alvdrez, who says : 
"Publicists have not only failed to see the real origin and nature of 
the doctrine, but have disfigured its true meaning;" and he adds: 
" For the majority of persons, it is the basis of the policy of hegemony 
which the United States is developing on the American continent." 
Further, on this latter point he says: 

These pointe of view are inadmissible, since the idea of hegemony does not 
grow out of the Monroe Doctrine nor is its development dependent upon it; and 
the uune objection may be made to the attempt to include within the category 
of "hegemony" every step taken by the United States in international policy 
in the American continent. 

The hegemony of the United States is the fruit of the prodigious and rapid 
deTelopment attained by that country, outdistancing the other American 
republics, and the de facto recognition of this circumstance not only by the 
states of Europe but also by those of America 

The United States as the most powerful of the states of America becomes 
the natural spokesman of the continent and charges itself with the duty of 
making its ideas respected, to the mutual advantage of all. 

This "confusion of ideas" in respect to the Monroe Doctrine, 
and the very prevalent disposition to make it a sort of scapegoat 
for all the manifestations of the policy of the United States, which are 
regarded by our neighbors as acts of "hegemony" and of "imperial- 
ism," has had a recent striking exemplification. This was the failure 
of the gracious and just act contemplated in the Fourth Pan-Ameri- 
can Conference looking to an expression of appreciation of the bene- 
fits of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America. The Latin-American 
delegations feared, as expressed by Sefior Alvdrez, that "while 
approving it, they might sanction along with it many acts of hege- 
mony committed by the United States by which more than one coun- 
try had felt its sovereign dignity to have been wounded." 

This state of facts should give sober pause to all those in the 
United States who are charged with the important and delicate task 
of shaping the relations between our country and our neighbors of 
Latin America. The latter, it will be seen, cordially approve "the 
principles which properly belong to the Monroe Doctrine," while they 



L 



MoHBOB DocrmntB and Latin Ameeica 



ive taken offence at and ohariah resentment of "certain tiwidf of 
[)olicy which are foreign to it/' but which they undtsoemingly confute 
with the Monroe Doctrine, to its disparagement and to the detriment 
oi the good relations which it is our desire and our duty to cultirate 
with our sister republics. It behooves us then, who desire to steer 
our course along the safe and pleasant paths of international friend- 
ship and goodwill, to do our utmost to dispel the misondentanding, 
at home and abroad, of the true import of the Monroe Doctrine, and 
by future ooDiiderate conduct avoid all ofTensive "acts of hogBOH my " 
which are eomptained of, even by friendly critics, as having wounded 
the sensibilities and the sovereign dignity of our neighbors. 

The most succinct, as well as authoritative, statement of the 
Monroe Doctrine is found, naturally, in the text of President Mon- 
roe's historic message of December 2, 1823. It embraces two separate 
but correlated propositions, the essential words of which are: 

1 the American continenta are henoeforth 

not to be eoneid^red aa subjects for future colonisation by any Euf o p sa a 
powers. 

2. . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 

opprswing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any 
European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition towards the United States. 

In The Annals of this Academy for May, 1011, Sefior AlvArei 
makes an analysis of President Monroe's Message, and deduces 
the generally accepted estimate of its political content. He thus 
summarises: 

The declarations of an international character contained in this document 
may be reduced to three: 

1. No European country may gainsay the right gained by the nations of 
the New World to their independenoe and sovereignty. 

2. The right is reoogniaed of these same American nations to organiae 
such fonna of government aa beat auit their intereata without the intarveotioa 
of any Ekiropean country in the affairs relating to internal regulation; and 

3. European nations are prohibited acquiring by occupation any part of 
the American continent. 

The foregoing simple propositions are the "whole of the law and 
the prophets" of the Monroe Doctrine. As Sefior Ahr^hnes proeeeds 
to say: "These declarations, by their predseness and de&iiteness, 
became henceforth the political creed of all the nations of the New 



70 The Annals of the American Academy 

World And this is so true that all those nations strove 

for the solemn proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine at the American 
International CongresB which met at Panama in 1826." No candid 
mind can justly disoover in any of the propositions of this traditional 
American policy any broader scope or ulterior purpose than those 
stated. 

In view of the carping criticism of our American patriots-at-large 
in aid and comfort of its ill-advised maligners abroad, we must dis- 
cover what really is the status of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin 
America, officially and among those whose opinion is authoritative. 

With the utmost enthusiasm and gratitude was the message 
hailed by the South American states, whose independence was for- 
ever assured by the policy declared by President Monroe ; their gov- 
ernments, and the heroes of their independence, declared their hearty 
approbation of its principles. Bolivar proposed it for general rati- 
fication at his projected Panama Congress; and from that date, says 
Sefior Alvdrez, "all the Latin states have not only striven to pro- 
claim it solemnly but also to unite to make it respected" — for, he 
says, it "expressed the aspirations of all America." A distinguished 
Spanish publicist, Exmo. Sefior Alejo Garcia Moreno, in a study of 
"The Monroe Doctrine," in 1909, says: 

These principles proclaimed by Monroe were accepted universally, in the 
first place, in the opinion of the people of the United States, and then in that of 
the other American republics, and the Monroe Doctrine was thus converted 
into a principle of American public law, which received its solemn consecra- 
tion in the Congress of the States of the South, reunited in Panama in 1826. 

The highest and most authoritative men of the states of Latin 
America are outspoken in approval and praise of the Monroe Doctrine, 
which has indeed long been an acknowledged Pan-American principle. 
Sefior A. de Manos-Albas, called by the late William T. Stead "one 
of the shrewdest and ablest public men to whom Latin America has 
given birth in our time," says: "There was an element of prophetic 
inspiration in the declaration of President Monroe, uttered in 1823. 
It rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the 
Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe 
is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted Amer- 
ican republics." The brilliant Peruvian, Garcia-Calder6n, in his just- 
ly celebrated new work, Les Dimocraiies Lattnes de L'Am^que, says, 
in grudging admission of the truth: "The United States proclaimed 



Monroe Docnmni and Latin Ambuca 71 



the autonomy of the coptinent and oontrtbuted to the 
of the originality of southem America, by foHbiddtng the fonDAtkm 
of colonies \^ithin Uieir vacant territoriee, by defending republican 
and democratic etateaajainat reactionary Europe." Before the Pourtli 
Pan-American Conference, Dr. Victoriano de la Plaia, Argentine 
miniiiter of foreign affairs, recognised the same truth: "This condi- 
tion of precarious autonomy and liberty of action, and the constaBl 
danger of being subjugated or suffering the mutilation of their te^> 
ritory, would have continued among those weak states but for the 
wise and famous dedarations of President Monroe, to which we ought 
to render due homage." I present a final citation from the highest au- 
thority, the eminent Argentine, Sefior Luis M. Drago, whose words 
are commended especially to those who persist in a misconception of 
the spirit and purpose of the Monroe Doctrine. In his famous note, 
in 1902, formulating the "Drago Doctrine," he appealed to the saving 
grace of the Monroe Doctrine as against European ag g r e ss i on in 
Venesuela; elsewhere he calls it "the formula of foreign policy of 
) le new world. ' ' In a recent exposition of his own celebrated doctrine, 
he uses these measured and weighty words: 

The Monroe Doctrine is in fact a formula of independence. It impoaea 
no dominion and no superiority. Much less does it establish protectorates or 
relation of superior to inferior. It creates no obligations and no respoDsibiii- 
ties between the nations of America, but simply calls upon all of them, with 
their own means and without foreign aid, to exclude from within their 
rt*spective frontiers the jurisdiction of European powers. Proclaimed by the 

oited States in the interest of their own peace and security, the other repub- 
lics of the continent have in their turn proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone 
to their own individual welfare and internal tranquillity. This moral eoBSoK 

f intentions and tendencies constitutes in itself alone a great force without 
uoed of treaties or formal alliances or definite obligations. Thus understood, 
the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more than the aTptssiioii of 
t he will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the i n d ep i w id en ee of 

lie states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to 
I he powers of Europe. 

Such illuminating statements of the principles which inspire 
the policy known as the Monroe Doctrine, and its hearty accepitanfe 
in Latin America, should have the happy effect of dissipating the 
misunderstanding of that doctrine which is so prevalent among 
many not only in Latin America and Europe, but among some in 
the United States who should better understand their government 



72 Thb Annals op the American Academy 

and ite historic polity. It may be added, that every nation of Latin 
America, admitted through the action of the United States to the 
last "Parliament of Mankind" at The Hague, has, in concert with 
all the other nations of the world, given its express assent to the 
Monroe Doctrine as an essential Pan-American principle. 

The last word of authoritative interpretation was uttered but 
the other day by ex-President Roosevelt in his address before the 
University of Buenos Aires, in which he declared : 

The Monroe Doctrine ia meant to express the fact that the western hemi- 
•phere is not to be treated as Africa or mid-Asia is treated, as a subject for con- 
quest by any Old World power. It is a doctrine which the United States pro- 
mulgated, partly as a matter of policy in its own interest, partly as a matter of 
policy in the interest of all the republics of the New World. 

And in expression of a very patent, but often perversely unrec- 
ognized truth, he added: 

But as rapidly as any other republic grows to possess the stability, the 
■elf-respecting insistence upon doing right to others and exacting right from 
otherB, just so soon that country becomes itself a sponsor and guarantor of 
the Monroe Doctrine with which the United States of the North no longer has 

any concern, so far as the doctrine relates to it As far as you (of 

the Argentina) are concerned, we have no more concern with the Monroe Doc- 
trine about you than you have about us. If ever it became vitally necessary 
to enforce it, each would help the other. 

The Monroe Doctrine, in its pristine significance, is thus seen 
to stand accredited, approved, and adopted by all America; it has 
won universal acceptance on its merits, and needs no defender or 
apologist. It will endure as an active principle until its protective 
and civilizing mission is accomplished with the emergence of all the 
American countries into self-sustaining nationality; until, in the elo- 
quent words of Exmo. Sefior Bermejo in his closing address before 
the Fourth Pan-American Conference, — "the day when America 
entire shall have finished her institutional evolution in the sense of 
forming *an indestructible union of indestructible states,' as runs 
the phrase consecrated by the most authoritative Areopagus on 
earth." Then only may the Monroe Doctrine be dubbed, by irrev- 
erent achoofanen, an "obsolete shibboleth;" but it will be cherished 
by the emancipated nations as of blessed memory through all coming 
time. 



Monroe Doctrine and Latin America 78 

An a ward agnm-sL l-^uroiK'an aKKn-HHiun, the Munrtx* I><K-trinf 
b not yet **o\mo\eUi." Thuitc who ho [mKMiuiiati.*ly licinumi tlmt wc* 
''abandon the Monroe Doctrine/' show that in their teal they reek 
not the leflBona of history and that they "ignore the plain tmeU of 
the present.'' Seftor Alvires recognises that it is still the weleome 
shield and buckler of Latin American independenoe and integrity, 
saying : ** These states not only do not reject it, but have sought and 
always will seek protection under it whenever it may operate for 
their benefit." The Peruvian, Seftor Caldcr6n, who virulently as- 
sails the United States because of his own ''confusion of ideas" re- 
specting the Monroe Doctrine, terrified by the qwetre idiich he raises 
before himself of a Japanese invasion and conquest of Latin America, 
" to erect there a new Japan," takes comfort to his fears, exclaiming: 
" The Monroe Doctrine, which liberated Latin America from the tute- 
lage of the Holy Alliance, is perhaps destined to protect it also against 
the Orient." He begins his chapter "Le Danger Allemand," with 
the fearsome words: "The Teutonic invasion disquiets the Hispano- 
American i^Titers. The tutelary protection of the United States 
does not suffice to make them forget the European peril." Elsewhere 
he dwells upon the fact that "tenacious Teutonic colonizers" flow 
into Brazil, Chile, and other countries of South and Central America, 
"the German danger remains." As for Japan, he says: "her 
teemen and publicists consider that Peru, Chile and Mexico are 
lands for Japanese expansion," and he gloomily predicts "a struggle 
U'twot^n half-breed America and stoical Japan, in which the former 
will los<» its autonomy and its traditions." 

History has been a long record of expansion of active and popu- 
lous nations into the territories of weaker and less populated states. 
1 iuTo is nothing to indicate that this movement has reached its 
final period. Indeed, the struggle for expansion for over-flowing 
pulations is reaching its most acute stage. The possibility of a 
-ramble for South America" does not exist alone in the fears of 
some South American theorists. Practical men of state openly ex- 
-ss them, and some of the land-hungry have been frank to avow 
-ir annoyance with the restraints of the Monroe Doctrine. An 
English writer in the Nineteenth Century Magazine, December, 1896, 
speaks c\'nically and covetously of the alluring possibilities in a 
"scramble for South America," and says, "if it once begins, neither 
the latent resources nor the moral influence of the United States 



74 The Annals op the American Academy 

will avail to protect its clients without the display of effective mili- 
tary strength." 

Again an English writer, Mr. Somers Somerset, in the same mag- 
asine, for April, 1903, at the time of the Venezuela troubles, defines 
the "new economic necessities" which look towards Latin America for 
a aolutkm, and says: 

In proportion m the available surface of the earth that is suitable for 
colonisation decreaees, it becomes more and more evident that not only is there 
no time to be lost in founding an empire, but that the price which a people may 
be able to allow itself to pay for the acquisition of that territory is greatly 
rising. The constant pressure of the peoples of Europe, the commercial struggle, 
and the natural desire for national aggrandizement are bound to be power- 
ful factors; and the consideration of "now or never" will very soon mark the 
policy of various European chancelleries. We have already seen that the Old 
World offers few attractions—there remains only the New World to be considered. 

The veto of the Monroe Doctrine, in the opinion of this writer, 
has up to this time saved the American countries from European 
aggression; but he adds: "it must be remembered that during that 
time the world afforded many opportunities for colonization in other 
regions, and that that period is drawing to its close, and it is scarcely 
to be expected that a mere formula or opinion will continue to protect 
those countries for long." That this is a real condition, and not a 
theory, is the belief of the most accredited Latin American statesmen. 
The events in Venezuela, says Dr. Juan A. Garcia, are not isolated 
facts, measures of policy, or reparation of wrongs, "but the oppor- 
tunity which materialized a tendency latent in Europe since the middle 
of the past century which in the last years has been emphasized and 
fortified by the new economic necessities." This subject is treated 
at length and very seriously by Dr. Luis M. Drago, in a recent ex- 
planation of his action, in 1902, in appealing to the protection of the 
Monroe Doctrine in behalf of Venezuela as against the aggression of 
England, Germany and Italy. His note pointed out, he says : 

A danger that lay very near and it aimed to forestall it. At the time when 
it was transmitted everything combined to inspire the greatest alarm. There 
was rife in political and diplonuitic circles a constant agitation which was dom- 
inant, and was di sse min ated by the greatest newspapers of the world, the most 
important and best accredited reviews and the books of thoughtful men, and 
which pointed out these countries as the best fields for the colonial expansion 
of the great powers, once the doors of Africa and the Orient were closed. 

Thinkers of the highest rank have suggested the advisability of turning 



Monroe Docnuim and Latin America 76 

' > 1^ •hn* titm the graal tfforU which the priaeipal povMi of Buropt hftfw 

to 111.1. 1«> fur theeooquMtuf «i«rila regioni, with riforouf eUaate, lyiag 

niw»idi«iaDieonMiwofih0world. There are alto niAiiy EuropMa writon 

i*Mint out the couniriM of South Ameriea and their gTMi wealth, frith their 

•unny tkiM end propitioue climetee, m the oeturel theatre where the great 

powen with their arme and Inetrumeote prepared for oooqueet have jrei in the 

eouree of thie century to diepute dominion The aet of ly^trfkw i 

attempted againat Venesuela eee m ed pooeequently to be the beginning of the 
hoetilitiet predicted againat Amariea. 

Writing about a year ago in the English Rnitw of Bmew§, 
Sefior A. de Mano^-Albaa calls Latin America "a tempting field for 
• xpansion/' and frankly states the incentives which the American 
FH Dorado offers to the avidity of the land-grabbing expuidoKMM 
> if Europe: 

The territorial reeponeibilitiee of the Latin- American nation* are greatly 
in ezeeee of their reepectiTO populations. The seventeen republics from Mexico 
to Cape Horn, with an area several times that of Central Europe, contain at 
best seventy million inhabitants, who could be oomfortably houaed in any one 
of the larger republics, leaving the immense remaining territory available for 
European expansion. Can Tripoli compare with the broad and fertile plains 
of Northern Venesuela, bordering on the Caribbean? Or Morocco with the 
Atlantic coast section of Colombia? Can the Congo oompare favorably with 
the Amason, or Madagascar or West Africa with the inner lands of Peru, of 
Bolivia, or of Ecuador? 

The consideration of such poestbilities implies no wanton spirit of alarm- 
-rn. If Tripoli has been thought worth Italy's present effort, and Moroeeo 
i ranee's recent venture, why should not the infinitely richer Caribbean coast 
an likewise? No one in his senees, surely, would outrage the powers by sup- 
osing that their abetention has been prompted by moral oonaidarations; 
( tieir reputation is too well established. 

From the foregoing, which are but a few of many similar espre»> 
sions of covetous desire towards the teeming poesibilities of Latin 
America, may be better appreciated the significance of the avowal at 
Sefior Alvdres when he frankly declares the reality oi these fean 
and the only hope of salvation, saying: ''The Monroe Doctrine, 
far from being a thing of the past, as some publicists pralSDdt is still 
of present importance in the sense that it denies the cnrislsniw of 
rritories *ntdUus* which could be acquired through occupation by 
European countries." 

It is needful to consider briefly that "confusion of ideas" which 
issociates the welcome and approved Monroe Doctrine with so- 



76 TmB Annalb op thf American ArAPEMY 

called "acts of hegemony and imperialism/' of which complaint 
is made, and which are, rightly or mistakenly, the cause of existing 
suspioion and ill-will. Knowing the truth and justice, or otherwise, of 
these charges, we may better be able to make any proper amende 
hcnorMe for the past by more considerate action in the future. 

The writer who most formally makes these charges and formu- 
lates the specifications of grievance, is Sefior Calder6n, in his recent 
Les Mnoaratie8 Latines de UAmtrique. He opens his chapter en- 
titled "Le P^ril Nord-Am^ricain" with these ominous words: 

In order to defend themaelyes against Yankee imperialism, the American de- 
mocracies would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms; 
eversrwhere, the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles, in Cen- 
tral America, the hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the char- 
acter of a Latin crusade. 

It is well to examine for a moment his catalogue of grievances^ 
which he reiterates as reasons for what he calls "an accumulation 
of hates" against the United States, and because of which, he declares, 
"the statesmen of the South refuse to believe in the friendship of 
the Yankees.'' After citing the "incessant territorial expansion" 
of the United States, from the Louisiana purchEise to the Panama 
Canal Zone, he concatenates every cause of complaint which he can 
conjure to his imagination, as follows: 

Interventions become more frequent with the expansion of frontiers: 
in the territory of Acre, in order to found there a republic of rubber-hunters; 
in Panama, to develop a province and construct a canal; in Cuba, under the 
eoyer of the Piatt amendment, to maintain internal order; in Santo Domingo, to 
supervise the customs; in Nicaragua, to sustain civilizing revolutions and 
overthrow t>Tants; in Venezuela and in Central America, to impose on those 
nations, torn by intestine discords, the political and financial tutelage of the 
imperial democracy. In Guatemala, in Honduras, the loans closed with the 
monarchs of North American finance reduce the peoples to a new slavery. Sui>er- 
vision of customs, expeditions of pacificatory fleets which defend the interests 
of the North Saxon, forced tranquillity and peace, such are the means employed 
. . . . The fortification of the Panama Canal, the possible acquisition of 
the GaUpagos Islands in the Pacific, are new manifestations of this imperial- 
istic progress. 

A quite similar catalogue is set out in the open letter addressed 
recently to President Wilson by Sefior Manual Ugarte, the foremost 
apostle of the proposed Pan-Latin crusade against the "colossus of 



MoNsoB EkxTTRiini AND JjAfm Amkrica 77 

the North." True, neither Sefior Calder6n nor ScAor Lgart« iUiowb 
wherein Latin America ia wronged by any of the acts recited; none uf 
the acquimtiona of territory, for over half a century, hat been at the 
expense of any country of Latin America; and 9vtry "intenrtttion" 
has been Ui signal benefit of the country eooMTiied and of dvflhMtioiL 
The United States has expanded, in obedience to its "manifest dea- 
tiny/' until it fills out its continental domain; that is an aooomplished 
fact, and justified by national neces sity and by civilisation. However, 
and far from a spirit of recrimination, but in justice to the truth ci 
history, which is now past, and never, it is to be hoped, to be repeated, 
must it be said, that if any of the events instanced have, indeed, 
tended to give occasion for the irritation attributed to them, the acts 
complained of have been abundantly provoked. The United States, 
in all conscience, has been far "more sinned against than sinning." 
The truth of this is witnessed by the Hon. James Bryce, who very 
justly Mys: 

United 8tat«t statMmen found theioMlves from time to time annoyed by the 
penrertity or ahiftineet of military dictators ruling Spanish-American eoun- 
tries. The big nation has, however, generally borne such provocations with 
patience, abusing its strength less than the rulen of the little ones abuse their 
weakness. 

One further citation of complaint from Sefior Calder6n. He 
quotes the eloquent and earnest words of Secretary Root, at the Third 
Pan-American Conference, where, "before assembled America the 
lay preacher of the new evangel" said: "We wish for no victories 
except those of peace; for no territory except our o^^ti; for no sover- 
eignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independ- 
ence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the 
family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest 
empire. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or 
powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic." 
Over against these golden words, which Sefior Calder6n calls "the 
solemn declarations of a Puritan politician," he sets, misquoted and 
out of its context, the language of Secretary Olney to Lord Salisbur>', 
in defense of Veneiuela against Great Britain, to the effect that "the 
United States is practically sovereign on the American continent;" 
and Sefior Calder6n asks "Where is the truth, in the imperialistie 
declaration of Mr. Olney or in the idaalism of Mr. Root?" I cannot 



78 The Annalb of the American Academy 

stop to demonstrate the fallacy of this mis-quotation, as I have done 
in my book on this subject; I will only say that these words, well 
qualified, were used in a "defi" to Great Britain, and to define the 
attitude of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine as towards 
ItXirope, and •not as respects Latin America, as a reading of his note 
shows. And in 1907, before the American Society of International 
Law, Mr. Olney himself clearly defined the relations of the Monroe 
Doctrine to Latin America, declaring: 

The United States under the Monroe Doctrine assumes no protectorate 
over any other American state; attempts no interference with the external 
any more than with the internal affairs of such a state; asserts no right to dic- 
tate the domeatic or foreign policy of such a state; and claims no right to use 
foroe in the affairs of such a state except as against its enemies and to aid it 
in defending ite political and territorial integrity as against any European 



To persist, after reading the foregoing words of Mr. Olney, in 
appealing to his "practical sovereign" talk to Lord Salisbury, either 
to bolster up baseless attacks or to create prejudice, would savor 
much of the trick of a shyster lawyer in citing to a court an obiter dictum 
from a case which he knows to have been overruled. All fears of 
imperialistic expansion of the United States, at the expense of Latin 
America, should be considered as foreclosed by the emphatic and 
official utterances of President Wilson, at Mobile: — "The United 
States will never seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." 
Furthermore, whatever may have been the modicum of justified com- 
plaint in the past, the present is very pregnant Avith roseate prospects 
for a happier era of good feeling and better relations for the future. 
In this regard the earnest words of President Wilson in his Mobile 
address to Latin America are of propitious augury, and should find 
hearty response with every good American: 

The future ia going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These 
states lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now 
be drawn cloeer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie 

of common understanding of each other It is a spiritual union 

which we seek. 

While the Monroe Doctrine protects Latin America from Europe, 
some of our neighbors cherish the fear that it is not a suflicient 
guaranty of protection against its own champions. Quia custodiet 



Monroe Doctrine and Latin Ambuca 79 

mdodemf queries Seflor Calder6n. And while Seflor de Maiio*- 
Albas says that the Monroe Doctrine was like a gift in the eridla of 
the nascent nationalities, the latter have acquired the daasic super- 
stition expressed in TVmso Danaoa d dcna fermUst, A remedy to 
remove such fears, and to reaUie the auspicious avowal that "the 
future is going to be very different for this hemiq>here from the past," 
I feel will be very welcome. 

To broaden the Monroe Doctrine from a North American policy 
into a genuine Pan-American principle is the easy and welcome so- 
lution. Happily tiiis is one of the most manifest tendencies of the 
times, as is witnessed by many authoritative acts and utterances in 
North and iSouth America. As early as 1862, in a note addr e ss e d by 
the foreign minister of Costa Rica to the Colombian government, thk 
"old, old story but yet forever new," of fears of the United States, 
is recited, together with some suggestions of current significance: 

If our republics could hftve the guaranty that they had nothing to fear 
from the United States of North America, it is indubitable that no other nation 

eould be more useful and favorable to us The idea has occurred to 

ny govemment that a new compact might be drafted by which the United 
States should bind themselyes solemnly to respect, and cause others to respeet, 
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the sister republics 

of this continent Resting upon a treaty of this kind, our republics 

would admit without diffidence, and without preoccupations in regard to the 
future, the idea of an intimate alliance with the North American people; they 
would feel as if they had entered into a new life, and be possessed of greater 
strength ; they would get rid of the serious and j ust fears which our raoe has felt ; 
they would mareh together with a firm step towards such a unity of institu- 
tions and interests as would change the face of the American natiooB. and lay 
the strongest foundation of our great continental alliance. 

Sefior Manoe-Albas, writing on this subject in the English /2e- 
view of Reviews t stated his plea for ''a new declaration of Pan-Amer- 
ican policy" in very earnest words, from which I briefly quote: 

The means to accomplish unity of sentiment and to dispel the misgi rings 
between the United States and the Latin-American republics is not far to seek. 
It is only required to amplify the Monroe declaration to the full extent of its 

logical development If the United States should declare that the era 

of conquest on the American continent has been closed to all and forever, be- 
ginning with themselves, the brooding storm of distrust will disappear from the 
Latin-American mind, and an international cordiality of incalculable possibU- 
ities will ensue, not only for the welfare of the American nations, but universally 
for the cause of freedom and democraey. 



80 The Annals op the American Academy 

Commenting on this, which he calls ''a masterly presentation 
of a plea for taking a forward step towards the world's peace," Mr. 
Stead says: 

Ab there is not a citisen of the United States who desires to make any such 
conquest, the acceptance of such a formula by the Government at Washington 
would have as it< first and immediate result the removal of the one great ob- 
stacle which hinders the extension of the influence and the interests of the 
United States in LAtin America. 

Practical recognition of the wisdom and desirability of a co- 
operative policy, and practical steps towards its realization, have 
been taken, and, as I have said, mark one of the most manifest ten- 
dencies of our international relations. In the first Pan-American 
Conference at Washington, in 1889, a resolution was unanimously 
adopted "That the principle of conquest shall not .... be 
recognized as admissible under American public law." At the present 
time there is pending in Congress, twice favorably reported by the 
House foreign affairs conmiittee, a resolution of which Mr. Slayden, 
of Texas, is the author, reciting that "the peace and commercial 
development of the American continent would be more certainly and 
speedily assured if the various South, Central and North American 
governments were reasonably assured against the forced permanent 
loss of territory as the consequence of war or otherwise," and resolves, 
"that the President of the United States be requested to enter into 
negotiations for the making of a treaty that will forever quiet the ter- 
ritorial titles of the various American states." It is understood that 
the executive branch of the government heartily approves the prin- 
ciple of this resolution and is working towards the end suggested. 

Another step, already begun, and the ideal of Pan-American con- 
fraternity is happily consmnmated. The republics of Latin America 
have long been silent partners, and indeed the chief beneficiaries of 
the North American doctrine; that they would welcome being in- 
vited into full partnership, sharing in both its benefits and responsi- 
bilities, is evidenced by many tokens. Taking as an instance a possible 
intervention to secure the establishment of peace and order in Mexico, 
Mr. Sherrill, late Minister to Argentina, well expresses the advantage 
of a sort of American concert of powers, suggesting that, rather than 
action by the United States alone, that Argentina, Brazil or some other 
American country be invited to join with us. The effect of such 



MoKROE DocmncE and Latin America 81 

joint action he myn, in the caae inslaneed, M well m whenever *'aii 
oocaflion for Armed intervention in thie heminpher e Rrieee," would 

have two marked tcndandai, both oC which would be hichly dadrable. Pint, 
it would entirely remoTe any idea among our South Amerieaa naighhow that 

our purpoee wae land-ffrabbing Furthermore it would be the beet 

aed moat oonviodog form of ioTitation to Latin Ameriea to partidpate equally 
with ue in the reeponaibilitiee and daralopmant of the Monroe Doetrioa. The 
great Doctrine would at onee beeome ooBtinantal, and eaaae to be unilateral, 
whieh ia today ite one great defect. 

Precedents for joint action, with the happieet resulte, may be cited. 
A gignal example was the oodperation, in 1007, of the United Stateg 
•nd Mexico in bringing order out of chaoe in Central America, re> 
gulting in the notable aeries of treaties signed at Washington between 
the five republics. Later, in 1911, the United States, Argentina and 
Braiil by their joint representations, prevented the outbreak of war 
b et wee n Peru, Ecuador and Chile. These instances, as said by Dr. 
Blakaelee, '' show that the United States has already made a beginning 
of working in unison with Latin-American states in enforcing the 
police power of the continent. It only remains," he justly remarks, 
"to extend this occasional co6peration into a definitely formulated 
and generally accepted policy. The new Monroe Doctrine," as he 
terms it, ''would accomplish everything that the present Monroe 
Doctrine aocomplishes, and much more. It would create a genuine 
Pan-Americanism." 

The advantages of such an international entente for the welfare 
a hemisphere, inestimable in making for peace, friendship and dvi- 
in America, are admirably stated by ex-Secretary Oln^ in a 
fieoent public address: 

That an American concert of purely .\merican etatee would occupy a posi- 
tion in America practically equivalent to that of the European eoneert ia 
Europe; that it would tend to avert ware between etatee ae well as i n e un a ati ens 
and revolutions within states; that it would do much to further trade and rom- 
meroe and intercouree of all kinds between the various American staiee; and 
that the United Statee, aa a leading member of the concert, might be eonnted 
upon as an agency for good even more potent than if acting in the invidiooi 
r61e of sole and supreme dictator, eeem to be tolerably sure reeulta. 

In South America there exists a great league and ooofederation 
between its three leading powers, Argentina, Braxil and Chile, popu- 



82 The Annals of the American Academy 

larly known as "The A B C of South America." These great powers, 
among the moet friendly to the United States, might readily be won 
into such a peace-making concert. These three great countries oc- 
cupy much more than half the extent of the South American conti- 
nent, and contain much more than half its population. The language 
of Secretary Blaine, in 1882, in reference to Brazil, is, a fortiori, much 
more significant if applied to the great ABC league: 

Brasil holds, in the South, much the same relationship to the other coun- 
tries that the United States does in the North. Her domanial extent, her com- 
merce, and her advancement in the path of successful progress exerts a bene- 
ficial and lasting influence in South America All this tends to make 

that empire as necessary a factor in securing peace and harmony in America 
as the United States itself, while its interests in the great and humane results 

prop osed are fully commensurate with our own What, then, is more 

natural than that these two great powers should earnestly unite in a movement 
which, it is hoped, will mark an historical epoch in South America, and exert 
its influence on countries beyond the seas, and on generations yet unborn. 

Such an invitation to an American co-partnership, extended 
to the partners of the ABC league, together with several of the other 
stable republics, would, no doubt, be welcome and cordially accepted. 
The United States exchanges Ambassadors with Brazil and Mexico, 
thus recognizing them as equals on the highest plane of international 
society. A like exchange with Argentina and Chile would signal- 
iie our deserved respect for these potent nationalities and their 
welcome into the new American concert ; a congress of these American 
ambaasadors could readily consummate the "spiritual union" which 
President Wilson assures that we seek with the nations of America. 
The basLs of such a union would be recognized friendly equality, and 
would neoeesarily carry the pledge of respect for their sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, so much desired by our neighboring republics. 
As said by the well-known Argentine political writer, Sefior Leopoldo 
Lugonee, in the Revue Sud-AnUricaine: 

Never has the realisation of Pan-Americanism been more necessary in the 
New World than now But Pan-Americanism means nothing with- 
out the United States, which represents in America the realization of the right 
to independence and the triumph of democracy. The first formula of Pan- 
Americanism, limited to the needs of the policy of defence, is the Monroe Doc- 
trine. Its declarations constitute the most significant and decisive act towards 
guaranteeing the independence of the Latin- American states. Thanks to the 
Monroe Doctrine our territorial integrity has been preserved— and that in itself 



MoimoB DocTUifB and Latin Ahsrica 8S 

is enough to inture the Unitod 8UtM our everlMting gnuitude If 

the Monroe Doctrine gUArantaei to tbeee eUtee the integrity o( their ter- 
ritoriea and their io«tttutiont, Latin AmerieAOt have nothing to fenr, 
. . . . secure in the helief that the Monroe Doetrine, which yaeterdaj 
sasured our indepa n dtoet, will luraaenre it to ue tomorrow. 



I wiah to elow by quoting the eloquent woitU of Hon. John Bar- 
' reetor General of the Pan-American Union, in a reoent ad- 
i ioh I heard hiiu deliver in Waahington : 

I believe that the time haa come when there ean be evolved from the Moo- 
roe Doctrine itaelf aa a principle, and there ean be auhatituted for the "Monroe 
Doctrine" aa a phraae, the principle and phraae of a "Pan-American poUey." 
.... The Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the Moo- 
roe Doctrine aa an original policy of the United Statea into a greater and "All- 
American" policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, 
the same dignity of position, and the aame aenae of indapandenee aa the United 

Statea now has By the substitution of "Piui-American" for 

"Monroe" and thus including all the American nations as sponsors; and by the 
substitution of "policy" for "Doctrine," and thus removing the hard, unjrield- 
ing, dictatorial and didactic suggestions of the word "doctrine," a long step 
will be taken towards a new era of Pan-American comity and confidence. 
.... Then we will have achieved that ideal, unselfish and fraternal 
aionahip of the American governments and peoples which will give a new, 
and permanently accepted significance to Pan-American relationahip, 
PiMi-American accord and Pan-American Union. 

I have sought to present a consensus of American opinion as to 
the Monroe Doctrine, its past signal services, its present signiBcanoe 
and its high potentiality to the future welfare of all America. I trust 
the early transmutation of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan- 
ican policy. 



THE EFFECTS OF THE PANAMA CANAL ON OUR RELA- 
TIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA 

By John Holulday Latan6, Ph.D., LL.D., 
Profetsor of American History, Johns Hopkins University. 

The Panama Canal, Mr. Bryce tells us in his book on South Amer- 
tea, is the greatest hberty man has taken with nature. He then pro- 
ceeds to propound some very interesting questions as to the probable 
effects of the canal on world commerce and, in a less degree, on world 
politics, also as to its effects on the political relations of Central and 
South America. He does not answer his own questions, however, 
the political effects being too delicate a question to be discussed by 
a diplomat, and the commercial effects being as yet too problematical 
to warrant a forecast. On the latter point he says : ** If a dozen of the 
most competent experts were, in 1914, to write out and place in the 
library of the British Museum and the Library of Congress their re- 
spective forecasts bearing on this subject, sealed up and not to be 
opened till A.D. 2000, they might make curious reading in that 
latter year." 

While it may not be safe to make a forecast as to the commercial 
effects of the canal, I believe that we can point out pretty definitely 
some of the political changes that it will bring about, for these changes 
are already well under way. New policies suggested or rendered nec- 
esBBiy by this great enterprise have already been formulated to a 
far greater extent than is generally realized. This paper is, therefore, 
not a forecast so much as a statement of policies now in the making. 

The building of the canal has, in the first place, rendered inevi- 
table the adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean Sea, 
and, in the second place, it has led to the formulation of new political 
policies to be applied in the zone of the Caribbean — what Admiral 
Chester calls the larger Panama Canal Zone — that is the West Indies, 
Meadoo and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. The policies 
thus far formulated include the establishment of protectorates, the 
supervision of finances, the control of all canal routes, the acquisi- 
tion of naval stations, and the requirement that governments shall 
be constitutional and based on the consent of the governed. 

Taking up a discussion of these policies my first proposition is 

84 



I 



Tbm Famama Canal amd Latin Amxbica tS 

that the Hay-Pauncefot« treaty was a turning point in the hittory of 
the West Indies, in that it was a formal recognition of the tnuMfereDoa 
of naval supremacy in the Caribbean from Great Britain to the UnHed 
States. The Spanish war contributed in no little degree to that coo- 
summation; the economic decline of the British West Indies and Uieir 
growing dependenee on the American market had, no doubt, some- 
thing to do with it; above all the rapid naval growth of other European 
powers presented to Great Britain so serious a situation that she wise^ 
decided to cultivate friendly relations with the United States and to 
nmove all causes of possible conflict; she deemed it unwise, therefore, 
to continue to insist on the joint control of the canal recognised by the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty half a century earlier. The advance of the 
United States in the West Indies has been rapid: Porto Rico was an- 
nexed at the doee of the Spanish war and Cuba became a protecto- 
rate; the Dominican Republic a little later came under the ft»*<M»m^l 
•opervision of the United States; and the canal zone was leased on 
tenns that amount to practical annexation. The supreoutcy of the 
United States in the Caribbean is now firmly established and in fact 
unquestioned. The political relations of the countries bordering on 
the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundly affected. Our Latin- 
American policy, if you object to the name Monroe Doctrine, has 
been enlarged in meaning and limited in territorial application so 
far as Its new phases are concerned. 

The original Monroe Doctrine announced our purpose to protect 
all the independent Latin-American states against political interfer- 
ence by European powers. We have now gone a step further and 
established formal protectorates by treaty over Cuba and Panama 
guaranteeing them not only against outside interference, but against 
internal disorders, and a similar protectorate over Nicaragua has been 
proposed. On July 19, 1913, a treaty signed with Nicaragua by 
Mr. Bryan was submitted to the Senate. It embodied almost word 
for word the Piatt amendment, which defined our relations with Cuba. 
Nicaragua agreed not to declare war without the consent of the United 
States ; not to sign treaties giving foreign powers a foothold on her soil ; 
not to contract any foreign debt which could not be met by the ordi- 
nary revenues of the country ; and to recognise the right of the United 
States to intervene for the purpose of protecting the ii 
of Nicaragua.* 

> Am, Ytar Book, tBtS, p. 01. 



86 The Aknals op the American Academy 

There were other equally important features of the treaty which 
will be considered in a moment. But the Senate refused to ratify 
it. The committee on foreign relations reported it unfavorably by a 
vote of eight to four.* The press reports indicate, however, that this 
treaty project has not yet been finally abandoned, but that ratification 
will be again urged upon the Senate as soon as more pressing matters 
are disposed of. 

President Roosevelt's Dominican policy added an important 
corollary to the Monroe I>octrine. He held in brief that where it was 
necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in the hands of 
receivers, the United States must undertake to act as receiver and 
take over the administration of its finances; that to allow a European 
power to take possession of the custom houses to collect the duties, 
the only effective method of paying the foreign debt, would be a 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He boldly adopted this policy and 
finally forced a reluctant Senate to acquiesce. In spite of the criticism 
that this policy encountered, the Taft administration adopted it 
and proposed to extend it to Honduras and Nicaragua. In January, 
1911, a treaty placing the finances of Honduras under the supervision 
of the United States was signed by Mr. Knox, and in June a similar 
treaty was signed with Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the 
refunding of the foreign debt in each case through loans made by 
American bankers and secured by the customs duties, the collector in 
each case to be approved by the President of the United States, and to 
make an annual report to the department of state.' These treaties 
were not ratified by the Senate. 

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. 
February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to 
the Senate. By the terms of this treaty Nicaragua agreed to give the 
United States an exclusive right of way for a canal through her ter- 
ritory and a naval base in Fonseca Bay in return for a payment of 
$3,000,000. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the 
Taft administration was at hand. In July Mr. Bryan submitted to 
the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the provisions of 
the second Knox treaty and in addition the provisions of the Piatt 
amendment, as already stated above. This arrangement has so far 
failed to receive the approval of the Senate. It b to be noted that 

•/Wd.,p. 125. 
•/Wd., 1911, p. 97. 



Tm Panama Caw al and Latin Ambrica 87 

the second Knox treaty and the Bryan treaty did not propose ^"•■mal 
administration by the United States, but the Biyan trealgr bound 
Nioaragua not to create a public debt which could not be met by the 
ordinary revenues of the island. 

President Wilson's attitude toward foreign roncsssions is a mat- 
ter of importance and carries our Latin- American policy a step further. 
As he expressed it, it is thifl : 



You hear of ooncawioni to fortign capitaiuu in Latin America. You do 
not hear of eoneasrioni to foraifo eapitaliaU in the United Staiea. They ara 
not grantod conecaaJona. Thay are invited to make inveatmenta. The work 
is ours, though they are welcome to inveat in it. We do not aak them to aup- 
ply the eapital and do the work. It ia an invitation, not a privtlefB, and tiM 
atatea that are obliged beeauae their territory doea not lie within the main 
field of modem enterpriae and action, to grant conceaaions are in thia eoodi- 
tion, that foreign intereata are apt to dominate their domeatio affairi— a eoo- 
dition of affaire alwaya dangeroua and apt to beoome intolerable 

What tbeae atatea are going to aeek, therefore, ia an emaneipation from the 
aubordination which haa been inevitable to foreign enterpriae and an 
of the aplendid character which, in spite of these diflBculties, they have 
and again been able to demonstrate.* 

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which 
Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colom- 
bia. This concession covered practically all of the oil interests in 
Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig 
canals in the country. As oil is coming into use as a naval fuel, the 
occupation of the Colombian oil fields and harbors by a foreign cor- 
poration presented a serious question. However, before the meeting 
of the Colombian Congress in November, 1913, which was to confirm 
the concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, 
withdrew the contract, alleging; ii-s his roAson the opposition of the 
United States. 

The next policy which we shall conijider i& that of acquiring con- 
trol of ail possible canal routes so that no competing canal may at any 
time in the future be dug by other powers. The manner in which we 
acquired the Panama Canal Zone produced a very bad effect through- 
out Latin America. Following Roosevelt's assertion of the big-stick 
policy and of the duty of the United States to pUy policeman in the 
hemisphere, his seizure of the Canal Zone — ^to adopt his own 

/6td., 1913, p.Ol. 



88 Th» Annals of the American Academy 

view of the transaction — aroused serious apprehension and made the 
countries of Latin America believe that the United States had con- 
verted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy to a policy of sel- 
fish a ggrcasi on. U'm hasty recognition of the Panama Republic tended 
tottrangthen belief in the reports that he had instigated the revolution. 
Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was not allevi- 
ated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech to the students of the University of 
California in which he boasted that he had taken the Canal Zone, 
and that if he had not acted as he did the matter would still be under 
discussion. 

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt admin- 
istration, Secretary Root had undertaken to reestablish friendly 
relations with Colombia by means of a tripartite treaty between 
the United States, Panama and Colombia. The proposed agree- 
ment provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by 
Colombia and for the transference to Colombia as Panama's share 
of the public debt of the first ten instalments of the annual rental 
of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to Panama 
for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaty was ratified by the 
United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia. The Taft 
administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, which 
resulted in the formulation of a rather remarkable proposition by 
Secretary Knox shortly before the close of the Taft administration. 
His proposals were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaty 
just referred to the United States would be willing to pay Colombia 
$10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the Atrato 
route and for the perpetual lease of the Islands of St. Andrews and 
Old Providence. These proposals were rejected by Colombia. The 
American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility, 
asked informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind 
would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would 
accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. 
Mr. Knox in reporting the matter to the President said that Co- 
lombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic 
administration.* 

In his message to the Colombian congress, September, 1913, 
President Restrepo referred to the concilatory attitude of President 

* d2d Cong., 3d mm., H. Doc. 1444. 



The Panama Camal asu Latin Ambbica 39 

WilflODi and added: 'The probability that the eervice of the Ijthmian 
Canal will soon be available, the advantafe of cultivating frankly 
oordial relationM with the United States, the clear and progreaive 
development of our nationality, and the peculiar needs of our mar- 
Hime departments, are making every day more close our rapproek§ 
ment with the great Republic of the North."* 

It would probably be wise policy as well as an act of justice on 
our part to agree upon some compromise with Colombia. While 
ordinarily a political act like the recognition of a new state b not a 
proper subject for arbitration, there are certain features of the Pana- 
ma case which possibly afford legal ground for Colombia's demand 
for pecuniary damages. I refer to President Roosevelt's interprelA- 
tion of the treaty of 1846. That treaty was a contract between the 
United States and Colombia, and yet President Roosevelt construed 
it as an obligation assumed by the United States for the benefit of the 
world at large, and under this interpretation he refused to allow Co- 
lombia to land troops in Panama for the purpose of putting down the 
insurrection. If Colombia should continue to insist on arbitration, 
basing her claims on President Roosevelt's forced construction of 
the treaty, it is difficult to see how the United States could refuse 
to submit the question to arbitration. 

The Nicaraguan treaty, signed by Mr. Bryan but not ratified 
by the Senate, provided that the United States should have an ex- 
clusive right of way over the Nicaraguan canal route. It was stated 
at the time that this treaty was negotiated that Gennany was con- 
sidering the possibility of getting the right of way for a canal through 
Nicaragua, but such a suggestion seems extremely improbable. 

Another important policy b the acqubition of naval stations in 
the Pacific and in the Caribbean. The Bryan treaty with Nicaragua, 
as we have already seen, provided for a ninety-nine-year lease of a 
naval base in Fonseca Bay and also for the lease of the Great Com 
and Little Com Islands in the Caribbean. The Knox propoaals 
to Colombia provided for coaling stations on the islands of St. An- 
drews and Old Providence in the Caribbean. 

The last policy to which I shall refer b President Wilson's re- 
quirement that the governments of Latin-American states shall be 
constitutional in form and based on the consent of the govemed, or, 

* Am. Year Book, l9tS, p. 80. Quoted from Londum riMM» 
1013. 



90 Thb Annalb of the American Academy 

to state it negatively, the doctrine of non-recognition. This is of 
ooune the policy that the administration has adopted in the case of 
Mexioo. In his Swarthmore speech President Wilson said : " I would 
like to believe that all thb hemisphere is devoted to the same sacred 
purpoee and that nowhere can any government endure which is 
stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the 
goveraed." The refusal to recognize a revolutionary government is 
not as novel a policy as some of the opponents of the Wilson admin- 
istration would have us believe,^ but as this question has a special 
place in this volume I shall not venture to discuss it further. 

The building of the canal has thus led to new developments 
of the Monroe Doctrine, developments not applicable to firmly es- 
tablished states like Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, but limited to 
what we Americans erroneously regard as typical Latin-American 
states, that is, the states within the zone of the Caribbean. The 
new applications of the simple principle announced by President 
Monroe in 1823 have aroused the apprehensions of certain Latin- 
American writers, and their denunciations of what they are pleased 
to call this pseudo-Monroeism have not failed to win the sympathetic 
support of a more or less limited number of writers in this country. 
Some of these writers appear to cherish a personal grievance against 
this cardinal principle of American diplomacy and one writer in 
particular has vehemently denounced it as an obsolete shibboleth.* 
It is in vain that the critics point out the difference between the 
doctrine of 1823 and the doctrine of 1914 or the difference between 
the international situation then and now. If the original policy had 
not expanded with the lapse of time or taken on new phases with the 
development of new situations, it would long since have ceased to 
be of any value to us, for the exact situation that called forth the orig- 
inal declaration in 1823 can never again arise. The Monroe Doctrine 
is merely a name that Americans have given for ninety years to our 
Latin-American policy, which in the necessity of things has under- 
gone changes and will continue to undergo them, and it is no more 
likely that the public will repudiate the name than that the State 
Department will repudiate the policy. 

Sefior Calder6n, in the Atlantic Monthly for March, 1914, takes 

' Moore, Digest of Intemaiional Law, I, 138-168. 

• Blnghmm, The Monroe Doctrine an ObaoleU Shibboleth. 



The Panama Canal and Latin Ambsica 



•1 



issue with Profeisor Bingham's ree«nt attack on the Monroe Doetrine 
on several pointa. He says: 



It is not true, •■ Profwsor Blnghsm mminUioi, thai smoncii the rapubUw 
wbieb fonn tho A BC slUanot, ArfontiiiA, Brmsil, sad Chili, powerful and solid* 
ly orgsniMd ttatM, one finds sny Jeslous opposition to the neo-8«son p ow w " 
sueh as would explain, aeeordiag to ProCessor Binghsin's theory, the alliaass 
of these ambitioua peoples. On the contrary, among these nations, out of raa^i 
of North Ameriean aeUon, the liveliest sympathy with the poltticaof the United 

States is discernible It is rather in the "sono of influence" of the 

United States, between the northern frontier of Mexico and Panama, in the 
Antilles, in Colombia and Venesuela, that hatred against the United States hss 
a popular passion. 



His final conclusion as to the future of the Monroe Doctrine we may 
safely accept: '*The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing 
this doctrine from the future history of America, even though thej 
eriticiie its exceases most severely. " 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE CANNING MYTH 

Bt Charles H. Sherrill, 
Former Minister to Argentina. 

On the twelfth of December, 1826, George Canning, then prime 
minister of England, made the proud statement in the House of Com- 
mons: " I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of 
the Old." This striking sentence, pronounced as it was by one of the 
greatest figures which the English parliamentary system ever pro- 
duced, has received wide credence ever since, even our own writers 
admitting that his suggestions had much to do with the wording and 
promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. In South America, the belief 
of the people in his controlling part in the acquisition and preserva- 
tion of their liberty has caused the erection of more than a few monu- 
ments to his memory. It is to the credit of those warm-hearted peoples 
that these testimonials to him were not affected by the frank admission 
of his boast that he was actuated not by a love for liberty, but by his 
need for something new to support his foreign policy in European 
affairs. 

The credit for the calling into existence of the New World belongs 
not to Canning, but to the splendid patriotism of those colonists 
who by means of many a pitched battle and arduous campaign drove 
out the Spanish, and even defeated an English army by the River 
Plate. Theirs is the glory of having alone and unaided gained for 
themselves the great boon of political independence. All hail, then, 
to San Martin, to Bolivar, to Sucre, to all their glorious and victorious 
brothers-in-arms! We shall see that Canning was equally unentitled 
to the credit of guaranteeing their hard-won independence against 
the land-hunger of Europe, which has made of Africa a congerie of 
European dependencies; this credit belongs to the people of the United 
States who, by means of President Monroe's message, that first clarion 
call of Pan-Americanism, cried out to all the world, "Hands off! 
these are our sister republics of this, the hemisphere of freedom." 

It is our purpose to show from documents, some long for- 
gotten, some recently published, that Canning himself knew that his 
boast was an empty one, that his remarks to Rush (American min- 

92 



MONBOE DoCTROfS AND THB CAJflOlfO MtTR 9| 

iflter in London) had nothing to do with framing the Monroe Doetnne, 
that it was Rush who, entirely without authority, -'tl**^'"^ the e^ 
England with America (jutt aa he had stiggeited it five 
>..... L.„.v: to Castlereagh), that he, Canning, waa snrprieed by the 
terms of Monroe's meeaage, waa oppoeed to ita guarantee of South 
American liberty aa againat Spafai, and also to ita forbidding Europe 
to plant colonies in thia hemisphere. 

The chief reason for the credence generally accorded on thia skle 
of the ocean to Canning's claim b Rush's ex p r essed belief that Can- 
ning's suggestions were largely responsible for the Monroe Doctrine. 
It was but natural that Rush should have come to believe this. 
It waa only human for him to attach undue importance to certain 
remarks of Canning's of which he would figure in history as the 
medium of communication to his own government. He realised and 
reported the deep impression made in Europe by the policy announced 
by President Monroe, but we shall see how far Canning's private 
views coincided with Rush's beliefs. 

Rush tells us that toward the end of August, 1823 (the Monroe 
Doctrine was not announced until December 2 of that year), after 
he had broached the subject to Canning of England's following our 
lead in recognizing the independence of the Spanish American col- 
onies (which we had already done in 1822), Canning sounded him as 
to whether there could be effected some public expression ''intimat- 
ing the joint disapprobation oi Great Britain and the United Statea 
of any projects which might be cherished by any European power, 
of a forcible enterprise for reducing the (Spanish) colonies to a sub- 
jugation on the behalf or in the name of Spain; or the acquisition of 
any part of them to itself by cession or conquest." A similar prop- 
osition was made by Canning to France October 9, 1823. It seems 
to have been entirely overlooked or forgotten that Canning, when 
interrogated in Parliament "whether the King of Spain would be 
allowed by this country to seek to cover His Transatlantick Colonier," 
contented himself with stating ''that the mother countr>' had the 
right to attempt to recover her colonies, but that no foreign power had 
the right to make that attempt in her behalf." How quickly this was 
forgotten appears from the fact that shortly thereafter Canning, 
himself forgetting it, made his famous boast. The struggMng oolooies 
heard only of his boast and not of his willingness to return them to 
Spain from whom they had just won their indepeodeooe. Also there 



04 Ths Annals op the American Academy 

has been genorally overlooked Rush's report that on November 24, 
1823, Canning expressed his belief that a monarchy would be the 
best form of government for the Spanish colonies — a true friend of 
struggling republics indeed! 

In many writers there may be noted a certain restlessness — ^a note 
of protest that so inspiring a triumph for liberty in our hemisphere as 
was the continued freedom of the Spanish colonies, should have to 
acknowledge a source no higher up the stream of international ethics 
than the scheming of a politician who openly claimed that he had 
created South American liberty to use it as a pawn in his game of 
European politics! Must we admit that the Monroe Doctrine had 
its rise in the whirlpool of European chicane, and only later joined 
the majestic stream of liberty whose fountain head was the Declara- 
tion of Independence? I have long felt how glaringly incongruous it 
was that a cause so far removed from international altruism should 
have produced so glorious a result, but it seemed impossible to find 
anything from an English source to disprove Canning's words, al- 
though many indications were available to show clearly that Pres- 
ident Monroe was but announcing a widely cherished policy of the 
American people, and not launching a doctrine either invented by 
himself or suggested to him by any one European or American 
statesman. All of these indications antedate Canning's suggestion to 
Rush. The diary of John Quincy Adams, then secretary of state, 
shows that on May 13, 1818, President Monroe propounded the fol- 
lowing question at a cabinet meeting: ''Whether the ministers of the 
United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will 
not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South 
Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence 
of those provinces; and whether measures shall be taken to ascertain 
if this be the policy of the British government, and if so to establish a 
concert with them for the support of this policy." When, as a result of 
Rush's having introduced the subject, Castlereagh sounded him July 
31, 1818, as to codperation with the United States in respect to medi- 
ation between Spain and her colonies. Rush was already authorized 
to answer that we would not take part "except on the basis of the in- 
dependence of the colonies.'' .... "A determination to which 
his government had come on much deliberation." Note this "on 
much deliberation," and also that this was a full five years before 
he heard the suggestion from Canning upon which the latter and his 



MoimoB Docnumi aicd the Caxninq Mtth 96 

ulinirerM \miiei\ ho much. Jeffenon, in a letter of Auguft 4, 1S20, to 
William Shurt, mys: "The day is not far dkrtant when we may 
formally roquire a meridian of partition through the ooean which 

latee the two hemispheres, on the hither side of whieh no Eiuo> 

i gun shall ever be heard." No, there should never have been any 
inisundcrHlanding, at least on this side of the water, as to how gener- 
ally accepted was this policy of our people to maintain ours as a hemi- 
sphere of liberty, nor any ignorance of the fact that Monroe but 
imnciated an established policy instead of launching a new doctrine. 
it was but the natural outgrowth and development of Washington's 
ftunous decUration against entangling foreign alliances. 

Notwithstanding how easy it has always been for a student of 
tory to show that Canning did not suggest the terms 
•e Doctrine, it was not until very recently that anything 

:ired by way of new evidence, which could conclusively prove 
uuii Canning knew when he made this boast that it was not a true 
one. The discovery to the world of this new evidence adds another 
liapter to the romance of historical "finds,'' the unearthing of which 
IS so delightful to the t$tudent seeking the reasons for great events. 
Let us accompany him into the erudite atmosphere of his library 
where lie piled the dusty tomes and unpublished letters that smugly 
keep their own counsel and their writers' secrets. By such assiduous 
delving into ancient records did Funck-Brentano learn from the 
Archives de la Bastille the real identity of the mysterious wearer of 
the iron mask about whom Alexander Dumas wove so delightful a 
web of fiction. John Fiske tells us in his American Revduticn 
tliat it was a similar quest among the old books in the library of the 
St r.irlii V family at Sutton Court, in the county of Somerset, England. 
tli:ii iioiiglit to light the letter of General Charles Lee, written while 
in a British prison during the revolutionary war, which, some eighty 
vears after the event took place, proved him to have been a traitor. 
How rightly Washington relieved him from hb command after his then 
inexplicable behavior which so nearly lost us the battle of Monmouth! 
Imposing is the array of ghosts which have thus accusingly ariasn 
from ancient documents to correct the history of events long misunder- 
stood or incorrectly reported. And from whose forgotten writings 
shall we obtaui unanswerable proof that Canning was not 
for the Monroe Doctrine, and did not seek to guarantee the 
< »f Spanish America? What source could be more convincing than his 



06 The Annals of the American Academy 

own letters to Bagot, English minister to Russia, recently published 
by a member of the Bagot family? At last we can discard the dramat- 
ic statement of a politician made at a strategic moment to support 
his political purposes, and read the facts as privately written by 
him at the time to an intimate friend. 

In an official letter dated at the foreign office, January 9, 1824, 
just after receiving news of Monroe's famous message, he says to 
Bagot: "How far that part of the speech of the President, which 
relates to Spanish America may .... have been prompted by 
a knowledge of the sentiments of His Majesty's government upon 
that subject, it is impossible to say." Speaking of the differences 
between those sentiments and this speech he goes on to say, *'The 
first and most essential difference is that the government of the United 
States has actually acknowledged the independence of the late 
Spanish Colonies, while His Majesty's government continues . . . . 

still to withhold such recognition If the message of the 

President is to be considered as objecting to an attempt to recover 
her dominions on the part of Spain herself, there is again as impor- 
tant a difference bet>veen his view of the subject and ours as perhaps 
it is possible to conceive." The " New World " which he later claimed 
to have created could have again become subject to Spain, if only he 
be first allowed to use it in " redressing the balance of the Old!" Con- 
tinuing he says : ** It is hardly necessary for me to add .... that 
the principle (if principle it may be called) which is brought forward 
in the President's speech, prohibiting all further colonization on the 
continents of America, is as new to this government as to that of 
France." A frank and full statement that Canning would not oppose 
our sister republics losing their liberty to Spain, nor wished them 
closed in the future to European colonization! Could anything be 
further from the Monroe Doctrine? Their temporary liberty was only 
to suit his political policy, and then, so far as he cared, they could be 
turned back to Spain, or colonized as has been India, or Egj^pt, or 
Algiers or Tripoli! At last the cat is out of the (letter) bag. As to 
the long-believed theory that he and Rush (he as the originator and 
Rush as the transmitter) had contributed greatly to the preparing 
of the famous doctrine, hear this excerpt from the same letter of 
Canning: *'I lost no time in applying amicably to Mr. Rush for an 
explanation for that part of the President's speech. Mr. Rush pro- 
fessed to be wholly unprovided with instructions on the subject 



Moinu>B DocTRum and tub CAicNiNa Mrru 07 

i !• lyB that he has not heard from hia government sinee the open- 

. f Congrees, nor even reoehred officially a copy of the PraMeni'a 

jM r. )i." Thia was privately written in January, 1824, and in Deeem- 

l>or, 1826, Canning had the effrontery to make the public statement in 

TT ,. 0f Commons; "I called the New World into existence to 

ebalanoeoftheOkir He outdid little Jack Homer in thai 

)>!• not only shouted '*What a big boy am I/' but also cUimed the 

' th for pulling out the plum and for baking the pudding. 

carve on the base of his statues in South America, ** He a|>- 

proved the return of Spanish rule. He preferred monarchies instead 

of republics in South America." 

His lack of interest in the continued freedom of the South Amer- 
icans either from a renewed Spanish rule, or from their colonisation 
by some other European power, makes it but natural that his first 
minister aeoredited to those newly bom republics. Lord Ponsonby, 
should entertain such an attitude of mind toward them as to write 
home in 1826 : ** No eye ever saw so odious a country as this Buenos 
Ayres. I will not trust myadf to speak of it;" and on October 17 of 
the same year, to write even more disparagingly of the Brazilians in 
a letter which tells of "Mr. Canning's approbation of my conduct." 
It is uplifting to be able to turn from such a viewpoint of the South 
Americans to the following: ''We behold there the glorious spectacle 
of eighteen millions of people Btruggling to burst their chains and be 
free." So spake Henr>' Clay, the man wlio had more to do with the 
recognition of the independence of those colonies, both in baking the 
pudding and in pulling out the plum, than did ever the boastful 
Canning. From 1816 on, both in Congress and outside, Henry Clay 
never ceased his efforts. In the winter of 1821 , long before Canning's 
m to Rush, Clay secured the passage in Washington of the 
lution that "the House of Representatives participate with the 
>plc of the United States in the deep interest which they feel for 
le Spanish provinces of South America, which are struggling to 
establish their liberty and independence, and that it will give its 
• >nstitutional support to the President of the United States whenever 
he may deem it expedient to recognise the sovereignty and in(le|)en- 
dence of any of the said provinces." In 1822 President Monroe 
iihlished the formal recognition, which was the crown to Clay's long 
:itruggle. The modern South Americans have forgotten the perriitr 
«nt and intelligently strenuous friendship of Henry Clay, so deeehred 




96 The Annals op thb American Academy 

have they been by constant reiterations of the Canning Myth. Their 
forefathers loved him so well that more than once were there read 
aloud at the head of their revolutionary armies portions of the speeches 
he was making in Congress from 1816 to 1820, urging the recognition 
of their independence. His altruistic efforts in their behalf and inter- 
est in their war for freedom, find an echoing note in the touching 
friendship of Lafayette for our own people under similar circumstances. 
Heniy Clay was actuated by no other motive than admiration for 
the struggles of a gallant people, and a passionate yearning that 
their independence be once and for all time recognized by his own be- 
loved land, which had by so short a time preceded them in entering tin 
family of nations. Henry Clay was tainted with no wish to use their 
liberty as a pawn in the game of pohtics, nor was he willing to give 
them back to Spain, nor to allow European colonization later on to 
rob them of their hard-earned sovereignty! 

Now that the dusty tomes of old correspondence have given up 
their secrets, we may at last cast away the belief that there was due 
to the play of intrigue in European courts, that great boon to South 
America of freedom forever from their intermeddling. No longer 
need the boasts of a sharp-witted politician continue to enjoy the con- 
fidence of credulous peoples who knew only of what he publicly said. 
and not of what he privately wrote. Away with the long-credited 
myth that put the Monroe Doctrine out of step with the majestic on- 
ward march of republican free government! The tree of American 
liberty becomes all the more symmetrical, since we learn that the 
Monroe Doctrine is one of its own branches, and not an alien growth 
grafted upon it. Let the policy announced in Monroe's message fit 
into its proper place in the orderly sequence of benefits won for 
political liberty in this hemisphere by that immortal document, the 
Declaration of Independence, which in express terms acknowledged as 
its inspiration a power immeasurably higher than politicians for whom 
political liberty is but a tool to use, and, when used, to discard. 



THE ATTITUDE OP EUROPE TOWARD THE 
MONROE DOCTRINE 

By a. Maurice Ix>w, M.A., 

Chief Aroerieaa CorrMpoodeni o( ib* 

London Morning Pott. 

I liave been asked to explain the attitude of Europe toward 
( ho Monroe Doctrine, but that would be an easier task did Europe 
know what the Monroe Doctrine is. That is where you have us of 
Europe at a disadvantage. We have to take the Monroe Doctrine 
largely on faith not unmixed with doubt, hoping for the best and al- 
ways fearing the worst. 

So far as England is concerned, she craves no additional territor}'. 
I know there b a well established belief among Americans that Eng- 
land never refuses to pick up any unconsidered trifle in the form of an 
iiiUuui or a continent that may be lying around loose, and that her di- 
plomacy is always directed with the view of putting another patch of 
red upon the map. That might have been true in the past, but it is 
not true today. Wliat she wants is peace and to be allowed to develop 
T empire commercially. To buy American cotton, turn it into 
cotton goods and sell them to America is more profitable than adding 
a few thousand square miles of jungle to the area of the British 
Empire. Modem statesmanship is " dollar diplomacy,'' and although 
that is a discredited term in the ears of some people, it is the true 
diplomacy of the twentieth century. The lust for land no longer 
\ist8. Wars of aggression or to satisfy dynastic ambitions belong 
10 the past. The real diplomat of today is the hustler who carries a 
case of samples and speaks the universal language of ''thirty dajrs, 
less two off for cash;" terms incomprehensible no doubt to many of 
us here, but which are as well understood by the guileless trader of 
the Middle Kingdom as by the merchant of Bombay, the Manchester 
manufacturer and the Pittsburgh foundryman. 

When British manufacturers sell goods or bankers lend their 
money or contractors build railways or docks or investors develop 
mines and plantations in a foreign country, they do not care about 
its politics. They want to feel sure that their contracts will be 

99 



100 The Annals of the American Academy 

obeerved, that life and property are secure, that the foreigner will 
have justice done him. In the past, in various parts of the world, 
the British trader was encouraged by his government to seek new 
markets and extend the commerce of Britain, and he went forth as a 
oommercial pioneer, taking risks and meeting hardships, but knowing 
that he could rely on his government for protection. His reliance was 
not misplaced. In some of the darker comers of the globe we had 
to administer justice in summary fashion. There is much virtue in 
a six-inch shell if properly aimed. We went up and down the world 
teaching civilisation with ships and armies, and making the commerce 
of the worid safe and open to all nations. 

In the last few years there has grown up what I venture to think 
is a decidedly immoral doctrine, and it is in the territory particularly 
under the protection of the United States that this doctrine, I regret 
to say, is most flagrantly exploited. Europeans are encouraged to 
fumiah Latin America with the capital and enterprise needed for its 
development, but when contracts are repudiated or property de- 
stroyed by revolution, courts make a mock of the law and simply reg- 
ister the decree of a dictator, men are badly treated and at times killed ; 
punishment, we are told, may not be inflicted, because the foreigner 
went there on his own volition and knew the risks he was taking. In 
theory these countries are supposed to be civilized and are to be 
treated with the respect and consideration one free and independent 
sovereign state has the right to expect of another. So far has this 
theory been carried that the Pan-American Congress, in the City of 
Mexico in 1901, declared that: 

'* America, as well as Europe, is inhabited today by free and inde- 
pendent nations whose sovereign existence has the right to the same 
respect, and whose internal public law does not admit of intervention 
of any sort on the part of foreign peoples whosoever they may be." 

Here is a platitude wrapped up in high sounding words, as most 
platitudes are, stating a truism with all the solemnity of a vital dis- 
covery, and enunciating a declaration impossible of acceptance. 
Nations similar to individuals are entitled to receive precisely that 
respect which they give. A nation that administers exact justice, 
that treats foreigner and citizen impartially and respects its obli- 
gationSy similar to a man who is considerate of his neighbors and 
keeps his word, is entitled to and is accorded respect. To try to write 
into the Code of Nations a declaration so contrary to morality and so 



ATTiTirnR OK Imjuope Toward Monroe no<^Tiiiini 101 

Mul>\ fTHivc of all aUvuuced cwiiuatiou — Umt the law of aoj ttate m^ 
not be questioned by ''foreign peoples"-'is a deelarmtioD opposed to 

iiblic policy. It is much as if the promoters of get-rich-quick enter* 
-'-< should meet in conference and declare that the post office d^ 
, aitiiiont hsLS no right to question their operations. It is only the 
la^^'l(^s.s that have no respect for the Uw. 

Rhetoric may conceal truth, but cannot create it. To put 
lII Uie nations on the same plane, to bracket them together as en- 

tied to the same respect, is an absurdity. The half barbarous 
MS of the Balkans are lower in the scale of civiliiatkm than Bnf- 
.... ur France or Germany. The civilisation of Central America 
has not yet been brought to the hig;h standard of North America. 
T^ r blunt way of stating facts may offend the sensibilities 

n! r , ^f the Balkans, as it may those of the states of Central 

inerica, but they have the remedy in their own hands. If they want 
to be treated with the same consideration as the great nations, th^ 
only have to show the same veneration for law and the same dbeenr- 
ance of a constitutional form of government. Nor is it true, as they 
so often assert, that the smaller states of Central America have to 
submit to being bullied because they are small and defenseless. Swit- 
lerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, could be packed away in 
Nicaragua with room still left for several thousand persons to move 
about without being crowded. Switzerland, Denmark, the Nether- 
lands, Belgium, Norway and Sweden could be stowed away in 
^>ne2uela with a margin still left to allow expansion. Yet while 
\ enezuehi and Nicaragua constantly furnish work for the diplomats 
and continually threaten their neighbors' peace, the little nations of 
Europe that I have just mentioned cause no uneasiness. The banker 
feels as secure when he lends them money as he does in dealing with 
the United States or any of the great European powers. In the sister- 
hood of nations, it is not size but character that counts. 

To speak quite frankly, the Monroe Doctrine is not popular in 

urope, and that unpopularity comes not from what the Monroe 
Doctrine is, but rather from what it is not. We have no objec- 
tion to the United States taking such precautions as may seem neces- 
sary to safeguard itself. England has done the same thing and has 
a Monroe Doctrine in the Persian Gulf. Japan found it necessaiy 
to go to war to protect herself from the menace of attack throagh 
Korea. The right of a nation to take adequate means for its protection 



102 Thx Annals op the American Acadeict 

will not be denied. But those rights involve corresponding obliga- 
tions. It is as dishonest for a nation to seek to obtain undue advan- 
tages and render no service to humanity as it is for an individual to 
grow rich by preying upon the credulity or avarice of his neighbors. 

Some thirty years ago a conference was held in Berlin, of which 
the United States was a member, to discuss spheres of influence. It 
was agreed that a power claiming a sphere of influence must make its 
jurisdiotion effective; in other words, in return for the advantages 
conferred by dominating or controlUng territory it must assume 
certain obligations, and one of the most important of these is the pro- 
tection of foreign subjects and their property. 

The territory embraced by the Monroe Doctrine is the Americnn 
sphere of influence, and I think Europe has a right to expect that the 
United States will not shirk its obligations. The United States can- 
not play fast and loose with its compacts. It cannot in honor say 
that Europe shall not take the territory of Latin America in satis 
faction for debt or as punishment for the murder of its subjects, an< i 
yet at the same time refuse on its own account to take measures to 
com{>el defaulting states to pay their just debts or make reparation 
for their crimes. 

The United States by its policy of "hands off" to Europe, and it 
refusal to accept responsibility for orderly government must be held 
— and I say it with regret — largely to blame for the revolution, dis- 
order, and insecurity that have so disgraced Latin America. If the;. 
was no Monroe Doctrine, Latin America would have a wholesome n 
spect for British and German battleships. Latin America now laugl i 
at Europe and sneers at the United States and wallows deeper in the 
pit of anarchy. That, as I see it, is the great result of the Monroe 
Doctrine. Let me add that I use the term "Latin America" gener- 
ically, and while some of the states of Latin America are faithful in 
the observance of their obligations and considerate in their treatment 
of foreigners in Latin America, as elsewhere, the just have to suffer 
for the crimes of the unjust. 

I have said that Europe does not know what the Monroe Doc- 
trine is or means, and I doubt very much if any one in America is bet- 
ter informed. All that we know is that the mere suggestion of any 
European power taking measures to protect itself in Latin America 
immediately arouses the active dislike and even open hostility of the 
United States. Some Americans, however, who have generously 



Attitude or Eubopb Towabd Monbob DocTRoni lOS 

'ttempted to interpret the Monroe Doctrine for the benefit ol b^ 
i^ted Europe have said that there ie nothing to prorent m from 
aeeldng reparation provided we do not occupy territory. I pieiimM 
thoee persons have a profound belief in the efficacy of ■beoot 
treatment. It recalls the old nursery rh3rme of the daughter who 
asked her mother for permission to bathe, which the mother granted 
*" f'"r darling on condition that she would not go into the water. If 
< not permitted to occupy territory, how can we exert prewureT 
If we cannot seise a custom house until a fine is paid, what redrev 
*'.!Wo we? 

Not long ago in a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, an eminent 
American asserted that '' the Monroe Doctrine does not stand in the 
way of a just war between any South American state and European 
state." >Vhat constitutes a just war the speaker did not define, but 
we may be sure the stronger power would always maintain the jus- 
tice of its cause and the weaker would proclaim to high heaven its 
bfamy; but after the war was over there would be at least this con- 
solation, the question could be referred to The Hague for determi- 
nation. It will be remembered that a few years ago Great Britain, 
Germany and Italy, feeling they had just complaint against Vene- 
suela, established a pacific blockade of one of its ports, much to the 
delight of the natives, who never having seen such a gallant spectacle 
believed it was arranged solely for their amusement, and eoji^sred 
it hugely. But not so Washington, where there was much pertur- 
bation among the guardians of the Monroe Doctrine and much search- 
ing, if not of hearts at least of precedents, to discover whether profane 
hands had not been laid upon the palladium of Latin-American debt 
repudiation . It was admitted by your President and his advisers that 
a pacific blockade was permissible, but it was also mtimated to the 
powers concerned that the sooner they found it convenient to order 
their ships away the better it would please the United States. A 
pacific blockade, however, not producing any tangible results in the 
way of cash, and the Monroe Doctrine prohibiting the allies from 
smiing and occupying territory, which the VenesueLans knew, a few 
shells were thrown into the port to remind its people that the ships 
had not been sent there to make a Latin-American holiday. Wheo 
the news reached Washington of the firing of thoee shells there 
much excitement. What would have happened had the 
really struck a blow instead of being content to show their teeth, I 



104 The Annals or the American Academy 

do not venture to say, but I can easily imagine that a somewhat awk- 
ward situation might have been created. If any European powtM 
should seriously go about to make war, just or otherwise, on one ot 
the states of Latin America, I do not think it would be long befoi t; 
the United States would ask explanations. It is not necessary to 
call attention to the message sent to Congress by President Clev( 
land that brought the United States and Great Britain almost tcj 
the verge of war. 

What Europe thinks of the Monroe Doctrine cannot be told 
until Europe knows what Americans think of it. After careful in- 
vestigation I reach the conclusion that as three schools of Monroeisi 
exist in the United States the foreigner is apt to become somewhat 
confused in his attempt to reduce the Monroe Doctrine to terms. To 
the first school belong the men who believe it is for the best interests 
of their country that the Monroe Doctrine should purposely be left 
vague, so that, as Secretary Hay once unofficially and somewhat 
jocularly defined it to me; "The Monroe Doctrine is anything that the 
American people choose to make of it of any particular time to fit an> 
particular emergency." President Wilson has recently been reported 
in the newspapers as saying, " There is much discussion, but no doubt, 
as to what the Monroe Doctrine means." And Mr. Taft, with equal 
brevity and no less lucidity, wrote not long ago, "Any question de- 
pendent upon or involving the maintenance of the traditional attitude 
of the United States concerning American questions commonly de- 
scribed as the Monroe Doctrine." Clearly then from this school 
we shall receive no precise definition. 

To the second school belong the men who fear there is something 
in the words "Monroe Doctrine" to offend the sensibilities of Latin 
Americans, and therefore they would abandon the name while re- 
taining the principle. They tell us that Latin America does not 
desire to be under the protection of the United States as enforced 
through the Monroe Doctrine, and that, instead of solidifying the rv- 
lations between the United States and Latin America, the Monroe 
Doctrine creates friction. But while the colonization of Latin America 
by Europe is not to be permitted and the European powers are not 
to be allowed to take means to secure redress in case of wrong doing, 
there is to be no obligation imposed upon the United States to act for 
Europe when the necessity demands it. 

To the third school belong those men who display a curious 



AnrruDE or Europe Toward Monrob DocTRnrB 106 

nidity about a great nation executing itif own mandate. The Moo- 
rt tell UB is good, but when anything !• to be dooa 

tii> II, the United States must ask for the aakCaiiee 

some of the Latin-American powers. 
Many well meaning but I fear short-eigbted penona have uried 

th (Treat penristeooe and more or len vehemenoe the wUooi of the 
1 States incorporating the Monroe Doctrine into a joint stock 
cuiK • rii and inviting some of the states of Latin America to acquire 
proprietiiry rights therein, tinctured, I presume, by the prevailing 
belief that a monopoly is vicious, but by some magic arrangement 
a bad trust may be made good, and if there are Latin-American 
stockholders the curse will be taken off the Monroe Doctrine. It is 

>t for a foreigner to instruct Americans, but whatever affects the 
L nit<Hi States is a matter of vital concern to an Englishman, and I 
cannot refrain from pointing out the grave danger you will run if the 
Monroe Doctrine is transformed from a purely North American 
polity to a Pan-American policy. 

In the first place, it is contrary to the teaching and experience 
of history, and history is valueless unless we make the past a guide 
to the present. History shows that an alliance between nationa of 
different blood and different speech and different traditions, whose 
concepts of justice and society are not the same, whose civilisation is 
not the same, has never endured and eventually is certain to involve 
the contracting powers in grave complications. And where shall this 
alliance end? Certain Latin-American states are now mentioned as 
eligible to admission in this partnership. How long, do you think, 
it will be before other states will claim the same right, insisting upon 

iiB evidence of their high cultural development and if refused will 
luiturally be bitterly resentful, as it would be public advertisemeot 
that they are inferior and not worthy to rank with states of the first 
order? Instead of a Pan-American doctrine bringing peace and order 
to I^tin America and satisfying Europe it would throw another dis- 
cordant element into that political cauldron and change the whole 
status so far as Europe is concerned. 

If the United States is anxious to invite Europe to challenge 
the Monroe Doctrine it cannot adopt an easier course than to admit 
Latin America into partnership, for I think it must be evident to 
ever>* one that while Europe will accept a doctrine maintained by the 
Uniteii States it will pro|>orly enough resent the dictation of 



106 Tbb Annalb of the American Academy 

America. I do not say that Europe considers itself ^' better^' than 
I^iin America or regards Latin America as inferior, as I dislike very 
much the assmnption of national superiority or the calm condescen- 
sion of foreigners. We need not go deep into reasons, for certain 
thinci are so well understood that explanations are unnecessary. 
An l«^gli«hmiin will go into an American court of law and have no 
fear that his nationality will prejudice him. An American feels secure 
in the impartiality of British justice. An Englishman in America 
has no dread that his property will be seized because his sympathies 
were with one political party or he hoped for the success of a rival 
political leader. An American may live in England, and without 
risk to his person or fortune hold in contempt monarchial institutions. 
When the same stability and the same liberty of thought and action 
exist in the states of Latin America as in the United States and Great 
Britain it will then be time enough to consider the wisdom of making 
the states of Latin America the mandatory of this continent. 

A further objection is that an alliance of the kind suggested is 
unworthy of a nation so great and powerful as the United States; it is 
a confession of weakness that the United States ought not to make. 
If the United States is not strong enough and courageous enough — 
and no one doubts either its strength or its courage — to uphold and 
enforce the Monroe Doctrine it ought to abandon it and not ask 
assistance to infuse it with vitality. 

If the United States is to regard the Monroe Doctrine simply 
as a means to obtain special privileges and hamper the legitimate 
expansion of Europe in Latin America, Europe will always resist it 
and be irritated and it will be the cause of continuing friction, but if, 
while safeguarding the mterests of the United States, it is also to be 
a means of keeping the peace and inducing Latin America to observe 
its obligations it will have the cordial support of the great powers 
of Europe. It would promote the harmony of international relations 
were the United States either frankly to declare what the Monroe 
Doctrine is, so that ail nations might no longer remain in doubt, or 
with equal frankness impress upon the states of Latin America that 
they cannot hope to escape the penalty of wrong doing by shielding 
behind the nebulous uncertainty of the Monroe Doctrine. 



WHAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THINK OF THE 
MONROE DOCTRINE* 

By Dr. Hbrbbbt Kjuui, 
Univenilj of Lei|>tig. 

It would be interesting to present a picture of the many inter- 

oonfliots which the Monroe Doctrine has prevented, and 

' the same time to attempt to portray what would have been the 

j*rohabIe condition of affairs on the American continent had the 

Monroe Doctrine never been promulgated. But it is impossible for 

uy human brain to furnish a detailed picture of this imaginary situ- 

' ion. To do so would require the prophetic vision of a seer. 

No stretch of imagination is necessary, however, to recognise 
<*arly that Central and South America without this great prineipU of 
olaHon would be a field of great rivalry for colonisation; a rivalry 
hich, on account of the higher value of the prizes offered, and abo 
I account of the greater power of resistance of the American States 
lii question, would make the struggle for the division of Africa seem 
small in comparison, and cause the shedding of rivers of blood. 
This side of th^ Monroe Doctrine is, as a rule, not yet sufficiently 
understood, and hence not appreciated, by the public opinion of 
Ekin)po, which follows, registers, notes and criticizes the circum- 
stances in which this dogma of American politics is applied. 

European interest in the Monroe Doctrine, at least in the three 
countries chiefly concerned, viz., Germany, England and France, is 
uncommonly great. In Europe as in America it is only necessary to 
connect a particular incident with the Monroe Doctrine in order to 
aro se a lively public interest. Very different, however, are the feel- 
infrs which this word arouses on the opposite shores of the Atlantic. 
In the United States one always finds confirmed the words of one of 
its leading statesmen, who once wrote me that "it may, indeed, 
almost be said that all our government has to do to rally the people 
to the support of any measure ... is to couple it with the 
fevered title of the Monroe Doctrine." 

( ompare with the following my book, entitled The Monroe Doeirime in iU 
Hclation to American Diplomacp and to International Law, pubHsbsd bj J. 
Quttentag, Berlin, 1013. 

107 



106 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

Ekiropean opinion, on the contrary, generally taking a critical 
attitude towards such matters as are coupled with the Monroe Doc- 
trine, oscillates between a dignified reserve and a certain distrust 
which soon develops into open hostility on the part of the chau- 
vinistic press. That Europe has not fully appreciated the causes, 
aims and accomplishments of this doctrine, and that the full com- 
ion of its character and its tasks only slowly and hesitatingly 
its way in the public opinion, is hardly to be wondered at. 
Is the situation, after all, very different in the United States? How 
many are there in that country who really have a correct idea of the 
purport and limitations of the Monroe Doctrine, based on an inti- 
mate and unprejudiced knowledge? How often, for instance, is it 
associated with afifairs with which it has no connection whatever? 
For example, what relation has it with the much discussed question 
of the Panama Canal tolls? This controversy is nothing more than 
a dispute about the interpretation of treaty rights. And yet the 
Monroe Doctrine is incessantly drawn into the discussion. Even 
such a man as Champ Clark declared in his recent speecli, in the 
House, against the amendment to the Panama Canal act, that "repeal 
would mean practical abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.'* 

Although some German papers recently went so far as to ex- 
press the opinion that the journey of Prince Henry of Prussia, the 
Kaiser's brother, to South America, was a protest on the part of the 
Kaiser against the Monroe Doctrine, and that he was thereby show- 
ing that he did not feel himself bound by it, nevertheless the people 
of Germany treat such a groundless statement with the contempt 
it deserves. 

The chief difficulty the European experiences in interpreting the 
doctrine lies in the fact that he unconsciously judges American con- 
ditions and affairs by European standards. It would require a con- 
scious effort for the people of a continent whose political sense and 
feeling are at present influenced by an incessant rivalry for colonial 
expansion, to conceive that a state may have any other political 
ideal; that its ambition may not necessarily strive for increase of 
power by colonial acquisitions.' 

That the United States, until now, has not shared such ambi- 

• Kot to be confuBed with the tendency always alive in the United States 
to extend the existing boundaries at the cost of its neighbors. See my book, 
noted above, p. 330. 



EUBOFBAN CoUHmUW Am MOITBOB DOCTKOTB 100 

' ''* *he hiftory of her foreign policy. This policgr 
lobroken line of OTmnpl<» to MsUtn sueh a 
iitiun, with tho aingia exception of the wave of imperialinn 
.i.i. . u-d toward colonial expansion which aroee at the time of the 
war with Spain, but which quickly subeided. It is impoeilble to 
understand American foreign policy, and with it the Monroe Doo- 
trin(\ without thoroughly considering this difference between the 
jH htical ideals of Europe and the United States— a difference which, 
at present, undoubtedly exists. 

On the other hand, I may venture to say that the feeling in 

urope towards the Monroe Doctrine is slowly ehangfaig. It is 
true, one sometimes reads, even now, heated arguments against this 
doctrine, in which, unfortunately, is often quoted that remark made 
by Hianiarck when he called the Monroe Doctrine "an international 
impertinence.'' But such arguments seem to become less frequent, 
and, on the whole, the number of sensible and more reasonable 
critics, who consider the merits as well as the weaknesses of the 

Monroe Doctrine, steadily increases. A convincing appeal may be 
iuade to the teachings of history. They refute the hitherto gener- 
ally aooepted argument raised against the doctrine, that its purpose 

as to give to the United States a monopoly of political expansion 
oa the American continent. In fact, not one instance can be proved 
in which the United States has added territory in America under 
the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. What she has done again 
and again, acting on this principle, is to prevent the over-eea expan* 
sion of any non-American state. 

Of particular interest is the change of public opinion in Europe 
I a another direction. Formerly discussion was chiefly centered on 
question of the justification, or rather the lack of justification, for 
the existence of the doctrine. This question has now been relegated 
to the background by two others. One is whether the United States 
can and will maintain the Monroe Doctrine, or whether, in the oourse 
of time this principle will turn against the country which formulated 
it and become a burden. The second question involves the duty of 
the United States, resulting from the doctrine, to provide for peace 
and order in Central and South America, and a reasonable protec- 
tion for non-American interests. Events in Mexico, prior to the 
recent active measures on the part of the United Stales, ehiefly the 

mrder of the British subject Benton, have given a number of 



110 TBs Annals of the American Academy 

European newspapers the opportunity to remind the United States 
of her dttti3r — to play the r61e of American policeman — a duty which 
ex-Praeident Roosevelt, in particular, repeatedly emphasized as a 
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.* When, however, the United 
States interfered in Mexico most of those newspapers had, unfortu- 
nately, already forgotten their former admonition. 

It is clear that Europeans, becoming more and more reconciled 
to the Monroe Doctrine, accept it as an existing fact and begin to 
diaeusB its consequences. 

The above refers only to the old style Monroe Doctrine, to tho 
doctrine which wants to prevent the increase of political power of 
non-American States in America, and which may be styled the politi- 
cal Monroe Doctrine. The affair takes a different aspect when we 
consider that new tendency to extend the doctrine into a prevention 
or limitation of the purely economic activity of non-American States, 
or their citizens, in America. 

But one cannot say that the Monroe Doctrine has actually 
developed in this direction, although such a development would 
not be inconsLstent with its character. Its transformation into a 
"commercial Monroe Doctrine" is relatively easy, and signs are 
not wanting that it already tends toward a development in this 
direction.^ Recall the last stage of the Panama Canal affair, and 
recall more especially the Magdalena Bay incident.^ It is clear that 
such a claim as '^ America for the Americans, economically as well 
as politically" would meet with an opposition and attack far more 
violent than any which the political Monroe Doctrine has ever 
aroused. It is probable that these attacks would come not only 
from the non-American camp, but also from American and even 
from the United States itself. 

* Compare his words in the annual message of December 6, 1904. "The 
•dherenoe of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United 
StsiM, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impo- 
t s o ca , to the exercise of an international police power." 

* One is reminded of Jefferson, who wrote to Governor Claiborne on October 
20, 1S06: "We shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their 

It dependence; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France 
\, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and 
the nme and that the object of both must be to exclude all European 
from this hemisphere." (Moore's Digest, vi, 371). 

* For further particulars on this point which forbids of enlargement here, 
see my book, noted above, pp. 217-230. 



EUBOPBAN CoUNTBnB AND MoifBOB DoCTROni HI 

It 18 (iifHcult to formulate a daoided opinkm a* to the attitude ol 
iiropean diplomacy toward the MomfXM Dootrine. Available ma- 
rial, neoMBar>' for that purpose, is lacking. One fact, however, la 
cerUiin, vii., the Monroe Doctrine, to the pieaent time, hat not 
1 >ocn exprettly reoogniied aa a rule of iniemaUonal low by any eo onlr y. 
The question as to whether it has been intemationaUy reeof- 
m poliHoal principle of the United States is of no great im- 

pi>: ..... . Since it is, in fact, a political principle of the United 

8tat4^8 which has been hd practice for ahnost a oentury, such a reoog- 

nition would he only the acknowledgment of an existing fact, and 

Hs such would have no real significance. It is of much greater im- 

rtance to note that the other states evidently reckon with the 

><*trine as a factor which must be taken into consideration. 

