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AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS 














WORKS BY DR. E. ZELLER. 





PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS: a History of Greek 
Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the time of Socrates, 
Translated from the German by SARAH F, ALLEYNE, 2 vols. 
Crown 8vo. 30s. 


SOCRATES AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 
Translated from the German by O. J. ReicHEen, M.A, 
Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d, 


PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY. Translated 


from the German by SaraH F, ALLEYNE and A, GoopwIn. 
Crown 8vo, 18s. 


STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SCEPTICS. Trans- 
lated from the German by O. J. ReIcHEL, M.A. Crown 
8vo. 15s. ° 


HISTORY OF ECLECTICISM IN GREEK PHILO- 
SOPHY. Translated from the German by Saran F, 
ALLEYNE, Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. 


OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY. Translated from the German by SARAH F, 
ALLEYNE and EVELYN ABBOTT. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. 





LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 
39 Paternoster Row, London 
New York and Bombay 








ARISTOTLE 





THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS 


BEING A TRANSLATION FROM 


ZELLER’S ‘PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS’ 


BY 


B. F. 0. COSTELLOE, M.A. 


AND 


J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A. ,. 


i : ' 
i a 
{ 


IN TWO VOLUMES —VOL. II. 


¢ \ 
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND GO. 
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 


1897 


All rights reserved 





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CONTENTS 


OF 


THE SECOND VOLUME 





CHAPTER X 
PHYSICS—continued 


C. Living Creatwres 


The Soul, 1. Its relation to the Body, 4. The Body as an Organic 
Whole related to the Soul as Means to End, 10. Stages of Ani- 
mate Existence, 21. The Evolution of Organic Life and the 
Law of Analogy, 24. Indications of life in Inorganic Nature; 
History of the Earth and Mankind, 29. 

Plants, 33. 

Animals, 37. Their Bodies and the homogeneous materials of which 
they consist, 38. Organs and their Functions, 41. Generation 
and difference of Sex, 48. Sensation, 58. The Five Senses, 62. 
Sensus Communis, 68. Memory and Imagination, 70. Pleasure 
and Pain, 75. Sleep and Waking, 75. Dreams, 76. Death, 77. 
Scale of Value in animal creation, 78. Classification of animal 
Species, 80. 


CHAPTER XI 
PHYsIcs—continued 


Man 


The Human Body, 90. Soul and Reason, 92. Active and Passive 
Reason, 97. Immediate and mediate exercise of Reason, 105. 
Desire and Volition, 108. Practical Reason and Rational Will, 
112. Free Will, Voluntariness, Intention, 114. The question of 
the Unity of the life of the Soul, 119. The Birth of the Soul, 
120. The Union of the Parts of the Soul, 123. The Immortality 
of the Soul, 129. Personality, 134. — 


vi ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XII 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 


A. Ethics 

The End of Human Activity: Happiness, 138. The essential elements 
of Happiness, 140. External Goods, 144. Pleasure, 146. Value 
of Pleasure, 148. 

Moral Virtue, 153. Virtue as a Quality of the Will distinguished 
from Natural Impulses, 155. Intellectual Insight, 157. The 
Origin of Virtue, 160. The Consent of the virtuous Will: the 
Proper Mean, 161. The Virtues, 163. Courage, Self-control, &c., 
167. Justice, 170. Distributive and Corrective Justice, 171. 
Complete and Incomplete, Natural and Legal Right; other dis- 
tinctions, 175. ‘The Intellectual Virtues: Insight, 177. The 
right relation to the Passions, 188. 

Friendship: its moral Import, 191. Nature and Kinds of Friend- 
ship, 193. Further discussions, 198. 


CHAPTER XIII 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY—continued 


B. Politics 


Necessity, Nature, and Functions of the State; Aristotle’s Politics, 
203. Ethical import of the State, 207. Aim of the State, 208. 

The Household as element in the State, 213. Husband and Wife, 
214. Parents and Children, 215. Master and Slave, 216. Pro- 
duction and Possession, 220. Against Common Property in 
Wives, Children, and Goods, 220. 

The State and the Citizen, 222. Differences among citizens, 229. 
Their political importance, 229. 

Forms of Constitution, 233. Comparative Value and Justification 
of leading forms, 244. Monarchy and Republic, 249. 

The Best State, 258. Its natural conditions and economic basis, 
258. Training of the Citizen, 261. Birth and Education, 262. 
Music, 266. Unfinished state of this part of the Politics in 
reference to Intellectual Training, Punishment, &c., 269. The 
Constitution, 272. 

Imperfect Forms, 274. Democracy, 274. Oligarchy, 277. Aristo- 
cracy and Polity, 278. Tyranny, 282. The distribution of 
Political Power, Changes in the Constitution, &c., 283. 


CHAPTER XIV 
RHETORIC 


Problem of the Rhetoric, 289. Kinds of Proof, 2983. Demonstra- 
tion, 294. Different species of Demonstration appropriate to 


Cl ——————EEEE tlle er. mc ES -htt— 
. 
: = 


CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME vii 


different Kinds.of Discourse, 295. Remaining forms of Proof, 
296. Style and Arrangement, 297. 


CHAPTER XV 
THEORY OF FINE ART 


Beauty, 301. Art as Imitation, 303. The effect of Art: Catharsis, 
307. The Arts, 318. Tragedy, 320. 


CHAPTER XVI 
RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY 


Aristotle’s attitude to Religion, 325. His Theology, 327. Signifi- 
cance and Origin of Popular Religion, 330. 


CHAPTER XVII 
RETROSPECT 


Aristotle’s point of view, 336. Development of the System, 338. 
Gaps and Contradictions, 342. Tendency of the Peripatetic 
School, 346 


CHAPTER XVIII 
THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL : THEOPHRASTUS 


His Life, 348. Writings, 351. Standpoint, 355. Logic, 358. Meta- 
physics: Aporiz, 364. Theology, 369. Physics: Nature in 
general; Inorganic Nature, 373. Structure and history of the 
World, 379. Botanical Theory, 381. Nature of Vegetable life, 
383. Parts of Plants, 384. Origin of Plants, 385. Classification, 
388. Zoology, 389. Anthropology: the Soul as cause of move- 
ment, 390. Reason, Active and Passive, 392. Higher and lower 
parts of the Soul, 395. The Senses, 396. The Freedom of the 
Will, 399. Ethics, 399. Happiness, 402. Views on other points 
of ethical doctrine, 406. Politics, 410. Religious views, 412. 
Rhetoric and Theory of Fine Art, 414. 


CHAPTER XIX 
EUDEMUS, ARISTOXENUS, DICH.ARCHUS, AND OTHERS 


Eudemus, 417. Logic, 418. Physics, 419. Metaphysics, 421. 
Ethics: Virtue as a divine gift, 422. Theology, 424. Uprightness, 
426. Other peculiarities of Eudemian ethics, 427, 

Aristoxenus, 429. Ethical views, 431. Theory of Music, 433. Of 
the Soul, 436 ; 


VOL. II. a 


viii ARISTOTLE 


Dicearchus: Anthropology, 438. The practical and the theoretic 
life, 440. Politics, 441. 
Phanias, Clearchus, and others, 443. 


CHAPTER XX 


THE SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS : STRATO 


Demetrius of Phalerus and others, 447. 

Strato, 450. Logic and Ontology, 454. Nature and Deity, 455, 
Physical principles: Heat and Cold, 456. Gravity, Vacuum, 
Time, Motion, 458. Cosmology, 464. Anthropology, 466. 


CHAPTER XXI 


THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AFTER STRATO TILL TOWARDS THE 
END OF THE SECOND CENTURY 
Lyco, 474. Hieronymus, 475. Aristo, 477. Critolaus, 479. Phor- 
mio, Sotion, &c., 483. 
Pseudo- Aristotelian Literature, 494. Logical, Metaphysical, Physical 
Writings, 495. The Magna Moralia, 498. The Hconomics, 498. 
The Rhetoric addressed to Alexander, 499. Conclusion, 499. 


APPENDIX 


ON THE FORM OF THE ‘ POLITICS’ ‘ ‘ : . . 5Ol 


INDEX . F P ; ; ‘ ; : j ; . 509 


Addenda and Corrigenda. 


Page 5, n. 2, col. 2, 1. 10, for cut read cut in pieces 
» 6,1. 8,for alien read allied 
» 61,1. 5, for force read faculty 
» 90, n. col. 1, 1. 19, for whole read whale 
» 111, n. 3, col. 2, ll. 2, 7, for cylinders read springs 
» 147, n. col. 1, 1.16, for these last, however, are merely causes read the satisfaction 
of a want, moreover, is merely the cause 
s 152, n.1, col. 1, 1. 3, omit wrong 
» 171,1.7, for quality read equality 
» 172, n. 2, col. 2,1. 3 from bottom, after things read that 
» 178,1. 4, for moral insight read moral virtue 
» 182, n. col. 1,1. 6, for p. 182 read p. 183 
» 184, n. col. 2,1. 10 from bottom, for picture read future 
» 195, n. 4, col. 1, 1. 4 from bottom, for 3 on preceding page read 2 supra 
» 196, n. 1, col. 1,1. 3, for pupil read audience 
» 204, n. 2, col. 2,1. 5 from bottom, for p. 203 supra, read Appendix, p. 507. 
» 231, n.1, col. 1, 1 9, for finds itself more at home read exercises more influence 
» 242, 1.10, for indispensable read indisputable 
» 243, n.1, col. 1,1. 6, for chiefly read nearly 
» 245,11, for But even any one of such advantages as these confers read But even 
such advantages as these confer of themselves no title to rule in the State. 
» 259, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 8, for size read greatness 
» 267, n. col. 1, L. 9, omit or 
» 274, 1. 8, for or form, differing read or from differing 
» 292, 1.9, for But as he regards...sense read Since, however, proof is the chief 
end in view 
» 322,n, col. 1,1. 8 from bottom, for added read not added 
» 9324, n. 5, col. 1, 1. 11, omit vol. i. 
3 825, ll. 1, 3, for section read chapter 
» n..2, col, 2,1. 5, before p. 291 read vol. ii. 
327, 1. 6, for scientific read theoretic 
» last line, omit and 
331, n. 2, col. 1, 1. 2 from bottom, for paveiq read pavreta 
335, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 10, for in chap. i. read vol. i. pp. 5, n. 7; 20, n. 2; 38, n. 
339, 1. 9, for motion read matter 
» 1.10, for relation read relationship 
375, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 9, fo7, Melinus read Melissus 
382, 1. 6 from bottom, for geological read zoological 


References. 

The following references are to Vol. i. :—Vol. ii. p. 159, n. 2, col. 1, 1. 8; 180, n. 2, 
col. 2, 1. 2; 181, n. col. 2, 1. 1, and 1. 11 from bottom ; 182, n. 1, col. 1,1. 6 from 
bottom ; 204, n. 2, col. 1, ll. 3 and 10, and 1. 2 from bottom ; 206, n. 4, col, 2, 1. 3 from 
bottom ; 219, n. 3, col. 1, 1. 4 from bottom; 236, n. col. 1,1. 10 from bottom ; 267, 
n. col. 1, 1.10; 292, n, 1, col. 1, 1.10; 302, n.1, col. 1, Il. 6,12; 331, n. 1, col. 1,11; 
332, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 1; 343, n. 2, col. 2, 1.1; 349, n. 3, eol. 2, 1. 1 from bottom. 


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ARISTOTLE 


AND THE 


EARLIER PERIPATETICS 





CHAPTER X 


[CHAP, IX. C. OF GERMAN TEXT] 


Living Creatures 


1. The Soul and Life 


Wuart distinguishes living creatures from all others is 
the Soul.' All life, in fact, consists in the power of self- 
movement,’ that is, in a capacity inherent in a being of 
effecting changes in itself: the simplest form of which 
is confined, as in the case of plants, to nutrition, growth, 
and decay.? But every movement implies two elements 


! De An. i. 1, 407, a, 4: the 
investigation into the nature of 
the soul is of the highest value 
for science, pdAtora 5¢ mpds thy 
giow* Fort yap olov apxh trav 
(pov [%) Wyn). 

2 Thid. ii. 1, 412, b, 16, ef. a, 
27, and see infra. 

* Tbid. ii, 2, 413, a, 20: A€yo- 
bev obv . . . BiwploOa Td EuWvxov 
Tov abixou TE Cv. wAcovaxas 5é 
Tov (hv Aeyoucvou, kby Ev Tt TOUTwY 


VOL. II. 


~h 
~“ 


évuTapxn povov, Civ avrd paper, 
oloy vovs, atoOnos, xlynots Kar 
ordois ) Kara Témov, ert Klynots 
kata tpophy Kal pOlois re Kab 
abinots, 3 kal ra pudueva wdvta 
Soxet Civ" palvera: yap éy adrois 
Exovta Sivauiw Kal apxhy ro.abrny, 
5: js abinoly te kal POlow Aau- 
Bdvovot . . . od8eula yap aibrois 
brdpxer Sivauis BAAN Woxijs. As 
this lowest form of life presents 
itself wherever the higher is (sce 


2 ARISTOTLE 


—something that moves, and something that is moved: 
form and matter; and if a thing moves itself, it must 
contain this duality within itself.' Hence every being 
that has life must be a compound being; and if we call 
the material part, which is subject to motion, the body, 
it will follow that the form, which is the cause of 
motion, has a being separate from and independent of 
the body.2. And as the form in general is identified with 
the efficient and the final cause, this being may also be 
said to be the final aim or end of the body.’ The form 
thus considered as motive or efficient force is called by 
Aristotle ‘ Entelechy ’; ‘and hence he defines the Soul as 


infra) it may be treated as the 
universal mark of a living thing ; 
ibid. c. 1, 412, a, 13: ray de 
gvoikav [sc. cwudrwv] Ta mev exer 
Cwhv Ta 8 ovn Exer* (why 5& A€yo- 
pev Thy 8 abtov [abtod] tpophy 
Tre kal avtinow Kal Plow. On the 
other hand, De An. i. 2, 403, b, 
25 (7d eupuxov 8h Tod abdxov 
dvoty = pddwcra Siapépew Soxei, 
Kiwhoet Te Kal TE alcOdved Bat), ex- 
presses merely the popular view, 
not the technical definition, of 
life. 

' See p. 4, n. 1, infra. 

2 De An. ii. 1, 412, a, 15: 
bore way cua pvoikdy peréxov 
(wis ova.a dy efn, ovola 8 ott ws ws 
auv0ern* érel § éori copa Tasvde" 
[TRENDELENBURG: gc@pa kal 
Toovel; TORSTRIK: kai a. roidvde], 
(why yip €xov, obk by etn Td capa 
Wuxh. ob ydp éott TaY Kad’ bro- 
Kemevov TO aaua, wadrdAoy 8 ws 
troxelucvoy Kal An. avayKatoy &pa 
Thy Wuxhv ovctay eivar ws eldos 
owpuatos gvoiov Suvduer (why 
éxovtos. Part. An. i. 1, 641, a, 
14-32; Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, b, 26; 


Metaph. viii. 3, 1043, a, 35. Ari- 
stotle had already described the 
soul in the Hudemus as etdés 71; 
see i. 383 sq., supra. 

3 De An. ii. 4,415, b, 7, where 
after the passage quoted, i, 356, n. 
1, sup., he goes on, 1.12: rt wer ody 
ws ovaia[sc. aitla early h Wuxh]) 
SjAov’ 7d yap altiov Tov elvat 
raow ) ovola, To bE Civ Tots Gaot 
To elval éoriv, aitia 5€ Kal apxh 
TOUTwY 7] WuxXh. ert ToD Suydpe 
bvTos Adyos 7) evTEeAexela. pavepoy 
8 &s kal ob Evexey H Wuxh airia* 
domep yap 6 vots Evekd Tov Trotet, 
Toy avToy Tpdmov  piots, Kal TOUT’ 
éotw auth TEéAOS. To.wovToy 8 ev 
Tois (gos ) Wuxy Kot [2] Kara 
pvow’ mavTa yap TA puvolKa ow- 
para THS Wuxns Upyava .. . ws 
evexa THS Wux7s bvTra. He then — 
goes on to show, what is a matter 
of course, that the soul is an 
efficient cause. Part. An. i. 1, 
641, a, 25: the ovcia is both effi- 
cient and final cause; rotovroy dé 
700 (gov rot aca H Wx} 7} mépos 
TL QUTHS. 


4 Cf, i. 379, supra, 





PHYSICS 8 


the Entelechy, or more accurately as the lirst Entelechy, 
of a natural body endowed with the capacity of life.' 
This again applies to none but organic bodies, the 
members of which are designed for some definite pur- 
pose and serve as instruments for the fulfilment of 
special functions.? The Soul accordingly is the First 


' De An, ii. 1, Aristotle pro- 
ceeds: 7 8 ovala évreAdéxera [the 
form is the efficient force]. 
rowvrov tpa oéuaros évred€exeia. 
The expression ‘entelecheia’ has, 
however, a double sense: at one 
time it is the power of action 
that is understood by it; at 
another, the activity itself (the 
standing example of the former 
meaning is émorjun, of the latter, 
Oewpeiv; seeibid., and cf. Metaph. 
ix. 6, 1048, a, 34 ; Phys. viii. 4, 255, 
a, 833; De Sensu, 4, 441, b, 22; 
Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 9; TREN- 
DELENBURG, De An. 314 sq.; 
Bonirz, Arist. Metaph. ii. 394). 
The soul can be called entele- 
cheia only in the former sense 
(that of the power), seeing that 
it is present even in sleep; this 
is what is meant by the addition 
mpwrn, When in 1. 27 it is said: 
Wuxh eotw evredéxeia 7 MpaeT 
cdparos pvaoikod duvdue: (why Exov- 
vos, for the power always pre- 
cedes the activity. 

