Aristotelous peri psuxes = Aristotle on the vital principle

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IIEPI *YXH2.
ARISTOTLE

ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE.

Crauslateb from % original

WITH NOTES BY

CHARLES COLLIER, M.D., F.R.S.

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS,
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PREFACE.

HAVING, after careful study of this Treatise, been led
to the conclusion that Aristotle's object, in its com-
position, was to put before the world his own opi-
nions as well as those of former and contemporaneous
writers upon the Vital Principle, I have been induced
to undertake a translation of it, in order to give the
general reader the theories, hypotheses, and opinions
which prevailed, at that early period of natural and
physiological knowledge, upon life and its manifes-
tations. The Treatise, indeed, records all the pre-
vailing opinions upon living beings and sentient
properties, which lie scattered through Aristotle's
other physiological writings; and it displays, per-
haps more than any other of his works, the extent
of his knowledge, and the perspicacity of his intel-
lect. Should it, however, be questioned whether a
work, composed at a time when the special sciences
pertaining to its subject were yet in their infancy,
can be now of any value, it might be answered that,
irrespective of any positive result, an interest must
ever be taken in the investigation, truthfully con-
ducted, of nature's operations; and that this, brief

1G76134

VI PREFACE.

as it is, comprises many of the dogmata, of an other-
wise enlightened age, upon the more abstruse topics
of natural philosophy and physiology.

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that several
versions of this Treatise are extant, but as they have
been written under an impression that its design is
rather psychological than physiological, this misap-
prehension has tended to vitiate, or render unintelli-
gible what otherwise, as literary productions, might
have done justice to the original. Some of the
translators, besides, seem to have been but imper-
fectly acquainted with physiology, and this want of
preliminary knowledge has sometimes led to a mis-
apprehension of the text, and sometimes to an inad-
equate appreciation of what could be only suggestive.
Thus, the causes which have contributed to make
the text abstruse, and even in places unintelligible,
have concurred in making the translations obscure,
and occasionally incomprehensible; for besides in-
dications of imperfect anatomical knowledge, the
arguments in the Treatise can be regarded but as
suggestions, and be elucidated only by reference to
the more matured science of modern times. It cannot
derogate from what is due to Aristotle, to admit that
physiology, in his age, was not only encumbered
with the hypotheses of earlier schools, but also
dwarfed and distorted by imperfect acquaintance with
those systems and organs of the living body, which

PREFACE. Vll

he perceived, intuitively, to be necessary to a full
comprehension of his subject. But although the
opinions and conjectures of this Treatise may, from
the advanced state of anatomy and physiology, have
but little intrinsic value, the method adopted by
Aristotle may not be undeserving the attention of
those who, with a wider range of special knowledge,
are better prepared for the undertaking; unless,
indeed, the Vital Principle is to be set down among
those final causes, which, lying beyond the human
comprehension, are to be admitted as ultimate facts.
Although this may be the case, however, some in-
terest must be taken in a Treatise which is, not only
indicative of Aristotle's style and mode of argument,
but pregnant also, by allusion, with collateral infor-
mation.

This version has been made with the inten-
tion of rendering it, in so far as the analogies of
language would allow, a faithful transcript of the
opinions and manner of Aristotle; and notes are
added for the elucidation of passages which by no
periphrasis could be made intelligible to the general
reader. It may be observed that the mind, (6 vovs),
although nowhere denned, appears, in this Treatise,
to represent the abstract immaterial principle usually
attributed to the ^vxn '•> f°r it alone is excluded from
all direct participation in corporeal functions or
changes.

Till PREFACE.

Although the title given to this version embodies,
as I believe, Aristotle's idea, yet it is not pretended
that the writers cited by him always employed the
term i/^xv m h*8 sense ; or even that he, himself,
was always consistent in the use of it. Plato was
certainly not engaged upon material agencies or pro-
perties in his Phcedo, and in the Timceus, which
partakes of a physiological character, and as such
has been criticised in this Treatise, the animating
motor principle is treated of rather as an abstraction
than as the originating and natural cause of life,
through all its manifestations. The term Vital
Principle, however, has been retained throughout,
even where it may seem to be less apposite, as well
to avoid the misapprehension which might be occa-
sioned by the substitution of another term, (that of
soul I mean,) which might then to some appear to
be its synonym, as on account of the extreme dif-
ficulty of determining the point where the metonymy
might, without question, be adopted.

This Translation is from the Oxford edition, col-
lated with that of Trendelenburg ; and this allusion
to that eminent scholar affords me the opportunity
of acknowledging the assistance which has been
derived from his comments upon passages, which
require, for elucidation, all the light that can be
thrown upon them by tradition and learning.

INTEODUCTION.

As this treatise may interest some who have
never considered the subject for the elucidation of
which it was composed, it will be well to offer a
summary of that which Aristotle had undertaken to
delineate, and to give, at the same time, an epitome
of the opinions which, in modern times, have been
entertained concerning it.

It is then that principle, which, inherent in genial
matter, establishes functions distinctive of animated
beings ; and those functions are nutrition, and, through
nutrition, growth or development, within a certain
prescribed range, and absorption or rather change
wrought by absorption, that is, decay. These two
functions constitute, in fact, animated beings, and
distinguish them broadly from whatever is inanimate;
and as those functions are inherent in the simplest

1

2 INTRODUCTION.

forms of being, it is in such that we might expect to
find a clue to the nature of that something which,
whether entity or mere quality, confers upon living
matter its distinctive properties. But whether we
examine a seed before development, or watch the
rudimental forms of life, that something lies shrouded
in matter which, although to appearance inanimate,
is yet, through its influence, under genial conditions,
capable of developing into a perfect being; and of
resisting, for a stated time, the agency of surrounding
elements. Thus, growth and development with their
antagonisms absorption and decay, effected through
the actions of the material framework of living
beings, constitute, essentially, life; and the subject
of this essay is that something which gives to matter
those attributes. The processes, then, of reproduc-
tion, growth, and decay, that is, generation, life, and
death, are the essential characteristics of living
beings, and conferred upon them, as has been said,
by that something which is designated Vital Principle.
Now, to homogeneous forms and solitary functions
others of more complex nature are superadded, and
these give rise to that long chain of being of which
man may be regarded as the head ; but yet, amid all
the simplicity of organs, of action, and of reaction,
those two functions still prevail, and constitute life,

INTRODUCTION. 3

whatever the type of being, in its strictest significa-
tion. This is the teaching of Aristotle, as it is the
doctrine of modern physiologists ; and those functions
are always here referred to as the essential conditions
of whatever is animated, although, for higher forms
of being, other "organs and functions are required.
The nature, however, of the essence or principle
which originates and orders those living functions is
hitherto for us, as it was for Aristotle, inscrutable ;
and it may be that the wide survey which he took of
life, by complicating simple functions with sentient
and even intellectual faculties, tended only to disturb
and pervert the course of his inquiry. But whether
Aristotle's mode of inquiry was or not faulty, and
whether the principle which animates the world (it
may be the universe) is or not among those causes
which are inscrutable, it will be ever a topic of deep
interest to the learned and the thoughtful of every
age.

In an opening chapter, Aristotle has in so clear
and succinct a manner reviewed the prevailing doc-
trines and opinions as well of his own as of a pre-
ceding age, that that summary may be regarded as
the exposition of all that was then most authoritative;
and as, from that time, physiology may be said to
have declined, it would be almost supererogatory to

1—2

4 INTRODUCTION.

allude to any other writer before the rise of modern
science. It may be mentioned, however, in deference
to the name, that Cicero1 has alluded, with a just
appreciation of Aristotle's superiority, to this treatise ;
but as the topic was foreign to his pursuits and little
in accordance with his talents, we cannot be sur-
prised if he mistook the scope of the design, and per-
verted thereby the tendency of the argument.

This treatise is, it may be added, both an intro-
duction and a sequel to the other physiological trea-
tises of Aristotle ; and, as it treats of all the charac-
teristics of living beings, it may contribute to a
clearer understanding of them, as they, in their turn,
may serve to elucidate it ; for they all proceed from
the same hand, maintain the same doctrines, and
emanate from the same laborious and original
intellect.

This topic engaged the attention of eminent ana-
tomists and physiologists towards the opening of the
present .century, and their writings will shew the
opinions entertained by the moderns concerning it;
but it has, generally, been made an incidental rather
than a special subject of inquiry, a prelude, aa it
were, to the teaching of anatomy and physiology.
The opinions entertained concerning vital principle

1 Tusc. Disp. Lib. I. i.

INTRODUCTION. 5

by the eminent men here alluded to (Hunter and
Barclay, Bichat and Cuvier) may well be collated
with those of Aristotle, who wrote at a time when
science was in its infancy, and when, for profitable
investigation, he had to depend almost exclusively,
amid so much hypothesis, upon his own laborious
and perspicacious intellect.

In quoting those writers, there is hardly occasion
for observing any order of precedence, as they
flourished about the same time, and contributed
equally to the present development of physiological
science.

According to Hunter1, "Animal matter is en-
dowed with a principle called, in common language,
life. This principle is perhaps conceived of with
more difficulty than any other in nature, which arises
from its being more complex in its effects than any
other; and it is, therefore, no wonder that it is the
least understood. But, although life may appear
compounded in its effects in a complicated animal
like man, it is as simple in him as in the most simple
animal, and is reducible to one simple property in
every animal." In another paragraph, he adds,
" the first and most simple idea of life is its being
the principle of self-preservation, by its preventing

1 On Vital Principle,

6 INTRODUCTION.

matter from falling into dissolution — for dissolution
immediately takes place when matter is deprived of
it; the second is its being the principle of action.
These are two very different properties, though they
arise from the same principle."

Barclay1 observes that, " in every living organized
structure there is plainly a power that preserves,
regulates, and controls the whole ; directing, at first,
the different processes in forming one part of the
organs, afterwards employing the assistance of the
organs which it has formed to produce more, till at
last it completes the whole of the system in such a
manner as to suit its future conveniences and wants.
This power, or rather this agent, physiologists have
named Vital Principle; though not a few are inclined
to suppose it to be the effect, rather than the cause,
of the organization. But in all operations that are
performed without either volition or consciousness, it
appears subordinate to a much higher power — to that
Almighty and Omniscient Being, who dispenses his
laws to the boundless Universe, and whose laws, ex-
cept by himself, can never be improved, altered, or
abrogated."

Bichat2 makes Vital Principle to be "the assem-
blage of the functions which resist death ;" and this

1 Introduction to Anatomical Nomenclature.

2 La Vie et la Mort,

INTRODUCTION. 7

definition was adopted substantively by Cuvier, who,
in his introductory lecture to the " Comparative Ana-
tomy," has illustrated the influences of this assumed
principle, by a : description, alike graphic and beauti-
ful, of what takes place when it has been withdrawn
or extinguished. "If1," he observes, "in order to
have a correct idea of life, we consider it in simple
forms of being, we shall soon perceive that it consists
in the faculty possessed by particular corporeal com-
binations of lasting for a given time and under a
determined form; of attracting, incessantly, into their
composition a portion of the surrounding substances,
and in giving back to the elements portions of their
own substance. So long as this series of move-
ments is maintained, the body, in which it is mani-
fested, is a living body; and when it is irrecoverably
arrested it is dead."

But although the definition of Bichat involves a
great truth, and is a summary of all that has been
ever said upon the subject, it is open to the criticism
of M. Magendie, that, by its admitting the idea of
death, it presupposes life, and thus establishes a
vicious circle of reasoning. It is criticised also by
M. Comte2, as a fancied antagonism between animate
and inanimate matter, a chimerical struggle between
1 Regne Animal. z Science Bwlogique.

8 INTRODUCTION.

living beings and surrounding influences; for "the
idea of life," he observes, "presupposes something
able to live, and it requires no less a certain assem-
blage of external influences for its fulfilment."

The nature of Vital Principle, then, is still for us,
as it was for Aristotle, a great mystery; and as
opinions upon it are at best but speculations, we may
proceed, without further comment, to the text, which,
besides miscellaneous matter, will be found to contain
suggestions for reflexion and inquiry.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter is an elaborate statement of the subject as
well as the object of the inquiry. The term ^J/VXTJ,
here rendered "Vital Principle," has several signi-
fications, as was observed in the preface, in the
course of this and the other physiological treatises:
in one passage, it implies the life of an animal ; in
another, the nutritive function ; in another, a vital
part; in another, a motor force; and in another, the
visual power (rov o^a-ros »; ^v-^tj1) ; some writers,
besides, derived the term ^v-^rj from -v^v^/ao? or
if/w^oi, coolness or cold, because respiration was held
to be a cooling process, and as such essential to life.
The object of Aristotle, then, in this treatise, was to
learn the nature of that essence or principle which,
under whatever denomination, is the innate source
of motion, and, consequently, of vital actions in all
bodies capable of being animated; for although, in the
more complicated forms of being, it is involved in

1 De Sensu et Sens. II. 16.

10 PKELUDE TO CHAP. I.

the manifestation of perceptions and passions, its
great office still is to originate, to maintain, and to
perpetuate life, through all its gradations. It may be
that, from some such conclusion, Aristotle was led to
regard the vital principle as inferior in destiny and
office to the faculty which he has designated1 mind
(o i/ovc), and made to be impassive, homogeneous,
apart from, and independent of, the body. These
opinions have much in common with those adopted
by Plato in the Timaeus; as, while, in that most
beautiful and intellectual disquisition, the senses,
appetites, and passions, the mortal framework, that
is, of the sentient being, are located about the heart
and liver, — the intellectual faculty, that which is
divine, and intended to direct and control the animal
powers, is placed in the head. The life is repre-
sented, in fact, by ^v^tj, which is bound up with
corporeal functions and appetites ; and reason by
i/ous, which, if any where, is, "as the divine seed of
wisdom," in the brain ; and, being homogeneous,
does not depend, for existence, upon the life of the
body. These few words will suffice to shew that
there is an analogy between the two systems of phy-
siology and psychology.

1 De An. i. 4 ; i. 5 ; in. 4, 6.

BOOK THE FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

IT may be assumed that all knowledge is beautiful
and estimable ; but as one branch may be more so
than another, either because of the exactness which
is requisite for its examination, or from its treating of
objects more exalted and wonderful than any others,
so, on both these accounts, we may reasonably assign
the first place to an inquiry into Vital Principle. For
the knowledge of it promises to contribute largely to
all truth, and most especially to truth in relation to
nature, since it is the origin, as it were, of living
beings. The object of our inquiry, then, is to study
and ascertain its nature and its essence, as well as its
accidents, of which some seem to be its own peculiar
affections, and some to belong to living beings, as
original properties, through it.

Let us premise, however, that the attempt to attain
to any certainty with respect to it is beset with almost
insuperable difficulties; for as this has much in

12 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

common with many other inquiries, with every inquiry,
I mean, instituted for ascertaining the essence and
the thing itself, it might hastily be supposed that, as
demonstration is the method for studying particular
"bodies in their accidents, there may be some one special
method of investigation when our object is to learn
what is the essence of a thing, and that that method
ought to be sought for on this occasion. If, however,
there is no one common method for ascertaining what
any thing in itself is, the systematic treatment of
our subject is rendered still more difficult; for, in that
case, it will be necessary to adopt, for each particular
subject, some one particular method. Although it
may be manifest, besides, that the inquiry should be
by some kind of demonstration, or division, or other
method, there will still remain many difficulties and
many liabilities to error in fixing upon the principles
from which the inquiry should set out; for the princi-
ples of different subjects differ, as those of number
are not those of plane surfaces.

It may be well, perhaps, before proceeding fur-
ther, to distinguish the "genus" to which Vital Prin-
ciple belongs, and determine what it is — determine, I
mean, whether it is a something and essence, or quan-
tity, or quality, or any other of the classified cate-
gories; as also, a distinction of no small importance,
whether it is among entities in potentiality, or whether
rather it is a reality. We have to consider too whether

CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 13

Vital Principle is divisible or without parts, and
whether every Vital Principle is or is not the same in
kind, and, if not the same, whether the difference is
generic or specific ; but they who now are engaged in
discussing and exploring Vital Principle seem to give
exclusive attention to that of man. We must be on
our guard against this, however, so that it may not
escape us whether there is but one definition for Vital
Principle as for animal, or whether it must be differ-
ent for each creature, as for a horse, a dog, or a man.
The term animal, besides, taken in an universal
sense, is either without meaning, or of very secondary
value; and so equally is every other common term
which might be predicated of this subject. If, on the
other hand, there are not several Vital Principles, but
parts only of a single Principle, we have to settle
whether we should commence the inquiry with the
Principle as a whole, or, contrariwise, with its parts;
and, with respect to the parts, it is difficult to deter-
mine which of them have been constituted differently
from others ; it is difficult also to say whether we
should study the parts before their functions, as the
mind before thought, or sensibility before sensation ;
and so for other faculties and functions. If it be ex-
pedient to commence the inquiry with functions, it
may be a question whether it would not be better
here also to study first their opposites ; as the object
of perception before that which perceives, and thought

14 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

before that which thinks. Now, the knowledge of
any thing in itself seems to be useful towards a right
conception of the causes of the accidents in sub-
stances ; as, in mathematics, the knowledge of straight
and curve, line and surface, is requisite for perceiving
to how many right angles the angles of the triangle
are equal. But the knowledge of the accidents con-
tributes, largely, in its turn, towards knowing what
the thing, essentially, is ; for whenever we may be able,
from the appearance of any substance, to recount the
whole or the greater number of its accidents, we are
then best prepared to say what its essence is. Thus,
the essence is the proper beginning for every demon-
stration, so that all the definitions, which do not
make known, or make it easy to conjecture what
may be the accidents of any substance, are to be
regarded as dialectic and unprofitable subtleties.

It is difficult to determine whether all the emo-
tions of Vital Principle are common to it and its
recipient, or whether some one emotion belongs to it
exclusively ; and this is a question, which, although
not easily settled, it is necessary to entertain. There
is scarcely one of the many emotions which are de-
rived from the Vital Principle, (as anger, or courage,
desire, or feeling,) in the manifestation of which the
Vital Principle can be said to be affected, actively or
passively, without the body; the faculty of thought
seems to be the peculiar property of the Vital Prin-

CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 15

ciple, but whether thought be imagination of some
kind, or never unaccompanied by imagination, still
we must admit that it cannot be exercised without the
body. If, then, there is any one function or emotion
which is peculiar to the Vital Principle, we should
admit that it might be isolated from the body; but, if
no one belongs to it, exclusively, then we say that it
cannot be separate from one. But, just as many acci-
dents concur in the quality straightness, in so far as
straightness (as, for instance, among others, to touch
a brazen sphere at a point, which, were it apart from
some kind of body, it could not do), so straightness is
inseparable from a body, since it is ever found to-
gether with one. In the same way all the emotions
of the Vital Principle (such as courage, gentleness,
fear, pity, daring, joy, love and hatred,) seem to be
manifested together with the body; for the body is
affected, simultaneously, by them. As evidence of
which, there are times when we are neither excited
nor alarmed, although misfortunes may be trying
and palpable, while, at other times, when the body is
plethoric, or in a state akin to that of anger, we are
moved by incidents which are trivial and unim-
portant. And what makes this yet more apparent is,
that, at times, without the occurrence of aught to
occasion alarm, we are thrown into the state of
persons under terror; and if this be true, it is clear
that all such emotions are material conditions. So

16 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

that the definition of any one of them, as that of
anger for example, may be said to be the motion of a
body of particular nature, or part or function of a
body, by such a cause, and for such an end.

Thus, for these reasons, it is for the physiologist
to study the Vital Principle, either as a whole, or
under some particular manifestation. But the phy-
siologist and the metaphysician would differ widely
in their definition of any one of those emotions, as
that of anger, for example ; which, while the latter
would hold to be desire for retaliation, or some such
motive, the former would maintain to be ebullition of
blood, or excess of heat about the heart. The one of
these, in fact, accounts for the passion by the matter,
and the other by the form and cause ; for the form is
the cause of the thing, which, if it is to be, must, of
necessity, be in a special matter. Thus, the cause of
a house, for instance, is such as this — " to be a shelter
to avert injury from rain, wind, and heat;" and here
the physiologist will speak of stones, bricks, and
rafters, while the metaphysician will, in these mate-
rials, only behold the form to be adopted for those
purposes. Which, then, of these is the physiologist?
Is it he who studies only the matter without refer-
ence to the cause, or he who is occupied with the
cause only? Or is it rather he who judges both from
cause and matter ; and which of the two is he ? May
we not however rather say that there is one who is

CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 17

engaged upon the properties which are inseparable
and only in so far as they are inseparable from matter,
while to the physiologist it belongs to judge of such
emotions and functions as emanate from particular
bodies and peculiar matter ? Properties different from
these belong to another ; and some of them to an
artisan, a physician or builder, as the case may be,
while the mathematician has to do with properties
which are not inseparable from matter, but which, as
they do not belong to any particular body, admit of
being treated as abstractions ; and abstract qualities,
as abstractions, belong to the transcendental philo-
sopher.

Let us, however, return to the point where our
discussion broke off, and repeat that the emotions of
Vital Principle, such as anger and fear, for instance,
in so far as they are innate, are inseparable from the
material frame-work of animals; and that they are
not to be regarded as a line or a surface.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter is a review of the opinions of earlier and
contemporaneous writers upon the Vital Principle,
and as Aristotle has never failed at the outset of each
subject of inquiry to record the principal writers upon
it, he may be regarded as the founder of tradition in
science. The writers here cited may be divided into
those who made motion, and those who supposed
feeling to be the essential characteristic of that which
imparts life to matter ; although there were some
who attributed to it both motion and feeling.

CHAPTER II.

As we are now entering upon the study of Vital
Principle, and are encompassed with doubts which
ought to be resolved, it will be incumbent upon us to
gather the opinions of such of the earlier writers as
have suggested any thing concerning it, in order that
we may be able as well to adopt their happier concep-
tions as to be on our guard against their errors.

CH. II.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 19

The suitable opening for this inquiry into the
Vital Principle is to lay down the properties which
appear, most especially, to belong to it. The ani-
mated being, then, seems to be especially distinguished
from whatever is inanimate by the two properties of
motion and feeling; and these two are almost the
only distinctions which have been transmitted to us
by the earlier writers upon the subject. Thus, some
of them maintain that the Vital Principle is in the
largest, fullest sense a motor power; and as they
believed that nothing can impart motion unless it be
self-motive, they assumed that the Vital Principle
must be among beings which are self-moved. Hence
Democritus says that it is a kind of fire and heat, and
as forms and atoms are, according to him, infinite, he
speaks of those which are spherical and apparent in
the sun's beams, while passing through chinks in
doors, as fire and Vital Principle ; and further says,
that those atoms, collectively, are the elements of
universal nature. Leucippus, in like manner, is dis-
posed to regard the spherical atoms as Vital Prin-
ciple, both on account of those forms being best
adapted for penetrating every where, and best able,
from being self-motive, to give motion to other things ;
and thus they both assume that it is Vital Principle
which imparts motion to living beings. Hence, too,
they make breathing to be the boundary of life — for
they maintain that the envelopment of animal bodies

2—2

20 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

crushes by its contraction those forms of atoms which,
from never being at rest, give motion, and that com-
pensation is afforded for their exit by the entrance of
other like forms, during inspiration; and that these
forms, while entering, resist the contracting and
solidifying power, and preclude the expulsion of all
the atoms which are essential to life. They further
maintain that animals can live only so long as they
can support this process. The opinion adopted by
the Pythagoreans seems to be to the same purport —
for some of them have maintained that Vital Principle
is the motes in the air, and others that it is that which
gives motion to the motes ; and it has thus been said
of those corpuscles, because of their appearing to be
constantly moving, although the air may be quite
still.

To the same point do they also come who say that
the Vital Principle is self-motive ; for all these philo-
sophers seem to have assumed that motion is the most
characteristic property of the Vital Principle ; and
that, while all other things are moved by it, it is self-
moved, and the more so, as they do not see any motor
which is not self-moved.

Anaxagoras, in like manner, says that the Vital
Principle is a motive force, and the same opinion may
be attributed to any one who, with him, may have
maintained that the mind has given motion to the
universe; and yet his opinion is not altogether in

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 21

accordance with that of Democritus. Democritus, in
fact, maintains that Vital Principle and mind are
absolutely identical ; that the apparent is the true ;
and that Homer, therefore, has done well in repre-»
senting Hector as "changing his mind while he lay."
Thus he does not employ the term mind as a faculty
for the attainment of truth, but makes mind to be
identical with the Vital Principle. Anaxagoras is
less explicit upon these points ; for, in many places,
he speaks of mind as the source of the beautiful and
the true, while, elsewhere, he says that it is identical
with the Vital Principle, and innate in all creatures,
larger or smaller, higher or lower, in the scale of
being ; but it is manifest that mind, in the sense of
intellect, is not equally allotted to all animals, nor
even to all men.

Thus they who have looked upon living beings
with respect to motion, have assumed that the Vital
Principle is the most motive of entities, and so many
as have looked upon them with respect to knowledge
and sentient perception, have said that the Vital
Principle comprises all first causes ; of which, while
some admit of several, others maintain that there is
only this one. Empedocles, for instance, seems to
maintain that the Vital Principle is derived from
all the elements, and that each element is Vital
Principle, as he says that " by earth we perceive
earth, by water water, by air air, by fire destructive

22 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

fire, by attraction attraction, and by repulsion dire
repulsion."

Plato, in a like manner, in the Timaeus, derives
the Vital Principle from the elements — for like, there-
in, is known by like, and things are derived from
first causes ; and so, likewise, have things been denned
by him in the treatises " upon philosophy." Accord-
ing to them, animal, in itself, is derived from the
abstract idea of unity, and primal length, and breadth,
and depth ; and other things in a somewhat similar
manner. It is besides maintained, but in a different
sense, that the mind is unity, and knowledge duality,
although, as one branch, it is unity ; and that the
number of the surface is opinion, that of the solid
sensation, for numbers were spoken of by him as
forms and first causes, and as derivatives from the
elements. Thus, some things are discriminated by
mind, some by knowledge, some by opinion, and
others by sensation ; as the numbers which represent
those faculties are the forms of things.

Since the Vital Principle has to some appeared to
be both motive and capable of knowing, there are
writers who have combined motion and intelligence,
and then represented the Vital Principle as a number
endowed with self-motion.

Philosophers differ with respect to first causes,
both as to their nature and number ; but they who
make them corporeal differ most from those who hold

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 23

them to be incorporeal; and from these again they
differ who make them to be a combination both of
corporeal and incorporeal molecules. They differ
also with respect to the number of such causes, as
some adopt only one while others admit of several ;
and, in accordance with these conclusions, they form
their estimate of the Vital Principle ; but yet they
have all assumed, and not unreasonably, that it is of
the nature of first causes to be motive. Hence, the
Vital Principle has to some appeared to be fire, as
fire, besides being the most attenuated and most
incorporeal of the elements, is both self-motive and
a primal cause of motion in other things.

Democritus has expressed himself more clearly
than any other writer in specifying the causes of each
of those properties : for he says that the Vital Prin-
ciple is identical with the mind, and to be placed
among primal and indivisible bodies ; that it is motive,
owing to the tenuity of its parts and its form ; that
of forms the spherical is the most mobile, and that
this is the form both of mind and fire.

Anaxagoras seems, as we have already said, to
distinguish the mind from the Vital Principle, although
he employs both terms as if synonymous ; excepting
that he sets down the mind as being, in the fullest
sense, the origin of all things. Thus he says that the
mind alone of all entities is homogeneous, unmixed,
and pure ; and to the same principle he attributes

24 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

the properties both of knowing and imparting motion,
as he maintains that it is the mind which has given
motion to the universe.

Thales, too, from what has been recorded of him,
seems to have assumed that the Vital Principle is
something motive, since he said that the loadstone
must have a Vital Principle because it gives motion
to iron.

Diogenes, together with some other writers, held
the Vital Principle to be air, because air was believed
to be the most attenuated of the elements, as well as
an originating cause ; and that, through these proper-
ties, the vital principle is able both to recognise things
and to impart motion to them. They argued that
Vital Principle, as being a first cause and the origin
of other things, is able to recognise them ; and that,
as being the most attenuated of entities, it is motive.

Heraclitus also maintains that the Vital Principle
is a first cause, since, in his system, it is the exhala-
tion out of which he constitutes every thing else ; he
regards it too as the most incorporeal of entities, and
as being "in a constant state of flux;" and further
says, that the moved must be known to the motor.
He agreed, in fact, with most others in believing all
things to be in motion.

The opinions of Alcmaeon upon the Vital Principle
seem to be very like those just cited — for he says that
it is immortal, on account of its resemblance to the

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 25

immortals, and that this resemblance is manifested by
its being continuously in motion ; for all divine bodies,
he argues, the moon, sun, stars, and heavens, are con-
tinuously moving.

Some writers of smaller pretension — and Hippo
was one of them — have ventured to represent the Vital
Principle as water ; and they seem to have been led
to this persuasion by the nature of semen, which, in
all creatures, is fluid. Hippo, indeed, reproves those
who assert that the Vital Principle is blood, because
blood is not semen ; and semen is, according to him,
the first principle of life.

Others have maintained, as did Critias, that the
Vital Principle is blood, from their assuming that
the most peculiar property of blood is feeling, and
that feeling is imparted to us through the nature of
blood. All the elements, in fact, have had their
partisans, excepting earth; and no one has adopted
it, unless such an opinion may be attributed to those
who have derived the Vital Principle from all, or
made it to be all the elements.

Thus, all these philosophers define Vital Principle
by the three properties, motion, feeling, and incorpo-
reity, each of which is referrible to first causes. Such
of them, therefore, as define it by the faculty of
knowing, make it to be an element or a derivative
from the elements, and, with one exception, their
opinions coincide ; — for they all maintain that like is

26 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. I.

known to like, and, since the Vital Principle recog-
nises all things, they constitute it out of all first
causes. But such as admit of only one cause and
one element, set down Vital Principle as being that
one, be it fire or air ; and such as admit of several
first causes, set down Vital Principle as being multi-
ple also. Anaxagoras stands alone in maintaining
that mind is impassive and without anything in com-
mon with aught else ; but, even were it so, he has
not explained, nor is it easy from what he has said to
explain, how or for what purpose it is to recognise
anything. So many writers as admit contraries
among first causes, constitute the Vital Principle
out of contraries, and so many as admit only one
contrary, whether hot or cold, or other analogous
contrast, make the Vital Principle to be that one.
Hence, led by the terms, some maintain that Vital
Principle is heat, because from heat the term life has
been adopted; and others affirm that it is cold, because
from cold, through respiration, the term Vital Prin-
ciple has been derived.

Such, then, the opinions which have been trans-
mitted to us upon Vital Principle, and such the
reasons upon which those opinions have been
grounded.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.

THIS chapter is upon motion, and its purport is to learn
whether the Vital Principle is in motion or at rest,
and if in motion, whether self-moved or in motion
imparted to it ; its object is also to inquire whether
motion proceeds directly from Vital Principle,
whether, that is, it impels to move while it is itself
at rest, or whether it imparts to the body the
motions which it first communicates to itself. Aris-
totle * admits of the six following modes of motion :
generation, corruption, growth, decay, change and
locomotion, which are all vital processes ; but as, in
a succeeding passage of this chapter, he speaks of
only four modes, he may have supposed that the two
first are included in the four last. There is an
incidental allusion to movement by conveyance, to
movement, that is, without progression. The inquiry
proceeds to the question whether Vital Principle is
• self-motive, and, if so, whether it is or not still

1 Metaphys. ill. 7.

28 ARISTOTLE ON THE [fiK. I.

subject to motion by impulse from without, which
seems to be answered in the negative ; for it can
scarcely be admitted that this Principle can be
subject to external impulse, since its movements, if it
do move, must result from sensual impressions.

CHAPTER III.

BEFORE proceeding farther, let us consider the nature
of motion ; for it may not only be untrue that Vital
Principle is, as some affirm, essentially self-motive or
capable of producing motion ; but it may be one of
those entities to which motion cannot possibly be-
long ; and it lias already been said that the motor is
not necessarily itself in motion.

Everything moved admits of being moved in two
ways : either by itself or by something else ; and by
something else we mean whatever is moved from
being in something which is moving, as sailors for
instance, — for they are not moved as is the vessel,
since it is moved by itself, but they are moved from
being in that which is moved. This is clear by
reference to their limbs — a particular movement of
the feet is walking, and walking is man's progression;
but the sailors do not at that time move by walking.
Since then motion may be spoken of in this two-fold

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 29

sense, let us consider whether the Vital Principle
moves by itself, and whether it partakes also of
motion communicated to it. As there are four kinds
of movement, tram I ition, change, growth, decay, it
follows that the Vital Principle should move accord-
ing to one, or more than one, or all of them ; and
if it do not move by chance, then motion must be
natural to it; and if so, then locality, for all the
movements above alluded to are local.

But if Vital Principle be essentially self-motive,
then accidental movement will not belong to it as to
a white colour or a length of three cubits ; for these
properties do move, but then it is by accident, and
owing to the bodies to which they belong happening
to be in motion. Thus, there cannot be for them any
locality as there will be for the Vital Principle, if it
partakes of motion by its own nature. Although,
however, it may be in motion by its own nature, it
may still be moved by force, and if by force, still by
nature; and the same holds good for the state of
rest. Thus, the point towards which anything is by
its nature moved, serves also by nature for its point
of rest, as equally the point to which anything is
moved by force serves also, by force, for its point of rest.
It is not easy, however, even conjecturally to deter-
mine what will be the forced movements and forced
states of rest of the Vital Principle — if its motion be
upwards it will be fire, if downwards, earth, for such

30 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

are the tendencies of those elements ; and this conclu-
sion applies equally to the intermediate movements.
Since the Vital Principle besides appears to give
motion to the body, it is probable that it communi-
cates to the body the motions which it imparts to
itself, and, if so, the converse may be true that it
communicates to itself the motions which it imparts
to the body. Now, the body is moved by translation,
so that the Vital Principle should change with the
body and be set free from it, either wholly or in its
parts ; and if this is admitted, it should follow that
the Vital Principle, having gone forth from the body,
might re-enter, and the consequence of this would be
that the dead bodies of animals rise again. . Could
the Vital Principle be subject to casual motion com-
municated by some other power than its own, then
an animal might be impelled to move by impulse
from without; but it is noway necessary that that
which is essentially self-motive should be moved by
something else, unless by mere chance, any more
than that which is good, in and for itself, should be
so by or for the sake of something else. It may be
confidently affirmed besides, that the Vital Principle,
if it do move, is moved by objects which act upon
the senses. Although, however, Vital Principle
should be self-motive, it would still be in motion,
and thus, as all motion is displacement of that which
moved, as being moved, the Vital Principle might

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 31

be displaced from its essence, unless its self-motion
were a casual property ; but self-motion is of its very
essence.

Some philosophers maintain that the Vital Prin-
ciple moves the body in which it is, as it is itself
moving, — and this is the opinion of Democritus, who
expresses himself almost in the words of the comic
poet Philippus, who charges " Daedalus with having
made a wooden Venus to become movable, when
quicksilver was poured into it." Democritus, in feet,
says much the same thing when he maintains that
indivisible spheres are in motion, from their having
been by nature constituted never to remain at rest,
and that these spheres drag along with them and give
motion to all things. But we will ask Democritus
whether it is those self-same spheres which produce
the state of rest, and it will be difficult or rather im-
possible for him to explain how they are to do so. It
is not thus, besides, that the Vital Principle appears
to give motion to an animal, as it acts, generally
speaking, by some kind of election and thought.

It is in this same manner, however, that Timseus
physiologically explains how the body is moved by
the Vital Principle — that, from its being in motion,
the body, with which it has been interwoven, is
moved also ; and having constituted it out of the ele-
ments, and divided it according to harmonic numbers,
in order that it may have an innate sense of harmony,

32 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

and that the universe may move in accordant orbits,
he bent the straight line into a circle, and dividing
that circle into two united in two parts, he again di-
vided the single circle into seven others, as if to indi-
cate that the orbits of the sky are the movements of
the Vital Principle.

But, in the first place, it is not correct to say that
the Vital Principle is magnitude, for Timaeus evi-
dently means that this Principle of the universe is
such as is the so-called mind ; and, then, that Principle
of the universe can resemble neither the sentient nor
the concupiscent faculty, as neither of these moves in
a circle. The mind is one and continuous as is cogi-
tation, and cogitation as are thoughts, and thoughts are,
by concatenation, one, in the sense, not of magnitude,
but of number ; and, therefore, the mind is not con-
tinuous in the sense of magnitude, but either it is
without parts, or, at all events, not continuous as
magnitude. How, indeed, were it magnitude, is it to
think — as a whole, or by some one of its parts ? But
parts must be regarded either as magnitude, or as
points, if, indeed, a point may be regarded as a part;
and, if parts be considered as points, then, as points
are innumerable, the mind, clearly, will never be able
to recount them all, and if, as magnitude, the mind
will have to dwell very often, or rather continuously,
upon the same subject. But it is manifest that think-
ing may be exercised once for all. If, besides, it

GH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 33

suffice for thinking, that there should be contact by
some one of its parts, why should it move in a circle,
or why be magnitude? And if necessary for thinking
that there should be contact by the whole circle, then
what means contact by its parts? How, besides,
shall that which has parts think by that which is
without parts, or that which is without by that which
has parts ? Thus, it follows that the mind must be
that circle: for thinking is the movement of the mind,
as the periphery is the movement of the circle ; and,
if thinking be the periphery of the mind, the mind
may be regarded as the circle, of which thinking is
the periphery. But then the mind will be ever
thinking, and necessarily so, since the peripheral
movement is unceasing. Now, there are limits to
practical thoughts, (as all such are for the sake of
something else,) and so equally there are to specu-
lative thoughts, in their reasons ; and every reason is
either a definition or a demonstration. Thus, demon-
strations set out from a principle, and are, in some
way, terminated by a syllogism or a conclusion; and
even though not concluded, they do not revert to
their principle, but, taking up another mean and ex-
treme, they proceed on ward ; but the periphery, on
the contrary, does revert to its point of departure.
Definitions, however, are always limited. If, more-
over, the same periphery recur often, the mind will
be driven to think often upon the same subject, and

3

34 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

thinking, besides, seems rather to be a kind of rest
and a halt than motion ; and this applies equally to
the syllogism. As every condition, besides, which is
compulsory and ungenial must be unhappy, so unless
movement be an essential property of that mind, it
must be moving against its nature, and it cannot but
be painful for it to have been so connected with the
body as to be unable to free itself from it; nay more,
it is a lot to have been avoided, since it is better for
the mind, as is commonly said, and to many seems
reasonable, not to have been connected with a body
at all. The cause too, of the circular movement of
the sky is obscurely stated — for the essence of the
Vital Principle is not the cause of that movement, as
it never does, excepting it be by chance, so move, nor
can the body be the cause, as it is the Vital Principle
rather which gives motion to it; neither is it ex-
plained how it is better for the Vital Principle to be
so circumstanced, and yet it ought to have been
shewn that God had caused it to have a circular
movement, as better for it to be in motion than at
rest, and to move in that rather than in any other
direction. But as this is an inquiry which belongs
rather to other studies, it may, for the present, be laid
aside.

The same incongruity which occurs in most of
the theories upon Vital Principle is met with here, in
that writers join Vital Principle to and place it in a

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 35

body without having first settled for what purpose the
body is to receive it, or how it is fitted for the office.
It would seem, however, to be necessary that this
should be settled, as it is through this connexion that
the one acts and the other is acted upon, that the one
moves and the other is moved ; and these are relations
which cannot be attributed to casual associations.
There are writers who content themselves with saying
what Vital Principle is, without determining any
thing about the body its recipient, as if it were ad-
missible, according to Pythagorean legends, that any
kind of Vital Principle might clothe itself with any
kind of body; but every thing, on the contrary, seems
to have its own particular character and form. Such
opinions are, in fact, very much like maintaining that
the builder's art may be undertaken with musical in-
struments; but we affirm that as each art must employ
its own instruments, so each Vital Principle must
employ its own body.

3—2

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IV.

THIS chapter opens with a definition of harmony, and
proceeds to shew that the then prevailing opinion
concerning the Vital Principle, as related to har-
mony, is not maintainable ; it is not quite agreed
upon whether the popular disquisitions here alluded
to are Aristotle's commentary upon the Phsedo ; or
his dialogue of Endemus ; or a digest of his own
oral teachings. The words in the original (\6yov<: 2'
oto-rrep evQvvas, K.T.X.), which are rendered " found to
be wanting" (Gallice, dont nous avons deja fait justice),
signify strictly the scrutiny or passing of the accounts
of magistrates at the close of their period of service,
and while the result was yet on the balance ; but, to
judge by the context, they seem here to imply rather
an unfavourable issue, and this is the purport of
other versions — " alia qusedam opinio de anima
tradita reprobata tamen, et his rationibus quae in
communisms sermonibus fiunt" The chapter closes
with a confutation of the opinion of Xenocrates, that
the Vital Principle is a number with self-motion.

CHAPTER IV.

ANOTHER opinion upon the Vital Principle has been
handed down, which to many is not less acceptable
than any one of those already alluded to, but which,
having been scrutinized in our popular disquisitions,
has been found to be wanting. The supporters of
this opinion say, that the Vital Principle is some kind
of harmony ; that harmony is a mixture and compound
of contraries, and that the body is constituted of con-
traries. But although harmony is a certain propor-
tion or compound of particles mixed together, it is not
possible that the Vital Principle should be the one or
the other ; for it forms no part of harmony to produce
motion, but all writers agree in assigning motive
power to the Vital Principle as its most characteristic
property. The term harmony, besides, is applicable
rather to health and the corporeal powers in general,
than to the Vital Principle, as would be very manifest
to any one who should undertake to account, by any
harmony, for the emotions and functions of the Vital
Principle ; for it would be scarcely possible to recon-
cile them to one another. If harmony, besides, may

38 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

be spoken of with reference to two points — as appli-
cable, most especially, to the composition of particles
in masses which have motion and proportion, when-
ever they may so coalesce as not to admit of any
which are homogeneous, and then as applicable to the
proportion of the commingled particles, yet in neither
sense can it be reasonable to regard Vital Principle as
harmony, nor can the Vital Principle be the compo-
sition of the parts of the body : for the composition of
the parts (and many and various are the compositions
of the parts) is quite open to examination — but of
what can we suppose that the mind, or the sentient,
or the appetitive faculty is a composition ? or how is
any one of them to be composed ? It is equally
absurd to think that the Vital Principle can be the
proportion of the mixture, since the mixture of the
elements which forms flesh is differently proportioned
from that which forms bone. It will happen, too,
from this theory, that there are many Vital Principles,
and many in every body, if all bodies are from the
elements in combination, and if the proportion of the
combination is harmony and Vital Principle. We
might inquire too of Empedocles, who maintains that
each of those bodies exists in a certain proportion,
whether Vital Principle is the proportion ? or whether
rather is it present in the members, as something
different from proportion? Is affinity, besides, the
cause of a fortuitous or a definite combination of

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 39

parts ? And then, again, is affinity the proportion,
or something besides the proportion ?