The last instance in which a European state questioned the 
ilidity of the Monroe Doctrine was the controversy between Eng- 
land and the United States as to the boundary between Venezuela 
•md British Guiana, commonly known as the " Venesuelan bound- 
y dispute." In the settlement of this dispute the United States 
won its most brilliant diplomatic victory for the doctrine. The vic- 
tor}' was so complete that the affair has repeatedly given occasion 
for the assertion that England, by her attitude, actually recognised 
the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law. 

Since the time of the Venezuelan boundary dispute there has 
on only one dubious example of a disregard for the great American 
ilt)ctrine — the Magdalena Bay incident with Japan in 1912. E\'en 
here the Japanese government did not contend that the Monroe Doc- 
trine could not hinder the acquisition by a Japanese syndicate of a 
concession of land from Mexico in lower California, to which the 
United States objected, but simply denied that such a transaction 
was bemg carried out. 

The case of the Venezuelan debts of 1901-1904 gave the German 
government occasion for the celebrated declaration ''that under no 
circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or 
the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territor}',"* a declaration 
which some, incorrectly, have construed as a repognition of tl... \ Ton- 
roe Doctrine by that government 

It is even reported that during the recent Mexican troubl' 

* Prememoria of the Imperial German EJnbaas>' at Waahington, December 
II. 1901. (Moore's DigtM, vi, 588) 



1 12 The Annalb op the American Academy 

European govcmmcntii have directly applied to the United States to 
act as intermediary in seeking redress for the injustice which their 
subjects have suffered in Mexico (consider in this connection the 
Benton case). Should these reports prove true it would be such a 
perfect acquiescence in the doctrine, of the governments concerned, 
that the jurist would have to consider seriously the question: Hav( 
not these powers actually conceded such a position to the United 
States on the American continent, that she is entitled to the general 
observance of the principle that the Monroe Doctrine proclaims? 

In conclusion, it is evident and most important, in my opinion, 
that nations should make every effort to get an impartial and unprej- 
udiced knowledge of their mutual standpoints and respective aims 
before they criticize one another's actions. 



THE MEANING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

By Charlea M. Pippbb, 
Waahiof ton. D. C. 

When we began to diaeim the Monroe Doctrine I was reminded 
of Uie flefmition which a famous English jurist gave of metapbyiiei. 
^He said, * 'metaphysics is two men in a dark room hunting for a blaek 
liat which is not there." We have not had any dark room. We 
have had plenty of light, but when we started out perhaps a good 
many of us felt we were hunting for a black hat which is not hare. 
But whatever the Monroe Doctrine nuiy be I think before we are 
through we will succeed in finding it out. 

I have noticed the general trend of the discussion is along two 
lines: First, as to the Latin-American view; and second, as to, not 
the European view, because Europe never has views, but as to the 
European attitude regarding the Monroe Doctrine. I confess my- 
self to a great deal of enlightenment on both points. 

The general tendency, as reflected by the papers of Mr. Barrett 
and others, is not to agree with college professors in other cities that 
the Monroe Doctrine is obsolete. There is nothing more to say 
there, but I think there is an idea that in some way it is to be super- 
seded by what Mr. Barrett called the doctrine of Pan-American 
eomity, or some general term such as that. We all appreciate what 
Mr. Barrett has done towards producing Pan-American comity, but 
as Mr. Barrett said, there is one difficulty in the way. Our Latin- 
American friends hate to be patronized. We owe a great deal to him 
and to ex-Minister Sherrill and to Professor Rowe and others for the 
work they have done in the last few years in educating our people 
about Latin America. When we come to the Latin-American 
It is set forth very clearly, indeed, in Mr. Grahame's paper, 
eially in reference to Argentina. 

The common notion seems to be that if the Monroe Doctrine it 
superseded, it will be replaced by what is called the A B C doctrine, 
an alliance of certain large countries in South America, who, in 
oo6peration with the I'nited States, will work for peace there. We 
all want peace in Latin America and hope it may be gained by work* 

Itt 



114 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

ing together. By the A B C doctrine is meant the alliance of Argen- 
tina, Branl and ChUe. This has one drawback. Other Latin-Ameri- 
can countries are veiy jealous of their territorial integrity and of 
their independence. It may not be an independence, it may not be 
a sovereignty, such as Mr. Low's country after a thousand years' 
practice has attained through self-government, but they prize it. 
There is jealousy of the United States, which I regret to say is cul- 
tivated for commercial reasons by our European friends, and is one 
of the reasons why we hear frequently of an Anglo-German alliance 
advocated m South America. 

Yet the South American countries, with a few exceptions among 
those bordering the Caribbean, are not afraid of territorial absorp- 
tion or land grabbing by the United States. A year ago a young 
Argentbe poet was in the United States, talking against what he 
caUed "Yankee imperialism." He also went to every important 
Central and South American country and delivered his address there. 
In Bolivia he was listened to very respectfully but the leading 
newspaper of La Pas stated that Bolivia needed not to guard 
against Yankee imperialism but against the imperialism from the 
south, from its own neighbors. 

I have a]wa3r8 got along very well with my Latin-American 
friends by talking plainly. We should be sympathetic with them, 
as the saying is, but we must look at South America as a whole. 
Knowing the conditions there we note the constant fear in some 
countries of absorption by their neighbors. When we come to dis- 
cuss the Monroe Doctrine historically and view our diplomatic 
relations and the diplomatic correspondence in the files of the state 
department, we find numerous instances in which the smaUer coun- 
tries of Latin America have appealed to the United States against 
the aggression of the larger ones and our good offices have always 
been exercised, and exercised successfully, in their behalf. But a 
new doctrine of comity based on the theory that the United States 
and three South American governments could regulate the rest of 
this hemisphere would cause much more ill-feeling than now exists. 
We should work harmoniously, should work with these stronger 
countries of South America, and should encourage them in what they 
are doing and depend on them to extend their influence, but I think 
we can dismiss the idea that the Monroe Doctrine can be superseded 
by any ABC doctrine. 



Mbanino or TUB Monroe Doctbuoi 115 



One raaaon for this growing rwUvMMii oonoerning Ibe Monroe 
Doctrine Hi South Ameriean oountriet ie perfaape ibe eelf-eooieioae- 
ae of thoee oouniriet. All oountries in their day have 
' ^'t-Hd. We had it some yean l>ack when we boaeted 
nf our 1 greatnees aa the result largely of a material growth. 

I hod it, and had it quite recently, on account of her growth. 
'i.iv of our Latin-American friends who are growing veiy rapidly 
luive got the same feeling now. I do not say it in the offeaiive eeoie, 
but it is an enUiged idea ci national consciomMM. It is a proper 
conception of their own power and their own influence. That is 
one reason that we find so many vigorous objections to the Monroe 
I )octrine now coming from two or three of these oountries, but it seems 
to me they go to too great a length. Most of you have received a cir- 
cular letter sent out recently by Dr. Zeballos, who was formerly 
the minister of foreign aflfairs in Argentina, and who delivered the 
address of welcome to ex-President Roosevelt at the convocation of 
the University of Buenos Ayres. He set forth what he ckumed was 
the Argentine view, henceforth to be known as the Zeballoe-Roosevelt 
protocol, and predicted it would supersede the Monroe Doctrine. 
Now eminent as any individual may be, eminent even as Dr. Zeballos 
and Mr. Roosevelt are, I do not think they can undertake to super- 
sede the Monroe Doctrine by a protocol between themselves. 

In connection with the Argentina view just one more thought 
comes to me. The vast British investments there undoubtedly give 
Great Britain a tremendous influence, but she is not going to war on 
account of those investments. They are safe. Yet there might 
be another cause. Argentina today does not recognise British sov- 
ereignty anywhere in the South Atlantic. The FalkUnd IsUnds 
have been under the British flag for more than half a century, but 
the Argentine Republic does not recognise that there is such a govern- 
ment as Great Britain there. Now we can conceive that RngliMu^ 
for some purpose or other might insist on Argentina's reoogniiiiic 
her sovereignty in the Falkland Islands. Suppose she should send 
her fleet down there. I am not quite so sure that Argentina would 
not then look to the United States, would not invoke the Monroe 
Doctrine in some form. Ordinarily it is not wise to put out strained 
hypotheses, but sometimes they enable us to understand poasible 
situations. 

Another reason why we cannot depend too much upon the moil 



116 The Annals op the American Academy 

powerful Latin-AiiHrican countries to render the Monroe Doctrine 
unnecessary- ami I say it with great respect for what they have 
done — 18 because they are yet in the process of evolution. We give 
them credit for what they are doing for republican institutions 
but we cannot affirm that all of them have passed the first stages 
of growth. The other day we read dispatches saying Brazil is 
liable to have a serious revolution in half a dozen states. These 
states are as a rope of sand holding tiie nation together. Those 
of us who know how little power the general government possesses 
understand that Brazil lias yet great problems before her. It is 
not improbable tliat in working out these problems there will be 
periods of internal disorder and unrest. There have been periods 
not so very far distant when Germany was threatening to send a 
fleet to Brazil and she was most offensive in her attitude. 

Another point occurs to me. It is no longer possible that internal 
conditions will prevail in the United States such that a European 
power would find us unable to enforce our construction of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. But when we review some of the chapters of American 
history during the Civil War when we had our hands full at home, 
these reveal that Europe was not then considerate. That was 
the period when the French invaded Mexico to set Maximilian on 
a throne. It was an invasion. It was the period when Spain was 
hoping to resume authority in Santo Domingo. It was the period 
when the French government under Napoleon the Third negotiated 
with the Ecuadorian government for a French protectorate over 
Ecuador. We have more than gathered strength since that Civil 
War. We will never have a civil war again, God please, but in our 
relations with foreign nations we are not so sure that war never will 
occur. We cannot be sure that between now and let us say 2014, we 
may not have complications with some foreign nation, and are we 
quite sure then no European countries would take advantage of that 
situation to establish themselves in South America? We have no 
question as to what the ultimate result would be, but the possibility 
is one of the reasons that make me doubt whether it is wise to abolish 
the Monroe Doctrine. 

You all know about the Galapagos Islands off Ek;uador. We 
do not need to lease them ourselves since the Panama Canal is built 
and we are established off Panama Bay. We do not need them, 
but it is quite conceivable that if we were in difficulties — I will not 



MsANoro OF TRB MoNBOE DocrsDfB 117 

iiHMiiioii Ahia, because it is a live wire like Mesco— but if we 
in (litiii ulties, I will say with Denmark, some Asiatic power or 
European power might want to take the Galapagos Islands. I have 
not a question then thai the American people would say it was a 
viohition of the Monroe Doctrine, and thegr woukl also define the 
doctrine. 

I have just a word in regard to the European attitude, which 
I have formed from the interesting paper of Mr. I»w. I haYo 
to his instructive address with a great deal of interest, yti 
'after all it occurs to me that there may be such a thing as 
anoe in Europe about the Monroe Doctrine — histoncai 
I was recently in South America where our English friends are so 
^well established that if you want a stenographer you have to go to 
le English firm for some young Englishman to take your dicta- 
tion. I had occasion to write a good deal about this Monroe Doc- 
trine, to refer to it in dictating letters, and my friend's fellow country- 
wrote it "Munro Doctrine." Now that is a trifling historiod 
[error, but it has frequently occurred to me that perhaps after all 
great English public does not know as much about the Monroe 
le as it ought to know. I perceive one difficulty in the attitude 
[of Europe toward Latin America. The repudiation of debts in the 
^tin-American states undoubtedly has been a shame, a disgrace 
them, but there has been very great improvement in the last few 
My recollection is that the last Hague Conference found a 
kula on that subject following Dr. Drago's suggestions first 
down in the Argentine note to the United States at the time of 
Venesuela blockade. But here comes a question — ^the European 
tude is that they should have the right to go in and by force col- 
[lect a just debt. That is it, isn't it? 
Mr. Low: Yes. 

Mr. Pepper: Now if Europe has the right to go in by force to 

Latin- American country and collect a just debt— and, of course, 

|io the creditor a debt is always just — that one hundred million debt 

Honduras to those EInglish creditors is always just — then they 

kve the right to go into other countries. The newspapers reoen^y 

iblished the protest of the British bondholders conmiittee against 

states of the United States which were charged with repudi* 

their debts. If the Monroe Doctrine is no bar to Great Britain's 

debts in Latin America by force what is the position with 



118 The Annals of the American Academy 

regard to the Lmted btates? If she has the right to enforce debt 
oolleetion in Latin America by gunboats what could we say, what 
objection could we make if the British fleet appeared off North 
Carolina, Florida or Georgia and asked for payment of debts alleged 
to have been repudiated by those states? 

In spite of the scandals of the past in the repudiation of debts 
by Latin-American countries, these countries have made very great 
progress, and I do not believe the matter of debt collection is ever 
going to be of serious consequence in connection with the Monroe 
Doctrine. The countries will pay their debts. The Argentine Repub- 
lic after fifty years paid the loan obtained from its English creditors. 

Now we come to the Monroe Doctrine proper. It is indefinite 
perhaps, but it is to the American people after all a live doctrine. 
It is a flexible doctrine, it changes and is affected by circumstances, 
as we have recently had very convincing evidences, but the Monroe 
Doctrine has held for a hundred years. It is more than a formula. 
It is a principle for our safety. It represents the aspiration of the 
whole of the people of the United States in regard to Latin America. 

It is for whatever government may be in power, for whatever 
administration, whatever Congress may be in power, to interpret 
the doctrine in the light of developments, in the light of circumstances; 
not to confuse it, as with Mexico, with anarchy at our door, but to 
interpret it in justice to the American people, with the understand- 
ing, with the feeling, that it is to be applied in justice. It represents, 
as Professor Latan6 has said, a cardinal principle of American diplo- 
macy that is vital to the American people, and without injustice to 
Europe, without injustice to any Latin-American country, I have no 
question that fifty years from now we will still be discussing the 
Monroe Doctrine as a live doctrine. 



THF \TnvT?OE DOCTRINE: A SOLUTION OF ITS PROBLEM 

Bt Phiup M. Broii'n, 
Former United SUtat Ministor to Ilonduru. 

Since I do not wish to add myself to the category of "doctrtn- 
airee/' it is with some diffidence that I respond to the request to ad- 
dress you on the topic under dJacmsdon. But nevertheless I do respond 
with a good deal of earnestness for this reason: It was my duty to 
serve as a diplomatic representative in Central America for a number 
of years, and to deal with the Monroe Doctrine in its practical oper- 
ations in peace and in war. I have also witnessed an attempt to ex- 
periment with the principle of alliance when the United States en- 
deavored to secure the co6peration of Mexico in dealing with the 
problems of Central America. 

I felt my responsibility very keenly at that time, and I feel it 
equally so now as a student of international politics residing again m 
this country. When I left Honduras, I stated to the President that I 
had come to Honduras as the representative of the United States, but 
that I left as the representative of Honduras. I particularly feel that 
responsibility of representing fairly the rights of those countries at this 
time because of the fact that they are in grave danger from their 
best friend, the United States. Though we aim to be of disinterested 
service to them, I believe that their territorial integrity and political 
independence are in a soise menaced by the mistaken policy we have 
adopted. At this moment in the little country of Nicaragua, a weak 
government is being maintained in power by a force of American 
marines stationed at Managua. 

The discussion of the Monroe Doctrine has been extremely 
illuminating. It has reminded me, however, of what President Taft 
once said to the newspaper editors gathered at a banquet in New 
York: ''Gentlemen, the truth does not lie in you. It lies between 
you." With two distinguished newspaper men addi^ssing us, wo 
have this epigram most felicitously illustrated. 

It seems to me that this discussion has brought out clearl>' the 
following points. First of all it is evident that the Monroe Doctrine 
is painfully vague, and, as remarked l^ Mr. Blaine of the h ip l e s i 

no 



120 The Annals of the American Academy 

Clajion-Bulwer treaty, "misunderetandingly entered into, imperfectly 
comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious." 

Secondly, it is clear that there exists a general apprehension 
on the part of all Latin America as to the purposes of the United 
States. When I was serving in Central America, I used to find it 
extremely difficult to make clear to the people of those countries 
exactly what we did mean. At that time it was my boast that, 
except for the impropriety of disclosing certain facts concerning 
different personalities, the United States need have no fear of reveal- 
ing all its diplomatic correspondence. I do not believe that there is 
an.N-thing selfish in our policy towards these countries. I believe that 
it has always been our earnest desire to be of constructive assistance. 
Yet it must be admitted that ''dollar diplomacy" has caused them 
genuine alarm. Recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine 
implying the right of veto by the United States on the choice of 
their chief executives, and indicating also a right of control over the 
granting of foreign concessions — all matters of supreme impor- 
tance — cannot fail to convey to the Latin-American mind a sinister 
significance. 

Thirdly, this discussion has clearly indicated the necessity of 
insuring the adequate protection of foreign interests in certain of 
the countries of Latin America. This has been most effectively and 
brilliantly brought out in the paper by Mr. Low. 

Fourthly, this discussion has revealed that reparation for wrongs 
and damages carries with it the danger of unjust aggression and even 
the loss of political independence. And in this connection, I would 
like to refer to the question raised by Mr. Low in regard to the block- 
ade of Venezuela in 1902. It is possible to view the facts in a some- 
what different light than viewed by Mr. Low. As a student of inter- 
national affairs who has carefully gone over all the records of this case, 
it seems to me that what occurred in that famous incident was some- 
what as follows: England, Germany and Italy had been trying for 
years to get Venezuela to meet its obligations. (I will not say just 
obligations, though certainly some of them were of that character.) 
They had been uniformly unsuccessful and felt compelled to resort 
to the use of coercive measures. Force was employed, and Venezuela, 
yielding under tremendous pressure — the pressure of the joint fleet 
which has been referred to by Mr. Low as more or less innocuous in 
the eyes of the Venezuelans — ^was obliged to sign a protocol of arbitra- 



Solution to Pboblim of Monboi DocTBoni 121 

tion, the United States having used its food offioea aa a frieodfy 
intermediary. Under that protocol, Voneiuela waa forced to arbitrate, 
not the question whether she owed the auma claimed — thia she had to 
eoncede in principle before England, Oennany and Italy would arbi- 
trate — but the question as to whether preference in payment should 
be given to those creditors who resorted to the use of foree, over thoae 
who proceeded by peaceful means. The consecration of this victoos 
principle by the decision of the arbitral tribunal hIiouM be deeply 
lamented fay all who believe in international fair phiy. 

Now this veiy situation in VenesueU to which Mr. Low referred 
seems to me to emphasise eloquently the necessity of facing squarely 
this whole question as to the meaning and vitality of the Monroe 
Doctrine. The adverse criticism to which it has been subjected in 
recent years, the suggestions that it is dead and useless, all tend to 
mislead people, and particularly to delude Europe into the belief 
that the United States will never again intervene to defend a Latin- 
American state from European aggression. This becomes therefore 
a most precarious situation, and it seems to me that it is our solemn 
duty as a result of this discussion to try to reach a definite conclusion 
as to what the Monroe Doctrine signifies to us. 

I realise that this task is difficult but I would ask your permission 
to allow me to indicate briefly what would seem to be the result, 
the final residuum of all this discussion, the working h>7>otheBi8 on 
which we as a nation may proceed in dealing with the problems of this 
hemisphere. 

First of all, we seem to be agreed that the Monroe Doctrine should 
be clearly defined ; and secondly, that it must be defined in terms that 
are acceptable to all Latin America. 

The Monroe Doctrine can no longer be considered as a peculiar 
possession of the United States, as purely a matter of state policy. To 
remove it out of the realm of policy; to obviate the unpleasant sug- 
gestion implied in the term doctrine; to avoid also the dangsroiia 
complications involved in the idea of alliance; I venture to suggest 
this possible solution, namely, to place the Monroe Doctrine within 
the safe sphere of absolute law. 

In spite of the dicta of statesmen and international bw publieista 
to the eflfect that the Monroe Doctrine, like the principle of the balaooa 
of power, is not a part of international law, it is not difficult ao to 
define it as to make it a fundamental principle (aa Mr. Pepper hat 
very aptly called it), of the law of nations. 



122 Thb Annals op thb Ambrican Academy 

The great defect of intemational law today, as you know, is 
that it has no sanction; no guarantee of enforcement other than the 
sanction of public opinion. That is the main thing we are striving 
for: as effective an enforcement of intemational law as wc have an 
effective enforcement of municipal law. Now if we will reduce the 
Monroe I>octrine down to the simplest terms; if we will strip it of all 
the vagaries of statesmen and commentators, we find in the last analy- 
ns that it means nothing more and nothing less than that the United 
States finds itself pledged to the defence of the rights of every nation 
to independence, sovereign jurisdiction and equality. These are the 
most sacred, basic principles of intemational law; and nothing could 
be more securely a part of intemational law than an effective sanction 
of these principles. Such a sanction is to be found in the Monroe 
Doctrine, which, interpreted in this light, ceases to be simply a ques- 
tion of policy, and is at once put on the solid basis of law. 

It seems to me that we as a nation are fast approaching a situation 
where it is imperatively necessary that in measured but forceful lan- 
guage we make unmistakably clear to Europe and to all Latin Amer- 
ica the vital meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. If Europe lacks any 
effective sanction to international law; if the smaller states such as 
the Balkan States are without any other protection than that of their 
own armies, America will not be remiss on its part. Our high aim 
should be, at least on this western hemisphere, to protect the smaller 
states from unjust aggressions by the great. In other words, we should 
boldly proclaim the Monroe Doctrine to be the great basic principle 
of international law, namely, the defence of the fundamental rights 
of sovereignty, independence and equality. 

But in the working out of the problems connected with the coun- 
tries of this hemisphere, it is not enough to enunciate principles. We 
must also have intemational agreements as to their practical operation 
especially in the case of nations seeking redress for just grievances. 
While no one nation should constitute itself the sole judge of its rights, 
no nation, on the other hand, should be permitted to escape the ful- 
fillment of its just obligations. The determination of these rights and 
obligations is properly a function of law. We should, for example, 
have an agreement of the nations of this hemisphere, if not of the 
whole worid, as to the precise rights of intemational creditors; as to 
the circumstances justifying a nation to go into bankruptcy; as to 
the legal methods permissible for the collection of debts; as to the 



SoM'Tiov Tn Prorlku ok \fovKOB Docnuini 



123 



* <> the rigbU oC 

<-.. „„.„-_ :^: ...-.-^ _^__„. :: -Ji of civil 

and many othar sueb qiMftioni which to diplomatle frietioiit 

- and even war. 

I IP other nations of the world, owing to political problflni 
i. are unable to undertake yet thin great taak of erealing 
MUst eventually supplant war, we in this hemisphere 
i„. . .. L if we do not whole-heartedly direct our energies in this 

direction. We have not only the inspiring opportunity but we have 
the agencies at hand in the Pan-American Conferences and the Pan- 
Amerioan Union so ably directed by the Honorable John Barrett. 
Already important steps have been taken in this sense. Jurists of 
note from the countries of Latin America and the United States are 
now at work on the drafting of laws on the subjects already indicated; 
laws which should bring order out of chaos, which should prove as 
aooeptable to Europe as to ourselves, and protect the rights of the 
weak as well as of the strong. 

Now it seems to me that if we can thus effectively take this whole 
question out of the realm of discussion of policy and of alliance, and 
place it firmly on the basis of international law, all Latin America 
will join with us with absolute unanimity and enthusiasm in the mu- 
tual defence of this great principle. In this way, without uncer- 
tainty or distrust, we can work together in perfect harmony apart 
I from the maelstrom of European politics in order to solve, if we can, 
great problems standing in the way of universal peace. In this 
we can leave Europe in no unfortunate uncertainty as to the 
JTital significance of the great principle that underlies the famous 
declaration of President Monroe nearly a century ago. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY 

OP THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE 

By J. J. Slechta, M.A., 
Fonnerly of the United States Consular Service. 

The scope of this article does not admit of a detailed analysis 
of the varied phases of the Monroe Doctrine as originally enunciated 
and subsequently developed into a permanent feature of our foreign 
policy. It is only necessary to remind students of the subject that 
the predominant motive actuating President Monroe and contem- 
porary statesmen in promulgating this doctrine was one of selfish- 
new— if anxiety for self-preservation may be called selfish. 

The dangers which the United States sought to avert by this 
means were two-fold: First, the acquisition of territory in the west- 
era hemisphere by European powers and the consequent peril to the 
supremacy of the United States in the western world; and second, 
the overthrow of newly established republics in South America and 
the resulting loss of prestige to democratic forms of government, 
of which this country was the champion and which were on trial 
before the world at large. Naturally enough, altruistic motives 
were even at that time suggested as explanatory of this nation's 
newly expounded policy, but a careful study of the literature of the 
question convinces that any such motive was subordinate to the 
conviction that the cause of our own democracy would suffer from 
any further encroachment of Europe on this hemisphere. 

The thesis which the writer has chosen to defend may be stated 
at the outset and is simply this: The Monroe Doctrine should be 
maintained by the United States substantially in the form in which 
it was conceived by its originators. In one particular, only, should 
thb be qualified. In view of the unquestioned supremacy now 
attained by this country and the impossibility of any successful 
aggnsnion by any foreign power, the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine 
can best be expressed in negative rather than positive terms. 

Instead of the assertion that no European power shall be per- 

124 



Tins Moinu)B DocnmfB and FoBMiaif Poucr 125 

mitted to acquire additumai territory in thu hwniyhew, the do^ 
trine abould embody the proposition that any ■ggrnMion on tho 
part of a Buro|)can power, which may be deemed danferoua to 
the tfupremaoy of the United States in this hemimhere, shall meet 
with the forcible opposition of this country. 

If it is sought to determine what advantages might reasonably 
be e]q)ected to result from such a foreign policy, it is necessary to 
consider the changed reUtionship between the United States and 
other countries of the new world. In the first place, it has long been 
evident that leading powers of Latin America not only regard them- 
selves as independent of the protection of this country, but actually 
resent any attitude of protection from the United States. Those 
who are familiar with the viewpoint of leading South American 
nations have no doubt that possible aggression from the United States 
is really very much more feared by most of them than aggreesion 
from any European power. 

Any foreign policy, therefore, which contemplates anything in 
the nature of gratuitous protection of powers which want nothing 
of the sort from us, leaves this countr>' in a wholly anomalous situ- 
ation. Another objection to what might be called an altruistic for- 
eign policy is that, whenever this country finds itself obliged to bring 
pressure to bear upon one of its neighbors in order to settle a claim 
or controversy of its own, a cry of woe goes up from all Latin Amer- 
ica, calling attention in the most ironical terms to the supposedly 
protective feature of the Monroe Doctrine. This is what happened 
in the Alsop claim settlement with Chili, when the whole Spanish- 
American press was united in a severe denunciation of the United 
States. The point of the whole matter is that if the United States 
follows the interpretation given the Monroe Doctrine for the past 
sixty years, Latin America takes our protection as a matter of course; 
expects it, in fact, when it is needed, and disclaims any desire for it 
when not needed. 

The Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived, would leave Latin 
America free to work out its own salvation, as it very much wisbes 
to do, and would relieve the United States of any responsibility in 
connection therewith except in so far as its own destinies might be 
affected. Then if, in case of unjust aggression from Europe, a 
Latin- American country should appeal to the United States for a»- 
sistance, such assistance might be given quite apart from any obli- 



126 T&B Annalb op the American Academy 

gation arising from a fixed policy. In that way only will Latin 
America reoogniie this country's foreign policy as genuinely dis- 
interested. 

It is the failure of American foreign policy to recognize the fact 
that disinterested statesmanship is not accepted at its face value in 
Latin America which constitutes its greatest weakness. An im- 
partial analysis of the causes for this consistent failure at once dis- 
doses the underlying weakness in all our international relations with 
Latin America. Probably John Hay was the only secretary of state 
this countr>' has ever had who knew how to handle Latin-American 
questions properly because he was great enough to see every issue 
from the Latin-American point of view. This great asset of a states- 
man can come, not merely from a knowledge of history, but from an 
i^ipreciation of its significance. Only an administrative authority 
totally destitute of the attributes of an intelligent statesman would 
choose to disregard the certain effect of a nation's antecedents and 
of the character of its people upon their method of thought in shaping 
a foreign policy. Few and far between have been the American 
statesmen who possessed in a high degree the ability to gain from an 
intelligent retrospect of a country's antecedents a perspective which 
should enable them to determine a foreign policy based upon strong 
future probabilities and not upon utter impossible eventualities. 
ITie holiest and best of intentions are trash without such an under- 
standing of the significance of history and national character. 

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the need of such far- 
sightedness than the blundering policy of this country in the Mexi- 
can situation. We deal with an unfortunate neighbor whose only 
political heritage has been that of centuries of oligarchy and autoc- 
racy. For a century and a quarter the Mexican people have had 
the benefit of close contact with a free p)eople, governed under a 
democracy. The ignorance of the masses and the cupidity of the 
governing classes have made it impossible that precept alone should 
lead to the establishment of genuine constitutional government in 
Mexico. This nation cannot reasonably hope, therefore, to create 
a real democracy in that country by stipulating some condition or 
change in a contemporaneous regime, which in itself is the product 
of a nation's heritage. 

Another distinct advantage to be gained from such a restriction 
of the Monroe Doctrine as indicated in the foregoing may also be 



Turn MONSOK DoCTROfB AMD FORBIQN PoUCT 127 

illustrated by reference to a feature of the current Mexican trouble. 
There can be no reaaonable doubt that the intereeU of peaeeln 
Mexico could have been eerved bett by the joint interveotioii of Eu- 
ropean countrieii and the United States. The prencnt inlerpraUUkm 
placed upon the Monroe Doctrine Ium made this seem inexpedleot 
There has been much niiscoooeption on this pointy indicated by the 
i^pparent belief that such a oourse involved some danfer to this 
country's foreign policy. It does not seem to have occurred to our 
statesmen that this may be very good evidsnoe that there is some- 
thing wrong with our foreign poUcy. 

Citisens of Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy 
have interests at stake in Mexico at least oommensurate with those 
of American citixens. There is every reason to believe that soeh 
interests were acquired quite as legitimately as were ours. Those 
oountries should share with the United States the reqxmsibility oC 
securing protection for such interests. A joint treaty between these 
six countries embodying an agreement on the part of each to share 
financial and other responsibility and an obligation to refrain from 
accepting any indemnity in territor>' or funds in any eventuality 
would cause a light to break over Mexico such as can be supplied in 
no other way. This countr>' can have no reason to doubt the abso- 
lute good faith in w-Wwh European powers would participate in such 
an agreement 

The present policy is essentially that of a "dog in the manger." 
We cannot settle Mexico's troubles ourselves and we foolishly fear 
to ask those equally interested in peace there to help us effectively, 
matters not what solution of the question comes from the present 
lent, anarchy and chaos must return to Mexico under any 
s to be determined by the United States alone, short of 
absolute conquest. The elimination of any one political deq>ot 
is temporixation, which can bring Mexico not one step nearer civili- 
sation, since it removes an effect and not the cause of that countr>''s 
misfortune. The result, on the other hand, of European repiesenta- 
tion, jointly undertaken with the United States, would be so to over- 
whelm public opinion in Mexico as to force the few disinterested 
leaders to the fore and so bring about at least the beginning of a new 
era m Mexico. It is highly probable that such intervention would 
take the form of an international police for Mexico, to enforce the 
proper observance of constitutional provisions for free govenmient. 



128 Tub Annals op the American Academy 

But whatever might be the form of actual intervention, there can hv 
no doubt that only in the hands of powerful European nations acting 
in concert with the United States can intervention become a wholly 
eflfective instrument, without involving loss of life or property to 
any conaklerable extent. 

The United States has constantly faced the danger of serious 
international complications arising from the implied obligation which 
exists under the present form of the Monroe Doctrine. We do not 
concede to European powers the right to protect their nationals in 
Latin America, because such a course might endanger the continued 
application of more or less vague principles of that doctrine. Wo 
must, therefore, assume the responsibility of affording protection 
not only to our own nationals and to their property, but to the nation- 
als of all European countries. The farcical manner in which even 
American citizens have been given protection to which they are 
entitled under the circumstances prevailing in Mexico indicates in a 
measure how absurd it is for this country to continue the voluntary 
assumption of this wholly unnecessary and dangerous burden. Far 
more critical situations may at any time result from such an as- 
sumption than could conceivably arise from an abandonment of this 
pernicious feature of our foreign policy. 

There can be no manner of doubt that the policy followed by 
the United States in its application of the Monroe Doctrine to Span- 
ish-American countries has served rather to estrange our neighbors 
than to make them our friends. In some countries on the west coast 
of South America there is a sentiment approving a kind of passive* 
American paternalism, but only because the South American hegem- 
ony is feared more than aggression from the United States. This 
hegemony is a phase of international relations which has as yet been 
completely disregarded in this country's foreign policy. Chili and 
the Argentine Republic wish above everything else to eliminate the 
United States as a factor in South American international affairs. 
Brazil, for her own protection and more or less against her policy, 
b forced to participate in a sort of gentleman's agreement, which 
has become, in fact, the ABC hegemony of South America. 

Argentina and Chili are both most vociferous in their objection 
to any form of Pan-American political union, believing that thi 
domination, in one form or another, by the United Stat 



The Monboe DocnmiB and Ponsair Poucr 190 

Tb^ fear nouang iruin ICurope, so if undiHurbed by Uie Umted 
BiAtm, they ( ould quickly doiniiuite the wwi eoMt eountriet. 

The Monroe Doctrine ehould not interfere with such ambitlooe, 
any more than it should prevent this country from settling with 
quick despatch any trouble it may have in South America. Should 
such a policy of Unsia /aire result in attempts of a stronger country 
to oppress the people of weaker nations, there could be no powibia 
objection to the same kind of intervention which is proposed above 
as the proper solution of Mexican troubles. 

The great nations of the world, with their advancsmeni m 
civilisation, their high standards of education and of what eoDtti- 
tutes free government, owe much to the weaker nations of the west- 
em hemisphere. Their nationals have invested ci^ital there with 
profit to themselves and thenr respective nations. Industrial and 
commercial conquest has taken the place of conquest of territory. 
The least that these nations can do in return is to luiite in an effort 
to guarantee to the people of less advanced nations an opportunity 
to work out in peace their own problems looking to the establishment 
of governments, liberal in fact, and not liberal merely on paper. 

The Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived, although wdBdk 
in its specific intentions, was nevertheless calculated to assure the 
attainment of this very purpose. Its various interpretatioiia hacwe 
since modified it so radically that under existing circumataaceB H' 
not only fails to do what is expected of it, but it serves as a serious 
obstacle to the employment of other means which can reasonably be 
expected to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem. 

(The author desires to state that this paper was submitted for pubiica- 
Uon May 14, 1914.) 



COMMUNICATIONS 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE* 

Bt Prof. Achillb Loria, 
The University of Turin, Italy. 

[Translation] 

The pressure of other duties together with the short time within which it 
was necessary to send you a reply have made it impossible for me to respond 
to your invitation as fully as I should have desired. I must, therefore, confine 
ni3rtelf to a few observations. 

As I view the situation, the Monroe Doctrine possesses a significance which 
is exclusively historical. It is the product and the expression of that period in 
the history of American trade in which even those portions of the American con- 
tinent which had acquired political independence found themselves in a condi- 
tion of economic dependence with reference to the countries of Europe ; a condi- 
tion of dependence which manifested itself in a vexatious interference on the 
part of European states in the affairs of the newly born republics. Against 
this form of interference the Monroe Doctrine represents a protest, and 
within these limits one must recognize its justification. 

Today, however, after the American continent has been emancipated from 
every trace of the suzerainty of the Old World, and is free from every form 
of intervention on the part of European countries, the Monroe Doctrine is 
hardly more than a diplomatic pleonasm, or the useless repetition of a truism. 
Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine now finds itself included in a larger prin- 
ciple, namely, that a state does not possess the right to submit its affairs to 
the control of another state, a doctrine which is universally recognized, and 
which is applicable to American as well as to European affairs. If there have 
been some violations of this rule, it is to be hoped that such violations will 
•oon disappear. 

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that a new series of relations 
which have acquired great importance in our times may be the cause of seriously 
undermining the principle above formulated. I refer to the conditions created by 
international credit. The states which owe large sums to foreigners find them- 
selves, whenever the payment of interest on such bonded debt is for any reason 
delayed, exposed to the intervention of the creditor states. This intervention 
usually begins by the appointment of a mixed commission, but often ends by 
actual political intervention. If the republics of Central America persist in 
the policy of a wasteful use of their natural resources, and at the same time con- 

*This communication was in the form of a letter to the President of 
the Academy. 



I 



Thb Mokroi Doctrinb 181 

tinue increanng their foreign inciebt^daaM, it ia ailofDilier liiMly ihAt tbdr 
political JpdtpaadaBM will b« Mrioaily undermiiMd. This vm eUarly mm 
by President lUxieeirelt. who in Mveml of hie meMigee eUlAd thai tht Ualted 
Statae would atrenuoualy oppose any attempt on the part of Europeao pOMt 
control the politieal deatiaiaa ol Amorioaa fUilit. 

If the Monroe Doetriao leads to these eooseqiisBesB, thera is oo dovbl 

it it will profoundly modify the condittona under which American atates 

II be able to borrow money in European eountriee. The bankere of Europe 

II not be willing to float loans for American statee if they find it impoeaibis 

use against suoh states the rseognissd means for compelling paymeot of pria- 

; 'sl aad iaterest, or if they do agree to loaa moaey it will be at aa sifissdJaglj 

high rate of iaterest aad uader moet oaerous conditions. In other words, for 

theee eountriee the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine means a raisiag of the 

rate of interest oa their loaas aad aa iacroase ia othsr fiaaaeial charges. 

Ins word, under modern eoaditioas, the Monroe Doetrine b but a part of 
a larger principle generally recognised, at least in theory, and on this account 
it has ao reason for independent existence. The doetrine posseeees no impor« 
taaos except under very exceptional conditions, ss whea aa American state 
contracts a large indebtedness in European eouatries aad fails to meet its 
cial obligations. If, however, the Monroe Doetrine is to be applied under 
eircumstaaces the debtor states will have to bear the burden through the raining 
of the rate of intereet at which they will be able to borrow. In other words, 
the Monroe Doctriae is oaly of practical value for thoee states that are williog 
to bear the burdcna which \ia application involves. 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE* 

Bt Pbof. a. Pillbt, 
The Faculty of Law of the University of Paris. 

[Trantlation] 

Id asking me to preeent my views on the Monroe Doctrine to the Amerieaa 
Academy of Political and Social Science you are doing me an uadesenrsd honor, 
and one to which I may not be able fully to respond. 

What can I say that may be of interest? Many jears afo, when I was a 
much younger man than I am today, I was inclined to eonsider the pr ia e i pis s 
proelaimed by Presideot Moaroe ss an encroachment upon the rights of iade- 
peadeat aations. It seemed to me that on the vast cheeker-board of world 
politics each state should be permitted a free hand ia the assertioa of its rights, 
and that in such assertion it should not be hampered by any outaide power. 
The right of every nation freely to determine the conduct of ita own affaiis 
seemed to me to be the corollary to national indepeadeaoe aad eovereigaty. 



«/Wd. 



132 Annals op trb American Academy 

Subsequent experience has modified my views on this point. I no longer 
believe in the doctrine of the complete independence of states in their inter- 
national relations. I have, furthermore, lost faith in the efficacy of abstract 
principles of international law, or, to express myself more correctly, I believe 
that if international law is to preserve its influence, it must be exceedingly 
modest, avoiding the formulation of principles which are far removed from fact, 
and becoming more and more empirical rather than dogmatic. 

These changes in my mental attitude have led me to discover in the Mon- 
roe Doctrine certain merits or advantages which I had not before appreciated. 
America is situated at a great distance from Europe. The interests common 
to both continents are numerous and important, and it is also well to bear in 
mind that there is a distinct danger that the conflicts between the two conti- 
nents will be long and serious. Any practical means of assuring a prompt and 
satisfactory solution of pending questions carries with it its own justification. 
Viewed from this standpoint the Monroe Doctrine deserves approval. In the 
first place, it is a principle that makes for peace and, as such, it may occupy 
an honorable place in the public law of nations. I am far from being a pacifist, 
I am even inclined to consider pacifism as one of the vital errors of our times. 
I am, nevertheless, a strong advocate of peace and, therefore, ready to approve 
any plan which will avoid the curse of war. 

It is clear that the right which under the Monroe Doctrine the United 
States arrogates to itself to interpose in the quarrels between European and 
American states may, if discreetly used, be the means of avoiding war, at least 
in the majority of cases. 

It is interesting to note that, although the Monroe Doctrine had its origin 
in a declaration sustaining the principle of non-intervention, it has led the 
United States to assert a right of intervention in a series of instances. Never- 
theless, the practice of intervention to which the Monroe Doctrine has led the 
United States may serve to place the political morality of the less advanced 
American states on a higher plane, and at the same time awaken in them an 
appreciation of international responsibility. This result, however, can only 
be secured on one condition, namely, that the Monroe Doctrine be honestly 
and loyally enforced, not in a spirit of imperialism on the part of the United 
States, but rather as a means of guaranteeing the liberty of action of the less 
powerful American states. 

It is clear that the Monroe Doctrine makes the United States the pro- 
tector, and to a certain extent the master (we must not fear to use correct 
terms) of the republics of North and Central America. This situation in- 
volves numerous duties. It means, in the first place, that the United States 
must require from the states under her control the strict observance of inter- 
national obligations. The pretention of President Monroe to regard as un- 
friendly to the United States any attempt to control the destinies of an Ameri- 
can state can only be justified if the United States becomes, as it were, the 
guarantor of the observance of international obligations by the states of North 
and Central America. If an attack on the independence of a state is to be con- 
demned, it must be borne in mind that such an attack may be the only recourse 
of a state whose rights have been trampled upon. 



Thb Moifsoi DocTRnni ISS 

Tba United 8UU« should refrain from giving th« lupport of b«r rteog* 
•ilioB to A to-cAlled AmorieAn intomntional l*w, which only difftn friMiIlM 
furopean tystom in that it attempU to giv* to the New World prirUefM hef»> 
l«for« unknown. IntematiomU law ia either the Uw of nil nntlooe or it le ••• 
lirvly non-«xiBtent. 

Kinally, I venture to hope thet the policy of the United 8Utee will be •»• 
eeedingly dieereet with referenee to everything that coneerae the Old World. 
It b one of the eompenentions for the existence and recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine. President Monroe understood it in this spirit, but the policy of the 
United States has undergone many changse since that time, and it would seem 
that the promisee made by him have not always been completely fulfilled. It 
may happen that the constant interposition of the United States, in matters so 
far removed that they cannot in any way affect the immediate interests of 
the United Statee will be interpreted as an unfortunate tendency to assert 
hMpBony on the American Continent. When applied beyond its normal 
I^Hl the Monroe Doctrine cannot be sustained except by the superior 
^^Heal power of the United States, and one cannot always be certain of 
posseesing such superior force. It is far better that the Monroe Doctrine 
should maintain itself by the servicee which it can render either to Europe or 
to America. 

It was my intention never to write a word on the Monroe Doctrine, but 

Tonr cordial invitation led me to depart from this determination. If, therefore, 

^ few lines seem naive or inadequate you must place the blame on yourself. 

^ <>ul(l never have had the audacity to write on this subject, of which I know 

seUttle. 



¥ 



THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD 
MEXICO* 

By Willard Saulsburt, 
United States Senator from Delaware. 

When Dr. Rowe, the president of this Academy, honored me 
with an invitation to preside at this session, he was kind enough to 
say that an acceptance involved no obligation to make an address or 
to take part in the discussion of the subjects to be dealt with at this 
meeting. I can assure you that a statement of that kind, coming 
with such an invitation, adds greatly to one's pleasure in acceptinJ.^ 
and realizing that the gentlemen who will speak to you all know so 
very much more of the Mexican situation, its problems and obliga- 
tions, than I do, I gladly content myself with the briefest reference to 
what we all know officially and for publication on that grave subject. 

Every patriotic American recognizes that when we come into 
the field of foreign politics and our interests become involved in the 
affairs of other nations of the earth, questions of politics in the nar- 
rower sense are forgotten, that we cease to be democrats and repub- 
licans and are simply Americans. Partisanship in this country, we all 
feel, does stop and should stop at the seashore. 

In the case of the unfortunate and distracted country to the south 
of us, our political diflferenc es stop at the Rio Grande. It may not be 
improper for me to refer briefly to our official attitude toward Mexico 
and to the proclamations of President Taft and President Wilson 
defining the duties of our own citizens toward that unhappy republic. 
We know in a general way how the long rule of President Diaz ended 
and how Madero succeeded to the presidency, but it may be well for 
me to call your attention to the fact that during the term of President 
Taft and while Madero was in power in Mexico, Congress, learning 
that other revolutions were preparing in that country, and that the 
ahipment of arms and munitions of war promoted domestic violen 
there, passed a joint resolution authorizing the President, finding such 
conditions to exist, to proclaim it unlawful to export arms from the 
United States to that country. On the same day the resolution was 

*Remarka as presiding oflBcer of the session of the Academy, Friday 
traninc, April 8, 1914. 

134 



PoucT or United Statu Towabd Mexico 1S5 



paned by Congreii, Praidfliit Taft, deciaring that oondiiiooi of 

domestic violence were being promoted by the use of anne or muni- 

y>nB of war sent from the United States, admonished all our ctUsflM 

1 1 violating the provisions of that reeolutioiL 

n of Madero followed, then came the mesiigi ol IV ssi- 

WiUon, strongly adverse to General Huerta, and subsequently, 

!K>rden continuing with no prospect of an early settlement, 

nations being engaged in furnishing both sides to the quarrel 

ith means of warfare, the President on the 4 th day of February last, 

UndinK Uiat there had been an essential change in the oonditioos 

under wliich President Taft's proclamation had been issued, revoked 

same and placed the United States in the same position as other 

powers with reference to the exportation of arms and munitions of war 

to Mexico. 

That is the position in which we stand today, and the President 
m revoking this prior proclamation, dedared that there was at the 
time no constitutional government in Mexico and that the existence 
of the prior order under the changed conditions hindered and delayed 
''the very thing the government of the United States is now insisting 
upon, namely, that Mexico shall be left free to settle her own affairs 
and as soon as possible put them upon a constitutional footing by her 
own force and counsel. " 

Thus it will be seen our government has assumed its present posi- 
tion with the expressed desire and hope that our neighbors, embroiled 
il war, may by their own force and counsel and without inter- 
o, certainly without inter\'ention, unless our own interest shall 
•' endangered, or our great national policy threatened by an un- 
iendly act, settle as best they may their internal affairs, prevenUng 
iir people, so far as possible, from entangling this govemmoit therein 
y advising them to remove themselves from the scene of conflict. 

I believe that the action of both administrations, that of Presi- 
ient Taft and of President Wilson, in restraining our citizens from 
taking part in the Mexican conflict and preventing the lives of our 
own people from being endangered, certainly in refraining from any 
active intervention in that country, meets the approval of all oar 
people. The horrors, the sufferings, the losses of war are too great to 
be incurred by any people, if avoidable with honor, and this great 
American nation can well set an example to all the world of refraining 
to the last possible moment from <»ng*p"g in wars, inTasions and 
bloody controversy. 



THE POSTULATES OF THE MEXICAN SITUATION 

Bt Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., 
ProfoMor of Oovemment, Harvard University. 

Three yean have now passed since the common people of the 
United States became aware that a volcanic eruption was threatened 
on the southwest border. At first there was only a little steam in 
northern Mexico, a gentle earth tremor, which slightly jarred the 
Dial administration; then more violent shocks; then a crash and an 
e9q)lotton which blew the whole Diaz government into Kingdom — 
Gone. After a short period of quietude came another shower of hail- 
stones and coals of fire, and the Madero government went up in smoke. 
Ever since that time red hot lava has been pouring out from the 
craters of Juares and Chihuahua; and the whole land is covered 
with smoke and fury. Such a calamity falls alike on the evil and the 
good. The lives and property of foreigners are not respected by these 
elemental forces. 

Is there no protection, no help, no aid? On the slopes of Aetna 
the peasants build enormous stone walls to deflect the lava streams. 
Why not try that method in Mexico? Of what use are such vener- 
able institutions as the administration in Washington, the state de- 
partment, the North American Review^ and the American Academy 
of PoUtical and Social Science, if ashes and scoriae devastate our mines 
and fields in Mexico? Do something I Get busy! Notify somebody! 
Stop the volcano from such disgraceful behavior! Send a warship to 
tell it to be good ! Pepper it with machine gims ! Let loose the Texan 
Bangers! Among these shouts the chorus of "Recognize Huerta!" 
has gradually drowned out the rest. It rises like the war cry of " We 
want Teddy/' as it roars through a Progressive convention. "Recog- 
nise Huertal'' "Recognize Huertal" Colonel Harvey waves his 
arms and wiggle-waggles his shoulders in the finest cheer master 
style as he shouts: "Now fellows, all altogether, one, two, three, Rec- 
ognise Huertal Recognize Huerta! Recognize Huerta! Tii ger." 

No one can deny or would minimize the present dreadful state 
of Mexico, or the suffering alike of native Mexicans, European for- 
and citizens of the United States. The trouble is that revo- 

186 



TiOB PO0TUL4TB0 OF TUB MkZICAN SiTTTATIOM 187 

'ion, civil war, battle, pUUfe, detlnietion and murder, are not 

normal in Mexico, but appear to be ordinary conditions of that un- 

Dpy land, for whieh no known romedy baa ever been found, tbougb 

ave sought it with tears. The era of Meiiean Revohitkm 

n 1 Aio and in the hundred and four years atnoe that time the 

vn no more than forty years of internal peace; while not 

-five dictators have galloped aeroes the political stage, 

<' Ms sword and crying "Recognise me!" ashedis- 

Aiiiiurul Chadwick pointed out in his admurable paper, 
...iidamcntal trouble in all the Latin- American countries, and 
t ticularly in Mexico, seems to be that the population is sub> 
!Iy of native American origin. So far as can be learned, six 
, . ..rs:it millions of the fifteen million Mexicans are unmixed native 
Indians. Six or seven millions are of mixed race and not more than one 
million are of unmixed European race. The deduction is simple, 
namely, that Mexico cannot be classed among nations derived from 
European stock and infused with European traditions. The presump- 
tion is that such a population has not acquired the coolness and 
political reasonableness which are the basis of modern civilised 
governments. 

The common people of the United States are undoubtedly con- 
fused upon this issue because of the supposed success of the thirty- 
two 3rear8 of the dominion of Diaz, from 1879 to 191 1. He succeeded 
b deluding his own people, foreign nations and even himself into 
the belief that Mexico had become so tame that it would eat out of 
hb hand. Diaz maintained his government by two strokes of genius. 
iHp first was the enlistment of brigands and other uneasy persons 
^Kb the corps of ** Rurales," or national mounted police. The second 
s the systematic encouragement of railroads which could carry his 
ij troops to scenes of revolt. But anybody who chooses may sat«fy 
^ f^imself that Diaz for years remained in power only by the despot's 
orite method of closing the mouths of those who criticise the gov- 
iment. Important men were banished or reduced to impotence; 
less significant went to prison; and a good many literally went 
the wall. Listen to the comment recently quoted with approval 
the Mexican newspaper El Didamen, ** Under the liberal tyranny 
^. Don Porforio Dias the wealth and culture of the ruling class of 
scarcely a million and a half of people increased rapidly, but the 



188 Tbm Annalb or ths American Academy 

ami mMi of the oommunity continued to live in the same abject 

BlIHfjr* 

The world heard much of the enlightened policy of Diaz, but 
whet aie the cvidcncee? What did he do to relieve his countrymen 
from the dreadful curee of peonage which has practically set Mexico 
Tery doee to slavery? How many boys and girls did his so-called 
system of popular education teach to read and write? How many 
eommunities were allowed even the rudiments of self government? 
What efforts did he make to break up the crushing system of immense 
IftiuWi estates? How far did he conserve the resources of his country 
against unfavorable contracts and concessions? What is the size of 
the fortune which he accumulated as a reward for his immense dig- 
nitice and powers? The real proof of the hollowness of the regime of 
this strong man is that though he had behind him the government, 
the army, the sympathy of foreign powers, and the prestige of thirty- 
two years of success, his empire crumbled beneath him at last. 

The American public does not deny to its neighbors the sacred 
right of having dictators it they want them ; but it is hard to convince 
the people of this country that dictators self-appointed, backed up by 
paid armies, and dependent for support upon brute force, can furnish 
a really good government. Diaz has the same justification as Hiero 
of Syracuse, or Xerxes of Persia, or Ivan the Terrible of Russia, but 
no such despotism can ever keep alive without murder, for the des- 
pot is a vampire who must always have fresh blood. A few months ago 
I inquired of a Bulgarian gentleman, who as a boy had lived under the 
Turkish dispensation, what was his complaint against the Ottoman 
government. "What was our complaint? That they crushed us to 
the earth; that whenever a young man arose who might conceivably 
become the leader of his people, that young man was rooted out." 
Woe to the country in which the ruler's policy is that of the East 
Indian monarchs, each of whom as he succeeded to the throne began 
by putting out the eyes of his younger brothers! 

Believing as we Americans do, that the only justification of arbi- 
trary and despotic government is the acquiescence of the people con- 
eemed, many of the common people have an inst nctive feeling that 
General Victoriano Huerta, the present self-styled president of Mexico, 
would not under the most favorable circumstances be likely to endure 
longer than the one year to three years which has been the term of 
most of his predeoessors. 



ThB PoATULATU of TBI MCXICAN SITUATION 180 

Colonel Harvey drawi a beart-rending picture at the mental auf- 

ferings of this proviaional oooatitutionaJ Preaident: "Branded — aa 

n aooeeeory to aMaastnation, deprived of the opportunity to borrow 

aioney — cajoled, tbreatened, cut off from aid wbenever poaible— 

remarkable for tba oonaiatent dignity, courtesy and coorideratiott 

exhibited by the old Indian." What is the life history of Victoriano 

Huerta? Up to 101 1 he was a not very conspicuous officer in the anny 

of Dias, without reputation of any kind beyond the boundaries of his 

\vn country. We first heard of him in February, 1013, in the cam- 

lign northward to Juares as a leader of an army of President Madero. 

hen he used his military authority to depose, imprison and supplant 

Preaident Madero who had given him his dignity and opportunity. 

At once he applied for diplomatic recognition, which was accorded 

by most of the powers of Europe. 

The next mark of surpassing greatness was the murder of his for- 
mer friend and principal. The tale of that transaction as related by 
this powerful chieftain, is that he sent his predecessor, who was a help- 
less captive in his hands, from one prison to another at night, with 
an escort so slender that when the cortege was attacked it was unable 
to protect its prisoner, and he was consequently shot by his friends. 
! he "strong man" takes refuge from the obvious charge of murder, 
^>c'hind the plea that he was so inept an administrator, and so timor- 
ous a conmiander, that he could not secure the safety of a state pris- 
oner, nor obedience to his orders by his most trusted troops, within 
a mile of his own palace. 

To some minds the proof against Huerta is incomplete; and the 
: tie to the presidency rests on an assumed constitutional basis. The 
> icts seem to be as follows: Huerta arrested Madero and the vice- 
Ijresident and declared their offices vacant. Thereupon the minister 
of foreign affairs constitutionally became president. His term lasted 
about a quarter of an hour, and his only official acts were to appoint 
Huerta to a cabinet office and then to resign; whereupon Huerta, as 
holder of the highest cabinet office, became "provisional president." 
A few days after Madero's murder he styled himself "provisional but 
constitutional president." 

The next evidence of statesmanship was in October, 1013, when 
a senator of the Mexican Republic, who unlike Huerta, had gone 
through the form of an election, was seised by the orders of the bead of 
that state, who was so powerful that he was afraid his government 



140 Ttt» Amnalb of the American Academy 

would be overthrown by a public criticism from a fellow Mexican. 
Then he imprisoned 110 members of Congress because his polic} was 
•o generally approved that he could not allow a single man to stand 
up in his plaoe and eK pre ee his mind in opposition. 

Even euch nnftiiimirf frequently have the animal attribute of 
belligerency, and the willingness to risk their lives for t 
of their rule; Santa Anna, one of the most slippery and c< 
temptibleof ail Mexican tyrants, conmianded two armies which mc: 
uied swords with the American forces. But where has General 
Hueria been during the fierce campaigns of the north? Town after 
town under his protection has been taken by forces of Mexicans 
which wero little better than organized brigands; and the general ani 
pfosidcint has remained serenely in his capital. A short time .1 
the city of Torreon, the gateway to the city of Mexico, was 1 
teiged, and battered, but the military head of the republic has n 
stirred to animate his own troops, or to share their danger. Such 
amateurs as Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Bolivar, 
found time in the intervals of state-craft to lead armies to victory. 
Somahow, the uninstructed think President Huerta is a roi faineant, 
who sends others to fight his battles, but avoids the villainous powder 



Every such dictator in the experience of Mexico has had to suller 
from dastardly contra-dictators, who have felt that their superb cour- 
age, popularity and patriotism gave them the same right as the head of 
the state to dispense with ordinary humanity. Among the rivals to 
Huerta the most notable is Carranza, who to the uninstructed Amer- 
ican public seems to be a badly carved figurehead, animated with Hu 
ta's desperate determination that other men shall fight and die for 
him at a distance. Nevertheless by his published instructions to 
Villa to murder his prisoners he has put himself outside the pale of civi- 
liaed men. If he really possesses authority, he must take the respon- 
sibility of committing the conduct of his campaigns to General Villa, 
a professional brigand, skilled in making war in the benign fashion 
of the Tartar, the Kaffir, and the Apache, a man who combines the 
qualities of a train robber, a pickpocket and a New York gunman. 

In international law, in ordinary morals, and in the sight of 
Almighty God, Villa's habit of killing non-combatants, men, women, 
and children, is nothing else but plain, despicable murder; murder 
without any military advantage; murder for the sake of killing. One 



Tbb PomruLATM or tbb Mbxicaji Situatiqii 141 



of him rmtimkt maAilmwrnK^^im haa hmtm tn ftwUrtlm lu^w^HlIt fff tlTO hup- 

dred men (who had thrown down their armB) on the plei^ that ubIcm 
he shot them they would form up again, automatioaUsr ann them- 
sehrea, and attack him in the rear. Villa'apleaisthatolthebuO-dof, 
that he must eat the rabbit beoauae otherwiee that animal will bite 
hie tail off. He haa aa much ca|Midty for civiliied f o v en u nent aa a 
buUinaring. The plain American people have juet the tame avenioo 
for Villa that they have for Huerta or for any other man who eeiaca 
upon power in order that he may benefit himaelf and mnMrro hk 



In intcmational law it is a safe rule that every government 
which actually represents a nation is entitled to recognition and to 
diplomatic intercourse. But amid the dust and gore of Mexico it 
is difficult to distinguish a figure which seems to deserve official recog- 
nition by the United States of America. I freely accept the principle 
that the personal character of Huerta or of Villa, though a factor 
in forming a judgment as to Mexican character and government, is 
not a determining reason for refusing to recognise one or the other. So 
far as the President and secretary of state have made the personal 
behavior of those leaders a reason for refusing to have relations with 
them, they have departed from the precedents of American diplomacy. 
Our government has been rather under than over solicitous as to the 
private character of the heads of other governments. A countr>' 
which three tunes recognised Santa Anna, and which recognised the 
most recent dictator of Peru by return mail, has no right to be finicky 
over Huerta's behavior. But behavior is a different thing from legal 
authority. Colonel Harvey denounces President Wilson for not 
giving a full opportunity ''to the only government, however dttcredtt- 
able, that does exist, and the only really strong man, however dis- 
reputable, who has appeared.'' To his mind the policy of the admin- 
istration is as if "one president declares war upon another president." 
Against this dictum I confidently protest. The rightful policy of our 
government is negative rather than positive. The probable and 
sufficient reason for not recognising Huerta as President of the Mexi- 
can Republic is simply that he has never given evidence that he is Pres- 
ident of the Mexican Republic, or indeed that he is the ehoice of the 
Mexican nation for any office or dignity. Who was it that declared 
him to be "provisional president'' February 19, 19137 General 
Victoriano Huerta. Who proclaimed him to be "provisional but 



14S Ths Annalb op thb Amsrican Academy 

fUtutional prandent" February 27? General Victoriano Huerta. 
How did the vacancy occur in the office of constitutional president? 
Through the aaBaaaination of President Madero and Vice-President 
Suarat, while in the custody of men acting under the orders of General 
VIeloffiano Huerta. Who profited by this crime, and thereby made 
hhneelf at beet (or at worst) an accessory after the fact? Victoriano 
HuerU. Who hae arrested people who questioned his title, im- 
prisoned, banished or executed, right and left? Victoriano Huerta. 
Who dissolved the coSrdinate legislative branch of the Mexican 
government and sent its members to prison on the tyrant's usual 
charge of oonsi^racy? Victoriano Huerta. By whose directions have 
tastes and forced loans been made? That of Victoriano Huerta. If 
the question were that of recognizing a newly created nation of Vic- 
loriuio Huerta by its sister power the United States of America, 
the case would be absolutely complete; every person, corporation, 
entity, and unit of government, comprehended within the broad term 
Victoriano Huerta, is unanimous in placing the entire public authority 
in the hands of Victoriano Huerta. 

Nevertheiees, the only question of international law and practice 
which the department of state has been called upon to decide is 
wliether the man who calls himself president of Mexico is either 
de jure or de facto the president of Mexico. Geographically he is 
plainly not the president of all Mexico, for at least a third of its area 
is outside of his authority. From a military point of view he is not 
the head of the Mexican republic, because his forces have been de- 
feated by rebel armies in every pitched battle for many months. 
Constitutionally he b not president of Mexico for he is not flanked 
by a congress choeen in an open election. As the wielder of supreme 
authority for the time being he is not entitled to recognition, because 
he is visibly afraid to leave his capital even to defend his government 
agsinst armed enemies. 

It is true as Colonel Harvey says that ''the manner in which 
the Mexicans see fit to change their rulers is none of our business;" 
but b it not our business to observe whether the Mexicans have 
changed their government? Colonel Harvey feels sure that if Huerta 
had been recognised he would have brought about peace by this time, 
becaus e he b the strongest man in sight. And Huerta makes the 
plea that all he needs to secure hb power b recognition by our govern- 



Trb Postulatbb or thb Msxicam SrruATioif 143 

ment What better proof eoold there be thAt his pofwer b feeble, 
unstable and temporary? The United States would have been glad 
to be reoognised by our neighbor Spain in 1781, but no sueb rsoog- 
nition was neoessaiy: the United States was independent simplj 
because it was independent. From 1821 to 1826 Mexico lacked the 
recognition of Great Britain, yet eheerfully maintained indep e n depee. 
When Louis Napoleon seised the power in France in 1851 be was not 
dependent on the recognition of other nations but on the acceptance 
of his rule by his countrymen. In what manner has the United States, 
as Colonel Harvey asserts, "deprived Huerta of the means of effective 
striving? " 

Another argument for recognition for Huerta is that otherwiss 
our government must recognize the Constitutionalists. To the unin- 
structed mind this point of view recalls the colored minister s appeal: 
" Oh, my hearers, do you realize that there is stretching before you at 
this moment two roads — one of those roads leads to eternal damna- 
tion, and the other to everlasting perdition — oh, my hearers, which 
road will you choose?" The common people look upon the two 
political organizations which are wrestling i^ith each other in Mexico 
as about equally removed from the third and narrow way which leads 
neither to damnation nor perdition ; and some Americans congratulate 
themselves that the government of the United States has taken no 
responsibility for either of those so-called governments. 

The moet familiar starting point for the Harvey cheering section 
with its ''Recognise Huerta!" is that he is the strong man, who only 
needs recognition by the United States to bring about order and good 
government. It is fair to ask why this particular strong man should 
succeed where failures were recorded by Iturbide, Bustamente, 
Aristomente, Santa Anna, Comonfort, Miramon, and Madero. The 
BerKner TagMaU which ought to know a strong man when it sees 
him, is sure that Huerta is " exactly the man that Mexioo at this junc- 
ture needs. " But if Mexico needs him, what prevents Mexico from 
having him? If by a ''strong man" is meant only one who can by 
brute force compel 15,000,000 people to obey him against their will, 
then the man for President of Mexico is evidently not Huerta but 
Hagenbeck, the lion-tamer, with his whip and revolver to encourage 
his loving subjects. The mention of lions suggests WaDaoe Irwin's 
conception of a strong character: 



144 Thb Annals op Tin American Academy 

Adolpbui I am hungrae, 

And rather faint am I, 
Pray ba to good as give to me 

A monal of your pie. 

Tbe Hon ate Adolphue' pie 

With aU poUtenen due, 
Than paining with a grateful sigh 

He ate Adolphus too. 

Than rising with a thoughtful roar 

He sauntered down the plain, 
A stronger, better lion for 

Adolphus' deed humane. 

I for one, protest against the argument that it is the moral duty 
of the United States to help into power a man of a type against 
whom erery man would take up arms, if he were an American and 
tried to make himself dictator of the United States. What is the 
use of dubbing as "Constitutional/' a process of murder and seizing 
oo offices which would justify revolution, if it; were tried here? Why 
eKCUse and extol a man who, if he tried his policy within tbe bounds of 
tlie United States, would be stoned out of civilized society! 

Doubtless many people are led to believe that Huerta is the 
government of Mexico, because he occupies the national capital, 
gives Ofders to an army and is supported by his troops so long as he 
is able to pay the price. After General Miramon in 1858 became 
"president substitute" and was recognized by most of the European 
powers, Secretary Cass instructed Minister McLean that possession 
of the Mexican capital was not an essential condition of the recogni- 
tion of the government; that he should recognize no government un- 
less it was "obeyed over a large majority of the country, and the 
people, and was likely to continue." President Buchanan thought 
thai since Miramon "was himself a military usurper, having expelled 
the constitutional president from oflSce, it would have been a lasting 
ifiignice to the Mexican people had they tamely submitted to the 
yoke." 

The fact is that there is no constitutional or international reason 
why at present anybody must be recognized in Mexico. It would 
have been well for the world if earlier administrations had been less 
hasty in recognizing dictators whose careers were destined to be short. 
It is not true, even though the London Specialar says so, that ''the 



Ten POflTULATIS OP THB MbXICAM SiTUATIOir 146 

alternAthrei Are to reoogniie wbatover prerident bat at the mooieDt 
climbed to power (or) to act as though Mexico were no loQier aa 
iadependentoountry." If thare are now two ocganitatiopi In Nipxico, 
neither of which can show any proof that it la dedred by the l^Iexican 
people, the obvioue common senae course would seem to be to reeof- 
niae neither of them. Aa Lincoln said in his famoiiaspeeeh in Chieafo 
about slavery, **l protest now and forever, agahiat that counterfeit 
logic which presumes that because I do not want a negro woman for 
t slave, I do necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding ia 
r hat I need not have her for either; but, as God made ua separate, we 
an leave one another alone, and do to one another much good 
thereby." 

Is there a Mexican people? Is there a popuUr will? Is there 
my known means of determining that will? That is of course the 
idical issue for Mexico and the Mexicans. Inasmuch aa stnoe 1821 
here have been over twenty military despots, and only two eleetiona 
t which there was an open and unstressed opportunity for the Mexi- 
ins to vote for a president, the prospect of a genuinely popular gov- 
mment is discouraging. Apparently most of the Mexican people 
would accept any just and moderate government which was once 
firmly seated; but with the single exception of Diaz, the "strong 
men" have never furnished anything approaching a just and moder- 
ate government, — certainly not Huerta. The Mexican tyrant loves 
the trappings of tyranny. Our American despots are satisfied with 
the actual control of conventions, legislatures, governors and parties; 
lit the Mexican wants all that, and in addition, a cocked hat, sabre, 
presidential palace, and bullet-proof automobile. We are not too 
far from the ordinary habits of Mexican life; bandits have recently 
attacked railroad trains in Massachusetts and Illinois; and a candi- 
date for the governorship of a southwestern state aeema to rest his 
claims on the fact that he served a term in prison for being captain of 
rigands; the beginning of ci\il war may be seen in Colorado. But 
the American people have the habit of accepting a defeat in a political 
election, cordially recognizing the candidates elected by the other 
irty, and then organising to beat them at the next electioiL Sueli 
patience and forb^utmoe seem lacking in the Mexican charaeler; 
with them it is rule or ruin. So long as recognition waits upon the 
xistence of a stable government, it may have long to wait 
There is a positive and pressing need for official 



146 Tbb Annals or tiii>: American Academy 

with some authority in Mexico i:>ecau8e the property and lives of 
forelgiien, including many American citizens, arc in daily danger. 
Some of that property arises from questionable dealings \\ith defunct 
Rovemments, much of it is fairly and honestly won against great 
difficultise. Most of the Americans who have established themselves 
in Mexico did so under a government which seemed likely to retain 
its auUiority and keep the peace. Our government owes to those 
people moral support at all times, and protection in case of need. Of 
oourse that protection can be offered without recognition of this or 
that Mexican government; and it is difficult to see how a constitutional 
praldent who cannot defend the lives and property of his own ad- 
herents in the north, could by recognition become suddenly powerful 
enough to defend Americans in the south. The main difficulty is 
not recognition, nor even the weakness of Mexican government, but 
in an instability of Mexican character, which seems to make good 
government impoesible. We have been misled by the exceptional 
endurance of the Diaz regime. Leaving that one administration out 
of account, no government in Mexico has ever been much aided by 
American recognition, or much marred by the lack of it. 

Then what is to be done? How is the United States to protect 
its nationals, or to make effective those claims for millions of dollars 
which will soon come pouring in, and which in the last resort will have 
to be paid by the Mexican taxpayer? Failing recognition, interven- 
tion has been demanded. If by intervention is meant the military' 
occupation of Mexico with a view to the pacification of the country, 
and then the withdrawal of troops, there have been some experiences 
that seem like precedents. Buchanan vainly sought from Congress 
in 1859 authority to send an army into Mexico, to break up the 
Miramon government, and thus open the way for the Juarez gov- 
ernment. Even when the French were in Mexico, no American 
troops ever croesed the border. 

It seems tolerably clear that any American expedition would 
forthwith bring about some approach to a real national government 
by making every decent Mexican ready to meet the Americans, as 
Tom Corwin put it in 1846, "to welcome them with bloody hands to 
hoqiitable graves. " For, strange as it may seem, the Mexicans, who 
have never learned how to develop the resources of their country, or 
to give it dignity among nations, have an inveterate love of their 
own land, a furious hatred of those who attempt to diminish their 



Tb PonvLATMB OF THB Mbxicam Situatiow 147 



k 



territory, and a willingnaw to die in it* defence, which among 
highly organiied nations might be called patriotim. 

Allowing that untervention should begin, when and how is it to 
end? That is a question of more significance to us than to the Meid- 
cans. Excellent military authorities think that a force ni TOOfiOO 
men would not be too large for the purpose, which would be by far 
the Urgest army ever moved from one country to another in America. 
And when would that country be ready to take care of itself again? 
Sixteen years we have been civilizing the Filipinos up to the point 
where they are unanimous only on one thing, namely, that they want 
us to leave. Nothing less than a similar experience of education in 
language, science, and self-government would much affect the dispo- 
sition of the Mexican people. 

Supposing that our physical means are sufficient for the task ol 
hoKling down Mexico, have we not sufficient race and color questkMM 
already? Are we so far advanced in the amalgamation of European 
races, much nearer to us than the Mexicans are in culture and stand- 
ards, that we can undertake a similar task at long range upon an 
unwilling people? Is Cuba so certain to remain a dependency faistead 
of to become an integral part of the United States, that we can under- 
take a problem many times more difficult? Have we been so success 
ful in the fair treatment and civilization of our own 300,000 Indians 
that we wish to be responsible for 14,000,000 more? Is the govern- 
ment of Boston, New York and Philadelphia so firmly established on 
principles of truth and righteousness that we can now tranrfer our 
energies to the uplift of Tampico and Masatlan, and the city of Mex- 
ico? Von Moltke used to say that he had worked out three different 
detailed plans for the invasion of England by a German anny, but he 
never could contrive a plan for getting the army back again. A 
stroke of the pen can send an army into Mexico! How many stiokes 
nf thft sword will be needed to keep it there? 



ERRORS WITH REFERENCE TO MEXICO AND EVENTS 
THAT HAVE OCCURRED THERE 

Bt Henry Lane Wilson, 
Former AmbMsador of the United States to Mexico. 

/. The Character of the Government of General Diaz 

Dial was not a tyrant, but a benevolent autocrat who understood 
the Mexican people and knew them to be unfitted for self-govern- 
ment. Though not elected by constitutional methods, he governed 
aooording to law. He ruled Mexico for thirty years with a hand of 
iron, but poesessed withal undeviating personal honesty, loyalty 
to obligations and a profound patriotism, together with a lofty con- 
ception, as to Mexico's needs and future. His foreign policy was 
clear and fixed from the first days of his power. It consisted, among 
other things, of the cultivation of the friendliest relations with the 
government of the United States coupled with the invitation to 
American capital and American energy to go thither and develop the 
marvellous resources of the country, affording them generous profits 
but reining in return much greater ones for Mexico. 

He had two great domestic policies: First, the development of 
the material resources of the country'; second, the quickening of 
the moral life of the nation. The first of these policies he accomplished 
with a high measure of success. The second he would have ac- 
complished but for the undermining influences of advancing years 
and the realization that the task was beyond his endurance and power. 
If Dias had carried the torch of enlightenment into the dark places 
of Mexico, the history of the last three years might have been differ- 
ently written. He covered Mexico with a network of railways; he 
developed her resources by concessions and by encouragement to 
foieign capital; he fostered her manufacturing, mining, agricultural, 
and commercial interests; built hospitals and innumerable public 
institutions; established her credit at home and abroad; and, with 
his army and rural police, made life as safe on a Mexican highway as 
on one of the public thoroughfares of the state of Massachusetts. 
He did more than this. With the materials which he had at hand he 

148 



WITH RVBUWUB TO MbZIOO 140 

tried to establish justice, and no man whooould prosciut to him aa hott- 
est cause ever suffered through a misearriate of justice; and no maa 
who observed the law and kept the peace needed to fear his avenginf 
hand. The legend, however, existed that those who broke the law, 
that those who committed crimes, must pay the penalty, and this 
made peace. 

//. DioM was not Owerthnnm hy Madtro, but by a Utdwertal PMU 
SenHmerU which Madero neilher Creaisd nor Repr$9inlsd 

The government of Dias was not overthrown by Madero; it 
collapsed and on its ruins Madero, who represented only a onall 
fraction of the active oppodtion, rode into power through the default 
of any other organised movement. 

The vast majority of Mexican public opinion was hostile to 
Madero from the first days of his government, and this hostility 
augmented as it became evident that his administration was insincere 
in its promises and incompetent in the performance of its obli- 
gations. Madero came into power pledged to a platform which de- 
clared for free press, free elections, free lands, free education, and a free 
judiciary, but after more than a year of his administration not a single 
pledge of his altruistic program had been kept. A free press existed 
neither in theor>' nor in fact. Of the metropolitan newqiapers three 
were owned by the government, and the editors of five were in jail. 
The press and the international news service were censored and only 
that which pleased the government was sent abroad. In the matter 
of elections, the government interfered with every gubernatorial 
election from the Rio Grande River to the boundary of Guatemala, 
and it used all its power and influence to elect a friendly legislatiTe 
body. Pledged to free and universal education, the government did 
not appropriate for educational purposes a single dollar b^ond the 
amount already established by preoedent Neitbsr was a single addi- 
tional school-house built, nor an additional opportunity afforded a 
Mexican child to receive education. To the great and preteiinent 
problem of furnishing lands to the people through some intelligent 
Bysiem of redistribution no attention whatsoever was paid, and when 
Madero fell not a single acre of land had been distributed, nor did 
there seem to be the slightest probability of any effort in that dirso* 
tion. In the last days of the govetnmoit a profound peiimisni suo- 



150 The Annals or the Amfrhav Academy 

ooodod the altruism which had been so bravely licralded in the ear ier 
and more fftngi«?M» days. The leader of the revolutionary protest 
^l ^iifc^ the deapotlfln of Diaz became himself a despot, practicing all 
tlie fonna of tyranny against which his revolution and his election 
wero proteaU; the dreamer of Coahuila, who essayed the r61e of 
Moaea, shriveled rapidly to the dimensions of a Castro. Thus, after 
the sacrifice of thousands of human lives, the destruction of vast 
material interests, aggravation of the condition of the poorer classes, 
and desolation and ruin spread over a third of the area of the republic, 
the Mexican people discovered that their lives and their property were 
subject to the same type of despotism which had aroused a national 
protest against Dias, and that the dangers and difficulties of the hour 
were vastly increased by the impotence of the government and its 
i^iparent inability to maintain the national prestige and credit. 

///. The Supposition that Madera was Elected by Constitu'ional 
Methods and by the Majority of the Mexican People 

Madero received a total vote of 19,987, out of a population of 
15,000,000 people. There is no such thing as a constitutional method 
in Mexico. There is no machinery for carrying out the national will 
through democratic channels. There are no precedents to guide the 
Mexican population in the exercise of sovereignty, and the people 
themaehres are totally unable to distinguish between right and wrong, 
between an autocracy and a democracy. If left to their own incli- 
nations they would choose an autocracy. 

IV. The Genera Belief hat the Madero Government was pro- 
American 

At the close of the Taft administration relations between the 
United States and Mexico had become severely strained. At the be- 
ginning of the revolutionary government there were in Mexico some- 
where between fifty and seventy-five thousand American citizens 
and Am e ric an capital invested to the extent of probably a billion of 
dollars. As the Madero government continued in power, it became 
evident, not only to the official representative of the government of 
the United Statea in Mexico, but to all observing foreigners, that there 
existed a strong anti-American sentiment among a large number 



WITH RsFnunfCB to Mnoo 151 




of the more ignorant part of tbe population of Mexieo; a 
which, if not in some meaaure ahared by the Mexican 
was at leaat not diaoountenanoed nor reproved by it In no 
instance, that can be recalled, did an official under Madero 
appreciation of the unselfish attitude of the Aroerioan govenmMBi and 
people, or express the smallest measure of gratitude for tbe material 
benefits which American intelligence and energy and Ameriean ea|^ 
ital had bestowed upon Mexico. On numerous occasions, howerer, 
public orators, the press, and all the organs capable of u 
public opinion, were busily engaged in inflaming the public mind 
in rendering more unsafe the situation of Americans and their proper- 
ties in Mexico. 

This lack of sound and civilized public policy bore its fruit, 
as might have been expected, in a wide and indiscriminatory attacic 
upon everything bearing the stamp of American origin. American 
interests honestly acquired, and on which vast amounts of capital 
had been expended, were everywhere attacked on baseless and absurd 
pretexts, by persons in collusion with friends of the government, and 
were harassed by confiscatory taxes and by the denial of the pro- 
tection which the most elementary conceptions of government would 
afTord them. American citizens, to a great number, were arrested 
on frivolous and insufficient charges, and incarcerated in filthy and 
uncivilized jails, from which neither the protests of our own govern- 
ment nor the palpable and proven injustice of their imprisonment 
could release them. Scores of American citizens were foully and 
brutally murdered, and neither diplomatic representations, entreaties 
nor threats served to procure the trial or punishment of the offending 
criminals. The property of our citizens was destroyed, yet the Ma- 
dero government turned a deaf ear to their complaints, and denied 
them that justice which it is incumbent upon all civilized nations to 
afford. To such an extent did this persecution grow that, at the 
of Madero's fall, probably thirty thousand American citizens had 
obliged to abandon their homes, their factories, their mines, and their 
haciendas, and return to the United States. 

The American property confiscated or destrc^yed reached a sum 
of vast proportions, and yet from all indications the Madsro govern- 
ment had no intention of recognizing its responsibility for the 
The inability to secure adequate proteetkm for American citii 
the unprovoked murder of many AmerieaB8» tbe failure on the part of 



152 Thb Annalb of thb American Academy 

the M fffl^ ** government to secure the arrest, detention and punish- 
ment (d thd muiderers, the disposition of the executive to attack 
kfidly Aoquirad American interests through trumped-up court 
piooenei, the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of Americans on 
frhfolous eharfes, the failure of local governments to remedy such 
abuw, the savage and barbarous character of the warfare — by all 
of then intolorablo conditions our government was finally forced 
to taka m deoWve stand. Hence, on September 15, 1912, the 
embaaqr, under instructions from Washington, addressed to the 
Mexicaa gov er nment a note which not only evidenced the virility 
and ik fft n o nn of the Taft administration, but induced the Madero 
adminbtration to dispatch the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Las- 
euratn, to the United States with instructions, couched in general 
and vague language, to make concessions to Secretary Knox, and also 
inekientaUy to see President-elect Wilson for purposes unknown to the 
author but presumably connected with the policy towards Mexico of 
the administration which was about to come into power. This oc- 
curred ooincidentaUy with the withdrawal of Seflor Calero, Mexican 
ambassador at Washington, and his public announcement in connec- 
tion with his resignation, that he had been instructed by the Madero 
administration systematically to misrepresent conditions in Mexico. 

V, Chancier of the 8(hcalled Constitutionalists and their Leaders 

The so-called constitutionalists are merely large organized bands 
of bandits who were in arms against the government of General 
Dias, and then in arms against the government of Madero, and are 
now in arms against the government of General Huerta. These ban- 
dits learned of their new opportunities in the last days of the Diaz 
,; they improved them under the government of Madero; 
thor have now become professional bandits who loot to live and 
Ihre to loot. The designation "Constitutionalist" has been assumed 
•olely for the purpose of enlisting the sympathy of the Washington 
gOfvamment, which should long ago have discovered the shallow pre- 
and mockery of the disguise. These people have no compre- 
of the meaning of the word "democracy." Their idea of an 
is a re\'olution, and they have no intention whatsoever of 
akfing hi the maintenance of an orderly, peaceful, democratic republic. 



TO Msaoo 16S 

The dvLim of my podtion during naarly four ymn of aiduoiM 
and responsible work in Mexico, have brought me frequently in eoi^ 
tact with the methode of ibeee northern brigand*, and I may aay 
without the slightest hesitation that, as a whole, they are not only 
entirely out of keeping with our conception of what an 
struggling for liberty should be, but are mere natural 
up in the habiliments of civilization. Of their chiefs and leaders It can 
only be said that their crimes are greater and their respon si bility 
more heavy because of their greater intelligenoe. 

Carransa, the dummy and opera bouffe president put forward by 
this band of outlaws, is an ineffectual politician. He Is reqxmsibls 
for the massacre of Durango. He was chased out of the state of 
Coahuila by his subordinates, and he has remained until tlie last few 
weeks, by the order of Villa, in complete isolation in the state of Sooora. 
Whatever part he takes in coming events, the American public may 
understand that it is purely opera bouffe in character, and that, wlien 
he is not needed for spectacular purpoees, his services will be promptly 
dispensed with. 

Villa, the real leader of the revolutionary party, has been a bandit 
for twenty-five jrears, and has to his credit more than one hundred 
murders. He has pillaged and looted the larger part of the state of 
Chihuahua. He is responsible for the massacres of Juares, Ojinaga, 
Chihuahua and Torreon, and he may be depended upon to murder 
and loot whenever he can do so with safety. 

Aguilar, the third chieftain, was in arms against Dias, and then 
in arms against Madero, and is now in arms against Huerta. His 
contribution to the cause of constitutionalism was the massacre of 
Victoria. The fourth in this galaxy of patriots is Zapata, who is re- 
sponsible for the desolation and spoliation of the states of Morelas 
and Guerraro. Zapata is known to all the world. He has been in 
arms against Dias, against Madero, and finally against Huerta, and 
will be in arms against any government establislied in Mexieo City. 

With these elements the Washington administration must deal 
when it shall have overthrown the government of General Huerta, 
and no government will be permitted to exist which has not the seal 
of their approval and support. 



154 TBI Annals op thb American Academy 

VI. Charadmr rf ih» Mexican PopulaHon as a Whole 

The character of the Mexican population as a whole is very 
gretlty mkundentood in the United States. At least 80 per cent of 
the population is of the indigenous races, without an abiding place 
except by sufferance, with no more than a nominal part or interest in 
the politics and affairs of the country, unable to read or write, who, 
wliile praserving the vices and traditions of their ancestors, have been 
made infinitely worse by the ingrafting of the vices of the white man 
and by the consciousness of a feeling of injustice arising from the 
realisation that they are pariahs and outcasts. Here lies, in large 
metsure, the root of the evil conditions and that which will con- 
stitute n menace for all time to come, unless righted by a strong and 
▼igoious government moving on definite lines of policy with the 
sympathy, advice and assistance of those civilized powers which, 
jnttfiitl of attempting to set up an altruistic republic among a people 
unfitted for it by education and tradition, may furnish those effective 
aids which will lead to a system of universal education, the implant- 
ing of sound political ideas, and a patriotism which shall be some- 
thing liigher and nobler than hatred of the foreigner. 

VII . Character of Madera 

Madero was a man of imperfect education and vision. He was a 
of the French school in politics and economics, but never 
its threads of philosophy for practical application nor com- 
prehended in the least the deep, practical common-sense which lies 
at the root of all French political opinion. He was a dreamer of 
dreams, and a singer of unknown songs which met with no echo. He 
came into power as an apostle of liberty, but he was only the man 
wiio liappened to be in the pubHc eye at the psychological moment. 
Remote from the great position where his misguided ambition carried 
him, he would, doubtless, have remained a quiet and simple country 
fsotleman of benevolent ideals and blameless life. Clothed with the 
eliief power of the nation, evil qualities, dormant in the blood or in the 
race, came to the surface and wrought ruin to him and to thousands 
upon thousands of the Mexican people. 



Ekm>m with RBrasBfCB TO Mexico 155 

VIJL BwenU of the BmnhardmmU of th$ City of Moxieo and tht 
(hertkrow of Mod&ro 

With refemioe to the bombardment of the City of Mexico, whieb 
culminated in the overthrow of Madero, it may be useful to illuminale 
a few pointo which have been matters of public rtismiMinn 

1. The representations unofficially made to Madero urging hit 
resignation by the American ambassador and the British, German, and 
Spanish ministers, with the approval of all their colleagues, were made 
after it was known that a large number of army oflloers under Huerto 
were untrue to the Madero government. Also th^ were made only 
after the military attache of the American ambassy had informed 
the ambassador that the citadel held by General Dias could not be 
taken by the Madero government, even with the sacrifice oC its en- 
tire military force. These representations reflected the viei»-8 of all 
foreigners in Mexico City. They were made, not only for the pur- 
pose of saving the lives of foreigners, but for the purpoee dL savii 
the lives of Madero and his family. 

2. These representations were enforced on the same day by 
lar representations from the Mexican Senate, and they were followed 
on tlie next day by similar representations from a committee of the 
army, at which time Madero killed with his own hand Colonels Riverol 
and Izquerdo. I believe this is not disputed. Following this act 
Madero was made prisoner by General Blanquet. Had he acted upon 
the advice given him by the members of the diplomatic corps and 
handed over his powers to Congress, the Mexican revolution would 
have avoided all the tragedies which followed. 

3. After the overthrow of Madero was announced to the Ameri- 
can embassy for transmission to the diplomatic corps, a new situattoo 
immediately developed. All civil power had ceased. Two hostile 
armies occupied the City of Mexico, which had been devastated by 
ten days of bombardment, during which the lives of some five to 
seven thousand people were sacrificed. In the poorer quarters of the 
city, thousands of people were starving. Bandits were beginning to 
appear in every quarter intent on pillage. Human life was safe 
nowhere. Some twenty thousand foreigners were depending upon the 
embassy for protection and for guidance. Fifteen hundred Amerieans 
had been brought out of the firing sone and furnished with homes 
in the immediate vicinity of the embassy which undertook to afTord 



106 Tkb Annals of trs Ambrican Academy 

Umoi piotaetioii and supply tham with the necessities of life. Lights 
and water for the embaasy had been cut off, and one side of the build- 
ing riddled with bullete. The scarcity of food increased, and the dif- 
ficulty of feeding the vast number of people dependent upon the em- 
bassy for supplies grew hourly greater. It seemed to the ambassador 
that his duty was elear, and he immediately sent, on his own responsi- 
bility, for General Felix Dias and General Huerta to come to the 
embassy, as neutral ground, for the purpose of arranging, if possible, 
for some cessation of hostilities. Eight hours after the overthrow 
of Madero these generals came to the embassy. The ambassador had 
met these men only once before in company with his colleagues, but 
he was able after six hours of discussion — sometimes of a highly irri- 
tating character — to induce these men to agree to turn over their 
powers to Congress. This was done, and on the morrow the people 
of the City of Mexico resumed their peaceful occupations. 

