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TI.IK APPROAC
IMIILOSOPI

11 \LPli B ANTON PKHHY

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New York, U. S. A.

T1I1H VOU'MK IS IH'imcATKD tO

M Y FAT HER

AH A TOKKN OK MY M)VK AKI> KSTKKM

PREFACE

IN an owsay cm "Tho. I'rohlow of Philosophy at
tho ProHont. TImo/1 Profrsnor Kdward Oaird SUVH
that "philosophy in not a first vonturo into u now
iiold of thought, Iwt tlu- n'thinkiuR of a «ot»ulnr
uiid religi^UH r^inwiottwu^sH which IUIH IMH^II cl^vol-
opod, in the main, itui<'jxm<Uinlly of phili»snphy.° *
If then1 IM* any inHpirution iuul oriRiuaHty in thi«
Inwik, thoy an1 <lti<* to my groat <loHtn* that
phy nhtmUl apiwar in itn vital rolationn tt
fitiniltiiT oxp^rionroH, If philosophy in, UK in corn- '
inrtnly nHHtunoti, approprinfc* to a phano in tho tlo
vt'Ioptnont of (»v«»ry in«Uvi*lua!t if nhotthl //row-* out
of intoroHtn to whirh ho in. niroady ntivr*. And if]
tho ^roitf. phtloHophorn an* Jndood novor <loa<T» flifi f
fiu*t nhoultl tnantf**Ht 5Uf*lf in thoir <fh«*«ic or hit*-
toricu! roproHonfntitHi of n |K*ri*nnini outlrwik upon
fhii wi»rl<L 1 inn not twkhig to iitfiifh to philoiio»
phy « iiHitutUH livolinow, wfiorowstli to ittftinuato
it into tlw KtKut (jj;rtt<'<*« of tlu* tttuciont. I

* I*w4 V^nli Ulmit^nwl f'Ai/tiwi/iliy, Vol. I, p. 207.
vll

vjjj PREFACE

• •

rather to be true to the meaning of philosophy.
For there is that in its stand-point and its problem
which makes it universally significant entirely
apart from dialectic and erudition. These are
derived interests, indispensable to the scholar, but
quite separable from that modicum of philosophy
which helps to make the man. The present book
is written for the sake of elucidating the inevitable
philosophy. It seeks to make the reader more
solicitously aware of the philosophy that is in him,
or to provoke him to philosophy in his own in-
terests. To this end 1 have sacrificed all else to
the task of mediating between the tradition and
technicalities of the academic discipline and the
more common terms of life.

The purpose of the book will in part account
for those shortcomings that immediately reveal
themselves to the eye of the scholar. In Part I
various great human interests have been selected
as points of departure. I have sought to intro-
duce the general stand-point and problem of phi-
losophy through its implication in practical life,
poetry, religion, and science. But in so doing
it has been necessary for me to deal shortly with
topics of great independent importance, and so risk
the disfavor of those better skilled in these sewral

PREFACE IX

* *

matter*. This ia evidently true of the chapter
which deals with natural science, .But the* prob-
lem which I there, faced, differed radically from
theme of the foregoing chapter^ and the method

of treatment IH correspondingly different. In the
caw of natural Heienco one IWH to deal with a
body of knowledge winch in frequently regarded
an the only knowledge. To write a chapter about
Hcienee from a, philosophical Htand-jjohit in, in the
pre.neitt ntate of opinion,, to undertake a polemic,

iigiunwt exclusive nat.Hnilism, an attitude which w

•
it.nelf philosophical, and an nuch in W(>11 known in

the hintory <»f philosophy an poxiiwistn or {lynnxii-

/*/.vm.. I have avoided the polemical npirit aind
method st» far us [KiSHible, but have-, nevertheleHH*
here tiiken nid^n ngitiimt n definite philosophical
{xmition. Thin <*hnpter, togetlier with tlu^ (?onc!u-
HJOII,. IH then*f«»re an exception to the purely in-
troductory und i*x|>osit,ory reprem^italiou which 1
have, on the whole, nought to givu, The relntively
great *pae<* accorded t«> the dtwuHnion of religion
int in my own belief fair to thn general inttmtnt
in thin topic, and to tlu* intrtiiHtc HtgniiktAut!^ of
tttf n»lutioti t«> philosophy*

!' htiv« in Pitrt 1 1 tmdcrtftktm to furnirth tha
reiitk*r wtj.h ft imip of the country to winch hi* hurt

X PREFACE

been led. To this end I have attempted a brief
survey of the entire programme of philosophy.
An accurate and full account of philosophical
terms can be found in such books as Kiilpe's "In-
troduction to Philosophy" and Baldwin's "Diction-
ary of Philosophy," and an attempt to emulate
their thoroughness would be superfluous, even if
it were conformable to the general spirit of this
book. The scope of Part II is due in part to a
desire for brevity, but chiefly to the hope of fur-
nishing an epitome that shall follow the course
of the natural and historical differentiation of the
general philosophical problem.

Finally, I have in Part III sought to present
the tradition of philosophy in the form of general
types. My purpose in undertaking so difficult a
task is to acquaint the reader with philosophy in
the concrete ; to show how certain underlying prin-
ciples may determine the whole circle of philosoph-
ical ideas, and give them unity and distinctive
flavor. Part II offers a general classification of
philosophical problems and conceptions indepen-
dently of any special point of view. But I have
in Part III sought to emphasize the point of view,
or the internal consistency that makes a system of
philosophy out of certain answers to the special

PREFACE XI

* *

problems of phikwophy. In such a division into
tyj)es, linos are of nerossity drawn too sharply,
There will In* many historical philosophies that.
refuse to fit, mid many possibilities unprovided
for, I must leave it, to the individual reader to
overcome this uhstraHness through hin own reflcnv
tion nj>on the intermediate and variant stand-
points,

Although tho order is on the whole* that of pro-
grensive eomph*xltyt I have nought to treat each

dhiipter with imfo'in'mlenr*1 enough to make it JKIS-

*
HI hie, for it, to lx* mid HeparHtely ; and I hiivi* pro-

vided n enrefully neleefed hihliogniphy in tin* liupe
that this hook may nerve HH a Ktitnnhirt an<I gttido
to the reading of other hooks.

The earlier elmptern have al ready np|>eitr<Hl UH
nrtirlen; ChnpteT 1 m the tntrrnnt.iowil Journal of
Kthiw, Vol. X I II, No, 4 ; ( Jlmjrtor 1 1 in the* /Vi/to"
Mi^hi^nl Kt'rii'Wj. Vol. XI', No. i\ ; ( 1uip-U*r ill in
the J/WIM/, VoL XIV, No. f>; C1i»pt*T IV in th«
tnlmitilitmtil Jnurnnt of AV/nV«» VoL XV, No* i ;
und HOMO pnrngraphs of (Itapter V in t!u« Journal

VoL I, No* 7* I uiu Indebted tt> tin*, eitttorn of
tlti'Ho {x*ruKHi*aitf f«tr |wmiin«bti to reprint with
ittiuor

xii PREFACE

In the writing of this, my lir«t l**«k, I hwvi»
been often reminded that a higher critic'. ..-killrd
in the study of internal ttviik'iw, c«*«l<! jimhably
trace all of its ideas to 8Ugg4'Hti«ni« that Imvr rntn*%
to me from my teachers and <»olli«ugt»'M of tl$*» I *«••
partment of Philosophy in Hiirvnnl rniviT^ify*
I have "unscrupulously forgotten what «»f flifir
definite ideas I have u<lapt(*r WilHum Jiiiin^ f»«r flip
inspiration and resources which
from, his instruction and peworw!

RALPH
CAMBRIB0K, March,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAET I
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY

PAGE

CHAPTER I. THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSO-
PHER 3

§ 1. Is Philosophy a Merely Academic Interest? 3

§ 2. Life as a Starting-point for Thought 4

§ 3. The Practical Knowledge of Means 8

§ 4. The Practical Knowledge of the End or Purpose. 10
« § 5. The Philosophy of the Devotee, the Man of Af-
fairs, and the Voluptuary 12

§ 6. The Adoption of Purposes and the Philosophy

of Life 17

CHAPTER II. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 24

§ 7. Who is the Philosopher-Poet? 24

§ 8. Poetry as Appreciation 25

§ 9. Sincerity in Poetry. Whitman 27

§ 10. Constructive Knowledge in Poetry. Shake-
speare 30

§ 11. Philosophy in Poetry. The World-view. Omar

Khayyam 36

§ 12. Wordsworth 38

§ 13. Dante 42

§ 14. The Difference between Poetry and Philosophy 48
xiii

xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 53

§ 15. The Possibility of Defining Religion 53

§ 16. The Profitableness of Defining Religion 54

§ 17. The True Method of Defining Religion 56

§ 18. Religion as Belief 59

§ 19. Religion as Belief in a Disposition or Attitude . 62
§ 20. Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Re-
sidual Environment, or Universe 64

§ 21. Examples of Religious Belief 66

§ 22. Typical Religious Phenomena. Conversion. . . 69

§ 23. Piety 72

§ 24. Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes

of Conveyance 74

§ 25. Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Re-

ligions 77

§ 26. Buddhism ." 78

§ 27. Critical Religion 79

CHAPTER IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF

RELIGION 82

§ 28. Resume of Psychology of Religion 82

§29. Religion Means to be True 82

§ 30. Religion Means to be Practically True. God is
a Disposition from which Consequences May

Rationally be Expected % 85

§ 31. Historical Examples of Religious Truth and

Error. The Religion of Baal 88

§ 32. GreekReli^on 89

§ 33, Judaism and Christianity 92

§ 34. The Cognitive Factor in Religion 95

* § 35- The Place of Imagination, hi Religion 97

§ 36. The Special Functions of the Religious Imagi-
nation JQJ

} 37. The Relation between Imagination and Truth

in Religion 105

TABLE OF CONTENTS xy

• *

PAGE

§ 38. The Philosophy Implied in Religion and in Re-
ligions 108

CHAPTER V. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 114

§ 39. The True Relations of Philosophy and Science.

Misconceptions and Antagonisms 114

§ 40. The Spheres of Philosophy and Science 117

§ 41. The Procedure of a Philosophy of Science 120

§ 42. The Origin of the Scientific Interest 123

§ 43. Skill as Free 123

§ 44. Skill as Social 126

§ 45. Science for Accommodation and Construction . 127
§ 46. Method and Fundamental Conceptions of

Natural Science. The Descriptive Method . . 128

§ 47. Space, Time, and Prediction 130

§ 48. The Quantitative Methotf 132

§ 49. The General Development of Science 134

§ 50. The Determination of the Limits of Natural

Science 135

§ 51. Natural Science is Abstract 136

§ 52. The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth 139

4 § 53. But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality 142

I, § 54. Relative Practical Value of Science and Phi-
losophy 143

PART II
THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VI. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTOMOLOGY 149

§ 55. The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of

the Problem of Philosophy 149

§ 56. The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical

Problems upon the Initial Interest 152

xvi TABLE OF CONTKNTrf

r*«»

§ 57. Philosophy as the Interpretation of t.ifr . . |.v
§ 58. Philosophy aa the Ivxfnwfrm of Srirftrr . J ;, $

§ 59. The Historical Diflfarenlintuw of I hr J'hiifw»plv

ical Problem ...... . ..... . . . . 1 .V»

§60. Metaphysics Seeks a Mrwt FutiflAtwnfjil IW?

ception ......... ...... ..... 1 .*i7

§ 61. Monism and Pluralism, . , ............. I. VI

§ 62, Ontology and CourrwJogy r<mrrr» IWfiK w»»f

Process ....... .... ...... . . I .v;i

§ 63. Mechanical and Tdfdogiml r<**mii}oKim ii«i

§ 64. Dualism ____ , , ____ , . , jn,1

§ 65. The New Meaning of Mtminm fttirl llnral^m I i>;i
* §66. Epistemology 8«k« tr»- Ufuifrotnw! thr» I'n^sj,

bility of Knowledge ,.,.., . . !iV4

§ 67. Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Affmwfirwn n*i!

» § 68. The Source and Criterion of t\timvfr*fu^ nr,

cording -to Emptricinm nntl Hnttmmlt«m.

Mysticism ...... ,.,.«*,.,,,. , . . itm

§69. The Relation of Knowted^ t« it* (tKjrrt »«-.

corditig to ReftluuD) »ttci t!w» H

Theory., ,.,..,,. _____ , , , , '. .
§ 70. The Relation of Knowlrdgti to it* t ili

cording to Idealwm ........ , , ,

« § 71. Phenomenalism, Hptrittialiimt, wni l

chism, .,..,...,,,,.,,,.. , .
f § 72. Transeendentdiim, or Abmltttr M*n)t«m .

CHAPTER VII. Tin NOEMATI?I BmcNcrxn AND t««

PROBLEMS OF Rcumtm , ..... .,,.,,.. . . IHI>

§ 73. The Normative 8otai«w. .,.,.,,..,,.,.. , i wi
§ 74. The Affiliations of Logic ..,,.,.,,.. . j M;»

§ 75. Logic Deals with the MM C*«mcittififw

of Truth in Belief..,. ....,,..,.. , ...... |M:I

§ 76. The Parts of Formal Logfe. iMnitinti, Ml

evidence, lafaimw, and Ofewttlkw . , , . . IH*

IM?

TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii

• •

PAGE

§ 78. Priority of Concepts 188

§ 79. ^Esthetics Deals with the Most General Con-
ditions of Beauty. Subjectivistic and For-

malistic Tendencies 189

§ 80. Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions

of Moral Goodness 191

§ 81. Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism 191

§ 82. Rationalism 193

§ 83. Eudsemonism and Pietism. Rigorism and

Intuitionism 194

§ 84, Duty and Freedom. Ethics and Metaphysics 196

§ 85. The Virtues, Customs, and Institutions 198

§ 86. The Problems of Religion. The Special In-
terests of Faith 199

§ 87. Theology Deals with the Nature and Proof of

God , 200

§ 88. The Ontological Proof of God 200

§ 89. The Cosmological Proof of God. 203

§ 90, The Teleological Proof of God 204

§91. God and the World. Theism and Pantheism .. 205

§ 92. Deism 206

§ 93. Metaphysics and Theology 207

§ 94. Psychology is the Theory of the Soul 208

§ 95. Spiritual Substance 209

§ 96. Intellectualism and Voluntarism 210

* § 97. Freedom of the Will. Necessitarianism, De-
terminism, and Indeterminism 211

§ 98. Immortality. Survival and Eternalism 212

§ 99. The Natural Science of Psychology. Its Prob-
lems and Method 213

§ 100. Psychology and Philosophy 216

§ 101. Transition from Classification by Problems to
Classification by Doctrines. Naturalism.
Subjectivism. Absolute Idealism. Absolute
Realism 217

xviii TABLE OF CONTKSTS

PART III
SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VIII. NATURALISM ...... — ,,,......., . '«V-M

§ 102. The General Meaning of MftU»ri*Uf»m *'«!3

§ 103. Corporeal Being ......... . . *2'2 4

§ 104. Corporeal Process*. ilylo*oi«n nml Mrrh-

anism ...... ,,,,,....,.,....,... "**25

§ 105. Materialism and PJby«f al Hr«*nc*» '.MM

§ 106. The Development of th«<Vmr**ptifW«*if !*h.v*-

ical Science, Bjmaa And Mutter ... . *'fc'H
§ 107. Motion and its Cauiw, IVvHopmrnt umi f>!v

tension of the (Jcmcc'ption «f Korr^ ,, . ;?;il
§ 108. The Development and Kxi4*nni<m nf tin* ( 'on •

ception oif I^nergy ...,,., , . ;l:w

§ 109. The Claims of Naturalwm . . , . ;';!'.*

§ 110. The Taak of Naturalimn ;* $i

§ 111. The Origin of thoC/onmoH. ,......,,,. . * fj!

§ 112. Life. Natural Selection , . f*'44

§ 113. Mechanical Physiology . . , , , , , . . . 24t!

* § 114. Mind. Tha Reduction to *Hf*nwifti«« ;*47

§ 115. Automatism ,.,,,,,...<,,,.. «r4W

§ 116. Radical Materialism, Mind MI tin K|iiphi*-

nomenon ..,.,.,...,. . . , , l*ftll

§ 117, Knowledge. Poaitivittm nntl AgtuwtirUtn , . . V'A'JI

§ 118. Experimentalism ..,,..,.... ;*/t*t

§ 119, Naturalistic EpistctmoioKy riot Hy«t«iiri»tiii , . **f*i!

* § 120. General Ethical St&nd-polnl 2/w

§ 121. Cynicism and Cywnaiolon. , . . SAO

§ 122. Development of UtaitMiimiMn.

ary Conception of Social 3

* § 123. Naturalistic Ethics not Rywtmatic , . 'M':

TABLE OF roNTKN'TH six

* «•

PAflB

§ 124, N&tumlimn n« AntHgoniHtto to Religion ...... 2f>3

§ 125, Xiittirftliwm ;w fh«» B*wia for a Religion of S<*r-

vin% Wonder, and Renunciation .......... 265

<'HAI*TKH IX'. SriwK.mviuM .................... ... 2(17

§ 12<1 Snhje.rtiviHm Originally A««oriated with R«»l-

ativiwtt and SeeptinHin ...... ...... ..... 2H7

§ 127. PhcnoinonaUnm an<l Spirit naitKin ........... 271

§ 12H. PhonomrnaliHitt n« Maintainf*<i hy HiTk<*l*«y.

*n«* I*r«)l»I<»iu Itihrrit.tMi from !)«wart«'K ami

Lorko ...... . . ____ 4 ..... . ....... ...... 272

| J2». Thi* KoftttAtinn of Miitoriiil S«l»Htanr«». , ..... 275

§ 130, The* Applirafion of the* IOpiMtcin<ilogirai Prin-

Hplo .,,,......... ....... ......... ..... 277

{ 13L Tho H<*fuiation of iw < 'omvivw! Corporeal

Wc»rhl ........ ...... ......,,..,..,.,,. 27H

5 1*12. Tin* TriytNitif»n to Sptnttialmtn. ............ 2HI)

§ Ki'i Kurthff Attrtn|it« to Maintain Phc*nonn'nul*

inni ,«..,....,.,,,,. ....... ........ 4 ... 2HI

§ JIH, Iii»rk««l<\v*rt HpiritunliMm. Inwnrdiat<» Knowl-

rd^cof thr IVrrrivrr. ............... . , „ "JH-I

§ itf5. Hrhopt'nhntt^rS H|nriluali«iii» <ir VotuntariHtn.

tiito KntHvltHlgi* of th^ Will ....... , *JH5

1.17, Tht* lnh**rvnt IVifHculty in SptrlttmltHtn. No
for ( )lij««rtivr Knowledge* ,..,...
er*!* Attempt to ! •nt

| Kill. Ol»i«»rtiv«« SpiritwiUwin.
} 140. Hrrk^l^y*!! C'cm**i*pttoti of <*

tu>iwt ftnd < )rtli*r ........................

I 141. Thn Otwrni Tt*nil«*ry of Htihj^ribn^rn to

Tfiiiwri'ipl ltf«*lf ........ . , ,,,,,,,,,.,.

i 142, KthiciU THiwrii*. HfUtivium ....... ......

| 143.

xx TABLE OF roNTKVTS

TWK

§ 144. The Ethica of Welfare ,..,.. . . , . , . , . ,ii'»»
§ 145. The Ethical Community ..... , . . . . ;fnj
§ 146. The Religion of Mystic wm . , . . ;|ii;i

§ 147. The Religion of Individual f'Wsfwrrafion with

God ........... . , . . . • • . . , . • - :inf

CHAPTER X. ADSOUJTE RKAM*&I ....... , , . . . MWI

§ 148. The Philosopher1* Tn«k, mid th<» l*hi!i*w»phrr'«i

Object, or thi» Aiwniutr ..... . ;mn

§149. The Eleatic Conr option of JM nj?. .... riim

§150. Spinoza's Conception of »Sub*»tiM*«r ,;il I

§ 151, Spinoza's Proof of Gtxl» tfn» hifjitif**^iil»*fiinrp.

The Modes and th« Attrttmtni. . . . , , . ;i|;*
§ 152, The Limits of Hpttuixn't Argtinirfii fur i Jt^| ;n »»
§ 153. Spinoza's Prnvi*ion for thi* Finite ,, , , .117
§ 154, Transition to Tdw'ilcigiriiir*mrr | ?fi«n«
§ 155. Early Greek PhiSnKophrr* it*»t Ml -rrtf inU
§ 156. Curtailment of Phtlonophy in ftir Ag** t»f thr

Sophists ..,.,..,,,,.,,,.,,,, . , . ;< j ti
§ 157. Socrates and th* Sulf-mttriiiftj nf thr $%

losophw ....... ,,.,»,.., . , , , . . ;i«*j

§158. Socratee'a Self-criticium A Prnphr^y *>( Trtifh :i;M
§ 159. The Historical Preparation f«r l'lnt«» nji

§ 160. Platomsm; Reality M thi» Alwiinl^ !ti«ft or

Good, ........ ,,.,„..... . , "l-*ii

' ••'•!•< »f*)»»

§ 161. The Progression of RxprHmm tAwniti fltwl :i,ii
§ 162. Aristotle^ Hiitrirchy of Bulnrtiinr«ii in iinb--

tion to Platonfem ,,.,,,, ....... , ..... , xi^t

§ 163. The Aristotelian Ph!t«mpby m « KwwrtlU-

I f 1 ^ 164* LeibniA Application of th* (Vmn^iinn »»f

1 1 • j Development to Hit Pmblm of

tion... ........... Jf ... :m

§ 165, The Problem of Impftrtottan

TABLK OF ('ONTKNTS xxi

• *

PA«B

§ lf>0, Ahnoiutr Krattsm In KpiHtomoIojKy. Ration-

niism , , ........... . .......... . ......... 339

§ 107. Th«* Kt'hition of Thought and its OhjcH in

Ab.Holuk* KwiiiMin ........ . ........ , , , . . 340

§ 1(>8. Th<» Stoi*'. and SpinoxiHtir Kthirn of NVrr.s-

Hity ...................... , .......... . 342

| 1119. Tho Platonic KthirK of P<«rfwtkm ........... 344

§ 170. Tht^ H«*ligH*n of Kulfihni^nt und th«« li^Iigion

of Hf^Minriuiion. , .......... , . ........ . 34f>

XL Aiwot.irTK IPKALIHM .,..,,.,.
5 171. t«<*iM»rnl (*o»Htn«*iivi* {'hururtur of

§ .172, Tht« <ff*'at < hitHt4ituling UrohlriuH of Almohi-

timu .... .......... ,.,..,.. ..... ...... 351

§ 173. Tlw U-r^-rk PhiioMopAttfH and th<» Frnhl<«rn
of Kvil. Th<» Tiink <»C th«* Now Alwolu-

} 174. Th»* Ht^itmin^ of AhrMilut4) IdcuHnm in K

AurtlyMW of l'*xpi*rH»iHM». ,..,,,..,.,..,,,,. 354
J 175. Kiint'* PriuciplrA U**Htrirt<*d to th«^ ICxjH'ri-

<*t»'<*H which thoy S«-t in OrdtT, ........... 3fi<l

| I7U. Tlu* iNmt-Kiiniiiin Mi'titphynirH IH a (5«»wTiiU-

(MUtci Morid CV»iiwi«u«»
Kunt. Th«i Almolutn
Spirit ....... ____ " , . ..... , ______ ...,,.. 35H

} 177. Ktchti'iuuftm, or t!io Atmohilt* Spirit n« Mornl

Activity ..,....,....,,. ..... , ____ . . , . . $X)

| I7H* Hotiititilirtwn, or tin* Ahmihiti? Spirit an *% nti-

iwtii ,......,.....,..,.,,.....,..,.,,, 3IH

| 179. Ht*^UntMKtitt or tin* Ahuoiutu Spirit iw Hi*-

l«?t»' ............. ..... ....,,,..,,.,.. Ml

| 180. Thi» Hti^Hiut Phihuiophy of Nutwrtt aiul Ilin-

lory . . . . ...... ...,....,.,.,,,.,......, rinri

Knihtrr of

! I'jpobto m a! Evil

TABLE OF WNTKXTS

§182 The Constructive Awmwnt l«»r Al««lutr
Idealism is Baaed upon ttw Siilg'Ttivntir
Theory of Knowlwigo . . . , . . - •

§ 183. The Principle of SubjwUvi«» Kxtrn-lr*! In
Reason ............... ......

§ 184. Emphasis on Mf-cotiae-iwiwi'** «*
Christian Philosophy ........ • •

§ 185. Descartas's Argument for thr fnilrfw
of the Thanking 8rlf ., . •

§186. Empirical Reaction of thr F,n«!^h l'

§ 187. To Save Exact BwniB Kiuit Mi4^ if Ivj^n

dent on Mind ........... • • • :* *' ?

§ 188. The Post-Kantiann Transform K»t»t*H Min«l

in-general into An AtMilnt<* MimJ -'^i »

§ 189. The Direct Argument Tlw Infrrnirr fr«*m

the Finite Mind to ttw* Infitiil^ Mm«t :iv

§ 190. The Realistic T«nd«mry \\\ Alw^Uit^ ltJrnh.«»u» . ;iK*»
§ 191. The Conception of l^^«mirt«mpifr«* < VjitrmJ

in the Ethic* of AtMKituta Mi»»li*»«. Kn.nl .'4Wi
§ 192. Kantian Ethien Buppfamtmb*! tlmtttith lh»1

Conceptions of Univ^rwl wt*l < H«j«vt«vr

Spirit.............. ...... . iWH

§ 193. The Peculiar PantheUm tititl M>**lirimn «f

Absolute Idealism — , ...... ....... :«*>

§ 194. The Religion of 'Kxuixtnutt H|nrituii2ity :«u:i

CHAPTER XII. CONCLVAION ,,.,..,.,,,,,, ...... .Wi

§ 195. Liability of Philoiophy to Rirviiiitm Ihtf !.#i it*

Systematic Cbaractctr ,,,,,. ..... ..... ;iuf*

§ 196. The One SoteuM and UM Many V\*\v#»«

phies ......,...,..., , 4 , . f ( ,,,.,,. . . . . rum

§ 197. Progress In PbUoiopby. Tim %ilii«tiwiirifi

or Eciecticittn of the Pmatt Ait? nils

§ 198, Metaphysiw. Tht Antafonbtki l.i«»rlfitw til

Naturaliimand Atewlu^tt, .,,.....,. , , :im

TABU*] OF roNTKNTS xxiii

• *

PA««

§ VM, roiKTwions from the Sid<* «»f AtwnlutiHin.
Kcrognifion of Nuturr. The NVo-i4'irh-

fniUH ....... ...... ..... ... ............ 401

§ "200. Thf Nf»o~Kuutifiii.H .... ............ , ..... . 4(K?

§ 201, UwoKTiition of tin* Individual, IVrnonul

ItiwiiiHin ..... . .......... . ............ 404

§ 202. Conrr.MMiorw from f h«« 8kl«* of Naturalism,

HwoKnitioiiof Kumlntarntal Priwiplr.s. , , 40f»
§ U0.3, HiTogiiitiiJiuif !h«« Will, rrnpnatimn ...... 407

§ LHM. Suntiimry i«j«l TnmHition <*> KpmtonioIoKy . , . 40H
I)orthn«'H of Kcuiima nn<i
Triidi'tiry in

^nry n Awoluto I
tionof I'I\|MTi«'nr«». .......... 410

itiloHofthy . , ....... ........... 412

I titJH. Th*« Itiif^r|>rrtjiiinii of Tradition nw th** Biutm

for u N«*w (\»»«tnu'tiot» .,,,...,.......,. 4!.'l

§ 201h Tiw* Truth of tin* Phymrnl 8yMt<nn, but, Fail-
urr «if Att^ttt|>t to l{«*(l»r<* nil Kxj«*ri**nr«*
toil ....... . ................. ...... 414

{ 2 JO, Truth of !V*y<'Mnfcl H^Jntionw Injt hu|^mw-

Inlity of < triMTfU ll*niurtion to t!u»m . ..,,.. 415

| 211, Truth of Logical imtl Hflii<*tt,l FrinrijtlrH. Va-
Ji<Jit.y itf Itt^nt of fVrf««**tion, tmt IIU|H»H-
mliiliiy of l)**thirifi^ th«* Wholr of H*pt*ri-<
^tit't* from it <......,., i ...,,.....,.... ( 415

§ "2V2, !'Jrrt-»r iw4 ICvil cunimt t«* Hotiu«*«H! to th«

Itli'nt ....,...,..,,.,.,.,..,...,..,,. 417

1*13. t^tlltM'tiv** rhiiriu*trr of tin* Vmvrm^ AM n

§ 214, Monti Impiii'fttinim of Hwrh rhtmlmiici Phi-

IrMciphy, tHjrity of tlm (loot!, , ......... 420

| 'JIH, Tht< Iiit*t<fttivc U» <uKMini*j«it , , . . ..... ,.,.... 422

§ 2 1 II, Tim JuNttiu'ftttan of Fnith ..... ,.,.,....... 4*M

TABLE OF CONTENTS

c r

PAGB

§ 217. The Worship and Service of God ......... ... 425

§ 218. The Philosopher and the Standards of the

Market-Place .......................... 425

§ 219. The Secularism of the Present Age .......... 427

§ 220. The Value of Contemplation for Life ........ 428

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 431

IXPEX: ............................................ 441

PART I

APPROACH TO THtf PROBLEM OF
PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTEE I

THE PKACTICAL MAIsT AIST> THE PHILOSOPHER

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY suffers the distinction cxf "being
regarded as essentially an academic pursuit. The
is Philosophy term philosophy, to be sure, is used in

a Merely common speech to denote a stoical man-
Academic — -,«*-,,^ '^, t. w , ........ . , *.••.. ..•-•• ^«^,.v,..~. .•• -

interest? ner.of accepting tke vicissitudes of life ;

but this conception sheds little or no light upon the
meaning of philosophy as a branch of scholarship.
The men who write the books on " Epistemology "
or " Ontology," are regarded by the average man
of affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a
"higher education/5 with little sympathy and less
intelligence. Not even philology seems less con-
cerned with the real business of life. The pursuit
of philosophy appears to be a phenomenon of ex-
treme and somewhat effete culture, with its own
peculiar traditions, problems, and aims, and with
little or nothing to contribute to the real enterprises
of society. It is easy to prove to the satisfaction

of the philosopher that such a view is radically

THH AiMMtOAHi TO

mistaken. Hut ii is au*»tlnT ;»n»i wrr -rrim
ter to bridge over tin* vrry ival i^ip fli;if M-jwrafr*
philosophy and common ^'?i-*\ Sn«'li HII uim H
realized only \v!«*n {»hilnmi|»hv i-* ^n-n t«» i-«-*np fr«»in
some special iJitfrost tiisif i^ liiuuaiily i!H|««rtant;
or when, af tor starting in fli<«?ii;!if jit H p"iisf \\hrrn

in all^
think-

f«»r

tu it.

life as a Start- Though tlrtTP l«» Ii
Ing- point for , , t

Thought. platlorniK wlien* ^j

one deals witli idcitn mid
one is led by tbc* inevititti
ing into the Hpl»»w nf

§2. rr.kete IK but ntu1

tion_ "\vlien ^ all tneti lire inviln} t*»

'llt ItUlliV Npi^i^Ul!
t '

l ^ronjH nf mini
may take their fttaml t«»j^*thiT, tlwrr M *ntly *»n^
; platform broad enough for nil. Thin imiv<<r»mt

I stand-point, or common piatfririu, in lt*/X If, IA
i •*--»""•**•"- • * • ^ <****»*>**

1 our . more definite them^ ihon. that j*liiti*%»j4iy,
even to its moat almtntmi toehuintlity, IM ftK*ff**J in
Ufe; and that it in inHC'paraliiy Iicituiil up with thr
s|lilfl.?tj°^ ,.of practical rtewlff, niitl tho fttiiittinn of
practical problems.

Every man knows what it tu fe» Hvn, ntnl !iin
immediate experience will verify thiw fftnrtimi of
the adventure that stand out oc»n«pit*tir»iiH|y. To
begin with, life^is_our birthright. Wo tiiil not. nuk
for.it, but 'whan Wgiew old tninsgti to 1* m*)f.

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER 5
• *

conscious we found ourselves in possession of it.
NOT is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the
will. As is true of no other gift of nature, we
must use it, or cease to be. There is a unique
urgency about life. But we have already implied
more, in so far as we have said that it must he
used, and have thereby referred to some form of
movement or activity as its inseparable attribute.
To live is to find one's self compelled to do some-
thing. To do something — there is another impli-
cation of life : some outer expression, some medium
in which to register the degree and form of its
activity. Such we recognize as the environment
of life, the real objects among which it is placed ;
which it may change, or from which it may suffer
change. K"ot only do we find our lives as unso-
licited active powers, but find, as well, an arena
prescribed for their exercise. That we shall act,
and in a certain time and place, and with reference
to certain other realities, this is the general condi-
tion of things that is encountered when each one
of us discovers life. In short, to live means to be
compelled to do something under certain circum-
stances.

There is another very common aspect of life
that would not at first glance seem worthy of men-

6 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

• •

tion. Not only does life, as we have just described
it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious
opportunity. The facts are such as we have found
them to be, and as each one of us has previouslv
found them for himself. But when we discover
life for ourselves, we who make the discovery, and
we who live, are identical. From that moment
we both live, and know that* we live. Moreover,
such is the essential unity of our natures that our
living must now express our knowing, and our
knowing guide and illuminate our living. Con-
sider the allegory of the centipede. From the
beginning of time he had manipulated his count-
less legs with exquisite precision. Men had re-
garded him with wonder and amazement. But
he was innocent of his own art, being a contrivance
of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding.
One day the centipede discovered life. He dis-
covered himself as one who walks, and the newly
awakened intelligence, first observing, then fore-
seeing, at length began to direct the process. And
from that moment the centipede, because he could
not remember the proper order of his going, lost
all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy
victim of his own self-consciousness. This same
self-consciousness is the inconvenience and the

THIS PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHKH 7
* *

great glory of human life* We must stumble
along a« best \vo can, guided by the feeble light
of our own little intelligence. If nature starts
us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, atul
bids TIB find the trail for ourselves, Mont men
arc, bravo enough to regard thin an the In'st thing
of all; some despair on account of it. In either
cane it in admittedly the true story of human life*
We, must live as separate selves, observing, fore-
seeing, and planning. There aw two things that
\vo can do about it We can repudiate our nut™
urea, decline^ the. responsibility, and degenerate
to the level of tlioso animals that never had our
ohanco; or w<» can leap joyously to. the helm, and
with all the strength and wisdom in us guide our
lives to their destination. Hut if we* do the for-
mer, wo shall he unable to forget, whut 'might have*
been, and shall ho haunted by n mnim* of igno-
miny; and if we do tin* second, we shall cxjxm-
cneo the unique happiness of fulfilment and nolf-
realization.

Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelli-
gent activity. Humanly sp*mkingf there i* no
such thing m a nitwit ion that IK imt at the mnw
time a tlieory* At* we live we are all thiwinta
Whoever hts Any iniagivitigH an to the practical

g THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

value of theory, let him mwinlwr thai, speaking
generally of human life, It in tru<» tn my thut, th*w
is no practice that doe« not insun nt Ii-n^fh from
reflection. That which IH tho. roimtnmrHt, oxju'ri*
ence of mankind is thn conjunction ivf thw» two,
the thought and the deed. And as mm'ly its we*
are all practical theorists, HO suroly is philoMnphy
the outcome of the br<*ad<mmg urn! dropi'uing
of practical theory, Hut to imdf»rnfand how tlm
practical man bocorncB tho phSloHo{ih<*i% wo uniHt
inquire somewhat more carefully into th<» inunnor
of his thought about lif<\

§8. Let anyone innpeet the Uwt numncnt in his
life, and in all probability ho will fmd that IIIH
The Practical mind was employed to (iincovor <!KJ

Knowledge of *

Means. means to some end* I in wttft iilr^Hdy
bent upon some definite achiovGimmt, ntul \va«
thoughtful for the sake of selecting the won<»mi«a!
and effectual way. HU theory mado lii« |>nietit*o
skilful. So through life his knowledge ahowH him
how to work his will Example, experiences and
books have taught him the of natnro and

society, and in his thoughtful living ho m cmnbiod
»to reach the goal he has set for the next hour, dtiy,
.OP year of his activity. The long periods til
human life are spent in elaborating the mount* to

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER (I

* *

some unquestioned end, I lore one meets the

curious tmth that we wake up in the middle of
life, already making headway, and under tin* guid-
ance of sonic* invisible steersman. When first we
take the business of life seriously, there in a con-
siderables stock in trade in t.ho shape of habits,
and. inclinations to all nortn of things tliat. we never
eorwelotiHly <d<*eted to purnuc^ Hineo we do not
begin at the beginning, our first problem in to
accommodate ournelve.H to ournelven, and otir first
deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plann out lined
by some predecessor that lu^ already HjH>krn for
UH, The name ihing in true <>f the nice of men.
At a certain Hinge in their development men found
themnelveH engaged in all manner of ritual and
(*untoin? and burdened with eoneernn that were not
of their own ehooning* They were burning in-
coiKBC, keeping forttivals, and naming nainen, all
of whieli they must now procc^ed to justify with
myth and legend, in order to rc*nder intelligible
to thonuwlves tho deliberate niul n
rcifmtition of tlu*nu K?eti HO imurh
was left to the f<»w, intd tho grcmt majority con-
tinued to seek that good which meutl usngc eoun*
tonanced and individual j)r«di«jxmition eonflrmecL
So every xnan of un aeto from day to day for

10 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

love's sake, or wcalth'H fwk<% ur p*mvr*H nitki1, or
for the sake o£ some iu?ar awl tanpl»l«» objwt ;

! reflecting only for th« grratrr <«fiu*i<»n<»v of hi*

I endeavor.

§ 4. But if this bo the common mannt T of think-
ing about life, it doc« not ropnwnt. tin* whol<» of

1 The Practical BW^h thought. Nor <l*H*H it follow that

I ' tiT^n^T0* Because it omipioH UH HO rmiH*t it in

Purpose. therefore wrrwpondmjrly fuwlum
Like the myth makc*rs of ol«l, \v<< uli want
or less to know the rm*wn uf tntr rn.tfa< Hori',
* 1 then, we meet with a mmunvhat «UfT**rr!it tyjH* of

reflection upon life, tho n'iUM*ti«m that ufMii«r!ii*H

$ ! , • .

v| the adoption of a Ufa pttr{H?mx It i« oln*i*niH thai

/;] most ends are selected for the nako of <»tlu»r

P and so are virtually moann. Thnn emu iiuiv nt

J'llj gle for years to secure a <*ollogi^ mhu*ntion« Thin

!l definite end has been adopted for tlu* wiki» of n

I 1 j i , • i /» «

* n' , somewhat more nulenmte <m«l of wMf-iMivann)*

^ • ment, and from it there isaws a %vhcilii m*rIi*H of

/ ! ' minor ends, which form a hierarchy of nte{« «H-

I' ' cending to the highest goal of ftitpi ration* Now

.Jij * uP°n tite $^® of things we live wry unayittamitttfl

, ^! •; lives, and yet were we to examiae ounieivofi in thin

j1!! ;' fashion, we should all find mt live* to bo nmrvolA

I; • * of organization. Their growth, as wo have

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER 11

* *

"began before we were* conscious of it; and \v<» are

commonly BO absorbed in some particular flower
or fruit that we forget tin* roots, and the design
of the whole. "Hut u little re fleet, ion reveals a re-
markable unitary adjustment of parts. The unity
is due to the dominance of n group of central pur-
poses. Judged from the stand-point of ex[»enemse?
it scorns bitter irony to nay that everyone gets
from life just what he wishes. Hut a candid
Kea rolling of our own hearts will incline im to
admit; that, after all, the way we go and the length
we go in determined pretty much by the kind and
the intensity of our secret longing. That for
\vhieh in the time of choice we are willing to- sac-
rifice all else, in the* formula that defmeH the luw
of viicli individunl lif<*. All this in not intended
to mean that we havn c*aeh nitiaed n. e-k»*ir tuid
definito i<leal whieh in our chosen gout. On the
contrary, Huch a c«>nc4>ption may be idmoftt HWMUI-
inglc«H to Home of ua, In general the* higher the
ideal the vaguer and IOSH vivitl in its
to our cotUHcioitHiu^H. Hut, named or
nharp or blurred, vivid or hulfvfurgotten, there nuiy
bo found in the heart of every man that which of
all things he wanta tu lie, that which ol all ik'tjiln
ha wants to do. If ho han had thc> nonital youth

12 HE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of dreaming, he has «*m it, and wurmoH to tlw
picture of his Imagination; if h<* has UM«H wmw
what more thoughtful than tho ordinary, his tvn-
son has defined it, and adopted it fur his vorutinn;
if neither, it has l>een proncnt as an um!<«rtoim
throughxmt the rendering of his moro 5n<»vitnMn
life. He will recognize it when it in IWIWM! UH
the desire to do tho will of (lod, or to hnvi* UH
good a time as possible*, or in nmkfi oihi»r |«M»pIo
as happy as possible, or to IK* otjtuil in inn n«,Hj«m-
sibilities, or to fulfil the exjH^tiition t»f hin tm»th<*rt
or to be distinguished, wealthy, **r mfltn*ntiul.
This list of ideals IB miftrcOlanfottH, ««*! i^liirully
reducible to more fundamental wmwptu, litit thrmi
are the terms in which mm nr« orcUnnrily
scions of their most intimate purjxwc*n. \V«
now inquire respecting the nature* of thu tiuntght
that determines the selection of mu?h it {tMr|xwny
or justifies it when it has been tmcnniwioiwly Ac-
cepted.

§ 5. What in most worth while I 80 far «»
human action is concerned tills dbvlmtsly clojumdM
^P031 "wtat is poBsible, upon what in
expected of us by our own nature*, ant!
?011 what iatewBta and oonoerna aro

Voluptuary, congepy^ fcy ^ tr0B^ 0£

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER 13
* i»

environment. What I had "best do, presupposes
what I have the strength and the skill to do, what
I feel called upon to do, and what are the great
causes that are entitled to promotion at my hands.
It seems that practically we cannot separate the
ideal from the real. We may feel that the high-
est ideal is an immediate utterance of conscience,
as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in
expression. We may be willing to defy the uni-
verse, and expatriate ourselves from our natural
and social environment, for the sake of the holy
law of duty. Such men as Count Tolstoi have
little to say of the possible, or the expedient, or the
actual, and are satisfied to stand almost alone
against the brutal facts of usage and economy.
We all have a secret sense of chivalry, that
prompts, however ineffectually, to a like devotion.
But that which in such moral purposes appears
to indicate a severance of the ideal and the real,
is, if we will but stop to consider, only a severance
of the ideal and the apparent. The martyr is
more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is
convinced that though his contemporaries and his
environment be against him; the fundamental or
eventual order of things is for him. He believes
in a spiritual world more abiding, albeit less

14 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

obvious, than the material world. Though every
temporal event contradict himt he- liven in thi1 cer-
tainty that eternity is his, Such an <me may have
found his ideal in the voice of (Jod an<i His proph-
ets, or he may have Ixjon led to Uo<l as the justi-
fication of his irresistible idtnil; but in either eune
the selection of his ideal in miKonahlc* to him in
so far as it is harmonious with the ultimate nut ure
of things, or stands for the promise* of reality. In
this wise, thought about life expand* info Hnme
conception of the deeper force** nf file world,
and life itself, in rewpect of it* fundamental
attachment to aix ideal, implien Home belief eon-
cerning the fundamental nature of tin environ-*
ment.

But lest in this account life be crediteil with ten*
much gravity and import, or It «eem to lx» iw-
sumed that life is all knight-errantry, let UH turn
to our less quixotic, and porhnpa more effeclnnl,
man of affairs. He works for hin daily hr<*ml,
and for success in his vocation. Ho "lim Hdeeied
. his vocation for its promise of return in the furm
of wealth, comfort, fame, or influonco. lie like*-
wise performs such additional service! to hi* faultily
and his community as is demanded of him by pub*
lie opinion and his own sens© of r

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER 15

* *

lie may have a certain contempt for the man who
sees visions. This may lx* his manner of testify-
ing to his own preference for the idea! of useful-
ness and immodiato eilieieiiey. lint even HO he
would never for an instant admit that he wan pur-
suing a merely conventional good. lie may IM»>
largely imitative in Inn standards of value, rooog-
nixing such aims an an* common to Home time or
race; nevertheless none would he more wire than
ho of the truth of his ideal. Question him, and
ho will maintain that his Is the reasonable life
under the conditions of lAimim existence, lie
may maintain. that, if then* he n (*od, he can host
serve Him by promoting the tangible wolf an* of
himself and those dependent upon him. He may
maintain that, since there in no (5od, lie must win
such rewards an the world can give. If ho havo
something of the heroic in him, ho may toll you
that, since there* in no God, he will bthor to the
uttermost for his follow-mou. Where ho bun not
solved the problem of life for himself, he may
believe hinwelf to he obeying the insight of Home
one wiser than himself, or of society an expressed
in its customs and institutions. .Hut no man ever
admitted thut his life wan purely a twitter of ox-
jHidioncy, or that in IUH tlonimiuit ideal Ito was

IQ THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

the victim of chance* In tho background of tho
busiest and most preoccupied lift* of uiTuirn, thorn
dwells the conviction that mu»h living in apprupri-
ate to the universe; that it ia called for hy tho
circumstances of its origin, opportimitk1^ and
destiny.

Finally, the man who makes light of Hfo him of
all men the most transparent innor <»<niHoi<wHWHH.
In him may ho clearly observed tho. relation
between the ideal and tho reflection that in na-

sumed to justify it

" A Moment's Halt— & momentary (n»i<%
Of Being from the W«II amid tht* \Ya«t«v—
And Lot — tho phantom Caravan han n*aoh*d
The Nothing it set out from— , . . "

*' We are BO other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that com** arid go
Round with the Sun-illuminM I^ftnt(*rn held
In Midnight by the Master of thu

Where the setting of life is construed in thtmo
terms, there Is but one natural and appropriate
manner of life. One© believing in the isuktion
and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all
worth save such as may be tasted in tho moment
of its purchase. If one's ideas and experumcwi
are no concern, of the worldX ^* incident* of ti
purely local and transient interest, they will real-

THK PRACTICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER f7

% »

Jaw most when they realize an immediate gratifi-
cation. When* one does not believe, that he. is a
member of the universe, ami a contributor to its
ends, ho doe.s we'll to minimize1 I lit* friction thai
arises* from itn accidental propinquity, and to
kindh* Homo little fin.* of enjoyment in his own
lonely lu»art. This is tlir liiV of al>an<l*>nnn'nt to
pl(ka.Hur<% ucvompamwl hy th<* <*onvi«'tton that llw
('(jiiditioiiH of lift* warrant no tnotv sfr<'iiut»ti.s or
Iuvro5<* plan,

§ IK In su<*h \vis<* do wo nilopt th<« 15 fi* ]>urjK>so,
<»r justify it wht*» unrons«*u»uHly a.<loptrcL Tlu*
Th« Adoption pufHtnt of an id«*nl iiuplit'H a lx*lirf in

of PurpoMV

andtht JtH olUH'ttiality, Slu*h It I'H'Hl'f will 111-

Phitoi^phr . t , * , t i »

of Lift. vnruihJy app<*ar wiu'ti the groundwork

of fho daily living IM laid hate hy a. little reflection.

And if our iiniilyHiH IMH not hern in error, there
is something more definite to he obtained from it.
Wo all believe in the prtteticid window of our fun-
damental ideals; but we believe^ lieHtdeH, that nueli
windoiu invoives the natu'tioti of the univerm* an
a whole* The nioi«onto«Hniws of uu ItidividunrH
Hfo will l.w Hiitiwlic'd with nothing IPHH liniil than
an iihmiltiteiy wise deposition of 5t. For every in*
dividuiil, his life in nil hin jKJWer iiml rtt^ies, and
m not to l»o Hfxjiit HHV«* for the gruatt'itt tjaud tkut

18 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

he can reasonably pursue. .Hut the solution of
suck a problem is not to to obtained short of a
searching of entire reality. Every life will rep-
resent more or less of such wi«<lom and enlighten-
ment; and in the end the hont Heleetinti of ideal
will denote the greatest wealth of experience. It
is not always true that lie who IUIH «oen inon* will
live more wisely, for in an individual cune in-
stinct or authority may be Iwttor aouroort of uHpi ra-
tion than experience, But wo tnmt im*tiwt IUH!
authority because wo believe them to represent a
comprehensive experience on the part of the ruee
as a whole, or on the part of God. lie whom*
knowledge is broadest and truont would know bent
what is finally worth living for. On thin nwotint,
most men can see no more rouRormhltt plan of life
than obedience to God's will, for God in the abun-
dance of his wisdom, and since all eternity i« plain
before him, must see with certainty that which in
supremely worthy.

We mean, then, that the selection of our ichml«
shall be determined by the largest poHftihlo knowl-
edge of the facts pertaining to Ufa* Wo moan to
select as one would select who knew all about the
antecedents and surroundings and remote conse-
quences of life. In our own weakness and fini-

HK PKACnrAL MAN AXl) PHlLOHOl'HKU 19

tud<». w may go hut a lift!** way in fhr dinrtion
of such an insight, and may jnvftT to urtvpt fhp
judgment of tradition or authority, hut w«» rrt'og-
n"m* a distinct tyjH* of knowh'dp* UH alon«* worthy
to justify art individual's adoption of «n itli'iil,
That fy[H» of knnwhulp* in fhr knoxvlrti^r flint row-
si« in its tntalit*

ill! jmrts of reality, lias, humiuily
^ is hoth ttnuttuinahlr nu«l incnnrrivuhh*.
If, involves ruthiT it r*nu*rjifinit of th«* kintl of real-
ity that is fundamental For a wins* |mrf*oH«* if
in t»na'0«»HHary thai \vo Mhouhl know iiuiuy tnattrrs
of fa<^t.t or «»vt*n HjHritio IIIWH, proviti<Mi \vt* nrr «'on«
vinrtHl of flu* iiiiirr im4 <*s*M'iitial «i!tjtr»rft*r of f!«*
univorw*, Sonio of thr uit(*nsativi*H ur«* uinttrrH of
<*vi»rys]ny thought IUH! HjMTi'h. Otn' niunot tt*ll
tlw Hiinjilrnt Htory of htiuuin lifi* wilhinii <Um*li»H-
ing fh«»in. To liv«* fit** htuuiui Hf<« Htf^utH lo' jiur-
HU« Id^alHj that in, fo ltnv<* a thing In tnlmf, tinil
tlicn to try fo tirrottijili^h if, U**r«* In cnu« kiiut of
fc*itllty ntitl JHAVIT. Th«* fdfut^tiiry Hyntwu, cm the*
othcT hiiiio!, it«H«H not {iitwin* ulndHf hut. itt«v*«$ mi*
oonncioUH <»f itw*lf, with u iiitviiiiiii<*itl
thut can bo expnmHfiJ in 11 iniititoitMUionl
anti i» rrprimnilntivt* o| nnothtT kind t»f roulit

20 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY y ,

and power. Hence a very common ami a VITV
practical question: Is there an und^rlvinp law,
like the law of gravitation, fun<Iani<'ntally an< 1 per-
manently governing life, in spit*' »f its ajifiaivitt,
direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is th<«n»
an underlying power, liko purpose, fim<lnm«'nfally
and permanently governing tin* planetary svHf««m
and all celestial worlds, in spit*1 of fit** apparent
control of blind and irrortistihlc forcru i ThU b
a practical question beoanw not h ing rtmlfl IHI iui»r<«
pertinent to our choice of iMt'nls. Xnfbiiij^ multl
make more difference to HA1 than 11 !x'!i«'f in th<«
life or lifelessness of ita onvir«*nni«*ut. Tht* faiUm
that generate or confirm our itloals always ri'fVr f*i
this great issue. And this in hut <tm», illicit thi*
most profound, of the many JHKUCS that arts*' fn»iu
the desire to obtain acme conviction of th<« titn«»r
and essential character of life!; Tli*mgli HO inti-
mately connected with practical rorircriw, th<*s*«
issues are primarily tho bnHiui'Hrt of thotight. In
grappling with them, thought b twilii! UJKHS fur
its greatest comprehen»ivono«H, }H*iii*t.riitifii
self-consistency. By the mwiwity of com
tion, thought is sometimoa lod to forjp't it*«
and the source of its problems. But in naming
itself philosophy, thought has only rtHttpiIml tim

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND PIULOHOPHKH 21
* *
dofiniteness and earnestness of its largest task.

Philosophy is still thought about life, representing
but the* deepening ami broadening of the* common
practical thought fulness.

We who began together at the start ing- point. of
lift*, have now entered together the haven erf phi'
lotwphy. It is not a final haven, but only the
point of depart tiff* for the field of philosophy
proper* Nevertheless that field is now in the
plain view of tin* man who occupies the practical
stand-point. .'He must recognize in philosophy a
kind of reflection that dlflWn only in extent and
persistence from the reflection that guides and jus-
tifies his life. He may not consciously identify
himself with any one of the three general groups
which have been characterised* Hut if lie IH
neither an idealist, nor a philistiw*, nor n pleasure
lover, surely he in ennijKnimled of such elements,
and does not escape, their Implications, lit* de-
sires something most of all, even though ht« higlt-
ont ideal be only an inference from the gradation
of Im immediate purposes. Thin hlghewl Ideal
represents what he cimeeive» to IK* thfl greatest
worth or value ttttnhmhlf* in the tintvorHf*, ami tin
adoption is bused ti{Km the* iargcwt g**t$eriili7,!ition
that ho win make or borrow* The eomplete junta-

22 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

fication of his ideal would involve a true knowl-
edge of the essential character of the universe
For such knowledge he substitute* either authority
or his own imperfect insight, But in cither case
his life is naturally and organically correlate*!
with a thought about the wniww hi if* folnHhj,
or in its deepest and essential c.hnracfrr. Such
thought, the activity arid its results, in philoso-
phy. Hence he who lives i», i/«« f*tHo9 a philoso-
pher. He is not only a potential philosopher, but,
a partial philosopher. lie has already begun to
be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prwlrntial
thinking of some little man of affairs, ami the sus-
tained thought of the devoted lover of truth, there
is indeed a long journey, but it is a straight, jour-
ney along the same road. Philosophy in neither
accidental nor supernatural, hut inevitable awl
normal. Philosophy is not properly a vocation,
but the ground and inspiration of all vocations.
In the hands of its devotees it grows technical tw«l
complex, as do all efforts of thought, awl to pur-
sue philosophy bravely and faithfully i« to encoun-
ter obstacles and labyrinths immmerahle. The
general problem of philosophy is mothor of ft
whole brood of problems, little ami great But

THE PRACTICAL MAN AM) PHILOSOPHER 23

* »
"whether wo IN* numlx.Twl amoiijir its <l(«vi>t<H*s, or

their iK'.iwlk'iarios, an <MJUU! sipiiiicanco. atta«*Iu*s
to tlio truth that philosophy in
with lifo.

CHAPTER II

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY

§ 7. As the ultimate criticism of all human in-
terests, philosophy may bo approaehed l>y avenuea
who is the as various as thoao intomsts. Only

Philosopher- , - ._ . . *• * .1

Poet? when philosophy IH discovered as th«

implication of well-recognisw»(l «peeinl interests, in
the significance of its- function fully appreciated.
For the sake of such a further understanding of
philosophy., those who find either inspiration or
entertainment in poetry arc invited in the pn\Ht*nt
chapter to consider certain of the relations IxUwwn
poetry and philosophy,

We must at the very outset decline to accept
unqualifiedly the poet's opinion in the* matt«irt for
he would not think it presumptuous to Incorporate
philosophy in poetry. " No man/1 said < 1olo-
ridge, " was ever yet a great poet without being at
the same time a great philosopher.1' Thin would
seem to mean that a great poet is a grant philos-
opher, and more too. We shall do better to begin
with the prosaic arid matter of fact minimum of
24

POETRY AM) PHILOSOPHY *ja

truth: some ] wintry is philosophical. This will
enable us to search for the* port inn of philosophy
that is in some poetry, without finally defining
their respective boundaries. It may be thai nil
true poetry is philosophical, as if may lie that all
true philoHophy is poetical; but it in much more
certain that much actual poetry is far from philo-
sophical, awl thaf most actual philosophy wan not
conceived or written by u poet. The mere jx»et
and the mere philosopher mn*t he tolerated, if it
be only for the purjn.ise of .shedding light upon th<*
philosopher-poet nnd the ytH*?'philost»pher, And
it 5s to the. philosopher port that \ve tttru, in the
hojK1 that under the genial spell of {w*»try we may
IH* lirotight. witfi nnderstumlin^; to the more forbid-
ding land of philosophy,

$ H» Poetry in well characterized f though not
defined, iw an iuterpretntioit of Ufe. The term
**life" ben* nignifies flit* human pur-
ponive conHciottHtu^ iniil active pursuit
of end«. An interpretation of lift* in, then, tt
selection itnd {iccmint of such vnhieH in humiiii ex-
pewncii as are itctinilly siniglit or lire worth the
seeking* For the jjoet nil fhinp arc* gixwl or bud,
and iiwer only ittiitters of fuel, lie in neither Hit
lkt nor t fttatUtician, and in even an obeerv«r

26 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

only for the sake of a higher design. He is ono
who appreciates, and expresses his appreciation HO
fittingly that it becomes a kind of truth, and a per-
manently communicable object. That "unbodied
joy/' the skylark's song and flight, ia through the
genius of Shelley so faithfully embodied, flint it
may enter as a definite joy into the liven of count-
less human beings. The aonHUoufl or Huggostivo
values of nature are caught by the pwtfVt quick
feeling for beauty, and fixed by his creative activ-
ity. Or with his ready sympathy be tuny perceive
the value of some hupmn ideal or mastering pas-
sion, and make it a reality for our common feeling,
Where the poet has to do with the, bane and hate-
ful, his attitude is still appreciative, The evil is
apprehended as part of a dramatic whole having
positive moral or aesthetic value. Moral ideas
may appear in both poetry and life us the inspira-
tion and justification of struggle. Where there is
no conception of its moral significance, the repul-
sive possesses for the poet's const! iousnofiH the*
aesthetic value of diversity and contract. Even
where the evil and ugly is isolated, UB in curtain
of Browning's dramatic monologues, it formn, both
for the poet and the reader, but a part of sumo
larger perception of life or character, which i* «ub-
f

POKTKY AND PHILOSOPHY 27

* *
lime or beautiful or good. Poetry involves, then,

the discovery and presentation of human experi-
ences thai are satisfying and appealing. If 5s a
language for human pleasures and ideals. I Win-
is without doubt a groat deal more than this, mid
only after u careful analysis of its jx'euliar lan-
guage could one distinguish if from kindred arts;
hut it will suflitv for our pur|K*srs to rhar»<'f«*ri/f*
and not differentiate. Start ing from this most
general truth n'MjHH'ting p*»**tr\% we may now l«x»k
for t.lmt iispert of if wherehy it may !w» n witness
of philosophical truth, *

$ !K Fur the answer to our quest Ion, we must
turn to an examination of the intellectual elements
8lnc«rlty IA (if poetry. In the first phlre, the rom*
nioii demand that I lie poet shall lw »e--

in his represent at ions is suggestive of au

itHnhle intelieettuil faefor in his genius*
AH we lut vi» seen, he is not to repr<«.hir<» nature,
hut the human appreciative experience of maturo.

Nevertheless, he must even here he true to hi«
ohjoct. 1 1 in art involves his ability to oxprew
genuinely ami sincerely what he himwlf c*xj««ri-
encrm in the presence of nattw% of what he ran

cateh nf the inner lives of olherft !\y virtue of hif*
intalligent nympafhy* No amount of emotinn or

28 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

even of imagination will profit a port, unless he
can render a true account of thorn. To he suns
he need not define, or even explain; for it in his
function to transfer the immediate qualities of ex-
perience: but he must ho able to nponk flu* truth,
and, in order to speak it, he must, him* known it.
In all this, however, we have made no demand that
the poet should see more than one tiling ut. n time.
Sincerity of expression does not require what in
distinctly another mode of intelligence, cmH[trchrn-
siveness of view. It in easier, and accordingly
more usual, to render ''an account, of the momenta
and casual units of experience, than of its totality.
There are poets, little and great, who JKUWXH the
intellectual virtue of sincerity, without lite intel-
lectual power of synthesis and reeoneilintion.
This distinction will enable ua to separate the in-
telligence exhibited in all poetry, from that din-
tinct form of intelligence exhibited in Mich poetry
as is properly to be called philosophical

The "barbarian" in poetry has recently been
defined as " the man who regards hi« pafiftinnH iw
their own excuse for being; who does not dowon-
ticate them either by understanding thcnr caww* or
by conceiving their ideal goal." 1 One will rend-

1 George Santayana, in his Povtry and Rdigwn, p. 176,

«]>i»H<"if i«*n *'f tliH ii«
,

\Vluif little tmitv fhrrv i* in thin

. . 1
flu* <HunjH»Hitii*u nf a piuvlv M'nsu-

.iijfC r*K^^ J»uj<! itwl Jrft hittitl.
1 e v*»ry ftiirf in itn U-*i light,

i, unit Mtoiutitf

yj.

Whitmim

ut oro'jol**** with kiin in nil nij^

\vt« fiinrjHf «lt»nv Iiim truth,
H! u««t uitt^Tstautliu^;. l'*h«*
ies ixx "\vliH8h h*' dinrnvrrM HI* inttrlt worth,
Dm axi<l onprit'iuurt, WIH! *!u nut ronHfituh*
e. To tiu* mtlulinn «»f ultiiunff ijii<*HfiunH

y^t<*ry, nntt thi* iHiuvir.-

ar-o Ix^yo*— -tlmi lift* v*l*t* mti! iiS0fttity«

on, ttntt ji»« m»y ttm tribute

d Is j[ii»tl4v tU»««rilH«I t*y the* writer j

3 C£ €t j;>llllllt.|WItlllglJfI.|| <if miililitiiillH vi«"

id,, ixnp>sr€-^Hi*iv0l but tmtnotoruiUH and html

iaa niiiitiory, liktt tJ«* WUVCM of the n«i

30 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

or the decorations of some barbarous t<-mjil<\ sub-
lime only by the infinite apfTivpntinn <»f parts/" '-

As is Walt Whitman, HO an* many po<»f* jrn»af.<T
and less. Some who havo smi tin* worM-virw, <<x~
hibit the same particularism in tbrir lyric miK»<is;
although, generally speaking, a port who on<»t»
has comprehended the world , will MT lb*» pnrtM of
it in the light of that wisdom. Hut Walt Whit-
man is peculiarly roprotwntativ** of th«» jmrtry that
can be true, without Innng win** in flu* mazmcr that
we shall come shortly to utifbTstiuiti «s tl»« ntann^r
of philosophy. Ho in an (It'.suJtory in hi* purf. nip-
tures as is the eommim man wlirn h»» Jivr.^ in hi.n
immediate experickiK*eH, Tin* truth \vou by <*wh JM
the clear vision of OIH» thing, or of u HmitiMt <»nl-
lection of things, and not tlm hrnail iiictuHivi* vision
of all things.

§10. The transition from Whitman ti» Shuk««-
speare may seem Bomcwliat ahrtipf, Imi tin* vrry

Constructive different lK'tWl»l»» thoM* |KM*M Hl»rVl*
Kncmledgeia t(> mflrk m|t fln jnt<WHti|w

Shakespeare, Neither httH put lllty tltlitltry

tion upon human life 11114! UN cuv
Neither, as JXH?!, in the witin^H of miy \vor)ii-vii*w ;
which will mean for \m fhut m»tihi«r in « ]ihi!<m-

'SantayanA : «|i, n"it| p, jmi,

TOOTHY AND PHILOSOPHY 31

opher-poo.t. AH renpeelH Shakespeare, this is a
hard Having. We are accustomed to the critical
judgment that finds in the Shakespearian < Iranian
an apprehension of the universal in human life.
But though thin judgment is true, it. is by no means
conclusive1 as respects Shakespeare's relation to the
philosophical type of thought. For there can he
universality without philosophy. Thus, to know
the groups and the marks of the. vertebrates in to
know a truth, which possesses generality, in con-
tradistinction to the particularism of Whitman's

*
poetic, consciousness, Hven HO to know well the

groups and murks of human character, vertebrate
and invertebrate, in to know that of which the aver-
age man, in his hand to hand struggle with life,
is ignorant* Such «. wisdom Shakespeare pos-
sessed to a unique degree, and it enabled him to
reconstruct human life, lie did not merely per-
ceive human states and motives, but he underHtmtd
human nature HO well that he could creak* cons int-
ent men itnd women. Moreover, Shakespeare**
knowledge wits not only ilum universal in being
a knowledge of general groups and lawn, but ill HO
in renfMK't of its extennity. II IH understanding
wiw IIH rich a» it was acute. It is true*, then, that
Shakespeare* rend human life a« an open book,

32 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

knowing certainly the manner of human thinking
and feeling, and the power and interplay of human
motives. But it is equally true, on the other hand,
that he possessed no unitary conception of the
meaning and larger relations of human life. Such
a conception might have been expressed either by
means of the outlook of some dominating and per-
sistent type of personality, or by a pervading sug-
gestion of some constant world-setting for the
variable enterprise of mankind. It could appear
only provided the poet's appreciation of life in de-
tail were determined by an interpretation of the
I' ' meaning of life as a whole. Shakespeare appar-

ently possessed no such interpretation. Even
when Hamlet is groping after some larger truth
that may bear upon the definite problems of life,
he represents but one, and that a strange and un-
usual, type of human nature. And Hamlet's re-
flections, it should be noted, have no outcome.
There is no Shakespearian answer to the riddles
that Hamlet propounds. The poet's genius is not
less amazing for this fact ; indeed, his peculiar dis-
tinction can only be comprehended upon this basis.
Shakespeare put no construction upon life, and by
virtue of this very reserve accomplished an art of
surpassing fidelity and vividness. The absence of

POKTKY AM.) PHILOSOPHY ;$3

philoHophy in Shakespeare, imd fin* presence of
the. most characteristic, quality of htn peuius, may
both IK* imputed hy the? one aiiirtnation, that f/itw
i"«v wo fihtiiwxficarttni point of nVir.

Thin truth signifies hoth gain and Inss. Tho
philoHophical <»ritit*isin of Hfr may vary from tin*
i<loal ohjoc'tivify of ahnohito truth, to tin* wuhjiv-
tivity of u }M*rHonul religion. Phitortophy niniH to
correct flu* partiality of partk*«lar jKHiitn of view
hy iwanH of a jKiint of view that nhall c*<«nprohf*iwl
thi'ir r^hitiouB, and offoc»t nticli r**con<'ilintionH or
tnumformatioim an whnll onahk* thorn to <UMH! ilutt*
a univ<*rH<*. IMiilonophy alwitVH HHHUUU'H flu* hypo-
thrtical view of <»nuuHci«*n<M*. Tin* mm\HHtty of
H\tch a final criticism in implicit in t*v<*ry H<*u*ntilit*
itt*tu of ki:ic»\v!<Higc»? IIIH! in <»v<»ry jiui^nu'nt that i«
P-IIHWH! UJHUI li.f<% Philowophy makcn a ciintinct
and pcctiliur contrihntion t<» human knowltwlj?*- l»y
it« lu»roic. <«ffort to tnt(uHuro nit kuo.\vU'«lg<*« ami nit
idealn hy thn Htan<lar<I of totality. N^vi*rt!u*U?HH
it in aignHicant that no human, individual am po«-
Bibly ptiRHOHH tlw rangt^ of ottmlttc*k*m*f*« Tho mont
a<le<jtiatr«UHly nustii-
phyBical nuncls; hut overy individual phiicim^phy

34 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ^ «

Trill nevertheless be a premature synthesis. The
effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable
test of the adequacy of prevailing conceptions, but
the completed knowledge of any individual mind,
will shortly become an historical monument. It will
belong primarily to the personal life of its creator,
as the articulation of his personal covenant with
the universe. There is a sound justification for
such a conclusion of things in the case of the indi-
vidual, for the conditions of human life make it
inevitable; but it will always possess a felt unity,
and many distinct features, that are private and
subjective. ISTow such a projection of personality,
with its coloring and its selection, Shakespeare has
avoided; and very largely as a consequence, Ms
dramas are a storehouse of genuine human nature.
Ambition, mercy, hate, madness, guilelessness, con-
ventionality, mirth, bravery, deceit, purity — these,
and all human states and attributes save piety, are
upon his pages as real, and as mysterious withal,
as they are in the great historical society. For
an ordinary reader, these states and attributes are
more real in Hamlet or Lear than in his own
direct experience, because in Hamlet and Lear he
t can see them with the eye and intelligence of gen-
ins. But Shakespeare is the world all over again,
f

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 35

and there is loss as well as gain in such realism.
Here is human life, no doubt, and a brilliant pag-
eantry it is ; but human life as varied and as prob-
lematic as it is in the living. Shakespeare's funj
damental intellectual resource is the historical and
psychological knowledge of such principles as
govern the construction of human natures. The
goods for which men undertake, and live or die,
are any goods, justified only by the actual human
striving for them. The virtues are the old win-
ning virtues of the secular life, and the heroisms

•

of the common conscience. Beyond its empirical
generality, his knowledge is universal only in the
sense that space and time are universal. His con-
sciousness contains its representative creations, and
expresses them unspoiled by any transforming
thought. His poetic consciousness is like the very
stage to which he likens all the world: men and
women meet there, and things happen there. The
stage itself creates no unity save the occasion and
the place. Shakespeare's consciousness is univer-
sal because it is a fair field with no favors. But
even so it is particular, because, though each may
enter and depart in peace, when all enter together
there is anarchy and a babel of voices. All
Shakespeare is like all the world seen through the

THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

eves of each of il« inhabitant-*, Human rxp«»ri-
enco in Shakespeare 'm human rxpi-rinnv an rvrrv-
one feels it, an fompivhHiMvr a* fit** airtrivpit*' uf
innumerable Hv<»8. Hut human f'X|M»rii'i»«v in phi-
losophy is the exp:>riHU'i* of all a* th»>u^ht by a
synthetic mind. Hrncv tin* width «*f lifV di'pii»fnl
by Shakcspc'iirv sorvi.^ only tu j«tiut <»ut tin* phi-
losopher's prohh'iu, ami t*» rhalh^iip* hi-* IH»\V«.TM.
Here he will, find nmti'riul, und ti^i rr^ulf^; mwh
to philoBophi/J.? alxntt, hut no phil«moj*ljy,

§ 11. The diwuHHion up t*» tin** p»*int tius jiffrib-
uted to poetry very dHinifi1 intrUi-rfual fiiilur^

Philosophy In that IK*VCTl.hl'l**HH d«» tiot f*«tU"(tttUti* phi-

Poetry, Th»

World-View, loHopliy* Wait WhitUUlIl HjH'ukH hirt

Omar Khty- . . » , t t •

yam. leeling with truth,, hut in gnu'rul tnum-

fests no compr(*l«*nHivo iimtght*

not only sincerity of cxpn*HHioij Inil mt

ing mind. He haa n ku<»wlo«lp» in*! *»iity of

ticular experiencoH, but «f Iniiiuii* iiiilutr; nnti a

consciousness full tuul varied liki* HiH»i<«ty iu<«lf.