Such are the difficulties which present themselves;
but if the Vital Principle is something different from
the composition, what is that which is simultaneously
destroyed with the life, in the flesh, and other parts
of an animal ? Besides these questions, since each of
the parts of the body has not Vital Principle, unless
the Vital Principle is the proportion of the composi-
tion in the parts, what is that which is destroyed
when the Vital Principle has forsaken the body? It
is then clear, from what has been adduced, that Vital
Principle can neither be any kind of harmony, nor be
moving in a circle.

But to maintain that the Vital Principle is moved
by accident is to maintain, as we have said, that it
moves itself as it is moved in that in which it is, and
which is moved by it; and that it cannot possibly
have locomotion in any other way. It might, how-
ever, with greater probability be doubted, and for the
following considerations, whether it moves at all —
for we are accustomed to say that the Vital Principle
is daring or afraid, is angry too, and both feels and
thinks, and as all these seem to be motions, it might
be supposed that the Vital Principle does move. But
yet this is no necessary consequence — for if to grieve,
to rejoice or think are motions, in the fullest sense,
then each of them is motion, and motion may be said

40 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

to emanate from the Vital Principle, as anger or fear
is produced by the heart being moved in this or that
manner, and thinking may be some analogous or
different kind of motion ; but some of these phseno-
mena are produced by the displacement of certain
particles in motion, and others by change, the expla-
nation of the quality and manner of which is foreign
to the present inquiry.

Now to maintain that the Vital Principle is angry
is very much like saying that it weaves or builds, and
thus it would, perhaps, be better to say, not that
Vital Principle pities, learns or thinks, but that the
man, by his Vital Principle, is so affected or so
engaged. It is not, however, hereby implied that
motion is in the Vital Principle, but, on the contrary,
that sometimes it proceeds to, and sometimes comes
from it; as sentient impression is from external objects,
and recollection comes from it to the movements or
impressions abiding in the sentient organs. The
mind seems to be a peculiar innate essence, and to be
indestructible ; were it destructible, however, it would,
in an especial sense, be so by the dulness attendant
upon age, when probably that happens to the mind
which takes place in the sentient organs ; for if an
aged person could take an eye of a certain character,
he would see as well as a young man. Thus, the
infirmities of age are attributable, not to the Vital
Principle having been in aught affected, but to its

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 41

recipient suffering, as it does from drunkenness or
maladies. Thus, too, thought and reflexion languish
when any thing within the body has been destroyed,
but that which thinks is impassive. The properties-,
therefore, of thought, love and hatred belong, not to
it, but to that which contains it, and as it contains it;
so that when this recipient is destroyed, it can neither
recollect nor love, as those emotions emanate not from
it, but from that which was in common with it, and
which has perished. But the mind is probably some-
thing more divine, and it is impassive.

It is, then, manifest from what has been adduced,
that Vital Principle cannot be in motion; and if
altogether without motion, it cannot clearly be self-
moved.

The most unreasonable by far of all the opinions
upon Vital Principle is that which holds it to be a
number with self-motion, for it is beset with insuper-
able objections ; those, in the first place, which result
from the idea of motion, and then those more particu-
lar objections to speaking of it as a number. How,
indeed, is it possible to think of an unit in motion ?
by what or how, being indivisible and homogeneous,
is it to be moved? If said to be both motor and
moved, it must have distinction of some kind. Since,
besides, they say that a line in motion forms a sur-
face, and a point in line, then units in motion will
form lines, as the point is distinguished from the unit

42 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

only by position; and thus the number of Vital Prin-
ciple has already locality and position. If, again,
from any number there be subtracted a number or an
unit, there remains a different number; but plants
and many creatures, after having been divided, live
on, and appear still, in a specific sense, to possess the
same Vital Principle. It might also be supposed to
make no difference whether we speak of the Vital
Principle as formed of units or corpuscles ; for if
points are substituted for the spherules of Democritus
and quantity alone remains, there will still be in that
quantity, as in all continuity, a motor and a moved ;
for the theory takes account neither of greatness or
smallness, but only of quantity. Thus, there must of
necessity be something to impart motion to the units.
But if the Vital Principle is the motor in an animal,
so must it be in the number, and thus the Vital
Principle, being no longer motor and moved, is the
motor only. Even admitting that the Vital Prin-
ciple may, in some way, be an unit, there must still
be some distinction between it and other units ;
but what distinction, save that of position, can
there be between one unit and another? If then
the units and points which are in the body are dif-
ferent, the units will be on the same spot as the
points, for the unit will occupy the place of the point;
but what then is there to prevent them from being
infinite in number on the same spot, even if there be

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 43

only two, as things are indivisible of which the
locality is indivisible ? But if the points in the body
are the number of the Vital Principle, or if the number
formed from the points in the body is the Vital Prin-
ciple, why have not all bodies Vital Principle ? Now
there seem to be points in all bodies, and those infi-
nite in number. How besides is it possible for the
Vital Principles to be separated and set free from
bodies, since lines are not divisible into points ?

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER V.

THE argument against the opinion of Xenocrates that
the Vital Principle is "a number with self-motion"
is continued, and Aristotle, having already objected
to it as number, proceeds here, after a brief allusion
to what had been advanced, to object to it as being
motive. If the Yital Principle be some kind of body,
then however attenuated its parts, there must be two
bodies in one ; if it be a number, then as the unit is
a point, unless that number be innate and peculiar,
every kind of body must have Vital Principle, and
this cannot be admitted. With respect to its motion,
it had been shewn that the unit, being homogeneous,
that is without parts, cannot be so acted upon as to
move ; if it be motor and moved, it must, as entity,
have some distinction, and then it is no longer to be
regarded as an unit. The resemblance between this
theory and that of Democritus is again alluded to, as
the same objection is applicable to both ; for it mat-
ters not whether the motor be a monad, or point, or

PRELUDE TO CHAP. V. 45

corpuscle in motion, since their motion is the cause of
motion in other things ; thus, both systems maintain
a blind force, and ignore the influences of sensibility
and will. It will probably be said that the topic has
been too long dwelt upon, but it should be recollected
what an important part was assigned by the Pytha-
goreans1 to number, which they derived from the
monad or unit, and regarded as the origin, the mat-
ter, and the essential properties of beings, and as con-
stitutive of the heavens. It has already been said
how, as numbers were the first entities in nature,
they perceived resemblances to beings and qualities
in them rather than in the elements fire, <fec. ; and
hence made one combination to be justice, another
mind, and so on.

1 Metapkys. I. 4, 5.

CHAPTER V.

THE peculiar incongruity to which we have alluded,
belongs as well to those who suppose Vital Principle
to be some kind of "body with tenuity of parts, as it
does to those who with Democritus maintain that the
body is moved by the Vital Principle; for if the
Vital Principle is in the whole sentient body, then,
being some kind of body, there must necessarily be
two bodies in one and the same body. And it may
be objected to those who speak of it as a number,
that if so, there must be many points in a single point,
or every kind of body must have Vital Principle,
unless it is a number innate and different as well from
other numbers, as from the points which are in the
body. It results too from this theory, that an animal
is moved by a number much in the same way that
Democritus, as we have said, gives motion to it ; for
what matters it whether we speak of spherules, or
large units, or units simply in motion? In either
case, the animal is compelled to move from their being
in motion.

CH. V.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 47

Such and many other such objections may be
urged against those who represent Vital Principle as
an intimate combination of motion and number ; as it
is not only impossible therefrom to give any definition
of Vital Principle, but we affirm that it cannot even
account for one of its accidents. And this would be
evident to any one who should attempt, by this
theory, to explain the affections and functions of the
Vital Principle, — its reasonings, sensations, pleasures,
pains, and other such manifestations ; for it would be
difficult, as we have already said, to form even a
conjecture concerning them from it.

Now three modes of defining Vital Principle have
been transmitted to us : some have represented it as
the most mobile of entities from being self-motive ;
some as the most attenuated, and others again as the
most incorporeal of entities; but we have already
reviewed those opinions, and shewn how very ques-
tionable and contradictory they are. There remains
for us then only to consider in what sense Vital
Principle can be said to be derived from the elements.
This opinion has been adopted in order to explain
how the Vital Principle can perceive and recognise
all beings and things; but it necessarily involves
many and weighty objections. The supporters of
this opinion lay it down as a fact that like recognises
like, which is very much like assuming that Vital
Principle is, in some way, the things themselves ;

48 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

but things are never homogeneous, as they contain
many other particles besides their own; and many or
rather infinite in number are their mutual combina-
tions. Thus even if it be conceded that the Vital
Principle may recognise and perceive the elements of
which anything is constituted, by what is it to per-
ceive or recognise the thing as a whole, whether it
be a man, or flesh or bone ? The same question may
be put for any other compound body ; as the elements,
constitutive of every such body unite, not in any
fortuitous manner, but in a certain proportion and
combination, just as Empedocles expresses himself
with respect to bone — " The bounteous earth, in her
vast furnaces, out of eight parts has had allotted to
her two of liquid light, of fire four, and bones were
made white." It would be to no purpose then, that the
elements should be in Vital Principle, unless propor-
tion and combination were there also ; for although
each element may recognise its like, there will still
be nothing whereby to recognise a bone or a man,
unless such things be present with it also. But it is
scarcely necessary to say that this cannot be; for
who can have a doubt whether a stone or a man is
or is not present in Vital Principle ? or good or ill,
or any other quality? As the term being, besides,
admits of several significations (for it signifies some-
times a particular object, sometimes quantity or quality,
or other one of the specified categories), shall it or

CH. V.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 49

not be said that Vital Principle is derived from them
all ? Now, there do not appear to be any elements
which are common to all the categories. Shall it
then be formed only from such elements as pertain to
the essence? How, in that case, is it to recognise
each of the others? Shall it be said that there
are, for each genus, elements and peculiar principles
wherewith the Vital Principle may be formed? If
so, it will be quantity, and quality and essence;
but it is impossible that from the elements of
quantity there should be eliminated essence without
quantity.

Such and other such difficulties concur to oppose
the opinion of those who say that the Vital Principle
is formed from all the elements.

It is absurd to maintain that like is unimpression-
able by like, and yet assert that like is able to perceive
and recognise like by like ; and the more so, as these
writers set down feeling as they do thinking and
recognising, as some kind of impression and motion.
But to shew how many doubts and difficulties beset
the opinion adopted by Empedocles, that "objects
are recognised by the corporeal elements in the rela-
tion of like;" we have only to observe that all
those parts in animal bodies, which are simply of
earth, as bones, sinews and hairs, seem to be alto-
gether without feeling, and consequently without any
feeling of UJce, and yet, according to the theory, they

4

50 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

ought to be perceptive. There will be a larger amount
of unconsciousness than perception, besides, allotted
to each principle, as each will recognise its own
individuals, but be unconscious of the many others —
all the others, in fact, which are unlike. It follows,
too, from this theory, that the god must be the most
senseless of beings, as he alone cannot recognise the
element " repulsion," of which all mortal beings can-
not but be conscious, since each of them is derived
from all the elements.

But wherefore, let us ask, have not all beings a
Vital Principle, since every thing is either an ele-
ment, or derived from one or from more than one, or
from all the elements ? Thus, it is necessary to every
being that it should recognise some one thing, or
more than one, or all things. But we are at a loss
to know what that is which individualizes things:
the elements are like matter; but that, whatever it be
which binds the others together, must of all be the
most influential. Now, it is scarcely possible that
any thing should be more influential and dominant
than the Vital Principle, and quite impossible that
any thing should be more so than the mind; for it
is probable that the mind was the first-born and
sovereign in nature, while these philosophers main-
tain that the elements were the first of entities.

None of these philosophers, however, neither they
who maintain that the Vital Principle is derived from

CH. V.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 51

the elements, on account of its recognising and per-
ceiving things, nor they who regard it as the most
motive of beings, can be said to speak of every Vital
Principle ; for all sentient creatures are not motive,
as there are animals which appear to be fixed abid-
ingly to the same spot, and yet locomotion seems,
according to these philosophers, to be the only motion
imparted to animals by the Vital Principle. They,
too, equally err who form mind and sensibility out of
the elements — for plants appear to be alive, without
partaking either of locomotion or sensibility; and
many animals have no understanding. But even if
we may pass over these objections, and admit that
the mind as well as the sensibility may be a part of
the Vital Principle, still no general theory could be
framed for every Vital Principle, or for it as a whole,
or for it individually. Thus, the reasoning in the
so-called Orphic verses has been stamped with this
same error, for the poet says that " the Vital Prin-
ciple, borne by the winds, enters from the universe
into animals during respiration." But this cannot
possibly be applicable to plants or to some animals,
since there are some which do not breathe. This
fact, however, had escaped the attention of those who
first adopted the hypothesis.

But even if it be well to form the Vital Principle
out of the elements, it by no means follows that it
should be out of them all, as one or other part of the

4—2

52 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. I.

contraries is able to judge both itself and its oppo-
site. Thus, by the straight we know both the
straight and the curve, as the ruler is the judge of
both, while the curve is the judge neither of itself
nor the straight.

There are writers who maintain that the Vital Prin-
ciple has been diffused through the universe, whence
probably Thales was led to think that all things are
full of gods. But the opinion is not without its diffi-
culties. Why, it may be asked, does not the Vital
Principle, when in the air .or fire, form an animal
rather than when in the elements in combination,
although seemingly more generally situated in either
of those elements alone ? It might also be inquired
why the Vital Principle, which is in the air, is more
exalted and more enduring than that which is in
animals. On either side, in fact, we are met by
absurdity and contradiction ; for it is very unreason-
able to speak of air and fire as animals, and absurd
to say that they are not so when Vital Principle is
conceded to them. Those philosophers, in fact, seem
to have assumed that Vital Principle is in those
elements, because the whole ought to be specifically
as its parts ; and so it was forced upon them to admit
that Vital Principle must be, specifically, the same as
its parts, if creatures become living creatures by
taking in something from that which surrounds them.
But if the air, however subdivided, is still homogeneous,

CH. V.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 53

and the Vital Principle heterogeneous, it is clear that
some one of its parts will, and some other will not be,
in the air ; and thus either the Vital Principle must
be homogeneous, or else it cannot be present in every
part of the universe. It is manifest, then, from what
has been adduced, that the faculty of recognising does
not belong to Vital Principle by virtue of its being
derived from the elements ; as also that it cannot with
accuracy or truth be said to be self-motive.

Since the faculties of knowing, feeling and think-
ing, together with desiring, willing and the appetites
generally, as also locomotion, growth, maturity and
decay, are properties of the Vital Principle, let us
inquire whether or not each of those properties is
imparted to us by the Vital Principle as a whole —
that is, does each of those faculties emanate from the
Vital Principle as a whole ? do we think, feel, act and
suffer by it as a whole, or are different offices assigned
to different parts ? Is life in one, or more than one,
or in all the parts, or is there some other cause for
life than the Vital Principle ?

Some writers maintain that Vital Principle is
divisible, and that by one part it thinks, and by
another feels desire ; but what then, if it be naturally
divisible, holds its parts together? Not the body
certainly, we answer ; for the Vital Principle, on the
contrary, appears to hold it together, as from the
moment of its departure the body expires and decays.

54 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. T.

If there be a something which makes it one, that
something is, in the strictest sense, Vital Principle ;
and it will be necessary again to inquire whether that
something is indivisible or with parts ; if it be indi-
visible, then why not at once conclude that it must
be Vital Principle? If it be divisible, reason will
again seek to learn what that is which holds its parts
together ; and thus may the inquiry be continued in-
terminably. With respect to the parts of the Vital
Principle, it is difficult to determine what is the part
which has been assigned to each of them in the body ;
for if it is the whole Vital Principle which sustains
the whole body, it is probable that each of its parts
sustains some one part of the body. But this is very
like an impossibility; for it would be difficult even to
conjecture what part the mind could connect with
others, or in what way it could do so at all. Thus,
plants, when divided, appear to live, and so do some
species of insects, as if possessing still the same Vital
Principle in a specific, although not in a numerical
sense; for each of the parts has sensation and loco-
motion for a time, and there is no room for surprise
at their not continuing to manifest those properties,
seeing that they are without the organs necessary for
the preservation of their nature. Nevertheless, in
each of those parts coexist all parts of the Vital Prin-
ciple, and those parts are, specifically, the same with
each other, and with the whole — with each other, as

CH. V.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 55

being inseparable, and with the whole as being sepa-
rable. But the living principle in plants seems to be
a kind of Vital Principle, for animals and plants
alike partake of it ; and it is separable from the sen-
tient principle, but yet without it no creature can
possess sensibility.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER I.

AFTER haying delineated his subject and quoted and com-
mented on the leading opinions concerning it, Aris-
totle here reverts to the definition of Vital Principle,
which was given partially at the commencement of
the inquiry, with the intent of giving to it a signifi-
cation comprehensive enough to include all living
beings ; for he had guarded us against limiting the
inquiry to the human family. The argument com-
mences as usual with Aristotle, ab ovo, — he attempts,
that is, to fix the meaning of essence, matter and
form, those primordial entities or conditions, which
make up and serve to distinguish all the beings and
things of the external world. These very abstruse
questions have been alluded to in a former note, and
passages were then cited from the Metaphysics and
other works for the purpose of obtaining, if possible,
precise notions concerning them ; but these abstrac-
tions are so shadowy, and words so fluctuating, that
they seem to elude even the perspicacity of Aristotle,

PRELUDE TO CHAP. I. 57

and the ductility of his language. Essence is said
to be a genus, to be constitutive, that is, with matter,
which, in itself, is no particular thing, of each genus
of beings or things ; but then it is form, which
realises, so to say, that combination by conferring
upon it a specific character. For form harmonises
with all the organisation of an animal ; and every
organised body, Cuvier observes, over and above the
common qualities of its tissues, has a peculiar form,
not only generally and exteriorly, but even down to
its minutest details ; and it is " this form which de-
termines the direction of each particular movement,
which supports the complicity of its life, constitutes
its species, and makes it what it is1."

1 Blainville, i"* ley on.

BOOK THE SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

THUS have the opinions handed down by former
writers upon Vital Principle been delineated ; and
now let us retrace our steps, and again, as if at the
outset of our inquiry, endeavour to define what it is
and what the most general expression for it.

We say, then, that essence is a particular genus
of entities, and that of it part is matter, which in
itself is not any one particular object, as it is other
than form and species from which each object derives
its particular denomination; and that, in the third
place, there is the derivative from both these. Now
matter is potentiality, species reality, and that in a
twofold acceptation, as knowledge and as reflexion ;
but bodies, and above all natural bodies, seem to be
essences; for they are, in fact, the origins of other
bodies. Among natural bodies some have and some
have not life ; and by life we mean the faculties of
self-nourishment, self-growth and self-decay. Thus,

CH. I.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 59

every natural body partaking of life may be regarded
as an essence ; but then it is an essence in combination,
as^ has been said. And since the body is such a
combination, being possessed of life, it cannot be
Vital Principle ; for as it is itself more truly subject
and matter, it cannot be among the subordinates of a
subject. It follows, then, that the Vital Principle
must be an essence, as being the form of a natural
body holding life in potentiality ; but essence is a
reality, — the reality, that is, of a body such as has
been described. Now reality is, in the twofold signi-
fication, either of knowledge or of reflexion ; and that
it may be regarded as knowledge is manifest in that
sleep and watching co-exist as original properties, in
Vital Principle ; and equally manifest that watching
is analogous to reflexion upon knowledge, as that
sleep represents knowledge possessed but not em-
ployed. But knowledge pre-exists in the same indi-
vidual, and the Vital Principle is, therefore, the
original reality of a natural body endowed with life
in potentiality ; only this is to be understood of a
body which may be organised. Thus, the parts even
of plants are organs, but then they are organs which
are altogether simple, as the leaf is the covering of the
pericarp, and the pericarp of the fruit ; and the roots
are analogous to the mouth, for both take in food.
If, then, there be any general expression for every
kind of Vital Principle, it may be set down as " the

60 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

incipient reality of a natural body which is orga-
nised"

It is, therefore, to no purpose to inquire whether
Vital Principle and the body are one, any more than
whether wax and the impress upon it are one, or
whether the matter formative of any object and the
object formed are one ; for one and being have many
significations, but they are correctly designated as
reality.

It has thus been explained generally what the
Vital Principle is, and shewn that it is an essence,
in its abstract signification, which implies the par-
ticular mode of being in any particular body, as if
any instrument, an axe, for instance, were a natural
body, the mode of being in the axe would be, at
once, both its essence and its Vital Principle; for,
were it once to be withdrawn, then, save in name, it
could be an axe no longer. All this, however, relates
to an axe, but Vital Principle is the mode and the
cause of being, not in any thing like an axe but,
in a natural body, having within it a principle of
motion and of rest.

But what has been said may be better understood
by reference to the parts of a body. Thus, if the eye
were an animal, vision would be its Vital Principle,
as vision, abstractedly considered, is the essence of
the eye ; but the eye is the matter of vision, and if
vision be wanting, then, save in name, it is an eye no

CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 61

longer, any more than is that an eye which is repre-
sented in sculpture or painting. All that has here
been assumed of a part may be made applicable to
the whole living body; for, as there is an analogy
between part and part, so is there between the whole
sensibility and the whole sentient body, in the ratio
of its sensibility ; but this must be understood of a
body which yet retains its Vital Principle, and is, in
potentiality, alive. The seed and the fruit are the
representatives of such a body in potentiality ; and as
cutting is the reality of an axe, vision that of an eye,
so watching is the reality of Vital Principle ; which is
to the body what vision is to an eye, and its own
property to any instrument ; but this is to be under-
stood of a body in potentiality. Thus, as an eye is a
pupil and vision, so an animal is a body and Vital
Principle.

It is then obvious that neither Vital Principle nor
any of its parts, even granting that it may be divi-
sible, can be separate from the body ; for of some of
its parts it is the reality; and yet there is nothing to
preclude the possibility of some others being separate,
as there are some which do not contribute to the
reality of any body. It is doubtful, however, whether
the Vital Principle is the reality of a body in the
sense that a mariner is of his vessel.

Thus far, then, have we proceeded in our attempt
to define and delineate Vital Principle.

PKELUDE TO CHAPTER II.

As the purport of this chapter is to determine the essen-
tial or characteristic properties of the Vital Principle
in order to attain to a solid definition, it commences,
very appropriately, with a short disquisition upon
that form, and a protest against any deviation from
its real purport ; and thus the argument of the
foregoing chapter is continued. The opening para-
graph is necessarily obscure, from the nature of its
topic, but it may be practically at least elucidated,
by reference to similar topics in the other works.
It is observed by Aristotle1, that the antecedent is,
absolutely speaking, more apprehensible than the
sequence, as a point e. g. is than a line, a line than a
surface, and a surface than a solid ; so too an unit is
more apprehensible than a number (for the unit is
the origin of all number), as a single letter is than
a syllable. But sometimes, on the other hand,
the reverse of this happens — for as it is the solid,

1 Topica, vi. 4, 5.

PRELUDE TO CHAP. II. 63

especially, which falls under the senses, so the twrface
is more apprehensible than the line, and the line
than the point; as the multitude (pi iro\\o\) are
already conversant with them, while the sequences
are to be acquired only by attention, or some peculiar
mental faculty. Thus, to speak generally, it is best
to gather knowledge concerning sequences through
their antecedents ; for this is by far the most scien-
tific mode of conducting an inquiry. In fine, what-
ever falls under the senses seems, from being familiar
to us, to be more apprehensible than principles or
causes, which are more or less abstractions ; as, the
falling of a stone seems to be more apprehensible
than the principle of Gravitation. But as the know-
ledge of any subject may be also acquired through
the study of its accidents, that is, its essential pro-
perties, so it is suggested that the knowledge of Vital
Principle may be arrived at through the study of
its faculties.

CHAPTER II.

SINCE that which is evident and, when abstract-
edly considered, more apprehensible may be derived
from particulars which are by their nature obscure,
although to us more apparent, let us again attempt,
bearing this in mind, to attain to a comprehensive
view of Vital Principle. It is not only correct that
the wording of a definition should shew, as do most
definitions, what a thing is, but it ought also to
embody and make apparent the cause of its being
what it is. But the terms usually employed make
definitions to be kinds of conclusions; as if, for
instance, to the question "what is a quadrature?" it
be answered, that it is to find an equilateral rectan-
gular figure equal to another figure with unequal
sides, such a definition is the statement of the con-
clusion; if it be said that the quadrature is " the
discovery of a mean proportional," this conveys the
cause of the thing.

We say, then, resuming our inquiry at its outset,
that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate
by having life. Now the term life has many accepta-

CH. II.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 65

tions, but if one only of the following properties,
viz. mind, sensibility, locomotion, and rest, as well
as the motion concerned in nutrition, growth, and
decay be manifested in any object, we say that that
object is alive. And, therefore, all plants seem to be
alive, for they all appear to have within them a
faculty and a principle by which they acquire growth
and undergo decay in opposite, directions; for they do
not grow upwards exclusively, but they grow equally
in both these and all other directions, and are alive
throughout so long as they are able to imbibe nourish-
ment. It is possible for nutrition to subsist inde-
pendently of the other functions, but the others cannot
possibly, in mortal beings, subsist without it; and
this is manifest in plants, since no other than it has
been allotted to them. Thus, it is by this faculty of
nutrition that life is manifested in living beings, but an
animal is characterized above all by sensibility ; for
we say that creatures endowed with sensibility are
not merely living beings but animals, although they
may neither be motive nor change their locality.
Touch is the sense first manifested in all creatures,
and, as the nutritive faculty can be manifested inde-
pendently of Touch and other senses, so the sense of
Touch can be manifested independently of any other.
We call nutritive function that part of Vital Principle
of which plants partake ; but all animals appear besides

5

66 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

it to have the sense of Touch ; and we shall, hereafter,
explain why each of those functions has been allotted.
Let it suffice, for the present, to say that Vital Prin-
ciple is the source of the nutritive, the sentient, cogi-
tative and motive faculties ; and that by them it has
been defined.

It is easy, with respect to some of those faculties,
to perceive, whether any one of them is the Vital
Principle, or a part of Vital Principle, and if a part
whether it is distinct from other parts substantively,
or in an abstract sense only; but there are others
which seem to elude investigation. Thus, as some
plants appear, after having been divided, and after
the parts have been separated, still to be alive, as if
the living principle, in each plant, were in reality one,
in potentiality more than one, so we see the same
occurrence in other distinctions of the Vital Principle,
as in insects which have been divided ; for each of
the parts manifests sensibility and locomotion, and if
sensibility, then imagination and desire, as wherever
there is feeling, there must be sense of pain and plea-
sure, and wherever these, there must, of necessity, be
desire. We have nothing very certain to offer upon
the subject of the mind and the reflective faculties;
but the mind seems to be another kind of Vital Prin-
ciple, and alone to be capable of existing apart from
the body, as the everlasting exists apart from the

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 67

perishable. Thus, it is manifest, from what has been
adduced, that the other parts of the Vital Principle
are not, as some say, distinct from the body, although
it is clear that, when considered absolutely, they are
different from it ; for the mode of being in a sentient
must differ from that in a cogitative being, since
feeling differs from thinking, and this applies equally
to other functions and faculties. All those faculties
besides belong to some animals, particular ones only
to others, and there are others to which one only
has been allotted, and this constitutes distinctions
among animals, the cause of which shall hereafter be
considered. But something very like this has taken
place with respect to the senses, for some animals
have them all; others have particular ones only,
and there are others again which have but one ;
but that one is Touch, which of all is the most
necessary.

As that by which we live and feel, like that by
which we understand, has a twofold signification,
since we speak of that by which we understand some-
times as Knowledge, and sometimes as the Vital Prin-
ciple, for we say that we understand by either of
them ; so equally does this apply to that by which
we are in health, and which sometimes refers to a
particular part of the body, and sometimes to the
whole body. Now, the two faculties alluded to, know-

5—2

68 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

ledge and health, are a form, a " specific something"
a " relation," and an action, as it were, of a recipient,
capable in the one case of knowing, and in the other
of maintaining health (for the action of creative ener-
gies seems to be innate in the impressionable and
suitably constituted subject), but the Vital Principle
is that by which we live, feel and think, from life's
outset; so that, although it may be the cause and
form, it cannot be matter and subject. Thus, the
essence has a threefold signification, as we have said,
in the sense of form, of matter, and the compound of
the two ; and of these matter is potentiality, and form
reality ; and since the living being is a compound of
the two, the body is not the reality of the Vital Prin-
ciple, but it, on the contrary, is the reality of a par-
ticular kind of body. On which account it is happily
assumed by some that the Vital Principle can neither
be without the body, nor be itself a body of any kind ;
for a body it is not, but yet it is something of the
body, and, therefore, present innately in the body,
and that peculiarly constituted. It is not, that is, in
any kind of body, as the earlier writers have main-
tained, when they attached it to a body without in
the least defining either the nature or quality of the
body; although it must be against all probability
that any kind of recipient should receive any thing
taken by chance. But here all takes place as might

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 69

reasonably be expected — for the realising influence
exists congenitally in its own subject, while yet
potential, and constituted of matter fitted for its
agency. It is then manifest, from what has been
adduced, that the realising influence and cause can act
only upon that which is potentially capable of be-
coming such or such a reality.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.

THE inquiry into the faculties and functions of living
beings is here continued, for the purpose of deter-
mining, through them, the source from which life is
derived; and the distinction between the animal and
vegetable kingdom is, incidentally, alluded to. That
distinction is placed in the presence or absence of
sentient properties; and so Lamarck1 distinguishes
plants, by their want of irritability, that is sensi-
bility, from animals.

1 Hist. Nat. T. i. p. 77.

CHAPTER III.

ALL the faculties of Vital Principle which have been
enumerated belong, as we have said, to some crea-
tures, some only of them belong to others, and there
are creatures again which have but one ; and we spoke
of those faculties as the nutritive, appetitive, sentient,
locomotive and cogitative. Of these, the nutritive
alone belongs to plants ; but to other beings both it
and the sentient have been imparted; and if the
sentient, then the appetitive, for appetite is desire,
passion and volition ; and all animals, without excep-
tion, have the sense of Touch. But the creature to
which sensibility has been imparted cannot but be
sensible of pleasure and pain, of what is grateful and
what painful ; and if sensible of these, it must have
desire, as desire is the appetite for what is grateful.
All such creatures, moreover, have the sense for food,
as they have Touch, which is that sense ; for all ani-
mals are nourished by what is dry and moist, warm
and cold, and Touch is the sense for judging of these
qualities. But it is only by chance that the Touch
can judge of other qualities, as neither sound, colour
nor odour contribute in aught to nourishment; and

72 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

savour is among tangible qualities. Hunger and
thirst are desires: the former for what is dry and
warm, the latter for what is liquid and cold ; and
savour is the condiment, as it were, for both. As,
however, we shall be more explicit upon those points
hereafter, it may, for the present, suffice to say, that
all such creatures as have the sense of Touch have
appetite ; it is uncertain whether or not they have
imagination, but this also shall be considered here-
after. There are creatures to which, besides those
faculties, locomotion has been imparted ; and others
again, as man, to which have been allotted both
reflexion and mind, together with any other and yet
nobler faculty, if such there be, than mind.

It is clear, then, that there can be but one defi-
nition for Vital Principle, as there is but one for a
geometrical figure; for as in geometry there is no
figure but the triangle and its sequences, so neither
are there any kinds of Vital Principle save those
which have been enumerated. Could there, however,
be any such common expression for figures, as with-
out being peculiar to any one, should yet be applica-
ble to all, so might there be for the Vital Principles
alluded to. It would be idle, however, to seek for
any such expression, in the case either of Vital Prin-
ciples or geometrical figures, as should neither be
applicable to any one of them individually, nor, put-
ting aside individuals, be applicable to them as an

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 73

individual species. But still there is an analogy
between the faculties of Vital Principle and geometri-
cal figures ; for as in vital properties, so in geometri-
cal figures, the antecedent is ever present potentially
in the sequences, and as the triangle is in the square,
so the nutritive is in the sentient faculty. Thus, the
inquiry must be conducted with reference to indi-
viduals, in order to learn what is the Vital Principle
of each, as of a plant, a man, or a brute ; and where-
fore beings are thus ranged in a series.

Without the nutritive function there can be no
sensibility, but in plants the nutritive exists without
the sentient ; so again without the Touch there can
be no other sense, while Touch can exist alone, for
many animals have neither sight nor hearing, and are
altogether without smell. Among sentient creatures
some have and some have not locomotion, and, finally,
to a few calculation and judgment have been imparted;
and to such among mortal beings as are so endowed
all other faculties have been imparted likewise. But
to such as possess some one only of the faculties,
calculation has not been allotted, as some of them
have not even imagination, while others live by it
alone ; it would be foreign to our present inquiry to
enter upon the speculative intellect.

It is, then, clear that the definition which comes
closest to each one of those faculties is also the fittest
for the elucidation of Vital Principle.

I
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IV.

THE opening paragraphs of this chapter are both obscure
and apparently contradictory ; for while it is sug-
gested that it might be well, in order to comprehend
faculties or functions, first to study the energies or
organs from which they emanate, yet the inquiry
reverts to nutrition as a fact ; without reference,
that is, either to vital processes or to food. We
may assume that Aristotle was unacquainted with
the rudimentary forms and development of the
corporeal organs, and yet, judging from this exor-
dium, he seems to have perceived that every part
must advance from a nascent state to its perfected
condition; and thus he has suggested the teaching
of developmental anatomy. As the inquiry proceeds,
we are reminded of the obscurity or inaccuracy of
language, in portraying the impressions upon and
the functions, so to say, of the sentient organs —
even now the external object is, with us, in common
parlance, a sensible object ; sensation, besides its own

PEELUDE TO CHAP. IV. 75

sense, implies casual feelings from within ; sight
signifies both faculty and function ; and nourish-
ment is food as well as digestion. It is somewhat,
pei'haps, objectionable that Aristotle should have
bound up, so to say, the generative with the nutri-
tive function, seeing how they differ both in the
periods of development and duration ; they are
equally necessary, no doubt, to nature's design, but
still they are neither contemporaneous nor identical.
With respect to spontaneous generation here alluded
to Aristotle1 admitted its possibility, and for obvious
reasons, in the case of eels j and, although he denied
that all mullets (TOUC K6<rTpe?e (j)ve<r6ai Trai/Tas) are
so reproduced, yet he believed that some of the
species spring forth (^U'CTOJ) from the mud and sand
on the sea-shore ; and thus it is evident, he continues,
that some creatures, not being derived from others,
may be the product of spontaneous generation. This
opinion upon reproduction prevailed for many ages,
and even yet, perhaps, notwithstanding the advance-
ment of science, it may not be altogether discredited.

1 Hist. Ani. vi. 14. 14. 15. 3.

CHAPTER IV.

IT is necessary, in order well to study those faculties,
that we should comprehend what each of them indi-
vidually is, and then, in like manner, carry our inquiry
into their consequences and other conditions. But if
it behove us to say what each of them is, as what is
the cogitative, sentient, or appetitive faculty, it should
previously be settled what that is which thinks and
that which feels ; for energies and acts are, abstract-
edly considered, pre-existent to their functions. Grant-
ing, however, that it is so, and that we ought, before
the faculties or functions, to have considered their
opposites, it might be fitting here also, and for the
same reason, first to define the opposites of the func-
tions— define, that is, food before nutrition ; the object
before perception ; and the intelligible before thought.
Thus we must first speak upon nutrition and
generation, for the nutritive faculty is innate in other
beings besides animals ; it is the primal and most
universal influence of the Vital Principle, and through
it life is manifested in all beings. Its functions are
to generate and to employ nourishment ; for the most

CH. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 77

natural of the functions in beings which are perfect,
that is, which are neither dwarfed nor spontaneously
generated, is to produce another such as itself, an
animal an animal, and a plant a plant, in order that
they may partake, to the extent which has been
allotted to them, of the Everlasting and the Divine.
All creatures yearn after this, and, for the sake of it,
they do all that they do naturally ; but since such
beings cannot, in uninterrupted continuity, partake of
the Everlasting and the Divine, because no perishable
being can abidingly continue as one and the same ;
yet each can partake thereof in its own allotted por-
tion, be it larger or smaller, and still continue, if not
the same, like the same, and one, if not in number, as
species.

The Vital Principle is the cause and the origin of
a living body. Now, cause and origin have several
significations ; for the Vital Principle is equally a
cause, according to any one of the three defined modes
of causation : as that whence motion proceeds ; as
that for which motion is produced ; and cause, again,
as the essence of living bodies. It is evident that it
is a cause as an essence, since the essence is in all
things the cause of their being what they are ; and
as life is the mode of being in living beings, so Vital
Principle is the cause and the origin of all such. It
is the realizing principle, besides, the cause that is of
something which exists in potentiality becoming a

78 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

reality. It is manifest, too, that Vital Principle is a
cause, in the sense of a final cause ; for as the mind
acts for some end, so does nature, and that end is her
aim ; and such an aim has the Vital Principle, by its
nature, in living bodies. Thus, all natural bodies,
those of animals as well as those of plants, are its
instruments, and are what they are for its purposes.
The term final cause has a twofold signification, as
it implies that for which, as well as that by which,
any result is obtained; and Vital Principle is a, final
cause, as that whence locomotion is derived, although
this is a property which does not belong to all living
creatures. Change and growth, moreover, are depen-
dent upon Vital Principle ; for sensation seems to be
a change of some kind, and whatever is sentient has
Vital Principle ; and this applies equally to growth
and decay, for nothing grows or decays naturally
unless it be nourished, and nothing is nourished which
does not partake of life. Empedocles has not ex-
pressed himself happily upon this point, as, after other
observations, he adds that plants take growth down-
wards, where they strike root, from this being the
natural direction of earth, and upwards, from this
being the natural direction of fire. Neither has he
clearly seized the import of the terms upwards and
downwards, as they are not identical for all creatures,
or for the universe ; for the nead is to animals what
the roots are to plants, if we may speak of organs

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 79

after their functions, although in other respects dif-
ferent. But, besides these objections, what is that
which is to hold fire and earth, with their opposing
tendencies, together ? Now, unless there be a restrain-
ing force, they must be torn asunder, and if such
there be, it ought to be regarded as Vital Principle,
and the cause both of nourishment and growth.

The nature of fire seems, to some philosophers, to
be the absolute cause of nutrition as well as growth,
and that because it alone, among bodies or elements,
appears to be nourished and to grow. It might,
therefore, be assumed, that it is fire which works out
those processes in plants and animals ; but although
fire is possibly a joint cause, it cannot be the exclusive
cause, as this must be assigned rather to the Vital
Principle. The increase of fire is infinite, so long as
there is any thing combustible, but to all the bodies
of nature's constitution there is a limit and a relation
both as to bulk and increase ; and these are conditions,
not of fire but of Vital Principle ; not of matter but
of design.

Since the same faculty of Vital Principle is at
once nutritive and generative, it is necessary first to
define nutrition ; for it is by this, compared with other
faculties, that Vital Principle is especially distin-
guished. Nutrition, then, appears to be a contrary
acted upon by a contrary, but this does not imply any
kind of contrary by any other contrary ; it refers only

80 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

to such contraries as can generate from and give
growth to one another. Thus, there are many things
derived from one another which are not always quan-
tities, as the healthy, for instance, is derived from the
unhealthy ; neither do these contraries appear, in any
manner, to be nourishment for one another, as water,
for instance, is nourishment for fire, but fire is not
nourishment for water. It is in homogeneous bodies
especially, that the contraries seem to be in the rela-
tions of nourishment and nourished. But here there
is a difficulty ; for while some maintain that like is
nourished as it is increased by like, there are others
who maintain, as we have said, that it is contrary
which is nourished by contrary ; that like is unim-
pressionable by like ; that food undergoes change and
is digested, and that all -change implies conversion to
an opposite or an intermediate state. Nourishment,
besides, is affected by the body which is nourished,
although the body is not affected by the nourishment,
just as the material is affected by the artisan, although
he is not affected by the material ; for it is the artisan
alone who converts the material from a raw state into
one of usefulness. There is, however, a distinction to
be observed in nourishment, between its last and ad-
ventitious or its first state ; if both states are nourish-
ment, distinguished only by the one being undigested,
and the other digested, then it may be correct to
admit of both explanations for nutrition; for in so

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 81

far as food is undigested, it is contrary nourished by
contrary, and in so far as it is digested, it is like
nourished by like. Thus, it is manifest that both
these opinions are in one sense right, and in another
wrong. But as nothing can be nourished which does
not partake of life, so a living body may be regarded
as a body which is nourished from having life ; and
thus nutrition is not in a casual, but a positive rela-
tion to a living body. There is an obvious distinc-
tion between nourishment and growth : in so far as a
living body is quantity, it is capable of growth, and in
so far as a something is matter and essence, it is nourish-
ment ; for it preserves the essence of the body, which
exists so long as it can be nourished. Nourishment,
however, does not generate that which is nourished,
as it is the same as it ; for it is already itself the
essence, and nothing can generate, although it may
preserve itself. Thus, it is the same faculty of Vital
Principle which is able to preserve that, such as it
may be, which contains it, and it is nourishment
which renders it fit for its office ; and, therefore, when
deprived of nourishment, it can exist no longer.

Now, there are here three things or conditions —
something to be nourished, something by which
nourished, and something which nourishes. That
which nourishes is the primal or nutritive faculty ;
that which is nourished is the body ; and that by
which nourished is food. And as things are correctly

6

82 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. II.

designated after the object to which they tend, and
as the object here is to generate another like itself,
so the primal faculty may be set down as being
generative of another like itself. That "by which
nourished" has a twofold signification, as has that
by which a vessel is steered, and which implies hand
and rudder, of which the one only moves, while the
latter both moves and is moved. It is necessary to
nutrition that food should admit of being digested,
and as it is heat which works out digestion, so all
living creatures have heat.

It has thus then be shewn, although but super-
ficially, what nutrition is ; but the subject shall be
further elucidated in other treatises upon the subject.

PKELUDE TO CHAPTER V.

ARISTOTLE, having fully inquired into the process of nutri-
tion, here enters upon the investigation of the sensi-
bility or sentient system, which is, as he said, the
line of separation between animal and vegetable
existence ; the inquiry includes, of course, the senses
and their organs, as well as allusions to those ex-
ternal forces or qualities which by their action pro-
duce simultaneous perception, that is, sensation.
Sensibility is one of the great mysteries of our
mortal nature, but its investigation was, in that age,
additionally complicated and abstruse, as the brain
as well as its relation to the spinal cord and con-
nexion with the organs of the senses were unknown.
But, although anatomy has detected the links between
the brain and sentient organs, and thus shewn that
the senses are emanations, so to say, from it, yet this
knowledge, however otherwise valuable, does not
explain how matter has been constituted thus to
produce sensation, and, by reflexion, consciousness.

6—2

CHAPTER V.

LET us now proceed, as those subjects have been
scrutinized, to speak upon sensation in its widest
acceptation.