4. Madero died as the result of a military conspiracy formed for 
the purpose of avenging the deaths of General Reyes, General Ruiz, 
Colonel Riverol and Colonel lasquerdo. The embassy's investiga- 
tions biought no certain conclusions except to indicate that General 
Huerta was in no way privy to the killing of Madero, but that it was 
his well-detined purpose to send him out of the country. At one time 
a tram was prepared for this purpose, but when telegrams from some 
member of the Madero family to the military governor of Vera Cruz 
urging him to rise, were intercepted, Huerta decided it would be un- 
wise to let Madero depart. The most that may be said of Huerta in 
eonnection with this crime, so repugnant to civilization, was that he 
did not take sufficient precautions to guard against it. Madero was 
killed in precisely the way it was related, namely, by his guards after 
an attack had been made upon the automobile. It may be mentioned 
here that Madero was being transferred from the guard house in the 
palace to the penitentia r y at the request of the American embassy, 
whieh acted in the matter in response to Mrs. Madero's prayers that 
more comfortable quarters should be assigned to the ex-president. 

5. It is believed by a great many honest people that Huerta 
slew Bfadero for the purpoee of succeeding him in the presidency. 
This is a chronological error. Madero had resigned and Huerta had 
s u e e eedsd to the provisional presidency before Madero was killed. 
Thus while Madero was violently overthrown, his death did not occur 
until after his su cce ssor had been chosen. 



EiROM WITH RsnnuDrai to Mbdoo 157 



JX» Legaiity of Uie GoMrnmeni of Husrta and Ui Support b^ P^ 

lie Opinion 

The government of QenerAlHuerU was m legally eonetHoted ee 

any Mexican government in the past President Madero and Viee- 

President Suarei resigned* Mr. Pedro Lasourain, the Madeio mfai- 

iBter of foreign affairs, then suooeeded mider the oonstittttkm to the 

I»rosidenoy. Ho assumod the office and appointed as his minister of 

the Ulterior, General Victoriano Huerta, and then resigned. General 

Iluerta then took offioe in accordance with the provisions of the Mex- 

in constitution, and his powers were approved by Congrees without 

lissontinK voice. The government came into power accompanied 

the hopes of fourteen million Mexicans who were not enamoied 

Huerta, but who were sick of disorder, blood and violence and the 

isting of the national resources. These people wanted a government 

iiioh would stand for law and order. Tliey believed Huerta to be a 

iMAQ of the type of Diss, who would be fearless and prompt in the 

protection of society and in the punishment of those who violated the 

1 aw. Huerta is a soldier. He has spent his entire life in military serv- 

•. He is an able, adroit, courageous man. His desire is to protect 

iety and to restore peace, and he is not over particular as to the 

thods employed to accomplish this end. He will fight to the last, 

md if eventually overthrown will go down in the midst of the ruins. 

X, Errors of the WaehinffUm Administraiion 

1. The announcement of the new doctrine that govemmenta 
owing their origm to violence would not be recognised by this govern- 
nt. This was an error for the following reasons : 

a. It was announced before the President had access to the 
records of the department of state and the history of our foreign rela- 
•08, which should have served as his guidance. 

6. It was purely an expression of the Presklent's personal views, 
being contrary to the traditions and precedents of this government 
since its existence. 

c. It was uttered without foresight and without that comprehen* 
sive view of its effect on our foreign relations which should have ol>- 
tained. This is made evident by the inconsistent attitude of the ad- 
ministration in refusing to recognise the administratioii of Huertat 



I 



158 Th» Annaxb or th» American Academy 

and subsequently recognising the new government of Peru — where 
the president had been deposed by violence and was in jail, and the 
minister of war had been assassinated—and by the recognition of 
the government of Haiti. These inconsistencies subject the admin- 
istration to the clmrge of msincerity. 

2. The refusal to recognise the provisional government of Gen- 
eral Huerta. In taking this position this government was acting 
within its rights, but it nevertheless contributed to the discredit of 
a government which was endeavoring to restore peace and order in 
Mexico, and which had the support of ninety-eight per cent of the 
Mexican public and of the American and all other foreign colonies, 
as wsll as of all European governments. The consequences following 
the T^ithliolding of our recognition have been most grave. Our atti- 
tude has been interpreted and is now recognized as favoring and 
supporting rebels in arms against a regularly constituted government. 
It has fed the flames of rebellion, stimulated the revolutionary move- 
ment, and is responsible for the destruction of millions of dollars worth 
of property and thousands of human lives. It has financially ruined 
thousands of Americans, and it has afforded advantages to European 
commercial, manufacturing and exploiting interests, to the loss and 
detriment of those of the United States. It has excited the suspicion 
and hostility of every Latin-American country, has grievously af- 
fronted ever>' European chancellery and has placed this nation in 
such imminent peril in its foreign relations with three great govern- 
ments that it has found itself obliged to determine its course in a 
great international question by the pressing necessities of the dif&cult 
position which it has created rather than in response to the call of 
high national and moral obligations. It has forced a further distorted 
and amplified interpretation of the already exaggerated Monroe Doc- 
trine, and launched us upon seas of imperiahsm from which no man 
may see the shore. Persistence in such a policy can be justified only 
by the supreme necessity of saving the pride and prest ge of an 
administration committed to a national blunder. It can therefore be 
justified only as a policy of "expediency " and not as one of "morals." 

8. The dispatch of the Land mission. The dispatch of Mr. Lind 
to Mexico, as the oflScial representative of the President in dealing 
with the Huerta administration without the approval or consent of 
the Senate of the United States, was an act at variance with our 
precedents, and was an assertion of over-lordship toward the sovereign 



EnowB WITH lUmuufCB to Mbooo IflO 



Mexican natioD throusb direct though not armed failenreslioB in 
its aflfairs. The r e pr e e en tations made through Mr. Lind had tilimdj 
been made, under inatruotions from Waahington, through the uroni 
and conatitutionally appointed officer of thii government, without 
■uccees, and their repetition through the President's pfrtffnal repi^ 
sentative, a perKm without diplomatic character or trahiiag, was an 
act of needless offensiveness toward a friendly and s o v e r ei g n stale. 
The Huerta government was convicted of high crimes and misdsmean- 
ors upon ex parU testimony. Huerta was told that he was unfit to be 
president and was asked to join in an expression of his own oondon- 
nation. Huerta's government was furthermore asked to give guar- 
antees for a constitutional election, whereas every person veiaed in 
Mexican affairs knows that a constitutional election is impossible in 
Mexico. Finally, the diplomatic maneuvers of the Washington gov- 
ernment having been con8|)icuou8ly baflled and defeated by the fear- 
less Mexican president and his astute minister of foreign relations, Mr. 
Gamboa, the administration made an irreparable mistake in retain- 
ing Mr. Lind in Mexico, after his mission had terminated, thus further 
irritating the Mexican government, exposing our onn government to 
additional ridicule, and the unfortunate Mr. Lind to the dubious 
delights — though assured safety — of the seaport of Vera Cruz. 

4. The attempt to discredit European nations accredited in Mex- 
ico, and to misrepresent their attitude with reference to recognition. 

The European governments accredited in Mexico have no polit- 
ical interests in that countr>% but they have large conmiercial ones 
and large colonies. France has $900,000,000 invested in hanking and 
manufacturing enterprises. Great Britain has close upon a billion 
of dollars invested in mines, banks, railways and plantations. Ger- 
many and Spain have each over 1500,000,000 invested in the country 
at large. The representatives of these governments have experienced, 
not only nearly two years of the misgovemment, but also the terrors 
and insincerities of the Madero government — a government in theory* 
totally unsuited to Mexico, and in practice worse than the autocracgr 
of General Dias. They desired to provide for the safety of their 
nationals and to secure for them an opportunity to pursue theb peace- 
ful occupations. They therefore recommended the rooognilkMi d 
the Huerta government, and for those reasons only their l e pt esen U iF 
tions were approved and acted upon by their ggvemmenta. The 
refusal of this government to accord recognition became therefore 



160 Thb Annalb of Tur American Academy 

equivalent to a rebuke to the European, Asiatic and Latin-American 
natitmii which had accorded recognition. This implied rebuke was 
to them not only because they were deprived of the moral 
of this government in aiding the Huerta administration to 
leetore oitler, but because they were offered no compensation for the 
loss of the bencfito expected to flow from their action. 

5. The attempt to destroy the financial credit and standing in 
Mezioo. 

This was the second act of intervention in the affairs of Mexico, 
cMgnedly expected to prevent the Huerta government from secur- 
inf the means necessary to put down rebellion and disorder. For the 
purpose of carrying out this pohcy this government and this nation 
wers made responsible for the destruction of vast material interests, 
for a protracted period of bloody warfare, for the unnecessary sacrifice 
of thousands of human Uves, and for the permanent impairment of 
cordial good feeUng between the two nations. Thid policy, initiated 
without any knowledge of the resources of the Mexican government, 
has been a ridiculous failure. Huerta's revenues today are larger than 
they were six months ago. They are composed of $5,000,000 a month 
from the customs revenue, and $6,000,000 from special taxes that are 
not burdensome, thus giving a total revenue of $11,000,000 a month 
to be used for administrative and war purposes. 

6. The lifting of the embargo on the importation of arms and 
ammunition into Mexico. 

This was an error (a) because it was dictated by considerations 
of "expediency" and not of "morals.'' Placing arms in the hands 
of civilised people bent on destroying one another is an inmioral act 
and contrary to \&vrs human and divine. How much more repre- 
hensible, therefore, is the placing of arms in the hands of savages and 
vandals with the power to take human life and destroy the property 
of law-abiding people. By this policy our government, acting upon 
the promptings of mistaken even though honest motives, became ac- 
to the crimes conmiitted by the hands of barbarians, (b) 
the act convicts the administration of insincerity, since the 
IVerfdent some six months ago announced his determination never 
to take this step, (c) Because, with the failure of some established 
Me a rie a n government to become responsible for damages growing out 
of the disturbed conditions existing in northern Mexico, we as a nation 
will become Uable, under international law and under the interpre- 



Erbobm with RsrBRXNCB TO Mdqco 161 

' ntion of the Monroe Doctrine, for money oompentatkm for the three 
und property of foreigners taken in that territory. Theee dimafee 
will amount to probably eeventy-five or one hundred milliona of doOan. 

7. The assumption that constitutional elections can be held in 
Mexico. 

There has never been a constitutional election in Mexico, and 
there never will be until a radical change is made in the habits and 
character of the people. The work of making the nation democratic 
must be begun at the bottom and not at the top. We cannot justly 
saddle an ignorant nation with respons b Lties such as are borne 
with difficulty by highly civilised nations. Eighty per cent of the 
population is Indian, unable to read or write, and having no com- 
prehension of the theory and practice of democracy. As well expect 
the statue of liberty in New York harbor to stand if built upon 
quicksand as to expect a constitutional election under present con- 
ditions in Mexico. Ehrery government there has been shot in and shot 
out of power, and a revolution is an election. The truth of this view 
IS sustained by the history of Mexico since the time of the revolu- 
tion against Spain. Where else throughout the world have there been 
more turbulence, more violent overturning of government, more 
hallelujalia of triumph, or more anathemas of death and defeat? 
The hero and patriot of one hour becomes in the next hour the fugitive 
from justice with a price upon his head. He who rules marches 
through slaughter to a throne. Power is seized by ambitious hands, 
but the victor ends his career in the dungeon, in exile, or by the 
dagger. From the time of the revolution against Spain down to the 
time of the establishment of the government of General Diai, the 
rulers of Mexico pass across the stage like the ghosts of Banqua 
The ambitious Iturbide, the tyrant Santa Anna, and the unhappy 
ind misguided Maximilian, along with a multitude of vulgar and 
bloody tyrants, held sway over the destinies of this unhappy countr>', 
des})oiling its population and leaving in their wake only the tragic 
echoes of disappointed ambitions. Philosophers should have learned 
the lesson taught in the pages of Mexico's bloody histor>', that the 
practice of democracy, which is a burden at times to the most cix-il- 
ised nations, cannot be successfully imposed upon an illitarate nation 
clothed only with superficial vestments of modem civilixation. 

NoTB. This papt ircu fad ai a wttUinQ of lA« Acoitmy April S, If 14. 



THE MEXICAN SITUATION 

By Hbnrt Clews, Ph.D., LL.D., 
New York. 

The situation in Mexico at the moment is about as bad as it 
oould be, and unless some outside influence is brought to bear, I 
ean see no chance of immediate improvement. 

The recent murders of an Englishman and an American have 
stirred the blood of all who speak our conmaon language. Fortu- 
nately for us, England has kept her hands off, leaving it to us to see 
that the factions in Mexico atone for their crimes. 

Were it not for the Monroe Doctrine, it is more than likely that 
several foreign powers would have landed marines in parts of Mexico, 
for the reason that citizens of their countries were being deprived of 
their business rights, and had suflfered large money losses on account 
of the chaotic state of affairs. If these countries once made a landinjj; 
it might be a long time before they withdrew, if ever, as they are 
hungf}' for a portion of the territory of this hemisphere, and now 
would be their opportunity for acquiring it. 

President Wilson, in his policy of non-intervention, is trying an 
experiment which we all hope will prove a success, for no one wishes 
to see bloodshed, or money lost, by settUng quarrels between the 
citisens of our near neighbors. With England approving of our 
waiting policy, other nations are lookers-on, and for the time being 
are willing to wait for the tide to turn when they can seek reparation 
for money losses. 

The future of Mexico is inextricably bound up in social, polit- 
ical and economic problems of the most complex character. 

Socially, the conditions in Mexico are such as to make success- 
ful government almost impossible at this time. The great mass 
of her population is a mixed race of Spanish and Indian blood raised 
but a step above the savage state.* The people are uneducated and 
grossly ignorant, highly excitable, and given to spasmodic outbursts 
of passion, outlawry and violence. To have ever given such a popu- 
the vote before it was able to exercise an approximately decent 
of it was a blunder of the most grievous sort. Mexicans not only 

162 



Tm MszicAif SrruATfoif KB 

have no oonoepiion of how to uae the balloi, but their inahiltlj to 
eomprehend its ineetimable privileflee eoDverte than iinfinwniflWi|| 
into toola of crafty and unBcrupulous leaders who brutaliae the voters 
and exploit them for purely selfish and personal ends. There is 
probably no more ignorant voter in the world than the Mexieaa. 
Our own colored people are infinitely better citiiens and better voters 
than the Mexican peon. The ballot in that anarchy-ridden oomiliy 
is not merely a farce, but a curse, inasmuch as it perverts every 
branch of the government and only serves to strengthen the grip of 
an oppressive and greedy aristocracy upon the entire population. 

Politically, the present system of government in Mexico is an 
absolute misfit. Her constitution is modeled after that of the 
United States — a nation that has in its blood the traditions, princi- 
ples and habits of generations of self-government behind it. It Is 
self-evident that what fits the United States cannot fit Mexico where 
racial conditions and traditions are so entirely different. Sueoess- 
ful self-government in Mexico can only come through many years 
of gradual change in the public character by means of experience, 
education and the influx of a better population. 

What Mexico primarily needs for the time being is a strong 
central government. Perhaps an intelligent and just despotism 
would best fit the present situation in Mexico. But can such be 
found? Does Mexico produce men of the necessary type? Can 
Mexico turn out a Lord Cromer of Egyptian fame, or a Colonel 
Goethals of Panama, or a Taft of the Philippines? If the destinies 
of Mexico could be controlled for a few years by men of this t}^*, 
she might bo educated gradually to take care of herself. The most 
successful government Mexico ever had, in spite of its gross abuses, 
was a despotism; but that government was notoriously corrupt. Its 
members grew enormously rich, and the people were taxed to death 
in order to support a political machine which simply crushed the 
taxpayer, and kept him in practical slaver}-. Human nature was 
bound to revolt against such oppression. 

My suggestion is to bring Huerta and Carransa together and 
see if they cannot agree on a provisional president to be appointed 
or elected, and that suitable recognition in some ofllicial capacity be 
given to each of these leaders. Both must realiic. though neither 
will admit it, that if the preeent struggle keeps up both must lose, as 
intervention will mean ruin to them. No lasting peace can be 



104 The Annals op the American Acadrbtt 

secured unless it guarantees protection to the lives and property of 
all foreign residents, and metes justice to the people of Mexico of all 
grades and conditions. 

Economically, Mexico is entirely dependent upon foreign capital. 
It is estimated that there are about &ve thousand millions of dollars 
of foreign investments in Mexico, a considerable portion of which 
belongs to the United States. Her railroads, her mines, her oil wells 
and her banks are all chiefly owned and controlled abroad. The 
Mexican people work largely for non-resident owners and masters. 
This, of itself, creates fatally weak economic and social relations, for 
there is no doubt that Mexico would be much better off if a larger 
proportion of these owners lived and spent their money in Mexico, 
and exerted their steadying influence upon political affairs. 

There is still one more economic and social weakness of far- 
reaching importance, and that is this, the great bulk of the land in 
Mexico is owned by a few wealthy families who have grown rich by 
extracting from the natives all they possibly can. There are practi- 
cally no small land owners in Mexico, and there is no peasant class, 
which, if it existed, would be an element of stability and result in a 
more equitable distribution of the national wealth. No domestic 
peace can be expected in Mexico until the present unwholesome 
land system is broken up. Mexico is suffering from a state of practi- 
cal slavery against which human nature is bound to rebel. To a sav- 
age the life of brigandage is vastly more interesting and attractive 
than any orderly self-government could be. 

What Mexico should have is, first, a strong, wise and unselfish 
government, with more or less autocratic powers. 

Second, a change of laws which would give opportunities to small 
land owners; and third, the encouragement of a better class of immi- 
gration — all with the purpose of keeping a large share of the nation's 
profits at home. Finally, above all, Mexico needs men — strong men, 
men of high and unselfish purpose, men of great executive ability 
who will consecrate themselves to the upbuilding of Mexico on the 
lines of justice and sound economic development. Mexico has a 
brighter future than is supposed even under the present clouds of 
revolution. When the=e pass away, as they ultimately will, there 
will spring up a new and better Mexico. There is a grand oppor- 
tunity for a statesman of con tructive genius. This is far and away 
the first and greatest need of Mexico. Can she produce such? If 



1 



Tin BlKDCAir Situation 



166 



I' ' ■ - : - tnd if not, what will hAppnT No- 

c« of the pretent protrtctod tUle 
of anarchy, except that it must end, and if not by iniide force, than 
by outside force. 

I am a most eAmeet advocate of peace by arbitration, and it 
would be a grand day for humanity if the Mexican troubles could 
be settled in that way as it would mean the d&vm of a new era. Many 
of the leading lights in Mexico are yearning for peace and 8a>'ing to 
both Huerta and Carranza, in the words of Shakespeare, "A plague 
on both your houses!" In our own country the right man has been 
found in every great crisis. Let us hope and pray that a Moses may 
arise in Mexico who will be able to lead his countrymen in the path 
of peace with honor to all who deserve honor. 



THE CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY IN MEXICO; 
WHAT IT IS FIGHTING FOR 

Bt Senor Don Roberto V. Pesqueira, 
Confldentiftl Agent of the Carr&nsa Government in the United States. 

It has been stated with much persistency throughout the United 
Statet and Europe that the real object of the present revolutionary 
movement in Mexico is merely to avenge the death of the late Presi- 
dent Madero and to restore to power his administration. This 
fallaey, baaed entirely upon imperfect information or misconception 
of the real facts, merits immediate correction, and it is my purpose 
to accompany it by some words of explanation that may possibly 
clarify in some degree the general subject under discussion. 

The revolution of 1910, led by Madero, was not one inspired by 
personal ambition or thirst for power. Madero's critics admit that. 
ttVeSL Porfirio Diaz, after the fall of Juarez, reluctantly recognized 
the movement as one based on economic and social considerations, 
and of a character so serious as to demand his resignation as presi- 
dent of the republic, indeed, his withdrawal from the country. For 
thirty years Diaz had ruled Mexico with a tyrannical hand of iron. 
During that period he granted many valuable and monopolistic 
oonoessions to foreigners, and surrounded himself with a group of 
favorites who were permitted to control affairs of state and barter 
away the rights of the people, without corresponding benefit to them. 
Through the constiMction of railways and the development of other 
industrial enterprises, however, some prosperity ensued, but such 
more particularly served to benefit the concessionaires and the 
already wealthy landowners than the masses, to whose educational 
and social advancement no thought was given. At the same time 
while the cost of living rose rapidly, the pay of the wage-worker 
failed to increase correspondingly, the landed proprietors, sustained 
always by the government, dictating terms of employment. The 
tribunals of justice became a mockery, the judges for the most part, 
corrupt, and supinely obedient to the executive. Diaz himself in 
violation of his pledge to retire, procured his reelection and settled 
down, as he thought, to the enjoyment of six years more of power. 
Smarting under their exploitation by the conservative element and 

166 



The CoNBTiTunoNALUT Paktt Df Mexico 167 



without the lawful means of redrew, the mmwee begaa to ahow 

of diaoontent, and, indeed, a purpose to resort to anna ralhsr than to 

submit longer to conditions approirimathig abject sUnrery. 

Madero and his followers believed that the first step towaids 
practical reform was to limit the tenure of the pwsidspcji to om 
term, since the ills from which the country had so long soffsradwws 
manifestly due to the corrupt influences made possible only by the 
long-continued occupation of the office by General Dias. With 
this and real popular suffrage, agrarian rdforms could be enacted, 
and it was believed, the people would forthwith come into their own. 
But EKax and his followers gave no heed to repeated wamtngs. Tbs 
revolution of 1910 followed. Dias retired; but before doing so and 
in order to check the reforms demanded by the people, he effected a 
compromise by which Francisco De la Barra, then minister of foreign 
relations, became provisional president, pending an election. 

De la Barra, an uncertain character, lacked a positive policy 
during his ad irUerim administration. As a creature of Dias, and 
intunately allied with the aristocracy and the corrupt element of the 
old regime, he limited himself merely to the discharge of the revolu- 
tionary forces, as a method by which he pretended that peace could 
best be established. On every hand he minimised the purpose and 
effect of the revolution, and sought to prepare a sentiment in favor 
of reactionary' principles. The same men who surrounded Dias and 
urged the continuation of his policies now returned to the country 
convinced that they were not be be prosecuted, and initiated a 
campaign against Madero and the aims of the rerohitkm. It was 
during this period that efforts were made to concen tr ate public 
opinion in favor of General Reyes and even De la Barra himself, as 
candidates for the presidency against Madero. It was also at this 
thne that the Clerical party, which since the downfall ci Maximilian 
had shown no signs of life, was suddenly revived under the name 
of the Catholic party, and cast its baleful influence in favor of the 
discredited policies of the past. De la Barra, while he had reosivod 
the government in trust, to be turned over to the revolution, did all 
possible to maintain himself in power and to avoid the advent of the 
new regime, thus demonstrating hostility to Madero personally, as 
well as to the reforms for which the revolution had been fought and 
won. Casting aside De la Barra as useless the reaettonariss now 
proceeded along more cunning ttnsa. 



108 Thb Annals of thi American Academy 

^f adero once elevated to the presidency by means of a free elec- 
tion, his administration was quickly beset by intrigue ond treachery 
on the part of this group who pretended to be his friends. Protest- 
ing an arflent and patriotic desire to forget the past and to cooperate 
in upholding the new government and its proposed reforms, they 
did 80 only to obscure their perfidious purpose of discrediting the 
latter and to cloak their treasonable intent to overthrow the con- 
■titutioiial chief magistrate. The conspiracy assumed such propor- 
tions that Madero, believing as he did in those who pledged their 
honor to his support, was rendered helpless for the time being in 
earning out the program of the revolution. At this moment, with 
malevolent deception, the con pirators, assisted by a large group of 
corrupt officers of the army, struck the blow known as the insurrec- 
tion of the Ciudadela, whi h offered General Victoriano Hiierta, 
commanding general of the government forces, opportunity treach- 
erously to assume the dictatorship of Mexico. The president and 
vice president were brutally put to death, and a reign of terror 
inaugurated that horrified the world. Such were the incidents that 
induced the Constitutionalist movement of today, a movement, 
that in reality, is naught save a continuation of the revolution of 
IfllO, a movement that demands government by the governed. 

While certain of the governors of states, and a majority of the 
military conmianders accepted Huerta in the role that he had as- 
sumed, the governor of the state of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, 
refused to be cowed and boldly declared himself in opposition to the 
dictator and his so-called government, and with his state militia, 
commenced inmiediate operations for armed resistance. He was soon 
joined by others of prominence, governors of states, members of the 
national congress, officers of the army and professional men, as well 
as by thousands of artisans and wage-earners who saw in the move- 
ment of which he was spontaneously proclaimed the first chief, the 
only hope of restoration of constitutional government. Notwith- 
standing their inability to purchase arms and munitions of war in 
the United States, through much heroic sacrifice a respectable army 
soon was formed in the border states, which within twelve months, 
has now been so augmented and armed that it controls a respectable 
portion of the republic. 

Under the leadership of Governor Carranza, the Constitutional- 
ist forces now occupy Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, most 



TBb CoNBTrrunoNALUT Pastt in Mexico 169 

of Coahuila, Tamaulipat, moet of Nuevo Leon, northern Tii^iftff 
and a part of San Luis Potod. Added to thia, they contiol vnrioua 
parts of Guerrero, Michoacan, Hidalgo, Vera Crui, Puebla and 
Morclos. Yet the men who have aooompUabed this military feat 
are artfully called bandits by those whose personal interests would 
be best served by the continuance of the Huerta regime. Bandits 
they may be, according to some advanced standard of military ethies 
of wiiich I am ignorant; but if they are bandits, then I presume 
thrir accusers consider themselves fortified by the attitude of the 
Hritish press, which, during the war for independence, so vociferously 
denounced Admiral John Paul Jon«i as a pirate, and three-quarters 
of a century later, described General Grant as a heartless butcher. 

The average foreigner in discussing Mexico will tell you that the 
country needs the mailed fist to govern it, t>ecau8e, he will say, that 
in such quality of government lies the sole safeguard of life and 
property. That was why the mailed fist of Diaz made him popular 
among the foreign concesnonaires and the favorit s who surrounded 
him — the group that finally sapped his imperious will and made 
him their plaything. It was a government of this character that 
prevented the people from regaining the lands taken from them 
through fraudulent and corrupt means; that ever protected him who 
was willing to pay, in one way or another, for protection. There- 
fore, many foreigners at this time, overlooking entirely the Mexican 
point of view, and the moral issues involved, are disposed to favor 
any man who is ''strong" enough to impose a peace that ^nll admit 
a resumpt'on of their profitable industrial operations. But the 
government of the mailed fist or the iron hand can never impose a 
permanent peace. Such a peace can be secured only through a 
proper adjustment of political, economic and social conditions. To 
that adjustment the reactionary element in Mexico is opposed, but 
the Constitutionalist party is intent on making it effective by armed 
force. 

The real interests of foreigners, as well as those of Mexicans, can 
only be conserved by means of reforms calculated to promote the 
general welfare of the masses, and by maintaining an equiUbrium 
between capital and labor. It would seem but natural, therefore, 
that foreigners, if they seek peace, should contribute towards the 
development of conditions that would insure a peace that would 
be permanent 



170 Thk Annals op thx American Academy 

The purpoaee of the Constitutionalist movement, which seek to 
bring about a permanent peace in Mexico, are better defined than 
were the motives of the revolution of 1910. These purposes contem- 
plate, not only the reSstablishment of constitutional government, 
but the reformation of the constitution itself and a revision of the 
laws made under it, to meet, by practical means, the plain require- 
OMlits d the situation. In sustaining this movement, which has now 
rotobod the dignity of a civil war. Governor Carranza has the support 
of a vast majority of the agricultural population, who have demon- 
strated a patriotic readiness, even eagerness, to sacrifice their lives 
and fortunes for the conunon good. 

While the soldiers of the Huerta forces are unwilling conscripts, 
taken on the streets, or from the jails of the cities, those in the Con- 
sUtutkmallst ranks are volunteers, pure and simple, intent on fighting 
for principle rather than for pay. According to the latest advices 
by the intelligence office of the Constitutionalists, Huerta has but 
55,000 men available for real service, despite his boast that he has 
205,000 under arms. Carranza has not less than 50,000 well-armed 
officers and men in the northern states alone, and can count on as 
many more in the south, as soon as they can be better equipped. 
The desperate fighting at Torreon and vicinity is but typical of the 
intensity of purpose with which the Constitutionalists are animated. 
Their attacks against fortifications considered impregnable, and the 
desperate and successful assaults of their infantry, against a wither- 
ing fire of artillery, serve to indicate their devotion to a cause which 
they believe merits the notice of all Americans who stand for law and 
lib^. 

I have not overlooked, however, the fact that the Constitution- 
alists have been charged by the press with many acts of violence 
and brigandage, of executing prisoners of war, of plundering cap- 
tured cities, and the like. In discussing this matter I need only to 
allude to General Sherman's remark that '*War is hell/' But in 
reference to the charges so recklessly hurled against our troops, 
I desire to make a plea by way of confession and avoidance. While 
it Is true that violence has been employed and houses sometimes 
iaeked, though never to the extent charged, it is also true that those 
who have suffered were previously engaged in giving aid to the 
enemy. Genend Sherman and General Sheridan did not hesitate 



TlfE CONBTITUTIONALmT PaRTT Df MkDOO 171 

to burn and pilla^Eo in their respective marchee throufb Georgia to 
the aea, and through the vall^ of the Shenandoah. 
the enemy's country, at that time, railroada, warehouaes, 
buildingii of all aorta and their oontenta, were nithhili rtwtioiMl, 
banks looted, livestock driven off for the use of the army, and the 
inhabitants, if not more harshly dealt with, left without even the 
bare necessities of life. It is true that oertain captured officers have 
been shot by our forces as well as a class of deserters known as "rsd 
flaggers;" but these officers were among those who participated in 
the treason of February 9, 1013, and received the punishment impoisd 
by Uw, in the precise manner as treason under simflar dreunstanees 
is punishable in the United States. In nsped to the execution of 
the "red flaggers," I have only to recall the hanging of fifty dese r te rs 
from the American army, at San Angel, Mexico, in September, 1S47, 
and the lashing and branding of some fifteen more, at the same place, 
by order of General Scott. Also, I might refer among other inei- 
dents, to the hanging of twenty-two prisoners of a federal regiment 
alleged to be deserters, by order of the famous General George E. 
Pickett in 1863. I merely mention these historical references to 
show that incidents of this character are not confined to the pr ea ent 
struggle in Mexico. War necessitates stem and sometimes cruel 
measures. 

In lieu of seising the property of the inhabitants for the use of 
their forces, the Constitutionalist commanders pay for such in local 
currency redeemable hereafter in gold equivalent, and at pr aa en t 
aooepted by merchants and banks at twenty-eight cents to the gokl 
dollar. It is also accepted by the authorities in payment of taxes 
of all kinds, thus greater lessening the burdens of tlM people which 
they continue so cheeerfolly to bear. Meanwhile, the boDioo de- 
rived from export duties on the precious metals is being coined into 
pesos, and also placed in circulation. 

It is well to note that throughout the territory occupied by the 
Constitutionalist forces, excepting where active military operations 
are in progress, the people are pursuing their usual avoca t kms; the 
fields are tilled; the mines are being worked; factories are fai operas 
tion, and merchants are buying and selling as in tune of peace. This 
is notably so in Sonora, where no ssmhiance of the Huerta regime 
exists, save for a small garrison at the port of Guaymas, pioleeled 



172 Th« Annalb of the American Academy 

by strong fortificationa and by warships in the harbor. Almost 
MiniUr conditions prevail in Sin loa and will very soon be extended 
to Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. 

Contrary to current reports that certain of the estates belonging 
to the great landoiMiers have been confiscated by the Constitution- 
alist authorities, the fact is that no such action has been taken, 
though, as a military measure some of them have been provisionally 
•eiied and the proceeds de.oted to the maintenance of the troops, 
and towards aiding the poor. The Constitutionalist program does 
not contemplate summary confiscation or partition of estates of 
this character, such as for instance the Terrazas holdings in Chihua- 
hua. Questions of such gravity, directly involved with the great 
agrarian problem, the first chief insi ts must, upon restoration of the 
Constitutional order, be submitted to the Congress for determi- 
nation. In respect to the attitude of the Constitutionalist party 
towards concessions, it is safe to say that when such have leen 
granted in strict accordance with the law, and when all the require- 
ments of the latter have been fulfilled by the interested parties, 
their rights ^ill be respected; but when concessions are, however, 
tainted with fraud or corruption, then it is equally safe to say that 
their legality will be tested. 

It may not be improper for me to refer at this time to the re- 
lations between Americans and natives in Mexico. Some of the 
press would have the public believe that there exists a sentiment of 
underlying hostility towards Americans, and that in consequence, 
many of them have been killed and their property destroyed or stolen. 
This is untrue. Throughout the country Americans are held in 
higher esteem than any other class of foreigners, and the laborer 
will invariably seek employment from them rather than from Euro- 
peans, not because they pay higher wages, but because of their repu- 
tation for fair treatment; and I venture to assert, on the highest 
authority, that since this war began, not one American citizen has 
lost his life because of his nationality. Some have been killed in per- 
rw)nal quarrels and bar room brawls, such as take place daily in New 
York, for in tance; some have been killed because of their presence in 
the line of fire during engagements, and some have been murdered 
by thieves. But, I repeat that no pc r. ons have been killed because 
they were Americans. The Constitutionalists, I may add, enter- 
tain a deep appreciation of the kindly sentiments that their cause 



Trb CoNtrrnmoNALMT Paktt or Mbqco ITS 

haa awakened among the thoughtful people of Iht? I : '- ^'-* . 
to whom treaaon waa ever odioua, and to whom eonttitu 
are ao dear. We appreciate, too, the spirit of faimcM that led the 
President to raise the embargo on the exportation of arma and muni- 
tions of war, and if we have not demonatrated our gratitude, it is 
because there ha^ been no fitting opportunity to do so. Nor have 
we Mexicans forgotten Seward and the degree of moral suppoK be 
gave President Juares in his noble struggle for democratic govern- 
ment against the reactionariea who sought to impoee on Mexico a 
monarchy, the same reactionaries who now so strenuously seek to 
sustain Huerta in his unbridled career of usurpation. 

There haa been much talk of intervention, but there is no more 
need of it in Mexico today than there was half a century ago in the 
United Statea. We are confronted with a great problem now, as 
you were then. Our problem must be settled by Mexicans, as yours 
was settled by Americans. I regard suggestions favoring intervoi- 
tion aa emanating mostly from those interested in the restoration 
of dividends rather than in the restoration of peace. Such waa 
certainly the case in 1862-1863. And I am happy in the belief that 
the majority of public men are of the same opinion. When peaee 
comes, the government of Mexico, following the example of the 
United States, will meet all obligations imposed on it by international 
law in respect to losses sufifered by foreign citizens and subjects. 
To this, the Constitutionalist government has already pledged itself. 

As the war progresses and as the Constitutionalist forcea, in- 
creasing both in number and power each day, press their campaign 
upon the city of Mexico, there will be heard suggestions of compro- 
mise, the selection of some personage not identified with either side, 
to assume the presidency pending an election, or maybe, the estab- 
lishment of a government by commission or junta de gotnemo, or some 
other suggestion discreetly calculated to delay or avoid the estab- 
lishment of the headquarters of the victorious army in the natkmal 
palace as a prelude to the restoration of constitutional fovemment. 
Indeed, the influence of certain of the European powers may be 
exerted to this end. Save in the days of Juares, practically every 
revolutionary movement in Mexico intended to wrset the control 
of the government from the clergy and the aristoeraQr has, with 
victory in its grasp, failed in purpose beeause of some cunningly 
devised compromise. Such waa the cause of Madero's downfall — 



174 TiiK Annals op th« Aiobrican Academy 

hit ttffnpt> p»»"g with Uie reactionaries — by which bitter experience 
the Oonstitutionalist cause will nevertheless profit. Therefore, no 
euQeetion of compromise with an element identified with the treach- 
erous overthrow of constitutional government, can or will under 
any droumstanees be considered. That element must be crushed, 
and those who have directed its destinies must answer before the 
law for their crimes. Such is the unalterable determination of the 
first chief of the Constitutionalist forces, in which he is supported to 
a man by his subordinates, and the present war will not, therefore, 
oease until this end, of such transcendental importance to the future, 
is assured. Then there must be a period of national purification and 
house cleaning, to be followed by the election of members of a new 
eongrasBy which body upon its organization will, in accordance with 
the eonstitution, fix the date for the election for a president and vice- 
president. This done, and the successful candidates inaugurated, 
coostttutional government will once more reign supreme. But, 
meanwhile, Mexico will be governed in a manner prescribed by the 
first chief of the Constitutionalist forces, and not by a compromise 
pfovisional government like that of De la Barra. No compromise 
meuis as much to the people today as the old cry of "liberty and 
eooititulioiL" 



Nora. Thi$ paper wai mbmiUed to the Academy April S, 19tJ^. 



THE DUTY OF THE UNITED 8TATBB TOWARD 
MEXICX) 

Bt FBilNK W. MONDELL, 
Mtmber of CoograMjrom Wyomiaf. 

Our relatioQB with the government and the people of Mexieo are 
controlled and affected by three eomewfaat diatinct element* of rela- 
tionship and obligation. They are : 

Primarily, the reciprocal duties and obligationa incumbent oo 
all civilised nations and enjoined by international law and uaafe. 

Secondly, thoee duties and obligations, and the problems they 
present, as affected by the fact that we are Mexico's only important 
immediate neighbor and, as secretary of foreign affairs, Gamboa, puts 
it, "Mexico's nearest friend." 

Finally, those duties and obligations as enlarged by the responsi- 
bilities we have assumed under the Monroe Doctrine. 

The maintenance of a correct attitude toward the government 
and people of Mexico is rendered the more difficult by reason of the 
fact that our proximity to Mexico tends to make our border people 
partisans in case of civil strife in that country, and multiplies the 
opportunity for, and the likelihood of, losses and injury to our citizens 
and their property under unsettled conditions. On the other hand 
this intimate relationship and the responsibilities we have awnmiftd 
under the Monroe Doctrine, as applied to Mexico, increase the im- 
portance of the maintenance of a correct and defendable attitude in 
our dealings with that neighboring state. 

A brief r^sum^ of recent occurrences in Mexico may aid in eluci- 
dating the character of the problems there and our relation to them. 

The unfortunate Madero revolution started from our border. 
The Diaz government which it overthrew had, in my opinion, abun- 
dant ground for criticising our failure to exercise proper precaution to 
prevent the hatching and launching of revolutionary movements 
aimed at the life of a neighboring friendly power. However that may 
be, the revolution was successful and was promptly recognised by our 
government. But the Madero government was deetjuad to be short- 
lived. Undermined by plots and conspiracies sod o v sfpowers d m 

175 



176 Th« Annals or the American Acadbmt 

tlie teat of government. President Madero was forced to resign and 
Huerta was proclaimed as provisional president two weeks before the 
dote of the Taft administration. 

Fbr more than a year the government, of which Huerta is the 
head» has exercised practically unchallenged jurisdiction over twenty- 
three of the thirty-one political subdivisions of Mexico, including the 
capital city, covering more than two-thirds of the territory and three- 
quarters of the population of the republic. 

That government has, in the main, maintained order and pro- 
tected life and property in the extensive and populous regions under 
its control. A very large portion of this territory has at no time been 
•eriously disturbed, and the orderly processes of civil government 
have been but little affected by the civil strife which has been in 
progress elsewhere. 

The government of Mexico under Huerta has long been recog- 
nised by most of the powers of Europe and has apparently faithfully 
endeavored to fulfill its international obligations. The attitude of 
this government toward our own, even under the trying conditions we 
have established of unofficial communication through various inter- 
mediaries, has been straightforward, frank, and remarkably free from 
ground for criticism. 

The conspiracies and conflicts which preceded the inauguration 
of the government of Huerta, the lamentable assassination of ex- 
President Madero which stained the first days of its establishment 
occurring, as these events did, but a few days before the close of the 
Taft administration made it incumbent on the outgoing, to leave the 
incoming administration free to deal with the situation unembar- 
rassed by prior act of recognition. 

The new administration adopted an attitude which the Presi- 
dent later referred to as one of ** watchful waiting. " How watchful 
it was must remain a matter of opinion — that it was one of waiting 
cannot be disputed. 

But this attitude of "watchful waiting " was not maintained down 
to the time when the President so characterized the attitude of his 
a dminis tration. The policy of our government was substantially 
mo d ifi ed wlien the President sent John Lind as his personal repre- 
sentative to, as the President phrased it, "those who are now exercis- 
ing authority or wielding influence in Mexico. " 

Tliis mission modified our attitude from one of "watchful wait- 



DuTT OP United Statbs Towabo Mkzioo 177 

ing" to one of anerfetio advice, or meddleeome interferenoe, depend- 
ing on how one views it The unusual nature and remarlcable eiiar> 
actcr of the demands made were very forcibly pointed out in the 
spirited reply of secretary of foreign affairs, Garoboa. The dedam- 
tion by thoee "exercising authority" in Mexico of the impractie^ 
bility of fully acceding to the President's demands was followed by 
another period which might, perfaape, be properly called "watchful 
waiting. " This, however, did not long continue. 

A radical change in our attitude was clearly indicated by the 
President's message delivered to Congress December 2, 1013, in 
which he declared in effect that the government exercising authority 
over the major portion of Mexico would never be recognised, or dealt 
with, by our government so long as Huerta was at the head of it, no 
matter how extensive its authority or control might be, because he 
said this is a military despotism and we are the friends and champions 
of constitutional government in America. One will search the annals 
of American history' in vain to find such a note of personal prejudice 
and individual ill Ainll toward the head of any government as is found 
in the language with which the President makes these declarations 
and in which he predicts the downfall of what he calls a "precarious 
and hateful power. " 

Some time after the delivery of this message of the President, the 
predicted overthrow of the Huerta government not having occurred, 
the embargo'on the shipment of arms into Mexico was raised w\Xh the 
explanation and declaration that there now existed no constitutional 
government in Mexico entitled to the benefits of that embargo. 

Up to the time of the dispatch of John Lind ^ith his very extra- 
ordinary instructions to "those exercising authority'' in Mexico our 
attitude, while open to criticism as to its wisdom, was undoubtedly 
not censurable from the standpoint of international usages. The 
demands contained in Mr. Lind's instructions upon those "exerda- 
ing authority" in Mexico did, however, unquestionably estahlish a 
new precedent in our international affairs; while the declaraliopa oon- 
tained in the President 's December message, to which I have referred, 
^Involve a radical departure from the past policy of our government in 
dealing with the republics on this continent. 

One of the primary obligations resting upon civilised govern- 
ments is to abstain from meddlesome interference with the internal 
and domestic affairs of other nations. It is true we are the friends of 



178 TuE Annals op ths American Academy 

ooDStttutional government, we are also its champions as the President 
sUlflS, but we are under no obligation, and have no right or authority, 
to detenmne what constitutes constitutional government in other 
countries. On the contrary we are bound by our international 
obUgations, while favoring the establishment of governments which 
we deem to be constitutional in form, to recognize such governments 
18 foreign peoples may establish, maintain, and give their adherence 
to. 

We are certainly getting on dangerous ground when we in effect 
declare that we shall refuse to have official relations with any govern- 
menti no matter how well established or long maintained, unless it be 
a constitutional government according to our interpretation. When 
we further assume the right to pass not only on the legitimacy of 
governments without regard to the extent, character, or permanence 
of their authority, but to dictate who shall preside over them, we have 
assumed an international task that will keep us very busy and much 
embroiled in the future. 

Our national pohcy in the recognition of governments has been 
well defined and uniformly adhered to. 

In 1830 Secretary of State Van Buren, wrote to Mr. Brown, our 
charge d'affaires to Brazil as follows: "Your business is solely with 
the actual government of the country where you are to reside, and 
you should sedulously endeavor to conciliate its esteem and secure its 
confidence. So far as we are concerned that which is the government 
de facto is equally so dejure. " 

The government of Juarez in Mexico was recognized by President 
Buchanan, though not in possession of the capital, on the ground that 
it was "obeyed over a large majority of the country and the people. " 

President Pierce, in a message to Congress of May 15, 1856, rela- 
tive to the situation in Nicaragua, said, "It is the established policy 
of the United States to recognize all governments without question 
of their source or organization, or of the means by which the govern- 
ing persons attain their power, provided there be a government de 
fado accepted by the people of the country. " 

Secretary of State Evarts, in a letter written in 1879 to our 
lepweentatrv'e in Venezuela, Mr. Baker, stated that recognition of a 
government did not depend on its constitutionality; that as our inter- 
national compacts and obhgations were with nations rather than 
political governments we should be watchful lest our course toward 
a government should affect our relations with the nation. 



Ddty of Uktted States Toward \fKxicft 179 

In 1890 Seoretary Hay authomed our mmtttcr to reoogniM Um 
goveramoit of Cattro in Venesuela ''if the provinonal fcnrwiuMDi b 
effectively administering government of nation and in a portion to 
fulfil international obligationa. " 

Mr. Hill, acting secretary of state, in a letter of September 8, 
1900, to Mr. Hart, United SUtes minister at BogoU, sUted that it 
had been the policy of the United States for more than a oentury, "to 
base the recognition of a foreign government solely on its <U fatio 
ability to hold the reins of administrative power. " 

These are a few of the many declarations by our government of 
our policy to recognise a government fully established — >w<l«itig eoo- 
trol over the major portion of a nation and disposed to meet its inter- 
national obligations. 

The Italian historian, Ferrero, in a recent review of the Meodean 
situation, characterised our present attitude toward Mexico as one of 
masked or indirect intervention, an attitude he said that 
plished ** by giving support to one of the two parties at war, 
the weaker one. '' In the present case this masked or indirect inter- 
vention has been accomplished by giving aid and comfort to every 
foe of law and order in Mexico, like Zapata, and every enemy of those 
whom the President has recognized through Mr. Lind as "exercising 
authority'' in Mexico. It has been done by ^withholding reoognttion 
from the Huerta government, by demanding its virtual overthrow, 
by continued official prediction of its early downfall and, later, by 
encouraging the sale of arms and munitions of war to its enwnkia. 

These acts are of a character which might easily prompt rspriial 
on the part of the Mexican government. As a matter of fact, how- 
ever, they have apparently failed to affect or disturb the very proper 
attitude of that government toward ours, or to change or modify ita 
disposition and purposes to protect, as far as possible, our dtis^ns and 
their property in the regions over which that government exe rcis s a 
jurisdiction. 

I realize that the American people are not at this time partkwilarfy 
eoncemed as to the propriety, according to the UMfSS of fntematioiuJ 
intercourse, of the acts and attitude of our govemment toward the 
government and people of Mexico. I doubt if they are particularly 
solicitous over the question as to whether or no the atthode of the 
administration towaixi the govemment of Mexico, in indireetfy inter- 
vening in favor of its enemies, may be a straining of the authoritj of 
the President in dealing with international affairs. 



180 The Annals of thi American Acadhmt 

An overwhelminK majority of the American people are, however, 
sincerely anxious to see peace established and are earnestly solicitous 
to avoid the necessity of armed intervention in Mexico. They have 
therefore a lively interest in knowing whether the attitude of our 
government toward Mexico is one calculated to aid in establishing 
peAoe and averting the necessity of intervention. 

In a speech I delivered in the House of Representatives on 
Friday, February 27, 1914, 1 said: 

I Am persuaded that the acta and attitude of our government have bad the effect 
of prolonging and extending the lamentable condition of appalling disorder 
and distress which prevail in Mexico; that a continuation of our present policy, 
or lack of policy, tends to retard indefinitely the establishment of orderly con- 
ditions and constitutional government and will, eventually, if persisted in, com- 
pel armed intervention, with its inevitable horrors and calamities. 

Let US examine the situation for a moment with a view to deter- 
mining whether the views thus expressed are well founded. The 
President, in his message of December 2, said: "Mexico has no gov- 
ernment" and declared that General Huerta, who is exercising an 
authority which the President himself has recognized must surrender 
that authority. It is true that if Huerta were to eliminate himself 
from the affairs of Mexico and some one else were to take his place 
whom Zapata, in the South, and Villa, Carranza, and other lesser 
chieftains in the North would all acknowledge and give loyal adher- 
ence to, and no other aspiring revolutionary chieftain appeared, the 
miracle of thus establishing order might be accomplished. 

Such an arrangement would still leave our administration con- 
fronted with the embarrassment its recently announced doctrine, 
relative to constitutionality, would present. Assuming that difficulty 
could be overcome no one familiar with the situation has the slightest 
notion that such a program of general conciliation and unanimous 
self efTacement on the part of the rival leaders could be carried out. 
There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has followed the 
developments in Mexico but that the warring leaders and factions 
must, some of them at least, be eliminated or persuaded by force 
before there can be a full restoration of peace. 

Assuming that the demand of our administration for the over- 
throw of Huerta and the government of which he is the head is accom- 
plished by the united forces of the so-called constitutionalists in the 



Duty or UNirxo States Toward Msnoo isi 

North and the outlaw Zapata in the South, in there any ground for 
hope that in such a contingency order and constitutional govcrmncnt 
would be speedily established in MeiioDT 

Is there anything in the eharaeier or past record of the so-aUlsd 
constitutional chieftains to justify the expectation that they eoold or 
would attempt to establish a government which would meet its inter- 
national obligations, or be satisfactory to the majority of the people o( 
Mexico? One must be sanguine indeed who can bring himself to 
believe that the people of southern and central Mexico and the strong 
and influential men of the nation, the vast majority of whom now 
give at least nominal adherence and support to the govermnent ci 
Huerta, would approve or support a government established by the 
joint efforts of Villa and Zapata even though presided over by so weQ 
intentioned an individual as Carransa is reported to be. 

Our qu te general approval of the unfortunate Madero, our ab- 
horrence of the manner of his untimely taking off and our natural and 
proper disposition to hold those at the head of the Huerta government 
responsible for that act inclined our people to approve, for a consider- 
able period, the withholding of recognition, the refusal offidaUy to 
recognize the Huerta government. The time came, however, when 
the refusal formally to recognize a government, for the time being at 
least, firmly established, widely supported, reasonably fulfilling, or 
attempting to fulfill, its international obligations involved not only 
a complete reversal of our national policy but a surrender of the only 
adequate means of protecting our citizens in Mexico and their prop- 
erty and of fulfilling the obligations we have assumed under the Mott> 
roe Doctrine, toward the property and citizens of other nations. 

It is not only not denied that our refusal to recognise the gorero- 
ment of Mexico under Huerta has greatly handicapped that g o v sfP- 
ment in securing the means for restoring order throughout the repub- 
lic, but our administration has gloried in that fact and prophesied tbs 
early downfall of the Mexican government as a result Our attitude 
therefore has confeesedly lengthened the period and increased the vio- 
lence of disorder in Mexico. If the present government in Mexico be 
not a constitutional government the extensioQ of Hs authority overall 
of Mexico would not make it so. When, however, we compare the 
very general protection of life and property which has pfwailed in the 
territory controlled by the Huerta government with the eonfiseatkin, 
plunder, murder, rape and rapine which have, in many localities, char- 



182 Tbb Annals of thb American Acadeimy 

acterixed the victories of the opponents of that government we shall 
find abundant ground for the belief that our duty to aid and encourage 
the establishment of peace and order in Mexico would have been bet- 
ter performed bad we taken the usual course of recognizing condi- 
tknia as th^ are, the Mexican government as it exists, and holding it 
responsible for the protection of life and property throughout the 
republic. 

No one familiar >\ith the situation in Mexico believes it possible, 
out of the conditions of turmoil and disorder which now exist there, to 
bring at once a government of unquestioned constitutionality, per- 
fect in its aims and personnel. Only a strong arm and a determined 
purpose can establish order there. If we persistently use our influence 
to weaken the strong arm of the government and to encourage further 
revolution we are follo\\'ing a path which will inevitably lead us to the 
point where we must be the strong arm which restores order. Our 
present attitude therefore is one which leads to intervention as cer- 
tainly and inevitably as though it were thus planned and purposed. 

The only way in which we can hope to perform our duties and 
obligations reasonably and avoid intervention in Mexico is to cease 
giving aid and comfort to the guerrilla forces, the outlaw chieftains, 
the well-meaning figure-heads of revolution, masking under the guise 
of constitutionalism, and return to the usages of international law 
and our long established policy and look to the government which is 
in authority to establish order and protect life and property. 



MEXICO* 

Bt Austen G. Fox, 
New York. 

Its problflm. Out of what does it arise? Does it arise out oC 
an absence of a constitution? No, because Mexioo has a written 

constitution, which, upon its face, is fair enough to loolc upon. Must 
not the problem arise, therefore, out of the characteristics of the 
people that make the constitution ineffectual for order? 

How does it happen, then, that Mexico's problem has beoome 
the problem of the United States? Mexioo threatens no invasioo 
of the United States. The concrete problem for the United States 
must be shall we invade Mexico? We are not asked by Meadeans 
to invade theur territory. If we go, we must go with arms in our 
hands, and we must intend to use our arms. In short, we must go 
with the purpose of killing, or maiming those who choose to defend 
their country against our invasion. Call this intervention, or any 
other name that we prefer. In fact, it is war, with all that is implied 
in the term, in a country, larger than France and inhabited by fifteen 
or twenty millions of people. 

When we decree intervention, we declare war, and that means 
victory, or defeat to our arms. Let us discard the possibility of de- 
feat, and assume victory. It must be a complete victory, however, 
and how long must we wage war before our rule shall be oompletof 
Who can tell, how many of our best must fall in order to establiBh 
our rule? The waste and cost in material, who can estimate? Who 
knows, today, the cost of subjugating the Filipinos? 

When we shall have put Mexico under out feet, what then — 
what next? Are we to retire, or are we to stay? It must be one or 
the other. 

It we retire, what shall we have accomplished? Will bayonet 
thrusts in our victims have implanted in the breaste of the survtvon 
that national character and capacity for orderly government, the 
abeence of which is at the bottom of the preeent disorder in Mesdoo? 

> Remarks m presidinii officer of the searioo oi the Amdf&mj, Satorday 
morning, April 4, 1014. 



184 The Annals op the American Academy 

War, whether we call it a war of reprisal or primtive expedition, 
or any other name, is seldom of educational value in fitting the losers 
for self govememnt. If, therefore, we retire at the close of hostilities, 
to what result can we point, except that of slaughter and increased 
Uxesr 

There is but one alternative, and that is permanent occupation 
of Mexico by our troops and its government from Washington. 
It will be easy enough for us to go in, but it may, at least, be im- 
poasible to get out, except accompanied by the confession that the 
eo-called Mexican problem remains unchanged. In short, how can 
we expect succeesful warlike operations in Mexico to raise the political 
character of its people? Neither political nor social uplift, as it is 
fash onable now to call it, is one of the results of the destruction and 
desolation of war. 

We must, therefore, ask ourselves this question : Are we so free 
of problems of our own that we are ready to take up the burden of 
establishing through war a stable government in Mexico, and of 
maintaining it for a period which none can measure, at a cost which 
no one can approximate? 

This is no time for disturbing the peace we now enjoy. 

We are told that there are twenty thousand Americans in Mexico 
and we know that the Southern Pacific Railway Company, the 
Standard Oil Company and other corporations, as well as individuals, 
have large investments south of our border. When we find pressure 
brought to bear upon Congress, or upon our President to begin a 
war with Mexico, may we not inquire whence the pressure proceeds? 
Who will be the beneficiaries, if Congress, or the President yields 
to the pressure? Among the men who will be called upon to lay 
do^-n their lives in the event of armed intervention, will there be 
found any one who now clamors for the protection of so-called 
American interests? 

What evidence have we that the American people insist upon a 
departure from the policy of letting other peoples work out, in their 
own way, their own political problems? Some there are who say 
that the President ought not to have done this, or that, or ought not 
to have done one thing, or another. 

Two things, however, he has done, is doing, and may be trusted 
to continue to do. 



Mkuco iB6 

He has stood, if standing and we know he will continue to stand 
for the keeping of public faith pledged by aolemn tieaty, «i»>J**w^ 
by appeals to escape from the common sense meaning of the plain 
English of our contracts. 

We know that we may look to him, with unwavering faith, as 
one who will act as the trustee for the peace and welfare of the whole 
people of the United States ready to undergo obloquy if need be, 
in his unalterable determination that no act of his shall deprive our 
nation of its right to continue to work out its own great problems 
and to perform its obligations in peace with the world and particularly 
with its neighbors, north and south. 

Non ponebat enim rumores ante Baiutcm; 
Ergo oiagis magtsque, viri nunc gloria ereaeit. 



MEXICO AND HER PEOPLE 

By Alfred Bishop Mason, 
New York. 

Some yean ago, there was current at Harvard an excellent jest. 
Though it was at the expense of Yale and though I am one of Yale's 
loyal sons, I must admit the humor of it. The Harvard question 
was: "What is autobiography?" and the Harvard answer was: 
"Autobiography is any Yale man talking." Yet, to justify my 
speaking on Mexico to an audience like this, I must perforce weave a 
few bits of personal reminiscence into the web of my talk. And it is 
sometimes true, as Thackeray says, that the capital letter *'I" is the 
straight line that measures the shortest distance between a speaker 
and his hearers. 

A dozen years ago, when I was building a little railroad from Vera 
Cruz to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the government of Porfirio Diaz 
was not corrupt. It was white and pure. For each 31 miles of rail- 
road built, there was a subsidy of $800,000 in government bonds. 
To get them, I had to have a certificate from a government engineer 
that the road was built in accordance with specifications and a certi- 
ficate from a government accountant that my books, accounts and 
vouchers were in proper shape. Engineer and accountant each had a 
salar>' of $1,500 per annum. If, under similar conditions, I had been 
building recently a highway in the state of New York, what would I 
have had to pay intermediaries, engineers, officials, bagmen and 
friends of the powers that be — ^no, thank God, the powers that were? 
In Mexico I never paid a penny and was never asked to pay a penny 
of blackmail, conmiissions or graft. My experience was that of 
other Americans. It justifies me, I think, in saying the Diaz govern- 
ment was then pure. It is said that as he grew older, he became a 
tool of younger men who were grafters. I doubt this, but I do not 
know. 

His government was arbitrary, of course. Most of my 300 miles 
of railroad were built through a sparsely settled country, where 
crimes of passion were rife and where theft was a fine art. I asked 
Dial to send me some rurales. They were the state constabulary of 

186 



Mexico and Hm Pioflb 1S7 

Modoo. A down of than arrived. The IteutenAoi In ehftrfB camt 
to my office to report the arrival. He saluted, explained hk errMid, 
and enquired: "8eftor Maaon, whom do you wish kiUedt" He waa 
dearly disappointed at not receiving a list of people to be shot offhand. 
It was interesting to hold the power of life and death in my haadi, 
but I really could not think at the moment of anybody I wished to 
kill. A fortnight later, sitting in my car at the end of track, I saw a 
sergeant of rurales riding by with three troopers, each with a rope 
around the pommel of his saddle, each rope fastened about a plodding 
fMon. The prooession was closed by a sobbing woman. I hailed 
t ho wriTNint and asked for an explanation. It seemed that one peon, 
ill call A, had quarreled with B about the woman. So A 
....t w V ir. kill B, paying him his price, a whole peso, 50 cents in our 
money, in advance. C did not know B by sight. So C hired D for a 
quarter of the peso to point out B. This done, C knifed B. The 
rurales had gathered in A, C and D and the woman in the case. " We 
are taking them to jail, Don Alfredo," said the sergeant. The jail 
was many miles away. Within half an hour, the rurales came baek. 
"Where are your prisoners?" I asked. "They tried to escape and 
we shot them." This is the well-known Mexican ley de fuga — the 
law of flight. Prisoners are troublesome and expensive. They are 
taken into the brush and shot. The ley de fuga is the stereotyped 
explanation. 

Again, about 1900, a tribe of mountain Indians killed aooie 
prospectors looking for mines because they thought they were survey- 
ing their lands. Experience long since taught the Indians, who hold 
their lands in common, that a survey has as its sure sequel a seisure. 
These particular prospectors were working under a government 
concession. Diaz sent a regiment into the mountains. It captured, 
bound and shot, without a trial, nearly 1,500 Indians, practically all 
the adult males of the tribe. Not a word of this got into the papers. 
Again, the governor of the state of Hildalgo was asked to resign 
by Dias. He refused. Nothing happened for a few months. Then 
at dawn the governor was awakened by a spruce aide-de-camp who 
offered him a blank resignation to sign. When he demurred, the 
aide took him to the window and showed him a batter}' in front of 
the palace, infantr>' around the palace, a cloud of cavalry behind the 
infantr>\ The governor signed. The brigade melted away as salentfy 
as it had come. The papers said nothing. 



188 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

ESections have always been a farce. A friend of mine sat as a 
con grcMUi an from part of Yucatan for 20 years. He was never in 
Yucatan and could not tell me the boundaries of his district. All he 
knefw was that every two years he received word from Diaz that he 
had been elected again. I had been a resident of Mexico a very short 
time when I received an official notice to vote at a national election. 
I went to the polls. There were two policemen at the door of the 
room, three men in frock coats and silk hats within behind a table 
which held a ballot box. Not a voter was in sight. I explained that 
I had received the notice, but that I was an American citizen and had 
no right to vote. '*If you wish to vote, sefior," said the chairman, 
"it will give us the utmost delight to have you do so.'' 

There is no middle class in Mexico. From the great land-owners 
with their retinues of lawyers, agents, favorites, you take one long 
step downwards to the small, the very small, retailer and the peon. 
Wholesale business and public utilities are in foreign hands. The 
peon mass in the north has been leavened by the return there of 
many thousands of Mexicans who have come across the border, 
working on railroad and other jobs, as far north as Minnesota, but 
southern Mexico is still sunk in the apathy of the ages. 

There is no public opinion in the country. Diaz was a benevo- 
lent despot, supported by the feudal lords who owned the land, the 
land barons of Mexico. I asked the president once why he did not 
apply the single tax and so break up the large estates. " It must be 
done some day," he replied, "but one of my successors must do it." 

These lords of land were lords of life as well. Terrazas o^vned 
40,000,000 acres in Chihuahua. That is nearly one and one-half 
times the s**e of Pennsylvan'a. He was supreme ruler of that great 
state of Chihuahua, whether he, or his son in-law Creel, or one of 
his sons, or some retainer of his was nominally governor. The 
police, the rurales, the alcaldes, the courts did only what he directed, 
were simply registering machines of his decrees. He used to be 
major-domo of a Seftor Martinez del Rio, whose great estates, confis- 
cated because he supported Maximili n, fell into his major domo's 
hands. Del Rio's son told me he had saved a remnant of his father's 
lands from Terrazas's clutch. "How much is this remnant?" I 
asked. "Barely five million acres," was the reply. Th t s nerrly 
one fift!» t):e s se of Penn**ylv ..n a. 

Mexican labor, fairly energetic when paid by the piece, slow 



Mbooo Am HsB Peoplb 180 

b^ond all dreamfl and niKhtmares of ilownesi when paid by the d^jr, 
is in every case unsatisfactor)- became it ie intenn ltte pt. Heft a 
laborer toiU for one of two reaaons, either to advance himaelf or to 
avoid being discharged. The peon has no wish to advance and if 
you disdiarge him lie is rather grateful to you for having saved him 
the trouble of making up his own mind to stop work. 

We misunderstand the Mexican, of course. The Spaniard is 
far more difficult than any other European for the Anglo-Saxon to 
understand. Mr. Rives, in his monumental book on The United 
States and Mexico, suggests that this may be because the ^laniih 
blood has an Afro-Semitio base, with a strong Moorish intermixtitrs 
afterwards. He quotes one ethnologist as saying that a Spaniard 
resembles the son of a European father by an Abyssinian mother. 
Be this as it may, the man was right who said: ''Three deep gulfs 
divide mankind— age, sex and race. And of these the deepest is 
race." 

Of one most beautiful Spanish characteristic, courtesy, we have 
scant share. The average American in Mexico behaves like a cad, 
with vulgar disre^rd of well-nigh sacred customs he cannot appre- 
ciate and of a deliglitful and stately courtesy he cannot approximate. 
Nor is it only the average American who so disports himself. When 
the second Pan-American Conference was held in the city of Mexico, 
Mrs. Dias gave a fite at Chapultepec for the delegates and others. 
It was a scene from fairyland. I was talking with her when at her 
elbow the president's chief aide-de-camp said to the chairman of 
the United States delegation: ''Senator, supper is about to be served 
and the President would like to have you give your arm to Mrs. 
Dias and lead the way." "Well," said the old man, looking at his 
watch and closing it with a snap, " tell the President Tm much obliged, 
but its gettin' late and Tm goin' back to the hotel now. Come 
along. Mother." And thereupon he and his wife departed, without 
even saying good-bye to the President's wife. 

The fundamental question in Mexico is the land question. The 
Mexican revolution will never be settled until it is settled right — 
by giving back to the people the land of which they were despoiled 
nearly four centuries ago. No statute of limitations runs sgainil 
the right of men and women to free access to land. Those of you who 
are not single taxers may well weigh that pregnant fact Its off- 
spring may some day astound you. The three great fortes, 



190 Tm Annals of thk American Academy 

than laws or consiiiutions or armies or privilege, are men's hunger for 
food, men's hunger for women, men's hunger for land. Until the 
peon has an opportunity to get his 10 or 20 hectares of land, the peon 
will not be at peace. 

What is there for the United States to do? Simply to watch 
and wait. It is weary work, this waiting, but as a great captain of 
industry once told me : *' Waiting is the finest of the fine arts." Profes- 
sor Patten's able argument in favor of our intervening because Mexico 
is not an industrial unit and our breaking it up into smaller states 
which are industrial units fails to convince me. Mexico is much more 
of an industrial unit than the United States were up to 1865. If 
economic forces are to break it up into smaller units it is still neither 
advisable nor right that those forces should be pricked into activity 
by American bayonets. We can occupy any part of Mexico we choose, 
at much cost of life, more cost of money, a colossal cost for pensions 
thereafter, and a terrible cost in the awaking of the devilish war- 
spirit which debauches a nation and its politics for a generation. 
When we have occupied it, what then? The French went where 
they would in Mexico, but whenever a French garrison marched out 
of a Mexican city Maximilian's rule ended in that city. The witty 
Pierre Bonaparte said of Napoleon's Mexican experiment: *'My 
cousin is finding out that you can do anything in the world with 
bayonets except sit upon them." If we occupy Mexico, we shall 
simply sit upon our bayonets. Let us still watch and wait. Emerson 
says every institution is but the lengthened shadow of some stout 
and resolute person. Some day some stout and resolute person will 
rise from the southern welter, put the Mexican people back upon the 
lands of Mexico, and then — not till then — will there be abiding peace 
in that great country. 



A REVISION OF AMERICAN P0UCIE8 

Bt SnioN N. Patten, Ph.D., 

ProfoMor of PoUiieal Ecooomj, 
Uoiveriiij of PoiiiMyWAiiU. 

In every age and nation two conflicting forces are active in 
determining national policies. One of these is the national seot:- 
ment generated in the past, which in connection with social traditioQ 
tends to perpetuate old and often useless policies. The other fores 
is the commercial needs upon which present national prosperity ds> 
pends. In our national history both of these forces have been active 
and each in turn has been dominant. 

During the period of the American Revolution, sentiment pre- 
vailed over interest, while in the period of constitutional develop- 
ment commercial interests were dominant. Both sentiment and in- 
terest played a part in the great Civil War, but interest was the 
chief motive and it in the end determined the course of events. 

Today we are entering a new epoch in which interest and emo- 
tion again conflict. The national policies of the preceding century 
have evoked the emotions that at present are dictating our foreign 
policy. It is equally plain that a new group of commercial interests 
have arisen creating an opposing force as great if not greater than 
that which in our early history gave rise to the desire for a constitu- 
tion. We should therefore contrast these two forces and see where 
their opposition lies and in what way the two can be adjusted 
without too great a break in the national policy. 

American sentiments are in the main aggregated around five 
principles: the Monroe Doctrine, local independent states, Anglo- 
American unity, foreign complications and a paternal attitude oo 
the part of the nation toi^-ards the smaller states to the south. These 
sentiments developed during the earlier epoch of isolation when 
commerce was internal. There were then no great interests to 
counteract in foreign affairs the sentimental opinions fenerated 1^ 
our earlier history. When we expanded we did so l^ annexa km 
and thus brought within the nation the various parts of the conti- 
nent commercially valuable to us. In this way national and race 
homogeneity was preserved and those foreign complicatioiia avoided 

191 



102 The Annals op the American Academy 

which might easily have created trouble. A new commercial situ- 
ation, however, has arisen, which demands the development of a 
foreign policy based on the same elements that up to the present 
time have created our internal demands and interests. Under the 
old condition our industries were in the main local. Wheat, meat, 
com and cotton were our great products, and they could all be pro- 
duced within our borders. The old theory of social progress assumed 
that national and race vitality could be found only to the north of 
the frost line, and that the nations to the south were bound to be 
defective and dependent. All this has changed in recent years 
through the increased control of disease and the spread of better 
industrial conditions to southern regions. The center of civiliza- 
tion at the present time is 15 degrees south of what it was a century 
ago. As good a civilization can now be maintained on the 25th 
degree of latitude as formerly on the 40th. 

In addition to this, radical modifications in our diet have taken 
place by which southern foods have become important — so important 
that they are today as vital an element in our diet as are the older 
products of northern regions. Sugar, fruit, rice, bananas and other 
tropical plants have now become an essential element in our food 
supply and only through further development of these products can 
a low cost of living be restored. At least one-third of the national 
diet should be obtained from regions south of the 25th degree. This 
means that they must be obtained in regions beyond the present 
limits of the United States. The only way, therefore, to reduce the 
present cost of living is the utilization of this great region for the 
production of foods for which they are best fitted. It is no over- 
estimate to say that if these changes were effected a reduction in 
the cost of living of 30 per cent could be made. This is important 
to eastern cities which can more readily obtain their food from south- 
em regions than from the western states. It is also of importance 
in places where immigrants from southern Europe live. These 
races are used to a vegetable diet and will therefore more readily 
adjust themselves to southern foods than will older northern races. 

These changes, therefore, mean the transference of industry 
from chilly New England to the sunny South and from the lakes on 
the north to the gulf on the south. The present advantages of the 
region from Philadelphia to Charleston are 20 per cent greater than 
those to the north, and a shift of population and industry must take 



A Revision or Ambucan Pouciw 

^ plaoe which will brint? the ofinter of AiiiL*r!caii riviliuainn within this 

m region. 

Another dement of importance in Ueciding futurf {K>liciei Is the 
ohnn^D in eooinl morality now taking pbice. Formerly people limited 
their reeponsibilities to their family, their locality, their itate or at 
meet to their nation. They felt reqKmaible for what took pIac4> in 
their own town aa <^poeed to other towns; to their neighborhoud 
as opposed to other parts of the city. They thought that croosing 
some artificial state line relieved them from responsibility for thi* 
people on the other side. This provincial tone is now disappearing. 
We are beginning to realise that we are as responsible for what takes 
pUee in the slums as for what takes plaoe in our own families, for 
what takes place across the river as well as in our own ward or city. 
National responsibilities are correspondingly changed, for our moral 
interests lie quite as much in what is outside of the artificial limiU 
of the United States as m what takes place within them. 

Social responsibility goes with trade. We control the lives 
and morality of those who supply us goods or furnish ua with serv- 
ice, and this responsibility is quite as great if the individuals who 
serve us live in a foreign land as if they are in parts of our own city 
or as members of our own family. It has been often asserted that 
trade follows the flag. It might be better said that moral responsi- 
bility follows conunerce. There is no way of avoiding this bvger 
responsibility except by narrowing our moral horison and rendering 
less effective the principle of social service to all mankind. 

Let me make clear the principle involved. In primitive oom- 
munitic^ each locality is industrially independent, oreates its own 
supply of food and satisfies its own wants. This simple economy of 
our forefathers is disturbed by the introduction of larger industrial 
units. The laborer now loses his industrial independence; hemust 
go where capital is and have his situation determined by its needs. 
The laborers in Philadelphia are not there because they desire it; 
they are there because they are dependent upon capital for employ- 
ment, and the capital finds its location in Philadelphia. Whenever 
this disturbance takes pUice, the conmiunity becomes from that 
time responsible for the laborers' condition. They m where they 
are either to create a higher return on capital or to ereate lower 
prices for consumers. The capitalist and the consumer, therefore, 
become socially responsible as soon as they take labor from its 



194 The Ann alb of the American Academy 

natural environment and put it in places where it satisfies the 
wants of the conununity at large. 

Under these conditions it is shortsighted to assume that respon- 
sibility ceases at the crossing of political lines. The real question is, 
Have you as a result of your altered consumption or from your desire 
for a larger income forced laborers to move from their accustomed 
ennronment to surroundings where they serve your ends? If so, 
your responsibility is met only when the condition of the laborers 
is brought up to the normal level of the community. 

In the copper region of Michigan, for example, many laborers 
have been aggregated to satisfy the wants of the nation and to secure 
profits to the owners of the mines. Neither mine owners nor the 
oODSumers of copper gooiis can disclaim responsibility for the evils 
eodating in this region. They have created the conditions under 
which the laborer lives and must accept responsibility for the labor- 
er's welfare. Our country and the world at large have many such 
problems. It means a moral responsibility on the part of any om- 
munity or class that has disturbed the natural conditions imder 
which laborers have existed by forcing them into a new environment 
where their independence is subordinated to the general good. Ex- 
ploitation and degradation are the results of these changes, unless a 
moral awakening on the part of the community brings to the dis- 
located population a return to their earlier social independence. 

The first question, therefore, to ask concerning the region to 
the south of the United States is, Have we dislocated their indus- 
tries? Has Mexico been disturbed by the demands of foreign con- 
sumers or foreign capitalists? If this is so, then the various com- 
mercial or national groups creating this dislocation are responsible 
for the disorder, confusion and misery prevalent in Mexico. It 
is not constitutional rights that we should uphold. Rather should 
we see that the conditions on which an industrial civilization depends 
are realized in Mexico. These conditions may be divided into 
three groups: political rights, economic principles with the resulting 
social responsibility and social ideals that are a consequence of our 
civilisation. 

I shall not attempt to formulate our political rights nor the 
principles of constitutional government that have followed their 
application to national life. It is, however, important that the 
eeooomic principles and the social emotions of our civilization should 



A RsvisioN or Amsrican Pouav 196 

be formulated ao that we can tee our respouibUity and reoogniae 
what are the real motiYes prompting our action towarde other 
elaeaee or races. The eeooomio prindplee are these: 

1. The mabtenance of order 

2. The freedom of exchange 

3. The education of the maves 

4. The ownership of hmd 

5. The security of capital 

6. The sacredneM of contracts 

7. The prevention of induBtrial exploitation 

8. A living wage 

Each of these has been found essential to the prosperity U 
America, and can therefore be assumed to be the basis of our rela- 
tions to any external industrial group. We must prevent exploita- 
tion; we must give a living wage; we must make capital secure; we 
must see that the masses in every community whose industrial rela- 
tions we dominate maintain their industrial efficiency. 

The social emotions arising from our civilization may be formu- 
lated as follows: 

1 . Brotherhood of man 

2. Joy in mutual pruspcTity 

3. Respect for manly labor 

4. Love of intergroupal contact 

5. Subordination of personal, group and national interest to 

the general good 
0. Subordination of legal rights to social welfare 

7. I Vide in Anglo- American ideals and civilization 

8. Self and group sacrifice for the benefit of backi^-ard races 
These emotions have been growing through the past two centuries 

and must be taken into consideration in tlio settlement of foreign 
affaire. Group interest must be subordinated to social welfare, a 
keener love for our brother man must be evoked, respect for manly 
ImImt must l)e encouraged, and a pride in Anglo-American ideals and 
« i\ iiization must grow with the spread of our imlustrial institutions. 
Last but not least is the sacrifice which is denmnded of us to help 
the backward races enter u\xn\ the civilization that we enjoy. 

Political action must deix'nd upon these economic principles or 
upon the social emotions that result from them. What we should 
insist upon in our dealings with neighboring states is not coostitu- 



196 TmB Annals or the American Acadebtt 

tional government but the reality of an industrial civilization. The 
question is not whether the Mexican constitution harmonizes with 
ours, but whether Mexican industry conforms to the conditions of a 
higher civilisation. Our feelings toward the Russian people, for 
example, should not be determined by the fact that they have an 
absolute monarchy, but by the violation of economic principles that 
the present government in Russia may favor, or by the suppression 
of the social emotions that have become the common heritage of 
mankind. Only on one or the other of these grounds have wc the 
right to interfere in foreign affairs or to demand conformity on the 
part of other nations to the principles which our civilization has 
evoked. We should be proud not of our constitution but of our 
civilisation. Our guide should be justice not liberty. 

These newer ideas and standards profoundly modify our external 
relations. With those parts of the world in which our conmaercial 
interests are slight, we have little responsibility; but this responsibil- 
ity increases as our trade and industry grow, and it becomes impera- 
tive when these interests are so dominant that regions with which we 
trade left to themselves would fail to maintain political and indus- 
trial stability. Our industrial relations with South America are 
slight and will always be so. No greater mistake can be made 
than to assume that the Panama Canal will make South America a 
part of our industrial system. We should view the Canal as a con- 
tribution to the general prosperity of the world in which we will gain 
not as we seize or maintain control of South America, but as we 
share in the general prosperity that comes to all through industrial 
gains. A broader policy should be adopted towards the South Amer- 
ican states. They should be made responsible for their own sta- 
bility, and for their own internal development. Our interest in them 
is no greater than in Africa or in Australia. We should take our 
hands off and allow that progress to take place which will come nat- 
urally through their internal development. This means the with- 
drawal of our assumed control, and the granting of complete inde- 
pendence on their part and also a complete responsibility for their 
own acts. They should be treated exactly as the Balkan States are 
now treated in Europe — as an independent unity that must struggle 
with and successfully overcome their own internal difficulties. 

The situation b different when we consider our relations to Cen- 
tral America and Mexico. All of this region is an integral part of our 



A RiYiaioN OF Ambricam Pouem 107 



induftriAl i^ystem. We cannot prosper without their proeperity, and 
they can maintain neither industrial proeperity nor poUUeal elabU* 
ity without our aid. To have our policy under these ooodHioiii ooo- 
troUed by sentiment is a fatal mistake. We must either control or 
let disorder eootinue and if disorder oontinues not only will thsgr 
soffo* but we shall have corresponding losses due to the lower stand- 
ard of life and higher cost of living thus imposed upon the Ameriosa 
people. 

Control may cost lives and may cost money but lives are now 
lost in far greater numbers than could be through any effective policy 
of control. The waste of wealth under present conditions also far 
exceeds any loss that we might undergo in establishing permanent 
industrial relations throughout this region. We cannot draw an 
imaginary line between them and us without moral degradation on 
the one part and commercial loss on the other. 

This control if properly exercised would create stable industry, 
a redistribution of population into regions now fitted for full 
physical development, and a movement of our colored population 
to the south instead of to the north, with a resulting mitigation of 
difficulties with the negro race. It would also mean a great exten- 
sion of the field of capital and enterprise, offering inducements for 
saving and personal development which would otherwise be absent. 
But more than all these, we should think of the social uplift which 
would come to all the tropical races through the improvonent ci 
their health and industry. There is no reason why this region for 
whose welfare we are socially responsible should not be made as 
prosperous and its population as virile as the northern races. 

This creates new political problems since our expansions in the 
past have been over territory of like industrial qualities and filled 
with people of similar traits and character to those of the adjacent 
states. Such a union as we have had in the past would not be ad- 
vantageous under the more complex conditions which an expanding 
commercial policy creates. There is, however, no reason why we 
should not have a4iunel states for whose social conditions and indu»- 
trial proeperity we are responsible without creating the difficulties 
which would arise if they were admitted to our union. We must 
conscientiously face these industrial problems, whether they relate to 
our recent inmiigrants, to the colored race, or to the races to our 
south. In the solution we could serve the world in as important a 



106 The Annals of the American Academy 

way as we ilid in our early liistory l)y securing our indcp)endence and 
establishing our political unity. 

The really difficult problem in this modification of our external 
policy relates to Mexico. We must, however, remember that Mex- 
ico is not an industrial unit, and that the real weakness in Mexico 
at the present time lies in the fact that the different sections are 
bound together only by weak sentimental ties. The economic inter- 
ests of these sections are so different and the class interests arc so 
intense that no political unity can be maintained in Mexico except 
as some sections dominate others or some classes control those differ- 
ing from themselves. Each new conquest will be that of a class or a 
section and thus revive the evils that caused the present revolution. 
To think that under such circumstances a unity can be maintained 
in Mexico is to fly in the face of experience. Political independence 
cannot be upheld except through economic independence, and any 
region that is not economically self-sufficing must sooner or later 
become a component part of some larger unity that is economically 
independent. 

The principles that I have enunciated apply not merely to the 
Mexican situation, but to the whole Anglo-American civilization. 
Both England and America have arrived at a point where old con- 
stitutional restraints have broken down and where new principles of 
conunon action must be developed. England has the same situation 
to face in regard to Ireland and to South Africa that we have in 
regard to Mexico. Our responsibilities are not diminished by the 
fact that Mexico is external to the territory of the United States, 
nor is English responsibility reduced on the plea that England is 
giving local self-government to various parts of the British Empire. 

Ireland cannot become a political unit, because she is not an 
industrial unit. Belfast does not trade with Dublin, but with the 
outside world. Dublin in turn has its external trade independent of 
other parts of Ireland. This means that any decision interfering 
with the industrial prosperity of Belfast will not be felt in Dublin, 
and hence will not tend to create a reaction that will set it aside. 
Our western states may not be much interested in eastern prosperity, 
but eastern depression is sure to be felt in the western states and to 
produce in them a reaction in favor of conditions in the east that 
would give them prosperity. No such mutual conditions exist in 
Ireland. All that would hold such a unit together would be a weak 



A Hrviaion or American Poucom IW 

local sentiment which could not under any etrcunntaiiOM be poiper- 
ful enough to prevent the ■ggrwinnii of one locality afainat aoothar. 
The same lack of <wninon int^reata prevails in South America. lis 
mining industry ereatas abnormal conditions for the benefit of the 
world at large. We can not expect a dominant cUas in aueh 
a locality to respect the interests of other rlsssfs The only 
method by wliich the balanced prosperity of these localitieB, groupa 
and classes can be insured is by some outside control impoiiBg 
upon the whole region the economic principles and social emotions 
that have (levelope<l in the larger Anglo-American worid. 

Our policy towards Mexico should be based on these prin ci ple a . 
We should break up the Mexican state and put in ita place natural 
unitji, the people of which have common industrial interesta and who 
would therefore feel any burden that may be imposed on some one 
class. There must in addition be an abrogation of class privileges. 
There should also be a definite policy about public utilities. Thi-jse 
are so influential that they cannot be controlled by the different 
localities. All this could be done without any break in our political 
precedents. It would, however, force a reconstruction of our eco- 
nomic ideals and a greater emphasis on our social emotions. Both 
these changes are much to be desired; if the Mexican situation leads 
ua to a clearer perception of the economic and social principles on 
which our civilization depends, we shall not only be the gainers in 
our foreign policy but also in all our domestic relations. 

Let me restate fundamentals to make my position clear. Eco- 
nomic interests should determine the extent of the region over which 
i**e exert efTective control. In this whole region our responsibilities 
are the same whether a given portion be in or without our national 
union. We should not control regions like South America where 
our ties are sentimental. We should control Mexico even if senti- 
ment on both sides of the national boundary is opposed. Social 
responsibility must dominate over regional feelings. 

Two groups of sentiments are wholesome: the Anglo-American, 
which reflect our whole civilization, and thoee evoked by local inter- 
ests. Class sentiments, regional sentiments, race sentiments, Un- 
guage sentiments and denominational sentiments are bad and should 
be displaced either by the broader sentiments of our civiliation or 
by economic interests. To treat Mexico as a whole would be as 
fatal as to have treated the South as a unit at the dose of the Civil 



200 The Annals of the American Acadebct 

War. Had we done this an intolerable situation would have arisen 
only solved by another war. We want no southern sentiment, no 
eastern or western sentiment, no more than we want Irish, German 
or Jewish sentiment. Mexican sentiment is a bar to their progress 
and to ours. It should be faced and suppressed just as southern 
sentiment was fought and defeated. 

Local political units should be economic and so demarked that 
people of similar interests can act together for common ends. No 
other sentiments except those generated by our whole civilization 
can be tolerated. That which goes beyond the locality should be 
broad enough and true enough to arouse all men. Interests are 
local; sentiments are universal. We should avoid the mistakes now 
committed by England in relation to Ireland and South Africa. 
Irish and South African sentiment is regional. Like southern senti- 
ment or Mexican sentiment or the class sentiments that are now 
forming, they are against social welfare, and should be repressed. 
Only as they are blended into a larger unity that is not regional or 
can our civilization expand and flourish. Both regions and 
must lose their emotional appeal in the march of events giving 
to localities their economic rights and to the whole world one religion, 
one future and one civilization. Away with all besides this goal in 
which political, economic and social interests unite into a harmonious 
whole and lift us above the strife of regional and race emotions. 



MEXICO: ITS PEOPLE AND ITS PROBLEM 

Bt Major CABsnm E. Gillsttb, 
Philadelphia. 

Strictly speaking, there ia no such thing ae international law, for 
there is nobo(^ authorised to pass such laws, no tribunal to interpret 
them, and no executive authorized to enforce them. Nations in this 
are in precisely the condition of a group of men in a mining camp in a 
wilderness where there is no government and no established laws. 

Yet in both cases certain fundamental principles are recognised 
and those who violate them are likely to have a fight on their hands in 
which disinterested parties are likely to take sides against them. 
Thus in the mining camp it is recognised that each man owns his own 
claim and can work it by any method he pleases provided he does not 
thereby interfere with the rights of his neighbor. 

So with nations; each nation is considered to own its territory, 
to have certain attributes called sovereignty. It can work its lands 
as it desires, provide its own government, and regulate its own affairs 
as it pleases and settle its internal disputes as it sees fit. In general 
no nation has a right to interfere with the sovereignty of another and 
remain its friend. Any such interference is really an act of war. 

Nations have the inherent right to change their governments by 
any method without other nations having the slightest right to inter- 
fere even though it be difficult at times for thoee other nations to de- 
termine what faction to recognise as the actual government. 

Under ordinary conditions no nation is bound to recognise or 
hold diplomatic relations with a government of whose character it 
disapproves. There is one very exceptional case, howei-er, in this 
behalf. The relations of the United States to other American re- 
publics, particularly Mexico and Central America, are different from 
thoee between any other countries. The Monroe Doctrine is the 
cause of this. Privately suggested primarily by England to prevent 
the Holy Alliance from helping Spain to reoover her ookmies, its real 
justifiable meaning is that we claim the right to tr>', on this continent, 
the experiment of government by the people unhampered and unoon- 
taminated by European monarchical systems. It has not inherently 



202 • The Annals of the American Academy 

the force of law, but we will fight for it, and that makes it about as 
good as law. 

There is one important point, however, generally overlooked. 
The doctrine does not contemplate for a moment any right to dictate 
the form of govenimont of other countries on this continent, especially 
those existing at the time of President Monroe. 

We have not a shadow of a right to demand that Canada become 
a republic, and no one has ever even suggested such a right, and we 
have not u sluuiow of a right in the same behalf as regards Mexico. 

Spain colonized and owned that country for a hundred years be- 
fore E^igland established her colonies here. We will prevent and did 
prevent Europe from making a monarchy of Mexico, but if Mexico 
wants to make a monarchy of herself the Monroe Doctrine does not 
apply. We have made it apply but we have no moral right to do so. 
We have the right to \ye what President Wilson calls ''the champions 
of constitutional government," within our own borders, and to en- 
courage it elsewhere, but we have no right to interfere with the sov- 
ereignty of Mexico. If she wishes or finds it unavoidable to change 
rulers by force it is really none of our business. 

It would seem that we should have the full right of non-recog- 
nition in such cases, but even this is not true. The rights that we 
have almost automatically arrogated under an extension of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine have been acceded to by foreign govermnents and the 
result is practically that if we do not recognize a de facto government 
of Mexico, we can kill it and even destroy that country simply by 
non-recognition as we are doing today. 

The big nations that divided up Poland have been condemned by 
civilization ever since. But the partition of Poland is a very mild 
matter, in comparison to the horrors of what we are doing in Mexico. 
That our people stand for it for a moment is only explainable on the 
ground of ignorance of the true facts. 

This ignorance of ours concerning Mexico is one of the most amaz- 
ing things of the age. The average American really knows less of our 
next-door neighbor to the south than he does of Germany or Japan. 

The typical and crowning error of this is the apparent assumption 
by the President, press, and people, that the so-called "Constitution- 
alists" of Mexico are analogous to our revolutionary sires trying to 
establish a true democracy in the so-called republic of Mexico. On 
the contrary they are vastly more similar to the followers of Geronimo, 
Sitting Bull, Cochise, or Rain-in-the-Face. 



