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AEISTOCRATIC  GOVERNMENT. 


ARISTOCRATIC  GOVERNMENT. 


HENRY  LORD   BROUGHAM,  F.R.S, 

MEHBEK  OP  THE  NATIONAL  INSTITUTE   OF  FRANCE. 


LONDON: 

BELL  AND  DALDY,  YORK  STREET,  COVENT  GARDEN, 
AND   186,  FLEET   STREET. 


TO 


THE    QUEEN. 


Madam, 

By  the  commands  of  the  Useful  Knowledge  Society, 
incorporated  by  charter  of  your  revered  predecessor. 
King  William  IV.,  I  lay  at  your  Majesty's  feet  the 
Treatise  upon  Political  Philosophy  which  they  have 
published  with  the  view  of  making  the  Science  of 
Government  more  generally  understood,  and  of  cor- 
recting the  errors  which  the  violence  of  conflicting 
parties,  or  the  zeal  of  rival  theorists,  have  propagated 
in  all  ages  and  in  all  countries. 

In  presuming  to  solicit  Your  Majesty's  gracious 
attention  to  this  work,  it  is  fit  that  I  should  state 
how  far  the  Society  and  how  far  the  author  alone  are 
severally  answerable  for  the  opinions  which  it  explains 
and  supports. 

The  Society  only  undertakes  a  general  responsibility 
for  the  doctrines  delivered  in  the  Treatises  published 
under  its  superintendence.     A  general  coincidence  of 


VI  DEDICATION. 

opinion  alone  is  to  be  expected  in  a  body  so  variously 
composed.  That  all  its  members  are  agreed  in  holding 
fast  by  the  principles  of  our  constitution,  in  cherishing 
those  sentiments  which  lead  to  the  improvement  as 
well  as  the  preservation  of  our  institutions,  and  in 
favouring  whatever  may  promote  the  peace  of  the 
world,  may  safely  be  affirmed.  The  details  connected 
with  those  fundamental  positions  are  to  be  regarded 
as  the  .work  and  as  the  doctrine  of  the  writer  rather 
than  of  his  colleagues. 

But  there  is  one  subject  upon  which  they  both 
equally  concur  without  any  shade  of  dijBTerence:  — 
That  Your  Majesty  may  long  reign  in  tranquillity, 
foreign .  and  domestic,  over  a  free,  a  loyal,  and  a 
happy  people,  is  alike  the  prayer  of  the  Society, 
and  of. 

Madam, 

Your  faithful  and  devoted  Subject, 

BROUGHAM. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF  ARISTOCRACY  IN  GENERAL. 

Aristocracy  defined — Errors  on  this  subject— Roman  and  Athenian  Governments — 
Germs  of  Aristocracy  may  exist  and  give  rise  to  it^ — Illustrations  from  Rome 
and  Athens — Pure  Aristocracies  rare — Tendency  of  Aristocratic  Government  to 
become  mixed       ........  .         .     Page  1 

CHAPTER  II. 

OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS. 

Dogmatical  denial  of  Checks— This  founded  on  theory  alone — Doctrine  of  Checlvs 
misconceived — Doctrine  explained — Its  foundation — Fallacy  of  the  objectors  ex- 
posed— Illustration  of  the  doctrine  from  joint  powers  :  Mutual  veto  :  Factious 
majority— Illustrations  from  English  constitution — Proceedings  since  1832 — 
Illustration  from  balance  of  Parties  in  Parliament — Illustration  from  Dynamics 
— Checks,  proper  or  imperfect — Example  of  the  proper  Checks  :  Roman  constitu- 
tion— Example  of  the  imperfect  Check  :  Venetian  Constitution — Absolute 
monarchies — English  and  American  constitutions — Senseless  project  of  Peerage 
Reform         ............     5 

CHAPTER  III. 

PROGRESS  AND   CHANGES   OF  A  RISTOCRACY —OLIGARCHY. 

Tendency  of  Aristocratic  and  Democratic  Cor  stitutions  to  mix  with  others — Dif- 
ference in  this  respect  of  Despotism — Tendoncy  greatest  in  Aristocracies — Early 
pupilage  of  the  people — Their  progress  to  emancipation — Best  course  for  tlie 
Aristocracy — Illustration  from  colonial  emancipation — Natural  introduction  of 
Oligarchy — Its  natural  progress  to  greater  exclusiveness — Its  natural  tendency 
to  dissolution — Examples  from  the  Venetian,  Genoese,  Siennese,  and  Lucca 
Governments       .         .         .         .         .         •         •         .         .         .         .17 

CHAPTER  IV. 

FOUNDATION   OF  ARISTOCRACY   IN   THE   NATURE   OF   THINGS. — 
NATURAL   ARISTOCRACY. 

Equality  impossible — Attempts  made  U  insure  it — Influence  of  independent  circum- 
stances— Of  wealth — Reflex  operatioa — Upstart  superiority — Foundation  of  re- 
spect for  hereditary  distinctions — Reflex  feeling —Hereditary  superiority  improves 
men — Effects  of  improvement — Respc.ct  for  rank — Natural — Essential  to  artificial 
Aristocracy — Illustrations  from  Rome,  Sparta,  Feudal  Government,  Modern 
Italy — Efi'ect  of  Natural  Aristocracj  in  destroying  Oligarchy — Political  pro- 
fession impossible — It  must  necessarily  be  a  corrupt  trade — Athenian  State 
orators — Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  Political  profession         .         .     23 


Vm  eONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  V. 

OF   PARTY. 

Origin  of  Party — Aristocracy  most  exposed  to  it — Venice  the  only  exception — 
Justifiable  party  unions — Factious  system — Undermines  principle — Destroys  con- 
fidence in  Statesmen— Corrupts  private  morals — Unites  sordid  motives  with  pure 
— Produces  self-deception — Destroys  regard  for  truth — Promotes  abuse  of  the 
Press — Gives  scope  to  malignant  feelings — Passage  of  Dante — Operation  of 
Faction  on  inferior  Partisans — Effects  in  paralysing  the  public  Councils — In 
promoting  treasonable  proceedings — Defence  of  Party :  Burke,  Fox — Conclusion 
of  this  subject       ........         ...    Page  34 

CHAPTER  VI. 

VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  THE  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY. 

Defects  of  Aristocracy — No  responsible  Rulers — No  influence  of  Public  Opinion — 
Comparison  with  other  Governments — Interests  in  conflict  with  public  duty — 
Illustrations  from  Roman  Constitution  ;  Modem  Aristocracies  ;  English  and 
French  Constitutions — Legislation  influenced  by  Aristocratic  interests — Similar 
Evils  in  Democracy — Evils  of  Hereditary  Privileges — Tendency  to  make  bad 
Rulers — Comparison  of  Aristocracy  and  Democracy — Corruption  of  Morals- 
Virtue  of  French  Republicans— Galling  yoke  of  Aristocracy — Merits  of  Aris- 
tocracy ;  firmness  of  purpose — Resistance  to  change— House  of  Lords — Contrast 
of  Democracy — Republican  attempts  to  resist  the  Natural  Aristocracy — Aristo- 
cracies pacific — Exceptions,  Venice  and  Rome — Encouragement  of  Genius — 
Comparison  with  Democracy  and  Monarchy — Spirit  of  personal  honour — Con- 
trast of  Democracy — F.  Paul's  opinion  —Aristocratic  body  aids  the  civil  Magis- 
trate— Error  committed  in  our  Colonies  ......     48 

CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY. 

IndividHal  influence  in  Aristocracies — Partial  delegation  of  supreme  power — Feudal 
and  Civic  Nobility  in  Italy — Polish  Aristocracy — Operation  of  Feudal  Aristo- 
cracy on  Government — Illustration  of  Feudal  Aristocracy  from  English  History 
— Monkish  Historians — William  of  Malmesbui-y — ^William  of  Newbury — Matthew 
Paris — Roger  Hoveden — Henry  of  Huntingdon         .         .         .         ..         »    63 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — POIiAND. 

Tendency  of  Aristocracy  towards  mixed  Government — May  be  really  pure  when 
apparently  mixed — Examples  :  Venice,  Genoa,  Lucca,  San  Marino — Polish  Con- 
stitution— Ancient  History — Oi'igin  of  factious  spirit — Extinction  of  all  jealousy 
of  Foreign  influence — Patriotism  of  the  Czartoryskis — Conduct  of  neighbouring 
Powers — The  Partition — Nobles  strictly  an  Aristocracy — Their  Privileges — 
Palatines  ;  Castellans  ;  Starosts — Elective  Crown — Foreign  interference — Diet 
of  Election — Royal  Prerogative — Change  in  1773 — Senate — Its  Constitution  and 
functions — Chamber  of  Nuncios  —Functions  of  the  Diet — Absurdities  in  its 
Constitution — Prophyiactao  power  and  Vis  Medicatrix  in  Governments — Miti- 
gating devices  in  the  Polish  Constitution— Administration  of  justice — Defect  in 
the  English  similar  to  one  in  the  Polish  Government — Military  System — 
Character  and  habits  of  the  Nobles— Prince  Czartory ski   .         .         .  .71 


CONTENTS.  ix 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY. 

Lombard  Conquest — Magyars — Arpad  Family — Feudal  circumstances — Nobility 
— Cardinal  and  Non-Cardinal  privileges — Magnates — Bulla  Aurea — Titled 
Nobles — Diet — Representation  ;  Proxies  ;  Votes — Delegation — Diet's  functions 
— Taxes — Cassa  Domestica  and  Militaris — Count  Szechinij — Local  County  Ad- 
ministration— Congregationes  Generales — Municipal  Government,  Kozseg ;  Can- 
didatio — Village  Government — Powers  of  the  Crown — Sale  of  Titles — Peasantry 
— Urbarium  of  Maria  Theresa — Lords'  power ;  Robot — Lords'  Courts ;  reforms 
in  these — New  Urbarium  ;  Prince  Mettemich's  reforms — Military  System  ; 
Insurrectionary  Army — Frontier  Provinces — Prejudices  of  Hungarians  in  favour 
of  their  Constitution — Conclusion  of  the  subject        ....    Page  86 

CHAPTER  X. 

CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME. 

tmportance  of  the  subject — Its  great  difficulty — Ancient  historians — Modern  writers 
— Predecessors  of  Niebuhr — Niebuhr  and  his  school — Scantiness  of  materials — 
haracter  of  Niebuhr's  writings — 'Early  history  entirely  fabulous — Illustrations 
— Early  divisions  of  the  people — Early  Constitution — The  Tribes — Patricians — 
Plebeians — Patrons — Clients — Comitia  Curiata — Niebuhr's  doctrine  examined — 
Equites — Reforms  of  Servius — Centuries  and  Comitia  Centuriata — Legislation  of 
Servius — Comparison  with  Solon's — Tarquin  the  Proud — His  tyranny — His 
expulsion— Foundation  of  the  Aristocratic  Republic — Fabulous  history — Com- 
parison of  the  Roman  Revolution  with  the  French  and  English  .  .      98 

CHAPTER  XI. 

CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME — {Continued.) 

Patrician  power — 1.  Patrons  and  Clients — Feudal  resemblance — MvaxVi — Error  of 
authors — Clients  in  Sparta,  Crete,  Thessaly,  and  Attica — 2.  Monopoly  of  Offices 
— Senate— Conflicting  accounts— Dionysins  and  Livy — Errors  of  authors — 
Censors — Choice  of  Senate — Practical  Checks  to  Censorial  power — Senate's 
functions — Variations  in  its  power — Patres  et  Conscripti — Senate's  influence — 
Dictators — Consuls — Praetors — Patrician  oppressions — Public  lands — Agrarian 
laws — Spurius  Cassius — Licinian  Rogations — Patrician  creditors — Tribunes 
chosen — Their  powers — Progress  of  popular  power — Decline  of  Comitia  Curiata 
— Rise  of  Tributa — Course  of  legislation — Double  legislation — Anomalies — 
Solution  of  the  paradox — Senatus  Consulta  and  Plebiscita — Checks  to  the  Tri- 
bunes —Superstitious  rites — Laws  of  the  auspices  -Senate's  errors — Democracy 
established — Practical  defects  in  the  Government — Decemvirs.  .         .     119 

CHAPTER  XII. 

CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME. — {Continued.) 

Government  carried  on  by  laws  and  legislative  decrees— Consuls — Prsetors — JJdiles, 
Plebeian  and  Curule— Quaestors,  Civil  and  Military— Choice  of  Magistrates- 
Controversy  de  Binis  Comitiis— Dictator— Progress  of  Popular  power— In terrex 


X  CONTENl'S. 

— Consular  functions — Provincial  Pro-Prajtors  and  Pro-Consuls — Vigour  of  the 
Government — Religious  polity — Pontifis — Rex  Sacrorum — College  of  Augurs — 
Haruspices — Sibylline  Decemvirs — Singular  facts — Judicial  duties  of  Magis- 
trates— Cornelian  laws — Judicial  system — Judices — Centum^iri — Quaesitores — 
Jus  Qua;stioms,  or  Merum  Imperium — Divinatio— Special  judicial  laws — Abuses 
from  thence — Analogy  of  Parliamentary  Privilege — Impeachment — Cognitiones 
extraordinarise — Examples Page  142 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

REFLECrriONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 

Progress  of  Democracy — Canuleius — Address  of  the  Patricians — Distinction  of  the 
Orders  obliterated — New  Aristocratic  distinctions — New  Plebeian  body ;  their 
baseness — Operation  of  Party — Plebeians  at  dififerent  periods — Virtues  of  the 
old  Plebeians ;  contrast  of  the  new — Savage  character  ;  warlike  habits — Mas- 
sacres of  Marius — Cicero— Julius  Caesar — Corruption  of  the  People— Canvassing; 
Treating ;  Bribery — Sale  of  Votes ;  Divisores ;  Ambitus  ;  Sodalitium — Bribery 
Laws — Unpaid  Magistracy — Popular  patronage  and  corruption — Peculatus  ; 
Repetund£E — Popular  corruption — Factions ;  Civil  War—  Overthrow  of  the  Com- 
monwealth— Conduct  of  the  Aristocracy — Aristocracy  and  Princes — Error  of 
the  Patricians — American  War ;  Irish  Independence — Roman  Parties — Conduct 
of  the  People — Roman  Yeomanry — Moderate  use  of  power — Natural  Aristocracy 
— Orders  new  moulded — West  Indian  Society — Aristocracy  of  middle  Classes — 
Power  useless  to  an  uneducated  People— Checks  on  the  People — Checks  in  gene- 
ral— Delay  and  Notice;  English  proceedings — Factious  men  at  Rome  uncon- 
trolled— Catiline's  conspiracy — Cicero's  conduct — Middleton's  error  .     155 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA. 

Greek  Authorities— False  Chronology — Ages  of  the  Historians — Early  History — 
Constitution  of  Crete — Perioeci ;  Clerotes — Pure  Aristocracy  established — Resist- 
ance— Federal  Government  established — ('onstitution  of  Sparta  derived  from 
Crete — Opinions  of  Polybius  and  others — Periceci — Helots — Lycurgus — General 
Remarks — Authors — Classes  of  the  People — Proofs  of  this  Theory— Hypomeio- 
nes  ;  Homoioi ;  Mothaces — Tribes ;  Phylse  ;  Obae — Castes — Morae — Errors  of 
Authors — Kings  or  Archagetae — Rules  of  Succession— Senate — Ecclesiae — Mode 
of  Voting — Harmosynffi  ;  Homophylaces ;  Harmostse  ;  Hippagretac  .         .174 

CHAPTER  XV. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA — (Coiitimwd.) 

Object  of  the  Spartan  system — Its  operation  traced — Stages  of  Human  Life  as  subject 
to  it — Marriage  ;  procreation  ;  infancy  ;  boyhood ;  pscdonomus  ;  full  age — 
Equality  of  Fortune  attempted — Slaves  ;  their  Classes ;  Treatment — Ephori  ; 
their  Power — Resemblance  to  Tribunes — Opinions  of  av\thors  reconciled — Epho- 
ral  Usurpation — Artificial  Aristocracy — Natural  Aristocracy — Controversy  on 
Classification  ;  Opinions  of  Authors — Contradictory  Usages — Unintelligible 
Statements — Paradoxes — Duration  of  Lycurgus's  Polity — Party  Process  and 
Changes — Agis ;  Lysander ;  Cleomenes  —Spartans  overpowered,  join  the  Achaean 
League — Distinction  of  Orders     .         .         .         .  .  .  .  .187 


CONTENTS.  xi 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS. 

Authors — Early  History— Cecrops  ;  Theseus — Threefold  Division  of  the  People — 
Ancient  Officers  —  Panathensea  —  Kings  —  Archons  —  Eupatridsc  —  Polemarch  ; 
Eponymus ;  Basileus ;  ThesmothetaB  —  Classes ;  Pedrsei ;  Diacrii ;  Paralii — 
Anarchy — Draco — Solon — Errors  respecting  his  Legislation — Solon's  Eeforms  ; 
Archons ;  Colleges ;  Paredri— Courts  of  Justice — Areopagus^Heliastae — Inferior 
Magistrates — Pure  Democracy — Classes  of  the  People— Population — Slaves — 
Effects  of  Slavery ;  Xenophon ;  Plato ;  Diogenes — Phylse  ;  Phratria; ;  Genea ; 
Trityes;  Demi — The  Ecclesia — Senate — Elections  ;  Scrutiny — Prytanes;  Epis- 
tata — Euthynae;  Logistaj — Voting;  Ballot — Areopagus — Its  Powers  ;  its  Com- 
position— LogistsB ;  Euthynae — Mars  Hill ;  St.  Paul — Heliaea — American  Court 
— Ephetae Page  204 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS — (Continued). 

Other  Checks  besides  the  Areopagus — State  and  Public  Orators — Payment  of 
Functionaries— Rules  as  to  Alterations  of  the  Law — Nomothetes — Syndics — 
Direct  Repeal  required — Impeachment  for  illegal  Legislation — Quorum — Pro- 
hibition of  Repeal — Power  of  Adjournment — Variety  of  Bodies — Appeal,  and 
reconsideration — Ostracism — General  feeling  against  these — Orators ;  their  in- 
fluences— Advocates  and  Professional  Orators — Legislative  and  Judicial  Func- 
tions combined — Corruption  of  Statesmen — Demosthenes — Whigs  in  Charles  II. 's 
reign — Demades — Corruption,  faction,  and  fickleness  of  the  People — Turbulence 
of  Assemblies — Radical  vices  of  the  System — Advantages  derived  from  the 
system       ............     224 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS — (Concluded.) 
OTHER  STATES. 

J'artiesat  Athens — Dalesmen,  Mountaineers,  Coastmen,  and  Trimmers — Usurpation 
of  the  Pisistratidse — Their  downfall — Pisistratus—  Clisthenes — Miltiades — Popu- 
lar ingratitude — Fables  on  Marathon — Democratic  reform — Aristides — Barbarous 
popular  excesses — Themistocles — His  maltreatment — Athenian  greatness  — 
Pericles — Alcibiades — Thirty  Tyrants  —  Faction  —  Rebellion — Socrates — Other 
States — Boeotia — iEtolia — Corcyra — Achsea — Foreign  appeals  .         .         .    241 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS — MUNICIPAL  CONSTITUTIONS  AND 
ARISTOCRACY. 

Feudal  plan  monarchical — Rise  of  Aristocracy — Civic  Nobility — Otho  I. — General 
form  of  Government — Consuls — Credenza— Senate — Parliament— Wars  of  the 
Cities— Pavia  and  Milan — War  of  the  Towns — Treaty  of  Constance         .     250 


XU  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE. 

Origin  of  Venice — Insular  Federacy — Anarchy — Doge  created — Venice  founded — 
Conquests — Parties — Doge's  power  restricted — Pregadi — Aristocracy  founded — 
Grand  Council—  Council  of  Ten — Inquisitors — Spies — Lion's  Mouth^IIommittee 
of  Public  Safety Page  260 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE — (^Continued.) 

Doge  —  Complicated  Election  —  Two  objects  kept  in  view  —  Neither  attained  — 
Examination  of  the  process  —  First  object  to  prevent  faction  —  Second  object  to 
prevent  corruption — Jealous  nature  of  Aristocracy — Limited  Power  of  the  Doge 
—  Ducal  Oath  —  OflBcers  to  watch  and  punish  the  Doge  —  Avogadors  —  Doge's 
prerogative  —  Senate  or  Pregadi  —  CoUegio — Judicial  power — Quarantia  — 
Offices  filled  by  Commoners  —  Procurators  of  St.  Mark  —  Savii  —  Provincial 
offices — Government  of  Candia     ....  ...     269 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  YESICE— (^Concluded.) 

Great  vigour  of  the  Government— Comparison  of  dominions  with  those  of  England 
— With  those  of  Rome— Venetian  Tyranny — Examples  :  Carrara ;  Carmagnola; 
Foscari — Firmness  and  Vigour — Military  policy — Equalizing  laws— Merits  of 
the  system — Provincial  Government— Oligarchy  substantially  established — 
Comparison  with  English  Government — Scottish  parliament — Meanness  and 
Pride  of  Venetian  Nobles — Improvements  in  modem  times      .         .         .278 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS — VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA. 

Terra  Firma — Feudal  Nobility — Municipal  Government  in  their  hands  originally 
— Podestas — Factions — Montecchi  and  Bonifazii — Adelardi  and  Salinguen-a — 
Vivario  and  Vicenza  families— Rise  of  the  Friars — Their  fanatical  preaching 
and  influence — Their  usurpafion — John  of  Vicenza — Jordan  of  Padua — Ezzelino 
da  Romano — His  prodigious  tyranny — Despicable  Submission  of  the  People — 
His  destruction — Submissions  of  the  Towns  to  others — Levity  of  Democratic 
Councils  of  Padua — Corrected  by  the  Aristocracy — Mimicipal  Governments — 
Anziani— Gastaldioni — Cane  della  Scala— John  Galeaz  Visconti— Democracy  of 
Verona  and  Vicenza — Submission  of  the  People  to  tyranny— War  of  Parties  in 
Italy— Hired  troops — Condottieri —Military  operations— Surrender  of  rights  by 
the  people  to  Chiefs— Effects  of  Aristocracy,  Faction,  Tyranny,  on  the  cha- 
racter of  the  People  -  Letters  and  the  Arts 295 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA. 

Early  History — Pisan  Alliances  and  Conquests — Constitution  of  1096 — Aristocracy 
— Parties  of  the  Nobles — Podesta — Turbulence  of  the  Factions — Constant  Re- 
volutions— Companies  of  Arts — Credenza — Oligarchy  established — Abate — 
Capitano  del  Popolo — W.  Boccanegro's  Usurpation — Genoese  Fickleness  and 
Factions — Party  movements  and  civil  conflicts — Viscontis  called  in — Perpetual 
Revolutions — New  Nobility;  their  Power  ;  their  Factions— Conflict  with  the 
old — Revolutions — French  Conquests — Andrew  Doria — Spanish  Conquest — 
Doria's  noble  Conduct  and  Reforms — Final  Aristocratic  Constitution — Attempts 
to  extinguish  Party — Alberghi — New  Factions — Councils — Doge— Syndics — 
Inquisitors — Judicial  Administration — Galling  yoke  of  the  Aristocracy — Folly 
of  the  new  Nobles  and  Plebeians— Oligarchical  periods — Comparison  of  Genoese 
and  Venetian  Governments — Oligarchy  of  Genoese  settlements         .     Page  310 


.   CHAPTER  XXV. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS — MILAN. 

Consuls — Podestas — Credenza — Patricians — Plebeians— Struggles  of  the  Orders 
—Cavalry — Condottieri — Foreign  Captain-General — Financial  Dictatorship — 
Companies  ;  Credenzas ;  Molta — Councils — Defects  of  History  in  Political 
Matters — Signer  del  Popolo — Martino  della  Torre — Visconti  completes  his  usur- 
pation— Unprincipled  Conduct  of  both  Patricians  and  Plebeians — Unfitness  of 
the  Lombards  for  Self-Govemment — Conflict  of  Factions — Succession  of  Revo- 
lutions— Visconti  Family — Vain  attempt  to  erect  Republic — Francis  Sforza — 
His  Victories,  and  elevation  by  the  Mob—  Fickleness  and  baseness  of  the  People 
at  Milan  and  Placentia — Charles  V.  obtains  the  Sovereignty  after  the  Sforzas 

328 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE. 

Florence  joins  the  League  late — Early  Constitution — Consuls  ;  Quarters ;  Senate 
— Burgher  Aristocracy — 'At  first  miked,  then  pure — Podesta  established — Ex- 
pelled, and  new  Government  established — Old  Constitution  restored — New  Con- 
stitution after  Manfred's  defeat — Two  Councils — Party  Government  within  the 
Government — Parallel  of  Jacobin  Club— New  Constitution — Its  Anomalies  and 
Absurdities — Factious  Turbulence — Interferes  with  Justice  and  Police — Ordin- 
ances of  Justice — Monstrous  Provisions — Popular  Aristocracy  ;  Popolani  Grossi 
— Bianchi  and  Neri — Absurdities  of  Party — New  mode  of  electing  the  Seignory 
— Burgher  Oligarchy — Duke  of  Athens — Progress  of  Tyranny — Changes  in  the 
Constitution — New  Party  divisions  ;  Natural  Aristocracy — Albrizzi  and  Ricci 
—Factious  Violence — Ciompi ;  Mob  Government — Triumph  of  the  Aristocratic 
Polity— Influence  of  Free  Institutions—Of  Democratic  Government— Grandeur 
of  Florence — Feudal  and  Burgher  Economy   ......    341 


XIV  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

LESSEB  ITALLVN  GOVERNMENTS — PISA — BOLOGNA — SIENNA — 
LUCCA — SAN  MARINO. 

Want  of  Information  respecting  Pisa. 

BoiiOQNA. — Early  Charter  and  Government — Early  regularity  of  the  Constitution 
— Consuls ;  Councils ;  Podesta ;  Public  Orators — Party  Feuds. 

Sienna. — Aristocracy  never  entirely  extinguished — Consuls  ;  Podesta  ;  Council 
— Oligarchy  established;  steps  of  the  transition — Intrigues  of  the  Oligarchs 
with  Foreign  Powers — Oligarchs  overthrown — Burgher  Aristocracy  and  Oligar- 
chy— Government  falls  into  the  hands  of  the  lowest  Class — Surrender  to  Visconti 
— Factious  Turbulence  and  Revolutions — Petrucci's  Power — Five  Orders  recog- 
nised— Duke  of  Calabria — Mob  Oligarchy — Revolution  and  New  Government 
— Dictatorship,  and  Destruction  of  this  Constitution — Government  of  Spain  and 
France  alternately — Union  with  Tuscany — Real  duration  of  Siennese  Oligarchy. 

LotxiA. — Revolutions  deserving  of  attention — Early  Government  and  Parties — 
Castruccio  Castracani's  Services  and  Usurpation — Goo^  Conduct  of  the  Lucchese 
— Anziani ;  Gonfaloniere  ;  College  ;  Great  Council— Practical  Oligarchy — Paul 
Giunigi — His  great  Merit — Cruel  ate — Republic  restored — Perfidy  and  Con- 
quest of  the  Medici — Martinian  Law— Oligarchy  finally  established — Its  per- 
manence. 

San  Making. — Antiquity  of  its  Government — Extent  and  Population — Constitu- 
tion ;  Anziani ;  Senate  ;  Gonfaloniere  ;  Capitani — Judicial  Authority    Page  355 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES. 

Division  of  the  Subject  : — 1.  Lucern — Feudal  History — Early  Constitution  — 
Aristocracy  established — Sovereign  Council — Senate — Avoyers — Self-Election — 
Aristocracy  popular — Consequences  in  French  invasion —  Act  of  Mediation, 
1803 — New  Constitution — Policy  of  Napoleon — Constitution  of  1814. 

2.  Zurich — Early  Aristocracy — Government  more  exclusive— Council — Senate — 
Constitution  of  1803— of  1814. 

3.  Bern — Early  Constitution — Aristocracy  introduced — Great  Council — Senate — 
Seizeniers — Avoyers — Constitution  of  1803 — of  1816 — Self-Election — Oligarchy, 

4.  Geneva — Early  History — Mixed  Aristocracy — Parties— Great  Council — Senate 
—Revolution  of  1 782— Restoration  of  the  old  Government— Constitution  of  1814 
— Importance  of  Geneva    ........  •     369 


POLITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

PART  II. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  THE   NATURE  OF  ARISTOCRACY   IN   GENERAL. 


Aristocracy  defined — Errors  on  this  subject — Roman  and  Athenian  Governments — 
Germs  of  Aristocracy  may  exist  and  give  rise  to  it — Illustrations  from  Rome 
and  Athens — Pure  Aristocracies  rare — ^Tendency  of  Aristocratic  Government  to 
become  mixed. 

Where  the  supreme  power  in  any  state  is  in  the  hands  of  a 
portion  of  the  community,  and  that  portion  is  so  constituted  that 
the  rest  of  the  people  cannot  gain  admittance,  or  can  only  gain 
admittance  with  the  consent  of  the  select  body,  the  government, 
as  we  have  seen  (Part  I.,  Chap.  II.),  is  an  Aristocracy ;  where 
the  people  at  large  exercise  the  supreme  power  it  is  a  Democracy. 
Nor  does  it  make  any  difference  in  these  forms  of  government, 
that  the  ruling  body  exercises  its  power  by  delegation  to  indi- 
viduals or  to  smaller  bodies.  Thus  a  government  would  be 
Aristocratic  in  which  the  select  body  elected  a  chief  to  whom  a 
portion,  or  even  the  whole,  of  its  power  should  be  intrusted  : 
provided  he  held  his  appointment  during  the  pleasure  of  his 
electors,  or  during  some  definite  but  short  period  of  time,  it 
would  not  be  a  Monarchy.  So  a  government  would  be  Demo- 
cratic in  which  the  bulk  of  the  people  appointed  a  chief  magis- 
trate with  full  powers,  or  a  councU  with  full  powers :  provided 
those  powers  were  only  exercised  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
electors,  or  during  some  definite  but  short  period  of  time,  it 
would  neither  be  a  Monarchy  in  the  one  case,  nor  an  Aristocracy 
in  the  other.  If  the  people  had  the  selection  of  the  governing 
body  among  the  privileged  class,  but  were  confined  to  that  class 
in  their  choice,  and  could  not  themselves  exercise  any  power, 
the  government  would  still  be  Aristocratic,  unless  the  privileged 
class  were  so  numerous  and  contained  persons  so  insignificant  as 

PART   II.  ^  B 


2       OF  THE  NATURE  OF  ARISTOCRACY  IN  GENERAL.    CH.  I 

to  be  mere  in^ruments  in  the  hands  of  the  electors  ;  in  which 
case  the  government  would  be  substantially  Democratic,  and 
could  not  fail  speedily  to  become  purely  such  by  the  abrogation 
of  all  exclusive  privileges.  The  essence  of  an  Aristocracy  is  the 
existence  of  a  privileged  class  which  engrosses  the  supreme 
power,  and  has  sufficient  force  to  resist  the  changes  that  any 
intermixture  of  Monarchial  or  Democratical  institutions  tend  to 
introduce  in  favom*  of  monarchy  or  of  democracy  respectively. 

There  have  been  but  few  instances  of  a  pure  aristocracy  or  of 
a  pure  democracy,  and  governments  have  frequently  been  con- 
sidered as  aristocratic  merely  because  there  was  lodged  a  great 
power  in  one  class,  or  democratic  because  the  citizens  at  large 
had  much  authority.  Nor  has  it  been  rare  to  find  reason ers 
misled  by  a  name,  and  confounding  the  distribution  of  power 
according  to  certain  rules  with  its  distribution  according  to  classes. 
Thus  nothing  can  be  more  inaccurate  than  to  consider  the  ear- 
liest Roman  and  Athenian  governments  as  aristocracies  merely 
because  a  considerable  portion  of  the  people  in  each  were  ex- 
cluded from  power.  In  the  former,  after  the  expulsion  of  the 
kings,  the  powers  of  government  are  represented  as  vested  ex- 
clusively in  the  families  of  rank,  the  nobles  or  patricians ;  in 
the  latter  the  class  of  citizens  alone  are  said  to  have  governed  the 
state  ;  and  in  both  it  is  inferred  that  the  body  of  the  people,  the 
inhabitants  at  large,  were  excluded  from  all  direct  authority. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  privileged  families  in  Rome 
were  the  whole  free  people  of  whom  the  founders  of  the  city 
consisted,  or  the  descendants  of  those  freemen  ;  and  the  com- 
moners or  plebeians  were  either  Kberated  slaves  or  foreigners 
who  had  settled  in  the  state.  Consequently  the  governing  body 
was  the  community  at  large,  subject  to  certain  exceptions,  and 
could  no  more  be  deemed  a  separate  order  than  Protestants  in 
Ireland,  before  the  abrogation  of  the  penal  laws,  could  be  correctly 
regarded  as  a  separate  order  and  called  an  aristocracy  as  contra- 
distinguished from  the  Catholics,  or  than  British-bom  subjects 
at  this  day  can  be  deemed  a  separate  order  from  aliens  and 
forming  an  aristocracy  in  the  government  In  fact,  during  the 
reign  of  the  first  kings  and  until  the  time  of  Ancus  Martins  there 
wore  no  commoners  or  plebeians  at  all,  the  people  consisting 
wholly  of  the  patricians,  or  iree  and  freely  descended  persons, 
and  their  clients,  retainers,  or  dependents ;  and  though  these 


CH.  I.  CONSTITUTIONS  OF  ATHENS  AND  ROME.  3 

dependents  had  no  more  political  functions  than  the  slaves,  they 
formed  like  them  parts  of  the  patron's  or  master's  family  ;  so 
that  the  power  shared  by  the  people  with  the  king  was  sub- 
stantially vested  in  the  whole  body.  Thus,  too,  the  whole  of 
the  Athenian  free  people,  not  being  aliens,  formed  the  governing 
body  :  foreigners  and  slaves  were  disqualified  ;  but  their  dis- 
qualification cannot  be  regarded  as  constituting  an  aristocracy  in 
the  free  native  Athenians.  Indeed  the  observation  applies  still 
more  strongly  to  Athens  than  to  Rome  ;  for  it  is  understood  that 
the  free  Athenian  people,  in  whom  the  government  resided, 
amounted  to  upwards  of  eighty  thousand,  and  the  slaves  and 
strangers  to  between  three  and  four  hundred  thousand,  of  whom 
all  but  about  forty  thousand  were  in  slavery.  No  classification 
can  rank  this  constitution  with  aristocracies,  that  would  not  make 
the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America  an  aristocracy 
in  respect  of  the  slave  population. 

But  although  it  would  be  a  great  abuse  of  language  to  consider 
these  governments  as  aristocratic,  yet  they  plainly  contained  the 
germs  of  aristocracy ;  the  elements  existed  from  the  beginning 
which  might  give  birth  to  aristocratic  government,  because,  if 
the  exclusive  privileges  continued  to  be  vested  in  the  smaller 
body,  and  the  numbers  of  the  persons  excluded  came  to  be 
greatly  increased,  it  is  clear  that,  whatever  might  have  been  the 
original  state  of  the  select  body,  and  though  it  might  at  first 
have  constituted  the  whole  nation,  it  would  become  an  hereditary 
aristocracy  when  surrounded  by  a  numerous  body  of  disqualified 
people.  This  happened  at  Rome  ;  at  Athens  it  cannot  with  any 
correctness  be  said  to  have  taken  place.  At  Rome  the  patricians 
formed  a  distinct  and  privileged  class,  far  from  numerous,  and 
surrounded  by  a  whole  nation  :  at  Athens  the  governing  body 
continued  to  be  composed  of  the  whole  free  people  not  being 
aliens  ;  and  the  number  of  aliens  and  slaves  constituting  the  rest 
of  the  state  did  not  materially  increase.  But  although  the  Ro- 
man aristocracy  grew  out  of  the  exclusive  privileges  possessed 
by  the  original  free  citizens  and  their  descendants,  it  is  erroneous 
to  conceive  that  the  government  was  at  any  time  a  pure  aristo- 
cracy. Before  the  republic  it  was  an  aristocratic  monarchy  of  the 
elective  kind  ;  afterwards  at  all  times  before  the  empire  it  was 
an  aristocratic  republic,  in  which  the  two  orders  of  patricians  and 
plebeians,  nobles  and  commoners,  had  at  different  periods  different 

b2 


4  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  ARISTOCRACY  IN  GENERAL.  CH.  I. 

proportions  of  power  and  influence,  but  in  which  there  was  at  all 
times  a  mixture  of  the  democratic  with  the  aristocratic  principle. 
In  hke  manner,  although  the  Athenian  government  never  con- 
tained anything  like  the  same  admixture  of  aristocracy,  yet  there 
were  privileges  in  practice  enjoyed  by  those  w^hose  descent  was 
distinguished.  The  Eupatridce,  or  well  bom,  were  eligible  to 
offices  from  which  freemen  whose  ancestors  had  been  slaves  or 
foreigners  were  excluded  for  several  ages.  Therefore,  inde- 
pendent of  the  weight  and  influence  which,  even  in  the  purest 
democracy,  are  possessed  by  persons  of  respectable  station  and 
descent,  there  were  distinctions  made  in  their  favour,  and  recoor- 
nised  by  the  law,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  in  the  practice 
and  by  the  customs  of  the  commonwealth.  In  so  far  there  must 
be  allowed  to  have  been  an  aristocratic  influence  in  the  consti- 
tution. In  Venice  and  in  some  of  the  smaller  states  of  modem 
Italy  are  found  instances  of  pure  aristocracy ;  in  the  United 
States  of  America  we  find  the  only  instance  of  a  permanently 
pure  democracy.  In  the  former  the  whole  government  was  in 
the  hands  of  a  comparatively  small  privileged  class ;  in  the  latter 
the  whole  people  partake  equally  in  the  powers  of  government, 
and  may  by  law  equally  exercise  aU  its  functions.  But  these 
are  the  only  modem  instances  of  the  aristocratic  and  the  demo- 
cratic principle  being  found  pure  for  any  considerable  time,  as 
Sparta  is  the  only  ancient  example  of  a  lasting  aristocracy.  The 
tendency  of  each  is  to  ally  itself  more  or  less  with  the  other,  or 
with  the  monarchial  principle,  or  with  both.  This  tendency 
leads  us  to  consider  the  natiu*e  of  mixed  government,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  checks  and  balances  in  which  it  consists.  Without 
forming  distinct  ideas  upon  this  important  subject  we  cannot 
advantageously  examine  the  nature,  the  effects,  and  the  tendencies 
either  of  aristocratic  or  of  popular  government,  and  the  inquiry 
is  equally  essential  with  a  view  to  its  bearing  upon  the  subject 
of  mixed  or  limited  monarchy. 


CH.  II.  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS. 

CHAPTER  II. 

OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS. 


Dogmatical  denial  of  Checks — This  founded  on  theory  alone — Doctrine  of  Checlts 
misconceived — Doctrine  explained — Its  foundation — Fallacy  of  the  objectors  ex- 
posed— Illustration  of  the  doctrine  from  joint  Powers :  Mutual  veto :  Factitious 
majority — Illustrations  from  English  constitution — Proceedings  since  1832 — 
Illustration  from  balance  of  Parties  in  Parliament — Illustration  from  Dynamics- 
Checks,  proper  or  imperfect — Example  of  the  proper  Check :  Roman  constitu- 
tion— Example  of  the  imperfect  Check  :  Venetian  constitution — Absolute 
monarchies — English  and  American  constitutions — Senseless  project  of  Peerage 
Refomi. 

Writers  on  the  mixed  constitution  of  England  had  formerly 
accustomed  themselves  to  describe  its  component  parts  as  the 
accurately  poised  and  balanced  portions  or  works  of  a  machine, 
and  to  extol  its  structure  as  if  this  system  of  checks  were  in 
practice  perfect,  working  according  to  the  theory  not  only  with- 
out any  stoppages  or  derangement,  but  without  any  retardation 
from  friction  or  resistance.  This  refined  and  somewhat  exag- 
gerated praise  gave  rise  to  objectors  who  impugned  the  doctrine 
itself,  as  well  as  the  extreme  to  which  it  had  been  pushed,  and 
at  last  came  to  deny  that  such  checks  and  balances  could  ever 
exist  at  all.  The  reasoners  to  whom  we  refer,  and  Mr.  Bentham 
was  the  chief,  held  all  notion  of  a  balance  to  be  absurd  ;  they 
treated  it  as  a  ridiculous  fancy  ;  they  maintained,  with  little  argu- 
ment, but  much  fluency  of  dogmatical  assertion,  and,  after  the 
manner  of  dogmatists,  with  no  small  portion  of  contempt  for  their 
adversaries,  that  no  such  equipoise  can  ever  exist ;  they  considered 
it  as  self-evident  that,  if  two  powers  are  found  in  a  constitution 
with  different  and  adverse  interests,  one  must  defeat  and  overturn 
the  other ;  they  denied  that  both  could  co-exist  and  act ;  they 
treated  the  doctrine  somewhat  as  theologians  have  l^een  wont  to 
treat  the  Manichean  scheme  of  two  principles  ;  contending  that  if 
the  two  antagonist  forces  were  equal  they  must  destroy  each  other, 
and  the  whole  movement  of  the  machine  be  stopped  ;  that,  if  they 
were  unequal,  the  greater  must  prevail,  and  prevent  the  lesser 
from  at  all  influencing  the  direction  or  the  rate  of  the  motion. 


6  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH,  II. 

It  seems  not  a  little  strange  that  this  manner  of  viewing  the 
subject  should  have  been  adopted  in  England,  and  with  refer- 
ence to  the  government  of  England,  where  so  many  facts  are 
constantly  seen  to  expose  its  inaccuracy ;  and  equally  singular 
that  those  reasoners  should  complain  of  the  doctrine  they  were 
attacking  as  speculative,  and  theoretical,  and  fanciful,  when,  in 
truth,  their  own  objections  are  foimded  upon  theoretical  views 
alone,  and  are  at  once  removed  by  examining  the  actual  facts. 
But  their  doctrine  is  not  confined  to  our  own  constitution ;  it 
extends  to  all  other  forms  of  government,  and  seems  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  effectual  checks  existing  in  any  scheme  of  polity, 
consequently  the  possibihty  of  any  mixed  government  being 
formed.  The  necessity  is  thus  obvious  of  considering  more  nearly 
the  grounds  of  the  theory. 

The  main  foundation  of  the  objection  to  the  doctrine  which 
rests  upon  the  counteracting  influence  of  different  powers  in  the 
same  constitution  will  be  perceived  to  be  a  misconception  of 
that  doctrine.  When  properly  conceived  and  stated,  it  does 
not  represent  the  conflicting  authorities  as  accurately  balancing 
one  another ;  it  only  regards  the  influence  of  one  power  as 
capable  of  limiting  the  exercise  of  another,  and  it  assumes  that 
none  of  the  powers  is  in  itself  absolute,  or  would  even  if  left  to 
itself  be  carried  to  all  extremities.  Thus  it  never  was  supposed 
that,  a  despotic  prince  being  established  in  any  state,  and  at  the 
same  time  an  aristocracy  of  equally  unlimited  powers,  there 
could  be  any  other  result  of  the  conflict  than  a  direct  collision 
and  the  complete  dominion  of  whichever  body  prevailed.  Place 
the  sultan  of  Turkey  and  the  aristocracy  of  Venice  together  in 
one  system,  no  one  can  doubt  that  either  the  Vizier  or  the 
Council  of  Ten  would  gain  the  upper  hand,  and  either  a  pure 
despotism  or  a  pure  aristocracy  would  speedily  be  established. 
But  the  question  is  what  would  be  the  result  of  a  combination 
between  the  powers  of  a  sovereign  accustomed  to  regard  himself 
as  one  authority,  perhaps  to  consider  himself  as  the  supreme, 
but  still  not  as  the  exclusive  depositary  of  arbitrary  power,  and 
a  patrician  body  accustomed  to  consider  themselves  as  the  mag- 
nates in  a  country  acknowledging  a  monarch.  In  such  a  system 
both  parties  will  be  disposed  to  resist  each  other,  to  encroach 
upon  each  other,  even  to  risk  an  open  rupture  with  each  other 
upon  certain  occasions,  by  no  means  on  eveiy  occasion,  and  up 


CH.  II.  DOCTRINE  EXPLAINED.  7 

to  a  certain  point  only  even  on  those  special  occasions,  and  l>y 
no  means  to  take  extreme  courses  and  push  matters  to  an  irre- 
parable rupture  even  on  those  few  and  excepted  occasions.  This 
brings  us  immediately  to  that  which  is  at  once  the  foundation  c/ 
the  doctrine  of  checks  or  balances,  and  the  exposition  of  the 
fallacy  upon  which  the  objectors  rest. 

The  efficacy  of  the  check  always  consists  in  the  general  reluc- 
tance of  all  parties  to  risk  the  consequences  of  driving  matters 
to  extremities.  To  avoid  this  each  will  yield  a  little  ;  and  some- 
times, where  the  concession  is  not  fatal,  one  will  give  up  the 
point  to  the  other,  expecting  in  its  turn  to  have  some  point  of 
the  like  kind  yielded  at  another  time.  Thus  the  result  will  be 
that  neither  body  will  carry  everything  its  own  way,  but  a  course 
will  be  taken  different  from  what  would  have  been  taken  had 
there  been  only  either  the  one  body  or  the  other  in  the  system. 
As  far  as  the  interests  of  the  different  bodies  are  concerned  those 
of  both  will  be  better  consulted  than  if  only  one  had  existed,  and 
in  proportion  as  the  interests  of  the  whole  community  are  iden- 
tified with  those  of  both  the  bodies  will  the  community  be  a 
gainer  by  the  result  of  the  conflict.  But  we  are  not  now  con- 
sidering the  checks  as  to  their  beneficial  tendency  ;  we  are  on 
the  question  whether  such  checks  can  exist  at  all ;  and  it  is  jalain 
that  the  compromise  which  the  conflict  produces  shows  the  real 
existence  and  the  efficacy  of  the  checks. 

Let  us  then,  to  take  the  simplest  instance,  suppose  there  are 
two  bodies  in  a  state,  the  consent  of  both  of  which  is  required 
before  any  given  measiu'e  can  be  adopted — for  example,  any 
law  made — and  that  in  this  respect  the  two  bodies  are  exactly 
of  equal  authority.  A  law  is  propounded  and  agreed  to  by  one 
of  them  to  which  the  other  will  not  consent,  or  will  only  consent 
if  it  shall  be  materially  altered.  The  first  body  refuses  to  alter 
it,  and  the  second  therefore  will  not  concur  in  adopting  it.  For 
the  present  the  change  in  the  law  cannot  be  effected,  and  must 
be  deferred.  The  refusal  of  the  second  body  may  become  less 
unqualified  another  year ;  or  the  alterations  now  demanded  may 
be  such  that  the  first  body  will  agree  to  them,  provided  some  one 
or  two  things  more  be  given  up.  In  the  end  the  measure  passes  ; 
not  such  as  either  body  would  have  desired  had  it  been  alone  in 
the  legislation,  but  such  as  both  can  agree  to. 

But  suppose,  now,  that  one  of  the  two  is  far  more  powerful 


8  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH.  II. 

than  the  other  in  fact,  though  by  law  both  are  equal.  It  is  said 
that  the  more  powerful  body  will  compel  the  other  to  yield,  and 
that  so  the  check  ceases  to  be  effectual.  But  how  can  this  com- 
pulsion be  exercised?  Only  in  one  of  two  ways— either  by  the 
weaker  body  being  afraid  of  resisting  the  stronger,  for  fear  of  its 
strength  being  used  destructively,  or  by  the  stronger  actually 
putting  forth  that  strength  ;  in  other  words,  either  by  fear  of  the 
government  being  overthrown,  or  by  its  actual  subversion.  This, 
however,  is  an  extremity  to  which  the  stronger  body  will  very 
rarely  resort ;  in  the  great  majority  of  instances  it  will  prefer 
yielding  many  points  to  avoid  the  mischiefs  of  such  a  course ; 
and  the  weaker  body,  being  aware  of  this,  will  generally  make  a 
stout  resistance.  The  stronger  may  carry  more  points  in  this 
way  than  the  weaker,  because,  the  real  power  of  the  two  bodies 
being  unequal,  the  constitution  inclines  towards  the  one  side. 
Thus,  if  the  more  powerful  body  be  popular,  the  government 
leans  towards  democracy  ;  if  patrician,  it  inclines  to  aristocracy ; 
but  the  leaning  of  the  legislatiue  being,  as  it  must  always  be,  in 
the  direction  of  the  more  powerful  body,  so  far  from  showing 
that  the  combined  action  of  the  two  bodies  produces  no  effect, 
only  shows  that  the  movement  which  results  is  according  to  the 
proportion  of  the  two  forces  whose  combined  operation  causes 
it,  and  that  the  government  is  carried  on  according  to  the  nature 
and  principles  of  its  structure. 

Let  us  now,  after  these  explanations,  suppose  the  case  of  two 
bodies  so  wholly  unmatched  that  one  could  in  no  way  resist  the 
other  if  they  came  in  conflict ;  and  still  it  is  manifest  that  their 
co-existence  with  opposite  interests,  and,  consequently,  inclina- 
tions, will  produce  a  very  different  action  in  the  whole  govern- 
ment from  what  would  have  taken  place  had  only  the  more 
powerful  body  existed  ;  will  effectually  cause  some  things  to  be 
done  different  from  what  the  powerful  body  alone  would  have 
done,  and  prevent  still  more  things  from  being  done,  which  the 
more  powerful  body,  if  left  to  itself,  would  have  done.  The 
reluctance  to  bring  on  a  collision  will  always  operate,  however 
disproportioned  the  forces  may  be.  The  opposition  of  even  the 
weakest  body  must  at  any  rate  create  delay,  and  thus  give  time 
for  reflection.  The  influence  of  rational  and  prudent,  as  well  as 
of  timid  men,  thus  obtains  an  opportunity  of  making  itself  felt 
The  force  of  the  powerful  body  becomes  divided,  and  a  pail,  is 


CH.  II.  FALLACY  OF  THE  OBJECTORS.  9 

thrown  into  the  scale  of  the  weaker  body.  The  apprehension 
of  an  opposition,  and  its  possible  result,  a  collision,  also  tends  to 
prevent  many  things  from  ever  being  propounded,  and  modifies 
beforehand  the  measures  actually  brought  forward.  Grant  that 
the  one  body  is  ever  so  much  an  overmatch  for  the  other,  unless 
the  disparity  be  such  as  to  render  all  attempts  at  resistance  im- 
possible (in  which  extreme  case  there  cannot  be  said  to  exist 
two  bodies),  no  one  can  maintain  that  the  check  is  wholly 
destroyed,  or  quite  inoperative,  who  is  not  prepared  to  contend, 
as  a  practical  position,  that  all  men  and  all  bodies  will,  upon  all 
occasions,  without  any  reluctance  or  hesitation,  do  whatever  they 
have  the  power  to  do. 

And  herein  lies  the  whole  fallacy  of  the  argument,  or  rather 
dogma,  which  denies  the  possibility  of  checks  and  balances.  It 
is  always  taken  for  granted  that  every  one  is  at  all  times  sure  to 
do  whatever  he  is  able  to  do.  Now,  if  this  were  at  all  true,  the 
whole  frame  of  civil  society  mast  be  destroyed,  and  all  govern- 
ment subverted  ;  or  rather,  no  society  ever  could  be  established, 
and  no  government  formed.  What  forms  the  principal  strength 
of  any  government,  and  every  constituted  authority  in  any  given 
government?  Doubtless  the  mutual  distrust  of  the  subjects  is 
one  very  great  security  :  the  uncertainty  in  which  each  man  is 
that  others  will  support  him  if  he  resists.  But  this  may  be  got 
over,  and  a  common  understanding  may  be  come  to  for  a  com- 
mon object.  How  seldom  does  actual  resistance  take  place ! 
How  many  times  is  it  avoided  when  every  inducement  to  it  is 
presented,  and  every  justification  afforded,  even  in  the  view  of 
the  strictest  reason  and  the  purest  patriotism  !  How  many 
oppressions  will  be  borne ;  how  long  a  time  will  misrule,  daily 
and  hourly  felt,  be  submitted  to ;  how  much  grievous  suffering 
will  be  endured  in  quiet  by  millions,  whose  slightest  movement 
could  subvert  the  hateful  tyranny,  and  restore  general  prosperity 
and  ease  !  The  main  cause  of  this  patience  is  the  universal  dis- 
position to  avoid  running  risks,  and  the  rooted  dislike  of  pushing 
things  to  an  extremity.  But  there  is  a  further  and  most  material 
circumstance  which  gives  force  to  the  constitutional  check  ;  it  is 
legal ;  it  is  known  and  felt  to  be  according  to  strict  law  and 
right ;  the  wrong  doer  is  felt  to  be  he  who  would  encroach  and 
usurp ;  however  superior  he  may  be  in  might,  the  right  is  on 
the  opposite  side  :  and  this  has  a  direct  tendency  at  once  to  in- 


10  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH.  IL 

vigorate  the  party  resisting,  however  inferior  in  natural  strength  ; 
and  to  dishearten  and  weaken  the  party  encroaching,  however 
superior  in  actual  power. 

Consider  how  in  any  state  joint  powers  are  exercLsed  by 
subordinate  authorities,  and  this  will  illustrate  also  the  argu- 
ment as  to  the  supreme  authorities.  There  are  two  bodies,  or 
a  body  and  a  single  functionary,  which  have  a  mutual  veto  on 
each  other's  proceedings  ;  say,  to  take  the  simplest  case,  upon  the 
choice  of  an  office-bearer,  the  concurrence  of  both  being  required 
to  make  the  election  valid.  According  to  the  reasfjning  of  those 
against  whom  we  have  been  contending,  the  single  functionary 
can  always  secure  the  appointment  of  his  candidate,  by  refusing 
every  person  proposed  by  the  body,  until  the  man  of  his  choice 
is  returned.  But  this  we  know  does  not  happen  in  practice, 
and  cannot  happen  ;  because  neither  party  is  disposed  to  bring 
matters  to  a  collision  by  standing  on  its  extreme  rights,  and 
both  are  disposed  to  have  the  choice  effectually  made.  There- 
fore the  knowledge  that  certain  persons  are  sure  to  be  rejected 
prevents  the  body  from  selecting  these,  and  the  necessity  of 
appointing  some  one  induces  the  functionary  to  accept  a  person 
different  from  the  one  he  would  most  have  preferred.  Neither 
party  obtains  the  result  most  desired,  but  a  person  is  chosen 
against  whom  neither  has  any  very  insuperable  objection  ;  and 
the  probability  is  that  a  better  choice  is  made  than  if  eithei 
singly  had  selected. 

Similar  illustrations  of  the  argument  are  afforded  by  those 
institutions  in  which  more  than  a  majority  of  voices  is  required 
to  pronounce  a  vaHd  decision,  as  where  two-thirds  or  three- 
fourths  must  concur.  The  temptation  given  to  minorities  to 
hold  out  and  govern  the  majority  is  in  most  cases  a  sufficient 
argument  against  such  arrangements  ;  they  are  only  admissible 
where  a  necessity  for  decision  does  not  exist,  as  where  the  object 
is  to  prevent  some  measure  from  being  adopted,  or  person  elected, 
■without  a  general  concurrence,  and  where  the  entire  interrup- 
tion of  the  proceeding  is  not  accounted  an  evil.  But  practically 
the  result  is  by  no  means  such  as  the  theoretical  reasoners  would 
expect ;  the  minority,  having  the  power  in  its  hands,  is  very  often 
found  to  yield,  and  let  a  compromise  take  place. 

It  is  true  that  in  these  cases  of  subordinate  bodies  the  law  and 
the  supreme  government  controls  both,  enables  each  to  exercise 


CH.  II.  ENGLISH  AND  OTHER  CONSTITUTIONS,  11 

its  rights,  and  prevents  the  one  from  encroaching  or  usurping 
upon  the  other.  But  in  the  case  of  co-ordinate  bodies  exercis- 
ing the  supreme  power,  the  substitute  for  the  control  of  the  law 
and  the  government  is  the  reluctance  which  each  feels  to  bring 
on  a  collision.  The  compromise  is  effected,  the  middle  course 
taken,  by  the  superior  authorities  under  the  influence  of  this  dis- 
position, as  in  the  cases  of  subordinate  authorities  under  the 
control  of  the  law  and  the  influence  of  a  similar  reluctance 
jointly — ^the  dislike,  namely,  to  drive  matters  to  the  extremity 
of  calling  in  the  arm  of  the  law,  or  of  suspending  the  operation 
which  the  common  interest  demands  should  proceed. 

When  we  come  to  examine  in  detail  the  constitutions  of  the 
ancient  commonwealths,  especially  of  Athens  and  Rome,  and 
also  those  of  the  modern  republics,  especially  in  Italy,  we  shall 
find  many  illustrations  of  the  principles  which  have  just  now 
been  adverted  to.  Even  in  those  constitutions  which  seemed  to 
confer  unlimited  power  upon  one  body,  if  there  was  any  other 
armed  with  authority,  however  feeble  it  might  be  in  comparison, 
the  whole  power  was  not  engrossed  by  the  prevailing  body,  but  a 
considerable  share  of  influence  was  possessed  also  by  the  other, 
and  the  motion  of  the  whole  machine  of  government  partook  of 
both  the  impulses  in  the  different  directions. 

But  a  more  striking  exemplification  of  the  same  doctrine  is  to 
be  found  in  the  practical  working  of  a  constitution  with  which 
we  are  much  more  familiar — that  of  our  own  country.  It  can- 
not be  doubted  that  ever  since  the  late  reform  in  the  representa- 
tion the  measures  of  the  legislature  have  been  affected  by  the 
incHnations  and  opinions  of  the  Lords  as  well  as  of  the  Commons. 
In  the  second  Parliament  after  the  reform  there  were  very 
material  changes  effected  by  the  Lords  in  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion of  the  municipal  corporations,  and  measures  affecting  the 
church  partook  largely  of  the  same  influence,  both  as  regarded 
tithes  and  church-rates.  The  majority  in  favour  of  further 
changes  had  no  doubt  been  greatly  diminished  by  the  general 
election  of  1 834-5  ;  but  even  in  the  first  Parliament  after  the 
reform,  when  the  majority  in  favour  of  further  change  was  about 
three  to  one,  and  when  the  members  of  the  lower  were  marshalled 
against  those  of  the  upper  house  in  the  same  proportion,  there 
were  some  measures  of  importance  thrown  out  in  the  Lords  for 
which  the  anxiety  of  the  Commons  was  matter  of  certainty,  as 


12  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH.  II. 

the  Local  Courts  Bill,  lost  too  by  the  narrow  majority  of  two  votes, 
and  other  measures,  as  those  relating  to  the  Irish  Church,  which 
the  Lords  suffered  very  unwillingly  to  pass,  and  which  were  on 
the  other  hand  materially  altered  in  the  Commons,  with  the  ma- 
nifest design  of  disarming  opposition  in  the  Lords. 

The  share  taken  in  legislation  by  each  of  the  great  parties 
which  generally  divide  both  Houses  of  Parliament  as  well  as  the 
nation  at  large,  affords  another  illustration  of  the  same  prin- 
ciples. Between  these  parties  there  is  little  or  nothing  in  com- 
mon :  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  Houses  of  Parliament  being 
divided  each  in  itself,  so  that  the  Lords  have  a  large  influence 
in  the  Commons,  and  the  Commons  some  supporters  in  the 
Lords,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  opposition  have  any  supporters 
in  the  ranks  of  the  Government  party,  and  the  Government 
party  has  always  a  decided  preponderance  in  every  question. 
And  yet  who  can  doubt  that  the  measures  of  the  Parliament 
are,  at  all  times,  considerably  influenced  by  the  opposition  ?  The 
reasoners,  or  rather  dogmatists,  who  hold  so  cheap  the  idea  of 
checks  and  balances,  must  needs  suppose  that  when  the  minis- 
ters have  a  majority  which  enables  them  to  carry  any  question 
they  please,  and  successfully  to  resist  whatever  their  adversaries 
attempt,  the  whole  course  of  legislation  will  take  one  direction, 
and  the  power  of  the  opposition  be  no  more  felt  than  if  no  such 
body  existed.  The  reverse  is  always  found  to  be  the  case  ;  not 
a  session  passes,  even  under  the  rule  of  the  most  powerful  admi- 
nistration, without  important  changes  being  effected  in  their 
plans  by  the  efforts  of  their  greatly  outnumbered  adversaries ;  to 
say  nothing  of  the  many  things  in  almost  each  measure  which 
are  altered  in  the  plan  before  it  is  brought  forward,  altered  to 
disarm  the  opposition,  or  to  smooth  the  passage  of  the  bill. 

In  all  these  instances,  whether  of  contending  parties  or  con- 
flicting authorities  in  the  State,  the  different  forces  combine  to 
produce  the  result,  the  movement  of  the  political  machine.  Its 
course  is  in  the  direction  neither  of  the  one  force  nor  of  the 
other,  but  in  a  direction  between  those  which  either  would  sepa- 
rately have  made  it  take.  As  a  body  on  which  two  forces 
operate  at  the  same  time,  in  different  but  not  in  opposite  direc- 
tions, moves  in  the  diagonal  between  the  two  directions  ;  so  does 
the  legislature  or  the  government  of  a  country  take  the  middle 
course  between  the  two  which  the  different   authorities  or  in- 


CH.  II.  PROPER  AND  IMPERFECT  CHECKS.  1 3 

fluences  would  make  it  take  if  left  to  themselves.  It  will  depend 
upon  the  proportion  of  the  forces  to  each  other,  whether  the  di- 
rection taken  shall  incline  more  to  the  one  or  to  the  other  ;  but 
this  affects  not  the  argument ;  the  course  is  affected  by  each, 
and  the  influence  of  each  prevails  so  far  as  to  check  that  of  the 
other. 

In  all  that  has  been  said  on  balances  and  checks,  we  have 
assumed  that  the  counteraction  was  of  one  kind  ;  but  there  are, 
properly  speaking,  two  descriptions  of  check,  differing  in  kind 
as  regards  their  structure  and  constitution,  differing  only  in 
degree  as  regards  their  operation.  The  several  authorities  which 
are  each  armed  with  power  or  influence  may  belong  to,  be 
selected  by,  or  be  otherwise  under  the  control  of  the  same  class, 
and  have  generally  the  same  interests ;  or  they  may  belong  to, 
be  selected  by,  or  be  otherwise  under  the  control  of  different 
classes,  and  have  essentially  different  interests.  The  former 
may  be  termed  imperfect  checks,  the  latter  perfect  or  j^rojier 
checks.  The  counteracting  influence  exercised  by  the  former 
will  always  be  comparatively  trifling,  and  sometimes  will  be 
hardly  perceptible  at  all.  Nevertheless  some  effect  may  in  most 
cases  be  practically  ascribed  to  it.  For  the  most  part  it  is  rather 
to  be  regarded  as  the  manner  in  which  the  power  of  the  class  is 
exercised — as  its  mode  of  operation — than  as  a  real  check.  Yet 
in  practice  such  divisions  of  the  supreme  authority,  even  though 
all  the  subordinate  parts  are  under  the  same  control,  is  found 
to  have  some  tendency  towards  moderating  its  force,  and  a  very 
great  tendency  to  prevent  mischief.  This  will  immediately 
appear  if  we  consider  how  these  two  kinds  of  checks  act. 

Let  us  again  take  the  simpler  case  of  two  powers.  In  the  Ro- 
man Republic  there  were  two  co-ordinate  bodies,  tlie  Comitia  by 
Tribes  and  the  Comitia  by  Centuries.  Their  powers  were  equal, 
and  they  were  composed  of  classes  whose  interests  were  widely 
different,  numbers  alone  being  regarded  in  the  one,  and  property 
alone  in  the  other.  This  is  the  most  remarkable  check,  properly 
so  called,  of  which  we  have  any  example,  and  we  shall  afterwards 
find  that  political  inquirers  much  more  practically  sagacious 
than  Mr.  Bentham's  followers  have  found  it  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  account  for  the  system  working  at  all  in  which  such  an 
arrangement  existed.  Probably  but  for  other  contrivances,  and 
certainly  but  for  the  gradual  formation  of  its  parts,  such  a  con- 


14  OF  BALANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH.  II. 

stitution  could  not  have  stood.  The  government  of  Venice 
affords  another  and  a  very  opposite  example,  a  remarkable  in- 
stance of  the  imperfect  check.  It  contained  several  bodies 
armed  with  high  authority,  some  of  them  with  the  highest  ;  but 
all  were  formed  out  of  the  general  or  greater  council,  and  that 
council  was  composed  of  the  nobles  alone.  Thus  the  Pregadi, 
or  senate,  which  was  the  executive  or  administrative  council, 
may  be  said  to  have  had  supreme  powers,  though  the  Council 
of  Ten,  which  also  had  the  same  supremacy,  was  more  efficient, 
from  being  less  numerous  and  more  uniformly  constituted,  con- 
sisting only  of  fourteen  persons,  and  these  the  most  important 
in  the  state.  But  both  those  bodies  were  composed  of  the 
nobles,  and  were  chosen  by,  selected  from,  acting  under,  and 
accountable  to  the  general  or  greater  council,  the  whole  body  of 
the  nobles.  Here,  therefore,  the  aristocracy  was  everywhere 
predominant ;  and  the  division  or  delegation  of  its  powers  was 
only  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  them  the  more  conveniently 
and  indeed  the  more  effectually.  In  one  point  of  view,  then, 
this  division  rather  tended  to  increase  the  aristocratic  power 
and  nothing  like  a  counteraction  can  be  perceived.  Again, 
when  an  absolute  sovereign,  as  we  have  seen  (Chap.  V.,  Part  I.), 
delegates  his  powers  to  a  minister  or  council,  he  only  acts  by 
those  agents,  and  the  superior  power  is  still  in  one  hand.  Ne- 
vertheless some  small  mitigation  even  of  despotic  power  is  pro- 
duced by  the  subdivision.  The  petty  chief  of  a  tribe,  so  small 
that  it  can  be  governed  by  a  single  will,  is  probably  more  des- 
potic and  exercises  his  power  more  absolutely  than  the  head  of 
any  regular  and  extensive  monarchy ;  and  the  sultan  and  czar 
in  their  palaces  are  more  despotic  than  in  the  rest  of  their  domi- 
nions. So  the  mere  existence  of  several  councils  at  Venice 
must  have  tended  to  prevent  some  acts  of  violence  which  might 
have  been  done  by  a  single  body,  numerous  enough  to  prevent 
individual  responsibility,  and  not  too  numerous  to  be  efficient. 
This,  however,  is  quite  clear ;  'the  existence  of  several  bodies 
has  a  tendency  to  interpose  delays  and  prevent  rash  councils 
and  precipitate  action.  The  safety  of  the  system  is  thus  better 
secured ;  and  so  far  the  subdivision  of  authority  has  anything 
rather  than  the  effect  of  checking  its  exercise.  Yet,  as  all  violent 
measures  are  apt  to  be  precipitate,  and  as  delay  and  reflection 
must  ever  be  favourable  to  both  justice  and  mercy,  the  tendency 


CH.  II.  ENGLISH  HOUSE  OF  LORDS.  15 

upon  the  whole  of  the  subdivision  will  be  found  towards  miti- 
gating the  exercise  of  arbitrary  power.  The  great  inferiority  in 
fact  of  the  efficiency  of  such  checks,  to  the  operation  of  those 
which  are  provided  by  the  vesting  of  power  in  bodies  differently 
constituted  and  having  conflicting  interests,  is  manifest. 

This  difference  may  be  further  illustrated  by  referring  to  the 
constitution  of  England  and  the  United  States,  in  both  of  which 
the  checks  of  the  three  members  of  the  Legislature  hold  a  middle 
place  between  the  extreme  cases  of  E-ome  and  Venice,  beside 
the  further  difference  of  there  being  an  effective  government  in 
both  England  and  America,  so  as  to  form  a  third  component 
part  of  the  constitution.  The  body  which  the  American  Senate 
represents  is  intimately  connected  with  the  body  which  chooses 
the  House  of  Assembly,  although,  the  qualification  of  the  electors 
being  different,  property  may  be  said  to  be  more  immediately 
represented  in  the  former,  and  numbers  in  the  latter.  In  so  far 
as  the  two  bodies  have  different  interests,  and  are  chosen  for 
different  terms,  the  check  belongs  to  the  perfect  class  ;  in  so  far  as 
the  influence  of  property  among  the  electors  of  the  representative 
assembly  operates  upon  their  choice,  the  check  becomes  of  the 
imperfect  kind.  So  in  England  the  connexion  between  the  Peers 
and  the  electors  of  the  Commons,  even  since  the  late  Reform,  makes 
the  check  more  imperfect  than  by  the  strict  theory  of  the  constitu- 
tion it  is  supposed  to  be,  and  more  imperfect  than  it  would  be  if 
the  Lords  and  the  electors  were  bodies  entirely  separated.  But 
in  so  far  as  the  Lords  differ  from  the  nation  at  large  in  their  in- 
terests, and  in  so  far  as  they  hold  their  places  for  life  and  by 
inheritance,  the  check  is  of  the  proper  or  perfect  kind. 

Consider  now  what  the  effect  would  be  of  a  plan  which  has 
frequently  of  late  years  been  broached,  and  of  which  many  per- 
sons were  very  recently  much  enamoured.  The  speculation 
was  to  deprive  the  House  of  Lords  of  its  legislative  functions, 
and  to  vest  the  whole  power  in  an  executive  and  a  House  of 
Commons.  But  the  manifest  absurdity  of  expecting  any  safe 
and  cautious  legislation  from  a  single  chamber  made  it  necessary 
to  devise  a  second  for  the  purpose,  it  was  said,  of  reconsidering 
the  bills  and  correcting  the  errors  into  which  the  first  chamber 
might  fall.  No  doubt,  the  whole  experience  of  parliament  demon- 
strated clearly  enough  how  great  this  necessity  was,  and  men  at 
once  saw  into  what  frightful  difficulties  the  country  must  be 


16  OF  BAI.ANCES  AND  CHECKS.  CH.  U. 

thrown  if  only  one  body  had  to  discuss  and  decide  upon  all 
measures.  But  then  nothing  could  be  more  ineffectual,  even 
for  revision,  than  the  plan  proposed.  The  second  house  would 
have  differed  very  little  from  the  first ;  even  if  a  higher  qualifi- 
cation had  been  required,  it  would  have  been  chosen  for  a  small 
number  of  years  only,  because,  had  it  been  elected  for  life  or  for 
many  years,  it  would  have  been  liable  to  the  very  same  objec- 
tions which  had  caused  the  House  of  Lords  to  be  dispensed 
witL  Therefore,  not  only  would  it  have  been  no  effectual 
check ;  that  was  not  the  object ;  but  it  would  have  given  no 
effectual  security  for  revision,  which  was  the  object  proposed.  It 
would  have  been  a  little,  and  but  a  little,  better  than  adding  so 
many  stages  to  those  through  which  bills  must  pass  in  the  Com- 
mons as  now  constituted  ;  a  little,  and  but  a  little,  additional 
security  for  reflection  and  revision  would  have  been  afforded. 
But  the  great  security  would  have  been  wholly  wanting,  which 
results,  and  can  only  result,  from  the  nature,  structure,  origin, 
and  interests  of  the  two  bodies  being  entirely  different,  and 
which  depends  upon  the  full  discussion  only  to  be  obtained  from 
such  really  conflicting  bodies.  It  deserves  to  be  noted  that  all 
these  senseless  projects  have  long  since  been  abandoned  by  their 
thoughtless  authors,  who  a  few  years  ago  considered  the  safety 
of  the  empire  to  depend  upon  what  they  termed  "  Peerage 
Reform." 


CH.  III.  PROGRESS  AND  CHANGES  OF  ARISTOCRACY.  ]  7 


CHAPTER  III. 

PROGRESS  AND  CHANGES  OF  ARISTOCRACY — OLIGARCHY. 


Tendency  of  Aristocratic  and  Democratic  Constitutions  to  mix  with  others — Dif- 
ference in  this  respect  of  Despotism — Tendency  greatest  in  Aristocracies — Early 
pupilage  of  the  people — Their  progress  to  emancipation — Best  course  for  the 
Aristocracy — Illustration  from  colonial  emancipation — Natural  introduction  of 
Oligarch}' — Its  natural  progress  to  greater  exclusiveness — Its  natural  tendency 
to  dissolution— Examples  from  the  Venetian,  Genoese,  Siennese,  and  liuoea 
Governments. 

We  have  in  the  outset  of  this  discussion  remarked,  that  aristo- 
cratic and  democratic  constitutions  have  a  much  greater  tendency 
to  mix  themselves  with  one  another,  and  even  with  monarchical 
institutions,  than  either  despotic  or  constitutional  monarchies 
have  to  ally  themselves  with  those  of  a  popular  nature.  This 
arises  from  the  different  nature  of  those  several  governments. 
When  a  despotism  is  established,  all  influence,  all  movement 
ceases,  except  that  which  proceeds  from  th«  sovereign ;  all 
power,  the  whole  force  of  the  state,  centres  of  necessity  in  him. 
The  least  division  of  this  force,  the  existence  of  any  opposite  will, 
unconnected  with  and  independent  of  the  monarch,  would  be 
destructive  of  the  system.  Consequently,  the  germs  do  not 
exist,  out  of  which  any  popular  institutions  might  grow  ;  there 
are  no  elements  of  gradual  change  ;  a  single  step  towards  it, 
however  small,  would  be  equivalent  to  revolt,  and,  being  treated 
as  such,  would  terminate  the  effort  at  once.  Change  can  only 
arise  from  some  unbearable  opposition,  or  some  intrigue  in  the 
family  or  among  the  connexions  of  the  Prince  :  this  to  succeed 
must  be  ripened  into  action ;  and  whatever  may  have  been  its 
origin,  it  has  never  any  but  one  result,  a  change  in  the  person  or 
the  family  of  the  despot.  The  alliance  of  the  monarchical  with  the 
aristocratic  principle  in  the  constitutional  monarchies  of  Europe 
is  no  exception  to  this  rule ;  for  these  monarchies  arose  out  of 
the  feudal  aristocracy  as  we  have  seen,  and  are  only  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  tendency  which  the  aristocratic  principle  has  to  ally 
PART  II.  C 


18  PROGRESS  AND  CHANGES  OF  ARISTOCRACY —  CH.  III. 

itself  with  other  institutions.  But  the  existence  of  aristocracy  in 
constitutional  monarchies  produces  a  tendency  to  further  admix- 
ture, which  cannot  exist  in  governments  purely  despotic ;  and  in 
proportion  as  these  monarchies  have  more  of  the  aristocratic  or  of 
the  democratic  institutions  connected  with  them,  will  always  be 
their  tendency  to  further  limitation  or  to  progressive  improvement. 
It  is,  however,  in  constitutions  entirely  popular,  in  those  of 
which  the  main  structure  is  either  aristocratic  or  democratic  or 
mixed  monarchy,  that  the  tendency  to  an  alliance  with  other 
principles  than  those  of  the  constitution  is  most  remarkable,  and 
much  more  in  aristocracies  than  in  republics.  The  reason  is 
plain  :  the  institutions  which  exist  are  of  a  nature  to  allow  dis- 
cussion and  consideration  among  either  the  whole  or  a  consider- 
able proportion  of  the  people.  The  desire  of  change  has  a  free 
scope,  even  where  it  is  founded  upon  no  rational  grounds,  but 
much  more  where  the  circumstances  of  the  government  indicate 
its  expediency  or  necessity.  Thus,  reforms  tending  towards  a 
democracy  may  become  a  favourite  object  in  a  mixed  monarchy, 
from  the  progress  of  the  people  in  wealth,  in  power,  and  in  im- 
provement ;  or  the  evils  of  democratic  ascendancy  may  suggest 
the  return  to  a  more  purely  monarchical  polity.  So  in  a  demo- 
cracy, the  necessity  of  repressing  tumults  and  securing  the  fo- 
reign as  well  as  domestic  peace  of  the  state  may  lead  to  enlarging 
the  aristocratic  influence,  or  still  more  probaLly  to  substituting 
a  monarchical  for  a  republican  regimen.  Both  of  these  courses 
were  taken  in  succession  by  almost  all  the  Commonwealths 
upon  the  mainland  of  northern  Italy.  The  aristocratic  form, 
however,  is  still  more  liable  to  form  such  admixtures  than 
the  democratic ;  and  accordingly,  except  the  Spartan  Govern- 
ment in  ancient  times,  and  the  Venetian  in  modern,  there  is  no 
instance  to  be  found  of  an  aristocracy  which  did  not,  sooner  or 
later,  become  either  a  democracy,  as  that  of  ancient  Rome,  or  a 
petty  monarchy,  like  those  of  the  Italian  States.  The  reason  of 
aristocracies  being  thus  naturally  shortlived  is  obvious  ;  and  it 
applies  stiU  more  strongly  to  oligarchies,  or  the  government  in 
which,  by  an  abuse  of  the  system,  there  has  been  found  a  kind 
of  aristocracy  within  an  aristocracy,  a  few  of  the  privileged 
class  usurping  the  whole  power  to  the  exclusion  of  their  fellows, 
just  as  these  had  at  first  usurped  the  supreme  power  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  people. 


CH.  III.  OLIGARCHY.  19 

The  period  in  a  nation's  progress  at  which  the  aristocratic 
power  is  naturally  established,  must  always  be  while  the  body 
of  the  people  are  in  a  low  state  of  refinement.  Their  power 
was  in  proportion  feeble,  and  the  upper  classes,  possessed 
of  almost  all  the  property,  and  beyond  comparison  better  in- 
formed, as  well  as  more  skilful  in  all  their  arrangements,  found 
it  easy  to  retain  in  their  hands  the  entire  direction  of  public 
^airs.  In  fact,  the  bulk  of  the  people,  being  extremel}'  ignorant 
of  everything  relating  to  the  administration  of  the  state,  never 
thought  of  interfering,  and  only  felt  an  interest  in  matters  which 
immediately  concerned  themselves  as  individuals.  Hence  any 
disputes  that  arose  between  them  and  the  superior  or  governing 
class  related  entirely  to  subjects  of  immediate  and  urgent  indi- 
vidual interest,  as  the  oppressions  exercised  at  Rome  by  the 
patricians  over  their  plebeian  debtors,  and  their  monopoly  of  the 
public  lands  without  paying  rent,  or  the  feudal  oppressions  in 
modem  Europe  by  taxation  and  the  exaction  of  personal  ser- 
vice. With  the  general  management  of  public  affairs  it  never 
occurred  to  the  people  that  they  had  any  concern  ;  and  their 
profound  ignorance  of  everything  which  related  to  government 
kept  them  wholly  aloof  from  all  controversies  respecting  it, 
save  only  that  in  the  Italian  Commonwealths  the  people  fre- 
quently required  to  have  a  voice  in  the  choice  of  the  chief 
magistrate.  In  all  other  respects,  even  in  those  republics,  they 
never  interfered  as  a  body,  and  for  their  own  rights  or  interests 
as  opposed  to  those  of  the  patricians.  They,  were  appealed  to 
by  the  contending  factions,  and  took  a  part  with  the  one  or  the 
other ;  but  in  almost  constant  indifference  with  respect  to  the 
subject-matter  of  their  contentions,  and  generally  ignorant  of  the 
merits  of  the  question,  only  taking  part  with  individual  leaders 
or  leading  families,  and  knowing  little  more  of  the  opposite  sides 
of  the  dispute  than  the  names  by  which  their  adherents  passed. 

But  though  such  is  necessarily  the  state  of  things  in  early 
ages,  and  the  power  which  the  people  must  necessarily  always 
possess  from  their  numbers  is  thus  divided,  and,  as  it  were, 
dormant,  from  their  ignorance  and  neglect,  the  progress  of 
society  by  degrees  increases  their  influence  with  their  experience 
and  information.  In  some  cases,  as  at  Rome,  where  the  patri- 
cians originally  bore  a  large  proportion  to  the  whole  body  of  the 
people,  the  mere  increase  in  the  numbers  of  the  plebeians  brings 

c2 


20  PROGRESS  AND  CHANGES  OF  ARISTOCRACY —  CH,  III. 

with  it  an  augmentation  of  their  relative  force  ;  hut  in  every  ease 
their  wealth  goes  on  increasing,  and  augments  their  influence.  It 
thus  happens,  that  as  the  weight  of  the  people  increases  with  the 
progress  of  society  in  knowledge  and  in  wealth,  they  are  ne- 
cessarily prepared  for  passing  from  the  state  of  pupilage  in 
which  they  must  always  be  in  earher  times  ;  and  once  prepared 
for  their  emancipation,  it  must,  sooner  or  later,  come  with  more 
or  with  less  of  violence  if  suddenly,  safely  and  peaceably  ^ 
gradually  effected.  The  true  wisdom  of  the  aristocracy  in  all 
such  cases  is  to  foresee  this  necessary  result,  and  to  prepare  for 
it  betimes,  as  the  true  wisdom  of  the  mother  country  always  is  to 
foresee  the  inevitable  emancipation  of  her  colonies,  and  to  part 
from  them  in  such  a  good  and  kindly  spirit  as  will  make  them 
her  natural  friends  when  independent.  The  course  which  the 
aristocracy,  like  the  mother  country,  invariably  takes  is  to  resist 
the  change  by  every  means  in  their  power.  But  they  are  always 
obliged  to  yield  somewhat ;  and  the  apprehension  that  each  conces- 
sion may  give  the  people  more  power  to  demand  further  changes 
is  the  reason  why  they  always  resist  the  change,  and  often 
refuse  to  grant  things  in  themselves  of  no  importance  to  them, 
though  beneficial  to  the  people.  The  struggle  being  once 
begun,  and  the  power  of  the  people  fully  put  forth,  the  aristo- 
cracy has  never  failed  to  take  one  course  after  finding  that  an 
admixture  of  democratic  institutions  only  brought  their  own 
power  nearer  its  close ;  they  have  called  in  another  auxiliary, 
and  given  both  themselves  and  the  plebeian  party  a  master.  The 
Romans  were  enslaved,  as  we  shall  find  when  their  constitution 
comes  to  be  examined  in  detail,  by  the  aristocratic  parties  be- 
tween whom  the  corrupted  plebeians  might  have  held  the 
balance  till  they  overthrew  the  whole  and  re-established  the  re- 
public; but  instead  of  that,  they  became  the  instruments  by 
which  conflicting  factions  tore  the  country  to  pieces,  and  all 
finally  submitted  to  a  race  of  tyrants.  In  all  the  republics  of 
modem  Italy,  with  the  exception  of  Venice,  the  aristocracy 
which  usurped  the  government  were  gradually  obliged  to  re- 
strict their  own  powers,  but  soon  put  an  end  to  all  conflict  with 
the  people  by  placing  sovereign  princes  of  their  own  order  at 
the  head  of  affairs,  and  chan^ng  the  aristocracy  into  constitu- 
tional monarchy. 

The  introduction  of  oligarchical  power  and  its  short  duration 


CH    III.  OLIGARCHY.  21 

are  natural  and  almost  necessary  attendants  upon  the  aristocratic 
constitution.  At  first,  when  the  aristocratic  body  is  not  numerous, 
and  all,  or  nearly  all,  its  members  are  really  endowed  with  the 
advantages  of  fortune,  that  is  with  wealth  as  well  as  with  birth 
and  rank,  the  supreme  power  is  shared  by  them  all ;  and 
the  struggle  of  parties  is  chiefly  confined  to  maintaining  an  influ- 
ence of  a  personal  nature  in  directing  public  affairs.  But  this 
Smuggle  soon  leads  to  the  design  of  exclusively  possessing  tliis 
great  influence  :  and  one  -party  generally  endeavours  to  intro- 
duce such  a  monopoly,  even  against  his  equals  in  birth  and 
wealth.  The  most  ordinary  course,  however,  is  that  a  certain 
class  of  the  whole  body,  without  reference  to  party  divisions, 
becomes  distinguished  from  the  great  body  of  the  patricians  by 
its  superior  wealth  and  personal  influence.  This  is  sure  to  hap- 
pen when  the  body  of  the  nobles  becomes  numerous,  and  con- 
sequently contains  many  poor  individuals.  The  rights  of  nobility 
being  enjoyed  by  all  the  children  of  each  house,  the  fojtune  will 
not  bear  so  great  a  subdivision  as  would  suffice  to  give  each  a 
reasonable  portion  ;  and  hence  independent  of  accidental  mis- 
fortunes or  personal  extravagance  reducing  families  to  poverty, 
the  inevitable  tendency  of  every  patrician  body  must  be,  as  its 
numbers  increase,  to  become  composed  of  two  classes,  a  wealthy 
and  a  poor.  The  consequence  is  almost  as  inevitable  that  an 
attempt  will  be  made  by  the  leading  families,  or  a  portion  of  the 
leading  families,  to  exclude  all  the  rest,  and  to  retain  in  their 
hands  the  exclusive  authority  of  the  government.  This  object 
is  effected  in  two  ways ;  sometimes  the  law  is  made  which  vests 
power  in  a  small  body,  or  comparatively  small  body,  of  the  pa- 
tricians, and  this  may  be  termed  the  strict  or  legal  olirjarchy. 
But  even  where  this  arrangement  is  not  made,  the  influence  of 
wealth  gives  a  sway  to  the  leading  families,  and  the  others  are 
practically  exclilded  from  the  government,  though  not  by  law  ; 
they  are  legally  capable  of  exercising  all  the  functions  of  govern- 
ment, but  do  not  in  fact  share  in  them  ;  and  this  may  be  termed 
the  natural  olirjarchy. 

Of  the  stricter  oligarchy,  the  pure  oligarchical  constitution 
permanently  established,  there  have  not  been  many  examples, 
partly  because  the  resistance  of  the  whole  body  of  this  privileged 
order  tended  to  prevent  its  establishment ;  partly  because,  when 
once  established,  the  same  cause  has  generally  subverted  such 


22  PROGRESS  AND  CHANGES  OF  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  IIL 

governments  very  soon  after  their  formation.  It  is  the  natural 
tendency  of  the  aristocratic  form  generally  to  mix  itself  with 
either  the  democratic  or  monarchical, — with  the  former  from  the 
progress  of  popular  influence, — with  the  latter  from  the  attempts 
of  the  aristocracy  to  obstruct  the  growth  of  that  influence,  or  of 
each  party  to  strengthen  itself  against  the  other.  But  the  ten- 
dency of  an  oligarchy  is  almost  inevitably  to  its  destruction,  and 
the  restoration  of  the  whole  patrician  body's  power.  It  is  the  still 
more  inevitable,  indeed  the  necessary,  tendency  of  an  oligarchy, 
as  long  as  it  exists  unchanged  by  law,  to  become  more  and  more 
close,  confined  to  fewer  hands,  and  thus  rendered  more  odious 
and  oppressive  to  the  rest  of  the  commimity.  For  the  select  class, 
if  the  power  is  hereditary,  becomes  less  numerous  by  the  natural 
extinction  of  families,  and  if  formed  by  perpetual  self-election  it 
becomes  gradually  more  narrow  in  consequence  of  the  disposition 
in  each  set  at  all  times  to  confine  it,  and  exclude  as  much  as 
possible  the  successors  who  on  each  vacancy  would  keep  up  the 
number.  Thus  at  Bologna,  the  senate  had  the  power  of  creating 
new  nobles,  but  hardly  ever  exercised  it  except  in  favour  of 
needy  and  therefore  dependent  persons.  Thus,  too,  at  Venice, 
from  the  year  1297,  there  was  a  pure  oligarchy  formed  ;  a  cer- 
tain number  of  families  usurped  the  whole  power  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  excluded  all  the  rest.  In  the  course  of  a  few  years, 
however,  those  who  were  excluded  obtained  the  repeal  of  this 
ordinance,  probably  because  they  were  taking  steps  to  obtain  the 
support  of  the  other  orders,  which  would  have  subverted  the 
aristocracy  entirely,  and  therefore  the  oligarchs  preferred  any- 
thing to  that  catastrophe.  In  1319  the  whole  nobles  were  again 
admitted,  but  the  government  was  confined  to  them. — Genoa 
had  an  oligarchical  government  for  some  years,  at  the  end  of 
which  the  distinction  was  abolished. — Sienna  was  under  a  pure 
oligarchy  from  1290  to  1354  ;  and  the  government  of  Lucca  be- 
came oligarchical  in  1554  by  the  Martinian  Law,  which  confined 
all  power  to  a  certain  class  of  families.  This  oHgarchy  lasted 
longer  than  any  of  which  we  have  the  history.  It  continued 
undisturbed  till  1799  ;  and  the  number  of  families  eligible  to 
ofiice  had  been  reduced  so  low  by  extinction  that  there  were 
not  enough  to  fill  the  public  offices. 


OH.  IV.  NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY.  23 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

FOUNDATION  OF  ARISTOCRACY  IN  THE  NATURE  OF  THINGS. — 
NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY. 


Equality  impossible — Attempts  made  to  insure  it — Influence  of  independent  circum- 
stances— Of  wealth — Reflex  operation — Upstart  superiority — Foundation  of  re- 
spect for  hereditary  distinctions — Reflex  feeling— Hereditary  superiority  impro^  es 
men — Effects  of  improvement — Respect  for  rank — Natural— Essential  to  artificial 
Aristocracy — Illustrations  from  Rome,  Sparta,  Feudal  Government,  Modern 
Italy — Effect  of  Natural  Aristocracy  in  destroying  Oligai'chy — Political  pro- 
fession impossible — It  must  necessarily  be  a  corrupt  trade — Athenian  State 
orators — Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  Political  profession. 

In  order  rightly  to  understand  both  the  real  foundations  of 
aristocratic  government,  and  the  limits  which  the  nature  of 
things  has  affixed  to  its  force  and  its  duration,  it  is  necessary 
that  we  examine  the  nature  and  the  foundation  of  what  may  be 
termed  the  Natural  Aristocracy.  We  have  already  made  some 
observations  upon  it,  as  far  as  was  necessary  for  discussing  the 
principles  and  explaining  the  structure  of  constitutional  mo- 
narchy ;  but  we  must  now  enter  more  fully  into  this  very  im- 
portant subject. 

The  notion  of  equality,  or  anything  approaching  to  equality, 
among  the  different  members  of  any  community,  is  altogether 
wild  and  fantastic.  All  the  attempts  that  have  ever  been  made 
to  secure  it  have  been  of  necessity  confined  to  merely  pro- 
hibiting positive  distinctions  of  rank  and  privilege,  which  can 
always  be  effected,  and  to  preventing  the  unequal  distribution 
of  wealth,  which  never  can  be  accomplished,  though  laws  may 
be  devised  for  rendering  this  more  slow,  to  the  great  injury  of 
the  public  interests,  and  restraining  of  individual  liberty.  But 
the  diversities  in  human  character  and  genius,  the  natural  pro- 
pensities of  the  human  mind,  the  different  actions  performed  by 
men,  or  which  have  been  performed  by  their  ancestors,  lay  the 
foundations  of  a  natural  aristocracy,  far  deeper  and  far  more 
wide  than  any  legislative  provisions  have  ever  even  attempted 
to  reach — because  no  such  provisions  can  possibly  obliterate  the 


24  NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  IV. 

distinctions  thus  created  by  the  essential  nature  of  man.  In 
examining  these  distinctions  we  shall  also  regard  the  distinctions 
of  wealth ;  because  laws  never  can  wholly  prevent  its  unequal 
distribution,  altliough  they  may  interpose  obstacles  to  it. 

1.  The  actual  possession  of  any  superiority,  whether  in  wealth 
or  in  personal  quahties,  imposes  a  certain  respect,  begets  a 
certain  deference  in  the  community  at  large  of  inferior  men. 
Independence,  if  not  influence  and  command,  are  possessed  by 
the  favoured  few.  The  mere  circumstance  of  their  small 
number  is  something ;  then-  having,  without  dispute,  what  all 
would  wish  to  have,  is  more.  A  man  of  this  class  never  pays 
court  to  you,  he  may  be  civil,  and  you  thank  him  for  it ;  he 
never  has  any  occasion  to  be  your  suiton  Now  nothing  more 
tends  to  lessen  respect  for  any  one  than  his  courting  you,  by 
which  he  seems  to  acknowledge  you  his  superior.  Even  talents 
are  less  powerful  in  this  respect  than  wealth,  because  they  are 
less  secure  to  their  possessor,  and  their  extent  is  less  a  matter  of 
certain,  undisputed  estimate.  All  this,  too,  is  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  the  positive  and  certain  influence  which  superiority, 
whether  of  riches  or  endowments,  bestows, — the  power  of  com- 
manding other  men's  services,  assisting  them  in  their  necessities, 
contributing  to  their  comfort  or  advancement.  Nay,  so  great  is 
the  tendency  to  recognise  this  influence,  that  you  shall  con- 
stantly see  a  person  of  great  affluence  exercise  an  extraordinary 
power  over  others,  from  the  fact  of  feehng  that  they  may  one 
day  be  indebted  to  him  for  favours,  though  in  reaHty  no  such 
thing  is  in  any  degree  probable.  Persons  of  known  wealth 
could  be  named  in  our  own  day,  and  in  this  country  so  boastful 
of  its  independent  spirit,  who  never  were  known  to  assist  any 
literary  man,  and  probably  never  would  had  they  lived  for  a 
century,  and  of  whom  all  connected  with  the  press  stood  in  a 
kind  of  awe  approaching  to  reverence,  merely  because  they  could, 
if  they  would,  befriend  the  caste  of  authors. 

A  reflex  feeling  greatly  increases  this  habitual  deference  for 
personal  or  patrimonial  superiority.  He  who  is  possessed  of  it 
is  known  to  be  looked  up  to  by  all,  or  almost  all  others.  This 
we  cannot  deny,  and  we  cannot  prevent.  Be  our  own  views 
ever  so  enlightened,  our  disposition  ever  so  independent,  our 
contempt  of  wealth  ever  so  philosophical,  we  are  aware  that  the 
party  is  an  object  of  observance  with  the  bulk  of  mankind,  and 


CH.  IV.  LONG  POSSESSION  OF  SUPERIORITY.  25 

this  makes  us  view  him  as  something  different  from  what  we 
really  know  him  to  be. 

2.  The  length  of  time  during  which  any  one  has  possessed 
the  attributes  that  command  respect  forms  a  very  material  in- 
gredient in  modifying  or  assessing  the  amount  of  that  respect. 
This  amount  bears  always  some  definite  proportion  to  the  length 
of  possession  ;  and  that,  not  only  because  of  the  greater  security 
which  long  possession  implies,  but  because  there  is  an  invincible 
disposition  in  men  to  consider  with  less  respect  not  only  those 
who  are  now  on  the  same  level  with  themselves,  but  those  who 
only  recently  were  lifted  above  that  level.  Indeed  the  supe- 
riority lately  attained  is  counteracted  by  the  impatience  with 
which  men  regard  the  elevation  of  those  whom  they  have 
known  as  their  equals.  "  But  t'other  day  he  was  no  better  than 
ourselves"  is  a  saying  in  all  mouths  on  such  occasions,  and 
comes  from  a  sentiment  that  nature  implants  in  all  bosoms. 
This  even  appHes  to  men  suddenly  and  late  in  life  raised  by 
Ihe  unexpected  acquisition  of  learning.  The  unexpected  deve- 
lopment of  genius  has  no  such  counteragent  to  the  admiration 
which  it  naturally  excites.  The  author  of  the  'Botanic  Gar- 
den '  *  or  the  Waverley  Novels,  the  inventors  of  printing  or  the 
spinning-jenny,  the  discoverer  of  America,  were  ungrudgingly 
bailed  as  great  benefactors  of  their  race,  large  contributors  to 
the  pleasures  or  the  profits  of  the  world.  The  individual,  in 
:-uch  instances  as  these,  is  regarded  as  having  all  along  pos- 
sessed the  same  happy  genius  which  late  in  life  burst  forth  with 
such  resplendent  lustre.  But  an  ignorant  mechanic  or  peasant, 
who  has  late  in  life  become  possessed  of  great  learning,  never 
fails  to  meet  from  the  bulk  of  mankind  with  somewhat  of  the 
slight  and  envy  that  haunt  the  path  of  upstart  wealth.  "  But 
yesterday  he  knew  no  more  than  we  did"  is  sometimes  said  as 
well  as  "  But  yesterday  he  was  no  richer  than  ourselves." 

3.  It  is  only  carrying  the  same  feeling  a  step  further  to 
respect  the  distinctions  which  are  handed  down  from  ancestors 
more  than  those  which  are  acquu-ed  by  their  present  possessor. 
Not  only  is  the  time  of  enjoyment,  generally  speaking,  longer, 

*  Never  was  there  a  greater  sacrifice  of  fair  dealing  and  sound  taste  to  party- 
spite  than  in  the  running  down  of  this  poem  by  Mr.  Canning  and  his  associates. 
With  all  its  defects,  and  they  are  the  defects  of  the  didactic  style  and  not  of  the 
poet,  there  are  in  this  splendid  poem  passages  of  almost  unequalled  maguificence, 
and  the  feelings  which  pervade  it  are  always  enlightened  and  humane. 


26  NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  IV. 

but  no  one  can  ever  recollect  the  party  unendowed  with  the 
superiority — no  one  can  remember  him  naked  of  the  marks  of 
distinction.  He  never  was  on  the  same  level  with  ourselves. 
Accordingly  the  impatience  of  superiority  is  in  this  case  apt  to 
go  back,  and  find  that  at  least  his  father  or  his  grandfather  was 
"  No  better  than  ourselves."  Thus  all  novelty  has  the  levelling 
tendency ;  it  tends  to  remove  the  distinction  on  which  the  diver- 
sity is  built ;  it  is  one  fewer  mark,  one  difference  more  taken 
away — and  the  whole  question  is  one  of  differences  and  dis- 
tinctions. This  is  really  the  foundation  of  respect  for  hereditary 
honours.  "  New  nobility/'  Lord  Bacon  says,  "  is  but  the  act 
of  power ;  ancient  nobility  is  the  act  of  time."*  Even  virtue 
and  genius,  and  mental  acquirements,  are  in  some  sort  affected 
by  this  law  of  our  nature.  A  man  is  himself  no  better  for  his 
ancestor  having  been  virtuous,  more  able,  more  learned  than 
others,  or  for  being  sprung  from  a  race  which  had  rendered 
precious  services  to  their  country.  A  man  is  no  worse  for  his 
forefathers  having  been  of  a  grovelling  nature,  or  infamous  life. 
Yet  where  is  the  individual  who  can  place  himself  above  the 
pride  of  descending  from  Marlborough  or  Blake,  Newton  or 
Watt  ?  And  where  is  the  sage  whose  wisdom  is  so  captious  or 
heart  so  callous  as  to  refuse  the  epithet  of  honest  or  natural  to 
such  pride  as  this  ? 

The  reflex  feeling  here  again  comes  into  action.  As  it  is  a 
fact,  perhaps  an  ultimate  fact  incapable  of  being  resolved  into 
any  more  general,  that  almost  all  men  feel  this  respect,  place 
this  value  upon  hereditary  distinctions,  ancestral  honours  come 
to  be  prized,  even  by  those  who  would  not  otherwise  esteem 
them.  We  thus  respect  him  who  possesses  such  honours,  be- 
cause we  know  that  he  is  the  object  of  deference  and  respect  to 
almost  all  men,  and  is  thus  distinguished  from  ourselves ;  nay 
we  love  to  associate  with  him,  on  account. of  other  men  running 
after  him,  and  on  account  of  his  acquaintance  being  of  necessity 
narrowly  limited,  as  well  as  highly  prized. 

4.  The  hereditary  possession  of  superiority  in  wealth  and 
station  has  a  certain  effect  upon  the  character  and  habits  of  the 
individual,  and  therefore  an  intrinsic  as  well  as  external  and 
accidental  value  in  exalting  the  possessor.  He  never  can  have 
been  the  associate  of  the  low  and  the  worthless  ;  he  has  never 
known  any  servile  employment  or  unworthy  courses;   he  has 

*  Essays,  xiv. 


CH.  IV.        PROGRESS  OF  THE  HEREDITARY  ARISTOCRACY.  27 

never  been  tarnished  with  meanness  or  depressed  by  dependence  ; 
never  suffered  under  insult  or  oppression  ;  never  had  his  feel- 
ings outraged  or  his  taste  offended  and  perverted  by  squalid  or 
sordid  contacts.  His  feelings  may  be  supposed  more  delicate,  his 
spirit  more  lofty,  his  principles  more  pure,  than  those  who  have 
struggled  with  hard  fortunes,  and  in  whom  the  school  of  adver- 
sity has  compensated  for  the  vigour  which  its  discipline  imparts, 
by  the  coarseness  and  callousness  which  its  rod  is  apt  to  imprint. 

It  is  upon  the  influence  and  authority  which  the  circumstances 
just  now  considered  bestow  upon  the  superior  members  of  every 
community,  that  their  'power  in  every  state  naturally  is  built. 
They  have  the  greatest  weight  and  confer  the  most  power  in 
less  enlightened  ages  ;  the  progress  of  knowledge  and  the  general 
improvement  of  the  people  never  fail  to  lessen  their  influence, 
with  the  exception  of  the  last-mentioned  circumstance,  which  is 
most  prized  in  a  highly  refined  state  of  society,  and  with  the 
further  exception  of  the  respect  due  to  virtue  and  capacity.  But 
no  progress  in  improvement  and  no  power  obtained  by  the  mass 
of  any  community  can  ever  destroy  the  influence  of  the  natural 
aristocracy,  efface  the  distinctions  which  we  have  been  describing, 
or  level  the  ranks  or  natural  orders  to  which  those  distinctions 
give  rise.  Indeed  the  beneficial  effects  produced  by  such  gra 
dations,  in  maintaining  the  peace  and  good  order  of  society,  are 
not  diminished  by  the  progress  of  improvement,  because  as  much 
is  gained  of  additional  respect  for  the  natural  aristocracy  by 
reflection  and  the  perception  of  the  expediency  of  giving  it  due 
weight,  as  may  be  lost  in  the  more  vulgar  deference  to  wealth 
and  birth. 

The  artificial  aristocracy  must  always,  to  a  certain  degree,  be 
connected  with  and  founded  upon  the  natural.  No  force  of 
positive  institutions  could  ever  maintain  the  power  of  a  body  of 
nobles  who  had  no  \yealth,  or  talents,  or  services  to  distinguish 
them  from  the  rest  of  the  community.  All  nobility  therefore  has, 
in  all  ages  and  countries,  been  originally  founded  upon  natural 
aristocracy ;  and  there  never  has  been  any  instance  of  a  nobility 
preserving  its  power,  or  even  its  place  in  society,  without  retain- 
ing also  a  large  share  of  the  natural  advantages  in  which  its  supe- 
riority originated.  The  Patrician  order  at  Rome  was  composed 
of  the  original  freemen  who  founded  the  state,  and  their  de- 
scendants bom  in  the  republic,  and  not  aliens.     But  they  also 


28  NATUILIL  .\EISTOCRACY.  CH.  IV. 

possessed  by  far  the  greater  share  of  the  land,  the  principal 
wealth  of  the  community. — The  Spartan  aristocracy  had  a  similar 
origin  and  endowment,  as  we  shall  afterwards  see. — When  the 
chiefs  who  overran  the  Boman  empire  established  themselves 
in  their  new  conquests,  we  have  seen  that  they  formed  a  privi- 
leged body  of  their  principal  companions  in  arms,  who  were  the 
most  daring  or  most  skilful  leaders  in  their  armies,  and  whom 
they  endowed  witb  ample  landed  possessions.  The  foundation 
of  the  feudal  aristocracy  was  the  possession  at  first  of  the  whole 
landed  property,  ever  afterwards  of  by  far  the  largest  portion  of  it. 
When  in  the  course  of  time  other  classes  of  the  community 
obtained  landed  rights,  the  nobles  still  retained  exclusive  rights 
of  a  peculiar  description  in  the  soil ;  and  even  when  all  such 
distinction  was  removed,  and  every  one  could  hold  his  land  by 
the  noble  tenures,  though  himself  not  noble,  there  was  still  the 
greatest  share  of  landed  wealth  vested  in  the  patricians.  When 
commerce  introduced  a  rival  class  of  possessors,  the  influence  of 
the  natural  aristocracy  gained  for  the  hereditary  nobles  the  re- 
spect, and  from  thence  the  influence,  which  we  have  seen  flows 
inevitably  towards  those  whose  wealth  is  hereditary. — In  the 
Italian  republics  commercial  wealth  early  rivalled  feudal ;  and  a 
civic  aristocracy  was  formed  of  the  classes  who  had  long  enjoyed 
this  distinction,  and  the  other  superiorities  constituted  by  capa- 
city, public  services,  and  long  habits  of  command.  The  famihes 
thus  distinguished  were  the  aristocracy  of  these  commonwealths, 
and  their  influence  was  established  exactly  as  we  have  seen  the 
natural  respect  for  station,  riches,  and  merits  always  operate. 
The  civic  nobility  thus  formed  soon  engrossed  exclusive  privi- 
leges, and  became,  by  artificial  means,  the  governing  body  of  the 
state.  In  all  these  communities  attempts  were  made  to  exclude 
the  bulk  of  the  people,  even  the  bulk  of  the  wealtliier  classes, 
and  in  all,  the  nobles  for  some  time  succeeded  in  confining  the 
political  power  to  their  own  order,  although  their  origin  was 
exactly  their  filling  the  same  station  which  the  richer  and  more 
eminent  families  of  the  people  now  occupied.  The  descendants 
of  the  noble  families  becoming  numerous,  more  of  them  became 
of  course  both  stripped  of  wealth  and  deprived  of  all  the  other 
attributes  of  natural  aristocracy.  But  a  suflScient  number  of  the 
order  continued  so  endowed  as  to  preserve  their  natural  influ- 
ence, and  to  have  a  real  weight  in  the  community,  independent  of 


k 


CH.  IV.  PROFESSION  OF  POLITICIAN.  29 

the  privileges  vested  in  them  by  the  laws  and  customs  of  the 
state. 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  constant  tendency  of  the 
natural  aristocracy  is  twofold.  It  both  restrains  the  power  of 
the  whole  patrician  body,  where  a  proper  or  artificial  aristocracy 
is  established,  and  where  no  privilege  is  possessed  by  one  branch 
of  the  nobles  over  the  rest ;  and  it  prevents  the  long  exclusion 
of  the  bulk  of  the  noble  order — in  other  words,  it  brings  the 
existence  of  an  oligarchy  to  a  close,  as  we  have  seen  happened 
in  Venice  and  Genoa,  the  cases  being  but  rare  and  inconsider- 
able, as  at  Sienna  and  Lucca,  in  which  the  oligarchy  was  of 
long  continuance. 

Thus  there  would,  in  all  communities,  necessarily  rise  to  influ- 
ence a  natural  aristocracy,  whether  the  laws  and  the  forms  of  the 
constitution  established  a  privileged  order  or  not.  This  natural 
aristocracy  would  obtain  a  considerable  share  of  real  power,  al- 
though there  should  be  no  order  of  men  legally  privileged,  and 
would  affect  the  distribution  of  influence  among  the  members  of 
a  privileged  order,  where  the  law  recognised  such  a  body,  and 
invested  its  whole  number  with  equal  direct  power.  This  neces- 
sity grows  out  of  the  impossibility  that  there  should  ever  exist 
to  any  extent,  and  for  any  length  of  time,  a  political  profession. 
This  impossibility  appears  manifest  from  several  considerations. 

1.  If  there  is  party  spirit  or  party  conduct  in  any  given 
state,  then  clearly  men  can  only  drive  the  trade  of  politics  by 
being  corrupt  or  factious,  or  both,  because,  instead  of  only  qua- 
lifying themselves  to  gain  their  livelihood  by  merit,  they  must 
also  either  quit  their  party  or  force  it  into  power.  Suppose  a 
lawyer  could  only  obtain  practice  by  truckling  to  the  bench,  or 
by  courting  attorneys,  he  would  be  less  corrupt  than  the  trading 
political  adventurer,  the  man  who  engaged  in  politics  as  a  spe- 
culation of  gain,  because  the  lawyer  could  not  advance  his  own 
interest  by  betraying  his  client's ;  whereas  the  trafficking  poli- 
tician must  betray  his  client,  the  country,  in  order  to  live,  and 
at  the  very  least  must  set  its  interest  at  nought.  He  Ttiay  do 
his  duty,  because  occasionally  his  interest  may  coincide  with  his 
principles  or  opinions  ;  but  this  does  not  necessarily  happen, 
and  in  order  to  live  he  must  regard  only  that  which  works  for 
his  party  and  himself 

2.  Suppose  party  to  be  unknown  in  the  given  state,  still  cor- 


80  NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  IV. 

ruption  is  inevitable,  because  whoever  has  the  dispensation  of 
patronage  must  be  gained  ;  and  hence  counsels,  pleasing  rather 
than  wholesome  or  useful,  must  be  given.  The  political  trader, 
like  the  player,  who  lives  to  please,  must  please  to  live.  But 
unhappily  there  must  also  be  in  his  composition  a  little  of  the 
prostitute  as  well  as  of  the  more  honest  player. 

3.  But  it  is  needless  canvassing  what  must  happen  in  a  state 
devoid  of  party  connexions.  Such  connexions  always  must  exist 
to  the  extent  of  our  present  argument,  for  the  government  of 
every  country  must  be  conducted  on  one  set  of  principles  or 
another.  But  the  existence  of  the  political  profession  converts 
this  state  of  things  into  the  ordinary,  vulgar,  and  worst  species 
of  party. 

4.  If  it  be  said,  "  You  can  pay  the  political  man,"  the  ground 
is  furnished  for  considering  who  is  to  select  the  person  that  shall 
be  paid.  Every  man  who  pleases  cannot  be  allowed  to  become 
the  stipendiary  servant  of  the  public.  Some  selection  there  must 
needs  be.  Then  this  only  adds  one  new  class  of  functionaries 
to  those  already  employed  by  the  state ;  and  some  one  must 
appoint  them,  like  the  rest. 

5.  At  Athens  there  were  ten  state  orators,  and  hardly  any  one 
else  ever  took  part  in  the  debates  of  either  the  Assembly  or  the 
Senate.  But  all  persons  must  undergo  a  severe  scrutiny  before 
they  were  even  allowed  to  speak  at  all.  The  concealment  of  any 
offence  or  other  disqualification  on  this  inquiry  was  severely 
punishable  ;  and  not  only  pure  Attic  descent,  but  the  possession 
of  property  in  Attica,  was  a  necessary  qualification  for  being 
appointed  a  pubhc  orator.  There  is  great  doubt  on  the  question 
whether  they  received  any  salary  or  not.  It  certainly  never 
could  have  exceeded  a  very  small  sum,  because  we  know  that 
the  judges  (or  rather  jurors)  had  only  a  groat  of  our  money 
each  sitting;  there  were  6000  persons  qualified  to  act  as  jurors, 
and  the  choice  being  by  lot,  each  could  only  be  selected  to  sit  on 
trials  100  times  in  a  year,  and  gain  about  thirty  shillings,  which 
small  sum  the  pay  of  a  state  orator  could  not  much  exceed.  If 
our  members  of  parliament  were  paid,  as  some  unreflecting  per- 
sons recommend,  from  a  foolish  idea  that  it  would  remove  one 
of  the  obstacles  to  the  lower  classes  sitting  in  the  legislature,  the 
only  result  would  be  a  great  increase  of  corruption  at  elections, 
and  a  complete  subserviency  of  the  representative  to  the  will  and 


CH.  IV.  POLITICAL  PROFESSION.  31 

caprice  of  his  constituents — a  subserviency  utterly  destructive 
of  the  deliberative  functions  so  essential  to  the  representative 
system. 

All  these  reasons,  which  show  the  profligacy  that  must  arise 
out  of  the  existence  of  a  political  trade  or  profession,  are  decisive 
against  its  possibility,  because  no  institution  can  endure  in  a 
popular  government,  whether  aristocratic,  democratic,  or  mixed, 
which  inevitably  leads  to  corruption  and  to  violation  of  public 
duty.  Hence  it  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  the 
administration  of  public  affairs  must  ultimately,  nay,  in  a  very 
short  time,  become  substantially  vested  in  the  natural  aristocracy 
of  any  country — the  classes  qualified  by  property,  by  respect- 
ability of  character,  by  capacity  and  acquirements,  by  experi- 
ence and  services,  to  take  the  lead  among  their  fellow-citizens. 
Where  there  is  no  order  privileged  by  law,  this  class  will  form 
such  an  order  in  practice  and  in  fact.  Where  there  is  a  privi- 
leged order,  in  whom,  either  exclusively  or  rateably  with  others, 
power  resides  by  law,  when  this  order  becomes  numerous  the 
portion  of  it  distinguished  from  the  rest  by  the  natural  aristo- 
cracy will  obtain  the  lead. 

We  have  here  only  been  considering  the  subject  of  a  political 
profession  in  its  connexion  with  the  question  of  natural  aristo- 
cracy. It  may  be  proper  to  add  a  few  words  relative  to  the 
opinion  of  those  who  regard  such  a  profession  as  wanted  in  the 
management  of  state  affairs.  These  reasoners  are  led  away  by 
the  notion  that  the  principle  of  the  division  of  labour  is  appli- 
cable to  the  work  of  government,  and  they  contend  that  men 
must  devote  themselves  exclusively  to  political  science,  in  order 
to  qualify  themselves  for  conducting  the  public  councils.  It  is 
exceedingly  common  to  hear  the  argument  put  tnus  :  any  com- 
mon handicraft  can  be  learned  only  by  sei"ving  an  apprenticeship 
to  it ;  then  how  can  men  suddenly  learn  the  difficult  art  of 
government?  One  great  fallacy  in  this  argument  is,  that  no 
person  ever  contended  for  the  intrusting  of  government  to  igno- 
rant or  inexperienced  hands  ;  that  no  person  ever  even  con- 
tended for  having  the  government  of  a  country  administered  by 
men  all  of  whom  had  other  serious  occupations  to  which  they 
were  devoted  ;  and  that  the  only  question  really  is  whether  or 
not  the  political  caste  shall  be  composed  of  men  whose  circum- 
stances are  independent ;  whether  it  shall  consist  of  men  who 


32  NATURAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  V. 

seek  their  livelihood  by  it  as  a  profession,  or  of  men  who,  well 
able  to  subsist  without  it,  pursue  it  from  motives  of  ambition  or 
public  spirit,  vanity  or  love  of  patronage,  and  possibly  with  the 
view  of  adding  to  a  fortune  already  independent. 

It  must  be  admitted  on  the  one  hand  that  if  only  men  in  easy 
circumstances,  and  having  no  professional  pursuits,  engage  in 
politics,  there  will  be  excluded  from  the  public  service  many 
persons  of  great  talents  and  integrity  whose  fortunes  are  small. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  the  liberal  professions  themselves  can 
only  be  pursued  by  persons  of  certain  means,  because  no  man 
can,  for  some  years,  gain  his  bread  by  them ;  and  yet  no  one 
ever  complained  that  this  excluded  the  pubHc  from  the  benefit  of 
able  lawyers,  physicians,  or  divines,  among  men  who  might  be 
bom  in  the  humbler  walks  of  life.  And  the  difficulty,  or  rather 
the  impossibility,  is  just  as  great  of  so  arranging  a  political  trade 
as  to  enable  all  who  are  qualified  for  it  by  their  talents  and 
virtues  to  enter  into  it.  Then  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  great 
mischiefs  arising  from  having  a  large  class  of  men  whose  sub- 
sistence depends  upon  their  success  as  political  adventurers  ;  for 
this  really  means  that  they  must  seek  after  place  at  all  hazards. 
We  have  already  shown  to  what  evil  consequences  this  kind  of 
contest  must  inevitably  lead. 

The  greatest  oversight,  however,  of  those  who  argue  for  a 
political  profession  consists  in  this  :  they  do  not  consider  that  in 
every  ordinary  profession  the  confidence  of  the  customer,  or 
employer,  is  given  the  more  freely  and  the  more  entirely  if  he 
knows  that  the  professional  man  follows  no  other  vocation.  The 
more  he  is  known  to  depend  on  his  calling,  the  more  he  is 
trusted.  But  in  the  political  calling  it  is  just  the  reverse  ;  no 
man  is  so  little  valued,  none  so  little  trusted,  as  he  who  is  known 
to  have  no  other  means  of  subsistence.  Who  will  ever  acknow- 
ledge that  his  hvelihood  depends  upon  his  success  in  parliament  ? 
Who  in  the  law,  or  the  church,  or  in  trade,  ever  hesitated  to 
profess  that  his  whole  reliance,  and  that  of  his  family,  was  upon 
his  professional  gains  ?  The  public  may  be  apt  to  over-rate  the 
independence  of  wealthy  men,  because  they  who  have  no  need 
of  money  are  exposed  to  feel  the  force  of  other  temptations.  But 
to  a  certain  extent  and  to  a  great  extent  it  is  quite  tnae  that 
needy  men  are  apt  to  be  dependent,  even  if  we  charitably  refuse 
our  faith  to  the  saying  that  "  an  empty  bag  will  not  stand  upright." 


CH.  IV.  POLITICAL  PROFESSION.  33 

It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  sufficient  political  knowledge  may 
be  acquired,  and  habits  of  public  business  may  be  formed  by 
men  busily  engaged  in  other  professions.  Mercantile  men  have 
often  distinguished  themselves  in  the  senate,  sometimes  in  the 
councils  of  their  country.  Lawyers  have  always  borne  a 
forward  part  both  in  council  and  in  debate.  Soldiers  have 
often  displayed  great  statesmanlike  qualities.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  captains  have  always  been  among  the  greatest  statesmen 
in  every  age  and  in  all  countries.  It  is  an  error  as  gross  as  it 
is  general  to  compare  the  training  required  for  learning  a  com- 
mon handicraft  to  that  which  is  necessary  for  fitting  men  to 
govern  their  fellow-creatures.  No  reading,  no  reflection,  no 
observation,  will  teach  manual  dexterity. 

We  may  on  the  whole  conclude  that  the  evils  greatly  coimter- 
balance  any  advantage  which  can  reasonably  be  expected  to 
result  from  the  existence  of  a  political  profession,  which  men 
never  should  follow  for  earning  their  subsistence. 


The  most  important  practical  considerations  flow  from  atten- 
tively examining  the  nature  and  tendency  of  the  Natural  Aris- 
tocracy. Of  these  it  may  suffice  that  we  mention  two  :  the 
security  afforded  in  every  popular  government,  whether  aristo- 
cratic, democratic,  or  mixed  monarchical,  against  the  incapable 
classes  of  the  community  administering  its  affairs  ;  and  the  safety 
with  which  in  any  government  except  a  despotism  political  rights 
may  be  intrusted  to  the  people,  in  so  far  as  regards  the  choice 
of  their  rulers.  It  is  quite  manifest  that  the  principal  weight  in 
the  State  will  always  be  possessed  by  those  whom  the  Natural 
Aristocracy  designates  as  its  rulers ;  the  class  best  qualified  to 
discharge  that  important  function.  Men  of  education,  of  inte- 
grity, of  independent  fortune,  of  leisure,  of  learning, — men  culti- 
vated as  well  as  capable, — will  always  be  preferred  by  the  great 
majority  of  the  people  themselves  as  their  rulers  and  their 
representatives.  In  an  aristocratic  eountry,  as  Poland  and 
Hungary,  the  noble  who  belongs  to  this  naturally  privileged 
class  will  always  bear  sway  over  him  whom  the  law  alone  clothes 
with  privilege ;  and  were  universal  suffrage  established  in 
England,  not  a  single  peasant  or  artisan  would  be  returned  to 
Parliament. 

PART  IL  D 


34  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

CHAPTER  y. 

OF  PARTY. 


Origin  of  Party— Aristocracy  most  exposed  to  it— Venice  the  only  exception- 
Justifiable  party  unions — Factious  system — Undermines  principle — Destroys  con- 
fidence in  Statesmen— Corrupts  private  morals— Unites  sordid  motives  with  pure 
— Produces  self-deception — Destroys  regard  for  truth — Promotes  abuse  of  the 
Press — Gives  scope  to  malignant  feelings — Passage  of  Dante — Operation  of 
Faction  on  inferior  Partisans — Effects  in  paralysing  the  public  Councils — In 
promoting  treasonable  proceedings — Defence  of  Party :  Burke,  Fox — Conclusion 
of  this  subject. 

The  existence  of  parties  in  an  aristocracy  is  one  of  the  most 
inseparable  attendants  of  that  scheme  of  policy,  and  one  of  its 
greatest  evils,  although  it  affords  almost  the  only  check  to  the 
power  of  the  governing  class.  Men  among  whom  the  supreme 
authority  in  any  state  is  divided  naturally  desire  each  to  engross 
a  larger  portion  than  falls  fairly  to  his  share.  When  the  num- 
bers of  the  ruling  class  are  considerable,  the  possession  of  power 
enjoyed  by  each  individual  is  not  such  as  to  satisfy  the  natural 
appetite  for  dominion,  an  appetite  ever  whetted  by  a  moderate 
indulgence  too  scanty  to  satiate  it.  The  superiority  over  the 
bulk  of  the  community  being  enjoyed  by  the  whole  order 
equally  is  assumed  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  the  object  of  all 
ambition  is  then  to  rise  above  the  rest  of  the  governing  caste. 
Such  elevation  is  the  only  distinction,  except  that  of  rank,  ser- 
vices, and  personal  qualities  ;  the  only  distinction  of  the  artificial 
beyond  the  distinctions  proper  to  the  natural  aristocracy.  Two 
consequences  result :  first,  the  most  powerful  of  the  order,  the 
members  most  amply  endowed  with  the  gifts  of  fortune,  whether 
of  riches,  or  honours,  or  esteem  for  talents  possessed  and  ser- 
vices rendered,  seek  to  engross  the  whole  power,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  rest  of  the  order  ;  or  secondly,  a  portion  of  these — a  few 
individuals,  sometimes  a  single  individual  or  family — form  de- 
signs of  usurping  an  undue  share  of  authority.  The  attempts  of 
the  first  kind  lead  to  an  oligarchy ;  those  of  the  second  either 
lead  to  a  usurpation  and  tyranny,  overthrowing  the  state,  if 
successful,  and  if  unsuccessful  inoperative  upon  its  constitution  ; 
or  they  lead  to   acquiring  a  preponderating    influence   in  the 


CH.  V.  ORIGIN  OF  PARTY.  35 

administration  of  its  affairs,  without  at  all  changing  its  govern- 
ment. The  efforts  made  with  this  object  in  view,  and  the  steps 
taken  to  attain  it,  give  rise  to  party  associations.  No  two  or  three 
families  being  sufficiently  powerful  to  withstand  the  jealousy 
which  such  an  attempt  would  excite  universally  in  the  rest  of 
the  order,  the  course  taken  is  to  extend  the  junction  and  com- 
prehend other  families,  and  many  of  the  inferior  or  more  de- 
pendent nobles.  The  whole  are  thus  leagued  together  for  a 
common  object,  or  an  object  professed  to  be  common,  but  in 
reality  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  and  preserving  the  influence  of 
the  leaders  in  administering  the  government  of  the  state.  Nor  is 
the  combination  confined  to  the  members  of  the  governing  body ; 
the  plebeians  are  appealed  to,  and  the  powerful  noble  families 
having  dependents  and  followers  among  them  secure  support  in 
case  of  any  commotion  to  which  the  intrigues  of  faction  may 
give  rise,  and  obtain  an  appearance  of  force  and  power  from  the 
numbers  of  their  adherents — an  appearance  calculated  to  give 
them  weight  with  their  own  order.  For  it  must  be  kept  in 
mind  that  the  nature  of  the  government  precludes  the  suppo- 
sition than  any  of  the  plebeian  order,  or  even  all  the  order 
acting  together,  can  directly  aid  by  lawful  and  constitutional 
means  the  proceedings  of  the  party,  inasmuch  as  the  whole 
powers  of  the  state  are  possessed  exclusively  by  the  patricians. 
But  if  one  class  of  individuals  or  families  thus  combine  and 
thus  act  for  their  own  aggrandisement,  their  proceedings  natu- 
rally bind  together  the  other  families  and  their  adherents  to 
resist  the  attempt  Hence  the  ruling  body  becomes  divided 
into  separate,  opposing,  and  conflicting  factions ;  each  having  its 
adherents  among  the  poorer  nobles,  who  can  directly  afford 
support,  being  possessed  of  voices  in  the  government ;  and  also 
among  the  plebeians,  who  can  give  no  regular  or  direct  support, 
having  no  such  voices. 

The  Venetian  constitution  presents  the  only  instance  of  an 
aristocracy  in  which  parties  were  little  if  at  all  known,  and 
had  certainly  no  considerable  influence  upon  the  working  of  the 
government,  or  the  administration  of  public  affairs.  The  fatal 
tendency  of  faction  to  destroy  the  existence  of  such  a  govern- 
ment, and  constantly  to  mar  its  operations,  early  introduced  an 
arrangement  by  which  all  such  disturbing  forces  were  counter- 
acted.    The  arbitrary  dictatorial   powers    conferred    upon    the 

d2 


36  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

Council  of  Ten  made  it  as  impossible  for  a  faction  to  gain  any 
head  in  ordinary  times,  as  the  dictatorship  at  Rome  rendered  all 
factious  movements  impracticable  while  that  power  existed  on 
some  extraordinary  occasions.  The  unexampled  duration  of  the 
Venetian  government  without  suflfering  any  change  was  the 
result  of  this  extraordinary  provision  in  its  structure.  All  the 
other  aristocratic  republics  of  Italy  were,  as  we  shall  see,  the 
hotbeds  of  constant  factious  combinations,  and  the  scenes  and 
the  victims  of  their  unprincipled  operations. 

If  the  nobles  were  only  animated  by  a  regard  for  the  public — 
the  good  of  the  state  at  large — or  even  if  they  were  only  in- 
fluenced by  a  regard  for  the  interests  of  their  own  order,  no 
such  party  divisions  could  have  place,  because  no  such  attempts 
to  engross  the  direction  of  the  public  affairs  would  be  carried 
further  than  was  dictated  by  a  conscientious  desire  to  further 
the  progress  of  certain  principles  and  secure  the  adoption  of 
certain  measures.  While  confined  within  these  narrow  bounds, 
nothing  deserving  the  name  of  party  or  faction  could  exist. 
Men  differ  in  their  opinions ;  the  line  of  pohcy  which  one  sin- 
cerely believes  most  conducive  to  the  public  good,  appears  to 
another  less  expedient,  or  positively  fraught  with  peril.  Thus 
differing,  each  may  honestly  endeavour  to  promote  his  own 
views,  and  may  consistently  join  with  others  who  entertain  the 
same  opinions.  Great  heats  may  even  be  engendered  by  this 
collision  ;  long  subsisting  animosities  may  exasperate  the  parties 
against  each  other  ;  but  the  difference  is  in  the  principles  really 
adopted,  and  the  course  pursued  is  dictated  by  that  real  differ- 
enca  Therefore  it  never  can  go  beyond  a  certain  safe  point, 
because  it  will  always  yield  to  the  prevailing  regard  for  the 
public  good,  and  will  therefore  stop  short  of  any  proceeding  by 
which  that  good  can  be  assailed  or  exposed  to  peril.  In  such 
combinations  and  in  such  conduct  there  is  nothing  blame- 
worthy. They  do  not  merit  the  name  of  factious  ;  they  can 
hardly  even  be  termed  party  proceedings. 

But  it  is  a  very  different  and  a  very  pernicious  kind  of  party 
to  which  the  term  faction  is  generally  applied,  and  which  arises 
out  of  the  contentions  for  power,  and  not  out  of  the  desire  to 
further  principles ;  and  this  weed  is  the  natural  growth  of 
popular,  but  most  of  all,  aristocratic  government.  Men  bind 
themselves  together,  and  obtain  the  support  both  of  their  fol- 


CH.  V.         EFFECT  OF  PARTY  ON  PRINCIPLES.  37 

lowers  among  the  ruling  orders,  and  their  dependants  among 
the  plebeians,  that  they  may  be  enabled  to  engross  the  whole 
power  in  administering  public  affairs.  The  possession  of  power 
with  its  attendants,  patronage,  honour,  places,  wealth,  impunity 
for  malversation,  indemnity  against  charges  of  maladministra- 
tion, all  the  benefits  that  uncontrolled  dominion  can  bestow 
upon  those  who  are  clothed  with  it — this  is  the  object  of  the 
party  combination,  and  to  this  every  other  consideration,  among 
the  rest  all  regard  to  public  duty,  all  concern  for  the  interests  of 
the  community,  is  sacrificed  without  hesitation,  without  scruple, 
and  without  remorse.  There  is  generally  a  pretext  of  principle 
put  forward  to  hide  the  nakedness  of  the  association  ;  but  no  one 
is  deceived  by  it,  and  the  less  that  the  same  principles  are  suc- 
cessively taken  up  and  abandoned  by  all  the  factions  successively 
as  it  suits  their  position  and  serves  the  purpose  of  the  day :  so 
that  you  shall  see  the  party  the  most  clamorous  for  certain  mea- 
sures before  its  accession  to  ofiice,  the  readiest  to  abandon,  and 
even  to  oppose  the  same  proposal  immediately  after  that  event ; 
and  the  same  men  who  had  the  most  loudly  condemned  a  given 
course  of  policy,  lay  themselves  meekly  down  by  its  promoters 
and  join  in  patronizing  it  as  soon  as  their  interest  in  the  clamour 
has  passed  away, 

1.  This  is  the  first,  and  it  is  the  worst  of  the  evil  effects  which 
party  produces.  Principles  are  no  longer  held  sacred  in  the 
estimation  of  mankind  ;  they  become  secondary  and  subordinate 
considerations  ;  they  are  no  more  the  guides  of  men's  conduct, 
but  the  false  fabricated  pretexts  under  which  the  real  motive  and 
object  is  cloaked  ;  they  are  the  mere  counters  with  which  the 
profligate  game  of  faction  is  played.  The  highest  public  duties 
are  thus  not  merely  violated,  but  brought  into  open  and  unblush- 
ing contempt.  A  low  tone  of  political  morality  becomes  the  pre- 
vailing sentiment  of  the  governing  classes  in  the  state.  Stern 
principle  is  scorned  ;  rigid  virtue  is  a  laughing-stock  ;  and  men 
in  the  humblest  stations  see  those  who  should  be  their  patterns 
set  them  an  example  of  the  most  scandalous  profligacy.  Add  to 
this  the  disgusting  hypocrisy  which  men  practise  in  their  loud 
assertions  of  opinions  which  they  care  nothing  about ;  their  so- 
lemn declaration  of  doctrines  in  which  they  have  no  faith  ;  their 
earnest  expression  of  feelings  no  deeper  than  their  mouths ; 
their  inflated  avowal  of  devotion  to  principles  wholly  foreign  to 
their  nature  and  habits.     All  this  makes  up  a  picture  which  the 


38  OF  PARTY.  CH,  V. 

people  must  be  debauched  by  beholding  so  continually  unveiled 
before  their  eyes. 

2.  The  alienation  of  the  people's  affections  and  confidence  is 
another  result  of  the  same  combinations.  Tlie  people  see  those 
who  have  assumed  the  entire  management  of  their  affairs  wholly 
regardless  of  their  interest,  only  bent  upon  keeping  power  in 
their  l\and,  and  affecting  to  make  the  public  good  the  guide  of 
their  conduct,  when  they  only  set  up  this  as  a  hollow  pretext  to 
conceal  their  real  object  A  distrust  of  all  public  men  is  the  in- 
evitable result ;  and  this  is  as  much  excited  in  the  partisans  them- 
selves, who  take  up  the  cause  of  the  rival  party  chiefs,  as  in  the 
portion  of  the  community  which  stands  neuter,  and  witnesses  the 
factious  conflict.  The  Italian  commonwealths  were  so  divided  into 
factions,  that  hardly  any  man  or  woman  could  be  said  to  stand 
aloof  from  them  ;  all  were  either  Bianchi  or  Neri,  Uberti  or  Buon- 
delmonti,  Cerchi  or  Donati.  But  we  can  have  no  doubt  that 
this  extinguished  all  kind  of  confidence  in  their  rulers,  and  ac- 
cordingly it  undermined  all  regard — not  perhaps  for  the  state, 
because  the  selfish  and  factious  hatred  of  some  other  neighbour- 
ing state  kept  a  kind  of  false  patriotism  alive — but  certainly  all 
regard  for  the  constitution  of  their  own  country.  The  universal 
consequence  was,  that  the  liberties  of  all  those  commonwealths 
were  subverted,  and  the  supreme  power  became,  sooner  or  later, 
vested  in  some  native  or  foreign  usurper. 

3.  Akin  to  this  is  the  fatal  tendency  to  corrupt  public  and  even 
private  morals  of  the  party  union,  as  removing  both  the  great 
incentive  to  virtue  and  the  most  powerful  barrier  against  vice. 
Public  praise  and  public  blame  are  no  longer  distributed  accord- 
ing to  men's  deserts.  Whatever  a  man  connected  with  party 
does  well,  he  is  quite  sure  to  be  undervalued,  perhaps  contemned, 
possibly  assailed,  by  one-half  the  community ;  and  let  him  act 
ever  so  ill,  he  is  secure  of  defence  at  least,  if  not  of  commenda- 
tion, from  the  others.  The  tribujial  of  public  opinion  becomes 
corrupt ;  it  no  longer  deserves  the  name  of  a  tribunal.  Who- 
ever is  cited  to  its  bar  knows  that  half  the  judges  are  for  him, 
and  half  against  him,  and  no  sentence,  or  nothing  that  may  fairly 
be  called  a  sentence,  can  be  pronounced.  Well  might  Mr.  Hume 
remark,  a  hundred  years  ago,  that  "  it  is  no  wonder  if  faction  be 
so  productive  of  vices  of  all  kinds ;  for  besides  that  it  inflames 
all  the  passions,  it  tends  much  to  remove  those  great  restraints, 
honour   and  shame,  when  men  find   that  no  iniquity  can  lose 


CH.  V.  ENCOUEAGEMENT  OF  SORDID  MOTIVES.  39 

them  the  applause  of  their  own  party,  and  no  innocence  screens 
them  against  the  calumnies  of  the  opposite." — (Hist.,  cap.  Ixix.) 

4.  But  though  this  seems  sufficient,  it  is  far  from  being  all  the 
mischief  done  by  faction.  Even  in  those  who  form  party  com- 
binations with  purer  views,  and  for  the  promotion  of  worthy  and 
patriotic  objects,  it  inevitably  works  a  corruption  of  the  deepest 
root  and  most  extensive  contagion.  The  nature  of  the  associa- 
tion, the  bond  which  keeps  it  together,  has  this  unfailing  conse- 
quence,— the  tie  is  and  ever  must  be  a  combination  to  obtain 
power  for  the  associates.  It  is  true  they  always  state,  and  in 
some  cases  really  believe,  that  they  desire  power  in  order  to 
carry  their  principles  into  effect.  Thus  the  Guelphs  in  any 
given  Italian  commonwealth  may  have  desired  power  in  order 
to  resist  the  Emperor;  the  Ghibelhnes,  in  order  to  resist  the 
See  of  Rome.  The  Whigs  in  the  last  century  among  our- 
selves desired  it,  in  order  to  keep  out  the  Pretender ;  and  the 
Tories  in  order  to  protect  the  church  and  the  monarchy  from 
republican  encroachments.  But  admitting  these  to  have  been 
the  real  motives  of  the  parties,  their  mode  of  action,  the  means 
which  they  all  proposed  to  themselves  for  giving  effect  to  their 
several  opinions,  however  conscientiously  entertained,  were  one 
and  the  same — the  possession  of  power,  vesting  that  power  in  the 
hands  of  their  chiefs,  and  giving  to  the  followers  a  rateable  pro- 
portion of  the  gifts  which  the  government  patronage  enabled 
them  to  bestow.  Thus,  too,  in  the  very  extreme  case  of  party, 
that  of  the  United  States  of  America  :  it  is  very  possible  that  the 
Federalists  may  sincerely  believe  their  principles  the  most  whole- 
some for  guiding  the  government  of  the  Union,  and  the  Demo- 
crats may  as  honestly  consider  theirs  the  true  means  of  preserv- 
ing the  great  Republic.  This  is  quite  possible  ;  but  what  is  quite 
certain  is,  that  the  primary  object  with  each  party  is  the  election 
of  the  President,  and  the  result  of  its  victory  is  the  removal  of 
above  3000  placemen,  from  the  chief  magistrate  at  Washington 
down  to  the  postmaster  in  every  village,  to  make  way  for  succes- 
sors from  its  own  body.  The  same  excess  of  party  violence  may 
not  take  place  in  this  country,  where  the  same  personal  interest 
is  not  felt  in  the  conflict,  because  so  universal  a  change  is  not  the 
result  of  a  change  of  ministry.  But  we  approach  nearly  to  it ; 
and  there  pervades  the  whole  community  a  combination  of  direct 
individual  interest  with  the  profession  of  political  principles  :  so 
that  while  the  nature  of  the  game  universally  played  induces 


40  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

very  many  to  espouse  the  cause  by  affecting  the  opinions  which 
belong  to  its  supporters  (and  of  the  universal  tendency  of  this  we 
have  already  spoken),  the  manner  in  which  the  game  is  and  must 
of  necessity  be  played  creates  the  other,  and  perhaps  more  per- 
nicious evil,  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  by  allying  insepara- 
bly the  possession  of  opinions,  and  the  exertions  made  to  give 
them  effect,  with  the  direct  interest  of  the  individual,  and  thus 
corrupting  e\^en  men  who  begin  by  conscientiously  holding  those 
opinions,  and  honestly  labouring  for  their  establishment. 

For  observe  what  inevitably  ensues.  The  party  principle 
and  the  personal  interest  for  a  time  coincide  ;  but  the  moment 
is  sure  to  come  when  they  no  longer  agi'ee,  and  either  principle 
or  power  must  be  sacrificed.  The  change  is  sometimes  made 
suddenly,  openly,  with  audacious  effrontery ;  more  frequently  it 
is  effected  with  greater  caution  and  less  boldness,  and  with 
every  species  of  falsehood  and  hypocrisy.  But  at  all  times  the 
union  of  personal  interest  with  political  principle,  the  fact  (the 
fact  quite  inseparable  from  party  operations)  that  the  same  acts 
which  tend  to  promote  party  objects  also  tend,  in  the  very  same 
degree,  to  further  individual  interests,  produces,  and  must  in- 
evitably produce,  the  most  reckless  disregard  of  all  but  party 
ties  and  party  duties,  and  must  sap  the  very  foundations  of 
private  as  well  as  public  morals.  This  is  the  necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  union,  and  this  explains  the  conduct  of  men  who, 
upon  other  matters,  are  not  deficient  in  moral  principle,  but 
who  cast  all  such  ties  away  when  party  objects  are  concerned. 
The  process  of  self-deception  is  plain.  The  partisan  covei"s 
over  the  iniquity  of  his  conduct  with  the  guise  of  principle  and 
patriotism,  pursues  his  personal  gratification  as  if  he  were  per- 
forming only  a  public  duty,  and  not  only  affects  to  be  guided 
by  the  purest  of  motives,  but  oftentimes  blinds  himself  into  a 
belief  that  he  has  no  other  incentive  to  a  course  of  conduct  the 
most  sordid  or  the  most  malignant.  His  experience  of  party 
movemcmts  must  be  exceedingly  limited  who  cannot  at  once 
point  to  numberless  instances  of  men,  in  all  the  other  transac- 
tions of  Hfe  tolerably  honest  and  pure,  who  have  gratified  the 
most  selfish  propensities  of  our  nature,  or  given  vent  to  its 
most  spiteful  feehngs,  while  they  covered  over  the  naturally 
hideous  aspect  of  their  intrigues  or  their  rancour  with  the  party 
varnish  of  a  zeal  for  the  good  cause,  and  a  vehement  hostility 
to  its  enemies. 


CH.  V.  ENCOURA-GEMENT  OF  FALSEHOOD.  41 

^  It  is  in  two  ways  that  this  injury  is  done  to  men's  morals  by 

'  the  party  tie.     A  regard  for  truth  is  abandoned,  and  kindly,  cha- 

ritable, even  ordinarily  candid  feelings  are  blunted,  nay  extirpated. 
(1.)  The  basis  of  all  morals  is  a  sacred  and  even  delicate 
regard  for  truth,  a  sentiment  of  proud  disdain  at  the  bare 
thought  of  being  humbled  to  a  falsehood,  a  feeling  of  disgust  at 
all  intentional  violation  of  that  paramount  duty.  But  how  many 
men  are  there  who  will  scruple  little  to  exaggerate  or  extenuate 
facts,  nay,  to  suppress  the  truth  they  know,  and  even  forge 
what  they  are  well  aware  is  false  coin,  so  as  they  can  make  the 
concealment  available  to  the  defence  of  their  party,  or  give  the 
fiction  currency  to  that  party's  gain !  Look  to  the  perpetual 
misstatements  of  the  party  press  in  England,  somewhat  worse 
in  America,  in  France  not  quite  so  bad  as  in  either  of  the 
English  countries,  yet  occasionally  rivalling  both.  The  un- 
blushing falsehoods  propagated,  the  unretracted  misstatements 
persisted  in  after  exposure*  for  the  support  of  their  party, 
through  these  channels  of  public  information,  and  which  might 
be  rendered  the  channels  of  popular  instruction,  made  the 
first  minister,  the  leader  of  the  popular  party,  declare  in  par- 
liament, no  longer  ago  than  the  year  1839,  that  he  thought 
it  questionable  "if  the   people  of  England  would  bear   much 

*  This  is  the  very  worst  of  the  oflfences  committed  by  the  periodical  press.  If 
the  public  will  have  daily  newspapers — that  is,  works  published  with  such  haste 
as  to  render  accuracy  of  statement  and  of  argument  impracticable — they  must  lay 
their  account  with  errors  of  every  kind,  among  others  with  the  grossest  misstate- 
ments being  even  innocently  promulgated.  No  one  can  be  unfair  enough  to  blame 
very  severely  the  errors  flowing  only  from  such  a  source  ;  they  are  the  unavoidable 
consequences  of  the  hard  necessity  under  which  the  ephemeral  work  is  prepared 
and  published.  But  if  the  authors  refuse  to  retract,  still  more  if  they  persist  in 
propagating  the  error  after  it  has  been  exposed,  the  defence  wholly  fails,  and  the 
statement  which  was  a  mistake  becomes  a  wilful  falsehood.  Nay,  the  unretracted 
error  becomes  a  falsehood  by  relation  backwards,  if  not  contradicted  when  exposed. 
Now  it  is  quite  notorious  that  newspapers  generally  speaking  refuse  to  admit  such 
errors,  nay,  often  persist  in  repeating  them,  for  fear  of  injuring  their  credit  for 
accuracy,  and  so  damaging  their  sale.  This  shameful  iniquity,  like  many  others, 
never  could  be  perpetrated  by  individuals  known  and  accessible  to  the  public  in- 
dignation in  their  own  persons.  Men  acting,  that  is,  writing  for  publication,  in 
the  dark,  whose  individuality  is  uncertain,  who  may  be  one  or  may  be  more  in 
number,  who  are  not  answerable  in  their  own  persons  for  any  falsehood  however 
gross,  or  any  slander  however  foul — this  anonymous  tyrant,  free  from  all  control, 
and  not  even  exposed  to  the  risks  which  the  most  despotic  of  known  tyrants  cannot 
always  escape — is  licensed  to  do  such  things  as  we  are  here,  in  common  with  all  honest 
and  rational  men,  holding  up  to  public  abhorrence ;  and  it  must  be  added,  that  the 
freedom  with  which  this  licence  has  been  used  during  the  last  twenty  years  has  effec- 
tually destroyed  the  influence  of  the  press,  by  degrading  its  character  and  by 
rousing  a  general  feeling  of  indignation  and  scorn  against  its  scandalous  abuses. 


42  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

longer  the  falsehoods  of  the  press,  its  not  saying  one  word  of 
truth,  its  perversion  of  every  fact  and  of  every  reason.''  The 
statement  may  be  somewhat  exaggerated  in  its  detail,  as 
speeches  are  wont  to  be  which  men  deliver  under  momentary 
excitement ;  but  the  foundation  of  the  charge  is  wholly  irre- 
movable. It  is  no  light  evil  in  any  community  that  one  part  of 
it  are  trained  by  party  to  trick  and  deception,  while  another  are 
drawn  into  unreflecting  dupery, — that  the  feelings  of  public 
men  are  rendered  callous  to  public  opinion  by  seeing  its  oracles 
so  often  devoid  of  all  truth  and  justice, — and  that  the  dictates  of 
right  and  wrong  are  confounded  by  observing  how  the  best  of 
party  men,  themselves  perhaps  incapable  of  such  baseness,  are 
yet  willing  enough  to  share  in  the  benefits  which  their  followers 
thus  render  to  their  cause. 

(2.)  Next  to  the  encouragement  of  falsehood  the  gratification 
of  the  malignant  feelings  is  the  worst  point  of  the  party  com- 
pact. Indeed  this  is  of  even  a  more  extended  influence  than 
the  former  mischief,  because  there  are  many  who  must  be  re- 
moved from  all  direct  interest  in  the  success  of  a  faction,  or  of 
a  factious  operation,  and  who  nevertheless  are  prone  to  gratify 
the  spiteful  propensities  of  their  nature.  This  guides  most 
partisans  more  or  less,  and  converts  society  into  a  multitude  of 
beings  actuated  towards  each  other  rather  with  the  spirit  of 
fiends  than  of  men.  They  never  would  feel  such  unworthy 
sentiments,  assuredly  they  never  would  give  them  vent,  but  for 
the  party  spirit  that  moves  their  souls,  and  makes  them  pretend, 
nay,  often  makes  them  really  think,  that  they  are  only  further- 
ing an  important  principle  when  they  are  vomiting  forth  the 
venom  of  "  envy,  hatred,  malice,  and  all  uncharitableness " 
against  their  adversaries.  The  eloquent  invective  of  the  great 
Italian  poet,  on  the  effects  of  faction  in  the  Italian  cities  of  his  day, 
is  familiar  to  most  readers  ;  and  the  pleasing  contrast,  which  he 
paints  with  his  wonted  vigour  and  concision,  of  Soritello  rushing 
to  the  embrace  of  the  great  Mantuan  bard  on  simply  hearing 
that  he  came  from  the  same  town  with  himself.*   The  war  of  the 

♦  Ahi  serva  Italia,  di  dolore  ostello 
Nave  senza  nocchier'  in  gran  tempesta 
Non  donna  di  provincia,  ma  bordello. 

Ah  !  Italy,  of  crimes  thou  common  inn, 
Bark  without  steersman  in  the  tempest  gale, 
No  village  frail  one,  gentle  yet  though  frail. 
Strumpet,  thy  guilt's  less  hateful  than  thy  din ! 


CU.  V.  EFFECTS  ON  INFERIOR  PARTISANS.  43 

Italian  factions  was  carried  on  by  arms  and  not  by  slander  ;  the 
party  spleen  found  its  vent  in  proscription,  banishment,  confis- 
cations, executions,  tortures,  massacres.  But  the  evil  plant  was 
the  same,  it  shot  its  roots  into  the  same  soil — the  bad  passions 
of  the  human  heart ;  it  was  fostered  by  the  same  devices,  it  was 
sheltered  from  the  breath  of  public  indignation  by  the  same 
self-deception,  confounding  selfishness  with  duty;  its  growth 
was  encouraged  and  its  shoots  propagated  by  the  same  delu- 
sion which  stifled  the  warnings  of  conscience,  reconciled  the 
mind  to  its  own  degradation,  and  thus  counteracted  the  naturally 
implanted  principles  of  its  decay. 

The  two  effects  of  party,  falsehood  and  malice,  to  which  we 
have  been  adverting,  have  this  in  common,  that  their  contagion 
is  not  confined  to  the  higher  natures  which  chiefs  may  be  rea- 
sonably supposed  to  possess — they  extend  to  the  humblest  of 
their  followers.  In  military  operations  the  tricks  which  are  in- 
volved in  a  stratagem  little  affect  the  men  under  the  command 
of  those  who  devise  and  order  it ;  they  are  generally  unaware  of 
the  part  which  they  are  called  upon  to  execute,  and  have  no 
share  in  the  deception  which  is  practised.  Even  the  cruelties  of 
which  they  are  the  blind  instruments  affect  their  moral  character 
far  less  than  if  they  unbidden  performed  their  part  in  the  bloody 
fray.  But  the  falsehood  of  party  warfare,  and,  still  more,  its 
malignity,  is  actively  partaken  of  by  all,  down  to  the  lowest 
retainer.  Nor  can  there  be  a  stronger  illustration  of  this  search- 
ing nature  of  the  contagion  than  the  well-known  fact,  that  the 
humbler  retainers  are  the  most  unscrupulous  and  most  rancorous 
members  of  every  faction.  You  have  only  to  compare  the  vio- 
lence of  a  country  club  or  newspaper,  their  daring  contempt  of 
all  truth,  and  even  probability  in  their  fictions,  with  the  analo- 
goiis  proceedings  of  the  factions  in  the  capital,  to  be  convinced 
how  entirely  the  party  taint  permeates  the  mass,  and  how  active 
the  contagion  is  to  gangrene  the  remotest  extremities  of  the 
body — as  the  meaner  parts  of  the  natural  frame  furthest  removed 
from  the  soiirces  of  sensation  and  of  circulation  are  ever  the  most 
ready  prey  to  mortification. 