Sensation is the combined result, as has been said,
of a motion and an impression, for it seems to be some
kind of change ; and some writers maintain that it is
only like which is impressionable by like, but we
have already, in our treatises " upon action and im-
pression" shewn how far the opinion is or is not
tenable. But it is difficult to understand why there is
no sensation from the senses of themselves, that is,
why, without the presence of external objects, the
senses do not give out sensation, although fire, earth,
and the other elements, from which or the accidents
of which sensation is derived, are present in them. It
is evident that it is because the sensibility is not in a
state of activity, but is only in potentiality; and,
therefore, that it is with it as with a combustible ma-
terial, which alone, without something on fire, does
not burn ; for otherwise it might set fire to itself, and
would stand in no need of fire, in reality, for the purpose.
Since we speak of sentient perception in a two-fold

CH. V.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 85

sense, (for we speak of one who hears and sees, in po-
tentiality, as " one hearing and seeing," although he
may happen to be asleep, and we say the same of
one who is actually employing those senses,) so may
sensation be spoken of in two ways, as subsisting in
potentiality and subsisting in activity. Let us, how-
ever, before proceeding further, observe that impres-
sion, motion, and action are for us equivalent terms —
for motion is a kind of action, although an action
which is incomplete, as has been elsewhere explained.
Now, all things which are impressed and set in motion
are so affected by something capable of making im-
pression and existing in activity; so that impression
is in one sense by like, and in another sense by un-
like, as we have said — for the unlike is subject to
impression, but, having been impressed, it is con-
verted into like. A distinction, however, must be
drawn between the terms potentiality and reality, for
we are now going to employ them in an absolute
sense — any individual whatever, then, may be learned,
as we might speak of any man as learned, because
man is among beings capable of learning and being
learned ; and so we speak of a man as learned, from
his actually professing, at the time, grammatical or
other knowledge.

Thus, each of these individuals is learned in po-
tentiality, although in a different manner — the one
is so because he is of a certain genus and peculiar

86 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. IT.

matter; and the other, because he can when he will
reflect upon his knowledge, provided there is no ex-
ternal impediment to his doing so. It is this one only,
however, when actually reflecting upon his know-
ledge, being in activity, and fully acquainted with
some one subject, as A. for instance, who is to be ac-
counted learned in reality. Both those first men, in
fact, are learned in potentiality; but the one is so
from having been modified by learning, and under-
gone frequent changes from one habit to an opposite
one; and the other is so from possessing sensibility
or rudimentary learning, and being able, although in
a different manner, to pass from inertia to activity.

But the term impression is not absolute in signifi-
cation, as sometimes it implies a kind of destruction
by a contrary, and sometimes it signifies rather pre-
servation of something being \n. potentiality by some-
thing which is in reality and like, in the relation that
potentiality bears to reality. Thus, the possession of
knowledge implies the power of reflecting upon it,
and this either is not change, being but an increase of
knowledge and a step towards its completion, or it is
change of a different kind. It is not correct, there-
fore, to say that an individual, when thinking, is un-
dergoing change, any more than that a builder, when
employed in building, is undergoing change; so that
the process by which an individual passes, as to his
thinking and reflecting faculties, from potentiality to

CH. V.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 87

reality, ought to have some other appellation than
that of instruction. We may not then, as has been
observed, say of the individual who, from being in
potentiality, learns and receives knowledge from one
who is in reality and able to teach, that he suffers
impression, or else it must be admitted that there are
two modes of change, one in privative dispositions,
and another over habits and nature. The first change,
however, of this kind in the sentient being comes
from the parent at the moment of conception; as
from that moment the being has, as it were, learning
and sensibility. There is an analogy between the
state of activity and reflexion just alluded to, but
with this difference, that the impressions productive
of activity, as the audible, the visible, and others, are
all derived from without; and the cause of this is
that sensation, in activity, is employed upon particu-
lars, knowledge upon universals ; and universals are,
in some way, in the Vital Principle itself. The act
of thinking, therefore, is dependant only upon the will
of the individual, which is not the case with sentient
perception, as for it there must of necessity be ob-
jects to be perceived; and this holds good, and for
the same reason, with respect to the sciences which
are engaged upon external objects, because all such
objects are among particulars, and are external to the
percipient. But an opportunity may hereafter present
itself for the further elucidation of the subject.

88 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. II.

Let it, for the present, suffice to say, that the
expression being in potentiality has not an absolute
signification, for it may be understood of a boy as
being qualified potentially to be a General, and also
of an individual of suitable age for the office ; and the
term sensibility is subject to like modifications of
meaning. But as the distinction between these two
states of sensibility is without any special appellation,
although it has been shewn that there is a distinction
between them and what the distinction is, it has been
found necessary to employ the terms impression and
change, as if their signification were unequivocal ; but,
as has been said, the sentient principle is, when in
potentiality, analogous to the external object when in
reality.

The sentient principle, in fact, suffers impression
when unlike; but, having been impressed, it is con-
verted into like, and becomes the same as that by
which the impression is made.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER VI.

THIS chapter, adopting a former suggestion, commences
with the nature and influences of the objects and
properties which act upon the senses. As those pro-
perties or influences, however, whatever their denomi-
nation, light, sound, odour, savour, motion, number
<kc., are considered in their relation to the senses,
respectively, they here are merely characterized under
the terms, which are defined, of peculiar and common.
Casual or chance perception is exemplified by a figure
which is far from being apparent.

CHAPTER VI.

LET us, before proceeding further, speak upon the ob-
jects of perception in relation to each of the senses.
The object of perception is spoken of in a three-fold
manner, as there are two ways in which we speak of
perceiving objects distinctly, and one in which we
speak of perceiving them accidentally; and of those
two ways one signifies the property which is peculiar
to each sense, and the other the property which is
common to all the senses. I mean by peculiar pro-
perty that which cannot be perceived by any other
than its own sense, and concerning which that sense
cannot be deceived — as colour for sight, sound for
hearing, and savour for taste. The touch, indeed,
discriminates several differences of quality, but every
other sense distinguishes only its own subjects ; and
thus sight or hearing is never deceived as to whether it
is colour or sound which is seen or heard, although it
may be deceived as to what or where the coloured,
what or where the sonorous body may be.

Such then the properties which are said to be
peculiar and to belong to particular senses ; but there

CH. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 91

are properties, such as motion, rest, number, form and
magnitude, which are termed common, as they belong
not to any one sense, but to all in common. Thus,
there is a movement which is perceptible both by
Touch and Sight. An object is said to be perceived
accidentally when, for example, something white
may be the Son of Diares — for the percipient is sen-
sible of the individual accidentally, because of his
being an accident of that which is perceived; and,
therefore, no impression is made by that which is
perceived, as a special object, upon the percipient.

The properties of bodies, which are in them-
selves perceptible, are, strictly speaking, peculiar
properties ; and to such each particular sense is natu-
rally and essentially related.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER VII.

THE treatise commences the examination of the senses
with the Sight, and closes with the Touch, which is
somewhat contrary to Aristotle's estimate of their
relative importance ; for he has shewn that the Touch
is the first, as it is the most universal of all the
senses, as well as essential to animal existence. Thus,
this sense is to sentient creatures what nutrition is
to other beings ; for as without Touch there can be
no animal, so without nutrition there can be no life.
Descartes, more in accordance with Aristotle's teach-
ing, begins with the Touch, and then proceeds to the
Taste, Smell, Hearing and Sight ; and so Grant ' makes
" all the other senses to be but modifications of the
Touch." Cuvier, however, reverses this it may be
general order, and treats of the special senses before
the Touch. It may be well to observe, that the
senses as well as their modes of excitation, had been

1 Outlines of Comp. Anat. e. vi.

PRELUDE TO CHAP. VII. 93

treated of in a distinct work ', which may be regarded
as supplementary to the present treatise ; and this
will explain why the eye and vision are here very
briefly alluded to, while particular attention has
there been given to the ear and hearing.

CHAPTER VII.

THE visible is that for which vision is the sense, and
the visible is both colour and something which is de-
scribable by words, although it happens to be without
a name; but our meaning will become clear to those
who accompany us in the inquiry. The visible is
colour, and colour is that which is upon something
visible in itself; and this something is visible, not
only after its appellation but, because it has in itself
the cause of being visible. All colour is motive of
the diaphanous, in activity, and to be so motive is the
nature of colour. On which account nothing is visi-
ble without light, but the colour of each object is
visible in the light; and we must, therefore, first say
what light is. There is a something diaphanous, and
I call diaphanous what is visible, and yet not visible,

1 De Sentu et Sens. i. 10.

94 AEISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

strictly speaking, in itself, but made visible by colour,
which is foreign to it. Such is air, and water, and
many solid bodies; yet neither air nor water, as air or
water, is diaphanous, but the same nature is present
in both those elements, which is in the eternal super-
nal body. Light is the active state of that same dia-
pkanous, in so far as it is diaphanous, and darkness is
the same in its state of potentiality. But light is the
colour, as it were, of the diaphanous, when made dia-
phanous in reality by fire, or other such element as
the supernal body; for to it belongs a something
which is identical with fire. We have thus said what
is the diaphanous and what light, and have shewn
that neither of them is fire, nor a body, strictly speak-
ing, nor an emanation from a body, (as, in that case,
they would be corporeal), but that they are the pre-
sence in the diaphanous of fire or something analogous
to fire, since two bodies cannot possibly coexist in
one and the same body.

Light seems to be the opposite to darkness ; and
as darkness is the absence of a particular state of the
diaphanous, it is evident that the presence of that
state must be light.

Thus Empedocles, or whoever else may have held
the same opinion, was wrong in supposing that light
was transported and manifested, without our con-
sciousness, between the Earth and surrounding space;
for the opinion is opposed as well to sound conclusion

CH. VII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 95

as to observation of the phenomenon. If the interval
were small, the fact might, indeed, escape us; but,
extended as it is from the East to the West, the pos-
tulate is too extravagant to be admitted.

Now that which is without colour is receptive of
colour, as that which is without sound is receptive of
sound; and that which is without colour is the dia-
phanous and the invisible or scarcely visible, such as
darkness seems to be. Such too is the diaphanous ;
but then it is the diaphanous, not in potentiality but,
in reality; for the same nature is sometimes darkness
and sometimes light. But all objects are not visible
in light, as there are some of which the peculiar
colour only of each is visible; for some, not visible
in light, produce sensation in the dark, as certain
fiery brilliant appearances (which have no special
appellation,) which emanate from fungi, horn, scales
and eyes of fishes, but the peculiar colour is not seen
of any one of those objects. It is foreign to our present
purpose to explain how such objects become visible ;
but this much is manifest, that it is colour which is
visible in light. Therefore, without light colour is
not visible; for it is an essential property of colour to
be motive of the diaphanous in activity, and the
reality of the diaphanous is light. As proof of this,
if any coloured object be placed over the sight, the
object will not be seen, and yet there is colour, which
is motive of the diaphanous, the air, that is, and, by

96 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

its being continuous between the object and the sense,
it is able to give motion to the visual organ. Thus.
Democritus was wrong in thinking that if the medium
were a void, vision would be so accurate as to render
an ant visible in the sky. The opinion, in fact, in-
volves an impossibility; for vision is produced by
some kind of impression upon the visual organ, and
as this cannot possibly be effected by the colour which
is visible, there remains only that it must be by the
medium, and thus a medium there must be ; so that
if there were a void, vision would be, not to say in-
accurate but, altogether precluded.

It has thus then been said why colour must be
visible in the light ; but fire is visible both in dark-
ness and in light, and necessarily so, since it is by fire
that the diaphanous becomes diaphanous. The same
reasoning holds good for sound and for odour, as
nothing sonorous or odorous can produce sensation
when in immediate contact with the sentient organ ;
but by odour or sound the medium is set in motion,
and by it the organ is moved. Thus, when any thing
sonorous or odorous is placed immediately upon the
sentient organ, no sensation is given out ; and this is
the case with the sense of Touch, although less evi-
dently so ; but the cause of this shall be explained
hereafter. The air is the medium for sounds, while
that for odour has no special appellation, for there is
a particular impression common to air and water ; and

CH. VII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 97

what the diaphanous is to colour that which is in
those elements is to odorous bodies, as aquatic ani-
mals appear to be sensible of odours. But neither
man nor animals which breathe can smell without
inspiring; and the cause of this shall be spoken
of hereafter.

PKELTJDE TO CHAPTER VIII.

THIS chapter is upon sound and hearing ; and as these
subjects had been but desultorily alluded to in the
other works, they are treated of at some length on
this occasion. It opens with the distinction of
bodies into sonorous and insonorous, and after tracing
the analogy between the acute and grave, and the
sharp and blunt (of touch), it passes by a rapid
transition to the voice, which is dwelt upon at some
length. The term evtpycta, which had been used in
place of evT€\€-^fta, to express the active as opposed
to the potential or negative state of the diaphaneity,
is again employed here to signify the analogous and
contrasting quality of sound. The distinction between
the terms is not very apparent now, although this
may not have been the case then ; for the evepyeta
may have conveyed the idea of action in the transi-
tion from potentiality, and so have been more
expressive of actual, as opposed to virtual light or
sound. Thus, if sound be a quality or condition, it

PRELUDE TO CHAP. VIII. 99

may be active, and it may be only virtual or faint ;
but although to us inaudible, it is not to be supposed
that silence any more than darkness is ever absolute ;
so that the text has limited the range of sound too
absolutely by the activity of the sense. Aristotle1
assigned, as has been said, a high privilege to this
sense, because through it instruction is orally con-
veyed, and thus the blind from birth are more intel-
ligent ((ppovtutorepot), he observes, than "the deaf
and dumb;" but the argument would have been
more correct had the second term been omitted, as
individuals are of necessity dumb when hearing is
quite shut out. The phraseology, however, is still
sanctioned in common parlance.

1 De Sensu et sensili i. 1 1.

7—2

CHAPTEE VIII.

LET us now proceed to determine the nature of sound
and hearing. Sound is double — one actual and an-
other potential ; for we say that some substances, such
as sponge and wool, are without sound ; and that
others, as brass, and bodies which are hard and
smooth, have sound, because such objects are able to
sound ; are able, that is, to create actual sound by the
action of the medium between the object and the
hearing. Sound of the actual kind is the invariable
result of something in relation to something and in
something ; for its producing cause is percussion. It
is impossible, therefore, that sound should be pro-
duced when there is only one substance, as that which
percusses must be distinct from that which is per-
cussed; so that the sonorous object sounds by its
relation to another object. But there can be no per-
cussion without movement, and sound is not produced
by the percussion of any kind of substance, as we
have said, (since wool, however percussed, does not,
while brass and smooth and hollow bodies — brass
because it is smooth — do give out sound,) and hollow
bodies create, by reflexion, many percussions after the

CH. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 101

first, owing to the medium within them having been
set in motion and being unable to make its escape.
Sound is audible in air, and so it is in water, although
less distinctly ; but neither air nor water is the efficient
cause of sound, as for it there must be percussion of
solid bodies against each other and against the air,
and this is effected whenever the air, having been
percussed, remains, is not, that is, dispersed. Thus,
if the air be struck sharply and forcibly it gives out
sound ; for the motion of that which percusses should
anticipate the dispersion of the air, as if any one were
striking a rapidly moving heap or cloud of sand.

An echo is produced whenever the external air has
been more than once repelled by the air contained
within a vessel, by the sides of which that air is pre-
cluded from being dispersed, just as a ball rebounds.
It seems as though an echo ought to be a constant
occurrence, although it may not be audible, since that
happens to sound which happens to light, and light is
continually undergoing reflexion (for, otherwise, as
light could not be everywhere, darkness would pre-
vail beyond the spot illumined by the sun), but yet it
is not everywhere reflected, as it is from water or
brass or any other smooth body, so as to form a
shadow whereby we are able to distinguish the light
itself.

A Void is rightly said to be the sovereign cause
of hearing; — for the air seems to be a void, and the

102 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

air, when moving continuously and as one body, is
creative of hearing. But, owing to its being very dif-
fluent, it gives out no sound, unless that which is
percussed be smooth ; when this, however, is the case,
the air becomes simultaneously one over the surface,
as the surface of every smooth body is one. Every
sonorous body is so constituted as to set in motion the
air which, by continuity, is one up to the hearing,
and the hearing is naturally connected with the air ;
and owing to sound being in the air, the air which is
without sets in motion that which is within. An ani-
mal, therefore, does not hear everywhere, neither does
the air penetrate everywhere; for the part to be set
in motion is a living part, and does not everywhere
contain air. The air itself, owing to its ready diffusi-
bility, is without sound ; but, when precluded from
being dispersed, its motion is productive of sound.
The air which is within the ears has been so immured
as to be immovable ; and this in order that the sense
may perceive accurately all variations of its move-
ment. It is for these reasons that we are able to hear
when in the water, as the water cannot gain access to
the congenital air, or pass into the ear through the
convolutions ; when, however, this does happen, there
is no hearing, any more than there is when the mem-
brane of the ear, which is to it what the skin over the
pupil is to the eye, is diseased. But proof is afforded
whether the hearing is perfect or not, in that the ear

CH. VIII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 103

is constantly giving out sound, just as a horn does ;
for the air within the ears is continually moving in
some peculiar manner, and yet sound is foreign to
that air and forms no part of its properties. It is on
this account, however, that we speak of hearing by a
void and something resonant, because we hear by the
part which contains the air confined within it.

But is it that which percusses, or that which is
percussed, which gives out sound ? Or do both con-
tribute to its production, each in its own way? Now,
sound is the motion of something which admits of
being moved after the manner of bodies rebounding
from smooth surfaces, whereon they may have been
impelled. But every kind of body, whether percussing
or percussed, does not, as has been said, give out
sound ; as when a sharp point, for example, strikes a
sharp point, there is no sound ; but in order to pro-
duce sound, that which is percussed must be so
smooth, that the mass of air upon its surface may re-
bound from, and be agitated over it. The distinctions
among sonorous bodies are revealed in the actual
sounds which they give forth; for as without light
colours are not visible, so without sound the acute
and grave are not audible. These terms (acute and
grave) are derived from tangible properties, and em-
ployed, in a metaphorical sense, for sounds; for the
acute moves the hearing quickly and sharply, the
grave moves it slowly and dully ; not, however, that

104 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

the acute is quick or the grave slow ; but that such is
the motion of the one from the celerity, and such the
motion of the other from the tardiness of its operation
upon the sense. And there does seem to be an ana-
logy between those sounds and the sharp and blunt,
as perceived by the Touch ; for the sharp pricks, and
the blunt pushes, as it were, because the motion ex-
erted by the one is rapid, by the other tardy ; and it is
in this manner that the terms in question have origi-
nated. Let us here, however, close our observations
upon the nature of sound.

The voice is a sound produced by a living crea-
ture; for nothing inanimate speaks, although there
are objects, such as the flute, lyre, and others, which,
having range of note, harmony, and expression, are
said, from a resemblance between their tones and the
voice, to do so; and the voice does seem to have all
the variations of note possessed by those instruments.
Many creatures have no voice (as all the insan-
guineous, for instance, and some of the sanguineous,
as fishes), which is very understandable, seeing that
sound is a certain motion of the air ; and with respect
to those fishes which are found in the Achelous and
said to speak, they produce sound by their gills, or
other such part. But although the voice is a sound
emanating from a living creature, it does not imply
any kind of sound, or a sound produced by any
kind of part; and as all sound is produced by the

CH. VIII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 105

conditions of something which percusses, something
percussed, and a something, that is the air, in
which percussion can be made, it might reasonably
be assumed, that such creatures only as take in air can
have a voice. Now, nature employs simultaneously
the air respired for two functions, just as she employs
the tongue for taste and for speech ; and of these the
former is necessary (and therefore imparted to most
creatures), and the latter, as an organ for interpre-
tation, is for their higher good ; so too does she
employ the breath both as necessary for tempering
the heat within (as shall be explained elsewhere), and
for the production of voice, which is for the welfare
of the individual. The pharynx is the organ of
respiration, for the sake of which is another part, the
lung, and it is owing to this part that quadrupeds
have more heat than other creatures.

It is the place about the heart which first needs
respiration ; and, therefore, it is necessary that the
air, during inspiration, should pass inwards; and
thus the percussion of the air respired by the living
principle in those parts, against the so-called trachea,
constitutes the voice. But every sound produced by
an animal is not voice, as we have said (for it is pos-
sible to produce sound by the tongue, as in coughing),
but in order to constitute the voice, there must be a
percussing living force, and the sound produced must
be expressive of something. The voice is, in fact, a

106 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. II.

sound expressive of something — it is not, that is, as
in coughing, a mere sound of the air inspired; and
speech is the percussion, by the living principle, of
the air in the trachea, against the trachea itself. As
proof of which, we are unable to speak when holding
the breath, that is, when we neither inspire nor
expire; for the act of holding the breath sets in
motion the air which is inspired. It is now manifest
why fishes, having no pharynx, are without a voice ;
and they have no pharynx, because they neither
admit the air nor breathe. It is foreign to our present
purpose, however, to inquire into the cause of their
having been thus constituted.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IX.

MODERN science confirms Aristotle's judgment concerning
the nature of odour, for it is said "to be a curious
and interesting problem, requiring much more investi-
gation than it has hitherto received ;" and, according
to Cuvier *, " of all the substances which act upon our
senses, those which produce the sensation of smell
are the least known, although their impression has
the liveliest and deepest influence upon our economy."
But the reason assigned in the text for this relative
imperfection of our smell is indefinite and question-
able ; for " although man's nostrils are less compli-
cated than those of any animals save the quadrumana,
he is the only creature whose smell is fine enough to
be affected by unpleasant odours" It may be doubted,
besides, whether any sensation can be, as is implied
in the text, so pure as to be freed from all mental
or corporeal association ; but when man's smell is

1 R&gne Animal, T. i. 73.

108 PRELUDE TO CHAP. IX.

compared with that of birds and beasts of prey, it
may be granted that, within a certain range of impres-
sions, it is relatively duller and coarser than with
them. It is, however, assumed, that sight and smell,
when perfect, have the faculty of perceiving colours,
and odours purely, unassociated, that is, with any
impression grateful or otherwise ; and thus, as man's
smell was held to be imperfect, he was supposed to
be sensible of odours as creatures with hard, that is,
compound eyes are of colours. For such creatures1
(crustacea, insects and others), having their eyes
uncovered, being without lids that is, see objects
which are at a distance " indistinctly, and as if they
were looking through congenitally attached eye-lids."

1 Hist. An. i. 15. 16.

CHAPTER IX.

IT is less easy to define smell and the odorous object,
than the subjects which have just been treated of, as
the nature of odour is not so clear to us as is that of
either sound or colour ; and the reason of this is, that
our sense of smell is inaccurate, is less delicate, in
fact, than it is in many animals. Thus, man has but
a coarse smell, and is never sensible of any thing
odorous without associating therewith an impression
of something painful or grateful ; and this seems to
indicate an organ imperfectly constituted. It is pro-
bable that colours are perceived by creatures which
have hard eyes in this same manner, and that shades
of colour invariably make upon them an impression of
something to be afraid of or otherwise. The human
race is circumstanced in a like manner with respect
to odours ; and there seems to be an analogy between
taste and kinds of savours, and smell and kinds of
odours, but as taste is a kind of touch, and touch of
all man's senses the most perfect, his taste is more
delicate than his smell. With respect to other senses,
man is far behind many animals, but he is especially

110 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

distinguished from them all by the accuracy of his
Touch ; and to this he is indebted for being of all the
most intelligent. As proof of which, individuals of
the human race are according to the constitution of
this sense and nothing else, clever or dull — for those
with hard flesh are slow, and those, on the contrary,
with soft flesh are quick of understanding.

As one savour is sweet and another bitter, so it
is with odours ; but some bodies impart an analogous
savour and odour, impart, I mean, a sweet odour and
a sweet savour, while other bodies give out their
contraries. Some odours equally with savours are
termed pungent, sour, and oily, but, as we have
already explained, owing to their not being so dis-
tinguishable by us as savours, odours have derived
their appellations from these, on account of the simi-
larity of the objects from which they both proceed.
Thus, the odour from saffron and honey is called sweet,
that from thyme and other herbs of the kind pungent,
and so for other bodies and odours.

There is a close analogy between the other senses
and the hearing : for as it is sensible of the audible
and the inaudible, so is vision of the visible and invi-
sible, and smell of the odorous and the inodorous,
and by inodorous is meant whatever is either alto-
gether without odour, or has but a very faint odour ;
and a sense analogous to this is attached to the term
insapid.

CH. IX.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. Ill

The smell is perceptive through a medium, such
as air or water, for aquatic animals seem to be sen-
sible of odour ; and so, likewise, are sanguineous and
insanguineous creatures, as well as those which wing
the air. Thus, some of these are to be seen proceeding
from a distance towards food, of which they have been
made sensible by the odour emanating from it. And
hence the difficulty of determining why, if other crea-
tures are sensible of odours in a like manner, man
alone can smell neither when expiring nor when
holding his breath but, only when inspiring ; and
this whether the odorous object be at a distance from
or close to him, or placed immediately within the
nostrils. It is common, it is true, to all the sentient
organs to be insensible to impressions when objects
are placed immediately upon them ; but it is peculiar
to man (as may be proved experimentally), to be
unable to perceive odours without inspiring. So that
as insanguineous creatures do not breathe, they ought
to have some other sense besides those spoken of,
but yet this cannot be, since they do perceive odour ;
for the perception of odour, whether agreeable or
disagreeable, is smell; and as these appear to
be destroyed by the same powerful odours as those
which destroy man (odours, for instance, from pitch,
sulphur, and other like substances), we must con-
clude that they have smell, although they do not
breathe.

112 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. II.

The olfactory organ in man appears to differ from
that in other animals as his eyes differ from those of
creatures in which they are hard ; for man's eyes are
furnished with a rampart, and a kind of sheath in
lids, without the elevation and drawing asunder of
which he cannot see, while hard eyes, having no
such provision, are instantly sensible of whatever may
be present in the diaphanous medium. In accord-
ance with this, the olfactory organ is, in such crea-
tures, like the eye, uncovered ; but, in such as breathe,
it is furnished with a cover, which during inspiration
is lifted up, as the veins and pores are then dilated.
On which account, creatures which breathe cannot
smell while in the water, as in order to smell they
must inspire, and while in the water they cannot
possibly inspire.

In fine, odour is derived from what is dry, as
savour is from what is moist ; and the olfactory organ,
when in potentiality, is analogous to that from which
odour is derived.

PRELUDE TD CHAPTER X.

THIS theory of taste and savour is adopted substantively
by modern physiology. Cuvier ' says that " Taste is
only a more delicate kind of Touch ;" and Miiller 2

considers fluid essential to its manifestations. There

f

are three conditions essential to Taste, he observes,
the specific nerve, the excitation of that nerve through
savour, and the solution of the savour in the moisture
of the sapid organ ; for sapid matter to be tasted,
must either be moistened, or else be solvable in the
tongue's moisture. All which implies that, if an
object is very arid, or if the organs of Taste are
incapable of supplying moisture, the percipient will
be sensible, not of sapid but, of tangible qualities only,
such as hot and cold, hard and soft.

1 Rbgne Animal, I. 31.

3 Handbuch der Physiologic, Lib. II. 489.

CHAPTER X.

THE sapid object is a kind of tangible object, and
this is the reason why it does not require, in order to
be perceived, any other medium than the body, for
the Touch requires no other. The body in which is
savour, is the gustable body, and the matter of savour
is in fluid, and fluid is something tangible. Thus,
were we in the water, and were any thing sweet cast
into the water, we should be sensible of the sweetness,
not through the water as a medium but, from its
having been mixed with the water as with a potable
fluid. Colour, however, is not thus made visible from
having been mixed with anything, nor is it made
visible by emanations ; and as the medium, in the
case of colours, plays no part and colour is the visible,
so is savour the gustable. No object, however, with-
out humidity can impart the sense of savour; and,
therefore, every sapid object contains humidity, in an
active or a potential state, as does salt ; for salt is
readily moistened and liquefied by contact with the
tongue.

Now, vision is perceptive of the visible and the
invisible (for darkness, although invisible, is still

CH. X.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 115

judged of "by vision), and a very bright light (which
is also invisible, although in a manner different from
darkness), and so hearing is equally perceptive of
sound and silence, of which that is audible and this
inaudible, as well as a very loud sound, just as vision
is of a very bright light ; for as a very low sound is,
in a certain sense, inaudible, so is a very loud and
crashing sound. On the other hand, the term in-
visible, used absolutely, is analogous to the term im-
possible upon other subjects, and which may be sig-
nificant of something generated without parts or with
parts ill formed for their office, as an animal without
feet, or a fruit without a kernel. So, too, the taste in
its turn is perceptive both of what is sapid and in-
sapid; and the insapid implies whatever has a faint
or nauseous savour, or a savour altogether perversive
of taste. The potable and the impotable seem alike
to be the origin of taste, for they both are sapid ; but
then the first has a nauseous savour, and is perversive
of taste, while the last is genial to the sense ; the po-
table is common, besides, to the touch and taste.
Since whatever is sapid is humid, it follows that the
organ of taste may neither be humid realty, nor yet
be incapable of becoming humid ; for the taste suffers
impression by the sapid body, in so far as it is sapid.
It is, therefore, necessary that the sentient organ, if
not moist, should, for its function, be capable of be-
coming so : and, as proof of this, the tongue, when

8—2

116 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. II.

very dry or very moist, is not sensible of sapid im-
pressions— as in the former instance, it is a tangible
rather than a sapid impression which is made by a
fluid when first tasted; and when very moist, it is
sensible only of the fluid already present, just as it
happens when, after tasting something pungent, we
proceed to taste a different fluid. It is thus that all
savours appear to the sick to be bitter, because the
tongue, with which they taste, is charged with a mois-
ture having that savour.

Kinds of savour are, like shades of colour, simple
when in broad contrast — as the sweet and bitter with
their sequences, of the former the oily and of the lat-
ter the brackish ; and intermediate to these are the
pungent, rough, astringent, and sour, which seem to
include almost all the varieties of savour.

In fine, the sapid sense, when in potentiality, is
such as is the sapid object; and the sapid object,
when in reality, is productive, in the sense, of its own
savour.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER XL

COMMENTATORS have differed widely in their interpretation
of Aristotle's meaning in the opening passage upon
the Touch. But it may, with some confidence, be
assumed that, from being unacquainted with the
nervous system, and observing the wide-spread and
varying delicacy of the sense, he was led to suppose
that it might either be diffused, so to speak, as several
organs, over the body, or be somehow identified with
or included in the flesh which covers the body. l The
flesh is the muscular substance, and as it envelopes, so
to say, the body, it was probably supposed to be the
seat or cause of the sense, as every part is sensible to
Touch; and the analogue of flesh is the colourless sub-
stance of the Insanguinea — insects, <tc. *And there
is a close analogy between the two substances, "as
the muscles of the highest class of animals, during
their development pass through the soft, colourless,

1 De Partib. Aid. i. 8. i. 3.

3 Grant's Outlines of Comp. Anat.

118 PEELUDE TO CHAP. XI. [BK. II.

homogeneous and gelatinous condition of the Inverte-
brata, before assuming the red colour." As the
Touch, besides, was regarded as the first in order of
the senses and characteristic of animals, so the flesh
was said to be the origin of all other parts of animal
bodies, bone and skin, sinews, veins, hair and nails ;
and this hypothesis may have confirmed the opinion
that it is either the sense or the seat of the sense of
Touch.

CHAPTER XI.

THE same reasoning holds good for the tangible
quality as for the Touch ; for if the Touch be not a
single but a manifold sense, it follows that tangible
qualities must be manifold also. Now, it is difficult
to determine whether the Touch is a manifold or a
single sense, and difficult also to say what the organ
may be which is percipient of tangible qualities ; that
is, whether or not it is the flesh, and that which, in
other creatures, is analogous to flesh; but yet the
flesh is only the medium, and the essential organ,
therefore, must be something different from flesh, and
situated internally.

Each sense seems to be perceptive of only one
contrary, as Sight of white and black, Hearing of

CH. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 119

acute and grave, and Taste of bitter and sweet ; but
several contraries belong to the sense of Touch, as hot
and cold, wet and dry, hard and soft, with others.
There is, it is true, a kind of solution for this diffi-
culty, in that the other senses also admit of several
contraries; as in the voice there are not only the
acute and grave but also the strong and weak, the
rough and smooth, with yet other contrasts; and
there are many and varied shades of colour. Still it
is not clear what that subjacent something is, which
is to the tangible impression what the Hearing is
to Sound.

Is then the sentient organ placed or not within
the flesh, or is it the flesh itself which is immediately
perceptive? It does not appear that any indication
can be obtained upon this point from sensation being
simultaneous with the tangible impression ; for, situ-
ated as we are, were any one to extend a membrane-
like substance over his flesh, the party would be
equally sensible when touched, and sensible at the
moment of contact; and yet, clearly, the sentient
organ cannot be in that membrane. It may be, how-
ever, that if the membrane were a congenital part of
the body, sensation would pass through it more
rapidly. Thus, this part of the body appears to be
disposed towards us as air would be, had air been
diffused around us ; for it would seem to us as thougli
by some one sense we perceive sound, colour, and

120 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

odour, and as though sight, hearing, and smell, are
one and the same sense. But now, as the motions
emanating from external objects are distinguishable
by the medium through which they are conveyed,
the sentient organs alluded to must manifestly be dif-
ferent also. With respect to the Touch, however,
this is still obscure, for it is impossible that a
living body should be constituted out of air or water,
as it must have some solidity; and there remains
only this conclusion, that it must be a mixture of
earth, and such other particles as have affinity with
flesh, and the analogue of flesh. Thus, the body has,
of necessity, been adapted for being the medium for
the tangible sense, through which the several tangi-
ble impressions are to be conveyed; and that the
impressions are manifold is shewn in the tongue
being perceptive of tangible as well as sapid qualities.
We are sensible, in fact, by this organ of all tangible
as well as sapid qualities ; and were the rest of the
flesh, like the tongue, sensible of savour, then " Taste"
and " Touch" would seem to be one and the same
sense ; but now we perceive, since they are not con-
vertible, that they must be distinct senses.

It may be a question whether, as all bodies have
depth, that is the third magnitude, any two bodies,
which have between them another body, can be in
contact ; for neither the humid nor the liquid is incor-
poreal, as each must, of necessity, be water or hold

CH. XI.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 121

water ; and thus, it follows that, as the extreme parts
of bodies in the water are not dry, the water, with
which their extremities are covered, must be inter-
posed between them. If this be true, then it is im-
possible that one body, when in the water, should be
in immediate contact with another; and this holds
good for bodies in the air ; for the air is in the same
relation to bodies in air which water is to bodies in
water ; but owing to our being in the air, the fact as
readily escapes us, as it does aquatic animals, from
their being in water, that water is in immediate
contact with water. It may then be asked whether
there is but one mode of impression for all the senses,
or whether it is different for different senses, seeing
that taste and touch are acted upon by contact, and
the other senses from a distance ? But yet this is a
seeming difference only, for we perceive the hard and
the soft, as we do the odorous, the sonorous, and the
visible, through media ; with this difference, that the
former impressions are made by objects close to, and
the latter by objects at a distance from us. On which
account, as we perceive all things through a medium,
the medium, in the case of bodies close to us, escapes
our attention; but if, as we have already said, we
could be sensible of all tangible impressions through
a membraneous substance, without our being con-
scious of their having been so transmitted, we should
then be situated as we now are, when in water or air;

122 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. II.

for so situated, we seem to touch bodies directly, and
to have no impression from them through a medium.

But tangible differ from visible and sonorous im-
pressions, in that the latter are perceived by the me-
dium acting in some way upon us, while the former
are perceived, not by, but together with, the medium,
like a man who is struck through his shield ; — for it
is not the shield which, having been struck, strikes
him, but the shield and he are simultaneously struck
together. To use a general expression, the flesh and
the tongue seem to be in the same relation to the
touch which air and water are to sight, hearing, and
smell ; — are disposed towards that organ, that is, as
each of those elements is to each of those senses.
When the sentient organ itself is touched, no sensa-
tion can there or then be produced, any more than a
white object can be seen when placed immediately
over the surface of the eye; and thus it is evident
that the part perceptive of tangible impressions must
be within. Thus, it should be with the touch, as
with the other senses; and if objects, when placed upon
an organ, are not perceived, but, when placed upon the
flesh, they are perceived, we must conclude that the
flesh is only the medium for tangible impressions.

The distinctions of the body, as body, are tangible
distinctions, and by these I mean distinctions such as
distinguish the elements, as hot, cold, dry and moist,
upon which we have heretofore spoken in our treatise

CH. XI.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 123

upon the Elements. The organ which perceives those
distinctions is that of Touch ; and the part in which
resides, primarily, the so-called sense of Touch is, in
potentiality, what tangible impressions are in re-
ality; for all sensation is a kind of impression. So
that whatever, by its agency, makes something else to
be as itself, can do so only from that something being
already, as itself, in potentiality. Hence, we are not
sensible of hot and cold, hard and soft, when mani-
fested in the same degree as in ourselves, but perceive
them only when in excess, as if the sensibility were
some kind of mean between the contraries of sentient
impressions, and able, as such, to judge of sentient
perceptions. The mean, in fact, is critical — for it is
either of the extremes in its relation to the other;
and as that which is to perceive white and black may
be neither one nor the other actually, and yet both
potentially, so it is with the other senses, and with
touch, which may be neither hot nor cold.

As vision was said to be, in some sense, perceptive
of the visible and the invisible, and the other senses
equally of their opposites, so Touch may be said to be
perceptive of the tangible and the intangible ; and by
intangible is meant as well what differs but slightly
from what is tangible, as air for instance, as what is
in such excess as to be destructive of all sensation.

We have thus then spoken, although but super-
ficially, upon each of the senses.

PKELUDE TO CHAP. XII.

HAVING treated of each of the senses, Aristotle here
proceeds to consider the source of sensation, the
sensibility, that is, which is typified as plastic wax,
from its capability of receiving the form of an object
without its matter. This comparison is indeed a
happy one ; and it has been often employed by
writers in modern times, and "among others by
Bossuet1." The chapter shews that for perception
there must be a due relation between impression and
sense, and that plants are insentient because they
have no faculty for the reception of the forms of
objects ; and it concludes by shewing that the agency
of some properties, as light, sound, <kc., is confined
to the sentient organs.

1 Connoissance de Dieu.

CHAPTER XII.

IT must be admitted, for the senses in general, that
each one is receptive of the perceptible forms of
things without the matter, as wax takes the impress
from a seal-ring, without the iron or gold of which
the ring is made ; — takes the device, that is, without
the metal on which the device is inscribed. In like
manner, the sense is impressed by each object having
colour, or savour, or sound ; not, however, after the
appellation of the object but, according as it is of a
certain quality, and in a given relation to the sense.
It is the primal organ in which this faculty exists ;
and it is identical with the object perceived, although
different from it in mode of being ; for, otherwise, the
percipient would be some kind of magnitude. But it
cannot belong either to that percipient or to sensation
to be magnitude, as they are rather a relation to, and
a faculty for the perception of the qualities of each
object. Thus, it is, from these reasons, made manifest
why sentient impressions in excess destroy the sen-
tient organs ; for if the motion of the impression be
stronger than that of the organ, then the relation

126 ARISTOTLE ON THE [l3K. II.

which constitutes sensation is dissolved, as harmony
and tone become discordant, when the chords are
struck too forcibly.

But why do not plants feel, seeing that they also
possess a living part, and are impressionable by tan-
gible qualities ? And that they are so impressionable
is shewn in their being both cooled and heated ; but
the cause is that they have not that mediate faculty,
nor any such principle as admits of their receiving
only the forms of things ; that along with forms they
are affected by the matter also.

It may be questioned whether impressions can be
made by odour upon what may be without smell, or
by colour upon what may be without vision, and so
for other qualities and senses. But if that which is
smelt be odour, then odour, if it produce anything,
must produce smell, and thus nothing without smell
can be affected by odour, and the same holds good
for the other senses; neither can beings which are
sentient be affected, save in so far as they are sen-
tient. All which is made evident in that neither
light nor darkness, sound nor odour, can act upon
bodies, although that which is present with them
may, as air with thunder splits wood. But yet tan-
gible and sapid qualities do act upon bodies; for,
otherwise, by what could inanimate things be acted
upon and changed ? Shall it then be said that those
other qualities also act upon bodies ? But all bodies

CH. XII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 127

are not impressionable by odour and sound, and those
which are so are indefinite and mobile, such as is the
air ; for the air gives out odour, as if it had been sub-
ject to impression. What then is smell but impres-
sion of some kind? But smelling is a sentient per-
ception ; and the air having been impressed by odour,
becomes quickly sensible to us.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER I.

'Tms book has been by one commentator held to be
spurious, even while admitting that all the opinions
are genuine, because of imputed solecisms in the
style and phraseology, which seem to indicate a
foreign hand. But were any one capable, as Tren-
dellenburg observes, of adopting, with so much per-
spicacity, the reasoning of Aristotle, he would be
much rather inclined to put forth an original work,
than thus to shelter his productions under another's
name. The opening passages involve great, it may
be, insuperable difficulties, owing rather to the argu-
ment than to the wording, although this is obscure,
for it seems to be assumed that a sense would be felt
to be wanting, although it might never have been
possessed ; and that the consciousness of its privation
would prove whether or not a sense were wanting.

• According to this theory, in fact, if the Touch were
a sense for every impression of which we now are
1 Vide Trendell. Comment.

PRELUDE TO CHAP. I. 129

sensible, and if there were any property not percep-
tible by us, we should perceive that another sentient
organ was required ; but it has not been shewn that
such a want, had it not previously been satisfied,
could be made sensible to us. And even for the
Touch itself, were there any one property, of which
we are sensible, say that of hardness, which had
never been perceived, we could hardly be conscious
of the want ; and there may be, probably are pro-
perties in the bodies around and above us of which
we are unconscious, and yet remain without the feel-
ing of a want. Each of the senses seems to be an
ultimate fact ; for we are satisfied that we see by
the eye and hear by the ear, and that with so little
attention or will that the sentient organs perform
their part almost irrespectively of the percipient.
In the succeeding passages, which relate to media
and the elementary constitution of the senses, there
is ambiguity or confusion, occasioned by the then
prevailing dogmata of dements and like by like, and
perhaps, it may be added, by unacquaintance with
the structure of the sentient organs.