Turn MmcAii Pbopli awd Pmobuoc 908 

When the Spaniarcb came to Mexico they found two Idndt of 
p<H)plc' — civilised Asteoe, Toltecs, Oaxaeanc, ete., probably of Euro- 
pean origin, and the wettorn ApAche-iike people, probably derived 
from Asiatic barbariana. Tbe Spamarda intermarried with the civil- 
iaed races and made peons ci the barbarian element 80 today there 
are two races in Mexico, one a cultured Latin race and the other 
uncouth savages more or lees " tamed. " 

Abeolutely the only difference between the common peons of 
Mexico and our reservation Indians lies in the fact that we killed off 
most of our Indians, and put the remnants upon reservations, while 
the Spaniards "converted"' theirs (with an axe if necessary) and put 
them to work. They have not chani^ed a whit in four hundred years. 
They have the habits, the food, the clothing, the houses, the super- 
stitions, and the vermin, that they had when Cortes came. I have 
seen thousands of their abodes, never one with a chimney, never one 
with anything but a dirt floor. They build the fire on the floor and 
the smoke gets out as beet it can. They have acquired nothing from 
civilisation but its diseases, firearms, horses, a few crude cooking 
utensils, and a very thin religious veneer for their old superstitionai 
mostly used with a view to better luck in gambling. 

Their clothing is exactly what Cortes found, substituting a little 
cheaper cotton cloth for some of the skins, and omitting the feathen. 

Beginning at the feet this costume consists of rude, homenuMle, 
leather sandals, worn part of the time on feet more nearly resembling 
hoofs. It can safely be asserted that 50 per cent of Villa 's " patriots ** 
have cracks a quarter of an inch deep in their hoof-4ike heels. They 
encase their legs generally in ''pants" made of unbleached cotton 
sheeting, held up by a kind of shawl or sash twipted around the waist; 
a blouse or jumper of the same material; no underwear or socks; a 
blanket made by hand, with a central slit for the head to go through — 
and a straw sugar-loaf hat 18 inches high, with a brim 2 feet wide — 
unkempt hair, generally " inhabited. " It can safely be guaranteed 
that there are not a dosen combs in Villa's camp, nor any soap used 
for bathing. 

It is also a safe assertion that not 5 per cent of Villa's "an^y " 
knows that they are called '* Constitutionalists" at all; not 1 percent 
could spell or pronounce the word constitution, nor identify a sii 
letter in its make-up; not one in a hundred would know what 
meant by a constitution nor would care a continental about it if you 



204 The Annals of the American Academy 

talked to him for a week. And if you handed him a ballot, he would 
not have the slightest conception of its use except possibly to roll a 
cigarette and he would prefer a corn husk for that. 

Their highest ideal of life is an uncurbed freedom, to ride a horse, 
carry a gun, and ''earn their bread by the sweat of their squaws'' in 
true Indian fashion. They have no desire for "votes for men," but 
are willing to compromise on "work for women." The women, like 
savages the world over, are willing to work. The men work only 
when compelled to do so by hunger, and then only enough to get com 
and beans. The problem of every wise employer of labor in Mexico 
18 to get the peons to have use for higher wages. Better food and 
better shelter will give more work for each dollar invested than com, 
beanSiand a blanket, and make a better country to live in. But every 
increase in wages beyond the pittance required for tliose almost in- 
variably goes for pulque or idleness. 

They seem to have only two emotions above those necessary for 
racial preservation, — fear, and the joy of destroying. Where the 
occasion would seem to call for anger, joy, resentment, patriotism, 
playfulness, or hate, the average peon smashes windows, preferably 
those of plate glass. 

When Mexico threw off the Spanish yoke in 1821, the peons in 
the out-of-the-way places filled up, walled up, and hid, every possible 
mine. A few months ago the " rebels " blew up with dynamite a coal 
mine which they knew belonged to the family of Madero, destroying 
about half a million dollars' worth of property and equipment. These 
rebels, who are the desperate offscourings of the peon class, have 
destroyed everything in northem Mexico that means "work for men," 
so far as they have been able to reach it, bridges, houses, banks, 
railroad stations, tunnels, theatres, cars, locomotives, culverts, every- 
thing. They have looted churches, missions, residences, banks, 
stores, and have murdered and held for ransom many persons of all 
nationalities. 

The civilized people number perhaps two millions, a race proud 
and ambitious — individually too ambitious, because too many do not 
seem able to perceive that in trying to govern a country in which 
there are less than three million intelligent people against over twelve 
million untutored savages, absolute unity is necessary in the civilized 
ranks. 

The fundamental trouble with the country, though, is that the 



Tn MwwiAM FmomM amd Pioi 

two million own all the land. The twelve million own nothing. 
M illions of them have no home but a blanket The rest live in ihaekt, 
huts, or eabinsi buUt tn^raUy by themaelvee on other people's land, 
and they generally work for the land owner. In this they are exactly 
in the position of the few scattered Indians in our West who live under 
preoisety similar oonditioDS, the only esseotial diffeveDoe being in 
their relative numbers, most of oars being gathered on raenralioos. 

Between the few civilised land owners and the numerous landless 
savages, is a small class of intelligent people who are neither peons 
nor land owners, and who are naturally dissstisfied with coodftkwi. 
Many of these are ready for any disturbance that may bring a change. 

Add now the fact that all three types come from fighting stock, 
and that to all the original natives bloodshed was a routine matter, 
and you will see that "government by the people" is here a prepos- 
terous dream. No republic nor anything like a republic ever has been 
or ever can be made out of Mexican peons or any other North Ameri- 
can Indians, except after a long period of gradual development of 
small landholders. We have never even attempted it with our own; 
why should we try to force it upon Mexico? We have several times 
given some of them land in severalty; they promptly drank or gam- 
bled it away. Nothing is so easy as to start a "revolution" in 
Mexico, if setting savages on the warpath \b revolution; and bandit 
outbreaks under any pretext from "constitutional government" to 
"forty acres and a mule" are something to be expected under any 
government except one of iron which handles both savage and rene- 
gade with prompt and severe punishment. Under a lax or hampered 
government banditism becomes a business, aided wonderfully by the 
topography of the country. Leaving out a strip from 50 to 100 miles 
wide around the coast, the body of Mexico is a plateau about 3000 feet 
above the sea along the northern border and 8000 in the southern 
portion. This plateau is fringed by a range of high mountains from 
whose crests down to the sea is an indescribably rough country where 
roads are practically unknown, all traffic being by pack trains on 
rough mountain trails. The plateau is cut up by numerous rough 
mountain ranges with few roads. From these fastnesses bandits are 
difficult to dislodge. They raid the valleys and then sneak back to 
their lairs in the mountains. 

No matter how many bandits may be ravaging the countiy, 
each band is as independent as a wolf. To capture large game like 



206 Ths Annals op thr American Academy 

a city they unite just as wolves that kill rabbits individually unite to 
pull down a buffalo. There is no organized amalgamation, however 
skilfully the mob may be press-agented into an army. Their method 
of taking a city is strikingly like a band of coyotes around a buffalo. 
They do not Ix^iege the city nor storm it; they camp around it and 
cut off its suppliei) until it is starve<^l out. In the sparse semi-desert 
of north Mexico this pkin works successfully — in the richer southern 
states the garrison can get supplies by sorties. The recent "storm- 
ing" of Torreon by Villa is probably largely newspaper picturesque- 
ness, though possibly the hordes of savages gathered were sufficiently 
numerous to venture a capture by assault. 

The regular or federal army of Mexico is composed mostly of 
peons, but they are officered by educated gentlemen, mostly graduates 
of the West Point of Mexico, Chapultepec. A very creditable disci- 
pline is maintained, but irregularities accompany all armies, in war 
times, our own Civil War being no exception. Skilful press-agenting, 
however, can make the incidents of General Huerta's army appear 
on a par with the regular business of the bandit **army " of which the 
most prominent leader now is Villa. 

Now that he has dominated most of the other bandit leaders and 
been supplied with cannon, his forces may have some semblance of an 
army. 

A typical example of the necessity of severity on the part of the 
government of Mexico in treating renegades who are "v^nUing to risk 
savage domination to gain personal control, as Madero did, is shown 
by General Angeles, now with Villa 's " army. " This man is a trained 
artillerist. He was imprisoned by General Huerta for treason. His 
wife pleaded for his release and he himself promised upon his most 
sacred honor that if released he would remain absolutely neutral in 
the struggle. Yet he went to the aid of the rebels as fast as he could 
go, consenting to serve under Villa to help destroy the civilization of 
his own country. General Diaz was not as kind-hearted a man as 
General Huerta. 

Serious consideration at the moment is being given to the dis- 
cussion of ways and means of restoring order in Mexico, the President 
being as firm as ever in the conviction that the solution must be 
acceptable to the "Constitutionalists." The futility of this can be 
readily grasped when it is reflected that Madero himself, in whose 
name they are fighting, was not "acceptable" to them. Practically 



Tiic Mexican People axd Problem 307 

not a single leader who helped Madero fight for *'confltitutioiial lib- 
erty" CEine in when the fight waa won. Oroioo akme did to, and be 
stayed only two weeks when he went back to fight Madero. The 
others all stayed on in "rebeUion" against Bffadero, eiaetJy as thcgr 
had fouglit Dias. Their business is brigandage and loot, and tbeir 
pretexts, always high-sounding, are varied to suit the occasion. 

ViUa protends to be fighting for Madero's "prineiplss," yei 
n>i*ently he viciously fought a oo-worker for tlie same cause, one 
Maximo Castillo, Madero's own bodyguard, who recently helped the 
cause of "freedom'* by gleefully wrecking a loaded passenger train 
in a blaxing tunnel. At least Villa says Castillo did. The latter 
lays it to Villa's men. It should be can^fully )K)rno in mind that 
these outrages are being done, not hv Mexico but l)y the tiavuges who 
are destroying Mexico. 

If Villa became president of .Mexico tomorrow, he would luive to 
fight ever>' one of his followers that he did not provide with an office, 
just as Madero did. 

Since 1821 Mexico has been culled a republic — it has never been 
one in reality for fifteen minutes. It was twice an empire, several 
times a military dictatorship, but never a government by the people 
for a moment. For fifty years it was one continued successkm of 
revolts, rebellionn, intrigues, anarchy, and destruction. One presi- 
dent actually rebelled against himself, as it were, and took the field to 
become a dictator, saying the country could not be governed under a 
constitution. Finally, a war hero, a military genius, a great construct- 
ive statesman, a skilful diplomat, and last, but by no means least, an 
"iron ruler*' appeared in Porfirio Diaa, who crushed renegade and 
bandit with merciless vigor, placated respectable opposition, and 
established peace and order. He worked a miracle of government; 
a rigorous military dictatorship under all the forms of a pure democ- 
racy. For thirty years under Diai peace prevailed and the count r>-. 
the richest in the world, prospered. 

This continued till the greatest source of wealth the country' 
possessed was discovered. When it was proven that Mexico contains 
an empire of oil, the richest deposits in the world, the troubles of 
Mexico began. 

Americans first drilled for oil but found little. Later Sir Weet- 
man Pearson, an English engineer, holding some pretty favorable 
government contracts, drilled much deeper and found oil in 



Tbb Annals of the American Academy 

quantities. Standard Oil never drills any pioneer wells. They wait 
till others find the oil and then go "buy" it — at their own figures. 
Like the American eagle which never tries to catch a fish, but waits 
till the osprey catches one and then goes and gets it, without risking 
taking cold by getting wet. But Sir Weetman was a pretty large 
fish hawk, and he seems still to have the oil. 

The enormous concentration of wealth in few hands that has come 
from Standard Oil methods is probably the greatest menace to our 
institutions that exists, and it is possible that Diaz, who was a wise 
and farsecing ruler, did not want Standard Oil to do to Mexico what 
it was doing to the United States. Some assert that his friends, and 
even he himself, were partners with Lord Cowdray. In any event he 
protected that fish hawk from the oil eagle. Then curious things 
happened. Diaz, who had been lauded for many years on all hands 
as the greatest constructive statesman of the age, began to be system- 
atioally reviled. One John Kenneth Turner, an impecunious news- 
paper scribbler, was "staked" by some one to make a ten months' 
trip to Mexico with money enough to pose successfully as a capitalist 
looking for big investments, taking along such luxuries as a traveling 
companion and a private secretary. He produced a scurrilous mis- 
representation of Mexico, and especially of Diaz, called Barbarous 
Mexico. 

Curiously enough, before oil was discovered in Mexico, Mr. 
Bryan, presidential candidate of the Democratic party of the United 
States, and editor of The Commoner^ paid the follo^ving tribute to 
Qeoeral Diaz: 

President Dias has left an indelible impress on his country. His adminis- 
tration covers an area of great and permanent improvement in the condition of 
that nation. 

When I waa in the city of Mexico I was especially impressed with his inter- 
est in education, and to education the people of Mexico must look for the laying 
of thai broad foundation which is necessary to stable government. 

I need not comment upon the executive ability of President Diaz. He has 
won a place among the great executive officers of the world. As one who feels 
deeply interested in the future of the Republic of Mexico, I rejoice in the prog- 
thai the country has made under Porfirio Diaz. 



After oil had been developed he referred to him in the following 
picturesque language: 



Turn Mexican Pbople aicd 

WhAl .... iliAt bloody old buUiber, ilut bloody old tyraai vbo iMf 
doiM nothing but murder and but«her for thirty yean, «ad would be «<^f to 
yvt only that tueh patnota aa Madero, Carransa and Villa rota to throw off tht 
yoke of tyranny which resulted in finally driving him from tha eountry. 

On September 0, 1012, Lawrence F. Converse appeared beCora the 
sub-committee of the committee on foreign relations of the United 
States Senate and testified under oath as follows: 

I waa taken into the oonfldence (of Madaro and hia offioen) aa aa oAeer oo 
their itaif. Mr. Madero told me his money waa coming from thai aouiee 
(Standard Oil). The three men mentioned (Franciaeo Madero, Braulio Hsr- 
nandes, Madero'a secretary of state, and Abraham Qonsalea, governor of 
Chihuahua) said that Standard Oil would back them to the last ditch. 

Mr. Madero stated to me several times, aa also did his other trusted 
offioers, that the Standard Oil Company was back of them. He told me that 
aeveral times for a positive fact. 

They were to have a high rate of interest and there was a tentative agree- 
ment aa to an oil concession in the southern states of Mexico. 

Before the same sub-committee S. G. Hopkins of Washington, 
D. C, testified that be had been attorney for Aladero and his re\'olu- 
tionists from the first outbreak. He is counsel for the rebels now and 
they have made their headquarters in his office down to the present 
day. He admitted on the stand that during a part of the time since 
Madero "broke out/' he, Hopkins, was counsel for the Waters- 
Pierce Oil C>)mpany operating in Mexico and owned by Standard 
Oil. Mr. Hopkins is well known as a press-agent of great resources. 

The possibilities of this situation are such as to demand strict 
observance on the part of the United States of the aocepted roles d 
international law, irrespective of the alleged personal qualities of 
Mexican presidents or would-be presidents as they appear in the 
press.* 

After about the proper length of time for Barbarmu Mexico to 
permeate the minds of the people of the United States, Madero began 
his revolution. His propaganda was "free land to the peont." In 
this he did not even have the merit of originality. That preeise 
thing had been the shibboleth of ever>' renegade outbreak from 1821 
till the time of Dias, 1S76, and there were literally hundreds of them. 
Not one of his predecessors had ever made the slightest effort to make 

* See The Trend Miagwiu for April, 1914. 



210 Thb Annals of the American Acadebcy 

good their lure. All that Madcro did in this behalf was to have his 
brother Gustavo go do>%ii to Morelos and buy a large hacienda at $12 
a hectare and sell it to the government at $36 — for free distribution. 

As shown alx)ve, the Monroe Doctrine gives an awful power for 
good or evil. In justice it should limit our normal right of non-recog- 
nition. As it stands President Wilson's refusal on March 7, 1913, to 
recognize General Huerta has absolutely prevented anybody from 
lending money to the Mexican government, except at their own per- 
sonal risks, for President Wilson can at any moment recognize Villa as 
president of Mexico, and what Villa or Carranza would do to Huerta 's 
bonds needs no demonstration. 

But we have gone far beyond mere non-recognition. European 
bankers have refused to lend money to the government of Mexico 
because of secret requests made to their governments by President 
Wilson. He also directed the Postmaster-General to demand a settle- 
ment from Mexico of about a million dollars at a time when such de- 
mand would hurt civilized Mexico most. All these things lie within 
the power of President Wilson. How unjust and wrong they are, 
time Avill surely show. 



THE REBfEDY FOR MEXICX) 

By Lwlis C. Wbllb, 
Praffl«or of PMaeh Mid Sfitiiiih, CUrk College, WonmUr, 

What should be desired in Mexico is not so much immediate peace 
asapeacethatahallbetoleraUypennanent. Mexicoisalandofiq)eclal 
privilege and great oppreanon of the mniwcn That is one of the two 
cauBee of the country *s present troubles. The other, complementary 
to it, is the twofold fact, first, that there is a deep-seated desire among 
the people for a change in their condition, and second, that large 
numbers of the more virile part of the population arc at last de- 
termined to force the change. These two causes must be taken as 
the fundamental considerations for foreign governments in the for- 
mation of a far-sighted policy with regard to the Mexican situation. 

For a permanent cure of disease, the cause must be removed. 
There will not be settled peace in Mexico, and there ought not to be, 
until the people see the promise of a reasonable degree of rehef from 
their sad condition. This can be realized only through the ascendeDqr 
of some party pledged to reforms. It is idle to think that a siroog 
man is the main essential. True it is that the man at the helm in 
Mexico should be one of extraordinary strength, but the movement of 
the times is greater than any individual; and unless he fall into step 
with the demands of the generation, no man's personality can long 
dominate the situation. There was never any substantial reasoo 
for thinking that General Huerta, with only his miUtar>' prestige to 
recommend him, could prove the salvation of his country. Granting 
that the recognition of his government a year ago by the United 
States would have resulted in peace, which is to be doubted, the peace 
would have been a forced one, maintained by the arbitrao' methods 
of the old regime. Such a peace would have been fatal to itself, 
the peace that Porfirio Dias maintained, and at best could have 
been but a temporary one. It probably would have resulted in a few 
years in an explosion all the more violent because ci the fcpre s si on. 

Not only must there come to power in Mezioo a party oonmiittcd 
to reforms, but, if settled peace is to result, its victor>' must come about 
under such circumstances as to enable it to carry some of the refonns^ 

211 



212 Thb Annals of thb American Academy 

where they are most urgent, into immediate execution. This means 
that their victory must be complete, and not one of compromise. The 
sad example furnished by the compromise of Madero should be a 
warning against another, not only to the Mexicans of the reform ele- 
ment, but also to foreign governments which may be inclined to exert 
p reoou re upon the contending parties to compose their dilTerences. 
No steps should be taken which would leave in positions of power men 
in sjTnpathy with the old regime who might work to undermine the 
strength of the victors or to delay or neutralize the realization of their 
purposes. Any such abortion on the part of the revolution would 
logically result in another popular revolution against the new govern- 
ment, as there were uprisings against Madero when it appeared that 
he would not bring to satisfactory fruition the aims with which he 
inspired the soldiers who fought his battles. The leaders of the revo- 
lution are but the instruments of the people, in whose hearts it has its 
real and vital force. If these instruments fail the people in the ulti- 
mate work that is to be done after the smoke of battle has cleared 
away, they will be cast aside for some of truer or stronger steel. It 
is therefore devoutly to be desired that the leaders of reform should 
have a clear field for their efforts. This will not be possible unless the 
Cientifico party and others whom President Diaz favored are so com- 
pletely defeated and shorn of their strength as to be discouraged 
for some time to come from attempting to block the progress of the 
age. These considerations not only justify the Mexican revolution- 
ists in declining mediation, but should deter foreign governments 
from pressing it. 

It may be too early to predict that the present Constitutionalist 
organization will win a victory so complete, or that the struggle can be 
ended soon enough to satisfy foreigners, except those who can possess 
themselves with gi^eat patience. But, on some accounts, it is desirable 
that the Constitutionalists, if they are to conquer Huerta, or any 
other reactionary to whom he may give place, should make somewhat 
slow progress in their march to Mexico City. As battles deplete 
their ranks, to restore them to their necessary numbers they will have 
to depend to some extent upon accessions of inexperienced soldiers in 
the country through which they pass. If no time is taken to train 
and discipline these men, not only will the war be bloodier, but 
the armies will in moments of stress and temptation be more 
irrwpc M mi b le, and possibly the cause of much unnecessary loss 



T FOH Mmxxco 213 

of property aod Buffertiif to noD^combatanu. Moraofw^ at tkm 
Con0titutk»Alkt tovemma&t extendi iU control to theioiiUi, Hneedi 
time to organiM iteelf in the new territory, to get ite mechinery 
into well oodrdinated operation, to restore a tranquil and con- 
fident state of mind aoKxng the people, eueh as appareotly exists 
in the seotkms where it has been longest in control, and to bring the 
daily activities of the people as nearly as may be back to their aoous- 
tomed Oow. If its armies should now capture dty after city in rapid 
sucoession, and arrive in a rush at the capital itself, the exdtement of 
the populace, as well as that of the soldiers, would run so high that 
numy grave events might take place. In some places the lower 
classes might take into their own hands the work of reform at 
which the revolution is aiming, interpret their regained rights in 
their own crude way, and in seising upon them commit many acts 
of vengeance and violence. The fall of Mexico City, if coming as 
the result of a battle at that point, will at any time be the ooeasioQ 
of great exdtement through the entire country. No better pro- 
vision can be had against the untoward contingendes of that 
event than the slow but sure consolidation of the power of the 
Constitutionalist government. 

Assuming that after a final victory of the Constitutionalists the 
dvil government of the country will temporarily be in the hands of 
General Carransa and his cabinet, the peace of the nation will be 
much better assured in the trying period that will follow, if they have 
had time in different localities to become acquainted with the condi- 
tions and problems that will confront them. They might well go 
further th^i this. They might get some of thoee problems partially 
off their hands by bringing to them local and providonal solutiana. 
For the mnwics of the people, probably the most tangible of the many 
abuses which they are fighting is that of the Und tenure. It b the one 
whoee abolition they will demand with the greatest promptness after 
the war is over. Any delay in this reform will be as perilous for 
the peace of the country as it proved to be in the time of Madero. In 
some of the phioes where Und is most sorely needed for individual or 
communal use, it might be wise for the ConsliliitionaliBt government, 

Ion the several stages of its southward progress, to seise land and confer 
it upon villages or divide it among familiea. This might be done 1^ 
confiscation in cases where dreumstances justify it, and by expropria- 



214 Thk Avvai^ ok thk American Academy 

in places wlieru invalitlity of title is not apparent anti no other grounds 
exist for confiscation. 

To do this wisely would take some time; but such a procedure 
would serve to appease the people pending the institution of further 
reforms, and render more secure the new government to be established 
in Mexico City. Such a policy as this, moreover, adopted as a mili- 
tary or revolutionary' measure, would probably in the long run save 
time. It would give the government experience in handling the ques- 
tion, contact with its varied aspects in the different regions, and a 
slight opportunity to test different methods of settling it. Success- 
ful solutions of the problem in a few localities would pave the way to 
lis general solution by legislative process, in which it would other- 
wise probably become subject to the same delay of endless debate as 
during the administration of Madero. 

However, impatience outside of Mexico for an early end to the 
fighting tends to foster a demand for intervention on the part of the 
United States. This will generally be recognized as unwarranted 
unless it can be clearly shown that Mexico has forfeited the sovereign 
right to settle her affairs according to her own ideas, and in the way 
that is most likely to settle them permanently. A condition of un- 
bearable anarchy would perhaps constitute such forfeiture if there 
should be no promise of a cessation through the operation of internal 
forces. By a state of civil war the right is not forfeited, as by the prin- 
ciples of international law a sovereign state may engage in civil war 
without interference, unless it is waged with unrestrained irrespon- 
sibility. That there is some anarchy in Mexico is undoubted. But 
the important question is whether this anarchy is not the incidental 
feature, and civil war the predominant fact, of the situation. 

It is sometimes difficult to know whether a domestic strife is to 
be considered a true civil war or a mere contest of personal ambitions. 
If. however, grounds for controversy exist such as justify an appeal to 
arms, no foreign government may properly presume to pass judgment 
on the motives of the leaders of a revolt, and assume that they are 
making only an insincere and selfish parade of their issues, unless their 
conduct of the war is such as to show them almost beyond doubt to be 
without principles of patriotism. Since a man 's fellow citizens may 
be supposed to be better judges of his character than persons of a 
different nationality, this principle applies with particular force to a 
struggle where large numbers of men are assem^linu; under the same 



Rbmxdt fob Msnoo 7\f% 

leaders, and proving their oonfidenoe in them by eniniiting tuetr 
oauae to their dhreotUm and Iheb Ihrei to their enmmand. 

Mexico undeniably preeents the basic conditioiu without which 
a struggle should not be viewed as a true civil war, namely, the eadsl- 
ence of issues which are of vital oonccrn to the people; and the 
abuseM which give rise to thom have been so tyrannical as to justify 
a revulution in the government, ami, if ni^cesHuy to that end, a violent 
purging of the nation. The revolt on these Iflsnes is under the guid- 
anee of leaders, civil and military, representing nearly all grades of 
society and many walks of life. Tliey include men of character who 
typify the most substantial products of Mexican civilization. The 
Mexicans, who have proved their confidence in them by enlisting unde 
their standard, are so strong in numbers and in spirit as to be a 
formidable force against the best armies that General Huerta can 
to oppose them. A large part of these troops certainly, and appar- 
ently almost all of them, are operating under orders from a single 
source. Their cliief is also exerdsmg the powers of civil government 
in a very extensive and growing territory. In a large part of this 
territory, notably in the State of Sonora, in which was loeated until 
recently the Constitutionalist capital, foreigners have been receiving 
complete protection. These conditions seem to establish civil war, 
and not anarchy, as the predominant fact of the situation. 

As for the way in which the war is being waged, comparisons 
should be made with other conflicts. In the history of the United 
States, not alone the terrible events of Sherman 's '' March to the Sea, " 
and thoee in Arkansas, Missouri and Tennessee diuing the Civil War, 
but, in more recent times, many predatory and licentious acts of 
American soldiers* in the war ^nth Spain, despite the efforts of the 
officers to prevent them, rise up to modify the judgment that might be 
passed on barbarities that have taken place in Mexico. The war 
ideals of the nation which may prove the most troublesome of the 
powers that may attempt to force the hand of the United Stales In 
Mexico or influence its action there, may be found in the speech made 
by the German Emperor' in 1900 to his troops eml>arking for China, 
in which he enjoins them to emulate the Huns of .\ttila; while the 
teal with which they obeyed his injunction, and the excesses of the 

» E. J. Benton, Iniernattonal Law and IhpUmacif of tke Spamsk-Atmerieam 
War, p. 162. 

'CharlM Francis Adsms, Studies .l/ih/ory and DipUmaiic, p. 38^. 



216 The Annals of the American Academy 

French, British and Russian soldiers* on the same expedition, show 
that the so-called civilised usages of war are largely a fiction. 

How, then, can we expect a nation, the masses of whose popula- 
tion are still in an early stage of their development, to carry on a war 
that shall fall short of Sherman 's definition? Can we expect her to be 
relatively more refined in warfare than she is in the pursuits of peace? 
If foreigners are satisfied to live in Mexico in times of peace, for the 
sake of reaping great profits from her backwardness in exploiting 
her own resources, and to profit also in many cases from Porfirian 
methods of preserving peace perhaps quite as barbarous as any of 
the acts of the present conflict, should they not accept their lot 
imooinplainingly when Mexico engages in warfare? And, everything 
considered, have not the warring Mexicans acquitted themselves 
quite as creditably as, in their own wars, have the soldiers of the 
five nations whose citizens are now most interested on her soil? 

Among the cogent reasons of other sorts why the United States 
should not intervene, there are some of which little has been said in 
public discussion. Mention may be made of a few, beginning with 
those which apply to continued control of the Mexican government. 

Americans have more than they can attend to to keep their own 
house in order. The full attention of their legislators and public opin- 
ion is needed on the many great domestic prbblems of city, state and 
nation. It is especially pertinent to remem})er that the American 
people do not need to cross their frontiers to find alien wards to 
guide, and ahens who bid fair to bring more sorrow to them than can 
ever come from the Mexicans if the latter are left to themselves. 
Recent articles* by Prof. E. A. Ross, in which he deals with the 
economic, political and social effects of recent immigration, offer on 
this point much food for thought. If America is to wield her highest 
influence in the progress of the world, she may well apply her energy 
developing her own civilization to its best within its natural boun- 
daries, instead of spreading it like a thin veneer over a large part of 
the earth's surface. 

An accumulation of foreign dependencies would in time invite 
great corruption in our public service. 

•A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China, chap, xxvi; Wm. Elliot GriflSe, 
China' 9 Story, pp. 272-3. 

*8ee The Century tor November and December, 1913, and January, 1914. 



RCtfCDT FOR MbZIOO 217 

Though ahnofii nouung is said of it in the jounult ol the 
United States, one learns in talldng with Meiieans eooeenied In the 
present struggle that there are in the air the genns d eontentkm In 
matters involving the Mexican priesthood. The revival In polities 
about two years ago of the defunct Clerical party is an ominous Indi- 
cation of this. It is somewhat difficult to get definite informatkm on 
the form which the matter Is likely to take, but enough Is upptmai 
to indicate that whoever Is eharged with the government of Meodeo 
during the next decade may expect to become involved in some serious 
church controversies. The people of the United States, espeeiaUy 
in view of the possibility of a similar development in the Philippines, 
if they have due regard for their domestic harmony, will strongly 
prefer to avoid the embarrassments of such controversiea. 

The problems of Mexico resulting from her past onfortunate 
history should be solved by Mexicans, who understand them and 
understand themselves; not by Anglo-Saxons, whose very blood 
makes it difiicult for them to understand the racial needs of Latin 
Americans. Mexico's problems are exceedingly complex. One of 
the most difficult, the agrarian problem, is one with which 
have had practially no experience in their present foreign 
It did not present itself in Cuba or Porto Rico, and exists in the 
Philippines in a very different form from the Mexican problem. Land 
in the Pliilippines, for the most part, is divided into very small hold- 
ings, and the problem of the Friar Lands was of a special and peculiar 
kind. The manner in which it was settled, however, though it may 
have been the best one for that particular case, which is open to ques- 
tion, is perhaps an indication that the American manner of attacking 
the Mexican land problem would be imidequate and unjust. Un- 
doubtedly much land in Mexico which appears to be legally held is 
morally open to confiscation. The Anglo-Saxon respect for technical 
property rights and horror of confiscatory methods are so great that 
American administrators, in obtaining land for the use of the peon, 
would probably saddle upon the country an unnecessary and unjust 
burden. It is safe to say that Mexico's land problem can be solved 
properly only by an internal revolution. 

The chances are great that it would take the United SUtes 
longer to bring even a temporary peace to Mexico than it will for the 
Constitutionalist foroes. 

The above reasons, except the last, apply especially to interven- 



218 TifE An'xaus o>" the American Academy 

tion for indetuiiU' occupation. To tliem should be adclocl ono which 
applies to intervention vnih the purpose of rejnaining only until 
peaceful elections can be held, and, like the objection based on the 
agrarian situation, to joint intervention as well as to action l)y the 
United States alone. Considering the pride and suspicion of the 
Mexican people, it is almost inconceivable that in an election presided 
over by foreigners or in the slightest degree under their supervision, 
the Mexican electorate would come to the polls in sufficient numbers 
to make the election representative of the will of the people. The 
result would probably be the choice of a president and congress who, 
even if not susceptible to the influence of scheming foreigners of the 
nationalities represented in the intervention, would lack the confidence 
of the nation. The logical thing to expect, after the withdrawal of 
the inter\'ening powers, would be a new revolution. 

The United States more than any other country has an interest 
in Mexico 's ultimate arrival at a peace established on solid founda- 
tions of social justice, and in her advance as a self-respecting nation. 
In this are involved its conmiercial and political relations not only with 
Mexico, but ^vith all Latin America as well. It may properly claim 
the right to judge, free from pressure from European nations, 
what policy will be most conducive to such a development, and to 
decide that there shall be intervention neither by itself nor by any 
other i)ower. The writer believes that a new basis should be found 
for the Monroe Doctrine in an understanding with the other coun- 
tries of this hemisphere. But, until such a basis is established, that 
doctrine, tacitly recognized by certain European powers as it has 
been, should not be thrown away. In the meantime, it can be given 
a new dignity by being invoked, if necessary, in the name of future 
peace and good will, to insure to Mexico the right of settling her diffi- 
culties without interference either American or European. 



THE SCOPE AND IJBOTB OF OUR 0BUGATI0N8 
TOWARD MEXICX) 

By L. 8. RowE. Ph.D., LL.D., 

Fntmmn of PoliUoU Science, 
UniYenity of Penneyh 



Any compreheiimve discussion of our relations with Mexieo 
involves two distiiict questions which, while closely rdated, should 
for the sake of olearness of Analysis be kept separate. 

There is, in the first place, the basic and fundamental problem 
involved in our relation to that section of the American continent of 
which Mexico forms a part; a relation so close and intimato that 
everything affecting its peace and welfare vitally affects our own 
national well-being. 

The concept of national sovereignty has undergone considerable 
cliange during the last century. It is true that our modem system of 
int^^mational law rests on the idea of national sovereignty. This 
principle marked a healthful reaction against the claims of universal 
dominion of the Holy Roman Empire. Useful as this principle has 
been in developing a respect for the rights of weaker states, the 
solidarity of interests of certain groups of nations of western civilisa- 
tion has begun to make serious inroads upon the traditional idea of 
sovereignty. The growth of the European concert, the int^^reats of 
certain temporary or permanent groupings, such as the Triple .\llianee 
and the Triple EIntente, all represent forces that have profoundly 
influenced and modified the doctrine of national sovereignty in Euro- 
pean affairs. 

Slowly, in many cases almost unconsciously, and in all cases 
wthout full recognition of the consequences iftvolvetl. rluuigra of a 
like nature* have lx»en taking place in international n*lations on the 
American continent. It is true that our national thought has not 
kept |>ace ^nth the aetual changes in intertuitional conditions, due 
to the fact that the foreign policy of the United States has been of a 
negative rather than of a positive character. We have been content 
>rith imiKisij' *?i prohibitions on Europe in her n*lations with the 

American cm Even in those cases in which tmr government 

has been compelled to formulate the nidiments of a positive American 

219 



230 TBI Annals of thb Aicbrican Academt 

(in the sense of a continental) policy, the new principles have been 
invoked for the purpose of re-enforcing the prohibitions on European 
states rather than because of the desire to develop a distinctive, con- 
structive American foreign policy. The establishment of a kind of 
trusteeship over San Domingan finances was justified by our govern- 
ment as the only way to avoid the dangers of European occupation 
and the consequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of 
resting our action in this case on a frank and positive assertion of a 
special national interest in everything affecting the stability, welfare 
and progress of the West Indies, irrespective of the attitude of the 
European countries, we took refuge behind the purely negative prin- 
ciple of the possible dangers involved in European aggression. 

The time has come when we must recognize that the doctrine of 
national self-protection includes far more than the Monroe Doctrine. 
As Dr. Patten has so well pointed out, the maintenance and improve- 
ment of the standard of living of the American workingman depend, 
in part, on an uninterrupted supply of tropical products from the 
West Indies and from Central America. The reduction of the price of 
meat, or at least the avoidance of an increasing cost, will depend in 
large measure uf)on the establishment and development of the cattle 
ranges of northern Mexico. Our great manufacturing interests look 
to an increasing extent to the vast mining resources of Mexico. 

In short, national economic interests of a basic character, affect- 
ing the welfare, the standard of life and the industrial prosperity of 
our country, are inextricably bound up with the political stability 
and the economic progress of Mexico, Central America and the 
West Indies. When we add to these fundamental economic and 
social interests, considerations of a strategic nature, the vital rela- 
tions of these sections of the American continent to the United States 
immediately become apparent. The acquisition of the Canal Zone 
has made of the United States a Central American as well as a North 
American power, and our national policy must hereafter be profoundly 
influenced by this change in our geographical relations. 

We are interested in the welfare of Mexico, of Central America 
and of the West Indies primarily because their stability and progress 
intimately affect the well-being of our own people, and we are 
interested in their attitude toward us because that attitude has a 
distinct bearing on our national safety. This essential solidarity 
of interests carries with it as a logical and inevitable consequence. 



Our Obuoations Toward Mixico 231 



a limitation on the freedom of action of all the partiei 
Approaching the quesiioD from the broadeet poeittile point ci wkiw, 
we are forced to the ooachMion that nalioiial iovereignty te limitad 
and modified by the larger inlerato of ocmliiieotal progreai. 

Approaching the situation eioluaively from the point ci view of 
the national self-protection of the United States, it is evident that, 
i r rcspee ti ve of any question of European interferanoe, we eannot 
remain indifferent to a condition of disorder or instability in any 
part of Central America, in Mexico or in the West Indies. There is, 
therefore, an aspect of the Mexican situation which must not be 
lost sight of and which will remain one of the most important in- 
tematiuual problems confronting the United States even aftor all 
pending questions with Mexico have been settled. 

The immediate problem with which we have to deal, however, 
and to which I am expected to address myself relates to the principles 
which should guide us in dealing \^ith the anarchical conditions now 
prevailing in certain sections of Mexico. 

Any discussion of our present relation to the Mexican situation, 
in order to be fruitful, must be undertaken in a constructive spirit 
and with a keen sense of the responsibilities involved. Mere destruc- 
tive criticism not only serves no useful purpose but adds to the diffi- 
culties of the administration in dealing with the situation. The 
purposes which the President has had in mind in the formulation of his 
Mexican policy are so lofty that they should only be modified or 
abandoned after it has been demonstrated that the ends which he has 
in view are unattainable. 

Before proceeding to an anal>'8is of the conditions now prevailing 
in Mexico, it is well to bear in mind that the present unrest in Blexieo 
is traceable to causes far deeper than the personal ambitions of petty 
local leaders. It is true that local politicians have taken advantafe 
of the feeling of unrest to stir up civil strife, but the reason for their 
success in fomenting revolutionary movements is traceable to the 
economic and social changes that have taken place in Meadoo during 
the hist thirty years. 

When President Dias assumed power he found the country in the 
most primitive state of economic organisation. The emphasis which 
he laid on the development of the natural resources of Bleiko, the 
improvement in transportation facilities, the development of the 
mince, the establishment of manufactures, all oontributed toward 



222 The Annals of the American Academy 

raising the standanl of life of a portion of the laboring population. 
This improvement, marked as it was, gave rise to a desire for further 
betterment, and created a feeling of discontent which soon found 
expression in secret political agitation. 

Amidst this forward movement for improvement, the condition 
of the agricultural laborer remained practically unchanged. He 
found himself tied to the soil, with but little opportunity to better 
his condition. The existence of great landed estates made it impossi- 
ble for him to look forward to securing a small piece of land, which he 
might call his own. Conscious of the improvement of the condition 
of the other classes of the laboring population, but seemingly cut off 
from all possibility of self-improvement, the discontent of the 
agricultural laborer added to the flame of political agitation. 

There is no doubt that Mexico is passing through the throes of a 
social re-adjustment, and that it is not possible to return to the condi- 
tions that prevailed during the administration of General Diaz. 
It is evident, however, that this re-adjustment cannot take place 
without a government worthy of the name. The present anarchical 
conditions prevailing in Mexico are the expression of a deep unrest, 
but Mexico cannot advance to a higher economic and social level 
unless there exists an authority sufficiently strong to command respect 
for person and property in all sections of the republic. 

Another factor which should not be lost sight of and which has 
contribute<l in no small measure toward bringing about the present 
situation, and which now enters as a complicating element, increasing 
the diflSculties in the way of a satisfactory solution, is the conflict of 
foreign interests which has been raging in Mexico during the last ten 
years. Those who have watched the course of Mexican affairs have 
been deeply impressed with the struggle for supremacy that has been 
waged between two groups of capitalists, represented, on the one hand 
by a great British s>Tidicate, and on the other by an American capi- 
talist with no less powerful affiliations. This struggle has been usually 
represented as involving nothing more than a scramble for oil con- 
cessions. As a matter of fact it goes far deeper, involving vast rail- 
road and agricultural interests. 

The struggle began when President Diaz, apprehensive of the 
domination of American capitalists, sought to coimter balance this 
influence by fostering other foreign interests. The nationalization of 
the great Mexican trunk lines, the construction of the Tehuantepec 



Our Obligatiunb Towaud Mkxicm 12S 

railroad by a Britiiih tyndieate, the granting of imporUai oU 
sions to Lord C^owdray and his anociatca were all intended to 
lirth and maintain a balance of power which would cheek tbe 
of the American group in governmental affairs. In other wunk, Dka 
first sought to develop the economic resources of the country by a 
liberal and even lavish treatment of American rapHaKati, and 
sought to curb ihoir power through the fostering of a BrttUi 
weight. It was this cliangc in the policy of General Dias which 
enabled Frandaoo Madero to count on the secret support of at leaal 
tome of the American companies interested in Mexico. It is 
ingly diilicult to estimate the precise effect of this struggle beti 
fori'ifni interests on the domestic situation, but every on 
that it enters as an important factor in explaining present conditioiia, 
and mu2it be reckoned with in the ultimate solution. 

It in evident, thert^fore, that while some of the element^} in the 
situation now confronting the United States are relatively simple, 
there are others so complex, and in some respects so elusive that any 
constructive suggestions should be offered, not in a spirit of dogmatic 
infjilliliility but rather as an attempt to throw some light on a per- 
plexing and dangerous situation. 

It would lx» difficult to find another instance in the histor}- of our 
country in which the real issues involved in a great national problem 
have been so befogged as in the discussion of the Mexican situation. 
If the • ' * iliat have obscured our vision simply led to temporary 
miscon , which, in the due course of time, would disappear, 

and enable us to see the situation in its true light, we might well 
patiently await this period of clearer vision. Unfortunately, howorer, 
the situation presses for early solution and upon a satisfactory sohttaon 
depend not only the peace of our country but also the well-being and 
l><)s.<ihly the independent national existence of sixteen millions of our 
neighbors. 

Whether our policy toward Mexico has been right or wrong, we 
must not close our eyes to the fact that it has aroused sorious opposi- 
tion in all classes of the Mexican population, whether living wHhiii 
the district under control of the government at Mexico City or in the 
territory occupicni by the insurgent forces. It has also aroused the 
opposition and rekindUni the distrust of the countries of Oentral and 
South America, and has served to bring together the E^iropean coun- 
tries in a combined determination to protect the interests of their 
citiiens in case the United States fails to do so. 



224 The Annals of the American Academy 

We find ourselves at the present moment in a condition of 
national isolation, unique in the history of the country, and which 
stands in marked and solemn contrast with the spirit of good will 
toward the United States which prevailed immediately prior to the 
meeting of the second conference at The Hague. With such vast 
spiritual and material interests at stake and with such consequences 
impending, it becomes a matter of patriotic duty, to make a careful 
and searching ^^examen de conscience** with a view to ascertaining not 
only whether we have adequately fulfilled our international obligations, 
but also whether the policy which we have pursued and are now pur- 
suing is in harmony with the best interests of our country. 

The most serious danger that we have had to face in connection 
with our recent policy toward Mexico is traceable to the fact that this 
policy rests on deduction from certain hypotheses rather than on 
the basis of fact and established principle. The President, in his 
solenm declaration of December 2, 1913, at a joint session of the 
two houses of Congress said: 

There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta 
has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all 
hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or 
dealt with by the government of the United States. We are the friends of 
constitutional government in America; we arc more than its friends, we are its 
champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish 
in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development 
in peace and liberty. Mexico has no government. 

There is something inspiring in the thought that the United 
States should become the sponsor and champion of constitutional 
government on the American continent; something which appeals to 
that spirit of service which is so deeply rooted in American national 
character. When, however, we stop to subject this policy, with all 
its implications, to careful analysb we are forced to the conclusion, first 
that it Lb unworkable in practice; secondly, that if the attempt is made 
to apply it, the results may be disastrous to the countries for whose 
benefit it is intended; thirdly, that it involves principles which will 
bring us into constant conflict with the republics of the American 
continent and will thus serve to undermine our influence in American 
affairs; and finally, that it means responsibilities which we neither are 
prepared to fulfill nor should be expected to undertake. 

We cannot hope to get at the basic and fundamental principles in 



OuB Obuqations Toward Mbxioo 

the diieimion of this question unleeB we an* Mc to i»wtmn<»tpt|ft 
•elves from the hypnotism of political catchwords, and squarely faos 
the facts of the situation, however unwelcome they may be. Many 
years before he was mentioned for the presldeney of the United States, 
Woodrow Wilson said: 

Self-flovemmeni ta not a thiDg that oao be "(iTon" to any psopU, 
it U a fonn of character aod oot a form of constitution. No people 
'*§JLY9n" the aelf-eootrol of maturity. Only a long appienticeahip of 
can secure them this precioua pneeeiilon. 



Between this profound political truth, so fellcitou«Iy 

principleB contained in President Wilson's message of Decem- 

13, there exists an inherent, fundamental, tragic eontradlctioo, 

ible in large measure for the difficulties which now confront 

Ud. 

Constitutional government does not mean any particular form of 
written instrument or any special form of governmental organisation. 
No matter how admirable the written instrument may be, it will 
remain a hollow form unless the political system for which it provides 
stands in direct and organic relation with the political training, the 
political capacity, the political traditions and the political antecedents 
of the people. If this close and intimate relationship does not exist, 
the pressure of forces far more potent than human desire or human 
ideals will M>on shape a political system which, however imperfect, 
will at least enjoy the advantage of being workable, and will be vital- 
ised by the strength that comes from the adaptation of political insti- 
tutions to national character and national needs. 

It was the misfortune of Mexico, in 1857, to adopt a constitution 
which was not, and is not today, in harmony either ^ith the political 
training or capacity of her people or with the primary requirements of 
h( r national development. The constitutional convention of 1857 
was made up of a group of political idealists, who labored under the 
illusion that a written constitution can create democratic conditiOM 
but failed to perceive the fundamental truth that writtod constitutioiis 
in order to be helpful, yes, even workable, must faithfully reflect the 
political capacity, the standard of civilisation and the eoooomic and 
social requirements of the mass of the nation. 

Instead of building up a constitutional system on the basis of 
these fundamental elements, the framers of the eooititution of 1857 



226 The Annals of the American Academy 

proceeded to deviae a nicely balanced scheme of government, moulded 
after the Constitution of the United States, adding thereto some of the 
more democratic features of the French constitution. Instead of 
recognizing the fact that the long period of anarchy and civil strife 
which characterized the history of the country between 1810 and 1857 
could only be brought to a close through a strong and highly cen- 
tralized national government, they attempted to provide a system 
under which the individual states would enjoy a measure of local 
autonomy almost, if not quite, as great as that enjoyed by the states 
of the American Union. Not only did the framers of the constitution 
ignore the manifest political needs of the country, but in their enthu- 
siasm for democratic institutions, they endeavored to build up a 
system based on universal suffrage in a country in which, at that time, 
95 per cent of the population were illiterate. 

The attempt to put the constitution of 1857 into operation served 
to perpetuate the condition of civil strife that had characterized 
the first four decades of national independence. The individual states 
not only lacked the financial resources for the building up of vigorous 
state institutions, but local politicians used their power for selfish 
personal purposes, which often took the form of aggression and open 
warfare against the self -constituted leaders of neighboring states. 
The result was that the period immediately after the taking effect of 
the constitution of 1857 is an unbroken record of local abuses, of 
sectional strife, and of a complete disregard of the personal and 
property rights of the inhabitants. 

Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on the part played by 
Porfirio Diaz in the development of Mexico, the historian of the 
future must at least give him credit for a clear perception of the fact 
that the constitution of 1857 was unworkable, that the only hope of 
preserving the national unity and national integrity of Mexico, and of 
giving to her a place in modem civilization was to bring about the 
unification of the country through the subordination of local political 
leaders to the national government, a process which involved the 
practical nullification of the constitution of 1857. 

These may be unwelcome facts, but it is not my present purpose 
to form any estimate of the rights and wrongs of Mexican political 
evolution, but rather to present the actual course of development; a 
development which shows clearly that the trend of constitutional 
growth and the conditions of constitutional government in Mexico 



Our OBUOATiovft Towaiid Mkxioo W7 

cannot be judged, if they are to bo laxrly 

which we are accustomed to apply in tht ::.-.. ,: 

unwilling we may be to accept the situation, it is nevertheleM a fact 
that the present oonstitutlon ci Mexioo is unworkable, and aqj 
attempt on the part of an outside power to force her to operate it is 
in reaUty condemning the country to the anarchical conditions wkiicb 
prevailed between 1857 and 1879. 

The serious student of Mexican civilisation can have no sympathy 
with the view that Mexico must have an arbitrary and tyrannical 
tral government, ruthless in its methods and unmmdf ul of the ; 
rights of the inhabitants. There is a wide difference between a 
strong, centralised, unified government and a tyrannical government. 
In fact, the real situation in Mexico is that the weaker the central 
government, the greater the sufTenng of the poor unprotected Indian 
because of the tyranny, the abuse and the corruption of local politi- 
cians and subordinate administrative officials. 

In any estimate of Mexican political conditions, it must alwajrs be 
borne in mind that we are dealing with a nation essentially Indian in 
its ethnic make-up, and in which the percentage of illiteracy, while 
not accurately determined, is probably in excess of 90 per cent. 
It is a mistake to suppose that the population is a turbulent one; on 
the contrary, there is probably no people of the American continent 
more easily governed, but there is also none more easily misled by 
vicious, corrupt and self-seeking local politicians. One of the most 
difficult problems with which President Diaz had to deal was to free 
the agricultural and mining laborers from the oppression and the 
t>Tanny of the state and local officials. It was a herculean task, in 
which he was but moderately successful, but the measure of sooosM 
which attended his efforts fully demonstrates where the primary 
requisities for political progress lay. 

The sentiments expressed by President Wilson in his messags of 
December 2, 1913, are dictated by a lofty idealism, but it is an kleafism 
which bean but little direct or organic rehition to the present needs 
and the present possibilities of Mexico. The intent, no doubt, was to 
formulate a policy helpful to Mexico, but when tested by the actual 
conditions of political life, the application of the constitutional 
standards formulated with such high purpose can have but one result, 
namely, to condemn the country to a prolonged period of anarehy, the 
outcome of which must be, either the oonqMt disappearance of 



228 Tgtb Annals or ths Amsbican Academy 

every vestige of civilization or the armed intervention of the United 
States to preserve the remnants which still exist. 

The untenableness of the position assumed by the government of 
the United States is clearly demonstrated by recent events in Haiti, 
and especially by the events in Peru. Whatever may be our judg- 
ment with reference to the rights and wrongs of the situation, it 
nevertheless remains a fact that the constitutional government of 
Peru was overthrown by a military conspiracy, to which, fortunately, 
our government did not attempt to apply the principle of constitu- 
tional sponsorship which is being applied to Mexico. The fact that 
the participants in this conspiracy base their action on the desire to 
prevent unconstitutional acts by the president of Peru does not alter 
the situation so far as the United States is concerned. 

The attempt to set the standards to which the governmental 
organization and governmental procedure of a foreign country should 
conform must arouse the grave concern of every one interested in 
preserving the best traditions of American policy. The moment we 
go beyond our manifest right in requiring that the lives and property 
of our own citizens in foreign countries shall be duly safeguarded, we 
not only depart from the accepted principles of international law but 
onbark without chart or compass upon waters so troubled that we 
run the risk of bringing disaster upon ourselves and disaster no less 
certain upon the peoples whom we are trying to serve. When we 
endeavor to dictate the conditions or terms of political activity in any 
foreign country, even a country toward which we occupy so excep- 
tional a position as Mexico, we are arrogating to ourselves a power 
which cannot help but arouse resentment and we are attempting 
something for which we are peculiarly unfitted. 

If the history of the last hundred years teaches any one lesson it is 
that we can best perform our mission on the American continent by 
the force of our example rather than by attempted interference in 
the internal affairs of our neighbors. A high regard for the sanctity 
of all our international obligations, and a firm resolve to promote 
the ends of social justice in our internal affairs will exert an influence 
on all the other republics of the American continent far deeper 
and far more lasting than any attempt to dictate to them the stand- 
ards according to which their governments shall be organized and 
administered. 

While the precise form of political organization which should 



OuB OBuaATiONB TowABD Mbxioo 230 

hannony with the training and capacity of the people, tlwre ara 
certain fundamental requisitee of civiliiation indiepeneable to every 
country, no matter what ite form of govenmient Unleee life ia 
protected, unle« the fundamental peraonal righto are eeeore and unlrei 
adequate protection b given to property, civilitatioo inevitably 
disappears. We have a real national interest in preasrving tbcee 
fundamental requisites of civilisation in every part of the American 
continent, and this interest rises to the dignity of a national responsi- 
bility in countries toward which we occupy such an exceptional rela- 
tionship as that wliich existo between Mexico and the United States. 
The fact that Mexico is our neighbor, that over twenty thousand 
American oitisens are resident in the republic, and that vast American 
interesto amounting to over a billion dollars are at stales, place the 
country in a position totally different from that of any of the countries 
of South America. Everything that affecto the peace, the welfare 
and the progress of Mexico is of interest to the United States. We ean 
no more remain indifferent to the continued existence of disorder and 
anarchy in Mexico than we could have remained indifferent to those 
conditions when they existed in Cuba. The primary conditions of 
national self-protection, the fulfillment of our national obligations to 
Americans resident in Mexico, the performance of our duty in pro- 
tecting the vast interests which our citizens have at stake in that 
country, and, finally, our larger obligations to the interesto of western 
civilisation, make it incumbent upon us to do everything in our power 
to preserve the primary requisites for the continued existence and 
development of this civilization. The relationship is not a personal 
one between the President of the United Stotes and the President of 
Mexico, but involves the present and future welfare of sixteen millions 
of Mexicans as well as the heavy responsibilities which we have 
assumed for the lives and properties of our own citizens and the eiti- 
sens of other foreign countries resident in Mexico. 

Although we cannot insist upon any particular type of constitu- 
tional government in Mexico, it is our manifest duty to insist on the 
re-establishment of order, and to do everything consistent with a 
respect for Mexican dignity and sovereignty to contribute toward 
that end. It is a significant fact that at every period in our own hia- 
tory at which there has been a clash between constitutional govern- 
ment and the maintenance of order, constitutional goverament has 
always given way. The annals of our country between 1860 and 1871 



280 Thb Annalb op the American Academy 

obtain in any country must, in order to be effective, be in close 
brisUe with illustrations of this fact. Are we then justified in insisting 
upon the application of political principles in a foreign country which 
we have not obeerved in our own? May we, in justice to ourselves 
and to Mexico, insist on conditions that condemn that country to 
anarchy, threaten it with disruption and jeopardize the very existence 
of civilised life? 

However widely we may differ as to the proper course to be pur- 
sued in the present emergency, it is clear that the President's policy 
has not only thus far failed of its purpose to bring about the re^stab- 
liahment of constitutional government in Mexico, but has produced 
results opposite of what was intended. The arraignment of Gen- 
eral Huerta contained in President Wilson's message of December 
2, 1913, brought to Huerta's support elements of the Mexican 
population that were at first bitterly opposed to him; it aroused for 
him the sympathy of many of the republics of Central and South 
America, and gave to him an international prestige which he could 
not otherwise have attained. 

The discussion of the principles that have guided the authorities 
in Washington in the adjustment of our relations with Mexico should 
be approached in a spirit of helpful cooperation. It is of little value 
to discuss what might have happened if a different policy had been 
pursued. In fact, in the present situation, such criticism is likely to 
do more harm than good. On the other hand, constructive sugges- 
tions may be of real value in furnishing the basis for public discussion, 
and in contributing toward the formation of an enlightened public 
opinion. 

Through a misconception of the elements involved in the present 
situation, the violent nature of some of the attacks on President 
Wilson's policy and the partisan nature of others have created 
the impression that the first step toward any change in our policy 
more favorable to the constituted authorities at Mexico City 
involves the formal recognition of the Huerta government. As a 
matter of fact, we have been in constant official relations with the 
Huerta government through our charg6 d'affaires in Mexico City. 
These conmiunications have dealt not only with matters affecting the 
present revolution, but have covered a wide range of subjects in no 
way related thereto. The refusal to give immediate recognition to 
the Huerta government does not violate the traditions of American 



Oi?u Ohlkjatiovh TowAito Mexico 231 



Nearly two yean elapacd bctweea the MWimptJon of 
y President Dias (November 28, 1870) and the formal reeog^ 
nition of hb government (Mayi 1878). 

therefore, the Proeident need not revcnu hie poUqr wilb 
withholding recognition, the present ettuetioii ^I^w«f4y 
that the first step in a constructive, positive policy toward Btodeo 
is the removal of the international boycott and financial blockade 
which the United States has instituted against the Huerta govem- 
imni. This boycott is a serious departure from the best tradi- 
\merican foreign policy and amounts to a qntemalie 
a the part of the government of the United States 
to overthrow the constituted authorities of a sister state. It 
is an open secret that foreign governments have been notified 
that the United States will regard it as an unfriendly act if they or 
their bankers advance money to the Huerta government, and it is an 
equally well known fact that when the fiscal agents of the Uuerta 
government entered into negotiations with European bankers for 
the floating of loans, these banks were notified by their raq)ective 
governments that the United States was opposed to any such advanoea. 
It is this boycott rather than the withholding of formal reeognitkm 
which b weakening the Huerta government, and which is contributing 
toward intensifying the condition of anarchy in Mexico. 

The events of the past few months have shown that the govern- 
ment at Mexico City is one that poseesses at least some of the elements 
of national and international responsibility, and it becomea, therefore, 
our solemn duty to refrain from a policy calculated to eripple the 
only authority worthy of the name. Unless we are prepared to take 
this position, we must assume the responsibility for the condition of 
anarchy to which we condenm the country. 

With the removal of the international boycott as the first step 
in a constructive foreign policy, the next step will be the leisUbliah- 
ment of the embargo on the exportation of arms and ammnwition, 
authorized by congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, established 
by President Taft by proclamation of the same date, and revoked by 
President Wilson on the third of February, 1014. [Since reft st a b - 
lished. EDrroR.] It is true that the congressional resolution goes 
beyond the strict requirements of our neutral obli^tiona, but It seta 
an example to the world of the desirability of placing theae neutral 
obligations on a distinctly higher plane. In a recent report on the 



232 TBI Annals of thb American Academt 

neutrality laws of the United States prepared under the auspices of 
the Carnegje Peace EIndowment, Dr. Fenwick, in conunenting on 
the congressional resolution of March 14, 1912, said: 

This eoDditional restriction of the moet important contraband trade may 
appear at first sight contrary to the rule of international law that neutral 
states are under no international obligation to restrict ordinary commerce in 
contraband on the part of their citizens. But .... a belligerent, whose 
territory borders upon that of a neutral, might, by storing supplies in a neutral 
town on the frontier and drawing upon them at will, practically convert the 
neutral town into a base of operations for its armies. In other words, the fact 
that the neutral and belligerent countries are contiguous may create such 
ehanfed conditions as to overrule the application of the principle of the freedom 
of contraband trade. 

If these principles are applicable to cases in which the United 
States occupies the position of a neutral toward two belligerents, the 
neoMBity for their application becomes more urgent when we are 
dealing with insurgents whose belligerency we have not recognized. 
The fact that this embargo strengthened the hands of the constituted 
government, made it possible for us to contribute within the measure 
of our power toward the maintenance of a united Mexico. The 
lifting of the embargo, through President Wilson's proclamation of 
February 3, 1914, has served to strengthen the insurgent movement, 
and has practically made our southern frontier a base of operations 
against the constituted government of Mexico. We are thus contrib- 
uting not only to the perpetuation of a condition of anarchy, but to the 
actual disruption of the country. 

The United States is interested in an orderly, a united, a progres- 
sive Mexico, and must carefully avoid any action that may lead to 
the disruption of that country. Any attempt, therefore, at a solution 
of the problem on the basis mentioned must carry with it due notice 
to the insurgents that the embargo will again be placed on the expor- 
tation of arms and ammunition, and that the United States will see 
to it that the Texas frontier shall no longer serve as a base of operations 
for the insurgent forces. 

There has been much talk within recent months of a secession of 
the northern states of Mexico, and the formation of a separate republic. 
If such a disruption of the country does occur, the United States will 
have to bear part of the responsibility for this calamity. The forma- 
tion of such a northern republic would be but the beginning of a series 



OxTB Obligations Toward Mexico 

of intrigues between disoootented elements in that seelioo of the 
country and the people of Texas, which wouJd probably end in a 
movement for annention. Such annexation would not serve any 
real national purpose, and would mean a grave wrong to the people 
of Mexico. 

The modification of our Mexican policy to the extent above out- 
lined will pave the way for further oonstructive measures for the 
solution of the preeent difficulties. We can then raise the Mexican 
situation to the dignity of a continental question by securing the 
cooperation of the leading powers of South America, namely the 
Argentine, Brasil and Chile, in the form of an offer of joint mediation 
coupled ^ith friendly representations indicating the n e eee sity of a 
termination of the conflict in Mexico, and the desirability of an agree- 
ment upon a third person, acceptable both to the Constitutionalists 
and to the constituted government to assume the provisional presi- 
dency pending the calling of a new election. It is hopeless, however, 
to attempt to secure such cooperation until the United States recedes 
from, or at least modifies its present purely negative attitude toward 
the Huerta government. 

Although it is desirable that mediation be raised to the dignity 
of a continental question by the united action of the leading American 
powers, there is no reason why such mediation should not have the 
support of the European governments. Such support would be in 
entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. Joint action with the 
European powers becomes dangerous when it takes the form of joint 
armed intervention. Such intervention would involve the United 
States in endless controversies with European powers, and might ulti- 
mately lead to armed conflict. The joint intervention of the Euro- 
pean powers in Mexico in 1861 demonstrates the worthlessness of 
any agreements as to the scope and limits of such intervention. On 
the other hand, we must not forget that the combined investment of 
European capital in Mexico is second in importance only to that of the 
United Statee. The most accurate calculation indicates that the 
sum total of foreign investments is as follows: 

American. . . tl.0S7,775.0n0 

Engliah 82l.30*'.8no 

French 143.446.000 

Other foreigo natioiis. . 1 18,535.380 



234 The Annals of the American Academy 

The pwfient situation has become intolerable, and it is evident 
that it must soon be brought to a close or armed intervention will 
become inevitable. As was recently said by the London Spectator: 

Mr. Wilson has become the sport of events This terrible state of 

affaire is the result of the primary error of supposing; that you can dictate to a 
proud and independent country, and at the same time respect its independence. 
The excellence of his motives remains unquestionable among the havoc of 

anarchy which they have created A policy, however, must be 

judged by its effects, not by its motives Wilson tried to dictate to 

Huerta while pretending that Mexico was a free and independent country. 

The country owes a deep debt of gratitude to President Wilson 
for the determined stand that he has taken against armed interven- 
tion. The sacrifice of life and of treasure which such intervention 
would involve, and the heavy responsibilities which would be placed 
upon us for many years to come, make it a matter of vital importance 
to exhaust every possible means to avoid such a calamity. 

The support which the people of the country will give to a 
policy of non-intervention makes it all the more important that 
we should adopt a positive, constructive policy. No matter how 
strongly the President may be opposed to armed intervention, 
the present anarchical conditions in Mexico must be brought to a 
close or conditions will arise which will make armed intervention 
inevitable. There is a logic of events far more irresistible and far 
more compelling than the logic of the human mind. Unless, therefore, 
our Mexican policy is adjusted to the re-establishment of order within 
the republic we will soon find responsibilities thrust upon us which we 
will be compelled, however reluctantly, to assume. 

For my own part I firmly believe that we involve ourselves in 
hopeless diflScuIties when we embark upon an international policy 
which attempts to dictate who shall or who shall not be the governing 
authorities in a neighboring but independent country. Our attitude 
toward the republics of the American continent should be inspired 
by a desire to be of service to them, whenever possible, but we should 
studiously refrain from interference in their internal affairs, unless 
such interference is dictated by overwhelming considerations of 
national interest or international obligation. We may well recognize 
once and for all time that our government can do but little to accelerate 
the development of democracy in any foreign country, and that in 
attempting to do so we are likely to do quite as much harm as good. 



Our Obuoations Towabd Mbxico 



The United States must permit the ooimtiiet of tha Amerloaa eontl- 
ncnt to work out their political dcatiniei in their own way, '^onftdent of 
the fact that as the misnni of their population advance in odtratjoo^ 
in economic power and sodal efficiency, the democratic derelopneBi 
in which we are so deeply faiterested will prooeed, slowly it b true, bitl 
productive of permanent results. Any attempt on our part to foree 
upon them either our standards of conduct or our methods of political 
action will only serve to arouse their bitter opposition, and thus thwart 
any higher purpose that we may have in view. 



NoTB. Thif paper wm read at a noMting of the Academy, April 4, 1914. 



AMERICAN CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 

By Robert J. Kerr, 
Chicago. 

The period of civil strife through which our neighbor on the 
south is passing has presented for solution by the American govern- 
ment many important problems. The Monroe Doctrine is involved 
and through it a number of questions affecting citizens and subjects 
of European nations and our own relations with their respective 
governments have come up for decision. The sovereignty of Mexico 
b at stake. The justice, propriety and expediency of declarations 
by the United States as to matters lying purely within the scope 
of the internal politics of Mexico are both upheld and denied. In- 
deed our government has been charged with having openly favored 
one faction in Mexican politics as against another, with having 
assumed a partisan attitude and having maintained such a position 
in spite of the manifest dangers of complications which might seri- 
ously embarrass our government and affect the privileges and rights 
of its citizens. 

In all the discussion that has ensued since the authorities at 
Washington decided not to recognize the government of General 
Victoriano Huerta, with all the consideration that has evidently 
been given by our statesmen to other phases of the problem, it is 
most strange that the rights of one class of American citizens have 
been persistently ignored by our government and have apparently 
not been considered by the American public. 

The fifty thousand American citizens who, before the conflict 
began in 1910, were living in various parts of Mexico, have been 
vitally concerned in the crisis, not only because, by their nearness 
to the scene of disorder and war, they have been the first to suffer, 
but what is far more important because minunderstandings and 
doubts have arisen as to their rights as American citizens. 

Almost at the outset of the first revolution early in the year 1911 
the President of the United States issued a proclamation directing 
American citizens resident in Mexico to return to the United States, 
abandoning their homes, factories, banks, shops and other enter- 



Amxbican CmoNs m FommiaN Cooirnuai 

prises and leaving their interests subject to the oapriees id the 
tending factions in Mexican politics or at the mercy of the hordes of 
bandits who ahnost immediately began to ply their old trade of 
highway robbery so long su p p r essed under the benefieent regime of 
Porfirio Dias. This proclamation and the principles or rules dsrhr- 
able therefromi defining the rights of American dtisens in similar 
oiroumstanoss, rsoeived the apparent endoiMment of the present 
administration at Washington, because an exactly similar proda* 
mation was issued in the summer of 1013. 

Aroused to eonsider the limits and restrictions, as well as the 
privileges of their status as American citizens resident in a foreign 
country, by the promulgation of these two prodamations, the mem- 
bers of the American colony throughout Mexico sought to obtain 
from their government a definite, dear-cut and comprehensive stato* 
ment on which they could rely in their future relations as residents 
in a foreign country. Actuated by motives of the highest patriot- 
ism, with the desire of informing their government as to the real 
oonditions in Mexico, many of the prominent members of the colony 
offered to give to the government the benefit of their years of acquaint- 
ance with Mexico and Mexicans. How were these offers reodved? 
In every case the first question asked of the American so prof- 
fering his testimony was as to whether or not he had material in- 
terests in Mexico. Naturally in every case the reply was, certainly, 
the witness had there his home, his business, his friends and his 
family. In every case the fact of such material interest was con- 
sidered by government offidals as an absolute disqualification of 
the witness and he was refused an opportunity to testify. Ordina- 
rily the rules of evidence are leas strictly applied by administrativo 
than by judicial officers, but no court would be worthy of respect 
which would refuse to accept the testimony of a witness simply 
because he might be interested in the subject matter under co nside P ' 
ation by the court. 

Not only has the testimony of individual Americans been thus 
refused time and time again by officials of the United States govern- 
ment, but duly constituted committees representing large bodies 
of American dtiiens have been denied an audience by repr es en tatives 
of their government solely on the ground that they were interested 
materially in Mexico and therefore were absolutdy disqualified to 
testify as to the things which th^ of all men might be eipacted best 



238 Tbb Annals op thb American Academy 

to understand by reason of their very residence among the Mexican 
people. 

The foregoing statements outline the attitude of the United 
States government toward its citizens in foreign countries as indi- 
cated by its acts during the past three years with reference to Ameri- 
cans in Mexico. Apparently the position of the government is 
founded on three propositions: First, Americans who go to a foreign 
country go primarily to further their own selfish concerns; second, 
being prejudiced by selfish interests the opinions of such Americans 
are warped and not entitled to respect or consideration; and third, 
if an American goes to a foreign country, he must be considered as 
having understood and assumed all the risks of residence in such 
country' and must by the very fact of his expatriation be held to 
have waived all claim for consideration and protection as an Ameri- 
can citizen. 

These propositions present to Americans resident in foreign 
countries, to their friends at home who are interested in their safety 
and welfare, and to all American citizens at home and abroad who 
prize their citizenship and love their country, a most astounding 
situation. Are these propositions supported by the facts and 
should the conclusion reached by the American government be 
approved by the American people? 

At the very outset of the discussion one fact should be clearly 
understood and fully appreciated. Whatever may have been the 
fact in years past, it is most emphatically true today that Americans 
in Mexico (and the same is true of every other civilized country 
where American citizens have gone in the legitimate pursuit of com- 
merce, trade and business) are not ticket-of -leave men, fly-by-nights, 
criminals and scapegoats, but, on the contrary, they comprise among 
their numbers men in every profession, trade and line of industry, 
to claim fellow-citizenship with whom would confer an honor on the 
best citizens who remain within the geographical confines of their 
country. Nor are these men in their self-expatriation actuated 
solely by the desire to "get rich quick," to make their fortunes in a 
foreign land because conditions there may be more propitious than 
in their own country. Modem business is most complex. It is 
impossible to say at what point the beneficent influence upon the 
well-being of all the people, flowing from the activities of a great 
commercial enterprise ceases, even when that point is far beyond 



AumoAN Cmms oi Pokbion Couimni 230 



the geographical limiU of the oountry. The humble elerk who 
fai the distribution of American foods at aome remote eorner d the 
earth ia contributing his small share toward the payment of the wtfee 
of the men who manufactured the goods, who, in turn, by ■p^»»^nf 
their wages in the markets of the mother oountry, extend to thou- 
sands of others not connected with the industry or enterprise which 
elaims the servioes of the clerk, shipping agent or salesman in a 
foreign land, a participation in the benefits realised from the woric 
of the far-away American living under a foreign flag. Even though 
the influence of the single individual may be small, in the aggregate 
the efforts of fifty thousand Americans engaged in legithnate pur- 
suits in a foreign land may make all the difference between proa* 
perity and depression in the mother country, so delicate is tlie 
structure of our modem commerce. 

It is absurd to suppose that the men who are chosen by the 
executive heads of great business corporations to take charge of 
thttr foreign oflSoes, that the lawyers, doctors and engineers w1m> 
serve their American clients in foreign countries, that the men who 
in subordinate positions comprise part of the great army of Ameri- 
cans in foreign countries are any less worthy of credence than men 
of the same class and station who remain in their native land. In 
fact, where, as in the consideration of the Mexican problem, it 
becomes necessary to understand and interpret the motives and 
actions of a people of another race with different ideals and different 
habits of thought, such men as these Americans of all classes ought 
to be especially qualified to report on conditions in the countiy where 
they have lived and worked, many of them for a quarter of a century. 

Unfortunately there are too many of the stay-at-home Ameri- 
cans who passively accept the third proposition announced by the 
American government as correct. It seems very easy for many 
to say that the Americans who go to a foreign country must take 
their chances and fight their own battles. If this attitude were 
the result of a serious consideration of the various elements enter- 
hug into the problem, it would be alarming indeed as mdicating a 
decadence of that spirit of loyalty and patriotism whieh aehieved 
independence, preeerved the union and now has welded the ele- 
ments of American dtiaenship into a powerful force for the advance- 
ment of civilisation, peace and prosperity throughout the world. 
It must, however, be assumed that the American living a protected 



240 Ths Annals of the American Academy 

life in the midst of the highest civilization the world has ever known, 
guarded on all sides by the watchful agents of his government, has 
given no thought whatsoever to the problems of his fellow citizen 
living in the midst of foreigners and without those influences and 
agencies which surround the citizen in his home land. It must 
be not callousness but carelessness that is responsible for the failure 
of the voice of public opinion to make itself heard when an American 
citizen comes to grief in a foreign country. Surely the ties of blood, 
interest and nationality are as strong with us as they are with our 
British cousins and yet what a different sight is seen in England 
when a British subject is menaced or harmed ! Press and public 
unite in demanding that the person or nation guilty of treating with 
disrespect any Englishman, however humble, be forthwith called 
to account by the officers of the British crown who are the represen- 
tatives of British sovereignty at home and abroad. It is because of 
this intense feeling of nationality that the British people have been 
able to extend their influence into remote corners of the earth and 
that Englishmen have been found for more than a century living 
the typical life of English gentlemen in the deserts of Africa, the 
jungles of Ceylon and the mountains of Mexico. 

No patriotic American could wish to see his country's flag 
capitalized for merely mercenary profits by reckless promoters. 
Any illegitimate attempt to secure or maintain an improper com- 
mercial or legal advantage by claiming American citizenship and 
the protection that might be afforded on that account by the Ameri- 
can government would be justly condemned by every patriotic 
American, but if we are to acquire and preserve the right ideals of 
American citizenship, there must be inculcated into the minds of 
all Americans, and particularly those of the great stay-at-home class, 
the conviction that American citizenship must be made to be a vital 
and valuable right and that the man who is so fortunate as to be 
able to claim that citizenship may count on the moral, political and, 
in the last analysis, military support and protection of his fellow 
cttizens and of his government. 

This conception of the significance of citizenship is not by any 
means new. The supreme court of the United States, in the cele- 
brated slaughter house cases, in a discussion of the rights involved 
in American citizenship, announced that it is one privilege of an 
American citizen to be protected in his person, life and property 



AiamcAN CirmafB ut VommoM Cornfrnxii 941 

in other words, the decUnUioo UmU 

le, liberty and the pumiit of heppineei, 

applies not only to all men who stay within the geogra|ihieal limits 

ir own country , but also to all men of that country wherever 

inay go. 
As if foreeeeing that this question might shortly come to be a 
vital issue, the Demooralto pai^, the suooessful party at the last 
general election held bk the United States, incorporated into ita 
platform a principle substantially identical with the decUration of 
the supreme court cited above. Theoretically, the administratkm 
at Washfagton is committed to the maintenance and support of the 
idea that American citisenship is a sacred right to be guarded and 

ted at home and abroad. Practically, from the viewpoint of 

ousands of American citizens who are now living away from the 
home land, that principle, that ideal has not only not been obeerved 
but has apparently been enturely abrogated. This viewpoint has 
been illustrated by a paraphrase written by an American in Mexico 
of Kipling's well-known poem, ''The Vampire," which bears on a 
story published in one of the recent magazines portra>ing the experi- 
ence of a family of three, father, mother and son, in Mexico during 
the recent disturbances: 

Two fools there were and their son they taught— 

(Even as you and I) 
That for their honor their Country fought — 

(But it wasn't the least what their country thought) 
Though the fools, in trouble, their Consul sought 
• (Even as you and I). 

But it's not the thought of what time has brought 

That stings like a white hot brand— 
It's coming to know that our Country don't care 

f And what have we done that she should not care?) 
And will not understand! 

Without considering at all the tremendous loes of prestige 
throughout Latin America, which has been suffered by the United 
States during the past three years, the loss of prestige experienced 
by individual Americans as a result of the known attitude of our 
government toward them, has been incalculable. Perhaps, though, 
this crisis may have been necessary in order to bring to the fore this 



242 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

very question, to rouse the American people and the American govern- 
ment to a proper realization of the seriousness of the subject. 

Americans in Mexico have suffered long and patiently through 
the trying experiences of the past three years and in spite of repeated 
disappointments their spirits are still buoyed up by the conviction 
that sometime, somehow, the American public will come to under- 
stand their vie\iT)oint and when once there is a general appreciation 
of the true situation, the ninety million inhabitants of the United 
States will be found to have just as keen sympathies, just as patri- 
otic devotion as inspired our forefathers to meet other crises and 
solve other problems in the past; and they will demand that their 
government, which protects them in the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
shall also protect all of their fellow citizens everywhere and shall 
compel every nation throughout the world to extend to American 
citizens the fullest protections and guaranties and shall require the 
effective punishment of any individual or body of men who unjustly 
bring harm to an American citizen. 



FACTORS AFFECTINO THE POUCY OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE PACIFIC* 

Bt RsAR-ADMiRikL C. H. Stockton, U.8.N., 
WMhiogion, D. C. 

The topic of the afternoon is "The Policy of the United Statee 
in the Pacific." I think I am quite safe in saying from a govern- 
mental point of view that there is no policy of the United States in 
the Pacific at the present time so far as the general government is 
concerned. And how could it be so with a lack of continuity in the 
state department, even when it b carried on under the same party 
but with different participants, a break occurring in the continuity 
with a change of party, and an absolute lack of continuity in the 
diplomatic service in the high grades? Mr. Grahame spoke at this 
morning's session of subordinates who realize that the moment they 
attain sufficient distinction to be promoted they will be quickly 
removed. There is an approaching lack of continuity, I am afraid* 
in the consular service. Consequently, the phenomenon of the 
enunciation of what will be the policy of the United States in the 
Pacific is here entrusted to hands that have no official standing eo 
far as creating that policy, but who will give you their own views as 
to what it should be. Certainly something constructive should be 
gained from such enunciations. 

There are curious points in connection with the Pacific. The 
oldest state of California is only three score years and ten of age. 
The other states are newer still. Alaska with its rich material Is 
simply approaching middle age. What is known as the slope of the 
Pacific, bordering on the Pacific Ocean, is practically the largest 
territory— in fact, the only home territory of any great power eioepl 
that of Japan, and yet it has been isolated on account of its want d 
direct water communication with us and with Europe. I doubt 
whether in any Pacific port of the United States there is a line of 
steamers direct from Europe carrying psBsnngeni and Mgbt. To 
an extent, the result has been that we have created a ouasiwiae 

*RemArkfl m presiding officer at the eeaiion of the Academy, Satordaj 
afternoon, April 4, 1914. 



244 Tbx Annals op the American Academy 

traffic on the Pacific coast which embraces practically all of the 
American mercantile marine of any value that we have, the only 
exception probably being the antiquated American Line running from 
New York to Southampton. The coastwise traffic and ships, as 
understood in the United States, are vastly different from those of 
any other country in the world. Others consider it to mean a con- 
tinuous coastal traffic without any intermediate stops in foreign 
territory. 

In the United States we first created our interco£istal traffic 
by the use of the Isthmus of Panama. We enlarged it by the use 
of Cape Horn and it has been further enlarged by the use of the 
Hawaiian Islands, and still further by the Philippines, so that practi- 
cally the Pacific Mail Steamship Company carries coastwise traffic 
from San Francisco to Manila with incidental stops in China and 
Japan. Consequently, the comprehensive term of coastwise traffic 
all that we have. 



THE POUCY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
PACIFIC 

Br Ellert C. Stowkll, Ph.D.^ 

AabtABt ProfoMor of InternatlooAl Law, 
Columbi* UniTertity. 

What I have to say about our policy in the Pacific is baaed en- 
tirely upon considerations of our material interests. I do not lose 
sight for one moment of the importance of the so-called higher mo- 
tives. They, however, are often only the emanations of material 
interests; in any event they are so elusive as to escape accurate 
analysis and must be left to the treatment of speculative writers. 

The choice of a wise policy is hardly more important than the 
faithful and continued adherence to it when once decided upon. In 
the competition of great powers today, prestige is a very important 
factor, and vacillation in a country 's foreign policy is most disastrous 
to its prestige. 

Before we can formulate the policy of the United States in the 
Pacific we must ask ourselves what are our material needs and inter- 
ests. What are we after? Do we want an outlet for emigration? 
No. Do we want land? Emphatically no. We want to make 
money; that is, we want to develop our trade with the countriae 
bordering on the Pacific. We want to share in the prestige and the 
pecuniary advantages to be derived from helping in the industrial 
development of China. We are looking for a remunerative field for 
the investment of our surplus capital and a market for our maufao- 
tures, besides opportunities for our technical experts. All these 
advantages, in addition to what we shall gain from a larger importation 
of Chinese commodities, are our aims in the Pacific. 

Of all regions in the world, China offers the greatest possibiiiues 
in this field. China is the key of the whole political situatioD in the 
Pacific. She is one of the principal factors in shaping the world 
policies of the great powers; and their efforts to secure commeretal 
advantages have caused the keenest rivalry among thsm. The 
simplest method for a power to benefit conmiercially from a country 
is to secure its political control and manipulate its governmental 

345 



946 Tbb Annals of the American Academy 

machinery so as to constitute a virtual monopoly of its trade and 
industrial development. This is the method which China's neigh- 
bors, Japan and Russia, have pursued in acquiring control of Man- 
churia and Mongolia. France has established herself to the south 
in Indo-China. Germany holds Kiao-Chau and looks upon the 
province of Shantung as accessory to that port. Great Britain has 
Hong Kong and claims a primary interest in the valley of the Yang- 
tse in the event of a breakup of the Chinese empire. The United 
States alone of the great powers of the earth has had no territorial 
ambitions in China, nor sought to acquire the political control of one 
foot of Chinese soil. Our traditions and our economic situation have 
opposed such an attempt. We are well situated for carrying on our 
commerce across the sea and enjoy a high degree of civilization and 
industrial development. We have no need, therefore, of privileges 
or preferential treatment to secure our share in the commercial advan- 
tages offered by China. Hence we are opposed to the policy of par- 
tition or establishment of spheres of influence. We demand^a field 
free for all. This is the policy of the open door, the maintenance of 
which we consider so unportant that we are ready to support it, if 
necessary, by force. 

Now since the principal purpose of any new acquisition of Chinese 
territory would be commercial advantage, this policy of the open door 
has acted as a barrier to any such attempt. For what country would 
make the sacrifices to secure the control of territory, the opening up 
of which might bring no greater benefit to herself than to the other 
powers? 

The consequence of this attitude of the United States is to secure 
us the sympathy of China, for she realizes the fundamental importance 
of our policy of the open door in helping her to preserve her political 
integrity and autonomy. The resulting confidence and friendship 
between the two governments is an everpresent — almost a controlling 
factor — in the actual diplomacy of the Far East. 

So much for the positive side of our policy in the Pacific. But 
what are our apprehensions? What dangers do we foresee? We 
fear the competition of the Asiatic coolie. Those regions exposed to 
Chinese and Jap>anese immigration are united in considering the policy 
of exclusion a vital necessity. For the American laborer cannot meet 
the unrestricted competition of the Chinese coolie. The policy of 
the United States government based on popular approval must and 



POUCT OP UlfTTBD STATES IN TBB PaOFSC 247 

" \ elude Chineae and Japanste laborers, even should Uits poliqr 
>war. But just as a corollary of our policy of the open door w a s 
found to be our friendship with China, so our policy of exclusion unites 
us in i^rmpathy with Canada and Australia, no less determined than 
we, to protect themselves from Asiatic immigration. Having here a 
permanent basis for the maintenance of a common policy, we should 
endeavor to eliminate, in a spirit of mutual compromise, all minor 
grounds of difference. Canada and Australia, loyal as th&y are to 
the mother country, would throw over their allegianoe rather than 
open their gates to Chinese immigration. 

In the long years of our diplomntic relations with China, this 
question of exclusion has caused no little irritation. But now that we 
are determined to adhere to this policy, distasteful as it is to China, 
she takes into account the friendly diplomatic support our government 
has afforded her, and accepts the matter as no longer open to dis- 
cussion. All China now asks is the admission of her merchants and 
students, and from this only advantage can result. Years henee 
when the Chinese government becomes more dependent upon popular 
demands, her laboring classes may force a policy of active opposition 
to their exclusion from other lands. 

But China is not the only countr>' affected by our policy of ex- 
clusion. There is the Japanese empire, which, however, has not the 
compensations which China finds elsewhere in our support of her 
policy. Quite the contrary. Japan finds us in her path at every 
turn. She might not object so seriously to our advocac>' of the open 
door, provided the application were not made to Manchuria, which 
she holds by cession of Russia's twenty-five year lease, expiring in 
1023. The fear that the United States will encourage China to assert 
her sovereign rights at the expiration of this lease was suffieieni to 
reconcile Japan with Russia and led to the formation of an a g reement 
for combined opposition against any attempt of the United States to 
support China in an effort to regain sovereignty over territory which 
has escaped from her control. Again in the Philippines the iaUnd 
empire finds rich possessions which but for the protection of the 
United States mig^t be exploited for the benefit of the Mikado's 
subjects. Her own great naval strength — paramount in Chinese 
waters — ^would have made it possible easily to ooeupy and defend 
those islands. Turning toward Mexico Ae eneounten an American 
veto of concessions made her in that country. In Korea, even, the 



348 The Annals op ths Amxrican Academy 

success of American missionaries has irritated her. The missionaries 
assert that the recent sanguinary repression of political conspiracies 
b nothing but an attempt to crush out Christianity. As if this were 
not enough, the proudest nation in the world, victor in one of the 
greatest wars of modem times, finds her subjects excluded from our 
territory, while illiterate and poverty-stricken immigrants from all 
parts of Europe are welcomed. It is in vain that the statesmen of the 
two countries refer to the opening up of Japan as a result of the never- 
to-be-forgotten mission of Commodore Perry, or recall that the United 
States was the first country willing to give up consular jurisdiction 
over its citizens in the Mikado's empire. Japan sees and appreciates 
the real situation; she wants to remain friends with the United States 
but her national pride demands she be excluded not by discriminations 
of race, but only on general grounds applicable to all immigrants. 
Aside from the sentimental consideration of national pride, America 
presents great opportunities for intelligent Japanese to amass wealth, 
and so develop the financial strength and taxable resources of the 
empire. The situation between the two countries is further embit- 
tered by a difference as to the rights which the Japanese enjoy by 
treaty stipulation to hold land in this country. 

We are then face to face with Japan; the atmosphere is charged 
with electricity. The flash may come at any moment; but it does 
not seem likely that any such terrible disaster will occur; and one of 
the principal reasons is the similarity of our situation with Canada 
and Australia. As we have seen they fear Asiatic immigration even 
more than we do. Their urgent representations have impressed 
British statesmen with the necessity of helping them to maintain 
their policy of exclusion. Consequently Great Britain, the ally of 
Japan, is ready to go to great lengths to prevent a conflict between her 
ally and this country over the question; the more so as the last few 
years have strengthened the cordial understanding between the two 
Elnglish-speaking nations — an understanding which is so important 
an influence for peace and civilization throughout the world. 

Japan will not attack us. If she had intended to strike she would 
have done so before the completion of the Panama Canal. But may 
we not question our justification in so vigorously supporting China's 
very natural desire to regain Manchuria and Mongolia? Might not 
a friend to China point out the advantages of Japanese and Russian 
control of these sparsely settled and as yet undeveloped provinces? 



PoucT OF UifrncD 8rATn nr trb Pacvic MO 

Capital, protooied by Japanoae and Ruanan credit, will Oow [d, 
Chinese merchants will reap a rich harvest, Chinese cooliss will swarm 
over the land and increase the Chinese population man>'fold. When 
all this has been acoompUshad, China, if she has been able to m^ititAfai 
a firm government capable of solving the difficult problems that laee 
her in the vast territories remaining, will find it poasible to regain her 
lost provinces by peaceful cession or by martial conquest 

In Mexico we can of course tolerate no interference on the part 
of Japan. She will never be allowed to retain any privileged position 
nor to establish settlements sufficiently populous to exercise any polit* 
ical influence. But would we be justified in helping the weaker «tates 
of South America to repel Japanese inunigration? If we hold aloof, 
these states will of themselves react against an Asiatic invasion, and 
we shall have supporters in our policy of exclusion. We shall have 
behind us the strength of the united public sentiment of the two 
Americas. 

Returning to the Philippines: are we justified in protecting in- 
ferior races — some of them among the lowest in the scale of human 
development — from the competition of that magnificent industrial 
machine, the Asiatic coolie? The European cannot multiply in these 
tropical islands; why then should we bar them to our brother race, 
fitted to supplant the Filipino as we have supplanted the red man? 
The answer is this: we must do it in the interest of the balance of 
power. China is likely some day to become the greatest power in 
existence, and the inevitable law of political development will draw all 
other powers together to check her supremacy. It would then be too 
late to pluck from her grasp these precious islands. As regards Japan, 
however, the situation is not quite the same. Japan, with poor soil, 
more limited population, and ruinous taxation, is never likely to be- 
come a menace to other nations. Our exclusion of the Japanese rests 
upon the exigencies of the present situation. There is also the possi- 
bility of Japan's making common cause with China at some hiture 
period. 