But there Is a kind of knmvit'tijyp* jwnHm^wd hy

neither, the kuowledgct tkntght hy rcNinHfmtiit|{ nil

aspects of human (jxjx'rwwr1, U»th pnrtirulitr uitil

general Not ovon 8hiktwj«.!»itf** in wiw» IIH mn»

who, having seen the wholu, «m»

interpret a part But though the |

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 37

* •

may not yet be found, we cannot longer be ignorant
of his nature. He will be, like all poets, one who
appreciates experiences or finds things good, and
he will faithfully reproduce the values which he
discovers. But he must justify himself in view
of the fundamental nature of the universe. The
values which he apprehends must be harmonious,
and so far above the plurality of goods as to trans-
cend and unify them. The philosopher-poet will
find reality as a whole to be something that accred-
its the order of values in his inner life. He will
not only find certain things* to be most worthy
objects of action or contemplation, but he will see
why they are worthy, because he will have con-
strued the judgment of the universe in their
favor.

In this general sense, Omar Khayyam is a phi-
losopher-poet. To be sure his universe is quite the
opposite of that which most poets conceive, and is
perhaps profoundly antagonistic to the very spirit
of poetry ; but it is none the less true that the joys
to which Omar invites us are such as his universe
prescribes for human life.

"Some for the Glories of This World; and some
Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;
Ah, take the Cash., and let the Credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum."

38 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

• •

Herein is both poetry and philosophy, allx'it hut
a poor brand of each. We are invited to oeeupy
ourselves only with spiritual rash, because the?
universe is spiritually insolvent. The immedi-
ately gratifying feelings arc the only filings that
the world can guarantee. Omar Klwyyam i« a
philosopher-poet, because Im immediate delight in
"youth's sweet-scented manuscript " in part of a
consciousness that vaguely Been, though it cannot
grasp, "this sorry scheme of things entire."11

" Drink for you know not whcnr<» yon com<», m»r why ;
Drink for you know 1u>t why you go, iwr \vhrnv**

§ 12. But the poet in hin world-view ordinarily
sees other than darkn<m Th<^ «am^ innn<<^ np!r
Wordsworth, itual ontorpriwo that Htmtaitw religi*H$H
faith leads the poet more often to find tho universe
positively congenial to his idenlg, and to idealn in
general. He interprets human exj?eriem»e in tho
light of the spirituality of all the world. It IK to
Wordsworth that we of the prenent age, are ehiefly
indebted for such, imagery, and it will profit «H
to consider somewhat caref\illy tho philomiphicnl
quality of his poetry.

Walter Pater, in introducing hi« appreciation
of Wordsworth, writes that 4C an intimate con-

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 39

* *

sciousness of the expression of natural things,

which weighs, listens, penetrates, where the earlier
mind passed roughly by, is a large element in the
complexion of modern poetry." We recognize at
once the truth of this characterization as applied
to Wordsworth. But there is something more dis-
tinguished about this poet's sensibility even than
its extreme fineness and delicacy ; a quality that is
suggested, though not made explicit, by Shelley's
allusion to Wordsworth's experience as " a sort of
thought in sense." Nature possessed for him not
merely enjoyable and desc^ibable characters of
great variety and minuteness, but an immediately
apprehended unity and meaning. It would be a
great mistake to construe this meaning in sense
as analogous to the crude symbolism of the educa-
tor Froebel, to whom, as he said, " the world of
crystals proclaimed, in distinct and univocal terms,
the laws of human life." Wordsworth did not
attach ideas to sense, but regarded sense itself as
a communication of truth. We readily call to
mind his unique capacity for apprehending the
characteristic flavor of a certain place in a certain
moment of time, the individuality of a situation.
Now in such moments he felt that he was receiving
intelligences, none the less direct and significant

40 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

• *
for their inarticulate form. Like the boy on

Windermere, whom he himself describes,

"while he hung

Loitering, a gentle shock of mild surprise
Has carried far into his heart the voice
Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
Would enter unawares into his mind,
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received
Into the bosom of the steady lake."

For our purpose it is essential that we should
recognize in this appreciation of nature, expressed
in almost every poem that Wordsworth wrote, a
consciousness respecting the fundamental nature
of the world. Conversation, as we know, de-
notes an interchange of commensurable meanings.
Whatever the code may be, whether words or the
most subtle form of suggestion, communication is
impossible without community of nature. Hence,
in believing himself to be holding converse with
the so-called physical world, Wordsworth conceives
that world as fundamentally like himself. He
finds the most profound thing in all the world to
be the universal spiritual life. In nature this life
manifests itself most directly, clothed in its own
proper dignity and peace. But it may be discov-
ered in the humanity that is most close to nature,
in the avocations of plain and simple people, and

101003

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 41

* »

the unsophisticated delights of children ; and, with
the perspcet ive of contemplation, even " among the
multitudes of that huge4, city/'

So Wordsworth is rendering a true account of
his own experience of reality when, art in ** The
Prelude,11 he nayn im

** A grnrlourt «pirit <>'<«r thin oiirih pn»Hi<li»HT
Ami in ilu* h<»«rt of inun ; inviHthly
It <HMn<*M in workH of tuiri'pr<nf<Ml
And t«»n<l4*m*y ta'iiign; dir<*rfin
Who can* iw\.t know not, think not, what thry do,*'

Wonlnworth is not a plnlosoj-ihf«r-j>w*t IHVJUISO hy
WMirchinp hin {.>»go8 we1 ran*iin<i an <*xptirit philo--
Hophioal <^r< *(.'d such an this, but hmiuso all flu* joys
of which Ins jxw»t-soul conijH»ls him to ning linvt* their
jMKitiliar note, and compose, their jjeculiar harmony,
hy virtue of such an indwelling consciousness, Here
in on<» who 5s a philosopher in and through his
jxu'fry. He is a philosopher in HO fur an the detail
of his appreciation finds fundamental justification
in a world-view. From the immanence of ** the
universal heart** there* follows, not. through any
mediate reasoning, but by the immediate experi-
ence of its propriety, a conception of that which
is of supreme worth in life. The highest and ln*«t
of which life is capable 5s contemplation, or the
of fh« univcrsid indwelling of God.

42 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Of those who fail to live thus fittingly in thr midst
of the divine life, Walter Pater speaks for Words-
worth as follows :

"To higher or lower ends they move too of ton with Home-
thing of a sad countenance, with hurried and ignoble gait,
becoming, unconsciously, something like thornH, in their
anxiety to bear grapes; it being possible for people, in tho.
pursuit of even great ends, to become thomHolvoH thin
and impoverished in spirit and temper, thus diminwh-
ing the sum of perfection in thcs world at its very
sources."3

The quiet and worshipful spirit, won hy the eulti-
vation of the emotions appropriate to the proxenen
of nature and society, is the mark of the, eomplet-
est life and the most acceptable nervier. Than for
Wordsworth the meaning of life in inwparuhln
from the meaning of tho universe. In apprehend-
ing that which is good and kuuitiful in human
experience, he was attended by a vinion of tho
totality of things. Herein ho \\m had to-do, if
not with the form, at any rate with tho very Hub-
stance of philosophy.

§ 13. Unquestionably the supremo philosopher-

poet is Dante. He is not only philosophical in tho

Dant«. temper of his mind, but 1m groatent

poem is the incarnation of a definite HyHtcni of

8 Appreciation®! p* 51),

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 43

* •

philosophy, the most definite that the* world has
seen. That conception of the world which in flic*
thirteenth century formd argumentative, and or-
derly cxpreHsion in the u Sumnia Theologize " of
Thomas of Aquino, and constituted the faith of
the church, i« visualized by Dante, and made the
basis of an interpretation of life.

The "Divina Connnedia " deals with all the
heavens to tho Empyrean itself, and with all spirit-
ual life to tho very presence of God. It derives

its imagery from the cosmology of the day, its

*
dramatic, motive from the (liristian and Greek

conceptions of God and his dealings with the
world. Sin is punished because of the justice* of
God; knowledge, virtue, and faith lead, through
God's grace and mercy manifested in Christ, to a
perpetual union with Him. Hell, purgatory, and
paradise give place and setting to the events of
the drama. But the* deeper meaning of the jioem
is allegorical* In a letter quoted by Lowell^ Ditnto
writes:

11 The literal subject of the whole work in the ntatc of the
Houl after death, mmply eonmdcred. But if the work !w
taken allegoricnlly the mibject in man, AH by merit or tie-
merit, through freedom of th« will, he rondor* hintMclf
liable to tho reward or ptmi«hment erf junticfl,"*

4 Latter to Can Grande, Boo Ix^walFi? K*aay m Dant®> p, 3-1 ,

44 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

In other words, the inner ami essential moaning
of the poem has to do not with external ivt.rilwtion,
but with character, and the laws which determine
its own proper ruin or jjerfedion. The punish-
ments described in the " Infonio " «n» m vomits of
the state of guilt itself, implications of t-lio will
that has chosen the part of hrnt.i.shnoss. Sin itself
is damnable and doadcning, hut fh<* knowledge
that the soul that ainncth shall dm in tlw first way
of emancipation from Bin. Tin* gmdnw<* of Virgil
through hell and purgatory HigmfwH tin1 knowI<Mlgc»
of good and evil, or moral insight, an fin* gui<fo
of man through this life! of utruggln and pr<»gn«.sj4.
The earthly paradise, at the done* of tlu» " Purga-
torio,?? represents the higliowt ntato to whirh human
character can attain when choice in <lt*t<*rmino<i hy
ordinary experience, intelligonoo, and nn<li*r,stan«l-
ing. Here man stands alone, c»ndcnwl with an
enlightened conscience. Hero an» nttownl tin* lant
words of Virgil to Dante, the explorer of tlw npir-
itual country:

"Expect no more or word or sign from me. Ftwt up-
right, and sane is thine own frws will, and it would i*»
wrong not to act according to ittt pleatfuro; wherefore thee
over thyself I crown and mitre/11

8 Purgatorio, Canto XXVIL Translation by Norton,

POETRY AND PIHUKSOPHV 4f>

» »

Pmt moral self-relianee is not the last word. As
Beatrix***, the* image of tenderness ami holiness,
<*omes to Dante in the earthly paradise, ami lewis
him from the summit, of purgatory Into the heaven
of heavens, and even to the eternal light; so there
is added to the*, mere human, Intellectual, and
moral resources of the soul, the sustaining ]»mvor
of the divine grace, the illuminating power of
divine truth, and the transforming jx*wer of divine
love* Through the aid of this higher wisdom, the
journey of life becomes the way to (}o<l. Thus
the allegorical truth of the*" Divina (Vmtmedui . "
IB not merely an analysis of the moral nature of
man, but the revelation of a universal spiritual
order, manifesting itself in the moral evolution
of the individual,, and above all In his ultimate
community with the eternal goodness.

"Thou HhouldHt not, if I. deem aright, wonder more* at
thy awent, than at a stream if from a high mountain it
(kw^iulrt to the bam*. A tuarv<»l it would In* iu th«.sc, if,
deprived of hindraiu't^ thou luwlst wit Iwlow, ev^n AM
quiet by living fire in earth would IKV*'®

Suehj in brief, is Dante's world-view, HO «ugg«»Htiv<»
of the freer idealiHtic eoxuM^jtionH of lator thought

as to justify a r<n»ent (*harucU^rixaticni of him «H
one who, u accepting witlumt ti shadow of u doubt

w, Ciuito I.

46 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

or hesitation all the conatitutivf1 itira* of in<vli»>val
thought and life, grasped thorn so firmly and #«vo
them such luminous exprcHHion that, tho spirit in
them broke away from tho form." T

But it must be added, an in tho easo of Words-
worth, that Dante Is a pluUmophor -jHH't not be-
cause St. Thomas Aquinas upjwarrt and Hjw»aks with
authority in the Thirteenth Canto of flu* ** Puru-
diso," nor even because u philcmoplucul <Wtrino
can be consistently formulated from hi« writing,
but because his consciouancwH of lift* in informed
with a sense of its tiniveraal Iwarmp*. Thoro JH
a famous passage in th« Tweiity-wrciwl <funt»> of
the "Paradiso/? in which I)ant« iicwriln'H hiniwlf
as looking down upon the earth from the starry
heaven.

'"Thou art so near the ultimate nalvutitm,' twgutt Mi«n-
trice, 'that thou oughtest to liavw thine uyen diwr itnd
sharp. And therefore ere thou further eutorwtt it, lauk
back downward, and sec how great a world I haw airtmtly
set beneath thy feet, in order that thy hutirt, «o far AM it
is able, may present itself joyous to thci trtuinphiiut crowd
which comes glad through this round ether/ With my
sight I returned through each and all tha mvm Hphiwm,
and ^aw this globe such that I amiM at it» nw»im am-
biance; and that counsel I approve an tho Iml which
holds it of least account; and ho who think* of otlwr
things maybe called truly worthy/'

7 Edward Caird, in his Literature and PMtoepfty, Vol. 1, p> 24,

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 47

* *

T)anto\s nealo of valurn in that whirl i appears from
the 8 tarry hoavon. II IB austere* piety, his invin-
e.ible courage t and Inn uiieoinproini.sing hatred of
wrong, are neither aeeidentn of temj>enunent nor
blind reactions, hut eompone tin* proper ehnruetvr
of one who has both Been tin1 world from (iod,
and returned to WM* (!od from tlu* world. He was,
as .Lowell lian 8aid, 4i a. man of gotnun who cotild
hold h<*artbrt»ak at buy f<^r twenty y<»ars, and woultl
not lot hiinsolf die* fill lu» had done hln tank " ;
and. his }H>w<»r wan not olwtinary, but a vi.sion of
tho ways of (5o<L Mi* kn<*w a truth that juHtilH'd
him In bin HacrifnM'H, and niudt* a gn*ni glory of
hirt <l<»f<'nt and <vxilc\ Kv<*n KO bin jMH»try or up-
of HiV in th<» rxpn^niotj «»f an inward

{i<jn of th<* world in its unity or t»Hsoiu*t».
It IB but an <*laliora!ion of fin* pi<*fy which h<*
attrJbntoH to th<» l<*Hm»r Hitintn of paradiw*, when h<*

nay :

"Nay, it iKOHmnitud to thin hltwtwi t^inioiir** to hohl our-
ctt within the1* tliviim will, wl«*r*»l*y <«ir vrry willn ar«
inns. Ht> that iw w<t arc* from Htagi^ to Hta|(i^ through-
out this rcmhn, to all tl«^ realm i« pk*iwiugf IIH t«> tl«*
who iuwilln UH with If in will. AIM! lti$ will in our
it in that mm wfw*r<nuito i« moving &U that which It cr
and which uuturo mttku«.M|

*/*aratii«0, Ciiiita II I.

48 THE APPROACH Tn PHILOSOPHY

§14. There now remaiin the brief f-s-k of tU^-
languishing the philosopher- pnH from th»* philo.m»*

between ouo wjlo having iinuii* th*' phil«H<*phii«al

Poetry and '

Philosophy. point of view his oWII, exprv-WH himself

in the form of poetry. The pltiloHnpluru! pnni
of view is that from \vht<*h the univfrw is c*(»nipnv
bended in its totality, Th« wiwlnm <*f thr philos-
opher is the knowledges <if «»iw»h through tho knowl-
edge of all. Wherein, then, tlwn t!n» jKH»t, when
possessed, of such wisdom, differ from flu* philoso-
pher proper? To thitf quention <*IM* nui givt* n«u*l-
ily enough the gtuierul ausw(*rT th«t tlu* tlifTiTi-nep
lies in the mode of utterance. FuHhi»rttum% we
have already given some ammut of th<» jH»rtiIi$ir
manner of the poet lie invite* tin to exiH^rietic'e
with him the beautiful and moving in mtturt? ami
life. That which the point ha« tt> i'Xprt'HH, nutl
that which he aims to arouse in othera, in an appr<*-
ciative experience, Ho reqturon what Wortln-
worth calls " an atmosphere of Henimtmn in whieh
to move his wings.?? Therefore if he w to IH*
philosophical in intelligence, and yet etwnt tally n
poet, he must find his universal truth in iimnwitatu
experience. He must be one who, in seeing tint
many, sees the one. The philosopher-poet in hu

POETRY AM) PHILOSOPHY 49

who visualizes a fundamental interpretation of flu*
•world, *4 A poem/* nays one* poet, " is the very
imago of life expressed in if.s eternal truth/1
The philosopher proper, on the other hand, has

the nterner and lens inviting tusk of rendering such
an interpretation articulate lo thought. That,
whi<*h iho pn<»t 8(M»,Ht the philosnpher must dtviine.
That whirh the poet divines, the philasophor ninst
ealeulate, Th«» philos<»pher must. <Ug for that
which the J»oet neen nlumng through. AH the j>oi't
lH fh< Might for tfie nuke of experience, the
er muni traitHeeml e^perieiu%e for the nuke
of thought, AH the poet noen nil, and all In each,
HO the philosopher, knowing each, tmiHt. think all
eonHiHtentlv together,, and then know etieh again.
It in the part, of philoHophy to eotleet and criticise
evidenee, to fortnuhilo and euordinnfe coiH*eplioiwf
aiul llnntlv to define- in exact termn, The ream-
inntion <sf the* structure <»f thought in ncctji
primarily in religion, whieh in it. general
ception of tlu* world nutdet the HIIHIH of daily
living*

For religion there* in no wihjiK'tivo oorn»hitiv^
IC*HH than life itnelf. F*icstry t« anofher and i«tir<5
ci-rcuiiiHcrilHH! niennn of ri*Htt^rSng thought to lifr%
By th« jKH!tf» iiiitigiiiiitioijj tind through tht$ art <§f

50 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Ms expression, thought m«y l«* sensuously per-
ceived. " If the time should wrr <'<iim«," naya
Wordsworth, " when what in now rail*1*! Science*,
thus familiarized to .men, shall lw ready to put on,
as it werCj a form of flesh and blood, tin* IWt will
lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration,
and will welcome the Being thus pnnlneed, us a
dear and genuine inmate of tin* h«wsehoM of
man."9 As respoctH truth, philosophy bus an in-
dubitable priority. The very HternnenH of the phi-
losopher's task is due to IUH supn*nie <lrtiH*»tion <*»
truth. But if validity te the merit of philosophy t
it can well bo supplemente<l by ininu'diaey, whieh
is the merit of ]x>etry. PrcmupjKim* in the pn-t
conviction of a sound philosophy* and we may nay
with Shelley, of his handiwork, that ** It in the JHT-
feet and consummate surfaea and bloom of all
things; it is as the odor and the color of the row
to the texture of the elements whieh eomjHww if,
as the form and splendor of unfadod lxmutvy to the
secrets of anatomy and corruption/* ** Indeed/*
as he adds, " what were our comtolatkmH on thin
side of the grave — and our aspiration* beyoml it—
if poetry did not ascend to bring light ami fint

8 Observations prefixed to the (second edition til Lyrfat
Ballads.

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY . 51

ft£j

from those eternal regions where the owl-
faculty of calculation dare not ever soar ? " 10

The unity in outlook, attended by differences of
method and form, -which may exist between poet
and philosopher, is signally illustrated by the rela-
tion between Goethe and Spinoza. What Goethe
saw and felt, Spinoza proved and defined. The
universal and eternal substance was to Spinoza, as
philosopher, a theorem, and to Goethe, as poet, a
perception and an emotion. Goethe writes to
Jacobi that when philosophy " lays itself out for
division," he cannot get on* with it, but when it
" confirms our original feeling as though we were
one with nature/' it is welcome to him. In the
same letter Goethe expresses his appreciation of
Spinoza as the complement of his own nature:

"His all-reconciling peace contrasted with my all-agita-
ting endeavor; his intellectual method was the opposite
counterpart of my poetic way of feeling and expressing
myself; and even the inflexible regularity of his logical
procedure, which might be considered ill-adapted to moral
subjects, made me his most passionate scholar and bis
devoted adherent. Mind and heart, understanding and
sense, were drawn together with an inevitable elective
affinity, and this at the same time produced an intimate
union between individuals of the most different types."11

10 A Defence of Poetry.

11 Quoted by Caird in his Literature and Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 60

52 THE APPROACH TO nill.oSnHIY

It appears, then, that some poets *h:w» wtfh all
philosophers that point «»f view fn»m \vhieh flu*
horizon line, is the boundary of alt the world.
Poetry is not always nr e^enimlly jihiltNe.phieal,

but may he so; and when tlu» jK*etir iiiiagiiuitinu
restores philosophy to innnrtlim\v, Intntun experi-
ence reaches its most oxalt<Ml sfnte, except ing unly
religion its(3lf? whcreiti (u«l in ln»th ne^i nrnl nl^i
served. Nor in t.h« part uf philimupiiy in poetry
and religion either igiiuhh.*. or pr«*Hump!nmw, fi*rf
humanly speaking, u the owl-wing*'*! faculty «-»f enl-
dilation " is tho only nafe and mir*'1 ineaiw of amvw
to that place on liigh,

"Where th<» nightin^ftlc doth slug
Not a Hc*nH<i'l<>HK> trittic^U tttiit^,
But a divmo meltKiiouH truth;
Philosophic
Tales and golden

• Of heaven and it«

CHAPTEE III

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE '

§ 15. THE least religious experience is so mys-
terious and so complex that a moderate degree of
The possibmty reflection upon it tends to a sense of

of Defining

Religion. intellectual impotence. " If I speak,"
says Emerson, " I define and confine, and am less."
One would gladly set down religion among the un-
speakable things and avoid the imputation of de-
grading it. It is certain that the enterprise of
defining religion is at present in disrepute. It has
been undertaken so often and so unsuccessfully that
contemporary students for the most part prefer
to supply a list of historical definitions of religion,
and let their variety demonstrate their futility.
Metaphysicians and psychologists agree that in
view of the differences of creed, ritual, organiza-
tion, conduct, and temperament that have been true
of different religions in different times and places,
one may as well abandon the idea that there is a

constant element.

• 53

54 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY g

But on the other hand wo have the testimony
afforded by the name religion; and the ordinary
judgments of men to the effect that if; signifies
something to be religious, and to he more or 1ms
religious. There is an elementary logical prin-
ciple to the effect that a group name* implies cer-
tain common group characters. Impatience with
abstract or euphemistic definitions .should not blind
us to the truth. Even the psychologist, tends in
his description of religious phenomena to single out
and emphasize what he calls a typical religious ex-
perience. And the sa'mc applies to the idealist's
treatment of the matter.1 Religion, he reasons,
is essentially a development of which (lie true
meaning can be seen only in the higher Hfngen.
The primitive religion is therefore only implicit
religion. But lower stages cannot lw regarded an
belonging to a single development with higher
stages, if there bo not some actual promise of the
later in the earlier, or some element which omlurcm
throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to immune
that in dealing with religion wo are dealing with
a specific and definable experience,

§ 16. The profitableneaB of undertaking «urh ft
definition is another matter. It. may well be that

1 Cf. Caird: The Evolution of Religion, Lectors II, HI.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 55

%
•»

in so human and practical an affair as religion,
definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is then1!
The Profit- n°k a bunian anc' practical value in the,
abi«n«Mof Vf,ry cJ0ifm{Hg of religion? IB there not
Ee%ion. ^ demand for it in tho peculiar rela-
tion that; exists between religion and tho process
of enlightenment 4 Religion associates Itadf with
the hahitn of society. The progress of enlighten-
ment means that more or less all the time, and very
profoundly at certain critical times, society must
change its habits, The consequence in that religion
is likely to IK* abandoned witlt the old habits. Tho
need of a new religion is therefore a chronic one.
The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes
to he both enlightened and religious, is chiefly oc-
cupied with the problem of disentangling religion
pure and. undented from definite discredited prac-
ticort and opinions. And the solution of tho prob-
lem turns upon some apprehension of the cmftoneo
of religion. There is a large amount of necessary
and unnecessary tragedy duo to tho extrinsic con-
nection: between ideas and certain modes of their
expression. There can be no more soriouft and
urgent duty than that of expressing as directly,
ami HO as truly na possible,^ the great {wrmummt
human emce.nts* The. wcm to whom educational

56 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

« *

reform has been largely due have been the men
who have remembered for their fellows what this
whole business of education is after all for. Co-
menius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
educational activity of its historical and institu-
tional accessories, and laying bare the genuine
human need that these are designed to satisfy.
There is a similar virtue in the insistent attempt
to distinguish between the essential and the acces-
sory in religion.

§17. Although declining to be discouraged by
the conspicuousness of. past failures in this connec-
Tbe Tme tion> one ^ay ^11 P^fit by them. The
amazing complexity of religious phe-
nomena must somehow be seen to be con-
sistent with their common nature. The religious
experience must not only be found, but must also
be reconciled with " the varieties of religious ex-
perience." The inadequacy of the well-known
definitions of religion may be attributed to several
causes. The commonest fallacy is to define relig-
ion in terms of a religion. My definition of re-
ligion must include my brother's religion, even
though he live on the other side of the globe, and
my ancestor's religion, in spite of his prehistoric
remoteness. Error may easily arise through the

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 57

attempt to define religion in terms of my own re-
ligion, or what I conceive to ho the true religion.
Whatever the relation between ideal religion and
actual religion, the fiold of religion contains by
common consent cultB that imiHt. on their own
grounds condemn one another; religions that are
had religions, nn<l yet religions.

A more enlightened fallacy, and a more danger-
OUB one, is due to the supposition that religion <;an
he defined exclusively in terms of Borne department
of human nature. There have*, lx»en descriptions
of religion in terms of foeli?ig, intellect,, and con-
duet respectively. But it is always easy to over-
throw such a description, by raising the question
of its application to evidently religious experiences
that belong to some, other aspect of life. Religion
in not feeling, Itemise there, aro many phlegmatic^
God- fearing men whose religion consists m good
works. Religion is not conduct, for there lire,
many mystics whoso very religion in withdrawal
from the field of action. Religion is not intellec-
tion, for no one has ever been able to formulate u
creed that is common to all religions. Yet with-
out a doubt ono must look for the essence of relig-
ion in human nature. The present psychological
Interest in religion HUB emphaamnl this truth*

58 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

How, then, may we describe it in terms of certain
constant conditions of human life, and yet o«eape
the abstractness of the facultative method 'i Mod-
ern psychology suggests an answer in demon-
strating the interdependence of knowledge?, feeling
and volition.2 The perfect case of this unity is
belief. The believing experience in cognitive m
intent, but practical arid emotional as well in con-
tent. I believe what I take for granted ; and the
object of my belief is not merely known, but alao
felt and acted upon. What I believe r.*rpn,ww,s
itself in my total experience.

There is some hope, then, of an adequate defi-
nition of the religious experience, if it bo regarded
as belonging to the psychological typo of belief/*
Belief, however, is a broader category than relig-
ion. There must be some religious type of believ-
ing. An account of religion in terms of believing,
and the particular type of it here in question,
would, then, constitute the central stem of a psy-
chology of religion, and affords the proper concep-
tions for a description of the religious experience).
Even here the reservation must be made that belief
is always more than the believing $tate, in that it

2Cf. Leuba: Introduction to a Psychological Study of Ktlig*
ion, Monist, Vol. XI, p. 195.
3 CL Leuba: Ibid.

% THE RELIGIOUS EXPKttlKNCE 59

means to be true.4 Hence to complete an account
of religion ono nhoitld consider its ohject, or its
cognitive hnplicutionH. Hut this direct treatment
of the relation between religion and philosophy
must be deferred until in the, prenent chapter wo
.shall have come to appreciate the inwardness of
the religious connciousmm To thi« end we must
permit oursolvos to be enlightened by the experi-
ence of religion** people an viewed from within,.
It in not our opinion of a man's religion that i«
here in question, but the content and moaning
which it has for him.

"I would have you," aaya Finding, in h'w n Heart « of
Men/' "go and knec*l Ixmido the Mahomtnodun an hu
prayn at the 8unw»t hour, and put your heart to hin iint!
wait for the echo that will surely come. * . . I.
would havft you go to the hillman Hmoaring the Htonu
with buttor that hi« god may lx^ plo»H<*dr to the woman
crying to the*, forwt god for h<»r aick rhild, to the boy
before \m monkn learning to be good. No matter where.
you go, no matter what the faith i« called, if you havo
tho hearing ear, if your heart in in uninon with th« heart
of the world, you will hear always the name «tmg."*

§ 18. The general identification of religion with
belief is mudo without serious difficulty. The;
essential factor in belief , i% a$ we, httvo

seen, the reaction of the whole porson-

* Of, | ». * P. 322,

60 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

ality to a fixed object or accepted situation. A
similar principle underlies common judgments
about a man's religion. lie is accounted most re-
ligious whose religion penetrates his life most inti-
mately. In the man whose religion coiwiHte in the?
outer exercise of attendance upon church, we* rec-
ognize the sham. He appears to he religion**.
He does one of the things which a religions man
would do; but an object of religious faith is not
the constant environment of his life. He may or
may not feel sure of God from his pow, hut God
is not among the things that count in his daily
life. God does not enter into his calculations or
determine his scale of values. Again, discursive
thinking is regarded as an interruption of religion*
When I am at pains to justify my religion, I am
already doubting; and for common opinion doubt
is identical with irreligion. In so far as I am
religious, my religion stands in no need of justifi-
cation, even though I regard it as justifiable. In
my religious experience I am taking something for
granted; in other words I act about it and fwJ
about it in a manner that is going to be determined
by the special conditions of my mood and tem-
perament. The mechanical and prosaic man ac-
knowledges God in his mechanical and prosaic

THE RELIGIOUS KXPKRIENTK 61

way. lie believes in divine retribution an lie
believes in commercial or .social retribution. Ho
is as careful to prepare for the next world as he
is to be respectable in tins. The ]K>ct, <:>n the other
hand, believes in God after the manner of his
genius* Though he worship God in spirit he may
conduct his life in an irregular manner peculiar
to himself. Difference of mood in the same in-
dividual may be judged by the same measure.
When God IB most real to him, brought home to
him most vividly, or consciously obeyed, in these
moments ho is most religious! When, on the other
hand, God in merely a name to him, and church
a routine, or when both are forgotten in the daily
occupations, he is leant religious. II is life on tho
whole* IB said to be religious in HO far an periods
of the second type arc subordinated to jwruuls of
the first type. Further well-known elements of
belief, corollaries of the above, are evidently pres-
ent in religion, A certain imtitjvry mnnhut con-
stant throughout an individual'** experience. Ho
cornea back to it as to a physical object in space,
And although religion is sporadically an oxclusive
and isolated affair, it tends strongly to bo nodal.
Tho religious object, or God, is a social object,
common to met and to my neighbor, and prcnup-

62 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

posed in our collective undertakings. This reduc-
tion of religion to the type of the believing state
should thus provide us with an answer to that old
and fundamental question concerning the relative
priority of faith and works* The test of the faith
is in the works, and the works are religious in BO
far as they are the expression of the faith. Re-
ligion is not the doing of anything nor the* feel-
ing of anything nor the thinking of anything,
but the reacting as a whole, in terms of all pos-
sible activities of human life, to some aecepled
situation.

§ 19. We may now face the more Interesting
but difficult question of the special character of
Religion as ^ligious belief. In spite of the fact

Di8UpofSitionor ttlat in tlie8e daJB tlic personality <>* God
Attitude. js Often regar(je<| ag a transient feature

of religion, that type of belief which throws most
light upon the religious experience is the belief in
persons. Our belief in persons consists in the
practical recognition of a more or less persistent
disposition toward ourselves. The outward be-
havior of our fellow-men is construed in terms of
the practical bearing of the attitude which it im-
plies. The extraordinary feature of such belief
is the disproportion between its vividness and the

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 63

direct evidence for it. Of this we are most aware
in connection with those personalities which we
regard as distinctly friendly or hostile to ourselves.
We are always more or less clearly in the presence
of our friends and enemies. Their well-wishing
or their ill-wishing haunts the scene of our living.
There is no more important constituent of what
the psychologists call our " general feeling tone.77
There are times when we are entirely possessed by
a state that is either exuberance in the presence of
those who love us,, or awkwardness and stupidity
in the presence of those whom we believe to sus-
pect and dislike us. The latter state may easily
become chronic. Many men live permanently in the
presence of an accusing audience. The inner life
which expresses itself in the words, " Everybody
hates me ! '7 is perhaps the most common form
of morbid self-consciousness. On the other hand,
buoyancy of spirits springs largely from a con-
stant faith in the good-will of one7s fellows. In
this case one is filled with a sense of security, and
is conscious of a sympathetic reinforcement that
adds to private joys and compensates for private
sorrows. And this sense of attitude is wonder-
fully discriminating. We can feel the presence of
a " great man/' a " formidable person/7 a superior

64 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

or inferior, one who is intoroslcsi or indiffrront to
our talk, and all the subtlest dogiws of approval
and disapproval.

A similar sensibility may quirkou us <*v<»n in
situations where no direct indivi<lual attitudes to
ourselves is implied. We? regard plums and com-
munities as congenial whcm we aro in .sympathy
with the prevailing pnrpo«oa or standards of value*.
We may feel ill at ca«o or thoroughly at hoinfi
in cities where we know no singles human soul.
Indeed, in a misanthrope like* Koussouu (and who
has not his Rousseau raoods!) tho men* absent of
social repression arouses a most intoxicating m»ns<»
of tunefulness and security. Nature ptavH tho
part of an indulgent parent who permits all Hortn
of personal liberties.

"The view of a fine country, a BUCCCHHIOII of ngnw*
able prospects, a free air, a good appetite, umi the* health
I gain by walking; the freedom of inng, mid tho diHturu^
from everything that can make mo rwoltoct tho <l<*-
pendence of my situation, conspire to frc1^ my mmlt mid
give boldness to my thoughts, throwing me, in a manner,
into the immensity of things, where 1 comlrina, ohoouc*,
and appropriate them to my fancy, without roitramt or
fear. I dispose of all nature as 1 please."*

§ 20. In such confidence or diBtnwt,
* Rousseau: Confasmonn, Book IV, p. 125.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE f>5

originally by the nodal environment, arid similarly
suggested by other surroundings of HIV, wo have
Religion «• ^lo kc\V *° ^lo religious conseiousiiess.

Belief in the r> i • i • .. • i t i * i . • .1

Ditpotltion of **U*' **' 1H now ^ixilf- *° a<*(* tlllit, III illi}

Envfron±!t, (>!IW' °f "'IW'"" th<W1 'ittitudcH an- COIl-

or Universe, <»<»riic»<l with tlui universal or supernatu-
ral rather than with present and normal human
relat.ionshipH. Rcligiotm r<»actionH arc " total ro-
aetions."

" To get at them/1 Hays William Jfumw, " you
go lK>!un<l tho forogroutui of oxintonn!! and n*acli <!owii
to tiuvt ctirioUB xenxc. o/ the whole rcxitlunt <*cwwo« d$ an
cvcrltixliny pr<wnccf intitnate or utien, t<»n*ibh» or
injC, lovable or odious, which in HOUH* d<*gn»e
poss<»ss<»s. HUH wise, o/ the world* K ywcRence, apjx»aling
an it doos to our pc.cniliar iiulividual tcmperaiu^nt, makes
tm fit her strenuous or careless, <l<kvout or hlaHphoinous,
gloomy <»r cxtiltant about Hfo. at larg<»; and our reaction,
involuntary am! inarticulate^ and often half uncoimciouH
as it in, is tlu1 com pie test of all our answers to the <|ueH-
tiou, *What is the character of this universe in which we
dwell?' '"

This rwidual r-nvironmrnt, or i'»rof<ntiuler realm
of tradition and nature*, may have* any degree of

•unity from ehaos to <»o,Hmo,H, For religion its nig-

7 William Juuuw: 77w* Kar»VftV# «/

p. 35, Tho italics nr« mine, I utti in tho prewnt chapter
unch*r conxtiint ohUgatMtn to Uuit w«»icl«rfuHy
and Htitiiulattng hook.

66 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

nificance lies in the idea of original and far-roach-
ing power rather than in the idea of totality. Hut
that which is at first only " beyond," IH pmctically
the same object as that which comes in the develop-
ment of thought to be conceived as the u world " or
the " universe." We may therefore tine I hem* latter
terms to indicate the object of religion, until the,
treatment of special instance** aha 11 define it more
precisely. Religion is, then, rnanV w/i.sr of I he
disposition of the universe to himself. We shall
expect to find, as in the social phenomena with
which we have just dealt, that the manifestation
of this sense consists in a general reaction appro-
priate to the disposition so attributed. He will be
fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident.* or
will habitually take precautions to be wife. Tim
ultimate nature of the world is here no specula-
tive problem. The savage who could feel some joy
at living in the universe would be 11101*0 raHgimm
than the sublimest dialectician. It i« in tho vivid-
ness of the sense of this presence that the <umt<»-
ness of religion consists. I am religion* in so fur
as the whole tone and temper of my living reflects
a belief as to what the universe thinks of nuch
as me.

§ 21. The examples that follow arts mdeeted

THE HELKHOUH EXPERIENCE f>7

because their differences in pernmml flavor serve
tc.) throw into relief their common re-

Religious

Bdi©^ ligious character. Theodore Parker, in

describing hiw own boyhood, writes as follows:

'* I ran hardly think without a shudder of the terrible
effect the doetrine of eternal damnation had on me.
'How many, many hours have 1 wept with terror as I
lay on my bed, till, between praying and weeping, sleep
gave* me repose. Hut before I wan nine years old thin
fear went away, and I saw clearer light in the goodness
of God. But for years, nay from seven till ten, I said
my prayers with much devotion, I think, and then con-
tinued to repeat, ' Lord, forgive my »Sns/ till sleep came
on mo."* *

Compare with thin Stcvenson'a (Christmas letter to
his mother, in which he nays:

" The whole necessary morality in kindness; and it
should spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doc-
trine! Faith. If you are nun* that <5od, in the long run,
means kindness by you, you should be happy; and if
happy, surely you should be kind.*'*

Hera is deatmy frowning and. destiny Bin 5 ling,
but in each CUHO BO real, BO prenent? as to be Imme-
diately responded to with luslploHH terror and with
grateftjl wttrm-hottrtodmms.

The author of the ** Imitatio Ohmti n R|K.tukrt
thus of the dally living of the t>hnstlan:

"Chadwifk; r/worfor* Parker, p. 18,
*Stov0u«cm: fatten. Vol. I, p. 221),

68 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

" The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to
the service of God should abound with eminent virtues
of all kinds, that he may be really the same person which
he is by outward appearance and profession. Indeed,
he ought not only to be the same, but much more, in his
inward disposition of soul; because he professes to serve
a God who sees the inward parts, a searcher of the heart
and reins, a God and Father of spirits: and therefore,
since we are always in His sight, we should be exceed-
ingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that may give
offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We
should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can,
imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness,
since we, as well as they, are always in His presence.
. . . And good men have always this notion of the
thing. For they depend upon God for the success of
all they do, even of their best and wisest undertakings." 10

Suck is to be the practical acknowledgment of God
in the routine of life. The more direct response
to this presence appears abundantly in St. Augus-
tine's conversation and reminiscence with God.

"How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my
deeds my words; or if not my words my will? But
Thou, 0 Lord, art good and merciful, and Thy right
hand had respect unto the profoundness of my death,
and removed from the bottom of my heart that abyss of
corruption. And this was the result, that I willed not to
do what I willed, and willed to do what thou willedst.
. . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be
wii&out the delights of trifles! And what at one time I

^Thomas & Kempis: Imitation of Christ, Chap. XIX.
by Stanhope, p. 44.

% THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 69

•»

feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For
Thou didst cast them away from me, Thou true and
highest sweetness. Thou didst cast them away, and
instead of them didst enter in Thyself — sweeter than
all pleasure, though not to flesh and blood; brighter
than all light, but more veiled than all mysteries; more
exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted in their
own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing
cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled
unto Thee my brightness, my riches, and my health,
the Lord my God."11

In these two passages we meet with religious con-
duct and with the supreme religious experience,
the direct worship of God. Jn each case the heart
of the matter is an individual's indubitable con-
viction of the world's favorable concern for him.
The deeper order of things constitutes the real and
the profoundly congenial community in which he
lives.

§ 22. Let us now apply this general account of
the religions experience to certain typical religions

icai phenomena: conversion; piety; and re-

Rciigious ligious instruments, symbolisms, and

Phenomena: & ' y }

Conversion, modes of conveyance. Although recent
study of the phenomenon of conversion has
brought to light a considerable amount of interest-

11 St. Augustine: Confessions, Book I, Chap. I. Transla-
tion in Schaff : Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. I, p. 129.

70 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

ing material, there is some danger of misconceiv-
ing its importance. The pyscholopy of conversion
is primarily the psychology of crisis <>r radical
alteration, rather than the? psychology of religion.
For the majority of religious men find women con-
version is an insignificant event, and in very many
cases it never occurs at all. Religion is moro
purely present where it is normal and monotonous.
But this phenomenon is ncverthelens highly Hig-

nificant in that religion and irreligion are placed
in close juxtaposition, and the, contribution of re™
ligion at its inception thereby emphasized. In
general it is found that eon verm on takes plnc<» <lur-
ing the period of adolescence. But this is the timo
of the most sudden expansion of t\m environment
of life; a time when there is the awakening e»m-
sciousness of many a new preacmcfl. Thin in some-
times expressed by saying that it Is n p<»ruul of
acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself
as over against its inheritance; the whole wit ing
of life sweeps into view. Some solution of the
life problem, some coming to terms with thn uni-
verse, is the normal issue of it- Religioim con-
version signifies, then, that in this fundamental
adjustment a man defines and accepts for hia lif«
a certain attitude on the part of the univorao* The

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 71

•

examples cited by the psychologists, as well as the
generalizations which they derive, bear out this
interpretation.

"General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army,
considers that the first vital step in saving outcasts con-
sists in making them feel that some decent human being
cares enough for them to take an interest in the question
whether they are to rise or sink." 12

The new state is here one of courage and hope
stimulated by the glow of friendly interest. The
convert is no longer " out in the cold." He is
told that the world wishes trim well, and this is
brought home to him through representations of the
tenderness of Christ, and through the direct min-
isterings of those who mediate it. But somehow
the convert must be persuaded to realize all this.
He must believe it before it can mean anything
to him. He is therefore urged to pray — a pro-
ceeding that is at first ridiculous to him, since
it involves taking for granted what he disbelieves.
But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar
to the object in this case that it can exist only
for one who already believes in it. The psychol-
ogists call this the element of " self -surrender."
To be converted a man must somehow suffer his

12 James: Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 203.

72 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

surroundings to put into him a new heart, which
may thereupon confirm its object. Such belief is
tremendously tenacioua because it so largely cre-
ates its own evidence. Once believe* that ** <Jod,
in the long run, means kimlnoHs by you," and you

are likely to stand by it to the end flu* more HO

in this ease because the external evidence either \vny
is to the average man so insufficient. Such n belief
as this is inspired in the convert, not, by reasoning,
but by all the powers of twggestion that perHmmlity
and social contagion can afford,

§ 23. The psychologies describe /"W.y »H a nenne
of unity. One fools after reading their accounts
piety. that they arcs too abstract, For them

are many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely
varying moods and atate«. Any state of rapt at-
tention is a state of unity, and this wcura in the
most secular and humdrum moments of life* Nor
does it help matters to say that in the ease* of relig-
ion this unity must have boon preceded by a atntu
of division; for we cannot properly ehuniefemct
any state of mind in terms of another state unless
the latter be retained in the former. And that,
which is characteristic of the religious w*twe of
unity would seem to be just such an overcoming of
difference. There is a recognition of two distinct

t THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 73

attitudes, which may be more or less in sympathy
with one another, but which are both present even
in their fullest harmony. Were I to be taken out
of myself so completely as to forget myself, I
should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from
which arises the peculiar exultation of religious
faith, a heightened experience of the same type
with the freedom and spontaneity that I experi-
ence in the presence of those with whom I feel
most in accord. The further graces and powers of
religion readily submit to a similar description.
My sense of positive sympathy expresses itself in an
attitude of well-wishing; living in an atmosphere
of kindness I instinctively endeavor to propagate
it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which
to a lesser degree is due to any sense of social
security; my power is that of one who works in
an environment that reenf orces him. I experience
the objective or even cosmical character of my en-
terprises. They have a momentum which makes
me their instrument rather than their perpetrator.
A paradoxical relation between religion and moral-
ity has always interested observers of custom and
history. Religion is apparently as capable of the
most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly
gentleness. Melding writes that,

74 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

" When religion is brought out or into daily lift* and unrd
as a guide or a weapon in tho world if. has no rffwt cither for
goodorevil. Its effect in simply in .strcrigf hening f hi* Iw.'urt,
in blinding the eyes, in deafening the eurrt. It in mi intru-
sive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or tr««bl«»H a HMU'H
powers. It is an impulsive force* wilding him headlong
down the path of emotion, whether thai path I«*nd to glory
or to infamy. It is a tremendous stimulant, that in ail." ls

Eeligion does not originate life purples <»r
their meaning, but stiniulateH them hy tin
means that works in all corporate and metal ac-
tivity. To work with the unm*rw* in tho most;
tremendous incentive that can apjH»al tu tho imli-
vidual will. ITonco in highly <»thi<*al roli^ioim tin*
power for good exceeds that of any othrr Hix*ial and
spiritual agency. Such rdigioti tiuikon pri^enf,
actual, and real^ that good on the whole winch the
individual otherwise tends to dlBthigmnh from
that which is good for him. In daily life the mor-
ally valid and the practically urgent are eommouiy
arrayed against one another; but the ethical relig-
ion makes the valid urgent.

§ 24, The instruments of religion aro legion,
and it is in order here only to mention certain
prominent cases in which their

Instruments,

symbolism, would seem to have direct rafereneft to

and Modes of

conveyance, the provocation and perpetuation of
,i8 Fielding: op, din p. 152.

% ^ THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 75

such a sense of attitude as we have been describing.
This is true in a general way of all symbolism.
There is no essential difference between the relig-
ious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind
us of human relationships. In both cases the per-
ceptual absence of will is compensated for by the
presence of some object associated with that will.
The function of this object is due to its power to
revive and perpetuate a certain special social at-
mosphere. But the most important vehicle of re-
ligion has always been personality. It is, after all,

to priests, prophets, and believers that religious
cults have owed their long life. The traits that
mark the prophet are both curious and sublime.
He is most remarkable for the confidence with
which he speaks for the universe. Whether it be
due to lack of a sense of humor or to a profound
conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose.
The power of such men is undoubtedly in their
suggestion of a force greater than they, whose de-
signs they bring directly and socially to the atten-
tion of men. The prophet in his prophesying is
indeed not altogether distinguished from God, and
it is through the mediation of a directly percep-
tible human attitude that a divine attitude gets
itself fixed in the imagination of the believer.

76 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY f •

What is true of the prophet in equally true of t.ho
preacher whose function it is not, to represent (}<><]
in his own person, but to depict hint with his
tongue. It is generally rew^ntzed that the
preacher is neither a moral isier nor u theologian.
But it is less perfectly understood that if. IH Ins
function to suggest the prosenoc of C.»nd. Urn
proper language is that of the*, imagination, and
the picture which he portrays Is that of a recipro-
cal social relationship between man and the Su-
preme Master of the situation of life, .He \vill not
define God or prove God, "but introduce 'Him and
talk about Him. And at the same time the asso-
ciation of prayer and worship with his sermon, and
the atmosphere created by tho meeting together of
a body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of
his suggestions of such a living prcwmw.

The conveyance of any single religious cult from
generation to generation affords a signal illustra-
tion of the importance in religion of the mwgni-
tion of attitude. Religions manage somehow to
survive any amount of transformation of creed
and ritual. It is not what la dono, or what IH
thought, that identifies the faith of the first rhri»-
tians with, that of the last, but a certain reckoning
with, the disposition of God, The succcmBtvo gun-

« THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 77

erations of Christians are introduced into the spirit-
ual world of their fathers, with its furnishing of
hopes and fears remaining substantially the same ;
and their Christianity consists in their continuing
to live in it with only a slight and gradual renova-
tion. To any given individual God is more or
less completely represented by his elders in the
faith in their exhortations and ministerings ; and
through them he fixes as the centre of his system
an image of God Ms accuser or redeemer.

§ 25. The complete verification of this interpre-
tation of the religious experience would require the
Historical application of it to the different histori-
Reiigion. cal cults. In general the examination
Religions. of such instances is entirely beyond the
scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration
may be given to those which seem to afford reason-
able grounds for objection.

Eirst, it may be said that in primitive religions,
notably in f etichism, tabooism, and totemism, there
is no recognition of a cosmical unity. It is quite
evident that there is no conception of a universe.
But it is equally evident that the natural and his-
torical environment in its generality has a very
specific practical significance for the primitive
believer. It is often said with truth that these

!| 78 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ^ *

earliest religions are more profoundly pantheist io
than polytheistic. Man rccognizoH un all-porvad-
ing interest that is capable of b<»ing <lini<»to<l to
himself. The selection of a dt'Ity in not duo to

i any special qualification for deification pojWHBcnl

i by the individual object itself, but to the tiu'it pre-

sumption that, as Thales said, *% all thingH art* full
of gods." The disposition of rosidual rtnilily mani-
fests to the believer no consistency or unity, but it

1 is nevertheless the most constant object, of Inn wilt

,'! He lives in the midst of a eaprieiouHneHH which ho

| must appease if he is to establish himrtolf at all.

; § 26. Secondly, in the ease of ftwldhixm we arc

Buddhism, said to meet with a religion that i« <m-
j sentially atheistic,

jj "Whether Buddhas arise, 0 priest*, or whether

; Buddhas do not arise, it remains a fact arul Urn fixed

and necessary constitution of being, that all Ita con-
I stituents are transitory."14

The secret of life lies in the application of thitt

1 truth: .

( 5 "0 builder 1 I've discovered theoJ

This fabric thou ahalt ne*er rebuild I
Thy rafters all are broken mow,
And pointed roof demolished lies!
This mind has demolition reached,
And seen the last of all deairei " u

14 Warren; Buddhism in Translation^ p. 14.
16 Ibid., p. 83.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 79

•

The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents
of his purely esoteric doctrine, helong to the re-
flective type which will presently be given special
consideration. But with the ordinary believer,
even where an extraneous but almost inevitable
polytheism is least in evidence, the religious ex-
perience consists in substantially the same elements
that appear in theistic religions. The individual
is here living appropriately to the ultimate nature
of things, with the ceaseless periods of time in full
view. That which is brought home to him is the
illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken
in the spirit of active endeavor. The only pro-
found and abiding good is nothingness. While
nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana
invites him to its peace. The religious course
of his life consists in the use of such means as
can win him this end. From the stand-point of
the universe he has the sympathy only of that
wisdom whose essence is self-destruction. And
this truth is mediated by the imagination of
divine sympathy, for the Blessed One remains
as the perpetual incarnation of his own blessed-
ness.

§ 27. Finally there remains the consideration of
the bearing of this interpretation upon the more

THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

refined and disciplined relipioiw. Th<« religion

of the critically enlightened man is less naive

and crcdulourt in its imagery. (Sod

Critical

Religion. tcuds to vanish into mi ideal <»r u uni-
versal, Into some object of theorcticsi! defini-
tion. Here wo are on that borderland where an
assignment of individual C«HCH can never ho
made with any certainty of correelmm, We
can generalize only by describing tin4 eunditionrt
that such cases xmwt fulfil if flH'V «r*' prop-
erly to be denominated riillgioiiH. And th«*r^ <§au
be no question of tlio juatirf of deriving Huc'h
a description from the rqwtn of hirttoriral and in-
stitutional religioiw. An id^ulintic phil*»Hi»phy
will, therij be a religion ju«t in HO fur HH it in r«»n-
dered practically vivid by the imagination. Sw»h
imagination must create and Hnntain it mx*inl rela-
tionship. The question of the legitimacy of thin
imagination is another matter. It riiiac^ tlu* IHHMO
concerning the judgment of truth iuipluHl in re-
ligion, and this is the topic of the next chapter.
At any rate the religious exjKarumce may tw real-
ized by virtue of the metaphorical or poetical n^
resentation of a situation as one of intercommuni-
cation between persons, where refloctivo definition
at the same time denies it The human worshipper

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 81

s"U-j>ply the personality of God from himself,
Inmself as from the divine stand-point.
"wJaa/tever faculty supplies this indispensable
quality of religion, he who defines God as
"txl-tixxiate goodness or the ultimate truth, has
yet worshipped Him. He begins to
only when such an ideal determines
^tnaiosphere of his daily living ; when he regards
i^oaxDGLaxience of such an ideal in nature and his-
SLS tlie object of his will ; and when he responds
px-esence in the spirit of his conduct and his

! CHAPTER IV

'1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EKLKHOH
i

I § 28. It has been maintained that religion in

i closely analogous to one's belief in tho diHjwmition

i Resume of toward one's sdf of men or communi-

; Psychology . .

of Religion, ties. In the case of religion this depo-
sition is attributed to the more or IOHH vagwly wm-

•[ ceived residual environment that is recognised an

,| ly*ng outside of the more familiar natural and

; social relations. After the rim of 8eu»mu* thin

^ residual environment tends to be conooivcnl its a

jj| unity which is ultimate or fundamental^ but for

•S the religious consciousness it is more commonly

I regarded as a general source of influence practically

\! worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like! nil

I belief, is vitally manifested, with such ttmphania

I upon action, feeling, or intellection m toiu|iuru-

| ment and mood may determine.

• | § 29. But if the psychology of baliof iff the

1 proper starting-point for a description of tho ru-

sj Religion ligious experience, it is none the ICBB

(| * Means to

; I be True. suggestive of the fact that religion, just

i-1 82

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 83

•*

because it is belief, is not wholly a matter for psy-
chology. For religion means to be true, and thus
submits itself to valuation as a case of knowledge.
The psychological study of religion is misleading
when accepted as a substitute for philosophical
criticism. The religious man takes his religion
not as a narcotic, but as an enlightenment. Its
subjective worth is due at any rate in part to the
supposition of its objective worth. As in any case
of insight, that which warms the heart must have
satisfied the mind. The religious experience pur-
ports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only
such happiness as increasing wisdom would con-
firm. And the charm of truth cannot survive its
truthfulness. Hence, though religion may be de-
scribed, it cannot be justified, from the stand-point
of therapeutics. Were such the case it would be
the real problem of religious leaders to find a drug
capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their
patient's experience.1 There would be no differ-
ence between priests and physicians who make a spe-
cialty of nervous diseases, except that the former
would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual

1 As Plato interprets the scepticism of Protagoras to mean
that one state of mind cannot be more true than another,
but only better or worse. Cf. Thecetetus, 167,

1 84 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

suggestion of serenity. Now no man wants to bc»
, even a blessed fool. He docs not want to dwell

\ constantly in a fictitious world, even if it he after

1 his own heart. Ho may from tho cynical point of

view actually do so, but if he bo roligiwu* he thinks
' it is reality? and is satisfied only in HO far an he*

' thinks so. He regards tho man who hurt mud in

his heart that there is no God as the fool, and not
f because he may have to suffer for itt but IK'CUUWJ

1 he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things

* Piety, on the other hand, ho regards as the wtaiulard

experience, the most voracious life, fleiu*ef it IH
>. not an accident that religion has had 5t« ereedn and

its controversies, its wars with science and its aj>-

(! peals to philosophy. The history of thcwo aiTairn

,'!'! shows that religion commonly fails to un<i(*rHt.aiuI

!'| the scope of its own demand for truth ; but they

;| have issued from the deep conviction thut one'n

' religion is, implicitly, at least, in tho field of truth ;

| that there are theoretical judgments whcmo truth

I , | would justify or contradict it

f This general fact being admitted, thwo remains

I the task to which the present discussion addresses

' \ itself, that of defining the kind of theoretical jwltj*

| ment implied in religion, and the relation to thin

• ' 1 . central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth,

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 85

theology, and ritual. It is impossible to separate
the stem and the efflorescence, or to determine the
precise spot at which destruction of the tissue
would prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to
obtain some idea of the relative vitality of the
parts.

§ 30. The difficulty of reaching a definite state-
ment in this matter is due to the fact that the truth
Religion in which any religious experience cen-
*res *s a practical and not a scientific
a Dis- truth. A practical truth does not com-
mit itself to anl sinSle scientific state-

quences May men+ an(j can often survive the over-

RationaHy *

be Expected, throw of that scientific statement in
which at any given time it has found expression.
In other words, an indefinite number of scientific
truths are compatible with a single practical truth.
An instance of this is the consistency with my ex-
pectation of the alternation of day and night, of
either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of
the solar system. Now expectation that the sun
will rise to-morrow is an excellent analogue of my
religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant
to the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is
overthrown until a central practical judgment is
discredited, and either could remain true through

g6 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

a very considerable alteration of logical definition;
but neither is on this account exempt from theoreti-
cal responsibility. In so far an religion deliber-
ately enters the field of science, and defines its
formularies with the historical or metaphysical
method, this difficulty does not, of course, exist.
Grant that the years of Methuselah's life, or the pre-
cise place and manner of the temptation of Jesus,
or the definition of Christ in the terms of the
Athanasian Creed, aro constitutive of < 'hrist.iamty,
and the survival of that religion will In* determined
by the solution of ordinary problems of historical
or metaphysical research* Hut the Christian will
very properly claim that his religion in only exter-
nally and accidentally related to such pro{Kwitioiwf
since they are never or very rarely intended in hi*
experience. As religious he is occupied with
Christ as his saviour or with (loci as hiB protector
and judge. The history of Jesus or tho meta-
physics of God essentially concern him only in no
;I far as they may or may not invalidate this rctlnf ion-

1 1 ship. He cares only for the power and dl«p0mtloii

I of the divine, and these are affected by history and

I metaphysics only in so far as ha has definitely put

J them to such proof.

' | For mJ religion is my sense of a practical nitua-

•! s

. RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 87

•

tion, and only when that has been proved to be
folly has my religion become untrue. My God is
my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My re-
ligion is overthrown if I am convinced that I have
misconceived the situation and mistaken what I
should do to be saved. The conception of God is
very simple practically, and very complex theo-
retically, a fact that confirms its practical genesis.
My conception of God contains an idea of my own
interests, an idea of the disposition of the universe
toward my interests, and some working plan for
the reconciliation of these tiSo terms. These three
elements form a practical unity, but each is capable
of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed
through the modification of any one of them. It
appears, then, as has always been somewhat vaguely
recognized, that the truth of religion is ethical
as well as metaphysical or scientific. My religion
will be altered by a change in my conception of
what constitutes my real interest, a change in my
conception of the fundamental causes of reality,
or a change in my conception of the manner in
which my will may or may not affect these causes.
God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always
a relation of entity to ideal : reality regarded from
the stand-point of its favordbleness or unfavorable-

gg THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

ness to human life, and prescribing for the latter
the propriety of a certain attitude.

§ 31. The range of historical examples la limit-
Historical less, but certain of these arc oftpwiully
ReuSousS°f calculated to emphasise the* application
Error. *** of a criterion to religion. Such in tho
ofhBfaeiHgi°n case with Elijah's encounter with the
prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testa-
ment.

"And Elijah came near unto all the people, and

How long halt ye between two opinions? If Yahweh

be God, follow him: but if Baal, then follow him. . . .

And call ye on the name of your god, and I will rail on

the name of Yahwch: and the God that an«weroth by

fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah mud unto t!w

prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for younwlvrH,

and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on the nam<*

of your god, but put no fire under. Ami they took the

bullock which was given them, and they drewwMl it, and

called on the name of Baal from morning ov«n until

noon, saying, 0 Baal, hear us. But there wai* no voice,

nor any that answered. . . . And it cunu* to pium

at noon, that Elijah mocked them, and said, C'ry aloud:

for he is a god; either he is musing, or he IB gone amdo,

or he is in a journey, or peradventure ho fdoeixsth, and

must be awaked. And they cried aloud, and cut them-

selves after their manner with knives and lanccfi, till the

blood gushed out upon them. . , . But there wan

neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that regarded/' a

2 Quoted with some omissions from / Kings, 18:21-29,

The Hebrew term Yahweh, the name of the national d<«ity,

has been substituted for the English translation, "the

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 89

The religion of the followers of Baal here con-
sists in a belief in the practical. virtue of a mode
of address and form of ritual associated with the
traditions and customs of a certain social group.
The prophets of this cult agree to regard the ex-
periment proposed by Elijah as a crucial test, and
that which is disproved from its failure is a plan
of action. These prophets relied upon the pres-
ence of a certain motivity, from which a defi-
nite response could be evoked by an appeal which
they were peculiarly able to make; but though
" they prophesied until the* time of the offering
of the evening oblation/' there was none that
regarded.

§ 32. An equally familiar and more instructive
example is the refutation of the Greek national
Greek religion by 'Lucretius. The conception

Religion. o£ jj£e ^j^ Lucretius finds unwar-
ranted is best depicted in Homer. There we hear
of a society composed of gods and men. Though
the gods, on the one hand, have their own history,
their affairs are never sharply sundered from those
of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly
reckon with them, gauge their attitude, and seek
their favor by paying tribute to their individual
humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of

90 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

the "Iliad/' Phoenix addressee himself to tho ro-
calcitrant Achilles as follows ;

"It fits not on<» that movra
The hearts of all, to live unmovM, aw! mtrror hn.tr* Cor

loves.
The Gods themselves are flexible; \vho«e virtues, honor*,

pow'rs,
Are more than thine, yet they will Iwnd their hren*t.M A*

we bend OUTS,

Perfumes, benign devotions, ftavorn of ofT**ringH burn'd,
And holy rites, the engines are with which their heart*

are turn'cl,
By men that pray to them.1' *

Here is a general recognition of that which
makes sacrifice rational. It in bocauw1 ho
this presupposition to bo mistaken^ that
declares the practices and fear» which ur<^ ft*un<l<»<!
upon it to be folly. It is the name with all that in
practically based upon the expectation <»f a lifo
"beyond the grave. The correction of tht* {»opulnr
religion is due in his opinion to that trmt vimv of
the world taught by Epicurua, whom* »u»i»ory
Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of tho Third
Book of the " De Eerum Natura " :

"Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darknaw
to raise on high so bright a beacon and riuwi a light on
the true interests of life, thee I follow, glory of th« (tre*nk
race, and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy
imprinted marks. . . „ For soon m thy philoftophy

5 Iliad, Book IX, lines 467 tg. Traiulation by Chupman.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 91

issuing from a godlike intellect has begun with loud
voice to proclaim the nature of things, the terrors of the
mind are dispelled, the walls of the world part asunder,
I see things in operation throughout the whole void: the
divinity of the gods is revealed and their tranquil abodes
which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with
rains nor snow congealed by sharp frost harms with
hoary fall: an ever cloudless ether o'er canopies them,
and they laugh with light shed largely round. Nature
too supplies all their wants and nothing ever impairs
their peace of mind. But on the other hand the Acheru-
sian quarters4 are nowhere to be seen, though earth is
no bar to all things being descried, which are in opera-
tion underneath our feet throughout the void." 5

In another passage, after ^describing the Phry-
gian worship of Oybele, he comments as follows :

" All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and
told, is yet widely removed from true reason. For the
nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy
immortality together with supreme repose, far removed
and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from
every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own
resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained
by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The earth
however is at all time without feeling, and because it
receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it
brings them forth in many ways into the light of the
sun."6

If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident

4 The supposed abode, of departed spirits.

5 Lucretius: De Rerum Natum, Book III, lines 1 sq. Trans-
lated by Munro.

6 Ibid., Book II, lines 644 sq.

THK Ai»PlH».\rH TH riltf.n^ril

*!' whn offiTfi W?i'"ml"» *»»!» '1"'

liov wiv fb'trlvv inifitfii'iNiT aiwr. *<r ^nsr

prfMtiKlril lit "thr niituiv ,-f ihinir--." TM <w f,,r
wlumi th«» w*»!N "f th»- w-rM hj«'l jmrn-l »iH,m.W,

HtH»h II prorrtlliri' WHH ijM lMnr»T J^v^iMr; flinngh

hi« might I'll"..*' !*« "rail fl;^ •'•'•)! \.-i.fnn.'M 11111!
r«'vrn-n*M- »!n» mr«h »** " in^ti^r -f Mir p,,l,,l% T

*5 MIL Th<* hi.^f^rv r-l r* lii'i"n r,-*ni>iu\'* rtu ni«»r«
}in|m^ivi« »n*l ilnwuiiii- .-h.^.trr fli.in fluit

n*nr«lH tl**' *li-vrl"»nii Hi »»f tin- ri

Mt, W, Ut»V»*»rt**n HtmlK'* i»»lit»irftMr nrmunt *»l Ihe

thin n4Iigi**ft tir.nt *"imrl> ilrtltint HH tnlml fwl
iniwHf HUUf'ii«-w»t >«v Yiihwrli.11 <*»»I|H inii'ri

» It WfiuW t»r iulrmilifiit «*• r-f.tnf^r^ thr r«|tit»Uv

rritiriu
.177 w/.
Mt,
Hrttttlir

«'

with tl^ nilwi «
|wt« hiM wi.n»
II Ki««*, 17 '
l»w

mrfi t.f

if Uw* kMHwtwlni* ••< Oi*l, ihnv »iw»v« fti^mi R |nnriir«
difif **f ihr Uw» *ti«l $*nni'»|4r« M! I tin n"v»'Wwlli |fl
, «ntl * wimm*ry *»si$»rw»»»n f»* r««»iit*«»» «"• » whote to
Hh* knowlwlK«» wwt fp»r »f Jfi*h«»*«h/ * ^ llw

» RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 93

in his chosen people determines the prosperity of
him who practises the social virtues.

" The name of Yahweh is a strong tower : the righteous
runneth into it, and is safe."

"He that is steadfast in righteousness shall attain
unto life."

"To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to
Yahweh than sacrifice." 9

But in time it is evident to the believer that
his experience does not bear out this expectation.
Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does he
prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, there-
fore, to distrust the virtue of his wisdom.

"Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as
light excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in
his head, and the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I
perceived that one event happeneth to them all. Then
said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so will it
happen even to me; and why was I then more wise?
Then I said in my heart, that this also was vanity. For
of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is no remem-
brance forever; seeing that in the days to come all will
have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise
man die even as the fool! So I hated life; because the
work that is wrought under the sun was grievous unto
me : for all is vanity and a striving after wind." 10

It is evident that he who expects the favor of for-

of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent obe-
dience." The Religion of the SemiteSj p. 23.

8 Proverbs, 18:10; 11:19; 21:3.

10 Eccksiastes^ 2 : 13 sq.

94 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 9 •

tune in return for his observance of precept is mis-
taken. The "work that is wrought under the
sun " makes no special provision for him during
his lifetime. Unless the cry of vanity is to be the
last word there must be a reinterpretation of the
promise of God. This appears in the new ideal
of patient submission, and the chastened faith that
expects only the love of God. And those whom
God loves He will not forsake. They will come to
their own, if not here, then beyond, according to
His inscrutable but unswerving plan.

"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken
and a contrite heart, 0 God, thou wilt not despise/'

" For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth
eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and
holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble
spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive
the heart of the contrite ones." u

In this faith Judaism merges into Christian-
ity.12 In the whole course of this evolution God
is regarded as the friend of his people, but his
people learn to find a new significance in his
friendship. That which is altered is the conduct
which that friendship requires and the expecta-

11 Psalms, 51:17; Isaiah, 57:15.

12 In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to
Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma, especially Chap-
ters I and IL

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 95

tion which it determines. The practical ideal
which the relationship sanctions, changes gradually
from that of prudence to that of goodness for its
own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to
human temporal welfare, has come to be an object
of disinterested service.