BOOK THE THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

WE may be satisfied, from the observations which
follow, that there is no sense besides the five — be-
sides, that is, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and
Touch ; for if Touch be the sense for every impression
of which we are sensible, and if we have this sense,
then, as all the conditions of whatever is tangible, in
so far as tangible, are made perceptible to us by the
Touch, it follows that, if any sensation be wanting,
some sentient organ must be wanting to us also.
Now, all the bodies which are perceived by touch-
ing are made sensible to us by the Touch which has
been allotted to us ; and all those which are perceived,
not by touching but, through media, are made sensi-
ble to us by simple bodies — that is, by air and water.
We are so constituted, in fact, that, if several objects,
differing generically from one another, could be per-
ceived through one medium, an individual, having a
sentient organ such as that medium, would, neces-

CH. I.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 131

sarily, be sensible of impressions through both me-
dia— as if the sentient organ should be of air, then, as
air is the medium for sound and colour, the individual
would be sensible of both impressions through the
same organ. Should there, however, be more than
one medium for the transmission of the same impres-
sion, as air as well as water (since both are diapha-
nous,) serves for the transmission of colour, then an
individual, having an organ constituted of either of
those elements, would perceive impressions transmit-
ted through them both. The sentient organs, how-
ever, are constituted of those two simple bodies, air
and water, exclusively — for the pupil is of water, the
hearing of air, and the smell either of one or other ;
but fire forms no part of any organ, or rather it is an
element common to all, as there is nothing sentient
without heat ; and earth either does not enter at all
into any sentient part, or it has been in some especial
and peculiar manner combined with the Touch.
Thus, there can remain only this conclusion, that,
were there no air or water, there could be no sentient
organ; and organs so constituted are actually pos-
sessed by animals now living. All the senses, in fact,
are possessed by animals which are neither imperfect
nor mutilated ; for the mole appears to have eyes be-
neath its skin. So that, unless there is some kind of
body hitherto unknown and some kind of impression
unsuited to bodies here on earth, it may be affirmed

9—2

132 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it
possible that there should be any special organ for
the perception of common properties, (such as motion,
rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which
we are made sensible, by each special sense, acci-
dentally ; for we perceive all such by motion as we do
magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of
magnitude ; the state of rest we are sensible of by the
absence of motion, and number we perceive by the
want of continuity and by particular senses, for each
sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there
cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any
one of those properties, as motion, for instance ; with
respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now
are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet.
And this we are able to do from our happening to
possess a sense which is perceptive of double impres-
sions, and by the way in which those impressions
coincide, we recognise what the thing is ; were this
not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance,
could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any
more than we could tell that an individual is the son
of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he
is fair ; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the
son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for
the perception of common properties and that not
casually, although it is not a peculiar sense ; for, were
it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those

CH. I.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 133

properties than, as has just been said, we see that an
individual is the son of Cleon. The senses, however,
do perceive, casually, the special qualities of each
other ; but then they do so, not as distinct senses but,
as becoming one sense, as when double impressions
may be made simultaneously upon the same organ,
as by bile, which is bitter and yellow. But as it
belongs not to either sense to say that both qualities
belong to one substance, we are exposed to error, and
led to think that if a fluid be yellow it must be bile.

Should any one inquire why we have been fur-
nished with several senses in place of having only
one, it might be answered, " that we have so been
constituted in order that the sequences and common
properties of bodies, as motion, magnitude, and num-
ber, may the less readily escape our notice." If
vision, in fact, were our only sense and it perceptive
only of whiteness, then all other qualities would more
readily escape our notice and seem to be identical, on
account of colour and magnitude being in an invariable
sequence to one another. But as here common proper-
ties are manifested in different bodies, it is evident that
each of those properties (colour and magnitude) must
also be different.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter opens with a continuation of the discussion
upon the senses, and, assuming sensation to be an
ultimate fact, it argues that vision (taken as an ex-
ample), must be the office of the eye, or some other
sense; if the office of some other sense, then it,
unlike every other, will have had assigned to it two
different modes of impression. Add to this, that
like the visual sense, which perceives colour only, it
must be imbued with colour, and this would inter-
fere with its own peculiar office. The further objec-
tion to another than its own sense for vision, in its
requiring an infinite series of perceptions, is neither
clear nor apposite ; for, had a sense been made per-
ceptive of double impressions, that faculty would be,
as much as a single sense, an ultimate fact. The
passage has been a fruitful topic for commentators,
as might be supposed, but it still remains the subject
of conjecture.

CHAPTER II.

SINCE we are sensible that we see and hear, we cannot
but be sensible that we see by sight or by some
other sense ; but, if we see by some other sense, then
it will be perceptive of sight and colour, the subject
of sight ; and thus there will be either two senses for
the same office, or the sight itself will be the percipient.
If, besides, there is some other than the visual sense
for sight, we shall have to admit an infinite series of
perceptions, or else this other sense, whatever it may
be, will be the visual percipient ; and this might as
well have been conceded to the first sense. But here
there is a difficulty — if to perceive by sight is seeing,
and if that which is seen is colour or something
having colour, then, if any sense is to see that which
sees, that sense must first have colour. It is then
manifest that perception by sight is not a single per-
ception ; for even when we may not see, it is still by
sight that we judge both of darkness and light, al-
though not in the same manner. That, moreover, which
sees, must have been already imbued with colour, since
each sentient organ must be receptive of the object of

136 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

perception without its matter ; and this accounts for
impressions and images being still present in the sen-
tient organs, after objects have been withdrawn.

The action of the object of perception is one and
the same with that of the sense, although they differ
in mode of being — I mean, for example, sound in
action and hearing in action ; for it may be that an
individual, endowed with hearing, does not hear, as
that a sonorous body does not give out sound. But
when an individual, capable of hearing, listens, and
when that which is sonorous gives out sound, then
hearing in action coincides with sound in action, and
the one may strictly be termed hearing, the other
sound. If motion, production, and impression, are in
the product, it follows that sound and hearing, in an
active state, must pre-exist in hearing in a potential
state; for the action of the creative and the motive
exists, naturally, in that which is to be acted upon.
It is, therefore, no way necessary that the motor
should be itself in motion. The action, then, of the
sonorous body is sound or sounding, that of the audi-
tory sense is hearing or audition; for hearing is
double as sound is double, and the same applies to
other senses and perceptions. Since production and
impression are, not in that which acts but, in that
which is impressed, so the action of the object of per-
ception and the sensibility is in the sentient being.
But, while for some senses these two states have

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 137

been specially distinguished by names, as sound and
hearing, there are others for which one or other state
is without appellation — the action of vision, for in-
stance, is called sight, but the action of colour is
unnamed ; the action of the sapid sense is called taste,
while that of savour is without appellation.

Since the action of the object of perception and
that of the sentient being is one and the same,
although different in mode of acting, it follows that
hearing and sound, in this sense, must together be lost,
or together be preserved; and this is true of taste
and savour, and other senses and functions ; but yet it
does not hold good of those relations in potentiality.

The earlier physiologists have expressed them-
selves ill upon the subject, as they thought that there
can be neither black nor white without sight, nor
savour without Taste. And yet what they said was
in part right and in part wrong; for as senses and
sentient impressions have a twofold acceptation, ac-
cording to their state of potentiality or activity, so
what was advanced by them may be applicable to
the one state, and inapplicable to the other. The fact
is, those writers reasoned absolutely upon conditions,
which do not admit of being so dealt with. If a voice
of any kind is harmony, and if voice and hearing are,
in one sense, the same, and, in another sense, not the
same, then, as harmony is proportion, it follows that
hearing must be proportion also. And hence it comes

138 ABISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

that every sound in excess, whether acute or grave,
perverts the hearing, as every savour in excess does
the taste ; and every colour over-bright or dark dulls
the sight, as every odour excessively pungent, whether
grateful or offensive, does the smell, as if shewing
that sensibility is a kind of proportion. Thus, quali-
ties, as acid or sweet or saline, are agreeable when-
ever they are reduced, pure and unmixed, to a due
proportion ; for it is this only which renders them
grateful. To speak generally, harmony is a combi-
nation of tones rather than the acute or the grave
singly, as for the Touch, the warmed or cooled is
genial, rather than the hot or cold, simply; for, as
sensibility is proportion, so qualities, in excess, pain
or pervert the senses.

Each sense is perceptive of its own appointed
subjects, is innate in its own organ, as a op°nal
organ, and judges of the distinctions of qualities, as
sight judges of white and black ; taste of bitter and
sweet, and so as to other senses and qualities. But
since we judge of white, sweet, and each other
quality by its relation to each sense, by what do we
perceive that qualities differ ? Now, it is evident that
it must be by some sense, as the impressions are all
sentient ; and equally so that the flesh cannot be that
final organism, as in order to judge of qualities it
must, of necessity, first touch bodies. Neither is it
admissible that, by different senses, we judge sweet

CH. II.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 139

to be different from white, as both qualities must be
apparent to some single faculty; for, otherwise, it would
be as if I should perceive one quality and you perceive
another, and thus make it evident that they are dif-
ferent from one another. But it is here required that
the same individual should perceive that they are
different, for the sweet is different from the white,
and what he perceives that he says ; and thus, what
he says that he thinks and perceives. It is then evi-
dent that we cannot, by different senses, judge of
different qualities, as also, from what follows, that we
cannot judge of them in a separate portion of time.
Neither can an opinion be in a separate portion of
time ; for just as it is the same individual who says
that good is other than bad, so when he says that the
one is different from the other, he implies that the
other is equally so, and does not employ the term
when loosely — he does not use it, I mean, in the
sense of now, in the phrase, "now I say that the object
is different," without implying that it is different now.
But, here, it is the same individual who employs the
term now, and says that objects are different now and
because now; for the impressions are coincident, as
they are inseparable, and as the time is indivisible. It
cannot, however, be, that the same individual, in so
far as indivisible, should be subject to contrary im-
pulses in time which is indivisible ; yet if sweetness
move sensation or thought in one way, bitterness

140 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

must move them in an opposite, and whiteness in
some other direction. Can, then, that which judges
be, numerically, indivisible and inseparable, yet sepa-
rable in its mode of being ? If so, then, in some way,
as divisible, it may perceive divisible, and, in some
way, as indivisible, it may perceive indivisible quali-
ties ; for in its mode of being it is separable, but,
locally and numerically, it is inseparable. But is not
this impossible ? The same may, in potentiality, be
indivisible and divisible and be the contraries; but
not so in mode of being, as it is divisible in action,
and cannot possibly be at once white and black, nor
be simultaneously impressed by the forms of those
colours, provided sensation and thought are such as
we have said they are. But it is with this, as with
that which some call a point, and which, in so far as
it is one or dual, is indivisible or divisible. Thus, in
so far as that which judges is one, it is indivisible,
and its perceptions are simultaneous ; and in so far as
it is divisible, it employs the same point twice, simul-
taneously. In so far, then, as it employs the boun-
dary as two, it judges of two things by it and per-
ceives that they are distinct, as the boundaries of the
line are distinct ; but in so far as it is one, it judges
by one act, and judges simultaneously.

Let what has been said then suffice for the defi-
nition of that principle, by which we maintain that
an animal is made a sentient being.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.

THIS chapter may be regarded as a metaphysical disquisi-
tion, since its purport is to distinguish mental facul-
ties from corporeal sensations as well as to examine
the opinions of earlier writers who had maintained
that cogitation is some kind of sensation; and,
finally, the nature of imagination, as lying inter-
mediately between faculties and sensations, is investi-
gated and defined. It treats, too, although but
incidentally, of the understanding, knowledge, opi-
nion, and other topics which border on abstractions ;
and closes with etymology to shew the sentient
origin of imagination.

CHAPTER III.

As writers, for the most part, define Vital Principle
by two different faculties, by locomotion and thought,
judgment and sensibility, it would seem as though
thought and reflexion are by them considered to be
some kind of sensation ; for, in both cases, the Vital
Principle both discerns and recognises something.
Thus, the ancients affirm that reflexion is identical
with feeling; and Empedocles has said, "man's in-
telligence is enlarged by what is present," and, else-
where, " hence, man derives his power of reflecting
upon different subjects;" so Homer's words, "such is
the mind" do but express the same idea. All these
writers assume, in fact, that thinking, like feeling, is
corporeal, and that Like is perceived and compre-
hended by Like, as was explained in our opening
chapters. But yet it was incumbent upon them to
have spoken, at the same time, upon the liability to
error through the senses ; for this belongs, more pe-
culiarly, to animals, and Vital Principle remains sub-
ject to it during the greater portion of existence. On
which account, either all appearances are, as some of

CH. III.] AEISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 143

those writers maintain, necessarily, true, or else error
is caused by contact of the unlike, which is the oppo-
site of the opinion, that like is recognised by like; and
the error from contraries seems to be identical with
the knowledge of contraries. It is manifest that feel-
ing is not identical with reflexion; for, while the
former belongs to all creatures, the latter has been
imparted only to a few. Neither is thinking, that
faculty to which belongs the sense of right and wrong,
(the right comprehending judgment, knowledge, and
sound opinion, the wrong comprehending their con-
traries,) to be confounded with feeling — for sensation,
being derived from particulars, is ever true, and
belongs to all animals; but the judgment may be
wrong, and is imparted only to such as have reason.
Imagination, in fact, is neither sensation nor judg-
ment, and yet it is not called up without sensation,
just as, without sensation, there can be no conception ;
but it is manifest that imagination is not conception.
Imagination depends, in fact, but upon ourselves, as we
can, at will, call it up (since it is in our own power
to place images before the eyes, as do they who, for
mnemonic aids, by laying down objects, form sym-
bols) ; but to form an opinion does not depend upon
ourselves, and then every opinion is, of necessity,
either true or false. Whenever, besides, we may have
an opinion upon any terrible and fearful incident, we
are straightway affected as if it were a reality, just as

144 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

we are when we think upon any desperate deed ; but,
under imagination, we become simple spectators, as it
were, of a pictorial representation of terrible or daring
achievements. There are, in conception itself, the
distinctions of knowledge, opinion, reflexion, and their
contraries, of which we shall speak elsewhere. With
respect to thinking, since it is different from feeling,
and feeling seems, in part, to be imagination and, in
part, conception, let us here define imagination, and
then proceed to the consideration of the other faculty.

If imagination be a faculty by which we say that
an image of some kind, and that not merely in the
sense of a metaphor, is called up within us, then it is
to be ranged among those faculties or powers, such as
feeling, opinion, knowledge, mind, by which we form
judgments and determine what may be true or false.

It is clear from what follows, that imagination is
not sensation ; for sensation is either a faculty or an
act, such as sight, and seeing, but an image is some-
times apparent to us without either faculty or act, as
phantoms in dreams for instance ; and then sensation
is ever present, which is not the case with the imagi-
nation. If, moreover, imagination were in act identical
with sensation, we should have to admit that it must
belong to all irrational creatures, but this does not seem
to be the case with the ant, bee, or worm; and then
sensations are always true, but imaginings are for the
most part false. Hence, we do not say, when accurately

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 145

examining any object, that we imagine to be so or
so, a man for instance, but we so express ourselves
rather when we do not clearly perceive what the
object is, and when the perception may be true or
false; when, to use a former expression, the object
appears to us as landscapes do to the purblind.

Neither can imagination be regarded as one ot
those faculties, such as knowledge and mind, which are
always true, for it admits of being false as well ; and
it remains for us to consider whether it is opinion,
since opinion may be both true and false. But belief
follows upon opinion, (as it is not admissible that an
individual should not believe in that upon which he
has an opinion,) and belief belongs to no irrational
creature although imagination is imparted to many.
Belief, besides, is an attendant upon every opinion,
as persuasion is upon belief, and reason alone can
persuade ; but although imagination belongs to some
irrational creatures, reason has been given to none.
It is manifest, then, that imagination can neither be
opinion with or through sensation, nor a combination
of opinion with sensation ; and for the same reasons
evident, that opinion is from nothing else but that
from which sensation is derived. By which I mean,
if imagination be the combination of an opinion of
whiteness and a sensation of whiteness, and not of an
opinion of goodness with a sensation of whiteness, then
to imagine is to think upon what has been sensually '

10

146 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

perceived, and that not accidentally. But there are
appearances which are fallacious, although our concep-
tion of them at the time may be true, as the sun, for
instance, appears to be a foot in diameter, and yet we
are satisfied that it is larger than the earth ; and in
such a case it happens either that the true opinion of
the sun's dimension must have been cast aside, or
else, while the sun remains as it was and the true
opinion has neither been forgotten nor changed, that
the opinion is at once both true and false. But the
opinion is simply false when it escapes us that the
thing seen is altered. It is evident, then, that ima-
gination can neither be any one, nor be derived from
any one of those faculties.

Since one object having been set in motion can
communicate motion to another, and since imagination
seems to be a kind of motion, and never to be produced
without sensation, or in other than sentient creatures,
or without the objects of sentient perception, and since,
on the other hand, motion can be produced by the act
of sensation, and this motion must of necessity be
equal to the impression, it may be admitted that the
motion of imagination can neither be produced with-
out sensation, nor in other than sentient beings ; that
beings endowed with it act and are acted upon in
many ways, and that its manifestations are both true
and false. This latter alternative happens thus: the
sensation which is derived from the objects peculiar

CH. III.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 147

to each sense is true, or it involves the smallest
amount of error ; but when, in the second place, such
objects are perceived in their accidents, there is room
for fallacy; when for instance, something is said to
be white, there is no fallacy, but when that object is
particularised and said to be this or that, the percep-
tion may be fallacious. There is, in the third place,
liability to error in our perception of common proper-
ties, and sequences in the accidents referrible to parti-
cular bodies — accidents, I mean, such as motion and
magnitude, which are referrible to all bodies, and
from which there is peculiar liability to error through
the senses. But the motion produced by the act of sen-
sation will differ from the sensation derived from these
three modes of sensation — the first, while sensation is
yet present, must be true; but the others, whether sen-
sation be present or not, may be fallacious, and more
especially, when the objects causative of sensation may
have been withdrawn. If, then, imagination alone
fulfil all the conditions indicated, and if it be all that
has been said, it may be defined as motion produced
by sensation in action. And since vision is a sense
above all others, imagination has derived its appella-
tion from light, because without light there is no
vision; and owing to its being an abiding faculty
and like sensations, animals perform many of their
actions through it. Some animals are so influenced from
being irrational; and others, as man, from having

10—2

148 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

their understanding eclipsed, at times, by passion,
disorder, or sleep.

Let this much, however, suffice for the inquiry
into imagination, for shewing what it is, and for what
purposes it has been imparted.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IV.

THIS chapter is upon the mind (o uous) and Aristotle's
inquiry is, whether it is part of that principle which
gives life to the body, or altogether distinct from
corporeal relations. It seems to be at once deter-
mined that there is no affinity between the mind
and sensibility, the ministrations of which trench so
closely upon cogitation ; and that the mind, there-
fore, existing independently of the body, is related to
subjects of thought, abstractions that is, as is sensi-
bility to sensism and sensation. Anaxagoras re-
garded all things as combinations save mind, which
alone he held to be homogeneous and pure. Aris-
totle1 makes the mind to be receptive of the subject,
and the essence of the subject of thought ; to be
something divine, and to confer upon us contempla-
tion, which is our sweetest, best enjoyment. " If this
faculty, in its occasional exercise, as by ourselves, is
happiness, it is, as the eternal attribute of the Deity,

1 Metaphys. I. 8, 13 ; XI. 7, 8 ; I. 3, 10 ; m. 5, 12.

150 PRELUDE TO CHAP. IV.

•wonderful, and more wonderful in proportion as
more enduring." But yet Aristotle quotes, without
objection, that the mind is innate in animals., and
the cause, in nature, of the world and its order ; and
he cites the verses of Parmenides, which seem to
imply that the mind is present in the limbs of man
as if it were a corporeal agent. To judge, however,
from observations in the course of this treatise, he
may be said, although, perhaps, not always consist-
ently, to have considered this great principle as
impassive, indiscerptible, and freed from all corporeal
ties ; and as being itself, only when withdrawn from
matter and its influences. Thus, as matter must
tend to preclude its offices, its existence, while asso-
ciated with mortal beings, can be only that of poten-
tiality.

CHAPTEK IV.

WITH respect to the part of Vital Principle by which
it both knows and reflects, whether that part be sepa-
rate, or separate, not substantively but, in an abstract
sense only, let us now consider in what it is distin-
guished from other parts, and how thinking is at any
time exercised. If thinking be such as is feeling,
then it may be some kind of impression by the subject
of thought, or other analogous agency. But then
that which thinks must be impassive, receptive of the
form of objects, and, in potentiality, the same as the
object, without actually being so. The mind, in fine,
must be related to subjects of thought as the sensi-
bility is to objects of perception. It is, then, necessary
since the mind thinks upon all subjects, that it should
be homogeneous, in order, as Anaxagoras expresses
himself, that it should domine, that is, recognise
things ; and as whatever is foreign to it precludes
and eclipses its inward light, so it can have no other
nature than that of potentiality. Thus, the so-called
mind of Vital Principle (and by mind I mean that part
by which Vital Principle judges and compares), is
not actually any one of the subjects of thought before

152 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

thinking upon it. It is very improbable, therefore,
that the mind should have been commingled with the
body; for were this the case, it would be a quality of
some kind, as hot or cold, or it would have some kind
of organ as there is for the sensibility, but no such
organ is to be found. It is well said by some that
Vital Principle is the place of forms, only this is to
be understood of Vital Principle, not as a whole but
as a cogitative faculty, and of forms, not in reality
but, in potentiality.

It is manifest, from the nature of the sentient
organs and sensation, that the quiescent state of the
sentient is not the same as that of the cogitative part.
For the sensibility is unable to distinguish impressions
in excess, as a sound amid loud sounds, or a colour or
odour among brilliant colours or pungent odours, but
the mind, on the contrary, when thinking intensely
upon any subject, can still think and with increased
rather than diminished intensity upon the subordinate
details ; the sensibility, besides, cannot be without a
body, but the mind is separable. When thus situated,
the mind can become each of the subjects of thought,
as an individual is said to be learned actually (and
this may be said when he is able at will to employ
his learning,) because he is at the same time equally
learned in potentiality, although not as he was before
he had learned or invented something ; for when so
learned he is able to reflect upon his learning.

CH. IV.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 153

There is a distinction between positive magnitude
and ideal magnitude, water and ideal water, and so
between many but yet not all substances, as with
some the two states are identical, but the mind judges
of flesh and ideal flesh either by some different faculty
or by being itself differently disposed ; for flesh cannot
be without matter, but, as is a snub nose, it is some-
thing in something. Now, it is by the sensibility
that we judge of hot and cold and other properties of
which flesh is the standard ; but it is either by some
distinct faculty or as a curved is to an extended line,
that we judge of ideal flesh. Straightness, on the
other hand, as well as the snub nose we place among
abstractions, for each is associated with continuity;
but the difference, if there be a difference, between
positive straightness and ideal straightness, the mind
judges of by some other, perhaps a dual faculty ;
by some other faculty, at least, or by being itself
differently disposed. To use a general expression,
as are things abstracted from matter so are subjects
of thought with respect to the mind.

It is difficult to determine how the mind, if it be
as Anaxagoras supposes, homogeneous, impassive
and without any thing in common with aught else,
is to think, if thinking be some kind of impression ;
for it is only in so far as there is something in com-
mon between two substances, that the one seems to
act and the other to be acted upon. And there is

154 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

the same difficulty if the mind itself is intelligible ;
for it will be present in other things, unless it is
itself, intelligible in some other way than they are,
and unless the subject of thought is some one
specific subject ; or else the mind will be some
kind of combination, and this reduces thought to the
nature of other things. But to suffer impression
according to some common relation implies, as has
been just explained, that the mind, in potentiality, is
as the subjects thought upon, and yet that, in reality,
it is no one of them before thinking upon it; and
thus the mind is to be regarded as a tablet on which
nothing may have been actually inscribed. The mind
is a subject of thought to itself as is any other topic,
since that which thinks and the subject of thought
are among immaterialities ; for speculative knowledge
is the same as the subject which is so known. But
we have to consider why the mind is not always
thinking, as each subject of thought, in potentiality,
is among materialities ; so that the mind will not be
present in any one of them (for the mind is the
immaterial faculty which judges of them), although
each of them will be subject to the mind.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER V.

THIS chapter assumes the existence of a generic matter,
as well as something which is to give to it reality,
and thus it seems to admit of formative conditions
other than those assigned to Vital Principle ; the
mind too, although said to be immaterial, is likened
to a material agent. Aristotle1 elsewhere, somewhat
in conformity with this, says, "even granting that
all things may be from one, or more than one primal
element, and that the self-same matter may be the
source of all beings, yet there is a peculiar matter
for each genus, as pituita is the primal matter for
sweet and oily, as the matter of bile is for bitter and
analogous qualities." An early commentator observes,
"matter is the receptacle and subject of forms,
without having in itself either figure, quality, mag-
nitude, or place ; nevertheless, it is not a mere name,
but truly exists as the basis of qualities. Matter

1 Metaphys. vu. 4. i.

156 PRELUDE TO CHAP. V. [BK. III.

exists potentially, bodies actually, with their peculiar
character ; and matter cannot be separated from
form and real existence."

CHAPTER V.

SINCE, throughout all nature, there is a matter for
each genus of entities (that which all belonging to
that genus are in potentiality), and a something which
is causative and constitutive from its making things
what they are, as art impresses its forms upon matter,
so those same distinctions must, of necessity, co-exist
in the vital principle. Such also is the mind, from
its faculty, on the one hand, of becoming all things,
and, on the other, of creating all things, as if it were
a virtuality like light ; for light, in a certain sense,
makes colours, being in potentiality, to become colours
in reality ; and the mind here meant is separate, im-
passive and homogeneous, being essentially an ener-
gizing influence.

That which acts is ever, in fact, more influential
than that which is acted upon, as the causative prin-
ciple is than the matter. Now, knowledge in activity
is identical with the subject ; but knowledge in poten-
tiality pre-exists in the individual ; and yet, strictly

CH. V.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 157

speaking, it does not pre-exist, as that cannot be said
to pre-exist which sometimes is, and sometimes is not
reflected on. But that alone, whatever it be, which
thinks, is separate from all else, immortal and eternal ;
and, because it is impassive, we derive from it no
memory. But the impressionable mind, on the con-
trary, is perishable ; and without it there can be no
cogitation.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER VI.

THIS chapter does but repeat what has already been
insisted upon, that the mind or the sensibility, when
engaged upon indivisibles, that is, single ideas or
simple sensations, is not subject to error ; and that
the liability to error commences when ideas or sensa-
tions are either generalized, or judged of in their
relations. It may be added, that the want of a
sensorium or faculty for the generalization of par-
ticular sensations, and for affording to the mind,
thereby, terms for comparison, is felt so much
throughout, that the brain alone can, for some
passages, fully explain all that the words may seem
to imply.

CHAPTER VI.

WHENEVER cogitation is employed upon what may
be indivisible it is not subject to error, but when
engaged upon topics which involve both error and
truth, there is a simultaneous combination of thoughts,
whereby they are, so to say, individualized ; in the
way that Empedocles expressed himself, "Now the
heads of many creatures budded forth without necks,
and then, heads and necks were by affinity made one."
It is thus that thoughts, however disconnected, as
the incommensurable and the diameter, are by the
intelligence joined together. If the question relate
to things past or future, the mind, thinking upon
time besides, adds it to the other conditions; for
error lies ever in the combination, as when the white
is said not to be white, the error is in the addition of
the negative. Now, it is always in our power to
speak of things individually ; but then, it is not only
true or false that Clem is fair, but equally so that he
ever was or ever will be fair. It is the mind which
individualizes each subject. But since the indivisi-
ble is in the twofold state either of potentiality or

160 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

actuality, there is nothing to preclude the mind when
thinking upon extension, from thinking upon it as
indivisible, for it is indivisible, actually, and in time
which is indivisible ; as time, like extension, is both
divisible and indivisible. It may not then be said
that the mind thinks upon any subject in each half;
for extension exists only in potentiality, unless it have
been divided. But the mind, when thinking upon
each of the halves separately, divides the time simul-
taneously, and then time becomes such as the two
extensions ; and if the mind make a whole of the two
halves, it does the same with time in its relation to
them. The mind, however, thinks upon the indivisible
as species and not as quantity, in an indivisible portion
of time and by an indivisible part of Vital Principle ;
and this neither by accident, nor in so far as the sub-
jects thought upon, or the part by which, or the time
in which, it thinks, are divisible, but as they are indi-
visible. There is, in fact, in such cases a something
indivisible, although it may not be separate, which
makes time and extension to be one; and which holds
good for all continuity, whether of time or extension.
Now, the point and every analogous division, and
whatever is as the point indivisible, are made known
as being privation of something. The reasoning upon
other subjects is like this, for were it asked how the
mind is to recognise bad or black, it may be answered,
that it recognises them in some way by their contraries;

CH. VI.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 161

but that which recognises them must, in potentiality,
be the thing recognised, and be present also in it. If
to any one of the senses there is no contrary, then that
sense recognises itself, is in activity and separate from
all else. An affirmation, like a negation, is something
in relation to something, and is always either true or
false ; but not so with the mind, as it is true when it
judges of any thing after its essence, and may not be
true when it judges of something in its relation to
something else. Thus, the visual perception of any
particular object is true, but whether a something
white which is seen be or be not a man is not in-
variably true ; and this holds good for abstractions.

11

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER VII.

COMMENTATORS are generally agreed in regarding this
chapter as a series of ill-connected repetitions of
former statements and doctrines ; but, although
repetitions, they will be found to illustrate or tend
to the completion of some preceding opinions. It
maintains, in fact, the same dogmata, adopts the
same illustrations, and assumes a faculty, the repre-
sentative of a sensorium, which physiology could not
then supply ; and thus, although the wording may
differ, the purport is the same. The term evepyfia
(which was before alluded to) is employed, in a more
especial manner in this chapter, and as neither its
meaning is obvious nor its equivalent easily selected,
it may be well to offer a few words in explanation of
it. Although it is opposed, like the e'i/xeA.e'^;eia, to
8i/i/a/ji<?, still the two terms are not synonymous ; for
the former (the evepyeia) seems to relate to action
in some form, and the latter to completion or deve-
lopment of something out of an imperfect or nascent

PRELUDE TO CHAP. VII. 163

condition. Action must be implied, it is true, in
completion or development, and, therefore, the evep-
yeta may be contained in the evreXe-^eia, although this
may not hold good reciprocally. But the first para-
graph may be cited as an example of what apparently
needs elucidation — "knowledge, is, it is said, w/ten
active, (latine, in actu,) (tj KOT' evepjeiav tTrumjpti),
identical with," &c. — "la science en acte est iden-
tique," &c. — " scientia autem, ea quae* est actu, est
idem quod res" and knowledge or science here, by
metonymy, may, probably, mean the faculty by which
knowledge is acquired or exercised ; but what means this
peculiar state which identifies the knowledge with the
reason? All function presupposes activity and inertia ;
but the last as much implies identification as the first,
so that the distinction between activity and complete-
ness, although present, probably, to Aristotle, is not
obvious to a modern student. The definition1 of the
term, although dwelt upon at length, fails, it may be
from the difficulty inseparable from abstract specula-
tions, to shew either what is strictly implied by it,
or how it differs from the eWeAc'^eja; it is evident
that motion, in some modified sense, in the process
of completion, is to be understood ; but beyond this,

1 Metaphytica, vni. 6. I.

11-2

164 PRELUDE TO CHAP. VII. [BK. III.

vague as it may be, explanation cannot be carried.
Potentiality is related to it as to the evTe\i%eia, but
the relation is too dependent upon verbal distinc-
tions, which cannot be transferred, to admit of being
made evident even to the student of the original ;
and thus it may be asked, what is meant by know-
ledge is, "when active" identical &c. or the same
words where they recur ?

CHAPTER VII.

KNOWLEDGE is, when active, identical with that which
is known; but knowledge, in potentiality, pre-exists in
the individual, and yet, strictly speaking, it does not
pre-exist, as all products are from a being in reality.
Now, it is the object of perception, which appears, by
its agency, to create sensation from the sensibility
which is in potentiality ; for it suffers neither impres-
sion nor change. So that this is a different kind of
motion ; for motion was said to be the act of something
incomplete ; but an act in an absolute sense is different,
as it is the act of something complete. Thus, a simple
sensation is like to a simple affirmation or a single
idea ; and as the impression may be grateful or pain-
ful, it is, as it were, affirmative or negative, and it bids

CH. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 165

to flee from or pursue -after something; and percep-
tions of pain and pleasure emanate from the sentient
medium in its relation to good or evil, in so far as
things may be one or other. So actual flight from
something is identical with actual appetite, as the
fugitive impulse does not differ from the appetitive
stimulus, for they differ neither from one another nor
from the sentient medium ; and yet they do differ in
mode of being. Images belong, naturally, to the
thinking, as sensations do to the sentient principle ;
and as it may affirm or deny that anything is good
or bad, it bids to flee from or pursue after it. The
Vital Principle, therefore, never thinks without an
image; as the air has made the pupil what it is, the
pupil something else, and so with the hearing ; but
the last term is one, as the mean, to which belong
several modes of being, is one.

It has already been said by what faculty the mind
discerns that sweet differs from hot, but yet it may be
spoken of again here. It is then an unit of some kind ;
and an unit in the sense of a limit, for it is as an unit
and a limit in the relation, considered analogically and
numerically, which the unit bears to the limit. What
matters it, besides, whether our doubt is as to how
the faculty judges of things, generically, the same, or
opposite, as white and black ?

Let A = white be in relation to B = black, and let
C be to D as A is to B, and so reciprocally; if C, D be

166 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

properties of some one body they will be as the pro-
perties A, B, and the body will be one and the same
with the other, although not the same in the mode of
being; and the same reasoning will hold good, of
course, though A be = sweet and B = white. Thus,
the cogitative faculty dwells upon ideas in images,
and by images, independently of sensation, it in some
way determines what ought to be pursued after or fled
from ; but, when acted upon by images, it is moved
to think, and, perceiving the beacon to be on fire
and moving, it comprehends, by that common property
(motion), that an enemy is at hand. Sometimes, too,
by images or thoughts present in Vital Principle, that
faculty, as if seeing, calculates and orders things future
in their relation to things present ; and when it sug-
gests that something is grateful or hurtful, it bids to
pursue after or flee from it, as its biddings always tend
to action. And with respect to all which pertains to
inaction, the true and the false are in the same genus
with the good and bad; but with this difference,
that the former have an absolute, and the latter only
a relative signification. The mind dwells upon abs-
tractions, so termed, as it thinks upon a snub nose:
in so far as it is a nose of that character it cannot be
thought upon abstractedly, but in so far as it is con-
cave the mind can, by thinking intensely upon the
form, realise to itself the nose without the flesh in
which the form is embodied. Thus, too, the mind

CH. VII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 167

thinks upon mathematical questions as abstractions,
although they are not really so, when they are thought
upon.

In fine, the mind when thinking, is, in act, the
thing thought upon. It shall hereafter be considered
whether or not it can be admitted that the mind,
without being itself apart from magnitude, can com-
prehend abstractions.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER VIII.

THIS chapter is a brief summary of the principal theories
and arguments which have been alluded to, and it
adds but little for comment. The opening para-
graphs are rendered less definite than might be
wished for, by the recurring particle irto<; and by
the substitution of ovra for irpdynara, although the
distinction between them is not very apparent. It
had just been said that "knowledge, in act, is
identical with what is known," and here the same
is predicated of Vital Principle, although with a
qualifying addition; and the meaning, in either
case, is dependent upon Aristotle's two sovereign
conditions. It may be understood how the intellect
as well as the sentient faculty can be regarded as
identical with their subjects, in the way that a
sentient organ, by reception of the form without
the matter, may be said to be identified with the
coloured or sonorous object; but it is not obvious
how this can apply to faculty or sense in poten-

PRELUDE TO CHAP. VIII. 169

tiality, unless, indeed, as they are in abeyance,
•without perception that is, so objects, not being
perceived, are without properties.

CHAPTER VIII.

HAVING thus summarily recounted whatever has been
said upon the Vital Principle, let us repeat that it is,
in some sense, all things which are; for things are the
subjects either of sentient perception or of thought,
and knowledge is, in some sense, things known, as
sensation is things sensually perceived. But let us
inquire how this is to be understood — Knowledge,
then, like sensation is divided, when in potentiality,
into things in potentiality, when in reality, into things
in reality ; and the sentient and the cogitative faculties
of Vital Principle are, when in potentiality, identical
with thoughts and objects of perception, in potentiality.
But the question here must necessarily refer either to
things or the forms of things ; but the things them-
selves they cannot be, as it is not a stone but the
form of a stone which is in the Vital Principle. Thus,
the Vital Principle is, as it were, a hand, for as a hand
is the instrument of instruments, so the mind is the
form of forms, and sensation the form of things sensu-
ally perceived. Since there is, seemingly, nothing

170 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

separate from perceptible magnitude, it must be ad-
mitted that all subjects of cogitation are in per-
ceptible forms, as well those termed abstractions as
those which relate to the conditions and changes of
the objects of perception. And, therefore, if a being
were without sentient perception, he could neither
learn nor understand ; as for reflexion the individual
must be able to call up an image of some sort, and
images are kinds of sensations, excepting that they
are immaterial. Imagination, on the other hand, is
something different from affirmation and negation,
for the true or the false is but a complication of
thoughts. But by what are primal thoughts to be
distinguished from such as are derived from images ?
Other thoughts, however, are not images, and yet
without images they could not be produced.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER IX.

THIS and the two following chapters are upon the parts
or powers rather, which give to animals locomotion ;
but, as the nervous even the muscular system had
not then been made out, the text is encumbered,
occasionally, as might be expected, with specula-
tions which may now seem idle, and distinctions
which are almost futile. Aristotle1 makes " animals
to move and be moved for the sake of something,
which is the limit of all their movements; and the
moving powers of an animal are, perceptibly, he
adds, thought and imagination, election, will and
desire, which are all referrible to mind and appetite,
els vovv Ka\ 5pe£tv. Thus, as imagination and per-
ception are alike able to direct an animal, they are
in one and the same relation to the mind. The
argument, in fact, dwells upon the motive as well as
the object for progression, without a word concerning
the agency by which it is to be effected, as if the
muscular power of the body were unknown, or

1 De Gen. Animalm. v. 16 ; n. 6. 46.

172 PRELUDE TO CHAP. IX. [BK. III.

regarded only as the seat or source of the touch;
and yet the flesh was said to be tJie origin ' and very
body of an animal. The strength2 of all animals is,
he adds, in the tendons (ij <<r^Js ci/ TO?? vevpoi^), and,
therefore, strength is greatest when they are full
grown; for the young have weak joints and deficient
sinews.

CHAPTER IX.

SINCE the Vital Principle of animals lias been
defined by the two faculties of judgment (which is
the office of thought with sentient perception), and of
locomotion, let us now, having dwelt sufficiently
upon sensation and mind, proceed to consider, with
respect to the motor power, what part of the Vital
Principle it may be. Let us consider, that is, whether
it is a part of Vital Principle and separate from it,
substantively or abstractedly, or whether it is Vital
Principle as a whole ; and if it be a part, whether it
is something peculiar and exclusive of those usually
attributed to Vital Principle, and which have been
alluded to, or whether it is to be considered as one
of them.

But a difficulty at once presents itself, both in

1 De Part. Animalm. ir. 8. i. a De Gen. Animalm. v. 7. 16.

CH. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PINCIPLE. 173

determining the sense in which we are to speak of
the parts of Vital Principle, and in settling how many
of them there may be. In one point of view, in fact,
the parts appear to be infinite in number and to com-
prise, not only those which some speak of as the
reasoning, passionate and appetitive, and others as the
rational and the irrational, but other parts also, which
by the distinctions employed in those classifications,
are brought into notice, and are more broadly distin-
guished from one another than are any of those to
which we have alluded. Those other parts are the
nutritive, which belongs to all plants and animals,
and the sentient, which cannot readily be placed
among either rational or irrational parts ; there is
the imaginative, besides, which differs in mode of
being from all the others, and yet it would be diffi-
cult to determine, amid the several parts of Vital
Principle, with which of them it is identical, or from
which it differs. Besides these, there is the appeti-
tive part, which, whether considered abstractedly or
functionally, would seem to differ from all others,
and yet it would be absurd to separate it from them ;
for volition is present in the rational, as decire and
passion are in the irrational part, and if the Vital
Principle be made up of these three, appetite must be
present in each of them.

But, to resume the more especial topic of this
chapter, what is that, let us ask, which confers upon

174 ARISTOTLE ON THE [fiK. III.

an animal locomotive power ? Now, it may be sup-
posed that the generative and the nutritive functions,
which are innate in all living beings, originate the
motion concerned in the processes of growth and
decay, which equally belong to them all ; and with
respect to breathing and expiration, sleep and watch-
ing, which are subjects of much difficulty, we shall
enter upon the consideration of them hereafter. Let
us, however, consider what confers upon an animal
the power of progression.

Now, it clearly is not the nutritive faculty — for
the movement of progression is ever for some end,
and is associated either with imagination or appetite ;
and then no being moves unless urged to it by desire
or fear, excepting, indeed, there be impulse from with-
out ; plants, besides, were nutrition the cause, should
be locomotive, and possess some organ to fit them for
that kind of movement.

Neither can it be the sentient faculty — for there
are many creatures which are sentient, and yet sta-
tionary throughout their existence ; and if nature do
nothing in vain, and never, except in the case of
beings dwarfed or deformed, omits anything neces-
sary to existence, the creatures alluded to are perfect
creatures ; and as proof of this they are reproductive,
are capable of development and subject to decay, so
that they also ought to have organs to fit them for
progression.

CH. IX.] VITAL PEINCIPLE. 175

Neither can the rational faculty or the so-called
mind be the motor power, for the speculative intel-
lect never thinks upon what is to be done, or suggests
aught concerning what should be fled from or pursued
after ; but this motion is the act of one fleeing from
or pursuing after something. Nor does that faculty,
even when reflecting upon any such object, at once
bid to flee from or to follow after it, as it often dwells
upon something terrible, or agreeable, without sug-
gesting alarm, although the heart may be set in
motion or some other part of the impression be agree-
able. Add to this, that although the mind may bid,
and the reason suggest that something should be fled
from or pursued after, the individual does not neces-
sarily move, but acts as does an intemperate person,
according to the dictates of passion. It is thus, occa-
sionally, we see that a physician, although versed in
medical science, does not cure, as if there were some-
thing other than the science which had the power of
acting according to the precepts of the science.

It may be affirmed that the appetite cannot be
the positive cause of this motion ; for the temperate,
even while desiring and yearning after something, do
not act in order to secure that for which they feel
appetite, but follow their understanding.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER X.

THE subject of locomotion is continued, and the motor
principles are said to be appetite and mind; but
mind in the sense rather of a perceptive or sentient
than a purely intellectual faculty; and yet it is
neither the centre of sensibility nor imagination,
although it partakes of the nature of each of them.
The imagination, which many are said to follow
against judgment, is evidently the voluntary species
of which man alone partakes; and the other, which
is allotted to the lower animals, may be regarded as
instinct. The mind, as a practical faculty, is to be
distinguished from the theoretical or speculative
intellect, which has for its object the discovery of
truth, as the other has the preservation of the body.
The argument is complicated, and made less appre-
hensible by the technicality and great precision
of its wording : thus, TO opf^rov, or object desired,
is food, and appetite is the stimulus or feeling
of hunger which compels to move; the practical

PRELUDE TO CHAP. X. 177

mind (Sidvota irpaKTiKrj) is the sentient faculty, and
the beginning of the action, which is the satisfaction
of the appetite, completes or is the last of the
series. Thus, these two, the appetite and practical
thought (which is sentient perception) are motors, as
being both stimulus and desire, and the object
desired (food, that is), acting upon the sentient
perception, urges to locomotion for the attainment
of it; the imagination, as an instinctive power, is
said never to impel to move, save for the satisfaction
of necessary wants.

CHAPTER X.

THOSE two faculties, the appetite and the mind, appear
to be the motor principles in animals — the mind, if
the imagination might be set down as being a kind
of thought ; for many against knowledge follow their
imaginings, and other animals are moved neither by
thought nor calculation, but by imagination. Thus,
those two faculties, mind and appetite, are locomotive
powers ; but, then, it is mind in the sense of a calcu-
lating and a practical faculty, and which differs from
the speculative mind by the object to which it tends.