We realize that this exclusion policy in the Philippines can be 
maintained only by a powerful nay>\ Unless it should secure the 
support of other European countries, it would have to be abandone d 
whenever the United States passed through a period of political 
embarrassment An effective neutralisation of the Philippinee 
would obviate this danger. At present, however, such a solution 
does not seem feasible. 



260 Trb Annals op the American Academy 

Great emphasis should be laid on the fundamental importance 
of a consistent adhesion to the policy of the open door. Our vigorous 
support of China in this direction should be balanced by the firm 
maintenance of our exclusion policy, vital not only to ourselves but 
also to our kindred communities, Canada and Australia. A powerful 
navy should protect our possessions in the Philippines, but we should 
cultivate the friendship of Japan and show our good will by refusing 
to embroil ourselves in the Manchurian question. We should refrain 
from interfering with her immigration to South America. After all, 
the world policy of the United States is based upon friendship with 
Great Britain and a determination to keep open a fair field for our 
oonmiercial enterprise within the territories of South America, Asia 
and parts of Africa. On this continent it is called the Monroe Doc- 
trine; in China, the open door; but the result is the same: to protect 
the weak; to lend them our support when in danger; and to help them 
to maintain their political integrity. Other considerations, it is true, 
enter into the Monroe Doctrine; but this purpose is a fundamental 
part of the doctrine comparable in its results with the policy of the 
open door. 

Everywhere then we find the policy of the United States one of 
friendship — support of others, asking only a fair field for all. We are 
not bound by entangling alliances which Washington 's farewell mes- 
sage bade us avoid, but our diplomatic cooperation with Great Britain 
and China is based on a deeper and safer foundation — permanent 
common interests and mutual confidence. 

In conclusion — We have found the two cardinal principles of 
American policy in the Pacific to be: (1) The open door in China; 
(2) exclusion of Asiatic immigrants. A corollary of the principle 
of the open door is our friendship with China, while the danger of 
coolie immigration unites us in bonds of sympathy with other coun- 
tries of European blood and traditions whose possessions border on 
the Pacific. Our Philippine policy is determined by our actual rela- 
tions with Japan and by subconscious, almost instinctive, apprehen- 
sions that the most populous political entity of the world may become 
a danger to the independence of other states, should her teeming mil- 
lions acquire and settle new regions of such strategic and economic 
importance as the islands ceded us by Spain. 



THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST- av 
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROGRAM 

Bt Rbaa-Admiral Richard Wainwrioht, U.S.N., 

WAshinftoD, D. C. 

If the history of the past is to be the prophet of the future, any 
diaouarion of the policy of the United States in the Pacific would be 
purely academic, as heretofore there has been no continuity of adioo 
in any direction and only occasional or spasmodic efforts to shoir 
what policy was favored by our country. But the growth of our 
manufactures has been so rapid that the demand for outside marketa 
is becoming increasingly imperative. When the minds of the great 
business executives are turned toward the policies of the United States, 
as far as they affect foreign trade, we will begin to adopt a foreign 
policy. It will be late in the day, but it may be hoped not too Uite to 
obtain a reasonable share in the commerce of the world. 

In the struggle for the trade of those countries south of us, there 
would seem to be no great need of intricate diplomacy. Fair play to 
all, respect for the strong like Chili, and encouragement and aid for 
the weaker states as Nicaragua, and quiet but firm insistence on the 
Monroe Doctrine, including the Lodge extension, would be all that 
would be required of direct diplomacy. We have been frequently 
unfortunate in our treatment of these countries, especially the strong- 
est, Chili. Time and again she has been unnecessarily offended by our 
improper actions. Nearly all South American and Central Ameri- 
can countries believe us to be individually honest, but diplomatically 
unsound. First Mr. Root and now Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bacon 
have helped to smooth our way. A continuous policy with trained 
diplomats to push it and we would soon be recognised as the beat 
friend of all Americans. 

In the Far East the situation is more difficult. Here we have 
generally been considered the best friend of both Japan and China, 
but have lost the advantage of the situation by occasional dipkxnatio 
blunders. The oriental b more difficult to comprehend than our 
southern neighbors and is more impressed l^ forms and 
this with exterritorial jurisdiction in some eastern eountriei, 

961 



252 Turn Annals op the American Academy 

the necessity for trained diplomats the more urgent. Besides the 
policy of a square deal, which to some extent includes the "open 
door," we have the Asiatic exclusion policy to complicate our diplo- 
matic efforts. This latter difficulty may be lessened if not overcome 
as we gradually turn against harboring the scum of Europe, and such 
exclusion acts can be drawn as not to hurt the amour propre of the 
Asiatic races. 

Even with trained diplomats and a continuous policy we cannot 
expect a fair share of the Pacific trade without American ships and 
American banks. The establishment of banks is necessary to furnish 
reasonable accommodations to our merchants; and as long as we de- 
pend on foreign ships to carry our goods we must expect foreign 
manufactures to take first place. 

The completion of the Panama Canal will not only stimulate 
trade in the Pacific and add to our natural advantages for the distri- 
bution of our goods, but it will also put us in a stronger military posi- 
tion and therefore will make us better able to reenforce our diplomatic 
efforts. Poor diplomacy may prevent the success of strongly sup- 
ported policies, but the best diplomacy is futile unless duly supported 
by naval and military power. All history supports this statement, 
although there is a tendency to ignore the teachings of history- both 
ancient and modem and to put trust in unregenerated human nature. 

Our occasional policy in the Far East is a fair illustration of the 
use of military power. 

Commodore Perry's diplomacy, when Japan was opened to the 
countries of the world, was backed by a strong show of force for those 
days. In later days, although in the opening of Korea Commodore 
Shufeldt was aided by the Japanese, it was known that our fleet was 
behind him, and they had had a taste of our fleet under Admiral John 
Rodgers at Chemulpho some years before. Even as late as our decla- 
ration of the open door there was considerable power behind the policy. 
We had shortly before acquired the Philippines and we had large 
military and naval forces in Asiatic waters. 

To strengthen our policies and to defend our coasts we have 
three strong home bases on the Pacific : Panama, San Francisco and 
Bremerton. We are forming a strong base in the Hawaiian Islands, 
and it is to be hoped that Guam will soon be strongly fortified. Now 
in holding the Philippines we are an Asiatic power and our position 
in all eastern affairs is much stronger for this, provided we hold them 



Thb Unitbd Statm and thb Fab Eait sn 

strongly. But beoauae of their distance from our eoMt, the Philip> 
pines as now held are a source of weakness in case tif trouble wHIi 
Japan. The proximity of that country to the Philippines, with her 
great military strength, would enable her to throw a large force into 
the islands before our fleet could arrive. It is extremely unlikely 
that we will ever maintain a sufficient force of our own army in the 
islands to ensure their security until the arrival of the fleet. A terri- 
torial army seems to me to be the solution of the problem. We have 
the example of the British in India, and by a continuous flofw of abort- 
time men through the territorial army, with a liberal supply of our 
own officers and non-oommissional officers, a powerful force for defeoae 
could be soon created. This territorial army would be a valuable 
part of our educational system in the Philippines and nothing could 
be better adapted to fit the native races for self-government than a 
short term of military training. Our Porto Rican regiment and the 
Philippine scouto form excellent examples. The expense of such an 
army would not be great as the young men under training would not 
have reached the self-supporting age and it would only be a question 
of bookkeeping whether they were supported in idleness by their 
families or under arms by the government. With the Philippines 
strongly held our voice for good would be potent in the East. 

We need the friendship of all our southern neighbors as an aid to 
the defense of our country for we need the support of the strong and 
the acquiescence of the weak in the Monroe Doctrine; but we need 
all the factors mentioned, American shipping, American banks, a 
continuous policy urged by trained diplomats backed by adequate 
force, if we are to obtain our just and necessary share of the trade of 
the Pacific. Even now our manufactories can seldom run full time, 
our borne markets are glutted and we must reach out for a share of the 
world 's trade if we would have contented workmen and pro sp ero u s 
merchants. 



THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
CHINA AND JAPAN 

Bt T. Itbnaga, Ph.D., 
Professorial Lecturer in the University of Chicago. 

Before proceeding I beg your leave to say that I stand here not 
as a representative of any authority, government or association, 
but simply as a student of international politics and a private citizen 
of Japan, and consequently, for what I speak I am solely responsible. 

In the discussion of such a big and comprehensive subject as 
that before us, it is well, I believe, to confine myself to one phase of 
it, namely, "The Policy of the United States in the Pacific," as it is 
revealed in its dealings with two of the most important factors in the 
Pacific problem, Japan and China. In trying to elucidate my point, 
however, I have, to confess at the outset that I find it difficult to get a 
clear, intelligent understanding of the American policy in the Pacific 
and am sometimes at a loss to know whether there is any definite 
policy at all. For the glorious record of diplomacy America has 
achieved in Tokio and Peking during many decades past has lately 
been much obscured, if not totally eclipsed, by another story that 
tells of America's dealings on its own soil with the Asiatic neighbors. 

Take the case of America with Japan. In the history of inter- 
national relations no record is so unique as that of the intercourse 
between Japan and the United States during the first five decades of 
its existence — so romantic in its inception, so pervaded throughout by 
mutual good-will, and so fruitful of untold benefits to mankind at 
large. Strikingly dramatic is the scene that introduces the first 
chapter of that intercourse. To the nation still enjoying a torpor of 
centuries and only equipped with bows and arrows, swords and 
spears, Commodore Perry suddenly makes his advent with the 
stately fleet of eight ships, armed with 230 cannons. And, contrary 
to the world's expectation, the adroit soldier-diplomat succeeds in 
forcing open the door of the nation that had for ages been hermetically 
closed against aliens, without a shot being fired, a man wounded, or a 
junk sunk. For his was truly a peaceful mission. Behind that 
outward display of force, under that glittering uniform of the Commo- 

264 



Unitbd Statm RmJLTiotn witr China and Japan 2ftS 



dore, there was hidden the spirit of American frientlBhip lowonJ 
Japan which he had been commiasioned U} diiicluMe. 'Dmt Ja|jaQ 
soon diaoovered it and remembert it with gratitude ii evinced by the 
monument which now sUnde on the very apot of Ptery't fini Un^ing^ 
and which, backed by the everlasting green hiili ot the Milcado'a 
land, overlooka the blue waters of the Pacific that binds in commoo 
embrace the two naUons on its opposite shores. 

The genuine Americanism found its finest eipression in Perry's 
successor, Townsend Harris. With that simplicity, honesty and 
f ranlcness worthy of a true American, and with consummate tact and 
infinite patience, Harris overcame the innumerable obstacles, ignor- 
ance, suspicion and prejudice, put in his way, and finally signalised 
his triumph by becoming the confidant and adviser to the Sbogun's 
government. The American policy of justice, fair dealing, and 
friendliness, thus inaugurated, was consistently pursued by all the 
succeeding administrations, and put into practice by able envoys who 
represented the President of the United States at the court of the 
Mikado — Pruyn and Bingham, Buck and O'Brien, Griscom and 
Anderson. 

The refunding of the Shimonoseki indemnity, the willing heart 
proffered for the revision of old treaties, the good office rendered to 
bring about the peaceful settlement of the Russo-Japaneae war, tlie 
commercial treaty negotiated under the Taft administration that 
facilitated the successful conclusion of new treaties with other pow- 
ers — these are a few instances, the prominent posts on the road of Jap- 
anese-American intercourse, that will recall to us hundreds of other 
instances: herein we witnessed the realization of what General 
Grant said "Whatever America's influence may be, I am proud 
to think that it has always been exerted in behalf of justice and 
kindness.^ 

On the part of Japan, I am also proud to think that she haa given 
a ready and most appreciative response to this gmerous poli^ of 
America, and that it has received its merited reward. Indeed, tlie 
sentiment of gratitude toward America has pervaded the whole natkm. 
To be an American was, therefore, the surest badge which enmmanded 
respect and love of the Japanese people. Mr. Seits, managing editor 
of the New York World, weU says: ''There is something painful aboui 
the childlike faith and grateful good-will manifested toward the 
American visitor by the people of Japan, in perpetual 
ment of their debt to the United States." 



256 Ths Annals of the American Academy 

No record of international relation, let me repeat, is, then, more 
beautiful and ennobling than that which has blessed the American- 
Japanese intercourse for the past half a century — ^justice, moderation, 
magnanimity on one side, and gratitude and appreciation on the 
other. 

No less inspiring is the story that tells of the American-Chinese 
relation. From the time of Burlingame to the time when President 
Wilson took the first step among powers to recognize the Republic of 
China, American diplomacy in China has singularly been free from 
•elfish motives, and has uniformly sought to be guided by the noblest 
principles of international intercourse. No wonder, then, that China 
has at all times regarded the United States as her best friend and 
trusted adviser. Eispecially should China be grateful for the masterly 
diplomacy of John Hay, which, together with the efforts of other 
friendly powers, was instnunental in saving her from disruption. 

Turn from this bright page of diplomatic history to another page 
wherein is written the story of America's treatment on its own soil 
of the Chinese. We are at once bewildered by the striking contrast 
presented on the two pages. While America in common with Euro- 
pean powers, prompted by their own humanitarian ideas, has forced 
thousands of missionaries upon the unwilling Chinese, and proclaimed 
therein the doctrine of the open door, she has on her own part closed 
tight her doors against the Chinese. More than this, the Chinese 
on this shore have been made the objects of derision. They have 
sometimes been mobbed, outraged, murdered. And these wrongs have 
seen no due redress. I am not taking upon myself the self-imposed 
task of an advocate of China. Nor am I picking a quarrel with the 
American Congress for enacting the Chinese exclusion bill. For my 
part, I believe there is a just ground for the enactment of such a law; 
the American nation has every right to protect itself by any means 
it deems fit from the danger of being overcrowded by undesirable 
immigrants, whose home government is too weak to control in its 
hand the matter that affects an international relation. What I am 
chiefly after is to know what is the American policy in the Pacific. 
Is there one American policy in the Pacific for this side of the water, 
and another for the other? 

Far more glaring becomes the inconsistency of the policy when 
it is studied in the light of the recent happenings in Japanese- American 
relations. That the United States will not place Japan in the same 
category of nations with China is, I presume, a premise I can safely 



Unitbo Htatm BaLktumB with China aitd Japah 357 



take for f^raiited. For, although geography aaagna Japan 
Asiatic nations, ihe oeeupiae by culture and ctvlHwtion a loiaUy 
different plane from that attained by her Adalio neighbora. fiaoe 
Perry introduced her into the family of natkma, Japan hat by dint oC 
energy reconstructed her whole scheme of life, political and eodal, 
and iM now evolving a unique otvilisation of her own, wboae aUndaid 
in not different from that of the weet. Moreover, Japan has dearly 
demonstrated her ability to stand upon her own feet and defend hm 
nff,hU and privileges. Japan has a strong government capabis 
of enforcing its will upon her own people, and of fulfilling any pledfs 
made to foreign governments. She has, for instance, kept the sch 
railed ''gentlemen's agreement" with utmost faith, in fact, ao rigidly 
that at the present day no student without means can ever hope to 
come to this country for education. In short, Japan has every right, 
I confidently believe, to receive the same treatment accorded to 
great powers. I would have considered the foregoing remarks as 
vain and out of place, had not the California episode given me a rude 
shock and forced upon me the necessity of stating in succinct terms 
Japan's position, in order to strengthen the point I am soon to make. 
There is, however, no need of entering here into the details of 
the California^ apanese question, still less into its pros and cons. 
After all, California is only one of 48 states forming the Union. What 
most vitally concerns our subject is this: Is the American policy in 
the Pacific such an unsettled, weak policy, as to be over-ruled and 
dictated by the whim of one state? It is, of course, presumptuous 
for a foreigner like myself to attempt to give any answer to such a 
question. He will, however, be permitted to say how difficult it is 
for him to understand the action of the California legislature in enact- 
ing, in face of the strongest protests of the Washington govenimeDt» 
the anti-alien land law, which is clearly and distinctly discnminatory 
against the Japanese, nay, in fact, solely aimed against them, and, 
hence, unjust, unfair, and at direct variance with the policy America 
has pursued toward Japan for the past half century. The only expla- 
nation that suggests itself to me is that the American people have 
not yet uttered their voice in unmistakable terms on theur policy in 
the Pacific, loud and distinct enough to conunand reqieet and obe- 
dience to it by every state in the Union. As a e o n se qi i ence, the 
strangest of anomalies such as we have witnesssd last spring is 
presented. In that episode it is sad to remember how the food and 
mighty President of the United States sent protest after protest to 



The Annals op the American Academy 

the California legislature, asking it to desist from passing the Webb 
bill; how the secretary of state flew across the continent to plead at 
the door of the California assembly for delay in action while efforts 
were being made to meet its wishes by diplomatic means. These 
protests and pleadings, however, proved of no avail. California 
enacted the land law, then went her own way, busying herself with 
the Panama Exposition and the like. In the meantime the President 
and the secretary of state took patiently, to use a mild term, upon 
their o\sti shoulders the burden of devising the ways and means of 
mending the international issue raised by California's action in which 
they took no hand whatever, nay, against which they had so strongly 
protested. I have perfect confidence that the issue will see an 
ultimate amicable settlement based upon broad and just principles 
and in harmony with the best interests of both nations, although how 
and when it will be accomplished is beyond the knowledge of the 
speaker who is outside the sacred pale of diplomacy. 

What we, your neighbors, are most concerned about is to see 
the definite formulation of the American policy in the Pacific, which 
would of necessity put to rest such trouble as that in California. Is 
it to be based upon the same principles of justice, fair dealings, and 
friendliness that have guided the American policy during the past 
toward its Asiatic neighbors, and to be put into practice on both sides 
of the ocean? Will it be an imperial or pacific policy? Will the 
magnificent navy of the United States which could easily be made 
the first and finest of all navies in the world, if America so wishes, by 
the enormous resources she has at her command — ^will this navy be 
used for the maintenance of order and peace in the Pacific, or will it 
be employed to overawe other nations and to perpetuate the wrongs 
perchance perpetrated by America? Will the splendid position 
America occupies in the Pacific with Hawaii, Guam and the Philip- 
pines as stepping stones over the waters — will these spots stand 
as sentinels of hght and security for the conunerce of the world to 
prosper, or as mere strategic grounds for the American navy to 
maneuver? Now and then an idle talk of giving up the Philippines is 
heard among some Americans. We, your neighbors, never wish that 
such a thing will come to pass. For one, I heartily agree with ex- 
President Taft in thinking that a grave responsibihty has been 
laid upon the American people that should cause them ever to retain 
the iidands and govern them for the benefit of all — the Filipinos, 
Americans and the world at large. The Philippines again constitute 



UinTBD States RsiJiTioNfi wttr China ajtd Japan 

an important factor in the Pftdfie problem. Staiamon have oot 
been lacking who foresaw ito importance. Mr. William H. Seward 
pointed out, fifty yean afo on the floor of the Ameriean Senata, thai 
"the Pacific ocean, ita ehorea, its islanda, and the vast regioo bejoiid« 
will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great bereaftar.^ 
Ex-President Roosevelt declared not many years ago that "the Padfie 
era, destined to be the greatest of aU and to bring the whole humaa 
race at last into one comity of nations, is just at the dawn." Have 
the American people as a whole risen to the height of prophetio vWoo 
that inspired those statesmen? Have the people at large come to 
the full realisation of the great significance of the Pacific drama? 
And in the unfolding of this interesting act, I am happy to aay, 
Japan is always ready to join hands with America in heartiest 
codpcration. 

The vast reaches of the Pacific rebuke the narrow suggMtkina of 
covetousness and jealousy. The ocean is broad enough to 



date without jostling all the navies and merchant fleets of the world, 
now in existence or hereafter to come. Those who have never seen 
the Pacific's vast expanse or visited its distant shores, are the only 
people who fall victim to such claptrap, which Professor Coolidge 
happily calls "mastery of the Pacific" or "dominion of the seaa." 
Peace and amity can reign among great nations interested in the 
Pacific for thousands of years to come. 

To conclude, then, as I began, by referring to the American 
Japanese relations. That the old relation between America and 
Japan, of a tutor and a pupil, would continue, is not to be expected. 
Japan has already attained her maturity. She will look up to America 
as a friend or an ally; the United States will treat Japan as an equal. 
If they are competitors in the Chinese market, each will prove to the 
other a manly and healthy rival. This passing of old relaliooahip, 
however, never means that with it the former cordial friendship should 
also go overboard. God forbid. The reasons that urge their eloeer 
bond are stronger and louder than ever. The common ideals of 
civilization which both America and Japan are solicitous to impart to 
Asia at large, the common policy in China — the ma i n t en ance of its 
integrity and of the principle of the open door — the oomnum inlemC 
in the Pacific to develop its vast hidden resources, and the ever 
increasing importance of trade between the two oountriee— these 
are strong arguments for the ever eloaer American-Japaiien friend- 
ship, which no sophistr>' could elude, no local issue overwhefan. 



THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES 

By Jiuji G. Kasai, 

Harvard University. 

When the sea-captains of Salem and Boston brought home 
silks, teas and spices from the Orient; and when the American mari- 
ners sailed the seas of Japan in search of whales, it became necessary 
for the United States to open the secluded empire of Japan which had 
been kept in isolation for three hundred years. The subsequent 
rise of American commerce in the Far East at once attracted the 
attention of the American statesmen. In 1832 when Edmund Roberts 
was appointed by President Jackson as an "agent for the purpose of 
examining in the Indian Ocean the means of extending the commerce 
of the United States by commercial arrangements with the powers 
whose dominions border on those seas," he was instructed to obtain 
** information respecting Japan, the means of opening a conmiuni- 
cation with it," and to seek to establish official relations with the 
island empire. In 1833 he concluded the treaties of amity and 
commerce with Siam and Muscat, but the prospect was so unfavor- 
able that he did not attempt to visit Japan. When he left Wash- 
ington in 1835, on his second visit to the Orient to exchange the 
ratifications of the treaties he had concluded with Siam and Muscat, 
he carried with him a message of President Jackson to the Emperor of 
Japan, and a considerable collection of presents. But Roberts 
died in Macao in 1836, and his squadron returned to the United 
States without reaching Japan. 

From that time on, several attempts were made by the United 
States to open Japan until finally President Millard Fillmore sent 
Commodore M. C. Perry with his message to the Emperor of Japan, 
with the object of negotiating a treaty to secure "friendship, com- 
merce, a supply of coal and provisions, and the protection of our ship- 
wrecked people." When, on July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry's 
''black squadron" appeared in the Bay of Yedo, the people of the 
whole empire were panic-stricken, and the government of the Toku- 
gawa Shogun was paralyze<i with fear. Seeing the gravity of the 

260 



IUL4TI0N8 BBTWBSr JaFAN AND UjflTBD ^TATM M 



situAUoo the Sbosun'i gcnreniment refiiiad to ti«M with Um 
envoy, and Perry left Uraga on oondition that he would return Um 
following epring for a reply. In the meantime the ififcimicin of 
Japan were seriously diaouning the need of the opening of the eountry, 
realliing that Japan oould no longer keep hereelf isolated from the 
incoming "barbarians." With a retaforced fleet of three steam 
frigates, four sloops of war and two store ships, all cleared for aetion. 
Commodore Perry reappeared in the Bay of Yedo in February, 
1854, with his strong determination "to demand as a right, not to 
solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy which are due from one 
civilised nation to another — due to the dignity of the Amariean 
flag." 

After careful deliberations, the Shogun's government appointed 
Hayashi-Daigakunokami and three other commissioners to treat 
with Perry. Thus, on March 31, 1854, the first treaty Japan had 
ever negotiated with a foreign nation in the nineteenth century 
was formally signed at Kanagawa by the representatives of the 
United States and Japan. The coming of Commodore Perry, there- 
fore, marked a new epoch in the history of modem Japan. By his 
firm demands and persistent efforts, American diplomacy won the 
first triumph in the dealings with the island empire. 

In the treaty of Kanagawa, it was provided that the two ports 
of Shimoda and Hakodate be opened to the visit of American dtissos, 
where they would enjoy more freedom than did the Dutch at Nagasaki. 
To improve this treaty, in 1857 Townsend Harris came to Shimoda as 
the first American consul-general, and on July 17 he concluded with 
the government of the Shogun a treaty regiilating the commercial 
relations with Japan. In the following year the treaty of Yedo was 
signed on July 20, by which the United States secured the rights of 
trade and residence for her citizens, low import duties and the privi- 
lege of extra territoriality to her citisens in Japan. By his honest 
diplomacy and wise counsel Harris won the confidence of the Japa- 
nese nation, and he left the deepest impression of America's goodwill 
in the hearts of the Japanese people. 

Such is the brief aooount of America's introduction of Japan into 
the comity of nations. Fmm that time on, the United States has 
befriended Japan against the perils of foreign aggresnoQ, and Japan, 
in turn, has revered America as her teacher and tme friend. T\lien 
the island empire fought against the might}' Russian 



262 The Annals of the American Academy 

the arena of Manchuria, the American people gave moral support 
to JaiMUi, by their constant sympathy. But unfortunately when 
the titanic struggle was over, and we had hardly fulfilled the hopes 
and expectations of the liberty-loving American people, there came 
the cries of jingoes and demagogues: "Beware of Japan's warlike 
ambition to master the Pacific at the expense of the United States." 
The rise of Japan was looked upon with jealousy and suspicion in 
some quarters, and the friendly feeling of the American people seemed 
to have suddenly changed into a hostile attitude toward Japan. 

At this juncture, the "school question" of San Francisco was 
fomented through the connivance of Mayor Schmitz of San Fran- 
cisco, and O. L. Tvietmoe, one of the notorious leaders of the 
MacNamara dynamite conspiracy. Less than one hundred inno- 
cent Japanese school children scattered in the public schools of San 
Francisco were made the targets of the merciless anti-Japanese 
labor union men, and the bogey of the "Japanese invasion" was 
created to threaten the minds of the American people. Tvietmoe 
thereupon organized the Japanese-Korean Exclusion League, and 
sent walking delegates to Portland, Seattle, Bellingham and even to 
Vancouver, B. C, to create an anti-Japanese movement; and they 
have used, since then, every means to stir up hatred against the 
Japanese in the United States. President Roosevelt used strong 
words to deter the anti-Japanese agitators in California, but all in 
vain. Thus, the "school question" was employed by these agitators 
as a means of open insult to the Japanese. Thereupon, the Japanese 
government sent Baron Ishii, the present ambassador to France, then 
the head of the bureau of commerce in the department of foreign 
affairs, to the Hawaiian Islands, and the Pacific coast states to 
investigate the condition of the Japanese. In the course of his inves- 
tigation Baron Ishii witnessed how his countrymen were treated with 
injustice and humiliation in a certain part of the United States. 
While the question was still pending, on December 4, 1906, President 
Roosevelt in his message to Congress paid high praise to Japanese 
civilization and culture and recommended to Congress that "an act be 
passed specially providing for the naturalization of Japanese who come 
here intending to become American citizens." Later, immigration 
regulations were made by which the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands, 
Canada and Mexico were prohibited from entering the United States. 
Finally, Japan was forced to enter into a "gentleman's agreement" 



Rblations BvnnnDf Japan and UiifnB> Bfnrm 

by which she should henceforth prohibit her Imborers from 
to the United SUtes. 

The i>opular feeling in Japan ran high to see soeh't^jasUce 
discriminations against the Japanese in the Unitad States, and the 
weak and submissive policy of the Japanese goromment invited 
severe criticism of the people. When an interpellation was made In 
the Japanese parliament as regards the government's Amerieaa 
policy, the late Count Komura, then minister of foreign affairs spoks 
on February 2, 1009, as follows: 

As regarda the quMiion of measuret unfavorable to the Japanese wbieh are 
pcndins In the California legislature, the imperial government, relying upon 
the sense of justice of the American people as well as the friendly disposition 
of the federal government, confidently hopes that such queettoot will not lead 
to any international eoroplications. 

Several cabinets have come into existence and ministers have 
been changed since this pronouncement of Count Komura, yet the 
Japanese government has been uniformly consistent in her tradttaoiial 
policy toward the United States. The Japanese people on the 
other hand have hoped to receive justice from the United States 
which for the last sixty years has been their friend, and which hat 
sent them missionaries to preach justice and equality; but they have 
been bitterly disappointed. 

While the Japanese-American relations were not improved to 
an appreciable degree, the Panama-Pacific exposition bill passed 
Congress, and San Francisco was chosen as the site of the fair. Seeing 
that the success or failure of the exposition depended largely upon 
Japan's willingness or unwillingness to participate, the directors of 
the exposition sent special commissioners to persuade the Japanese 
government to take an active part in the fair. They assured the 
authorities in Tokio that although California, through some anderink 
ble elements, had repeatedly humiliated the Japanese, th^ woukl 
see that thereafter no such discriminations should be made againal 
the Japaneee. Thereupon, the Japanese government voted one 
million dollars to participate in the exposition and to build a lasting 
monument to present to the city of San Francisco after the fair, and 
sent commissioners to choose the site for the buiktings. But no 
sooner had the friendly voice of thoee American cnmmkwioDCgs of 
the exposition given proof of genuine frkmdship of the 



254 Trb Annals of the American Academy 

people, than the anti-Japanese measure was again introduced in 
the legislature at Sacramento. Although President Wilson sent his 
peace-loving secretary of state to Sacramento to prevent the passage 
of any legislation hostile to the Japanese which would mean an 
affront to a friendly nation, Governor Johnson with his defiant at- 
titude turned a deaf ear to the supplication of the chief executive 
of this great nation. The Webb bill was passed and the Japanese 
were prohibited from owning land in California. Mr. Bryan returned 
to Washington without being able to accomplish the purpose of 
his mission. With the agreement of the anti-Japanese leaders in 
California Mr. Bryan recommended the appointment of Mr. Cami- 
netti, the most anti-Japanese member of the California senate, as 
commissioner-general of immigration, and he, since his appointment, 
has made wholesale accusations against the Japanese and has made 
most stringent immigration regulations particularly against the 
Japanese. 

Already a year has gone by since the passage of the alien land act 
which is aimed at the Japanese, but no satisfactory solution has 
been reached by the two governments. Japan has been very frank 
and sincere in' dealing with the California question. What she wants 
is honor and justice; and to receive, in the words of Commodore 
Perry when he op)ened Japan, "those acts of courtesy which are due 
from one civilized nation to another." Beyond this she has claimed 
nothing. Yet there are many writers in this country who have 
maliciously asserted that Japan has shown the mailed fist to bluff 
the American government. I ask these people to read the history 
of the anti-Japanese agitation for the last ten years with their 
own eyes and without prejudice. The following statement of Prof. 
J. H. Latan6 of Johns Hopkins University, in his convocation 
address at the University of Chicago, August 29, 1913, apropos of 
this question, represents this class, and would hardly bear honest 
analysis: "Japan is merely taking advantage of our present embarass- 
ment to extort from us certain concessions. In this she displays 
greater shrewdness than wisdom. It would be a serious mistake, 
therefore, for the United States to yield to the Japanese pressure." 
To such a charge no reply is necessary. 

There is another serious misapprehension in the minds of the 
American people, that is the supposed danger of coolie labor under- 
mining the wage system of this country. As a matter of fact no 



RsLATioNs BiTWKKN Japan anp Uititbd Statbi 365 



'coolies" have ever immigraled into the Uiut«d BUUm from Japan. 
The Japanese sovemment has ahrays issued passports to 
who have oome to the United States, and the stanidard of 
of the applicant was so high that no one without some education 
and means could procure a passport. The Japanese imnugratioQ 
cannot be classed with the Chinese coolie lalx)rer. It can be safely 
stated that the Japanese immigrants are far superior not only to 
other Asiatics but also to the immigrants from many European 
countries. Moreover since Japan has entered into the "gentleman's 
agreement" the regulation has been so stringent that it is almost 
impossible for even a student to procure a passport to come to the 
United States for study. When we think of the American-Japanese 
relations and consider that many Japanese students who have 
studied in the United States have always been the best smhasssdofs 
that America could send to Japan, it is lamentable for the oomtty of 
the two nations that these youths of high ambition are prevented 
from coining. Thus the number of the Japanese in the United States 
decreased tremendously since the "gentleman's agreement." Accord- 
ing to the report of the commissioner-general of immigration of the 
United States, the total number of the Japanese of all clssses entei^ 
iug the Hawaiian Islands and the continental United States for the 
five years ending June 30, 1013, was 23,496, while those returned 
to Japan during the same period numbered 46,209, thus showing an 
actual decrease of 22,709 in these five years. Does this look as 
though the "Japanese invasion" were inmiinent? 

It is alleged also that the Japanese laborers in California crowd 
out the white men from the farm with cheap labor. But, according to 
the report of Mr. John D. Mackenzie, the commissioner of labor of 
the state of California, the average daily wage paid to the Japanese 
laborers in agriculture i8$1.49 with board, and $1.54 without, while that 
of white help is $1.38 with board, and $1.80 without. The 

! ' v:ige of the Japaneee laborers employed by the Japanese fi 

. > with board. Mr. Mackenzie went still further in saying 
t hat the skill and efficiency of the Japanese laborers are without equal, 
Hiid California needs Japanese labor. It has been alleged that the 
J a panese would own all the fertile land in California. But , out of their 
patience and toil the Japanese farmers in California have bought 
only 26,707 acres out of 17,750,000 acres of arable land in that slata, 
—less than one^eventh of one per cent. 



266 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

Such has been the attitude of the United States toward the 
Japanese in America. While she has been erecting barriers against 
the Japanese upon her own soil, and is trying to extend the time- 
honored Monroe Doctrine to the Far East, she is using her aggressive 
policy in eastern Asia, to cope with Japanese expansion and devel- 
opment in that part of the world. Japan on the other hand feels 
that she has an inalienable right in the Far East to preserve her 
superior position, and to take any course of action required for her 
setf-preservation and defense. But she has no intentions of extending 
her political sphere upon the western hemisphere. Although Japan 
has no political intentions in Mexico, the Lodge resolution was 
passed in the Senate early in 1912, when a certain jingo created the 
"Magdalena Bay" affair, in order that he might make a fortune by 
selling a barren land of lichens at a high price. In regard to Mexico, 
Japan has been extremely cautious not to injure the feelings of the 
United States. The Japanese government has never tried to have 
an iota of political control over any bays or harbors in Mexico or in 
any other part of this continent.^ 

In regard to Japan's Manchurian policy, she has strictly adhered 
to the principles of the "open door" and equal opportunity. She 
has never used any discriminating policy against foreign merchants, as 
has been so frequently alleged, by charging higher tariffs or railway 
rates than she has charged her own nationals. By her proximity to 
the market, cheaper transportation, better banking facilities, and 
superior knowledge of the needs and taste of her customers, Japan 
has been able to compete successfully with foreign merchants in 
Manchuria. Moreover, it is patent that international trade is ex- 
change — the exchange of the products of one country with those of 
another. So with the trade between Manchuria and Japan. Japan, 
being the only importer of the soya bean, the chief agricultural pro- 
duct of Manchuria, in return exports cotton manufactures from her 
factories. In discussing the trade relations with Manchuria, Dr. 
Toyokichi lyenaga, former professorial lecturer of the University of 
Chicago, says: 

It is in the trade of cotton goods alone that Japan has played the r61e of 
a sueoeesful competitor of America. Japan has developed the trade in Man- 

' Just recently, although she was asked to take charge of the Mexican 
embassy at Washington by General Huerta, she declined because of her friendly 
attitude toward the United States. 



RsLATioNB Bmnmr Jafan and Uititbd G^atm 9S7 

ohuria from noihing in 1900 to 151,400 pt«c«i of tliMUAt, dX.OW picoM of drtU 
and 1800 pioMt of ihirting in 1006, whilo the AmoriMB trado ol l,imjUO pitrw 
of thMtinf and 442,201 |>ioe«i of drill in 1004 has dropped to 615,106 piocM of 
■hoeUog, and 104,670 pioett of drill, in 1000. . . . 

Further it muii bo addod iHUi Mipliadf that, if Um AMfkn ooMop i». 
duaUy haa tuffered to aome eiteat in Ifaoeburia by the Tapaneae eoBBpetltloa, 
the American eotton growera have by no meana been loaera. The raw eottott 
imported in 1010 from the United Statea to aupply Japaneee eottoo milla waa 
valued at 17,103,128 yen. The American cotton import of 1011 raaehed a 
phenomenal value of 60,000,000 yent We ean aee no reaaon why the eao« of 
manufaeturera alone ahould find ita defendera, while that of the farmer* ia 
left unnoticed. 

It is unfortunate to recall the propoeal of Secretary Knox to 
Japan to neutralise the South Manchurian Railway. It was eoii- 
demned at that time alike by American public opinion and by the 
Japanese people. This suggested policy, according to Dr. David 
Starr Jordan, chancellor of Leland Stanford Junior University, was 
''personal only — was never acted upon, never approved by the Ameri- 
can people and no official action was ever based upon it." Next 
appMtfed a scheme of American capitalists to build the Chinchow- 
Aigim Railway as a rival to the South Manchurian Railway. It 
was followed by the proposal of the four power loan of $50,000,000, 
the interest to be guaranteed by all the unhypothecated resources 
of Manchuria and with the provision that China should come to 
the four powers for future loans, thus dethroning Japan from her 
primacy in Manchuria. To Japan, Manchuria is hallowed ground. 
Upon this plain, twice she fought for the sake of her national cxisteiico. 
Two billion yens of her treasure were spent, and the precious blood of 
one hundred and thirty thousand of her noblest sons was shed for the 
honor of their beloved Nippon. After the glorious victories at Nan- 
shan, Port Arthur, Lioyang and Mukden, at such an enonnoua coat 
of blood and treasure, what has Japan received as the trophies ol 
war? Only 750 miles of railways in South Manchuria, and the 
of the Kwantang province of 1,303 square miles! What 
could Secretary Knox logically expect from Jwptait Hofw could 
Japan be expected to give up the precious prise at the ougfesttoii ol 
a nation which has no vital interests in Manchuria and no com- 
prehension of the deep problems there involved, and has ni>vtf 
sacrificed a penny of her treasure or a drop of her blood? 

In discussing the policy of Secretary Knox, Mr. Hamilton ilolt, 
editor of the Independent, sajrs: 



268 The Annals of thb American Academy 

Our attitude in respect to Manchuria was very much the same as though 
Japan went to our border state Mexico and said: "See here, Mexico, the 
Unitad States has a good deal of money invested in your territory. It is a 
menaoe to your integrity. We suggest that you let us raise a loan, so that 
you can pay the United States what you owe her and then tell her to get out. 
You can come to us only for aU future loans." If such a proposition were made 
by Japan to Mexico nearly every editor in the United States would be shriek- 
ing for war. But the Japanese are very self-controlled people. They say 
my little. They feel, however, that they have the same right in eastern Asia 
that we claim in this hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine, that is an 
inalienable right to take any proper course requisite for self-preservation. 

Thus, this "great blunder" of Knox's diplomacy has served to 
bring Russia and Japan together for the mutual protection of their 
property and interests in Manchuria. Japan defended only her true 
rights when she refused this proposal. She has justly acquired 
those rights by the treaty of Portsmouth, and by the treaty of Peking 
of December 22, 1905. She will never relinquish those interests and 
rights, but will protect them with all her might. But these have 
nothing to do with the "open door" policy; Japan has always adhered 
to the principle of equal opportunity, and she will ever maintain 
that principle. 

While the attitude of Japan toward the United States has been 
very frank, yet from my personal observations, I am inclined to believe 
that the policy of the United States toward Japan has undergone a 
complete change since the time of the Russo-Japanese war. Prof. 
Sidney L. Gulick of Doshisha University, Kioto, who has lived in 
Ja(>an more than thirty years, in his recent work, American-Japanese 
Problems, says: 

The present Oriental policy of the United States as a whole is, in important 
respects, humilating to the Oriental and disgraceful to us. Professing friend- 
ship in words, we deny it in important deeds. Demanding an open door for 
Americans in Asia and equality of opportunity for our citizens with that ac- 
corded to oitisens of the "most favored nation," we do not ourselves grant 
same things to Asiatics in our land. 



In sunmiarizing, then, Japan's attitude toward the United States 
has always been one of extreme friendliness. She has always re- 
spected America with that sense of reverence which is characteristic 
erf that island empire. There is no fear on the part of the United 
States of the so-called "Japan's aggressive policy." It is to the 
United States that Japan has been turning to bring about a better 



Relatione BmncBif Japan and Uiciteo ArATm 

tfolution, and ber people have been asking for justice and booor. 
Japan haa ftrugKled for the last ibrty years to win the right to stand 
abreast of the most enlightened nations of the world, and she has by 
her own exertions won "the right to treatment on a baab of full and 
frank equality/' Will Ameriem, that has proudly watched the growth 
of the island empire during the last half century, now turn to be a 
pra9ocai0iir to wound eternally the heart of the nation heretofore 
filled wHh deepest gratitude? Justice is the basis of intematioiial 
amity and peace. May America ever be true to her praiseworthy 
traditions of freedom and justice. May the seholars and 
of the United States study the Japanese questions 
free from bigotry and prejudice, and realise that justice is the plea 
of the Japanese in America and of the nation acroes the sea. On 
the high plane of justice and mutual respect alone can our traditioiial 
friendship be strengthened in the future as it has so happily proa- 
pered in the past. 



A CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE POLICY FOR AMERICA 

By J. Pease Norton, 
Profaasor of Railway and Trade Statistics, Harvard University. 

Never in all the ages recorded by the historians of the past have 
the nations of the earth paused upon the threshold of an era so full of 
promise. Wonderful inventions together with signal advances in 
social organization are making a new world. One cloud alone looms 
black and portentous — the war cloud which in the twinkling of an eye 
may break into the storm which will impoverish whole nations and 
defeat the progress of a thrifty generation. Only by (clearly discern- 
ing the dangers can such conditions be handled adequately, even by 
our wisest statesmen. 

The United States is no longer an isolated country. To the west, 
we have flung our battle-lines to meet the expansion of the Orient in 
the Philippines. At Behring Strait, our sentries watch the frontiers 
of the Czar. On the south at Panama, we clutch by the throat the 
pasBagpwajrs for the navies of two oceans. Our armies of occupation 
are now holding by force of arms our outlying possessions. Like 
the Romans of old, we send forth our governors to rule over the 
millions of our alien subjects. In this imperial development con- 
cerning which discussion apparently no longer can exist because the 
flag once flying is not easily withdrawn, a greater and a greater care 
must be exercised lest our defenses are unequal to the probabilities of 
future danger. 

The United States is no longer an isolated nation. Our country 
has become the storm center of the world. The present silence is 
suggestive, — almost expectant like the calm before the storm, to be 
followed by sudden rattling peals we know not when. 

Statesmanship consists in the resolution of conflicting racial 
fofoes by constructive peace policies in advance of violent disturb- 
aaoes. War is the conflict of unstable racial forces, often caused by 
the economic pressure of population upon subsistence, always in 
search of a more stable equilibrium. The fundamental facts of racial 
geography should influence our determination of a constructive peace 
policy for America. Take in your left hand a small globe of the world 

270 



CoNSTRucnvB Pkack Policy worn Ambbica 371 

and plaee the thumb of your right hand upon PckinR, the tnd«c finder 
at Behring Strait, the second finger upon St. J^uU and the Uttlr 
finger at New OitoaoB. Nota carefully the rehitive diataneoi beCwnn 
points in the interior of China and pomta in the interior ct AmeHet, 
first, by the way of the Behring Strait and, then, by way of the PteiAe 
Ocean through San Francisco and Asiatic port«. In the Ungip^y^ of 
relative distances, fundamental geographioU and racial principles are 
often stated. Considering the geographical situation of the United 
States, does not reason declare that it is more important for us to 
command the land than the sea? A French engineer, M. Loncq de 
lx)bcl, at the International Congress of Arte and Sdenoes in 1904, 
suggested that it is possible to tunnel the Behring Strait. Within 
a few weeks. Congress has appropriated 135,000,000 for the construc- 
tion of one thousand miles of railway in Alaska. The Rmrian 
government has considered favorably the project suggested by Lobel, 
to extend the Siberian Railway toward the Behring Strait. 

Let us add to the great wonder of the world now created at 
Panama, a second wonder, more wonderful and more far-reaching. 
Just as we have linked together the oceans, let us link together the 
continents of the world. Let it be said in history that one and the 
same nation, which at Panama put asunder two continents that 
nature had joined together, still not content with one colossal task 
straightway at Behring Strait joined together two continents which 
nature had left asunder. The question whether it is possible for our 
engineers to construct such tunnels should be left for them to decide. 
When one contemplates the tunnel work of the Simplon, the work of 
constructing the tubes underlying Manhattan and the North and 
East Rivers, including the great bores of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
the work does not seem either impossible or impractical from the 
standpoint of capital expenee. 

That the land is more important than the sea seems ondent 
when we consider geographically the route by which our nation may 
invade the East, if ever it shall be necessar>' for the purposes of 
defense. The very possibility of war is a calamity, more grie^-ous 
than mind can tell. Yet national policies should pro>ide for all 
iities. If in an unfortunate tide of events we must carry the 
wiir into Asia, let us carr>' it by land and not by sea. 

But, far more than this advantage in times of war, such a poikj 
should be the guarantee of lasting peace. Through these tunnels, 



272 TiiE Annals op the American Academy 

great inter-coniiiu ntal railroads would thread their way. The build- 
ing of the Alaskan Riiilway has already been provided for by the 
present Congress. By this railroad and possible future tunnels, 
five continents will be joined. For the traveler of the twentieth 
century, there will be "no more sea." Such continental railways will 
become the arteries of commerce. In times of peace, the railways 
will be trade routes of the world. In times of war, the railways will 
prove of value in ways which are apparent. By them, vast bodies of 
troops could be quickly assembled, their strength properly massed and 
the current of adequate supplies constantly maintained. Often as in 
the career of men, so in the lives of nations, crises are turned by wise 
policies which are adopted long before the real difficulties are reached. 

What, then, should constitute a constructive peace policy for 
America? At this juncture, he who would think ahead, after con- 
templating the facts — geographical, racial, economic, sociological 
and national — irresistibly driven by the logic of the situation is 
forced to say: why not make for a long world peace by a new triple 
alliance, the United States, Russia and China — three great nations 
representing three civilizations, diverse races, yet common in three 
essentials: all are land powers; all meet at Behring Strait figuratively 
speaking; all are interested in internal development rather than in 
geographical expansion. Why not make treaties mutually defending 
the integrity of the domains of each? By such an alliance, war might 
be prevented for many years and the swift march of progress might 
carry our civilization many leagues onward in the great uplift which 
otherwise may be impeded, if not prevented, by those internecine 
combats which have drawn the life-blood from all the departed nations 
of the past, whether temporarily the victors or the vanquished, it 
mattered not. We may not estimate the value of a peace, guaranteed 
principal and interest, to China, to Russia and to the world. A 
wonderful development is in store for China. Russia has the great 
future filled with opportunity. The United States has a dream to 
work into a reality, a civilization which will stretch from Behring 
Strait to Panama. The Panama Canal was the inception. The 
Alaskan Railway and the Behring tunnels should be the greater 
conception and the new triple alliance should bring with it lasting 
peace. 

Let us reason carefully without regard to precedent, and strictly 
in accord with the interest of the great future which holds in store 



Co!f8TRUc-nvK Peacb Policy mit AwKHir* J78 



such splendid up{x)rtuniti(« for inteosive developincni by a|J 
and by all races. We occupy the heart of North America. We own 
Alaska, Panama and some of the iaUnds of the sea. To the touth, 
there lives an unhappy people, now greatly troubled by a 
ing civil war. To the north, there is a kindred people, 
are our needs. War has oome to the people of the South, 
fcovemment of the past thirty years failed to bring to the oomnMNi 
people the great Mwrfngs of free public education, protection to life 
and property, local self-government and a system of small freehold 
properties in place of the great landed estates. A protoetorate by 
the United States over Mexico and Central America ooneetred in the 
spirit of the higher patriotism with patient watchfulness for the 
purpose of insuring to each province the benefits of an equitable Wf^ 
tem of taxation, an honest administration, free elections, free public 
education and proper protection to life and property, would make for a 
lafltinK peace in North America. Without such a protectorate, every 
Highty despot wafted into Mexico City by some hot-headed impulse 
of an uneducated and distracted people becomes a ready tool for the 
political schemesters of foreign nations, to be manipulated for the pur- 
pose of necuring concessions and colonies. In the past, we have 
written the Monroe Doctrine in figures of iron. If these principles 
which are fundamental to a constructive peace for North Ameriea 
cannot be seen clearly as yet by all nations, let us trace these prin* 
ciplos in letters of fire: North America for North Americans and 
withal peace, order, education, protection to life and property, last- 
ing prosperity. 

Let us go further and help to establish the peace of the world, 
by means of a new triple alliance to include Russia, China and the 
United States, seven hundred millions of people, an alliance for the 
mutual defense of the integrity of the domains of each natkm. Let 
us control the new tunnels under the auspices of the triple allianee. 
Let us say to all the world: We ask only peace and fair commerce. 
Our good will goes out to all. Our destiny is in North America and 
in the islands of the North American continent. There our rule 
shall be sufficient to insure security to all. We do not want the 
Philippines. They are too far removed from the land of our deethny. 
We await an honorable release. Shall we not give thm over into 
their own hands, a republic under the protection of the triple aOianoeT 
Having eetablished through such an alliance a lasting pence which 



274 The Annals of the American Acadebtv 

no nation would care to controvert, the severe economic pressure now 
felt by Japan could be relieved by a more intensive application of the 
recent advances in the arts, again through a reduction in the excessive 
appropriations for a navy and, finally, by emigration to friendly 
countries. 

Let us open our doors to the immigration from all nations, 
restricted fundamentally in accordance with the statistical principles 
of the eugenic melting-pot, namely, that in any one year the number 
of immigrants shall not be greater than 2 per cent of our population 
and that the number from any nationality shall not be greater than 
that fraction of 2 per cent which the population of the given nation- 
ality now in our country bears to the entire population of the United 
States. 

At home, let us look sharply to the objects for which go the 
enormous appropriations for the army and the navy. Let us hold 
that the sum we give for national defense is not too great, but rather 
that what we get in return is much too little. As we follow the careers 
of successive sessions of Congress, all bent upon vast appropriations 
and following constantly in the track of their predecessors, dimly 
at times there are those of us who have wondered whether tradition 
does not play too great a r61e at Washington. Let us interpret 
rightly the truth expressed in these words: 

Were, half the power that fills the world with terror, 
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts, 

Given to redeem the human mind from error, 
There were no need of arsenals or forts. 

To obtain more utility from what we spend should be our purpose. 
We reform by substitution more easily than by prohibition. The 
following quotation clearly describes the wastes which have long 
been with us: 

"Change the scene," said Charles Sumner one day at Harvard 
College, "and cast your eyes upon another object. There now 
swings idly at her moorings in this harbor a ship of the line, the 
OhiOf carrying ninety guns, finished as late as 1836 at an expense of 
$548,000, repaired only two years afterwards for S233,000, with an 
armament which has cost $54,000, making an aggregate of $835,000 
88 the actual outlay at this moment for that single ship, more than 
$100,000 beyond all the available wealth of the richest and most 
ancient seat of learning in the land." 



CoNsmucmni Piacb Pouct fOR Ambuca 276 

How small iheae figures look in oompariflon with the figurat of 
today. Today at then a battleship at $14,000,000 conu more than 
the foundatioii ol Yale University. Possibly $1 5,000,000,000 has 
been expended upon the United States navy during the last tiranly 
years. For the world, the costs of standing armies are no less asUmiid- 
ing than depressing. In 1006 the amount expended by twenty nations 
reached $17,000,000,000. New inventions are maldng battleships 
obsolete for a continental power. An air-ship capable of dropping 
explomves can be built for $2,000. One battleship at $14,000,000 
cost as much as seven thousand air-ships. What convoy of battle- 
ships threatening New York or San Francisco could withstand the 
hail of dynamite from these hostile hornets of the air, ten to twenty 
thousand in number, flying by day just above the clouds and by night 
just beneath the stars? 

We should adopt a no-battleship program and appropriate ten 
millions, at least, annually for aero-nautical defense. One-half of 
this should be used as subsidy to increase the number of the owners 
of hydroplanes along our seacoast, to be classed as the aero-nautical 
reserve. 

Finally, let us link up our army expenditures with education and 
vocational training. The army reserve should consist of two million 
men. Such a number we should build up in twenty years by establish- 
ing the standing army at four hundred thou^sand, consisting of yoimg 
men who may wish to attend high schools giving vocational training, 
universities, scientific schools or industrial colleges. At least two 
self-sustaining trades should be taught each man in addition to his 
regular training. The man should have the privilege of choosing his 
trades from a broad list. The arts of war, rifle practice, marchmg and 
drilling, can readily be taught to small companies of sdected bojrs who 
are living for the first two years at their own homes, aesiiming the 
term of enlistment to be four years. Cross country work can be 
accomplished in vacations. The expenditures for the army by this 
plan become simultaneously a subsidy to education. Exeeptkxial 
boys in all the schools of the country, above fifteen yean In age, 
would then have adequate opportunity of securing a ▼oea t io n a l or 
higher education under a fair s>'stem of civil service examinations, 
and the country would have an army reserve of one millkm men at 
the end of ten years, two million at the end of twenty years, every 
man of them with two self-sustaining tradee. 



276 The Annals of the American Academy 

In summary, then, a rough outline of a constructive peace policy 
for America has been sketched, involving several radical departures. 
Among these, the plan of the peace enthusiasts for an Anglo-American 
alliance is not essential. The requirements of this analysis, outlining 
the essentials of a constructive peace policy for America are, first, a 
new triple alliance to include Russia, China and the United States; 
second, the construction of the Behring tunnels and the completion 
of our part of the inter-continental railway in Alaska, already com- 
menced; third, a no-battleship program and a curtailment in naval 
expenditures; fourth, development of aero-nautical defense and the 
organization of an aero-nautical reserve; fifth, the development of 
the army reserve through the use of the army funds as a means of 
educating young men, especially in vocational training and in the 
arts of war; sixth, establishing once for all a statistical maximum 
limit for the annual immigration into the United States. 

In this way, we shall perhaps most economically achieve the 
goal of a lasting peace, develop commerce, increase the opportunity 
of our people, mutually benefit with other nations and firmly construct 
the bulwarks of that impregnable security which is necessary to insure 
the intensive development of that magnificent area of the earth's 
surface which stretches from Behring Strait to the canal at Panama. 



THE FOREIGN POUCY OP THE UNITED 8TATBB* 

Bt T. p. Cork, 
United 8utM Senator froin Oklebomm. 

I know of no subject more fitting for disciuKion than that of 
"A Constructive American Foreign Policy/' no fonmi mora fitting 
than the city of Philadelphia; for in this city the world w!tn««ed 
the graatflst exhibition of constructive statemanship within the tides 
of time. In this city the dead past buried its dead; in this city a 
new age was brought forth from the womb of time; in this city a new 
republic was established and ripened, dedicated to human freedom 
and human equality. This republic has shown it is as equally adapted 
to the government of forty-eight sovereign states as it was to the 
government of thirteen feeble and infant commonwealths. Ehrery 
exigency has been met by the constructive genius of our statemen 
and of our people. Perhaps we have been at times too much absorbed 
in our domestic policies to devote as much time and attention to our 
foreign policies or to our foreign relations as their supreme importance 
would justify. 

There are two schools of opinion touching the time as to when 
the United States really became a world power. One sehool of 
opinion believes that we entered the arena of world-wide politioi 
when our fathers declared here in Philadelphia that all men wen 
created equal and that all men were endowed with inAl^^n^l^fi righta. 
Others believe that our birth occurred with the declaration of war 
against Spain. There are many of us who believe that the United 
States has been a world power since 1776, that its influence has 
been international, that its example has been a guide to the kyvert of 
liberty in every clime in every succeeding time. There are thoee who 
believe that when the liberty bell rang out to the inhabitants of this 
land it meant liberty to all in every quarter of the globe. 
There are those of us who believe that our example since the decla- 
ration was promulgated within this city's walls has been the mighi- 
iest influence amongst the sons of man, fashioning the dselintea of 

> R«nmrk8 as pr«etdinf oflker of the leeeion of the Academy* flalodajr 

eTening, April 4, 1914. 

m 



278 The Annai^ of the American Academy 

nations. The infiuence of the United States, the service of the United 
States, have been of a double character. We have had a negative in- 
fluence, if I may say so, and a positive influence. We had to assist 
in ridding the world of ancient Rome. We had to assist other nations 
in sweeping away the dead and wrinkled skin of antiquity. We 
had to assist in striking away the shackles from the nations as we 
assisted in striking away the shackles of the individual. Our example 
in those countries which are governed by despotism has been an 
inspiration to lovers of freedom — ^more than an inspiration — a sub- 
stantial guide and a substantial leader. When the United States took 
its place in the sisterhood of nations, monopoly prevailed upon the 
seas. It was an age of prohibition, of restriction, of search and sei- 
zure, of indefeasible allegiance. We have helped to rid the world 
of those shackles. Search and seizure are now little more than a 
reminiscence. Indefeasible allegiance has passed with the other 
barbaric quackeries or is fast passing. The inherent right of ex- 
patriation is coming to be a universally acknowledged right amongst 
the children of men. We have established or helped to establish 
the principle of neutrahty, which has done so much to civilize the 
methods of modem warfare. 

It cannot be denied that with the declaration of war against Spain 
and with the conclusion of peace there came a train of new problems, 
a train of new and of strange duties, perchance, and undoubtedly a 
train of new responsibilities. There is no one who would under- 
take to crush the American eagle back into its shell, but for my 
own part I beUeve that we should neutralize the inheritances which 
we received in consequence of the war, and that the leading powers 
of the earth should guarantee their neutrality and their integrity 
and their independence. This would reassure us against the dangers 
of war in another hemisphere. I still believe in the far-sighted wis- 
dom and provision of Washington when he declared that we should 
have no permanent aUiances, but should rely on temporary alliances 
for extraordinary emergencies. If indeed there be a balance of 
power in Europe or a balance of power in Europe and Asia, we know 
that balance is in unstable equilibriimi, and we can best serve our- 
selves and our destiny and our mission in a situation to cast the 
weight of our influence in whichever pan of the scale may promise 
most for the advancement of Christian civilization. I still believe 
that with a foresight almost superhuman Jefferson was right when 



Thk FoRrirsN Pmiry ny thie TTvivpio StaTWI JTP 



he proDOunoeU our iuU;rDAikMud policy to be UiAt of peaee, 
and friendship with all naUona and entangling allianeea whh nooa. It 
cannot be doubted that with the spread of proaperity and the probi^ 
bility of peace we ought to endrde the world with our eo mm aw a . 
I am anxious, and I oonfeas an ambition to see the United 8C«laa 
the industrial, the oommercial, and the financial leader of the world. 
I want to see the United States achieve that position by 
that position. She must conquer commerce. She must 
foreign eommeroe, not with the guns but with goods. R^rtwid w i 
foreign markets give added stability to our industries, to our proa> 
pcrity, to prices generally; and stability is one of the greatest de- 
sideratums in the industrial and financial worlds. 

The obeerving of treaties is a virtue which the United States 
has inculcated among other nations, and this it has practiced with 
fidelity by its sacrificing observance of its treaty obligations. There 
may always be debate as to the wisdom of entering into a treaty. 
There can never be debate as to the virtue of obeerving any given 
treaty. 

Good faith is to a nation what honor is to a man and what 
chastity is to a woman. It is that virtue without which all other 
virtues are vam. Fidelity— good faith— is essential to the soeeess 
of a nation and of its rulers. It is essential to the success of a city 
hoes, perhaps the worst of modem rulers, at least in the United 
States, and my words are to have no local application in this instance. 
The proverbial city boss may have every vice in the category of viess, 
he may want every virtue in the calendar of virtues, save only one. 
He must keep his word. And if you will make mquiries, as I have 
done, you will find the philosophy accounting for the success of the 
city boss in every city is this fact. His devout followers, and eveo 
those who follow him with an accusing conscience, offer this i^wlogy. 
He wnll do what he says he w\\\ do. And that virtue cannot be denied. 
It \\'ill cover a multitude of vices. I hope that the United States 
in the future as in the past will be a splendid example of a natkm of 
the earth that adheres with scrupulous and unquestioning fidelity to 
its treaty obligations. 

We have done the same in establishing the principle of neutral- 
ity, and in conducting international affairs according to the reoog> 
nized and established rules of international law. We have taken 
the initiative in promoting the p r ogr e s s of arbitratkn. In order to 



280 The Annals of the American Academy 

eliminate war we must eliminate the causes of war. We must 
minimize the differences between nations or municipalities for the 
pacific adjustment of these differences. Arbitration promises to 
compass the differences, to preserve peace, and to obviate war 
amongst the Christianized nations of the earth. We have been 
amongst the foremost in the establishment and in the practice of 
this principle, and I trust that we will persevere in the future in the 
promotion of the principle and the practice of arbitrating inter- 
national disputes. This I say is the best means of obviating war, 
and I rejoice that the sentiment of modem civilization is growing 
constantly more steadfast in favor of peace and against war. It 
leads me to hope that the time will come when duelling between 
nations will be considered as odious and as harmful as duelling be- 
tween individuals. I hope the time will come when it will be deemed 
to be no different for one hundred thousand men to murder one hun- 
dred thousand people than for one Cain to murder one Abel. The 
Christianized nations of the earth expend two billion dollars a year 
in preparation for war. Two billion dollars a year! The United 
States, champion of peace, expends four hundred and fifty million 
dollars a year on wars past, present, and to come. Enough to build 
four hundred and fifty thousand homes costing a thousand dollars 
apiece. Enough to build homes sufficient to house more than one- 
half of the population of this splendid metropolis. Four hundred 
and fifty millions a year on the bloody annals of war and only twenty- 
five millions a year on the arts of peace — on agriculture. Now I 
know and you know that the Golden Age has not come, perchance 
is not coming, when the dove of peace may plaint her notes in the 
throat of the cannon with unmolested and unthreatened security, 
and yet philanthropists may dream and poets may sing of the coming 
of the time when the plowshare will be dominant over the sword. 
I have a dream of my own, and I wish that each and every auditor 
here tonight might survive until the realization of my dream. I 
wish that the time might come when the Christianized nations of 
the earth would remit at least one billion dollars from their annual 
charges for war and for bloodshed — one billion dollars of burden from 
the bended backs of their citizens — and allow it to remain in the hands 
of those who earned that splendid, that colossal sum; when the 
civilized nations would limit their war expenditures to not more than 
five hundnxl million dollars a year and devote that for the time to the 



The Fobxion Policy of the United Statk^ 2R1 

maintimancft of their praent military ettAbUahmeDU, auU wuuUl kvy 
about half abillion ayMtf foran intMvalkMial peaee guarmnt«c fundani 
invest that half bilUon in the bonds of the different nations, at least 
one-half of it in the bonds of the different nations and the other half 
in the stocks and bonds of the leading industrial ooneems of the vari- 
ous countries, and then create an international force for the adjudi- 
cation of international quarreb, ho tluit when a verdict in given in 
favor of an iigured nation, indemnity would be paid like an falter- 
national fine. How much of war would that abolish and how much 
of peace and its infinite hlesringw would it bring in its train. Nov 
that is my dream. Not a praetioal proposition for the p res en t time, 
but in the process of the suns a solution of that kind or of some other 
kind must be found to obviate war and the rumors of war and estab- 
lisli in its stead the universal blessing of peace. 

One other point. Our foreign policy cannot be better, cannot 
be wiser than our foreign representatives, than our amhassednn, 
our ministers and our consuls, who are our national lepw en t at i ves 
in foreign lands. They ought to be men who can ably and adequately 
protect and promote the vast and varied interests of this splendid 
industrial and commercial republic. We ought to insist upon the 
very highest standard of fitness and of efficiency, for no matter how 
V theory our foreign policy may be, until the agents for its 

: lent are raised to these standards our policy will still be sub- 
ject to criticism. It will not be a success. It will be characterised 
by a greater or less degree of failure. 



THE ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 

By W. Morgan Shuster, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subject of this discussion is one on which I have very 
definite convictions. It by no means raises an academic ques- 
tion. Our relations with the other nations of the world are of vital 
and material interest to every inhabitant of this country. We have 
sailed out of the comparatively calm seas of our foreign relations of 
twenty years ago. Serious problems confront us on many sides. 

Since I feel earnestly upon this subject I shall speak earnestly, 
and if to anyone present I shall appear to touch upon matters of party 
politics, I crave their indulgence, because I do not intend to speak in 
a partisan spirit. 

The foreign policy of a nation having a representative form of 
government should be the accurate expression of the collective con- 
science of the people. Autocratic governments are in a different 
situation. 

In the United States the vast development of a free press, the 
large number of public-spirited societies, the system of open debate in 
Congress, all afford unusual opportunities to either the government 
official or the private citizen to gauge public sentiment on any impor- 
tant question. It is the privilege and the duty of every citizen to 
take part in the formation of a sound popular sentiment in any matter 
involving the honor, the prestige and the welfare of his country. 

But there are some obstacles to the practical working out of this 
idea. Even with a representative government like ours it is impossible 
for the citizens at large to express in a formal manner their views and 
wishes concerning any emergency which may arise, however momen- 
tous. The polls cannot be invoked even in the gravest situation. 
Thus it may occur — and this is a serious defect in the actual practice 
of theoretically popular government — that a President or Congress, 
in entire good faith, may in a sudden international crisis pursue a 
course diametrically opposed to the conscience and judgment of a 
vast majority of the citizens. Fortunately such instances are not 
likely to occur. 

282 



A CoNnvacTiTB AmnwoAW Founoii Poucr 

But even if the dtiMns at large were able to vote on eon 
policy in our dealings with another nation or natiooi, woald they be 
able to do so, at short notice, with <islinnees, impartiality and knowl- 
edge of the real factors involved? I think not. The greatest draw- 
back today to the attainment of civilisation's principal goal, univerMl 
peace and jostlee, is the fanperfect deivelopnient of the indlvidiial 
oonsdenoe on broad international questions. As individuals we are 
still bitten by a hundred vanities which to us obscure the merits of 
any such question. Race-pride, aimlees indulgence in patriotic 
fervor, the inherent lurking dislike for foreigners which has persbted 
to this day, the spirit which fans each member of a large mob to a 
fanatical state which, alone, no one of them could possibly attain, the 
belief that national conscience should not necessarily be aa s e nsiti ve 
as individual conscience — something of all these things hokb back 
each nation in the world in its natural rapprodbsmsnl with the other. 
It should, therefore, be the aim of statesmen to educate their 
countr>inen along the broad lines of modem diplomacy. By modem 
diplomacy I mean the school which is slowly but surely diqJactng the 
adherents to the former 8>'8tem of deceit, subterfuge, evasion and 
trickery, which made the title " diplomat" a by-word with the messes 
In the United States the problem of creating and eetabfisliing a 
constructive foreign policy is especially difficult. Let us consider 
what elements such a policy should contain, and then discuss the 
possibility of attaining them. Some experience with the law has 
taught me to hesitate at framing definitions. But it seems dear to 
me that no foreign policy of ours, or of any other natioii, could be 
termed ''constmctive'' unless it should be based on certain obvious 
and fundamental principles. 

A constructive foreign policy must have permanency and con- 
tinuity. It must be a guide to our citizens in dealing with other 
nations, and to the other nations in their dealings with our govern- 
ment and our citisens. Therefore, in the United States, a foreign 
policy must be non-partisan; it must not be framed in a spirit of 
domestic politics, nor ever be made the instrument d party strategy. 
I This is vital, since it is dear that, with the changes eveiy four years 
I in our executive branch, and the possibility of even more frequent 
m changes in the legislative branch, there can be no continuit>' if our 
K foreign rdations are to be made the subject of party advantage. 



284 The Annals of the American Academt 

new definition of patriotism. The present conception of that word 
is too much bound up with the historical achievements of mere mili- 
tary success. Respect and encouragement should be given to love 
of country, but the wonderful emotional appeal which is made to 
the sense of nationality should be enlisted on the side of humanity 
and justice. Real patriotism demands that national honor shall be 
placed above national welfare. 

If any conflict should arise between national duty and national 
welfare, we should first fulfill our obligations as a nation, and then 
adjust, as fairly as may be, our internal questions and the losses 
growing out of them. For example, I would rather see my govern- 
ment pay $100,000,000 a year subsidy to our coastwise trade than 
to be even suspected of violating or evading a treaty stipulation. 

It must be remembered that a nation which lowers its prestige in 
the eyes of the world places a stain not only on each of its living citi- 
zens at the time the offense occurs, but also upon millions of unborn 
citizens whose future government will be dealt with in the light of 
past actions. 

So far, I have mentioned elements of a purely general character 
which should help form a foreign policy for the United States, but 
there is a long list of specific points which cannot be safely ignored. 

The foreign policy of the United States up to the present time, 
so far as there has been any at all, has consisted of sporadic assevera- 
tions of the Monroe Doctrine. Washington appealed to his coun- 
trymen to avoid entangling alliances. In so far as making treaties of 
offense or defense is concerned, that advice has been kept. But other 
circumstances may impose upon a nation risks and responsibilities 
quite as great as such documents of alliance. 

We have entanglements in the Orient, in the Pacific, in the 
Caribbean, and, if we would be consistent, as far south as Cape 
Horn. We have somewhat lightly assumed a quasi-protectorate 
against the great military powers of the world in behalf of some 
twenty nominal republics, many of which are in reality monarchies 
or oligarchies with only the barest forms of democracy. It is use- 
less to attempt to soften this fact. If the Monroe Doctrine means 
anything to the world today it means that the United States must, on 
proper demand, stand sponsor for the acts, debts or any other obli- 
gations incurred by any one of the present or future nominally sover- 
eign governments in South and Central America. This is a thoroughly 



A CONOTKUCmrB AMKUCAJt POKBIOV POUCT WB 

entangling allianoe» except that the other partaeaarD m no w^ eDian- 
gled by it. If any "subject" of the Monroe Doctrine ■nquieieee In Um 
stand or action taken by the United States in its behalf, all is well and 
good; if it does not, it is in the same situation as if the doeirina did 
not exist and the United States sought to meddle in its affaiia. 

I believe that a ooostruetive American foreign poUey demands 
that we should deal with eveiy sovereign nation in the world, larfs 
or small, on tenns of absolute equality. The justice of a nation's 
olaim to sovereignty should not be tested by the number of ships 
or men which it can muster, nor should our attitude, as one of the 
present-day world powers, be in the faintest degree altered by oKber 
the strength or the weakness of the nation with which we are dealing. 
Any taint of opportunism in our external relations could not fail to 
lower our prestige as a nation and diminish our power for good in 
the world's affairs. 

We should regard it as a paramount national duty to observe 
strictly the spirit of all our treaty obligations, with large countries 
or with small. If a question arises as to the exact meaning of such 
an instrument, we should, if unable to adjust the question by diplo- 
matic exchanges, agree to arbitrate the point and to abide loyally by 
the decision. We should exact similar treatment by other nations in 
their dealings with us. Some years ago we grossly violated a long- 
standing treaty with a friendly but minor Latin-American nation. 
We did so by force and fraud. We have been asked by that nation 
to make amends or, if their form cannot be agreed upon, to arbitrate 
the question. We have done neither thing so far, but there are 
certain negotiations in progress. No really constructive foreign 
policy can countenance the commission of an injur>' to the feelinyi 
or the welfare of a friendly nation without the fullest reparation being 
offered and made by the offending party. A nation which is not 
big enough to make amends for a wrong done to another nalioii is 
no more civilised than is the man who injures another by accident, 
but refuses to apologize. 

We should continue to do cver>ahing possible to encourage the 
formation and employmejit of arbitral tribunals and prooednre, not 
only by proposing or acceding to such a system in cases of questkMis 
involving ourselves, but by sending repre s en tatives to form a part 
of 8urh tribunals whenever so requested. 

In order that the national government of the United Slalfls may 



286 The Annals of the American Academy 

act with proper authority in its dealings with other nations, there 
should be a constitutional amendment effecting the complete sub- 
mergence of the theory of state's rights and sovereignty in so far as 
they might come into conflict with the treaty-making power of the 
federal government. Until this shall be done, we will continue to be 
in the ridiculous and anomalous position of having to explain to 
foreign nations that we cannot maintain our treaty obligations to 
them because of the action or attitude of some state government. 
The absurdity of this situation becomes more apparent when we reflect 
on the fact that if any state of the Union should be attacked by a 
foreign power, it would become the absolute duty of the national 
government to protect the state — in other words, an attack on any 
state would be an attack on the United States, but the international 
obligations assumed by the United States are not necessarily binding 
upon each state. 

Last, but not least, it should be a vital part of our constructive 
foreign program to create and maintain a highly trained, non-political, 
non-partisan diplomatic and consular service. The arguments and 
the prejudice in certain quarters against this plan spring from a 
narrow ignorance which it is a disgrace to our national intelligence to 
allow to influence us. Today, more than ever, each nation, in its 
manifold and complicated relations with the others, springing from 
political, financial and commercial rivalries of constantly increasing 
importance, has need of highly competent representatives abroad, 
not only as channels of conmiunication, but as advisers to the home 
government. No nation of the slightest importance in world affairs 
is as backward and as short-sighted as is the United States in this 
respect. We at times seem to be proud of our shortcomings in this 
matter. The American people need for their foreign representatives 
not only men of good manners, and of some knowledge of the world 
beyond that acquired in the pursuit of their local career, however 
brilliant, but men who have made a study of international law, of 
history, of the political alliances of the world, of the natural and 
inevitable tendencies and trends of the principal nations, and of the 
laws and customs governing international finance and trade. No 
man, be he inherently ever so shrewd, can, without this special 
training, have the poise and self-control necessary to acquit himself 
with credit when pitted against the trained minds of the statesmen 
who direct the foreign offices of the important nations of the world. 



A CoNrrRucnvB Amuucan Fosmai P^ucr 387 



The oonmiUr tervioe is not lev imporUni. Every 
nation but the United Statet rnoogniiea thit fact It would ba 
paadng strange if our ccmunereial affairs were so different from tbois 
of any other oountry that we oould afford to entrust them to inei- 
perienoed hands. 

Our foreign policy should naturally take spedal heed of our 
peculiar position in the western hemispheie. We are dominaiit 
among the Latin-American natkms purdly because of our siae, our 
wealth, and our armed forces. We are not dominant because we 
are regarded as particularly just or generous in our dealings with 
them; nor because of any similarity of fundamental social institu- 
tions. We are apt to think that the Latin Americans are moie 
Americans, as we ourselves understand that term, than Latina. I 
believe that the contrary is the case. It is a mistake to suppose that 
because in the superficial forms of their governments many Latin- 
American countries are like the United States, their peopie are 
similar in their social, political, commercial or ethical viewpointa. 
The great majority of them have a distinctly Latin education; their 
mental process follows more closely that of Europe; they are by blood, 
tradition, financial relations, trade routes, and in some eases fai actual 
distance, nearer to Europe than to us. Any sane American foreign 
policy should adjust itself to these facts, and not start out on a false 
hypothesis. 

President Wilson, in a speech at Mobile on October 27, 1913, 
rv' '- :ng the diplomatic representatives from Costa Rica, Bolivia, 
;. Peru, Brazil and Argentina, made a declaration which, for 
its boldness of expression and high statesmanship, deserves to become 
one of the axioms not only of American foreign policy, but of that of 
every truly civilized nation in the world. 

He said: ''I want to take this occasion to say that the United 
States will not again seek to secure one additional foot of territory by 
conquest." 

The authority of a President to speak for, or bind, the American 
nation in such an affair may well be questioned, for Congiem may 
declare a war of conquest at any time and direct the P reride a t to 
wage it, but his enunciation of this view as a principle of American 
statesmanship is beyond all cavil. 

The history of our annexation of some of the territor>' now con- 
stituting the United States proper has been questiooed m stfiel 



288 The Annals ok the American Academy 

ethics, but our actions were at least on a plane with the international 
standards of those times, in addition to the fact that the land was 
really needed for the proper development of the American nation. 
But commencing with the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and 
passing to the conquest of Cuba, Port j Rico, Guam and the Philip- 
pines, and the forcible separation of tne state of Panama from the 
friendly republic of Colombia, we find that our motives and stand- 
ards, however unselfish and noble they may appear in our own eyes, 
are still subject to the gravest question in the minds of the peoples 
of the rest of the civilized world. Whether realizing it or not, we 
were giving to the world, and especially to Latin-American nations, 
a horrible example of that same "land-hunger" which we claim for 
over ninety years to have prevented Europe from gratifying at 
their expense. 

President Wilson's words anent the securing of additional 
territory by conquest were, therefore, peculiarly timely and appro- 
priate, and they should be proclaimed on every possible occasion and 
with all obtainable authority in our diplomatic exchanges with Latin- 
American countries. 

The President, in this same speech, however, went further, and 
in so doing he gave a remarkable example of the state of "mental 
guardianship" which those who subscribe to the bundle of declara- 
tions now known as the Monroe Doctrine are apt to feel toward all 
other western nations. 

He said: "States that are obliged to grant concessions are in 
the condition that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic 
affairs. Such a condition of affairs is apt to become intolerable. 
And it is emancipation from this inevitable mbordination which we deem 
it our duty to assist in.^' 

Now this is sheer idealism and dreaming. In enunciating a 
principle of this nature the President went beyond the confines of 
statecraft, and sailed away over the seas of fancy. 

Under no previous construction of the Monroe Doctrine have 
we attempted to say what concessions should or should not be granted 
by any Latin-American nation. The Lodge resolution adopted by 
the United States Senate in the summer of 1912 as a result of the 
Magdalena Bay incident was aimed only at the acquisition of certain 
concessions by foreign governments. Nowhere, so far as I am 
aware, has there been any attempt by even the most ardent Monroe 



A CoNtTKUonrs Ambbkum Pokbuw Fouor 



doctrinaire to Miert that the United SUtee poenene the veto pofwir 
over all conceinona iougbt to be granted by nationa In the weatern 
hemj^hftie. Furthannoie, moat of the nationa ol Latin Ameriea 
have ahraya been, and are today, unable to obtain foreign eapHal 
except by means of cionoewiow Th^ do not, aa a rule, grant them 
by choiee, but through neoeinty. To say to euoh nationa that they 
should not grant coneeMJons, but rather "invite hnreatmenta" of 
foreign capital, is a mere question of language, and is analogous to 
telling a man who is starving to death that he should not pawn or 
sell his watch. 

Lastly, even were it possible by mere persuasion to indues 
Latin-American nations to cease granting concessions to 
the question arises: under any other system how would the 
capital for their development be obtained? European bankers 
would probably refuse to furnish it without some adequate security, 
and practical experience has absolutely demonstrated that American 
capital will not go there even on the favorable terms which provoked 
this utterance by President Wilson. 

I cite this case as a fair instance of what, in my opinion, a con- 
structive American foreign policy ought to avoid. It is one of the 
many unauthorised attempts at political guardianship over smaller 
western nations which arouses against the American people a very 
keen resentment. We must be sure of our neighbor's u-illingness to 
have us meddle in his private affairs before we venture to do so, by 
word or deed, even though our intentions be of the best and moat 
unsel6sh. 

On the other hand, in this same address, the President used 
language which might well be placed at the top of the stationery of 
our state department: "It is a very perilous thing to determine a 
foreign policy in terms of material interests. It is, indeed, a degrad- 
ing thing." 

The United States may well follow that rule, and it may property 
use such friendly influence as it can exercise to "see that from no 
quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and 
national comity," but it should be remembered that the Ameriean 
people neither hold any divine commission to right the wroogB of the 
world, nor are they so free from doubt and danger in their own internal 
affairs as to be able, wisely, to devote their budding ene r gie a and 
resources to galloping up and down the world's highways with 
ing buckler and gleaming sword. 



290 The Annals of the American Acadsmt 

Not as a specific foreign policy, but in the realm of international 
ideas to be given our moral support, we might well class the theory of 
a present-day "balance of territory," to be established throughout 
the inhabited world. We have seen much of the ** balance of power" 
in Europe. It has always seemed to me a most unstable thing, but a 
balance of territory would be but a recognition by the family of 
nations that sovereignty in a people should no more depend upon the 
extent of their military and naval resources than does the right of an 
individual, in any civilized conmiunity, to liberty and the protection 
of the laws depend upon his physical strength. 

The greatest obstacle to the fixture of sovereignty and territorial 
limits as they exist today is a fatuous tendency towards over-central- 
ization of political control. Trade, finance, increasing population in 
the older countries, the principle of the "white man's burden," all 
seem to whisper it. Some nations pursue this policy for a "place in 
the sun;" others have stopped at no pretext and have shrunk from 
no crimes, however shocking, to fling further afield their flag and 
sovereignty. Yet, in any truly permanent arrangement of the 
world's political units, all government must take serious heed of, if 
not indeed actually pause at, certain racial, climatic and geographical 
lines of natural demarcation. No government can successfully 
withstand the test of time and changing social conditions unless 
there is at least a potential homogeneity among its people. The 
limitations on empire-building are distinct and inexorable. At these 
natural barriers must cease the existing trend of powerful nations 
towards concentrating imder their political aegis all the weaker 
states and peoples which may come within their grasp, whether the 
relationship may take the forms of colonies, dominions, protectorates, 
suzerainties or spheres of influence. Failure to recognize this fact 
will only prolong the political unrest of the world and take heavier 
toll of humanity in general. 

Many will say that this is idealism. It may be so. But if the 
American people, in their dealings with other nations and races, 
cannot rise to this plane, shall they not at least hold it up as a standard, 
as a serene guiding-star of policy in moments of storm and crisis 
when the public mind is inflamed by the heat of controversy or the 
fires of racial passion? 

Hiree general reasons occur to me for which one nation may 
ordinarily intervene in the affairs of another: first, in the protection 



A CoNfiTRUcnTB Ambucak Forbion Poucr 201 

of the intervening natkm't eitiieBi or their p rope rty , if either art 
jeopardiied; seeond, to itop a wmnton rfwuiding of blood; third« on 
the broad grounds of altrukm, tometimea called a "duty to elviU- 
lation/' and, in the Orient, "the white man'a burden." 

As to the reasonable and cUntereated eiereiie of the firtt prero- 
fi^tive, there can be no juet complaint. The direct coUeetioo of 
;..» — tional debts by force in the last resort will continue to be 
ry until some international bafliff shall be created for this 
purpoee. Any other system would but invite fraud on the part of 
administrationa temporarily in power in any debtor nation. By 
common aooeptanee it is the right of a nation to protect its natkmals 
from violence or injustice. In connection with this a very delicate 
question arises. It is the right of individuals to trade in most foreign 
countries. It is also the admitted policy of most nations to foster 
their trade with other countries by all legitimate means. But what 
are legitimate means? Is, for instance, the exaction of any fonn of 
trade or tariff concessions by political preesure on another govern- 
ment a legitimate act? If not, how far may a friendly government 
go in the endeavor to promote its foreign commerce, and widen the 
field for its bankers, manufacturers, engmeers and contractors? There 
is no standard at present in such cases, and the decision must be left 
to the foreign offices of the governments involved. 

As for the second reason for intervening in another natkm's 
affairs — to stop wanton bloodshed — it is a highly dangerous policy. 
Suffice it to say that it should be indulged in only as an exercise of 
what may be termed the international police power, and then only 
when the leading nations of the world are agreed that no other coarse 
remains open. 

The third reason— ^truism — is one which has recently been ad- 
by the United States not only as a justification for forcible 
iuivi %< iition in the affairs of a theretofore friendly power, but for 
retaining indefinitely under the American flag territory obtained by 
armed conquest or ceded by a treaty of peace. At what profit 
or loes this task has been performed is a reasonable subject of inquiry. 

A eonstaruetive fordgn policy must take notioe of the faet that 
international politics are intimately oonnected with intematkNial 
finance. Theoretically, perhaps, this should not be so, but the rela- 
tionship is even closer than in the ease of domestie polities and finance. 
It may be poeeiblc for the United States government to hold itself 



292 The Annalb of the Americaj^ Academy 

clear of any influence in its foreign relations by financial problems, 
but no one nation, however powerful, can suddenly change the con- 
duct of all other nations. The foreign policy of the United States in 
this respect is therefore compelled to choose between following more or 
lees settled lines of action and standing strictly alone, at whatever 
cost to its bankers and commerce generally. The latter course would 
be difficult. The former course may not be idealistic, but the chasm 
between idealism and finance still exists. On finance must fall the 
opprobrium and criticism engendered by the intense struggle of 
nations and individuab to amass wealth. International policies 
should not be shaped to mercenary ends, but unless a government 
shall cooperate with its international bankers, its efficiency and 
influence will be greatly reduced. Other nations, which follow a 
more material course, will make loans on profitable terms, and the 
American investors in foreign securities (never numerous and always 
timid) will be content with domestic securities and enterprises. Since 
the United States still has need of all its surplus money, no immediate 
harm will result, but profitable foreign investment fields are not 
opened up in a day, and our present policy should consider the future. 
Furthermore, a certain proportion of foreign securities held in any 
country is a steadying factor in times of local money disturbances. 
A constructive foreign policy must determine a line of conduct 
for our government in the matter of encouraging the investment of 
American capital in undeveloped foreign nations. For our govern- 
ment to do nothing would be, in practice, equivalent to putting a 
veto on all such investments, since capital will not go as private 
loans to foreign governments unless there is some promise or guarantee 
from its own government that good offices will be extended in the 
case of default of payment or breach of faith. To ask American 
investors to make loans to any governments smaller or less stable 
than the leading nations of Europe except upon some such assurance 
of official support at home would only encourage purely speculative 
financing, and place responsible bankers under a handicap which 
would inevitably drive them from any competitive field. Thus, if a 
group of American capitalists were bidding against a European group 
for a loan to be issued by a Latin-American nation, the fact that our 
government would not guarantee to extend its good offices in case of 
necessity, whereas the governments of Europe would do so, would 



A C0N8TBUGTIVB Ambbican Forbiqn Pouct 

effectually bar AmerioinoApilal from the field, even though Umto 
not other inherent himilkMmii which render real com p e lit ioii with 
tho European mon^ markets akmg these lines practically hnposiible. 

T '^'^lusion, I desire to advert to a very live issue on whieh our 

aeeam to have no very clearly defined poliey. I refer 
to the Mexican situation. Blany plans have been sugfssted, but of 
late some prominence has been given to the idea of what may be 
termed a '' Pan-American intervention." I believe that any attempt 
at joint intervention in Mexico by several South American nations, 
acting with this country, would result most unfortunately. The 
plan is impracticable, and if attempted, would result in endless com- 
plications in the future. The mere broaching of it through any official 
channels would be sure to arouse in Europe further 
against the policy and attitude of the United States. The 
of the leading nations of Europe from the intervention would deprive 
the effort of exactly that crushing moral force which the united action 
of the leading powers of the world can always bring to bear. The 
Mexican dictators and people would still feel that they were fighting 
only the American nation, nominally assisted by some small South 
American powers, which in all matters would have to be oompletety 
dominated by the United States. 

Argentina, Bnudl and Chile have been mentioned as proper 
participants with the United States in bringing about public order 
and restoring normal government in Mexico. Each of those countries 
has its own peculiar and difficult problems to solve. No one of them 
has any substantial political, commercial or financial interests in 
Mexico. Their participation in armed intervention in the latter 
country would, therefore, mean to the European powers which are 
materially and vitally interested in Mexico but another test of how 
far the Monroe Doctrine is to be tolerated. It might well be thai 
just some such instance as this would be selected by those powers aa 
the starting point for a coalition in defiance of that doctrine. En gla nd, 
France, Germany and Spain would have a strong case upon which 
to rest their challenge of our exclusive policy. Every precedent of 
international law would be with them. The lives and property of 
their nationals have been destroyed and are still jeopardised in Meiieo. 
The United SUtes would by its action be admitting the necessity (or 
outside aid in restoring peace and order in Mexico, yet it would be 



2H The Annals of the American Academy 

undertaking that task in a manner calculated to emphasize its sus- 
picions of the good faith of leading European nations and thus increase 
the resentment which in certain quarters is already felt there. 

It is illusory for the American people to seek to isolate the western 
hemisphere from the rest of the world. The whole tendency of the 
day is a cloeer relationship between all nations, races and peoples. 
This is the inevitable result of modem civilization, progress, world 
commerce and science. Any attempt to retrograde, to mark ofT and 
reserve continents for the exclusive political domination and com- 
mercial monopolization of any one nation, however powerful, cannot 
fail to evoke in other nations a feeling of resentment which will increase 
in exact ratio as the policy of isolation succeeds. Conmion sense, 
fair play and prudence all urge upon the American people a closer 
and more harmonious understanding with the leading European 
nations in the solution of the Mexican situation, and any suggestion 
having a contrary tendency is harmful, and even dangerous. 



A PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY 

Br Edward W. Townskkd, 
4 Itaober of CoDgr«« from New Jeraey. 