(3.)  The  less  obvious  evils  of  party  have  now  been  enumerated 
and  examined.  Those  which  are  most  open  to  ordinary  observa- 
tion need  not  detain  us  so  long ;  but  they  are  not  the  less  strik- 
ing for  being  the  more  obvious.  It  is  no  little  evil  that  any 
community   should    be    so   circumstanced    as   necessarily  to   be 


44  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

deprived  of  the  eflfective  services  of  half  its  citizens,  whether  for 
council  in  difficulties,  or  for  defence  against  foreign  aggression. 
Yet  thus  paralysed  are  states  in  which  parties  are  equally 
balanced.  Nevertheless,  there  is  much  exaggeration  in  the  view 
which  represents  the  party  opposed  to  the  ruling  power  as 
always  wholly  excluded  from  all  voice  in  the  government.  That 
party  exercises  some  and  a  sensible  influence  wherever  the 
business  of  the  state  is  conducted  in  a  senate  or  deliberative 
council,  open  to  both  parties.  The  opposition  prevents  some 
bad  measures  from  being  carried  ;  prevents  more  from  ever  being 
proposed  ;  alters  and  amends  some  ;  forces  others  upon  a  reluc- 
tant administration.  So  that  the  course  pursued  by  the  supreme 
power  is  in  such  states  in  a  direction  given  by  the  combination 
of  the  two  forces  ;  the  diagonal,  and  not  eitljer  side  of  the 
parallelogram,  as  we  explained  in  the  second  chapter.  Never- 
theless, though  not  excluded  from  all  voice,  the  opposition 
often  occasions  alterations,  and  interposes  obstacles  without  re- 
gard to  the  pubUc  good.  The  objections  are  taken  not  on 
their  own  merits,  not  because  the  measures  propounded  by 
the  government  are  really  open  to  objection,  but  merely  be- 
cause those  measures  are  propounded  by  the  government.  Many 
good  measures  are  thus  defeated  ;  many  changes  are  effected  in 
those  carried,  changes  detrimental  to  the  public  interests.  Some- 
times peace  has  been  precipitated,  as  in  the  treaty  of  Utrecht, 
when  the  interests  of  the  country  required  a  perseverance  in  the 
war  that  had  cost  so  much,  and  proceeded  so  successfully.  But 
it  was  a  Whig  war,  under  a  Whig  captain,  and  therefore  the 
press  and  the  party  ran  it  down,  with  its  conquering  general,  in 
order  that  the  Tories  might  gain  a  triumph  over  their  adver- 
saries. What  cared  they  if  this  could  only  be  won  by  giving 
France  a  triumph  over  England  ?  So  the  most  profligate  oppo- 
sition that  ever  minister  encountered  drove  Walpole  into  a  war 
with  Spain  which  his  good  sense  disapproved,  and  which  the 
party  chiefs  afterwards  distinctly  confessed  to  Mr.  Bxu-ke  that 
they  excited  solely  with  the  view  of  displacing  their  political 
adversary.  Among  the  crimes  of  party  in  modem  times  this 
assuredly  stands  the  blackest.  The  peace  of  twenty  years  was 
broken,  and  Europe  was  involved  in  the  countless  miseries  of 
warfare,  without  the  shadow  of  a  reason  either  in  policy  or  in 
justice,  solely  to  gratify  the  lust  of  power  raging  in  afewfamiUes 
and  their  adherents,  lords  of  the  EngUsh  Crown  and  the  English 


CH.  V.  ENCOURAGEMENT  OF  TREASON.  4,5 

Parliament.  The  factions  in  the  Italian  republics  can  alone 
furnish  a  parallel  to  this,  the  most  disgraceful  passage  in  our 
party  history. 

It  is  indeed  a  serious  evil  to  any  community  that  there  should 
always  exist  within  its  bounds  a  powerful  body  of  men  on  whom 
the  enemies  of  the  state,  foreign  or  domestic,  may,  generally 
speaking,  reckon  for  countenance  and  support.  They  never 
cease  to  pretend  that  they  are  far,  very  far,  from  wishing  to  im- 
pede the  public  service.  In  some  instances  of  urgent  danger 
hovering  over  the  country,  they  find  it  so  far  necessary  to  court 
the  public  favour,  and  disarm  the  general  indignation,  as  to 
withhold  their  opposition,  or  even  to  lend  a  faint  or  perfunctory 
support  to  the  measures  of  their  adversaries.  In  other  instances, 
where  their  resistance  would  be  hopeless,  they  are  unwilling  to 
incur  the  odium  for  nothing.  But  it  very  rarely  indeed  happens 
that  in  any  posture,  however  critical,  of  public  affairs,  the  party 
in  opposition  refrains  from  exercising  its  power  if  it  can  reckon 
upon  defeating  the  plans  of  the  government.  In  the  modern 
Italian  Republics,  as  well  as  in  those  of  ancient  Greece,  the 
faction  opposed  to  the  ruling  party  never  hesitated  to  join  the 
pubhc  enemy,  and  to  serve  against  their  o"wn  country.  No  man 
was  ever  abhorred  or  despised,  or  even  distrusted,  for  such  trea- 
son. Indeed  no  man  was  expected  to  do  otherwise  if  the  motive 
existed  for  such  a  proceeding,  and  the  occasion  favoured  its 
adoption.  In  modem  times  the  motions  of  the  government  are 
impeded,  and  the  interests  of  the  enemy  are  furthered,  by  as  sure 
though  not  so  shameless  a  breach  of  public  duty  and  violation  of 
the  allegiance  which  all  states  have  a  right  to  demand  from  all 
their  subjects.  That  certain  benefits  are  by  many  ascribed  to 
party  is  well  known  to  all  who  have  read  Burke  and  Fox  ;  and 
it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  it  may  be  expedient,  and  even  neces- 
sary, in  certain  emergencies  of  public  affairs,  for  men  who  appre- 
hend the  same  peril  from  a  policy  pursued  by  the  government 
of  their  country,  to  form  a  combination  in  order  to  resist  the 
measures  adopted  or  threatened,  and  to  waive  minor  differences 
of  opinion  in  order  to  act  in  concert  and  with  effect,  preferring, 
as  Mr.  Fox  says,  the  giving  up  something  to  a  friend  rather 
than  surrender  everything  to  an  enemy — ^jrielding  themselves 
to  the  force  of  the  bond  described  by  Mr.  Burke  as  unit- 
ing wise  and  good  men  in  all  ages  —  that  arising  from  an 
identity  of  sentiment  upon  the  sum  of  affairs.     This  forms  the 


46  OF  PARTY.  CH.  V. 

true  description  of  the  party  bond,  where  it  is  justifiable,  and 
where  it  is  formed  upon  public  principles.  But  it  presents  no 
defence  of  a  constant  and  perpetual  existence  of  factious  com- 
binations ;  of  dividing  the  whole  community  into  two  or  more 
classes,  habitually  opposed  to  each  other  ;  of  marshalling  the 
people  as  well  as  the  leading  statesmen  into  bands,  the  members 
of  which  agree  in  everything  with  one  another,  but  most  of  all 
in  both  approving  whatever  their  chiefs  propose,  and  in  resisting 
whatever  proceeds  from  the  other  faction.  Occasional  party 
unions  for  a  precise  definite  object,  or  for  accomplishing  some 
desirable  end,  beneficLil  to  the  state,  for  frustrating  some  attempt 
injurious  to  the  state,  differ  more  widely  from  what  is  called 
party  than  the  life  of  the  habitual  sot  differs  from  that  of  the 
sober  man  who  tastes  the  fruit  of  the  vine  to  recreate  his  ex- 
hausted strength,  or  counteract  a  dangerous  disease. 

Some  there  are,  indeed,  who  push  their  defence  of  party  a 
great  deal  further,  and  who  hold  it  right  that  at  all  times  there 
should  be  a  party  united  in  opposing  the  existing  government. 
Their  argument  is  founded  on  the  advantage  of  the  people 
having  some  combined  and  disciplined  force  to  resist  the  body 
which  is  ever  of  necessity  combined  and  disciplined  on  the  side 
of  power,  by  the  pay  and  the  rank  which  the  possessors  of  power 
distribute.  These  reasoners  further  contend  that  this  arrange- 
ment secures  a  thorough  investigation  of  all  measures  propounded 
by  the  government,  and  establishes  a  jealous  vigilance  of  the 
whole  of  the  government's  conduct.  There  may  be  some  little 
truth  in  this  statement ;  but  surely  no  contrivance  can  be  more 
clumsy  than  one  which  would  secure  a  correct  working  of  the 
machine  by  creating  obstacles  that  may  at  any  moment  suspend 
its  movements  ;  and  no  check  can  be  more  costly  than  one 
which  must  occasion  a  perpetual  loss  of  power,  a  loss,  too, 
always  great  in  proportion  to  the  force  required  to  be  exerted  ; 
that  is  in  proportion  to  the  necessity  of  union  and  the  danger  of 
dissension.  Only  conceive  a  person's  astonishment  who  should 
for  the  first  time  be  informed  that,  in  order  to  prevent  an  erro- 
neous policy  from  becoming  the  guide  of  a  nation's  councils, 
one-half  her  statesmen,  and  nearly  one-half  her  people,  were 
continually  and  strenuously  employed  in  working  against  the 
other  half  engaged  in  the  public  service  !  "  What  are  all  these 
able,  and  experienced,  and  active  men  aboTit  ?  "  (would  be  his 
exclamation.)     "  Their  whole  lives  are  spent  in  political  con- 


OH.  V.  DEFENCE  OF  PARTY.  47 

tention,  and  are  as  much  devoted  to  public  affairs  as  those  of 
the  ruHng  party  themselves.  With  what  views  do  they  volun- 
teer their  toil,  and  in  what  direction  are  their  efforts  bent  ? " 
To  this  there  can  be  but  one  answer  given,  and  it  would  cer- 
tainly astound  the  unpractised  inquirer — "  The  only  inspiration 
of  these  men  is  patriotism — their  sole  object  the  good  of  then- 
country  ;  the  course  they  take  to  pursue  this  end  is  opposing 
every  one  measure  of  the  government — working  against  the 
whole  policy  of  the  state."  It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  if  the 
credulity  of  the  inquirer  made  him  trust  the  truth  of  this  infor- 
mation as  to  the  motives  of  the  party,  his  sagacity  would  at 
least  incline  him  to  suggest  that  the  end  in  view  might  be 
attained  by  somewhat  more  safe  and  more  natural  means. 

But  although  we  have  pointed  out  the  great  evils  of  party  and 
its  constant  liability  to  abuse,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  every 
one  who  enlists  himself  under  party  banners  is  therefore  a 
person  devoid  of  wisdom,  far  less  of  integrity.  Men  who  really 
wish  well  to  their  country,  and  who  have  no  desire  so  near  their 
hearts  as  the  furtherance  of  principles  to  which  they  are  con- 
scientiously and  deliberately  attached,  will  often  find  themselves 
under  the  necessity  of  acting  with  others  professing  the  same 
opinions  as  themselves,  because  they  see  little  or  no  prospect 
of  giving  effect  to  those  opinions  if  they  stand  and  act  alone 
in  the  State.  The  preceding  inquiry  tends  to  make  us  jealous 
and  distrustful  of  party  unions,  and  of  the  motives  of  all  who 
form  them  ;  but  it  ought  not  to  close  our  ears  to  all  that 
may  be  urged  in  their  defence.  The  best  proof  which  they 
who  thus  combine  can  give  of  their  motives  being  pure  is 
their  patriotic  conduct  upon  great  questions ;  the  sure  proof 
of  their  course  being  unprincipled  is  their  holding  a  different 
conduct  on  the  same  questions  when  in  power  and  when  in 
opposition ;  above  all,  their  dislike  to  see  their  own  policy 
adopted  by  their  adversaries.  This  is  a  test  of  their  sincerity 
which  the  people  ought  ever  to  apply. 


48  DEFECTS  OF  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  VI. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  THE  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.* 


Defects  of  Aristocracy — No  responsible  Rulers — No  influence  of  Public  Opinion — 
Comparison  with  other  Governments — Interests  in  conflict  with  public  duty — 
Illustrations  from  Roman  Constitution  ;  Modern  Aristocracies  ;  English  and 
French  Constitutions — Legislation  influenced  by  Aristocratic  interests — Similar 
Evils  in  Democracy — Evils  of  Hereditary  Privileges — Tendency  to  make  bad 
Rulers — Comparison  of  Aristocracy  and  Democracy — Corruption  of  Morals- 
Virtue  of  French  Republicans — Galling  yoke  of  Aristocracy — Merits  of  Aris- 
tocracy ;  firmness  of  purpose — Resistance  to  change — House  of  Lords — Contrast 
of  Democracy — Republican  attempts  to  resist  the  Natural  Aristocracy — Aristo- 
cracies pacific — Exceptions,  Venice  and  Rome — Encouragement  of  Genius — 
Comparison  with  Democracy  and  Monarchy — Spirit  of  personal  honour — Con- 
trast of  Democracy — F.  Paul's  opinion  —Aristocratic  body  aids  the  civil  Magis- 
trate— Error  committed  in  our  Colonies. 

The  vices  of  aristocratic  government  are  inseparable  from  its 
natm-e,  capable  only  of  some  mitigation,  wholly  incapable  of 
entire  counteraction,  affecting  other  governments  in  which  the 
aristocratic  principle  exists  though  mixed  with  the  monarchical 
or  the  democratical,  and  affecting  these  more  or  less  according  as 
the  aristocratical  principle  enters  more  or  less  largely  into  their 
respective  systems.  We  are  now  to  examine  the  vices,  and 
afterwards  to  consider  the  redeeming  virtues  of  the  aristocratic 
polity. 

1.  The  first  and  fundamental  defect  of  this  government  is  that 
supreme  power  is  vested  in  a  body  of  individuals  wholly  irre- 
sponsible. That  the  supreme  power  is  vested  in  one  body  with- 
out any  control  from  others  is  doubtless  a  great  defect ;  but  it 
is  only  a  defect  which  every  pure  form  of  government  has,  every 
government  which  is  not  mixed  ;  it  is  the  very  essence  of  the 
pure  as  contradistinguished  from  the  mixed  forms  of  govern- 
ment. But  the  lodging  of  supreme  power  in  persons  not  indi- 
vidually responsible  is  the  vice  of  all  popular  government,  and 
of  an  aristocracy  as  much  as  a  democracy — indeed  much  more  ; 
because  no  democracy  can  exist  without  either  the  occasional  or 
the  periodical  exercise  of  a  controlling  power  by  the  body  of  the 
people.     If  those  to  whom  the  supreme  power  is  confided  are 

*  Some  of  these,  especially  the  evils  of  party,  have  been  already  examined.    But 
party  is  not  so  peculiar  to  aristocratic  government  as  the  incidents  here  treated  of. 


CH.  VT.  1^0  RESPONSIBILITY  IN  AN  ARISTOCRACY.  49 

not  bound  at  certain  intervals  to  come  before  the  people,  either 
for  a  confirmation  of  their  acts  or  for  a  renewal  of  their  trust, 
the  government  is  no  longer  democratic,  but  aristocratic,  or  oli- 
garchial. While  the  democratic  rulers  exercise  the  powers  of 
their  trust,  they  are  like  the  nobles  in  an  aristocracy,  screened 
from  individual  blame  or  attack  by  belonging  to  a  large  body, 
all  of  whom  are  implicated  in  the  acts  of  the  state.  The  main 
difference,  and  a  most  important  one,  is  that  they  must  account 
to  the  people,  either  when  their  acts  come  to  be  confirmed,  or 
when  their  term  of  office  expires ;  whereas  the  nobles  in  an 
aristocracy  never  can  be  called  to  any  account. 

It  thus  happens  that  these  irresponsible  persons  have  neither 
the  institutional  check  to  their  conduct,  nor  the  natural  check, 
neither  rendering  any  account  nor  suffering  any  penalty  for 
malversation,  nor  yet  watched  and  prevented  by  the  force  of 
public  opinion.  He  who  is  only  the  member  of  a  council  con- 
sisting of  five  or  six  hundred,  or  even  fifty  or  sixty  persons,  has 
the  blame  of  misconduct,  and  the  responsibility  for  failure,  so 
much  divided  with  his  colleagues,  that  he  cares  little  for  the 
rateable  share  of  it  that  falls  upon  himself  What  member  of  the 
Venetian  Great  Council  cared  for  the  imprecations  of  the  people  ? 
Who  regarded  the  horror  generally  excited  by  such  atrocious 
acts  as  the  judicial  murder  of  Carmagnola  against  every  rule  of 
justice,  or  the  cruel  and  unending  persecution  of  Foscari?* 
No  single  ruler,  no  council  of  eight  or  nine  members  under  an 
absolute  monarchy,  would  have  dared  to  perpetrate  such  wicked- 
ness, especially  when  barbarous  cruelty  was  complicated  with 
base,  and  revolting,  and  despicable  fraud.  So,  what  Roman 
senator  felt  scared  at  the  thoughts  of  the  popular  odium  which 
the  decrees  of  the  senate  raised  against  it  in  the  Marian  and 
Syllan  contests  ?  —What  member  of  our  own  House  of  Lords 
takes  very  sorely  to  heart  all  that  at  various  times  is  flung  out 
of  scorn,  or  ridicule,  or  hatred,  against  hereditary  lawgivers, 
in  order  to  assail  that  illustrious  senate  ?  Nor  is  it  only  that  any 
given  person  may  be  in  the  minority  who  had  no  hand  in  doing 
the  act  reprobated.  Even  those  who  were  its  supporters,  nay, 
its  promoters,  hide  themselves  in  the  number  who  concurred, 
and  among  them  escape  from  all  serious  censure. 

*  These  will  be  fully  treated  of  -when  we  come  to  examine  the  Venetian  consti- 
tution. 

PART  II.  B 


50  VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.       CH.  VI. 

We  have  seen  how  the  party  union  divides  and  even  destroys  all 
individual  responsibility.  Just  so  does  the  association  of  all  the 
nobles  forming  the  aristocracy,  and  thus  governing  the  country. 
Each  keeps  the  other  in  countenance,  and  all  screen  themselves 
under  the  name  of  the  order.  We  have  seen  (Chap.  V.)  how  all 
the  members  of  a  party  do  things  for  its  benefit  which  none  of 
them  would  venture  to  do  for  his  own  advantage.  Just  so  do 
all  the  nobles  join  in  doing  things  for  the  benefit  of  their  order, 
the  ruling  body,  which  each  would  be  scared  from  attempting 
on  his  own  account  by  the  dread  of  public  censure  or  of  per- 
sonal consequences.  "  It  is  all  for  the  interest  of  the  party," 
say  the  members  of  a  faction. — "  It  is  all  for  the  interest  of  our 
order/'  say  the  nobles.  The  prince  is  but  too  much  disposed 
to  look  only  among  princes  for  his  public,  and  to  regard  their 
praise  or  their  blame  as  all  he  has  to  consider.  But  he  is  far 
less  confident  in  the  fellow  feeling  of  the  small  circle  he  lives  in, 
and  which  he  calls  the  world,  than  the  aristocracy,  because  they  are 
a  numerous  body,  and  each  of  their  number  can  well  look  to  the 
class  as  the  public,  the  people,  the  world,  none  other  having 
any  voice,  from  the  nature  of  the  constitution,  in  state  affairs. 
It  is  the  constant  and  mvariable  disposition  of  all  men  in  resolv- 
ing upon  the  line  of  conduct  which  they  shall  pursue,  so  far  as 
they  shape  it  by  public  opinion,  to  cast  their  eyes  rather  upon 
their  own  class  than  the  world  at  large.  Judges  and  advocates 
look  to  the  bar  ;  "  The  opinion  of  Westminster  Hall  "  is  a  well- 
understood  expression  among  our  own  sages  of  the  law ;  it  is 
almost  to  them  synonymous  with  the  opinion  of  mankind.  If 
our  statesmen  do  not  confine  their  regards  to  the  chambers  of 
parliament,  it  is  because  they  are  subject  to  the  direct  interposi- 
tion of  the  people  out  of  doors.  Were  there  no  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  were  the  whole  powers  of  government  vested  in  the 
peers,  each  patrician  would  look  to  that  body  alone,  and  shape 
his  conduct  in  accordance  with  its  views.  The  case  supposed 
would  be  a  pure  aristocracy  ;  and  this  is  the  first  and  fundamental 
vice  of  that  scheme  of  polity.  The  supreme  power  is  vested  in 
the  hands  of  men  who  foraa  a  body  numerous  enough  to  be  to 
themselves  as  the  whole  world,  and  those  men  never  look 
beyond  it.  The  tendency  of  the  constitution  is  to  place  them 
wholly  above  the  influence  of  public  opinion,  which  restrains 
even  tyrants  in  their  course.     In  modem  times,  it  is  true,  this 


CU.  VI.  NO  FEAR  OF  PERSONAL  DANGER.  51 

irresponsibility  never  can  be  complete,  because  the  natural 
aristocracy  interferes  with  it  The  respect  due  to  talents,  learn- 
ing, wealth,  even  virtue,  obtains  for  those  who  belong  not  to  the 
privileged  class  a  certain  weight  in  society ;  and  their  opinion 
win  bo  in  some  degi'ee  regarded  by  the  members  of  the  ruling 
body.  But  such  a  control  must  always  be  exceedingly  slight 
and  uncertain,  compared  with  its  effects  upon  the  very  few  men, 
or  the  single  man,  who  in  a  monarchy  wields  the  supreme  power 
of  the  state. 

2.  The  want  of  individual  responsibility  in  an  aristocracy  does 
not  stop  here.  As  the  nobles,  the  rulers  of  the  state,  are  uncon- 
trolled by  public  opinion,  they  are  also  removed  above  the 
check  which  acts,  and  alone  acts,  on  the  prince  in  absolute  mo- 
narchies ;  they  have  little  or  no  fear  of  personal  violence. 
Their  numbers  place  them  in  a  condition  to  resist  any  ordinary 
tumults ;  and  the  risk  of  assassination,  which  even  sultans  and 
czars  nm,  is  very  little  thought  of  by  individuals  who  form  an 
indestructible  body.  Were  there  a  powerful  leader  to  whom 
the  public  indignation  might  point,  he  would  be  exposed  to  this 
peril ;  but  there  can  be  no  such  chief  in  the  ordinary  times  of  an 
aristocratic  government,  all  the  efforts  of  the  governing  body 
being  directed  to  prevent  any  such  influence  from  being  ac- 
quired as  directly  tending  to  subvert,  the  constitution.  Hence 
the  people  can  only  conspire,  or  rise  against  the  whole  order, 
and  this  risk  is  little  heeded  by  individuals,  or  by  the  body  at 
large.  At  the  same  time,  as  a  general  rising  of  their  subjects, 
excluded  from  all  participation  in  the  administration  of  affairs, 
might  be  the  result  of  great  oppression,  the  nobles  of  Venice, 
the  most  lasting  of  all  aristocracies,  took  care  to  govern  with  a 
light  and  kindly  hand,  and  reserved  the  principal  exertions  of 
arbitrary  power,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  for  the  factions,  con- 
spiracies, and  ambitious  views  which  might  arise  among  the 
members  of  their  own  order. 

3.  It  is  the  worst  of  all  the  vices  of  an  aristocracy  that  the 
interests  of  the  ruling  body  are  of  necessity  distinct  from  those 
of  the  community  at  large,  and  consequently  their  duties  as 
governors  are  in  perpetual  opposition  to  their  interests,  and 
therefore  to  their  wishes  as  individuals  and  as  members  of  the 
government.  Somewhat  of  the  same  vice  no  doubt  belongs  to  a 
monarchy,  and  is  corrected  by  the  other  bodies  who  share  with 

E  2 


52  VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLirY".       CH.  VI. 

the  sovereign  in  a  mixed  monarchy.  But  there  is  this  great 
difference  in  an  aristocracy,  that  the  conflicting  interests  in  a 
prince  are  confined  to  himself,  his  own  amassing  of  wealth,  his 
own  indulgence  of  personal  caprice,  his  own  partiality  to  his 
family  and  adherents ;  whereas  in  an  aristocracy  there  are  hun- 
dreds of  families,  all  of  whom  with  their  dependents  are  singled 
out  as  objects  of  exclusive  favour,  and  clothed  with  peculiar 
privileges,  which  must  necessarily  be  enjoyed  at  the  expense  of 
the  whole  community.  We  have  only  to  consider  the  legislation 
of  Rome  in  the  early  or  aristocratic  times  of  the  Republic  to 
satisfy  ourselves  how  unremittingly  and  how  shamefully  the  pa- 
trician body  will  exercise  the  supreme  power  which  resides  in  it 
for  its  own  exclusive  benefit,  and  in  contempt  of  the  people's 
interests.  The  public  land  was  almost  wholly  monopolised  by 
the  governing  class.  Some  small  portion  having  originally  been 
bestowed  on  the  plebeians,  the  acquisitions  obtained  by  con- 
quests which  their  toil  and  blood  had  made  were  retained  in 
the  hands  of  the  state,  but  enjoyed  entirely  by  the  patricians  as 
tenants  at  a  nominal  rent,  and  tenants  who  could  transfer  and 
mortgage  their  possessory  titles  at  pleasure.  The  people  too 
were  prevented  from  exercising  any  but  the  meaner  kinds  only 
of  trades,  besides  cultivating  their  pittance  of  the  soil ;  while  the 
lucrative  kinds  of  traffic,  and  that  of  the  sea,  were  reserved  for  the 
nobles.  Then  the  capital  which  they  were  thus  enabled  to  amass 
was  lent  at  heavy  interest  to  the  poor  plebeians,  and  the  rigour 
of  the  law  against  debtors  placed  them  under  the  most  strict 
and  cruel  control  of  the  patricians.  Lastly,  the  military  force  of 
the  state  was  supplied  entirely  by  the  plebeians,  while  for  some 
ages  the  places  of  rank  in  the  army,  raised  by  a  strict  conscrip- 
tion, were  reserved  for  the  upper  classes.  All  this  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  laws  which  secured  the  exclusive  powers  of 
government  and  enjoyment  of  offices  to  the  nobility.  We  shall 
hereafter  see  the  like  fruits  of  patrician  dominion  in  the  Spartan 
legislature,  and  in  that  of  the  Italian  aristocracies ;  but  no  in- 
stance is  so  striking  as  that  which  the  Roman  history  affords. 

It  is  the  same  in  a  more  limited  degree  with  several  sfovernments 
which  give  a  preponderance  to  the  aristocracy,  and  the  mischief 
bears  always  a  pretty  exact  proportion  to  that  preponderance.  The 
Swiss  republics  and  the  Polish  and  Hungarian  constitutions  will 
furnish  us  with  illustrations  of  this  proposition  ;  but  the  history  of 


CH.  VI.  INTERESTED  ARISTOCRATIC  LEGISLATION.  53 

our  own  legislature  in  England  is  not  barren  of  such  examples  ; 
and  the  almost  entire  extinction  of  aristocratic  influence  in  France 
may  be  reckoned  a  principal  cause  of  the  tendency  which  the  legis- 
lature of  that  great,  opulent,  and  flourishing  country  has  in  recent 
times  exhibited  towards  popular  arrangements.  Not  going  back  to 
feudal  legislation,  but  reserving  that  for  a  separate  consideration 
of  the  Feudal  Aristocracy,  we  need  only  recur  to  the  times  after 
that  feudal  government  had  ceased,  and  only  left  behind  it  the 
influence  of  the  aristocracy  in  the  mixed  monarchy,  to  find 
examples  in  abundance  of  its  effects  upon  the  course  of  legis- 
lation. Beside  the  laws  made,  and  those  retained  against  all 
principles  of  sound  policy,  and  against  the  most  important  in- 
terests of  the  community,  in  order  to  retain  the  preponderance 
of  the  patrician  body,  laws  restraining  the  commerce  in  land, 
and  restricting  the  popular  voice  in  the  legislature — we  find  im- 
portant advantages  granted  to  landowners  above  the  owners  of 
all  other  property.  There  is  no  occasion  to  enumerate  more 
than  a  very  few  of  these.  The  right  of  voting  for  members  of 
parliament  has  never  been  severed  from  the  possession  of  land, 
except  in  the  two  cases  of  the  freemen  in  boroughs  and  the  three 
universities.  A  man  may  possess  a  million  of  money  in  the 
funds,  or  acquired  by  commerce,  and  he  has  no  voice  in  choosing 
his  representatives,  though  the  owner  of  an  acre  or  two  of  land 
has  his  vote,  and  may  have  it  in  every  county  in  which  he  owns 
an  acre  or  two.  While  the  law  of  settlement  continued  in  its 
original  rigour,  any  pauper  might,  though  not  actually  charge- 
able, be  conveyed  from  the  place  of  his  residence  to  that  of  his 
birth  ;  but  if  he  owned  the  comer  of  a  freehold  anywhere,  he 
might  there  abide  and  defy  the  unparalleled  cruelty  of  that  law. 
While  the  tax  falls  heavy  upon  succession  to  personal  estate, 
the  produce  of  a  man's  genius  and  toil  for  a  whole  life  of  hard 
fare  and  hard  work,  and  pinching  economy,  endured  by  his 
family  or  by  himself,  and  at  the  moment  of  their  succession, 
when  it  may  be  the  most  wanted,  this  hard-earned  but  well- 
gotten  treasure  is  condemned  to  pay  large  tribute,  while  the 
broad  acres  that  have  descended  through  a  long  line  of  lazy 
ancestors  wholly  escape  the  hand  of  the  tax-gatherer.  The  laws 
affecting  the  rate  of  interest  and  the  commerce  in  grain  may  no 
doubt  be  defended,  the  one  upon  the  score  of  a  tender  regard 
for  the  interests  of  poor  debtors,  and  the  other  on  the  ground  of 


64  VICES  AND  VIKTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.        CH.  VL 

gecuring  a  steady  supply  of  food  to  the  people  ;  but  we  cannot 
shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact,  that  these  objects  are  accomplished, 
through  benefits  m  the  first  instance  conferred,  or  supposed 
to  be  conferred,  upon  the  landed  aristocracy,  whose  incum- 
brances are  somewhat  diminished,  and  Avhose  rents  are  materially 
increased  by  the  prohibitory  system ;  and  we  may  further  be 
assured  that  their  persuasion  of  its  being  for  their  benefit  has 
always  worked  powerfully  in  making  them  so  zealous  to  up- 
hold it. 

As  regards  the  administration  of  public  afiairs,  the  interests 
of  the  aristocracy  as  a  body  are  always  sure  to  be  consulted, 
and  riot  those  of  the  people.  But  individuals  are  not  likely  to 
obtain  the  gratification  of  their  selfish  desires  at  the  pubhc  ex- 
pense— the  rest  of  the  order  are  sure  to  have  their  jealousy 
aroused  by  any  such  attempts.  If,  however,  one  party  obtains 
the  decided  mastery,  there  will  be  nothing  to  prevent  its  fla- 
grantly sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  community  to  those  of  its 
own  adherents.  The  only  check  upon  such  gross  malversation 
is  to  be  foimd  in  the  party  combinations  of  their  adversaries, 
and  this  benefit  of  the  party  principle,  together  with  the  price 
paid  for  it,  we  have  already  examined  at  length.  Generally 
speaking,  we  may  lay  it  down  as  certain,  that  the  gross  malver- 
sation by  which  individual  interests  are  predominant  over  those 
of  the  community  at  large  will  be  found  more  ea.sily  affected 
and  consequently  carried  to  the  greater  excess,  by  the  ruling 
party  of  a  democratic,  than  by  the  predominant  faction  of  an 
aristocratic  republia  There  can  hardly  be  conceived  under  any 
form  of  poKty  a  more  absolutely  tyrannical  rule  than  that  of  the 
dominant  body  in  a  democracy  when  it  has,  as  in  order  to  rule 
for  any  length  of  time  it  must  have,  the  full  support  of  the  great 
mass  of  the  people.  A  refuge  from  this  intolerable  tyranny  is 
only  to  be  found  in  a  balance  of  conflicting  parties,  which  renders 
the  community  a  scene  of  unceasing  factious  broils,  hardly  con- 
sistent with  the  existence  of  a  regular  government,  and  wholly 
incompatible  with  a  tranquil  and  orderly  condition  of  civil 
society. 

4.  The  principal,  certainly  the  most  glaring  defect  of  a  mo- 
narchy is,  that  the  hereditary  succession,  which  is  an  essential 
part  of  the  system,  deprives  the  community  of  all  security  for 
those  qualities  being  found  in  its  ruler  which  are  most  essential 


CH.  VI.  TENDENCY  TO  GIVE  BAD  RULEllS,  55 

to  the  public  good.  The  chances  of  birth  expose  the  state  to 
perpetual  risk  of  either  a  wicked,  or  an  imprudent,  or  an  imbe- 
cile ruler  becoming  intrusted  with  the  sum  of  affairs.  So  an 
hereditary  aristocracy  exposes  the  country  to  a  like  risk  of  per- 
verse or  incapable  persons  being  intrusted  with  supreme  power. 
The  aristocratic  form,  then,  has  this  vice,  in  common  with  tht^ 
monarchical,  but  has  not  the  redeeming  quality  of  avoiding,  by 
hereditary  succession,  the  turmoil  and  the  shocks  to  public 
tranquillity  which  arise  from  a  conflict  for  power.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  have  seen  that  the  factious  tendency  is  more  predomi- 
nant in  this  than  in  any  other  constitution.  It  must  nevertheless 
be  admitted  that  the  risk  of  many  incapable  or  wicked  rulers 
being  found  in  the  body  of  the  nobles  is  far  less  considerable 
than  the  risk  of  a  wicked  or  incapable  ruler  becoming  the  sove- 
reign in  a  monarchy.  In  one  respect  the  two  forms  of  govern- 
ment approach  to  a  closer  resemblance.  The  education  of  tlio 
rulers  in  both  is  such  as  peculiarly  to  unfit  them  for  worthily 
exercising  the  high  functions  of  their  station.  The  traininf  of 
patricians,  next  to  that  of  princes,  is  peculiarly  adapted  to  spoil 
them.  They  are  born  to  power  and  pre-eminence,  and  they 
know  that,  do  what  they  will,  they  must  ever  continue  to  retain 
it.  They  see  no  superiors ;  their  only  intercourse  is  with 
rivals  or  associates,  or  adherents,  and  other  inferiors.  They 
are  pampered  by  the  gifts  of  fortune  in  various  other  shapes. 
Their  industry  is  confined  to  the  occupations  which  give  a  play 
to  the  bad  passions,  and  do  not  maintain  a  healthy  frame  of 
mind.  Intrigue,  violence,  malignity,  revenge  are  engendered 
in  the  wealthier  members  of  the  body  and  the  chiefs  of  parties. 
Insolence  towards  the  people  with  subserviency  to  their 
wealthier  brethren,  are  engendered  in  the  needy  individuals 
of  a  body  which  extends  all  its  legal  rights  and  privileges  to 
its  present  members — too  proud  to  work,  not  too  proud  to  beg, 
mean  enough  to  be  the  instruments  of  other  men's  misdeeds, 
base  enough  to  add  their  own.  There  can  be  no  kind  of  com- 
parison between  the  education  of  rulers  in  a  democratic,  or  a 
mixed  constitution  and  an  aristocracy  ;  there  can  be  no  kind  of 
comparison  between  the  tendency  of  republican  and  of  aristo- 
cratic institutions,  and  their  sinister  effects  on  the  characters  of 
men  engaged  in  administering  their  powers.  The  democratic 
regimen  is,  in  all  respects,  incomparably  more  wholesome  t-o  the 


56  VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.         CH.  VI, 

character,  and  more  useful  in  forming  virtuous  and  capable  men 
— men  whom  it  is  safe  and  beneficial  for  a  community  to  trust. 

5.  The  tendency  of  an  aristocracy  is  further  to  promote 
general  dissoluteness  of  manners,  self-indulgence  and  extrava- 
gance, while  that  of  a  democratic  government  manifestly  inclines 
towards  the  severer  virtues  of  temperance,  self-denial,  frugality. 
Rapacity,  or  any  care  for  amassing  wealth,  is  little  known  in  a 
pure  republic :  it  confers  no  distinction  until  the  time  arrives 
when  it  can  give  influence  and  power,  and  then  it  becomes  a 
subject  of  general  and  perilous  suspicion.  But  individual 
wealth  is  congenial  to  the  aristocratic  constitution.  When  the 
Committee  of  Public  Safety  governed  France  for  fifteen  months, 
and  almost  disposed  of  the  riches  of  Europe  as  well  as  of  France, 
these  decemvirs  only  allowed  themselves  ten  francs  (about  nine 
shillings)  a-day  for  their  whole  expenses.  Each  month  there 
was  issued  to  the  Ten  a  rouleau  of  three  hundred  francs  (about 
twelve  pounds)  for  their  whole  expenses ;  and  when  Robes- 
pierre, St.  Just,  and  Couthon  were  put  to  death  on  the  10th 
Thermidor,  1794,  there  were  found  in  the  possession  of  each  no 
greater  sum  than  the  seven  or  eight  pounds  of  their  rouleau 
which  remained  unexpended.  These  men  had  for  many  months 
the  uncontrolled  management  of  milHons,  subject  to  no  account 
whatever. 

6.  The  qualities  which  an  aristocracy  naturally  engenders  in 
the  ruling  class  of  insolence,  selfishness,  luxurious  indulgence, 
are  extremely  calculated  to  render  their  yoke  oppressive  and 
galling.  Accordingly  there  is  no  form  of  government  more 
odious  to  the  people.  We  naturally  feel  much  less  repugnance 
to  the  superiority  of  a  sovereigTi,  removed  far  above  us,  than 
to  one  more  near  our  own  level.  The  same  sentiment  which 
makes  the  rule  of  an  upstart,  lately  on  a  footing  with  ourselves, 
intolerable,  makes  the  rule  of  a  nobility  more  hateful  than  that 
of  a  prince.  It  is  more  humbling  to  the  natural  pride  and  self- 
love  of  man.  It  is,  besides,  more  vexatious,  because  it  is  less 
remote.  The  sovereign  comes  very  little  in  contact  and  conflict 
with  the  body  of  the  people  ;  the  patricians  are  far  more  near, 
and  their  yoke  is  far  more  felt  The  general  tendency  of  aris- 
tocracy is  not  only  to  vex  and  harass,  but  to  enslave  men's 
minds.  They  become  possessed  with  exaggerated  notions  of 
the  importance  of  their  fellow  citizens   in  the  upper  classes ; 


CH.  VI.  OPPRESSIVE  NATUBE  OF  ARISTOCRACY.  57 

they  bow  to  their  authority  as  individuals,  and  not  merely  as 
members  of  the  ruling  body — transferring  the  allegiance  which 
the  order  justly  claims^  as  ruler,  to  the  individuals  of  whom  it  is 
composed ;  they  also  ape  their  manners,  and  affect  their  society. 
Hence  an  end  to  all  independent,  manly  conduct.  We  are  now 
speaking  merely  of  a  proper  aristocracy,  or  one  in  which  the 
supreme  power  is  held  by  a  body  of  nobles  in  their  corporate 
capacity.  If  to  this  be  added  the  possession  of  power  by  each 
or  by  many  individuals  of  the  privileged  order,  as  in  the  Feudal 
System,  the  grievance  is  infinitely  greater ;  but  of  that  we  are  to 
treat  separately.  The  general  unpopularity  of  an  aristocracy 
underwent  an  exception  in  the  remarkable  instance  of  Venice. 
The  ruling  body  in  that  celebrated  republic,  and  the  govern- 
ment generally,  was  exceedingly  popular.  In  the  Roman  re- 
public the  case  was  widely  different.  While  the  aristocracy 
continued  unmixed  nothing  could  be  more  odious  to  the  people  ; 
and  the  constant  struggles  between  the  patricians  and  plelieians, 
frequently  breaking  out  in  open  revolt,  and  all  but  civil  war, 
still  more  frequently  demanding  a  dictatorial  magistracy  to  save 
them  from  it,  were  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  constitution  was 
unpopular,  notwithstanding  all  the  superstitious  reverence  of  the 
Romans  for  established  thingfs,  and  all  their  devotion  to  the  inte- 
rests  of  their  countr}^ 

We  are  now  to  see  if  the  aristocratic  constitution  possesses 
any  redeeming  qualities,  any  virtues  to  be  set  in  opposition  to 
so  many  imperfections.  It  is  by  no  means  devoid  of  such  merits, 
although  they  may  not  amount  to  anything  like  a  complete  equi- 
poise in  the  scale. 

1.  There  cannot  be  any  doubt  that  the  quality  of  firmness 
and  steadiness  of  purpose  belongs  peculiarly  to  an  aristocracy. 
The  very  vices  which  we  have  been  considering  lead  naturally 
to  this  virtue,  and  it  is  a  very  great  merit  in  any  system  of 
government.  The  members  of  the  ruling  body  support  each 
other — they  disregard  all  sudden  ebullitions  of  popular  discon- 
tent— they  will  not  partake  of  sudden  panics — nor  will  they 
abandon  plans  of  policy  foreign  or  domestic  on  the  first  failure, 
as  the  multitude  are  ever  prone  to  do.  A  system  of  administra- 
tion, a  plan  of  finance,  a  measure  of  commercial  or  agricultural 
legislation,  a  project  of  criminal  or  other  judicial  administration 
— may  seem  to  have  failed,  yet  the  patrician  body  will  give  it 


58  VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.       CH.  VI. 

a  further  trial  They  adopted  it  on  mature  deliberation,  and  not 
on  the  spur  of  a  passing  occasion  ;  they  will  not  be  hastily 
driven  from  it.  So  if  hostilities  have  been  entered  into,  the 
first  disaster  disposes  the  multitude  to  wish  for  peace  at  all 
hazards — they  who  had,  perhaps,  driven  the  government  to 
rush  into  the  war.  But  if  the  aristocratic  rulers  have  taken  the 
field  they  will  stand  the  hazard  of  repeated  defeats,  and  only 
abandon  the  struggle  when  it  has  become  desperate,  or  when  an 
opportunity  presents  itself  of  making  an  advantageous  peace. 
The  admirable  conduct  of  the  Venetian  government  will  afford 
us  signal  illustrations  of  this  position. 

2.  Akin  to  this  merit  is  the  slowness  with  which  such  a  govern- 
ment is  induced  to  adopt  any  great  change.  Indeed,  resistance  to 
change  is  peculiarly  the  characteristic  of  an  aristocracy  ;  and  the 
members  of  the  ruling  body  and  their  adherents  obtain  at  all  pe- 
riods, in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  the  power  of  stemming  the  revo- 
lutionary tide.  This  makes  them  equally  resist  improvements  ; 
but  it  tends  to  steady  and  poise  the  political  machine.  The  sanae 
quality  of  resisting  change,  and  the  same  general  firmness  of  pur- 
pose, belong  to  the  aristocratic  body  in  all  mixed  governments. 
In  these  it  is  productive  of  great  benefit  upon  the  whole,  although 
it  not  unfrequently  stands  in  the  way  of  improvements,  both  con- 
stitutional, economical,  and  administrative.  The  history  of  our 
own  House  of  Lords  abounds  in  examples  sufficiently  striking  of 
these  truths.  Whatever  faults  their  enemies  have  imputed  to 
the  peers  as  a  body,  no  one  has  been  so  unreflecting  as  to  deny 
them  the  praise  of  firm,  stedfast  resolution,  and  of  acting  up  to 
their  resolves.  But  for  their  determination  to  resist  measures 
which  they  deemed  detrimental  to  the  state,  or  to  which  they 
had  objections  from  a  regard  for  the  interests  of  their  own  order, 
many  measures  of  crude  and  hasty  legislation  would  have  passed 
in  almost  every  parliament.  If  ever  they  have  yielded  it  has 
been  when  the  voice  of  the  country  at  large  was  so  unanimous, 
and  when  they  were  so  divided  among  themselves,  that  a  further 
resistance  became  attended  with  greater  mischiefs  than  any  which 
they  could  ascribe  to  the  operation  of  the  proposed  changes. 
One,  indeed  the  most  remarkable,  instance  of  this  concession  was 
their  suffering  the  Reform  Bill,  in  1832,  to  pas.",  by  seceding 
from  the  struggle.  But  the  crown  and  the  people  were  then 
united,  and  a  creation  of  new  peers,  fatal  to  tlie   aristocratic 


CH.  VI.  RESISTANCE  TO  CHANGE.  59 

branch  of  the  constitution,  would  have  been  the  inevitable  con- 
sequence of  the  bill  being  rejected.  Of  this  its  adversaries  had 
timely  notice,  and  they  very  wisely  and  patriotically  suffered  it 
to  pass  by  their  secession.  They  have  since  amply  regained  any 
influence  which  they  then  lost ;  for,  during  the  last  ten  years, 
they  have  had  a  preponderating  share  in  the  government  of  the 
country. 

The  tendency  of  every  government,  as  well  as  an  aristocracy, 
is  to  resist  change  ;  and  self-preservation  is,  with  forms  of  polity 
as  with  the  human  frame,  the  first  law  of  nature.  But  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  aristocratic  form  be  not  above  all  others 
iealous  of  change,  quick  to  perceive  a  risk  of  it  in  every  measure 
of  improvement,  and  averse  to  whatever  may  by  any  possibility, 
how  remote  soever,  arm  any  other  class  than  the  ruUng  order 
with  the  power  of  shaking  or  of  sharing  its  dominion.  It  is  quite 
clear  that  the  democratic  system  has  the  least  of  this  jealousy, 
and  tends  the  most  to  promote  plans  of  general  improvement, 
because  whatever  improves  the  people's  condition  augments  their 
influence  and  confirms  their  supremacy.  All  jealousy  is  in  this 
system  directed  against  individual  ambition  and  the  formation  of 
a  privileged  class.  Attempts  are  made  to  prevent  the  accumula- 
tion of  wealth,  as  regards  landed  property.  Those  attempts  are 
frequently  successful,  by  restraining  the  power  of  devise ;  and 
similar  efforts  are  made,  and  always  vainly  made,  to  resist  the 
force  of  the  natural  aristocracy  in  other  particulars.  The  pride 
of  ancestry,  and  the  distinctions  thence  arising,  can  never  be  era- 
dicated :  but  the  prevention  of  any  substantial  privileges  from 
accruing  to  those  who  are  well  descended  is  not  at  all  difficult ; 
and  any  such  distinctions  as  would  be  conferred  by  an  order  of 
merit  are  carefully  withheld  even  from  the  highest  civil  and 
military  services.  The  project  in  America  of  a  society  or  order 
of  civil  merit,  the  Cincinnati,  soon  after  the  revolutionary  war  had 
ended,  and  the  independence  was  established,  met  with  some 
support  ;  but  it  was  speedily  frowned  down  by  the  general 
opinion  of  the  democratic  party,  and  no  similar  attempt  has  ever 
since  been  made.  Bestowing  all  offices  for  a  very  short  term  is 
the  constant  expedient  resorted  to  for  obstructing  plans  of  indi- 
vidual ambition  ;  and  the  tendency  of  war  inevitably  to  raise  up 
a  body  of  powerful  men,  frequently  a  single  person  of  predomi- 
nant popularity  and  influence,  has,  in  America,  combined  with 


60  VICES  AND  VIRTUiS  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.       CH.  VI. 

the  other  happy  circumstances  of  its  position,  discouraged  all 
military  spirit,  and  tended  to  preserve  the  public  tranquillity. 
To  such  precautions  as  these  the  repubUcan  jealousy  of  change 
is  generally  confined,  while  free  scope  is  given  to  all  improve- 
ments, and  encouragement  afforded  without  any  obstruct'' on 
whatever  to  all  the  exertions  by  which  individuals  can  either 
better  their  own  condition  or  extend  the  prosperity  of  the  com- 
munity. This  is  one  of  the  greatest  merits  of  democratic  govern- 
ment ;  and  it  stands  in  a  very  marked  contrast  to  that  extreme 
apprehension  of  all  change  which  pervades  both  absolute 
monarchies,  and  still  more  aristocracies,  making  the  rulers 
habitually  apprehensive  of  every  movement,  however  slight,  and 
consequently  of  almost  every  improvement  that  can  be  projected 
— ^haunting  them  with  incessant  alarms,  and  causing  them  to 
resist  all  the  advances  which  the  people  can  make,  not  merely 
for  the  progress  itself  at  any  given  moment,  but  for  fear  of  its 
leading  to  other  changes  unseen,  or  only  seen  through  the  mag- 
nifying power  of  their  jealous  fancy.  We  might  have  set  down 
this  as  among  the  worst  vices  of  the  aristocratic  system,  but  that 
it  naturally  connects  itself  with  that  conservative  spirit  and  power 
of  resistance  which  in  any  given  constitution  must  be  deemed  a 
merit ;  it  is  the  excess  and  the  abuse  of  the  conservative  prin- 
ciple. 

3.  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  an  aristocratic  government  will 
generally  be  found  to  be  a  pacific  one.  This  great  virtue,  cover- 
ing as  it  does  many  transgressions,  it  owes  partly  to  its  dislike  of 
change,  partly  to  its  being  ill  adapted  for  military  movements, 
but  chiefly  to  its  jealousy  of  individual  eminence,  likely  to  be 
raised  upon  the  ground  of  military  success,  and  to  the  want  of 
any  gratification  of  individual  ambition  in  the  progress  of  con- 
quest. When  the  Venetian  Government  addicted  itself  to  con- 
quests, it  was  obliged  to  adopt  the  plan  of  entrusting  its  armies 
and  navies  only  to  foreign  mercenaries,  in  order  to  escape  the 
dangers  of  usurpation  and  change  of  government.  The  Roman 
aristocracy  is  a  more  remarkable  exception  to  the  rule  ;  but  the 
popular  party,  the  weight  long  acquired  by  the  plebeians,  had  a 
great  share  in  forming  this  warlike  propensity.  Sparta  was  at 
aU  times  averse  to  war,  and  at  all  times  proved  inefl&cient  as  a 
military  power. 

4.  We  may  undoubtedly  set  down  as  a  merit  of  aristocratic 


CH.  VI.       ENCOITRAQEMENT  OF  GENIUS— POINT  OF  HONOUR         61 

government  that  it  tends  to  bring  forward  genius  and  enconrao-e 
attainments  in  various  branches  of  human  enterprise — not  merely 
poHtical  talents,  but  those  connected  with  the  arts  and  with 
letters.  The  tendency  of  a  democratic  republic  is  to  let  talents 
be  brought  into  action  by  the  stimulus  which  it  gives  to  all  men, 
and  the  opportunity  which  it  affords  to  all  classes,  of  rising 
to  eminence  equally.  The  aristocratic  government  throws  in- 
superable obstacles  in  the  way  of  political,  and  many  in  the  way 
of  judicial  and  of  military  capacity.  But  it  encourages  all  genius 
in  the  arts  and  in  letters.  The  democratic  constitution  en- 
courages talents  also  in  those  departments,  but  the  aristocratic 
fosters  genius  of  a  higher  order  by  the  more  refined  and  exalted 
taste  which  it  .produces  and  diffuses.  The  Italian  aristocracies 
afforded  the  most  celebrated  examples  of  this  merit,  and  the 
influence  remains  manifest  to  our  day  in  the  imperishable  works 
of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centiuies.  In  this  merit  the 
aristocratic  materially  excels  the  monarchical  constitution. 

5.  Akin  to  this  is  the  excitement  and  preservation  of  the  spirit 
or  principle  of  personal  honour.  No  government  so  manifestly 
excels  in  fostering  this  high  sentiment  as  the  aristocratic  ;  and 
an  aristocracy,  whether  the  sole  ruler  or  bearing  its  share  of 
rule  in  a  mixed  monarchy,  is  remarkable  for  its  beneficial  in- 
fluence in  this  important  particular.  The  manner  in  which  it 
thus  acts  is  obvious.  Men  who  belong  to  a  limited  and  privi- 
leged body  are  under  the  constant  and  jealous  superintendence 
of  all  their  fellows,  strict  in  preserving  pure  the  honour  of  the 
whole  class,  and  resolved  that  no  one  baseness  shall  be  suffered 
to  tarnish  it.  They  feel  much  less  repugnance  to  crimes,  how- 
ever hurtful  to  the  community,  which  imply  no  personal  degra- 
dation, and  feel  no  repugnance  at  all  to  crimes  of  fraud  and 
perfidy  as  well  as  of  cruelty  committed  by  the  whole  order  for 
its  own  interests.  But  they  will  suffer  none  of  their  class  to 
incur  degradation  whereby  the  body  may  suffer  without  its 
interests  being  at  all  furthered.  In  a  democracy  no  such  senti- 
ments have  any  necessary  place,  nor  have  they  in  an  absolute 
monarchy  uncombined  with  aristocratic  institutions.  In  the  for- 
mer, stem  virtue  is  held  in  high  esteem,  and  any  breach  of  the 
law,  or  disregard  of  moral  obligation,  is  regarded  Avith  aversion. 
But  the  delicate  sense  of  personal  honour  is  lightly  valued  ;  and 
a  coarseness  of  manners  and  want  of  all  refinement  accompanies 


G2  VICES  AND  VIRTUES  OF  ARISTOCRATIC  POLITY.       CH.  VI. 

a  more  rigid  conformity  to  the  laws  and  more  strict  regard  to 
moral  duties.  The  sacrifice  of  all  considerations  in  a  pure 
aristocracy  to  the  honour  of  the  ruling  order  is  exemplified  by 
what  Father  Paul  lays  down  as  a  clear  duty  in  his  '  Opinione 
j)er  il  petyetuo  Dorrvinio  di  Venezia.'  "  If,"  says  he,  "  a  noble 
injure  a  plebeian,  justify  him  by  all  possible  means  ;  but  should 
that  be  found  quite  impossible,  punish  him  more  in  appearance 
than  in  reality.  If  a  plebeian  insult  a  noble,  punish  him  with 
the  greatest  severity,  that  the  commonalty  may  know  how  peril- 
ous it  is  to  insult  a  noble." 

6.  It  is  certain  that  the  existence  of  an  aristocratic  body  in  any 
state,  whether  it  be  mixed  with  monarchy  or  with  democracy, 
greatly  tends  to  promote  order,  and  to  facilitate  the  administra- 
tion of  aifairs,  by  aiding  the  magistrate  in  maintaining  subordi- 
nation. The  manner  in  which  a  gradation  of  ranks  produces 
this  important  effect  is  obvious  ;  equally  obvious  are  the  evils 
which  necessarily  arise  from  the  want  of  such  a  controlling  in- 
fluence— an  influence  ever  superseding  the  more  harsh  appeal 
to  the  direct  force  of  the  executive  power.  We  shall  find  abun- 
dant proofs  of  this  when  we  come  to  examine  the  American  and 
other  democracies.  At  present  we  may  only  remark,  that  a  very 
great  error  has  been  committed  in  our  remaining  colonies,  those 
of  North  America  especially,  in  not  introducing  into  their  system 
an  aristocratic  body.  The  plan  of  Lord  Grenville  in  1791  (for 
his  it  was)  contained  the  groundwork  of  such  an  addition ;  but 
it  has  never  been  built  upon. 


CH.  VII.         INDIVIDUAL  INFLUENCE  IN  ARTSTOCRACIICS.  (io 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY. 


Individual  influence  in  Aristocracies — Partial  delegation  of  supreme  power — Feudal 
and  Civic  Nobility  in  Italy — Polish  Aristocracy— Operation  of  Feudal  Aristo- 
cracy on  Government — Illustration  of  Feudal  Aristocracy  from  English  History 
— Monkish  Historians — William  of  Malmesbury — William  of  Newbury — Matthew 
Paris — Roger  Hoveden — Henry  of  Huntingdon. 

We  have  hitherto  treated  of  the  aristocratic  government,  in 
which  a  select  body  of  hereditary  nobles  exercise  the  supreme 
power,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others,  and  in  which  each  member 
of  that  body,  possessing  the  same  privileges  with  his  fellows, 
only  has  by  law  the  portion  of  power  that  falls  to  his  share  as 
one  of  the  ruling  order.  But  no  such  scheme  of  polity  can  exist 
for  any  considerable  time  without  these  individuals  acquiring 
personal  weight  and  influence,  not  merely  with  their  colleagues, 
but  over  the  subject-classes  ;  and  this  will  vary  in  different  indi- 
viduals according  to  their  wealth,  their  descent  from  eminent  per- 
sons, the  services  they  have  rendered,  the  capacity  they  possess, 
in  short,  according  to  the  distribution  of  the  natural  aristocracy, 
which  has  already  been  treated  of  at  large.  The  power  of  an 
aristocratic  government  therefore  must  always  consist,  not  merely 
of  the  supreme  or  corporate  power  vested  in  the  ruling  body 
and  exercised  by  its  majority,  but  also  of  the  influence  and 
authority  possessed  by  its  individual  members  in  common  with 
all  other  eminent  members  of  the  community,  though  greater  in 
them,  as  belonging  to  the  ruling  body. 

It  may,  however,  well  happen  that  the  institutions  of  the  coun- 
try vest  direct  influence  in  the  individual  members  of  the  patrician 
body,  and  that  they  thus  possess  individually  an  authority  and  per- 
sonal weight  beyond  that  which  the  natural  aristocracy  would  give 
them,  and  beyond  that  which  the  individuals  of  the  subject-classes 
derive  from  equal  wealth,  descent,  talents,  or  services.     Not  only 


64  OF  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  VII. 

may  they  be  protected  in  their  persons  from  legal  process  to  which 
others  are  amenable,  as  for  debt,  subjected  to  different  jurisdic- 
tion for  offences,  endowed  with  titles  of  honour,  distinguished 
by  precedence  in  rank  while  not  exercising  their  political  func- 
tions, exclusively  eligible  to  fill  important  offices — all  of  which 
prerogatives  are  almost  inseparable  firom  their  position  as  mem- 
bers of  the  governing  body  ;  but  they  may  have  attached  to 
their  possessions,  or  even  to  their  persons,  rights  of  a  valuable 
nature,  and  tending  to  bestow  much  individual  authority.  They 
may  have  the  exclusive  power  of  being  followed  by  trains  of 
retainers ;  exemptions  or  other  privileges  may  be  attached  to 
those  retainers  ;  their  property  may  be  exempt  from  burdens  to 
which  others  are  subject ;  they  may  have  direct  authority  over 
their  retainers,  and  over  all  who  dwell  upon  their  property ; 
they  may  have  judicial,  and  they  may  have  military  power  over 
their  dependents  ;  in  a  word,  the  supreme  power  of  the  state 
may  to  a  certain  extent  be  delegated  to  them,  subordinate  to  the 
ruling  body  indeed,  but  supreme  as  regards  their  inferiors.  We 
have  already  shown  at  great  length  how  the  scheme  of  polity, 
which  grew  up  all  over  Western  Eiu*ope  after  the  dissolution 
of  the  Roman  Empire  by  the  inroads  of  the  northern  nations, 
created  a  class  of  privileged  persons,  whose  individual  power 
was  connected  with  the  possession  of  land,  and  who  exercised 
over  those  to  whom  portions  of  their  land  were  given  upon  cer- 
tain conditions,  an  authority  much  greater  and  more  constantly 
effectual  than  any  which  the  sovereign  could  exercise  over  them- 
selves. The  sovereign  power  in  such  a  state  may  either  be  held 
by  an  individual,  as  in  the  feudal  monarchies,  or  by  a  body,  as 
in  the  feudal  aristocracies  of  the  middle  ages.  But  in  either 
case,  the  barons,  the  noble  landowners,  or  holders  of  noble  fiefs, 
form  a  peculiar  body,  whose  powers  are  not  exercised  by  the 
whole  as  a  corporation,  but  by  each  chief  in  his  own  district. 

According  to  the  principles  of  the  Feudal  System  all  land  was 
held  in  grant  either  immediately  or  mediately  from  the  prince. 
He  was  the  over-lord  of  all,  and  no  one  could  hold  any  real 
property  except  as  rendering  him  service  and  owing  him  allegi- 
ance in  respect  of  it.  All  sub-tenants  held  of  their  immediate 
lords  in  the  same  manner.  Therefore,  when  an  aristocratic 
government  sprung  up,  or  a  democratic,  in  the  Italian  states,  it 
was  among  the  nobles  who  held  of  the  Emperor,  the  common 


CH.VII.  FEUDAL  AND  CIVIC  ARISTOCRACIES.  65 

lord  paramount,  or  among  the  citizens  of  the  towns  who  had 
grown  into  importance  and  acquired  privileges,  or  it  was  among 
the  vassals  of  the  great  feudatories — the  princes  subordinate  to 
the  Emperor ;  but  in  all  cases  of  feudal  nobility  there  was  an 
over-lord,  and  no  nobles  held  their  lands  of  any  corporation,  or 
of  any  aristocratic  body,  even  where  those  corporate  or  aristo- 
cratic bodies  had  thro-vm  off  the  Imperial  yoke  and  obtained  the 
supreme  power  in  the  commonwealth.  The  feudal  nobles  often 
inclined  towards  their  liege  lord  in  the  contest  between  him  and 
the  towns ;  but  they  generally  endeavoured  to  maintain  a  sub- 
stantive power  in  their  own  body,  and  to  resist  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  civic  nobility.  They  in  every  case  failed  sooner  or 
later,  and  were  at  length  obliged  to  enrol  themselves  in  the  civic 
companies,  in  order  to  protect  themselves  from  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  popular  body,  or  of  the  city  aristocracy,  and  in 
order  to  obtain  their  share  of  the  political  power  set  up  in  defiance 
of  the  Emperor.  But  whether  they  united  in  this  manner  with 
the  citizens,  or  retained  their  separate  condition,  they  exercised 
great  individual  influence,  from  their  possessions  and  the  num- 
bers of  their  adherents.  In  all  the  Italian  towns,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  find,  they  had  their  houses  fortified  like  castles,  and 
they  exerted  their  individual  influence  by  levying  bodies  of 
armed  adherents,  with  whom  they  waged  war  against  one  ano- 
ther, to  the  great  disturbance  of  the  public  peace,  and  often  to 
the  subversion  of  the  established  government.  The  part  of  Italy 
where  the  feudal  nobility  exercised  most  power  was  in  the  states 
afterwards  possessed  by  Venice  on  the  mainland.  The  nature 
of  the  ground  contributed  much  to  produce  this  effect.  The 
hUly  or  strong  coimtry  extended  in  those  parts  to  no  great  dis- 
tance from  the  towns,  so  that  the  fastnesses  of  the  barons  were 
near  the  scene  of  action,  and  afibrded  them  strongholds  from 
whence  they  could  sally  at  the  head  of  their  followers,  and  to 
which  they  could  always  retreat.  Under  shelter  of  those  castles 
their  retainers  could  hold  out  against  the  burgher  militia. 

Poland  affords  another  and  a  remarkable  example  of  feudal 
aristocracy — in  some  respects  the  most  remarkable  of  any.  The 
government  was  not  a  pure  aristocracy,  because  the  crown, 
though  elective,  was  conferred  for  life,  and  had  some  consider- 
able share  of  authority  down  to  the  first  partition  in  1772,  after 
which  it  became  nearly  as  nominal  as  that  of  the  doge  at  Venice ; 

PART  II.  F 


66  OF  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY.  CH.  VII. 

but  at  all  former  periods  the  effectual  powers  of  legislation  and 
the  most  important  executive  functions  were  possessed  by  the 
nobles,  while  those  nobles  excluded  the  people  at  large  from  all 
share  whatever  in  the  government,  and  each  noble  possessed 
more  or  less  of  feudal  authority  and  privileges,  in  proportion  to 
the  extent  of  his  demesnes  and  the  number  of  his  vassala 

The  tendency  of  the  individual  power  possessed  by  the  nobles 
of  any  country  to  support  the  aristocratic  government  established 
in  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  and  is  evidently  not  unmixed 
with  a  tendency  of  the  opposite  kind.  If,  indeed,  the  force  of 
the  law  be  complete,  and  no  individual  can  either  violate  its 
provisions  or  act  against  the  interests  and  security  of  the  whole 
body,  whatever  influence  each  member  has  over  his  retainers 
must  contribute  to  the  strength  of  the  government.  But  this 
supposes  not  only  a  complete  efficacy  in  the  law  to  prevent  all 
sedition  and  conspiracy — it  supposes  also  an  entire  absence  of 
party  and  its  combinations,  and  this  we  have  found  to  be 
peculiarly  difficult  to  conceive  in  an  aristocratic  constitution, 
Now  as  soon  as  such  combinations  exist  it  is  manifest  that  the 
greatest  mischiefs  both  to  the  peace  of  society  and  to  the  stability 
of  the  government  must  arise  from  the  power  of  individual 
nobles,  and  little  less  than  anarchy  can  be  expected  to  prevail  in 
a  community  so  constituted.  The  whole  history  of  the  Italian 
commonwealths,  and  much  of  the  Polish  history,  is  one  continued 
scene  of  the  faction,  confusion,  and  civil  war  arising  from  the 
power  of  individual  nobles.  In  Italy  their  fortified  houses,  or 
castles,  were  the  theatres  of  regular  sieges.  Their  bands  of  fol- 
lowers, acknowledging  no  law  but  the  will  of  their  chief,  carried 
on  war  against  each  other  as  if  they  were  the  subjects  of  separate 
and  independent  princes.  The  change  of  ministry,  as  it  would 
be  called  in  our  more  quiet  days,  was  the  elevation  by  force  of 
one  party  to  power,  and  the  expulsion  of  their  adversaries, 
generally  attended  with  the  razing  to  the  ground  of  all  their 
castles,  and  the  massacre  of  such  opponents  as  did  not  fly.  But 
no  country  under  the  dominion  of  the  feudal  aristocracy  could 
be  said  to  possess  a  regular  government.  France  and  Germany 
were,  under  their  monarchs,  as  much  a  prey  to  civil  anarchy  as 
Italy  and  Poland,  except  that  the  aristocratic  or  democratic 
power  in  the  smaller  commonwealths  of  the  south  had  even  less 
force  than  the  power  of  the  crown  in  the  north  to  restrain  and 


CH.  Vn.       ENGLAND  UNDER  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY,  67 

control  the  turbulence  of  the  barons.  We  have  already  examined 
at  such  length  the  nature  and  effects  of  the  feudal  scheme  where 
it  prevailed,  that  it  is  only  necessary  the  reader  should  be  re- 
ferred to  those  chapters  of  the  First  Part  in  which  this  important 
subject  is  discussed  (Chap.  VIIL  ix.  x.).  But  we  shall  here  add 
an  illustration  of  the  state  of  government  and  society  under  the 
feudal  aristocracy  in  the  middle  ages  ;  and  though  it  is  not  taken 
from  the  history  of  the  Italian  or  Polish  republics,  but  from  that 
of  England,  exactly  the  same  state  of  things  must  have  prevailed 
among  them,  only  that  their  annalists  have  given  us  less  minute 
information  respecting  its  details.  The  subject  is  also  curious, 
as  illustrating  our  own  early  history,  and  showing,  if  any  proof 
of  that  were  wanting,  the  folly  of  those  ignorant  and  unreflecting 
persons  among  ourselves  who  are  fond  of  bidding  us  look  to 
the  more  ancient  periods  of  our  government  for  the  perfection  of 
the  English  constitution.  The  period  to  which  we  shall  now 
refer  was  immediately  preceding  the  reign  of  King  John,  and 
the  granting  of  the  great  Charter ;  and  that  important  act  being 
on  all  hands  admitted  to  have  been  merely  declaratory,  all  the 
praises  lavished  on  the  original  form  of  our  polity  must  be 
understood  as  being  applicable  to  the  reign  of  King  Stephen,  of 
which  we  are  now  about  to  speak. 

The  Monkish  Histories  certainly  may  be  relied  on  for  the 
general  descriptions  which  they  give  of  the  state  of  the  country, 
unless  in  those  instances  with  which  ecclesiastical  controversies 
and  the  interests  of  the  church  are  concerned  ;  and,  above  all, 
they  may  be  trusted  as  not  exaggerating  in  their  accounts  of 
enormities  committed  by  prelates  or  other  churchmen,  as  well  as 
by  lay  barons. 

William  of  Malmesbury  flourished  in  the  worst  of  the  times 
which  he  describes,  about  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century. 
His  work  is  dedicated  to  Robert  of  Gloucester,  son  of  Henry  II. 
The  following  is  his  account  of  the  year  1140  : — 

"  The  whole  of  this  year  was  defaced  by  the  horrors  of  civil 
war.  Castles  were  everywhere  fortified  throughout  the  whole  of 
England,  each  sheltering  its  own  district,  nay  rather,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  laying  it  waste.  The  soldiery  issuing  forth  from 
them  carried  off  the  sheep  and  cattle,  not  sparing  even  the 
churches  or  the  cemeteries.  The  houses  of  the  WTctched 
peasantry  were  stripped  of  everything  to  their  very  straw  thatch, 

F  2 


68  OF  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY,  CH.  VII. 

and  the  inhabitants  bound  and  flung  into  prison.  Many  of  them 
breathed  their  last  in  the  tortures  which  were  inflicted  on  them 
in  order  to  force  them  to  ransom  themselves.  Nor  could  even 
bishops  and  monks  pass  in  safety  from  town  to  town.  Numbers 
of  Flemings  and  Bretons,  accustomed  to  live  by  plunder,  flocked 
to  England  to  share  the  general  booty." — (Will.  Malm.,  185.) 

"  Such,"  says  the  author  of  Gesta  Regis  Stephani,  961,  "  such, 
was  the  doleful  aspect  of  our  miseries,  such  the  most  dishonour- 
ing form  of  the  sordid  tragedy  (qucestuosce  tragedicB  inhones- 
tissimus  modus)  everywhere  openly  exhibited  in  England. 
Prelates  themselves,"  he  adds,  "  shameful  to  tell,  not  indeed  all 
of  them,  but  very  many,  or  a  great  proportion  of  the  whole  (non 
tiimen  om,nes,  sed  pluriTni  ex  omnibus),  armed  and  fully  ap- 
pointed, and  mounted,  did  not  scruple  to  join  the  haughty  spoilers 
of  the  country,  to  partake  of  the  plunder,  and  putting  to  the 
torture,  or  casting  into  dungeons,  whatever  soldiers  they  took,  and 
imputing  to  their  soldiery  all  the  outrages  of  which  they  were 
themselves  the  authors.  And  to  say  nothing  of  the  others  (for 
it  would  be  indecent  to  blame  all  alike),  the  principal  censure  of 
such  impious  proceedings  fell  upon  the  Bishops  of  Winchester, 
Chester,  and  Lincoln,  as  more  intent  than  the  rest  upon  such 
evil  courses." — (Lib.  ii.  p.  962.) 

The  treatment  which  the  cro^vn  met  with  from  the  barons  is 
thus  described  by  William  of  Malmesbury,  speaking  of  the  year 
1138: — "Their  demands  from  the  king  had  no  end:  some 
would  ask  lands,  some  castles  ;  in  short,  whatever  they  had  a 
mind  to,  that  they  must  have.  If  ever  he  delayed  granting 
their  requests,  straightway  they  became  incensed  and  fortified 
their  castles  against  him,  plundering  his  lands  to  an  enormous 
amount.  The  king's  profusion  never  could  satisfy  them  ;  the 
earls  who  had  not  already  been  endowed  with  crown  lands  rose 
against  him  ;  they  became  more  greedy  in  their  demands,  and 
he  more  lavish  in  his  grants." — (Lib.  i.) 

William  of  Newbury  informs  us  that  "  he,  the  least  of  the 
saints  of  Christ,  was  first  bom  unto  death  in  the  first  year  of 
Stephen's  reign,  and  again  born  unto  life  in  the  second  year." 
To  describe  the  anarchy  which  prevailed  ho  cites  the  text — "  In 
these  days  was  no  king  in  Israel,  but  every  one  did  as  seemed 
good  in  his  eyes."  Neither  the  king  nor  the  Empress  Maude 
had  any  real  power. — "  The  animosities  of  the  contending  pro- 


CH.  VII.      ENGLAND  UNDER  THE  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY.  (59 

vincial  nobles  waxing  hot,  castles  had  arisen  in  every  part  of 
the  country  from  the  fury  of  the  conflicting  factions,  and  there 
were  in  England  as  many  kings,  or  rather  tyrants,  as  tliere  were 
owners  of  castles — each  having  power  of  life  and  death,  and  of 
administering  justice  to  their  subjects  like  so  many  sovereigns." 
— "  Thus,"  he  afterwards  says,  "  by  contending  against  each 
other  with  long  established  mutual  hatred,  they  so  wasted  with 
rapine  and  fire  the  fairest  regions,  that  in  a  country  once  most 
fertile  almost  all  power  of  growing  grain  was  destroyed." — 
(Lib.  i.,  cap.  xxiiL) 

Matthew  Paris  lived  a  century  later,  but  he  gives  the  same 
account  of  those  dreadful  times  ;  the  same  picture  of  a  wretched 
country,  abandoned  to  the  rule  of  local  tyrants,  the  intolerable 
yoke  of  a  feudal  aristocracy ;  but  flourishing  as  our  romance 
writers  Avill  always  have  it  under  the  sway  of  chivalrous  barons, 
the  paternal  rule  of  mighty  chiefs  who  revelled  in  their  halls, 
led  forth  gallant  hosts  to  do  deeds  of  arms,  and  while  they 
ravaged  the  country  or  plundered  their  neighbouring  lords, 
entertained  minstrels  to  sing  their  deeds  and  magnify  their 
name. 

"  There  was  no  shelter  from  violence  even  in  the  shades  of 
night.  Everything  was  wrapt  in  slaughter  and  fire.  Shouts, 
and  wailing,  and  shrieks  of  horror  resounded  on  every  side." 
These  are  the  words  of  Matthew  Paris  (1 1 39),  and  Roger  Hove- 
den  uses  the  same  language. 

At  length  a  treaty  was  made  between  Stephen  and  the  Duke 
of  Normandy,  afterwards  Henry  II.,  the  principal  article  of 
which  was  applied  to  the  extinction  of  this  ancient  pest.  It  was 
agreed  that  all  the  castles  erected  since  the  time  of  Henry  I. 
should  be  pulled  down.  No  one  dared  to  propose  any  destruc- 
tion of  the  old,  and,  as  it  were,  established  strongholds  of  vio- 
lence, rapine,  and  anarchy.  A  hundred  and  twenty-six  were 
within  the  scope  of  this  stipulation.  It  is  however  to  be  observed 
that  the  treaty  itself,  as  given  in  Rymer  (Feed.,  i.  18),  contains 
no  such  provision ;  and  Henry  of  Huntingdon  says  that  "  the 
brightness  of  the  day  was  overcast  in  some  degree  by  the  meet- 
ing of  the  two  princes  at  Dunstable,  where  they  complained  that 
some  of  these  castles,  erected  for  the  worst  of  purposes,  remained 
still  entire,  contrary  to  the  treaty,  owing,  it  was  said,  to  the 
goodnature   of  Stephen   sparing   some    of  his  barons."  (398.) 


70  OF  THE  FEUDAL  AEISTOCRACY.  CH.  VII. 

William  of  Newbury  relates  how  "  castles  were  biirnt  after  the 
treaty  like  wax  melted  in  the  fire,  they  having  before  served  as 
retreats  to  wicked  men  and  dens  of  robbers,"  When  Henry  II. 
came  to  the  throne  he  took  care  to  see  the  stipulation  executed, 
destroying  all  the  castles  built  since  Henry  the  First's  time,  with 
only  a  very  few  exceptions. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  England  under  the  Feudal  aristo- 
cracy ;  but,  no  doubt,  rendered  far  more  the  prey  of  general 
anarchy  by  the  evils  at  the  same  time  aflSicting  tlie  country  of  a 
disputed  succession.  The  consequent  weakness  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  incentives  to  civil  war,  acted  upon  the  materials 
of  revolt  and  turbulence  which  the  force  individually  possessed 
by  the  barons  collected  in  every  part  of  the  kingdom  ;  and  it 
may  fairly  be  questioned  whether  in  any  country  pretending 
to  have  a  regular  government,  and  removed  by  but  a  step 
from  barbarism,  there  ever  was  seen  in  the  world  such  a  state 
of  things  as  England  presented  during  the  sad  period  of  which 
we  have  been  surveying  the  annals  upon  the  testimony  of  con- 
temporary and  imsuspected  witnesses 


CH  Vin.  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES.  71 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES.— POLAND. 


Tendency  of  Aristocracy  towards  mixed  Government — May  be  really  pure  when 
apparently  mixed — Examples :  Venice,  Genoa,  Lucca,  San  Marino — Polish  Con- 
stitution— Ancient  History — Origin  of  factious  spirit — Extinction  of  all  jealousy 
of  Foreign  influence — Patriotism  of  the  Czartoriskjs — Conduct  of  neighbouring 
Powers — The  Partition — Nobles  strictly  an  Aristocracy — Their  Privileges — 
Palatines  ;  Castellans ;  Starosts — Elective  Crown — Foreign  interference — Diet 
of  Election — Royal  Prerogative — Change  in  1773 — Senate — Its  Constitution  and 
functions — Chamber  of  Nuncios — Functions  of  the  Diet — Absurdities  in  its 
Constitution — Prophylactic  power  and  Vis  Medicatrix  in  Governments — Miti- 
gating devices  in  the  Polish  Constitution — Administration  of  justice — Defect  in 
the  English  similar  to  one  in  the  Polish  Government — Military  System — 
Character  and  habits  of  the  Nobles — Prince  Czartorisky. 

We  have  already  seen  that  an  aristocracy  may  be  easily  com- 
bined so  as  to  form  part  of  some  other  constitution  ;  that  its  na- 
ture even  lends  itself  to  such  changes  and  modifications  as  pro- 
duce a  mixed  government ;  and  that  accordingly  there  have  been 
very  few  instances  of  purely  aristocratic  constitutions  lasting  for 
any  such  length  of  time  as  monarchies  are  generally  found  to 
endure.  Wherever  the  aristocratic  principle  enters  into  any 
form  of  government,  it  brings  with  it  more  or  less  of  the  conse- 
quences which  we  have  seen  follow  from  the  establishment  of 
that  scheme  of  polity,  more  or  less  in  proportion  as  the  principle 
enters  more  or  less  largely  into  the  system.     This  is  manifest. 

But  it  is  also  clear  that  a  government  does  not  cease  to  be 
aristocratic,  and  may  well  be  so  described — it  does  not  become, 
properly  speaking,  a  mixed  government — by  the  mere  addition 
to  the  aristocratic  body  of  some  other  power,  too  feeble  to  con- 
trol it  or  to  share  with  it  the  supreme  power.  Thus  the  Vene- 
tian government,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  was  most  strictly 
speaking  a  pure  aristocracy,  though  nominally  at  its  head  was 
placed  a  kind  of  mock  chief,  a  mere  shadow  of  royalty,  in  the 
person  of  the  Doge.  The  like  may  be  said  of  Genoa  during  the 
time  that  the  aristocracy  prevailed  and  excluded  the  popular  in- 


72  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES  -  POLAND.  CH.  VIII. 

fluence.  In  Lucca  and  San  Marino,  the  Gonfaloniere,  though 
possessing  more  authority,  could  not  be  said  to  change  the  aris- 
tocratic or  oligarchical  frame  of  the  constitution.  Neither  does 
the  circumstance  of  the  executive  power,  or  rather  a  portion  of 
it,  being  conferred  by  election,  make  any  difference.  If  that 
power  were  substantial  and  real,  if  it  eflfectually  counteracted  the 
aristocratic  influence,  then,  although  conferred  by  the  nobles,  if  it 
were  bestowed  for  life,  it  would  make  the  government  a  mixed 
monarchy,  and  if  conferred  by  the  people  it  would  be  equally 
monarchical,  though  the  right  of  election  in  both  instances  would 
tend  to  give  the  choosing  body — ^the  nobles  in  the  one,  and  the 
people  in  the  other — some  additional  weight  in  the  balance  of 
constitutional  power.  So  the  Doge  or  the  Gonfaloniere  being 
elective  officers  did  not  make  them  the  less  monarchical :  it  was 
their  insignificant  authority,  their  irapotency  to  control  the 
aristocracy,  that  made  their  weight  as  dust  in  the  balance  of  the 
constitution. 

The  two  countries  in  the  constitution  of  which  the  principle 
of  aristocracy  has  entered  most  largely  are  Poland  and  Hun- 
gary. In  both  of  these  the  government  might  be  truly  tenned 
mixed,  because  the  sovereign,  elective  in  the  one  and  hereditary 
in  the  other,*  possessed  considerable  power,  although  the  root  of 
the  monarchy,  especially  of  the  PoUsh  monarchy,  was  planted  in 
the  patrician  body.  In  both,  too,  there  was  a  large  addition  to 
the  influence  of  the  crown  from  foreign  influence;  in  Poland, 
from  the  unjust,  unconstitutional,  and  illegal  interference  of 
foreign  powers  ;  in  Hungary,  from  the  crown  being  for  ages 
worn  by  the  Austrian  monarch,  and  from  the  consequent  pre- 
valence of  all  the  disturbing  forces  which  we  have  seen  belong 
to  the  imperfect  federal  system. — We  shall  now  examine  thess3 
two  constitutions,  as  afibrding  full  illustrations  of  the  aristocratic 
principle,  while  we  proceed  to  treat  in  detail  of  ancient  and 
modem  aristocracies. 

The  kingdom,  or  the  republic  of  Poland,  for  it  has  gone  by 
both  names,  was,  before  its  partition  had  been  effected  by  one 
of  the  most  detestable  national  crimes  that  human  ambition  ever 
committed,  among  the  most  extensive  and  important  states  of 
Europe.     Its  surface  stretched  over  nearly  250,000  square  miles ; 

*  The  crowu  was  urigioally  hereditary  iu  Poland,  aiid  elective  in  Hungary. 


CH.  VIII.  POLISH   HISTORY.  73 

its  population  exceeded  twenty  millions  ;*  its  productions,  vege- 
table and  mineral,  were  rich  and  various ;  its  rivers  gave  easy 
vent  to  its  produce,  though  it  possessed  little  seacoast ;  and  its 
position  in  the  centre  of  Europe  gave  it  a  natural  influence  over 
the  neighbouring  states. 

The  feudal  polity  prevailed  here  as  over  the  greater  portion  of 
Europe  to  the  south  of  the  Baltic  Sea,  although  it  was  not 
reduced  to  so  regular  a  system  as  in  most  of  the  other  countries. 
The  division  of  the  land  was  more  unequal ;  but  there  were  no 
great  fiefs  as  in  France  and  Italy.  The  sovereign  had,  as  every- 
where, in  theory  a  very  limited  prerogative,  in  practice  still  less 
authority  ;  and  the  barons  had  extensive  powers  over  their  vassals, 
and  an  overruling  influence  in  the  government.  As  tlierc  were 
no  great  feudatories  dividing  the  country  into  so  many  princi- 
palities, governing  each  in  a  kind  of  federacy  under  the  common 
superior,  there  was  no  difterence  between  the  legal  privileges 
and  rights  of  the  numerous  barons  or  landowners.  The  more 
wealthy,  those  who  possessed  the  largest  estates,  had,  of  course, 
most  influence  ;  but  all  were  recognised  as  the  ruling  order,  and, 
together  with  the  sovereign,  and  much  more  than  the  soveieign, 
carried  on  the  administration  of  aflfairs. 

The  sovereign  was  nominally  elective ;  but  as  soon  as  one 
powerful  family  had  obtained  the  crown,  they  had  suflicient 
influence  to  transmit  it,  by  making  the  election  fall  upon  some 
one  of  their  number  on  each  successive  vacancy.  Thus  the  Jagel- 
lons,  descended  from  Jagellon,  Duke  of  Lithuania,  uniting  that 
duchy  with  Poland  in  1385,  on  his  marriage  with  Hedwige  of 
Anjou,  the  Polish  queen,  continued  to  reign  till  1572  ;  and  the 
Piast  race,  from  which  Hedwige  had  sprung,  was  on  the  Polish 
throne  in  the  tenth  century,  and  before  the  introduction  of 
Christianity.  The  nobles  chose  one  Piast  after  another  for 
successive  ages ;  and  it  was  not  till  the  Jagellon  dynasty,  which 
had  reigned  for  two  centuries,  became  extinct,  upon  the  death 
of  Sigisraund  Augustus  in  1572,  that  the  elective  system,  the 
cause  of  all  the  evils  which  afterwards  befell  the  country,  became, 
after  the  succession  of  three  Vasas,  completely  established  in 
substance  as  well  as  in  name. 

The  first  struggle,  however,  to  which  this  wretched  system 

*  This  includes  Lithuania,  the  extent  of  •which  was  120,000  square  miles,  and 
the  population  nt-arly  six  millions. 


74  MIXED  ARISTOCRiciES— POLAND.  CH.  VIII. 

gave  rise,  was  productive  of  considerable  benefit  to  the  nation. 
The  "  Confederation  of  Poland,'^  as  it  was  ever  after  called  and 
almost  ever  respected,  decreed  that  all  distinction  of  poHtical 
privileges  on  account  of  religious  differences  should  cease,  and 
that  every  sect  should  enjoy  the  same  civil  rights.  This  great 
event  happened  in  1573  ;  Henry  of  Valois  was  elected  king,  and 
soon  after  resigned  the  throne,  when  be  became  Henry  III.  of 
France  on  the  death  of  Charles  IX.  The  factious  spirit  which 
an  aristocracy,  governing  with  an  elective  king,  engendered  and 
spread  over  the  whole  community,  soon  took  such  entire  pos- 
session of  all  men,  that  no  animosity  was  felt  towards  any  foreign 
enemy  ;  no  jealousy  was  entertained  of  any  foreign  interference  ; 
no  precautions  were  taken  against  any  foreign  aggression.  The 
two  most  formidable  neighbours  of  the  republic  were  certainly 
Austria  and  Muscovy.  In  1586  the  czar,  Feodor  Ivanovitch, 
was  very  near  being  elected  ;  and  Maximilian  of  Austria  was 
actually  chosen  king.  It  is  true  he  had  a  competitor,  whom  his 
own  party  also  elected ;  but  it  was  another  foreign  prince  and  a 
powerful  neighbour,  though  less  formidable  than  the  other  two, 
Sigismund  Vasa  of  Sweden.  A  civil  war,  combined  with  a 
foreign,  ensued  from  this  double  choice :  Maximilian  was  defeated 
by  John  Zamoyski  and  taken  prisoner ;  and  Sigismund,  though 
he  lost  his  hereditary  kingdom  of  Sweden,  reigned  nearly  half  a 
century  in  Poland — ruining  the  country  by  his  weakness,  and 
oppressing  it  by  his  bigotry,  which  led  him  secretly  to  violate 
the  Confederation,  though  he  dared  not  openly  to  act  against  its 
salutary  provisions.  The  spirit  of  faction  joined  with  his  mis- 
govemment  to  make  his  reign  a  long  anarchy  ;  but  the  wise 
government  of  his  two  sons,  who  were  fortunately  chosen  after 
him,  especially  the  second,  John  Cassimir,  did  much  to  restore 
the  public  prosperity. 

The  great  nobles,  or  magnates,  had  hitherto  the  chief  share 
both  in  the  government  of  the  country  and  the  election  of  the 
king.  The  lesser  nobles  could,  by  combining  against  them,  dispose 
of  the  election,  though  they  could  never  long  retain  a  permanent 
influence  in  the  government  from  the  inevitable  effects  of  the 
natural  aristocracy.  In  1668  their  combination  obtained  the 
election  of  Michael  Prince  Wisniowietzki,  who  was  succeeded  in 
1673  by  the  heroic  John  SobieskL  At  his  decease  the  House  of 
Saxony,  through  Ilus.sian  influence,  obtained  the  crown,  which 
they  held  through  the  same  support  from  1690  to  1763. 


CH.  VIII.  PATRIOTISM  OF  THE  CZARTORISKYS.  75 

Now  began  the  glorious  efforts  of  the  Czartoriskys,  the  most 
noble  and  virtuous  of  the  great  houses  of  Europe  ;  efforts  which 
have  been  nobly  persevered  in  ever  since,  and  which  have  ended 
in  the  voluntary  destruction  of  that  self-devoted  family  of  illus- 
trious patriots.  Endowed  with  such  ample  possessions  that  their 
quota  to  the  levy  in  times  of  peril  was  not  less  than  20,000  armed 
men ;  descended  from  the  Jagellons  ;  allied  by  marriage  with 
all  the  other  great  families  of  the  realm,  and  with  many  of  the 
royal  houses  of  Western  Europe ;  yet  more  revered  for  their 
virtues  and  their  patriotism  than  respected  for  their  power,  they 
endeavoured  to  bring  about  those  essential  reforms  in  the  consti- 
tution which  the  sad  experience  of  past  times  had  proved  to  be 
so  eminently  wanted.  But  Russia  and  her  tools,  the  Saxon 
party,  resisted  all  change  ;  and  although  she  was  during  the 
Empress  Elizabeth's  reign  most  unexpectedly  and  most  unac- 
countably gained  over  to  the  liberal  interest,  the  Saxons  now 
obtained  the  aid  and  countenance  of  France,  which  put  herself 
at  the  head  of  that  party  called  the  republican,  because  they 
maintained  the  supreme  power  of  the  nobility  and  opposed  all 
salutary  reform,  and  among  others  the  formation  of  a  vigorous 
executive.  Nevertheless  the  Russian  influence  joined  to  that  of 
the  patriots  under  the  Czartoriskys  succeeded  in  strengthening 
the  power  of  the  crown,  restricting  that  of  the  nobles,  and  above 
all  placing  bounds  to  the  exercise  of  the  veto,  the  great  flaw  in 
the  system,  and  which  made  an  impossibility,  the  imanimous 
concurrence  of  the  diet,  an  indispensable  requisite  to  all  legisla- 
tive acts.  Under  the  same  influence  Poniatowski  was  chosen 
king  in  1764,  on  the  decease  of  Augustus  III.  of  Saxony  ;  and 
there  appeared  for  a  while  the  dawn  of  brighter  days  for  Poland. 
Soon,  however,  the  inherent  vice  of  the  system,  the  interference 
of  foreign  influence,  again  broke  out,  and  Russia  found  that  her 
preponderance  was  gone  if  the  reforms  lately  effected  were 
suffered  to  be  maintained.  In  less  than  two  years  the  veto 
was  restored,  the  crown's  power  reduced  to  its  former  crippled 
state,  and  the  formal  guarantee  of  Russia  interposed  to  the 
existing  constitution  —  in  other  words,  to  the  perpetuation  of 
those  abuses  and  that  anarchy  which  rendered  the  whole  ad- 
ministration dependent  upon  her  own  pleasure,  and  made  the 
Russian  Ambassador  nder  of  the  country. 

The  fruits  of  the  vile  tree  thus  again  planted  and  thus  nur- 


76  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — POLAND.  CH.  VIII. 

tured  were  soon  gathered  by  the  hands  that  had  cherished  it. 
In  1772  a  portion  of  the  country  containing  five  millions  of  in- 
habitants was  seized  on,  without  the  shadow  of  a  pretext,  by  its 
three -most  powerful  neighbours,  Russia  leading  the  way  in  this 
great  pillage,  and  receiving  the  lion's  share  of  the  spoil  In 
1791  the  progress  of  liberty  and  of  free  opinions,  accelerated  by 
the  French  revolution,  gave  birth  to  a  vigorous  effort  in  behalf 
of  Polish  reform.  The  constitutional  diet,  on  the  3rd  of  May,  in 
that  year,  promulgated  a  new  constitution,  framed  on  the  model 
of  our  own,  and  to  the  merits  of  which  Mr.  Burke  himself  bore 
a  generous,  though  perhaps  not  a  very  willing,  testimony.  Had 
it  not  contained  the  two  cardinal  defects — first,  of  being  some- 
what too  much  in  advance  of  the  age,  finding  the  people  with 
their  aristocratic  regimen  unprepared  for  its  provisions  ;  and  next, 
of  making  no  effectual  provision  for  raising  a  sufficient  national 
force — there  is  great  reason  to  believe  that,  in  the  critical  position 
of  European  affairs  in  which  it  was  launched,  it  might  have 
survived  to  bless  the  country  with  a  regular  and  orderly  govern- 
ment, and  to  secure  its  independence  from  foreign  aggression. 
But  the  spoiler  was  at  hand  :  the  partitioning  powers  suddenly 
took  the  field  ;  they  wasted  the  country  and  besieged  the  towns ; 
after  massacres,  of  which  there  is  no  other  example  in  the 
modem  warfare  of  European  nations,  they  overturned  the  new 
constitution,  and,  as  the  price  of  their  interference,  divided  among 
themselves  half  of  what  their  former  crimes  had  left  nominally 
independent.  Two  years  later  the  final  bloAV  was  struck,  and, 
after  a  desperate  struggle  under  the  gallant  Kosciuszko,  tliey 
erased  this  ancient  kingdom  from  the  map  of  Europe. 

We  are  now  to  view  more  nearly  the  structure  of  this  bad 
government ;  the  worst,  without  any  exception,  that  has  ever 
been  established  for  any  length  of  time  in  any  part  of  the  world 
— ^the  one  which  most  signally,  most  constantly,  and  most  inevi- 
tably failed  to  bestow  upon  its  subjects  the  benefit  that  all  govern- 
ment is  formed  to  dispense — internal  tranquillity  and  security 
from  foreign  aggression.  Whatever  we  have  already  seen  of  mis- 
fortune befalling  the  country,  whatever  we  are  yet  to  observe 
of  tumult  and  anarchy  in  the  adminis  ration  of  its  affairs,  all 
proceeded  directly  from  this  fruitful  source  of  public  calamity. 

The  chief  power  of  the  state,  although  not  the  supreme  or 
the  sole  power,  was  lodged  in  the  patrician  body.     Every  noble 


CH.  VIII.  RIGHTS  OF  THE  NOBLES.  77 

had  an  equal  voice  in  exercising  the  functions  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  he  used  it  by  voting  for  the  election  of  representa- 
tives, called  nuncios,  that  is,  delegates  or  ambassadors  to  the 
chamber  of  nuncios  in  the  diet,  or  supreme  legislative  assembly. 
The  choice  was  made  at  provincial  assemblies,  or  lesser  diets, 
called  dietines.  The  rights  and  condition  of  nobility  .could  only 
be  conferred  by  the  united  voice  of  the  three  states  composiug 
the  diet,  namely,  the  king,  the  senate,  and  the  nuncios  ;  conse- 
quently the  body  was  strictly  an  aristocracy  (Chap.  i.  Part  ii.), 
all  the  family  of  each  noble  having  its  privileges  by  inheritance, 
and  no  person  having  the  power  of  entering  into  the  body  with- 
out its  own  consent  expressly  given.  The  dietines  decided  all 
claims  of  nobility,  on  the  production  of  the  claimant's  title  or 
letters  of  nobility ;  and  the  severest  penalties  were  denounced 
against  any  one  who  should  presume  unauthorised  to  usurp 
the  rank,  or  to  prefer  false  or  fictitious  claims  ;  he  might  even 
be  put  to  death  by  any  noble  summarily  and  without  trial. 
The  rank  was  not  lost  by  intermarriage  with  persons  of  an  infe- 
rior class ;  consequently  the  claimant  had  only  to  prove  his 
noble  male  descent ;  but  three  generations  of  descent  must  have 
elapsed  before  the  privileges  could  be  fully  enjoyed,  unless  in 
extraordinary  cases  of  public  service.  The  noble  thus  descended 
and  thus  entitled  was  termed  Scartabel  (quasi  Bellus  ex  Charta). 
The  rights  of  nobility  were  forfeited  by  crimes  and  by  following 
a  degrading  trade  ;  but  menial  service,  even  in  the  house  of  a 
foreigner,  did  not  forfeit ;  it  only  suspended  the  right  of  voting 
during  the  servitude. 

Beside  the  elective  franchise,  the  Polish  noble  enjoyed  other 
immunities  of  an  extraordinary  kind.  He  alone  could  hold 
landed  property.  He  had  a  right  to  all  mines  and  minerals, 
including  salt  mines,  on  his  lands,  commoners  being  excluded 
from  such  rights  entirely.  He  exercised  jurisdiction  over  his 
peasants  or  vassals,  even  to  the  extent  of  life  and  death.  His 
house  was  an  asylum,  giving  refuge  from  arrest  to  all  male- 
factors, and  all  debtors,  though  he  became  in  some  sort  answer- 
able if  he  shielded  any.  His  own  person  was  sacred,  and  he 
could  only  be  arrested  upon  a  judicial  conviction  of  a  crime, 
or  if  taken  in  the  act.  No  great  office,  hardly  any  other  of 
importance  under  the  crown,  could  be  held  but  by  a  noble  ;  and 
these  were  of  high  pecuniary  value  as  well  as  power  and  in- 


78  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — POIJIND.  CH.  VIII. 

fluence.  The  chief  were  ^xildtiTiates,  eastellanies,  and  starosties. 
The  palatines  were  governors  of  provinces  and  chiefs  of  the 
nobles  within  their  respective  bounds,  heading  them  when 
called  out  on  great  emergencies,  in  the  pospolite,  arriere-ban, 
or  levy  en  irmsse,  and  also  commanding  them  in  war.  The 
castellans,  originally  the  lieutenants  of  the  palatines,  became 
afterwards  invested  with  equal  powers,  only  in  smaller  districts. 
The  palatmates  and  eastellanies  were  rather  offices  of  hono\u- 
and  influence  than  of  profit ;  but  the  starosties  re  exceed- 
ingly valuable  in  point  of  emolument.  They  were  attached  to 
the  lands  originally  domains  of  the  crown,  and  no  one  could 
hold  a  starosty  without  possessing  some  portion  of  this  land. 
They  were  a  species  of  government,  and  many  of  them  had 
civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction.  The  income  amounted  in  some 
to  as  much  as  2500/.  a-year.  They  were,  like  the  palatinates 
and  eastellanies,  conferred  by  the  crown  ;  and  without  the  royal 
assent  did  not  go  to  the  widow  or  heirs  :  but  this  assent  was 
rarely  withheld;  so  that  they  became  almost  hereditary,  like 
the  offices  in  the  other  feudal  monarchies.  There  were  in  the 
whole  kingdom,  including  the  grand  duchy  of  Lithuania,  no 
less  than  452  starosties.  The  crown  had  besides  a  vast  number 
of  villages,  which  were  generally  granted  for  life,  with  all  their 
rents  and  emoluments. 

The  king  was  elected  by  the  whole  body  of  the  nobility,  thus 
constituted  and  thus  richly  endowed.  The  primate.  Archbishop 
of  Gnesen,  was  viceroy  or  interrex  during  an  interregnum  after 
a  sovereign's  decease,  abdication,  or  deposition  ;  and  in  case  that 
see  was  vacant,  the  Bishop  of  Cuiavia.  All  the  ordinary  ad- 
ministration of  justice  was  suspended,  only  extraordinary  coun- 
sellors were  appointed  to  dispose  of  criminals,  and  generals  to 
guard  the  frontier .;  but  so  feeble  were  the  national  forces,  that 
foreign  princes  almost  always  marched  their  troops  into  the 
country  as  soon  as  an  election  approached.  The  foreign  minis- 
ters were  formally  desired  to  quit  the  capital,  that  the  choice 
might  be  the  more  free ;  but  they  as  regularly  refused  to  go. 
Thus  a  Russian  ambassador  answered  the  requisition  by  ob- 
serving that  he  had  been  sent  to  reside  in  Warsaw,  and  not  in 
the  country.  An  Austrian  envoy  said  on  the  like  occasion,  that, 
if  he  went,  he  was  sure  his  master  would  order  the  Silesian 
regiments  to  escort  him  back. 


CH.  VIII.  ELECTION  OF  KING.  79 

The  Diet  of  Election  began  its  discussions  with  a  statement 
of  grievances,  called  exorbitances  or  complaints  of  the  infractions 
of  the  constitution  during  the  late  reign,  and,  after  resohing  to 
exact  some  new  concession  from  the  new  king,  they  proceeded 
to  choose  him.  The  Deputies  who  were  sent  from  the  various 
dietaries,  amounting  in  number  to  about  150  nuncios,  and  called 
Rota  Equestris,  occupied  an  enclosed  space.  They  conducted  the 
whole  deliberations  ;  but  they  were  liable  to  be  changed  during 
the  process  at  the  will  of  their  constituents,  who,  as  the  last  of 
all  the  absurdities  in  which  this  constitution  abounded,  attended 
in  person,  and  partook  fully  in  the  vote  elective  of  the  crown, 
though  not  in  the  deliberations  on  grievances.  The  whole 
nobles  marched  upon  Warsaw  by  various  routes  forth  from  their 
castles  at  the  head  of  their  retainers  and  dependants,  all  but  the 
poorer  class  mounted,  and  all  without  any  exception  armed.  As 
many  as  130,000,  frequently  more,  occasionally  even  200,000, 
were  thus  assembled.  Arriving  at  the  scene  of  the  operations, 
the  elective  operations,  the  great  plain  of  Vola  near  the  capital; 
they  occupied  the  ground  around  the  enclosure  of  the  Nuncios, 
and  there  encamped  during  the  six  weeks  that  the  Election 
Diet  lasted  by  law.  During  this  period  of  interregnum  the  re- 
pubhc  was  termed  "  most  serene"  and  assuredly  a  title-  of 
honour  less  expressive  of  the  fact  never  was  invented  or  be- 
stowed by  the  overweening  caprice  of  princes,  prone  to  fancy 
that  they  could  endue  their  favourites  with  the  qualities  which 
they  named  them  by,  than  this  appellation  assumed  by  the  aris- 
tocratic republic  to  describe  its  own  state  while  exercising  uncon- 
trolled power. 

The  sovereign  thus  named,  unless  when  the  election  was 
brought  about  by  foreign  armies  or  foreign  gold,  generally  had 
to  fight  for  his  crown.  Having  in  one  or  the  other  way  secured 
the  possession  of  it,  his  prerogatives  were  so  far  from  being  the 
shadow  of  monarchy  like  those  of  the  Italian  doges,  that  they 
really  gave  great  influence,  and  entitled  the  political  philosopher 
very  correctly  to  term  the  constitution  a  mixed  aristocracy.  He 
enjoyed  a  considerable  revenue,  above  60,000/.  a-year  for  his 
personal  expenses ;  named  to  all  the  great  offices,  of  which  there 
were  forty-eight,  but  ten,  of  the  highest,  having  places  in  the 
senate  as  well  as  in  the  council  of  state  ;  appointed  all  military 
officers  ;  had  the  exclusive  patronage  of  all  the  seventeen  bishop- 


80  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES— POLAND.  CH.  VIII. 

lies  and  of  all  the  greater  livings  ;  gave  away  the  vacant  sta- 
rosties,  and  gave  or  refused  the  succession  of  deceased  starosts 
to  their  families  ;  granted  privileges  to  towns,  so  however  that 
these  interfered  not  with  the  rights  of  the  nobles  ;  distributed 
orders  of  knighthood  ;  and  bestowed  titles  of  nobility  on  fo- 
reigners, who  however  obtained  from  thence  no  rights  or  pri- 
vileges.* He  received  foreign  ministers,  but  in  the  presence  of 
the  council ;  and  though  he  could  appoint  ambassadors  to  repre- 
sent the  republic,  they  could  neither  make  alliances,  nor  treat 
of  peace  and  war.  It  was  among  the  many  vices  and  absurd 
anomalies  of  this  vile  constitution  that  the  generals  and  ministers 
named  by  the  crown  held  their  places  UTemovably,  until  they 
either  consented  to  retire  or  were  sentenced  by  the  Diet. 
Finally,  he  had  the  nomination  of  the  senate,  of  which  body  we 
are  now  to  speak.  But  the  senators,  like  the  generals  and  mi- 
nisters, held  their  places  independent  of  the  crown. 

The  number  of  the  senate  was  136,  of  whom  seventeen  were 
prelates.  Beside  these  136,  the  ten  great  officers  of  state 
had  seats  in  the  senate,  and  of  course  possessed  more  influence 
than  any  of  the  other  members.  The  senators  had  constant 
access  to  the  king's  person,  and  foiu-  of  tliem  were  required  to 
be  always  near  him.  Without  their  presence  he  could  do  no 
act  of  state  ;  and  this  contrivance  to  maintain  a  watch  over  the 
crown  on  the  part  of  the  aristocracy  manifestly  resembles  what 
we  shall  find  to  have  been  practised  at  Genoa  and  at  Venice 
with  a  similar  view.  No  senator  could  quit  the  country  without 
express  leave  of  the  Diet. 

The  functions  of  the  senate  were  to  preserve  peace  and  vmion 
among  the  various  provinces  or  the  palatinates  and  castellanies  ; 
and  to  assist  at  the  diet,  of  which,  in  its  legislative  capacity,  the 
senate  formed  an  integral  part.  Its  consent  was  required  for 
the  making  of  any  law,  and  the  taking  of  any  resolution  of  the 
diet,  as  much  as  that  of  the  king  and  the  Chamber  of  Nuncios. 
The  senate  could  only  be  convoked  by  the  king,  unless  in  the 


*  We  have  made  no  mention  in  the  text  of  the  change  which  was  eflFected  in 
1773,  after  the  first  partition,  because  we  are  here  giving  an  account  of  the  okl 
constitution  while  Poland  was  entire.  That  change  really  reduced  the  regal  autho- 
rity almost  to  a  shadow :  it  was  the  nomination  by  the  Diet  of  councillors,  without 
whose  consent  no  act  of  the  Crown  could  be  performed.  This  was  copied  from 
the  constitution  of  Venice,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 


CH.  VIII.  .  THE  DIET.  81 

event  of  any  illegal  proceedings  taken  by  him,  in  which  case  the 
primate  might  call  a  meeting.  If  the  primate  refused  in  such  an 
emergency,  the  nobles  could  assemble  it. 

The  nobles  were  represented  in  the  Chamber  of  Nuncios, 
chosen  as  we  have  seen  by  the  dietines  of  the  provinces,  all  of 
which  were  to  hold  their  meetings  the  same  day,  except  two, 
Zata  and  Holitz,  which  met  a  week  earlier.  The  number  of 
nuncios  was  168,  provided  the  electors  in  each  of  the  sixty-four 
districts  were  unanimous;  for  unanimity  was  required  in  dietines 
as  well  as  diets ;  but  Prussia  Royal  had  a  right  to  send  100 
representatives  of  its  nobility.  The  same  absurdity  which  pre- 
vailed at  the  election  diet  was  also  found  to  exist  in  the  ordinary 
meetings  of  the  nuncios  ;  for,  under  the  name  of  arbiters,  all  the 
nobles  claimed  a  right  to  attend  the  meetings  of  their  repre- 
sentatives, and  even  to  interpose  their  opposition  and  protest  to 
the  choice  of  the  marshal  or  president  of  the  chamber.  This, 
however,  was  not  peremptory,  but  only  led  to  inquiry. 

Every  function  of  the  government  not  performed  by  the  king 
alone  was  performed  by  the  Diet.  They  only  could  make  laws, 
determine  questions  of  peace,  war,  or  alliance,  levy  taxes,  raise 
troops,  coin  money,  confer  nobility,  and  naturalize  foreigners. 
But  in  aU  their  proceedings  the  grand  and  revolting  anomaly 
was  introduced,  which  has  obtained  the  expressive  and  descriptive 
name  of  the  Liberum  Veto,  only  that  this  is  not  generally  un- 
derstood in  the  full  extent  of  its  absurdity.  Not  only  was 
absolute  unanimity  required  to  give  any  vote  force  and  effect , 
but  if  any  one  of  the  many  parts  or  chapters  of  a  law,  or  of  any 
one  law  of  the  many  discussed  at  a  diet,  was  rejected,  the  whole 
legislation  of  that  diet  fell  to  the  ground.  It  was  necessary  to 
adopt  all  or  to  reject  all.  Surely  no  human  contrivance  was  ever 
devised  so  eiBFectual  to  tie  up  the  will  and  paralyse  the  judgment 
of  any  deliberate  assembly.  Add  to  this,  that  the  duration  of 
the  diet  was  fixed  by  law — ^it  must  expire  in  six  weeks,  and  even 
at  the  hour  striking,  whatever  subject  of  consideration  might 
then  be  before  it. 

When  any  gross  absurdity  has  for  any  reason  found  its  way 
into  the  frame  of  a  government,  there  seems  to  be  called  forth  a 
protective  or  prophylactic  power  in  the  system,  analogous  to 
that  by  which  the  natural  body  throws  off  any  noxious  or  any 
extraneous  matter  introduced  into  it ;  and  if  mischief  cannot  be 

PAST  II.  Q 


82  MIXED  ABISTOCRACIES — POLAND.  CH.  VIII. 

prevented,  then  is  exerted  another  power  like  the  vis  medicatrix 
of  the  natural  frame  —  a  power  of  making  some  secondary 
provision  which  may  counteract  the  mischievous  effects  of  the 
malconformation,  and  enable  the  machine  to  go  on  working, 
which  othenvise  must  be  stopped  or  destroyed.  We  shall  find 
examples  of  this  truth  in  the  ancient  as  well  as  modem  republics 
of  the  south  ;  and  Poland  affords  one  as  applicable  to  the 
grievous  vices  of  its  political  system  which  we  have  just  been 
describing.  The  king  had  the  power  of  convoking  extraordinary 
diets  upon  emergencies,  but  these  could  only  last  three  weeks. 
However,  when  a  diet  had  failed  of  coming  to  any  useful 
decision,  in  consequence  of  the  veto,  a  majority  of  the  chambers 
might,  with  the  assent  of  the  crown,  turn  the  diet  into  a 
Confederation.  This  usually  took  place  on  the  emergency  of 
some  threatened  invasion,  or  other  public  danger.  If  without 
the  royal  assent  the  confederation  took  place,  it  was  called 
Rokosz.  Sometimes  even  when  the  confederation  was  regular, 
being  authorised  by  the  crown,  always  in  the  case  of  a  Rokosz, 
there  were  re-confederations  or  anti^confederations,  which  at 
once  led  to  a  civil  war.  The  king  had  the  power  likewise  of 
convoking  a  Senatus  GoncHiwrn,  or  senate  deliberating  under  his 
presidency ;  but  its  decrees  only  had  the  force  of  law  tempora- 
rily, and  required  to  be  confirmed  by  the  diet.  Another  kind  of 
confederation  was  the  Zwyozck  or  Military  Zwyozck,  and  this 
was  another  name  for  a  military  revolt.  After  every  kind  of 
confederation  it  was  usual  to  hold  a  diet  of  pacification,  in  which 
the  intention  and  the  name  alone  were  of  value. 

The  administration  of  justice  was  upon  a  footing  nearly  as 
singular  and  of  a  description  quite  as  imperfect  as  any  other 
branch  of  the  Polish  constitution.  The  king  continued  much 
later  than  in  any  other  country  of  Europe  to  hold  the  judicial 
power  in  his  own  hands.  Until  late  in  the  sixteenth  century  he 
was  the  sole  judge  of  important  cases,  as  well  criminal  as  civil ; 
and  he  went  round  the  kingdom  to  exercise  this  high  office, 
with  his  numerous/ suite,  all  of  whom  were  maintained  at  the 
public  cost  in  each  district  that  they  visited.  This  labour,  so 
alien  to  a  modern  prince's  habits,  made  Henry  III.  say,  "  Faith, 
these  Poles  have  only  made  a  judge  of  me,  and  soon  they  will 
make  an  advocate."  His  successor,  Stephen  Battori,  created 
regular  courts,  reserving  to  himself  the  greater  causes  only.     In 


CH.  VIII.  JirDICIAL  AND  MILITARY  SYSTEMS.  83 

the  reign  of  the  succeeding  princes  the  nobles  and  the  clergy 
obtained  the  judicial  power,  and  this  weakened  exceedingly  the 
influence  of  the  crown,  without  materially  improving  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  The  want  of  any  provision  for  the  pro- 
secution of  offences  was  a  serious  imperfection,  though  not  con- 
fined to  Poland  ;  and  the  maxim  became  established,  and  as  rooted 
as  it  was  pernicious — "  Ifemine  instigante,  reus  absolvitur" 
It  is  only  by  a  variety  of  accidental  circumstances  concurring  to 
counteract  the  evil  in  our  own  system, 'that  a  similar  defect  has 
not  ended  in  paralysing  the  whole  execution  of  our  criminal 
law ;  and  the  mischiefs  that  daily  arise  from  it  are  very  grievous, 
notwithstanding  the  partial  remedy  which  these  circumstances 
have  applied. 

But  the  manner  of  appointing  the  Polish  judges  was  as  bad  as 
possible.  They  who  composed  the  higher  tribunals  were  elected 
at  the  several  dietines  by  the  nobles,  and  at  the  chapters  by  the 
superior  clergy.  The  places  of  these  judges  were  lucrative,  gave 
great  influence,  and  were  eagerly  sought  after  by  the  nobles ; 
and  their  persons  were  sacred,  so  that  the  least  injury  or  insult 
offered  them  was  punished  with  death.  They  had  cognizance 
of  all  crimes,  treason  and  peculation  excepted,  subject  to  appeal. 
The  diet  was  the  court  of  re^dew,  and  had  original  jurisdiction 
of  treason  and  peculation. 

The  military  state  of  the  country  was  not  better  than  its  civil. 
There  was  no  army  that  could  be  relied  on  when  wanted,  any 
more  than  in  the  other  feudal  kingdoms,  while  the  armed  state 
of  the  nobles  and  their  high  privileges,  almost  exempting  them 
from  the  control  of  the  law,  made  the  country  a  prey  to  the 
worst  form  of  anarchy,  that  of  a  military  mob.  The  nobles  did 
not  serve  in  the  infantry,  however  poor,  excepting  as  officers  ; 
and  all  the  cavalry,  men  as  well  as  officers,  were  nobles.  Each 
had  a  right  of  bringing  three  servants  to  attend  him,  and 
these  were  all  on  a  kind  of  equal  footing  with  their  masters. 
Every  noble,  private  as  well  as  officer,  and  how  needy  soever, 
was  admitted  to  the  general's  table.  The  servants  were  called 
pacholiks :  they  were  all  armed,  and  all  took  part  in  the  fight. 
The  diet  alone  could  call  out  the  pospolite  (or  levy  or  arHere- 
ban),  and,  on  its  being  summoned,  all  ordinary  administration  of 
justice  ceased  ;  the  king  alone  and  the  senate  exercised  judicial 
functions,  and  martial  law  was  administered  by  military  tribunals, 

g2 


84  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — POLAND.  CH.  VHI. 

Such  was  the  structure  of  the  Polish  constitution :  its  basis  a 
completely  formed  and  firmly  cemented  aristocracy,  but  joined 
and  badly  adjusted  to  a  kingly  power  ;  and  certainly  it  would  not 
be  possible  to  devise  a  system  less  fitted  to  secure  any  one  of  the 
objects  of  all  government.  Bad  as  it  was,  and  ill  as  it  worked 
in  modem  times,  and  after  its  principles  were  settled,  in  earlier 
ages  it  was  still  more  tumultuous  and  more  mischievous,  and 
unavoidably  engendered  a  constant  struggle  between  the  nobles 
and  the  sovereign,  to  the  utter  and  habitual  neglect  of  the  public 
interest  Thus  it  was  not  till  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury that  the  king's  consent  was  required  to  the  passing  of  any 
law,  or  that  the  senate  was  recognised  as  a  body  separate 
from  the  representatives  or  nuncios ;  and  when  John  Albrecht, 
an  able  and  patriotic  prince,  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  after  in  vain  attempting  to  curb  the  exorbitant  power 
of  the  nobles,  tried  many  schemes  for  the  general  benefit  of  the 
country,  he  was  stoutly  and  successfully  resisted  in  all  his  en- 
deavours, the  aristocracy  desiring  only  to  thwart  him,  and  caring 
nothing  at  all  for  the  interests  of  the  state,  which  he  was  desir- 
ous of  advancing.  In  his  reign  began  that  constant  disposition, 
much  increased  in  the  Saxon  reigns,  to  seek  foreign  aid  in 
their  party  conflicts,  which  formed  the  great  stigma  on  the 
character  of  the  Poles.  No  one  was  jealous  of  the  Czar ;  all 
fears  were  merged  in  the  jealousy  of  the  crown. 

The  character  and  the  habits  of  the  ruling  class  were  such  as 
it  might  be  expected  that  uncontrolled  power  thus  distributed 
among  individuals,  as  well  as  vested  in  the  body,  would  form  in 
each  of  its  members.  Tliey  were  fierce,  ignorant,  haughty, 
overbearing.  The  natural  talents  of  the  Polanders  are  great ; 
no  people  have  more  :  they  combine  the  suppleness  and  quick- 
ness that  distinguish  the  Sclavonian  race  with  far  more  steadi- 
ness and  perseverance  than  ordinarily  accompanies  these  brilliant 
and  attractive  qualities ;  and  all  the  insolence  of  the  nobles  was 
covered  over  and  concealed  by  a  polish  of  manners  almost  pecu- 
liar to  that  people.  The  inequality,  however,  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  wealth  was  extreme ;  and  although  each  noble,  be  his 
condition  ever  so  mean  in  point  of  fortune,  possessed  the  full 
privileges  of  his  order,  the  wealthy  landowner  received  as 
much  homage  from  his  poorer  brethren  as  from  the  needy  com- 
moners.    The  power  and  splendour  in  which  the  greater  families 


CH.  VIIL  PRINCE  CZARTOKISKY.  85 

lived  was  not  to  be  matched  by  anything  in  more  reFmed  coun- 
tries. The  Prince  Czartorisky,  beside  maintaining  a  multitude 
of  dependents  and  gentlemen  in  needy  circumstances,  had  a 
suite  of  young  nobles  who,  at  his  residence,  his  court,  received 
their  education,  and  became  fitted  to  shine  both  in  that  brilliant 
circle  and  in  the  attractive  society  of  Warsaw.  The  princess 
was  daily  seen  at  Poulawi  to  take  her  morning  drive  attended 
by  twenty  gallant  cavaliers,  rivalling  each  other  in  their  de- 
voted obeisance,  and  all  but  fighting  for  the  honour  of  handing 
her  from  the  carriage  when  she  alighted,  or  picking  up  her  fan 
when  it  chanced  to  fall.  The  military  force  of  his  domains  we 
have  already  mentioned.  It  is  this  lofty  position,  this  brilliant  lot, 
which  that  great  patriot,  the  present  representative  of  the  family, 
has  exchanged  for  poverty  and  exile  — a  lot,  however,  that  he 
only  prized,  and  now  only  regrets,  as  it  afforded  him  the  j)ower 
of  serving  that  country  for  which  he  has  made  so  vast  and  so 
costly  a  sacrifice.* 

*  The  works  upon  Poland  are  numerous,  and  some  of  them  possess  great  merit. 
There  are  several  in  German  and  in  Latin.  Of  course  those  in  Polish  are  to 
foreigners  a  sealed  book.  The  Chev.  d'Eon's  Description  de  la  Pologne,  in  vol.  i. 
of  his  Loisirs,  gives  the  best,  and,  generally  speaking,  the  most  correct  account  of 
the  constitution.  But  no  one  should  omit  reading  the  admirable  work  of  Rulhieres 
(L'Anarchie  de  la  Pologne,  in  4  vols.),  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  attractive 
histories  that  was  ever  written.  Recourse  has  been  had,  in  prepariug  this  cliaptc  r, 
to  original  sources  of  political  information. 


MIXED  AIIISTOCIIACIES — HUNGARY.  CH.  IX. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY. 


Lombard  Conquest — Magyars — Arpad  Family — Feudal  circumstances— Nobility 
— Cardinal  and  Non-Cardinal  privileges — Magnates — Bulla  Aurea — Titled 
Nobles — Diet — Representation  ;  Proxies  ;  Votes — Delegation — Diet's  functions 
— Taxes — Cassa  Domestica  and  Militaris — Count  Szechinij — Local  County  Ad- 
ministration— Congregationes  Generales — Municipal  Government,  Kozscg ;  Can- 
didatio — Village  Government — Powers  of  the  Crown — Sale  of  Titles — Peasantry 
— Urbarium  of  Maria  Theresa — Lords'  power ;  Eohot — Lords'  Courts  ;  reforms 
in  these — New  Urbarium  ;  Prince  Mettemich's  reforms — Military  System  ; 
Insurrectionary  Army — Frontier  Provinces — Prejudices  of  Hungarians  in  favour 
of  their  Constitution — Conclusion  of  the  subject. 

The  Aristocracy  of  Hungary  never  was  so  firmly  established,  or 
endowed  with  privileges  so  extensive,  as  that  of  Poland  ;  and  it 
is  a  question  much  agitated  amongst  political  inquirers,  whether 
or  not  the  Feudal  System  ever  existed  in  that  country.  The 
Lombards,  in  the  year  526,  overran  the  greater  part  of  Hungary  ; 
and  in  the  ninth  century,  the  Magyars,  a  people  from  Central 
Asia,  obtained  possession  of  it,  dividing  the  lands  among  their 
chiefs,  and  reducing  the  former  inhabitants  to  a  state  of  slavery. 
The  family  of  Arpad,  their  principal  leader,  held  the  chief  autho- 
rity until  its  extinction  in  1301.  After  the  lapse  of  nearly  four 
centuries  Austria  obtained  a  footing,  and  occasionally  the  supreme 
power ;  but  it  was  not  till  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury that  she  received  the  crown  formally,  and  only  since  171 1 
that  she  has  held  it  without  dispute. 

It  seems,  on  the  one  hand,  difficult  to  deny  that  the  feudal 
scheme  ever  found  a  footing  ia  Hungary ;  and,  on  the  other,  to 
admit  that  it  was  fully  established.  The  servile  condition  of 
the  cultivators  of  the  soil,  the  holding  of  all  lands  under  the 
crown,  the  great  power  of  the  nobles,  then  exemption  from 
tribute,  the  exclusive  possession  by  them  of  free  land,  and  the 
annexation  of  services  to  the  qualified  possession,  or  rather  enjoy- 
ment, of  landed  rights  by  the  peasant,  as  well  as  the  jurisdiction 
exercised  by  the  lord  over  the  tenant  to  a  considerable  extent, 
all  savour  strongly  of  feudality.  Indeed,  the  gifts  which  the 
former  could  exact  from  the  latter  on  the  marriage  of  his  child, 


CH.  IX.  NOBILITY.  87 

or  his  own  capture  in  war,  were  entirely  of  a  feudal  aspect  and 
origin ;  while  we  must  admit  that  the  refinements  of  the  system, 
and  its  complete  symmetry,  had  no  place  among  the  Hungarians. 

The  foundation  of  the  whole  system,  both  of  the  general  govern- 
ment and  af  the  local  polity  of  the  community,  has  at  all  times 
been  the  influence  and  the  privileges  of  the  Nobles — originally, 
as  everywhere,  a  select  few,  but  become,  in  process  of  time,  a 
numerous  body,  and  forming  now  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
whole  inhabitants.  They  amounted  to  350,000  a  century  ago, 
and  may  now  be  estimated  at  a  million  and  a  half,  the  whole 
population  being  not  more  than  nine  millions  and  a  half  Of 
course,  in  this  numerous  body  there  are  not  many  wealthy  indi- 
viduals, and  very  many  in  the  meanest  circumstances  :  but  all  of 
them  possess  the  same  rights  and  exemptions  by  law ;  all  of 
them  form  an  artificial  aristocracy ;  and  it  is  the  natural  aristo- 
cracy alone  which  apportions  their  relative  influoDce,  confining 
the  administration  of  affairs,  the  real  weight  in  the  state,  to  such 
of  the  class  as  excel  in  wealth  and  other  personal  or  accidental 
qualities  and  possessions. 

Their  privileges  are  of  two  kinds,  cardinal  and  non-cardinal. 
The  most  important  of  the  latter  are  the  being  exempt  from  hav- 
ing troops  quartered  on  them,  and  the  right  to  sell  upon  their 
estates  certain  articles,  of  which  the  government  has  the  mono- 
poly elsewhere,  and  as  against  all  commoners.  It  is  another  of 
these  non-cardinal  privileges  that  the  nobles  alone  can  possess 
lands. — The  cardinal  privileges  are  more  valuable  and  more 
numerous.  The  noble  holds  his  land  free  from  all  direct  taxes, 
all  tithe,  and  all  toll.  The  only  service  which  he  is  bound  to 
perform  is  the  attendance  upon  the  levy  when  the  hann  or  insur- 
rection is  called  out  on  an  invasion.  His  person  is  sacred  ;  he 
cannot  be  arrested  until  convicted,  unless  he  is  taken  in  the  fact ; 
his  house,  too,  cannot  be  entered  on  any  account  by  the  officers 
of  justice.  All  fiefs  are  male,  excepting  in  the  district  of  Arva, 
where  the  land  goes  also  to  females  on  the  failure  of  males.  In 
that  event  elsewhere  the  fief  reverts  to  the  crown.  There  was 
till  very  lately  (1835),  strictly  speaking,  no  power  of  selling  the 
land,  but  recourse  was  had  in  consequence  to  perpetual  mort- 
gages ;  and  as  these  were  redeemable  on  payment  of  the  mort- 
gage-money and  all  improvements,  a  double  price  was  generally 
stated  in  the  contract,  great  claims  for  expenditure  were  made. 


88  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY.  CH.  IX. 

and  endless  litigation  ensued.  But  still  the  titles  to  land  pur- 
chased are  very  insecure,  because  all  land  originally  granted  by 
the  crown  is  redeemable  within  thirty-two  years ;  and  this  right 
may,  by  a  legal  proceeding  (the  mere  registering  of  the  claim), 
be  kept  alive  for  ever.  At  twenty-four  years  of  age  the  son  can 
demand  a  provision  ;  and  on  the  lord's  death  an  equal  di\dsion 
of  the  land  is  made,  only  reserving  to  the  youngest  the  benefit 
of  a  house. — These  customs  remind  the  English  reader  of  gavel- 
kind, once  the  common  law  of  this  country,  though  now  confined 
to  Kent ;  and  Borough-English,  once  the  custom  of  all  boroughs, 
though  now  only  known  in  a  very  few  places.  Where  the  fief  is 
male,  one -fourth  goes  to  females  on  failure  of  males  when  the 
crown  takes  the  residue.  It  is  another  strange  privilege  of  the 
nobles  that  they  owe  no  allegiance  to  the  king  before  his  coro- 
nation. 

Originally  the  Magnates,  or  higher  nobles,  oppressed  the  in- 
ferior, who,  combining  together,  exacted  from  King  Andrew  and 
the  higher  nobles,  in  1222,  the  great  charter,  called  the  Bulla 
aurea,  seven  years  after  King  John  was  forced  by  his  barons  to 
grant  our  Magna  Gharta.  The  purport  of  this  important  conces- 
sion was  to  communicate  all  the  privileges  of  nobility  to  the  whole 
order  ;  and  it  was  plainly,  like  our  own  charter,  only  a  declara- 
tion of  existing  and  violated  rights.  It  further  declared,  that 
every  noble  should  be  subject  to  the  court  of  the  Palatine,  ex- 
cepting in  capital  cases  and  causes  of  forfeiture,  which  were 
reserved  to  the  royal  jurisdiction.  The  most  remarkable  article 
of  the  Bulla  aurea  contained,  like  our  own  great  charter,  a  sti- 
pulation of  resistance  in  case  the  other  provisions  should  be  vio- 
lated. This  article  has  only  been  omitted  since  the  year  1687, 
and  that,  as  is  expressed,  not  from  any  objection  to  its  substance 
on  the  part  of  the  crown,  but  only  to  avoid  the  misconstructions 
to  which  it  had  frequently  given  rise.  The  titled  nobles  are 
about  two  hundred  families. — We  are  now  to  view  the  system 
of  government  which  arises  out  of  this  aristocracy,  and  of  which 
this  aristocracy  is  the  basis. 

The  supreme  power  in  the  state,  by  the  theory  of  the  consti- 
tution, is  the  Diet  or  general  assembly  of  the  Orders  ;  but  there 
is  in  practice  a  wide  difference  between  the  rights  of  the  Hun- 
garian and  those  of  the  Polish  Diet,  and  the  crown  has  become 
the   preponderating  authority,   although   the   diet   still   retains 


k 


CH.  IX.  THE  DIET.  89 

considerable  powers.  It  is  composed  of  three  great  branches, 
the  Prelates,  the  Magnates,  and  the  Delegates  of  the  inferior 
nobles  and  the  free  towns.  The  prelates  are  thirty-six  in  num- 
ber, of  whom  thirty-four  are  Catholics,  and  one  a  Greek  bishop  ; 
the  magnates  and  the  higher  clergy,  those  who  have  official 
right  to  be  barons  and  counts,  and  the  magnates  by  descent  and 
tenure  of  land.  There  are  six  or  seven  hundred  in  all  who  have 
a  title  to  sit  in  this  chamber ;  but,  comparatively,  few  attend, 
sometimes  no  more  than  thirty  or  forty.  The  prelates  and  mag- 
nates form  one  chamber  {Tabula).  The  lower  chamber  is 
composed  of  deputies  chosen  by  the  forty-six  counties,  that 
is,  by  the  inferior  and  numerous  nobility,  a  million  and  a 
half  in  number,  and  of  whom  about  120,000  are  supposed 
actually  to  vote.  The  free  towns  also  send  deputies :  each 
county  sends  two.  But  there  is  also  a  singular  kind  of  deputies, 
who,  however,  have  no  right  of  voting— the  proxies  of  mag- 
nates who  do  not  choose  to  attend  in  their  own  chamber,  and 
the  proxies  of  the  magnate  widows,  who  of  course  cannot  sit. 
These  proxies  resemble  what  we  may  recollect  to  have  found  in 
the  Sicilian  parliaments.  (Part  i.  Chap,  xvii.)  The  deputies  of 
towns  are  entu'ely  under  the  influence  of  the  crown,  for,  as  the 
whole  expenditure  of  the  revenue  is,  except  for  sums  less  than  six 
pounds,  under  the  absolute  control  of  the  sovereign,  if  any  town 
were  to  choose  a  refractory  deputy,  the  sums  necessary  for  re- 
pairs and  improvements  would  be  left  unprovided.  This  entire 
subserviency  of  the  town-deputies  is  the  excuse  for  the  nobles 
having  long  since  taken  away  their  right  of  voting  :  they  are  as 
mere  ciphers  as  the  proxies,  and  have  not  more  privilege  than 
that  of  cheering  the  speakers,  and  themselves  debating,  if  they 
please,  which  however  they  very  rarely  do.  A  single  vote  was 
once  offered  to  all  the  town-deputies  collectively  ;  but  it  was  at 
that  time  rejected  with  some  indignation.  All  the  deputies, 
however,  are  in  some  sort  deprived  of  dehberative  functions,  for 
they  are  merely  the  delegates  of  their  constituents,  and  are  so 
far  bound  to  follow  their  instructions,  that,  should  they  depart 
from  them,  and  be  unable  satisfactorily  to  explain  their  conduct, 
they  are  immediately  displaced  and  succeeded  by  more  obedient 
representatives.  The  lower  chamber  has  a  president  called 
Personalis.  The  forty-six  counties  have  niuety-two  deputies, 
but  only  forty-six  votes :  Croatia  has  one,  Sclavonia  three,  the 
free  to^vns  one,  the  chapters  one  ;  making  in  all  fifty-four  votes. 


90^  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY.  CH.  IX. 

The  crown  has  alone  the  power  of  convoking  the  diet ;  but  the 
law  requires  it  to  be  assembled  once  in  three  years.  This,  how- 
ever, has  been  so  little  attended  to,  that  only  three  Diets  were  con- 
vened in  the  forty  years'  reign  of  Maria  Theresa  ;  and  Joseph  II. 
never  called  a  Diet  at  all  during  his  ten  years'  reign.  There  was 
no  Diet  from  1813  to  1825  :  the  Diet  of  that  year  lasted  two  years. 
Each  Diet  is  a  newly-elected  body ;  no  prorogation  is  known ; 
and  the  same  Diet  has  been  known  to  sit  for  three  or  four  years. 
The  most  extraordinary  part  of  its  constitution  is  the  uncertainty 
which  still  prevails  as  to  what  part  of  the  magnates  the  right  of 
voting  resides  in  ;  for  the  right  of  created  nobles  to  vote  with 
those  by  office  and  estate  is  so  much  a  matter  of  dispute,  that  the 
Palatine,  who  has,  since  the  time  of  Maria  Theresa,  always  been 
an  archduke,  and  is  chosen  by  the  Diet  from  four  candidates 
named  by  the  crown,  has  frequently  been  known  to  reject  the 
determination  of  an  absolute  majority  as  president  of  the  cham- 
ber, and  to  declare  a  question  carried  or  rejected  by  the  majority 
of  the  undisputed  votes.  The  existence  of  such  a  doubt  clearly 
indicates  either  that  this  branch  of  the  Diet  is  seldom  appealed 
to,  or  that  its  assent  is  reckoned  of  comparatively  little  impoit- 
ance.  It  is  another  and  a  revolting  absurdity  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  Diet,  that  the  nobles,  like  those  of  Poland,  instead  of 
delegating  all  powers  to  their  deputies,  and  suffering  them  to  act 
for  themselves,  claim  the  right  of  attending  in  person  also  ;  and 
accordingly  they  crowd  the  chamber,  taking  part  by  cheer- 
ing and  other  interruptions,  though  they  have  never  claimed 
the  right  of  speech  or  of  protest,  as  the  Poles  have  on  one  im- 
portant proceeding  at  least — the  choice  of  the  marshal  or  pre- 
sident. The  language  spoken  in  the  chamber  of  magnates  is 
almost  always  Latin.  The  policy  of  the  court  has  been  of  late 
years  to  estrange  the  Hungarians  of  high  rank  from  their 
country,  so  that  they  are  educated,  and  generally  reside,  at 
Vienna,  and  are  unacquainted  with  their  mother  tongue.  It  is 
further  to  be  observed,  that  the  upper  chamber  has  only  the 
right  of  assent  or  refusal  to  the  resolutions  of  the  lower.  No 
measure  whatever  can  be  originated  in  the  chamber  of  magnates. 
The  two  chambers  in  Hungary,  as  everywhere  else,  formerly 
sat  together ;  their  separation,  which  was  as  late  as  1562,  is  said 
to  have  arisen  from  the  accident  of  the  hall  being  too  small  to 
contain  both.  In  this  respect  Hungary  agrees  with  the  other 
feutlal  kingdoms.     But  it  has  one  custom  of  great  value,  and 


CH.  IX-  TAXATION.  91 

peculiar  to  itself.  When  the  chambers  (tabulce)  differ,  recourse 
is  had  to  what  is  termed  a  mixed  sitting,  in  which  both  sit,  dis- 
cuss, and  vote  together.  Hence  concession  and  compromise  are 
more  conveniently  effected  in  Hungary  than  anywhere  else,  and 
all  collision  is  avoided. 

The  Diet's  principal  function  is  legislative,  that  is,  by  the 
theory  of  the  constitution  ;  for  the  Empress  Queen,  finding  how 
refractory  it  was,  and  how  resolved  to  refuse  all  grant  of  privi- 
leges to  the  bulk  of  the  nobles  and  the  peasantry,  issued  lier 
celebrated  edict,  the  Urbarium  of  1765,  which  has  been  held  to 
have  the  force  of  law,  though  part  is  enactive,  and  only  part 
declaratory.     The  levying  of  taxes  is  also  in  the  hands  of  the 
Diet,  as  well  as  their  distribution  for  collection  among  the  dif- 
ferent districts.     But  in  practice  this  important  right  seems  con- 
fined to  direct  taxation,  from  which  the  nobles  being  exempt, 
the  Diet,  their  representative,  is  sure  to  refuse  all  such  supplies 
as  cannot  be  raised  upon  the  townsfolk  and  the  peasantry  ;  and 
hence  the  sovereign  has  introduced  a  large  amount  of  indirect 
taxes,  which  of  course  fall  on  the  nobles  as  well  as  on  other  classes 
of  consumers.     Thus,  of  the  whole  revenue,  amounting  to  nearly 
three  millions  and  a  half  sterling,  no  less  than  two  millions  are 
raised  by  a  salt-tax,  or  salt-monopoly,  which  amounts  to  the  same 
thing,  and  150,000?.  by  customs ;  all  foreign  goods  pay  sixty- 
five  per  cent.,  and  goods  from  Austria  five  per  cent.     The  crown- 
lands  yield  ]  20,000?.,  and  the  mines  100,000?.;  and  the  direct 
taxes,  falling  on  the  peasants  and  citizens  alone,  raise  between 
500,000?.  and  600,000?.     The  raising  a  salt-tax  without  consent 
of  the  Diet  has  been  always  held  illegal  by  the  Hungarians  ;  but 
the  imperfect  federal  system  has  always  made  their  complaints 
vain.     Had  the  sovereign  no  other  dominions  but  Hungary,  this 
impost  never  could  have  been  levied ;  his  other  resources  enable 
him  to  continue  a  tax  which,  though  falling  equally  on  the  poor 
and   the   rich,    effectually   neutralizes  the  privilege,   so  highly 
prized  by  the  nobles,  of  being  exempt  from  taxation  ;    and  the 
tax  will  assuredly  be   kept  up  until,  yielding  to  the  voice  of 
reason  and  justice,  the  nobles  shall  consent  to  bear  their  share  of 
the  public  burthens  directly  imposed. 

It  is  not  only  in  the  general  taxation  of  the  state  that  this  ex- 
emption is  claimed  by  the  Hungarian  nobles  ;  they  pay  none  of 
the  local  taxes,  called  the  Cassa  Doniestica,  in  contradistinction 


92  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY.  CH.  IX 

to  the  Cassa  Militaris,  or  those  raised  by  the  Diet  and  the 
Crown  for  general  purposes.  The  Cassa  Domestica  is  wholly 
raised  by  the  votes  of  the  county  meetings,  and  it  is  wholly  paid 
by  the  commoners  or  peasants,  and  townsfolk.  But  it  is  wholly 
administered,  as  well  as  wholly  imposed,  by  the  nobles  alone. 
Vet  out  of  this  money,  thus  levied  on  the  peasants,  are  paid  not 
only  the  expenses  of  a  local  kind,  as  roads  and  bridges,  but  the 
salaries  of  places  which  nobles  only  can  hold,  including  the  pay 
(twelve  shillings  a-day)  of  the  deputies  to  the  Diet,  which  has, 
however,  now  ceased.  The  greatest  practical  reformer  of  the 
age,  a  corresponding  member  of  this  Society,  Count  Szechinij, 
has  carried  the  point  of  making  them,  and  for  the  first  time,  pay 
toll  or  pontage  on  using  the  new  bridge  at  Pest.  The  Diet, 
but  with  difficulty,  were  persuaded  to  sanction  this  waiver  of 
privilege — a  small  step  certainly  ;  for  the  refusal  to  pay  amounted 
to  insisting  upon  having  the  benefit  of  a  public  work  to  the  ex- 
pense of  which  they  would  not  contribute. 

The  local  administration  of  the  counties  is  twofold,  as  it  re- 
sides in  the  country  districts  or  in  the  municipalities.  The  forty- 
six  counties  have  each  its  local  administration,  chanonng  their 
officers  once  in  three  years  ;  and  even  the  execution  of  the 
general  laws  made  by  the  Diet,  and  of  the  edicts  which  the 
Crown  sometimes  issues  of  its  own  authority,  must  in  all  cases 
be  left  to  the  local  officers.  The  crown  names  the  chief  of  them, 
or  lord-lieutenant,  called  Fd  Ispan  ;  the  others  are  chosen  by 
the  nobles  of  each  county.  Among  these  others  the  Ali  or  Vice- 
Ispan  or  Vice-Comes,  as  he  is  called,  has  nearly  the  functions  of 
our  vice-comes  or  sheriff:  he  is  constantly  resident,  which  the  lord- 
lieutenant  hardly  ever  is  :  he  directs  the  police  and  decides  small 
causes,  both  of  debt  and  breach  of  the  peace.  The  place  is  much 
sought  after  by  the  nobles,  not  so  much  for  the  small  salary  an- 
nexed to  it  of  about  801.,  as  for  the  influence  which  it  gives,  and 
the  practice  of  pubhc  business.  The  county  magistrate,  called 
Szolgo-Birok,  is  not  necessarily  a  noble.  The  Crown,  in  its  Lieu- 
tenant, has  the  important  right  of  what  is  called  Candidatio  in  all 
elections ;  that  is,  it  names  three  persons,  of  whom  the  nobles  choose 
one.  This  right,  however,  is  in  practice  much  limited  ;  for  the 
persons  of  leading  influence  are  almost  always  selected — that 
is,  such  persons  as  are  secure  of  having  powerful  support  from  the 
electors.    The  exercise  of  political  functions  in  their  county  meet- 


CH.  IX.  crown's  prerogatives.  93 

ings,  and  of  rights  in  choosing  their  magistrates,  has  tended  to 
give  the  Hungarians  far  more  political  knowledge,  by  turning 
their  minds  to  state  affairs,  than  might  have  been  expected  from 
a  people  whose  press  is  under  such  strict  censorship.  Travellers 
represent  them  as  not  only  singularly  attentive  to  all  passing 
events,  but  exceedingly  well  informed  upon  political  matters 
generally.  Their  meetiugs,  however,  do  not  always  pass  off 
very  quietly :  on  the  contrary,  an  election  is  with  them  the 
scene,  if  not  of  as  much  corruption,  certainly  of  far  more  vio- 
lence than  either  ours  of  England,  or  even  those  of  Ireland.  As 
many  as  eight  persons  were  lately  killed  at  the  restauration  or 
election  of  officers  for  a  single  county  in  one  year. 

But  the  county  meetings  {congregationes  generates)  are  of  a 
much  higher  importance  than  may,  from  this  statement,  at  first 
appear.  They  are  attended  by  all  the  nobles  and  ecclesiastics,  and 
as  many  as  4000  persons  may  be  present.  Beside  directing  local 
matters,  they  put  in  force  all  the  decrees  of  the  Diet :  by  these 
they  are  bound  ;  but  not  by  the  royal  ordinances,  which  they 
examine  most  scrupulously,  and,  if  they  find  anything  in  such 
an  edict  repugnant  to  the  national  rights  or  noble  privileges,  they 
have  the  power  of  putting  it  on  the  shelf  {cum  honorc  deponeo-e), 
so  that  it  is  no  more  heard  of  in  that  county.  Thus  each  county 
forms,  in  some  sort,  a  separate  state  ;  and  Hungary  has  been 
by  some  deemed  a  kind  of  federal  monarchy. 

The  government  of  the  towns  is  in  the  hands  of  a  senate  and 
a  council,  called  Kozseg :  these  are  self-elected.  The  Senate  of 
Pest  consists  of  twelve,  the  Council  of  one  hundred  and  twenty, 
members.  There  is  also  a  mayor,  a  judge,  and  a  commissary  of 
police.  The  three  superior  officers  are  annually  chosen  ;  the 
others  are  for  life.  In  these,  as  in  the  county  elections,  the 
Crown  has  the  candidatio  ;  but  there  is  a  wide  difference  in  its 
exercise,  for  the  town  officers  are  all,  like  the  town  deputies  to 
the  Diet,  the  mere  creatures  of  the  government,  and  for  the  same 
reason— the  veto  of  the  crown  upon  all  public  expenditure  ; 
while  those  of  the  country  are  extremely  independent,  generally 
speaking. 

In  the  villages  the  magistrates  are  elective  ;  the  lord  here 
having  the  candidatio.  He  has  also  the  monopoly  of  meat  and 
wine  in  his  villages ;  a  right  fearfully  calculated  to  produce 
oppression. 


94  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES— HUNGAEY.  CH.  IX. 

We  have  now  surveyed  the  privileges  of  the  nobles,  the  only 
body  of  the  nation  whom  the  constitution  appears  to  recognise. 
But  in  this  survey  we  have  incidentally  had  occasion  to  see  the 
main  points  in  the  position  of  both  the  crown  and  the  peasantry 
or  commons.  The  king  has,  beside  those  prerogatives  which  we 
have  mentioned,  the  exclusive  appointment  of  all  officers,  civil, 
military,  and  ecclesiastical,  except  those  whose  election  he  shares 
with  the  nobles,  and  except  the  Palatine,  who  presides  in  the 
Upper  Chamber  of  the  Diet,  and  is  chosen  by  the  two  Houses. 
The  king  also  grants  the  privileges  of  nobility  at  his  pleasure, 
except  the  Indigenuit,  or  nobility  to  foreigners,  which  can  only 
be  conferred  by  the  Diet  All  hereditary  titles  of  nobility  also 
flow  from  the  crown.  Money  is  often  raised  in  this  manner 
by  the  crown,  as  we  may  remember  we  found  it  to  be  in  France 
(Part  I.,  Chap.  xni.).  The  title  of  Count  has  generally  fetched 
5000^. ;  that  of  Baron  2000/^.  But  it  is  said  that  an  eminent 
tailor  of  London,  Mr.  Stultz,  was,  probably  in  consideration  of 
his  calling,  made  to  pay  10,000Z.  for  being  made  a  Baron.  The 
right  of  pardoning  convicts  is  also  a  part  of  the  royal  preroga- 
tive :  and  a  power  still  more  important  than  all  the  rest  is  pos- 
sessed by  the  sovereign — he  has  the  unrestricted  control  of  the 
expenditure  of  all  public  money,  whether  raised  by  vote  of  the 
Diet,  or  by  edict,  as  the  salt-tax,  or  proceeding  from  crown  lands 
and  other  regalia.  No  account  whatever  of  this  expenditure  is 
ever  rendered  to  the  Diet.  The  coronation  oath  binds  the  king, 
not  only  to  maintain  the  constitution  inviolate,  but  also  to  re- 
unite to  the  kingdom  all  the  provinces  which  have  ever  been 
lost,  as  Bosnia,  Servia,  Wallachia. 

The  peasants  are  contradistinguished  from  the  people ;  the 
word  populus  being  in  Hungary,  as  in  ancient  Rome,  confined 
to  the  patrician  body,  the  nobles,  clergy,  and  citizens  of  free 
towns.  The  rest  of  the  community  are  termed  plehs,  and  fre- 
quently ^Ze6s  TThisera  contribueTis — a  singularly  significant  expres- 
sion, designating  at  once  the  state  of  the  people,  and  the  privi- 
lege or  exemption,  which  the  nobles  chiefly  prize.  One  is  here 
reminded  of  the  French  description  of  the  Roturiers,  "  ge7is 
taiUables  et  corveables."  Originally  they  were  astricted  to  the 
soil ;  but  in  1405  a  law  was  made  suffering  them  to  quit  with 
the  lord's  leave,  which,  however,  was  not  to  be  arbitrarily  or 
capriciously  withheld.     The  language  of  one  of  the  old  laws  is 


CH.  IX.  lord's  jurisdiction.  95 

remarkable ;  it  gives  protection  to  the  peasantry — "  Ne  omnis 
rusticitas  delectur,  sine  qua,  nobilitas parum  valet."  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  sixteenth  century,  their  rebellion  under  Dosa 
having  been  quelled,  they  were  reduced  again  to  complete  ser- 
vitude by  a  law  which  was  repealed  in  1547,  and  re-enacted  the 
year  after,  and  afterwards  much  modified  in  1556. 

In  the  Diet  of  1764  Maria  Theresa  in  vain  endeavoured 
to  obtain  a  more  favourable  law  from  the  nobles  ;  and  there- 
fore she  issued  her  famous  Urhariuvi,  which  is  partly  declaratory, 
like  the  Bulla  aurea,  in  favour  of  the  inferior  nobles  ;  but  partly 
also  enactive.  The  peasant  had  by  this  important  instrument 
the  free  power  of  leaving  his  land,  provided  his  debts  are  paid 
and  there  is  no  criminal  charge  against  him  ;  but  his  lord  can- 
not remove  him.  A  portion  of  land  was  allotted  to  him  of  from 
sixteen  to  forty  acres  of  arable,  and  from  six  to  twelve  of  pasture, 
with  a  house  and  one  acre  of  garden- ground.  His  money  pay- 
ments were  reduced  to  a  mere  trifle  ;  and  his  service  or  labour, 
called  Robot,  was  fixed  at  oue  hundred  and  four  days  without 
his  team,  fifty-two  with  it,  by  one  or  two  days  in  the  week,  un- 
less at  harvest-time,  when  it  might  be  doubled.  He  was,  beside 
this,  to  render  a  small  amount  in  kind  of  poultry  or  vegetables, 
and  to  contribute  if  the  lord  were  to  be  ransomed  in  war,  or  to 
have  a  child  married.  The  power  of  inflicting  corporal  punish- 
ment was  likewise  reduced  to  the  bestowing  of  twenty -five  lashes. 
The  obligation  of  soc  or  grinding  at  the  lord's  mill  was  abolished  : 
the  lord's  power  of  taking  the  peasant's  land  was  confined  to  the 
case  of  his  requirmg  it  for  building  his  own  house  upon,  and 
then  he  must  find  other  land  equally  valuable  ;  and  the  peasant 
was  allowed  to  take  wood  in  the  lord's  forest  for  his  needful 
occasions,  a  right  resembling  our^ire  and  hedge  bote. 

One  of  the  greatest  grievances  which  this  wise  and  liberal 
measure  left  was  the  Lord's  Court,  having  jurisdiction  of  dis- 
putes, not  only  between  peasant  and  peasant,  but  also  between 
the  lord  and  peasant;  the  judge  being  named  by  the  former. 
The  power  of  inflicting  capital  punishment  is  now  only  possessed 
by  some  few  lords,  or  by  special  grant.  Prince  Esterhazy  is  one 
of  those  few.  The  new  Urbarium  of  1835,  which  does  the  great- 
est honour  to  the  eminent  statesman  so  long  at  the  head  of  the 
Austrian  Councils,  removed  this  cause  of  complaint.  Prince 
Mettemich  provided  by  this  edict  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Lord's  or  Manor  Court  should  be  confined  to  causes  between 


96  MIXED  ARISTOCRACIES — HUNGARY.  CH.  IX 

peasant  and  peasant,  and  that  all  questions  arising  between  lord 
and  peasant  should  be  henceforth  tried  by  a  new  court  composed 
of  the  district  magistrate  and  four  disinterested  persons.  He 
abolished  all  right  of  inflicting  corporal  punishment,  restricting 
the  Lord's  Court  to  imprisonment  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three 
days,  in  case  the  peasant  failed  to  perform  his  services.  Small 
tithes  and  extraordinary  gifts  were  also  abolished,  and  the  pea- 
sant was  not  to  be  compelled  to  make  long  journeys  with  his  team 
in  order  to  do  his  appointed  ser\dce  for  the  lord.  The  noble 
was  made  liable  to  all  taxes,  local  and  general,  in  respect  of 
peasant  or  ignoble  land  purchased  by  him ;  and  in  return  for 
such  large  concessions  he  only  acquired  the  right  of  freely  de- 
vising his  land  if  childless — the  right  of  division  among  children, 
if  any,  remaining ;  the  right  to  have  his  share  of  all  the  land 
lying  contiguous  ;  and  the  free  right  of  selling  his  land.  Many 
nobles  compound  with  their  peasants  for  the  robot  or  labour. 
Count  Szechinij  compounds  for  about  one-third  of  the  one  hun- 
dred and  four  days,  or  the  fifty-two  with  team. 

The  military  system  of  the  Hungarian  monarchy  is  singularly 
inefficient.  The  insurrectionary  army  or  levy  en  masse  on  inva- 
sion was  found  wholly  useless  in  1809,  when  Napoleon  had 
penetrated  to  Vienna  and  occupied  Presburgh  itself :  it  was  hard 
to  say  whether  the  troops  or  ffieir  accoutrements  were  the  least 
capable  of  actual  service  in  the  field.  Yet  the  numbers  raised 
were  40,000  men  by  the  counties,  and  45,000  by  the  towns.  The 
military  frontier  towards  Turkey  is  better  provided  for  defence. 
This  extensive  coast,  reaching  a  thousand  miles  from  the  Adriatic 
eastward,  and  comprising  18,000  square  miles  of  territory,  is  in- 
habited by  a  warlike  people,  all  the  peasants  being  soldiers,  and 
holding  their  land  by  a  strictly  military  tenure.  Of  these,  45,000 
are  constantly  under  arms,  and  their  numbers  might  be  raised  to 
100,000  in  case  of  necessity.  The  whole  system  is  military.  The 
country  is  divided  into  four  command eries,  under  so  many  gover- 
nors, and  all  the  officers  exercise  both  civil  and  military  jurisdic- 
tion. The  Aulic  Council  of  Vienna  regulates  the  whole.  In 
each  family  a  patriarchal  authority  resides ;  the  property  is  in 
common ;  the  chief,  termed  Gospodar,  being  the  father  of  the 
clan,  and  all  the  adult  males  have  voices  in  the  management  of 
the  common  concerns.  But  this  portion  of  the  empire  is  not 
properly  Hungarian. 