12

178 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

Now, every appetite tends to some object, for the
appetite, which is the beginning of the practical mind,
has ever some object in view, and that object is the
beginning of the action. So that these two, appetite
and practical thought, may reasonably be regarded as
motor powers — for the object longed for impels to
move, and then, through it, the practical intelligence
impels, because its origin is the object longed for ;
and when imagination may incite to move, it never
does set in motion without appetite. Thus, it is the
object longed for alone which produces motion ; for if
there were two motives, mind and appetite, they
would produce motion according to some common
formula. But as the case is, the mind does not
appear to produce motion without appetite, for voli-
tion is appetite ; and even when a creature may move
by calculation, it still moves by volition ; the appe-
tite, on the contrary, impels to move against calcula-
tion, for desire is a kind of appetite.

The mind then is always right; but appetite as
well as imagination may be right and may be wrong.
It is, therefore, the object desired which always ex-
cites to move, but then that object is a good or an
apparent good ; not however, a good in every sense,
but a practical good, and a practical good admits of
being otherwise than good.

It is manifest then, that it is that faculty of Vital
Principle, the so-called appetite which excites to

CH. X.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 179

move. But when Vital Principle is divided into
parts, and parts are distinguished by their faculties,
very many are made apparent, as the nutritive, the
sentient, the cogitative, the deliberative, and the ap-
petitive, and these differ from one another more than
do the desiring and the passionate.

The appetites admit of being opposed to one
another, and this occurs when reason may be opposed
to desire, but the opposition can be manifested only
in beings with a sense of time; for the mind com-
mands to resist on account of the future, while desire
urges to immediate compliance, as that which is good
appears, as the future is unseen, to be absolutely good
and absolutely grateful. Thus, the appetitive faculty,
in so far as appetitive, may, in a specific sense, be the
motor, but it is the object desired by appetite which
is the first to set in motion ; for without having been
itself moved, it incites to move from having been
thought upon or imagined; and there are several
such motors. There are three terms here : the motor;
then that by which it moves ; and thirdly, that which
is moved. But the motor is in the two-fold sense of
unmoved, and both motor, and moved — the unmoved is
the practical good ; the motor and moved is the appe-
titive stimulus or appetition (for that which is moved
moves only in so far as it desires, and appetite is a
motion or an act of some kind) ; and the moved is
the animal. As the organism by which appetite

12—2

180 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

effects motion is obviously corporeal, its nature must
be studied together with those functions which are
common to the body and the Vital Principle. But to
speak summarily, the organism whereby motion is
effected, is as a hinge in which coexist the beginning
and the end of motion — for herein are the convex and
the concave, of which that is the beginning, and this
the end of motion; and therefore the one is at rest
while the other is in motion, as although, rationally
considered, the two pieces are distinct, yet, substan-
tively, they are inseperable.

In fine, then, as has been said, an animal is en-
dowed with self-motion to the extent of its appetition ;
but it cannot be susceptible of appetite without ima-
gination, and all imagination is either rational or
sentient, and of this latter kind other animals partake
also.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER XL

IT is by no means obvious what may have been meant by
" imperfect creatures," or in what sense desire,
unless it be as instinct, can be assigned to them;
for there is no trace throughout the zoology of
Aristotle, extensive as it is, of any such species of
being. One commentator has suggested polypi and
mollusca; but the former, in their present accepta-
tion, (improperly termed zoophytes), had not then
been observed, and the latter1 could not, from the
description, have been regarded as " imperfect
animals." The "polypus" was the generic term for
the highest forms of the Cephalopoda, or " cuttle
fish."

1 De Part. Animalm, iv. 7. 4.

CHAPTER XI.

LET us now consider the motor power in such im-
perfect creatures as have only the sense of Touch ;
and learn whether or not it is admissible that imagi-
nation and desire can be present with them. Now,
they do appear to be sensible of pain and pleasure,
and if so far sensible, they must of necessity have
desire. But how can imagination be present in
them ? It may, perhaps, be answered that, as their
movements are indeterminate, so those sensations are
present, but present in some indeterminate manner.

The sentient imagination belongs, as has been
said, to other animals, but that which is voluntary
is found only in such as are rational ; for it is matter
of calculation whether this or that shall be done, and
as the individual is to pursue what is larger and
better, he must be guided by a rule of some kind,
and thereby be enabled to individualize several diffe-
rent images. The reason why these creatures do not
seem to be capable of forming opinions is, that they
are without the faculty for drawing inferences, and
this includes opinion. But the appetite has no deli-

CH. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 183

berative will, as appetite sometimes overcomes and
impels tlie will, and sometimes the will overcomes
and impels the appetite, as a ball is bandied to and
fro ; or appetite rules and impels appetite, when in-
temperance has the ascendancy. But that which is
superior is ever naturally more dominant, and pro-
ductive of motion in three different directions ; but
the intelligent faculty has no motion — it remains
at rest. Although the conception of the universal
is to be distinguished from the conception of the
particular, (for while the former says that such an
one ought to perform such an act, the latter says
that such an one, and that / am he, ought now to
perform this particular act,) yet it is this latter
opinion rather than the former which impels to
move ; and although both may be motive, the one, at
least, is rather at rest, and the other is rather in
motion.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER XII.

As the treatise is drawing to a close, this chapter again
alludes to the distinction between the life in plants
and animals from the presence or absence of sensi-
bility— thus, animals are distinguished from plants
by being sentient, as plants are from inanimate
bodies by nutrition and growth. Aristotle1 placed
plants immediately after inanimate substances, and
says that they are distinguished, generically, by
degrees of vitality; that compared with other
bodies they appear to be almost alive (<r^e8ov iXa-nfp
ev\^v^ov) ; compared with animals, to be inanimate ;
and that the transition from the one to the other
is in an unbroken series. Thus, there are " marine
creatures," he says, "which cannot with certainty be
ranged among either animals or plants ; and sponge
has altogether the appearance of a plant." La-
marck8 has substantively adopted this, as he, too,

1 Hist. Animedm, vni. i. 6.
3 Introduction, 77. 96.

PRELUDE TO CHAP. XII. 185

commences with inanimate things (which, what-
ever their character, he distinguishes broadly from
whatever has life) and then passes to plants, which
he distinguishes from animal bodies, by being non-
irritable — incapable, that is, of contracting any of
their solids, suddenly and repeatedly, while animal
bodies are, on the contrary, endowed with contrac-
tile power. Cuvier1 observes, that "living and
organised beings have, from the earliest times, been
subdivided into animated beings — beings, that is,
which are sentient and moveable, and beings which
are inanimate ; and as these are neither sentient nor
moveable, they are reduced to the common faculty
of vegetation or nutrition." It is not necessary,
then, as Aristotle remarks, that all living beings
should be sentient.

1 R&gne Animal, C. I. 18.

CHAPTER XII.

IT is necessary to every living creature that it should
have a nutritive principle in order that it may live
and continue to live, from birth to death ; for it is
necessary to every thing generated that it should be
capable of growth, development and decay, and as these
cannot be carried on without nourishment, it is neces-
sary to all reproductive and perishing beings that
they should have a congenital nutritive function. But
it is not necessary to all living beings that they should
be sentient, nor can it be admitted that such as have
simple or homogeneous bodies can have Touch, or
that there can be an animal without Touch ; neither
can any beings be sentient but such as are receptive
of form without the matter. It is necessary to an
animal, however, that it should be sentient, if nature
do nothing in vain — for all things in nature are for
some end, or else they are accidents of things for
some end ; so that if there were any animal body fitted
for progression without being sentient, it would perish,
and could not attain to the end which is nature's
design. How, in fact, is such a body to be nourished?

CH. XII.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 187

As to creatures which are fixed, they obtain their
nourishment on the spot where they have been pro-
duced. It is not possible then, that a body which is
not fixed to one spot and which has been generated,
should have living principle and judging faculties
without being sentient. Nor can a creature sponta-
neously generated be sentient ; Why, let us ask,
should it be so ? The sensibility is for the greater
good either of the Vital Principle or the body ; but
neither of these can, in the case supposed, be effected
by it, as the one will not through it think the better,
nor the other be better fitted for its offices. Thus,
there is no living body free to move which is not
sentient. But if a body be sentient, it must necessarily
be either homogeneous or compound — Now, homoge-
neous it cannot be, as in that case it would be with-
out Touch, and Touch it must of necessity have. All
which is proved thus — Since an animal is a living
body, and all bodies are tangible, and tangible im-
plies whatever is perceptible to Touch, it follows that
the body of an animal must be sensible to Touch, if
the animal is to preserve its existence. The other
senses, as the sight, smell, hearing, perceive through
other media; but if an animal when touching were
without sensation, it could have no guide for avoiding
some things or seizing others, and so circumstanced,
it would not be possible for it to preserve its existence.
The taste, therefore, is a kind of Touch, for taste is the

188 ARISTOTLE ON THE [BK. III.

sense for food and food is a tangible body; but sound,
colour and odour neither nourish nor contribute to
growth or decay. Thus, taste must of necessity be a
kind of Touch from its being the sense which is per-
ceptive both of what is tangible and nutritive ; and,
as these two senses are necessary tD animals, it is
manifest that there can be no animal without Touch.

The other senses, being for the higher good of
animals, are allotted, not to all but, only to particular
genera, as they are necessary to none but such as
have the power of progression. If, indeed, such a
creature is to preserve its existence, it must not only
be sensible of objects when touching them, but be able
also to perceive them when at a distance; and this
can be effected if it be sensible through a medium,
which, having been impressed and set in motion by
the objects of perception reacts upon the percipient.
And it is thus that the locomotive impulse acts until
it cease in rest — that which impels something else
communicates along with impulsion impelling power,
and the motion is in a midspace ; and as the first
motor impels without having been impelled, so the
last is impelled without impelling, and the inter-
mediate links, of which there are several, both impel
and are impelled. So is it too with respect to changes
wrought in bodies, excepting that they are effected
without change of locality — as if any one were to
tinge a portion of wax, it would be in motion until

CH. XII.] VITAL PRINCIPLE. 189

it should be saturated; nothing like this, however,
can happen to a stone, but it can to water, and that
to a distance. The air is mobile in the highest
degree, and, provided it be still and in one mass, it
both acts and is acted upon. It is better, therefore,
in the case of refraction, to assume that the air, in so
far as it is one mass, (and it is so over every smooth
surface,) is impressed by form and colour, rather than
that visual rays issuing from the eye are refracted.
Thus, the air, in the case of vision, gives motion
to the sense, as if the impress upon wax had been
transmitted to its extremity.

PKELUDE TO CHAPTER XIII.

THERE were four admitted elements, fire and air, earth
and water, from which all things were supposed
to be formed; and the object here is to shew that
an animal cannot be homogeneous, connot be formed,
that is, of only one element. Now, earth was
supposed to give solidity, fire to be diffused through
all living bodies, and thus there remained only air
and water from which to constitute sentient organs ;
the earth was assigned, however, more particularly
to the Touch, but, as Touch is perceptive of other
qualities (as hot and cold) besides those of mere
Touch, it could not be constituted of that element
alone. The organs of relation, sight and hearing,
were formed, principally, of water and air, which
are the media for the transmission of visual and
sonorous impressions; and the smell partook more of
fire, as the Touch did of earth, yet not exclusively.
The theory is superseded by the increase of our
knowledge of external nature, but, in assuming

PRELUDE TO CHAP. XIII. 191

elements, combination and proportion, it seems to
typify, as it were, an atomic theory. Hippocrates1,
also, taught that the human body cannot be exclu-
sively, either of air or fire, water or earth, or any
single element; although, he adds, "I do not quarrel
with such as think otherwise." Plato2, likewise,
" derived all things, so to say, from these four
elements, in due proportion and relation to one
another ; so that what fire is to air, that air is to
water, and water to earth, and each is, by affinity,
united with others, to form whatever is visible and
tangible."

1 De Natura Hominis.

2 Timceus, y., B.

CHAPTER XIII.

IT is manifest that an animal body cannot be simple,
cannot, I mean, be only fire or air; for an animal
cannot have any other sense without having Touch,
and every living body is sensible to Touch, as has
been said. But all the elements, except earth, may
constitute sentient organs, as these all receive impres-
sions through something foreign to themselves and
through media ; but the Touch is made sensible by
touching bodies, and hence its name. And yet the
other sentient organs do perceive by Touch, but then
it is through something foreign to themselves ; while
Touch alone seems to perceive directly, through itself.
So that an animal body cannot be constituted of any
one of the other elements exclusively, nor can it be
formed only of earth; for the Touch is the medium, as
it were, for tangible impressions, and the organ is
perceptive not only of the distinctions which pertain
to earth, but of hot, cold, and all other tangible
qualities. Hence it is that we have no feeling in
bones, hair, or other analogous parts because they are
of earth; and plants for the same reason, being of

CH. XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. 193

earth have no feeling. It is impossible then that
there should be any other sense without that of
Touch ; and its organ is neither of earth nor any other
element exclusively. Thus, it is manifest that the
Touch is the only sense of which animals cannot be
deprived without dying ; that animals only can pos-
sess it ; and that it alone of the senses is necessary to
animal existence. On which account, other sentient
impressions in excess (as those of colour, sound and
odour) may injure the organs but do not destroy
the animal, excepting it be by chance, as when with
sound there is an impulse and a blow, or as when, by
visual or odorous impressions, other influences are set
in motion, which destroy the animal through the
Touch ; and when savour destroys life it does so by
communicating simultaneously a tangible impression.
But the excess of tangible impression, whether hot,
cold or hard, destroys the animal, because as every
impression in excess destroys the sentient organ, so
the tangible destroys that of Touch, and it is by the
Touch that animal life has been denned ; and it has
been shewn that an animal cannot possibly exist
without the Touch. Thus, the excess of tangible
impressions destroys not the organ only but the
animal, as that sense alone is necessary to its exist-
ence. Animals, in fact, possess, as has been said, the
other senses, not merely for existence but, for higher
enjoyment: they have sight, in order that, as they live

13

194 ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE. [BK. III.

in air and water, in a transparent medium in short,
they may see ; taste, that by discerning what is grate-
ful or nauseous in food they may have desire for and
move to obtain it ; hearing, that others may signify
something to them, and a tongue that they may
signify something to others.

NOTES.

13—2

NOTES.

BOOK THE FIKST.

CHAPTER I.

Note 1, p. 1 1. Truth in relation to nature, &c.] Aristotle1
says that some beings exist by nature, and some by other
causes ; those by nature include animals and their parts,
plants and elementary bodies, as fire and air, earth and
water, for all such, evidently, exist, and exist by nature.
The objects, in fact, of nature's constitution are broadly
distinguished from whatever does not emanate from her —
"for all her productions appear to have within them a
principle of motion, and of rest ; some for locomotion,
and some for the motions of growth, decay, and change.
But neither a bed, a garment, nor any other similar ob-
ject, whether formed of stone, earth, or composition, has
any such innate tendency to change ; and thus nature is
to be regarded as the source and first cause of motion and
rest in something which has, not casually but, innately, in
itself, from its origin, the capability of being so acted
upon." The term nature2, besides, is applied to any sub-
stance which, however rude and unchangeable, admits, by
its own properties, of being converted into something, as
1 Nat. AuscuU. n. i. 3 Metaphys. iv. 4. 3. 5.

198 NOTES. [BK. i.

bronze is said to be the nature of a statue or of bronze
utensils, wood of wooden, articles, and so of other materials
and products. There were some who spoke of the essence
of natural bodies as nature, and as they made the primal
combination of particles, that is affinity, to be essence,
Empedocles maintained that "the nature spoken of by
men is only the combination of and change among par-
ticles." So that Aristotle confined the term nature to
existing beings and the processes by which they are sup-
ported and perpetuated, to living and organised matter
that is, while others widened its acceptation, and made it
applicable to the changes continually going on through
and by elementary substances. With him, in fact, it was
a living principle ; with others, a property or force,
whereby change is a law.

"The term nature," says Cuvier1, "in our own and most
other tongues, signifies, sometimes the properties which a
being derives from its birth (hereditarily) in contradis-
tinction to those which it may derive from adventitious
circumstances ; sometimes the whole of the beings which
compose the universe, and sometimes, again, the laws to
which those beings are subjected. It is in this last sense
that we are accustomed to personify nature, and out of
respect to employ its name for that of its author."

Note 2, p. 11. Its essence as well as its accidents]
Aristotle* observes that essence seems, most manifestly,

1 R^yne Animal, Introduction.
1 Metaphys. VI. 2. i.

CH. I.] NOTES. 199

to be an innate property in bodies ; and, therefore, animals
and plants, and parts of animals and plants, as well as
natural bodies, as fire and water, air and earth, the ele-
ments, in fact, are essences ; to which may be added the
bodies which are derived from the elements, as the
heavens, stars, sun, and moon. Some, however, regarded
the boundaries of bodies, as surface, line, point, and unit,
as essences, rather than bodies or solids themselves. Thus,
essence, according to the first definition, seems to be
scarcely distinguishable from nature. Aristotle1, how-
ever, in another passage, considers it under four heads : as
mode of being, as universal, genus, and subject ; and sub-
ject he held to be essence in a fuller sense than the
others. Plato admitted of essence in forms, mathematical
abstractions, as also in sentient bodies ; and the Pythago-
reans first, and Plato later, adopted unity as essence.
Aristotle, in fact, seems to confine his definitions of these
abstract powers or entities to the outer world ; and others
to comprehend, under the term, the abstractions of pure
science, and the immediate operations of general laws.

The term " accident" was with Aristotle2, as it is with
us, significant of chance or possibility, as well as what is
necessary and constant. The former is exemplified by an
individual, when digging, finding a treasure, as this is an
occurrence neither necessary nor constant ; and thus there
can be no assignable cause, save chance, which itself is
undefinable, he adds, for an incident so purely casual.
1 Metaphys. VI. 3. i ; ix. 2. * Ibid. IV. 30.

200 NOTES. [BK. i.

But it also implies properties which, although not essen-
tial, are, still, inherent, inalienable from, and distinctive
of particular bodies, as it is a property of the triangle to
contain two right angles ; these properties only are re-
garded as accidents in modern science, and such are
implied in the passage alluded to.

Note 3, p. 12. Concerning tlie thing itself, &c.] This
stands first in the enumeration of the categories1, which
comprize the ten following — thing itself; (ri eV-ri) ; quan-
tity ; quality ; relation ; when ; where ; position ; reci-
piency ; action ; and impression. They are so designated,
Aristotle says, because there must ever be, in some one
of them, accident and genus, individual, and definition ;
for it is through them that premisses signify either indi-
vidual, or quantity, or quality, or other one of those
enumerated. It is made evident, thus — when it is said
of a man lying down that it is a man or an animal, the
party both says what it is, and points' out its essence;
when it is something white which is lying down, then
the party designates its quality, as well. But these two
exemplifications seem to shew that the terms essence, ac-
cidents, category, like the abstractions of which they are
the representatives, cannot be clearly distinguished from
one another ; so that they may almost be regarded as
derivatives from one comprehensive idea. Essence is, in
the first of those instances, almost confounded with the
categories, although it is the object8 of a special inquiry;
1 Topica, I. 9. i. * Catey. 5. i.

CH. I.] NOTES. 201

and this seeming incongruity may have led some scholars
to set it down among them.

Note 4, p. 12. Some kind of demonstration or division,
&c.] Demonstration is, according to Aristotle1, a sci-
entific syllogism, and by scientific is meant, he says, the
method, through which we learn, with certainty, what a
subject may be ; and, 11 the knowledge be such, it follows
that demonstrative knowledge must be derived from con-
ditions which are original, immediate, and more appre-
hensible and causative, than the conclusion sought for.
Those conditions are, in fact, the suitable principles for
ascertaining that which is to be demonstrated ; as, without
them, the result will be, not demonstration but, a syllogism,
which cannot, with certainty, eliminate truth. Thus,
while demonstration* is a kind of syllogism, every syllo-
gism is not demonstration. Division is said by Aristotle8
to be an imperfect syllogism, for it assumes what ought to
be demonstrated, and draws conclusions from a priori
reasonings. In this allusion to division, Aristotle may
be supposed to have had Plato in view, " as it was by
a process of dividing and subdividing that that emi-
nent man conducted his inquiries after truth ;" as, how-
ever, this method was considered by him to be a faulty or
imperfect syllogism, it may be that he alluded to it as
one which might be adopted, without altogether approving
of it as a mental process.

1 Analytic, b. I. i. 2. B Ibid. a. I. 4. i.

3 Ibid. a. i. 31.

202 NOTES. [BK. i.

Note 5, p. 12. As those of number are not those of
plane surfaces, &c.] That is, the science of number dif-
fers, generically, from that of Geometry. The nature, so
to say, of numbers had been a subject of deep and curious
speculation long before and during the age of Aristotle,
and there lie scattered through his works notices of
writers and systems which, although in themselves inter-
esting to scholars, would, even were it possible to give a
clear summary of them, be foreign to the present inquiry.
Aristotle1, before entering upon number, denned "quan-
tity" as being, partly definite, and partly continuous —
and the former. he constituted of parts which have no
mutual local relation to each other; the latter of parts
which have that relation. The "definite" quantity is
represented " by number and by a word ; the continuous
by line, surface, solid, and time and place, besides." In
order to shew that number is definite or discontinuous, he
observes, " there is no common boundary whereon the
parts of any number conjoin ; as if, for instance, five or
three be parts of ten, there is no common boundary
whereon five or seven can conjoin to make the whole
number, but each part is, for ever, a distinct number,
and thus number is among definite quantities." " Words
are, in like manner, among definite quantities ; and it is
manifest that words, uttered by the voice, are quantity,
in that they are measurable by long and short syllables,
and manifest too that there is no common boundary
1 Categ. 6. i.

CH. I.] NOTES. 203

whereon the parts of a word, that is syllables, conjoin to
make the whole sound, and thus that each is for ever a
distinct sound. But a line, on the contrary, is continuous,
as there is no common boundary whereon its parts, that is
points, conjoin, as lines, to make a superficies, whereon
all parts of the solid conjoin ; so too time is con-
tinuous, for that which is present is conjoined with that
which is past, as it is with that which is future." Aris-
totle1, having shewn that there are these opposite con-
ditions of quantity, in a positive as in an abstract sense,
defines an unit (tj /xoVac) as being, in direct opposition to a
point, without position or place ; a line as being divisible
only in one way; a superficies as divisible in two, and a
solid, quantitatively considered, as divisible in three, and,
indeed, in all ways. Number is still regarded, of course,
as a collection of units ; the superficies as that which has
only length and breadth ; and the solid as that which has
length, breadth, and depth.

Note 6, p. 12. Among entities in potentiality or whether,
&c.] These terms run, like a golden thread, through all
the physiological works of Aristotle, and were adopted by
him in order to distinguish virtual from actual condition
or existence, the capability, that is, of becoming, by in-
nate force or power, an entelechy or reality, which is the
purport of the last term. They may be briefly exempli-
fied thus: — an egg, e.g. is alive in potentiality — it has
within it, that is, a principle, whereby, under genial
1 Metaphys. IV. 5. 24.

204 NOTES. [BK. i.

circumstances, it can develope into a living being ; and
so a seed, while alive, is capable of becoming a perfect
living plant, as the egg or the caterpillar or the chrysalis
is, in potentiality, the future perfect insect or butterfly.
The terms comprehend, in fact, all the metamorphic con-
ditions of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and have
a range of application wide enough to include life under
all degrees and forms. This was the first great idea in
their adoption, and although Aristotle made them to sig-
nify an analogous transition in moral or mental faculties,
(as when he speaks of a boy as a general, in potentiality,)
yet their real purport is to distinguish those two universal
conditions of living and sentient beings. Cicero1 has al-
luded to these terms or rather to the entelechy, (as was
noted in the preface,) but, from not having contrasted it
with the potentiality, he seems to have mistaken its gene-
ral import ; and he may thus have been led to suppose
that Aristotle's intention, in this novel term, was to desig-
nate a special fifth nature, to be the source of motion and
the originating cause of mental faculties and natural
emotions. Montaigne*, also, in modern times, following
Cicero, speaks of the entelechy only, which he regards,
erroneously, as the motor power of the body — "ce qui
naturellement fait mouvoir le corps." A hot dispute
prevailed among scholars, it may be added, before and
during the age of Rabelais8, (and which he has alluded to

1 Tusc. Disp. I. 10. a Essai, Lib. n. ch. xii.

3 La, Vie de Gargantua, Lib. v. ch. xix.

CH. I.] NOTES. 205

with all his wonted wit and learning,) whether the term
should be eWeAe'^eia or eVSeAe'^eia ', he was, evidently
himself, one of the entelechists, as he says that the Lady
Quint-essence, who had had Aristotle, "that paragon of
all philosophy," for god-father, had been truly and cor-
rectly named Entelechy by him.

Note 7, p. 13. Wliether t/te difference is generic or
specific.] " The term Genus 1 implies a continuous series
of individuals having a like species or form, so that genus
may be predicated of man, so long as there may be a
continuous generation of human beings ; the term again
may be applied to the source whence individuals may
have descended, and thus some Greeks are of the Hellenic,
others of the Ionic genus, on account of their direct de-
scent from Hellenus or from Ion. And this applies so
much more to the progenitor than to external conditions,
that the descendants from a female constitute a genus.
Species8 implies the mode of being of the individual, to-
gether with the primal essence ; and as the matter con-
stitutive of the genus is in the species, so species may be
regarded as parts of the genus. In modern classification,
genus signifies " a distinct but subordinate group, which
gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of
which it is composed." The physical sciences have been
so widely developed, however, that, as those terms no
longer suffice for grouping the myriads of beings which
have been observed since Aristotle's time, naturalists
1 Metaphys. iv. 25. 28, * Ibid. vi. 75.

206 NOTES. [BK. i.

have, in addition, adopted kingdom or class, order, sub-
genus, individual, and variety.

Note 8, p. 13. T/ie term animal, however, in an uni-
versal sense, &c.] This passage, which, in the original, is
even more elliptical than its version, has engaged much of
the attention of commentators without having been satis-
factorily elucidated — some have explained it as a criticism
of the ideas or archetypes of Plato ; and others as an
objection to every universal term, which, although an
abstraction, is to typify actual beings; and this is, pro-
bably, the purport of the criticism. Thus1, "the origin
of the controversy, during the middle ages, between the
nominalists and realists, may be traced down to Aristotle
and his followers." Wording so elliptical must, of course,
be subject, according to the bias of opinions, to different
interpretations ; but if it imply objection to every abstract
term which is to embody, so to say, realities, this version
may be accepted as its interpretation. The Latin version*,
however, is, "Animal autem universale aut nihil est aut
posterius est, et quicquid itidem aliud communiter prasdi-
catur;" and the French3, "C'est que 1'animal pris en un
sens universel ou n'est rien, ou bien n'est que quelque
chose de tres ulterieur."

Note 9, p. 13. The mind before thought, <fcc.] Aris-
totle* says that among the philosophers who were engaged

1 Trendel. Comment. * Ed. Acad. Borriaica.

3 J. P. Saint Hilaire.

4 Metaphys. I. 3. 16 ; xin. 3. 5 ; xi. 7. 7.

CH. I.] NOTES. 207

upon first causes, Anaxagoras and his predecessor Her-
moticus had maintained that, as in animals there is a
motor principle, so in nature there is mind, and that it is
the cause as well of the universe as of universal order ;
and thus " they assumed at once that mind is the cause of
the beautiful, the origin of being, and the source whence
motion is derived for every thing living." Anaxagoras,
in fact, regarded mind as the first cause of things (which
Ernpedocles was rather disposed to assign to the principle
of attraction, which he designated 0iA«a, and held to be an
universal element), and maintained that, while all else is
but a combination of particles, it is homogeneous, impas-
sive, isolated, and pure. We are incapable, Aristotle
observes, in his comment upon these opinions, of continu-
ous thought and reflexion, because these are recreations too
lofty to be continuously maintained ; but, on this account,
watching (not being asleep, that is), feeling and thinking
are our most genial conditions, because from and through
them, we derive our hopes and recollections. Notwith-
standing, however, this acknowledgement, so to say, of
mind, as a sovereign principle, and its attributes, there is
no attempt to define its nature and its relations, or to
shew in what it was identified with or different from the
vital principle ; and this want of critical distinction be-
tween them is the more apparent as several epithets
(trpoyevea-TaTo^ — 0eu)prjTino<: — irpanTtKos— 7ra0»/TiKo?) are
introduced in the course of these physiological treatises,
which cannot but have modified the parent term.

208 NOTES. [BK. i.

Note 10, p. 15. Whetfier all tJie emotions of Vital Prin-
ciple, &c.] These passages shew clearly the suggestive power
and perspicacity of Aristotle's intellect, and they point so
clearly to doctrines which had yet to be developed, that they
cannot be studied without feelings of surprise as well as
admiration. The brain1 was, in that age, supposed to be
merely a supplementary organ to respiration ; and, from
its not giving out sensation when touched, and from im-
perfect anatomy, it was supposed to have no relation
whatever with the sentient organs or spinal cord. The
nerves, as cords of sensation, were unknown ; the very
term (yevpov), which has been transferred to them as nerve,
meant then tendon or sinew. Hence it is that, in modern
languages, a man is said to be nervous in the one sense,
and a delicate female to be nervous in the other. It was
thus, from intuition and study, that Aristotle drew this
train of suggestive reasoning upon the influences exercised
over our passions and emotions by the organs of the body ;
that he discerned, that is, the seat and source of the tem-
peraments. Bichat*, having a far wider range of anato-
mical knowledge, was able, by assigning to the brain and
ganglionic system their proper offices, to distinguish in-
tellectual faculties from passions and emotions, which
although human, still are temperamental and functional —
to distinguish, that is, the animal from the organic life.

Note 11, p. 15. In tlie same, way all the emotions, &c.]
These passages are quite in accordance with all that phy-
1 De Part. Animcdm, n. 7. 4. 2 Recherches physiologiqnes.

CH. i.] NOTES. 209

siology now teaches ; for although but repetition, it may
be said that Aristotle places the passions and emotions in
the organic life, and shews " that every individual must be
influenced by his particular temperament." Thus, as organs
predominate, or may be more or less active, individuals
are affected and modified, so to say, in temper as in cha-
racter. The temperaments ought to be subordinated, of
course, to the higher faculties ; but those organs are abiding
powers, and they are ever exercising an influence which
it is for reason to control or subdue. Plato, in the Timceus,
has discerned this great truth — a 'mortal principle (ore TO
6injTov eVeo-rcAAe yevoi) is there assigned to the body, as
the seat of the passions and coarser appetites, while the
brain is represented as a soil fit for the divine seed of
wisdom ; and this will suffice to shew that this most gifted
man, although but imperfectly acquainted with physiology,
had perceived the co-existence in the human being of an
intellectual and, so to say, a functional existence. Des-
cartes1 seems to have adopted opinions concerning the
" passions of the soul," which have much in common with
those of Aristotle ; but although so well acquainted with
his writings, he does not appear to have studied this
treatise.

Note 12, p. 16. But the physiologist and t/te metaphy-
sician would, &c.] The difference here dwelt ^ upon in
the mode of accounting for the same phenomena, accord-
ing to the bias given by studies or pursuits, will, it may
1 Les Passions de Fame.

14

210 NOTES. [Ex. i.

be assumed, be of constant recurrence ; foi", as physical
science advances, it will become more and more difficult
for the same party to attain to a large and solid acquaint-
ance with the attributes of mind (abstractions, that is),
and the knowledge of " external nature." The self-same
differences, in fact, which were delineated so graphically
by Aristotle, are still to be traced in our almost exclusive
attention to the physical sciences, and our disinclination
to admit, in our inquiries, of any proof but such as can be
tested through and by the senses and observation. The
terms here rendered physiologist and metaphysician (terms
unknown, by the way, to Aristotle) in the Latin version
are naturalis, and disserendi artifex ; that of artisan is
faber ; builder, artifex ; and transcendental philosopher is
primus philosophus.

CHAPTER II.

Note 1, p. 19. Hence Democritus, &c.] None of the
works of this eminent man have come down to us ; but
notices of his opinions lie scattered through the writings
of Aristotle, and these may suffice for the elucidation of
this and other allusions to him. Following his master
Leucippus, Democritus1, abandoning metaphysical subtle-
ties, looked into the constitution of the external world for
1 Metaphys. I. 4. 9.

CH. ii.] NOTES. 211

the knowledge of natural causes ; and he was thus led to
adopt the hypothesis of indivisible and moving corpuscles,
in order to account for the universal law of motion.
" Several other philosophers l had, before their time, con-
sidered matter as divisible into indefinitely small particles,
but as they were the first who taught that these particles
were originally destitute of all qualities except figure and
motion, they may well be regarded as the founders of the
atomic system of philosophy." Democritus8 maintained
that nothing can ever be produced from nothing, and that
" indivisible atoms (elementary corpuscles, that is) consti-
tute the essence of bodies." He adopted, as elements, the
plenum and vacuum, making the former, in contradistinc-
tion to the latter, to be entity, and the two to be, as
matter, the causes of things ; he maintained too, that they
are equally distributed through all bodies. He agreed
with Anaxagoras in believing that throughout all nature
there is a principle of combination ; and with his master
Leucippus, in regarding form arrangement and position of
particles, as causes of elementary distinctions among bodies.
But in some of this reasoning he was mistaken, Aristotle
observes, from not distinguishing the condition of poten-
tiality from reality, since the same object may simultane-
ously, when in potentiality, be and not be, although this
cannot hold good of the same when in reality. Democritus
also thought that, owing to the difference of sensation

1 Enfield's Hist, of PhOos. Vol. I. 4«.
3 Mctaphys.Vl. 13. 9 ; m. 5. 5 ; I. 4. 9.

14—2

212 NOTES. [Ex. i.

produced by the same object upon the same individual,
truth either has no existence, or else it can hardly ever be
attained to by mortal beings. To return, however, to the
doctrine of atoms, Leucippus and Democritus maintained
that, as bodies are distinguished by forms, and forms are
infinite, elementary bodies must be infinite also ; but then,
with the exception of fire, which was said to be spherical,
they forgot to specify what the forms are ; and they denned
elementary bodies by greatness and smallness as well as
form. Thus, form motion and size are, according to
them, the constituents of these formative atoms, and,
accordingly, the larger atoms which are said to go to the
formation of bodies, are distinguished from the smaller
ones or motes (held to be visible only in the sun-beams),
which, as being endowed with vital properties, are alluded
to, in a succeeding passage, as supporting, through respi-
ration, the life of the animal. In fine, this doctrine of
atoms varying in form and size, constantly moving, and,
through attraction and repulsion, combining with and
separating from one another, prevailed in all the schools
of antiquity; and there may perhaps be traced in it a
faint outline of the present matured theory of atomic
proportion.

Note 2, p. 19. Hence, too, they make breathing,
&c.] This description conveys, under a rude exterior, so
to say, a description of the process of breathing or respi-
ration, as well as the purposes which it has to fulfil in the
animal economy — " the contraction of the chest (expiration)

CH. ii.] NOTES. 213

expels particles rendered effete, and these are supplied by
others from without, during inspiration ; and this alter-
nation continues so long as life endures." It emanates
from an early stage of physiology, no doubt, but yet it
does clearly intimate that without such an alternation life
could not be maintained — that a renewing power from
without, and an expulsion of something prejudicial from
within, are necessary to animal existence. Democritus
(of Abdera), Anaxagoras and Diogenes are cited by Aris-
totle1 as believing respiration to be necessary for all crea-
tures (in opposition to himself, who limited the process to
air-breathing animals), and he has given their account of
the process in fishes and oysters (molluscs). " Anaxagoras
says that fishes, during respiration, discharge the water
through the branchise, and that then, as there may not be
a vacuum, they draw in air which is in the mouth ; and
Diogenes maintains that, when fishes discharge the water
through the branchise, they draw in, by means of the void
created in the mouth, the air which is ever present in
water and encircling the mouth." Democritus advanced
a step nearer to modern teaching, in accounting for fishes
dying when out of the water by their then taking in too
much air ; as, when in the water, they can take in only
a moderate quantity." But all this was objected to, abso-
lutely, by Aristotle, both because of his own more restricted
views of respiration, and of the apparent discrepance of
the theories with common sense, and thus was he led, in
1 De Eespirat. i. i.

214 NOTES. [BK. i.

this instance, to oppose theories pregnant with suggestion,
and advantageous to the progress of science.

Jfoie 3, p. 20. To the same point do they aho come, <fcc.]
The writers here alluded to are said by Philoponus to be
Plato, Xenophanes and Alcmaeon. Aristotle1 observes
that, as nature is the origin of motion and change, it is
necessary, in order to comprehend motion, to understand
what nature is. Motion seems to be the property only of
continuity, and the infinite is displayed, first of all, in
what is continuous ; and, therefore, in definitions of con-
tinuity, there is frequent reference to the infinite, as if all
continuity were infinitely divisibla Besides these reasons,
without place void and time, there cannot be motion.
But whatever is in motion, must have been moved by its
own or by some other power, and this motor may be the
second or third of a series, as the staff, for instance, which
moves the stone is moved itself by the hand, which is
moved by the man ; and although the last of these may
be spoken of as the motor, yet the term is applicable rather
to the man, as being the first link in the chain. Thus,
the man who communicates motion by bis will is, himself
at rest ; and, therefore, it by no means follows, Aristotle
contends, that the motor should itself be in motion.

Note 4, p. 21. Homer has icell represented, <kc.] The

term a\Xo<ppoveu>v, rendered " changing his mind," occurs

but once in the Iliad, and there it refers, not to Hector,

but to Euryalus vanquished in the funeral games; and

1 Nat. Auscutt. m. i. vm. 5.

CH. ii.] NOTES. 215

signifies stupefaction of the faculties rather than what is
here attributed to it. Thus, either Democritus must
hare misquoted, or the Iliad, since Aristotle's time, have
suffered, as is commonly believed, more than one mutila-
tion. The purport of the passage, however, is sufficiently
obvious.

Note 5, p. 21. Thus Democritus does not employ tfa
term mind, &c.] He made mind, that is, to be a sentient
principle and identified with those filings and emotions,
which Aristotle held, as has been shewn, to be but
emanations from the corporeal organs and functions,
to be manifestations, that is, of the temperament. An
apology has been offered for this attribution of mind
to all creatures, in that such a principle may seem to be
represented by the consummate order which prevails
in their constitution j and thus that Anaxagoras mav
have meant that, while it may be present, objectively,
in all beings, it can be present, subjectively, (as mind,
that is) only, in a few. Plato1 seems to imply something
like this when adopting one essence or faculty which is
eternal and unbegotten, and another which has no
abiding and is perishable — the one capable, by intellect
with cogitation, of comprehending unchangeable natures :
and the latter capable, by opinion with sensual percep-
tions, of comprehending whatever is casual and ephemeral.

Note 6, p. 21. Have said that the Vital Principle
comprises alljirst causes, <fca] Aristotle* observes that, a<?
1 Timceus, 27. D. 8 Nat. Avscult. n. 3.

216 NOTES. [Bx. i.

every investigation is for the purpose of knowing some-
thing, and as we cannot be said to know before we can
comprehend wherefore a thing is what it is, (comprehend,
that is, its first cause,) so it is evident that we must thus
study the laws of reproduction destruction and change,
throughout nature, in order to be enabled to refer, for
each subject of investigation, to the first causes of the
phsenomena. This argument seems to confine causation
to natural operations in particular, that is, living bodies ;
but cause had then, as it has now, a far wider significa-
tion— besides essence, individual being, elements, and
other admitted first causes, that of which anything is
made, was said to be its cause, as bronze of a statue,
silver of a goblet, and, in a general sense the maker is
the cause of the production, and he who alters, of the
change, &c. Thus, there was great latitude in the
enumeration of first causes. Thales1, the founder of
this branch of philosophy, maintains that water is a
first cause, because the earth rose from water. Anaxi-
meues and Democritus contend that, as air was before
water, so it is rather to be regarded as the first cause of
everything.

Hippasus and Heraclitus set it down as being fire ;
and Empedocles, adding earth, adopted four elementary
causes ; for he maintained, that these elements are un-
changeable and unproduceable, although capable of com-
bining with and separating from one another. He first
1 Metaphysica, i. 3. 5. 8.

CH. ii.] NOTES. 217

adopted the four elements, in fact, as the first causes of
all things, although, as he makes fire to be the antagonism
of the other three, which he held to be of one nature, he
can hardly be said to have regarded them as more than
two. This doctrine of elements prevailed, in fact, down
to the time of Descartes1, who admitted, however, only
of three, fire, air, and earth ; and he maintained that all
the forms of inanimate bodies may be accounted for by
the motion form size and arrangement of particles,
without the aid of any agent, such as heat or cold,
moisture or dryness. Thus all elementary particles are,
according to him, first causes.

Note 7, p. 21. By earth we perceive, &c.] The
doctrine of elements prevailed even to the constitution of
the sentient organs, for, as sensibility could have no part
in the theory of that age, philosophers had adopted the
dogma, that like recognises and perceives by like, that air,
that is, perceives by air, water by water, and so for the
other elements ; and thus the organ of vision was supposed
to be of water, that of hearing to be of air, and that of
smell to be of fire. As illustration of which, Aristotle2
describes " odour as being a vaporous exhalation, and,
as such, necessarily derived from fire (heat) ; and the
special organ of smell is said, on this account, to be
located about the brain, for the matter of cold (the brain)
is, in potentiality, hot" and, therefore, able to perceive

1 Du nombre des Elements.

2 De Sensu et Sen. n. 1 1 . 20.

218 NOTES. [BK. i.

what is derived from heat. The visual organ is said to
be of water, and to see objects, not as being water but, as
being diaplianous, as this quality belongs to air as well as
water, but then water is more protective and condensed
than air, and, therefore, the pupil and the eye are con-
stituted of water. These are rude theories, no doubt,
and sorry substitutes for the knowledge of the brain and
its system ; but philosophy cannot rest upon a confession
of ignorance, and this hypothesis, unsatisfactory as it
may now seem, was for ages the admitted theory of
sentient perception. But this theory of Empedocles,
however otherwise faulty, may well be supposed, without
violence to the text, to convey in the terms a-Topytj and
i/e?^o», a knowledge, or perception rather, of attraction
and repulsion; and an assumption of these principles
may be traced in most of the systems of that time con-
cerning elementary combinations. This must be main-
tained with some reserve, however, as some have given a
more literal version of the terms in amor and discordia,
or lis, which, as moral or sentient qualities, seem to be
without any relation to elementary combinations. The
latin version of the phrase is, Terrain nam terra, lympha
cognoscimus undam, setheraque sethere; sane ignis
dignoscitur igne ; sic et amore amor, ac tristi discordia
lite ; and the French is, " Par la terre nous voyons la
terre ; 1'eau par 1'eau ; par 1'air, 1'air divin ; par le feu, le
feu qui consume; par I 'amour, T amour; et la discorde
par la discorde funeste."