After the first performance of Sardou's political satire " \ 
at the Vaudeville tbeatre in Paris in 1872, Preadent Thiers ordered 
the governor of Paris to forbid a second performanoe. 

I wish that after the first performance of Sardou's romantic 
drama "Dora" at Wallack's theatre m New York in April, 1878, 
where it was given its American name of " Diplomacy/' that the then 
mayor of New York had ordered its immediate suppression. I am 
soberly convinced that if the police powers of New York had been eiar> 
cised for the immediate suppression of that play, it would be Ism 
difficult now to discover the elements of a constructive Amerioan 
foreign policy* 

If some of you wonder what I have said has to do with the sub- 
ject upon which I have been asked to address you, I hasten to explain: 
not many weeks ago an artist friend of mine in New York who had 
found profitable occupation in drawing caricature illustrations of the 
tango, drew the figure of a young woman so distorted, that it was a 
caricature of his own caricatures. Acting upon a happy inspiration, 
he gave the drawing the title of the " Debutante Slouch " and thus it 
was reproduced in a popular illustrated weekly. Today a miilion 
young American women are trying to copy that illustration in their 
own walk and carriage and thoee who have an unusually supple baek- 
bone, and are highly gifted with the power of imitation, are soooeed- 
ing, to the delighted surprise of obeervers. 

You see at once now the quarrel I have with Victorien Sardou's 
play "Diplomacy." 

Jerome A. Hart, in one of his entertaining books, gives us a Uvety 
and comprehensive account of the plays of Sardou, and lyeaktng of 
a woman character in the play, he says this of her: "This young My 
is a unique and fascinating person, beautiful, elegant, s ed u fl U we as a 
fairy princess." 

Dora, you may recall, was unooosciously enlisted into the group 
of women who, Sardou would have us suppose, eodst in all the large 

»6 



296 Tax Aivnalb of the AiyncBiCAN Acadbmt 

European capitals, and act as secret agents for diplomats. Mr. Hart 
gives testimony to his belief that such groups actually exist, and arc 
not the creation of M. Sardou's lively imagination, and says of them: 
"These ladies wear gorgeous goi^ns, and resemble Solomon's lilies in 
the other respect that they toil not; but they excel at writing let- 
ters, which letters pay the cost of their gorgeous gowns, ^heir per- 
fumed correspondence is filled ^vith gossip, political and other, and 
it amuses foreign statesmen even when it does not instruct them." 

I shudder as I pause to ask if Mr. Hart unconsciously suggests 
here one of the reasons why only the very rich may play " Diplomacy" 
for us in foreign capitals? But that is somewhat aside from my main 
purpose in introducing M. Sardou into this very respectable company. 
Sardou is not the only offender, but he came conveniently into my mind 
as a type. Other romance writers have entranced their readers by 
drawing, if I may be permitted to phrase it in this way, the ''Debutante 
Slouch." The creators of this burlesque diplomacy have been amazed, 
as my artist friend was at the result of his work, to find their fanciful 
creations laboriously copied; to find that nature, in fact, imitates art. 
Sardou and his fellow offenders have created a picture of diplomacy 
wherein we see lovely and mysterious women gorgeously gowned 
seducing from incautious diplomats, secrets for the information 
of other diplomats; a picture of subtle intrigue, of masterful in- 
tellect gaining advantage by processes allied to wizardry; of vast and 
comphcated affairs determined at secret meetings, the result of which 
at times is announced by the sudden boom of artillery, the thundering 
charge of cavalry. This is the romance picture of diplomacy which 
excites the ambition of excellent he&da of families to desert their homes 
and their comfortable clubs, and their golf links, to enter upon this 
delightful occupation, thinking to become "Baron Steins," to com- 
mune with bevies of "Doras," to control the destinies of nations, to im- 
part to startled secretaries of state code messages carrying delight- 
ful information derived from scented correspondence. That is why M. 
Sardou's play and like output from other romance, lie under the dis- 
advantage of my severe disapprobation. 

To be sure there is a somewhat more real though scarcely more 
admirable attraction to the very wealthy in the prospect of represent- 
ing our country in foreign courts. They will have there opportunity 
to dine with nobility, even at times with royalty, they will be seen 



A Practical Dirunucr 

at the shooting boxat of dulMS, at the race ooune with oaHt, at tiia 
clubs witli baruneU and on the atreeta with men of faahion. 

In nothing which I have said do I intend to indicate diaapproval 
of the custom praotiaed by many administrationa, of more than ooa 
political faith, of making appointmenta to the large plaoea in the dip- 
lomatic service of rich men, because th^ are rich men. I am willing 
to admit that ahnost any rich man who made his own money, if he 
obey instruction such aa I shall presently indicate, would be aa 
capable as one less favored by fortune of carrying on, as a diplomat, 
the business of our foreign reUtions; but it d stresses me greatlly 
that this air of romance, of unreality, should have enveloped this Tery 
practical business. 

There should be no illusion about it, and the incentive to engage 
in the business should be only a desire to do a public service in a very 
straightforward and simple manner. I do not mean that there are 
not certain qualifications for the office not usually pos ses s ed by men 
who have been industriously engaged accumulating a fortune, but I 
have a scheme to overcome the difficulty arising from that lack of 
special knowledge. There is, for instance, the great difficulty of 
kno\iing exactly how to address members of the diplomatic corps. In 
my own three years' experience on the foreign affairs committee of 
the House of Representatives, I have had the customary opportuni- 
ties offered to the members of that committee, of meeting not infre- 
quently, members of the diplomatic corps in Washington and the 
ladies of their households. I have found the men very human beings, 
interested deeply in trap shooting, golf, baseball, tiie price of beef 
and the difficulty of securing a lower berth. The ladies are all of them 
charming and affable. But I began to enjoy this highly enviable 
opportimity too late in life successfully to school m>'8elf in one of 
these special qualifications I have referred to; I do not know today, and 
sadly confess that I never expect to know, what rank in diplomacy 
entitles a man to be addressed as ** Your Higlmess/' and what rank as 
'' Your Excellency." Unlimited study gives one a certain steadiness of 
voice in the matter of addressing by Uie more familiar titles, that is, 
those of nobility with which an early reading of Bulwer familiar- 
ises one. 

There is another difficulty of a more serious nature, oonoeming this 
special requirement that I have spoken of, one that somewhat handi* 
caps our system of appointment as it is practised at present, but which 



298 The Annals op the American Academy 

under my improvement will be also happily overcome. It is the mat- 
ter of speechmaking by our diplomats. For this embarrassing prob- 
lem I have a happy solution. When a representative in Congress 
finds in his morning's mail, 20 letters asking for precisely the same in- 
formation, the congressman does not dictate 20 different forms of 
reply, but indicates a form already in use, or, if the matter is new, 
dictates a form to cover the whole 20 requests. This system could 
readily be applied in the matter of diplomatic speeches. One appoint- 
ed to be ambassador to the Court of St. James, let us say, going to 
Washington to receive his instructions, could be supplied with a set of 
forms; form A to be used at the dedication of a new monument to 
Robert Bums; form B to be used if the admirers of Wordsworth are 
to unveil a bust of their favorite poet; form C the opening of a new 
Anglo-American Club in London. It is unnecessary further to unfold 
this scheme. It readily unfolds itself to any practical mind. To be 
sure the unexpected is always happening. But even in such an event 
I would have the situation handled with caution and according 
to instructions received by the diplomat. If, for instance, a society 
is placing a tablet in honor of George Bernard Shaw, and should in- 
vite our diplomat to submit a few remarks upon that interesting 
occasion, and his index failed to disclose an appointed form, the appro- 
priation allowed him by my committee for incidental expenses would 
enable him to cable news of the exciting event to the secretary of state, 
and receive an approved speech by cable in ample time for its delivery. 

To deviate a moment from the sober and orderly course of my 
remarks, what, I ask, could be more solemnly whimsical than an ex- 
pression of the opinion of the present secretary of state, on the life 
and writings of George Bernard Shaw? Unless, indeed it might be 
a whimsically solemn review by Mr. Shaw of the diplomatic excel- 
lencies of the present secretary of state of the United States. 

Now to my panacea: there are in the department of state in Wash- 
ington, a score, probably many more than that number, of men who 
have received years of training there. They are linguists and highly 
skilled in the details, the precedents and the history of our foreign 
relations — the kind of men foreign nations appoint to diplomatic 
posts — but incapable of making large campaign contributions; these 
are without prospect of being sent by us to occupy diplomatic posts 
at important capitals. We should provide a new position in each 
American embassy; that of assistant ambassador, and to these places 



A FuAcncAL DiFLOMAcr fgg 

should be appoinied men mob aa I have deaeribed, and tbiui by t^ 
preaenoe of auch a man at each <mbaa«y , the am haaBadof nillbegiTan 
freedom aolcly to eigoy social deligbta, except upon auch nooadoni 
when he might be requiied to deliver an addreas reUtiag to form A, 
B or C, which form would be deftly aeleoted for him and filled in 
where blank qiacet aa to the name and occupation of the pemn wboae 
memory waa to be celebrated, required. Thie aariatant diplomat 
could perform the simple dutiea of the oflSoe, such aa cooTeying to 
the government to which his chief waa accredited the information 
hia own government wished to be conveyed, and receive from that 
government the information it wished to conv^ to Waahington, and 
diligently devote the rest of his time to discovering means of inereaa- 
ing our foreign commerce. Having been trained in his business, 
this assistant ambassador would know what be was in a foreign capi- 
tal for, he would be under no illusions as to '' Doras, " he wouki know 
that there was no hocus-pocus, no sharp card tricks, no foolery what> 
ever of any kind about this business of maintaining proper and profit- 
able foreign relations between the countries whence he came, and 
to which his superior officer was accredited. He would know that M. 
Sardou was just as much a joker as is Mr. Ibsen, and that the play of 
"Diplomacy'' is no more like the thing diplomacy than "A DoU'a 
House" is like anything that really ever existed. 

If these thoughtful remarks have not indicated to you pr e c i sely 
what in my opinion should constitute the elements of a constmelive 
American foreign policy, they have been made in vain. Fiom the 
time when, in March, 1776, the Continental Congress named Silaa 
Deane as its diplomatic agent to France until this year of grace 1914, 
the end and aim of our foreign relatione have been to extend our com- 
merce. I do not say that this aim has been held true at all timea, but 
I lay it down as a general proposition, that friendly relatkms being 
assumed, there is little else involved in foreign relations and certainty 
nothing else comparable in importance, to the business of *«*^"*^*^ 
the commerce of this country. 

The importance of our ooouneroe, in every consideratioo of our 
foreign policy, even in the earlieat timea when that poliqr was being 
developed, is suggested by Profeaeor Moore, whose abseaoefiraai the 
state department at this moment I deeply regret. InhisOnsJ yy wd h sd 
Years of Amerioaan Diplomacy, he speaks of the 14 trealiaa entefed in- 
to between the United Statea and the European nations early in our 



300 The Annals op xnE American Academt 

national life, and refers to their wide range of subjects, among them 
commercial intercourse, and in one instance the agreement that "If 
difference should arise in consequence of our infraction of the treaties, 
no appeal shall be made to arms till a friendly arrangement shall have 
been proposed and rejected." Our author comments : "These clauses 
were far in advance of the international law of the time. They repre- 
sent an aspiration; but, if intended as a prophecy, they yet remain 
for the most part unverified and unfulfilled, though they are by no 
means discredited." 

I know that statistics make dull matter for an address, but I 
can not refrain from using a few figures to emphasize my contention 
that our foreign policy should be more largely directed to securing 
foreign commerce. 

The total Latin-American foreign commerce for the year 1912 was 
twenty-eight hundred million dollars, of which our share was eight 
hundred millions, with a balance against us, however, of two hundred 
millions, — a fair percentage of conmierce for us, although the balance 
against us remains a serious drain. The figures for the ABC group, 
Argentuia, Brazil and Chile, are far from satisfactory, a fact due in 
part, certainly, to our lack of a constructive policy toward the ABC 
group, which, if adopted, would result in a much better trade showing. 
The total foreign commerce for Brazil, for 1912, was six hundred and 
seventy million dollars, of which our share was one hundred and nine- 
ty millions, with a balance against us of fifty-three millions. Great 
Britain had a balance in her favor of thirty-four millions in her share 
of Brazil's commerce for the same year. Only one more illustration 
by statistics: Chile's total commerce for 1912 was two hundred and 
sixty-one miUions, of which our share was forty-one millions, with a 
balance against us of eight millions. 

In those three great countries, of trade potentialities beyond com- 
putation, we have an embassy in Brazil only. There are bills pending 
to raise Argentina's legation to an embassy, but the administration has 
not yet made a recommendation that we should pay a similar deserved 
compliment to Chile, although peculiar reasons exist why Chile 
should be so complimented. It seems to me that our state department 
should adopt as a policy toward the A B C group an attitude of 
special cordiality, which should have as its most significant expres- 
sion our friendly recognition of the great importance those powers 
have achieved in the family of nations; of our sincere pleasure in 



A PKACnCAL DlFLOMACr 101 

their splandid dvilimtion, ibair high •dvanoement in tri, leUan aad 
Hcienoe. Th^ aboiiM be made to loMm aad fed that tbey are to thaiv 
with U8 the reqxwidbilitiea, tbe burdens and prhrilefea oC weetero 
hemiepbere guardianifaip. Our erchange of oommeroe, of friendly 
interooune tbrougb travel is startUngiy abort of what it abould be; 
and for a remedy we roust look to a foreign policy fhring greater and 
well deeerved recognition to tboee tbree great and iplendkl natiooa. 
Commeroe promotes peace as surely as peace promotes com- 
merce. But what I shall say upon this subject now is upon the 
assumption that we shall remain at peace with the great niOkms of 
the earth, through the simple expedient of minding our own business 
and making the great part of that business the securing of foreign 
trade as a means of extending our domestic industries. Granting me 
that assumption, I now reveal what most profoundly lies in my mind 
on this subject. It seems to me that no student of our preeent eco- 
nomic and social conditions, even one giving but casual study to those 
subjects, can fail to see the vital necessity of providing more empk^- 
ment at more wages if we wish our country good health. There are 
symptoms plain to the senses, that a distemper threatens our social 
body. Some once looked about and denied that such qrmptoms were 
visible. Today only the fool will make such denial. More employ- 
ment and better wages must be provided if we would have the threat- 
ening symptoms disappear — the fever subside. As an essent ial 
means for bringing about such subsidence there must come, as 
speedily as may be, a vast increase in our foreign commerce, a vast 
increaseof foreign consumption of our manufactures. The radicalism, 
so plainly discerned in groups of ail the three parties contending for 
the political control of the government, is bom of a perception of this 
need. It seems at times as if this radical energy was misdirected to 
attain the desired big end. We cannot, solely by legislation, I n er sass 
employment, increase wages or decrease the hours of labor, yet this 
is being constantly attempted. Manufacturers will not prodoee 
more than they can profitably sell, they cannot give more than a 
tain share of their product in wages, or else they starve 
The radicals see the symptoms and, in part at least, attempt their otrs. 
Under-employment and under-pay are not caused by the qrmptoma 
of idleness and unfair conditions of living. Yet we see the attempt 
pcrsiBted in to cure thoee thmgs by legialation, which in no degiee 
whatever can, nor doee it even aeek to increase the demand for labor- 



802 The Annalb op the American Academy 

ere and increase the share of the product which capital can give to 
labor. The remedy it seems clear to me is expansion of our foreign 
trade, a great increase of foreign use or consumption of our produc- 
tions; and that I would have brought about largely by the work of 
our diplomats in carrying out our foreign policy. 

Probably the men attracted from idle lives at home by the fasci- 
nation of a Sardou picture of "Diplomacy," would be of but small 
aid in furthering a policy which seeks to better domestic condi- 
tions by increasing our foreign trade. If it has become a political 
necessity that such men should hold such offices, then the remedy I 
suggested, half in jest a moment ago, might be seriously considered. 
Let us, if it seems expedient that we should do so, treat the office of 
ambassador as purely ornamental, an offering to one whose gifts to 
party entitle him to a reward. But let us reform our embassies by 
placing in each of them a practical man, trained in intercourse with 
foreignere, trained to know which of our productions the country he 
is accredited to might use or consume, trained to know that diplomacy 
is not a romance but a business, and perhaps in that way we may 
supply at least the elements of a constructive American foreign policy. 



C70III in UN I CUf 14MI 

THE TRUTH ABOUT STATE REGULATION OF UTIUTIEB 

IN WISCONSIN 

Bt O. C. Mathkwb, 
Public UtiliilM SUtiatician, lUilroMl CommiMtoo of WUconain. 

In the May number of Thb Annals, Mr. Stiles P. Jones, seo- 
retar>' of the Voters League of Minneapolis, has made an attack 
upon methods and results of state regulation of public utilities in 
Wisconsin which puts state control in a very bad light. Because of 
the importance of the subject and the seriousness of the charges made 
by Mr. Jones, it appears that the facts with regard to the situation 
should be presented as fuUy as possible. 

One significant fact with regard to the statements made by Mr. 
Jones is that his information has been drawn, as he states, from 
the files of the Minnesota Home Rule League, an organisation which 
came into existence to perform a single function, to defeat Governor 
Kl)orhart's plan for a state public utilities commission. The secre- 
tary of the league, who was actively in charge of its task of gather- 
ing information in opposition to Governor Eberhart's program had 
been campaign manager for the governor's opponent during the pre- 
vious campaign. Whatever may have been the merits of the contro- 
versy in which the Home Rule League engaged i^ith the governor's 
supporters, it seems that the circumstances under which the league 
did its work and the purpose for which it disseminated informaUon 
were hardly such as would be likely to lead to a fair, hnpartial analy- 
sis of the situation in Wisconsin and to the presentation of the un- 
biased truth with regard to the activities of the Wisoonain ooounii- 
sion. As Mr. Jones states, "The league first proceeded to comb 
Wisconsin,'' but there is evidence that the combing was not ckxie to 
find the truth, but was done to find ever>' situation which might con- 
ceivably be turned against the commission. 

Unfortunately for those who have expected to find in Mr. Jones* 
paper an accurate rdsum^ of Wisoonsm conditions, many of the acts 
and opinions of the Wisconsin eommismni have undergone marvel- 



304 The Annals of thb American Academy 

ous changes between the time when they were gathered in the comb 
of the league's investigator and the time of their appearance in the 
bulletin entitled ** Regulation of Public Utilities in Wisconsin," of 
which Mr. Jones' article is merely a recapitulation. 

Starting with eight general charges against commissions, the 
author proceeds to establish his case by citing what the league has 
apparently taken for facts. To reply to the charges made by Mr. 
Jonee it is necessary to take up his paper in detail and review the 
evidence upon which he reUes for his conclusions. This will necessar- 
ily lead to a scattering rebuttal of his argument but because the weak- 
ness of his argument is due to the evidence which he uses and to his 
method of handling the various items of evidential data, a reply 
must be directed to the items of evidence upon which he rests his case. 

A review of the e\ndence of which he makes use leads one to 
believe that the Home Rule League from whose files he draws his 
information has permitted itself to be misinformed in some particu- 
lars and that in others, its zealous pursuit of the truth has resulted 
in the drawing of erroneous conclusions and, incidentally, in the 
spreading abroad of a number of statements for which no foundation 
exists outside the somewhat prejudiced imagination of its sponsors. 

But let us look at the proof by which the league's case is sup- 
ported. 

In his article, Mr. Jones quotes the Home Rule League to the 
effect that out of 134 cases decided by the commission up to March, 
1912, *' Public service corporations of Wisconsin asked the commis- 
sion for increase of rates in 52 cases. Substantial increases were 
granted in 43 cases and small increases in 7 additional cases. In other 
words, some increase was granted in nearly every case where it was 
asked, some were granted when not asked for." The statement is 
made that 38 of the 134 cases were telephone cases. 

Up to March, 1912, the commission actually issued 126 deci- 
sions in utility cases, although the number of actions disposed of was 
substantially as stated by the league. 

A count of the decisions shows, however, that 51 of the decisions 
instead of 38 as stated by Mr. Jones were issued in telephone cases. 
Probably this is a mere oversight, but it is significant, because a 
large part of the increases authorized by the commission came in 
telephone cases. 

Of the 51 telephone decisions, 32 were issued in cases where util- 
ities asked for authority to increase rates. Of these, 22 were granted; 



RaouLATioN or UTnjrmi of WnooHm 106 



5 were granted in part, and 5 were refuaed,althouch the league fUtea 
that the eommiarion haa granted Inereaaea In all but two eaaaa wharo 
utilitiea asked for them. Of the 37 caaee in which telephooe ulifiliM 
wero permitted to inereaae ratea, 24 resulted in actual faiereaasa of 
revenue. In the other 3 eases deereaaes hi some elaases of ratsa mora 
than offaet the hiereaaes authorised. Of the 24 fajeieaaw authoriaed, 
8 were inereaaea of $200 per year or less, and only 6 were over $1,000. 
In most of Uy oaaes the merease can be computed mathematically 
and in the others it can be estimated very cloeely. The total inereaaea 
permitted in the case of telephone utilities were $17,530 per year, 
equal to 34/100 of 1 per cent of the telephone revenues of the 
for the year ending June 30, 1912. Included among t 
were such as the increase in the case of the Ettrick Telephone Com- 
pany which was authorised to increase its rate from $3.00 to $4.00 
per year, and thoee in the cases of the Morris Telephone Company, 
which was authorised to charge 50 cents per month, of the Pewaukee- 
Sussex Telephone Company, where an increased rate was authorissd 
in cases where rentals were not paid promptly, and Platte ville, Re- 
wey, and EUlenboro Telephone Company where an increase waa 
authorised, to be effective when full metallic service was installed 
Another fact which should be noted in connection with the inereaaea 
which the commission has permitted is that of the 24 telephone 
utilities whose revenues were increased by authority of the com- 
mission, 9 were mutual companies having a total of 4049 subscribers, 
of whom 2454 were stockholders. In these cases, therefore, the appli- 
cations to increase rates came from the very parties who would pay 
the greater part of the increase. 

In the cases where inereaaea were authorised the increases wtn 
granted because the companiea were not earning enough to provide 
adequate service and meet the depreciation on the equipment, to 
-■'-■ 'nothing of providing a return on capital invested. 

vinong the smaller telephone companies a general praeliee haa 
prevailed ol extending the plant out of such earnings as would prop- 
erly have been used to provide for depreciation, without adding to 
the value of the plant as shown on the utility's books. Among 
the mutual companies, stockholders frequently did eonslnielioii work 
without charge to the company. As a result, the vahie aa carried 
on the books of these companiea, has been less than the actual inveil- 
ment. Basnig our figures upon thi^ eonaervativo ^tatftnent of Tahie, 
we find that all the telephone companiea for which the 



306 Tbs Annalb of the American Academy 

authorized increases earned 2.6 per cent upon the value of their 
property in 1912, after the increases became efifective, and 4.1 per 
cent in 1913. In this case computation depreciation was computed 
at 7 per cent, although in some cases a higher allowance should be 
made which would still further decrease the amount available for 
return upon investment. Mr. Jones does not state that a public 
utility should not be entitled to a reasonable return upon its invest- 
ment, but if the commission is to be criticised for permitting telephone 
companies to increase rates, the conclusion must be that the critics 
do not believe that a utility is entitled to earn a reasonable rate of 
interest. 

The Home Rule League is quoted further by Mr. Jones as fol- 
lows: " In a term of five years, during which the trend of public serv- 
ice charges was so strongly downward, the trend under the Wis- 
consin conunission was uniformly upward." What the facts are with 
regard to water, gas, and electric rates in Wisconsin we shall see later, 
but there is one ix)int in the statement quoted which should be noted 
here. The trend of public utility charges in the telephone business 
has not been strongly downward. Most of the small, independent 
telephone companies in the country were started with a very few 
subscribers, by parties who know but little about the cost of conduct- 
ing a telephone business. As the business expanded the necessity for 
continuous service, for metallic lines and for improved standards of 
maintenance has increased the cost of conducting the business. To 
this must be added the tardily recognized necessity of providing for 
depreciation of property, and the fact that wages of operators and of 
repairmen have gone steadily upward, without corresponding savings 
in efficiency, such as have made reduced prices possible in other public 
utilities. 

The cost of conducting the telephone business has not been 
decreasing. 

In spite of all this, the increases in telephone rates authorized 
by the conmiission have been extremely small. In 1912, 647 tele- 
phone exchange systems and 26 toll systems reported to the commis- 
sion. In almost five years from 1907 to March, 1912, the commis- 
sion authorized increases of revenue for 24 telephone utilities, 9 of 
which were mutual companies. In other words, about one telephone 
company out of 27 was permitted to increase its rates during five 
years; the total increase amounted to about one-third of 1 per cent 



RiQULATioN or Vnunm nc WnooMtoi 907 



of tho telephone reveauee in the state, end efter the 
authoriied the oompeniee were earning a snaller return on tiMir 
investment than could have been obtained from fini-daai fann niori> 
gagee. 

Nineteen caeee were handled l^ the onmrninion during the tioM 
alluded toby M r. Jonei, in whieh oomplainte of varioua kinds againai 
tdephone utilitieB were ooncemed, or in which the applicationa did aoi 
relate to rates. In six of these casss service matters wers invohred, 
and in five oases improvements were ordered. Two casss related to 
pole removal, and in one of these the removal was ordered. Rates 
were involved, either directly or indirectly, in ten cases. In four of 
these oases rates were reduced; in five cases the proceedings were dis- 
missed, one of them because the complainant could not lawfully file 
a complaint, and in one case rates were increased in order to provide 
enough revenue to enable the utility to furnish adequate servioe. 
Discriminations were ordered discontinued in two cases. 

In leaving this matter of telephone rates, we should remember 
that telephone companies in Wisconsin never possessed municipal 
franchises, and that prior to the enactment of the public utility law 
rates of telephone utilities were not fixed by any public authority. 
Without commission regulation telephone utilities would have been 
free to charge what rates they chose and every increase upon which 
the commission passed could have been made without being psssed 
upon by any governmental body. 

From what has been said, it will probably be clear that what the 
Home Rule League and Mr. Jones have charged against the Wis- 
consin commission does not have a firm foundation of facts, as far 
as the telephone utilities are concerned. 

A study of the other cases shows facts afanost equally at variance 
with the charges made by the league. 

Only one heating utility case was handled during the period 
chosen by the league for its study. This was an investigation, oo 
the commission's motion, of heating rates in Milwaukee, and the 
facts obtained showed that no order could be issued. 

There was one case against a toll bridge utility and as a result 
of its investigation the commission ordered extensive improvements 
to be made. 

Four cases involved gas rates. The Manitowoc Gas Company 
was authorised to reduce its illuminating gas rate and put in a 



808 Thb Annals op the American Academy 

25-cent service charge, which service charge was eliminated ^vithin a 
short time. The net reduction amounted to from $6,000 to $8,000 per 
year. 

The Green Bay Gas and Electric Company was authorized to 
put in an optional gas rate and a minimum monthly bill of 40 cents. 
The optional rate was optional with the consumer so that it could not 
amount to an increase in any case. 

The rates of the Racine Gas Light Company were reduced about 
$13,000 per year and a reduction of the gas rates of the Wisconsin 
Traction, Light, Heat, and Power Company was made by which an 
annual reduction of about $12,000 was efifected in Appleton, Neenah, 
and Menasha. 

The water cases handled by the commission during the period 
studied by the league number nineteen. Increases in rates were per- 
mitted in only two cases, and one of these was a municipally-owned 
plant which had been losing so much money that the tax-payers 
entered complaint and asked that the plant be made self-support- 
ing. In the other case the utility still earns less than 6 per cent, 
with a very economical management. 

Two applications were made by water utilities for authority 
to increase rates, but both were dismissed. In six cases lower rates 
were asked for but the earnings of the utilities did not justify a reduc- 
tion, but in one of these cases improvements in service were ordered. 
In four cases new rate schedules were ordered. In one of these cases 
the total revenue was practically unchanged, and in the other three, 
reductions were made. Six of the other cases related to service and 
in every case improvements were ordered. In one case a rule fixing 
terms for payment for service was approved with the consent of both 
parties to the case. 

Of electric utility cases the commission handled 42 during the 
time in question, i.e., it handled 42 cases in which matters relating 
to the electric business were the only ones involved. Twenty-three of 
these cases involved applications by the utilities for authority to in- 
crease or adjxist rates. In 20 cases the applications were granted, and 
in 3 cases they were denied, but this does not mean that the revenues 
of the utilities were increased in 20 cases. 

In the Marinette case revenues were decreased as a result of the 
granting of the utility's application; in 10 cases there was no increase 
of revenues, but merely an adjustment of rates by which discrimina- 



RaauLATioN or Unums or Wnoomor 300 

^ able practioef were eliminfttod, and in c 
Vet the HooM Rule League, M quoted bj Mr. 
BUtes that tubstaniial iuereaeea were authorised by the 
in 43 oaaee out of 52 ap|>licatknii, and mall increaees in all but 2 of 
the others. 

The 9 electric utilities which were permitted to increase their 
rates earned for interest in 1012, 0.4 per cent upon the value oi their 
property, using the more conservative appraisal value, instead of 
the book value, which for the electric utilities often ezoeeds the 
actual value. For 1913, the amount earned for interest was equal 
to7.2percentof the value of the property. The electric bo slB ass has 
grown very rapidly during the past few years and yet the Increases 
authorised by the commission did not yield a 7 per cent return untfl 
1913. 

Nineteen electric utility cases involved other matters than appli- 
cations by utilities to change rates. Service was involved in 7 ol 
these, and unprovement was ordered in 5 cases. In one other case 
the company made the improvement without an order. Five cases 
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Three cases arose from com- 
plaints agamst utility rates and the complainants were upheld in 
two cases, and in one case a new schedule was recommended but no 
order was made. In one of the other cases the commission acted aa 
a board of arbitration; in two cases investigations of discrimmatory 
practices were made on motion of the commission; in one other eass 
discriminatory rates were discontinued and in the other a proposed 
rule of the utility was rejected. 

Eight decisions of the commission were issued in joint utility 
cases, i.e., cases which involved electric and water rates, or eleetrie 
and gas rates, etc. In one of these, standards of gas and eleetrie nnriee 
were established. General reductions were made in rates in five eases. 
A new schedule was provided upon the application of the Jefferson 
municipal light and water pUmt, and an increase was authorised in 
only one case and then only as applied to business lighting. This was 
in La Crosse. 

This somewhat lengthy and probably tedioas summary of the 
decisions has appeared to be justified because the statements regard- 
ing rate casee made by the Home Rule League and quoted by Mr. 
Jones are not true in a single important particuUr. The league s^yt 
that there have been suheUmiial increases in 43 cases and t^ tUl aniuU 



310 The Annals op the American Academy 

decreases in only 3 cases. Aside from the fact that the numbers have 
not been correctly stated by the league, the word "substantial" has 
undergone a remarkable change of meaning in its use. Even taking 
every increase which the commission has authorized the number is 
lees than the 43 listed as "substantial." But the league's definition 
of the word "substantial," as applied to the decreases, is very far from 
what it is as applied to the increases. The decrease in the second 
Madison Gas and Electric case alone, which, by the way, was taken 
up on motion of the commission, was more than S8,000 greater than 
the increases authorized in all the telephone cases taken together. 

SuDMnarized, the facts are that increases in revenues were per- 
mitted in 37 cases instead of in 50, and all but 13 of these were cases 
of small telephone companies. Revenues were decreased in 17 cases 
up to March, 1912, aggregating annually between $132,000 and 
$135,000, and being more than $100,000 greater than the sum of 
all increases. Increases were refused outright in 10 cases, instead of 
in 2, as stated by the league, and in 15 cases new schedules were 
authorized which removed discriminations but did not increase 
revenues. Surely the league would hardly wish to criticise the com- 
mission for removing discriminations even though it were done on 
application of the utility, as long as no increase in revenues resulted, 
yet this is the conclusion to be drawn from its statements. 

A count of the cases shows that the service was involved directly 
in 23 cases and indirectly in one or two more, instead of in 34 cases, 
as stated by the league. The league has, however, hit upon the 
truth in its statement that improvements were ordered in 20 cases, 
which is the only correct statement in the extract quoted by Mr. 
Jones. 

The criticism of Mr. Jones' paper does not end with what he 
states on the authority of the Home Rule League. Many of the 
statements for which he assumes the responsibility are not true and 
others are so illogical that it is surprising that the author could have 
made himself beheve in his own conclusions. To refute his argu- 
ments requires merely a statement of the truth. For example, he 
states that, "Many of the estimated reductions made during the 
past year are held up awaiting the action of the court of last resort, 
with the people paying the old rate in the interim." As a matter of 
fact there are only two reductions so held up, and they are the Mil- 
waukee and the Superior street railway cases which he mentions. 



R»OUI»ATinN nv T'TiiiTir-M nt WmOO W DI 811 



Mr. JoncM (1(M M iitit fxpkin by what mental piocM i ho 
f }i<> fart that iliac two utilities have appealed to the eourta •• aa 
nt asainet the eommiaioii. It might be pertineDl to faM|«ibv 
Willi what mysteriouB power Mr. Jones would clothe the eHiet io 
that witli home rule in utility regulation, the utilltiee would no loafer 
exercise their rights of appoal. The commission is criticiiied for aoi 
reducing rates and then it b further criticised because utilities take 
ever>' legal means of protecting their earnings. 

Another statement made by Mr. Jones which is not a statsment 
of the truth is that the commission has refused to permit the sale 
of hydro-electric power in Madison. The falsity of this statement 
was pointed out to the secretary of the Home Rule League at the 
first annual meeting of the League of Minnesota Municipalities in 
October, 1013, but as evidence of their earnestness in getting at the 
truth of the situation in Wisconsin, they have repeated their mi^ 
leading statements in their recent bulletin and here we find the 
same charges. The truth is that the city of Madison, the Prairie 
du Sao Company, or any other person or organisation has never 
asked the commission to permit the sale of hydro-electric power in 
Madison. No case has ever come before the commission on this mat- 
ter. The power plant is not yet completed. The commisekm would 
indeed be ridiculous if it had attempted to pass upon a situation which 
never was brought before it. But "the citisens of Madison have 
stripped for battle'* says Mr. Jones, thereby giving the impression 
that the commission is fighting with the people of Madison. The 
truth is that the Madison Board of Commerce has hired an expert to 
investigate the question of securing hydro-electric power and to secure 
the facts which will determine whether any action shall be brought 
before the commission. The Madison story as told by the Home 
Rule League and reiterated by Mr. Jones is a political fabriealioii, 
pure and simple, and the league officials knew the facts when the 
story was published. 

We are told by Mr. Jones that the utilities are in politics m Wia- 
consin, but that in Duluth such is not the case. It is sipiifioant that 
in all comparisons, with a single exception in the case of etieet rail- 
way service, which Mr. Jones and the league have made b etween 
conditions in Minnesota and in WisooDflin, Duluth has been the only 
example cited in Minnesota. It is stated that in Superior the public 
service companies "come pretty near to dominating the polities of 



312 Thb Annals of the American Academy 

that city," but the author does not explain how he reconciles this 
statement with his other statement that the people of Superior voted 
seven to one to ask the legislature for authority to take over the 
street railway. A vote of seven to one for municipal ownership is 
not very strong testimony that the community is politically in the 
grip of the corporation. 

Comparison is also made of the price of gas in Duluth and Supe- 
rior. Duluth has a population about twice as great as that of Superior. 
In 1912 the Duluth plant sold 325,000,000 cubic feet of gas to about 
8,000 consumers. The Superior plant sold a little over 67,000,000 
cubic feet to 3,400 consumers. Sales in Duluth were about twice as 
great per consiuner as in Superior, and fixed charges of the plant 
were distributed over a vastly greater volume of sales. The com- 
parison between Duluth and Superior is certainly not as fair as a 
comparison between St. Paul and Minneapolis, but the home rule 
partisans have refrained from calling attention to the difference in 
rates between those two cities. If the author had cared to make a 
fair comparison he would have compared Minnesota cities with cities 
of similar size in Wisconsin. For example, Winona, Minn., might 
have been compared with Eau Claire; St. Cloud and Stillwater, Minn., 
with Ashland, and Manitowoc; Red Wing and Faribault, Minn., with 
Watertown and Waukesha; or Moorhead and South St. Paul, with 
Stoughton and Monroe, in nearly all of which cases the Wisconsin 
rates would have been found lower than those in Minnesota. 

Furthermore, the Duluth gas plant is municipally owned and 
whatever advantages it might seem to have in any fair comparison 
would be found to be due in large measure to the fact that many ac- 
tual expenses, such as cost of supervision, depreciation, and taxes 
which the city has foregone, have not been fully met from the earnings 
of the plant, but have been borne by the tax-payers. 

With regard to municipal ownership the author charges that ex- 
cept in water works cases, the attitude of the commission "has been 
distinctly obstructive at all times, on the theory that municipalities 
are not competent to perform such duties of city administration." 
There is not even a semblance of truth in this statement. The com- 
mission has no discretionary power, of any kind whatever, which 
would enable it to obstruct municipal acquisition. The statutes of 
Wisconsin state very clearly how and by what means cities may secure 
municipal ownership. Electric plants have been municipalized in 



Rbgulatiom of UnumH m Wi 



818 



Brodbead, Kauluuina, Caahtoii, Mid Manitowoc. The Grmad Rapidi 
and Prairie du Sao oaaei ut ponding at thk writing. In ovwy 
oaae where a et ty liaa taken the proper eteps to purohaae the propert i y 
of a utility the oomminion has valued the propert y , ae required by 
law. No other result would have been poMible and at no time haa 
there been any attitude "obetruotive" to the securing ol municipal 
ownership. 

Mr. Jones criticises the indeterminate permit feature of the law 
and makes four charges which are entirely unsupported by the facta. 
To answer these charges it will perhape be best to take them up fan 
order. Speaking of the indeterminate permit, Mr. Jones states that: 
(1) "It has prolonged the life of privately owned utilities through 
its obstructive effect on municipal ownership.'' Whether the ind^ 
terminate permit has had an obstructive effect on municipal ownership 
must be judged from the facts of the case. According to the Wis- 
consin law as it was prior to the adoption of the indeterminate permit 
feature a city could take over a private plant only in case it oould 
prove the meeuUy of such acquisition in court. The eiprcissd 
wish of the voters of the city was of no value unless the dty eould 
prove that municipal o^niership was necessary. As the indeterminate 
permit Uw was passed in 1907 the acceptance of the indeterminate 
permit was made optional with the utilities, but the acceptance of 
an indeterminate pennit by a utility bound the utility to agree thai 
its property could be purchased by the city at any time, without 
the necessity for municipalization being proved. That is, the utili- 
ties waived all rights of court review as to the necessity of purchase. 
This was the situation up to 1911. At that time a Urge number of 
the utilities had accepted the indeterminate permits and thidnhj 
agreed to sell their plants to the cities whenever the voters aboukl 
determine to purchase them. The following statement shows the 
facts as taken from the 1911 reports, as to the extent to which the 
utilities had consented to sell their plants without the 



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314 The Annals of the American Academy 

court review. This includes all of the privately-owned water, gas, 
electric and heating utilities. Telephone utilities are not included 
because they had never held municipal franchises. 

Out of 140 private electric utilities, 53 voluntarily took the in- 
determinate permit, 15 out of 40 gas utilities, 19 out of 31 water util- 
ities and 7 out of 14 heating utilities. Of a total of 225 private util- 
ities, the necessity of proving in court that municipal ownership 
was necessary was eliminated in 94 utilities. All private utilities 
which have started operations since 1907 have been obliged bylaw 
to acquiesce in the right of the municipality to purchase the plant 
at any time. In 1911 the legislature extended the indeterminate per- 
mit feature to all utihties, and those who accepted the permit under 
compulsion probably still have the right to have the necessity of 
purchase proved in court. That the permit has not had an obstruct- 
ive effect on municipal ownership is further evidenced by the fact 
that the water plants in Sheboygan, Fond du Lac, Appleton, Lake 
Geneva, Manitowoc, Whitewater, Oshkosh, and Antigo, have been 
purchased by the cities and that water plant purchase cases are pend- 
ing for Racine, Janesville, and Beaver Dam. There are only 25 
privately-owned water plants in Wisconsin at the present time. Four 
electric plants have been municipalized and two cases are now pending. 

The second charge which Mr. Jones makes is that the indeter- 
minate permit "has entrenched the companies in their monopoly 
grip upon the cities, with the result of continued excessive charges 
and inefficient service." It is true that the permit gives utilities a 
monopoly of the field they serve. If the statement that rates are 
excessive and service inadequate, where utilities are protected by 
the permits, were true, the utilities might be said to have a "monopoly 
grip." The number and nature of the commission's orders to im- 
prove service and the inspection carried on by its engineering de- 
partment have resulted in improvements in service until there is no 
question but that service furnished by the utilities of Wisconsin is 
superior to that of surrounding states. The charge that rates are 
excessive and service inadequate is one for which Mr. Jones has failed 
to dte any evidence whatever. If rates are excessive and if home 
rule is the proper means of regulation, how would we account for the 
fact that in two of the three reductions which have been made in 
electric rates in Madison, the commission opened the cases on its 
own motion, because neither the city not its citizens would file a 



RsoiTLATioN or UTiunm or Wnoomn 316 

complaint? The advaaUfes and aavtnga which retult, in the loof 
nin, from having a eltjr auppHad by a ilngle utiUty ai« too w^ 
to readers of Tms Annai^ to need repetition in this dlaouMion. 

The third oritielBn of the faidetenninato pmwh la that "It 
haa made it impoarible for munidpaUtiea to aeenre eheapir or better 
street light eervioe through the oonstniction of municipal phinta.*' 
80 far as any reoord which haa ever been faitroduoed beforo tba mb^ 
misBion shows no municipality eould get cheaper and better street 
lights by constructing its street lighting plant. The city of Milwaukee 
is faiveetigating the question at present but no conclusions have been 
reached by Its experts. 

The final charge against the permit is that "It has nullified exist- 
ing contract obligations between cities and utility oompaaiea, oflea 
to the great advantage of the companies.*' 

No contract could possibly be nullified by the permits. That much 
of the statement needs no explanation. Nan-contraetual features of 
franchisee have been altered but cities have often been the parties 
to take advantage of this. The law provides that rates shall be rea- 
sonable and service adequate, and these have been regulated by the 
commission so far as they were not matters of contract. To stale 
that contractual relationships have been changed is to ignore the 
fact that the supreme court of Wisconsin has upheld a contract be- 
tween a city and a public utility under whose terms the city was realty 
receiving free service (141 Wis. 363, Superior v. Dou^as Count>' 
Tel. Co.). 

Mr. Jones attacks the commission severely for ita valuation 
methods. It should, however, be remembered that the 
which must be considered in valuing utility property have 
termined by the courts and that the Wisconsin commisskm haa no 
choice as to the inclusion of the various elemente. If the cnmrnfawaoo 
were not to give consideration to such elementa as going Tahie, ita 
decisions would be reversed in court. Neither the cnmmfarinn nor 
any municipality could enforce an order which would not yield a 
reasonable return upon a valuation of the property, Indndinf ill 
valuation elements which the courts have held must be eoMJderwt 
Mr. Jonee' real contention should not be with the conunission for in- 
cluding elements which, under the law, it had no power to 
but should be rather with the courta, by whom the 
have been laid down. 



816 Tte Annalb of the American Academy 

Aside from the unreasonableness of his attack upon the commis- 
sion for including in its valuations elements which must, legally, be 
included, there is another objection to the statements that Mr. Jones 
has made with regard to the commission's method of valuation, 
which is, that the facts are not correctly stated. Speaking of going 
value, he says: "In effect, it (the commission) capitalizes the com- 
pany's early losses, puts upon the public all the hazards of the busi- 
ness, and assures the utility of liberal returns on its investment from 
the very beginning of operation." Nothing could well be further from 
the truth. The commission has never included losses which did not 
represent a reasonable outlay in developing the business. The risk 
due to abnormal conditions, to lack of necessity for the utility in the 
community served, to poor business management, has been placed 
upon the utility. All that has been included as an element of value 
is the cost of building up the business under normal conditions. The 
position of the commission is stated in its decision in State Journal 
Printing Co. v. Madison Gas and Electric Co. (4 W.R.C.R. 601-586) 
as follows: "As already stated, when such deficits are due to abnor- 
mal conditions, or when due to bad management, defective judgment, 
extravagance, lack of ordinary care and foresight, unduly high capi- 
tal charges, and other causes of this nature, it is manifestly clear that 
they should be accorded little or no consideration in either the valu- 
ation or the rates." Apparently Mr. Jones has not known what the 
commission's attitude has been on this question. At least he has 
failed to state correctly the facts in the case. 

A number of other points in the commission's valuations are 
criticised, among them the inclusion of property donated. The val- 
uations of railroad property placed before the United States supreme 
court in the Minnesota rate case, included all land, regardless of its 
method of acquisition. The fact that the commission has been up- 
held in its valuations by the Wisconsin supreme court shows that the 
conunission's valuations have been made in accordance with the law, 
and we are not told by Mr. Jones how any other valuation could be 
upheld, even with home rule in utility affairs. 

In speaking of the inclusion of service connections, the author 
includes only enough of the opinion of the commission to give the 
impression which he wished to convey, i.e., that the commission has 
included service connections, paid for by consumers, in its valuation. 
He fails to quote a complete sentence, of which the missing portion 



RaouLATioN or Unumi or WMOomm S17 



reads as follows, "from the point of ykm of equity Ibll 

may well be given to the fact that a large number ol 

been paid for by consumers, and that certain lands have beao donated 

to the company by the municipality/' City of Ashland t . Asbknd 

Water Company (4 W.R.C.R. 373, 806). 

The Appleton and Oshkosh oases are quoted as showing that the 
commission includes in its valuations in municipal purchase eases the 
cost of paving over mains which has not been disturbed by the utility. 
An examination of the facts in these cases, however, shows that the 
final value fixed by the commission included only the present vahis 
of the property, mkuvm of patemerUa, plus a small allowaaee for 
going value. The cost of undisturbed paving is not in the final val- 
uation, although it is shown as one element in the cost of reproduction 
which is quite a different thing from the price for municipal acqui- 
sition. In the Ashland case previously cited and on the page follow- 
ing that from which Mr. Jones quotes with reference to services, the 
attitude of the conmussion with regard to paving over mains Is ex- 
pressed as follows: 



While this item (pAving ov«r mainB) \b unqaestiooAbly a vsUd one in < 
mating the eott of reproduction new, it ia not an item which, oo its faee, most 
bo included in the value of the property for rate-making purposes. The fact 
is, that respondent company was obliged to cut through no pavements whatso- 
ever in the original construction of its system. If the company had not dnee 
been compelled to cut through paving, nothing whatever ■bould be allowed 
under that head in this prooeeding. (Ashland w. Ashland Water Coapeay, 4 
W.R.C.R. 278-S07.) 

This seems to state clearly the commission's position with regard 
to paving, which is quite different from the position described by the 
author. 

Mr. Jones scores the commisAion for its order in the Milwaukee 
Street Railway case, in which the fare was fixed at 18 tidnCs for 50 
cents, which case is now pending in the United States courts. He 
says, " Compare such a meager and uncertain result with what Qevo- 
land, Columbus, Toledo, and Detroit with 3-cent fares have seeursd 
for themselves through the direct action of their city coanefls." 
This statement requires some attention to be given to the 
in the cities mentioned. The most recent data available 
Columbus are contained in the 1914 McOrawBUdneRaihnifMamiaL 
This publication shows passenger revenues per rewne pMseogsr for 
1912, of 3.32 cents. Tho 1018 figures are not giw. 



318 The Annals or the American Academy 

The following quotation from the May, 1914, issue of Pxiblic 
Service, bears upon the Toledo situation: 

The company, through its attome3r8, had notified the city council that it 
would not recognise the Schreiber ordinance as valid nor accept three cents as 
fare, and shortly before midnight on March 27, all its conductors were instructed 
that they must not accept a 3-ccnt fare, except in the 3-cent fare hours — 
between 5:30 and 7:30 in the morning and 4:30 and 6:30 in the evening — but 
that no passenger must be ejected from a car for refusing to pay the regular 
fare. Because of this order there was very little confusion even on the first 
night, when those who were out were expecting some sort of excitement and 
more or less disposed to start something of the kind. In the next few clays 
some persons rode free after tendering three cents, and refusing to pay any 
more, and on the first Sunday there was more or less family joy-riding at the 
expense of the company, but in less than a week the novelty of these conditions 
had worn off and nearly all the passengers paid their fares as before. Now 
nearly eighty-five per cent of those who ride are paying full fare, and the com- 
pany reports that many of the others are not regular passengers and would not 
be using the cars at all if it were not for the chance to ride free. 

The Detroit situation is explained by Henry M. Hyde in a recent 
issue of the Chicago Tribune. As explained by Mr. Hyde there is a 
3-cent fare on the so-called Pingree lines covering only about 60 miles 
of streets. On the other lines the ticket fare is 7 for 25 cents, except 
that during the rush hours 8 tickets for 25 cents are sold, vrith no trans- 
fer privilege. 

The following extract from a letter by Peter Witt, city street 
railroad conunissioner of Cleveland, states the rates in Cleveland. 

The rate still is what it has been during the past three years, 3 cents with 
a penny charge for transfer and a penny rebate. It is quite possible that owing 
to the scrapping of a lot of obsolete machinery the penny charge for a transfer, 
without rebate will have to go on. This will affect 25 per cent of all car rides, 
and will be in operation, if put on, for about one year. 

From this it will be seen that the statement that there are 3-cent 
fares in the four cities mentioned is decidedly misleading. In view 
of Mr. Jones' insistence on comparing Duluth and Superior it might 
be expected that be would have compared street railway fares in 
Milwaukee with fares in St. Paul and Minneapolis, where a straight 
5-cent fare is charged. But his only comparison of Milwaukee and 
the Twin Cities relates to service, and consists of unsupported state- 
ments which are not supported by the facts. 



Rboulation or Ununni in Wi 



319 



The following faoto, for Um year 1912, 6<fort Urn tm; 
Milwaukee eenriee were ordered, are of intereel a« thowinf Uie 
of hie eooeluekiiie: 





M Miwl^ 


He-eei. 


Av6nun Iatb 


6.00 ela. 
67.18 per eeat 
2.61 eU. 
6.106 

0.00187 
87413 
3244 
61.08 
6.110 cU. 


4 34elt. 


Ratio of trmnifer to rovonue iiitneini 

*Nnt Muninn iwr rarMiiiS HMMBflW 


66.66 par eeat 
1.99 eta. 


Ri^vfintift iMMnimr mir oat nilo 


6.661 


MilM of ainfle track per 1000 revenue pM- 


000160 


Cat milee per mile of track 

Car milee per 11000 of operating earning* 


100676 
66M 
61.63 


*Net earnings per dollar of capitaliaation 


8 412cU. 



•Net 

intereet. 



inelude amoonte available for taxes, depreciatioa, aad 



In the light of the facts shown by the foregoing table the cUumt 
for superior service in the Twin Cities do not appear to be well sup- 
ported. It must be remembered, too, that these fact6 relate to Mil- 
waukee service prior to the service order. With 13,000 more car miles 
per mile of track than in St. Paul and Minneapolis and with 3594 
car miles per $1000 of operating earnings as compared with 3244 in 
the Twin Cities, the service in Milwaukee is certainly not as poor as 
Mr. Jones would have us believe. 

There is perhaps only one other statement made by Mr. J< 
which need be mentioned here. He 8a>^ that "the onmmiMi 
authorized the issuance of nearly one billion dollars' worth of 
ties of public utilities.'' In this statement he leaves the realm of 
facts entirely. Up to 191 1 the oonmiission had no power to prevent 
the issuance of public utility securities. This power was conferred by 
the legislature of 1911. Up to June 8, 1914, the enmmissinn had 
authorized the issuance of public utility securities of aD 
amountmg to 113,668,435, of which $2,684,475 was for 
purpoees. 

A number of utilities are operated in oonpection with aUeei 
railways and the securities authorised for theae eompanies are not 
separable between the utility and the railway busineosea. The total 
authorizations for theee companies amounted to $17,935,000, of which 
$4,585,000 was for refunding purposes. 



320 The Annals of the American Acaokmt 

Taking all the issues including the portion for street railways, the 
authorizations to public utility companies amount to S3 1,603,435, 
and only $24,333,960 of this was for new purposes. This is quite 
different from one billion dollars, in which Mr. Jones must have in- 
cluded all steam road securities, original and refunding, and then 
added about 50 per cent for good measure. 

The opposition of utility companies to the stock and bond law 
arises from the fact that the law has prevented over-capitalization, 
has prevented the manipulation of securities and the unloading of 
properties on an uninformed public, and has destroyed the field for 
the wild cat promoter. 

There are many other portions of Mr. Jones' paper which might 
be challenged, but the limits of this article will not permit of a full 
reply at this time. It is beheved, however, that enough has been said 
to show the fallacy of his argument and the misinformation under 
which he has apparently labored with regard to the facts. Inasmuch 
as his attack rests almost entirely upon the *' facts" which he quotes 
and practically not at all upon questions of principle, it seems that 
no further refutation of his statements need be made. 



BOOK DEPARTMENT 

NOTES 

Barboui, Sir Davio. THm ir^utne^ of ik§ Gold Supply on Frie— •nd 
Pp. xii, IM. Pric«, 11.2ft. N«w York: The MMmiUmn CompAay, 1914. 
Sir David Barbour hat agidii ■hown hii intorMt in the tiMory ol 
lo 1012. Tlu Standard of VahiM doalt with the quAoUty thaory of 
with the introductioD of the gold lUiidard into Indim. In this votan* Iw oo»* 
t«nda that the aoundnMi of the quantity theory "ia beyond quetlloo tad tbo 
oontroverty ought to be eloeed" and devotee himaelf to ahowing how the quaa- 
tity of money affeete prioet. Juat what may be the diatinction between tkia 
form of trantaMot and an argument aa to the validity of the theory it la hard 
to determine. 

A aummary of the book doee not aeem naoeeaary aa it ia merely a raatat*- 
ment of the uaual argumenta for the quantity theory with little originality of 
treatment. Throughout the author showa himaelf a firm believer in the Riear- 
dian explanation of the movement of the precioua metala— ao much ao that ona 
wondera how he would explain the heavy importationa of gold into Franee and 
Germany in the laat few yeara aince price differencea are at leaat not obvioua aa 
an explanation. Belief in natural law ia repeatedly emphaaiaed aa in the aaaer- 
tion (p. 8) that " pricea are determined by human beinga who are liable to make 
miatakea. But there are influencea at work which tend to correet aueh miatakaa 
and prieea alwaya tend to be regulated by economic conaidarationa." Aa a 
brief atmmiary of the argumenta for the quantity theory the volume ia intetaat- 
ing but it adda little to our knowledge of the aubject either in ita atatament of 
fact or in ita method of treatment. 



Cannan, Eowin. Wealth— a Brief Explanation of the CautOB of 

Welfare, Pp. xxiii, 274. Price, Sa. 6d. London : P. S. King and Son, 19U. 
Profeaaor Cannan'a previous worka have uaually been of the erudite aort, 
dealing with refinementa of economic analyaia and of textual criticiam. Thia 
new work reveala the aame careful habit of mind, but both in purpoee and ia 
execution the expoaition ia more popular. It haa been "evolved gradually out 
uf the annual courae of lecturea which I have given for ftrat-year atudantaat 
the London School of Economiea." There ia an avoidance of any d ia cu aa in n of 
wagea, profita and rent. Theee categoriea are regarded aa of only local and kia- 
torical importance. There ia little illustrative detail and little diaawfawi ol 
current practical problema. Fundamentala are regularly iiiiiphaaiaad Tba 
keynote of the work ia perhapa better expreaaed in thia aantanaa Ibaa in any 
other: "Our ayatem may be a bad ayatem, but it ia aajratera ofaooMaort; it ia 
not ohaoa." The dominating phaaea of thia order are the pointa regularly en* 
phaaiaed. Particularly striking is the diaeuaaton of inequalitiea of individual 
income and of variations of national wealth. Tba book will ba fooad 
both to apecialista and to the more thoughtful of the | 

821 



322 The Annalb op the American Academy 

Cablton, Frank T. The Industrial Situation. Pp. 169. Price, 76 cents. 

New York; Fleming H. Revell Company, 1914. 

Ab part of a general plan to socialize church work, the Federal Council 
Commission on the church and social service is authorizing a number of books 
by leading authorities which present in succinct elementary form some of the 
leading industrial and social problems of the day. Professor Carlton has writ- 
ten a book which qualifies splendidly for this series. On the one hand, the book 
contains a maximum of important up-to-date facts. On the other, it is ampli- 
fied by summaries and questions which throw considerable light upon the 
fundamental problems involved in the questions under discussion. Social 
evolution resulting in modern industrialism; the effect of industry upon the 
home, upon the school, and upon women and children; wages, hours and con- 
ditions of employment; organized labor; and movements for industrial better- 
ment, make up the bulk of topics which are discussed. 

Carson, W. E. Mexico: The Wonderland of the South. -Pp. xiii, 449. Price, 
12.50. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. 
Travel books on Mexico are of course especially popular during the present 
difficulties with our neighboring republic. Mr. Carson's breezy, interesting 
account of his trips through the country have already made this book well 
known. The edition of 1909 has been enlarged by the addition of an account of 
Mexican affairs since Diaz. In the other chapters there are a number of state- 
ments made which show the work of revision to have been carelessly done since 
they refer to conditions existing at the time of the first edition but now out- 
grown. There is little except in the chapters added in the new edition to indi- 
cate the darker side of Mexican life, the economic unsoundness of the national 
finances, and the unfortunate results of the land system and peonage. The 
chief emphasis is upon the characteristics of travel, the landscapes, the old 
world cities and the economic possibilities of the country. 

Chetnet, Edward P. A History of England From the Defeat of the Armada to 
the Death of Elizabeth. (1st vol.) Pp. x, 560. Price, $3.50. New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1914. 

Cleveland, Grovbb. The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy. Pp. v, 122; 
The Independence of the Executive. Pp. v, 81 ; The Government in the Chi- 
cago Strike. Pp. v, 49. Price, $1.00 each. Princeton: Princeton Uni- 
versity Press, 1913. 

Princeton University has rendered a service to the public, as well as paid 
a tribute to Mr. Cleveland, by publishing in separate, extended form, these 
lectures delivered by him on the Stafford Little foundation at the univer- 
sity. No two actions of Mr. Cleveland bear stronger testimony to his clear- 
sightedness, his decision, his independence and honest courage as a national 
executive than his firm and successful intervention in the Venezuelan contro- 
versy with England in 1895, and in the so-called "Chicago strike" of 1894. 
His vigorous executive insistence on the Monroe Doctrine at the conscious risk 



Book DBPABmnif tH 

of war with a firti-«UM pow«r reeUiiiMd Um Amerieaa priadpW ffoa Um 41^ 
repute into whieh unfueceasful diplomacy with EnglaBd, aiiiM 1011. had 
brought it. He not only vindieatod iha righta of Venaaoala, biti ha btooglM %im 
doctrine cloaer to legialative aaoetioo than it had efwr bata bafora. 

The faoU and tba marita of tbia ooe ti of awy and ollha alrika ara ^wm im 
the aimple and foreald maaaar eharaotariatie of Mr. Cl«vabuid« aod Ua aldUf«l 
introduetton of important letters and ordera addf riridnaai and reality to tha 
narrativea. 

Tba Tolomaa ara atiraotiva in form and contain an appropriate prefaaa 
by Dean Andrew P. Weet of tba graduate college. 

VON DaoBNniLD-ScBONausa, Da. jun. Fbroinakd Qkaf. Dm Lokmik^oritm 
row Ad. Smith, Rieardo, J. St. MiU und Marx. Pp. vui, 100. Prica, UX 
MQiieban: Duncker and Humblot, 1014. 

PAinauvssa, W. C. A Financial Hittory of California. Pp. 307. Barfcalay : 

UniTendty of California, 1913. 

Thia ia an exceedingly able study. The author has very clearly aeparatcd 
the period undar consideration into epochs and within each epoch has tbor> 
oughly analysed revenues, debts and expenditures. A reader feels that the 
picture is accurate and sympathetic and that a judicial attitude has been main- 
tained throughout. If all of the financial histories of the states, issued under 
the supervision of the Carnegie Institution, prove as good aa this, we shall have 
a very valuable collection of monographs. 

Fraskb, John F. Panama and What It Meant. Pp. ix, 291. Price, $1.75. 
New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1913. 
The work of Mr. Fraser is one of the most popular and at the i 
of the most readable accounts of the Panama Canal. The author haa i 
himself, in the main, to a study of the transformation of aanitary, aoelal and 
political conditions that has taken place since American occupation. His 
account of the battle against disease on the Isthmus is particularly illuminat* 
ing. Probably the most suggestive chapter in the book is that dealing with the 
future in the Pacific, in which the author anal3rses the changea which tba eoiH 
structton of the canal is likely to effect in commercial relaliooa with tba Par 
East. Mr. Fraser's book can be unqualifiedly recommended to tboaa daatriag 
a succinct account of the conditions under which the Panama Canal baa 
constructed, aa well aa the probable economic and political effects of tba 
international waterway. 

Qbst, John M. The Lawyer in Literature. Pp. zii, 249. Price, t3J0. Boa- 
ton: The Boeton Book Company, 1913. 

Hill, Datid Jatnb. A History of Diplomacy in the In t trn aHtmal Dmek p 
mmU of Europe. (Vol. Ill— TAs DipUmaey of Ike Ay of AkattwHtm), 
Pp. zxri.TOO. Price, 16.00. New York : LoB^BaDa, Qraao 

1914. 



324 The Annals op the American Academy 

HoPPMAN, Fredbrick L. The Statistical Experience Data of the Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, Baltimore, Md., 189B-191L Pp. ii, 161. Price, $2.00. Balti- 
more : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1913. 

Mr. Hoffman has here aggregated in a compact form the statistical data 
found in the annual reports of the Johns Hopkins Hospital. Taking the death 
rate as the best test, from a medical and hospital viewpoint, of hospital effi- 
ciency, he has presented an extended analysis of mortality rates by age, sex, 
race, cause of death and mode of treatment. No other hospital in the United 
States today, to the author's knowledge, furnishes the required information in 
an equally admirable manner. It is to be hoped that Mr. Hoffman's mono- 
graph will make available to a greater number of persons the information con- 
tained in the annual reports of the hospital and will afford the beginning of a 
movement in the direction of uniform hospital statistics. 

Hughes, Anne E. The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso Dis- 
triei. Pp.97. Berkeley: University of California, 1914. 

Kennedy, J. C, et al. Wages and Family Budgets in the Chicago Stock-yards 
Distrirt. Pp. 80. Price, 25 cents. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1914. 

Mr. Kennedy and his assistants have added another valuable piece of first- 
hand research work to the extant studies of wages and the standard of living in 
H restricted area. Eight hundred dollars is fixed as a minimum. "We believe 
that no family of five can live decently in the Stock-yards District on less than 
this amount" (p. 79). Although no general wage figures are given, the wage 
statistics for specific plants show that from 10 to 20 per cent of the male wage- 
earners receive as much as $800 a year. The resulting destruction of family 
standards is appalling, as the authors forcibly point out. The study is, if 
anything, too brief; and too few details are given on which conclusions may be 
based. The method of investigation is the most complete reported by any 
recent standard of living study in the United States. 

Lowell, A. Lawrence. Public Opinion and Popular Government. Pp. xiv, 
415. Price, $2.25. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1913. 

LowRT, E. B. Teaching Sex Hygiene in the Public Schools. Pp. 94. Price, 50 

cents. Chicago: Forbes and Company, 1914. 

A carefully written primer on a subject which is attracting widespread 
attention. The author has sacrificed intrinsic value to brevity. 

Monkswell, Lord. The Railways of Great Britain. Pp. viii, 303. Price, 

$2.00. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1914. 

This book describes the services and equipment of the railways of Great 
Britain and contains some data regarding rates and fares. The railroads in 
each section of the country are taken up in turn in successive chapters, the pur- 
pose of the volume being to give information regarding the equipment and serv- 
ices of the several systems and to suggest desirable changes. The book is not 



Booir T>KpAi>TMiQrr 



written in a eritical spirit, but it poiot« the way to 
ecpecially in technical matteri. Tba volume U to be eoBflMaded to tlkoie teir- 
ing ft eoaeiee ftod firti-hftod fteeooDi ol the equipmeat, operating metJMde, 
•enriee, ehftrfM, ftod finftoeet of BriUfth lUllwftjrt. 



Moeu. ROBBRT. ThM Ciwa 8tnie€ of OrnU Bntain. Pp. 04. Priet, 9U0. 
New York: Columbift UniTertity, 1014. 

NiBMBTBB. Tb. uod Stbufp. K. Jokf^uek dM VotJ»rreeku. Pp. riii, %»». 

Price, M.88. MOnehen: Duncker and Humblot, 1013. 

The yoftrbook eovert the period from September 1, 1011, to Augoil tl. 
1012, and contain! much of tntereat to students of law and diplomacy. 

Proptrty—IU Duties and Rights. (Easajn by Various Authors with an Intro- 
duction by the Bishop of Oxford). Pp. zz, 106. Price, $1.50. NewYorit: 
The Macmillan Company, 1013. 

The volume contains seven essays on historical, philosophical, and relig- 
ious conceptions of property written by English university men, five of whom 
are profewors or lecturers at Oxford. 1 1 is designed to create some baekgrouad 
for a eooftnietive ideal or principle of property among those who revolt from 
the aoeepted idea and use of private property in present-day organitation. 
The reasoning of the essayiste converges toward their support of the biblical 
doctrine of the stewardship of property, property as a trust, and of a phase of 
community ownership, which would leave to the individual what he needs for 
freedom and what be is able to use, and would restore to society the direct own- 
ership of some things and the "eminent" ownership of things that are essential 
to the production of wealth. The subjects treated are: The historical evolo* 
tion of property, the philosophical theory, the principle of private properiy,tbo 
biblical and early Christian idea of property, the theory of property JBMedJM 
val theology, property and the reformation, property and personality. 

Salin, Edoar. Die WirUchaftUchs Entwicklung von Alaska {und Yuk&n Tsrri- 
tory). Pp. viii, 226. Price, M6. Tubingen: Verlag von J C. B. Mohr, 
1014. 
* ' A study of industrial concentration, using Alaskan development as induc- 
tive and illustrative material. The sources of information are largely in Eng- 
lish, United States government reports forming a oooBklBffable pcoportioo of 
these. 

Sbasbobb. Cabl E. Psychology in Daily Lifs. Pp. xvii, 336. Price, $1 JO. 

New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1013. 

By a method which he defines as "selective rather than cooeecutive," iIm 
author discusses in a very readable way some of the aspecta of the every day 
mental life and reactions of the individual. Particular mice for cultivating a 
serviceable memory and for maintaining mental health and efficiency are illuo> 
trated by concrete material taken from daily life and the ptyehoiQgkftl labo- 
ratory. The book will no doubt stimulate some of its rsftdonlOftmoi 



326 The Annals of the American Academy 

tematic study of a science so fundamental in its principles and far-reaching in 
its applications to different phases of human activity. 

The behavioriat will look in vain for the chapter on habit which he might 
expect to follow the lively treatment of play with which the book begins. Nor 
will he entirely approve the exclusion of the social reactions of every day life. 
He will find, however, that the first of these omissions is made up to a large 
extent in later chapters and the latter in another volume of the same series. 

The author has an optimistic enthusiasm for mental health and believes 
that one may develop mental efficiency by estimating his endowments and 
mental handicaps and proceeding forthwith to adopt a method of life according 
to the principles of psychology and the conservation of human energy. Subject 
yourself to scientific management and you will not only be healthy and efficient 
but successful and happy as well. 

Smith, Edqar Fahs. Chemistry in America. Pp. xiii, 356. Price, $2.50. 

New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914. 

Chemical achievement in America has been one of the foundations of our 
industrial development. The history of achievement in this field could have 
no more suggestive outline and no more salient illustration than that afforded 
by Dr. Smith in this volume. Some real treasures illustrating the early days 
of chemistry in America are brought to light, and are put in accessible form for 
the first time. 

Sowers, Don C. The Financial History of New York State from 1789 to 1919. 

Pp. 346. Price, $2.50. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1914. 

This is another of the monographs prepared under the direction of the de- 
partment of economics and sociology of the Carnegie Institution. The study 
covers the interval from 1789 to 1912, treating each topic for the entire period 
rather than dividing the history into epochs. As a result the reader does not 
feel the growth of the state as a whole. This feeling is intensified by the lack 
of interpretation and vigorous criticism, the study being descriptive rather 
than analjrtical. 

Taussig, F. W. The Tariff History of the United States (6th rev. and enlarged 
ed.) Pp. xi, 465. Price, $1.75. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914. 
In the present edition, the tariff history of the United States is brought 
down to date by the insertion of a chapter on the tariff of 1913. This act makes 
the greatest change in our tariff system since the Civil War. It does not bring 
free trade; but it does mean a great lowering of protection. The author ex- 
presses the belief that in the long run the new tariff will brace and strengthen 
the country's industries, and make it easier to frame future duties without log- 
rolling or manipulation. 

Tatlob, W. G. L. The Credit System. Pp. x, 417. Price, $2.26. New York: 

The Macmillan Company, 1913. 

There are, according to Professor Taylor, three main stages of price theory. 
First came the quantity theory, next the view expressed in the phrase "business 



Book DsrABTicBirr 



ij," and Ufli or ftU Um dywaiU tteory advMMd ia ihii 
Tb« vie wpofait ol Um author it aroltttloBanr, Us MpUwUloM AM Mftda Willi Ite 

aid of "biolofieal analocy. vUoh it baUarwl lo bo oT Um of tiplit 

tion/' and the study of eriaeo was the point of dopartuf* in writiaff. 

Several of the ai m ait i o M in the book ara eziramaly inlaiattiac. Hm 
inaiatenee that "prioa flueiiiaiioa ia itaalf a nofmal pi 
attempt to avoid "thatataBftamaniol 'nonaal' and 'abnormal'" 
lating. A refueal to baliain in iha trorUaii of a myaterioue "natural" law 
whoee operationa are ooaaaionally intemiptad and an "aboormal" or "un- 
natural" situation produead, is gratifying and ia another arkUMe ol ecientiAe 
methods. 

Unfortunately, howarar, the author's idaaa are obaeored by an unfortunata 
style. In many places the reviewer is unable to determine the meaning of 
the expreasions uaed. Thus the atatament (p. 190) that "logical analjrsis is 
agnostic of antaoedents, before a ehoaan point of departure" suggeata the truth 
of the current saying that language ia a device "to conceal thought." More 
important, however, is the doubtful value of such an extrema use of biological 
Analogy as the author haa employed. It may be (p. 2) "of the assanea of 
explanation" (whatever that may mean), but it is treacherous. 

Whitu)cx, BaAJTD. Forly Year* Qf It. Pp. xii, 874. Price, II .£0. New 

York : D. Appleton and Company, 1914. 

This is an intereating and informing book of memoirs happily writtaa 
before the author had raaehed the autobiography stage. With the style of a 
literary artist, and with a social philosophy wrought out through years of axpar- 
ienoe with men, first as a reporter, then as a lawyer and finally through four 
terms sa mayor of the city of Toledo, Mr. Whitlock tells ua of the human proe* 
esses in the actual workings of our urban democraciea. The book tsems with 
intimate, human, informing discussions of franehiaea, vioa, social workers, 
politicians, policemen, legislators, puritans, and of raformera and others of their 
ilk whose cure-all is that "there ought to be a law." Tom Johnaon, Golden 
Rule Jonea and Brand Whitlock himself are recreated in fleah and blood as 
imdarrtood and baliavad in by their friends. The reader finishes the book with 
a feeling, that he aeea, though nowhere in the bookareanyraasoos jotted down, 
why Mr. Whitlock held the three prerequisites of urban damoeraey to ba Iha 
non-partisan ballot, home rule, and municipal ownership and opa rmti oa of 
public utilities. 

Wainmif , Robbbt H. Regulation of Public Senrieo Compami— in Ormt Britain. 

Pp. 281. New York: Public Service Commission for the Firat Diatriet, 

1914. 

Thia report ia the result of a special investigation undertaken oa bahalf of 
the department of regulation of municipal utilities of tha National Chria 
ation. There have bean salaeted for special study those phssss of tha 
of public service eompanies as carried out in Qreal Britain whlah aeass to ba of 
peculiar intereat in connection with our own problssas. Tha author regards tha 
British sliding scale system for the autossatie regulation of the ratea of eharga 



328 The Annals of the American Academy 

and dividends of gaa companies as better than the American system of occa- 
sional rate regulation. He develops a new system of control which he calls the 
"merit rating method," and which ho recommends as better than either of the 
above methods. Under the merit rating method the state commission "will 
periodically rate the companies on the basis of comparative efficiency in serving 
the public and allow them to earn dividends varying with such efficiency." 
This is an interesting suggestion, and one worthy of careful consideration by 
all who are interested in the general problem of public service control. 

WoBCBSTBB, DsAN C. The Philippines^ Past and Present. (2 vols.) Pp. rvi, 
1024. Price, $6.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. 

Wrightinqton, S. R. and Rollins, W. A. Tax Exempt and Taxable Invest- 
ment Securities. Pp. 234. Price, $3.50. Boston: The Financial Publish- 
ing Company, 1013. 

REVIEWS 

Beard, Charles A. Contemporary American History. 1877-191S. Pp. vii, 
397. Price, $1.50. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. 

A book of this nature lies in the border zone between history and politics. 
Because of the difficulty of securing a proper perspective of recent events, 
American histories usually leave the student stranded somewhere between the 
period of reconstruction and the Spanish-American war. On the other hand, 
books on American government frequently lack the historical background nec- 
essary for a proper understanding of current events. To bridge this gap is a 
contribution of value to students of history and government, and to the general 
reader who desires a brief summary of the conditions and tendencies underlying 
present American problems. 

The author abandons the usual chronological method of history for the 
topical method, and subordinates minor detals to broad movements. One 
chapter is given to the restoration of white control in the governments of the 
Southern States. Another traces the economic revolution following the Civil 
War. Others deal with party issues during the past quarter-century, with the 
growth of imperialism, the development of capitalism, and the various mani- 
festations of dissent as expressed in numerous minor parties. The policies of 
Roosevelt and the causes of republican disintegration in the campaign of 1912 
are given especial attention. 

Perhaps the most interesting chapter to the student of government is the 
one entitled the revolution in politics and law. This is a valuable digest of 
the theory and decisions of the supreme court in interpreting the fourteenth 
amendment to the federal Constitution as the bulwark of property rights 
against legislative interference. The author gives evidence to show that the 
framers of this amendment had in mind a far wider purpose than the safeguard- 
ing of the newly emancipated slaves from their former masters, and that they 
deliberately intended to nationalize the prevalent theory of laissez-faire in 
business matters against attempts at control on the part of law-making bodies 
in the conunonwealths. The various steps by which the federal courts de- 
veloped the power of judicial review over attempts of state legislatures to regu- 



Book Dbpartmkmt |S9 

late eorpofAiiona and labor are an iatoraatiiii phaae ol the grovtii of o«r «•• 
written Conatitutioo. 

In tracing the underlying ommm of rteool Aaerieaa rfnTiln|wmil, mof« 
than uaual eniphaaia ia laid oo oooooinie and toeiaJ faetora, aad tho oIom aoA* 
naoUoo between buaioe«i and poUtiea la inaiaied upon throafbovi. WhOt 
aiming at atriot Impartiality in atAlomenta of faet and in inlarprttntion, tbo 
author'a lympathy with what ara fUMraUy enllod radieal movemeoU ia alao 
evident. Aa a atimulua to thought and aa a baaia for diaouaaion thia book will 
prove of the graatett value. 

RATMOirD QAaFlBLp QVTTBLL. 

Tnnify CoiUg€. 

BiLoaAM, Huoo. In collaboration with Louia Edward Levy. C9u»$ o/Buri' 
n4M Depr€4tion. Pp. xvii, 531. Price, 92.00. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippin- 
cott Company, 1014. 

Although intended aa an explanation of perioda of commercial dapfurinn. 
revealed by an analysia of the baaic principlea of economica, thla volimM bn- 
eomea, by reaaon of the authors devoting 361 out of 531 pagea to the analyib of 
economic principles, rather a text on eoonomiea than a study in a definite field 
The first portion deals with value, pricea, money and credit ; the second with the 
distribution of wealth; the third with restraints on industry, including a chapter 
mathematically describing the perioda of the trade cycle; and the remainder of 
the book (151 pagea) ia devoted to an explanation of a proposed ajatma of cur- 
rency reform and its effects. 

In the opinion of the authors, fluctuations in buaineaa are due to the fact 
that our money is limited, partly by natural conditions and principally by law. 
Aa a remedy it is proposed to remove the legal limitation of the use of credit aa 
a medium of exchange which prevents the supply of money from meeting the 
demand. The following methods are advocated : 

1. Broaden the range of securities acceptable from the agents of iaana by 
the treaaury aa a baais for bank notea. Liena on real property are auggaalad 
aa deairable for thia purpoae. 

2. Notea iaaued on thia baaia to be redeemable in gold from a fund in tha 
custody of the government. Such fund ia to be aoppUed by the banks applying 
for currency. 

3. An insurance fund to secure deposits, to be created by requiring all 
banka to depoait, aay 2 per cent of their oapital and surplus. 

4. The formation of a credit elearanee system by eomposing societies of 
business men in their respective localities. 

The new currency law is considered by the authots to bs a step in the right 
direction, but not sufficient to correct the evils. 

The present monetary system by placing restrictions upon tbs issonnes of 
currency gives to money a power which it would not otherwiss posssss. In ths 
authors' opinion. Since the quantity is insuflkient for ths nstds of tks eoas- 
munity money becomes desirable, thereby obtaining the povsr to sosHMnd an 
unearned income aa a return to lendera of money and owncfs of enpilnl. 

One eriUeiam which might be made ia that although the authors sUUn 
"this study must begin with obeervation of facU and daaaification of st a t istics, 



330 Tub Annals of the American Academy 

from which to determine the cause or causes that produce the observed re- 
sults," conditions are very generally and broadly described and statistics are 
non-«xi8tent. Thus, although lack of money is considered the principal cause 
of the phenomena studied, in the United States in 1837, 1857, 1873 and 1803 the 
amounts of paper currency in circulation were very large comparatively, while 
these were years of severe crises. The unusually large proportion of paper 
money to specie in crisis yean is also significant. 

All investigations have failed in the attempt to show conclusively one 
predominant cause of variations in business generally, and this one is no excep- 
tion in this respect. It is, however, a very good presentation of the lack of an 
exchange medium theory and of the defects of the previous currency system in 
this country. 

R. RiEGEL. 

University of Pennsylvania. 

Chandler, W. H. The Express Service and Rales. Pp. v, 340, and Supple- 
ment. Chicago: La Salle Extension University, 1914. 

This work by the assistant manager of the traffic bureau of the Mer- 
chants' Association of New York contains a practical and clearly stated ac- 
count of certain phases of the express business. Being written at this late date 
the author had the advantage of the important decisions rendered by the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission which to some extent rendered obsolete earlier 
works dealing with express tariffs, classifications, rates and regulations. 

The most valuable chapters of Mr. Chandler's timely book are those de- 
scribing the newly prescribed system of quoting express rates, and the newly 
adopted express classifications, rates, tariffs and regulations. Much practical 
information is also contained in the chapters dealing with express forms, the 
express receipt, railroad contracts, public regulation, express company organiz- 
ation, and the money, financial, foreign, order and commission departments. 
It also contains a comparison of the relative rates and services of the express 
companies and the parcels post. The discussion in these chapters is supple- 
mented with detailed tables of rates and the reproduction of numerous tariffs 
and forms. 

Although the book contains a short historical chapter and another dealing 
with express capitalization and earnings, these subjects are not fully treated. 
It likewise makes no effort fully to describe the principles underlying express 
rates, and the factors considered in their determination. It is likely that it was 
not the author's purpose to enter into a lengthy discussion of these phases of 
the express business. 

0. G. HUEBNEB. 

University oj Pennsylvania. 

Daniels, John. In Freedom' b Birthplace. Pp. vi, 496. Price, $1.60. Bos- 
ton: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1914. 

Among local studies of the Negro problem this volume stands easily in the 
first rank. It describes the career of the Negro in Boston from his advent in 
1638, eight years after the settlement of the colony, through the vicissitudes of 



Book DaPABTHBirr ttl 



hiB enuuidpAUoo and adJiaftaMOi at a free dtiaao, to hia 
ton in 1914. 

A wealth of material haa baan aoUaetad aimaaniing Nagro liiailaw tltfmagk* 
out the entire period and iba aablaviBMiita of ihaaa m&n aoaalltvla aeaa ol Um 
moet intereating if nol tha oMai iaportaai portione of tha votIl 

Chaptera are davotad to (ha da wrip l J OB ol the etruggla for f raadoa wkM 
waa partieipatad in moal giaaroualy by tba "fraa pafaooa ol aolor,-" le tba 
axparianaa of fraadoiaii whaa iknmn iipoo thair own laaoviaaa; lo Iba aoaiil 
and aibieal advaaea; to the ebureb; (o tba aaeaamia aebiavaeMata; aad to bia 
aiparianee with tba ballot. The laat cbaptar diaoiMna tba futma ol tba Wapo 
people. 

In reference to tba aeonookio aituation a moat painataking analjraia ia mmi& 
of oeeupationa, buaineee enterpriaaa and ownerahip. While aoma aapaela al tba 
problein are diecouraging tba author concludea that "the Negroea in Boatott 
are not only laying an aeonomto foundation, but are accumulating a eurplw 
with which to rear tba itruotura of a better family and aoaununity life." 

Aa to the future of tba Negro the author beliavaa tbal, maaaitriid egaiiiat 
tba background of hia African jungle home, hia eonditi o ni undar alavary, and 
tba "reoonatructlon" experienoee» hia preaent attainmanta ara at laaat 
able. Hia preaent actual inferiority and tha prevailing prejodiaa 
eonatituta the real hindrances. Both of theaa, bowaver, ara naitbar inadMlbla 
nor naeeaaarily permanent. 

Tba whole book, while frankly deaeribing tha difficultiea and dangsra, b 
decidedly optimiatic. On tha whole it ia one of tba moat unbiaaad atudiaa wa 
have aeen. It ia perhapa unfortunate that the author haa not givan tba book 
a title that would indicate something of its contents. Tha appaadiaaa aontaJn- 
ing very complete statiatical tables and the excellent index add greatly to tba 
uaefulneas of the book. 

Uniwtnity of PmmaffUrama, 

DiwiNO, Abtuub 8. Corporate Promotion* and BeorgomMOtion; Pp. vUl, 
615. Price, 12.50. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1014. 
This book, though burdened with a mass of undigssted tablea, ia tboroogb 
and scholarly, and a moat valuable contribution to the literature ol tniata and 
corporation finance. 

The main contribution of this work is a detailed atudy ol a aalactad groop 
of industrial combinations, each of which has paand tbrmigb tba ayala ol pro- 
motion, failure, and reorganisation. The conaoUdationa diaeosaad ara: Tba 
United SUtea Leather Company ; the sUrch consolidations; the glucose combi- 
nations; the cordage conaoUdationn; the Weatingbouae Electric and Maaufactur* 
ing Company; the NaUooal Salt Company; the United Sutes Realty and Oaa- 
struction Company; the Anaerican Bicycle Company; tba Amariaaa Malting 
Company; the New England Cotton Yam Company; tba eottoadyakiaaaa Md a 
tions; the asphalt consolidaUons; the Unilad Statea 8hipb«ildiac Oampaaiy; 
and the American Qlue Company. This list ia not intaodad to ba aibaaativa; 
it would clearly be impoaaible to preaent in tba eompaas ol one book all tbs ear* 



332 The Annals of the American Academy 

porate promotions and reorganisationa. But enough consolidations have been 
chosen to illustrate the various causes of failure, and the means of reorganisa- 
tion. In three concluding chapters the various promotion schemes and reorgan- 
isation expedients are summarised. 

The point of view of the author is of especial interest. He is apparently 
a thorough-going believer in the laissez-faire principle. He hazards the belief 
that whatever "trust problem" exists will work out its own solution. Restrict- 
ive regulation will only hamper the efficient corporation, and the doom of the 
inefficient waits on no legislative regulation, but is rather delayed thereby. 

In developing the point that legislative action is unnecessary, it is main- 
tained that the success of a consolidation is dependent upon the presence of one 
of two conditions. Consolidation may be successful if it has at its command 
executive ability of a high enough order to cope with the difficulties besetting 
the administration of a large business. The author is much impressed, as he 
states in the preface, by the tremendous importance of individual ability, or 
its lack, in determining the success or failure of any enterprise. But he is 
likewise much impressed by the difficulty of obtaining men with ability to man- 
age a large and scattered group of concerns as efficiently and as economically 
as a man of ordinary ability can manage a single concern. The lack of such 
men, or, at least, the failure to find them, explains the unsuccessful out- 
come of many corporate consolidations, and renders the success of still others 
problematical. 

Yet even though a consolidation is not managed by the most able entre- 
preneurs, it may still be successful if it is secured against unrestricted compe- 
tition through having a monopoly control over some essential raw material, some 
patent, or some franchise. However, in only rare cases are these conditions 
realized, and the author therefore feels that the trust problem may be left to 
work out its own solution. 

It is at this point that the conclusions of the author are open to criticism. 
Though certain of the combinations, or trusts, have gradually lost control 
because of inefficient management, and because of the insistent pressure of 
vigorous competition, these disintegrating forces will work out their results 
but slowly, if at all, in the case of those trusts whose monopolistic position is 
based on the ownership of raw material, or on the enjoyment of patent and 
franchise privileges, supplemented possibly by the possession of enormous 
capital, the use of objectionable competitive methods, and the shelter of favor- 
ing tariffs. To deal succeosfully with such monopolies, something more than 
a laissez-faire policy would seem to be required. 

Eliot Jones. 
University of Pennsylvania. 

DuNLOP, RoBEBT. Ireland under the Commonwealth. (2 vols.) Pp. ccliv, 
753. Price, S8.00. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1913. 
The character of this work is better indicated by its description in the sub- 
title as "A Selection of Documents Relating to the Government of Ireland from 
1651 to 1659." The documents, excepting a few from manuscripts in the library 
of Trinity College at Dublin, are taken from certain volumes in the Irish Record 



Boos OvAsmniT SSt 



Offio« known m Um '*CoauBOO«Mltb RMords." 
of the toUtn «Dd oram taiMi by tbo Iridi nnmiiMinmn (Intof Um M 
deputy and eoiueU) who had ehnrsB ol iho go^iranuBt of IraUad ditriac Um 
period. They eooMquenily diapUy the aelual nppUenlioo of Um pctodpli ol 
the Cromwelltmn Mttlemeni nad coosUUilo our moet bnporUai MiurM of im» 
formation about that nuchHiiooUd poUey. Mr. Dunlop, to bo Ottio. doot sol 
reproduoo tbo oontenU of iboio voloBit in full, but iho mIocUom prislod, Im 
hU opinion, ''oompriao, with tbo OMOptJOD of a oumbor of potitioaa poMMiiag 
only a limitod intoreat, a fairly eoinploto record of all that b likely to pfovo of 
value to the otudoni of the period." He further inforau ua that the ooUoeltos 
waa made with the objeot of aaaembling " evory aorap of infonnatioo beariag oa 
the lOYomiDoni of Ireland by the Conunonwoalth ragardleoi of whothar ii told 
for or againat that government" (p. i). 

Thoaa matoriala, moreover, are for the moat part made aoeoMiblo to tho 
■tudoal oataido of Dublin for the fint time. Prendorgaat, who radlaeovwad 
thaaa raeorda, uaad them extenaively in the preparation of hia CroonailUoA 
StUlaaieMl of troUmd and ineluded many extracta therefrom in hia notoa to thai 
work. He rarely givea more than a amall portion of any one documeai, how« 
ever; hia tranaoriptiona are not alwaya accurate, and their value ia further 
impaired by bis method of ohooaing the excerpta to illuatrate a not impartial 
text. Thia ia the only place where any of the orders have been previoualy 
printed. A few of the lettera have found their way into print elsewhere through 
the preaervation of a small number of the originala of which the "CommoD- 
wealth Reoorda" contain only the official copiea. Mr. Dunlop finda, howovor, 
that with the exception of those in Firth's Memoin of Bdmtmd Lmdom, whUk 
constitute the most considerable single collection, they have beoB poorljr 
edited. Furthermore, it aeems probable that the letters woro ftrai writlaai ia 
the copy books and then transcribed, which renders the eopiea of value ovoa 
where the originala exist. 

Mr. Dunlop doea not explain fully the principlea whieh he haa followed in 
editing the dooumenta. Some appear to be in the form of abetraeta similar to 
those found in a calendar, while others, although given wtrbaUm, are not in fulL 
By far the largeat and most important part of the oootenta, however, is eneloaad 
within inverted «*^^r*"[*^ and apparently consists of reproductions in ssliiuo. 
The spelling haa been modernised throughout. 