* Aristotle proceeds, 1. 28: 
rowiro bt [sc. durvduer (why Exor], 
 &y # dpyaviKdy, adding that the 
parts of plants also are organs, 
though very simple ones (cf. 
Part. An. ii. 10, 655, b, 37). On 
the definition of organic life cf. 
the passage quoted by TRENDE- 
LENBURG in loco; Part. An. i. 1, 
642, a, 9: as the axe to fulfil 
its purpose must be hard, obrws 
kat drmel 7d caua vpyavoy (evend 


Tos ‘yap €xaorovy Tay poplwy, 
duolws 5& Kal rd bAov) avdyKn Upa 
Towovdt elvat kal ex Towyvdl, ei éxeivo 
éorar. Ibid. i. 5, 645, b, 14: eel 
dé 7d wey bpyavoy way Everd Tov, Td 
5 of Evena mpatls tis, pavepdy Sri 
kal rd civoAov cama ouvéornKe 
mpatews Twos €vexa mAhpovs. As 
the saw exists for the sake of 
sawing, so Td aud mws THs WuxIs 
Evexev, Kal Ta popia T@V Epywy mpds 
& wéguxev Exacrov. Ibid. ii. 1, 
646, b, 10 sqq.: of the constitu- 
ent parts of living things some 
are homogeneous, others hetero- 
geneous (see i. 517, n. 6, supra) ; 
the former, however, exist for the 
sake of the latter; éxelywy [sc. 
TaY Gyouotomep@y] yap Epya Kal 
mpaters eiciv . . . Sidmep CE doTav 
kal veipwy &C. guverThKact Te 
dpyavika Tov popiwy. Tbid. ii. 10, 
655, b, 387: plants have only a 
few heterogeneous parts; mpds 
yap oAlyas mpdtes dAlywy dpydvev 
n xpnots. the ‘organic’ parts of 
the body, therefore, are those 
which serve a definite purpose ; 
for this use of the word see, e.g. 
Gien. An. ii. 4, 739, b, 14: rots 
dpyavikois mpos Thy guvovoiay 
peoplois, TIngr, An. 4, 705, b, 22: 
boa pey yap dpyavikois mépeot xpa- 
neva. (Aéyw 8 oloy wooly i) mréputw 
Tit GAAw ToLOdT@P) Thy cipnuevny 
peraBordy [locomotion] moeira 

boa 5€ wh To1wvTaLs poplas, 


ait@ 5€ TH owpart Fiadrppes 
roiovmeva mpucpxetat. All the 


B2 


4 ARISTOTLE 


Entelechy of a Natural Organic Body.! This definition 
does not, indeed, apply to the higher portion of the 
Soul, which in the human spirit is added to its other 
parts. With this, however, Natural Philosophy has 
nothing to do: it is rather the subject-matter of the 
‘First Philosophy.’ ? 

The soul, considered as the form and moving prin- 
ciple of the body, must itself be incorporeal ;* and here 
Aristotle contradicts the interpreters of his theory who 
represent it as being material in nature. It does not 
move itself, as Plato thought, for then it would be a 
motum as well as a movens, and every motum exists in 
space. Nor is it a harmony of its own body ;° for such 
a harmony would be either a union or a proportionate 
mixture of different materials, and the soul is neither 
one nor the other: the notion of harmony is better 
suited to physical conditions, such as health, than to 
the soul.6 Again, it is not a number that moves itself, 


parts of a living body, however, 
serve some active purpose. 

1 De An. ii. 1, 412, b, 4: € 
34 Te Kowdy éeml maons Puxis det 
Aéyew, ein dy evTeAéxera 7] WPOTY 
cdpatros puotkod dpyavikov, and a 
similar definition is given, l. 9 
sqq.: it is the Adyos [or the ovata 
Kata Tov Adyov| THuaTOS PuatKo 
rowovdl ExovTos apxny KwiTews Kar 
OTAMEWS EV EAUTH. 

2 See on this subject Part. 
An. ti, 1, 641, - a,: 172) 10% 
cf. De An. i. 1, 403, a, 27, b,¥ 
sqq., li. 2, 413, b, 24. 

®§ See p. 2, n. 2, supra. De 
Juvent. 1, 467, b, 14: dHAev brt 
obx oldy 7° civat oGua Thy ovoiav 
avis [THs WuxIs|, GAA’ Buws Bri *y’ 
éy Ti TOU TmuaTos brdpxe popig, 


pavepdv. 

4 De An. i. 3, 404, a, 21, c: 4, 
408, a, 30 sqq. The further 
reasons that are urged against 
this view we must here pass over. 
On the Platonic conception of a 
world-soul see i. 459, n. 5, supra. 

5 On this assumption, cf. 
ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. i. 413. 

5 De An. i. 4 init. 408, a, 30, 
where this conclusion is sup- 
ported with further arguments, cf. 
PHILOP. De An. EK, 2,m, (Ar. Fr. 
41): Kéxpnra 5€ kal ards 6 
*AptororéAns .. . €v TE EvVOHpwp 
TG diarsyw Sto emixeiphoeor Tav- 
TOS. MiG bev otTwS* TH Gpuoria, 
gnoly, €orl te evaytiov, 7 avap- 
pootia* TH dt Wuxi ovdéy évaytior * 
ovk apa 7 WuxH apuov’a eorly’.., 


PHYSICS 5 


for it does not move itself, and if it were a number it 
certainly could not do so.' It is not some one sort of 
material, as Democritus thought, nor a mixture of all 
materials, as Empedocles held :? for if it were a mate- 
rial it could not spread through all parts of the body,* 
since two bodies cannot coexist in the same space ; and 
if the soul must contain all materials, in order that it 
may be able to perceive them all, the same argument 
would oblige us to ascribe to it all combinations of 
materials in order that it may know all. We cannot 
identify it with the air we breathe, since all living crea- 
tures do not breathe.‘ Nor is it diffused through all sorts 
of matter,’ since simple bodies are not living creatures. 


The soul, then, is not in any sense corporeal, 


Seurépg 5é* tH apuovia, pol, rod 
Téparos évaytioy early 7 dvapnootla 
Tov odéparos* dvapuoorla b& Tod 
éuixou c@uaros vocos Ka dobévera 
kal aloxos. dv 7d wey dovumerpla 
éotl tay croixelwy 7 vdoos, Td BE 
Tav Suoiopepay 7 aobévera, Td Se 
Tay dpyaviKxay Td aloxos, [On this, 
however, see i. 517, n. 6, eupra-} 
ei tolvuy % dvapuoorla vécos K 
dobévera cal aloxos, ) dpuovla kpa 
byela Kal icxds Kal KdAAOS. Wx} 
Be obdéy eat ToiTwy, ore iyela 
onl obre irxds obre KaAAOS* WuxXhy 
yap elxev wal 6 @epoitns alaoxioros 
dv. ov kpa éorly } Wuxh apuovla, 
kal radra wey ev éxelvos. THEMIST. 
De An. 44 sp.; Simei. De An. 
14, a, 0, and OLYMPIODURUS in 
Phed, p. 142, also mention this 
argument from the Ludemus. 

' Ibid. 408, b, 32 sqq.; cf. 
ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 871, 2. 

* On the former of these 
views see De An. i. 5 init. c. 3, 
406, b, 15 sqq, c. 2, 403, b, 28, and 


Ph. d.G@r.i. 807 sq.;on the latter, 
De An. i. 5, 409, b, 23 sqq. c. 2, 
404, b, 8, Ph.d. Gr.i. 725. Only 
one of Aristotle’s many objections 
to the theory of Empedocles is 
here given. 

* As it is obvious that the 
nutritive and sensitive soul at 
least does, from the fact that 
when a plant or an animal is cut, 
life remains in all parts alike so 
long as its organic conditions are 
present; De An. i. 5, 411, b. 19, 
ii, 2, 413, b, 13; cf. i. 4, 409, a, 
9; Longit. V. 6, 467, a, 18; Jur. 
et Sen. 2, 468, b, 2 sqq. 483. 

* De An. i. 5, 410, b, 27. 

5 Aristotle attributes this 
view first to Thales, but identifies 
it specially with Diogenes of 
Apollonia and Heraclitus; cf. 
De An. i. 5, 411, a, 7 sqq.; also 
c. 2, 405, a, 19 sqq. and ZELL. 
Ph. d.Gr.i. pp. 178, 2; 238; 240; 
587, 2; 642 sy. 


6 ARISTOTLE 


and none of the attributes peculiar to corporeal sub- 
stances can be ascribed to it. On the other hand, it 
cannot exist without a body.! Aristotle is even anxious 
to indicate the particular matter in which it resides, 
and which it carries with it as it passes from one being 
to another in the process of procreation. This he 
describes at one time as Caloric (@zppov), at another as 
Pneuma, regarding it as alien to the ether, and of a 
higher nature than the four elements; but he is wholly 
unable to give any clear account of its qualities, or 
to harmonise this conception with the general teaching 


of the Physics.” 


1 De An. ii. 1, 418, a, 4: dre 
bev ovv ovK oT 7] WUXH XwpioTH 
TOU THmaToS, 7) Mepn Ta adTHs, él 
Mepiorh mwépuKey, ovk &SndAov . . . 
ov phy GAN’ Enid ye odvOeyv KwAdvet, 
dia TH NOevds elves Tdmaros eyTe- 
Aexelas. Cf. Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, 
b, 22 sqq. 737, a, 7 sqq. and p. 
4, n. 3, supra, and p. 8, n. 1, infra. 

* The principal passage upon 
the subject is Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, 
b, 29: wdons pév ody Wuxis Sivauis 
ET EpOU THUATOS COLKE KEKOLYWYNKEVAL 
Kal @Qeorépov Tay Kadoumévwv 
oroxelwy: as 5é Siapépovar Timid- 
TnT. ab Yuxal Kal ariuia dAAHAwYr, 
oftw Kal 7 To.adTn Siapéper pvots. 
mdvTwy pey yap ev TE owépuare 
évuTapxelt, Sep more? yovisa eivar 
Ta TTWEpuata, T KaAOUpEVOY DEpudr. 
Toute 8 ov wip ode To1adry Sivauts 
€oTW, GAAG Td CurrepiAauBayduevoy 
€v TH omwepuatt kal ev TE abpwder 
mvevpa kal ) ev TE mvedmaTi vais, 
dvddoyov otaa Te Tay oTpwr 
aro.xelw. It is not fire but heat, 
whether of the sun orof animals, 
that generates life. 7d 5€ ris 
yoviis THua, ev @ ocvvaméepxerat Td 
om epua To Tis Yuxikhs apxis, Td 


The only right view is that the soul is 


Mev xwpicrdy by céuaros, Sols 
eumepiAauBdavetar Td Oeiov (ToL10vTOS 
5° éorly 6 Kkadrovmevos vovs), Td 8 
axwpirrov, TovTe Th omépua [with 
WIMMER read o@pa] tis yovijs 
Siadverar xal mvevpatovra: pvdoww 
éxov bypay Kal mvevuarwdn, As 
the material in which the soul 
resides is here expressly distin- 
guished from the elements, it is 
naturally thought of as ether, 
which elsewhere (see i. 476, n. 2, 
and 477, n. 1, swp7a) is described in 
almost identical terms. Buton the 
other hand the ether is neither 
hot nor cold, nor as the element 
of the immutable spheres can it 
ever enter the region of the 
earthly changes of birth -and 
death (see i. 473 sq. supra, and 
the admirable discussion in 
MEYER'S Arist. Thierk. 409 sqq.). 
Even if, relying upon De Calo, 
i. 2, 269,a,7 (on which, however, 
see i. 474, n. 1, supra), we suppose 
(with KAMPE, Hrkenntnissth, d. 
Ar, 23) that it is forcibly injected 
into the organic germ, the ques- 
tion would still remain how we 
are to explain such a process 





PHYSICS 7 


the form of its body, since the form cannot exist with- 
out the matter to which it belongs, and yet it is not 


and how the evolution which 
we must ascribe to the omépua 
Tis WuxiKhs apxis, whether we 
take diadveo@a as referring to 
the germ itself or only to the 
yovh, is consistent with the 
immutability of the zther (i. 476, 
supra). The material in question, 
moreover, is never described as 
wether. It is merely compared 
with it. Nor, indeed, does Ari- 
stotle ever speak of an zthereal 
matter, but only of vital heat 
and vital breath, as residing in 
the body. Similarly De Vita, 
4, 469, b, 6: mdvta 5t Ta pdpia 
kal way 7d cGua trav (dwy txe 
Twa ciupuToy Oepudrnta puoikiy * 
whence the heat of the living, 
the coldness of the dead, body. 
dvarykaiov 8) rabrns thy dpxhy Tis 
Oepudrntros ev Th Kapd'q ois 
évaiwois elvat, trois 5’ dvaluos ev 
T®@ dvddoyov’ épyd(era: yap Kal 
WETTEL THE HPvtTiKe@ Oepug Thy Tpophy 
mwdvra, udAwora bE Td KUpimTaTor. 
With the heat of the heart life 
too becomes extinct, 5a 7d Thy 
apxhv evredOey rijs Oepudrntos 
hpticba wact, kal ris puxis domwep 
eumemupeupévns ey Tois moplois 
rovros [the heart is as it were 
the hearth on which the soul's 
fire burns] . . . dvdy«n rolvuy 
Gua 76 Te Civ iwdpxew Kal Thy ToD 
Bepuovd tovTov owrnp'ay, Kal Toy 
Kadovmevoy Odvarov elvat Thy TébTOV 
pbopdy. Part. An. ii. 3, 650, a, 
2: as it is only by heat that food 
can be digested, all plants and 
animals require an a&px? Gepuod 
gvonh. c. 7, 652, a, 7 sqq.: the 
soul is not fire but resides in a 
fiery body, heat being its chief 
instrument in the performance 
of its functions of nourishment 


and motion. iii. 5, 667, b, 26: 
Thy Tov Oepuod apxhy avaryKaiov ev 
TG a’t@ térw [as the sensitive 
soul] elva. De Respir. c. 8, 474, 
a, 25, b, 10: 7d Gv Kal H Tis 
Wuxiis ekis peta Oepudrnrds tivds 
éoTw ... mupl yap épyd (era: mdyra. 
This heat resides in the heart. 
The other faculties of the soul 
cannot exist without the nutri- 
tive, nor the nutritive dvev 700 ov- 
oikod mupds* ev TolT@ yap h pivots 
éumemipevkey avThy. c. 13, 477, 
a, 16: the higher animals have 
more heat; Gua yap dvayen Kal 
Wuxiis TeTuXNKEvaL Timiwrépas. C. 
16,478, a, 28: all animals require 
cooling da thy év tH Kapdia rijs 
Wuxiis eumripwow. c. 21 wmit.: 
Tov Oepuov, ev @ H apxh 7H Operrinh 
(which, 480, b, 1, is also called 
mip). Ibid. c. 17, 479, a, 7 sqq.: 
the apxh Tis (wis gives out bray 
bh Karapixynta Td Oepudy td 
Koivwvouv abris. When, there- 
fore, through old age the lungs 
(correspondingly the gills) grow 
dry and stiff, the fire (i.e. the 
vital heat) gradually dies away 
and is easily put out altogether. 
5d yap 7d OAlyov elvas Td Oepudy, - 
Gre rov wAelorov diamemvevedtos 
ey TG TWANVE THS Cwis,... TaXéws 
amrocBévvura. De An. ii, 4 fin.: 
epyacera 3 thy wépw 7d Oepudr : 
5d wav Fupuxoy Exe Oepudryra. 
Gen. An, ii. 1, 732, a, 18: the 
higher animals are larger ; roto 
5 obk advev Oepudtnros Wuxixijs. 
c. 6, 743, a, 26: H 88 Oepudrns 
evumdpxe: ev TH TWEPMATIKG TWepiT- 
tépmart, 744, a, 29: man has the 
purest @Oeppdrns ev Ti Kapdig. 
Cf. Gen. An. ii. 4, 740, b, 29: 
the nutritive power of the soul 
forms and feeds plants and ani- 


8 ; ARISTOTLE 


itself material.' This enables us to answer the question 
about the unity of soul and body. heir relation to 
one another is just the same as that which subsists 


mals, xpwuevn oiov dpydvois Bepud- 
TnT. Kal WuxpéTrnrt. According to 
Gen. An. iii. 11 (see i. 460, n. 3, 
supra) the vital heat resides in 
the mvevdua, the apyy Tov mvevuaros 
(De Somno, 2, 456, a, 7) in the 
heart, from which all animal 
heat proceeds; in those animals 
which have no heart, & Té 
avddoyov To aiupuToy mvedua 
dvapvodmevoy Kal aovvidvoy ai- 
vera (ibid. 1. 11). This mvedua 
stupuroy, which is a natural and 
inherent property, not an external 
adjunct, of animals, is frequently 
mentioned, as in Gen. An. ii. 6, 
744, a, 3, v. 2, 781, a, 23 (ZELLER, 
Ph. d. Gr.i. 16, 659, b,17), where 
we are told that it pervades the 
channels of hearing andsmell, and 
is the medium by which sounds 
and smells are conveyed to their 
respective senses ; Part. An. iii. 
6, 669, a, 1, where it is said that 
in the case of bloodless animals, 
which have less internal heat 
and do not require to breathe, 
the mvevua ciuurov is sufficient 
for purposes of cooling. As, how- 
ever, according to the above, it 
is also the seat of animal heat, 
the phrase must be understood in 
the sense explained in Respir. 9, 
474, b, 31 sqq., to mean that 
cooling, in the case of such non- 
respirating animals as require 
more than that caused by the air 
or water that surrounds them, is 
produced by the expansion and 
contraction of the mvedua Euguroy, 
which in turn, by setting in 
motion the abdominal membrane 
which produces, e.g., the chirp of 
the cricket, causes it to act asa 


fan (for this is the sense in 
which we must understand 475, 
a, 11, 669, b, 1). Beside these 
passages, the statement in Gen. 
An. ii. 3, stands rather isolated. 
Granting that the céua deidrepov 
tav oroixelwy there spoken of is 
distinguished from the mvedyua in 
which it resides (4 év r@ mvebmari 
pvois), it is yet hardly possible 
to attribute to it an zthereal 
nature. The truth seems rather 
to be that Aristotle here feels a 
want which his philosophy as a 
whole does not enable him to 
supply.— The writer of the 
spurious treatise m. Myveduaros 
discusses the nature of the 
mvevua Euputov, though he by no 
means confines himself to this 
subject. He gives no indication, 
however, of the view he held of 
its material character.—The ques- 
tion of the relation of Aristotle’s 
assumptions with regard to the 
mvevua to his doctrine of the 
Nous is for later discussion (see 
Ch. XI. on the Reason, infra). 