No such transformation as this was absolutely
realized during the period covered by the writings
of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been
realized in the development of Christianity. But
the evolution of both Judaism and Christianity
has taken this direction. The criterion of this
evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphys-
ical. A Christian avows that lie rates purity of
character above worldly proB{X)rity, BO that; the
former cannot properly bo prized for the sake
of the latter. Furthermore, ho shares more or
loss unconsciously such philosophical and scien-
tific opinions as deny truth to the conception of
special interferences and dispensations from a su-
pernatural agency. Therefore ho looks for no fire
from heaven to consume his sacrifice* But his
religion is nevertlwlcms a practical expectation.
lie believes that God is good, and that God loves
him and sustaiiiH him. Ho believes that there
obtains between himself, in so far as good, and the

TIIH APPKOACH To 1'HILosnPHy

vrrsp sirh .v/^v/V rft*rtiif*tti*\ a mil ';ytiip;»thy and
m*ipnw*tit m*iif*»twiii«'iiK I!»* l*'Ii<iws that ho
HHMUVS through ?h«» prnfuundly ]w»f*«nf fnnvs of
tho univi'rsr that \vhi«*h hr n^ar*!-* ;$, «finn-nf \v«irth;
and that ^Miwvvliaf i> ad<l*'ij t«> tlfi-^r furrrn hv vir-
tu<M»f Ins t'<'ivsi'<Tafi«'fi. "l^ir <5i»»i nf flu- < 'hristiaiw
<*atnu>t IK* <h'tnii'd ^It^rl nf ^nuir ^nrh «<'C4Uint us
this, iwluMvr «*f an idral, mi aftifudi-, attd 1111 i*xw
prctalion. I» <»fhiT wnni.H flu* (J«<d **f f|n« Chris-
tians is <<> !M( kfi«»wn «?ily in fi-riiH nf (hf Christ*

Hki* <iutl«»nk tipnii lifi«, in whir!} fln« tJtMriph* in

*
taught t*> I'liitilufr fhr itiHHfi-r, Whni moral and

oithor its sculr nf vulu**«, **r it* muviftinn flint
rvnits «rr in th*5 «*n«l ilrfi-rtuini-ii in no
with that wall* *«f vahtrn, iln'it ChrUtiun*
ity tnubt. t*ith<'r l«* friin^fMriiirtj, »«r («' uftfnutiili1 fur
tl«* WISP tiutii. If \vi« huvr rnurrivrd idr rMm*tu^
of CliriHtiniiity t**o Jirmullv **r viiy;u»dv, if tlm*H nut
inurJi ittnttrr f«»r <*ur prrwitl j«i»rj«wH, Itn t»s-
w*iu'«» int itt nny nili% i*«*tM*' »tirh iiiU'itrdtH*HH nf lifo
n«wtlv!i!g idnilifv ttmi rniUty int«* »»IM% iiml drnw-
ing UJK»U oliji^tivo iriiflt *«nly i*> fhr r\li»ii
fur th<* runfiriiiiii^ «*f Unit rrtHti*»ti,

I«<» t!n» at*|pitl$vif factor in r*'ti#ii*!t, with tlit* thi^i

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 97

The Cognitive that every religion centres in a practical

Factor in

Religion. Secret OI the Universe. I. O he T

7,s /o believe that a certain correlation of forces,
moral and factual, ?,s* In reality operative, and that
it determines the propriety and effectiveness of
a certain type of living. Whatever
the futility, vanity, or self-deception of this
discredits the religion. A nd, per contra, except as
they define or refute such practical truth, relic/ ion
is not essentially concerned with theoretical judg-

ments.

§ 35. But neither religion nor any other human
interest consists m essentials. Such u practical
The Place of conviction as that which has been de-

Imagination

in Religion. lined inevitahly llmvers into a marvel-
ous complexity, and taps for its nourishment every
spontaneity of human nature!. If it be said that
only the practical conviction is essential, this
is not the same as to say that all else is super-
lluous. There may bo no single utterance that my
religion could not have spared, and yet wore I to
be altogether dumb my religion would, indeed,
be aa nothing* For if 1 believe, I accept a pres-
ence in my world, which as I live will figure in
my dreams, #r in my thoughts, or in my habits.

98 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY % *

And each of these expressions of myself will have
a truth if it do but hear out my practical accept-
ance of that presence. The language of religion,
like that of daily life, is not the language of sci-
ence except it take it upon itself to he so. There
is scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily
intercourse with men which is not guilty of trans-
gressions against the canons of accurate and defi-
nite thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor
another, I am held to "be truthful, even though my
language deal with chance and accident, material
purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow
that the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair
into the sea. Science is a special interest in the
discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions, and
employs its terms with an unalterable connotation.
But no such algebra of thought is indispensable
to life or conversation, and its lack is no proof of
error. Such is the case also with that eminently
living affair, religion. I may if I choose, and I
will if my reasoning powers be at all awakened,
be a theologian. But theology, like science, is a
special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas, the
master theologian, did not glide unwittingly from
prayer into the qumiiones of the " Summa Theo-
' logise," but turned to them as to a f r^h adventure.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 99

Theology la inevitable, because humanly speaking
adventure is inevitable. For man, with his intel-
lectual spontaneity, every object is a problem ; and
did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation,
there would be good reason to believe that he did
not practically reckon with any. But this is simi-
larly and -independently true of the imagination,
the most familiar means with which man clothes
and vivilics his convictions, the exuberance with
which he plays about them and delights to confess
them. The imagination o£ religion, contributing
what Matthew Arnold called its " poetry and elo-
quence/7 does not submit itself to such canons as
arc binding upon theology or science, but exists
and flourishes in its own right.

The indtBpensableneHB to religion of the imagina-
tion is (hie to that faculty^ power of realizing what
is not perceptually present. Religion IB not inter-
ested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or
the transcendent universal. And yet thin interest
is a practical one. Imagination may introduce
one into the vivid presence of the secret or the
transcendent. It is evident that the religious im-
agination hero coineiden with poetry. For it is
at least one of the interests of poetry to cultivate
and satisfy a seme for the universal ; to obtain an

100 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY % •

immediate experience or appreciation that shall
have the vividness without the particularism of
ordinary perception. And where a poet elects so
to view the world, we allow him as a poet the
privilege, and judge him hy the standards to which
he submits himself. That upon which we pass
judgment is the fitness of his expression. This
expression is not, except in the case of the theo-
retical mystic, regarded as constituting the most
^ valid form of the idea, "but is appreciated expressly

* for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy.

The same sort of critical attitude is in order with
the fruits of the religious imagination. These
may or may not fulfil enough of the require-
ments of that art to be properly denominated
poetry ; but like poetry they are the translation of
j ' ideas into a specific language. They must not,

therefore, be judged as though they claimed to
* ' ' ' excel in point of validity, but only in point of con-

; , , sistency with the context of that language. And

; ' j the language of religion is the language of the

I ;/| practical life. Such translation is as essential to

i , (]< an idea that is to enter into the religious experi-

ence> as translation into terms of immediacy is
essential to an idea that is to enter into the appre-
ciative consciousness of the poet. IJo object can

RELIGION AND

•*

find a place in my religion until it is conjoined *V-
with my purposes and hopes ; until it is taken for
granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends,
or the courses of the stars, or the stretches of
the sea.

§ 86. The religious imagination, then, is to be
understood and justified as that which brings the
The special objects of religion within the range of
th«nR«H^ioui ^V^11S- r^l(' <*ttntral religious object, as

Imagination. jms J)mi m^ ;H m attUudti of tllO TO-

siduum or totality of things. To bo religious one
must have, a sense for tho presence of an attitude,
like his sense for the presence of his human fed-
lows, with all the added appreciation that in proper
in the case of an object that is unique in its mys-
tery or in its majesty. It follows that; the religious
imagination fulfils its function in so far as it pro-
vides the object of religion with properties similar
to those which lend vividness and reality to tho
normal social relations.

The presence of one's fellows is in part tho per-
ceptual experience of their bodies. To this there.
corresponds in religion some extraordinary or sub-
tle, appearance, Tho gods may in visions or
dreams be met with in their own proper embodi-
ments; or, as is more common, they may be re-

i 102 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

I »

! garded as present for practical purposes : in some

inanimate object, as in the case of the fetish ; in
some animal species, as in the case of the totem;

i in some place, as in the case of the shrine ; or even

in some human being, as in the case of the inspired
prophet and miracle worker. In more refined and
highly developed religions the medium of God's
presence is less specific. He is perceived with

" — a sense sublime

Of something far more deeply interfused,

f " Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

|f And the round ocean and the living air,

And the blue sky,«and in the mind of man."

God is here found in an interpretation of the com-
| mon and the natural, rather than in any individual

* ' and peculiar embodiment. And here the poet's

I appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indis-

1 1; pensable.

it But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of

^ "the household of man" in that he knows their

history. They belong to the temporal context of
T actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be

<;• historical. The sacred traditions or books of re-

f ) I * ligion are largely occupied with this history. The

! more individual and anthropomorphic the gods,

the more local and episodic will be the account of
their affairs* In the higher religions the acts of

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 103

God are few and momentous, such as creation or
special providence; or they are identical with the
events of nature and human history when these
are consirucd as divine. To find God in this lat-
ter way requires an interpretation of the course
of events in terms of some moral consistency, a
faith that sees some purpose in their evident des-
tination*

There is still another and a more significant
way in which men recognize one another: the way
of address and conversation. And men have in-
variably held a similar intercourse with their gods.
To this category belong communion and prayer,
with all their varieties of expression, T have no
god until I address him. This will he the most
direct evidence of what is at leant from my point
of view a social relation. There can be no general
definition of the form which this address will take.
There may be as many special languages, as many
attitudes, and an much playfulness and subtlety
of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on
the other hand, there are certain utterances that
are peculiarly appropriate to religion. In BO far
as he regards his object as endowed with both
power and goodness the worshipper will two the lan-
guage of adoration; and the sense of his depend-

104 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

ence will speak in terms of consecration and
thanksgiving.

"0 God, thou art my God; early will I ftook thw.
My soul thirsteth for the*, my flwh longolh for tho<%
In a dry and weary land, whore no water IH.
So have I looked upon tlu»c» in the sanctuary,
To see thy power and thy glory.
For thy loving-kindness is better than Hfo;
My lips shall praise thec."

These are expressions of a hopeful faith; 1mt?
on the other hand, God may be addresaotl in terms
of hatred and distrust.

"Who is most wretched in thin dolonwn placet
I think myself ; yet I would rather Iw %

My miserable self than He, than Ho
Who formed such creature?* to IUH own diHgnuM*.

" The vilest thing must be lews vil<» than Thou
From whom it had it« being, God and Lord!
Creator of all woe and Hint abhorred,
Malignant and implacable." xi

In either case there may be an indefinite degree
of hyperbole. The language of love and hate, of
confidence and despair, is not the language of de-
scription. In this train of the religious cotiBciouH-
ness there is occasion for whatever eloquence man
can feel, and whatever rhetorical luxuriance he
can utter.

13 James Thomson: The City of Dreadful Night, Quoted
by James, in Th& Will to Believe, etc., p. 45.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 1Q5

•>

$ »M7. Such considerations as those serve to ac-
count for the exercise and certain of the fruits of
The Relation the religious imagination, and to des-

between

imagination innate the general criterion governing

and Truth in

Religion. its propriety. But liow t.s one to deter-
mine Ike, boundary between the imaginative and
the cognitive? It is commonly agreed that what
religion nays and does is not all intended literally.
But when in expression of religion only poetry and
eloquence., and when is it matter of conviction?
If we revert again to the cognitive aspect of re-
ligion, it in evident that there is but one teat to
apply : whatever either fortifies or mislead-^ the will
i.$ literal conviction. This test cannot bo applied
absolutely, because it can properly he applied only
to the intention of an individual experience.
However I may express my religion, that which I
express, ia, we have seen, an expectation. The
degree to which I literally mean what I say is
then the degree to which it determines my expec-
tations. Whatever adds no item to these expecta-
tions, but only recognizes and. vitalizes them, is
pure imagination. But it follows that it ia en-
tirely impossible from direct inspection to define
any given expnmion of religious experience a«
myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth*

106 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

It submits to such distinctions only when viewed
from the stand-point of the eonorc.to religion* ex-
perience which it expresses. Any such given ex-
pression could easily be all imagination to one,
and all conviction to another. Consider the pas-
sage which follows :

"And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white*
horse, and he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True;
and in righteousness he doth judge and make war. And
his eyes are a flame of fire, and U[x>n hin head arc many
diadems; and he hath a name written, which no cmo
knoweth but he himself. And he in arrayed in a garment
sprinkled with blood : And his name in called The Word
of God/'14

Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report ?
There is evidently no answer to the quentiou BO
conceived. But if it were to express my own re-
ligious feeling it would have some Bpeeiile propor-
tion of literal and metaphorical significance, ac-
cording to the degree to which its detail contributes
different practical values to me- It might th«n bo
my guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony
to the dignity and mystery of the function of
Christ.

The development of religion bears in a vary im-
portant way upon this last problem, The factor

, 19:11-13,

% % RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 1Q7

of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a
more clearly recognized role in religion. There
can be no doubt that what we now call myths were
once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was
once history. If we go back sufficiently far we
come to a time when the literal and the meta-
phorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this
because science had not emerged from the early
animistic, extension of social relations Men
meant to address their gods as they addressed their
fellows, and expected them t<j hoar and respond, as
they looked for such reactions within the narrower
circle of ordinary intercourse. The advance of
science has brought into vogue a description of
nature that inhibits such expectations. The re-
sult has been that men, continuing to use the same
terms, essentially expressive as they are of a prac-
tical relationship, have come to regard them as
only a general expression of their attitude. The
differences of content that are in excess of factors
of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On
the other hand, it in equally possible, if not equally
common, for that which was once imagined to
coma to bo believed. Such a transformation is,
perhaps, normally the case when the inspired utter-
ance passes from its author to the cult. The

108 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY -

prophets and sweet singers are likoly to poasrss an

! exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their

followers; and for this reason ahnont, certainly

misunderstood. For theso ronsoiw it is nuvnifoHtly

• ' absurd to fasten the name of myth or tin* name of

; creed upon any religious utterance1! whatsoever,

unless it be so regarded from tho Htund-point of the

personal religion which it originally <-»xpro,ss<-»<l, or

unless one means by BO doing to <U»iim» it an an

1 expression of his own religion. H<» who defines*

"the myth of creation/7 or "the poetical story of

j, Samson," as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic ro-

i( ligion? exhibits a total loss of hiHtorienl sonso. Tim

> j distinction between cognition and fancy <lon« not

(j exist among objects, but only in the intending ex-

perience; hence, for me to attach my own
.tion to any individual case of belief, viewed apart
from the believer, is an utterly confusing projec-
tion of my own personality into the field of my
study.

§ 38. Only after such considerations as those
are we qualified to attack that much-vexed question

The PMioso- as to whether religion deals invariably

phy Implied */

inReiigioa with a personal god* It is often as-

and ia

Religion*. sumed in discussion of this question
that "personal god," as well as "j$od," is a (Ms-

* % RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY H)9

tinct and familiar kind of entity, like* a dragon or
centaur; its exintenee alone being problematical.
This is doubly fake to the religious employment
of such an object. If it be true that in religion
we mean by God a practical interpretation of the
world, whatsoever be its nature, then the ijcrsonul-
ity of God must be a derivative of the attitude, and
not of the nature of the world. Given the prac-
tical outlook upon life,, there is no definable world
that cannot be construed under the* form of God,

My god is my world practically recognised in re-

spect of its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my
ideals* In the sense, then, conveyed by this term
attiiudft tny god will invariably POBBOBB the char-
acters of personality. But the degree to which
those characters will coincide with the characters
which I assign to human persons, or the tonne of
any logical conception of personality, cannot be
absolutely defined. Anthropomorphisms may be
imagination or they may l>o literal conviction.
This will depend, m above maintained, upon the
degree to which they determine my expectations*
Suppose the world to be theoretically conceived as
governed by laws that are indifferent to all human
interests. The practical expression of this concep-
tion appears, in the naturalism of Lucretius^ or

HO THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY f "

Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the
vivid presence of an indifferent world, I may pict-
ure my gods as leading their own lives in Home
remote realm which is inaccessible to my pet i lions,
or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous
cruelty. In the latter ease 1 may shrink and
cower, or return them contempt for contempt, f
mean this literally only if I look for eonKet[ueneert
following directly from the emotional coloring
which I have bestowed upon them. It may well
be that I mean merely to regard my HO If #*/?> specif*
eternitatis, in which case I am penwnifyinf) in the
sense of free imagination. In the religion of en-
lightenment the divine attitude tends to l»elong to
the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to
its cognitive intent This in true even of opt .imiHtic
and idealistic religion. The love and providence
of God are less commonly supposed to warrant an
expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and
have come more and more to mean the play of my
own feeling about the general central conviction
of the f avorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or
moral concerns. But the factor of personality can-
not possibly be entirely eliminated, for the religious
consciousness creates a social relationship between
man and the universe. Such an interpretation of

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY HI

life is not a ease of the pathetic fallacy, unless it
incorrectly reckons with the inner feeling which it
attribute's to the universe, It is an obvious prac-
tical truth that the total or residual environment
IB significant, for life. Grunt this and you make
rational, a recognition of that significance, or a
more or less constant sonso of coincidence or eon-
ilict with cosmical forces. Permit this conscious-
ness to stand, and you make some expression of it
inevitable. Such an expression may, furthermore,
with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human
nature, set forth and transfigure this central belief
until it may enter into the context of immediacy.
Thus any conception of the universe whatso-
ever may afford a basin for religion. But there is
no religion that does not virtually make a more
definite claim upon the nature of things, and, this
entirely independently of its theology, or explicit
attempt to define itself. .Kvery religion, even in
the very living of it, in naturalistic, or dualistie,
or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessi-
mistic. And there is in the realm of truth that
which justifies or refutes these definite practical
ways of construing the universe. But no historical
religion is over BO vague even as this in its phil-
osophical implications. Indeed, wo shall always

112 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY f '

be brought eventually to the inner moaning of nomo
individual religious experience, whore no general
criticism can be certainly valid.

There is, then, a place in religion for that which
is not directly answerable to philosophieal or wi~
entific standards. But there IB always, on the
other hand, an element of hope which eowoivej*
the nature of the world, and means to be grounded
in reality. In respect of that element, philosophy
is indispensable to religion. The meaning of re-
ligion is, in fact, the central problem of plulonophy.
There is a virtue in religion like that whieh Emer-
son ascribes to poetry. " The poet in in the right
attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after
some struggle, having only reason** for believing.'9
But whatever may be said to the disparagement
of its dialectic, philosophy is the juHtilieation of
religion, and the criticism of religions* To it
must be assigned the task of so refining jxwitive
religion as to contribute to the perpetual establish-
ment of true religion. And to philosophy, with
religion, belongs the task of holding fast to the
idea of the universe. There is no religion except
before you begin, or after you have rested from,
your philosophical speculation, But in the uni-
verse these interests have a common object, As

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 113

philosophy is the, articulation and vindication of
religion, HO in religion the realization of philoso-
phy. In philosophy thought is brought up to the
elevation of life^ and in religion philosophy, as the
sum of wisdom, enters into life.

CHAPTER V

NATURAL SOIBNOB AND PHILOSOPHY

§ 39. In the case of natural Heionro \vo mwt
not only with a special human interest, hut with a
The True theoretical discipline. Wt» are e,mi-

Relations of

Philosophy fronted, therefore, with a new question:

and Science. . • t • i i i r

MisconcejH that of the relation withm the body ot

tions and An- , , r » » - . /. « .

O OT t\V<) «>f it

tagonisms.

stituent members. Owing to tho militauit t<»ni|Mtr
of the representatives of both 8cio«co and philoH-
ophy, this has long since ooaBod to Im an umdemic
question, and has frequently been mot in tlu^ spirit
of rivalry and partisanship. But tho truo ord<»r
of knowledge is only temporarily distorted by the
brilliant success of a special type of investigation ;
and the conquests of science are now BO old n story
that critical thought shows a disposition to judgo
of the issue with sobriety and logical highmindod**
ness.

In the seventeenth century a newly emancipated
and too sanguine reason proposed to know the

whole of nature at once in terms of mathematics!
114

% NATURAL HTIKNCK AND PHILOSOPHY 115

and mechanics. Thus the system of the. English-
man Ilohhes was science swelled to world-propor-
tions, simple, compact, conclusive., and all-compre-
hensive. Philosophy projnwd to do the work of
Ht'ience, hut in its -own grand manner. The1 last
twenty yearn of Hohlws's life, HjK.'nt in repeated
discomfiture at flu* hands of Keih Ward, Wall in,
"Boyle, and oilier H«»5entiiic experts of tin* new
Koynl Soci4»ty, certified C(»nchisively to the failure
of this enf(*rpriH<% and tin* experimental HjK'eialiHt
thereupon t<»ok exeluhiv<» posrteHHiou <»f the.1 field of
natural law. But the idealist, on the other hand,
reconstructed nature- to meet the dttinaiulrt of phil-
osophicul knowledge and religious fuitlu Tlu»rc
isHiied, together with little mutual understanding
and lens Hvinpnthy, on the OHO hand jHwilivitwi, or
<»xchisiv<^ t'XiHTiuu^ituIiHin, and on tho other lunui
a ruhi<l « nd unHyinpathoti^ truuHcowle.ntaliHM.
^ who <*onHigned to tlui flnnu.^ all thought
** ulwtrju't rouHunin^ <'ou<H^niiii|? quantity or
ami " iiXjM*rinujntal roamming cont^orn-
iwg niattor of fact un<I oxiHttmcc fl ; Comttt, who
DLHHtgtiiHl m^tttphyKt<*H to an ttnuuituro ntago in the
development of human intelligencti ; and Tywlull,
who rcduitiid thct religioun cotiHeiouHncHR to an emo-
tional experience of tnyatery, are typical of the one

116 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

attitude. The other is well oxhihitrd in Srholl-
ing's reference to " the blind and thoughtless modo
of investigating nature which has bwnne generally
established since the corruption of philosophy by
Bacon, and of physics by Boyhv" Dogmatic <*x-
perimentalism and dogmatic idealism signify more
or less consistently the abstract; isolation of the
scientific and philosophical motives.

There is already a touch of quaint-ness in both
of these attitudes. We of the present an* in the
habit of acknowledging the autonomy of science,
and the unimpeachable validity of the results of
experimental research in BO far- as they are sanc-
tioned by the consensus of experts. But at the
same time we recognise the delmiteneBs of the. task
of science, and the validity of such reservations as
may be made from a higher critical point of view,
Science is to be transcended in so far as it is under-
stood as a whole. Philosophy is critically empiri-
cal ; empirical, because it regards all boifia fide de-
scriptions of experience as knowledge; critical,
because attentive to the conditions of both general
and special knowledge. And in terms of a critical
empiricism so defined, it is one of the problems
of philosophy to define and appraise the generating
problem of science, and so to determine the value

« NATURAL iSC'lKNVK AND PHILOSOPHY J jj

assignable to natural laws in the \vhoki system of
knowledge,

§ •!(). If thin IK* the true function of philosophy
with refrn-nee to srirnee, several current notions
Th« sphcrts of of flu* relations of the, uplwres of these

Philosophy . '

*mi Sdtnc*. mseipnnert niHY IH» disproved. In th<5

firnt pia<*<», phMoHophy will not In* all tlm .scifnu^ss
rrpinh'd an <m«* H("ii»nr(*. Hricjicr tc^nds to unify
without, any hiph*kr <*ritirJHin. Tin* vnrloua aci-
CIU*C\H nlrnuly n*gnr<l flu* on<» nature as th<*ir com-
mon olyt'H, antl flu* om» nyrttcin of intrnlopoiulont
IJUVH an llu'ir <*onunnn nrlufvrnH^nt. The* philoBo-
plu'r who tri<'rt to.hl* all ncionco at otu*(% fuiln igno-
u^ntiHf* In* frirrt to rt*phiw the work of
with tlit* work of a tUlottanto; and if
y h<» ulonfiVal with that l«»dy of truth
and organi^*d by tho cofipprativo nr»
tivily of m*i<*iitiiir mvi\f tl»*» philonophy in ft nauio
und then* IK no <x*c»iiHion for the oxi«U»neo of tho
philoKophor im «ucli. Bc^ondly, philosophy will
not, bo the atwtnhlJng of the Heienaos; for such
would he a merely c*h>riral work, and tho philoso-
pher would mweh heater In* regarded a« non-cxiHtont
than at* n lKink-kfO|w»r. Nor, thirdly, i» philosophy
an auxiliary diseipline that, may bo called upon in
amerpncies for the solution of some baffling proh-

118 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

lem of science. A problem defined by aeienco
must be solved in the scientific, manner. Science
will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in
her own campaign, but will fight it out according
to her own principles of warfare. And a« long
as science moves in her own piano, «he. can acknowl-
edge no permanent harriers. Thorn is then no need
of any superscicmtifie research that shall replace,
or piece together, or extend the \vork of Heience*
But the savant is not on this account in possession
of the entire field of knowledge. It JH true that
he is not infrequently moved to swh a conviction
when he takes MB about to view him estates.
Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our
beds in sheol, or take the wings of the morning
and dwell in the uttermost parts of the ana— -ami
look in vain for anything that in not work done,
or work projected, by natural science*. Persuade
him, however, to define his estates, and lie, has cir-
cumscribed them. In his definition ho mn»t em-
ploy conceptions more fundamental than the work-
ing conceptions that he employs within hk Sold
of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as definite
and specific he has undertaken the solution of tho
problem of philosophy. The logical self-conscious-
ness has been awakened, and there is no honorable
/ r

* NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY H9

way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
what takes place in any account of the generating
problem of science. To define science is to define
at least one realm that is other than science, the
realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own
proper categories. One cannot reflect upon sci-
ence and assign it an end, and a method proper
to that end, without bringing into the field of
knowledge a broader field of experience than the
field proper to science, broader at any rate by the
presence in it of the scientific activity itself.

Here, then, is the field* proper to philosophy.
The scientist qua* scientist is intent upon his own
determinate enterprise. The philosopher comes
into being as one who is interested in observing
what it is that the scientist is so intently doing.
In taking this interest he has accepted as a field
for investigation that which he would designate
as the totality of interests or the inclusive experi-
ence. He can carry out his intention of defining
the scientific attitude only by standing outside it,
and determining it by means of nothing less than
an exhaustive searching out of all attitudes. Phi-
losophy is, to be sure, itself a definite activity and
an attitude, but an attitude required by definition
to be conscious of itself, and, if you please, con-

120 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

scions of its own eonH<*iousn«w, until if 8 attitude
shall have embraced in ifn ohjrrt fh<* vory prin-
]! ciple of attitudes. Philosophy drfiwH itwlf and

1 1 all other human taska and intnvsts. Xono have*

I, furnished a clearer justification of philosophy thun

1' those men of Beicntifle pn»<.lilocti<tnH who havo

^ claimed the title of agn<wt.icH. A gw«l instnnw* in

f I

| furnished l>y a contemporary physiriKt, \vhi>

Jj chosen to call hia reflations " aiHiiwfaphyHio

1 "Physical science does not pretend to lx> a

! view of the world; it simply dainw that it in working

toward such a complete yiew in the fuiuw. Tin* hig;hortt
philosophy of tho scientific investigator in |>twi«*Iy thin
toleration of an incomplete conception of th« worW and
the preference for it, rather than mi apparently iwrfeH,
but inadequate conception**'1

It is apparent that if one wore to clmllcmgo
such a statement, tho issue raiaod would at <m<*o
be philosophical and not sciontific. Tho prohlont
here stated and answered, t^qmrcia for its HO!U-
tion the widest inclusivenosB of view, and a po-
culiar interest in critical reflection an<l logical
coordination.

§ 41. One may be prepared for a knowledge of

* Ernst Mach: Science of Mee&anwa, Translation by MrCbr-
mack, p. 464. No one baa miide more important eontrtbu-
tions than Professor Mach to a certain definite modern
philosophical movement. Of, | 207,

^NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 121

the economic and social significance of the railway
The Procedure even if one does not know a throttle

of a Philoso-

phy of Science, irom a piston-rod, provided one has
broad and well-balanced knowledge of the inter-
play of human social interests. One's proficiency
here requires one to stand off from society, and to
obtain a perspective that shall be as little distorted
as possible. The reflection of the philosopher of
science requires a similar quality of perspective.
All knowledges, together with the knowing of them,
must be his object yonder, standing apart in its
wholeness and symmetry. Philosophy is the least
dogmatic, the most empirical, of all disciplines,
since it is the only investigation that can permit
itself to be forgetful of nothing.

But the most comprehensive view may be the
most distorted and false. The true order of knowl-
edge is the difficult task of logical analysis, requir-
ing as its chief essential some determination of
the scope of the working conceptions of the differ-
ent independent branches of knowledge. In the
case of natural science this would mean an exam-
ination of the method and results characteristic of
this field, for the sake of defining the kind of
truth which attaches to the laws which are being
gradually formulated. But one must immediately

122 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY „

reach either the one or the other of two very gen-
eral conclusions. If the laws of natural Heicneo
cover all possible knowledge of reality, then thore
is left to philosophy only the logical function of
justifying this statement. Logic and natural .sci-
ence will then constitute tho Bum of knowledge,
If, on the other hand, it be found that tho. aim of
natural science is Biieh an to oxdudo certain as-
pects of reality, then philosophy will not bn ro-
stricted to logical criticism, but will have a cog-
nitive field of its own. Tho groat majority of
philosophers have assumed the* lattor of thrso alter-
natives to bo true, while moat fcggrcsHivo wnontiHts
have intended the former in their somwvhat blind
attacks upon " metaphysics*" Although tho so-
lection of either of those nlternativoB involves UB
in the defence of a specific answer to a philosophi-
cal question, the issue is inevitable in any intro-
duction to philosophy because of its bearing upon
the extent of the field of that study. Further-
more there can be no better exposition of the mean-
ing of philosophy of science than an illustration
of its exercise. The following, then? is to bo re-
garded as on the one hand a tentative refutation
of positivism, or the claim of natural science to be
coextensive with JcnowaUe reality,; and on tho

, N ATI' HA I* HC1KNCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123
%

other hand n programme fnr flu* pr*Kvdnn' of phi-
losophy with tvfVtvnn' to natural wii'i^v.

$ 4 it. S«*i«'WM» isnwH fhr«>ugh imperceptible
fr*»w **rpuur huhifn and in*fin<*ts which

The Origin nf signify fill* jM»!4s«»H,Htu!l hj living <T(»llt-

th« Sett fiilflc

UITH nf a }'K>wi*r to iiH'H fln» onviron-

poa-

inni thr lir^i Krirnn* oonnistrt in fhow hit hit-
ual adjuHhnrnfH rc^uinon to turn and mfru-hunian

(jrpuuMniH, Man IH «ln*a«ly pri
Ix'foro hf n'rognixivH if* AH *i/**/// il
itwlf early in hip 'hintory from lnn;t. or
tratUtiou, Skill in fnmiUn'rity with general kinds
of evenly together with iihilify to identify an in-
dividual with reference to u kind, and HO IK* pro
pared for the outcome, T'htm xmm IB inwardly
prepared for the iflfernafioti of day an«l night, and
thci {Miriods of the Htm*cmH. 1I« practically antici**'
pate« thci i>rcKH«Hi*i<in of natural events in the count-
IOH« emc*rg!*rK'Ie« of IUH daily life. But science in
th« «trict<ir mnw l^ginft whim skill becomes free
and mciaL

§ 43. Skill may bo »aid to bo free when the es-
sential terniM of the action have been abstracted
from the circtitnstaneas attonding them in Individ-

124 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

nal experiences, and are retained as ideal plans ap-
SkuiasFree. plieixble to any pnu.'hVal oeeasion. The
monkey who swings with a trapeze fn»iu his porch
on the side of the cage, counts upw swinging hack
again without any further effort cm his mvn part.
His act and its successful issuo Hignify his practi-
cal familiarity with the natural tnoti<ms of bodies.
We can conceive such a performance to IN* neeom-
panied by an. almost entire failure* to grasp its es-
sentials. It would then be noerflsnry for nearly
the whole situation to be repeated, in order to Induce
in the monkey tho saifio action and expectation.
He would require a similar fof m, color, and dm-
tance. But he might, on the other hand* regard
as practically identical all suspended and freely
swinging bodies capable of affording him Htipport,
and quite independently of their Hha{x% HIJSC, time,
or place. In this latter ease Ira ftkili wcnild lw
applicable to the widest possible number of oaacft
I; that could present themselves. Having a ilintwrn-

ing eye for essentials, he would lose no ehanco of
a swing through looking for more than tho bare
necessities. When the physicist describes the pen-
dulum in terms of a forarala such as t=s29r<\/$?
he exhibits a similar discernment. He has found
that the time occupied by an oscillation of any pen-

* .NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 125

dulum niay be calculated exclusively in terms of its
length and the acceleration due to gravity. The
monkey's higher proficiency and the formula alike
represent a knowledge that is free in the sense that
it is contained in terms that require no single fixed
context in immediacy. The knowledge is valid
wherever these essential terms are present; and
calculations may "be based upon these essential
terms, while attendant circumstances vary ad infi-
nitum. Such knowledge is said to be general or
universal. 9

There is another element of freedom, however,

• 7 *

which so far has not been attributed to the monkey's
knowledge, but which is evidently present in that
of the physicist. The former has a practical
ability to deal with a pendulum when he sees it.
The latter, on the other hand, knows about a pen-
dulum whether one be present or not. His knowl-
edge is so retained as always to be available, even
though it be not always applicable. His knowl-
edge is not merely skill in treating a situation, but
the possession of resources which he may employ
at whatever time, and in whatever manner, may
suit his interests. Knowing what he does about
the pendulum, he may act from the idea of such
a contrivance, and with the aid of it construct

126 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

some more complex mechanism. 1 1 is formulas arc
his instruments, which he may use on any nreasion.
Suppose that a situation with factors ti9 l>9 and r
requires factor d in order to become At. a.s desired.
Such a situation might easily lm hopc'loss for an
organism reacting directly to the stimulus fj/>r, and
yet be easily met by a free knowledge nf r/. One
who knows that I, m, and n will produce */, may by
these means provide the iniHBuig factor, complete
the sum of required conditions, «6n/, and so obtain
the end I/. Such indirection might IK* used to
obtain any required factor of ^ I he end, or of any
near or remote means to the end, There is, in
fact, no limit to the complexity of action made
possible upon this basis; for sineo it is available,
in idea, the whole range of such knowledge may
be brought to bear upon any individual problem*
§ 44. But knowledge of this free* type becomes
at the same time social or institutionaL It con-
skin as social, sists no longer in a skilful adaptation
of the individual organism, but in a system of
terms common to all intelligcmco, and preserved
in those books and other monuincnta which serve
as the articulate memory of the race. A knowl-
edge that is social must be composed of uncquivo-
I cal conceptions and fixed symbols, «. The nmtUe-

. NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 127

•

matical laws of the exact sciences represent the
most successful attainment of this end so far as
form is concerned. Furthermore, the amount of
knowledge may now be increased from generation
to generation through the service of those who make
a vocation of its pursuit. Natural science is thus
a cumulative racial proficiency, which any indi-
vidual may bring to bear upon any emergency of
his life.

§ 45. Such proficiency as science affords is in
every ease the anticipation of experience. This
Science for nas a twofold value for mankind, that

Accommoda- Q£ accommodaiion an(J that of COILStrUC-
turn and Con- • '

struction. i{onm Primitively, where mere survival
is the function of the organism as a whole, the
value of accommodation is relatively fundamental.
The knowledge of what may be expected enables
the organism to save itself by means of its own
counter-arrangement of natural processes. Con-
struction is here for the sake of accommodation.
But with the growth of civilization construction
becomes a positive interest, and man tends to save
himself for definite ends. Accommodation comes
to take place for the sake of construction. Science
then supplies the individual with the ways and
means wherewith to execute life purposes which

128 THE APPROACH TO PIIILO8OPHY ,

themselves tend to assume an absolute value that
cannot be justified merely on the ground of xeienee.
§48. If natural science be animated by any
special cognitive interest, thin motive should ap-
pear in the development of itn method

Conceptions &nd fundamental conceptions. If that

interest haw been truly defined, it should
110W cna^° m t° understand the. pro-
Method. grcasivo and permanent. in scientific in-
vestigation as directly related to it. For the aim
of any discipline exercises a gradual selection from
among possible method*, and gives to its laws their
determinate and final form, * f

The descriptive method is at the present day
fully established. A leading moral of the history
of science is the superior usefulness of an exact
account of the workings of nature to nn explana-
tion in terms of some qualitative potency* Expla-
nation has "been, postponed by enlightened Bcienca
until after a more careful observation of actual
processes shall have been made; and at length it
has been admitted that there is no need of any

explanation but perfect description* Now tho

»
practical use of science defined above, requires no

knowledge beyond the actual order of events. For
such a purpose sufficient reason signifies only suffi-

* NATrilAL SC'IBNVE AND PHILOSOPHY 129

oiont condition*. All oth<»r con^iderationa are ir-
relevant, and it in proper to ipior<» them. Such
haH actually tarn the fate of the so-called meta-
phy.sienl Holution of H peri a I problems of nature,
The* cant* of Kepler in the clannic instance. This
groat Hciontist Hupjilrniontcd hi« laws of planetary
nu»tion with th<» following Hpaculation concerning
tht» agf»nci(*H at work;

*f W«* mtwt mippow* otu* of two thingn : either that the
moving Hpiritn, in proportion m thay are moro removed
from tlw wits, an* nion* ftH»hlo; or that thoro is one moving
npirit in thi» nmtrt* of all the* arbitnr namely, in th<s sun,
whic^h urgt*« (»arh body th« mom vehemently in propor-
tion. EH it. in ni*nn*r ; but in more* distant spacer languishoB in
cotiwqitonco of tho romot^notw and attenuation of its
virtue,1*1

Th<> following paHnago from Hegel affords an

intoroHting antilogy:

moon in the watwkwi oryotal which seeks to
complete itnolf by mfann of our Baa? to quench the thirst

of iU arid rigidity, and therefore produces ebb arid
flow.111

'No aciontiBt lum ever Rotight to refute either of
thcso thoorica. They Imvo merely been neglected.

1 Whewdl: Hittory o/ the Inductive Sdmemt Vol. I, p. 289*

Quoted from Kapktr. Mynteriwn C&srn&graphicum*

1 Quoted by Sldgwiok In hi* Phitowphy, it* Sco-pt and

®! p. 80,

130 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

They were advanced in ukxliciu'e to a demand for
the ultimate explanation of the phenomena in ques-
tion, and were obtained by applying «ueh general
conceptions as were most satisfying to the reasons
of their respective authors. But they contributed
nothing whatsoever to a practical familiarity with
the natural course of event**, in thin <*anc the times
and places of the planets and the tides. Hence
they have not been used in the* building of seieneo,
In our own day investigators have herome con-
scious of their motive, and do not wait for histori-
cal selection to exclude powers and reasons from
their province. They deliberately neck to formu-
late exact descriptions. To thin end they employ
symbols that shall nerve to identify the terms
of nature, and formulas that shall define their
systematic relationship. These systems must Im
exact, or deductions cannot be made from them,
Hence they tend ultimately to assume a mathe-
matical form of expression,

§ 47. But science tends to employ for them* sys*
terns only such conceptions as relate to prediction;

space, Time, *^eBe *^° m°Bt fundamental are

establish, its method was the science of

where measurement and computation in terms of

SATUHAL HTIKNTK AND PHILOSOPHY 131

space and time* were the most obvious means of
description ; awl tin* general application of the
method of astronomy by Galileo and Newton, or
the development of mechanics, in the most, impor-
tant factor in the establishment of inodora sei-
(»U<H% u{x»n a [H'naanonl working haniH. Tho }^r-'
HtstoiK1^ of flu* fiTm r^^.sr, t<*s<iiu»H to flu:* fact that!
8<'i<'W<' is prinutnly <*<in<M*rn<»d \vith the d<»t<»nuiim--
tion of rf'irn/.'r. Its ili'finifi-orm of objcHstft are'
nuMUiH of identification, while lt« laws arc dynami-
atl, /. /'., have reference to% the coiulitionH under

which these objectn nriao. Thtm the chenuHt may

know ICHH nbotit *the propertten of water than

the poet; hut he in preeminently nkilled in its pro-
duction from flementH, and tinderntaiulB similarly
tho coiajKnindtt into which it may outer. Now the?
g*jni5rttl...t*(>n<Uti«nH of nil anticipation^ whereby ifcT
IxjconwH exact and verifiable, are npncial and tem-y
poral A preilictable <»vont munt be assigned to I
what m here now, c*r th<»ro now; or what is hcrofl
then, or thoro tht^n. An experimentally verifiable
syHtoin mu«t contain ^ij£cKiin<^^ for which

can bt* mibBtitutecl tho lu^ro and now of tho oxpori-
niontor'a itnituxliato oxi»erit*nco. Ilonco ^^^^
d^ilsjgninarJly with £j|j£^^
ments. The anochanical theory of nature owes its

132 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

success to a union of apace a. ml time thrmiph it«
conceptions of mailer and wniiimS Ami the pro-
jected theory of energetic** must nutinfy the sumo
conditions.

§ 48. But, furthermore, seienee has, as we havo
seen, an intercut in freeing Its descriptions from
The Quantita- ^IG Prai^ir angle wt<l relativity of an
tive Method, individual^ experience, for the nuke of
affording him knowledge of that with whieh ho
must meet Science enlightens the will hy ac-
quainting it with that \vhieh taken place In nptto
of it, and for which it mu*t hold itnelf in readi-
ness. To this end the individual benefits himself
in so far as he eliminate!* hinmelf from tht* obje<»tH
which he investigate. 1 1 in knowledge in uw»fnl
in so far as it is valid for his own indefinitely
varying stand-points, and thorns of other wills nw-
ognized by him in his practical relations. But in

4 The reader is referred to Mr, Berlrwid RuiM*n*»
on matter and motion in his l*rincipk* ttf
Vol. I. Material particles he dofiruM w **nmny-<m<»

1 i ^i°ns of all times to some places, or of all tarsim <»f 11 o<»n-

| Ij tinuous one-dimensional series t 'to ftornt termi of a ron-

; \ tinuous three-dimensional aericni *." BimiUrly, " when

\ L different times, throughout any period how«v«*r uhort, arc

! ; correlated with different places, there li motion; whan

* | different times, throughout some period howewr short,

) « are ^ correkted with the sama place, ther« bi iwt»>f Op,

I * «&., P« 473,

NATURAL HCIKNCK AND PHILOSOPHY 133

attempting to describe objects In forms other than
those of n specific experience, science in com polled
to describe them in terms of one another. For this
purpose //ir f/wnifitafirc wriltnd is peculiarly ser-
viceable. With ifH aid objects penult themselves
to Im <I<«s<.TilK»<l ns multiples of one unothor, and as
occupying posititms in rc4lntinn to one another.
When ail objects are dewrilieil strietly in forma of
one another, they are expressed in terms of arbi-
trary units, and treated in terms of arbitrary
spaeial or temporal axes of rof(*rc*ncc. Thus
there arises the universe* of the Heientifie irnngina-
tion, a vast oompliw\?f;y of nmterinl (lispluccmcnts
and tranHformati(ms, without <r<»lor, music, pleas-
ure, or any of all that rich variety of qualities.
that the leant of human experiences contains. It
does not completely rationalise or oven completely
dencribe nuch exj^rieiuH^Hj but, formulates their «uc-
coasion. To thiR end they are reduced to terms
that corroBpowl to no «ix«*ific expt^ric^ieo,.. and for
this very reason may lie translated again into all
definable hypothetical experiences The solar sys-
tem for afltronotny is not a bird's-eye view of
elliptical orbits^ with the planets and satellites in
definite phases, Nor is it this group of objects
from any such point of view, or from any number

134 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY •

of such points of view; but a formulation of their
motions that will servo as the key U» an infinite
number of their uppea niuees. Or, consider the
picture of the idrtlrynaviria romping in tht» meso-
zoic sea, that commonly accompanies u ffvxt book
of geology. Any mieh picture, and all swh pict-
ures, with their coloring and their temporal and
spacial perspective, are imaginary. Xo .such spe-
cial and exehtsive manifolds can In* defined as hav-
ing been then and there realised. But we have a
geological knowledge of thin jK»riod, that, fulfils the
formal demands of natural Heiene<%. in HO far as we
can construct this and eountlo.su other Hpeeifle ex-
periences with reference to it.

§ 49. Science, then, is to he understood as
springing from the practical neeeBHity of autici-
The General pating the environment. Thin antici-

Development t

of science, pation appears first aa congenital or
acquired reactions on the part of tho organ imn.
Such reactions imply a fixed coordination or «y«-

tem in the environment whereby a given circum-
stance determines other circumstances ; and ncicnica
proper arises as the formulation of such systems.
The requirement that they shall apply to the
phenomena that confront the will, determines their
spacial, temporal, and quantitative form* The

NA1THAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 135

osH of *H»ience 5* marked by tho growth of
thene coneeption.s in th<» dim'tion of comprehen
siveness cm the one hand, and of reiiwment and
delicacy on thi1 other. 'Man lives in an environ-
ment that in growing at the HIUOC* timo richer and
rxtondrd, hut with a coinpoiwafory sirnplifi-
in tin* <«vr*r rloscr HVHlonintizntio'n of flcicn-
tifir, <*c»n<*rptionH nndor th<» form of tho order of
tiutun*.

8 50. At th<» o|H*mnf£ of fltin chnptor it was

maititfutu'd that if, in a function of philoHOphy to

Th* p«t*rmi* ^^itirtHo Hc'ioniui fhrotigh 5t« grannitmg
Umhtcif itilt- Prn^I^^>^^ 5t« Holf-iinjK»H<Ml tank viewed
urii scitnc*. ||H (tt«t.<*nnitung itn province and selecting
itn cnfcgori'CH, V\w alw>vo account of thn origin
arul method of Hcicncc nniHt HulluM', an a definition
of it« generating proh)<»in, anrl afford tho haBin of
our aimwcr to tho <pic»Ktion of itn HtnitH* Enough
has bwn Haiti to nuiko it cli*nr that pliilosophy Is
not in the field of HCIOWW, and i« therefore not
entitled to etmtwt it« rcnnlt in detail or even to
tnke aiclas within tho province of it« special prob-
lonia. Furthermore*, philosophy should not aim to
restrain science by the* imposition of external bar-
riers* Whatever may bo said of the sufficiency of
its categories Jn any region of the world, that body

136 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of truth of which muthomatics, rnwlwui™, and
physics are the foundations, must Vw rrpardrd a.n
a whole that tends to be itll-cnmpn'hrnsiv*' in if*
own terms. There remanm for philosophy, th<»n,
the critical examination of thcw trrms, anil thn
appraisal as a whole of the truth that ih^v may
express.

§ 51. The imposftihiliiy of omhrac»hi# th<» \vhoU»
of knowledge within natural s<*i<»iu"<* is dut* to the*
Natural fact that tho latter in ahxlrnci. Thin

Science is

Abstract follows from flu* fact that imttiral Hci-
ence is governed by a aelwtivo Int<*n»Ht T\\^ for-
mulation of definitions and lawn in <kxchwiv«*ly
mechanical terms is not due to the, oxliauntivc* or
even preeminent reality of theme prnfHTtiw, hut to
their peculiar sorviceablencKB in a v<kriiialilo <lo-
scription of events. Natural acicm'c HCHM not
affirm that reality is essentially conRtitutwi of mat-
ter, or essentially characterized by motion ; but i«
interested m the mechanical acipoct of reality, and
describes it quite regardless of othar ovidont a«-
t P®cts and without meaning to projudico thorn.
It is unfortunately true that the aciontiBt has rarely
been clear in his own mind on thin point It Is
only recently that he has partially freed himself
^rom ^e habit of constraint big terms as final and

° *

* ^NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 137

exhaustive.5 This he was able to do even to his
own satisfaction, only by allowing loose rein to the
imagination. Consider the example of the atomic
theory. In order to describe such occurrences as
chemical combination, or changes in volume and
density, the scientist has employed as a unit the
least particle, physically indivisible and qualita-
tively homogeneous. Look for the atom in the
body of science, and you will find it in physical
laws governing expansion and contraction, and in

chemical formulas. There the real responsibility

•

of science ends. But whether through the need of
popular exposition, or the undisciplined imagina-
tion of the investigator himself, atoms have figured
in the history of thought as round corpuscles of a
grayish hue scurrying hither and thither, and
armed with special appliances wherewith to lock
in molecular embrace. Although this is nonsense,
we need not on that account conclude that there

5 That the scientist still permits himself to teach the
people a loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Pro-
fessor Ward's citation of instances in his Naturalism and
Agnosticism. So eminent a physicist as Lord Kelvin is
quoted as follows : " You can imagine particles of some-
thing, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This
tMng we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only
substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we
are sure of, and that is the reality and substantiality of the
luminiferous ethej." Vol. I, p. 113.

138 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

are no atoms. There are atoms in precisely tb
sense intended by scientific law, in that the f onm
las computed with the aid of this concept are tru
of certain natural processes. The conception c
ether furnishes a similar case. Science is not n
sponsible for the notion of a quivering gelatinoi
substance pervading space, but only for certai
laws that, e. <?., describe the velocity of light i
I ^ terms of the vibration. It is true that there

\ < | such a thing as ether, not as gratuitously roundc

out by the imagination, with various attributes <
,- immediate experience, but just in so far as th

J' concept is employed in verified descriptions <

radiation, magnetism, or electricity. Strict
speaking science asserts nothing about the existen
of ether, but only about the behavior, e. #., of ligl
If true descriptions of this and other phenomei
are reached by employing units of wave propag
tion in an elastic medium, then ether is proved
exist in precisely the same sense that linear fi
are proved to exist, if it be admitted that the
are 90,000,000 x 5,280 of them between the eai
and the sun. And to imagine in the one case
jelly with all the qualities of texture, color, a
the like, that an individual object of sense woi
possess, is nmch the same as in the other to imj

• ^NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 139

ine the heavens filled with foot-rules and tape-
measures. There is but one safe procedure in
dealing with scientific concepts : to regard them as
true so far as they describe, and no whit further.
To supplement the strict meaning which has been
verified and is contained in the formularies of
science, with such vague predicates as will suffice
to make entities of them, is mere ineptness and
confusion of thought. And it is only such a sup-
plementation that obscures their abstractness. For
a mechanical description of things, true as it doubt-
less is, is even more indubitably incomplete.

§ 52. But thotzgli the abstractness involved in

scientific description is open and deliberate, we

' The Meaning must come to a more precise under-

of Abstract-
ness in Truth, standing of it, if we are to draw any

conclusion as to what it involves. In his " Prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge," the English phi-
losopher Bishop Berkeley raises the question as to
the universal validity of mathematical demonstra-
tions. If we prove from the image or figure of an
isosceles right triangle that the sum of its angles
is equal to two right angles, how can we know
that this proposition holds of all triangles?

"To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in
view whilst I gaake the demonstration be, for instance,

140 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whos<* m«!f\s are
of a determinate length, 1 may no-vort Iw kw lw r<»rtuin
it extends to all other rectilinear triuuglrH, of what Hort
or bigness soever. And that twauw* iwithrr th« right
angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of tho
sides are at all concerned in the* demount rat ion. It in
true the diagram I have in viow include* all thew par-
ticulars; but then there m not thft fount mention niwl« of
them in the proof of the proportion."*

Of the total conditions proarnt in tho ronrroto
picture of a triangle, one may in ow'« ealetUationH
neglect as many as otic aocs fit, aiul work with the*
remainder. Then, if one liaa oltwrly di8f
the conditions tiaecl, one may cfanfidi»iiflv
that whatever has been found* trvw cif them holds*
regardless of the neglected condition*. Thrw may
be missing or replaced by other*, provJdtitl thci
selected or (for any given invcHtigntion) oa*etitial
conditions are not affected. That which in truo
once is true always, provided time is not ow* of
its conditions ; that which is truo in one plaice IB
true everywhere, provided location i* not oiici of it*
conditions. But, given any concrete Bttuation, the
more numerous the conditions one ignores in ono!»
calculations, the less adequate ara one98 calcula-
tions to that situation. The number of its inhabi*

'Berkeley: Prindpks of Human Kiwwkdg*, Intitxlur-
tion. Edition of Fraser, p. 248,

* % NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 141

tants, and any mathematical operation made with
that number, is true, but only very abstractly true
of a nation. A similar though less radical ab-
stractness appertains to natural science. Simple
qualities of sound or color, and distinctions of
beauty or moral worth, together with many other
ingredients of actual experience attributed therein
to the objects of nature, are ignored in the me-
chanical scheme. There is a substitution of cer-
tain mechanical arrangements in the case of the
first group of properties, the simple qualities of
sense, so that they may be assimilated to the gen-
eral scheme of events, and their occurrence pre-
dicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character
is not reckoned with, even in psychology, where
the physiological method finally replaces them with
brain states. Over and above these neglected
properties of things there remain the purposive
activities of thought. It is equally preposterous
to deny them and to describe them in mechani-
cal terms. It is plain, then, that natural science
calculates upon the basis of only a fraction of the
conditions that present themselves in actual experi-
ence. Its conclusions, therefore, though true so
far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of
everything, ^re completely true of nothing.

142 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

§ 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of
inadequacy which may be urged against natural
But Scientific science, not in the. spirit of detraction,

Truth is Valid „ ' , r , . .. -

for Reality, but for the sake or u more sound iM'litu
concerning reality* Tho philosopher falls into
error no lees radical than that, of the dognmtic
scientist, when lie charges the' Heientist with tm-
truth, and attaches to his conceptn the predieat<» of
-unreality. The fact that the eoneeptH uf sei«*n(M»
are selected, and only inadequately true of reality,
should not be taken to mean that they are sportive
or arbitrary. They are not " device?* " or abbre-
viations, in any sense that doen hot attach to such
symbolism as all thought involves. 'Nor are they
merely "hypothetical," though like all thought
they are subject to correction.7 The Hciontist does
not merely assert that tho initiation for energy is
true if nature's capacity for work he i
but thai such is actually the erne* Tho
does not arrive at results contingent WJK>II the nup-
position that men are numerable, but declares his
sums and averages to be categorically truo. Simi-
larly scientific laws are true; only, to IK* ««rc, so

7 The reader who cares to pursue thi» topic1: ftirtlt4*f !»
referred to the writer's discuwion of "2Vw/M«»r W'«nl*«
Philosophy of Science" in the Journal o/ Phifawphy, 1%*
chology and Scientific Methods, Vol. I, No* l^

* I^ATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 143

far as they go, but with no condition save the con-
dition that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it
shall not need correction. The philosophy of sci-
ence, therefore, is not the adversary of science, but
supervenes upon science in the interests of the 'ideal
of final truth. 'No philosophy of science,, is sound
which does not primarily seek by an analysis of
scientific concepts to understand science on its own
grounds. Philosophy may understand science bet-
ter than science understands itself, but only by

holding fast to the conviction of its truth, and in-

eluding it within whatever account of reality it
may be able to formulate.

§ 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient
and most exalted of human disciplines, it is not
Relative infrequently charged with being the

Practical i •/ o o

Value of most unprofitable. Science has amassed

Science and

Philosophy, a fortune of information, which has
facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not
philosophy, on the other hand, all programme and
idle questioning ? In the first place, no question-
ing is idle that is logically possible. It is true
that philosophy shows her skill rather in the ask-
ing than in the answering of questions. But the
formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest
significance. f "No valid though unanswered ques-

THE APPROACH TO i'HH.OSOPin t

tion can have a purely negative value, nnd ey.ju'riu
as respects the wmsiateney or completeness of truth.
But, in the second places philosophy with all its
limitations serves mankind as indispensably as

science. If science HuppHeH the individual with
means of self "preservation, and flu* instrumentH of
achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, <>«* tlw
objects of deliberate confttruction. Such r<'flc<.'t5c»i
as justifies tho adoption of a fundamental lif*1 pnr-
pose is always philosophical- For every judgment
respecting final worth IB a judgment xub «/*'<?&
elernitatis. And the nrgency of life re<juires !he
individual to pass Bneh judgtnentH, It IH true that
however persistently rtrfloctiv« he may he in tho
matter, his conclusion will bo premature in con-

sideration of the amount of evidence logically d«-
manded for such, a judgment* Hut he mu«t Im ua
wise as he can^ or he will bo as foolinh »IH ci.»nvon-
tionality and blind impulse may Intfmt htm to IKJ.
Philosophy determines for society what every In-
dividual must practically determine upon for him-
self, the most reasonable plan of reality a« n whole
^ , which the data and reflection of an opoch can

f j afford. It is philosophy's service to mnnkind tci

J compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration

i i

\* \ of the specialist, a service needed in^very fl pro*

ft:.1

• ^NATURAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 145

ent day." Apart from the philosopher, public
opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and indi-
vidual opinion is further warped by accidental
propinquity. It is the function of philosophy to
interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and
wise belief. The philosopher is the true prophet,
appearing before men in behalf of that which is
finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the
most considerate and comprehensive reflection pos-
sible at any stage in the development of human
thought. Owing to a radical misconception of
function, the man of science has in these later days
begun to regard knnself as the wise man, and to
teach the people. Popular materialism is the
logical outcome of this determination of belief by
natural science. It may be that this is due as
much to the indifference of the philosopher as to
the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case
the result is worse than conservative loyalty to re-
ligious tradition. For religion is corrected surely
though slowly by the whole order of advancing
truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof
against an over-emphasis upon new truth. It has
generally turned out in time that the obstinate
man of religion was more nearly right than the
adaptable intellectual man of fashion. But phi*

146

THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

losophy, an a critique of s<vifim'p for the sake <
faith, should provide flu* individual religious }?
Hover with intellectual enlightenment and gentl
ness. The quality, orderliness, and inclusivem*
of knowledge, finally determiue its vulur; and ll
philosopher, premature UH Inn nynthiM-uH may nan
day prove to be, is the wisest man uf his own ge
eration. Prom him the man <if faith should <*hta'
such discipline of judgment as shall oiwldr hi
to be fearless of a<ivancing knowle<}g<% litH»aune n
quaintod with its SCOJK*, and wi InlellrrttiiiHy <*u
did with all his vision** and hi« ii

f> r
i '

PART II

•

THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF
PHILOSOPHY

OHAPTEE VI

METAPHYSICS AJSTD EPISTEMOLOGY

§ 55. THE stand-point and purpose of the phi-
losopher define his task, but they do not necessarily
The impost- prearrange the division of it. That the

bilityofan , . .

Absolute task is a complex one, embracing many

Division of the IT, ft T • i i

Problem of subordinate problems which must be
Philosophy, treated'seriaftm, is attested both by the
breadth of its scope and the variety of the inter-
ests from which it may be approached. But this
complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance
which here attaches to unity. That which lends
philosophical quality to any reflection is a stead-
fast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and
consistency. Hence, though the philosopher must
of necessity occupy himself with subordinate prob-
lems, these cannot be completely isolated from one
another, and solved successively. Perspective is
his most indispensable requisite, and he has solved
no problem finally until he has provided for the
solution of alj. His own peculiar conceptions are
149

150 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

those -which order oxp^rit'iirr, and r«v<>nrii<» such
aspects of it as otlwr intm-sts haw di-nf inguislipd.
Hence the compatibility of any i<!<»a with all otl»'t
ideas IB the prime test of its philosophical sufli-
j ; ciency. On tho.se ground,** it may cnntidcntly \w

I asserted that the*, work of philosophy cammi hci

j f assigned by the pi<w to diifciviif njnvialistK, and

I then aasemhled. Thore an* no Hp*-»ci»l piiilnsoph'

ji ; ical problcmiB which can 1«? fnudly wilvrd u|K»n

I ! their own merits. Indeed, mu'h prohlnns ^mU

never even be named, for in th«*ir di8eri»f%«iM^rt tlwy

/» ! would cease to be philortophioul.

1 1$

The case of metaphysics uttd cin^frnwJorj^
affords an excellent illustration* Tho foniHT ol
these is eonimonly defined an the. theory of rt*ttl-
ity or of first principles, llw latter an thn iltoor}
of knowledge. But the most distinct iv<» philosoph-
ical movement of the nineteenth wtitury imim
from the idea that knowing and IK*! tig tiro Iden-
ticaL1 The prime reality IB defined n« a knowing
mind, and the terms of reality art! Interpreted ai
terms of a cognitive process. Ucm ami logical
principles constitute the work!* It is ^vidcmt thai
in this Hegelian philosophy apwtrmrtlogy

1 The post-Kantian movoment In Ctommny-
in so far as. influenced by HcgeU Bee Chap. XIL

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLCMt

metaphysics. In defining the relations
edge to its object, one lias already defined one's
fundamental philosophical conception, while logic,
as the science of the universal necessities of
thought, will embrace the first principles of real-
ity. If ow, were one to divide and arrange the prob-
lems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident
that one would not have deduced the arrangement
from the general problem of philosophy, but from
a single attempted solution of that problem. It
might serve as an exposition of Hegel, but not as
a general philosophical programme.

Another case in ^>6int is provided by the present-
day interest in what is called ff ^pragmatism." 2
This doctrine is historically connected with Kant's
principle of the " primacy of the practical rea-
son," in which he maintained that the conscious-
ness of duty is a profounder though less scientific
insight than the knowledge of objects. The cur-
rent doctrine maintains that thought with its fruits
is an expression of interest, and that the will which
evinces and realizes such an interest is more orig-
inal and significant than that which the thinking
defines. Such a view attaches a peculiar impor-
tance to the springs of conduct, and in its more
*Cf. §203.

152 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

systematic development.3 ha** tvpurilwl f//u>« .11
the true proptt'doutic an<I proof of philosophy. Hn
to make ethics the key-atom* of flu* nrch, in to <i<
fine a special philosophical Hyntfrn; for it w th
very problem of philosophy to <IiH]K»Hr tho parts ri
knowledge with a view to HVHtiniuifm const rwtiw
The relation of the provinww of metaphysics, *»pii
temology, logic, and othicrt oamwt, thru, IM* flflinr
without entering theB^ prnvinooH and uriHwrrin
the questiona proper to thrtn.

§ 50. Since the alx>vp to.rm* oxtnt, h<nvovc*
there can be no donht hut that important divinim
The Depend- within tho jffc»nt*ral nuii of philoHopli

enceofthe

Order oi Phw- havo actually lxM»n ttuu!<\ Tlu» incw

osophical *.

Probieitti tablcncsB of it apj>rnr« in the* vnnrty ^

upon the Ini- t ,» , »

tiai Interest the SOUrCCH ItOHi Whti'U that JUIH. IIW

spring. The point of departure will always* <!
termine tho emphasis and th« application
the philosophy receives* If philcwopliy I
to supplement more special intercut*, it will r
ceive a particular character from whatever intr
«st it so supplements. Ha who approaches it fro
a definite stand-point will find In it primarily i
ititerpretatioB. of that stand-point,

§ 57. There are two sources of the philosophic
'$. g., the system of Fiohta, Cf. § 177.

^ METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 153

aim, which are perennial in their human signifi-
cance. He, firstly, who begins with the demands
philosophy as of life and its ideals, looks to philoso-

the Interprets-

tionofLife. phy for a reconciliation of these with
the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy
will receive its form from its illumination of life,
and *it will be an ethical or religious philosophy.
Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century philosopher
who justified mysticism after the manner of mathe-
matics,4 displays this temper in his philosophy :

"After experience had taught me that all the usual
surroundings of social life ai% vain and futile; seeing
that none of the objects of my fears contained in them-
selves anything eitfter good or bad, except in so far as
the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to in-
quire whether there might be some real good having
power to communicate itself, which would affect the
mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact,
there might be anything of which the discovery and
attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, su-
preme, and unending happiness." 5

In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with
the problem of being in the rigorous logical fash-
ion of his day, the final words of his great work
are, " Of Human Freedom " :

"Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as
such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being

4 See Chap. XI.

5 Spinoza: On the Improvement of the Understanding.
Translation by Hjjlwes, p. 3.

154 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

conscious of himself, and of <iodl nmi of thing*, by a
certain eternal nomwity, i«»v«»r WWM In }«\ hut nhvayn
possesses tru« acquioswnr** of his s| ilrit . Iff h*» way which
I have pointed out an loading to I hw rrwilt H»M*IIIS t»xw«d-
ingly hard, it may mwrthc-lrj-w IN* disrovrn'd, NVrdn
must it be hard, wince it in HO H**ldofn found. How would
it he possible if salvation \vc-ro r<*wly to our hand, and
could without great labor Ix? found, flint it should hi* hy
almost all men neglected? Hut, all things excellent nni
as difficult as they arc rare."*

§ 58. On the other huml, <n«fc \vlu» looks to phi-
losophy for tho extension an<l eorrretinn *»f nei^u-
Philosophy as tlfic knowl<»(igo will In* primarily infer-

tile Extension , . , t „ , » t t « . -

of Science. CStCU 1H ttH« |mUt»8(»pUU»ni U^tinttlon <»t

\iltiinatcconcoptionH, an<l in tlr* jitHbtvd wli*»r<«with
such a definition is ohtaincMl. Thus Ihr philoHophy
of the scientist will ton<l to IK* lopml iu»l nH*ta
physical. Such is th<? cuw* with Ihwiirf^H n»<i
leibniz, who arc nevcrtholerts intiinut^ty n»Iatt*<i t*
\ Spinoza in the historical dovelopmont of philtm

i ! ophy.
i \

M " Several years have now elapsed/1 utiyn the former

! j "since I first hecame aware that I had acvepted, evei

' I from my youth, many falsa opinion*; for trw% mid tha

, j consequently what I afterward hatted on »ut'h prinrtple

! was highly doubtful; and from that time I wit« con

, [ vinced of the necessity of undertaking onn* in my Hfc t
rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of cotn

fl Spinoza: Ethics, Part V, Proportion XL1I.
by Elwes, p. 270.

^METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 155

mencing anew the work of building from the foundation,
if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure
in the sciences. "7

Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical
even than Descartes's. He sought in philosophy a
supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
universe.

"Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of
those who have worked much at mathematics, I have
none the less meditated upon philosophy from my youth
up; for it always seemed to me that there was a possi-
bility of establishing something solid in philosophy by
clear demonstrations. ... I perceived, after much medi-
tation, that it is impossible to find the principles of a
real unity in matter al&ne, or in that which is only pas-
sive, since it is nothing but a collection or aggregation of
parts ad infinitum." 8

§ 59. Though these types are peculiarly repre-
sentative, they are by no means exhaustive. There
The Historical are as many possibilities of emphasis as

Differentia- J r r

tion of the there are incentives to philosophical re-

PMlosophical

Problem. flection. It is not possible to exhaust
the aspects of experience which may serve as bases
from which such thought may issue, and to which,
after its synthetic insight, it may return. But it
is evident that such divisions of philosophy rep-

7 Descartes: Meditations, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97.

8 Leibniz: New System of the Nature of Substances. Trans-
lation by Latta, jjp. 299, 300.

156 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

resent In their order, awl in the *h,'irpncss witl

which they are Hnndorrd, the infrlhrtual auf<»l»iti#

raphy of the, individual philoHuph<*r. Thtw is 1m

one method hy which thai whieh l& preuliar eifho

to the IiKliv.idiu.il, or to the Hp<»eial position wind

ho adopts, may IK* eliminated. Though if. in Jm

possible to tabulate the empty programme of phi

losophy, we may name pertain npeein! pmUrniH t.ha

have appeared in itn ktxturif. Sin<*i» thi^

comprehendn tiie aetivitieH of many ind

general validity uttuclieH to if, There has h(»ci:

moreover, a certain periodicity in tin* eiiier^'iin* o

these proWcnim, HO that it may fairly lw claimed fo

them that tliey indicate inevitable jthuw«n in th

development of human reflection ujxm rxporicnci

They represent a normal differentiation of tnU»rct

which the individual mind, in tl»* ccnirne of ii

own thinking, tenda to follow. It IK true that i

ean never be said with aBHuranee that any ago i

utterly blind to any aspect of t*xjK»ru?nrc». This i

obviously the ease with the practical awl theornt

cal interests which have just bucn diHttngttiHluH

There is no age that does not have »omo practici

consciousness of the world as a whole, nor an

•which does not seek more or lass earnestly to un

versalize its science. But though ft compel us 1

, METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 157

deal abstractly with historical epochs, there is
abundant compensation in the possibility which
this method affords of finding the divisions of
philosophy in the manifestation of the living phil-
osophical spirit

§ 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of
Greece, is commonly awarded the honor of being
Metaphysics ^10 founder of European philosophy,
^dumlmtai ^ -"10 desorvo ^l*B distinction, it is on.
conception. accoun{ Of the question which he raised,

and not on account of the answer which he gave

to it. Aristotle informs us that Thales held
" water " to bo " the material cause of all things." °
This enido theory is evidently due to an interest
in the totality of things, an interest which is
therefore philosophical. But the interest of this
first philosopher has a more definite character.
It looks toward the definition in terms of some
single conception, of the constitution of the world.
As a child might conceivably think the moon, to
be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its child-
hood thinks here of all things as made of water,
Water was a well-known substance, possessing well-
known, predicates. To define all nature in terms
of it, was to maintain that in spite of superficial
9 Burner Sarly Greek Phiksophy, p, 42.

158 TOE APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY .

differences, all things hnvr thcso pri'dieate.M in eon

inon. They arc the predicate whifh qualify f<

reality, and compow* a community of nufutv fro1

which all the individual ohjorts and rvruts <

nature arise. The HHC<*«»SHOI\H of Thal«s wen* ev

deritly dissatisfied with his fuiiduturntal «*«iiu*o

tion, because of itn hu»k of p««oraHty. Th*

seized U]x>n vaguer atihHtan<*<»H lik<« air and Hr«\ f<

the very definiteneBH of tin* natun* f»f wnt^r f<i

bids the identification of other Huh*taw<*H with ;

But what is BO obviouHly trtu* of wati'r is m*arre

less true of air and fire*; and It njijwarrt! at leug

that only a substance p<w«<wmji: thii most prwr

characters of body, Btich an HhitjM% HIW», itnd mob

ity, could bo thought RR tntly priui«»val nud

sal. In this wise a conception Hk<» our

physical conception of matter wuim lit ii^upth in

vogue. Now the problem of which Ihiw \v<»rw i

tentative solutions ia, in general, the pr«ibl«»in

metaphysics; although this term hchnijup to a hit

era, arising only from the accident it 1 plneo of t

discussion of first principles after phy*itn in t

system of Aristotle. The attempt to ^r«ri» a mi

fundamental conception which attache* #onw di

nite meaning to the reality including and fn/or

ing every particular thing, i$ mefapbytic*.

^METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 159

§ 61. It must not be supposed that metaphysics
is dogmatically committed to the reduction of all
Monism and reality to a unity of nature. It is quite
Pluralism. consistent with its purpose that the
parts of reality should be found to compose a
group, or an indefinite multitude of irreducibly
different entities. But it is clear that even such
an account of things deals with what is true of all
reality, and even in acknowledging the variety of
its constituents, attributes to them some kind of
relationship. The degree to which such a relation-
ship is regarded as intimate and essential, deter-
mines the degree vt<3 which any metaphysical sys-
tem is monistic™ rather than pluralistic. But the
significance of this difference will be better appre-
ciated after a further differentiation of the meta-
physical problem has been noted.