Mr. Dunlop aupplamenta the dooumenta with erudite notoa coBca ra a d 
mainly with the identifieation of peraona and plaeea and with an ample iBtfo> 
duction. The latter contains not only a summary of the period covered by the 
documents, but also a survey of the period from IMl to 1051 chiefly for the por^ 
poee of tracing the cauaea of the rebellion which began in 16tl. Briedy, Mr. 
Dunlop's thesis is that the rebellion was not cauaed primarily either by Ramam 
Catholic ploU or by agrarian difficulties, but by a feeling of an t a g p n i wi **b»- 
tween the Engliah in Ireland and the Engliah in England" (p. ix). He axplaiaa 
how the levy of eeaa in Elisabeth'a reign tended to arouae the eooatitutiooal 
opposition of the gentry of the Pale, while the poUey of eeitleneat ai the aaao 
time cauaed the hoatility of the naUvelriah. Baligkm, whieh ai the bagiwiiBC 
of Elisabeth's reign had been a matter of indiffaranoa, by the elooa of bar rsign 



334 The Annals of the American Academy 

had become, through the activities of the Jesuits, a divergooce of burning im- 
portance. The consequent tendency of the native Irish and the Anglo-Irish 
to heal their immemorial diflTerences and to draw together against the common 
oppressor becomes evident before 1603 and during the reigns of James I and 
Charles I ever grows stronger, until a united Catholic Ireland rose in 1641 to 
free itself from the danger of a puritan parliament in England. The narrative 
is based on a careful study of original materials and adds much to our knowledge 
of Irish history under the Tudors and Stuarts besides this new point of view. 

W. E. LUNT. 

Cornell Univertity. 

Fibldino^Hall, H. The Passing of Empire. Pp. viii, 307. Price, $2.60. 

Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1914. 

HouoBTON, Bernard. Bureaucratic Government: A Study in Indian 
Polity. Pp. vii, 200. Price, 38. 6d. London: P. S. King and Son, 1913. 

These two books treat almost the same subject matter and arrive at sub- 
stantially the same conclusion, both are studies of Indian unrest and present a 
constructive criticism of present-day British policy in the empire. The first 
is anecdotal and suggestive, the second is devoted to closer argument and gives 
greater space to the philosophy of government. Both authors write from a 
background of official experience in India and both choose most of their ex- 
amples from the government of Burma. 

Mr. Fielding-Hall's argument runs as follows: Indian government was 
formerly successful because it depended on commanding personalities. The 
English administrator went out at the age of sixteen or eighteen. He was 
educated after he arrived . Western civilization did not have a chance to stamp 
itself upon his character but he grew up in Indian conditions and knew the lan- 
guage and the people. Conununication was slow, he cultivated judgment and 
though his power was arbitrary it was tempered by discretion. The old village 
organization of Indian society was not disturbed and the English officer, who 
was not only the representative of government but government itself, had an 
organic connection with the life of the people. His was a human government, 
one which recognised that fundamentally the Oriental was moved by the same 
motives as the Occidental and that the basis of control was sympathy and 
mutual understanding and respect. 

New conditions have destroyed this basis of control. Communication has 
improved, the officer has become only the last link of a chain which extends 
to the viceroy and the privy council. As a result freedom of decision has van- 
ished from him, he becomes only the agent of a central authority charged with 
the duty of carrying out the iron-bound rules of the Indian code. At the same 
time that he has been made a functionary without real power or discretion the 
influence of the village which was the basis of Indian government has been 
destroyed. The headman instead of being part of the village charged with 
the administration of a unit possessed of a large degree of local autonomy, has 
become merely "a finger of government" no longer conmianding the confi- 
dence and respect of the community because he is both in it and of it. The 



Book Dbpartmbnt 

rainedy Um auUmt btUevw liat in fterMUng to far m 
foniMriy poMaMd by tbe fovwDflMBi. 

One of the inotl pr— ring bm(U to a rafonn of Um ptaal ud dvil toAm km 
•ueh A way thai juf iioo will no loofar be a game wbaft aaeh aida playa lo via 
at wbaiever eoal. Tbe judgaabould be given power to aoeourar^UMi 
to eoafeea by bolding out poMibUiltoa of leewr penalty, if tbe affair to 
without formal trial. Tbe Uwa wbieb puniab rillagaa and indiTidnato vttbottl 
actual proof of wrong^ioingahould be aboUabed. TbeywerefiUedloanenrltor 
■tage of Indian eoetoly but often reeult in aerioua injustice under pftaeal eo»- 
dittona . Tbe eodei in fact, by cryatalUsing old Indian cuitom, bav« Made 
healthy legal growth impoaaible. 

Engliah ofltoera abould go to India at an earlier age ao that they may bieoan 
acquainted with Indian conditions while their own minds are still plaelk. 
The Indiana abould be encouraged to enter the civil aerviee but are not to be 
appointed to tbe higher admintotrative poaitions, beeatiae they have not yet 
developed tbe eapaoity to handle the work they would there be eallad apoa to 
do and beeause the Indian peoples themselves would not have eoaftdiMaia 
them in such positions. Meanwhile local government should be givaa new life 
by granting the village a degree of local autonomy, and gradually developing 
higher dtotrict and provincial assemblies. The preeent councils, the author 
believes, are worse than a farce because they have no organic connection with 
the life of the population. Education for self-government to tbe only means by 
which Indian unreet can be stilled. It will again make India contented. "To 
conquer India was great .... but to make of India a daughter not a 
subject .... that will be greater still." 

Mr. Houghton's arguukent to to a large degree a parallel. The change from 
the old to the preeent system he pictures as the growth from an autoeraey to a 
bureaucracy. The result to that Engliah government has become lifeless, aad 
formalistio. He has greater confidence in the councito than has Mr. Fielding- 
Hall. The partition of Bengal ho holds was a mtotake of the bureaucracy 
which might have been avoided by the creation of a new council. He thinks 
that instead of demanding a servile obedience to the bureaucratic govemmealal 
machinery the government would do well to arouse party feeling among tbe peo- 
ple, and encourage education which would make the party feeling intellifHit. 
Control of affairs should be shifted into the hands of men not of the professiooal 
official class. " The keynote to all progrees lies .... in the traasler of 
the superior control from the bureaucracy to men unwarped by ofltoial bias aad 
more in s>'mpathy with popular aspirations." The first condition of keeping 
the Indian Empire, the author believes, to to extend to tbe people real eelf- 
government. The delay neeeaeary in thto development, tbe autbor ovideotly 
thinks, has been exaggerated. 

CBaaTBR Laoto Joraa. 
Uniwertity of Wiicontin. 



336 The Annals of the American Academy 

Qabofalo, Babon Raffablb. Criminology. (Translated by Robert W. 

Millar.) Pp. zl, 478. Price, $4.60. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1914. 
Physical Baaet of Crime. (Papers and Discussion contributed to the 38th 

Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Medicine, Minneapolis, 

June 14, 1913.) Pp. 188. Price, $4.00. Easton: American Academy of 

Medicine, 1914. 

The first volume is the seventh in the series of nine books selected for 
translation by the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology from 
the leading continental writers. It was translated by Robert Wyncss Millar 
of the Northwestern Law School. 

In the list of scholars who have given to the world the modern science of 
criminology none is more worthy to stand close beside its gifted founder, Caesar 
Lombroso, than the author of this work. At present Baron Garofalo is pro- 
curator-general at the court of appeal of Venice, senator of the Kingdom of 
Italy, adjunct professor of criminal law and procedure of the University of 
Naples, and president of the Italian Society of Sociology. 

The scope of the book is best presented in a skeletal outline: Part I, 
Crime, has two chapters dealing with natural crime and the legal notion of 
crime; Part II, the criminal, with three chapters — criminal anomaly, social 
influences and influences of the laws; Part III, repression, four chapters; the 
law of adaptation, existing theories of criminal law, defects of existing criminal 
procedure, and the rational system of punishment; Part IV, outline of prin- 
ciples — suggested as a basis for an international criminal code. 

A brief review could not give any adequate criticism of such a work. We 
present, therefore, a mere statement of a few of the leading ideas, for which the 
author has contended for twenty-five years. 

The Theory of Crime. In the nature of things, crime cannot be a juridical 
abstraction. It is "an action which wounds some one of the sentiments which, 
by common consent, are called the moral sense of a human aggregation. . . . 
an act which no civilized society can refuse to recognize as criminal and repress 
by means of punishment." Injury to one of the elementary altruistic senti- 
ments of pity or probity are its essential elements. "The injury must wound 
these sentiments, not in their superior and finer degnees, but in the average 
measure in which they are possessed by a community — a measure which is 
indispensable for the adaptation of the individual to society. Such crimes are 
due to "psychic anomalies — exceptions similar to physical monstrosities." 

Crime so considered remains a constant factor in the midst of changing 
laws and moralities, applicable among all peoples whatever the stage of culture. 

Classification of Criminals. The author criticizes Ferri's classification of 
(1) bom, (2) habitual, (3) occasional, (4) passionate and (5) insane criminals, 
aa unscientific from the anthropological point of view. His classification is 
(1) murderers, (2) violent criminals, (3) criminals deficient in probity and (4) 
lascivious. In the phraseology of this classification one is impressed with the 
idea that it belongs rather to the classical school philosophy, and turns atten- 
tion to the character of the crime rather than to the nature of the criminal, but 
a careful reading of his discussions* clears away this difficulty. He says: "To 



Book DBPARmmT tS7 



flght with any bopt of aueetM «• mutl know our taaBy" and bit atlMipi h to 
get mi Um real amtnn of erimiiuUity. Ewy om who luw sitanptod to latt 
Ferri'i oUatiiieatioo aa a baiia ol iadiieUTa altidiaa baa taaoaalaiail Iba yrmj 
diffioulUea wbieb Baroo Oarofalo baa poiatod out. 

Bnf9twdBtp&nii&mo»aF9rm^fB0prtMM\on. For niaoy yaaia tba avtbor 
baa raaclad againai Iba fonna of pwiiibmant which have bad aa a moUva aipla> 
UoQ, reUliatioo or Tamtanaa, and avaa iDtimidaUoa. Batulla Inm UMaa 
DMiboda have bean bopal— ly inadaquato. Not only abould Cba vlatlm of artea 
obtain indemnity from iba offeadar, a thing almost entirely lacking in erimlBal 
law, but the enforeod re|>aratioii woald be the moat natural and Taluable diaei* 
plioe for the criminal. 

Thia Yoloma wiU give UtUe eonfort to the eriUea of the Italiaa Sahool 
who, in Ibair baato to expoee what they have regarded aa palpable errota, bava 
taken altofetbar too narrow a view of ita daima. Breadth of vialoo ia aoi tba 
laaal eooaplettoae cbaraoteriitic of the author's work. It ie a great book. 

Pkifneal BaaM of Cnm€, The American Academy of Madieina waa afga»» 
iied originally to seeure the standardisation of medieal edaeatlon. fiaee tUa 
task is now accomplished, it has turned ita attention to the study and discusstoo 
of social problems which have a basis in physiology or medicine, or which in any 
vital way involve the membera of the medical profession. The volume under 
review ia a compilation of the papers read before the annual meeting of iba 
Academy held in Minneapolis in June, 1913. and preeenta the aobjaei froa 
varioua points of view. Papers were contributed by ph>'Bicians and surgeons; 
professors of education, physics, sociology, psychology, law; superinteodeata 
of hospitals, refonnatories and prisons. The diseusaiona 
of crime in relation to physiologic and psychologic inberitanee, patbologie 
ditions; aa a result of feeble-mindednees and insanity; as a product of alcohol- 
ism, and specific diseases; as the outgrowth of social conditions, education, 
parental influeneea, eto. Cooamenting on the papers presented, the Jmtmai 
of ths American InBtiiuU of Criminal Law and Criminoiogy, September, I9IJ; 
said, editorially (p. 321) : '* With no deeire to disparage any featitra of tba pro> 
gram, it may be asserted that the report on 'Heredity as a Factor in Criminal* 
ity, a Study of the Findings in About a Thousand Cases' reached the bigb 
water mark. ... It repreeented intonaive reeeareb and the reaulta re- 
ported are of far-reaching value for a theory of the criminal. Up to dato it ia 
the most extensive and intensive study of its kind." 

The bringing together of such a group of serious eeholars, not to exploit 
any theory or bjrpotbeeia, but to confer upon the interrelations of the variooe 
scientific studiee with a view to the better undantaBding of the baaea of Iba 
unsocial habita which we call criminal is an aeUvfWMBl of no little aMmani. 
The group of studenta repreeented in this meeting wonld be the bal todaalaia 
that any finality in the explanation of crime baa been reaebad, bnl Ibara la 
the oooapieaoiia abaanoe of any feeling of uncertainty in regard to Iba 
of the positive method of study and investigation. It will be vary 
certing to those who still prefer to think of crime as the result of a deliberala 
ohoioa of evil to eome in contact with this book. 

J. P. 
Ummnity of 



338 The Annals of the American Academy 

Haobrty, Jamu E. Mercantile Credit. Pp. xiii, 382. Price, $2.00. New 

York: Henry Holt and Company, 1913. 

In disouBsing mercantile credit the author endeavors to combine a theoret- 
ical treatment with a view practical enough to attract the business man. The 
two parts of the book deal with (1) the origin, development and present status 
of mercantile credit and (2) legislation. In the first part the theory and his- 
tory of credit are discussed, credit instruments are classified and the different 
kinds of credit described. A discussion of mercantile and personal credit is 
followed by a more concrete description of the work of the credit man, the credit 
oflBce, sources of credit information, adjustment bureaus, collections, credits 
and credit men's associations. Part two treats bankruptcy legislation his- 
torically and descriptively. A discussion of early legislation is followed by 
chapters on the bankrupt law of 1800, the bankruptcy laws of 1841, 1867 and 1898, 
state insolvency legislation and finally laws regulating the sale of goods in 
bulk. 

A distinct service has been rendered by the author in bringing together in 
one volume a discussion of a subject that had not hitherto been adequately 
treated. The work of the credit man and his service in the community are not 
fully appreciated and-Dr. Hagerty's treatment of the subject is most welcome. 
It is unfortunate, however, that present methods of extending credit were not 
subjected to more careful analysis and criticism. At the present time descrip- 
tion is not enough. Thorough scrutiny of our methods is imperative. Under 
the federal reserve act just passed there will be necessary a careful definition 
of commercial paper. This definition might be so worded, as to include only 
double name paper. If this were done present credit methods would be almost 
revolutionized. Before such a step is taken we should have a careful analysis 
of the methods now employed. If they are poor they should be abandoned but 
if an actual improvement over those used abroad they should be retained. It 
is unfortunate that we have as yet no adequate treatment of this extremely 
important question. 

£. M. Pattebsgn. 
University of Pennsylvania. 

Hunter, Robert. Violence and the Labor Movement. Pp. xiv, 388. Price, 

SI. 50. New York : The Macmillan Company, 1914. 

We have here a much-needed study of the history of terrorism in the labor 
movement. The various discussions of the I . W . W . have shown in their analy- 
ses of present conditions a lack of historical background. Mr. Hunter finds 
that the aims and methods of the radical groups throughout the world are but 
echoes of the pleas of the anarchists under Bakounin and his followers. The 
declaration of war between capital and labor, with its accompanying violence, 
and the organization of labor into "one big union" are but repetitions of old 
philosophy. The Marxians or parliamentarians have opposed them for almost 
a century. This opposition has not been based on moral grounds, but on a 
faith in economic law and on a realization of the impracticability of violence. 

The clear historical narrative does not reflect the author's well-know 
parliamentary leanings. This impartiality breaks down, however, when he 



Boob DvAvrmorr m 

•eekt to Aiunrtr Um f 3rBdi«AUtl arilidm oa the todatin philosophy Aod pio* 
gram. He niaket a virulent attack oo employers who tntntiirant linlsoM by tho 
iatroduetion of private detoetivss and militia into labor eoaflleta. HUhoot 
doubt this is warranted, but it waksna the scholarly toae of thsstmfy. Oa tha 
whole, howe var, thia ▼olmaa ia a f<sry nUiiabla eontribatioo. 1 1 throws aash* 
naedad light oothaatnicilsa of thaTariooailamseU in the radical wing oltha 
labor aovanent. 

AuuLUTDwi Fuuaasn. 
N9W York Ciiy. 

MATUKwa, PsBOiBic. ToxoHtm and the DiMtribution of W§<Uik. Pp. liii, Ml 

Prioe, t2.60. New York: Doubladay, Pa«B and Company. 1914. 

Never has the reviewer seen more eonvineing evidanea of the interrelatioa 
of all knowledge. The author b a devotee of the single tax. His argumeata 
against protective tariffs are well preaented, his attack being direetad agiiaai 
both the "old" protection and the "new." He next assails all other forma of 
indirect taxation, and then shows the weaknesses of all direct taxes, except thai 
on real property. Finally the adequacy of a land tax which b "the naUiral 
tax," the problems of transition from our present system to the new one, 
the incidence of taxation and the numerous fiscal probleoM prsssnted ars 
analjrsed. 

If the author had been content to stop at thb point (p. 300), he would hava 
presented a fairly complete and interesting treatment of hb thesb, although it 
contains little that b new and shows a complete dependence upon the writings of 
Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. "The abandonment of the import duty, 
however, entails an unfamiliar form of social organisation" and the withdrawal 
of "power to tax consumption would be followed by a new era in the hbtory of 
civilisation." Thb at once opens up the entire field of human knowledge. All 
progress b reviewed. A statement of the evolutionary hypothesb b not "out 
of place." Since, however, there are important factors in human develop- 
ment relatively, if not actually, independent of the influaoea of tbaavolutioa- 
ary soianeea, we must consider intellectual progress. Architoetiira, sculpture, 
painting, music, poetry are analysed and classified and the alpdfieanca of 
science to man b considered. But religion must not be omitted, i 
Confucius, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Zoroaster, Egypt, Judaism, 
Greece, and Rome are successively presented. Midway between the theo- 
logical and the rational lies metaphysics and thb consideration, of eoui;se, com- 
peb us to review philosophic thought from Thales to the modems. Last of all 
appears politics. 

Excuses for such a collection of information within the covers of a single 
volume are hard to find . The author seems to have supposed thai aradilioB ia, 
per 9€, valuable. The first three hundred pages are, as p ioT i ooi l y alalad. 
somewhat interesting. The latter part of the l>ook b, to put it mildly, a ssisftt. 

E M. PATTaaaoN. 
C/atMrtify of j 



840 The Annals of the American Academy 

Nbwmatxb, 8. W. Medical and Sanitary Inspection of Schools. Pp. vi, 318. 
Price, 12.50. Philadelphia: Lea and Fcbiger, 1913. 

Ab the author states in his preface, this book is designed to furnish to 
physicians, nurses and teachers a guide to the physical examination of school 
children, and it attempts to develop a deeper appreciation of the relations be- 
tween mental and physical development. 

In the section dealing with the administration of medical and sanitary 
inspection special emphasis is placed on the importance of the school nurse as 
an aid to the physician and the belief is expressed that if legislatures will make 
mandatory the employment of both school nurses and physicians, much greater 
efficiency will result than where physicians only are employed and there will 
be no need for legislation designed to compel the parent to obtain treatment 
recommended for the child. An especially commendable feature of the book is 
the inclusion of forms used in a proper system of record keeping. The chapter 
on infectious, contagious and communicable diseases and that on physical 
defects discusses the most important of these diseases and defects with a view 
to enabling the person in charge to determine the trouble and take steps to 
meet it by proper methods. In the discussion of mentality an attempt is made 
to determine the extent and analyze the causes of retardation. The allotment 
of 34 pages of a 300-page book to an explanation of the Binet system of testing 
mentality may seem excessive even in face of a desire to emphasize this portion 
of the book. As a whole, Dr. Newmayer's book furnishes an excellent hand- 
book for use of anyone interested in medical and sanitary inspection of schools. 

Bruce D. Mudqett. 
University of Pennsylvania. 

Oppenheimer, Franz. The Stale. (Translated by John M. Gitterman.) Pp. 
V, 302. Price, $1.25. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1914. 
This book is a study of the origin and development of the state from the 
sociological and economic viewpoint. Its material is drawn largely from 
Ratzel's writings, and in its theory that state origin results from conquest it 
follows Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz. The economic interpretation of his- 
tory is emphasized throughout. 

Its general thesis follows: There are two methods of securing wealth — 
production and robbery. The state, as a political organization, results from 
the latter, the forced subjection of the weak to the strong inevitably following 
the accumulation of wealth and the rise of economic differences. When capital 
is vested in land and other forms of realty the feudal state results, at first in 
the patriarchal tribal form, later in the more developed medieval type. When 
capital is vested in movable commodities the commercial state results. Of 
this form the independent city with its outlying trading posts is typical. As a 
money economy developed and standing armies grew in size, a centralized 
government resulted, reaching its climax in the Roman Empire. This was 
destroyed by the exploitation of slave labor. Later, when capital was vested 
in productive industries, the modern constitutional state was formed. In the 
future, through the increasing socialization of industry and the disappearance 
of private ownership of land, the political organization will become less, 



Book Dbpakhudit 841 

and the •ooBomi c orginif tioa won imporUnt. Tb« ftoAl oatMat will bt m 
Mmi-coeUUtiie "freenuui't dUieaahip/' ia which eUn iatarvato haw MUif«|y 
ditftp|MM«d. 

vnd\9 deeidodly oat ■id»d in iU ntflMt oT all faeton aavo fofvc in aUlt 
origin and of all influtDOM taTt Um •eoooddo in tUU dtTtlopotni, tba book it 
a brilliant itudy of otHnIo important pbaaaa of political oTolutioa. Tba 
author errs ia believiaf that tha aooial-ooataet tboory of ttala origia la alill 
■eriooaly bald, and in ooaridariac tbt politieal and aooooMJc orgaalaalioM of 
•oeiaty aa aeparable and antagoniatie. Tbo tranalation ia unuaually wall doaa. 

THnil, ColUg,, ^~^'"^ ^^"^^ 0»~^ 

Pond. OMaa L. PaMtc UtilUi^s. Pp. Ut, 964. Priea, 16.00. IndianapoUa: 

Bobba-MarriU Company, 1013. 

Tbia ia a work of groat merit that will be uaeful to practicing lawyers, 
atata officials and memben of public aenrioe commiaaiona. At the preaent 
time over one-half of the states vest in a conmiiaaion authority over moat 
municipal and other utilities. A few cities have establiabed municipal publie 
utilities commissions. The activities of these public bodies and of tba at- 
torneys who appear before the conmiissiona make auch a work as that by Mr. 
Pond of sapeeial value. 

The early part of the volume contains chapters whieh i*imtt'1ifr in detail 
the legal powers of the municipalities, and diacuaaea the legal queationa eon- 
neeted with franchises and municipal contracts. Problems of taxation are also 
oonaidered. The latter part of the book is concerned with problema of regula- 
tion of the services and charges of public service corporations. In the chapters 
upon municipal ownership, the author takea a conservative poaition, hia view 
being that, "with an efficient regulation and control of the aenrioe furatabed by 
municipal public utilitiea and the ratea charged for it, the necessity for munici- 
pal ownership as a meana of regulation and control in the mi^onty of eases at 
leaat would disappear. ' ' The author, however, believea that eaeh municipality 
ahould be in a poaition to adopt the policy of municipal ownership whraevar 
conditions justify such a course. 

The next to the last chapter of the book discusses and advoeates municipal 

bureaus or commissions as a useful and necessary aid to the city in regulating 

public utilities. The final chapter of the book considers state public utilitiea 

commissions which are claimed by the author to be necessary. The state 

public service commission is required for the regulation of utilities outatde of 

the big cities in which public utilities commiaaiona may be justified. Evea ia 

the caae of large citiea it is desirable that the state ahould have auch autborily 

over public utilities as may be neoessary to deal with intenirbaa qusitioaa. 

Emobt R. JonMOM. 
Umptrtity of Ptntuyhania. 

Rivsa. Qbo. L. The VniUd StaUs and Mtxieo. Pp. ziv, 1446. Price, 16.00. 

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 

No branch of the foreign affairs of the United Statee is sueeeptible of such 
widely diflferent interpretations aa bur relatione with Mexico. Tbe eveata 



342 The Annals of the American Academy 

which led up to our war with that country have been variously pictured as a 
phase of our internal struggle with slavery and as an example of wanton aggres- 
sion by a stronger upon a weaker power. Mr. Rives' two well written volumes 
treat the period leading up to the conflict and the struggle itself from a now 
viewpoint. His attitude is more impartial than that of those who lived through 
the troublous times of which they wrote and whose views were warped by their 
political beliefs or blurred by their nearness to the events. The author has a 
great advantage too, in that he writes at a time when the diplomatic archives 
of the countries chiefly interested, the United States, Mexico, Great Britain, 
and Texas, for the period have been thrown open to free examination. 

It is a satisfaction to citizens of the United States to find in the new point 
of view thus made possible much material that contradicts the early indict- 
ments made against our national policies and those who took an active part in 
their framing. Instead of assuming the attitude of an aggressor the United 
States is shown to have exercised singular forbearance and self-control. The 
"watchful waiting" policy in relation to Mexican disturbances is by no means 
a new feature of our diplomacy. There was no American conspiracy involved 
in the annexation of Texas and in the Mexican war. The attitude of President 
Polk is shown to have been far from that generally attributed to him, and the 
policy of Great Britain is strongly contrasted with what the pro-slavery faction 
believed it to be. On the other hand the author does not overlook our mistakes, 
although he shows they were due oftener to ignorance and inability to under- 
stand a people of highly contrasted ideals and habits of life than to bad intent. 
Then as now the people of the United States looked upon Mexico as a country 
inhabited by a European race, to be judged by the standards of Europe and 
of English America. In fact, Mexico has always been a country of predom- 
inantly aboriginal stock whom the European immigrants have conquered 
but never expelled. 

In order to put our relations with our southern neighbor in their proper 
setting the author allows himsef frequently to digress into discussions of our 
domestic affairs and includes a rather disporportionate treatment of the Oregon 
controversy. The reader of the second volume cannot but feel that though 
intent to write a military history of the Mexican war is disclaimed, the attrac- 
tions of the study of the campaign have been too great for the author to resist 
their description. 

Chester Lloyd Jones. 
University of Wisconsin. 

Thornton, W. W. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Pp. Ixiii, 929. Price, $7.60. 
Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company, 1913. 

The consideration now given by Congress to amendments to the anti- 
trust law gives timeliness to Mr. Thornton's Treatise on the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Act. The work is a comprehensive and well-arranged textbook that 
must prove useful to practitioners and other students of law. 

The volume starts with a good brief history of the enactment of the law. 
The authorship of the bill in its final form is, however, credited to Senator Hoar 
on the authority of Senator Hoar's "Autobiography;" but the evidence that 



Book DspARTiirNT S4S 



8eiiAtor Edmundt wroia moti of ibe bill u ooocluflive. Mr. 
miaUd M other writoit havt boon. 

BaooeHiTo ohftptera of Um voloM diteuM rtttrmiaU of Iradt Mid 
oommoii law, whal ooMliUitM oob u mw, Aod what ii ombraood la tiMl 
of interstate and foroign ooaunerot. Theaaehaptera art followed by a i 
ation of the oonatitutionality and the eoaatruetion of the aet of July 2. IMI. 
The proviaioaa of the law are then analyaed. The major part of the book ie 
devoted to a diaeuaaion of the application of the law to eontraeta in raalrairt 
of trade, to oMBopoUaa, to eonapirmcy, to eontrol of prieea or prodoalioa. t9 
to eliminate oonpetition, and to acreeroenU aifeeting 
I. The reUtion of the law to carriers, to patenU, to the pateal i 
eina bminaai, to eopyrighu and to labor oombinatiooa ia nonrirtaiod Tha 
later ehaptera of the book deal with queations eoneeminc proead ur a uadar the 
aet— auiU in equity, iodictmenU, action for damajsa, eTldanee, ete. 

The appendices contain the text of the Sherman Aet, aaetiooa 7S to 77 of 
the Wilaon Tariff Act, and the Senate Report (No. 1320, Od Coocrsas, Sd 
flsaaion) on "The Control of Corporations, Persona, and Flrma ^^rg*^ im 
Interstate Commerce." There is a good topical index. 

EiioKT R. Jowiaow. 
Uniperaity of PeniuyUania, 

Vbillbr, Lawrkncb. a Model Housing Law. Pp. viii, 343. Priee, 12.00. 

New York: Surrey Associates, Inc., 1914. 

This volume shows marked growth in the author's conception of the seopa 
of housing legislation since his first book on tenement law was published. Its 
plan is eomprehensive, though technical, and will interest those enga§sd is 
drafting housing legislation. Especially helpful are the numeroua < 
notea and diagrama. Some sections of the propoeed law are new though 
of them are on the statute books of the larger cities. The author warns 
who contemplate using the book not to attempt to improve it for, be deelaiaa, 
"every word, every oomma haa been weighed and haa ita exaet and daftaito 
meaning." 

Contrary to this advice very careful consideration ahould be given to all 
ita provisions. Especially is this true of the definitions where the phraaeology 
may differ from that eatablished by custom and court dectaJon in the city for 
which the law is being framed. Moreover aome definitiona read la eooj unction 
with suggested sections practically nullify the latter. This is true with the 
definition of the family which nullifies the section governing the takiag of 
lodger*. So alao the definition of a rear ]rard makea aeotiona 22 and 38 contra- 
dictory. An nnforeaeen omission is the failure to eatabliah aa atriei raquire- 
ments for privacy in connection with the locAtion of water-cloael ymapartawnta 
in tenements aa in dwellings. Section 34 requires in every new dwalUng oae 
entrance "to at leaat one water-closet compartment shall be had without 
ing through a bedroom," but dwellingi are of varioua kinda and iaeliida 
ment and boarding houaea. The aotbor nowhere makaa a aimiUr raiiuiiaaiaai 
for each apartment within a tenement. It would aaem that the raaaooa J«ti- 
fyingsuch a standard for a single dwelling would hold equally troeforanapaffi- 



844 The Annals op the American Academy 

ment in a multiple building, and emphatically more true for boarding houaea. 
Moreover, there arc omissiona, aa in section 106, where a slight change of phraae- 
ology would make the language more inclusive and less discriminatory. 

It is just such dcfccta aa the above that weaken the book and make what is a 
splendid conception fall short of its possibilities. It needs revision before it 
can be recommended as a safe guide in the hands of inexpert enthusiasts for 
housing reform. It must not be assumed, moreover, that it covers the whole 
range of housing legislation. Numerous features common to continental laws 
and essential to a legislative program for housing reform arc here omitted. 
Undoubtedly the author contemplates a supplementary work later on. 

Bernard J. Newman. 
Philadelphia. 

Wallino, William E. Progresaivism and After. Pp. xxxv, 406. Price, $1.50. 

New York : The Macmillan Company, 1914. 

With remarkable power of analysis and breadth of vision, the author ana- 
lyzes modem progressive movements and present-day philosophies. Socialism, 
in his opinion, will come, but the development will be gradual and society will 
paas through a series of slow changes. The class struggle of socialistic propa- 
ganda is not yet here. 

The present world-wide movement — progressivism — represents the efforts 
of the small capitalist against the large. Income and inheritance taxes, anti- 
trust laws and the regulation of monopoly all seek to restore competition. If 
this cannot be done, the industry is to be managed by the government for the 
benefit of the farmer and storekeeper. Labor is not completely ignored, be- 
cause its support is needed. However "there are to be no real concessions, 
no improvement at the expense of profits. Everything that is to be done for 
labor is either to pay for itself or to bring in profits greater than its costs " 
(p. 77). 

The progressive movement will establish state capitalism. The upper 
groups of labor, those possessing special skill or the advantages of position due 
to their place in government industries, will hold the balance of power. Their 
demands for increased wages and better conditions will be met, even at the 
expense of the other groups. The control of society by these groups will be 
the period of state socialism. "The fundamental changes that state socialism 
will bring in the treatment of the laboring masses will be rather in their more 
careful protection against rise of the cost of living and in the extension of com- 
munistic benefits rather than in any increase in wages" (p. 190). 

It is only after this period that socialism will come. It will be brought 
about by the attack on the cost of living as controlled by the farmer. It will 
mean internationalism and true democracy. For the first time government will 
be for all the people. 

The struggle throughout will be for equality of opportunity. This will 
mean not only that all shall have the opportunity for complete preparation but 
that no individual shall be compelled to compete against superior education or 
against inherited funds. The equality of opportunity advocated by the pro- 
gressives considers only those who have some capital. 



Book Dbpabtmsnt Mft 

The argumeoi in maay pUoM la dlfltouli to follow 
italiea in the quotatioot and bMMtt of poreotbetleal rtfi 
tioM of the book. It b to b« doubted, morooYer, if Um 
UiK« caiiitAlim will b« ■uecwful. In ipite of tbatt 
■ouod, tho trtiiiinntwupMlln, tht quot«iloi» and iUuttrmtioM 
illuminAting. All ptftOBt intorwtod la nodeni political aad 
opby tbould T9md thii itudy of tb« iobertiit eoDaervatiam of tbe 




N9W Ycrk Cily. 

Whittaeiii, Sib Tbomab P. Owrurthip Ttnure and Taxatiam o/ i^aiid. Pp. 

XXX, 574. Price. $3.75. New York: The MaemilUo CompMy, 1914. 

Thie it an elabormte eanvMt of the many historical and tbaoretieal prob* 
lame Chat are now being drawn into the political field in Englend by the radical 
tax rtforman. It i« apparently dedgnad to eenre at a hand book of arfuaaola 
for the moderately minded speakar under beeeeeity of meeting the ehargee of 
the radicals. So we have the case of the radicals in the words of Henry Ooorge 
or his English followprs, and each group of arguments is accompanied by as 
elaborate, but not always convincing rebuttal. Some of the argunaents ad- 
vanced against the radical position read well at first blush, but, like the famous 
oration of Lysias for the fig stealer, will hardly bear a cloee scrutiny. It may 
be that the purpoees of politics would be adequately senrod and ooa would 
scarcely feel inclined to criticise the polemic attitude if the book did not eott- 
tain much of a more serious character. Portions of the study will probably 
prove suggestive to any serious student. There is a careful attempt to weigh 
the charges so frequently preferred against the present leasehold system, dis- 
cussion of the mode of assessment of urban property, and of the probable results 
of the land taxes reoommended by the extreme radicals. In this portion of 
the study Mr. >\ hittaker rises above the atmosphere of partisan oootrovarey. 
The book is thus more than a mere polemic and something less than a dispaa- 
sionate analysis. 

It is Mr. W hittaker's purpose to destroy the case of the single taxart by 
showing that facts are not as alleged. Hence a long aeries of historieal ehaptcn 
with refereneos to the leading "authorities." The effeetivene« of soeh a 
method must be questionable at best*. The experience of theologieal eootro* 
versy would suggest that the historical method is not very decisive. Thaia ia 
usually enough of a case on both sides to leave each party a basis for furtbar 
argument, and in matters pertaining to the history of land tenurr in Fnglaiid 
no view can yet be regarded as settled and authoritative. Historieal aCody 
does indeed breed oertain convictions and an inelinatioo towards aodarata 
views; these eonvietions are clearly evident on every page of Mr. H1iittaker*s 
work. With such sincerity of conviction evan opponents ought to sympathise, 
but they are convictions only and are founded upon faith, not upon facta. Mr. 
WhitUker distrusts theory. The ethical questions and mattari of economic 
theory are poorly handled. This weakness of the book is probably the moat 
serious from the point of view of polaaaiea. CSavar fallaciaa ana ba da aU oyad 



846 The Annals of the American Academy 

only by clever reaAoning, and the success of Voltaire's sarcasms against certain 
predecessors of the modern singlc-taxers should have been a significant example. 

The interesting chapters in the historical portion are those upon the dis- 
tribution of national income and changes in the rate of wages. Both arc well 
considered presentations that should carry weight. In the discussion of pres- 
ent conditions there is a weak chapter on the leasehold system, based largely 
upon the vested interest argument. The chapters on parks and game pre- 
serves, upon unimproved urban land, and upon the rural housing problem are 
all interesting and significant. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these 
chapters would make a better impression if detached from the historical and 
polemical material. 

The conclusions can be briefly stated. We are to distinguish between 
administrative needs that are general and services performed by local or state 
officials for the specific benefit of the occupiers of property. Resources to meet 
needs of the first type can be most readily secured by taxing according to ability 
to pay. The cost of other services should be met by those who derive the 
benefit, and should be levied according to the value of the property. 

Abbott Payson Usher. 
Cornell University. 

WiNQriELD-STRATPORD, EsM^. The HiHloTy oj English Patriotism. (2 vols.) 
Pp. Hi, 1286. Price, $7.50. New York: John Lane Company, 1913. 

This volume reviews English history from the days of the Norman invasion 
to the close of the nineteenth century to discover and analyze the forces that 
tended to strengthen and to weaken the patriotic feelings of the English people. 
The work is a contribution to the philosophy of history, and deals with a subject 
hardly less difficult than it is interesting and significant. All must recognize 
that it is the expansion of the patriotic feeling for the tribe into affection for 
the nation and loyalty to the empire that has made the British Empire possible, 
and that enables the British people to look forward hopefully into the future. 
Hence by the study of the growth and expansion of national and imperial con- 
sciousness is to be found the key to British history. 

The difficulty of such a study is to exclude irrelevant facts and to confine 
one's attention to the events and forces that have strengthened or weakened, 
narrowed or broadened, the patriotic feelings of the masses of people. On the 
whole, the author has succeeded in excluding impertinent facts, although at 
times one feels that the discussion has only a remote connection with the 
author's thesis. 

Volume one contains two "books." Book one ends with the discussion 
of the "Puritan ideal," while book two begins with the "restoration" and ends 
with "Chatham." The second volume contains book three upon "The Great 
War" of the French revolution and its eflfects upon English patriotism and 
ideals, and book four upon "The Modem Age" which begins with the reform 
bill, includes the work of Disraeli and ends with the rise of the modern demo- 
cratic organization of society and government. 

Of the two volumes, the second is naturally the more interesting. During 
the hundred years following the outbreak of the French revolution, the national 



Book DBPAsncnrr $17 



and MoiAl idaftte of «Im Briikh paopU «m inuMfofOMd; Ibt BritM 

M A unified fofot omm to bt. How«v«r, Um work of ■Uwnlhilag 

parUI noMpiniMmw, of •nlnrgjng national Into Imparial fratrinHam 

on. if Um worid^wida cnpire nndor the Briiiah fla« ia to be a 

unified foree aoKNif the powen of the world. Thii broad fact ia made patent 

by the nuthor'e elenr aunrey of the foroea that in the peat have 

devalopaBant of BngUah patriotlflD. 

Emokt R. J< 
UmMrniff of 



WonafOLO, W. BaaiL. Rteonttruelion of tk§ Ntw CoUmUs mm d tr Lard MUmm. 

Pp. z, 806. Priee, 17.50. London: Kegan Paul, TVaseh. THUwer and 

Company, Ltd., 1018. 

Mtunu, Vtaoouirr. The Nation and Uu Emjnre, Pp. xlWi, 615. Priea, 
88.00. Boeion: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1018. 

In an earlier rolume Mr. Worsfold preeented an aecount of the work of Lord 
Milner in South Africa from the time of hia appointment aa oommiw i o aar ia 
1887 to the peaee of Vereeniging, 1002. This account b continued ao aa to eovar 
the entire history of Lord Milner'e public life aa commiaaiooar for the New 
Coloniee in their reconstruction after the war. From the eomplate eoUaetioa 
of official papers, from a personal diary and from newspaper reporta both im- 
perial and South African, the author records carefully and in great detail the 
aetivitiea of the high commissioner. Throughout the story there is an intenee 
loyalty and an admiration for Lord Milner that give the Tolomea the ehar^ 
aeter of memoirs prepared by a devoted private secretary rather than an effort 
to preeent an impartial view of South African affairs under the Crown Colony 
regime. Every effort is nuule to present the commiaaioner in the beet light. 
All of his leading policies are vigorously defended and the reader is led to 
believe that Milner invariably chose the right course and did the things whieh 
would redound to the honor and glory of the British Empire and at the aama 
time promote the best interests of South Africa. In the face of economic dia- 
aster and political opposition, both of which were not merely un| 
in degree but unexpected in character we are aasured that all affairs 
met and handled with oonapieaoua sueeesa." 

It is oomparattvely easy to find statementa and eooelnaioiia to whiah 
reption may be taken in a work written with auch an obriona biaa. 
ing the plana and execution of the aeheme of repatriation i 
upon the elose of the war, attention is called to the general a fflafaaay of the 
repatriation department, which within a period of little more than eight 
months had reatored the entire Boer population to their homea. Althoogh 
an official examination made by the home ofllea ravaalad the following dafaala: 
bad aeoounting, uneoonomio buying of suppUaa, axeaariva aoppUaa of 
and eritieiama of particular transactions, navatthalaaa the high 
is entirely exonerated and the defeeta are attributad to tha "< 
cumatances." When Lord Milner waa aagof iating with tha ! 
itiea relative to tha Dalagoa Johannaalwirg railway and waa aiming "to 
the province of Moaambiqua by eeoooeaie ties to Britiah South Africa eo i 




348 Ths Annalb op the American Academy 

pletely that the control of ita industrial development would lie in British 
hands" the author seema surprised that it was so difficult to remove the sus- 
picion of sinister designs on the part of the British government, and appears 
unable to understand why the Portuguese government "assumed so hesitating 
and suspicious an attitude" as to result in the prospect being temporarily 
abandoned. Here as in similar instances the author like other imperialists 
appears not very particular about the method by which the rule of the empire 
is to be extended and fails to understand why other nations and their colonial 
poa e ee a ions do not welcome British rule. 

Making due allowance for the fact that all the evidence is marshalled in 
such a way as to be favorable to Lord Milner and his colonial policies the vol- 
umes may be read with much interest and profit. The author discusses Lord 
Milner's part in the work of repatriation, his policy for the reorganization of 
railway administration and the readjustment of railway rates, the relation 
between Transvaal and Delagoa Bay and finally the reasons for the adoption 
of the policy which was distinctly Milner's — the importation of Chinese labor. 
In each of these matters Lord Milner took a deep personal interest and through 
his ability to do a prodigious amount of labor actually directed personally much 
of the public work of the colonies. Many exceedingly difficult problems and 
some very delicate situations, particularly in winning back the Boers, were 
evidently handled with unusual tact and with discerning judgment. The 
two dominant ideas of Milner were the advancement of imperial interests and 
the preparation of the way for the administrative unity of South Africa. The 
high commissioner gave much attention to his so-called "fads" — land settle- 
ment, the bringing of British settlers to South Africa, afforestation, scientific 
study of agriculture and irrigation, and lastly the inter-colonial council. It 
was through the latter body that new South Africa was to be "cast deliberately 
in a mould from which it could take on readily the form of union." The story 
of Crown Colony government as directed by Milner is told in such a thorough 
manner that no student of colonial affairs can afford to neglect these volumes. 

The Nation and the Empire by Viscount Milner contains a collection of 
speeches and addresses delivered at the time of his appointment as commis- 
sioner, during his stay in South Africa and on his return to England in defense 
of his policies and in the advancement of the one great idea — imperial federa- 
tion. The meaning and significance of the term "imperial " are unfolded in an 
interesting introduction wherein it is possible to amplify the dominant note of 
the speeches. At the Navy League meeting in Johannesburg on May 29, 1904, 
Lord Milner defined his notion of imperialism as follows: "I am an imperialist 
out and out, and by imperialist I do not mean that which is commonly 
supposed to be indicated by the word. It is not the domination of Great Brit- 
ain over other parts of the empire that is in my mind at all, when I call myself 
an imperialist out and out. I am an Englishman, but I am an imperialist more 
than I am an Englishman, and I am prepared to see the Federal Council of the 
empire sitting at Ottawa, sitting at Sydney, sitting in South Africa, sitting any- 
where, so long as in the future we all hang together." A large part of Milner's 
public utterances are intended to forward imperial federation as an ideal 



Book Dr.pARTMrvT 



gr«at«r and more worthy of rapport than the evAnotMSt priaeipltf of Iht rag* 
ular partiM. 

Thii ToluBM preaeaU in full muif id dr eMW from whkh Mr. Worafold 
quotM eitrmeU. The Oraaff Roinot apooeh whieh waa daaarlbod by tha Ub> 
orala aa an act of monumontal folly, doftinod to brine th« two natiooa at war, 
and many other utterancea over whieh controversiea raced In Enclaad aad 
South Africa, are here given in full. Moreover the fate of Lord Miloer's polieioa 
in the handa of the liberal miniatry after the downfall of tha UsioBiat miiarily 
ia deaeribad and tha dafanaa of bia Sooth African career before the Bovae 
of Lorda and other public bodiea ia portrayed in ■pteehea after the liberal 
party had aet about to undo muoh that waa aocomplidwd under Crowa Celeay 



The time haa not come to eetimate the work of Lord Milner with 
faimoM to all parties concerned. Many more years must pass before his atti* 
tude toward and treatment of the Boers can be impartially considered. Nor 
ia it poesible as yet to weigh with the even hand of justiee the differanee betneen 
the Unionist policies as formulated and carried out by Chamberiain and MU- 
ner and the Liberal opposition whieh called forth a eondemnation of Miloer'a 
policiea from no less men than Henry Campbell-Bannerman, John Morley and 
James Bryee, and led to a reversal of the most noteworthy dcriaionji made by 
the governor. When the time comes to consider the eareer of Milner from tbe 
impartial viewpoint of history it will be a great advantage to have theee !»• 
portent public utterances as well as the painstaking record furnished by an 
enthusiastic admirer. The volumes constitute a notable addition to the liter- 
ature on the history of South Africa. 

Aa the idea of imperial federation develops the nation will in all probability 
find more cause for gratification in the work of their high commiseinner at the 
critical period in South African affairs, and they may aooord eren greater \ 
to the man who sees in the organic union of the dominiona and the 
country "one of the noblest conceptions that has ever dawned upon the politi* 
oal imagination of mankind." 

CBAnLie O. Hah 
Whitman C^Ug$. 



INDEX 



ABC dootriiM, ropltotrnwl ol Mon- 
roe DooiriiM by, 118. 

AUdum nilwi^, the, 371, 373. 

AIvAtm, SeAor AleJMidro, oo Monroe 
Doeiriiie,e7,00,76. 

AysaiCA, A CoMermDcrtrB Piaoi 
Poucrroa. J. Peaae Norton, 370- 
270. 

AMBUOAN FOBBION POUOT, ElX- 
MBim or A CONSTBUCTIVB. W. 

Morgnn Shueter, 2S3-2M. 

AUBUCAJf POUCIM, A RsVtSION OF. 

8. N. Patten, 191-300. 

Arbitration: Kncouragement of, 386; 
•ettlement of Mexican troubles by, 
105. 

Argentina: An advaneed common- 
wealth, 11; as participant with 
United States in restoring order in 
Mexico, 383; attitude of, toward 
United States, 03 ; European domin- 
ion over, 10; freedom from negro 
problem in, 11; objection of, to any 
form of Pan-American union, 128; 
population of, 10; stability of, 9. 

Barrett, John, on Monroe Doctrine, 
88. 

A Pan-American Policy: The 

Monroe Doctrine Modernised, 1-4. 

Bolivia: Climate of, 5; population of, 
12. 

Brasil: Area and population of, 9; 
as participant with United States 
in restoring order in Mexico, 393; 
attitude of, toward United SUtes, 
03; European dominion over, 10; 
inhabitants of, 15; republican sys- 
tem of government in, 10. 

BaowN, Puup M. The Monroe 
Doctrine: A Solution of Its Prob- 
lem, 119-123. 



Bryan, WUliam J,, and Nlsatafs 
treaty, 85; tribute of. to Dias, 308. 

Calder6n, SeAor, on Monroe Doelriae 

91. 
California: Japanese laborsn in, 388. 
Ja p a n ese question, the, 387, 388, 

354. 
Central America: Civilisation of, 101; 

economic progress of, 230; relations 

of United SUtes with, 190, 301. 
Cbaowick, F. E. a study of Iberir- 

America, 6-19. 
CmsTBR, CoLBT N. Ths Prsosnt 

Status of the Monroe Doetrine, 

30-27. 
Chili: Area and population of, 11; 

as participant with United States 

in restoring order in Mexioo^ 388; 

attitude of, toward United States, 

03; European dominion over, 10; 

objeotion by, to any form of Pan- 
American union, 128; stability of, 

9; trade with, 251. 
China: Importance of, 345; open door 

in, 250; possibilities of, for surplus 

capital, 345; question of exeiusion 

regarding, 347. 
AND Japan, tbs Rblatioxs or 

TH« Unitbo Statbs wrm T. 

lyenaga, 354-359. 
Cleveland, Grover, and Yeneauela 

case, 33. 
Cunra, Hbnbt. The Mexican Situ* 

aUon, 103-105. 
Colombia: Compromise with, 88; 

population of, 11 ; treaty with, 88. 
Constitutional government, meaning 

01,388. 
Constitutionalist forees, 

of property under, 173. 



351 



352 



Indbx 



ConntitutionaliBt movement: Pur- 

poees of, 170; successor, 212. 
Party in Mexico: What it is 

FiOHTiNQ FOR, Thb. Dod Roberto 

V. Pcsqueira, 166-174. 
CoDStitutionalisU, character and 

leader of so-called, 152. 
Cuba: Location of, 33; protectorate 

over, 85. 

Dias: Attitude of, toward constitu- 
tion of Mexico, 226; Bryan's tribute 
to, 208; evidences of regime of, 138; 
fostering of foreign interests by, 
222; government of, 137, 148, 186, 
187, 221; overthrowing of, 149. 

Diplomacy, a Practical. Edward 
W. Townsend, 295-302. 

Diplomatic and consular service, 
highly trained, non-political, 286. 

Ecuador: Climate of, 5; population 
of, 11. 

Embargo: Lifting of, 160; regstab- 
lishment of, on arms and munitions, 
231. 

England, attitude of, toward addi- 
tional territory, 99. 

Europe: And the Monroe Doctrine, 
109; historical ignorance as to Mon- 
roe Doctrine in, 117; right of, to 
protect nationals in Latin America, 
128; question of interference of, 
5L 

Europeans, treatment of, in Latin 
America, 100. 

Far East, rise of American commerce 
in, 260. 

United States and the: an 

Economic and Miltary Program, 
Richard Wainwright, 251-253. 

Foreign Countries, American Cit- 
ies IN. Robert J. Kerr, 236-242. 

policy, elements in a construc- 
tive, 283. 

Fox, Austen G. Mexico, 183-185. 



Gillette, Cabsiub E. Mexico, Its 
People and Its Problem, 201-210. 

Gore, T. P. The Foreign Policy of 
the United States, 277-281. 

Grahams, Leopold. The Latin 
View of the Monroe Doctrine, 57-62. 

Haiti: Area of, 31; government of, 
36, 37, 41 ; industries of, 47; location 
of, 33; opinions of important writers 
on, 37, 39-46; position of, 31; reli- 
gious condition of, 42; social condi- 
tion of, 36; wealth of, 32. 

Hart, Albert Bushnell. The Pos- 
tulates of the Mexican Situation, 
136-147. 

Hawaiian Islands, as basis for con- 
structive policies by United States, 
252. 

Hay-Pauncefote treaty: And history 
of West Indies, 85; provisions of, 25. 

Hibben, Paxton. The South Amer- 
ican View as to the Monroe Doe- 
trine, 63-65. 

Honduras, grave danger of, from 
United States, 119. 

Huerta: As salvation of Mexico, 211; 
attitude of United States toward 
government under, 177, 180; govern- 
ment under, as provisional presi- 
dent, 176; legality of government 
of, 157 ; probable term of, 138 ; recog- 
nition of, as Mexican president, 
142, 143. 

Iberic-America, a Study op. F. E. 
Chadwick, 5-19. 

Immigration, restriction of, 274. 

International law: Modern system of, 
219; non-existence of, 201. 

Intervention: And Huerta and Car- 
ranza, 163; avoidance of, in Mexico, 
182; joint armed, 233; participation 
of Argentina, Brazil and Chili in 
armed, 293; President Wilson's 
attitude toward armed, 234; reasons 
for non-, by United States, 216; 



353 



remilt of, 147; right of, under Mon- 
roe Doeirine, 1S2. 
Itbnaoa. T. The ReUtloM of Ihe 
United fiUtM with China nnd 
Japan, 264-^9. 

Japan: A ttroag jnnfmnMii, 987; 
and Pan.Paeifie BtpoMoo. 968; 
friendly attitude of, toward United 
Statee, 308; intaroourae between, 
and the United SUtea, 354; Man- 
churian policy of, 306; migration of 
cooliee from, 306; proposal to, re- 
garding neutrality of South Man- 
ehurian Railway, 367. 

RsLATioNs BirwBBur, Ain> tbs 

Umrmo Statbb. Juiji O. Kasai, 



A«n 



Tbb Rblatiomi or tbb Unitbd 

9TATB8 WITH Cmif A AMD. T. lyen- 
aga, 354-380. 

Japaneee, number of, in United 
SUtee, 365. 

labor, wagea of, 365. 

KAaAi, Juui G. The Relatione be- 
tween Japan and the United States, 
360-380. 

KsRB, R. J. American Citiiena in 
Foreign Countries, 336-343. 

Kbaus, Hbbbb*t. What European 
Countries Think of the Monroe 
Doctrine, 107-112. 

LATANi, John Holladat. The Ef- 
fects of the Panama Canal on Our 
Relations with Latin America, 
84-01. 

Latin America: Appeal of states of, 
to United States, 114; confusion of, 
with Iberio- America, 6; furnishing 
of capital to, by Europe, 100; loss of 
prestige of United States in. 341; 
people of, 50; right of Europeans 
to protect their nationals in. 128. 

Thi ErracTB or thi Panama 

Canal on oua Rblations with. 
John UoUaday Latan«, 84-01. 



Tm Moirnoa Docmnni 

Joseph Wholes, 66-0. 

Latin-Ameriean nnnmiiiiiis, total 
amount of, 100. 

eountries; Amarletti enpltAl te, 

980; apprebeosioa 9t, fnft4bm 
pun>oees of Unit«l SCatas, 190; 
attitude of, toward Monroe Dor- 
trine, 3; ehangKl ralatlooBhip of, 
toward United States, 198; full 
partnership of, with United States, 
80; insuring adequate proieetioo ct 
foreign interesU in, 120; poUey d, 
137; repudiation of debts in, 118; 

LoniA, AcBiLLB. The Monroe Doe- 
trine, 130-131. 

Low, A. Maubics. The Attatuda 
of Europe towards the Monroe 
Doctrine, 00-106. 

Mac Cobklb, Wiluam A. The Mon- 
roe Doctrine and Its Application to 
Haiti, 28^56. 

Madero: As president, 168; 
tionof, 176; character of, 154; 
promise of. 212; election of, 150; gor- 
emment under, pro-Amerieaa, 150; 
overthrowing of, 155; rerolntioa 
led by, 166. 175. 

Martinet, Dr. Mareial, on Monroe 
Doctrine, 64. 

Mabon, a. B. Maxieo and bsr Fso- 
pie, 186-190. 

Mbxican SrruATioN, Tu. Henry 
Clews, 163-165. 

SrruATioN, Tm Pobtvlatbs or 

The. Albert BushnaU Hart, 130- 
147. 

Mexico: American population In, 988; 
anarchy in, 214 ; armed iatamntkNi 
in, 303; (5m aiso Intervention) as a 
monarchy, 309; as a republic, 207; 
central goremment of, 237; char- 
acter of population of, 137, 154, 163; 
elasses of population of, 133, 908; 
eonstlttttion of, 168. 133» 998; eon- 
stitutlonnl sis eti on in, i, 180; con- 
stitutional fowmnant in, 188, 139, 



354 



Index 



229; uanger to torcigm'rs in, 146; 
disruption of, 232; dreadful state 
of, 13G; economic condition of, 164; 
economic progress of, 220; cfTect of 
action of United States on, 127; 
establishment of true democracy 
in, 202; foreign investments in, 
233; future of, 162; government of, 
under Huerta, 176; ignorance con- 
corning, 202; independence of, 194; 
influence of Monroe Doctrine on, 
162; inhabitants of, 203; Japanese 
interference in, 249; joint inter- 
vention in, 127; land question in, 
189; land owners in, 164 ; land tenure 
in, 213; landed class in, 14; local 
politicians in, 221 ; means of restor- 
ing order in, 206; nationalities in, 
12; necebsity of change of laws in, 
164; need of a strong central 
government in, 163; non-recogni- 
tion of, 231; number of Americans 
in, 184, 229; object of revolutionary 
movement in, 166; oil deposits in, 
207 ; permanent peace in, 211 ; policy 
of, 221, 233; policy of United States 
towards, 199; political condition 
of, 163; political unity in, 198; pop- 
ular will in, 145; public opinion in, 
188; redress for injuries done to 
Europeans in, 112; regular army of, 
206; relations of United States with, 
175, 196, 201 ; relief from conditions 
in, 211; result of proximity of 
United States to, 175; r^sumd of 
recent occurrences in, 175; rights of 
American citizens in, 236; seces- 
sion of northern states of, 232; 
settlement of troubles of, by arbi- 
tration, 165; social condition in, 
163; social readjustment of, 222; 
solution of problems of, 217; sov- 
ereignty of, 202, 236; suffering of 
Americans in, 242; United States as 
sponsor of constitutional govern- 
ment in, 224; unlawful to export 
arms to, 134; unrest in, 221; war 



between, ami UniliMi States, 184; 

weak binding of sections of, 198. 
Mexico. Austen G. Fox, 183-185. 
AND HER People. Alfred Bishop 

Mason, 186-190. 

Errors with Reference to, 

AND Events that Have Occurred 
There. Henry Lane Wilson, 14&- 
161. 

Its People and Its Problbm. 

Cassius E. Gillette, 201-210. 

The Duty op the United 

States Toward. Frank W. Mon- 
dell, 175-182. 

The Policy of the United 

States Towards. VVillard Sauls- 
bury, 134-135. 

The Remedy for. Leslie C. 

Wells, 211-218. 

The Scope and Limits of our 

Obligations Toward. L. S. Rowe, 
21^235. 

Mexico City, bombardment of, 155. 

Mitre, Emilio, on Monroe Doctrine, 
61. 

MoNDELL, Frank W. The Duty of 
the United States toward, 175-182. 

Monroe Doctrine: A cardinal prin- 
ciple of foreign policy, 20; a doc- 
trine of self-preservation, 48; a live 
doctrine, 118; abrogation of, 50, 53; 
acceptance of, by European gov- 
ernments, 58; acceptance of, by 
Latin America, 71; Alvarez on, 67, 
69, 75; application of, 16, 57, 202; as 
part of international code, 30; atti- 
tude of European diplomacy to- 
ward, 111 ; attitude of South Amer- 
ican republics toward, 23; authori- 
tative statement of, by President 
Monroe, 69; Barrett on, 83; beliefs 
regarding, 104; British government 
denied right to be official party to es- 
tablishment of, 68; Calder6n on, 91 ; 
Canning suggestions and, 93, 95; 
cases involving reassertion of, 58; 
"commercial," 110; declaration of, 



IWDSX 



22; deftaition of. 121 ; dlweffAitl for, 
111; effcwt of. 53, 01. 74. 107. 125. l». 
131 ; enforcMiivnt of, 03; European 
intorest in, 107; European interpra> 
Ution of. 108; extouion ni, 2; for- 
•icn interpreUUoii mmI mifundor- 
■toading of, 00; fononUtloo of. 07; 
historioAl UcBorMMo rtgvdiag. 117; 
hifltorical ■JgnJOcaoce of, 130; his- 
tory of. 21 ; imporUnco of. 00. 31 ; in- 
flueoo« of. 78. 100. 102. 210; intorpnv 
Ution of, 3, 118; justifioAtion for, 
100: limitation of appliemtios of, 23; 
M n . 04 ; moUvM prompting 

. I>t . .on of, 124; new Arrange- 
mettl* eootfoming application of, 22; 
no reaaon for indepemlrnt exiatence 
of, 131; not cardinal principle of 
I'an- American policy, 63 ; not obao- 
lete, 73. 113; obligations aaaumfHl 
under, 181 ; origin of. 30; the origi- 
nal, 28; original object of, 48; 
Panama Canal and, 90; part of law 
of American continent, 50; political 
principle of United Statcii, 111; 
l>opularity of, in Europe, 101 ; pres- 
ent interpretation of, 127; prin- 
ciples laid down in. 20; promulga- 
tion of, SO; purport and limitations 
of 108; purpose of, 85; replacement 
of, by A B C doctrine. 113; results 
of, 132; Roosevelt on. 60, 61. 66. 67, 
72; self-protection, basic principle 
of, 25; toleration of, 293; true read- 
ing of, 17 ; unilateral or continental 
in operation, 57; vaguenev of, 119; 
validity of, 111 ; violation of, 220. 

MoNRoi Doctunb: A Solution op 
Its Probuui, Tub. Philip X. 
Brown, 110-123. 

AND Its Appucation to Haiti, 

Tbb. WiUiam A. MaoCorkle, 2S 
56. 

AND Latin Ambbica, Thb. 

Joseph >Vhda8B, 00-88. 

and thb Canning Myth Thk 

Charles H. SherriU, 92>98 



— AND mm FomoN Pbunr or tmi 
Unitbo ^atbs im tub WBsrmsN 
HBniapflBBB. Thk J J, MsdMa, 
124-129. 

— PUBBNT 9rAT0s or. Colby K. 
Cbsslor, 20-27. 

— Tbb. Arhille Ix>ris, 130- 131 

— Tbb. a. l*illet, 131-133. 

— TWB Attitudb or Evbopb To- 
ward TMR. A. .Mauriee Low. 90- 
106. 

— Til IS Latin- Ambbican Vibw or 
tub. Leopold QrahaoM. 37-0. 

— Thb Mbanino op thb. Charles 
M. Ptopper. 113-118. 

— Tub Sotrm Ambbican Vibw as 
T(» THB. Paxton Hibbsn, 63-05. 

— Wuat Eobopban CouNTBtaa 
Think or tup M#»r»»#Tt Kraus, 
107 112. 



National policies, forces in determin- 
ing, 191. 

Negroes, mixture of, with whites, 16. 

Nicaragua: Site of, 101; treaty with. 
80,89. 

Norton, J. Pbasb. A ConstruetiTe 
Peace Policy for Ameriea* 270-270. 

P AC! PIC, Factors Appbctino Pouct 

OP THB UnITBD 8taTS8 IN THB. 

C. H. Stockton, 243-244. 

policy of United States in the, 

254. 

Thb Policy op thb Unitbo 

Statbs in thb. Ellery C. Slowsll, 
245-2S0. 

trade: EstabUshmsnt of baaks 

share of. by Unitsd Statss* WL 
Panama, protectorate orer, 80^ 

Canal: And Mooros DwtriM. 

90; ehaa«as sffsetsd throvih. 04; 
offset of eonplsUon of, upon trade, 
282; offset of, on relatioas of Unitsd 
States with South Aasrka, 22. 



356 



Indbx 



Canal Zone, effect of acquisition 

of, by United States, 87, 88. 

Pacific Exposition, and Japan, 

263. 

Pan-American policy: Evolution of, 
2; new declaration of, 79; results of, 
2. 

TBB Monroe Doctbinx Mod- 

SBNikBD, A. John Barrett, 1-4. 

Paraguay, population of, 12. 
Patten, Simon N. A Revision of 

American Policies, 191-200. 
Peace, triple alliance to secure, 273. 
Pepper, Charles M. The Meaning 

of the Monroe Doctrine, 113-118. 
Peru : Climate of, 5 ; population of, 1 1. 
Pesqubira, Don Roberto V. The 

Constitutionalist Party in Mexico: 

What It is Fighting For, 166-174. 
Philippines: Effective neutralization 

of, 249; exclusion policy in, 249. 
PiLLET, A. The Monroe Doctrine, 

131-133. 

Roosevelt, Theodore: Effect of pres- 
ence of, in South America, 26; on 
Monroe Doctrine, 57, 60, 61, 66, 67, 
72. 

Root, Elihu: On international rela- 
tions, 77; sojourn of, in South 
America, 26; treaty with Colombia 
proposed by, 88. 

Rows, L. S. The Scope and Limits 
of Our Obligations Toward Mexico, 
219-235. 

Saulsburt, Willard. The Policy of 
the United States Toward Mexico, 
134-135. 

Sherrill, Charles H. The Monroe 
Doctrine and the Canning Myth, 
92-98. 

Shuster, W. Morgan. The Ele- 
ments of a Constructive American 
Foreign Policy, 282-294. 

Slbchta, J. J. The Monroe Doctrine 
and the Foreign Policy of the 



United States in the Western Hem- 
isphere, 124-129. 

South America: Attitude of, towards 
Canning, 92; confederation between 
leading powers of, 81. 

South American countries: Not 
afraid of territorial absorption by 
United States, 114; suspicion of, 
concerning Monroe Doctrine, 58. 

Spaniards, governing class in Span- 
ish-American provinces, 8. 

Stockton, C. H. Factors Affecting 
the Policy of the United States in 
the Pacific, 243-244. 

Stowell, Ellbrt C. The Policy of 
the United States in the Pacific, 
245-250. 

Taft, William H., attitude of, toward 

Mexican revolutions, 134. 
Townsend, Edward W. A Practical 

Diplomacy, 295-302. 
Treaties between United States and 

European nations, 299. 

United States : As friend of Japan and 
China, 251 ; as sponsor of constitu- 
tional government in Mexico, 224; 
attitude of, toward acquisition of 
land in South America, 59; attitude 
of, toward recognition of govern- 
ments, 178; attitude of, toward 
South American countries, 17; 
changed policy of, toward Japan, 
268; changed relationship between, 
and countries of new world, 125; 
effect of attitude of, on Mexican 
policy, 223; extension of, 270; for- 
eign representatives of, 281; inter- 
ference of, in South American rela- 
tions, 22; observation of treaties 
by, 279; policy of, in the Pacific, 
243, 245, 254; policy of, regarding 
Chinese and Japanese laborers, 
246, 247; principle of neutrality 
established by, 279. 



IMDI 



► 



UmTBo Statm AMD ruB Fa* Ea^t: 

AN EOOIIOICIO AMD MlUTAST PBO* 

aKAM, Tn. RkbMd WAiBvrighl» 

361-968. 
RBLATiom BvnrsBir Jafah and 

nu. Juiji G. KamI, 900-360. 
Tte DUTT or, TOWABD Mvtioo. 

Frmnk W. MoockU, 175-183. 

TBS FOMBIOM POUOT OF TMB. 

T. P. Oore, 377-361. 
Unicumy : AtUludt ci, Unrsrd United 
States, 63; popuUtko of, 10. 

VtOMiMU: BloekiKl* of, 108, 130; 

pOfHlUtiOB of, 11. 

VUU: Anny of, 308; Attitude of Amer- 
ieAO people towmrdi, 141. 

Wainwuqbt, RiCBAKD. The Uoitod 
SUtee and the Far East: An 
Bsooomic and Military Program, 
361-388. 



srrots of the, rsjirdlm llwiso, 117. 

Wmxa, LasuB C. The RsMsdy for 
Msjdeo 311-318. 

West Indies, eeooom i e pr o y ssi of the, 
330. 

Wbblbbs, Jossra. Ths \fiamn% 
Doetrine and Latin Amsrisa, i8-> 
88. 

WfLsoN, Hbmbt Lamb, bfora vitk 
Reference to Mexico and tha SfBBis 
that have occurred there, 148-161. 

Wilson, President: Attitoda of, to- 
ward foreign oonrnssJons, 87; atti- 
tude of. toward ll«doo, 136. m, 
185; attitude of, toward MaiieaB 
goTemment under Hosrta, 177, 180; 
requirement by, thai 
of Latin-American states be 
tutional, 80. 






Government Regulation 

OF 

Water Transportation 



THE ANNALS 



Volume lv 



, 1914 



B»n<Mi: BMORT R. X>RN80N 

tAm BocToa: CLYDB L. KINO 

Booc DwAvncBifT: ROtWKLL O. MoCmiA 

IffwaAn Bmt«m: JAMKB C. BALLAGR. O. O. HITBBNBR. B. B. HUBBWBB . CABL 

KXUBT. J. P. UCRTBNBBROBR, L. & BOWB, BLLBRY 

O. 8T0WBLL. T. W. VAN MBTRB 







\ 



AMBBICAJt ACADBMV OF POLITICAL AND 80CtAl 

aOn ANB Woodland Atbnvb 

PatLAOBLFBlA 



Copyright, 1914, by 

American Academt of Political and Social Sciencs 

All rights reserved 



EUROPEAN AGENTS 

EInqland: p. S. King A Son, 2 Great Smith St., Westminster, Londoa, S. W. 
France: L. Larose, Rue Soufflot, 22, Paris. 

Germany: Mayer A MQller, 2 Prinx Louis Ferdinandatrasse. Berlin, N. W. 
Italy; Giornale Dcgli Economisti, yia Monte Savnllo Palazzo Orsini. Rome. 
Spain: E. Dossat, 9 Plaza de Santa Ana. Madrid 



CONTENTS 

COMPETITION VER8W IN THE STEAMSHIP 

BUSINESS: PROPOeSl) I 

Emory R. Johnson, Ph.D., 8e.D., Pro(«ior of TnuuporuOoa tad 
Commeroe, Unlveraity of Pennaylvanim; Member of the PubUe 8er- 
▼iee Commbrioo of pMUifylYAaU. 

EXTENT OF REGULATION OP OCEAN AND INLAND WATER 

TRANSPORTATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 17 

GroTer G. Huabner, Ph.D., AaiiaUnt Profeeeor of TrmnsporUtioo and 
Coauneree, Univenity of PennsylvanU. 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STEAMSHIP AGREBMBNTB 

AND CONFERENCES IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE ... 48 

Paul GottheU, Member of the Firm of Funch, Edye and Co., New York, 

and Chairman of the Special Committee of Steamship Linee Operating 

from United Statee Atlantic and Gulf Porta to Foreign Countriea. 

STEAMSHIP LINE AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE 

AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE 75 

S. S. Huebner, Ph.D., Profeeaor of Insurance and Commerce, Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania, and Expert to the Committee on the Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries during its Investigation of Shipping Combi- 
nations. 

THE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF STEAMSHIP 

CONFERENCES AND AGREEMENTS IIS 

William H. 8. Stevens, Ph.D., Instructor in Economies, Columbia 
University. 

POOLING AGREEMENTS 144 

W. G. Sickel, Vice-Director, Hamburg-American Line, New York. 

RATE AGREEMENTS BETH^EEN CARRIERS IN THE FOREIGN 

TRADE IM 

P. A. S. Franklin, Vice-President, International Mercantile Mariae 
Company, New York. 

DEt-ERRED REBATE SYSTEMS I*l 

Herbert Barber, President of Barber and Company, inc., Htm Toriu 

CONTRACTS BETWEEN STEAMSHIP LINES AND SmPPBS 10 

D. J. Donovan, General Western Agent for Foreign Steamship liass, 
Chicago. 

TRAFFIC AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STEAMSHIP UNE8 AND 

!CAN R.\ILR0AD8 I» 

is Hanly, Member of Congress from Texas, and Member of Ibe 
Committee on the Merchant Marine and 

Ui 



IT CONTBNTB 

AGREEMENTS AND CONFERENCES IN THEIR RELATION TO 

OCEAN RATES 194 

William Boyd, President of Houlder, Weir and Boyd, Inc., New York. 

RATE MAKING IN DOMESTIC WATER TRANSPORTATION 205 

E. O. Merchant, Ph.D., Waahing^on, D. C. 

RELATION OF THE CONTRACTOR OR SPECULATOR TO THE 

WORLD'S OCEAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 232 

T. Ashley Sparks, Member of the Firm of Punch, Edye and Company, 
New York. 

WATER TERMINALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR CON- 
TROL 287 

Ernest S. Bradford, Ph.D., Washington, D. C. 

APPENDICES: 

I. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SHIPPING 
CONFERENCES AND AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERI- 
CAN FOREIGN TRADE 243 

II. METHODS OF CONTROLLING COMPETITION BE- 

TWEEN DOMESTIC CARRIERS BY WATER 252 

III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE 

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES 266 

IV. BILL TO REGULATE CARRIERS BY W ATER ENGAGED 

IN THE FOREIGN AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 263 

BOOK DEPARTMENT 276 

INDEX.. 299 

BOOK DEPARTMENT 

NOTES 

Babson — The Future Method of Investing Money (p. 275) ; Backhouse and 
Bland — Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (p. 276); Bzbt— The Deaf 
(p. 276); Best and Ogdes— The Problem of the Continuation School and Its 
Successful Solution in Germany (p. 276) ; Branford — Interpretations and Fore- 
catts (p. 276) ; Brown— r^ Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation (p. 277) ; 
Clark— Socio/ Justice Without Socialism (p. 277); Enoel— T^ Elements of 
Child Protection (p. 278) ; Foster— TA* Social Emergency (p. 278) ; Gilbreth— 
The Psychology of Management (p. 279) ; Goldman — Stock Exchange Laws (p. 
279); Haines — The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (p. 279) ; Illing- 
worth — The Ccdperation of Science and Industry (p. 280) ; Johnston— Cammon 
Sense in Foreign Policy (p. 280) ; KEPHARi^Our Southern Highlanders (p. 281) ; 
Kohler — Philosophy of Law (p. 281); Matredsr — A Survey of the Woman 
Problem (p. 282) ; Mbckun— Democracy and Race Friction (p. 282) ; Michaels— 



CmiiWTi V 

Sexual EtkicM (p. 389); Moblbt-Oh PoliHet amd HiUorw (p. 30); Fmm^Tht 
Btign oj Sir Bdward Canon (p. 383); KAaum^-Oroded Corparmipm 
amd Ouidi lo UU Stwdif ^ Auditing (p. 3BS); RmmL^lMJamd: 4 
Trip Tkrongk Saga Land (p. 3M) ; SiUOMAir— rA« /neoiM fas (p. aM); 
■■■»— LaltM j4i«Mrieo (p. IBS); Vbbmoiff— T*« ICmindby irowitoiM; Trwm^ 
parioHom and C om m $ r c t , I79lhl9lt (p. 986); WooLf^ B i ri g l i M ^ fyiwq/rpito 
(p. 986); Wiiovr ano HoMOinui— 4fi OmI/im o/ I^oeol (TitinwiMl m^ Lbtai 
Taxation (p. 186). 

UYIBWB 

CABor-ITAalirfii IiM ^ (p. 986) C. Kdny 

OuTor-ir/Urf md Why Public Ownonkip Haa FaiUd (p. 987) B. J< 

HoAO— 4 Tkoory of InUrool . (p. 988) BttlMr L. 

JoBMOit— JMffOt^Mi AoM iA« UniUd Kingdom to North 

Awmrioa, I7$9-I9li (p. 900) H. P. Pairchild 

Jfum^-Siatnlo Lam Making ip,m). 8. M. UodMy 

Low— rA« Oooomance of England (p. 903) R. 0. OtitoU 

OmAOB— National Ouilds: An Bnguiry into the Wage^yttem and 

the Way Out (p. 908) 8. Neariag 

OumoMMm-'Within Frieon WaUe (p. 998) J. P. lichUnbOTiy 

Rmmymt— Round about a Pound a Week (p. 904) 8. NMriag 

8mAQmM—PrineipUe of Beonomice: Being a Reoieion of /lUro- 

dueHon to Beonomice (p. 904) L. 8. BUkay 

8iBonuBi>— Oftiioeroey in New Zealand (p. 906) R. C. MoCtm 

WiLLft—SoaoZ Foreee in England and Awwriea (p. 906) B. D. Modfttt 

WiLUAUBOtt— Maritime Bnterpriee, 14SS-tS68 (p. 997) . . A. P. Uiber 



TH» PAPERS IN THIS PUBLICATION WEBB 
COLLECTED AND EDITED BY 

8. 8. HuEBNER, Ph.D., associate editor, 

AND WERE WRITTEN DURING THE MONTHS 

OF May and June. The volume 

WENT TO PRESS IN JuLY, 1914. 



COMPETITION VERSUS COOPERATION IN THE 
SHIP BUSINESS: PROPOSED LEGISLATION 

Bt Emort R. JoHMioif, Ph.D., So.D., 



r 



Prof«Mor of TnuuporUUoo and Co a m r ot, Uni vanity of PtaaaylirmaU; 
Mtmber of iho Publie 8onrio« Commiaiioii of PeaiMylTaaia. 

Shippers whether by rail or by water routes require, first of all, 
adequate and regular services at reasonable and relatively sUbIs 
rates. The primary consideratkm is that of service. Under prss- 
ent-day conditions, the rates charged, though of importance to ship- 
pers, seldom Impose serious restrictions upon trade, and it is probabis 
that commercial transactions suffer more from frequent fluctuations 
in charges than from unreasonably high rates. 

Carriers, particularly steamship lines, require, for the successful 
development of their business, a dependable volume of traflk mov- 
ing in a steady flow and at rates that yield returns high enough to 
enable the carriers readily to secure the capital needed to develop 
adequate and up-to-date terminals and to provide the ships and other 
facilities required to handle a growing tonnage of trafllc. Suocem 
in the transportation business doubtless depends more upon a steady 
volume of traffic than upon a large tonnage if it be fluctuating in 
volume. The steadier the flow of traffic the more fully can fadlitieB 
and floating equipment be utilized; the greater the fluctuation in 
tonnage, the larger the unprofit&bic movement of vessels partly 
loaded or in ballast. 

The net profits obtained by carriers ought, in the mtexestol 
the public as well as in the interest of the owners of railroads and 
steamships, to be large enough to attract capital to the transportation 
business; and the conditions under which transportation servieea 
are rendered ought to be such as to cause men having capital to in- 
vest and having a desire to achieve success in business to wish to 
devote their money and energies to the construction and 
of railroads and to the building and nmning of steamships. 

The extent to which competition among railroads or 
steamship lines should be insisted upon by law and regulation, and 
the degree of codperation among rival carriers that should be per- 
mitted by the government must, in the last analysis, be decided with 

1 



2 The Annai^ of the American Academy 

reference to the effect of competition and cooperation upon the 
8er\'ice8 and rates secured by shippers and upon the present prosperity 
and future prospects of rail and water carriers. It was formerly 
thought that the public interests required the fullest possible measure 
of competition in the transportation business, but experience has 
shown that the public does not necessarily suffer, and may benefit, 
from some forms of cooperation among rival carriers. It is the pur- 
pose of this paper to inquire to what extent there is cooperation among 
rival steamship lines and to consider the regulation that should 
be exercised by the Government. 

Competition, it should be remembered, may be in rates or in 
services, or in both. Rival steamship lines combine or cooperate 
first of all to agree upon rates, and, secondarily, to regulate their 
services in such a way as to secure the best use of their facilities. 
Experience shows that agreements among rival carriers as to rates 
and services do not put an end to the efforts of the several companies 
that are parties to the agreement to secure business. Each company 
is managed by energetic and ambitious men who endeavor to attract 
passengers and tonnage to the vessels in which they are severally 
interested. Competition in service continues and the cooperation 
of steamship lines mitigates but does not terminate the operation of 
the law of increasing returns. Under normal conditions, every 
steamship manager strives to secure additional traffic, because more 
passengers and more tonnage mean less cost and more profits per 
unit of business handled. 

Whatever the theory may be as to competition or cooperation 
in the steamship business, the fact is that there is at the present 
time a very large degree of cooperation among carriers by water. 
This is true both in the foreign trade and in the coastwise com- 
merce of the United States. As Professor S. S. Huebner states in 
the comprehensive and valuable report which he made in 1914 to 
the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House 
of Representatives (p. 281): 

As regards nearly every foreign trade route, practically all the established 
lines operating to and from American ports work in harmonious cooperation, 
either through written or oral agreements, conference arrangements, or gentle- 
men's understandings. The few instances where two or more lines serve the 
same route and have denied the existence of written or oral agreements for 
the regulation of the trade, are exceptions and not the rule. 



CoMPSTrnoN vbmus CodrsBATioir 8 

The ooOperatioii among the eurien engngad in the ooMlwiie 
trade of the United States b not quite so complete, but Professor 
Huebner sUtes {UritL, 403) that 'Sinth the exceptkm of the Padfio 
coast trade proper .... the line traffic is handled by 
comparatively few companies and these are ha$iAy controlled by 
railroads and shipping consoHdationfl." Professor Huebner further 
sUtes (p. 405) tha^- 

On the Great Lskei Um through psekage freight from the wattem f»i«vsjrt 
to ea«teni leaporta ria Buffalo ie controlled exclueively by tix railroad-owned 
boat Itnee. . . . 

Eves in the Pseille eoaat trade (ineluding the intereoaatal trade), where 
independent fttramthip linee make a more prominent ehowing than in etiher 
the Atlantic ooaet or Great Lakee trade, railroade and shipping eonaolidatione 
repreeent a large proportion of the total tonnage. 

In the recommendations which the House Committee on the 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries adopted at the doee of its investi- 
gation of "Steamship Agreements and Affiliations in the American 
Foreign and Domestic Trade/' the committee summarizes the pres- 
ent relations of ocean carriers engaged in the American foreign trade 
in the following concise language (p. 415): 

It is the almoflt universal practice forateamship lines engaging in the Amer- 
ican foreign trade to operate, both on the in4>ound and out-bound voyagea, 
under the terms of written agreements, conference arrangements or gentle- 
men's understandings, which have for their principal purpoee the regulation 
of competition through either (1) the fixing or regulation of rates, (2) the 
apportionment of traffic by allotting the ports of sailing, restricting the num- 
ber of sailings, or limiting the volume of freight which certain lines may carry, 
(3) the pooling of earnings from all or a portion of the traffic, or (4) meeting 
the competition of non-conference linee. 

It is recognised by everybody that unfair and destructive com- 
petition among carriers is not desirable. When the Interstate 
Trade Commission bill was before the Senate, the following amend- 
ment, introduced by Senator Cummins of Iowa, was adopted by 
the Senate. 

"That unfair competition in commerce is hereby declared un- 
lawful. 

"The commission shall have authority to prevent such unfair 
competition." 

The commission, after hearings, may order a person or cor- 
poration to desist from unfair practices and — 



4 The Annals of the American Academy 

Any suit brought by any such person, partnership, or corporation to 
annul, suspend, or set aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the 
commission shall be brought against the commission in a District Court of 
the United States in the judicial district of the residence of the person or 
of the district in which the principal office or place of business is located, 
and the procedure set forth in the act of Congress making appropriations to 
supply urgent deficiencies and insufficient appropriations for the fiscal year 
1913, and for other purposes relating to suits brought to suspend or set 
aside, in whole or in part, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
shall apply. 

This legislation indicates that the public has come to realize 
that some restriction should be placed upon competition that is un- 
fair and destructive, and experience will probably show that carriers 
in order to keep competition within fair limits, must be allowed 
some measure of cooperation. 

In deciding upon the degree or form of cooperation that should 
be allowed rival steamship companies, the advantages claimed for 
codperation should be considered, and the objections to interline 
agreements should be kept in view. It will be well to summarize, 
briefly, the advantages and disadvantages resulting from the coopera- 
tion of steamship companies with each other. These advantages 
and disadvantages are set forth in Professor Huebner^s report, 
above referred to (pp. 300-307). 

It is contended by the carriers, and it was the opinion of Pro- 
fessor Huebner and the House Committee on the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, that agreements among ocean carriers as to rates and 
services are a "protection to both shipper and ship owner." It 
was represented to the committee that the cooperation of rival 
steamship lines gave shippers a more regular service, that regularity of 
service enabled merchants to build up their trade, to reach a greater 
number of markets, and to carry smaller stocks of goods with conse- 
quent lower storage charges. A regular, dependable service, further- 
more, enables merchants to avoid engaging cargo space in advance 
and yet to count upon being able to deliver goods at definite future 
dates. By means of agreements, it was pointed out to the committee, 
merchants trading in the United States may have a service comparing 
in regularity with the service from European countries, which to- 
gether have a much larger foreign trade than is handled to and from 
the United States. Agreements, likewise, give a better distribution 
of sailings by dates and ports and permit exports to be shipped from 



CoMpprmftur vKiuinii CoflpERATinv 

the interiorof the United states to foreign countries with tbei 
detention at the aeaboard. 

The other advantagee resulting from agreements between 
ship lines, staled brie43r>are the greater security given to capital in- 
vested in the steamship business, more stable, uniform and equitable 
rates of insurance payable by merchants, the stability of freight and 
passenger charges, the securing of uniform freight rates by all mer- 
chants. Urge and smaU, the maintenance of rates from the United 
Statee to foreign markets that are equal to, or fairly related to, thoae 
from other countries, the reduction in the cost of service to the 
carrier, and the distribution of the total cost of all the services of the 
lines, parties to the agreement, over the traffic as a whole in such a 
way as to make possible the largest development of the total trade. 

Obviously, it is poesible that the public may suffer by allowing 
ooean carriers freely to enter into agreements concerning their serv- 
ices and rates. Disadvantages to the public may result from the 
monopolisitic nature of the conferences or agreements of carriers. 
The very purpose of the agreement is to limit competition, and monop- 
oly is the antithesis of competition. If carriers were not restrained 
by economic forces or statutory law, they would doubtless estal^ish 
a degree of monopoly that would be injurious to the public. Where 
competition is restricted by combinations of carriers, it isusuaUy 
necessary for the Government to protect the public interest by intelli- 
gent regulation. 

Another objection urged against conference agreements of steam- 
ship lines is that the agreements, as now made and enforced, are 
secret. This practice violates the well-established principle that 
there should be no secrecy in the business of common carriers; their 
relations vnih each other and to the public should be matters of public 
knowledge. 

It is, moreover, the practice of some steamship companies, by 
permission of the conference agreements, to grant more favorable 
rates, on certain classes of commodities, to large shippers than are 
given smaller shippers. This discrimination among shippers tends 
to give to the more favored shippers a monopoly of trade, to the 
injury of the public as a whole. For the most part, it is the policy 
of steamship companies to grant the same rates to large and small 
shippers, and this is the only wise policy. 

Furthermore, in the long-distance trade between the United 



6 Ths Annals of the American Academy 

States and South America, Africa, Asia and Australasia, the well- 
known system of deferred rebates to loyal shippers prevails to a 
large extent in the traffic to the United States. The practice of 
making a rebate of 5 or 10 per cent in the freight charges, payable 
six months or a year subsequent to the termination of the period in 
which the shipments were made, but payable only to such shippers 
as have patronized the conference lines exclusively, ties shippers 
to the conference lines so closely as to prevent independent lines 
from entering into competition with the lines parties to the con- 
ference. The carriers consider deferred rebates necessary in certain 
trades. Whether they are in the interest of the public or whether 
they are necessary to the carriers is debatable; probably, they should 
be prohibited. 

Certain practices of conference lines are subject to criticism and 
seem to show the necessity for regulation of the conference agree- 
ments and the services and practices of ocean carriers. Some of 
these practices will be considered in reviewing the recommendations 
made by the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries con- 
cerning the regulations of carriers by water. The practices considered 
undesirable by the committee are dealt with in the bill which the 
committee has introduced and which is now pending in Congress. 
(See appendbc IV to this volume). 

The views of the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries as to the advantages of cooperation among carriers by water 
are entitled to great weight, and may well be quoted in this con- 
nection (p. 416) : 

It is claimed that . . . the prohibition of cooperative arrangements 
between practically all the lines in nearly all the divisions of our foreign trade 
would not only involve a wholesale disturbance of existing conditions in the 
shipping business, but would deprive American exporters and importers of 
the advantages claimed as resulting from agreements and conferences if hon- 
estly and fairly conducted, such as greater regularity and frequency of service, 
stability and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of service, better dis- 
tribution of sailings, maintenance of American and European rates to foreign 
markets on a parity, and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination 
of secret arrangements, and underhanded methods of discrimination. 

These advantages, the committee believes, can be secured only by permit- 
ting the several lines in any given trade to cooperate through some form of rate 
and pooling arrangement under Government supervision and control. It is 
the view of the committee that open competition can not be assured for any 



CoMrrrrnoif mus CoOpBRATum 7 

lengih oi tiiuo oy unienns oxuiing a y—mm f tfmi m i U d. Tb« eiiiife bMtorj 
of iUMiithip •crMOMiite thowt iluil la omm ooouBtrM Ibtra U bo ki^^ 
medium beiweeo war uid peAM when MYwml linat engag* in Um mom tnufo. 