1 See p. 2, n. 2, supra, and 
Metaph. vii. 10, 1035, b, 14: émel 
de TeV Cdwv Yuxh (TOdTO yap 
ovala Tov eubdxov) 7) Kara Tov 
Adyov ovala Kat Td eldos Kal Tori 
hv elvar TE Togde cduartt. c. 11, 
1037, a, 5: the body is the #An, 
the soul the otela » mpérn. viii. 3, 
1043, a, 35. De An. ii. 2, 414, a, 
12: as the form is everywhere 
distinguished from the matter 
which receives it, so is the soul 
TovTo @ (Guev Kal aicbavdueba Kat 
diavoobmeda mpdrws, Sorte Adyos Tis 
dv ef Kal eldos, GAA’ ovx BAN Kal 
To wtmokeluevov* tpixas yap Ae- 


PHYSICS 9 


between form and matter.' To ask whether soul and 
body are one, is just as ridiculous as to ask whether 
the wax and the form impressed upon it are one. They 
are and they are not: they are separable in thought, 
inseparable in reality.? Life is not a combination of 
soul and body,’ and the living being is not some- 
thing joined together of these two parts;* but the 
soul is the active force that operates in the body, or, if 
you will, the body is the natural organ of the soul. We 
cannot separate them any more than we can separate 
the eye and eyesight.’ None but a living body deserves 
the name of body,® and a particular soul can only exist 
inits own particular body.’ Therefore the Pythagorean 





youevns Tijs ovalas, Kabdmep etrouer, 
ay Td wev eldos, Td SE HAn, Td 5E CF 
dupoiv* rovtwy 3 % wey bAn diva- 
pus, Td 5 eldos evreddxeia* eel 5t 
To & duoiv Eupuxoy, od 7d cand 
eat evTedéxeia Wuxis, GAA’ airy 
odéparés twos. Kat $1 ToUTO KaAGs 
brodapBdvovow, ois doxet wht’ tvev 
odparos elva: pire caud Te 7 
Wxh. cGua pev yap otk eon, 
odparos 5€ rt. De An. ii. 1, 412, 
b, 11 sqq. thus illustrates: if the 
axe were a creature, its nature as 
an axe would be its soul; if the 
eye were a separate being, its 
eyesight (dys) would be its soul, 
airn yap oicia bpbaduod H Kara 
tov Adyov. 5 8 dpOadruds GAH 
bWews, hs amrodcrrovans oi Forw 
bpParyuds. The soul is to the body 
as sight is to the eye. 

' See i. 351, n. 1, supra. 

2 De An. ii. 1, 412, b, 6: the 
soul is the entelecheia of an 
organic body. 8: Kal od de? (yreiv 
ei &y % Wux? Kal 7d cama, borep 
ob’ roy Knpdy Kal 7d oxua, ovd’ 
bAws Thy Exdorou bAnv Kal 7d 0b BAN. 


% As perhaps the Platonists 
defined it, consistently with the 
account of death in Phedo, 64, ©. 

* Metaph. viii. 6, 1045, b, 11. 
Top. vi. 14 init.: Gv and the (Gor 
are not a ovyveots } cbvderuos of 
soul and body. 

5 De An. ii. 1,413, a,1: as 3’ 
H bWis kal 7) Sbvauts Tod dpydvou 7H 
Wuxh [sc. evredéxerd eorw]* 7d 
5 cGma Td Suvduer bv* GAA’ Gowep 
5 dpOadrpds H Kdpn Kal H dis, Kane 
nH Wuxh Kal rd copa Td CGor. 

6 Ibid. 412, b, 11, 20, 25. 
Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 33 sqq. 641, 
a, 18. Gen. An. ii. 5, 741, a, 10. 
Meteor. iv. 12, 389, b, 31, 390, a, 
10. Metaph. vii. 10, 1035, b, 24. 

7 De An. ii. 2, 414, a, 21 (fol- 
lowing on the passage quoted p. 8, 
n.1, supra): kal 51 rovTo év touart 
brdpxet, kal év od@pati Towvry, Kal 
ovx domep oi mpérepovy eis tama 
evipunotovy abrhy, od8ev mpoadiopl- 
Covres év rivt Kal mol, Kalrep ovde 
pawouevov tod truxdvros béxerOa 
7) tuxdv. orw Be yiverat Kal Kara 
Adyov: éxdorou yap H evTedéxera 


10 5; ARISTOTLE 


notion of one soul passing through bodies of the most 
various sorts is just as absurd as if one should imagine 
that one and the same art could use tools of the most 
various kinds indifferently—that a flute, for example, 
could be of the same use to a carpenter as an axe.! 

The true essence of everything is its form, and the 
essence of everything that comes into being is its 
purpose or end.’ Living creatures are no exception to 
this law. Every living creature isa little world,'a whole, 
the parts of which subserve as instruments the purpose 
of the whole.* But every instrument depends upon the 
nature of the work for which it is designed; so the 
body exists for the soul, and the qualities of every body 


are determined by those of its soul.! 


ev T@ Suvdper brapxovti kal TH oiKela 
vAn wépucey eyyiverOa. Cf. the 
passages quoted, i.221,n.1, supra, 
from Phys. ii.9, and elsewhere. 

' De An. i. 3, 407, b, 13: most 
writers (Aristotle is thinking 
principally of Plato) make the 
mistake of speaking of the union 
of soul and body, ov@éy apoodiopt- 
cavtes, bia tiv’ aitiay Kal mas 
ExovTos TOU Témaros, Kaito. Sdzerev 
dy tovT’ dvarykaiov elyar* Sid yap 
Thy Kowwvlay To wey mores TH BE 
mdoxer Kal Td wey Kivertar To BE 
kwel, TovTwy 8 ov0ey imdpyer mpds 
&AANAG Tois TvxXodoW, of SE udvor 
€miXElpota A€yewv Toidv Tt 7) WUXh, 
mept d€ Tov Setouevov cHuatos ovbey 
Ett mpoodiopiCovoww, dowep évdexd- 
Mevov Kata Tods Tv@ayopiKo’s 
BvGous Thy Trvxodcay Wuxhy els Td 
tuxdy évitecOa caua* doxel yap 
exactov Siuov exew cidos kal 
Mophiv, TapamAhcwv 5 Aێyovow 
omep ef tis pain thy rexroviKhy 
eis avAods evdverOar: Set yap Thy 


Nature, like a 


bev réxvnv xphoba rots dpydvas, 
Thy 5& Wuoxhy TE cHpam (cf. p. 
8,n. 1, supra, ad fin.) 

* See i. 375, n. 1, and i. 459, 
sqq. supra. Theexpression, Part. 
An. i. 1, 640, b, 28, % yap Kara 
Thv moppiv tots Kupiwrépa Tis 
bAiKIs picews, is used with refer- 
ence to the above question of the 
relation of soul and body. 

% See p. 3, n. 2, supra, and 
Phys, viii. 2, 252, b, 24: €i 8 év (do 
tTovto Suvardv yevéoOa, Ti KwAvEL 
TO avTd cuuBijva Kal Kata Td Tay ; 
ei yap év uixp@ Kéoum yiverat, Kal 
ev meydAw. 

* Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 22 
sqq. concluding (641, a, 29): 
ore Kat obtws dy Aexréov etn TE 
mepl picews Oewpnrin@ wep) Wuxi 
MGAAov 7) wept ris bAns, bow MaAAOV 
h bAn Be exetvny pias éeorly } 
avdmadiv, c. 5, 645, b, 14: eel 5é 
Td wey ipyavoy way Evekd Tov, Ta 
5é Tov owuatos poplwy Exacrov 
evekd Tov, Td 5’ ov Evena mpat's ris, 


“a ee 


PHYSICS 11 


judicious manager, gives to each the instrument it can 
use.! Instead, therefore, of deducing the spiritual from 
the corporeal, as the elder physicists had done, Ari- 
stotle takes the opposite path, describing the soul’s life 
_as the end and the body’s life as the means. While 
Anaxagoras had said that man was the most rational 
being because he had hands, Aristotle denies any truth 
to this dictum unless it be reversed—man has hands 
because he is the most rational being; for the instru- 
ment must be fitted to its work, not the work to its 
instrument.2 .The nature of the instrument is not, 
indeed, a matter of indifference in respect to the result : 
anything cannot be made out of any substance or by 
any means;* but this does not negative the fact that 
the choice of the instrument depends upon the purpose 
in view.’ It is perfectly obvious that it does in the case 





gavepoy bt: Kal td obvodAor capua 
auvéotnke mpdteds Tivos €Evexa 
mAhpous.... doT€ kal 7) caud rws 
Tis Wuxis Everev, kal TA udpia TOY 
Epywv mpds & wépuKey Exacror. 
Metaph. vii. 10, 1035, b, 14 sqq. 
De An. ii. 4; see p. 2, n. 3, supra. 
' Part. An. iv. 10, 687, a, 10: 
q 8t piois del Siavéuer, Kxabdrep 
GvOpwros ppdvmos, Exaoroy Te 
Suvapéevy xpiaba. Jhid. c.8, 684, 
a, 28: h 8& picts arodldwow ae 
Tois xpjvOa Svvauévois Exaorov 7) 
uévws 7) wGAdror. iii. 1, 661, b, 26 
sqq.: of those organs which serve 
for purposes of defence or are 
indispensable to the support of 
life, Exacta amodiiwaw ip pais 
Tois Suvauévois xpicla pdvus 7) 
MaAAoy, wdAwra 5 re wdALoTa. 
Hence the female is usually 
either wholly or in part unpro- 
vided with defensive organs, 


* Part, An. iv. 10, 687,a, 7-23, 
especially the words just after 
the passage quoted above :' rpec- 
ine yap Te byte abaAnrh dSovva 
MGAAov abdAods 2) TE abdAods ExyorTs 
mpocbeivat aAnriKhy’ Te yap pel- 
(ov. kal kupiwtépw mpoodeOnke Tod- 
Aatrov, GAA’ ov TE eAdrrom Td 
Timim@repoy Kal meiCov....7T@ obv 
mwAeloras Suvapevp Sé~aoOa Téxvas 
70 émt wAciorov Tay dpydvev xpii- 
Tov Thy xEipa awodédwKev fh pvors. 

* See pp. 9, n. 7, and 10, n. 1, 
supra. 

‘ There is, therefore, no real 
inconsistency between the doc- 
trine previously laid down and 
the statements, Gen. An. ii. 6, 
744, a, 30, that man’s intelligence 
affords proof of the edxpacia of 
the central organ of his life; 
Part. An. ii. 2, 648, a, 2 sqq. c. 4, 
651, a, 12, that greater intelli- 


12 ARISTOTLE 


of organic beings. ‘The adjustment of means to end 
which prevails in nature here displays itself in its fullest 
perfection.’ ‘To them we may with most propriety 
apply the axiom that Nature always produces the best 
that was possible under the given circumstances.? 

This working towards fixed ends begins to show itself 
in the nutrition and development of organisms. Nutri- 
tion is not a mere operation of warmth, as was supposed ; 
warmth may be important in the process, but it is 
always the soul that regulates it and directs it to 
a certain definite result.’ Nor can we adopt the theory 
suggested by Empedocles for explaining the growth of 
plants by saying that the fiery element tends upwards 


and the earthy downwards 


gence is aconsequence of thinner 
and cooler blood; ibid. iv. 10, 
686, b, 22, that the meaner in- 
telligence of animals, children, 
and dwarfs is to be explained on 
the ground of the earthliness and 
immobility of the organ which 
their souls must employ; De 
Respir.13, 477, a 16, that warmer 
animals have nobler souls, and 
De An. ii. 9, 421, a, 22, that man 
excels all other creatures in the 
fineness of his sense of touch 6:0 
kal ppovinétaréy éeortt Tov Cow, 
and that among men those who 
are white, and therefore have a 
more delicate sensibility, are 
mentally more highly endowed 
(cf. also Metaph. i. 1, 980, b, 23). 
Mental activity may be pheno- 
menally dependent upon certain 
conditions which in turn exist 
only for its sake: that which in 
reality is the primary and con- 
ditioning principle may appear 
to follow in time as a later and 


in their composition ; if so, 


conditioned result ; cf. Part. An. 
li. i, 646, a, 24. Further con- 
sideration, however, reveals the 
logical difficulties in which we 
are thus involved. The soul’s 
development is said on the one 
hand te be conditioned by the 
capabilites of its body, the 
character of the body on the 
other hand is conditioned by 
the requirements of the soul— 
which, then, is primary and con- 
ditioning ? If the soul, why has it 
not a body which permits a 
higher development of its 
powers? If the body, how can it 
be itself treated as though it 
were the mere tool of the soul ? 

1 Meteor. iv. 12; see i, 468, 
n. 5, supra. 

* See the discussion, supra, i. 
p. 459 sqq. The statements there 
made refer forthe most part prin- 
cipally to the organic nature. 

3 De An.ii. 4,416, a, 9: Soxe? 
dé Tig H TOD wupds Pdots amrAas 





PHYSICS 13 


what keeps the two together and prevents their sepa- 


ration?! The same applies to the structure of the 
organism. It is impossible to explain even the origin 


of organic creatures? on the supposition that their 
separate parts are formed and brought together by a 
blind and purposeless necessity, only those combinations 
surviving which succeed in producing from an aimless 
stream of matter a being adapted to an end and capable 





of life.’ 
normal results. 


For chance produces only isolated and ab- 
When, on the other hand, we are 


dealing with the normal adaptations of Nature we are 
forced to regard them as purposely designed by her 


from the beginning.‘ 


aitia tis Tpopis Kal rijs abgjoews 
elvat....70 d¢€ouvairtiov méev mas 
eo, ov phy amrAGs ye altiov, GAAG 


MaAAov H WexXh. wey yap Tov 


mupds abimots eis &mreipov, ews by 7 
Td kavotoy, Tav Bt pice cuvicTa- 
bévwy mdvtwy éo7) mépas Kal Adyos 
meyéOous Te kal abtjoews* Tavra 
bt Wuxiis, GAA’ od mupds, Kal Adyou 
maAAor 4h bAns. Cf. p. 14, n, 2, inf; 
and upon afriov and ovvairior, su- 
vra, i. p. 360, n. 1, and p. 463, n.1, 

1 Ibid, 415, b, 28 sqq. 

2 As Empedocles tries to 

do; see following note. We 
cannot suppose, however, that 
Empedocles (or any other of the 
pre-Aristotelian philosophers) ex- 
pressed the theories of which he 
is chosen by Aristotle as therepre- 
sentative, in so general a sense as 
is here attributed to him. 

* Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 16, Ari- 
Stotle starts the question: ti 
k@Ate: thy gdtow ph everd tov 
mo.eiy und’ St, BéAtiov, GAA’ Sowrep 
ter 6 Zeds Ke. [see i. 471, supra] 
«.. ote ti kwddver otw kal Ta 


But this is precisely what we 


mépn Exew ev TH pices, olov ros 
dddvras €& avdyKns dvareiAa Tovs 
Mev €umpoobiouvs dteis, emitndelous 
mpos Td Siapetv, rods 5 youdlous 
mwAareis Kal xpnoiuous mpds Td Acai- 
vew Thy Tpophy, érel ov Tovrov 
Evexa yevéoOat, GAARA oupmeceiy, 
duolws 5€ Kai wep) Tay LAAwY mepar, 
év bcos Soxet imdpxew Td Everd 
tov. Smov peéev oby &mayta ouvéBn 
domwep koy e€i Evexd tov éyivero, 
TAavUTA Mev €owON amd TOD abToudTou 
ovotdvTa émirndelws: boa be wh 
odtws, am@dAeTo Kai amddAuTaL, 
Kabdrep "EuwedoxAfs Aéyer Ta 
Bovyevi) avipdmpwpa. 