Such  is  the  Huncrarian  Constitution — "  the  ancient  idol  of  the 


CH.  IX.  WORKS  ON  HUNGARY.  97 

nation,"  as  one  of  their  own  authors  has  said  ;  and  an  idol  to 
whose  worship  they  have  sacrificed  their  country,  and  made 
themselves  three  hundred  years  behind  the  rest  of  Europe  in 
every  branch  of  social  improvement.  This  constitution  means, 
in  the  mouths  of  its  votaries,  the  privileges  of  the  nobles,  the 
oppression  of  the  people,  the  neglect  of  national  prosperity,  the 
sacrifice  of  real  and  solid  advantages  to  a  nominal  glory  and 
empty  pride.  It  is  by  another  of  these  authors  charged  as  the 
cause  why  he  deeply  grieves  to  see  his  countrymen  wretched, 
degenerated  and  grovelling  in  the  dust 


The  contemplation  of  the  Polish  and  Hungarian  Governments 
gives  rise  to  constant  recollections  of  the  general  principles  un- 
folded respecting  the  Aristocratic  system.  All  the  vices  of  that 
policy  receive  exemplification  from  the  effects  produced  in  both 
countries  by  the  vices  which  were  described  as  inseparable  from 
its  existence.  But  it  would  be  difficult  to  trace,  in  the  history  of 
either,  any  of  those  redeeming  virtues  which  we  found  reason  to 
admire  in  the  government  of  Venice,  and  of  which  the  Aristo- 
cratic principle  infuses  the  influence  in  mixed  constitutions, 
such  as  our  own,  when  it  forms  a  part  of  them,  and  a  part  of  the 
greatest  value  and  importance. 

We  have  now  examined  the  general  principles  which  govern 
the  structure  and  functions  of  the  Aristocratic  System,  and  have 
illustrated  those  principles  by  contemplating  the  mixed  aristo- 
cracies of  Poland  and  Hungary.  We  are  now  to  inquire  into 
the  structure  and  functions  of  the  other  Aristocratic  Governments 
in  ancient  and  in  modern  times,  beginning  with  the  government 
of  Rome.* 

•  The  '  Statistica  Hungarise'  of  Horvath,  1802,  is  one  of  the  best  works  on  Hun- 
gary.— The  'Travels'  of  Mr.  Paget,  2  vols.  8vo.,  1836,  contains  much  valuable 
information  upon  all  subjects  connected  with  Hungary  and  the  Hungarians. — The 
works  which  have  been  chiefly  relied  on  for  information  upon  the  three  material 
points  of  creation  of  nobles,  inheritance  of  land,  and  jurisdiction  of  nobles,  are, 
Novotny,  'Sciagraphia  Hungariae,'  (1798,)  Pars  I.,  p.  103 — Werboez, '  Corpus  Juris 
Hungarici,'  Pars  I.,  Tit.  3,  4,  6,  7,  8,  40,  47-53,  57 ;  Pars  II.,  Tit.  12;  Pars  III,, 
Til.  32  — '  Decret.'  an  1630,  Art.  30;  1435,  Art.  2;  1550,  Art.  77  —  Demian, 
'  Tableau  des  lloyaumes  de  Hongrie,'  &c.  (1809)  II.,  329. — Original  information 
of  much  value  has  also  been  obtained  from  eminent  persons  connected  with  public 
affairs. 


PART  II. 


98  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X. 


CHAPTER  X. 

CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMK 


Importance  of  the  subject — Its  great  diflSculty — Ancient  historians — Modem  writers 
— Predecessors  of  Niebuhr — Niebuhr  and  his  school — Scantiness  of  materials — 
Character  of  Niebuhr's  writings — Early  history  entirely  fabulous — Illustrations 
— Early  divisions  of  the  people — Early  Constitution — The  Tribes — Patricians — 
Plebeians — Patrons — Clients — Comitia  Curiata — Niebuhr's  doctrine  examined — 
Equitcs — Reforms  of  Servius— Centuries  and  Comitia  Centuriata— Legislation  of 
Servius — Comparison  with  Solon's — Tarquin  the  Proud — His  tyranny — His 
expulsion — Foundation  of  the  Aristocratic  Republic — Fabulous  history — Com- 
parison of  the  Roman  Revolution  with  the  French  and  English, 

The  constitution  of  ancient  Rome  at  the  different  periods  of 
its  history  forms  a  subject  of  such  curious  inquiry,  and  of  such 
useful  contemplation  to  the  political  student,  that  we  must  of 
necessity  examine  it  attentively,  notwithstanding  the  great 
obscurity  in  which  a  considerable  portion  of  it  is  involved. 
Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  more  difficult  than  to  obtain  a  distinct 
and  accurate  account  of  its  earlier  stages ;  and  some  parts  even 
of  its  later  history  are  encumbered  with  much  doubt.  The  Ro- 
man historians  all  belonged  to  an  age  very  remote  from  that  in 
which  the  foundations  of  the  government  were  laid.  Livy  and 
Dionysius  hved  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  seven  centuries  after 
the  building  of  the  city  ;  four  and  a  half  after  the  establishment 
of  the  Commonwealth.  The  age  of  Polybius  was  two  centuries 
nearer  the  times  in  question  ;  but  his  detailed  narrative  is  con- 
fined to  the  transactions  of  his  own  day,  although  our  most  cer- 
tain lights  upon  the  earlier  times  are  undoubtedly  derived  from 
what  has  reached  us  at  secondhand  of  his  general  summary,  and 
from  his  incidental  remarks.  Plutarch,  besides  that  he  lived 
much  later  —nine  centuries  after  the  building  of  the  city — had 


CH.  X.  ANCIENT  HISTORIANS.  99 

been  very  little  in  Italy,  and  possessed  an  extremely  imperfect 
knowledge  of  the  language.  Livy,  too,  appears  to  have  been 
deficient  in  the  essential  qualities  of  the  historian.  He  is  now 
universally  allowed  to  have  been  so  careless  in  examining  the 
evidence  of  facts  which  he  relates,  and  so  much  biassed  by  a 
disposition  to  favour  one  party  and  one  class  of  opinions,  that  he 
is  little  entitled  to  our  confidence,  and,  indeed,  only  claims  our 
unqualified  admiration  by  the  charm  of  his  unrivalled  style, 
which  must  have  placed  him  at  the  head  of  all  historians  had  he 
but  maintained  an  ordinary  reputation  for  the  more  cardinal  vir- 
tues of  industry  and  fidelity.*  Dionysius,  though  he  had  con- 
sulted the  authorities  much  more  diligently  than  Livy,  yet 
evinces  no  discrimination  in  the  use  of  them  ;  and  having  written 
with  the  undisguised  purpose  of  flattering  the  national  vanity  of 
his  countrymen  by  representing  the  Roman  origin  and  institu- 
tions as  derived  from  Greece,  his  fidelity  stands  very  much 
lower  than  that  of  the  celebrated  Roman  author.  Besides,  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  has  described  the  ancient  government  with 
any  minuteness  ;  nothing  upon  the  system  is  to  be  found  in  their 
writings :  it  is,  indeed,  by  casual  observations,  or  as  incidental  to 
the  narrative  of  events,  that  we  find  anything  like  the  outline  of 
any  of  the  institutions ;  and  their  statements  are  often  at  variance 
both  with  one  another  and  with  themselves. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  whole  early  history  of  Rome  had  long 
been  well  known  to  all  who  critically  examined  it  as  recorded  by 
those  writers,  and  as  referred  to  in  other  classical  remains.  It 
had  not  escaped  the  habitual  sagacity  and  scepticism  of  Voltaire,  f 

*  The  carelessness  of  Livy,  the  credulity  of  Plutarch,  and  the  bad  faith  of  Diony- 
sius, are  often  complained  of.  But  can  anything  exceed  some  of  the  stories  in 
Valerius  Maximus  ?  It  seems  hardly  credible  that  any  respectable  person  should 
have  set  down  such  things  as  he  has  brought  together.  Thus  he  relates,  as  if  he 
were  describing  an  ordinary  occurrence,  that  one  of  the  ten  tribunes  (twenty-nine 
years  before  there  were  more  than  five,  and  fifteen  years  before  there  were  above 
two)  burnt  his  nine  colleagues  alive  for  preventing  a  choice  of  successors— that 
being  a  capital  offence  by  a  law  only  made  thirty-seven  years  after — although  the 
historian  well  knew  that  neither  Livy  nor  Dionysius,  nor  any  one  but  the  inaccu- 
rate Zonaras,  had  ever  made  the  least  allusion  to  such  a  tale,  and  although  he  also 
knew  that  the  alleged  ground  of  the  massacre  is  inconsistent  with  the  whole 
current  of  events. — (Val.  Max.,  vi.  3,  2.) 

t  See  particularly  the  Introduction  to  the  Essai  sur  les  Maeurs.  — Bayle,  with 
all  his  scepticism,  does  not  appear  to  have  questioned  the  authenticity  of  the  ancient 
histories  where  they  relate  no  miracles ;  yet  he  frequently,  as  in  his  article  on 
Lucretia,  points  out  their  discrepancies. 

H   2 


100  CONSTITUTION   OF  ROME.  OH.  X. 

A  more  learned  and  accurate  scholar,  M.  Beaufort,  had  made  it 
the  subject  of  a  separate  treatise  a  hundred  years  ago.*  Peri- 
zonius  had  taken  nearly  the  same  view  of  the  matter  half  a  cen- 
tury before ;  and  Cluverius  had  devoted  a  portion  of  his  great 
work  (Italia  Antiqua)  to  an  elaborate  statement  of  the  contra- 
dictions and  uncertainties  of  the  Roman  historians.  But  it  was 
not  till  the  beginning  of  the  present  century  that  the  subject 
underwent  a  full  investigation,  and  that  the  portions  which  may 
be  relied  on  were  separated  from  those  which  are  purely  fanciful 
or  greatly  misrepresented.  The  Germans  have,  as  usual  with 
that  excellent  and  admirable  people,  been  the  principal  la- 
bourers in  this  department  of  literature ;  and  it  is  to  Niebuhr 
chiefly,  and  after  him  to  Gottling,  and  Wachsmith,  and  Savigny,f 
that  we  are  indebted  for  the  materials  from  which  a  more  correct 
view  of  the  subject  is  now  obtained.  Nevertheless  those  mate- 
rials are  after  all  very  scanty  for  the  formation  of  a  complete 
history.  Writing  in  the  first  three  centuries  was  but  rarely  used, 
and  the  meagre  registers  of  events  which  the  pontiffs  kept,  with 
whatever  inscriptions  had  been  carved  on  brass,  almost  all  pe- 
rished when  the  city  was  sacked  and  burnt  by  the  Gauls,  A.  U.  C. 
360  (364  according  to  Varro).  The  few  monuments  that  could 
be  collected,  after  the  Gauls  retreated,  were  very  little  consulted 
by  the  early  historians,  who  appear,  like  Livy  and  Dionysius, 
to  have  rather  occupied  themselves  with  putting  the  traditions 
preserved  in  popular  songs  J  into  the  form  of  a  narrative  than 
with  any  examination  of  the  evidence  upon  which  those  tradi- 
tions rested.  Moreover,  as  even  the  earliest  historians,  too, 
lived  five  centuries  and  a  half  after  the  foundation  of  the  city, 
their  knowledge  of  the  subject  was  little  more  likely  to  be  cor- 
rect than  that  of  later  writers.  It  is  only  by  examining  and 
comparing  the  narratives  thus  composed,  the  fragments  of  old 

*  '  L'Incertitude  des  Cinque  Premiers  Siecles  de  I'Histoire  Romaine,  17.38.' 
His  work  on  the  Roman  Government  ('  La  Republique  Romaine,'  2  vols.  4to.)  was 
published  in  1766,  and  is  by  far  the  most  learned  and  accurate  treatise  on  the 
subject. 

+  Ileyne,  in  1793,  placed  the  subject  of  the  Agrarian  laws  upon  its  right  footing ; 
and  Vico,  a  learned  Italian,  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  had  taken, 
with  regard  to  some  important  points,  the  same  view  of  the  Constitution,  which 
late  inquiries  Isave  countenanced. 

X  The  learned  and  ingenious  work  of  Mr.  Macaulay,  '  Lays  of  Ancient  Rome,' 
well  desei-ves  to  be  consulted  by  the  reader  of  the  early  Roman  historj-.— Mr.  M. 
might  render  much  service  by  undertaking  a  Roman  History,  still  a  great  desideratum. 


CH.  X.  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  INQUIRY.  101 

laws,  and  other  monuments  accidentally  preserved  in  them,  the 
allusion  to  facts  scattered  over  other  matters,  above  all  the 
treatise  of  Cicero  on  Government  {De  Republicd),  fortunately 
recovered  in  part,  and  in  composing  which  he  appears  to  have 
relied  for  the  early  history  upon  the  lost  books  of  Polybius,  that 
any  approach  can  be  made  to  the  real  truth  respecting  the  origin 
of  the  Roman  Government.  That  Cicero  himself  should  in  some 
respects  have  fallen  into  mistakes  concerning  it ;  that  in  his  time 
the  subject  should  have  been  surrounded  with  doubt,  can  little 
surprise  us,  when  we  reflect  how  much  controversy  prevails 
among  ourselves  at  this  day  upon  the  early  history  of  the  English 
parliament,  although  we  only  live  at  the  distance  of  six  centuries 
from  the  events  in  question,  and  the  use  of  writing  has  been  imi- 
versal  during  the  whole  time,  and  although  a  body  of  men  devoted 
to  literary  pursuits  has  always  existed,  and  the  records  of  the 
age  are  still  in  perfect  preservation.  Much  of  the  uncertainty 
which  prevails  upon  these  important  subjects  arises,  both  in  the 
history  of  the  Roman  government  and  our  own,  from  contem- 
porary writers  omitting  to  describe  matters  of  familiar  observa- 
tion, and  which  they  assumed  that  every  one  must  be  aware  of ; 
a  remark  applicable  not  only  to  the  early  but  to  the  later  history 
also  of  the  Roman  institutions. 

Finally,  it  must  be  stated  as  an  additional  embarrassment  to 
the  student,  that  the  most  important  work  upon  the  subject,  that 
of  Niebuhr,  is  written  in  a  manner  peculiarly  confused  and  ob- 
scure. He  shows  no  management  or  mastery  of  his  materials ; 
he  never  keeps  in  mind  the  necessity  of  proceeding  from  things 
already  explained  to  new  information ;  he  does  not  state  plainly, 
and  by  way  of  either  narrative  or  exposition,  what  he  has  to  tell, 
but  works  by  reference,  and  remark,  and  allusion ;  he  forgets 
that  he  is  to  instruct  us,  and  assumes  that  we  already  know  the 
matter  he  is  dealing  with.  A  work  less  didactic,  less  clear  and 
plain,  less  easily  or  agreeably  followed,  can  with  difficulty  be 
named,  among  books  of  the  class  to  which  it  unquestionably 
belongs,  works  of  sterling  value  and  original  genius. 

Such  are  the  difficulties  of  the  inquiry  upon  which  we  are 
about  to  enter  ;  and  if  we  would  form  a  notion  how  necessary  it 
is  to  the  accurate  knowledge  of  the  Roman  government,  we  have 
only  to  recollect  the  great  errors  into  which  authors  of  the  highest 
reputation  have  been  led  by  indiscriminately  taking  for  granted 


102  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X. 

whatever  they  find  in  the  two  most  famous  Latin  historiana 
Not  only  have  most  of  the  commentators,  as  Sigonius,*  Onu- 
phrius  Panvinius,t  P.  Manutius,:^  treated  as  authentic  every 
thing  save  the  miracles,  which  Livy  himself  was  fain  to  reject  ; 
but  Machiavel  and  Montesquieu  actually  suppose,  from  the 
manner  in  which  Dionysius  speaks  of  Romulus  dividing  the  land, 
that  each  person  at  Rome  had  a  small  allotment  which  he  could 
not  exceed  without  breach  of  the  law  ;  and  both  these  authors, 
concei\'ing  this  poverty  and  equality  to  be  essential  paits  of  a 
republican  government,  regard  the  Agrarian  laws,  from  time  to 
time  propounded,  as  attempts  to  restore  the  equality  by  en- 
forcing this  imaginary  maximum.  §  Under  the  pressure  of  these 
difficulties,  and  the  influence  of  these  inducements,  it  is  fit  that 
we  now  proceed  to  deal  with  the  subject. 

That  a  certain  portion  of  the  early  Roman  history  is  purely 
fabulous,  no  one  of  course  has  ever  doubted  ;  but  it  was  a  long 
time  imagined  that  the  greater  part  might  be  true,  and  thus  men 
had  become  habituated  to  believe  everything  but  the  preter- 
natural passages.  There  seems,  however,  no  foundation  for  the 
belief  that  the  greater  part  of  the  story  is  an  account  of  real 
events,  or  even  that  all  the  actors  in  the  scenes  described  were 
really  existing  persons.  Some  of  them  may  have  had  no  existence 
at  all ;  and  some  of  the  events  are  certainly  mere  poetical  fictions, 
not  quite  so  improbable  as  the  miraculous  portions  of  the  tale, 
but  quite  as  unreal.  Thus  a  close  examination  of  the  accounts 
of  Romulus,  and  his  supposed  brother  Remus,  has  led  all  who 
have  undertaken  it  to  the  conclusion  that  the  whole  is  a  fiction, 
and  that  Romulus  is  only  tlie  personification  of  the  Romans,  the 
earliest  inhabitants  of  Rome,  as  ^olus  among  the  Greeks  was  of 
the  -^olians,  and  Dorus  of  the  Dorians.  The  personal  existence 
of  Numa  is  at  the  best  extremely  doubtful,  though  it  has  not 
been  given  up  so  completely  as  that  of  Romulus.     The  sounder 

*  Dc  Ant.  Jiir.  Civ.  Rom.  He  supposes  that  Romulus  established  the  relation 
of  patron  and  client  universally  between  the  patricians  and  plebeians. 

f  De  Civ.  Rom.,  cap.  vii.  He  gives  the  impossible  fable  of  the  Rape  of  the 
Sabines  at  length. 

J  De  Senatu,  cap.  i.  He  adopts  the  same  notion  as  to  patrons  and  clients  with 
Sigonius.  Paul  Manutius  (X)e  Civ.  Rom.)  terms  Livy  "  Scriptor  interdum  parum 
diligens  ;"  but  in  the  same  passage  describes  Dionysius  as  an  author  of  the  most 
consummate  accuracy,  and  one  "  cui  fidem  non  habere  nemo  debeat.' 

§  Mach,,  Discorsi,  I. — Mont.  Grand,  et  D^c,  cap.  3.  He  makes  this  supposed 
equality  the  main  cause  of  the  Roman  power. 


CH.  X.  EAKLY  HISIORY  WHOLLY  FABULOUS.  103 

opinion  seems  to  be  that  these  two  kings  must  be  taken  merely 
as  representing  two  early  periods  of  the  history  of  the  people  ; 
Romulus,  or  the  age  of  Romulus,  being  the  earliest  period,  when 
the  Romans  were  at  war  for  the  existence  of  their  horde  and 
town  with  all  around  them — Numa,  or  his  age,  being  the  subse- 
quent period  of  comparative  tranquillity,  when  some  progress  was 
made  in  the  arts  of  peace.  Of  the  events  so  constantly  recited , 
one  may  be  mentioned,  as  an  example  of  universal  credit  being 
given  to  a  narrative  almost  as  contrary  to  the  ordinary  course  of 
nature  as  the  supposed  relationship  of  the  god  Mars  to  the 
founder  of  the  city.  The  rape  of  the  Sabines  could  not  jDossibly 
have  happened  in  anything  resembling  the  way  in  which  it  is 
related ;  not  to  mention  that  one  account  makes  the  number  of 
women  seized  amount  only  to  30,  while  Dionysius  gives  it  at  527, 
and  Plutarch  at  683 :  numbers  manifestly  taken  at  random,  either 
by  the  authors,  or  by  the  makers  of  some  ancient  ballads,  from 
whom  they  copied.  Similar  inconsistencies  and  improbabilities 
are  to  be  found  in  the  succeeding  reigns,  even  when  the  persons 
mentioned  appear  to  have  had  a  real  existence.  The  fight  of 
the  Horatii  and  Curiatii  is  in  all  its  particulars  e\idently  poetical ; 
but  the  murder  of  the  elder  Tarquin  by  the  sons  of  Ancus,  thirty- 
eight  years  after  he  had  obtained  the  crown  in  preference  to 
them,  and  at  the  time  when  he  must  soon  have  been  removed 
out  of  their  way  by  old  age,  to  say  nothing  of  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  said  to  have  been  perpetrated  (by  a  peasant  sent  to 
ask  at  an  audience  redress  for  some  injury)  and  of  the  contrivers 
of"  the  plot  suffering  Servius,  Tarquin's  favourite,  to  rule  in  his 
name  some  days  after  he  was  killed — all  this  is  manifestly  a 
fiction,  and,  if  intended  to  pass  for  history,  a  very  clumsy  fiction  ; 
and  other  stories  expose  and  refute  themselves.  But  parts  of 
the  early  history,  which  are  not  so  improbable,  seem  equally 
unfounded  :  as  the  accounts  of  Tarquin  silently  striking  off  the 
heads  of  the  tallest  poppies  to  suggest  a  proscription  of  the  chief 
men  at  Gabii,  when  the  emissaries  from  his  partisans  there  came 
to  receive  his  instructions.  This  is  plainly  borrowed  from 
Herodotus,  who  recounts  that  the  same  symbolical  advice  was 
given  to  Periander ;  and  indeed  the  rape  of  the  Sabines  bears  a 
close  resemblance  to  a  passage  in  his  history,  the  rape  of  the 
Athenian  women  by  the  Pelasgi  of  Lemnos. — (Lib.  vi.  cap. 
137.) 


104  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X. 

That  the  city  was  founded  about  the  year  753  before  the 
Christian  era,  is  the  opinion  now  most  prevalent,  although  Sir 
Isaac  Newton's  chronology'  fixes  the  dat«  at  693.  That  we  may 
find  at  a  very  early  period  the  origin  of  those  divisions  among 
the  inhabitants,  and  of  those  institutions  which  with  some  material 
alterations  were  continued  for  many  ages,  seems  neai'ly  certain ; 
and  these  changes  appear  to  have  begun  very  early,  some  of  them 
at  the  beginning  and  others  at  the  end  of  the  second  century  from 
the  foundation  of  the  city. 

By  tracing  back  these  divisions  and  institutions,  with  the  help 
of  tradition  and  tbe  occasional  mention  of  particulars  in  various 
classical  remains,  we  seem  justified  in  concluding  that  at  the 
earliest  period,  the  period  assigned  to  Romulus — in  other  words, 
the  beginning  of  the  nation — the  inhabitants  consisted  of  a  single 
tribe  akin  to  the  Latins,  but  that  another,  the  Sabines,  was  in  a 
few  years  added ;  and  that  the  former  were  called  Ramnes,  the 
latter  Titles  or  Titiensea.  Each  tribe  was  composed  of  freemen, 
children  of  freemen  alone  ;  and  the  whole  free  people  formed  the 
two  tribes.  Each  tribe  consisted  of  a  hundred  houses,  clans  or 
kindreds  (gentes),  consisting  of  different  families  originally  re- 
lated to  one  another,  but  afterwards  agreeing  chiefly  in  having 
the  same  religious  rites;  and  they  were  divided  into  bodies 
called  cuHcB,  of  ten  houses  (gentes).  A  chief,  or  king,  was  at 
the  head  of  the  whole :  he  was  chosen  by  them,  and  had  the 
command  of  their  forces  in  all  warlike  or  predatory  operations. 
He  was  also  the  chief  priest  and  the  chief  judge  of  the  commu- 
nity ;  but  the  other  powers  of  government  were  vested  in  a 
council  or  senate,  chosen  out  of  the  tribes  in  the  manner  to  be 
presently  examined.*  The  persons  composing  these  two  tribes 
were  not  only  free  and  free-born,  but  also  natives,  that  is,  bom  in 
the  place  and  descended  from  natives.  The  tribes  thus  consisted 
of  all  the  inhabitants  who  were  both  free,  free-born  and  native. 
There  were  others  who  did  not  come  within  this  description, 

♦  Among  the  theories  propounded  on  this  subject  there  is  one  of  Gottling,  which 
has  met  with  great  favour,  and,  as  it  should  seem,  very  imjustly.  It  represents  the 
houses  (gentes)  as  divided  into  ten  curiae  or  bodies  of  ten,  and  then  supposes  a 
second  division  into  ten  decuries,  consisting  of  parts  of  gentes,  and  so  arranged  for 
the  purpose  of  choosing  a  decurio,  to  be  the  senator  of  each  decuria,  thus  supposing 
a  refinement  still  greater  than  mere  representation ;  for  it  is  a  division  of  the  same 
bodies  in  two  different  ways  for  different  purposes.  Both  Niebuhr  and  the  other 
recent  authorities  entirely  reject  Livy's  theory  of  nomination  by  the  king ;  yet  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  probabilities  are  much  in  favour  of  some  such  scheme. 


C'H.  X.  EARLY  CONSTITUTION — TRIBES.  105 

and  these  were  chiefly  poor  followers  of  the  families,  slaves  set 
free,  or  the  children  of  slaves,  and  strangers  who'  had  come  to  live 
in  the  new  city.  None  of  these  were  classed  in  either  tribe  ;  but 
the  followers  and  freed-men  were  dependants  upon  the  houses  or 
individual  members  of  the  tribe,  and  called  clients,  from  the 
Greek  word,*  signifying  to  hear  or  obey.  It  is  probable  that 
the  strangers  were  mostly  of  the  same  origin  as  the  population  of 
the  country  on  the  west  of  the  Tiber,  or  Southern  Etruria,  and 
became  a  much  more  numerous  and  important  body,  when,  about 
a  century  after  the  foundation  of  the  city,  the  inhabitants  of 
Alba  removed  to  Rome  upon  their  town  being  destroyed,  and 
were  classed  with  the  Tuscan  settlers.  A  third  class,  composed 
of  these  free  men,  was  then  added  to  the  two  former,  and  called 
Luceres;  supposed  by  some  to  be  a  Tuscan  name.  It  was  divided, 
like  the  other  two,  into  ten  curise,  or  bodies  of  ten  houses  (gentes) 
each,  and  it  had,  like  the  Hamnes  and  Titles  (the  Latins  and 
the  Sabines),  its  followers,  dependants  or  clients.  These  houses, 
however,  of  this  third  tribe  were  regarded  as  inferior  to  those  of 
the  other  two,  and  called  the  lesser  {minores  gentes),  the  others 
being  the  greater  {majores  gentes).  There  seems  less  reason  to 
suppose  that  Tullus  Hostilius,  in  whose  reign  this  addition  of  a 
third  tribe  took  place,  was  an  imaginary  person,  than  that  Ro- 
mulus and  Numa  were  such ;  but  nothing  can  be  more  impro- 
bable than  the  greater  portion  of  the  stories  related  of  his  times, 
especially  the  most  remarkable  of  them,  the  battle  of  the  Horatii 
and  the  Curiatii. 

In  the  next  reign,  that  of  Ancus,  there  is  more  reliance  to 
be  placed  upon  the  narrative  ;  and  it  appears  that  in  his  time 
considerable  bodies  of  Latins  came  to  settle  at  Rome  on  the 
captiu'e  of  their  towns ;  but  they  were  not  formed  into  a  separate 
tribe,  or  enrolled  among  the  three  already  formed.  Nor  of  the 
last  of  those  three,  the  Luceres,  were  any  members  admitted 
into  the  senate  until  the  next  reign,  that  of  Tarquin  the  Elder, 
when  a  hundred  of  them  were  added  to  the  senate,  but  called 
Senators  or  Fathers  of  the  lesser  houses  (patres  minorum  genr- 
Hum) — those  of  the  Ramnes  and  Titles  being  of  the  greater 
i'majorum  gentium).  The  Latin  and  other  strangers  thus  formed 
a  body  of  persons  separated  from  and  inferior  to  the  three  tribes 
still  more  than  the  third  tribe  was  separated  from  and  inferior  to 
*  hXt/f/c.     An  old  Latin  word  had  the  same  sense. 


W6  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X. 

the  other  two.  This  body  is  by  some  writers,  of  which  Niebuhr 
is  the  chief,  considered  to  have  had  no  existence  before  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Latins  in  the  time  of  Ancus.  But  though  its  members 
were  increased  by  that  settlement,  it  must,  to  a  certain  degree, 
have  been  in  existence  previously  ;  because  those  who  afterwards 
composed  the  Luceres  had  stood  in  the  same  relation  to  the 
Ramnes  and  Titles  before  they  became  a  third  tribe,  in  which  the 
Latin  settlers  in  Ancus's  time  stood  to  the  three  tribes ;  they  were 
aliens,  and  enjoyed  no  pohtical  rights ;  the  tribes,  that  is,  the 
free  and  native  people,  were  alone  regarded.  They  may,  in 
a  sense,  be  said  to  have  formed  a  privileged  class,  as  compared 
with  the  others ;  but  it  is  much  more  correct  to  say  that  the 
whole  Roman  people — all  the  free  and  free-bom  natives — were 
alone  regarded  in  the  government  from  the  earliest  times ;  and 
that  the  others,  chiefly  aliens,  had  no  place  in  it.  The  members 
of  the  tribes  were  called  patres  or  fathers  ;  and  afterwards,  when 
the  title  of  patres  began  to  be  given  peculiarly  to  the  more 
ancient  of  the  body,  who  constituted  the  senate,  they  were  called 
Patricians,  or  members  of  the  cla.ss  to  which  the  patres  belonged. 
Those  who  depended  on  them  as  clients  were  reckoned  with  them, 
and  in  some  sort  were  considered  to  be  part  of  the  tribe  to  which 
their  patrons  belonged,  though  they  did  not  share  its  rights, 
except  through  those  patrons.  The  rest  of  the  community  were 
called  plebs — plebeians,  or  commonalty. 

But  out  of  this  distribution  there  soon  arose  the  relation  of  a 
privileged  to  an  unprivileged  class.  The  number  of  the  houses 
was  necessarily  Hmited  to  those  who  had  been  of  the  three  tribes 
always ;  for  no  family  could  be  enrolled  among  them  unless  by 
an  act  of  the  whole  State  adopting  or  naturalizing  them,  or  by 
filling  certain  high  offices ;  consequently  the  numbers  of  their 
members  never  could  greatly  increase  ;  indeed  they  continued  for 
a  long  course  of  years  to  do  little  more  than  maintain  their  origi- 
nal numbers,  while  the  plebeians  rapidly  increased,  not  only  by 
the  natural  progress  of  population,  but  by  other  means.  Settlers 
flocked  to  the  city  as  often  as  it  conquered  any  Italian  town ; 
dependants  or  clients,  on  the  family  of  their  patrons  being  extinct, 
became  plebeians  if  they  did  not  choose  any  other  patron  ;  slaves 
who  obtained  their  freedom,  though  they  generally  became  clients 
of  their  former  masters,  yet  sometimes  were  thrown  off  altogether, 
and  became  plebeiana     The  patricians,  too,  were  not  allowed  to 


CH.  X.  PATRICIANS  AND  PLEBEIANS,  107 

intermarry  with  the  plebeians  ;  and  the  fruits  of  any  connection 
thus  formed  being  illegitimate,  all  became  plebeians.  As  the  ple- 
beian body,  then,  continued  to  increase,  while  the  numbers  of  the 
patricians  remained  at  first  nearly  stationary,  and  afterwards 
began  to  decline,  a  division  of  the  whole  nation  into  two  classes 
was  well  established  ;  and  the  smaller  class  had  rights  which  the 
larger  body  did  not  share. 

The  only  difference  between  the  account  here  given  of  the 
plebeian  body's  origin,  and  that  given  by  Niebuhr  and  his  fol- 
lowers, is,  that  they  consider  the  body  to  have  been  established 
all  at  once  at  the  time  of  Ancus ;  whereas  we  hold  it  much  more 
consistent  with  the  facts  and  with  probability  to  consider  this 
body  as  having  gradually  increased  from  the  very  beginning. 
Indeed,  even  Niebuhr,  although  he  considers  the  great  body  of 
the  plebeians  to  have  been  formed  out  of  the  Latins  who  became 
subject  to  Rome  in  the  time  of  Ancus,  acknowledges  that  such  a 
body  as  we  have  described  must  have  arisen  in  the  very  earliest 
times.  But  the  existence  of  the  patricians  as  a  privileged  order 
— in  other  words,  the  existence  of  an  aristocracy — cannot,  -with 
any  accuracy,  be  referred  to  the  earliest  times,  when  all  the 
people,  that  is,  the  tribes  or  free  and  native  Romans,  enjoyed  the 
privileges  for  themselves  and  their  retainers,  foreigners  alone  and 
slaves  being  excluded.  It  is  only  when  a  body,  and  a  large  body, 
of  native  Romans  had  grown  up,  the  descendants  of  foreigners, 
freed-men,  the  offspring  of  illicit  intercourse,  and  cast-off  retainers, 
that  we  can  with  any  correctness  of  speech  denominate  the  patri- 
cians, descendants  of  the  original  free  and  native  houses,  a  privi- 
leged order,  and  the  government,  in  which  they  held  exclusive 
authority,  an  aristocracy. 

Beside  their  exclusive  right  to  places  in  the  senate,  the  patri- 
cians exercised  direct  authority  as  a  body.  The  curiae  into  which 
the  houses  were  formed  met  in  an  assembly  called  the  comitia 
curiata,  which  appears  to  have  been  attended  not  only  by 
the  heads  of  the  houses  (gentes),  but  by  all  housekeepers,  that  is? 
by  the  heads  of  all  families.  Those  are  manifestly  wrong  who 
suppose  that  it  was  a  representative  body ;  that  is,  a  body  of  persons 
either  named  by  the  houses,  or  who,  from  their  position  at  the 
head  of  those  houses,  might  be  said  to  attend  the  assembly  on 
their  part.  For,  in  that  case,  whether  we  regard  the  senate  as 
appointed  by  the  king,  or  as  composed  of  decurions,  officers  of  the 


108  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMK  CH.  X. 

houses,  or  as  chosen  by  the  houses,  its  composition  would  be 
substantially  the  same  with  what  Niebuhr  ascribes  to  tlie  co- 
mitia  curiata :  so  that  there  must  have  been  two  bodies  com- 
posed of  the  same,  or  nearly  the  same  persons,  and  appointed  in 
the  same,  or  nearly  the  same  manner,  yet  exercising  perfectly 
different  functions  in  governing  the  same  community ;  an  ab- 
surdity which  never  could  have  been  established,  or  have  grown 
up  in  any  scheme  of  administration.* 

In  the  comitia  curiata  the  patrons  of  the  greater  houses  (ma- 
jorura  gentium)  had  precedence  over  those  of  the  lesser  (mino- 
rum  gentium),  possessing  the  exclusive  right  to  hold  certain 
ofl&ces,  as  that  of  pontiffs,  which  gave  them  the  whole  super- 
intendence of  religious  rites,  though  each  tribe  had  a  priest 
(Jlamen)  of  its  own,  each  having  deities  of  its  own.  The  two 
greater  tribes  had  also  twenty /ecia^,  or  heralds,  one  for  each 
curia,  and  these  acted  as  ambassadors  on  all  occasions.  They 
had  two  criminal  judges,  from  whose  decisions,  however,  there 
lay  an  appeal  to  the  comitia  or  assembly  of  the  curiae,  as  there 
did  from  the  king's  decision  in  civil,  though  not  in  criminal 
causes.  There  was  thus,  as  it  were,  an  aristocracy  within  an 
aristocracy ;  all  the  patricians  being  privileged  as  contradistin- 
guished from  the  plebeians,  but  two  of  the  patrician  tribes 
(Ramnes  and  Titles)  having  privileges  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
third  (Luceres). 

The  patricians  assembled  in  the  comitia  curiata  had  so  far 
legislative  authority  that  all  laws  were  passed  by  them,  but  on 
the  proposal  of  the  senate  ;  and  the  senate  could  only  sanction, 
after  discussion,  measures  proposed  by  the  king,  without  the 
power  of  originating  any.  In  like  manner,  and  on  the  same 
proposal  of  the  king  first,  and  then  of  the  senate,  all  ofiScers,  civil 
and  military,  were  a.ppointed  in  the  comitia  curiata  ;  which  like- 
wise decided  on  peace  and  war  in  the  same  way,  the  decisions  of 
the  senate  being  only  final  on  administrative  questions.  The  king 
himself  was  elected  by  the  comitia  curiata,  and  on  being 
elected  was  armed  with  the  supreme  power  (imperiuTri)  by  a 
separate  law  of  the  same  body.     This  course  was  pursued  in  the 

*  Niebuhr's  own  doctrine  respecting  the  senate  makes  it  composed  in  precisely 
the  same  way  in  which  he  imagines  the  comitia  curiata  to  have  been,  of  a  senator 
for  each  decuria  (I.  21),  so  that  each  senator  must  have  acted  in  two  capacities ;  a 
refinement,  as  well  as  an  anomaly,  hardly  conceivahle  in  a  rude  community. 


CH.  X.  COMITIA  CURIATA — EQUITES.  109 

case  of  the  first  four  or  five  kings,  but  not  in  that  of  Servius 
TuUius,  who,  making  the  commons  believe  that  Tarquin  had 
survived  his  wounds,  and  ingratiating  himself  by  paying  their 
debts,  first  ruled  for  some  days  in  Tarquin's  name,  and  then 
obtained  their  approbation  to  his  succeeding ;  but  he  then  pro- 
cured a  law  to  be  made  giving  him  the  supreme  power.*  This 
singular  proceeding  of  first  electing  the  chief  magistrate,  and 
then  by  another  act  giving  him  his  power,  was  often  adopted  in 
the  choice  of  consuls,  who,  being  elected  by  the  centuries,  were 
endowed  with  authority  by  the  curiae.  But  it  was  more  strange 
in  the  earlier  times,  when  both  the  election  and  the  arming  with 
power  were  performed,  though  by  separate  acts,  yet  by  the  same 
body.  The  imperium  of  both  king  and  consul  ceased  on  entering 
the  city  ;  out  of  the  city  they  were  absolute.  The  king  first, 
afterwards  the  consuls,  convoked  the  comitia  curiata,  through  the 
officers  (lictors)  of  the  curiae,  each  having  its  own. 

The  two  tribes,  or  twenty  curiae  of  the  greater  houses,  were 
not  the  only  aristocracy  within  an  aristocracy  in  this  singular 
frame  of  government.  There  was  a  select  body,  probably  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rest  originally  by  their  greater  wealth,  and 
thus  enabled  to  serve  on  horseback,  while  the  others  were  foot 
soldiers.  They  were  accordingly  called  Equites,  or  horsemen, 
and  we  have  given  them  the  name  of  knights.  They  at  first 
consisted  of  three  centuries  or  hundreds,  one  in  each  tribe,  and 
the  elder  Tarquin  added  a  second  century  to  each  of  the  original 
centuries,  and  then,  according  to  some  indistinct  accounts,  pro- 
ceeded to  double  the  number  of  the  whole.  Servius  added 
twelve  centuries,  or,  as  some  say,  only  six,  assuming  there  had 
been  twelve  before  ;  for  all  are  agreed  that  there  were  finally 
eighteen.  A  doubt  may  be  raised  whether  or  not  the  three 
subordinate  centuries  instituted  by  Tarquin  were  taken  from  the 
plebeians ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  twelve  new  cen- 
turies of  Servius  TuUius  were  formed  of  the  noblest  and  wealthiest 
citizens  of  the  plebeian  order.     It  has  been  held  by  Niebuhr  and 

*  Livy  and  others  have  fallen  into  a  manifest  error  in  supposing  that  Servius  was 
the  favourite  of  the  senate,  and  chosen  by  that  body.  The  patricians  hated  him  so 
much,  and  he  was  so  sensible  of  it,  that  Paullus  (the  jurisconsult)  has  related  an 
instance  of  the  precautions  he  took  against  them :  he  made  them  all  inhabit  a  par- 
ticular quarter  of  the  town  (thence  called  Vicus  Patricias),  because  it  lay  so 
exposed  to  his  force  on  the  high  ground  above,  that  he  could  easily  crush  them  if 
they  were  found  plotting  against  him. 


110  CONSTITUTION  OP  ROME.  CH.  X. 

others  that  when  the  plebeian  order  became  numerous,  and 
formed  the  infantry  of  the  army,  all  the  patricians  had  a  right  to 
serve  on  horseback ;  and  they  thus  consider  equites  and  patri- 
cians as  synonimous,  contrary,  it  must  be  admitted,  to  the  whole 
current  of  classical  authority,  and  to  all  that  seems  most  esta- 
blished in  the  maxims  of  the  Roman  government,  as  well  as  the 
habitual  forms  of  expression  most  familiar  to  claasical  students. 
It  may  suffice  to  cite  the  common  expressions  of  'equestrian  order,' 
*  equestrian  dignity,'  '  equestrian  census,'  and  to  mention  the 
common  sapng  that  this  order  was  the  breeding-ground  of  the 
senate  (seminarium  senatus) — senators  being  deemed  irregularly 
chosen,  if  not  from  such  patrician  or  such  plebeian  office-bearers 
as  were  also  of  equestrian  rank.  The  officer  who  commanded  the 
Equites  {Tribunus  Celeruvi)  held  a  high  rank  under  the  kings, 
and  was  employed  to  convoke  the  curiae,  and  preside  at  their 
comitia.  Under  the  republic  he  was  called  master  of  the  horse 
(Tivigister  equitum),  but  was  only  an  occasional  officer,  appointed 
by  the  Dictator,  of  whom  we  shall  presently  speak. 

A  very  important  change  was  introduced  by  Servius.  Sprung 
himself  from  an  humble,  probably  a  servile  origin,*  owing  his 
promotion  to  the  favour  of  the  commons,  whom  he  always  courted, 
and  viewed  most  jealously  by  the  patricians,  whom  he  despised 
and  controlled,  he  appears  to  have  thought  that  the  time  was 
come  when  the  growth  of  the  plebeian  body  and  the  undue 
authority,  oppressively  exercised,  of  the  patricians,  rendered  a 
new  arrangement  of  the  political  power  both  safe  to  attempt,  and 
expedient  if  successfully  pursued.  He  began  by  passing  many 
laws  in  the  comitia  curiata  for  regulating  the  rights  of  parties  in 
respect  of  contracts,  and  of  injuries  and  wrongs  ;  probably  for 
defining  the  rights  of  citizens  and  of  the  two  orders.  He  also 
transferred  from  the  kings  to  judges  the  jurisdiction  in  private 
causes.  He  either  divided  more  of  the  public  lands  among  the 
commons  or  gave  them  a  better  title  to  what  they  already  held  ; 
and  he  is  even  said  to  have  abolished  the  practice  both  of  pledg- 
ing and  imprisoning  the  person  for  debt.  Finally,  he  raised 
both  the  freed-men  and  slaves  to  some  consideration  in  the  com- 
munity, enrolling  the  former  among  the  lowest  class  of  citizens 
in  the  distribution  which  we  are  presently  to  consider,  and  giv- 

*  He  is  supposed  to  have  been  a  natural  son  of  Tarquin  by  a  slave.  Cic.  dc 
Rep.,  II.,  21,  mentions  this  tradition. 


CH.  X.  REFORMS  OF  SERVIUS.  ]  1 1 

ing  the  latter  a  yearly  religious  festival  {compitaUa),  during  which 
they  were  treated  as  free.  Next,  in  order  to  balance  the  thirty 
curiae,  he  distributed  the  commons  into  thirty  tribes — four  city, 
and  twenty-six  country  tribes  ;  at  the  head  of  each  he  appointed 
a  tribune  ;  and  under  his  presidency  the  tribe  met  for  the  levy- 
ing of  its  share  of  the  taxes  and  raising  its  quota  of  men  to  the 
army.  This  arrangement  with  the  power  of  meeting  could  not 
fail  greatly  to  increase  the  weight  of  the  commons,  as  well  as  to 
afford  them  the  means  of  acting  in  concert,  and  thus  extending 
their  power  much  further.  But  this  was  not  the  whole  of 
Servius's  reforms ;  and  it  is  remarkable  that  the  spirit  of  his 
legislation  gave  no  power  to  the  multitude  without  at  the  same 
time,  and  in  the  same  proportion,  providing  a  safeguard  against 
its  abuse,  and  a  security  against  its  exceeding  the  bounds  whicli 
he  deemed  safe  for  the  state.  He  added  twelve  centuries  of 
equites  to  the  six  already  existing  of  the  patricians  (or  six  to  the 
twelve),  and  these  new  equites  were  all  plebeians  of  wealth.  He 
then  divided  the  whole  people,*  that  is,  the  two  orders,  patrician 
and  plebeian,  into  five  classes,  into  which  persons  were  enrolled 
without  any  regard  to  their  rank  or  dignity,  but  merely  with  a 
view  to  their  wealth,  according  to  which  all  were  taxed  to  the 
revenue  ;  and  each  class  consisted  of  so  many  centuries  of  house- 
keepers. The  property  of  the  first  class  was  about  820?.  f  of 
our  money,  or  400i.  according  to  another  calculation,  and  of  the 
last  the  tenth  of  this  sum  ;  and  to  a  sixth  division  belonged 
those  who  had  less  than  this,  and  those  who  had  no  property  at 
all,  and  who  were  called  proletarii  and  capite  censi.  The  whole 
people  by  centuries  were  to  assemble  in  comitia ;  but  the  centu- 
ries, thus  classified  according  to  their  property,  were  not  com- 
posed numerically  of  so  many  hundreds,  for  this  would  have 
given  the  great  majority  to  the  votes  of  the  poorer  classes.  The 
first  class  consisted  of  nearly  as  many  centuries  as  all  the  other 

*  People  (populus)  in  the  early  times,  and  indeed  until  the  distinctions  between 
patrician  and  plebeian  were  greatly  diminished,  means  properly  the  former  order, 
that  is,  the  original  free  and  native  Romans  and  their  descendants,  that  is,  the  three 
tribes  of  the  houses.  When  the  word,  therefore,  is  used  in  a  larger  sense  it  is 
necessary  to  give  notice. 

t  Nothing  is  less  certain  than  the  old  computation  of  money ;  for  undoubtedly  if 
we  reckon  100,000  asses  (the  highest  census)  at  so  many  pounds  of  copper  or  brass, 
a  fortune  would  be  indicated  far  beyond  what  can  have  been  fixed.  See,  however, 
Nieb.,  vol.  i.,  pp.  448-458,  Transl. 


112  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME,  CH.  X. 

four  together  :  it  contained  eighty  centuries,  and  an  additional 
one  of  artisans  for  constructing  military  machines ;  while  the 
second,  third,  and  fourth  contained  twenty  each,  and  the  fifth 
thirty.  Then  the  eighteen  centuries  of  equites,  belonging  to  the 
higher  or  wealthier  descriptions,  and  separated  from  the  whole 
people  before  their  distribution  into  classes,  voted  with  the  first 
class,  which  may  be  said  to  have  had  ninety-nine  centuries, 
while  all  the  other  four  classes  numbered  only  ninety  ;  and  only 
ninety-five  or  ninety-six,  even  if  two  centuries  of  military  me- 
chanics and  the  centuries  below  the  classes  be  reckoned.*  Now> 
as  the  votes  were  taken  by  centuries  in  the  assembly,  each 
century  voting  by  a  majority  of  its  members  and  reckoning  as 
one  vote,  this  arrangement  gave  the  decided  majority  to  the 
wealthier  class  against  the  more  numerous ;  the  intention  of 
Servius  being  that  which  Cicero  says  ought  ever  to  be  carefully 
maintained  in  a  commonwealth,  preventing  the  greatest  influence 
being  exercised  by  merely  the  greatest  numbers  :  "  Ne  plurium 
valeant  plurimi."  (De  Rep.,  II.  21.)  The  addition  of  the  cen- 
tury called  Ni  quis  scivit  is  remarkable  ;  it  was  in  order  that  any 
one  might  vote  who  had  omitted  to  vote  in  his  own,  as  Festus 
says,  "  Ne  quis  civis  sufiragii  jure  privaretur."  Both  Cicero 
and  livy  praise  this  whole  system,  and,  as  it  seems,  justly,  for 
at  once  giving  each  citizen  a  voice,  and  yet  apportioning  hLs 
influence  to  the  respectability  of  his  station.-|-  The  four  inferior 
classes  could  only  be  called  on  to  decide  in  the  event,  which 

*  Five  tribes  were  added  to  the  thirty  of  the  Luceres  in  later  times,  but  the 
■whole  numbers  never  exceed  thirty-five.  At  one  time  when  Porsenna  had  con- 
quered Rome,  and  she  had  lost  all  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  ten  tribes  were  taken 
away,  and  one  having  been  added,  this  explains  the  passage  of  Li\-y,  in  which  the 
number  is  said  to  be  only  twenty-one.  This  ingenious  and  satisfactory  explanation 
is  Niebuhr's,  to  whom  we  also  owe  the  emendation  and  interpretation  of  the  passage 
in  Cicero  de  Rep.,  II.  22,  from  which  the  accotmt  in  the  text  is  taken.  But  the 
numbers  in  Cicero,  if  we  adopt  Niebuhr's  supposition,  are  still  not  reconcileable  to 
the  total  of  one  hundred  and  ninety -three,  always  represented  as  the  number  of  the 
centuries ;  for  he  speaks  of  ninety-six  as  the  remaining  centuries,  after  deducting 
those  of  the  first  class,  and  Angelo  Mai  can  only  make  the  total  one  hundred  and 
ninety-three,  by  making  the  remainder  ninety-five.  Cicero,  if  the  passage  is  not 
corrupted,  seems  plainly  to  have  held  that  eight  from  the  inferior  classes  must  join 
the  eighty-nine  of  the  first  to  give  a  majority,  and  to  have  supposed  that  the  equites 
had  only  six  votes — and  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  gets  his  sum  of  eighty-nine. 

t  Cic.  De  Rep.,  II.  22: — "Neque  excluderetur  suffragiis  (reliqua  multitudo)  ne 
superbum  esset ;  nee  valeret  minus,  ne  esset  periculosum."  Livy,  I.  43 : —  "  Gradus 
facti  ut  neque  exclusus  quisquam  suffragio  videretur,  et  vis  omnis  penes  primores 
civitatis  esset." 


CH.  X.  SERVIUS'S  REFORMS.  113 

hardly  ever  happened,  of  the  centuries  in  the  first  class  differing. 
For  an  uneducated,  and  indeed  barbarous  people,  there  seemed 
no  .better  arrangement  than  one  which  should  thus  recognise 
each  man's  right  to  vote,  but  only  make  the  votes  of  the  multi- 
tude decide  in  case  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
upper  classes.  It  is  further  to  be  noted  that  the  people  were 
distributed  in  the  centuries  according  to  their  age  ;  each  class 
having  an  equal  number  of  elders  and  younger  men,  or  men 
under  forty-five  and  above  that  age.  So  that  the  latter,  though 
considerably  fewer  in  number  in  each  century,  yet  forming  cen- 
turies, and  the  vote  being  by  centuries,  had  an  equal  voice  with 
the  young  men.*  Thus  the  voices  of  five  elderly  persons  had 
as  much  weight  as  those  of  nine  younger  ones. 

The  distribution  into  centuries,  and  the  account  taken  of  ages, 
numbers,  and  property,  was  made  the  foundation  both  of  the 
taxes  and  of  the  military  service.  The  army  was  formed  of  the 
people  by  centuries.  The  seniores,  or  elder  centuries,  remained 
in  the  city  as  a  kind  of  reserve,  and,  unless  in  case  of  necessity, 
the  younger  (junior es)  alone  took  the  field.  Every  one  was 
obliged  to  arm  himself,  as  well  as  to  pay  taxes  (tributa)  accord- 
ing to  his  fortune,  or  class  ;  and  those  under  the  fifth  class  were 
not  called  upon  to  serve  excepting  in  cases  of  urgent  necessity.! 

The  comitia  centuriata  being  established  by  Servius,  they 
appear  very  soon,  if  not  at  once,  to  have  come  for  some  purposes 
into  the  place  of  the  comitia  curiata.  If  the  kingly  government 
had  been  peaceably  continued,  the  choice  of  the  king  would  have 
been  vested  in  them,  on  the  proposition  of  the  senate  ;  as  they 
afterwards  chose  the  consuls  and  all  the  great  patrician  magis- 
trates, except  the  dictator,  master  of  the  horse,  and  interrex. 
They  had  legislative  power  likewise,  but  could  only  entertain 
questions  submitted  to  them  by  the  senate  ;  and  the  assent  of  the 
comitia  curiata  was  likewise  necessary  to  give  their  decision  the 
force  of  law.  The  effect,  too,  of  long  usage,  as  well  as  of  the  patri- 
cian influence,  was  such  that  very  few  legislative  measures  were 
for  many  years  brought  before  the  comitia  centuriata,  the  senate 

*  The  population  returns  of  1831  give  the  proportion  of  ages  upon  10,000,000  of 
males— from  15  to  39  years  old,  3,608,000— from  40  to  69,  2,049,000,  or  as  9  to  5; 
and  if  all  above  69  be  added,  the  proportion  is  still  as  18  to  11. 

t  Niebuhr  supposes  that  those  who  had  some  property,  but  under  the  census  of 
the  fifth  class,  were  the  accensi,  who  followed  the  army  unarmed,  and  took  the 
places  and  armour  of  those  killed  in  battle. 

PART  II.  I 


114  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMR  CH.  X. 

an(^  the  curiata  continuing  in  most  cases  to  make  the  law.  The 
constitution  of  Servius  being  introduced  towards  the  end  of  the 
second  century,  it  was  not  till  the  laws  of  the  twelve  tables,  and 
the  adoption  of  an  uniform  system  of  jurisprudence,  a  hundred 
years  later,  that  the  general  legislative  power  become  regularly 
vested  in  the  comitia  centuriata. 

That  there  is  much  of  a  fabulous  description  in  the  commonly 
received  history  of  Servius  no  one  now  doubts.  The  whole 
account  of  the  conspiracy  against  him,  his  murder,  the  conduct 
of  his  daughter,  and  of  Tarquin,  who  dethroned  and  succeeded 
him,  is  so  full  of  gross  improbability  and  contradictions  that  it 
has  generally  been  given  up  as  the  fiction  of  the  early  poets, 
working  upon  some  tradition  of  facts  which  it  is  now  impossible 
to  sift  from  their  inventions.  But  that  Servius  really  made  the 
whole,  or  the  greater  number,  of  the  changes  in  the  constitution 
which  have  been  ascribed  to  him  seems  to  be  admitted.  He 
has,  however,  like  our  Alfred,  and  like  Charlemagne  in  France, 
become  the  person  to  whom  every  early  arrangement  is  traced ; 
whatever  the  Romans  obtained  of  free  and  popular  institutions 
was  supposed  to  be  a  revival  of  his  laws  which  Tarquin  had  abro- 
gated ;  and  things  which  it  cannot  be  pretended  that  he  ever 
did,  he  is  fancied  to  have  intended  doing,  as  resigning  the  crown, 
and  giving  the  supreme  power  to  two  consuls.*  Another  theory, 
but  resting  on  far  better  foundations,  represents  him  to  have 
taken  the  Greek  forms  of  government  as  his  model  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  political  power.  Cicero  expressly  describes  him  as  having 
been  thoroughly  versed  in  the  Greek  customs,  under  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  elder  Tarquin,  his  protector,  who  is  known  to  have  been 
the  son  of  a  Greek.-f"  And  there  is  a  striking  resemblance  of 
his  reforms  to  those  of  Solon,  a  century  and  a  half  before  ;  espe- 
cially in  his  abolition  of  servitude  for  debt,  his  distributing  the 
citizens  into  classes  according  to  their  property,  his  apportioning 
the  military  services  and  taxation  to  the  census,  and  his  giving 
all  citizens,  including  clients,^  a  vote  in  the  assembly.  The  like- 
ness however  ends  here  ;  for  Solon's  constitution  was  essentially 
democratic  from  the  votes  being  given  by  individuals,  and  not  by 

•  Niebuhr  himself  adopts  some  of  these  traditions. 

t  Cic.  de  R.  P.,  ii.  20. 

X  It  is  supposed  that  Solon's  fourth  or  lowest  class  was  chiefly  composed  of  the 
serfs  or  cultivators,  whose  name  (  Thetai)  it  bore,  and  who  stood  to  the  Eupatridas, 
or  noble  families,  in  the  relation  of  clients  to  patrons. 


CH.  X.  TARQUIN  THE  PROUD.  115 

classes ;  and  though  the  lower  orders  were  excluded  from  all 
offices,  and  the  two  next  from  the  higher,  yet  the  judicial  power 
was  given  to  the  whole  body,  and  given  by  lot ;  whereas 
the  constitution  of  Servius,  after  all  the  additions  which  he 
made  to  the  power  of  the  commons,  additions  which  wore  an 
aspect  much  larger  than  their  real  substance,  remained  essentially 
aristocratic  as  before,  until  those  changes  introduced  by  him 
enabled  the  commons  in  the  course  of  time  to  obtain  a  really 
democratic  government. 

The  great  favour  which  Servius  naturally  and  justly  enjoyed 
with  the  plebeians,  was  met  by  hatred  equally  sincere,  but  not 
so  openly  displayed,  on  the  part  of  the  patricians.  There  seems 
no  reason  to  doubt  that  they  joined  in  a  conspiracy  against  him, 
which  ended  in  his  dethronement,  probably  his  murder,  and  in 
placing  Tarquin,  the  son  of  his  predecessor,  upon  the  throne. 
Although  the  legends  and  songs,  and  after  them  the  historians, 
have  without  doubt  exaggerated  the  vices  of  his  reign,  as  well  as 
the  crimes  by  which  he  began  it,  it  is  certain  that  he  exercised 
great  tyranny,  and  that  he  was  enabled  by  the  aid  of  the  patri- 
cians to  undo  nearly  all  that  Servius  had  done  for  the  commons. 
The  meetings  of  the  tribes  were  no  longer  held  ;  the  centuries 
were  only  kept  up  with  the  view  to  taxation  and  the  army ;  the 
judicial  power  was  restored  to  the  crown  ;  and  the  law  which 
prevented  pledging  or  seizing  the  debtor's  person  was  repealed, 
if  indeed  such  a  law  had  ever  been  enacted.*  The  patricians, 
however,  suffered  very  speedily  for  their  profligate  support  of 
the  tyrant,  and  their  emplo3nnent  of  his  power  to  crush  the  com  - 
mens.  All  authorities  represent  him  as  having  been  made  king 
without  any  form  of  election,  and  certainly  he  was  not  chosen  by 
the  comitia  centuriata.  The  probability,  however,  is  that  his 
election  was  sanctioned  either  by  the  senate  or  the  comitia 
curiata ;  for  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  he  should  have 
omitted  a  confirmation  so  essential  to  his  title,  when  he  could  so 
easily  obtain  it  from  his  partizans.  But  the  patricians  did  not 
expect  him  to  surround  himself  with  a  body  guard,  and  by  the 
power  which  this  gave  him  to  tyrannize  over  themselves  still 
more  intolerably  than  he  permitted  them  to  domineer  over  the 
people.     By  charges  of  conspiracy,  and  by  all  the  other  wonted 

*  It  will  presently  be  shown  how  great  a  share  the  law  of  debtor  and  creditor 
contributed  to  the  power  of  the  patricians. 

I  2 


116  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X. 

acts  of  tyrants,  he  was  enabled  to  banish  or  put  to  death  such  as 
threatened  to  oppose  him,  or  such  as  had  wealth  which  he  desired 
to  confiscate.  He  seldom  assembled  the  senate,  and  hardly  ever 
the  curiae  ;  he  made  peace  or  war,  and  treaties  with  neighbour- 
ing towns,  of  his  own  mere  authority  ;  and  in  all  respects 
governed  as  an  absolute  prince.  His  capacity  appears  to  have 
been  of  a  high  order ;  and  it  is  clear  that  he  greatly  extended 
the  dominions  of  the  city,  both  by  conquests,  and  by  colonies 
settled  in  order  more  easUy  to  retain  them,  according  to  the  Roman 
policy  in  all  ages.  He  was  enabled  to  place  Rome  at  the  head 
of  the  Latin  league  by  his  success  over  several  of  the  Latin 
states,*  and  his  intrigues  with  others.  His  power  at  home  was 
increased  by  these  foreign  operations,  and  by  the  wealth  which 
he  thus  obtained  ;  but  those  who  had  set  him  up  joined  on  the 
first  favourable  opportunity  to  pull  him  down. 

During  his  absence  at  the  siege  of  Ardea,  a  town  on  the  coast, 
an  insurrection  broke  out,  said  to  have  been  occasioned  by  the 
licentious  conduct  of  his  son  towards  a  Roman  matron  ;  the  patri- 
cians joined  its  leader,  Junius  Brutus,  and  the  people  gladly 
availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  be  revenged  on  him 
whose  tyrauny  had  commenced  with  oppressing  them.  The  Tar- 
quins  were  expelled ;  and  all  ranks  being  disgusted  with  a  form  of 
government  under  which  all  had  alike  suffered,  it  was  resolved 
that  the  chief  magistrate  should  thenceforward  be  elected  yearly, 
and  not  for  life  ;  and,  as  a  further  security  against  usurpation, 
that  two  should  be  chosen  with  equal  powers.  These  were 
called  consuls,  and  being  named  by  the  popular  assembly,  the 
comitia  centuriata,  they  were  armed  with  the  supreme  power 
(i/inperivm)  as  the  kings  had  been,  by  a  decree  of  the  curiae. 
The  revolution  was  effected  with  as  little  change  as  possible  in 
the  other  parts  of  the  government ;  and  it  was  at  first  marked 
with  great  moderation  towards  the  exiled  family.  The  senate, 
which  Tarquin  had  by  his  proscriptions  reduced  to  a  small  num- 
ber was  completed  to  300,  and  it  appears  to  have  assumed  the 
chief  direction  of  affairs.  They  resolved  to  deliver  up  all  Tar- 
quiu's  personal  property,  and  allow  him  to  sell  his  lands,  in  the 
hope  that  he  would  attempt  nothing  against  the  republic.  The 
course  upon  which  he  entered,  of  intrigues  and  plots  for  his 
restoration,  and  the  wars  which  he  excited  with  this  view  among 

*  Cic.  de  R.  P.,  ii.  24. 


CH.  X.  AKISTOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  FOIUMED.  117 

the  neighbouring  states,  put  an  end  to  all  such  kindly  dispositions ; 
and  the  senate  found  it  necessary  to  prepare  for  their  defence  by 
enlisting  the  commonalty  still  more  completely  in  their  cause. 
The  goods  of  the  Princes  were  given  up  to  the  people  as  plunder, 
and  their  lands  were  distributed  among  them.  The  patricians 
now  found  it  necessary  to  secure  the  support  of  the  other  order, 
by  giving  up  the  greater  portion  of  their  domains  ;  and  seven 
jugera  (rather  more  than  four  acres  and  a  quarter)  were  allotted 
to  each  plebeian.  The  laws  of  Servius  were  restored  ;  a  solemn 
determination,  sanctified  by  oaths,  and  fenced  by  the  outlawry 
of  all  who  should  contravene,*  was  taken  never  more  to  suffer 
regal  authority ;  but  beyond  this,  and  giving  an  appeal  to  the 
plebeians  from  the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  consuls,  similar  to 
that  which  the  patricians  always  had  from  the  decision  of  the 
king  and  judges,  no  material  change  in  the  polity  of  the  state 
appears  to  have  been  introduced.  The  government  continued 
to  be  aristocratic  under  the  consuls,  as  it  had  been  under  the 
kings,  with  only  the  additional  security  to  the  patrician  power 
which  was  obtained  from  the  choice  of  the  executive  magistrates 
being  vested  in  bodies,  over  whom  the  aristocracy  had  the  most 
complete  influence,  and  from  the  powers  of  these  magistrates 
being  limited  to  a  year's  duration. 

The  legendary  history  of  Rome  has  added  many  fictions  to 
the  true  account  of  this  revolution,  both  in  what  regards  its 
immediate  cause,  the  manner  of  effecting  it,  the  subsequent 
conduct  of  those  engaged  in  it,  and  the  events  of  the  war 
to  which  it  gave  rise.  What  foundation  there  may  be  for 
the  story  of  Lucretia,  the  feigned  idiotcy  of  Brutus,  the  con- 
spiracy and  the  death  of  his  sons  or  nephews,  the  assassination  in 
Porsenna's  tent,  and  Scaivola's  devotion,  the  voluntary  abandon- 
ment by  Porsenna  of  his  conquest,  the  defence  of  the  bridge  by 
Codes — it  is  in  vain  now  to  inquire.  That  these  things  never 
could  have  happened  as  they  are  described,  and  that  some  of 
them  are  wholly  inconsistent  with  dates f  and  facts,  all  authorities 
seem  now  to  be  agreed.  We  shall  most  safely  read  the  Roman 
history  of  those  ages  if  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  general 
results  ;    and  it  is  a  somewhat  remarkable  circumstance   that 

*  Whoever  should  attempt  to  obtain  regal  authority,  might  be  put  to  death 
without  trial. 

t  Brutus,  a  child  at  Tarquin's  accession,  is  represented  as  having  a  son  gi'own 
up  twenty-five  years  after. 


118  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X 

modem  times  have  furnished  instances  by  no  means  unlike  that 
of  the  Roman  revolution.  The  conduct  of  the  senate  respecting 
the  royal  family  reminds  us  of  the  early  stage  of  the  French 
revolution  ;  and  the  alteration  which  the  intrigues  and  wars  of 
the  Tarquins  occasioned  in  their  treatment  by  the  Romans 
somewhat  resembles  the  changes  which  the  first  invasion  of 
France  by  the  Alhes  and  the  Boirrbon  Princes  occasioned  at 
Paris.  Had  the  French  stopped  at  confiscation  of  the  emigrant 
property,  the  parallel  would  have  been  complete.  The  alarm 
excited  by  the  invasion  of  France  afforded  no  justification,  nor 
even  any  palliation,  of  the  atrocities  for  which  it  was  made  the 
pretext ;  and  though  the  fact  of  the  republican  party  being  the 
minority,  greatly  overmatched  by  the  royalists,  and  generally  by 
those  averse  to  a  commonwealth  in  every  part  of  France,  may 
explain  why  the  system  of  terror,  with  all  its  enormities,  was 
resorted  to,  and  may  account  for  a  course  of  wholesale  change  as 
well  as  cruelty,  being  pursued,  so  opposite  to  the  proceedings  of 
the  Roman  patricians  and  plebeians,  who  seem  to  have  been 
nearly  unanimous  in  their  opposition  to  kingly  government,  yet 
this  fact  affords  no  kind  of  vindication  to  those  whose  motives 
it  illustrates.  The  treatment  of  the  royal  family  in  1830  is  con- 
sistent with  the  scope  of  these  remarks ;  and  in  one  respect  our 
own  revolution  of  1 688  seems  to  resemble  that  of  Rome  :  as 
little  was  done  as  appeared  possible  in  changing  the  system  or 
even  the  dynasty ;  and  all  the  measures  adopted  had  for  their 
aim  the  restoration  of  the  former  constitution,  and  the  counter- 
action of  recent  encroachments. 


CH.  XI.  PATRICIAN  POWER.  119 


CHAPTER  XI. 


CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME. 

(Continued.) 


Patrician  power — I.  Patrons  and  Clients — Feudal  resemblance — iErarii — Error  of 
authors — Clients  in  Sparta,  Crete,  Thessaly,  and  Attica — 2.  Monopoly  of  Offices 
— Senate — Conflicting  accounts — Dionysius  and  Livy — Errors  of  authors — 
Censors — Choice  of  Senate — Practical  Checks  to  Censorial  power — Senate's 
functions — Variations  in  its  power — Patres  et  Conscript! — Senate's  influence — 
Dictators — Consuls — Praetors — Patrician  oppressions — Public  lands — Agrarian 
laws — Spurius  Cassius — Licinian  Rogations — Patrician  creditors — Tribunes 
chosen — Their  powers — Progress  of  popular  power — Decline  of  Comitia  Curiata 
— Rise  of  Tributa — Course  of  legislation — Double  legislation — Anomalies — 
Solution  of  the  paradox — Senatus  Consulta  and  Plebiscita — Checks  to  the  Tri- 
bunes—Superstitious rites — Laws  of  the  auspices — Senate's  errors — Democracy 
established— Practical  defects  in  the  Government — Decemvirs. 

There  were  three  great  constituent  parts  of  the  power  possessed 
by  the  patricians — the  relation  of  patron  and  cHent — the  exclu- 
sive possession  of  offices — and  the  structure  of  the  senate ;  and 
out  of  these  arrangements  arose  in  the  fourth  place  their  mono- 
poly of  the  public  property  in  land,  and  their  oppression  of  the 
plebeians. 

1.  Although  the  relation  of  patron  and  client  was  at  first 
established  for  the  protection  of  the  poor  dependant,  and  was 
indeed  a  consequence  of  that  poverty  and  dependance,  yet  it 
gave  great  power  to  the  patricians,  because  it  not  only  attached 
numbers  of  followers  to  each,  but  continued  to  influence  the 
client,  and  make  him  subservient  after  his  circumstances  had 
become  improved.  The  relation  was  of  the  closest  nature.  The 
client's  existence  might  almost  be  said  to  merge  in  that  of  his 
patron.  He  could  only  sue  and  be  sued  in  the  patron's  name, 
and  the  patron  was  bound  to  defend  all  his  suits.  The  patron 
had  jurisdiction  over  him,  and  in  early  times  he  had  even  the 
power  of  inflicting  capital  punishment  upon  him.  Like  husband 
and  wife,  by  our  laws,  they  could  not  be  witnesses  for  or  against 
each  other.  The  courts  of  justice  did  not  afford  any  protection 
to  the  chent  against  injuries  offered  by  his  patron ;  the  religious 
sense  of  the  sacred  duty  which  bound  the  latter  was  accounted 


120"  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMK  CH.  XI. 

sufficient  to  restrain  all  excesses,  but  it  appears  to  have  been  the 
only  restraint.  One  of  the  oldest  Roman  laws,  of  which  any 
fragment  remains,  declared  the  patron  who  injured  his  client  a 
sacrifice  to  the  gods,  that  is,  condemned  him  to  capital  punish- 
ment, probably  to  be  inflicted  by  the  pontiff.*  The  existence 
of  the  patron's  rights  for  so  many  ages,  without  any  abuse,  and 
of  the  client's  subordination,  is  only  one  of  the  innumerable 
instances  which  the  history  of  every  constitution  affords  of  the 
consoHdating,  the  counteracting,  and  the  healing  effects  produced 
by  manners  and  habits  upon  positive  institutions  and  their  opera- 
tion. This  relation  was  hereditary  on  both  sides ;  the  client's 
children  being  under  the  protection  of  and  bound  by  allegiance 
to  the  patron  and  his  representative,  that  is,  the  hereditary  head 
of  the  family.  The  patron,  whose  landed  property,  or  whose 
possession  of  the  public  land  was  considerable,  generally  gave 
his  clients  portions  to  cultivate  ;  they  paid  in  all  probability  a 
portion  of  the  produce  ;  but  the  grant  was  always  resumable  at 
pleasure.  In  any  extraordinary  necessity  of  the  patron,  as  the 
expenses  of  a  public  office,  the  portioning  a  daughter,  the  ran- 
som of  himself  or  his  sons  if  taken  in  war,  the  being  condemned 
to  pay  damages  in  a  civil  or  fines  in  a  criminal  proceeding,  the 
client,  if  be  could  afford  it,  bore  a  part  in  his  patrons  aid,  with 
the  gentiles  or  members  of  the  same  housaf  The  clients  were 
often  able  to  realize  property  to  a  considerable  amount ;  for 
while  those  in  the  country  farmed  the  patron's  land,  those  in 
the  towns  carried  on  the  trades  and  practised  the  mechanical 
arts,  from  which  patricians  were  at  all  times  excluded  by  their 
dignity,  and  plebeians  in  the  earlier  period  by  the  warlike  habits 
of  the  nation,  and  the  common  feeling  of  antiquity,  which  con- 
nected citizenship  with  property  in  land  ;  and  when  a  client  died 
without  making  his  will  the  patron  was  his  universal  heir. — It  is 

*  "  Sei  Patronos  client!  fraudem  faxit  sacer  estod."  This  is  generally  con- 
sidered one  of  the  laws  of  the  twelve  tables  ;  but  P.  Merula  has  maintained  that  it 
was  a  law  of  Romulus,  that  is,  one  of  the  most  ancient  of  the  laws,  which,  with  the 
modem  ones,  and  those  brought  from  Greece,  were  formed  into  the  twelve  tables. 
His  chief  arguments  rest  on  an  ancient  MS.  of  Servius  (Ad  Mn.  vi.  609 j,  where  the 
law  is  ascribed  to  Romulus  and  th«  twelve  tables,  the  common  editions  giving  it  to 
the  twelve  tables  only,  and  on  Calpumius  Piso,  who  wrote  in  the  time  of  Trajan. — 
De  Legg.  Bom.,  cap.  ii. 

t  The  distinction  between  house  ztxA  family  must  always  be  carefully  kept  in 
view.  In  this  account  of  the  Roman  constitution yam//y  always  means  the  persons 
related  to  <;ach  other,  as  in  the  modem  sense ;  house  means  the  gens,  or  clan,  the 
relationship  of  the  members  of  which  could  not  be  tiaced. 


CH.  XI.  PATRONS  AND  CLIENTS.  121 

not  surprising  that  with  so  many  points  of  resemblance  to  the 
feudal  relation  of  lord  and  vassal,  authors  should  have  traced  the 
latter  to  the  Roman  times  ;  but  the  speculation  seems  groundless, 
for  the  very  essence  of  the  feudal  relation  was  the  holding  land 
under  a  lord,  and  owing  certain  duties  in  respect  of  that  land  ; 
whereas  the  clientela  and  the  grant  of  land  had  not  any  necessary 
connexion,  although  they  might  be  combined.  The  clients  are 
represented  by  most  authors  as  having  voted  with  their  patrons 
in  the  comitia  curiata,  at  least  after  the  plebeians  became  power- 
ful, and  endeavoured  to  carry  measures  in  those  assemblies. 
But  there  seems  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  ever  voted  except 
in  the  comitia  centuriata.*  Slaves  set  free  by  their  master  were 
understood  to  become  his  clients,  and  probably  did  so  become  at 
all  times  ;  but  Servius  is  said  to  have  provided  for  this  by  a  posi- 
tive law,  intended  as  some  compensation  to  the  patricians  for 
the  admission  of  freedmen  to  votes  in  the  assemblies  of  the 
centuries. -f 

The  number  of  clients  which  the  more  wealthy  patricians  had 
is  represented  as  very  large.  "When  Attus  Clausus,  founder  of 
the  Claudian  family,  removed  from  the  Sabine  territory  to  Rome, 
he  was  followed  by  5,000  persons  dependent  upon  his  family ; 
and  when  the  Fabian  family  left  Rome,  where  they  had  for  six 
years  filled  the  consulate,  they  carried  with  them  4,000  clients  to 
Etruria,  where  they  were  all  soon  after  destroyed.  But  it  became 
in  process  of  time  usual  for  whole  towns  and  districts  to  place 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  patricians,  and  thus  become 

*  Niebuhr  (I.  21)  has  laid  it  down,  with  a  dogmatism  somewhat  extraordinary 
upou  such  a  subject,  that  "  there  cannot  be  the  least  doubt  that  the  clients  lived  in 
vassalage,  cultivating  the  lands  of  the  Equites." 

t  Dionysius  states  very  positively  the  admission  of  freedmen  to  the  rights  of 
citizens  by  Servius  ;  but  Niebuhr  holds  that  this  was  impossible,  because  their 
admission  is  represented  as  dating  from  the  discovery  of  the  Tarquiu  conspiracy 
by  a  slave,  and  his  manumission  in  consequence  ;  and  also  because  freedmen  only 
obtained  the  right  of  voting  in  the  tribes  two  centuries  later,  when  Appius  Claudius 
was  censor.  The  facts  on  which  these  two  reasons  of  Niebuhr  rest  appear  to  be 
with  diflBculty  reconciled.  It  is,  however,  possible  that  Servius  enrolled  the  freed- 
men with  the  lowest  class,  which  would  give  them  no  right  of  voting.  So  far  as 
these  rights  of  citizenship  were  conferred  by  enrolment  in  the  centuries,  the 
freedmen  became  serarii.  It  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  the  term  ararii  included 
only  the  accensi,  proletarii,  and  capite  censi :  all  whose  property  did  not  consist  in 
land  were  cerarii,  whatever  its  amount  might  be,  and  they  might  be  enrolled  and 
taxed  in  one  or  other  of  the  higher  classes,  although  not  entitled  to  bear  arms. 
The  citizens  of  other  states  who  shared  in  the  franchise  of  Rome,  for  example  the 
citizens  of  Csere,  were  enrolled  among  the  ararii. 


122  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMK  CH.  XI. 

their  clients.     This  must  liave  greatly  increased  the  power  of 
those  individuals,  and  the  influence  of  their  order.* 

The  relation  of  patron  and  client  has  been  traced  not  only  to 
the  other  Italian  tribes,  as  the  Sabines,  Latins,  Etruscans,  but  to 
the  Greek  commonwealths.     The  Helots  were  only  a  tribe  or 
caste  of  cultivators,  and  no  individual  landoAvner  had  any  pro- 
perty in  them,  although  they  were  attached  to  the  soil ;  and  they 
were  held  in  a  state  of  abject  slavery  by  the  government.     A 
caste  of  the  same  description  existed  in  Crete,  called  the  Meno'ites. 
But  in  Thessaly  the  psTiestce  more  nearly  resembled  the  Roman 
clients ;  for  they  were  attached  to  particular  families  ;  though 
their  treatment  appears  to  have  been  arbitrary  and  cruel     The 
Athenian   Thetes,   though  much   more  free,  and  more   mildly 
treated,  were  in  like  manner  attached  to  the  Eupatridse,  or  noble 
families,  cultivated  their  lands,  and  paid  in  return  a  sixth  of  the 
produce,  their  persons  being  liable  to  seizure  for  any  default. 
They  were  probably  admitted  to  the  rights  of  citizens  by  Solon, 
his  fourth  class  being  called  by  the  same  name.     In  all  these 
instances  the  subject-caste  appears  to  have  been  the  original 
natives  of  the  country,   reduced  by  conquest  to  a  subordinate 
condition ;  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  greater  number  of 
the  Roman  clients  originally  belonged  to  conquered  tribes.     But 
no  distinction  whatever  was  made  between  the  different  kinds  of 
client,  and  the  foreigner  stood  upon  the  same  footing  as  the 
native,  although  he  was  generally  of  more  independent  fortune, 
only  seeking  protection  in  consequence  of  the  disabilities  under 
which  he  lay  as  an  alien.    The  importance  of  this  class  of  clients, 
together  with  the  value   of  the  whole  body  to  their  patrons 
in  their  contests  with  the  plebeians,  no  doubt  tended  to  secure 
them  good  treatment  in  times  when  the  force  of  the  religious 

*  There  cannot  be  a  greater  mistake  than  that  which  yet  has  been  extremely 
prevalent,  of  confounding  the  plebeians  with  the  clients.  Almost  all  writers  ha%e 
been  led  into  the  error  by  the  passage  in  Dionysius,  that  Komuliis  placed  the 
commons  under  the  protection  of  the  patricians  as  clients.  Plutarch  and  others, 
with  almost  all  the  commentators,  and  even,  which  is  most  singular,  the  juriscon- 
sults, have  from  thence  considered  the  clients  as  constituting  the  plebeian  body,  or 
at  least  as  the  origin  of  that  body.  Livy  clearly  shows  the  diCFerence  in  various 
passages,  as  ii.  64,  iii.  14.  In  these,  especially  the  first,  the  clients  are  expressly 
placed  in  contradistinction  to  the  plebeians.  How  any  one  who  was  acquainted 
with  the  controversy  between  the  patricians  and  the  plebeians,  and  the  oppressions 
of  the  former,  could  ever  fall  into  such  an  error,  seems  incomprehensible.  How, 
for  instance,  could  the  patron  oppress  his  client  as  a  creditor  when  they  had  not 
even  a  right  of  action  against  one  another  ? 


CH.  XL  MONOPOLY  OF  OFFICES.  128 

obligation  may  be  supposed  to  have  proved  less  effectual.  Freed- 
men  and  their  descendants,  foreigners,  and  provincial  towns, 
formed  in  the  later  periods  of  the  commonwealth  the  only  body 
of  clients. 

2.  All  the  offices,  the  power  of  which  extended  over  the 
whole  nation,  were  at  first  filled  by  the  patricians,  and  the  ofiice- 
bearers  were  named  either  directly  or  substantially  by  them- 
Some  doubt  prevails  as  to  the  manner  of  the  election  ;  but  it  is 
probable  that  in  the  earlier  ages  the  senate  sometimes,  and  some- 
times the  curiae,  elected.  As  long  as  either  the  one  or  the  other 
chose,  the  appointment  was  directly  in  the  patricians ;  but  even 
after  the  centuries  came  to  elect,  the  choice  substantially  re- 
mained in  the  hands  of  the  wealthier  class,  that  is,  of  the  patri- 
cians, by  means  of  their  own  votes  and  the  votes  of  their  clients  ; 
and  the  offices  were  still  not  tenable  by  plebeians.  The  greatest 
struggle  of  the  two  orders  was  accordingly  upon  this  latter 
point ;  and  as  the  people's  power  increased  they  by  degrees 
obtained  admission  to  all  the  magistracies.  In  proportion  as  they 
gained  these  important  points,  the  government  became  less  aris- 
tocratic, and  at  length  assumed  a  democratic  form,  with  scarcely 
more  aristocratic  admixture  than  seems  unavoidably  to  flow  from 
the  natural  tendencies  of  society,  what  we  have  termed  the 
Natural  Aristocrax3y.  There  was  still,  however,  and  to  the  last, 
one  strong  hold  from  which  the  patricians  never  were  entirely 
driven — one  body  into  which  the  plebeians  never  obtained  free 
admission,  except  through  official  titles* — that  was  indeed  the 
most  important  of  all  the  bodies  in  the  state,  the  senate  itself ; 
and  as  this  constituted  the  earliest  and  the  most  powerful  support 
of  the  patrician  influence,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  its  structure 
with  particular  attention. 

The  senate  was  a  body  originally  of  a  hundred  chief  men  of 
the  houses  {gentes)  of  the  Ramnes  tribe,  in  whom  were  vested 
some  of  the  most  important  functions  of  government.  When 
the  Titles  were  added  as  a  second  tribe,  another  hundred  were 
added  to  the  senate  ;  and  a  third  hundred  from  the  Luceres,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  added  a  considerable  time  after  the  forma- 
tion of  that  tribe.-f     A  great  obscurity,  as  might  be  expected, 

*  Taevc  is  reason  to  think  that  some  plebeians  were  admitted  to  fill  up  the 
numbers  of  the  senate  in  the  earliest  age  of  the  republic. 

t  Niebuhr,  i.  21,  has  a  very  unaccountable  theory  respecting  the  composition  of 
the  senate.     He  supposes  the  Luceres  to  have  been  the  first  senators,  because  they 


124)  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XI. 

hangs  over  the  origin  of  this  celebrated  council ;  but  a  much 
greater  diversity  than  could  have  been  supposed  possible  exists 
among  the  accounts  which  have  reached  us  of  its  construction.* 
That  only  patricians  were  at  first  capable  of  sitting  in  it,  and 
that  its  number  of  300  continued  down  to  a  comparatively  recent 
period,  the  seventh  century  of  the  city,  are  undisputed  facts ; 
that  the  senators,  in  what  way  soever  appointed,  held  their  places 
for  life,  or  until  removed  for  misconduct,  or  loss  of  qualification 
(censtis),  is  equally  certain ;  that  a  certain  age,  and  in  later 
times  a  certain  fortune,  were  required  to  quahfy  a  patrician  for 
the  place,  is  ahke  undeniable :  but  the  precise  age  and  fortune 
are  matters  of  controversy,  probably  because  they  were  at  first 
ill  defined,  and  may  afterwards  have  varied  at  difierent  periods; 
and  there  are  conflicting  accounts  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
senators  were  chosen.  On  these  accounts  opposite  theories  have 
been  founded,  and  it  does  not  appear  that  the  recent  inquiries  of 
Niebuhr  and  his  followers  have  led  to  a  result  upon  which  it 
would  be  safe  to  rely. 

The  two  conflicting  accoimts  are  those  of  Dionysius  and  of 
Livy ;  for  Festus,  who  ^sTote  in  the  third  century  of  our  sera, 
and  took  his  materials  from  Verrius  Flaccus,  a  writer  in  the 
Augustan  age,  may  be  supposed  to  have  derived,  through  Verrius, 
his  authority  from  Livy  or  from  those  writers  whom  Livy  had 
consulted ;  or  Livy  and  Verrius  may  both  have  written  upon 
the  prevailing  traditions  of  their  times.  Dionysius  describes  the 
nomination  as  an  election, •!•  and  an  election  of  a  somewhat  com- 
plicated kind.  Each  tribe,  he  says,  were  desired  to  choose  three 
(al^eT^jSai),  then  each  curia  to  select  three  more  (eortXe^aj),  and 
adding  the  ninety  supplied  by  the  curiae  {itpoxzipia-a.^ro)  to  the 
nine  appointed  by  the  tribes  {x'^olny^ciai),  Romulus  placed  over 
the  whole  as  their  chief,  or  leader  {rr/sfjiuv)  Pnnceps  Sefiatus, 

had  the  religious  rites  under  their  care,  and  the  Ramnes  (Latins)  to  have  been 
afterwards  admitted,  and  last  of  all  the  Titles  (Sabines),  and  that  these,  and  not 
the  Luceres,  were  admitted  by  Tarquinthe  Elder.  This  seems  wholly  inconsistent 
with  the  ascendant  of  the  Sabines,  and  afterwards  of  the  Latines  and  Sabines 
united.  Nor  can  it  possibly  be  conceived,  that,  when  the  Luceres  did  not  even 
form  a  tribe,  they  alone  should  have  composed  the  senate. 

*  The  subject  of  the  choosing  of  the  Roman  senate  is  fully  discussed  by  many 
of  the  learned  antiquaries  and  jurisconsults  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies. Magaragiuo,  De  Senatti,  cap.  xiv ;  P.  Manutius,  De  Legij.  Rom.,  cap.  iv. ; 
F.  Hottomannus,  De  Senatii,  ii.  1 ;  Car.  Sigonius,  De  Art.  Jure.  Civ.  Bom.,  ii.  2. 

t  Dion.  i.  12. 


CH.  XI.  senate's  structure.  1 25 

the  one  whom  he  had  himself  appointed  as  his  lieutenant 
when  absent  from  the  city.  Livy  and  Festus,  after  Verrins, 
affirm  that  the  senators  were  chosen  originally  by  the  kings  and 
afterwards  by  the  consuls  (Festus  adds,  erroneously,  by  the  mili- 
tary tribunes),  who  both  appointed  them  in  the  first  instance,  aud 
filled  up  vacancies.*  The  election  described  by  Dionysius  is  im- 
probable, because  so  great  a  refinement  in  that  rude  age  can 
hardly  be  conceived  possible.  But  the  theory  of  some  late  writers 
is  much  more  improbable,  because  they  ascribe  a  still  greater 
refinement  to  the  institution.  They  suppose  the  tribe  divided 
into  ten  curiae,  or  bodies  of  ten  houses  (gentes)  each,  for  general 
purposes,  but  they  say  that  there  was  another  division  into  decurite, 
each  consisting  of  parts  of  several  gentes,  and  a  division  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  electing  a  senator.  Nothing  certainly  can  be 
more  improbable  than  this  refinementf  Niebuhr  thinks  that  the 
decurio,  or  head  of  each  gens,  was,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  a 
senator;  but  it  does  not  appear  what  constituted  a  head  of  a  gens, 
or  indeed  that  such  a  title  was  recognised  at  all.  It  seems  upon 
the  whole  most'  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  king  appointed 
the  senators,  and  afterwards  the  consuls,  not  only  because  we  thus 
at  once  adopt  the  account  of  the  Roman  historians,  but  because 
such  a  constitution  of  the  body  is  much  less  refined  than  an 
elective  one,  and  because  it  coincides  with  the  subsequent  nomi- 
nation of  senators  by  an  executive  magistrate,  the  censor.  If  the 
patrician  body  had  possessed  the  elective  power  ascribed  to  them 
by  those  who  have  followed  Dionysius,  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive 
that  they  should  have  abandoned  it  altogether,  when  by  the 
expulsion  of  the  kings  their  influence  became  more  predominant. 

*  Livy,  i.  8,  says,  "  Centum  creat  senatores"— (i.  e.  Romulus  ;)  and  thismiglit 
apply  to  the  creation  of  the  office,  without  showing  that  the  choice  was  made  by 
the  king  himself.  But  when  he  states  that  Brutus  filled  up  the  deficiencies  occa- 
sioned by  Tarquinius  Superbus  (ii.  1),  he  expressly  says,  "primoribus  equestris 
gradus  lectis  explevit."  In  the  speech  which  he  makes  for  Coriolanus  (iv.  4),  we 
find  the  words,  "ab  regibus  lecti  aut  post  reges  exactos  jussu  populi."  The  jussu 
populi  must  refer  to  offices  conferred  by  the  curiae  and  the  centuries  (it  is  for  the 
present  purpose  immaterial  which),  and  that  by  means  of  such  offices  the  eligibility 
into  the  senate  was  obtained.  The  account  of  Festus  is  much  more  distinct — "  Ut 
reges  sibiligebant  sublegebantque  ita  post  exactos  eos  Consules  quoque  et  tribuni 
militum  consular!  potestate  legebant."  This,  he  says,  continued  until  by  the  Lex 
Ovinia  the  choice  was  given  to  the  censors.  This  law  is  nowhere  mentioned 
but  by  Festus ;  and  commentators  and  jurisconsults  have  doubted  its  existence. — 
(J.  Zamoscii  de  Stu.  Bom.,  i.  3 ;  ap.  Grcev.,  i.  1074.)  Livy  alone  makes  Brutus  fill 
up  the  vacancies  occasioned  by  Tarquin;  Dionysius,  Plutarch,  and  Festus  all 
ascribe  this  to  Valerius,  his  colleague. 

t  Gottling — History  of  the  Roman  Government. 


126  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XL 

The  passage  of  Cicero  {Or.  pro  Sext.),  on  which  reliance  has  been 
placed,  as  showing  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  republican 
government  the  people  chose  the  senators ;  and  the  expression 
used  by  Livy,  that  they  were  appointed  by  desire  of  the  people, 
certainly  can  only  refer  to  the  power  which  all  classes  had  of  being 
appointed  senators,  when  chosen  to  offices  that  qualified  them.* 

The  senators  holding  their  office  for  life,  it  was  only  upon  their 
death  or  removal,  that  vacancies  could  arise.  It  was  always 
required  that  senators  should  be  persons  of  wealth,  and  of  a 
certain  age,  which  according  to  Cicero  was  30,  though  some  have 
given  a  lower  and  some  a  higher  age.  Under  the  empire  3,500?., 
afterwards  7,000/.,  and  then  10,000L,  was  the  property  required. 
If  a  person  had  become  infamous,  either  by  sentence  of  a  court, 
or  by  notoriously  bad  life,  he  was  removed, ;  so  he  was  if  he  had 
fallen  into  bad  circumstances,  and  had  no  longer  the  fortune 
required  to  support  the  dignity  of  the  station.  Holding  any  of  the 
higher  offices,  those  called  curule,  that  is,  consul,  prsetor,  cunile, 
sedile,  or  censor,  and  also  the  quaestorship,  though  not  curule,  gave 
a  claim  to  be  chosen  senator.  Whoever  held  those  offices  could 
attend  the  senate,  both  during  his  office  and  after  he  retired  ;  but 
though  he  had  the  right  of  speaking,  he  was  not  a  senator,  and 
probably  had  no  vote.  To  be  a  senator  it  was  necessary  that 
the  person  should  be  chosen  at  first  by  the  consuls,  or  dictators, 
afterwards  by  military  tribunes  with  consular  power,  when  these 
were  appointed  in  place  of  consuls,  as  a  concession  to  the  plebeians, 
who  sought  a  share  in  the  consulship ;  and  almost  immediately 
after  this  struggle  the  register  of  the  senate  was  made  up  by  the 
censors,  who  were  then  chosen  by  the  patricians,  and  endowed 
with  great  authority,  both  in  order  to  relieve  the  consuls  from 
duties  incompatible  with  the  conduct  of  military  operations,  and 

*  "  Diligimtur  ab  uuiversopopulo,  aditusque  in  ilium  summuni  ordinem  omnium 
civium  industria  habuit." — (Pro  Sext.)  It  never  could  be  Cicero's  intention  to 
state  that  the  whole  people,  plebeians  as  well  as  patricians,  were  both  eligible,  and 
electors  of  the  senators,  from  the  moment  that  the  monarchy  was  overthrown. 
Still  less  is  it  conceivable  that  the  plebeians  had  free  admittance  into  the  senate  in 
the  middle  of  the  third  century,  while  it  was  not  till  the  beginning  of  the  fourth 
(a.u.c.  308),  when  they  obtained  by  Canuleius's  law  the  right  of  marriage  with 
patricians,  and  by  Licinius's  the  right  of  being  chosen  consuls.  Least  of  all  is  it 
conceivable  tliat  the  whole  body,  patricians  and  plebeians,  having  had  the  right  of 
election  in  the  year  244,  gave  it  up  to  the  censor,  a  patrician  officer,  in  308,  and 
without  a  struggle.  As  to  the  expression  of  Livy,  jussu  populi — see  last  note  but 
one.     Possibly  in  the  passage  of  Cicero  ab  should  be  read  ex. — F.  Hottom.  ii.  1. 


CH.  XL  CENSORS— CHOICE  OF  SENATE.  127 

in  order  to  prevent  the  plebeians  from  profiting  too  much  by  the 
success  which  had  attended  their  late  struggle.      The  care  of 
the  revenue,  the  power  of  ascertaining  not  merely  the  numbers  of 
the  people  but  their  fortunes,  and  of  assessing  them  accordingly, 
the  authority  to  stigmatize  persons  of  bad  conduct  with  infamy, 
the  power  of  removing  a  citizen  from  one  tribe  to  a  lower,  or  a 
higher — that  is,  from  a  county  to  a  city  tribe,  and  vice  versa — 
as  the  punishment  or  reward  of  his  conduct,  together  with  the 
general  guardianship  of  the  laws  and  superintendence  of  their  due 
execution,  rendered  this  an  office  of  the  highest  importance,  and 
the   censors  immediately   obtained  the  right  of  filling  up  the 
vacancies  in  the  senate,  as  they  had,  by  the  nature  of  their  office, 
the  power  of  declaring  a  senator  no  longer  qualified  by  fortune  or 
character,  and  thus  of  removing  him.     The  census  was  taken 
every  five  years,  that  period  being  called  a  lustrum ;  and  the 
office  of  censor  was  only  created  occasionally,  in  general  at  the  end 
of  every  five  years;  but  very  early  after  its  creation  (A.U.C.  321) 
its  duration  was  confined  to  a  year  and  a  half,  and  only  extended 
to  three  years,  at  a  later  period,  in  so  far  as  any  works  undertaken 
by  the  censors  remained  to  be  completed.     It  does  not  appear 
that  the  power  of  removing  and  choosing  senators  was  exercised 
oftener  than  once  in  five  years ;  and  we  are  unable  to  ascertain 
that  the  other  powers  of  degrading  and  promoting  were  exercised 
more  frequently.     The  choice  and  removal  of  senators,  however, 
was  by  no  means  left  perfectly  free  to  the  censors,  nor  had  it  been 
in  the  breast  of  the  consuls  and  dictators  before  the  institution  of 
the  censorial  office.     A  solemn  oath  was  taken  to  exercise  all  the 
powers  of  the  office  without  favour  or  partiality,  and  this  among  a 
religious  people  like  the  Romans  must  have  had  a  great  influence 
on  the  conduct  of  the  magistrate. — Then  a  senator,  if  removed, 
was  injured  in  his  reputation  ;  and  though  not  rendered  infamous, 
which  only  happened  if  he  was  also  stigmatized  {in/amid  notatus) 
by  the  censor,  yet  he  must  have  suffered  so  much  injury  as 
to  make  the  act  one  of  great  delicacy.     The  removal,  too,  could 
only  be  effectually  made  if  both  censors  agreed ;  for  one  censor 
might  restore  those  whom  his  colleague  had  removed,*  and  a 
future  censor,  it  is  supposed,  might  restore  a  senator  unjustly 

•  On  this,  as  on  so  many  other  points,  much  uncertainty  prevails.    Paul.  Man., 
De  Sen.  Rom.,  cap.  iii. — J.  Zamoscius,  De  Sen.  Rom.,  i.  19. 


128  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XI. 

reraoved  ;*  certainly  a  future  election  to  a  curule  office  might 
enable  a  censor  again  to  choose  the  party.  The  vacancies  were 
thus  not  likely  to  be  many  on  each  occasion  ;  though  seven  or 
eight  removals  at  once  have  been  mentioned  by  authors.  These? 
with  the  vacancies  by  death,  would  not  much  more  than  suffice 
to  make  room  for  the  nomination  of  those  who  had  held  the  five 
offices ;  because  these  being  annual  must  have  supplied  a  consi- 
derable number  of  persons  not  already  senators  ;  and  it  was  held 
almost  as  injurious  to  be  passed  over  as  to  be  removed.-|- — Another 
check  to  the  censorial  power  was  provided  by  the  risk  which  each 
censor  ran  of  being  himself  treated  harshly  or  unjustly  had  he 
thus  treated  others,  and  the  indignation  of  the  patrician  body,  had 
the  discretion  been  abused  as  to  them,  and  of  the  plebeians,  had 
a  capricious  promotion  or  degradation  been  attempted  in  the 
tribes,  must  have  contracted  the  power  in  its  general  exercise ;  so 
that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  comprehending  how  the  extraordinary 
functions  of  this  office  could  be  exercised  for  four  centuries  without 
encroaching  materially  upon  all  the  other  departments  of  the 
state,  although  its  powers  appear  so  extreme  in  theory  that  they 
who  cannot  understand  the  possibility  of  a  balance  in  any  govern- 
ment, or  the  modifications  which  in  practice  all  power  whatever 
must  undergo,  would  at  once  pronounce  the  censorship  incompa- 
tible with  the  existence  of  the  Roman  constitution,  and  that,  at  the 
veiy  least,  the  senate  must  have  been  packed  in  the  space  of  two 
lustrums. 

The  commons  (Plebs)  never  as  such  were  directly  eligible  into 
the  senate ;  but  as  they  obtained  the  right  to  all  the  offices  in 
succession,  they  became  thus  qualified,  and  when  censors  from 
their  body  were  appointed,  the  plebeian  holders  of  curule  offices 
were  chosen  senators  as  well  as  the  patrician.  But  the  plebeian 
offices  were  of  themselves,  after  the  early  part  of  the  sixth  cen- 
tury (A.U.C.  537),  considered  as  a  qualification.     Fabius  Buteo 

*  The  Lex  Clodia,  which  prohibited  the  mark  of  infamy  (Censoria  nota), 
required  the  concurrence  of  both  Censors,  as  well  as  the  formal  accusation  before 
them  of  the  party  ;  but  Cicero  regards  this  as  having  destroyed  the  oflSce.—  Or.  pro 
Sext. —  Or.  in  Pisonem. 

t  Those  passed  over  {prcEteriti)  are  plainly  indicated  by  Festus  in  the  passage  so 
often  quoted  on  this  subject;  for  he  mentions  the  toco  moti  as  well  as  the  prateriii; 
yet  some  have  confounded  these  two  descriptions,  and  have  supposed  the  prateriti 
to  be  those  whose  names  the  Censors  omitted  in  calling  over  {recitando)  the  senate, 
—  P.  Man.,  cap.  iii. 


CH.  XI.  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  SENATE.  1 29 

having  at  that  time  been  chosen  dictator  for  the  express  purpose 
of  filling  up  the  senate,  reduced  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-three 
by  the  Punic  war,  then  going  on,  after  enrolling  all  who  had  held 
curule  offices,  he  completed  the  number  by  enrolling  tliose  who 
had  been  tribunes  of  the  commons,  and  also  some  plebeians  as 
well  as  patricians,  merely  on  account  of  their  military  services 
and  honours* — for  the  senate  might,  therefore,  now  be  considered 
as  a  popular  body,  quite  as  much  so  as  the  British  House  of 
Commons  during  the  times  when  it  was  formed  upon  the  jjrinciple 
of  virtual  representation.-f- 

The  power  and  jurisdiction  of  the  senate  is  matter  of  less  con- 
troversy. It  appears  at  first  to  have  engrossed  almost  ail  the 
functions  of  government,  except  the  command  of  the  army,  and 
the  decision  of  the  greater  causes,  which  were  both  reserved  for 
the  king.  But  the  senate  had  the  power  of  making  peace  and 
war  during  the  monarchy,  of  levying  troops,  of  raising  taxes  aud 
managing  the  revenue,  of  distributing  the  public  lands.  Every 
ten  senators  had  a  chief,  called  the  curio,  and  the  ten  curiones  of 
the  Ramnes  tribe  governed  each  fiive  days  in  rotation  when  the 
throne  was  vacant ;  they  were  then  called  interreges,  and  the 
vacancy  an  interregnum.  One  of  them  also  presided  in  the 
senate,  and  acted  as  viceroy  or  lieutenant  (custos  urhis)  in  the 
king's  absence.  The  power  of  the  senate,  however,  did  not 
extend  beyond  the  city ;  the  king  had  absolute  power  beyond  its 
limits.  In  the  earliest  times  of  the  republic  the  senate  appointed 
the  dictator.  Afterwards  a  dictator  could  not  be  named  without 
a  resolution  of  the  senate,  but  the  nomination  was  given  to  one 
of  the  consuls.  Until  the  rise  of  the  plebeians  to  power,  the 
senate's  previous  consent  was  required  to  the  entertaining  any 
proposition  by  the  other  bodies  in  the  state.  There  seems  to 
have  been  originally  no  effectual  check  upon  the  senate's  power, 
except  the  prerogative  which  the  king  had  of  convoking  it,  and  of 
prescribing  what  should  be  discussed  before  it. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  there  was  a  great  difference  between 
the  senators  of  the  greater  and  lesser  houses.     The  former,  those 

*  F.  Hottoman's  treatises  De  Mag.  Roni.  and  De  Sen.  et  Sctis  deserve  to  be  con- 
sulted as  conveniently  bringing  together  much  of  the  loarning  on  these  subjects, 
with  great  accuracy  and  impartiality. 

+  Liv.  xxiii.  2.3,  says  that  he  thus  chose  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  senators 
with  extreme  impartiality,  showing  a  preference  of  classes,  not  of  individuals  (ut 
ordo  ordini  non  homo  homini  prselatus  esse  videretur),  and  with  universal  approbation. 
PART  II.  K 


1 30  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH,  XI. 

of  the  Ramnes  and  Titles,  were  called  upon  first  to  give  their 
opinion  ;  and  the  latter,  those  of  the  Luceres,  were  only  allowed  to 
vote  without  speaking,  unless  they  had  been  consuls.  No  differ- 
ence whatever  was  made  between  the  Patres,  the  original  senators, 
and  the  Conscripti,  those  who  were  added  at  the  expulsion  of  the 
Tarquins  to  fill  up  the  number.  The  phrase  Patres  Conscripti 
is  commonly  translated  "  Conscript  FatJiers  ;"  but  it  was  equiva- 
lent in  the  old  Latin  idiom,  which  did  not  use  conjunctions,  to 
•'  Patres  et  Conscripti."  As  the  kings  originally  had  the  exclu- 
sive right  of  bringing  any  subject  before  the  senate,  it  is  probable 
that  this  right  passed  to  the  consuls ;  but  it  was  afterwards 
obtained  by  all  the  consular  tribunes  and  praetors,  and  of  course 
by  dictators  and  other  extraordinary  ofiicers,  and  in  later  times 
by  the  tribunes  of  the  commons.  The  senate  was  a  great 
administrative  council,  endowed  with  all  except  the  authority  to 
make  laws,  to  choose  the  ordinary  magistrates  (for  originally  it 
chose  the  dictator),  and  to  make  peace  and  war.  These  functions 
were  vested  in  the  comitia,  that  is,  in  the  assemblies  of  the 
people  ;  but  as  the  consul  was  almost  always  under  the  influence 
of  the  senate,  and  as  the  comitia  centuriata  could  not  be  held  with- 
out his  authority,  the  senate  could  generally  prevent  their  meeting. 

Although  the  power  and  jurisdiction  of  the  senate  is  less  con- 
troverted, yet  it  varied  exceedingly  in  different  periods.  We  are 
at  present  to  regard  it  chiefly  in  the  earlier  stages,  before  the 
popular  influence  was  established.  The  rise  of  the  commons  in 
Rome,  as  everywhere  else,  was  gradual ;  and  we  must  therefore 
fix  upon  some  time  at  which  to  consider  the  senate's  influence. 
The  greatest  power  which  it  ever  possessed  was  immediately 
after  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins :  it  retained  all  the  authority 
which  it  had  held  at  any  time  during  the  monarchy  ;  and  when, 
instead  of  a  king,*  whose  oflSce  was  for  life,  and  who  had  a  body 
guard,  there  were  substituted  consuls  who  held  their  office  for  a 
year,  and  were  answerable  at  the  end  of  that  time  for  whatever 
they  had  done  whUe  in  office,  the  senate's  power  greatly  increased. 

The  senate  was  from  the  beginning  not  merely  the  council  of 
the  king,  as  the  celeres  or  equites  were  his  body  guards ;  it  had 

♦  They  who  treat  Romulus  as  a  real  person  relate  the  tradition,  that,  having 
excited  the  jealousy  of  the  senate  or  the  patrician  body,  he  was  assassinated  by 
them ;  Livy  says,  torn  in  pieces.  The  encroachments  of  the  chiefs  and  JQ^ousy  of 
the  nobles  were  probably  real  events. 


CH.  XI.  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SENATE.  131 

powers  independent  of  him ;  engrossed  the  greater  portion  of  the 
functions  of  government ;  and  had  a  great  weight  also  in  legisla- 
tion. Except  the  command  of  the  army,  the  decision  of  private 
causes  or  lawsuits  between  individuals,  and  the  duty  of  high 
priest,  all  which  functions  belonged  to  the  king,  subject  only  to 
the  religious  control  of  the  augnrs  or  soothsayers,  the  govern- 
ment might  be  said  to  vest  in  the  senate  within  the  city ;  beyond 
it  the  king  was  absolute  in  all  respects.  The  senate  levied  troops, 
managed  the  revenue,  disposed  of  the  public  lands.  It  had  the 
sole  power  of  proposing  laws  to  the  comitia,  whether  curiata  or 
centuriata.  The  only  check  upon  its  authority  was,  that  it  could 
not  assemble  without  the  king's  convoking  it,  and  that  it  could 
not  entertain  any  question  which  he  had  not  brought  before  it. 
No  new  law  could  be  considered  in  the  comitia  without  the  pre- 
vious consent  both  of  the  king  and  the  senate.  It  must,  however, 
be  borne  in  mind,  that  as  regards  the  body  of  the  patricians,  no 
addition  was  made  to  their  power  by  the  previous  veto  of  the 
senate  ;  for  whether  a  law  was  proposed  in  the  curiata  or  centu- 
riata, the  patricians,  in  the  one  case  directly,  in  the  other  substan- 
tially, decided  upon  its  adoption  or  rejection. 

We  have  marked  the  distinction  made  between  the  different 
classes  of  senators ;  those  of  the  greater  and  lesser  houses.  But 
no  difference  was  made  between  the  Patres  and  the  Conscripti,  or 
those  added,  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins,  to  complete  the 
body.  When  two  consuls  were  substituted  for  a  king,  the  right 
of  assembling  the  senate  devolved  upon  them,  and  it  is  likely  that 
at  first  they  also  had,  like  the  kings,  the  exclusive  right  of  pro- 
pounding the  subjects  for  consideration.  This,  however,  was 
afterwards  obtained  by  other  magistrates,  namely,  the  Prsetor, 
together  with  the  principal  extraordinary  magistrates,  the  dicta- 
tor, the  consular  tribunes,  the  interrex,  and  the  decemvirs.  The 
influence  of  the  senate  was  alM^ays  great  with  the  consuls,  as  long 
as  these  were  chosen  only  from  the  patrician  body,  and  it  was  one 
of  the  many  consequences  of  this,  that  the  comitia  centuriata 
were  not  often  held  while  the  power  of  the  senate  was  at  its 
height.  Originally,  the  choice  of  a  dictator  belonged  to  the 
senate,  and  the  consuls  naming  him  upon  the  senate's  appoint- 
ment, was  only  a  form  to  testify  that  they  did  not  object  to  this 
superseding  of  their  own  authority.    Afterwards  the  consul  named 

k2 


132  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMR  CH.  XL 

a  dictator  at  his  discretion,  when  he  was  commanded  by  the  senate 
so  to  do.  Without  choosing  a  dictator,  the  senate  could  confer 
upon  the  consuls  absolute  power  within  the  city,  as  they  always 
possessed  it  beyond  the  walls.  This  was  done  by  a  vote  passed 
m  critical  emergencies,  that  the  consuls  should  take  care  the  state 
sufiFered  no  harm ;  and  sometimes,  though  rarely,  the  other  great 
magistrates,  as  the  praetors,  were  joined  in  the  same  vote.    When  j 

the  dominions  of  the  republic  were  much  extended,  the  principal 
duty  of  the  consuls  was  the  conduct  of  the  wars  in  which  the 
people  were  unceasingly  engaged.  The  senate  assigned  to  the 
consuls  their  provinces  or  commands.  In  like  manner,  when 
there  was  a  necessity  for  a  greater  number  of  military  com- 
manders, and  additional  magistrates  were  created  with  the  title  of 
prcdor  (besides  the  original  prsetor,  who  remained  in  the  city  to 
administer  justice  in  civil  causes),  the  senate  assigned  the  provinces 
of  the  praetors  ;  and  in  later  times,  when  it  was  necessary  to  pro- 
vide for  the  government  of  many  conquered  countries,  and  it  had 
become  usual  to  commit  these  to  magistrates  who  had  already 
pas.sed  through  their  year  of  office,  and  were  now  called  ]yro- 
consuls  and  projrrcetors,  the  senate  determined  the  provinces, 
that  is,  determined  which  should  be  consular,  and  which  praeto- 
rian. Thereupon  those  magistrates  cast  lots  for  them.  The 
appointment  of  ambassadors,  the  giving  audiences  to  those  of 
foreign  states,  the  awarding  honours,  the  decreeing  a  triumph,  a 
supplication  or  an  ovation,  were  in  all  ages  the  peculiar  province 
of  the  senate.  In  certain  causes  judges  were  chosen  out  of  the 
senate.  This  judicial  power  at  a  late  period  (A.U.C.  630)  was 
transferred  to  the  equestrian  order,  then  shared  with  them, 
and  afterwards  by  Sylla  restored  to  the  senate. 

The  authority  thus  possessed  by  the  senate  during  the  age 
when  the  assembly  was  composed  of  patricians,  whom  the 
rigorous  law  preventing  plebeian  intermarriages  kept  as  a  sepa- 
rate body,  was,  as  might  be  expected,  abused  to  the  greatest 
degree.  Not  only  the  common  people  (plebs)  were  treated  with 
insupportable  haughtiness,  and  insults  quite  gratuitous,  such  as 
being  summoned  to  the  comitia  by  the  sound  of  a  horn,  while  the 
curia?  were  cited  individually,  each  by  the  lictor  of  his  curia ;  but 
the  public  land,  all  that  came  to  the  state  by  conquest  (which 
generally  amounted  to  one-third,  the  rest  being  left  to  the  con- 


CH.  XI.  AGRARIAN  LAW.  133 

quered  people,  who  paid  rent  for  it*)  was  parcelled  out  among  the 
patricians,  while  the  plebeians,  when  they  got  any,  had  only  small 
allotments,  not  exceeding  two  jugera,  or  one  acre  and  a  half.  These 
allotments  were  possessed  by  them  in  fee  simple ;  and  in  the 
earliest  times  the  whole  of  the  plebeians  were  landowners,  even 
the  city  tribes  being,  for  the  most  part,  engaged  in  agriculture,  as 
they  were  not  allowed  to  occupy  themselves  either  with  trade  or 
the  mechanical  arts.  The  patricians  held  only  some  very  small 
portions  of  land  in  fee  simple  ;  but  they  had  large  possessions,  as 
they  were  called,  that  is,  large  tracts  of  the  public  land,  which 
were  by  law  resumable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  state,  and  were  also 
by  law  held  on  condition  of.  paying  to  the  state  a  tenth  of  the 
produce  of  com,  a  fifth  of  wine  and  all  other  produce,  and  some 
rent,  it  is  uncertain  what,  for  cattle  in  the  pasture-land.  As, 
however,  the  government  was  vested  in  their  own  hands,  these 
laws  were  habitually  evaded  ;  and  among  the  first  attempts  made 
by  the  people  to  lessen  the  patrician  power  was  the  proposed  law 
for  enforcing  the  payment  of  the  rents  by  the  patricians,  restricting 
the  extent  of  their  occupation,  and  dividing  a  portion  of  the 
domains  among  the  commons.  Spurius  Cassius  (a.u.c.  227)  first 
made  this  attempt,  and  was  put  to  death  by  the  patricians,  upon 
the  pretext  that  he  had  formed  a  conspiracy  to  restore  monarchy. 
After  a  struggle  of  ten  years,  Licinius  Stole  (A.U.C.  387)  succeeded 
in  carrying  his  law  to  restrict  the  possessions  to  five  hundred 
jugera  (three  hundred  and  seventy-eight  acres),  the  number  of 
cattle  to  one  hundred,  and  of  sheep  to  five  hundred,  dividing  all 
the  residue  of  the  lands  among  the  commons,  in  the  proportion  of 
seven  jugera  (five  acres)  to  each,  requiring  a  certain  number  of 
free  citizens  to  be  employed  in  the  cultivation,  and  enforcing  the 
payment  of  the  patrician  rents  to  the  state.  The  law,  however, 
was  evaded  in  all  its  branches,  and  Tiberius  Gracchus  long  after 
(a.u.c.  630)  perished  in  an  attempt  to  revive  and  extend  the 
Licinian  rogations,  or  proposed  laws.  The  possessions,  though 
resumable,  never  were  resumed.  The  court  of  the  praetor,  exer- 
cising an  equitable  jurisdiction,  restrained  by  his  interdict  (or 
injunction)  all  interference  with  the  possession.  The  land  thus 
held  was  transmitted  to  heirs  or  devisees,  and  conveyed  to  pur- 
chasers as  if  it  had  been  held  in  fee.    The  error,  therefore,  of  most 

*  The  rent  was  one-tenth  of  com  and  one-fifth  of  all  other  produce.  These  rents 
were  farmed  out  by  the  state. 


1 34  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XL 

writers  in  treating  of  Agrarian  laws  does  not,  as  Niebuhr  main- 
tains, consist  in  considering  that  those  laws  Laterfered  with  property, 
for  they  did  directly  interfere,  or  even  that  they  established  a 
maximum,  for  a  maximum  was  established  by  them  ;  but  in  con- 
sidering that  they  prevented  any  person  from  holding  above  a 
certain  extent  of  land  by  any  title.  The  Agrarian  laws  did  not 
prevent  that ;  tliey  only  sought  to  limit  the  extent  which  should 
be  held  of  the  domain  lands.* 

But  though  this  monopoly  of  land  was  sufficiently  grievous,  and 
the  bmrdens  imposed  on  the  people  heavy  in  proportion  as  the 
patricians  escaped  from  the  pajnnent  of  their  rent  to  the  public, 
the  worst  oppressions  exercised  by  that  body  were  in  their  capa- 
city of  creditors.  The  law  gave  them  power  of  the  most  unlimited 
and  of  the  most  barbarous  kind  ;  and  the  wealth  of  the  order, 
amassed  probably  both  by  foreign  commerce  and  by  agriculture,  f 
had  reduced  a  great  proportion  of  the  plebeians  to  the  condition 
of  debtors.  The  person  of  the  debtor  could  be  seized  and  impri- 
soned, but  he  could  also  be  worked  and  scourged  like  a  slave 
until  the  debt  was  paid ;  and  he  was  even  liable  to  be  cut  in 
pieces  by  one  or  more  creditors,  in  proportion  to  their  demands, 
without  any  punishment  being  inflicted  if  the  proportion  was  ex- 
ceeded. In  so  cruel  and  bloody-minded  a  nation,  an  aristocracy 
so  proud  and  unfeeling  as  the  patricians  showed  themselves  at  all 
periods  was  sure  to  exercise  such  powers,  except  perhaps  the  last, 
without  remorse  ;  and  the  first  great  resistance  of  the  plebeians, 
after  the  time  when  they  joined  their  oppressors  against  the  king 
as  a  common  enemy,  was  about  twenty  years  subsequent  to  that 
event  (a.u.c.  263),  when  they  left  the  city  at  a  critical  period  of 
the  war,  indicating,  it  is  supposed,  a  disposition  to  have  back  the 
kings,  rather  than  any  longer  to  bear  the  tyranny  of  the  privileged 
orders.  A  most  important  advantage  was  the  result  of  this  mea- 
sure.    They  obtained  the  power  of  assembling  by  tribes  in  a 

•  It  would  be  quite  as  correct  to  assert  that  an  English  act  of  Parliament 
restricting  copyholders  to  400  acres,  limiting  the  number  of  cattle  they  could  turn 
out  on  the  wastes  to  half  the  proportion  of  their  levancy  and  couchancy,  and  giving 
the  lord  all  the  copyhold  tenements  above  four  hundred  acres,  implied  no  maximum 
and  no  forfeiture  of  vested  copj'hold  rights,  as  to  contend,  after  the  manner  of 
Niebuhr,  that  the  Agrarian  laws  did  not  interfere  with  patrician  property  and 
establish  a  maximum.  The  copyhold  is,  in  contemplation  of  law,  a  tenure  at  the 
lord's  will  ;  and  the  resumption  by  the  state  in  Eome  would  have  been  as  violent 
an  act,,  after  very  long  possession,  as  the  law  we  are  supposing. 

t  See  Arnold,  Hist,  of  Rome,  vol.  i. 


CH.  XL  TRIBUNES  OF  THE  PEOPLK  135 

comitia  tributa,  which  no  patrician  could  attend,*  and  of  choos- 
ing magistrates  of  their  own,  whose  office  it  shoukl  be  to  protect 
them  from  all  oppression.  These  were  called  tribunes,  being- 
elected  by  the  assembled  tribes.  The  accounts  differ  as  to  their 
original  number,  whether  two  or  five ;  t  but  the  right  of  the 
officer  is  certain,  although  he  may  not  all  at  once  have  been 
invested  with  it.  In  the  course  of  a  short  time  the  tribune  could 
summon  any  one  before  the  comitia  tributa,  and  impeach  him 
there  ;  and  he  soon  acquired  another,  and  a  singular  power,  that 
of  stopping  any  measure,  whether  legislative  or  administrative, 
by  his  single  negative,  called  his  veto.  So  great  was  the  force  of 
this  interposition  (intercessio)  that  one  tribune  could  throw  out  a 
measure,  preventing  it  from  becoming  a  senatus  considtum  (an 
order  or  resolution  of  the  senate),  or  a  law  in  the  comitia,  though 
his  colleague  supported  it.  The  person  too  of  the  tribune  was 
sacred,  and  could  not  be  in  any  way  affected  during  his  office  ; 
insomuch,  that  if  he  were  to  enter  the  senate,  where  he  had  no 
right  to  be,  though  his  presence  of  itself  caused  the  business  to 
cease,  he  being  a  stranger,  yet  no  steps  could  be  taken  to  make 
him  withdraw.  His  presence  had  the  same  effect  in  the  senate 
with  a  motion  that  the  house  ^e  counted,  which  any  one  might 
make  by  saying  nwmera  senatum;  and  if  the  proper  number  was 
not  present  the  business  was  stopped.  :f     The  same  effect  in  the 

*  This  is  the  generally  received  opinion ;  but  there  seems  a  plain  mistake  in  sup- 
posing that  the  comitia  tributa  were  first  held  on  this  occasion.  It  is  much  more 
probable  that  they  had  been  held  ever  since  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins,  if  indeed 
Servius  TuUius  had  not  originally  established  them.  Certain  it  is  that  the  account 
of  the  Valerian  law,  the  law  of  Valerius  Publicola,  which  so  greatly  endeared  him 
to  the  people,  is  unintelligible,  unless  there  existed  comitia  tributa  at  that  time; 
because  it  provided  an  appeal  for  the  plebeian  against  the  sentence  of  any  magistrate 
— that  is,  any  patrician  ;  and  that  could  be  no  kind  of  security  if  the  appeal  was 
only  to  the  patrician  body  which  the  comitia  centuriata  was,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses. It  is  an  additional  reason  for  disbelieving  the  c>mmon  accounts,  that  we  are 
told  the  trial  of  Coriolanus  (a.u.c.  263)  was  the  first  instance  of  the  senate  giving  up 
its  judicial  power  to  the  people,  and  the  first  instance  of  any  popular  measure  without 
a  previous  senatus  consultum.  Now  this  is  the  same  date  with  the  supposed  origin 
of  the  comitia  tributa.  Is  it  likely  that  an  assembly,  then  for  the  first  time  known, 
should  at  once  both  have  obtained  judicial  authority,  and  afforded  the  first  instance 
of  any  assembly  acting  without  the  previous  authority  of  the  senate  ?  Is  it  not 
much  more  probable  that  these  important  steps  were  made  by  a  body  already  existing, 
which  was  well  known,  and  which  had  been  for  a  course  of  years  increasing  its  power  ? 

t  Two  plebeian  a;diles  were  also  allowed  thenceforth  to  be  chosen,  with  judicial 
as  well  as  police  powers. 

X  There  is  nothing  known  for  certain  as  to  the  number  which  formed  a  quorum. 
For  some  purposes  two  hundred  were  required.     It  is  said  that  for  others  four 


136  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XI. 

comitia  curiata  was  produced  by  a  declaration  of  the  haruspices 
that  the  omens  were  unfavourable,  which  defeated  a  measure 
agreed  upon  by  both  senate  and  comitia.  If  the  tribune,  how- 
ever, opposed  in  the  senate,  the  decree  was  stUl  recorded  {pre- 
scriptum),  notwithstanding  that  he  opposed  the  recording.  This 
seems  to  have  been  the  only  exception  to  his  absolute  veto. 

But  great  as  was  the  gain  thus  made  by  the  plebeian  influence, 
it  was  not  till  their  legislative  powers  became  recognised  that  the 
commons  could  be  said  to  have  thrown  off  the  yoke  of  the  aris- 
tocracy. The  previous  consent  of  the  senate,  by  a  senatus  con- 
sultum,  was  first  dispensed  with  in  the  year  281  (u.c),  but  the 
law  so  made  at  the  comitia  tributa  only  bound  the  commons. 
Soon  after  (304)  the  Valerian  and  Horatian  law  is  said  to  have 
given  the  plebiscitum,  or  resolution  of  the  tribes,  general  efficacy 
over  all  the  orders  of  the  state  ;  but  another  law  was  made 
(a. u.c.  414),  the  Publilian,  which  made  the  senate  a  party  to 
whatever  the  people  might 'brder  ;  and  the  Hortensian  law,  at  a 
much  later  period  (a,U.C,  465),  expressly  declared  the  plebiscitum 
to  have  universally  the  force  of  law.  The  probability  is  that  the 
two  latter  laws  were  only  made  to  declare  and  enforce  a  law  already 
in  existence.* 

The  comitia  curiata  fell  gradually  into  disuse  as  the  centuriata, 
and  aspecially  as  the  tiibuta,  rose  into  power  ;  latterly  they  were 
a  mere  form,  and  only  kept  in  existence  for  the  sake  of  religious 
ceremonials,  the  jurisdiction  over  which  belonged  to  them.  The 
struggles  of  the  commons  with  the  patricians  were  almost  entirely 
made  in  obtaining  the  privileges  for  the  comitia  tributa  ;  the 
centuriata  being  so  entirely  under  the  control  of  the  patricians 
that  no  opposition  could  arise  between  them  and  the  senate.  The 
course  of  legislation,  however,  was  the  same  in  both  tributa  and 
centuriata.  In  both,  as  in  the  senate,  and  originally  in  the 
curiata,  while  these  continued  effective,  only  certain  persons  had 
the  right  to  propose  measures  (jus  rogationis,  or  legis  ferendce) 
originally  propounded  exclusively  by  the  king.  Tlie.se  persons 
were  the  two  great  ordinary  magistrates,  consuls  and  prsetoi-s  ; 
the  extraordinary  ones,  dictator,  iuterrex  (who  acted  with  consular 

hundrod  in  later  times  Trere  required,  after  the  total  number  had  increased  to  six 
hundred,  and  under  the  empire  to  one  thousand. 

*  Dionysius  gives  the  first  of  these  statutes — Livy  the  second — A.  Gellius,  after 
Lselius,  the  third — P.  Manutius,  De  Leg(j.,  cap.  xxxiii.,  judiciously  suggests  the 
explanation. 


CH.  XI.  COURSE  OF  LEGISLATION— ANOMALIES.  I*i7 

power  when  the  consuls  had  not  been  named,  and  when  there 
was  no  dictator,  and  was  appointed  for  five  days  only),  tribune 
with  consular  power,  and  of  course  the  decemviri,  appointed  ex- 
pressly to  propose  laws.  The  law  was  first  prepared  {scripta), 
then  propounded  {promulgata,  quasi  prevulgatd)  by  the  magis- 
trate, who,  if  he  desired  to  have  the  general  assent,  first  obtained 
a  seTiatus  consultum,  and  on  that  grounded  his  proposal  to  the 
comitia ;  if  he  was  a  demagogue  he  proposed  the  law  at  once. 
The  comitia,  after  discussion,  in  which  only  those  allowed  by  the 
magistrates  took  part,  voted  by  ballot,  drawing  lots  for  wliicli 
century  or  tribe  should  vote  first — should  be  first  ashed  its 
opinion  :  hence  the  priority  thus  obtained  was  csHedLprairogativa, 
and  the  majority  of  the  centuries  or  tribes  decided.* 

Th'e  double  legislation  in  this  system,  which  has  been  ob- 
served upon  by  Mr.  Hume  as  a  very  strange  anomaly,  inasmuch 
as 'the  two  bodies,  the  tribes  and  centuries,  were  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  and  so  differently  composed  that  the  patri- 
cians and  wealthy  class  preponderated  at  all  times  and  of  necessity 
in  the  one,  and  the  numerous  body,  the  multitude,  without  any 
rank,  and  with  little  or  with  no  property,  as  necessarily  prevailed 
in  the  other.  But  there  was  another  anomaly,  almost  as  great, 
in  the  conflicting  powers  of  the  senate  ;  for  although  its  exclusive 
legislative  authority  had  ceased,  it  retained  a  concurrent  power 
upon  certain  matters,  having,  after  the  disuse  of  the  comitia  curiata 
and  the  rise  of  the  tributa,  become  not  only  a  great  and  powerful 
administrative  council,  but  also  exercising  important  legislative 
functions,  not  only  in  assenting  to  the  measures  which  were  to  be 
brought  before  the  comitia,  but  also  in  passing  certain  S.  C.  and 
decrees,  which  had  the  force  of  laws,  without  any  sanction  of  the 
bodies  in  which  the  general  legislative  power  had  become  vested. 
P.  Manutius  has  enumerated  between  twenty  and  thirty  S.  C. 
which  were  binding  generally  without  any  other  laws  to  give 
them  efficacy  ;  and  though  their  subjects  are  chiefly  of  an  ad- 
ministrative or  executive  nature,  as  raising  troops,  sending  ambas- 
sadors, repairing  the  roads,  some  are  legislative,  as  fixing  the 
rate  of  interest.     It  is  supposed  that  the  people  assented  tacitly 

*  Some  writers  have  hazarded  the  assertion  very  confidently  that,  though  the 
centuries  voted  by  centuries,  the  tribes  voted  individually  (per  capita).  The  weight 
of  authority  is  as  entirely  the  other  way  as  can  be  conceived  on  any  such  question. 
C.  Sigonius,  De  Jut:  Ant.  Civ.  Horn.,  i.  17;  Onuph.  Panvin.,  iJe  Civ.  Bo?n., 
cap.  69 ;  N.  Gruch.,  ii.  4  ;  P.  Man.,  De  Legg.  Rom.,  cap.  •57 ;  Rosin.  Ant ,  viii.  2. 


138  CONSTITDTION  OF   ROME.  CH.  XI. 

to  the  proceedings  of  the  senate.  But  the  solution  of  the  difficulty- 
lies  in  the  tribunitian  power.  As  the  veto  could  at  any  moment 
stop  the  S.  C,  the  senate  was  suffered  to  go  on,  just  like  our 
courts,  acting  under  the  powers  of  a  statute,  and  making  laws 
which  are  binding  unless  either  house  of  parliament  shall,  on 
being  apprised  of  them,  dissent.  The  same  remark  applies  to 
the  legislation  of  the  centuries.  The  knowledge  that  the  tri- 
bunes could  interpose  must  have  tended  to  make  the  centuries 
often  adopt  measures  towards  which  they  had  the  greatest  disin- 
clination. But  the  knowledge  that  the  comitia  tributa  could  pass 
a  law  without  either  senate  or  centuries  must  have  had  still  more 
weight  with  both.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  both  the  comitia 
had  the  same  power  of  making  laws.  The  tributa  always  exer- 
cised it,  but  until  the  year  414,  as  we  have  seen,  the  plebiscita 
were  not  generally  binding.  These  plebiscita,  like  the  S.  C, 
were  in  most  cases  administrative  or  executive,  as  giving  the  lesser 
provinces  to  pro-praetors  and  pro-consuls,  and  making  peace, 
it  being  held  quite  clear  that  the  centuries  alone  could  make  war> 
and  only  a  single  instance  being  found  of  the  tributa  taking  this 
upon  itself  But  the  Aquilian  law  respecting  personal  injuries, 
the  Falcidian  respecting  wills,  A.U.C.  714  (both  inserted  in  Jus- 
tinian's Codes),  the  Silian  on  weights  and  measures,  the  Attian, 
(A.U.C.  620,)  on  the  right  of  tribunes  to  be  named  senators,  were  all 
plebiscita,  and  made  by  the  tribes  alone.*  The  centuriata  are 
supposed  by  some  to  have  made  fewer  laws  than  the  tributa  ;  but 
this  position  must  be  confined  to  administrative  measures,  for  the 
greater  number  of  the  general  legislative  measures  were  made  by 
the  centuries,  with  the  previous  authority  of  the  senate.  The 
power  of  declaring  war,  trying  for  treason,  and  choosing  the  con- 
suls, praetors,  and  quaestors,  possessed  by  the  centuries ;  and  the 
power  of  making  peace,  trying  for  minor  offences,  and  naming 
ambassadors  and  inferior  officers,  possessed  by  the  tribes  ;  appear 
really  to  have  been  the  only  exclusive  privileges  of  these  two 
bodies ;  and  there  seems  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  senate  had 
the  same  concurrent  authority,  together  wdth  the  exclusive  right  of 
naming  a  dictator  and  interrex.  Now  it  must  necessarily  result 
from  the  existence  of  bodies  with  concurrent  and  equal  powers, 
that  each  will  yield  somewhat  to  the  others.  If  each  of  our  houses 
of  parliament  could  make  laws,  each  would,  on  being  asked  by 

*  P.  Man.,  DeLegg.,  cap.  v. 


CH.  XL  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PARADOX.  139 

the  other,  adopt  partially  measures  to  which  it  was  averse,  in 
order  to  prevent  the  greater  evil  of  the  whole  measures  being 
carried  in  spite  of  it ;  and  the  wish  to  gain  the  advantage  of  having 
a  law  or  a  measure  of  any  kind  adopted  by  both  would  incline  the 
house  which  propounded  it  to  rest  satisfied  with  a  partial  accom- 
plishment of  its  purpose.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  was 
the  effect  of  the  co-ordinate  powers  possessed  by  the  three  bodies 
at  Bome.*  Even  the  absolute  veto  of  the  tribune  found  a  practical 
check  in  various  ways.  Thus,  if  he  prevented  a  consul  from  being 
cjiosen,  the  senate  appointed  an  interrex,  and  might  appoint  a 
dictator — which  was  threatened  in  Pompey's  case  ;  or  it  could 
declare  by  a  S.  C.  that  the  tribune  was  answerable  for  all  the 
consequences  of  his  intercession ;  or  it  could  give  absolute  power 
to  the  consul,  by  the  vote  ne  quid  detrimenti.  In  these  and  the 
like  instances  the  consuls  and  senate  were  secure  as  often  as  the 
tribunes  plainly  put  themselves  in  the  wrong,  and  were  not  sup- 
ported by  a  very  great  majority  of  the  people.  Cicero's  case 
illustrates  this.  The  senate  and  centuries  were  decidedly  favour- 
able to  his  return  from  banishment ;  all  the  tribunes  but  two, ' 
whom  Clodius  had  corrupted,  took  his  part  also  ;  and  the  people 
being  well  disposed  towards  him,  these  two,  Son-anus  and  Quinc- 
tus,  did  not  venture  to  give  their  veto.  Clodius,  it  must  be  ob- 
served, was  the  only  dissentient  in  the  vote  of  the  senate. 

There  was  a  more  direct  check  to  the  tribune's  power,  and 
generally  to  the  authority  of  the  tribes,  in  the  religion,  or  rather 
superstition,  of  that  most  superstitious  people.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  sixth  century  the  ^lian  and  Fusian  laws  were  passed, 
by  the  former  of  which  the  observation  of  the  heavens,  and  the 
auspices,  or  examination  of  the  entrails  of  birds,  suspended  all  pro- 
ceedings in  the  popular  assemblies ;  and  by  the  latter,  all  holy 
days  (dies  fasti)  were  made  to  adjourn  popular  proceedings, 
and  were  consecrated  to  religious  rites  and  to  the  administration 
of  justice.  The  multitude  had  thus  time  given  for  reflection,  and 
the  upper  classes  for  exercising  their  natural  influence;  and  when 
Clodius  obtained  a  repeal  of  the  law  in  A.u.C.  699,  Cicero  declared 
that  "  the  bulwarks  of  the  public  peace  had  been  swept  away  " 
(In  Pison.  4).    To  them  he  ascribed  the  escape  of  the  community 

*  Before  we  can  adopt  Mr.  Falck's  doctrine  {Encyclop^die  Juridiqtte,  iii.  s.  C9), 
and  Niebuhr's,  ii.  240,  that  the  senate's  assent  was  required  to  give  plebiscita  a 
binding  effect,  we  must  get  rid  of  all  that  has  been  said  on  the  Hortensian  and 
similar  laws. 


140  CONSTITUTION  OF  HOME.  CH   XI. 

from  all  former  seditions.*  But  before  this  law,  which  was  pro- 
bably declaratory,  and  to  enforce  the  custom,  the  distinction  had 
existed  between  the  greater  and  lesser  magistrates,  with  regard  to 
the  auspices.  The  consul,  prastor,  and  censor  could  interpose  at 
any  popular  meeting  with  the  announcement  that  the  auguries 
were  unfavourable,  and  could  thus  prevent  the  adoption  of  any 
measure  by  the  tribes,  as  well  as  by  the  senate  and  centuries.  The 
lesser  magistrates  had  no  such  power,  although  the  tribune  could 
use  his  veto.  This  privilege  of  the  auspices  put  the  patrician 
magistrates  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  tribunes,  giving  them 
in  fact  a  veto.  Now  the  result  of  a  mutual  veto  must  needs  be 
a  compromise;  as  has  already  been  shown  (Part  IL,  c  ii.).  The 
senate  acted  without  its  accustomed  good  judgment  when,  in- 
stead of  being  satisfied  with  these  checks,  and,  above  all,  with  the 
veto  of  the  auspices,  they  allied  themselves  occasionally  with  one 
of  the  tribunes  to  obtain  his  aid  in  obstructing  his  colleagues. 
They  had  recourse  to  this  expedient  against  Tiberius  Graechus, 
who  was  compelled  by  it  to  have  his  colleague  removed — the  only 
instance  of  a  tribune  ever  being  displaced.  Their  error  was  still 
greater  when  they  sought  the  like  assistance  as  against  their  own 
natural  ally,  the  consul.  Upon  the  refusal  of  the  consuls  to  appoint 
a  dictator,  (a.u.c.322,)  the  tribunes  were  appealed  to,  and,  by  the 
threats  of  arrest,  compelled  them  to  obey  the  senate — a  lesson  on 
their  supreme  power  which  these  magistrates  never  forgot,  but 
once  and  again  turned  to  their  account,  as  against  the  patricians. 
It  must  however  be  allowed  that  when  the  number  of  the  tribunes 
was  increased  to  ten,  this  gave  inevitably  a  considerable  hold  over 
them  to  the  rival  bodies,  as  it  became  the  more  likely  that  divi- 
sions should  exist  among  the  tribunes ;  and  so  far,  therefore,  this 
may  be  reckoned  among  the  checks  to  the  plebeian  domination. 

Of  the  anomalies  to  which  we  have  been  referring,  no  explana- 
tion whatever  can  be  derived  from  the  choice  of  almost  all  the 
magistrates  who  had  the  right  of  propounding  laws  being  vested 
in  the  patrician  bodies,  the  senate,  and  the  centuries,  because 

*  A  singular  uncertainty  prevails  respecting  the  date  of  these  two  laws.  The 
iElian  is  by  P.  Manutius  held  to  have  been  a  tribnnitian  law,  as  he  says  he  can  find 
no  consul  of  the  JElia.  Gens,  which  Sigonius  and  Onuph.  Pauvin.  have  shown  that 
there  are.  But  Hottoman  ascribes  it  to  Q.  Celius,  prjEtor  in  a.u.c.  .'j86,  and  the 
Fusian  to  Publius  Fusius  (or  Furius)  Philo,  in  a.u.c.  (jl  7,  which  agrees  well  enough 
with  Cicero's  statement  that  the  law  (in  that  passage  he  treats  it  as  one  ;  elsewhere 
In  Vatin.,  as  two)  had  existed  near  one  hundred  years.     In  Pis.,  5. 


CH.  XI.      DEFECTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT — DECEMVIRS.  141 

there  was  one  office,  the  most  important  of  all  in  this  point  of 
view,  the  tribuneship,  in  filling  up  which  the  tribes  only  could  act. 
But  the  powers  of  that  office  and  the  general  authority  of  the 
comitia  tributa  in  a  very  short  time  so  far  diminished  that  of  the 
patricians,  that  the  government,  from  an  almost  pure  aristocracy, 
became  democratic,  with  an  admixture  of  aristocratic  influence. 

But  the  machinery  of  government  and  legislation  did  not  become 
capable  of  working  without  very  great  difficulties  being  encoun- 
tered, and  serious  obstacles  raised  by  this  double  legislation.  The 
existence  of  two  legislative  bodies,  distinct,  independent,  and  hos- 
tilely  opposed  to  one  another,  became  so  intolerable  from  their 
constant  jarring  and  from  the  confficting  laws  which  they  made, 
that  the  community  had  recourse  to  an  extraordinary  magistracy 
which  should  supersede  both  the  one  and  the  other  order,  be 
armed  with  dictatorial  powers  like  a  single  magistrate,  and  at  the 
same  time  resemble  a  popular  body  or  council,  by  its  numbers. 
Ten  persons  were  constituted  a  Supreme  Council  to  prepare  a 
body  of  laws  which  should  be  binding  on  the  whole  people.  They 
digested  the  old  laws,  with  such  additions  as  they  thought  expe- 
dient, chiefly  borrowed  from  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Grecian 
States  ;*  and  these  laws  of  the  Ten,  afterwards  Twelve  Tables, 
being  adopted  by  the  senate  and  the  comitia,  became  the  founda- 
tion of  the  whole  legal  system.  This  important  change  took  place 
at  the  beginning  of  the  foiirth  century. 

*  It  is  the  opinion  of  Niebuhr  and  others  that  nothing  at  all  was  taken  from 
Greece;  au  opinion  for  which  there  appears  no  sufficient  ground. 


142  CONSTITUTION  OF  KOMK  CH.  XII. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CONSTITUTION  OF  ROMK 
(^Continued.) 


Grovemment  carried  on  by  laws  and  legislative  decrees— Consuls — Praetors — ^diles, 
Plebeian  and  Curule — Quaestors,  Civil  and  Military — Choice  of  Magistrates  — 
Controversy  de  Binis  Comitiis — Dictator — Progress  of  Popular  power — Interrex 
— Consular  functions — Provincial  Pro- Praetors  and  Pro-Consuls — Vigour  of  the 
Government — Religious  polity— PontifiFs — Rex  Sacrorum — College  of  Augurs — 
Haruspices — Sibylline  Decemvirs —Singular  facts — Judicial  duties  of  Magis- 
trates— Cornelian  laws — Judicial  system — Judices — Centum viri — Qusesitores — 
Jus  Quaestionis,  or  Merum  Imperium — Divinatio— Special  judicial  laws — Abuses 
from  thence —Analogy  of  Parliamentary  Privilege — Impeachment — Cognitiones 
extraordinarise — Examples. 

In  treating  of  the  Senate  and  the  Comitia,  we  have  nearly  ex- 
plained the  subject  of  the  Roman  constitution  as  far  as  the  supreme 
power  is  concerned,  whether  legislative  or  executive.  For  the 
administration  of  the  government,  as  well  as  the  machinery  of 
legal  enactment,  was  carried  on  almost  entirely  by  what  were 
called  laws  or  decrees  of  those  bodies ;  and  the  magistrates  had 
little  more  to  do  than  to  bring  propositions  before  them,  and  to 
carry  their  resolutions  into  execution,  whether  in  their  political 
or  their  judicial  capacity,  of  which  the  latter  formed  by  far  the 
greater  portion  of  their  duties,  unless  in  the  case  of  the  consuls 
who  commanded  the  forces  and  governed  the  provinces,  the  quaes- 
tors who  managed  the  financial  concerns  of  those  provinces,  and 
some  of  the  inferior  provincial  oflScers,  as  pro-consuls  and  pro- 
praetors. 

The  consuls  originally  succeeded  to  the  whole  power  of  the 
kings,  and  could  order  any  one  to  be  summarily  put  to  death 
for  disobeying  their  orders.  This  power  was  soon  resti-ained  by 
the  Valerian  law,  which  gave  an  appeal  to  the  tribes  in  the  case 
of  a  plebeian,  the  patricians  having  already  an  appeal  to  the 
curiae  or  the  centuriea  Out  of  the  city  the  consul  was  absolute  ; 
and  in  the  city,  when  he  acted  with  the  senate's  advice  and  con- 


CH.  XII.         CONSULS — PRiETORS  — ^DILES — QU^STORS.  14.'> 

sent,  as  he  generally  did,  his  power  was  only  bounded  by  the 
veto  of  the  tribunes,  and  checked  by  the  knowledge  that  at  the  end 
of  the  year  he  became  a  private  citizen,  and  was  answerable  for 
all  he  had  done  in  his  office.  The  creation  of  censors  restrained 
the  functions  of  the  consuls,  as  we  have  seen  ;  and  their  judicial 
power  was  transferred  to  the  praetors.  But  still  they  retained  the 
military  command  of  the  State,  and  could  both  raise  and  distri-^ 
bute  its  forces,  appoint  the  officers,  and  take  the  money  appointed 
for  the  payment  of  the  troops,  which  the  quaestors,  who  were  at 
the  head  of  the  treasury,  could  not  refuse  unless  upon  extreme 
occasions.  The  tribunes  were  in  fact  the  only  magistrates  not 
subject  to  their  authority ;  and  they  had  the  duty  of  executing  all 
the  decrees  of  the  senate,  and  all  the  laws  made  by  the  comitia 
centuriata. 

The  praetors  were,  strictly  speaking,  judicial ;  and  they  exer- 
cised extensive  jurisdiction.  But  although  edicts  which  they 
made  at  entering  upon  their  office  laid  down  the  laws  by  which 
they  were  to  be  governed,  and  although  some  of  these  were  termed 
translatitious,  being  taken  from  former  edicts,  and  others  new,  yet 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  departed  materially  from 
the  received  laws  of  the  State.  Whatever  they  added  to  the  edicts 
of  their  predecessors  was  probably  a  mere  statement  in  writing  of 
the  customary  or  common  law.  Their  numbers  were  increased 
to  six  in  the  year  A.U.C.  604,  and  sometimes  there  were  as  many 
as  eight. 

The  plebeian  aediles  were  ancient  magistrates  created  in  A.  u.  C. 
261,  and  they  had  both  the  superintendence  of  police  and  a  petty 
jurisdiction  in  such  causes  as  the  tribunes  delegated  to  them.  They 
bore  to  the  tribunes  the  same  relation  which  the  praetor  did  to  the 
consul :  they  were  his  deputies  to  act  under  him,  and  his  substi- 
tutes in  his  absence  ;  but  they  did  not,  like  the  praetor  and  curule 
sedile,  issue  any  general  edicts.  The  curule  aediles  created  in  A.u.c. 
388  had  a  high  jurisdiction,  chiefly  in  matters  of  economy  and 
police  ;  but  as  connected  with  these,  they  kept  a  watch  upon  cases 
of  an  immoral  description.  They  had  the  same  practice  with  the 
praetors,  of  issuing  an  edict  on  entering  upon  office,  to  declare  the 
rules  which  they  should  follow. 

The  quaestors  or  treasurers  were  either  civil  or  military,  the 
former  having  the  control  of  the  financial  affairs  of  the  State,  the 
latter  accompanying  the  consul  on  his  military  service  for  the 


144  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  X[I 

supply  of  the  troops.  Tacitus  is  supposed  to  be  mistaken  in  liis 
statement,  that  the  office  existed  under  the  kings ;  that  after- 
wards the  consuls  appointed  the  quaestor  until  the  year  307,  when 
the  people  elected  him  ;  and  that  the  military  quaestors  were  the 
more  anciently  appointed,  the  office  of  city  quaestor  not  being 
created  till  a  much  later  period.  All  other  authorities  are  agreed 
in  representing  the  city  quaestor,  or  general  financier,  as  coeval 
with  the  commonwealth,  and  the  military  as  appointed  long  after 
— Livy  says  in  the  year  333.  There  were  then  two  of  each  de- 
scription ;  and  in  488,  when  all  Italy  was  conquered  and  divided 
into  four  governments,  four  new  quaestors  were  chosen,  one  for 
each.  The  office  was  the  first  in  the  course  of  promotion  towards 
the  consulship  and  the  senate  ;  as  such  it  was  much  sought  after ; 
and  accordingly  the  number  of  quaestors  was  in  later  times  in- 
creased for  party  purposes.  Sylla  raised  it  to  twenty ;  and  Julius 
Caesar,  whose  kindly  disposition  ever  kept  pace  with  his  thiist  of 
power,  made  no  less  than  forty,  to  gratify  his  adherents. 

There  is  no  part  of  the  Eoman  constitution  supposed  to  be 
better  ascertained  than  that  which  relates  to  the  choice  of  magis- 
trates, and  none  which  seems  to  have  been  less  broken  in  upon  by 
violence  and  usurpation.  The  comitia  centuriata  chose  the  con- 
suls and  praetors,  censors,  curule  aediles,  and  quaestors.  The 
tributa  chose  the  tribunes  and  all  inferior  magistrates.  The  senate 
appointed  the  dictator  and  interrex  ;  and  the  tribes  chose  the  tri- 
bunes with  consular  power.  A  controversy,  however,  was  long 
carried  on  between  two  learned  jurists,  N.  Gruchius,  and  C.  Si- 
gonius,  upon  the  question  called  "  de,  binis  comitiis,"  that  is, 
whether  the  choice  of  the  centiu-ies  required  confirmation  by  the 
curiae,  and  after  them  by  the  tribes ;  and  whether  in  like  manner 
the  choice  of  the  tribes  required  confirmation  by  the  centuries. 
The  affirmative  was  maintained  by  Gruchius,  the  negative  by 
Sigonius,  in  a  series  of  learned  treatises  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
sixteenth  century.  The  arguments  of  the  latter  appear  greatly 
to  preponderate ;  nor  can  the  complete  success  of  the  plebeians  in 
their  struggle  with  the  patricians  be  deemed  compatible  with  the 
doctrine  of  Gruchius 

The  choice  of  a  dictator  stood  in  peculiar  circumstances.  The 
senate  decreed  that  there  should  be  one  appointed,  but  never 
named  him ;  this  was  left  to  the  consul,  it  is  said,  because  the 
power  conferred  seemed  to  supersede  his  own,  and  therefore  his 


CH.  XII.  DICTATOR — INTERREX.  145 

assent  must  be  interposed.  Certain  it  is  that  although  the  consul 
was  generally  supposed  to  take  whatever  name  the  senate  pleased, 
his  acting  in  the  nomination  was  deemed  absolutely  necessary, 
and  the  senate  never  acted  of  itself  in  it ;  insomuch  that  when 
there  was  a  manifest  necessity  for  a  dictator  in  the  second  Punic 
war,  and  one  consul  being  killed,  and  all  communication  cut  off 
with  the  other,  instead  of  proceeding  to  appoint  Fabius  Maximus, 
the  senate  referred  the  choice  to  the  people  ;  and  to  prevent  this 
from  being  drawn  into  precedent  he  was  only  called  pro-dictator. 
Though  the  consul  generally  adopted  the  senate's  suggestion, 
there  were  exceptions.  Thus  Clodius,  to  insult  the  senate  and  the 
office,  named  a  door-keeper  (Gricia),  and  P.  Lacsenas  (a.u.c.  397) 
named,  in  opposition  to  the  senate,  a  plebeian,  the  first  time  the 
office  had  ever  been  so  filled.  The  appointment  of  a  dictator 
being  odious  to  the  people  was  more  and  more  disused  as  their 
power  increased,  and  from  a.u.c.  554  to  Sylla's  time,  671,  none 
was  appointed.  Sylla  and  Julius  Caesar  were  chosen  dictators  by 
the  people,  now  reduced  to  submission.  Till  their  time,  >Yith  the 
exception  of  Fabius,  the  senate  and  consuls  had  in  all  cases  named 
the  dictator.  During  the  struggle  of  the  plebeians  for  the  con- 
sulship the  consular  tribunes  were  chosen  by  the  people  when 
they  had  the  ascendant,  and  when  the  patricians  were  stronger 
consuls  were  elected.  This  state  of  things  lasted  from  the  time 
of  Oanuleius's  attempt  to  open  the  consulship  (a.u.c.  307  to  387), 
when  the  first  plebeian  consul  was  chosen.  These  consular  tri- 
bunes at  'first  were  three  in  number,  and  a  fourth  was  added 
in  327 ;  two  more  in  348 ;  and  they  never  were  more  than  six. 
Notwithstanding  the  struggle  between  the  Orders  out  of  which 
this  office  arose,  the  plebeians  were  satisfied  with  the  point  which 
they  had  gained  of  being  eligible,  and  elected  none  but  patricians 
for  haK  a  century  ;  nor  after  that  time  did  they  choose  nearly  as 
many  of  their  own  as  of  the  other  Order.  At  length  their  ad- 
mission to  the  consulate  itself  put  a  period  to  the  contention,  and 
consular  tribunes  were  chosen  no  more. 