CH. ii.] NOTES. 219

Note 8, p. 22. In the treatises " upon philosophy," &c.]
These books are said to have been expositions of the
teaching of Plato and the Pythagoreans upon ideas and
the nature of the sovereign good, or philosophy, and to
have been gathered by Aristotle from the oral teaching of
his great preceptor. It is generally believed that they have
not come down to us ; but a more modern commentator
seems to have been persuaded that they are still pre-
served in the Metaphysics, (that store-house, where lie
scattered the fragments of every system of philosophy
that ever had any authority, ) and yet there is no passage *
in that work, in which Aristotle alludes directly to the
topics here cited by him. If a digest of Plato's* doctrine
of the elements may be offered, he makes fire and earth
to have been the first of created elements, because what-
ever is produced must be visible and tangible and corpo-
real, and nothing can be visible without fire, or tangible
without solidity, whence the body of the universe was, in
the beginning, constituted out of fire and earth; but
since it is scarcely possible for two elements so to coalesce
as to form bodies without the intervention of other
combining elements, the Creator placed water and air
between fire and earth, and made them to be in the same
relation to the first elements which they are to each
other — and thus fire is to air as ai/r is to water, and air
is to water as water is to earth. The Pythagoreans* were

1 Vide Trendelen. Comment. * Timasus. 31. B. ct seq,

3 Metaphysica, I. 5. 6

220 NOTES. [Bx. i.

the first who devoted themselves to mathematics, and, by
exclusive attention to that study, they were led, at first,
to consider their principles as the principles of entities ;
but as numbers must be before mathematics, they were
brought to perceive many resemblances to beings and
conditions in numbers, rather than in fire or earth, water
or air. Thus, they assumed that a particular combination
of numbers is justice, that another is Vital Principle and
mind, another proportion or fitness ; and further, perceiving
the proportions and impressions of harmonic sounds to be
numbers, and other things appearing to bear a resem-
blance to numbers, and numbers to be the first of created
entities, they assumed that the elements of numbers must
be the elements of entities ; and that the heavens and
every kind of harmony must be numbers. But some?
while they held that numbers are elements, believed odd
and even to be the origin of numbers, and, therefore,
elements in a stricter sense ; and, as the unit is derived
from odd and even, they regarded it as the origin of all
numbers. Enough, however, has been said for rendering
apprehensible to the general reader, the import of the terms
and the tenour of the argument ; and it would be idle, even
were the doctrine fully known, to attempt any such dis-
quisition as would be required for a full elucidation of this
the most abstruse, perhaps, of all the topics of antiquity.

Note 9, p. 22. There are writers who have combined,
&c.] Simplicius1 and Philoponus attribute this opinion to
1 Vide Trendel. Comment.

CH. ii.] NOTES. 221

Xenocrates, whom they praise as the ablest expositor of
the doctrine of ideal numbers. He maintained that
Vital Principle has in it an abiding source of ideas
congenial with a mobile, ever-changing nature, such as
pertains to the external world, and that hence it is a
number which, while unable to free itself from the nature
of things, approximates to ideas ; and in order to prevent
faculties so ungenial from being severed, he derived from
Vital Principle the faculty and origin of motion, by
which, as by a link, they are to be retained together.
Thus, he thought to reconcile the apparent discrepance of
the co-existence of ideas and things in the same being.
Plato1 has well criticised, in one of his writings, the
varying theories of philosophers upon the number, nature
and relations of elementary principles.

Note 10, p. 23. Anaxagoras seems, as we have, &c.j
The writing of Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian, here
alluded to, appeared, according to Aristotle2, after those
of Empedocles, although, in age he was his senior ; and
Anaxagoras maintained, he says, that first causes are
infinite in number. Thus, that almost all homogeneous
bodies, such as water or air, can be produced or destroyed
only by combination and separation ; and that, admitting
of no other origin or destruction than these, they must
endure for ever. From all which it might be inferred,
that he admitted of but one cause, and that in the form
of matter. He made mind, to which he attributed
1 Sophista. 8 Afetaphys. i. 3. 9. B. xm. 4. 5.

222 NOTES. [Ex. i.

intelligence, to be a first cause, (as Empedocles made
affinity to be an element,) to be innate in and the source
of motion in animals, as well as the cause, in nature, of
the universe and its order.

Note 11, p. 24. Tholes, too, from what, &c.] In this
allusion to the influence of the magnet, Thales may have
been criticising the opinions which made motion de-
pendent upon life. He was the founder of the school
which derived all things from one or more material and
indestructible elements; he believed water to be the
sole element, (whence he demonstrated that the earth is
from water), and was probably led, Aristotle observes, to
this conception, from perceiving that the nutrition of all
creatures is fluid ; that heat is produced from water, and
that by heat animals live ; and, then, that all seminal
particles are naturally fluid.

Note 12, p. 24. Diogenes, togetJier with some oilier
writers, &c.] It is probable that this opinion was
suggested to Diogenes by the respiration, which he knew
to be essential to animal existence and dependent upon
the air ; although the process itself, and the changes
effected by it, were of course then unknown. Air, how-
ever, was believed to be necessary for the maintenance of
life, and so it might well be regarded as the originating
cause of all things ; and more especially by one who saw
so far, as was shewn in a former note, into its mode of
agency. It is shewn by Aristotle1 that he had well
1 De Part. ni. 2. 6.

CH. ii.] NOTES. 223

studied the vascular system ; and he seems to have
perceived that the brain is the seat of sensation. In fine,
philosophers, generally, in adopting four causes, have
been divided between fire, water, and, as with Diogenes,
air; which he held to be the origin of all secondary
operations.

Note 13, p. 25. Others, as Critias.] The opinion that
blood differs from the other fluids and has an independent
vitality, has prevailed, no doubt, in all ages ; but Aristotle 1
placed it, as well as its analogue, the ichor, which circu-
lates in molluscs, insects, <fec., among insentient and excre-
mentitious parts, such as bone, nails, cartilage, and other
like parts. It may be added, too, that the brain was so
considered. "To conceive," Hunter * observes, "that the
blood when circulating is endowed with life, is perhaps
carrying the imagination as far as it can go, but the
difficulty arises from its being fluid, as the mind is
not accustomed to the idea of a living fluid. But when
all the circumstances of this fluid are considered, the idea
that it has life within it, may not appear so difficult to
comprehend, for every part is formed, as we grow, out of
the blood, and if it has not life previous to this operation,
it must acquire it in the act of formation." One of the
great proofs of the blood's vitality is to be found in
coagulation, as the blood, when circulating, is not subject
to certain laws to which it is subject when removed from
the vessels.

1 De Part. AnimdTii. i. 4. 8. a Hunter's Works, T. in.

224 NOTES. [BK. i.

Note 14, p. 26. So many ivriters as admit.] Heat is
the antagonism to cold, for it is fixed1, and with a down-
ward tendency, while heat is mobile, and has an inclina-
tion upwards ; heat, again, tends to dilate bodies, while
cold acts by contracting them. Thus, as heat2 separates,
and cold consolidates, they came to be looked upon as the
elements or causes of destruction, (as he^b appears to be
self-motive and a cause of change?) and restoration. But
as heat (£eo> to boil or be hot) is derived from, or is the
synonym of life or living, (£aw contr. £w, £ae»i/ cqntr.
tyjv,) so some made life, from this supposed identity, to be
heat ; and others, from the resemblance between cold
(\l/vxpos or >^u^o<:) and the Vital Principle, (v/^^*?) as
breathing was supposed, by all the physiologists, to be a
process for cooling the blood, made it to be cold. It is
hardly possible to transfer to another, and that not a
cognate tongue, the full sense of a passage which depends
upon etymology ; but the general import of these two
opinions may, perhaps, be gathered from what is here
said. Thus, Cervantes3 makes his knight fix upon the
name Rocinante, because Rocin is a horse, or nag of the
ordinary character; but, as his charger is to have wide-
spread renown, and to be distinguished from all other
nags, it ought to have a sonorous and suitable appellation,
and this is realised, in his own opinion, by the suffix
ante, and hence, Rocinante.

1 Metaphys. xin. 5. 2 De Gen. et Corr. ix. n.

3 T. I. Cap. i.

CH. III.] NOTES. 225

CHAPTER III.

Note 1, p. 29. It is not easy, hoioever, <fec.] That is,
if the Vital Principle be a first cause and an element or
combination of the elements, it cannot be determined, if
subject to external impulse, what its movements will
be — if it be of fire, it must move upwards, if of earth,
downwards, and so for intermediate movements. Plato
maintains, as was said, that, as there can be nothing
visible or tangible without Jire or solid without earth,
tJiese were the first of created elements ; and that, as
there can be no enduring combination out of two elements,
avr and water were next created and placed between the
first two.

Note 2, p. 30. Now, the body is moved by translation.']
This passage has been the subject of much and serious
controversy, both as to its meaning and its genuineness ;
and yet, although an argumentum ad absurdum, it is a
fair conclusion from those premises. Thus, if the Vital
Principle be an entity distinct from the body which it
animates, and if the body be moved, by translation, from
it, the Vital Principle, having also that movement, may
set itself free, and if able to do this, it may re-enter and

15

226 NOTES. [BK. i.

resuscitate the body which it had left. The assumption,
in fact, is an evident objection to the opinion that Vital
Principle moves itself as it moves the body ; and seems to
be necessary to the completion of the argument.

The passage, however, has been regarded as an inter-
polation introduced by some Christian writer, (adeo verba
Christianum seculum referunt,) in order to support the
doctrine of the resurrection : and Trendelenberg, while
unwilling to suppress the passage, seems to question its
authenticity. The subsequent paragraphs are in support
of Aristotle's opinion that the Vital Principle, if self-
motive, cannot be subject to motion by other impulse
than its own, (just as that which is good in itself, cannot
be so by or for the sake of something else,) and that, if
it were so subject, its motion would be due to sentient
impressions.

Note 3, p. 31. Some philosopJwrs maintain.] This
passage is a covert satire of the doctrine of Democritus
that motion is transmitted through all nature by atoms
in constant motion ; and these are said to have been
likened by Philippus, the reputed son, according to
Meineke, of Aristophanes, to globules of quicksilver,
which, when poured in, made a wooden figure to become
moveable. It is uncertain, by the way, when this metal
was first employed ; it is here alluded to as a well-known
substance, and is so spoken of by Theophrastus. ' Pliny

1 Hist. Nat. 33. 32.

CH. III.] NOTES. 227

says that " it was brought from the silver mines of Spain,
in the form of cinnabar, and, when freed from its ore,
used in metallurgy;" further, "that it is always fluid,
and an universal poison."

Note 4, p. 31. It is in this same manner, &c.j If the
Vital Principle be to the body what Plato, in the Timceus,
made the great animating principle to be to the Universe,
a source of intelligence and ordered motion, there must be
an accordance between terrene and celestial bodies and
movements ; but as earthly bodies are moved by objects
of sense and perception, and as their movements are not,
like those of the heavenly, in a circle, their natures must
be different. It would be idle to attempt to make a
digest of the opinions entertained in the Timceus, the
most abstruse and laboured of all Plato's works, or to
trace the analogy between the constitution and motions
of the supernal orbs, and the constitutions and conditions
of earthly bodies. But four points seem to be evident
— that the universe moves by motions communicated by
the anima; that the anima is from the elements; that
it has so been divided, as to have an innate sense of
harmonic numbers ; and that it has been made to move
in the same circles as the sky. This summary is adduced
by Aristotle to shew how scarcely possible it could be to
adjust this speculation to his own subject of inquiry, and
he may have been led to criticise it the rather, as the
great principle of the universe is synonymous with his
own treatise; each is, in fact, -^v^tj. But to quote the

15—2

228 NOTES. [BK. i.

learned ' commentator, " Platonem in Timceo quam
maxime obscurum illustrare, hujus loci non est."

Note 5, p. 32. But, in the first place.] These critical
objections cannot be fully realised without reference to
the leading opinions and arguments of the Timceus, which,
although, perhaps, at the time, regarded only as specula-
tions and now stand self-confuted as physics, are enshrined
in words which shall endure, until mankind cease to
find delight and instruction in pure and abstract studies.
The first objection raised by Aristotle is to the ascription
of magnitude to that anima (which is to be necessarily
inferred from its being divisible,) as well as to the
intelligence or mind, which Ls identified with it ; for
magnitude would imply a material entity, and matter
conjoined with form and essence implies parts, and what-
ever has parts cannot either be self-existent, or indefinite
in duration. Another objection, much insisted upon, is
the movement in a circle, which cannot, it is said, be the
motion produced by the passions or appetites ; but the
chief topic is resumed, and the mind is shewn to be,
like the thoughts which emanate from it, immaterial.
Aristotle's subject, however, unlike that of the Timceus,
was confined to the agent or principle, whatever it be,
which imparts motion and other vital properties to organ-
ised matter.

Note 6, p. 33. Now, there are limits to practical
thoughts] The origin2 of whatever is original is in the
1 Trendel. Comment. * Metaphys. V. i. 5.

CH. III.] NOTES. 229

maker or creator, whether it be mind, or art, or a special
faculty — it is an abstraction that is; but, whatever
is practical is dependent only on an agent, or his choice,
for the act is identical with what is chosen. Thus, prac-
tical thoughts are confined to the particular faculties and
organs which are required for securing what may have
been chosen.

Note 7, p. 33. Terminated by a syllogism.] The
syllogism1 is an argument, in which, from given premises,
something different from the terms laid down results,
necessarily, from their admission. Modern definition is
much like this — the syllogism is said to be an argument
of three propositions, having the property, that the con-
clusion necessarily follows from the two premises ; so that
if the premises be true, the conclusion must be true ; and
a conclusion is the proposition which is inferred from
certain former propositions, termed the premises of the
argument.

Note 8, p. 34. The same incongruity] This is an
objection by Aristotle to the doctrine of metempsychosis,
adopted by the Pythagoreans, and, being placed upon
obvious physical relations, it may be considered as irre-
fragable. Thus, philosophers held numbers to be elements,
and perceived in them and their combinations resem-
blances to, or types of faculties and sentient properties, as
has been observed. Their doctrine* was, " that man
consists of an elementary nature, and a rational or divine
1 Analytic, a. I. i. 6. * Hist, of Philos. Vol. i. 397.

230 NOTES. [BK. i.

principle, and that of this last, the divine is seated in the
brain, the passions and appetites in the liver and heart ;
that the rational part is immortal, the sentient principle
perishable." They further taught, that the imperishable
part, freed from the chains of the body, assumes a new
form, passes to the centre of the earth for judgment,
and, if not deemed worthy of associating with perfect
spirits, is returned to earth to inhabit another body, of
higher or lower nature, according to its former deserts.
This doctrine has been so developed and exemplified in
the final teaching of Socrates, before his death, that that
dialogue1 may be regarded as a faithful exposition of the
argument and its merits. Aristotle, overlooking eveiy
supernal cause or agency, objects to the doctrine, not on
its own grounds but, by reasonings, which are purely
deductive ; and the doctrine is, no doubt, when tested by
physical science, incongruous.

Note 9, p. 35. Such opinions are, in fact, &c.] This
passage is apparently abstruse and ambiguous, owing to the
terms being applicable to more than one art or implement ;
and yet, " * as it involves a kind of antithesis between
the art and the implements, the Vital Principle and the
body," the general sense can be made sufficiently obvious.
The purport of the phrase is well given in the Latin
version : Perinde igitur dicunt atqui si quispiam artem
fabrilem fistulas ingredi dicat ; etenim ars quidam instru-
mentis, anima vero corpore utatur oportet. The French
1 Ffuedo. * Trendel. Comment.

CH. IV.] NOTES. 231

version is less definite : " C'est absolument comme si Ton
pretendoit que 1'architecture peut se meler de fabriquer
des instruments de musique."

CHAPTER IV.

Note 1, p. 38. It is equally absurd to think, &c.]
This is an unanswerable objection to Empedocles and bis
followers who made all bodies to be combinations, in
differing proportions, of the elements — for whether the
Vital Principle be harmony or a combination of particles,
there must, as combinations are various, (since that which
forms bone is not that which forms flesh,) be several prin-
ciples in each member of the body; and if it be not pro-
portion, there must then be a second Vital Principle to
maintain that relation. The succeeding passages are,
necessarily, from the absence of precise knowledge con-
cerning atomic proportion and relation, obscure ; but they
point to opinions which, although not based on experi-
mental science, anticipate, when closely looked into, much
that is now admitted.

Note 2, p. 40. Now, to maintain that Vital Principle,
&c.] The argument reverts to the question whether the
Vital Principle can be subjected to motion casually pro-
duced— be subject, that is, to motion through the body
which is moved by it, and thus partake of locomotion ; but

232 NOTES. [BK. i.

the Vital Principle, being an essence, cannot be subject
to casual motion ; and then it has been) shewn that a
motor is not, necessarily, itself in motion. There seems,
however, to have been some difficulty in refusing all
motion to the Vital Principle, since the emotions and
passions which emanate from it seem to be motions, or
combined with motions, — as passion excites and fear de-
presses the motions of the heart, and deep thought furrows
the brow ; but Aristotle, in order to reconcile these with
his own opinion, has recourse to an hypothesis which is
left for future inquiry. It is well said, however, that the
man rather than the Vital Principle is moved by passions
and emotions ; and thus motion may descend from it, as
the first motor, and at rest, to the several organs, (act, that
is, upon the temperament,) or ascend to it, by perception
of the external world, for memoiy. Philoponus, comment-
ing upon this passage, observes, as proof that recollection
originates in the Vital Principle and thence permeates to
the body, that, "when reminded of any fearful incident
we turn pale, and when recalling a voyage we become
qualmish."

Note 3, p. 40. The mind seems to be a peculiar innate
essence, &c.] Aristotle has nowhere denned this great
faculty, to which he attributed so high a destiny and such
lofty privileges — "intellectus nihil patitur ; est atque
manet ;" but the opinion was not exclusively his, nor did
it originate with him, for Anaxagoras1, and before him,
1 Metapkys. I. 3. 10.

CH. IV.] NOTES. 233

Hermoticus made the " mind to be the cause as well of
existence in animals as of the universe and universal order."
There is, evidently, here a want of distinction between
mind and Vital Priuciple ; and it may be that, in order
to avoid the obvious objection of two bodies in one,
Aristotle has always delineated this faculty as homoge-
neous and pure ; that is, as immaterial.

Note 4, p. 40. For if an aged person.] This allusion
to diminished perception, by changes, from the influence
of time, in the sentient organs, implies all that can now
be said ; for could the organ be restored to its pristine
form, and its energies be, so to say, revived, the aged
person would see or hear as he did when young. The
body is modified, in fact, by age, just as it is, to use
Aristotle's apposite reflexion, by maladies and rioting,
which anticipate the otherwise slower processes of time ;
" Senectus non eo existat, quod anima sed quod id patitur
in quo inest, i. e. corpus, sicut in ebrietate et morbis."

Note 5, p. 41. Thus, too, thought and reflexion lan-
guish] Quid sit, quod intus perire dicatur, commenta-
tores quaerunt ; sed nihil definiendum, nisi quod oculi
similitudini respondeat l ; but Philoponus, who is here
cited, clearly perceived that the passage pointed to the
destruction of a corporeal organ, and not to a mere change
of form. Whenever, in fact, there is destruction, however
brought about, of a corporeal organ, there is almost
universally mental disturbance and delirium.
1 Trendel. Comment.

234 NOTES. [BK. i.

Note 6, p. 41. The most unreasonable by far of all tJie
opinions, &c.] These passages are so associated with the
peculiar doctrines of the Pythagoreans ', that they can
hardly, within the compass of a note, be made intelligible
to the general reader. These held the unit, it may be
said, to be the origin of number, and the point to be the
origin of the line ; and so they made unit and point to
belong to one common genus. But the unit was said to
be a point without position, and, therefore, an abstract
entity, which, being without parts or distinctions, cannot
be either motor or moved, and, therefore, cannot represent
the principle of all motion. Thus, the opinion is objected
to as making the Yital Principle a number, which deprives
it of locality or position, and then as attributing motion
to it which, as a number, it is not susceptible of. The
following passages, which treat of the division of plants
and insects, further prove, by analogy, that the Vital
Principle cannot be a number, as, unlike a number, each
part seems to have, after division, all the properties which
it had while yet conjoined with the whole. The argument
is then turned against the doctrine of Democritus, if the
corpuscles be regarded as points, there must still be in
each point, as quantity, a motor and a moved ; and the
theory depended for support upon quantity, rather than
relations of size. Unless, then, the Yital Principle be
both motor and moved, which it evidently cannot be,
there must be a motor power for those corpuscles.
1 Topica, I. 1 8, 8.

CH. IV.] NOTES. 235

Note 7, p. 41. How, indeed, is it possible.] This pas-
sage is very elliptical and obscure, but its purport seems
to be an objection to the doctrine of Xenocrates, a follower
of Plato, who maintained that the Vital Principle might
be separate from the body. The argument runs thus : if
the Vital Principle be a number, and if each unit be a
point, how, as the point is not separable from the line,
can the Vital Principle be separate from the body?
Although the point may be, abstractedly, apart from the
line, yet as the line is not divisible into points, (since
points are but the termination of the line) it follows that
the Vital Principle, when regarded as a point, cannot be,
actually, separate from the body. The Latin paraphrase is,
" Insuper qui fieri potest ut separentur et absolvantur a
corporibus, ipsa puncta ? siquidem lineae non dividuntur in
puncta1; " the French is, " Comment est-il possible que les
ames se separent et se delivrent des corps, puisque les
lignes ne se divisent pas en points 1 "

1 Acad. Reg. Sorussica.

236 NOTES. [BK. i.

CHAPTER V.

Note 1, p. 47. Now, three modes of defining Vital
Principle, &c.] There is here a want of conformity with
other definitions of the Vital Principle, which points
either to neglect on the part of copyists, or to want of
early revision; for, in one place, Aristotle has distin-
guished the animate from the inanimate by " motion and
sensibility," while in another he has conjoined with them
immateriality ; and here, also, he has three terms, but
incorporeity, as if to approach nearer to the doctrines of
his great preceptor, is substitued for sensibility.

Note 2, p. 47. This opinion has been adopted, &c.]
The elements, and the parts assigned to them in the
constitution of bodies, by the schools of antiquity, have
been noticed in a former note ; but the notion that, as
like perceives like, the Vital Principle, being derived
from the elements, must perceive each like, cannot account
for the perception of compound bodies, unless, (which is
an absurdity) it contain, essentially, all compounds what-
ever. This is all very hypothetical, no doubt, but then
it assumes that there are elements, and that elements
combine, by affinity, in different proportions, to form
different bodies ; and, thus, the doctrine may be regarded
as a faint outline of the matured theory of modern times.

CH. V.] NOTES. 237

This is further shewn in the formation of bone, as given
in the verse quoted from Empedocles, and which, besides
proportion, admits heat as an agent in combination. The
epithets employed by that eminent writer are not so pre-
cise as might be desired, and it cannot now be determined
what was meant by the words "liquid light," or fire,
(i^'o-Tt? a 17X17) (was it phosphorus, in some form T) ; but yet
proportion and combination, under high temperature, are
quite apparent — the Latin version of the quotation is :

" Cceperat ante duas tellus justissima vasis
Aeris ac fontis partes : Vulcanus et ipse
Quatuor ex octo adjunxit, quis Candida magna
Vis fcecundaque naturae confecerat ossa."

Note 3, p. 49. It is absurd to maintain, &c.] We have
had handed down, by the earliest writers, differences of
opinion, Aristotle l says, upon " action and impression ; "
but most of them agree in making like unimpressionable
by like, (since the one is not more active or passive than
the other,) and the unlike and different alone to have
been so constituted as to act and re-act upon one another.
Democritus stood alone in maintaining that the selfsame
like can be, at once, active and passive ; for he would not
grant that things which are, essentially, different, can
mutually act and re-act upon one another. And even
though things should seem to be different, there is ever
something like, he maintains, by which the impression is
made. The difference between these opinions, however,
1 De Gen. et Corr. i. 7. r.

238 NOTES. [BK. i.

when followed out, is, after all, formal rather than sub-
stantive ; for, in either case, the Vital Principle, whether
like or unlike, must be material, as the opinion still
implies some kind of impression, and impression implies
material properties.

Note 4, p. 49. But to shew how many doubts, <kc.]
The earlier philosophers differed widely, as has been said,
upon the elements, both as to their nature and number ;
but those writers are evidently wrong, Aristotle1 observes,
who admit of only one element and one nature, as they
take no account of incorporeal entities. Empedocles
adopted the four elements as constitutive of tlie matter of
bodies, and hence the objection to his opinion, that " sen-
sation is produced by corporeal elements in the relation
of like ; " for those parts which are formed of earth (hair,
bones, <fec.) are insensible ; and, therefore, this element
cannot be perceptive of like. This assumption of insen-
sibility is, of course, too absolute, but such parts are no
doubt withdrawn, more or less, from the general sensi-
bility and sympathy of the living body. The term vevpa,
it may be observed, by the way, which here signifies
tendon or sinew, has now the meaning of nerves, the
conductors, that is, of sentient impressions ; and Galen,
who lived so many ages after Aristotle, and was well
acquainted with the brain, optic nerves, and office of the
nerves, still employed vevpov as a muscular chord.

1 Metaphyt. I. 8. i ; xin. 4, 5.

CH. V.] NOTES. 239

Note 5, p. 50. It follows, too, from this theory, <tc.]
Empedocles regarded affinity (jtf>i\lav) as an element, but
what the deity to which he refused, so to say, repulsion
(TO velicos) is uncertain ; " whether Sphaerus ' or not, it
implies, at all events a being, to which ' repulsion ' (in
quern pugna non admittitur) had not been imparted." If
this, like affinity, were an element, then, as each sentient
being was supposed to be constituted of all the elements,
that deity must have been less favoured than other beings,
since he was unconscious of antagonistic properties, and
therefore, relatively, less intelligent than they.

Note 6, p. 50. But we are at a loss to know, &c.]
Aristotle here inquires what the particular faculty or
force may be which individualises, makes one, that is, of
objects ; and, thereby, gives to the sentient being the
consciousness of identity. It cannot be a sense, as the
senses are derived from the elements, and the elements
are akin to matter, while that, whatever it be, which
combines the faculties and powers of the body must, of
all, be the most influential ; and it may be inferred rather
than gathered from what is said, that it cannot be either
the Vital Principle or the mind. But do not all these
doubts and suggestions point to a central organ where
the sentient impressions, so to say, meet, and where con-
sciousness has its seat ? Does not the brain, which, as
the source of sensibility was then it may be said un-
known, fulfil all that is required by this suggestion 1 The
1 Trendel. Comment.

240 NOTES. [BK. i.

brain is the organ which individualises different impres-
sions, and so enables the mind to compare and judge ; it
is the organ, too, which, retaining impressions, is the seat
of memory, and the source whence imagination draws its
images. The mind is again spoken of as higher in nature
than aught else, and thus Aristotle agrees with Anaxa-
goras who held that the " mind was the first of all
created entities and powers."

Note 7, p. 51. Thus, the reasoning in the so-called
Orphic verses, &c.] The epithet, " so-called," seems to imply
that there were doubts as to the author of these verses ;
be this as it may, they shew that animal life was known
to be especially dependent upon respiration. Aristotle's
criticism seems to imply that he was not acquainted with
respiration in any other form than that of air-breathing
animals, and therefore, not aware that the influence of
the air upon the system is necessary for the maintenance
of life in all creatures. Cicero * maintains that " Aristotle
denied the existence of the poet Orpheus ; " and that the
verses under that name were attributed, by the Pythago-
reans, to one Cecrops.

Note 8, p. 51. If it be well to form tlie Vital Prin-
ciple, <fec.] The wording as well as the meaning of
this objection to the opinion that " Vital Principle must
be formed from all the elements" is embarrassed and
obscure ; and, owing to the brevity of the argument, it
cannot be expounded with certainty ; but it seems to
1 De Nat. Dew. I. 38.

CH. V.] NOTES. 241

imply that as one part of a contrary can judge itself and
the other, so all the elements cannot be necessary, since
nature never employs means in vain. ' " TJnum sufficit
ex contrariis, ut et hoc et alterum judicetur ; ad recti
nonnam etiam curvum exigitur; veruin sui index et falsi,
ut Spinoza loquitur."

Note 9, p. 52. There are writers who maintain, &c.]
Aristotle seems to have interpreted this opinion differently
from others, and, differently, it may be, (by regarding the
beings alluded to as the representatives of Yital Proper-
ties,) from its original import. Cicero2, for instance, attri-
butes to Thales, one of the wisest among the seven, the
opinion, that " it is expedient for men to suppose that
whatever can be perceived is full of gods, for, thereby,
all, as if placed in consecrated shrines, would become
purer." Whatever may be the value of that version,
the opinion could not be maintained when applied to
the cause of living actions, the origin, that is, of living
beings ; for, as bodies were supposed to be formed of
elements, and elements to be everywhere, the elements
themselves should be transformed into animals, which
involves an absurdity.

Note 10, p. 53. Since the faculties oj knowing, feeling,
&c.] Aristotle, quitting the question of life in its sim-
plest form, here reverts, after enumerating the properties
which characterise the highest forms of created beings, to
the question, whether or not all the properties may be
1 Trendel. Comment. * De Leyibut, II. 1 1.

16

242 NOTES. [BK. i.

derived from one and the same principle ; and if not from
one and the same, what that is which combines the parts,
and makes them to be one. The passage which follows
is an evident allusion to the Timceus, according to which,
as has been said, reason is placed, as in a soil fit for
the heavenly seed, in the brain, the appetite and passions
in the heart, liver, or spleen ; and then comes the ques-
tion, what so connects those organs as to make them
mutually subsidiary to one another? not the body, cer-
tainly, it may be answered, as the body itself is but the
instrument of the Vital Principle.

Note 11, p. 55. But the living principle in plants, <kc.]
This passage is, to appearance, obscure, owing to its construc-
tion and scientific wording, but yet its meaning is obvious :
the living principle in plants, that which constitutes their
vitality, is assimilation, (growth, through nutrition, that
is,) and it exists in plants without sentient properties;
but sentient properties cannot, of course, exist without
nutrition, as nutrition is essential to life, and present,
therefore, in every thing which lives.

BOOK THE SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

Note 1, p. 58. Now matter is potentiality, species
reality.] A few words may suffice for a further attempt
to elucidate these terms. Matter, then, per se, has no
definite existence, but with essence it becomes a some-
thing in potentiality, and then capable, under genial
conditions, of becoming a reality, the specific and indi-
vidual character of which depends upon form. Matter is
said to be comprised in essence, and therefore the distinc-
tion between them is hardly discernible, but Aristotle1,
under the term essence, comprises elements (earth, fire,
water and air) as well as derivatives from the elements,
and that because, while all other bodies are to be con-
sidered as dependent upon them, they pre-existed to, and
were the origin of all others. In another passage* he
assumes one universal, primordial, material essence, as
the source whence all things which are have proceeded ;
yet still he admits of a peculiar essence for each genus, as
the primal matter of pituita is whatever is sweet or oily,
1 Metaphys. ry. 8. i. a Ibid. VII. 42.

16—2

244 NOTES. [BK. n.

and as whatever is bitter is the primal matter of bile.
Although essence may be an abstraction, yet a generic
character is clearly assigned to it in the text, and even in
recent times recourse has been had to such an assumption
in order to explain the difference between the secretions
of organs supplied with the same fluids and animated by
the same nerves. Thus, it was assumed that there must
be for each organ a peculiar essence, a substantia propria
(v\i%tj ova-ia), for the fulfilment of its functions as well as
the maintenance of its relations and sympathies with the
other parts of the system. The text seems to admit of
only one essence and one matter to be as the matrix for
all things, which is, of course, opposed to the doctrine of
elements and the formation of bodies by them ; but the
hypothesis could treat of them only as primordial
entities, however diversified by form their manifestations
may be. Aristotle was the first, however, who made form
to be the realising principle, to be that which confers
upon matter specific character, and constitutes the series
of being ; and this has been adopted by modern physio-
logists, as Reil makes form ' together with variety in t/te
combination of the elements " to be the cause of existing
differences in organic bodies and their faculties."

Note 2, p. 58. But bodies, and above all natural

bodies.] Living bodies, that is, are broadly distinguished

from all others by the innate power of reproducing

similar bodies, (similar in a specific sense, that is,) and

1 Miiller Handbuch der Phys. i. 27.

CH. I.] NOTES. 245

which are the material for most of the works of man's
hand; as the human intellect can confer upon its
creations nothing save newness of form. Without assert-
ing that all which is has emanated from living bodies,
modern science has shewn that vast masses of matter,
now inorganic, were the product of what once had life.

Note 3, p. 59. Thus every natural body partaking of
life, <fec.] The text seems to be in accordance with what
had preceded, but it has been objected to by some on
account of its supposed obscurity ; it seems, however, to
imply that the three primordial conditions, matter, essence
and form, are necessary to, and concur in the formation of
every specific body.

Note 4, p. 59. And since the body is such a com-
bination, &c.] This passage is obscure both in word-
ing and purport, but it seems to imply that the living
body, being what it has been said to be, is indepen-
dent and self-existent, and, as such, cannot be Vital
Principle, because it cannot be among the subordinates
of a subject, which is the part seemingly ascribed to
Vital Principle, as merely realising what already had
existence in potentiality.

Note 5, p. 59. Now reality is, in the twofold significa-
tion, <kc.] These two terms, which, as has been said, per-
vade and illustrate Aristotle's philosophical writings, are,
themselves illustrated, as it were, here, \inder the forms of
sleep and watching — the one, being the analogue of poten-
tiality, and the latter, of reality — and thus knowledge,

246 NOTES. [BK. n.

although possessed, yet, if not exercised, is only in
potentiality ; but when actually exercised, it is raised
up and converted into reality. It is not easy, without
periphrasis, to fix upon an apposite term for the cVf"/-
yopa-i^, which signifies, of course, a state the opposite to
sleep — watching, adopted here, and the French reveil seem
to imply a forced condition ; and " being awake" is hardly
definite enough.

Note 6, p. 59. Only this is to be understood of a body
which may be organised, &c.] Organs are instruments
subservient to the purposes of the living body, as the
living body is subservient to the Vital Principle, and
Vital Principle, in its turn, subservient to nature's design
in creation. So that even plants, although insentient,
have organs, but organs which, in contradistinction to
those of animals, are homogeneous ; as the leaf is said to
be formative of all the parts of the fruit. Aristotle1
distinguished the parts of animals, as is known, as homo-
geneous (da-vvde-ra), that is simple or of one nature,
as flesh, bone and sinew, and compound (a-vv6era)} as hand,
foot, &c., which are made up of different or unlike parts.
Thus, all the parts which are heterogeneous or unlike, are
made up of parts which are homogeneous or like, as a hand,
for example, is made up of Jlesh, tendons and bones ;
while the parts of plants, on the contrary, are but
developments of one simple part, that is the leaf. It is
manifest that Aristotle here points, suggestively, to the
1 Hist. Animalm, I. r. 3.

CH. I.] NOTES. 247

development of organs by their own innate powers, and
thus he may be said to have originated a doctrine which
has been adopted, and, perhaps, realised as homologous
physiology, by modern science. Goethe1, before the
present century, had observed that " whoever looks even
casually at the growth of plants, cannot but perceive
that certain outward parts often change, and sometimes
assume wholly, at other times, partially, the form of parts
lying next to them. The secret affinity between the
different outward parts of plants, as leaves, calix, corolla,
stamen, which are naturally developed out of one another,
has been long known ; and this process, whereby one and
the same organ is seen to undergo manifold changes,
has been designated Metamorphosis of Plants" The
pericarp is, of course, the seed-vessel, the covering, that
is, of the seed, (as the pod of leguminosa, the hairy
covering of the chestnut, or the pulpy coat of fruit,) and
the germinal part of seeds is by Aristotle2 compared to
the prolific end of the egg which is attached to the
oviduct, (rrj vff-rfpa,) as the seed is to pods, husks, or other
forms. The seed and fruit are well said to be analogous
to an animal body in its state of potentiality, (which may
be likened to a state of hybernation,) as ages may pass
away without extinguishing that latent existence which,
under favourable conditions, being resuscitated, can re-
sume the actions of life.

1 Goethe, Einleitung zur Metamvrph. der Pflangen.
8 De General, n. i.

248 NOTES. [BK. n.

Note 7, p. 59. And the roots are analogous to tJie
mouth, &c.] This is one of those suggestive allusions
which characterise Aristotle's writings, and seem to have
anticipated knowledge that was yet to be realised ; for
had it been worked out, science might long since have
been in possession of the doctrine of homology. The
passage shews that Aristotle had perceived that parts
might be designated after their functions rather than
their forms, for it is the same process in plants, he
observes1, only they take in food by their roots, out of
the earth, already concocted, and hence they have no
excrementitious matter ; as for them, the soil and its
warmth are as a stomach, while animals have within
them a soil, that is a stomach, from which they draw
nutrition, as plants do from the earth, until digestion
have been completed."

Note 8, p. 60. It is, therefore, to no purpose.] An
exemplification of matter and form, as body and Vital
Principle, by the analogy of wax and the impress or form
given to it by the seal ; for these may typify a reality, as
a statue may typify a reality in the form given to the
marble.

Note 9, p. 60. It has thus then been explained] This
is a wider and closer exemplification than had been given,
both of the nature and influence of Vital Principle as
the essence in living bodies — for it is to the living body,

according to this analogy, what the special property is to
t

1 De Part. Animalm. n. 3.

CH. I.] NOTES. 249

the instrument. Thus, vision is the essence of an eye, as
cutting is that of an axe, for, could the organ or instru-
ment be deprived of those faculties, they would no longer,
save in name, be eye or axe ; and this holds good of the
living body, which, if deprived of its essence, its Vital
Principle that is, being no longer able to fulfil its
purposes in creation, is not to be regarded, save in name,
as an organised body.

Note 10, p 61. It is then obvious that neither Vital
Principle, <fec.] There is an apparent contradiction in this
passage, owing to the want of completeness in the argu-
ment— the Vital Principle, as the essence, cannot be
distinct from the organs of the body, since they depend
upon it for their functions ; but the mind, being im-
passive, (dira6tj<: o i/oiJ<;,) and the cause of all the higher
faculties, may exist apart from all which is corporeal and
even sentient, and thus survive the body's death and
decay. Thus, Aristotle has elsewhere observed that it is
scarcely possible for anything to be of higher value or
more influential than the Vital Principle, and quite
impossible that anything should be more so than the
mind.

Note 11, p. 61. It is doubtful, however, whether, <fec.]
Whether, that is, the Vital Principle is separable from
the body, as the mariner is from his vessel — whether,
as he is not necessarily involved in its- wreck, so it
may survive the death of the body. But the question
evidently pertains to psychology, and can scarcely be

250 NOTES. [BK. n.

entertained amid inquiries into corporeal functions and
sympathies ; and the chief object of this treatise, is to
ascertain what that principle is which, for a stated time,
animates and presides over the functions of reproduction,
nutrition, growth and decay. It is evident, besides, that
Aristotle has annexed, so to say, this high privilege to the
mind, as the seat and source of all moral and intellectual
qualities and faculties.

CHAPTER II.

Note 1, p. 64. It is not only correct that the ivord-
ing, &c.] Aristotle1 makes a definition to be a term
significant of what a thing essentially is, and, thus a defi-
nition may be employed in place of nouns, or one defini-
tion for another; but a noun cannot be accepted as an
adequate definition, since every definition ought to involve
some kind of cause. It is an expression2, in fact, which so
explains any term as to distinguish it from all else, as a
boundary line separates fields. Aristotle, again, makes it
to be something laid down (dea-is fnev eV-n) as the arithme-
tician lays down the unit as indivisible, quantitatively
considered; and yet this is no hypothesis, since the unit,

1 Topica, I. 5. i. Analyt. 6. 1.2. 7.
a Trendel. Comment.

CH. II.] NOTES. 251

in itself, is not the same as the unit in relation — that is
in combination. The conclusion is the close of a syllogism,
and to be distinguished from description which proceeds
from particulars, and from definition which is a summary
derived from universals. The distinction between these
terms is exemplified in the text by a geometrical figure —
if we say that the " quadrature is that by which a rect-
angle with unequal sides is reduced to a square, this is a
definition but a definition bordering on description, as it
gives no account of how the operation is to be performed,
or whether it can be performed at all;" and if we say that
" the quadrature is the finding of a mean proportional,
the definition partakes of the character of an explanation
rather than a description ;" for if there be found " a mean
proportional between any two lines which make a rect-
angular figure, that proportional is the side of the required
square."

Note 2, p. 64. We say . . . that the animate, &c.] Nu-
trition, or the faculty by which matter can identify other
matter with itself and thereby develop and grow is the
rudimental principle of life, and the distinction between
living and inert matter; for inert unlike living matter,
increases in bulk, not through its own agency but, only
by the casual agglomeration of external particles. This
was assumed to be the sole faculty of plants, as Touch was
supposed to be the first and the only sense necessary to
animal existence ; but it may be questioned whether
nutrition and Touch are ever thus found as isolated and

252 NOTES. [BK. n.

independent faculties. Cuvier * also looked upon nutrition
as the characteristic property of living matter; for life
consists, he observes, in the faculty possessed by certain
corporeal combinations of enduring for a time under some
determinate form, of drawing incessantly into their com-
position portions of surrounding substances, and of giving
back to the elements portions of their own substance."

Note 3, p. 66. With respect to some oftJwse faculties,
&c.] It is the purport of this passage to shew that, by
experiment and observation, we may obtain an insight
into the organs and functions of the body; but that, as
the mental faculties do not admit of being so scrutinized,
the investigation of them is, necessarily, obscure and com-
plicated. The distinction between sentient properties and
mental faculties is further exemplified by the lower forms
of animal existence, which continue to live, after having
been divided, in each of the parts; and as each part has
locomotion and manifests feeling, it is assumed that it
must also have imagination (instinct T) and desire. But
nothing at all resembling this can be predicated of the
mind, since, being indiscerptible, it is without parts, and,
so constituted, it cannot be subject to the change or disso-
lution of the body.

Note 4, p. 67. But something very like this has taken
place, &c.] Aristotle 2 is everywhere consistent with what
is advanced here — for an animal is defined by him as a

1 Rdgne A nimal, T. i. 1 1 .
* De Part. n. 8. i.

CH. II.] NOTES. 253

being furnished with senses, and, above all, with that
which first is manifested — the Touch ; and, elsewhere ', he
says, that every animal, as such, must have some one sense,
since it is by sensibility that we distinguish what is from
what is not an animal. "It is further suggested that
animals may be distinguished, grouped that is, after
sentient and reasoning faculties, and that Zoology may
thus be founded on universal and demonstrable principles.

Note 5, p. 67. As that by which we live and feel.} As
life, that is, implies a body and living principle, so know-
ledge implies faculties and mind; and health the liability
to sickness ; but as Vital Principle is said to be the cause
of life and feeling, it is, as such, a creative energy, and
cannot, therefore, be matter and subject. It cannot, that
is, be a mere faculty or function, or be subject to what is
termed sickness.

Note 6, p. 68. On which account it is happily assumed,
&c.] This is a summary of what had been said concerning
that something, whatever it be, which constitutes a living
body and distinguishes it from inert or inanimate matter ;
and, although very indefinite, it still is all which can be
said concerning it. Aristotle guards against the assump-
tion, as Vital Principle requires for its manifestation
peculiar matter and exact relation, that it may animate
any kind of body, and thus the argument reverts to living
matter and its capability of organism, as the germ, so to
say, of animal existence. This necessary relation between
1 De Senxu ct Sens. I. 6. 7.