‘ *Addvaroy 5é [Aristotle an- 
swers, ibid. 198, b, 34] rodroy exe 
Tov TpdToY, TATA wey yap Kal mavTa 
7a puoel i det ottw yivera }) ds 
emt Td word, Tv BF ard réxns Kal 
Tov avToudrouv ovdéy. . . . ef ovv 
h ws amd cuprrduaros done F 
Evend Tov elvat, ef uh oldy Te TadT’ 
elvas phte amd ouprtdparos mht’ 
and Tabtoudrov, évexd tov by ey, 
In farther proof of design in 
nature, he adds: é@r: évy bois 


14 ARISTOTLE 


are doing in the case of a living being. What makes 
a living body is not the separate material elements, but 
their special and peculiar combination, the form of the 
whole to which they pertain.' We cannot explain its 
structure by the mere operation of elementary forces 
working in matter, but only by the operation of the 
soul, which employs these forces as instruments in giving 
form to matter.? Nature makes only those organs that 
are fitted for the purpose of each organism, and creates 
them in order, according to their several uses.’ First 
she forms the parts on which the life and growth of the 
being depend ; * then the remaining most important parts 


Tédos €or TL, TobTOU Eveka mpdr- 
TeTat To mpdtepoy Kal Td epetijs. 
ovKOUY ws TpaTTETaL, OUTw TépuKeE, 
kal as mépuxey, oftw mpdrrerat 
Exaorov by wh TL eumodi(n. mpdrre- 
Tat 3° Everd tov: Kal népucey apa 
tovtTov évexa, Of. i. 462, n. 2, 
supra. 

1 Part. An. i. 5, 645, a, 30: 
just as when we speak of a house 
or furniture, we mean, not the 
material of which it is made, 
but the Ay wopp}, so in the in- 
vestigation of nature we speak 
rept THs cuvOécews Kal THs BANS 
ovolas, AAAG wh wep) TovTaV & ph 
ounBaiver xwpiCduevd more Tis 
ovolas avTay. 

2 Gen. An. ii. 4, 740, b, 12: 
n Se Sidkpiows yiyveta Tov moplwy 
[in the formation of the foetus] 
ovX &s Tives brodauBdvovoat, dia Td 
mepukevat pépecOa Td Buoroy mpos 
Tb Guowv (and therefore as in 
elementary processes); for in 
that case homogeneous parts, 
flesh, bones, &c., would unite in 
separate masses; GAA’ bri 7d 
mepittapma TO TOD OhAews Suvduer 


Toovrdv eat olov pice Td (Gor, 
kal Evert Suvdmer ta udpia evepyela 
3 ovév, . . wal Bri 7d woinridy 
Kol Td mwadntixdy, bray Olywow, 

. evO0S TO wey mote? TH DE Wao KXEL. 

. domep 5& Ta brd THs TéxVNS 
ywopmeva yiverat 5 TdY dpydver, 
éort 5 aAnbéorepoy eimeiy Sid THs 
kwhoews abtav, airy 8 early 4 
evepyera THs Téxvns, H Se Téxv 
opp TaV yryvomevwy ev KAA, OU TWS 
H THs Opertixis Wuxjs dSvdvays, 
homwep kal ev abrois rots (dois Kar 
tols putois torepoy ex THS Tpopis 
mol tiv abigow, xpwuevn oiov 
opydvots Oepudrnri: Kal Wuxpdrntt 
(ev yap Tovrots H Klynots exelyns Kal 
Ady tivl Exactov viverra) obtw Kal 
ef apxijis cuvioryat Td pio yLyvd- 
evov. 

3 Thid. ii. 6, 744, a, 36: éme 
5 otPey moet meplepyor ovde wdrny 7 
pvats, djAov ws 0d8’ Borepoy ovdE 
mporepov. tata: yap Td ‘yeyovds 
Marny 3} wepiepyov. 

* In the lower animals the 
heart or the organ that corre- 
sponds toit; Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, 
a, 23. 


PHYSICS 15 


of the organism; and lastly the instruments which it 
employs for special purposes.' The nutritive soul- is 
developed first, as forming the common basis of all life ; 
and next the several functions of the soul by which 
each higher organism raises itself above that which 
precedes it in the scale of being. First comes a living 
_being, and next some special sort of being.? In 
obedience to the same law the organism is dissolved in 
the reverse order. That which life can least dispense 
with dies last, the less vital organs first ; so that Nature 
works round in a circle to her starting point.’ All parts 
and functions of the living creature exhibit the same 
proofs of contrivance, and can only be’ explained as 
the product of design. Accordingly all Aristotle’s 
researches into the corporeal nature of animals are 
governed by this view. The essential and decisive 
causes are always final causes,‘ and whatever leads in 
the ordinary course of nature to a definite end must 
have existed for that end.° He tries to prove that every 
organ is just what it must have been in order to fulfil 
its purpose in the best possible way according to the - 





! Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, a, 16-h, 
6, c. 1, 734, a, 12, 26. 

2 Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, a, 27-b, 
14 (cf. 737, b, 17, c. 1, 735, a, 4 
sqq.). As the inhabitant of a 
material body, the soul may be 
said to exist potentially in the 
seed. In the evolution of the 
living being the nutritive soul 
comes first, next the sensitive and 
rational : first comes'a (gor, then 
a definite (gov, e.g.a horse ora 
man. borepoy yap ylverat 7d TéA0s, 
TO 8 Yedv dors 7d Exdorov Tijs 
yevéoews TéAos, 


3 Thid. c. 5, 741, b, 18: that 
the heart is the central organ is 
seen at death ; awodciwe: yap 70d 
Civ evrevOey TeAevTaioy, cupBa‘ver 
5° éml wdvtwy 7d TEAcvTAioy yw- 
Mevov mp@tov amodclrev, Td dé 
mpwrov TeAEuTaiov, omep Tis 
picews Siavrdo0dpouotons kal dveAcr- 
Touevns emi Thy apxhy Bbev FAGev, 
tort yap mkv yéveots ek Tod ph 
bvros eis TH by, H BE POopa ex rod 
ivros wiAw eis Td hy by. 

* CE. i. 459, sqq. supra, 

® Cf. p. 17, infra, 


16 ARISTOTLE 


means at hand.! He points out how every animal is 
provided with organs adapted to its mode of life, or 
how the common organs of a tribe are modified to meet 
its special needs.? Nor does he neglect the inter- 
dependence of the different members: distinguishing 
the principal organs which directly serve to fulfil the 
end of life, from those which are added for their pro- 
tection and maintenance ;* and remarking that Nature 
always affords the strongest protection to the noblest 
and the weakest parts,‘ that, where one organ is not 
equal to its task, she makes or modifies another for the 
purpose,® and that she places organs of opposite 
character near one another, in order that each may 
temper and supplement the action of the other.’ He 
sees in the artistic instincts of animals an obvious 


1 Proofs of this, the most im- 
portant of which will call for 
future discussion, are given 
throughout the whole work De 
Fart. An., and in many passages 
of Aristotle’s other zoological and 
anthropological works. 

? Thus the elephant, being not 
only a land-animal, but leading 
also an amphibious life in mor- 
asses, is provided with a proboscis 
- that it may breathe more easily 
under water; Part. An. li. 16, 
658, b, 33 sqq. In like manner the 
form of birds’ beaks depends 
upon the nature of their food, 
as is shown (bid. iii. 1, 662, b, 1, 
sqq. iv. 12, 693, a, 10sqq.) in the 
case of birds of prey, the wood- 
pecker, the raven, grain- and 
insect-eaters, water- and moor- 
fowl. Dolphins, again, and sharks 
(ibid. iv. 13, 696, b, 24) have the 
mouth in the upper part of their 


bodies to enable other animals to 
escape from them more easily, and 
to prevent them from doing injury 
to themselves by their voracity. 

3 The flesh, for example, is 
the principle organ of sense- 
perception ; bones, on the other 
hand, nerves, veins, skin, hair, 
nails, &¢c., exist merely for its 
sake, as is shown Part. An. ii. 8. 

4 ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 14, 
658, b, 2 sqq., iii. 11. 673, b, 8, 
iv. 10, 690, b, 9. 

5 Thid. iv. 9, 685, a, 30. 

6 Thid. ii. 7, 652, a, 31: aet 
yap pio pnxavarat mpds Thy 
Exdorou brepBoAhy BoyPeay Thy TOU 
évavtiov mapedpiay, tva avicd(n Th 
Oarépov imepBodAjy Cdrepoy, b, 16: 
érel 8 Grayta Seira: ris évaytias 
porhs, va tuyxdvn TOU peTplov Kal 
Tov weoov: thus the head counter- 
balances the heart. 





PHYSICS 17 


example of unconscious contrivance in Nature.'| Nor 
does he forget the influence of necessity, which here, as 
elsewhere, cooperates with Nature in the realisation of 
her designs.? Indeed, he expressly requires observers 
of nature to make use of both causes in their explana- 
tions.’ Still he holds fast to the belief that physical 
causes are only means employed by Nature for her ends, 
and that their necessity is only conditional; * nor does 
he cease to marvel at the wisdom with which Nature 
makes use of the materials suited to her purposes, and 
overcomes the opposition of such as are antagonistic. 
Like a good housewife, she employs the dregs and 
refuse of animal life for beneficial purposes, and suffers 





nothing to-be wasted.° 


She turns everything to the 


best possible account;® if she can make one organ 


1 Phys. ii. 8, 199, a, 20: 
pdrwora St pavepdy em Trav (gov 
Tav tAdwy, & obre Téxvn ode 
(nticavta = obre «= BovAevodueva 
mover. S0ev Siamopoval tives WoT Epo 
v@ h Tin BAA epydCovTa: of 7’ 
apdxva: kal of mipunkes Kal Ta ToOL- 
aita, Kata uixpoy 5’ ofrw mpoidyrs 
kal éy trois puTois palverata cuue- 
povra ywdueva mpds Td TéAOS, olov 
Ta piAAa THS TOU KapwoU EveKa 
oxémns. bor ei pice: Te moe? Kal 
vend Tov h XeAWav Thy veorTiay Kal 
bdpdxvns 76 apdxviov, kal Ta puTa 
Ta pidrAa Evexa TaV KapTay Kal Tas 
piGas ob tvw GAAE Kdtw Eveka Tijs 
Tpopijs, pavepdy bri early 7 aitla 7 
ToaiTn ev Tois pice: yivopévas Kal 
otow, Of. i. 463, n. 1. 

2 See i. 360, n. 1, supra. 

% Ibid, and Part. An, i. 1, 
643, a, 14: d00 rpdro Tijs airias 
wal det Adyorras ruyxdvew udAora 
uty duo, &c, (Cf, PLATO, Tim. 


VOL. Il, 


46, C; Div. i. 642, 6). In dis- 
cussing individual parts of the 
body he frequently gives both 
sides in succession, e.g. Part. ii. 
14, 658, b, 2: man has thicker 
hair than any other animal, é 
aydaynns wiv bia Thy bypdétyTa Tov 
eykepddrov Kal dia Tas padas, . 
évexey 5 Bonbelas, imws cxemd (wot, 
&e. 

‘The proofs have already 
been given, i. 360, n. 1, supra, 

5 See i. 465, n. 2, supra. 

® Thus, forexample( Part. An. 
iii. 14, 675, b, 17 sqq.), the intes- 
tines are coiled tightly together, 
brws tamedvnra ) pvois Kal wh 
&Opdos 7} H Ekob0s TOU wepitTéparos, 
especially in those animals which 
are destined for a frugal manner 
of life. The same thought had 
already been expressed in PLATO, 
Tim. 72, E. 


18 ARISTOTLE 


serve, she does not give an animal several for the same 
function ;' if she needs materials for strengthening one 
member, she despoils another which appears less indis- 
pensable ;* if she can achieve several objects by one 


' Thus Aristotle explains 
(Part: An. iii. 2) that different 
animals are provided with differ- 
ent means of defence, some with 
horns, others with claws, some 
with size, others with fleetness, 
others again with repulsive 
excrement; Gua 8 ixavas kal 
mAelous Bonbeias ov Sédwkev 7 
vats Tots abrois. Again, ibid. iv. 
12, 694, a, 12, he remarks that 
birds which have a spur are not 
endowed with bent talons also; 
airiov & bri ovdty H pdais ore? 
mweplepyov. Again, Respir. 10, 
476, a, 6 sqq.: gills and lungs 
never exist together, éwel pwarny 
ovbey ép@uev Towotcay Thy iow, 
duvoty 8 bvrow Odrepoy by hy warn 
(just before he says: ey 8’ ép’ &y 
ipyavov xphomoy). And again, 
Part. iii. 14, 674, a, 19 sqq.: ani- 
mals which have more perfect 
masticating organs (i.e. aupe- 
dovra) are supplied with a simpler 
digestive apparatus: those which 
are defective in the former 
respect, on the other hand, have 
several stomachs ; after enume- 
rating several species of animals 
which belong to the former class, 
he proceeds, 674, a, 28: those 
animals which, like the camel, 
require more than one stomach 
on account of their great size 
and the coarseness of their food, 
form an exception to the rule; 
the teeth and stomach of the 
camel resemble those of horned 
animals 6. 7d dvayKaidrepoy elvat 
a’Th Thy Kowrlav éxew roadbryny } 
Tovs mpoobioys dddvras, it can do 


without the latter as oddéy tvras 
mpovpyou. 

2 Gen. An. iii. 1, 749, b, 34: 
thin animals have a greater 
power of procreation; 7 yap eis 
TA K@AG Tpoph TpeémeTat Tors 
TowovTos eis meplrtwua omeppa- 
Tikdv' & yap éxeiey apaiper 7 
piots, mpootidnow évrava. Part. 
An. ii. 14, 658, a, 31: in long- 
tailed animals, the hairs of the 
tail are shorter, in short-tailed, 
longer,’ and the same is true of 
the other parts of the body; 
mavtaxod yap amrodliwor [7 piois | 
AaBovoa ErEpwHev mpds %AAO udpiov, 
cf. ibid. c. 9, 655, a, 27: Gua be 
Thy avThy dbrepoxhv eis mwoAAovs 
ténous aduvaret Siaveuew H pvots. 
For further explanations v. 
Meyer (to whom I gratefully 
acknowledge my obligations for 
much of this section), Arist. 
Thierk. 468: ‘Nature employs 
the earthy refuse either for 


horns or double rows of teeth’ - 


(see Part, An. iii. 2, 663, b, 31, 
664, a, 8—or, as in the case of 
the camel, for a hard palate, 
ibid. c. 14, 674, b, 2). ‘The 
bear, which has a hairy body, 
must be content with a stunted 
tail (ibid. ii. 14, 658, a, 36). In 
the case of mammals, the earthy 
material has been employed for 
their tails, and accordingly, un- 
like man, they have no flesh upon 
their legs (ibid. iv. 10, 689, b, 
21). Sharks, again, require this 
earthy material to give their 
skins the proper thickness, and 
accordingly have mere gristle for 


aii 


AN 





PHYSICS 


19 


organ, she makes it do the work ;! although, when this 
arrangement will not serve, she is no niggard in her 
contrivances: * of the different materials which she has 
at her disposal she employs the best upon the nobler 
and the worse upon the less important members.* Even 
in the cases where one cannot attribute any definite 
utility to certain structures, they are not without a 
design; for Aristotle thinks that their end may be 


their skeletons (ibid. ii. 9, 655, 
a, 23).’ Meyer quotes further 
examples from Part. An. ii. 13, 
657, b, 7, iv. 9, 685, a, 24. Cf. 
also Part. An. iii. 2, 663, a, 31. 

' Thus the mouth, besides 
the common purpose of eating, 
serves various other ends in the 
various animals, and is thus 
variously formed ; 7 yap pvois . . . 
Tois Kowois mdvTwy woplos eis TOAAG 
tav idiwy Karaxpita... h 8 
giois mdvra ouvtyayev eis by, 
mwowtoa Siapopay ab’tov rod popiou 
mpos tas tis épyaclas diaopds. 
(Part. An. iii. 1, 662, a, 18, cf. 
Respir. c. 11 init.) Likewise 
thetongue (Respir.ibid.; Part. ii. 
17). Thehand (Part. iv. 10, 687, 
a, 19) is obx tv dpyavoy aAdrAa 
TOAAG* Eat: yap wowepel Ypyavov 
mpd dpydvev (cf. De An. iii. 8, 
432,a,1); it is (b, 2) nal byvt Kal 
xnAh Kal Képas Kal Sdépv Kal Elpos 
Kal &AAo drovovoiy SrAov Kal bpyavov, 
&c.; and similarly the breasts of 
women, Part. An. iv. 10, 688, a, 
19 sqq., the trunk of the ele- 
phant, ibid. ii. 16, 659, a, 20, and 
the tails of animals, ibid. iv. 10, 
690, a, 1 (among other passages). 

? Part. An. iv. 6, 683, a, 22: 
bmrov yap évdéxerar xpioOa dvoly 
ém 50’ Epya wal uh eumodiCew mpds 
Erepov, oddiy H pics elwhe moreiv 


bowep i} Xadkevtixh mpds ebréAciav 
dBeAtoKoAlyvioy* (on this GOrT- 
LING, De Machera Delphica, Ind. 
lect. Jen. 1856, p. 8); GAA’ darov 
Mh evdéxerat Kataxpirat TH ate 
éml mrelw Epya. Polit. i. 2, 1252, 
b, 1: od0éy yap H pdots more? ToL0d- 
Tov olov xadKoTimo: Thy AcApuchy 
Mdxapay [GOTTLING,  ibid.; 
ONCKEN, Staatsl. d. Ar. ii. 25, 
who both fail, however, to give 
a complete account of the matter] 
mevixp@s, GAA’ Ev mpds Ev: oftw 
yap by amoreAoiTo KdAAoTa Tay 
dpydvwv Exacroyv, uh modrdois Epyors 
GAN’ év) SovActov. MEYER, Arist. 
Thierk. 470, rightly remarks that 
these statements are inconsistent 
with the principles of the parsi- 
mony of nature as previously 
laid down, and even although 
we grant that it is possible to 
find, with Aristotle, a basis of 
reconciliation in the phrase Sov 
évdéxerat, we cannot deny that 
there is a certain arbitrariness in 
the way in which it is applied. 