It  is  singular  that  with  so  great  hatred  of  the  mere  name  of 
king  the  Romans  should  have  preserved  that  of  interrex  through 
all  times  of  the  commonwealth.  In  the  vacancy  of  the  consular 
office  he  was  appointed,  and  only  by  the  senate,  only  from  the 
patrician  body,  and  only  for  five  days  ;  but  during  these  days  he 
had  the  whole  authority,  civil  and  military,  of  the  consul,  as  far 

PART  II.  L 


146  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XIL 

as  it  could  be  executed  without  leaving  Kome,  At  the  end  of 
the  five  days  he  named  his  successor,  and  the  second  interrex 
held  the  comitia  for  the  choice  of  consuls,  which  in  practice  came 
to  be  the  principal  function  of  the  office.  His  power  of  proposing 
laws  was  necessarily  limited,  because  no  law,  though  adopted, 
could  be  confirmed  and  passed  until  it  had  been  published  about 
four  weeks  (three  market  days,  at  nine  days'  interval),  and  his 
own  power  did  not  extend  to  the  second  publication.  In  trou- 
blous times,  however,  the  interrex  appears  to  have  acted  more 
than  ministerially.  The  law  giving  Sylla  absolute  power  was  pro- 
pounded by  an  interrex  ;  and  the  interrex  and  pro-consuls  near 
the  city  were  once  armed  by  the  senate  with  the  extraordinary  au- 
thority of  providing  for  the  public  safety.  The  consuls  were  almost 
always,  in  the  earlier  times  of  the  commonwealth,  employed  in 
commanding  the  armies  of  the  state,  and  the  consular  power  in 
their  absence  devolved  upon  the  prsetor,  then  called  custos  urbis. 
If  the  war  had  not  been  brought  to  a  close  when  the  consul's  year 
expired,  he  was  frequently  intrusted  in  the  command  either  till 
the  operation  in  which  he  was  engaged  was  finished,  or  for  a  time 
certain  ;  and  he  had  the  title  of  pro-consul  during  this  prolonga- 
tion of  his  authority  ;  but  with  all  the  authority,  civil  as  well  as 
military,  though  local,  of  consul  This  prolongation  was  first 
resorted  to  in  the  year  427.*  As  the  conquests  of  Rome  increased, 
the  provinces  were  given  to  pro-consuls  and  pro-prsetors,  that  is, 
to  the  consuls  and  praetors  upon  the  expiration  of  their  office,  and 
with  a  view  to  government  merely,  though  there  might  be  no 
warlike  operations  to  conduct.  In  these  provinces  they  exercised 
supreme  power,  and  the  possession  of  them  formed  the  great  object 
of  ambition  towards  the  latter  periods  of  the  republic.  A  third 
kind  of  pro-consul,  and  pro-praetor,  was  that  of  the  military  com- 
mand being  given  in  any  expedition  or  province  to  an  individual 
who  was  not  at  the  time,  nor  had  been  immediately  before,  in 
office.  This  last  was  not  a  magistery,  but  a  mere  command  :  the 
two  former  were  magistrates,  having  the  potestaa,  or  jurisdiction, 
as  well  as  the  imperium,  or  command.  The  senate  appointed  in 
all  the  tlu-ee  cases ;  but  in  the  first  case,  that  of  prolonging  con- 
sular jurisdiction,  and  in  the  last,  that  of  a  private  person  being 

*  Nothing  can  be  more  clear  than  that  Dion.,  lib.  ix.,  is  wrong  in  the  statement 
of  a  pro-consul  having  been  created  in  the  year  275.  Beaufort,  i.  336,  explains 
this  error  satisfactorily. 


CH.  Xn.     REVOLUTIONARY  VIGOUR  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.  1  47 

commissioned,  the  concurrence  of  the  tribes  by  a  plebiscitum  was 
required.  In  this  third  case  the  authority  of  the  comitia  curiata 
was  also  necessary  to  give  the  command,  and  it  was  necessary  in 
order  to  clothe  the  consuls  or  prastors  in  the  second  case  with  the 
fullest  powers.  Accordingly  they  almost  always  either  obtained 
it  before  leaving  the  city,  or  had  it  immediately  conferred  under 
their  successors.  In  the  distribution  of  provinces  the  senate  was 
held  alone  to  decide,  although  the  tribes  occasionally  interfered, 
and  with  more  or  less  success,  according  to  the  state  of  parties 
and  their  relative  strength  at  the  moment.  For  some  time  after 
the  establishment  of  the  tribunate  the  senate  generally  obtained 
the  assent  of  the  tribes,  but  this  practice  was  gradually  laid  aside- 
In  the  year  631  a  law  proposed  by  C.  Gracchus  confined  the 
senate's  right  to  distribute  the  commands  of  the  consuls  and  proe- 
tors,  without  any  power  of  interposition  being  allowed  to  the  tri- 
bunes, provided  the  distribution  should  be  made  before  the  elec- 
tion of  these  magistrates,  and  while  it  was  unknown  on  whom  the 
choice  should  fall.  But  this  law  only  referred  to  the  appointment 
for  the  conduct  of  warlike  operations. 

The  whole  roAdew  of  the  Roman  government,  as  regards  the 
magistracy  and  assemblies,  shows  how  large  a  portion  of  its 
functions  was  performed  by  the  latter,  how  inconsiderable  in 
comparison  by  the  former.  The  administrative  as  well  as  legis- 
lative power  resided  substantially  in  those  bodies.  It  is  enough 
to  cite  as  an  instance  the  first  appearance  of  Cicero  before  the 
assembly  of  the  tribes.  It  was  in  support  of  the  Manilian  law, 
and  gave  rise  to  one  of  his  most  exquisite  orations.  That  law  was 
simply  a  resolution  that  the  command  of  the  war  against  Mith- 
ridates  should  be  taken  from  the  pro-consul  Lucullus,  and  given 
to  Pompey,  who  was  then  with  an  army  in  Cilicia,  upon  another 
expedition.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  mode  of  carrying  on 
a  government,  exposed  as  it  is  to  various  most  serious  objections, 
and  among  others  to  that  of  preventing  any  certain  rules  of  con- 
duct being  prescribed,  and  of  opening  a  wide  door  to  oppression 
and  abuse,  has  one  great  recommendation  in  times  of  difficulty, 
provided  the  people  are  not  divided  by  party.  Nothing  tends 
more  to  inspire  animation  and  vigour  into  the  public  councils,  and 
promote  the  execution  of  whatever  designs  may  be  formed.  It  is 
in  its  nature  a  revolutionary  kind  of  government,  and,  with  all  the 
evils,  it  possesses  the  advantages  of  that  course  of  proceeding. 

L  2 


148  CONSIITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XII. 

Rorae  was  so  constantly  engaged  in  wars  which  placed  her 
existence  in  peril,  that  for  many  ages  she  might  be  said  to  be  in 
a  revolutionary  state.  The  combination,  however,  was  not  confined 
to  the  legislative  and  administrative  powers.  The  judicial  functions 
were  also  too  often  interfered  with  by  the  assemblies ;  and  for 
this  no  excuse  can  be  offered  upon  any  principle,  or  in  any  cir- 
cumstances, which  would  not  justify  the  suspension  of  all  law 
during  some  extraordinary  and  momentous  crisis. 

Hitherto  we  have  spoken  only  of  secular  or  civil  oflfices.  But 
the  religion  of  the  State  was  at  all  times  a  most  important  part  of 
its  policy ;  it  was  entirely  subordinate  to  the  government,  and 
formed  a  part  of  it.  There  were  originally  four  pontiffs  or  high 
priests,  and  a  chief  (Pontifcx  Maximus).  The  king  had  been 
high  priest,  though  not  supreme  in  rehgious  matters.  On  the 
expulsion  of  the  Tarquins,  a  king  for  sacrifices  {Rex  sacrorum  or 
sacrificialis)  was  created,  whose  wife  was  a  priestess  and  had  the 
title  of  queen  ;  but  he  was  under  the  chief  pontiff.  The  number 
of  pontiffs  continued  to  be  four  till  the  year  453,  when  for  the 
first  time  the  plebeians  obtained  the  right  of  filling  that  ofiice,  and 
four  plebeian  pontiffs  were  added.  Until  649  the  college  itself 
filled  up  all  vacancies,  when  by  the  Domitian  law  the  election  was 
given  to  the  tribes,  seventeen  of  whom  being  chosen  by  lot,  their 
majority  named  the  pontiffs ;  and  this  continued  until  Sylla  re- 
stored the  rights  of  the  college,  and  doubled  its  numbers,  among 
his  other  laws  in  favour  of  the  aristocracy.  The  Domitian  law 
was  revived  in  690  in  favour  of  Julius  Caesar,  whom  the  people 
elected  and  made  chief  pontiff,  that  place  being  vacant  by  death. 
The  choice  of  chief  pontiff  among  those  who  were  already  pontiffs 
appears  always  to  have  been  with  the  tribes  ;  and  it  was  always 
an  office  for  life.  Until  the  year  500  no  plebeian  ever  held  it. 
All  priests  were  subject  to  the  pontiff:  they  could  appoint 
any  one  to  the  priesthood  against  his  will ;  and  the  more  powerful 
priests,  as  those  of  Jupiter  and  Mars,  attended  the  college  of 
pontiffs.  But  the  pontiffs  were  themselves  subject  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  comitia,  although  the  interference  seldom  took 
place.  The  college  had,  besides  its  superintendence  of  temples, 
ceremonies,  festivals,  and  the  calendar,  jurisdiction  in  certain 
matrimonial  causes ;  and  their  consent  was  required  for  the  adop- 
tion of  children.  The  qualifications  for  the  priesthood  consisted 
in  freedom  from  personal  defect,  and  in  there  being  no  other 


CH.  XII.        AUGUES — HAllUSPICES— SIBYLLINE  BOOKS.  149 

member  of  the  same  family  in  the  same  college.  Moral  character 
and  mature  age  were  not  required.  The  dissolute  in  manners  and 
the  young  men  of  seventeen  could  hold,  as  Julius  Csesar  did,  the 
ofl&ce  of  High  Priest  of  Jupiter. 

The  College  of  Augurs  was,  next  to  the  pontiffs,  the  most 
important  religious  body ;  but  its  functions  were  confined  to 
observing  the  signs  supposed  to  be  given  of  good  or  bad  fortune, 
from  the  flight  of  birds,  and  from  the  manner  of  feeding  of  those 
kept  as  sacred  by  the  State.  Any  sinister  appearance  gave  the 
augurs  the  power  of  interfering  with  whatever  proceeding,  civil  or 
military,  they  were  pleased  to  interrupt.  As  men  of  opposite 
parties  held  the  office,  and  their  conduct  must  therefore  have 
been  watched,  it  may  be  inferred  that  there  were  certain  rules  or 
principles  laid  down  to  guide  these  absurd  decisions.  In  the  year 
453  the  place  .of  augur  was  opened  with  that  of  pontiff  to  the 
plebeians,  and  five  were  added  to  the  former  number  of  four. 
Sylla  added  six  more.  The  College  originally  filled  up  the 
vacancies  in  its  numbers  ;  but  the  Domitian  law  introduced  the 
same  mode  of  election  as  in  the  case  of  pontiffs ;  and  that  law, 
after  being  repealed  by  SyJla,  was  restored  in  690. 

The  Jiaruspices  were  a  lower  kind  of  augur,  but  forming  no 
separate  body,  and  having  apj)arently  no  commission.  They  were 
irregular,  and  might  for  money  be  consulted  by  any  one.  They 
were  held  in  great  contempt  by  rational  and  respectable  persons, 
though  frequently  consulted  even  by  these.  As  there  was  abso- 
lutely no  difference  in  their  art,  except  that  they  examined  the 
entrails  of  birds,  and  the  augurs  observed  their  flight  and  feeding, 
nothing  can  be  more  strange  than  the  different  estimation  in 
which  they  were  held,  their  science  being  precisely  the  same. 

The  only  other  religious  fraternity  which  requires  to  be  men- 
tioned is  that  of  the  decemviri,  and  afterwards,  in  Sylla's  time, 
the  quindeceTYiviri,  for  the  custody  of  the  Sibylline  books,  which 
they  were  not  allowed  to  consult  without  an  order  of  the  senate. 
These  books,  which  the  legendary  history  represents  to  have  been 
sold  by  a  prophetess  to  one  of  the  kings,  probably  contained 
nothing  but  directions  for  prayers  and  sacrifices.  But  the  reports 
of  what  was  found  in  them  on  any  given  occasion  had  often  the 
effect  of  controlling  or  encouraging  the  people.  The  plebeians 
were  admitted  into  this  body  in  the  year  886.    The  appointment 


150  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XII. 

was  made  in  the  same  way  and  underwent  the  same  changes  as 
that  of  the  pontiflFs  and  augurs. 

The  entire  control  which  the  patricians  had  of  the  auguries  and 
auspices  greatly  increased  their  authority  with  the  people,  until 
the  plebeians  were  also  admitted  to  the  religious  ofl&ces.  But 
even  after  that  change  had  taken  place,  the  same  superstition 
was  constantly  used  to  maintain  the  influence  of  the  government, 
and  also  in  the  armies,  to  control  or  excite  the  troops.  There  is, 
however,  a  thing  wholly  unintelligible  in  all  this  if  there  were 
no  principles  or  rules  by  which  the  augur  was  guided.  That  all 
parties  should  agree  in  showing  reverence  for  the  religion,  and 
those  who  disbelieved,  as  well  as  those  who  had  faith  in  it,  can 
easily  be  understood ;  but  that  of  conflicting  parties  one  should 
allow  the  other  to  invent  omens  for  its  discomfiture,  and  that  a 
person  hostile  to  the  college,  when  admitted  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  gross  impositions  practised,  should  take  no  advantage  of  the 
discovery  he  had  made,  appears  very  hard  to  explain  on  any 
supposition  except  that  of  there  having  really  been  some  general 
rules  which  were  more  or  less  followed  by  all. 

With  the  exception  of  the  military  department  under  the  con- 
suls, and  the  legislative  in  the  hands  of  the  senate  and  the  comitia, 
in  which  the  magistrates  acting  as  legislators,  the  whole  duties  of 
these  magistracy  were  of  a  judicial  description.  The  judicial 
system  was  somewhat  complicated.  In  cases  of  treason  the 
comitia  centtuiata  decided  ;  in  cases  which  were  punishable  only 
with  fine,  the  tributa.  Trials  were  either  private,  that  is,  questions 
of  civil  right  and  injury,  including  minor  ofiences ;  or  public,  that 
is,  questions  affecting  the  state,  including  the  graver  criminal 
cases.  Beside  the  presiding  magistrate,  there  appear  always  to 
have  been  a  certain  number  of  judges  (Judices).  For  this  purpose 
a  number  of  judices  were  annually  selected  from  the  body  which 
by  law  was  possessed  of  the  privilege.  The  senate  had  it  exclu- 
sively till  the  year  620  :  it  was  then  transferred,  at  the  sedition  of 
the  Gracchi,  to  the  Equestrian  order,  vnih.  whom  it  remained  for 
sixteen  years,  and  it  was  then  given  to  the  senate  and  them 
jointly,  three  hundred  being  taken  fi-om  each.  The  plebeians 
then  obtained  the  right  of  adding  a  certain  number  from  each 
tribe.  Sylla,  desiring  to  restore  the  power  of  the  senate,  which 
in  that  age  had  been  exceedingly  reduced,  restored  by  his  laws 


CH.  XII.  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM.  151 

{Leges  Gomeli<ie)  the  sole  privilege  to  that  body.  At  his  death 
the  Aurelian  law  divided  this  privilege  among  the  senate,  equites, 
and  paymasters  (tribuni  cerarii),  numerous  plebeian  officers  who 
had  the  care  of  paying  the  troops  ;  and  finally  Julius  Csesar 
restored  the  exclusive  power  to  the  senate  and  equestrian  order, 
with  whom  it  remained.  The  praetor  annually  appointed  four 
hundred  and  fifty  of  these  two  orders,  and,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  case,  a  certain  number  of  these  were  chosen  either 
by  lot  or  by  what  was  called  editio  exhibitus,  that  is,  by  the  one 
party  selecting  one  hundred,  from  whom  the  other  chose  fifty. 
Beside  these  judices  there  were  centwrnviri,  that  is,  one  hundred 
and  five,  chosen  five  by  each  tribe,  and  supposed  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  law.  In  cases  before  the  praetor,  if  he  felt  a  doubt  upon 
the  law,  he  referred  the  matter  to  the  centumviri ;  if  upon  the 
fact,  he  referred  it  to  one  or  more  of  the  judices  to  examine.  Ui^on 
the  report  of  either,  or  both  bodies,  he  pronounced  his  decree  ;  and 
if  he  felt  no  doubt  either  on  the  law  or  the  fact,  he  decided  at 
once  himself  The  similarity  of  this  to  the  practice  of  our  courts 
of  equity  is  striking ;  and  as  the  account  is  taken  from  an  author 
who  wrote  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  long  before  our  present 
practice  was  established,  no  suspicion  can  arise  of  his  having 
fancied  the  course  of  proceeding.*  A  power  of  challenging  the 
judices,  as  drawn  by  lot,  was  given  to  each  party. 

Originally  the  supreme  criminal  jurisdiction  was  in  the  kings, 
and  the  consuls  for  a  short  time  succeeded  to  this  ;  but  their  juris- 
diction was  reckoned  by  the  Valerian  law,  which  gave  an  appeal  to 
the  people,  that  is  to  the  tribes,  and  still  more  by  the  Horatian  law 
half  a  century  after  (a.u.c.  304),  which  made  it  a  capital  offence 
to  create  any  magistrate  without  appeal.  The  administration  of 
criminal  justice  until  the  year  604  appears  to  have  been  confided 
in  each  case  specially  by  decrees  of  the  senate  to  the  higher  magis- 
trates, consuls,  praetors,  and  dictators,  who  are  armed  with  the 
high  judicial  power  called  jits  qucestionis — under  the  empire  called 
Tnerwm  imperium — which  concluded  all  cases  affecting  the  hfe 
or  the  civic  rights  of  citizens,  and  the  power  of  examining  slaves  by 
torture.  Qucesitores^arricidii  were  also  appointed  occasionally 
to  try  murder  and  other  grave  offences.  Perpetual  and  regular 
criminal  jurisdiction  of  this  kind  was  only  given  to  those  magis- 
trates in  that  year.     Beside  these  judices  quaestionis  there  were 

*  Nic.  Gruch.,  De  Com,  Rem.,  i.  2.— C.  Sig.,  De  Jttdicii,  ii.  6,  12. 


152  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XII. 

others  who  had  the  same  name,  and  who  assisted  the  higher  ma- 
gistrates, and  attained  to  the  office  of  aediles.  They  assisted  in  the 
trials  by  superintending  the  choice  or  ballot  for  judices,  by  ex- 
amining accounts  and  documents,  by  taking  the  evidence  of  such 
witnesses  as  were  not  examined  viva  voce,  and  taking  that  of 
slaves  by  the  torture."  The  presiding  magistrate  did  not  decide 
the  cause,  he  only  applied  and  earned  into  execution  the  law ; 
the  judices  gave  the  verdict,  and  upon  that  the  magistrate  pro- 
nounced the  sentence  and  saw  it  executed.  The  judices  were 
sworn,  except  in  one  kind  of  cause,  divinatio,'f  or  determining 
the  title  of  parties  to  prosecute  a  suit,  and  they  voted  by  ballot. 
Originally,  they  voted  openly ;  the  ballot  was  introduced  in  the 
year  666  for  all  but  cases  of  treason,  and  soon  after  for  these  also. 
A  judge  (Judeoc)  was  allowed,  if  he  pleased,  to  vote  openly,  and 
Cato  did  so  in  Mile's  case,  being  one  of  the  minority  of  thirteen 
who  were  for  an  acquittal.  As  at  all  times  a  law  could  be  easily 
obtained  for  an  extraordinary  trial,  or  trial  by  a  special  tribunal, 
so  the  course  of  procedure  was  sometimes  entirely  changed  by 
the  same  law — ^a  natural  consequence  of  the  manner  of  governing, 
of  carrying  on  the  executive  government  by  the  means  of  laws  or 
decrees  which  the  legislative  body  made  for  each  case.  In  Llilo's 
case  Pompey  obtained  a  law,  directing  that  out  of  four  hundred 
whom  he  should  choose  from  the  senate,  equites,  or  paymasters 
(trihuni  cerarii),  eighty- one  should  be  taken  by  lot ;  and  that 
after  they  had  heard  the  cause,  each  party  should  challenge  five 
from  each  class,  reducing  the  number  to  fifty-one.  The  law  also 
named  a  special  judge,  who  filled  no  office  ;  and  it  required  the 
evidence  to  be  taken  first,  during  three  days,  then  the  cause  to  be 
argued,  allowing  the  prosecutor  two  hours,  and  the  defendant 
three.  It  is  by  some  authorities  maintained  that  this  law,  though 
intended  for  one  case,  was  applied  generally ;  and  Tacitus  J  (if  the 
treatise  be  his)  gives  it  as  one  cause  of  the  downfall  of  eloquence. 
Nothing  could  tend  more  to  impair  the  judicial  system  and  to 
introduce  abuses  into  all  its  parts,  than  the  combination  of  the 
legislative  with  judicial  office ;  and  the  practice  to  which  it  gave 
rise  of  making  a  law,  or  ordinance  in  the  nature  of  a  law,  for  each 

*  The  opinion  that  they  were  not  magistrates  at  all,  but  private  persons,  is  fully 
refuted  by  C.  Sigouius,  De  Jud.,  ii.  5.  The  notion  probably  arose  from  confounding 
them  with  the  qusesitors. 

t  The  dispute  which  frequently  arises  iu  our  courts  of  equity  as  to  who  shall  have 
the  management  of  a  suit,  or  the  carriage  of  a  commission,  is  properly  a  divinatio. 

i  De  Causis  Corruptae  Eloquentia;. 


CH.  XII.  SPECIAL  JUDICIAL  LAWS.  153 

case  of  any  moment.  Until  the  year  604  every  thing  was  done 
by  these  special  laws  ;  each  trial  being  directed  by  a  particular 
order  of  the  senate  or  the  comitia.  Even  after  the  regular  tribu- 
nals were  established,  the  interference  of  legislative  acts  was  yer- 
petual.  Now,  if  there  be  any  thing  more  undeniable  than  an- 
other in  jurisprudence,  it  is,  that  the  door  for  misdecision  and 
injustice  can  never  be  opened  more  wide  than  by  making  rules 
for  trying  the  particular  case  instead  of  general  prospective  re- 
gulations. In  truth,  such  special  laws  are  always  more  or  less 
retrospective,  and  for  this  reason  full  of  abuse  and  oppression. 
But  if  it  were  only  that  they  are  sure  to  be  dictated  by  partial 
considerations,  and  not  by  enlarged  views,  this  would  be  enough 
to  prove  them  a  fruitful  source  of  error.  It  may  safely  be 
affirmed  that  a  general  law  laid  down  by  a  body  little  entitled  to 
respect,  and  even  swayed  by  sinister  views,  would  be  a  far  better 
rule  to  guide  both  the  parties  and  the  judges,  than  a  resolution 
taken  by  a  far  more  trustworthy  authority,  upon  the  spur  of  the 
occasion,  and  to  meet  its  peculiar  exigencies.  The  allowing  our 
Houses  of  Parliament  to  define  their  privileges  by  resolutions  on 
each  case  as  it  occurs  would  be  a  far  more  certain  means  of 
working  injustice  to  the  people,  and  finally  of  destroying  the  inde- 
pendence of  Parliament  itself,  than  the  adoption  of  a  general  rule 
of  law  to  be  administered  by  judges  who  do  not  take  their  opi- 
nions upon  it  from  the  facts  of  the  case,  but  from  previous  and  un- 
biassed consideration  of  the  subject.  The  same  circumstance  in  the 
nature  and  practice  of  the  government,  the  union  of  executive  and 
legislative  powers  in  the  same  body,  occasioned  at  Rome  many 
trials  for  offences  of  a  political  nature  especially  to  be  had  before 
the  people,  by  what  we  should  term  impeachment.  The  general 
rule  was  that  the  crimes  against  the  state,  treason  or  sedition,  and 
peculation,  including  extortion  {concussio),  alone  should  be  tried 
before  the  comitia,  and  that  all  others  should  be  tried  by  the  ordi- 
nary judges,  or  by  commissioners  (qusesitors)  appointed  specially. 
But  there  are  few  offences  which  we  do  not  find  to  have  been  tried 
by  the  people  in  the  way  of  extraordinary  or  special  inquiry  (cogni- 
tiones  extraordinarice),  and  this  not  only  in  the  earlier  times,  but 
at  all  periods  of  the  commonvrealth,  though  less  frequently  in  the 
later.  In  302,  P.  Scstius  was  tried  in  the  comitia  on  a  charge  of 
nmrder,  a  body  having  been  found  in  his  garden  (Liv.  iii.  33)  ; 
Fulvius,  in  426,  for  adultery  (lb.  viii.  22) ;  Scantinus,  a  plebeian 


154;  CONSTITUTION  OF  ROME.  CH.  XII. 

tribune,  in  527,  for  infamous  and  unchaste  conduct  (Yal.  Max. 
vi.  1.  7).  After  the  establishment  of  regular  courts  in  604,  the 
comitia  ordered  Vestal  virgins  to  be  put  to  death  though  the 
pontiflFs  had  acquitted  them,  and  censured  these  pontiffs  ;  and 
in  690  Silus  was  tried  for  endeavouring  to  seduce  a  matron 
by  the  offer  of  money  (Val.  Max.  vi.  1.  8).  This  jurisdiction 
was  exercised  by  the  centuries  in  cases  which  involved  the  life 
or  rights  of  citizens  (capital  cases).  The  tribes  could  only  try 
for  offences  punishable  by  fine,  though  they  sometimes,  as  in  the 
case  of  Cicero's  banishment,  assumed  also  jurisdiction  in  the 
higher  cases ;  and  once,  in  that  of  Coriolanus,  were  authorized  to 
try  treason.  The  truth  is,  that  from  the  union  of  legislative  with 
judicial  power,  it  was  hardly  possible  to  confine  the  different 
bodies  to  their  several  provinces.  The  senate  itself,  though  only 
in  later  times,  appears  to  have  superseded  the  law,  and  some- 
times, as  in  Catiline's  case,  to  have  awarded  outlawry  and  capital 
punishment. 

Certain  forms  were  observed  in  the  mode  of  trial,  especially  as 
to  the  citations  and  notices,  and  the  time  allowed  before  trial ; 
but  in  the  decision  the  same  mode  of  voting  was  pursued  as  in 
making  laws  or  choosing  magistrates,  that  is,  by  centuries  or  by 
tribes,  according  as  the  trial  was  before  one  comitia  or  the  other ; 
and  after  the  year  666  the  vote  was  by  ballot.  Before  that  time, 
the  comitia,  which  voted  by  ballot  on  all  other  matters,  had  voted 
openly  in  judicial  proceedings. 


CH.  XIII.       REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.  155 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 


Progress  of  Democracy — Canuleius— Address  of  the  Patricians— Distinction  of  the 
Orders  obliterated — Ne-w  Aristocratic  distinctions — New  Plebeian  body;  their 
baseness — Operation  of  Party — Plebeians  at  different  periods — Virtues  of  the 
old  Plebeians ;  contrast  of  the  new — Savage  character  ;  warlike  habits — ^las- 
sacres  of  Marius — Cicero— Julius  Caesar — Corruption  of  the  People— Canvassing; 
Treating ;  Bribery — Sale  of  Votes ;  Divisores ;  Ambitus  ;  Sodalitum— Bribery 
Laws — Unpaid  Magistracy — Popular  patronage  and  corruption — Peculatus  ; 
Repetundae— Popular  corruption — Factions ;  Civil  War—  Overthrow  of  the  Com- 
monwealth— Conduct  of  the  Aristocracy — Aristocracy  and  Princes — Error  of 
the  Patricians — American  War ;  Irish  Independence — Roman  Parties — Conduct 
of  the  People — Roman  Yeomanry — Moderate  use  of  power — Natural  Aristocracy 
— Orders  new  moulded — -West  Indian  Society — Aristocracy  of  middle  Classes — 
Power  useless  to  an  uneducated  People— Checks  on  the  People — Checks  in  gene- 
ral— Delay  and  Notice;  English  proceedings — Factious  men  at  Rome  uncon- 
trolled— Catiline's  conspiracy — Cicero's  conduct — Middleton's  error. 

Such  was  the  constitution  which,  from  monarchical  and  repub- 
lican mixed  together,  had  become  aristocratic,  but  in  the  course 
of  less  than  a  hundred  years  was  republican  again.  In  fact,  after 
the  tribuneship  had  become  established,  and  the  legislative  right 
of  the  tributa  was  recognised,  there  wanted  nothing  to  bring  about 
the  change  but  the  acknowledgment  of  the  plebeians  being 
entitled  to  hold  the  higher  offices  of  the  state,  in  like  manner 
as  their  right  to  appoint  inferior  magistrates  had  been  recognised. 
In  the  year  308,  Canuleius  having  obtained  the  important  con- 
cession of  the  right  of  marriage  with  the  patricians,  attempted 
the  admission  of  the  plebeians  to  the  consulship ;  but  matters 
were  not  yet  ripe  for  so  great  a  change,  and  the  patricians  evaded 
the  demand  by  appointing  military  tribunes  with  consular  power, 
to  be  chosen  from  both  orders  alike  ;  and  they  created  the  office 
of  censor,  to  be  held  by  patricians  alone,  with  a  view  to  take 
a  large  portion  of  the  consular  power,  so  as  to  give  the  plebeians 
fax  less  than  the  rest  of  the  change  appeared  to  bestow.  But 
in  402,  soon  after  the  legislative  power  had  been  obtained  by 
the  tribes,  the  censorship  was  opened  to  the  plebeians  ;  they 
had  some  time  before  (897)  obtained  the  curule  sedileship,  which 
with  the  prgetorship  had  been  created  for  the  purpose  of  diminish- 
ing the  consular  jurisdiction  ;    and  in  417   the    plebeians   also 


156  llEFLECnONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.        CH.  XIII. 

obtained  the  prsetorsliip.  The  Licinian  Rogations,  too,  which 
had  been  evaded  chiefly  by  the  appointment  of  dictators,  and 
by  the  oppressive  conduct  of  creditors,  became  really  operative 
in  414.  In  453  the  plebeians  were  made  eligible  as  pontiffs 
and  augurs.  So  many  of  them  became  magistrates,  or  be- 
longed to  the  equestrian  order,  that  after  the  second  Punic  war 
in  the  6th  century  there  were  more  plebeian  than  patrician  sena- 
tors. The  two  consuls  in  one  year,  581,  were  plebeian — the  two 
censors  in  another,  622.  So  that  the  former  distinction  of  the 
orders  into  patrician  and  plebeian  no  longer  existed  to  any  prac- 
tical purpose,  the  only  preponderance  being  that  which  is  pos- 
sessed by  wealth,  by  illustrious  birth,  or  by  nobility — which 
consisted  at  Rome  in  having  a  right  to  statues,  either  of  the  party 
himself  or  of  his  ancestors,  in  consequence  of  their  having  filled 
cunile  offices. 

A  change  had  gradually,  but  entirely  been  effected  in  the  com- 
position of  the  orders.  The  commons  (plebs)  which  at  first 
were  the  inhabitants,  small  landowners  bom  free,  and  generally 
of  free  parents,  but  of  families  originally  foreign,  and  not  of  the 
original  free  and  native  Romans,  had  afterwards  so  increased  in 
numbers,  and  so  risen  in  importance,  from  the  wealth  of  some 
and  the  merits,  chiefly  warlike,  of  others,  that  they  both  acquired 
great  consideration  in  the  community,  and  had  many  families 
distinguished  by  a  succession  of  magistrates,  and  were  thus  en- 
nobled, in  the  Roman  sense  of  the  term.  It  was  between  this 
great  body  and  the  patricians  that  the  contest  chiefly  was  carried 
on,  and  the  success  of  the  plebeians  had  been  complete.  But 
the  more  respectable  portion  of  the  plebeian  body  by  degrees 
separated  itself  from  the  rest,  and  every  one  was  ranked  accord- 
ing to  his  own  circumstances  and  those  of  his  family,  without  any 
regard  to  whether  he  was  bom  of  a  house  that  belonged  to  the 
one  order  or  the  other.  The  lower  orders  as  distinguished 
from  the  higher — those  who  had  come  to  fill  the  place  originally 
occupied  by  the  plebs,  as  contradistinguished  from  the  patricians 
— were  now  either  freedmen,  or  aliens  unprotected  by  any  patron, 
or  the  spurious  issue  of  the  better  classes,  or  such  as  by  their 
misconduct  or  misfortune  had  fallen  into  abject  poverty ;  and, 
according  to  all  the  accounts  which  have  reached  us,  a  more  base, 
profligate,  and  desperate  multitude  never  existed  in  any  part  of 
the  world.  They  differed  almost  as  much  from  the  commons  of 
older  times  as  they  did  from  the  more  respectable  order  of  citizens 


CH.  XIIL  PLEBEIANS  AT  DIFFERENT  PEKIODS.  157 

in  their  own  day.  It  was  by  appeals  to  their  passions,  by  cor- 
nipting  them  and  by  exciting  them,  that  the  leaders  of  parties 
were  enabled  to  use  their  numbers,  armed  as  they  all  were,  and 
habituated  to  war,  to  use  them  in  the  bloody  conflicts  by  which 
the  republic  was  first  disgraced  and  then  overturned.  The  parties 
which  thus  tore  the  community  in  pieces  were  now  only  in  name 
patrician  and  plebeian  ;  the  leaders,  and  a  great  portion  of  those 
who  joined  them,  were  indiscriminately  of  all  orders  and  all  de- 
grees, except  the  rabble  5  and  the  rabble  formed  the  common 
stock  from  which  those  patrons  drew  their  supplies  of  armed 
followers,  mere  tools  or  instruments  in  their  hands.  Principles, 
as  never  fails  to  happen,  were  adopted  merely  as  the  rallying 
cries  or  watch-words  of  faction ;  and  though  Sylla  was  of  a  patri- 
cian, and  Marius  of  a  plebeian  and  very  humble  family,  the  one 
cared  as  little  for  the  preponderance  of  the  senate  as  the  other  did 
for  that  of  the  tribes.  But  the  sanguinary  disposition  of  the  whole 
people  had  a  principal  share  in  these  enormities,  and  in  the  final 
catastrophe  to  which  they  led.  It  was  the  habit  of  constant  war 
for  centuries  that  formed  this  character,  and  the  republican  insti- 
tutions had  no  share  in  producing  it. 

The  original  structure  and  character  of  the  plebeian  body  was 
of  a  peculiarly  estimable  kind.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  any 
great  vice  in  it  save  the  fondness  for  war,  naturally  incident  to  a 
rude  state  of  society,  and  which,  at  Rome,  was  perpetuated  by 
the  whole  institutions  being  formed  upon  a  military  principle — 
the  work  of  the  patricians,  whose  wealth  and  power  depended 
mainly  upon  the  progress  of  conquest.  But  the  people  were  a 
body  of  very  small  landowners,  whose  lives,  when  not  engaged  in 
war,  passed  in  cultivating  their  fields  and  gardens,  in  attending 
religious  ceremonies,  and  occasionally  partaking  the  amusement 
of  rustic  games.  They  may  be  said  to  have  been  a  yeomanry 
living  in  and  near  a  great  city.  Their  frugality  was  strict ;  their 
course  of  life  sober  and  chaste  ;  their  honesty  and  good  faith 
unvaried  ;  their  fortitude  exemplary  ;  their  reverence  for  the  laws 
and  customs  of  the  state  rehgious  ;  and  their  veneration  for  their 
gods  and  the  observances  taught  by  their  superstitions  so  habitual, 
that  it  became  a  part  of  their  nature,  and  only  wanted  the  lights 
of  a  purer  faith  to  make  it  deserving  of  the  highest  respect  to  which 
the  religious  character  can  be  entitled.  Unhappily  there  was 
early  inculcated  upon  their  minds  a  belief  that  the  glory  of  the 
community,  by  which  was  meant  the  extension  of  its  dominions, 


158  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.      CH.  XIIL 

formed  the  only  object  worth  pursuing,  and  that  each  man's  virtue 
and  his  value  was  proportioned  to  the  share  he  might  have  in  pro- 
moting it.  The  whole  people  were  soldiers  ;  the  whole  country  a 
camp ;  and  the  gains  of  the  system  becoming  at  first  the  sole  pro- 
perty of  the  patricians,  and  at  all  times  theirs  in  an  extremely  un- 
due proportion,  the  people  fought  and  suffered,  and  perished  for 
the  profit  of  this  heartless  body,  much  more  than  for  any  interest 
of  their  own.  But  the  consequence  of  the  system  was  to  diffuse 
through  all  classes  a  hard  and  unfeeling  disposition,  a  disregard  of 
all  suffering,  whether  of  ourselves  or  of  others,  a  contempt  of  death, 
and  a  familiarity  with  scenes  of  bloodshed,  which  never  spread  so 
wide  or  took  so  deep  a  root  in  any  other  extensive  community. 
This  inhuman  character  survived  even  to  the  most  polished  times. 
Slaves  were  not  only  tortured  to  extort  their  testimony,  but  killed 
for  the  pastime  of  their  masters.  Foreign  princes  taken  in  war 
were  sometimes,  as  in  Jugurtha's  case,  loaded  -with  chains  and 
left  to  perish  in  a  dungeon,  or  put  to  more  instant  death  as  a 
part  of  the  ceremonial  at  a  triumph.  The  amphitheatres  were 
filled  by  persons  of  all  ranks  and  of  both  sexes  to  ^vitness  the  de- 
struction of  their  fellow-creatures  by  each  other's  hands  or  by  ^vild 
beasts  hardly  more  ferocious  than  themselves,  and  the  audience 
frequently  gave  the  command  that  the  life  of  a  vanquished  com- 
batant shoidd  not  be  spared.  It  was  at  a  very  late  period  of  the 
commonwealth,  and  when  Cicero  had  grown  up  to  manhood,  nay, 
not  twenty-five  years  before  his  consulship,  that  the  atrocious  pro- 
scriptions of  Sylla  were  perpetrated,  and  the  far  more  horrible 
massacres  with  which  Marius  feasted  his  eyes  for  five  days  and 
five  nights  while  on  the  brink  of  the  grave ;  and  the  great  moralist 
and  patriot,  himself  of  the  most  humane  dispositions,  though  he 
repeatedly  in  his  philosophical  writings  expresses,  not  very 
strongly,  the  feehngs  unavoidably  raised  by  one  of  his  enormities, 
yet  hardly  ventured  even  tenderly  to  blame  them  when  addressing 
the  people  a  few  years  later  upon  the  subject  of  the  massacres, 
and  while  their  memory  was  still  fresh  in  the  minds  of  all ;  and  he 
pronounced  on  another  occasion,  before  the  judges  themselves,  a 
magnificent  panegyric  upon  the  monster,  without  making  the  least 
exception  of  the  scenes  that  closed  his  sanguinary  life.* 

*  In  the  Tusc  Quaest.,  v.  19,  referring  to  the  savage  command  of  Marius,  often 
repeated,  to  put  Catulus,  his  companion  in  the  Cimbrian  victory,  to  death,  Cicero 
uses  the  expressions,  "  nefaria  vox  "  and  "  scelerata,"  and  says  that  Marius,  "  inte- 
ritn  talis  viri,"  overwhelmed  the  fame  of  his  six  consulships,  and  stained  the  close 
of  his  life.     He  says  nothing  of  the  tliousands  whom  the  wretch  had  made  be  pnt  to 


CH.  XIII.         SANGUINARY  CHARACTER  OP  THE  ROMANS.  159 

Next  to  the  sanguinary  habits  formed  by  their  devotion  to  war, 
the  corruption  of  the  people  by  the  abuses  of  their  government 
was  the  most  important  of  the  remote  causes  of  the  common- 
wealth's destruction.  The  votes  of  persons  in  a  low  condition 
were  necessary  to  the  obtaining  of  the  inferior  offices  through 
which  political  leaders  rose  to  the  praetorship  and  consulship,  be- 
cause these  inferior  offices  were  bestowed  by  the  comitia  tributa.* 

death  before  his  eyes.     In  the  De  Nat.  Deor.,  iii.  32,  he  makes  one  of  the  speakers 
in  the  dialogue  argue  against  the  existence  of  a  providence,  from  Marias  dying  in  liis 
bed  at  an  advanced  age,  and  a  seventh  time  consul,  after  the  man,  "  omnium  perfi- 
diosissimus,"  had,  not  massacred  |j;iousands,  but  ordered  Catulus,  "  a  man  of  the 
highest  station,"  to  be  killed.     In  the  De  Or.,  iii.  2,  he  mentions  "  Marii  ca;dem 
crudelissimam,"  but  it  is  after  deploring  his  "  acerbissimam  fugam ;"  and  in  the  De 
R.  P.,  i.  3,  though  he  calls  it  "acerbissima  clades,"  he  adds  "  principum  cacdes," 
clearly  showing  what  it  was  that  he  mainly  regarded.    In  the  oration  to  the  people 
{Post  Reditum,  8)  he  contrasts  Marius's  vengeance  after  his  return  with  the  peace- 
ful conduct  he  meant  himself  to  pursue,  but  without  at  all  blaming  him ;  and  in  the 
oration  to  the  judges  (20),  pro  Balbo,  he  describes  him  as  the  disciple  of  Scipio 
Africanus,  and  asks,  "  Quseris  aliquem  graviorem  ?  constantiorem  ?  pra;stantiorem 
virtute,  prudentia,  religione,  aequitate  ?"     This  was  not  above  thirty  years  after  the 
massacre.    In  what  other  civilized  part  of  the  world  could  such  a  man  have  been  so 
spoken  of  in  a  court  of  justice,  when  the  recollection  of  his  atrocities  was  yet  as 
fresh  in  the  minds  of  all  men,  as  if  they  had  been  perpetrated  the  day  before  ?     This 
speech,  it  must  be  recollected,  was  made  in  the  year  697,  long  after  the  judicial  body 
had  been,  by  the  law  of  Julius  Caesar,  restoring  Sylla's  constitution  (694),  confined 
to  the  senators  and  equestrian  order,  excluding  the  plebeian  magistrates  (tribuni 
aerarii),  and  settling  the  administration  of  justice  upon  a  regular  plan,  touching  the 
age  and  qualifications  of  the  judges,  as  well  as  the  whole  course  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings taken.     But  the  whole  of  their  history  is  full  of  similar  proofs  how  rooted  in 
the  minds  and  habits  of  the  people  were  cruelty  of  disposition  and  carelessness  of 
human  life.     No  man  in  any  other  country  could  have  treated  Milo  as  a  model  of 
patriotism  and  excellence,  and  almost  a  martyr  to  his  party,  when  it  was  admitted 
that,  however  the  affray  began,  he  had  ordered  his  servants  to  put  the  wounded 
man  to  death,  and  that  they  had  also  killed  the  keeper  of  the  tavern  into  which  he 
had  been  carried.     In  no  other  country  could  one  of  Brutus's  high  character  have 
published  a  speech  in  which  he  admitted  the  facts,  and  defended  Milo  on  the  ground 
of  Clodius  being  a  public  enemy — a  defence  which  Cicero  had  judiciously  rejected, 
at  the  consultation  of  Milo's  friends.     The  bare  fact  of  Milo  travelling  with  a  band 
of  gladiators,  desperate  ruffians  proverbially  ready  for  any  slaughter,  is  an  illustration 
of  the  manners  of  the  age  and  nation.     What  respectable  man  could,  in  any  other 
place,  have  had  such  an  attendance  ?     The  savage  tumult  excited  to  oppose  Cicero's 
return  from  banishment  is  another  illustration.     It  seems  to  have  made  but  little 
sensation,  and  caused  no  horror.     Clodius  and  the  actors  in  it  were  suffered  to  go 
unpunished — as  might  happen  here  at  every  trifling  election  riot; — and  yet  so  many 
were  killed  in  it  that  "  the  forum  flowed  with  blood — the  Tiber  and  the  sewers  were 
filled  with  dead,  and  such  masses  of  these  had  never  been  seen  in  the  city,  except  in 
Marius's  massacres."    Cic.  pro  Lep.,  35  to  38.    Julius  Caesar,  himself  the  mildest  and 
most  generous  of  men,  thought  it  no  shame  to  avow  that  his  wars  cost  1 ,200,000  lives. 
*  In  the  latter  times  of  the  Commonwealth  that  which  had  been  always  the  custom 
became  required  by  positive  enactment.   One  of  Sylla's  laws  prohibited  any  one  from 
being  chosen  consul  who  had  not  been  praetor,  or  praetor  who  had  not  been  quaistor. 


160  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.  CH.  XIIL 

But  the  centuries  were  to  be  gained  as  well  as  the  tribes  ;  for  though 
the  comitia  centuriata,  when  opposed  to  the  tribes,  and  when  not 
divided  among  themselves,  were  so  arranged  as  to  exclude  all  the 
numerous  and  poorer  classes  from  any  share  in  the  decision,  yet 
when  the  question  lay  between  opposing  candidates  of  whatever 
order,  the  votes  of  all  the  four  inferior  classes  became  as  important 
as  those  of  the  first,  their  centuries  deciding  when  the  smaller, 
but  more  numerous  centuries  of  the  wealthy  could  not  agree. 
Thus  was  introduced,  with  the  view  of  obtaining  both  the  higher 
and  the  inferior  offices,  the  practice  of  both  courting,  or  as  we 
should  say  canvassing,  the  multitude,  and  also  of  giving  them  the 
entertainments  of  public  shows,  which  they  so  highly  prized.  To 
this  was  soon  added  the  treating,  or  giving  them  dinners.  Then 
came  the  distribution  of  provisions,  and  finally  of  money.  Though 
these  practices  began  with  the  tribes,  they  were  extended  to  the 
centuries  also.  The  law  allowed  much  of  this  corruption  ;  and 
one  candidate  (Crassus)  gave  an  entertainment  at  which  ten 
thousand  tables  were  served,  so  that  the  whole  people  partook  of 
it,  and  each  also  received  a  donation  in  money.  The  most  open 
and  profligate  bribery  succeeded ;  it  became  undisguised  and 
universal.  Votes  were  openly  sold  ;  tables  or  shops  were  opened 
in  the  public  places  for  the  traffic ;  there  were  persons  who  canied 
on  the  business  of  providing  votes  as  undertakers  ;  there  were 
others  {divisores)  whose  profession  it  was  to  distribute  the  candi- 
date's money ;  others,  as  a  kind  of  stakeholders,  received  it  in 
deposit  till  the  votes  were  given.  Against  this  general  corruption 
laws  were  early  made,  but  were  found  unavailing.  As  early  as 
the  year  321  the  senate  proposed  to  put  down  canvassing,  by 
prohibiting  any  one  from  appearing  in  the  white  or  candidate's 
dress.  In  895  the  sohciting  votes  was  strictly  prohibited,  in  order 
to  prevent  it  from  being  done  at  fairs  and  other  meetings.  It  was 
at  a  later  period  made  capital,  that  is,  punishable  with  banish- 
ment (571  and  594<),  to  purchase  offices,  that  is,  to  bribe  the 
electors  (Polyb.  vi.  54).  In  604  tribunals  were  created  solely  for 
trying  offences  against  the  freedom  and  purity  of  elections.  One 
to  try  bribery  {arnbitus),  another  to  try  acts  of  violence  [vis), 
another  to  try  combination  or  conspiracy  (sodalitiurri),  but  all  in 
vain.  At  one  time  the  tribes  made  a  law  so  severe  that  the  senate 
judiciously  objected,  and  desired  it  to  be  reconsidered,  on  the 
ground  that  no  party  would  be  found  to  prosecute,  and  no  judge 


CH.  XIII.  BEIBERY — TREATING.  161 

to  condemn.  They  therefore  proposed,  through  the  consuls,  as 
more  effectual,  a  mitigated  law  of  fine  and  disqualification,  with 
rewards  to  prosecutors  and  a  prohibition  of  the  traffic  in  votes  ; 
but  the  same  year  Sylla  and  his  colleague  were  convicted  of  gross 
and  extensive  bribery,  and  removed  from  the  consulship.  The 
penalty  of  ten  years'  banishment  for  treating,  giving  shows,  and 
hiring  armed  mobs,  was  then  inflicted  :  first  by  a  S.  C,  and  then 
by  a  law  which  Cicero  prevailed  upon  the  comitia  to  pass.  But  so 
little  did  it  check  the  practice,  that  soon  after  (a.u.c.  700)  the 
violence  of  the  candidates  and  their  mobs  prevented  any  choice  of 
consuls  for  six  months.  Nay,  to  so  great  a  height  had  corruption 
proceeded,  and  so  hopeless  did  the  cure  of  evil  appear,  that  Cato 
himself  approved,  on  one  remarkable  occasion,  of  the  senators 
raising  a  sum  among  themselves  to  enable  the  candidate  whom 
they  favoured  for  the  consulship  to  outbid  his  adversary  in  bribing 
the  centuries.* 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  much  of  the  corruption  of  which  we 
have  been  speaking  must  be  traced  to  the  pernicious  practice  of 
allowing  the  magistrate's  emoluments  to  depend,  not  upon  an 
adequate  provision  directly  and  avowedly  made  for  his  support, 
but  upon  other  advantages  to  which  he  might  look  as  incidental 
to  his  office.  The  magistracies,  through  which  men  passed  to  the 
prsetorship  and  consulate,  were  rather  expensive  than  lucrative, 
from  the  theatrical  exhibitions,  which  were  part  of  the  .^dile's 
duties,  and  the  largesses  to  poor  citizens,  expected  from  all  office- 
bearers. The  fortunes  made  by  praetorian  and  consular  com- 
mands, and  especially  when  the  provinces  became  numerous  and 
wealthy,  formed  the  great  temptation  both  to  avarice  and  ambi- 
tion, and  these  were  regarded  as  the  sure  source  of  wealth  and 
power.  The  profits  of  the  quaestors  were  in  all  probability  also 
considerable.  It  was  to  obtain  such  prizes  that  the  fortunes  of 
the  patricians  were  expended,  and  that  debts  were  incurred,  as  a 
speculation  certain  to  repay  all  that  might  be  advanced,  provided 
the  bribing  was  successful  in  securing  the  place. -f* 

*  Julius  CsGsar  had  promised  a  sum  to  each  voter,  in  order  to  secure  the  election 
of  a  colleague,  whom  the  senators  expected  to  become  his  tool.  They  therefore 
offered  the  same  sum  on  the  part  of  Bibulus. 

t  M.  Beaufort  (K^p.  Rom.,  torn.  i.  p.  428),  while  he  admits  that  "  all  ancient 
authors  keep  a  profound  silence  on  the  emoluments  of  each  office,"  has  no  doubt  that 
each  was  provided  with  an  ample  salary.  The  mere  fact  of  no  mention  being  any- 
where made  of  this  seems  strongly  to  negative  its  existence — the  passages  which 
PART  II.  M 


162  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.        CH.  XIII. 

The  practice  of  bribing  appears  to  have  kept  exact  pace  with 
the  advance  or  abatement  of  the  patronage  in  the  hands  of  the 
people.  Julius  Caesar  recommended  both  consuls,  and  half  the 
other  office-bearers,  and  substantially  named  them :  bribery 
became  less  frequent.  Augustus  restored  the  election  to  the 
people,  and  with  it  bribery  increased ;  insomuch  that,  finding  the 
punishment  of  five  years'  disability  with  a  pecuniary  forfeiture 
ineffectual,  and  being  desirous  to  prevent  it — at  least  in  the  two 
tribes  in  which  he  was  enrolled — he  could  only  do  so  by  himself 
distributing  as  much  money  among  the  members  of  those  bodies 
as  the  candidates  offered.  The  same  state  of  things  continued 
until  Tiberius  gave  the  elective  power  to  the  senate,  which  was 
then  only  exercised  nominally,  and  his  successors  avowedly  filled 
up  all  offices  themselves.  Bribery  was  now  confined  to  the  pro- 
vincial towns  (mv/nidpia)  and  colonies,  where  the  people  still 
appointed. 

The  corruption  of  the  people  extended  to  those  in  the  upper 
classes.  The  peculation  {loeculatus)  and  extortion  {repetuThdce) 
of  persons  in  office  became  universally  and  openly  practised.  The 
trials  before  the  comitia  tributa,  which  frequently  took  place,  and 
the  erection  of  special  tribunals  (a.u.c.  604)  to  try  these  offences 
had  little  effect.  The  punishment,  indeed,  of  restitution,  sometimes 
double  or  treble,  which  always  till  the  latter  end  of  the  common- 
wealth was  inflicted  for  these  offences,  appears  not  to  have  stamped 
them  with  any  infamy.  Lentulus,  two  years  after  his  conviction 
of  extortion  in  the  year  606,  was  made  censor,  to  watch  over  the 
morals  of  the  people  and  the  purity  of  their  magistrates.  Under 
the  empire  the  punishment  was  exile,  and  the  vigour  of  the 
government  appears  to  have  somewhat  checked  the  practice.  No 
society  can  be  conceived  more  corrupted  or  more  hardened,  of 
principles  more  loose,  or  of  feelings  more  despicable  and  callous, 
than  that  of  Rome  towards  the  termination  of  the  commonwealth. 
It  only  required  such  desperate  leaders  as  did  not  long  delay  ap- 
pearing to  destroy  the  whole  system,  by  arraying  against  each 
other  bodies  of  a  rabble  whom  the  habits  of  war  had  made  as 

he  cites  for  the  most  part  would  seem  to  authorise  an  opposite  conclusiou.  Thus, 
Livy,  saying  that  the  cousul's  camp  equipage  was  furnished  by  the  state,  if  it 
proves  anything,  is  rather  against  the  supposition  of  a  large  salary ;  and  as  to 
Cicero  living  in  splendour,  though  born  to  a  small  fortune,  and  refusing  all  govern- 
ments, no  one  can  be  ignorant  of  the  vast  prfifits  which  he  made  by  the  exercise  of 
his  most  lucrative  profession. 


CH.  XIII.  FACTION — CTVIL  WAR — DESPOTISM.  163 

cruel  as  the  conflicts  of  faction  had  rendered  them  turbulent,  and 
the  unprincipled  acts  of  their  patrician  superiors  had  taught  them 
to  be  venal. 

The  hiring  soldiers  from  the  rabble  of  the  city  was  first  prac- 
tised in  Marius's  time,  and  had  the  most  fatal  effect  upon  the 
constitution.  Nothing  tended  more  to  maintain  the  conflicts  be- 
tween the  two  parties  which  divided  the  community — that  of  Sylla 
or  the  senate,  and  that  of  Marius  or  the  commons  ;  and  to  their 
civil  wars  succeeded  the  more  regular  and  sustained  contests 
between  Pompey  and  Caesar.  The  state  was  now  exhausted  by 
the  sanguinarj"  game  of  the  factions ;  foreign  conquests  rapidly 
increased,  arming  the  leaders  with  new  treasures  and  new  forces, 
and  no  resistance  was  made  to  whatever  chief,  having  gained  the 
greater  military  power,  chose  to  use  it  for  establishing  his  own 
dominion  on  the  ruins  of  the  republican  constitution.  The  forms 
of  the  old  government  were  alone  preserved :  Julius,  and  after 
him  Augustus  Caesar,  obtaining  the  votes  of  the  subservient  senate 
and  comitia,  were  created  sometimes  consul,  sometimes  perpetual 
dictator,  and  ruled  under  those  titles,  and  with  the  assent  of  the 
public  bodies.  But  their  real  power  was  wholly  derived  from  the 
troops  in  their  pay,  and  they  were  succeeded  by  princes,  who, 
ruling  by  the  same  means,  extinguished  the  very  name  of  liberty, 
and  practised  a  tyranny  which  has  in  all  ages  been  regarded  as 
the  most  profligate  and  detestable  ever  known  in  an  advanced 
state  of  society. 

The  successive  changes  in  the  Roman  government,  and  the 
struggles  which  first  led  to  them,  then  were  increased  by  them, 
may  easily  be  explained  by  attending  to  the  operation  of  the 
aristocratic  principle  and  the  improvident  conduct  of  the  patrician 
body.  In  the  earliest  period  of  the  monarchy  the  power  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  whole  free  native  people,  with  an  elective  chief, 
and  no  plebeian  body  having  yet  been  formed,  he  could  not  find 
a  balance  to  the  power  of  the  people,  that  is,  the  patricians. 
The  Constitution  was  now  more  republican  than  monarchical ; 
certainly  it  could  with  no  accuracy  of  language  be  called  aris- 
tocratic. When  the  plebeian  order  became  numerous  in  propor- 
tion to  the  patricians,  the  latter  retained  their  ascendant,  and 
notwithstanding  occasional  attempts  of  the  king  to  court  the 
commons,  he  did  not  succeed  in  curbing  the  privileged  body  ;  the 
government  was  now  aristocratic.     The  patricians  and  plebeians 

m2 


164  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.      CH.  XIII. 

combined  to  dethrone  the  king,  and  for  a  short  time  acted  in  con- 
cert ;  but  the  domineering  spirit  of  the  aristocracy  soon  broke  out 
into  new  excesses,  and  their  power  being  much  augmented  by  the 
revolution,  their  oppression  of  the  poor,  but  numerous  and  increas- 
ing, order  became  greater  than  ever.  They  committed  the  error, 
fatal  to  all  privileged  classes,  of  forgetting  that  while  their  own 
numbers  are  nearly  stationary,  and  their  progress  in  wealth  is 
limited  and  slow,  the  mass  of  the  community  increases  rapidly 
and  its  wealth  becomes  proportionally  extended  ;  but  they  still 
more  omitted  in  their  calculation  a  circumstance  peculiar  to  Rome, 
that  the  whole  nation  being  military,  and  all  its  occupation  war, 
the  force  of  the  multitude  must  needs  become  overwhelming,  and 
that  any  attempt  must  be  hopeless  to  deprive  them  of  their  share 
in  those  conquests  which  were  made  by  the  force  of  their  arms. 
The  patricians  were  bent  upon  continuing  to  govern  the  country 
as  exclusively  after  the  commons  were  reckoned  by  hundreds  of 
thousands,  and  the  territory  had  stretched  over  and  far  beyond 
the  neighbouring  districts,  as  they  had  been  suffered  to  do  when 
the  plebeians  were  not  much  more  numerous  than  themselves,  and 
the  city  and  suburbs  were  the  whole  extent  of  their  dominions. 
The  apprehension  of  the  commons  gaining  more  power  by  what- 
ever was  bestowed  upon  them,  whether  of  the  public  lands  or  of 
political  privileges,  made  the  patricians  adhere  the  more  tenaci- 
ously to  their  exclusive  rights,  each  concession  being  deemed  not 
only  an  immediate  diminution  of  their  own  power,  but  the  means 
of  still  further  lessening  it ;  so  that  it  might  be  impossible  to  tell 
where  the  rise  of  the  lower,  and  the  decline  of  the  superior  class, 
would  end.  This  alarm  at  encroachments  operated,  as  it  ever 
does,  to  prevent  them  even  from  abandoning  rights  of  no  value 
to  themselves,  and  allowing  privileges  that  did  not  come  into  con- 
flict with  their  o^vn  ;  because  such  changes,  by  augmenting  the 
popular  influence,  would  lead  the  way  to  more  hurtful  sacrifices 
being  extorted. 

In  acting  upon  such  views  an  aristocracy  differs  not  materially 
from  a  prince,  except  only  that  it  is  relieved  from  the  checks 
of  fear  and  reputation  which  individual  responsibility  imposes,  and 
except  also  that  a  body  often  is  swayed  by  Aaolent  feelings  which 
the  contagion  of  numbers  embitters  while  it  propagates  them. 
But  in  another  respect  the  conduct  of  the  body  is  always  worse 
than  that  of  the  individual.     Oppres.sion,  where  it  tends  to  no 


CH.  XIII.  ARISTOCRACY.  10,3 

end,  is  apt  to  be  exercised  by  a  number  of  persons  more  harshly 
because  they  come  personally  more  in  contact  with  the  objects  of 
their  hatred,  or  jealousy,  or  dread.  At  home,  according!}^,  the 
patrician  was  filled  with  haughty  contempt  and  fierce  dislike  of 
the  plebeian  ;  and  the  law  which  he  had  made  enabled  him  to 
gratify  these  feelings  not  only  against  the  body,  but  in  crushing 
and  tormenting  individuals,  his  debtors.  A  single  ruler  becomes 
the  more  cruel  from  fear,  knowing  that  he  stands  alone  with  tlie 
community  against  him  ;  but  a  minority,  a  select  privileged  few, 
not  only  act  under  the  influence  of  the  same  dread,  and  are 
equally  impelled  to  make  up  by  terror  for  the  inequality  of  their 
natural  force  ;  they  are  also  the  more  excited  to  whatever  nia}'^ 
intimidate  their  adversaries  by  being  always  set  in  opposition  to 
them,  always  matched  and  balanced  against  them,  and  conse- 
quently acting  under  a  constant  sense  of  their  own  dangers  from 
the  conflicting  power  being  let  alone. 

The  Roman  aristocracy  was  marshalled  in  a  more  especial  man- 
ner by  its  powers  being  exercised,  not  in  electing  rulers,  but  in 
ruling  of  itself.  When  the  curiae  and  their  more  select  body  car- 
ried on  the  government  with  the  king,  they  were  the  whole  patri- 
cians in  a  body.  When  the  commons  had  their  own  assembly  the 
opposition  of  the  two  orders  became  more  regular  and  more  fierce? 
and  the  pretensions  of  the  patricians  were  the  more  peremptory, 
and  their  domination  the  more  overbearing.  The  same  system  of 
the  ruling  power  being  exercised  by  the  whole  body  had  another 
most  fatal  effect :  it  prevented  the  wise  foresight  and  virtuous 
moderation  of  a  few  leading  men  from  having  its  due  weight  with 
the  bulk  of  their  order,  and  gave  to  the  course  pursued  that  cha- 
racter of  violence,  impatience,  and  irreflection,  which  too  often  be- 
longs to  the  proceedings  of  the  multitude.  The  inevitable  necessity 
of  concessions  being  granted  too  late  to  compulsion  and  through 
fear,  if  they  were  not  in  due  season  given  with  a  good  grace,  never 
once  appears  to  have  been  present  to  the  patrician's  mind.  He 
always  thought  and  acted  as  if  his  order  could  retain  its  predomi- 
nance, and  as  if  the  plebeians  were  never  to  increase  in  power.  A 
single  ruler  or  a  select  body  of  counsellors  would,  in  all  proba- 
bility, have  granted  some  share  of  the  public  lands  in  the  time  of 
Spurius  Cassius,  but  the  patrician  body  put  him  to  death  as  a 
traitor  for  the  bare  proposal.  When  Licinius  renewed  the  attempt 
it  was  evident  that  in  the  end  some  measure  of  the  kind  must  be 


1 66  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.        CH.  XIII 

carried,  and  almost  as  evident  that  by  timely  concession  much 
of  the  hostile  feeling  might  be  allayed  which  both  filled  the  state 
with  sedition,  put  its  existence  once  and  again  into  jeopardy,  and 
ended  in  far  more  power  being  given  than  any  one  at  first  thought 
of  demanding.  But  the  patricians  were  inflexible,  and  when  com- 
pelled to  yield  in  outward  appearance,  defeated  the  measure  by 
such  chicanery  as  brought  on  new  struggles  and  higher  demands. 
It  was  only  in  times  of  great  public  danger,  or  by  proceedings 
which  amounted  to  open  resistance,  that  the  commons  could  gain 
any  of  their  rights ;  by  refusing  to  serve  at  one  time  when  there 
was  a  formidable  war,  or  by  leaving  the  city  in  a  body  at  another 
critical  period.  The  patricians  never  acted  as  if  the  people  were 
daily  growing  in  strength,  and  themselves  stationary  ;  they  forgot 
that  it  is  as  impossible  to  keep  a  whole  nation  in  pupilage,  as  to 
keep  a  man  in  leading-strings  ;  they  were  not  aware  that  their 
true  interest  required  them  so  to  treat  the  people  while  under 
their  control,  as  to  postpone  the  period  of  their  emancipation  by 
the  influence  of  kindly  treatment,  and  to  seciu-e  a  mutual  good 
understanding  when  at  length  the  period  should  arrive. 

If,  in  the  American  war  and  in  the  conflict  with  Ireland,  there  had 
been  only  a  prince  and  his  ministers,  without  a  popular  assembly 
to  consult,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  for  a  while  the  same  results 
would  have  followed  among  ourselves.  But  it  may  be  reasonably 
questioned  whether  anything  but  the  bitterness  of  contending 
bodies  coidd  have  so  long  maintained  the  policy  which  lost  Ame- 
rica long  before  the  separation  became  necessary,  and  with  hostile 
feelings  established  almost  as  a  part  of  the  national  character  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  ;  and  it  seems  equally  probable  that  the 
independence  of  the  Irish  parliament  would  have  been  granted, 
and  the  elective  franchise  conferred  upon  the  great  body  of  the 
people,  without  waiting  until  the  volunteer  army  created  by  the 
necessities  of  the  American  war  forced  the  one  measure,  and  the 
difficulties  of  the  French  revolution  obtained  the  other.  If  there 
be  any  doubt  whether  these  things  would  have  been  better  \vithout 
a  governing  body,  such  as  the  British  parliament,  it  only  can 
arise  from  the  influence  of  the  people  affecting  its  deliberations, 
and  being  exerted — ^as  upon  full  consideration  it  is  always  likely 
to  be — in  the  right  direction,  although  at  first  joining  in  the  pre- 
vailing errors.  In  proportion  as  the  parliament  approached  the 
constitution  of  the  patrician  body,  that  is,  an  aristocracy  uncon- 


CH.  XIII.  PARTIES— rOPULAR  VIRTUES.  167 

nected  with  the  oppressed  orders  (in  this  case  the  people  of  the 
colonies  and  of  Ireland ),  in  the  same  proportion  was  it  likely  to 
misgovern  by  giving  scope  to  its  jealousy  of  the  other  classes,  and 
its  desire  of  monopolising  all  power. 

The  consequences  were  produced  at  Rome,  which  must  always 
ensue  from  the  same  exclusive  and  engrossing  spirit.  The  two 
orders  grew  up  into  a  settled  and  a  mutual  hatred  ;  and  when  the 
people  had  gradually  attained  its  full  strength,  it  obtained  not 
merely  a  share,  but  the  preponderance  in  the  government,  so  as 
to  establish  a  powerful  and  most  turbulent  democracy.  Under 
this  the  patricians  suffered  constant  mortification  ;  and  although 
the  natural  influence  of  their  wealth  and  attainments  preserved 
them  from  being  trampled  upon  and  crushed,  as  they  would  in 
their  former  state  have  overpowered  the  commons,  they  had  less 
than  their  just  and  natural  influence  in  consequence  of  their  former 
conduct,  and  the  mutual  hatred  to  which  it  had  given  rise.  If  they 
had  yielded  and  conciliated  betimes,  the  government  would  still 
have  been  republican,  but  with  a  control  in  the  hands  of  the  upper 
classes  which  must  have  both  improved  the  form  of  the  constitu- 
tion, and  prevented  the  factious  excesses  that  proved  its  ruin.  The 
hatred  of  the  two  orders,  which  survived  their  distinct  existence, 
ranged  the  difierent  parts  of  the  community  against  each  other, 
when  the  terms  patrician  and  plebeian  had  entirely  lost  their 
original  sense  ;  and  gave  rise  to  those  factious  contests  which  pro- 
duced the  massacres,  proscriptions,  and  civil  wars  that  destroyed 
at  once  the  character  of  the  nation  and  its  free  constitution. 

The  conduct  of  the  plebeians  throughout  the  struggle,  that  is, 
in  the  age  when  the  character  of  the  body  was  respectable,  and  its 
original  structure  remained,  clearly  proves  how  safely  the  patricians 
might  have  trusted  to  the  influence  of  the  Natural  Aristocracy  for 
securing  to  them  an  ample  share  of  authority  in  the  state.  The 
moderation  of  the  popular  proceedings  has  often  been  commended, 
and  it  has  been  deduced  from  their  sober  habits  and  honest,  con- 
scientious nature.  That  they  possessed  many  of  the  qualities  which 
distinguish  an  imcorrupted  yeomanry,  little  advanced  in  knowledge 
any  more  than  in  refinement,  may  be  admitted,  and,  among  other 
qualities,  the  modesty  and  even  humility  incident  to  that  cha- 
racter, and  the  aversion  to  violent  courses,  although,  from  living 
in  crowds,  habits  of  combined  action  were  formed,  which  country 
people  in  general  have  nothing  of.    But  the  principal  cause  of  the 


168  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.        CH.  XIII. 

moderation  in  question  was  the  natural  influence  of  the  patrician 
class,  from  wealth,  rank,  habits  of  command,  eminent  services, 
and  superior  information.  Their  oppressions  drove  the  commons 
to  resistance,  but  a  httle  concession  soon  appeased  them,  and  then 
the  Natural  Aristocracy  resumed  its  influence.  We  have  many 
remarkable  instances  of  this.  It  may  suffice  to  cite  two.  When 
the  struggle  for  the  consulship  had  so  far  proved  successftil  that  as 
a  compromise  consular  tribunes  were  allowed  to  be  chosen  from 
both  orders  indifferently,  the  plebeians,  without  any  exception, 
chose  patricians ;  and  it  was  nearly  half  a  century  (from  A.U.C. 
309  to  353,  when  Licinius  Calvus  was  chosen)  before  they  ever 
availed  themselves  of  the  right  to  choose  a  plebeian.  They  first 
were  allowed  to  choose  a  consul  from  their  own  order  in  387 ; 
from  that  time  both  consuls  might  have  been  plebeian,  though 
only  one  could  be  patrician.  Yet  nearly  two  centuries  elapsed 
before  the  commons  chose  both  from  their  own  body  (581).  So 
the  censorship  was  opened  to  them  in  402  ;  but  it  \^as  not  till  622 
that  both  censors  were  plebeian.  The  influence  of  the  patricians 
was  alike  powerfully  felt  in  the  elections  to  the  other  offices  which 
were  open  to  both  orders.  Tribunes  and  plebeian  sediles  they 
could  not  be  by  law  ;  but  curule  asdiles  and  queestors  were  chosen 
by  the  tribes  alone  ;  and  notwithstanding  the  power  of  mere  num- 
bers in  that  assembly,  the  patricians  were  as  frequently  chosen  to 
fill  these  places  as  to  hold  the  higher  offices,  the  appointment  of 
which  belonged  to  the  centuries,  with  whom  numbers  had  com- 
paratively little  sway.  Instead  of  wisely  and  virtuously  trusting 
to  their  natural  influence,  the  patricians  maintained  the  contest 
with  the  people  to  the  last,  and  when  defeated,  employed  their 
wealth  in  corrupting  the  multitude,  and  their  authority,  their 
force,  their  example,  in  exasperating  it,  setting  man  against  man, 
family  against  family,  till  the  extinction  of  privileges  so  grievously 
abused  became,  if  not  a  public  benefit,  certainly  no  injury  to 
mankind. 

But  if  such  were  the  changes  which  the  plebeian  body  under- 
went, we  may  rest  assured,  although  history  only  gives  general 
indications  of  it,  that  the  admission  of  the  plebeians  occasioned  a 
separation  of  the  patrician  party  into  those  who  still  maintained 
its  exclusive  privileges,  and  those  who,  more  moderate  in  their 
opinions,  had  no  repugnance  to  form  with  the  more  eminent 
plebeians  a  new  aristocracy.     The  high  or  old  patrician  party 


CH.  XIII.  ORDERS  NEW-MOULDED.  169 

continued  the  struggle,  as  such  bodies  always  do,  long  after  it 
became  hopeless.  They  had  the  augurs  with  them,  for  those 
places  were  still  exclusively  patrician,  and  instances  are  not  want- 
ing of  the  most  barefaced  partiality  shown  by  them  in  furthering 
the  views  of  their  party.  Thus,  when  Cornelius  had  named  as 
dictator  Marcellus,  who,  though  consul  some  years  before,  was  of 
a  plebeian  family,  the  augurs  pretended  that  the  auspices  were 
wrong  taken,  and  declared  the  nomination  void,  they  having  been 
at  Rome  and  the  appointment  made  at  Samnium.  It  was  only 
in  the  process  of  time  that  this  difference  among  the  patricians 
gradually  wore  out,  and  the  new  aristocracy  was  established. 
While  it  lasted  the  senate  was  always  niore  moderate  and  rational 
than  the  order  at  large. 

The  transition  of  parties  and  orders  from  their  original  state, 
of  the  patricians  on  one  side  and  in  one  class,  the  plebeians  on 
the  other  side  and  in  the  other  class,  into  .that  state  in  which  the 
natural  aristocracy  was  formed,  and  separated  the  wealthier  and 
higher  born  from  the  inferior  classes,  was  of  course  gradual,  and 
only  abolished  the  distinction  of  patrician  and  plebeian,  substitut- 
ing a  new  arrangement  for  it,  in  a  long  series  of  years.  The  steps 
must  have  been  the  same  as  in  all  such  cases  ;  and  the  principal 
one  always  is  made  by  the  inferior  class  itself.  The  habitual 
respect  for  the  upper  class,  and  the  desire  of  belonging  to  it,  or  if 
not  of  belonging  to  it,  of  being  connected  with  it,  and  of  being 
distinguished  from  the  rest  of  their  comrades,  is  the  powerful 
engine  in  bringing  this  change  about.  The  class  below  the 
privileged  class  always  the  most  highly  prize  those  privileges,  anc' 
most  eagerly  desire  to  separate  themselves  from  those  below  them, 
and  ally  themselves  mth  those  above.  Hence  the  more  wealthy 
and  powerful  among  the  plebeians  were  at  all  times  desirous  of 
likening  themselves  to  the  patricians,  and  no  sooner  obtained 
access  to  patrician  offices  than  they  engrossed  these  almost  as 
much,  and  excluded  the  bulk  of  their  order  almost  as  entirely  from 
them  as  the  patricians  had  before  done  with  reference  to  the 
whole  plebeians.  The  barriers  being  now  removed  which  separated 
the  two  orders,  first  by  intermarriages  being  allowed,  and  then  by 
the  magistracies  being  opened,  the  plebeian  families  whose  ances- 
tors were  distinguished  by  having  held  offices,  or  by  any  other 
eminence  in  the  state,  formed,  together  with  the  patricians,  the 
aristocracy  of  the  state  ;  and  such  of  the  patricians  as  fell  into  bad 


170  REFLECTIONS  OX  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.      CH.  XIII. 

circumstances,  or  became  discountenanced  for  bad  conduct,  or 
for  conduct  of  a  mean  description,  such  as  engaging  in  occupations 
that  were  thought  degrading,  were  numbered  among  the  lower 
orders,  notwithstanding  their  birth.  Supposing  slavery  in  our 
colonies  had  been  gradually  abolished,  and  the  distinctions  of 
colour  had  not  separated  the  descendants  of  the  master  from  those 
of  the  slave,  there  would  in  the  course  of  ages  have  been  formed 
a  class  of  society  which  would  be  the  higher  or  aristocratic  order, 
and  the  lower  order  would  consist  of  the  descendants  of  slaves 
and  freemen  indifferently.  Nor  could  any  one  fix  the  time  when 
this  distribution  of  rank  by  natural  aristocracy  had  succeeded  to 
the  artificial  distinction  oT  slave  and  free.  The  oppression  of  the 
more  numerous  body  at  Rome  by  the  new  aristocracy,  composed 
of  the  patricians  and  higher  plebeians,  was  just  as  great  as  it  had 
ever  been  when  exercised  by  the  patricians  alone.  So  would  the 
West  Indian  aristocracy  oppress  the  inferior  classes  in  the  case  sup- 
posed. Indeed  the  maltreatment  of  their  own  order  by  the  up- 
start plebeians,  and  by  the  descendants  of  West  Indian  slaves, 
would  probably  exceed  that  of  the  old  aristocracy. 

It  must  however  be  observed  that  the  structure  of  the  govern- 
ment is  not  answerable  for  evils  of  this  clasa  The  oppression  of 
the  patricians  while  the  plebeians  were  excluded  from  a  share  of 
the  government,  must  be  laid  to  the  account  of  the  aristocratic 
constitution,  the  artificial  aristocracy.  The  continuance  of  the 
same  oppressions  exercised  by  a  body  somewhat  different,  after 
the  plebeians  had  obtained  not  only  their  share  but  a  preponderat- 
ing influence  in  the  government,  was  owing  to  the  natural  influ- 
ence of  wealth  and  rank,  the  natural  subserviency  of  the  inferior 
classes,  and,  as  parcel  of  that  subserviency,  their  natural  tendency 
to  covet  such  distinctions,  and  to  trample  upon  those  beneath  them. 
It  is  not  that  any  wonder  can  ever  be  felt  at  the  more  eminent 
persons  in  the  community  rising  to  the  top  ;  or  that  any  one  can 
suppose  it  possible  for  the  bulk  of  the  people  to  confide  their 
affairs  to  persons  of  their  own  class.  Whatever  be  the  structiire 
of  the  government,  the  higher  stations  must  generally,  almost 
universally,  be  filled  by  the  upper  classes,  let  the  power  of  ap- 
pointing to  them  be  ever  so  absolutely  vested  in  the  people,  and 
without  any  rule  of  exclusion.  This  is  the  law  of  our  nature.  But 
the  Roman  people  disregarded  their  own  interests  in  the  choice 
they  made  of  magistrates,  and  the  support  they  gave  to  measures. 


CH.  XIII,  CHECKS  UPON  THE  PEOPLE.  171 

They  might  have  selected  from  the  upper  classes,  and  excluded 
all  those  whose  station  disqualified  them  from  holding  power,  and 
yet  have  consulted  the  true  interests  of  their  own  order,  and  of 
the  state.  Of  this  they  were  incapable  by  their  ignorance.  They 
had  obtained  power,  but  they  used  it  to  further  the  interests  of 
their  leaders.  They  had  obtained  political  power  before  they 
were  politically  educated,  so  as  to  exercise  it  beneficially  for  them- 
selves and  for  the  state  ;  and  the  acquisition  only  prov(id  hurtful 
to  both.  The  control  over  their  superiors  which  they  possessed, 
the  power  of  providing  for  their  own  interests,  was  almost  entirely 
thrown  away ;  it  enabled  them,  but  did  not  dispose  them,  to  pur- 
sue the  course  most  for  their  own  benefit.  They  were  the  mere 
instruments  in  the  hands  of  others,  and  the  recovery  of  their  rights 
availed  them  nothing. 

A  survey  of  the  constitution  of  Rome  is  calculated  to  suggest 
another  general  observation  respecting  the  people,  as  important  as 
that  on  which  we  have  been  dwelling,  relative  to  the  aristocratic 
body.  The  exertion  of  the  popular  influence,  such  as  it  was  after 
the  tribunes  were  established,  and  after  the  universal  power  of 
legislation  and  of  government  became  vested  in  the  tribes,  would 
have  been  wholly  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  any  other 
power  or  privileges  in  the  state,  and  must  have  led  immediately  to 
the  supremacy  of  the  multitude,  but  for  the  operation  of  the  nu- 
merous checks  which  the  forms  of  proceeding  and  rights  of  various 
functionaries  provided.  Now  these  checks  all  resolved  themselves 
into  gaining  time  for  more  full  deliberation  ;  but  this  was  found 
sufficient  in  most  cases  to  prevent  serious  mischief,  partly  because 
the  opportunity  was  thus  afforded  for  the  upper  classes  exerting 
their  natural  influence,  and  partly  because  the  people  themselves 
had  certain  feelings  and  principles  deeply  implanted  in  them  both 
of  a  patriotic  and  of  a  superstitious  kind,  which  produced  their 
effects  when  time  was  allowed  for  their  operation.  The  force  of 
these  feelings  and  principles  secured  at  all  times  the  observance  of 
forms  and  a  deference  to  official  privileges.  The  most  furious 
assembly  might  be  stopped  short  in  its  proceedings  by  the  warn- 
ing of  a  magistrate,  or  of  an  augur ;  and  the  same  habits  of 
thinking  in  most  cases  enabled  the  superior  orders,  or  the  reflect- 
ing persons  even  of  their  own,  to  turn  them  away  from  extreme 
courses  before  any  irreparable  evil  had  ensued.  Whoever  doubts 
the  safety  of  entrusting  a  large  share  of  influence  to  a  well-edu- 


172  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION.       CLL  XIIL 

cated  people,  may  do  worse  than  reflect  on  the  safety  with  which 
for  many  ages  the  absolute  power  of  the  Roman  tribes  was  en- 
joyed by  them,  with  no  better  substitute  for  sound  political  infor- 
mation than  their  ancient  hereditary  prejudices  in  respect  of  civil 
and  religious  customs. 

But  an  examination  of  the  Roman  government  is  also  fitted  to 
place  in  a  strong  light  the  use  of  checks,  and  to  show  how  erro- 
neous the  arguments  are  of  those  who  contend  that  every  thing 
which  a  body  has  the  power  to  do  will  be  done.  The  various 
provisions  of  the  constitution  operated  by  delay,  and  the  delay 
was  in  most  cases  sufficient,  because  all  was  not  done  that  could 
legally  be  done,  because  reflection  had  its  free  scope,  and  because 
compromise  and  mutual  concession  was  preferred  to  extreme  mea- 
sures. Whoever  has  considered  the  effects  produced  by  notice 
both  in  our  courts  of  law  and  our  legislative  assemblies,  will  at 
once  perceive  how  much  they  resemble  the  effects  of  the  delays  at 
Roma  In  courts,  the  consequence  of  notice  is,  that  parties  can- 
not be  taken  by  surprise,  and  that  an  application  to  undo  what 
had  unfairly  been  done  may  be  unnecessary.  But  in  Parliament 
the  advantage  is  greater ;  for  the  delay  interposed  both  prevents 
many  things  from  being  attempted  by  individuals  or  by  parties, 
which  might  on  the  spur  of  an  occasion  have  been  successfully 
tried,  and  induces  the  body  itself  to  adopt  a  resolution  very 
different  from  that  which  might  at  first  have  been  taken. 

But  there  arose  out  of  the  conflict  of  authorities  at  Rome  and 
the  influence  possessed  by  bodies  as  well  as  by  individual  magis- 
trates, one  most  pernicious  mischief,  affecting  at  all  times  the 
security  of  the  state,  and  which,  with  the  always  sanguinary  and 
latterly  corrupt  character  of  the  people,  finally  effected  its  ruin. 
There  was  no  effectual  control  over  dangerous  men,  men  of  turbu- 
lent ambition  and  profligate  character,  and  who  might  be  disposed 
to  seek  their  own  aggrandisement  in  the  confusion  of  public  affairs. 
In  earlier  times  such  risks  were  avoided,  sometimes  by  acts  of 
sudden  and  irregular  energy  on  the  part  of  the  magistrates,  and 
sometimes  by  the  appointment  of  dictators.  When  the  people 
would  no  longer  submit  to  the  dictatorial  authority,  the  senate  by 
its  extraordinary  resolution  ne  quid  detrinienti,  endeavoured  to 
supply  its  place,  and  to  make  it  safe  and  regular  for  magistrates 
to  act  as  they  had  formerly  done  illegally  and  at  their  own  peril 
But  stni  the  influence  of  the  different  bodies,  and  of  the  different 


CH.  XIII.  CATILINE — CICERO.  173 

orders  in  the  state  to  which  persons  belonged,  was  sufficient  to 
prevent  the  law  from  taking  its  regular  course,  even  when  the 
most  atrocious  conspiracies  had  been  detected.  The  suddenly 
putting  to  death  Catiline's  associates,  after  they  had  been  clearly 
detected  and  had  indeed  confessed  their  treason,  was  an  act  of 
vigour  beyond  the  law :  it  was  certainly  done  by  the  consul  and 
the  senate  in  breach  of  the  forms  of  the  constitution  ;  and  indeed 
Cicero  was  afterwards  impeached  for  it.  At  the  moment,  it  was 
rendered  practicable  by  the  state  of  public  feeling  on  the  recent 
discovery  of  the  plot.  But  so  httle  could  Cicero  reckon  upon 
this  frame  of  mind  lasting,  that  he  had  the  prisoners  strangled 
on  the  same  night  on  which  he  had,  with  considerable  difficulty, 
obtained  the  vote  for  their  punishment  And  as  for  the  principal 
criminal  himself,  Catiline,  not  only  had  no  attempt  been  made  to 
seize  his  person  and  proceed  against  him,  but  the  whole  efforts  of 
the  consul  were  directed  to  make  him  quit  the  city,  of  which  the 
gates  were  thrown  open  to  favour  his  retreat,  although  it  was 
ascertained  that  he  was  going  to  head  a  rebel  army  for  the  sup- 
port of  his  accomplices  at  Rome,  and  although  he  stood  so  clearly 
convicted  by  his  own  furious  declarations,  that  none  of  the  senators 
would  degrade  themselves  by  sitting  near  him  in  the  same  part 
of  the  house.  There  was  no  want  of  Aagour  in  the  magistrate, 
any  more  than  of  proof  against  the  criminal ;  but  there  were  large 
bodies  of  powerful  men  with  whom  the  one  was  connected,  and  of 
whom  the  other  was  in  prudence  obliged  to  stand  in  fear.* — The 
blessing  of  an  escape  from  the  perils  of  such  a  terible  state  of 
things  is  well  worth  a  large  sacrifice  of  power  to  all  the  orders  of 
a  community. 

*  Middleton's  attempt  to  turn  the  proceeding  into  a  panegj^ric  on  Cicero's  skill  is 
as  great  a  failure  as  his  endeavour  to  place  him  on  a  level  with  Demosthenes  in 
eloquence,  and  almost  with  Lucretius  in  poetry.  It  is  plain  that  he  had  a  sufficient 
case  against  the  criminal,  if  he  had  only  had  a  tribimal  of  magistrates  before  which 
to  use  it.  But  the  same  state  of  parties  and  of  manners  which  made  it  safe  for  Clodius 
to  insult  him  by  his  mob  in  the  streets,  and  impeach  him  before  the  assembly  of  the 
tribes,  for  saving  the  country,  and  only  five  years  after  this  service — which  made  it 
also  safe  for  men  like  Crassus  and  Julius  Caesar  to  intrigue  almost  openly  with  des- 
perate conspirators,  and  for  patricians  of  the  highest  rank  to  set  on  men  almost  as 
noble  as  themselves  to  assassinate  the  first  magistrate  of  the  country— rendered  it 
not  merely  dangerous  but  wholly  impossible  to  put  the  law  in  force  against  those 
conspirators  and  assassins,  unless  at  particular  moments,  and  in  peculiar  combina- 
tions of  circumstances,  which  deprived  the  wrong-doers  of  all  support  from  any 
considerable  body,  and  thus  armed  the  law  with  a  transitory  and  unusual  vigour. 


174  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE.  CH.  XIV, 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — CRETE — SPARTA. 


Greek  Authorities— False  Chronology — Ages  of  the  Historians — Early  History — 
Constitution  of  Crete  — Perioeci ;  Clerotes — Pure  Aristocracy  established — Resist- 
ance— Federal  Government  established — (constitution  of  Sparta  derived  from 
Crete — Opinions  of  Polybius  and  others — Perioeci — Helots — Lycurgus — General 
Remarks — Authors — Classes  of  the  People — Proofs  of  this  Theory — Hypomeio- 
nes ;  Homoioi ;  Mothaces — Tribes ;  Phylae  ;  Obaj — Castes — Morae — Errors  of 
Authors — Kings  or  Archagetae — Rules  of  Succession— Senate — Ecclesiae — Mode 
of  Voting — Harmosynse ;  Homophylaces ;  Harmostae  ;  Hippagretse. 

The  early  history  of  Greece  is,  like  that  of  Rome,  and  indeed  of 
every  other  nation,  lost  in  obscurity.  The  first  historians  whose 
writings  remain,  lived  even  longer  after  the  events  which  they 
describe  than  those  of  Rome ;  and  there  seems  no  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  they  had  any  other  authority  for  the  stories  which  they 
relate  than  the  old  traditions  of  the  country.  The  chronology  of 
Greece  is,  accordingly,  much  more  uncertain  than  that  of  Rome  ; 
and  the  impossibility  of  the  dates  commonly  given  by  ancient 
writers  is  more  apparent.  Thus  they  make  the  foundation  of 
Athens  1556  years  before  the  vulgar  era,  and  the  reign  of  The- 
seus 1334.  But  Sir  Isaac  Newton  has  adduced  reasons  for  be- 
lieving that  Athens  could  only  have  been  founded  1080  years,  and 
Theseus  have  reigned  968  before  Christ.  Of  these  reasons  it  may 
suffice  to  mention  one.  By  the  common  account,  nine  successive 
kings  must  have  reigned  at  Athens  thirty-five  years  each  upon  an 
average,  and  the  thirteen  archons  who  followed  them  twenty-seven 
years  each  ;*  nay,  in  Sparta,  nine  kings  after  Aristodemus  are 
reported  to  have  reigned  forty-one  years  on  an  average — a  thing 
contrary  to  all  experience,  and  which  in  that  state  of  society  may 
confidently  be  pronounced  impossible  to  have  happened.  But 
supposmg  the  Newtonian  account  to  be  taken,  which  brings  those 
early  events  much  nearer  the  time  of  the  historians,  we  shall  still 
have  Thucydides  living  above  five  centuries  after  Theseus,  and  six 

*  C.  Sigon.  De  Rep.  Ath.,  i. — C.  Sig.  De  Ath.  Temporibus — J.  Meursius  {De 
Fortund  Ath.  and  Atticce  Lectiones)  points  out  many  errors  and  discrepancies  of 
ancient  authors. 


CH.  XIV.  EARLY  GRECIAN  HISTORY.  175 

and  a  half  after  the  foundation  of  the  city,  Polybius  nearly  nine  cen- 
turies, Dionysius  above  ten,  Plutarch  between  eleven  and  twelve, 
after  the  foundation ;  and  after  Theseus  all  later  than  Thucydides 
in  the  same  proportions.  So  with  respect  to  Sparta,  Herodotus 
wrote  above  two  centuries  and  a  half,  Xenophon  nearly  three,  and 
Plutarch  nearly  eight,  after  the  most  recent  time  assigned  as  the 
age  of  Lycurgus.  These  authors  and  others,  however,  do  not 
differ  so  much  with  each  other  upon  the  more  important  matters 
as  the  Roman  historians :  hence  there  is  considerably  more  re- 
liance to  be  placed  upon  the  traditions  which  all  agree  in  record- 
ing ;  and  we  may  the  more  safely  conclude  that  they  had  some 
foundation  in  fact.  The  most  important  portions,  too,  of  the 
subject  are  those  so  near  the  times  of  the  historians,  that  we  have 
every  reason  to  trust  their  accounts  where  they  agree.  Xenophon 
describes  the  legislation  of  Solon  at  the  distance  of  only  a  century 
and  a  half;  and  though  much  further  removed  from  Lycurgus, 
yet  the  Spartan  institutions  had  lasted  to  his  own  times.  It  must 
however  be  observed,  that  there  were  many  things  in  the  origin 
of  that  Spartan  system  and  the  early  history  of  the  state  gene- 
rally, almost  as  little  known  in  those  days  as  in  our  own.  This 
obscurity  arose  from  the  Spartans  having  no  writers  of  any  kind, 
and  from  their  intercourse  with  their  neighbours  having  for  some 
ages  been  extremely  limited. 

The  structure  of  the  government  in  the  Greek  states,  though 
necessary  to  be  examined,  does  not  afford  matter  of  such  import- 
ant consideration,  nor  is  it,  with  the  exception  of  Sparta,  of  so  sin- 
gular and  anomalous  a  kind  as  the  Roman  constitution.  About  the 
middle  of  the  tenth  century  before  Christ,  the  troubles  in  Palestine 
appear  to  have  occasioned  an  emigration  of  Phoenicians,  who  were 
n  a  much  more  civilized  state  than  the  Pelasgians,  the  original  in- 
habitants of  Greece.  Sir  Isaac  Newton  considers  this  to  have  hap- 
pened in  king  David's  time,  and  his  opinion  has  met  with  general 
approval.  These  emigrants  brought  with  them  to  Greece  and  the 
islands  the  knowledge  of  many  arts  formerly  unknown  in  those 
barbarous  districts  ;  and  they  founded  Thebes  in  Boeotia,  beside 
establishing  the  government  of  Minos  in  Crete,  where  certainly  the 
first  general  system  of  polity  known  in  Greece  was  instituted.  Its 
object  was  purely  military,  all  its  arrangements  being  framed  with 
a  view  to  train  up  warriors  from  the  earliest  age,  and  to  place  each 
member  of  the  community  under  the  strict  discipline  of  the  law,  in 


176  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE -CRETE— SPARTA.  CH.  XIV. 

the  whole  conduct  of  his  life.  The  supreme  power  was  lodged  in 
a  king  or  military  chief,  and  ten  magistrates,  called  cosmi,  chosen 
yearly,  it  does  not  appear  how,  from  certain  families  only,  and  a 
senate  appointed  for  life  from  those  who  had  been  cosmL  All 
laws  and  treaties  were  in  the  name  of  the  cosmi  and  city  or  state  > 
and  one  of  the  cosmi,  thence  called  eponymus,  gave  his  name  to 
the  year.  There  were  assembhes  of  the  people,  but  without  any 
other  power  than  simply  to  accept  or  reject  the  propositions  of 
the  senate  and  cosmi.  The  cosmi  were  the  executive  government, 
both  civil  and  miUtary,  when  there  no  longer  was  a  king  ap- 
pointed ;  and  the  king  appears  to  have  been  hereditary  as  regarded 
the  family,  but  with  an  election  as  regarded  the  person.  The 
election  was  in  all  probability  by  the  senate ;  *  or  if  the  people 
were  called  upon  to  interfere,  it  was  only  as  in  the  case  of  new 
laws,  to  sanction  what  the  senate  proposed  ;  but  the  choice  of  the 
senators  is  said  to  have  rested  with  the  cosmi  Aristotle  deci- 
dedly blames  the  aristocratic  principle  of  confining  the  choice  of 
officers  to  certain  families.  In  truth,  the  government  appears  to 
have  been  entirely  aristocraticaL  But  as  it  was  also  military, 
and  as  the  whole  pursuits  of  the  people  were  subordinate  to  their 
warlike  occupations,  a  class  of  persons  in  a  meaner  and  in  a  ser- 
vile condition,  called  periceci  (-Tj-f^ioixoi),  from  inhabiting  the 
neighbourhood  of  towns,  cultivated  the  soil.  They  were  considered 
so  far  the  property  of  the  state,  that  they  could  not  be  separated 
from  the  soil,  and  they  paid  a  portion  of  the  produce.  These 
perioeci  were  evidently  the  descendants  of  the  original  inhabitants, 
whom  the  Phoenician  settlers  had  subdued.  The  slaves,  Avho 
were  either  prisoners  of  war  or  their  descendants,  formed  a  sepa- 
rate class,  and  were  always  treated  in  Crete  with  much  greater 
humanity  than  in  most  of  the  Greek  states.  They  were  chiefly 
distinguished  from  the  free  inhabitants  by  being  incapable,  Hke 
foreignei-s,  of  political  privileges,  and  by  being  restrained  from 
g}-muastie  exercises  and  the  use  of  arms,  t  It  was  a  part  of  the 
civic  economy  that  all  the  citizens  lived  in  pubhc  ;  the  members 
of  each  of  the  tribes  into  which  the  people  were  arranged  dining 
always  at  the  same  table.     The  education  and  training  of  all 

*  U.  Ennius,  Vet.  Greec.  {De  Repub.  Cret.) — J.  Laurentius,  De  RebuspuJdicis, 
cap.  i. 

t  It  is  extremely  incorrect  to  confound,  as  some  authors  have  done,  the  perioeci 
or  tributaries,  and  slaves,  derates,  so  called  from  falling  to  the  lot  of  the  con- 
querors.    They  are  sometimes  called  chrysonetes,  from  being  purchased. 


CH.  XTV.  CONSTITUTION  OF  CRETE.  177 

children  devolved  upon  public  officers  appointed  by  the  state,  so 
that  the  whole  community  was  formed  into  one  great  family. 

When  the  government  became  purely  aristocratic,  by  the  wliole 
power  being  vested  in  the  cosmi,  there  were  frequent  insurrections, 
occasioned  by  their  tyranny ;  and  we  are  told  that  the  laws  did 
not  punish  sedition,  because  some  such  check  was  necessary  to 
counteract  the  extensive  powers  of  the  magistrates.  This  most 
clumsy  contrivance  is  censured  justly  by  Aristotle  :  but  it  seems 
difficult  to  conceive  how  any  government  could  have  existed  in 
such  circumstances  ;  and  the  probability  is,  that  the  notion  of  re- 
sistance, when  unsuccessful,  going  unpunished,  may  have  arisen 
from  the  frecjuency  of  its  occurrence,  and  the  consequent  mutual 
forbearance  of  the  different  parties  which  divided  the  community. 
The  principal  of  a  communion  of  goods  appears  to  have  so  far 
been  established,  that  the  public  revenue  derived  from  the  heavy 
tribute  or  rent  paid  by  the  perioeci  was  employed  to  support  the 
expense  of  feeding  the  whole  citizens  and  their  slaves  at  the  public 
tables  ;  but  this  arrangement  was  one  of  the  first  to  fall  into  disuse. 

It  is  wholly  uncertain  at  what  time  there  ceased  to  be  kings 
in  Crete ;  the  last  is  said  to  have  been  Idomeneus,  who  was 
at  the  siege  of  Troy.  But  this  is  plainly  a  fabulous  portion  of 
history.  At  whatever  time  the  royal  office  ceased,  the  unity  of 
the  government  appears  soon  after  to  have  terminated  ;  and  the 
island  was  divided  into  a  number  of  petty  communities,  or  cities, 
each  under  the  government  of  cosmi  and  a  senate.  The  most 
powerful  of  these  states  were  the  Gnossians,  Gortynians,  and  Cy- 
donians.  The  two  first  were  in  a  constant  state  of  rivalry  and 
hostility,  and  to  this  the  independence  of  the  lesser  communities 
was  mainly  owing.  These  formed  alliances  among  themselves, 
offensive  and  defensive,  and  communicated  to  each  other  the  rights 
of  citizenship,  isopoliteia,  which  implied  the  full  power  of  possessing 
land  in  each  other's  territory,  of  marrying,  and  of  having  their 
laws  executed  upon  fugitives  ;*  in  short,  all  but  political  privileges. 
A  central  council  was  ultimately  est,ablished,  which  determined 
the  quotas  to  be  furnished  by  each  state,  and  apportioned  the 
shares  of  the  booty  taken  in  war  according  to  the  relative  num- 
bers of  the  citj^ens,  reserving  to  the  government  of  each  a  tenth  of 

*  Where  a  citizen  of  one  state  had  injured  the  citizen  of  another,  he  was  tried 
by  judges  equally  taken  from  both  communities — de  medietate,  as  the  English 
law  terms  it. 

PART  II.  N 


178         GOVEENMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA,       CH.  XIV. 

its  portion.  The  uniformity  of  the  accounts  respecting  the  Cretan 
government  justify  us  in  concluding  that  it  was  generally  of  the 
nature  described,  and  that  it  had  assumed  a  regular  form  much 
earlier  than  any  other  system  of  poHty  in  any  part  of  Europe. 

It  cannot  reasonably  be  doubted  that  from  Crete  the  govern- 
ment of  Sparta  was  derived.*  In  the  earliest  times  the  Laconians, 
an  invading  body  of  Dorians  from  Thessaly,  lived  in  tribes  or 
towns,  under  chiefs  or  kings,  whose  authority  was  precarious  and 
ill-established,  the  most  powerful  portion  of  each  community 
being  the  landowners.  A  kind  of  union  of  the  whole  had,  how- 
ever, been  formed.  In  consequence  of  the  kingdom  being  left  by 
one  of  these  chiefs  (Aristodemus)  to  his  two  sons,  Eurysthenes 
and  Procles,  there  continued  always  to  be  two  kings,  one  of  the 
family  of  eackf  They  are  said  to  have  divided  the  country  into 
six  districts,  and  placed  a  chief  over  each  as  their  deputy,  J  residing 
themselves  at  Sparta,  the  chief  town.  The  original  inhabitants, 
after  being  at  first  only  made  tributary,  were  reduced  to  slavery 
in  consequence  of  a  revolt,  and  the  free  inhabitants  of  the  countr}' 
(perioeci),  though  holding  inferior  privileges  to  those  of  the  chief 
towns,  were  allowed  to  fill  public  offices.  The  slaves  were  called 
Helots,  from  Helos,  one  of  the  towns  in  which  they  lived,  and 
which  had  led  the  insurrection. 

Nothing  could  be  more  feeble  and  disjointed  than  such  a 
government ;  and  particularly  an  executive  power  thus  consti- 

*  Polybius  (lib.  vi.  c.  45)  denies  this  ;  but  the  reasons  which  he  assigns  appear 
insufficient  to  support  his  proposition.  He  relies  only  on  the  great  inferiority,  as 
he  considers  it,  of  the  Cretan  to  the  Spartan  institutions  in  many  particulars  ;  but 
this  is  inconclusive.  The  similarity  in  such  peculiar  institutions  as  the  cosmi  and 
public  tables  seems  to  justify  the  opinion  of  Plato,  Xenophon,  and  others  who  trace 
the  Spartan  to  the  Cretan  government.  This  question  is  fully  and  judiciously 
discussed  in  St.  Croix's  learned  treatise,  Des  anciens  Gouvernemens,  Fe'deratifo,  et 
de  la  Legislation  de  Crete,  p.  413  et  seq.  It  is  plain  that  Polybius  had  a  violent 
prejudice  against  the  Cretans,  whom  he  even  accuses  of  cowardice  and  inaptitude 
for  war,  notwithstanding  their  vile  practice  of  selling  or  hiring  their  services  to 
foreign  nations,  and  being  sometimes  found,  as  Livy  has  recorded,  fighting  on  both 
sides.  An  equal  instance  of  national  prejudice  on  the  same  subject,  though  it  take 
an  apologetic  and  not  a  vituperative  turn,  is  to  be  found  in  Haller's  explanation  of 
the  same  baseness  in  the  Swiss.  He  has  the  courage  to  assert  that  it  comes  from 
the  desire  of  maintaining  martial  habits,  and  learning  the  improvements  in  the  art 
of  war !  ^ 

+  U.  Emmius,  Vet.  Grac.  {Rep.  Lac.)  Aristodemus  is  represented  as  one  of 
the  Heraclidae  who  overran  the  greater  part  of  Greece,  and  reduced  the  natives  in 
some  places  to  absolute  subjection,  in  others  to  a  divided  property.  Laconia  is 
said  to  have  been  his  share. 

J  Strabo,  viii. 


I 


CH.  XIV.  LYCUEGUS.  179 

tuted  ;  and  the  dissensions  of  the  kings,  with  the  factious  disposi- 
tions of  the  landowners,  their  appeals  to  the  multitude,  who  were 
left  without  any  regular  share  in  the  government,  the  number  of 
slaves,  who  carried  on  all  the  agriculture  of  the  country,  and 
being  subjected  to  cruel  treatment  were  ever  ready  to  revolt  when 
a  foreign  war  made  such  a  movement  the  more  dangerous,  all 
exposed  the  state  to  such  risks  of  utter  destruction,  that  the  adop- 
tion of  some  new  system  seemed  necessary  to  preserve  its  existence. 
Fortunately  Lycurgus,  who  succeeded  on  his  brother's  death  to 
the  joint  crown,  but  who,  with  great  magnanimity,  refused  to  take 
it  upon  learning  that  the  widow  was  with  child,  retired  into  Crete 
during  some  civil  commotion,  and  being  invited  by  both  the 
sovereigns  and  the  people  to  return,  brought  back  with  him  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  Cretan  system,  upon  the  principles  of  which  he 
persuaded  his  countrymen  to  new-model  their  own.  The  common 
chronology  places  this  change  in  the  884th  year  before  Christ ;  but 
Sir  Isaac  Newton,  upon  better  grounds,  dates  it  in  the  year  708.* 
As  constantly  happens,  all  the  institutions  of  the  country  have 
been  ascribed  to  Lycurgus ;  whereas  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
he  preserved  many  of  former  times,  and  that  some  were  added  by 
succeeding  statesmen.  It  is  however  certain  that  the  extremely 
artificial  and  unnatural  system,  of  which  he  was  the  principal 
founder,  took  such  hold  as  to  last  an  extraordinary  length  of 
time,  and  produced  effects  upon  the  character  and  habits  of  the 
people  which  distinguished  them  from  all  other  nations.  The 
desperate  state  of  anarchy  into  which  the  community  had  fallen, 
and  the  dangers  to  which  all  were  exposed  from  their  neighbours, 
as  well  as  their  own  countrymen,  perhaps  still  more  from  the 
slaves,  or  conquered  race,  appear  to  have  combined  with  the 
superstitious  reverence  for  the  oracles  consulted  by  Lycurgus,  to 
make  the  people  adopt  his  plan  ;  and  if  once  fully  adopted,  the 
more  it  was  in  opposition  to  the  natural  order  of  things,  it  per- 
haps had  the  better  chance  of  taking  deep  root,  and  becoming 
permanently  established.  There  are  some  parts  of  the  system 
almost  incomprehensible  ;  there  are  others  which  must  be  regarded 

*  J.  Meursius  (Areopagus,  cap.  3)  makes  Lycurgus  contemporary  with  the 
beginning  of  the  Olympiads,  which,  according  to  Newton,  is  the  year  776  B.C. 
Aristotle,  Pausanias,  and  Plutarch  give  the  same  date.  Xeuophon  places  his  age 
much  earlier  ;  but  the  preponderance  of  authority  seems  in  favour  of  the  reign  of 
Charilaus,  who  was  the  sixth  from  Procles,  and  flourished  about  700  b  c. 

N   2 


180  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— SPARTA.  CH.  XIV 

as  doubtful,  because  of  the  conflicting  accounts  that  describe 
them  ;  there  are  not  a  few  which  remain  imperfectly  stated  ;  and 
there  are  several  which  cannot  be  believed  to  have  existed,  be- 
cause they  are  directly  repugnant  to  others  vouched  by  the  same 
authorities.  But  it  will  be  expedient  in  the  first  place  to  give 
the  account  in  which  the  greater  number  of  ancient  writers  agree, 
which  may  therefore  be  supposed  to  represent  something  re- 
sembling the  Spartan  constitution,  and  the  main  portions  of  which 
may  probably  be  trusted.  The  learned  and  judicious  treatise  of 
Nicolas  Cragius  De  Republicd  Lacedcemoniorum,  the  treatise  De 
Rep.  Lac.  in  the  third  volume  of  U.  Emmius's  Vetus  Grcecia, 
and  the  second  book  (chaps.  4  to  8)  of  J.  Meursius's  Miscel- 
lanea Laconica,  bring  together  the  whole  of  the  learning  upon 
this  subject  But  beside  the  occasional  notices  in  Aristotle's 
Politics  and  Plato's  Laws,  the  treatise  of  Xenophon  upon  the 
polity  of  Lacedsemon  contains  most  valuable  information.  It  is 
only  to  be  lamented  that  the  description  is  confined  rather  to  the 
institutions  which  regulated  the  economy  of  the  state,  and  that 
much  of  the  government  is  left  untouched.  The  probity,  good 
sense,  and  great  practical  experience  of  the  writer  make  his  au- 
thority as  high  as  possible  on  all  subjects. 

The  Lacedaemonians,  or  Laconians,  may  be  considered  as  of 
three  classes  :  the  Spartans,  inhabitants  of  the  capital ;  the  country 
people  (perioeci),  inhabitants  of  the  neighbourhood  ;  and  the  inha- 
bitants of  the  other  districts  or  towns.  The  whole  of  these  towns 
were  under  subjection  to  Sparta,  but  each  had  its  municipal  go- 
vernment, and  there  Avas  only  an  assembly  of  the  whole  inhabit- 
ants upon  extraordinary  occasions,  chiefly  upon  questions  of  peace 
and  war.  The  assemblies  (ecclesiwj  to  be  mentioned  presently, 
called  the  lesser,  were  therefore  confined  to  the  affairs  of  Sparta 
and  its  territory,  and  only  regarded  the  government  of  the  other 
towns  in  so  far  as  these  were  subject  to  Sparta.  In  those  assem- 
blies only  the  Spartans  could  take  a  part ;  the  perioeci  were  ex- 
cluded from  them,  and  were  ineligible  to  office. 

A  great  obscurity  hangs  over  the  perioeci.  Some  represent 
them  as  all  the  free  inhabitants  of  the  country,  that  is,  all  but  the 
Helots  ;  others  as  the  portion  of  those  country  people  who  lived 
near  the  town.  Some  make  no  distinction  between  them  and  the 
Lacedaemonians,  reckoning  as  Lacedaemonians  the  neighbours  of 
the  Spartans,  and  considering  all  the  other  people  as  Laconians  , 


CH.  XIV.  CLASSES  OF  THE  PEOPLK  181 

according  to  which  opinion  Spartans  and  Lacedaemonians  were  those 
Laconians  who  lived  in  and  near  the  capital.  It  has  been  affirmed 
(Cramer's  Ancient  Greece,  iii,  156)  that  the  perioeci  had  the  rights 
of  citizens,  being  eligible  to  all  offices  ;  and  it  has  been  represented 
as  quite  undeniable  that  they  were  of  Laconian  origin  (U.  Em- 
mius,  De  Republicd  LacedceinoniwuTn),  although  the  attempt  to 
give  them  the  rights  of  citizens  was  resisted  in  the  proceedings  of 
Agis,  expressly  on  the  ground  that  to  admit  foreigners  was  contrary 
to  the  laws  of  Lycurgus  (Plut.,  Agis).  Though  there  are  difficul- 
ties attending  almost  any  supposition,  the  most  probable  theory 
seems  to  be  this.  The  Dorians,  having  overrun  Laconia,  at  first 
lived  with  the  original  inhabitants,  leaving  them  a  great  part  of 
their  possessions,  but  subjecting  them  to  burdensome  exactions. 
A  revolt,  headed  by  the  town  of  Helos,  was  suppressed,  and  all 
who  had  been  engaged  in  it  were  reduced  to  the  condition  of  serfs, 
and  their  lands  distributed,  so,  however,  as  to  leave  them  in  pos- 
session upon  payment  of  a  rent.  Those  who  had  not  joined  in 
the  revolt  retained  their  lands  and  were  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country,  while  the  Dorians  lived_  in  the  lesser  towns,  and  were 
distinguished  from  the  Spartans,  who  inhabited  the  chief  town, 
and  kept  free  from  all  admixture  with  the  natives.  With  these 
natives,  the  Lacedaemonians,  or  Dorians,  inhabiting  the  other 
towns,  probably  mixed  more  freely  in  marriage,  and  also  adopted 
them  as  citizens  (Erasm.  Vindurgius  Helleuicus,  Art.  Lacedce- 
monii).  But  the  perioeci  were  in  all  probability  the  descendants 
of  the  original  inhabitants  living  in  the  country.  The  property 
of  the  land  belonged  to  the  town  people  and  the  country  people 
alike ;  and  as  the  Dorians  despised  all  agricultural  industry, 
which  the  Spartans  still  more  scorned  after  their  institutions  had 
assumed  a  purely  military  character,  the  whole  interest  whicli 
they  held  in  the  land  was  as  manorial  owners,  the  Helots  being 
the  possessors  and  cultivators. 

It  seems  impossible  upon  any  other  supposition  to  account  for 
the  three  following  circumstances,  which  seemed  vouched  upon 
unquestionable  authority. 

1.  The  Cretan  perioeci  were  serfs,  and  are  represented  as  being 
in  Crete  what  the  Helots  were  in  Laconia.  Now  it  is  quite  un- 
deniable that  the  perioeci  in  Laconia  were  free.  But  if  they  were 
originally  of  the  same  class  with  the  Helots,  and  the  Helots  be- 
came serfs  after  their  insurrection,  we  can  easily  perceive  the  rea- 


182  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GBEECE— SPARTA.  CH.  XIV 

son  why  the  Cretan  pericBci  are  compared  to  the  Helots  —the 
Helots  being  the  enslaved  portion  of  the  Laeonian  perioeei. 

2.  When  Cinadon,  according  to  Xenophon,  enumerated  the 
classes  of  persons  whom  he  could  rely  on  to  join  his  insurrection, 
because  they  all  had  a  common  cause  in  the  oppression  exercised 
by  the  Spartans,  he  mentions  the  perioeei,  with  the  Helots,  the 
newly-enfranchised  slaves,  and  the  inferior  class  of  Spartans  {hypo- 
OTieiones),  none  of  whom  had  any  civic  rights.  He  says  nothing 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  or  inhabitants  of  the  other  towns.  These 
he  could  not  reckon  upon ;  and  when  he  says  that  the  owner  only, 
or  master  {Sia'jroTins)  of  any  farm  will  be  against  him,  he  is  ex- 
pressly speaking  of  farms  belonging  to  Spartans  alone  {Hist.  Gr. 
iii.,  p.  385,  ed.  Lenuclavii). 

3.  When  Agis  brought  forward  his  plan,  he  proposed  to  make 
a  new  division  of  the  lands,  giving  4500  lots  to  the  Spartans ;  and 
as  only  seven  hundred  famihes  of  these  remained,  of  whom  all 
but  one  hundred  had  lost  their  property,  he  was  to  fill  up  their 
number  to  the  original  amount*  from  persons  chosen  among  the 
perioeei  for  their  good  qualities.  The  other  1500  lots  were  to  be 
distributed  among  the  people  of  the  districts,  that  is,  the  Lacedae- 
monians, to  whom  the  perioeei  always  were  regarded  as  subordi- 
nate. Accordingly,  they  were  not  to  receive  their  lots  as  a  body, 
but  persons  were  to  be  selected  from  among  them.  That  they, 
and  not  the  Lacedaemonians,  were  to  be  thus  enrolled  among 
the  Iwmoioi,  the  peers,  or  Spartans,  is  easily  explained ;  there 
was  no  jealousy  of  them  because  they  had  not  magistrates  and 
troops  of  their  own,  like  the  lesser  Laeonian  towns.  They  lived 
entirely  under  the  control  of  the  Spartans.  The  Tnothaces  were  a 
number  of  young  persons  who  had  been  in  a  servile  condition,  not 
Helots,  of  whom  the  law  discouraged  and  even  prohibited  the  en- 
franchisement, but  liberated  domestic  slaves,  or  their  children, 
and  who  were  educated  along  with  the  sons  of  the  upper  classes, 
in  order  to  accompany  them  in  war  after  finishing  their  education. 
And  nothing  can  more  clearly  show  the  error  of  those  who  consider 
the  only  peculiarity  of  the  hoTnoioi  to  have  been  their  Spartan 
training ;  for  here  the  mothaces  were  free  and  were  trained,  but  ex- 
pressly are  stated  "  not  to  have  had  any  civil  rights,"  Lysander, 

*  It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  plan  of  Agis  proceeds  upon  the  calculation 
of  those  who  gave,  not  9000,  but  4500,  as  the  original  number  in  Ljcurgus's  dis- 
tribution.    It  is  one  of  the  three  accounts  which  Plutarch  mentions  as  current. 


CH.  XIV.  TRIBES  ;    OTHER  SUBDIVISIONS.  1 83 

Syliphus,  and  Theocrates  having,  for  their  great  services,  been 
made  citizens,  as  exceptions  to  the  rule. 

The  people  were  divided  into  six  tribes*  { phylw),  and  each  tribe 
into  five  subdivisions  called  obce.  The  army  consisted  of  one 
division  or  regiment  for  each  tribe.  There  were  also  castes,  as 
in  India  and  Egypt,  so  that  the  same  occupation  descended  in  all 
the  members  of  a  family.  In  order  to  constitute  a  citizen  with 
full  privileges,  both  father  and  mother  must  have  been  Spartan, 
and  free  for  three  generations.  These  were  termed  homoioi 
(equals  or  peers)  freedmen  or  foreigners,  and  their  issue  were, 
together  with  the  poorer  classes  who  could  not  pay  their  contri- 
butionsf  to  the  public  table,  called  hypoTneiones,  and  had  no  poli- 
tical privileges  any  more  than  the  perioeci.  Thus  there  appears 
to  have  been  at  Sparta,  as  at  Rome,  a  patrician  class,  and  com- 
posed in  a  similar  manner,  though  much  more  numerous.  It 
afterwards  was  gradually  diminished  :  at  the  time  of  Cinadon's 
insurrection  in  the  reign  of  Agesilaus,  three  centuries  after  Lycur- 
gus,  there  were  not  above  seven  hundred  Spartan  families  in  the 
whole  community,  and  none  of  the  class  were  then  found  serving 
in  a  lower  rank  than  centurions. 

The  two  kings  (called  archagetce)  were  taken  one  from  each  of 
the  royal  families.  Originally  they  were  probably  elected  from 
those  families  ;  but  though  the  form  of  election  continued,  and'the 
assembly  decided  in  cases  of  disputed  succession,  yet  it  always 
chose  the  eldest  son  of  the  deceased  or  deposed  king,  or  his  next 
male  heir,  if  he  left  no  son  ;  and  the  grandson  by  a  deceased  son 

*  Xenophon  distinctly  states  that  there  were  six  divisions.  {Rep.  Lac.  xi.) — 
Aristotle,  Died.  Sic,  and  others,  make  them  five. — J.  Meurs.  (Misc.  Lacon.,  i.  16) 
plausibly  suggests  that  Xenophon  may  have  included  the  Scyra,  troops  who,  tliough 
provincial,  were  reckoned  as  Lacedasmonians.  But  N.  Cragius  enumerates  six 
tribes  by  their  names,  without  including  the  Scyra.  (Rep.  Lac,,  i.,  6.)  The  phijla 
appears  to  have  been  the  military  division  ;  the  mora,  a  portion  of  it  between  twenty 
and  sixty  years  old,  being  the  military  age. 

+  Nothing  can  be  more  erroneous  than  the  inference  which  some  have  drawn 
from  a  passage  in  Xenophon  (Rep.  Lac.  c.  10)  that  all  were  IfAotoi,  or  fully-privi- 
leged citizens,  who  observed  the  laws  and  discipline  of  Lycurgns.  It  is  true  that 
he  there  says  all  such  should  have  the  civic  rights,  notwithstanding  bodily  inferio- 
rity or  poverty  of  circumstances — but  this  must  have  meant  all  of  the  class  to  which 
the  civic  rights  belonged  ;  for  in  his  Hist.  Grasc.  iii.,  he  describes  Cinadon  as  both 
strong  and  brave,  and  yet  not  of  the  o^«/oi— seeN.  Crag.  Rep.  Lac,  xi.  10;  U. 
Emm.,  Gr.  Fet.  The  account  which  Xenophon  gives  of  the  grounds  on  which 
Cinadon  had  reckoned  for  success  shows  how  few  homoioi  there  were — "  Count 
the  people  in  the  market-place,  kings,  ephori,  senators,  and  about  forty  more ;" 
and  in  the  country,  "  the  master  only  of  each  farm." 


184  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XIV. 

excluded  his  uncles.  The  deposition  or  forfeiture  of  th^.  father  for 
crimes  involved  not  his  issue  ;  and  infancy  formed  no  bar  to  the 
succession,  a  guardian  or  regent  beicg  appointed  to  administer 
during  the  minority  and  superintend  the  child's  education.  It  was 
a  ground  for  passing  over  the  next  heir  that  he  had  any  lameness 
or  other  great  bodily  defect.  Nor  could  one  of  the  other  family 
ever  succeed  on  a  vacancy,  however  near  in  blood.  The  purity  of 
the  constitution  was  entirely  gone  when  Agesilaus,  himself  lame, 
was  chosen  to  the  exclusion  of  his  nephew  on  the  ground  of  his 
mother's  alleged  adultery  ;  and  still  more  when  he  made  one  of 
his  family  his  colleague.  It  is  one  of  the  many  remarkable  and 
inconsistent  things  in  this  singular  constitution,  that  though  there 
was  no  jealousy  of  a  spurious  issue  being  introduced  into  any  other 
family,  the  chastity  of  the  queen  was  watched  over  with  the  most 
rigorous  care  by  magistrates,  on  whom  that  duty  especially  de- 
volved. 

The  senate  consisted  of  twenty-eight  persons  chosen  by  the 
assembly,  and  holding  their  places  for  life.  They  were  required 
to  be  sixty  years  old,  of  unblemished  reputation,  and  were  obliged 
to  solicit  the  office  as  candidates.  The  government  was  at  first 
almost  entirely  in  the  senate,  and  its  authority  was  at  all  times 
considerable.  The  kings  had  the  command  of  the  forces,  and  one 
led  each  army,  if  there  were  two  in  the  field  ;  if  not,  and  they 
could  not  agree,  the  senate  probably  bestowed  the  command. 
While  at  the  head  of  the  troops  the  king  had  unlimited  power, 
both  over  the  soldiers  and  the  people  in  whose  territory  the  service 
was  carried  on.  At  home  he  had  precedence  in  public  places, 
was  honoured  by  all  except  one  class  of  magistrates  (the  ephori) 
rising  when  he  entered,  had  a  double  portion  of  food  at  the 
dinners,  which,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  people,  he  was 
obliged  to  attend  ;  had  the  third  part  of  the  booty  taken  in  war ; 
had  a  double  vote  in  the  senate.  The  kings  called  this  body 
together,  and  they  presided  over  it  in  their  turn  ;  they  were  also 
at  the  head  of  the  religion  of  the  state,  appointing  each  two  officers 
called  pythii,  who  communicated  with  the  oracle  at  Delphos,  and 
reported  the  answers,  which  the  kings  used,  we  may  believe,  to 
support  their  influence.  The  kings  had  also  jurisdiction  in  cer- 
tain causes,  as  the  right  to  marry  an  heiress  whose  father  had  died 
without  betrothing  her,  the  adoption  of  children  by  childless 
persons,  and  the  care  of  the  highways.     Although  it  is  possible 


CH.  XIV.  SENATE;   ASSEMBLIES.  18o 

that,  from  their  influence,  and  especially  their  military  rank  in 
so  warlike  a  state,  the  kings  were  not  such  mere  ciphers  as  they 
have  been  represented,  yet  it  is  plain  that,  from  their  lim!:tetl 
prerogative,  and  from  their  unavoidable  disagreements,  they  could 
have  no  great  share  of  power,  and  were  little  adapted  to  make 
any  encroachments  upon  other  branches  of  the  government. 

The  senate,  beside  the  criminal  jurisdiction  in  all  capital  cases,* 
had  the  power,  as  well  as  the  kings,  of  convoking  the  assemblies  of 
the  people  (ecclesioe),  and  had  the  sole  power  of  proposing  to  those 
assemblies  laws  or  measures  of  any  kind.  The  assemblies  were 
attended  by  all  the  free  and  freeborn  native  citizens  (homoioi)  of 
thirty  years  old,  being  held  monthly,  and  also  on  extraordinary 
occasions.  This  assembly  had  no  right  to  originate  any  matter, 
or  to  debate  it ;  for  no  one  could  speak  but  the  magistrates,  or 
those  whom  they  and  the  senate  allowed,  and  the  assembly  could 
only  accept  or  reject  the  propositions  which  it  made. 

The  chief  power  of  the  assembly  was  the  choice  of  magistrates  ; 
and  it  was  exercised  by  acclamation  and  not  by  ballot,  and  only 
rarely  by  division.  A  very  artificial  method  of  determining  the 
majority  without  dividing  was  resorted  to.  Certain  persons  were 
appointed,  it  does  not  distinctly  appear  by  whom,  and  enclosed 
in  a  building  close  by  the  place  of  meeting,  but  so  that  they  could 
neither  be  seen  nor  see  what  passed.  The  candidates  presented 
themselves  in  the  order  determined  by  lot,  and  the  people  ex- 
pressed their  opinion  by  shouta  The  persons  enclosed  made  a 
minute  of  what  they  considered  as  the  shout  of  the  greatest  num- 
ber, distinguishing  by  figures  only,  that  is,  calling  it  the  first,  se- 
cond, and  third  shout,  and  reporting  it  in  this  way  before  they 
could  tell  to  which  candidate  the  figure  and  the  shout  referred. 
The  same  course,  mutatis  mutandis,  was  taken  when  any  measure 
was  proposed  ;  and  though  it  is  said  that  the  numbers  were  some- 
times so  balanced  that  the  scrutineers  could  not  tell  which  had 
the  majority,  and  that  then  they  required  the  meeting  to  divide, 
it  should  seem  that  in  the  assemblies  this  hardly  ever  happened, 
though  in  the  meetings  of  the  senate  it  was  not  uncommon. 
Thus  it  seems  clear  that  with  a  little  management  the  regulating 

*  No  capital  trial  could  be  finished  without  a  delay  of  some  days,  for  fear  of 
fatal  mistakes  (jiuUa  tinquam  de  morte  hominis  cunctatio  longa) ;  but  an  acquittal  on  the 
converse  of  this  principle  did  not  absolve — the  party  might  be  tried  at  any  time  on 
fresh  evidence  appearing  against  him. 


186  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XIV 

body,  the  senate  could,  by  collusion  with  the  scrutineers,  as  by 
audible  signals,  even  if  no  tricks  were  played  with  the  lot,  obtain 
a  favourable  report  touching  the  result  of  the  appeal  to  the  people, 
where  there  was  any  considerable  division  of  opinion- 
There  were  beside  the  kings  and  polemarchs,  or  commanders 
of  the  forces,  other  magistrates,  of  whose  functions  a  very  imper- 
fect account  has  reached  us.     The  harmosynce  appear  to  have 
had  censorial  powers,  particularly  as  regarded  female  conduct, 
but  also  to  have  exercised  a  general  corrective  authority.     The 
hoTnophylaces,  or  guardians  of  the  laws,  beside  prosecuting  for 
offences,  may  have  been  the  depositaries  and  interpreters  of  those 
laws,  as  they  were  never  reduced  to  writing.     The  harmostce,  of 
whom  more  is  known,  because  they  served  abroad,  were  governors 
of  conquered   provinces   or  towns  ;    the   Lacedaemonian   policy 
being,  wherever  they  obtained  a  footing,  to  establish  a  senate, 
geuerally  often  persons,  and  to  appoint  a  governor  over  the  whole. 
But  harmostse  were  also  appointed  at  home  for  purposes  of  police ; 
and  the  same  name  is  given  to  a  much  higher  magistrate,  if  we 
may  believe  Dionysius,  who  describes  him  as  a  dictator  occa- 
sionally chosen.     It  is,  however,  probable  that  this  only  refers  to 
such  cases  as  that  of  Agis  and  Cleomenes,  chiefs  in  revolutionary 
movements.     These,  and  all  other  civil  magistrates,  were  chosen 
at  the  annual  popular  assembly,  and  held  their  office  for  one 
year.     The  hippagretcB  were  military  officers  like  the  polemarchs, 
being  three  persons  originally  appointed  by  the  kings,  afterwards 
by  the  ephori,  and  who  chose  each  a  hundred  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished young  men  as  a  kind  of  body  guard,  or  equestrian 
order,  which,  upon  attaining  a  certain  age,  they  quitted,  but  re- 
tained a  rank  in  consequence  of  having  been  formerly  so  selected ; 
and  this  was  understood  to  give  them  a  claim  as  candidates  for 
any  vacancy  in  the  senate,  in  like  manner  as  the  equites  had  a 
similar  preference  at  Rome. 


CH.  XV.  OBJECT  OF  THE  SPARTAN  SYSTEM.  1 87 


CHAPTER  XV. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA. 
Continued. 


Object  of  the  Spartan  system — Its  operation  traced — Stages  of  Human  Life  as  subject 
to  it — Marriage  ;  procreation ;  infancy  ;  boyhood  ;  paodonomus  ;  full  age — 
Equality  of  Fortime  attempted — Slaves;  their  Classes;  Treatment — Ephori  ; 
their  Power — Resemblance  to  Tribunes — Opinions  of  authors  reconciled — Epho- 
ral  Usurpation — Artificial  Aristocracy — Natural  Aristocracy — Controversy  on 
Classification  ;  Opinions  of  Authors — Contradictory  Usages — Unintelligible 
Statements — Paradoxes — Duration  of  Lycurgus's  Polity — Party  Process  and 
Changes — Agis ;  Lysander ;  Cleomeues  —Spartans  overpowered,  join  the  Achaean 
League — Distinction  of  Orders. 

The  whole  object  of  the  Spartan  constitution  and  economy  was  to 
train  up  soldiers ;  to  this  every  other  consideration  was  sacrificed  ; 
and  the  extreme  of  consistency  to  which  the  principle  was  carried 
has  certainly  no  parallel  in  the  history  of  makind. 

The  lawgiver  was  not  satisfied  with  beginning  at  the  cradle 
and  taking  possession  of  the  new-born  infant,  that  he  might  per- 
vert its  nature  to  his  purpose  ;  he  began  with  taking  precautions 
to  ensure  a  strong  and  healthy  breed  of  animals,  and  in  sufiicient 
numbers.  Young  men  were  required  to  marry  at  an  early  age, 
but  not  until  the  vigour  of  their  body  had  become  complete. 
The  maidens  were  not  inured  to  female  occupations  or  trained  to 
the  softness  and  dehcacy  that  most  adorns  their  sex,  but  habituated 
to  masculine  sports,  and  to  exposure  of  their  persons  for  the  sake 
of  acquiring  a  hardy  and  muscular  frame.  With  a  view  to 
eradicate  the  sense  of  shame  which  might  prevent  them  from 
regarding  themselves  as  the  lawgiver  did — in  the  light  of  mere 
brood  cattle — they  were  accustomed  to  associate  as  much  with 
youths  as  with  those  of  their  own  sex.  Although  marriage  was 
held  in  reverence,  and  ordinary  bastardy  deprived  of  all  political 
privileges,  adultery  was  allowed,  and  even  encouraged,  wherever 
there  was  either  a  want  of  issue,  or  a  prospect  of  improving  the 
breed  by  a  change  of  connexion.  The  law  even  interfered  with 
the  seasons  of  conjugal  intercourse,  in  order  to  promote  the  more 
vigorous  generation  of  a  robust  offspring. 


188  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH  XV. 

The  young  animal  being  bom,  was  instantly  delivered  over,  not 
to  the  care  of  the  parent,  or  even  of  a  niu-se,  but  to  government 
inspectors,  who  put  it  to  death  if  it  either  had  any  blemish  or 
appeared  of  a  sickly  constitution.  The  Romans  allowed  the  same 
option  to  the  parent  that  the  Spartans  gave  the  magistrate  ;  and 
the  term  education  derives  its  origin  from  the  father  electing  to 
take  up  his  progeny  instead  of  leaving  it,  as  he  had  the  power  of 
doing,  exposed  to  perish. 

At  an  early  age  the  boys  came  under  the  government  of  a 
magistrate,  called  the  pcedonomus,  or  boy  ruler,  who  took  care 
that  they  were  trained  to  habits  of  exercise,  discipline,  and 
temperance,  not  so  much  for  the  sake  of  their  morals  as  of  their 
health,  and  to  give  them  the  strength,  the  agility,  and  the  powers 
of  endurance  which  were  the  great  essentials  of  Spartan  excel- 
lence. But  cunning  as  well  as  patience  and  courage  was  to  be 
acquired ;  and  thieving  and  stratagem  was  taught,  the  remorse 
being  connected  only  with  failure,  and  the  shame  only  attached 
to  detection.  Sentimental  attachments  were,  also,  encouraged 
between  persons  of  the  same  sex,  with  a  preposterous  notion  of 
inspiring  courage  and  confidence,  and  a  reliance,  still  more  absurd, 
upon  the  power  of  the  law  to  prevent  the  abuses  which  it  encou- 
raged,* In  order  that  every  chance  should  be  taken  to  secure 
the  great  object,  the  production  of  an  animal  of  perfect  strength 
and  suppleness,  and  in  good  condition,  even  the  period  of  military 
service  was  postponed,  and  a  year  or  two  of  the  youth's  life  was 
spent  in  the  chase. 

But  the  superintending  care  of  the  state  did  not  cease  when  the 
young  soldier  had  been  given  to  his  country ;  the  life  of  each  man 
in  war  was  regulated  by  his  commander,  and  by  the  magistrates 
who  accompanied  the  forces,  and  in  peace  by  a  discipline  almost 
as  rigorously  enforced  as  if  the  town  had  been  a  camp.  All  the 
citizens  were  obliged  to  feed  at  a  public  repast,  of  a  broth  pro- 
verbially ahke  difficult  to  eat  and  to  digest,  and  of  boiled  pork, 
which  the  older  and  truer  Spartan  despised  and  left  to  younger 
and  nicer  palates.  On  these  dainties  the  magistrates,  the  kings 
not  excepted,  were  bound  to  feed  with  the  rest  of  the  community ; 

*  In  Crete  the  atrocious  plan  was  pursued  of  encouraging  the  worst  abuse  of 
those  passions  ;  and  Xenophon,  in  affirming  that  no  such  abomination  existed  at 
Sparta,  confesses  that  it  is  not  easy  to  make  people  belieTe  this  in  Greece,  becaase 
of  the  guilty  practice  prevailing  elsewhere. — Hep.  Lac,  cap.  ii. 


CH.  XV.  LAWS  OF  EQUALITY.  1 89 

and  though  wine  was  not  forbidden,  no  one  was  allowed  to  use  a 
light  in  going  home,  in  order  that  all  risk  of  intemperance  might 
be  avoided.  But  at  this  public  repast  the  citizens  were  not  suf- 
fered even  to  choose  their  places.  They  were  classed  in  companies 
of  fifteen  ;  and  each  company  admitted  persons  to  fill  up  vacancies 
by  a  ballot,  in  which  a  single  dissentient  was  sufficient  to  exclude. 
Gymnastic  exercises  occupied  the  whole  time  not  given  to  war 
and  the  chase,  while  the  season  of  youth  continued  ;  at  a  mature 
age  idleness  was  regarded  as  the  peculiar  privilege  of  the  free. 

If  the  Spartan  system  outraged  all  the  feelings  and  tastes  of 
our  nature,  and  treated  men  as  mere  animals  for  the  purpose  of 
improving  the  breed  of  soldiers,  it  did  no  less  violence  to  every 
prudential  principle  upon  which  the  political  structure  of  society 
rests,  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  an  imaginary  impossible 
equality,  loosening  all  ties,  and  confounding  the  whole  community 
into  a  single  family.  The  whole  land  of  the  country  was  divided 
into  small  parcels — 9000  for  the  Spartans  themselves,  80,000  for 
the  country  people  (perioeci) — each  parcel  was  calculated  to  suf- 
fice for  supporting  a  family,*  and  no  person  was  allowed  either 
to  sell,  or  exchange,  or  devise  his  lot  so  that  his  eldest  or  other 
male  heir  might  be  disappointed  of  the  succession.  The  use  of 
gold  and  silver,  or  of  any  money  but  pieces  of  iron  a  pound  in 
weight,  was  strictly  forbidden,  as  well  as  of  all  ornaments,  and  all 
luxuries  of  every  kind.  Each  person  was  allowed  to  interfere 
with  his  neighbour's  children,  and  correct  them  as  if  they  were 
his  own.  Every  one  could  in  like  manner  use  his  neighbour's 
cattle,  or  his  dogs  in  hunting,  or  his  arms  or  furniture,  and  as 
far  as  laws  could  provide  for  it,  or  encourage  it,  all  men's  goods 
were  in  common,  there  being  only  separate  property  recognised 
in  the  soil.  But  it  was  probably  by  inculcating  the  duty  of 
freely  lending  rather  than  by  recognising  any  absolute  right  that 
this  community  was  sought  to  be  established. 

The  most  hateful  part  of  the  Spartan  economy  remains  to  be 
mentioned  :  in  no  part  of  Greece,  or  indeed  of  the  ancient  world, 
was  there  so  large  a  proportion  of  slaves.  Their  numbers  do  not 
anywhere  appear ;  but  as  all  authorities  are  agreed  that  they  were 
far  more  numerous  than  in  any  other  state,  as  we  know  that  in 

*  Each  person  was  supposed  to  have  seventy  bushels  of  grain  for  himself,  and 
twelve  for  his  wife,  with  wine  and  fruits  in  proportion.  Eighty-two  bushels  may 
have  been  about  seven  quarters  of  our  measure. 


190  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XV^. 

Attica  there  were  400,000  slaves  to  about  40,000  free  inhabitants, 
and  as  we  moreover  are  informed  that  no  less  than  50,000  were 
carried  away  by  the  ^Etolians  in  one  incursion  upon  Sparta,  we  may 
form  some  notion  how  abundant  the  slave  population  must  have  been. 
It  consisted  of  three  classes  —the  common  household  slaves,  taken 
in  war  or  acquired  by  purchase,  and  their  descendants ;  the  Helots, 
or  descendants  of  the  ancient  inhabitants,  whom  the  Dorians  or 
Lacedaemonians  conquered ;  and  the  Messenians,  who  were  also,  but 
at  a  later  period,  a  conquered  people.  All  writers  are  agreed  that 
the  Messenians  were  even  more  cruelly  treated  than  the  Helots ; 
and  they,  as  well  as  the  first-mentioned  class,  appear  to  have  been 
held  in  absolute  slavery,  not  being  attached  to  the  soil  like  the 
Helots,  who  were  properly  speaking  serfs,  and  possessed  the  lands 
originally  belonging  to  them  upon  the  pajonent  of  a  moderate  and 
fixed  rent.  But  their  treatment  was  so  inhuman,  that  we  can 
vdth  difficulty  imagine  that  of  the  Messenians  to  have  been  worse, 
and  are  led  rather  to  suppose  that  the  difference  referred  to  as 
indicating  an  inferiority  of  the  Messenians  must  be  the  serfage  of 
the  Helot,  who  could  not  be  separated  firom  the  soil  nor  liberated 
from  his  bondage  without  the  public  authority.  Hence  his  condi- 
tion is  frequently  described  as  something  between  liberty  and 
slavery.  It  was  no  doubt  the  more  cruel  for  being  the  less  abso- 
lutely dependent.  The  supposed  rights,  the  fear  of  resistance, 
the  wealth  which  he  even  was  allowed  to  possess,  all  exasperated 
the  ferocious  Spartan  against  him,  and  having  no  protection 
either  in  the  law  or  its  administration,  constant  suffering  was  his 
lot.  He  was  hunted  like  a  beast ;  he  was  compelled  to  work  at 
the  hardest  and  most  degrading  employments ;  he  was  dragged  to 
the  field  and  exposed  to  all  the  toils  and  dangers  of  war.  When 
the  Spartan  youths  were  to  be  taught  how  to  conduct  ambushes, 
it  was  by  sallying  forth  from  the  woods  and  murdering  the  Helots 
as  they  escaped,  that  the  lesson  of  "glorious  war"  was  made  easy. 
Nay,  in  returning  home  at  night,  a  Spartan,  always  armed,  hap- 
pening to  meet  some  of  these  wretched  beings,  would  wound  oi 
kill  them  in  sport.  The  fear  of  their  revolt  was  at  the  bottom  of 
all  this  cruelty ;  and  on  one  occasion  when  2,000  had  volunteered 
to  serve  the  country  in  a  dangerous  expedition,  and  were  with 
unheard-of  perfidy  rewarded  by  emancipation,  the  fear  of  their 
martial  prowess  was  such,  that  they  are  said  to  have  been  all 
murdered   in    cold  blood,  all   having  immediately  disappeared. 


CH.  XV.  EPHORI.  191 

"  They  made  them  disappear,"  says  the  historian,  "  and  no  one 
knew  how  each  of  them  perished."* 

It  appears  that  after  the  constitution  as  settled  by  Lycurgus 
had  lasted  somewhat  more  than  a  century  and  a  quarter,  a  ma- 
terial change  was  introduced.  There  probably  had  at  all  times 
existed  magistrates  called  ephori,  or  overseers ;  and  they  may 
have  had  jurisdiction  in  private  causes,  or  suits  between  indivi- 
duals. It  is  also  possible  that  their  influence  may  have  gradually 
increased  until  they  assumed  a  large  share  in  the  government. 
But  the  weight  of  authority  is  in  favour  of  that  account  which  re- 
presents them  to  have  been  either  altogether  created,  or,  which  is 
more  likely,  armed  with  extended  rights,  by  one  of  the  kings  ; 
and  the  most  rational  theory  seems  to  be  this.  The  senate,  like 
all  aristocratic  bodies,  had  so  encroached  both  upon  the  royal 
prerogative  and  upon  the  rights  of  the  people  in  the  assemblies, 
that  an  alliance  or  co-operation  was  effected  between  the  kings  and 
the  people.  The  kings,  without  the  people,  had  no  direct  power 
in  peace  and  in  domestic  concerns  ;  but  if  they  could  obtain  their 
support  against  the  common  oppressor,  by  claiming  a  restoration 
of  popular  rights,  the  royal  authority  must  gain  by  the  change. 
This  was  probably  the  view  which  Theopompus  according  to 
some,  Chilon  according  to  others,  had  in  arming  the  Ephori  with 
new  powers,  or  as  the  commonly  received  account  has  it,  of 
creating  the  office,  as  a  protection  for  the  people  against  the 
senate.  A  protection  against  the  crown  was  obviously  unnecessary 
in  the  reduced  state  of  the  royal  authority  ;  but  the  Ephori  were 
empowered  to  protect  the  people  against  all  magistrates  as  well 
as  against  the  senate.  They  were  five  in  number,  and  chosen  in 
the  assembly  without  any  qualification  of  class  or  of  property ;  so 
that  persons  of  the  humblest  condition  and  greatest  obscurity 
might  hold  the  office.  Other  magistrates  must  have  had  at  least 
wherewithal  to  pay  the  very  moderate  contributions  required  for 
the  support  of  the  public  table;  but  the  Ephori  needed  not  have 
even  that  small  fortune.  Aristotle  uses  a  remarkable  expression 
respecting  the  effect  of  giving  the  people  this  voice  in  the  govern- 
ment, though  he  greatly  disapproves  the  allowing  persons  of  no 
weight  in  character  or  in  station  to  hold  such  power.  "The 
people,"  he  says,  "  rests  in  quiet  or  leads  a  quiet  life  (rio-uxac^si) 
from  having  a  share  in  the  government."! 

*  Thucyd.,  iv.  80.     Eip  nairaii  ri  auTout  are  his  expressive  words, 
t  Ar.,  Pol.,  lib.  ii. 


192  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE —SPARTA.  CH.  XV. 

The  resemblance  of  the  Ephori  to  the  Roman  tribunes  has 
often  been  remarked  ;  and  they  appear  to  have  usurped  a  consi- 
derably larger  share  of  power.  They  not  only  judged  in  all 
private  causes,  which  probably  was  their  original  office,  but  they 
assumed  the  right  to  inflict  fines  at  their  pleasure  for  all  offences 
except  capital  ones,  and  to  levy  these  fines  upon  the  offender 
They  equally  with  the  kings  and  the  senate  had  the  privilege 
of  convoking  the  assembly  of  the  people,  and  of  propounding 
laws  and  measures.  They  could  also  convoke  the  senate,  and 
they  sat  and  voted  in  it.  They  were  the  only  persons  who 
did  not  rise  upon  the  entrance  of  the  kings  into  any  public  as- 
sembly. The  1  jst  important  power,  however,  which  they  claimed 
and  constantly  exercised,  was  that  of  removing  and  punishing 
magistrates  for  malversation  in  office,  or  for  oppressing  the  people. 
The  language  employed  by  authors  would  lead  to  the  belief 
that  the  Ephori  not  only  denounced,  but  themselves  tried  and 
condemned  on  these  occasions.*  It  is,  however,  probable  that 
in  graver  cases  they  brought  the  party  before  the  assembly  ; 
but  they  certainly  had  the  power  of  interrupting  the  magistrate 
during  his  office,  and  of  casting  him  into  prison.  They  assumed 
the  power  also  of  putting  the  kings  themselves  on  their  trial ; 
but  it  is  more  distinctly  stated  that  when  a  king  was  to  be 
tried  the  senate  sat  with  the  Ephori  as  judges,  the  other  king 
presiding  ;  and  in  case  of  condemnation,  there  lay  an  appeal  t 
the  people.  Instances  are  cited  of  this  power  being  exercised  ; 
but  that  of  Agis,  who  was  put  to  death,  with  his  mother  and 
grandmother,  in  circumstances  of  extreme  and  even  brutal  cruelty, 
must  be  regarded  as  the  violent  act  of  partisans  in  a  revolutionary'^ 
movement.  When  Pausanias  was  tried  the  senate  were  equally 
divided,  but  the  Ephori  voting  with  the  fourteen  who  were  for  an 
acquittal,  he  escaped.  Each  king  monthly  took  an  oath  to 
govern  according  to  the  laws,  and  the  Ephori  on  the  part  of  the 
people  also  swore  that  his  dominion  should  be  supported  as  long- 
as  he  kept  his  oath  ;  a  compact  strongly  resembling  that  of  the 
Spanish  and  other  feudal  monarchies. -f- 

*  'Evfus  TapaxonuM  Koka^iuirn  (Xen.  Bep.  Zac,  viii.) :  "they  punish  directly 
and  on  the  instant."  But  when  speaking  of  capital  punishment,  he  only  says 
they  bring  to  trial  ui  aytata.. 

t  The  important  subject  of  the  Ephori  has  giyenrise  to  considerable  coutroTcrsy, 
chiefly  as  to  the  manner  and  time  of  their  introduction  into  the  constitution.  Xeno- 
phon,  though  he  does  not  in  very  distinct  terms  say  so,  yet  plainly  intends  to  state  that 


CH.  XV.  EPHORAL  USURPATIONS.  193 

The  most  constant  and  arbitrary  interference  in  all  departments, 
military  as  well  as  civil,  soon  proved  that  the  Ephori  had  attained  a 
power  which  was  more  than  a  match  for  both  kings  and  senate  com- 
bined. They  assumed  the  general  power  of  executing  the  laws,  and 
of  enforcing  the  decrees  of  the  assembly,  as  well  as  superintending 
all  other  magistrates ;  they  took  upon  them  also  the  general  cen- 
sorial power,  the  Harmosynse  being  forced  to  act  in  subordination 
to  their  authority  ;  and  they  exercised  a  universal  civil  jurisdiction, 

Lycurgus  introduced  them.  (^Eep.  Lac,  cap.  viii.)  The  word  (ffuyxaTcca  x.iuairai) 
implying  that  the  chief  men  (^ti^arKrei),  with  whom  he  had  described  Lycurgus  as 
having  acted,  joined  him  in  introducing  the  i^o^ua.  It  is  hardly  correct,  therefore, 
to  cite  Xenophon,  as  Barthelemy  (Voy.  An,,  iv.,  460,  4to,  ed.)  has  done,  for  the 
position  that  it  was  not  Lycurgus,  but  the  principal  citizens  who  created  the  office, 
and  to  join  his  authority  with  that  of  Aristotle,  Cicero,  and  others,  who  date  the 
change  about  a  century  later.  The  Abbe  cites  Plutarch  as  an  authority  also  to  the 
same  effect.  But  he  afterwards  cites  another  passage  to  show  that  the  Ephori 
raised  a  popular  tumult  against  the  introduction  of  Lycurgus's  changes.  Here, 
then,  as  in  so  many  other  instances,  that  writer  (Plutarch)  is  too  careless  to  be 
of  much  weight  as  an  authority.  There  are,  also,  inconsistent  passages  in  Plato  to 
the  same  effect,  namely,  Epist.  viii.,  and  Ve  Legg.,  iii.  The  authority  of  Aristotle 
appears  entitled  to  much  greater  respect,  and  he  expresses  himself  without  any 
hesitation  {De  Hep.,  v.,  11),  although  he  had  distinctly  before  him  the  institution 
of  the  Cosmi  at  Crete,  and  had  in  a  former  book  compared  the  Ephori  to  them 
(xi.,  10).  U.  Emmius  {De  Hep.  Lac.)  gives  the  preference  to  this  opinion,  and 
A".  Cragius  (ii.,  4)  leans  to  the  same  side.  J.  Meursius,  however,  {Miscell.  Lac, 
ii.  4,)  cites  a  passage  of  Diog.  Laert.,  ascribing  to  Chilon,  one  of  the  Seven  Sages, 
the  appointment  of  the  Ephori  to  govern  along  with  the  kings.  That  a  magistrate 
of  this  name  was  known  among  the  Messenians  as  well  as  the  Cretans  seems  to  be 
generally  admitted,  although  his  powers  were  probably  much  more  limited  than 
those  of  the  Ephori  soon  became  at  Sparta.  If,  indeed,  we  can  trust  the  speech 
which  Plutarch  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Cleomenes  (  Vit.  Cleom.),  the  kings  ori- 
ginally appointed  them  as  their  deputies  when  absent  from  the  city ;  and  this  is 
a  much  more  probable  account  than  the  somewhat  romantic  story  told  of  Theo- 
pompus,  that  he  created  the  office  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  being  a  bridle  on  the 
royal  authority,  saying  to  his  .wife,  when  she  accused  him  of  weakening  the 
power  he  was  to  leave  his  son,  that  it  would  be  more  lasting,  though  smaller. 
Aristotle  adopts  this  story,  contrary  to  his  wonted  sagacity.  Cicero  (Z>e  Legg., 
iii.,  7)  also  says  that  Theopompus  created  the  Ephori  to  counteract  the  kings 
(pppositi  regibus),  as  the  tribunes  were  made  to  counteract  the  consuls.  The  most 
probable  solution  of  the  difficulty,  and  which  goes  far  to  reconcile  the  various 
accounts,  is,  that  there  were  Ephori  before  even  Lycurgus's  time,  who  might  be 
lieutenants  of  the  kings  in  their  absence,  and  might  in  the  course  of  time  come  to 
exercise  jurisdiction  even  while  the  kings  were  at  home ;  but  that,  in  the  time  of 
Theopompus,  when  their  authority  had  become  somewhat  greater,  a  change  was 
made  which  gave  them,  and  through  them  the  people,  a  power  of  resisting 
the  senate.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  reign  of  Theopompus,  and  conse- 
quently the  date  assigned  to  the  change  in  the  power  of  the  people  through  the 
Ephori,  coincides  with  the  important  event  of  the  Messenians  being  completely 
subdued,  and  their  territorj'  divided  among  the  Lacedaemonians — an  event  which 
probably  increased  greatly  the  numbers  of  the  landowners  or  privileged  class. 
PART  IL  •  O 


194  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XV. 

though  the  kings,  who  originally  held  this  in  their  own  hands, 
retained  the  right  of  sitting  with  them  in  judgment  upon  causea 
The  Ephori  despatched  ambassadors,  received  those  of  foreign 
nations,  levied  troops,  instructed  their  commanders,  provided  for 
their  pay  and  sustenance  ;  in  short,  exercised  the  whole  powers  of 
government,  either  of  themselves  with  the  consent  of  the  people, 
or  by  direct  authority  derived  from  the  decrees  of  the  popular 
assembly.  They  appear  to  have  held  a  far  more  absolute  and 
undivided  authority  than  the  Roman  tribunes.  Perhaps  at  the 
most  brilliant  period  of  the  Spartan  history,  and  before  the  con- 
quest of  Athens  had  relaxed  the  ancient  discipline,  they  resembled 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  in  France,  as  far  as  regarded  their 
power  and  their  success.  Nor  in  the  struggles  which  at  various 
times  ensued  between  them  and  the  other  governing  bodies,  the 
kings  and  senate,  was  the  senate  at  all  united.  The  Ephori  had 
always  a  party,  often  the  majority  of  the  senate,  under  their  in- 
fluence ;  and  the  only  risk  which  their  power  seems  ever  to  have 
run  of  being  destroyed  was  when  a  king,  availing  himself  of  their 
number  (as  the  patrician  party  did  at  Rome  of  the  number  of  the 
tribunes),  obtained  the  co-operation  of  several  Ephori  against 
their  colleagues,  and  against  the  order  which  they  represented. 
We  are  left  without  any  information  as  to  the  power  possessed  by 
each  of  them  individually ;  and  though  it  seems  probable  from 
their  sitting  as  a  court  or  body,  that  each  had  not  independent 
authority  like  the  Roman  tribune,  yet  the  Spartan  history  abounds 
with  instances  of  a  single  Ephorus  issuing  his  orders  to  the  generals 
of  armies,  and  commanding  the  arrest  of  magistrates — whether 
with  the  assent  of  his  colleagues,  or  by  usurpation,  or  by  right, 
we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  :  one  or  the  other  of  the  two 
first  suppositions  seems  the  most  probable. 