§ 62. It has already been suggested that the
test of Thales's conception lay in the possibility of
Ontology and deriving nature from it. A world prin-
conTm iLng ciple miist be fruitful. ]$Tow an ab-
and Process. stract distinction has prevailed more or
less persistently in metaphysics, between the gen-
eral definition of being, called ontology,, and the

10 No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism"

in current usage, because of its appropriation by those who

160 THE APPROACH TO PHILOHOt'HY

study of the pro<*OHH<?H \vhrn *\vith U'inf* in divide

into things and events. Thin latter ntudy him 1

do primarily with tlw <J<*tuilrt <»f rxjwrk'iuH'. wn

merated and Bystemati/A'd In* tho natural wiowe

To reconcile thene, or the coum* of nature, wit

the fundamental definition of briny, in fhi* proi

1cm of cosmology. ( -mmnlogy in the o<J»Ht ruing <

the prima fade reality in f<*nn8 of tht> ^H^pntti

reality. It in the proof and tho rxplunaiitm <

ontology. SInco tlia numt familiar jwrt of tl

prima facie reality, tho purl; alinont (^^luniv^ly n-

ticod by the naive rmtid? is emlmtml within ll

field of the phynioal H<»5<»iH»<*«, ""$!«* trrni coHinult^

has come more definitely to wignify the ;;/u7«w>/;/

of nature. It embraces Htieh an cxumiimtiou <

space, time, matter, cftn»alityy etc*,, a« Hi*ekn -

answer the most general qiumtionR alwnit thosn, at;

provide for them in the world thought of an mo

profoundly real Such a study rcwtvet* it* phil

sophical character from its affiliation with onto

ogy, as the latter would find its application i

cosmology*

§ 63. But in addition to the consideration <

maintain that the universe li unitary tmd homojccmocniff
physical tmm (cf. § 108). It should property be lu
to emphajsize the unity of the world in any term*.

t METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 161

the various parts of nature, cosmology lias com-
Mechanical Tiionly dealt with a radical and far-
Iaico»moi0'" reaching alternative that appeared at
gies> the very dawn of metaphysics. Dif-

ferences may aristi within a world constituted of
a single substance or a small group of ultimate
substances, by changes in the relative position and
grouping of the parts. Jlenee the virtue of the
conception of motion. The theory which explains
all differences by motions of the parts of a quali-
tatively simple world, is called mechanism. An-
other source of change familiar to naive experi-
ence is willy or the action of living creatures.
According to the mochanical theory, changes occur
on account of the natural motions of the parts
of 'matter; according to the latter or ideological
conception, changes are made by a formative
agency directed to some end. Among the early
Greek philosophers, Leucippus was an exponent of
mechanism.

"He says that the worlds arise when many bodies
are collected together into the mighty void from the
surrounding space and rush together. They come into
collision, and those which are of similar shape and like
form become entangled, and from their entanglement
the heavenly bodies arise." u

*" Burnet: Op, tit., p. 358.

162 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was famed for his
doctrine of the Nous, or Intelligence, to whose di-
rection he attributed the whole process of the world.
The following is translated from extant fragments
of his book, " irepl <£vcr€o>9" :

" And Nous had power over the whole revolution, BO
that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began
to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolu-
tion now extends over a larger space, and will extend
over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled
together and separated off and distinguished are all
known by the Nous. And Nous net in order all things
that were to be and that, were, and all things that are
not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
revolve the stars and the sun and «tho moon, and the air
and the ether that arc separated off." w

§ 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine
of Anaxagoras not only names a distinct kind of
Dualism. cause, but also ascribes to it an inde-
pendence and intrinsic importance that do not
belong to motion. Whereas motion is a property
of matter, intelligence is an originative power
working out purposes of its own choosing. Hence
we have here to do with a new ontology. If we
construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we have
a definite substitute for the physical theories out-
lined above. Such a theory is scarcely to be at-
tributed to any Greek philosopher of the early
12 Burnet: Op. tit., p. 284. f

9 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 163

period ; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in
the development of thought, after the rise of the
problem of epistemology. But Anaxagoras's sharp
distinction between the material of the world on
the one hand, and the author of its order and evo-
lution on the other, is in itself worthy of notice.
It contains the germ of a recurrent philosophical
dualism, which differs from pluralism in that it
finds two and only two fundamental divisions of
being, the physical, material, or potential on the
one hand, and the mental^ formal, or ideal on the

other.

§ 65. Finally, "the alternative possibilities which
these cosmological considerations introduce, bear
The New directly upon the general question of
Monumand ^1C interdependence of the parts of the
Pluralism. \vorld, a question which has already
appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and
pluralism now obtain a new meaning. Where the
world process is informed with some singleness
of plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are recip-
rocally necessary, and inseparable from the unity.
Where, on the other hand, the processes are random
and reciprocally fortuitous, as Leucippus proposes,
the world as a whole is an aggregate rather than a
unity. In this way uniformity in kind of being

164 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

may prevail in a world the relations of whoso
parts are due to chance, while diversity in kind of
"being may prevail in a world knit together by Homo
thorough-going plan of organization. Thus mon-
ism and pluralism are conceptions as proper to cos-
mology as to ontology.

But enough has been said to demoiiBtrate the
interdependence of ontology and cosmology, of the
theory of being and the theory of differentiation
and process. Such problems can be only abstractly
sundered, and the distinctive character of any

metaphysical system will usually eonsint in Home

theory determining their relation* Philosophy
returns to these metaphysical problems with its
thought enriched and its method complicated, after
becoming thoroughly alive to the problems of
epistemology, logic, and ethics.

§ 66. Epistemology is the theory of the possibil-
ity of knowledge, and issues from criticism and
Epistemology scepticism. If we revert again to the

Seeks to tin- ^ °

derstand the history of Greek philosophy, we find a

Possibility of J * l J*

Knowledge, first period of enterprising speculation
giving place to a second period of hesitancy and
doubt. This phase of thought occurs simulta-
neously with the brilliantly humanistic age of
Pericles, and it is undoubtedly true that energy is

, METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 165

withdrawn, from speculation largely for the sake
of expending it in the more lively and engaging
pursuits of politics and art. But there are patent
reasons "within the sphere of philosophy itself for
entailnumt of activity and taking of stock. For
three centuries men have taken their philosophical
powers for granted, and used thorn without ques-
tioning them. Kepeated attacks upon the prob-
lem of reality have resulted in no concensus of
opinion, but only in a disagreement among the
wise men themselves. A great variety of mere
theories has been substituted for the old unanimity
of religious tradition and practical life. It is
natural under these circumstances to infer that
in philosophy man has overreached himself. He
would more profitably busy himself with affairs
that belong to his own sphere, and find a basis for
life in his immediate relations with his fellows.
The sophists, learned in tradition, and skilled in
disputation, but for the most part entirely lacking
in. originality, arc tho new prophets. As teachers
of rhetoric and morals, they represent the prac-
tical and secular spirit of their age ; while in their
avoidance of speculation, and their critical justifi-
cation of that course, they express its sceptical
philosophy. ^

166 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

§ 67. In their self-justification certain of the
sophists attached themselves to a definite doctrine
scepticism, maintained by thoso of their prede-
^d^nosti- cessorB UU(1 contemporaries who were
cism* atomists, or followers of that same

Leucippus whom we have quoted. This doctrine
was the result of an attempt to construe ix^reeption
in terms of the motion of atoms. Outer objects
were said to give off line particles which, through
the mediation of the sense organs, impinged upon
the soul-atom. But it was evident even to the curly
exponents of this theory that according to sneh
an account, each perceiver is r6l$gated to a world
peculiar to his own stand-point. His perception
informs him. concerning his own states as affected
by things, rather than concerning the things them-
selves. Upon this ground the groat sophist Pro-
tagoras is said to have based, his dictum : Havrow
XprjpdT&v fjierpov avdpG&Tros,—" Man is the measure
of all things." This is the classic statement of the
doctrine of relativity. But wo have now entered
into the province of epistemology, and various
alternatives confront us. Keduce thought to per^-
ception, define perception as relative to each indi-
vidual, and you arrive at scepticism, or the denial
of the possibility of valid knowledge. Plato ex-

f METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 167

pounds this consequence in the well-known disctis-
sion of Protagoras that occurs in the u Thewtctus."

"I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears
is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his
book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-
faced baboon, or Home other yet stranger monster which
has sensation, in the measure of all things; then he might
have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of
him by informing us at the outset that while we were
reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he wan no
better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men- •
would not this have produced an overpowering effect?
For if truth is only sensation, arid no man am discern
another's feelings better than he, or has any superior
right to determine whether his opinion is true or false,
but each, as we have ieveral times repeated, is to himself
the sole judge, and everything that he judges IH true and
right, why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred
to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be
well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to htm,
if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? .
The attempt to supervise or refutes the notions or opinions
of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly,
if to each man his own are right; and this must bo the
case if Protagoras's Truth, is the real truth, and the
philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving
oracles out of the shrine of his book." 13

This is the full swing of tlio pendulum from dog-
matum, or the uncritical conviction of truth* A
modified form of scepticism has been developed in
these later days tinder the influence of natural sei~

18 Plato: Theostetw, 101. Translation by Jowett. Ref-
erences to Platowe to the marginal paging.

168 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

once, and is called agnosticism or positivism. It
accepts the Protagorean doctrine only In the sense
of attributing to human knowledge an a whole an
incapacity for exceeding the range of perception,
Beyond this realm of natural selenee, whore
theories can be sensibly verified, lien the unknow-
able realm, more real, but forever inaccessible.

§ 68. It is important to note that both scepti-
cism and agnosticism agree in regarding pcrccp-

The Source tion as ike csMniial factor in

and Criterion i i i •

of Knowledge bo far at any rate an our knowledge is

concerned, the certification of being con-

and Rational- « . • i •t'*ta t*- it

ism. Sls*a in percoivabmty. Knowledge is

Mysticism. coextensive with actual and possible

human experience. This account of the source
and criterion of knowledge is called empiricism,
in distinction from the counter-theory of ration-
alism.

The rationalistic motive was a quickening in-
fluence in Greek philosophy long before it became
deliberate and conspicuous in Socrates and Plato,
Parmenides, founder of the Eleatic School, has
left behind him a poem divided into two parts:
" The Way of Truth " and " The Way of Opin-
ion." 14 In the first of these he expounds his
14 Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy pprf 184, 187.

f MOTA PHYSICS AND KPISTKMOLOGY 1(59

esoteric philosophy,, which is a definition of being
established by dialectical reasoning. He. finds that
being must. i>e single, eternal, and changeless,
because otherwise* it cannot be thought and defined
without contradiction. The method which Par-
menides here employs presupposes that, knowledge
consists in understanding rather than perception.
Indeed, he regards the fact that the, world of tho
Hermes in manifold and mutable as of. little conse-
quence to the wine man. 'flu* world of sense is
the province of vulgar opinion, while that of rea-
son is tho absolute truth revealed only to the phi-
losopher. The tnttfi has no concern with appear-
ance^ but is answerable only to the test of
rationality. That world w real which one w able
ly thinking to make intelligible. Tho world in
what a world must be in order to be jxissible at all,
and the philosopher can deduce it directly from tho
very conditions of thought which it must satisfy.
He "who would know reality may disregard what
seems to be? provided he can by reflective analysis
discover certain general necessities to which being
must conform. This is rationalism in its extreme
form.

The rationalism of Socrates was more moderate,
as it was more fwitful than, that of Parmenides,

170 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY .

As is well known, Socrates eomywwed no philo-
sophical books, but Bought to inculcate wisdom in
his teaching and converBatioiu "Ills method of
inculcating "wisdom was to evoke it in Inn inter-
locutor by making him considerate of the manning
of his speech. Through his own questions he
sought to arouse the questioning spirit, which
should weigh the import of words, and be satis-
fied with nothing short of a definite and consistent
judgment. In the Platonic dialogues the Soeratic

method obtains a place in literature. In the
f

" Thesetetus," which is, perhaps, the greatest of all
epistemological treatises, Soeratw is reprcwntod as
likening his vocation to that of the midwife*

"Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like
theirs, but differs in that I attend men, and not woman,
and I look after their souls when they are in labor, and
not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art in in
thoroughly examining whether the thought which the
mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a
noble and true birth. And, like the midwivcs, I am
barren, and the reproach which is often made against
me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit
to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is that
the god compels me to be a midwife, but docs not allow
me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all
wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention
or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with
me profit. ... It is quite clear that they never

, METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 171

learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to
which they cling are of their own making. " 15

The principle underlying this method is the insist-
ence that a proposition, to be true of reality, must
at least bespeak a mind that is true to itself, in-
ternally luminous, and free from contradiction.
That which is to me nothing that I can express in
form that will convey precise meaning and bear
analysis, is so far nothing at all. Being is not,
as the empiricist would have it, ready at hand,
ours for the looking, but is the fruit of critical
reflection. Only reason, overcoming the relativity
of perception, an«L*the chaos of popular opinion,
can lay hold on the universal truth.

A very interesting tendency to clothe the articu-
lations of thought with the immediacy of percep-
tion is exhibited in mysticism, which attributes the
highest cognitive power to an experience that tran-
scends thought, an ineffable insight that is the oc-
casional reward of thought and virtuous living.
This theory would seem to owe its great vigor to
the fact that it promises to unite the universality
of the rational object with the vivid presence of
the empirical object, though it sacrifices the defi-
nite content of both. The mystic, empiricist, and

15 Plato: Tfocetettts, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.

172 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY r

rationalist arc in. these several ways led to revise
their metaphysics upon the basis of their epistc-
mology, or to define reality In ferine dictated by
the means of knowing it.

§ 69. But within the general field of episte-
mology there has arisen another inane of even
Th« Relation greater significance in its hearing npon

of Knowledge *

to its object metaphysics. The first issue, as we

According to f ...

Realism, and have seen, has reference to the criterion

the Represent- „ ~ ., , , • i • i • , r

ative Theory, of knowledge, to tho possibility of ar-
riving at certainty about reality, and the choice of

means to that end. A second question arises, con-
cerning the relation between tfwknvwlc-dye and its
object or that which is known. This problem
does not at first appear as an epistemological diffi-
culty, but is due to the emphasis which tho moral
and religious interests of men give to the concep-
tion of the sell My knowing is a part of me, a
function o£ that soul whose welfare and eternal
happiness I am seeking to secure* Indeed, my
knowing is, so the wise men have always taught,
the greatest of my prerogatives. Wisdom appei^
tains to the philosopher, as folly to the fool But
though my knowledge be a part of me, and in me,
the same cannot, lightly at any rate, be said of
what I know. It would seem thajj I must dis-

• METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 173

tingiiish between the knowledge, which Is my act
or state, an event in my life, and the known, which
is object, and belongs to the context of the outer
world. The object of knowledge would then be
quite independent of tlie circumstance that I know
it. This theory has acquired the name of real-
ism,10 and is evidently as close to common sense
as any epistomological doctrine can be said to be.
If the knowledge consists in some sign or symbol
which in my mind stands for the object, but is

18 Much ambiguity attaches k» the terms " realism" and
"idealism" in current usage. The first had at one time in
the history of philonof>hy a much narrower meaning than
that which it now possesses. It was used to apply to those
who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of ideas,
univcreals, or general natures. Realists in this sense were
opposed to nominalists and conceptualists. Nominalism main-
tained the exclusive reality of individual substances, and re-
duced ideas to particular signs having, like the name, a purely
symbolical or descriptive value, Conceptualism nought to
unite realism and nominalism through the conception of
mind, or an individual substance whose meanings may pos-
sess univenml validity. Though this dispute was of funda-
mental importance throughout the medieval period, the
issues involved have now been restated. Realism in the old
sense will, if held, come within the scope of the broader
epistemological realism defined above. Nominalism is cov-
ered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism by modern
idealism.

The term idealism is sometimes applied to Plato on ac-
count of his designation of ideas as the ultimate realities.
This would be a natural use of the term, but in our own
day it has become inseparably associated with the doctrine

174 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

quite other than the object, realism in given the
form known as the representative theory. This
theory is due to a radical d induction between the
inner world of coiiseioii&neas and the outer world of
things, whereby in knowledge the outer object re-
quires a substitute that is qualified to belong to
the inner world. Whore, on the other hand, no
specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the
inner world> realism may flourish without the rep-
resentative theory. In such a ca«o the object would
be regarded as itself capable of entering into any
number of individual experiences or of remaining
outside them all^ and without on either account for-
feiting its identity. This view was taken for
granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in
our own day. During the intervening period
epistemology has been largely occupied with diffi-
culties inherent in the representative theory, and

which, attributes to being a dependence upon the activity
of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato m a realist,
and so opposed to idealism.

The term idealism is further confused on account of its
employment in literature and common speech to denote
the control of ideals. Although this is a kindred meaning,
the student of philosophy will gain little or no help from it,
and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term in its
technical use and permits it in t/hat capacity to acquire an
independent meaning.

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 175

from that discussion there lias emerged the theory
of idealism,17 the great rival theory to that of
realism.

§ 70. The representative theory contain** at
least one obvious difficulty. If the thinker be
The Relation confined to his ideas, and if the reality

of Knowledge

to its Object be at the same time beyond these ideas,

According to

idealism. how can he ever verify their report ?
Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be
true of that which belongs to a wholly different
category ? How under such circumstances can
that which is a part of Ihe idea be attributed
with any certainty* to the object? Once grant
that you know only your ideas, and the object
reduces to an unknown x9 which you retain to
account for the outward pointing or reference of
the ideas, but which is not missed if neglected.
The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
almost inevitably the next step. Why assume
that there is any object other than the state of
mind, since all positive content belongs to that
realm? The eighteenth century English philos-
opher, Bishop Berkeley, was accused by his con-
temporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even mad-
ness, for his boldness in accepting this argument
and drawing this conclusion:

47 See note, p, 173,

176 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and
feel it: and if 1 wen* out of my study I should nay it
existed; meaning thereby that if I wan in my study I
might perceive* it, or that some other spirit actually does
perceive it. Then* was an odor that is, it was smelt;
there was a sound — -that in, it was heard; a color or
figure, and it wan perceived by night or touch. Thin ia
all that I can understand by these and the like expres-
sions. For as to what in said of the absolute existence
of unthinking things, without any relation to their being
perceived, that in to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
esscis perdpi; nor ia it possible that they should have
any existence out of the minds or thinking thing which
perceives them . " ia

§ Yl. In tins paragraph Berkeley maintains
that it is essential to thingH, or at any rato to their
Phenomenal- qualities, that they lie perceived* This

jam! an^^1" principle when expressed an an episto-
Panptychiam. moi0gicaj[ or metaphysical generaliza-
tion, is called phenomenalism* But in another
phase of his thought Berkeley emphasizes the
perceiver, or spirit The theory which maintains
that the only real substances are these active Helves,
with their powers and their states, has been called
somewhat vaguely by the name of spiritualism.1®
Philosophically it shows a strong tendency to do-

18 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I,
Eraser's edition, p. 259.

10 To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears
the same name.

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 177

vclop Into cither panpsychism or transcendental-
ism. The former is radically empirical. Its
classic representative is the Gorman pessimist
Schopenhauer, who defined reality in terms of will
because that term signified to him most eloquently
the directly felt nature of the self. This imme-
diate revelation of the true inwardness of being
serves as the key to an " intuitive interpretation n
of the gradations of nature, and will finally awaken
a sense of the presence of the universal Will.

§ 72. Transcendentalism, or absolute idealism,
on the other hand, emphasizes the rational activity,
Transcendent- rather jfcftan the bare subjectivity, of the
Absolute* SGtf- ^U' *crm " transcendental ?? haw
idealism, become associated with this type of
idealism tlmnigh Kant, whose favorite form of
argument, the " transcendental deduction," was au
analysis of experience with a view to discovering
the categories, or formal principles of thought,
implied iu its meaning. From the Kantian
method arose the conception of a standard or abso-
lute mind for the standard experience. This mind
Is transcendental not in the sense of being alien,
but in the sense of exceeding the human mind in
the direction of what this means and strives to be.
It is the ideal or normal mind, in which the true

178 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

reality is contained, with all the* chaos of finite
experience) compounded and nMlmwd. There is
no being but the absolute, tho one all-iwlurtivo
spiritual life, in whom all things an1 inherent, and
whose perfection is the virtual implication of all
purposive activities.

"God's life . . . aeros the ono plan fulfilled
through all the manifold lives, tht* mngh* ronHrioUHness
winning its purpose by virtue* of all the ideas, of all the
individual selves, and of all the lives. No finite view IB
wholly illusory. Every finite intent taken preeindy in
its wholeness is fulfilled in the Absolute* The leant life
is not neglected, the mo$t, fleeting art in a rerognixed
part of the world's moaning. You are for the divine
view all that you know yourself kt this mutant to tx\
But you are alao infinitely more. The preeioumtetw of
your present purposes to yourself is only a hint of that
preeiousness which in the end links their meaning to the
entire realm of Being."10

The fruitfulness of the philosopher'** reflective
doubt concerning his own powers is now evident*
Problems are raised "which are not merely urgent
in themselves, but which present wholly now alter-
natives to the metaphysician. Bationaliam and
empiricism, realism and idealism, are doctrines
which, thongh springing from the epistemological
query concerning the possibility of knowledge, may

20 Quoted from Professor Josiah Royee's The World aiwl
the Individual* First Series, pp. 426-427,

, METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 179

determine an entire philosophical system. They
bear upon every question of metaphysics, whether
the fundamental conception of being, or the prob-
lems of the world's unity, origin, and significance
for human life.

CI! AFTER VII

THE NORMATIVE HCIKNTEH AND THE t*ROBLKMB OF
.RELIGION

§ 73, THERE are three nets of problonw whoso
general philosophical important dfprndH upon the

The Normative phlCC which metaphywk*H UHSltflhS t<> tliO

mem. human critical faculties Man pannes
judgment upon that which chums to l>o trut9 beau-
tiful, or good, thus referring ''to itleulrt an<! ntancl-
ards that define theHo values. Attempt** to make
those ideals explicit, and to formulate principles
which regulate their attainment, have resulted in
the development of the three so-called normative
sciences: logic, mfhetics, and ethics. These sci-
ences are said to owe their origin to the Socratic
method, and it is indeed certain that their prob-
lem is closely related to the general rationalistic
attitude.1 In Plato's dialogue, " Protagoras,"
one may observe the manner of the inception
of both ethics and logic. The question at issue
between Socrates and the master sophist Pro-

1 Of. § 68.
180

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION isi

tagoras, is concerning the possibility of teach-
ing virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the
discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish,
expounding in sot speeches the tradition and usage
in which such a powsihility is accepted. Socrates,
on the other hand, conceives the issue quite differ-
ently. One can wither afiinn nor deny anything
of virtue unless one knows what is meant by iL
Even the poswossion of nueh a meaning was scarcely
recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Soc-
rates's quentJotiH to attribute to the various vir-
tues an external grouping analogous to that of the
parts of the face. • But Socrates shows that since
justice, temperance*, courage, and the like, are ad-
mittedly similar iu that they are all virtues, they
nrast have in common some essence, which is vir-
tue in general. This ho seeks to define in tho
terms, virlua is knowledge* The interest which
Socratee here shows in tho reduction of the ordi-
nary moral judgments to a system centering in
some single fundamental principle, is the ethical
interest. But this is at tho name time a particxt-
lar application of tho general rationalistic method
of definition, and of the general rationalistic poB-
tulate that one knows nothing until one can form
unitary and determinate conceptions. The recog-

182 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

nition which Socrates thua given to criteria of
knowledge is an exprnwion of the logical interest
In a certain sense, indeed, tho, whole labor of Soc-
rates was in the cause of the logical interest. For
he sought to demonstrate that belief in not neces-
sarily knowledge; that belief may or may not bo
true. In order that it shall be friu% and con-
stitute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and
accompanied by an understanding of its object
Socrates thus set the problem of logic, the discov-
ery, namely, of those characters by virtue of the
possession of which belief is knowledge.

§ 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and
thus distinguishes itself from the psychological ac«
TiMAflUi*. count of tho elements of the believing

Uons

o* Logic, state.2 But it is not possible sharply
to sunder psychology and logic. This is due to
the fact that the general principles which make
belief true, may be regarded quite independently
of this fact They then become the most general
truth, belonging to the absolute, archetypal realm,
or to the mind of God.s When the general prin-
ciples of certainty are so regarded, logic can be

*The Socratic distinction between the logical and the
psychological treatment of belief finds its best expression in
Plato's Gorgias, especially, 454, 455, Of. also | 29.

3 Thus, e. g. Hegel See § 179. Of. alaorJI 199, 200,

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 183

distinguished from metaphysics only by adding to
the study of the general principles themselves,
the study of the special conditions (mainly psy-
chological) under "which they may be realized
among men. In the history of human thought the
name of logic belongs to the study of this attain-
ment of truth, as the terms aesthetics and ethics
belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty
and goodness.4 It is evident that logic will
have a peculiar importance for the rationalist.
For the empiricist, proposing to report upon,
things as they are given, will tend on the whole to
maintain that knowledge has no properties save
those which are given to it by its special subject-
matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute
relationship between the normative sciences and
the other branches of philosophy.

§ 75. Logic is the formulation, as independently
as possible of special subject-matter, of that which
Logic Deals conditions truth in belief. Since logic

mththeMost

General Con- is concerned with truth only in so far

ditions of .. -I/-ITJ* j •

Truth in Belief, as it is predicated oi beliei, and since
belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be
defined as the formulation of the most general
principles of knowledge. The principles so for-
* 4 Cf . § 84.

184 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

mulated would he those virtually u«o.fl to justify
belief or to disprove the imputation of error.

§ 76. What is called formal logic is animated
with the hope of extracting thoao formulations
The Parts of dirpctly from an analysis of the pro-
<*<tow> of thought The mo»t general
logicai Principle which have appeared
observation. jn ^ historical development of formal
logic are definition, salf-evidmce, inference^ and
observation. Each of these has been given special
study, and each has given ri»o to special issues.

Definition has to do with the formation of con-
cepts^ or determinate and unequivocal meanings.
The universality of such concepts, and their conse-
quent relation to particular things, was, as we have
seen, investigated at a very early date, and gave
rise to the great realistic-nominalistic controversy.5
A large part of the logical discussion in the Pla-
tonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier
" eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the
sophists, and consisting in the adroit use of am-
biguity.6 It is natural that in its first conscious
self-criticism thought should discover the need of
definite terms. The perpetual importance of defi-
5 See § 69, note.

8 The reader will find a good illustration of eristic in Plato's
Euthydemm, 275. r'

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 185

nition has been largely due to the great prestige in
modern philosophy of the method of geometry,
which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as
the model for systems of necessary truth.

Self-evidence is the principle according to which
conviction of truth follows directly from an under-
standing of meaning. In the practice of his in-
tellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that
thought is capable of bringing forth its own cer-
tainties. And rationalism has att all times re-
garded truth as ultimately accredited by internal
marks recognizable by reason. Such truth ar-
rived at antecedent* to acquaintance with instances
is called a priori, as distinguished from a posteriori
knowledge, or observation after the fact. There
can be no principles of self -evidence, but logicians
have always been more or less concerned with the
enumeration of alleged self-evident principles,
notably those of contradiction and identity. A
philosophical interest in the mathematical method
has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a
view rather to their f ruitfulness than their intrin-
sic truth. Indeed, the interest in self-evident truth
has always been subordinate to the interest in sys-
tematic truth, and the discovery of first principles
most commonly serves to determine the relative

1S6 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

priority of definite* concepts, or the correct point
of departure for a series of inferences.

The greater part of tin* famous Aristotelian
logic consists in a study of infcrrnrr,, or ike
derivation of n&w knowlrdyc from old knowledge,
Aristotle sought to set down and classify every
method of advancing from premiBes, The most
Important form of inference) which he defined was
the syllogism, a scheme of reasoning to a conclu-
sion by means of two premises having one term in
common* 'From the premises " all men are mor-
tal ?? and " Socrates is a man,11 one may conclude
that " Socrates is mortal" Tim is an instance
not only of the syllogism in general, but of its
most important ** mood/' the subtmmption of a
particular case under a general rule. Since the
decline of Aristotle*s influence in philosophy there
has been a notable decrease of interest in the dif-
ferent forms of inference ; though its fundamental
importance as the very bone and sinew of reason-
ing or deductive thinking has never been chal-
lenged. Its loss of preeminence is in part due to
the growth of empiricism, stimulated by the writr
ings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century,
and fostered by the subsequent development of ex-
perimental science.

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 187

Observation is the fundamental logical prin-
ciple of empiricism. For a radical empiricism,
knowledge would consist of descriptive generaliza-
tions based upon the summation of instances.
That branch of logic which deals with the advance
from individual instances to general principles, is
called inductive logic. It has resulted in the an-
nouncement of canons of accuracy and freedom
from preconception, and in the methodological
study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.

Eules for observation directed to the end of discov-

«*

ering causes, constitute the most famous part of
the epoch-making Jogic of J. S. Mills.7

§ 77. There are two significant tendencies in
contemporary logic. Theories of the judgment
Present have arisen in the course of an attempt
ThaonToT *° define the least complexity that must

the Judgment j^ pregen^ £n order that thought shall

come within the range of truth and error. It is
evident that no one either knows or is in error
until he takes some attitude which lays claim to
knowledge. Denoting by the term judgment this
minimum of complexity in knowledge, an impor-
tant question arises as to the sense in which the

7 The reader can find these rules, and the detail of the
traditional formal logic, in any elementary text-book, such
as, e. g., Jevons: Elements of Logic.

188 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY <

judgment involves the jwhjoot, predicate, and
copula that arc commonly pn-nont in it« propoai-
tional form.

1 78. But a rm»rc* important logical develop-
ment has been dnc in the remit analysis of (infinite
priority of accredited Hvaft'iiw of knowledge. The
Concept*, fttudy of tin* fundamental eoweptiona of
inathomatics and im»chani<*H, tnp*thf»r with an (%x-
aniination «f tlu*. HVHti*matir. ntructnro of thm* HCI-
cneoB, fitrnirthoH tho ntont n<>taht*» rnwn* Th<»r<? urn

two BtwBOB in which Htirh Ht.\u!i«*H may IH* r<»pird«<l

» *'

an logical. In tin* firnt p!«ct% in H<> far an they
bring to light tho inner cohiTrftw* f»f any }>ndy of
truth, tho kind of ovidowv ujw»n whtrh it ro.Ht«,
an<l the typo of formal pi'rfortion which if, «»pk^
thoy differ from formal logic only in that they
derive their criteria from ninety rather than from
tho direct analynirt of the* |»rcH*«*<hiri» of thought
And Binco formal logic, nuwt itwlf miiko t«xjx»ri-
montn, this dlffcwnco In not ti rmiirnl one* The
study of camm tcncln chiefly to enrich wth&datagy,
or tho knowledge* of the. H-peeli'il crtteriii of H(x^ial
sciences. In the m*con(i jilnce, mic*h Ht!tdie» nerve
to define tho relatively few wimple trutha which
are oommon to the relatively ninny complex truths.
A study of tlie ftmndationt of aritimwtte rovealft

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 189

more elementary conceptions, such as class and
order, that must be employed in the very definition
of number itself, and so are implied in every
numerical calculation. It appears similarly that
the axioms of geometry, are special axioms which
involve the acceptance of more genera] axioms or
indefinables.8 Logic in this sense, then, is the
enumeration of conceptions and principles in the
order of their indispensableness to knowledge.
And while it must be observed that the most gen-
eral conceptions and principles of knowledge are
not necessarily those most significant for the exis-
tent world, nevertheless the careful analysis which
such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruit-
ful for metaphysics than for logic.

§ 79. Esthetics is the formulation, as inde-
pendently as possible of special subject-matter,
Aesthetics of that which conditions beauty. As
Most General* logic commonly refers to a judgment of

truth, so aesthetics at any rate refers to
a Judgment implied in appreciation.
tic Tendencies. But ^fe it is g€nerally admitted that

truth itself is by no means limited to the form of
the judgment, the contrary is frequently main-

8 What is called "the algebra of logic" seeks to obtain
an unequivocal symbolic expression for these truths.

190 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY f

tained with reference to beauty. The aphorism,
De gustibus non est disputandum, expresses a com-
moil opinion to the effect that beauty is not a prop-
erty belonging to the object of which it ia predi-
cated, but a property generated by the appreciative
consciousness. According to this opinion there can
be no beauty except in the case of an object's pres-
ence in an individual experience. Investigators
must of necessity refuse to leave individual caprice
in complete possession of the field, but they have in
many cases occupied themselves entirely with the
state of aesthetic enjoyment in the hope of discov-
ering its constant factors. ThVopponing tendency
defines certain formal characters which the beau-
tiful object must possess. Evidently the latter
school will attribute a more profound philosophi-
cal importance to the conception, of beauty, since
for them it is a principle that obtains in the world
of being. This was the first notable contention,
that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid
upon the subjective aspect of the {pathetic experi-
ence, great metaphysical importance may be at-
tached to it, where, as in the case of the German
Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as
a spiritual life which is to be appreciated rather
than understood.

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 191

As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has
manifested itself in aesthetics to deal with groups
of objects that He within its province, rather than
directly with its concepts and principles. The
first special treatise on. aesthetics, the " Poetics "
of Aristotle, belongs to this type of inquiry, as
does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the
formulation of general principles.

§ 80. Ethics f the oldest and most popular of the
normative sciences, is the formulation, as indeperv-
Ethics D«aia dently as possible of special subject-mat-
Con* ^rf °f that wJwch conditions goodness
of 0^ QQftjLfah Ethics is commonly con-
Goodness. ccrned with, goodness only in so far as
it is predicated of conduct, or of character, which
is a more or less permanent disposition to conduct
Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to consti-
tute moral goodness, ethics may bo defined as the
formulation of the general principles of morality.
The principles so formulated woxild be those vir-
tually employed to justify conduct, or to disprove
the imputation of immorality.

§ 81. The student of this science is confronted
with a very considerable diversity of method and
differentiation of problems. The ear-

of the Good.

li^t and most profound opposition of

192 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY r

doctrine in ethics arose from the differences of in-
terpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is
capable. His doctrine is, as we have* seen, ver-
bally expressed in the proposition, ritiue *,s* knowl-
edge. Socrates was primarily concerned to show
that there is no real living without; an understand-
ing of the significance of life. To live* well is to
know the end of life, the good of it all, and to
govern action with reference to that end. Virtue
is therefore the practical wisdom that enables one
to live consistently with his real intention. But
what is the real intention t the end or good of life?
In the " Protagoras,'* where n*to represents Soc-
rates as expounding Inn position, virtue is inter-
preted to mean prudence, or foresight of pleasur-
able and painful consequences* He who knows,
possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt
himself to the real situation and to gain the end
of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek pleasure, but
only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.

"And do you, Protagoras, like the ra«t of the world,
call some pleasant things evil anil Home painful things
good ? — for I am rather disposed to Hiiy that things are
good in as far as they aro pleasant, if they have no con-
sequences of another sort, and m m far as they aro painful
they are bad."*

8 Plato: Protagorm, 351. Translation J^y Jowett.

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 193

According to this view painful things are good
only when they lead eventually to pleasure, and
pleasant things evil only when their painful con-
sequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence
moral differences reduce to differences of skill in
the universal quest for pleasure, and sensible grati-
fication is the ultimate standard of moral value.
This ancient doctrine, known as hedonism) express-
ing as it does a part of life that will not suffer
itself for long to he denied, is one of the great

perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the

<*
course of many centuries it has passed through a

number of phases* varying its conception of pleas-
ure from the tranquillity of the AVISO man to the
sensuous titillations of the sybarite, and from the
individualism of the latter to the nniversalism of
the humanitarian. But in every case it shows a
respect for the natural man, praising morality for
its disciplinary and instrumental value in the ser-
vice of such human wants as are the outgrowth of
the animal instinct of self-preservation.

§ 82. But if a man's life be regarded as a truer
representation of his ideals than is his spoken
RationaHsm. theory, there is little to identify Soc-
rates with the hedonists. At the conclusion of the
defence of hi» own life, which Plato puts into his

194 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY r

mouth in the well-known " Apology/' be speaks
thus :

" When my sons are grown up, I would ank you, 0 my
friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble
them, as I have troubled you, if they swm to care about
riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they
pretend to be something when they are really nothing,-—
then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not earing
about that for which they ought to care, and thinking
that they are something when they are really nothing."10

It is plain that the man Soeratoa eared little for
the pleasurable or painful conHc»quonoo8 of his acts,
provided they were worthy of the high calling of

human nature, A man's virtue! would now Reem

*
to possess an intrinsic nobility, * If knowledge ho

virtue, then on this basis it must l>o IKKUIUHO knowl-
edge is itself excellent. Virtue as knowledge
contributes to the good by constituting it. We
xneet here with the rationalititw strum in ethics.
It praises conduct for the inherent worth which it
may possess if it express that reason which the
Stoics called " the ruling part." The riches of
wisdom consist for the hedonist in their purchase
of pleasure. For the rationalist, on the other
hand, wisdom is not coin, but itself the very sub-
stance of value.

§ 83. Rationalism has undergone modifications
« Plato: Apology, 41. Trandation by Jowett,

^NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND EELIGION 195

even more significant than those of hedonism,
an(i involving at least one radically

and Pietism. /• , • A .•,

Rigorism and new £rouP °* conceptions. Among the

Grecks rationalism and hedonism alike
are eudwmonistic. They aim to portray the ful-
ness of life that makes " the happy man." In the
ethics of Aristotle, whose synthetic mind weaves
together these different strands, the Greek ideal
finds its most complete expression as " the high-
minded man/7 with all his powers and trappings.
But the great spiritual transformation which ac-
companied the decline of Greek culture and the
rise of Christianity, brought with it a new moral
sensibility, which finds in man no virtue of him-
self, but only through the grace of God.

"And the virtues themselves/' says St. Augustine,
" if they bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather
than virtues; for although they are regarded by many
as truly moral when they are desired as ends in them-
selves and not for the sake of something else, they are,
nevertheless, inflated and arrogant, and therefore not to
be viewed as virtues but as vices/'11

The new ideal is that of renunciation, obedience,
and resignation. Ethically this expresses itself in
pietism. Virtue is good neither in itself nor on
account of its consequences, but because it is con.-

11 Quoted by Paulsen in his System of Ethics. Transla-
tion by Thilly, p. 09.

196 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 0

formable to the will of God. The, extreme inward-
ness of this ideal is characteristic of an age that
despaired of attainment, whether of pleasure or
knowledge. To all, even the pemx:'iited, it in per-
mitted to obey, and BO gain entrance into the
kingdom of the children of God, Hut as every
special study tends to rely upon iin own concep-
tions, pietism, involving as it doen a relation to
God, is replaced by rigorixtoi and intuUionixm.
The former doctrine defines virtue in termn of the
inner attitude which it express. It must l:>e done
in the spirit of dutifulnenn, because ow ontjhl, and
through sheer respect for the *law which one's
moral nature affirms. Inhdiwnism ban attempted
to deal with the source of the moral law by defin-
ing conscience as a special faculty or sonao, quali-
fied to pass directly upon moral questions, and
deserving of implicit obediences. It is character-
istic of this whole tendency to look for the spring
of virtuous living, not in a good which such living
obtains, but in a law to which its owes obedience.
§ 84. This third general ethical tendency has
thus been of the greatest importance in emphasis-
Duty «ad ing the consciousness of duty* and has
brought both hedonism and rationalism.
n of its fundamental im-

^NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 197

portance. Ethics must deal not only with the
moral ideal, but also with the ground of its appeal
to the individual, and his obligation to pursue it.
In connection with this recognition of moral re-
sponsibility, the problem of human freedom has
come to be regarded in the light of an inevitable
point of contact between ethics and metaphysics.
That which is absolutely binding upon the human
will can be determined only in view of some
theory of its ultimate nature. On this account

the rationalistic and hedonistic motives are no

longer abstractly sundered, as in the days of the
Stoics and Epieijfreans, but tend to be absorbed in
broader philosophical tendencies. Hedonism ap-
pears as the sequel to naturalism ; or, more rarely,
as part of a theistic system whose morality is
divine legislation enforced by an appeal to motives
of pleasure and pain. Eationalism, on the other
hand, tends to be absorbed in rationalistic or ideal-
istic philosophies, where man's rational nature is
construed as his bond of kinship with the universe.
Ethics has exhibited from the beginning a ten-
dency to universalize its conceptions and take the
central place in metaphysics. Thus with Plato
good conduct was but a special case of goodness,
the good being the most general principle of

198 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

reality.12 In modern times Fichto and his school
have founded an ethical metaphysics upon the con-
ception of duty.13 In these canes ethics can be dis-
tinguished from metaphysics only by adding to
the study of the good or of duty, a study of the
special physical, psychological, and nocial condi-
tions under which goodness and dutifulncas may
obtain in human life. It is possible to attach the
name of ethics, and *wo have aeon the same to bo
true of logic, either to a realm of ideal truth or
to that realm wherein the ideal is realised in
humanity.

§ 85. A systematic study of ethics requires that
the virtues, or types of moral practice, shall bo
The virtues, interpreted in the light of the central

Customs, and

institutions, conception of good, or of conscience.
Justice, temperance, wisdom, and courage were
praised by the Greeks. Christianity added self-
sacrifice; humility , purity t and benevolence. Those
and other virtues have been defined, justified, and
co-ordinated with the aid of a standard of moral
value or a canon of duty*

There is in modern ethics a pronounced ten-
dency, parallel to those already noted in logic and
aesthetics, to study such phenomena belonging to
13 Cf. §160. »Cf, £177.

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 199

its field as have become historically established.
A very considerable investigation o£ custom, insti-
tutions, and other social forces has led to a con-
tact of ethics with anthropology and sociology
scarcely less significant than that with metaphysics.

§ 80. In that part of his philosophy in which
he deals with faith, the great German philosopher
The Problems Kant mentions God, Freedom, and Tm-

of Religion. 7 7

The Special mortality as the three pre-eminent re-
interests of
Faith. ligicms interests. Religion, as we have

seem, sets up a social relationship between man
and that massive drift of tilings which determines
his destiny. Of the two terms of this relation,
God signifies the latter, while freedom and immor-
tality are prerogatives which religion bestows upon
the former. Man, viewed from the stand-point of
religion as an object of special interest to the uni-
verse, is said to have a soul ; and by virtue of this
soul he is said to be free and immortal, when
thought of as having a life in certain, senses inde-
pendent of its immediate natural environment
The attempt to make this faith theoretically in-
telligible has led to the philosophical disciplines
known as theology and psychology.1**
u Concerning tke duty of philosophy to icligion in these

200 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

§ 87. Theology, as a branch of philosophy, deals
with the proof and the nature of God. Since
Theoio " God " is not primarily a theoretical

Deals with the coliceptlon, the proof of God IB not
Nature and l 7 *

Proof of God. properly a philosophical problem. His-
torically, this task has been assumed as a legacy
from Christian apologetics; and it has involved,
at any rate so far as European philosophy is con-
cerned, the definition of ultimate being in such
spiritual terms as make possible the relation with
man postulated, in Christianity. For this it has
been regarded as sufficient to ascribe to the world an
underlying unity capable of bearing the predicates
of perfection, omnipotence, and omniscience. Each
proof of God has defined him pre-eminently in
terms of aome one of these his attributes,

§ 88. The ontological proof of God hold the
foremost place in philosophy's contribution, to
Christianity up to the eighteenth cen-

ical Proof of . „

God. tury. This proof infers the existence

from the ideal of God, and so approaches the nat-
ure of God through the attribute of perfection.
It owes the form in which it was accepted in the
Middle Ages and Renaissance to St Anselm,

matters, Of. Descartes: Meditations t Dedication, Transla-
tion by Veitch, p. 81. »

NORMATIVE SCIENCES'^J JffiUQKfisr 201

Archbishop of Canterbury at the close of the
eleventh century. He argued from the idea of a
most perfect being to its existence, on the ground
that non-existence, or existence only in idea,, would
contradict its perfection. It is evident that the
force of this argument depends upon the necessity
of the idea of God. The argument was accepted
in Scholastic 'Philosophy15 largely because of the
virtual acceptance of this necessity. Mediaeval
thought was under the dominance of the philosoph-
ical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and through them
rationalism had come to be the unquestioned start-
ing-point for all thought 'For Plato reality and
rationality meant one and the same thing, so that
the ultimate reality was the highest principle of
rationality, which he conceived to be the idea of
the good. In the case of Aristotle the ideal
of rationality was conceived to determine the
course of the coamical evolution as its immanent
final cause. But in itself it was beyond the world,
or transcendent. For Plato perfection itself is
reality, whereas for Aristotle perfection determines
the hierarchical order of natural substances. The
latter theory, more suitable to the uses of Chris-

l& The school-philosophy that flourished from the eleventh
to the fifteenth oantury, under the authority of the church.

202 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY *

tianity, because It distingnirfied between God and
the world, waa incorporated into the* great school
systems. But both theories contain the iwencf* of
the ontological proof of God. In thought one fleeks
the perfect truth, and ponilB it an nt onw tho eul-
minatioB of insight and the meaning of life. The
ideal of God is therefore a neewnary idea, Invauao
implied in all the effort of thought m the object
capable of finally satisfying it. St. Antrim adds
little to the force of this argument, and doeH much
to obscure its real significance.

In stating the ontological argument tho term
perfection has been exproHnly eHipha«ixe<l, iK'eatiHc^
it may be taken to embrace botli truth and good-
ness. Owing to a habit of tluntght, due in the
main to Plato, it was long oufltonmry to regard
degrees of truth and goodness as interchangeable,
and as equivalent to degrees of reality* Tho em
realissiinwn was in its complctonoBH the highest
object both of the faculty of cognition and of the
moral will. But even in the scholastic period
these two different aspects of the ideal were clearly
recognized, and led to sharply divergent tenden-
cies. More recently they have been divided and
embodied in separate arguments. The cpistcmo-
logical argument defines God in terms of that

^NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 203

lute truth which is referred to in every judgment.
Under the influence of idealism this absolute truth
has taken the form of, a universal mind, or all-
emhracing standard experience, called more briefly
the absolute. The ethical argument, on the other
hand, conceives God as the perfect goodness im-
plied in the moral struggley or the power through
which goodness is made to triumph in the universe
to the justification of moral faith. While lie
former of these arguments identifies God with
being, the latter defines God in terms of the intent
or outcome of being. Thus, while the epistemo-
logical argument does not distinguish God and the
world, the latter does so, assuming that independent
reality can be attributed to the stages of a process
and to the purpose that dominates it.

§ 89. The cosmological proof of God approaches
him through the attribute of creative omnipotence.
The Cosmo- The common principle of causal ex-

logical Proof .

of God. planation refers the origin of natural
events to similar antecedent events. But there
must be some first cause from which the whole
series is derived, a cause which is ultimate, suffi-
cient to itself, and the responsible author of the
world. Because God's function as creator was a
part of the Christian teaching, and because expla-

204 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 9

nation by causes Is habitual with common sense,
this argument lias had great vogue. But in phi-
losophy it has declined in importance, c'hiufly be-
cause it has been absorbed in arguments which deal
•with the "kind of causality proj>or to a iirst cause
or world-ground. The argument that follows is
a case in point.

§ 90. The ideological proof argues that the
world can owe its origin only to an intelligent first

The TeleologI- C&US6. TllO OVldtmcO for tlllH 18 fltr-
cal Proof of

God. nislied by the cunning contrivances and

beneficent adaptations of nature. These could not
have come about through chance or the working
of mechanical forces, but only through the fore-
sight of a rational will This argument originally
infers God from the character of nature and his-
tory; and the extension of mechanical principles
.to organic and social phenomena, especially as
stimulated by Darwin's principle of natural selec-
tion, has tended greatly to diminish its importance.
When, on the other hand, for nature and history
there are substituted the intellectual and moral
activities themselves, and the inference is made to
the ideal which they imply, the teleological argu-
ment merges into the ontological. But the old-
fashioned statement of it remains i& the form of

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 205

religious faith, and in this capacity it has had the
approval even of Hume and Kant, the philosophers
who have contributed most forcibly to its over-
throw as a demonstration of God. They agree
that the acknowledgment of God in nature and
history is the sequel to a theistic belief, and an in-
evitable attitude on the part of the religious con-
sciousness.

§ 91. Another group of ideas belonging to philo-
sophical theology consists of three generalizations
God and respecting God's relation to the world,
^nown as theism, pantheism, and deism.

and
Pantheism. AlthougB, theoretically, these are corol-

laries of the different arguments for God, two of
them, theism and pantheism, owe their importance
to their rivalry as religious tendencies. Theism
emphasizes that attitude to God which recognizes
in him an historical personage, in some sense dis-
tinct from both the world and man, which are his
works and yet stand in an external relationship
to him. It expresses the spirit of ethical and
monotheistic religion, and is therefore the natural
belief of the Christian. Pantheism appears in
primitive religion as an animistic or polytheistic
sense of the presence of a divine principle diffused
throughout naiure. But it figures most notably

206 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY „

in the history of religions, in the highly reflective
Brahmanism of India, In sharp opposition to
Christianity, this religion preaches the* Indivisible
unity of the world and the illusorinoHH of the In-
dividual's sense of his own independent reality.
In spite of the fact that such a doctrine in alien
to the spirit of Christianity, it enters into Chris-
tian theology through the Influence of philosophy.
The theoretical idea of God tends, an \ve have seen,
to the identification of him with the world an its
most real principle. Or it bestows upon him a
nature so logical and formal, and 00 far removed
from the characters of humanity, an to forbid his
entering into personal or social relations. Such
reflections concerning God find their religious ex-
pression in. a mystical sense of unity, which has in
many cases either entirely replaced or profoundly
modified the theistic strain In Christianity, In
current philosophy pantheism appears in the epia-
temological argument -which Identifies God with
being; while the chief "bulwark of theism Is the
ethical argument, with its provision for a distinc-
tion between the actual world and ideal principle
of evolution.

§ 92. While theism and pantheism appear to be
permanent phases in the philosophy of religion,

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 207

deism is the peculiar product of the eighteenth cen-
Deism. tury. It is based upon a repudia-

tion of supernaturalism and " enthusiasm," on the
one hand, and a literal acceptance of the cosmo-
logical and teleological proofs on the other. Ee-
ligions, like all else, were required, in this epoch
of clear thinking, to submit to the canons of experi-
mental observation and practical common sense.
These authorize only a natural religion, the ac-
knowledgment in pious living of a God who, hav-
ing contrived this natural world, has given it over
to the rule, not of priests and prophets, but of
natural law. The^ artificiality of its conception of
God, and the calculating spirit of its piety, make
deism a much less genuine expression of the re-
ligious experience than either the moral chivalry
of theism or the intellectual and mystical exalta-
tion of pantheism.

§ 93. The systematic development of philosophy
leads to the inclusion of conceptions of God within
Metaphysics ^e problem of metaphysics, and the
and Theology, ^fcordination of the proof of God to
the determination of the fundamental principle of
reality. There will always remain, however, an
outstanding theological discipline, whose function
it is to interpret worship, or the living religious

208 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

attitude, In terms of the theoretical principles of
philosophy.

§ 94. Psychology is Ihe theory of Ike soul. As
we have already seen, the rise of Hceptieism directs
Psychology is attention from the object of thought to

the Theory of

the Soul. the thinker, and HO eniphuHizea the self as
a field for theoretical investigation. But the orig-
inal and the dominating interest in tho «<*lf is a
practical one. The precept, yv&fft omuroj/, has
its deepest justification in tho concern for tho
salvation of one's soul. In primitive and half-
instinctive belief the «df is recognised in practical
relations. In its uninnntic pJiftftc thin belief ad-
mitted of such relations with all living creatures,
and extended the conception of life very generally
to natural processes. Thus in tho beginning the
self was doubtless indistinguishable from the vital
principle. In the first treatise on psychology, tho
"Trepi ¥vx»}9w of Aristotle, this interpretation
finds a place in theoretical philosophy. For Aris-
totle the soul is the entekchy of the body—that
function or activity which makes a man of it.
He recognized, furthermore, three stages in this
activity : the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls,
or the vegetable, animal, and distinctively human
natures, respectively. The rational soul, in its

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 209

own proper activity, is man's highest prerogative,
the soul to be saved. By virtue of it man rises
above bodily conditions, and lays hold on the
divine and eternal. But Plato, who, as we have
seen, was ever ready to grant reality to the ideal
apart from the circumstances of its particular em-
bodiment, had already undertaken to demonstrate
the immortality of the soul on the ground of its
distinctive nature.10 According to his way of
thinking, the soul's essentially moral nature made
it incapable of destruction through the operation,
of natural causes. It is evident, then, that there
were already ideaa*in vogue capable of interpret-
ing the Christian teaching concerning the exist-
ence of a Houlj or of an inner essence of man capa-
ble of being made an object of divine interest.

§ 95. The immediate effect of Christianity was
to introduce into philosophy as one of its cardinal
Spiritual doctrines the theory of a spiritual being,
Substance constituting the true self of the indi-
vidtial, and separable from the body. The differ-
ence recognized in Plato and Aristotle between the
divine spark and the appetitive and perceptual
parts of human nature was now emphasized. The
former (frequently called the " spirit," to distin-
i* Especially ia the Phcedo,

210 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY ,

guish it from the lower soul) was defined aa a
substance having the attributes of thought and
will. The fundamental argument for its existence
was the immediate, appeal to self-consciousness;
and it was further defined as indestructible, on
the ground of its being utterly discontinuous and
incommensurable with its material environment
This theory survives at the present day in the con-
ception of pure activity, but on the* whole the* attri-
butes of the soul have superseded its Bubatanee.

§ 90. Iniclledualwm and voluntarism arc the
two rival possibilities o? emphasis when the soul is
defined in terms of ft* known activities.

and Vohmtax- , , ,

ism. Wherever the essence of personality is

in question, as also occurs in the ease <>f theology,
thought and will present their respective claims
to the place of first importance. Intellertualimi
would make will merely the concluding phase, of
thought, while voluntarism would reduce thought
to one of the interests of a general appetency. It
is evident that idealistic theories will bo much
concerned with this question of priority. It is
also true, though less evident, that intollectualism,
since it emphasizes the general and objective
features of the mind, tends to subordinate the
individual to the "universal; while,, voluntarism,

MOEMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 211

emphasizing desire and action, is relatively indi-
vidualistic, and so, since there are many indi-
viduals, also pluralistic.17

§97. The question of the freedom of the will
furnishes a favorite controversial topic in philos-
Frcedom of ophy. For the interest at stake is no
Necessitarian- less than tta individual's responsibility
S ^Tin1"1" before man and God for his good or

determinism. ^ ^^ Jt kearg a}y,e upon SGienGQf

religion, and philosophy, and is at the same time
a question of most fundamental practical impor-
tance. But this diffusion of the problem has led

•»

to so considerable^ a complication of it that it be-
comes necessary in outlining it to define two issues.
In the first place, the concept of freedom is de-
signed to express generally the distinction between
man and the rest of nature. To make man in all
respects the product and creature of his natural
environment would be to deny freedom and accept
the radically necessitarian doctrine. The question
still remains, however, as to the causes which domi-
nate man. He may be free from nature, and yet
be ruled by God, or by distinctively spiritual
causes, such as ideas or character. Where in gen-
eral the will is regarded as submitting only to a
17 Schopenhauef is a notable exception. Cf. §§ 135, 138,

212 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY -

spiritual causation proper to its own realm, the
conception is best named determinism; though in
the tradition of philosophy it is hold to be a doc-
trine of freedom, because contrasted with the
necessitarianism above defined. There remains
indeterminism, which attributes to the will a spon-
taneity that makes possible the direct presence to
it of genuine alternatives. The Issue may here
coincide with that between intellectual inm and
voluntarism. If, e.g., in God's act of creation, his

ideals and standards are prior to his fiat, his con-
%

duct is determined ; whereas it is free in the radi-
cal or indcterministie sense if bib ideals themselves
are due to his sheer will. This theory involves at
a certain point in action the absence of cause, On
this account the free will is often identified with
chance, in which case it loses its distinction from
nature, and we have swung round the circle.

§ 98. There is similar complexity in the prob-
lem concerning immortality. Were the extreme
immortality, claims of naturalism to bo established,

Survival and

there would be no ground whatsoever
upon which to maintain the immortality of man,
mere dust returning unto dust. The philosophical
concept of immortality is due to the supposition
that the quintessence of the individual's nature is

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 213

divine.18 But several possibilities are at this
point open to us. The first would maintain the
survival after death of a recognizable and discrete
personality. Another would suppose a preserva-
tion after death, through being taken up into the
life of God. Still another, the theory commonly
maintained on the ground of rationalistic and
idealistic metaphysics, would deny that immortal-
ity has to do with life after death, and affirm that
it signifies the perpetual membership of the human
individual in a realm of eternity through the truth
or virtue that is in him. "'But this interpretation
evidently leaves open the question of the immor-
tality of that which is distinctive and personal in
human nature.

§ 99. So far we have followed the fortunes only
of the " spirit " of man. What of that lower soul
The Natural through which he is identified with the

Science of °

Psychology, fortunes of his body? When philos-

Its Problems

and Method, ophy gradually ceased, in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, to be " the handmaid of
religion," there arose a renewed interest in that
part of human nature lying between the strictly

18 It is interesting, however, to observe that current spirit-
ualistic theories maintain a naturalistic theory of immor-
tality, verifiable, it is alleged, in certain extraordinary
empirical observations.

214 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY r

physiological functions, on the one hand, and
thought and will on the other. Descartes and
Spinoza analyzed what they called the " passions/'
meaning such states of mind as are conditioned
by a concern for the interests of the body. At a
later period, certain English philosophers, follow-
ing Locke, traced the dependence of ideas upon
the senses. Their method was that of introspec-
tion, or the direct examination by the individual
of his own ideas, and for the sake of noting their
origin and composition from simple factors. The
lineal descendants of these same, English philos-
ophers defined more carefully f the process of asso-
ciation, whereby the complexity and sequence of
ideas are brought about,, and madn certain con-
jectures as to its dependence upon properties
and transactions in the physical brain. These are
the three main philosophical sources of what has
now grown to be the separate natural science of
psychology. It will be noted that there are two
characteristics which all of these studies have in
common. They deal with the experience of the
individual as composing his own private history,
and tend to attribute the specific course which this
private history takes to bodily conditions. It is
only recently that these investigations have ac-

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 215

quired sufficient unity and exclusiveness of aim to
warrant their being regarded as a special science.
But such is now so far the case that the psychol-
ogist of this type pursues his way quite indepen-
dently of philosophy. It is true his research has
advanced considerably beyond his understanding
of its province. But it is generally recognized
that he must examine those very factors of sub-
jectivity which the natural scientist otherwise
seelSs to evade, and, furthermore, that he must seek
to provide for them in nature. He treats the inner
life in what Locke called " the plain historical
method," that is*»fo say, instead of interpreting
and defining its ideas, he analyzes and reports
upon its content. He would not seek to justify a
moral judgment, as would ethics, or to criticise
the cogency of thought, as would logic; but only
to describe the actual state as he found it. In
order to make his data commensurable with the
phenomena of nature, he discovers or defines bod-
ily conditions for the subjective content which he
analyzes. His fundamental principle of method
is the postulate of psycho-physical parallelism^ ac-
cording to which he assumes a state of brain or
nervous system for every state of mind. But in
adopting a province and a method the psychologist

216 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY -

foregoes finality of truth after the manner of all
natural science. lie deals admittedly with an
aspect of experience, and his conclusuons are no
more adequate to the nature of the self than they
are to the nature of outer objects. An admirable
reference to this abstract division of experience
occurs in Kulpe's " Introduction to Philosophy J? :

"For the developed consciousness, as for the naive,
every experience is an unitary whole; and it IH only the
habit of abstract reflection upon experience that makes
the objective and subjective worlds seem to fall apart
as originally different forms of existence. Just aa a
plane curve can be represented in analytical geometry
as the function of two variables, tthe ahscusNtt and the
ordinates, without prejudice to the unitary course of the
curve itself, so the world of human experience may be
reduced to a subjective and an objective factor, without
prejudice to its real coherence/'1*

§ 100* The problems of psychology, like those
of theology, tend to disappear as independent philo-
sophlcal topics. Tho ultimate nature

and Philos-

ophy. of the self will continue to interest phi-

losophers — more deeply, perhaps, than any aspect
of experience — but their conception of it will be
a corollary of their metaphysics and epistemology.
The remainder of the field of the old philosophical
psychology, the introspective and experimental

18 Translation by Pillsbury and Titchctier, p* 59.

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 217

analysis of special states of mind, is already the
province of a natural science which is becoming
more and more free from the stand-point and
method of philosophy.

§ 101. Eeminding ourselves anew that philo-
sophical problems cannot be treated in isolation
Transition from one another, we shall hereinafter
seek to become acquainted with general
'stand-points that give systematic unity
to ^e ^sslies which have been enumer-
%fefa Such stand-points are not clearly

Absolute r J

idealism. defined J>y those who occupy them,

Absolute • J rj ?

Realism, and they afford no clear-cut classifica-
tion of all historical philosophical philosophies.
But system-making in philosophy is commonly
due to the moving in an individual mind of
some most significant idea; and certain of these
ideas have reappeared so frequently as to define
more or less clearly marked tendencies? or con-
tinuous strands, out of which the history of
thought is forever weaving itself. Such is clearly
the case with naturalism. From the beginning
until now there have been men whose philos-
ophy is a summation of the natural sciences,
whose entire thought is based upon an acceptance
of the methods and the fundamental conceptions

218 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of these disciplines. This tendency stands in the
history of thought for the conviction that the vis-
ible and tangible world which interacts with the
body ia veritable reality. Thin philosophy is
realistic and empirical to an extent entirely deter-
mined by its belief concerning being. But while
naturalism is only secondarily episfemologieal,
subjectivism and absolute idealism have their
very source in the self-examination and the fielf-
criticism of thought Subjectivism signifies tho
conviction that tho knmver cannot escape himself.
If reality is to be. kept within jjho range of possible
knowledge, it must be defined in terms of the
processes or states of solves. A fuwlutfl idealism*
arises from a union of this cpistemologicul motive
with a recognition of what arc regarded as tho
logical necessities to which reality must submit.
Eeality must be both knowledge and rational
knowledge; the object, in short, of an absolute
mind, which, shall be at once all-containing and
systematic. This rationalistic motive was, how-
ever, not originally associated with an idealistic
epistemology, but with the common-sense principle
that being is discovered and not constituted by

thought. Such an absolute realism 1% like natu-

.*>
ralism, primarily metaphysical rather than opiate-

NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND RELIGION 219

mological; but, unlike naturalism, it seeks to de-
fine reality as a logical or ethical necessity.

Under these several divisions, then, we shall
meet once more with the special problems of phi-
losophy, but this time they will be ranged in an
order that is determined by some central doctrine.
They will appear as parts not of the general prob-
lem of philosophy, but of some definite system of
philosophy.

PART* III

•%

SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VIII

§ 102. THE meaning conveyed by any philo-
sophical term consists largely of the distinctions
The General which it suggests. Its peculiar qual~

Meaning of ^ > °° x H

Materialism, ity, like the physiognomy of the battle-
scarred veteran, is a composite of the controversies
which it has survived. There is, therefore, an
almost unavoidable confusion attendant upon the
denomination of any early phase of philosophy as
materialism. But in the historical beginnings of
thought; as also in, the common-sense) of all ages,
there is at any rate present a very essential strand
of this theory. The naive habit of mind which,
in the sixth century before Christ, prompted suc-
cessive Greek thinkers to define reality in terms

1 PRELIMINARY NOTE. — By naturalism is meant that
system of philosophy which defines the universe in the
terms of natural science. In its dogmatic phase, wherein it
maintains that being is corporeal, it is called materialism,
In its critical phase, wherein it makes the general assertion
that the natural sciences constitute the only possible knowl-
edge, whatever 4oe the nature of reality itself, it is called
positivism, agnosticism, or simply naturalism.

223

224 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of water, air, and. fire, is in this respect one with
that exhibited in Dr. Samuel Johnson's smiting
the ground, with his stick In curt refutation of
Bishop Berkeley's idea-philosophy. There is a
theoretical instinct, not accidental or perverse, but
springing from the very life-preserving equipment
of the organism, which attributes reality to tangi-
ble space-filling things encountered by the body.
For obvious reasons of self-interest the organism
is first of all endowed with a sense of contact, and
the more delicate senaos enter into its practical
economy as means of anticipating or avoiding

contact From such practical expectations con-
cerning the proximity of that which may press
upon, injure, or displace the body, arise the first
crude judgments of reality. And these are at the
same time the nucleus of naive philosophy and
the germinal phase of materialism*

§ 103. The first philosophical movement among
the Greeks was a series of attempts to redxice the
corporeal tangible world to unity, and of these
Bain*. ^ie concepti0]DL offered by Anaximander

is of marked interest in its bearing tipon the de-
velopment of materialism. This philosopher is
remarkable for having defined his first principle,
instead of having chosen it from among the dif-

NATURALISM 225

ferent elements already distinguished by common-
sense, lie thought the unity of nature to consist
in its periodic evolution from and return into
one infinite sum of material (TO aTreipov*), which,
much in the manner of the " nebula " of modern
science, is conceived as both indeterminate in its
actual state arid infinitely rich in. its potentiality.
The conception of matter, the most familiar com-
monplace of science, begins to be recognizable. It
has here reached the point of signifying a common
substance for all tangible tilings, a substance that
in its own general *yad omnipresent nature is with-
out the special marks that distinguish these tan-
gible things from one another. And in so far the
philosophy of Anaxhnander is materialistic.

§ 104. But the earliest thinkers are said to be
hylozoistSj rather than strict materialists, because
Corporeal °f their failure to make certain distinc-
Hy°iozo8ismand ^ons *n connection, with the processes
Mechanism. 0£ ^^^ ^he term hylozoism unites

with the conception of the formless material of
the world ($X??), that of an. animating power to
which its formations and transformations are due.
Hylozoism itself was not a deliberate synthesis of
these two conceptions, but a primitive practical
tendency to universalize the conception of life.

22() THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Such u animifWi '* inrttinetively ns^x'wto with an
object.^ hulk and hardness a rapacity for locomo-

tion and general initiative. And the material
prineipleB defined hy the philasnpherM retain tins
vague and eompn'hensive attribute an u matter
of <.*oin*He, until it, is dirttinpuishetl and Ht'j>jirated
througli attempts to understand it.

That nsjHM'.t <if natural pnHM»ss \vhi<*h wan most
impressive to Greek inimls of the n*lleetive tyj)o
was the alternation of u generation and decay."
In full aceonl with hi^more nneient mantor, Epi-
H, the .Latin JHH*! Lucre! ii^ writes:

" Thtw neither nui <li»iith-d<\'ding tuotimm kwp the
maatery always, unr e.ntoinh oxiHt<»n<*t* fi»revt*rtiu>ro ; nor,
on the oilier hand, ran tht* hirth uud itMTc*am* giving
motioua of thingH jm»w*rvo th«'in alwayn iift.<*r they are
bom. Thus the war of firnl iK^iiiitingH wngtHl from
eternity i» carried on with dtibtmw innue: now hcr«,
now tharc, th« Hf«*-bri»p;ittg; c»l«*n«»atH of thiiign get the
mastery and arc o'ormmttiwd in turn: with thci fumtral
wail blondn the cry whitth babkin raiw* whon they enter
the bonh^rs of light; and no night ever followed day, nor
morning night, that heard not, mingling with the siddy
infant *a eriew, wailingn of tho attondantH on death and
black funeral"1

In a similar vein, tho cnarltc&t concoptitmn of natu-
ral evolution attributed it to tho coworking of

ftLueretiu»: De Rmtm N®tumt Bk* U, Un«« 5CJ0-680,
Translation by Mun,ro»

NATURALISM 227

two principles, that of Love or union and that of
Hate or dissolution. The process is here distin-
guished from the material of nature, but is still
described in the language of practical life. A
distinction between two aspects of vital phenomena
is the next step. These may be regarded in respect
either of the motion and change which attend them,
or the rationality which informs them. Life is
both effective and significant. Although neither
of these ideaa ever wholly ceases to be animistic,
they may nevertheless be applied quite indepen-
dently of one another. The one reduces the primi-
tive animistic world to the lower end of its seal©,
the other construes it in terms of a purposive util-
ity commensurable with that of human action.
Now it is with mechanism, the former of these
diverging ways, that the development of material-
ism is identified. For this philosophy a thing
need have no value to justify its existence, nor any
acting intelligence to which it may owe its origin.
Its bulk and position are sufficient for its being,
and the operation of forces capable of integrating,
dividing, or moving it is sufficient for its deriva-
tion and history. In short, there is no rhyme or
reason at the h$art of things, but only actual mat-
ter distributed by sheer force. With this elimma-

228 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

tion of the element of purposivoness from the
hylozoistic world, the content and process of nature
are fitted to one another. Matter Is that which is
moved by force, and force is the determining
principle of the motions of matter. Materialism
is now definitely equipped with its fundamental
conceptions.

§ 105. The central conceptions of materialism
as a philosophical theory differ from those em-
ployed in the physical sciences only in

and Physical f

science. what is demanded, of them. I he sci-
entist reports upon physical'- phenomena without
accepting any further responsibility, while those
who like Lucretius maintain a physical meta-
physics, must, like him, prove that a the minute
bodies of matter from everlasting continually up-
hold the sum of things," But, though they employ
them in their own way, materialists and all other
exponents of naturalism derive their central con-
ceptions from the physical sciences, and so reflect
the historical development through which these
sciences have passed. To certain historical phases
of physical science, in so far as these bear directly
upon the meaning of naturalism, we now turn*

§ 106, ITrom the earliest times^ down to the
present day the groundwork of materialism has

NATURALISM 229

most commonly been cast in the form of an atomic
theory. Demoeritus, the first system-builder of

The Develop- $£$ school, adopted the conception of

ment of the

Conceptions indivisible particles (arofioi), impene-

of Physical

Science, trablo in their occupancy of space? and
Matter. varying among themselves only in form,
order, and position. To provide for the motion
that distributes them he conceived them as sep-
arated from one another by empty space. From
this it follows that the void is as real as matter, or,
as Demoeritus himself is reputed to have said,
u thing ia not more-, real than, no-thing."