* Gen. An. ii. 6,744, b, 11sqq., 
where Nature’s management is 
compared in this respect with 
that of a household in which the 
free members receive the best 
food, the servantsa coarse quality, 
and the domestic animals the 
worst, , 


c2 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


fulfilled in the very symmetry and perfection of their 
form,' and that this explains why many animals have 
organs, or at least the indications of them, which they 


do not use.? 


It is only where he cannot discover the 


least trace of purpose that our philosopher can bring 
himself to explain a phenomenon by chance or blind 


necessity.* 


1 He treats it, for example, 
as a universal law that all the 
organs should be in pairs (d:pv7), 
seeing that the body has a right 
and a left, a front and a back, 
an upper and a lower (Part. An. 
iii. 7 init. c. 5, 667, b, 31 sqq.). 
Even where to all appearance 
there is only a single organ, he 
exerts himself to prove that it is 
double (ibid. 669, b, 21: Sidmep 
kal 5 éyxépados BovAcrar Simepis 
elvat mact kal Tay aicOnrnpiwy 
txacrov. Kara Toy abrdy dé Adyor 
h Kapdia rais KoAlus. Likewise 
the lungs). Another typical law 
is that the nobler parts, where it 
is possible, should be in the upper 
part, in front and on the right as 
the better position (Part. An. iii. 
3, 665, a, 23, b, 20, c. 5, 667, b, 
34, cf. c. 7, 670, b, 30, c. 9, 672, 
a, 24, c. 10, 672, b, 19 sqq.); so, 
likewise, that the locomotive 
impulse (the a&px?) should pro- 
ceed for the same reason from 
this quarter (Jng7. An. 5, 706, b, 
11); cf. Ch. X. on Animals. The 
same esthetic conception of 
Nature’s contrivances is expressed 
in the observation, Part. An. ii. 
14, 658, a, 15 sqq., that men are 
better protected in front than 
‘behind, the front being the nobler 
(riuwrépa) side, and therefore 
demanding stronger defences; 
and in 1. 30 of the same paasage, 


where the hairs of the tail of 
the horse and other animals are 
described as merely ornamental. 

* The hind, while it has no 
horns, has teeth like the stag, 
because it belongs to a horned 
class; and similarly in certain 
species of crabs the female has 
claws which belong properly 
only to the male, 8m: év 7@ yéver 
eiot TH ExovtTt xnAds (Part. An. 
ili, 2, 664, a, 3, iv. 8, 684, a, 33). 
Again, spleen, which is a neces- 
sity only to viviparous animals, 
and is therefore more strongly 
developed in these, is yet found 
to exist in all (mdéupixpoy dSomep 
onuciov xdpv) as a kind of 
counterpoise to the liver, which 
is on the right side of the body 
and therefore requires something 
to correspond to it on the left, 
bor’ avayratov pév ws, wh Alay 3 
elvai maot Tots (pois ( Part. An. iii. 
7, 669, b, 26 sqq. c 4, 666, a, 27, 
cf. H, An. ii. 15, 506, a, 12). 
Similarly the monkey, belonging 
as it does to the four-footed 
races, is endowed with a tail 
bcov onuelov xapiv, H. An, ii. 8, 
502, b, 22, c. 1, 498, b, 13. Cf. 
MEYER, p. 464 sq.; EUCKEN, 
Meth. d. arist. Forsch. 104 sqq., 
Si. 

3 A purposeless creation of 
this kind (repitrwua) he finds in 
the gall (Part, An. iv. 2, 677, a, 


Chae S- e 





PHYSICS 21 


This prevalence of design in nature shows itself, as 
we have seen before (i. 466 sqq.), in a gradual pro- 
gression, a continual process of development. The 
various functions of the soul and life are not shared by 
all living creatures in equal perfection, but different 
forms of animation, and different parts of the soul, may 
be distinguished, which determine the gradations of 
animate life. Plants are confined to nutrition and pro- 
pagation ; the nutritive soul alone is active in them.' 
Beasts add to this the sensitive soul, for sensation is the 
most universal mark of distinction between beasts and 
plants.2 The lowest form of sensation, common to all 
animals, is the sense of touch; here begins the feeling 
of pain and pleasure, and the appetites, among which 


11 sqq.; see i. 361, n. 1, supra). 
Upon necessity and chance, p. 
359 sqq. supra. 

1 De An.ii.2 (see i. 511, n. 2, 
supra). Ibid. 413,b, 7: Operrindy 
5 Aéyouey Td TowvTov pudpiov Tis 
Wuxiis ob Kal ra puta peréxet. C.3 
init. c. 4,415, a, 23; 7 yap Oper- 
Tikh Wuxh Kal Trois &AAos bwdpyxei, 
kal mpaérn kal Kowotdrn Bdvvauls 
éort Wuxis, Kad’ hy bwdpxer Td Civ 
draow. hs early tpya yevyjoa Kal 
tpopn xpnoOu. Hist. An. viii. 1, 
588, b, 24; Gen. An. i. 23, 731, 
a, 24, procreation alone is men- 
tioned as the peculiar function 
of the vegetable sense; and De 
An. ii. 4, 416, b. 23, it is said: 
éwel 5¢ aed Tov téAovs Grayta 
mpocaryopevew Sixaov, TéAoS BE rd 
yevvijoa olov ard, efn by ) mpdty 
Wuxh yeryntixh oloy até. On the 
other hand, Gen. An. ii. 4, 740, 
b, 34 sqq. (cf. c. 1, 735, a, 16), 
shows that it is one and the 


same living energy which first 
forms and afterwards. nourishes 
the body, but that the former is 
the more important function; 
ei obv airn early n Operrixh Puxn, 
aitn éot) Kal 7 yevy@oa* Kal TovT’ 
early 7 puows 7 Exdorov, evuTdpyx- 
ovoa Kal év utois Kal ev (yous 
waco. 

2 De An.iti. 2, 418, b, 1: 7d 
bey obv Chy bia Thy apxhy TavTHy 
imdpxet Tois (aot, Td BE GGov bia 
thy atcOnow mpwtws' Kal yap Ta 
Ly Kiwovpeva und GAAdTTOvTa Témov 
éxovta 8 aloOnow (pa Aéyouev 
kai ob (hv udvov. De Sensu, c. 1, 
436, b, 10; De Jurent. c.-1, 467, 
b, 18, 27; Part. An. ii. 10, 6655, 
a, 32, 656, b, 3; iv. 5, 681, a, 12; 
Ingr. An. c. 4, 705, a, 26 sqq. b, 
8; Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 30; 
ii. 1, 732, a, 11. Most of these 
passages expressly notice the dis- 
tinction between the (@v and the 
(or, 


22 ARISTOTLE 


the appetite for food appears first.! One division of 
_living creatures combines with sensation the power of 
locomotion, which also belongs to the bestial soul.? 
Lastly, besides nutritive and sensitive life, man pos- 
sesses Reason, the third and higbest faculty of the 
soul. The soul exists in no other form than those 
which we have just described.‘ These themselves, 
however, are so related to each other that the higher 


cannot exist without the lower.° 


1 De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 4 sqq. 
21 sqq. c. 3, 414, b, 1-16, 415, a, 
3 sqq. ili. 12, 434, b, 11 sqq. c 
13, 435, b, 17 sqq.; De Sensu, 1, 
436, b, 10-18; Part. An. ii. 17, 
661, a,6; H. An. i. 3, 489, a, 17; 
De Somno, 1, 454, b, 29, c. 2 init. 
In these passages Aristotle some- 
times mentions ap} alone, some- 
times ap) xa yedou, as the 
property of all animals, but the 
apparent inconsistency is ex- 
plained by the fact that Aristotle 
regarded the sense taste as a 
form of touch; De Sensu, 2, 438, 
b, 30. De An. ii. 9, 421, a, 19; 
ii. 10 init. iii. 12, 434, b, 18. 

2 De An. ii. 3, 414, b, 16. 

3 Ibid. ii. 3, 414, b, 18 (cf. iii. 
3, 427, b, 6; Gen. An. i. 23, 731, 
a, 30 sqq.): érépos 5€ [Tov (dor 
bmdpxer] Kal 7d diavontindy Te Kal 
vos, otov avOpémos Kal ef Tt TOLOd- 
Tov erepdv éotiv } Kal Tiidrepor, 
On the latter part of this obser- 
vation see the discussion upon 
the different kinds of living 
beings infra. 

4 Dé An, ii. 3, 414, b, 19% 
just as there is no figure which 
is not either triangular, quad- 
rangular, or with some other 
number of angles, so there is no 
soul which is not one or other 


Animal life exhibits 


of the uxai mentioned. 

® Ibid. 414, b, 28: mapamdAn- 
alws 8 &xer re wepl trav oxnudtwv 
kal Ta Kata Wuxiy: del yap ev Te 
epetns imdpxe: Suvduer Td mpdtepov 
emi Te TOV oXnUdTwY Kal éml Tov 
eupixwv, oiov ev retpayove pty 
tpiywvov ev aig@nting 5& Td Oper- 
Tidy . . . dvev wey yap Tod Oper- 
TiKOv Td aicOnrikdy ovK tot’ TOD 
5’ aigOnrikod xwpl(era Td Opemtixdy 
€v trois putois, mdAw 3 tvev mev 
TOU anTiKod TeV HAAwY aicOhoewy 
ovdeuia brdpxel, ap) 3° kvev Tay 
&AAwy tmdpxet kal Trav 
aigOnrikav be To ev exer Td KaTa 
témov Kiwnytikoy, Ta 8 odK exeL. 
TeAeuTatoy 5€ Kal €Adxiora Aoyiopov 
kal didvoiay' ois wey yap tmdpxer 
Aoyicuds TY HPOapray [to the (a 
&pbapra, i.e. the stars, a pure vods 
belongs], rovrois nal ta Aowa 
wd-Ta, ois 8 éxelywy Exacrov, od 
maot Aoyiou“os, GAAX Tois mev ovdE 
pavtacla, Ta 5€ tTaitn udvn Coow. 
wep. 5€ Tod Oewpyntixod vov Erepos 
Adyos (on this see infra). Ibid. 
c. 2, 413, a, 31, with regard to 
the Operrixdv: xwpl(ecOa dé rotTo 
bev TOV HAAwY duvaTdy, Ta 8’ BAAa 
tovtov adbvarov év Trois Ovyrois. 
Cf. i. 5 fin. De Somno, 1, 454, a, 
11, De Juvent. 1, 467, b, 18 sqq. 











PHYSICS 


28 


a developing scale, in which each successive step in- 


cludes all that went before. 


Plato’s doctrine of the 


parts of the soul is thus applied to all animate exist- 
ence, without violence to the general conception of its 
originator, though with important modifications of de- 
tail,! and we are enabled to embrace all natural species 


! Aristotle objects, indeed ( De 
An, iii. 9, 10, 432, a, 22 sqa. 433, 
a, 31 sqq.), to Plato’s threefold 
division, on the ground that if 
we make the functions and facul- 
ties of the soul our principle of 
division we have far more than 
three parts, for the difference 
between the @perrixdy, aicOnrixdy, 
pavractixdy, vontiKoy, BovAeuTixdy, 
opextixdy is wider than between 
the éwiuynriucdy and dupixdy, and 
asks, De An. i. 5, 411, b, 5, in 
view of it: rl oty mote ouvvéxes 
thy Wexhv ei pepiorh wépuner ; it 
cannot be the body, for it is 
rather the soul which holds the 
body together; if, on the other 
hand, it be said that it is an in- 
corporeal force, then this is the 
proper soul. But the question 
immediately recurs, is this simple 
or manifold? If the former, 
why cannot the soul itself be so 
just as well? [f the latter, then 
for the parts of the ovvéxor 
another ovvéxovy must be sought, 
and so on ad infinitum. We 
should thus finally be forced to 
suppose that each part of the 
soul resides in a particular part 
of the body, which is obviously 
not the case either with respect 
to the reason, which has no bodily 
organ corresponding to it at all, 
nor in t of the lower prin- 
ci of life, which, in the case 

those animals and plants which 
survive being cut in pieces, lives 


on in each of the parts. Never- 
theless, Aristotle himself speaks 
of parts of the soul (see p. 21, n. 1, 
supra; De Vita, i. 467, b, 16), 
and although he tries more fully 
to preserve the unity of its life 
amid the multiplicity of parts, he 
cannot be said to have been any 
more successful than Plato in 
this endeavour, nor does vows bear 
any closer relation in his theory 
to the lower elements of the soul 
than does the immortal part in 
Plato’s. His departure from 
Plato, accordingly, does not seem 
to be so important in principle. 
He differs from him partly in 
his account of different forms of 
animal life, but Plato, no less 
than he, assigns the lowest of the 
three parts into which he divides 
the soul to plants, the middle 
one to beasts, and holds that the 
higher part presupposes the lower 
but not vice versa; see Div. i. p. 
714. The chief difference be- 
tween the philosophers is in their 
respective starting points: while 
Plato begins his investigation 
into the nature and of the 
soul from the ethical side, Ari- 
stotle approaches it from the side. 
of natural science. On the other 
hand, STRUMPELL (Gesch. d. 
theor. Phil. 324 sqq.),as BRANDIS 
has pointed out, ii. b, 1168 sq., 
goes too far in saying that Ari- 
stotle attributes to one and the 
same being not only different 


24 ARISTOTLE 


from the lowest to the highest in one comprehensive 
view as concentrated and progressive manifestations of 
the same life. 

This progressive development of animal life corre- 
sponds to the actual fact, which Aristotle had no doubt 
observed, and which had led him in the first instance 
to his theory, that all organic nature exhibits a 
steady progress from more imperfect and defective 
productions to richer and fuller forms of life. ‘ N ature,’ 
he says, ‘makes so gradual a transition from the inani- 
mate to the animate kingdom, that the boundary lines 
which separate them and the position of the inter- 
mediate are rendered indistinct and doubtful. Next to 
the inanimate kingdom comes that of Plants ; and here 
we not only distinguish greater and less degrees of 
vitality subsisting among individuals, but the whole 
tribe seems animate when compared with inorganic 
substances, inanimate when compared with animals. 
Again, the transition from plants to animals is so 


gradual that many marine 
whether they are animals 


faculties or parts of the soul but 
different souls, to man four, to 
beasts three (counting the sensi- 
tive and the motive principles as 
two). Aristotle speaks, indeed, of 
a Wuxh Operrich, aicOnrikh, AoyuKh, 
and of different puxat (see e.g. pre- 
ceding page; De Vita, 3, 469, 
a, 24), but he does not mean that 
several souls exist together in an 
individual as so many separate 
beings; he even defines the rela- 
tion of these. so-called qWuya) to 
one another in the distinctest 
manner as one of comprehension, 


creatures leave us in doubt 
or vegetables, since they 


the nutritive soul being contained 
in the sensitive, and the sensitive 
in the rational, just as the tri- 
angle is contained in the quad- 
rangle (see preceding note), so 
that an animal, for instance, can 
no more be said to contain two 
souls than a quadrangle can be 
said to contain two kinds of 
figures. If he fails, as a matter 
of fact, perfectly to preserve the 
unity of the soul throughout (see 
end of Ch. XII.), weare not on this 
account justified in denying that 
he attempted to do so, 


PHYSICS 25 


adhere to the ground, and cannot live when separated 
from it. Indeed, the whole tribe of Ostreacee, when 
compared with locomotive animals, resemble vege- 
tables.’ ‘The same may be said about sensation, phy- 
sical structure, mode of life, propagation, the rearing of 
their young, &c.: in all of these respects we notice a 
gradual progression of development.' The continuity 
of this order brings into play the law of Analogy, the 
presence of which Aristotle takes some trouble to 
demonstrate in the sphere of organic structures and 
their vital functions. Analogy, as we have shown 
before,? is the bond which unites different genera; 
in organic nature, as elsewhere, it transcends generic 
differences, and where no real similarity of kind is 





possible, produces resemblance.* 


' Hist. An. viii. 1, 588, b, 4 
sqq.where detailed proof is given ; 
Part. An. iv. 5,681, a, 12, where, 
in speaking of zoophytes and the 
differences which are to be ob- 
served amongst them, he remarks: 
h yap piots weraBalve: cvvex@s ard 
Tay avixwyr eis TH (Ga did TOY Cdv- 
Tov wey ovk bvtwy BE Cow obtws 
bore doxeiy wauray pixpdy Biapépery 
Oarépov Odrepory TH abyveyyus GA- 
AfAas. 

21. 272, n. 2, supra. With 
what follows cf. MnyuR, Arist. 
Thierk. 334 sqq. 103 sq. 