From  the  composition  of  the  Spartan  ruling  body,  the  Ho- 
moioi,  it  seems  manifest  that  as  its  numbers  decreased,  and  as 
no  additions  were  ever  made  by  allowing  foreigners  to  be  enrolled,* 
while  the  numbers  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  people  of  foreign 

*  It  is  said  that  only  two  instances  of  any  such  naturalization  were  known.  We 
have  no  distinct  account  of  the  Laconian  population  ;  for  Plutarch  (  Vit.  Lye.)  gives 
three  totally  different  statements  in  the  same  passage ;  but  we  are  told  that  they 
could  send  30,000  infantry  and  1500  cavalrj-  into  the  field.  (Arist.  Pol.  ii.)  At 
Plataea  they  had  45,000  men,  but  chiefly  Helots,  there  being  only  5000  Spartans 
and  as  many  Lacedsemonians.  If  the  31,500  is  exclusive  of  serfs  and  mercenaries 
the  population  must  have  been  1 40,000  at  least.  The  proportion  of  Spartans  we 
have  no   means   of  ascertaining;   but  Xenophon  {Hist.  Gr.  vi.)  mentions  700 


CH.  XV,  ARTSTOCEATIC  GOVERNMENT.  195 

and  of  servile  origin,  greatly  increased,  the  power  which  was  gained 
by  the  people,  and  of  which  the  Ephori  were  the  depositaries, 
necessarily  became  the  power  of  a  privileged  order,  and  that  the 
Ephori  were  then  the  representatives  of  an  aristocracy.  At  first, 
when  the  Spartans  were  a  numerous  body,  and  the  rest  of  the 
community  insignificant  in  bulk,  the  power,  as  far  as  any  was  pos- 
sessed, independent  of  the  kings  and  the  senate,  might  be  consi- 
dered as  that  of  a  democracy.  But  the  kings  and  senate  together 
far  outweighed  the  people  until  the  power  of  the  Ephori  was  ex- 
tended, and  therefore  it  must  be  considered  that  the  first  fonn  of 
government  was  rather  aristocratic  or  oligarchical  than  demo- 
cratic. For  although  the  senators  were  chosen  by  the  people, 
and  though  at  that  period  the  people  consisted  of  the  whole  nation, 
except  slaves  and  foreigners,  yet  the  kings  who  were  taken  from  a 
class  consisting  of  two  families,  must  be  regarded  as  a  part,  and  a 
very  important  part,  of  the  governing  body,  the  senate  ;  while  the 
rest  of  the  body  must  have  had,  with  the  aid  of  the  kings,  a  pre- 
ponderating influence  in  the  votes  by  which  successive  vacancies 
were  filled  up.  There  was  thus,  in  substance  and  effect,  a  ruling 
body  irremovable,  and  only  liable  to  be  changed  so  slowly  by  the 
people  at  large,  even  independent  of  the  senate's  influence,  that 
little  real  power  remained  beyond  the  circle  of  the  body.  The 
rise  of  the  people's  power  gave  a  democratic  form  to  the  govern- 
ment, with  a  counteracting  power  on  the  part  of  the  senate  ;  and 
when  what  had  been  the  popular  body  became  a  select  or  pri- 
vileged order,  engrossing  that  large  share  of  power,  and  excluding 
the  body  of  the  inhabitants  from  all  civil  privileges  whatever,  the 
government  must  be  considered  to  have  become  wholly  aristo- 
cratic, the  aristocracy  consisting  of  three  branches,  the  kings,  the 
senate,  and  the  Spartans,  or  homoioi.  It  appears  sufficiently  clear 
that  the  Ephori  were  in  all  respects  either  the  agents  and  crea- 
tures, or  the  leaders  and  masters  of  the  privileged  class,  the  most 
powerful  branch  of  this  aristocracy,  and  were  thus  the  tyrants  of 
the  people  at  large  when  they  co-operated  with  the  senate  and  the 
kings,  and  when  resisted  by  one  or  both  of  these  two  classes,  their 

Spartans  as  their  whole  numbers  at  Leuctra,  and  adds  that  400  were  killed,  there 
being  1000  Lacedaemonians  killed.  This  would  make,  if  the  proportions  wore 
preserved,  1750  Lacedsemonians.  At  the  battle  of  Corinth,  he  says  they  had  6600 
and  7200  allies  (ib.,  lib.  iv.).  The  lowest  estimate  in  the  passage  of  Plutarch  gives 
4500  Spartans  in  Lycurgns's  time,  and  the  highest  gives  9000,  the  Lacedaemonians 
being  30,000. 

02 


196  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GKEECE— SPARTA.  CH.  XV. 

tyrants  also.  The  constitution  was  aristocratical,  and  as  the  op- 
pressed people  had  a  very  numerous  body  of  slaves  and  of  serfs 
still  more  oppressed  than  themselves  for  their  natural  allies,  the 
result  took  place  which  never  faUs  to  follow  from  a  minority 
rilling  over  a  hostile  majority ;  terror  was  called  in  to  supply  the 
want  of  force,  and  a  perpetual  apprehension  of  the  Spartans  that 
the  Helots  and  Messenians  might  join  the  Lacedaemonians  in 
throwing  off  the  common  yoke,  mingled  with  an  occasional  alarm 
that  those  servile  castes  might  join  a  foreign  enemy,  was  some- 
times the  cause,  and  always  the  pretext,  of  the  dreadful  cruelties 
exercised  upon  those  hapless  races,  to  the  lasting  disgrace  of  the 
Spartan  name. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  if  the  independence  of  the  state 
had  continued  for  some  ages,  and  the  privileged  body  had  been 
reduced  still  more  in  numbers,  while  the  bulk  of  the  people  in- 
creased, the  same  struggle  would  have  ensued  which  elevated  the 
plebeian  order  at  Rome,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  would  have 
obtained  the  preponderance.  The  Natural  Aristocracy  would  then 
have  been  formed  without  regard  to  Spartan  extraction.  The 
families  of  distinguished  men,  the  descendants  of  the  senators  and 
kings,  the  persons  of  wealth  and  renown,  would  have  held  the 
highest  places  in  the  senate  and  the  magistracy.  While  the 
commonwealth  lasted  no  such  arrangement  took  place.  But 
there  must  have  been  the  usual  conflict  of  individuals  and  of  their 
supporters — the  usual  struggle  of  parties  for  power— and  the  Na- 
tural Aristocracy,  to  a  certain  extent,  must  have  had  its  influence 
within  the  circle  of  the  privileged  class  (homoioi),  among  whom 
the  senators,  in  all  probability,  carried  on  the  intrigues  of  faction. 
We  find  the  kings  and  other  leading  men  paying  court  to  the 
Ephori ;  Agesilaus  always  rose  when  they  entered  the  room,  as 
indeed  he  courted  the  senate  by  making  a  present  to  each  person 
on  his  election.  There  was  thus  the  Natural  Aristocracy,  as  it 
were,  within  the  Artificial,  and  the  party  game  was  played  with- 
out any  reference  to  the  people,  because  as  yet  the  people  had 
obtained  no  privileges,  and  it  was  not  worth  the  while  of  any 
party  to  court  them.  They  might  be  formidable  enough  in  an 
insurrection,  just  as  the  Helots,  the  Messenians,  and  the  slaves 
might  be  ;  and  accordingly  Cinadon,  in  describing  his  resources, 
names  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  perioeci,  with  the  freedmen  and 
the  serfs.     But  until  a  faction  had  determined  on  rebellion  the 


CH.  XV.  QUESTION  OF  CLASSIFICATION.  197 

help  of  the  people  was  unavailing,  and  the  proceedings  of  party 
are  always  framed  upon  the  plan  of  only  using  the  means  which 
the  existing  constitution  maJces  lawful. 

The  ancients  were  a  good  deal  divided  in  opinion  upon  the 
question  to  what  class  of  governments  the  Spartan  properly 
belonged.  Plato,  in  one  passage  {Leg.  iv.),  seems  to  think  that 
the  difficulty  can  hardly  be  solved  ;  but  he,  in  another  passage 
of  the  same  book,  treats  the  denial  of  it  being  an  aristocracy 
as  absurd  (aroTrov).  Aristotle,  without  pronouncing  a  decided 
opinion  himself,  says  that  some  consider  it  as  a  mixture  of 
monarchy,  oligarchy,  and  democracy,  while  others  regard  the 
ephoral  power  as  a  tyranny,  and  the  institution  as  in  many  re- 
spects democratic  {Pol.  ii.).  But  he  afterwards  says  that  the 
power  of  the  Ephori  converted  the  aristocracy  into  a  democracy. 
Plutarch  so  entirely  differs  in  his  view  of  the  question,  that  in  one 
of  his  works  (on  the  Three  kinds  of  Government),  he  gives  Sparta 
as  the  example  of  aristocracy ;  and  in  another  (Life  of  Lycurgus), 
he  describes  the  power  of  the  Ephori  as  the  power  of  the  aristo- 
cracy. Others,  as  Isocrates  {Panath.),  regard  it  as  a  mixture  of 
aristocracy  and  democracy.  The  safest  course  seems  to  be  that 
which  we  have  ventured  to  take,  of  considering  the  different  periods 
of  its  history  as  presenting  different  forms  of  the  government,  and 
of  distinguishing  carefully  between  the  Spartan  body  and  the 
nation  at  large. 

But  it  is  a  much  more  difficult  thing  to  ascertain  how  far  we 
can  trust  the  accounts  of  so  strange  and  unnatural  a  state  of 
society  as  the  Spartan  institutions  are  represented  to  have  esta- 
blished ;  the  more  especially  as  those  accounts  appear  frequently 
to  involve  contradictions,  as  well  as  matters  the  operation  of 
which  they  afford  no  means  of  comprehending. 

1.  Among  the  former  class  may  be  reckoned  those  extraordi- 
nary provisions  respecting  female  chastity,  to  which  reference  has 
already  been  made.  Children  bom  out  of  wedlock  had  no  civil 
rights ;  but  adulterine  bastardy  was  occasionally  encouraged  by 
the  law.  A  strict  watch  was  kept  over  the  chastity  of  women  (a 
vigilance  which  the  best  accounts  show  to  have  been  exceedingly 
ineffectual),  while,  with  the  husband's  consent,  the  wife  was  suf- 
fered to  form  a  connexion  with  another  man  merely  to  gratify  his 
passion,  and  independent  of  the  adultery  permitted  for  the  sake  of 
securing  an  offspring.      Then,   with  all  this  indifference  on  the 


198  GOVEHNMEN'rS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XV. 

subject,  it  was  a  common  form  of  swearing  at  Sparta  to  wish  an 
enemy  four  great  curses,  of  which  one  was,  that  his  wife  might 
have  a  gallant.  It  is  true  that  the  other  three  (a  taste  for  build- 
ing, for  embankments,  and  for  horses)  all  turn  upon  expense, 
and  so  the  gallantry  might  be  reckoned  only  pernicious  from  its 
costliness. 

The  compelling  all  to  dine  in  public  seems  difficult  to  reconcile 
with  the  ballot  and  exclusion  from  the  messes.  How  were  those 
excluded  to  comply  with  the  law  ?  Then  how  were  those  to  obey 
who  could  not  pay  the  monthly  contribution  ?  Was  the  table 
only  for  the  homoioi  ?  But  then  the  hypomeiones  must  have  had 
more  freedom  than  the  privileged  class ;  and  so  greatly  was  free- 
dom prized  above  everything  else,  that  the  Spartan  looked  down 
with  contempt  on  all  who  even  laboured  voluntarily,  and  respected 
the  indolent  as  the  most  free. 

The  only  meat  allowed  is  said  to  have  been  the  black  broth 
and  boiled  pork.  Yet  we  are  told  that  whoever  went  out  to  hunt 
sent  what  he  caught  to  the  public  table.  By  whom  was  the  game 
eaten,  and  how  was  it  cooked  to  avoid  improving  the  fare,  and 
introducing  a  taste  for  luxury  ? 

Each  person  was  allowed  to  drink  as  much  wine  as  he  pleased, 
in  order  to  show  that  reliance  must  be  placed  on  his  temperance, 
and  that  it  was  no  virtue  unless  it  were  voluntary.  But  then,  to 
prevent  it  from  being  voluntary,  every  one  must  find  his  way  home 
in  the  dark.  Not  to  mention  that  this  late  hour  of  dining  or  sup- 
ping assumes  the  whole  company  to  have  eaten  in  private  during 
the  day,  contrary  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  system. 

There  was  an  inscription  or  notice  fixed  to  the  wall,  and  the 
young  Spartans  were  often  reminded  of  it  by  the  elders ;  nothing 
said  in  the  dinner-room  was  to  be  repeated  out-of-doors.  But  as 
all  the  people,  or  nearly  all,  were  admitted,  it  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  any  harm  could  be  done  by  the  disclosure. 

2.  But  the  division  of  property  seems  the  least  comprehensible 
part  of  the  polity.  The  allotments  of  land  could  not  be  sold  or 
divided,  and  all  encouragement  was  given  to  bringing  up  a  numer- 
ous family.  Then  how  were  the  younger  children  maintained  ? 
Yet  the  law  seemed  to  assume  that  every  citizen  had  the  means 
of  subsistence ;  for  in  the  earlier  times  all  who  served  in  war 
defrayed  their  whole  expenses,  and  every  male  from  twenty  to 
sixty  years  of  age  was  a  soldier.     It  was  only  in  later  times  that 


CH.  XV.  PAEADOXICAL  STATEMENTS.  1 99 

the  state  furnished  the  expenses  of  its  troops.  After  the  system  of 
Lycurgus  had  been  established  about  a  century,  the  conquest  of 
Messene  gave  a  large  increase  of  national  domain ;  but  two  or 
three  generations  must  have  again  filled  the  country  with  paupers. 
Were  the  Helots  and  Messenians  (the  actual  owners  of  the  land, 
subject  to  fixed  rents)  regarded  as  liable  to  be  dispossessed,  that 
is,  to  have  an  additional  number  of  manorial  lords  imposed  upon 
them  as  the  numbers  of  the  people  increased?  And  yet  all 
authors  are  agreed  in  stating  that  the  rent  paid  by  these  serfs  was 
never  raised.  Observe — no  explanation  of  the  difficulty  is  afforded 
by  the  fact  of  the  Spartans  diminishing  in  numbers ;  for  the 
Lacedaemonians,  the  perioeci,  freemen  inhabiting  the  country 
districts,  had  the  property  in  the  land  as  well  as  the  Spartans, 
and  their  numbers  increased  exceedingly.  At  the  first  division 
30,000  allotments  were  distributed  among  them,  above  three 
times  as  many  as  fell  to  the  share  of  the  townsfolk.  It  is  another 
difficulty  that  while  all  fortunes  were  required  to  be  equal,  certain 
citizens,  because  of  their  wealth,  furnished  horses  for  the  cavalry  ; 
and  these  were  used  only  by  inferior  troops,  the  infantry  being 
reckoned  the  more  honourable  service.  Nor  will  it  suffice  to  urge 
as  an  explanation  of  such  difficulties  that  the  ancient  writings  have 
preserved  only  an  imperfect  record  of  the  facts ;  for  the  ancients 
themselves  appear  to  have  felt  how  hard  it  was  to  comprehend 
the  Spartan  economy.  Aristotle  points  out  the  inconsistencies  of 
some  of  Lycurgus's  provisions  {Pol.  ii.).  Plato,  as  well  as  he, 
describes  the  luxury  and  insolence  of  the  Spartan  women,  whose 
domineering  nature  and  profligate  habits  have  hardly  been  denied 
by  any  writer  excepting  Plutarch. 

The  prohibiting  a  circulating  medium  appears  to  be  if  possible 
more  uniatelligible.  For  if  it  was  meant  to  prevent  the  accumu- 
lation of  wealth,  no  such  object  could  be  accomplished,  unless 
barter  were  forbidden  ;  and  though  free  men  and  women  might 
not  be  allowed  to  work  at  all  handicrafts,  in  some  they  could  em- 
ploy themselves ;  at  any  rate  they  could  buy  slaves  and  make 
them  work.  There  were  prohibitions  of  luxuries,  such  as  fine 
furniture  and  costly  ornaments ;  but  any  one  might  amass  such 
property,  though  he  could  not  display  it ;  and  to  the  possession 
of  slaves  and  cattle  there  wei^  no  limits. 

It  was  however  held  that  every  man's  cattle  might  be  used 
freely  by  his  neighbours ;  his  horses  ridden,  his  slaves  driven,  his 


200         GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA       CH.  XV. 

children  corrected.  Then  what  subjects  of  dispiite  could  there  be 
for  judges  to  determine,  except  perhaps  assaults  ?  And  yet  we 
are  told  that  the  magistrates  sat  daily  to  determine  causes,  and 
that  the  army  was  always  accompanied  by  judges  to  settle  the 
disputes  between  individuals,  without  troubling  the  commanding 
officers.  Though  no  professional  advocates  were  suffered,  the 
character  of  the  people  was  litigious  ;  and  their  avarice  was  almost 
as  proverbial  as  the  want  of  all  chastity  in  both  sexes.* 

In  all  the  doubt  and  difficulty,  however,  which  encompass  the 
subject,  there  appears  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  extra- 
ordinary state  of  society  which  Lycurgus's  institutions  either 
created  or  completed  had  a  duration  very  little  to  be  expected 
from  the  principles  upon  which  it  was  founded,  and  only  to  be 
explained  by  the  system  of  education  which  formed  its  principal 
constituent  part.  The  original  distribution  of  property  must 
needs  have  been  constantly  broken  in  upon  ;  and  the  complaints 
made  of  harsh  creditors,  at  an  early  period,  prove  that  wealth 
was  gradually  accumulated  in  different  hands.  The  introduction 
of  luxuries,  to  a  certain  extent,  also  took  place,  and  the  severe 
discipline  generally  was  in  some  measure  relaxed.  But  the 
great  features  of  the  system  were  to  be  traced  according  to  the 
commonly  received  accounts  at  the  end  of  five  centuries,  although 
the  Peloponnesian  war  and  the  conquest  of  Athens  had  produced 
considerable  changes,  and  though  Xenophon  admits,  at  the  end 
of  three  centuries,  that  important  deviations  had  taken  place  from 
the  ancient  regimen,  particularly  in  the  disposition  of  men  to  obtain 
provincial  and  foreign  governments,  to  amass  wealth,  and  rather  to 
possess  eminent  places  than  to  qualify  themselves  for  deserving 
them  {Rep.  Lac.  xv.).  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  de- 
generacy went  on  increasing  till  the  wars  of  Lysander  and  Agesi- 
laus.  The  consequent  intercourse  with  foreigners,  and  especially 
with  the  East,  a  century  later,  introduced  great  laxity  of  discipline, 
and  rendered  the  Spartan  habits  little  less  luxurious  than  those  of 
other  nations.  A  great  change  in  the  laws  respecting  property 
had  been  introduced,  probably  soon  after  the  Peloponnesian  war 
though  the  time  is  uncertain,  by  one  of  the  Ephori,  Epitadius, 
who  carried  an  ordinance  allowing  the  alienation  of  property  both 
by  gift,  sale,  and  devise.  But  it  is  probable  that  the  strictness  of 
the  former  law  had  been  gradually  relaxed  before  this  change, 

*  Aaxa/vi^wn  was  the  common  expiession  in  Greece  for  unnatural  practices. 


CH.  XV.  PROCEEDINGS  OF  PARTIES.  201 

and  that  it  only  added  the  power  of  devise  to  a  right  already 
recognised  of  conveyance  inter  vivos. 

A  considerable  number,  however,  of  the  privileged  class, 
(homoioi)  still  continued  to  take  a  pride  in  adhering  to  the 
old  discipline,  and  to  distinguish  themselves  by  this  which  had 
now  become  a  peculiarity  among  the  Spartans,  as  it  had  once 
been  a  mark  of  the  whole  class,  distinguishing  them  from  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  others  of  the  common  orders.  It  appears 
always  to  have  been  regarded  with  respect  by  the  people  at 
large  ;  and  the  general  recurrence  to  it  made  a  principal  part 
of  the  reforms  occasionally  propounded  by  those  who  were 
desirous  of  changing  the  aristocratic  form  which  the  govern- 
ment had  assumed.  We  are  not  informed  in  what  respect 
this  was  urged  by  Cinadon ;  but  it  formed  a  material  part  of 
the  plan  proposed  by  Agis,  and  afterwards  executed  by  Cleo- 
menes.  Agis  having  become  king  about  four  centuries  and  a 
half  after  the  time  of  Lycurgus,  took  the  lead  of  the  popular 
party,  and  his  colleague,  Leonidas,  appears  to  have  been  at  the 
head  of  the  Spartan  or  privileged  order,  Agis,  with  the  con- 
currence of  at  least  one  of  the  Ephori,  Lysander,  whose  elec- 
tion he  had  influenced,  proposed  the  redistribution  of  the  lands, 
the  reduction  of  the  Spartans  to  their  original  allotment,  the 
grant  of  the  residue  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  admission  of 
these  to  all  the  privileges  of  citizens,  and  the  filling  up  their  num- 
bers from  the  perioeci,  together  with  the  subjection  of  all  classes 
of  citizens  to  the  a,ncient  discipline.  He  made  a  voluntary  sur- 
render of  the  whole  property,  real  and  personal,  of  his  family,  as 
an  earnest  of  the  sincerity  and  honesty  of  his  motives  in  bringing 
forward  this  important  measure.  The  senate  rejected  the  propo- 
sition by  a  majority  of  one  ;  the  people  supported  Agis  ;  Lysander 
impeached  Leonidas,  the  leader  of  the  aristocratic  party ;  and, 
with  the  aid  of  the  people,  dethroned  him,  placing  Cleombrotus 
in  his  room.  A  new  election  of  Ephori  was  on  the  point  of  restor- 
ing Leonidas,  when  Agis  and  Cleombrotus  by  force  removed  them 
from  their  office,  and  prosecuted  their  reforms  with  the  help  of 
Agesilaus,  whose  election  as  an  Ephorus  they  had  brought  about. 
He  appears  to  have  betrayed  them,  having  a  large  estate  and 
heavy  debts,  and  resting  satisfied  with  a  measure  for  absolving  all 
creditors,  but  delaying  the  promised  distribution  of  lands.  This 
completely  alienated  the  people  from  the  party  of  the  two  kings 


202  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — SPARTA.  CH.  XV. 

and  Agesilaus,  who  began  to  act  oppressively,  and  excite  a  strong 
disposition  in  favour  of  Leonidas.  A  party  of  the  aristocracy 
therefore  recalled  him,  and  the  people,  deceived  in  their  expecta- 
tions of  the  only  reform  they  cared  for,  stood  by  and  saw  Leonidas 
restored,  and  Agis  dethroned  and  barbarously  miirdered,  with  his 
mother  and  grandmother.  Cleomenes,  who  succeeded  his  father, 
Leonidas,  and  married  Agis's  widow,  is  represented  as  having 
been  induced  by  her  to  renew  the  measures  of  her  husband ,  for 
whom  she  is  said  to  have  filled  him  with  the  greatest  admiration. 
It  is  much  more  probable  that  he  found  the  power  of  the  Ephori 
had  become  intolerable,  and  that  the  war  which  was  carrying  on 
with  the  Achseans  gave  him  a  pretext  for  introducing  a  change  of 
government,  as  indeed  it  afforded  a  good  reason  for  inducing  the 
people  to  make  extraordinary  efforts,  by  awakening  their  zeal  for 
the  public  service.  What  we  know  for  cenain  is  that  he  put  four 
of  the  Ephori  to  death,  abolished  the  office,  and  banished  eighty  of 
their  partizans,  brought  forward  at  the  same  time  the  measures 
of  Agis  for  dividing  the  lands,  set  the  example,  like  Agis,  by  giv- 
ing up  his  own  estates,  admitted  a  selected  body  of  the  perioeci, 
so  as  to  complete  the  number  of  the  homoioi,  cancelled  all  debts, 
and  restored  the  strict  education  and  discipline  established  by 
Lycurgus.  It  should  seem  that  for  some  time  at  least  he  had 
been  sole  king.  How  this  happened  we  are  not  told,  but  the 
prejudices  of  the  people  being  strongly  against  monarchy,  or  the 
government  of  one  king,  to  which  they  had  not  been  accustomed, 
he  had  his  brother  elected  king  with  him,  being  the  first  instance 
of  both  kings  taken  from  the  same  family.  These  changes  hap- 
pened in  the  year  230  b.  c.  The  vigour  which  they  gave  the 
government  enabled  Cleomenes  to  carry  everything  before  him  in 
the  war  with  the  Achseans,  who  could  only  make  head  against 
him  by  obtaining  the  aid  of  Antigonus,  the  Macedonian  general. 
He  defeated  the  Spartans,  drove  Cleomenes  from  his  kingdom, 
and  upon  the  same  principle  whicli  led  the  Russians  and  their 
allies  to  maintain  the  Polish  anarchy,  restored  the  government  of 
the  Ephori,  and  indeed  all  that  Cleomenes  had  abolished.  Tlie 
Spartans  were  soon  after  compelled  to  submit  and  join  the  Achaean 
league,  abandoning  for  ever  the  institutions  of  Lycurgus. 

It  is  manifest  that,  before  the  time  of  Agis,  the  aristocracy  had 
become  divided  into  two  classes,  the  wealthy  families,  about  one 
hundred  in  nimiber,  and  the  remaining  six  hundred,  who,  though 


CH.  XV.  DISTINCTION  OF  ORDERS.  203 

possessed  of  the  political  supremacy,  were  dependent  upon  the 
richer  citizens,  and  probably  in  most  cases  their  debtors.  The 
class  below  these,  the  hypomeiones,  and  descendants  of  freedmen 
and  foreigners,  in  all  probability  formed  nearly  the  same  kind  of 
order  with  the  poorer  of  the  homoioi,  and  took  part  with  them  in 
supporting  Agis  and  Cleomenes  in  their  revolutionary  measures  ; 
hoping,  if  not  to  share  in  the  lands  distributed,  at  least  to  have 
their  debts  cancelled.  The  party  of  the  Ephori,  the  aristocracy, 
or  rather  the  oligarchy,  as  contradistinguished  from  the  rest  of  the 
aristocracy  (homoioi),  were  probably  the  wealthy  families,  eighty 
of  whom  Cleomenes  banished. 


204         GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.      CH.  XVL 


1 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS. 


Authors — Early  History — Cecrops ;  Theseus — Threefold  Division  of  the  People — 
Ancient  OfBcers — Panathenaea — Kings  —  Archons  —  Eupatridse  —  Polemarch ; 
Eponymus  ;  Basileus  ;  Thesmothetae — Classes  ;  Pedrsei  ;  Diacrii  ;  Paralii — 
Anarchy — Draco — Solon — Errors  respecting  his  Legislation — Solon's  Reforms  ; 
Archons ;  Colleges  ;  Paredri — Courts  of  Justice — Areopagus — Heliastae — Infe- 
rior Magistrates — Pure  Democracy — Classes  of  the  People  ^Population — Slaves 
— Effects  of  Slavery ;  Xenophon ;  Plato ;  Diogenes — Phylae ;  Phratria; ;  Genea ; 
Trityes ;  Demi — The  Ecclesia — Senate — Elections ;  Scrutiny — Prytanes ;  Epis- 
tata— Euthynae;  Logistse — Voting;  Ballot — Areopagus — Its  Powers  ;  its  Com- 
position— Logistae  ;  Euthynae — Mars  Hill ;  St.  Paul — Heliaea — American  Court 
— Ephetae. 

The  government  of  Athens  and  tlie  Athenian  history  generally 
are  more  fully  known  than  those  of  Sparta.  The  writers  whose 
works  have  reached  us  are  all  Athenians,  or  inhabitants  of  the 
colonies  and  provinces  which  had  constant  intercourse  with 
Athens.  They  therefore,  though  living  at  a  distance  of  time 
from  the  earlier  stages  of  the  constitution,  were  yet  fully  acquainted 
with  its  structure  and  working  in  their  own  age,  and  wherever 
they  have  left  any  uncertamty  in  treating  of  their  earlier  institu- 
tions it  has  rather  been  owing  to  their  omitting  to  describe  what 
they  consider  every  one  must  know,  than  from  the  subject  being 
unknown  to  themselves.  The  more  early  portions  of  their  con- 
stitutional history  are  necessarily  involved  in  the  doubt  and 
obscurity  inseparable  from  such  inquiriea 

About  thirty  years  before  the  Phoenicians  made  their  inroad 
into  Greece,  as  we  mentioned  in  Chapter  XIII.,  Athens  is  sup- 
posed to  have  been  founded  by  Cecrops.  The  date  of  this  event 
is,  as  we  before  stated,  variously  assigned.  Sir  I.  Newton  placing 
it  nearly  five  centuries  later  than  the  greater  number  of  ancient 
authorities ;  but  with  the  balance  of  probability  altogether  on  his 


CH.  XVI.  EARLY  HISTORY  205 

side,  ho  assigns  the  year  1080  B.  c.  for  the  foundation  of  the 
city. 

Cecrops  is  generally  believed  to  have  come  from  Egypt ;  but  he 
may  very  possibly  have  been  a  chief  of  the  Pelasgi,  the  original 
inhabitants  of  Greece  ;  and  the  Athenians  over  whom  he  obtained 
his  dominion  were  most  probably  a  tribe  of  that  nation,  first  called 
Cranai,  from  the  name  of  a  former  chief,  though  they  are  fre- 
quently described  as  a  tribe  of  the  lonians  who  had  invaded 
Greece  from  Thessaly.  Cecrops  is  represented  as  having  col- 
lected them  into  twelve  tribes  or  towns,  of  which  Athens,  then 
called  after  him  Cecropia,  was  the  most  considerable,  being  built 
around  a  rocky  hill  or  stronghold  where  he  had  fortified  himself 
The  other  towns  were  only  very  imperfectly  under  his  dominion, 
each  having  its  own  chief  and  senate  or  council  of  elders,  and  all 
living  in  constant  alarm  from  the  Boeotians,  a  powerful  nation  in 
their  neighbourhood,  as  well  as  in  a  state  of  frequent  war  with 
each  other.  Under  the  successors  of  Cecrops  Athens  retained, 
in  general,  the  same  kind  of  precarious  and  irregular  influence 
over  the  other  eleven  states,  and  it  was  not  till  the  time  of  The- 
seus, in  the  latter  part  of  the  tenth  century  before  our  era,  that 
anything  like  a  regular  system  of  government  can  be  said  to  have 
been  established,  even  if  we  take  the  traditions  which  remain  of 
his  times  as  authentic  history.  The  Cretans  having  obtained 
some  decisive  victories  over  the  Athenians,  he  restored  their  inde- 
pendence, and  using  the  power  which  this  gave  him,  j^artly  by 
persuasion,  partly  by  the  protection  which  he  could  afford  them 
against  invasion,  he  induced  the  eleven  towns  to  give  up  their 
separate  councils,  and  all  unite  under  one  government  and  one 
council  at  Athens,  whither  he  had  attracted  a  great  concourse 
and  established  in  it  a  powerful  force.*  He  is  said  to  have  given 
up  in  a  great  measure  his  own  regal  authority,  retaining  only  the 
command  of  the  forces  and  execution  of  the  laws,  and  to  have 
divided  the  people  into  three  classes,  the  well-bom  or  patricians 
{eupatridce),-f'  the  agriculturists  (geomori),  and  the  artisans  {dc- 
*  Thucyd.,  ii.,  15,  says  he  was  powerful  as  well  as  prudent  or  wise — fura  tov 

f  'Evrarpilai,  ytufjui^oi,  "htifjiiov^yoi.  The  division  into  four  tribes  whose  names  were 
repeatedly  changed  has  probably  given  rise  to  some  confusion  ;  for  it  is  said  that 
Erechtheus  gave  them  the  names  of  armed  artisans,  farmers,  and  shepherds,  which 
is  plainly  the  threefold  division  expanded.  Yet  it  is  also  possible  that  the  two 
divisions  were  different,  and  that  the  fourfold  division  may  have  been  only  of  the 
Eupatridse,  or  of  the  Eupatridae  and  Geomori. 


206  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.      CH.  XVI. 

miurgi),  confining  to  the  first  the  right  of  sitting  in  the  council 
or  senate,*  of  superintending  religious  rites,  making  laws,  and 
holding  magistracies.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  judicature 
{prytanewni)  as  well  as  a  council  established.  |  What  these  ma- 
gistracies were,  or  how  they  were  conferred,  and  how  the  council 
and  judicature  were  chosen,  we  have  not  the  least  information, 
except  that  polemarchi,  or  commanders,  colacretce,  or  treasurers, 
naucrarii,  or  collectors  of  imposts,  and  phylobasileis,  or  chiefs 
of  tribes,  are  all  mentioned  occasionally  as  most  ancient  officers ; 
but  the  frequent  mention  in  after  times  of  a  popular  government 
as  the  work  of  Theseus  makes  it  probable  (as  U.  Emmius  has 
observed^)  that  the  choice  of  magistrates  was  lodged  in  the  upper 
class,  if  not  in  the  others  also.  We  are  equally  ignorant  in  what 
manner  the  confederate  or  subject  towns  sent  their  deputies  to 
the  council,  or  indeed  whether  they  sent  any  at  all,  and  were  not 
entirely  under  the  power  of  the  Athenian  government  for  the  sup- 
port of  which  all  appear  to  have  paid  tribute. §  But  the  one 
institution  which  can  with  tolerable  certainty  be  traced  to  Theseus, 
and  which  continued  ever  after,  had  a  direct  reference  to  the 
federal  union,  and  was  plainly  designed  to  maintain  it.  A  yearly 
festival  was  established,  at  which  all  the  inhabitants  of  Attica 
were  present,  and  which  was  hence  called  the  pa7iathencea.\\ 

The  chiefs  or  kings  who  succeeded  Theseus  soon  extended 
their  authority,  and  diminished  that  of  the  council  and  people  ; 
and  Codrus,  who  reigned  about  a  century  and  a  half  after  him, 
having  fallen  (it  is  said,  voluntarily  sacrificed  himself)  in  the  first 
war  between  the  Athenians  and  Dorians,  the  royal  power  was 
much  abridged,  and  the  name  of  king  changed  to  archon  or  first 
magistrate.  A  century  and  a  half  later, IT  the  archon 's  office  in- 
stead of  being  for  life  was  given  only  for  ten  years,  and  in  less 

*  BovXtvTti^iov.  Plutarch  (  Vit.  Thes.)  says  the  senate  still  met  in  the  same  place 
where  Theseus  had  planted  it. 

t  Plutarch  (whose  account  is  the  most  minute  in  other  respects)  mentions  less 
distinctly  than  Thucydides  there  being  a  prytanenm  as  well  as  a  senate. 

X   Vet.  Gracia.     {De  Rep.  Ath.) 

5  Thucyd..  ii.,  15. 

II  naiaSnvaiix.  There  were  other  games  called  ftiniKia  or  migratory,  and  (tvwuiia. 
or  cohabitative,  with  a  reference  to  a  union  of  the  provinces,  similar  to  that  of  the 

^  The  ordinary  account  makes  the  hereditary  archons  continue  for  31.5  years 
(C.  Sigon,,  De  Rep.  Ath.,  and  De  Ath.  Temp.—V.  Emmius,  Vet.  Gr.  Rep.  Ath.)  ; 
but  the  Newtonian  account  is  followed  in  the  text. 


CH.  XVI.  ARCnONS.  207 

than  fifty  years  it  became  annual.  The  principal  change  intro- 
duced on  the  death  of  Codrus  appears  to  have  been  that  the 
archon  was  rendered  accountable  to  the  senate  and  people  like 
other  magistrates  ;  but  the  office  continued  to  be  hereditary,  the 
senate  and  people  only  interfering  in  cases  of  disputed  succession. 
When  the  decennial  archons  were  substituted,  the  election  became 
vested  in  the  people,  that  is,  in  the  patrician  class  (eupatridcB) ;  and 
when  the  office  became  annual,  it  was  held,  not  by  one,  but  by 
nine,  chosen  in  the  same  manner,*  of  whom  one  was  the  chief, 
giving  his  name  to  the  year,  and  hence  called  eponymus ;  another 
was  polemarch,  or  commander  of  the  forces ;  and  a  third  was 
called  king,  having  the  superintendence  of  religious  matters.  The 
other  six  were  called  thesmothetcB,  having  the  guardianship  of 
the  laws,  probably,  with  the  patrician  body,  a  legislative,  and 
certainly  a  large  judicial  power.  The  whole  government  appears 
to  have  been  in  the  hands  of  the  nine,  and  they  were  elected  by 
the  patrician  order  and  out  of  their  own  body.  The  order  had 
now  obtained  great  power  over  the  community.  They  had  lent 
money  to  the  poorer  landowners,  and  by  usury  not  only  had 
amassed  sufficient  wealth  to  purchase  almost  all  the  land  in  the 
country,  but  had  obtained  the  power  of  exercising  great  opprcb,- 
sion  over  the  inferior  classes.  There  were  no  longer  any  consi- 
derable number  of  small  proprietors,  unless  in  the  mountainous 
districts ;  and  the  country,  in  consequence  of  the  distribution  of 
landed  property,  was  split  into  parties  opposing  each  other  with 
bitter  animosity.  These  factions  had  continued  from  the  time  of 
Cylon,  who,  endeavouring  to  destroy  the  influence  of  the  Alcmaeo- 
nidae  family,  descendants  of  the  last  hereditary  archon,  and  to 
make  himself  tyrant  or  chief  of  the  state,  had  failed  in  the  attempt 
But  three  parties  were  now  formed — the  pedroei,  inhabitants  of  tlie 
plains,  who  were  oligarchical ;  the  diacrii,  inhabitants  of  the  hilly 
country,  who  were  democratic ;  and  the  paralii,  or  those  con- 
nected with  the  commerce  of  the  coast,  who  wavered  between  the 
other  two,  but  generally  were  said  to  favour  a  mixed  form  of 
government.     The  confusion  which  their  proceedings  first  occa- 


•  Thucydides  (i.,  126)  speaks  of  the  nine  archons  as  well  established  at  the  time 
of  Cylon's  sedition.  But  they  must  have  been  known  from  the  time  of  Creon,  the 
first  yearly  archon,  which  by  the  common  chronology  was  90  years,  and  by  the 
Newtonian  45,  before  Solon.  The  former  places  Solon  at  the  beginning,  the  latter 
about  the  middle,  of  the  sixth  century  before  Christ. 


208  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.      CH.  XVI. 

sioned,  induced  the  community  to  call  upon  Draco,  a  man  of  tried 
integrity  and  great  capacity,  though  of  a  severe  and  unyielding 
temper,  to  prepare  a  code  of  laws,  which  till  then  they  never  had 
possessed ;  and  when  this  was  found  ineffectual,  chiefly  because 
he  had  left  everything  untouched  that  related  to  the  government 
and  its  administration,  recourse  was  a  few  years  afterwards  had 
to  Solon,  one  of  the  wisest  and  most  learned  men  of  the  age. 
Being  himself  of  a  noble  family,  he  obtained  the  confidence  of  the 
patricians,  who  seeing  that  some  reform  was  absolutely  necessary 
to  prevent  anarchy,  were  better  pleased  it  should  be  in  the  hands 
of  a  man  of  their  own  order  than  intrusted  to  the  common  people. 
He  was  enabled  to  keep,  and  even  to  extend  his  favour  with  both 
the  patrician  and  plebeian  classes :  with  the  former,  by  giving 
the  constitution  a  somewhat  aristocratic  character  in  one  important 
particular ;  with  the  latter,  by  a  strong  measure  which  he  carried 
for  relieving  debtors  not  only  from  arrest,  but  from  a  considerable 
portion  of  their  existing  burdens.* 

Of  course  everything  that  had  existed  before,  as  well  as  every- 
thing that  he  introduced  into  the  institutions  of  the  state,  was 
afterwards  ascribed  to  Solon.  But  it  is  demonstrated  beyond  all 
possibility  of  question  that  the  principal  feature  of  the  government, 
the  nine  yearly  archons,  with  their  several  departments,  existed  at 
least  half  a  century  before  Solon's  legislation, — that  the  Areopa- 
gus, though  greatly  improved  by  him,  was  established  long  before 
his  time, — ^and  that  the  chief  doubt  rests  upon  the  existence  of  a 
senate  in  former  ages,  though  some  council  of  the  kind  probably 
was  estabHshed.  It  is  certain  that  he  adopted  the  more  important 
of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  old  constitution,  and  retained 
its  most  important  parts.  Then,  as  many  things  were  ascribed  to 
him  which  he  found  already  established  and  only  improved,  so 
other  things,  which  were  introduced  long  after  his  age,  were  sup- 
posed to  be  parts  of  his  plan.  It  becomes  therefore  very  difficult 
to  describe  the  government  as  he  left  it,  and  then  to  trace  the 
changes  which  it  afterwards  underwent.  We  know  that  most  of 
his  institutions  were  preserved  ;  that  the  usurpation  of  Pisistratus 
during  his  lifetime,  and  the  supreme  power  which  he  left  to  his 

*  The  Seisachthia,  or  relief  from  burdens,  is  variously  understood.  Some  con- 
ceive it  to  have  been  an  extinction  or  reduction  of  interest  upon  an  increase  of  the 
principal,  ■which  seems  improbable ;  others  represent  it  as  a  raising  the  denomina- 
tion of  the  currency  ;  others  as  a  partial  amnesty. 


€H.  XVI.  SOLON'S  REFORMS.  209 

family  (the  Pisistratidse),  did  not  change  any  of  Solon's  laws,  and 
consisted  only  in  their  engrossing  the  chief  of  the  offices  which  he 
had  estabhshed  ;*  that  Clisthenes  upon  their  expulsion,  half  a 
century  after  Solon,  extended  the  influence  of  the  people,  new 
modelled  the  tribes  and  senate,  and  greatly  curbed  the  aristocracy  -jf 
that  Aristides  thirty  years  later  destroyed  the  last  remains  of  the 
oHgarchical  power  by  opening  all  magistracies  to  the  lowest  class 
of  the  people  ;  and  that  ultimately  a  republican  government  was 
estabhshed,  though  originally  the  form  had  inclined  towards 
aristocracy.  But  the  particular  changes  through  which  this  event 
was  accomplished  we  have  no  means  of  tracing,  and  it  therefore 
becomes  more  convenient  that  we  should  at  once  proceed  to  con- 
sider the  government  in  its  last  stage,  when  all  the  arrangements 
to  which  ancient  writers  refer  had  been  introduced.  We  may, 
therefore,  look  at  the  constitution  as  it  existed  in  PhiHp's  time. 

The  names  and  many  of  the  duties  of  the  ancient  magistrates 
were  retained  by  Solon  ;  but  their  powers  were  first  in  his  time, 
and  then  by  the  gradual  encroachments  and  final  supremacy  of 
the  democracy,  reduced  withia  very  narrow  limits.  They  were 
all  chosen  by  the  people,  and  all  held  their  offices  for  a  year  only. 
The  principal  change  made  by  Solon  in  the  form  of  their  proceed- 
ings was  that  the  archons  before  his  time  all  acted  separately — not 
merely  the  three  first,  but  the  six  thesmothetse ;  whereas  he  gave 
them  the  functions  of  two  colleges,  enabling  them  to  sit  together 
as  judges.  It  should  seem,  however,  that  these  six  came  to  act 
chiefly  in  the  capacity  of  judicial  officers  and  guardians  of  the 
police  of  the  city  j  the  three  chief  archons  presiding  with  two 
assessors  each  (paredri)  in  one  or  other  of  the  ten  high  courts  or 
tribunals  in  which  civil  and  criminal  justice  was  administered. 
In  five  of  these  courts  the  presiding  archon  chose  by  lot  the  other 
members  of  the  court  acting  as  jurors,  and  who  generally 
amounted  to  five  hundred,  upon  extraordinary  occasions  to  twice 
as  many  in  the  more  important  court.  In  four  of  them,  which 
tried  homicides  of  different  descriptions,  the  numbers  were  much 

*  Herodotus  (i.  59)  praises  Pisistratus  for  his  good  and  just  administration  of  the 
government,  and  says  that  he  changed  nothing  of  its  fundamental  principles.  Thu- 
cydides  (vi.,  ,54)  praises  the  valour  and  wisdom  of  the  Pisistratidse,  and  says  that 
they  governed  by  the  existing  laws,  always  taking  care  to  appoint  themselves  to 
the  higher  offices. 

t  The  changes  recorded  as  made  by  Clisthenes,  except  the  ostracism,  do  not  appear 
to  bear  directly  on  the  oligarchy.     Concerning  Clisthenes,  see  Herod,  v.  66-()9. 
PART  II.  P 


210  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVI. 

smaller,  and  were  taken  from  a  list  of  fifty-one  returned  by  the 
tribes.  In  one,  the  Areopagus,  the  places  were  held  for  life,  and 
no  jurors  attended  it.  The  person  of  every  archon  was  held 
sacred,  and  any  insult  to  him  was  punished  by  the  loss  of  all 
civil  rights.  Their  election  was  vested  in  the  people,  and,  by  the 
law  of  Aristides,  abrogating  that  of  Solon,  every  citizen  was  ca- 
pable of  being  chosen.  But  every  person  chosen  underwent  two 
scrutinies  ;  one  before  the  senate,  or  rather  a  select  body  of  the 
senate,  the  prytanes  ;  the  other  before  the  tribunal  of  the  heliasts.* 
They  must  show  that  they  were  descended  of  Athenian  parents 
for  three  generations,  that  they  had  borne  arms  in  the  service  of 
the  state,  and  that  their  domestic  character  was  free  from  reproach. 
At  the  end  of  their  year  they  were  eligible  to  the  Areopagus  upon 
passing  their  accounts,  and  undergoing  a  new  scrutiny  as  to  their 
official  conduct. 

Of  the  inferior  magistrates,  some  were  chosen  by  the  people, 
and  others  by  lot.  Most  of  these  magistracies  were  in  the  hands 
of  ten  persons,  each  tribe  choosing  one  either  by  election  or  by  lot, 
and  none  held  his  office  above  a  year. 

The  various  officers  possessed  some,  but  only  a  moderate  de- 
gree of  influence ;  the  archons  chiefly,  when  they  could  agree 
and  act  in  one  body.  But  the  government  could  hardly  be  said 
to  be  administered  by  them  at  all.  They  were  in  truth  the  ser- 
vants or  instruments  of  the  great  councils,  the  Assembly,  the 
Senate,  the  Areopagus,  and  the  Helisea,  all  of  which  bodies  being 
chosen  annually,  and  chosen  by  lot,  except  the  Areopagus,  the 
government  might  truly  be  said  to  be  directly  administered  by  the 
great  body  of  the  people.  In  what  manner  this  administration 
was  carried  on  we  are  now  to  see. 

The  first  division  of  the  people  is  that  into  natives,  foreigners 
(metosai),  and  slaves.  The  numbers  of  the  Athenian  people  have 
given  rise  to  considerable  dispute  among  antiquaries  and  political 
reasoners.  Mr.  Hume,  in  arguing  against  the  supposed  popu- 
lousness  of  ancient  nations,-}-  estimates  the  free  inhabitants  of 
Athens  at  84,000,  the  foreigners  at  40,000,  and  the  slaves  at 
160,000  only.     But  though  he  probably  comes  near  enough  the 


♦  The  a»a*f;<rif  seems  to  have  come  befort-  the  election ;  the  iiiificKna  after.  The 
former  tried  the  qualification,  as  citizenship  by  three  descents ;  the  latter  scrutinized 
chai-acter. 

t  Essays,  Part  II.,  2. 


CH.  XVI.  SLAVEBY ;  ITS  EFFECTS  211 

truth  as  to  the  two  first  classes,  there  is  every  reason  to  beheve 
that  the  slaves  were  much  more  numerous  ;  according  to  the 
most  credible  accounts  400,000.*  The  treatment  which  they 
received  was  very  different  from  that  of  the  Spartan  slaves,  still 
more  from  that  of  the  serfs  or  helots  ;  it  appears  not  to  have  been 
extremely  severe.  Yet  we  may  remark  the  extent  to  which 
slavery  had  perverted  the  feelings  of  even  the  worthiest  and  most 
humane  persons  from  the  manner  in  which  such  a  writer  as 
Xenophon  speaks  of  the  servile  condition.  He  mentions  the  in- 
solence of  slaves,  and,  indeed,  of  foreigners,  whom  he  treats  as 
if  they  belonged  to  the  class  of  freedmen,  if  not  of  slaves  ;  and  he 
seems  almost  to  complain  of  the  law  which  prevented  beating 
them, — ^that  is,  beating  another  man's  slave  to  repress  his  inso- 
lence,— assigning  as  the  only  reason  for  the  prohibition  that  other- 
wise there  would  be  a  risk  of  beating  free  citizens,  who  could  not 
be  distinguished  from  slaves  by  their  outward-|-  appearance.  It 
is  another  proof  how  deeply  rooted  the  existence  of  slavery  was 
in  the  minds  of  the  Greeks,  indeed  of  all  ancient  nations,  that  free 
citizens  of  all  their  own  states  might  be  sold  into  slavery,  and  held 
as  slaves  equally  with  foreigners,  or,  as  they  were  termed,  bar- 
barians. Plato  himself  was,  in  returning  from  Syracuse,  sold  into 
slavery  by  the  perfidy  of  a  Spartan  ambassador,  acting  in  league 
with  the  tyrant  Dionysius,  to  whom  the  philosopher  had  given 
some  offence  :  he  was  ransomed  for  about  a  hundred  pounds. 
Diogenes  was  sold  by  pirates,  who  captured  the  vessel  he  was 
saiUng  in ;  and  refusing  to  be  ransomed,  he  passed  the  rest  of  his 
life  in  slavery,  but  as  the  instructor  of  his  master's  children. 

The  whole  people  were  divided  into  ten  tribes  (phylce), 
Chsthenes  having  changed  the  ancient  division  of  four  into  ten. 
Each  of  the  four  ancient  tribes  was  divided  into  three  vestries  or 
phratrice  (resembling  the  Roman  eurice),  and  each  phratria  into 
thirty  families  (genea).  The  ten  tribes,  which  were  local,  were 
made  up  of  demi.  There  was  a  division  of  each  of  them  into  three 
parts,  called  Trityes.  These  divisions  seem  to  have  been  chiefly 
subservient  to  the  sacrifices  and  other  religious  solemnities,  like 
the  Roman  division  of  gentes.  There  was  another  division  into  dis- 

*  Mr.  Hume's  arguments  have  been  refuted  by  other  writers.  See  particularly 
Clinton's  Fasti  Hellenici ;  aud  he  may  have  been  misled  by  the  supposition  that 
the  passage  in  Athenaeus  refers  to  the  proportion  of  slaves  fit  to  bear  arms. 

f  Xen.,  De  Rep.  Ath.,  cap.  i. 

p  2 


212.'         GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.      CH  XVI. 

tricts  or  villages  called  demi  ;  and  this  had  a  reference  to  the  en- 
rolment of  the  citizens ;  for  no  one  could  claim  his  civil  rights 
unless  he  belonged  to  a  deraus  and  a  jphyla  (a  village  and  tribe). 
There  were  officers  at  the  head  of  each  division  and  subdivision  : 
over  the  tribes  there  was  a  phylobasileus ;  over  the  vestry  a 
phratriareha  ;  over  the  village  a  demarchus.  This  division  was 
also  subservient  to  the  military  system,  the  tribes  raLsing  each  its 
quota  of  men,  and  commanded  by  the  phylarchus,  and  those  of 
the  subdivisions,  demi,  under  the  several  demarchi.  A  classifi- 
cation of  another  kind  had,  however,  been  made  by  Solon.  He 
not  only  retained  but  extended  the  aristocratic  principle  of  the 
older  government ;  but  he  substituted  an  aristocracy  of  wealth 
for  the  old  one  of  birth.  He  divided  the  citizens  into  three 
classes  according  to  their  income,  as  they  had  an  income  of  five 
hundred,  three  hundred,  or  two  hundred  bushels  of  grain.  From 
these  classes  alone  could  magistrates  and  senators  be  chosen  :  all 
the  inferior  orders  formed  a  class  by  themselves,  excluded  from 
political  office,  but  allowed  to  act  as  a  kind  of  juryman,  in  assist- 
ing the  magistrates  at  the  trial  of  causes,  and  allowed  also  to  sit 
and  vote  in  the  assembly  of  the  people  (ecclesia).  Aristides 
abolished  all  distinction  between  the  classes,  making  every  one 
eligible  to  all  offices.* 

In  that  assembly  (ecclesia)  the  whole  legislative  as  well  as  ad- 
ministrative power  was  lodged,  subject  only  to  the  powers  of  the 
archons  as  executive  and  judicial  officers  chosen  annually  by  the 
assembly.  Peace  and  war,  alliances,  taxes,  expenditure,  legis- 
lation, were  all  intrusted  to  the  same  body,  which  likewise 
chose  all  the  superior  magistrates,  the  inferior  ones  being  selected 
by  lot.  To  the  assembly,  also,  were  all  magistrates  responsible 
for  their  official  conduct ;  liable  to  be  tried  before  it  by  impeach- 

♦  G.  Postellis,  De  Rep.  Ath.,  c.  21.  This  treatise  gives  a  distinct  and  concise 
summary  of  the  magistracies,  but  it  is  written  with  a  political  bias,  at  least  with 
frequent  reference  to  Venice. — J.  Meurs.,  Solon,  cap.  14. — Car.  Sigon.,  De  Hep. 
Atk.  ii.  2 — J.  Meurs.,  Attic.  Led.,  v,  20. — In  some  writers  there  is  a  reference 
to  J.  Pollux  on  the  Census  of  Solon ;  and  there  must  be  an  error,  possibly  in 
the  editions  (codices),  as  great  as  any  of  those  corrected  by  J.  Meursius  in  his 
various  most  learned  treatises.  It  is  said  that  the  first  class  paid  a  talent  in  taxes, 
the  second  half  a  talent ;  yet  the  whole  income  of  the  first  was  five  hundred  bushels, 
and  of  the  second  three  hundred,  which  at  five  drachms  a  bushel  (the  price  cited 
in  various  places)  would  make  the  whole  income  of  the  one  class  eighty-four,  and 
of  the  other  fifty  pounds,  out  of  which  they  were  to  pay  nearly  two  hundred 
and  a  hundred  pounds  respectively.  This  subject  is  elaborately  examined  in  Beckh's 
Public  Economy  of  Athens,  book  iv.,  sect.  5. 


CH.  XVI.  GENKRAL  ASSEMBLY.  213 

ment,  and  to  be  punished  by  its  sentence.  This  assembly  met 
four  times  in  every  prytaneia  of  thirty-five  days,  or  about  once 
every  nine  days ;  but  it  was  called  together  on  any  occasion  that 
required  its  interposition,  either  by  the  senate  or  by  the  chief 
archon,  or  by  the  military  conimanders  with  the  senate's  permis- 
sion. The  checks  upon  its  power  were  originally  considerable  ; 
and  some  of  them  continued  at  all  times,  though  some  had  ceased 
to  operate.  The  president  (the  epistata,  or  chief  of  the  proedri) 
was  always  a  member  of  the  senate,  and  it  was  he  who  generally 
brought  the  business  forward.  No  resolution  could  be  taken  by 
it  unless  the  senate  had  pre^aously  sanctioned  it  by  its  vote.  A 
measure  adopted  by  the  senate  was  valid  and  binding  for  one  year, 
whether  the  assembly  confirmed  it  or  not ;  but  no  decree  of  the 
assembly  could  bind  till  the  senate  confirmed.  But  as  the  power 
of  the  people  increased,  even  though  the  senate,  having  so  much 
to  hope  or  fear  at  their  hands  in  the  amount  and  distribution  of 
magistracies,  became  extremely  subservient  to  the  assembly,  yet 
the  latter,  not  content  with  their  influence,  by  degrees  assumed 
the  direct  power,  not  only  of  rejecting  the  senate's  propositions,  a 
power  which  they  always  possessed,  but  of  making  decrees  and 
laws  to  which  no  previous  sanction  of  the  senate  had  been  given. 
To  sit  and  vote  in  the  assembly  required  no  qualification,  except 
being  twenty  years  of  age  and  a  native  Athenian  ;  but  whoever 
was  degraded  by  any  infamous  crime  was  incapacitated  from  at- 
tending ;  and  it  was  a  capital  offence  for  a  foreigner  to  be  present. 
The  ordinary  meetings  were  thinly  attended,  and  it  was  often 
necessary  to  send  officers  around  for  the  purpose  of  compelling 
those  in  the  street  to  come  in  under  pain  of  being  fined.  The 
strict  rule  required  six  thousand  to  be  present  when  personal 
laws,  as  decrees,  of  baoishment  or  naturalisation,  were  made  ;  but 
Thucydides  tells  us  that,  for  many  years  of  the  war,  so  many 
citizens  had  been  abroad  on  service  or  on  business,  that  it  had 
never  been  found  possible  to  assemble  five  thousand.  The  ex- 
pedient of  giving  pay  to  such  as  attended  was  latterly  resorted  to ; 
and  four  pence  a  day  was  found  sufficient  to  attract  the  poorer 
classes.  On  great  emergencies  all  the  citizens,  that  is,  all  the 
people  of  Attica  as  well  as  the  townsfolk,  were  summoned.*  It 
was  some  check  upon  their  proceedings  that  the  old  were  allowed 
to  speak  first,  and  for  some  ages  no  one  under  fifty  could  begin  a 

*  Thucyd.  vii.,  72. 


214  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.      CH.  XVL 

debate.  It  was  a  more  effectual  practical  restraint  that,  though 
every  one  had  a  right  to  speak,  hardly  any  one  ever  thought  of 
it  but  the  appointed  orators  of  the  state.  But  the  proceedings 
were  generally  as  tumultuous  and  as  noisy  as  might  be  expected 
in  these  circumstances.* 

The  Senate  was  probably  at  first  the  council  of  the  king, 
and  then  of  the  archon ;  but  when  that  oflSce  became  annual,  the 
senate's  authority  must  have  greatly  increased.  Solon  appears 
only  to  have  increased  its  numbers,  and  made  its  power  more 
solid.  The  chief  prerogatives  of  the  government  being  after- 
wards transferred  to  the  popular  body,  the  senate  had  much  less 
influence  than  before  ;  but  it  always  retained  considerable  weight 
in  the  administration.  Solon  had  required  that  every  resolu- 
tion of  the  popular  assembly  should  first  be  sanctioned  by  a 
decree  of  the  senate ;  but  this  afterwards  ceased  to  be  the  law. 
Yet  the  ordinary  course  of  proceeding  was  that  both  should  con- 
cur, and  it  was  held  to  be  a  principle  of  the  constitution  that  the 
senate's  decrees  had,  without  any  confirmation  by  the  popidar 
assembly,  the  force  of  law  for  a  year.  Certain  questions  seem  to 
have  been  reckoned  its  pecuHar  province,  and  those  of  great  im- 
portance, as  peace  and  war,  the  raising  of  money  for  the  public 
service,  the  care  of  the  navy,  and  of  all  matters  concerning  the 
religion  of  the  state.  But  it  entertained  apparently  all  questions 
of  a  public  nature.  Its  jurisdiction  as  a  court  was  exceedingly 
confined.  If  any  case  of  a  pressing  nature  arose,  not  admitting 
delay,  the  senate  considered  it,  and  either  sent  it  to  be  tried  by 
the  ordinary  tribunals,  or  inflicted  a  fine,  in  imposing  which  it 
could  not  exceed  five  hundred  drachmae  (about  15l.)-f  It  had 
the  power  of  expelling  its  own  members,  as  well  as  of  deciding 
upon  their  quaUfications  when  returned. 

The  numbers  of  Solon's  senate  were  four  himdred  ;  Clisthenes 
raised  them  to  five  himdred ;  and  they  were  chosen  by  lot 
from  all  the  tribes.  Each  tribe  returned  fifty,§  and  fifty  more  as 
substitutes,!  to  take  the  places  of  those  who  might  die,  or  be  found 
disqualified  on  the  scrutiny.  On  being  so  returned  each  person 
underwent  a  scrutiny  ( cZocimasia)  as  to  his  character  and  life,  and 
he  might  afterwards  be  impeached  before  the  senate  itself  for  any- 

•   U.  Emmius,   Vet.  Grae.  {Hep.  Ath.)— Cur.  Sigou.,  De  Rep.  Ath.,  ii..  4 
t  Demostheues  expressly  states  this  to  be  the  limit  of  its  judicial  power 


CH.  XVI.  PRTTANES.  21 5 

thing  tending  to  disqualify  him,  as  we  see  in  some  of  the  orations 
that  still  remain.*  The  five  hundred  being  chosen  were  divided 
into  bodies  or  sections  of  fifty  each,  who  presided  in  their  turn, 
each  of  the  first  four  sections  for  thirty  days,  each  of  the  other  six 
for  thirty-five.  The  presiding  section  was  termed  the  prytanes ; 
and  there  is  some  controversy  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  pre- 
siding officers  of  the  sections  were  chosen.  One  opinion  seems  to 
be,  that  each  section  divided  itself  into  five  bodies  of  ten  each,  and 
that  each  of  the  first  seven  of  each  ten  was  the  chief,  or  epistata, 
in  his  turn  presiding  one  day  in  the  senate,  while  the  other  three 
of  each  ten  were  left  out  altogether. — Another  opinion  is,  that 
thirty-five  or  thirty-six  of  the  prytanean  section  were,  each  in  his 
turn,  epistatse  of  the  prytanes,  and  consequently  presided  one  day 
in  the  senate,  while  the  epistata  chose  by  lot  one  from  each  of 
the  other  nine  sections,  not  being  prytanes,  and  these  nine  were 
the  proedvi,  who  presided  at  the  general  assemblies  of  the  people. — 
All  accounts  agree  in  this,  that  no  one  presided  above  a  day  in  his 
turn,  and  that  all  the  selections  were  made  by  lot.  The  president  of 
the  senate,  of  whose  authority  the  jealousy  was  thus  great,  generally 
opened  the  business  for  their  consideration ;  and  he  kept  the  great 
seal  of  the  state  as  well  as  the  key  of  the  citadel  and  treasury. 
The  prytanes  formed  a  kind  of  college  during  their  month,  and 
lived  at  the  public  expense  in  a  place  called  the  tholus,  close  to 
the  senate-house,  entertaining  there  the  public  guests  and  any  citi- 
zens who  received  that  high  honour  for  their  services.  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  prytanes  to  receive  all  proposals  of  a  political  nature 
from  every  quarter,  to  reduce  them  to  writing  if  deserving  atten- 
tion, and  to  lay  them  before  the  senate.  They  prepared  the  busi- 
ness generally  for  that  body,  and  their  president  (epistata)  opened 
it  to  the  meeting.  Any  proposition  of  a  legislative  kind,  made  in 
the  senate,  was  referred  to  them.  Some  have  supposed  that  the 
scrutiny  into  the  conduct  of  magistrates  was  performed  by  them  ;t 
this  seems  doubtful ;  but  certainly  they  are  represented  as  exer- 
cising great  authority  in  the  administration  of  public  affairs  firom 

*  Lysias,  In  Fhilovem — passim. 

t  J.  Laurent.  De  Rcbuspub.,  cap.  i.  An  account  sometimes  given  of  the  matter 
is  this  : — The  scrutiny  into  the  conduct  of  magistrates  was  conducted  by  the  sy^wvw 
and  ^.tyirroLi,  ofiBcers  appointed  for  that  special  purpose ;  and  if  there  was  ground 
for  a  charge  of  malversation,  the  Xoytarat  brought  the  case  before  an  ordinary 
court  of  justice,  in  which  they  presided  on  those  occasions,  and  the  ivSu^oi  seem  to 
have  acted  as  public  prosecutors. 


216  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE-  ATHENS.      CH.  XVI. 

their  weight  in  the  senate.  The  daily  pay  of  a  senator  was  double 
that  of  a  person  attending  the  assembly,  about  eightpence  ster- 
ling. 

The  voting  was  generally  by  the  bean,  or  ballot  in  later  times. 
Originally  it  was,  as  in  the  assembly,  by  holding  up  the  hands.* 
The  ancient  authorities  are  full  of  allusions  to  the  ballot,  of  which 
two  are  remarkable.  Demosthenes  says  that  the  law  required, 
when  a  foreigner  was  to  have  the  rights  of  citizen  conferred  on 
him,  that  the  voting  should  be  not  only  by  the  bean,  but  so  secretly, 
before  strangers  were  admitted  (that  is,  foreigners),  that  every  one 
might  be  entirely  master  of  himself,  and  examine  in  his  own  mind 
the  merits  of  the  party,  t  -^chines  says  that  the  senators  had 
excluded  Timarchus,  voting  by  the  leaf,  that  is  with  the  names 
written  down,  but  retained  him  afterwards  voting  by  the  bean ; 
for  which  the  people  punished  them  by  withholding  the  oUve 
crown,J  the  reward  given  to  senators  on  quitting  their  office. 

It  is  here  obvious  to  remark,  that  if  the  choice  of  the  senate 
and  of  all  those  who  presided  in  it,  as  well  as  in  the  assembly, 
were  really  made  by  lot,  as  was  professed,  there  could  have  been 
no  security  whatever  for  the  selection  of  fit  persons.  The  scrutiny 
could  not  have  been  at  all  effectual  for  this  purpose  if  it  be  true, 
as  is  represented,  that  only  an  equal  number  of  supernumeraries 
(g'ffiXax'JvTcs-)  were  returned.  For  how  is  it  conceivable  that  out 
of  twenty  thousand  individuals,  the  great  majority  of  whom  were 
of  the  lower  description,  the  lot  should  fall  upon  only  five  hundred 
unfit  persons  in  the  one  thousand  returned  ?  The  probability  cer- 
tainly is,  that  seven  hundred  or  eight  hundred  out  of  the  one 
thousand  should  be  unfit  for  the  office.    Possibly  th  e  inferior  classes, 

*  Car.  Sigon.,  De  Eep.  Ath.,  ii.,  3— G.  Postelli,  Rep.  Atk.,  c.  7  — U.  Emmius, 
Vet.  Gr.  (Rep.  Ath.)— Thuc,  viii.,  c.  69,  Plutarch  (  Vit.  Publicola)  says  that  the 
senate  existed  before  Solon,  but  he  doubted  its  numbers. 

t  Kv^its  oil  avro;  avrev  tKaaros  ffxoTnrai  x^os  avrat  itrita  fiiWii,  &C. — In  Near.  ap. 
Reiske,  Cr.  Gr.,  ii.,  1375.  He  speaks  of  it  as  if  the  common  voting  by  bean  was 
not  a  complete  ballot — ■^<'(piZ,i>u,itoi  and  xevlfir.i  ^tupi^afityot  are  here  as  elsewhere  appa- 
rently distinguished.  The  main  difficulty  of  the  passage,  however,  is  in  the  yi'ppa 
atai^i,,,  which  some  have  read  as  if  it  were  that  screens  were  raised  to  protect  the 
voters  from  observation,  and  others  as  if  the  only  reference  were  to  the  booths  being 
taken  away  before  strangers  were  admitted,  while  Wolfius  and  others  read  it  ytai 
(qu.  yt^ara  ?),  i.  e.,  taking  up  (avaipuy)  the  freedom,  or  honour  conferred.  Yet  it 
seems  not  very  sensible  to  state  that  before  the  vote  conferred  the  freedom,  the 
freedom  could  not  be  taken  up. 

t  -^sch.,  In  Tim.  The  impopular  course  was  clearly  the  one  they  took  when 
voting  more  or  less  secretly.— Reiske,  Or.  Gr.,  iii.,  129. 


CH.  XVI.  AREOPAGUS.  217 

though  possessing  the  right,  did  not  enrol  themselves  so  as  to  be 
chosen  to  the  senate,  and  were  satisfied  with  being  so  enrolled  as 
to  have  a  right  to  attend  the  assembly.  We  can  else  with  diffi- 
culty understand  how  any  body  could  be  thus  formed  resembling 
a  senate  in  its  character  and  functions.* 

The  Areopagus  was  a  body  of  a  very  different  construction,  and 
it  must  have  exercised  a  great  influence  over  the  proceedings  of 
the  assembly,  if  it  had  not  a  direct  control.  It  is  a  remark  of 
Plutarch  that  Solon,  by  these  two  councils,  the  Senate  and  Areo- 
pagus, made  the  commonwealth  fast  as  by  two  anchors,  in  the 
popular  tempests.  He  certainly  did  not  for  the  first  time  erect 
the  Areopagus,  but  he  greatly  extended  its  jurisdiction  ;  and  from 
other  passages  of  the  same  writer,  it  is  clear  enough  that  he  only 
referred  to  the  changes  made  by  Solon  in  both  these  bodies,  y 
Before  his  time  the  Areopagus  had  only  a  high  criminal  juris- 
diction ;  he  gave  it  a  general  censorial  power,  enabling  it  to 
punish  by  censures  and  exposure,  and  also  by  penalties,  all  trans- 
gressions against  the  rules  of  morality  and  all  infractions  of  the 
customs  of  the  country.  This  important  office  it  continued  to 
discharge  for  about  a  century,  when  Pericles  abolished  it,  and 
confined  the  jurisdiction  to  criminal  matters  and  a  general  super- 
intendence of  the  other  tribunals,  from  all  of  which  there  lay  an 
appeal  to  the  Areopagus.  It  appears  also,  in  sending  causes  to 
be  tried  by  them,  to  have  had  a  jurisdiction  in  the  first  instance. 
From  its  ancient  respectability,  from  the  high  powers  which  it  still 
possessed,  and  from  the  higher  which  for  many  years  it  had  exer- 
cised, with  universal  approbation  for  its  rigid  justice  and  its  hu- 
mane spirit,  this  body  retained  a  great  weight  in  the  community ; 

*  Xenophon's  opinion  of  the  Athenians  and  their  government  was  sufficiently 
low.  "  These  folks,"  said  he,  "can  easily  distinguish  good  citizens  from  bad,  and 
they  like  such  as  serve  their  purpose,  how  worthless  soever  they  may  be,  hating 
public  benefactors,  as  deeming  that  merit  is  rather  hurtful  than  profitable  with  the 
multitude.  Not  that  all  this  is  to  be  blamed  in  the  people  themselves  ;  every  one 
has  a  right  to  pursue  his  own  interest.  But  when  you  see  any  one  not  of  tlic  people 
prefer  to  live  in  a  state  subject  to  popular  dominion  rather  than  in  one  where  an 
oligarchy  is  established,  you  may  rely  on  it  he  does  so  from  no  good  motive,  but 
being  determined  to  act  amiss,  he  thinks  he  can  better  escape  detection  under  a 
democracy  than  an  oligarchy." — De  Rep.  Ath.,  cap.  ii. 

t  We  may  probably  so  understand  also  the  passage  in  Cic.,  De  Off.,  lib.  i.,  in 
which  he  compares  Solon's  institution  of  the  Areopagus  to  Themistocles'  victory  at 
Salamis.  Demosthenes  treats  the  origin  of  the  body  as  lost  in  fabulous  antiquity, 
and  describes  it  as  having  tried  Mars  for  the  murder  of  Halcrothus,  on  the  com- 
plaint of  Neptune.  (/«  Arisloc.')  J.  Meursius  clearly  shows  that  the  Areopagus 
existed  before  Solon.     {Areop.,  cap.  iii.) 


21 8  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVI. 

it  occasionally  interposed  its  authority  on  questions  of  a  political 
nature,  even  after  the  time  of  Pericles.  It  was  the  highest  and  most 
venerable  of  all  the  tribunals.  Even  foreign  states  have  been  known 
to  appeal  to  it,  and  refer  their  disputes  to  its  arbitration.  But 
what  especially  made  its  power  and  its  proceedings  of  importance 
was  the  independence  which  alone,  of  all  the  constituted  autho- 
rities, it  appears  to  have  enjoyed.  It  was  the  only  body  not  im- 
mediately dependent  upon  the  people ;  and  this  makes  it  the  more 
to  be  lamented  that  several  particulars  in  its  structure  and  opera- 
tions have  been  left  unexplained  by  ancient  writers. 

The  members  were  appointed  for  life,  all  the  other  magistrates 
being  of  annual  nomination.  They  were  chosen  from  those  who 
had  been  archons,  and  who,  on  quitting  office,  could  undergo  a 
severe  scrutiny,  both  as  to  their  accounts,  as  to  their  whole  conduct 
in  the  magistracy,  and  also  as  to  their  whole  previous  life.  They 
were  required  to  be  well  bom,  to  have  received  a  good  education, 
and  to  have  distinguished  themselves  by  their  public  services. 
They  must  also  have  been  of  mature  age  :  what  that  age  was  we 
are  not  told ;  nor  is  it  anywhere  asserted  that  there  was  any  fixed 
period  assigned  by  law ;  neither  does  it  clearly  appear  before  whom 
the  scrutiny  was  made,  in  whom  the  decision  was  vested,  or  that 
there  was  an  appeal  from  it  if  unfavourable.  The  logistce  are  re- 
presented as  examining  the  ex-archon ;  but  so  they  examined 
every  one  retiring  from  office.  The  logistae  were  ten  persons  of 
great  knowledge  and  respectability,  chosen  yearly,  one  from  each 
tribe,  before  whom  every  magistrate  was  bound  to  appear,  and  ren- 
der an  account  of  liis  public  conduct,  within  thirty  days  after  the 
expiration  of  his  office.  In  all  probability  the  inquiry  was  origi- 
nally confined  to  matters  of  account ;  but  it  seems  clear  that  after- 
wards a  more  general  investigation  was  entered  into.  -^Eschines 
distinctly  shows  that  those  who  had  no  public  money  passing 
through  their  hands,  nay,  those  who,  so  far  from  being  public  ac- 
countants, were,  like  the  trierarchce,  persons  chosen  to  undertake  an 
expense  for  the  public,  were  subject  to  this  revision ;  and  he  asserts 
that  the  members  of  the  Areopagus  itself  (who  could  have  no* 
handling  of  money)  were  liable  to  be  examined  by  these  logistas.! 

♦  -iEsch.  In  Cles. — Dobson,  viii.,  173.  When  he  adds  that  the  Areopagus  per- 
forms its  high  fuuctions  subject  to  the  votes  of  the  Heliasta;  (xv^ixt  ayu  tui  Myiffru* 
•jTa  rm  u/JArtaaty  4"it">*d  ^^  means  that  the  members  might  be  impeached  at  the 
instance  of  the  logistaR. 

t  There  either  m  ere  other  magistrates  of  a  similar  kind  called  euthyna,  or  this  is 
another  name  for  the  logistae.     The  difference  between  the  two  is  mentioned  by 


CH.  XVI,  AREOPAGUS— SCRUTINY.  219 

The  logistae  had  no  power  of  passing  a  sentence ;  they  could  only 
acquit  or  send  to  trial  those  whom  they  examined  ;  but  their  ac- 
quittal was  not  final;  the  party  might  afterwards  be  brought  before 
the  heliaea  and  condemned.  The  examination  or  scrutiny  of  the 
ex-archons,  therefore,  was  a  necessary  proceeding,  whether  they 
were  candidates  for  the  Areopagus  or  not.  The  probability  is 
that  the  Areopagus  itself  decided,  taking  into  consideration,  no 
doubt,  the  report  of  the  logistae ;  but  it  is  generally  agreed  that 
the  claim  of  the  ex-archon  to  his  place  was  irresistible  if  he  pos- 
sessed the  qualifications  required.  As  they  had  enjoyed  the  popu- 
lar favoiu"  the  year  before  when  chosen  archons,  the  Areopagus 
was  not  likely  to  reject  them  if  their  merits  were  manifest.* 

The  numbers  of  the  Areopagus  were  necessarily  uncertain  ;  but 
it  is  singular  that  the  ancient  writers  afford  us  no  means  of  ascer- 
taining how  many  they  generally  were.  Sometimes  they  are  said 
to  have  been  thirty,  at  another  time  fifty-one  ;  but  if,  as  is  gene- 
rally supposed,  Socrates  was  tried  before  them,  the  number  who 
concurred  in  his  sentence  was  above  three  hundred  and  sixty ;  and 
we  are  also  told  that  before  the  eighty,  who  changed  their  opinion, 
went  over  between  the  trial  and  the  sentence,  the  majority  was 
only  three.  This  would  suppose  a  very  numerous  body,  more  nu-^ 
merous  than  the  senate.  Now  nothing  can  be  less  likely  than  so 
numerous  a  body  retaining  at  all  times  the  extreme  veneration  in 
which  they  were  held  by  a  people  as  fickle  as  critical ;  not  to 

some  and  denied  by  others.  If  they  were  different,  probably  the  one  class  war, 
confined  to  examining  the  accounts. 

*  In  the  second  oration  against  Aristogiton,  we  find  it  distinctly  stated  that  the 
thesmothetes  were  excluded  from  the  Areopagus  by  the  decree  of  the  people — that 
is,  the  assembly.  The  argument  is  that  they,  when  excluded,  quietly  submit — ran 
iifiiTt^ais  ytuiinci ;  and  the  charge  against  Aristogiton  which  the  orator  was  mainly 
bringing  was  his  insolence  to  the  people,  and  setting  himself  above  their  authority 
— h-xi^  vfia;  (fomtav  {In  Arist.  ii.  2,  3).  The  two  orations  against  Aristogiton  are 
indeed  by  many  denied  to  be  genuine,  especially  the  second,  though  Longinus  and 
Pliny  seem  to  have  had  no  doubt  about  it ;  but  whether  they  were  A 's  or  Hy- 
perides's  can  make  little  difference,  as  to  their  authority  on  the  present  question. 
The  orations  were  plainly  made  in  the  assembly,  and  not  in  either  the  senate  or 
Areopagus.  It  is  singular  that  J.  Meursius  (Areop.  cap.  v.),  in  showing  the  error 
of  those  who  suppose  the  three  chief  archons  to  have  been  excluded  from  the  Areo- 
pagus, and  only  tlie  six  thesmothetes  admitted,  has  overlooked  the  strongest  proof 
of  all,  the  argument  of  Lysias  (/«  Evandrum),  who  contends  that  the  senate  should 
not  allow  Evander  to  be  second  archon  (or  King  of  the  Sacrifices),  because,  though 
that  office  is  only  annual,  it  gives  the  holder  a  right  to  the  Areopagus,  which  is  for 
life.  He  even  seems  to  say  that  this  admission  would  be  a  matter  of  course, 
probably  conceiving  this  previous  scrutiny,  and  its  favourable  result,  to  be  taken  as 
binding  at  the  end  of  Evander's  year  of  office. 


220  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE -ATHENS.      CH.  XVL 

mention  the  impossibility  of  so  large  a  number  resulting  from  the 
annual  election  of  a  very  few  persons,  jDrobably  advanced  in  life. 
Either  then  there  must  be  some  error  in  the  texts,  or  Socrates  must 
have  been  condemned  by  another  tribunal,  probably,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  the  heliastse. 

The  meetings  of  the  Areopagus  were  held  on  the  hill  dedi- 
cated to  Mars,  from  whence  their  name*  was  derived.  One  or 
more  of  the  archons  presided,  and  propounded  the  busmess  at 
each  sitting.  The  sittings  were  in  the  night ;  no  advocate  or 
party  in  addressing  it  was  permitted  to  declaim  or  use  any  rhe- 
torical artifice.  The  decisions  were  given  by  ballot.  The  person 
tried  could  not  be  sentenced  the  same  day ;  and  if  he  chose  to  fly, 
though  on  his  trial  for  a  capital  offence,  as  murder  or  treason, 
neither  the  prosecutor  nor  any  magistrate,  nor  even  the  court  itself, 
could  prevent  his  escape.  Sentence  of  outlaT\Ty  and  forfeiture 
was  alone  given  against  him. 

Some  have  maintained,  and  J.  Meursius  among  the  number, 
that  an  appeal  lay  from  the  Areopagus  to  the  assembly,  as  it  cer- 
tainly lay  by  Solon's  laws  from  all  other  tribunals ;  and  some 
passages  have  been  adduced  to  prove  this.  But  there  seems  little 
probability  that  it  was  so,  and  the  passages  are  not  unequivocal 
and  decisive.  Its  high  functions  would  seem  to  preclude  this 
appeal;  and  learned  men  have  held  that  the  sentence  being  final, 
was  one  reason  for  St.  Paul  being  dragged  before  it.  But  the 
true  reason  was,  because  at  that  period  the  Areopagus  had  the 
jurisdiction  respecting  the  introduction  of  foreign  gods.  It  is  said 
that  there  are  proofs  of  the  decisions  pronounced  by  it  being  reversed 
in  the  assembly,  or  rather  by  the  Heliastse,  When  these  cases, 
however,  are  examined,  it  seems  doubtful  whether  there  had  really 
been  a  judgment  of  the  Areopagus,  or  only  a  report  putting  the 
party  on  his  trial.  This  is  at  least  certain,  that  in  some  cases  it 
was  armed  with  authority  to  pronounce  a  final  sentence  ;  that  in 
others  it  appears  only  to  have  begun  the  prosecution  ;  while  in 
others  it  could  review  the  decision  of  the  Helisea,  and  put  a  person 
on  his  trial  a  second  time  who  had  been  acquitted.  But  even 
those  who  maintain  that  an  appeal  lay,  admit  that  when  the 
Areopagus  did  pronounce  a  sentence,  there  was  hardly  an  instance 
of  its  giving  dissatisfaction  ;  and  the  passages  are  clear  which 

*  \^uo;  -ra-yoi,  Mars's  hill,  as  it  is  sometimes  translated,  e.g.  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, relating  to  St.  Paul's  trial  before  this  Court.    (^Acts,  xix.) 


CH.  XVI.  HELI^A.  221 

represent  that  even  the  parties  against  whom  the  decision  was 
given  always  acquiesced.  Some  say*  that  convicts  always  con- 
fessed they  were  rightly  sentenced.  Demosthenes  himself,  who 
did  not  go  so  far,  yet  saysf  that  there  never  was  an  instance 
either  of  a  prosecutor  who  had  failed,  or  an  accused  person  who 
had  been  condemned,  being  able  to  show  that  the  Areopagus  had 
decided  erroneously.  Practically  speaking,  then,  their  decisions 
may  be  considered  as  having  been  final.  |  It  appears  that  in 
some  cases  the  Areopagus  itself  referred  matters  to  the  otlier  tri- 
bunals, probably  the  Heliaea,  notwithstanding  that  they  had  final 
jurisdiction  respecting  them.§  How  great  was  the  influence  of  the 
Areopagus  with  the  people  appears  from  many  instances.  On 
one  occasion,  when  a  vote  of  the  assembly  had  passed  over 
Phocion,  always  unpopular  with  the  multitude,  and  given  the  com- 
mand of  an  expedition  to  their  favourite  Charidemus,  the  Areopa- 
gus went  among  them,  and  by  their  authority  obtained  a  reversal 
of  the  ill-considered  decision,  and  the  appointment  of  Phocion.  || 

Next  to  the  Areopagus  in  importance  was  the  court  of  the 
Helisea,  or  the  Heliastae,  which  does  not  seem  to  have  been  a  court 
of  ordinary  jurisdiction  in  criminal  cases,  but  to  have  had  special 
jurisdiction  in  these  as  it  ordinarily  had  in  civil  cases,  and  to  have 
had  all  important  cases  respecting  the  state  and  political  offences 
brought  before  it,  as  part  of  its  special  and  extraordinary  jurisdic- 
tion.    There  seems  good  reason  to  think,  notwithstanding  the 

*  Lye,  In  Leoc. 

t  Dem.,  In  Aristoc. 

X  Dinarchus  m  Aristogiton's  case  treats  his  complaint  of  the  Areopagus  as  some- 
thing quite  extravagant,  and  as  more  strange  than  all  the  rest  of  his  conduct;  but 
it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  it  was  an  appeal — ^la^ixo^ifi.ivos  rriv  liovXm  -yriPi  ecXti^-ua;. 
(Reiske,  Cr.  Gr.,  Din.  77.)  The  whole  oration  is  an  attack  on  the  party  for  stiange 
and  unheard-of  conduct.  The  proceeding  in  which  Demosthenes  was  tried  and 
banished  seems  to  have  been  only  a  n-port  of  the  Areopagus,  by  whose  award  he 
had  rashly  said  he  should  be  bound  :  it  was  given  unanimously  against  him,  and 
sent  the  case  apparently  to  be  tried  before  the  Heliaja.  Dinarchus  calls  the  pro- 
ceeding in  the  Areopagus  aTohiln.  (Reiske,  Cr.  Gr.,  Din.  3.)  He  speaks  of 
a  decree  of  the  assembly  on  a  former  occasion,  making  the  decision  of  the  Areo- 
pagus final  (i6.  58).  From  another  passage  it  seems  even  possible  to  suppose  that 
the  Areopagus  decided  on  the  question  of  guilty  or  not  guilty,  and  that  the  case  was 
then  sent  before  the  other  tribunal  to  fix  the  punishment  {ib.  75).  It  is  singular 
that  Plutarch  {Vit.  Dem.)  only  mentions  the  proceeding  in  the  Areopagus,  and 
neither  in  the  life  of  Demosthenes  nor  of  Dinarchus  {Vit.  x.  orat.,  if  that  work  be 
his,  which  seems  more  than  doubtful)  does  he  make  any  mention  of  the  proceeding 
before  the  Heliastae,  which  condemned  and  banished  Demosthenes. 

§  ^^schines,  In  Tim. 

II  J.  Meurs.,  Solon. — Id.,  Areopagus. — Car.  Sigon,,  De  Rep.  Ath.,  ii.,  5,— G.  Pos- 
telli,  c.  iv. — U.  Emmius,  Vet.  Grac,  De  Sep.  Ath. 


222         GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.      CH.  XVT, 

prevailing  opinion  of  antiquaries  in  favour  of  the  Areopagus,  that 
the  Heliaea  sentenced  Socrates ;  and  the  reference  made  to  his 
trial  by  ^Eschines,  when  he  says,  "  the  people  whom  he  is  address- 
ing put  Socrates  to  death,"  may  very  reasonably  be  accounted  for 
by  the  circumstance  of  the  same  people  forming  also  the  court  of 
the  Heliastae.  These  were  chosen  by  lot,  and  for  the  particular 
occasion,  as  it  appears  ;  the  archon,  to  whom  complaint  had  been 
preferred,  and  sometimes  the  Areopagus,  directing  a  trial  before 
them.  The  number  varied  according  to  the  nature  and  import- 
ance of  the  cause ;  it  seems  never  to  have  been  less  than  500  ; 
sometimes  1000  or  1001,  and  sometimes  as  many  as  1500.  The 
charge  against  Demosthenes  was  tried  before  that  number,  as 
Dinarchus  expressly  states  in  his  oration  addressed  to  them,  that 
they  were  so  numerous  ;*  and  if  there  be  no  error  in  the  text, 
Andocides,  referring  to  his  father's  prosecution  of  Speusippus, 
says  there  were  6000  present  on  that  occasion.-f-  It  manifestly 
was  only  another,  and  a  somewhat  less  promiscuous  assembly  of 
the  people  than  the  ecclesia.  It  was  less  promiscuous,  because 
the  age  of  thirty  was  required,  and  the  numbers  were  taken  apart 
from  all  the  rest,  though  taken  by  lot.  The  number  was  fixed 
on  each  occasion  by  the  archon.  It  was  on  account  of  its  great 
number,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  causes  which  came  before  it, 
reckoned  the  highest  court ;  but  as  it  only  met  rarely,  and  as  the 
Areopagus  was  a  permanent  tribunal,  besides  its  weight  on  politi- 
cal matters,  its  superior  importance  is  manifest.  A  solemn  oath 
was  taken  by  all  the  judges,  or  rather  jurors,  of  the  Heliaea,  bind- 
ing them  not  only  to  judge  according  to  the  laws  and  the  evidence, 
but  also  to  maintain  the  established  government,  to  resist  all 
attempts  at  an  extinction  of  debts,  a  division  of  real  estates,  the 
establishment  of  a  tyranny  or  an  oligarchy,  or  the  undue  election 
of  magistrates ;  so  that  though  assembled  for  the  trial  of  a  cause, 
they  appear  to  have  interfered,  at  least  as  incidental  to  the  subject 
matter  of  their  jurisdiction,  with  many  of  the  most  important 
branches,  both  legislative  and  executive,  of  the  administration. 
Thus  they  were  evidently  called  upon  to  repeal  illegal  decrees, 
and  even  to  abrogate  laws  that  had  been  made  irregularly  and 
unconstitutionally ;  because  when  any  one  was  tried  before  them 

,     *  Reiske,  Cr.  Gr.  iv.,  Din.  72. 

+  lb.  iv.,  And.  9.     He  speaks  of  it  as  a  court  of  6000.     K«i  nyuturaro  cv  i^a.Kifx*' 
Xitit  Klnteuut  xai  fiiTikafii  iixafrtDH  Terouruy  200. 


CH.  XVI.  EPHET^.  223 

for  having  caused  such  a  law  to  be  passed,  its  repeal,  as  well  as 
his  punishment,  was  sought  by  the  articles  of  the  charge.  In  this 
respect  they  appear  to  have  had  a  jurisdiction  somewhat  resem- 
bling that  of  the  Federal  constitutional  court  in  the  United  States 
of  America  There  is  every  reason  to  suppose  that  most  of  the 
great  political  causes  of  which  we  have  any  account  were  tried 
before  this  tribunal. 

The  Ephetce  were,  next  to  the  Areopagus,  the  most  ancient  of 
the  judges,  being,  in  the  time  of  the  kings,  fifty  Athenians  and 
fifty  Argives,  who  tried  all  crimes  of  homicide.  In  Draco's  time 
they  were  reduced  to  fifty-one  (to  avoid  the  chance  of  equal  divi- 
sion), and  the  Argives  no  longer  formed  part  of  the  court.  After- 
wards each  of  the  ten  tribes  chose  five  persons  of  the  age  of  fifty  at 
least,  and  of  unblemished  reputation ;  another  was  added  by  lot. 
These  judges  formed  four  courts,  called  the  PrytaneuTn,  Phrea- 
trium,  Delphiu7n,  and  Palladium,  which  tried  the  different  kinds 
of  homicide ;  the  Prytanes,  for  example,  that  which  was  occa- 
sioned by  animals,  or  by  inanimate  objects.  Solon  is  supposed 
to  have  given  extended  powers  to  the  Areopagus  as  a  counter- 
balance to  the  influence  of  the  ephetse.  Some  have  confounded 
this  tribunal  with  the  senate,  misled  by  the  Prytaneum,  which 
formed  one  of  its  divisions.*  But  the  members,  as  well  as  its 
functions,  were  totally  different.  These  Prytanes  however,  that  is, 
the  tenth  part  of  the  senate  in  rotation,  beside  presiding  by  their 
epistatse  and  proedri  over  the  senate  and  the  assembly,  exercised, 
as  we  have  seen,  great  powers,  but  not  apparently  any  judicial 
functions. 

*  J.  Stephanas,  De  Jurisd.  Vet.  Grac,  cap.  iv.  In  cap.  iii.,  the  learned  author 
treats  the  court  of  the  Prytanes  as  the  senate,  and  there  is  no  inaccuracy  in  so  doing, 
the  senate  having  civil  jurisdiction.  But  in  cap.  iv.  he  gives  the  same  court  juris- 
diction as  to  homicide  by  animals  and  inanimate  objects,  which  belonged  to  the 
branch  of  the  51  under  the  archon  called  king.  He  supposes  Socrates  to  have  been 
tried  in  the  Prytanes  or  senate. 


224         GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.      CH.  XVII. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS. 
(^Continued.') 


Other  Checks  beside  the  Areopagus — State  and  Public  Orators — Payment  of  Func- 
tionaries— Rules  as  to  Alterations  of  the  Law — Jsomothetes — Syndics— Direct 
Repeal  required — Impeachment  for  illegal  Legislation — Quorum — Prohibition 
of  Repe.-xl — Power  of  Adjournment — Variety  of  Bodies— Appeal,  and  reconsidera- 
tion— Ostracism — General  feeling  against  these — Orators  ;  their  influences — 
Advocates  and  Professional  Orators— Legislative  and  Judicial  Functions  com- 
bined— Corruption  of  Statesmen — Demosthenes — Whigs  in  Charles  XL's  reign 
— Demades — Corruption,  faction,  and  fickleness  of  the  People — Turbulence  of 
Assemblies — Radical  vices  of  the  System — Advantages  derived  from  the  system. 

Such  were  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  Athenian  system, 
resolving  themselves  aU,  more  or  less,  immediately  into  the  bulk 
of  the  people ;  and  we  are  now  to  consider  in  what  manner  any 
control  or  check  was  provided,  beside  the  Areopagus,  to  render 
the  working  of  the  machine  regular,  and  keep  it  subject  to  any 
fixed  law,  or  any  influence  other  than  popular  caprice. 

1 ,  The  appointment  of  public  orators  may  be  deemed  some 
kind  of  check  upon  the  popular  proceedings,  though  it  perhaps 
rather  evinces  the  great  sense  which  there  was  of  some  check 
being  required,  than  the  efficiency  of  the  expedient  resorted  to. 
Ten  orators  were  chosen  (latterly  at  least,  by  lot),  who  both  in 
the  senate  and  the  assembly  were  to  debate  for  the  people,  repre- 
senting their  interests,  as  it  were  ;  and  they  were  paid  a  small 
sum  each  time  they  spoke.*  They  appear  to  have  undergone  a 
scrutiny  before  being  allowed  to  act  as  orators,  probably  before 

♦  It  was  one  drachma,  or  eightpence.  Nothing  is  more  puzzling  than  the  small 
sums  M'hich  appear  to  have  been  received  as  adequate  payment  for  public  services, 
and  to  have  been  eagerly  sought  after.  Three  oboli  (four  pence)  a  day  for  attending 
the  assembly ;  for  the  senate,  six  oboli ;  nay,  only  the  same  for  the  Areopagus  itself 
when  sitting  judicially. 


CH,  XVII.  RESTRAINTS  ON  CHANGES  IN  THE  LAW.  225 

they  were  drawn  by  lot ;  and  any  immoral  conduct,  or  political  or 
other  offence,  or  any  misbehaviour  in  war,  precluded  them  from 
being  chosen.  They  were  also  required  to  be  natives,  born  of 
Athenian  parents,  to  have  one  or  more  legitimate  children,  and  to 
possess  property  in  Attica.  The  same  character  and  qualification, 
ascertained  by  the  same  scrutiny,  was  required  of  all  others  who 
would  address  the  assembly,  as  well  as  of  the  PubHc  Orators  ;  and 
whoever  succeeded  in  concealing  any  part  of  his  former  life  from 
the  court  which  examined  him  previous  to  his  admission,  was 
liable  to  be  punished,  as  well  as  disqualified  from  acting  in  future, 
upon  the  imposition  being  discovered.  In  practice,  hardly  any  one 
but  the  Ten  Public  Orators  ever  addressed  either  the  senate  or 
assembly  ;  and  this,  as  well  as  what  has  been  stated  respecting  the 
choice  of  the  senators,  makes  it  very  difficult  to  conceive  that  the 
lot  really  decided  upon  all  these  elections.  Practically  there  may 
have  been  some  arrangement  or  understanding  by  which  the  names 
of  comparatively  few  of  those  eligible  were  placed  in  the  urns. 

2.  The  strict  rules,  however,  respecting  alterations  of  the  law 
were  a  much  more  effectual  check  upon  the  wild  democracy  of 
the  Athenian  constitution.  Fortunately  a  tolerably  exact  account 
of  this  is  given  in  the  orations  which  remain  of  Demosthenes  and 
Andocides  ;  an  account  which,  if  it  is  far  from  explaining  every 
particular  of  the  legislative  process,  yet  shows  clearly  that  there 
were  delays  interposed,  and  notices  required  to  be  given,  which 
afforded  an  opportimity  for  reflection  to  the  people  themselves,  for 
the  exertion  of  such  influence  over  them  as  the  Areopagus  pos- 
sessed, and  for  the  operation  generally  of  the  authority  that 
always  resides  in  the  Natural  Aristocracy  of  the  community.  The 
constancy  with  which  the  Athenians  adhered  to  these  rules  rather 
than  their  original  adoption,  which  was  probably  owing  to  oligar- 
chical influence,  is  a  proof  how  conscious  they  were  of  their  own 
unfitness  to  be  trusted  with  the  supreme  power,  of  the  little  re- 
liance which  they  had  upon  themselves. 

The  three  first  assemblies  each  year  were  devoted  to  the  consi- 
deration of  new  laws ;  but  the  two  first  of  the  three  could  only 
consider  of  such  as  were  not  repugnant  to  any  law  already  exist- 
ing. The  proposal  of  a  repeal  or  other  law  inconsistent  with  the 
old  was  then  received,  but  it  was  rigorously  exacted  that  no  such 
law  should  be  propounded  without  a  previous  repeal  of  the  old. 
As  soon  as  the  proposition  was  made  the  senate  appointed  a  num- 

PART  II.  Q 


226  GOVERNMENTS  OP  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVII. 

ber  of  persons  called  Nomothetes,  or  law-makers  (some  think 
fifty*),  not  by  lot,  but  by  selection,  to  digest  and  reduce  it  to 
writing.  In  that  form  it  was  laid  before  the  Prytanes,  who  were 
to  make  it  public  by  immediately  affixing  it  to  a  portico  in  a  fre- 
quented part  of  the  city,  called  the  Eponymi,  or  Statues  of  the 
Ten  Heroes.  It  was  required  to  be  thus  placarded  daily  until 
the  assembly  again  took  it  into  consideration.  Other  nomothetes, 
said  to  have  been  five  hundred,  and  chosen  by  the  districts  who 
returned  the  senate-f-  (the  demi),  then  examined  it,  as  did  the 
senate  itself  All  the  nomothetes  must  have  served  as  Heliastae, 
and  taken  the  solemn  oath  of  these  judges.  Then  five  persons 
were  chosen,  but  not  by  lot,  called  Syndics,  whose  special  duty  it 
was  to  defend  the  old  law,  and  of  consequence  to  resist  the  intro  • 
duction  of  the  new.  Finally  the  assembly,  on  the  full  discussion 
of  the  question,  determined  upon  adopting  or  rejecting  the  pro- 
position. 

3.  But  another  important  restraint  was  imposed  by  positive 
law,  and  it  operated  at  all  times,  and  actively,  though  it  was  per- 
verted, like  everything  else  in  that  turbulent  commonwealth,  to 
the  purposes  of  faction.  It  was  criminal  to  bring  forward  any 
decree  or  any  legislative  measure  which  was  contrary  to  the 
existing  law :  the  first  step  to  be  taken  was  propounding  a  direct 
repeal.  This  of  itself  was  a  great  security ;  inasmuch  as  men 
will  often  be  averse  openly  and  at  once  to  abrogate  an  old  law,  or 
destroy  an  ancient  institution,  who  would  have  little  scruple  about 
suffering  it  gradually  to  be  undermined  or  indirectly  assailed,  and 
frittered  away,  as  it  were  by  piecemeal.  But  suppose  a  person  pro- 
pounded a  total  repeal  of  the  old  law,  he  was  compelled  to  substitute 
another  in  its  place  ;  and  if  this  was  not  btneficial  to  the  nation,  J 
he  was  liable  to  be  prosecuted  at  any  time  within  a  year,  although 

*  Reiske  supposes  the  word  3i  to  have  been  originally  the  cipher  for  fifty  ( Or. 
Or.  And.  de  Master.,  iv.  40),  and  he  translates  it  so  accordingly. 

t  There  seems  some  reason  for  suspecting  an  error  here,  if  not  in  the  text,  at 
least  in  the  interpretation  that  has  been  given  to  it.  Andocides  says  500  no- 
mothetes, e'uf  at  Itifurai  hXoyrt  (Reiske,  Cr.  Gt.,  iv.  40);  and  adds  that  they,  mean- 
ing the  nomothetes,  were  sworn  before  they  proceeded.  Demosthenes  says  they 
took  the  oath  of  the  heliasta  (/n  Tim.),  but  he  says  nothing  of  their  appointment. 
If  the  demi,  as  Reiske  supposes  (viii.,  336),  actually  elected  the  nomothetes,  it  is 
the  only  instance  known  of  their  making  any  choice ;  ^ni^Tai  would  describe  the 
people,  indeed,  the  assembly  as  well  as  the  demi. 

X  Ertrnhiof  ru  liiu.ai.  (Dem.  In.  Timoc.)  The  proper  meaning  is  fitted — well 
adapted.  But  in  which  way  soever  we  translate  the  word,  the  argument  must 
remain  the  same. 


CH.  XVII.  IMPEACHMENT  OF  ILLEGALITY.  227 

the  people  and  the  senate  should  have  sanctioned  his  proposition 
and  passed  the  law — nay,  although  the  same  should  have  been 
acted  upon.  If  his  proposition,  being  adopted,  had  proved  ever 
so  beneficial,  he  was  liable  to  prosecution  unless  he  had  brought 
it  forward  and  carried  it  according  to  the  strict  forms  of  legisla- 
tive procedure,  having  regard,  among  others,  to  the  important  iiile 
which  required  direct  repeal,  and  prohibited  any  indirect  breaking 
in  upon  the  existing  law.  Thus  the  responsibility  under  which 
the  supreme  power,  the  people  and  the  senate,  could  not  be  placed, 
was  cast  upon  each  member  of  the  community  who  chose  to  put 
that  irresponsible  power  in  motion.  Every  person,  be  he  ever  so 
insignificant,  was  entitled,  on  this  condition,  to  make  what  pro- 
posals he  pleased  ;  and  no  person,  how  powerful  soever,  was  ex- 
empt from  prosecution  for  his  attempts  to  change  the  law,  or  to 
obtain  decrees  inconsistent  with  its  principles.  Nor  was  the  con- 
currence of  the  state  itself  any  guarantee  of  his  safety.  The  same 
body  which  to-day  joined  in  carrying  his  measure,  might  some 
months  hence,  nay  some  years  hence  (for  it  sufficed  if  the  prose- 
cution were  commenced  within  the  year,  the  trial  might  be  at  any 
time*),  join  in  working  his  ruin,  and  that  without  any  original  fault 
on  his  part  or  on  theirs  ;  because  all  might  have  been  formally  done, 
and  the  event  might  still  prove  the  change  to  be  hurtful.  It  is  no 
wonder  that  the  orators  and  party  chiefs  at  Athens  stood  in  great 
dread  of  such  a  proceeding,  and  regarded  with  the  most  serious 
apprehension  the  responsibility  which  they  thus  incurred  in  the 
discharge  of  their  public  duty,  if  you  will,  but  certainly  in  the 
pursuit  of  their  own  ambitious  objects. 

This  species  of  prosecution  or  impeachment  was  termed  y^cx.<p'n 
TTa^avoptwvf — charge  or  accusation  of  illegahty ;  and  it  was  in 
constant  use  between  the  contending  parties,  or  rival  statesmen 

*  The  most  elaborate  prosecution  of  this  kind,  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge, 
that  of  Ctesiphon  for  obtaining  the  decree  crowning  Demosthenes,  was  commenced 
indeed  within  the  year,  but  argued  and  decided  after  seven  or  eight  years  had 
elapsed,  and  the  most  important  events  had  entirely  changed  the  face  of  things. 

t  There  appears  to  be  some  doubt  whether  this  prosecution  could  be  maintained 
against  a  person  who  had  only  attempted  to  carry  an  unlawful  measure  ;  and  if  we 
were  to  take  the  passage  in  Andocides  so  often  referred  to  as  some  have  understood 
it,  there  appears  a  colour  for  the  opinion  that  the  attempt  was  suflScient.  But  the 
word  /Sat/Xtuft-v,  which  is  rendered  senator  by  Reiske  and  others,  seems  to  imply  more. 
It  is  coupled  with  ■ra^alt'hurn  ra  lixasrn^iiu,  and  may  therefore  be  taken  to  mean  that 
Speusippus  had  by  his  counsels  obtained  a  decree  of  the  senate  putting  Andocides's 
father  on  his  trial.    Had  it  been  senator,  the  expression  would  rather  have  been 

Q  2 


GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.      CH.  XVTI. 

and  commanders,  down  to  the  time  of  the  Thirty  tyrants  who 
abolished  it.  The  greatest  orations  of  the  two  first  orators  of  any 
age,  Demosthenes  and  ^schines,  were  delivered  upon  trials  of 
this  description ;  and  some  others  of  Demosthenes,  hardly  less 
noble,  were  prepared  by  him  upon  similar  occasions  to  be  deli- 
vered by  different  parties,  it  being  the  practice  at  Athens  for  pri- 
vate accusers  to  deliver  speeches  prepared  by  professional  orators, 
as  well  as  to  defend  themselves  when  charged,  in  those  instances 
in  which  advocates  were  not  allowed.  Some  doubt  hangs  over 
the  question  which  of  the  tribunals  had  cognizance  of  this  charge. 
There  seems  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  great  case  of  Timocrates 
was  tried  before  the  HeUastae,  and  the  probability  is  that  the  case 
of  Aristocrates  was  also  tried  by  them.  There  can  be  very  little 
question  that  the  case  of  Ctesiphon  was  disposed  of  by  the  same 
tribunal.* 

4.  Some  additional  check  was  interposed  by  the  rule  which  was 
laid  down  as  to  the  numbers  whose  concurrence  was  required  in 
the  kind  of  proceeding  most  Hkely  to  be  influenced  by  popular 
violence.  It  was  a  rule  constantly  in  force  that  no  law  could  be 
passed  to  affect  any  one  person  without  affecting  equally  the 
whole  people,  unless  6000  persons  were  present  at  the  least  Be- 
side the  general  law,  many  instances  occur  of  this  number  being 
specially  required  by  other  laws,  not  indeed  to  join  in  the  vote, 
but  to  vote  in  the  question.  Thus  the  admission  of  an  alien  to 
the  rights  of  citizenship,! — ^the  restoration  of  those  citizens  who 
had  been  disqualified  by  crimes  or  default — the  remission  of  any 
debt^:  due  to  the  public — ^are  cases  provided  for  by  particular 
laws ;  although  they  all  appear  to  come  under  the  description  of 
personal  laws  or  decrees,  and  might  therefore  have  been  supposed 
provided  for  by  the  general  law.     It  is  to  be  observed  that  this 


♦  Demosthenes  (/n  Timoc.)  quotes  a  clause  in  the  senator's  oath,  and  then,  to 
show  that  it  does  not  bind  those  to  whom  the  speech  is  addressed  (u^j ),  he  has  the 
Heliast's  oath  read,  in  which  the  clause  does  not  occur.  This  oration  was  made  for 
Diodorus,  the  prosecutor  of  Timocrates,  as  the  one  against  Aristocrates  was  made 
for  Eacpicrates.  The  address  is  throughout  in  this  to  the  Athenians,  as  in  the  two 
orations  on  the  Crown,  except  in  a  single  instance.  But  that  is  not  decisive  ;  for 
the  large  judicatures  were  always  addressed  as  the  Athenians.  There  is  one  pas- 
sage in  each  of  the  orations  of  Demosthenes  and  iEschines,  which  refers  to  judges, 
and  to  those  standing  round  as  contradistinguished  from  the  judges,  clearly  showing 
that  these  speeches  were  not  delivered  in  the  general  assembly.  In  all  these  cases, 
too,  the  oaths  are  referred  to  under  which  the  persons  addressed  were  acting. 

t  Dem.  ///  Neacram.  +  Id.  In  Timoc. 


CH.  XVII.  OTHER  CHECKS.  229 

rule  only  applied  to  the  proceedings  of  tlie  assembly  ;  for  the 
senate  could  act  by  the  bare  majority  of  its  numbers  ;  and  the 
tribunals,  such  as  the  Areopagus  and  Helisea,  could  proceed  to 
sentence  against  individuals  by  the  majority  at  meetings  com- 
posed of  comparatively  few  voters. 

5.  Beside  these  restrainta  there  were  others  much  more  feeble, 
because  they  were  attempts,  as  it  were,  of  the  people  to  put  them- 
selves under  disabihties,  and  had  little  more  effect  than  to  slu;w 
how  much  some  control  was  desiderated.  Upon  a  new  law  being 
made,  it  was  not  unusual  to  add  a  perpetual  prohibition  of  any 
repeal  or  alteration.  The  funds  for  the  army  had  been  by  Peri- 
cles diverted  to  give  the  people  the  power  of  attending  theatrical 
exhibitions,  in  which  they  so  much  delighted.  Eubulus,  a  dema- 
gogue, at  the  very  time  when  the  expenses  of  the  war  most  re- 
quired this  supply  to  be  restored,  had  a  law  passed  making  it  a 
capital  offence  so  much  as  to  propose  it. — The  exemptions  from 
serving  certain  expensive  offices  had  been  carried  to  excess  ;  and 
Leptines  proposed  a  law  not  only  recalling  some  of  those  already 
granted,  but  prohibiting,  under  pain  of  confiscation  and  infamy, 
any  one  to  propose  new  exemptions  in  future  ;  and  it  is  to  be  re- 
marked that,  in  the  able  and  well-reasoned  oration  which  Demos- 
thenes wrote  for  one  of  the  movers  of  the  repeal  (the  time  for  pro- 
secuting Leptines  having  elapsed),  the  absurdity  of  a  law  assum- 
ing to  bind  the  legislature  prospectively  is  not  one  of  the  grounds 
taken.*  It  is  an  observation  of  Mr.  Hume,  marked  by  his  wonted 
sagacity,  that  such  laws  proved  "  the  universal  sense  which  the 
people  had  of  their  own  levity  and  inconstancy."  j 

6.  There  was  a  power  vested  in  the  presiding  officer  similar  to 
that  which  we  may  remember  to  have  found  of  such  importance  at 
Rome,  of  adjourning  the  meetings  of  the  assembly  upon  any  omen 
appearing  to  authorise  it.  The  archons,  too,  appear  to  have  pos- 
sessed this  privilege  ;  certainly  the  prytanes  and  proedri ;  though 
it  seems  to  have  been  much  more  rarely  resorted  to  than  at  Rome. 

7.  The  referring  so  many  important  questions  to  bodies  different 
from  the  assembly  must  be  deemed  a  check  upon  its  rashness  and 
violence,  even  if  those  bodies  were  constituted  in  the  same  way 
with  itself,  which  neither  the  Areopagus  nor  the  Ilelisea  were.   The 

*  Dem.,  2Hd  Olynth.,  and/n  Lept.  t  Essays,  Part  ii.,  'lO. 


230  GOVEENMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVII. 

Heliaea  came  nearest  to  it  in  composition,  being  taken  by  lot,  and 
without  any  permanent  functions.  But  even  if  out  of  six  or  seven 
thousand  persons  five  hundred  are  chosen  by  lot,  the  merely  set- 
ting them  apart,  especially  if  they  are  to  act  under  the  sanction  of 
an  oath,  is  likely  to  make  their  conduct  more  cautious  and  deli- 
berative. We  know  how  diflFerently  a  very  small  number  mits 
from  the  body  out  of  which  it  is  taken,  in  the  instance  of  juries. 
To  a  certain  degree  the  same  kind  of  difference  will  be  found  to 
affect  the  proceedings  of  a  much  less  select  body  like  the  Heliasta?. 
The  same  observation  applies  to  the  senate.  There  can  be  Httle 
doubt  that  the  prytanes,  though  chosen  like  the  other  450,  and 
their  president,  though  also  selected  by  lot,  felt  an  individual 
responsibility  which  did  not  influence  the  senators  at  large. 

8.  The  uncertainty  in  which  we  are  left  regarding  the  right  of 
appeal,  and  the  course  taken  for  obtaining  the  judgment  of  dif- 
ferent bodies  on  the  same  matter,  prevents  us  from  being  able  to 
trace  distinctly  the  operation  of  probably  the  most  effectual  of  all 
these  checks.  One  thing  is  however  clear ;  there  was  a  tendency 
to  have  the  proceedings  of  each  judicature  reviewed  by  some  one 
or  more  other  bodies,  and  an  option  given  of  going  before  one  or 
other  of  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdictions.  In  some  instances  it 
is  believed  that  two  decisions  of  the  same  body  were  necessary  to 
give  any  sentence  effect.  It  should  indeed  seem  from  the  oration 
of  Demosthenes  against  Timocrates,  that  hardly  any  resolution  or 
judgment  was  final  until  it  was  executed,  and  that  two  successive 
determinations  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  Assembly  did  not  prevent 
the  whole  ground  from  being  again  gone  over  before  the  Heliastse. 
If  there  lay  no  direct  appeal  from  the  Areopagus,  there  were  few 
instances  in  which  that  body  did  not,  either  after  or  before  pro- 
nouncing a  final  sentence,  send  the  case  to  the  Heliastss.  We 
have  the  remarkable  instance  of  Demosthenes  being  either  tried 
for  bribery  as  to  the  whole  matter,  or  at  any  rate  as  to  the  punish- 
ment to  be  inflicted,  before  the  latter  tribunal,  after  a  unanimous 
sentence,  or  at  least  a  resolution  against  him,  of  the  Areopagus. 
The  converse  of  this  case  was  that  of  Antiphon,  stated  in  the 
oration  upon  the  Crown.  He  had  been  arrested  for  treason  and 
sent  to  take  his  trial  in  the  Heliaea,  where  by  the  arts  of  a  party 
he  was  acquitted,  and  he  left  the  city.  The  Areopagus  had  him 
seized  again,  and  again  put  on  his  trial  before  the  same  courts, 


CH.  XVIL  OSTRACISM.  231 

though  probably  not  composed  of  the  same  members,  when  he 
was  put  to  the  torture,  convicted,  and  executed.*  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  such  a  course  of  proceeding  exposed  parties  to  great 
hardships,  an  acquittal  being  no  protection ;  but  it  is  equally 
manifest  that  a  security  was  derived  from  it  against  rash  and 
inconsiderate  determinations. 

There  was  one  kind  of  proceeding  not  peculiar  to  Athens,  but 
more  practised  there  than  anywhere  else,  and  which  may  be 
thought  rather  to  operate  in  a  contrary  direction  to  those  rules 
and  principles  now  under  consideration,  giving  a  freer  scope  to 
the  democratic  power,  rather  than  providing  a  restraint  to  it.  It 
was  an  ancient  custom,  the  origin  of  which  is  left  in  great  uncer- 
tainty, that  when  any  citizen  had  either  from  his  wealth  or  his 
renown,  and  it  might  even  be  from  the  reputation  justly  acquired 
by  his  eminent  services  or  his  singular  virtues,  attained  an  ex- 
traordinary degree  of  weight  and  influence,  he  was  liable  to  be 
removed  for  a  length  of  time  by  banishment,  in  order  to  prevent 
his  acquiring  a  power  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people,  and 
inconsistent  with  the  democratic  form  of  the  government.  This 
extraordinary  proceeding  was  not  of  course  regarded  as  a  degra- 
dation ;  it  was  even  affected  to  be  treated  not  as  a  punishment ; 
and  it  accordingly  differed  from  ordinary  or  penal  exile,  because 
it  was  attended  with  no  forfeiture,  which  always  attended  the 
other.  In  another  respect  it  differed,  that  generally  the  place  of 
banishment  was  assigned,  although  some  have  doubted  this  from 
the  example  of  Themistocles,  who,  as  a  reward  for  such  services 
as  hardly  any  man  had  ever  rendered  to  his  country,  was  banished 
to  Argos,  and  Thucydides  nevertheless  tells  us  that  he  went  to  all 
parts  of  the  Peloponnesus.t  It  can  hardly  be  supposed,  how- 
ever, that  a  person  so  unjustly  treated  as  to  be  naturally  bent  on 
revenge  should  be  suffered  to  go  wherever  he  pleased  ;  and  we  may 
therefore  presume  that  the  general  rule  was  to  assign,  the  place 
of  residence.  The  rules  were  very  strict  by  which  this  proceeding 
was  conducted.  A  day  was  appointed  on  which  the  people  as- 
sembled in  the  public  place  or  forum,  where  ten  passages  were 
prepared  ;  by  these  all  the  tribes  might  go  to  the  urns  in  which 
each  person  was  to  put  his  shell,  or  rather  piece  of  earthenware 
in  the  shape  of  a  shell,  from  whence  the  operation  was  termed 
ostracism.     On  this  ware  he  was  to  write  the  name  of  the  person 

*  Dem.  De  Cor.  +  Thuc,  lib.  i.,  c.  135. 


232  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.  CH.  XVI  I. 

whom  he  desired  to  banish.  The  nine  axchons  attended,  with 
the  prytanes  on  the  part  of  the  senate,  and  they  first  of  all  counted 
the  people  present ;  if  there  were  fewer  that  6000  there  could 
be  no  sentence  passed  ;  and  there  are  three  wholly  inconsistent 
accounts  given  of  this  quorum ;  one  representing  the  presence 
only  of  the  fixed  number  to  be  necessary ;  the  second  represent- 
ing the  number  of  6000  votes  to  be  required,  but  a  majority  of 
these  to  be  sufficient ;  the  third  representing  6000  votes  as  neces- 
sary to  sentence  any  person.*  There  is  also  an  opinion  adopted 
by  men  of  great  name  on  the  authority  of  an  ancient  writer,  that 
no  person  under  sixty  years  of  age  could  vote,  but  that  there  must 
be  6000  present  of  the  legal  age  of  twenty.f  The  time  of  banish- 
ment was  ten  years;  but  sometimes  a  decree  of  the  assembly 
shortened  this  period.  Some  of  the  greatest  and  most  virtuous 
men  in  Greece,  Themistocles,  Cimon,  Aristides,  suffered  by  os- 
tracism for  the  influence  which  their  merits  had  acquired  ;  and 
it  has  been  a  general  remark  in  all  ages,  that  the  excesses  of 
popular  violence  never  brought  greater  odium  upon  republican 
government  than  was  cast  upon  it  by  this  refinement  of  cruelty  and 
injustice.  The  professed  object  was  to  give  a  security  against  the 
introduction  of  tjranny  and  the  subversion  of  the  popular  consti- 
tution ;  but  it  would  not  be  easy  to  imagine  a  worse  result  of  any 
tyranny  or  of  any  change  in  the  popular  constitution  than  the 
enormity  of  ostracism  itself  This  detestable  custom  was  in  use 
both  at  Argos,  Melitus,-  and  Messina ;  a,nd  at  Syracuse,  where  it 
was  called  petalism,  from  the  names  being  -written  on  leaves.  In 
the  three  former  places  the  Athenian  term  of  ten  years  was 
adopted  ;  in  Syracuse  it  was  only  five  :  nor  was  it  long  tolerated 
there,  even  in  this  somewhat  mitigated  form. 

It  is  manifest  that  all  the  circumstances  which  we  have  been 
considering  depended  for  their  influence,  indeed  for  their  exist- 

*  The  account  given  by  Plutarch  (  Vit.  Arist.)  seems,  in  one  respect,  very  unin- 
telligible. He  says  that  different  persons  were  proposed  for  ostracism,  and  that  he 
whose  name  appeared  on  the  greatest  number  of  shells  was  banished.  It  is  easy  to 
see  that  when  one  party  proposed  to  banish  an  adversary  his  friends  would  retaliate. 
But  if  the  vote  was  taken  as  Plutarch  describes,  it  would  follow  that  one  or  other 
must  be  banished,  and  only  one ;  whereas  the  majority  might  be  of  opinion  that 
both  should  be  banished,  or  neither;  and  in  the  event  of  more  than  two  being 
denounced,  the  consequence  would  be  still  more  absurd. 

t  Car.  Sigon.,  De  Repub.  Ath.,  ii.,  4;  and  he  quotes  Plutus's  Comment.  Grac. 
U.  Emmius  {Vet.  Grac.)  and  A.  Tiiysis  {Rep.  Ath.)  adopt  the  same  account 
J.  Meursius  {Att.  Led.  v.,  18)  gives  all  the  other  learning  ou  the  subject. 


CH.  XVII.  GENERAL  CONSERVATIVE  FEELING.  233 

ence,  upon  the  strong  disposition  of  the  community,  and  especially 
of  the  numerous  and  inferior  class,  to  abide  by  ancient  customs, 
and  to  make  the  deviating  from  them  an  exception  of  rare  occur 
rence.  This  principle  was  mixed  up  with  religious  feelings  ;  and 
it  was  carefully  inculcated  by  almost  every  one  who  pretended 
to  acquire  any  sway  over  the  people.  All  reflecting  men  must 
have  early  perceived  that  unless  some  rules  were  held  sacred  and 
immovable  in  the  guidance  of  their  proceedings,  an  entire  de- 
struction of  the  state  must  speedily  ensue  ;  the  catastrophe  which 
should  involve  the  whole  in  anarchy,  accompanied  in  all  likeli- 
hood with  subjugation  to  a  foreign  power,  would  almost  certainly 
be  attended  with  the  rebellion  of  their  numerous  slaves ;  and  the 
massacre  of  the  free  native  inhabitants  by  these  enraged  inmates, 
the  resident  foreigners  heading  them,  must  have  been  a  risk  seldom 
out  of  the  Athenian's  view  when  political  contention  came  to  an 
extremity.  The  contemplation  of  a  hazard  never  remote  from 
the  commonwealth  was  sufficient  to  prevent  a  people  so  singu- 
larly quick,  acute,  and  intelUgent,  from  lightly  neglecting  esta- 
blished rules,  on  the  enforcement  of  which  their  very  existence 
seemed  to  depend.  Nothing  but  such  a  phrenzy  as  seized  the 
people  of  Paris  once  in  two  thousand  years,  and  spread  to  infect 
the  colonies,  could  have  made  the  factious  divisions  that  ruined 
St,  Domingo  possible  in  a  settlement  where,  as  in  Attica,  a  few 
thousand  free  men  were  surrounded  and  might  at  any  instant  be 
overwhelmed,  by  myriads  of  slaves.  The  modes  of  proceeding, 
then,  to  which  we  have  been  referring,  were  generally  speaking 
maintained  by  common  consent  and  as  a  matter  of  course  ;  and 
they  must  have  had  some  tendency  to  moderate  the  power  and 
regulate  the  caprice  of  the  multitude.  But  after  making  all 
allowances,  we  must  perceive  that  this  power  and  caprice  had 
quite  scope  enough  to  work  the  most  extensive  and  the  most  re- 
mediless mischief 

The  body  of  the  people  in  whom  so  predominant  a  power 
was  vested  were  for  the  most  part  in  needy  circumstances ;  they 
voted  secretly ;  they  were  therefore  exposed  to  corruption  in  all 
its  forms,  from  the  more  refined  influence  of  canvassing  to  the 
grosser  substance  of  threats  and  bribes.  Even  supposing  them  to 
have  acted  without  interested  motives,  their  poverty,  which  was 
such  that  a  large  proportion  received  a  small  allowance  daily 
from  the  pubUc  treasury  or  granary  for  then-  support,  must  have 


234  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ^ATHENS.  CH.  XVII. 

greatly  jarred  with  any  patriotic  piinciples  if  they  had  been  suf- 
ficiently enlightened  to  feel  their  influence.  But  they  were  only 
half  educated,  and  being  wholly  incapable  of  thinking  for  them- 
selves, abandoned  themselves  to  the  guidance  of  demagogues, 
who  drove  the  disreputable  trade  of  gaining  an  influence  over 
them  by  a  life  of  artifice  and  intrigue.  The  statesmen  of  Athens 
were  the  most  consummate  artists  in  their  calling  of  orators  that 
the  world  ever  saw,  and  they  were  among  the  most  profligate  and 
unprincipled  men  that  ever  obtained  dominion  over  a  nation. 

The  power  possessed  by  the  multitude  to  be  exercised  in 
crowded  public  assemblies,  where  nearly  the  whole  business  of 
the  state, — executive,  legislative,  and  judicial, — was  carried  on, 
made  the  profession  of  an  orator  the  only  important  civil  occupa- 
tion, and  they  who  pursued  it  united  the  calling  of  the  hired 
advocate  with  that  of  the  politician.  Now  the  necessity  of  advo- 
cates in  every  community  governed  by  a  system  of  laws  is  quite 
manifest  ;  the  service  which  they  render  is  exactly  this,  that 
without  their  aid  justice  could  not  be  administered,  men's  rights 
could  not  be  secured,  and  the  simple  and  the  feeble  coidd  not  be 
protected  from  the  cunning  and  the  powerful.  But  it  is  most  essen- 
tial to  morals  that  the  advocate  should  be  only  the  representative 
of  other  men  in  that  openly  avowed  capacity,  and  that  all  he  says 
and  does  should  be  said  and  done  by  him  as  standing  in  the 
stead  of  the  party.  The  politician,  whether  sitting  in  a  senate  by 
personal  right,  or  delegated  by  others  to  consult  for  their  good, 
acts  in  a  judicial  capacity,  acts  in  his  own  proper  person,  and 
upon  his  own  judgment ;  he  delivers  his  opinion  because  such  are 
his  convictions,  and  there  cannot  be  a  more  corrupt  or  a  more 
debasing  employment  of  his  faculties,  or  a  more  pernicious  use 
of  his  position,  than  being  alike  prepared  to  support  any  side  of 
any  question.  If  all  the  members  of  both  houses  of  the  English 
parliament,  or  both  the  French  chambers,  who  ever  bear  a  part  in 
their  debates,  were  also  advocates  practising  at  the  bar,  the  con- 
stitution of  those  assemblies  would  suffer  considerable  damage 
from  the  unavoidable  effect  of  the  professional  habit  upon  the 
political  character.  The  large  admixture  of  other  leading  men 
prevents  this  from  happening  to  any  great  degree.  If  not  only 
there  were  no  such  admixture,  the  advocate  and  the  senator  being 
completely  identified,  but  if  also  the  professional  and  the  political 
functions  were  entirely  blended  and  confused,  by  the  judicial  busi- 


CH.  XVII.  CORRUPTION  OF  STATESMEN.  235 

ness  being  caxried  on  in  the  same  assemblies  with  the  legislative, 
nay,  in  the  greater  number  of  cases  the  same  question  being  botli 
a  cause,  and  a  law  or  other  state  measure,  it  is  easy  to  see  how 
deep  a  wound  must  be  inflicted  upon  pubHc  virtue — how  wide  a 
door  opened  to  the  contamination  of  statesmen's  purity.  The 
Athenian  orator  in  some  meetings  of  the  Heliaea  spoke  as  the 
hired  advocate  of  a  party  who  was  on  his  trial,  or  was  prose- 
cuting an  adversary ;  in  others  he  wrote  for  lucre  the  party's 
speech  which  he  was  to  deliver  in  his  own  person  ;  and  tlie 
greatest  of  all  tliis  celebrated  body  was  known  to  have  occasion- 
ally written  the  addresses  of  both  sides.  In  other  meetings  of  the 
same  tribunal  he  was  to  advise  the  state,  but  standing  in  the  same 
place,  addressing  the  same  audience,  employing  the  same  re- 
sources, using  the  same  artifices.  No  versatility  of  powers,  no 
steadiness  of  principle,  could  in  such  circumstances  enable  any 
man  to  draw  the  line  between  the  two  capacities  ;  and  while  he 
gave  himself  wholly  up  to  his  client  in  the  one,  reserve  himself 
wholly  for  his  conscience  and  his  country  in  the  other.  It  was  of 
inevitable  necessity  that  he  came  soon  to  regard  the  conflict  of  the 
senate  and  forum  as  the  same,  and  to  be  ready  for  any  side  of 
any  question  in  both.  Bad  enough  is  it  for  the  state,  degrading 
enough  for  the  individuals,  that  there  should  occasionally  be 
men,  or  bodies  of  men,  actuated  by  party  views  to  the  excess  of 
regarding  principles  as  indifferent,  supporting  whatever  measures 
may  tend  to  further  such  paltry  interests,  and  opposing,  it  may 
be,  the  self-same  measures  because  their  adversaries  have  adopted 
them.  But  what  only  happens  on  rare  occasions  in  France  or  in 
England,  and  is  the  pity  or  the  scorn  of  all  good  men,  according 
as  they  happen  to  be  of  a  more  humane  temper,  or  a  more  severe, 
was  the  constant  state  of  things  at  Athens,  marshalling  men  on 
whichever  side  they  found  it  for  their  interest  to  take,  and  making 
aU  principles  be  treated  in  very  deed  as  the  counters  wherewith 
the  game  of  faction  was  to  be  played.* 

There  can  be  no  question  that  these  men  exercised  the  powers 
of  government  by  leading  the  multitude ;  and  as  the  military 
commands  were  bestowed  by  the  assembly  in  the  same  way  with 
the  magistracies,  the  generals  were  drawn  into  the  political  con- 
tests, and  became  partisans  of  the  orators,  in  some  instances 
sharing  m  their  corruption,  though  generally  much  freer  from 

*  See  Chap.  V. 


236  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVII. 

that  taint  than  the  gownsmen.  These  apparently  were  accessible 
to  foreign  influence,  and  even  to  corruption  in  its  coarsest  form. 
If  all  that  is  urged  against  Demosthenes  respecting  the  embassy  be 
put  out  of  view,  and  his  conduct  before  Philip  be  merely  ascribed 
to  embarrassment  and  timidity,  there  seems  no  ground  for  ques- 
tioning the  bribery  that  afterwards  led  to  his  conviction.  That  we 
have  only  the  powerful  speech  of  his  accuser,  and  are  without  the 
reply  which  he  may  have  made  to  it,  and  that  a  tradition  remains 
of  Harpalus  sending  an  account  to  Alexander  of  the  manner  in 
which  he  had  squandered  the  treasure  embezzled  from  him,  with- 
out any  mention  of  Demosthenes  as  receiving  a  part,  is  surely 
nothing  like  an  argument  to  be  set  against  the  unanimous  opinion 
of  such  a  body  as  the  Areopagus,  by  whose  judgment,  moreover, 
the  great  orator  had  professed  his  readiness  to  abide.  Nor  can 
the  same  excuse  be  urged  for  him  that  has  been  set  up  for  the 
party  in  England  which  has  been  charged  with  receiving  foreign 
pecuniary  aid  to  further  its  attacks  upon  arbitrary  power,  and  the 
establishment  of  its  own  principles.*  The  Athenian  partisan  had 
deemed  it  for  the  interest  of  his  country  to  reject  the  proposals  of 
the  Macedonian,  whose  peculations  made  him  the  enemy  of  the 
prince  he  had  robbed,  until  the  fruits  of  those  peculations  were 
employed  to  silence  the  most  eloquent  of  human  tongues ;  and  it 
never  has  been  suggested  that  the  money,  if  received  at  all,  was 
employed  for  any  public  purposcf  The  mercenary  nature  ot 
Demades  was  never  disputed — it  was  hardly  disguised  by  him- 
self ;  and  Antipater's  saying  has  been  recorded,  that  he  had  two 

*  There  seems  every  reason  to  disbelieve  the  story,  that  the  more  distinguished 
leaders  of  the  Whigs,  especially  Russell  and  Sidney,  were  parties  to  the  assistance 
which  some  of  them  are  believed  to  have  had  from  Louis  XIV.  through  his  ambas- 
sador. Mr.  Rose  {Observations  on  Fox's  Historical  Work,  sec.  iv.)  appears  to  acquit 
them  of  the  charge,  and  he  admits  that  the  Tory  leaders,  with  the  King's  con- 
nivance, received  considerable  sums,  and  even,  like  their  master,  pensions.  Lord 
J.  Russell,  in  his  able  and  temperate  Life  of  his  illustrious  ancestor  (Chap,  x.),  has 
convicted  the  principal  author  of  the  charge.  Sir  J.  Dalrymple,  of  a  misstatement 
so  gross  as  well  to  deserve  the  epithet  of  "dishonest,"  which  he  gives  it ;  and  Ba- 
riUon's  predecessor,  Colbert,  it  is  curious  enough  to  observe,  describes  the  commis- 
sioners whom  he  was  employed  somewhat  earlier  to  bribe,  and  among  whom 
was  the  profligate  and  despicable  Buckingham,  almost  as  Antipater  had  described 
Demades — persons,  he  says,  whom  he  plainly  saw  nothing  would  satisfy. 

t  Plutarch  {Vit.  Dem.)  relates  other  instances  of  Demosthenes's  corruption.  If 
we  may  believe  his  account,  Alexander  foui.d  letters  of  the  orator's  in  Persia  that 
proved  his  having  received  sums  of  money  from  that  court.  But  no  one  can  impeach 
his  purity  during  the  long  struggle  with  Philip,  his  enmity  to  whom  seems  tc 
have  been  the  predominating  passion  of  his  mind. 


CH.  XVII.  CORRUPTION — FACTION — FICKLENESS.  237 

supporters  at  Athens,  Phocion  who  would  receive  nothing,  and 
Demades  whom  nothing  would  satisfy.  Others  made  an  open 
profession  of  such  profligacy,  and  this  became  even  the  language 
of  society  among  the  political  classes.  In  fact  those  politicians, 
looking  to  the  support  of  the  multitude,  could  always  reckon 
upon  a  good  chance  of  escape  from  prosecution  ;  and  if  they  were 
not  actually  condemned,  they  had  always  a  sufficient  number  of 
partisans  to  cover  them  from  the  effects  of  public  opinion.  The 
operation  of  party  in  removing  the  chief  incitements  to  good  con- 
duct, and  the  most  powerful  restraints  upon  bad,  has  been  already 
explained.*  The  Athenian  factions  and  democracy  worked  in 
this  manner  more  effectually  than  faction  in  our  times ;  it  was 
often  easy  for  an  individual,  without  party  connexions,  to  obtain 
by  rhetorical  arts,  especially  when  joined  with  corruption,  in- 
demnity for  the  worst  conduct ;  and  once  secured  by  a  vote, 
however  narrowly  carried  in  his  favour,  the  clearest  proof  of 
infamy,  in  the  eyes  of  all  virtuous  and  reflecting  persons,  was  of 
no  avail  in  effecting  his  downfall.  That  the  fickleness  of  the 
people  afforded  chances  of  escape  we  have  numerous  proofs. 
The  instance  of  Antiphon's  first  acquittal  has  already  been  men- 
tioned. The  acquittal  of  Ctesiphon  was  perhaps  justified  in  all 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  though  it  must  be  observed  that 
the  preponderance  of  the  legal  argument  was  against  him,  and 
that  an  award  of  the  honour  in  question  to  Demosthenes,  avowedly 
given  as  an  irregularity,  though  to  be  excused  by  his  services, 
was  all  that  in  strictness  should  have  been  decreed.  But  the 
numerous  court  suffered  itself  to  be  carried  away  by  his  elo- 
quence, and,  not  content  with  honouring  him,  ruined  his  adver- 
sary, driving  him  into  banishment  by  the  failure  of  his  prosecu- 
tion. How  little  it  was  possible  to  reckon  upon  the  coiirse  which 
the  people  would  take  in  any  given  case  appeared  the  more  clearly 
from  this,  that  they  were  then  for  the  most  part  attached  to  the 
Macedonian  party,  and  hostile  to  the  great  orator,  whose  own 
fate  was  not  long  afterwards  sealed  by  the  same  fickleness  of  the 
same  people,  recalling  him  from  a  just  banishment  to  serve  their 
own  purposes,  and  immediately  afterwards  abandoning  him  to 
the  fury  of  his  enemy  and  their  own,  at  a  moment  when  he  was 
wholly  occupied  with  providing  for  their  defence. 

The  turbulence  of  the  Assembly,  and  even  of  the  less  numerous 
*  See  Chap.  V. 


238  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVIL 

tribunal,  the  Helisea,  was  as  remarkable  as  the  intrigues  and  pro- 
fligacy of  the  leading  men.  On  many  occasions  there  was  an 
uproar  excited  by  the  predominant  party,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting an  adversary  from  being  heard,  and  this  so  successfully, 
that  it  LS  exceedingly  uncertain  that  some  of  the  noblest  remains 
of  Attic  eloquence  were  ever  delivered.*  Such  scandalous  scenes 
were  not  confined  to  meetings  held  upon  political  questions  ;  those 
of  a  judicial  kind  were  sometimes,  though  not  so  frequently,  dis- 
cussed under  the  same  sinister  influence  ;  and  instances  were  not 
wanting  of  the  most  eminent  men,  charged  with  the  greatest 
offences,  and  desirous  to  defend  themselves,  yet  prevented  by 
clamour  from  obtaining  a  hearing.  This  happened  to  Demos- 
thenes himself  in  one  stage  of  the  accusation  brought  against  him 
for  corruption,  and  it  was  therefore  that  he  afterwards  obtained  a 
decree  referring  the  case  to  the  Areopagus.  So  sensible  were  the 
Athenians  of  this  vice  in  their  constitution,  that  an  arrangement 
was  made  for  the  tribes  taking  upon  themselves  in  rotation  to 
guard  the  public  meetings,  and  endeavour  to  maintain  some 
order  in  their  proceedings.  The  same  causes,  however,  in  which 
the  evil  originated  affected  also  the  remedy,  and  too  often  frus- 
trated its  operation,  namely,  the  fickle,  inconstant,  volatile  temper 
of  the  people,  and  the  great  number  of  persons  appointed  to  keep 
down  tumult.  These  preservers  of  order  were  themselves  led 
away  by  the  predominant  feelings,  yielded  to  the  excitement,  and 
joined  in  the  violence  which  they  were  stationed  to  control 

That  the  Athenians  had  not  formed  those  sober  and  calm 
habits  of  both  thinking  and  acting  upon  state  affairs  which  alone 
can  fit  men  for  bearing  a  useful  part  in  the  government,  and 
which  may  be  wholly  wanting  even  to  a  people  of  great  acuteness, 
and  very  well  acquainted  with  the  particulars  of  each  separate 
question  brought  before  them  (Part  I.,  Chap.  III.),  seems  quite 
indisputable.  It  is  also  extremely  probable  that  the  same  bad 
constitution  might  have  worked  far  better  with  another  nation,  or 
with  the  same  in  a  more  advanced  stage  of  improvement  But 
its  vices  were  deeply  rooted,  and  of  a  mischievous  influence,  which 
could  in  no  circumstances  have  been  fully  counteracted.  The 
want  of  the  representative  principle — the  consequently  too  large 
numbers  which  attended  the  meetings  of  the  most  powerful  body 
in  the  state — the  exercise  of  administrative  powers  by  such  a 

*  This  controversy  exists  even  as  to  the  orations  upon  the  Embassy. 


CH.  XVII.        ADVANTAGES  DERIVED  FROM  THE  SYSTEM.  239 

number — the  formation  of  the  less  numerous  bodies  by  lot — and 
the  confusion  of  judicial  as  well  as  legislative  functions  with 
executive — were  defects  of  a  nature  so  radical  and  pernicious  as 
no  improvement  in  the  character  and  habits  could  ever  be  ex- 
pected to  countervail.  The  entirely  promiscuous  nature  of  the 
assembly,  and  the  extension  of  the  same  vicious  composition  to 
the  Senate  and  the  Heliaea  by  the  lot,  exceedingly  limited,  though 
it  did  not  wholly  destroy,  the  influence  of  the  Natural  Aristocracy. 
This  would  of  itself  have  been  a  fatal  defect ;  but  even  had  these 
assemblies  been  composed  entirely  of  the  classes  most  fit  to  govern 
and  had  their  numbers  been  in  consequence  greatly  diminished, 
the  confusion  of  functions,  and  the  consequent  imperfection  of  the 
judicial  system,  would  have  still  made  the  constitution  inadequate 
to  provide  for  its  own  stability,  and  to  perform  the  most  important 
of  the  services  for  the  purpose  of  securing  which  all  governments 
are  established. 

It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  no  less  certain  that  the  Athenian  con- 
stitution was  calculated  to  bestow  those  important  benefits  which 
flow  from  all  popular  systems,  however  ill  contrived,  and  that  at 
different  periods  it  in  fact  did  bestow  those  benefits.  The  uni- 
versal competition  of  talents,  the  emulation  in  virtue,  the  personal 
interest  in  the  public  welfare,  the  zeal  for  promoting  it  often  at 
the  expense  of  individual  sacrifices,  and  very  generally  at  the 
risk  of  individual  suffering,  not  only  led  to  the  possession  of 
extraordinary  accomplishments,  and  the  performance  of  bril- 
liant exploits,  but  placed  the  whole  powers  of  the  community  at 
the  disposal  of  its  government,  and,  when  sound  counsels  were 
followed,  produced  results  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  natural 
resources  of  the  country.  The  very  defects  themselves  of  the 
system  had  this  tendency ;  the  part  which  each  person  was  en- 
abled, and  even  called  upon  to  take  in  the  administration,  and 
the  risk  to  which  failure  in  any  civil  measure  or  any  military 
enterprise  exposed  all  statesmen  and  captains,  must  often  have 
produced  exertions  little  hkely  to  be  made  under  a  more  regular 
and  a  more  just  dispensation.  These  results  were  dearly  pur- 
chased by  their  concomitant  mischiefs,  and  they  were  never  to  be 
relied  upon  in  a  scheme  of  polity  such  as  we  have  been  contem- 
plating. The  extraordinary  efforts  which  were  successfully  made 
to  resist  foreign  aggression,  in  circumstances  which,  after  every 
allowance  is  made  for  the  gi-oss  exaggerations  of  historians,  re- 


240  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.  CH.  XVII. 

cording,  as  usual,  the  traditions  of  national  vanity,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  all  but  desperate,  and  the  great  power  which,  after 
these  exertions,  Athens  obtained  for  a  considerable  period  of  time, 
are  probably  without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  any  other  nation. 
No  one,  however,  can  examine  the  annals  of  those  times  without 
perceiving  how  precarious  the  advantages  were  that  thus  accrued 
from  the  system,  and  with  how  many  serious  mischiefs  they  were 
accompanied. 


CH.  XVIII.  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE  —  ATHENS.  241 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS  (concluded) — 
OTHER  STATES. 


Parties  at  Athens — Dalesmen,  Mountaineers,  Coastmen,  and  Trimmers — Usurpation 
of  the  Pisistratidae — Their  downfall— Pisistratus — Clisthenes — Miltiades — 
Popular  ingratitude — Fables  on  Marathon— Democratic  reform — Aristides — 
Barbarous  popular  excesses — Themistocles — His  maltreatment— Athenian  great- 
ness— Pericles — Alcibiades — Thirty  Tyrants — Faction —  Rebellion — Socrates — 
Other  States — Boeotia — ^^tolia — Corcyra — Achsea — Foreign  appeals. 

The  opposite  parties  of  the  patricians  and  the  plebeians,  the 
landowners  in  the  plains  (or  dalesmen)  and  the  mountaineers, 
between  which  Solon  had  steered  his  course  with  so  much  address, 
continued,  in  his  time,  and  after  him,  to  distract  the  nation.  But 
the  party  of  the  coast  had  grown  up  to  importance,  and  (as  the 
phrase  used  to  be  in  England  a  hundred  and  eighty  years  ago) 
trimmed  between  the  other  two.  The  Alcmoeonidse,  the  most 
powerful  family,  descended  from  the  kings  and  perpetual  archons, 
and  always  desirous  of  regaining  their  family's  mastery  over  the 
state  which  was  termed  tyranny  or  the  supreme  government  of  an 
individual,  set  themselves  at  the  head  of  this  third  party ;  but  not- 
withstanding their  great  influence,  they  exposed  themselves  to  a 
degree  of  public  odium  from  which  theynever  could  entirely  recover, 
by  violating  a  sanctuary  in  order  to  destroy  the  rival  party,  that 
of  Cylon,  the  leaders  of  which  had  taken  refuge  there  when  his 
attempt  failed  to  usurp  the  chief  power.  While  the  contest  lay 
between  the  trimmers,  headed  by  the  Alcmoeonidse,  and  the  dales- 
men, headed  by  the  patrician  Lycurgus,  Pisistratus,  the  chief  of 
another  great  family,  paid  his  court  to  the  mountaineers,  and 
seized  by  their  help  upon  the  chief  power.  The  other  two  parties 
coalesced  against  him,  and  drove  him  out  of  the  country ;  their 
leaders  quarrelled,  and  he  was  enabled  to  return,  but  was  again 
expelled  ;  new  dissensions  enabled  him,  after  thirteen  years'  exile, 
PART  II.  B 


242  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.  CH.  XVIII. 

again  to  return,  and  by  the  aid  of  a  force  which  he  brought  with 
him,  and  of  his  adherents  in  the  popular  or  mountain  party,  to  re- 
possess himself  of  the  government,  which  he  retained  till  his  death, 
and  left  to  his  sons.  All  the  institutions  of  Solon  were  preserved 
during  the  fifty  years  of  this  tyranny ;  the  family  governed  strictly 
according  to  his  laws ;  they  conferred  many  benefits  on  the  com- 
munity, and  made  many  improvements;  they  were  always  favoured 
by  the  people,  to  whom  they  paid  unceasing  court ;  but  an  act  of 
sriolence  and  injustice  which  was  connect(id  with  unchaste  passions 
both  in  them  and  in  those  they  endeavoured  to  oppress,  and 
which  was  calculated,  like  the  excesses  of  Tarquin  at  Rome,  to 
excite  public  indignation,  was  taken  advantage  of  by  the  patrician 
and  coast  factions  to  ruin  their  credit.  One  of  them  was  killed 
by  the  injured  individuals ;  and  the  others  having  become  the 
objects  of  public  indignation,  the  Alcmoeonidse  family  now  saw  an 
opportunity  of  attaining  the  great  object  of  their  ambition,  the 
tyranny,  by  taking  the  line  which  Pisistratus  had  pursued.  They 
left  the  trimmers,  or  such  of  them  as  they  could  not  persuade  to 
join  them  in  heading  the  mountaineers,  and  Clisthenes,  their 
chief,  obtained  the  power  which  Pisistratus  had  held  by  the  same 
means,  by  paying  court  to  the  popular  party,  and  by  also  avail- 
ing himself  of  assistance  from  Sparta.  But  he  gave  the  people 
an  influence  which  the  Pisistratidae  had  withheld;  he  made  those 
additions,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken,  to  the  tribes  and 
senate,  and  to  the  officers  chosen  by  the  people.  The  patricians, 
under  Isagoras,  stniggled  against  him,  and  finding  they  had  no 
chance  of  success,  they  in  their  turn  also  called  in  the  assistance 
of  Sparta,  and  the  party  of  Clisthenes  appealed  to  Persia  for  help, 
which  was  refused,  unless  upon  terms  that  the  Athenians  would 
not  submit  to.  The  Spartans,  joined  by  the  Boeotians  and  others, 
were  at  first  successful ;  and  Clisthenes  with  seven  hundred  fami- 
lies of  his  party  were  driven  out  of  the  country.  A  quarrel 
between  the  two  Spartan  kings,  on  the  eve  of  a  great  battle,  occa- 
sioned their  forces  to  be  withdrawn,  and  the  Athenians  defeating 
their  allies,  Clisthenes  and  his  party  were  recalled.  The  accident 
of  his  adversaries,  the  aristocratic  party,  under  Isagoras,  ha^dng 
been  assisted  by  Sparta,  not  only  confirmed  the  attachment  of  the 
Alcmoeonidge  to  popular  principles,  but  to  the  cause  of  Athenian 
independence.  Sparta  being  the  leader  of  the  aristocratic,  oli- 
garchical, or  Dorian  faction  in  Greece,  Athens  was  at  the  head  of 


I 


OH.  XVIII.  MARATHON — MILTIADES.  243 

the  Ionian  or  democratic ;  and  the  decidedly  democratic  turn 
which  the  Athenian  government  took  began  with  Clisthenes 
though  it  was  only  completed  by  the  Persian  war. 