It aeenii dear that oodperatkm amoiig ftaaniBlup liiifli k doir^^ 
but that it would not be wise to ghre rival oarrieni whether on httid 
or aea unrestricted freedom in oombining to restrain competitioiL 
It is nccwwary for the Government to lay down the condttiooa under 
which carriers may cooperate and for the Qovemment so to regulate 
the agreements of carriers with each other and with shippers and 
passengers as to secure, if possible, for both the carriers and tiie 
public, the advantages obtainable from the cooperation of carristt 
wiUiout thereby allowing the public to be oppressed by arbitrary 
or monopolistic action on the part of the carriers. In Ifgisiating 
for the regulation of ocean carriers, the fact should be kept in mind 
that the chief aim of the Government as well as of the carriers should 
be to provide shippers with services of maximum quality and quantity. 
No academic theories as to government restriction of monopoly 
and enforcement of competition, nor any general theory as to govern- 
ment regulation of rates and services of common carriers should 
interfere with the maintenance and development of transportation 
services. 

The best tliought concerning the extent to which the Govern- 
ment should regulate the agreements of rival ocean carriers is that 
presented in the recent report of the House Committee on the Mer- 
chant Marine and Fisheries. As the result of its careful investi- 
gation, the committee concluded tliat the agreements were desirabla 
from the point of view of the public interest as well as from the view- 
point of the welfare of the carriers, but it also believed that it is 
neoessary to have "some form of effective government supervisiaii." 
It was the belief of the committee that "the advantages and abuses 
connected with steamship agreements and conferences as now oon- 
ducted are inherent and can be eUminated by only effective govwn- 
ment control," and the committee reccmmiended the following 
measures for the regulation of steamship carriers engaged in tlis 
foreign trade of the United States: 

1. That firms or lines engaged in the foreign trade be subjeet 
to the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission as re- 
gards rates and the approval of contracts with each other, with 
shippers and with railroads. 



8 Thb Annals op the American Academy 

2. That carriers engaged in the foreign trade be required to file 
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, for approval, agreements 
with other steamship companies, or with shippers or with railroads. 

3. That the Interstate Conmierce Commission be given ample 
powers to make investigation upon complaint or upon its own motion, 
the commission to have power to correct unjust rates, to supervise 
classifications of freight and to adjust rates among classes of com- 
modities. 

4. That the granting of rebates be made illegal and that carriers 
be required to charge equal rates to shippers irrespective of volume 
of freight ofifered. 

5. That the Interstate Conmierce Commission be given the 
power to make investigations, upon complaint or upon its own motion, 
to determine whether carriers have given reasonable notices of in- 
creased rates; whether shippers have been imf airly treated as re- 
gards cargo space and other facilities; whether the carriers have made 
discriminating or otherwise unfair contracts with favored shippers; 
and to determine whether the carriers have equitably settled claims 
against them. 

6. That carriers be prohibited from employing "fighting ships" 
to drive out of business companies not members of a conference. 
Fighting ships, it may be necessary to explain, are vessels temporarily 
put into service to carry freight at exceptionally low rates to and 
from ports served by Unes outside of the conference, the losses in- 
curred in the operating of fighting ships being borne by the lines 
belonging to the conference. 

7. The committee further reconunends the prohibition of the 
payment of deferred rebates to loyal shippers, both in the import 
and export trade of the United States. 

Certain special additional recommendations, applicable to 
carriers by water engaged in the domestic trade, were made by the 
conmiittee. The more important of these reconmiendations are the 
following: That the Interstate Commerce Commission be given 
complete jurisdiction over interstate port-to-port traffic of coastwise 
carriers, with power to fix maximum rates; that railroads be pro- 
hibited from making a through rail-and-water route prohibitive as 
compared to an all-rail route by charging "more for the same service 
on water-borne commodities than they charge for the proportionate 
share of the rail haul;'' that the Interstate Commerce Commission 



CoMFETrnoif msuB CoOrauTioif 



be shren power to allow carriers by water to eharfe differeotialf 
enough lower than competinc rail rates to enable the earriere by 
water to aeeure a fab ihare of the traffic; that raflroada and carrien 
by water be required to ianie through bills of lading over lines of 
interstate carriers by water; that railroads be reciuired to allow 
carriers by water to use the railroad terminal facilities under like, 
fair conditions; and that the railroads be prohibited, in the future, 
from securing control of canals or eompanies engaged in transpor- 
tation by canals. 

Since the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries com- 
pleted its report and formulated the above recommendatioDS, Hon. J. 
W. Akoamder, Chairman of the Committee, with the ssristsnre of 
ProlesK>r S. S. Huebner, has drafted a bill for the regulation of carriers 
by water, which bill is now pending in Congress. A copy of the 
propoeed legislation is printed as an appendix IV to this volume. 
Inasmuch as the primary purpoee of the bill is to regulate the 
agreements and the practices of steamship conferences which are 
formed to regulate competition in the business of transportation 
by water, it will be appropriate to devote the remainder of this paper 
to a consideration of the principal features of the bill that has been 
presented to Congress. 

After defining, in the first section of the bill, the term "common 
carrier by water" and drawmg the necessary distinction be t ween 
such carriers "in niterstate commerce" and "in foreign commerce," 
the bill, in section two, prohibits the granting of deferred rebates, the 
operation of fightmg ships, and retaliatory action by carriers against 
shippers for patronising non-conference lines. These p i oiv i s to n s 
reach the chief abuses of the steamship conferences. Unquestion- 
ably, fighting ships ought to be prohibited; by their use unfair com- 
petition is waged against independent carriers. The use of fitting 
ships to destroy competitors is analagous to the practice of local 
price cutting by trusts to drive small competitors out of b usi nes s . 
It is also desirable to prohibit the granting of deferred rebates to 
loyal shippers, although it must be recognised that such rebates 
may not be without advantage to shippers as well as to carriers. It 
is believed, however, that the advantages d deferred rebates are 
more than offset by the fact that such rebates secure to the carriers, 
that are members of a conference, a monopoly that may be dangerous 
to the public interest Probably, deferred rebate agrsemento are 



10 The Annals op the American Academy 

a violation of the anti-trust law and could not be lawfully entered 
into by carriers subject to that act. 

Section three of the bill provides that conference agreements 
must be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is 
given power to modify or disapprove them. It is necessary that the 
commission, acting for the Government, should be informed of all 
agreements and arrangements entered into by steamship lines, 
members of conferences; although, in a sense, the bill, by giving 
the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to disapprove or 
modify these agreements, makes the Government a party to the 
arrangements entered into by competing carriers. As drafted, the 
bill apparently assumes that the agreements among carriers may 
become binding upon the parties to the contracts, as soon as they are 
executed, although the bill stipulates that "such agreements, under- 
standings, conferences and arrangements shall be approved or dis- 
approval by the Interstate Commerce Conmiission." 

If it is intended that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
shall formally approve or disapprove the conference agreements, 
such agreements ought not to become effective until the commission 
has had reasonable time to consider them and pass upon them. Ix 
would seem that the law ought to require the agreement to be filed 
with the commission at least thirty days before becoming effective. 
It probably would not be wise to give the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission power to suspend the effective date of such agreements in 
the manner that it can suspend proposed increases in railroad rates. 
It will doubtless be best to allow the agreements to become effective 
without action by the commission thirty days after filing, the com- 
mission having power at any time, after hearing initiated upon com- 
plaint or upon its own motion, to order the modification or termi- 
nation of any agreements. 

By section four of the bill as drafted. 

Every traffic or rate association or conference of which any common carrier 
by water in interstate commerce may be a member ... is placed under 
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission as regards the ap- 
proval of all matters pertaining to rates, traffic arrangements between carriers, 
and other conditions of water transportation. 

This action, taken with other portions of the act, confers upon the 
commission clearly the power to approve or disapprove of the rates 



CoiffpnTnoN VERSufi CoAperatiom 11 

nanicd in conference agreemeuU enUTeii iuUj hy turrurft l<> naUr 
in intentate cuminercc. Indeed, by Mectiun »«'v<n, ih«- < oiiiiiiiw»iuii 
18 given power 'Ho determine, prescribe and onlir ciiforrinl juai 
and reaaoiiabic raW of carrien by wator In intanUie OQauneroe. 

One of the abuMi of ateamahip cooferanoes haa been the lefoaal 
of the members of an existing conference to admit new members 
to the assoeiatioiL To meet this staialkxiy section four of the pro- 
posed act makes it unlawful for a oonfiBrenee to deny membership 
'*to any carrier because the oonsent of all or any number of the 
existing meinbcrs of such association or conference can not be obtatned 
to favor the adminion of said carrier." The fonmiissian Is gi?en 
power to prescribe the conditions under which outside lines may 
become members of existing conferences. 

The provisions of section five of the bill write into the p roposed 
act sections two and three of the interstate commerce act which pro- 
hibit Bjpeaai rates and rebates and unreasonable discriminataons as 
between persons, places and kinds of traffic. By these proviskms, 
the proposed act will establish new standards of conduct to be ob- 
8cr\'c^ by carriers by water. It is recognised by those who drafted 
the bill, and will, in time, come to be recognifeed by everybody, that 
secret rates, rebates and unfair discrimination when granted by car- 
riers by water are as contrary to public policy as when given by rail- 
road companies. If the proposed bill becomes a law and is wisely 
administered, it i^ill mark a long step forward in providing equal 
opportunity to all shippers and producers, large and small, as regvtfds 
the services of conunon carriers by lake and sea as well as by raiL 

Sections six, seven and eight of the proposed measure give the 
Interstate Commerce Commission revisory power over the rates 
charged by carriers by water. Section six appUes to carriers in 
foreign commerce and sections seven and eight to carriers in inter- 
state commerce. The bill, in section seven, requires carriers by 
water in interstate conunerce to file and keep open to pubBe in- 
spection local and joint rates and fares, and provides that no increase 
may be made in such charges except upon ten days' notice to the 
commission, which body is given the power, either upon complain t 
or upon its own motion, to prescribe maximum rates and fares, 
and to determine what differentials may be established 
the charges of competing rail and water carriers in interstate 
merce. By these provisions, the Interstate Commerce 



12 The Ankals of the American Academy 

is given, with two exceptions, the power over the rates of interstate 
carriers by water that it has over the charges of railroads. The 
two exceptions are, that interstate carriers by water may reduce 
rates without giving the commission advance notice, and that the com- 
mission has no power to suspend the rates filed by interstate carriers 
by water. 

Common carriers by water in foreign commerce are subjected 
to lees complete regulation than are interstate carriers by water. 
Section six gives the commission authority to prescribe the maximum 
rates that may be charged by common carriers by water in foreign 
conmierce, but such carriers are not required to print and file their 
rates, nor is it made necessary for them to give the commission 
advance notice of an increase in rates. Section six, however, should 
be read in connection with section thirteen of the proposed act, which 
provides that the Interstate Commerce Conmiission may, at its 
discretion, require any common carrier by water in foreign commerce 

to file with it any periodical or special report, or any account, record, rate, or 
charge, or any memorandum of any facts and transactions appertaining to 
the carrier's business, concerning any matter about which the commission is 
authorized or required by this act to inquire or keep itself informed or which 
it is required to enforce, or to require from any such carrier specific answers 
to all questions upon which the Conmiission may need information in carry- 
ing out this act. 

Section thirteen probably gives the commission power to require 
the printing and filing of the tariffs of carriers by water in foreign 
commerce, and it is suggested that it would be better to change the 
phraseology of section sbc of the bill so as to confer, by that section, 
upon the commission whatever powers it is intended that the act 
shall give the commission as regards the printing and fiUng of the 
rates of carriers in foreign commerce. 

There can hardly be any doubt that the printing and filing of 
the rates is a necessary prerequisite to any intelligent and effective 
regulation of rates by the conmiission. In my judgment, it is de- 
sirable to require common carriers in foreign commerce to give the 
commission ten days' notice of increases in rates, with the proviso 
that the conmiission, in its discretion, may, upon application, permit 
certain classes of carriers, without giving the conmiission advanced 
notice, to quote higher rates than those on file with the commission. 



CoMPrnnoN vrmus CoOFBRATIOif 13 

The poflseorion of such diiicreUoa by tbe commiflsion would prolMibly 
enable it to prescribe different regulatione or requiremenU for oom- 
panlat and veMels wignfed in "line*' and "tramp" eervioea. 
It is provkiad by aaotlon eight of the bill that- 



WlMMTtr a eomroon carrier by water ia iateratate eoamtroe redoeee ite 
ratee . . . below a fair and reomaeraiiTa baaia with the iataai of driv- 
iof out or otherwiaa iaiuriag a ooapatitiva earriar by water, it ehaU aolbe 
permitted to inoreaae sueh ratee ualeee after hearing by the Intenlaie Coan 
meroe Commieeion it thall be found that luob propoeed increeae reeta upoa 
chanted oonditione other than the elimination of aaid competition. 

The oomminion ia given power to determine whether the rates 
in questkm were actually reduced below a remunerative basis with 
the intent of driving the competitor out of businssB. This proviiioii 
which is taken, with modification, from the interstate eommeroe aei 
will doubtless do much to prevent carriers by water from starting 
upon a destruotive warfare for the purpose of eliminating competi- 
tion. The effect, however, will probably be to cause practically all 
carriers to enter into conference agreements. If competitors can not 
in the future be driven from the field by warfare, they will need to 
be made harmless. Steamship companies will seek to become 
friendly neighbors by means of mutual understandings. This is as 
it should be, provided the understandings and agreements of the 
friendly neighbors are known to, and regulated by, the Government. 

The remaining sections, nine to twenty-two, of the proposed act, 
with the exception of sections eleven, thirteen, fourteen and twenty- 
one, do not call for special discussion in this paper. Section nine 
wisely prohibits carriers, subject to the act, from disclosing other 
than to shipper or consignee — 

any information concerning the nature, kind, quantity, destlsatioD, consignee, 
or routing of any property tendered or delivered to such eommon earner for 
interstate transportation, or for transportation between the United Stales 
and a foreign country, which information may be used to the detriment or 
prejudice of such shipper or consignee, or which may improperly disclose his 
business transactions to a competitor, or which may be uaed to the detriaaat 
or prejudice of any carrier. 

Section ten gives the Interstate Commerce Commission power to 
adopt such rules and regulations as may be neoessary to prevent 



unfair treatment of shippers in the matter of eargo apaea aeeonmodalloiia or 
other facilities, having due regard fur the proper loading of the fisiil aad the 



14 The Annals of the American Academy 

available tonnage, or unfair or discriminating contracts with shippers !)ased 
OD the volume of freight offered, or unfair treatment in the loading and land- 
ing of freight in proper condition, or unfair treatment in the adjustment and 
•ettlement of claims. 

Section eleven is intended to reach and prevent the objection- 
able practice on the part of railroad companies of charging on traffic 
received by railroad from connecting carriers by water a higher rate 
for the rail portion of the through, joint service than the railroads 
charge for a corresponding rail haul on traffic that is handled by an 
all-rail route from shipper to consignee. To illustrate: the rail- 
roads charge on ex-lake grain a rate from the lakes to the seaboard 
higher than the proportionate share of an all-rail rate from the middle 
West to the seaboard. Section eleven reads as follows: 

That when property may be or is transported by rail and water from point 
to point in the United States, and not entirely within the limits of a single 
State, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company or companies to discrimi- 
nate against such rail-and-water route, as compared with the all-rail route 
between the same points, by charging more for the same transportation service, 
having due regard for reasonable extra terminal charges and other expenses 
involved, on water-borne commodities and articles moving between said points, 
than they charge on the same kind of commodities and articles for the pro- 
portionate share of the all-rail haul. The Interstate Commerce Commission 
is hereby empowered upon complaint, or on its own initative and after full 
hearing, to determine questions of facts as to the violation of the provisions 
of this section by any railroad company, and to order any such violation dis- 
continued. 

Section twelve prohibits railroads and other common carriers 
from acquiring control of any canal, or any common carrier operat- 
ing as a canal, when the waterway is used in interstate commerce, 
unless the acquisition of such control is permitted by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission "as being in the public interest and of ad- 
vantage to the convenience and commerce of the people." This 
will give the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to deter- 
mine the extent to which it is necessary or desirable to permit the 
common ownership and operation of railroads and inland waterways. 

As was pointed out above, section thirteen gives the Interstate 
Commerce Commission the power, at its discretion, to require com- 
mon carriers by water in foreign commerce to make reports and to 
file rates. It is wise to give the Interstate Commerce Commission 



COMFBTrnON VniSUB Co6PBEATIO!f I" 

thiB discretionary pofwer. EiparisDoe with the AdminktratioD oC 
the act will indicate to the nnrnmiwinn hofw far it will be praetieablo 
and wiee to go in requirinf reports of carriers by water in the forelgD 
trade. In my judpnent, it will be found prtietioable, eventually, 
to make nearly the aame requiremente of oarriert in the foreign trade 
as are made of oarriert in the ooastwiie trade, and it is wise to five 
the oommiHion disorstionsry power in prescribing rules to be followed 
by carriers employed in international trade. 

It is equally wise, as is provided by section fourteen of the bill, 
to apply flection twenty of the interstate commerce act of 1887, as 
amended to date, to "common carriers by water in interstate oom- 
meroe, as far as the aame may be applicable to said carriers." This 
will enable the Interstate Commerce Commission to require compre- 
hensive annual reports, to prescribe a uniform system <^ accounts, 
and to employ agents who shall have authority to examine all accounts 
and records kept by the carriers by water in interstate commerce. 

SecUons fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen and nineteen pro- 
vide appropriate penalties for violation of the act, and prescribe the 
procedure for enforcement of the law. While of great importance, 
these sections do not require discussion in this paper, which has to 
do with the economic provisions of the proposed law. Section twenty 
authorises the commission "to employ such experts and other assisU 
ants as may be necessary, and to appoint special agents or examiners 
who shall have powers to administer oaths, examine witnesses and 
take testimony." Section twenty-two merely provides that the 
act shall take effect upon its passage. 

The enforcement of the act is placed, by section twenty-one, 
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is to be enlarged 
from seven to eleven members, not more than six of whom shall be 
adherents of the same political party. This provision of the bill is 
sure to meet with at last two general criticisms, — that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission is now overburdened and unable to keep 
abreast of its work, and that it ^ill be predisposed to apply to carriers 
by water the same kind and degree of regulation that it has applied 
to raibroads, and thus subject the business of transportation by 
water to rules that will be too detailed and too rigid. Those who 
urge these criticisms will argue for the establishment of a new, autono- 
mous commission charged solely with the duty of regulating carriers 
by water. 



16 Thb Annalb of thb American Academy 

It is true that the Interstate Commerce Commission is at present 
over-worked, but the addition of four new members ought to enable 
the commission not only to perform its new duties satisfactorily, 
but also to expedite its work of regulating railroads. The combined 
task of regulating the rail and water carriers can doubtless be per- 
formed by eleven men more easily than seven men can handle the 
present work of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 

The fear that the Interstate Commerce Commission will go 
further and faster than would a separate commission with the regu- 
lation of carriers by water is probably not well founded. The long 
experience which the Interstate Commerce Commission has had in 
the regulation of railroads, and to some extent in supervising carriers 
by water, may, indeed, make it more cautious than an entirely new 
administrative body would be. The Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion would certainly approach the task of regulating carriers by 
water more intelUgently than would a new commission, and it would 
probably make fewer mistakes. 

A strong argument against the establishment of a separate com- 
mission for the regulation of carriers by water is that if there were 
two commissions, there might be conflict of jurisdiction, lack of uni- 
formity in regulation and in decisions that would both lessen the 
effectiveness of regulation and be of disadvantage to shippers and 
carriers. It will be better to increase the membership of the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission, to provide it generously with facilities 
for doing its enlarged work, and to entrust it with the task of regu- 
lating carriers by water as well as by land. 



EXTENT OF REGULATION OF OCEAN AND INLAND 

WATER TRANSPORTATION BY THE FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT 

Bt Gkotbb G. Eumbkeb, Pb.D., 



AaftiaUnt Profenor of TnuMporUUon and CommMrM, Uaiwrsitj oi 

PMUMylTADlA. 

In the past the federal regulation of transportation agencies 
has been oonceraed much more largely with railroads than with 
other common carriers. Gradually, however, as it became evident 
that the need for such regulation is not peculiar to railroads, the 
scope of the interstate commerce law was extended so as to include 
express, sleeping car and private car companies, fast freight lines, 
industrial railroads, refrigeration and ventilation services, terminal 
facilities, elevators, transfer and delivery services, and all transpor- 
tation agencies operated in connection with the interstate shipment 
of freight or passenglsrs by rail. The interstate busnien of pipe 
lines, electric street railways, and telephone, telegraph and aU>le 
lines were likewise placed within the scope of the interstate 
act, and, as will be hereafter described, water transportatioD 
were under certain conditions subjected to the provisions of the 
statute. So limited, however, is the control of the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission over water carriers that the enactment of addi- 
tional legislation applicable to their charges and public aenrioai ii 
now being seriously considered. 

The relations between carriers by water and be t wee n soeli 
carriers and railways has also become a matter of public interest. 
The Sherman act of 1890 and the anti-trust provisions of the tariff 
act of 1894 are generally applicable to all combinations, cooferenees 
or agreements which unreasonably restrain interstate or foreign 
trade, and the Panama Canal act of 1912 regulates certain phases 
of such relations, but the need of federal legialatioQ partteolarty 
applicable to steamship combinations, confereoees or agreemeoti is 
a topic of serious consideration. 

Existing federal regulation of ocean and inland water trans- 
portation may conveniently be classified mto (1) navigation Uws 

17 



18 The Annals of the American Academy 

concerning the public safety, registry and enrollment, treatment of 
crews and a multitude of matters not directly connected with trans- 
portation charges and services; (2) statutes regulating the charges 
and public services of water transportation agencies; and (3) statutes 
regulating or prohibiting combinations, conferences or agreements. 

General Navigation Laws 

Since it is with the type of regulation included in (2) and (3) 
above that this volume is especially concerned, it is not the purpose 
of this paper to present a detailed analysis of the many navigation 
laws which Congress has from time to time enacted. Brief mention 
of the principal groups of statutes will, however, serve to emphasize 
the line of demarcation which Congress has in the past drawn between 
water and rail transportation. Both rail and water carriers have 
been the subject of much legislation, but for the most part, although 
not entirely, in separate statutes and with different objects in view. 
The principal federal laws regulating the railroads are those con- 
cerning their charges and public services, while the principal laws 
concerning water transportation are the various general navigation 
statutes. The public safety has been regulated in the case of both 
rail and water transportation, but the conditions of operation have 
differed so widely that separate statutes were enacted. Mention 
of some of the many navigation laws which are now in effect will 
also serve to emphasize that, in matters other than charges and 
public services, water transportation is regulated by a multitude of 
federal statutes. 

Navigation StattUes. — An important group of navigation laws are 
those which require American vessels, excepting harbor craft and ves- 
sels not propelled by sails or internal motive power of their own, to be 
registered, enrolled or licensed. Vessels so documented with the United 
States Commissioner of Navigation are identified by an official name 
and number permanently carved or marked on the vessel as required 
by law, and each registered vessel in addition has her draught officially 
marked on the stem and stem post. These statutes, moreover, 
specify what vessels may and may not be documented. Since 1817 
foreign built vessels have been barred from the American coastwise 
business, and it is therefore important for vessels equipped with 



Ermrr or Rboulation bt Peorral Qomnmrr 10 

saiU or fiii^ims to be properiy eDToUed or lioenaed. Until 1912, 
lik(*\virti% furiMKii liutlt vawe li wer0 barred from Amarietii m^jiiiji 
On August 24 of that year free shipping was applied in the foreipi 
trade to the extent that foreign vessels not over five years of afi 
and wholly owned by citiiens of the United States or by rtomostlo 
corporations, the president and managing directors of which are 
Amerioan ottiaens, were permitted to register under the Amerieaa 
flag. When so registered, foreign built vessels are subjeei to ail 
the navigation laws applicable to American vessels — *gfg|fH in the 
foreign trade, and to all the privileges of Amefican n^a^, enepi 
that of engagmg m coastwise navigation. 

SimiUir to the laws |Ax)viding for the documenting of vesssis, 
are thoee requiring the meaturemeni of doeumenM osssais. Eveiy 
registered, enrolled, or lieensed vessel of the United States most be 
measured in accordance with the official rules enacted by Congress 
and enforced by the Commissioner of Navigation. Each doeu- 
mented vessel is required to carry a measurement certificate show- 
ing her official length, breadth and depth, her gross and net tonnage, 
and other particulars descriptive of her identity. Foreign 
entering American ports are, likewise, required to be so 
unless the measurement laws of their home countiy are accepted 
by the Secretary of Conunerce as being substantial^ the 
those of the United States. The requirements regarding 
ment are particularly important because the tonnage taxes of the 
United States and other countries as well as numerous private 
mercial charges are based upon the net register tannage of 
All vessels navigating the Panama Canal, moreover, are required to 
be measured in accordance with the measurement rules promulgated 
by the President of United States on November 21, 1913, and all 
tolls collected at the Panama Canal are based upon their net tonnage 
so ascertamed. 

The Umnage tax laum constitute another group of navigation 
statutes. As amended on August 5, 1909, every vessel, American 
and foreign, entering from any foreign port in North or Central 
America, the West Indies, the Bahamas, the Bermudas, or Oarril>- 
bean coast of South America is required to pay 2 cents per net 
register ton not exceeding a total of 10 cents per ton annually, and 
every vessel entering from any other foreign port is required to psgr 
a tannage tax of 6 cents per net ton not aiceeding 30 



20 The Annals of the American Academy 

ton annually. By an act of March 8, 1910, those entering other- 
wise than by sea from a foreign port at which no tonnage taxes, 
light house dues or other equivalent taxes are imposed on American 
\, are exempt from tonnage taxes at American ports; and all 
engaged in coastwise or inland navigation have for many 
years been similarly exempted. Numerous statutes contain pro- 
visions for retaliation in case discriminating taxes are levied on 
American vessels or wares by any foreign country, and in accordance 
with the acts of 1816 and 1828, treaties providing for shipping reci- 
procity have been negotiated with a large number of foreign coun- 
tries. The United States has since 1828 consistently adhered to 
the policy of shipping reciprocity alike for vessels and their cargoes, 
until the enactment of the tariff law of Octobers, 1913, which pro- 
vides "that a discount of 5 per cent on all duties imposed by this 
act shall be allowed on such goods, wares, and merchandise as shall 
be imported in vessels admitted to registration within the laws of 
the United States: Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall 
be so construed as to abrogate or in any manner impair or affect the 
provisions of any treaty concluded between the United States and 
any foreign nation." This clause, which applies only to countries 
with which the United States does not have shipping reciprocity 
treaties, is a step in the direction of the policy of shipping protec- 
tion which prevailed during the years 1789 to 1815. 

Many navigation laws regarding the treatment of crews on Amer- 
ican vessels have been enacted by Congress. There are statutes 
concerning the payment of wages, the attachment of wages and 
clothing, the punishment for disobedience and mutiny, the keeping 
of a log book, the shipping of crews before shipping commissioners 
and consuls, the signing of shipping agreements, the scale of pro- 
visions, the depositing of a crew list, the minimum space per man 
assigned as crew's quarters, the heating, ventilation, etc., of crew's 
space, and the use of force, misrepresentations and other illegal 
methods in the shipping of crews. There are statutes which regu- 
late the return of seamen who have deserted from American vessels 
in American ports, and numerous treaties which regulate desertion 
from American vessels in foreign countries and from foreign vessels 
in the United States. Several bills concerning the treatment of 
seamen on American vessels and the practice in case of desertion 
are now being considered by Congress. 



Extent or Rcouuition bt Pbdbbal O o f MJUU prr 21 

VariouH iiavigaiion Iftwu reKubitt* the manning of A rumen n tru^fU. 
There are tftatute« requiring the liceniting uf oflicent, ami cntAhlinhitig 
the method of obtaining a iicenae; some requiring the maiter and 
all watch officers, including pilots, to be dtiiens of the United Btstes; 
and others providing that the empk^srment of licensed offieeis aad 
crew of American vessels subject to the inspection laws of the United 
States shall be determined by local inspection officials. Various bills 
now before Congress would materially alter the requirements rsgud- 
ing the manning of American vessels if the bilb were enacted into law. 

Many statutes regulate the 9eawcrtkine$$ and impedian of ves- 
sels. There are detailed provisions relatmg to the inspectioD of 
American steamers and also other American ve ss els canying 
gers, their equipment with life saving appliances, permanent 
ways, wire tiller ropes and fire fighting appliances, and the carriage 
of inflammable or explosive cargoes. Some of the requirements re- 
garding inspection apply also to foreign paasenger steamers unless 
the inspection laws of their home country approximate those of the 
United States. Severe penalties are provided for knowingly send- 
ing out unseaworthy vessels. 

There are statutes which further promote the public safety by 
establishing rules for the prevention of collisions, and legally applying 
the xfUemaHonal rules of the road to American sea-going vosseis. 
Indeed the general rules of ocean navigation are establisfaed by 
international treaty as well as by statute. Conventions embodying 
revised rules to govern ocean navigation, wiretess telegraphy, safe 
oonstruction of sea-going vessels and other mattefs oonoeniing safely 
of life at sea are now pending in the Senate of the United States and 
before the governments of the several foreign countries whose repre- 
sentatives recently (November 12, 1913^an. 20, 1914) met in inter- 
national conference. In 1910 and 1912 Congress enacted important 
laws prohibiting American as well as foreign passenger vessels carry- 
ing more than Bhy persons from leaving an American port witboiii 
being fitted with the required wireless ieUffraph apparatus and the 
required number of operators, and subjecting the use of radio 
munication on Und as well as on sea to a code of much n eeded 
lations. The United States is likewise party to an international con- 
vention of 1912 regarding the use of wireless telegraphy. 

Other important federal navigation laws which in various wi^r* 
regulate water transportation are those regulating the ffilrif and 



22 The Annals of the American Academy 

dearance of vessels, tlic boanliay and search of vessels by properly 
authorized government officials, the entry of imparled merchandise, 
the documents which must be carried and presented, quarantine and 
bilU of healthy the inspection, entry and deportation of immigrants, 
the ocean mail service under the mail contract act of 1891, the traffic 
in special cargoes such as livestock, adulterated products and opium, 
the establishment of anchorage grounds, the placing of obstructions 
to navigaiionf the trial and punishment of crimes committed upon 
the high seas or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States 
or of any particular state, the punishment of piracy, the liability of 
owners, masters and shippers, the duty of rendering assistance to 
vessels in distress and the right to remuneration for scdvage services. 

Regulation by Executive Departments. — Many of the execu- 
tive departments and bureaus of the government are con- 
cerned with the regulation of shipping. In the Department of 
Commerce are the bureau of navigation which is entrusted with 
the documenting of American vessels and the general enforce- 
ment of the navigation laws; the shipping commissioners appointed 
at the various ports of entry to supervise the shipping and discharge 
of seamen on American vessels; the bureau of corporations which 
has investigated and reported on ** Transportation by Water;" and 
the steamboat-inspection service. In the Treasury Department are 
the customs service which has charge of the entry and clearance of 
vessels, the collection of duties and tonnage taxes, the survey and 
inspection of cargoes, the measurement of vessels, and the bonding 
of imported wares; the revenue cutter service which cooperates with 
the customs service in the boarding of vessels, the collection and 
security of revenue and the enforcement of the customs regulations; 
the Alaska seal agents who supervise the Alaskan seal fisheries; and 
the public health and marine hospital service. The Department of 
State negotiates treaties of commerce and navigation, and contains 
the consular service which serves as well as regulates American ves- 
sels and their crews in foreign ports. In the Department of Labor 
is the bureau of immigration which is in charge of the entry or rejec- 
tion of immigrants and the administration of the immigration laws, 
and which supervises the arrangements which the rail and ocean 
carriers have made for the through transportation of immigrants to 
interior destinations. The Department of Agriculture regulates and 



Extent or RnaDLATioif by Piokkal GoTBnrmorr 



•uperviaes the exportation «nd importatioo of liveeloek, memU, dAiry 
products, and jointly with the TVeMUiy Depaittnent appliee the laws 
prohibiting the importation and exportation of adulterated or inie> 
branded foods or dru^i. The War Department eetablirfiei harbor 
lines beyond which no piers, wharves or bulkheads may be extanded* 
and administers the Uws prohibiting the obstmetion of navifiUion. 
Officers of the Navy Department are asugned to numerous ports of 
entry to cooperate with the port collectors, and the ^wnm^ndfng 
officer of a ffeet may act as consul on the high seas and at foreign 
ports where there is no resident consul. The Navy Department 
likewise inspects vessels of the first three cUssee operating under the 
mail contract act of 1891, and jointly with the War Department is 
entrusted with the enforcement of the laws and treaties of neutrality. 
The Post Office Department regulates the ocean mail service, and 
the Department of Justice is concerned with the enforcement of laws 
applicable to water transportation. There are various additional 
executive bureaus which primarily aid rather than regulate navigation. 

ReguiaHon by Other Federal AtUhoriUes. — In addition to the 
executive departments of the government there are the federal 
courts before which those who violate the navigation laws may be 
brought for trial, and which interpret these laws. As will be seen 
later, the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction over 
water transportation under certain conditions. The United States 
Congress of course enacts the federal statutes which regulate water 
transportation, ratifies treaties which directly or indirectly affect 
ocean carriers, and through its committees holds hearings and con- 
ducts investigations. 

Fbdbrai« Rbgulation or Chaboes and Pubuc Sebvicb 

While the charges and public services of carriers en^ifed m 
water transportation have not been subjected to federal eontrol to 
the extent that those of the raiboads haVe been, such reguUitaon is 
not entirely lacking. Some of the general navigation laws men* 
tioned above directly or indirectly regulate certam phases of the 
public service of water carriers, particularly those concerning the 
inspection of steamers, the seaworthiness of vessels, quarantine and 
l>ills of health, the carriage of livestock, dairy products, adulterated 
products, uiflammable articles and explosives, and those requiring 



24 The Annals of the American Academy 

vessels to be fitted with prescribed life saving devices. These stat- 
utes however are primarily concerned with the public safety, health 
and similar matters, which resemble more the railway safety appli- 
ance acts than the kinds of control exercised over railways through 
the interstate commerce act. 

The Passenger Ad of 1882 as Amended. — One phase of the 
public service of ocean carriers which has been subjected to 
federal control is their steerage passenger traffic. The so-called 
"passenger act of 1882" as amended to date regulates the max- 
imum number of steerage passengers which may be carried and 
tends to safeguard reasonable accommodations by prescribing the 
minimum space per passenger which may not be exceeded on the 
various steerage decks. It regulates light and air, provisions, medi- 
cal attention, discipline and cleanliness, the privacy of passengers, 
the carriage of explosives and cattle on vessels carrying steerage 
passengers, the carriage of cargo or stores on steerage decks, the 
keeping of a passenger list, and the payment of fees to the collector 
of customs in case of the death of steerage passengers. It also pro- 
vides for an inspection, under the direction of the United States 
customs collectors of all vessels carrying steerage passengers, with 
a view to administering effectively the provisions of the passenger 
act. 

The Immigraiion Laws. — The steerage passenger traffic of ocean 
carriers is further regulated by those provisions of the immigra- 
tion laws which prohibit the handling of the excluded classes of 
immigrants, the illegal landing of any alien passengers, and the 
illegal solicitation or encouragement of the immigration of aliens 
into the United States. The immigration laws also contain pro- 
visions requiring ocean carriers to deport all aliens brought to the 
United States in violation of the law, and requiring them to pay 
a head tax of four dollars for every alien, with certain exemp- 
tions, brought to the United States by them. As was stated 
above, the immigrant service supervises the arrrangements which 
the ocean and rail carriers have made at New York for the 
through transportation of immigrants to interior destinations. 

The Interstate Commerce Act as Amended. — The principal 
federal statute regulating the charges and public services of water 



EXTBNT OF RBOUL4TION BT FBDBUL QoTIBIfiaDrT 



oanien m the intentato oommaroe act ai ^»»— Htd Thie Ml, 
however, which is so highly important in the eootrol of rail 
and other forms of interstate land transportation, applies to 
interstate water transportation onty under certain conditions nd 
only in oertam respects. Water carriers were brought within the 
/ ' ' act in 1906 when section 1 was amended so as to ineliide 

iotk carrier or carriers engaged m the transportfltiooof 
rs or property wholly by railroad (or wholly by railroad and 

iter when both are used under a common oontrol, man- 

anmngement for a contmuous carnage or shipmsttt) 
from one state or territory of the United States or the District of 
r ' '' any other state, etc." Section 6 and 15 defihe the powers 

iiasion over such rail-water traffic, but this provision of 
section 1 is of fundamental importance. 

In interpreting this section the Interstate Commerce Commis> 
sion has ruled that it applies only to such water shipments as ars 
made partly by railroad and partly by water when both are under 
a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous 
carriage or shipment and that it does not apply to the pori4Q^pori 
btuiness of water carrier$. The commission has expressly ruled in 
opinion No. 787 (in the matter of jurisdiction over water carriers^ 
15 I. C. C. Reps. 208-211, Jan. 7, 1909) as follows: 

The languAge of the provisioD in queetion indicates ite meanins. The 
Act appliee to any common earner or carriers engaged in transportation partly 
by rail and partly by water when both are used under a common control, man- 
agement or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment. The use of 
the word "when" is significant and its natural meaning seems to be that a 
water carrier is subject to the act "in so far as" or "to sueh extent as" it 
carries traffic under a common control, management or arrangement with a 
railroad. It need hardly be stated that the Act does not require publication 
of or adherence to rates upon purely intrastate traffic. With regard thea 
to the history and purpose of the enactment, the language used, and the rules 
of statutory construction which have been mentioned, it is difficult to see 
how serious doubt can arise that Congress did not intend to regulate the 
charges exacted upon the port-to-port businese of water carriara. .... 
It seems dear that the port-to>port buiineM of water earrien it not wiUda 
the purriew of the statute. This constmeUon giTes workable effect to erery 
provision of the act and is in harmony with its remedial purposes. It eoa tj ole 
the all-rail and the part-rail and part-water transportation which is the sub- 
ject of "coomion arrangement" and leaves all other water earriafs open to 
free competition. Upon further consideration we are constrained to adopt 



26 The Annalb op the American Academy 

the view that water carriers are subject to the law only as to such traffic as is 
transported under a common control, management or arrangement with a 
rail carrier and that as to traffic not so transported they are exempt from its 
provisions. 

This interpretation was strengthened in 1910 when it was stated 
in section 15 that "the commission shall not have the right to estab- 
lish any route, classification, rate, fare, or charge when the trans- 
portation is wholly by water, and any transportation by water 
aflfertod by this act shall be subject to the laws and regulations 
applicable to transportation by water." 

There is no all inclusive general definition of what relations or 
practices constitute or are evidence of common control, management 
or arrangement, i.e., what constitutes through rail-water transporta- 
tion, but numerous decisions have been rendered by the commission 
and the courts in particular instances when a through bill of lading 
has been issued, when a contract or understanding of any kind in- 
volving through transportation has been made, when joint rates are 
quoted, or when rate divisions are agreed upon by the rail and water 
carriers. The application of the interstate commerce act to domestic 
shipments by rail and water under such conditions is clear. But it 
has repeatedly been ruled by the United States Supreme Court in 
recent decisions that the appUcation of the interstate commerce act 
is not dependent upon the issue of a through bill of lading or other 
specific evidence of that kind. The Supreme Court has ruled that it 
is the character of the service and not the manner of billing which 
determines whether commerce is intrastate or interstate, local or 
through, and whether it is conducted by rail or partly by rail and 
partly by water under a through arrangement. Some of the cases 
applicable are: Southern Pacific Terminal Company vs. I. C. C, 
219 U. S. 498, Feb. 20, 1911; Railroad Commission of Ohio vs. 
Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, May 27, 1912; U. S. vs. Union Stock 
Yards Co., 226 U. S. 286, 1912; Texas and New Orleans Railroad 
Co. vs. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. Ill, Jan. 27, 1913; and Louisiana 
Railroad Commission vs. Texas and Pacific Railway Co., 229 U. S. 
336, June 10, 1913. 

Commission's Power over Accounts and Statistics. — While the 
commission has no power to regulate the port-to-port business 
of water carriers it has been ruled by the commission and the 



Extent or Regulation by Fbdbbal OomDnmrr 27 

Supreme Court that one teetkni of the act to regulate e oB u new 

appliM not only to the interatat« buiiiie« of watar carriers wideb 

die in connection with railroads, but to their entire 

... ror..rr«(| to it section 20 which empowen the 

rm tydtHM pf aeetmnU and call for MktMaA rwportB, 

i uurt has ruled that whenever the water carrier ^m^m i m 

•ntcrstate commerce act as regards a portion of its 

misiion may prescribe the methods of keeping the 

:iny*8 entire businees, and may require statist!- 

i... .., • - "ntire operations. The court expressly ruled 

that in so doing unission is not regulating the port^to-port 

^ of water carriers, but is taking the necessary steps properly 

t te that portion of their interstate business which is handled 

1 tion with railroads. In the words of Justice Day in Good- 

rii'ii Co. 98. Interstate Commerce Conunission, 224 U. S. 

19^1, A,.... ., 1912: 

If the Commiosion ia to succeMfully perform its duties in respeei to 
reasoiuible rates, undue discriminstion and favoritism, it must be infonnod 
aa to the business of the carriers by a system of accounting which will not 
permit the possible eoocealment of forbidden practices in accounts which it 
is not permitted to see, and concerning which it can require no information. 
. . . . The object of requiring such accounts to be kept in a uniform way 
and to be open to the inspection of the Commission is not to enable it to regu- 
late the affairs of the corporations not within its jurisdiction, but to be in- 
fomiod coneeming the business methods of corporations subject to the .\ct 
that it may properly regulate such matters as are really within its jurisdic- 
tion .... Carriers partly by land and partly by water may be re- 
quired to keep accounts of all their traffic both interstate and intrastate 
under the provisions of Section 21. 

Commimon*8 Poxctr to Establish Through RmUea and Joini 
Rales.— The interstate commerce act confers upon the commissioii the 
power to establish through routes and joint rales in the case of Inter- 
state shipments made partly by rail and partly by water. Prior 
to the amendment of 1910 it could exercise this important power 
only if the carriers failed voluntarily to establish any through routes 
whatever between two points which warranted such aetion. 
but one through route voluntarily established by the carriers 
the requirements of the law, Uie conmilssion's jurisdiction over water 
transportation was great ly rest ricted. The Mann-Elkms amendment 
of 1910, however, remedied this defect somewhat by stating that: 



28 The Annals op the American Academy 

The Commission may also, after hearing, on a complaint or on its own 
initiative without complaint, establish through routes and joint classifications, 
and may establish joint rates as the maximum to be charged and may prescribe 
the division of such rates as hereinbefore provided and the terms and condi- 
tions under which such through route shall be operated, whenever the carriers 
themselves shall have refused or neglected to establish voluntarily such 
through routes or joint classification or joint rates; and this provision shall 
apply when one of the connecting carriers is a water line. 

This amendment gives the commission the power to establish 
additional through routes even though one has been voluntarily 
established by the carriers. In Flour City Steamship Co. et al. vs. 
Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. et al, 24 I. C. C. Reps. 179, June 4, 1912, 
the commission held that: 

Prior to 1910 our power to establish through routes was limited to in- 
stances in which no satisfactory through route existed. The elimination of 
this limitation placed within the discretion of this Commission the establish- 
ment of additional through routes. In the exercise of this discretion the 
existence of through routes capable of adequately and expeditiously handling 
all traffic offered is entitled to much consideration, but no longer constitutes 
a barrier to another through route. The lower charge proposed to be made 
by the new route we leave for consideration when we come to fix the joint rate. 
All we here hold is that it is within the power of this Commission to establish 
an additional route in connection with the complainant steamship company, 
provided that company is such a common carrier as is contemplated by the 
law. 

This view concerning the commission's power to establish addi- 
tional through routes was supported by the United States Commerce 
Court in Crane Iron Works vs. United States (I. C. C. et al. Inter- 
veners) 209 Fed. Rep. 238, June 7, 1912. The court held that, sub- 
ject to the conditions imposed in the act, the establishment of addi- 
tional routes and the prescribing of joint rates are discretionary with 
the commission. 

There are, moreover, various instances since the amendment of 
1910 was adopted in which the commission established through rail 
and water routes to given points because the carriers had voluntarily 
established such routes to certain other competitive points. It was 
held that failure to treat competitive points and shippers alike in 
this matter constituted undue discrimination. Similarly, it has held 
it to be an undue discrimination for a railroad to establish through 



EXTEKT OF RbOULATION BY FBDBBAL O o T mM t iU PfT 

connections with one water earner and refuae to do ao with 
operating under similar conditions. In United States w. Paeifie 
and Arotio Ry. and Navigation Co. et al.» 228 U. 8., 87, AprU 7, 1013, 
the Suprone Court pointed out that the establishment of through 
oonneotions with some water carriers and the refusal to do so with 
others may result in a monopoly or oombination in unrsteonebla 
restraint of trade and be illegal under the Shennan anti-tnisi law. 

The power of the Interstate Commerce Conmussion to establish 
additional through routes is not, however, dependent solely upon 
the amendment of 1910, for section 11 of the Piuiama Canal act oC 
1012, amended section 6 of the interstate commerce law which deals 
with the issue, filing and publication of throu^ rates indnding rates 
over rail and water routes, by adding the following provisioiis: 

When property may be or is transported from point to point in the United 
States by rail and water through the Panama Canal or otherwise, the trans- 
portation being by a common carrier or carriers and not entirely within the 
limits of a single state, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall hare 
jurisdiction of such transportation and of the carriers both by rail and by 
water which may or do engage in the same in the following particulars, in 
addition to the jurisdiction given by the Act to regulate commeroe •■ amended 
June 18, 1010: 

(b) To establiiih through routes and maximum joint rates between sad 
over such rail and wat«r lines and to determine all the terms and eooditioas 
under which such lines shall be operated in the handling of the traiBe embrsosd. 

Cc) To establish maximum proportional rates by rail to and from ports 
to which the traffic is brought, or from which it is taken by the water carrier, 
and to determine to what traffic and in connection with what vesssls and upoo 
what terms and conditions such rates shall apply. By proportioiial rates are 
meant those which differ from the corresponding local rates to and from the 
port, and which apply only to traffic which has been brought to the port or 
is carried from the port by a common carrier by water. 



This amendment renders complete the power of the 
over through interstate rail-water traffic, and it proWdes that 
ever any interstate traffic is handled partly by rail and partly by 
water the commission may establish a through route and maadmum 
joint rates over such rail and water carriers. By comiectiiig with 
each other in the transportation of interstate traffic, rail and water 
carriers automatically place themselves within the jurisdietiOD oC 
the commission as regsids the establishment of throuf^ rootei 
maximum joint rates. 



30 The Annals of the American Academy 

The application of these amended clauses to rail-water traffic 
other than that moving through the Panama Canal has been ques- 
tioned, the contention being that the words "or otherwise" relate 
to the phrase "by rail and water" and not to the phrase "through 
the Panama Canal." This contention has, however, been rejected 
by the commission and indeed it is clear that the disputed words if 
related to the former phrase can have no meaning whatever. Each 
of the clauses following the paragraph which contains the phrase 
"by rail and water through the Panama Canal or otherwise" deals 
exclusively with traffic handled partly by rail and water. Moreover, 
the words "through the Panama Canal or otherwise" appear again 
in clause (d) of this amendment (see p. 35) and are there used in 
such a way that their meaning and intent are unquestionable. The 
Interstate Commerce Conunission in Augusta and Savannah Steam- 
boat Company vs. Ocean Steamship Co. of Savannah et al., 26 I. 
C. C. Reps. 384, March 10, 1913, interpreted section 11 of the Panama 
Canal act as follows: 

But our jurisdiction does not rest upon the above ground solely (the 
amendment of 1910). Since the filing of this petition, by the Panama Canal 
Act, so-called, approved August 24, 1912, this body has been given additional 
jurisdiction over water carriers. The 11th section of the Act amends Section 
6of the Act to regulate commerce as follows: .... If the above amend- 
ment applies to the traffic in question the right of the Commission to establish 
this through route is clear. The defendants contend that it does not apply 
for the reason that this amendment relates to traffic which passes through 
the Panama Canal. They argue that the words "or otherwise" modify the 
phrase "by rail and water" and not the phrase "through the Panama Canal," 
but the plain everyday reading of the Act is "through the Panama Canal or 
otherwise" and the defendants have referred us to no cannon of construction 
nor to any reason for disregarding the obvious meaning of those words. Indeed, 
a consideration of the situation to which the amendment applies would seem 
to conclusively demonstrate that the position of the defendants is incorrect 
since the words "or otherwise" are pure surplusage if read as the defendants 
say they should be. Traffic through the Panama Canal can only move by rail 
and water unless it moves from port-to-port, and in that case we have no 
jurisdiction. We hold, therefore, that the Commission has the jurisdiction to 
establish the through routes and the joint rates prayed for. 

In Truckers Transfer Company vs. Charleston and Western 
Carolina R. R. Co., 27 I. C. C. Reps. 275, June 5, 1913, the com- 
mission reiterated its discretionary power over the establishment of 
joint rail-water rates and ruled as stated in the syllabus that: 



RxTENT or RsotnATioN BT Pbocral GoTwomiirr 81 



When boat Udm havo met all r — ■ooa bw roquirwnaiiu of owmit ra^l* 
roadi with r«iip«ct to aeourity for freight ehartoa, adoquaey of aairiag^ iflti* 
oney of manafwwtnt, and any other guarantee whieh may Juelly or InvfMjr 
be required, they ahould bo permitted to eetablbh through routes and p«b- 

liah Joint mitm with ihAir rnniM»«tinv railwavs. 

Comnwuwn'M tower to urder thyneal CornmUmu.^Thid Intar- 
state Commerce OommiHioa not only may flitabfigh througih rail- 
water routes and joint rates when interstate freight is handled 
partly by rail and partly by water, but it may, when eooridera- 
tions of praotieabUity, pubUo safety and volume of tnUBe war- 
rant, order the ulabHMng of physical cann^dian between rail and 
water earriers. Section 11, clause (a) of the Panama Canal act 
granted to the commission the power: 

to eetabliah physical connection between the lines of the rail carrier and the 
dock of the water carrier by directing the rail carrier to mako suitable eoa- 
neoiion between its lines and a track or tracks which have been eonstmetod 
from the dock to the limits of its right of way, or by directing either or both 
the rail and water carrier individually, or in connection with one another, to 
construct and connect with the lines of the rail carrier a spur track or tracks 
to the dock. This provision shall only apply when such connection is roaion 
ably practicable, can be made with safety to the public, and where the amooat 
of business to be handled is sufficient to justify the outlay. Hie rninniiMina 
shall have full authority to determine the terms and conditions upon whieh 
these conneoting tracks when eonstnioted shall be operatod, and it may either 
in the construction or the operation of such tracks determine what sum shall 
be paid to or by either carrier. The provisions of this paragraph shall extend 
to cases where the dock is owned by other carriers than the carriers involvwL 



It is probable that the exercise of this power may have an 
important bearing upon the future of coastwise and inUnd water 
transportation. 

Commissian*9 Powers over Rale DimeumM. — ^The Intentala 
Commerce Commission has the power to make rate dineume b^ 
tween rail and water carriers which operate over a through route. 
The clause of section 15 of the interstate commerce act as 
in 1910, quoted on p. 28 above, expreesty specifies thai the 
mission may "prescribe the division of such through tales as 
hereinbefore provided, and the terms and conditions under which 
such through routes shall be operated " The amend- 
ment contained in the Panama Canal act again provides that 



32 Thb Annals op the American Academy 

in case of through routes and joint rates the commission may "deter- 
mine all the terms and conditions under which such lines shall be 
operated in the handling of the through traffic embraced." 

Commission's Powers over Through Bills of Lading. — The com- 
mission also has the power to order the issttance of through hills 
of lading in interstate rail-water traffic. The clauses of the inter- 
state commerce act, as amended in 1910 and 1912, which are 
quoted in the preceding paragraph, include bills of lading as well 
as other terms and conditions of traffic. Another provision of sec- 
tion 15, however, expressly requires the issuance of a through bill 
of lading by providing that, subject to reasonable exceptions, a 
shipper may designate in writing over which one of two or more 
through routes he desires to ship his freight. The section referred 
to specifies that: 

It shall thereupon be the duty of the initial carrier to route said property 
and issue a through bill of lading therefor as so directed, and to transport said 
property over its own line or lines and deliver the same to the connecting lin« 
or lines according to such through route, and it shall be the duty of each of 
said connecting carriers to receive said property and transport it over the said 
line or lines and deliver the same to the next succeeding carrier or consignee 
according to the routing instructions in said bill of lading. 

In practice the commission has at various times required the 
issue of through rail-water bills of lading. Instances are the Augusta 
and Savannah Steamboat Company and the Flour City Steamboat 
Company cases, previously cited. In Gulf Coast Navigation Co. 
vs. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. et al., 19 1. C. C. Reps. 544, Nov. 
14, 1910, the commission has, however, denied that a water carrier 
owned by a shipper is entitled to through routes, joint rates, and 
through bills of lading, even though incorporated as a common 
carrier. 

Commission's Powers over Water Terminals. — Water terminal 
facilities operated in connection with interstate shipments made 
partly by rail and partly by water are brought within the scope 
of the interstate commerce act by section 1, and the commission 
has at various times exercised its jurisdiction over such terminals. 
In Southern Pacific Termmal Company vs. I. C. C. 219 U. S. 
498, Feb. 20, 1910, the Supreme Court ruled that the Interstate 



Extent of Rsoulation by Pkobral Go 

Commeroe Commkikm baa juriadietioQ to raguUto tba 
of a terminal company which ia part of a railroad and 
system and operates terminals, sueh as those of the Southeni FMifts 
Termfaial Co. at Galveston. In Mobile Chamber of Coaraeree ei 
al vt. Mobile and Ohio R. It Co. et al., 23 1. C. C. Reps. 407, May 7, 
1012, the commission prohibited future discrimination hi water 
termmal facilities at Mobile. It ruled that: 

Thero can be no auoh thing m a tonninAl which i« not a pubU« iefminAl— 
A rate ohars»d which only applies to certain favored eonneetiona unleea a 
like rate ia made to aooie other dock or facility where a like service ia ren- 
dered The defendant carriere muat make their whanree avail- 
able to the ahipe to which the ahipmenta are destined on the rate they eharvi 
for shipeide delivery, and they may do this at any wharf there rsesrving their 
own docks for certain lines of ships and giving delivery at whatever other 
docks they chooee. 

Ccmmi99um*$ Powers over Ferries. — Section 1 of the interstate 
commeroe act also places within the scope of the act all ferries 
operated in connection with interstate rail-water traffic. In New 
York Central and Hudson River Ry. Co. vs. Board of Choeen 
Freeholders of the County of Hudson, 248 U. S. 248, Feb. 24, 1913, 
the Supreme Court ruled, as stated in the syllabus, as follows: 

Congress by passing the Act to regulate commerce has taken control <d 
tnterstate railroads and having expressly included ferries used in ooanectioa 
therewith has destroyed the power of the state to regulate such ferries. The 
• >|)enition at one time of both the power of Congress and that of the state over 
I matter of interstate commerce is inconceivable. The execution of the greater 
power takes poeseesion of the field and leaves nothing upon which the lesnr 
power can operate. 

Blatkkei Protmrwn of Commerce Ad.— The above statement 
indicates the manner in which the Interstate Commeroe Com* 
mission has exercised its power over rail-water transportation* 
the specific provisions of the interstate commerce act 
and their interpretation by the courts and the 
The act as amended in 1010 and 1012 provides, however, that 
the commission may determine **aU the ierms and 
under which through rail-water routes shall be operated and 
which any interstate traffic carried partly by rail and partly by water 
5;hall be handled. The full scope of these provisions has not 



34 The Annals of the American Academy 

interpreted either by the commission or the Supreme Court. It is 
probable that they give to the commission full control over any 
interstate "property" which **may be or is transported from point 
to point in the United States by rail and water " 

Commission's Powers over Railroad-Owned Water Carriers, — 
With the exception of section 20 concerning accounts and statis- 
tics the interstate commerce act at present applies only to such 
interstate water transportation as is conducted partly by rail and 
partly by water, the port-to-port business of water carriers being 
purposely excluded from the scope of the act. Section 11 of the 
Panama Canal act, however, in amending the interstate commerce 
act as regards the ownership or control of competitive or potentially 
competitive water carriers by railroads, contains a clause which pro- 
vides for the future regulation of the port-to-port as well as the rail- 
water traffic of railroad-owned or controlled water carriers. The act 
prohibits the future ownership or control after July 1, 1914 by rail- 
roads engaged in interstate commerce of water carriers which com- 
pete or may compete with such railroads; but provides that the com- 
mission may permit the railroads to own or control water carriers 
other than those navigating the Panama Canal, if such service by 
water "is operated in the interests of the public and is of advantage 
to the convenience and commerce of the people, and if such exten- 
sion will neither exclude, prevent, nor reduce competition on the 
route by water under consideration." It then provides: "in every 
case of such extension of rates the schedules and practices of such 
water carrier shall be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and shall be subject to the act to regulate commerce and all amend- 
ments thereto in the same manner and to the same extent as is the 
railroad or other common carrier controlling such water carrier or 
interested in any manner in its operation." 

Commission's Powers over Ocean Carriers Engaged in Foreign 
Trade. — The provisions of the interstate commerce act, as amended 
in 1906, concerning the charges and public services of ocean carriers 
engaged in the foreign trade is contained in section 1, which provides 
that the act applies 

to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers 
or property wholly by rail (or partly by rail and partly by water when both 



I 



Extent or Rbqulation bt PsonuL GoTBBMiciirr 



are uted tuider « cwwnm o n oonlrol, maiufwniint or una§mamA for » 

uous earriage or ■hiproent) fron ono tUto or territory of the Uaitod SlaSea, 
or the Dbtriot of Columbia to any other state or territory of the Unitod Buiot 
or the Diatrict of Columbia* or from one place in a territory to another ptaeo 
in the lame territory, or from any place in the United Statea to an adjaeant 
foreign eountry, or from any plaea in the United Stataa throtigli a foraifii 
country to any other place in the United Stataa, and alao to the traMport*- 
tioD in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United Stataa 
to a foreign country and earried from eueh plaee to a port of trim ahltmwt, 
or shipment from a foreign country to any place in the United Stataa nod 
carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or as 
adjacent foreign country. 

An additional provision applicable to the foreign trade was 
added in 1912» the Panama Canal act (section 11, para^TApb '*d") 
providing that, " if any rail carrier subject to the act to regulate com- 
merce enters into arrangements with any water carrier operathif 
from a port in the United States to a foreign country through tba 
Panama Canal or otherwise for the handling of through business 
between interior points of the United States and such foreign coun- 
try, the Interstate Commerce Commission may require such rail- 
way to enter into similar arrangements with any or all other lines of 
steamships operating from said port to the same foreign country." 

In Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. vs. Hamburg-American Packet 
Co. et al., 13 I. C. C. Reps. 266, Mar. 9, 1908, the Interstate Com- 
merce CommiflBion expressly pointed out that its powers over ocean 
carriers engaged in the trade with non-contiguous foreign oomitrieB 
are intentionally diflferent from those which it possenes with respect 
to interstate commerce. The act applies to trade conducted partly 
by rail and partly by water, "from any place in the United States 
to any adjacent foreign country" and ''from any place in the United 
States through a foreign country to any other place in the United 
States." But the commission has no jurisdiction over the chaiges 
or services of the ocean carrier in case of shipments to or from over- 
sea countries. In case of such shipments the act applies ooiy to 
the railroad or inland portion of the export or import charges or 
services, i.e., it applies only to such shipments as are carried '*from 
* 'in the United States) to a port of trans-shipmeDi" or 
ice from a port of entr>' either in the United Stales or 
country." The commission denied that the iaiie of a 
tomiign rail-water bill of lading places the ocean carrier within its 



36 The Annals of the American Academy 

jurisdiction or that it has any control over ocean pools. It claimed 
full authority over the rail portion of the import and export rates, 
but disclaimed any authority over the rates or practices of ocean 
carriers engaged in trade with non-contiguous foreign countries. 

In later decisions the commission has repeatedly denied any 
power to establish through routes, joint rates and through bills of 
lading between railroads and ocean carriers engaged in the over-sea 
trade. By confining itself to the rail carriers it has, however, at 
various times, effectively prevented undue discrimination in the 
foreign trade. In Aransas Pass Channel and Dock Company vs. 
G. H. and S. A. Railway Co. 27 I. C. C. Reps. 415, June 16, 1913, 
for example, it held that 

this Commission has no more power to require the issuance of through bills of 
lading to foreign destination than it has to establish through routes or rates 
to such destinations, but it does have power to remove unjust discriminations 
and may require the discontinuance of practices which create such dipcrimina- 
tions. In our opinion it is unjustly discriminatory to refuse to issue through 
export bills on cotton exported through Port Aransas, Texas, while issuing 
them through Galveston or other Texan ports to which cotton is carried by 
defendants or in the transportation of which they participate. Defendants 
may waive the collection of the under charges on the past shipments of cotton 
exported through Port Aransas to which we have referred, but they will be 
required to establish rates in accordance with the views herein expressed and 
also to observe the same practices in respect to through bills of lading on cot- 
ton via Port Aransas that they observe on like traffic via other ports. 

In Galveston Commercial Association vs. A. T. & S. Fe Ry. Co. 
25 I. C. C. Reps. 222, Nov. 12, 1912, the commission took occasion 
to say that it 

has no direct jurisdiction to compel the issue of through export bills of lading 
nor to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they shall issue, since it 

has no jurisdiction over the water carriers But wo hold that to 

decline to issue bills of lading through Galveston, while issuing them through 
other ports would be an undue discrimination against Galveston, unless justi- 
fied by difference in conditions at different ports which does not appear in this 
record. 

In Chamber of Commerce of N. Y. vs. New York Central and Hudson 
River R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. Reps. 74, June 4, 1912, the commission 
also stated that it has **no jurisdiction of the ocean rates and must 
deal with this question as though the ports were destinations instead 
of gateways." 



EXTBNT or RbOULATTON BT FBDKItAf Hnv 
STATXrm RlOULATlNO OB PBOHIBITQfO COMBIN ATlOHfS, 

OB AoBBBunm 

As was shown in the conclusive report of the House Coaunitlee 
on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, the eiis t e ne e of steamship 
combinations, conferences or agreements is an ahnost univenal con- 
dition. The committee has reconmiended that cerUm obnoarfoqs 
practices, such as the granting of deferred rebates and the operatioo 
of fighting ships should be prohibited, but that steamship confer- 
ences and agreements should be subjected to federal reguUtioo so 
as to avoid their evil results and retain their advantages. Sueh 
federal statutes as are at present applicable are based upon the 
policy of free competition, rather than co6peration, and their tend- 
ency is to prohibit and abolish rather than to regulate. The stat- 
utes referred to are the interstate commerce act as amended, the 
Sherman anti-trust law of 1890, and certain sections of the Wilson 
tariff act of 1894. 

FrttvUions of Inierstate Commerce Ad, — Section 4 of the in- 
terstate commerce act as amended in 1910 aims to safeifuard 
water competition by providing that: ** Whenever the carrier by 
railroad shall, in competition with a water route or routes, reduee 
the rates on the carriage of any species of freight to or from com- 
petitive points it shall not be permitted to increase such rates unless 
after hearing by the Interstate Commerce Commission it shaD 
be found that such propoeed increase rests upon changed con- 
ditions rather than the elimination of water competition." It 
is probable that this provision may prove valuable in the future 
development of the country's inland and coastwise waterways. 
Inland water transportation has in the past not infrequently suffered 
a decline as a result of temporarily low railroad rates. 

Section 5 of the original interstate commerce act prohibits 
the pooling of the freight or earnings of railroads as follows: 

It shall be unlawful for any eommon earrier subjeet to the proTtrioos of 
this Act to enter into any contract, a gf ee m e n t or com b iBStion with aay ether 
comiiMm earrier or earriera for the pooling of fieifhts of this sad eeoipeClag 
railroads, or to divide between them the aggregate or net proeeeds of the 
earnings of such railroads or any portion thereof; and in any caee of aa ipee 
ment for the pooling of freighu aa aforesaid each day of iu continuaaee shall 
be deemed a separate offense. 



38 The Ann alb of the American Academy 

It has been claimed that this anti-pooling clause applies to water 
carriers operating in connection with raih*oads, but the commission 
has denied that it is applicable to water carriers either in the domes- 
tic or foreign trade. Its ruling in Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. V8. 
Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I. C. C. Reps. 274, March 9, 
1908, was as follows: 

The matter which is moet prominently raised in the present complaint 
(the pooling of traffic by water carriers) is plainly one as to which the Commis- 
sion has no jurisdiction for the Act prohibits pooling only as to "railroads." 
The pooling of ocean freights or of water freights of any character was evidently 
not in the mind of Congress when it adopted this provision. (Section 5.) 

The Interstate Commerce Commission at present has no author- 
ity either to prohibit or regulate steamship lines in the matter of 
pooling their freight or receipts. 

Provisions of Panama Canal Act. — A common form of com- 
bination in the coastwise and inland business is the owner- 
ship or control of water carriers by inierstate railroad companies. 
In 1912 Congress amended section 5 of the interstate commerce 
act so that all such ownership or control of competing water 
carrier, or carriers which may be competitive shall, after July 
1, 1914, be prohibited, unless the commission under certain con- 
ditions extends the time during which water carriers so owned 
or controlled may be operated. The prohibition, however, is prac- 
tically complete because the commission is not empowered to grant 
such extension of time unless it decides that the service by water 
is "operated in the interest of the public and is of advantage to the 
convenience and commerce of the people and that such extension 
will neither exclude, prevent or reduce competition on the route 
by water under consideration." When this amendment was being 
considered in Congress an unsuccessful effort was made to substi- 
tute the word "or" for the word *^*and" in the preceding phrase. 
The addition which was made to section 5 of the interstate com- 
merce act in section 11 of the Panama Canal act is as follows: 

From and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and fourteen, it 
shall be unlawful for any railroad company or other common carrier subject 
to the Act to regulate commerce to own, lease, operate, control, or have any 
interest whatsoever (by stock ownership or otherwise, either directly, indi- 



ErrxNT or RMVuiTioif bt Fkohul QommaNT 19 

neily, through any iKildiBf eoiDp«ajr, or by tUwkholdti or dirteloft is ooa- 
mon, or in any oth^ ouuuior) In nay eotnnMMi enrriar by wnUr opofiiod thronfb 
the Pananui Cnnnl or elMwhore with which tnid nUlrood or other earrior nfor»- 
■aid doM or may eocnpeto for imflte or any tbm b I carrying freight or 
upon aaid water route or eUwwbm with which aaid railroad or oCbor 
aforaaaid doea or may eomptU for iraiBe; and in eaaa of tho vioUUon of tUt 
proTiaioo eaeh day in whieh meh vioUiion oontinuoa ahall bo daanod a aopo* 
rate offenae. 

Juriadieiion ia boraby eonforrad on the Interstate Commeree Coounkiloa 
to detormiao queatiooa of fact aa to the competition or poaaibUity of eompa* 
tition, after full hearing, on the application of any railroad company or other 
carrier. Sueh appUeation may be filed for the purpoee of determining whether 
any exiating aerriee ia in violation of thia aection and pray for an order per- 
mitting the continuance of any vcesel or veaaela already in operation, or for 
the purpoee of aaking an order to inatall new aenrice not in conflict with the 
proviaiona of thia paragraph. The commiaaioii may on ita own motion or the 
application of any ahipper inatitute prooeedingi to inquire into the operatioo 
of any veeael in uae by any railroad or other carrier which haa not Applied to 
the eommiaaion and had the question of competition or the poaiibility of 
competition determined aa herein provided. In all such caaea the order oC 
said eommiaaion shall be final. 

If the Interstate Commerce Commiaaion ahall be of the opinion that any 
such existing specified service by water other than through the Panama Canal 
ia being operated in the intereat of the public and is of advantage to the con- 
venience and commerce of the people, and that such eztenaioo will neither 
exclude, prevent, nor reduce competition on the route by water 
eration the Interstate Coounerce Commission may, by order, extend tho 
during which such service by water may continue to be operated beyond July 
first, nineteen hundred and fourteen. In every caae of such extenaioB the 
rates, schedules, and practices of such water carrier shall be filed with the 
Interstate Commeree Commission and shall be subject to the act to regulate 
eommereo and all amendmenta thereto in the aame manner and to the aania 
extent aa ia the railroad or other common carrier controlling such water carrier 
or intereated in any manner in its operation: Provided, Any application for 
extenaion under the terms of this provision filed with the Interstate C oma aroo 
Commission prior to July first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, but for any 
reaaon not heard and disposed of before said date, may be oooMdored and 
granted thereafter. 

As was more fully stated above on p. 34 sucb oompelitive or 
potentially competitive water carriers as may be o^Tied or controlled 
by interstate railroads after July 1 , 1914, by consent of the Intecstata 
Commerce Commission are subjected to all the provisioiM of the 
interstate commerce act as regards their rates, schedules and prac- 
tices both in their rail-water and their port-to-port 



40 Thb Annaxb of the American Academt 

The amendment to the interstate commerce act above quoted 
also prohibits any railroad-owned or controlled water carrier which is 
or may he competitive, from passing through the Panama Canal. So 
far as Panama Canal navigation is concerned this prohibition is 
complete because in such cases the Interstate Commerce Commission 
is not under any circumstances authorized to extend the time of 
railroad ownership or control. It has not been decided whether this 
prohibition excludes all railroad-owned or controlled vessels from 
navigating the Panama Canal or only such water carriers as are or 
may be in competition with the railroads. Neither has it been 
decided whether this prohibition applies to steamship lines which 
are owned or controlled by the Canadian Pacific Railroad or other 
foreign railroad companies. 

Section 11 of the Panama Canal act also amends section 5 of 
the interstate commerce act by prohibiting any vessel which is owned, 
chartered, operated, or controlled by any concern which is doing busi- 
ness in violation of the Sherman anti-trust law of 1890, or the anti-trust 
sections of the Wilson tariff act of 1894 from navigating the Panama 
Canal. The section provides that: 

No vessel permitted to engage in the coastwise or foreign trade of the 
United States shall be permitted to enter or pass through said canal if such 
ship is owned, chartered, operated or controlled by any person or company 
which is doing a business in violation of the provisions of the Act of Congress, 
approved July 2d, 1890, entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against 
unlawful restraint and monopolies." All the provisions of sections seventy- 
three to seventy-seven both inclusive of an Act approved August twenty- 
seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled "An Act to reduce tax- 
ation to provide revenue for the Government and for other purposes." Or 
the provisions of any other Act of Congress amending or supplementing said 
Act of July 2d, 1890, commonly known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and 
Amendments thereto, or said sections of the Act of August twenty-second, 
eighteen hundred and ninety-four. The question of fact may be determined 
by the judgment of any Court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, 
in any cause pending before it to which the owners or operators of such ship 
are parties. Suit may be brought by any shipper or by the Attorney-General 
of the United States. 

Although it is provided that the question of fact is to be deter- 
mined by any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction 
the strict enforcement of this section is of doubtful practicability. 
Its strict enforcement would require that all vessels owned, char- 



ErnofT OF Rboulation bt Fbobkal QowmmmmrT 41 

tered, operat«d or oontroUed l^ illogal induttrud eombbiftUQiit be 
denied the right of canal panafe. It would abo prerani the paaMfa 
of vaaseli owned, chartered, operated or controlled by aO thoee 
steamship concerns which are parties to any eonfersnees, pools, 
agreements or understandmffi which the courts may dedare to "be 
illegal under the federal antUnist laws. Should the eoorte deelaro 
the steamship conferences, etc., which now prevail so widely amoof 
the ocean carriers of the world, to be illegal combinations, relatively 
few vesseb would under the above provision of the Panama Canal 
act be legally authorised to navigate the canal. 

The Federal ArUi'Truet Ads.—The sUtutes which aro gn- 
erally applicable to and which prohtbii all eonUnnaUafu, conferemeee 
or agreemenU which resuU in unreasonable reetrainl of inlereiale or 
foreign trade are the Sherman anti-trust law of 1890 and certain pro- 
visions of the Wilson tariff act of 1S94. Tlie former statute declares 
to be unlawful 

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwiae or eoo* 
spiracy in reatraint of trade or commerce among the aeveral statea, or with 
foreign nations .... every person who shall monopolise or attempt 
to monopolise or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopoliie any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or 
with for<^ign nations .... every contract, combination in form of 
trust or otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in any 
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or in restraint of 
trade or commerce between any such territory and another, or between any 
such territory or territories and any state or states, or the District of Co- 
lumbia, or with foreign nations or between the District of Columbia and any 
state or states or foreign nations 

Section 73 of the tariff act of 1894 which remains in effect, 
declares: 

that every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is hereby 
declared to be contrary to public policy, illegal and void when the asms is 
made by or between two or more persons or corporations either of whom is 
engaged in importing any article from any foreign country into the United 
States and when such combination, conspiracy, trust, acreanwnt, or eontract 
is intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade or free competition in law- 
ful trade or conunerce or to increase a market price in any part of the United 
Sutes of any article or articles imported or intended to be imported into the 
United Sutes or of any manufacture into which sueh imported srtMt 
or is intended to enter. 



L 



42 The Annalb of the American Academy 

The common belief that tho Sherman anti-trust act applied only 
to industrial combinations was clofuiitely abandoned in 1897-98 
when in U. S. vs. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 
and U. S. vs. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, the United 
States Supreme Court decided that " the language of the act includes 
every contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
states or with foreign nations.'* This construction of the act still 
holds except that, since the decisions in the Standard Oil and the 
American Tobacco cases, the word "unreasonable" has been inserted. 

Application of Federal Anti-Trust Acts by the Courts. — There 
have been no instances in which the Sherman anti-trust act 
has been specifically applied to the usual type of combination, 
conference or agreement among water carriers by the Supreme Court, 
although various cases are at present being urged by the govern- 
ment. (U. S. vs. Hamburg- American Packet Co. et al.; U. S. vs. 
American-Asiatic Steamship Co. et al. ; U. S. vs. Prince Line Ltd. et 
al.y. The Supreme Court has, however, in a decision involving an 
agreement between several steamship companies and the Canadian 
Pacific Railroad to suppress competition in the Alaskan trade by 
refusing to establish through routes, joint rates and through bills 
of lading over independent outside steamship lines, definitely applied 
the Sherman anti-trust law to rail and water carriers operating in 
American territory, even though they may be foreign corporations. 
In the decision referred to — U. S. vs. Pacific and Arctic Railway and 
Navigation Company, Pacific Coast Steamship Company, Alaskan 
Steamship Company and Canadian Pacific Railway Company, 228 
U. S. 87, April 7, 1913 — the Supreme Court decided as stated in the 
syllabus: 

That while under the Interstate Commerce Act a carrier may select its 
through route connections, agreements for such connections may constitute 
violations of the Anti-Trust Act if made not for natural trade reasons or on 
account of efficiency but as a combination and conspiracy in restraint of inter- 
state trade and for the purpose of obtaining a monopoly of traffic by refusing 
to establish routes with independent connecting carriers A com- 
bination made in the United States between carriers to monopolize certain 
transportation partly within and partly without the United States is within 
the prohibition of the Anti-Trust Act and is also within the jurisdiction of the 
criminal and civil law of the United States even if one of the parties combin- 



EXTVfT OF RlOUiAflON BT FbOBEAL 



ing be a foreipi eo rp o rt tJoo. . While Uie United Suiee mmy not 

control foreign eititene operating in foreign territory it mey eootrol 
when operating in the United Sutee in the mme mnnner m it mny 
eitliene ol thi« country. 

The lower federal oourU have at varioui tiinee applied tbe 
Sbennan anti-truft aet to water earrien. Tbe circuit court in United 
States M. Hamburg-American Packet Company, et aL, 200 Federal 
Rep. 806, Dec. 20, 1011, declared tbe division of steerace traffic into 
peroentafes and the pooling of receipts derived therefrom to be Ukfal. 
and took occasion to say that the act applies regardless of whether 
the parties to tbe combination are citiiens or corporations of the 
United States or of foreign countries, whether the vessels used are 
of American or foreign registry, and whether the illegal restraint 
is practiced in domestic or foreign commerce. Tbe decision of the 
court, which has been appealed to tbe Supreme Court of the United 
States, oontams the foUowing obeervations regarding the application 
of tbe federal anti-trust act to water carriers: 

It may be accepted without diecuBeion that the transportation of paa- 
•engers between thia country and Europe forms a part of the eommeroe oi the 
United States to foreign nations. It is also oleariy established that CongreM 
has power to prohibit all contracts, combinations and eonspiracies in restraint 

of such part of the foreign eommeroe of the United States Tbe 

prohibitions of the Anti-Trust Act apply broadly to contracts in restraint of 
trade or commerce with foreign nations We see nothing to war- 
rant the contention that the Acts should be narrowly interpreted as prohibiting 
only contracts which are to be performed wholly within the territorial juris- 
diction of the United States nor— if it were for us to consider— any reason for 
concluding that the broader construction would lead to international eompli- 
oattons As the contract directly and materially affeete the for- 
eign eommeroe ci the country by being put into effect here, it is imiiterial 
where it was entered into or by what vessels it was to be or has been focsMd. 
Citiaens of foreign countries are not free to restrain or nioiiopolise tbe foreign 
eommeroe of this country by entering into combinations abroad nor by employ- 
ing foreign vessels to effect their purposes Whether or not the 

statute is directed against all combinations in restraint of eompetition it is 
oertain that it embrsees those in which the purpoee and effect are to charvi 
arbitrary and excessive transporUtion rates. Whether the statute be broadly 
or narrowly constructed it is dear that it prohibits eombinstinas sad eoa- 
spiracies to restrain the busineso of transporting psssssigMS wbsa assoBpeaisd 
with acts of oppression and attempts to mooopohss. 

In Thomsen et al. ra. Union Castle Mail Steamship Compan>* 
et al., 166 Federal Rep. 251, Oct. 1, 1908, the Circuit Court of Appeals 



44 The Annalb or thb Americaj^ Academy 

in considermg the deferred rebates which enabled the so-called "South 
African Lines" conference to fix ocean rates and suppress outside 
competition, likewise, took occasion to say 'Hhat the combination 
was formed in a foreign country is immaterial. It affected tne 
foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here;" 
and that Thomsen et al. are entitled to "their full day in court" 
to try and collect treble damages. Since the application of the rule 
of reason by the Supreme Court, a new trial has been ordered in this 
case but the statement of the Circuit Court of Appeals with reference 
to the application of the anti-trust act to illegal combinations formed 
in foreign countries has thus far not been altered. 

In Cole Transportation Company vs. White Star Line, 186 Fed. 
Rep. 63, March 7, 1911, the Circuit Court of Appeals in considering 
the lease of a vessel by one Great Lakes carrier to another and an 
agreement by one of the carriers not to engage in competition dur- 
ing a term of three years, declared the lease to be void, and in vio- 
lation of the Sherman anti-trust act. In United States vs. Great 
Lakes Towing Co. et al., 208 Federal Reporter 733, Feb. 11, 1913, 
the United States District Court decided that this consolidation had 
been formed to secure a monopoly and combination in unreasonable 
restraint of interstate and foreign commerce and violates the Sherman 
anti-trust act. 

Sufficient decisions have been rendered by the federal courts to 
indicate that the anti-trust laws apply to all consolidations, agree- 
ments, contracts, conferences or arrangements between carriers by 
water which unreasonably restrain interstate or foreign trade. The 
pending cases above mentioned, particularly the Supreme Court case 
of United States vs. Hamburg-American Packet Company et al., 
will, however, indicate more clearly whether the courts regard the 
typical ocean conferences and agreements, which so generally pre- 
vail, as monopolies or combinations in "unreasonable" restraint of 
trade. 

Shortcomings and Fallacies op Present Statutes 

Having outlined the various ways in which water transportation 
is subject to government control, it is obvious that while many 
phases are covered by existing statutes many others are at present 
unregulated. It has, moreover, been suggested that some of the 



Extent or Rsoulation by FmawkL Ooranniiirr 4& 

Btatuub now Hpplicable may in the naar future require modtfieatioft 
eo im to deal fully and wifely with praeticftl traneportatiaB 
tions and practicee. 

In the domeitte trade the intentate oharfee and public 
of carriers by water are not regulated in their port-to-i)ort 
Tboee of water carriera which handle only portrto-port traffic are 
lubjeot to no covemment regulation, and thoee of carriera by water 
which handle traffie hn oooneetion with railroads are regulated onty 
in so far as they concern traffic handled partly by rail and partty 
by water. As regards their interstate port-to-port businesi the Inter- 
state Commerce Commisnon has no authority to require the filing 
of rate tariffs, to determine maximum charges and danification, or 
to prevent discriminations between shippers or places as regards 
rates, fares, demurrage, storage, and other charges, deferred rebalea» 
the settlement of claims, loading and discharging cargo, bills of lading, 
transfer and lighterage, terminal or other facilities, regulations or 
practices. The interstate commerce act likewise does not apply to 
the interstate port-to-port traffic of canals. 

Althou^ the commission has the power to establish a uniform 
accounting system and require statistical reports covering the port- 
to-port business of carriers by water who handle interstate traffic in 
connection with railroads, it has no authority over the accounts d 
carriers by water who conduct only a port-to-port business. It can 
not require them to submit statistical reports and cannot investigate 
their financial and business operations. 

The application of the interstate commerce act to the interstate 
freight traffic of carriers by water which b handled partly by raO 
and partly by vrtLier has gradually been increased in the 
of 1906, 1910 and 1912, and the charges and public senrioea fai 
of such traffic can be effectively controlled whenever the 
sees fit to exercise its full authority. However, as regards the pa»> 
senger traffic handled over rail-water routes, though seetkna 1 
and 15 of the act to regulate commerce include both the iieswngiBi 
and freight traffic, the important amendments to secUon 6 fwitainad 
in the Panama Canal act of 1912 refer only to the transportatioo 
of "property.'' There are no convincing reasons why the pro- 
visions of this amendment should not be equally applicable whetlier 
the rail-water service concerns freight or pas^nger traffic. 

It has also been recommended by the House Oooimittee of 



46 The Annals of the American Academy 

the Merchant Marine and Fisheries "that the railroads be pro- 
hibited from making the through rail and water route unprofitable 
as compared with the all-rail route, by charging more for the same 
service on water-borne commodities than they charge for a propor- 
tionate share of the all-rail haul/' As the interstate commerce act 
now^ stands the commission has the power to regulate both the 
rail and water portion of a rate in case of a through rail and water 
route, and could, if it desired, prevent the situation referred to by 
the committee. The commission, as in New York Produce Ex- 
change V8. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., et 
al., and Chicago Board of Trade vs. Atlantic City Railroad Co. et 
al., 20 I. C. C. Reps. 504, April 4, 1911, has refused to require 
the railroads carrying ex-Lake grain from Buffalo to charge less than 
the local rail rate. The recommendation of the committee aims to 
prohibit the situation referred to rather than to depend upon the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for an exercise of its powers. 

Although the Interstate Conmierce Commission has on various 
occasions exercised its power in the following matters, the Committee 
on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, in order to avoid all possible 
ambiguity and doubt, recommends that 

the rate divisions on any trade route should be open equally to all water 
carriers that comply with such conditions of quality and regularity of service 
as the commission may determine to be reasonable .... that the rail- 
roads and water carriers be required to issue through bills of lading to all 
interstate water carriers that meet such conditions of quality and regularity 
of service as the Interstate Commerce Commission may consider reasonable 
. . . and that railroads be required to account separately to the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission for the income and expenditures of interstate 
water lines owned or controlled by them. 

The ownership or control of water carriers by railroads is fully 
covered by the Panama Canal act. The reading of section 11 indi- 
cates, however, that it is in some respects ambiguous. It moreover 
raises the question of whether it is desirable to treat railroad-owned 
or controlled vessels differently in the handling of Panama Canal 
traffic than in other branches of the coastwise business. 

In the foreign trade with over-sea countries government control 
over the charges and public services of ocean carriers is far less 
extensive than in the domestic business. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission has no jurisdiction over their charges or public services 



Extent or RBouLATfov nv Pbdbiul OovBRmncrr 47 



in the port-to-port bumnMS and Done over their rail-waler 
other than mich indirect control M if ei er o i ee d by rofulAtiiig Um 
rates, bilb of lading and other arrangements oC co on ee Ua g raflrcMMit. 
The comminBon has no authority over the masdmum rates, fares or 
other eharses or over the contracts or other conditions ci ocean 
carriers affecting the interests of shippers or psssengers, other than 
over the transportation of explosives. It lias no power to prohibit 
the payment of deferred rebates or to prevent unfaur discriminatioos 
in charges, accommodaUons, cargo space and other facilities, in the 
settlement of claims, or in other services and practices. 

Conferences, agreements, traffic associations, pools or other ar- 
rangements and understandings between carriers by water both in 
the interstate and foreign trade are, whenever they unreasonably 
restrain trade, prohibited by the Sherman anti-trust act and the 
anti-trust sections of the Wilson tariff act. Yet the fnriirtfmpe of 
steamship conferences, agreements, etc., is an almost universal con- 
dition and the wisdom of abolishing rather than regulating them hat 
frequently been questioned. Vessels owned, chartered, oontroUed, 
or operated by concerns which do business in violation of theae 
acts, are moreover barred from the Panama Canal, although the 
desirability and practicability of employing the canal as a 
of enforcing the country's anti-trust laws has not been 

The House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries haa 
reoonunended the prohibition of objectionable features such as the 
use of "fighting ships" or retaliatory and unfair methods againai 
independent shippers or carriers by water, and the pa3rment of de- 
ferred rebates. It has reconmiended that, as in the case of rail- 
roads, carriers by water, " if cutting rates with a view to driving out 
a competitor, should be denied the privilege of restoring rates, and 
jurisdiction should be conferred on the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission to determine whether rates are cut with the object of cnMh* 
ing such competition." It has also reconmicnded however, thai 
any conferences, agreements, etc., whether between carriers by water 
or between such carriers and shippers, railroads, or other 
tation agencies, which are not discriminating or unfair in 
shall be retained. In order to protect the interest of all parties con- 
cerned the committee recommcnd5 that all conferences, agreements, 
etc., shall be filed with the IntersUte Conmicrce Commission and that 
the commission shall have the power to cancel or reject them or any 
parts thereof which are "discriminating or unfair in character or 
detrimental to the commercial interests of the United dtatea.'* 



I 



HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STEAMSHIP AGREE- 
MENTS AND CONFERENCES IN THE AMERICAN 
FOREIGN TRADE 

By Paxil Gottheil, 

Member of the Firm of Funch, Edye and Company, New York, and Chair- 
man of the Special Committee of Steamship Lines Operating from 
United States Atlantic and Gulf Ports to Foreign Countries. 

The scope of this article is confined to a discussion of the devel- 
opment of agreements and conferences entered into by the steam- 
ship companies engaged in the foreign trade of the United States. 
These companies furnish today the greater portion of the tonnage 
required to move the vast export traffic of this continent. The 
evolution of the different services into the powerful position occupied 
by them today affords an interesting study presenting innumerable 
instances of lines falling by the wayside, history alone remaining to 
tell the tale of disappointed hopes and wasted endeavors. Those 
lines which have survived, together with many new enterprises, 
share today in overwhelming proportion the export traffic of the 
United States. This traffic logically divides itself into three distinct 
groups, and for the purpose of this article it is desirable to consider 
the subject from the standpoint of each separately. The three groups 
may be stated as follows: 

Group I. The trans-Atlantic trade covering all ports in Europe 
bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, the Baltic, the White 
Sea, and the Mediterranean, as well as ports in Asia on the Mediter- 
ranean and the Black Sea. 

Group II. The long-voyage trade, covering Africa, excepting 
Mediterranean ports; Asia, with the exclusion of the ports on the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea; South America, east and west 
coast, but excluding the most northern part of it; and Australia and 
New Zealand. 

Group III. The Caribbean trade, covering the Bermudas, the 
West Indies, Central America, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and 
British, Dutch and French Guiana. 

48 



HlSTOBT or AOBBBOOm AND _ 

SkamMhip Serneu Camprinng Oraup ! 

The epooh-makiiig period of trane-AUantio steem DAvicalioa 
dates from about the middle of the last century. Previous to this 
date traneportation across the Atlantic both for goods and passsofm 
was supplied exehishrely at first by irreguUr saittng ships and later 
by the well known Ifaies of packet vessels. These packet lines re- 
mained in the trans-Atlantic trade until after the Civil War, but in 
the meantune the devetopment of steamship lines had been rapid 
and a large number of services were established to various BritUi 
and continental porle. As early as 1858 there were 31 steamers 
aggregating 67,000 tons engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade. The 
fonnalkm of the most unportant steamship services, all under the 
foreign flag, occurred between the years 1855 and 1866. The White 
Star Line, however, did not start its Liverpool service until 1870, 
and during the seventies and eighties many additional services under 
separate and distinct companies and to different ports were created. 
Some of these developed rapidly, while others disiqq;)eared because 
of their inability to maintain their position in competition with their 
stronger and better equipped rivals. It may be stated that few new 
enterprises to the northern part of Europe were undertaken after 
1890; at least the few lines started since that date have plajred no 
important part in the general expansion of the steamship trade. 
On the other hand, the established companies have continually added 
types of