254 NOTES. [BK. n.

the matter and principle is then advanced to refute the
doctrine of metempsychosis maintained by the followers
of Pythagoras ; as the active and passive, the agent and
subject, cannot possibly be mere casual associations. The
subject is further exemplified, in the closing paragraphs,
by those two conditions which pervade all Aristotle's
writings — the body while yet in potentiality is, by the
Vital Principle, realised, converted, that is into reality ;
for Vital Principle can act only upon what is in poten-
tiality, and capable, under its influence, with form, of
becoming a specific creature.

CHAPTER III.

Note 1, p. 71. And all animals, without exception,
have the sense of Touch, &c.] Aristotle, having observed
that plants have only the function of nutrition, that is,
are not sentient, proceeds to the first and, therefore, most
universal of the senses — that which may, as he assumed,
be present without any other, although there can be no
other without it. Thus, the Touch, as perceptive of food,
was supposed to be subservient to the appetite, and the
Taste, as discriminating, by tangible qualities, what in
food may be genial or otherwise, was held to be a modi-
fication of the Touch ; but the Touch alone was by
Aristotle regarded as distinctive of animal in contrast

CH. III.] NOTES. 255

with vegetable existence. " According to the argument1,
he adds, by which appetite is said to be the mediate cause
of motion, there must, in living animal bodies, be some
such medium ; and the being, therefore, which by its
nature is incapable of motion, is impressionable by
appetite, through some other faculty." Plants, that is,
are not affected by the appetitive stimulus as are
animals.

Note 2, p. 72. As, however, we shall be more explicit,
<fcc.] The Touch being the earliest, so to say, of the
senses and distinctive of animal existence, is here held to
be the cause of appetite, as appetite is of motion ; and
as has been observed, the Touch was supposed to exist
independently of the other senses. This sense is said to
be especially discriminative of food, as animals are
nourished by substances which are hot and cold, dry
and moist, and these qualities are subject to it ; but it
can distinguish only by chance such other properties
(odour, colour, sound, for instance) as do not contribute to
nutrition. It is not easy to attach a definite notion to
the imagination here alluded to, but as Aristotle has
elsewhere distinguished the rational from the sentient
imagination, and as instinct only can be assigned to
creatures with one sense, it may be assumed that this is
its meaning.

Note 3, p. 72. It is clear, then, that there can be but
one, &c.] The triangle8 forms all rectilineal figures,
1 De Matu An. 10. i. * Saint ffilaire.

256 NOTES. [BK. n.

which have more than three sides, that is, " all such
figures may be divided into triangles, as the square into
two, the pentagon into three, the hexagon into four, &c. ;
and geometry has, since that age, reduced this to a special
theorem."

Note 4, p. 73. Thus, tJte inquiry must, <fec.] The
conclusion here arrived at enforces the necessity of
attention to individual existences, in order to ascertain
what may be the distinction, if such there be, between
Vital Principles ; so that the question reverts to former
speculations, whether or not there is but one Principle
variously imparted, or whether rather, each genus of being
has its own special cause of vitality and motion. It belongs,
also, perhaps, to the same speculation, to ascertain why
beings have been ranged in a series — why, that is, such
manifold gradations of existence from man down to the
zoophyte ; unless, indeed, with other conditions of similar
character, it is beyond the pale of human inquiry.

Note 5, p. 73. But to such as possess some one only of
tJie faculties, &c.] It is far from easy to fix upon the exact
equivalents of the original terms (XoyMr/tov, 3«a'i/oia, ^ai/ra-
<r('a,) which have been here rendered by calculation, judg-
ment and imagination; but the speculative intellect, (0e«-
ptlTiKo*: vovs,') implies it may "be assumed" the human
mind or understanding, which was said to be impassive,
homogeneous, and distinct from all else. It might well,
therefore, be regarded as foreign to an inquiry, the
purport of which is to detect the animating principle

CH. IV.] NOTES. 257

of bodies fitted for receiving its influences. It is some-
what strange that Aristotle, whose teaching was so
didactic, should nowhere have given a definition of that
principle or being, to which he has assigned so exalted a
destiny.

CHAPTER IV.

Note 1, p. 77. But since such beings cannot, <fec.]
The purport of this passage is almost too obvious for
comment, embodying the great fact of the perpetuation
of the species, and compensation, by reproduction, for the
death of the individuals ; and number refers, of course, to
individuals, species to the aggregate.

Note 2, p. 78. The term final cause, &c.] This is a
kind of parenthetical clause, intended merely to guard
against the supposition that the fact of some animals
having a fixed habitat, not being locomotive that is, was
unknown, or had escaped notice.

Note 3, p. 78. And this applies equally to growth and
decay.] Aristotle1 perceived, although it may be in-
distinctly, that the source of nutrition is through the
blood — he perceived, that is, that " the blood is replenished
by vessels, which arise on and are spread over the mesen-
tery, and which empty themselves into the cava and the
1 De Part. Animalm, IV. 3. 4.

17

258 NOTES. [UK. n.

aorta;" the anatomy is, no doubt, imperfect, but it still
is an outline of the knowledge of the lacteals. It seems
to shew that veins gather fluid from the intestines, and
convey it to the large blood vessels ; but there was no
analogous knowledge, in that age, whereby the process of
decay that is absorption could be accounted for. The
term decay, therefore, was the mere expression for a
general fact.

The objection to the terms " upwards and downwards,"
used by Empedocles to delineate the growth of plants,
suggests the advantage that would accrue to science, if its
terms were made sufficiently precise to fix, beyond doubt,
the several relations and positions of the same body, or
all bodies. And in the analogy between the heads of
animals and roots of trees, we cannot but perceive the
outline of a doctrine which has been developed, by modern
science, into homologous physiology.

Note 4, p. 79. The nature of fire seems to some
philosophers, &c.] This is an argument, drawn from the
agency of fire, to dispi-ove the then prevailing opinion,
that, as it alone of the elements appears to be nourished
and to grow, it may be the source of life and the origin
of living actions ; as they are shewn, by the contrast
between living and igneous properties, to be essentially
distinct from one another. The opinion may have
originated from the fact that heat accompanies digestion,
and as fire was by some held to be the first element, it
was readily supposed to be the agent in that process. As

CH. IV.] NOTES. 259

an illustration of this opinion, it was maintained, even by
Aristotle l, that " food, taken into its appointed receptacles,
is vaporised and transmitted to the veins, in which,
undergoing change, it is converted into blood, and car-
ried onward to the heart."

Note 5, p. 81. T/tere are here three things, <fec.] The
meaning of this passage, apart from its scientific wording,
is sufficiently obvious — that which nourishes is food when
digested; for food both acts and is acted upon by the
body, and, when so acted upon, it is assimilated to and
incorporated with its substance, through the blood. But
food, being dead, is contrary to the living matter, which
has, however, power to convert it into like, to assimilate
it, that is, to the living system. Thus, food, in its first
state, is contrary to or unlike, and in its last, or concocted
state, it is like the body ; and, therefore, the same element
is in one sense contrary, and in another sense like, acting
upon a contrary or like. So too the rudder, which directs
the vessel, represents the stomach, which converts the
food into nourishment for the body; and the sensibility,
which gives power to the stomach, represents the hand
which, through the rudder, directs the motion of the
vessel ; and the vessel is analogous to the body which
is nourished.

1 De Somno, 3. 3.

17-

260 NOTES. [BK. ir.

CHAPTER V.

Note 1, p. 84. In our treatises upon action and im-
pression, &c.] Some commentators have, in the treatises
here alluded to, seen only a reference to other disquisitions,
as those upon " ' reproduction and destruction,' or decay,"
•7rfp\ yei/co-coK KU\ <j)0opd<: ; but as the passages which are
cited do not meet the whole question, it has been suggested
by Trendelenberg that the allusion may be to some other
work which has not come down to us.

Note 2, p. 84. It is difficult to understand, &c.] In
another chapter of this treatise, Aristotle has alluded to
the power possessed by the senses of recalling former
impressions ; of realizing images at will, that is, without
external objects. But the question here is to learn why
the senses, which were supposed to be derived from the
elements, from which or the accidents of which sensation
itself was derived, are not in constant activity. The
answer is, that the normal state, so to say, of the sensi-
bility is potentiality, and that it is insusceptible, there-
fore, of perception, without impression by something
from without to call it into action ; just as the combustible
material requires, in order to burn, the agency of fire.
But the comparison contains a converse proposition, as
while the material is required for the sensibility, it \sfire,

CH. V.] NOTES. 261

which may be regarded as the sensibility, which is required
for the material.

Note 3, p. 84. Since we speak of sentient perception,
&c.] These passages upon perception aud sensation, which,
in themselves, when deeply inquired into, are sufficiently
obscure, are still less, if possible, apprehensible, on account
of the wording and the attempted illustration by the
leading terms, potentiality and reality. It is obvious,
however, that we may and do speak of an individual as
one who hears and sees, whether or not, at the moment,
conscious of sound or colour ; whether that is, awake or
asleep, active or quiescent, in potentiality or reality.
But an individual is, strictly speaking, only then seeing
and hearing when he is actually sensible of colours and
sounds ; just as an individual, to use Aristotle's analogy,
is only then to be accounted really learned, when actually
reflecting upon and exercising some one special subject of
knowledge. All attempts, however, to scrutinize the in-
timate operations, so to speak, of the sensibility under
impression from without or excitation from within soon
lose, even with the advanced knowledge of this age, the
character of inductive science, and are lost, as in the
text, in the maze of metaphysical abstractions. It seems
to be the object of the argument to prove, that the sensi-
bility, before being acted upon by external objects, such as
light, sound, colour, <fec., exists in potentiality and is unlike;
when acted upon, it is raised to the state of reality, and
thus made like to that by which the impression is made.

262 NOTES. [BK. n.

Note 4, p. 85. Before proceeding further let us, &c.]
Tliis and the following passages are but repetitions of
what had been said, and further attempts at elucidation ;
they all too depend for a meaning upon the two great
leading terms. For motion is in a two-fold state — when
generated by impulse from without it is passive, when
self-generated it is active ; and that may be regarded
as potential, this as real. Thus, if a body be at rest,
l>efore being impelled, the agent, by which it is im-
pelled, is unlike and active; but, when so moved, it is,
by the very act of motion, made active, and like to the
agent.

Note 5, p. 85. But we must draw a distinction, &c.]
These passages embody, in examples, the two terms so
often alluded to, and exhibit the opposite conditions of
human beings — every man is learned, potentially, because
man is naturally so constituted as to be able to become
learned, or, being learned, is subject to an eclipse of his
learning by sleep, or disease, or inattention; and every
man, endowed with the faculties of his nature, may
acquire some one branch of learning, and, when there is
no impediment to his doing so, by the exercise of that
knowledge, become learned in reality.

The individual who is learned in the first sense cannot,
without a succession of changes, (while passing, that is,
from ignorance to knowledge), become, at will, learned, in
reality ; and he can, therefore, be accounted learned, only
in potentiality.

CH. V.] NOTES. 263

Note 6, p. 86. The term impression, <fec.] The same
mode of illustration, through those two terms, is still
continued — impression may be to an extent to destroy
sensibility, and obliterate, of course, sensation, or it may
be to that genial extent which raises, so to say, potentiality
to reality, and renders the being conscious of external
objects. So an individual, with knowledge yet potential,
that is, possessed but not exercised, can, by reflecting
upon it, without any change being wrought, render it
a reality ; for the possession of knowledge, like the endow-
ment of sensibility, implies the self-same two-fold condi-
tion. Thus, the state of reflection is to acquired
knowledge what external impressions are to sensibility ;
for, in either case, the agencies, when genial, occasion the
transition from potentiality to reality ; and so eliminate
practical knowledge or perfect consciousness.

Note 7, p. 87. Thefrrst change, however, of this kind,
&c.] It is not easy to perceive how this nascent condition
can be a change, unless the first germ of being may be
so regarded ; and, indeed, it may be supposed, from the
first moment, to have already, in potentiality, the powers
which are yet to be developed. It may be, too, that this
mysterious entity, along with the faculties and powers of
its own nature, may involve the idiosyncrasy of the
parent, for good or for ill ; which was indeed exemplified
in the life and death of the philosophical Montaigne1.

1 T. n. chap. 37.

264 NOTES. [BK. n.

This capacity of the system for retaining dormant within
it a something to be developed, by iinknown causes, in
time, is exemplified in the atom of virus, which, after an
indefinite period, may, by mysterious agency, become a
reality in the form of Hydrophobia. Well might the
philosopher, when reflecting upon these incidents, exclaim,
" Qui m'eclaircera de ce progres, je le croirai d'autant
d'autres miracles qu'il voudra."

Note 8, p. 86. So tliat the process by which an indi-
vidual, &c.] This very obscure passage seems to intimate
that, as instruction is only the development of faculties
pre-existing and in potentiality, it is not to be regarded as
an impression; for such an opinion would imply, instead
of nature's ordinary process (development), a change
from a privative state (ignorance), as well as change in
habits of thought. This cannot, however, be insisted
xipon with much confidence ; the French version is, " Done,
ce qui fait passer 1'etre qui est en puissance a la realite
parfaite, & 1'entelechie, en fait d'intelligence et de pensee,
doit s'appeller, non du nom d'apprentissage, mais d'un
tout autre nom."

Note 9, p. 87. There is an analogy between, &c.]
Sensation, that is, is to the body what reflection is to the
mind, save that the one is produced by impression from
without, and, therefore, not subject to the will, while the
latter is the operation of will upon internal faculties.
Thus, sensation admits a series of individual impressions
which are to be analyzed and compared by the mental

CH. VI.] NOTES. 265

operation ; and as the former becomes the parent of
inductive, the latter is the source of deductive science.

Note 10, p. 88. Let it for the present suffice, &a] An
obvious distinction of potentiality — a boy is, potentially,
qualified to be a general ; that is, he has, by nature,
faculties and powers which, when developed, will fit him
for the office ; and so is one who, although of suitable age,
and whose faculties and powers are developed, may not
yet have acquired the necessary military knowledge. An
analogous distinction may be traced in sentient properties,
but it is too evanescent for precise description; and the
closing paragraph is a kind of summary of the conversion
of the potential and unlike into the real and like.

CHAPTER VL

Note 1, p. 90. The Touch indeed, &c.] This sense
has a wider range of perception than any other — that is,
it is not restricted, like the Sight, Hearing, and Smell, to a
definite organism and one mode of impression ; and, besides
being extended over the body, it is essential to animal
existence. The text makes no allusion to the Taste, be-
cause this sense was regarded1 as subsidiary to or a modi-
fication of the Touch. The special senses are Sight, Hearing,
and Smell ; Taste is less definite, as the tongue is sensible
1 De Semu et Sent. iv. i.

266 NOTES. [BK. n.

of tangible as well as sapid qualities ; and Touch is ex-
tended over the body. Some properties, however, wliich
are enumerated, are subject to all the senses, and, hence,
termed common; but the attempted illustration of them
by "a kind of motion" (K/W/O-K TJS) does not, owing to its
vagueness, assist in explaining them.

Note 2, p. 91. An object is said to be perceived, <fec.]
An example in illustration of casual or accidental percep-
tion; but it is by its wording so obscure as to stand itself
in need of elucidation. The purport, however, seems to be,
that the percipient does not, by sight, (as sight distinguishes
only colour and form) discern what the white object really
is ; but the other senses, by some accidental perception,
coming in aid of the special sense, may determine that
the white object is a certain individual. There may
besides, perhaps, be a covert allusion to the two-fold
acceptation of the term accident, which signified then
as it does now both casual incidents and the real, or
inalienable properties of bodies ; and if so, the passage
may imply that the individual is perceived by chance;
detected, that is, by a mere guess. It is of little moment,
but the individual alluded to is said, by Philoponus, to
have been a friend of Aristotle's ; and that letters which
had passed between them were extant in his time.

CH. VII.] NOTES. 267

CHAPTER VII.

Note 1, p. 93. TJie visible is colour, &c.] Aristotle1
says that the faculty of Sight announces to us, dis-
tinguishes, that is, the manifold and various shades of
colours, on account of all bodies partaking of colour, and
thus by Sight, especially, we are able to perceive common
properties, such as form, magnitude, motion and number ;
but the Hearing, on the contrary, is perceptive only
of distinctions of sounds from sonorous bodies and the
variations of voice from such as have speech 2. The sense
of " Hearing, however, contributes more than any other,
since speech is the channel for instruction, to the cultiva-
tion of the understanding."

Note 2, p. 93. All colour is motive of the diaphanous,
&c.] These passages seem almost to indicate a presenti-
ment of the modern or undulatory theory of light, for
they assume the existence of a diaphanous, that is, a
subtle medium which, by its motion, is creative of vision.
So too, the modern theory assumes a subtle elastic ethei*,
which has inertia without gravity, which fills space, per-
meates all bodies, and admits of being set in motion by
the agitation of the particles of ponderable matter, and
which particles, when set in motion, communicating a like
1 De Sensu et Sen*. \. 10. 2 I. n.

268 NOTES." [BK. u.

motion to the molecules adjacent, act upon others, and
thus motion is propagated further and further in all
directions. The theory of Aristotle is much the same —
there is a diaphanous medium which may well represent
the subtle ether, and which, when potential, that is
quiescent, is darkness, and when set in motion by colour,
(the property of which is to render it motive), is light,
renders objects visible, that is. Thus, the same diaphaneity
when passive, that is, potential, is darkness, when active,
that is, in reality, is light, and the cause of objects being
visible. The value of the hypothesis is diminished by
the identification of the " diaphaneity" with air and water
and solid bodies, because of their affinity with the
supernal region or firmament above, which, together with
all the heavenly bodies, was supposed to be of igneous1
nature ; and to be corporeal, circular, and in constant
motion.

Note 3, p. 94. LigJit is the active state, &c.] The
diaphaneity which, when passive, is darkness, when set in
motion and made active, is light, is made visible, that is ;
and thus light, being a mere condition of the diaphaneity,
"is not a body, for, were it so, there would be two bodies
in one, which is an impossibility." It may now seem
strange that Aristotle should have paid so little attention
to the opinion of Empedocles*, " that light arrives midway
from the sun, before it reaches the sight, or the earth ;"
for although it differed from his own, in regarding the sun
1 Meteoroloffica, 3. i. 2 De Ccdo, ?. 3.

CH. VII.] NOTES. 269

as the source of light and the distinction of day from
night, yet, in transmitted light, it supplied a motor,
which was required for the completion of his own theory
of sensation through the agency of a medium acted upon
by impulsion.

Note 4, p. 95. Now that which is without colour, &c.]
The diaphaneity, that is, when passive, is receptive of
colour and made active, just as the air, when quite still,
is more readily set in motion and made sonorous by per-
cussion ; and this leads, amid some confusion of thought,
to the consideration of those luminous appearances (ignes
fatui) which are visible only in the dark, by their colour.
'The precise nature of these appearances is still only
conjectural, notwithstanding the advance of chymistry ;
but they are supposed to be due to phosphyretted
hydrogen eliminated, under favouring circumstances, from
decaying animal and vegetable matter, and ignited by
contact with the atmosphere."

Note 5, p. 95. Therefore, witliout light colour is not
visible.] Colour, that is, by imparting motion to the
diaphaneity, renders it, from being potential and dark,
actual and visible, that is, light ; and thus, as without
light there is no colour, so without colour there is no
light ; and this lends support to the opinion, that the air,
as being a diaphanous medium, is essential to sight.
Aristotle had indeed maintained, in opposition to
Empedocles1 and others, that vision is not caused by the
1 De Sensu et Sens. II. 15, 16.

NOTES. [BK. n.

emanation of luminous rays from the eye as light proceeds
from a torch or lamp ; and he ridiculed the notion that
vision is precluded in the dark owing to the extinction of
those rays therein. It is probable that this theory first
led him to adopt a medium and its successive motion, as
the immediate cause of vision ; as he had accounted for
hearing by the propagation of the impulse given to the
air by the sonorous body. Aristotle was unacquainted
with the structure of the eye ; but he was aware, of
course, that it contains humours, and these he held to be
necessary, not as being aqueous that is elementary but,
as being diaphanous, for this property seemed to be as
requisite for vision within the eye, as it is for the trans-
mission of light to the eye. It was this assumed succes-
sion of action, after impression upon a diaphanous medium,
which led to the conclusion that the eye itself must be
diaphanous, and, therefore, that the visual power must be
somewhere on the inside of the eye ; and this is the only
approximation to a right knowledge of the retina and its
relations.

Note 6, p. 96. It has thus then been said, <fcc.] The
cause of colour being visible is sufficiently obvious from
what has been said ; but fire was said to be visible both
in darkness and in light, owing to its being, as fire, of
the nature of the firmament above, which was believed
to be fire, or something identical with fire. It may be
presumed that the subject was here introduced, in order
to notice and account for those luminous appearances,

CH. VII.] NOTES. 271

which have been alluded to, and which, in that age, could
not but have been topics of wonder and speculation ;
they were irreconcilable besides, with the prevailing
notions of colour and light.

Note 7, p. 96. The air is the medium for sounds, &c.]
The air was by Aristotle held to be essential to sound ;
but it is not apparent why odour was supposed to be
transmitted by some modified condition of air or water,
unless, indeed, it was required in order to account for the
perception of odours by fishes and aquatic animals.
There was a difficulty, in fact, in accounting for the
transmission of odour through air and water, because
odour1 was held to be a vaporous exhalation eliminated
by fire ; and the " special organ of smell was said to be
located about the brain*" the coldest of all parts of the
body, in order that the exhalation might there be con-
densed and made productive of smell. Thus, it might
seem to be irreconcilable with odour, that it should be
transmissible in air or water, and this may have led to
the hypothesis of a modified condition of the elements
for smell.

Note 8, p. 97. But neitfter man nor animals which
breatJte, &c.] The term in the text (avairvet), like our
own term breathing, is expressive both of inspiration
and expiration, whereas it is evident that the sense of
the passage requires the former process only. And yet

1 De Sensu et Sens. II. 19, 20.

2 De Part. Animalm, u. 7.

272 NOTES. [BK. n.

elsewhere l, Aristotle, in his criticism of the theory adopted
by Diogenes and Anaxagoras to account for the respira-
tion of fishes, has clearly distinguished the one from the
other. He objected also to Timseus and some others who
had maintained that expiration must precede the other.
Enough, however, that he perceived, although unac-
quainted with the parts on which odours impinge, or the
organ by which they are made sensible, that they could
gain access to the sense only through inspiration.

CHAPTER VIII.

Note 1, p. 100. Sound of the actual kind is tJie, &c.]
As sound is the result of percussion, the passage implies
something to be percussed, as well as something in which
that which percusses is to move ; but what that some-
thing is in which percussion is to be made is not explained.
Some commentators, as Simplicius, have considered the
words ev TIVI to imply, " the air which is interposed
between the sonorous body and the sense," and which,
but for the contradictory opinions of that age with
respect to the air, might be at once accepted as its
meaning ; and even taken as some special medium, as has
been suggested, it still may signify a, body of air. We
1 De Respiraticme, 2. 3.

CH. VIII.] NOTES. 273

may consider the voice, Plato1 observes, as percussion
(sound, that is,) transmitted, by the air, through the ears,
brain and blood, to the sentient principle. But as the
nature and properties of the air were then, from the
want of experimental science, unknown, they were avail-
able for any hypothesis ; and yet there is evidence that
Aristotle, not to add Plato, did regard the air as essential
to sound and voice. Aristotle2, while agreeing with most
philosophers in ranking air among the four elements, "sees
a difficulty in determining what its nature may be in the
universe around the earth, or what its order in relation to
the other elements of bodies." He was aware of the air
holding water in solution, and observes that, whether
water be or be not produced, equally, from the whole air,
that which is around the earth must be not air only but
vapour, which is again to be condensed and become
water. Thus, " we maintain," he adds, " that fire and air,
water and earth are producible out of one another, and
that each of them is present, in potentiality, in each of
the others ; as is the case with all bodies, which have
a base into which each of them is ultimately reducible."
He has distinguished the air we inspire from that which
we send forth (eWe'jUTeii/) and to which he has given a
specific appellation (TO irvev^a) ; but owing to the diffi-
culty of determining either its nature or its office,
(although it is the subject of a special3 treatise,) no

1 Timceus, 67 B. a Meteorologica, I. 3. 3. i.

3 irepl Trvev/j.a.Tos.

IS

274 NOTES. [BK. n.

unexceptionable equivalent for it can be offered. These
quotations shew, amid many suggestive observations, that
knowledge concerning the air was then very unsettled ;
and yet they prove, it may be assumed, that air was
implied in the passage referred to.

Note 2, p. 101. An eclw is produced w/tenever, &c."j
This passage is obscure, both from its elliptical wording
and the want of adequate exemplification ; but, in
attributing to the air elasticity and capability of being
reflected, it seems to suggest that the atmosphere only is
the cause of sound and, therefore, of echoes. So, accord-
ing to modern science1, "an echo is sound reflected from
a distant surface and repeated to the ear ; although
several other conditions are required for its production."
In another treatise2, it is assumed that reflexion of the air
(»/' araicA.atrtt) is the immediate cause of an echo; and
since an echo is reflexion, "must there not be, for its
production, air confined, impacted and communicating, as
one mass, with that which is to be reflected?" But an
echo, whether or not audible, ought, as the text states,
looking at the properties of the air, to be a constant
occurrence ; for as light is continually reflected from
bodies, and thereby casting shadows by which light
is distinguished, so sound, owing to the air's elasticity,
must be often reflected and, therefore, repeated, in varying
degrees of intensity, according to the nature of the surface
on which it may have impinged. That age, in fine, wa.s
1 Brande's Hist, of Science. a Problemota, XI. 8.

CH. VIII.] NOTES. 275

acquainted with several of the properties of the air, but,
as they had not been tested experimentally, its acquaint-
ance with them was but conjectural, and could lead to no
positive inference ; it was reserved for modern science to
ascertain what the air is, and what its properties in rela-
tion to the world, its productions and inhabitants.

Note 3, p. 101. A void is rightly said, &c.] It would
be difficult even to conjecture what could have been
meant by a void in that age ; for although it had been
perceived1, it may be but obscurely, that the air rises by
fire (heat) to the upper regions and becomes ether, (as in
the Timceus, expiration is accounted for by the rising up
from within of the heated breath,) yet it is not to be
supposed that rarefaction was an admitted property of
the air, or that any condition like rarefaction was implied
in the void. Aristotle* observes, upon this topic, that,
"according to some philosophers, a plenum is a space or
vessel when full, and a vacuum or void is the same when
empty, thus making, as he says, the plenum to be identical
with the vacuum and space, excepting in conditions of
relation." In all this it is evident that no account was taken
of the air ; and he objects to Anaxagoras, (who had shewn,
experimentally, that the air is substance of some kind,) that
he argues against what had never been contended for — the
advocates for a void maintain, he says, that it is a space
in which there is no tangible body, and, holding every

1 Meteoroloyica, II. i.
8 Xat. AutcuU. iv. 6. I.

18—2

276 NOTES. [BK. n.

thing to be corporeal, they consider that only to be a void
in which there is absolutely nothing ; so that it can be to
no purpose to shew that the air is something. This
epitome shews sufficiently how widely apart from one
another are the antient and modern significations of a
void, since it now implies such a rarefaction of the air as
can be obtained through the air-pump; and, as rarefaction
cannot be carried beyond 300 times, no proof can be
afforded of the possible existence of a void. Aristotle1
objects to those who maintained that the void is identical
with any space filled with air, " for, if the air be driven
out, the space will clearly, he observes, be a void, in a
stricter sense than it was, since it will no longer be full
of air." But it would be foreign to the purport of these
notes to inquire further into the opinions of that age ;
it may be inferred, however, from what has been adduced,
that Aristotle, although he refused corporeity to the air,
was not a very consistent supporter either of the plenum
or vacuum.

Note 4, p. 102. Every sonorous body, <kc.] This
passage is a summary of all that physiology has now to
offer upon sound and hearing ; but although it might
have been surmised that sound is vibration of the air,
caused by a sonorous body and conveyed, by successive
undulations, to the organ of hearing, yet, as the internal
ear was then unknown, it is a surprising assumption that
air must be contained within the organ, in order that the
1 Topica, vn. i. ii.

CH. VIII.] NOTES. 277

vibration may be communicated to the sense. Aristotle
may perhaps have been led, notwithstanding the unstable
opinions of his age upon the air, to conclude that, as
sound " is present in the air," air must be connected with
the hearing, and, if so, be contained, naturally, within its
organ. The succeeding passages hardly admit of comment,
on account of their evident want of anatomical know-
ledge ; but they prove that the tympanic membrane had
been made out, as also that it may be so injured, as to
admit fluid from without into the ear. And this disease
of the membrane is aptly compared to ulceration and
consequent opacity of the eye's membrane, (the cornea,)
whereby the rays of light are precluded from entering
the eye and producing vision.

Note 5, p. 102. But proof is afforded, &c.] This
somewhat puerile experiment is still extant. It seems
strange that the very obvious cause of this phenomenon
did not occur to one who had surmised, without ana-
tomical proof, that there is air within the tympanum ; it
had escaped Aristotle, besides, that, in a former passage,
he had made the air which is immured vnthin the ear to
be immovable.

Note 6, p. 104. The voice is a sound, <fec.] This
passage is a clear definition of the voice, and it points,
although indistinctly, to the parts and functions concerned
in its formation. The voice ' is said to be different from
sound, and speech to be different from either; and, as
1 Hist. Animalm, iv. 9. r.

278 NOTES. [BK. n.

speech can be produced by no other part than the pharynx,
those creatures only can speak which have lungs, as speech
is the articulation of the voice by the tongue. Where-
fore, the voice and larynx send forth vowels, the tongue
and lips consonants, and these together make up speech.
So, too l, Cuvier says, that " man alone among animals can
articulate sounds, owing probably to the form of his
mouth and the mobility of his lips." The2 pharynx, so
called, and trachea, are of cai*tilaginous nature, and this
because they are for the sake of the voice as well as
breathing ; and it is necessary that that, which is to give
out sound, should have firmness as well as smoothness.
But the larynx and pharynx are here alluded to as if
they were one and the same organ, and it may be, that
owing to the complicity of the parts and their multiplied
relations to one another, they were then so considered ;
but yet passages3 might be cited, which seem to shew that
they were known, both by function and position, to
be different organs.

Note 7, p. 105. Nature employs, simultaneously, the air,
&c.] It was assumed by the physiologists of that and,
indeed, many subsequent ages, that the office of respira-
tion is merely to cool the blood, or rather to temper its
heat, which was supposed to be constantly tending to an
excess incompatible with life. In modern times, on the

1 Anatomic Comp. t. I. 15.
8 De Part, Animalm, vn. 3. 5.
3 Ibid. ii. 3. 9 ; in. 3. i.

CH. VIII.] NOTES. 279

contrary, the action of the air which is inspired upon the
venous blood has been by some regarded as a process of
combustion, and the source, through combustion, of the
special temperature which characterises all organised and
living bodies. Respiration is said, by Grant1, to be
essential to the constitution of animal bodies ; for by this
function " the vital fluids are purified and replenished, the
muscular system is furnished with its capability of action,
and the high temperature of the mammalia is preserved
in every condition of the surrounding element."

Note 8, p. 106. As proof of which we are, unable, <fec.]
The meaning of this passage, owing in part to the
unsettled knowledge of that age, is by no means evident ;
but it can be readily admitted, that the act of holding
the breath must set in motion, disturb, that is, the air
which has been inspired, and produce coughing rather
than articulation. The French commentator makes the
text (mvet xai TOVTO) to imply " disturbance of the
function;" Trendelenburg, however, sanctions the version
here given. It will be apparent, from what has been
adduced, that the word pharynx (of fishes) should have
been larynx, for this, being the upper part of the trachea,
is the tube which conveys air to the lungs, as the other,
being the upper part of the cesophagus, is the tube
which conveys food to the stomach ; and all fishes have a
pharynx, of course, but, as they do not breathe, they are
without a larynx.

1 Outlines, p. 592.

280 NOTES. [BK. u.

CHAPTER IX.

Note 1, p. 109. And there seems to be an analogy,
<fec.] Aristotle \ in thus making Touch superior to, and
more influential than any other sense, (for it is the most
perfect, he observes, of man's senses, although with respect
to some others he is inferior to many animals,) is sup-
ported by Cuvier2, who says, "that Touch is the most
important of all the senses, and that its several degrees of
perfection exercise a surprising influence over the nature
of different animals ; and that of all the vertebrata man
has the most perfect Touch." It is difficult to attach a
sense to the term hard or soft applied to flesh, which,
by anatomical3 description, corresponds with the muscular
substance of the body ; but man is said to have softer
flesh than any animal 4, and on this account, through the
delicacy of his sense of Touch, to be of all creatures the
most intelligent. It is presumable that Aristotle was led
to suppose, from this sense being spread, so to say, like
the muscular substance, over the surface of the body, that
its organ lies somewhere in or beneath the flesh, and thus
to have concluded that a relative hardness or density of
that substance, by impeding tangible impressions, may be

1 Hist. Animalm, I. 15. 14. * Anat. Comp. t. ni. 569.

3 Hist. Animalm, in. 16. r. 4 De Part. n. 16. 16.

CH. IX.] NOTES. 2S1

the cause of, or concomitant with dulness of the faculties.
The nervous system was then unknown, and Aristotle, so
fond of analogies, might readily suppose that the Touch
had, like other senses, its appointed organism ; and, if
there were such an organ, that it is extended over the
body, and thus must be in or beneath the flesh. The
Taste, as being a modification of Touch, was said to be
more delicate in man than animals.

Note 2, p. 110. There is a close analogy^ A similar
observation is made in the following chapter, and, besides
bringing sentient perceptions under some general law, it
was, probably, intended to shew that colour, sound, and
odour, although inappreciable by our senses, may still be
present. It shews, in fact, that our senses, being limited
in their capacity of perception, are not to be relied upon
when impressions are very greatly in excess or propor-
tionally faint.

Note 3, p. 111. Tlie smell is perceptive.] "That fishes
smell," Aristotle1 observes, "is shewn in their being taken
by baits which have the particular odour, foul or grateful,
to which they are attached." But modern science has, of
course, determined both the seat and the structure of the
olfactory organ in fishes ; and shewn " how it is protected
from the violent and incessant action of the currents of
water required for respiration." Sanguineous* creatures
are all such as have red blood, and insanguineous, those
which, in place of red blood, have a pale bluish fluid
1 Hist. Animalm, TV. 8. 19. J Ibid. I. 4. 3.

NOTES. [BK. n.

circulating in their veins. These last include "insects,
molluscs, Crustacea, and creatures with more than four

Note 4, pi 111. And htnce Ae dijflmlty of detcr-
iMjy, ic.] If the site amd structure of the olfactory
sense, in the lower forms of life, are still somewhat con-
jectural, it may well be supposed that the smell in non-
breathing animals was, in that age, although seen to be a
feet, inexplicable. But yet, although anatomy could not
then determine the seat of the sense, it might have been
conjectured that, as such creatures are obviously affected
by odours, there must be some other inlet for them than
that through which impression is made upon animals ;
and the detection of this mode of perception, would have
been another instance of homologous physiology. Aris-
totle1, following Plato, placed the seat of the smell and
other senses in the neighbourhood of the heart ; but
" the organ was said to be located, suitably, between the
eyes."

Note 5, p. 1 12. Tke olfactory organ in man, appear*
to differ, <fcc.] The analogy is obviously faulty, as it
seems to imply that the olfactory, like the respiratory
organs, are furnished with a cover, by the raising of which
odours gain access to the sense ; or rather, owing to the
intricacy of the parts and imperfect anatomical know-
ledge, the epiglottis has been associated with the velum
and posterior fauces. It could answer no purpose, then,
1 De Part. Animalm, n. 30. 9. 17.

CH. IX.] NOTES. 283

to inquire, as some have, what animals have an operculum
for the smell, of that kind ? or what mean those veins
and pores? As although the operculum, that is, the
epiglottis, was known to be protective of the larynx and,
therefore, the respiratory organs, the relations of the
larynx with the parts associated with it had not been
made out ; and the veins and pores refer, probably, to the
bronchi and vessels within the chest.

Note 6, p. 112. In fine, odour is derived, <fec.] Aris-
totle here differs from Plato, who held that odorous
particles are in a state rather of fluidity ; and Cuvier '
says, that " the organ of smell is moistened with abundant
viscosity, which arrests the odorous particles contained in
air or water ; as fishes are sensible of odours. But odour,
being regarded as exhalation, was assumed to be of fiery
nature and, therefore, like the element, dry, and this
required, for the conformity of the hypothesis of like
upon like, that the organ of the sense, when in potenti-
ality, should be also dry, and so, in due relation to
odour.

1 Anal. Comparee, 15™* kfon.

284 NOTES. [BK. n.

CHAPTER X.

Note 1, p. 114. Colour, however, is not thus made
visible.] The opinion here objected to originated with
Democritus. Aristotle1 held it to be absurd to suppose
that colour and vision could be a process of emanation
from the eyes ; for colour produces sensation, he observes,
not by emanation but, by contact, and so it is better, at
once, to admit that vision is produced by the action of the
medium. There are2, it is said, seven distinctions of colour
and as many of savour ; and in another work 3 seven
vowels, seven pleiads, and seven chords.

Note 2, p. 114. No object, however, which is without
humidity.] This is little more than a repetition of what
had been said concerning sapid substances. Aristotle4
seems to have adopted a theory, derived from mechanics,
for explaining the solubility of objects — Whence comes it,
he asks, that an earth is both melted and moistened by
fluid (KCLI TtjKeTai KOI reyyerai) while soda (TO Be v'npov) is
melted but not moistened ? The answer is, because there
are pores throughout the soda which cause its parts to
be, at once, separated by the fluid ; while the pores in

1 De Sensu et Sens. 3. 15. 3 De Sensu et Sens. 4. 18.

3 Metapkysica, xm. 6. 5. 4 De Meteorol. iv. 9. 4.

CH. X.] NOTES. 285

the earth are in alternate rows, so that the influence of
the fluid, in whatever way it may gain access, cannot but
be different.

Note 3, p. 114. As vision is perceptive, &c.] The
argument here is interrupted and obscured by parentheti-
cal explanations; but the purport is, that the senses are
the sole judges of sentient impressions through all their
degrees of intensity, and that, as sensibility is a mean,
they cannot discriminate such as are far above or below
the allotted medial standard. There is a seeming discre-
pance, however, in employing the term invisible as ana-
logous to impossible on other subjects, as vision is not
altogether lost in any darkness; but a creature without
feet could not continue its existence, nor a fruit without
the kernel continue its species.

Note 4, p. 115. The impotable as well as the potable,
<fec.] The impotable implies, of course, whatever is neither
moist nor capable of becoming moist, and every such sub-
stance must, necessarily, pain — be very disagreeable to, that
is — and pervert the Taste. All these passages, however,
while proving that moisture is required for savour, point to
a want of knowledge of the salivary and mucous glands
which were yet to be discovered. But over and above the
due conditions of moisture, there was still required the
knowledge of the nervous sysbem to account for the many
perversions of Taste which are manifested, both in sick
and well ; and manifested, at times, without any apparent
cause. It will occur to many, besides, how differently the

286 NOTES. [BK. n.

Taste is affected by the same substance, as sugar for in-
stance, in different persons, and even, at times, in the
same person.

Note 5, p. 116. Kinds of savour are like shades of
colour, &c.] There must ever be difficulty in fixing
upon terms for savours or other sentient qualities, and
still greater difficulty in settling what are the exact
equivalents for such terms in another, and that not
a cognate tongue ; for although some savours, as bitter
and sweet, may be supposed to have an universal accep-
tation, there are others which, being far less definite,
are subject to variation, according to climate and race.
So that, with the exception of bitter and sweet, it can
hardly be pretended that the other terms, as oily, pungent,
rough, astringent, <fec., are perfect representatives of those
in the text.

Note 6, p. 116. In fine tJie sapid sense, &c.] This
passage does but repeat what has been already insisted
upon, that the sense, in potentiality, that is, when inactive,
is identical with that which is to act upon it; but that,
having been acted upon, it is brought into the state of
reality, and then becomes perceptive of the qualities of the
excitant.

CH. XI.] NOTES. 287

CHAPTER XI.

Note 1, p. 118. Each sense seems to be perceptive,
<tc.] This passage seems to imply that all sentient im-
pressions may, in a strict sense, be tangible impressions.
Aristotle1, in another treatise, observes that sentient
bodies are bodies sensible of tangible impressions, and that
tangible impressions only have contraries, which, in kind,
are specific and causative. And, "thus, neither white-
ness and blackness, sweetness and bitterness, or any
other contraries save those alluded to, can form element-
ary distinctions." All which implies, perhaps, that the
Touch is either the origin of or coeval with animal
existence ; and that the other senses are but for the
higher forms of being. The properties, besides, which
are attributed, so to say, to the Touch are, in con-
tradistinction to those of the organs of relation, mainly
concerned in the changes continually going on in inert
bodies ; and this consideration may have, in part, con-
tributed to the speculative opinion just quoted.

Note 2, p. 120. It may be a question whether as all
bodies, <fec.] This is an argument to prove that, as there
cannot be absolute contact of bodies in water, so neither
1 De Gen. el Corr. n. i. i.

288 NOTES. [BK. n.

can there be in air ; and thus that the flesh can be only
the medium for tangible impressions — that there must
ever be air interposed, that is, between the object and the
surface of the body. It may seem now to be supereroga-
tory, but, as the atmosphere had not then been experi-
mentally investigated, crude and contrary opinions, as
might be supposed, were entertained concerning it, and
its manifold relations1. The term "third magnitude" is
derived from, or associated with the Pythagorean doc-
trine of number — as of magnitude, continuous length is
referrible to one, breadth to two, and depth to three ; and,
thus, depth is the " third degree " of or relation to
magnitude.

Note 3, p. 122. But tangible differ from visible, &c.]
"It will be evident that whatever may, in these passages,
be erroneous, is traceable to the flesh being regarded as
the sense or the medium for the sense of Touch, as, in
either case, the Touch, differing from every other sense,
would, from what has been maintained, require two media.
There seems to be something like forgetfulness in with-
drawing, so to say, the medium in the example given of
tangible impression, and supposing that the man and his
shield can be simultaneously transfixed.

Note 4, p. 122. The different states of the body as a

body, &c.] As the Touch was regarded as a primal or

elementary sense, so the qualities, of which it is perceptive,

(as hot and cold, dry and moist, <fec.) were also regarded

1 Metaphysica, IV. 13. i.

CH. XI.] NOTES. 289

as elementary qualities ; and distinguished from visual or
sonorous impressions, by being necessary to animal exist-
ence. It is uncertain whether the work "upon the
Elements" here alluded to was a distinct work, or a
chapter in one of the treatises which have been cited ;
but the question is of little consequence, and foreign,
besides, to the purpose of these notes.

Note 5, p. 123. TJie mean, in fact, is critical, &c.] This
is a transfer, so to say, of moral to physical relations.
"Whatever is continuous and divisible comprehends," Aris-
totle ' says, " the three terms, more, less, and equal, which
all bear a relation either to the thing itself or to our-
selves ; for the equal is a given mean between excess and
deficiency. Now, the mean implies that which is equi-
distant from either of the extremes, and it is one and the
same in all material conditions ; but the mean, in relation
to us, implies a state in which there is neither excess nor
deficiency." Thus, temperance nourishes and preserves
the body, while excess or deficiency of food and drink
tends to destroy it. Moderate exercise increases, while
immoderate or insufficient exercise impairs the strength ;
and so for other conditions which are readily adducible.