This  celebrated  struggle  was  mainly  occasioned  by  the  family 
and  faction  of  the  Pisistratidse,  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  court 
of  Darius,  and  by  their  intrigues  led  him  to  undertake  the  con- 
quest of  Greece.  The  Athenians,  deserted  by  the  other  states, 
met  his  invading  army,  in  which  the  exiled  chief  of  that  faction, 
Hippias,  had  a  forward  appointment.  Three  generals,  with  the 
right  of  commanding  in  rotation,  headed  the  Athenian  army  ;  and 
when  two  of  them,  Aristides  and  Themistocles,  desired  to  give  up 
their  turn  that  Miltiades,  the  more  experienced  leader,  might 
conduct  the  fight,  he  knew  the  nature  of  the  people  he  served  too 
well  to  accept  it,  being  quite  aware  that  any  mischance  must 
prove  his  ruin,  had  he  commanded  out  of  his  turn.  He  waited 
till  his  day  came,  and  gained  the  immortal  victory  of  Marathon, 
certainly  one  of  the  greatest  achievements  in  the  history  of  war, 
although  the  accounts  preserved  by  Greek  writers,  our  only  au- 
thorities, give  it  almost  a  fabulous  aspect*  For  a  little  while  the 
illustrious  captain,  who  had  performed  this  prodigious  service,  was 
the  idol  of  his  countrymen.  But  an  expedition  which  he  had 
been  allowed  to  undertake  on  representing  the  great  treasure  that 
would  accrue  from  it,  proved  unsuccessful ;  he  was  tried  upon  a 
charge  of  misconduct  whilst  commanding  in  Thrace  at  a  former 
period  of  his  life  ;  like  Sir  Walter  Kaleigh,  he  was  sentenced  be- 
cause the  avarice  of  his  tyrants  had  been  disappointed ;  and,  like 
that  great  man,  he  was  punished  upon  an  obsolete  charge  by  the 
ingratitude,  not  indeed  of  the  prince,  but  of  the  people  whom  he 
had  faithfully  and  brilliantly  served. 

The  war  was  renewed  after  Darius's  death  by  his  son,  with  a 
force  altogether  overwhelming.   Athens  was  now  joined  by  Sparta, 

*  We  are  desired  to  believe  that  120,000  Persian  troops,  brought  over  in  600 
vessels,  were  entirely  defeated  by  11,000  Greeks,  -with  a  loss  of  between  6000  and 
7000  men,  the  conquerors  only  losing  182.  Nor  is  any  explanation  given  of  the 
means  by  which  the  remainder  of  the  beaten  army,  still  sufficient  to  overwhelm  the 
Athenians,  were  prevented  from  executing  their  plan  of  doubling  Cape  Sunium, 
and  marching  to  Athens  immediately  after  the  battle.  The  other  Greek  states  had 
held  back  from  the  contest,  being  well  disposed  to  yield  the  merely  nominal  sub- 
mission which  would  have  satisfied  Darius.  That  the  Athenians  refused  to  yield 
this  submission  is  perhaps  less  a  proof  of  their  constancy  than  their  sagacity ;  for 
they  well  knew  that  as  the  whole  quarrel  was  with  them,  no  terms  they  could 
submit  to  were  likely  to  save  them  from  the  king's  tyranny. 

b2 


244)  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE — ATHENS.  CH.  XVIII. 

while  Thebes  and  other  states  took  part  with  the  invader.  After 
an  almost  miraculous  display  of  valour  and  self-devotion  at  Ther- 
mopylae, and  the  greatest  naval  victory  of  ancient  times  at  Salamis, 
the  force  of  numbers  prevailed,  and  Athens  was  twice  taken  and 
sacked  within  a  few  months.  It  was  at  this  crisis  that  Aristides 
conceived  the  design  of  completing  the  reforms  of  Clisthenes. 
Though  a  decided  supporter  of  the  patrician  party,  he  had  early 
perceived  the  powerful  effect  of  those  reforms  in  calling  forth  the 
exertions  of  the  people,  and  he  introduced  the  great  change  in 
the  constitution  by  which  all  offices  were  thrown  open  to  every 
class  of  the  people.  There  might  be  the  greatest  objections  to 
this  measure,  though  it  seemed  difficult  to  stop  short  in  reform  at 
the  point  where  Clisthenes  had  left  it ;  but  all  must  confess  that 
Aristides  deserved  the  greatest  commendation  both  for  overcoming 
his  early  prejudices,  and  for  rising  superior  to  the  paltry  fear  of 
being  deemed  inconsistent.  The  spirit  of  the  nation  was  now 
raised  to  the  highest  pitch  of  excitement,  and  while  it  enabled  the 
chiefs  to  perform  the  greatest  exploits,  it  also  burst  forth  into  the 
most  barbarous  excesses  both  of  cruelty  and  injustice.  Splendid 
victories  were  gained  against  great  superiority  of  force,  and  after 
that  of  Platsea  above  200,000  of  their  enemies  were  massacred 
when  incapable  of  resisting.  The  most  strenuous  opposition  was 
by  the  spirit  of  the  people  made  to  the  invading  army,  while  the 
odds  seemed  wholly  against  them  ;  and  they  stoned  to  death  at 
different  times  two  of  their  orators  (Cyrsilus  and  Lycidus)  for 
merely  proposing  to  negotiate  in  desperate  circumstances,  their 
women  in  one  of  these  instances  acting  the  part  of  furies  and 
murdering  the  wife  of  the  offender.* 

The  naval  power  of  Athens  was  founded,  and  the  city  rebuilt 
and  fortified,  by  the  wise  and  vigorous  counsels  of  Themistocles  ; 
and  he  was  soon  after  banished  from  the  country  he  had  so  often 
saved.  This  petty  state  not  only  rose  to  the  head  of  all  the 
Greeks,  and  gave  the  law  to  them  for  above  fifty  years,  but  ex- 
tended its  dominion  over  the  islands,  obtained  possession  of  the 
coast  which  forms  the  key  of  the  Euxine,  and  at  one  time  held  a 
large  part  of  Egypt.  This  too  was  the  period  when  the  fine  arts 
made  the  greatest  progress,  when  those  works  were  produced 

*  Demosthenes  reminds  the  Athenians  of  this  brutal  passage  in  their  history  as 
one  of  peculiar  glory,  and  as  well  calculated  to  rouse  up  a  spirit  equally  honourable. 
{De  Coroiia.) 


CH.  XVIII.  ATHENIAN  GREATNESS.  245 

which  are  still  the  admiration  of  the  world  even  in  the  fragments 
that  time  has  spared  to  us,  and  when  the  foundations  were  pre- 
pared for  those  more  precious  works  of  a  higher  art  which  happily 
bids  defiance  to  its  ravages.  Though  Pericles,  under  whose  aus- 
pices these  great  things  were  done,  went  far  in  corrupting  the 
people  to  retain  his  power,  yet  he  kept  himself  wholly  independent, 
consulting  their  interests  and  his  own  glory  as  bound  up  with 
theirs,  but  rather  dictating  to  them  than  suffering  them  to  pre- 
scribe his  course ;  whereas,  says  the  historian,  those  who  followed 
him  shaped  the  public  measures  for  their  own  aggrandisement 
and  profit,  accommodating  themselves  and  giving  up  the  manage  - 
ment  of  affairs  to  the  mere  pleasure  of  the  people.* 

The  Peloponnesian  war  exhibited  constant  proofs  of  the  inevit- 
able consequence  of  the  new  leadership,  and  the  radical  vices  of 
the  constitution.  But  it  may  suffice  to  mention  the  Sicilian  expe- 
dition, and  the  conduct  of  Alcibiades.  His  personal  influence, 
and  that  of  his  faction,  induced  the  people  to  undertake  the  con- 
quest of  Sicily,  for  which  their  resources  were  utterly  inadequate, 
and  against  the  soundest  advice  of  their  most  experienced  generals. 
•  On  the  eve  of  his  departure  he  was  impeached  for  sacrilege,  but 
allowed  to  sail,  his  trial  being  postponed.  On  the  eve  of  a  battle 
he  was  recalled,  but  escaped  and  joined  the  Spartans,  the  chiefs 
of  the  league  against  his  country,  while  the  two  Athenian  armies 
in  Sicily  were  destroyed.  After  reducing  Athens  to  the  greatest 
straits  and  peril  at  the  head  of  her  enemies,  he  intrigued  with  the 
Persian  king — regained  his  influence  at  home — established  an 
oligarchy  of  four  hundred — was  suffered  to  return — became  more 
popular  than  ever—  removed  the  new  constitution  and  substituted 
another—  was  actually  offered  the  supreme  power  in  the  state — 
suddenly  lost  the  favour  he  had  acquired,  by  the  giddy  people 
laying  on  him  the  blame  which  another  officer  had  alone  incurred, 
refusing  to  hear  his  defence,  and  driving  him  into  exile. 

After  many  years  of  various  fortune  Sparta  succeeded  in  over- 
coming her  great  rival,  overthrowing  the  popular  government, 
and  planting  an  oligarchy,  commonly  called  the  Thirty  Tyrants, 


•  Thucyd.,  ii.,  65.     The  expression  is  remarkable,  and  stronger  than  in  the  text 

— ETjaa-a»T9  Kof  ninat  ru  Sji/**  xai  ra  'T^ayfiMra,  &C.  Erjaa-ovTa  is  "  turned  round," 
"jumped  about,"  as  men  do  in  treading  grapes.  He  had  said  just  before,  that 
though,  in  the  time  of  Pericles,  the  government  was  nominally  democratic,  yet  in 
reality  it  was  in  the  bands  of  the  first  men  in  the  state. 


246  GOVERNMENTS  OF  GREECE— ATHENS.  CH.  XVIII. 

in  its  place.  A  system  of  terror,  maintained  by  numerous  assassi- 
nations, had  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Four  Hundred,  and 
contributed  to  maintain  their  power.  Other  murders  under  the 
colour  of  judicial  proceedings  attended  their  overthrow.  Their 
tyranny,  and  the  outrages  both  committed  by  them  and  against 
their  adherents,  were  fai*  exceeded  by  the  Thirty,  who  in  the  short 
period  of  eight  months  put  upwards  of  1500  citizens  to  death,  and 
indulging  in  every  excess  of  arbitrary  power,  sacrificed  not  only 
all  who  were  likely  to  shake  their  dominion,  but  all  whose  wealth 
offered  any  temptation,  or  whose  death  could  gratify  any  per- 
sonal animosity.*  Their  overthrow  restored  the  democratic  con- 
stitution, and  the  government  by  factions  and  their  chiefs,  among 
whom  there  was  constantly  scope  for  the  interference  of  Sparta, 
now  predominant  by  land  in  Greece,  as  Athens  still  continued  to 
be  by  sea.  The  same  system  of  tumult  and  intrigue,  but  rendered 
more  pernicious  than  ever  by  the  destruction  which  the  Thirty 
Tyrants  had  effected  of  almost  all  the  eminent  men  in  the  state, 
continued  during  the  rise  of  the  Macedonian  power,  and  prepared 
the  way  for  that  final  ascendancy  which  destroyed  the  independ- 
ence of  Athens,  and  secured  her  comparative  tranquillity,  without 
any  remains  of  her  ancient  glory,  until  with  the  rest  of  Greece 
she  became  part  of  a  Koman  province. 

In  the  whole  history  of  Greek  faction  and  democracy  there  is 
nothing  more  remarkable  than  this,  that  in  the  very  communities 
which  of  aU  that  ever  existed  were  the  most  inflamed  with 
national  feeling  of  patriotic  spirit  and  mutual  hatred,  one  of  the 
most  ordinary  occurrences  should  have  been  the  appeals  of  con- 
tending parties  to  the  enemies  of  their  country  for  help  in  carry- 
ing on  their  factious  contests  ;  and  that  the  worst  kind  of  treason 
— -joining  the  public  enemy,  and  both  counselling  and  assisting 
his  operations — should  have  formed  almost  a  regular  part  of  the 
political  conduct  pursued  by  the  leaders  of  every  faction  which 
happened  to  be  defeated.  A  French,  or  English,  or  American 
faction  does  not  form  a  coalition  with  other  parties  once  adverse  to 
his  own,  nay,  hardly  appeals  to  the  country  at  an  election 
against  the  faction  that  has  removed  him  from  office  with  less 

*  They  governed  by  a  larger  council  of  3000  well-armed  men,  selected  from 
ampng  the  wealthier  classes,  and  by  whose  aid  they  disarmed  the  rest  of  the  com- 
munity. The  scenes  which  took  place  in  this  assembly,  and  the  destruction  by  its 
means  of  their  adversaries,  and  sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  Therameues,  of  mem- 
bers of  their  own  body,  strongly  remind  the  reader  of  the  reign  of  terror  in  Paris. 


CH.  XVIIl.  FACTIOUS  REBELLION.  247 

reluctance  or  fewer  scruples  than  an  Athenian  patriot,  upon  being 
ill-treated  by  the  people,  showed  in  betaking  himself  to  the 
Spartan  camp  or  the  court  of  the  Persian  despot.  Nor  does  the 
reputation  of  the  man  who  so  acted  appear  to  have  suffered  any 
indelible  stain,  any  more  than  his  return  to  popular  favour  was 
prevented  by  their  openly  avowed  treasons. 

The  low  standard  of  patriotism  and  political  feeling,  the  want 
of  a  genuine  public  spirit,  and  the  frightful  vehemence  of  faction, 
is  not  the  only  matter  which  such  facts  as  these  illustrate.  The 
odious  tyranny  of  the  multitude  must  have  reached  a  height,  and 
become  a  grievance  altogether  intolerable,  giving  to  the  country 
itself  the  aspect  of  a  capricious  and  cruel  despot,  clothing  it  in 
attitudes  at  once  frightful  and  hateful,  and  stripping  it  of  all  that 
should  naturally  win  affection  or  respect.  We  may  well  believe 
how  unbearable  a  tyranny  it  must  have  been  that  could  induce  a 
man  of  such  perfect  virtue  as  Socrates  to  espouse  the  party  of  those 
who,  under  the  dictation  of  the  victorious  enemy,  overthrew  it  to 
set  up  in  its  stead  the  oligarchy  which  proved  beyond  measure 
more  insupportable  still ;  nay,  could  even  make  him  adhere  to 
that  oHgarchy  when  its  hands  were  stained  with  the  blood  of  the 
most  eminent  persons  in  the  state.  To  his  political  connexion 
with  these  men,  and  his  having  been  the  teacher  of  Critias  and 
Theramenes,  their  leaders,  and  the  worst  among  them,  his  own 
condemnation,  under  the  most  false  pretexts,  was  undoubtedly 
owing  ;  and  this  judicial  murder  adds  one,  and  not  the  least  dis- 
graceful, to  the  catalogue  of  crimes  for  which  the  constitution  and 
the  people  of  Athens  are  answerable.* 


*  Socrates  had  nobly  distinguished  himself  in  resisting  the  determination  of  the 
people  to  condemn  the  generals  who  had  gained  the  battle  of  Arginusa.  The 
clamour  of  faction  against  these  great  public  benefactors  succeeded  in  obtaining 
sentence  of  death  upon  them  immediately  after  their  victory,  and  Socrates  exposed 
himself  to  the  fury  of  the  mob  by  refusing,  as  presiding  officer  in  the  assembly 
(proedriis),  to  let  the  question  be  put.  The  judicial  murder  was  nevertheless  per- 
petrated immediately  after.  He  exposed  himself  to  the  resentment  of  the  Thirty 
in  like  manner,  by  refusing  to  join  in  executing  an  order  of  theirs  to  put  a  wealthy 
man  to  death  in  their  proscription.  He,  however,  had  been  named  as  one  of  those 
deputed  to  do  the  work,  and  he  remained  at  Athens  unmolested,  and  even  adhering 
to  them  during  their  reign.  He  and  Xenophon  had  the  utmost  aversion  to  the 
democratic  constitution  and  party,  and  the  prosecution  against  him  was  instigated 
by  the  leaders  of  Thrasybulus's  party,  which  had  overturned  the  tyrants.  A 
solemn  oath  having  been  taken  l)y  the  people  to  maintain  animosity  grounded  upon 


248  GOVERNMENTS  OF  ANCIENT  GREECR  CH.  XVIII. 

It  would  be  impossible,  from  tbe  extraordinary  and  conflicting 
notices  left  of  them,  to  examine  minutely  the  constitutions  of  the 
other  Greek  states,  even  if  there  were  any  good  purpose  to  be 
served  by  the  inquiry,  after  having  entered  so  much  at  large  as 
we  have  done  into  the  subject  of  the  two  leading  commonwealths. 
Most  of  the  others  appear  to  have  borne  a  general  resemblance  to 
Athens,  both  in  the  form  of  their  government  and  in  their  history ; 
some,  however,  having  a  more  aristocratic  or  oligarchical  system. 
But  the  defects  of  the  great  democracy  seem  to  have  been  still 
more  strikingly  exhibited  in  some  of  these  less  considerable  sys- 
tems of  polity  than  iu  the  Athenian,  while  in  all  of  them  that 
intolerable  and  factious  violence,  which  prevailed  in  Athens  and 
Sparta,  was  carried  to  a  greater  pitch. 

The  Theban,  or  rather  Boeotian,  government  was  in  the  hands 
of  a  council  from  all  the  eleven  towns,  or  petty  states  of  the  union, 
and  of  eleven  chiefs  called  Boeotarchy,  who,  as  well  as  the  two 
polemarchs  at  the  head  of  domestic  concerns,  were  chosen  for  a 
year  ;  and  such  was  the  jealousy  of  those  chiefs  acquiring  inde- 
pendent power,  that  it  was  an  offence  punishable  with  death  to 
refuse  quitting  their  ofl&ce  within  one  month  after  it  expired.  No 
person  could  fill  any  high  office  until  he  had  ceased  for  ten  years 
to  carry  on  any  retail  trade. 

Other  instances  of  jealousy  towards  the  magistrates  are  to  be 
found  in  different  commonwealths.  Thus  the  ^tolians,  a  federal 
union  like  the  Boeotians,  had  a  chief  annually  chosen,  and  whose 
duty  it  was  to  convoke  the  general  council,  called  Pancetolon.  He 
was  to  lay  before  it  the  cause  of  its  assembling,  but  was  prohibited 
from  making  any  speech  whatever  upon  the  subject  To  him, 
however,  was  intrusted  the  execution  of  the  decrees  and  laws 
made  by  the  assembly.  This  imposing  silence  upon  the  executive 
is  the  converse  of  the  scheme  in  earlier  times  adopted  in  Crete, 
and  at  Spaxta,  of  allowing  the  assembly  only  to  determine  on  the 
matters  propounded  without  any  discussion. 

Corcyra  seems,  of  all  these  ancient  states,  to  have  been  the 
most  renowned  for  violence  and  sedition,  insomuch  that  "  Cor- 
cyrian  sedition"  came  to  be  a  proverbial  expression.  One  of 
these  violent  anarchies  is  recorded  in  which,  besides  butchering  or 

that  charge,  and  the  restoration  of  the  old  democracy,  it  was  impossible  to  try 
Socrates  for  the  real  offence  which  he  had  given,  and  the  superstitions  ground  was 
found  as  effectual. 


CH.  XVIIL  TWO  GREAT  PARTIES.  249 

banishing  the  sixty  senators,  each  town,  and  even  each  house, 
was  divided  against  itself ;  brothers,  nay,  even  parents  and  chil- 
dren, shedding  each  other's  blood. 

In  all  these  commonwealths  the  great  bulk  of  the  people  were 
slaves  ;  and  in  the  Achaean  state  it  happened  that  the  grown-up 
men  having  been  greatly  reduced  in  numbers  by  the  Spartan 
invasion,  the  slaves  rose,  took  the  whole  management  of  the 
government  into  their  own  hands,  and  had  entire  possession  of  the 
country  for  some  years.  How  they  were  overpowered  we  are  not 
distinctly  informed,  but  they  were  either  extirpated  or  banished  iu 
a  body. 

Each  of  the  states,  and  indeed  each  town  of  every  state,  was 
divided  into  two  factions,  arranged  against  each  other  with  that 
implacable  and  unscrupulous  fury  which  is  only  known  in  petty 
states,  subject  to  the  curse  of  unbalanced  popular  government. 
These  two  parties,  the  democratic  and  aristocratic  or  oligarchical, 
were  always  in  openly  avowed  correspondence  with  the  two  great 
leaders  of  the  party,  Athens  and  Sparta ;  so  that  besides  the  mis- 
chiefs of  civil  broils,  of  themselves  sufficiently  intolerable,  they 
were  exposed  to  the  yet  more  unbearable  evils  arising  out  of 
foreign  influence.  The  worst  of  all  wars  is,  no  doubt,  a  civU  war ; 
but  a  civil  war,  in  part  waged  by  foreign  co-operation,  is  a  worser 
form  of  civil  war. 


260  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENl'S.  C'H.  XIX. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS  -MUNICIPAL  CONSTITUTIONS  AND 
ARISTOCRACY, 


Feudal  plan  monarchical — Rise  of  Aristocracy— Civic  Nobility — Otho  I. — General 
form  of  Government — Consuls — Credenza — Senate — Parliament — Wars  of  the 
Cities — Pavia  and  Milan — War  of  the  Towns — Treaty  of  Constance. 

The  feudal  system,  of  wliich  we  formerly  traced  tlie  establish- 
ment in  Italy,  especially  in  its  northern  and  middle  divisions 
(Part  I.,  Chap.  XVIII.),  created  a  state  of  society  out  of  which 
aristocratic  government  arose  as  its  natural  growth.  We  have 
seen  the  rise  of  such  institutions  in  Rome  and  Sparta  from  the 
separation  of  the  class  which  had  effected  the  conquest  of  the 
country,  and  retained  for  itself  and  its  descendants  the  exclusive 
possession  of  political  power,  treating  the  original  inhabitants, 
and  all  foreigners  who  settled  among  them,  as  an  inferior  order 
of  persons.  The  northern  nations  who  overran  Italy,  beside  their 
superiority  as  conquerors,  introduced  a  new  distinction,  not  at  first 
so  powerful  in  maintaining  the  difference  of  ranks,  but  much 
more  desirable — that  of  territorial  possession.  The  land  became 
the  property  of  the  conquerors ;  and  such  portions  of  it  as  were  left 
to  the  original  inhabitants  could  only  be  possessed  by  them  on 
paying  a  portion  of  its  produce.  The  portion  of  land  which  was 
entirely  taken  from  them,  was  again  subdivided  among  the  con- 
querors, so  as  to  create  distinctions  in  their  ranks ;  but  all  of 
them — all  the  free  and  military  settlers  and  their  descendants, 
whether  holding  whole  provinces  under  the  prince,  or  only  holding 
smaller  portions  under  those  great  proprietors — formed  an  order 
distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the  community,  who  were  either  in 
a  state  of  bondage  or  of  vassalage  to  them  if  they  were, allowed  to 
possess  or  to  cultivate  the  land ;  and,  if  unconnected  with  the 
land,  were,  whether  free  or  bondsmen,  reckoned  of  no  account  in 
the  state  until  their  industry  as  artisans  and  traders  had  given 


CH.  XIX.  FEUDAL  ARISTOCRACY.  251 

them  wealth  and  importance.  There  was  thus  a  privileged  class 
or  aristocracy  in  all  those  feudal  states ;  but  the  government  was 
monarchical ;  it  was  a  gradation  of  monarchical  divisions  ;  and  the 
lord  or  baron  was  the  monarchical  chief  of  his  vassals ;  the  great 
feudatories,  the  duke  or  count,  or  on  the  frontiers  the  marquis, 
was  the  chief  of  the  barons ;  and  the  king  or  prince  was  the  chief 
of  the  great  feudatories.  Whatever  division  there  was  of  power 
and  of  influence  consisted  in  the  sharing  of  it  between  the  prince 
and  those  great  feudatories,  or  between  the  great  feudatories  and 
their  barons.  Between  the  barons  and  their  vassals  there  was  no 
such  partition,  any  more  than  between  the  vassals  and  those  sub- 
feudatories  who  held  of  them,  or  between  any  of  those  classes  of 
landowners  and  the  serfs  who  cultivated  the  ground. 

It  is,  for  om*  present  purpose,  immaterial  in  what  way  we  de- 
cide the  questions  which  have  been  raised  on  this  subject:  whether 
the  whole  army  obtaining  grants  of  land,  the  whole  of  the  ori- 
ginal conquerors  in  any  district,  became  the  privileged,  the  noble 
class,  or  only  the  superior  portions  of  them,  the  companions  of 
the  chief  or  prince ;  and  whether  in  subsequent  times  the  privi- 
leges and  rank  of  nobles  were  confined  to  those  landowners  who 
held  immediately  under  the  prince,  or  were  extended  to  those 
also  who  held  under  the  great  feudatories.  It  is  most  probable 
that  in  some  places  where  the  number  of  the  invaders  was  small, 
or  soon  became  small,  as  a  separate  class  they  might  form,  like 
the  ancient  Roman  and  Spartan  patricians,  the  privileged  class  ; 
while  in  other  provinces  this  distinction  was  confined  to  a  limited 
number  in  a  large  body  of  settlers.  It  is  also  likely  that  the  im- 
mediate holders  under  the  prince  enjoyed  distinctions  over  the 
other  landowners  ;  and  when  the  great  feudatories  became  them- 
selves rather  princes  federally  connected  with  the  common  chief, 
king,  or  emperor,  than  subjects  of  his  crown,  their  barons  formed 
a  noble  class  as  holding  under  princes  rather  than  under  subjects. 
But  in  what  way  soever  we  consider  these  questions,  the  establish- 
ment of  distinct  classes  or  orders  of  men  in  each  community  is 
clear ;  in  each  community  there  was  a  body  dififerent  from  the 
bulk  of  the  people,  and  possessing  privileges  which  the  people 
did  not  enjoy.  This  body  originally  consisted  of  considerable 
landowners — at  all  times  it  possessed  the  great  bulk  of  the  landed 
property,  either  dii-ectly  or  by  rights  which  it  held  over  the 
immediate  cultivators.    But  as  its  privileges  were  hereditary,  and 


252  ITAUAN  GOVERNMENTS.  CH.  XIX- 

descended  to  all  the  posterity  of  the  first  proprietors,  in  process 
of  time  the  body  consisted  of  many  persons  possessing  very  little 
landed  property,  and  of  many  possessing  none  at  all,  as  well  as  of 
great  proprietors.  The  importance  of  the  class  depended  upon 
the  territorial  rights  of  its  more  considerable  members.  The 
more  numerous  and  poorer  members  had  privileges  which  distin- 
guished them  from  the  rest  of  the  commumty  ;  but  they  were,  like 
the  mere  vassals,  rather  followers  of  the  chiefs  than  partakers  of 
their  power.  There  was  thus  an  aristocracy  vritldn  an  aristo- 
cracy ;  the  whole  body  of  the  nobles  was  distinguished  from  the 
rest  of  the  people ;  but  the  real  aristocracy  consisted  of  the 
weJilthy  nobles,  according  to  the  distribution  of  the  Natural 
Aristocracy. 

We  have  already  (Part  I.,  Chap,  xin.)  traced  the  origin  of 
the  great  titles  both  in  France  and  Italy,  originally  personal 
offices  conferred  by  the  sovereign  upon  the  more  powerful  nobles, 
as  governors  of  districts  or  towns ;  afterwards,  through  the  negli- 
gence or  weakness  of  the  prince,  made  hereditary  in  their  families. 
In  the  Lombard  kingdom,  but  still  more  universally  under  the 
Carlovingian,  all  the  considerable  towns  of  Italy  were  under 
governors — at  first  under  dukes,  who  held  a  large  district ;  but 
afterwards  under  counts,  who  represented  the  sovereign  in  the 
several  towns.  In  each  town  the  count  (who  was  sometimes  the 
bishop  also,  and  always  commanded  the  forces  as  well  as  presided 
in  the  tribunals)  had  a  kind  of  court  or  council  in  administering 
justice ;  it  was  composed  of  burghers,  chosen  by  the  count,  and 
approved  by  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants,  and  called  sculdasci,  as 
we  have  seen  (Part  L,  Chap,  xvii.),  answering  to  the  scahi/ni  or 
Eschevins  of  the  Franka  The  count,  accompanied  by  these  ma- 
gistrates, attended  the  sovereign's  court'  or  general  assembly,  at 
which  his  decrees  were  published,  and  received  the  kind  of  sanc- 
tion, little  more  than  a  formality,  required  to  give  them  the  force 
of  laws.  The  villages  were  the  property  of  the  barons,  and  inha- 
bited by  their  vassals,  who  cultivated  the  land  under  them,  paying 
a  certain  proportion  of  the  produce,  and  rendering  certain  services, 
as  well  as  attending  the  subordinate  courts,  in  which  the  barons, 
with  their  assistance,  administered  justice,  and  following  them  in 
war  as  their  militia. 

The  burghers  by  degrees  acquired  some  importance,  and  be- 
came m  many  instances  a  counterpoise  on  behalf  of  the  people  to 


CH.  XIX.  CIVIC  NOBILITY.  253 

the  count's  authority.  But  in  the  country  the  barons  met  with 
no  opposition,  and  found  no  one  of  any  importance  in  wealth  or  of 
any  influence  to  match  with  their  own.  There  subsisted  a  con- 
stant jealousy  between  the  towns  and  the  barons.  The  burghers 
considered  that  the  country  districts  which  lay  under  the  dominion 
of  the  barons  naturally  belonged  to  the  town,  which  depended 
upon  them  for  its  supplies ;  and  the  barons,  who  disliked  any 
rivalry  of  the  burghers,  were  better  pleased  to  remain  constantly 
among  their  own  vassals  in  the  country,  avoiding  all  intercourse 
with  the  towns.  Meanwhile  the  power  both  of  the  towns  and 
the  barons  was  increasing,  though  in  very  different  degrees,  the 
towns  making  a  much  more  rapid  progress  towards  independence. 
The  first  step  made,  however,  was  common  to  both.  The  northern 
nations,  from  jealousy  of  the  conquered  people,  had  made  it  a 
settled  rule  of  their  policy  to  destroy  all  fortifications,  to  keep 
every  town  open,  and  to  prevent  all  country  residences  from  being 
surrounded  with  walls  or  other  outworks.  This  policy  was  main- 
tained during  the  subsistence  of  the  Lombard  kingdom,  from  the 
latter  part  of  the  sixth  to  the  latter  part  of  the  eighth  century. 
But  during  the  Carlovingian  monarchy,  and  the  unsettled  times 
which  succeeded  it,  the  sovereign  found  it  necessary  to  pursue  a 
different  course  in  order  to  protect  the  country  against  the  new 
swarms  of  barbarians,  especially  the  Huns,  who  were  continually 
making  inroads  into  Italy ;  and  in  the  ninth  and  tenth  centuries 
charters  of  fortification  were  granted  by  the  sovereign,  who  alone 
was  considered  as  intrusted  with  the  public  defence,  to  all  towns 
of  any  consequence,  and  even  to  most  villages,  monasteries,  and 
baronial  residences  ;  so  that  these  all  became  places  of  strength, 
afforded  shelter  to  the  neighbourhood,  were  places  of  refuge  to 
the  people  whom  the  barons  or  their  followers  oppressed-,  and  also 
enabled  those  baronial  followers  to  escape,  whom  the  quaiTels  of 
the  barons  placed  in  frequent  jeopardy.  A  considerable  increase 
in  the  population,  in  the  wealth  and  generally  in  the  importance 
of  the  towns,  especially  of  the  larger  ones,  was  the  consequence. 
But  this  additional  importance  of  their  inhabitants  was  attended 
with  the  almost  entire  separation  of  the  nobles,  who  now  confined 
themselves  to  their  castles,  and  the  domains  cultivated  by  their 
vassals  and  their  enfranchised  serfs  attached  to  the  soil,  and 
neither  liable  to  be  removed  by  the  owner  nor  fi:ee  to  quit  it  of 
themselvea 


254  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS.  CH.  XIX. 

The  government  of  the  towns,  too,  the  municipal  police,  and 
administration  of  justice  was  exceedingly  imperfect,  until  the 
foundation  of  the  Saxon  kingdom  of  Italy  by  Otho  1.,  commonly 
and  justly  called  the  Great,  under  whose  reign  a  very  important 
change  was  made  in  the  condition  of  the  Italian  towns.  It  is  not 
often  that  men  have  happened  to  bestow  this  appellation  on  those 
whose  warlike  exploits  were  their  least  remarkable  distinction,  and 
whose  conquests  over  barbarism  and  anarchy  long  survived  the 
influence  and  even  the  memory  of  their  mihtary  exploits.  This 
eminent  person  finally  overthrew,  in  965,  after  a  contest  of  four 
years,  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  which  had  been  a  prey  to  various 
princes  during  the  anarchy  of  half  a  century  after  the  Carlovingian 
dynasty  ended  in  Charles  le  Gros.  The  feudal  army  by  which 
this  conquest  was  effected  could  only  have  been  kept  together  so 
as  to  retain  the  country  in  subjection  by  seizing  the  greater  part 
of  the  land  and  dividing  it  among  the  commanders  and  their  fol- 
lowers. Notwithstanding  the  hatred  in  which  he  was  naturally 
held  by  the  Lombard  barons,  Otho  was  too  just  and  too  wise  to 
adopt  such  a  policy.  He  ran  the  risk  of  his  conquests  being  ren- 
dered insecure  by  the  return  of  his  German  troops  to  their  own 
country  when  the  respective  periods  of  their  service  expired,  and 
he  left  the  Italian  barons  in  possession  of  their  lands  and  their 
castles,  however  ill-disposed  towards  him  he  knew  them  to  ba 
Instead  of  establishing  an  authority  which  must  always  have  been 
shaken  by  his  absence  from  the  scene  of  his  victories,  consequently 
rendering  each  visit  to  his  hereditary  dominions  dangerous  to  his 
new  acquisitions,  he  judiciously  laid  the  foundation  of  an  admir- 
able influence  by  giving  the  towns  such  privileges  as  should  secure 
their  good  government,  and  at  the  same  time  render  them  his 
steady  allies  against  the  discontented  barons,  by  establishing  their 
independence,  and  making  them  owe  it  to  his  favour.  He  took 
the  precaution,  indeed,  of  bestowing  upon  his  own  brother,  Henry 
of  Bavaria,  the  duchy  of  Carinthia  and  the  marquisate  of  Verona 
and  Frioul,  because  this  secured  the  entrance  into  Italy.  He 
created  three  other  great  fiefs — Este,  Modena,  and  Monferrat — 
into  marquisates  for  his  adherents.  But  the  other  fiefs  he  left  un- 
touched :  in  these  the  power  of  the  great  feudatories  was  greater 
over  their  barons  and  vassals  than  was  that  of  the  new  feudatories 
whom  he  had  created,  and  who  could  make  no  resistance  to  the 
attacks  upon  their  authority,  except  by  entirely  quitting  the  towns 


CH.  XIX.  MTJNICIPAL  CONSTITUTIONS  255 

and  strengthening  themselves  in  their  castles.  But  in  all  the  fiefs 
the  baronial  power,  as  opposed  to  the  towns,  became  exceedingly- 
weakened,  in  consequence  of  the  municipal  institutions  which 
Otho  allowed  the  burghers  to  obtain. 

Hitherto  the  count  intrusted  with  the  government  of  each  town 
had  been  assisted  by  a  council  of  sculdasci  chosen  from  the  body 
of  the  burghers.  There  was  now  a  general  desire  of  returning  to 
the  ancient  Roman  plan  of  municipal  government.  Otho,  ever 
inclined  to  gratify  the  wishes  of  the  citizens,  allowed  each  town  to 
appoint  two  consuls,  annually  chosen  by  the  people ;  and  these 
were  charged  with  the  administration  of  justice,  and  with  the  com- 
mand of  the  town's  militia.  It  was  also  the  office  of  the  consuls 
to  convoke  and  to  preside  over  the  councils,  which  were  two  in 
number :  one  called  the  credenza,  or  secret  council,  an  executive 
body,  small  in  number,  and  charged  with  the  financial  concerns 
of  the  community  as  well  as  its  foreign  relations,  assisting  and 
also  controlling  the  consuls ;  the  other,  a  more  numerous  body, 
and  forming  a  senate — the  name  by  which  it  went  in  many  towns, 
though  in  some  it  was  called  the  greater,  in  others  the  special 
council,  its  principal  office  being  to  prepare  the  legislative  and 
administrative  measures  which  were  to  be  laid  before  the  general 
assembly  of  the  people.  In  that  assembly,  or  parliament,  as  it 
was  generally  termed,  the  supreme  power  might  be  said  to  reside ; 
but  it  was  only  convoked  upon  important  occasions,  and  in  almost 
all  the  towns  its  deliberations  were  confined  to  those  matters 
which  had  received  the  previous  sanction  of  the  two  councils,  the 
senate  and  the  credenza^  These  councils  were  chosen  by  the  dif- 
ferent districts  or  wards  into  which  the  town  was  divided,  and 
each  of  which  also  furnished  one  or  more  troops  of  horse  and 
companies  of  heavy  infantry :  the  former  troops  chosen  by  the 
wealthier  burghers,  the  latter  from  those  next  in  degree,  while 
the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  joined  the  military  levy  lightly  armed — . 
every  person  between  eighteen  and  seventy  being  obliged  to  serve. 
The  service  of  the  state  was  not  the  only  one  in  which* these  forces 
were  employed.  The  towns  asserted  their  independence  against 
the  barons  of  the  adjoining  territory,  and  against  the  great  feuda- 
tories themselves,  and  Otho  and  his  successors  encouraged  this 
struggle. 

Nor  could  they  prevent  another  incident  of  the  feudal  system — 
the  general  right  of  private  war — from  extending  itself  to  the 


256  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS.  CR  XIX. 

towns,  which,  accordingly,  carried  on  frequent  hostihties  with  one 
another.  The  chief  contest  lay  between  the  two  most  powerful 
towns,  Pavia  and  Milan,  and  their  hostility  was  bitter  and  of  long 
duration.  When  the  Saxon  famUy  was  extinct  in  1002,  on  the 
death  of  Otho's  grandson,  those  two  towns  took  opposite  parts  in 
the  war  of  the  disputed  succession  ;  and  both  they  and  all  the 
other  towns  established  their  municipal  privileges  more  securely 
during  that  contest.  The  separation  of  the  burghers  and  the 
nobiHty  had  now  become  everywhere  complete ;  and  the  progress 
which  the  former  had  made  in  wealth  and  importance  from  the 
gradual  increase  of  their  commerce  during  the  eleventh  century 
excited  the  jealousy  of  the  barons,  who,  except  when  they  attended 
the  occasional  general  assemblies  or  diets,  held  by  the  emperors 
on  their  visits  to  Italy,  found  their  importance  reduced  within  a 
narrow  compass,  and  had  not  the  benefits  of  the  police  which  the 
towns  maintained,  but  were  obliged  to  provide  for  their  own  secu- 
rity by  the  force  which  they  severally  supported.  This  jealousy 
broke  out  in  the  reign  of  Conrad  It.  (the  Salic)  between  the 
barons  and  the  city  of  Milan,  then  under  the  government  of  Arch- 
bishop Heribert ;  and  after  hostilities  in  which  other  towns  took 
part,  the  emperor  brought  about  a  general  pacification  by  the  new 
and  very  important  ordinances  which  he  promulgated  in  the  diet 
held  at  Roncaglia  in  1026,  establishing  the  hereditary  right  to 
fiefs,  unless  on  the  forfeiture  of  the  vassal  for  felony,  and  declaring 
all  serfs  personally  free,  though  annexed  to  the  soil.  Soon  after 
Conrad's  decease  in  1039,  the  practice  became  general  for  the 
inferior  nobility,  especially  the  less  wealthy  landowners,  to  enrol 
themselves  as  burgesses  in  the  neighbouring  towns,  and  thus 
acquire  the  protection  of  the  burgher  forces,  as  well  as  a  voice  in 
the  administration  of  the  civic  affairs.  The  townspeople  were 
inclined  to  pay  them  court,  and  to  obtain  the  fellowship  also  of 
the  more  powerful  barons,  by  giving  them  a  share  in  the  municipal 
offices,  both  because  of  their  capacity  to  form  the  cavalry  of  their 
burgher  militia,  and  because  of  the  power  which  the  command  of 
the  castles  enabled  them  to  exert  over  the  traffic  of  each  town. 
Out  of  this  state  of  things  arose  the  governments  of  the  towns  in 
the  north  and  middle  of  Italy. 

We  have  in  the  former  part  of  this  work  (Part  I.,  Chap,  vili.) 
described  the  long  war  carried  on  by  the  See  of  Rome  with  the 
Franconian  emperors  upon  the  dispute  of  the  investitures.     For 


CH.  XIX.  WAR  OF  TOWNS.  257 

sixty  years  the  towns  were  divided  by  this  controversy,  taking 
part,  some  with  the  emperors,  some  with  the  see  ;  but  the  effect 
of  these  operations,  both  the  civil  intrigues  and  the  miUtary  move- 
ments, was  greatly  to  increase  the  influence  of  the  townspeople, 
and  to  make  their  subjugation  by  the  emperor  more  difficult  when 
he  was  afterwards  'disposed  to  take  part  with  the  barons,  and 
revoke  the  municipal  privileges  granted  by  the  Saxon  princes. 
The  war  of  the  investitures  was  closed  in  1122  by  the  j)eace  of 
Worms.  Thirty  years  after  this  treaty,  Frederick  Barbarossa, 
being  related  by  blood  both  to  the  Guelph  and  Ghibelline 
families,  as  our  Henry  VII.  was  to  the  House  of  Lancaster  by 
blood  and  the  House  of  York  by  marriage,  was  enabled  to  ex- 
tinguish during  his  long  reign  the  feud,  which  afterwards  broke 
out  more  fiercely  than  ever  upon  his  election  as  emperor,  and  his 
assumption  of  the  Italian  kingdom.  He  was  encouraged  by  the 
advantages  of  his  position,  at  the  head  of  both  the  parties,  to  at- 
tempt subduing  the  Italian  cities.  The  people  of  Lodi  having  ap- 
pealed to  him  for  aid  against  the  Milanese,  who  had  for  forty 
years  kept  them  in  cruel  subjection,  he  took  their  part,  and  re- 
pairing to  Roncaglia,  where  he  held  the  diet  as  was  customary, 
he  there  received  the  complaints  of  other  towns  against  their 
oppressors.  He  was  soon  at  the  head  of  a  formidable  league, 
the  principal  member  being  Pavia,  and  he  was  immediately  in- 
volved in  hostilities  against  Milan  and  the  towns  which  sided  with 
her.  This  war  continued  for  thirty  years  to  lay  waste  the  Italian 
territories  and  towns ;  but  it  called  forth  displays  of  patriotism 
and  of  courage  which  rendered  their  conquest  impossible,  even  if 
Frederick's  German  resources  had  been  far  more  available  than 
those  of  any  feudal  monarchy  ever  could  be.  We  have  already 
seen  (Part  I.,  Chap,  xix.)  that  he  was  compelled  to  acknowledge 
the  entire  independence  of  the  towns  and  their  municipal  go- 
vernment by  the  treaty  of  Constance,  which  terminated  this  long 
conflict. 

The  acknowledgment  of  independence  by  the  peace  of  Con- 
stance was  an  event  of  great  importance  to  the  Italian  cities,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  the  foundation  of  their  governments.  Although 
before  this  war  they  had,  ever  since  the  time  of  Otho  I.,  asserted 
their  freedom,  and  during  the  Saxon  dynasty  had  in  fact  enjoyed 
it,  they  were  always  regarded  as  by  law  subject  to  the  empire, 
and  they  never  openly  claimed  to  be  independent  of  it.     They 

PART  IL  S 


258  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS.  CH.  XIX, 

swore  fealty ;  they  paid  tribute  ;  and  five  years  after  the  war  had 
commenced,  and  notwithstanding  that  Frederick  had  concluded  a 
treaty  with  the  Milanese,  recognising  their  right  to  elect  consiils, 
and  engaging  that  his  troops  should  not  enter  their  town,  his 
military  operations  having  failed,  or  only  proved  successful  by 
the  plague  and  famine  that  aided  him,  yet-  a  diet  held  at  Ron- 
caglia,  mth  the  full  consent  of  the  laity,  though  influenced  by  the 
slavish  counsels  of  the  clergy  and  the  lawyers,  had  given  up  to  the 
crown  the  rights  of  regalia,  as  toll,  coining  money,  mills,  fisheries, 
with  the  power  of  seizing  the  great  fiefs,  and  of  levying  a  general 
capitation  tax,  and  of  naming  all  consuls  and  judges,  but  Avith 
consent  of  the  burgesses.  Frederick  had  accordingly  sent  to  all 
the  towns  strangers  to  act  as  judges,  under  the  name  oipodestas; 
and  these  being  his  creatures,  devoted  to  his  interests,  were  found 
in  constant  opposition  to  the  consuls,  who,  though  chosen  by  him, 
belonged  to  the  cities  in  which  they  were  appointed,  and  had  been 
accepted  by  the  people.  Hence  the  great  object  of  the  war  on 
Frederick's  part  had  been  to  supersede  the  consular  authority,  or 
abolish  the  ofliice  altogether.  The  right  of  private  war  had  also 
been  taken  from  the  towns,  as  well  as  from  the  great  feudatories 
and  barons  at  the  same  diet ;  but  so  manifest  an  improvement  in 
the  administration  of  the  government  had  excited  no  avowed  op- 
position, however  much  it  might  secretly  be  disliked  by  those 
whose  powers  of  annoyance  and  oppression  were  thus  restrained. 
The  position  in  which  the  peace  of  Constance  had  placed  the 
empire  and  the  towns  was  widely  different  from  that  in  which  the 
diet  of  1158  had  left  the  parties.  All  rights  of  royalty  (regcdia) 
within  the  walls  of  each  town  were  secured  to  its  government, 
together  with  all  rights  which  had  actually  been  exercised  in  the 
adjoining  district  or  country  territory  belonging  to  it.  Every 
town  was,  moreover,  recognised  as  entitled  to  levy  troops  and 
exercise  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction  within  its  territory.  The 
right  of  the  towns  to  continue  their  league,  and  renew  it  as  often 
as  they  pleased,  was  further  declared  and  confirmed  by  way  of 
securing  to  them  the  performance  of  the  articles  stipulated.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  rights  reserved  to  the  crown  were  more  nominal 
than  substantial.  The  consuls  chosen  by  the  people  were  to  re- 
ceive, but  without  any  appointment,  investiture  from  the  imperial 
legate,  unless  in  towns  in  which  the  bishop  or  count  had  been 
used  to  give  it ;  and  each  town  was  to  swear  fealty  once  in  ten 


CH.  XTX.       TREATY  OF  CONSTANCE — VENICE.  259 

years,  to  defend  the  imperial  rights  against  towns  not  belonging 
to  the  league ;  and,  on  the  emperor's  progress  through  Italy,  to 
provide  forage  and  market  for  him,  and  repair  the  roads  and 
bridges.  The  only  interference  of  any  moment  with  the  nmnicipal 
governments  was  the  appointment  in  each  city  of  a  judge  of  ap- 
peal for  all  causes  of  a  certain  amount  (about  sixty  pounds  of  our 
money) ;  but  he  was  sworn  to  decide  according  to  the  local  laws 
and  customs,  and  could  not  postpone  the  final  decision  of  any 
case  beyond  two  months. 

In  this  treaty,  as  we  have  already  seen  (Part,  i.,  Chap,  xix.), 
were  comprehended  on  the  side  of  the  league,  Milan,  Mantua, 
Verona,  Bologna,  and  thirteen  other  great  towns ;  on  the  imperial 
side,  Pavia,  Genoa,  and  six  others.  Ferara  had  the  option  of 
joining  within  a  limited  time.  Imola  and  six  others  were  excluded. 
Venice  had  joined  in  some  of  the  military  operations,  having  taken 
part  in  the  league  formed  by  Verona,  Vicenza,  Padua,  and  Treviso 
in  1164,  but  had  never  been  considered  as  comprised  in  the  great 
confederacy,  never  having  submitted  at  any  time  to  the  imj^erial 
authority.  Accordingly  she  would  not,  by  joining  in  the  peace  of 
Constance,  give  any  colour  to  a  claim  which  she  had  always  suc- 
cessfully resisted.  While  the  other  towns  had  been  engaged  some- 
times in  war  with  one  another,  sometimes  in  contests  with  the 
emperor  and  the  Roman  see,  she  had  risen  to  a  far  greater  im- 
portance than  any  of  them,  and  at  an  earlier  period.  Never 
having  been  subdued  by  the  northern  barbarians,  she  claimed  to 
deduce  her  origin  from  the  ancient  state  of  P»,ome.  Her  history 
and  constitution  are  therefore  peculiarly  deserving  of  attention. 
Of  all  the  municipalities  she  was  the  most  powerful,  and  her  go- 
vernment was  of  far  longer  duration  than  any  other  in  Europe, 
her  state  having  grown  up  to  importance  at  a  much  earlier  period. 
This  subject,  therefore,  may  conveniently  be  considered  before  we 
examine  this  commonwealth,  which  on  the  mainland  of  Italy 
arose  out  of  the  feudal  kingdoms. 


S  2 


260  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XX. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE. 


Origin  of  Venice — Insular  Federacy — Anarchy — Doge  created — Venice  founded — 
Conquests— Parties — Doge's  power  restricted — Pregadi — Aristocracy  founded — 
Grand  Council — Council  of  Ten — Inquisitors — Spies — Lion's  Mouth — Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety. 

The  Venetians  ( Veneti  or  Reneti),  inhabiting  the  north-eastern 
corner  of  the  Italian  peninsula,  were  very  late  brought  under  sub- 
jection to  the  Roman  republic.  It  was  not  till  the  great  victory  of 
Marius  over  the  Cimbri  and  Teutones  that  their  territory  was  re- 
duced into  the  condition  of  a  Roman  province.  It  followed  the 
fall  of  the  other  provinces  during  the  struggle  of  the  factions  which 
tore  first  the  commonwealth  and  afterwards  the  empire  in  pieces, 
sometimes  falling  to  the  share  of  one  party  or  chief,  and  some- 
times of  another,  and  occasionally  partitioned  between  contending 
claimants.  The  barbarians  afterwards  ravaged  the  continental 
portion  of  it ;  but  the  inhabitants  both  of  the  country  and  of  Padua, 
Verona,  Yicenza,  and  the  other  towns,  found.a  refuge  in  the  islands, 
which  were  never  subdued  by  any  of  the  northern  invaders.  In 
those  fastnesses  the  proprietors  of  the  continental  territory  re- 
mained after  the  retreat  of  Attila  in  the  year  450  ;  but  the  pea- 
santry returned  to  the  mainland  and  resumed  their  occupation, 
the  owners  of  the  soil  continuing  to  inhabit  the  islands.  Here 
they  established  a  kind  of  government  formed  somewhat  accord- 
ing to  the  model  of  the  Roman,  to  which  they  had  so  long  been 
accustomed.  Each  island  chose  its  chief,  called  a  tribune,  whose 
principal  office  was  the  administration  of  justice  ;  but  who  re- 
ceived instructions  for  the  guidance  of  his  proceedings  from  the 
general  assembly,  or  comitia  of  the  inhabitants.  Occasionally  the 
tribunes  of  the  different  islands  met  to  confer  upon  matters  of  com- 
mon interest,  and  their  decisions  bound  the  whole  of  this  kind  of 
federal  body,  or  insular  confederacy. 


CH,  XX.  APPOINTMENT  OF  DOGE.  261 

It  should  seem  that  their  insular  position,  convenient  for  com- 
}nerce,  and  their  natural  habits  derived  from  thence,  giving  them 
the  command  of  the  coasting  trade  and  the  traffic  up  the  rivers  of 
the  mainland,  their  numbers  and  power  had  soon  increased  to  a 
considerable  pitch  ;  for  early  in  the  sixth  century  they  carried  on 
a  successful  war  with  the  Sclavonians  settled  on  the  north-eastern 
parts  of  the  Adriatic  ;  and  in  the  year  527  they  overran  and  seized 
upon  Dalmatia,  The  Lombard  invasion,  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
century,  drove  more  of  the  Venetians  into  the  islands,  and  tlie  go- 
vernment being  feeble,  the  seventh  century  was  spent  in  constant 
quarrels  of  the  dififerent  islands  and  their  tribunes  among  them- 
selves ;  so  that  the  Lombards  by  land  and  the  Sclavonians  by  sea, 
taking  advantage  of  these  fatal  dissensions,  harassed  the  republic, 
and  were  on  the  point  of  efifecting  its  destruction,  when  a  general 
assembly,  held  in  697,  resolved  upon  a  measure  necessary  to  save 
the  independence  of  the  state  and  to  extinguish  the  seditions  Avhich 
were  working  its  ruin.  This  was  the  appointment  of  a  magistrate 
invested  with  sufficient  authority,  and  holding  his  office  for  life. 
They  gave  him  the  title  of  doge,  or  duke  :  he  was  to  have  the 
command  of  the  forces,  and  the  power  of  appointing  to  all  offices 
civil  and  military,  and  to  exercise  the  prerogative  of  making  peace 
and  war.  In  other  respects  he  was  to  be  under  the  control  of  the 
general  assembly.  This  change  of  government  appears  to  have  an- 
swered the  purpose  of  those  who  proposed  it ;  for  Paolo  Anafesti, 
the  first  doge,  repelled  all  the  aggressions  which  had  threatened 
the  republic,  obtained  the  acknowledgment  of  its  independence 
from  the  Lombard  kings,  and  quelled  all  the  seditions  which  had 
disturbed  the  public  peace. 

Attempts  were  afterwards  made  by  the  Carlovingian  princes  to 
subdue  the  Venetians,  but  their  only  result  was  causing  the  seat 
of  government  to  be  transferred,  in  the  year  800,, to  the  island 
called  Rialto,  on  which,  and  sixty  neighbouring  islets,  the  city 
of  Venice  was  built.  While  it  was  increasing  in  commerce  and 
wealth,  the  maritime  towns  of  Istria  and  ])almatia  obtained  from 
the  Greek  empire,  to  which  they  belonged,  the  privilege  of  arming 
for  their  defence  against  the  barbarians,  and  of  choosing  magis- 
trates for  their  government.  But  the  piracies  of  the  barbarians' 
kept  them  in  such  alarm,  that  they  forVned  a  defensive  league, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  tenth  century  placed  themselves  under  the 
protection  of  Venice,  which,  partly  by  intrigue  and  partly  by  force, 


262  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XX. 

succeeded  in  reducing  them  to  subjection.  They  became  pro\n.nces 
governed  by  Venetian  nobles,  that  is,  having  justice  administered 
to  them  and  their  forces  commanded  in  the  name  of  the  republic 
by  those  nobles,  who  bore  the  title  of  podestas,  and  the  doge 
assumed  the  title  of  Duke  of  Venice  and  Dalmatia. 

The  eleventh  century  was  wasted  in  factious  contests  between 
the  leading  noble  families,  of  whom  the  Morosini  and  Caloprini 
were  the  chief;  but  whether  these  were  cant  names  assumed  by 
the  families  as  the  leaders  of  the  parties,  or  taken  by  the  parties 
from  families  so  called,  seems  to  be  uncertain.  The  force  of  the 
republic  was  so  weakened,  and  her  councils  so  kept  in  a  state  of 
inaction,  by  these  party  broils,  that  no  extension  of  her  power 
was  effected,  nor  was  an  adequate  progress  made  in  her  internal 
improvement.  But  the  part  which  her  traders  were  enabled  to 
take  in  the  crusades  greatly  extended  her  commerce  during  the 
next  century,  and  her  military  co-operation  in  Asia  obtained  for 
her  not  only  valuable  mercantile  privileges  in  the  kingdom  of 
Jerusalem,  but  the  power  of  planting  Venetian  settlements  there 
to  be  governed  by  their  own  laws  and  their  own  magistrates.  The 
Venetians  at  the  same  time  made  an  easy  prey  of  several  of  the 
Greek  islands  now  that  the  Eastern  empire  was  cnimbling  to 
pieces,  and  they  were  enabled  to  extend  their  footing  in  Dal- 
matia with  the  same  facility  and  for  the  same  reason. 

These  conquests  tended  materially  to  increase  the  power  of  the 
doge,  and  the  people,  headed  by  the  nobles,  became  alarmed  for 
their  liberties.  During  four  centuries  no  check  was  effectually 
interposed  to  restrain  his  prerogative.  A  sedition  had  been  raised 
by  the  tyrannical  conduct  of  the  third  doge,  who  was  put  to  death  ; 
and  for  five  years  magistrates  were  elected  under  the  title  of  mus- 
ter of  the  forces  (maestro  delta  milizia),  but  this  plan  was  aban- 
doned in  consequence  of  their  misconduct,  and  the  office  of  doge  was 
restored  with  all  its  former  powers.  Nor  was  any  permanent  change 
in  those  powers  effected,  how  frequently  soever  the  tyranny  of  the 
doges  occasioned  revolts  and  led  to  their  violent  deaths,  or  their 
depositions,  with  the  punishment  of  having  their  eyes  put  out,  a 
cruelty  which  the  Venetians  imported  from  the  East  during  their 
conquests  in  the  Levant.  During  the  first  century  after  the  office 
was  created,  ten  persons  enjoyed  it,  and  of  these  six  were  killed  or 
deposed  ;  but  no  check  had  been  devised  upon  their  prerogative, 
except  the  appointment  during  one  short  reign  of  two  tribunes, 


CH.  XX.  RESTRICTIONS  OF  DOGE's  POWER.  263 

whom  the  doge  was  to  consult  before  undertaking  any  measure  of 
importance.  But  this  institution  had  no  pennanent  duration,  and 
the  doges  went  on  as  before,  extending  their  power  with  the  in- 
crease of  patronage  and  influence  which  the  newly-acquired  domi- 
nions of  the  republic  gave  them,  and  they  were  frequently  suffered 
to  associate  their  sons  with  themselves  in  the  office,  and  thus  to 
make  it  for  a  generation  or  two  hereditary  in  their  families.  Se- 
ditions as  before  occasionally  broke  out ;  depositions  and  assassi- 
nations of  doges  took  place,  though  less  frequently  ;  but  no  steps 
were  taken  to  limit  the  ducal  power  until  the  year  1030,  when  the 
dethronement  of  a  doge  gave  the  nobles  and  the  people  an  oppor- 
tunity of  at  length  imposing  restraints  upon  the  authority  of  tlie 
chief  magistrate,  before  that  time  only  liable  to  the  same  control 
from  revolt  and  personal  violence,  which  in  the  Russian  monarchy 
is  still  the  only  check  upon  the  autocrat's  prerogative.  But  in  that 
year  an  important  change  was  effected,  which  for  the  first  time 
restricted  the  doge's  power.  The  former  plan  of  two  councillors 
was  revived,  and  their  consent  made  indispensable  to  all  the  doge's 
acts  ;  the  joining  of  the  son  with  the  father  in  the  office  was  strictly 
prohibited  ;  and  upon  occasions  of  importance  the  doge  was  fur- 
ther bound  to  request  the  attendance  of  the  chief  citizens  at  a 
council,  for  the  purpose  of  deliberation  and  advice.  The  citizens 
thus  requested  were  from  thence  called  pregadi,  and  though  the 
doge  had  the  choice  of  them,  as  there  was  a  general  agreement 
in  opinion  and  interest  among  the  nobles,  and  as  the  people  were 
united  with  them  in  all  questions  relating  to  the  doge's  power 
and  the  means  of  resisting  it,  the  power  of  choosing  made  little 
difference,  and  this  council  afforded  a  substantial  protection  to 
the  community.  It  was  the  origin  of  the  most  ancient  of  the 
Venetian  councils. 

During  a  century  and  a  half  after  this  change  the  combined 
influence  of  the  nobles  and  the  people  introduced  a  still  more  im- 
portant alteration  in  the  government,  the  foundation  of  the  aristo- 
cratical  constitution  which  soon  supplanted  the  ducal  monarchy, 
and  continued  for  above  six  hundred  years  to  occupy  the  attention 
of  political  reasoners.  In  1 1 73  an  expedition  against  Constanti- 
nople, under  the  Doge  Vitale  Michieli,  had  signally  failed,  partly 
through  his  feeble  councils,  but  chiefly  from  the  ravages  of  the 
plague,  which  the  remains  of  the  fleet  brought  back  to  Venice, 
and  occasioned  the  laying  waste  of  the  city,     A  revolt,  the  assas- 


264  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XX. 

sination  of  the  doge,  a  six  months'  interregnum,  were  the  conse- 
quences of  these  errors  and  calamities  ;  but  those  six  months 
were  employed  in  framing  a  new  constitution  upon  a  republican 
modeL 

The  foundation  of  the  whole  was  a  grand  council  of  four  hun- 
dred and  eighty  members,  in  whom  were  vested  exclusively  all  the 
powers  not  held  by  the  doge,  and  who  were  also  to  share  with  him 
all  the  sovereignty  which  he  possessed.  The  members  were  an- 
nually chosen,  not  by  the  nobility  at  large  or  by  the  people  at 
large,  but  by  twelve  tribunes  appointed  yearly,  two  for  each  of 
the  six  quarters  into  which  the  city  was  divided,  each  tiibune 
choosing  forty  councillors.  It  never  seems  to  have  been  doubted 
that  the  choice  would  be  confined  to  the  noble  houses ;  but  there 
was  a  restriction  which  prevented  the  tribunes  from  taking  more 
than  four  from  any  one  family.  The  first  tribunes  appear  to 
have  been  chosen  by  the  people  of  each  quarter,  and  for  about 
thirty  years  there  were  remains  of  this  popular  election.  But  the 
council  had  the  absolute  nomination  of  all  other  ojffices,  and  its 
members  soon  usurped  the  power  of  rejecting  whatever  names 
were  presented  as  their  successors  ;  thus  rendering  the  annual 
election  a  mere  form,  and  retaining  the  places  of  councillor 
almost  entirely  in  the  same  hands.  The  council  had  thus  almost 
come  to  be  permanently  hereditary  in  fact  long  before  it  was  made 
so  by  law.  This  step  was  taken  a  century  and  a  quarter  after 
the  creation  of  the  council,  and  it  was  taken  in  consequence  of  an 
attempt  made  by  the  people  to  regain  their  share  in  the  election 
of  the  doge.  The  attempt  failed  by  the  cowardice  of  Tiepolo, 
whom  they  chose,  and  who  fled  before  the  steady  determination 
of  the  grand  council  They  allowed  the  popular  ferment  to  sub- 
side by  delaying  the  election  for  a  few  days  after  Tiepolo's  flight, 
and  then  chose  Gradenico,  who  seconded  the  efibrts  of  the  aris- 
tocratic party;  and  in  1297  it  was  declared  by  law  that  none 
should  be  excluded  at  the  annual  election  but  those  who  had 
done  something  to  render  them  iin worthy  of  a  seat ;  that  the  grand 
council  of  forty  (the  quarantie)  should  decide  upon  the  exclusion ; 
and  that  whoever  had  twelve  votes  of  the  forty  should  be  retained 
in  his  place.  It  was  further  provided  that  three  electors  should 
be  annually  appointed  by  the  council  to  form  lists  of  citizens 
worthy  of  being  added  to  the  council,  the  number  to  be  fixed 
yearly  by  the  doge  and  senate,  and  that  whoever  of  the  list  had 


CH.  XX.  ARISTOCRACY — OLIGARCHY.  265 

twelve  votes  of  the  forty  should  be  elected.  This  provision  was 
designed  to  flatter  the  people,  to  keep  them  quiet  under  the 
change  now  making  in  the  constitution,  and  to  conceal  the  transi- 
tion which  was  making,  at  least  in  the  legal  frame,  and  which 
in  practice  had  been  made  already,  from  a  popular  to  an  aristo- 
cratic government.  But  next  year  a  new  law  was  introduced 
which  completed  the  establishment  of  the  aristocracy.  It  was 
provided  that  those  only  should  be  elected  who  had  previously 
been  of  the  council  or  were  descended  from  ancestors  who  had 
belonged  to  it.  Thus  an  hereditary  aristocracy  was  finally  esta- 
blished. If  no  further  change  had  taken  place  it  was  an  oligarchy, 
not  a  pure  aristocracy,  for  the  supreme  power  was  confined  to  a 
certain  number  of  patrician  families. 

But  it  has  always  been  found  more  difficult  to  undermine  the 
rights  of  the  people,  and  by  a  succession  of  subtle  devices  to  de- 
prive them  of  power,  than  to  deceive  the  patrician  body  and  endow 
a  portion  of  them  with  the  supreme  authority  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  rest.  An  abortive  attempt  in  1299,  made  by  some  of  the 
plebeians  to  rescind  by  force  the  law  of  the  preceding  year  and 
reopen  the  door  of  the  council  to  their  order,  was  succeedtiil  ten 
years  after  by  a  much  more  formidable  conspiracy  of  t]ie  excluded 
nobles,  whom  some  of  the  most  distinguished  members  of  the 
council  and  a  still  greater  number  of  plebeians  joined  ;  and  they 
were  headed  by  a  brother  of  Tiepolo,  who  had  formerly  been  the 
object  of  the  popular  choice.  The  plot  failed,  and  some  of  the 
ringleaders  were  put  to  death  ;  but  it  was  so  nearly  succeeding, 
and  it  had  so  powerful  a  support,  that  the  greater  number  even 
of  its  chiefs  were  allowed  to  leave  the  city  in  safety,  and  two  ma- 
terial changes  were  made  in  the  constitution,  with  the  view  of 
preventing  the  recurrence  of  a  similar  danger.  The  one  of  these 
was  a  law  made  in  1315,  but  completed  in  1319,  abolishing  the 
three  electors,  and  entitling  every  person  who  had  either  sat  in 
the  council,  or  was  of  a  noble  family,  to  become  a  member  with- 
out any  election,  further  than  an  examination  of  his  qualification. 
This  finally  established  the  aristocratic  constitution.  The  other 
change  was  the  appointment  of  the  celebrated  Council  of  Ten, 
and  this  was  effected  the  same  year  with  the  failure  of  Tiepolo's 
conspiracy,  while  the  alarm  was  at  its  height  which  that  event 
had  occasioned  among  the  whole  patrician  body.  This  council 
was  at  first  named  only  for  two  months,  with  a  commission  to 


266  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XX 

wateh  the  movements  of  the  banished  conspirators,  and  to  prevent 
any  renewal  of  their  attempts.  It  was,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  word,  a  dictatorship  ;  for  it  was  vested  with  absolute  power  to 
arrest  and  punish  summarily  any  nobles  suspected  of  treason  or 
felony  ;  to  dispose  of  the  public  treasure,  and  generally  to  exercise 
all  the  powers  of  the  grand  council  for  the  safety  of  the  state. 
But  armed  with  such  authority,  it  became  immediately  a  perma- 
nent body.  At  first  it  was  continued  for  three  years,  with  a  pro- 
vision that  each  member  should  be  re-elected  or  excluded  at  the 
end  of  four  months ;  afterwards  it  was  adopted  as  an  integral 
portion  of  the  government,  and,  next  to  the  grand  council,  it  was 
the  most  important  branch  of  the  constitution.  Indeed  it  may  be 
regarded  as  having  superseded  the  grand  council  itself,  but  for 
the  control  retained  over  it  by  that  body  continuing  to  choose  it 
for  short  periods  of  time. 

Although  called  the  Cowncil  of  Ten,  it  consisted  of  seventeen 
members,  all  taken  from  the  grand  council  and  chosen  by  it ;  ten, 
called  the  black  (neri),  from  their  official  robes,  and  chosen  at 
four  meetings  in  the  months  of  August  and  September — six, 
called  the  red  {rossi),  for  the  like  reason,  and  chosen  every  four 
months,  three  at  a  time  ;  consequently  the  ten  held  their  office  for 
a  year,  and  the  six  for  eight  months.  The  doge  alone  held  his 
place  in  it  for  life,  and  acted  as  president.  The  whole  members 
of  the  grand  council  were  eligible,  with  one  exception  :  two  per- 
sons of  the  same  family,  or  even  of  the  same  name,  could  not  be 
chosen  ;  an  example  of  the  extreme  jealousy  of  each  other  which 
prevails  among  all  the  members  of  an  aristocracy,  as  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  observe  (Pt.  II.  Chap.  v.).  The  proceed- 
ings of  the  Ten  were  all  secret ;  the  accused  was  not  confronted 
with  the  witnesses  ;  he  did  not  even  know  their  names :  the 
punishment  of  death  was  inflicted  sometimes  in  public,  sometimes 
secretly ;  and  then  the  body  of  the  criminal  was  exhibited,  or  he 
was  onl}'^  announced  as  having  been  put  to  death.  The  members 
were  not  responsible  for  their  conduct  either  individually  or  as  a 
body,  and  from  their  sentences  there  lay  no  appeal.  Though  in 
general  they  acted  arbitrarily  and  without  any  regard  to  law, 
they  occasionally  laid  down  rules  for  their  guidance  when  they 
were  apprehensive  that  they  might  be  induced  to  review  their 
decisions.  In  that  case  they  sometimes  fixed  a  time  within  which 
their  sentence  should  not  be  changed,  or  determined  the  number 


k 


CH.  XX.  COUNCIL  OF  TEN — INQUISITORS  267 

of  voices  which  must  concur  to  alter  it.  Like  all  the  Italian 
tribunals,  it  used  the  torture  both  to  the  party  accused  and  the 
witnesses.  As  if  the  powers  of  this  council  were  not  sufficient  to 
secure  a  vigorous  administration,  there  were  three  of  its  members 
who  in  succession  held  for  three  months  the  office  of  inquisitors ; 
they  could  order  the  instant  execution  of  any  citizen  not  noble, 
and  inflict  upon  the  nobles  themselves  any  punishment  short  of 
death :  to  inflict  capital  punishment  upon  a  noble  required  the 
vote  of  the  council  at  large,  and  the  presence  of  fourteen  mem- 
bers. As  might  be  expected,  the  existence  of  such  a  tribunal 
led  almost  from  its  creation  to  the  employment  of  spies  in  an 
abundance,  and  with  a  reliance  upon  their  information  and  in- 
ventions, unknown  to  any  other  system.  It  was  not  even  necessary 
that  the  secret  informer  should  be  seen  by  the  council  or  inqui- 
sition. Boxes  (called  Lion's  Mouths  from  their  form)  were  placed 
in  difierent  parts  of  the  city,  into  which  any  one  might  fling  his 
denunciations.  The  keys  of  these  boxes  were  intrusted  to  the 
inquisitors.  The  punishments  ordered  by  the  inquisitors  were 
always  inflicted  secretly  in  tlie  prisons. 

The  Council  of  Ten,  as  might  easily  be  foreseen,  speedily  usurped 
the  whole  authority  and  power  of  the  government ;  but,  what 
could  not  have  been  expected,  it  never  made  any  attempt  what- 
ever to  continue  its  existence  and  erect  itself  into  a  body  inde- 
pendent of  the  grand  council.  On  the  contrary,  when  the  grand 
council  refused  to  re  elect  it,  which  it  might  at  any  time  do  effec- 
tually by  witholding  the  number  of  votes  necessary  to  constitute 
an  absolute  majority,*  the  Council  of  Ten  submitted,  and  a  kind 
of  interregnum  took  place,  until  the  grand  council  thought  proper 
to  revive  the  governing  body.  This  happened  for  the  first  time 
in  the  year  1580,  and  the  last  instance  of  the  kind  was  in  1761, 
when  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Ten  was  confined  to  criminal  cases, 
and  their  power  in  other  respects  somewhat  limited. 

With  the  exception  of  their  never  having  continued  their  own 
authority,  the  relation  of  the  Council  of  Ten  to  the  grand  council 
closely  resembled  that  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  to  the 
National  Convention  in  the  French  republic  ;  and  it  secured  to  the 
state  many  of  the  advantages  which  France  derived  from  that  too 
celebrated  committee.     All  plots,  all  attempts  to  plot  against  the 

*  A  majority  of  the  whole  members  of  the  Grand  Couucil  was  requiied  for  the 
election  of  each  of  the  Council  of  Ten. 


268  GOVEKNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XX. 

government  were  rendered  impracticable  by  a  system  of  vigilance, 
jealousy,  spycraft,  sudden  arrest,  and  summary  punishment  by 
whicli,  while  it  made  every  man  suspect  his  neighbour,  besetting 
and  surrounding  with  peril  all  the  common  intercourse  of  social  life, 
stifling  the  seditious  purpose  before  it  could  find  vent  in  words — 
an  extraordinary  degree  of  vigour  was  imparted  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  affairs  both  civil  and  military,  foreign  and  domestic. 
The  continuance  of  such  a  constitution  as  the  Venetian  for  so 
many  centuries  can  only  be  explained  by  the  constant  watchful- 
ness of  this  dictatorial  and  inquisitorial  body,  the  terror  which  its 
proceedings  inspired,  and  the  mutual  distrust  which  they  sowed 
universally  among  the  citizens.  It  must,  however,  be  added,  that 
the  body  of  the  people,  though  excluded  from  all  share  in  the  govern- 
ment, felt  this  tyranny  far  less  than  the  privileged  classes ;  and  that 
the  burthen  of  maintaining  the  public  expenditure  fell  as  lightly 
as  possible  upon  the  inhabitants  of  the  city,  the  foreign  dominions 
fully  defraying  it  in  all  ordinary  times.  The  aristocracy  was  po- 
pular at  Venice  ;  the  government  was  at  all  times  beloved  by  the 
people.  It  pressed  light  upon  them  in  every  way ;  its  despotic 
powers  were  hardly  ever  exercised  but  upon  the  privileged  classes  ; 
and  it  was  both  successful  in  keeping  the  peace  at  home  and  in 
raising  the  name  and  extending  the  commerce  of  the  people 
abroad. 


CH.  XXI.  DOGE — COMPLICATED  ELECTION.  269 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE. 

{Continued.) 


Doge — Complicated  election — Two  objects  kept  in  view — Neither  attained— Ex- 
amination of  the  process — First  object  to  prevent  faction — Second  object  to 
prevent  corruption — Jealous  nature  of  Aristocracy — Limited  power  of  the 
Doge — Ducal  Oath — Officers  to  watch  and  punish  the  Doge— Avogadors — 
Doge's  prerogative — Senate  or  Pregadi — Collegio— Judicial  power — Quarantia 
— Offices  filled  by  Commoners — Procurators  of  St.  Mark — SaviL — Provincial 
offices — Government  of  Candia. 

When  we  have  examined  the  structure  of  the  Grand  Council,  and 
its  committee  the  Council  of  Ten,  we  have  in  fact  examined  the 
whole  effective  portion  of  the  Venetian  government;  the  real  power 
resided  in  those  bodies,  and  all  the  other  authorities  of  the  state 
were  subordinate.  In  considering  these,  therefore,  we  are  rather 
about  to  view  the  arrangements,  the  details,  by  which  the  Grand 
Council  and  Council  of  Ten  carried  on  the  government,  than  to 
contemplate  any  other  power  in  the  state  which  could  be  said  to 
have  a  substantive  existence.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  examine 
those  nominal  authorities,  because  they  have  at  all  times  attracted 
the  regards  of  political  reasoners,  and  also  because  their  structure 
is  calculated  further  to  illustrate  the  jealous  character  of  the  aris- 
tocratic system  and  the  refinements  of  Italian  polity. 

The  first  of  the  constituted  authorities  that  claims  our  attention 
is  the  doge,  once  the  master  of  the  state,  but  ever  since  the  creation 
of  the  grand  council  in  1173,  an  ofiicer  of  rank  only,  with  no  real 
power  and  very  little  influence  of  any  kind.  The  choice  of  the 
doge,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  at  first  entrusted,  for  once  only,  to  a 
committee  of  eleven  ;  soon  afterwards  the  Grand  Council  assumed 
it  permanently,  appointing  first  twenty-four,  and  afterwards  forty 
of  its  members,  from  whom  eleven  electors  were  chosen  by  lot. 
But  in  1249  a  new  and  very  complicated  manner  of  exercising 
this  elective  power  was  devised,  which  continued  to  be  practised 
as  long  as  the  republic  lasted,  that  is  till  the  year  1 798.     First 


270  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXL 

of  all,  thirty  of  the  council  were  drawn  by  lot,  and  these  again 
were  reduced  by  lot  to  nine,  who  selected,  by  a  majority  of  seven 
at  least  of  their  number,  forty  of  the  council,  and  those  were  by 
lot  reduced  to  twelve.  These  twelve  elected  twenty-five  of  the 
council,  which  were  reduced  by  lot  to  nine,  and  the  nine  selected 
forty -five,  of  whom  eleven  drawn  by  lot  selected  forty-one  of  the 
council  to  be  electors  of  the  doge.  A  majority  of  twenty-five  of 
these  electors  was  required  to  join  in  choosing  the  doge. 

The  prevailing  view  in  this  combination  of  choice  and  chance 
must  have  been  twofold — to  prevent  the  combination  of  partisans 
and  thus  neutralize  or  weaken  party  influence  ;  and  to  prevent 
the  knowledge  of  the  parties  who  should  elect,  and  thus  frustrate 
or  obstruct  the  exercise  of  bribery  or  other  undue  influence.  The 
first  of  these  objects  could  not  be  at  all  secured  by  the  contrivance ; 
the  second  could  only  be  most  imperfectly  attained. 

1.  In  order  to  try  its  eSect  upon  party,  we  must  suppo.se 
two  or  more  factions  to  divide  the  great  council;  suppose,  too.  an 
aristocratic,  which  for  shortness  we  shall  call  the  Whigs,  and  a 
monarchical,  the  Tories,  and  first  suppose  them  unequal  in  the  pro- 
portion of  two  to  one.  The  chances  are  that  the  first  lot  gives 
twenty  Whigs  to  ten  Tories,  and  the  second  six  Whigs  to  three 
Tories.  As  seven  must  then  conciu:  to  choose  the  forty,  it  is  certain 
that  the  minority  may  make  terms  ;  but  nothing  can  be  so  impro- 
bable as  that  they  should  obtain,  by  holding  out,  any  proportion  of 
the  forty  wliich  could  affect  usefully  for  their  purpose  the  next  or 
fourth  operation,  the  lot  reducing  the  forty  to  twelve  ;  for  unless 
they  get  so  many  of  the  forty  as  to  give  them  a  fair  chance  of 
having  seven  out  of  the  twelve,  they  do  nothing,  a  bare  majority 
of  the  twelve  being  enough  to  choose  the  twenty-five  by  the  fifth 
operation.  The  twenty-five,  then,  will  be  all  Whigs,  and  so  will 
of  course  the  nine  to  which  they  are  reduced  by  lot.  These,  by 
the  seventh  operation,  ^vill  choose  eleven  Whigs,  whom  the  lot  re- 
ducing to  eight,  these  eight  will  choose  forty-one,  all  Whigs,  twenty- 
five  of  whom  will,  therefore,  by  the  tenth  and  last  operation,  choose 
a  Whig  doge.  In  fact,  the  whole  result  is  certain,  notwithstand- 
ing the  complication,  after  the  two  first  lots ;  and  the  complication 
then  becomes  useless.  These  two  lots  make  it  a  chance  who  will 
have  the  choice  of  doge,  and  make  it  possible  that  the  minority 
should  choose  him — make  it  even  possible,  though  not  likely,  that 


CH.  XXT.  COMPLEX  ELECTION  OF  DOGE.  271 

if  the  council  is  divided  so  as  to  have  four  Whigs  for  one  Tory,  the 
small  Tory  minority  should  choose  him.  If  by  lot  seven  Tories 
and  two  Whigs  are  found  among  the  nine,  this  is  inevitable.  It 
is  the  result  of  the  chance  which  presides  over  the  first  operation, 
and  all  the  subsequent  complication  cannot  counteract  it.  If  there 
is  any  advantage  in  a  scheme  which  makes  it  possible  for  a  small 
minority  to  bind  the  whole  body,  this  is  secured,  but  it  is  secured 
by  the  lot,  and  not  by  the  combination  of  lot  and  selection. — 
Again,  if  parties  are  very  nearly  balanced,  the  lot  may  give  one 
the  free  choice ;  but  it  may  also  give  a  narrow  majority  of  the 
nine ;  in  which  case  the  Tories  might  obtain  a  large  minority  ot 
the  forty.  But  this  would  be  wholly  unavailing  unless  the  next 
lot  gave  them  a  majority  of  the  twelve,  because  a  bare  majority  of 
these  choose  the  twenty-five.  Therefore  the  only  effect  of  the 
complication  here  is  to  introduce  a  second  chance,  which  the  ma- 
jority of  five  to  four  in  the  nine  would  probably  struggle  to  make 
a  small  chance  by  not  allowing  any  considerable  number  of  Tories 
to  be  of  the  forty.  It  is  quite  clear  that  in  every  possible  case, 
and  whatever  division  we  suppose  to  exist  in  the  council,  there  is 
an  end  of  all  doubt  and  an  end  of  the  whole  operation  as  soon  as 
the  twelve  are  chosen.  For  a  bare  majority  of  these  twelve  de- 
cides the  election,  and  the  remaining  five  operations  are  absolutely 
thrown  away.  Thus  the  only  possible  effect  of  the  contrivance  in 
preventing  the  combinations  of  partisans  is  the  introduction  of 
chance  by  drawing  lots  for  one  of  the  electing  bodies.  As  the 
absurdity  of  choosing  the  doge  by  lot  would  have  been  too  glaring, 
the  lot  is  only  applied  to  the  choice  of  electors.  But  as  far  as  it 
is  intended  to  prevent  faction  from  interfering,  the  choice  of  the 
doge  depends  upon  chance,  that  is,  the  lot  decides  from  what 
party  he  shall  be  taken.  The  complication  of  the  process  mani- 
festly has  no  effect  at  all.  Nor  can  the  effect  even  of  the  lot  very 
materially  obstruct  the  operations  of  party ;  the  factions  will 
always  be  represented  in  the  thirty  first  dra"\vn  by  lot,  and  all 
their  intrigues  will  be  practised,  only  within  that  nan-ow  range, 
instead  of  having  the  whole  council  for  their  field.  The  history 
of  election  committees  in  the  English  House  of  Commons  proves 
how  impossible  it  is  to  exclude  party  from  a  much  smaller  number 
of  persons  chosen  by  lot. 

2.  It  may  be  admitted  that  the  lot  threw  some  impediment  in 


272  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXI. 

the  way  of  corruption  and  intimidation,  preventing  those  undue 
influences  from  being  used  towards  the  gi'eater  number  of  the 
council  When,  however,  the  thirty  were  once  drawn  and  then 
reduced  to  nine,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  those  nine  should  be 
exempt  from  the  arts  of  the  candidates.  Even  if  they  were  to 
vote  secretly,  the  bargain  might  be  made  by  the  candidate  or  his 
party,  that  the  bribe  should  only  be  paid  if  earned,  that  is,  upon 
the  final  election  taking  place.  If  we  suppose  seven  of  the  nine  to 
be  thus  bought,  it  is  clear  that  they  could  secure  the  event  by 
choosing  as  many  of  the  forty  as  made  it  certain  a  majority  of  the 
twelve  should  be  friendly,  and  then  the  election  was  certain, 
always  supposing  as  we  have  done  throughout,  that  there  were  a 
sufficient  number  of  sure  voters  in  the  council  itself ;  and  we  shall 
presently  see  that  numbers  and  the  dependent  circumstances  of 
most  of  its  members  after  the  earlier  times  of  the  constitution, 
always  secured  the  existence  of  many  voters  ready  to  take  any 
part.  The  obstruction  given  to  bribery  and  intimidation,  be  it 
greater  or  less,  was  plainly  confined  to  the  first  operation  of  the 
lot  It  is  not  possible  to  understand  how  the  combination  of 
choice  and  lot,  in  a  word,  how  all  the  subsequent  operations, 
could  increase  the  difficulty  of  bribing  ;  but  it  is  manifest  that  the 
necessity  which  the  contrivance  created  of  finding  voters  at  each 
stage  of  its  operation,  in  the  Grand  Council,  extended  the  field  of 
corruption.  Each  time  that  any  new  voters  were  to  be  selected, 
as  the  twenty-five,  the  forty,  the  forty-one,  it  became  necessary 
to  corrupt  or  intimidate  those  who  were  thus  chosen  ;  and  there 
would  have  been  much  less  of  those  undue  practices  required,  had 
the  operation  been  confined  to  a  choice  of  the  doge  by  the  first 
thirty  upon  whom  the  lot  had  fallen. 

In  one  respect  it  may,  perhaps,  be  supposed  that  the  compli- 
cated contrivance  has  a  beneficial  tendency ;  the  repeated  choice, 
and  in  two  instances  by  greater  numbers  than  the  bare  majority, 
may  be  conceived  to  secure  fuller  dehberation,  and  to  give  the 
minority  some  influence,  some  power  of  effecting  a  compromise. 
But,  then,  the  admixture  of  chance  by  the  several  times  the  lot  is 
interposed  can  have  no  effect,  except  to  disturb  the  process  of 
selection  ;  and  a  single  choice,  by  a  defined  majority,  would  pro- 
bably give  as  great  a  security  against  rash  election,  and  as  great 
a  probability  of  a  middle  course  being  taken,  as  all  the  five  selec- 


CH.  XXI.  RESTRICTIONS  UPON  THE  DOGE.  273 

tions  of  the  system.  The  door  which  the  lot  opens  for  a  minority 
of  the  electors  by  possibility  determining  the  result  is  of  itself  a 
decisive  argument  against  it,  if  there  were  no  other. 

We  may,  therefore,  confidently  affirm  that  this  contrivance, 
which  has  so  often  been  vaunted  as  the  perfection  of  skill,  as  a 
refinement  in  political  wisdom  only  to  be  expected  from  the  subtle 
genius  and  long  and  various  experience  of  Italian  statesmen,  is 
wholly  undeserving  the  praise  lavished  upon  it.  There  can  be 
as  little  doubt  that  it  abundantly  proves  the  refining  nature  of 
these  politicians,  and  illustrates  the  morbid  jealousy,  the  ever- 
watchful  suspicions  of  aristocratic  rulers, — no  sooner  bestowing 
any  power  than  they  are  alarmed  lest  it  be  used  against  them, 
— compelled  to  vest  authority  and  discretion  in  some  hands,  and 
then  fettering  its  exercise  by  checks,  and  not  unfrequently  seeking 
security  against  those  checks  themselves. 

The  same  spirit  was  displayed  in  the  control  provided  for  the 
exercise  of  the  doge's  authority,  which  presided  over  the  nomina- 
tion to  the  office.  He  was  bound  in  all  things  by  the  advice  of 
the  six  councillors,  called  the  red  {rossi),  who  formed  with  him 
the  signoria,  or  little  executive  council.  Originally  he  had  the 
choice  of  his  councillors,  the  pregadi,  as  we  have  seen  ;  but  about 
half  a  century  after  the  revolution  in  the  year  1229,  the  choice 
of  the  pregadi  was  vested  in  the  great  council ;  and,  their  number 
being  increased  to  sixty,  they  were  formed  into  a  Senate,  six  coun- 
cillors having  ever  since  the  revolution  been  assigned  to  the  doge, 
who  were  chosen  by  the  Grand  Council,  and  only  chosen  for  eight 
months,  four  going  out  every  four  months,  so  as  to  be  con- 
stantly under  the  superintendence  and  control  of  the  council. 
These  six  formed,  also,  as  we  have  seen,  part  of  the  Council  of 
Ten.  Not  only  was  the  doge  bound  to  follow  the  advice  in  all 
things  of  these  six  delegates  and  representatives  of  the  great 
council,  but  he  could  not  leave  Venice  without  the  Great  Council's 
permission  ;  receive  foreign  ministers  or  open  despatches,  except 
in  presence  of  the  Little  Council ;  nor  even  have  his  effigy  upon 
the  coin,  though  it  bore  his  name. 

It  might  have  been  supposed  that  the  doge's  authority  was 
sufficiently  controlled  by  this  arrangement ;  but  this  did  not  suf- 
fice. Before  the  revolution  of  1173,  and  while  the  doge  was  a 
real  monarch,  the  principal  checks  upon  his  power  were  the  pro- 
mises which  he  made  in  the  oath  which  he  took  at  his  election, 

PART  II.  T 


274  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXI. 

and  which  received  alterations  and  additions  almost  each  time  the 
office  was  vacant.  These  promises  were  continued  after  the  revo- 
lution, and  even  after  the  ducal  power  became  a  mere  shadow.  In 
124<0  they  were  formed  into  a  kind  of  code,  m  one  hundred  and 
four  chapters,  and  this  code  was  continued  during  the  rest  of  the 
thirteenth  century.  But  the  oath  continued  ever  after  to  be  taken, 
and  it  was,  in  fact,  a  renunciation  of  aU  power  and  prerogative.  It 
bound  the  doge  to  execute  the  decrees  of  all  the  councils,  to  hold 
no  correspondence  with  foreign  powers,  not  to  receive  their  am- 
bassadors, or  open  their  despatches,  except  in  the  presence  of  the 
little  council,  the  six ;  not  even  to  open  the  letters  of  any  of  his 
subjects,  but  in  the  presence  of  one  of  the  six ;  neither  to  acquire 
nor  to  hold  any  property  out  of  the  Venetian  territories ; 
and  to  permit  none  of  his  relations  to  hold  any  office  whatever 
for  his  benefit,  either  within  the  territory  or  without.  Adding 
insult  to  tyranny,  this  oath  further  bound  him  never  to  make  any 
attempt  at  increasing  his  power,  nor  ever  suffer  any  citizen  to  kneel 
before  him  or  kiss  his  hand.  At  the  same  time  with  the  formation 
of  the  senate  (1229)  five  magistrates  were  created  for  the  express 
purpose  of  receiving  this  oath  at  each  vacancy  of  the  doge's  office, 
and  of  making,  under  the  great  council's  direction,  such  additions 
as  might  seem  necessary  for  causing  it  to  be  better  observed. 
They  were  called  correctors  of  the  ducal  oath  (correttoH  delta 
proTYhissione  ducale),  and  three  other  magistrates  were  also 
created,  called  iTiquisitora  of  the  late  doge  (inquisitori  del  doge 
defunto).  Their  office  was  to  examine  minutely  the  conduct 
of  the  late  doge,  and,  comparing  it  with  the  laws  and  with  his 
oath,  not  only  to  condemn  his  memory,  but  to  fine  his  heirs  in 
case  he  was  found  to  have  violated  either. 

But  the  constitution  did  not  trust  to  the  effect  of  this  post- 
humous inquiry,  or  exempt  the  doge,  any  more  than  his  nominal 
subjects,  from  responsibility  at  all  times.  There  were  three  ma- 
gistrates appointed  for  the  express  purpose  of  watching  over  all 
the  laws,  and  restraining  all  violation  of  them,  whether  by  the 
doge,  or  the  nobility,  or  the  people.  These  were  termed  avoga- 
dors  of  the  community  {avogadori  della  coTnmune),  and  they 
were  authorised  to  bring  the  conduct  of  the  doge  at  any  time  be- 
fore the  great  council.  All  attempts  at  usurpation  could  thus  be  at 
once  punished,  by  whomsoever  made.  In  truth,  the  prerogative  of 
the  doge  was  reduced  to  little  more  than  his  rank  and  an  inconsider- 


CH.  XXI.  doge's  pkerogative.  275 

able  patronage.  The  letters  of  credence  to  ambassadors  and  other 
similar  commissions  bore  his  name  before  the  other  authorities, 
though  he  was  not  allowed  to  sign  or  to  seal  them.  The  foreign 
despatches,  which  he  was  not  allowed  to  open,  were  addressed  to 
him.  He  presided  in  the  councils,  and  had  the  right  of  proposing 
any  measure  without  the  previous  assent  of  or  communication  with 
any  other  authority.  The  prebends  of  the  Cathedral  of  St.  Mark 
were  all  in  his  gift,  as  were  the  nominations  to  the  knighthoods 
of  the  same  order.  His  revenue  was  only  1 2,000  ducats,  or  SoOOl., 
which  seemed  to  render  the  exemption  of  his  family  from  all 
sumptuary  laws  somewhat  of  a  mockery,  the  more  especially  as 
neither  his  sons  nor  brothers  could  fill  any  place  of  importance, 
nor  were  they  allowed  to  receive  from  the  pope  ecclesiastical  pre- 
ferment, with  the  sole  exception  of  the  cardinal's  hat. 

Thus  it  might  most  truly  be  said,  in  the  words  of  the  old  proverb 
respecting  this  unfortunate  functionary,  that  he  was  a  king  in  his 
robes,  a  captive  in  the  city,  a  private  person  out  of  it  (rex:  in  pur- 
pura, in  urbe  captivus,  extra  urbem  lyrivatus).  The  saying  adds 
that  he  was  "  senator  in  curia."  He  presided  in  the  pregadi, 
which,  after  1229,  became  a  senate.  It  very  easily  obtained  the 
superintendence  of  all  matters  relating  to  trade  and  to  the  foreign 
affairs  of  the  republic,  and  prepared  all  measures  for  the  delibera- 
tion of  the  great  council.  But  it  was  composed  of  sixty  elected  by 
that  council,  and  as,  in  the  course  of  time,  it  became  customary 
for  the  Council  of  Ten,  all  the  ministers,  and  the  criminal  council 
{guarardid),  also  to  attend  it,  the  consequence  was  that  it  really 
contained  all  the  important  members  of  the  great  council,  and 
the  most  material  deliberations  of  the  government  were  conducted 
by  it :  in  fact,  it  represented  the  great  council.  Thus  in  the  pre- 
gadi resolutions  were  taken  for  making  peace  or  declaring  war, 
choosing  councillors,  appointing  ambassadors,  regulating  trade, 
directing  expenditure,  imposing  taxes.  Its  members  in  later  times 
were  about  three  hundred  ;  but  the  substantial  power  over  its 
deliberations  was  of  course  exercised  by  the  Council  of  Ten. 

The  body  next  in  importance  to  the  pregadi  was  the  college 
{collegio),  of  which  the  signoria,  or  the  doge,  and  his  six  coun- 
cillors formed  the  principal  members,  though  there  were  added 
about  eighteen  others,  being  the  chiefs  of  the  quarantia  and  the 
ministers  of  different  departments.  In  the  college  all  foreign 
ambassadors  were  received,  and  the  despatches  and  the  petitions 

T  2 


276  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICK  CH.  XXI. 

addressed  to  the  government  from  any  quarter  were  there  read 
It  was  understood  to  meet  every  morning. 

The  judicial  power  was,  very  early  after  the  revolution  of  1173, 
taken  from  the  doge.  The  criminal  jurisdiction  was  in  1 1 79  vested 
in  a  council  of  forty,  called  the  quarantia,  or  the  old  criminal 
council,  to  distinguish  it  from  two  others,  also  composed  of  forty 
each,  and  exercising  criminal  jurisdiction.  All  these  bodies  were 
chosen  by,  and  out  of,  the  great  council ;  their  secretaries,  as  those 
of  all  the  councils,  might  be  commoners,  and  excepting  the  office 
of  chancellor,  the  dignity  of  which  was  greater  than  its  authority, 
these  were  the  only  places  open  to  the  commons  at  large.  The 
chancellor  was  generally  chosen  from  among  the  secretaries,  and 
almost  always  a  commoner.  The  old  quarantia  was  divided  into 
three  departments,  the  chiefs  of  each  of  which  sat  in  the  college. 

The  office  most  in  request  at  Venice,  after  that  of  doge,  was 
the  place  of  Procurator  of  St.  Mark  ;  these  procurators  were  nine 
in  number,  and  held  their  places  for  Hfe.  They  had  jurisdiction 
over  charitable  foundations,  causes  testamentary  and  tutorial,  and 
kept  the  archives  of  the  state  ;  they  had  also  the  power  of  protect- 
ing debtors  from  the  extreme  rigour  of  the  law  in  favour  of 
creditors.  Their  functions,  and  the  tenure  of  their  office,  gave 
them  considerable  weight,  and  the  doge  was  generally  chosen  from 
their  body. 

Of  the  councillors,  or  ministers  of  different  departments,  some 
had,  and  others  had  not,  seats  in  the  college.  The  five  ministers 
of  the  Terra  Firma  provinces  (savii  di  terra  firnna)  and  the  five 
ministers  of  marine  {savii  delle  ordini)  had  seats  in  that  body. 
But  by  far  the  most  important  offices  under  the  republic  were 
those  of  the  provinces.  In  these  the  governors  and  judges  were 
at  all  times  Venetian  nobles,  appointed,  and  appointed  only  for  a 
time,  by  the  government — ^that  is,  by  the  ruling  powers  in  the 
great  council ;  and  three  of  them,  the  Morea,  Candia,  and 
Cyprus,  were  always  termed  subject  kingdoms.  The  example  of 
Candia  will  serve  for  the  others  also.  During  the  four  centuries 
that  this  fine  island  belonged  to  the  republic,  its  affairs  were  ad- 
ministered by  a  chief  governor  {procurator-general),  with  four 
subgovemors  {proveditori)  under  him,  for  the  four  provinces  into 
which  the  island  was  divided.  Judges  {rettori)  were  likewise 
sent  from  Venice,  and  each  of  them  was  assisted  by  two  coun- 
cillors, natives  of  the  island.     The  administration  of  the  towns  wfus 


CH.  XXI.  GOVERNMENT  OF  CANDIA-  277 

in  the  hands  of  the  Candiotes,  who  formed  the  municipal  councils. 
The  Candiote  nobles  had  feudal  privileges  ;  but  they  were  boiuid 
to  have  a  certain  number  of  militia  among  their  dependents  ready 
for  the  public  service.  This  was  reckoned  at  60,000 ;  so  that 
the  numbers  of  the  people  must  have  been  then  much  greater 
than  they  are  now ;  for  they  are  at  present  only  estimated  at 
300,000.  The  wars  with  the  Turks  for  the  possession  of  Candia, 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  are  supposed  to  have 
cost  the  republic  twenty -five  millions  of  ducats. 


278  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXII. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE. 
(Concluded.') 


Great  vigour  of  the  Government — Comparison  of  dominions  with  those  of  England — 
With  those  of  Rome  —  Venetian  tyranny — Examples:  Carrara;  Carmagnola; 
Foscari — Firmness  and  vigour — Military  policy — Equalizing  laws — Merits  of  the 
system  —  Provincial  Government — Oligarchy  substantially  established — Com- 
parison with  English  Government — Scottish  Parliament — Meanness  and  pride  of 
Venetian  Nobles — Improvements  in  modem  times. 

We  have  now  examined  the  details  of  this  singular  constitution, 
as  far  as  it  is  at  all  necessary  for  understanding  in  what  manner, 
and  according  to  what  arrangements,  the  sovereign  power  re- 
siding in  the  Great  Council,  and  its  committee,  the  Council  of 
Ten,  was  exercised  in  administering  the  government.  But  we 
must  never  lose  sight  of  the  real  and  efficient  ruler,  the  Council 
of  Ten ;  for  that  was  at  once  the  mainspring  and  the  regulator 
of  the  whole  machine. 

The  Council  of  Ten,  and  the  system  which  it  administered, 
may  he  regarded  as  the  natural  and  genuine  growth  of  the  aris- 
tocratic scheme.  A  government  thus  constituted  must,  as  we 
have  before  seen,  be  subject  to  constant  apprehension  from  two 
different  quarters,  the  dislike  or  restlessness  of  the  people  who 
are  excluded  from  power ;  and  the  ambition,  sometimes  of  the 
more  powerful  of  the  privileged  class,  sometimes  of  the  others 
who  are  jealous  of  influence  unequally  distributed.  Party  being 
the  constant  attendant  of  aristocracy,  unless  it  can  find  a  vent, 
as  in  the  representative  system,  it  will  work  by  intrigue  and 
conspiracy.  The  constant  alarms  which  this  risk  excites,  and 
the  constant  desire  to  prevent  any  undue  power  being  acquired 
by  one  or  more  of  their  own  number,  naturally  gives  rise  to 
such  jealous  precautions  as  created  and  maintained  the  Council 


CH.  XXII.  GEEAT  ViaOUR  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.  279 

of  Ten.  But  it  also  in  part  owed  its  continuance  to  the  necessity 
wliich  every  popular  government,  whether  aristocratic  or  demo 
cratic,  always  finds  inevitable,  of  supplying  the  natural  want  of 
unity  and  concentration  in  the  executive  power.  The  Roman 
aristocracy  early  resorted  to  an  occasional  dictatorship,  and  con- 
tinued its  recourse  to  this  expedient  when  gradually  mixed  up 
with  democratic  institutions,  sometimes  by  appointing  a  dictator, 
sometimes  by  arming  its  ordinary  magistrates  with  dictatorial 
powers.  The  Athenian  democracy  would,  in  all  probability, 
have  much  longer  preserved  its  preponderance  in  Greece,  and 
its  independence  of  a  foreign  power,  if  its  executive  administra- 
tion had  been  in  firmer  and  steadier  hands.  The  Spartan  aris- 
tocracy, which  was  paralysed  by  the  want  of  an  executive, 
hardly  ever  undertook  extensive  operations,  and  generally  failed 
when  it  did.  But  both  the  Spartan  and  Athenian  governments 
had  recourse  to  expedients  for  preventing  revolution ;  the 
ostracism  of  Athens  was  dictated  by  jealousy  of  revolutionary 
attempts ;  the  impeachment  for  illegal  legislation  (7§a(pr)  wocqoc- 
voixuy)  was  the  fruit  of  similar  alarms,  and  of  the  people's  dis- 
trust of  their  own  fitness  for  self-government.  But  in  Venice 
alone  was  the  public  alarm,  the  consciousness  that  it  required 
something  to  obviate  the  risk  of  conspiracy,  and  supply  the 
natural  defects  of  popular  government,  reduced  to  a  system  ;  in 
Venice  alone  was  the  dictatorial  power  made  an  integral  part  of 
the  constitution,  and  the  results  of  it  are  sufficiently  remarkable. 
No  government  ever  had  so  long  a  duration  as  the  Venetian 
with  so  little  of  sudden  and  violent  change,  and  so  few  shocks 
from  attempted  revolution  ;  nor  is  there  any  instance  of  foreign 
dominion  being  acquired  and  an  influence  sustained  so  dispro- 
portioned  to  the  natural  resources  of  the  state.  England  herself, 
supposing  her  to  possess  at  wUl  the  whole  of  her  East  Indian 
as  well  as  colonial  empire,  has  a  population  of  about  one-fourth 
part  of  her  remoter  subjects,  and  a  mass  of  wealth  incomparably 
greater  than  that  of  all  her  dependencies  together.  But  Venice, 
with  a  number  of  inhabitants  which  never  reached  200,000, 
perhaps  never  exceeded  150,000,  had  between  three  and  four 
millions  of  people  subject  to  her,  not  only  possessed  herself, 
from  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century,  of  her  rich  Italian 
provinces  in  the  Terra  Fii-ma — Verona,  Vicenza,  Padua, — but 


28(»  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXII. 

hacl,  from  a  much  more  early  period,  nearly  all  Dalraatia,  had 
carried  her  arms  by  sea  and  land  into  the  Eastern  empire,  taking 
its  capital,  Constantinople,  and  obtaining  for  her  share  two  ninth 
parts  of  the  remaining  Latin  empire — retained  possession  of  the 
Morea  for  three  centuries  (from  1204  to  1492),  and  again  took 
it  from  1684  to  1715 — held  Cyprus  for  a  century  (from  1473  to 
1571),  Candia  for  above  four  centuries  (from  1224  to  1669),  the 
Ionian  Islands  for  an  equal  period — and  gave  such  uneasiness  and 
alarm  to  other  states,  that  a  grand  alliance  was  formed  to  reduce 
her  power  by  no  less  important  monarchies  than  France,  Spain, 
Austria,  and  the  see  of  Rome.  The  commercial  wealth  of  this 
extraordinary  commonwealth  no  doubt  furnished  the  resources 
which  enabled  its  government  to  work  such  wonders ;  but  the 
frame  of  that  government,  so  well  calculated  for  the  councils  of 
deep,  unscrupulous  policy,  and  for  prompt  and  vigorous  execu- 
tion, must  be  allowed  its  full  share  of  the  merit,  if  conquests 
can  ever  deserve  admiration  ;  and  the  extraordinary  ability  dis- 
played for  so  great  a  length  of  time  by  the  Venetian  statesmen 
who  administered  its  powers  has  certainly  no  parallel  in  the 
history  of  any  other  nation.  Ancient  Rome  could  alone  have 
furnished  one,  and  that  only  if  the  circumstances  had  been 
materially  different  in  which  her  conquests  were  made,  and  if, 
instead  of  having  in  only  one  instance  met  with  an  adversary 
equal  in  ^kill,  she  had,  in  all  instances  but  one,  been  matched 
against  nations  as  far  advanced  in  civilization  as  herself  This 
was  the  case  with  Venice  in  all  her  wars,  saving  only  those 
waged  against  the  remains  of  the  Latin  empire. 

A  system  of  polity  which  could  thus  unite  lasting  stability  with 
extraordinary  vigour,  draw  forth  the  resources  of  its  subjects,  in- 
crease them  beyond  what  their  nature  seemed  to  permit,  apply  them 
with  steady  determination,  and  almost  constant  success ;  which 
could  train  a  succession  of  the  ablest  statesmen,  while  it  fostered 
the  enterprises  of  the  richest  merchants,  and  controlled  the  am- 
bition of  the  one  and  the  influence  of  the  other  so  as  to  make 
both  work  as  parts  of  the  machine,  wthout  ever  obstructing  its 
operations,  and  render  all  men  the  mere  instruments  of  the 
public  aggrandisement,  in  which  their  individual  importance 
was  habitually  merged, — presents  no  ordinary  claims  to  our 
admiration. — "Has   tant^s  virtutes   ingentia    vitia    apquabant; 


CH.  XXII.  TYRANNY  OF  THE  GOVERKMENT.  281 

inhumana  crudelitas,  perfidia  plusquam  Punica,  nihil  veri,  nihil 
sancti,  nullus  deorum  metiis,  nullum  jusjurum,  nulla  relligio" 
(Liv.  xxi.  4).  — Nothing  can  be  more  profligate  than  the  disre- 
gard of  all  principle,  nothing  more  daring  than  the  contempt  of 
all  engagements,  nothing  more  heartless  than  the  cold-blooded 
and  calculating  cruelty  by  which  the  republic  was  ever  ready 
to  compass  her  objects,  prevent  opposition  or  extinguish  it,  and 
occasionally  to  seek,  like  animal  instinct,  for  the  gratification  of 
revengeful  passions, — as  like  an  individual  she  yielded  to  alarm, 
and  to  the  excess  of  fury  which  fear  alone  engenders.  An  aris- 
tocracy in  full  and  uncontrolled  dominion,  subject  to  the  pas- 
sions of  the  multitude,  but  pursuing  their  gratification  with  the 
determination  of  an  individual,  yet  exempt  from  his  responsi- 
bility, and  able  to  keep  itself  in  countenance  because  of  its 
numbers,  could  alone  have  been  able  to  do  the  ^vicked  things 
with  which  all  authorities  have  charged  the  Venetian  govern- 
ment :  things  of  which  some  were  murders  under  the  mask  of 
public  executions, — others,  though  committed  in  public,  had 
not  even  the  doubtful  palliation  of  that  pretext, — and  not  a  few, 
being  perpetrated  in  secret,  may  have  been  no  better  than 
common  assassinations.  When  all  that  the  people  were  suffered 
to  see  or  to  know  was  the  strangled  corpse  of  some  obscure 
person,  with  an  inscription  that  he  had  been  put  to  death  in  the 
night  for  treason,  and  when  the  whole  particulars  were  veiled 
for  ever  after  in  a  secrecy  which  if  broken  would  have  brought 
down  the  same  fate  on  the  councillor  or  the  clerk,  we  can  cer- 
tainly give  no  examples  to  illustrate  what,  if  human  nature  were 
the  same  at  Venice  as  elsewhere,  must  have  been  the  inevitable 
abuse  of  powers  so  exercised.  But  enough  remains  on  record 
of  the  more  public  transactions  of  the  government  to  show  how 
far  men  can  go  when  they  themselves  form  the  public  whose 
opinion  alone  they  regard,  and  are  subject  to  none  of  the 
personal  responsibUity  which  checks  even  the  most  absolute 
despots. 

The  family  of  Carrara  had  been  lords  of  Padua  for  nearly 
ninety  years,  and  all  Italy  had  produced  no  more  gallant,  ac- 
complished, or  humane  prince  than  Francis  II.  When,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century,  the  Venetians  made  war  upon 
him  as  part  of  their  policy,  then  turned  towards  obtaining  do- 
minions on  the  mainland,  he  resisted  the  attacks  of  their  merce- 


282  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICK  CH.  XXII. 

nary  troops  with  a  far  inferior  force,  and  after  prodigies  of 
valour  and  of  fortitude,  in  the  midst  of  famine  and  of  a  pesti- 
lence such  as  perhaps  never  ravaged  any  other  city,*  he  and 
his  two  sons  were  overpowered,  and  were  made  prisoners  by 
acts  of  the  most  shameless  perfidy  on  the  part  of  the  Venetian 
government,  his  other  two  sons  having  been  despatched  to 
Florence.  The  pregadi  proceeded  to  try  them,  and  it  was 
expected  they  would  have  been  banished  to  some  distant 
fortress ;  but  the  Council  of  Ten  caused  them  all  three  to  be 
strangled  in  prison,  and  this  after  they  had  been  honoured  with 
a  solemn  public  reception  suited  to  their  rank,  and  placed  on 
the  same  bench  with  the  doge.  The  signoria  (or  executive 
council)  then  offered  a  reward  of  40,000  florins  (equal  in  value 
to  8000?.  of  our  present  money)  to  whoever  would  seize  and 
bring  to  Venice  alive  either  of  the  other  two  sons,  and  3000?. 
for  the  assassination  of  either.  It  is  honourable,  perhaps,  to 
the  Italians  of  the  age  that  none  ever  claimed  the  reward.  One 
of  them  died  a  natural  death :  but,  twenty  years  after  the  war 
had  ceased,  when  all  revenge  would  have  been  extinguished  in 
the  bosom  of  any  single  tyrant,  the  implacable  Council  of  Ten, 
having  taken  the  surviving  brother  in  an  attempt  upon  Padua, 
put  him  pubHcly  to  death. 

A  few  years  before  this,  Carmagnola,  the  most  skilful  general 
of  the  age,  after  leaving  the  Milanese  service,  had  been  twice 
employed  by  the  Venetian  government,  and  had  gained  for  it 
the  most  important  victories,  which,  after  adding  Brescia  and 
Bergami  to  their  dominions,  encouraged  them  to  meditate  the 
entire  conquest  of  Lombardy.  After  a  peace,  to  which  this 
ambitious  lepubhc  reluctantly  submitted  for  three  years,  they 
again  made  war  upon  Milan,  and  their  great  captain  proved  no 
longer  victorious,  though  their  chief  disaster  was  the  loss  of  a 
fleet,  with  the  command  of  which  he  had  nothing  to  do.  He 
was  invited  to  attend  the  senate  (pregadi),  that  the  conditions 
of  a  negotiation  for  peace  might  be  discussed.  Received  with 
the  utmost  respect,  attended  by  a  brilliant  procession,  he  was 
placed  in  the  seat  of  honour,  and  loaded  with  professions  of 
esteem  and  admiration.  The  consultation  on  which  his  advice 
was  desired  lasted  till  a  late  hour,  and  he  was  pressed  to  let  his 

*  Some  accounts  say  that  40,000  perished  of  it  in  Padua ;  and  none  rate  the  num- 
ber lower  than  28,000. 


CH.  XXIL  CAEMAGNOLA — FOSCARI.  283 

suite  retire  for  the  night  after  the  fatigues  of  their  journey. 
No  sooner  was  he  left  alone  with  the  senators,  than  they  ordered 
in  their  guards,  who  hurried  him  to  prison  and  loaded  him  with 
irons.  The  pretext  of  this  enormity  was,  that  his  late  want  of 
success  had  arisen  from  wilful  neglect  or  treacherous  disposi- 
tions. Next  day  he  was  put  to  the  torture ;  he  suffered  the 
more  excruciating  torment  that  he  still  had  a  wound  open  whicli 
he  had  received  in  the  service  of  his  savage  executioners ;  and 
the  story  ran  that  he  had  in  his  agony  confessed  the  charge. 
What  we  know  for  certain  is,  that  a  few  days  afterwards  he  was 
publicly  executed,  with  a  gag  in  his  mouth  to  prevent  him  from 
denying  this  imputation  upon  his  memory.  That  such  a  body 
as  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  during  the  ferment  of  a  revo- 
lutionary crisis,  was  capable  of  judicially  murdering  an  unsuc- 
cessful general,  and  that  the  mob,  of  whom  it  was  alternately 
the  tyrant  and  the  slave,  were  capable  of  ascribing  any  reverse 
of  fortune  to  treachery,  no  one  will  think  of  denying ;  nor  would 
the  infliction  of  torture  have  been  spared  at  Paris,  any  more 
than  it  was  at  Venice,  had  such  an  atrocity  formed  part  of  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  age ;  and  we  may  even  admit  that  the 
gagging  of  the  victim  has  not  been  without  its  parallel  in  the 
more  recent  scenes.  But  not  even  the  tribunals  of  1793  and 
1794,  nor  the  wildest  and  most  savage  of  the  mobs  to  whom 
massacre  then  became  familiar,  were  capable  of  the  cold-blooded 
plot  which  the  regular  government  of  Venice  formed  as  an  act 
of  its  ordinary  administration,  or  of  the  consummate  treachery 
with  which  the  select  body  of  its  patricians  all  joined  in  carry- 
ing it  on.  A  more  signal  proof  cannot  be  imagined  of  the 
degree  to  which  men  banded  in  parties,  and  looking  only  to 
their  own  order,  learn  to  lose  the  power  of  blushing  as  well  as 
of  feeling. 

Francis  Foscari  had  been  doge  during  the  brilliant  campaigns 
of  Carmagnola,  and  had  by  his  councils  been  a  strenuous  pro- 
moter of  the  Lombard  war,  so  long  an  especial  favourite  with  the 
nation  and  its  rulers.  His  popularity  and  an  influence  extraor- 
dinary in  so  crippled  an  office,  but  acquired  by  the  talents,  the 
courage,  and  the  firmness  which  he  had  uniformly  displayed, 
raised  the  jealousy  of  the  senate  and  the  Council  of  Ten,  subjected 
him  to  an  unremitting  vigilance  ;  but  nothing  could  be  found  in 
all  his  proceedings  to  justify  a  suspicion  in  a  country  where  sus- 


284  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICK  CH.  XXII. 

picion  was  fatal  to  its  object.  Of  his  four  sons,  one  survived  ;  and 
against  him,  to  the  great  joy  of  the  council,  a  Florentine  exile, 
settled  at  Venice,  preferred  in  secret  a  charge  of  receiving  some 
presents  from  one  of  the  Viscontis,  enemies  of  the  republic.  He 
was  put  to  the  torture  ;  under  its  extremities  he  made  a  confession  ; 
and  he  was  banished  for  life.  His  wretched  father,  now  in  his 
eighty-sixth  year,  and  bent  down  by  family  afflictions,  was  desir- 
ous of  having  his  office  taken  from  him,  his  oath  and  the  law  pre- 
venting his  resignation  ;  but  the  Council  refused  him-  this  favour, 
and  insisted  on  retaining  him  in  a  position  which  every  day 
added  to  his  sufferings.  One  of  the  inquisitors  of  state  was  assas- 
sinated. Upon  the  mere  suspicion  arising  from  the  son's  ser- 
vant having  been  seen  in  Venice,  both  he  and  his  master  were 
cruelly  tortured  ;  but  no  confession  was  extorted.  The  real  assas- 
sin on  his  death-bed  confessed  his  crime ;  but  this  could  obtain 
no  relaxation  of  the  more  severe  exile  to  which  Foscari  had  been 
condemned  upon  the  suspicion  now  proved  to  be  wholly  ground- 
less. The  torments  he  had  suffered  produced  insanity ;  he  was 
suffered  to  revisit  his  family  at  Venice,  but  sent  back  to  the  place 
of  his  banishment  the  moment  his  reason  returned.  There  he 
wrote  a  letter  to  the  Duke  of  IVIilan  and  let  it  be  seen,  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  obtaining  his  recall  to  Venice  in  order  to  be  tried 
for  the  offence.  The  iriexorable  Council  recalled  him,  and  when 
the  cause  of  Tvriting  the  letter  was  stated  in  his  defence,  they  a  third 
time  ordered  him  to  be  tortured,  in  order  to  try  if  he  would  main- 
tain his  story.  He  did  so,  was  sent  back  to  his  exile,  and  as  soon 
as  he  landed  died  of  the  agony  he  had  endured.  There  being 
no  longer  any  means  of  making  the  unhappy  doge  suffer  through 
his  family,  the  execrable  Ten,  now  at  the  instigation  of  Loredano, 
a  personal  and  hereditary  enemy  of  the  Foscaris,  resolved  to 
humble  the  old  man  by  insults.  They  ordered  another  election 
and  desired  him  to  resign ;  he  pleaded  his  oath,  and  at  length 
they  removed  him  by  a  compulsory  decree.  The  public  voice 
was  raised  in  accents  of  indignation  at  such  treatment,  such  con- 
tinued persecution  of  this  venerable  person,  so  long  the  favourite 
of  his  countrymen.  The  council  issued  a  proclamation,  forbid- 
ding all  persons  to  speak  upon  the  subject  on  pain  of  being  car- 
ried before  the  state  inquisitors.  Foscari  died  suddenly,  but  it 
is  supposed  a  natural  death,  at  the  moment  his  successor's  elec- 
tion was  proclaimed. 


CH.  XXIT.  ZENO — FALIEEi  ,  285 

Of  the  government's  jealous  nature  abundant  examples  have 
already  been  given ;  nor  did  the  former  services  of  those  who 
were  the  objects  of  its  suspicions  at  all  operate  in  allaying  them, 
even  where  no  apprehension  of  ambitious  encroachment  could  be 
entertained.  Carlo  Zeno  was  the  most  distinguished  person  of 
his  time,  both  for  his  great  capacity,  which  had  rescued  the  re- 
public from  extreme  danger,  and  as  being  one  of  the  most  irre- 
proachably virtuous  of  her  citizens.  He  was  accused  before  the 
council  of  having  received  a  sum  of  about  100?.  from  Francis  Car- 
rara, whose  accounts  showed  the  payment  merely,  without  stating 
on  what  ground  it  had  been  made.  Zeno  at  once  admitted  the 
fact,  but  stated  that  it  was  in  repayment  of  a  sum  he  had  lent 
Carrara  while  in  banishment  at  Asti.  His  character  made  it  im- 
possible for  any  of  his  judges  even  to  charge  him  with  corrui3- 
tion,  and  yet  they  deprived  him  of  all  his  employments,  and  con- 
denmed  him  to  imprisonment  for  two  years,  as  if  to  punish  him 
for  having  proved  that  their  suspicions  were  utterly  groundless. 

As  a  last  illustration  of  the  courage  and  confidence  iDroduced 
by  supreme  power  being  entrusted  to  a  select  body,  or  a  party 
looking  only  to  itself,  and  above  all  responsibility,  may  be  given 
the  proceeding  against  the  celebrated  Marino  Falieri ;  and  it  is 
an  instance  in  which  the  conduct  of  the  government  may  be  con- 
sidered as  free  from  blame.  In  this  case  the  popular  feeling  was 
on  the  doge's  side :  his  wife's  virtue  had  been  attempted  by 
one  of  the  chiefs  of  the  councU ;  a  most  inadequate  reparation 
had  been  made  by  the  offender's  colleagues  ;  the  citizens,  whose 
families  had  for  some  years  been  invaded  by  the  young  nobles 
in  the  same  manner,  made  common  cause  with  the  doge :  Ber- 
tuccio,  a  leading  man  among  them,  had  himself  suffered  from  the 
licentiousness  and  the  insolence  of  these  privileged  intruders ; 
and  the  consequence  was,  a  conspiracy  formed  to  chastise  the 
offenders  and  to  overturn  the  aristocratic  government  which  pro- 
tected them.  The  secret  of  the  plot,  however,  was  betrayed  on 
the  eve  of  its  execution  ;  and  the  usual  expedient  of  torture  being 
resorted  to,  obtained  a  confession  that  the  doge  was  implicated. 
He  was  brought  to  trial  immediately  before  the  Council  of  Ten- 
As  there  had  been  no  instance  of  a  doge  being  thus  treated,  the 
council  called  in  as  assessors  twenty  persons  of  the  highest  rank, 
and  this  sonta,  or  quinta,  became  a  permanent  body,  as  we  have 
seen.    He  was  condemned  to  death  and  executed,  but  with  closed 


286  -  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE  CH.  XXII. 

doors,  as  indeed  the  whole  proceeding  had  been  conducted  in 
secret.  One  of  the  council  appeared  immediately  at  the  window 
with  the  bloody  sword  in  his  hand,  and  informed  the  assembled 
multitude  that  "a  great  criminal  had  fallen  by  the  hand  of  justice." 
The  doors  were  flung  open,  and  they  saw  the  headless  trunk  of 
their  favourite  weltering  in  his  blood.  Now  it  may  safely  be 
affirmed  that  in  no  other  government  could  the  extraordinary 
step  of  putting  the  chief  magistrate  to  death  as  a  common  culprit 
have  been  taken  in  this  manner.  There  was  no  precedent 
of  his  being  amenable  to  the  law ;  and  though  he  undoubtedly 
was  so  by  the  constitution  of  1173,  the  acting  upon  this  for  the 
first  time  without  the  presence  of  the  public,  and  then  executing 
the  sentence  upon  a  popular  prince,  in  a  cause  known  to  be 
favoured  by  the  people,  showed  a  degree  of  confidence  in  them- 
selves and  their  order  on  the  part  of  the  Council,  which  we 
should  in  vain  look  for  in  any  but  an  aristocratic  government. 
A  despotic  court  would  have  secretly  poisoned,  or  secretly  ba- 
nished or  imprisoned,  the  powerful  enemy  whom  it  did  not  ven- 
ture openly  to  try  and  punish.  A  popular  government,  while  in- 
flicting an  extraordinary  punishment,  would  have  sought  sup- 
port in  publicity  for  its  doubtful  authority.  The  Council  of  Ten 
did  not  even  fortiiy  itself  with  the  sanction  of  the  body  of  which 
it  formed  a  part ;  but  joining  to  itself  a  handful  of  leading  men, 
tried,  condemned,  and  executed  the  doge,  and  only  let  the  people 
know  of  the  proceeding  after  it  was  terminated. 

We  have  said  that  the  course  pursued  by  the  Council  in  this  in- 
stance was  justifiable,  always  of  course  excepting  the  mode  of 
trial  and  the  torture,  for  which  the  judicial  system  was  to  blame 
rather  than  those  who  administered  it.  The  disregard  of  the 
popular  voice  can  certainly  not  be  reckoned  blameable  ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  entitled  to  great  respect ;  and  the  history  of  Venice 
abounds  in  similar  examples,  some  of  which  show  that  the  firm- 
ness of  the  Council  saved  not  merely  the  estabhshed  constitution, 
but  the  independence  and  the  very  existence  of  the  republic, 
which  the  universal  voice  of  the  common  people  was  prepared  to 
sacrifice.  When  the  Genoese,  in  1379,  had  almost  entirely  de- 
stroyed the  Venetian  navy  and  taken  Chiozza,  the  port  of  Venice, 
from  whence  the  city  was  itself  exposed  to  immediate  and  most 
imminent  danger,  the  fiimness  of  the  doge  and  the  government 
alone  checked  tho  universal  panic  which  prevailed.     The  people 


CH.  XXIL  MILITARY  POLICY.  287 

insisted  upon  making  peace  upon  any  terms,  and  at  once  aban- 
doning tbe  conflict ;  the  government  resisted  this  base  clamour,  and 
affected  to  put  a  bold  front  upon  the  aspect  of  affairs ;  yet  so  Avell 
aware  was  it  of  their  desperate  posture,  that  it  secretly  sent  am- 
bassadors to  accept  any  conditions,  except  such  as  should  sacri- 
fice the  independence  of  the  repubhc.  The  refusal  of  this  offer 
by  Doria's  haughty  declaration,"  that  "  the  Horses*  of  St.  Mark 
must  be  bridled  before  the  Genoese  could  treat  for  peace,"  at 
length  roused  the  people  to  support  the  government,  which  had 
previously  taken  the  determination  (like  that  of  the  Dutch,  in 
similar  circumstances,  three  centuries  later)  to  abandon  Venice 
and  seek  a  refuge  in  Candia.  The  consequences  of  the  Genoese 
violence  and  folly  are  well  knowii ;  they  were  themselves,  through 
the  signal  achievements  of  Pisani  and  Zeno,  reduced  in  a  few 
months  to  ask  for  the  peace  which  they  had  before  refused  to 
treat  of. 

The  jealousy  of  the  Venetian  government  has  been  already 
remarked,  as  shown  in  all  the  arrangements  of  its  structure,  as 
well  as  in  all  its  cruel  treatment  of  individuals.  But  its  most 
singular  exhibition  was  in  the  military  concerns  of  the  state. 
Though  early  bent  upon  foreign  conquests,  and  having  from 
a  period  before  the  formation  of  its  aristocratic  constitution  al- 
ways held  possession  of  distant  territories,  the  republic  never 
would  have  an  army  of  its  own  citizens,  nor  even  suffer  a  Vene- 
tian to  command  the  land-forces  employed  in  its  service.  Sol- 
diers were  hired  from  the  different  Italian  states,  and  Dalma- 
tians and  Istrians  also  entered  the  army.  IS'o  Venetian  noble 
ever  served  in  it ;  no  soldiers  were  ever  allowed  to  enter  the  city, 
whether  in  peace  or  war ;  and  the  general  was  always  a  foreigner, 
to  whom  there  were  assigned  two  councillors,  as  residents  at  his 
head-quarters,  for  the  purpose  of  watching  and  controlling  his 
operations,  on  behalf  of  the  government  whom  they  represented. 
Carmagnola's  army  consisted  of  nearly  24,000  of  these  condot- 
tieri,  or  mercenaries,  and  the  forces  employed  in  the  Lombard 
war  amounted  in  the  whole  to  1 8,000  cavalry  and  as  many  in- 
fantry. On  the  other  hand,  the  navy  was  chiefly  manned  by 
Venetians ;  and  all  their  naval  commanders  belonged  to  the 
city.     It  seems  as  if  the  Council  of  Ten  thought  it  could  easily 

*  The  group  of  four  brazen  horses,  one  of  the  most  precious  remains  of  antiquity, 
forms  the  just  boast  tof  the  Place  of  St.  Mark  at  Venice. 


288  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXII. 

cope  with  the  ambition  of  any  naval  commander  who  should  be 
raised  to  eminence  by  his  services,  but  dreaded  the  conflict  with 
land-forces ;  v)r  perhaps  felt  unequal  to  withstand  the  junction 
of  a  successful  general  with  a  victorious  admiral 

The  jealousy  of  foreign  influence  arose  from  the  same  source — 
the  fear  of  any  citizen  acquiring  power  dangerous  to  the  state, 
that  is,  to  the  equality  among  the  nobles,  which  all  the  arrange- 
ments of  the  constitution  were  framed  to  preserve.  No  precau- 
tions could  prevent  some  from  becoming  wealthier  than  others, 
although  their  entering  into  trade  was  forbidden  by  law  until 
the  year  1788,  when  a  proclamation  encouraged  their  engaging 
both  in  manufactures  and  commerce.  But  the  marriage  of  a 
noble,  or  the  daughter  of  a  noble,  with  a  foreigner,  was  at  all 
times  strictly  forbidden.  The  apprehension  of  direct  foreign 
influence  hkewise  operated  in  the  same  direction.  No  Venetian 
could  be  a  knight  of  Malta  ;  nor  could  any  priest  belong  to  any 
of  the  councils,  for  fear  of  papal  influence. 

We  have  already  stated,  that  with  all  its  faults,  and  notwith- 
standing the  cruel  despotism  which  it  exercised  over  the  nobles, 
the  Venetian  government  had  great  merits  as  far  as  the  people 
were  concerned.  No  one  under  a  certain  rank  was  exposed  to  its 
suspicions  and  its  oppressions,  though  any  one,  by  becoming 
rich  and  powerful,  became  also  the  object  of  its  vigilant  superin- 
tendence. But  that  which  deprived  it  of  the  most  burthensome 
quahties  of  an  aristocracy  was  the  feudal  attributes.  No  castles, 
no  vassals,  no  territorial  possessions  either  in  the  mainland  or 
elsewhere,  but  enjoyed  the  same  influence  from  their  property 
with  the  wealthiest  commoners.  They  had  no  doubt  the  protec- 
tion which  belonged  to  their  exclusive  possession  of  the  govern- 
ment ;  but  although  at  times  (and  we  have  seen  one  instance  in 
considering  the  history  of  Marino  Falieri)  they  availed  them- 
selves of  their  favour  with  the  tribunals  to  oppress  the  citizens, 
yet  generally  speaking  they  were  far  too  jealous  of  each  other 
to  allow  such  unlawful  proceedings,  and  they  administered  the 
government  so  as  to  control  their  own  order  and  give  satisfaction  to 
the  people.  They  were  in  no  sense  of  the  word  an  insolent  and 
domineering  aristocracy.  The  turbulence  of  faction  was  also  in 
modem  times  little  experienced  at  Venice.  During  the  eleventh 
century  it  had  reached  its  height,  and,  as  we  have  before  seen, 
suspended  the  operations  of  the  government  in  its  provincial 


CH.  XXII.  rKOVINCIAL  GOVEENMENT.  289 

affairs ;  but  after  that  time,  and  even  long  before  the  revokition 
which  founded  the  aristocratic  power,  it  had  almost  entirely 
ceased.  There  is  no  instance  of  such  a  government  having  been 
so  little  a  prey  to  party  dissensions  and  intrigues.  This  can  only 
be  accounted  for  by  the  rigorous  control  which  the  Council  of 
Ten  habitually  exercised  over  all  who  could  enter  into  factious 
measures.  t 

The  provincial  policy  of  the  government  was  in  almost  every 
respect  inferior  to  its  domestic  administration,  excepting  always 
its  treatment  of  the  Italian  dominions — those  of  the  Terra  Firma. 
The  want  of  an  army  and  fortified  places  in  those  provinces,  as 
well  as  the  natural  hostility  of  the  feudal  nobles,  made  it  neces- 
sary to  take  part  with  the  people  against  the  barons.  Accord- 
ingly everything  there  wore  a  democratic  aspect,  as  in  Venice 
all  was  aristocratical.  Hence  the  people  regarded  the  govern- 
ment as  their  protector,  and  were  ready  to  sacrifice  their  lives 
and  fortunes  "  for  St.  Mark"  (as  the  metropolis  was  familiarly 
termed),  while  the  barons  were  reduced  to  insignificance,  and 
humbled  if  not  oppressed.  In  the  remoter  provinces  it  was 
widely  otherwise.  Though  the  republic  maintained  only  a 
small  military  force  to  keep  them  in  subjection,  her  navy  was 
powerful,  and  the  Greeks  having  a  hatred  and  a  fear  of  the 
Turks  greater  than  any  which  Christian  oppression  could  excite, 
the  Venetians  could  always  reckon  upon  their  submission, 
and  even  upon  their  service  in  the  militia.  The  provincial  go- 
vernment of  St.  Mark,  then,  afforded  no  exception  to  the 
position  that  commonwealths  have  in  all  ages  been  the  most 
tyrannical  of  rulers.  The  senate  was  wise  enough  to  leave  the 
local  administration  in  the  hands  of  the  natives  when  all  the 
places  of  profit  and  power  were  engrossed  by  its  own  delegates. 
But  with  that  single  exception  the  unfortunate  Greeks  and  Illy- 
rians  enjoyed  no  consideration.  Their  markets  were  subject  to 
the  most  galling  monopoly  ;  their  agriculture  was  oppressed  with 
heavy  taxes ;  the  Venetian,  whether  noble  or  commoner,  never 
thought  of  settling,  but  resorted  to  the  province  in  order  to  make 
money  by  oppressing  it ;  and  the  general  hatred  of  the  Greeks 
as  being  corrupt,  and  the  contempt  of  the  Illyrians  as  being 
barbarous,  communicating  itself  to  each  individual,  filled  up 
whatever  the  government  had  left  wanting  in  the  measure  of 
provincial  maltreatment  and  vexation.     The  venality  and  cor- 

PART  IL  U 


290  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXH. 

ruption  which  marked  the  government  of  the  eastern  dominions, 
and  which  tainted  the  administration  of  justice  as  well  as  of 
political  power,  presented  a  singular  contrast  to  the  purity  with 
which  the  city  and  the  Terra  Firma  were  always  ruled. 

It  remains  that  we  observe  how  entirely  the  frame  of  the  Ve- 
netian government  conformed  itself  to  the  law  which  seems 
general  in  aristocratical  systen^,  and  became,  in  the  natural 
course  of  things,  an  oligarchy. 

We  have  hitherto  been  considering  that  government  as  it 
originally  was  formed,  and  assuming  that  its  powers  continued  to 
be  vested  in  the  whole  body  of  the  nobles.  By  law  and  in 
theory,  no  doubt,  they  did  so  continue  to  the  very  end.  But  in 
fact,  a  great  change  had  taken  place,  though  so  silently  and  so  gra- 
dually, that  it  is  quite  impossible  to  trace  it,  or  to  point  out  the 
time  when  and  the  steps  by  which  it  was  effected.  At  first  it  is 
probable  there  were  few  nobles  excluded  from  the  Great  Council  of 
four  hundred  and  eighty,  and  that  the  whole  body  of  the  nobiUty 
consisted  of  no  more  than  six  hundred,  if  so  many.  It  is  certain 
that  in  those  early  times  there  were  none  of  the  class  who  did 
not  possess  sufficient  fortune  and  weight  to  be  really  component 
parts  of  a  patrician  or  aristocratic  body.  Several  circumstances, 
however,  concurred  with  the  natural  increase  of  their  numbers 
and  the  accidents  of  life,  to  create  a  division  of  the  order  into 
rich  and  poor.  It  was  very  early  held  disgraceful  for  a  noble  to 
follow  any  profession  but  that  of  arms  or  public  employment ; 
and  as  they  would  not  serve  in  the  land-forces,  their  choice  was 
reduced  to  the  navy  or  the  civil  service  of  the  state.  The  law 
forbade  the  exercise  of  trade,  and  also  prohibited  their  holding 
more  than  one  office  at  a  time.  They  were  alike  prevented  from 
repairing  their  fortunes  by  foreign  alliances  ;  and  marriage  with 
wealthy  mercantile  families  was  their  only  resource.  Thus  it 
happened  that  the  numbers  increasing  to  about  thirteen  hundred, 
many  of  them,  invested  with  the  whole  privileges  of  their  order 
were  reduced  to  the  lowest  poverty,  and  led  a  miserable  and 
dependent  life,  pensioners  upon  the  charity  of  the  state  or  serv- 
ing their  wealthier  brethren  in  almost  a  menial  capacity.  It 
was  reckoned  that  no  less  than  five  hundred  received  public 
charity,  and  several  hundreds  besides  had  nothing  that  could 
be  called  an  independent  fortune.  Yet  all  of  these  were  in- 
scribed in  the  golden  book  like  the  wealthiest ;  and  all  of  them 


CH.  XXIL  NATURAL  OLIGARCHY  ESTABLISHED.  291 

equally  had  votes  in  every  one  of  the  many  elections  which  were 
continually  going  on  to  form  the  councils  that  administered  the 
government.  There  were  only  about  sixty  families  who  really 
possessed  sufficient  influence  ever  to  be  chosen  as  members  of 
the  government  from  their  wealth  and  rank — that  is,  from  the 
number  of  years  they  had  continued  in  such  circumstances,  and  the 
number  of  considerable  persons  belonging  to  them,  and  of  other 
but  poorer  nobles  devoted  to  their  interests.  The  general  ex- 
istence of  bribery  and  corruption  of  all  sorts  between  a  body  of 
candidates  and  a  body  of  voters  thus  constituted  may  easily  be 
imagined.  The  original  body  of  nobility  received  very  rarely 
any  recruits.  In  times  of  great  financial  embarrassment  nobility 
was  sold  to  the  wealtliiest  citizens,  but  for  a  price  so  high  that 
few  could  purchase  it ;  as  much  as  100,000  ducats,  or  30,000^.  of 
our  money,  was  required  to  be  paid,  and  in  times  when  the 
value  of  money  was  twice  as  high  as  it  now  is.  The  nobles  of 
the  Italian  provinces  were  never  regarded  as  members  of  the 
order  ;  but  in  later  times  they  were  admitted  on  proving  a  noble 
descent  for  two  centuries  and  the  possession  of  an  income  from 
land  of  16001.  a-year ;  conditions  with  which  very  few  could 
comply. 

Thus  there  was  formed  an  aristocracy  within  an  aristocracy, 
in  fact  an  ohgarchy — an  hereditary  body  of  sixty  families,  in 
whose  hands  the  whole  powers  of  the  government  were  placed. 
Every  one  of  the  thirteen  hundred  was  equally  eligible  to  all 
offices  from  that  of  doge  downwards,  as  every  one  could  equally 
vote  at  all  elections ;  every  one  could  be  procurator  of  St.  Mark, 
governor  of  Corfu,  of  Verona,  member  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  or 
Inquisitor  of  State ;  but  to  such  offices  no  one  ever  dreamt  of 
aspiring,  except  about  ninety  or  a  hundred  persons,  perhaps  not 
half  as  many,  since  only  one  of  a  house  could  hold  some  of  the 
higher  offices,  and  the  accidents  of  health  or  incapacity  would 
disqualify  several  of  the  select  few. 

In  this  respect  they  accurately  resembled  our  own  nobility  in 
England  ;  or  rather,  in  this  most  material  respect,  the  Venetian 
and  the  English  constitutions,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  stood  till 
very  late  times  exactly  upon  the  same  footing. 

The  chief  power  was  vested  in  the  House  of  Commons  and 
those  who  elected  it.  Not  supreme  and  unchecked,  as  at  Venice, 
it  was  lodged  in  the  privileged  class  and  councils  chosen  by 

u2 


292  GOVEENMENT  OF  VENICK  CH.  XXII. 

them,  but  still  the  chief  power,  and  which,  if  exercised  with 
firmness  and  union  among  those  who  held  it,  could  not  be 
resisted  by  the  other  branches  of  the  government.  The  chief 
class  which  chose  the  House  of  Commons  was  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  persons.  These  had  originally  formed  a  kind 
of  minor  nobility,  the  freeholders,  or  persons  holding  imme- 
diately of  the  crown,  and  they  had  originally  sat  themselves  in 
parliament,  probably  in  England,  certainly  in  Scotland,  and  not 
by  their  representatives.  But  to  them  were  afterwards  added 
the  chief  persons  in  the  towns.  By  changes  which  took  place 
in  the  fifteenth  century  both  in  England  and  Scotland,  a  portion 
only  of  the  freeholders  was  allowed  to  retain  the  right  of 
election,  and  the  elective  franchise  was  afterwards  gradually 
restricted  to  a  few  of  the  burghers.  Let  us  cast  our  eyes  back 
upon  the  Scottish  parliament,  ia  which  the  resemblance  to  the 
Venetian  aristocracy  is  the  most  striking. 

The  commons  sat  in  the  same  chamber  with  the  peers,  and 
originally  without  any  representation.  The  peers  were  the 
greater  barons ;  the  commons  the  lesser  or  gentlemen.  The 
rest  of  the  community  had  no  share  whatever  in  the  govern- 
ment, no  political  rights ;  and  except  that  the  power  of  the 
crown  was  much  more  substantial  than  that  of  the  doge,  and 
that  the  clergy  were  not  represented  by  the  prelates,  the  govern- 
ment was  an  aristocracy  of  the  same  kind  in  its  fundamental 
principles  with  the  Venetian.  The  introduction  of  representa- 
tion took  place  in  both  systems,  except  that  in  Scotland  a  portion 
of  the  nobles  continued  to  sit  in  person,  while  at  Venice  the 
whole  of  the  councils  became  elective  for  a  time  ;  and  afterwards 
the  great  council,  the  body  of  electors,  did  little  more  than  ex- 
ercise its  functions  of  choosing  the  bodies  by  whom  the  govern- 
ment was  administered.  But  this  leading  feature  was  common 
to  both  Scotland  and  Venice — the  enjoyment  of  political  power 
was  strictly  confined  to  a  very  small  class  of  the  community,  the 
great  body  of  the  people  being  wholly  excluded  from  the  con- 
stitution. It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  a  considerably 
larger  proportion  of  the  people  exercised  the  power  of  election 
at  Venice,  that  is,  had  a  share  in  the  government,  than  in  Scot- 
land. There  were  1300  nobles,  all  equally  entitled  to  vote  and 
to  be  elected  to  every  office  and  every  council,  nay,  actuall)' 
sitting  in  one  of  the  councils.     This  formed  about  one  in  115 


CH.  XXII.  COMPAEISON  OF  ENGLAND  AND  VENICE.  293 

of  the  people.  In  Scotland  before  1832  the  number  of  voters 
was  4000,  in  a  population  of  2,360,000 — or  one  in  590— five 
times  fewer  than  at  Venice.  Even  now  the  proportion  is  not 
three  times  greater  than  it  was  at  Venice,  between  the  privileged 
class  and  the  whole  body  of  the  people. 

But  the  resemblance  holds  not  only  with  respect  to  the  origin 
of  the  privileged  class  and  its  small  proportion  to  the  com- 
munity at  large ;  the  manner  in  which  it  became  divided  so  as 
to  engender  an  oligarchy,  and  the  quality  in  general  of  its  mem- 
bers, were  by  no  means  so  dissimilar  as  they  might  at  first  sight 
seem  to  be.  In  Scotland,  as  at  Venice,  the  lesser  barons  became 
numerous  by  natural  increase,  and  many  of  them  fell  necessarily 
into  poverty.  Take  even  the  body  of  4000  voters  and  compare 
them  with  the  1300  Venetian  nobles,  there  will  be  found  fully 
as  great  a  proportion  of  the  latter  as  of  the  former  class  in  a 
mean  and  dependent  condition.  On  the  other  hand  the  aristo- 
cracy within  the  aristocracy,  the  natural  oligarchy,  existed  in  as 
great  perfection  among  our  Scottish  privileged  persons  as  among 
the  Venetian.  Though  all  could  by  law  be  elected  to  parlia- 
ment and  hold  offices  in  the  state,  in  practice  there  was  an 
impassable  barrier  between  the  poor  man  and  either  parliament 
or  place.  The  main  distinction  between  the  two  systems  was 
that  all  who  could  acquire  very  moderate  wealth  found  among 
us  no  barrier  excluding  them  from  becoming  electors ;  having 
once  become  electors,  they  could  overleap  the  second  barrier 
by  the  further  acquisition  of  wealth,  but  in  this  respect  the  two 
systems  were  alike.  In  one  other  material  particular  the  ruling 
caste  of  the  northern  aristocracy  is  most  honourably  distinguished 
from  its  parallel  in  the  south ;  there  may  have  been  as  much 
canvassing,  bribery,  corruption,  and  undue  influence  in  Scotland 
as  at  Venice,  but  the  voters,  with  all  the  pride  of  the  Scottish 
character,  were  not  slaves  to  that  pride  of  family,  so  ludicrous  if 
it  were  not  so  melancholy,  which,  while  it  prevented  the  high- 
bom  pauper  from  earning  an  honest  independence,  and  taught 
him  to  look  down  upon  the  genius  of  his  fellow-citizens,  the  most 
wealthy  and  enterprising  merchants  in  the  world,  did  not  prevent 
the  most  ancient  nobility  of  Europe  *  from  seeking  a  discredit- 

*  Of  this  there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  Venetian  nobility  goes  back  to  the 
seventh  century  at  least — probably  to  the  sixth. 


294«  GOVERNMENT  OF  VENICE.  CH.  XXII. 

able  livelihood  by  holding  up  a  prelate's  train,  or  bearing  a  rich 
lord's  sword. 

In  many  respects,  and  among  others  in  their  mingled  pride 
and  meanness,  and  spirit  of  intrigue,  the  Venetian  nobles  con- 
tinued to  the  end  of  the  republic  such  as  the  form  and  the  prac- 
tice of  the  government  had  made  them.  But  the  progress  of 
improvement  had  greatly  mitigated  the  harsher  features  of  thek 
administration,  as  well  as  lessened  the  more  profligate  propen- 
sities of  their  character.  The  possession  of  wealth*  became  a 
title  to  respect  in  all  particulars ;  the  cultivation  of  letters  and 
the  liberal  arts  raised  another  description  of  men  to  consequence. 
Society  gradually  became  somewhat  more  mixed ;  and  the  nobles 
in  the  same  proportion  became  responsible  to  public  opinion. 
They  still  considered  their  own  order  to  be  the  tribunal  before 
which,  whether  as  private  individuals  or  as  acting  in  the  different 
administrative  councils,  their  conduct  was  chiefly  to  be  tried ; 
and  therefore  many  things  were  done  and  many  duties  neglected 
which  a  differently  constituted  state  would  not  have  permitted. 
But  the  perfidious  massacre  of  the  Carraras,  the  offering  rewards 
for  assassination,  the  torture  and  banishment  of  Foscari,  and 
even  the  execution  of  Marino  Falieri,  could  no  more  have 
happened  at  the  end  of  the  18th  century  at  Venice,  than  the 
cruelties  of  Lauderdale  and  the  profligacy  of  Charles  could  have 
been  repeated,  after  having  stained,  and  without  any  risk  to 
their  perpetrators,  the  period  marked  by  Blackstone  as  the  most 
perfect  era  of  the  English  constitution. 


CH.  XXIII.  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS.  295 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS— VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA. 


Terra  Firma — Feudal  Nobility — Municipal  Government  in  their  hands  originally 
— Podestas  —  Factions  —  Montecchi  and  Bonifazii  —  Adelardi  and  Salinguerra  — 
Vivario  and  Vicenza  families — Rise  of  the  Friars — Their  fanatical  preaching 
and  influence — Their  usurpation — John  of  Vicenza — Jordan  of  Padua — Ezzelino 
da  Romano  —  His  prodigious  tyranny  —  Despicable  submission  of  the  People  — 
His  destruction  —  Submission  of  the  Towns  to  others  —  Levity  of  Democratic 
Councils  of  Padua — Corrected  by  the  Aristocracy — Municipal  Governments  — 
Anziani — Gastaldioni  —  Cane  della  Scala  —  John  Galeaz  Visconti  —  Democracy 
of  Verona  and  Vicenza — Submission  of  the  People  to  tyranny — War  of  Parties 
in  Italy — Hired  troops — Condottieri — Military  operations  —  Surrender  of  rights 
by  the  People  to  Chiefs  —  EfiFects  of  Aristocracy,  Faction,  Tyranny,  on  the 
character  of  the  People — Letters  and  the  Arts. 

We  may  now  proceed  to  consider  those  governments  which 
arose  out  of  the  feudal  monarchies.  We  examined  the  scheme 
of  policy  created  in  the  Venetian  islands  in  the  first  place,  be- 
cause it  is  the  only  Italian  commonwealth  which  never  was 
subject  to  either  the  Gothic,  the  Frank,  or  the  Saxon  kingdoms, 
and  which  seems  to  have  arisen  directly  out  of  the  ruins  of  the 
Roman  empire.  But  we  have  seen  that  it  acquired,  though  at 
a  comparatively  late  period,  a  footing  on  the  mainland  by  the 
conquest  of  Padua,  Verona,  Vicenza,  and  Friul.  We  may  there- 
fore now  conveniently  begin  with  considering  the  governments 
of  the  Terra  Firma  before  this  conquest  by  the  ambitious  and 
powerful  city. 

The  barons  of  Terra  Firma  were  distinguished  from  those 
of  the  other  Italian  districts  by  a  ver^  important  peculiarity. 
Their  possessions  extended  so  as  to  come  into  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  the  towns  ;  but  the  country  was  mountainous, 
bold,  and  difficult;  and  hence  their  castles  were  much  more 
independent  of  the  burgher  power  when  that  rose,  as  we  have 
shown  it  did  generally,  in  the  twelfth  century  (Part  ii.  Ch.  xix.). 
Those  nobles,  like  the  others,  enrolled  themselves  among  the 


296  VENETIAN   TERRA  FIRilA.  CH.  XXIII. 

citizens  of  the  neighbouring  towns,  but  not,  as  elsewhere,  in 
order  to  obtain  protection  either  in  their  struggles  with  the 
sovereign,  the  prince,  or  great  feudatory,  or  as  against  the  civic 
power  itself.  On  the  contrary  they  early  conceived  ambitious 
designs  upon  the  independence  of  the  towns,  and  besides  enrolling 
themselves,  they  built  palaces  within  the  walls  and  fortified  them 
so  as  to  make  each  house  a  castle.  In  Ferrara  there  were  not 
fewer  than  thirty-two  such  fortresses  within  the  walls.  At  first 
they  remained  united  amongst  themselves  as  against  the  burghers, 
obtained  possession  of  all  the  civic  oflSces,  kept  all  the  power 
in  their  own  hands,  and  domineered  over  the  citizens.  But,  as 
always  happens  in  aristocratic  governments,  party  spirit  soon 
gaiaed  admission,  and  every  town  was  divided  between  two 
contending  factions. 