* Part. An. i. 4, 644, a, 14. 
Why are not water and winged 
animals included under one 
name? éo7: yap Evia wdOn Kowde 
kal rovrois Kal rots &AAos (dois 
Gmagw. GAA’ Suws dp0as Sidpiora 
Tovrov tov mpémrov. boa mey yap 
diapépe: tav yevar Kal’ iwepoxhyv 
kal Td maAAov Kal Td HrTov, TadTa 
bwéCeverat ev yéver, boa F exer 7d 


This analogy may be 


avddoyov xwpls. Two kinds of 
birds differ from one another by 
the size, for instance, of their 
wings ; birds and fish, on the other 
hand, T@ dvdAoyov: yap éxelum 
mwrepov, Oatép» Aenls. Analogies 
of this kind are found in almost 
all animals: Ta yap moAAa (oa 
dvddoyov tavT> mémrovOey. Simi- 
larly in the following passage, 
644, b, 7 sqq. a contrast is drawn 
between ditferences which exist 
within the same genus, e.g. be- 
tween large and small, soft and 
hard, smooth and rough animals, 
and those which permit us to 
trace only general analogies. To 
the same effect, c. 5, 645, b, 4: 
WOAAG Kowva TWoAAOIsS bmdpxet TAY 
(dwv, Ta wey GrA@s, olov mwddes 
mrepa Aewldes, wal dn 35h Tov 
avroy tpéwoy tovrois, Ta 8 dva- 
Aoyor. Aéyw 8° dvddAoyorv, bri Tois 
bev bwdpyet WAeipwr, Tois 5€ wAev- 
pov wey od, & 5€ Trois Exovar WAEV- 


26 ARISTOTLE 


observed in the most different quarters, In place of 
blood, bloodless animals have certain humours which 
correspond to it ;! and this is also the case with flesh.2 
Molluses, being without fat, are provided with an 
analogous substance.’ Cartilage and gristle correspond 
to bones in snakes and fish, and in the lower animals 
their place is supplied by shells, &c., which serve the 
same purpose of supporting the body. The hair of 
quadrupeds answers to the feathers of birds, the scales 
of fishes, and the mail of oviparous land animals>— 
the teeth of beasts to the bills of birds.6 Instead of a 
heart, bloodless animals have a similar central organ,’ 
and instead of a brain, something like one.’ Gills take 
the place of lungs in fishes, and they inhale water 
instead of air. Roots perform the same office for 
vegetables as heads, or rather mouths, for animals, and 


Mova, éKelvots Erepoy ayTi TovToOU * 
kal Tots mev aiua, tots 5€ Td dvd- 
Avyou Thy abthy Exov divauw Hvrep 
tots évalwos Td aiua. Thid. 20 
sqq.; Hist. An. i. 1, 486, b, 17 
sqq., 487, a, 9, c. 7, 491, al4sqq.; 
ii. 1, 497, b, 9; viii. 1 (see infra). 

1 Hist. An. i. 4, 489, a, 21; 
Part. An. i. 5, 645, b, 8, ii. 3, 
650, a, 34, iii. 5, 668, a 4, 25, 
Gen. An, ii. 4, 740, a, 21. De 
Somno, c. 3, 456, a, 35, and other 
passages. 

* Part. An. ii. 8 init. iii. 5, 
668, a, 25, ii. 1, 647, a, 19; Hist. 
An, i. 3, 4, 489, a, 18, 23; De An. 
ii. 11, 422, b, 21, 423, a, 14. 

* Gen.-An. i. 19, 727, b, 3; 
Part. ii. 3, 650, a, 34. 

* Part. ii. 8, 653, b, 33- fin. c. 
9, 655, a, 17 sqq. c. 6, 652, a, 2; 
fist, iii. 7, 516,-b, 12 sqq. c. 8, 


517, a, 1, i. 1,486, b, 19. 

° Part. iv. 11, 691, a, 15, i. 4, 
644, a, 21. Hist. iii. 10 init. i. 
1, 486, b, 21. 

® Part. iv. 12, 692, b, 15. 

” Part. ii. 1, 647, a, 30, iv. 5, 
678, b, 1, 681, b, 14, 28, a, 34; 
Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 23 sqq. c. 
4, 738, b, 16. c. 5, 741,b,15. De 
Respir. c. 17, 478, b, 31 sqq. De 
Motu An. c. 10, 703, a,14. On 
the parts which Aristotleregarded 
as analogous to the heart see 
MEYER, p. 429, 

8 Part. ii. 7, 652, b, 23, 653, a, 
11; De Somno, 3, 457; b, 29. 

® Part. i. 5, 645, b, 6, iii. 6 
init. iv. 1, 676, a, 27; Hist. An. 
viii. 2, 589, b, 18, ii. 18, 504, b, 
28; De Resp. c. 10 sq. 475, b, 15, 
476, a, 1, 22. 


—— 


PHYSICS 27 


take up food into their systems.' Sume animals which 
have no tongues are provided with an enalogous organ.” 
The arms of men, the fore feet of quadrupeds, the wings 
of birds, the claws of crabs, are all analogous,’ while 
the elephant has a trunk instead of hands.‘ Oviparous 
animals are born from eggs; correspondingly, the 
embryo of mammals is surrounded with a skin like that 
of an egg, and in the chrysalis insects assume an oval 
form. Reversely, the earliest germs of higher animal 
life corresponds to the worms from which insects are 
bred.> The habits, occupations, tempers, and reason of 
animals can be compared with those of men; while the 
human soul in childhood can scarcely be distinguished 
from that of beasts.° ‘Thus does one inner bond of 
union permeate all departments of organic nature—one 
life unfolds itself from the same fundamental forms in 








continually ascending degrees of perfection. 


And as 


organic nature is the sphere of contrivance and design, 


1 De An, ii. 4, 416, a, 4: as 
N KEepady Tav Cdwr, obrws ai pita 
TaV puT@y, ei xph TA bpyava Aێyely 
TavTa Kal €repa trois Epyos. De 
Juvent. c. 1, 468, a, 9; Ingr. An. 
c. 4, 708, a, 6. 

* Part. iv. 5, 678, b, 6-10. 

% Part. iv. 12, 693, a, 26, b, 
10, ¢c. 11, 691, b, 17; Hist. i. 1. 
486, b, 19, c. 4, 489, a, 28, ii. 1, 
497, b, 18. 

‘ Part. iv. 12, 692, b, 15. 

5 Hist. vii. 7, 586, a, 19: Gen. 
An. iii. 9. See i. 467, n. 1, supra. 

® Hist. An. viii. 1, 588, a, 18: 
Everri yap ev Tois mAcloros Kal Tov 
trAAwy (gov Ixyvn Tav mepl Thy 
Wuxhy tpdrwy, Grep él tev dyOpa- 
mov Exe: pavepwrépas Tas Siapopds, 


After illustrating this with 
examples he proceeds: ra péy 
yap TG maddAov Kal Arrov diapéper 
mpos toy tvOpwrov. . . Ta BE Ta 
dvddroyoy Siapeper* ws yap ev aw- 
Opin téxvn Kal copia Kai cdvects, 
obtws ev'ois Tay Cowv dori Tis Erépa 
To.avTn gvoikh Sivas. pavepw- 
tarov & éotl td rowirov em thr 
tav maldwy nAikiay BrAdpacw’ ev 
TovTos yao Tav wey borepoy Ekewy 
écouevwr tory ideiv oloy txvn Kat 
onépuara, Siapéper 8° odfey ws 
eimeiv ) Wux? THs Tav Onplwy Puxis 
Kara Tov xpdvov TodTov, Sor’ oddéiv 
&Aoyoyr, ei Ta wey Ta’Ta Ta bE wapa- 
rAfow Ta 8 avddoyor brdpxet rots 
hAAos (gious. 


28 ARISTOTLE 


it is itself in turn the object which all the inorganic 
universe must serve. ‘The elements exist for the sake 
of homogeneous substance, and this for the sake of 
organic structures. Here, therefore, the order of 
existence is reversed: that which is last in origin is 
first in essence and value.! Nature, after displaying a 
continual decrease of perfection from the highest sphere 
of heaven to earth, there reaches her turning point, and 
the descending scale of being begins to reascend.? The 
elements by their mixture prepare the conditions neces- 
sary for the development of living creatures, and we 
see Life expanding itself from its first weak germs to 


its highest manifestation in humanity.® 


1 Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 12: 
tpiav 8 vvcav Tay cuv0écewr [on 
which see i. 517, n. 6, sup. |] mpornv 
pev &y tis Oeln Thy ek TOV KadouME- 
vev bd TeV oTotxelwy.... Sev- 
Tépa 5€ ctoTacis ek TaY TPOTwY 7 
Tav duoiomepoy pias ev Tots Coots 
éotiv, olov dcTod Kal capkds Kal 
Tav tAAwy TY TOLOUTwY. TpiTn BE 
kat TeAevTala Tov apiOudy 7 TOV 
Gvomoimep@v, ofov mpoommov Kal 
xeipds Kal tay TowtTwy poplwy. 
érel 5 éevayvtiws em) tis yeverews 
éxet kal THs ovclas* Ta yap torepa 
TH yeveoe: mpdtepa Thy pvow éotl 
Kal mp@Tov To TH yeveoet TEAEV- 
tatov, for the house does not exist 
for the sake of the stones and the 
bricks, but these for the sake of 
the house, and generally the 
material for the sake of the form 
and the final product: 7@ wey obv 
xpdév@ mporépay Thy BAnV avaryKatov 
civat Kal Thy yeveow, TE Adyp dE 
Thy ovolay Kal Thy Exdorov popphy. 
...@oTe Thy pey t&v oToxelwr 
BAnv avarykatoy elvat Tay duoomepav 
evekev, batepa yap exelvar TatTa TH 


yevéoel, TOUTwY 5E TA GvomoLoMeph 
[i.e. organic nature]. tavra yap 
Hdn 7d TéAOS Exe Kal Td Wépas... 
ef Gupotépwy ev oty Ta (Ga ouv- 
éoTnke TOV mopiwy To’TwY, GAAG Ta 
GMOoLomEph T@Y GvomolomEepav EveKev 
eo * éxelvwv yap Epya Kat mpd- 
Eeis eioly, oloy opOaAuod, Kc. 

* Cf. what is saidin Gen. An. 
ii. 1,.731, b, 24: eel ydp éort 7a 
bev aldia Kal Oeta Tay bvTwY Ta 3’ 
évdexdueva Kat eivat cad uh elvat, Td 
d€ Kaddv Kal Td Oeiov alrioy del Kare 
Thy aitod picw Tod BeAriovos év 
Tois evdexouevols, TO SE pH Gtd.ov 
evdexouevdv éott Kal elva Kal 
meTarauBdvew Kal Tod xeElpovos Kal 
Tov BeAtiovos, BéATiov 5€ Wuxh mev 
oapatos, ToS Euvyxov Tov abvxou 
dia THY WuxHv, Kal 7d Elva TOU MH 
eivat Kal TO (hv rod wn Civ, 
dia Tavtas Tas aitias yéveois (wv 
éoriy. 

’ That Aristotle conceives of 
such a process of development 
from lower to higher forms, and 
of man as the highest step in 
the scale of evolution, by refer- 


(OOOO EO EOE --_ = 








PHYSICS 29 


Aristotle finds the first indications of this Life in 


inorganic nature. 


ence to which we may test the 
degree of perfection attained by 
lower forms of being, is obvious 
from the passages referred to, 
pp. 21 sq., 25 sq., and i, 465 
sq., supra, as well as from those 
which immediately follow. Cf. 
further Part. An. ii. 10, 655, b, 
37 sqq., Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 
24. In the former of these 
passages Aristotle says: plants 
have few and simple organs, 
7a St aps TE Civ alaOnow Exovra 
modupoppotépay exer Thy idéav, Kat 
TovTwy €repa mpd érépwv marddroy, 
Kal wodAvxovorépay, bawv wh wdvov 
row Civ GAAG Kal Tov ed Civ 7 pits 
mereiAnpev. rowiro 3’ €or) 7d Ta 
avOpdrwv yévos* ‘yap pdvoy 
peréxer Tov Belov Tav Huiv yvwpl- 
pov Cowy,} wdAwra rdvrwv. In 
the latter: ris wey yap Tay puTay 
ovalas ov0év éorw AAO Epyoy ov5e 
mpagis ovdeula Ay 7 TOU orepuatos 
yeveris . . . TOD BE Cov od udvory 
To yevvijoa Epyoy (TovTo wey yap 
kowdy Tav (éyTwy mdyTwv), GAG 
kal yvooeds Twos TavTa meTéxXoval, 
7rd ev wAclovos, Ta 5° CAdrTovos, Ta 
bt wduray wixpas, alabyow yap 
txovow, ) 8° alaOnois yvaois ts. 
Taurns St Td Tipioy Kal &riwoy worAd 
Biapéper ckowoic. mpds ppdvnaow 
kal mpds 7d Tay aixwy yévos, 
mpds piv yap rd ppoveiy dowep 
obdév elvar Sone? rd Kowwveiv apijs 
kal yedoews udvoy, mpds 5é avaic- 
Onclay BéATioroy. It isnot incon- 
sistent with this view that, 
starting’ from man, Aristotle 
(Part. An. iv. 10, 686, b, 20 sqq.) 
should attribute to the different 
animal tribes a continually di- 
minishing degree of perfection 
as compared with him, and ( Hist. 


Movement in general may be re- 


An. i. 6, 491, a, 19) should begin 
with man as being best known 
to us. Nor can we with FRANT- 
zwzius (Arist. tb. die Theile d. 
Thiere, p.315,77;contrast MEYER, 
Arist. Thierk. 481 sqq.) conclude 
from these passages that Aristotle 


. regards nature under the form of 


a retrogressive rather than a pro- 
gressive development, and con- 
ceives of its history as that of 
an ideal animal assuming a 
succession of degenerate shapes 
as it descends from the human 
to the vegetable form. For, in 
the first place, he does not always 
begin with man, but only when 
he is treating of the external 
organs; when, on the other 
hand, he is dealing with the 
internal organisation, a field in 
which more is known of the 
lower animals than of men, he 
takes the opposite course (Hist. 
An. i. 16 init., cf. Part. ii. 10, 656, 
a, 8). But, in the second place, 
it does not at all follow that that 
which is more known to us must 
in itself be the first either in 
point of value or of time, or 
that because Aristotle, in treating 
of the forms of organic life, 
begins with the more perfect and 
proceeds to the more imperfect, 
therefore nature follows the 
same course in producing them. 
On the contrary, he states as 
definitely as possible that nature 
proceeds in the reverse order ; 
see, besides other passages, the 
preceding note, There is here 
no question of a metamorphosis 
such as that described, either 
retrogressive or progressive. 
Aristotle does not conceive of an 


30 ARISTOTLE 


garded as a sort of life. In a certain sense we attribute 
animation to everything: we talk of the life of the air 
and the wind, and find analogies to the phenomena of 
the organic life of animals in the sea." Again, the 
world has its youth and age like plants and animals, 
except that they do not succeed each other as conditions 
of the whole, but are present simultaneously as alter- 
nating states of its parts. A well-watered region may 
dry up and grow old, while an arid tract may spring 
into fresh life by timely moisture. When streams 
increase, the land about their mouths is gradually 
changed to sea; when they dry up, the sea becomes 
land.2. When these changes take place slowly, length 


ideal individual either developing 
or degenerating into various 
forms. The organic forms do 
not themselves pass into one 
another; the transition is effected 
by nature as she rises to the 
fuller exercise of her creative 
power. Cf. p. 25, supra. 

1 See i. 459,n.5, 460,n.1, sup., 
and Gen. An. iv. 10, 778, a, 2: 
Bios yap Tis xal mvedpards ort Kal 
yéveois kal p8icis. Upon the sea 
v. Meteor. ii. 2, 355, b, 4 sqq. 
356, a, 33 sqq. 

2 Cf. on this the full and 
remarkable exposition, Meteor. i. 
14. The same regions, Aristotle 
there says, are not always wet 
or dry, but according as rivers 
arise or disappear, the land 
retreats before the sea or the sea 
before the land. This happens, 
however, kara tid Tagw Kal repl- 
odov. apxn dt rovTwy Kat atriov drt 
Kal THS yas Ta evTds, bowep 7H 
gdépara Ta Tov puT@y Kal (dor, 
axuhv exer kal yipas. In regard 
to the latter, however, Gua way 


akuacew Kal pOlvew dvarykatov’ TH 
5t yi TovTO yiverat Kara mépos Bid 
wotw Kal Oepudrnta. As these 
increase or diminish, portions of 
the earth change their character, 
bore méexpe tivds Evvdpa dbvarat 
diamevery, elra Enpalverar Kad ynpd- 
oKelmdAw * Erepot 5¢ rdé701 BidoKor- 
Tat Kal €yvdpo yiyvorvrat Kata mépos. 
Where a region dries up, the rivers 
decrease and finally disappear, 
the sea retreats, and land is 
formed where the sea was before ; 
the opposite happens when the 
moisture of a district increases. 
As examples of the former pro- 
cess, Aristotle in the following 
passage (351, b, 28 sqq., 352, b, 
19 sqq.) names Egypt, which is 
unmistakably a mpécxwois Tod 
NeiAou, an por Tov Tor amov (SGpov 
Tov wotauov, HEROD. ii. 5), and 
the region surrounding the oracle 
of Ammon, which, like Egypt, 
lies below the level of the sea 
and must therefore once have 
been the sea bottom; Argolis 
and the neighbourhood of My- 


PHYSICS 31 


of time and the gradual character of the transformation 
cause the memory of them to be usually forgotten ; ! 
when they happen suddenly they belong to that class 
of devastating inundations ” to which Aristotle, following 
Plato,’ attributed those relapses into primitive barbarism 
which, coeternal though the human race is assumed to be 


-cenz in Greece; the Bosphorus, 


the shore of which is cuntinually 
changing. Some, he says (352, 
a, 17 sqq.; according to ii. 3, 
356, b, 9 sqq., he is thinking here 
of Democritus, but the same view 
is ascribed to Anaximander and 
Diogenes; cf. ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. 
i. 205, 2, 799, 4), attribute these 
changes to a change in the world 


‘asa whole, as yivomeévou Tov odpavod, 
- holding that the collective mass 


of the sea is diminished by 
gradual evaporation (contrast 
Meteor. ii. 3). But if in many 
places the sea changes into land 
and contrariwise land into sea, 
we cannot explain this upon the 
ground of a yéveois Tov Kéopov’ 
"yeAotov yap 51d wixpas Kal drapialas 
meraBoArds Kweivy To wav, 6 5t Tijs 
vis bryos Kal Td wéyeOos ovOév ear: 
dhmov mpds Toy bAov oipavdy, GAA 
wdytwy tovtwy altioy bmoAnnréov 
bri ylyverat 51a xpdvev ciuapuéevwr, 
oloyv év rais Kar’ éviavrdy Spas 
Xeiudv, oOFrw mepiddou Twds weydAns 
méyas xemuwrv Kal drepBodrdh buBpwr. 
airy 8 ob del Kara robs abrots 
témovs. Deucalion’s flood was 
chiefly confined to ancient Hellas 
or the country watered by the 
Achelous. Cf. 352, b, 16: ére) 
5° dydyxn tov bdov [the whole 
globe] ylyver@a: wév ria mera- 
Borhy, ph perro yéveow kal 
POopay, etrep péver [uevel] rd wav, 
avdynn . . . wh Tods avtods del 


témous irypovs 7’ elvat Oaddrry Kal 
mwotapois Kat Enpots. The Tanais, 
consequently, and the Nile will 
one day cease to flow, and the 
Palus Meeotis will be dried up: 
Td yap Epyov abray exer wépas 5 dé 
Xpdvos ovK Exe. 