But atomism has not been by any means uni-
versally regarded as the most satisfactory concep-
tion of the relation between space and matter.
Not only does it require two kinds of being, with
the different attributes of extension, and hardness,
respectively,8 but it would also seem to be experi-
mentally inadequate in the case of the more sxibtle
physical processes, such as light- The former of
these is a speculative consideration, and as such
had no little weight with the French philosopher
Descartes, whose divisions and definitions so pro-
foundly affected the course of thought in these

8 The reader will find an interesting account of these
opposing views irf Locke's chapter on Space, in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding*

230 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

matters after the sixteenth century. Holding also
" that a vacuum or space in which there is abso-
lutely no body is repugnant to reason," and that
an indivisible space- filling particle ia aelf-contra-
dictory, he was led to identify space and matter;
that is, to make matter as indispensable to apace
as space to matter. There ia, then, but one kind
of corporeal being, whoso attribute is extension,
and whose modes are motion and rent. The most
famous application of the mechanical conceptions
which he bases upon- this first; principle, is his
theory of the planets, which, are conceived to bo
embedded in a transparent medium, and to move
with it, vortex fashion, about the sun.*

But the conception of the space-filling continuity
of material substance owes its prominence at the
present time to the experimental hypothesis of
ether. This substance, originally conceived to
occupy the intermolecular spaces and to serve as
a medium for the propagation of undulations, is
now regarded by many physicists as replacing
matter. " It is the great hope of science at the
present day," says a contemporary exponent of
naturalism, " that hard and heavy matter will be

4 Descartes distinguished his theory from that of Democ-
ritus in the Principles of Philosophy, Fart IV, § ceil

NATURALISM 231

shown, to lie ether in motion." 5 Such a theory
would reduce bodies to the relative displacements
of parts of a continuous substance, which would
be first of all defined as spacial, and would pos-
sess such further properties as special scientific
hypotheses might require.

Two broadly contrasting theories thus appear:
that which defines matter as a continuous sub-
stance coextensive with space; and that which de-
fines it as a discrete substance divided by empty
space. But, both theories arc seriously affected by
the peculiarly significant development of the con-
ception of force.

§ 107. In the Cartesian system the cause of
motion was pressure within, a plenum. But in the
Motion and seventeenth century this notion encoun-
tcrc(l ^ie ^tcm of Newton, a system

and Exten»ion whfoh sOCmod to involve action at a
of the Concep"" ,.„. :..*•„.«-<. -«-*» -- «•*.

tioa of Force, (Ug^ee In the year 1728 Voltaire
wrote from London:

"When a Frenchman arrives in London, he finds a
very great change, in philosophy as well as in most other
things. In Paris he left the world all full of matter;
here he finds absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is
seen filled up with ethereal vortices, while here the same

* Pearaon: Grammar of Sdencet pp» 259-260. Of. iWdL,
Chap. Vl!» entire.

232 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

space is occupied with tho play of the invisible forces of
gravitation. In Paris the earth is painted for UH longish
like an egg, and in London it is oblate like a melon. At
Paris the pressure of the moon caunefl the ebb and flow
of tides; in England, on the other hand, the «ea gravitates
toward the moon, so that at the same time when the
Parisians demand high water of the moon, the gentlemen
of London require an cbb."e

But these differences are not matters of taste,
nor even rival hypotheses upon an equal footing.
The Newtonian system of mechanics, the consum-
mation of a development initiated by Galileo, dif-
fered from the vortex theory of Descartes as exact
science differs from speculation and unverified
conjecture. And this difference of method carried
with it eventually certain profound differences of
content, distinguishing the Newtonian theory even
from that of Democritus, with which it had so
much in common. Although Denioeritus had
sought to avoid the element of purposivcnoss in
the older hylozoism by referring the motions of
bodies as far as possible to the impact of other
bodies, he nevertheless attributed these motions
ultimately to weighty signifying thereby a certain
downward disposition. Now it is true that in his
general belief Newton himself is not free from
hylozoism. He thought of the motions of the

* Quoted in Ueberweg: History of Philosophy, II, p, 124.

NATURALISM 233

planets themselves as initiated and quickened by
a power emanating ultimately from God. They
are " impressed by an intelligent Agent," and

" can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and
skill of a powerful ever-living Agent who, being in all
places, is more able by his will to move the bodies within
his boundless uniform sensorium, and thereby to form
and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our
will to move the parts of our own bodies." 7

But by the side of these statements must be set
his famous disclaimer, " hypotheses non fingo."
In his capacity of natural philosopher he did not
seek to explain motions, but only to describe them.
Disbelieving as he* did in action at a distance, he
saw no possibility of explanation short of a refer-
ence of them to God ; but such " hypotheses " he
thought to be no proper concern of science. As a
consequence, the mathematical formulation of mo-
tions came, through him, to be regarded as the
entire content of mechanics. The notion of an
efficient cause of motion is still suggested by the
term -force, but even this term within the sys-
tem of mechanics refers always to a definite
amount of motion, or measurement of relative mo-
tion. And the same is true of attraction, action,

7 Quoted from the Opticks of Newton by James Ward,
in his Naturalism mnd Agnosticism, I, p. 43.

234 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

reaction, and the like. The further explanation
of motion, the definition of a virtue or potency
that produces it, first a neglected problem, then an
irrelevant problem, is finally, for a naturalistic
philosophy in which this progression is completed,
an insoluble problem. For the sequel to this
purely descriptive procedure on the part of science
is the disavowal of " metaphysics " by those who
will have no philosophy but science. Thus the
scientific conservatism of ISTewton has led to the
positivistic and agnostic phase of naturalism. But
a further treatment of this development must be
reserved until the issue of epistemology shall have
been definitely raised.

A different emphasis within the general mechan-
ical scheme, attaching especial importance to the
conceptions of force and energy, has led to a rival
tendency in science and a contrasting type of natu-
ralism. The mechanical hypotheses hitherto de-
scribed are all of a simple and readily depicted
type. They suggest an imagery quite in accord
with common-sense and with observation of the
motions of great masses like the planets. Material
particles are conceived to move within a contain-
ing space ; the motions of corpuscles, atoms, or the
minute parts of ether, differing e only in degree

NATURALISM 235

from those of visible bodies. The whole physical
universe may be represented in the imagination
as an aggregate of bodies participating in motions
of extraordinary complexity, but of one type.
But now let the emphasis be placed upon the de-
termining causes rather than upon the moving
bodies themselves. In other words, let the bodies
be regarded as attributive and the forces as sub-
stantive. The result is a radical alteration of the
mechanical scheme and the transcendence of com-
mon-sense imagery. This was one direction of

outgrowth from the work of Newton. His force
of gravitation prevailed between bodies separated
by spaces of great magnitude. Certain of the fol-
lowers of Newton, notably Cotes, accepting tho
formulas of the master but neglecting his allusions
to the agency of God, accepted the principle of
action at a distance. Force, in short, was con-
ceived to pervade space of itself. But if force be
granted this substantial and self-dependent char-
acter, what further need is there of matter as a
separate form of entity? For does not the pres-
ence of matter consist essentially in resistance,
itself a case of force? Such reflections as these
led Boscovich and others to the radical departure
of defining malarial particles as centres of force.

236 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

§ 108. But a more fruitful hypothesis of the
same general order is due to the attention directed
The Develop- to the conception of energy, or capacity

ment and Ex- . IT

tension of the for work, by experimental discoveries

of the possibility of reciprocal trans-
formations without loss, of motion, heat, electric-
ity, and other processes. The principle of the
conservation of energy affirms the quantitative
constancy of that which is so transformed, meas-
ured, for example, in terms of capacity to move
units of mass against gravity. The exponents of
what is called " energetics 7? have in many cases
come to regard that the quantity of which is so
conserved, as a substantial reality whose forms and
distributions compose nature. A contemporary
scientist, whose synthetic and dogmatic habit of
mind has made him eminent in the ranks of popu-
lar philosophy, writes as follows:

"Mechanical and chemical energy, sound and heat,
light and electricity, are mutually convertible; they
seem to be but different modes of one and the same
fundamental force or energy. Thence follows the im-
portant thesis of the unity of all natural forces, or, as it
may also be expressed, the 'monism of energy/" 8

* Haeckel: Riddle of the Universe. Translation by Mc~
Cabe, p. 254.

The best systematic presentation of " energetics" is to
be found in Ostwald's Vorlesungen HbeT Naiur-Philosophie.

NATURALISM 237

The conception of energy seems, indeed, to
afford an exceptional opportunity to naturalism.
We have seen that the matter-motion theory was
satisfied to ignore, or regard as insoluble, problems
concerning the ultimate causes of things. Further-
more, as we shall presently see to better advantage,
the more strictly materialistic type of naturalism
must regard thought as an anomaly, and has no
little difficulty with life. But the conception of
energy is more adaptable, and hence better quali-
fied to serve as a common denominator for various
aspects of experience. The very readiness with
which we can picture the corpuscular scheme is a
source of embarrassment to the seeker after unity.
That which is so distinct is bristling with incom-
patibilities. The most aggressive materialist hesi-
tates to describe thought as a motion of bodies in
space. Energy, on the other hand, exacts little
if anything beyond the character of measurable
power. Thought is at any rate in some sense a
power, and to some degree measurable. Recent
discoveries of the dependence of capacity for men-
tal exertion upon physical vitality and measure-
ments of chemical energy received into the system

Herbert Spencer^ in his well-known First Principles, makes
philosophical use of both " force" and "energy."

238 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

as food, and somehow exhausted by the activities
of thought, have lent plausibility to the hypothesis
of a universal energy of which physical and " psy-
chical " processes are alike manifestations. And
the conception of energy aerais capable not only
of unifying nature, but also of satlafying the
metaphysical demand for an efficient and moving
cause. This term, like " force n and " power/5 is
endowed with suck a significance by common
sense. Indeed, naturalism would seem here to
have swung round toward its liylozoistic starting-
point. The exponent of energetics, like the naive
animistic thinker, attributes to nTature a |x>wer like
that •which, he feels welling up within himself.
When he acts upon the environment, like meets
like. Energetics, it is true, may obtain, a definite
meaning for its central conception from the meas-
urable behavior of external bodies, and a meaning
that may be quite free from vitalism or teleology.
But in his extension of the conception the author
of a philosophical energetics abandons this strict
meaning, and blends his thought even with a phase
of subjectivism, known as panpsycMsm*® This
theory regards the inward life of all nature as
I homogeneous with an immediately felt activity or

ft Cf . Chap. IX.

NATURALISM 239

appetency, as energetics finds the inner life to be
homogeneous with the forces of nature. Both owe
their philosophical appeal to their apparent success
in unifying the world upon a direct empirical
basis, and to their provision for the practical sense
of reality.

Such, in brief, are the main alternatives avail-
able for a naturalistic theory of being, in conse-
quence of the historical development of the funda-
mental conceptions of natural science,

§ 109. We turn now to an examination, of the
manner in which naturalism, equipped with work-
The claims of *n£ Pr™£pks, seeks to meet the special
Naturalism, requirements of philosophy. The con-
ception of the unity of nature is directly in. the
line of a purely scientific development, but natu-
ralism takes the bold and radical step of regarding
nature so unified as coextensive with the real, or
at any rate knowable, universe. It will be remem-
bered that among the early Greeks Anaxagoras
had referred the creative and formative processes
of nature to a non-natural or rational agency, which
he called the Nous. The adventitious character of
this principle, the external and almost purely
nominal part which it played in the actual cos-
mology of Ansscagoras, betrayed it into the hands

240 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of the atomists, with their more consistently natu-
ralistic creed. Better, these maintain, the some-
what dogmatic extension of conceptions proved to
be successful in the description of nature, than a
vague dualism which can nerve only to distract the
scientific attention and people the world with ob-
scurities. There is a remarkable* passage in Lu-
cretius in which atomism is thus written large and
inspired with cosmical eloquence:

" For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of
things station themselves each in its right place guided
by keen intelligence*., nor* did they bargain sooth to say
what motions each should assume, but because many in
number and shifting about in many ways throughout
the universe, they are driven and tormented by blows
during infinite time pant, after trying motions and unions
of every kind at length they fall into arrangements such
as those out of which our sum of things has been formed,
arid by which too it is preserved through many great
years, when once it has been thrown into the appropriate
motions, and causes the streams to replenish the greedy
sea with copious river waters, and the earth, fostered by
the heat of the sun, to renew its produce, and the race of
living things to come up and flourish, and the gliding
fires of ether to live: all which these several things could
in no wise bring to pass, unless a store of matter could
rise up from infinite space, out of which store they are
wont to make up in due season whatever has been lost."10

The prophecy of La Place, the great French

mathematician, voices the similar faith of the

10 Lucretius: Op. ctX, Bk. I, linos 1021-1237.

NATURALISM 241

eighteenth century in a mechanical understanding
of the universe:

" The human mind, in the perfection it has been able
to give to astronomy, affords a feeble outline of such an
intelligence. Its discoveries in mechanics and in geome-
try, joined to that of universal gravitation, have brought
it within reach of comprehending in the same analytical
expressions the past and future states of the system of
the world."11

As for God, the creative and presiding intelligence,
La Place had " no need of any such hypothesis."
§ 110. But these are the boasts of Homeric

heroes before going into battle. The moment

*»

The Task of stic^ a*geileral position is assumed there
Naturalism. arjse SBn(jry difficulties in the applica-
tion, of naturalistic principles to special interests
and groups of facts. It is one thing to project a
mechanical scheme in the large, but quite another
to make explicit provision within it for the origin
of nature, for life, for the human self with its
ideals, and for society with its institutions. The
naturalistic method of meeting these problems in-
volves a reduction all along the line in the direc-
tion of such categories as are derived from the
infra-organic world. That which is not like the

11 Quoted from La Place's essay on Probability by Ward:
Op. tit., I, p. 41*.

242 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

planetary system must ho construed as mechanical
by indirection and subtlety.

§ 111. The origin of the present known natural
world was the first philosophical question to he
The origin of definitely met by science, The general
the Cosmos. form of solution which naturalism of-
fers is anticipated in the most ancient theories of
nature. These already suppose that the observed
mechanical processes of the circular or periodic
type, like the revolutions and rotations of the stars,
are incidents in a historical mechanical process of
a larger scale. Prior to the present fixed motions
of the celestial bodies, the whole mass of cosmic
matter participated in irregular motions analogous
to present terrestrial redistributions. Such mo-
tions may be understood to have resulted in the
integration of separate bodies^ to which they at
the same time imparted a rotary motion. It is
such a hypothesis that Lucretius paints in his bold,
impressionistic colors.

But the development of mechanics paved the
way for a definite scientific theory, the so-called
" nebular hypothesis/7 announced by La Place in
1796, and by the philosopher Kant at a still earlier
date. Largely through the Newtonian principle
of the parallelogram of forces, the present masses,

NATURALISM 243

orbits, and velocities were analyzed into a more
primitive process of concentration within a nebu-
lous or highly diffused aggregate of matter. And
with the aid of the principle of the conservation
of energy this theory appears to make possible the
derivation of heat, light, and other apparently
non-mechanical processes from the same original
energy of motion.

But a persistently philosophical mind at once
raises the question of the origin of this primeval
nebula itself, with a definite organization and a
vast potential energy that must, after all, be re-
garded as a part df nature rather than its source.
Several courses are here open to naturalism. It
may maintain that the question of ultimate origin
is unanswerable; it may regard such a process of
concentration as extending back through an infi-
nitely long past;12 or, and this is the favorite
alternative for more constructive minds, the his-
torical cosmical process may be included within a
still higher type of periodic process, which is re-
garded as eternal. This last course has been fol-
lowed in the well-known synthetic naturalism of
Herbert Spencer. " Evolution," he says, " is the

13 An interesting account and criticism of such a theory
(Clifford's) is to bg found in Royce's Spirit of Modern Philoso-
phy, Lecture X.

244 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

progressive integration of matter and dissipation
of motion." But Hueh a proccsn eventually runs
down, and may be conceived as giving place to a
counter-process of devolution which neatters the
parts of matter and gathers another ntore of poten-
tial motion. The two processes in alternation will
then constitute a eoamical system without begin-
ning or end.

In such wine a sweeping survey of the physical
tmiver.se may be thought in the terms of natural
science. The unifonnitarian method in geology,
resolving the history of the crtmt of the earth
into known processes, such as erosion and igneous
fusion;18 and spectral analysis, with its discov-
eries concerning the chemical constituents of dis-
tant bodies through the study of their light, have
powerfully reenforccd this effort of thought, and
apparently completed an, outline sketch of the uni-
verse in terms of infra-organic processes.

§ 112. But the cosmos must be made internally
homogeneous in these same terms. There awaits
life. solution, in the first place, the serious

Natuf&l

selection. problem of the genesis and maintenance
of life within a nature that is originally and ulti-

18 This method replaced the old theory of *' catastrophes"
through the efforts of the English geologiate, Hutton (1726-
1797) and Lyell (1767-1849).

NATURALISM 245

mately inorganic. The assimilation of the field of
biology and physiology to the mechanical cosmos
had made little real progress prior to the nine-
teenth century. Mechanical theories had, indeed,
been projected in the earliest age of philosophy,
and proposed anew in the seventeenth century.14
Nevertheless, the structural and functional tele-
ology of the organism remained as apparently
irrefutable testimony to the inworking of some
principle other than that of mechanical necessity.
Indeed, the only fruitful method applicable to
organic phenomena was that which explained them
in terms of purposive adaptation. And it was its
provision for a mechanical interpretation of this
very principle that gave to the Darwinian law of
natural selection, promulgated in 1859 in the
" Origin of Species/' so profound a significance
for naturalism. It threatened to reduce the last
stronghold of teleology, and completely to dispense
with the intelligent Author of nature.

Darwin's hypothesis sought to explain the origin
of animal species by survival under competitive
conditions of existence through the possession of
a structure suited to the environment. Only the

14 Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood,
published in 1628, was regarded as a step in this direction.

246 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

most elementary organism need be presupposed,
together with slight variations in the course of
subsequent generations, and both may be conceived
to arise mechanically. There will then result in
surviving organisms a gradual accumulation of
such variations as promote survival under the spe-
cial conditions of the environment. Such a prin-
ciple had been suggested an early as the time of
Empedocles, but it remained for Darwin to estab-
lish it with an unanswerable array of observation
and experimentation* If any organism whatsoever
endowed with the power of generation be allowed
to have somehow come to be, ntftn ruliflm now prom-
ises to account for the whole subsequent history
of organic phenomena and the origin of any known
species.

§113. But what of life itself? The question
of the derivation of organic from inorganic matter
Mechanical ^as PrOTe<l insoluble by direct means,
Physiology. an<j ^ cage 0£ naturalism must hero

rest upon such facts as the chemical homogeneity
of these two kinds of matter, and the conformity
of physiological processes to more general physical
laws. Organic matter differs from inorganic only
through the presence of proteid, a peculiar product
of known elements, which cannot 4>e artificially

NATURALISM 247

produced, but which is "by natural means perpetu-
ally dissolved into these elements without any dis-
coverable residuum. Eespiration may be studied
as a case of aerodynamics, the circulation of the
blood as a case of hydrodynamics, and the heat
given off in the course of work done by the body
as a case of thermodynamics. And although vital-
istic theories still retain a place in physiology, as
do teleological theories in biology, on the whole
the naturalistic programme of a reduction of or-
ganic processes to the type of the inorganic tends
to prevail.

§ 114. The histtOry of naturalism shows that,
as in the case of life, so also in the case of mind,
Mind. its hypotheses were projected by the

to Sensation. Greeks, but precisely formulated and
verified only in the modern period of science. In
the philosophy of Democritus the soul was itself
an atom, finer, rounder, and smoother than the
ordinary, but thoroughly a part of the mechanism
of nature. The processes of the soul are construed
as interactions between the soul and surrounding
objects. In sensation, the thing perceived pro-
duces images by means of effluxes which impinge
upon the soul-atom. These images are not true
reports of the<mxter world, but must be revised by

948 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

thought before its real atomic* structure emerges.
For this higher critical exercise of thought I)c-
mocritus devised no special atomic! genesis. The
result may he expressed either as the* invalidity of
such operations of mind as he could provide for
in his universe, or the irredueibility to his chosen
first principles of the very thought; which defined
thorn. Later naturalism has generally sacrificed
epistemology to cosmology, and reduced thought to
sensation. Similarly, will has been regarded as a
highly developed ease of instinct;,, Knowledge and
will, construed as sensation and instinct, may thus
be interpreted in the naturalistic manner within
the field of biology.

§ 115. But the actual content of sensation, and
the actual feelings which attend upon the prompt-
Automatism, ings of instinct, still stubbornly testify
to the preseB.ee in the universe of something belong-
ing to a wholly different category from matter and
motion. The attitude of naturalism in this crucial
issue has never "been fixed and unwavering, but
there has gradually come to predominate a method
of denying to the inner life all efficacy and real
significance in the cosmos, while admitting its
presence on the scene. It is a strange fact of his-
tory that Descartes, the French philosopher who

NATURALISM 249

prided himself on having rid the soul of all
dependence on nature, should have greatly con-
tributed to this method. But it is perhaps not so
strange when we consider that every dualism is,
after all? symmetrical, and that consequently what-
ever rids the soul of nature at the same time rids
nature of the soul. It was Descartes who first con-
ceived the body and soul to be utterly distinct
substances. The corollary to this doctrine was his
automatism, applied in his own system to animals

other than man, but which those less concerned

•*

with religious tradition and less firmly convinced
of the soul's originating activity were not slow to
apply universally. This theory conceived the vital
processes to take place quite regardless of any
inner consciousness, or even without its attendance.
To this radical theory the French materialists of
the eighteenth century were especially attracted.
With them the active soul of Descartes, the distinct
spiritual entity, disappeared. This latter author
had himself admitted a department of the self,
which he called the " passions/7 in which the
course and content of mind is determined by bod-
ily conditions. Extending this conception to the
whole province of mind, they employed it to dem-
onstrate the tholough-going subordination of mind

250 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

to body. La Mettrie, a physician -and the author
of a book entitled " L'Homme Machine," was first
interested in this thesis by a fever delirium, and
afterward adduced anatomical and pathological
data in support of it. The angle from which he
views human life is well illustrated in the fol-
lowing:

" What would have sufficed in the case of Julius Caesar,
of Seneca, of Petronius, to turn their fearlessness into
timidity or braggartry? An obstruction in the spleen,
the liver, or the vena portae. For the imagination is
intimately connected with, these viscera, and from them
arise all the curious phenomena of hypochondria and
hysteria. ... 'A mere nothimg, a little fibre, some
trifling thing that the most subtle anatomy cannot dis-
cover, would have made two idiots out of Erasmus and
Fontenelle.'"15

§ 116. The extreme claim that the soul is a
physical organ of the body, identical with the
Radical brain, marked the culmination of this

Materialism.

Mind as an militant materialism, so good an in-

stance of that over-simplification and
whole-hearted conviction characteristic of the doc-
trinaire propagandism of Prance. Locke, the Eng-
lishman, had admitted that possibly the substance
which thinks is corporeal In the letters of Vol-

the account of La Mettrie in Lange: History of
Materialism^ Translation by Thomas, if, pp. 67-68.

NATURALISM V , 251

taire this thought has already found a more posi-
tive expression:

" I am body, and I think ; more I do not know. Shall
I then attribute to an unknown cause what I can so
easily attribute to the only fruitful cause I am acquainted
with? In fact, where is the man who, without an absurd
godlessness, dare assert that it is impossible for the
Creator to endow matter with thought and feeling? " ltt

Finally, Holbach, the great systematizer of this
movement, takes the affair out of the hands of the
Creator and definitively announces that " a sensi-
tive soul is nothing but a human brain, so consti-
tuted that it easily receives 'the motions communi-
cated to it." 17 * *

This theory has been considerably tempered
since the age of llolbach. Naturalism has latterly
been less interested in identifying the soul with
the body, and more interested in demonstrating its
dependence upon specific bodily conditions, after
the manner of La Mettrie. The so-called higher
faculties, such as thought and will, have been re-
lated to central or cortical processes of the nervous
system, processes of connection and complication
which within the brain itself supplement the im-
pulses and sensations congenitally and externally

16 Quoted from Voltaire's London Letter on the English,
by Lang©: Op, tit.^ II, p. 18.

17 Quoted by Lainge: Op. tit., II, p. 113.

252 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

stimulated. The term " epiphenomenon " lias been
adopted to express the distinctness but entire de-
pendence of the mind. Man is " a conscious
automaton," The real course of nature passes
through his nervous system, while consciousness
attends upon its functions like a shadow, present
but not efficient.18

§ 117. Holbaeh's " Systeme de la Nature," pub-
lished in 1770, marks the culmination of the un-
equivocally materialistic form of natu-

Positivism and . -i • i i«rv» i •

Agnosticism, ralism. its epistemological dimculties,
always more or less in evidence, have since that
day sufficed to discredit materialism, and to foster
the growth of a critical and apologetic form of
naturalism known as positivism or agnosticism.
The modesty of this doctrine does not, it is true,
strike very deep. For, although it disclaims knowl-
edge of ultimate reality, it also forbids anyone
else to have any. Knowledge, it affirms, can be
of but one type, that which comprises the verifiable
laws governing nature. All questions concerning

18 The phrase "psycho-physical parallelism/' current in
psychology, may mean automatism of the kind expounded
above, and may also mean dualism. It is used commonly
as a methodological principle to signify that no causal
relationship between mind and body, but one of corre-
spondence, is to be looked for in empirical psychology. Cf.

NATURALISM 253

first causes are futile, a stimulus only to excursions
of fancy popularly mistaken for knowledge. The
superior certainty and stability which attaches to
natural science is to be permanently secured by
the savant's steadfast refusal to be led away after
the false gods of metaphysics.

But though this is sufficient ground for an ag-
nostic policy, it does prove an agnostic theory.
The latter has sprung from a closer analysis of
knowledge, though it fails to make a very brave
showing for thoroughness and consistency. The

crucial point has already been brought within our

view. The genefal principles of naturalism re-
quire that knowledge shall be reduced to sensations,
or impressions of the environment upon the or-
ganism. But the environment and the sensations
do not correspond. The environment is matter and
motion, force and energy; the sensations are of
motions, to be sure, but much more conspicuously
of colors, sounds, odors, pleasures, and pains.
Critically, this may be expressed by saying that
since the larger part of sense-perception is so un-
mistakably subjective, and since all knowledge
alike must be derived from this source, knowledge
as a whole must be regarded as dealing only with
appearances. ""There are at least three agnostic

254 ™E APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

methods progressing from this point All agree
that the inner or essential reality is unfathomable.
But, in the first place, those moat close to the
tradition of materialism maintain that the most
significant appearances, the primary qualities, are
those which compose a purely quantitative and
corporeal world. The inner essence of things may
at any rate t>e approached by a monism of matter
or of energy. This theory in epistemologieal only
to the extent of moderating its claims in the hope
of lessening its responsibility. Another agnosti-
cism places all sense qualities on a par, but would
regard physics and psychology 'as complementary
reports upon the two distinct series of phenomena
in which the underlying reality expressea itself.
This theory is epistemological to the extent of
granting knowledge, viewed as perception, as good
a standing in the universe as that which is accorded
to its object But such a dualism tends almost
irresistibly to relapse into materialistic monism,
because of the fundamental place of physical con-
ceptions in the system of the sciences. Finally,
in another and a more radical phase of agnosticism,
we find an attempt to make full provision for the
legitimate problems of epistemology. The only
datum, the only existent accessiblS to knowledge,

NATURALISM 255

is said to be the sensation, or state of consciousness.
In the words of Huxley :

" What, after all, do we know of this terrible ' matter '
except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical
cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do
we know of that 'spirit' over whose threatened extinc-
tion by matter a great lamentation is arising, . . .
except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypo-
thetical cause, or condition, of states of consciousness?" ia

The physical world is now to be regarded as a
construction which does not assimilate to itself the
content of sensations, but enables one to anticipate
them. The sensation signi€es a contact to which
science can provider key for practical guidance.

§ 118. This last phase of naturalism is an at-
tempt to state a pure and consistent experimental-
Experimen- *8m> a "workable theory of the routine of
taKsm. sensations. But it commonly falls into

the error of the vicious circle. The hypothetical
cause of sensations is said to be matter. Prom this
point of view the sensation is a complex, compris-
ing elaborate physical and physiological processes.
But these processes themselves, on the other hand,
are said to be analyzable into sensations. Now
two such methods of analysis cannot be equally
ultimate. If all of reality is finally reducible to
8 Queted by Ward: Op. at,, I, p. 18.

256 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

sensations, then the* term sensation must be used
In a new sense to connote u self-subsiHtent being,
and can no longer refer merely to a function of
certain physiological processes. The. issue of this
would bo some form of idealism or of the experi-
ence-philosophy that is now coming so rapidly to
the front.20 But while it is true that idealism
has sometimes been intended, and that a radically
new philosophy of experience has sometimes been
closely approached, those, nevertheless, who have
developed expcrimentalism from the naturalistic
stand-point have In reality achieved only u thinly
disguised materialism. For ZJw rrr?/ ground of
their agnosticism is materialixiic*"1 Knowledge,
of reality itself is stud to be unattainable, because
knowledge, in order to come within tho order of
nature, must be regarded as reducible to sensation;
and because sensation itself, when regarded as a
part of nature, is only a physiological process, a
special phenomenon, in no way qualified to be
knowledge that is true of reality*

§ 119. Perhaps, after all, it would bo an fair to
the spirit of naturalism to relievo it of roaponaibil-

30 There are times when Huxley, «. g,t would wwm to bo
on the verge of the Berkeley an idealism. Of. ('hap. IX.

21 For the case of Karl Pearson, read hia Grammar of
Science, Chap. II. *

NATURALISM 257

ity for an epistenaology. It lias never thoroughly
reckoned with this problem. It has deliberately
Naturalistic selected f roin among the elements of ex-

Epistemology . .

not Systematic, perienee, and been so highly construc-
tive in its method as to forfeit its claim to pure
empiricism; and, on the other hand, has, in this
same selection of categories and in its insistence
upon the test of experiment, fallen short of a thor-
ough-going rationalism. While, on the one hand,
it defines and constructs, it does so, on the other
hand, within the field of perception and with con-
stant reference to the test of perception. The ex-

planation and jusftification of this procedure is to
be found in the aim of natural science rather than
in that of philosophy. It is this special interest,
rather than the general problem of being, that de-
termines the order of its categories. Naturalism
as an account of reality is acceptable only so far
as its success in satisfying specific demands obtains
for it a certain logical immunity. These demands
are unquestionably valid and fundamental, but
they are not coextensive with the demand for truth.
They coincide rather with the immediate practical
need of a formulation of the spacial and temporal
changes that confront the will. Hence naturalism
is acceptable to common-sense as an account of

i»

258 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

what the every -day attitude* to the environment
treats an ite object. .Naturalism in vommon-Htmao
alnmt the " outer world," revised and. brought up
to date with the aid of the rtwiltw of Hcienee. Its

deepest spring in the organic inHtmct fur the reality
of the tangible, the vital recognition of the rtignifi-
cance of that which SB on the plants of interaction
with the body.

§ 120. Oddly enough, although eommon-Hcm«e, is
ready to intrust to naturalism tin* description of

the situation of life, it preferB to deal

Bthlc&l

otherwise with its iumls* Indeed, com-

mon-sense is not without a certain Htmpicion that
naturalism is the advocate of moral reversion. It
11 is recognized as the prophecy of the brute majority

of life, of those considerations of expediency and
pleasure that are the warrant for its secular moods
rather than for its sustaining ideals. And that
strand of life is indeed its special province. For
the naturalistic method of reduction imxst find the
key to human action among those practical condi-
tions that are common to man and his inferiors
in the scale of being. In short, human life,
like all life, must be construed as the adjustment
of the organism to its natural environment for

NATURALISM 259

the sake of preservation and economic advance-
ment.

§ 121. Early in Greek philosophy this general
idea of life was picturesquely interpreted in two
cynicism and contrasting ways, those of the Cynic
cyrenaicism. an(j ^ Cyrenaic. Both of these wise
men postulated the spiritual indifference of the
universe at large, and looked only to the contact of
life with its immediate environment. But while
the one hoped only to hedge himself about, the
other sought confidently the gratification of his
sensibilities. The figure of the Cynic is the more
familiar. DiogeHes of the tub practised self-
mortification until his dermal and spiritual callous-
ness were alike impervious. Prom behind his pro-
tective sheath he could without affectation despise
both nature and society. He could reckon himself
more blessed thA. Alexander, because, with de-
mand reduced to the minimum, he could be sure
of a surplus of supply. Having renounced all
goods save the bare necessities of life, he could
neglect both promises and threats and be played
upon by no one. He was securely intrenched
within himself, an unfurnished habitation, but the
citadel of a king. The Cyrenaic, on the other
hand, did not seek to make impervious the surface

260 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

of contact with nature ami society, but sought to
heighten its sensibility, that it might, become a
medium of pleaHimible feeling, .For the inspira-
tion with which it may be pursued this ideal has
nowhere been more eloquently set forth than in
the pages of Walter Pater, who styles himself
" the new (-y relink*."

" Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is
the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to
us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we wee
in them all that is to be, seen, in them by the fluent
senses? How shall we 'pass most swiftly from point
to point, and be present always at the foeim where the
greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest
energy?

To burn always with thin hard, gcmliko flame, to
maintain this ecstacy, m success in life. . . . While
all melts under our feet, we may well ealeh at any ex-
quisite passion, or any contribution, to knowledge that
seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit fret* for a mo-
ment, or any stirring of the senses, ttrango dyes, strange
colors, and curious odors, or work of the artist's hands,
or the face of one's friend, Not to discriminate every
moment some passionate attitude In those about ua,
and in the brilliancy of their gifts some tragic dividing
of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of frost and
sun, to sleep before evening,''83

§ 122, In the course of modern philosophy the
ethics of naturalism has undergone a transforma-

M Pater: The Renamance, pp. 249-250.

NATURALISM

261

tion and development that equip it much more
formidably for its competition with rival theories.
Development ] f the Cynic an<l Gyrcuaic philosophies

of Utilitarian- , . . , * .

ism. of life seem too egoistic and narrow in

Evolutionary .

Conception outlook, this inadequacy has been large-
ty overcome through the modern con-

ception of the relation of the individual to society.
Man is regarded an BO dependent upon social rela-
tions that it in Loth natural, and rational for him
to govern bin actions with a concern for the com-
munity, Then* wan a time when this relation, of
dependence was viewed as external, a barter of
goods between the* individual and society, sanc-
tioned by an implied contract. Thomas ITobbes,
•whose unblushing materialism and egoism stimu-
lated by opposition the whole* development of Eng-
lish ethics, conceived morality to consist in rules
of action which condition the stability of the state,
and so secure for the individual that "peace"
which self-interest teaches him is essential to his
welfare.

" And therefore so long a man is in the condition of
mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private
appetite is the measure of good and evil: and conse-
quently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and
therefore also the ways or means of peace, which, as I
have showed before* are * justice/ * gratitude/ modesty/

262 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

'equity,' * mercy/ and the rent of the lawn of Nature, are
good; that is to Bay, 'moral virtues*; and their contrary
'vices,1 evil"23

-Jeremy Benthain, the apostle of utilitarianism In
the eighteenth century, defined political and social
sanctions through which the individual could pur-
chase security and good repute with action condu-
cive to the common welfare. But the nineteenth
century has understood the matter better— and the
Idea of an evolution under conditions that select
and reject, ia hero again the illuminating thought
No individual, evolutionary naturalism maintains,
has survived the perils of life \vithout possessing
as an. inalienable part of his nature, congenital like
hie egoism, certain impulses and instinctive desires
in the interest of the community as a whole. The
latest generation .of a race whoso perpetuation has
been conditioned by a capacity to sustain social
relations and make common cause against a more
external environment, is moral, and docs not adopt
morality in the course of a calculating egoism,
Conscience is the racial instinct of self-preservation
uttering itself in the individual member, who draws
his very life-blood from the greater organism,
§ 123. This latest word of naturalistic ethics has

Hobbes: Leviathan, Chap,

NATURALISM 263

not won acceptance as the last word in ethics, and
this in spite of its indubitable truth within its scope.
Naturalistic 'For the ileepoi' ethical interest seeks not

Ethics not

Systematic. BO much to account for the moral nature
as to construe and justify its promptings. The
evolutionary theory reveals the genesis of con-
science, and demonstrates its continuity with nat-
ure, but this falls an far short of realizing the pur-
pose of ethical Btudy as a history of the natural
genesis of thought; would fall, short of logic. In-
deed, naturalism shows horo, as in the realm of
epistomology, u jwrwHtent failure to appreciate the
central problem. * ftn acceptance as a philosophy,
we are again reminded, can bo accounted for only
on the score of its genuinely rudimentary char-
acter. AH a rudimentary phase of thought it
in both imlisjxmHttblo and inadequate. It is the
philosophy of hwtlnet, which should in normal
development precede a philosophy of reason, in
which it is eventually assimilated and supple-
mented.

§ 124. There is, finally, an inspiration for life
which this philosophy of naturalism may convey —
«• atheism, its dctractors'would call it, but

Antagonistic . » . „ •,

to Rtugioau none the less a faith and a spiritual ex-
altation that spring from its summing up of truth.

264 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

It is well first to nmli/.c* that which in dispiriting
in it, its failure to provide for tho freedom, im-
mortality, and moral provideiKv, of tho more san-
guine faith.

" For what in man looked at from thin point of view?
. . . Man, HO far an natural science by itself in able
to teach us, in no longer the Until ciuwe of the universe,
tho Heaven-descended heir of nil the ages. His very
existence in an accident, bin Htnry a brief and transitory
episode iu the lifo of one of the meanest, of the planets.
Of the combination of onuses which first converted a
dead organic compound into the living progenitors of
humanity, science, indeed, an yet known nothing. It
is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease,
and mutual slaughter, fit nurses jf the future lords of
creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail,
a race with conscience enough to feel that it, is vile, ami
intelligence enough to know that it in insignificant.
. , . Wo sound the future, and learn that after a
period, long compared with the individual lift*, but short
indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our
investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the
glory of the sun will bo dimmed, and the earth, tidoless
and inert, will no longer tolerate the moo which has for
a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into
the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy
consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a
brief space broken the contented silence of tho universe,
will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer* * Im-
perishable monuments' and 'immortal deeds/ death
itself, and love stronger than death, will l>e as though
they had never been. Nor will anything that is bo
better or be worse for all that the lattor, genius, devo-

NATURALISM

265

tion, and suffering of man have striven through count-
less generations to effect." 2*

§ 125. But though our philosopher must accept
the truth of this terrible picture, he is not left
Naturalism as without spiritual resources. The al>
SdSono£ra straet religion provided for the agnostic
Service, faithful by Herbert Spencer does not

Wonder, and *; l >

Renunciation. j(; JH f;ni(>? afford uny nourishment to the
religious nature. He would have men look for a
deep spring of life in the negative idea of mystery,
the apotheosis of ignorance, while religions faith to
live at all must lay hold upon reality. But; there
does spring from naturalism a positive religion,
whose fundamental motives are those of service*,,
wonder, and renunciation: service of humanity in
the present, \vonder at the natural truth, and re-
nunciation of a universe keyed to vibrate with
human ideals.

"Have you/' writcw ('harle« Ferguson, "had dreama
of Nirvana and mokly VWKWH and rapturcm? Have you
imagined that the end of your life in to be absorbed back
into the life of (Jod, and to fbe the earth and forget all?
Or do you want to walk on air, or fly on wingH, or build a
heavenly city in the doudn? Come, let UH tak« our kit
on our tthouldern, and go out. and build the city here."**

H Quoted from Balfour: tfoundatim* o/ #*&>/, pp. 29-31.
** Ferguson: RelOjiwi r»/ /->«mormrj/, p. 1CK

2()6 THK APPROACH. TO PHILOSOPHY

For llaeekf'l ** natural religion " Ls Hneh an

14 the astonishment with whieh we gjur upon the starry
heavens and the inirroseopie life in a drop of water,
the awe with which we trace fb* tuarveH<»us working
of energy in the motion of mutter, the reverence with
which wo gniHp the univerMiil doiniiiance of tlu.» law of
throtighout the umverne."*

There, IB a <U*<ijHir un<l a Hinoc*r<»r note* in the stout,
forlorn lunnuniHin of

"That which IWH bofore the human riM*f» i« a coimtant
Hirugglo to maintain and improve, in opposition to the
State of Nature, the HtHtt* of Art of an urbanized polity;
in which, and by whi<*b, man may <!<*vel«p a worthy
civilisation, <?apnl>lo of maintaining and eonnlantly
improving itw^lf, until tho evohitltvi of our globe, «hall
have enteT(»d HO far upon it» downwnnl courm*. that tho
conmic proceiw remimcm its uwny; niui, c»ne<* more, tho
Bfcate of Nature provaib over tho tmrfaw* of our planet. MM

30 Haeckel: Op. cit., p. 344,
™ Huxley; Evolution and Ethic$f j>. 45. Collected
Vol. IX,

CHAPTEE IX

SUBJECTIVISM 1 \

{

§ 126. WHEN, in the year 1710, Bishop Berke- I

ley maintained the thesis of empirical idealism, \

Subjectivism having rediscovered it and announced |

^^witT it; with a justifiable sense of originality, j

Relativism jie prOToked a kind of critical judgment
cism. ^at was» Keenly annoying if not entirely

surprising to him. In refuting the conception of
material substance and demonstrating the depend-
ence of being upon mind, he at once sought, as he
did repeatedly in later years, to establish the world
of practical belief, and so to reconcile metaphysics
and common-sense. Yet he found himself hailed
as a fool and a sceptic. In answer to an inquiry

1 PRELIMINARY NOTE. By Subjectivism is meant that
system of philosophy which construes the universe in ac-
cordance with the epistemological principle that all knowledge
is of its own states or activities. In so far as subjectivism
reduces reality to states of knowledge, such as perceptions
or ideas, it is phenomenalism. In so far as it reduces reality
to a more internal active principle such as spirit or will,
it is spiritualism.

267

268 THR APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

concerning the* reception of his book in London,
his friond Sir John I'Vtvtval wrote* an follows:

u I did hut name the mihjrct matter of your book oi
Principle* to worn** inj^ntoun frii'ndn of mini* and the)
immediately treated It with ridicule, at the name tim«
refusing to react it, which I have not yet got one to do
A. physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover
your person, and argued you mu«t nee<l« \w. mad, anc
that you ought to take remedies. A bishop pitied you
that a denire of ntartiug wmwfMng new should put yoi
upon Hurh an undertaking. Another told me that yoi
are not gone. BO far OH another gentleman in town, wh<
artMTta not only that there in no wuch thing as Mattel
but that wo ourselves have no being at all.'13

There can bo no doubt btit that tho idea of tli
dependence of real things w\mi thoir apjKMiranc
to the individual is a paradox to common-sense

It is a paradox because, it aoeniB to reverse th
theoretical instinct itself, awl to define the res
In those very terms which <li«eiplined thougl:
learns to neglect In the early history of thougl:
the nature of the thinker himself is recognized £
that which is likely to distort truth rather tha
that which conditions it When the wiao man, tl;
devotee of truth, first makes his appearance, h
authority is acknowledged because he has r
nounced himself. As witness of the tmivers;

3 Berkeley: Complete Works, Vol. I, p. 852. Frasei
edition.

SUBJECTIVISM 269

being he purges himself of whatever is peculiar to
his own individuality, or even to his human nature.
In the aloofness of his meditation he escapes the
cloud of opinion and prejudice that obscures the
vision of the common man. In short, the clement
of belief dependent upon the thinker himself is
the dross which inuHt be refined away in order to
obtain the pure truth- When, then, in the critical
epoch of the Greek sophists, "Protagoras declares
that there is no belief that is not of this character,
his philosophy is promptly recognized as scepti-

cism. Protagoras argues that sense qualities are

clearly dependent flpou the actual operations of the
senses, and that all knowledge reduces ultimately
to these terms.

flcnsoH are variously named hearing:, seeing,
smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain,
desire, fear, and many more which are named, as well as
innumerable others which have no name/, with each of
them there w horn an object of M u«r, — all Boris of colors
born with ail sorts of sight and sounds in like manner
with hearing, and other objects with the other senses/'1

If the objects aro " born with JJ tho senses, it fol-
lows that they aro born with and appertain to the
individual pcreoivcr.

1 Plato; Thewt^, 156. Translation by Jowett. The
italics are mine.

270 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

** Either nhnw, if you run, that our «en«atu>n8 arc not
relative and individual, or, if you admit that they arc
individual, prove that this dws nut involve the con-
Hequenee that. the. appearanee IHTOIWH, or, if you like tc

nay, is to the individual only."4

The flame motif in tliun rf»wl<»ml by Walter Patei
in tho (Vmclu.simi of his *4 K^naissuneo ":

"At fir.st sitfht experienre wern« to l«iry ua under i
flood of external ohjerfw, preHsinj< tip-on tw with a fiharj
and iiuportunaU*. reality f ruilinp; UK out of ourw^lvcH in i
thousand fornw of urtion. But \vh<»n reflexion bi^in;
to iw*t upon thorn* ohjtH*tH they are dinmpated tnnder it
influence; the cohesive foroe twvniH Htinpended like j
of nmgie; cat*h obje<ft in loom»d into a group o
color, odor, texture ^in the inind of th
observer. , . . Kx|«Tience.f already re<luced to
swarm of imprcBHioim, i« ringed round for each on« c
us by that thick wall of personality through which n
real voice has ever pierced on its way to UH, or from us t
that which we can only conjecture to be without. Ever
one of those impressions is the impression of the itxdi
vidual m his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitar
prisoner its own dream of a world/*

The Protagorcan generalization SB due to tlio re
flection that all experience is sortie individual es
perience, that no subject of diBconrno <*acapoB th
imputation of belonging to some individual's pr:
vate history* The individual must start with hi
j own experiences and ideas, and ho can never gc

* Plato: Op. dtn 106.

SUBJECTIVISM

271

beyond them, for ho cannot sec outside his own
vision, or even think outside his own mind. The
scepticism of this theory is explicit, and the for-
mulas of Protagoras— the famous "Man is the
measure of all tilings" arid the more exact for-
mula, " Tlie truth is what appears to each man at
each time " r>— luivo been the articles of scepticism
throughout the history of thought

§ 127. There is, therefore, nothing really sur-
prising in the reception accorded the " new phi-
loHophy 7? of Bishop Berkeley. A seep-

* *

Ism and Spirit- ...., .% ,

uaHam. tioul rdativiHm is the earliest phase of
subjectivism, aiuUitB avoidance at once becomes
the most urgent problem of any philosophy which
proposes to pnxwod forth from this principle.
And this problem Berkeley moots with great adroit-
ness and a wise recognition of difficulties. But
his sanguine temperament and speculative interest
impel him to what he regards as the extension of
his first principle, the rointroduction of the con-
ception of subntanco undor the form of spirit, and
of the objective order of nature under the form
of the mind of God. In abort, there are two mo-
tives at work in him, Bide by side: the epistemo-
logical motive, restricting reality to perceptions

272 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

and thoughts, and the wetttphyrtioul-religicms mo-
tive, leading him eventually to the1 definition of
reality in terms* of peredvhtg and thinking spirits.
And from tho tmie of Berkeley the.se two prin-
ciplo.H, phenomenalism and nfiiriiualism,, have re-
mained a» distinct an<! alternating phases of
.subjectivism. The former in it« critical and
dialeetieal (Conception, the latter itn constructive
and practical conception.

§ 128. As phenomenalism, has its ehiHflic1 state-
ment and proof in the writing« of Berkeley, we
wc^ to return to thene. The
^"H philosopher wished to be
as the prophet of common-
setlBe has ftlrcva(iT been mentioned. This
and Lock*, purpose reveals itself explicitly in th<
aorics of " Dialogues between llylas and Philo
nous." The form in wHlc.h Berkeley here advance*
his thesis is further determined by the manner ii
which the lines were drawn in his day of thought
The world of enlightened public opinion was ther
threefold, consisting of Qod? physical nature, anc
the soul. In the early years of the seventeenth
century Descartes had sharply distinguished be
tween the two substances — -mind, with its attri
bute of thought; and body, with its attribute o:

SUBJECTIVISM

273

extension— and divided the finite world between
them. God was regarded us the infinite and sus-
taining cause of both. Stated in the terms of
epistcmology, the object of clear thinking is the
physical cosmos, the subject of clear thinking the
immortal soul. The realm of perception, wherein
the mind in subjected to the body, embarrasses the
Cartesian system, and has no clear title to any
place in it. And without attaching cognitive im-
portance to this realm, the system is utterly dog-
matic in its opiatomology.0 For what one sub-
stance thinks, in list bo assumed to be somehow true
of another quite 'independent substance without
any medium of communication. Now between
Descartes and Berkeley appeared the sober and
questioning " Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing/' by John Locke. This is an interesting
combination (they cannot bo said to blend) of
traditional metaphysics and revolutionary opiste-
mology. Tho universe still consists of God, the
immortal thinking soul, and a corporeal nature,
the object of its thought But, except for certain
proofs of God and self, knowledge is entirely
reduced to the perceptual typo, to sensations, or
ideas directly imparted to the mind by the objects
*Por another Issue out of this situation, cf, §§ 185-187.

274 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

themselves. To escape dogmatism it IH main-
tained that the real in what IH ohscnwd to be pres-
ent. But Locke thinks the qualities HO discovered
belong in part to the1 pweiver and in part to
the substance outside the mind. Color 5s a ease
of the former, a u secondary quality " ; and exten-
sion a ease of the latter, a " primary quality."
And evidently the above empirical teat of knowl-
edge IB not equally well met in those two eases.
When I HOC a red object I know that red exists,

for it in observed to lie prosont, and I make no

claim for it beyond the present, litit when I note
that the red object is square, i am supposed to
know a property that will continue to exist in the
object after I have closed my eyes or turned to
something else. Here my claim exceeds my ob-
servation, and the empirical principle adopted at
the oxitset would seem to l>e violated. Berkeley
develops his philosophy from this criticism. Ilia
refutation of material substance is intended as a
full acceptance of the implications of the new em-
pirical epistomology. Knowledge is to be all of
the perceptual typo, where what is known is
directly presented; and, in conformity with this
principle, being is to be restricted to the content
of the living pulses of experience.

SUBJECTIVISM

275

§ 129. Berkeley, then, beginning with the three-
fold world of Descartes and of conn non-sense,
ThcRefuu- propose to apply Locke's theory of
Material knowledge to the discomfiture of cor-
Substance, jxH'eal naturo. It was a radical doe-
trine, because it meant for him and for his
contemporaries the denial of all finite ohjects out-
side the mind. But at; tho same time it meant a
restoration of the homogeneity of experience, the
reestablish men t of tho <jualitativo world of every-
day living, and HO had its basis of appeal to
common-sense. Tho encounter between Hylas, the
adv<xi,ate of the tfudttioiml philosophy, and Philo-
nous, who reproHontH the author himself, hegins
with an exehango of the charge of innovation.

HyL I am glad to find there was nothing in the
accounts I hw.ir<l of you,

Phil. Pray, what were those?

Hyl. You w<»rc r<!ipr<»fl<inted, in last night's eonversa-
tiony aw ouo who nuiintaincul tho most extravagant
opinion that c^v<^r entered into tho mind of man, to wit,
that there is no sue.h thing an material oubstance in. the
world,

Phil. That there 5« no flu<%lx thing as what philosophers
call material mthxtanM, I am Hcriously persuaded: but if
I were made to two anything absurd or sceptical in this,
I should then have the name reason to renounce this
that I imagine I^ave now to reject the contrary opinion.
, Hyl. What! oan anything be more fantastical, more

27(1 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

repugnant to Common-Senm*, or a mor<» manifest piece
of Scepticism, than to bdu»v<* then* is no such thing as
muttcrf

PhiL Softly, good Ilyliw, What if it .should prove
that you, who hold then* i«, are, by virtue of that opinion,
a greater sceptic, and maintain more, paradoxes and
repugnances to Ooittinoii-SonH«, than I who believe no
such thing?7

PhikmcniB now proceeds with IUB cane. Begin-
ning by obtaining from Hylaa the lulmittHion that
pleasure and pain are otwent hilly relative and sub-
jective, ho argues thnt HonsationH mu*h an heat,
since they are Inseparable from those feelings,
must be similarly regarded. * And ho IB about
to annex other qualities in turn to thin core
of subjectivity, when Ilylas enters a general
demurrer :

" Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me
all this time. You asked me whether heat and cold,
sweetness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of
pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply that they
were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished:—
those qualities as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains;
but not as existing in the external objects. We must
not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat
in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat
or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire 01

sugar."8

1 Berkeley: Op, tit*, Vol. I, pp.t 380-881.
8 Md., p. 389,

SUBJECTIVISM 277

§ 130. Here the argument touches upon pro-
found issues. Philonous now assumes the extreme
iica- otnl.'"r'<-u^ Contention that knowledge
tion of the applies only to its own vS'i/cholociical

Epistemologi- * l ** * ^ J

<»i Principle, moment, thai its object in no way ex-
tends beyond that individual situation which we
call the, state of knowing. The full import of such
an cpistemology Berkeley never recognized, but he
is clearly employing it he* re, and the overthrow of
Hylas IB inevitable HO long m he does not challenge
it or turn it againnt Inn opponent This, however,
as a protagonist of Berkeley^ own making, he fails
to do, and ho pla^into Plulonous's hands by ad-
mitting that what ie known only in perception
rmiBt for that reaaon consist in perception. He
frankly OWHB " that it ia vain to stand out any
longer," that " colors, aotrnds, tantea, in a word,
all those termed secondary qualities, have certainly
no existence without the mind." 9

Hylas lias now arrived at the distinction be-
tween primary and secondary qualities. " Exten-
sion, 'Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest "
are the attributes of an external substance which
is the cause of sensations. But the same episte-
mological principle readily reduces these also to
* * Ibid., p> 307.

278

THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

dependence on mind, for, likn the* smmdary quali-
ties, their eontent is pvrn only in {H'n*rption.
llylaH I.H then driven In <lrtVn«l a p'noral material
substratum, whieh in tin1 niusr of ideas, but to
\vhirb noiir f»f tbr drtinit<» <»f»nt<'iit of tbcw i<loa8
run b<"* attril»utr<l. In ^bort, hi* han put all the
content, of kiwwh'flpp on tb*« on*» i^iilt\ an<5 atlinitted
its inw'imrability from fbr |M^rrrivin^ npirit, and
left flu* behijLC <»f tbin^H Htnn«liii^ <*w{»ty aiul for-
lorn on the oilier. Tbis ainoutits, JIH Philojmus rev
min<lH liini, to flte iieniid of fbe reality of the
known world,

11 You arc* tlw»n*fon% by yntir |tfiw*ijiIf»Mf forced to

deny th.e rrttlity of wnwihlr thinpi; niitr** you riuirir it to
conHint in an nhHiiluti* exiHtt'iin* «*\fi»rinr fn thi» nunct.
Tlirtt In to H«>% you ure n •tlmvurigtst n«Tj»tit*. 80 I hiwe
Batumi my pt>inir whirfi wiui to ntww your j}rinei|ile.H led
to 8copt«%i»m. " **

tlon of *

{| 1SL Hiiving fttlvunrod tho clirwt ompirlr'wt
argument for phrnnmcnitlfcm, Bc*rkfley now givaB
the rationnlintu* nu>tivo iin opportunity

¥ .

to exprew itwlf in thn qnonoH of Ilyliw

, 'ti

World. UH t(i wlietlier thi^re IH* not nn nlmouuc

<kxten«ioii?.l? noinehow iilmtrnrtiul by tbmigbt from
the rclntivitioH of {wweptictn, IH tln^re not «t least
a conc«tt>a6/e worlc! indc^xmtUmt of j

WM p. -II H,

SUBJECTIVISM 279

The answers of Philonous throw much light upon
the Berkeleyan position. He admits that thought
is capable of separating the primary from the sec-
ondary qualities in certain operations, but at the
same time denies that this is forming an idea of
them as separate.

"I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those quali-
ties, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense,
to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how
doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word
motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind
exclusive of body? or, because* theorems may be made
of extension and figures, without any mention of great
or small) or any otheY sensible mode or quality, that
therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension,
without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality,
should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the
mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without re-
garding what other sensible qualities it is attended with,
as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations.
But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the
bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure
abstracted ideas of extension."11

Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure exten-
sion or motion, because, although we do actually
deal with these and find them intelligible, we can
never obtain a state of mind in which they appear
as the content. He applies this psychological test
* Ibid., pp. 403-404.

280 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

because of Ills adherence to the general empirical
postulate that knowledge is limited to the indi-
vidual content of its own individual states. " It
is a universally received maxim," he nays, " that
everything which exists is jxiHwular" Now the
truth of mathematical reckoning in not particular,
but is valid wherever the conditions to which it
refers arc fulfilled. Mathcinmtical reckoning, if
it is to bo particular, nuwt bo regarded aa a
particular act or state of Homo thinker. Its truth
must then he construed an relative to the, interests
of the thinker, aa a symbolism which has an in-
strumental rather than a purvey cognitive value.
This conclusion cannot bo disputed short of a rad-
ical stand against the general epiBtemologieal prin-
ciple to which Berkeley is HO far true, the principle
that the reality which in known in any state of
thinking or perceiving is the state itself.

§ 132. This concludes the purely phcnomenal-
istic strain of Berkeley's thought. He has taken

The Transition *"10 immediate approhonHion of sensible
tospwtu«itam.0i)joctfl jn a gjato Of m;ml centring

about the pleasure and pain of an individual, to
be the norm of knowledge. Ho ban further main-
tained that knowledge cannot escape tho particu-
larity of its own states. The rc&ult is that tho

SUBJECTIVISM 281

universe is composed of private perceptions and
ideas. Strictly on the basis of what has preceded,
Hylas is justified in regarding this conclusion as
no less sceptical than that to which his own posi-
tion had been reduced; for while he had been
compelled to admit that the real is unknowable,
Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as
relative to the individual. But the supplementary
metaphysics which had hitherto been kept in the
background is now revealed. It is maintained
that though perceptions know no external world,
they do nevertheless reveal a spiritual substance
of which they a*e"" the states. Although it has
hitherto been argued that the esse of things is in
their percipi, this is now replaced by the more
fundamental principle that the esse of things is in
thoir percipere or velle. The real world consists
not in perceptions, but in perceivers.

§ It33. Now it is at once evident that the episte-
mological theory which has been Berkeley's dia-
Icctical weapon in the foregoing argu-

ment is no longer available. And those

who have cared more for this theory
than for metaphysical speculation have attempted
to stop at this point, and so to construe phenom-
enalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own

282 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to
make it worth our while to review them before
proceeding with the development of the spiritual-
istic motive in subjectivism.

The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-
perceptions, ideas, or phenomena. What is to be
accepted as the fundamental category which gives
to all of these terms their subjectivistic signifi-
cance ? So far there seems to be nothing iii view
save the principle of relativity. The type to which
these were reduced was that of the peculiar or
unsharable experience best represented by an in-
dividual's pleasure and pain. * But relativity will
not work as a general principle of being. It con-
signs the individual to his private mind, and can-
not provide for the validity of knowledge enough
even to maintain itself. Some other course, then,
must be followed. Perception may be given a
psycho-physical definition, which employs physical
terms as fundamental ; 12 but this flagrantly con-
tradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or,
reality may be regarded as so stamped with its
marks as to insure the proprietorship of thought.
But this definition of certain objective entities of

13 Of. Pearson: Grammar of Science, Ct^p. II. See above,
I IIS.

SUBJECTIVISM 283

mind, of beings attributed to intelligence because
of their intrinsic intelligibility, is inconsistent
with empiricism, if indeed it does not lead eventu-
ally to a realism of the Platonic type.13 Finally,
and most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism
have been retained after their orignal meaning has
been suffered to lapse. The " impressions " of
Hume, e. g.f are the remnant of the Berkeleyan
world with the spirit stricken out. There is no
longer any point in calling them impressions, for
they now mean only elements or qualities. As a
consequence this outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism
epintemology ia at 'present merging into a realistic
philosophy of experience.14 Any one, then, of
these three may be the last state of one who under-
takes to remain exclusively faithful to the phe-
nomenaliRtic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in
the principle esso est percipi.

18 Sec Chap. XI, Of. also § 140.

14 The same may bo said of the l ' permanent possibilities of
sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities out-
side of actual perception are either nothing or things such
as they are known to be in perception. In either case they are
not perceptions.

In Ernst Mach's Analysis of Sensations, the reader will
find an interesting transition from sensationalism to realism
through the substitution of the term Beztandtheil for Em-
pftndung, (See Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See
below, §207.

284 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
Berkeley's § 134. Let us now follow the. fortunes

Spiritualism. . .

immediate of the other phase ot subjectivism—

Knowledge of . _ , . _

the Perceiver. that wlucii develops the conception of
the perceiver rather than the perceived. When

Berkeley holds that

" all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in
a word, all those bodies which compose, the mighty
frame of the world, have not any subnistence without
a Mind/'

his thought has transcended the opistemology with
which he overthrew the conception of material sub-
stance, in two directions. .For neither mind of the
finite type nor mind of the divirn? typo is perceived
But the first of these may yet be regarded as a
direct empirical datum, even though sharply dis-
tinguished from au object of perception. In the
third dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new
kind of knowledge :

" I own I have properly no idea, either of God or any

other spirit ; for these being active, cannot be represented

, by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do never-

; theless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking sub-

; stance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist.

.i Farther, I know what I mean by the terms / and myself;

and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I

do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a

sound." 1& ^

l* Berkeley: Op. cit., p. 447.

SUBJECTIVISM 285

The knowledge here provided for may be regarded
as empirical because the reality in question is an
individual present in the moment of the knowl-
edge. Particular acts of perception are said di-
rectly to reveal not only perceptual objects, but
perceiving subjects. And the conception of spir-
itual substance, once accredited, may then be ex-
tended to account for social relations and to fill
in the nature of Gocl. The latter extension, in so
far as it attributes such further predicates as uni-
versality and infinity, implies still a third episte-
niology, and threatens to pass over into rationalism.
But the knowledge of one's fellow-men may, it is
claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the knowl-
edge of one's self. Perceptual and volitional ac-
tivity has a sense for itself and also a sense for
other like activity. The self is both self-conscious
and socially conscious in an immediate experience
of the same type.

§ 135- But this general spiritualistic conception
is developed with less singleness of purpose in
Berkeley than among the voluntarists

hauer's Spirit- .

uaiism, or and panpsycMsts who spring irom

Voluntarism. _ . - . .. . .

immediate Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist,

and ^mystic among the German Kan-
tians of the early nineteenth century. His great

286 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

book, " Die Welt nls Willc und Vorstelhmg,"
opens with the phenomenal Lstic contention that
" the world is my idea." It soon appears, how-
ever, that the " my ?1 is more profoundly signifi-
cant than the " idea." Nature in my creation,
due to the working within mo of certain fixed
principles of thought, such as space*, time, and
causality. But nature, just because* it is my crea-
tion, is less than me: is but a manifestation of the
true being for which 1 must look 'within myself.

But this Inner self cannot be made an object of

f
thought, for that would bo only to create another

term of nature. The will itself, from which such
creation springs, is " that which is most immedi-
ate " in one's consciousness, and " makes itself
known in, a direct manner in its particular acts."
The term will is used by Schojienhaucr as a gen-
eral term covering the whole dynamics of life, in-
stinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that
sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appe-
tency which is the conscious accompaniment of
struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the whole
world may now be apprehended.

"Whoever has now gained from all theso expositions
a knowledge in abstracto, and therefore^loar and certain,
of what everyone knows directly in concrete, i, e», as

SUBJECTIVISM 287

feeling, a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature
of his phenomenal being, . » . and that his will is
that which is most immediate in his consciousness,
. . . will find that of itself it affords him the key to
the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature ;
for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are
not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence,
both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in the
latter, thus merely one-sidedly as idea alone."10

Tlie heart of reality is thus known by an " intui-
tive interpretation/7 which begins at home in the
individual's own heart.

§ 136. The panpsychist follows the same course
of reflection. There is an outwardness and an
Panpsychism. inwardness of nature, corresponding to
the knower's body on the one hand, and his feel-
ing or will on the other. With this principle in
hand one may pass down the whole scale of being
and discover no breach of continuity. Such an
interpretation of nature has been well set forth by
a contemjx>rary writer, who quotes the following
from the botanist, 0. v. Naegoli:

" Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions
of higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the
other animals also, and we have no grounds for denying
it to plants and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses
in us a condition of comfort and discomfort. In general,

u Schopenhaue^ The World as Will and Idea. Transla-
tion by Haldone and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.

288 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

the feeling of pleasure arises when the natural impulses
are satisfied, the feeling of pain when they are not satis-
fied, Since all material processes are composed of
movements of molecules and elementary atoms, pleasure
and pain must have their seat in these particles. . . .
Thus the same mental thread runs through all material
phenomena. The human mind is nothing but the
„ highest devolpment on our earth of the mental processes
which universally animate and move nature."17

According to panpsychism, then, physical nature
is the manifestation of an appetency or bare con-
sciousness generalized from the thinker's awareness
of his most intimate self, Sxteh appetency or bare

consciousness IB the essential or substantial state

of that which appears as physical nature.

§ 187. We nmst now turn to the efforts which
this doctrine has made to maintain itself against
The inherent ^ie sceptical trend of its own cpiste-
mol°Sy- For lamely as in the case
°"^ P"ienomcnaKBm *te dialectical prin-
cipie threatens to be self-destructive.
Immediate presence is still the tost of knowledge.
But does not immediate presence connote relativ-
ity and inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of
knowledge that must be supplemented and cor-

17 Quoted from Naegeli: Die MechanuGk-pht/mologixcIw Theo-
rie der Abstammungskhre, by Friedrlch Paplsen, in his Intro-
duction to Philosophy. Translation by Thiliy, p. 103.

SUBJECTIVISM 289

rected before objective reality and valid truth
are apprehended? Does not the individuality of
the individual thinker connote the very maximum
of error ? Indeed, spiritualism would seern to have
exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have
passed from scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The
object of knowledge is no longer even, as with the
phenomenalist, the thinker's thought, but only his
thinking. And if the thinker's thought is relative
to him, then the thinker's act of thinking is the

very vanishing-point of relativity, the negative

•»

term of a negating relation. How is a real, a
self-subsistent world to be composed of such ? Im-
pelled by a half-conscious realization of the hope-
lessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritu-
alism has sought to universalize his conception;
to define an absolute or ultimate spirit other than
the individual thinker, though known in and
through him. But it is clear that this development
of spiritualism, like all of the speculative proced-
ure of siibjectiviBm, threatens to exceed the scope
of the original principle of knowledge* There is
a strong presumption against the possibility of
introducing a knowledge of God by the way of
the particular ^presentations of an individual con-
sciousness.

290 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

§ 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a
genuine effort to accept the metaphysical eonse-
qucncos of his cpistcmology. His
" cpisteinology, as we have seen, defined

universalize knowle<lc:o as centripetal. The object

Subjectivism. n * J

Mysticism. Of rea] knowledge is identical with the
subject of knowledge. If I am to know the uni-
versal will, therefore, I. must in knowing become
that will. And this Schopenhauer maintains.
The innermost heart of the individual into which
he may retreat,, oven from MH private will, in—the
universal. But there' is another way of arriving
at the same knowledge. In contemplation I may
become absorbed in principles and lawn, rather
than bo diverted by the particular npaeial and
temporal objects, until (and thin in peculiarly true
of the aesthetic experience) my interest no longer
distinguishes itself, but coincide** with truth. In
other words, abstract thinking and ptire willing
are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points on
the deeper or transcendent circle of experience.
One may reach this part of the circle by moving
in. either of two directions that at the start are
directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject
or by utterly giving one's self up to the object.
Heality obtains no definition by this moans. Phi-

SUBJECTIVISM 291

losophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a programme
for realizing the state in which I will the universal
and know the universal will. The final theory of
knowledge, then, is mysticism, reality directly ap-
prehended in a supreme and incommunicable ex-
perience, direct and vivid, like perception, and at
the same time universal, like thought But the
empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the
appeal to a familiar experience of self as will, has
meanwhile been forgotten. The idea as object of
my perception, and the will as its subject were in
the beginning regarded as common and verifiable
items of experience * But who, save the occasional
philosopher, knows a universal will ? Nor have at-
tempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Scho-
penhauer's first principle, been successful. Certain
voluntarists and panpsychists have attempted to
do without the universal will, and define the world
solely in terms of the many individual wills. But,
as Schopenhauer himself pointed out, individual
wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of
something other than will, such as space and time.
The same is true if for will there be substituted
inner feeling or consciousness. Within this cate-
gory individuals can be distinguished only as
points of view, which to be comparable at all must

292 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

contain common objects, or l>o defined in terms
of a system of relations like that of the physical
world or that of an ethical community. The con-
ception of pure will or pure feeling inevitably at-
taches to itself that of an undivided unity, if for
no other reason because there is no ground for dis-
tinction. And such a unity, a will or conscious-
ness that is no particular act or idea, can be known
only in the unique "experience which mysticism
provides.

§ 139, The way of Schopenhauer is the way of
one who adheres to the belief that what the thinker
Objective knows must always 'ba a part of himself,
Spiritualism, i^8 fitato ()r yB aetivity. .From this

point of view the important element of being, its
very essence or substance, is not any definable
nature but an immediate relation to the knower.
The consequence is that the universe in the last
analysis can only be defined aa a supremo state or
activity into which the individual's consciousness
may develop. Spiritualism has, however, other
interests, interests which may be quite independent
of epistemology. It is speculatively interested in
a kind of being which it defines as spiritual, and
in terms of which it proposes to define the universe-
Such procedure is radically different from the

SUBJECTIVISM 293

epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to
maintain that the esse of objects is in their percipi,
or Schopenhauer to maintain that " the world is
my idea/' or that led both of these, philosophers to
find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-
activity. For now it is proposed to understand
spirit, discover its properties, and to acknowledge
it only where these properties appear. I may now
know spirit as an object; which in its properties,
to be sure, is quite different from matter, but which
like matter is capable of subsisting quite independ-
ently of my knowledge. "Phis is a metaphysical
spiritualism quite* '"distinct from epistemologieal
spiritualism, and by no means easily made con-
sistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost
irrepressible tendency to overstep the bounds both
of empiricism and subjectivism, an historical con-
nection with which alone justifies its introduction
in the present chapter.