There  is  nothing  more  singular  in  the  history  of  the  Italian 
republics  than  their  at  first  violently  opposing  Frederic  Barba- 
rossa  upon  the  substitution  which  he  aimed  at,  of  podestas  for 
consuls,  and  afterwards,  when  they  had  successfully  resisted 
him,  adopting  that  institution  voluntarily,  although  their  repug- 
nance to  it  and  to  giving  up  their  consuls  had  really  been  the 
main  cause  of  the  quarrel,  the  chief  ground  of  the  contention  with 
him.  These  podestas  were  always  foreigners ;  the  nobles  had 
the  choice  of  them  in  the  Terra  Firma  cities  ;  and  neither  party 
could  trust  the  important  functions  of  the  ofl&ce  to  an  adverse 
partisan  connected  with  the  place.  The  podesta  both  com- 
manded the  forces  and  presided  over  the  distribution  of  justice  ; 
and  he  brought  with  him  a  body  of  his  own  followers  to  give 
his  administration  weight,  as  well  as  to  provide  for  his  own 
security.  These  arrangements  were  willingly  submitted  to  by 
the  people,  because  they  found  in  them  the  only  means  of  quell- 
ing the  fury  of  the  aristocratic  factions,  and  securing  the  great 
object  of  a  tolerable  police.  The  choice  of  consuls  had  been 
much  more  in  the  h^nds  of  the'  people  ;  the  podestas  were 
almost  always  named  by  the  select  body,  the  credenza,  or  the 
senate  ;  substantially  by  the  nobles.  But  they  exercised  their 
powers  with  vigour,  and  made  examples  of  all  who  committed 
acts  of  violence,  without  regard  to  their  station.  Indeed  their 
administration  of  justice  was  much  of  a  military  or  dictatorial 
character.     They  were  quite   independent   of  both  the  people 


en.  XXIII.  FACTIOUS  DrVTSIONS.  297 

and  the  nobles ;  whereas  the  consuls  had  always  been  more  or 
less  under  the  influence  of  their  fellow- citizens.  The  podesta 
never  scrupled  to  arrest  a  refractory  noble,  appeal  for  help  to 
the  body  of  the  citizens  as  well  as  to  his  own  followers,  put  to 
death  any  one  committing  treason  against  the  community,  and 
rase  his  fortified  house  or  castle  to  the  ground.  The  people 
willingly  purchased,  by  a  sacrifice  of  their  own  power,  this  relief 
from  the  outrages  of  the  contending  factions.  Sometimes  each 
party  chose  one  podesta,  and  these  two  joined  in  choosing  a  single 
podesta.  At  Verona  the  two  parties  were  the  Montecchi  (who 
were  Ghibellines  or  imperial)  and  Bonifazii,  sometimes  called 
•  Cwpeletti  (who  were  the  papal  or  independent  party),  and  they 
commonly  joined  in  the  choice  of  a  podesta.  The  parties  in 
most  of  the  cities  were  denominated,  as  we  have  seen  (Part  i. 
Ch.  XVIII.),  either  from  some  nickname,  or  from  the  leading- 
family  of  each.  At  Verona  the  two  families  were  the  Montecchi 
and  Bonifazii,  and  their  memory  has  been  preserved  by  our 
Shakspere  under  the  names  of  Montagu  and  Capulet.  The  same 
arrangement  took  place  at  Ferrara  as  at  Verona,  the  Adelardi, 
who  were  Guelfs,  joining  with  the  Salinguerra,  the  Ghibellines, 
in  the  appointment.  At  Vicenza  the  parties  of  the  Vivario  and 
Vicenza  families  commonly  joined  in  naming  a  coTrhmissario,  and 
he  chose  the  podesta ;  but  at  one  time  each  party  chose  its  own 
podesta. 

It  is  needless  to  observe,  however,  that  in  many  instances  the 
violence  and  profligacy  of  the  factions  became  an  overmatch  for 
the  podesta's  authority,  though  backed  by  the  aid  of  the  citizens 
at  large.  In  Ferrara  one  quarrel  of  the*  two  leading  families 
about  the  marriage  of  an  heiress  kept  the  republic  in  a  state  of 
constant  civil  war  for  forty  years,  from  1180  to  1220.  During 
that  period  the  city  was  no  less  than  ten  times  exposed  to  the 
proscriptions,  the  pillage,  and  the  destruction  of  houses  con- 
sequent upon  each  reverse  that  gave  the  victory  to  one  or  other 
of  the  factions. 

In  the  two  other  Guelf  towns,  Vicenza  and  Padua,  a  tempo- 
rary change  took  place  soon  after  this  time,  and  extended  itself 
also  to  Verona,  the  chief  Ghibelline  town  in  the  north-east  of 
Italy.  The  fanatical  preaching  of  the  Franciscan  and  Dominican 
friars,  whose  order  had  recently  been  established,  obtained  them 
extraordinary  influence  with  the  multitude.     They  used  this  to 


298  VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA.  CH.  XXIII. 

inveigh  against  a  luxury  which  had  really  no  existence,  the 
manners  and  habits  of  all  classes  being  of  extreme  simplicity ; 
but  the  ascetic  life  which  the  monks  and  hermits  practised  made 
the  most  ordinary  indulgences  appear  excessive.  They  did  a 
far  better  service  to  humanity  by  opposing  with  their  utmost 
zeal  the  bloodthirsty  and  turbulent  habits  of  the  rival  factions 
and  rival  towns,  and  endeavouring  to  put  down  all  private  war. 
But  their  most  favourite  object  was  of  a  very  dififerent  descrip- 
tion, the  establishment  of  inquisitorial  tribunals,  and  associations 
for  the  extirpation  of  heresy  by  fire  and  sword.  The  zeal  of  the 
crusaders  appears  never  to  have  taken  this  new  direction.  John 
of  Vicenza,  one  of  these  Dominicans,  distinguished  himself- 
chiefly  by  the  more  holy  of  these  works — the  preaching  of  peace. 
He  obtained  so  great  an  influence,  not  only  with  the  people,  who 
had  always  hated  the  wars  of  the  patrician  factions,  but  even 
with  the  nobles  themselves,  that  they  took  the  oaths  of  peace 
which  he  presented ;  and  the  magistrates  of  the  principal 
towns  called  upon  him  to  reform  their  municipal  statutes,  in 
order  to  repress  more  effectually  the  outrages  against  which  he 
had  inveighed.  Padua,  then  the  most  powerful  of  the  common- 
wealths in  the  March  of  Treviso,  Vicenza,  Verona,  Treviso, 
Belluno,  all  submitted  to  his  legislation,  as  did  also  Mantua, 
Brescia,  and  Bologna,  cities  not  in  the  March.  Encouraged  by 
his  success,  he  convoked  a  general  meeting  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  towns,  to  hear  the  blessed  doctrines  of  peace  preached.  It 
was  held  in  the  plain  of  Pasquara,  near  Verona,  and  is  said  to 
have  been  attended  by  above  400,000  persons,  who  flocked  to 
it  under  their  prelates,  nobles,  and  magistrates  from  Bologna  on 
the  south,  to  Acquileia  on  the  north  of  the  Adriatic.  Moved  by 
his  eloquence,  and  by  the  novelty  of  being  thus  addressed  with 
scriptural  texts,  and  vehement  exhortations  by  learned  men,* 

*  The  remains  which  have  been  preserved  to  us  of  the  sennons  that  produced 
such  marvellous  effects  are  mere  strings  of  texts,  accompanied  by  the  most  homely 
remarks  in  no  great  number.  The  language  chiefly  used  was  Latin,  which  the 
people  generally  understood,  though  they  could  not  speak  it.  Frequently  the 
preacher  made  his  commentary  also  in  the  mother  tongue,  then  beginning  to 
acquire  form  and  symmetry.  The  usual  operation  of  a  vehement  manner  must 
have  combined  with  the  as  ordinary  influence  of  a  numerous  crowd  to  produce  the 
effects  which  all  the  authorities  ascribe  to  the  exertions  of  those  preachers,  not 
only  in  leading  multitudes,  but  inducing  men  of  all  ranks  to  obey  their  injunctions, 
making  most  governments  submit  to  their  arbitration,  and  leading  barons  to  quit 
the  world  for  the  hermitage,  and  even  princes  to  seek  the  cloister. 


CH.  XXIII.  RISE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  FRIARS.  299 

the  assembled  thousands  entered  into  the  pacification  which  he 
enjoined,  under  threat  of  the  heaviest  curses ;  and  the  famihes 
of  D'Este  and  Romano,  the  leaders  of  the  most  turbulent  of  the 
factions,  ratified  the  treaty  by  a  marriage  which  he  dictated. 
Whether  it  was  that  the  success  of  this  assembly  filled  the 
preacher  with  an  ambition  of  the  more  ordinary  kind,  or  that  his 
real  views  had  always  partaken  of  the  secular  nature,  and  that 
he  now  found  the  moment  opportune  for  realizing  them,  certain 
it  is  that  he  who  hitherto  had  confined  himself  exclusively  to 
his  holy  ministry,  all  at  once  assumed  the  attitude  of  a  temporal 
chief;  and  after  spreading  abroad  the  fame  of  many  miracles 
which  he  pretended  to  have  wrought,  he  obtained  the  ready 
assent  of  the  municipal  council,  first  of  Vicenza,  and  then  of 
Verona,  to  the  assumption  of  supreme  power,  as  duke  and 
count,  in  their  commonwealths.  The  multitude  in  both  towns 
manifestly  overpowered  the  patricians,  both  hurried  on  by  the 
influence  which  he  had  acquired  over  them,  and  seduced  by  his 
promises  to  curb  the  aristocracy,  and  distribute  the  offices  and 
powers  of  the  community  more  equally.  He  made  many  new 
laws,  which  gave  little  satisfaction ;  he,  however,  checked  the 
barons  by  obtaining  hostages  for  their  pacific  conduct,  and  he 
garrisoned  some  of  their  castles  with  the  public  force.  But  his 
usurpation  was  attended  with  the  most  odious  persecution.  At 
Verona  he  condemned  many  persons  for  heresy,  and  caused 
sixty,  all  members  of  the  first  families,  to  be  publicly  burnt. 
Meanwhile  another  monk,  Jordan,  a  Benedictine,  had  obtained 
nearly  as  great  power,  and  by  similar  means,  at  Padua,  though 
he  never  assumed  the  title  of  sovereign.  Excited  by  his  remon- 
strances, the  Paduans  attacked  Vicenza,  liberated  the  inhabitants 
from  the  tyranny  of  John,  and  after  taking  him  prisoner,  only 
gave  him  up  at  the  Pope's  intercession,  on  his  exiling  himself, 
and  taking  refuge  in  his  original  obscurity  at  Bologna, 

The  flight  of  the  monkish  ruler  restored  the  domination  of 
the  nobles  at  Vicenza,  and  brought  back  a  still  worse  curse  than 
Friar  John  had  proved  to  Verona.  Some  years  before,  in  1225, 
the  senate  of  that  commonwealth,  a  body  of  eighty  nobles,  annually 
chosen  by  their  own  body,  had  been  returned  entirely  under  the 
influence  of  the  Montecchi  party,  and  the  Guelfs  had  been  driven 
away.     Eccelino,  or  Ezzelino,  da  Romano,  the  Ghibelline  leader. 


300  VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA.       '  CH.  XXIII. 

prevailed  on  the  senate  to  create  for  him  the  office  of  captain  of 
the  people,  and  under  that  title  to  appoint  him  podesta.  At  first 
he  made  no  change  in  their  institutions,  but  in  a  few  years  he  was 
allowed  to  introduce  an  imperial  garrison  into  the  to\vii  as  the 
most  effectual  means,  it  was  represented,  of  maintaining  the  ruling 
faction  and  "  keeping  out"  the  Guelfa  He  soon  obtained  the  most 
absolute  power  in  Verona.  The  other  towns,  though  under  the 
influence  generally  of  some  one  powerful  family,  had  not  as  yet 
•given  themselves  hereditary  princes.  The  government  in  each  of 
them  was  really  possessed  by  a  few  of  the  nobles,  to  whom  the 
others  were  as  submissive  as  they  were  tyrannical  over  the  vassals 
on  their  estates,  and  over  the  common  people  in  the  towns.  In 
those  places  where  a  single  family  possessed  the  chief  influence 
this  abject  submission  was  shown  towards  its  chief  But  in  all 
of  these  republics  the  intrigues  and  contentions  of  parties  were 
uninterrupted,  and  the  councils  of  the  community  were  fluctuat- 
ing and  distracted.  The  Marquis  D'Este  had  been  made  chief 
(rettore)  of  Vicenza ;  but,  without  consulting  him,  the  Vicentines 
and  Paduans  joined  in  an  attack  on  Verona.  Ezzelino,  at  the 
head  of  the  imperial  troops,  took  Vicenza,  and  treated  it  like  a 
town  that  had  been  stormed.  The  Paduans  put  D'Este  at  their 
head,  and  placed  the  government  in  the  hands  of  sixteen  nobles, 
who  proved  cowards  and  traitors,  first  flying  to  their  castles,  and 
then,  on  their  return,  delivering  over  the  town  to  the  Ghibellines. 
Ezzelino  thus  became  sovereign  under  the  Emperor  of  Padua 
and  Vicenza,  and  introduced  an  imperial  guard  into  those  towns 
as  he  had  done  into  Verona.  He  began  by  destroying  the  resi- 
dence of  every  noble  in  the  town  who  had  opposed  him ;  and  one 
half  the  places  or  castles  of  Padua  ai*e  said  to  have  been  rased 
by  him  to  the  ground. 

It  appears  certain  that  Ezzelino  exceeded,  in  the  cruelty  of 
his  ferocious  reign,  all  the  atrocities  of  the  other  tyrants  whose 
history  has  reached  us,  either  in  ancient  or  modem  times.  That 
he  put  none  of  his  victims  secretly  to  death,  if  it  were  true, 
which  there  never  could  be  any  means  of  ascertaining,  would 
only  show  that  his  audacity  and  contempt  of  all  men's  feelings 
kept  pace  with  the  relentlessness  of  his  savage  nature.  Murders 
were  openly  committed  by  his  orders,  sometimes  by  public  ex_ 
ecution,    sometimes   accompanied   with   torture,   sometimes   by 


CH.  XXIII.  TYEANNT  OF  EZZELINO.  301 

walling  up  the  cells  of  his  victims  and  leaving  them  to  perish  of 
hunger,  and  so  near  the  street  that  the  air  was  rent  with  their 
cries.     His  own  nephew  was  among  the  number  whom  he  de- 
stroyed, having  first  starved  to  death  the  young  man's  uncles, 
barons  of  Vado.     His  practice  was  to  imprison,  frequently  to 
kill,  the  relations  and  friends  of  the  parties  on  whom  his  ven- 
geance was  wreaked.     Once  he  put  to  death  the  whole  of  a 
numerous  family  who  had  been  his  most  devoted  adherents,  and 
their  offence  was  that  one  of  them  had  married  a  Guelf.     When- 
Padua  was  rescued  from  his  gripe,  he  revenged  himself  upon  all 
its  inhabitants  who  happened  to  be  in  his  army.     These,  to  the 
number  of  11,000,  were  dispersed  in  small  bodies  and  massacred, 
only  200  having  escaped.     When  at  length  he  was  overthrown, 
his  prisons  were  found  filled  with  many  hundreds  of  victims  of 
both  sexes,  and  many  children  among  them,  whom  the  monster 
ha,d  caused  to  be  blinded  and  otherwise  mutilated.     His  lieu- 
tenants, whether  the  podestas  whom  he  appointed  in  the  towns, 
or  the  officers  whom  he  placed  in  the  castles  of  the  subject 
barons,  were  to  the  full  as  bloody-minded  as  himself,  if  they  had 
less  audacious  courage.     One  of  them  put  a  whole  audience  of 
persons  to  death  for  having  applauded  some  verses  which  he 
supposed  contained  a  dark  allusion   to   the   tyrant.     Nothing 
can   be   more   disgraceful  to   human   nature   than   the   length 
of    time   during   which    this   execrable   fiend   was   suffered   to 
outrage   humanity.     Full   two-and-twenty   years   elapsed    after 
the  capture  of  Padua,  when  he  perfidiously  seized  and  impri- 
soned twenty  of  the  noblest  Paduans,  as  well  as  friar  Jordan, 
the  favourite  of  the  people,  and  began  to  pull  down  the  castles 
of  every  one  who  fled  from  his  cruelty ;  and  during  that  long 
period  nothing  like  an  insurrection  of  the  people,  nor  any  con- 
spiracy of  the  nobles,  can  be  traced  to  have  taken  place.     One 
attempt  only  was  made  to  destroy  him  ;  and  one  to  destroy  a 
creature  of  his  whom  he  had  armed  with  his  delegated  tyranny, 
nature  and  education  having  already  qualified  him  to  represent 
his  master.     A  noble  prisoner,  brought  before  Ygna,  the  podesta 
of  Verona,   rushed   upon   him  and  stabbed  the  wretch  to  the 
heart  before  the  guards  could  cut  his  destroyer  in  pieces.     This 
passage  is  said  to  have  occasioned  the  Italian  proverb,  which 
purports  that  whoever  sets  no  value  on  his  own  life  is  master  of 


90i  VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA,  CH.  XXHL 

the  king's.  It  was  a  crusade  preached  by  the  pope  against  the 
common  scourge  that  finally  raised  a  sufficient  force  to  destroy 
him ;  and  the  singular  courage  and  capacity  of  the  man  made 
the  event  for  some  time  doubtful,  the  first  symptom  of  defection 
from  him  that  he  ever  experienced  having  been  on  the  morning 
of  the  day  he  received  the  wound,  of  which,  being  taken  pri- 
soner, he  refused  to  be  cured,  and  died  fiercely  and  fearlessly  as 
he  had  lived. 

.  All  the  commonwealths  which  Ezzelino  had  enslaved  now 
recovered  their  liberty,  but  only  to  lose  it  some  years  later, 
though  to  less  oppressive  masters.  Verona  made  Martino  della 
Scala  podesta,  and  thus  laid  the  foundation  of  that  principality. 
Vicenza  placed  herself  again  under  the  senate  of  Padua,  which 
appointed  her  podesta,  and  also  their  own.  Padua  retained  her 
constitution  much  longer,  and  it  was  always  more  or  less  popular 
during  the  remaining  part  of  the  thirteenth  and  a  portion  of  the 
fourteenth  century.  The  government  was  indeed  at  different 
times  almost  purely  democratic,  when  the  people  so  far  pre- 
vailed over  the  nobles  as  to  vest  the  whole  administration  in  the 
companies  of  artizans.  At  the  head  of  these  were  popular  tri- 
bunes, called  GoyStaldioni.  The  senate  itself  then  became  a 
popular  body,  for  it  was  composed  of  citizens  to  the  number  of 
one  thousand,  elected  yearly.  The  nobles,  even  those  most 
eminent  for  their  talents,  were  without  discrimination  excluded 
absolutely  from  all  places  of  power  or  trust.  Yet,  with  an  in- 
consistency of  which,  except  in  the  Italian  republics,  there  are 
no  examples,  the  people  had  no  jealousy  of  the  most  powerful 
and  ambitious  family  of  all  the  nobles ;  they  had  recourse  to  the 
Carraras  as  leaders  against  the  rest  of  the  patricians,  and  gave 
them  a  preponderance  which  enabled  them,  early  in  the  four- 
teenth century,  to  possess  themselves  of  the  supreme  direction  of 
affairs.  Nothing  could  exceed  the  levity  and  uncertainty  of  the 
Paduan  councils  as  long  as  this  democratic  influence  prevailed. 
Vicenza  threw  off  their  yoke ;  sought  the  protection  of  Can^ 
deUa  Scala  (the  patron  whom  Dante  has  celebrated  as  affording 
him  refuge  when  banished  from  Florence),  and,  preferring  the 
rule  of  an  absolute  prince  to  the  tyranny  of  their  Paduan  neigh- 
bours, had  vested  in  him  the  uncontrolled  government  of  their 
state,  and  soon  found  him  taking  the  usual  precautions  against 


CH.  XXIII.  PADUAN  DEMOCRACY.  303 

their  fickleness,  by  introducing  a  foreign  garrison,  and  maintain- 
ing body-guards. 

The  Paduan  democracy  fluctuated  between  its  hatred  of  Cane 
della  Scala  and  its  fears  of  the  emperor  Henry  VII.,  then  engaged 
in  an  expedition  to  recover  the  imperial  authority  in  Italy.  When 
they  had  resolved  to  resist  the  emperor  they  immediately  took 
fright,  and  endeavoured  to  obtain  peace.  For  this  they  had  to 
pay  in  the  harshness  of  its  conditions.  They  then  violated  these, 
and  recommenced  the  war.  Against  Delia  Scala  they  raised  the 
largest  army  that  had  in  modem  times  been  seen  in  Italy — 
10,000  horse  and  40,000  foot — ^but  it  remained  inactive,  and 
gained  no  advantage,  when  a  pestilent  disease,  to  which  its  ill- 
chosen  position  subjected  it,  rendered  the  whole  design  abortive. 
It  was  always  remarked  that  when  the  errors,  inconsistencies, 
and  incapacity  of  the  popular  government  had  brought  the  state 
within  a  hair's  breadth  of  destruction,  the  nobles  were  looked 
to  as  the  only  resource,  and  generally  interfered  with  effect. 
Their  party  having  obtained  once  more  the  superiority,  the 
people  turned  their  eyes  towards  the  Carraras,  who, in  1314,  headed 
a  sedition  against  the  ruling  body,  at  the  head  of  which  were 
two  wealthy  men,  self-raised  to  power  from  being  citizens,  yet 
supporting  the  exclusive  or  aristocratic  policy.  The  old  popular 
government  was  thus  restored  by  the  general  assembly  of  the 
inhabitants.  The  administration  of  affairs  was  vested  in  eighteen 
senators  (called  anziani)  ;  these  were  to  be  assisted  by  tribunes 
{gastaldioni),  and  a  foreigner  was  chosen  podesta.  The  affairs 
of  the  commonwealth,  however,  prospered  no  better  than  before  ; 
and  an  attempt  to  regain  Vicenza  was  defeated  with  great  loss. 
Della  Scala  threatened  reprisals,  and  seemed  prepared  to  besiege 
Padua  ;  and  Jacob  Carrara,  whom  he  had  made  prisoner  in  the 
unsuccessful  attack  of  the  Paduans,  having  gained  his  confi- 
dence, is  supposed  to  have  obtained  for  his  country  the  favour- 
able terms  of  the  peace  which  was  made,  and  no  sooner  made 
than  broken  by  the  restless  government  of  Padua.  Can^  then 
attacked  Padua  in  good  earnest,  but  spared  all  the  Carrara 
estates  ;  notwithstanding  which,  and  the  other  manifestations  of 
the  secret  understanding  that  prevailed  between  himself  and 
that  family,  it  continued  as  popular  as  ever,  had  exclusive  pos- 
session of  all  the  places  of  trust ;  and  its  partisans,  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  desperate  state  of  public  affairs,  assembled  the  senate 


304  VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA-  CH.  XXIH 

and  magistrates,  and  easily  carried  a  resolution  abolishing  the 
democratic  constitution  and  restoring  the  government  in  Carrara 
and  his  family.  This  happened  in  1318.  Four  years  after  they 
found  themselves  unable  to  support  their  independence  against 
the  power  and  genius  of  Can^  dell  a  Scala,  who  added  Padua  to 
his  other  principaHties  of  Verona,  Vicenza,  Ferrara,  and  Tre- 
viso,  and  retained  Carrara  as  his  lieutenant  in  Padua.  But  the 
successors  of  Cane  soon  lost  the  power  which  his  great  capacity 
and  good  fortune  had  enabled  him  to  acquire,  and  a  league 
formed  against  them  by  Florence,  Venice,  and  other  republics, 
alarmed  by  the  universal  encroachments  of  the  family,  terminated 
in  their  losing  the  greater  part  of  their  principalities.  At  Padua, 
the  Carraras,  aiding  the  Guelf  party,  regained  their  authority, 
which  they  retained  (with  an  interval  of  two  years,  when  Vis- 
conti  seized  upon  it)  till,  at  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, they  were  conquered,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Venice,  which 
had  obtained  previously  no  other  part  on  the  mainland,  except 
Treviso,  ceded  on  the  peace  dictated  by  the  allies  to  Delia  Scala 
in  1348.* 

John  Galeaz  Visconti  (the  first  Duke  of  Milan)  overthrew 
the  remains  of  the  Delia  Scalas,  and  succeeded  to  the  princi- 
pality both  of  Verona  and  Vicenza  Though  the  league  formed 
against  him  succeeded  in  recovering  Padua,  which  he  had  also 
taken,  he  retained  his  other  possessions  ;  and  it  was  only  during 
the  minority  of  his  sons,  and  the  bloodthirsty  and  feeble  re- 
gency of  his  widow,  that  Verona  was  taken  by  Carrara,  and 
became  subject  to  his  government,  and  that  Vicenza  was  given 
up  to  Venice  as  the  price  of  her  joining  the  regent  against 
Carrara 

The  effects  of  the  democratic  government  at  Padua  in  dis- 
tracting the  councils  of  the  community,  and  supporting  per- 
petual factious  contests,  have  been  already  noted  ;  the  same 
consequences  were  produced  in  the  less  important  common- 
wealths of  Verona  and  Vicenza.  In  all  the  three  states,  too, 
there  was  the  same  disregard  of  liberty  on  the  part  of  the 
people,  the  same  disposition  to  give  themselves  masters,  so  as 
they  might  only  insure  a  triumph  over  some  adverse  party.     At 

*  In  1381,  being  attacked  by  Carrara,  and  unable  to  defend  it,  they  sold  Treviso 
to  Leopold  of  Austria,  from  whom  Carrara  bought  it  soon  after;  and  it  came  to 
Venice  with  the  rest  of  Carrara's  possessions  in  1406. 


CH.  XXIII.  POPUIiAR  SUBMISSION  TO  TYRANTS.  305 

Vicenza  the  domination,  first  of  the  Scalas,  then  of  the  Viscontis, 
was  welcomed  as  the  means  of  avoiding  a  union  with  Padua 
under  the  mild  rule  of  the  Carraras,  both  from  the  natural 
antipathy  to  the  Paduans  and  from  the  Ghibelline  hatred  of 
the  Guelfs.  When  the  Viscontis  had,  by  the  unexpected  re- 
storation of  Carrara  at  Padua,  for  a  short  time  been  overthrown 
at  Verona  also,  and  the  burghers  would  have  re-established  the 
republican  government,  the  populace  insisted  on  taking  back 
the  representative  of  the  Scala  family,  a  child  of  six  years  old, 
and  restoring  its  absolute  sovereignty,  without  any  condition  or 
limitation.  Francis  Carrara  himself  was  rescued  at  Padua  with- 
out the  least  attempt  at  reviving  the  popular  government,  though 
circumstances  gave  the  citizens  the  power  of  making  whatever 
terms  they  chose.  So  when  his  father  abdicated  three  years 
before,  the  forms  of  the  old  popular  government  were  gone 
through,  and  the  people  stood  by  as  passive  spectators  of  a 
show.  They  were  assembled  in  the  old  hall,  where  the  former 
meetings  had  been  held  before  the  beginning  of  the  century  ; 
four  senators,  a  gonfaloniere,  and  a  mayor  (syndaco)  were  ap- 
pointed :  into  their  hands  the  sovereignty  was  resigned,  and 
they  transferred  it  to  the  prince's  son,  without  a  moment's  de- 
liberation, the  people  taking  no  more  part  than  if  there  never 
had  been  a  commonwealth  in  Padua. 

It  is  generally  said  that  such  was  the  effect  of  a  tyrannical 
government,  at  least  of  an  absolute  monarchy,  which  had  for 
many  years  been  founded  upon  the  ruins  of  the  republican  or 
aristocratic  constitution.  But  this  will  not  account  for  the  entire 
disregard  of  popular  rights,  and  the  proneness  to  choose  a  single 
master,  which,  long  before  the  downfall  of  the  Viscontis  at 
Verona,  the  abdication  of  the  elder  Carrara  at  Padua,  and 
the  submission  to  the  Scalas  at  Vicenza,  had  marked  the  con- 
duct of  those  republics.  Seventy  years  before  the  abdication, 
and  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  before  the  downfall,  the 
same  indications  had  appeared  on  the  part  of  the  people,  and 
the  same  conduct  had  been  held  by  them.  The  misgovemment 
of  the  nobles,  the  maladministration  of  the  popular  bodies,  above 
all  the  contests  of  the  factions,  were  the  real  causes  of  the  utter 
indifference  with  which  the  people  had  come  to  regard  the 
changes  in  the  dynasty,  or  rather  of  the  inclination  which  they 
showed  to  have  rulers  who  should  give  them  some  chance  of 

PART  II.  X 


306  VENETIAN  TERRA  FIRMA.  CH.  XXIIL 

escaping  from  the  miseries  they  had  so  long  and  so  largely  en- 
dured. No  one  can  suppose  that,  with  their  active  and  intelli- 
gent nature,  the  Italians  had  ceased  to  take  an  interest  in  the 
management  of  public  affairs.  Even  if  the  habits  had  not  been 
formed,  of  mingling  with  every  movement  of  the  state  as  it 
were  a  private  and  individual  concern,  they  were  very  sure  to 
have  interested  themselves  in  whatever  was  passing,  but  much 
more  when,  for  a  long  com-se  of  years,  they  had  been  constantly 
appealed  to,  sometimes  for  their  active  co-operation,  always  for 
their  countenance  and  acclamation,  by  whatever  power  was  ex- 
erting itself  in  each  community.  But  then  this  state  of  things 
had  been  attended  with  most  serious  consequences  to  every 
member  of  society,  not  even  excepting  the  humbler  classes,  over 
whose  heads,  in  all  other  modern  states,  the  storms  of  civil  discord 
are  wont  to  sweep  innocuous. 

For  the  conflict  of  parties  in  an  Italian  commonwealth,  and  of 
different  towns  or  commonwealths  with  one  another,  was  not 
carried  on  by  one  class  only  of  the  community,  but  engaged 
every  description  of  the  people.  When  the  great  bell  tolled  to 
intimate  either  that  there  was  a  revolt,  and  the  magistrates  must 
be  supported,  or  that  there  was  an  invasion,  and  the  citizens 
must  defend  their  country,  all  were  bound  to  join  the  standard 
of  their  quarter;  no  delay  was  allowed,  nor  was  any  excuse 
accepted.  A  candle  was  sometimes  lit  under  the  gate,  and 
before  it  burnt  into  the  socket  the  citizens  must  be  armed  and 
in  the  field,  and  before  the  toUing  of  the  bell  had  ceased. 

The  only  troops,  however,  on  whom  reliance  was  placed  were 
the  heavy-armed  cavalry ;  and  the  practice  had  become  universal 
at  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century  to  have  these  com- 
posed wholly  of  foreigners.  Before  the  end  of  the  century  it 
had  been  found  that  an  ample  supply  of  such  hired  troops 
might  be  obtained  in  Italy ;  and,  accordingly,  there  were  cap- 
tains everywhere,  who  made  it  their  calling  to  raise  and  train 
bands  whom  they  hired  out  indiscriminately  to  all  states  and  all 
factions.  These  condottieri  also  introduced  another  practice : 
the  campaigns  they  carried  on  were  marked  with  little  blood- 
shed for  the  soldier,  but,  in  compensation  for  this,  the  citizens 
and  the  peasantry  bore  the  brunt  of  the  war,  and  their  indis- 
criminate pillage,  as  it  was  the  great  aim  of  the  military  move- 
ment, so  it  was  the  unfailing  consequence  of  its  result 


CH.  XXIII.  EFFECTS  OF  PARTY  CONTESTS.  307 

The  economy  of  every  state  was  arranged  with  a  view  to  the 
operations  of  this  predatory  warfare.  The  country  was  not 
studded  with  houses,  or  barns,  or  buildings  of  any  kind  ;  all  the 
peasants  lived  in  villages,  walled  and  fortified,  and  protected  by 
the  castle  of  the  baron  or  his  lieutenant.  On  the  first  alarm,  all 
the  cattle,  and  stores  and  implements,  and  moveable  property  of 
every  description,  were  removed  within  the  shelter  of  the  castle. 
To  overpower  the  whole  country,  scores  of  such  places  must  be 
taken.  There  were  in  the  Florentine  territory  three  or  four 
hundred  such  fortified  villages  or  single  castles.  Hence  the  in- 
vading army  much  more  frequently  rested  satisfied  with  com- 
mitting as  much  havoc  as  it  could  in  the  deserted  country,  and 
taking  as  many  of  the  castles  as  it  could  overpower  by  a  sudden 
and  unexpected  movement.  The  instant  that  the  place  sur- 
rendered, every  enormity  was  practised,  as  a  matter  of  right 
and  of  course,  upon  the  persons  of  the  wretched  inhabitants  to 
whom  it  had  afforded  a  shelter,  and  upon  their  property,  which 
was  given  up  to  indiscriminate  and  unrestrained  pillage. 

It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  people  grew  tired  of  con- 
tests which  the  nobility  thus  carried  on  for  its  own  benefit,  and 
at  their  cost.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  remedy  was  a  most 
ineffectual  one  to  which  they  had  recourse,  that  of  giving  up 
the  government  to  the  arbitrary  disposal  of  a  single  chief ;  and 
there  were  as  many  wars  and  as  much  suffering  under  the  petty 
tyrants,  as  under  either  the  aristocracy  or  the  democratic  rulers 
whom  they  superseded. 

Nor  must  we  omit  to  mark  the  benefits  which  resulted  from 
popular  constitutions,  with  all  their  serious  evils,  and  the  mis- 
chiefs which  accompanied  the  establishment  of  absolute  princes. 
We  have  seen  how  ill  the  affairs  of  Padua  were  administered 
by  the  democratic  government.  Yet  during  the  usurpation  and 
tyranny  of  Ezzehno  the  whole  industry  and  commerce  of  the 
state  was,  as  it  were,  suspended  ;  and  the  half  century  which 
followed  his  downfall,  though  distinguished  by  constant  errors 
and  mismanagement  of  the  public  concerns,  so  that  neighbour- 
ing powers  could  hardly  tell  in  what  the  Paduan  government 
consisted,  was  yet  still  more  marked  by  the  great  and  general 
progression  of  the  people  in  every  branch  of  industry,  and  in 
the  acquisition  of  all  kinds  of  wealth.  The  erection  of  a  court 
in  every  city,  with  all  it^  attendants  of  oppression,  flattery,  false- 

x2 


308  VENETIAN  TERRA  ITRMA.  CH.  XXIII. 

hood,  and  subserviency,  would  have  been  a  high  price  to  pay 
for  even  the  precious  benefit  of  freedom  from  factious  conten- 
tion and  intrigue ;  but  these  were  not  extirpated,  they  only 
changed  their  course  and  their  complexion.  We  have  already 
had  occasion  to  explain  the  evils  of  petty  principalities  (Part  I., 
Chapter  xvill.).  It  is  impossible  to  rank  among  these  any  pe- 
culiar tendency  to  produce  by  far  the  worst  vices  which  stain  the 
character  of  Italian  society  in  the  middle  ages,  and  especially 
in  the  fourteenth  century — treachery  and  cruelty,  the  utter  dis- 
regard of  good  faith,  and  of  human  life  and  suffering,  which 
mark  the  conduct  of  all  the  wars  and  all  the  factious  move- 
ments of  the  times.  The  hardness  of  heart  produced  by  uncon- 
trolled power,  the  corruption  engendered  by  the  unalterable 
smiles  of  fawning  dependents,  the  callousness  to  all  sense  of 
shame  induced  by  party  connexion  and  party  hostility,  are 
quite  sufficient  to  explain  the  worst  practices  of  the  period,  and 
they  belong  to  the  aristocratic  fully  as  much  as  to  the  princely 
times.  Assassination  itself,  the  most  atrocious  feature  in  the 
aspect  of  the  age,  can  never  be  a  more  natural  product  of  any 
soil  than  of  that  in  which  slavish  obedience  to  a  master  always 
in  sight  affords  boundless  supply  of  ready  tools,  and  a  selfishness 
fostered  from  the  cradle  makes  every  rival  be  regarded  not 
merely  as  an  enemy,  but  a  wrongdoer. 

The  constant  agitation,  however,  in  which  these  states  were 
kept  by  their  factions,  their  wars,  and  their  rivalry  with  each 
other,  both  during  the  existence  of  their  popxilar  constitutions, 
and  especially  during  the  period  which  immediately  succeeded 
under  their  first  princes,  had  the  effect  of  drawing  forth  genius, 
and  promoting  acquirements  of  every  kind.  The  fourteenth 
century  was  distinguished  from  all  that  had  preceded  since  the 
Augustan  age,  by  its  able  statesmen  and  commanders,  its  culti- 
vation of  the  fine  arts,  and  the  great  works  of  architecture 
which  it  left,  and  which  continue  still  the  admiration  of  man- 
kind. A  more  melancholy  proof  could  hardly  be  given  of  the 
degree  to  which  genius  and  activity  may  be  perverted  to  useless, 
or  even  mischievous  purposes,  and  of  the  possible  disconnexion 
between  the  successful  pursuit  of  the  arts  or  of  letters  and  the 
happiness  of  mankind.  Succeeding  ages  have  profited  incalculably 
by  the  genius,  the  learning,  and  the  taste  which  were  awakened 
in  those  days ;  but  the  bulk  of  the  people  have  seldom  been 


CH.  XXIII.  ARTS  AND  LETTERS.  309 

more  miserable  than  tte  contemporaries  of  Dante  and  Petrarch, 
Giotto  and  Cimabue  ;  while  the  great  capacity  of  the  Viscontis 
and  the  Scalas  was  the  curse  of  their  own  age,  and  only  benefited 
posterity  by  the  patronage  which  men  of  letters  obtained  from 
their  vanity,  or  from  their  policy  of  amusing  the  people  whom 
they  enslaved. 


310  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  CH.  XXIV. 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA. 


Early  History — Pisan  Alliances  and  Conquests — Constitution  of  1096 — Aristocracy 
— Parties  of  the  Nobles  — Podesta — Turbulence  of  the  Factions — Constant  Revo- 
lutions—Companies of  Arts  — Credenza — Oligarchy  established — Abate — Capi- 
tano  del  Popolo — W.  Boccanegro's  Usurpation — Genoese  Fickleness  and  Factions 
—  Party  movements  and  Civil  conflicts— Viscontis  called  in — Perpetual  Revolu- 
tions— New  Nobility ;  their  Power ;  their  Factions — Conflict  with  the  old — 
Revolutions — French  Conquests — Andrew  Uoria — Spanish  Conquest — Doria's 
noble  Conduct  and  Reforms — Final  Aristocratic  Constitution — Attempts  to  extin- 
guish Party — Alberghi — New  Factions— Councils — Doge — Syndics — Inquisitors 
— Judicial  Administration — Galling  Yoke  of  the  Aristocracy — FoUy  of  the  new 
Nobles  and  Plebeians — Oligarchical  periods — Comparison  of  Genoese  and  Vene- 
tian Governments — Oligarchy  of  Genoese  settlements. 

Although  the  Genoese  were  not,  like  the  Venetians,  entirely- 
separated  from  the  Gothic,  Lombard,  and  French  monarchies, 
they  were  nevertheless  much  less  connected  with,  and  dependent 
upon,  those  conquerors  than  any  other  inland  people  in  the  north 
of  Italy.  This  exemption  they  owed  partly  to  their  situation, 
which  was  protected  by  the  Apennines  towards  the  land,  and  by 
the  sea  on  the  other  side ;  but  they  owed  it  in  great  part  also  to 
their  poverty.  Until  the  ninth  century,  when  they  had  made 
considerable  progress  in  commerce,  they  displayed  little  to  invite 
a  conqueror ;  their  land  and  their  waters  were  equally  unpro- 
ductive ;  and  their  magnificent  harbour  was  really  the  only 
advantage  which  they  could  be  said  to  derive  from  nature.  Hence 
when  the  Lombards  took  possession  of  Genoa,  they  did  not  use 
much  pains  to  maintain  a  strict  dominion  over  it ;  and  though  it 
was  formed  into  a  county  by  Charlemagne,  and  conferred  by 
Pepin  upon  his  kinsman  Ademar's  family,  who  thus  held  it  for 
about  a  century,  it  asserted  its  independence  upon  the  fall  of  the 
Carlovingian  monarchy,  deposed  the  counts,  and  formed  a  repub- 
lican government,  upon  the  model  which  was  followed  by  most 
of  the  Italian  commonwealths  in  the  dark  ages.  About  the 
middle  of  the  tenth  century  it  had  been  taken  and  pillaged  by 


CH.  XXIV.  EARLY  GENOESE  CONSTITUTION.  311 

the  Saracens  ;  but  had  soon  expelled  them,  and  taken  reveno-e, 
by  joining  with  Pisa  in  an  attack  upon  their  colony  of  Sardinia, 
the  sovereignty  of  which  was  given  to  the  Pisans  by  the  terms 
of  their  treaty  of  offensive  alliance,  the  Genoese  reserving  the 
whole  of  the  booty  resulting  from  the  combined  operations. 
The  possession  of  the  island,  however,  was  subsequently  a  bone 
of  contention  between  the  two  states,  and  the  Genoese  frequently 
had  a  footing  in  it.  Of  Corsica  they  became  possessed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  eleventh  century,  and  retained  it  till  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth,  when  it  was  given  up  to  France. 

The  constitution  adopted  in  1096  vested  the  supreme  power 
in  a  senate  of  nobles,  or  rather  in  consuls  chosen  by  and  out  of 
the  senate ;  for  the  senate  appears  to  have  been  a  council  of 
these  magistrates,  and,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  rare  mention  of 
it  in  early  Genoese  histories,  a  council  of  no  great  authority. 
The  number  of  the  consuls  varied  from  four  to  six,  and  they 
were  at  first  chosen  for  three  or  four  years;  but  in  1122  the 
office  was  made  annual ;  and  soon  after  they  were  divided  into 
two  classes,  the  one  class  having  only  the  functions  of  supreme 
judges.  When  this  division  took  place,  the  number  of  the  con- 
suls was  increased ;  for  those  who  had  the  political  authority 
continued  to  be  sometimes  four  and  sometimes  six  in  number. 
They  exercised  very  extensive  powers,  having  the  whole  executive 
government  in  their  hands,  unless  when,  upon  important  occasions, 
they  assembled  the  people  in  a  General  Assembly  or  Parliament. 
They  commanded  the  forces,  superintended  the  execution  of  the 
laws,  corresponded  with  foreign  powers,  and  managed  the  ex- 
penditure of  the  revenues,  rendering  an  account  of  their  dis- 
bursements to  the  general  assembly  when  they  quitted  office. 
The  care  of  making  alterations  in  the  laws  devolved  upon  com- 
missioners especially  appointed  for  the  purpose,  and  called  cor- 
rectors {correttori),  twelve  or  fifteen  in  number,  and  lawyers  by 
profession  ;  but  their  office  appears  to  have  consisted  mainly  in 
adopting  and  applying  the  principles  of  the  Roman  law.  Any 
constitutional  changes  were  the  work  of  the  consuls  and  the 
people,  influenced  no  doubt  by  the  lawyers,  who  always  had 
much  weight,  and  always  leant  towards  the  arbitrary  doctrines  of 
the  Roman  imperial  code.  The  judicial  consuls  were  chosen  by 
the  seven  companies  (some  accounts  represent  them  as  six,  some 
as  eight)  into  which  the  commoners  were  divided,  and  each  ad- 


312  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  CH.  XXIV. 

ministered  justice  to  the  body  tliat  appointed  him.  Each  of  the 
six  quarters  of  the  to^vn  chose  likewise  an  officer  called  captain, 
who  was  considered  as  bound  to  protect  the  commons  of  the 
quarter  like  a  tribune  ;  for  the  jealousy  of  the  nobles  began  to 
operate  at  a  very  early  period,  and  not  \vithout  cause. 

From  the  earliest  time,  the  senators,  the  consuls,  and  all  func- 
tionaries of  any  importance,  were  taken  from  the  nobles ;  and 
their  ambition  produced  its  wonted  effects  :  they  formed  parties 
under  the  more  powerful  families,  each  desiring  to  obtain  the 
undivided  power  by  engrossing  all  offices,  and  especially  by  ex- 
clusively holding  the  consulships.  The  earliest  division  of  this 
sort  which  is  recorded  was  that  of  the  avogadi  and  castri  (or 
castelli),  which  went  so  far  that  the  consuls  were  obliged  to  in- 
terfere, and  allow  them  a  time  and  place  for  terminating  their 
differences  by  arms.  When,  however,  the  hostile  meeting  was 
to  have  taken  place,  the  archbishop,  with  the  aid  of  the  magis- 
trates and  the  urgent  entreaties  of  the  people,  prevailed  upon 
the  partisans  to  lay  aside  their  animosity  and  swear  to  keep  the 
peace.  A  government  so  feeble  as  against  the  nobles  and  their 
parties  could  manifestly  not  expect  that  such  a  pacification  would 
long  endure.  Accordingly  the  history  of  Genoa  for  ages  pre- 
sents a  constant  succession  of  violent  scenes,  from  the  outrages 
of  the  noble  families  and  their  adherents  in  their  struggles  for 
power,  and  their  mutual  efforts  to  gratify  their  revenge.  The 
feature  which  all  these  conflicts  present  of  the  successful  party 
not  only  driving  their  adversaries  from  the  country,  but  rasing 
their  houses  to  the  ground,  indicates  that  each  noble  had  fortified 
his  mansion,  and  that  the  civic  nobility,  if  they  had  fewer  re- 
tainers than  the  feudal  barons  in  the  country  districts,  had  as 
many  castles. 

At  the  time  when  the  singular  pacification  was  effected  to 
which  wc  have  referred,  the  republic  had  been  for  about 
fifty  years  continually  engaged  in  wars  with  the  Pisans  and 
the  Barbary  Corsairs.  A  universal  relaxation  had  been  the 
result,  from  the  attention  and  the  exertions  of  the  government 
being  so  constantly  directed  to  the  foreign  service  of  the  state. 
The  magistrates  had  no  longer  any  authority ;  the  multitude 
was  turbulent  and  rebellious  ;  all  police  was  at  an  end  ;  disbanded 
soldiers  in  troops  robbed  upon  every  highway.  The  senate,  as  a 
last  resource,  sent  for  three  hundred  regular  troops  to  perform 


CH.  XXIV,  FACTIONS  AND  TURBULENCE.  313 

the  duties  of  policemen,  and  appointed  three  commissioners  to 
bring  malefactors  to  trial  and  punish  them  summarily.  The 
severe  examples  which  they  made  had  the  effect  of  restoring 
obedience  to  the  laws  ;  but  the  nobles  and  their  adherents  con- 
tinued to  set  all  law  at  defiance  in  their  mutual  contentions. 
About  this  period  the  intolerable  evils  of  such  a  state  of  things 
gave  rise  to  the  substitution  of  a  podesta  for  the  consuls,  he 
being  a  foreigner,  chosen  for  a  year,  and  almost  always  a  man  of 
rank  and  of  some  influence  in  his  own  country ;  he  was  attended 
by  two  lawyers  and  by  tAVO  gentlemen  of  the  degree  of  knights, 
whom  he  brought  with  him.  The  principal  advantage,  however, 
in  Genoa,  as  elsewhere,  which  the  people  derived  from  this 
magistrate,  as  compared  with  the  native  consuls,*  was  his  having 
no  party  or  family  connexion,  and  being  chosen  only  for  a 
year,  and  without  the  possibility  of  acquiring  such  influence 
as  to  make  him,  or  any  one  else,  ever  think  of  extending 
his  power  or  the  tenure  of  his  office.  He  was  not  only  the 
chief  criminal  judge,  but  the  commander  of  the  forces,  A  very 
few  years  only  elapsed  before  parties  of  the  nobles  began  their 
attempts  to  restore  the  consulship,  in  order  that  they  might  have 
an  opportunity  of  obtaining  the  chief  power,  and  overturning 
the  popular  constitution.  Thus  consuls  were  restored  in  1182. 
Then  the  conteading  parties  were  marshalled  under  the  Cortes 
and  Voltas ;  the  former  had  such  influence  in  the  senate  as  to 
choose  three  consuls  of  their  own  house,  and  the  latter  flew  to 
arms.  Both  these  families  fortified  their  houses,  and  carried  on 
war  openly  in  the  streets  of  Genoa ;  nor  could  anything  quell 
the  civil  broils  which  were  thus  excited,  but  the  war  with  Henry 
IV.,  in  which  the  republic  was  soon  after  engaged.  In  the  course 
of  the  next  year  the  office  of  podesta  was  revived. 

It  appears  that  the  Genoese  nobles  early  arranged  themselves 
into  companies  as  the  artisans  did  in  other  towns.  Of  these 
companies  there  were  generally  eight,  each  of  which  chose  one 
councillor  and  a  member  of  the  credenza,  whose  office  continued 
for  a  year.  Its  office  was  to  assist,  and  of  course  to  control,  the 
podesta  in  his  executive  functions,  and  to  superintend  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  state.  This  council  was  the 
only  body  which  possessed  any  real  power ;  the  popular  assembly 

*  When  mention  is  made  of  the  consular  office  being  abolished,  the  political  and 
not  the  judicial  consuls  are  alone  meant.  The  latter  (consoli  dei  placiti)  were 
always  retained. 


314  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  OH  XXIV. 

was  only  convoked  occasionally,  and  never  except  by  the  exe- 
cutive government,  seldom  by  that,  unless  in  some  pressing 
emergency  of  public  affairs ;  but  the  council  was  always  in 
operation.  The  eight  companies  appear  to  have  excluded  all 
the  families  which  had  not  been  originally  enrolled  in  one  or 
other  of  them.  Hence  an  oligarchy  was  in  reality  established, 
and  the  result  took  place  which  we  have  always  observed  in  such 
cases ;  the  excluded  nobles  could  not  brook  the  monopoly  of 
their  brethren  and  peers,  and  were  disposed  to  take  part  with 
the  commoners  in  attacking  them.  Several  attempts  were  made 
without  success  to  destroy  the  oligarchical  system  ;  and  in  1 227 
a  formidable  conspiracy  formed  with  this  design  failed.  The 
select  body  being  of  the  Guelf  party,  the  Ghibellines  aided  their 
brethren,  who  were  the  excluded  part  of  the  aristocracy,  and 
the  civil  war  of  parties  was  complicated  with  the  less  pernicious 
malady  of  foreign  invasion.  But  the  Guelf  and  the  oligarch 
prevailed.  It  must  be  added,  however,  that  the  people  had 
always  an  officer,  called  the  abate,  to  watch  over  their  rights  and 
interests  ;  he  had  a  kind  of  tribunitian  power,  and  was  elected 
by  themselves.  The  origin  of  his  office  was  the  usurpation  of 
Doria  and  Spinola  as  captains  of  liberty  in  1270.  To  gratify 
the  plebeian  party  and  keep  them  quiet,  they  gave  them  this 
functionary.  At  length  the  people  were  induced  to  take  an 
active  part  against  the  oligarchy.  The  excluded  nobles  pre- 
vailed on  them  to  rise,  and  one  of  that  class,  William  Boccanegro, 
who  had  played  the  part  of  a  demagogue  against  his  own  order, 
was,  in  the  heat  of  the  sedition,  chosen  captain  or  podesta  of 
the  people  (capitano  del  popolo),  a  new  office,  and  which  at  a 
later  period  proved  destructive  of  all  liberty  in  other  repubhcs, 
as  we  have  already  seen.  They  gave  him,  however,  a  council  of 
thirty-two  anziani,  or  senators,  four  from  each  company  ;  and  if 
these  were  taken  from  the  company  of  nobles,  and  not  from  the 
commons  in  their  eight  quarters,  the  proceeding  must  be  ad- 
mitted to  have  been  of  a  very  moderate  and  judicious  kind. 
However,  whether  the  council  thus  appointed  was  of  the  select 
body  or  not,  their  proceedings  were  framed  upon  the  plan  of  the 
whole  revolution  which  had  been  effected,  and  were  dictated  by 
its  spirit ;  for  they  immediately  declared  the  captain's  office  to 
be  for  ten  years,  settled  upon  him  a  revenue  of  a  thousand  golden 
florins  (equal  to  twice  as  many  pounds  of  our  money),  gave  him 
a  body  guard,  beside  an  establishment  of  officers,  and  placed  the 


CH,  XXrV.  BOCCANEGRO— FACTIONS.  315 

office  of  annual  podesta  at  his  disposal,  that  functionarj-'s  powers 
being  now,  in  consequence  of  the  captain's  prerogative,  reduced 
to  those  of  chief  civil  and  criminal  judge. 

Boccanegro  soon  began  to  grasp  at  still  larger  power ;  to  ex- 
tend his  salary,  increase  his  guards,  and  govern  without  the  least 
regard  to  his  council.  But  he  also  excluded  the  nobles  from  all 
places  of  trust  and  authority,  and  this  raised  a  conspiracy  against 
him,  in  which  the  people  deserted  their  champion  to  join  with 
their  adversaries.  After  having  been  five  years  in  office  he  was 
driven  from  it,  and  the  old  government  was  restored.  The 
oligarchy  therefore  was  continued  ;  and  among  the  families  who 
had  any  real  power,  four  only  are  to  be  named,  the  Dorias, 
Spinolas,  Grimaldis,  and  Fieschis.  All  the  companies  could 
belong  to  the  council  and  could  choose  their  representative  in 
that  body  ;  but  the  families  who  alternately  governed  the  repub- 
lic were  those  four.  The  two  former,  being  Guelf,  generally 
were  found  combined,  as  were  the  two  latter,  being  Ghibellines. 
But  frequently  one  affected,  and  for  a  season  obtained,  supreme 
power,  sometimes  as  captain  of  the  people,  sometimes  as  consul, 
and  then  the  other  would  join  the  opposite  faction  ;  and  all  on 
both  sides  would  appeal  to  the  people.  On  one  occasion,  1291, 
by  the  consent  of  the  party  who  held  the  office  of  captain,  the 
government  was  changed ;  that  office,  being  made  annual,  was 
declared  only  tenable,  like  that  of  podesta,  by  a  foreigner  ;  and  a 
provision  was  added  that  equal  numbers  of  nobles  and  plebeians 
should  always  be  placed  in  the  other  offices.  The  changes,  and 
factions,  and  civil  dissensions  of  Genoa,  the  turbulence  of  the 
nobles,  and  the  fickleness  of  the  people  during  the  thirteenth 
century  became  proverbial,  and  were  regarded,  even  in  Italy,  as 
a  thing  wholly  without  example. 

But  the  fourteenth  century  opened  with  a  scene  unprecedented 
even  at  Genoa,  and  to  which  we  may  safely  defy  the  whole  his- 
tory of  party  to  produce  a  match  for  its  baseness  and  its  folly, 
much  as  we  have  been  accustomed  to  see  party  movements  con- 
ducted on  similar  principles  within  the  very  narrow  limits 
assigned  to  the  enormities  of  modem  faction.  The  Doria,  or 
Spinola  party,  having  gained  the  mastery  over  the  Grimaldi  and 
Fieschi,  soon  quarrelled  about  the  sole  possession  of  the  prize — 
the  supreme  power.  They  went  to  war,  and  the  Spinola  had 
the  advantage  ;  whereupon  both  the  Grimaldi  and  Fieschi  took 
part  with  the  Doria ;  and  proving  too  strong  for  them,  and  after 


316  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.         CH.  XXIV. 

theii*  united  efforts  had  defeated  and  banished  the  Spinola,  the 
Doria,  too,  retired  and  left  the  field  to  the  other  two.  The 
Doria  and  Spinola  were  thus,  in  consequence  of  their  former  joint 
success,  in  joint  defeat  and  exile — for  in  the  Italian  party  wars, 
defeat,  always  involving  military  overthrow,  implied  the  banish- 
ment of  the  survivors.  Their  common  misfortune  brought  them 
again  together,  and  they  signalized  their  coalition  by  calling  in 
foreign  assistance,  as  did  their  successful  antagonists  ;  the  one 
sending  for  Visconti,  the  other  for  the  King  of  Naples,  to  whom, 
jointly  with  the  Pope,  the  people  were  pleased  to  give  the  lord- 
ship of  the  republic  for  ten  years  ;  and  the  Visconti  and  see  of 
Rome  accordingly  named  them  lieutenant-governors  of  Genoa  as 
soon  as  the  war  was  ended.  This  happened  in  1331  ;  and  whether 
it  be  that  a  thirteen  years'  civil  war,  with  foreign  interference, 
had  wholly  exhausted  the  patience  of  the  people — or  that  the 
Doria  and  Spinola  parties,  when  exercising  the  oflfice  of  joint 
captains,  insisting  to  choose  the  abate,  a  plain  usurpation  upon 
the  Commons,  was  a  degree  of  tyranny  not  to  be  borne — or  that 
a  patrician  faction  inimical  to  the  oligarchy  was,  as  on  the  former 
occasion  of  the  first  captain's  appointment,  at  the  bottom  of  the 
movement — in  1338  a  sedition  was  begun  at  Savona,  where  the 
nobles  were  all  driven  away,  and  two  captains  chosen,  with  a 
council  of  twenty  mariners,  and  this  sedition  spread  immediately 
to  Genoa,  where  the  multitude  chose  Simon  Boccanegro,  first  as 
their  abate  ;  and  when  he  objected  that,  his  family  being  noble, 
he  could  not  legally  hold  the  tribunitian  office,  he  was  by  accla- 
mation created  doge,  with  almost  absolute  power ;  and  by  his 
great  decision  and  firmness,  as  well  as  the  justice  and  moderation 
of  his  government,  he  appeared  to  justify  this  extraordinary 
proceeding. 

But  he  had  removed  all  the  nobles  from  office,  and  that  body 
soon  began  to  plan  his  overthrow.  It  was  not,  however,  till 
134<4  that  they  could  bring  together  a  force  sufficient  to  defeat 
him.  He  at  first  agreed  to  such  a  change  in  the  government  as 
placed  the  whole  power  in  the  hands  of  a  council,  composed  of 
half  nobles  and  half  commons.  But  he  was  then  compelled  to 
resign,  and  he  removed  to  Pisa.  A  doge  who  united  both  patri- 
cians and  plebeians  in  his  favour  was  then  chosen ;  but  the 
Spinolas  took  arms  and  fortified  themselves  in  the  suburbs  and  on 
the  hills,  many  of  the  people  taking  part  with  them.  A  sedition 
against  the  nobles  again  began  at  Savona,  and  again  extended 


CH.  XXTV.  CRIMES  OF  PARTY,  317 

itself  to  the  capital.  The  doge,  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
people,  banished  all  the  senators  of  noble  family,  and  ordered  a 
general  disarming  of  the  patricians  by  a  search  in  all  their  houses. 
Both  parties  now  agreed  that  all  their  differences  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  arbitration  of  Visconti,  then  lord  of  Milan  ;  and 
he  awarded  that  all  the  exiled  nobles,  with  one  or  two  exceptions, 
should  be  recalled. 

Soon  after  this  transaction  the  Genoese  fleet  sustained  a  general 
and  nearly  fatal  defeat  in  Sardinia,  in  the  war  against  the  Pisans 
and  Catalans.  The  courage  of  the  people  was  completely  cut 
down,  and  all  the  attempts  of  the  Florentine  allies  to  make  them 
bear  up  against  the  blow  were  ineffectual.  The  whole  commu- 
nity appeared  utterly  disheartened  ;  and  when  the  senate,  calling 
together  an  assembly  of  the  people,  proposed  to  place  the  repub- 
lic under  the  protection  of  Visconti,  the  measure  was  received 
with  unanimous  and  hearty  assent.  Visconti  readily  accepted 
the  office,  dethroned  the  doge,  and  appointed  a  governor.  The 
senate  next  year  chose  his  nephew  to  succeed  him  ;  and  the 
Viscontis  having  exasperated  the  nobles  by  their  arbitrary  pro- 
ceedings, the  people  joined  in  restoring  the  former  government, 
and  Boccanegro  was  brought  back  as  doge  from  the  exile  in  which 
he  had  lived  for  fifteen  years. 

It  would  answer  no  good  purpose  to  follow  the  dull,  monoto- 
nous course  of  the  Genoese  revolutions  which  generally  ended 
in  giving  power  to  a  foreign  state  ;  and  always  evinced,  both  in 
the  conflicting  factions  of  the  patricians  and  in  the  unsparing 
and  unprincipled  hatred  of  the  people  towards  the  nobles,  an 
utter  disregard  of  all  duty  to  the  country,  and  a  constant  readi- 
ness to  sacrifice  at  one  time  the  liberties  of  the  community,  at 
another  time  its  independent  existence,  for  the  poor  satisfaction 
of  gaining  some  triumph  over  an  adversary,  or  exalting  a  friend 
at  his  expense ;  a  degree  of  baseness  hardly  exceeded  by  those 
wretched  beings  who  in  other  countries  have  been  found  capable 
of  plunging  their  country  into  all  the  horrors  of  war  that  their 
hold  of  place  might  be  made  more  secure,  or  their  spleen  be 
gratified  by  heaping  difficulties  upon  the  heads  of  their  adver- 
saries and  successors.* 

*  One  example,  but  not  a  solitary  example  of  this  worst  enormity  of  faction, 
has  been  more  than  once  referred  to  in  this  work,  namely,  the  Spanish  war  in 
Walpole's  lime. 


318  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  CH.  XXIV. 

Nor  was  the  profligate  game  of  party  played  by  the  old  nobi- 
lity alone.  The  frequent  expulsion  of  these  nobles  from  office, 
sometimes  even  from  the  dominions  of  the  republic,  led  the  way 
to  many  wealthy  famiHes  of  the  commons  rising  into  importance. 
They  filled  offices  of  trust ;  they  acquired  influence  in  the  ma- 
nagement of  public  affairs ;  they  were  regarded  as  noble  fami- 
lies ;  but  they  were  considered  as  a  new  or  inferior  nobihty ; 
and  their  conflicts  with  the  others  were  natural  enough ;  but  also 
they  imitated  these  others  in  soon  raising  conflicts  among  them- 
selves ;  and  the  Adorni  and  Fregosi  families  were  as  much  dis- 
tinguished for  their  contentions  as  the  Dorias  and  the  Grimaldis, 
the  Spinolas  and  the  Fieschis.  In  truth,  the  new  nobles  were 
originally  the  Natural  Aristocracy  ;  but  as  soon  as  they  obtained 
a  preponderance,  they  were  bent  upon  excluding  all  other  classes, 
both  the  old  nobles  and  the  common  people.  Hence  from  the 
time  of  Boccanegro  being  made  doge,  in  the  middle  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  the  old  nobles  were  excluded  from  all  offices  ; 
but  the  plebeians  were  never  chosen.  The  new  nobles  held 
every  place  exclusively,  from  that  of  doge  downwards,  excepting 
during  the  occasional  changes  which  followed  different  attempts 
of  the  old  nobles  to  establish  a  tyranny,  when  a  compromise 
generally  took  place,  and  a  council,  sometimes  of  twelve,  some- 
times of  twenty-four,  was  instituted,  with  the  provision  that  one- 
half  should  be  noble  and  one-half  plebeian — that  is,  nobles  of 
the  new  or  plebeian  houses. 

When  the  supreme  power  was  given  up  to  the  Duke  of  Milan, 
chiefly  with  the  view  of  restraining  the  factions,  the  republican 
constitution  was  retained,  a  treaty  being  made  which  provided 
that  half  the  magistrates  should  be  taken  from  each  order.  In 
1499  the  French  overran  the  duchy  of  Milan,  and  annexed  it  to 
their  crown.  Genoa  was  transferred  with  it  as  a  kind  of 
appanage,  and  under  stipulations  similar  to  those  which  had  been 
made  with  Milan.  The  power  of  the  Grand  Duke  had  been 
effectual  in  keeping  down  the  factions ;  he  had,  generally  speak- 
ing, observed  the  conditions  of  the  treaty,  and  had  held  the 
balance  even  between  the  conflicting  orders.  But  when  a  French 
governor  was  substituted  for  a  Milanese  the  case  was  widely 
different.  All  the  leaning  was  towards  the  nobles,  whose  inso- 
lence broke  out  more  intolerably  than  ever.  Their  contempt  for 
the  new  families  led  to  constant  insults  and  breaches  of  the  peace. 


CH.  XXIV.  REVOLUTIONS — FRENCH  INFLUENCE.  319 

No  redress  was  afiforded  by  the  courts  of  justice,  because  the 
order  of  the  wrongdoers  formed  always  one  half  of  the  mem- 
bers, and  took  part  against  the  injured  party.  The  governor 
leant  in  the  same  direction  The  nobles  were  even  found  to 
caiTy  daggers  with  a  motto  indicating  at  once  their  bitter  feel- 
ing towards  the  other  class,  and  the  use  to  which  the  instrument 
was  destined — {castiga  vilani)  "  chastise  the  plebeians."  This 
state  of  things  became  intolerable;  and  in  1507  a  revolt  was 
the  consequence.  The  body  of  the  people  took  part  with  the 
new  nobles,  and  the  result  was  that  their  terms  were  granted 
— the  chief  of  which  was  that,  as  they  outnumbered  the  old 
nobility  two  to  one,  one-third  only  of  the  magistracies,  in- 
cluding the  places  in  the  council  or  senate,  should  be  filled 
by  the  old  nobility,  and  the  remaining  two-thirds  by  the  other 
orders.  The  new  nobles,  however,  immediately  claimed  the 
whole  of  this  proportion  for  themselves,  excluding  the  real 
commoners  altogether.  Hence  these  now  revolted,  claiming 
their  share  as  against  both  classes  of  nobles.  Although  they 
were  opposed  by  the  new  nobles,  they  completely  defeated 
the  old,  and  drove  them  from  the  country.  The  consequence 
was  their  obtaining  the  right  to  choose  for  themselves  eight 
tribunes  as  guardians  of  their  rights.  The  King  of  France 
(Louis  XII.)  confirmed  all  the  concessions  which  both  the 
new  nobles  and  the  commons  had  thus  extorted  from  his  lieu- 
tenant, but  upon  condition  that  the  fiefs  and  castles  of  the 
Fieschi  family  which  had  been  taken  should  be  restored.  The 
new  nobles  agreed  to  this;  the  commons  strenuously  opposed 
it,  and  further  insisted  upon  measures  being  adopted  for  seizing 
Monaco,  the  fortress  of  the  Grimaldis,  and  which  had  been  by 
them  made  the  shelter  of  pirates  who  infested  those  seas.  The 
popular  leaders,  flattering  themselves  with  the  hope  of  obtaining 
assistance  from  Rome  and  from  the  Emperor,  persuaded  the 
people  to  refuse  all  accommodation  with  Louis,  to  throw  off  his 
authority,  and  to  choose  a  doge.  Left  to  themselves  and  panic- 
struck,  they  were  entirely  overthrown  ;  the  French  king,  beside 
putting  the  doge  and  many  of  the  revolters  to  death,  and  levying 
heavy  contributions  on  the  city,  burnt  the  charters  and  treaties 
containing  its  privileges,  restored  the  former  equal  division 
of  the  magistracy  between  the  two  orders,  and  put  an  end  to 
the  appointment  of  popular  tribunes. 


320  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  CH.  XXIV. 

In  1522  the  Emperor,  Charles  V.,  succeeded  in  surprising  the 
town,  and  it  was  subjected  to  the  most  cruel  and  unsparing  pil- 
lage of  which  even  Spanish  troops  are  capable.  But  five  years 
after,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  loss  which  the  French  had 
sustained  at  the  fatal  battle  of  Pavia,  they  were  enabled,  chiefly 
by  the  skill  and  courage  of  Andrew  Doria,  their  most  famous 
admii-al,  to  regain  possession  of  Genoa.  This  eminent  person, 
how  illustrious  soever  his  name  has  become,  was  in  truth  a  naval 
condottiero.  He  was  a  distinguished  member  of  the  great  Doria 
family,  but  had  early  entered  into  the  service  of  various  foreign 
princes,  and  being  possessed  of  several  galleys,  or  ships  of  war, 
had  latterly  hired  himself  and  them  to  Francis  I.,  who  was  then 
engaged  in  his  memorable  war  with  Charles  V.  The  term  of 
Doria's  service  expired  in  1528  ;  and  they  who  would  find  excuses 
for  his  conduct,  which  he  never  could  himself  even  profess  to 
approve  or  defend,  have  said  that  he  refused  to  renew  his  en- 
gagements because  France  had  broken  faith  with  his  country, 
and  that  he  was  resolved  to  restore  her  free  constitution.  But 
the  fact  is  unquestioned  that  he  had  borne  arms,  if  not  against 
her,  yet  against  the  power  which  had  become  possessed  of  her 
territory ;  and  that  in  this  warfare  he  had  reduced  her  by  a 
blockade,  that  is,  by  endeavouring  to  starve  her  people,  his  fel- 
low-citizens. The  fact  is  equally  unquestioned  that  this  success 
restored  her  to  the  dominion  of  the  very  prince  whose  breach  of 
faith  with  her  is  the  alleged  ground  of  quitting  his  service ;  nor 
did  he,  when  thus  instrumental  in  effecting  the  restoration,  seek 
to  impose  any  terms  upon  those  whom  he  had  made  the  con- 
querors of  his  native  country.  It  might  well  have  been  ex- 
pected, that  the  same  desire  to  restore  her  liberties  which  is 
given  as  the  ground  of  his  proceedings  in  1528,  should  have 
actuated  his  conduct  in  1527.  Again,  it  is  not  denied  that,  when 
he  sent  his  envoy  to  announce  his  withdrawing  from  the  French 
service,  he  not  only  gave  the  breach  of  faith  as  his  ground  of  com- 
plaint, but  the  arrears  of  pay  due  to  himself ;  and  that,  like  a  true 
condottiero,  he  put  the  payment  of  those  arrears  in  the  front  of 
the  conditions  upon  which  he  again  tendered  his  services.  The 
stipulation  of  an  ample  pay  (60,000  florins  a-year)  was  in  like  man- 
ner coupled  with  the  restoration  of  the  Genoese  constitution  in 
his  offer  to  the  emperor,  who  readily  accepted  the  terms ;  and  partly 
by  Doria's  fleet,  partly  by  the  co-operation  of  the  Genoese  them- 


CH.  XXIV.  ANDREW  DORIA.  321 

selves,  the  French  were  expelled  and  the  Spaniards  admitted, 
whose  sacking  of  the  city  he  had,  during  the  whole  course  of  the 
war  while  fighting  against  them,  never  forgiven,  refusing  to 
make  any  Spaniards  prisoners  of  war,  but  sending  all  he  took  to 
the  galleys. 

Here  ends  the  blameable  or  equivocal  part  of  this  great  man's 
conduct.  Nothing  could  be  more  truly  noble  and  disinterested 
than  all  that  followed.  The  constitution,  with  important  amend- 
ments, was,  under  his  auspices,  restored.  He  refused  all  the 
offers  of  the  emperor,  who,  averse  to  popular,  even  to  aristocratic 
government,  urged  him  to  accept  the  principality  into  which  he 
offered  to  erect  Genoa  for  him  ;  and  when  the  office  of  doge  was 
once  more  established,  and  all  voices  joined  in  beseeching  him 
to  accept  it,  he  declined,  recommending  that  it  should  no  longer 
be  conferred  for  life,  but  only  for  two  years.  He  passed  the 
rest  of  his  days,  prolonged  to  an  extreme  old  age,  among  his 
countr3niien,  universally  esteemed  and  beloved,  and,  in  all  the 
emergencies  of  their  affairs,  respectfully  consulted.  His  liberal 
spirit,  notwithstanding  all  his  opportunities  of  amassing  wealth, 
prevented  him  from  leaving  any  considerable  fortune  ;  and  so 
entirely  did  he  hold  himself  to  be  at  the  service  of  the  state,  that 
he  took  the  command  of  its  ^eet  in  one  of  its  wars  at  the  age  of 
eighty-five,  a,nd  was  in  his  ninetieth  year  when  he  finally  re- 
signed the  command  of  the  Spanish  navy.* 

The  constitution  ^  it  was  now  remodelled,  with  some  mate- 
rial changes  made  in  1576,  continued  to  govern  the  Genoese 
commonwealth,  until  it  was  finally  subverted  in  1799  by  the 
French  invasion.  It  was  framed  by  twelve  functionaries,  styled 
Reformers  of  the  Law  {Rifovmatori),  who  had  been  appointed 
to  suggest  amendments  of  the  law,  and  to  effect  a  general  recon- 
cilement of  the  contending  factions  the  year  before,  when  the 
French,  under  Doria,  obtained  possession  of  the  country.  The 
French  government  had  thrown  no  impediment  in  the  way  of 
their  judicial  labours,  and  the  changes  which  they  proposed  in 

*  It  may  be  observed  that  the  reason  he  gave  for  refusing  the  dogeship  was  his 
wish  to  continue  in  the  Spanish  command,  which  he  thought  incompatible  with  that 
high  oflBce;  and  some  may  conceive  that  the  old  condottiero  habit  here  again 
broke  out.  The  cruel  punishment  of  the  Fieschi  conspirators  has  also  been  laid  to 
his  charge ;  but  the  murder  of  his  favourite  nephew  and  heir,  the  intended 
murder  of  himself  by  that  infamous  gang,  and  the  general  habit  of  the  age  as  to 
severe  inflictions  in  such  cases,  must  be  taken  as  a  great  palliative  of  his  giiilt. 
PART  II.  Y 


322  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.         CH.  XXIV. 

the  constitution  upon  its  restoration,  were  adopted  by  the  Spanish 
government  acting  under  Doria's  advice  when  the  French  were 
succeeded  by  the  emperor. 

The  fundamental  provision  by  which  the  factions  were  to  be 
united,  and  their  conflicts  terminated,  consisted  in  abrogating  the 
exclusion  of  the  patrician  or  old  noble  party,  opening  aU  the 
offices  and  honours  in  the  state  to  all  alike,  that  is,  to  all  the 
nobles,  whether  old  of  the  year  1338,  or  new,  and  distributing 
the  whole  body,  without  distinction  of  title,  name,  or  party,  into 
twenty-eigl>t  aXberghi ;  each  family  which  had  six  houses  occu- 
pied by  its  members,  or  adopted  adherents,  being  reckoned  an 
aZbergo.     Among  these  twenty-eight  all  the  others  were  dis- 
tributed, so  as  to  mingle  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines,  patrician  and 
plebeian  nobles,  in  the  same  albergo,  and  to  sink  their  names  in 
those  of  the  family  to  which  they  were  enrolled.     Two  names 
were  wholly  suppressed,  those  of  the  Adomi  and  Fregosi,  whose 
contests  had  so  bitterly  divided  the  republic  for  the  last  hundred 
years.     From  very  early  times  there  had  always  been  a  practice 
among  the  noble  houses  of  adopting  others  into  their  own  circle, 
and  making  them,  as  it  were,  members  of  their  own  famihes. 
The  object  of  this  was  evidently  to  increase  the  number  of  their 
adherents  ;  and  the  resemblance  of  the  system  to  that  of  the 
ancient  clientela  would  at  once  present  itself,  were  it  not  repulsed 
by  the  consideration  that  the  adopted  families  were  of  distinction, 
and,  though  only  of  plebeian  degree,  yet  of  wealth  sufficient  to 
rank  them  with  the  adopting  houses.     The  adopting  family  was 
termed  albergo,  the  inn  ;  and  not  only  gave  protection  to  the 
other,  but  communicated  its  name  and  as  much  of  its  privileges 
as  the  law  permitted.     It  was  upon  this  old  practice  that  the 
Riformatori  now  built  their  strange  plan  of  exterminating  par- 
ties ;  and,  as  well  might  be  expected,  if  it  put  an  end  to  old,  it 
gave  rise,  before  long,  to  new  divisions.     The  old  parties  might 
easily  be  abolished,  because  they  were  marshalled  according  to 
names  and  persons,  the  factions  having  no  distinguishing  prin- 
ciples, and  not  even  pretending  to  adopt  any,  as  their  successors 
have  often  done  in  modem  times  to  conceal  their  selfish  and  per- 
sonal views,  which  formed  the  real  bond  of  their  union.     Con- 
tention, and  even  civil  war  again  broke  out  between  the  old  and 
new  nobles,  while  the  people  murmured  at  being  excluded  from 
all  share  in  the  government ;   and  before  half  a  century  had 


CH.  XXIV.  NEW  AND  FINAL  CONSTITUTION.  323 

elapsed,  the  names  of  the  alberghi  were  abolished,  and  each 
family  resumed  its  own.  The  great  council,  too,  or  the  chief 
senate,  which  in  1528  had  been  formed  of  the  whole  nobles  in 
rotation,  four  hundred  sitting  each  year,  was  now  composed  of 
all  who  had  been  inscribed  in  the  Libro  d'Oro  (or  Golden  Book), 
and  were  twenty-two  years  old.  The  number  of  those  families 
was  about  one  hundred  and  seventy  :  but  the  senate  had  the 
power  of  adding  ten  yearly,  seven  from  the  city,  three  from  the 
country,  provided  the  heads  were  persons  of  a  similar  station  and 
fortune  to  those  of  the  nobles ;  a  power  which,  of  course,  was 
rarely  exercised,  and  then  only  by  elevating  elderly  persons  who 
had  no  children,  and  were  not  likely  permanently  to  increase 
the  number  of  the  ruling  body.  They  also  added  a  number  of 
persons  in  needy  circumstances,  who  became  mere  dependents 
upon  the  wealthier  class. 

To  this  body  belonged  the  choice  of  the  lesser  senate,  or 
council  of  two  hundred,  the  doge,  the  councillors  of  the  signory, 
sometimes  called  also  governors  {rettori),  and  the  'procurators 
of  the  town  {procuratori  di  commune).  The  governors  were 
originally  eight,  and  afterwards  twelve.  The  procurators  were 
equal  in  number,  with  the  addition  of  those  who  had  been 
doges,  being  those  who  had  immediately  before  been  governors. 
All  these  offices  were  held  for  two  years,  except  that  the  doge 
became  procurator  for  life,  if  no  charge  was  proved  against  him 
upon  quitting  his  office.  He  could  not  be  re-elected  doge  for 
ten  years,  nor  could  the  governors  till  after  an  interval  of  five. 
It  thus  happened  that  the  members  of  the  doge's  council  were 
partly  in  office  for  two  years,  partly  for  four,  and  partly  for  life. 
The  Doge's  election  was  complicated,  as  at  Venice,  though  much 
less  so  :  that  of  the  governors  was  by  thirty  electors,  whom  the 
great  council  appointed,  and  who  selected  one  hundred  and 
twenty  names,  from  which  twelve  were  taken  by  lot. 

The  government  was  in  the  hands  of  the  lesser  council,  and 
the  doge's  councU,  sometimes  called  the  Signoria,  though  the 
Signoria,  properly  speaking,  formed  only  a  part  of  it.  The  great 
council  could  alone  levy  new  taxes,  or  make  any  fundamental 
changes  in  the  constitution  ;  but  it  wiis  only  called  together  by 
the  Signoria  on  extraordinary  emergencies,  the  lesser  council 
having  the  power  of  making  peace  and  war,  and  even  of  making 
laws,  provided  they  did  not  alter  the  constitution  of  1576,  and 

y2 


324!  GOVERNMENT  OF  GENOA.  CH.  XXIV 

were  agreed  to  by  two-thirds  of  the  voices.  Inferior  magistrates 
were  also  chosen  by  this  body ;  and  where  the  senate  is  men- 
tioned, we  may  in  general  assume  the  lesser  council  or  lesser 
senate  to  be  meant.  The  Signoria,  or  doge's  council,  possessed 
all  the  other  powers  of  the  executive  government,  conducting 
foreign  affairs,  receiving  ambassadors,  superintending  the  execu- 
tion of  the  laws,  providing  for  the  peace  of  the  country,  and 
managing  all  its  financial,  and  all  its  military  and  naval  con- 
cerns. 

The  power  of  the  doge  was  even  less  than  that  of  his  brother 
at  Venice,  if  less  can  well  be  imagined.  He  had  no  patronage 
at  all,  and  was  watched  by  two  governors,  who  were  obliged  to 
live  with  him  in  his  palace.  He  had,  however,  a  body-guard  ; 
and  before  the  surrender  of  Corsica,  he  wore  a  crown  and  carried 
a  sceptre.  His  representation  was  somewhat  greater  than  that 
of  the  Venetian  phantom  ;  but  he  was  only  addressed  by  the 
somewhat  homely  title  of  "Messire  Doge,"  though  by  a  kind  of 
mockery  he  was  called  "  Most  serene  and  illustrious  Prince." 
Like  the  Doge  at  Venice,  he  presided  in  all  councils,  and  in  all 
had  a  double  or  casting  vote — a  privilege  of  very  little  value  in 
bodies  so  numerous  and  so  constituted.  Eight  days  were  allowed 
after  his  office  expired  for  bringing  any  charges  against  him  ; 
and,  like  all  other  magistrates,  he  was  subject  to  the  inquiry  of 
the  censors  or  syndics.  These  officers  were  appointed  for  four 
years,  and  were  five  in  number :  beside  the  functions  just  men- 
tioned, and  in  which  they  resembled  the  Athenian  censors  [lo- 
gistce),  their  duty  was  to  watch  generally  over  all  violations  of 
the  law,  and  especially  of  the  constitution.  It  was  a  tribute  of 
respect  to  Doria  that  he  alone  was  made  censor  for  life.  There 
were  seven  Inquisitors  of  State,  who'se  duties  were  nearly  the 
same  as  those  of  the  Venetian  inquisitors,  but  who  had  not  the 
same  absolute  power :  they  exercised  a  \'igilant  superintendence, 
even  by  spies  in  families,  but  could  only  act  through  the  comls 
of  justice,  or,  in  extraordinary  cases,  through  the  signory.* 

The  administration  of  criminal  justice  was  committed  to  the 
podesta,  or  foreigner,  as  we  have  seen  :  in  1576  there  was  added 

♦  There  was  a  practice  at  Genoa  of  erecting  a  tablet  in  some  conspicuous  place 
to  record  the  crimes  of  doges.  Two  singular  remains  of  this  are  still  to  be  seen 
in  one  of  the  principal  streets  of  that  city.  The  expressions  employed  to  describe 
these  magistrates  are  sufficiently  plain  and  homely.  One  is  called,  among  many 
other  tenns  of  vituperation,  "  Fur  Magnus,"  and  the  other  "  Latronum  maximus." 


I 


CH.  XXIV.  ARISTOCRATIC  OPPRESSION.  325 

the  criminal  rota  of  foiir  forei^  judges  ;  civil  justice  was  admi- 
nistered also  by  foreigners,  but  of  inferior  rank,  being  doctors 
of  law,  in  general  taken  from  the  Italian  universities.  From  ail 
these  courts  an  appeal  lay  to  the  General  Assembly,  a  body  com- 
posed of  the  signory  and  one  hundred  members  of  the  great 
council. 

The  only  offices  which  were  allowed  to  be  filled  by  the  com- 
moners were  those  of  the  three  secretaries  of  state :  they  were 
lucrative,  could  be  held  for  ten  years,  and  sometimes  were  con- 
tinued further  .  and  were  understood  to  give  those  who  had  held 
them  a  title  to  be  enrolled  among  the  nobles. 

That  we  may  be  able  to  understand  how  galling  to  the  com- 
moners this  exclusion  must  have  proved,  we  have  only  to  reflect, 
first,  on  the  equality  which  the  law  and  the  habits  of  the  country 
seemed  to  encourage  by  all  ranks  alike  taking  part  in  every  kind 
of  mercantile  occupation,  whether  of  manufactures  or  of  foreign 
commerce  ;  next,  on  the  circumstance  that  many  families  of  the 
excluded  class  possessed  ample  wealth,  high  ecclesiastical  pre- 
ferment, even  feudal  property,  and,  in  virtue  of  their  fiefs,  titles 
of  nobility.  The  patricians,  whether  of  the  old  or  new  nobility, 
affected  a  superiority  over  those  distinguished  families  even  more 
intolerable  than  the  mere  possession  of  exclusive  privileges  and 
power  ;  and  the  insolence  and  the  privileges  of  the  poorer  nobles 
created  after  Doria's  revolution  were,  on  account  of  their  po- 
verty, more  hard  to  bear  by  the  respectable  and  wealthy  plebeian 
families,  who  in  all  other  respects  were  so  greatly  their  superiors. 
Then  these  were  not  wise  enough  to  disregard  this  conduct,  or 
to  pursue  their  own  course  without  aping  the  habits  of  those 
who  thus  affected  to  despise  them.  They  could  afford  to  dis- 
play the  same  magnificence  with  the  wealthiest  of  the  patricians  ; 
but  with  that  they  were  not  satisfied.  Many  of  them  must 
needs  appear  always  armed  and  in  military  garb,  attended  with 
bravoes  ready  to  execute  any  unlawful  order,  and  even  to  assas- 
sinate those  who  were  supposed  to  have  given  them  offence. 
Such  were  reckoned  the  distinguishing  marks  of  nobility  in  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  nobles,  however,  kept 
those  imitators  at  a  distance,  and  mortified  them  and  their  fami- 
lies by  a  supercilious  demeanour  to  which  the  folly  of  the  ple- 
beians and  their  want  of  proper  pride  lent  its  only  sting.     Sedi- 


326  GOVEENMENT  OF  GENOA-  CH.  XXIV. 

tions  and  conspiracies  were  the  consequence ;  but  no  success 
attended  them,  and  the  government  remained  aristocratic,  almost 
oligarchical,  as  before.  Strictly  speaking,  the  oligarchy  had  only 
existed  in  the  earliest  periods,  when  the  old  nobles  excluded  the 
new,  and  afterwards  when  the  new  excluded  the  old  from  all 
share  of  direct  power.  In  the  most  rigorous  sense,  of  the  partial 
preference  and  general  disqualification  by  law,  it  perhaps  only 
existed  from  1298  to  1319.  But  if  the  distinguished  plebeian 
families  holding  feudal  titles  be  regarded  as  nobles,  the  oHgarchy 
continued  during  the  remaining  two  centuries  and  a  half  of  the 
repubhc's  existence. 

With  respect  to  the  bulk  of  the  people,  it  may  seem  at  first 
sight  that  the  Venetian  constitution,  as  administered  by  the 
nobles,  gave  them  less  consideration  than  they  enjoyed  in  the 
more  turbulent  republic  of  Genoa,  There  the  constant  factious 
dissensions  rendered  appeals  to  them  frequent ;  while  at  Venice 
the  vigour  of  the  government,  repressing  all  or  almost  all  party, 
confined  the  intrigues  of  the  chiefs  to  the  body  of  the  nobles 
exclusively.  The  people,  however,  appear  to  have  been  in  both 
republics  treated  with  forbearance,  exposed  to  few  vexations  by 
taxes,  and  seldom  made  the  subject  of  direct  oppression.  The 
aristocracy  of  Genoa  was  not  indeed  so  great  a  favourite  with 
them  as  that  of  Venice  :  but  it  was  patiently  and  even  cheerfully 
submitted  to,  though,  in  all  the  more  essential  qualities  of  good 
government,  the  inferiority  of  Genoa  was  sufficiently  remarkable. 
The  rulers  had  no  power  of  checking  the  disorders  constantly 
produced  by  the  factious  nobles ;  the  police  generally  was  very 
defective  ;  the  great  interests  of  the  state  were  repeatedly  sacri- 
ficed to  those  of  the  ruling  class ;  their  contentions,  besides  filling 
the  city  with  slaughter,  paralysed  all  the  efforts  wliich  could  be 
made  by  the  national  force,  distracted  every  negotiation,  and 
delivered  up  the  country  successively  to  Milan,  to  France,  and 
to  Spain.  But  nothing  was  done  to  outrage  the  feelings  of  the 
common  people ;  and  all  experience  shows  that  they  regard 
insult  far  more  than  injury,  nay,  that  they  have  more  frequently 
risen  against  their  rulers  because  of  some  act  which  was  calcu- 
lated to  excite  indignation  in  bystanders,  and  in  which  them- 
selves were  but  remotely  concerned,  than  because  of  an  act,  or 
even  any  course  of  misgovemment,  by  which  theii*  most  important 


Cfl.  XXIV.  PROVINCIAL  OLIGARCHY.  327 

interests  were  sacrificed.  Thus  it  will  always  be,  until  they  have 
learnt  well  their  duties  and  their  rights,  and  can  distinguish 
between  things  that  only  offend  and  things  that  seriously  hurt 
them. 

The  aristocratic  government  of  Genoa  extended  to  her  foreign 
possessions  ;  and  however  much  the  nobles  at  home  were  resolved 
to  preserve  equality  of  privileges  among  themselves,  in  some  of 
those  settlements  an  oligarchy  was  completely  established.  The 
great'  island  of  Ohio  was  entirely  governed  by  nine  families,  or 
rather  branches,  of  the  Justinianis,  who  excluded  all  others  from 
a  share  in  the  administration  from  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth 
century. 


328  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS.  CH.  XXV. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS — ^MILAN. 


Consols — Podestas—Credenza— Patricians — Plebeians — Struggles  of  the  Orders — 
Cavalry  —  Condottieri  —  Foreign  Captain-General  —  Financial  Dictatorship — 
Companies  ;  Credenzas  ;  Molta  —  Councils  —  Defects  of  History  in  Political 
Matters — Signor  del  Popolo — Martino  della  Torre  —  Visconti  completes  his 
Usurpation — Unprincipled  Conduct  of  both  Patricians  and  Plebeians— Unfitness 
of  the  Lombards  for  Self-Government — Conflict  of  Factions  —  Succession  of 
Revolutions — Visconti  Family — Vain  Attempt  to  erect  Republic — Francis  Sforza 
— His  Victories,  and  elevation  by  the  Mob — Fickleness  and  baseness  of  the 
People  at  Milan  and  Placentia — Charles  V.  obtains  the  Sovereignty  after  the 
Sforzas. 

The  most  important  republic  founded  on  the  mainland  of  Italy 
was  that  of  Milan ;  and  it  had  taken  the  lead,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  the  struggle  which  lasted  for  so  many  years  with  the  em- 
peror, having  been  the  chief  town  of  the  great  league.  When 
the  peace  of  Constance  established  the  independence  of  the 
towns,  although  the  principal  point  in  dispute  had  been  the  re- 
fusal to  give  up  their  consuls,  and  be  ruled  by  podestas  of  the 
emperor's  nomination,  the  Milanese,  Hke  most  of  the  others, 
were  satisfied  to  have  podestas ;  and  Frederick  allowed  them  to 
choose  their  own.  The  war  of  the  league  had  kept  down  the 
hostile  spirit  of  the  patricians  and  plebeians :  but  the  mutual 
animosity  of  the  two  bodies  revived  with  the  peace  ;  and  it  is 
probable  that  the  latter  were  willing  to  have  the  chief  military 
and  judicial  power,  an  authority  almost  of  a  dictatorial  nature  ; 
intrusted  to  one  who  could  not  belong  to  the  party  of  the  nobles ; 
for,  though  a  noble  by  rank,  he  was  always  a  foreigner,  whereas 
the  consuls  were  Milanese.  He  was  only  chosen,  like  the  con- 
suls, for  a  year.  These  consuls,  originally  only  two  in  number, 
were  now  twelve,  and  had  no  longer  any  military  command  or 
judicial  authority,  except  that  some  of  them  acted  as  justices  of 
the  peace.  They  formed  the  executive  council  or  credenza,  and 
had  the  patronage  of  all  offices  and  the  direction  of  the  finances, 
being  classed  in  bodies  as  consuls  of  justice  and  of  finance.     Al- 


CH.  XXV.  CONTESTS  WITH  THE  FEUDAL  NOBLES.  829 

though  the  nobles  and  plebeians  always  chose  them  from  among 
the  nobles,  these  were  anxious  to  avoid  the  party  election,  and 
insisted  on  the  consuls  choosing  their  successors,  which  would 
have  established  a  regular  oligarchy.  But  the  people  would 
not  agree  to  this,  and  obtained  a  law  which  gave  the  consular 
election  to  a  body  of  one  hundred  of  the  trades  or  artisans  chosen 
at  the  general  council  or  assembly  of  eight  hundred,  but  with 
the  condition  that  nobles  only  should  be  eligible.  It,  however, 
frequently  happened  that  the  consuls  (or  credenza)  of  one  year 
were  allowed  to  name  their  successors  without  any  election.  At 
the  head  of  this  aristocratic  republic  was  the  archbishop,  repre- 
senting the  emperor;  but  only  nominally  at  its  head.  The 
coinage  was  under  his  authority,  and  justice  was  administered  in 
his  name ;  but  he  in  no  way  interfered  Avith  the  podesta,  who 
alone  exercised  judicial  functions. 

For  many  years  the  constant  struggle  carried  on  between  the 
two  orders  related  to  the  appointment  of  the  various  officers  in 
the  state.  Sometimes  matters  came  to  an  open  rupture,  and  in 
1221,  when  the  nobles  were  overpowered  and  driven  from  the 
town,  they  fortified  themselves  in  their  castles,  and  being  pur- 
sued thither,  many  were  besieged,  and  their  buildings  razed  to 
the  ground.  A  general  submission  was  the  consequence.  But 
again  the  nobles  appear  to  have  gotten  the  upper  hand,  and  to 
have  had  exclusive  possession  of  all  places,  civil,  military,  and 
ecclesiastical.  A  new  war  agarust  them  was  the  result ;  and  by 
the  peace  of  Ambrogio  it  was  provided  that  all  offices,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  should  be  divided  between  the  nobles  and 
the  commons.  It  is  probable  that  no  distinction  was  ever  made 
between  the  feudal  nobility  and  those  who  had  been  raised  to 
distinction  in  the  towns,  and  had  no  strongholds  in  the  adjoining 
districts,  but  had  acquired  wealth  and  importance  from  com- 
merce. As  always  happens  in  such  cases,  they  were  sure  to 
take  part  with  the  remains  of  the  ancient  nobility  in  any  contest 
with  the  commonalty.  Whensoever  conflicts  took  place  beyond 
the  precincts  of  the  town,  the  nobles  being  generally  mounted 
as  well  as  their  vassals,  in  an  age  when  the  cavalry  decided  the 
fate  of  every  battle,  they  almost  always  had  the  advantage  ;  but 
in  the  towns,  the  people  could  always  defeat  them  by  barricading 
the  streets,  and  by  attacking  from  the  houses. 


330  GOVERNMENT  OF  MILAN.  CH.  XXV. 

About  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century,  however,  a  great 
change  took  place  in  the  mode  of  conducting  hostilities  ;  and  this 
change  was  productive  of  very  important  consequences  to  the 
parties  which  divided  Milan,  as  well  as  those  of  all  the  other 
commonwealths.  A  class  of  men,  as  we  have  seen  (Part  II., 
Chap.  XXIV.),  had  arisen,  formed  by  the  perpetual  wars  every- 
where waged ;  they  devoted  themselves  to  military  pfursuits,  and 
were  banded  together  under  captains  who  made  a  profession  of 
hiring  out  their  services  indiscriminately  to  all  who  would  pay 
them.  In  the  rare  case  of  peace,  or  of  any  other  event  which 
threw  them  out  of  employment,  the  chiefs  were  not  perhaps 
always  captains  of  banditti ;  but  their  followers  were  universally 
of  that  description,  and  the  numberless  robbers  who  haunted  aU 
the  forests  of  Germany  and  Italy  furnished  the  greater  part  of 
the  troops  serving  under  those  hirehngs  or  condottieri.  The 
towns  which  had  hitherto  been  unable  to  send  any  available 
forces,  that  is,  any  heavy  cavalry,  into  the  field  without  the  aid 
of  their  nobles,  could  now  hire  troops  to  carry  on  their  wars 
with  each  other ;  and  they  sometimes  engaged  a  neighbouring 
prince,  as  well  as  a  mere  condottiero,  to  serve  them  in  this  capa- 
city. Indeed  the  chances  were  that  the  prince  had  originally 
raised  himself  to  power  by  following  that  profession.  The  Mi- 
lanese, when  carrying  on  war  with  Pa  via  in  1253,  made  a  treaty 
with  Lancia,  marquess  of  Montferrat,  by  which  he  was  to  be 
their  captain-general  and  podesta  for  three  years ;  and  so  much 
more  did  they  regard  their  quarrel  with  Pavia  than  the  party  to 
which  they  belonged,  that  they  thus  gave  the  chief  power  in 
their  commonwealth  to  a  Ghibelline,  though  the  commoners  of 
Milan  were  of  the  Guelf  party.  He  was  allowed  to  act  by  a 
deputy  in  administering  justice,  residing  himself  at  Montferrat, 
and  commanding  the  forces.  The  nobles,  who  belonged  to  the 
Ghibelline  party,  could  not  fail  to  derive  much  influence  from 
this  singular  arrangement  About  the  same  time  their  finances 
having  become  so  deranged  that  they  were  compelled  to  suspend 
the  payment  of  the  public  creditor,  only  liquidating  their  debts 
by  instalments  in  eight  years,  to  provide  the  sums  required  a 
singular  expedient  was  resorted  to.  A  Bolognese,  called  Gozza- 
dini,  was  appointed  financial  dictator,  being  vested  for  four  years 
>nth  the  power  of  le\^ing  whatever  taxes  he  deemed  necessary, 


CH.  XXV.  POPULAR  PARTIES.  331 

and  in  whatever  manner.  In  order  to  extend  his  authority  fur- 
ther, he  was  made  podesta  during  the  last  year  of  his  office.* 
The  oppression  of  his  schemes  raised  a  revolt,  in  which  he  was 
assassinated  by  the  mob  ;  a  sufficient  proof  that  his  imposts  were 
of  a  kind  to  spare  the  upper  classes.  The  greater  part  of  them 
were  however  continued.!  Another  act  of  nearly  equal  folly 
was  committed  by  the  popular  government,  and  about  the  same 
time.  To  show  their  respect  for  the  pope,  Innocent  the  Fourth, 
who  visited  Milan  in  1251,  and  prove  themselves  devoted  Guelfs, 
they  allowed  him  to  name  the  podesta  for  next  year ;  yet  this 
was  but  two  years  before  they  chose  Lancia,  a  noted  Ghibelline, 
for  their  chief. 

The  numbers  of  which  the  noble  families  were  composed,  and 
who  always  acted  in  concert,  gave  them  a  weight  which  the 
commons  did  not  possess.  To  counterbalance  this,  the  people 
formed  themselves  into  companies  or  societies  ;  and  of  these 
there  were  two,  more  important  than  all  the  others,  and  on 
which  these  others  became  in  some  sort  dependent.  The  one 
was  called  the  company  of  the  Credenza,  and,  contrary  to  what 
from  its  name  might  be  supposed,  it  consisted  of  the  inferior 
artisans,  and  allied  itself  with  the  populace.  The  other  was 
called  the  company  of  the  Motta,  consisting  of  the  better  kind  of 
artizans,  and  it  leant  towards  the  aristocracy. 

These  companies  chose  magistrates  or  leaders  of  their  own 
for  the  purpose  of  watching  the  chiefs  of  the  state.  The  nobles, 
joined  by  the  motta,  had  their  podesta  Sorresina ;  the  people, 
represented  more  truly  by  the  credenza,  had  theirs,  Martino 
de  la  Torre,  a  professed  demagogue.  Each  order  appears  to 
have  given  unlimited  powers  to  the  podesta  or  leader  of  its  own 
nomination,  and  to  have  appointed  him,  not  annually,  but  once 
for  all ;  whereas  the  real  podesta  had  powers  defined  by  law, 
beside  being  only  in  office  for  a  year.  The  nobles  appear  to 
have  had  two  councils,  one  of  the  Vavasors  or  lesser  nobles,  the 
other  of  the  higher,  or  capitani,  who,  with  the  archbishop  as 

♦  If,  as  is  said,  he  was  appointed  in  1250,  and  if  the  agreement  with  Lancia 
was  made  in  1253,  the  latter  could  only  have  begun  to  exercise  his  ofl5ce  of 
podesta  in  1254,  as  Gozzadini  was  podesta  during  his  fourth  year. 

t  A  finance-  minister,  Prina,  in  whom  the  Emperor  Napoleon  had  great  confi- 
dence, was  put  to  death  in  a  sudden  revolt  of  the  Milanese  nobles  about  the  year 
1803  :  they  destroyed  him  with  their  umbrellas.  Of  him  Napoleon  once  said, 
when  discussing  the  merits  of  Mr.  Pitt,  whom  he  regarded  as  a  mere  financier, 
"  Je  pr^fere  muii  Prina." 


332  GOVERNMENT  OF  MILAN.  CH.  XXV. 

president,  formed  the  Credenza  del  Oagliardi.  Each  of  these 
councils,  that  is  the  Credenza  or  Credenza  de  St.  Artihrogio  for 
the  commons,  the  Gagliardi  and  Vavasari  for  the  nobles,  appear 
to  have  made  edicts  or  laws  which  were  binding  on  their  own 
members  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  senate  and  comitia  tri- 
buta  did  at  Rome  before  the  period  when  the  decrees  of  the  latter 
acquired  a  general  legislative  force.  When  it  was  required  to  pass 
a  law  which  should  be  binding  upon  the  whole  state,  or  to  form  any 
resolutions  upon  a  matter  of  universal  concernment,  the  General 
Council  or  General  Assembly  was  convoked  by  the  podesta,  and 
consisted  of  persons  deputed  from  all  classes  of  the  community. 
Its  numbers  appear  to  have  varied.  We  are  told  of  two  hun- 
dred at  one  time  ;  eight  hundred  at  another,  and  as  many  as  a 
thousand  at  another  time.  Nothing  is  known  with  any  kind  of 
accuracy  respecting  the  mode  of  their  deputation  or  election,  or 
of  the  qualifications  of  the  persons  who  chose  or  were  chosen. 
As  almost  always  happens,  historians  have  filled  their  works 
with  minute  accounts  of  battles  and  sieges,  and  the  cruelties  of 
some  chiefs  and  the  frauds  of  others,  with  the  tumults,  the  fickle- 
ness, and  the  sufferings  of  the  people  :  but  the  system  by  which 
they  were  ruled,  and  out  of  which  almost  every  thing  arose  that 
governed  their  fortunes,  has  rarely  been  deemed  worth  recording, 
more  rarely  still  been  made  the  subject  of  remark. 

The  people  had  gained  the  advantage  by  the  treaty  of  Ambro- 
gio ;  but  the  year  after,  another  civil  war  having  broken  out,  a  new 
convention  was  made,  by  which  the  nobles  recovered  the  ground 
they  had  lost.  The  military  operations  had  been  carried  on  in 
the  country,  where  they  generally  had  the  mastery  ;  but  the  dis- 
sensions broke  out  again  in  the  towns,  and  the  people,  ha^^ng 
gained  the  advantage,  resolved  to  choose  a  new  officer,  with  tri- 
bunitian  authority,  though  far  more  dangerous  to  their  liberties  : 
this  was  a  protector,  or  lord  (jyrotettore,  or  signore  del  popolo) ; 
the  first  name  expressing  the  motive  and  object  of  the  appoint- 
ment, the  second  accurately  describing  its  tendency  and  result 
The  two  societies,  powers,  or  factions,  as  they  truly  were,  into 
which  the  commons  were  ranged,  the  Credenza  and  the  Motta, 
would  not  agree  in  the  person  upon  whom  this  important  trust 
should  be  conferred.  Each,  therefore,  chose  its  own,  and  the  one 
of  the  Motta  being  killed  a  few  days  after,  and  probably  also  be- 
cause the  Credenza  were  the  more  numerous,  the  greater  part  of 


CH.  XXV.  PRINCES  OBTAIN  THE  SOVEREIGNTY.  333 

the  Motta  joined  the  paxty  of  the  nobles.  The  nomination  of  the 
Credenza  prevailed  in  favour  of  Martino  della  Torre,  and  the  nobles 
with  Sorresina,  their  podesta,  were  once  more  driven  from  the  town 
and  immediately  applied  for  help  to  Ezzelino  da  Romano,  who, 
coming  to  their  assistance,  was  defeated  and  slain  as  we  have 
already  seen  (Part  II.,  Chap,  xxili.).  In  this  victory  Martino  bore 
a  forward  part  at  the  head  of  the  Milanese  forces ;  and  the  Mar- 
quess of  Palavicino  was  joined  with  them  in  the  campaign.  He 
had  long  before  been  chosen  chief  or  lord  of  Cremona  and  suc- 
ceeded EzzeHno  at  Brescia,  Novara,  and  other  towns.  Lodi  now 
chose  Martino  for  its  chief,  and  gave  him,  from  the  smallness  of 
the  place,  more  unlimited  powers  than  he  had  at  Milan.  The 
nobles  rallied  their  forces  to  oppose  the  commons  ;  and  Martino? 
with  the  consent  of  the  latter,  made  a  treaty  with  Palavicino,  ap- 
pointing him  their  captain-general  for  five  years  with  a  large  pay, 
on  condition  of  his  providing  them  a  force  of  cavalry.  Thus  for- 
tified against  the  nobles,  the  commons  defeated  them,  and  re- 
duced eight  or  nine  hundred  of  them,  and  their  followers,  to  sur- 
render at  discretion.  The  people  loudly  required  that  they  should 
be  put  to  death ;  but  this  Martino  refused,  and  would  only  allow 
them  to  be  confined  in  cages,  and  thus  exhibited  for  many  years. 
The  power  of  Della  Torre  and  his  successors  was  greatly  in- 
creased by  the  influence  which  they  derived  from  obtaining  simi- 
lar elevation,  not  only  at  Lodi,  but  at  Como,  Bergamo,  Vercelli, 
in  all  which  places  the  plebeian  party  was  powerful,  but  chose 
Della  Torre  as  their  chief,  under  the  name  of  protecting  them 
against  the  aristocracy,  and  superintending  the  administration  of 
justice.  He  thus  obtained  in  a  short  time  as  great  power  at 
Milan  as  in  any  of  those  other  states,  by  the  never-failing  opera- 
tion of  the  imperfect  federal  union  which  we  have  had  so  many 
occasions  to  consider,  and  which  we  formerly  fully  explained 
(Part  I.,  Chap.  X.).  But  it  was  reserved  for  the  Viscontis,  by 
stiU  further  acquisitions,  to  complete,  a  few  years  later,  the 
structure  of  tyranny,  of  the  which  the  foundations  were  laid  in 
the  time  of  the  Della  Torres. 

It  would  not  be  easy  to  find  terms  sufficiently  strong  for  the 
expression  of  those  feelings  which  such  conduct  as  that  of  the 
Milanese  must  raise  in  every  considerate  mind ;  and  it  is  hard  to 
say  which  of  the  two  orders  is  the  most  deserving  of  reprobation. 
Neither  of  them  ever  gave  a  thought  to  the  public  interest,  or  to 


334  GOVERNMENT  OF  MILAN.  CH.  XXV. 

the  liberties  of  their  country,  or  even  to  its  security  from  foreign 
conquest :  on  the  contrary,  both  appear  to  have  been  ever  will- 
ing that  it  should  submit  to  a  master,  and  to  have  cared  little  for 
the  risk  which  might  be  run  that  the  master  should  be  some 
foreign  prince  long  kno^vn  as  an  enemy, — some  blood-thirsty 
tjTSint,  old  in  the  practice  of  every  crime,  or  some  unprincipled 
captain  of  banditti,  known  only  for  the  mercenary  employment  of 
his  sword  and  his  gang,  wherever  pay  was  to  be  earned  or  plun- 
der obtained.  The  plebeian  party  had  no  kind  of  excuse  for 
giving  up  the  state  to  Delia  Torre,  especially  after  the  example 
of  Cremona,  which  had  taken  the  Palavicinis  as  protectors,  and 
found  them  tyrants,  who  only  made  a  trade  of  leading  them  as 
mercenaries  to  foreign  wars  for  their  own  profit.  The  step  was 
taken  solely  with  a  view  to  party  triumph.  In  order  to  gain  a 
victory  over  the  nobles,  they  threw  away  their  free  constitution, 
and  set  a  tyrant  over  the  state,  willing  to  be  enslaved  themselves 
for  the  sake  of  a  momentary  triumph  over  their  adversary,  and  to 
enjoy  the  base  satisfaction  of  that  adversary  shariug  afterwards  in 
their  own  disgrace.  The  nobles  had  the  excuse  of  having  been 
driven  from  the  city  with  every  cruelty  and  ignominy  which  an 
exasperated  populace,  heated  with  its  unexpected  victory,  and  only 
half  recovered  from  its  alarm,  could  inflict  But  to  whom  did  they 
resort  as  their  champion,  to  slake  their  thirst  of  vengeance  against 
their  plebeian  oppressors  ?  To  the  most  execrable  tyrant  that  ever 
modern  Italy  had  produced,  so  fruitful  in  every  growth  of  cruelty 
and  of  treachery.  The  monster  Ezzelino  was  the  chosen  instru- 
ment of  their  fury,  and  they  were  anxious  first  to  punish  their 
adversaries  by  letting  loose  upon  them  in  war  that  fiend  and  "his 
legion,  then  to  destroy  their  country  by  installing  him  as  its  per- 
manent ruler.  When  men  are  so  little  fitted  for  self-government 
by  their  political  education  as  to  give  party  feelings  this  mastery 
over  their  reason — or  are  so  blinded  by  their  devotion  to  leaders 
as  to  play  their  game,  unreflecting  and  almost  unconscious  instru- 
ments in  their  hands — or  are  so  corrupted  as  to  disregard  all  du- 
ties and  all  ties  save  those  which  band  them  together  in  the  de- 
sperate pursuit  of  some  factious  or  some  sordid  object — we  may 
most  safely  pronounce  them  wholly  unfit  to  be  intrusted  with 
political  power,  and  may  conclude  that  the  scheme  of  polity  is  the 
best  for  them  which  confines  their  direct  interference  Avnthin  the 
narrowest  limits.     The  same  feelings  are  raised  and  the  same  re- 


CH,  XXV.  POPULAR  BASENESS.  335 

marks  are  applicable  in  the  case  of  all  the  other  Lombard  repub- 
lics. In  all  these  -was  the  same  sacrifice  of  principle  to  party. 
The  same  detestable  maxim,  "  Anything  to  beat  an  adversary," 
was  the  rule  of  conduct  with  the  factions  which  distracted  and 
enslaved  them  all.  If  the  example  of  Milan  is  the  most  striking 
to  show  the  frightful  excesses  that  spring  from  such  profligacy, 
it  is  only  because  the  Ezzelinos  and  the  Viscontis,  the  worst  of 
all  the  chiefs  who  have  disgraced  human  nature,  happened  to 
flourish  at  the  time  when  the  Milanese  factions  were  set  in  array 
against  one  another,  or  because  the  lesser  republics  were  visited 
with  the  like  scourges  in  the  shape  of  more  obscure  though  hardly 
less  wicked  tyrants. 

Nor  did  the  people,  either  nobles  or  commons,  in  a  single  in- 
stance, after  having  once  given  themselves  a  master,  make  any 
effectual  exertion  to  restore  the  commonwealth,  when  they  found 
that  the  expedient  which  they  had  adopted  led  to  the  extinction 
of  their  liberties.  At  first  the  Protector,  or  Lord  of  the  people, 
took  care  to  preserve  the  old  forms  of  the  constitution.  The 
Delia  Torres  retained  the  podesta,  the  councils,  the  consuls. 
They  only  took  care  to  govern  themselves  in  the  name  and 
through  the  co-operation  of  these  functionaries.  After  a  while, 
the  Romish  see,  taking  advantage  of  the  discontent  excited  by  their 
wars  and  by  the  burdens  which  they  laid  upon  the  people,  in- 
terfered to  remove  them,  and  to  place  the  Viscontis  in  their  stead. 
The  people  lent  themselves  to  the  intrigue  and  changed  their 
rulers  (1377),  but  made  no  effort  to  regain  their  constitution. 
Again  a  sedition  was  raised,  and  the  Torriani  family  restored  : 
stilLno  effort  on  behalf  of  the  people.  A  few  years  after  (1302), 
when  the  Emperor  Henry  VI.  made  his  progress  through  Italy, 
and  the  Lombard  toAvns  were  everywhere  gained  over  to  his  side, 
chiefly  by  the  persuasions  and  intrigues  of  the  lawyers,  at  Milan 
he  was  received  with  the  utmost  deference,  and  the  Torriani  and 
the  Visconti  bid  against  each  other  for  his  favour,  by  proposing 
larger  grants  of  money  than  had  been  originally  brought  forward  ; 
the  senate  adopted  the  highest  of  the  three  proposals,  and  the 
sedition  which  the  rival  leaders  then  raised  against  Henry  only 
ended  in  the  expulsion  of  the  Torriani,  and  the  appointment  of 
the  Imperial  vicars  or  commissaries  {missi)  at  Milan,  as  in  the 
other  towns,  to  administer  justice  with  the  podestas,  which  they 
did  in  a  manner  far  more  satisfactory  to  the  people. 

The  Viscontis  were  now  replaced  in  the  Signory  ;  but  in  1 32^ 


GOVEKNMENT  OF  MILAN.  CH.  XXV. 

they  were  driven  out  by  a  sedition  which  the  pope  had  fomented, 
and  in  which  the  nobles,  the  mob,  and  the  ill-paid  German  mer- 
cenaries of  the  family  had  joined.  During  the  few  weeks  that 
this  change  lasted,  a  republic  was  nominally  formed,  but  the 
whole  power  was  vested  in  a  few  of  the  leading  nobles  and  Ger- 
man captains,  the  main  authors  of  the  change.  Again  the  Vis- 
contis  were  expelled  in  1327  by  an  intrigue  of  the  nobles  with 
the  Emperor  Louis  of  Bavaria,  and,  as  before,  with  the  aid  of 
their  German  mercenaries.  A  republican  form  was  once  more 
given  to  the  government,  of  which  the  powers  were  nominally 
vested  in  a  council  of  twenty-four,  one  chosen  for  each  tribe,  but 
sitting  under  the  presidency  of  the  Imperial  German  ;  and  accord- 
ingly the  emperor  levied  what  taxes  he  pleased,  and  governed 
without  the  least  regard  to  the  people  or  to  the  shadow  of  a  con- 
stitution which  he  had  given  them.  Next  year  he  concluded  a 
bargain  with  the  Viscontis,  to  restore  them  for  a  yearly  sum  of 
25,000  florins,  and  give  them,  with  the  seignory,  the  appoint- 
ment of  Imperial  vicar  (missus)  ;  and  on  his  quitting  Italy  they 
obtained  once  more  the  command  of  the  German  mercenaries, 
which  enabled  them  to  regain  and  greatly  to  extend  all  the  power 
they  had  lost 

John  Galeazzo  Visconti,  before  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  cen- 
tury, was  lord  of  all  the  Lombard  states,  from  Novara  to  Vicenza 
in  the  north,  and  on  the  south  to  Bologna,  Pisa,  and  Sienna. 
In  1394,  and  more  fully  in  1396,  the  Emperor  Winceslaus  gave 
him,  for  the  sum  of  1 00,000  florins,  the  title  of  Duke  of  Milan 
and  Count  of  Pavia,  erecting  all  his  dominions  into  one  duchy 
and  county,  but  not  on  the  plan  of  the  feudal  monarchies, 
which  allowed  female  successions  :  here,  as  in  all  the  Ita- 
lian lordships  founded  by  the  emperors,  there  was  no  feudal 
principle  introduced,  and  the  succession  was  in  terms  limited 
strictly  to  male  heirs.  In  the  time  of  this  crafty,  able,  and  pro- 
fligate ruler,  there  was  no  chance  of  the  republican  government 
being  anywhere  revived ;  but  the  many  reverses  of  fortune 
which  the  family  had  sustained  in  the  first  half  of  the  century 
had  presented  repeated  opportunities  for  the  successful  opera- 
tion of  the  republican  and  aristocratic  spirit,  had  it  not  been 
wholly  extinct.  The  division  of  his  dominions  among  his  three 
sons,  the  eldest  of  whom  was  only  thirteen  years  old — the  feeble- 
ness of  a  female  regent,  governing  with  a  council  of  seventeen — 
the  defection  and  mutual  quarrels   of  the  German   mercenary 


CH.  XXV.  ATROCITIES  OF  THE  VISCONTIS.  *        837 

captains — the  attacks  of  the  emperor — the  divisions  of  the  Vis- 
conti  family  themselves — even  the  continuance  of  this  anarchy 
for  ten  years — excited  no  more  than  occasionally  a  sedition  in 
some  towns,  having  no  other  object  than  the  exchange  of  one 
petty  tyrant's  fainily  for  another ;  and  even  the  detestable 
tyranny  of  the  eldest  Visconti,  John  Maria,  exposing  the  people 
to  all  but  unexampled  oppression,  and  calculated  to  shock  men's 
feelings  even  more  than  it  embittered  their  sufferings,  as  it  was 
combined  wiib.  no  capacity  to  make  it  really  formidable,  and 
might  therefore  have  been  supposed  wholly  impossible  to  be 
endured,  although  it  ended,  but  after  being  patiently  borne  for 
many  years,  in  the  just  and  righteous  assassination  of  the  can- 
nibal himself,  never  seems  to  have  awakened  a  thought  in  any 
quarter  of  resisting  a  government,  which,  with  all  its  many  and 
great  imperfections,  seemed  to  make  the  appearance  of  such  a 
monster  armed  with  authority  impossible.* 

At  length  this  truly  infernal  family  ceased  to  outrage  the 
world  :  the  male  line  failed  in  Philip  Maria,  who  died  in  1447, 
and  for  three  years  there  was  an  attempt  to  govern  Milan  by 
a  republican  constitution.  Twenty-four  councillors  were  chosen, 
four  by  each  of  the  six  quarters,  and  their  authority  was  limited 
to  two  months ;  and  a  general  assembly  of  eight  hundred  was 
occasionally  appealed  to,  as  of  old.  Pavia,  and  many  of  the  other 
Lombard  towns,  took  a  similar  course,  their  object  being  to  shake 
off  the  Milanese  dominion.  But  in  this  they  ultimately  failed, 
as  did  the  Milanese,  to  maintain  their  commonwealth.  An  able 
condottiero  chief,  Francis  Sforza,  married  to  J.  Galeazzo's 
daughter,  and  once  in  the  Milanese  service,  which  he  deserted, 
having  gained  some  brilliant  victories,  and,  above  all,  having 
stormed  the  important  town  of  Placentia,  next  in  magnitude  to 

*  Giovanni  Maria  Visconti  is  perhaps  the  only  person  in  history  who  raises  a 
doubt  on  the  claims  of  Ezzelino  da  Romano  to  the  first  place  in  the  black  catalogue 
of  tyrants ;  biit  his  cruel  and  brutal  nature  acted  on  so  much  more  limited  a  scale, 
that  the  balance  seems  thus  cast  in  Ezzelino's  favour.  He  confined  himself  to  the 
work  of  executing  the  laws  on  capital  convicts,  but  he  sentenced  to  death  himself 
such  as  he  chose  to  destroy.  He  generally  hunted  his  victims  with  bloodhounds, 
who  were  trained  and  fed  with  human  flesh  for  the  purpose.  The  names  of  many 
gentlemen,  some  belonging  to  his  own  family,  are  preserved,  as  having  been  mur- 
dered by  him  in  this  manner  ;  and  they  include  the  son  of  one,  on'y  twelve  years 
old.  The  wretchedness  experienced  by  the  Lombard  people,  under  the  savage  and 
sordid  tyranny  of  the  German  mercenaries,  during  the  anarchy  which  followed 
J.  Galeazzo's  death,  exceeds  all  that  can  be  found  even  in  the  Italian  history. 
The  Spaniards  in  the  New  Wo  rid  could  alone,  for  avarice  and  cruelty,  afford  a 
match  to  these  bloodthirsty  ruffians, 

PART  II.  Z 


338      '  GOVERNMENT  OF  MILAN.  CH.  XXV. 

Milan  itself,  after  a  long  blockade,  captured  that  capital,  and 
was  chosen,  without  any  reserve  or  condition  whatever,  the  lord 
of  the  state.  At  different  periods  of  the  war  there  is  no  doubt 
that  he  might  have  been  s-uccessfully  resisted,  but  for  the  mis- 
management of  the  council,  which  was,  at  two  several  elections, 
returned  from  the  dregs  of  the  people,  and  threw  away  all  the 
advantages  that  a  more  respectable  body  had  gained.  The  final 
surrender  at  discretion  was  partly  the  work  of  this  council,  and 
partly  of  the  mob,  which  broke  in  upon  and  overpowered  them. 
The  negotiation  with  Venice  would  certainly  have  proved  fatal 
to  Sforza,  had  the  council  under  the  patrician  influence,  which 
planned  it,  not  been  changed.  Nor  was  this  all :  Sforza 's  scan- 
dalous treachery  in  going  over  to  Venice  with  his  hireling  army 
had  made  him  naturally  detested  by  the  Milanese.  The  ex- 
tremities to  which  his  blockading  army  reduced  them  must  have 
still  further  exasperated  the  whole  people  against  him  ;  for  never 
did  the  inhabitants  of  any  to^vn  suffer  more  severely  than  the 
Milanese  now  did  for  months.  Yet  he  was  received  on  his  entry 
with  almost  divine  honours,  and  the  enthusiasm  of  the  multi- 
tude, whom  he  had  only  just  ceased  to  starve,  knew  no  bounds : 
a  victorious  general,  always  faithful  to  them,  who  should  have 
defeated  him  and  raised  the  blockade,  could  not  have  been  more 
unanimously  hailed  as  a  deliverer  by  the  people  whom  he  had 
saved.  So  when  he  stormed  Placentia,  every  house  was  destroyed  ; 
the  very  floors  and  beams  were  carried  away  ;  the  inhabitants, 
beside  suffering  all  the  ordinaiy  horrors  of  such  a  moment,  were 
tortured  to  make  them  discover  their  treasure  ;  and  10,000  of 
them,  including  some  of  their  principal  citizens,  were  carried 
away  and  sold  as  slaves.  The  town  has  never  since  recovered 
anything  like  its  former  prosperity.  But  Sforza  could  safely  ven- 
ture, without  any  escort,  within  its  walls  a  few  months  after  the 
horrid  scene :  he  was  well  received,  and  chosen  by  acclamation 
Lord  of  the  state.  It  may  safely  be  affirmed  that  no  aristocracy, 
such  as  that  of  Venice  or  Genoa,  could  ever  have  shown  the 
want  of  firm  purpose,  and  the  fickleness  towards  their  worst 
enemies,  which  thus  degraded  the  people  of  Placentia  and 
Milan. 

As  the  surrender  had  been  absolute,  and  the  leading  men 
among  the  nobles,  who  would  have  obtained  from  Sforza  some 
promise,  sure  enough  indeed  to  be  speedily  broken,  had  of  neces- 


CH.  XXV.  TYRANNY  UNRESISTED.  839 

sity  yielded  to  the  peremptory  commands  of  the  conqueror  and 
the  base  impatience  of  the  multitude,  his  power  of  course  be- 
came equally  uncontrolled  with  that  of  the  Viscontis,  whom  he 
succeeded ;  and  in  the  next  generation  it  produced  its  appointed 
fruits.  The  tyranny  of  his  son,  Galeazzo,  made  him  a  fit  suc- 
cessor even  to  the  Viscontis.  But  though  a  private  and  family 
wrong  caused  his  assassination  by  one  of  the  nobles,  after  a 
reign  of  ten  years,  patiently  submitted  to  by  the  people,  whose 
strongest  feelings  he  daily  outraged,  so  little  disposition  was 
there  to  change  the  government  which  had  produced  such  mon- 
sters, that  the  supreme  power  passed  quietly  to  a  child  of  eight 
years  old  ;  and  the  brave  men  who  had  rid  the  world  of  this 
execrable  pest  were  put  to  death  with  unheard-of  torments.  It 
is  to  be  noted  that  the  atrocities  by  which  his  whole  life  had 
been  stained  were  of  the  kind  ever  found  to  exasperate  the 
popular  feelings  most  bitterly,  and  in  all  ages  of  the  world  to 
produce  a  greater  effect  in  awaking  men  from  the  torpor  induced 
by  established  despotism,  than  even  the  more  congenial  deeds  of 
cruelty.  Outrages  upon  female  virtue,  or  other  grievous  displays 
of  unchaste  passions,  have,  from  the  times  of  the  Greek  tyrants 
and  the  Roman  down  to  modern  days,  been  very  generally 
the  proximate  causes  of  revolt  against  power  lawlessly  abused, 
and  have  oftentimes  proved  effectual  to  this  righteous  end,  after 
the  instinct  that  makes  men  recoU  from  scenes  of  blood  had 
been  appealed  to  in  vain.  The  people  of  Milan  had  not  only 
seen  their  inhuman  despot  destroy  his  victims  sometimes  by 
feeding  them  on  filth  too  disgusting  to  be  named,  sometimes  by 
burning  them  alive,  but  had  beheld  him  systematically,  and  by 
wholesale,  subject  the  wives  and  daughters  of  his  subjects  to 
the  brutal  lust  of  his  soldiery,  and  seen  him  make  the  shame  of 
their  families  public  to  the  world.  Yet  did  not  all  these 
enormities  suffice  to  revive  the  republican  spirit,  or  to  create  the 
least  desire  of  limiting  an  authority  thus  outrageously  abused. 
The  infant  child  of  the  tyrant  grew  up  almost  an  idiot ;  the 
quarrels  of  his  uncles  for  the  regency,  and  the  weakness  into 
which  the  government  fell,  were  all  opportunities  thrown  away 
upon  the  Milanese,  The  state  became  enfeebled,  but  the 
crown  continued  powerful,  by  whose  hands  soever  its  powers 
were  wielded :  till  after  the  country  had  been-  overrun  by  the 
French,  and  alternately  a  Bourbon  and  a  Sforza  had  held  the 

z  2 


340  GOVERNMENT  OF  MILAX.  CH.  XXV. 

sovereignty,  it  fell  under  the  power  of  Charles  V.,  with  the  rest 
of  Northern  Italy.  It  was  allowed  by  him  to  remain  in  the  last 
of  the  Sforza  family  for  a  large  yearly  rent,  and  on  his  death  was 
formally  seized  in  1535  by  that  ambitious  and  unprincipled 
monarch.  That  the  Milanese,  who  had  avoided  all  opportunity 
of  restoring  the  commonwealth  under  the  weakest  princes, 
should  have  ever  harboured  a  thought  of  resistance  to  the  com- 
pact and  extensive  power  of  Charles  was  of  course  entirely  out 
of  the  question. 


CJH.  XXYI.  GOYEENMENT  OF  FLORENCE  341 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE, 


Florence  joins  the  League  late — Early  Constitution — Consuls ;  Quarters  ;  Senate — 
Burgher  Aristocracy— At  first  mixed,  then  pure  -Podesta  established— Expelled, 
and  new  Government  established — Old  Constitution  restored — New  Constitution 
after  Manfred's  defeat— Two  Councils — Party  Government  within  the  Govern- 
ment— Parallel  of  Jacobin  Club — New  Constitution — Its  Anomalies  and  Absur- 
dities— Factious  Turbulence — Interferes  with  Justice  and  Police— Ordinances  of 
Justice— Monstrous  Provisions — Popular  Aristocracy ;  Popolani  Grossi — Bianchi 
and  Neri — Absurdities  of  Party — New  mode  of  electing  the  Seignory — Burgher 
Oligarchy — Duke  of  Athens — Progress  of  Tyranny — Changes  in  the  Constitution 
— New  Party  divisions;  Natural  Aristocracy — Albizzi  and Ricci— Factious  Vio- 
lence— Ciompi ;  Mob  Government — Triumph  of  the  Aristocratic  Polity — Influ- 
ence of  Free  Institutions — Of  Democratic  Government — Grandeur  of  Florence — 
Feudal  and  Burgher  Economy. 

The  early  history  of  Florence  resembles  that  of  the  other  states 
in  the  northern  part  of  Italy,  except  that  it  appears  to  have 
suffered  very  severely  from  the  Gothic  invasion.  The  city  was 
almost  entirely  destroyed,  and  never  regained  its  former  import- 
ance till  it  was  rebuilt  by  Charlemagne.  The  inhabitants,  who, 
like  all  the  Tuscans,  have  ever  been  an  industrious  and  frugal  race, 
applied  themselves  to  the  pursuits  of  trade,  and  were  early  famous 
for  the  excellence  of  their  manufactures,  and  their  expertness  in 
all  the  transactions  of  exchange.  They  bestowed  much  attention 
upon  the  improvement  of  their  police  and  the  arrangement  of 
their  municipal  administration,  but  took  no  part  in  the  Lombard 
League  against  Frederick.  In  1173,  his  legate  having  prevailed 
upon  many  of  the  Tuscan  barons  to  join  him,  the  Florentine 
territory  was  ravaged  by  them,  and  the  consul  cast  into  prison. 
This  determined  their  course,  and  they  then  joined  the  Tuscan 
Guelfic  League,  though  for  a  long  time  they  took  no  very  forward 
part  in  its  proceedings,  and  their  magistrates  rather  affected 
neutrality  between  the  Guclf  and  the  Ghibelline  factions,  which 
soon  divided  the  community. 

Their  municipal  government  appears  to  have  been  simple,  and 


342  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE.        CH.  XXVI. 

not  materially  different  from  that  of  the  Lombard  towns.  The 
executive  power  was  intrusted  to  consuls,  who  also  commanded 
the  forces.  The  city  being  divided  into  districts,  or  quarters, 
originally  four,  afterwards  six,  each  of  these  chose  one  ;  and  the 
office  was  annual.  A  senate  of  a  hundred  members,  likewise 
chosen  yearly,  formed  the  council  of  the  community,  and  upon 
extraordinary  emergencies  they  called  together  the  whole  people. 
But  in  general  the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  the  consuls 
and  senators,  who  were  invariably  of  the  higher  class  of  burghers, 
that  is,  the  civic  nobility.  The  city  by  degrees  got  the  better  of 
the  country  nobles  or  barons,  and  made  it  expedient,  if  not  neces- 
sary, for  them  to  become  citizens,  for  their  protection,  and  to 
submit  their  fiefe  and  vassals  to  the  civic  jurisdiction.  The 
government  was  thus  a  civic  aristocracy,  but  with  a  certain  influ- 
ence given  to  the  people,  and  the  power  left  to  any  one  of  becom- 
ing by  his  acquisition  of  wealth  a  member  of  the  governing  body ; 
nor  did  the  aristocracy  become  complete  till  the  great  victory  of 
the  GhibelHne  party  in  1250.  The  families,  from  the  equal  dis- 
tribution of  property  which  commercial  pursuits  tend  to  produce, 
were  exceedingly  numerous.  All  those  of  the  same  house  for  many 
generations  continued  to  be  regarded  as  forming  one  family ;  so  that 
some  had  as  many  as  two  and  even  three  hundred  persons  within 
its  circle.  The  habits  which  enabled  them  to  amass  great  wealth 
do  not  appear  to  have  been  attended  during  a  long  time  with  any 
taste  either  for  luxurious  indulgences  or  magnificent  display.  As 
late  as  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  the  manners  of  all 
ranks  are  described  as  of  extreme  and  even  primitive  simplicity  ; 
and  the  parsimony  which  Dante  has  satirically  commemorated 
arose  from  the  remains  of  those  frugal  and  homely  habits.  But 
the  government  was  actuated  by  a  spirit  of  politic  hberality  w^hen 
exertions  were  required  for  the  public  service,  by  undertaking 
either  extensive  military  operations,  or  constructing  works  oL 
general  utility,  or  even  of  mere  ornament  and  magnificence  ;  and 
the  splendour  of  the  public  buildings  which  that  age  has  left 
forms  a  singular  contrast  with  the  frugality  which  reigned  in  the 
establishment  of  the  patrician  burgher,  and  would  only  suffer  him 
to  portion  his  daughter  with  what  Avould  make  2001.  at  tlie  pre- 
sent day. 

About  the  same  time  with  the  other  towns,  in  1 207,  the  practice 
was  introduced  of  confiding  to  a  foreigner,  annually  chosen,  and 


CH.  XXVI.  CONFLICTING  FACTIONS.  343 

of  noble  rank,  the  administration  of  criminal  justice,  witli  the 
superintendence  of  the  civil  judicature  vested  in  subordinate 
judges,  and  the  execution  of  the  government  or  political  decrees, 
as  well  as  of  his  own  sentences.  The  first  podesta  was  a  Milanese 
noble,  and  the  consuls  continued  to  exercise  all  the  other  func- 
tions of  the  municipal  administration  ;  nor  did  the  podesta  at 
Florence  interfere  with  the  command  of  the  forces. 

Soon  after  this  time  the  first  great  factious  divisions  of  the 
nobles  took  place.  Before  this  period  there  had  been  very  little 
violence  in  the  disputes  of  the  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines  at  Florence. 
Men  were  known  to  favour  the  one  or  the  other  side,  but  the 
government  kept  strictly  neutral ;  and  the  contest  could  not  be 
said  materially  to  influence  the  community.  But  now  the  per- 
sonal quarrel  of  two  families,  the  Buondelmonti  and  the  Uberti, 
arising  from  a  marriage,  and  followed  by  a  scuffle  and  an  assassi- 
nation, divided  the  whole  of  the  body  into  two  parties,  bitterly 
opposed  to  each  other — all  the  Guelfs,  to  the  number  of  forty-two 
families,  joining  with  the  Buondelmonti,  and  all  the  Ghibel- 
lines, twenty-four,  taking  part  with  the  Uberti.  They  fortified 
their  houses ;  they  armed  their  followers  ;  they  fought  in  the 
streets,  or  besieged  each  other  s  castles,  or  met  in  single  combat, 
or  set  assassins  on  one  another,  to  the  entire  destruction  of  the 
public  peace,  and  the  interruption  of  all  peaceful  pursuits  among 
those  who  were  thus  banded  against  each  other.  But  as  this  state 
of  things  lasted  for  no  less  than  three-and-thirty  years,  and  as  the 
progress  of  the  community  in  wealth  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
materially  obstructed,  we  may  infer  that  the  people  at  large  took 
little  part  in  the  constant  fray,  and  that  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment being  in  the  hands  chiefly  of  those  who  maintained  the 
contest  rendered  it  impossible  to  terminate  it  as  long  as  parties 
were  nearly  balanced.  But,  upon  the  whole,  the  Guelfs  suffered 
most  severely,  no  less  than  thirty-six  of  their  palaces  or  fortified 
towns  being  razed  to  the  ground.  What  the  Uberti  wanted  in. 
number  of  families  they  probably  made  up  in  the  strength  of 
each,  in  their  wealth,  and  in  their  retainers.  They  had  likewise 
the  support  of  the  imperial  party  abroad ;  and  Frederick  made 
at  length  a  demonstration  in  their  favour,  which  appears  to  have 
been  decisive  ;  for  in  1248  the  government  took  part  against  the 
Guelfs,  and  drove  them  from  the  country.     The  exclusion  of  the 


Sii  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCK  CH.  XXVI. 

people  from  all  interference  with  the  government,  and  the  vesting 
of  its  whole  powers  in  the  nobles,  was  now  completed. 

The  natural  consequences  of  this  success  in  a  community  so 
constituted  soon  followed.  First,  the  nobles  became  more  over- 
bearing, and  harassed  the  common  people  ;  then  these  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  emperor's  declining  health  and  expected  death  to 
combine  against  their  oppressors.  They  drove  the  podesta  from 
the  town,  and  chose  a  magistrate  whom  they  called  captain  of  the 
people,  giving  him  a  council  of  twelve  senators,  or  anziani,  two 
chosen  by  each  quarter,  and  all  to  remain  only  two  months  in 
oflB.ce.  They  distributed  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  into  twenty 
companies,  and  those  of  the  country  districts  into  ninety-six,  and, 
requiring  all  to  serve  between  the  ages  of  fifteen  and  sixty-four, 
thus  raised  a  militia  of  nearly  100,000  men,  the  choice  of  their 
oflficers  being  left  to  the  soldiers.  The  emperor's  death  in  1250 
enabled  them  to  complete  this  change,  and  to  recall  the  exiled 
party.  The  parties  of  the  nobles  were  now  compelled  to  make 
peace  with  one  another,  and  to  lower  the  fortifications  of  their 
houses ;  and  a  new  podesta  was  chosen,  to  act  with  the  captain  of 
the  people.  At  first  Lucca  alone  of  the  Tuscan  to\vns  had  joined 
the  Guelf  party ;  but  the  new  government  showed  extraordinary 
vigour  in  all  its  operations,  and,  one  after  another,  the  towns  were 
reduced  and  obliged  to  unite  with  the  league  ;  but  the  municipal 
government  of  each  remained  unchanged  by  these  successes  of  the 
Florentines. 

For  some  time  the  Guelfs  used  their  victory  with  moderation  ; 
but  the  violence  of  Italian  party  hatred  afterwards  found  its 
accustomed  vent,  and  the  Ghibellines  were  banished  in  1258. 
Two  years  after,  with  the  help  of  Sienna  and  other  towns,  and, 
above  all,  with  the  aid  of  the  Imperial  troops,  they  gained  a 
most  complete  victory  at  Arbia,  to  the  almost  entire  destruction 
of  the  Florentine  army  (Villani,  Stor.  Fior.  vi.  c.  70.  p.  202 — 
Sismondi,  c.  xviii.).  The  consequences  were  important :  not  only 
were  the  Ghibellines  recalled  and  the  Guelfs  expelled  in  their 
turn,  but  the  constitution  of  1250  was  abolished,  the  aristocracy 
restored,  and  a  native  Florentine  appointed  podesta,  to  hold  his 
oflfice  for  two  years.  A  convention  or  diet  of  the  Ghibelline  towns 
was  then  held,  and  the  entire  destruction  of  Florence  and  dis- 
persion of  it,s  jK'ople  was  strongly  urged  by   the  magistrates  who 


CH.  XXVI.  NEW  CONSTITUTION.  .345 

represented  Pisa  and  Sienna,  as  the  only  means  of  preventing 
future  wars,  but  in  reality  as  the  means  of  extinguishing  an  ad- 
verse party,  and  destroying  a  political  and  commercial  rival. 
Nor  could  anything  have  prevented  this  device  from  being  adopted 
but  the  tirmness  of  the  XJberti  leader,  Farinata,  who  exclaimed 
against  the  infernal  proposition,  and  refused  to  let  his  country  be 
sacrificed  to  his  party — an  act  of  virtue  rare  even  in  modern  times 
and  beyond  the  Alps,  but  without  example  in  the  dark  ages  of  Italy. 
A  renewal  of  the  same  scenes  followed  the  emperor's  (Manfred) 
defeat  at  Grandmilla  by  Charles  of  Arragon,  in  1 266,  through  the 
singular  weakness  of  the  podesta,  Guido  Novello,  who,  ever  since 
the  battle  of  Arbia,  had  governed  with  an  exclusive  court  of 
thirty-six  nobles.  The  Guelfs  were  once  more  restored,  and  with 
them  the  democratic  government  returned.  That  government 
however  now  suffered  a  material  alteration  :  Charles  was  allowed 
to  hold  the  seignory  for  ten  years,  appointing  a  lieutenant-vicar, 
or  Commissioner  (missus),  for  superintending  the  military  offences 
and  administration  of  justice,  and  the  thirty-six  councillors  of 
Guido  were  reduced  to  twelve  :  but  the  political  government  was 
now  Nvidely  different. 

The  seignory,  consisting  of  the  lieutenant  and  his  council,  were 
in  every  matter  to  obtain,  first  of  all,  the  sanction  of  the  Popular 
Council,  a  body  of  one  hundred  citizens  ;  and  then,  on  the  same 
day,  the  sanction  of  the  credenza,  composed  of  eighty,  but  in 
which  the  chiefs  of  the  seven  greater  crafts  (or  arts)  had  a  seat. 
From  these  two  bodies  all  Ghibellines  and  all  nobles  were  ex- 
cluded. These  two  other  councils  it  behoved  also  to  consent  to 
every  measure,  including  the  appointment  of  all  offices ;  one  of 
these  councils  consisted  of  the  podestas,  of  ninety  members,  both 
nobles  and  commoners,  besides  the  chiefs  of  crafts ;  and  the 
general  council  was  composed  of  three  hundred  citizens,  of  all 
ranks.  In  each  of  these  councils  the  consent  of  two-thirds  was 
required  to  sanction  any  legislative  measure.  The  great  weight 
of  the  citizens  at  large  in  all  these  councils,  which  gave  them 
a  direct  influence  in  the  government,  superseded,  generally 
speaking,  the  assembly  of  the  people.  But  there  was  another 
constitution  at  the  same  time  established,  which  continued  to 
regulate  the  republic,  and  to  preserve  its  popular  form  as  long  as 
the  commonwealth  lasted.  This  was  the  administration  formed 
to  manage  the  fund  that  arose  from  confiscating  the  Ghibelline 


846  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCK  CH.  XXVI. 

estates ;  and  it  was  a  complete  party  government  within  the 
government  of  the  state.  The  Guelfs  chose  every  two  months 
their  consuls  called  ijarty  captaiTis,  who  had  their  secret  council 
of  fourteen  members,  their  general  council  of  sixty,  three  priors, 
a  treasurer,  and  a  prosecutor  of  Ghibellines.  There  never  cer- 
tainly was  an  instance  of  any  party  feud  being  in  any  country  so 
disciplined  and  so  wielded.  The  vigorous  administration  not  only 
of  its  own  affairs,  but  those  of  the  republic  which  it  governed,  was 
the  result.  Had  the  Jacobin  Club  at  Paris  been  a  more  regular 
body,  and  continued  to  govern  in  quiet  times,  it  would  have 
formed  a  second  instance  of  the  same  sort. 

The  quiet  of  the  state  and  appeasing  of  party  dissensions  were 
not  among  the  consequences  of  these  arrangements.  But  the 
vigour  which  they  gave  to  the  administration  of  public  affairs,  and 
the  consequent  strength  to  the  Guelf  party  at  large,  made  the 
court  of  Rome  anxious,  if  possible,  to  aUay  intestine  divisions  that 
seemed  at  every  moment  to  threaten  the  ruin  of  the  republic. 
Accordingly  Nicholas  III.  exerted  himself  to  bring  about  a  paci- 
fication, and  with  success.  The  people  had  never  taken  any  in- 
terest in  these,  or  the  other  quarrels  of  the  nobles,  and  were  well 
pleased  to  see  them  terminated  on  any  terms.  The  chief  pro- 
vision which  the  pope  made  was  to  obtain  the  recall  of  the  exiled 
party  and  the  mixed  constitution  of  the  earlier  council,  giving 
eight  places  to  the  Guelfs  and  six  to  their  adversaries.  This 
arrangement  was  made  in  1 279,  and  as  the  feeble  condition  of 
the  Neapolitan  dynasty  had  transferred  the  lead  of  the  Guelf 
party  of  Florence,  from  the  Anjou  family  to  the  government  of 
the  republic,  the  arrangements  of  the  party  became  those  of  the 
states,  and  a  final  settlement  of  the  constitution  was  effected  upon 
principles  which  continued,  with  two  material  additions  upon 
nearly  the  same  plan,  to  govern  the  system  as  long  as  the  com- 
monwealth remained  frea  This  important  step  was  taken  in  the 
year  1282. 

The  executive  government  was  vested  in  a  chief,  or  Oonfaloniere 
di  giuatizia,  and  in  magistrates  called  Priors  of  the  crafts  {Prioi^ 
delle  arte),  that  of  the  lawyers  alone  having  none.  They  were 
lodged  in  the  same  palace  and  maintained  at  the  same  table,  at 
the  public  expense.  They  held  their  office  for  two  months  only, 
and  were  elected  by  the  persons  going  out  of  office,  the  chiefs,  or 
gonfaloniers  of  quarters,  with  the  consuls  of  the  crafts  and  a  cer- 


CH.  XXVI.  POPULAR  VIOLENCE  AND  INJUSTICE.  847 

tain  number  of  adjuncts  whom  they  chose  in  the  city.  The  vote 
was  by  ballot ;  and  no  person  could  be  chosen  until  he  had  been 
two  years  out  of  office.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  plan  of 
government  more  faulty  than  that  which  changed  the  executive 
power  twelve  times  in  a  year,  unless  the  same  constitution  had 
furnished  another  example  of  absurdity  still  more  revolting  in  the 
restrictions  laid  upon  the  legislative  authority.  The  nine  members 
of  the  seignory  could  alone  propound  new  laws,  and  those  only 
in  rotation,  each  having  his  day,  on  which  he  was  absurdly  enough 
called  the  proposto,  which,  if  it  meant  anything,  meant  rather 
propositore,  and  no  amendment  was  allowed  to  his  proposition- 
The  assent  of  the  whole  four  colleges  or  councils  was  required  as 
before,  and  two-thirds  of  each  must  concur  in  order  to  give  any 
proposed  change  the  force  of  law. 

The  quarrels  of  the  nobles  now  continued  as  constant  as  ever, 
and  their  interference  with  the  administration  of  justice  became 
more  intolerable  still.  Whoever  of  their  number  was  charged 
with  any  offence  became  the  object  of  protection  to  his  family,  so 
that  each  prosecution  was  like  the  trial  of  a  noble  house.  There 
could  not  be  said  to  exist  any  police  with  respect  to  the  order,  and 
as  against  them  the  people  had  no  redress  for  any  injury.  Such 
a  state  of  things  became  unbearable,  and  the  people  soon  found 
a  leader  in  Giano  della  Bella,  a  noble  who  renounced  his  station 
to  head  them.  A  commission  was  appointed  to  prepare  regu- 
lations which  might  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  case  ;  and  in  1292 
the  general  assembly  of  the  people  obtained  the  adoption  of  their 
report,  long  known  and  universdly  reprobated  under  the  name, 
than  which  none  was  ever  less  descriptive  of  the  thing  signified, 
Ordinances  of  justice.  It  seems  certain  that  in  no  country  has 
party  violence  ever  gone  the  length  of  openly  avowing  such  designs 
of  oppression  as  are  in  this  famous  instrument  plainly  disclosed. 
All  iniquitous  things  have  been  perpetrated  elsewhere,  but  always 
under  the  disguise  of  some  mask,  or,  if  undisguised,  yet  done  with- 
out being  proclaimed,  and  done  as  the  exception,  not  announced 
as  the  rule.  It  was  reserved  for  Florence  to  promulgate  a  code 
of  avowed  and  rank  injustice  as  the  rule  of  conduct  in  adminis- 
tering a  free  and  popular  government.  It  began  by  excluding 
from  all  office  the  whole  members  of  the  thirty-seven  greatest 
families  in  the  country  and  depriving  them  by  name  of  the  power 
to  enter  into  any  craft  whereby  they  might  become  eligible  to 


348  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE.  CH.  XXVI 

office.  It  gave  to  the  seignory  the  power  of  inserting  from  time 
to  time  new  names  in  the  book  of  nobles,  and  thereby  rendering 
those  who  bore  them  equally  ineligible  with  the  real  nobles  :  thus 
inflicting  nobility  and  its  disqualifications  as  a  punishment.  But 
the  most  monstrous  of  all  the  provisions  contained  in  this  code  of 
democratic  justice  was  the  rule  of  evidence  which  it  appHed  to 
the  nobles.  Mere  rumour,  if  sworn  to  exist  by  two  credible  wit- 
nesses, was  sufficient,  not  to  put  a  person  on  his  trial,  as  has  some- 
times been  said  to  be  the  English  law  of  impeachment,  though 
certainly  never  acted  on,  but  also  to  warrant  his  conviction.  The 
adoption  of  this  ordinance  was  accompanied  with  the  formation  of 
a  numerous  military  police  under  an  official  called  Gonfaloniere 
di  Giustizia;  and  one  of  the  first  acts  after  the  adoption  of  the 
plan  was  to  pull  down  all  the  houses  of  the  Galetti  family,  upon 
the  avowed  ground  that  one  of  them  had  killed  a  Florentine  citizen 
somewhere  in  France. 

Meanwhile  the  influence  of  the  great  body  of  the  people  was 
constantly  decreasing ;  the  whole  power  in  the  state  became  vested 
in  the  wealthier  citizens,  those  called  Popolani  grossi,  though  the 
government  was  practically  so  democratic  that  the  priori  were 
required  to  be  persons  actually  exercising  themselves  the  trade  of 
the  craft  to  which  they  nominally  belonged.  Yet  those  wealthier 
burghers  were  equally  disliked  by  all  above  and  all  below  them ; 
the  nobles  viewed  them  with  contempt,  and  the  common  people 
with  aversion,  to  whom  they  were  more  insolent  than  the  real 
nobles.  Nor  was  it  easy  to  distinguish  them  from  that  noble  class 
by  their  circumstances  any  more  than  by  their  habits.  They  had 
their  fortified  houses  or  palaces*  in  the  town,  their  possessions  in 
the  country,  with  vassals  and  other  retainers  ;  their  families  were 
numerous,  and  their  younger  branches,  bred  up  in  ease  and  indul- 
gence, had  all  the  insolent  pride  of  the  patrician  order. 

Among  these  nobles  there  now  broke  out  a  new  party  dissension. 
At  Pistoia  there  was  a  private  and  personal  quarrel  between  two 
branches  of  the  CancelKeri  family,  called  the  Bianchi  and  Neri,^ 

*  The  term  palace,  however,  at  Florence,  was  applied  to  so  low  a  kind  of  man- 
sion, that  in  the  estimate  of  losses  made  on  one  of  the  changes  of  government,  all 
houses  were  called  palaces  which  were  valued  at  300  florins,  about  420Z.  or  500/.  of 
present  value. 

t  So  called  from  Biancha  or  Bianchi,  the  name  of  a  female  ancestor  of  one  branch ; 
and  by  a  play  on  the  word,  ucri  (black),  was  given  as  the  name  of  the  other,  to  dis- 
tinguish it. 


CH.  XXVI.      PARTIES— <JHANGES  IN  THE  CONSTITUTIO.V.  349 

and  aJl  the  other  families  making  common  cause  with  these  after 
the  fashion  of  the  age,  the  community  was  involved  in  perjoetual 
discord  and  violence,  and  the  government  to  quell  it  gave  up  to 
Florence  the  seignory  for  ten  years.  The  government  ordered 
the  leaders  of  both  factions  to  leave  Pistoia  and  come  to  Flo- 
rence. There  it  happened  that  a  quarrel  existed  between  an 
ancient  family  the  Donata,  and  one  of  the  Popolani  grossi ;  the 
Cerchi  and  some  of  the  Neri  having  been  received  into  the  houses 
of  the  former,  the  latter  received  the  Bianchi  from  a  spirit  of 
opposition.  This  was  quite  enough  to  inoculate  all  Florence 
with  the  Pistoian  parties,  and  the  whole  families  of  distinction 
became  ranged  against  each  other  as  Bianchi  or  Neri ;  but  with 
so  little  regard  to  anything  like  principle,  or  opinion,  or  consist- 
ency, that  the  Bianchi,  who  were  for  the  new  as  against  the  old 
nobility — the  Grossi  popolani  as  against  the  nobles — were  all 
Ghibellines,  whose  principles  were  aristocratic,  hostile  to  all  po- 
pular encroachments,  and  favourable  to  even  absolute  power, 
certainly  to  the  ancient  estabUshed  order  of  things ;  while  the  Neri, 
who  held  by  the  rights  of  the  ancient  nobility,  and  were  the  pa- 
trician party,  were  all  Guelfs,  whose  principle  it  was  to  take  part 
with  the  people  as  against  the  aristocracy,  and  to  favour  popular 
government. 