' Thid, 351, b, 8 sqq , which 
also refers to Egypt. 

* The other possibility, of a 
sudden destroying heat, is even 
more completely neglected by 
Aristotle than by Plato. 

* Plato introduces the story 
of the Atlantides in the Zimaus 
with the remark that devastating 
tempests, at one time of fire, as 
in the time of Phaéthon, at 
another of flood, overtake man- 
kind at intervals. When cities, 
with all their attendant civilisa- 
tion, become overwhelmed in the 
latter, the survivors, who are for 
the most part semi-barbarous 
mountaineers, must in again 
from the beginning. Hence we 
have a youthful Hellenic culture 
side by side with an effete 
Egyptian civilisation. The same 
conception recurs in the account 
of the gradual rise of civilised 
states out of primitive barbarism, 
in the Lams, iii. 676, B sqq.—the 
question whether the human race 
has existed from all eternity or 
only for an indefinitely long 
time (vi. 781, E) being left 
undecided, 


32 


ARISTOTLE 


with the world,! yet from time to time befall it in the 
history of its civilisation.” Life nevertheless in the strict 
sense exists only, as Aristotle emphatically declares, in 
beings which are moved by their own soul, 7.c, in Plants 


and Animals.® 


1 Aristotle does not, indeed, 
expressly say that this is so in 
any extant passage of his writ- 
ings; it follows, however, from 
his whole view of the world that 
he could not have assigned a 
beginning to the human race 
any more than to the world it- 
self. As man is the end of 
nature, she must have been im- 
perfect for an infinite period of 
time, if at any time the human 
race did not as yet exist. More- 
over, Aristotle actually says (cf. 
i. 475, n. 4, 508, n. 2, supra, 
that in the history of civilisation 
the same discoveries have been 
madean infinite number of times, 
and his pupil, Theophrastus, 
among other arguments against 
the eternity of the world con- 
troverts that which uses the 
comparative recentness of these 
discoveries to prove that mankind 
came into being within a definite 
period of time. See Ch. XII. part 
3. According to CENSORINUS, 
4,3, Aristotle taught the eternity 
of the human race in one of his 
own writings. The question which 
he discusses Gen. An. iii, 11, 
762, b, 28 sqq. how we are to 
conceive of the origin of man 
and the four-footed tribes (etmep 
eyévovtéd more ynyeveis, &omep 
gaol ties . . . elmep Hv Tis apx? 
THS yevérews waar Tos (Pols) is 


suggested hypothetically, and 
not from the point of view of 
his own theory. Cf. BERNAYs, 
Theophr. v. d. Frommigh, 44 sq. 
2 It has already been shown 
i. 475, n. 4, 508, n. 2, and 256, 
n. 2, supra, and will be still 
further proved Ch. XII. part 
2, that Aristotle regards reli- 
gious beliefs and_ proverbial 
truths as remnants of a civilisa- 
tion which has been destroyed 
by devastations of nature. These 
devastations, however (accord- 
ing to p. 30, n. 2), can only have 
affected particular parts of the 
earth, although often so wide 
that the scanty survivors of the 
former population were forced to 
begin again from the very begin- 
ning. When, therefore, CEN- 
SORINUS, 18, 11, says of the great 
annus mundi (on which see ZEL- 
per, Ph. d. Gr. i. 684, n. 4, and 
250), ‘quem Aristoteles maximum 
potiusquam magnum appellat,’we 
may not conclude (as BERNAYS, 
ibid. 170, shows) that Aristotle 
conceived of periodic revolutions 
in the history of the universe or 
even of the earth as a whole, 
He may have employed the ex- 
pression in discussing the views of 
others perhaps in the books upon 
philosophy (on which see p. 56 


es 
8 See p. 1, supra, 










PHYSICS 83 


2. Plants. 


Plants stand lowest in the scale of living creatures. 
They first display a real soul, inhabiting an organic 
body, and no mere analogue of a soul, Yet this soul is 
of the lowest sort, and its functions are confined to 
nutrition and propagation. Vegetables are not en- 
dowed with sensation and locomotion or the faculties of 
life from which they spring. They have no vital point 
of unity (no pecorns), as is proved by the fact that 
they continue to live after being cut in pieces; and 
owing to this defect they are insensible to the form 
of that which operates upon them.‘ Hence we may 
compare them to animals that have coalesced; for 
though in reality they have but one soul, they combine 
several potential souls.> Again the sexes have not yet 





atin 


——— ———_ = ae 


















organs of sense. 


1 On Aristotle’s botanical 
treatise cf. p. 93. All that his 
extant works contain upon the 
subject of plants is to be found 
collected in WIMMER’s Phyto- 

Aristot. Fragmenta (Bres- 
laa, 1838). 

2 See p. 1, n. 3, supra. 

* See p. 21, n. 2, supra. As 
plants never awake to sensation, 
their condition is like an eternal 
sleep, and they do not, accord- 
ingly, participate in the alterna- 
tions of sleep and waking (De 
Somno, 1, 454, a, 15; Gen. An. v. 
1, 778, b, 31 sqq.). For the 
same reason there is no distinc- 
tion between the front and the 
back in plants, for this depends 
upon the position of the different 
Finally, being 
without the power of locomotion 
while they participate in growth, 


VOL. II. 


they have no right and left side, 
but merely an upper and a lower ; 
Ingr. An. c. 4, 705, a. 29-b, 21; 
Jurent. c. 1, 467, b, 32; De Calo, 
ii. 2, 284, b, 27, 285, a, 16, cf. i. 
497,n.1,supra. On Plato’s view 
of plants, which in spite of parti- 
cular deviations from Aristotle’s 
is yet nearly related to it, see Ph. 
d. Gr. pp. 731, 714, 7. 

4 De An.i. 5, 411, b, 19, ii. 
2,413, b, 16,c. 12,424,a32; Long. 
Vita, c. 6, 467, a,18; Juv. et Sen. 
c. 2, 468, a, 28. See also foll. n, 

5 Juv. et Sen. 2, 468, a, 29 
sqq., where, speaking of insects 
which can live in a divided form, 
he says: they are plants which 
live on in slips; they have only 
one soul évepyela, but several 
Suvduer. Colkact yap Ta rTowira 
tav (wv moddois (wos cupme- 
guxdow. Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 


D 


54. ARISTOTLE 


attained to separate existence in them: confined to 
mere vitality and the propagation of their species, they 
remain in the condition of perpetual union of the sexes.! 
The nature of their body corresponds to this incom- 
pleteness in the life of their soul. Its material com- 
position consists principally of earth;? its structure is 
simple, designed for few functions, and therefore pro- 
vided with few organs ;* deriving its nourishment from 
the earth, and being deprived of locomotion, it is rooted 
to the ground, and the upper part of it, which corre- 
sponds to the head of animals, is turned downwards — 
the better member to the worse place.* It is true that 
in its contrivance we do not altogether fail to trace the 
designing faculty of nature, but we do so only indis- 
tinctly.2. But, though in comparison with other living 


creatures plants occupy so 


21: arexvas Zone TA (Ga Horep 
gute elvat Siaiperd. De An. ii. 2, 
413, b,18: as otons Tis ev TovTaLS 
Wuxis évreAexela mey pds ev 
éxdotw mute, Suvduer 5& wAcidvwv. 
Cf. Part. An. iv. 5, 682, a,6; De 
Resp. c. 17, 479, a, 1; Ingr. An. 
Ty 707, ib; 3. 

_.! Gen, An. i. 23, 731, a, i. 24, 
b, 8, c. 20, 728, b, 32 sqq. c. 4, 
717,.a, 21, ii. 4 fin. iv. 1, 768, 
b, 24, tii. 10, 759, b, 30; Hist. 
An. viii. 1, 588, b, 24, iv. 11, 538, 
a, 18. 

2 De Resp. 13, 14, 477, a, 27, 
b, 23 sqq.; Gen. An. iii.11,761,a, 
29. That Aristotle held that there 
were other constituents in plants 
besides earthis obvious from the 
passage. cited i. 482, n. 3, supra. 
According to Meteor. iv. 8, 384, 
b, 30, plants consist of earth and 
water, the water serving for their 


low a place, compared with 


food (Gen. An. iii. 2, 753, b, 25 ; 
HT, An. vii. 19, 601, b, 11), for 
the consumption of which heat 
is necessary (see p. 12, n. 3, and 
p- 14, n. 2 ad jfin., supra). 

* De: An? Bis *t,. (412; bis 
Part. An. ii. 10, 655, b, 37; 
Phys. viii. 7, 261, a, 15. 

4 Ingr. An. c. 4 init. c. 5, 
706, b, 3 sqq.; Long. Vite, 6, 467, 
b, 2; Juv. et Sen. c.1 fin.; Part. 
An. iv. 7, 683, b, 18, c. 10, 686, b, 
3lsqq. Seefurther p. 27,n.1, sep. : 

5 Phys. ii. 8,199, a, 23: nal év 
Tos puTois palverat TA TUUPepoyTa 
ywopeva mds Td TEAOS, oloy Ta 
@vAAG Tis TOU Kaprod EveKka 
oKemns .. .. TH HuTs® TA PVAAG 
eveka Tov Kaomay [sc. éxer] kal Tas 
pl€as ovK Gyw GAAG KaTw Eveka TIS 
tpopys. b, 9: Kal ev trois purors 
éveott To Evend Tov, ATTov Be 
5i/ pOpwrat, 





PHYSICS 


85 


the inanimate world the operation of the soul in plants, 
and especially the propagation of the species, must be 


placed very high.’ 


As all terrestrial things imitate 


by their endless reproduction the eternity of Heaven, 
so living creatures are enabled by means of procreation 
to partake, within the limits of their own particular 


species, of the eternal and the divine.’ 


This, then, 


is the highest aim of vegetable life.* A more elevated 
rank of vitality appears in Animals,‘ to which Aristotle 


1 Cf. precedirg note and p. 
13 sqq. 

2 Gen. An. ii. 1, 731, b, 31: 
drei yap adivaros 7h vais Tod 
rowvrou ‘yévous Gidios elvat, Kad’ dv 
évdéxera: tpémwov, Kata ToiTdy 
éorw Xldiov Td yryvdmevov. apiOug@ 
piv obv Gdivarov,.... ede OF 
évdexerat* 51d yévos det avOpdmwy 
kal (dwv éorl kal putav. Tbid. 
735, a, 16: allanimals and plants 
have 7d Operrixdy* tovro 8 Fare 
7) yevyntixdy érépov olov air: 
rovTo yap mavtds ioe: TeAclouv 
Zpyov kai (gov kal putod. De An. 
ii, 4, 415, a, 26: puvoumdraroy yap 
Trav etpywv tois (a@ow, boa TéAca 
Kal ui) mnpduata, 2) Thy yéveow 
abroudrny exet, Td moron Erepov 
olov abvrd, (Gov wiv (Gov, puTdy Be 
gurdv, iva Tod del Kal tov Oelov 
peréxwow f Sbvavra &c. Polit. 
i. 2, 1252,a, 28. Cf. the passages, 
Gen. et Corr. ii.10 and 11 (i. 511, 
n. 3, sup.), from which @con. i. 3, 
1343, b, 23 is copied, and on the 

itions of Plato which 
Aristotle here follows, Ph.d. Gr.i. 
512, 3. 

* De An. ii. 4. 
sy ° 
Eerarecng further details of 
Aristotle's doctrine of plants may 
be mentioned: (1) his division 


See p. 21, n.1, 





of the plant into root, stem, 
branches, and leaves. The root 
is the nutritive organ, and the 
leaves are veined in order to dif- 
fuse the nutriment which is con- 
tained in the sap (Part. An. iv. 
4, 678, a, 9, iii, 5, 668, a, 22; 
Juv. et Sen. 3, 468, b, 24). Again 
(Part. An. ii. 10 init.), he divides 
the bodies of plants and animals 
into three chief parts: that by 
which they take up food into 
their system (the head), that by 
which they rid themselves of su- 
perfluous matter, and that which 
lies in the middle between these 
two. Inplants, the root isthe head 
(see p.27, n.1,supra); as the nu- 
triment they draw from the earth 
is already digested, they require 
no store-chamber for useless sur- 
plus (on this see also Gen. An. ii. 
4, 740, a, 25, b, 8); nevertheless, 
the fruit and the seed which 
form at the opposite end from 
the root are secretions ( Part. An. 
ii. 3, 10, 650, a, 20, 655, b, 32, 
iv. 4, 678, a, 11; H. An. iv. 6, 
531, b, 8, with which De Sensu, 
5, 445, a, 19, where the elements 
which plants fail to absorb and 
leave behind in the soil seem to 
be regarded as repirraépara of the 
food of plants, is not inconsis- 


D2 


36 


ARISTOTLE 


accordingly devoted so large a portion of his scientific 


activity.’ 

tent).—(2) Earth and water are 
the food of plants (Gen. et Corr. 
ii. 8, 335, a, 11; Part. An. ii. 3, 
650, a, 3, and p. 34, n. 2, supra. 
Cf. Hf. An. vii. 19, 60%; -b, 125 
Gen. An. iii. 11, 762, b, 12); it 
is the sweet part of their food 
that nourishes plants and animals 
(De Sensu, 4, 442, a, 1-12); this 
they consume by aid of their vital 
heat (cf. p. 12, n.3,and p. 14, n. 2, 
supra, and Part. An. ii. 3, 650, 
a, 3 sqq.), which, in its turn, is 
supplied to them partly from 
their food, partly from the 
surrounding atmosphere, albeit 
plants do not require respiration ; 
if the atmosphere is too cold or 
too hot the vital heat is destroyed 
and the plant withers (De Sensu, 
c. 6; cf. Respir. 17, 478, b, 31). 
As to the influence exercised 
upon the character and colour of 
plants by the nature of the soil 
and water, see Polit. vii. 16, 1335, 
b, 18; Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, b, 32 
sqq. v. 6, 786, a, 2sqq.; H. An. v. 
11, 543, b, 23; De Sensu, 4, 441, a, 
11, 30; cf.. Probl. 20, 12; De 
Color. c. 5. —(3) The seed and the 
fruit of plants are made of the 
surplus portion of their food 
(Part. An. ii. 10, 655, b, 35, c. 7, 
638, a, 24; Gen. An. iii. 1, 749, 
b, 27, 750, a, 20, i. 18, 722, a, 11, 
723, b, 16, 724, b, 19, c. 20, 728, 
a, 26, c. 23, 731, a, 2 sqq.; Meteor. 
iv. 3, 380, a, 11); they contain 
both the germ and the food of 
the new plant (De An. ii. 1, 412, 
b, 26; Gen. An. ii. 4, 740, b, 6, i. 
23,731, a, 7); smaller plants are 
more fruitful, being able to ex- 
pend more material upon the 
formation of seeds: on the other 


hand, excessive fruitfulness stunts 
and destroys plants, because it 
absorbs too much of the nutritive 
substance (Gen. An. i. 8, 718, b, 
12, iii. 1, 749, b, 26, 750, a, 20 
sqq. iv. 4, 771, b, 13, i. 18, 725, 
b, 25; cf. H. An. v. 14, 546, a, 1 
—on barren trees, especially the 
wild fig-tree, see Gen. An. i. 18, 
726, a, 6, c. 1, 715, b, 21, iii. 5, 
755, b, 10; H. An. v. 32, 557, b, 
25). On the origin of the seed, 
see the remarks, Gen. An. i. 20, 
728, b, 32 sqq. c. 18, 722, a, 11, 
723,b, 9. On the development of 
the germ from the seed and on pro- 
pagation by slips, Juv. et Sen. c. 
3, 468, b, 18-28 (cf. WIMMRR, p. 
31; BRANDIS, p. 1240); Gen. An. 
ii. 4 739, b, 34, c. 6, 741, b, 34, 
iii. 2, 752, a, 21, c. 11, 761, b, 26; 
Respir. c. 17, 478, b, 33. On self- 
generation in plants and animals, 
and on parasites, there are remarks 
in Gen, An. i. 1, 715, b, 25, iii. 11, 
762, b, 9,18; H. An. v. 1, 539, 
a, 16.—(4) On the length of life 
and the decay of plants vide 
Meteor. i. 14, 351, a, 27; Longit. 
Vite, c. 4,5, 466, a, 9, 20 sqq. c. 
6; De Respir. 17, 478, b, 27; ef. 
Gen. An. iii. 1, 750, a, 20; on the 
fall of the leaf and evergreens, 
Gen. An. v. 3, 783, b, 10-22. 