§ 140. To return again to the instructive ex-
Berkeiey's ample of Bishop Berkeley, we find him

Conception of .

God as Cause, proving God f rom the evidence 01 mm

Goodness and . . , ., » , . ,

Order. m experience, or the need 01 mm to

support the claims of experience.

"But, whatevet power I may have over my own
thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense

294 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

have not a like dependence, on my will. When in broad
daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose
whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to rny view: and so
likewise as to the hearing and other sense's; the ideas
imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is
therefore some other Will or Spirit that- produces them.

The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct
than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a
steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at
random, as those which are the effects of human wills
often are, but in. a regular train or series-— the admirable
connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and
benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules, or estab-
lished methods, wherein the Mind we. depend on excites
in us the ideas of Sense, are called the lawn of nature."16

Of tlio attributes of experience* here in question,
independence- or " steadiness " is not regarded as
prima facie evidence of spirit, but rather aw an
aspect of experience for which some cause is nec-
essary. But it IB assumed that the power to " pro-
duce/7 with which such a cause must, be endowed,
is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this
cause gives further evidence of its spiritual nature,
of its eminently spiritual nature, in the orderli-
ness and the goodness of its effects.

" The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the
goodness that perfects all things is the Supremo Being."1*

• *:- i 18 Berkeley: Op, dt., p. 2735

19 Op. cit., Vol. If pp. 272-273.

SUBJECTIVISM 295

That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berke-
ley has in an earlier passage proved by a direct
appeal to thoindi vidimus sense _o

" I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure,
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is
no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea
arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is ob-
literated and makes way for another. This making
and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate
the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded
on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents,
or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse
ourselves with words."20

Although Berkeley is herein general agreement
with a very considerable variety of philosophical
viewa, it will bo readily observed that this doctrine
tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is re-
tained in its purity. Berkeley himself admitted
that there waft no " idea ?? of such power. And
philosophers will as a rule cither obtain an idea
corresponding to a term or amend the term —
always excepting the mystical appeal to an inar-
ticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure
power revealed in an ineffable immediate experi-
ence tends to give place to kinds of power to which
Homo definite meaning may be attached. The
energy of phyau*a, defined by measurable quan-
™ Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 278.

296 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

illative equivalence, IB a rase, in point The, ideal-
istic trend is in another direction, power coming
to signify ethical or logical connection. Simi-
larly, in the later philosophy of Berkeley himself,
God is known l>y the nature of his activity rather
than hy the fact of his activity ; and we arc said
" to account for a thing, when we show that it
is BO host." (tod's power, in short, becomes indis-
tinguishable from bis universality attended with
the attributes of goodness and orderliness. But
this means that tho analogy of the human spirit,
conscious of its own activity, in no longer the basis
of tho argument By the diviVie will in now meant
ethical principles, rather than the " hero am I
willing57 of tho empirical consciousness. Simi-
larly tho divine mind is defined in terms of logical
principles, such as coherence and order, rather
than in terms of tho " here am I thinking " of tho
finite knowor himself. But enough has boon said
to make it plain that this IB no longer the stand-
point of §2BI^^ Indeed, in his last
philosophical writing, the " Siria," Berkeley ia BO
far removed from the principles of/ knowledge
which made him at once the disciple ffad tho critic
of Locke^as to pronounce himaojf ihe dwotoe. of

Platonism and the prophet of transcendentalism,
•-^"**" •*****'"•""• - • •* -•*• —•«**. .. . «-•• " ••-

SUBJECTIVISM 297

The former strain appears in his conclusion that
" the principles of science are neither objects of
sense nor imagination ; and that intellect and rea-
son are alone the sure guides to truth." 21 His ;
transcendentalism appears in his belief that suchj
principles, participating in the vital unity of the!
Individual Purpose, constitute the meaning and so
the substantial essence of the universe.

§ 141. Such then are th§ various paths which
lead from subjectivism to other types of philos-
The General ophy, demonstrating the peculiar apti-

Tcndcncy of

Subjectivism tudc of the former for departing from

to Transcend . .

its first principle. Beginning with the

relativity of all knowable reality to the individual
laimver, it undertakes to conceive reality in one or
tho other of the terms of this relation, as particu-
lar state of knowledge or as individual subject of
knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic^
nature of their own, and become respectively!
empirical datum, and logical or ethical principle.
In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowl-
edge has been abandoned. Those whose specula-
tive interest in a definable objective world has been
less strong than their attachment to this principle,
have either accepted the imputation of scepticism,
21 Op, tit., V<3l. III, p. 249.

298 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

or had rrcoiirso to the radical f*pifltc?mologieal doc-
trine of myatieism.

'8 142. Since tho ouwnotf of subjectivism ia
epifttemologinil rathor than niotaphyrtUMil, ita prac-
tioal and roligiouH Implication are

Theories. . m . » ,

Relativism. various, • 1 no otiucal thrones which; I
are corollary to tho tondrneioB oxpoundod above,
range from cxtrcinc* ogoinni to it inyntical tinivor-
Baliwtn- The clone colimH^tion !ict\vcHkn tho fonuo.r
and relativism is evident, and the form of egoism
moHt consistent with epistemologioal relativinm is
to ho found among th<«e name Sophists who first
maintained thin latter doctrine. If we may
believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for
their individual pupils an appearance- of good,
In the " Thoaetetns," Socrates is represented as
speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras :

" And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise
man have no existence; but I Hay that the \vlrn man is
ho who makes the evils which are and appear to a man,
into goods which arc and appear to him. - , . I nay
that they (the wise men) are the physicians of the human
body, and the husbandmen of plants-— for the husband-
men also take away the evil and disordered sensations
of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensa-
tions as well as true onos; and the wise and good rhetori-
cians make -the good instead of the evil sioem just to states;
for whatever appears to be just *nd fair to a atate, while

SUBJECTIVISM 299'

sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it ; but the teacher
of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil,
both in appearance and in reality."22

As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance
of truth to the individual, so good is indistinguish-
able from a particular seeming good. The su-
preme moral value according to this plan of life
is the agreeable feeling tone of that dream world

to which the individual is forever consigned. The

**
possible perfection of an experience which is " re-

duced to a swarm of impressions/' and " ringed
round " for each one of 115 by a " thick wall of
personality " has been brilliantly depicted in the
passage already quoted from Walter Pater, in
whom the naturalistic and subjectivistic motives
unite.28 If all my experience is strictly my own,
then my good must likewise be my own. And if
all of my experience is valid only in its instants of
immediacy, then my best good must likewise con-
sist in some " exquisite passion," or stirring of the
senses.

§ 148. But for Schopenhauer the internal
world opens out into the boundless and unf athom-

^ I re""

Pessimism and

Seif-deniai. ^re from the W0rld upon my own pri-

33 Plato; Thecitetu8t 167. Translation by Jowett.
38 See § 121. ,

300 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

vate feelings, I am still short of the true life, for
I am asserting myself against the world. I should
seek a sense of unison with a world whose deeper
heart-beats I may learn to feel and adopt as the
rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one's
private self is the ground of Schopenhauer's
pessimism.

"All willing arises from want, therefore from de-
ficiency, and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction
of a wish ends it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there
remain at least ten which are denied. Further, the
desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfac-
tion is short and scantily measured out. But even the
final satisfaction is itself only apparent; every satisfied
wish at once makes room for a new one, both are illusions;
the one is known to be so, the other not yet. No at-
tained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but
merely a fleeting gratification; it is like the alms thrown
to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day that his misery
may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The subject
of willing is thus constantly stretched on the revolving
wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the Danaids,
is the ever-longing Tantalus."24

The escape from this torture and self-deception is
possible through the same mystical experience, the
same blending with the universe that conditions
knowledge.

§ 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the

24 Schopenhauer: Op. tit. Translation by Haldane and
Kemp, VoL I, pp. 253-254. 4

SUBJECTIVISM , 303,

wr-/',*?* ' *

most consistent practical sequel to'Vsubjectivistie r..
epistemology, its individualism presents another
The Ethics kasis for life with quite different pos-
of welfare. sibilities of emphasis. It may develop
into an aggressive egoism of the type represented
by the sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation
that " might is right, justice the interest of the
stronger.7' 25 But more commonly it is tempered
by a conception of social interest, and serves as
the champion of action against contemplation.

The gospel of action is always individualistic. It

•»

requires of the individual a sense of his inde-
pendence, and of *the real virtue of his initiative.
Hence those voluntarists who emphasize the many
individual wills and decline to reduce them, after
the manner of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may
"be said to afford a direct justification of it. It is
true that this practical realism threatens the tena-
bility of an epistemological idealism, but the two
have been united, and because of their common
emphasis upon the individual such procedure is
not entirely inconsequential. Priedrich Paulsen,
whose panpsychism has already been cited, is an
excellent case in point The only good, he main-
tains, is " welf «fro," the fulfilment of those natural
25 See Plato: Republic, Bk. I, 338.

302 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

desires which both distinguish the individual and
signify his continuity with all grades of being.

"The goal at which the will aims does not consist in
a maximum of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal
exercise of the vital functions for which, the species is
predisposed. In the case of man the mode of life is on
the whole determined by the nature of the historical
unity from which the individual evolves as a member.
Here the objective content of life, after which the will
strives, also enters into consciousness with the progres-
sive evolution of presentation; the type of life becomes
a conscious ideal of life." K

Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer,
the good consists in individual attainment, the
extension and fulfilment of tne distinct interests
that arise from the common fund of nature. To
be and to do to the uttermost, to realize the maxi-
mum from nature's investment in one's special
capacities and powers — this is indeed the first
principle of a morality of action.

§ 145. But a type of ethics still further re-
moved from the initial relativism has been adopted

The Ethical an<^ more or I088 successfully assimi-

Commumty. lftted by 8^^^^ philosophies.

Accepting Berkeley's spirits, with their indefinite
capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal
principles that underlie a God-adnspiistered world,
38 Paulsen: Op. cft^fk 423,

SUBJECTIVISM 303

and morality becomes the obedience which the in-
dividual renders to the law. The individual, free
to act in his own right, cooperates with the pur-
poses of the general spiritual community, whose
laws are worthy of obedience though not coercive.
The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship,
entailing opportunities, duties, and obligations,
rather than thraldom, partakes of the truth as
well as the inadequacy of coihmon-sense.

§ 146. As for religion, at least two distinct

practical appreciations of the universe have been

•»

TheRcll ionof historically associated with this chap-
Mysticism. ter in -philosophy. The one of these
is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the religious
sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopen-
hauer's ethics, his very philosophy, is religion.
For the good and the true are alike attainable only
through identification with the Absolute Will.
This consummation of life, transcending practical
and theoretical differences, engulfing and effacing
all qualities and all values, is like the Nirvana of
the Orient — a positive ideal only for one who has
appraised the apparent world at its real value.

"Rather do w& freely acknowledge that what remains
after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are
still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to

301 TUB APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

those in whom the will has turned and han denied itself,
this our world, which in so mil, with all its suns and
milky-wayH— in nothing." "

$ 147. From fho union of the* two motives of
voluntarism and individualism spring* another
UIU' a inon* familiar typo of religion,
tJult <rf cwprativ<* spiritual omleuvor.
with God. jn |]U3 religion of S<?hop<inhnuor the
«oul nniHt utterly loHcvitnelf for tho wako of peaeo;
lic^ro tlio Houl intiBt pornirtfc in I In own Inung and
activity for the Hake of the progressive goodness
of the world. For Schopenhauer (Jod is tlio uni-
vorsal solution, in which all m;>tioiiH <vas<». ami all
difforenccm disappear; hero God is the General of
moral forces. The deeper and more significant
imivorso ia

*'a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of
Providence, concurring in one dtmiga to promote the
common benefit of the whole, and conforming their
actions to the established laws and order of the Divine
parental wisdom; wherein each particular agent shall
not consider himself apart, but as the member of a great
City, whose author and founder is God: in which the
civil laws are no other than the rules of virtue and the
duties of religion: and where everyone's true interest is
combined with his duty."38

™ Schopenhauer: Op. tit. Translation by Haldt&e and
Kemp, p. 532,
28 Berkeley: Op. citn Vol. II, p. 138,

SUBJECTIVISM 305

But so uncompromising an optimism is not essen-
tial to this religion. Its distinction lies rather in
its acceptance of the manifest plurality of souls,
and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by
service.29 As William James has said :

" Even God's being is sacred from ours. To cooperate
with his creation by the best and lightest response seems
all he wants of us. In such cooperation with his pur-
poses, not in any chimerical, specjilative conquest of him,
not in any theoretical drinking of him up, must lie the
real meaning of our destiny." 30

29 For an interesting characterization of this type of
religion, cf. Royce: Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 46.
80 James: The Will to Relieve, p. 141.

CHAPTER X

§ 148. No one has uiuloTHtoml hotter than the
philosopher himself that he cannot ht>jx.! to IK*, popu-
"ar W^J }ni*11 °^ practical <'omnion-
HenH(l» Indwd> It hart commonly lx»<»n
a tmittor of pride with him. The

Objec*» or the *

Abioiut«, ehtBHje ro.p?m*ntation of the philoHo-
pher*B faith in liinwolf in tx> \w foun<l in Plato's

" Republic." The* plulonophor in then* jx>rtrayo<l
in the famorm (•avo nimile UH one who having HO.OU
the light itnolf <*nn no longer dintingiUHh the
shadows which are apparent to thono who Hit per-
petxially in the twilight Within tho cave of
shadows he is indeed UIHS at Inn eime than those
who have never seen the sun. But since ho known
the source of the shadows, his knowledge surrounds

1 By Absolute Rmlum is meant that »y«tftm of philosophy
which defines the universe aa the ahmlut® luring, implied
in knowledge as its final objoct, but awtumcU to bo indiv*
pendent of knowledge. In the Spinosintte ttytttom thw
absolute being is conceived undar the form of tub* fane* t or
1 self-sufEciency; "m Platonum under thc^form of ^mrfwtwn;
and in the Aritttotelwn system under the form of a hwrarchy
of mbstancw*

aoe

ABSOLUTE REALISM 307

that of the shadow connoisseurs. And his equa-
nimity need not suffer from the contempt of those
whom he understands better than they understand
themselves. The history of philosophy is due to
the dogged persistence with which the philosopher
has taken himself seriously and endured the poor
opinion of the world. But the pride of the phi-
losopher has done more than perpetuate the philo-
sophical outlook and problem; it has led to the
formulation of a definite philosophical conception,
and of two great philosophical doctrines. The

conception is that of the absolute; and the doc-

•.

trines are that of *the absolute being,, and that of
the absolute self or mind. The former of these
doctrines is the topic of the present chapter.

Among the early Greeks the role of the philos-
opher was one of superlative dignity. In point
of knowledge he was less easily satisfied than
other men. He thought beyond immediate prac-
tical problems, devoting himself to a profounder
reflection, that could not but induce in him a sense
of superior intellectual worth. The familiar was
not binding upon him, for his thought was eman-
cipated from routine and superficiality. Fur-
thermore his inlklleetual courage and resolution
did not permit him to indulge in triviality, doubt,

3Q8 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

or paradox. He sought his mvn with a faith that
could not lie denied. Kven IleraelifuH the Dark,
who was also called ** the Weeping Philosopher,"
IxH'ause he found at the very heart, of nature that
transiency which the philosophical mind seeks to
escape, felt himself to he exalted as well as isolated
by that insight "But this Hent.mient of personal
aloofness led at one1!* to a division of experience,.
He who knows truly' belongs to another and more
abiding world. As there in a philosophical way
of thought, there is a philosophical way of life, and
a phlioMjpliieal vlijcct. Since the. philosopher and
the common man do not HCO &Hkc, the, tenna of
their experience are JneonnnenHumble* In Par-
numidcB the Kleiitie this motive is most strikingly
exhibited. There in u Way of Truth which di-
verges from the Way of Opinion. The philoso-
pher walks the former way alone. And there Is
un object of truth, accessible only to one who takes
this way of truth. Parmenidea finds this object
to be the content of pure affirmation,

"One path only m left for m to speak of, namely,
that It 19. In it are very many tokens that what IB,
is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, im-
movable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will
it be; for now it i% all at once, a contiguous one/' *

a Bunust: Early Greek Philosophy f p. 185.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 309

The philosophy of Parmeiiides, commonly called
the Eleatic Philosophy, is notable for this emer-
gence of the pure concept of absolute being as the
final object of knowledge. The philosopher aims
to discover that which is, and so turns away from
that which is not or that which ceases to be. The
negative and transient aspects of experience only
hinder him in his search for the eternal. It was
the great Eleatic insight to <•< realize that the out-
come of thought is thus predetermined; that the
answer to philosophy is contained in the question
of philosophy. The philosopher, in that he reso-
lutely avoids all partiality, relativity, and super-
ficiality, must affirm a complete, universal, and
ultimate being as the very object of that perfect
knowledge which he means to possess. This ob-
ject is known, in. the history of these philosophies
as the infinite or absolute?

§ 149. The Eleatic reasons somewhat as fol-
lows. The philosopher seeks to know what is.
The Eleatic The object of his knowledge will then

Conception . . . 1 . ,

of Being. contain as its primary and essential
predicate, that of being. It is a step further to
define being in terms of this essential predicate.
8 When contrasteclpwith the temporal realm of " genera-
tion and decay," tnis ultimate object is often called the
eternal.

310 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Parmenidea thiuka of being us a power or strength,
a positive ttolf-maintonan<*n to which all affirma-
tion** refer. Tim remainder of the Kleatie. philos-
ophy in the. analysis of thi« concept and the proof
of its implications. Bring must pernist through
all change, and span all dhuwms. Before being
there can be only nothing which i« the name as to
say that; HO far as being is concerned there is no
before. Similarly th**re ran l*e no after or beyond.
There can He no motion, change, or division of
being, became b<»ing will lx\ in nil partn of every
division, and in all" «tugen of ev<*ry procoss.
Hence lx*ing in l4' tu3K*roattMl • i|n<I ixicleHtructiblo,
alone, complete, itntuovable, un<l without en<Ln

The argument tunw upon the application to
being as a whole of the meaning and the implica-
tions of only being. Being i« the affirmative or
positive. From that alone, one can derive only such
properties as eternity or unity. For generation and
decay and plurality may belong to that which is
also affirmative and positive, but not to that which
is affirmative and positive only. The Elastic phi-
losophy is due, then, to the determination to de-
rive the whole of reality from the bare necessity
of being, to cut down reality t^ what flows en-
tirely from the assertion of its only known nee-

ABSOLUTE REALISM 311

essary aspect, that of being. We meet here in its
simplest form a persistent rationalistic motive, the
attempt to derive the universe from the isolation
and analysis of its most universal character. As
in the case of every well-defined philosophy, this
motive is always attended by a " besetting " prob-
lem. Here it is the accounting for what, empiri-
cally at least, is alien to that xiniversal character.
And this difficulty is emphasized rather than re-
solved by Parmenicles in his designation of a limbo
of opinion, " in which is no true belief at all," to
which the manifold of coiftmon experience with
all its irrelevaiiciepcan be relegated.

§ 150. The Eleatic philosophy, enriched and
supplemented, appears many centuries later in the
rigorous rationalism of Spinoza.4 With

Conception .

of Substance, bpmoza philosophy is a demonstration
of necessities after the manner of geometry.
Keality is to be set forth in theorems derived from
fundamental axioms and definitions. As in the
case of Parmenides, these necessities are the im-
plications of the very problem of being. The phi- "
losopher's problem is made to solve itself. But
for Spinoza that problem is more definite and
more pregnant. /The problematic being must not
4 Holland, 1632-1677.

312 THE APPROACH TO PHILOROPHY

only be, hut must ho suffifwnt to il&elf. What the
philosopher seeka to know in primarily an intrinsic
entity* ItR naturo. must ho indopondont of othor
natures, and my knowledge of it independent of my
knowledge of anything olac. Reality in something
which need not ho, Bought further, Ho eoiiHtrued,
being i« in Spinoza1s philosophy tormod wthstance.
It will ho Bc»<»n that to c]t»fhio Htihrttunro in to affirm
the existowo of it, f/>r HuhstaiH'o IB BO dofinod as
to oml)o<ly tho v<»ry qualifioation for
Whatever oxiBts oxist.B uudor tho form of
an that "which IB *n. itB(.klf, un<l IB
through itrtdf: in olhor wor!^, that of which a
eoiKKvption can bc^ fornu5<l indopondontly of any
other concoption.7> n

§ 151. There remains hut one further funda-
mental thesis for tho establishment of tho Bpino-

ziatic philofiophv, the thesis which main-
*'

Proof of God* %

the inflnito tains tho oxcltisivo oxifttxmce of tho one

Substanco.

Th« Modes " absolutely infinite being/9 or God.
Attributes. The exclusive existence of God follows
from his existence, because of the exhavmtiveness
of his nature. Ilia IB the nature " consisting in
infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal
and infinite essentiality." Ho will contain all
* Spinoza: Ethics, Part I. Translation by Elww, p. 45.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 313

meaning, and all possible meaning, within his fixed
and necessary constitution. It is evident that if
such a God exist, nothing can fall outside of him.
One such substance must be the only substance.
But upon what grounds are we to assert God's
existence ?

To proceed further with Spinoza's philosophy
we must introduce two terms which are scarcely
less fundamental in his system than that of sub-
stance. The one of these is " attribute/7 by which
he means kind or general property; the other is

" mode/7 by which he means case or individual

tiling, Spinoza's ^roof of God consists in show-
ing that no single mode, single attribute, or finite
group of modes or attributes, can be a substance ;
but only an infinite system of all modes of all at-
tributes. Translated into common speech this
means that neither kinds nor cases, nor special
groups of either, can stand alone and be of them-
selves, but only the unity of all possible cases of
all possible kinds. '

The argument concerning the possible substan-
tiality of the case or individual thing is relatively
simple. Suppose an attribute or kind, Af of which
there arc cases aml^f ani^ am%, etc. The number
of cases is never involved in the nature of the

314 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

kind, JIB is neen for example in tho fact; that the
definition of triangle presrriln's no s[Kx?ial num-
ber of individual triangles. 1 lenee am 1 , «;n2, ama,
ete.y must IK* explained by something outside of
their nature. Their Iteing eases of A does not ac-
count for their existing severally. This in Spi-
noza'8 8taU»inrnt of thi* arpumont. that individual
events, «n<»h m inations or HensationH, are not self-
de]Kkn<l<kntT but belong to a rantf»xt of like events
\vhieli nre inuttially <lejH*n<Ient.

The question of the attribute is tnore difficult
Why may not an attribute UK n coniplete domain
of intorclopendont evcmtn, itself* IK* independent or
substantial ? Bpino35irs predeeesHort I)(*Ht»artes, had
maintaincsd pr<*(*i«ely that thesis in behalf of the
domain of thought and the domain of apace.
Spinoza's answer rests upon the famous oncological
argument, inherited from scholasticism and gen-
erally accepted in the first period of modem philos-
ophy. The evidence of oxiKtcmca, bo declares, is
dear and distinct concoivability.

"For a person to say that ho ha» a clear and distinct —
that is, a true— idea of a substance, but that he is not
sure whether such substance exists, would be the same
as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure
whether or no it was falsa/16

9 Ibid., p. 40,

ABSOLUTE REALISM 315

Now we can form a clear and distinct idea of an
absolutely infinite being that shall have all possible
attributes. This idea is a well-recognized stand-
ard and object of reference for thought. But it is
a conception which is highly qualified, not only
through its clearness and distinctness, but also
through its abundance of content. It affirms itself
therefore with a certainty that surpasses any other
certainty, because it is sup*ported by each and
every other certainty, and even by the residuum
of possibility. If any intelligible meaning be

permitted to affirm itself, so much the more irre-

sistible is the claifti of this infinitely rich mean-
ing. Since every attribute contributes to its valid-
ity, the being with infinite attributes is infinitely
or absolutely valid. The conclusion of the argu-
ment is now obvious. If the being constituted by
the infinite attributes exists, it swallows up all
possibilities and exists exclusively,

§ 152. The vulnerable point in Spinoza's argu-
ment can thus be expressed: that which is im-
The Limits of portant is questionable, and that which
*s unquestionable is of doubtful im-

for God. -portance. Have I indeed a clear and
distinct idea of an absolutely infinite being?
The answer turns upon the meaning of the

316 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

phrase " idea of." It in true I run add to stick
meaning as 1 apprehend the thought of possible
other meaning, and suppose the whole to havo
a defmiteness and systematic unity like that
of the triangle. But such an idea in prob-
lematic. I am eom|Kklled to use the term " pos-
sible/* and HO to confess the failure of defmito
content to measure up to my idea, 'My idea of an
absolutely infinite being is like my Idea of a uni-
versal language: I can think of it, hut I. cannot
think it oitf* for luck of data or lieeuuse of the con-
flicting testimony of other data. If I menu the
infinity of my being to IK* a term of inelusiveness,
and to insist that the all must he, and that there
can be nothing not included in flu* all, I can
scarcely bo domed* Hut it, is reasonable, to doubt
the importance of such a truth. Tf, on the other
hand, I mean that my infinite being shall have
the compactness and organic unity of a triangle,
I must admit that such a being IB indeed prob-
lematic. The degree to which the meaning of the
part is dependent upon the meaning of the whole,
or the degree to which the geometrical analogy is
to be preferred to the analogy of aggregates, like
the events within a year? Is a problem that falls
quite outside Spinoza's fundamental arguments.

ABSOLUTE EEALISM 317

§ 153. But the advance of Spinoza over the
Eleatics must not be lost sight of. The modern
Spinoza's philosopher has so conceived being as

Provision for .

the Finite. to provide for parts within an individ-
ual unity. The geometrical analogy is a most
illuminating one, for it enables us to understand
how inanyness may be indispensable to a being that
is essentially unitary. The triangle as triangle
is one. But it could not be £uch without sides and
angles. The unity is equally necessary to the
parts, for sides and angles of a triangle could not
be such without an arrangement governed by the
nature triangle. •The whole of nature may be
similarly conceived: as the reciprocal necessity of
naiura naturans, or nature defined in respect of
its unity, and natura naturata, or nature specified
in detail. There is some promise here of a recon-
ciliation of the Way of Opinion with the Way of
Truth. Opinion would be a gathering of detail,
truth a comprehension of the intelligible unity.
Both would be provided for through the considera-
tion that whatever is complete and necessary must
be made up of incompletenesses that are necessary
to it.

§ 154. This consideration, however, does not
receive its most effective formulation in Spinoza.

318 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

The isolation of the parts, tlu* actual severally
and irrelevance of the mod<»Hj Htill prosonts a grave
Transition to problem. I A th«*ri* «. kind of whole to
Conception!, which not only parts but fragment^ or
parts in thdr very ini'owplftoiu'ss, are indispen-
sable ? This would 8t*em to be true of a progres-
sion or dercloinnenf , si nee that \v*»uld require both
perfection as its end, and degrees of imjKsrfeetion
as its .stages. Spinoza was provontod from making
much of thin idea by his rejection of the principle
of Ideology, lie regarded appreciation or valu-
ation as a projection of jiorHonal bias. ** Nature
has no particular goal in view," and " final causes
are mere human figments*" u The ]xu*feetion of
things is to be reckoned only from their own nature
•and power," 7 The philosophical method which
Spinoza here repudiate*, the interpretation of the
world in moral terms, is Platoniwn, an indepen-
dent and profoundly important movement, belong-
ing to the same general realistic type with Eloati-
ciarn and Spinozism. Absolute being is again, the
fundamental conception. Hera, however, it is
conceived that being is primarily not affirmation
or self-sufficiency, but the good or ideal. There
are few great metaphysical systoins that have not
7 Md,t pp. 77, 81.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 319

been deeply influenced by Platonism; hence the
importance of understanding it in its purity. To
this end we must return again to the early Greek
conception of the philosopher ; for Platonism, like
Eleaticism, is a sequel to the philosopher's self-
consciousness.

§ 155. Although the first Greek philosophers,
such men as Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and
Early Greek Empedocles, were clearly aware of their
*o? sS?*" Distinction and high calling, it by no
critical. means follows -that they were good
judges of themselves. Their sense of intellectual
power was unsuspecting; and they praised phi-
losophy without definitely raising the question of
its meaning. They were like unskilled players
who try all the stops and scales of an organ,
and know that somehow they can make a music
that exceeds the noises, monotones or simple
melodies of those who play upon lesser instru-
ments. They knew their power rather than
their instrument or their art. The first philoso-
phers, in short, were self-conscious but not self-
critical.

§ 156. The intoediately succeeding phase in the
history of Greek philosophy was a curtailment, but

320 TH.K APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

only in the most Hujtertieial sense a eritieisnj
the activity of the philosopher. In flu* Peri<»
curuiimtntof AP«' philosophy sutTwd more from
Phiintopbytn uu,,ntjlin f}um from refutation.

th« Ag« of

the Sophist*. neeptieism of the sophist*, who wm^

knowing mm <»f thin ap\ was nut HO much 0013
tion an in<lispoHition. llicy fuilrcl to nx'o^ni/,**
old philosophical problem; it <!i<l not apiwa\
thorn as a genuine problem. Tlw* nophists wero-
intelhvtnal men of an age of hnnwnism, intllr\
alism, n,n«l *srn//rtn"»s;/t* TheHi* w^re years in w|
tho circle, of human H^*ief\% the Htufe with its
tttitutiourt, citiKcnHhip with itH'^muuifohl a<*tivi
and interests, bounded the horizon of thouj
What iHHuI to look lH*yon<J 'i Life was not it pi
loin, but an abundant opportunity and a wmH«j
capacity. The world wan not a nwntery, bu
placo of outortaininont an<l a sphere of iietimi,
this tho sophittt» wore faithful
their lovo of novelty,, irreverence, i
ologanoe of Bjxjoch, and abovo all in their pru
of Individual efficionoy^ they preached and p
dored to their age* Their public, though it Uv
to abuse thorn, was tho greatcwt 8ophint of tli
all — brilliant and capricious, iaecfmparably rich
all but wisdom. The majority belonged to wi

ABSOLUTE REALISM 321

Plato called " the sight-loving, art-loving, busy
class.77 This is an age, then, when the man of
practical common-sense is preeminent, and the
philosopher with his dark sayings has passed away.
The pride of wisdom has given way to the pride
of power and the pride of cleverness. The many
men pursue the many goods of life, and there is no
spirit among them all who, sitting apart in con-
templation, wonders at the meaning of the whole.
§ 157. But in their midst there moved a strange
prophet, whom they mistook for one of themselves.
Socrates and SocratOB was not*one who prayed in the
criticism of the wilderness, but a man of the streets and
Philosopher. tllo market-place, wll° talked rather
more incessantly than the rest, and apparently with
less right, lie did not testify to the truth, but
pleaded ignorance in. extenuation of an exasperat-
ing habit of asking questions. There was, how-
ever, a humor and a method in his innocence that
arrested attention. lie was a formidable adversary
in discussion from his very irresponsibility; and he
was especially successful with the more rhetorical
sophists because he chose his own weapons, and
substituted critical analysis, question and answer,
for the long speeches to which these teachers were
habituated by their profession. He appeared to

322 THK APPROACH T<> PHILOSOPHY

i>e governed by an in«atittbk» inqnisitiv«no«a, and

a somewhat malicious dtwr« to dtm'rc'dit thoao
who spoke with authority.

But to those *who know him IxHffT, inul <^|x«eially
to Plato, who knew him l^nt, Somites was at once
the sweetest and most compelling npir.it of bin age,
There was a kind of truth in the quality of his
character. lie wan perhaprt flic first of all reverent
men* In the prtwncvj of cow-fit hin «t4 {"-deprecia-
tion was ironical, but in another pnwitn* it was
moat genuine^ and hm de<*{H*Ht npring of thought
and action. Thin otfter }>n^Hen<»o wiw bin own
ideal. Socrates was BiiMHwly8 humble injcatino, ox-
IKK'.ting so nmeh of philtmophy, lie wiw bin own de-
ficiency. Unlike the unskilled player^ ho did not
seek to m&ke music; but ho loved music, and knew
that such music as is indeed muttic wa» Imyoncl his
power. On the other hand, ho was well aware of
his superiority to those in whom Boif-gatisf action
was possible because they had no conception of the
ideal Of such lie could say in truth that they
did not know enough even to realize tho extent of
their ignorance. The world has long been famil-
iar with the vivid portrayal of the Socratie con-
sciousness which is contained Hi Plato's " Apol-
ogy/' Socrates had set out in life with tho opinion

ABSOLUTE REALISM 323

that his was an age of exceptional enlightenment
But as he came to know men he found that after
all no one of them really knew what he was about.
Each " sight-loving, art-loving, busy " man was
quite blind to the meaning of life. While he was
capable of practical achievement, his judgments
concerning the real virtue of his achievements
were conventional and ungrounded, a mere reflec-
tion of tradition and opinion. When asked con-
cerning the meaning of life, or the ground of his
opinions, he was thrown into confusion or aggra-
vated to meaningless reiteration. Such men, Soc-
rates reflected, wer*e both unwise and confirmed
in their folly through being unconscious of it.
Because he knew that vanity is vanity, that opin-
ion is indeed mere opinion, Socrates felt himself
to be the wisest man in a generation of dogged
unwisdom.

§ 158. It is scarcely necessary to point out that
this insight, however negatively it be used, is a
Socrates's revelation of positive knowledge. Her-

Parmenides claimed to

a Jrropnecy

of Truth. know ; Socrates disclaimed knowledge
for reasons. Like all real criticism this is at once
a confounding of error and a prophecy of truth.
The truth so discovered is indeed not ordinary

324 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

truth concerning historical nr physical things, hut
not on that account less significant. un<l ncci'rtsary.

This truth, It will also he admitted, i« virtually
rather than actually sH forth hy Socrutos himself,
lie know that lift! hun somt* meaning which those
who live with conviction denire at heart to realize,
and that knowledge, has jiriucij»h»« with which
those who speak with conviction intend to he con*
fiistcmt. There i,s, in- short, u rutional life and a
rational diseourHO. "Furthermore, a rational life
will IKS a life wisely dire<'te<! to the <»ml of the
good ; and a rational d&rourse one- const nic.t«*.d with
to th.(% real naturert"<*f things, and tho
which tlow from th<»so iinfurcH. But
Socrates did not conclusively define eithcvr the
meaning of life or the form of perfect knowledge,
lie testified to the necessity of some such truths^
and his testimony demonstrated liolh the blindness
of his contemporaries and also his own deficiency.
§ 159, The character ami method of Socrates
have their host foil in the sophist^ but their
the Historical bearing on the earlier philosophers is

Prep&ratton

lor Plato. for our purposes oven more inntrnctive.
Unlike Socrates these philosophers had not made
a stiidy of the task of the philosofiiior. They were

philosophers — " spectators of all time and all ex-

ABSOLUTE REALISM 325

istence " ; but they were prccritical or dogmatic
philosophers, to whom it had not occurred to define
the requirements of philosophy. They knew no
perfect knowledge other than their own actual
knowledge. They defined being and interpreted
life without reflecting upon the quality of the
knowledge whoso object is being, or the quality of
insight that would indeed be practical wisdom.
But when through Socrates the whole philosophical
prospect is again revealed after the period of
humanistic concentration, it is as an ideal whose
possibilities, whoso necessities, are conceived be-
fore they are realised. Socrates celebrates the role
of the philosopher without assigning it to himself.
Tho new philosophical object is the philosopher
himself; and tho new insight a knowledge of
knowledge) itself. These three types of intellectual
procedure, dogmatic speculation concerning being,
humanistic interest in life, and the self-criticism of
thought, form tho historical preparation for Plato,
tho philosopher who defined being a the ideal of
thought, and upon this ground interpreted life.

There is no more striking case in history of the
subtle continuity of thought than the relation
between Pluto and his master Socrates. The
wonder of it is due to the absence of any formula-

326 YHK APPROACH TO

tion of fifH'f ritif «u fho jmrt of Sorrutrn himself.
lit* only livod mid tnlkwl : mul vrt i*i»to cmited a
nyntrm of fthil<wt{thy in whirh h*» i,s faithfully
enilKulif*d, Tli** form of otulHtiliinrnt ia fho «lla-
logut"^ in whirh I ho talking «>f SIHTJIIIS IH {w*rjH»tu-
atocl and coiHht«»t<»<l to |mtfowu!«*r iH^tirn, ami in
which his lifo i« l.K»th rt'wWw! mid iiit^TjiretiKL
But IIH tlu! vt'hioln of rtutoV thought, pn^^rvisft and
makcft |Kkrfi*rt tlio Horrati^ inothoti, 140 tho thonght
itself hogintt with t\n\ Sorrntic* ntofivi* nnd Tfti
to the* fnnl an oxpnwion nf it, Th<» p
of pc»rfo.ct kitowknlgo whirh vUMtmtfmHh
from hi« cont<*niporHri<*H IwH'oim'f' in I*lnto tho clear
vision of a ri'iilin of i<hntl truth,

§ 100. Plato Iwffmt* hi« phihwophy with tho
philosopher and th« philo«ophor*H mt4»n%Ht. Tim
philosopher is a lnw*rf who liko nil lov-
ers ^OEKg ^or ^w ^nutiful Hut he ia
0r Oood* the suprwne lovrr, for ho IOVCR not tho
individual beautiful object but thn Abw>luto
Beauty itself. He ia a lover too In that he does
not possess^ but somehow apprehends bin object
from afar- Though imperfect, he «ooka 'porf ac-
tion; though standing like all hut follows in the
twilight of half-reality, he faees^ toward the sun.
Now it is the fundamental proposition, of the Pla-

ABSOLUTE REALISM 327

tonic philosophy that reality is the sun itself, or
the perfection whose possession every wise thinker
covets, whose presence would satisfy every long-
ing of experience. The real is that beloved object
which is "truly beautiful, delicate, perfect, and
blessed." There is both a serious ground for such
an affirmation and an important truth in its mean-
ing. The ground is the evident incompleteness of
every special judgment concerning experience.
We understand only in part, and we know that we
understand only in part What we discover is
real enough for practical purposes, but even com-
mon-sense questions* the true reality of its objects.
Special judgments seem to terminate our thought
abruptly and arbitrarily. We give " the best
answer we can," but such answers do not come as
the completion of our thinking. Our thought is
in some sense surely a seeking, and it would appear
that we are not permitted to rest and be satisfied
at any stage of it. If we do so we are like the
sophists-^ blind to our own ignorance. But it is
equally true that our thought is straightforward
and progressive. We are not permitted to return
to earlier stages, but must push on to that which is
not less, but morej than what we have as yet found.
There is good hope, then, of understanding what

328 *nir, AI

the Meal may lw* from our knowledge nf the cl 5 roc-
lion \vhieh it 5mj>elM u« to follow.

Bui to understand Fluff's eone^iition of tho
jm>gTeHHion of e\[M»riencv w?» tnu*f airain eateh np
the H«M»nitir Hfrnin \vliir»li hi» Wf«nvi»x into every
theme. For Sn**raf<% Hfiid^nt *if life nn<l innn-
kind, all objeefH WITI* ohje<»fH i-*f infer**;*!, and all
inii*reHt.rt pnietieul interej*trt. One in ignorant
when onn cloen ttot kn?nv the pw«l nf things; opin-
ionative when om* rate?* fhin^n by roitventionnl
«tan<lar<ifl; wiw» whrn f»n«» kiinw^ tln«ir n*al good
hi iMatoiitMtu flib pnieti«*at interpretation <»f ex-
perienec npjH'arH in the prineiyle that the. <ihje.rt
of {H»rfeet, knmvlotipt is tin' yuml. The nat.ttro of
tilings \vhirh one neekn to know heller in the good
of tlungH, tli« libHoltite heing whieh in the goal of
all thinking i« the very $nml Jt«*lf, I'*liiio <loo»
not use the tortri gnotl in any in**n*ly ntiliiitrinii
. Indeed it I» very Higniiirnnt that for Plato
IB no cloavago lx*t\vron thtwwtifiil and prac-
tical intortwtft, To Im morally p"«>d i« to know tho
good, to net ono'« hoart on thn trua ohjeet of aifoc-
tion ; and to bo theoretically Round i« to undowtand
perfection. The good JtBtslf JH the oud of every
aim, that in which til intcroat* 8onvorf?o. Hence
It cannot "be defined, as might a apcdutl good, in

ABSOLUTE REALISM 329

terms of the fulfilment of a set of concrete condi-
tions, but only in terms of the sense or direction
of all purposes. The following passage occurs in
the " Symposium " :

"The true order of going or being led by others to the
things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps
along which he mounts upward for the sake of that
other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to
all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and
from fair actions to fair notiona, until from fair notions
he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last
knows what the essence of beauty is."8

§ 1(51. There is, then, a " true order of going,"
and an order that leads from one to many, from
The Progres- theueo to forms, from tlieiice to moral-
^9 all<^ ^rom *h°nce ^° $IG general ob-
j^s 0£ thought or the ideas. In the
" ^Republics," where the proper education of the phi-
losopher is in qu cation, it is proposed that he shall
study arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and dia-
lectic. Thus in each case mathematics is the first
advance in knowledge, and dialectic the nearest to
perfection. Most of Plato's examples are drawn
from mathematics. This science replaces the va-
riety and vagueness of the forms of experience
with clear f unitawj, definite, and eternal natures,

1 Plato: Symposium, 211, Translation by Jowett.

THK AITHHACH t'o nm*o^il'HY

»}* tin* ntititlwT and thi» pvimHriral figure*
certain individual thinp* nrr approximately
triangular, hut jKuhjivt f«> ulfrrafuin, and itulofi-
m»nv. On th«% «»thrr hutn! tin* trttin^lo as

y gr*»!iirfry it* ilu« t5x**d mid ni«H|\iivwal

Ihr phiifmi»{ihi(*ai mind will itf nn<»v jm.Hrt t.o it from

thorto. But flu* iiiiitlii»ii!fitiriil ol*ji»<*t-H nrr thom-

w*lvo« not thnrouphly^indrr^tfHid whrn

only in tnnfhf^iuiticat IfrtnH, fnr tin*

•of mathpfnnHcH iirr arhitrary. And th«* HHIIIC in

fntc* nf nil th<» tuH*ftlli«d nMH*ial H4.»i«*nn»H, Kvt»u tho

41 wily drt'fim alxmt lH*ifi$c» Iwt n»*vrr run behold thr
waking reality m> lung n# th**y Irnvr* th«* hy|wthw»t
they tutu unrxmiiiiiiMi, nnd urt* iiinit>li* tit ^tvi* an «<••
count of thf!rrt* For whoit n tun ft ktmw* imi h'w owr'
first prtncipbp and wh<*« tlw conrtuwwi iitnl intrrmi»diat4
steps are alto winitrtictrd out «f h^ kw»w« not what
how can he imagine that mtrh *i conventional
will aver becomo

Within tlia ncionco of dinlocticn wo aw k> tiwlor
sta»d the connoctionB and wwjtienwi* «f idiin« them
selves, in the hope of oiim mating wary arbitrari
ness nnd conventionality within a nyatom of trull
that is pur© and wlf-lutninout nitioEality. T<

1 Plato: JfbpubUct 633. Trandation by Jowitt.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 33!

this science, which is the great interest of his j

later years, Plato contributes only incomplete
studies and experiments. We must be satisfied
with the playful answer with which, in the " Re-
public," he replies to Glaucon's entreaty that " he
proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to
the chief strain, and describe that in like man-
ner " : " Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to fol-
low me here, though I would* do my best" r
But a philosophical system has been projected. I
The real is that perfect significance or meaning •*
which thought and every interest suggests, and
toward which there is in experience an appreciable I
movement It is this significance which makes j
things what they really are, and which constitutes I
our understanding of them. In itself it tran-
scends the steps which lead to it ; " for God," says
Plato, " mingles not with men." But it is never-
theless the meaning of human life. And this we
can readily conceive. The last word may trans-
form the sentence from nonsense into sense, and
it would be true to say that its sense mingles not
with nonsense. Similarly the last touch of the
brush may transform an inchoate mass of color
into a picture, disarray into an object of beauty;
and its beauty mingles not with ugliness. So life,

:.W2 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

•whon It finally rcaliws itsrlf, obtains a now and
inoommonHurahlf* qualify of |M*rtWtinn In. which
humanity in transforms! into dc'ity. Thoro. IB
frankly no provision for imperfection in mich a
world. In his later writings Plato sounds Ins
characteristic note less frequently, nn<] permits* the
ideal to create a cosmos throu^li thi» admixture of
inaii<»r. But in his rnmwnt <»f inspiration^ the
Phitoirat, will hav<* lul'w^isi1 for th<» itujH^rfoct. It
is iluj durknoHH lH»liind his hark, or tlw twilight
throtigh which ho pajwo« on hi« way to tho light
lie* will use even tho iH^iuti^s of oarth only ^ an
Htoprt along which ho mounts upward for t,ho «ako
of that otlior Iwuuty."

, Wo hnvo tnot, tht*n, with two distinct
philosophical, dootrinon which tiriHi* from tho con-
coption of tho alwnhitc, or tho

Hler«rchy

ofSubstAACM phor'a pocnliar <>hjoc»t: tho d<K*trine of

In Relation ' , -

the absolute wing or *uhxtanc<>, awl

that of tho absolute ideal OT good. Both dm^trines
are rcalifltic in that they assume reality to \w de-
monstrated or rovoalo<J, rathor than craiitcidf hy
knowledge. Both aw rationalistic* in that they
develop a system of phtloBophy from tho problem
of philosophy, or deduce a definition of reality

ABSOLUTE REALISM 333

from the conception of reality. There remains a
third doctrine of the same type — the philosophy
of Aristotle, the most elaborately constructed sys-
tem of Greek antiquity, and the most potent in-
fluence exerted upon the Scholastic Philosophy of
the long mediaeval period. This philosophy was
rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by Leibniz,
the brilliant librarian of the court of Hanover.
The extraordinary comprehensiveness of Aris-
totle's philosophy makes it quite impossible to ren-
der here even a general account of it. There is

scarcely any human discipline that does not to some
•»

extent draw upon It. We are concerned only with
the central principles of the metaphysics.

Upon the common ground of rationalism and
realism, Plato and Aristotle are complementary in
temper, method, and principle. Plato's is the gen-
ius of inspiration and fertility, Aristotle's the
genius of erudition, mastery, and synthesis. In
form, Plato's is the gift of expression, Aristotle's
the gift of arrangement. Plato was born and
bred an aristocrat, and became the lover of the
best — the uncompromising purist; Aristotle is
middle-class, and limitlessly wide, hospitable, and
patient in his interests. Thus while both are
speculative and acute, Plato's mind is intensive

334 THE APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY

and profound, AriHtntloV extensive and orderly.
It was inevitable, thru, that Aristotle should find
Pluto one-aided. The philosophy of the ideal is

not worldly enough to !«• true. If, is a religion
rather than a theory- of reality. Aristotle, how-
ever, would not rettottnee it, hut. emintrue it that
it may letter provide, fur nature, and history.
Thin is the Hipaiieanei* of his new terminology.
Matter, to which Pluto reluctantly roneeden Home
room EH a principle of degradation in the \mi-
veraOj IB BOW admitted to good standing. Mat-
ter or material in mtiiHjH'UHahlo to lH*5iig a«

its potentiality or that out <*f %hieh it in consti-
tuted. The ideal, on the other hand, IOHOH HH ox-
clusivo title to the pro<licati^ of reality, and becomes
the form, or the determinate tmturo which

only in its particular omlxxlimonti*. The

or substance IB the concrete Individual, of which
these are the abstracted tttt|K*etn. Aristotle's
" form/7 like Plato's M idea/1 in a taleological prin-
ciple. The essential nature of the object is its
perfection. It is furthermore essential to the ob-
ject that It should strive after a higher perfection.
With Aristotle, however, the Reality is not the
consummation of the process, the highest perfec-
tion in and for itself, but the vary hierarchy of

ABSOLUTE REALISM 335

objects that ascends toward it. The highest per-
fection, or God, is not itself coextensive with
being, but the final cause of being — that on account
of which the whole progression of events takes
place. Reality is the development with all of its
ascending stages from the maximum of potential-
ity, or matter, to the maximum of actuality, or
God the pure form.

§ 163. To understand the virtue of this philoso-
phy as a basis for the reconciliation of different
interests, we must recall the relation

Han Philos-

ophy as a between Plato 'and Spinoza. Their

&<jconcillt- ...,.„.

tkm of Plato- characteristic difference appears to the

jilsm and 1 . .

best advantage in connection with

mathematical truth. Both regarded geometry as
the best model for philosophical thinking, but for
different reasons* Spinoza prized geometry for
its necessity, and proposed to extend it. His
philosophy is the attempt to formulate a geometry
of being, which shall set forth the inevitable cer-
tainties of the universe. Plato, on the other
hand, prized geometry rather for its definition of
types, for its knowledge of pure or perfect natures
such as the circle and triangle, which in imme-
diate experience are only approximated. His
philosophy defines reality similarly as the absolute

;j;jfi THE AlTHuAHi To Pff ILnSuPtlY

jM«rfWfic>.n, Appli<'«l to nature Spiuo/.ism 5« me-
ohattioni, RIM! iuftkn for nrrrssnry lawn, while
Plutwii.sm in Mt'oiupiml, NIK! l*M»kM fur adaptation
and 8ipni{it*attm Arintntlr** pomfion in inter-
mediate, With Pluto In* iitlimiH that tho good is
the ultimate prinripk*. I$ut thin v«»ry principle is
eowiuvtul to govern n univ^rw* f»f Hulmtim«*$» each
of which inaititainH its own pro{H»r IK^U^ and all
•of which tire. r^ipitH'itlly doformiwd in their
changes Final onuw*« donnnat^ natuns but work
through oilk*iont ca«»(»H. Kvality JH not puro jwr-
ftsction, a» in Platouinfn, n«»r tin* iniliffi»n*nt
Hity, a« in Spinoxa»mf bnt tH** nynfctn of
necosHary to tho coinpl^to progression toward the
highlit jwrfw.tion. Tho Aristotelian philosophy
proraisoB, then, to overcome* lx>th tlm hard roaliant
of ParmenuUtt and S|)inoeay and alno tho auper-
nattiralisin of Plato*

§ 104. But It promises, furthermore, to remedy
tho tlefoot common to these two ductrmoa, tho vary
Ldbnii»aAp- beaottix&g problem of this whole typo of

pUcfttion of 01 «/ *

th« Conception philosophy. That problem, as has boon

ofDmlop-

sa©n? Is to provide for the imperfoct

« . .

withm the perfect! for the temporal m-

<r*

cideuts of nature and history within the eternal
being. Many absolutist philosophers have do-

ABSOLUTE REALISM 337

clared the explanation of this realm to be impos-
sible, and have contented themselves with calling
it the realm of opinion or appearance. And this
realm of opinion or appearance has been iised as a
proof of the absolute. Zeno, the pupil of Par-
menides, was the first to elaborate what have since
come to be known as the paradoxes of the empirical
world. Most of these paradoxes turn upon the
infinite extension and divisibility of space and
time* Zeno was especially interested in the diffi-
culty of conceiving motion, which involves both
space and time, and thougfit himself to have de-
monstrated its absurdity and impossibility.10 His
argument is thus the complement of Parmenides's
argument for the indivisible and unchanging sub-
stance. Now the method which Zeno here adopts
may be extended to cover the whole realm of nat-
ure and history. We should then be diulectically
driven from this realm to take refuge in absolute
being. But the empirical world is not destroyed
by disparagement, and cannot long lack champions
even among the absolutists themselves. The rec-
onciliation of nature and history with the abso-
lute being became the special interest of Leibniz,
the great modern Aristotelian. As a scientist and

M See Bumet; Op. cit., pp. 322-333.

338 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

man of affairs, he was profoundly dissatisfied with
Spinoza's resolution of nature, the human indi-
vidual, and the human society into the universal
being. lie became an advocate of individualism
while retaining the general aim and method of
rationalism.

Like Aristotle, Leibniz attributes reality to in-
dividual substances, which he culls "monads77;
and like Aristotle hfe conceives these monads to
compose an ascending order, with God, the monad
of monads, ns its dominating goal.

" Furthermore, every Hubntanci* is like an entire world
and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world
which it portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost
as the same city is variously represented uwoniing to
the various situations of him who in regarding it. ThuH
the universe is multiplied in Home nort iw many timefl
as there are subgtancoti, and the glory of (*od IH multiplied
in the same way by as many wholly different representa-
tions of Ms works."11

The very " glory of God," then, requires the in-
numerable finite individuals with all their char-
acteristic imperfections, that the universe may
lack no possible shade or quality of perspective.

§ 1(55, But the besetting problem m in fact not

u Leibnw: JDincottfte on Met&pkyqica. Translation by
Montgomery, p. 15.

In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends
to be subject! viatic, Cf, Chap, IX.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 339

solved, and is one of the chief incentives to that
other philosophy of absolutism which defines an
The Problem absolute spirit or mind. Both Aristotle
tio^m^s and I^ibniz undertake to make the
unsolved. perfection which determines the order
of the hierarchy of substances, at the same time
the responsible author of the whole hierarchy. In
this case the dilemma is plain. If the divine form
or the divine monad be othSr than the stages that
lead up to it, these latter cannot be essential to it,
for God is by definition absolutely self-sufficient
If, on the other hand, Gocl is identical with the
development in its entirety, then two quite incom-
mensurable standards of perfection determine the
supremacy of the divine nature, that of the whole
and that of the highest parts of the whole. The
union of these two and the definition of a perfec-
tion which may be at once the development and its
goal, is the task of absolute idealism.

§ 166. Of the two fundamental questions of
epistemology, absolute realism answers the one
Absolute explicitly, the other implicitly. As re-
EpSoiogy spects^Ae source of the most valid
Rationalism, knowledge, Parmenides, Plato, Aris-
totle, Spinoza are all agreed: true knowledge is

<yo THE APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY

the work of reason, of pun* intrlhvtion. Plato
is ih<* great exponent of diul«*<*ti<\ or the reciprocal
afiinitioB and noe« Cities of ideun. Aristotle IB the
founder of deductive lo^te, Spino/.a proposes to
consider evrn ** human actions ami oVsimi " UB
thougli h<; WIT** ** <*on«*4»rii(*d with liiws, plants, and
.soli<Ls.M Kinpiri«*al data may !M* th^ occasion, but
cannot be tlu» ground of tin* higlu-st knowhidge.
According to I

"it «c<»nw that nmwrtry Irulhrt, «urh IIH w** find in pure
H, and c.HpwiaHy in nrithmHir and K«H>mctry,
luivo principle wh/*w^ proof dr«*n not d<*pi*iul upon
In,Htan<H»8t nor, conHt»qut»ntlyr upMti the wittMw of tho
Ui^UHc^, although without tho w»nsr$ it would never have
conic into our heads to think of them/'11

§ 107. Tho unsworn whi<*lt these* philosophies
give to tho question of the relation hcfwwn th&

this R«k«on siald of knowtetlti? and it$ vhjrH, divide

of Thought

aadittObjtct thom into two groujw. Among tho an-

In Abtolutt

reason irt rc*gnro!cHi a« tho moann

of onianctpation from tho linutatlonH of tho pri-
vate mind. " Tho Blooping turn nHido oach into
a world of his own/* but " tho waking "—the wi«o
men—" have one and tho Rarno world.n What tho
individual knows hdonp to lifuiaolf only in so

n Leibnisi: New Emai/9 <m tfa Human
Translation by Latta, p. S6S.

ABSOLUTE REALISM 341

far as it is inadequate. Hence for Plato the ideas
a.re not the attributes of a mind, but that self-sub-
sistent truth to which, in its moments of insight,
a mind may have access. Opinion is " my own,"
the truth is being. The position of Aristotle is
equally clear. "Actual knowledge/' he main-
tains, " is identical with its object"

Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age.
Modern philosophy began with a new emphasis
upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argu-
ment— " I think, hence I am " (cogito ergo sum)
— Descartes established the* independent and sub-
stantial reality of tBe thinking activity. The " I
think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental
being, known intuitively to the thinker himself.
l^"ow although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally de-
termined by the same motives that obtain in the
cases of Plato and Aristotle, they must reckon with
this new distinction between the thinker and his
object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
doctrine of " parallelism," in which mind is de-
fined as an " infinite attribute " of substance, an
aspect or phase coextensive with the whole of
being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his
doctrine of " representation " and " preestablished
harmony," whereby each monadic substance is in

342 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

itself an active Bpiritnnl entity, and Wongs to tho
universe through its knowledge of a ap.cilic stage
of tho development of tho univcrHC. But both
Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such {Conceptions
as these to tho fundamental identity that pervades
the whole. With Spinoza tho attributes belong
to tho samo absolute .substance, and with Lmtmiz
tho nionads represent tho one universe. And with
both, finally, the perfection of knowledge, or the
knowledge of (Jod, i« mdifltinjSwshablo1 from its
object, God lumaolf. The opistomologieal subtle-
ties peculiar to tho«o 'philosophers are. not stable
doctrines, but render incwitab-io either a return to
tho simpler and bolder realism of tho Greeks, or
a passing over into the more radical find systematic
doctrine of absolute idoaltanu

§ 168. We have met with two .general motives,
both of which ara subordinated to the doctrine of
The stoic «wd an absolute being poRtulatotl and nought
Kfof bJ philoHophy. Tho one of thoun mo-
N«cta«ity, ^veg ica<jfl ^0 fjia conception of the ab-
solutely necessary and immutable Autwtanc^ the
other to the conception of a consummate perfec-
tion. There is an interpretation of life appropri-
ate to each of these conceptions* Both agree in

ABSOLUTE REALISM 343

regarding life seriously, in defining reason or phi-
losophy as the highest human activity, and in em-
phasizing the identity of the individual's good
with the good of the universe. But there are
striking differences of tone and spirit.

Although the metaphysics of the Stoics have
various affiliations, the Stoic code of morality is
the true practical sequel to the Eleatic-Spinozistic
view of the world. The Sfe>ic is one who has set
his affections on the eternal being. He asks
nothing of it for himself, but identifies himself
with it. The saving grace is a sense of real-
ity. The virtuou^'man is not one who remakes
the world, or draws upon it for his private
uses; even less one who rails against it, or com-
plains that it has used him ill. He is rather one
who recognizes that there is but one really valid
claim, that of the universe itself. But he not only
submits to this claim on account of its superiority ;
he makes it his own. The discipline of Stoicism
is the regulation of the individual will to the
end that it may coincide with the universal will.
There is a part of man by virtue of which he is
satisfied with what things are, whatever they be.
That part, designated by the Stoics as " the ruling
part," is the reason. In so far as man seeks to

344. THE APPROACH TO PHI LOW.) PHY

the lawa and naturos which actually
'prevail, lie ramtot Iw diHronffnNMl with anvthimr

* • v O

\vhatHoever thai may IK* known to him.

" For,, in HO far as we am infrlltgrnt lyings, we* cannot
desire anything navo thnt whirh in tH'WNKury, nor yield
absolute arquioHcTiNM* to anything, navn to that which is
true; whorofon*, in HO far iw \vo hav<» a right undcrrttand-
5ng of th«>M« things, thi* <»n«!i%nvor of th«» Iwlt^r part of our-
selves in in harmony with the* onirr of imt.uw an a whole." ia

In agrfunncnit with thJS t^iirlting; of Spinoza's IB the
fatnotw Stoie formula to flu* <*f!Vrt that " nothing
oan hu|ij'K*n ('ontrnry to tin* will of fho wine man,"
who IB fr^c through Inn v<»ry a<*fjuJo8conr:o. If tea-
son l)o the projx*r " ruling part/' fin* fir«t «t^p in
the moral lift1; in th<* RXibonlination of tho appt^ti-
tivo nature niul the onthroninnont of rcm«<>n. One
who ia hiniHclf rational will t!w*n rwogtii^ the
fellowship of all rational hein$s iui<l the unitary
and bcnefioont rationality of tho entire imivcrRo.
The highoRt morality i« thn« ftlroa<ly upon tho
plane of religion.

§ 169. With Spinoaa and the Stoio.fi, the per-
fection of the individual IB reduced to what the
The Plutonic univorftc rcquiroR of him. The good
man is willing to bo, whatever ha muBt

18 Spinoza: Op, at, Fart IV, Tnuudation by Elwes,
p. 243,

ABSOLUTE REALISM 345

be, for the sake of the whole with which through
reason he is enabled to identify himself. With
Plato and Aristotle the perfection of the individ-
ual himself is commended, that the universe may
abound in perfection. The good man is the ideal
man — the expression of the type. And how dif-
ferent the quality of a morality in keeping with
this principle! The virtues which Plato enu-
merates— temperance, courage, wisdom, and jus-
tice— compose a consummate human nature. He
is thinking not of the necessities but of the possi-
bilities of life. Knowledge of the truth will
indeed be the best ef human living, tut knowledge
is not prized because it can reconcile man to his
limitations ; it is the very overflowing of his cup
of life. The youth are to

" dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds;
and beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye
and ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and
insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony
with the beauty of reason." u

Aristotle's account of human perfection is more
circumstantial and more prosaic. " The function
of man is an activity of soul in accordance with
reason," and his Happiness or well-being will eon-

u Plato: Op. dt.t 401.

346 ™K APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

siat in the fulness of rational living. But such
fulnetw requires a sphere of litV that will call forth
and exercise the highest Innnan capacities Aris-
totle frankly pronounces "external poods* M to be
indiwpensable, and happiness to IK* therefore u a
gift of the go<ls.M The rational man will acquire
a certain exqnisiteness or finesse, of action, a
" mean" of conduct; and this virtue will be diver-
sified through the- various relations into which ho
must enter, and the different situations which ho
must; meet. He will IK* not. merely brave, temper-
ate, and just, an Pluto* would have him, hut 151x»ral,
magnificent, gentle, truthful, witty, friendly, and
in all Helf-rej4|tectitig or high-minded. In addi-
tion to those strictly moral virtues, he will possess
tho intellectual virtues of prudence and wisdom,
the resources of art and science ; and will finally
possess tho gift of insight, or intuitive reason,
Speculation will bo his highest activity, ami tho
mark of his kinship with the gods wlto dwell in
the perpetual contemplation of the truth.

§ 17Q. Aristotle^ cthifR oxpro«ww tlu»

of Fulfilment,

a»d the E«- buoyancy of the ancient world, when

Hglonof Re-

the individual does not feel

oppressed by the eternal reality, but rejoieeB in it
Ho is not too conscious of hin «ufferings to be

ABSOLUTE KEALISM 347

disinterested in his admiration and wonder. It
is this which distinguishes the religion of Plato
and Aristotle from that of the Stoics and Spinoza.
With both alike, religion consists not in making the
world, hut in contemplating it ; not in cooperating
with God, but in worshipping him. Plato and
Aristotle, however, do not find any antagonism
between the ways of God and the natural inter-
ests of men. God does not«differ from men save
in his exalted perfection. The contemplation and
worship of him comes as the final and highest stage
of a life which is organic and continuous through-
out. The love of «God is the natural love when,
it has found its true object.

" For he who has been instructed thus far in the things
of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due
order and succession, when he comes toward the end
will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty —
and this, Socrates, is that final cause of all our former
toils, which in the first place is everlasting — not growing
and decaying, or waxing and waning; in the next place
not fair in one point of view and foul in another, . . .
or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part
of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge,
nor existing in any other being; . . . but beauty
only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which
without diminution and without increase, or any change,
is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties
of all other things."16

15 Plato: Symposium, 210-211. Translation by Jowett,

:|,|S TliF, AlTUi.Urit To I'HH.nSuHIV

Tlir rrlijrinn of Spituvfl i** flu* religion of one
whu lui* rrnounmJ fhf favnr nf flu* tmivorno.
11<* wtt« di*priv**il rurlv in litV »«f rvrrv Inwftt of
f«»rl«ni\ find wt out to tin*! tin* £«H»tl which rcnjuirod
no 8|KH"inl «ii,«4}H*iiH!itif*n hut oiilv flit* cotntnon lot
iiiul thi* ronunott Itiiinitii i»ii*|i>\vnirnt. Ho found
that p*nd to rtuwit^l In fin* cftnvirtinn «f the* twxsuv-
nity, iniulo at*ropt«blii throngli thr nuprrinaov of
tin* uu<l<*rHttttitlinp. Tho Uk«* fiiifh of fho Ktoi<?B
niakt*rt of nr> umitmt thr* ditl^rrnti* nf fortimo
H tho oiux^rtir nuti Kirtrlnrt the

11 For two rwuimiK, thrn, it Is rtrfit to !>p «*ont<*»t with

that which hapfwnw t« thw; t!w <mc Iwriuim* it, wiw dono
for thrso and pn»i«rrilw<l for th«% ii«4 in n murmur had
reformer to thc*i% ortjacmiilly from tht^ tno«t nnriont cnusc.8
spun with thy dmitiny; uttd tho othrr Ionium* <«vc*n thai
which oomt» wwiwally to iwory nun m to th« |K>war
which adminbtori the untveri^ § nuw of Mirity and
perfection, nay even of itts wry rontintmntv. For the
isritegrity of the whole Is mutihitatl, if thou cuttiutt ofi
anything whatever from the wmjtmrtion and tlw con-
tinuity cither of the part* or of the wumw. And thou
clost cut off* m far M it Ii in thy power! whan them art
dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out
of the way." w

11 Marcus AamltuB Antoninus: Thought** Translation
Lgpg, p. WL ^

CHAPTEE XI

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM1

§ 171. ABSOLUTE idealism is the most elabo-
rately constructive of all the historical types of

General philosophy. Though it may have Over-

Constructive

Character of looked elementary truths, and have

Absolute .

idealism. sought to combine irreconcilable prin-
ciples, it cannot be charged with lack of sophistica-
tion or subtlety. Tts great virtue is its recognition
of problems — its exceeding circumspection; while
its great promise is due to its comprehensiveness —
its generous provision for all interests and points
of view. But its very breadth and complexity ren-
der this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivo-
cal use of conceptions. This may be readily
understood from the nature of the central doctrine
of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine
it is proposed to define the universe as an abso-

1 By Absolute Idealism is meant that system cf philosophy
which defines the universe as the absolute spirit, which is
the human, moral, cognitive, or appreciative consciousness
universalized; or as the absolute, transcendental mind, whose
state of complete knowledge is implied in all finite thinking.

349

350 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

lulc spirit; or a l>oing infinite, ultimate, eternal,
and Holf-Kurtioiont, like the. l>oing of Plato and
Bpmoza, hut possessing at tin* name tint** flu* dis-
tinguishing properties of spirit, Sueh conceptions
as self-consciousness, will, knowledge, and moral
goodness are carried over from fh«» r«*alm of human
oinloavor and m«»ial rrlationn to th<* unitary and
all-in<»luHivo roality. "Now it !uw bron ohjwtod
that, this prowiun* irtM*ithor nu^uiingirssj in that
it HO appH(\H tho t«»rm Hjiirit as to wmtnuHirt its
moaning; or j)r«kju<ii«»ial to npirittial intonists, in
that it noutraliwH il«* j»rojnkrti<kH of npirit through
BO oxtonding thoir uso. Thtw on<* may oont<nid
that to affirm that, tho unlvorno an n wholo in spirit
is moaninglosH, ninco moral goodtuw rc»quirort Hji6-
cial condi tionn and rclatinnH that onnn«>t Iw at-
tributed to tho unlvar^ UH a \vhol<»; or one may
contend that mteh d<x*trino in prejudicial to moral
intorostft bocaiwo by attributing Hpirittuil j'^rfc^-
tion to tho totality of being it diHorodltn all moral
loyalties and antagonism**. Tho dilllrulHoB that
lio in tho way of absohito idoaliBtu aro <lm% tiion,
to the complexity of its synthoi*i% to it« wtnjiUniumt-

ary recognition of difforonctw and r<w>hitiou of

». *•

them into unity. But thi« Bynthcmis IH duo to tho
"urgency of certain great problems which tho first

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

i-- .,

or realistic expression of the absolutist
undiscovered and unsolved.

§ 172. It is natural to approach so deliberate
and calculating a philosophy from the stand-point
The Great °^ ^le problems which it proposes to

problem^ solve- One of these is tlie epistemo-
Absoiutism. I0gicai problem of the relation between

the state of knowledge and its object. Naturalism
and absolute realism side with common-sense in
its assumption that although the real object is es-
sential to the valid state of knowledge, its being
known is not essential to the real object. Sub-
jectivism, on the otllter hand, maintains that being
is essentially the content of a knowing state, or
an activity of the knower himself. Absolute ideal-
ism proposes to accept the general epistemological
principle of subjectivism; but to satisfy the real-
istic demand for a standard, compelling object, by
setting up an absolute knower, with whom all valid
knowledge must be in agreement. This episte-
mological statement of absolute idealism is its
most mature phase ; and. the culminating phase, in
which it shows unniiRtakable signs of passing over
into another doctrine. We must look for its pris-
tine inspiration in its solution of another funda-
mental problem : that of tho relation between the

351! TI!K APPROACH Tn PHILOSOPHY

nhsohUt* ami tho nnpirioni. I.ikr uhnnluto realism,
thin philosophy ropmls tin* ntmvw an a unitary
and internally nwj*M«ry Iw'itt^ and tuulortakoH to
hold that l*'ing mvmmUihU* fr»r i»vory item of ex-
perinu'O. 'Hut \v«» hiivi* found that nhnolutc real*
iHiii in k*«-«t with thi* <!ifli<nilty of UMH lu'rounting
for th<» frttgiw*ntariiH*i*H niul isolation of the indi-
vidual Tht» contention tliat tin1 wiivt'ttto must
rowlly 1m a rational or-jH*rfi*«>t. unity in tl
tlio evitlent inultipH**ity, irrrl<!vntu»<«, n
ffH»tion in tl«< f«»re'fcroiini<lahl<.». Rational
nccc8Aitic*A EIK! ompirtrnl far in nw out of joint.