Note 6, p. 123. As vision was said to be in tome
sense, &c.] The passage is obscure, but it seems to repeat
a former observation, that, as the senses can judge of sen-
tient properties only in their mediate state, the terms
invisible and intangible are, strictly speaking, incorrect
1 Ethica Nicom. II. 6. 5.

19

290 NOTES. [BK. n.

and inapplicable. " The air ', moving in currents, was said
to be wind ; " and, when at rest, it was supposed, like
all else, when either in excess or deficiency, to be with-
drawn from sentient perception.

CHAPTER XII.

Note 1, p. 125. It is the primal organ, &c.] Philo-
ponus and Simplicius, according to some commentators,
believed that the "mind" was the organ or principle
here alluded to ; but Saint Hilaire is disposed to regard
it as "sensibility, irrespective of any thinking principle."
Trendelenburg inquires, what means the term ' primal '
quid hoc »y>irror? He seems, however, to consider the
mind as the special seat of the faculty in question — " quod
primum dicitur, id tacite mentem spectari videtur, quse
propria est hujus facultatis sedes ; et ea prima quidem,
si ab intimo fonte projidscaris." It may, however, with
some confidence, be assumed that this primal organ points,
suggestively, to the brain ; for it evidently implies a cen-
tral organ connected with each of the senses, and receptive
of all sentient impressions. Thus, such an organ, -while
receptive of form, may well be said to be identical with
the object ; and yet, seeing how opposed are the manifes-

1 Jfeteoroloffica, L 13. 2.

CH. XII.] NOTES. 291

tations of the sensibility to the properties of matter, not
be so, in an absolute sense. The organ, like the brain, in
fact, being perceptive of forms and properties through
the senses, is identified, pro tanto, with objects ; although
it cannot but differ from them absolutely, in mode of
being, that is in essence.

Note 2, p. 126. But why do not plants feel, &c.] The
answer to this question, by assigning to the organ a defi-
nite locality and function, seems to lend support to the
explanation offered in the foregoing note. The passage
in the original TO /*>/ e^eii/ /xe<roT»/Ta is rendered too
freely, perhaps, in this version, as mediate faculty ; but
the French "qualite moyenne" is to the same purport.
The Latin is, " neque id medium, tanquam mensuram et
modum habent, quo sensus quasi judicant." It may be
that as Aristotle had refused, so to say, sensibility to the
brain, he found himself constrained, in order to explain
the function of the senses and their power of recalling
images, to adopt a central organ, to be as well the source
of sensibility as the sensorium or store-house, for the
mind and memory. He had been led, in fact, to regard
the brain as insentient, because of its not imparting
sensation when touched, and as subsidiary to the respira-
tion for tempering the internal heat, because of its appa-
rent coldness. All this was the settled conviction of this
great man ; Democritus, however, seems to have perceived
that the brain is either the organ or the seat of sensi-
bility, although the opinion was not generally admitted.

19—2

292 NOTES. [BK. u.

Plato agreed with physiologists in making the seat of
the senses to be the liver and neighbourhood of the heart,
but he differed from Aristotle in believing the brain to be
continuous with the spinal chord, and to be the source of
the intellectual faculties. He held the brain, in fact, to be
the seat if not the source of the higher faculties, while he
assigned the appetites and coarser passions to the viscera.
Hippocrates ', who lived some years before him, assigns to
the brain the guardianship of the mind, and makes it to
be not only the first percipient of all the changes of the
seasons, but also the source and seat of all the more deadly
and complicated maladies.

Note 3, p. 126. It may be questioned, &c.j The
argument, in these passages, is to account for the changes
which are constantly going on in bodies, and for which
•that age could assign no adequate cause ; but still it was
perceived that tangible and sapid qualities (hot and cold,
wet and dry, acid, saline, astringent, and others) must be
the agents principally concerned in their production.
Thus, although neither light nor darkness, sound nor
odour, can act upon bodies, yet something present with
them may, and this seems to point, suggestively, to those
imponderable and invisible forces (heat, magnetism, elec-
tricity, &c.), for which, as yet, even " no plausible theory
has been adopted."

Note 4, p. 126. But all bodies are not impi-essionable,
&c.] These passages are very obscure ; but their purport
1 Epistola, T. in. 824 ; T. i. 614.

CH. XII.] NOTES. 293

seems to be, that odour and sound can act only upon such
bodies as, like the air and water, are neither limited
nor stationary — are made to be the carriers, as it we're,
of delicate emanations and vibrations to sentient organs.
Thus, it is added, the air, having been impressed by odour,
readily gives it out, and, then, through the smell, becomes
perceptible to the sentient being. But neither odour nor
sound, as such, can in aught contribute to the changes to
which all inert bodies are subject ; and the actions of
sound and odour, therefore, seem to be limited to sen-
tient, that is, living properties. This may be to us a
truism, but it must be recollected that even to Aristotle
the olfactory passages were but imperfectly known ; that
the opinions upon the Atmosphere were hypothetical ; and
that the processes by which changes are wrought in
inert matter were still to be detected.

BOOK THE THIKD.

CHAPTER I.

Note 1, p. 131. The sentient organs, however, are con-
stituted, &c.] The senses were formed, according to that
age, from the elements — as the hearing from air, and the
eye, which alone was supposed to have a special organ,
from the purest part of the fluid secreted by the brain ; and
vision is the result, according to Aristotle, of refraction.
Thus, Democritus ' was held to be right in saying that the
eye is water but to be wrong in supposing vision to be
caused by reflection, (jo opav elvm Ttjv £^0a<r<i/) as vision
is, not in the eye but, in the percipient; for "vision is re-
fraction " (a'i»aK\a<r<? jap TO irdBoi). Aristotle shews that,
according to the admitted doctrines, these two elements
only constitute the sentient organs of all animals which
are perfect ; and adds, as if to guard against a possible
objection, that the mole has eyes although they may not
be very apparent. It is then argued that, unless there is
some kind of body or mode of impression different from all

1 De Sensu et Sens. 2. 10.

CH. I.] NOTES. 295

with which we are acquainted, no sense can be wanting;
and Cuvier1 adopted a similar argument to prove that no
animal, unknown to Zoology, remains to be discovered.

Note 2, p. 132. And this ive are able to do, &c.]
This passage is elliptical and obscure ; but, as " the rela-
tive is too closely connected with the example something
sweet to admit of being separated," it may imply that the
sight may, by colour and refraction, determine the quality
of a particular fluid. But, as no sense can judge, excepting
indirectly, of compound qualities, the perception of such
is accidental, a kind of guess, that is, just as it would be
in the case of a fair individual, in the example of Cleon's
son.

Note 3, p. 133. The senses, however, do perceive casu-
ally, &c.] This passage remains, according to its wording,
unintelligible, notwithstanding the attention bestowed upon
it by commentators, because of the difficulty of attaching
any sense to the assumption, that the senses can become
as one. The comment " si unum et idem uno et eodem
tempore a diversis sensibus percipitur, ni sensus in unum
coalescunt," assumes but does not shew that the senses can
so coalesce, and then judge of impressions made upon them
individually. And thus here again is required a central
organ, the common origin of the perceptive power of the
senses, to which all impressions are to be referred and by
which they are to be compared; and such an organ is the
brain. But still, from the moment that we judge of more
1 Discours sur lea Revolutions de la terre, 66 — 67.

296 NOTES. [BK. in.

than a simple impression or a single idea, there is liability
to error, as was observed and exemplified in the case of a
fluid, which, from being bitter and yellow, is at once
assumed to be bile because those are the known qualities
of that fluid. Many of our errors arise, no doubt, in like
manner, from our not sufficiently scrutinising the impres-
sions derived from external objects.

CHAPTER II.

Note 1, p. 135. It is then manifest that perception
&c.] This is a conclusion drawn from the reasoning
of a former chapter, and its purport is to shew that our
senses enable us to judge even of privative conditions, as
darkness and silence ; and, further, that, being receptive
of forms without matter, they can retain images, and so,
through the sensorium recall objects after their with-
drawal.

Note 2, p. 136. The action of the object of percep-
tion, &c.] It has been attempted, by some of the
ancient commentators, to annex this to the preceding
argument, and shew that, as sight must first be imbued
with colour, so the hearing must, in order to perceive
sounds, be first sensible of the actions of sonorous bodies.
But the more obvious signification, and which is equally
supported by the text, is, that there must be simultaneous-

CH. II.] NOTES. 297

ness of action between the object and the sense, although
the modes of that action are as different as material are
from living properties. The succeeding passage is, by its
wording, obscure, but yet it admits of being elucidated
by the term on which its meaning chiefly depends ; for
hearing, when in potentiality, must involve both sound
(as without hearing there is no sound,) and hearing, in
reality, just as the Vital Principle must exist, innately
in the body in potentiality, but which, under genial
circumstances, is to be acted upon and made a reality ;
and thus, too, the power which impels may, itself, be
at rest.

Note 3, p. 136. But while for some senses tfiese two
states, &c.] It is scarcely possible, owing to the difficulty
of fixing upon synonyms, to make this passage clear to
the general reader — the text instances two terms (\//o0>;-
<ri? KCCI tj ciKovo-i?), as potential conditions of sound and
hearing (-v|^o'0os KO.\ tj awtf), and it may be assumed that
they conveyed a modified signification of the action and
sensation, which another language, even were the meaning
quite evident, may fail in imparting. But even the
plastic Greek fails, in many instances, in discriminating,
without periphrasis, the two conditions ; for vision,
although potential, is still vision, nor has it any other
designation when made reality by colour, and this applies
equally to the taste ami savour. In this version, the
double condition of sound is rendered by sound and
sounding, that of the sense by hearing, and audition for

298 NOTES. [BK. in.

want of a vernacular term ; the French version gives
them as " le son et la resonnance, et 1'acte de ce qui pent
entendre est Fouie ou £ audition." It is clear that hearing
and sound, and other senses and actions, in reality, must
coincide to eliminate sensation ; although this does not,
of course, apply, as the text observes, to the senses in
potentiality. And, hence, in this state, there are, for a
sentient being, no such qualities as white or black, bitter
or sweet, as they depend, for their reality, upon a given
condition of the sensibility, which depends again, in part,
upon the will.

Note 4, p. 137. If a, voice of any kind is harmony,
&c.] This deviation from the immediate subject of the
chapter, which was to prove that the five senses satisfy
all our wants as sentient creatures, and that, therefore,
there can be no other sense besides them, is, no doubt,
episodical, although it is annexed, by the extremes of
sounds, to the general argument upon sensibility. But
the phrase itself is by its wording obscure, and, by its
conclusion unsatisfactory, for it may not follow that,
because voice may be harmony and harmony proportion,
the hearing must be proportion also. It1 has been
suggested that, by a slight change of position in the
words, and so, instead of the present wording, making
harmony, voice to be (el S* »;' <pwv^ (rv/icptovia vice el %rj o-uju-
(fxatiia (pwvti -m) of any kind, it might be assumed that
hearing should be harmony. Aristotle2, by allotting
1 Vide Trendel. Comment. a De Part. Animalm, iv. 9. i.

CH. II.] NOTES. 299

" vowels and consonants, which constitute speech, to the
larynx, tongue and lips," seems, by this variety of sounds,
to consider voice as a kind of harmony ; and Cuvier says,
that all the modifications of sound which are expressible
by the letters of the alphabet, " take place in the mouth,
and depend on the relative mobility of the tongue, and
still more the lips, whence the perfection of man's speech
is derived."

Note 5, p. 138. But since we judge of white, sweet,
and each other, &c.] The only answer to this, as it was
to a former inquiry, is, that the brain is that general-
ising faculty, and that it fulfils all the conditions, however
enigmatically described, which are required in the text.
It is impossible to refuse to the brain the property of
receiving and comparing contrary impressions, simultane-
ously, and receiving them, therefore, in the words of the
text, as an indivisible principle, just as the mind can
compare opposite ideas ; and all the speculations upon
impulses and the divisibility and indivisibility of that
which is to perceive and judge only shew the want of a
central organ for the reception and comparison of indi-
vidual sensations. And many of these passages are
necessarily obscure, owing to their partaking of the
character of inquiry or suggestion, rather than didactic
statement ; but their obscurity may be, in part, seen
through by the introduction of that source of sensibility,
which is said, in the closing paragraph, to constitute
animal in contradistinction to mere vegetive life.

300 NOTES. [BK. HI.

CHAPTER III.

Note 1, p. 142. Thus, t/ten the ancients affirm, &c.]
Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus,
are cited by Aristotle1 as maintaining the doctrine
alluded to in the text ; but as Homer8 can hardly be
said in the passage quoted to have adopted it, there is
probably an error in the reference. The arguments of
these writers, in support of the doctrine, are derived from
the uncertain and varying nature of sentient impressions
which, as they depend upon individual organisms, cannot,
for the attainment of truth, be brought under any absolute
law. Thus, they held that it belongs not to the many
nor even the few to judge of truth, since the selfsame
fluid, when tasted, seems to some to be sweet, to others
bitter ; so that if all were sick or mad, and two or three
only well or sane, then these and not the others would
seem to be in that state. Many things, besides, appear
to have for many animals opposite qualities from what
they have for us; and even for the same individual,
similar substances do not always produce the same
sensation. So that it is uncertain which of these are true
or false, since these are neither more nor less true than

1 Metaphysica, III. 4. 8. 9. * Odyss. xvm. 135.

CH. III.] NOTES. 301

those ; and this made Democritus say, that either nothing
is true, or else that truth is for us uncertain (alri\ov).
From their assuming, as a general proposition, that
reflection is sensation, they maintained that reflection
is change, and that the apparent, through sensation, is, of
necessity, true ; and it is from such conclusions, Aristotle
adds, that Empedocles and Democritus as well as their
followers became fettered by those opinions. For Em-
pedocles affirmed, that men, by changing their habit
(ef«?) change also their judgment, " for man's wisdom is
enlarged," &c. ; and elsewhere he says, that " in so far as
men are capable of change, in so far they are capable of
forming different judgments." The opinion of Parmenides
is to the same purport ; and there is a recorded saying of
Anaxagoras to some of his followers, that "beings will
be to them such as they may suppose them to be." These
writers attribute the same opinion to Homer, (but it was
shewn in a former note that this reference is faulty,)
because he made " Hector, as if beside himself under the
blow, to lie thinking differently," (d\\o<f)poveovTa). But
it was incumbent upon these writers, as is observed in the
text, to have dwelt upon the liability to error to which
we are all ever subject through the senses; for if all
appearances are to be held as true, then the same impres-
sion may be at once true and false ; which is to admit an
impossibility. The doctrine, in fine, of this school, as
given in the text was, that the power by which animals
move is corporeal, and like to the faculty which thinks,

302 NOTES. [BK. in.

as also that the faculty of conclusions (judgment) is
some form of sensibility ; and thus, it reduced, so to
say, the faculties of thought to sensual impressions and
conditions.

Note 2, p. 142. On which account, eitJier all appear-
ances, <fec.] This is a dilemma, as an objection to their
doctrine, in that, " either all appearances are, as they
maintain, necessarily true, or else (in opposition to their
dogma, that like is recognised by like,) there is recognition
by unlike;" and thus the error from contraries is made
identical with the knowledge of contraries. The objection
is then placed upon the obvious ground that, while
sensation is allotted to all creatures, reflection, which
implies reason, belongs but to few ; and next, as a general
argument, it shews that mental faculties, being derived
from other sources than feeling, cannot be identical with
sentient perceptions.

Note 3, p. 143. But it is manifest that imagination,
<kc.] The argument next proceeds to the subject of
imagination, and as has been well observed, it is thus
appropriately placed between sentient perceptions and
thoughts, " as imagination cannot be without senses,
or the mind without imagination." For " imagination
is not identical with sensation," Aristotle1 observes,
and yet " it is called up either through thought or
through sensation." Imagination then, is neither sensa-
tion nor conception, as the former depends upon external
1 Metaphysica, in. 5. 23. De Motu Animalm, 8. 5.

CH. III.] NOTES. 303

influences, and the latter, which is a result from reason-
ing, being true or false, is removed from the will ; but
imagination on the contrary, can be exercised how and
when we please. It is difficult either to represent
graphically the process here alluded to, or to determine
the precise import of the text ; and other versions seem
to be equally indefinite. The Latin is, "licet Hamque,
cum libet, fingere quicquid volumus, atque ante oculos
ponere, perinde atque ii faciunt qui, in artificiosse memorise
comparatis atque dispositis locis, imaginis fingunt atque
simulacra collocant," and the French, " et Ton peut s'en
mettre 1'objet devant les yeux, comme le pratiquent ceux
qui traduisent les choses en signes mnemoniques, et
inventent des symboles." Hence, an opinion, arrived at
by a chain of reasoning drawn from particulars which we
hold to be true, cannot but affect us differently from
imaginings which are of our own coining, and which we
know to be fictitious. A succeeding passage, which shews
that imagination cannot be opinion, is to the same purport
— for, being derived from particulars, its issue is, so to
say, independent of us ; but imagination may be exercised
upon any combinations which the will may choose to
recalL

Note 4, p. 147. But the motion produced by the act,
&c.] The wording, by the act, is but an indifferent
representative of the original VTTO rfj<: cvepyeias, and yet
its exact signification, or its relation to the eWe/Ve^ia is
by no means obvious ; the phrase, besides, notwithstanding

304 NOTES. [BK. in.

its repetitions, is still vague and obscure. It seems,
however, to embody former assertions — that a single sen-
sation from a special organ, that is, must be true ; and
that there is room for fallacy when other qualities are added
to that sensation, and still more so when common pro-
perties, as motion, magnitude, or number, are, for ex-
planation, to be taken into the account.

Note 5, p. 147. And since vision is a sense, &c.] It
will be apparent that this passage depends, for its mean-
ing, upon etymology — (j)avTa<ria. (fancy or imagination)
may be derived, if not from <£a'oe, yet, from the same
root as 0a'o?, which probably is 0w? (light), as light is
essential to vision ; and 0a'oe may have formed (palvio,
which is an approximation to (pavraa-ia. The Latin
version is, " cum autem visus maxime sit sensus, hinc est
quod nomen imaginatio ab ipso lumine sumpsit, phan-
tasiaque dicitur, quia sine lumine visio fieri nequit."
Imagination or the mental perception of images, that is,
being regarded as an inward sight, and sight as the most
precious of the senses, was derived from the same root as
light, because light is essential to sight.

CH. IV.] NOTES. 305

CHAPTER IV.

Note 1, p. 153. T/wre is a distinction between posi-
tive, &c.] All the passages, under this head, are obscure,
if not incomprehensible ; their purport seems to be whe-
ther the mind judges, by one and the same faculty, of
realities, (qualities, that is, perceived through the senses)
and realities viewed, abstractedly, in their essence. Thus,
the inquiry seems to be whether the mind is sensibility
or associated, so to say, with sensibility, or altogether
distinct from it ; whether the sentient perception which
is engaged upon particulars, can ever be capable of the
abstract reasoning which detects the essence of things,
and so generalises and groups them for universal laws.
This does not, however, apply, it is said, to all subjects,
as, with some, "the two states are identical;" and this
is the case with abstractions or immaterialities, which fall
within the province of the mind apart from sense.

Note 2, p. 153. Now, it is by tfte sensibility that we
judge, &c.] This phrase seems to allude to the then
admitted doctrine that the sense of Touch either is flesh or
in the flesh, and that it, therefore, directly or indirectly, is
perceptive of hot and cold, and other such qualities ; and
this assumed sentient property may have led to this com-

20

306 NOTES. [BK. in.

plicated argument, which makes flesh to be rather an
abstract than a positive substance. Trendelenburg, in the
allusion to curved and straight lines, sees a reference to
Plato's opinions upon intellectual processes : " Sane Plato
actiones intellectus circulis primum recto, mox circinato
recurrentique interius comparat : Aristoteles linese expli-
catse et replicatse, sive porrectse et curvatse." It may,
however, be assumed that, whatever the figures or analo-
gies employed, the operations of the mind will still remain
as mysterious as those of the sensibility ; and, thus, that
all such inquiries are, as final causes, beyond our research
and, so far, unprofitable.

The Latin version of the phrase is, " Sensitiva igitur
parte calidum discernit et frigidum, quorum qusedam est
ratio caro, alia vero esse carnis discernit, aut separabile
aut se habente ad se ipsam perinde atque se habet cum
extensa fuerit linea flexa." That of the French, " Mais
c'est certainement par une autre faculte qui est separee, ou
qui du moins devient a elle-meme ce que la ligne brisee
est £ elle-mfeme aussi quand on la redresse, que nous
jugeons ce que signifie etre la chair."

Note 3, p. 154. But we have to consider why the
mind, <fec.] The chapter is closed rather abruptly with
this passage, which, by some, is said to be spurious ; but,
although obscure in its wording, it is in keeping with the
general tone of the inquiry and argument. The main
purpose of the inquiry is why, as every subject of thought,
in potentiality, is among material substances, the mind is

CH. V.] NOTES. 307

not constantly thinking, just as it has been asked why
the sensibility, which is ever acted upon by external in-
fluences, is not constantly made percipient. The answer
seems to be, that the sensibility, being in potentiality, is
incapable of perception without the agency of external
influences, while the mind, being immaterial, is able to
judge of the relations of things, without being identified
with them; and thus, that, although every object, as a
subject of thought, may be said to belong to the mind, it
cannot belong to any one of them. It may well, however,
be said, with respect to this, among other passages of
this chapter, " est enim Aristotelis, liberum cogitationis
cursum sequi neque anxia perspicuitatis causa deflecti"

CHAPTER V.

Note 1, p. 156. As if it were a virtuality like light.'] The
original «'? ef is TIC is ill represented by virtuality, and
yet neither habit, state, nor condition would represent
the agency of the mind as a realising principle ; as that
which can collect, compare, and so give reality, in gene-
ralisations, to perceptions received through the senses.
" Sicut colores expectant, ut appareant, (i. e. ut colorum
vice vere fungantur) ita sensuum notitiae et quidquid ad
intellectum patientem pertinet mentem agentem requirunt,

20—2

308 _ NOTES. [BK. in.

ut omnes veritatis numeros habeant, et verse notioiiis vim
consequantur."

Note 2, p. 156. Knowledge in activity is identical
with, &c.] This passage seems to be the complement of
what had just been asserted, that the agent is ever more
influential than the subject, and the originating cause
than the matter ; for the intellect, in activity, may be
said to create, to identify with itself that is, the know-
ledge which it acquires concerning external things through
abstract reasoning. Knowledge pre-exists, however, as
has been said, in every well-constituted individual, be-
cause each is furnished, at birth, with faculties for
acquiring knowledge ; but yet it cannot strictly be said to
pre-exist, since it may, or may not be developed by edu-
cation or reflection ; as the mind, moreover, is impassive,
it is not impressionable, and cannot, therefore, be the seat
of memory. But what means the impressionable mind
which is perishable ? may it not be again said that,
suggestively, the brain is here implied ; since this organ
is the sensorium, the seat of memory, and dependent,
besides, like all other organs, upon life, for its functions
and its continuance.

CE. VI.] NOTES. 309

CHAPTER VI.

Note 1, p. 159. In the way that Empedocles, &c.] The
passage cited in support of the above opinion is not very
apposite; for Empeclocles1, who had made "nature to be
nothing more than the combination of (yu <£"«<?) and change
among commingled particles," (attraction and repulsion,
in other words), is quoted by Aristotle * in the words,
" many heads of creatures without necks budded forth ;"
and, as if to turn against him, as it were, his own doc-
trine, it is added, " they were by affinity joined together."
This led Aristotle to the simile in the text, as Empedo-
cles3 formed things in nature by the combination of
individual particles, so may the mind eliminate new by
the association of former or admitted ideas ; and as, in
the verse cited, head and neck lie dissevered, so, in the
idea of quantity, there is nothing in common between
the measure of the diagonal and the side of the square.
Thus, as there is no common measure for the diagonal
and the side of the square, they are, in so far, distinct ;
but although, in themselves, distinct, they can, in thought,
be combined and made one. " By diameter may be

1 De Gen. et Corr. i. i. 7. * De Ccdo, in. 2. 7.

3 Vide Trendel. Comment.

310 NOTES. [BK. in.

understood the diagonal which divides the square into
two equal triangles ; or it may mean the diameter of the
circle which is incommensurate with the circumference."
In a word, it is by combination that error creeps into our
judgments, and falsifies our perceptions.

Note 2, p. 159. It is the mind, &c.] The question
of a fact, such as that in the example, is dependent
upon the brain rather than the mind, as that organ can
combine the individual notices obtained through the
senses ; but when the mind intervenes, so to say, and
judges from what is, of what was or is to be, there is
room for error. It is almost puerile to explain that the
assertion " something is not white " is not, necessarily,
fallacious ; and that, if the object be white, the fallacy
comes from the addition of the negative. The double
sense of indivisibility is to the same purport ; extension
is clearly divisible, and, therefore, divisibility is made,
actually, apparent as a fact ; but the mind can realise to
itself extension without parts, as indivisible, that is, and
in potentiality.

Note 3, p. 160. It may not then be said, &c.] In
this version, the term mind is used, and in another, " in-
telligence," (which is its synonym), as that which thinks,
(rl €woei), but the text does not so specify it ; and any
allusion to halves would but ill-accord with the notion of
homogeneity and impassibility assigned to the thinking
principle. But no theory which could be framed of the
mind would aid in explaining the train of reasoning

CH. VII.] NOTES. 311

here ; for, independently of the abstruse nature of all
mental processes, there is, evidently about it, confusion,
arising from the assumption of a something associated
with sensibility, which the brain only could rectify.

Note 4, p. 160. The point and every analogous divi-
sion, &c.] With respect to quantity l, in relation to indi-
visibility, "a point which has position, (KO! Qiaiv e%ov
<rT«7/ui;') is indivisible, but a line is divisible in one, surface
in two, and body in several directions;" and by privation
is implied that the point is without length, depth, or
breadth ; the line without either breadth or depth ; and
the surface without depth. It is obvious, from what has
been said, that every affirmation or negation must, as
depending upon sentient impressions, be either true or
false ; but that the judgment, when deciding upon essen-
tial or abiding qualities, may be true, and that, when
drawing its inferences from accidental qualities or rela-
tions of bodies, it may be erroneous.

CHAPTER YIL

Note 1, p. 165. Images belong, naturally, to the think-
ing principle, <kc.] This very suggestive comparison
between intellectual and sentient perceptions, seems, even
in the absence of knowledge of the brain, to assume that
1 Metaphysica, iv. 6. 24.

312 NOTES. [BK. in.

practical thoughts must be derived from the senses, and,
therefore, through a sensorium ; and as impressions may
be genial or otherwise, the faculties suggest pursuit or
flight. The practical mind, in fact, never thinks without
an image which acts, in its turn, so to say, upon it, as the
air, which has been impressed by colour, does upon the
pupil and the pupil upon something else (that is, the
retina), and so sound upon the hearing ; but the last
term, that is, the visual or auditory sense, is one, as the
mean or medium, however modified in condition, is one.
It will be evident, with but little consideration, that the
obscurity which is palpable in the succeeding passages is
occasioned by the absence of the brain, and can be cleared
away only by its introduction; and that, with it, the
analogies of unit and limit acquire some kind of signifi-
cation.

Note 2, p. 166. Thus tlie cogitative faculty dwells,
&c.] Aristotle seems here to consider images or thoughts,
present in memory, as necessary to ratiocination, and he
has elsewhere said that an individual without senses
could neither learn nor understand ; but he is evidently
alluding to a higher faculty than the sensibility, and
•which is able, by abstract reasoning, to draw, from present
appearances or images, conclusions as to future occur-
rences, and, by that prevision, to determine what should
or should not be done.

Note 3, p. 166. And with respect to all which, &c.]
This passage seems, although obscure from its brevity, to

CH. VII. NOTES. 313

imply that without action, when thoughts are not carried
out that is, there can for us be neither good nor bad, as
these are relations pertaining to individuals, and dependent,
not upon any universal law but, upon social institutions ;
but that tmth, being the same for ever, is, even when not
exercised, in an absolute relation to all men, and in oppo-
sition to all falsehood.

Note 4, p. 166. The mind dwells upon abstractions,
&c.] The term abstractions here, as in an earlier passage,
signifies mathematical questions, which, from not being
referrible to any particular body, admit of being treated as
such ; and so a snub- nose, as the realisation of a particular
form, may, by that form apart from matter, be regarded
as an abstraction. The argument is then resumed that
the mind, when thinking, is, wJien active or in act, the
subject thought upon. The closing passage, by its ques-
tioning whether " the mind, witliout being itself imma-
terial, can comprehend abstractions," seems to militate
against the arguments adduced to prove that it is impassive
and homogeneous, freed, that is, from all the conditions of
matter ; but it is yet doubtful where (whether or not in
"the metaphysics") this argument may, according to
promise, have been continued.

314 NOTES. [BK. m.

CHAPTER VIII.

Note 1, p. 169. But tJie question here must necessarily
refer, &c.] This argument, while maintaining the opinion
that sensibility is receptive of form without matter, is an
objection to the doctrine of Empedocles and others, who,
having derived the Vital Principle from material elements,
made perception to be material also, in the relation of
like by like. But here it is said that, as the hand is the
instrument for making instruments, so the mind is the
archetype of forms, and sensibility the recipient of the
forms of things without their matter, perceived through
the senses. Aristotle, however, does make imagery, the
power that is, of recalling forms, to be essential to cogi-
tation, and, consequently, to reflection ; although doubting
whether there may not be thoughts which cannot have a
sentient origin.

Note 2, p. 170. Imagination, on the other hand,
&c.] Imagination, or the faculty which calls up images
is, necessarily, different from that which determines the
truth or falsehood of any proposition, and which affirms
or denies ; for affirmation or negation, as the predicant
of something held to be true or erroneous, is, as was said,
a combination of thoughts ; and thoughts, being made up

CH. IX.] NOTES. 315

of simple ideas, are not, like the imagination, under our
own control. Thus, while the former may be regarded as
a single faculty, and, in some sense, independent of the
judgment, the latter involves many and opposing ideas
and perceptions. But what is here meant by primal
thoughts (TO. 2e -n-pw-ra vo^aTa)1 Do the words imply
innate ideas, or conceptions of pure abstraction, such as
creation, virtue, responsibility, and others'? Or must it
be admitted that no definite sense can be attached to
them 1 If primal mean innate thoughts, (thoughts, that
is, no way dependent upon sentient properties,) then such
are distinguishable at once from those which are derived
from images, although these are not, themselves, images
in reality.

CHAPTER IX.

Note 1, p. 173. But a difficulty at once presents itself,
&c.] There is an apparent want of discrimination here
between the faculties which are the privilege and dis-
tinction of higher creatures and the functions which are
essential to life, and without which there can be neither
animal nor living being. In a subsequent paragraph the
rational faculty or mind («al o KaXov/jLevus i/oi/s) is ex-
cluded from all participation in corporeal movements,
and held to have no part in sentient perception. It is

316 NOTES. [BK. in,

supposed, in fact, never to be engaged upon what is prac-
tical as its office is contemplation, so that, " when dwelling
upon what may be fearful, or otherwise, it does not, at
once, suggest, flight or pursuit ; " although, independently
of its influence, "the heart or some other organ of the
body maybe accelerated or depressed." But in all this, as
no allusion is made to a moving force, whether the
motive be imagination or the stimulus of appetite, the
inquiry may be said to be defective.

Note 2, p. 173. But to resume the more especial, &c.]
Although these passages, which allude both to physical
and moral causes of motion, are sufficiently obvious, yet, as
they do not explain how locomotion is effected, they fail
in the object of the inquiry ; and then the motion con-
cerned in nutrition, growth and decay, is almost in the
same category, so to say, with that of progression. It
may be mentioned that the " motion and progression of
animals," " breathing and expiration," " sleep and watch-
ing," "youth and age," are special treatises, and probably
composed for the elucidation of this particular work upon
" life." The comparison between the intemperate man
who, although rational, acts against his reason, and the
physician who, although versed in medical science, does
not cure, seems to exemplify the adage, that to advise is
one thing, to do, another ; or to confirm the solemn words
of Johnson, "that teachers of morality discourse like
angels, but they live like men."

CH. X.] NOTES. 317

CHAPTER X.

Note 1, p. 178. Thus it is the object longed for alone,
&c.] Food, that is, being necessary both for stilling the
appetite and preserving the body, is the first motor ; for,
were there, as the text says, two motors, then, as the
practical mind never impels to move without appetite,
appetite could not impel to move without the mind,
which is not the case. This is the argument ; but it is
less distinct than might be wished for owing to the
nature of the practical mind not having been defined,
and to insufficient knowledge concerning both muscular
agency and the brain and nervous system.

Note 2, p. 178. The mind then is always right, &c.]
The intellect, that is, when neither moved by appetite
nor perverted by imagination, (for both may be wrong) is,
when freed from those influences, always right ; but food
incites to move because it is either good or appears to be
a good, in the sense, not of a moral but, of a practical
good, and, as such, it may, by abuse, be the opposite of
good.

Note 3, p. 179. The, appetites admit of being opposed,
&c.] "Appetite and reason are not always in accord-
ance," Aristotle1 observes, and as, when any one desire is
1 Eih. End. n. 8. 5.

318 NOTES. [BK. in.

subdued another may arise and strive for the mastery, so
appetite may well be opposed to appetite. But resistance
to desire can be manifested only in such beings as have a
sense of time, have, that is, powers of abstraction, by
which, withdrawing themselves from what is present, and
foreseeing consequences in the future, they are enabled to
resist the immediate compliance which desire or passion
is urging upon them. For "the1 portion of time now
present, is a portion of that which is future and indi-
visible."

Note 4, p. 179. For loithout having been itself -moved,
&c.] Owing to the wording there is obscurity about
this passage, but yet it may be elucidated — the object
desired, food, that is, although at rest, may, acting
upon the appetitive sense, incite to move, and so be
regarded as a motor; and there are, of course, as many
such motors as there are kinds of food. These then are
the three terms — first, the motor or food; then the
muscular agency by which locomotion is effected ; and
lastly, that which is moved, or the animal.

Note 5, p. 180. £ut to speak summarily, &c.] The
passage has, in this version, been rendered with a bias
that the analogy was drawn from the structure of the
knee-joint, which, in all times, has been likened to a
hinge, and hence termed " ginglymoid ; " and concholo-
gists, following Aristotle1, have so termed the hinge of

1 Nat. Ausc. rv. ro.

3 Hist. Animalm, IV. 4. 11.

CH. XI.] NOTES. 319

the bivalves. The Latin is, " nunc ut in summa dicamus,
id quod movet ut instrumentum, ibi est collocandum ubi
idem piincipii rationem finisve subit ut in cardine fit —
hinc enim convexum et concavum est ; quorum alterum
finis, alterum principium est ; quapropter alienum quiescit
alterum movetur." The closing paragraph seems to con-
firm what has been assumed, that sentient imagination is
analogous to " animal instinct."

CHAPTER XL

Note 1, p. 182. The sentient imagination belongs,
&c.] Instinct is the fixed but unerring guide of the
lower animals ; the voluntary imagination, on the other
hand, the faculty, that is, which can, at will, be called up
and supply images for selection and combination by the
judgment, can belong only to beings endowed with
reason — that is, to man. The faculties associated with
this imagination, enable the individual, by idealising a
measure, to select what may be, relatively, larger and
better, and out of several impressions or sensations, to
form general notions. It is unnecessary to follow the
argument which explains why these creatures, so low
in the scale, cannot form opinions.

Note 2, p. 182. But appetite has no deliberative
icill, &c.] The meaning of this passage is, seemingly, too

320 NOTES. [BK. in.

obvious to require comment ; but some commentators
have in the term o-QaTpa seen an allusion to the celestial
spheres, rather than a ball, because, as the upper controls
in its movements the lower sphere, so reason, being
superior to appetite, is to control inordinate desires.
" Quibus collatis, non temerarium erit, o-^a/pa? similitu-
dinem ita interpretari : consilium tanquam superius
(»/ ai/co) ita appetitum in suum motum convertere, sicut
superior sphsera eas, quce inferiores volvuntur." The
words which follow " that which is superior is ever
naturally more dominant," may require some such
interpretation, for they seem to imply that motion, by
translation, may be derived from the motions of the
spheres above, which were said to be in three directions ;
but the knowing faculty, the mind, that is, like the first
motor, is, for ever, at rest.

Note 3, p. 183. Although tfte conception of tlie uni-
versal, &c.] This abstruse passage can only be under-
stood by reference to the special treatise upon " the
motion of animals, wherein this topic is considered;" it
is asked, " whence comes it, that an individual, after
thinking, sometimes acts and sometimes does not act,
sometimes moves and sometimes does not move?" and
the answer1 is, that "action or motion is the conclusion
of a syllogism," of which " the conception of the universal
is the major, that of the particular, the middle, and the
action following it the minor."

1 De Motu Animalm, 5. f. i.

CH. XII.] NOTES. 321

CHAPTER XII.

Note 1, p. 186. Simple or homogeneous bodies, <fec.]
There is no clue in Aristotle's writings to the meaning
of "simple (or homogeneous) bodies" (TO o-w/ua aVAoi/i/),
unless it be the Acalepha ', " the body of which, like
that of the oyster, is said to be altogether fleshy, but,
unlike the oyster, to be without a shell ; and it is further
said to belong rather to plants than animals." But
as in the following chapter it is shewn that an animal
body, if homogeneous, cannot exist, so the tenor of the
whole argument may be, to shew that no animal body
can be homogeneous.

Note 2, p. 187. As to creatures which are fisced, &c.]
These include such species of the Testacea as are fixed
to one habitat, and derive nutriment from the water with
which they are surrounded ; but it is not easy to deter-
mine what is meant by the term dyevinjrov, (spontaneously
generated,) as this mode of reproduction was attributed,
by Aristotle, to some fishes and eels, which are certainly
neither homogeneous nor insentient.

Note 3, p. 188. The otlter senses, being for, &c.] It may
be questioned whether this description is absolutely true,

1 Hist. Animalm, iv. 6. 6. vui. i. 7.

21

3'2'2 NOTES. [BK. in.

as there are creatures •which, although fixed to one
habitat, not capable of progression that is, are endowed
with all the senses, although it may be in some modified,
or less active form than in the higher animals. For
" the l nervous system has been detected in every division
of the animal kingdom, and almost in every class, and it is
everywhere connected with sensation and motion."

Xote -4, p. 188. Be sensible through a medium, etc.]
The medium, that is, made diaphanous and motive by
colour or sound, acts, by a succession of undulations,
upon the eye or the ear, and finally, through the humours
of the former and the air in the latter, upon the sentient
part of these organs ; so that there is an evident analogy
between these undulations and the impulses which main-
tain locomotion until lost in the state of rest. This
succession of impulses may well apply to the changes
which, without change of locality, are slowly and silently
going on in bodies, and be compared to colouring matter
which permeates and gradually combines with each
molecule of wax up to saturation ; but every substance
cannot, of course, be thus affected — a stone, for instance,
owing to the condensation of its particles, cannot be
made receptive of colour.

Note 5, p. 189. The air if mobile in the highest

degree, <kc.] The nature and properties of the atmosphere

were imperfectly known, as has been said, in the age of

Aristotle. It was deemed necessary to sensation that

1 Grant's Outline*, 179.

CH. XII.] NOTES. 323

the air should be still (for, when in motion, it was con-
verted, according to opinion, into wind), and as one mass ;
and as this aggregation of the air could be only over
smooth surfaces, the outer coat of the eye (the cornea)
seemed, by its smoothness, to favour Aristotle's doctrine,
that vision is through a medium, and completed, by
refraction, at the bottom of the organ. The medium, set
in motion, by colour, was said to give motion, by successive
impulses, to the air over the cornea, which communicated
the impulse to the organ within ; and this superseded
the doctrine that vision is produced by rays emanating
from the eya Thus, " the air (that over the cornea), in
its turn, sets vision in motion ;" but the last clause of
the sentence is very obscure, and offers, as some com-
mentators have said, "great difficulties." It may, per-
chance, be a continuation of the analogy and suggest
that, as colouring matter acts, successively, until each
particle is saturated, so the impulse is transmitted to the
cornea, and finally, from it, to the visual faculty within.

324 NOTES. [BK. in.

CHAPTER XIII.

Note 1, p. 192. The Touch is made sensible... aiid
lience its name, &c.] The text refers to etymology to
shew, that as, in all times, it had been noticed that the
impression upon other senses is different from that upon
Touch, it had hence obtained its appellation a$»/, which,
being derived from OTTTW, (to fasten or bind,) signifies
fastening or binding, and so (by touching,) immediate
contact ; as contact is necessary for the sensation of
Touch. This may suffice for the explanation of the
term in the original, but it may not, of course, be
applicable to its synonym in a modern language, since its
origin may be from another idea, and, therefore, a dif-
ferent root.

Note 2, p. 192. And yet the other sentient organs, <fec.]
It had been proved analogically, that, as bodies in the
water are separated by the water, (as was supposed to be
proved by their extremities being wet,) so bodies in the
air are separated by air, and therefore, that, as no one
body is in immediate contact with another body, sensa-
tion can be effected only through a medium ; and this
was supposed to hold good even for the Touch. Thus,
the medium, acted upon and acting in its turn, reduces

CH. XIII.J NOTES. 325

all sensual impressions to the one impression by contact,
and this generalisation is supported by some modern
writers and regarded as the theory of Sensation. " There *
may, however, be many other impressions derived from
outward bodies, for which the sensitive nerves of the
lower animals are adapted, besides those which affect us,
and we cannot always be certain of the identity of the
feelings communicated to them by organs which appear
analogous to our own."

Note 3, p. 193. On which account, other sentient, <fec.]
This is consonant with the opinion that the Touch is the
only sense necessary to animal existence; although the
organs of relation are required for the higher forms of
being. Thus, impressions in excess upon those organs,
whether by colour, sound, or odour, may injure or pervert
the senses, but cannot further affect the individual ;
while tangible impressions, hot, cold, or hard, can
together with the sense destroy the animal.

Note 4, p. 193. Animals, in fact, possess... the other
senses, <fec.] This is referrible, of course, only to the
higher orders of animals, as they alone require such
organs for the exercise of their faculties, and the enjoy-
ment of their existence. The Tongue is here introduced,
whether by inadvertence or in submission to common
opinion, as if it were a sense, or the sole organ for
speech; and yet, as the chief of the organs for taste

1 Grant's Outlinet, p. 248.

326 NOTES. [BK. in.

and speech, it may be said to constitute one of the
distinguishing features of humanity. As no creature,
however, is without a tongue, it can scarcely be supposed
to be wanting, and yet, as it would not seem to be so
essential as some other parts, life might, perhaps, for a
time, be maintained without it. But speech is, of course,
nowise necessary to life, as the learned commentator
observes: "Nam etiam linguae sermone, si vitam, de-
tractis ornamentis, ad necessitatis angustias redigere velis,
vitse conservatio carere potest.:'

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