The  only  other  change  that  took  place  in  the  constitution  of 
]282,  after  the  ordinance  excluding  the  nobles,  related  to  the 
manner  of  choosing  the  seignory,  and  it  was  of  great  importance. 
Ever  since  that  constitution  was  established,  the  electoral  body 
had  continued  the  same  as  we  have  described  it,  namely,  the  late 
priors,  the  police  chiefs  or  gonfalonieri  of  the  quarters,  the  councils 
of  crafts  and  adjuncts ;  and  the  elections  were  six  times  a-year. 
In  1323,  when  there  was  a  great  pressure  upon  the  country  from 
foreign  war,  the  seignory,  having  gained  much  credit  with  all  the 
people  by  the  discovery  of  several  plots  among  the  nobles,  took 
upon  themselves,  in  concert  with  the  adjuncts,  to  name,  instead  of 
six  succeeding  priors,  one  hundred  and  twenty-six,  who  should 
every  two  months  rise  by  lot  to  the  six  vacant  places — thus 
anticipating  the  elections  for  three  years  and  a  half  The  same 
principle  was  soon  after  applied  to  the  offices  of  gonfalonieri  di 
giustizia,  to  that  of  the  twelve  prudhommes  or  councillors  of  the 
priors,  and  to  the  college  of  sixteen  gonfalonieri.  Thus  seven 
hundred  and  thirty-five  persons  were  selected  at  once  and  by  one 


350  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE.  CH.  XXVI. 

set  of  electors ;  and  out  of  these,  every  two  months,  thirty-five  were 
drawn  by  lot ;  so  that  for  three  years  and  a  half  no  discretion 
whatever  could  be  exercised  by  any  of  those  having  the  right  of 
selection.  These  priori,  belonging  to  the  popolani  grossi,  of 
course  selected  their  creatures  for  these  places.  These  popolani 
grossi  had  now  so  far  monopolized  the  chief  power,  that  Florence 
might  be  said  to  be  entirely  governed  by  a  burgher  oligarchy, 
and  about  the  year  1340  it  was  understood  that  twelve  of  those 
powerful  citizens  engrossed  the  whole  authority  of  the  state  and 
named  to  all  its  offices.  They  took  upon  themselves  the  creation 
of  a  new  magistrate,  a  kind  of  chief  judge  ;  and  they  appointed  a 
captain,  with  high  powers,  to  command  a  guard  for  the  govern- 
ment 

Two  years  after,  this  example  was  followed  by  the  people,  who 
became  enraged  at  the  failure  of  an  attack  upon  Lucca,  and  chose 
the  Duke  of  Athens  captain  of  justice  and  commander  in  chief. 
The  oligarchy  are  accused  of  having  secretly  urged  on  the  duke 
to  acts  of  cruelty  and  oppression  against  their  adversaries,  the 
nobles  and  the  people,  in  order  to  divert  their  attention  from  their 
own  misconduct.  However,  it  is  certain  that  he  turned  upon 
themselves  and  made  severe  examples  of  several.  Soon  after  it 
was  found  that  those  burgher  chiefs  had  been  appropriating  public 
money  without  account,  and  the  nobles  and  the  rich  merchants, 
whom  the  oligarchy  excluded  from  office,  joined  the  mob  in 
giving  absolute  power  for  life  to  the  duke.  It  is  true  he  held  it 
but  for  a  year,  being  driven  away  in  consequence  of  his  sordid 
exactions,  his  oppressive  and  offensive  conduct,  and  the  tyranny 
and  perfidy  which  he  exercised  towards  all  classes  in  succession 
after  having  filled  every  place  with  the  very  scum  of  the  people. 
But  the  nation,  having  once  voluntarily  submitted  to  the  dominion 
of  a  sovereign,  was  prepared  for  any  tyranny  that  could  be  dis- 
guised under  plausible  pretexts,  designated  by  inoflfensive  names, 
assumed  by  slow  degrees,  and  exercised  without  needless  se- 
verity— a  memorable  though  a  very  ordinary  example  of  the 
manner  in  which  despotism  creeps  upon  a  community  where  the 
genuine  spirit  of  liberty  has  been  extinguished  by  the  debasement 
of  national  character,  or  perverted  by  the  arts  of  party. 

The  losses  sustained  by  the  republic  during  the  government  of 
the  duke  have  perhaps  been  overrated,  yet  they  were  very  consi- 
derable :  for,  beside  losing  all  the  conquests  in  Lucca,  Pistoia, 


CH.  XXVI.  FOLLY  OF  THE  NOBLES.  351 

Volterra,  Arezzo,  that  base  and  vulgar  tyrant  had  nearly  trebled 
the  land-tax,  robbed  the  public  creditor  of  the  funds  assigned  for 
his  security,  grievously  increased  the  other  taxes,  and  in  the  short 
space  of  ten  months  appropriated  a  sum  equal  to  half  a  million  of 
our  present  money,  great  part  of  which  he  had  vested  in  foreign 
funds. 

If  the  nobles  had  conducted  themselves  with  ordinary  prudence, 
they  would  certainly  have  obtained  a  repeal  of  the  infamous 
Ordinance,  as  soon  as  they  had,  with  the  assistance  of  the  people, 
overthrown  the  tyrant  whom  the  mob  had,  but  with  their  assent, 
set  up.  The  ordinance  was  in  fact  suspended  in  their  favour,  and 
they  were  admitted  to  one-third  of  the  public  employments  ;  when 
their  revenge  for  so  long  an  exclusion  burst  forth  in  acts  of  vio- 
lence against  the  other  orders,  and  led  to  an  immediate  re-enact- 
ment of  the  ordinance,  in  all  its  unmitigated  injustice.  Civil  war 
ensued  ;  the  nobles  were  defeated,  many  of  their  palaces  pillaged 
and  burnt,  and  all  that  remained  of  the  changes  which  had  been 
effected  in  the  ordinance  was  the  erasing  from  the  noble  list  be- 
tween five  hundred  and  six  hundred  families — either  those  whose 
poverty  made  them  rather  tools  in  the  hands  of  others  than  for- 
midable in  themselves,  or  those  whose  conduct  towards  the  com- 
mons appeared  to  have  merited  this  favour.  Some  of  the  greatest 
families  received  this  mark  of  distinction,  and  becoming  com- 
moners were  thenceforth  rendered  again  capable  of  holding  office. 
The  division  of  the  city  into  four  equal  quarters,  instead  of  six 
very  unequal,  was  a  material  improvement  introduced  at  the  same 
time,  and  the  seignory  was  composed  of  the  gonfalonier  with 
eight  priors,  two  from  each  quarter.  The  council  of  the  seignory 
was  to  consist  of  twelve  citizens  and  sixteen  chiefs  of  companies. 
But  the  most  remarkable  part  of  the  change  was  the  provision 
that,  of  the  nine  constituting  the  seignory,  three  should  be  taken 
from  each  class  of  burghers — for,  in  fact,  the  commoners  were  now 
divided  not  into  two  ranks  merely,  the  grossi  and  the  inferior  ones, 
but  into  three  ;  those  below  the  grossi  having  become  separated 
into  the  middle  classes  and  the  artisans.  Such  is  the  inevitable 
tendency  of  the  Natural  Aristocracy  to  create  divisions,  and  so  cer- 
tainly do  those  who  get  a  little  above  others  endeavour  to  act  like 
their  superiors  and  to  look  down  upon  those  beneath  them.  The 
middle  burghers,  in  all  probability,  were  now  as  much  disliked  by 
the  artisans  as  they  disliked  the  grossi— and  they  probably  looked 


352  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE.         CH.  XXVI. 

down  upon  the  artisans  as  much  as  they  were  looked  down  upon 
by  the  grossi. 

These  dissensions,  and  the  old  difference  of  Guelfs  and  Ghibel- 
lines  combined  to  create,  in  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
the  parties  of  AJhizzi  and  Ricci,  the  occasion  as  usual  being  a 
family  quarrel,  through  which  the  elements  of  the  discord  pre- 
viously existing  only  found  a  vent.  The  Albizzi,  though  of  the 
Guelf  or  hberal  and  democratic  party,  were  the  supporters  of  the 
popular  nobility,  or  new  aristocracy  ;  the  Ricci,  though  Ghibel- 
lines,  headed  the  democratic  party,  or  those  opposed  to  the  popo- 
lani  grossi  and  attached  to  the  middle  and  lower  classes.  Yet 
both  parties  had  for  their  leaders  famihes  of  the  same  new  nobihty, 
whose  members  were  playing  the  same  game  with  their  inferiors 
against  one  another  as  had  so  often  been  played  by  the  conflicting 
parties  of  the  real  and  old  nobihty  both  in  this  and  other  states. 
The  most  outrageous  proceedings  were  the  result  of  these  fac- 
tious struggles,  and  upon  one  occasion  the  very  rabble  took  the 
lead  against  both  parties,  banding  themselves  under  the  name  of 
Ciampi,  and  terrifpng  the  government  into  an  unconditional  sur- 
render of  the  whole  constitution  and  the  establishment  of  mob 
government  by  law.  The  repubhc  was  tossed  about  from  one  set 
of  rebels  to  another  in  a  state  of  constant  anarchy  for  three  years, 
from  1378  to  1381.  But  the  influence  of  the  Albizzi  party  was 
finally  established,  and  it  governed  the  state  for  above  half  a  cen- 
tury with  great  success,  extraordinary  ability,  and  as  much  vii-tue 
as  could  well  be  expected  in  that  age  and  among  that  people. 

The  triumph  of  aristocratic  government  is  perhaps  more  justly 
to  be  marked  in  the  history  of  Florence  during  that  celebrated 
period  than  even  in  the  more  extended  annals  of  the  Venetian 
polity.  The  burgher  patricians  could  not  be  accused  of  infringing 
the  rights  of  the  other  orders,  or  of  assuming  either  power  or 
wealth  at  the  expense  of  their  interests.  At  home  their  govern- 
ment was  moderate,  and  it  was,  generally  speaking,  vigorous.  In 
foreign  affairs  it  was  distinguished  by  an  enlarged  and  disinterested 
policy,  which,  while  it  raised  the  name  and  influence  of  the  re- 
public, successively  checked  the  conquests  of  the  Visconti  and  of 
Naples,  and  consulted  the  interests  of  all  Italy  by  Avisely  taking 
the  course  that  prevented  encroachments  in  one  quarter,  and 
afforded  everywhere  protection  to  national  independence.  The 
origin  of  those  achievements  which  Tuscany  made  in  letters  and 


CH.  XXVI.  GRANDEUR  OF  FLORENCE.  '353 

the  arts  may  be  also  mainly  traced  to  the  same  period,  although, 
as  we  have  so  often  had  occasion  to  observe  in  other  countries,  the 
merit  was  afterwards  ascribed  to  those  who  succeeded,  namely,  the 
Medici,  and  who  reaped  the  harvest  prepared  by  the  preceding  age. 
But  it  is  to  be  well  noted  in  commemorating  the  glories  of  the  Flo- 
rentine aristocracy,  that  these  dreadful  scenes  of  strife  and  pillage 
and  bloodshed,  in  which  the  reign  of  the  Albizzi  began,  had  their 
origin  in  the  contentions  of  the  leading  families  of  the  new  nobility, 
and  that  even  the  mob  revolt  of  the  ciompi  was  instigated  by  the 
proceedings  of  the  Ricci,  particularly  Salvestro  dei  Medici.  It 
may  be  well  to  remark  further  the  pitch  of  wealth  and  grandeur 
which  Florence  had  reached  under  its  popular  government,  and  at 
which  not  all  the  turbulence  of  its  democracy,  nor  the  factions 
wherewith  its  aristocracy  had  distracted  the  community,  had 
prevented  its  industrious  people  and  skilful  traders  from  arriv- 
ing, under  the  happy  influence  of  free  institutions. 

There  were  in  the  whole  state  little  above  600,000  inhabitants, 
of  whom  150,000  belonged  to  the  city;  but  more  than  100,000 
of  these  were  enrolled  as  militia.  In  time  of  war,  the  lepublic, 
conscious  of  the  want  of  military  valour,  which  distinguished  its 
subjects  as  much  as  did  their  political  courage,  employed  merce- 
nary troops,  and  incurred  heavy  debts  ;  but  in  peace,  when  these 
were  discharged,  the  revenue  was  six  times  greater  than  the  ex- 
penditure, and  the  debts  were  rapidly  extinguished.  None  of  the 
native  magistrates  or  ministers  received  any  other  reward  than  the 
gratification  of  their  ambition,  and  the  satisfaction  of  discharging 
a  public  duty.  In  fact  all  were  actively  engaged  in  the  lucrative 
pursillts  of  commerce  and  manufactures.  The  yearly  produce  of 
the  woollen  trade,  the  great  staple  of  the  country,  was  equal  to 
two  millions  of  our  present  money  ;  the  ships  of  the  republic  were 
seen  in  every  sea,  the  merchants  in  every  trading  city  ;  the  capital- 
ists had  the  command  of  almost  all  the  changes  in  Europe,  and 
could  influence  most  of  its  courts ;  there  were  no  less  than  eighty 
bankers  and  dealers  in  money  belonging  to  the  city ;  and  the 
yearly  coinage  greatly  exceeded  half  a  million  of  our  money. 
These  things  however  were  more  nearly  akin  to  the  pursuits  of 
traders  than  other  branches  of  industry,  and  the  more^  liberal  pur- 
suits, in  which  even  during  the  most  democratic  period  of  their 
history  the  Florentines  excelled  Nowhere  was  agriculture  in  all 
its  departments  more  liberally  protected,  more  strenuously  or  more 
PART  II.  2  A 


354  GOVERNMENT  OF  FLORENCE.  CH.  XXVI. 

successfully  pursued.  The  feudal  nobles  had  no  reason  to  pride 
themselves  upon  any  superiority  in  this  respect.  On  the  contrary, 
the  country  smiled  chiefly  under  the  rule  of  the  burgher  govern- 
ment ;  and  it  was  universally  allowed  that  the  eye  could  at  once 
distinguish  between  the  lands  held  as  fiefs,  and  those  of  rich 
merchants,  by  the  far  higher  state  of  culture  in  which  the  latter 
uniformly  were  found.  The  leading  families,  truly  termed  mer- 
chant-princes, cultivated  literature,  science,  all  the  fine  arts,  and 
were  the  patrons  of  genius  in  every  department.  The  democratic 
government  had,  before  the  temporary  surrender  of  the  state  to 
the  Duke  of  Athens,  and  the  more  permanent  establishment,  first 
of  the  aristocracy,  and  then  of  the  tyrannical  sovereignty,  extended 
the  power  of  the  republic,  by  conquest  and  by  negociation,  over 
most  of  the  Tuscan  states ;  had  frustrated  all  the  attempts  of 
Milan  to  overpower  it ;  had  resisted  the  imperial  aggressions,  par- 
ticularly in  Henry  VII.'s  time,  when  it  formed  the  league  which 
secured  the  independence  of  all  Italy ;  had  checked  the  Scalas  in 
their  ustirpations,  and  saved  the  principality  of  Padua  from  their 
domination.  It  is  certain  that  the  democratic  power  in  no  other 
Italian  commonwealth  was  attended  with  so  wise  and  vigorous  an 
administration,  and  in  none  produced  so  few  of  the  evils  in  foreign 
affairs  inseparable  from  that  scheme  of  polity. 

The  government  of  Florence,  after  the  period  which  we  have 
been  considering,  became  monarchical,  and  belongs  to  the  former 
part  of  this  work.  It  has  accordingly  been  already  examined, 
as  have  also  been  the  steps  by  which  the  commonwealth  was 
destroyed. 


CH.  XXVII.  PISA.  355 


CHAPTER  XXYII. 

LESSER  ITALIAN  GOVERNMENTS— PISA— BOLOGNA— SIENNA- 
LUCCA — SAN  MARINO. 


Want  of  Information  respecting  Pisa. 

Bologna — Early  Charter  and  Government — Early  regularity  of  the  Constitution 
— Consuls  ;  Councils ;  Podesta ;  Public  Orators — Party  Feuds. 

Sienna — Aristocracy  never  entirely  extinguished — Consuls  ;  Podesta  ;  Council — 
Oligarchy  established ;  steps  of  the  transition — Intrigues  of  the  Oligarchs  with 
Foreign  Powers — Oligarchs  overthrown — Burgher  Aristocracy  and  Oligarchy — 
Government  falls  into  the  hands  of  the  lowest  Class — Surrender  to  Viscouti — 
Factious  Turbulence  and  Revolutions — Petrucci's  Power — Five  Orders  recognised 
— Duke  of  Calabria — Mob  Oligarchy — Revolution  and  New  Government — Dicta- 
torship, and  Destruction  of  this  Constitution — Government  of  Spain  and  France 
alternately — Union  with  Tuscany — Real  duration  of  Siennese  Oligarcliy. 

LcccA — Revolutions  deserving  of  attention — Early  Government  and  Parties — Cas- 
truccio  Castracani's  Services  and  Usurpation — Good  Conduct  of  the  Lucchese— 
Anziani;  Gonfaloniere ;  College;  Great  Council — Practical  Oligarchy — Paul 
Giunigi — His  great  Merit — Cruel  Fate — Republic  restored — Perfidy  and  Conquest 
of  the  Medici — Martinian  law — Oligarchy  finally  established — Its  permanence. 

San  Marino — Antiquity  of  its  government — Extent  and  Population — Constitution  ; 
Anziani ;  Senate  ;  Gonfaloniere  ;  Capitani — Judicial  Authority. 

It  would  be  useless,  and  indeed  in  most  instances  only  give  rise 
to  repetitions  of  the  same  remarks,  upon  almost  the  same  facts, 
were  we  to  examine  in  detail  the  constitutions  and  the  history  of 
the  other  Italian  commonwealths.  The  one  which,  after  those  we 
have  been  considering,  may  be  most  calculated  to  interest  the 
poHtical  observer,  is  Pisa,  from  the  very  early  period  at  which 
her  commercial  importance  was  established,  and  from  the  lead 
which  she  took  in  the  cultivation  of  the  arts,  occupying  a  position 
extraordinarily  disproportioned  to  her  natural  resources.  But 
unfortunately  there  is  no  one  of  the  Italian  states  respecting 
which  we  have  so  little  authentic  information.  The  period  of  her 
prosperity  was  from  the  eleventh  to  the  thirteenth  century,  before 
the  end  of  which  she  had  fallen  into  complete  decline.  But  no 
native  historian  has  treated  of  her  affairs  at  any  time,  and  what 
we  know  of  them  is  gathered  from  very  scanty  notices,  occasionally 
given  by  writers,  all  of  whom  belonged  to  the  countries  of  her 

2  a2 


356  .  GOVERNMENT  OF  BOLOGNA.  CH.  XXVIl. 

enemies  and  rivals.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  her  constitution 
was  nearly  the  same  with  the  early  ones  of  Florence  and  other 
towns,  and  that  the  same  dissensions  prevailed  among  her  nobles 
and  burghers. 


On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  one  of  the  early  governments  of 
which  we  have  more  detailed  information  than  we  possess  of  the 
Bolognese.  At  the  beginning  of  the  twelfth  century  Bologna 
received  from  the  Emperor  Henry  V.  a  municipal  charter,  giving 
it  the  right  of  coinage,  and  of  choosing  its  consuls  and  other 
magistrates.  They  were  to  be  taken  from  the  nobles ;  and  the 
judges  were  to  administer  justice  in  the  emperor's  name.  There 
was  the  usual  division  of  the  town  into  quarters  or  wards,  the 
usual  command  of  the  militia  in  each  by  its  gonfaloniere,  or 
■  standard-bearer,  the  usual  opposition  of  the  country  to  the  civic 
nobles,  and  the  enrolment  of  the  former  ultimately  among  the 
citizens.  At  the  end  of  the  war  between  the  Emperor  Frederick 
and  the  Lombard  league,  we  find  the  government  at  Bologna  a  lead- 
ing member  of  that  league ,  described  as  reduced  to  a  more  fixed  and 
better  defined  state  than  that  of  almost  any  other  commonwealth 
— a  condition  which  it  had  attained  some  time  before,  but  in  all 
probability  by  slow  degrees,  so  that  the  exact  period  cannot  truly 
be  assigned  with  the  accuracy  which  some  "svriters  have  affected. 
The  General  Council  was  composed  of  all  citizens  eighteen  years 
old,  excluding  only  the  lowest  citizens  and  labourers  ;  the  Special 
or  Lesser  Council  consisted  of  six  hundred  citizens,  and  the  exe- 
cutive, or  Credenza,  was  not  numerous,  but  all  lawyers  had  a  right 
to  seats  in  it.  The  members  of  the  special  council  and  credenza 
were  named  yearly,  by  ten  persons  in  each  of  the  four  tribes  into 
which  the  inhabitants  were  divided  ;  these  ten  were  drawm  by  lot, 
and  selected  the  councillors  of  their  tribe.  Nothing  is  known  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  consuls  were  chosen  ;  the  podesta  was  a 
foreigner,  annually  appointed  by  forty  members  of  the  General 
and  Special  councils ;  these  were  drawn  by  lot,  and  enclosed  in  a 
kind  of  conclave,  but  obliged  to  make  their  choice  by  a  majority 
of  twenty-seven,  within  twenty-four  hours,  or  they  lost  their  right 
of  election.  The  councils  generally  named  the  town  from  which 
he  was  to  be  taken,  and  the  law  required  that  he  should  have  no 
relationship  A\ith  any  of  the  electors,  thus  leaving  it  to  chance 


CH.  XXVII.  JTACTIONS — LOSS  OF  LIBERTY.  '357 

whether  the  fittest  persons  should  not  be  excluded.  The  law 
likewise  required  that  he  should  be  a  noble,  thirty-six  years  of 
age,  and  having  no  landed  property  in  the  state.  The  consuls 
and  podesta,  or  some  one  by  their  leave,  could  alone  make  any 
proposition  to  the  councils  ;  and  nothing  was  binding  on  the  com- 
munity without  the  consent  of  all  the  councils.  In  general  tlie 
measures  propounded  by  the  consuls,  or  podesta,  were  only  dis- 
cussed by  four  public  orators,  the  rest  of  the  meeting  having  little 
more  to  do  than  ballot  for  its  adoption  or  rejection. 

The  same  war  of  party,  as  in  other  states,  distracted  and  ex- 
hausted Bologna.  The  Guelfs  were  led  by  the  Gierenci  family, 
the  Ghibellines  by  the  Lambertazzi ;  and  after  a  succession  of 
ordinary  hostilities,  with  little  bloodshed,  the  amour  of  a  Lamber- 
tazzi with  a  Gierenci,  followed  as  was  usual  with  an  assassination, 
produced  an  open  rupture,  in  which  all  the  nobles  and  many  of 
the  commons  took  part.  The  Gierenci,  having  captured  all  the 
fortified  houses  of  their  adversaries,  obtained  a  sentence  of  banish  - 
ment,  of  which  12,000  according  to  one  account,  15,000  accord- 
ing to  another,  were  expelled,  their  property  confiscated,  and  their 
houses  razed  to  the  ground.  Both  parties  had  called  in  foreign 
assistance,  and  the  Lambertazzi,  after  their  expulsion,  fought 
against  their  country,  in  union  with  the  refugee  Ghibellines  from 
all  other  parts  of  Italy.  The  victorious  party  of  the  Gierenci  had 
to  protect  themselves  by  the  aid,  first  of  the  pope,  then  of  the 
Viscontis,  which  they  purchased  with  the  surrender  of  the  com- 
monwealth's independence ;  and  we  have  seen  (Part  i.,  Chap,  xviii.) 
by  what  steps  the  alternate  anarchy  and  dangers  of  the  state  led 
at  Bologna  to  the  loss  of  its  independence,  as  well  as  its  liberties. 


Sienna  presents  few  peculiarities  to  distinguish  its  early  political 
history  from  that  of  the  other  commonwealths.  It  was  a  bishop's 
see  in  the  sixth  century.  In  the  contests  between  the  pope  and 
the  emperor  it  generally  took  the  Ghibelline,  or  imperial  side. 
The  government  was  republican,  and  resembled  that  of  Florence, 
and  after  the  aristocratic  period  the  people  obtained  the  chief 
power,  though  the  nobles  were  never  excluded  so  entirely  from 
the  administration  of  its  affairs  as  at  Florence,  owing  in  a  great 
measure  to  the  ascendant  of  the  Ghibelline  party,  and  the  support 
which  it  received  from  the  imperialists.  It  is  a  decisive  proof  of 
the  aristocratic  influence  never  having  been  entirely  subdued,  that 


358  GOVERNMENT  OF  SIENNA.  CH.  XXVII. 

when  the  Florentines  conquered  Sienna  in  1254,  they  and  their 
Guelf  allies  in  the  republic  left  the  government  entirely  un- 
changed ;  and  when,  four  years  after,  the  Ghibellines  were  banished 
from  Florence,  they  were  received  and  sheltered  in  Sienna,  where 
they  prepared  the  great  victory  which  was  afterwards  gained,  as 
we  have  seen,  at  Arbia.  The  government  was  vested  in  consuls, 
a  podesta,  and  a  council,  the  seignory  consisting  of  fifteen  inhabit- 
ants in  all.  Towards  the  latter  part  of  the  thirteenth  century  the 
Guelf  party  had  the  ascendant,  and  the  republic  joined  the  great 
Tuscan  league  against  Genoa,  in  which  Pisa  alone  refused  to  take 
a  part.  When  the  great  revolution  of  1282  changed  the  govern- 
ment of  Florence,  the  people  of  Sienna  immediately  after  followed 
the  example  of  their  powerful  neighbours.  In  place  of  the  coun- 
cil of  fifteen,  nine  officers  were  appointed,  under  the  name  of 
governors  and  defenders  of  the  people  :  they  were  all  to  be  taken 
from  the  burghers,  and  the  nobles  to  be  entirely  excluded  ;  their 
term  of  office  was,  as  at  Florence,  two  months ;  and,  like  the 
Florentine  priori,  they  were  lodged  together  and  maintained  at 
the  public  expense ;  finally,  they  were  chosen  for  each  of  the 
three  wards  or  quarters  of  the  city.  The  burghers  were  to  choose 
the  nine  defenders  ;  and  they  formed,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years 
after  this  constitution  was  established,  a  list  or  register  of  the 
families  to  whom  they  were  resolved  to  confine  the  elective  fran- 
chise, as  well  as  the  eligibility. 

The  manner  in  which  this  transition  to  oligarchy  was  effected 
deserves  oiu:  attention,  because  we  have  in  hardly  any  other 
instance  the  course  recorded  which  the  faction  pursued  in 
order  to  accomplish  its  monopoly  of  power.  The  General 
Council  of  the  people  were  the  electors,  and  it  consisted  of 
four  hundred.  At  first,  the  election  was  six  times  a  year,  but 
immediately  after  they  chose  the  whole  six  sets  at  once,  and, 
as  at  Florence,  drew  the  Nine  every  two  months  by  lot.  But 
those  first  chosen  having  the  right  to  attend  the  council,  and  to 
cause  a  new  election  as  soon  as  the  fifty-four  first  chosen  were  ex- 
hausted, these  combined  together  and  voted  against  any  new 
name  beiag  selected,  or  at  least  any  name  of  which  they  disap- 
proved, for  they  allowed  a  few  additions  occasionailly  to  be  made. 
The  votes  of  some  who  supported  them,  together  -w^th  their  o^vn, 
were  sure  to  defeat  those  who  desired  to  promote  other  persons, 
biit  who  did  not  act  with  the  same  concert  in  favour  of  the  same 
names.     We  have  in  our  own  times,  both  in  the  India  House  and 


CH.  XXVII.  OLIGARCHY — THE  NINE.  859 

in  the  ballots  for  secret  committees  in  parliament,  examples  of 
the  effect  of  a  house-list,  which  this  was.  The  whole  number  of 
the  persons  who  were  inscribed  in  this  list  was  under  ninety,  the 
number  of  families  probably  less  than  thirty.  There  was  thus  con- 
stituted a  class,  or  rank,  which  got  the  name  of  the  "  Mountain," 
or  "  Order  of  the  Nine"*  This  burgher  aristocracy  was  really 
an  oligarchy,  for  it  monopohzed  the  powers  of  government  to  the 
absolute  exclusion  of  a  portion  of  its  own  body.  The  privileged 
governing  class  soon  became  ahke  odious  to  the  nobles  and  the 
people,  and  especially  to  the  class  from  which  themselves  were 
taken.  Accordingly,  aware  of  their  unpopularity,  and  of  the  dan- 
ger to  which  it  exposed  them,  they  endeavoured  to  intrigue  with 
foreign  states  to  obtain  support,  and  at  any  rate  were  afraid  of 
taking  any  decided  course  which  could  shake  their  security. 
This  was  shown  in  all  their  relations  both  with  Milan  and  Flo- 
rence ;  but  in  1355  they  placed  the  republic  under  the  emperor's 
authority,  in  order  to  obtain  his  protection  for  their  own  usurped 
power.  Charles  IV.  however  found,  upon  arriving  at  Sienna, 
that  he  had  espoused  a  party  that  was  opposed  by  the  nobles,  the 
populace,  and  the  greater  number  of  the  wealthy  citizens,  and 
heard  nothing  but  cries  oi"  Death  to  the  iVme,"  wherever  he 
went,  coupled  with  favourable  expressions  towards  himself  He 
lost  no  time  in  abandoning  those  he  had  come  to  support,  and 
forfeiting  his  pledges  in  their  behalf;  he  suffered  the  mob  to  pil- 
lage their  houses,  insult  their  persons,  and  even  murder  them  as 
they  fled  ;  he  made  decrees  against  all  the  "  Order  of  the  Nine  ; " 
appointed  thirty  commissioners,  of  whom  twelve  were  nobles,  to 
reform  the  government  under  the  presidency  of  his  natural  brother ; 
and  left  lieutenants  to  maintain,  on  his  departure,  the  sovereign 
authority  he  had  obtained  by  his  treaty  with  the  Nine,  and  which 
he  did  not  think  fit  to  lay  down  upon  their  overthrow.  On  his 
return,  a  few  weeks  after,  having  meanwhile  been  crowned  at 
Rome,  he  made  no  other  stipulation  with  the  people,  except  that 
his  brother  should  have  the  seignory,  in  order  that  there  should 
be  some  one  to  arbitrate  between  the  conflicting  parties.  The 
government  had  been  settled  by  the  commission  in  his  absencoj 
and  had  pronounced  sentence  of  perpetual  exclusion  against  the 
Order  of  the  Nine,  vesting  the  administration  in  Twelve  burghers, 

*  Andrea,  Dei-Cronica  Sanese,  1283,  torn,  xv.,  p.  38 — Malavolti,  Storia,  Parte  II. 
lib.  iii.,  fol.  50— Mat.  Vil.,  iv.,  61,  p.  278. 


360  GOVERNMENT  OF  SIENNA.  CH.  XXVII. 

chosen  in  the  same  manner  and  at  the  same  time  as  the  Nine  had 
been,  but  adding  a  college  of  six  nobles  as  councillors  of  the 
seignory  or  the  twelve,  and  adding  one  hundred  and  fifty,  also 
nobles,  to  the  general  council  of  four  hundred.  No  sooner  had 
the  emperor  left  Sienna  than  the  people  rose  upon  his  brother 
and  drove  him  from  the  state,  thus  investing  the  Twelve  with 
supreme  authority.  For  they  pursued  exactly  the  same  course 
which  the  Nine  had  formerly  taken,  with  this  additional  circum- 
stance as  regards  their  brother  burghers,  that  they  began  their 
encroachments  with  a  positive  law  excluding  from  power  thirty  of 
the  firet  families  among  the  commoners.  They  succeeded,  how- 
ever, to  the  odium  as  well  as  to  the  authority  of  the  Nine,-  and 
endeavoured  to  protect  themselves  by  fomenting  divisions  among 
the  nobles,  to  whom  they  were  as  hateful  as  to  the  people.  A 
perfidious  attempt  of  this  kind  to  take  advantage  of  the  hereditary 
feud  between  the  Toloinei  and  SalimberH,  the  leading  families  of 
the  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines  respectively,  was  defeated  by  the  still 
greater  craft  of  the  nobles  themselves  ;  and  at  the  moment  when 
the  oligarchs  expected  to  see  a  conflict  between  the  forces  of  the 
feudal  vassals  and  the  imperialist  troops  of  which  they  had  the 
command,  both  armies  united  against  themselves,  together  with 
the  retainers  of  the  Nine,  and  many  of  the  people ;  and  they  were 
overthrown  after  a  reign  of  thirteen  years. 

The  nobles  now  endeavoured  to  restore  the  old  government 
under  the  consuls,  only  rendering  it  more  entirely  aristocratic,  by 
taking  ten  from  their  own  order  generally,  and  three  from  the 
Order  of  the  Nine.  The  people  rebelled  against  this  proposition, 
and  both  parties  having  appealed  to  Charles,  he  sent  a  force, 
which  the  nobles  would  have  defeated,  had  not  the  Twelve  and  the 
people  united  to  receive  the  imperial  troops,  driving  the  barons  to 
their  castles  in  the  country.  A  government  of  compromise  was 
now  formed  :  it  consisted  of  twelve,  taking  three  from  the  "  Order 
of  Nine,"  four  from  the  "Order  of  Twelve,'"  and  five  from  the  rest 
of  the  burghers,  who  were  formed  into,  a  third  order  called  "  the 
Reformers."*  The  two  councils  were  to  be  formed  of  the  orders 
in  the  same  proportions  ;  and  the  nobles  were  absolutely  excluded. 
An  imperial  lieutenant  (or  vicar)  was  placed  at  the  head-  of  the 
republic.      The   Twelve,   however,  raised   a   revolt   against    an 

*  Monte  dei  9— Monte  dei  12— and  Monte  dei  Riformatori.  — Malavolti,  Storin 
Sanese,  Part  II.,  lib.  vji. 


CH.  XXVII.         FACTIONS  — SURRENDEK  TO  VISCONTI.  361 

an-angement  far  too  equitable  to  suit  their  purpose  ;  and  failing 
in  their  design,  immediately  joined  the  emperor  in  his  base  and 
sordid  scheme  of  selling  Sienna  with  other  Tuscan  cities  to  the 
see  of  Kome.  The  general  council  having  thwarted  all  their  pro- 
ceedings, they  took  arms  against  the  rest  of  the  authorities  and 
were,  with  the  emperor,  signally  defeated.  The  nobles  now  made 
a  great  effort  to  regain  their  authority,  and  all  parties  agreed  in 
calling  in  the  mediation  of  Florence.  The  result  was  that  the 
nobles  were  recalled,  and  rendered  capable  of  holding  all  offices 
except  those  constituting  the  seignory.  The  proportion  was  fixed 
in  which  they  and  the  people  should  hold  the  inferior  magistracies. 
This  arrangement  did  not  last  long,  and  the  whole  power  was  soon 
usurped  by  the  Order  of  Reformers,  composed  of  the  lower  classes 
of  artisans.  Their  oppression  became  equally  unbearable  to  the 
nobles  and  the  rest  of  the  commimity.  The  orders  of  the  Nine 
and  the  Twelve  now  joined  the  nobles  against  them,  and  a  san- 
guinary struggle  ensued,  which  ended  in  driving  4000  of  the  un- 
popular order  and  its  partisans  out  of  the  town,  and  vesting  the 
government  in  the  orders  of  the  Nine  and  the  Twelve,  and  a  new 
order  formed  of  a  portion  of  the  lowest  class,  which  had  been  ex- 
cluded from  the  order  of  Reformers,  and  called  the  Order  of  the 
People  (monte  del  popolo).  This  happened  in  1385  ;  and  in  the 
course  of  the  next  two  or  three  years  the  old  enmity  against 
•Florence  broke  out  more  fiercely  than  ever,  and  the  Siennese 
actually  had  the  baseness  to  offer  their  sovereignty  to  John 
Galeazzo  Visconti,  in  the  hope  that  the  result  would  be  his  esta- 
blishing an  absolute  power  over  their  rivals  the  Florentines.  He 
deemed  it  prudent  to  refuse  it  for  the  present ;  but  after  continued 
wars  with  Florence,  and  still  more  after  the  weakness  induced  by 
the  folly  and  violence  of  the  government,  vested  in  the  lowest 
classes,  had  exhausted  the  country,  and  when  the  spirit  of  the 
people  was  broken  by  the  conflict  of  the  factions  and  the  tyranny 
of  the  successive  oligarchies,  Visconti  obtained  his  favourite  object, 
and  Sienna,  as  well  as  Pisa,  was  given  up  to  him,  and  held  in 
sovereignty  from  1399  until  his  death  in  1402. 

During  the  whole  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  first  half  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  the  history  of  Sienna  presents  a  constant  series  of 
factions  and  changes  ;  the  power  being  in  the  hands  sometimes  of 
one  order  of  the  burgesses,  sometimes  of  the  other ;  and  once,  for 
above  twenty  years,  in  the  hands  of  a  person  of  great  capacity, 


862  GOVERNMENT  OF  SIENNA.  CH.  XXVII. 

called  Petrucci,  of  an  ancient  family,  who  obtained  the  chief  in- 
fluence in  1439  over  the  executive  council  with  declaratory  powers 
(valia)  appointed  to  settle  the  state,  and  retained  it  through  the 
influence  of  the  French  monarch  Louis  XII.,  till  his  death  in 
1512.  There  were,  in  fact,  five  orders  now  recognised  at  Sienna; 
the  old,  or  country,  or  Feudal  Nobles ;  the  Nine,  or  one  body  of 
popular  nobles  ;  the  Twelve,  who  were  another  body  of  the  same 
class  ;  the  Reformers ;  and  the  People.  From  the  Nine,  the 
Twelve,  and  the  Reformers,  were  excluded  a  body  of  four  hundred 
wealthy  and  respectable  traders,  quite  fitted  in  all  respects  for 
holding  the  higher  stations;  the  jealousy  and  monopolizing  spirit  of 
the  government  kept  them  out  In  1403  a  coalition  was  effected 
of  the  Nine,  the  Reformers,  and  the  People ;  and  during  the  fif- 
teenth century  this  combination  excluded  all  the  rest.  These  three 
orders  by  turns  chose  the  gonfaloniere,  and  each  of  them  gave  their 
powers  to  the  seignory.  In  1408  and  1409  the  urgent  remon- 
strances of  Pius  II.  made  the  seignory  add  to  the  number  of  pri- 
vileged families  the  Picolomini,  and  open  to  the  nobles  a  part  of 
the  offices,  though  positively  refusing  to  include  the  order  of  the 
Twelve  in  the  permission.  In  1464,  however,  the  pope  died,  and 
the  admission  of  the  nobles  was  immediately  repealed.  During 
the  long  period  of  what  was  called  the  "  Trinity  "  government 
(that  is,  the  coalition  of  the  Nine,  the  Reformers,  and  the  People), 
the  affairs  of  the  country  had  been  upon  the  whole  tolerably  well* 
administered ;  but  the  usual  scope  had  been  given  to  foreign  in- 
trigue, and  the  Duke  of  Calabria  coming  in  force  to  Sienna  in 
1480,  was  only  prevented  from  annexing  it  to  Naples  by  the 
sudden  landing  of  the  Turkish  army  at  Otranto.  On  his  leaving 
the  city,  the  most  dreadful  contests,  burnings,  and  massacres  took 
place  among  the  Orders,  and  at  length,  in  1492,  a  resolution  was 
taken  to  have  but  one  order,  into  which  all  the  rest  should  be 
fused.  This,  however,  would  not  satisfy  the  democratic  party, 
who  insisted  on  a  line  being  drawn  for  the  purpose  of  excluding 
those  of  the  Orders  allowed  to  hold  office  who  had  any  patrician 
connexion.  A  complete  mob  oligarchy  was,  after  new  massacres, 
re-established,  and  with  this  the  Medici  family  treated  and  in- 
trigued. In  1 487  a  revolution  was  effected  without  bloodshed, 
and  the  Great  Council  was  now  to  consist  of  seven  hundred  and 
twenty,  one  hundred  and  eighty  to  be  chosen  by  the  Reformers, 
as  many  by  the  People,  as  many  by  the  Nine,  and  as  many  by 


CH.  XXVII.  SIENNESE  OLIGARCHY.  363 

the  Nobles  and  the  Twelve  jointly.  In  a  very  short  time,  how- 
ever, a  dictatorship  (or  valia)  of  twenty-four  was  appointed,  and 
this  new  constitution  was  at  once  swept  away, — with  the  usual 
accompaniments  of  such  changes,  the  bainshment  and  execution 
of  many  parties.  After  being  for  nearly  thirty  years  under  the 
protection,  that  is  under  the  government  of  Charles  V.,  and  Philip 
II.,  and  the  Kings  of  France,  and  having  sometimes  a  Spanish, 
sometimes  a  French,  garrison  introduced  to  quell  their  factions 
the  Siennese  finally  abandoned  even  the  forms  of  their  republican 
government  in  1557,  and  were  united  to  Tuscany. 

The  government  of  Sienna  certainly  presents  the  most  remark- 
able instance  of  an  oligarchy  continuing  for  a  great  length  of 
time.  Yet  it  did  not  in  reality  last  so  much  longer,  as  at  first  sight 
it  may  appear  to  have  done,  than  the  principles  might  have  led 
us  to  expect.  The  first  dominion  of  the  Nine  was  undoubtedly 
oligarchical,  and  it  continued  for  the  extraordinary  period  of 
above  seventy  years,  from  1283  to  1355.  The  government,  too, 
was  almost  constantly  oligarchical  during  the  rest  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  and  a  part  of  the  fifteenth.  But  the  same 
oligarchy  did  not  continue  in  power.  Thus  the  Twelve  who 
succeeded  the  Nine,  in  1355,  only  remained  thirteen  years  in 
power.  The  power  of  the  Reformers,  at  their  first  usurpation, 
did  not  last  so  long :  the  power  of  the  lowest  class,  the  Order 
of  the  People,  beside  being  shared  with  the  other  Orders  of  the 
Twelve  and  the  Nine,  was  interrupted  by  the  surrender  to  Vis- 
conti  before  it  had  lasted  above  a  few  years  ;  and  the  succeeding 
century  presents  us  with  a  succession  of  changes.  The  natural 
tendency  of  an  oligarchy,  therefore,  to  be  overthrown,  and  the 
great  difficulty  to  support  itself  which  that  government  must  ever 
have,  which,  from  its  nature,  must  unite  against  its  existence  all 
its  own  natural  supporters,  is  by  no  means  contradicted  by  any 
portion  of  Siennese  history,  except  only  the  earlier  period  when 
the  Nine  first  ruled.  In  all  other  respects  that,  as  well  as  the 
more  recent  period,  is  calculated  fully  to  confinn  whatever  has 
been  either  here  or  elsewhere  laid  down  respecting  the  tendency 
of  oligarchical  government,  or  rather  the  oligarchical  abuse  of  re- 
publican government,  to  injure  all  the  best  interests,  foreign  and 
domestic,  of  the  community. 


364  GOVERNMENT  OF  LUCCA.  CH.  XXVII. 

Tlie  small  state  of  Lucca  merits  a  particular  examination,  not 
only  on  account  of  its  early  progress  in  civilization  and  wealth, 
and  of  the  extraordinary  degree  in  which  it  swarmed  at  all  times 
with  inhabitants,  but  because  of  the  singular  political  measures 
which  at  different  periods  changed  its  government.  It  belonged, 
with  Florence,  Sienna,  and  all  the  other  towns,  except  Pisa,  to 
the  remarkable  association  of  which  we  have  already  spoken,  the 
Tuscan  League,  in  the  twelfth  century.  It  had  originaUy  an 
aristocratic,  then  a  republican  government,  like  the  other  states, 
and  was,  like  them,  a  prey  both  to  the  factions  of  its  own  families, 
and  to  the  more  general  divisions  in  which  aU  Italy  took  a  part 
Like  Florence  it  adopted  the  Pistoian  division  of  the  Biaiichi  and 
Neri,  and  these  parties  experienced  the  same  numerous  and 
sudden  reverses  in  Lucca  as  elsewhere.  When  the  Bianchi,  or 
Ghibellines,  were  banished  in  1301,  and  an  aristocratic  govern- 
ment was  formed,  the  principal  influence  in  the  state  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Obizei  family  ;  but  they  became  odious  to  the  people 
as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  nobles,  and  a  combination  of  the  two 
classes  overthrew  them,  and  recalled  the  Guelfs  in  1314.  Cas- 
truccio  Castracani,  of  whom  we  have  already  spoken  (Part  il., 
Chapter  XVIIL),  intrigued  vnth.  the  Pisan  chiefs  to  further  his 
own  designs  upon  the  sovereignty,  but  afterwards  defended  Lucca 
against  them,  and  was  made  captain  of  the  people  and  the  forces. 
He  was  chosen  three  successive  years  to  the  office,  and,  having 
gained  the  favour  of  the  common  people,  and  gratified  them  by 
assisting  to  banish  the  Guelfs,  he  openly  claimed  the  absolute 
sovereignty,  which  the  senate  conferred  upon  him  by  a  majority 
of  two  hundred  and  nine,  out  of  two  hundred  and  ten  who  voted 
on  his  proposition.  The  magistrates  were  chosen  as  before,  the 
outward  forms  of  the  constitution  being  maintained  by  him,  as  it 
always  was  by  usurpers  in  Italian  commonwealths,  at  least  for 
some  time  after  they  obtained  the  chief  power,  but  generally,  also 
in  name,  even  after  they  had  engrossed  all  the  real  authority  to 
themselves.  In  1327  the  emperor  Lewis  of  Bavaria  erected 
Lucca,  Volterra,  and  Pistoia  into  a  duchy  for  liim  ;  but  next  year, 
with  his  accustomed  rapacity  and  faithlessness,  he  seized  Lucca, 
and  sold  it  to  another  branch  of  the  Castracani  family ;  and,  in 
the  course  of  forty  years,  it  was  made  the  subject  of  barter  and 
sale  seven  several  times  by  usurpers,  princes,  and  mercenary  cap- 
tains.     From  the  year   1342  it  was  siurendered  to  Pisa,  but 


CH.  XXVII.  LUCCIIESK  OLIGARCHY.  365 

finally,  in  1369,  Charles  IV.,  for  a  large  sum  (equal  to  nearly 
half  a  million  of  our  present  money),  established  its  independence, 
resting  the  government  in  ten  anziani,  as  before.  It  has  ever 
been  esteemed  a  singular  merit  in  the  Lucca  people  that,  during 
the  fifty-five  years  of  their  subjugation,  they  retained  the  constant 
resolution,  if  possible,  to  regain  their  independence,  and  that  no 
other  people  either  kept  so  free  from  foreign  intrigue,  or  so  uni- 
versally maintained  their  courage  and  hopes  under  adverse  for- 
tune. 

The  government  was  now  in  some  degree  changed,  but  its  fun- 
damental principles  remained  the  same  as  before  the  subjugation. 
In  1323  the  Florentine  plan  had  been  adopted  of  choosing  magis- 
trates at  once  for  several  elections,  and  then  drawing  their  names 
by  lot,  and  this  practice  continued  ever  after.  The  people  were 
now  distributed  into  three  tribes,  instead  of  the  city  being  divided 
into  wards  as  before.  The  executive  government,  or  seignory, 
consisted  of  a  gonfaloniere  and  nine  anziani,  three  for  each  tribe  ; 
these  all  remained  in  office  for  two  months,  and  were  obliged 
then  either  to  retire  altogether,  or  change  their  offices.  There 
was  a  college,  or  lesser  council,  of  thirty-six,  chosen  for  six 
months ;  and  a  great,  or  general  council,  originally  of  two  hun- 
dred, afterwards  of  ninety,  chosen  yearly.  The  members  of  these 
different  bodies,  in  effect,  chose  their  successors,  and  consequently 
always  remained  in  office,  with  the  single  change  of  going  out  for 
a  while,  to  comply  with  the  law.  The  nobles  were  absolutely 
excluded  from  all  offices  and  all  councils.  This  kind  of  rotation, 
by  which  the  same  persons  continued  to  remain  always  in  place, 
was  known  among  the  Florentines  by  the  nickname  of  the  "  little 
circle  government "  (signoria  del  cerchioUno).  Among  the  families 
to  whom  this  practical  oligarchy  gave  the  principal  control,  the 
most  powerful  was  that  of  the  Giunigi ;  they  gradually  obtained 
an  almost  unbounded  influence  ;  and  thirty  years  after  the  Luc- 
chese  independence  had  been  restored,  the  plague  having  carried 
off  most  of  their  leading  men,  Paul  Giunigi  took  advantage  of 
his  family's  power  in  the  republic,  and  the  accidental  absence  of 
all  competition,  to  usurp  the  sovereignty,  and  abolish  the  places 
of  anziani  altogether,  in  nearly  the  same  way  in  which  Benti- 
voglio  soon  after,  in  similar  circumstances,  usurped  absolute  power 
at  Bologna.     None  of  the  Italian  tyrants,  subverters  of  the  com- 


GOVERNMENT  OF  LUCCA-  CH.  XXVII. 

monwealth,  is  spoken  of  with  such  contempt  as  this  individual, 
as  if  the  want  of  showy  talents,  and  the  administering  of  a  people's 
affairs  without  brilliant  exploits,  were  a  disgrace  to  a  prince 
and  a  discredit  to  his  subjects.  For  thirty  years  he  maintained 
peace  and  good  order  at  home,  avoided  all  foreign  wars,  intro- 
duced many  wholesome  laws,  which  long  survived  his  age,  and 
appeal^  to  have  been  among  the  very  best,  though  also  the  most 
obscure,  of  the  sovereigns  who  governed  Italy,  or  indeed  Europe, 
in  modern  times.  When  he  could  no  longer  avoid  war,  and  the 
country  was  invaded  by  Florence,  he  made  as  gallant  and  obsti- 
nate a  resistance  as  ever  was  offered  to  unprincipled  aggression  ; 
and  his  reign  was  only  cut  short  by  a  foul  conspiracy,"  which 
those  who  favoured  a  surrender  to  the  enemy  assisted.  He  was 
seized  and  sent  to  Milan  a  prisoner,  and  ended  his  days  in  a 
dungeon. 

The  old  republican  government  was  immediately  restored,  and 
lasted,  with  few  changes,  down  to  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth 
century  (1551),  when  the  discontent  of  the  workmen  at  laws 
made  to  favour  the  masters  produced  a  revolt,  and  they  were 
appeased  by  adding  to  the  general  council  a  proportion  of  wealthy 
or  respectable  persons  not  belonging  to  the  class  of  popular  or 
burgher  nobles.  But  the  next  year,  the  government  having 
obtained  a  body-guard,  and  being  aided  by  the  mihtia  of  the 
country  districts,  this  law  was  repealed,  and  the  former  exclusive 
system  restored.  In  1 554  the  imperialists  in  league  with  Cos- 
mo L,  of  Florence  (Medici),  having  overpowered  Sienna,  and 
reduced  it  by  famine  to  capitulate,  on  the  solemn  promise  of  pre- . 
serving  its  Hberty  and  constitution,  and  this  promise  having  been 
shamefully  broken,  so  that  Sienna  was,  with  the  rest  of  the  Tus- 
can states,  entirely  subjugated  ;  a  law  was  proposed  and  adopted, 
called,  from  its  author,  Martino  Bernadini,  the  Martinian  law,  by 
which  all  persons  were  absolutely  and  perpetually  excluded  from 
office  who  were  either  born  out  of  the  city,  or  who  were  sons  of 
such,  or  of  any  country  proprietor.  The  practical  result  of  this 
regulation  (B.  An.  Loc.  lib.  xv.)  was  to  vest  the  government  en- 
tirely in  the  hands  of  a  limited  number  of  families,  who  could 
never  be  increased,  and  it  engrossed  the  government  as  completely 
as  the  famous  Serrata  did  that  of  Venice.  The  result  was  that  in 
1 600  there  were  only  one  hundred  and  eighty-six  families  capable 


CH.  XXVII.  SAN  MARINO.  867 

of  holding  office  ;  and  in  1797,  on  the  French  invasion,  only 
eighty-eight — in  fact  not  enough  to  afford  the  number  of  persons 
wanted  to  fill  all  the  offices  in  the  republic. 


There  still  exists,  after  the  utter  subversion  of  all  other  com- 
monwealths, a  small  republic,  with  a  mixed  aristocratical  govern- 
ment, which  we  may  shortly  describe  in  this  place,  though  it 
ought  perhaps  to  have  been  treated  of  under  another  head.  The 
state  of  San  Marino  has  survived  all  the  changes  which  the  rest 
of  Italy  underwent,  first  in  the  dark  ages,  then  in  the  times  of 
struggle  between  the  emperor  and  the  papal  see,  afterwards  in 
the  foreign  aggressions  which  changed  the  possession,  and  the 
domestic  usurpations  which  altered  the  government,  of  all  the  other 
commonwealths,  and  lastly  in  the  revolutionary  times  near  our 
own  day.  It  is  in  truth  the  smallest  and  the  most  ancient  govern- 
ment in  Europe,  dating  its  commencement  from  the  eighth  cen- 
tury, if  we  count  it  as  founded  when  the  town  was  built,  or  from 
the  tenth,  if  we  date  it  by  the  time  when  it  became  walled 
for  defence.  The  small  extent  and  importance  of  this  district 
has  been  the  cause  of  its  escaping  the  general  fate.  The  popes 
frequently  attempted  to  seize  possession  of  it,  and  it  took  part 
with  the  Ghibellines,  or  imperialists.  Innocent  IV.  laid  it  under 
excommunication  ;  and  at  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  the 
rector  sent  by  Boniface  VIII.  to  govern  that  part  of  Romagna, 
Urbino,  in  which  San  Marino  lies,  sent  a  vicar,  or  lieutenant,  to 
Montefeltro,  of  which  San  Marino  is  part,  in  order  to  enforce  the 
payment  of  dues  claimed  by  the  See  of  Rome.  The  inhabitants 
refused,  and  the  matter  being  referred  to  a  judge  of  Rimini,  a 
man  of  learning  and  probity,  he  decreed  that  the  republic  was, 
and  had  from  all  time  been,  independent.  A  charter  was  accord- 
ingly granted  to  it  by  the  papal  vicar.  The  popes  never  after- 
wards persevered  in  their  attempts  against  this  little  community ; 
Napoleon  gained  some  cheap  popularity  by  respecting  its  inde- 
pendence, when  he  overran  Italy  in  later  times  ;  and  on  the 
pope's  restoration  in  1814  the  independence  of  the  republic  was 
confirmed.  The  extent  of  the  territory  is  confined  to  twenty-seven 
square  miles,  chiefly  of  a  steep  mountain,  with  some  fertile 
valleys,  lying  about  ten  miles  from  the  Adriatic  coast :  it  has 
one  town,  and  7000  inhabitants  in  all. 


368  GOVERNMENT  OF  SAN  MARINO.  CH.  XXVII. 

The  govemtnent  of  San  Marino  is  vested  in  a  General  Council 
of  Anziani,  three  hundred  in  number,  and  an  executive  council, 
or  senate  of  twelve,  with  a  Gonfaloniere,  or  chief  magistrate,  who 
is  changed  every  three  months.  The  other  magistrates  are  called 
Capitani,  and  changed  half-yearly.  The  council  and  senate  are 
both  composed  half  of  nobles  and  half  of  burgesses ;  but  when 
any  affair  of  extraordinary  importance  is  to  be  discussed,  the 
general  assembly,  or  Parliament,  is  convoked,  consisting  of  one 
member  of  each  family.  Civil  and  criminal  j  ustice  is  ad  ministered 
by  a  foreigner,  a  doctor  of  laws,  who  is  chosen  for  three  years, 
being  the  only  remnant  of  the  practice  which  we  have  seen  at  one 
time  prevailed  in  all  the  communities  of  Italy. 


CH.  XXVIII.  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES —LUCERN.  869 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

SWISS   ARISTOCRACIES. 


Division  of  the  Subject  : — 1.  Lucebn — Feudal  History— Early  Constitution  — 
Aristocracy  established — Sovereign  Council — Senate — Avoyers — Self- Election — 
Aristocracy  popular — Consequences  in  French  invasion — Act  of  Mediation, 
1803 — New  Constitution — Policy  of  Napoleon — Constitution  of  1814. 

2.  ZoBiCH — Early  Aristocracy — Government  more  exclusive— Council — Senate — 
Constitution  of  1803— of  1814, 

3.  Bern — Early  Constitution — Aristocracy  introduced — Great  Council — Senate — 
Seizeniers — Avoyers — Constitution  of  1803 — of  1816 — Self-Election — Oligarchy. 

4.  Geneva — Early  History — Mixed  Aristocracy — Parties — Great  Council — Senate 
— Revolution  of  1 782 — Restoration  of  the  old  Government — Constitution  of  1 81  -t 
— Importance  of  Geneva. 

Several  of  the  Swiss  Cantons  have  always  had  governments 
either  purely  aristocratical  or  mixed  aristocracies.  It  would  not 
be  profitable  to  examine  minutely  the  whole  of  these  constitutions, 
which,  generally  speaking,  bear  a  close  resemblance  to  one  another, 
having  grown  up  among  the  same  people,  in  circumstances  nearly 
similar,  and  in  states  which  formed  parts  of  the  same  Federal 
Union.  It  was  chiefly  in  the  larger  cantons  that  the  aristocratic 
polity  prevailed  ;  and  we  shall  single  out  three  of  them  for  exa- 
mination— Lucem,  Zurich,  and  Bern  ;  because  the  two  latter  are 
by  far  the  most  important  members  of  the  whole  Helvetic  body, 
and  because  the  first  affords  in  some  respects  the  example  of  the 
purest  aristocracy,  next  to  that  of  Venice,  which  survived  to  a 
recent  period  of  time.  To  these  Geneva  may  be  added,  on  ac- 
count of  certain  peculiarities  that  belong  to  it,  and  on  account  of  its 
celebrity  in  the  world  of  science  and  letters.  Lucem,  or  Luzern, 
is,  in  importance,  the  sixth  of  the  cantons,  Bern  being  the  first. 
The  population  of  Bern  is  above  400,000  souls ;  of  Zurich, 
230,000  ;  of  Lucem,  124,000. 

1.  Lucern  joined  the  confederacy  in  the  year  1332  :  it  has 
always  been  a  Catholic  state,   and  stands  first  in  importance 

PART   11.  2    B 


370  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES — LUCERN.  CH.  XXVIU. 

of  the  Catholic  cantons.  Originally  this  canton  was  a  feudal 
seignory  under  an  ecclesiastical  superior,  the  abbot  of  Lucern, 
and  a  number  of  mesne  lords  under  him,  their  superior.  Its 
constitution  at  that  period  was  of  a  purely  democratic  kind. 
The  whole  community  deliberated  in  common  upon  the  alter- 
ation to  be  made  in  the  laws  ;  upon  taxes  to  be  raised,  upon 
questions  of  peace  and  war,  upon  treaties  of  alliance.  The  re- 
solutions of  the  general  assembly  required  to  be  ratified  by  a 
select  council  composed  of  eighteen  selected  burghers,  who  were 
changed  every  six  months.  The  chief  magistrate  was  called  the 
Avoyer,  and  he  had  jurisdiction  in  civil  matters.  The  abbot  ap- 
pointed another  executive  officer,  called  the  Amman,  who  was 
selected  from  the  people,  and  with  their  concurrence.  In  Lucern, 
as  in  the  greater  part  of  Switzerland  in  the  thirteenth  century,  the 
house  of  Hapsburg,  under  their  able  and  politic  chiefs,  Rodolph 
and  his  son  Albert,  had  obtained  an  overwhelming  ascendent ; 
but  when,  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth,  the  three  small 
cantons  of  Uri,  Switz,  and  Unterwald  joined  in  resisting  their  op- 
pressors, and  gained  the  famous  battle  of  Morgarten  (1315),  often 
termed  the  Swiss  Marathon,  the  Austrian  power  was  weakened, 
so  that  Lucern  and  other  cantons  joined  them,  and  finally  all  had 
thrown  off  the  yoke. 

The  former  democratic  government  did  not  long  survive  this 
event.  The  city  or  capital  of  the  canton  soon  obtained  an  over- 
whelming influence  ;  and  in  the  city,  the  more  powerful  families 
or  nobles.  This  was  the  natural  consequence  of  the  change  thai 
had  been  brought  about.  Under  the  feudal  superiority  of  the 
abbot,  and  afterwards  under  the  feudal  monarchy  of  the  Austrian 
family,  the  government  was  administered  by  the  joint  influence  of 
the  prince  and  the  people,  the  barons  holding  their  influence,  as 
elsewhere,  over  their  vassals,  and  thus  having  considerable  weight 
in  the  general  administration  of  affairs.  But  when  there  no  longer 
was  a  chief,  and  a  foreign  chief  with  his  guards,  his  revenue,  his 
military  power,  and  all  the  other  resources  of  the  imperfect  Feudal 
Union,  as  the  real  power  resided  in  the  nobles,  an  aristocratic 
constitution  grew  up  to  maturity.  The  supreme  power  came  to  be 
vested  in  a  sovereign  council  of  one  hundred  members,  chosen  from 
the  five  hundred  burghers  of  the  city,  the  country  people  having  no 
voice  whatever  in  the  government.  But  in  fact  the  power  did  not 
reside  in  even  this  council  at  large,  for  it  was  divided  into  two 


CH.  XXVIII.  LUCERN  ARISTOCRACY.  371 

bodies, — ^the  senate  or  little  council,  and  the  great  council.  Now, 
the  senate  consisted  of  thirty-six  members,  who  were  divided  into 
two  bodies  of  eighteen  each,  and  these  alternately  exercised  the 
whole  power  of  administration.  They  chose,  or,  as  it  was  called, 
confirmed  each  other,  and  a  few  great  families  had  the  whole 
management  of  these  elections ;  their  members  succeeded  one 
another,  so  as  to  make  the  places  hereditary.  In  this  senate  was 
vested  the  whole  administration  of  police  and  of  finance,  and,  in 
fact,  the  executive  government ;  for  though  two  avoyers,  or  chief 
magistrates,  were  appointed,  they  were  senators,  and  they  were 
changed  every  year.  They  were  chosen  by  the  great  or  sove- 
reign council  of  one  hundred ;  but  in  that  council  the  senate 
exercised  an  overpowering  influence ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  they 
formed  above  a  third  of  its  whole  numbers ;  next  they  had  the 
appointment  of  civil  officers  in  their  hands ;  and  lastly,  they 
had  also  the  patronage  of  all  benefices,  which  were  so  valuable 
that  two-thirds  of  the  landed  property  of  the  country  were  in 
ecclesiastical  hands.  Moreover,  the  senate  was  a  permanent  body, 
always  sitting,  while  the  great  council  only  was  convoked  upon 
special  occasions.  In  the  senate's  hands  was  all  criminal  juris- 
diction, except  that  in  capital  cases  the  consent  of  the  larger  body 
was  required.  An  appeal  in  civil  suits  likewise  lay  from  the  one 
body  to  the  other.  However,  the  voice  of  the  senate  in  that 
larger  body  was  sure  to  be  preponderant 

In  one  respect  the  powers  of  the  aristocracy  in  Lucern  appear 
to  have  suffered  some,  and  even  a  considerable  limitation.  If 
any  new  tax  was  to  be  imposed,  or  any  question  decided  of  peace 
or  war,  or  of  foreign  alliance,  a  general  assembly  of  the  burghers 
was  necessary  to  give  the  resolution  force.  There  was  another 
restriction,  resembling  what  we  may  remember  to  have  found  in 
the  aristocracy  of  Venice.  The  jealousy  of  the  Patrician  order 
provided  that  father  and  son,  nor  any  two  members  of  the  same 
family,  could  not  sit  at  the  same  time  in  the  senate. 

With  these  restrictions  the  government  of  Lucern  was  a  pure 
aristocracy  of  an  oligarchical  aspect,  and  as  such  it  continued  for 
above  five  centuries,  but  without  exciting  any  discontent  in  the 
people  subject  to  its  control.  On  the  contrary,  its  rule  appears 
to  have  been  popular,  like  that  of  Venice,  and  probably  fi'om  the 
same  cause,  that  it  pressed  lightly  upon  the  middle  and  lower 
classes  of  the  community.     Accordingly  when  the  hour  of  trial 

2  B  2 


372  SWISS   ARISTOCRACIES  — LUCERN.  CH.  XXVIII. 

came  for  all  the  ancient  governments  of  Europe,  the  public  voice 
was  loudly  raised  iu  behalf  of  the  existing  order  of  things.  All 
the  attempts  of  the  French  emissaries  to  excite  discontent  signally- 
failed.  It  was  in  vain  that  they  spread  their  invectives  against 
aristocracy  and  oligarchy ;  they  spoke  a  language  which  the  sub- 
jects of  the  Lucem  patricians  did  not  understand.  In  vain  they 
offered  emancipation  from  a  thraldom  which  the  people  had 
never  felt,  or  tendered  them  a  state  of  liberty  and  equality  for 
which  they  had  no  taste.  Every  such  offer  was  rejected,  and 
force  was  required  at  once  to  conquer  the  people  and  put  down 
a  government  which  they  had  so  little  mind  to  subvert,  that  they 
made  its  cause  their  own.  The  country  was  held  in  subjection 
by  military  power,  with  some  intervals  during  the  temporary 
overthrow  of  the  French  authorities  by  the  misgovemment  of  the 
executive  directory  and  the  successes  of  the  Russian  and  Austrian 
allies.  But  when  the  peace  with  Austria  enabled  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  to  make  a  settlement  of  the  Swiss  affairs,  a  new  con- 
stitution was  given  to  Lucem  as  to  the  other  twelve  cantons,  by 
the  celebrated  Act  of  Mediation,  19th  of  February,  1803. 

This  constitution  resembled  the  others  in  its  general  outline, 
though  it  was  less  aristocratic  by  a  great  deal.  The  legislative 
power,  the  superintendence  of  all  executive  functions,  and  the 
nomination  to  all  ofl&ces  extending  over  the  whole  canton,  was 
vested  in  a  Great  Council  of  sixty  members.  Fifteen  of  these 
formed  the  little  or  executive  council ;  and  this  had  the  power  of 
proposing  measures  to  the  larger  body,  as  well  as  of  appointing 
all  officers  whose  powers  were  local  only.  These  fifteen  were 
chosen  by  the  sixty  of  whom  they  formed  a  portion.  To  elect  the 
sixty,  all  the  citizens  of  thirty  years  old  if  bachelors,  or  of  twenty 
if  married  or  widowers,  and  possessing  property  of  thirty  pounds 
value,  had  voices ;  and  the  election  was  a  complicated  one,  of 
lot  combined  with  choice,  after  the  fashion  of  the  Italian  common- 
wealths. 

It  is  here  to  be  observed  that  Napoleon  and  those  able  men 
whom  he  consulted,  adopted  as  much  of  the  former  constitution  as 
they  could  for  the  stock  on  which  to  engraft  their  changes.  Who- 
ever attentively  observes  the  structure  of  the  greater  and  lesser 
councils,  with  theii-  relations  to  each  other,  will  perceive  that  the 
model  of  the  whole  was  the  former  government  of  the  sovereign 
council  and  senate. 


CH.  XXVIII.        PRESENT  CONSTITUTION  OF  LUCERN.  STo 

In  1814,  the  constitution  of  Lucern,  as  well  as  of  the  othei- 
cantons,  underwent  material  alterations.  The  supreme  power 
was  now  and  is  still  vested  in  two  councils,  the  council  of  one 
hundred  and  the  daily  council  {quotidien),  the  latter  being  thirty- 
six  members  of  the  former.  The  whole  hundred  hold  their  places 
for  life,  and  are  chosen  half  by  burghers  of  the  city  and  half  by 
the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  The  council  itself  names  forty  of 
the  burgher  members  and  twenty-nine  of  the  country  members  ; 
the  burghers  name  ten  and  the  country  citizens  name  the  remain- 
ing twenty-one.  The  daily  council  consists  of  at  least  ten  country 
members,  and  the  whole  thirty-six  are  chosen  by  itself  from  the 
great  council.  Beside  being  a  burgher  in  the  town  and  a  citizen 
in  the  country,  a  voter  must  also  pay  taxes  on  a  property  of  six- 
teen pounds  value.  Father  and  son,  or  two  brothers,  cannot  sit 
together  in  either  council. 

The  principal  legislative  power  resides  in  the  great  council  and 
the  avoyers,  its  presidents,  who  are  chosen  by  it  from  the  daily 
council.  All  laws  proposed  by  the  daily  council  are  adopted  or 
rejected  by  the  great  council.  All  taxes  are  by  it  imposed  or 
repealed.  Any  member,  on  giving  notice  to  the  avoyer,  may  pro- 
pose a  law,  which  the  great  council  either  rejects  at  once  or  re- 
mits to  the  daily  council,  and  it  is  only  on  its  report  or  proposal 
that  it  can  be  further  considered  by  the  great  council.  The 
power  of  pardoning  and  all  other  sovereign  attributes  reside  in  the 
great  council.  The  great  council  sits  three  times  a  year,  and 
oftener  if  convoked  by  the  daily  council,  which  sits  the  whole 
year,  and  exercises  the  ordinary  powers,  executive,  judicial,  and 
administrative,  of  the  government. 

2.  Zurich,  the  second  canton  in  point  of  extent  and  importance, 
was  originally  an  imperial  fief,  and  its  capital  had  early  a  municipal 
charter  and  government.  Like  the  Italian  cities  its  constitution 
was  at  first  democratic,  but  afterwards  a  kind  of  civic  aristocracy, 
and  it  had,  like  them,  constant  struggles  with  the  feudal  nobility 
of  the  country.  When,  in  the  fourth  century,  the  imperial  power 
was  overthrown  and  the  canton  joined  the  Helvetic  confederacy, 
an  aristocratic  government  grew  up,  though  less  purely  such  than 
in  Lucern.  As  regarded  the  country  it  was  equally  so  ;  for  tlie 
town,  with  less  than  a  fifteenth  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country, 


374  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIKS — ZURICH.  CH.  XXVIII. 

engrossed  the  entire  and  exclusive  possession  of  the  powers  of  go- 
vernment. Its  burcfhers,  about  2000  in  number,  had  the  election 
of  the  governing  and  sovereign  council  in  their  hands ;  and  after 
interposing  many  obstacles  to  the  admission  of  new  burghers,  even 
to  supplying  vacancies  occasioned  by  death  and  extinction  of  fami- 
lies, they  came,  in  1661,  to  a  resolution,  ever  after  acted  upon,  that 
no  more  should  be  admitted  on  any  account.  They  were  divided 
into  thirteen  tribes,  of  which  one  was  noble,  and  had  a  great  pre- 
ponderance ;  for  while  the  others  only  chose  twelve  to  the  great 
council,  the  noble  tribe  chose  eighteen.  The  sovereign  council 
consisted  of  two  hundred  and  twelve,  but  was  called  the  council 
of  two  hundred  ;  the  senate,  fifty  in  number,  formed  a  part  of  it. 
The  right  of  exercising  trade  in  the  city  was  most  strictly  confined 
to  the  burghers ;  all  strangers,  and  even  the  inhabitants  of  the 
canton  not  being  burghers,  were  excluded.  The  tribe  of  nobles 
never  took  part  in  commerce  of  any  description ;  they  had  the 
fidl  right  to  do  so,  but  regarded  it  as  beneath  their  rank 

The  fifty  who  composed  the  senate  were  twenty-four  tribunes 
and  four  councillors  chosen  by  the  nobles,  with  twenty  chosen 
by  the  sovereign  council,  to  which  two  burgomasters  were  added. 
Twenty-five  of  the  senate  administered  the  government  for  six 
months,  and  the  other  twenty-five  for  the  rest  of  the  year.  The 
council  chose  the  burgomasters  annually,  and  they  were  presidents 
of  the  senate  by  turns,  each  for  six  months.  The  legislative  au- 
thority resided  in  the  council,  the  judicial  in  the  senate,  from  which 
an  appeal  lay  in  civil  cases  only  to  the  council.  The  only  restraint 
in  the  senate  was  a  yearly  revision,  by  which  they  were  liable  to 
be  changed  ;  but  as  the  senators  were  fifty  in  number,  and  formed 
a  large  proportion  of  the  council,  this  was  little  likely  to  happen. 
The  nobles  had  manifestly  a  great  preponderance  in  that  body,  and 
the  government  was  thus  formed  on  an  aristocratic  model,  though 
very  far  from  being  so  pure  an  aristocracy  as  that  of  Lucem. 

In  1803  the  Act  of  Mediation  changed  the  form  of  the  consti- 
tution, and  established  a  government  on  exactly  the  same  prin- 
ciples which  we  have  explained  in  the  case  of  Lucem.  The  only 
material  difierence  was  in  the  numbers  of  the  two  councils ;  the 
greater  being  composed  of  one  hundred  and  eighty,  the  lesser  of 
twenty-five.  The  latter  were  chosen  by  the  whole  body,  and  they 
formed  a  part  of  it. 


CH.  XXVIII.  PRESENT  CONSTITUTION  OF  BERN.  o7o 

In  1814  a  material  change  took  place  in  this  constitTition. 
The  exclusive  power  of  the  capital  was  no  longer  allowed ; 
but  all  rights  of  election  to  the  councils  were  apportioned  as 
near  as  possible  to  the  population  of  the  different  districts  into 
which  the  canton  was  divided.  The  great  council  returned  its 
number  of  two  hundred  and  twelve  ;  the  little  was  reduced  from 
fifty  to  twenty-five  ;  all  chosen  by  the  great  council  from  its  own 
body  as  before.  The  great  council  are  now  to  choose  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty  of  its  own  members  ;  the  rest  being  chosen  by 
the  tribes,  thirteen  choosing  two  each,  one  choosing  five  and  the 
others  one  each.  The  members  of  the  little  council  hold  their 
places  for  six  years  ;  those  of  the  great  council  hold  theirs  also  for 
six  years,  one-third  going  out  every  two  years.  The  right  of  voting 
in  the  districts  or  tribes  rests  in  those  who  in  each  are  enrolled  as 
burgesses ;  and  servants,  insolvents,  and  convicts  are  alone  ex- 
cluded. The  citizen  of  one  parish  can  be  made  a  burgess  in  any 
other. 

3.  The  town  of  Bern  obtained  a  charter  from  the  emperor  m 
1218,  constituting  it  a  free  city.  The  government  was  vested  in 
a  council,  called  the  two  hundred  from  its  original  number,  but 
afterwards  extended  to  two  hundred  and  ninety-nine,  all  chosen 
from  the  burghers  of  the  city  !  To  this  body  all  the  canton  was 
subject ;  and  it  appointed  from  its  own  members  a  senate  to  ad- 
minister the  executive  powers  of  the  state.  The  general  assembly 
of  the  burghers  elected  the  council,  every  one  having  a  vote  who 
was  possessed  of  a  house  in  Bern.  The  assembly  also  chose  the 
magistrates.  The  burghers  were  divided  into  four  guilds ;  the 
chief  of  each  was  called  banneret  or  standard-bearer,  and  he  had 
great  influence  in  the  elections.  By  degrees  the  members  of 
council  prolonged  their  offices  during  life  ;  and  the  council  after- 
wards usurped  the  power  of  filling  up  all  vacancies,  so  that  the 
government  became  aristocratical,  or  rather  an  oligarchy,  a  small 
number  of  powerful  families  obtaining  the  entire  control  of  affairs. 
Asin  Italy,  so  here  many  of  the  feudal  barons  in  the  country  became 
burghers  of  Bern,  while  others,  waging  war  with  the  city,  were 
defeated,  and  forced  to  sell  or  surrender  their  demesnes,  which  thus 
gave  enlarged  wealth  and  power  to  the  civic  aristocracy.  At  the  end 
of  the  thirteenth  century  Rodolph  of  Hapsburg  in  vain  attempted 
to  subdue  the  canton,  and  his  son  Albert  was  signally  defeated  in 


376  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES — BERN.  CH.  XXVIII. 

a  similar  attempt  ten  years  after  (1298).  The  Emperor  Louis 
of  Bavaria  once  more  invested  Bern  ;  but  was  defeated  in  the 
great  battle  of  Laupen  in  1339.  Friburg  and  the  forest  cantons 
having  assisted  the  Bernese  in  this  war,  Bern  a  few  years  after- 
wards, in  1352,  joined  the  Helvetic  Confederacy. 

ITie  constitution  of  Bern  became  gradually  more  aristocratic, 
until  the  meetings  of  the  general  assembly  were  wholly  discon- 
tinued, and  the  great  council  engrossed  the  whole  power  of  the 
state.  It  was  in  1682  that  the  sovereignty  was  declared  to  reside 
in  that  body ;  and  it  was  restrained  by  no  check  of  any  kind.  In 
Lucem  the  great  questions  of  peace  and  war,  of  alliances,  of  tax- 
ation, could  only,  as  we  have  seen,  be  decided  by  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  burghers.  But  no  such  restriction  was  imposed 
upon  the  council  of  Bern  ;  it  had  full  authority  in  all  matters 
whatever,  without  exception.  It  consisted,  when  full,  of  two  hun- 
dred and  ninety-nine  members,  and  the  vacancies  could  only  be 
filled  up  when  they  came  to  eighty  ;  but  the  rule  was  that  they 
must  be  filled  up  when  they  amounted  to  a  himdred.  The  new 
members  were  named  partly  by  the  avoyers,  partly  by  the  sei- 
zeniers,  who  were  sixteen  members  of  the  council  appointed 
yearly  by  lot,  and  partly  by  the  accession  of  the  persons  claiming 
to  be  admitted  in  right  of  their  offices.  The  senate  consisted  of 
twenty-seven  persons,  including  the  two  avoyers,  and  all  chosen 
by  the  great  council,  out  of  its  own  body.  The  choice  was  by  a 
complicated  ballot,  of  lot,  and  selection,  after  the  Italian  fashion. 
The  avoyer  and  other  magistrates  were  chosen  by  the  great  coun- 
cil :  the  avoyers  for  life  ;  the  other  officers  for  four  and  six  years. 
The  executive  government  was  vested  in  the  senate,  which  sits 
daily. 

Although  the  government  was,  in  the  strictest  sense,  aristocratic, 
it  was  in  great  favour  with  the  nation,  and  must  be  admitted  to 
have  secured  the  most  important  objects  of  all  government,  and^ 
indeed,  of  all  political  society.  Miiller,  no  friend  of  such  systems 
in  general,  has  pronounced  it  the  constitution  under  which  by  far 
the  greatest  wisdom  of  administration  was  displayed  for  the 
gTeatest  length  of  time.  Other  writers  have  compared  the  in- 
fluence and  authority  exercised  by  the  patricians  to  that  of  guar- 
dians and  parents  over  their  wards  and  children  ;  and  some  have 
described  the  relation  of  the  people  to  the  aristocracy  as  resem- 
bling that  of  clients  to  their  patrons.     Accordingly  the  govern- 


CH.  XXVIII.  PRESEin'  CONSTITUTION  OF  BERN.  877 

ment  enjoyed  entire  confidence  and  esteem  from  the  people,  not- 
withstanding their  exclusion  by  it  from  all  share  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  public  affairs  :  the  French  found  but  little  support  in 
their  intrigues  against  it ;  and  their  invasion  was  as  much  resisted 
by  the  whole  nation  as  if  all  had  borne  a  part  in  the  management 
of  its  concerns. 

In  1803  the  new  constitution  was  imposed  upon  Bern  by  the 
famous  Act  of  Mediation.  In  its  outline  it  resembled  the  former 
government ;  but  the  great  council  consisted  now  of  only  one 
hundred  and  ninety-five  members  ;  the  little  council  retained  its 
former  number  of  twenty-seven.  A  council  of  state  was  added, 
consisting  of  the  two  oldest  and  two  youngest  members  of  the 
senate.  Its  office  was  to  watch  over  the  internal  and  external 
safety  of  the  state,  and  report  to  the  other  councils. 

The  most  important  change  introduced  into  the  constitution  by 
this  act  was  the  restoration  to  the  community  of  a  voice  in  the 
choice  of  the  great  council.  The  avoyers  were  named  by  the 
great  council  out  of  the  senate  or  lesser  council ;  the  senate  was 
chosen  out  of  the  great  council,  and  by  it ;  the  members  of  the 
great  council  were  chosen,  one-third  by  the  tribes  immediately 
and  directly,  two -thirds  by  lot  out  of  lists  sent  by  the  councils  of 
qualified  persons.  The  latter  council  was  changed  two-thirds 
every  two  years. 

In  1816  the  constitution  of  Bern  was  finally  settled.  The  pre- 
amble of  the  Constitutional  Act  bears  that  the  object  of  the 
authorities  in  forming  the  new  government  is  to  restore  what 
was  valuable  in  its  ancient  structure,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
place  it  in  harmony  with  the  wants  of  the  present  age — a  most 
wise  and  salutary  view,  and  which,  if  steadily  pursued,  cannot  be 
too  much  commended.  In  one  most  important  particular  the 
ancient  constitution  is  changed  and  improved  ;  the  country,  both 
towns  and  rural  districts,  are  admitted  to  a  share,  though  certainly 
not  an  equal  share,  of  the  administration,  formerly  confined  to  the 
capital.  The  country  is  to  have  ninety-nine  members  of  the 
great  council,  the  capital  two  hundred.  The  qualification  of  the 
deputies  is  fixed  at  possessing  the  right  of  burgesses  in  a  town  or 
parish,  being  twenty-nine  years  of  age,  and  having  about  700?. 
in  property.  The  right  of  becoming  burgesses  of  the  capital  is 
also  opened  to  the  burgesses  of  the  country.  Of  the  ninety-nine 
country  members  the  council  itself  chooses  twenty-five.      The 


378  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES — BERN.  CH.  XXVIIL 

magistrates  of  each  town  choose  its  deputies  ;  in  the  country 
parishes  the  choice  is  made  by  electoral  colleges,  according  to  a 
regulation  not  to  be  found  in  the  Constitutional  Act,  though  pro- 
mised by  it  The  two  hundred  deputies  of  the  capital  are  chosen 
by  an  electoral  college,  composed  of  the  little  council,  and  a  com- 
mittee of  sixteen  adjuncts  taken  from  the  great  council.  Here, 
therefore,  we  have  the  principle  of  self-election  applied  in  its 
entire  perfection  to  two  hundred  deputies  for  the  town  and  twenty- 
five  for  the  country ;  so  that  a  majority,  in  the  proportion  of  three 
to  one  of  the  whole  members  of  council,  are  not  elected  by  the 
people  in  any  way,  but  are  appointed  by  themselves.  The  little 
council,  chosen  by  the  great,  and  of  its  own  members,  consists  of 
twenty-seven.  It  is  subject  to  annual  confirmation,  that  is,  elec- 
tion, and  is  therefore  merely  a  committee  of  the  whole  body.  The 
members  of  the  great  council  themselves  are  said  to  be  subject  to 
the  same  annual  confirmation  ;  whereas  it  is  plain  that  the  self- 
elected  majority  have  at  all  times  the  absolute  power  of  excluding 
from  their  own  numbers  any  one  who  in  any  particular  dissents 
from  their  opinion  or  opposes  their  designs.  This  annual  confir- 
mation, or  exclusion,  is  indeed  performed  by  the  council  of  sixteen, 
composed  of  the  little  council  and  sixteen  assistants,  chosen  by  lot. 
But  suppose  every  one  of  the  sixteen  were  drawn  of  the  minority, 
there  would  still  be  a  majority  composed  of  twenty-seven,  whom 
the  majority  of  the  great  council  had  named  and  purged  of  all 
dissidents.  The  powers  and  functions  of  the  two  councils  are 
nearly  the  same  as  those  possessed  by  the  same  bodies  under  the 
more  ancient  constitution,  which  we  have  already  described. 
The  government  of  Bern  may  therefore  well  be  deemed  aristo- 
cratic.    The  admixture  of  democratic  influence  is  small  indeed. 

4.  Geneva. — This  territory  was  originally  under  the  empire, 
first  of  Charlemagne,  afterwards  of  his  successors.  As  their  feeble- 
ness increased,  and  lessened  their  authority,  the  bishops  acquired 
the  ascendent.  The  sovereigns  counterbalanced  this  by  granting 
privileges  to  the  people  of  the  towns,  and  fomenting  discord  be- 
tween the  bishops  and  the  feudal  lords,  or  counts,  who  governed 
in  the  emperor's  name.  The  counts  then  sold  their  territorial 
possessions  to  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  against  whom  the  bishops 
united  with  the  people.  The  counts  now  endeavoured  to  obtain 
a  share  in  the  episcopal  authority,  which  they  could  not  resist, 


CH.  XXVIIL  GENEVAN  ARISTOCRACY.  379 

and,  for  this  purpose,  procured  the  nomination  of  their  sons  and 
brothers  to  the  sees  as  they  fell  vacant.  Early  in  the  fourteenth 
century  Charles  III.  of  Savoy  had  vested  in  himself  an  absolute 
authority  over  the  commonwealth,  and  he  exercised  great  oppression 
upon  the  people.  Two  parties  were  now,  in  consequence,  formed, 
one  called  the  free  or  patriotic,  the  other  the  servile,  which  took 
part  with  the  duke.  After  various  struggles  Geneva  at  length 
formed  a  treaty  with  Bern  and  Fribourg  in  1526,  and  finally 
established  a  republican  government,  with  the  reformed  religion, 
the  duke  and  the  bishops  being  alike  expelled  for  ever.  This 
led  to  immediate  hostilities  with  Savoy,  in  the  result  of  which 
Geneva  was  successful,  and  in  1584  was  by  treaty  united  with 
the  Helvetic  confederacy.  The  last  attempt  against  the  state 
was  made  by  Savoy  in  1602,  and  it  was  not  till  1764  that  the 
Genevan  independence  was  formally  acknowledged. 

The  government,  though  republican,  was  aristocratic,  or,  at 
least,  had  a  strong  mixture  of  aristocracy.  There  were  four 
councils  :  the  senate  or  lesser  council,  of  twenty  five  ;  the  council 
of  sixty,  for  the  management  of  foreign  affairs ;  the  great  council, 
originally  of  two  hundred,  but  afterwards  composed  of  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  ;  and  the  sovereign  council,  or  general  assembly, 
of  all  citizens  twenty-five  years  old.  The  sixty  were  chosen  by 
the  senate  ;  the  great  council  was  originally  elected  by  the  general 
or  popular  assembly  ;  but  the  patrician  party,  ingratiating  them- 
selves with  the  people,  obtained  as  they  were  sure  to  do,  from  a 
class  of  men  ever  ready  to  give  their  confidence  to  persons  of 
rank,  and  never  suspecting  any  abuse  of  it  till  too  late,  the  right 
of  election  to  be  taken  from  the  general  assembly,  and  vested  in 
the  councils  themselves,  so  that  the  senate  should  choose,  or,  as 
it  was  called,  confirm  the  council,  and  the  great  council  should 
choose  the  senate.  They  likewise  in  1712,  obtained  from  the 
general  assembly  a  repeal  of  the  law  which  had  been  made  in 
1707,  requiring  that  the  assembly  should  every  five  years  meet 
to  deliberate  on  the  most  pressing  public  interests. 

The  senate  had  the  power  of  convoking  the  great  council — of 
furnishing  all  magistrates  from  their  own  body — of  naming  the 
inferior  magistrates — of  choosing  half  the  great  council — of  con- 
ferring rights  of  burghership  —of  superintending  the  financial 
administration — and,  generally,  of  exercising  the  executive  and 
judicial  power  of  the  state.     The  great  council  chose  the  senate, 


380  SWISS  ABISTOCRAaES — GENEVA.  CH.  XXVIH. 

had  a  veto  on  all  its  proceedings,  and  had  the  appeal  from  all  its 
judicial  sentences,  as  well  as  the  general  power  of  pardon.  The 
general  assembly,  or  council,  consisted  of  1500  burghers,  of 
whom  only  1 200  could  ever  attend,  the  others  being  foreigners 
or  incapable  persons.  It  met  twice  a-year — chose  the  greater 
magistrates — decided  on  questions  of  peace  or  war,  and  alUances 
— had  a  veto  on  all  legislative  acts  of  the  two  other  councils — 
and  chose  half  the  great  council.  Four  of  the  senate  might  be 
removed  yearly,  and  four  syndics  were  chosen  from  the  senate  by 
the  general  council ;  these  sjmdics  must  be  three  years  out  of 
office  before  they  were  re-elected ;  and,  if  all  the  senators  were 
rejected  by  the  general  council,  four  must  retire  into  the  great 
council,  and  four  new  members  be  added,  as  syndics. 

In  1782  a  revolution  was  effected  in  this  republic,  already 
abundantly  tinctured  with  no  small  mixture  of  aristocracy.  The 
power  of  the  general  council  to  name  half  the  great  council,  or 
council  of  two  hundred,  was  now  taken  away,  and  the  great 
council  obtained  the  right  of  annually  confirming,  that  is,  in  fact, 
of  annually  choosing  the  senate.  The  citizens  had  hitherto  been 
addicted  to  clubs,  or  circles  as  they  were  termed,  political  bodies 
which  earned  on  constant  discussions  of  all  public  measures,  and 
exercised  great  influence  over  the  proceedings  of  the  legal  and 
regular  councils,  as  well  as  over  all  the  administrative  officers. 
These  were  now  strictly  prohibited,  as  were  all  assemblies,  or 
meetings  of  the  people.  The  militia  was  likewise  abolished,  and 
the  right  of  bearing  arms  was  taken  from  the  citizens  at  large. 

Great  heartburnings  and  much  discontent  was  the  consequence 
of  this  important  change.  The  conflicting  parties  did  not  scruple 
to  look  abroad  after  the  manner  of  all  popular  governments, 
ancient  and  modem,  without  any  monarchical  head  ;  and  the  de- 
feated faction  called  in  the  assistance  of  Savoy  or  Sardinia  and 
France,  in  1789.  The  former  government  was  restored  and  the 
restrictions  of  1782  were  removed.  The  pure  aristocracy  then 
established  became  now  mixed  with  democratic  institutions, 
though  the  aristocratic  principle  still  manifestly  prevailed  in  the 
composition. 

This  aristocracy  was  abolished  by  the  new  and  stUl  existing 
constitution  established  in  1814.  All  distinction  of  ranks  is  now 
abolished  ;  no  noble  cla.ss  is  recognised  ;  and  the  nile  is  that  all 
Genevans  are  equal  in  the  eye  of  the  law.     The  government  is 


CH.  XXVIII.  PRESENT  CONSTITUTION  OF  GENEVA.  381 

vested  in  two  councils ;  a  representative  council  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty,  and  a  lesser,  or  council  of  state,  of  twenty-eight  members. 
The  former  is  elected  by  all  persons  twenty-five  years  old,  who 
pay  six  pounds  in  direct  taxes  and  are  not  in  arrear,  and  who  are 
armed  and  equipped  for  the  militia,  or  have  some  lawful  exemp- 
tion from  that  service.  The  clergy,  the  members  of  the  uni- 
versity, the  academy,  and  other  similar  establishments,  are 
entitled  to  vote,  whether  they  pay  the  fixed  sum  in  taxes  or  not. 
Thirty  members  of  the  great  council  go  out  yearly.  No  more 
than  five  persons  of  the  same  name  and  family  can  sit  in  it  at  one 
time.  The  members  of  the  council  of  state  are  named  by  the- 
great  council,  but  are  not  removeable  unless  the  great  council 
pleases,  which  it  may  yearly,  to  exercise  a  scrutiny,  in  which  case 
whatever  members  have  one  hundred  and  twenty-six  votes  against 
them,  go  out  of  the  council  of  state  and  retire  into  the  gTeat 
council,  which  chooses  others  of  its  number  to  succeed  them. 
More  than  two  of  a  name  or  family  cannot  sit  in  the  council  of 
state.  The  power  of  proposing  measures  to  the  great  council  is 
vested  in  the  council  of  state,  together  with  the  direction  of  the 
finances,  that  is,  the  receipt  and  expenditure  of  the  taxes  voted  by 
the  great  council.  The  executive  functions  generally  of  the  go- 
vernment reside  in  the  council  of  state  ;  such  as  the  direction  of 
foreign  afiairs,  subject  to  the  great  council  approving  or  rejecting ' 
any  treaties  made. 

The  great  or  representative  council  has  the  legislative  power, 
on  the  proposition  of  measures  by  the  council  of  state.  It  also 
raises  or  remits,  or  changes  all  taxes,  appoints  to  all  the  more 
considerable  offices,  and  receives  yearly  the  council  of  state's  re- 
port of  its  administration. 

There  are  four  syndics  or  executive  magistrates  named  yearly 
from  the  council  of  state  and  the  great  council.  This  election  is 
by  ballot. 

The  republic  of  Geneva  is,  except  that  of  San  Marino,  the 
smallest  state  in  territory  and  population  in  the  world,  having 
only  125  square  miles  of  surface  and  25,000  inhabitants.  But 
its  cultivation  of  letters  and  philosophy,  and  the  eminent  men 
whom  it  has  given  to  the  world  in  both  departments,  give  an 
interest  to  whatever  concerns  it,  far  beyond  the  importance  of  its 


382  SWISS  ARISTOCRACIES— GENEVA.  CH.  XXVIII. 

extent,  population,  and  wealth.  Few  countries  of  much  greater 
consideration  have  contributed  more  useful  works  to  the  diffusion 
of  literary  and  scientific  knowledge  :  few  have  raised  so  many  in- 
genious and  learned  men  who  devote  themselves  to  a  diligent 
pursuit  of  learning,  and  to  the  education  of  youth  in  its  various 
departments. 


N  0  T  K 


There  now  only  remain  the  subjects  of  Democracy  and  Mixed  or  Limited 
Monarchy  to  complete  this  branch  of  Political  Philosophy,  and  so  give  the 
whole  that  belongs  to  the  Structure  of  Government.  Its  Functions,  com- 
prising Political  Economy,  will  follow. 

Of  Democracy  we  have  already  treated  incidentally  only,  and  in  the 
connexion  which  it  necessarily  bears  with  Aristocracy.  We  have  been 
obliged,  however,  to  give  the  Athenian  Constitution,  partly  in  order  to  show 
how  groundless  the  notion  is  of  those  who  class  it  with  the  ancient  Aristo- 
cratic Commonwealths,  partly  because  it  was  inconvenient  to  separate  it 
from  the  other  ancient  Governments,  when  it  threw  so  great  a  light,  by 
comparison,  upon  their  structure  and  working. 


INDEX. 


Abate,  vide  Genoa. 

Acbaia,  249. 

Adelardi,  family  of,  297. 

.iEdiles,  143. 

^lian  law,  140. 

^rarii,  121. 

^tolian  government,  248. 

Agis,  vide  Sparta. 

Agrarian  laws,  133,  134. 

Alberghi,  vide  Genoa. 

Albizzi,  vide  Florence. 

Alcibiades,  vide  Athens. 

Alcmaenidse,  vide  Athens. 

Ali  Ispan,  vide  Hungary. 

Ambitus,  160. 

American  courts  of  justice  com- 
pared with  the  Heliaea  of  Athens, 
223 ;  United  States,  a  pure  de- 
mocracy in,  4 ;  war,  reflections  on 
the,  166. 

Anziani,  office  of,  302;  vide  also 
Lucca,  San  Marino,  Milan,  and 
other  Italian  repubhcs. 

Archagetse,  vide  Sparta. 

Archons,  vide  Athens. 

Areopagus,  vide  Athens. 

Aristides,  vide  Athens. 

Ai'istocracy,  definition  of,  1  ;  pure, 
a  rare  occurrence,  2  ;  errors  on, 
ib. ;  Roman  and  Athenian  govern- 
ments not  an,  ?'&.;  germs  of,  in  the 
Roman  government,  3  ;  mixed, 
of  Rome,  ih.  ;  pure,  found  in 
Venice  and  some  other  Italian 
states,  4 ;  lasting  in  Sparta,  ih.  ; 
tendency  of,  to  mix  with  other 
constitutions,  17 ;  this  tendency 
greater  in,  than  in  democracy, 
18  ;  becomes  established  in  a  na- 
tion when  it  is  in  a  state  of  igno- 
rance, 19  :  weakened  by  the  pro- 
gress of  the  people  in  wealth  and 
intelhgence,i6.;  best  course  for  the, 
to  foUow,  20  ;  illustration  of  this 
from  colonial  emancipation,  ib. ; 
ends  usually  in  a  monarchy,  ih. ; 
natural  introduction  of  oligarchy 
into,  21  ;  examples  of  this  from 
the  governments  of  Venice,  Ge- 
noa, Sienna,  and  Lucca,  22  ;  na- 


tural foundation  of,  23  ;  influence 
of  independent  circumstances,  24; 
of  wealth,  ib. ;  of  the  length  of 
time  during  which  superiority  is 
possessed,  ib. ;  artificial  founda- 
tion of,  27 ;  illustration  of  this 
fi-om  the  history  of  Rome,  Sparta, 
Feudal  governments,  modern 
Italy,  ib. ;  two-fold  tendency  of 
natural,  29 ;  natural  will  always 
get  the  administration  of  public 
affairs  in  every  country,  31  ;  prac- 
tical considerations  deduced  from 
the  examination  of  the  natural, 
33 ;  origin  of  party  in,  34 ;  of 
Venice  exempt  from  party,  35  ; 
of  other  Italian  republics  greatly 
subject  to  parties,  36  ;  defects  of, 
48  ;  irresponsibility  of  rulers  in 
an,  ib.  ;  not  subject  to  public 
opinion,  49  ;  compared  with  other 
governments  in  this  X'espect,  50  ; 
uncontrolled  by  fear  of  personal 
violence,  51 ;  interests  of,  in  con- 
flict with  public  duty,  ib.  ;  illus- 
tration thereof  from  the  history  of 
Rome,  52  ;  from  the  constitution 
of  France  and  England,  53  ;  evils 
of  an  hereditary,  55 ;  tendency 
ot^  to  make  bad  rulers,  ib. ;  ten- 
dency of,  to  corrupt  morals,  56  ; 
galling  yoke  of,  ih. ;  merits  of, 
57 ;  firmness  of  purpose,  ib.  ;  re- 
sistance to  change  of,  58  ;  illus- 
tration thereof  from  the  English 
House  of  Lords,  ib.  ;  resistance 
to  change  of,  often  carried  too 
far,  59 ;  contrast  between,  and 
democracy  in  this  respect,  ib. ; 
republican  attempts  to  resist  the 
growth  of  a  natural,  ih.  ;  pacific, 
with  the  exception  of  those  of 
Rome  and  Venice,  60  ;  encourages 
talent,  particularly  in  arts  and 
literature,  ib. ;  promotes  the  spirit 
of  personal  honour,  61  ;  contrast 
with  the  democracy  in  that  re- 
spect, ib. ;  opinion  of  Father  Paul 
on  the  same  subject,  62  ;  assists 
the  functions  of  magistrates,  ih. 


384 


INDEX. 


Aristocratic  body,  error  committed 
in  the  English  colonies  by  not 
introducing  an,  into  their  govern- 
ment, 62. 

Aristocracies,  individual  influence 
in,  63  ;  partial  delegation  of  su- 
preme power  in,  ih. 

Anstocracy,  Feudal  and  Civic  in 
Italy,  64 ;  Feudal  in  Poland,  65  ; 
operation  o^  on  government,  66  ; 
illustration  thereof  from  English 
history,  67 ;  testimony  of  the 
monkish  historians  on  the  same 
subject,  ih. :  tendency  of,  towards 
a  mixed  government,  71  ;  may  j 
be  really  pure  when  apparently 
mixed,  ih. ;  instances  thereof  in 
Venice,  Genoa,  Lucca,  San  Ma- 
rino, ih. ;  natursd,  168  ;  of  middle 
classes,  170  ;  artificial  in  Spai-ta, 
195  ;  natural  in  Sparta,  196 ;  rise 
of,  in  Italy,  251 :  foimded  in  Ve- 
nice, 263;  in  Genoa,  312,  321, 
325  ;  natural  in  Florence,  351  ; 
burgher  in  Sienna,  360  ;  of  Swit- 
zerland, 369  ;  of  Lucem,  370,  371 ; 
of  Zurich,  373 ;  of  Bern,  375  ; 
of  Geneva,  379. 

Aristocratical  polity  triumphs  in 
Florence,  352. 

Aristotle's  opinions  on  Greek  go- 
vernments, 176,  177,  180,  191, 
193,  197,  199. 

Arnold's  Roman  history,  134. 

Arts  and  letters  prosper  in  Italy, 
308. 

Arpad,  dynasty  of.  in  Hungary, 
86. 

Arva,  district  of,  Hungary,  87. 

Athens,  constitution  of,  204 ;  early 
history,  ih. ;  Cecrops,  ih.  ;  The- 
seus, 205  ;  three-fold  division  of 
the  people  in,  ih. ;  eupatridse, 
geomori,  demiurgi,  ih.  ;  ancient 
officers  in,  prytaneum,  polemar- 
chi,  colacretae,  naucrarii.  phylo- 
basileis,  206 ;  panathenjea.  ih. ; 
kings,  ih.\  archons,  ^6.;  eupatridse, 
207  ;  polemarch,  eponymus,  basi- 
leus,  thesmothetse,  ih.\  classes,  pe- 
drsei.  diacrii,  psealii.  ih.\  anarchy, 
ih. ;  Draco,  208  ;  Solon,  ib.  ;  er- 
rors respecting  Solon's  legislation, 
ib. ;  Solon's  reforms,  archons,  col- 
leges, paredii,  209  ;  courts  of  jus- 
tice, ih. ;  Areopagus,  210  ;  HeH- 
astae,  ib. ;  inferior  magistrates, 
ih. ;  pure  democracy,  ib.  ;  classes 
ofthei>eople,  ib. ;  population, /ft. ; 


Slaves,  211;  effects  of  slavery,  ib.; 
Xenophon,  Plato,  Diogenes,  ih. ; 
phylse,  phmtriae,  genea,  trityes, 
demi,  ib. ;  the  ecclesia,  212 ;  se- 
nate, 214  ;  elections,  sci-utiny, 
ib. ;  prytanes,  epistata,  ib.  ;  eu- 
thynse,  logistoe,  215  ;  voting,  bal- 
lot, 216 ;  areopagus,  217 ;  its 
powers,  ih.;  its  composition,  218  ; 
logistse,  euthynse,  ib.  ;  Mars  hill, 
St.  Paul.  220 ;  helisea,  221  ; 
American  court,  223 ;  ephetae, 
ib.  ;  other  checks  besides  the 
areopagus.  224  ;  state  and  public 
orators,  ih. ;  payment  of  func- 
tionaries, ih.  ;  nlles  as  to  alter- 
ation of  the  laws,  225  ;  nomo- 
thetes,  226  ;  eponymi.  ib.  ;  syn- 
dics, ih. ;  direct  repeal  required, 
ih.\  impeachment  for  illegal  legis- 
lation, 227  ,  quorum,  228  ;  prohi- 
bition of  repeal,  229 ;  power  of 
adjournment,  ih.  ;  appeal  and 
reconsideration,  230  ;  ostracism, 
231 ;  general  feeling  against  this, 
233 ;  orators,  their  influences, 
234  ;  advocates  and  professional 
orators,  ih.:  legislative  and  judicial 
functions  combined,  18  ;  corrup- 
tion of  statesmen,  235  ;  Demo- 
sthenes, 236 :  Whigs  in  Charles 
II.'s  reign,  236 :  Demades,  ih.  ; 
corruption,  faction,  and  fickle- 
ness of  the  people,  237 ;  turbu- 
lence of  assemblies,  238  ;  radical 
vices  of  the  system,  ib.:  advan- 
tages derived  from  the  system, 
239;  parties  in,  241:  dalesmen, 
mountaineers,  coastmen,  and 
trimmers,  ib.  ;  the  Alcmaenidae, 
ib.;  usurpation  of  the  Pisistratidae, 
ib. ;  their  downfall,  242 ;  Pisis- 
ti-atus,  ib.  ;  Clisthenes,  ih. ;  MU- 
tiades,  243  ;  Popular  ingratitude, 
ib. ;  fables  of  Marathon,  ib. ;  de- 
mocratic reform,  244  ;  Aristides, 
ib.  ;  barbarous  popular  excesses, 
ib.  ;  Themistocles,  ib. ;  Athenian 
greatness,  ib.  ;  Pericles,  245  ;  Al- 
cibiades,  ib.;  Thirty  Tyrants,  ib.; 
faction,  246  ;  rebellion,  247  ;  So- 
crates, ib. 

Athens,  duke  of,  vide  Florence. 

Augurs.  149. 

Auspices,  law  of,  140. 

Avogadi,  vide  Genoa. 

Avogadors,  vide  Venice. 

Avoyers,  vtc^e  Lucem,  Bern. 


INDEX. 


385 


Bacon's,  Lord,  opinion  on  ancient 
and  new  nobility,  26. 

Basileus,  vide  Athens. 

Bayle's  criticism  of  history,  99. 

Beaufort's  work  on  Rome,  100,  161. 

Bentham's  denial  of  checks  in  the 
constitution,  5. 

Bern,  early  constitution  o^  375  ; 
aristocracy  introduced,  ih.  ;  great 
council,  376  ;  senate,  seizeniers, 
avoyers,  ib. ;  constitution  of  1 803, 

377  ;   of  1816,  ib. ;   self- election, 

378  ;  oligarchy,  ib. 

Bianchi  and  Neri,  vide  Florence. 

Binis  comitiis,  controversy  de,  144. 

Boccanegro,  Gullielmo  and  Simone, 
vide  Genoa. 

Boeotian  government,  or  Bceotar- 
chy,  248. 

Bologna,  creation  of  nobles  in,  22  ; 
early  charter  and  government 
of,  356 ;  early  regularity  of  the 
constitution,  ih.  ;  consuls,  coun- 
cils, podesta,  public  orators,  367  ; 
party  feuds,  ih.  ;  Gierenci  and 
Lambertazzi,  7J&.;  loss  of  liberty,  ^'6. 

Bonifazzi  and  Montecchi,  297. 

BuUa  aurea,  vide  Hungary. 

Buondelmonti,  vide  Florence. 

Burke's  defence  of  party,  45 . 

Burke  lauds  the  Polish  constitution 
of  1791,  76. 

Ceesar,  Julius,  character  of,  151, 
161,  163. 

Calabria,  duke  of,  vide  Sienna. 

Can  deUa  Scala,  302. 

Candia,  vide  "Venice. 

Candidatio,  vide  Hungary. 

Canulejus,  law  of,  165. 

Capite  censi.  111. 

Capitano  del  Popolo,  vide  Genoa. 

Carmagnola,  vide  Venice. 

Carrara,  vide  Venice. 

Castellan,  vide  Poland. 

Cixssa  domestica  and  militaris,  vide 
Hungary. 

Castri,  vide  Genoa. 

Cas truce:  o  Castracani,  vide  Lucca. 

Catiline's  conspiracy,  173. 

Cecrops,  vide  Athens. 

Censors  in  Rome,  125,  126,  127. 

Centumviri,  151. 

Centuries,  111. 

Charles  V.,  emperor,  takes  posses- 
sion of  MUan,  340. 

Checks,  system  of,  in  the  consti- 
tution of  England,  extolled  by 
many  writers,  6  ;  their  existence 
PART  II. 


dogmatically  denied  by  Bentham 
and  his  school,  ih. ;  this  denial 
founded  on  theory  alone,  6  ;  doc- 
trine of  the,  in  the  British  con- 
stitution misconceived,  ib.  ;  doc- 
trine of,  explained,  7  ;  foundation 
of  this  doctrine,  8  ;  fallacy  of  the 
objections  to  this  doctrine  ex- 
posed, 9  ;  illustration  of  this  doc- 
trine from  joint  powers,  10  ;  from 
mutual  veto,  ih.  ;  from  a  factious 
majority,  ib.  ;  from  the  British 
constitution  and  the  proceedings 
in  parliament  since  1832,  11  ; 
from  balance  of  powers  in  par- 
liament, 12  ;  from  dynamics,  ib.  ; 
proper,  or  perfect,  and  imperfect, 
13;  examples  of  proper,  from 
Roman  constitution,  ib.  ;  exam- 
ples of  imperfect,  from  the  Veni- 
tian  constitution,  and  absolute 
governments,  14  ;  examples  of 
imperfect  from  the  constitution 
of  England  and  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  15. 

Checks  on  the  power  of  the  people 
in  Rome,  171 ;  in  general,  172. 

Chrysonetes,  vide  Crete. 

Cicero,  101,  112,  114,  126,  139,  147, 
168,  161,  162,  173. 

Cinadon,  vide  Sparta. 

Cincinnati,  order  of,  in  America, 
abolished  by  the  jealousy  of  the 
democratic  party,  59. 

Ciompi,  vide  Florence. 

Civic  nobility  in  Italy,  64. 

Cleomenes,  vide  Sparta. 

derates,  vide  Crete. 

Clients  in  Rome,  105,  106,  119  ;  lu 
different  parts  of  Greece,  122. 

Clisthenes,  vide  Athens. 

Clodia  lex,  128. 

Cluverius's  work  on  ancient  Italy, 
100. 

CoUacretse,  vide  Athens. 

Collegio,  vide  Venice. 

Colonies,  which  is  the  wisest  policy  of 
the  mother-country  towards  its,  20. 

Comitia  curiata,  107,  136,  163  ;  tri- 
buta,  136. 

Compitalia,  111. 

Condottieri,  306,  330. 

Confederation,  vide  Poland. 

Congregationes    generales,    vide 
Hungarjr. 

Conscripti,  130. 

Consuls  in  the  Italian  cities,  255, 
vide  also  Milan,  &c. ;  of  Rome, 
116,  132,  142,  146. 

2  C 


386 


INDEX. 


Corcyra,  government  of,  248. 

Cornelian  law,  151. 

Cosmi,  vide  Crete. 

Cragius,  on  Sparta,  180. 

Credenza  in  the  Italian  cities,  255, 
vide  also  Genoa,  Milan,  and  other 
Italian  republics, 
ete,  constitution  of,  175  ;  cosmi, 
eponymus,  176 ;  periceci,  ib.  ; 
clerotes,  chrysonetes,  ih.  ;  pure 
aristoci-acy  established,  177  ;  re-  j 
sistance,  ih.  ;  federal  government 
established,  ih.  ;  isopoliteja,  ib. 

Curia,  104. 

Curio,  office  of,  129. 

Curule  offices,  126. 

Custos  urbis,  129,  146. 

Czartoryski,  family  of^  their  gran- 
deur and  patriotism,  75  ;  splen- 
dour in  which  they  lived,  and 
noble  sacrifices  submittini  to  by 
its  present  representative,  85. 

Dante's  passage  on  the  effects  of 
faction,  42. 

Decemviri,  141. 

Demades,  vide  Athens, 

Demi,  vide  Athens. 

Demiurgi,  vide  Athens. 

Democracy,  definition  of,  1  ;  pure, 
a  rare  occurrence,  2  ;  errors  on, 
ib.  ;  pure  in  the  United  States  of 
America,  4  ;  tendency  of,  to  mix 
with  other  constitutions,  17  ;  this 
tendency  lesser  in,  than  in  aris- 
toci-acy,  18 ;  responsibihty  of 
rulers  in,  48  ;  tyranny  of,  54  ; 
better  calculated  than  aristocracy 
to  form  ^nrtuous  and  able  citizens, 
55  ;  incHned  to  changes,  59  ;  en- 
deavours to  resist  the  growth  of 
natural  aristocracy,  ib. 

Demosthenes,  vide  Athens. 

Despotism  has  no  tendency  to  mix 
itself  with  other  institutions,  rea- 
sons thereof,  17. 

Diacri,  vide  Athens. 

Dictator  in  Rome,  131,  144. 

Diets,  vide  Poland,  Hungary, 

Dietines,  vide  Poland. 

Diogenes,  vide  Athens. 

Dionysius,  98,  99,  121, 122, 124, 136. 

Divinatio,  152. 

Divisores,  160. 

Doge,  vide  Genoa,  Venice. 

Draco,  vide  Athens. 

Ecclesia,  vide  Athens,  Sparta. 
Education,  origin  of  the  word,  188. 


Elizabeth,  Empress  of  Russia,  75. 

Emmius,  on  Sparta,  180. 

England,  revolution  of,  compared  to 
that  of  Rome,  118;  government 
compared  with  that  of  Venice, 
291  ;  dominions  of,  comjjared 
with  those  of  Venice,  279. 

Ephetse,  vide  Athens. 

Ephori,  vide  Sparta. 

Eponymus,  vide  Athens,  Crete. 

Equality  impossible,  23  ;  attempts 
made  to  insure,  ib. 

Equites,  109. 

Eupatridse,  vide  Athens. 

EuthyuEe,  vide  Athens. 

Ezzellno  da  Romano,  299. 

Faction,  vide  Party. 

Falieri,  Marino,  vide  Venice. 

Fasti  dies,  139. 

Feciales,  office  of,  in  Rome,  108. 

Feodor  Ivanovitch,  czar  of  Muscovy, 
candidate  for  the  throne  of  Po- 
land, 74. 

Feudal  plan  is  monarchical,  250. 

Feudal  nobiUty  in  the  Venetian 
terra-firma,  295. 

Flamen,  office  of,  in  Rome,  108. 

Florence  joins  the  league  late,  341 ; 
early  coustitution  of,  342 ;  consuls, 
quarters,  senate,  ib.\  burgher  aris- 
tocracy, ib. ;  at  first  mixed,  then 
pure,  ib. ;  podesta  established, 
343 ;  factions — Buondelmonti  and 
Uberti,  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines, 
ib. ;  podesta  expelled,  and  new 
government  established,  344  ;  old 
constitution  restored,  ib.  ;  new 
constitution  after  Manfred's  de- 
feat, 345  ;  two  councils,  ib. ;  party 
government  within  the  govern- 
ment, ih. ;  parallel  with  the  Jaco- 
bin club,  346  ;  new  constitution, 
ih. ;  its  anomaUes  and  absurdities, 
347  ;  factious  turbulence,  ih.;  in- 
terferes with  justice  and  pohce,  ih. ; 
ordinances  of  justice,  ib.  ;  popular 
aristocracy;  Popolani  grossi,  348  ; 
Bianchi  and  Neri,  348 ;  absurdi- 
ties of  party,  349  ;  new  mode  of 
electing  the  seignory,  ib.;  burgher 
oUgarchy,  350 ;  duke  of  Athens, 
ib.  ;  progress  of  tyranny,  ih.  ; 
changes  in  the  constitution,  351 ; 
new  party  divisions ;  natural  aris- 
tocracy, ib. ;  Albizzi  and  Ricci, 
352  ;  factious  violence,  ih.;  ciom- 
pi,  mob-government,  zT).;  triumph 
of  the  aristocratic  pohty,  ib. ;  in- 


INDEX. 


387 


fluence  of  free  institutions,  352  ; 
of  democratic  government,  353  ; 
grandeur  of,  ib. ;  feudal  and 
burgher  economy,  354. 

Fo-Ispan,  vide  Hungary. 

Foreign  appeals  common  in  the 
Greek  republics,  244. 

Foscari,  vide  Venice. 

Fox's  defence  of  party,  45. 

France,  effects  of  the  extinction  of 
aristocratic  influence  on,  53  ;  re- 
volution of,  compared  with  that 
of  Rome,  118. 

French  republicans,  disinterested- 
ness of  the,  56 ;  conquest  of  Ge- 
noa, 321 

Friars,  rise  of,  in  Italy,  297  ;  their 
usurpations,  298 

Gastaldioni,  office  of,  393. 

Genea,  vide  Athens. 

Geneva,  early  history  of,  378  ;  mix- 
ed aristocracy,  379  ;  parties,  ib. ; 
great  council,  ib. ;  senate,  ib. ;  re- 
volution of  1782,  380  ;  restoration 
of  the  old  government,  ib.  ;  con- 
stitution of  1814,  ib. ;  importance 
of,  381. 

Grenoa,  early  history  of,  310  ;  Pisan 
aUiances  and  conquests,  311 ;  con- 
stitution of  1096,  ib.  ;  aristocracy, 
312  ;  parties  of  the  nobles,  ib.  ; 
Avogadi  and  castri,  ib. ;  podes- 
ta,  313  ;  turbulence  of  the  fac- 
tions, ih. ;  parties  of  Cortes  and 
Voltas,  ib. ;  constant  revolutions, 
ib. ;  companies  of  art,  ib. ;  cre- 
denza,  ib. ;  oligarchy  estabhshed, 
314 ;  abate,  ib.  ;  capitano  del 
popolo,  ib.  ;  GuUielmo  Boccane- 
gro's  usurpation,  315  ;  fickleness 
of  the  inhabitants  of,  ib.\  Simeon 
Boccanegro,  316 ;  party  move- 
ments and  civil  conflicts,  ib.;  Vis- 
contis  called  in,  317 ;  Perpetual 
revolutions,  ib. ;  new  nobility, 
their  power,  their  factions,  318  ; 
conflict  with  the  old,  319  ;  revo- 
lution, ib. ;  French  conquest,  ib.; 
taken  by  the  emperor;  Doria's 
history,  220  ;  Doria's  noble  con- 
duct and  reforms,  321;  final  aris- 
tocratic constitution,  ib.;  attempts 
to  extinguish  party,  322 ;  Al- 
berghi,  ib.  ;  new  factions,  ib. ; 
councils  or  signoria,  323  ;  doge, 
324  ;  syndics,  ib. ;  inquisitors,  ib.; 
judicial  administration,  ib. ;  gall- 
ing yoke  of  the  aristocracy,  325 ; 


folly  of  the  new  nobles  and  ple- 
bians,    ib. ;   oligarchical   periods, 

326  ;    government   of,  compared 
with  that  of  Venice,  ib. 

Genoese  settlements,  ohgarchy  of, 

327  ;  Justiniani,  ib. 

Gentes,  vide  Rome. 

Geomori,  vide  Athens. 

Ghibellines,  vide  Guelfs. 

Gierenci,  vide  Bologna. 

Giunigi,  Paul,  vide  Sienna. 

Gonfaioniere,  vide  Lucca,  San  Ma- 
rino. 

Gottling's  theory  of  the  early  divi- 
sions of  the  Roman  people,  104. 

Greece,  authorities  on  the  history 
of,  174 ;  false  chronology,  ib.  ; 
ages  of  the  historians,  175  ;  early 
history  of,  ib. 

Grachius  on  Rome,  144. 

Guelfs  and  GhibeUines  at  Florence^ 
343. 

Harmostae,  vide  Sparta. 

Harmosynae,  vide  Sparta. 

Haruspices,  149. 

Hehsea,  vide  Athens. 

HeliastfE,  vide  Athens. 

Helots,  vide  Sparta. 

Henry  of  Huntingdon,  a  monkish 
historian,  quoted,  69  ;  of  Valois, 
king  of  Poland,  74. 

Hereditary  distinctions,  foundation 
of  respect  for,  25  ;  their  effects  on 
individuals  possessed  of  them,  26 ; 
privilege,  vide  Aristocracy. 

Hippagretae,  vide  Sparta 

Homoioi,  vide  Sparta. 

Homo-phylaces,  vide  Sparta. 

Horatian  law,  151. 

Hortensian  law,  136. 

Hottoman's  work  on  Rome,  129. 

Hume's  opinions  quoted,  38,  137. 

Hungary,  history  of,  86  ;  Lombard 
conquest  of,  ib,  ;  Magyars,  ib.  ; 
dynasty  of  Arpad,  ib. ;  dynasty  of 
Austria,  ib.;  feudal  circumstances 
in,  ib.  ;  nobles  of,  87  ;  their  pri- 
vileges, cardinal  and  non- cardi- 
nal, ib. ;  tenure  of  fiefs,  ib. ;  mag- 
nates, 88  ;  bdlla  aurea,  ib.  ;  titled 
nobles,  ib.  ;  diet,  ib.  ;  representa- 
tion, proxies,  votes,  tabula  per- 
sonalis, 89  ;  functions  of  the  diet, 
90;  taxes,  91;  cassa  domestica  and 
mihtaris,  ib.  ;  Count  Szechini's 
efforts  to  introduce  reforms,  92  ; 
local  county  administration,  ib.  ; 
functions  of  Fo  -  Ispan  and 
2  C  2 


388 


INDEX. 


Ali-Ispan,  ib. ;  of  Szolgo  birag, 
ib. ;  congregationes  generules,  93  ; 
municipal  govemment,  Koszeg, 
ib.  ;  village  government,  ib. ; 
powers  of  the  crown,  94  ;  indige- 
nat,  ib. ;  sale  of  titles,  ib . ;  pea- 
santry, ib. ;  urbarium  of  Maria 
Theresa,  95  ;  lords'  power,  ib.  ; 
robot,  ib.  ;  lords'  courts,  ib.  ;  re- 
forms in  these,  ib. ;  new  urbarium, 
ib. ;  Prince  Mettemich's  reforms, 
96 ;  miUtary  system,  ib. ;  insur- 
rectionary army,  ib. ;  miUtary 
frontier,  ib. 

Hungarian  prejudices  in  favour  of 
their  constitution,  97 ;  conclusion 
of  this  subject,  ib. 

Hungary,  works  on,  ib. 

Hypomeiones,  vide  Sparta. 

Ignorance  of  the  people  makes  it  in- 
different to  the  public  affairs,  19. 

Indigenat,  vide  Hungary. 

Inquisitors,  vide  Venice,  Genoa. 

Interreges,  129. 

Interrex,  145. 

Irish  independence,  reflections  on, 
166. 

Isopohteia,  vide  Crete. 

ItaUan  governments,  municipal  con- 
stitutions and  aristocracy,  250; 
feudal  plan  monarchical,  ib. ;  rise 
of  aristocracy,  251 ;  civic  nobility, 
253 ;  Othon  first  grants  municipal 
institutions  to  the  towns,  254  ; 
general  form  of  government  of 
their  towns,  255 ;  consuls,  ib.  ; 
credenza,  ib.  ;  senate,  ib. ;  parHa- 
ment,  ib. ;  wars  of  the  cities,  255  ; 
Pa  via  and  Milan,  256  ;  war  of  the 
towns,  257  ;  treaty  of  Constance, 
ib. 

Jacobin  club  compared  with  party 
government  in  Florence,  346. 

Jagellon  dynasty  in  Poland,  73. 

John  Albert,  king  of  Poland,  84. 

John  Casimir,  king  of  Poland,  74 ; 
of  Vicenza,  298 ;  Jordan  of  Pa- 
dua, 299. 

Judicial  system  of  Rome,  150. 

Justiniani,  vide  Genoa. 

Kosciusko,  76. 
Koszeg,  vide  Hungary. 

Logisthae,  vide  Athens. 
Lambertazzi,  vide  Bologna. 
Letters  and  arts  flourish  in  Italy, 
308. 


Liberum  veto,  vide  Poland. 

Licinian  rogations,  133. 

Lictors,  109. 

Lion's  Mouth,  vide  Venice. 

Lithuania,  vide  Poland. 

Livy,  98,  99,  109, 112,  122,  124,  125, 
126,  136,  144,  162. 

Lombards,  unfitness  of,  for  self- 
government,  334. 

Lords,  house  of,  resistance  of  the,  to 
change,  beneficial  to  the  country, 
58. 

Luceres,  105. 

Lucerne,  feudal  history  of,  369;  early 
constitution,  ib.-.  aristocracy  esta- 
blished, ib.\  sovereign  council,  */>.; 
senate,  371;  avoyers,  i6.;  self-elec- 
tion, ib.\  aristocracy  popular,  ib.\ 
consequence  of  this  popularity  in 
the  French  invasion,  372  ;  act  of 
mediation,  »Z).;  poUcy  of  Napoleon, 
ib. ;  constitution  of  1814,  373. 

Lucca,  revolutions  in,  deserving  of 
attention,  364  ;  early  government 
and  parties,  ib. ;  Castruccio  Cas- 
tracani's  sendees  and  usurpation, 
ib. ;  good  conduct  of  the  inhabit- 
ants of,  365 ;  anziani,  gonfalo- 
niere,  college,  government  coun- 
cil, ib. ;  practical  oligarchy,  ib.  ; 
Paul  Giunigi,  ib. ;  his  great  merit, 
366  ;  cruel  fate,  ib. ;  repubUc  re- 
stored, ib.  ;  perfidy  and  conquest 
of  the  Medici,  366 ;  Martinian 
law,  ib. ;  oligarchy  finally  esta- 
bUshed,  ib. ;  its  permanence,  367. 

Lycurgus,  vide  Sparta. 

Lysander,  vide  Sparta. 


Macaulay's  Lays  of  Ancient  Eoine, 
100. 

MachiaveUi's  errors  in  Boman  his- 
toiy,  102. 

Magister  equitum,  110. 

Magnates,  vide  Hungary. 

Manfred's,  emperor,  defeat,  followed 
by  a  new  constitution  in  Florence, 
315. 

Manihan  law,  147. 

Manutius,  P.,  errors  in  the  history 
of  Rome,  102. 

Marathon,  i>ide  Athens. 

Marino,  San,  antiquity  of  the  go- 
vernment of,  367 ;  extent  and 
population,  ib. ;  constitution,  an- 
ziani, senate,  gonfaloniere,  capi- 
tani,  judicial  authority,  368. 

Martinian  law,  vide  Lucca. 


INDEX. 


389 


Mediation,  act  of,  vide  Lucerne,  Zu- 
rich, Bern. 

Medici,  vide  Lucca,  Sienna,  Flo- 
rence. 

Merum  Imperium,  151. 

Messenians,  190. 

Meursius  on  Sparta,  180. 

Middleton's  error  respecting  Cicero, 
173. 

Milan,  government  of,  328;  coun- 
cils, ib. ;  podestas,  ih.  ;  credenza, 
ib.  ;  patricians,  329 ;  plebeians, 
ib.  ;  struggles  of  the  orders,  ib.  ; 
cavahy,  330  ;  condottieri,  ib.  ;  fo- 
reign captain-general,  ib.  ;  finan- 
cial dictatorship,  ib.  ;  companies, 
credenzas,  motta,  321  ;  councils, 
ib. ;  defects  of  history  in  pohtical 
matters,  332  ;  Signor  del  Popolo, 
ib. ;  Mai-tino  della  Torre,  333  ; 
Visconti  completes  his  usurpa- 
tion, 334 ;  unprincipled  conduct 
of  both  patricians  and  plebeians, 
ib. :  unfitness  of  the  Lombards  for 
self-government,  334  ;  conflict  of 
factions,  ib.;  succession  of  revolu- 
tions, 335  ;  Visconti  family,  336  ; 
vain  attempt  to  erect  a  republic, 
337  ;  Francis  Sforza,  ib.  ;  his  vic- 
tories, and  elevation  by  the  mob, 
338 ;  fickleness  and  baseness  of 
the  people  of  Milan  and  Placentia, 
ib. ;  Charles  V.  obtains  the  sove- 
reignty of,  after  the  Sforzas,  340. 

Miltiades,  vide  Athens. 

Montecchi  and  Bonifazii,  297. 

Montesquieu's  errors  on  the  history 
of  Rome,  102. 

Morse,  vide  Sparta. 

Mothaces,  vide  Sparta. 

Motta,  vide  Milan. 

Napoleon's  policy  in  Switzerland, 
vide  Lucern. 

Naucrarii,  vide  Athens. 

Neri  and  Bianchi,  vide  Florence. 

Niebuhr's  opinions  on  the  history 
of  Rome,  100,  107,  108,  112,  114, 
121, 123,  124,  125,  134,  139,  141. 

Nobility,  vide  Aristocracy. 

Nomothetes,  vide  Athens. 

Nuncios,  vide  Poland. 

Oligarchy  in  Venice,  290 ;  in  Genoa, 
314, 327 ;  of  burghers  in  Florence, 
350;  in  Sienna,  358,  359,  360, 
362,  363  ;  in  Lucca,  365,  366  ;  in 
Bern,  378. 

Orators,  state,  vide  Athens. 

Ostracism,  vide  Athens. 


Otho  I.  emperor,  grants  municipal 
institutions  to  the  Italian  towns, 
254. 

Padua,  299,  301,  302,  303. 

Psedonomus,  vide  Sparta. 

Palatine,  vide  Poland. 

Pansetolian,  248. 

Panathensea,  vide  Athens. 

Panviuius,  Onuphrius,  errors  in 
the  liistory  of  Rome,  102. 

Paralii,  vide  Athens. 

Paredii,  vide  Athens. 

Parliament  of  the  ItaUan  cities,  255. 

Paris,  Matthew,  quoted,  69. 

Party,  origin  of,  in  aristocracies,  34  ; 
had  no  existence  in  Venice,  35 ; 
justifiable,  36  ;  factious,  ib.  ;  bad 
efiiects  of  the  factious,  37  ;  weak- 
ening of  principle,  ib.  ;  destruc- 
tion of  confidence  in  statesmen, 
38 ;  coiTuption  of  private  and 
pubUc  morals,  ih.  ;  Hume's  opi- 
nion on  this  subject,  ih.;  union  of 
sordid  motives  with  pure,  39  ; 
examples  thereof  from  history,  /i.; 
produces  self-deception,  40  ;  de- 
stroys regard  for  truth,  ib. ;  pro- 
motes abuse  of  the  press,  41  ;  ge- 
nerates malignant  feelings,  42  ; 
passage  of  Dante  on,  ih.  ;  opera- 
tion of,  on  inferior  partisans,  43; 
effects  of,  in  paralysing  public 
councils,  44;  examples  of  the 
mischief  done  by  factions  in  Eng- 
land, ib.  ;  promotes  treasonable 
proceedings,  45  ;  defence  of,  by 
Fox  and  Burke,  45  ;  general  re- 
marks on,  46. 

Patres  et  conscripti,  vide  Rome. 

Patricians,  vide  Rome. 

Patrons  and  clients  in  Rome,  119  ; 
in  different  parts  of  Greece,  122. 

Pavia,  266. 

Paul's,  Father,  opinion  on  aristo- 
cracy, 62. 

Peculatus,  162. 

Pedrsei,  vide  Athens. 

Peerage,  senseless  project  of  a  re- 
form of  the  English  peerage,  15. 

Pericles,  vide  Athens. 

Perioeci,  vide  Crete,  Sparta. 

Perizonius'  work  on  Roman  liistory, 
100.  ' 

Personalis,  vide  Hungary. 

Petrucci,  vide  Sienna. 

Phyla),  vide  Athens 

PhylobasileLs,  vidn  Athens. 

Phratrise,  vide  Athens. 


390 


INDEX. 


Piast,  dynasty  of,  in  Poland,  73. 

Pisa,  want  of  information  respect- 
ing, 355. 

Pisan  fdliances  with  Genoa,  311. 

Pisistratus,  Pisistratidae,  vide 
Athens. 

Plato,  vide  Athens,  Sparta. 

Plebeians,  vide  Eome. 

Plebiscitum,  136,  139. 

Plutarch,  opinions  on,  98. 

Podesta,  functions  of,  296  ;  vide  also 
Florence,  Milan,  Bologna,  Sienna. 

Poland,  constitution  of,  72  ;  history 
of,  ih.;  confederation  of  1573,  74  ; 
efforts  of  the  Czartoryskis  to  im- 
prove the  constitution  of,  75 ; 
election  of  Poniatowski  to  the 
throne,  ih.  ;  the  improvements  of 
the  Czartoryskis  overturned  by 
the  intrigues  of  Russia,  ih. ;  first 
dismemberment  of,  76  ;  constitu- 
tion of  the  3rd  May,  1791,  ih. ; 
nuncios,  diet,  dietines,  ih. ;  of- 
fices of  palatines,  castellans,  and 
starosts,  78;  election  of  the  kings, 
ih. ;  rights  and  privileges  of  the 
kings,  79  ;  composition  and  func- 
tions of  the  senate,  80  ;  chamber 
of  nuncios,  81 ;  liberum  veto,  ih.  ; 
confederation,  rokosh,  senatus 
concilium,  82  ;  administration  of 
justice,  ih. :  courts  of  justice 
created  by  Stephen  Battari,  ih.; 
election  of  judges,  ib. ;  pospdite, 
or  arriere  ban,  ih. ;  vain  attempts 
of  John  Albert  to  curb  the  exor- 
bitant power  of  the  nobles,  84 ; 
character  and  habits  of  the  nobles, 
ih. ;  splendour  of  the  Princes 
Czartoryski,  and  patriotism  of 
the  present  representative  of  this 
family,  85  ;  works  on,  ih. 

Polemarch,  vide  Athens,  Sparta. 

Pohtical  profession  impossible,  31 ; 
must  necessarily  be  a  corrupt 
trade,  ib. 

Polybius's  account  of  Sparta,  178 ; 
opinion  on,  98. 

Pontiffs  in  Rome,  148. 

Popolani  grossi,  vide  Florence. 

PospoUte,  vidv  Poland. 

Praetor  in  Rome,  132,  143. 

Pregadi,  vide  Venice. 

Princeps  senatus,  124. 

Proconsul  and  propnetor  in  Rome, 
146. 

Procurators  of  St,  Mark,  vide 
Venice. 

Proletarii  in  Rome,  111. 


Proveditori,  vide  Venice. 
Prytanes,  Prytaneum,  vide  Athens. 
Pythii,  vide  Sparta. 

Quarantia,  vide  Venice. 
Qusesi tores  in  Rome,  151. 
Quaestionis  jus,  ih. 
Quaestors  in  Rome,  143. 

Ramnes,  vide  Rome. 

Repetundae,  162. 

Rex  sacrorum  in  Rome,  148. 

Ricci,  vide  Florence. 

Robot,  vide  Hungary. 

Roger  of  Hoveden,  a  monkish  his- 
torian, quoted,  69. 

Rokosh,  vide  Poland. 

Rome,  government  of,  not  an  aris- 
tocracy, 2;  contains  germs  of 
aristocracy,  3  ;  became  a  mixed 
aristocracy,  ib.;  oppression  of  the 
people  by  the  aristocracy  of, 
52  ;  aristocracy  of,  odious  to  the 
people,  57  ;  constitution  of,  98; 
importance  of  this  subject,  ih. ; 
its  great  difficulty,  ib. ;  ancient 
historians  of,  ih.;  modern  writers, 
99  ;  predecessors  of  Niebuhr,  100; 
Niebuhr  and  his  school,  ih.  ; 
scantiness  of  materials,  ih. ;  cha- 
racter of  Niebuhr's  writings,  101; 
errors  of  eminent  authors  on  the 
history  of,  ih. ;  early  history  en- 
tirely fabulous,  102 ;  illustrations 
thereof,  ih. ;  probable  era  of  the 
foundation  of,  104 ;  early  divi- 
sions of  the  people,  ih. ;  early 
constitution,  ib.  ;  the  tribes,  ih.; 
patricians,  106  ;  plebeians,  ib.  ; 
patrons,  ib.:  clients,  105  ;  comitia 
curiata,  107  ;  Niebuhr's  doctrine 
examined,  ib.;  equites,  109;  re- 
forms of  Servius,  110  ;  centuries, 
111;  comitia  centuriata,  113; 
legislation  of  Servius,  114;  com- 
parison with  Solon's,  ib.  ;  Tar- 
quin  the  Proud,  115  ;  his  tyranny, 
116  ;  his  expulsion,  ih.  ;  founda- 
tion of  the  aristocratic  republic, 
ib.  ;  fabulous  history,  117  ;  com- 
parison of  the  revolution  of,  with 
those  of  France  and  England, 
118;  patrician  power,  119;  pa- 
trons and  chents,  ih.  ;  feudal  re- 
semblance, 121  ;  seraiii,  ih. ; 
error  of  authors,  ih. ;  chents  in 
Sparta,  Crete,  Thessaly,  and 
Attica,  1 22  ;  monopoly  of  offices, 
123  ;  senate,  ih. ;  conflicting  ac- 


INDEX. 


391 


counts  of  it,  124 ;  Dionysius  and 
Livy,  ib. ;  errors  of  authors,  125 ; 
censors,  ib.  ;  choice  of  senate, 
126  ;  power  of  censors,  ib.  ; 
practical  checks  to  censorial 
power,  127  ;  senate's  ftinctions, 
129;  variations  of  its  power,  ii.; 
patres  et  conscripti,  130 ;  senate's 
influence,  ib. ;  dictators,  131  ; 
consuls,  132 ;  praetors,  ib.  ;  pa- 
trician oppressions,  ib. ;  public 
lands,  ib.  ;  Agrarian  law,  133 ; 
Spurius  Cassius,  ib.  ;  Licinian 
Rogations,  ib.  ;  errors  of  writers 
on  Agrarian  law,  134 ;  patrician 
creditors,  ib. ;  tribunes  chosen, 
135  ;  their  power,  ib,  ;  progress 
of  popular  power,  136 ;  decline 
of  comitia  curiata,  ib.  ;  rise  of 
comitia  tributa,  ib. ;  course  of 
legislation,  137 ;  double  legisla- 
tion, ib. ;  anomalies,  ib.  ;  solution 
of  the  paradox,  138 ;  senatus 
consulta  and  plebiscita,  ib. ; 
checks  to  the  tribunes,  139  ;  su- 
perstitious rites,  ib. ;  laws  of  the 
auspices,  140 ;  senate's  errors, 
ib. ;  democracy  established,  ib. ; 
practical  defects  of  the  govern- 
ment, 141  ;  decemvirs,  ib.  ;  go- 
vernment carries  on  laws  and 
legislative  decrees,  142  ;  consuls, 
«6. ;  praetors,  143;  aedUes,  ple- 
beian and  curule,  ib.  ;  quaestors, 
civil  and  military,  ih.  ;  choice  of 
magistrates,  144  ;  controversy  de 
binis  comitiis,  ib.  ;  dictator,  ib. ; 
progress  of  popular  power,  145 ; 
interrex,  ib.  ;  consular  functions, 
146 ;  provincial  proconsuls  and 
propraetors,  ib. ;  vigour  of  the  go- 
vernment, 147 ;  rehgious  polity, 
148  ;  pontiffs,  ib.  ;  rex  sacrorutn, 
ib.  ;  college  of  augurs,  149 ; 
haruspices,  ib. ;  Sibylline  decem- 
virs, ib.  ;  singular  facts,  150  ;  ju- 
dicial duties  of  magistrates,  ib. ; 
CorneUan  laws,  151 ;  judicial 
system,  ib. ;  justices,  ib.  ;  cen- 
tumvirs,  ib. ;  quaestores,  ib.  ;  jus 
gucestionis,  or  merum  imperium, 
lb.  ;  divinatio,  152  ;  special  ju- 
dicial laws,  ib.  ;  abuses  from 
thence,  163 ;  analogy  of  parha- 
mentary  privilege,  ib. ;  impeach- 
ment, ib. ;  cognitiones  extraor- 
dinurioe,  ib.  ;  examples,  ib.  ; 
progress  of  democracy,  155 ; 
Canulejus,   ib.  ;    address  of  the 


patricians,  ib.;  distinctions  of  the 
orders  obliterated,  156  ;  new  aris- 
tocratic distinctions,  ib. ;  new 
plebeian  body,  their  baseness,  iJ).; 
operation  of  party,  157  ;  jilebeiaus 
at  different  periods,  ih.  ;  virtues 
of  the  old  plebeians,  contrast  of 
the  new,  ib.  ;  savage  character, 
warhke  habits,  158  ;  massacres  of 
Marius,  ib.  ;  Cicero,  ih. ;  Julius 
Caesar,  159  ;  corruption  of  tlie 
people,  canvassing,  treating, 
bribery,  ib.  ;  sale  of  votes,  divi- 
sores,  ambitus,  sodahtium,  160 ; 
bribery  laws,  ib. ;  unpaid  magis- 
tracy, 161  ;  popular  patronage 
and  corruption,  162;  pecvhitiis 
repetundve,  ib. ;  popular  corrup- 
tion, faction,  civil  war,  ib.  ;  over- 
throw of  the  commonwealth,  163; 
conduct  of  the  aristocracy,  ih. ; 
aristocracy  and  princes,  164 ; 
error  of  the  patricians,  165  ; 
American  war,  Irish  independ- 
ence, 166  ;  Roman  parties,  167  ; 
condiict  of  the  people,  ib. ;  Eo- 
man  yeomanry,  ih.;  natural  aris- 
tocracy, 168;  orders  new  moulded, 
169;  West  Indian  society,  170; 
aristocracy  of  middle  classes,  ib. ; 
power  useless  to  an  uneducated 
people,  171;  checks  on  the  people, 
ib. ;  checks  in  general,  172  ;  delay 
and  notice,  English  proceedings, 
ib.;  factious  men  uncontrolled,  ih.; 
Catiline's  conspiracy,  173 ;  Ci- 
cero's conduct,  ih. ;  Middleton's 
error  respecting  Cicero,  ib. 
Roman  dominions  compared  with 
the  Venetian,  280. 

Salinguerra,  family  of,  297. 

Saint  Croix's  work  on  ancient  fede- 
ral governments,  178. 

San  Marino,  vide  Marino. 

Savii,  vide  Venice. 

Saxony,  house  of,  on  the  throne  of 
Poland,  74. 

Scotch  parhament  compared  with 
the  Venetian  government,  292. 

Seisachtia,  vide  Solon. 

Senate  of  Rome,  123,  126,  129,  130; 
of  the  Italian  cities,  255. 

Senatus  concilium,  vide  Poland. 

Servius  TuUius,  King  of  Rome,  109, 
110,114,115. 

Sforza  family,  vide  Milan. 

Sibylline  books  and  Decemvirs,  149. 

Sienna    aristocracy  never  entirely 


392 


INDEX. 


extinguished,  consuls,  podesta, 
council,  357 ;  oligarchy  esta- 
blished in,  steps  of  the  transition, 
358 ;  intrigues  of  the  oligarchs 
with  the  foreign  powers,  369  ;  oh- 
garchs  overthrown,  360  ;  burgher 
aristocracy  and  ohgarchy,  ih. ; 
government  falls  into  the  hands 
of  the  lowest  class,  361 ;  surrender 
of,  to  Visconti,  ib.  ;  factious  tur- 
biilence  and  revolutions,  ih.  ; 
Petrucci's  power,  362 ;  five  or- 
ders recognised,  ih. ;  Duke  of 
Calabria,  ib. ;  mob  oligarchy,  ih.  ; 
revolution  and  new  government, 
ib. ;  dictatorship  and  destruction 
of  this  new  constitution,  363 ; 
governments  of  Spain  and  France 
alternately,  ih.  ;  union  with  Tus- 
cany, ib. ;  real  duration  of  Sien- 
nese  ohgarchy,  ih. 

Sigismund  Augustus,  King  of  Po- 
land, 73. 

Sigismund  III.,  Vasa,  King  of  Po- 
land, 74. 

Signor  del  Popolo,  vide  MUan. 

Sigonius's  opinions  on  the  history  of 
Rome  quoted  and  examined,  102, 
144,  152. 

Sodalitiura,  160. 

Solon,  vide  Athens;  Solon  compared 
with  Servius,  114. 

Sparta,  the  only  lasting  aristocracy 
of  ancient  times,  4  ;  constitution 
of,  derived  from  Crete,  178;  opi- 
nions of  Polybius  and  others,  ib. ; 
Eerioeci,  ih.,  180  ;  helots,  ih.,  181  ; 
ycurgus,  179  ;  general  remarks, 
ib. ;  authors,  180  ;  classes  of  the 
people,  ib.  ;  proofs  of  this  theory, 
ih. ;  hypomeiones,  homoioi,  mo- 
thaces,  182  ;  insurrection  of  Ci- 
nadon,  ih.,  183 ;  tribes,  phylse, 
obse,  183  ;  castes,  ih.:  morse,  ih.  ; 
errors  of  authors,  ib. ;  kings  or 
archagetae,  «&.;  rules  of  succession, 
ih. ;  senate,  184  ;  ecclesise,  185  ; 
mode  of  voting,  ih. ;  polemarchs, 
harmosynae,  homophylaces,  har- 
mostae,  hippogrenae,  186 ;  object 
of  Spartan  system,  187  ;  its  ope- 
ration traced,  ih. ;  stages  of  hu- 
man Ufe  as  subject  to  it,  ih.  ; 
marriage,  procreation,  infancy, 
boyhood,  paedonomus,  fuU  age, 
188  ;  equality  of  fortune  attempt- 
ed, 189  ;  ephors,  191;  their  power, 
ib. ;  resemblance  to  tribunes, 
192  ;  opinions  of  authors  recon-   I 


ciled,  ih. ;  Ephoral  usurpation, 
193;  artificial  aristocracy,  195; 
natural  aristocracy,  196  ;  contro- 
versy on  classification,  opinions 
of  authors,  197  ;  contradictory 
usages,  ib.  ;  unintelligible  state- 
ments, ih.  ;  paradoxes,  198  ;  du- 
ration of  Lycurgus'  pohty,  200; 
party  process  and  changes,  ih. ; 
Agis,  Lysander,  and  Cleomenes, 
201 ;  Spartans  overpowered,  join 
the  Achaean  league,  202  ;  distinc- 
tion of  orders,  203. 

Spurius  Cassius,  133. 

Stephen  Battori,  King  of  Poland, 
82. 

Svriss  aristocracy,  369 ;  division  of 
this  subject,  ih. 

Synodus,  vide  Athens. 

Szecheny,  Count,  vide  Hungary. 

Szolgo  Birok,  vide  Hungary. 

Tabula,  vide  Diet  of  Hungary. 
Tarquin  the  Pi-oud,  his  character 

and  expulsion,  116. 
Ten,  Council  of,  vide  Venice. 
Theban  government,  vide  Boeotian 

government. 
Themistocles,  vide  Athens. 
Thesmothetae,  vide  Athens. 
Theseus,  vide  Athens. 
Titus,  vide  Rome. 
Torre,  Martino  della,  vide  Milan. 
Tribes,  Roman,  184. 
Tribunes  of  Rome,  135,  139,  140. 
Tribunus  celerum,  110. 
Ti-ityes,  vide  Athens. 
Tuscany,  Sienna  united  with,  363. 

Uberti,  vide  Florence. 

Upstart  superiority  less  respected 

than  a  long-established  one,  25. 
Urbarium,  vide  Hungary. 

Valerian  law,  135,  142. 

Valerius  Maximus,  opinion  on,  99. 

Vasa,  dynasty  of,  in  Poland,  73. 

Venice,  ohgarchy  of,  22. 

Venice  free  from  political  parties, 
35  ;  aristocracy  of,  popular,  57 ; 
origin  of,  260 ;   insular  federacy, 
ib.  ;  anarchy,  261  ;  doge  created, 
ib. ;  town  of  Venice  founded,  ih. 
conquests,     ib. ;      parties,     262 
doge's    power    restricted,    263 
pregadi,  ib. ;  aristocracy  founded, 
ih.  ;  grand  council,  264  ;  oligarchy 
estabhshed,  265  ;  council  of  ten, 
ih. ;  inquisition,   267  ;  spies,  ih. ; 


INDEX. 


393 


lion's  mouth,  ib. ;  committee  of 
public  safety  in  France  compared 
with  the  council  of  ten,  ih. ;  doge, 
269 ;  comphcated  election  of  the 
doge,  ih. ;  two  objects  kept  in 
view  by  this  comphcation,  270 
neither  of  them  attained,  ih. 
examination  of  the  process,  ih. 
first  object  to  prevent  faction, 
ih.]  second  object  to  prevent  cor- 
ruption, 271  ;  jealous  nature  of 
aristocracy,  273 ;  hmited  power 
of  the  doge,  ih, ;  ducal  oath,  274 ; 
ofl&cers  to  watch  and  punish  the 
doge,  ih. ;  avogadors,  ih. ;  doge's 
prerogative,  275 ;  senate  or  pre- 
gadi,  ih. ;  collegio,  ih. ;  judicial 
power,  276  ;  quarantia,  ih. ;  9f- 
fices  filled  by  commoners,  ih. 
procurators  of  St.  Mark,  ih. 
savii,  ih.  ;  provincial  ofl&ces,  ih 
proveditori,  ih. ;  government  of 
Candia,  277  ;  great  vigour  of  the 
government,  278 ;  comparison  of 
the  dominions  of,  with  those  of 
England,  279  ;  comparison  with 
those  of  Rome,  280 ;  tyranny  of, 
281 ;  examples,  Carraro,  Carmag- 
nola,  Foscari,  202  ;  Zeno,  Marino 
FaUeri,  285  ;  firmness  and  vigour 
of  the  government  of,  286  ;  mih- 
tary  pohcy,  287 ;  equaUsing  laws, 
288  ;  merits  of  the  system,  ih. ; 
provincial  government,  289  :  oh- 
garchy  substantially  estabhshed, 
290  ;  comparison  with  the  Eng- 
lish government,  291  :  Scottish 
parHament  compared  with,  292  ; 
meanness  and  pride  of  the  nobles 
of,  293 ;  improvements  in  mo- 
dem times,  294. 
Venetian  terra  firma,  295  ;  feudal 
nobility,  ih. ;  municipal  govern- 
ment originally  in  their  hands, 
296  ;  podestas,  ih.  ;  factions,  297  ; 
Montecchi  and  Bonifazii,  ib. ; 
Adelardi  and  Salinguerra  fami- 
nes, ih. ;  Vivacio  and  Vicenza 
families,  ih. ;  rise  of  the  friars, 
ih.  ;  their  fanatical  preaching 
and  influence,  ib. ;  their  usurpa- 
tion, 298  ;  John  of  Vicenza,  ib.  ; 
Jordan  of  Padua,  299;  Ezzelino 


da  Romano,  77).  ;  his  i)n)digiou8 
tyranny,  300;  despicable  sul>- 
mission  of  the  people,  301  ;  his 
destruction,  ih.  ;  submission  of 
the  towns  to  others,  302  ;  Cane 
deUa  Scala,  Ih. ;  levity  of  the 
democratic  councils  of  Padua, 
ih. ;  corrected  by  the  aristocracy, 
303  ;  municipal  governments,  ih.  ; 
anziani,  ib. ;  gastaklioni,  ih.  ; 
Jolm  Galeaz  Visconti,  3()4 ;  de- 
mocracy of  Veroua  and  Vicenza. 
ib.  ;  submission  of  the  people  to 
tyranny,  305  ;  war  of  parties  in 
Italy,  306 ;  hired  troops,  iJ>. ; 
condottieri,  ih.  ;  military  opera- 
tions, 307  ;  surrender  of  rights  by 
the  people  to  the  chiefs,  ib.  ;  ef- 
fects of  aristocracy,  faction,  ty- 
ranny, on  the  character  of  the 
people,  ih. ;  letters  and  arts,  308. 

Venetian  government  compared 
with  the  Genoese,  326. 

Verona,  297,  298,  299,  300,  302, 
304. 

Vicenza,  297,  298,  299,  300,  302, 
304. 

Vico  on  Roman  constitution,  100. 

Visconti,  vide  Milan,  Genoa,  Sienna. 

Vivacio,  family  of,  297. 

Voltaire's  criticism  of  Roman  his- 
tory, 99. 

Wealth,  foundation  of  aristocracy, 
24  ;  respect  of  talent  for,  iJ>. 

West  Indian  society,  170. 

Whigs  bribed  by  Louis  XIV.,  236. 

WiUiam  of  Malmesbury,  a  monkish 
historian,  quoted,  67 ;  of  New- 
bury, ditto,  ditto,  68. 

Xenophon,  vide  Athens 

Zamoscius,  vide  Zamoyski. 

Zamoyski,  John,  74 ;  his  work  on 
the  Roman  senate,  125,  127. 

Zeno,  vide  Venice. 

Zurich,  early  aristocracy  of,  373 ; 
government  of,  more  exclusive, 
ib.\  council,  374  ;  senate,  ih.\  con- 
stitution of  1803,  ib.:,  constitution 
of  1814,  375. 


PART  II. 


2d 


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