§ 17S» Kvcn Pluto had \mm <*on«riouH of n eor-
tain responsibility for matter* of fitct Inaamuch
as ho attachw! tlw prcKiicato of reality
to tlit absolute porfoetion, he maao that

km ^1 BtU.

Th« T^C being the only nourw to which they
could be rafentnl. IWhuptt, then, ho

, they are due to the vary
of God.

"He was good, and no gtmdwtii can aver have my
jealousy of anything. Arid being free from jealouny,
he desired that all things should b*> an like.! himself as
possible/*1

s Plato: Timmm* 39. Tmudatbn by Jowstt.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 353

Plotinus, in whom Platonism is leavened by the
spirit of an age which is convinced of sin, and
which is therefore more keenly aware of the posi-
tive existence of the imperfect, follows out this
suggestion. Creation is " emanation " — the over-
flow of God's excess of goodness. But one does
not readily understand how goodness, desiring all
things to be like itself, should thereupon create
evil — even to make it good. The Aristotelian
philosophy, with its conception of the gradation of
substances, would seem to be better equipped
to meet the difficulty. £ development requires
stages ; and every %ffnite thing may thus be perfect
in its way and perfect in its place, while in the
absolute truth or God there is realized the meaning
of the whole ordey. But if so, there is evidently
something that escapes God, to wit, the meaning-
less and nrifitness, the error and evil, of the stages
in their successive isolation. ISTor is it of any
avail to insist (as did Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza
alike) that these are only privation, and therefore
not to be counted in the sum. of reality. For pri-
vation is itself an experience, with a great variety
of implications, moral and psychological ; and these
cannot be attributed to God or deduced from him,
in consideration of his absolute perfection.

;|^.| THF. AlTKoAni TO PHILOSOPHY

The task of thr now »K*"»hit inin in now in clear

vimv. Tin* prfWf must t«« uiurndcd to admit
th«* nnporfWt, Tlu* uh^»-!iit** si^nific'nnce must lw
H*» construed as to j»n*vi*lr for fhr i'vidmi factB;
for tho niuiH'anin^ thin>*H and «»hanp%s i»f tlu* nat-
uru! <>n.!r*r; for igiifiniiK^% jdn, *l«^pair, and ovory
human <i«»ti<*5onoy. Tlu* ww jthilo.M*i{ihy is to solve
this jmilil^in by ck'fniii!^ n xftirifiwl nhtoilulr, and
by HO t»«mHtruinjj: fin* liff»«*r dynnnurn uf spirit, m to
dcnwmstruto tJu* n<«{M»HHity of flit* v<*ry ini|H*
and opjKu-titinu wltirli m H** biitlliii^ f<» th<*

§ 17-L Absuhito idoultsnu \vhi<*h in <»ss<»utially
a jundorn <!ortrims dm*H not \w$ki with rluijwodww,

Th« BftjtfnnlnjE ^n*t With II VOfV Hnl^r linillyMIH of fuinil-

"ir frnt3m' ^»ii«luc»t4nl hy flu* most Holier
of nil philnHopIuTH, !uunnnt«*l Kant.

f *

TpliJg pliilo«n|i!n*r livi»d in Ko
Germany^ at tho cltwo of the inghtwnth <*t»
He is rolatod to alwolnta icionliHia much n«
rates is related to Platoniam: 1«% wiw not

:, speculative^ htit employed a eritiritl method which

was traitBfortned by hia followers into a nwtaphyai-
cal conBtrnction. It IB ostucnttal to the undivrrttand-
ing both of Kant and of hin mow Hjwwtilative
successor!^ to olworvo that lie beginn with tho
recognition of certain non-philoftophical trnthH—

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 355

those of natural science and the moral conscious-
ness. He accepts the order of nature formulated
in the Newtonian dynamics, and the moral order
acknowledged in the common human conviction of
duty. And he is interested in discovering the
ground upon which these common affirmations
rest, the structure which virtually supports them
as types of knowledge. But a general importance
attaches to the analysis because these two types
of knowledge (together with the aesthetic judg-
ment, which is similarly analyzed) are regarded
by Kant as coextensive with experience itself.
The very least experience that can he reported
upon at all is an experience of nature or duty,
and as such will he informed with their char-
acteristic principles. Let us consider the former
type. The simplest instance of nature is the ex-
perience of the single perceived object. In the
first place, such an object will be perceived as in
space and time. These Kant calls the forms of
intuition. An object cannot even be presented or
given without them. But, furthermore, it will be
regarded as substance, that is, as having a sub-
strattim that persists through changes of position
or quality. It will also be regarded as causally
dependent upon other objects like itself. Causal-

356 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Itv, substance, and like principle to flu* number
of twelve, Kamt calls the cnft'rfnrien nf the under-
standing. Both intuition awl understanding are
indispensable to fhe <'X|H.Tirnro of any object what-
soever. They may be* mud to condition the. object
in general. Their principles contlitiun fho pro<vas
of making soniethiiig out of tlu» manifold of nen-
sation. Hut. nintilarly, ^VITV moral rxiK'rioncio
recognixos what Kant rails the nttt'<i<iriral impera-
tive-. Tin* c»at<%p>ri(*al iniprriilivp in tlu* law of
rea8oiiabh»xu*Hs or impartiality In ^midurt, n»quir-
ing fh(* individual to itc*f <»n u maxim which, ho
eau u will U> IHI law tuuviTsul,** Xo Htut<« of <lc-
ttiro or Httuation imlling fr»r nrtJon imwns anylhing
morally t»3C«^jit in tho light of this obligation.
Thus certain principli'H of thought, stiid iirtioii nro
said to bo implicit in till cxf)^ri<*nro, Th<*y aro
univornnl and n«KH»H»ury 5u tl«» w*n«o that thcsy
arc (liHcoveml m tho emidiltoiiH tjot of any purtleu-
lar oxjwrionoo, but of oxiH*ri(*nn» in gi»ni*riiL This
implicit or virtual prom?m*n in rxporionro in gen-
eral, Kant (*all« tlunr tranw*onri<mtnl <*hftf!W*ti»rf and
tho proeew of <»xpli<»atinjf thoni in hin famous
Transcendental Dwlurtwn*

§175. The! rwfriftiott whtrh Kant putu upon
bis method in quite tMMentittl to ito

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 357

deduce the categories, for example, just in so far
as I find them to be necessary to perception.
Kant's Princi- Without them my perception is blind,

-1 make nothins of i1; ; with them my ex-

perience becomes systematic and ration-
order. aL 33-^ categories which I so deduce
must be forever limited to the role for which they
are defined. Categories without perceptions are
" empty " ; they have validity solely with reference
to the experience which they set in order. Indeed,
I cannot even complete that order. The orderly
arrangement of parts of experience suggests, and
suggests irresistibly) a perfect system. I can even
define the ideas and ideals through which such a
perfect system might be realized. But I cannot
in the Kantian sense attach reality to it because it
is not indispensable to experience. It must re-
main an ideal which regulates my thinking of
such parts of it as fall within the range of my
perception; or it may through my moral nature
become the realm of my living and an object of
faith. In short, Kant's is essentially a " critical
philosophy," a logical and analytical study of the
special terms and relations of human knowledge.
He denies the validity of these terms and relations
beyond this realm. His critiques are an inven-

358

THE APPROACH TO

tory of the conditions, principles, find pros^ta of
that cognition which, although not alow ideally
conceivable, IB alone possible.

§ 176. With the. sueeesaors of Kunf, m with
the successors of Socrates, a rritieism heeonu's a
The Post- system of metaphvsifM. This tratwfnr-

Kantian Meta- tjml jH r{fIN,fIM} jn f|h, {K^t-Kimf iu!18
physics is a

Generalization | a qmfralizatwH «/ fhe human

of the Cogni- ^ •' ^ '

tive and Moral C0(jnit!vc wr*t*ritnt#nr$x. Acconlin^ to

Consciousness

as Analyzed Kant's analvsirt it cuntaius a umnifuld

by Kant. The , * .

Absolute spirit. <>f sense which ituist IK* orpuiixed h

categories in olHnUenw to the ideal i>f n ra-
tional universe. The whole enterprise, with its
problems given in iTorcopHon, its instruments
available in the activificK of the titulersfund-
ing, and its ideals revealed In the reason, is an
organic spiritual unity, manifesting itself in the
self-consciousness of tho thinker. Now in ulv-
solute idealism this very eitferprtHc i»f knowl-
edge, made universal and called the ahwlufr spirit
or mind, is taken to Iw thn iiliiinafe reality.
And here at length would worn to Iw aflorded tho
conception of a being to which the* prohiwiuttte
and the rational, the data ami the principles, the
natural and the ideal, are alike iiidisj^nmitilc!.
We are now to seek the real not in the idem! itself,

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 359

but in that spiritual unity in which appearance
is the incentive to truth, and natural imperfection
the spring to goodness. This may "be translated
into the language which Plato uses in the " Sym-
posium/7 when Diotima is revealing to Socrates
the meaning of love. The new reality will be not
the loved one, but love itself.

" What then is Love? Is he mortal? "

"No." f

"What then?"

" As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor
immortal, but is a mean between them."

" What is he then, DiotimaS"

"He is a great spirjt, and like all that is spiritual he
is intermediate between the divine and the mortal."3

Reality is no longer the God who mingles not with
men, but that power which, as Diotima further
says, " interprets and conveys to the gods the
prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the com-
mands and rewards of the gods."

In speaking for such an idealism, Emerson says :

"Everything good is on the highway. The middle
region of our being is the temperate zone. We may
climb into the thin and cold realm of pure geometry
and lifeless science, or sink into that of sensation. Be-
tween these extremes is the equator of life, of thought,
of spirit, of poetry. *. . . The mid-world is best." 4

3 Plato: Symposium, 202. Translation by Jowett.
* Emerson: Essays, Second Series, pp. 65-66.

360 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

The new reality is this highway of the spirit, the
very course and raceway of self -consciousness. It
in traversed in the movement and self -correction
of thought, in the interest in ideals, or in the sub-
mission of the will to the control of the moral law.
§ 177. It is the last of these phases of w»lf -con-
sciousness that Fiehte,, who was Kant's immediate
successor, regards an of paramount im-

or the Abso-

lut* Spirit «• portanee. AH Phttnnism liegun with the

Activity. ideal of the pood or the object of life,

HO the now idealism Ix^ins with the conviction

of duty, or tha slur if o/ life. Being in the living

moral nature compelled to build itself a natural

order wherein it may ohey the moral law, and to

divide itself into a community of moral solves

through which the moral virtues may Ix* realised.

Nature and society flow from the conception of an

absolute moral activity, or ego, Such nn ego

could not be pure and isolated and yet l>o moral

The evidence of tbia w the common moral con-

sciousness. My duty compels ma to net upon the

not-eelf or cnvironmont, and to nmjx^t and ccxipor-

ate with other solves. Fiehto'n aluioluto in thin

moral consciousness universali^d and inada eter-

nal* Moral valuo being its fundamental prin-

ciple the universe must on that vary account cm-

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 35!

brace both nature, or moral indifference, and hu-
manity, or moral limitation.

§ 178. But the Romanticists, who followed close
upon Fichte,, were dissatisfied with so hard and ex-
Romanticism, elusive a conception of spiritual being.
^tca^80luteLife, they said, is not all duty. In-
sentiment ^^ ^ tnie spiritllal life is quite

other, not harsh and constrained, but free and spon-
taneous— a wealth of feeling playing about a con-
stantly shifting centre. Spirit is not consecutive
and law-abiding, but capricious and wanton, seek-
ing the beautiful in no orderly progression, but in
a refined and versatile sensibility. If this be the
nature of spirit, and if spirit be the nature of real-
ity, then he is most wise who is most rich in sen-
timent. The Eomanticists were the exponents
of an absolute sentimentalism. And they did
not prove it, but like good sentimentalists they
felt it.

§ 179. Hegel, the master of the new idealism,
set himself the task of construing spirit in terms
Hegettanism, as consecutive as those of Fichte, and
spir^ £fsoluteas comprehensive as those of the Eo-
piaiectic. manticists. Like Plato, he found in
dialectic the supreme manifestation of the spirit-
ual life. There is a certain flow of ideas which

362 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

determines the meaning of experience, and is the
truth of truths. But the mark of the new prophet
is this: the flow of Ideas itself 5s a proeexx of xrlf-
correction due, to a .SWIM of error. Thus hare
sensation is abstract; ami hare thought in abstract.
Tho real, however, in not merely tho concrete in
which they are united, but the very process in the
course of which through, knowledge of abstraction
thought arrives at- thn concrete. The principle of
negation is the very life of thought, and it in the
life of thought, rather than the outcome of thought,
which is reality. The most, general form of tho
dialectical process contains tKree moments: tho
moment of t'lnwi*, in which aftirmatwn is made;
the moment, of unfit hews, in which the opjKwite as-
sorts itself; and the moment of xi/nt-hruM, in which
a reconciliation in effected in a new thesis. Thus
thought is the progressive overcoming of contra-
diction; not tho state of freedom from contradic-
tion, hut the act of escaping it Such processes
are more familiar in tho moral life. 'Morality
consists, so oven cotntnou-Benoc aiwortH, in. the over-
coming of evil Character IH tho resistance of
temptation; goodness, a growth in grace through
discipline* Of such, for Hogpl, u the very king-
dom of heaven, it is the titik of tho philosopher,

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 353

a task to which Hegel applies himself most as-
siduously, to analyze the battle and the victory
upon which spiritual "being nourishes itself. And
since the deeper processes are those of thought,
the Hegelian philosophy centres in an ordering of
notions, a demonstration of that necessary pro-
gression of thought which, in its whole dynamical
logical history, constitutes the absolute idea.

§ 180. The Hegelian philosophy, with its em-
phasis upon difference, antagonism, and develop-
The Hegelian me]DL^ ^ peculiarly qualified to be a phi-
SlStof losophy of nature* and history. Those
and History, principle^ • Of spiritual development
which logic defines are conceived as incarnate in
the evolution of the world. Nature, as the very
antithesis to spirit, is now understood to be the
foil of spirit. In nature spirit alienates itself in
order to return enriched. The stages of nature
are the preparation for the reviving of a spiritu-
ality that has been deliberately forfeited. The
Romanticists, whether philosophers like Schelling
or poets like Goethe and Wordsworth, were led by
their feeling for the beauty of nature to attribute
to it a much deeper and more direct spiritual sig-
nificance. But Hegel and the Romanticists alike
are truly expressed in Emerson's belief that the

364 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

spiritual interpret ntion of nature is the "true

"The poot alono known astronomy, rh^miafry, vegeta-
tion, and animation, fur In* <W« not «fop al the.m* farts,
but employs them art signs. Hn knmvs why the plain or
meadow of HJWC<* \V?IH strnwn with thew fimvers we call
sunn and mnotm and stunt; why thi» great dt»«»p in adorned
with aninmls, with turn, and god«; for in fv^ry word he
speaks Iw ndm on thorn a.s tin* hom»H of thought."1

The IK»\V awuk«iintiff of spirit which is for
the coiiHtnnmation of thfs natural evolution,
\vith tho individual or xuhjcHin* spirit, un<l de-
velops into the sor»in!-or ohjrrtiw spirit, which in
morality and history* History is a \vr5tnblo dia-
le<*tic of nations, in tlw rfMirse of which tho cou-
BciouHHCHH of individual liberty is developed, and
c<.K)rdinute<l with the unity <>f the state* Tho high-
est stage of spirit incarnate is that of ahxoluta
spirit, embracing art, religion, and philosophy,
In art the absolute idea obtains expression in HWI-
suotis existence, more perfectly In classical than in

* Emoraon: Op, dLv p. 25.

The powiibility of conflict hotwoon thin method of natttro
study and the empirical method of acSunce m significantly

attested by the circumstance that lit tho year 1801 Hegel
published a paper In which he maintained, on the ground
of certain numerical harmonie*, t|*at th«rft tould be no

planet between Mam and Jupiter, white at utmost exactly

the sam© time Pla^l discovered Cere8f the fl»t of the as-

teroids.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 365

the symbolic art of the Orient, but most perfectly
in the romantic art of the modern period. In re-
ligion the absolute idea is expressed in the imagi-
nation through worship. In Oriental pantheism,
the individual is overwhelmed by his sense of the
universal ; in Greek religion, God is but a higher
man ; while in Christianity God and man are per-
fectly united in Christ. Finally, in philosophy
the absolute idea reaches it* highest possible ex-
pression in articulate thought.

§ 181. Such is absolute idealism approached
from the stand-point of antecedent metaphysics.
R6sumfe. -ft *s ^ most elaborate and subtle
Provisi°n f °r antagonistic differences
witllin unity ^at the speculative mind
Evil- of man has as yet been able to make.

It is the last and most thorough attempt to resolve
individual and universal, temporal and eternal,
natural and ideal, good and evil, into an absolute
unity in which the universal, eternal, ideal, and
good shall dominate, and in which all terms shall
be related with such necessity as obtains in the defi-
nitions and theorems of geometry. There is to be
some absolute meting which is rational to the
uttermost and the necessary ground of all the in-
cidents of existence. Thought could undertake no

3GO THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

more ambitious and exacting task, .Nor is It evi-
dent after all that, absolute idealism enjoys any
better success in this task than absolute realism.
The different between them becomes much less
marked when we reflect that the former, like tho
latter, must reserve the predicate of In'ing for the
unity of the whole. Even though evil and con-
tradiction lielong to the* essence of f.hinps, move in
the m*<Tet heart of a spiritual univt^rso, the reality
is not the.se in their neventlty^ Imt that life- within
which they fall, the ntory within \vhieh tht»y
" earn a place*" And if alwolute id<*alisni has
defined a new perfection, it Iras at the name, time
defined a new imjKkrfoetion, The jx*r feet ion in
rich in cxmtraHt, and thun 5n<*hiHtv<* of both tht^
lights and shade* of experience; hut tile perfection
belongs only to tho eomjxwition of these i4enic*nts
within a single view* .It is not nwesBary to such
perfection that the evil should over Iw viewed iu
isolation. The idealist employe* the analogy of the
•drama or the picture whose very significance re-
quires tho balance of opposing forces ; or tho anal-
ogy of the symphony in which a higher musical
quality is realised through tho ^solution of discord
into harmony. But none of these unities requires
any element whatsoever that does not partake of its

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 367

beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that
the hero should himself have his own view of
events with no understanding of their dramatic
value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an un-
balanced fragment of it should dwell apart, or
to the symphony that the discord should be heard
without the harmony. One may multiply without
end the internal differences and antagonisms that
contribute to the internal meaning, and be as far
as ever from understanding the external detach-
ment of experiences that are not rational or good
in themselves. And it is«precisely this kind of
fact that precipitates the whole problem. We do
not judge of sin and error from experiences in
which they conduct to goodness and truth, but
from experiences in which they are stark and
unresolved.

In view of such considerations many idealists
have boon willing to confess their inability to solve
this problem. To quote a recent expositor of
Hegel,

" We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question
has developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil,
which has always baffled both theologians and philoso-
phers. An idealism which declares that the universe is
in reality perfect, can find, as most forms of popular

308 THIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

do, an escape from the* difficulties of the ex-
ist nice of evil, by declaring thai the universe in aa yet.
only growing towards its ideal perfection. But this
refuge disappear** with the reality of time, and we are
left with an awkward difference fietween what philosophy
tolls us must be, and what our life tells UH actually in."6

If the philosophy of eternal {K»rfertion persists in
its fundamental doctrine in npiteof thift irreconcil-
able conflict with life, it is IxK'auso it; IB l*»lieved
that that doctrine* mu$t. IK* true. Lot UH turnl then,
to its more constructive and <'omjK»ning argument.

§ 182. The proof <v£ alwohtt<» i«l<»ulism in nup-
posed by tl»o nuijority of its ^xpononts to follow
The Constmc- frotn the problem of opiHtomology, and
particularly from the1* inanifost
°^ *rn*h ^po» tho knowing
jn }tiH iintinl pluwe ulwoluto

idealism is in(H«tingiUHliabk* from H\ib-
jeetivism. Like that philosophy it fiml« that the
object of knowledge IB in«oparablo from the state
of knowledge throughout the whole range of ex-
perience. Since the knowor can nevc^r <»fteaj>o him-
self, it may IKJ set <lown as an elementary fact that
reality (at any rate whatever reality <*an be known
or even talked about) owes itS being to mind.

* McTaggart: Studfa in H«g€lian JDtal«clMr» p* 181.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

Thus Green, the English neo-Hegelian, maintains
that " an object which no consciousness presented
to itself would not be an object at all/' and won-
ders that this principle is not generally taken for
granted and made the starting-point for philoso-
phy.7 However, unless the very term " object " is
intended to imply presence to a subject, this prin-
ciple is by no means self-evident, and must be
traced to its sources. *

Wo have already followed the fortunes of that
empirical subjectivism which issues from the rel-
ativity of perception. At*the very dawn of phi-
losophy it was observed that what is seen, heard,
or otherwise experienced through the senses, de-
pends not only upon the use of sense-organs, but
upon the special point of view occupied by each
individual sentient being. It was therefore con-
cluded that the perceptual world belonged to the
human knower with his limitations and perspec-
tive, rather than to being itself. It was this epi-
stomological principle upon which Berkeley found-
ed his empirical idealism. Believing knowledge
to consist essentially in perception, and believing
perception to be ^ subjective, he had to choose
between the relegation of being to a region inac-
7 Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 15.

370 THH APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY

cessihle to knowledge, an*! flu* dHinition of Ixnng
in term* of Huhjwtivity. To avoid scepticism ho
awepted flu* latter alternative. But among the
Greeks with whom thin theory of percept ion origi-
nated, if. drew its meaning in large part from tho
distinction IK 'tween jHT^vption and n«a*on. Thus
w» read in I*lato'H 4t S

"Ami you would allow thai w<» fmrtiri{mt<k in f;o

tion with the* huiiy, and hy pi^n'ptinn; hut %vi» parti«'ipatc
with t-ho Mt>ul l.»y thought in trur rHH<«iin% and

y<ni wcnilcl affirm to IK* ahvnyn thi* «umi» mid it

It is f»on<u*iv<*d that although in fx»rr«*ption man
in <!on<lt'innc<l to n knowlcdgf^ronditiiined by tho

and station of IIIH Innly, hi* may nev-
owajx* himwlf iuid lay hold on the
^ trtio OHBtmao " of thingHf by virtuo of thought,
In other wordn, knowledge in (Mmtrndirttinrtion
to " opinion," in not nuwta by thc^ «uV>j««'tt but in
tho Houl'ft participation in tlic* et<»rniil nut urns
of thingH. In tlici moment of insight the* varying
courw* of tho individniil thinker coincide** with tho
unvarying truth; but in that moment the individ-
ual thinkor is ennobled through faring aHMiiuilatod
to tho truth, while tho truth ii| no more, no less,
the trttth than bafore.

1 Plato; Th® Sophiit, 248. Tnuxilatiou by Jowett.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 37!

§ 183. In absolute idealism, the principle of
subjectivism is extended to reason itself. This
The Principle extension seems to have been originally
xtend- ^IIQ to moral and religious interests.

ed to Reason. prom tlie mOY^ g^d-point the contem-
plation of the truth is a state, and the highest state
of the individual life. The religious interest uni-
fies the individual life and directs attention to its
spiritual development Among the Greeks of the
middle period life was as yet viewed objectively
as the fulfilment of capacities, and knowledge was
regarded as perfection of *f unction, the exercise of
the highest of human prerogatives. But as moral
and religious interests became more absorbing, the
individual lived more and more in his own self-
consciousness. Even before the Christian era the
Greek philosophers themselves were preoccupied
with the task of winning a state of inner serenity.
Thus the Stoics and Epicureans came to look upon
knowledge as a means to the attainment of an inner
freedom from distress and bondage to the world.
In other words, the very reason was regarded as an
activity of the self, and its fruits were valued for
their enhanceme^ of the welfare of the self. And
if this be true of the Stoics and the Epicureans, it
is still more clearly true of the neo-Platonists of

372 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

the Christian era, who mediate !»«•»< \v<«rn tho un-
dent and mediu'val worlds.

§ 184-. It in \voll knnwn fhnt fho early jHTiod
of Christianity was a jioriod of flu* mn.st vivid
Emphasis on «»lf-ronst'iou!<m\sH. Th<» individual lx»-

Self-con-

scioutnestin lirvod that his natural antl serial

Early Christian

Philosophy. environment wan alien tr» his dwper

«])iritiial int(*r(\sK lie* thort'for** \vifhdnnv into
himself. 11<3 lK»Hovt'd ^liiiwlf fn huv<» hut one
duty, the salvation of hi« «*>ul; mnl that duty re-
quired. him to H<»un»h lib innermost H|>r5ngH of
action in order to upriH'^ any that nttpht compro-
niiso him with tho world and turn him from God,
Tho drama of lifo wan onm'twl within th<* rirclo
of hi« own ac*lf-<!onH<*iouHn<w* ('ifix«»n«lupf liodily
health, all forms of appnv*iuti(>n nnd knowl^d^^
wore identified in tha pitrtH t!i«»y plny«Mi hori*. In
short tho Christian wnittmuHnwi*, iilthough nnitin-
ciation was its clwppBt motivo, \va« roflfxivo and
eontrijK^tal to a dog^roo hitliorto unknown among
tho European peoples And when with St. A
tino thoorotiea] int<*ro*tR onro mon^ vi
aHflortcd thoniH«lvoB, thin now emplifi«Ia wnH in tho
very foreground. St. AuRUAtinty wished to i^gin
his system of thought with a first indubitahlo c«r-
teinty, and elected neither being nor itleitst but

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 373

self. St. Augustine's genius was primarily re-1
ligious, and the " Confessions," in -which he re-
cords the story of his hard winning of peace and
right relations with God, is his most intimate
book. ITow faithfully does he represent him-
self, and the blend of paganism and Christianity
which was distinctive of his age, when' in his
systematic writings he draws upon religion for
his knowledge of truth I ^ In all my living, he
argues, whether I sin or turn to God, whether I
doubt or believe, whether I know or am ignorant,
in all / know that I am P. Each and every state
of my conseiousiw&s is a state of my self, and as
such, sure evidence of my self's existence. If one
wore to follow St. Augustine's reflections further,
one would find him reasoning from his own. finite
and evil self to an infinite and perfect Self, which
centres like his in the conviction that I am I, but
is endowed with all power and all worth. One
would find him reflecting upon the possible union
with God through the exaltation of the human,
self-consciousness. But this conception of God as
the perfect self is so much a prophecy of things
to come, that more than a dozen centuries elapsed
before it was explicitly formulated by the post-
Kantians. We must follow its more gradual de-

374 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

vclopmcnt in the philosophies of I)<wartos and
Kant.

§ 185. When at; flic olosn of tho six toon th cen-
tury the Frenchman, Rono Dosnirtos, sought to

Dew*rt6f'i construct philosophy anrw and np<m no-
Argument for , . .
the indepen- euro, foundations, hi* Urn si'Wfcd as thn

donee of the . . . . ft » *

Thinking Self. initial certainty of thought flii» thlUK-

crys knowlcdgo of hiiiinolf, This principle now
reeeivod its clnHHu* fonnylution in tho proposition,

Cogito crr/n MINI -u 1 think, howo I am/1 Thn

argumont iloon not difTor ossontially From that of
St AugiiHtino, hut it iwvf fin<ls a plaw in u systom-
atic and. critical nwtaphyHics. *ki that my think-
ing IH cortain of itst*lft says I)os<*urt<'S, in that I
know inynolf hofore 1 know nn^ht O!H<% my sol f run
novor ho <lopen<h»nt for its I'M-ing u|nm anything
olse that I may <*onio to know, A thinking Hotf,
with ite knowlo<lgft and its volition, is qnito ca-
pable of subsiftting of itself. Such is,. incloodf not
the oano with a finite «olf? for nil fmitnflo is sig-
nificant of limitation^ arid in rocopu^ing my limi-
tations I" postulate tho, infinite beting or ("iotl But
the relation of my solf to a physifiil world i« quito
without nncosaity. Human nattiro, with soul and
body ccmjoinctl, is a combination of two HubtttancwB,
noithor of which in a n^<*c««ary conw^cjtionco of tho

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 375

other. As a result of this combination the soul is
to some extent affected by the body, and the body
is to some extent directed by the soul; but the
body could conceivably be an automaton, as the
Hcml could conceivably be, and will in another life
become, a free spirit. The consequences of this
dualism for epistemology are very grave. If
knowledge be the activity of a self-subsistent think-
ing spirit, how can it reveal the nature of an ex-
ternal world ? The natural order is now literally
" external." It is true that the whole body of
exact science, that mechanical system to which
.Descartes attached* so much importance, falls
within the range of the soul's own thinking. But
what aHBuranco is there that it refers to a province
of itn own — a physical world in space? Descartes
can only suppose that " clear and distinct " ideas
must be trusted as faithful representations. It
is true the external world makes its presence known
directly, when it breaks in upon the soul in sense-
porcoption. But Descartes's rationalism and love
of mathematics forbade his attaching importance
to this criterion. Real nature, that exactly de-
finable and predictable order of moving bodies
defined in physics, is not known through sense-
perception, but through thought. Its necessities

376 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

arc the necessities of reason. Descartes finds
himself, then, in the perplexing position of seek-
ing an internal criterion for an external world.
The problem of knowledge so .stated sets going the
whole episteinological movement of the eighteenth
century, from Locke, through Berkeley and Hume
to Kant And the issue of thin development is the
absolute idealism of Kant's Huccossors.

§ 186. Of the English philosophers who pro-
pare the way for the epiHteniology of Kant, Jlmno
Empirical ^B *110 m(>B^' radical and momentous. It

Reaction of wftH j ^ mm^\ ^nnt from ^
the J&ngUsn

Philosophers, a dogmatic Hlumborr, " to tho tank of tho
" Critical. Philosophy." Hume IB one of the two
possible (wnsoquoneeH of Descartes. One who at-
taches greater importance to tho rational neeossi-
tios of scionoo than to its <sxtonuil rc^ferencc^. is
not unwilling that nature should bo nwallowcd up
in mimL With Malehrancho, DcHcrartc^B itntnc-
diato succosBor in Franco, nature in thus provided
for within tho archetypal mind of GoiL With tho
English philosophers, on the other hand, exter-
nality is made tho very mark of nature, and an
a consequence sense-perception bwwuw tho <*rito-
rion of scientific truth. This empirical theory of
knowledge, inaugurated and developed by Locke

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 377

and Berkeley, culminates in Hume's designation
of the impression as the distinguishing element of
nature, at once making up its content and certify-
ing to its externality. The processes of nature are
successions of impressions ; and the laws of nature
are their uniformities, or the expectations of uni-
formity which their repetitions engender. Hume
docs not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion.
If the final mark of truth is the presence to sense
of the individual element, then science can consist
only of items of information and probable general-
izations concerning their sciences. The effect is
observed to follow j?pon the cause in fact, but there
in no understanding of its necessity ; therefore no
absolute certainty attaches to the future effects of
any cause.

§ 187. But what has become of the dream of
the mathematical physicist? Is the whole system
TO save Exact of Newton, that brilliant triumph of the

Science Kant

Makes it mechanical method, unfounded and dog-
Dependent • ft T • * 1 "T P

on Mind. matic * It is the logical instability 01
this body of knowledge, made manifest in the well-
founded scepticism of Hume, that rouses Kant to
a reexamination of the whole foundation of natural
science. The general outline of his analysis has
been developed above. It is of importance here

378 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

to understand its relations to the problem of De.s-
cartes. Contrary to the view of the English phi-
losophers, natural science is, says Kant, the work
of the mind. The certainty of t.ho causal rela-
tion is due to the human inability to think other-
wise. Hume is mistaken in supposing that mere
sensation gives us any knowledge of nature* The
very least experience of objects involves the em-
ployment of principles which are furnished by
the mind. Without the employment of such prin-
ciples, or in hare sensation, there is no intelligible
meaning whatsoever, ilufc once* admit the employ-
ment of HUeh principles and funnulate them .sys-
tematically, and the whole Newtonian order of
nature is seen to follow from them. Furthermore,
since these principles or categories are tlw condi-
tions of human experience, arc* the very instru-
ments of knowledge, they are valid wherever thoro
is any experience or knowledge* Thorn is but one,
way to make anything at all out of nature, and that
is to conceive it as an order of necessary events in
space and time. Newtonian science in part of
such a general conception, and is therefore neces-
sary if knowledge is to IK* possible* at all, even the
least Thus Kant turns upon Hume, and shuts
him up to the choice between the utter abnegation

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 379

of all knowledge, including the knowledge of his
own scepticism, and the acceptance of the whole
body of exact science.

But with nature thus conditioned by the neces-
sities of thought, what has become of its external-
ity? That, Kant admits, has indeed vanished.
Kant does not attempt, as did Descartes, to hold
that the nature winch mind constructs and con-
trols, exists also outside ^of mind. The nature
that is known is on that very account phenomenal,
anthropocentric — created by its cognitive condi-
tions. Descartes was rigftt in maintaining that
«ensc-perc*eption certifies to the existence of a world
outside the mind, but mistaken in calling it nature
and identifying it with the realm of science. In
nhort, Kant acknowledges the external world, and
names it the thing-in-itself ; but insists that be-
cause it is outside of mind it is outside of knowl-
edge. Tints is the certainty of science saved
at the cost of its metaphysical validity. It is
necessarily true, but only of a conditioned or de-
pendent world. And in saving science Kant has
at the same time prejudiced metaphysics in gen-
eral. For the human or naturalistic way of
knowing is left in sole possession of the field, with
the higher interest of reasons in the ultimate

380 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

nature of being, degraded to the* rank of practical
faith.

^ IBS. The transformation of this critical and
agnostic doctrine into absolute Idealism in inevi-
Thc Pott- table. The metaphysical interest was

Kantiftns

Transform bound to avail itself of the sjiocnlative

Kant** Mind- . .

in-ganerai into suggest iveiiess with which the Kantian
Mind* philoHopliy ul»onn<ls. Thcs franrtforinu-

tion tnni.s \ipon Kant'H a«Hntnption that, whatever
is coiiHtructcMl by the mind is on that amwnt pluv
iioinonon or appearance. Kant has earned along
the presumption that Whatever in act or content of
mind in on that account not mi£*objt*et or //mif/*/V
itself. We have Been that thin in generally ac-
cepted an true of the relativities of HenHe-jnereep-
tionu But is it true of thought? The poni- Kan-
tian Ideal iftt maintains that ihat depends -upon the,
thought. The content of private individual think-
ing in in BO far not, real object; but it doen not fol-
low that thiB IK true of aueh thinking SB m univer-
sally valid. Now Kant htm deduced his categories
for thought in general. There are no empirical
eases of thinking except the human thJnkcr«;
but the catogorieB are not the property of any
one human individual or any group of
Individuals. They are the conditions of

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 351

ence m general, and of every possibility of ex-
perience. The transition to absolute idealism
is now readily made. Thought in general becomes
the absolute mind, and experience in general its
content. The thing-in-itself drops out as having
no meaning. The objectivity to which it testified
is provided for in the completeness and self-
sufficiency which is attributed to the absolute ex-
perience. Indeed, an altogether new definition of
subjective and objective replaces the old. The sub-
jective is that which is only insufficiently thought,
us in the case of relativity toad error ; the objective
is that which is -completely "thought. Thus the
natural order is indeed phenomenal; but only
IxK'tmRO the principles of science are not the high-
est principles of thought, and not because nature
is the fruit of thought. Thus Hegel expresses
his relation to Kant as follows:

" According to Kant, the things that we know about
are to us appearances only, and we can never know their
essential nature, which belongs to another world, which
we cannot approach. . . . The true statement of
the case is as follows. The things of which we have
direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us
only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper
case of these thing?, finite as they are, is to have their
existence founded not in themselves, but in the universal
divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist

3Sl> THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

as Kant's, but in contradistinction to the subjective
idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be termed
Absolute Idealism."*

§ 189. Absolute idiMilirtin in thus reached niter
a long and dcvioun covim* of dt*\vloptm*nL But.
The Direct *'H> ^g*nm*nt iiuiv IK? Hinted nnwli more
T~Lce »>™%- Plato, it will I* romi-mix-mi,

from .the jFinitt fouuj tjmt t,X{K?riott<'« fields OVCT to

Mtnd to the *

infinite Hind. triai8<^»nd itHoIf, The* thinker flndn
hinwelf <»oni]H41(Hl to purnuc* the ideal of immu-
table und universal truth, and must Ideutifj the
ultimate being with tot i<lual. Similarly Hegel

"Tlmt upward spring of the mind HignifioK that the
being which the world lum m only a nemblawv, no real
being, no absolute truth; it Higniflen that lx»yoml and
above that appoaran<*e, truth abi<k»s in tlwlt w> that
true being is another name for (*od/M9

The further argument of al>Bolute Idealism <lif-
forn from that of Plato in that the dej»endem*e of
truth upon the mind IB accepted an a first principle.
The ideal with which exjxsrionce is informed ia
now the slate of perfect knowledge, rather than the

* Hegel: fincycloirtdw, §45, lecture nota. Quoted by
MeTaggart: Op. dt.t p, 09.

10 Hegel: Encydopddw> §50. Quoted by MeTaggart; Op.
aX, p. 70,

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 333

system of absolute truth. The content of the state
of perfect knowledge will indeed be the system of
absolute truth, but none the less content, precisely
as finite knowledge is the content of a finite mind.
In pursuing the truth, I who pursue, aim to realize
in myself a certain highest state of knowledge.
Were I to know all truth I should indeed have
ceased to be the finite individual who began the
quest, but the evolution would be continuous and
the character of self -consciousness would never have
been lost. I may say, in short, that God or being,
is my perfect cognitive sc4f.

The argument Ar absolute idealism is a con-
structive interpretation of the subjectivistic con-
tention that knowledge can never escape the circle
of its own activity and states. To meet the de-
mand for a final and standard truth, a demand
which realism meets with its doctrine of a being
independent of any mind, this philosophy defines
a standard mind. The impossibility of defining
objects in terms of relativity to a finite self, con-
ductB dialectically to the conception of the abso-
lute self. The sequel to my error or exclusiveness,

is truth or inelusiveness. The outcome of the dia-

lectic h determined by the symmetry of the antith-
esis. Thus, corrected experience implies a last

384 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

correcting experience; partial rognitton, complete
cognition; empirical subject, transcendental sub-
ject; finite mind, an absolute mind. The follow-
ing statement IB taken from a contemporary ex-
ponent of the philosophy:

"What you and I lack, when we lament our human
ignorance, in simply a certain desirable and logically
possible state of mind, or type of experience; to wit, a
etate of mind in which we should windy be able to say
that we had fulfilled in experience what we now have
merely in idea, namely, the knowledge, the Immediate
and felt presence, of what we now call the Absolute
Reality. . - - There is an Absolute Experience for
which the conception of an absolute reality, i. c,, the
conception of a system of ideal tr'ith, is fulfilled by the,
very contents that get presented to this experience.
This Absolute Experience is related to our experience
as an organic whole to its own fragments* It is nn ex-
perience which finds fulfilled all that the eompletest
thought can conceive* as genuinely possible. Herein
lies its definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute
Experience, as for ours, there are data, contents, facts.
But these data, these contents, express, for the Absolute
Experience, its own meaning, its thought, its idea*.
Contents beyond these that it possess^ the* Absolute
Experience knows to be, in genuine truth, Impossible*
Hence its contents are indeed particular,— a m»!eetkm
from the world of bare or merely conceptual possi-
bilities,— but they form a self-determined whole, than
which nothing completes, more organic, more fulfilled,
more transparent, or more compfrte in meaning, is
concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand,
these .contents are not foreign to those of our finite

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 385

experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of
one life."11

§ 190, As has been already intimated, at the
opening of this chapter, the inclusion of the whole
The Realistic °^ reality within a single self is clearly
to^bTohite a questionable proceeding. The need
idealism. of avoiding the relativism of empirical
idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of
the self -consciousness be d'ye to a certain selection
and exclusion within the general field of experi-
ence, it is equally evident that the relativity of

self-consciousness can never be overcome through

appealing to a higlfcr self. One must appeal from
the self to the realm of things as they are. In-
deed, although the exponents of this philosophy
use the language of spiritualism, and accept the
idealiBtie epistemology, their absolute being tends
ever to escape the special characters of the self.
And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly
Bet over against the finite or empirical self, as the
standard and test of truth, it is the less distin-

11 Royce: Conception of God, pp, 19, 43-44.

This argument is well summarized in Green's statement
that " the existence oj one connected world, which is the
presupposition of knowledge, implies the action of one self-
conditioning and self-determining mind," Prolegomena to
Bthm, p. 181.

386 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

guishuble from tho, realist's order of independent
beings.

§ 191. But however much absolute idealism
may tend to abandon its idealism for tho .sake, of
The Concep- ^:H absolutism within the? field of metu-
^doSLs 1%^> awh i« »<»t tho ease within tho

eeption of the self here receives a new

Idealism.

Kant* emjihasis. The same self-eousciousneHH

which admits to the highest truth is the evidonee
of man's practical digpity. In virtue of his ini-
mediat(!s npprohmisiou of tlu*N principles of self-
hood, and his direct participation in the life, of
spirit, man may bo said to possess the* innermost
secret of tho universe. In order to achieve good-
ness he must therefore reeognixo and express him-
self. Tho Kantian philosophy is hero again the*
starting-point. It was 'Kant who first gave ade-
quate expression to tho Christian idea of tho moral

"Duty! Thou sublime and mighty mime that dost
embrace nothing charming or inmnuutinff, but rcujuircHt
submission, and yet ncekcHt not to move the will by
threatening aught that would aroutw natural averuion or
terror, but merely boldest forth £ law which of itself
finds entrance into the mind, „ . . a law before
which all inclinations are dumb, even though they

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 387

secretly counterwork it; what origin is there worthy of
thoc, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the in-
clinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a
power which elevates man above himself, ... a
power which connects him with an order of things that
only the understanding can conceive, with a world which
at the same time commands the whole sensible world,
and with it the empirically determinable existence of
man in time, as well as the sum total of all ends,"12

With Kant there can be no morality except con-
duct; be attended by the consciousness of this duty
imposed by the higher nature upon the lower. It
is this very recognition of \ deeper self, of a per-
sonality that "belongs to the sources and not to the
consequences of nature, that constitutes man as a
moral being, and only such action as is inspired
with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant
does little wore than to establish the uncompro-
mising dignity of the moral will. In moral
action man submits to a law that issues from
himself in virtue of his rational nature. Here
he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
appetency which binds him to the natural world.
As a rational being he himself affirms the very
principles which Determine the organization of

11 Kant: Critical Examination of Practical Reason. Trans-
lated by Abbott in Kant's Theory of Ethics, p. 180.

THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

nature. This is hi.s /mv/m?i, at <met» the ground

an<I the implication of his duty. .Man is free from

nature to servo the higher law of his personality.

§ 102, There are two respect* in which Kant's

ethics has been regarded, as inadequate by those
Kantun Ethics who draw from it their fundamental

Supplemented

through tho principles. It in said that Hunt is too

Conceptions „

of Univcrwi I'ljjjonstie, that he makes too stern a

and Objective , .

Spirit. business ot morality, in slinking so

mudi of law and HO little of love and spontaneity.
There are good reasons for this. Kant, seeks to
isolate the moral eoiiHeiousnoHH, and dwell upon it;
in its purity, in order that ho rany demonstrate its
incommensurability with tho values of inclination
and sensibility, Furthermore, Kant may speak
of the principle of the ttlmohtte, and reeo^nixe. the
deeper eternal order as a law, but he may not, if
ho is to bo consistent with. Inn own critical prin-
ciples, affirm tho metaphysical being of such im
order* With his idealistic followers it is ]H>ssiblo
to define the spiritual sotting of tho moral life,
but with Kant it is only possible to define tho an-
tagonism, of principles. Hence the greater opti-
mism of the post-Kantian». They know that the
higher law is tho reality, and that he who obeys
it thus tmites himself with tho absolute sell That

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 359

which for Kant is only a resolute obedience to
more valid principles, to rationally superior rules
for action, is for idealism man's appropriation
of his spiritual birthright. Since the law is the
deeper nature, man may respect and obey it
as valid, and at the same time act upon it gladly
in the sure knowledge that it will enhance his
eternal welfare. Indeed, the knowledge that the
very universe is founded upon this law will make
him less suspicious of nature and less exclusive in
his adherence to any single law. He will be more
confident of the essential goodness of all manifes-
tations of a univessfc which he knows to be fun-
damentally spiritual.

But it has been urged, secondly, that the Kan-
tian ethics is too formal, too little pertinent to the
iasuctt of life. Kant's moral law imposes only obe-
(licnco to the law, or conduct conceived as suitable
to a universal moral community. But what is the
nature of such conduct in particular ? It may be
answered that to maintain the moral self-conscious-
ness, to act dutifully and dutifully only, to be
Bclf-reliant and unswerving in the doing of what
one ought to do, is to obtain, a very specific char-
acter. But does this not leave the individual's
eondtict to his own interpretation of his duty?

300 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

It wan just this element of individualism which
Hegel sought to eliminate through the applies*-
tioii of his larger philosophical conception. If
that which expresses itself within the individual
consciousness as the moral law IK* indeed the law
of that self in which the, universe, in grounded, it
will appear an objective spirit in the. evolution of
society. For Hegel, then, the most valid standard
of goodness is to he found in that customary mo-
rality which }>cspoaks the moral leadings of the,
general humanity, and in those institutions, sueh as
the family and. the stato, which are: the. moral nets
of the absolute idea itself. Finally, in the realm
of absolute spirit, in art, in revealed religion, and
in philosophy, the individual may approach to tlm
aclf-conflciouflness which IB tlm {>erfeet truth and
goodness in and for itself,

§ 193. Where the law of life in the implication
in the finite Helf-conHciou«nc>H« of the eternal and
8clf-conftciouHti«8B, there <»an lw

Pftnth«itm , „

and Mysticism BO (iiviBioii between morality and ro-

of Absolute t , . , . *

ugion, an there <*an ha none between

thought and will. Whatever man w»okn in in the

end God. As the perfect fulfilment of the think-
ing self, God is the truth; us tho jwrfoct fulfilment

of the willing self, God is tho good* The finite

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 391

self-consciousness finds facts that are not under-
stood, and so seeks to resolve itself into the perfect
self wherein all that is given has meaning. On
the other hand, the finite self-consciousness finds
ideals that are not realized, and so seeks to resolve
itself into that perfect self wherein all that is sig-
nificant is given. All interests thus converge
toward

"some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition
of cognition and volition i& overcome — in which we
neither judge our ideas by the world, nor the world by
our ideas, but are aware that inner and outer are in such
close and necessary harmony that even the thought of
possible discord has ^ become impossible. In its unity
not only cognition and volition, but feeling also, must
be blended and united. In some way or another it must
have overcome the rift in discursive knowledge, and the
immediate must for it be no longer the alien. It must
be as direct as art, as certain and universal as philoso-
phy."13

The religious consciousness proper to absolute
idealism is both pantheistic and mystical, but with
distinction. Platonism is pantheistic in that nat-
ure is resolved into God. All that is not perfect
is esteemed only for its promise of perfection.
And Platonism is mystical in that the purification
and universalizati<3h. of the affections brings one

13 Quoted from McTaggart: Op. ctt., pp. 231-232.

302 THK APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

in tho end to a prriVriion that pxoppd.s nil
of thought and HjKM'du With Spiuojr.a, on tho
ofhrr hand, God may In* suit! to I«» r«»solvod into
nature. ,Niitutv is m«d<» diving hut is now tho
less nature, for its divinitv ponsints in its a5w>luto
iu*fM».Hsity« HpiiK^a'H pantitriHtu paM^rs <»vi»r into
inystirirtin Iwraust* tin* ahso!ut<> nr<M*ssity ^xcerdrt
In Inifh unity and rirhncws thi% laws known to
tlu» human und^rstaiiding. In absolute idealism,
iinally, both (!od and nature nr<». r^f*n!vt»d into tho
H(*lf. For that whtrh is divim* in **xjH*ri<w<». in
Bc^lf^M-iiiHcnouHn^HH^ an<UthiH IH at th«» mmv titno t.lui
ground of nature, Thu« in tkt; highrnt knowlrdgo
tlin Hi*lf i.s c*xpan<I«*<l and i-*nrirh<*jx»r to
tiuR philrmnphy in tho c*onHriousiu»«s of idoittity,
together with tlm ncniw* of wnvtTHnl iintnnn<*n<n>*
The imHvidual aclf may IK* din^tly Hrnwihh* of th#
a1)Koluto 8olf, for those arc1! <mo spiritual Iifi\
Thiw EntorHon Hays:

** It w a Br*r*rc*t which every inteiiertuai man quickly
Iearn«j that beyond the energy of hw pomieKMedi iwicl eon-
AciouH int(dl.cH»t he JH capable of u r«?w energy (nn of an
intellect doubled on itwM), by abandonment to the
nature of thinp; that bwride hin privaey of j>ower IIM an
Individual man} there i«t a great pi»>15<? power ujxm winch
ho can draw, by unlocking, at all risks, hi« humAn
and suffering the ethereal tides to roll und

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 393

through him; then he is caught up into the life of the
Universe, his speech is thunder, his thought is law, and
his words are universally intelligible as the plants and
animals. The poet knows that he speaks adequately
then only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or 'with
the flower of the mind'; not with the intellect used as an
organ, but with the intellect released from all service
and suffered to take its direction from its celestial life."14

§ 194. But the distinguishing flavor and qual-
ity of this religion arises from its spiritual hos-
The Religion pitality. It is» not, like Platonism, a

of Exuberant .

Spirituality, contemplation of the best ; nor, like plu-
ralistic idealisms, a moral knight-errantry. It is
neither a religion of exclusion, nor a religion of
reconstruction, but a profound willingness that
things should be as they really are. For this rea-
son its devotees have recognized in Spinoza their
true forerunner. But idealism is not Spinozisra,
though it may contain this as one of its strains.
For it is not the worship of necessity, Emerson's
" beautiful necessity, which makes man brave in
believing that he cannot shun a danger that is ap-
pointed, nor incur one that is not " ; but the wor-
ship of that which is necessary.

Not only must one understand that every effort,
however despairing, is an element of sense in the
universal significance;

14 Emerson: Op. cit., pp. 30-31.

394 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

" that the whole? would not lx* whnt it in were not pre-
cisely this finite purpose loft in its own uniqwwas to
speak preci.Mely it« own word a word which no other

purpose can apeak in the language of the divine will";111

but one taunt havo n zont (or mich participation,
and a hoart for thn divine will which it profits,
Indeed, HO much in thin religion n lm'«;» of life,
that it may, am in the <*nw of fl»* Koinunti<*iHt,s, bo
a lore of caprice. Batflt* and <l<*nth, {>nin niul joy,
error and truth—all that foflonpt to tlw» Htory of
thin mortal world, nro to IK* fi«lt n« tli^ thrill of
healthy and rolixhed nnHlio i^Hcurr'H of (}nd. "Uo-
ligioii in m\ exulH*nmt Hpirittudity, n F<*«rli»HS mm*
aihility, a knowledge of both good imd ovil, and n
Avill to «ervo tho good, win If* i*xiUtinp thut the evil
will not yield without n lwttl<*.

11 Itoycn: fib World &nd the Individual, Fir*t time*, p. 465.

CHAPTEE XII

CONCLUSION

§ 195. ONE who consults a book of philosophy
in the hope of finding there a definite body of
Liability of truth, sanctioned by the consensus of ex-
™Motyt° l)erts> camot fail to te disappointed.

SyTtcmatic And ^ s]lmlA now ^ Plairi tha* tllis is

Character, ^IIQ no^ ^0 ^ie fr*ai}ties of philosophers,
but to the meaning* of philosophy. Philosophy is
not additive, but reconstructive. Natural science
may advance step by step without ever losing
ground; its empirical discoveries are in their
soveralty as true as they can ever be. Thus the
stars and the species of animals may be recorded
successively, and each generation of astronomers
and zoologists may take up the work at the point
reached by its forerunners. The formulation of
results does, it is true, require constant correction
and revision— but there is a centoaJMbpdy of data
which is little ^affajpted, and which accumulates
from age to age. Now the finely of scientific

truth is proportional to the modesty of its

395

396 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Items of truth persist, while flip interpretation of
thorn is subject to alteration \vifh the general
advance of knowledge; and, relatively speaking,
so ion co consists in iielns of truth, and philosophy
in their interpretation. The liahilily to revision
in science itself increases as thai body of knowl-
edge Incomes more* highly unifif*<J and svHt<»rnuti<\
Thus tho piTwnt ngc% with its att.<*inpf to oon,Htru<»t
a single roiHproh<*tiHivo system of mechanical sci-

; onoo, is peculiarly an ago when fundamental oon-

' (*epfions are Hiilijeefed to a thorough rei'Xainination
-— \vh(^n, for example, 'HO ancient a conception an
that of matter is threatened with displacement by
that of energy. Hut philosophy is fuwnftttllt/ inn-

\k&ry and #y sic Mafic* -and thus xnjwrlatiwly liahlc.

' io rm$ion.

| 11)11. It is noteworthy flint, it is only in this
ago of a highly systematic natural science that
Th« on* different Bygtenw an* projected,. UH in

t!u* eam' JUHt no<<ul of tlu* rivalry

iH»tw(K»n tlm strictly meehntiieit^ or <»or-
]m«(5ulur, theory and the newer theory of ener
getics. It IUIH Iw»rotoforo Inien taki'ti for grunti'd
that although thero may bo^rnany phiioHophioH,
there is but onot body of ucionco. And it i« Btill
taken for grdnu»l that tbo oxporimontal <iatai! of

CONCLUSION 397

the individual science is a common fund, to the
progressive increase of which the individual scien-
tist contributes the results of his special research ;
there being rival schools of mechanics, physics, or
chemistry, only in so far as fundamental concep-
tions or principles of orderly arrangement are in
question. But philosophy deals exclusively with'
the most fundamental conceptions and the most
general principles of orderly arrangement. Hence
it is significant of the very task of philosophy that
there should be many tentative systems of philoso-
phy, even that each philosopher should project and
construct his own philosophy. Philosophy as the]
•~- •* truth of synthesis and reconciliation, of eompre-j
hottHivenoss and coordination, must be a livingl
unity. It is a thinking of entire experience, and
can bo sufficient only through being all-sufficient.
The heart of every philosophy is a harmonizing in-
sight, an intellectual prospect within which all
human interests and studios compose themselves.
Such knowledge cannot be delegated to isolated co-
laborers, but will be altogether missed if not loved
and sought in its indivisible unity. There is no
modest home-keeping philosophy ; no safe and con-
servative philosophy, that can make sure of a part
through renouncing the whole. There is no phi-

398 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

losophy without intellectual temerity, a» there IB no
religion without moral temerity. An<l the one is
the supremo interest of thought, UH the other in tho
supreme interest of life.

§ 197* Though tho many philosophic^ IKS inev-
itable, it imiHt not Iw concluded that there IB
t there fore no progress in philosophy.

phil<>H°phy i« prmpitated in tho inin-

gj<>(} W18<lom of HW1W Iftt^Ht ligC% With

all of its inhoritanoa The l4' j.ww5tiv<» -% kuowlotlgo
furnished by the seiondws, tho relin<*ment.H and dis-
tinctions of tho philosophers/ the iti<ka!H of st.x*5ety

—these and the whole sum of civilization aro its
'ingredients. Where there i«t no ninglo syntoui of

• philosophy significant enough to oxpn^mi the ago^

j as did the systems of Plato, Thomas Aqutuaa,
I Descartes, Lockaf Kant, Begd, and the othors who
1 belong to the roll of tho great philosopher*, there

I exists a ^^^^^^J^^^^M'^f which i» more elu-

4 sive but not loss significant

rayrate from its own stand-point— is not a
great ph^08^]^^^^^^^8* Such systems may
indeed' l>e living in our ntidsj^ unreeognixnd ; but
historical perspective cannot safely bo anticipated.
It is certain that no living Y0i<» is known to

CONCLUSION 399

for this generation as did Hegel, and even Spencer,
for the last. There is, however, a significance in
this very passing of Hegel and Spencer, — an en-
lightenment peculiar to an age which knows them,
"but has philosophically outlived them. There is a
moral in the history of thought which just now no
philosophy, whether naturalism or transcendental-
ism, realism or idealism, can fail to draw. The
characterization of this contemporary eclecticism
or sophistication, difficulfrand uncertain as it must
needs be, affords the best summary and interpre-
tation, with which to conclude this brief survey of
the fortunes of philosophy.

§ 198* Since the problem of metaphysics is the
problem of philosophy, the question of its
present status is fundamental in any

The Antagonls-

tic Doctrines of cliaracterization of the age. It will

Naturalism and . „

from the loregoing account 01

the course of metaphysical development that two
fundamental tendencies have exhibited themselves
from the beginning. The one of these is jaatural-
istic apjijagapincal, representing the claims of what
common sense calls " matters of fact " ; the other
is transcendental _ and rational, representing the
claims of the standards and ideals which are im-
manent in experience, and directly manifested in

4(K) THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

the great human interests of thought and action.
These tendencies have on the whole, heen antago-
nistic; and the clear-cut and momentous systems of
philosophy have been fundamentally determined
by either the, one- or the other.

Thus materialiHm is due to the attempt to re-
duce all of experience, to the elements and prin-
ciples of connection which arc* employed by the
physical Bcienecn to wet in order the actual motions^
or changes of place, whL'h the parts of exirrien.ee
undergo. Materialism maintain** that the* motions
of Ixxlion are indifferen^to consideration** of worth,
and denies that they issue fmm a deejw cnune
of another order. Tin* very ideas of such non-
moclianical elements or principles are hen* pro-
vided with a mechanical origin. Similarly u pho-
nomonalism, like that of Hume, takes inuncnliato
presence to sense as the norm of being and knowl-
edge. Individual itomB, directly voriiiwl in tho
moment of their occurrence, are held to Im at onco
the content of all real truth, and the mmm* of
those abstract ideas which the misguided ration-
alists mistake for real truth,

Bjjt the ftbaftllitiist, on tho other hand, contend**
that tho thinker must m<tan somothing by tho real-
ity which he seeks. If he had it for the looking,

thought would not he, as it sd';*^|^|]f^[§? a p1
posive endeavor. And that which is meant
reality can be nothing short of the fulfilment
final realization of this endeavor of thought,
find out what thought seeks, to anticipate the c
summation of thought and posit it as real,
therefore the first and fundamental procedure
philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and
mutters of fact, must come to terms with this
solute reality, or be condemned as m^^a/gg
nj$e. Thus Plato distinguishes the world
a generation ?J in which w& participate by per<
lion, from the " tetie essence "*in which we ;
** m tioiputo by thought; and Schelling speaks of
modem experimental method as the " corrupti<
of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
miHtriuj nature in terms of spirit.

§ 1USK Now it would never occur to a so]
ticatxul philosopher of the present, to one who
Conctisions thought out to tho end the whole

IfOffl the Side , 1 « - ,

of Abtoiuti*m, ditiou of philosophy, and lelt tne {

ity of the great historical issues
Huffer either of these motives to d
unto him to the exclusion of the other. A
lutinm httH long since ceased to speak sliglati
of physical science, and of the world of perceg

402 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

It is c'onooded that motions muni In1 known in the
mechanical way, and matter** of fart in tho matter-
of-fuet way. Furthermore, the prestige. whieh nci-
eiK'e enjoyed in the nineteenth century, and the
prestige which the empirical and weular world of
action has enjoyed to a decree that has steadily
increased wince the*. KeniUHHtmw, have eottvinml
the abHolutist of the intrinsic mgnifiranee of tlu»so
parts of i»x{H*riene<^ Th<»y are no longer fiHlu<'ed?
Imt are jwrmitted to flourish in their own right.
From the very councils of nlmoliite itUtalisui lhi*re
issnod a distinction which in fast Iwoimag
Iwtween the World of 'Appreciation, or the
realm of moral and logical principle^ and the
World of Description,, or the realm of empirical
tioiiH and mechanical causas,1 It 5s
indeed maintained that the former of thiwe in
metaphysically suttorior; Intt the lattor i« ranked
t the disparagement of its own projxjr cuta-
.gores.

With the Fichteans this dintinction corr^ajwiulH
to the distinction in the system of Fichto batwotm
the active moral ogo# and the nattmt which it
posits to act upon* But the !£H^^2£.., aro

• l Cf. Josl&h Koyoe: The Spirit of Madtm Phibaophy,

Lecture XII; Tkn World end the Indmdml,

CONCLUSION

403

concerned to show that the nature so posited,
or the World of Description, is the realm 'of me-
cJianical science, and that the entire system of
mathematical and physical truth is therefore mor-
ally necessary.2

§ 200. A more pronounced tendency in the
same direction marks the work of the neo-Kan-

*»••••-•••' "" •-...- . . anfjtH-'K »•**• <""»••"*-"'

The iceo- tjg&f* These philosophers repudiate
Kaotians. |jlo Spiritualistic metaphysics of Scho-
penhauer, Pichte, and "llegel, believing the real
Bignilieance of Kant to lie in his critical method,
in MB examination of theHSrst principles of the dif-
ferent systems of knowledge, and especially in his
analysis of the foundations of mathematics and
physics.8 In approaching mathematics and phys-

* Of. Hugo Munaterberg: Psychology and Life. The more
important writings of this school are: Die Philosophic
im Beginn <k$ zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, edited by Wilhelm
Windolbond, and contributed to by Wixxdelband, H. Rickert,
(), Liobmann, E. Troeltsch, B. Bauch, and others. This
book contains an excellent bibliography. Also, Rickert:
Dfr O^gmutand der Erkenntnis; Die Orenzen der natur-
wiswwchaftlichvn Begriffsbildung, and other works. Windel-
band: Prdludwn; Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. Miinster-
berg: OrundzHg$ der Psychologie. Eucken: Die Grundbegriffe

8 Of. P. A. Lange: History of Materialism, Book II, Chap. I,
on Kant and Materialism; also Alois Riehl: Introduction
to th® T/teort/ o/ 5<5ence and Metaphysics. Translation by
Fairbanks. The more important writings of this school
are; Hermann Cohen: Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung; Die

4(>| THM APPROACH Tu PHILOSOPHY

I<VH from a j£«*n«*ral logical j-*tan«!-jNiinf, th«*s4» iu»o-
Kanfiantt Iwotm* mmvly il5*tHn£niHhahlo in iufor-
(:ist and U*w|H«r from \]\nw orient isfs who approach

logic from flit.* mathematical nnd phy^inil %Mfan<l-
pmnf.

§ tlO'L Tho fiiiiti4, uiorat int!ivi<ittal, with his
spiritual ]«TH|HH»tivf% has l<in^r niutM1 1'M'fu

th« ii

Ptrson*!

ti* utmorh hint in flu* iu«!ivi.MiW<(!
. »<*lf* If in n«n<" jHiinlin! out tlytf Kiohto,

• an<! <*vt»n IlVg<»! himni'If, t«i*n»H*lhi* nhHiiluN* hi IK»
a phmdity or WH'u^ty «»f jn'tHon?*.1* It in
emu'wlwl that tho will of th«* nhxoluio HUIH!
with tho willn <if all finit<* rn*iitiiri*i«. in llioir >wn*«»r-
. ally, that Gcxl \vill« in anil through mt*u.ft (f«»r-*
ntHixmding to thin imlividttuiiHtM* li»n<ii«n<*y on th«^
part of ttlmoluU^ }di*iiltmnf tlii*n» IIIIH IHH*U n^ontly

ik tfarrrinen Krktmntni**) Anil oth0r workn. Fiiul Nnii*rjt:
ik; Kinfoitwng in di*

» E, d

Kritici*mttH, und urinn fttdntlung ftif ili* t'tutiti

*Cf. J, M. E, MrTiiggurt: fHudiv* inM*g*iian C
Chap. I1L
& Cf. Eoyce: 7%« CwuMption &f C?«rf» »Supp^tm«nla

pp. i 35-322 ; 77* HVM ami l^f lndMdwtt Pint Merit*.

CONCLUSION

projected a personal idealism, or humanism, which
springs freshly and directly from the same motive.
This philosophy attributes ultimate importance to
the human person with his freedom, his interests
his control over nature, and his hope of the ad-

kingdom through co-

operation with his fellows.6

JLvMM*M»*>-««M.I|W*-"> ,-.«•»»*»,,.*»,,..,. .... - ...

§ 202. Naturalism exhibits a moderation and
liberality that is not less striking than that of
concessions absolutism. This abatement of its
^t^ulm. claims began in toe last century with

^ was then conceded

Principles. tjmt ttfere is an order other than that
of natural science ; but this order was held to be
iuuwasHiblo to human knowledge. Such a theory
is essentially unstable because it employs prin-
ciplas which define a non-natural order, but re-
fiisofl to credit thorn or call them knowledge. The

* This movftinftnt began as a criticism of Hegelianism in
behalf of the human perKonality. Of. Andrew Seth: Hegelian-
urn and Personality; Man avid the Cosmos; Two Lectures on
TVwwm* G. II. Howison: The Limits of Evolution. The
important writings of the more independent movement
UFO: William James: The Will to Believe. H. Sturt, editor:
l*erwmal Idealism, Philosophical Essays by Eight Members
of Oxford University^ F. C. S, Schiller: Humanism. Henri
Bttrggon: Emoi mr les donnas immtdiates de la conscience;
Malikr* et mfinwire. This movement is closely related to that
of Praj/wafwm, Bue under § 203.

406 Till': APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

agnostic* in in the paradoxical position of one who
known of an unknowable w<»rl<l. Pnwnt-day
naturaliHin is more circ»w»H|»cct. It hnn interested
itnelf in bringing to light that, in the v«»ry pro-
ecM.lnre of science which, because it predetermines
what nature .shall IH», cannot k* included within
natures To this interest in dim the rediscovery
of the rational foundations of menee. If. WHH
already known in the spvrnfernth nntftiry that
exact Heienee do<»n not differ radieally fn»?n inathe-
TinatieH, JIH inatheinaticH doen n*»|. differ rudirnlly
from logic, Matheniutien and tnerhnnieH are n*»w
being Hulnnitted to n critical exit tni nation which
rovoalrt the definitions and iiupHciitionn uj«ni
which they rtwt, »n<l the general relntion of tlu^e
to the fundamental elerneiitH nm! iMHtmnitieH of
thought7

1 Cf. Bartmnd RtuwnH : Principle* it} Mathrmtitie*,

Vol. L Among tlm moitt important writ»nn« it! thin inm*^-
iA<int are the following; ClUiMeppI IVtiim: F<mtufair* tfo
MatMmatiqmf ptibliahed by th« Kirittn tti maternal if a,
Tom, I-IV. Hlcltard IHiddkinci: If« w'nrf wrwt wvw
dlte Zohl&nt Q«»rg Cantor: (Jrundtagtn rinrr
Mannigfattigkn^khn, IrfHili Coutunkt: l>f I* In/In i .1
mattqu<st and wrtlcbi in /2mm« d^ Mtfaphiiiriqtt* tt fa Mwntfa*
A, N. Whitahimd: /I Trmtm m Ummrml Atyibrti* IIf*ifirirh
Herts: Dt« Prinxijrinn cltr Mwhanfa J!<mri I*ciifimr^l: /«A
Sdmm tt t'Hyp&thto*. For tht bnaring of thfti Invenligi^
tionft on philosophy t w» Koyoe: JPfci o/ (hi ldte«l# lit

e, Vol. XX, No, 510.

CONCLUSION 407

§ 203. This rationalistic tendency in natural-
Recognition ism is balanced by a tendency which is

of the Will. * ^

Pragmatism, more empirical, but equally subversive
of the old ultra-naturalism. Goethe once wrote:

" I have observed that I hold that thought to be true
which is fruitful for we. ... When I know my
relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I
possess the truth."

Similarly, it is now frequently observed that all

^ll9^e^§^Jl3ya^U /H^^M* and ft is proposed
ttmj this shall be regarded as the very crij^jio&.of
Jjruth. According to this* principle science as a
whole, oven knowledge as a whole, is primarily a
human utility. The nature which science defines
IB an artifact or construct. It is designed to ex-
press briefly and conveniently what man may prac-
tically expect from his environment. This ten-
dency is known as pragmatism. It ranges from
systematic doctrines, reminiscent of Fichte, which
Beck to define practical needs and deduce knowl-
edge from them, to the more irresponsible utter-
ances of those who liken science to " shorthand," 8
and mathematics to a game of chess. In any case
pragmatism attributes to nature a certain depend-
ence on will, and therefore implies, even when it
8 The term used by Karl Pearson in his Grammar of Science.

4()8 TI1H APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

d*H>H not avow, thai will with iH jwuliar
or values -cannot Iw irdnwd io tht* t^nns <»f naturo.
'In short, it \vmihl IH» mnn« Inn* to nay thai natnro
oxprc»ssi»s \vill, than that will oxpnws nafnn».°

§204-. Swhy fh«*!U is tin* cnntrinpnrary rclfrti*
oinin as n'sjxvtrt th«* central pr«»hh*w *»f mof.a-

Sumrnwy, und physi(*H. Tlton* an* nrtfurnlisfif* ailfl ?"n-
Tf AJrtition to / . , . . . . , ...

£pist«tnology. </M'/aW7f/«nr t4*tt<il«tUM«'S 111 nrisnhtllXW ;

rafionaf.itifif and ethical tondrnrios in WI/J/M//,S*W ;
nn«! finally thn intI<'jHfnflrnf »n*l
in<*nfH uf iwrmnnt i(lfttl!?t?n an* I

Sinrr, th<» rist* -nf tin* Kantian nn*l {Mist- Kantian
plnloKophy, inoi a physics atnl vpistrinoltipy havi»
maintained rolatiims s<^ intiinatt* that thi* pnwnt
atato of the former nuumt In* <*hnrurt<*ri/,<*d with-
out ftoitic rofore-ucc tf> tlu* prosotut ntuto of tho
latter- Iiuleocl? tho v«*ry 5ss«i»rt ujwm. whirh niota*

8 The Important Ettglkh wrif-ittp «f tin* rriNtnit i
pcmdivnt niovc^nwnt known *n ^mgnmiwn iitv: C*. 8. IVi
I llmtratitin* of tlm Logif, of *SV$wir*»t in J*upttfar
Monthly^ Vol. XII. W, JamcMi; V'^w l*rogmnti? Mtthwlt in
Journal of Philtwttf)hfit faychQlagy* an^ *^nr»/t/ic MtthtHi*,
Vol. 1; Humfinwm awl Tru^, in Mt'nct, Vol. XIII, N. H.; TVSw
of Humanwm, in Jwir* €*/ l^i/., t**yeh..9 wui »SV,
., Vol. II (with bihliiifcniphy); 7*Aii» ir'ill f*> llf/unv. John
Daway; Mtudm in logical Theory* W.^Tnldwt?!!: l*mgfm^imit
in Mtnrff Vol. XXV., N. H. BIHJ nliH> iiinritlttw on }#r*tmat
idealism 1 1 20L A nimilur tendency him nfippAWti in Frmtre
in ISarpon, I^eRoyf Milhaud, and in (formally In Bimmel.

CONCLUSION 409

physicians divide are most commonly those pro-
voked by the problem of knowledge. The counter-
tendencies of naturalism and absolutism are always
connected, and often coincide with, the episte-
mological opposition between empiricism, which
proclaims perception, and rationalism, which pro-
claims reason, to be the proper organ of knowl-
edge. The other great epistemological controversy
does not bear so direct and simple a relation to the
central metaphysical issues, and must be exam-
ined on its own account.

§ 205. The point of controversy is the depend-
ence or independence of the object of knowledge
'hc stoto of knowledge; idealism
maintaining that reality is the knower
or his ccmteilt of mind> realism, that

Tendency in ]>cin» known is a circtunstance which

Empirical to

appertains to some reality, without
being the indispensable condition of reality as
such. Now the sophisticated thought of the pres-
ent age exhibits a tendency on the part of these
opposite doctrines to approach, and converge. It
has been already remarked that the empirical ideal-
ism of the Berkeley an type could not avoid tran-
scending • itself . Htime, who omitted Berkeley's
active spirits, no longer had any subjective seat or

410 THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

locus for the perceptions to which Berkeley ha<l
reduced the outer world. And perceptions whict1-
are not the states of any subject, retain only thei^
intrinsic character and become a series of elements-
When there is nothing beyond, which appears, arx<3-
nothing within to which it appears, there ceases
to be any sense in using such terms as appear anco?
phenomenon, or impression. The term sensatioX*.
is at present employed in the same ill-considered
manner. But empirical idealism has come gracL"U-~
ally to insist upon the importance of the content-
of perception, rather than the relation of percep-
tion to a self as its state. Ther^erms element axx<l
experience, which are replacing the subjectivis"fcl<*
terms, are frankly realistic.10

§ 206. There is a similar realistic trend in
development of absolute idealism. The
Realistic Hegelian philosophy was notably ol>~
jective. The principles of development* t
irt wllicl1 & centres were conceived "by
of Experience. Hegel himself to manifest ftemselvcm
most clearly in the progressions of nature and 1aift~
tory. Many of Hegel's followers have been, lotl
by moral and religious interests to emphasize

10 Cf. Ernst Mach: Analysis of Sensation. Translation
Williams.

CONCLUSION 411

sciousness, and, upon epistemological grounds, to
lay great stress upon the necessity of the union of
the parts of experience within an enveloping self.
But absolute idealism has much at heart the over-
coming of relativism, and the absolute is defined
in order to meet the demand for a being that shall
not have the cognitive deficiencies of an object of
finite thought. So it is quite possible for this
philosophy, while maintaining its traditions on the
whole, to abandon the term self to the finite sub-
ject, and regard its absolute as a system of rational
and universal principles— self-sufficient because
externally independent and internally necessary.
Hence the renewed study of categories as logical,
mathematical, or mechanical principles, and en-
tirely apart from their being the acts of a think-
ing self.

Furthermore, it has been recognized that the
general demand of idealism is met when reality is
regarded as not outside of or other than knowledge,
whatever be true of the question of dependence.
Thus the conception of experience is equally con-
venient here, in that it signifies what is imme-
diately present in knowledge, without affirming it
to consist in being so presented.11

11 Cf . F. H. Bradley: Appearance and Reality.

412 THE APPROACH TO Pini.osnpHY

§ "207* Ami at thin point MrnliHiu \* iwi hy a
latter-day n*ali»m. Tlio traditional modrrn rwil-
springing frnm l)r*mrt*»H was
It wan wtppnwd that reality

of Iwniig

or nuHn'j^rrKont^tJ in thought.
'Hut. flu* oni1! of th«w aJti'rnaiivf^ i,^ ilngiuulir, in
that thought can w*n«r t«*Ht fho vuK*lity uf if.n rela-
tion to that wltic*h IM {*ef{rtttjilly itnt.**!*!** <?f it;
whib the* oth<*r IH nptonttr, pro\*i«Jin^ only for the.
kno\vlo<lfprt of a world \»f n|i{M*nritnf*i% 1111 unj»rojH*r
knowU*<lg« that IH in fnot. not Mnivvletlgi* at »li

But roalinm IH not rK^4*Wfir5Iy chuilifit tc% HIIUM* It
requires only that lx*ing «lmU not U* (!i*]H*fulfmt
tipon boing known. Furilw»n«ori», Mimt» rtnptri*
cJsm in congenial U> naturalinnu it, i** an
to say that nature in tHrortly known in
This firat takas tlia form of poAitiviiim^ or the*
theory that only such nature iw can JH»
known ean be rsally knom*n« But thin
provi»ion for an unknown world hoyond, inevitably
falls away ante! laavas rff-atity na Ihnt which w
directly known* hut not mndUwmd by knawkdgt,
Again the term experieiuM h the mcwt ttneful, find
provides a common ground for ideali*tic> realmn

CONCLUSION 413

with, realistic idealism. A new epistemological
movement makes this conception of experience its
starting-point. What is known as the immanence
philosophy defines reality as experience, and means
by experience the subject matter of all knowledge
— not defined as such, but regarded as capable of
being such. Experience is conceived to be both
in and out of selves, cognition being but one of
the special systems into which experience may
enter.12

§ 208. Does this eclecticism of the age open
any philosophical prospedl? Is it more than a
The interpre- general** compromise — a confession of

tation of Tra- £ ^^Q on t^e part Of g^ an(i every
dition as the r J

Basis for a radical and clear-cut doctrine of meta-

New Con-
struction, physics and epistemology ? There is

no final answer to such a question short of an in-

12 Cf. Carstanjen: Richard Avenarius, and his General
Theory of Knowledge, Empiriocriticism. Translation by
H. Bosanquet, in Mind, Vol. VI, N. S. Also James: Does
Consciousness Exist 1 and A World of Pure Experience, in
Jour, of Phil, Psych., and Sc. Meth., Vol. I; The Thing and
its Relations, ibid., Vol. 31.

The standard literature of this movement is unfortunately
not available in English. Among the more important writ-
ings are: R. Avenarius: Kritik der reinen Erfahrung; Der
menschliche Welfbegrilj, and other works. Joseph Petzoldt:
Einfuhrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung. Ernst
Mach: Die Analyse der Empfindung und das Verhdltniss des
PhysischenzumPsychischen^.Auff. WilhelmSchuppe:Gru«^

414 THE APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY

dojwMtid^nt construction, an<i Hiirli procoduro would
<»xwd the HCOJX* of tlu» prvs.rnt dineuHsion. lint
there i« an evident interpretation of tradition that
suggests ii poj-wible hasiH for nueh c'onstntt'tion.

§ 2(Mh Suppose* it to IH* granted thai tho rah»-
goriCB of nainro nro cjuit« w*lf-8uft5(*i<.nit- This

tht Truth of would IlU^in tllllt flM'tt* Knight <*OTU'4»iv-
the Physic*! , '

System, but ttnlV IH* II HtTH'tlV JlliVHiral <»T<ll»r, g<lV-
FnUurtofAt- " * /' - i '

t«mpttoR«- crn<Mi only by nimuuncal

duce All Kx- i i At ' t »

p«ri«nca to it. im<* "V "w^ tnor<« git'IKTal log

h*H» Hit* l>nd of

HO (ixt<*nd<*<l «H to !n«*htdi* nu<*h giwral <*on-
an identity, diifiwiK^C inunln*^ ijualify,
, an<l tinio, IH tlui account of H»<*h an «»r<U»r.
Thin ordcjr niwl Imvo no valtH«, and IHHH! not IKS
known. But itinlity an a whoh* IH <*vidonf1y not
B\u*h a strictly physical ordor, for tlw df%flnition of
the phyaieal order involv<w th« r<*jt«*tion of many
of the tnoBt fniniliar aB|KH*tK c»f ^xjwrwiUH*, «uch
an itn value and its lx)ing known in ctmHciout* milvun.
'MatorialiBtn, in that It projKiBcm to <umc<uv« tlio
whole of reality a» physical f mu«t iittinnpt to rci"

n*» «?^r Erkennlmmthitm® nnd

Kinfilhrung in di0 ** Kntik derr#in$n fl+fohrung'** ..... -nit <$xjx»ii-

tion of AvenaxiuM. Alio articltw !>y tht* nlHi-va, ii. Willy, It* v.

Bahubert-Soldeni, and otlmm^ in the Vwrtdjukfmvhnjt {Mr

CONCLUSION 415

duce the residuum to physical terms, and with no
hope of success. Goodness and knowledge can-
not be explained as mass and force, or shown to be
mechanical necessities.

§ 210. Are we then to conclude that reality is
not physical, and look for other terms to which we
Truth of may reduce physical terms ? There is

Psychical Re-
lations, but no lack of such other terms. Indeed, we

Impossibility .

of General could as lairly nave oegun elsewhere.

Reduction ,-«, * „

to Them. IJiTis some parts oi experience compose
the consciousness of the individual, and are said
to be known by him. Experience so contained is
connected by the special relation of being known
together. But this relation is quite indifferent to
physical, moral, and logical relations. Thus we
may be conscious of things which are physically
disconnected, morally repugnant, and logically con-
tradictory, or in all of these respects utterly irrel-
evant. Subjectivism, in that it proposes to con-
ceive the whole of reality as consciousness, must
attempt to reduce physical, moral, and logical rela-
tions to that co-presence in consciousness from
which they are so sharply distinguished in their
very definition. ^The historical failure of this
attempt was inevitable.

§ 211. But there is at least one further start-

THK APPROACH To

t, tho oiu* udoptrd l»y tin1
and rliihorato of all twim^trttHiw

Truth of Li.n/irul wwsjutii'M an* as rvidi-ntlv r<»ul

Logical «ttd n

Ethic*! Prin- aH intdiu^ or «»!VP,H« It IM {HM,sihU» t<>

cipU?*.

Validity of fl<»ihuj irnwral fv|n*j4 of inffivwv, an

tdtal «f , . , '

p«rf«ctinn, \v**Il an t'(»tuimrt and internally iH»t*<\s*

but Im|>»§»l-

wutyofD*- wiry 8y«tc»nm Httrh HH fww of mafho-

ducing th« » frn , f f

Wh«i«ofEx- inatu*rt. Ihoro IH a HTHrti

p*ri«nc« • t t * * r * • t * •

from it. glllHUIlhlc* HtnU'U OI pttn« mf luMlility Hi

tin* univrrH**. Whrliwr or not it in* poHnitili* tt>
rati«'»nu!ity n« wif hnlwintont* inns-
ro di*gr«*i'rt it 5n ill any ratn jK»SHiblo
to o<m(*«*ivc» erf u inuxiintuu **f* ratifi-»it!ify. But
similarly Uwru »ro di*gr«*H of mural gi«»dn<^M. It
is |x>KHii)l(j to daliita with num\ or I^HH <«xa«'tuoHH a
morally i^rfe^t {»Twitit or nn i<l<*ut itumii com-
munity* Marcs again It itnty Itci imfKiMHthiit that
pure and unalloyed gotxlnoKB Hhouiti <fonHtituto a
univcrna of itaalf. But that n maximum of gixwi-
s9 with all of the acooworion wliic*h It might
^ nhoulcl bo thus nolf-mitwtKU^nt^ in quito
conceivable It in thus poBBiblo to clofmo an abni*-
luto and porfcwt order, in wliic*h logical niH^tnwity,
the iBtorc«t of thought! or moral goodncwH, tho
Interest of will, or both toptlwr, nhoulci Im roal-
eH to the maximanu Abiolutium eouotuvcii real-

CONCLUSION 417

ity under the form of this ideal, and attempts to
reconstruct experience accordingly. But is the
prospect of success any better than in the cases of
materialism and subjectivism ? It is evident that
the ideal of logical necessity is due to the fact that
certain parts of knowledge approach it more closely
than others. Thus mechanics contains more that
is arbitrary than mathematics, and mathematics
more than logic. Similarly, the theory of the evo-
lution of the planetary system, in that it requires
the assumption of particular distances and par-
ticular masses for the parts' of the primeval nebula,
•*

m more arbitrary1* than rational dynamics. It is
impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge
which belong to the lower end of the scale of ration-
ality, to regard reality as a whole as the maximum
of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a
purely mathematical, or a purely logical, realm
would bo more rational. The similar disproof of
the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
as to require no elucidation. It is evident that
even where natural necessities are not antagonistic
to moral proprieties, they are at any rate indiffer-
ent to them* *

§ 212, But thus far no reference has been made
to error and to evil. These are the terms which

41K THK AlTKOArii T»» FiltLoHoPH Y

fhr Mrata nf rationality and pM«ln«'-4 nui*t ri'pudi-
at<.» if thi'V an* to ivfuiii fhrir innming. Nrvi«r-

Error Aitd Evil ^N»lf^s- I'X print**** 4'otttaHM thrill and

^holoirv «li^TiUv4 thrill. \V«

to * *
tht idwiL alrr«*lv f

In «hnw tJinf }*^irnl j«»r-
tV<*t.inn r<'<'|tiirt»H rrr«»r, an«l that w<»ral j»'rf<'<»ti«m

r<»<|tiin*M <*vil. In if rftnri'ivjihli' that Htii*!i t*JT**rtj4
nhuuhl IN* HVic'^rH.^ful f Snj»{«mi« a 1'ii^hrr h^i*' t*»
niako t.h«' |.»rin<vij*h* of <'<»titraili<ftt*>u th*' vrrv l»«itt«!
of rationality. What wan formerly t»rr«*r in now
to truth, liiit. what «*f tho n«*w

n<Tti»<l t<»niw of thought '{ TlwH*' full outnto'r th<*
now trutli UH wm»ly IIH tin* *il<! «»rror Ml «ut^i<!i* th«

old truth. Ami thi* aim* nf inoriil ^Hnln«»>i8 in pr«-
ciw*ly parallel. Tlu* htgiwT pmwlnc*HJ4 tiuiy IH* no
defined a« to- roquirc fftthmt mid HIU. Thun it
lx% trmititaimul that thorn enn l«i no
without Htrugglo, and no trtiit spiritual
excn*pt through roiK^tanm^ Hut what of fnUuro
unr(u]oi»no<lf nin vnirc*{>f*iito^ ovil titit*t>f$t|)tntHfttodi
and unrcwolvwl? 'Nothing ImHuWn guinotl «fti»r
all but a nciw definition of ^CKM!IIP»H— unii n mnv
definition of evil. And this in an uthiciil, not a

CONCLUSION 419

metaphysical question. The problem of evil, like
the problem of error, is as far from solution as
ever. Indeed, the very urgency of these problems
is due to metaphysical absolutism. Tor this phi-
losophy defines the universe as a perfect unity.
Measured by the standard of such an ideal uni-
verse, the parts of finite experience take on a frag-
mentary and baffling character which they would
not otherwise possess. The absolute perfection
must by definition both determine and exclude the
imperfect. Thus absolutism bankrupts the uni-
verse by holding it accountable for what it can

*
never pay. *

" § 213. If the attempt to construct experience
in the special terms of some part of experience be
Collective abandoned, how is reality to be defined ?
Strive™ Jt is evident that in that case there can
as a Whole. ^ nQ definition of reality as such. It
must be regarded as a collection of all elements,
relations, principles, systems, that compose il
All truths will be true of it, and it will be the
subject of all truths. Eeality is at least physical,
psychical, moral, and rational. That which is
physical is not necessarily moral or psychical, but
may be either or both of these. Thus it is a
commonplace of experience that what has bulk and

420 THK APPROACH TO PHII.OSol'HY

wight may nr may imf In* p«»*l, tut*! may or may
not IH* known* Similarly, that \viii«*h is. jHyrhiml
may or may not IH» phy^irni, m<»rul, or rational;
and that whi<*h in mural *»r nttional may «»r may
not Ixi phyninil ami p^y«*hi<»al. Tlu*n» i**, thfii, iiu
indi'toriiiiiiiHiti in I ho univorno, a itiori* rntn<*iiU«tt(*«*
of priuciploM, in that it roniniuH phymoal, JIHY-
<*hiraU moral, logical oniorH, witlirnit l«»iiig in nil
roHpwt.Hi«itli<*r it phy^J<*nl, u {»nyi'hi<*iil, 11 nionil! or n
logical nmw*ity.ia K«*ttiity «*r oxjH'riontv itw*lf IH
l in tlio Hr»nw» of )x*iug c*x-rlnwivrly pn*dt*tt»r*
by no ono of tl»:i mn*!»nil HVHt«»niH if containn.
Hnt fin* different «yHt<»niH of oxjvricnc*!* r<*tuin th<»ir
MjKH*itic tind projK^r nnturt**, without thn eompro- *•
mi MI which in involved in nil iitUwipt* to cxt<*nd
80iiie OUP until it nhali i^itliran! thtnn all. If wirh
a univornu itceinii inrcmiMnviihly fUwttUnry and
chaotic, one may iilwtyn wmiiid oatt'tt wlf by cli-
rcctly consulting exporioncu tliiit it i* not only
found immocUaU'ly and unrtifi0c*tiirc4yf but WH
turnod to and lived in after awry thuoretteal

§ 214. But what implication* for Hfo would be

11 It It not, of conn*, dwii«d th*t ilitrt may l>t
orderi, «uoh m» «. f,* an ««th«tio ordtor; or that Uwm rnny
be deftnito tnktioni ht»tw««ii ordem« mich wi* t» f ,,

tha pyel»*pliyiI0al ralatkm,

CONCLUSION 421

contained in suet a philosophy? Even if it be
theoretically clarifying, through being hospitable
Moral impii- *o all differences and adequate to the

cations of such. _ i , • <• i i /»

a Pluralistic multifarious demands of experience, is

^ not on ^at V637 accoiult morally
Good- dreary and stultifying? Is not its

refusal to establish the universe upon moral foun-
dations destructive both of the validity of goodness,
and of the incentive to its attainment ? Certainly
not — if the validity of goodness be determined by
criteria of worth, and if the incentive to goodness
be the possibility of making that which merely
exists, or is necessary, also good.

This philosophy does not, it is true, define the
good, but it makes ethics autonomous, thus distin-
guishing the good which it defines, and saving it
from compromise with matter-of-fact, and logical
or mechanical necessity. The criticism of life is
founded upon an independent basis, and affords
justification of a selective and exclusive moral
idealism. Just because it is not required that the
good shall be held accountable for whatever is real,
the ideal can be kept pure and intrinsically worthy.
The analogy of logic is most illuminating. If it
be insisted that whatever exists is logically neces-
sary, logical necessity must be made to embrace

422 THM; AITHOACH TO rnirosuni

that front which it in flistinpiinhc*! l>v t
such art contradiction, mere empirical eisiirttenec,,
ancl error. The consequence in u logical ehao-*
which has In trufli forfeit***! the name of lnj»i<»,
Similarly a goodness dctinrd t<* w»ko jHtsniMe the
<l«Mhu*ti«*n fr<«n it uf nionil i»vil nr inorui infliff^r--
riire I^WH the very dint iugtUHhiujj jtrujwrtteH r»f
goo(In(*HH. The rnnse^jiKnu1!5 in an rfitieal neutral*
iiv which invali<hitert the umriil wit!, A meta-
physical neutrality^ nit 'tin* f*ther h«n«I» HltltMii^h
tlc'nyin^ that reality iw mich in }»re*le^tinei| t<*
morality- ....... -IUK! thtin itifwltujs n<> {MWHilnllty c»f an

<'tlucal absolutism ........ Uv*?mes tli*» true p*t»tm<i f«»r

an cihiciil purinnu

JJ 2 in. But, wcontlly, then* ciw IH» no luck of
to gwwiiicHrt iu a universe which^ though

Th«Xnc«ntlv«

iMiiL Thiit which in nu»-

<»h«tuoully <>r logically luwaKttry, ttn<l tliut which
in }:wyi*hica.liy proimnt, may 6*t ymnl. Am! whut
can th« rimlt//iiti<m of ginK!iicnn n»nin if tint flint

what I« uiitural imc! ai3Ci!««iiryf actuul iin«t reiilf
tthall IM^ ulw> g«x«l. Tim world in nol gixul, will
not Iw gocic!f merely through Unng wlmt it ii*> but
i« or »hall I'm maci«i goocl through tliti nc't^Kition of

, It in tliw l^licf tlnil the null in not

CONCLUSION 423

necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is
not necessarily, but may be, realized; which, has
inspired every faith in action. Philosophically it
is only a question of permitting such faith to be
sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world
be made good through good-will, then the faith of
moral action is rational ; but if the world be good
because whatever is must be good, then moral
action is a tread-mill, and its attendant and animat-
ing faith only self-deception. Moral endeavor is
the elevation of physical and psychical existence
to the level of goodness. *

" Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition
^ into a servant of character, draw upon the history for
support in the struggles of the spirit, declare a war of
extermination against the total evil of the world; and
then raise new armies and organize into fighting force
every belief available in the faith that has descended
to you." H

Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, prob-
lem. It is not to be solved by thinking it good,
for to think it good is to deaden the very nerve of
action ; but by destroying it and replacing it with
good.

§ 216. The justification of faith is in the prom-

14 Quoted from George A. Gordon: The New Epoch for
Faith, p. 27.

424 T1IH APPHOAri! TO PHILOSOPHY

isn of reality. For what, after all, woul IK* iho

meaning of a faith whieh deelareH that nil things,
. ^ good, had, iiml indifferent „ an* overlust*

turn of Faith. jug]y and nmwarilv what they are—
oven if it wore eonehided on philosnphienl ^ronndH
to call that nliiinato n<'rf\Hnity POI.M!. Fn5lh IIIIH

intprosts ; faith in faith in f£w«li.jfw nr 1n»iuity,
Thf»n what niora jtist and jv>t«»nt ratine of despair
than fhi* thought that thr ideal munt IH* iH'ld a«*-
ooniitahh* "for error, uptime, mid evil» or for th«
indifTt'rent iu*cc*sHitieH of natun*? ITI An* i^leuls 'if*
])<», prixf^d ihf^ less, or^H»1jrv<»iJ in the I*1^ \vli<»n
iliere. IH iu> gnnnvd for Iheir iiHJ^'Hehntent ? II<»w
tnuch more hojH»fnl for what in wi>rth the hoping,
that nature nhouW cHneeni idealn nnd take mnne,
Bteps toward reulixing them, thitii that Idtmk
should havo <*rftiitDd( iiiiture— -mirh m it in! How
much bettor a report can we give of nnttir« for itn
ideali, than of the iticmlft for tiieir )mmii\vorkt if
it ho nature 1 Kntewon writes:

11 Suffice It for the joy of the univcriw that wn
not arrived at .a wall, but at intflmutmMtt cm*iiiw, Our
life nccrnut not prrwmt mi much iw prowiwctiv**; not fur
the affiww on which it in wanted, but AN n hint of thin

YMt-flowing vigor, Mo*t of lifa to Im in«rn ad-

11 Cf. J&mii; The, Will to on

o/ D0terminii)nr pamm*

CONCLUSION 425

vertisement of faculty; information is given us not to
sell ourselves cheap; that we are very great. So, in
particulars, our greatness is always in a tendency or
direction, not in an action. It is for us to believe in the
rule, not in the exception. The noble are thus known
from the ignoble. So in accepting the leading of the
sentiments, it is not what we believe concerning the
immortality of the soul or the like, but the universal
impulse to believe, that is the material circumstance and
is the principal fact in the history of the globe."18

§ 217. If God be rid of the imputation of moral
evil and indifference, he may be intrinsically wor-
The Worship shipful, because regarded under the

and Service •• i i • i - 1 i \ i •*» i

of God. form of the highest ideals. And 11 the
great cause of goodness be in fact at stake, God
may both command the adoration of men through
his purity, and reenforce their virtuous living
through representing to them that realization of
goodness in the universe at large which both con-
tains and exceeds their individual endeavor.

§ 218. Bishop Berkeley wrote in his " Com-
monplace Book " :

" My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my
heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction."

If it be essential to the meaning of philosophy

that it should issue .from life, it is equally essen-

16 Essays, Second Series, p. 75.

426 THK APPKO,M*H TO rifll.nsnPHY

tial that it nhonl*! rrturn f*» Hfi». I»ut this oon-
WM'tion. of philosophy with lifV il»H^ ni»f iwan its

Tht Phiioto- rrdtu'fion f«» fh«i t«TUH of lit'** a?* «M*U-
jjhtr imd fhi

SUmd«rd« of <VW'<! in tin1 IIHIfkrl •}«In*'4», IMnlomijiliy

tht Market- . . .

r frt*in lif<% nn«l »wrkfn

lifi% without I'lrvuling and riin*>Min^ it. nn*I will
thorofon* uhvnyn lx» inr«»innioti?*ur»Mf' with Uf«»
nurr*»wly H>n<'f»ivi»fl. .Ih*iu*r f!i*^ }'»iiilnMu}4irr muni
always !M» an littlt* un4iT^f*««4 l\v iiirii uf flu* ^trppt.
as was Thal(«s by tl»» Tliru<*iun iuuitlnuutl^n. Ho
has an Imimvna* nii«l n wis«!*»?n w'rultiir ID his

" Wl«»n lie* in rnvili'fl, ho hnn nnlhinp; frrm^in! t<i «ny
in ntirtwor it* tho rivilitirn *»f IUM mivt^rnnrirf*, f*»r ho known
no HctuululH of iinyoiH*, niwl th«\v <lo not intrrmt him;

find tht inborn hn i« laiigh***! nt for hi* fthfi'pifttmfwt; nnft
w!wn othom ara k*ing; |*nuHint nnd glnrtfiiMi, hr rntimtt
hdp layghiit^ v«ry mnmvly in th«* mntj»lirity nf tun hmrt ;
aiul thin again mttkon him l<n-»k lik** it ftwtj. Whrn hi*
hoars a tyrant or king pulogiftwit ho fnnrion thiit ho i«
Imtomng t« tho praimm of mnm kiwjior of O«H!O 11 iiwhio-
h(»rd, or Hlio.phonl, or rowlwnt* whit in ln»i«K priiim*<t for
the quantity of milk whioh ho m|tio«'y,on fr«»nt fhrnt; iwtif
ho rornarkn that tho rroiiUiro whom thoy ton*!, nrul out
of whom thoy wju«w»o thn wontth, in of it I«<i« trnotntilo
and more inwdunm nature. Thon, itgniii, ho f»h^i
that the groat man i« of mw«mty mi ill-inann^rod
unedumted an any «hophr»rdt Cor ho hiw no itfinurft ami
he In Hurroumtad l>y a wall, whirh "m Inn
Hearing of onortnouB laiulod prt>[»rtc(t(>rii of Urn

CONCLUSION 427

acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle,
because he has been accustomed to think of the whole
earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and
say that some one is a gentleman because he has had
seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that
their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrow-
ness of vision of those who utter them, and who are not
educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider
that every man has had thousands and thousands of
progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor,
kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, many times
over/'17

•

It is not to be expected that the opinion of
the " narrow, keen, little, legal mind " should
appreciate the philosophy which has acquired
the "music of speech/7 and hymns "the true
* life which is lived by immortals or men blessed of
heaven." Complacency cannot understand rever-
ence, nor secularism, religion.

§ 219. If we may believe the report of a con-
The Secular- temporary philosopher, the present age

ism of the . ... , -4:

Present Age. is made insensible to the meaning 01
life through preoccupation with its very achieve-
ments :

" The world of finite interests and objects has rounded
itself, as it were, into a separate whole, within which
the mind of man can*fortify itself, and live securus ad-
versus deos, in independence of the infinite. In the

17 Plato: Theatetus, 174-175. Translation by Jowett.

42S THI-; APPWv.vni To PHILOSOPHY

aphiw of thfwtjht, th«Mr«' haa l**»tm fonnim! if^rlf nn «*VCT-
iunrjw<in£ body of $n«*n»*«\ whirh, f raring nut thr rela-
tion of finite* thingH to tmit*' thine4*, n«-vrr fm*!« it JHMVM-
ftfiry to Mrrk for ft Iw^ininit^ c«r »n rit4 to itM infinite
«*»rir« of phrnffinrnn, nn«l whirh m«'»-ts thr rlniinn of
thnolo^y with th** Hayin« -flf th»» »^f mnnnn'r, 'I do not,
fuwd that hyp«»th**H»^,* In tin* uphrn* of nr/iVin
the* roinplpxity of nift(it*rn lifi* pn*«i'ntf* n fhonMan<i imi

in way* t**» mthtl*1 to

out ....... iiit**n*HtH n»iiiirirrriiilt W'iriiif «n« pnitni- -in pur-

otn* <-»r othrr tif wliirh fhr irttjiviiiun! inny find

tly% niH»vi of any return itpMj htmwlf* or w*«*in« any
to iwk himwlf wht*fhi«r thm
or ol>j«»rl t««yon<l

**J. u^rc* H mi ignrt^v in
it IMI in th<* »<olr*inu jWHriin* of tin* w

Th*v*tu«of only «*onf<nnpliitir»ii «'iiu munition mirh n

ConttmpUiUon

for tif«. prt»mnu'f*. M«»r4«nv<»r, tlw« w^MjimM must.

t, for iwniniry tn nhurt »n*!
facie* Truth doo» not w*rjntn\ hc»\v<*v4»r, to

lowacl out of tlie %»orl<i Thorr IH 11
ilotnchinont from lifti which in Itw
oven If more1 TU»hlf\ than worUHtnt'iw* Bn**it JH
Intt

11 And it may Im nnid that (iw trutt frii*ntlithi|) tmtw«r»n
onsiivtff in «*tv*h wholly kivyig ttm othrr) tht* trim
philosopher lovoa cvory part of wtmicim, mitl wiitdom

11 E. Caird: Litem/tim antf Phihwphy, Vol. I, pp. Slft-ttltt.

CONCLUSION 429

part of the philosopher, inasmuch as she draws
to herself, and allows no one of his thoughts to wander
"to other things."

though, as Aristotle thought, pure contem-
plation be alone proper to the gods in their per-
fection and blessedness, for the sublunary world
"tliis is less worthy than that balance and unity of

faculty which distinguished the humanity of the

Greek.

" Then," writes Thucydide^ "we are lovers of the beau-

tiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind

'without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk

and ostentation, but when these is a real use for it. To

avoid poverty with u^is no disgrace; the true disgrace is

in. doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does

not neglect the State because he takes care of his own

Household; and even those of us who are engaged in busi-

xiess have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a

man who takes no interest in public affairs not as a

harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are

originators, we are all sound judges, of a policy. The

great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discus-

sion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by

discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar

power of thinking before we act, and of acting too,

•whereas other men are courageous from ignorance, but

liesitate upon reflection." lfl

Thus life may be broadened and deepened with-
out being made thki and ineffectual. As the civil .

10 Translation by Jowett. Quoted by Laurie in his Pre-
Christian Education, p. 213.

4W THE APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY

community is related to the individual's private
Interests, so the community of the universe is re-
lated to the civil community. lltrrr is u ritixou-
ffhip in this lurp'T f'nunnuuity which rcipiiri's a
wider a in I iuf»r<* p'licruiH inf^n^t, rni»fiMl in a
deeper an*l in«»n» <juief relleefiuii, T!i«« world, h«»\v-
c»ver? is not. to he left hehind, hut served wills a
new sense of proportion, with the [M»euliur forti-
1ii<le and reverence which are the proper fruits
of j»hih»sojthy.

"This Is fliitt which will in<!<*«Ml tli^itify ?md «*\ult
knowknigt*, if coutctnplu^.utt aiid Action may he nn»n»
nearly IUH! Htrmtly coiijoiniMl nini united to^fUcr tlmn
they have lM*eti; H roiijiint'iion like tint«i flwt <»f lh«» two
liij^hcni pliint^.H: Saturn, th»* ptnnci ef rent ?»*d rdiifinii-
p!uliour ami Ju(>it<*rf the planet t»f rivi! norjrty usul

*»/ L

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The references contained in this bibliography have been
selected on the score of availability in English for the general
reader and beginning student of philosophy. But I have
sought wherever possible to include passages from the great
philosophers and men of letters. These are placed first in
the list, followed by references to contemporary writers and
secondary sources.

CHAPTER I, THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE
PHILOSOPHER.

PLATO: Republic, especially Book VII. Translations by
Jowett and*Vaughan. Theaetetus, 172 ff. Trans-
lation by Jowett.

ARISTOTLE: Ethics, Book X. Translation by Welldon.
MARCUS AURELITJS: Thoughts. Translation by Long.
EPICTETUS: Discourses. Translation by Long.
BACON: The Advancement of Learning.
EMERSON: Representative Men — Plato; or the Philosopher.

Conduct of Life — Culture. Essays, Second Series

— Experience.

ROYCE, JOSIAH: Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Introduction.
HIBBEN, J. G.: Problems of Philosophy. Introduction.

CHAPTER H, POETRY AOT) PHILOSOPHY.

PLATO: Republic, Books II and III. Translation by Jowett.

(Criticism of the poets as demoralizing.)
WORDSWORTH: Observations Prefixed to the Second Edition of

the Lyrical Ballads.
SHELLEY: Defence of Poetry.

431

KVKHKTT, (\ <\: IWfry, f'Wio/y, *pr-l />?//;/. , 1 1]Mrtr,.JM

|ihi!«w»|jfiv »»f fwr-trv.i I'-.^r^j. '/

Oil twi Lilt-Wry. \\ III thr J-mHrv o

f-mti, (*n*'t!if% TriHiv ••«'*!*, Hfmviinu* '
(?ASU1>, El>WAiUK Literature <»«*/ /*/H/*«.IM^A?/ i, Won
I Jatltr, C Jorthi% rlr. I

KOY<*K, JOHIAK: iSV?^^'.1***/^/^'^/^*^/ /•>'»•»/. Mw/iv «»n T

tiiul J'fawmifim,

HANTAYANA, Gr.Hitar,. l*or/n/ *i»*l Krhyitw. \ Pt»ln*«
jUH'fry; Ctrrrk |»nrtry
r!f,'l
, K. II.: I'hihuwi&y in Pnr/rv ' /t N/mr

(11AITKHS III AND IV, itKI,lt;iuX,

PLATO: H-rjfuhi.n\ Hm»k III. Triiii»liifit»ii» l*v Jnwrtf mut

by MI*

w«»i*. (Otw of tt«* tir
Uhwty ntwl ot«* trf ti
emientHit m rrti^tott.

KANT: Cn'fu/w*«/ f*wrf itmmin-- TH* CVin««

by Mit* MuSW, Cnii^tf nf l*

l»y AtiUtit in TAri*ry «/ £th*r*t

itn tht* jm»vinn« i.»f fmth« tltMitt-
It f«im ki«iwl«l|g;is mitl rriiilw it I** HI***
rnlit-y.)

ner*. Tnui*tnti<»ti l»y Ottmn, <!'«»»*

prcifouitii IIIH! nymfmth^tiic in it* usutar-
wf rriiitiit.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY 433

ARNOLD: Literature and Dogma. (On the essence of religion
as exemplified in Judaism and Christianity.)

SABATIER, A. : Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on
Psychology and History. Translation by
Seed. Religions of Authority and the Re-
ligion of the Spirit. Translation by Hough-
ton. (These books emphasize the essential
importance of the believer's attitude to
God.)

JAMES, WILLIAM: The Varieties of Religious Experience. (A
rich storehouse of religion, sympatheti-
cally interpreted.)

EVERETT, C. C. : The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.
(A study in the definition and meaning of
religion.)
CAIRD, EDWARD: Evolution of Religion. (Indoctrinated with

the author's* idealistic philosophy.)

FIELDING, H.: The Hforts of Men. (A plea for the universal
religion. Special feeling for Indian re-
ligions.)

HARNACK, A. : What is Christianity f Translation by Saun-
ders. (Attempt to define the essence of
Christianity.)
PALMER, G. H.: The Field of Ethics, Chapters V and VI. (On

the relation of ethics and religion.)
BROWN, W. A.: The Essence of Christianity. (Special study

of the definition of religion.)
JASTROW, M.: The Study of Religion. (Method of history and

psychology of religion.)

SMITH, W. ROBERTSON: The Religion of the Semites. (Excel-
lent study of tribal religions.)
CLARKE, W. N.: What Shall We Think of Christianity ? (An

interpretation of Christianity.)
LETJBA, J. H.: Introduction to a Pyschological Study of Re-

Hgiop. In The Monist, Vol. XI, p. 195.
STARBTJCE:, E. D,: The Pyschology of Religion.

434 BIBLfuc;H,\llI!V

CHAITKH V, THK PIHI.nSunf K'AL CIUTICFSM

OF sni'AVK,*

PLATO: /iV;rn/»/i>, Bonk Yll. .VJtJ flf, Tnim»L'ifmu*3 l»y JmvHt

and Vwitfh.'in. rhnftbt. W\ fl, Tmi*«!ah*.*» |»y
Jowott.

/n'/*ftr*»i>. tlif Fourth I)m1n£iuv .Sin,,?. «»HJH«-
rially 2-'U 2*U, if in lhi< fiuliirr of f |y» H-irntiMt

t<» grn.Hj* lh«* drr|wr truth rr'i|Mvfintf CHUHI'M
ant} HulHtjuitTH »

ItinrimrMr m\ Mfth***l, Tnin»il?ifs»m Jty V»'ifi*h.

lation hy Khvf.«.

KANT: f V?Y»'*/w- »*/ /'HI**' Ifrttwn •• Trttnifrn*l«*ntitl .ftitthflic ami
Trun*rnulfnt<tl J»*i/0/ir, TrmiMt'.tfinn liy M»\ Mul-
lor. (HtiiiJif.H <»f th»* MrfljMil *-»f Srinirr.)

uml rnlni«i» of tf>i tim^ iw pli
.)

Mrfhtim*"*, tHtntnrtrnt ntu! IlH»l
il,)

e* »/ /'.«yrA*»f<i»/y« V«»J. II, C1«i|
iii, fl%tii|i!i<w$jtrK flir pmrliml it

K, JottXAIf: T/ir H*w/*l itwl fll*1 tiuhntitutl. twrnnd *S*r
iVflliif**, {lutrrjtfrtfttit^t **f

f nnturiU wirnrr frmti ft*«<
nt of ni)nt>hit<n ttirnUnfit.)

/ AViWirr, cllit^ tittuU <tf
(mm ttir nft^nftftc4 niniu! jKniil,}
, W, K.: /^rftirm fiwl K*My*,' O« f^s^ 4irrw nwil /n-
ttrumrnt* nf Srifititifle Thtnttjht; Tk& /'At-

* For fwthtr oonttmtKirMry wrilit*nn tio Uti* u^ilt^i** fw»i<f»

BIBLIOGRAPHY 435

HUXLEY, T. H.: Method and Results. (The positivistic posi-
tion.)

MUENSTERBERG, HUGO: Psychology and Life. (Epistemo-
logical limitations of natural sci-
ence applied to psychology, from
idealistic stand-point.)

FULLER-TON, G. E. : A System of Metaphysics, Part II.

TAYLOR, A. E. : Elements of Metaphysics, Book III.

CHAPTERS VI AND VII, THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY.

PLATO: Dialogues, especially Protagoras and Theaetetus.
Translation by Jowett. (The actual genesis of
special problems.) *

EJJELPE, OSWALD: Introduction to Philosophy. Translation by
Pillsbury aifd Titchener. (Full and ac-
curate account of the traditional terms
and doctrines of philosophy.)

HIBBEN, J. G. : Problems of Philosophy. (Brief and elementary.)
SIDGWICK, HENRY: Philosophy, its Scope and Relations.
PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH: Introduction to Philosophy. Transla-
tion by Thilly.

BALDWIN, J. M.: Dictionary of Philosophy. (Full, and con-
venient for reference.)

FERRIER, J. F.: Lectures on Greek Philosophy. (Interpreta-
tion of the beginning and early develop-
ment of philosophy.)
BURNET, J.: Early Greek Philosophy. Translation of the

sources.

FAIRBANKS, A.: The First Philosophers of Greece.
GOMPERZ, TH.: Greek Thinkers, Vol. I. Translation by Mag-
nus. (On the first development of phil-
osophical problems.)
PALMER, G. H.: The Field of Ethics. (On the relations of

the ethical problem.)

PUFFER, ETHEL: The Psychology of Beauty. (On the rela-
tions of the sesthetical problem.)

CIIAITEK VIII, XVITfUUSM*

; (hi ihr .\nlurr **/ YVn *»*;*, TrimnUtiMU !»y Mmmi.

i Eiirly iimfcrmiiiiri.'*
HC.UIIIKH: iVr/tt/j/i.v/iiV/i/ NVA//-W I''4ifr«i hv rulkiiiM. i^ria-

, Part I, tMtntrnt

rt»*jf .U<l«rr. TniiiHlfif ii«n • liy ( olliu
I, I N'llirfrrlifli friifyrv »jaf««rot|

), W, K.; Lr

(Um-

tit'irnrp and U'fhr^w ?Vd</i/M7ri; »SV»rwr
Chri*tuttt Tnitiitiim. ifanfrut crinii^
U«t with ttlnti*f<m«' nttti

fllti' *yitt*<fmtti!<

Stttumnry j»liil«w*|thy,) IVi'im'i^
fM t*f tmturnltum.)

tmv<*my with FrwIrHrk
tv A, J,: F»w«r!ciliww «/ /fr/»>/, I*»n, I,
ligicnw, moml, wul i
of mittiriilwit.l
PATER, WAtrxit: Afnryw 1^ K^ncwrmn.

O* J.: Thmgktu m Ktligia*. (A|»pitiiirii«Hi from

BIBLIOGRAPHY 437

BENTHA.M, J.r Introduction to the Principles of Morals and

Legislation. (Utilitarian.)
STEPHEN, L. : Science of Ethics. (Evolutionary and social.)

CHAPTER IX, SUBJECTIVISM.

PLATO : Theaetetus. Translation by Jowett. (Exposition and

criticism of Protagoras.)
BERKELEY: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous;

Principles of Human Knowledge.

HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
SCHOPENHAUER: The World as Will and Idea. Translation

by Haldane and Kemp.

MILL, J. S. : An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Phi-
losophy, X-XIII.

CLIFFORD, W. K.: Lectures and Essays: On the Nature of

Takings in Themselves. (Panpsychism.)

DEUSSEN, PAUL: Elements of Metaphysics. Translation by
Duff. (Following Schopenhauer and
Oriental philosophy.)

PAULSEN, FR.: Introduction to Philosophy. (Panpsychism.)
STRONG, C. A. : Why the Mind Has a Body. (Panpsychism.)
JAMES, WILLIAM: Reflex Action and Theism, in The Witt to
Believe. (Morality and religion of in-
dividualism.)

CHAPTER X, ABSOLUTE REALISM.

PARMENTDES: Fragments. Arrangement and translation by

Burnet or Fairbanks.

PLATO: Republic, Books VI and VII. Translations by Jowett
and Vaughan. Symposium, Phcedrus, Phcsdo, Phil-
ebus. Translation by Jowett.

ARISTOTLE * : Psychology. Translations by Hammond and
Wallace. Ethics. Translation by Welldon.

* The Metaphysics of Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel must be found by
the English reader mainly in the secondary sources.

438 BIBLIOGRAPHY

SPINOZA: Ethics, especially Parts I and V. Translations by
Elwes and Willis.

LEIBNIZ: Monadology, and Selections. Translation by Latta.
Discourse on Metaphysics. Translation by Mont-
gomery.

MARCUS AURELITJS: Thoughts. Translation by Long.

EPICTETUS: Discourses. Translation by Long.

CAIRD, EDWARD: The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Phi-
losophers. (The central conceptions of
Plato and Aristotle.)

JOACHIM: A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza.

CHAPTER XI, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

DESCAETES: Meditations. Translation by Veitch.
KANT: Critique of Pure ReasCn. Translation by Max Miiller.
Critique of Practical ReasorC.^ Translation by Ab-
bott, in Kant's Theory of Ethics.

FICHTE*: Science of Ethics. Translation by Kroeger. Popu-
lar Works: The Nature of the Scholar; The Voca-
tion of Man; The Doctrine of Religion. Transla-
tion by Smith.
SCHILLER: ^Esthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters.

Translation by Weiss. (Romanticism.)
HEGEL*: Ethics. Translation by Sterrett. Logic. Transla-
tion, with Introduction, by Wallace. Philosophy
of Mind. Translation, with Introduction, by
Wallace. Philosophy of Religion. Translation
by Spiers and Sanderson. Philosophy of Right.
Translation by Dyde.
GREEN, T. H.: Prolegomena to Ethics.

EMEESON: The Conduct of Life — Fate. Essays, First Series —
The Over-Soul; Circles. Essays, Second Series —
The Poet; Experience; Nature. (The apprecia-
tion of life consistent with absolute idealism.)
WORDSWOHTH: Poems, passim.
COLERIDGE: Aids to Reflection, The Friend.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 439

ROYCB, J.: Spirit of Modern Philosophy. (Sympatlietic ex-
position of Kant, Fichte, Romanticism, and
Hegel.) The Conception of God. (The episte-
mological argument.) The World and the In-
dividual, First Series. (Systematic devel-
opment of absolute idealism; its moral and
religious aspects.)

CAXUD, EDWAKD: The Critical Philosophy of Kant. (Exposi-
tion and interpretation from stand-point
of later idealism.)

EVERETT, 0. C.: Fief tie's Science of Knowledge.
McTAOOAHT, J, M. E.: Studies in Hegelian Dialectic. Studies
in Hegelian Cosmology.
•

SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HIS-
TORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

I.*-GENERAL.

Rooana: Student's History of Philosophy. (Elementary and
"* el<».ar; copious quotations.)

: Hittnry of Philosophy. Translation by Thilly . (Com-
rfllwttMVo And compact.)

D: A Hutory of Philosophy. Translation by Tufts.
(Emphasis upon the problems and their de-

Hwttmj *t Philowpliy. Translation edited by
Houjfli; in three volumes. (Detailed and accu-
rate oxpomtion.)

Utt»»»wao: A Hwtory of PMlmphy. Translation by Morns
and Portor, in two volumes. (Very complete ;
excollorxt account of the literature.)

IL— SPECIAL PERIODS.

: Lecturm oa 0mA; Philosophy. (Excellent intro-
duction,) . ,

U,: Short IIMary «l <*™k PMksophy. (Brief and

clear.)

44()

»KIJUNn: Hirtnrynf Anfit-nf /V»7/w» ;»/»•/„
<.*u*hitmn, f.Wry nrnirnfr

/Vn/*.^M/»/»y, TriUi^ljif i<*» In* Ail««vin»,
nntl Ihr iSVtrni/i/- Mitmlx. Trmi^Intitin hy
. i l''ull ftii*I lirrnriiff*/!

: (frrrk 7"Ai«Ajrr.f, TrnnMnt^t l«v Mn^Tiu^. in four
v«hniw»i, l\Vry lull; w»|vrinl!\M»n i'lntd. CW«
«t> furfhrr fhriii fluf^,'!
ir/f/ l/rfrl' j'hiJtmnjihif, CTrniwl»fion« of frit#-

f with «*<«iijnriiii>ry^

1 /•'iMf rhiltw*f'hrr* f*/ ffYmv, (TrAimhiUonK
f ffjigiiirntii, '\Vilh rMintitrtifnry.)
r/ **/ /*/n7/f*«;-»A»/, fl'^rrlli'iit. nrcouttt of
Hrhr>Iiwtir p!ijl««**j*hy,)
IlOY<*K: T/ir Spirit nf Mwtrrn /*/n'/ifijif>;?^v. (Vt»ry Hlituiin-

No: //M/**ry «/ Mwtrrn jf'/ii7'vr*;»/»y. Trnn^lnfittn hy
Moycr, in two vittuium, 4 Full ami grn/HL)

INDEX

AIWOMJTB, the, 307, 309. 332,
301, 302, 400, 404; being,
308; wibHtance, 312; ideal
320; Mpirit, 349 (note), 368
ff.; muuL 340 (note). 358,
380, 322 /£,

3C1 ;

mo.auing, 177. 349
(mrfe), 400; criticiMm of, 349.
305, 385, 4 1 1 , 410 ; opistcmol-
ogy of, 30H ff.; an related
to Kant, 380; direct argu-
ment for, 3H3 ; fithicM of, 386
ff,; rcliKicm of, 300 ff.; of
prorwut day, 402 ff., 410,

AlWOUJTK ItKAJMHM, chap. X;

gonuml moaning, 306 (note),
400; 0pmt.fttttology cjft 330;
ttthirK of. 342; 'roHgton of,
340; mUrium of, 338, 416.
Aim'nurr, th«, 139.
Anrtvm% 200, 285, 295.
, 189.

ttM, 168, 252 ff»
AK, 230;quotod> 102.
AKAXXMANDKH, 224,

, HA INT, 2<X).
ol*<)MOHt*tltHM[, 100*

iATioN, 25^ 402.

ii, in formal logic, 186;

of, 195, 346; p«y-
ch<»lt»gy of, 208; philosophy
of, 306, 332 ff . : aiwl Plato,
333, 336: ami ftj)ino«ft, 330;
topUUtmoiogy of, 339 : religion
<»f, 34% 42§; on ovil. 353.
ATOM HIM, 100, 220. Also BOO
undor L«uon*i>w, and DK-

ATTITUI>IO, 02.

ArrmnuTH, in Spinom, 312 ff,

AtK»mTiM% BAXNT, on com*

munlon with Ocxl, W; on

pu*ti«m, 195; hii conception

of ttdf, 372,

AUTOMATIMM, 248,

BAAL, religion of, 88.

BACON, FRANCIS, on thought
and action, 430.

BALFOUK, A. J.. on materialism,
264.

BEAUTY, in esthetics, 189: in
Plato, 327, 332.

BEING, Eleatic conception of,
308 ff .

BELIEF, key to definition of re-
ligion, 58 ; general characters
applied to religion, 59 ff . ; in
persons and dispositions, 62;
examples of religions, 66 ff . ;
object of religions, 65, 82,
* 97 ; relation to logic, 182, 183.

BKNTHAM, 262.

BERKELEY, on idealism, 176;
relation to common -sense,
267; his refutation of ma-
terial substance, 275 ff . ; epis-
temology of, 277, 296, 369;
theory of mathematics, 279;
his spiritualism, 280, 284,
292; his conception of God,
284, 293; ethics of, 302; re-
ligion of, 304.

BUDDHISM, 78.

CATJHB, in science, 131 ; God as
firet, 203; of motion, 231 ff.;
spirit art, 293 ff .

OmiWTXANiTY, persistence of,
76; essence of, 86; develop-
ment front Judaism, 94;
ethics of, 195, 198, 386; idea
of God in, 200 ff., 205; em-
phasis on self-consciousness
m, 372.

COMTB, 115.

CONTEMPLATION, 428.

CONVERSION, 69 ff.

CORPORKAI, BBXNG, 224: proc-
eeHOi of, 225; Berkeley's
critique of, 278: historical
conceptions of, 229.

441

•H'j isur.x

<;,»«!, luU'i T4ir»m. '.MS. •/:,;* if ,</:,/. nf

cnfMMiuv. ffrwrat inriuimsc ] ^-^r^rfr^ /•;.!„ ,111. ,c:,' f,r

nf. !M». iii«<rhnw«w in, i*'«I, firiirlrv, .;:';;', •/*«». ».f »!>„

'^V*; frlfnln^v in. 1*»1. «^.Ju»r r«-'/>hnri«, .it1*. 'AM , <(f

u, MrriiMi., :n\ni ;i|n, ,i|}r »,f Hnt,,.-. ;i7ii. «.f

r,f »,frw*»« a--*v, I*»H ff

£!.„

*. 4-t. in, »r.«. !

t«

II Wj trf

, IW4 llftfl, {UK*, itwi,

aim rr, 4UI,

.fruttr* HIV w««lt»r I* AttMr.M-

IMK«, nfttt Ki:s«i»*

UtffN, *»*t P|*tfl^ £if*f$' lift

faith, 4'J-I, * )iKi«M4 AW,

i tit Jogir, IH7; t(t

, 2H*J If,: *»f t^ir
fWkplpy. 274 II

iiin ur, uiili rr^

l*» fliit*, unit ititnr Atitw **£ lilwil*, IM,
tif, IHHf 173; Rf]KUt!tt4il Uitl wUli* fiH; Jtfwu'Wrr of, IIH;

INDEX

443

nn ii (UspnmUon from which
conw.titU'iMM*!* may be tvx-
|H't»t<««l, Hf>; meaning^ of, in
religion, H7 ; idea of, in Juda-
win uiul Christianity, 92;
why hJHtoricai, 102;' social
relation with, I Oft; tho onto-
logical proof of, 200; cthiail
nn<l PHistomologioal argu-
riK'iitrt for, 202 j cosmological
proof of, 203; ideological
proof of, 201 ; relation to' the
world. in tlwwm ; pantheism
fin* I tivifmi, 205 ft.* will of,
'212;<*.im<M*ption of, m Berke-
tf\V» 2S1, 2lKi ff.; conception
nutl proof of, In Spinoza,
312 ff., 302, 31K1; wmcoption
of, in Plato, IW1, 352, 301,
303; r.ttiKwn-tiou of, in LeU>-
ni«, 33H, 3»>3, Also WHS Aw-

HOt.rTTI.

<**»j;i'siKf on H|»ino7,a, an<t on
phittwophy, »l; ou pragnxa-
liHin, 407,

<}(M»t», fh«% th*H)riwi«fr in (%tlucHr

UU ff. ; and ilw m,»,LB26 ff.,

421 ff,
(tHttttK, J*«4igiori, in Homer and

Lur.r«'titt«r HO; IdwUn, 105,

HUH, '120.
<ti<KKN, *I\ H,, quotcxl, 300,

3H5 (H*rff)»

IDEAL, the, in Plato, 326: valid-
ity of, 416.

IDEALISM, various meanings of
term, 173 (note) ; meaning of,
as theory of knowledge, 175
ff., 409; of present day, 409
ff.; empirical, see SUBJEC-
TIVISM, PHENOMENALISM,
SPIUITUALISM ; absolute, see
ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

IDEALS, in life, 10 ff.; adoption
of, 17 ff.

IDEAS, the, in Plato, 329.

IMAGINATION, in poetry, 99;
place of, iu religion, 80, 97
ff. ; npeciai functions of, in
religion, 101 ff. ; scope of, in
religion, 105 ff.; and the
personality of God, 110.
, IMTTATIO CHHISTI, quoted, 68.

IMMANENCE THEORY, 412, 413.

IMMORTALITY, 212.

INDIVIDUALISM, 301. 320, 338,
404.

, in ethics, 196.

H\r,rK.r,i^ ctuoicd, 230, 206.

HKItONIMM, 102.

KUKt., *m i*rif*nr.^. 120; philoft*
onhy «»f, !f»0, »6i ff,: rda-
tff»u* to Kttnt, 381 ; on tno al>-

3H2; ^thifH of, 300.
tTim, IWJ8,
, phih«ophy of, in

, .

f!«MtitKrtf bin ituwionwpliou of
ri'liiiioiw of philosophy and
wiwiH*,. Hftj«|tu>iwl cm (jih-
«on»2(H,

Hoi.HA.rtt, 251, 252.
HOMKU, oii. (Jrtwk r«4kton, 00,
HifMANtNM, .TJK), 404, 405.

<»f, U5, 877:
of, 3iJ3; ^w*
, 370.
!h.ixt.KY» cjuut«i, 255^ 266*

JAMES, WILLIAM, quoted on re-

ligion, 65, 71, 305.
JUDAIHM. development of, 92;

and Christianity, 94.

KANT, his transcendentalism,
177, 356; his critique of
knowledge, 354 ff., 377 ff.;
and absolute idealism, 380;
ethics of, 386.

KBPLKR, quoted, 129.

KNOWLEDGE, of the means in
life, 8; of the end, 10; in
poetry, 27 ff. ; in religion, 82,
85, 97, 105; general theory
of, ou opistom'ology, 164 ff.;
problem of source and cri-
terion of, 168 ff. ; problem of
relation to its object, 172 ff.,
277, 340, 351, 368 ff.; rela-
tion of logic to, 183 ff.; ac-
count of, in naturalism, 253
ff. Also see EPISTBMOLOQY.

LA MBTTEIE, quoted, 250.

LA PLACE, 242; quoted, 241.

LBIBNIZ, on function of philos-
ophy. 155; philosophy of,
333, 336 ff.; ©pistemology of,

4,14 I*"**

LttTVivprn, qnotosl, Iftl. . .

ItiFr;, tut A Htnrt ing -point, for MTM». rt)»hitintiHn of in nut-

thought. It; <!ffinition «»f« uraJwn, rJil7. * 17 ff. ; nf<»«i«i,

f> ff.; Ami fw«IfMM»n*'»o»i»tn«<!*«. in Ifc-rkrlov, 'JK-l, 2fH, 21W;

ft; phitoMophv of 17 ff., S.Vl; »U'«niiif«% ;if!i (m***). 3f»K,

inrrhnnirnl l"hwry of. *44 ff.j HH'J ff Ai*u» fuv un

ri'ttmi of phiIoiH*|»hy to, 4*7 Rtul Si»fi..

ff, ; coiit(*ntplivti<in tn. 4**.H, Mim»;, in Hpinnxn, .'it;

H'KK, rpiHtontoIony of, 'J7II. M» -»NAI»»», in I.*nl»n«f i

IK*, origin in Sorro-tir ntrth- MMMJ«M, I»VJ» i*l»l,

.. si, JHt ; uHitiiiti»»nM of, IH2, M«ftiAt,irt« »n*i rrtij

j[HH;«!Hitnti<»n of. IKTJ; jmrtrt Kr«»uiMi*« of, n-rrn

of fnrnuti, IH4 ff, ; |*nwtit . Kntit* 3f»fl; itirrndv

t«'n<irnri«'H in4 JH7 ff>; nl0*"« Mn«Tt«-f*M, nmr-rnl

hrn of» 1HU. t > t 171; Hrluti^nltAttr

aN-jtK.'nt'M, Inn oritirinm of fyf*i» *»! rrlsgi**««j i

r,.1, M.K..«mHr«;i*U ' hon« of, with ^ht!*i
Jio7; on tht* tt!wwthit*% *il*I, 1 Itl; wpfjft^ <*f« with rr'

MACK, K«, 2KHi «»« j»h»Uwij»hy f<> phiJo*»«»phy. II? I!'.

MAtw't»n At'KW.if *, I14H, iw »|»*Hiiit uttrrrf*l(< lU.'l If,

g, ainfV 14 ;'*!**- H:i;'«infh««t'

224 If,; urul «l r«nrr|»ti*»fw of, 4t»o4 li'H

I; Fff^irhi 24W; ff . ; ^^tt^rni <ir>\'rtn|tnM'>nt ««f4

ry of mint! ift» !£Atl( J»H; hioil» of4 I.MVfitiiwt «,!*«

In Mriwt, I.KI ff,4 414 « %'nlt<tity

««; of, !4rJ, t*i|tir Mi<t» IKH; ilf*-

.,„„,„ ,.. of, vrlot»mriil **f rtitirrjitiuiMi t«,

271* ; ikmU»*ii *n**M»f»tkm off SKIM If . ; grow win **f, urtHinhtig

Uon of, SI I, SIH« 1177; f*rrtimt*titirf< niui

I «f,

', ; in FittUi «i«I Artatotlr,

»34. wi'niWKin^ »»iit" l^k of

of i4 tfttwt* 24 1; fritirUin* of, 'll?, 2B7*

"&> thti world «t

30; in ?o«molottyf tftl, Uaft; AU«» «MW utitlrr

tilotfy» t
i, 23 1; of

of I'HMdiiftni 23 1; of Nrwttm

243; of Hf*, 244; in H|4noiia> t^rkHry, aW4- in Ht»ittoiui«

f m*Ai*ttYiiu*Mf wlAlion f-ii t»pin« K«nf #177 ff, ; in «?«nt«»t«-

tnmoi«»gy» I£W; rutAiion t«* iximry tihiloi»o|»hy. 4Ui.

•Uiiw. i5l, 1IHJ f f, j t.Mtatl«ii Al** w* N*rt>4ui» Hc-ifcNt^

of, 158; n^Ation t4i!of(iiic tKH; Ami NATt^MAMAMi

tei to, .Bttf "" WltAI1 •v-**l*i--ll--t ' '

nf, J

INDEX

445

NEO-FICHTEANS, 402, 403

(note).

NEO-KANTIANS, 403.
NEWTON, 232, 235, 242, 355,

377.
NORMATIVE SCIENCES, the, 180.

OMAR KHAYYAM, quoted, 16;

as a philosopher-poet, 36.
ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, of God,

200.

ONTOLOGY, 159.
OPTIMISM, 104, 388, 422, 424.

PANPSYCHISM, 176, 238, 285 ff.
PANTHEISM, in primitive re-
ligion, 78; general meaning,
205; types of, 390.
PARKER, THEODORE, quoted on

religion, 67.

PARMENIDES, and rationalism,
168; philosophy of, 308 ff.,
337; and Aristotle, 336.
PATER, WALTER, on Words-
worth, 38; on Cvrenaicism,
260; on subjectivism, 370.
PAXJLSEN, FRIEDRICH, etnics of,

quoted, 302.

o PEARSON, KARL, quoted, 230.
PERCEPTION. See SENSE-PER-
CEPTION.

PERSONAL IDEALISM, 404, 405.
PERSONALITY, of God, impor-
tant in understanding of re-
ligion, 62; essential to relig-
ion? 108 ff.

PERSONS, description of be-
lief in, 62; imagination of,
101, 110.

PESSIMISM, 104, 299, 424.
PHENOMENALISM, general
meaning, 176, 267 (note) ; of
Berkeley, 272, 275 ff.; of
Hume, 283; various ten-
dencies in, 281.

PHILOSOPHER, the practical
man and the, chap, i; the
r61e of the, 306, 426.
PHILOSOPHY, commonly mis-
conceived, 3; of the devotee,
13; of the man of affa%s, 14;
of the voluptuary, 16; of life,
its general meaning, 17 ff.,
153 ; its relations with poetry,
chap, ii, 112; lack of, in

Shakespeare, 33; as expres-
sion of personality, 33; as
premature, 33; in poetry of
Omar Khayyam, 36; in poe-
try of Wordsworth, 38 f f . ; in
poetry of Dante, 42 f f . ; differ-
ence between philosophy and
poetry, 48 ff. ; in religion, 108
ff.; compared with religion,
112; true attitude of, toward
science, 116; sphere of, in re-
lation to science, 117, 395 ff. ;
procedure of, with reference
to science, 121, 135, 142,
154, 160; human value of,
143, 426 ff.; can its problem
be divided? 149, 155; origin
of, 157 ; special problems of,
chap, vi, vii; and psychol-
ogy, 216; peculiar object of,
308; self-criticism in, 319
ff., 325; permanence and
progress hi, 395 ff.; contem-

* porary, 398 ff.

PHYSICAL. See CORPOREAL
BEING, MATERIALISM, etc.

PHYSIOLOGY, 246.

PIETY, description and inter-
pretation of, 72; in ethics,
195.

PLATO, on Protagoras, 167, 269,
270, 298; quoted, on Socra-
tes, 170, 192, 194; historical
preparation for, 324; psy-
chology of, 209; philosophy

of, 306, 318, 326 ff., 382:
and Aristotle, 333; and
Spinoza, 318, 335 ; epistemol-
ogy of, 339, ethics of, 342;
religion of, 346, 391, 393; on
evil, 352; on spirit, 359;
on reason and perception,
370 ; on the philosopher, 426.
PLURALISM, general meaning
of, 159, 163, 419- in ethics,
302, 421 ff . ; in religion, 304,
POETRY, relations with phi-
losophy, chap, ii; as appre-
ciation, 25; virtue of sincer-
ity in, 27; the "barbarian"
in 28; constructive knowl-
edge in, 30; difference be-
tween philosophy and, 48 f f .
POSITIVISM, on relation of
philosophy and science, 115,

INDEX

447

•tsv, H»r», 207 ff. Sco
undor POSITIVISM, and AG-
NOSTICISM.
,riir.M'!N<}, misconeeption of

irtioi. \HTICISM, **M; idea of
Vio<l in, 201.

Iriiorr.NH.vt'KK, his fmnpsych-
JMIU or vohmtunwn, 177,
2H5 ff, ; univiTsiilisjes subjec-
tivism, 2!>0; mysticism of,
2W; Hint's of, 20V); religion

•U'tiiscK.. Also w»e under NA-

•n'HM* SrtiiMrK, ttiul NOR-

M ATI VK Hril'.NVK,

4Krr», \UISM, of Shakespeare,
34; of I'erielewi Age, 320;
of jnri'sent nj/,»% 427.

Hlr.T.K» j*rt»blem of, 2ttl; proof of,
in ht. August inr, 372; proof
of, in Uivinvrt «*s, ^74; deeper
mnrul of, 3H7; in eotit(»»ipo-
rury j»hil«»Hojihy, -lit, 413.
Also w<» Sot; i,, and M

|<t huninn HIV, 0; dovt-hm-
tnriH «»f rourrption of, lul
ff, ; in iihH«»lut«« td<»nli«n, 3H3;

Hr-NHK i»i-;«« T, 171* >N, UW. 247,
2*!U, :t70; IMHKK IIM» in Burko-

i«%a«t. , ...

*4n .\ K t-'nt'r, \ JiK, fftnwml criti-
rifttu of, ati ff,; hiK «nivtTHtt,l-
ity, 31 j Iwk «»f philonophy
tiu :*:«.

HtiM.t.t-iv, ijuot.tMl on |HH»try, 50,

HOC! AI< UK.!,ATIoNHr IwlU'f ill-

«piwl hy, iinnlofowt of «v.
Iigioi^ \VJii tuititfiuatiou «f,

<»^t<*iid»Hl to (Joti, 101.

, >f, 100;

ttmi n«»r»uitiv« nritniw*, IHO:
i*t!ii<»n of. H>'2r 1»4; «wttM»tl

of, :«! ff.
Htit'itmi'H, th*«, ^j)mt«nn«l«Ky of>

H-W; wont ir win of, 271, 320;

Kium 4>ft UUK» ;UU ; ft|C« «f,

32<K
How., ih«% in Arwt«tl<», ^;

*nd vol-
In iHwiry <»f, Ul<>;

immortality of, 212; Berke-
ley's theory of, 284. Also see
under MIND, and SELF.
SPACE, importance in science,

130; and matter, 229.
SPENCER, 236 (note), 243, 265. .
SPINOZA, and Goethe, 51;
quoted on philosophy and
life, 153; philosophy of, 306,
311 ff.; criticism and esti-
mate of, 315 ff.; and Plato,
318, 335; and Aristotle, 336;
epistcmology of, 339; ethics
of, 342; rehgion of, 348, 392,
393.

SPIRIT, the absolute, 358 ff.
SPIRITUALISM, general mean-
ing, 176, 267 (note) ; in Berke-
ley, 280, 292; in Schopen-
hauer, 285; criticism of, 288;
objective, 292.
STEVENSON, R. L., quoted on

religion, 07.

STOICISM, ethics of, 342; relig-
«ion of, 348,

SUIUECTIVIHM, chap, ix; gen-
eral meaning, 175, 218, 267
(•note); 415; in sesthetics, 190;
of Berkeley, 275 ff: ^ univer-
Hulization of, in Schopen-
hauer, 290; criticism of, 297,
415; ethics of, 298 ff.; in ab-
soiuto idealism, 368; of pres-
ent day, 409.

SUBSTANCE, spiritual, 209, 284;
material, Berkeley's refuta-
tion of, 275 ff.; Spinoza's
conception of, 311; the in-
finite, in Spinoza, 312; Aris-
totlo'H conception of, 334;
Leibniz's conception of, 338.
SYMMOLIHM, in religion, 75.

TELMOLOOY, in cosmology, 161 ;
proof of God from, 204;
Spinoza on, 318; in Plato,

:m ft, 336; in Aristotle,

336,

THEISM, 205, .

THKOLOOY, relation to religion,

9S; in philosophy, 199 ff.;

relation to metaphysics, 207.
THOMSON, J., quoted, 104.
THOUGHT, and life, 6 ft.; as

being, in Hegel, 361 ff.

•us

INDKX

Tiirr'YPUifH, «w ttwuRht firnl VIWT»">', I^H, 34 .Y

nrfiiin, 421*. \ * «!• T utt? , «iMnfnl4 *Mt» 2.jt.

TiMt", ifHj~H»rtnnrf* in urii-tirr, \nrt-A t MIT^M, in l*»yrfir»Jou\%

ritiru.iW. \VWTM\N, W\»,T, 27 ff,

TYNiuwl/ii5. I|H'» wsl1' »M*-r**»*m«»on of,

2tt; m Hrlii*|*nli?iirr, 177;

ifir knt>wl- iw fMi.«w, t)> Hrr'krlov* 2tKl

f. ff , it« itrnitiiinfiof!!. 4ili,

ntou onj^ft. of |»liii**«n|r»li%* ufftvrfflfti, 4^» «|tioff>«i «n

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LI FM AND I.KTTH KS OF

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FARADAY.- FAHAOAY AH A

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/fuv;,i/,i.v.v ,LVP o>.'.v STANDARD AND GENERAL WORKS. 13

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STANDARD AND GENERAL WORKS.

Sport and Pastime — continued.

FORD. -THK THEORY AND MASKELYNE. — SHARPS AND
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