1 On the sources from which 
he received assistance, vide the 
valuable account of BRANDIS, ii. b, 
1298-1305. Of his predecessors 
in this field the most important 
was undoubtedly Democritus, 
whom he frequently mentions 
with the greatest respect. He 
refers further to certain views 
of Diogenes of Apollonia, Anax- 
agoras, Empedocles, Parmenides, 





PHYSICS 37 


3. Animals. 


The powers of nutrition and propagation are accom- 
panied in all animals by sensation, the feeling of plea- 
sure and pain, and the appetites: in most of them also 
by the. power of locomotion. Hence the sentient and 
the motive soul is now added to the vegetable.’ Even 
that moral and intellectual life which reaches its full 
development in man may be dimly traced in the lower 
animals: they exhibit gentleness and fierceness, fear 
and courage, cunning and understanding; nor do we 
fail to perceive an analogue to the scientific faculty of 
men in the teachableness of certain animals; while 
conversely children display the same kind of rudi- 





Alemzon, Herodorus, Leophanes, 
Syennesis, Polybus, several state- 
ments of Ctesias and Herodotus 
(which, however, he treats with 
critical distrust), and now and 
then, rather by way of literary 
embellishment, to the poets. 
Notwithstanding all these, he 
must have mainly relied for his 
knowledge of animals upon his 
own observations, supplemented 
as those were by information 
received from shepherds, hunters, 
fishermen, breeders, and veterin- 
ary doctors. His theory, with the 
exception perhaps of a few isol- 
ated points, may be regardedas his 
own original work. ‘The setting 
into place and putting to use of 
the facts left him by his predeces- 
sors, BRANDIS remarks, 1303, ‘as 
well as the scientific form which 
he gave to zoology, are in all pro- 
bability Aristotle’s own work.’ 


LANGE, indeed, judges differently, 
Gesch. d. Material. i. 61: ‘The 
belief that Aristotle was a great 
discoverer in natural science is 
still widely diffused. The know- 
ledge, however, that he had 
many predecessors in this field 
. . . has necessarily caused this 
opinion to be much critisised,’ &c. 
Yet when we ask where we hear 
of these predecessors, LANGE 
refers us (pp. 129, 11, 135, 50) 
merely to a quotation from MUL- 
LACH, Fr. Phil. i. 338, who, how- 
ever, expresses himself much 
more guardedly: ‘haud scio an 
Stagirites illam qua reliquos phi- 
losophos superat eruditionem ali- 
qua ex parte Democriti librorum 
lectioni debuerit.’ On the aid 
which Alexander is said to have 
lent Aristotle in his zoological 
investigations see p. 29 sq. 
' See p. 21, supra. 


38 ARISTOTLE 


mentary moral and intellectual development which we 


detect in brutes.! 


The character and structure of their bodies answer 


' H, An. viii. 1, 588, a, 18: 
éveott yap &c. (see p. 27, n. 6, su- 
pra). Kal yap nuepdrns kal dypid- 


Tys Kat mpadtns Kal xarerdrns Kal - 


avdpia kal deAla Kal pdBor rad Odppn 
kal @vuol Kal mavovpyia Kal ris 
mepl Thy Sidvoiay cuvécews everow 
€v wohAvis avtay duodrynres. (For 
the continuation of this passage 
see p. 27,n. 6.) JZbid. ix. 1 init.: 
Ta 3 H0n Tav Cpwy éor Tov pey 
duavpotépwy Kat BpaxuvBiwrépwy 
ATTOv Huiv evdnrda Kara Thy atcAn- 
aw, Tav 5 waxpoBiwrépwy évSnrd- 
TEpa. aivovra: yap éxovrd tiva 
divauwy mepl Exactov Tey Tis Wuxis 
Tabnudtwy puochy, wept re ppdvn- 
ow kal eifOecav Kal avdplay Kab 
Beirlav, mepi re mpgdtynta Kat xade- 
mwéTnTa Kal Tas &AAas Tas ToLabTas 
efeis. Evia 5 Kowwve? tds Gua 
kal uabhoews Kal didacKarlas, Td 
wev map’ GAAhAwY Ta Se Kad mapa 
Tav wwOpdrwr, Scamep axons meré- 
xe, MH pdvoy Boa Tav Wopwy BAX’ 
boa Kal Tov onuelwy Biacbdverat 
tas Siapopds. (Cf. c. 3 init.: ra 
3 HOn tTav Cdov. . . diabéper nard 
Te deiAlav Kal rpadryra Kal avdplay 
kal tuepdrnta Kal vody re Kal 
avo.) After discussing the 
difference between the sexes 
with respect to disposition, Ari- 
stotle continues, 608, b, 4: rodTwy 
Y Ixvn wey trav Addy eorly ev 
Tow ws eimeiv, waAAOY BE havepo- 
TEpa év Tois Exovot maddov Hos 
kal uddrtora ev avOpém@* Todo yap 
Exel Thy vow amrorereNcouerny 
&e. Cf. i. 1, 488, b, 12 sqq.; Gen. 
An. i. 23 (see p. 28, n. 3, supra). 
Upon the docility and sagacity 
of many animals see also Metaph. 
i, 1, 980, a, 27 sqq.; Eth. iv. 7, 


1141, a, 26; Part. An. ii. J, 4, 
648, a, 5, 650, b, 24. In the 
ninth book of his Natural History 
Aristotle treats not only of habits 
of animals in general but more 
especially of the traces of intelli- 
gence which they exhibit, Of 
all quadrupeds the sheep has the 
smallest amount of intelligence 
(c. 3, 610, b, 22); the stag, on 
the other hand, displays a large 
amount (c. 5). Bears, dogs, 
panthers, and many other ani- 
mals find out the proper remedies 
against wounds and sickness, and 
the proper means of assistance 
against the attacks of other ani- 
mals (c. 6). With what intelli- 
gence again do swallows build 
their nests, and the pigeon pro- 
vide for his mate and his young 
(c. 7); how cunningly partridges 
manage their love-affairs, and 
hatch and protect their broods 
(c. 8); how cleverly the crane 
directs his flight (c. 10); what 
design is displayed in the habits 
of birds in general, in the choice 
of a habitation, in the building 
of their nests, in the: search for 
food (see ibid. c. 11-36). In 
like manner Aristotle remarks 
upon the cunning of many marine 
animals (c. 37), the industry of 
spiders (c. 39), of bees, wasps, 
and the like (c. 40-43), the 
docility and cleverness of ele- 
phants (c. 46), the moral instinct 
of camels and horses (c. 47), the 
humane disposition of dolphins 
(c. 48), &c.; with all which it 
is only natural that much that 
is questionable should be mixed 


up. 


of — — ——— 





universal organ of animal life.‘ 


PHYSICS 36 
to the higher tank which animals occupy in the scale of 
animated nature. Their.more numerous and various 
functions require a greater number and complexity of 
organs. Aristotle discusses all these organs in his 
treatise on the Parts of Animals.! First (ii. 2-9) he 
describes the homogeneous materials of which they 
consist— blood, fat, marrow, brain, flesh, bones, sinews, 
veins, skin, &c. The fundamental constituents of these 
materials are the elements of warmth, cold, dryness, 
and humidity.? Flesh, or that which corresponds to it 
amongst the lower classes of animals, is the most essen- 
tial and indispensable portion of the animal economy : 
for Aristotle, unacquainted as he was with the nerves, 
believed that flesh was the medium of the most universal 
of the senses, that of touch, and therefore the most 
Bones, sinews, and 
external coverings serve to unite and protect the flesh.* 
The blocd® furnishes the nourishment of the various solid 


' More accurately in the 
last three books of this treatise ; 
see i. 92, n. 1,. and i. 89, n. 2, 
supra, on these and the ‘Avaropat, 


early adh, rabryns 8 aicOnripiov rd 
TowvTov pdpidy éotw. On the 
importance of flesh for sensation 
see, further, c. 1, 647, a, 19, c. 3, 








2 Part. An. ii. 2 init. —c. 3, 


650, a, 2, referring to the different 


respects in which one thing is 
said to be warmer than another, 
and the transition from one state 
into another, 

® Cf. p. 26, n. 2, supra. 

* Part. ii. 8 init.: mpdrov 


" Goelaledl wept oapxds ey ois 


xovot odpras, ev 5& trois KAAos Td 
GydAoyov* totro yap apxh Kal 
oGua Kal? aitd tay Cohwy éeoriv. 
dHrov Be Kara roy Adyov: Td yap 
(Gov dbpiCdueda tS Exew alcOnow, 
mo@rov 5€ thy mpdérny' airn 3 


650, b, 5, c. 10, 656, b, 34; A. 
An, i. 3, 4, 489, a, 18, 23; but 
especially De An. ii. 11, 422, b, 
19, 34 sqq. 423, b, 1 sqq. 29, iii. 
2, 426, b, 15. The organ of 
sensation itself is the heart (see 
infra). 

5 Part. ii. 8, 653, b, 30 sqq. 

6 The blood, or that which cor- 
responds to it (see p. 26,n. 1.sup.), 
is most immediately food (re- 
Aevtala or eoxdrn tpoph) to the 
animal body (De Somno, cc. 3, 
456, a, 34; Part. ii. 3, 650, a, 
32 sqq. ¢. 4, 651, a, 12; Gen. An. 


40 | ARISTOTLE 


constituents. The brain serves to cool the blood,! and 
is therefore composed of the cold elements of earth and 
water; the marrow® and other parts* are made of 
surplus blood. Here, therefore, we may notice a 
graduated scale of means and ends. ‘The homogeneous 
elements of the body exist for the sake of the organic,’ 
but while some of them fulfil their end directly as parts of 
the organism, a second class serves merely as nutriment 
to the former, and a third consists of the superfluous 
remnant of the second,® which nevertheless has a use of 
its own in the economy of Nature and is not lost.’ 
Each of these materials is of superior or inferior quality 
according to its purpose, so that even here different 
animals and different parts of the same animal do not 
stand upon the same level.® ‘T'he soul resides primarily 


ii. 4, 740, a, 21, and passim); on 
its quality, therefore, much of 
the life both of soul and body 
depends; Part. An. ibid., and c. 
2, 648, a, 2 sqq. According to 
the latter passage, thick warm 
blood is more conducive to 
strength, thin cool blood to sense 
perception, and thought. The 
best mixture is one of warm but 
thin and pure blood. 

} Ibid.c.7 (seep. 16,n. 6, sup.). 
Only animals which have blood, 
therefore, have a brain (ibid. 
652, b, 23); human beings havea 
proportionately larger one than 
beasts, men than women (653, a, 
27), because their blood, being 
warmer, requires more to cool it. 
Bloodless animals, however, have 
something analogous to the brain ; 
see p. 26, n. 8, supra. 

2 Thid. 652, b, 22. 

3 Ibid. c. 6 fin.: [6 pverds] 


Tis aiuar Kis Tpopis THs eis 607 


kal &KavOav pepiCouevns earl rd 
éurepiAauBavduevoy mepittwua me- 
peer. 

4 Such as the seed, which is 
afterwards discussed, and the 
milk (Gen. An. iv. 8). 

5 See 1. 517, n. 6, ii. p. 3, n. 2, 
and p. 28, n. 1, supra. 

§ Part. ii. 2, 647, b, 20 sqq. 

7 See i. 465, n. 2, supra. 

8 Part. ii. 2, 647, b, 29 (after 
explaining the three kinds of 
duotomep): abtav 5€ roitwy ai 
Siahopal mpds BAAnAa Tod BeAriovos 
evekéy cio, oiov Tay Te HAAwY Kah 
aiuaros mpos aiua’ Td pev yap 
Aemrétepoy Td Se maxtrepoy Kal Td 
bev Kabapmtrepdv eort Td BE 
OorAEpwrepov, Ett SE TH wey Wuxpd- 
Tepov Td Se Oepudrepoy ev re Trois 
Mopiots TOD Evds (gov (To yap ev ToIs 
dvw mépect mpds Ta KadTw wdpia 
Siahéper ravrais Tals Siapopais) Kat 
Erépw mpos Erepoy. Similar differ- 
ences in flesh are referred to, 


PHYSICS 41 


in the Pneuma, which is the cause of vital heat, and 
which in turn has its chief seat in the heart." 

If we proceed to consider the organs formed of 
homogeneous materials, we must notice in the first 
place that animals possess a point of functional unity, 
and consequently an organ in which their vitality is 
centred :2 in creatures that have blood this organ is the 

heart, in others something similar ;* it is only some of 
the very lowest classes that so closely resemble plants 
as to possess at least potentially several points of 
vitality and to continue living after they have been 





cut in pieces.‘ 


This central organ is formed at the 


very beginning of life in every animal, and cannot 


be -destroyed without its dissolution.® 


Part. iii. 3, 665, a, 1, c. 7, 670, b, 
2. De An. ii. 9, 421, a, 25: of 
piv yap okAnpdcapka apueis Thy 
Sidvoray, of Bt wadrdaxdoapKat edpvets. 

1 Cf. p. 6, n. 2, supra. 

2 See p. 33, n. 4, supra. 

3 See p. 26, n. 7, supra, and 
Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, b, 16: apxh yap 
ris picews 4 Kapdla kal 7d dvddrovyor, 
7) 8& Kdtw mpocOhKn Kal TovTOU 
xdpw. De Vita et M.c. 2-4; Part. 
iii, 4, 665, b, 9 sqq. ¢. 5, 667, b, 
21. For a more detailed account 
of the parts which, according to 
Aristotle, represent the heart, 
and are always situated in the 
centre of the body, see Part. iv. 
5, 681, b, 12-682, b, 8; on their 
situation see further, Juv. et Sen. 
2, 468, a, 20. 

4 Aristotle remarks this, De 
An. ii. 2, 413, b, 16 sqq.; Juv. et 
Sen. 2, 468, a, 26 sqq.; Ingr. An. 
7, 707, a, 27 sqq.; Part. An. iii. 
5, 667, b, 23, iv. 5, 682, b, 1 sqq. 
(see p. 33, n. 5, supra), of many 
insects (which have not yet been 


Its function ® 


all identified; cf. MEYER, Arist. 
Thierk. 224). 

5 Part. iii. 4, 666, a, 10, 20, 
667, a, 32; De Vita, 3, 468, b, 
28; Gen. An. ii. 4, 739, b, 33, 
740, a, 24, where the view of 
Democritus is controverted which 
represented the outer portions 
as being formed first, ‘as though 
we were dealing with figures of 
wood or stone and not with 
living beings, whose evolution 
proceeds from within outwards.’ 

6 MnyeR, Arist. Thierk. 425 
sqq. The blood is boiled out of 
the food by means of the heat of 
the heart (De Respir. 20, 480, 
2 sqq.); the circulation of the 
blood, as well as the distinction 
between veins and _ arteries 
(Part. iii. 4, 666, a, 6. De Respir. 
20, 480, a, 10, and the whole 
description of the system of the 
veins, Part. iii. 5; Hist. An. iii. 
3), was unknown to Aristotle, 
who, however, was acquainted 
with the beating of the heart and 


42 ARISTOTLE 


consists partly in preparing the blood, and partly in 


producing sensation and motion. 


the pulse (cf. 1.262, n.1, sup.) and 
mentions the different quality of 
the blood (see infra, and cf. p. 40, 
n. 8, supra). He also accurately 
describes many of the veins 
(Part. iii. 5, Hist. An. iii. 3, 513, 
a, 12 sqq. cf. PHILIPPSON, “TAn 
avOp. p. 28). The veins have 
their source, not, as Hippocrates 
and his school held, in the head, 
but in the heart (Part. ii. 9, 654, 
b, 11, iii. 4, 665, b, 15, 27, c. 5 
init.; Hist. An. iii, 3, 518, a, 21; 
Gen. An. ti. 4, 740, -a, 21; 
De Somno, 3, 456, b, 1). The 
separation between the purer and 
the thicker blood is effected, at 
least in the case of all the larger 
animals, in the heart, the former 
passing upwards, the latter down- 
wards (De Somno, c. 8, 458, a, 
13 sqq.; Part. iii. 4, 665, b, 27 
sqq.; Hist. An. iii. 19, 521, a, 9). 
The native heat of the heart 
enables the blood, and this again 
enables the body, to retain its 
heat (Part. iii. 5, 667, b, 26); the 
heart, Part. iii. 7, 670, a, 24, is 
therefore compared to the Acro- 
polis, as the place in which 
Nature maintains her sacred fire. 
The boiling of the blood produces 
(v. MEYER) steam in the heart, 
causing the latter to heave and 
thus expanding the chest; into 
the space, thus left vacant, air 
rushes and so cools the whole 
that it again contracts until the 
steam which is generated in the 
heartagain produces the pulsation 
which is transmitted through all 
the veins and is accompanied by 
respiration (Part. ii. 1, 647, a, 
24, iii. 2, 665, b; Hist. An.i. 16, 
495, b, 10; De Respir. 20, 479, 


Next in importance 


b, 30, 480, a, 2, #4, c. 21, 480, a, 
24, b, 17). As the cause of 
respiration, the heart is also the 
cause of motion; De Somno, 2, 
456, a, 5,15, cf. Ingr. An. c. 6, 
707, a, 6sqq. The sinews, more- 
over, have their source in the 
heart, which is itself very sinewy, 
although they are not wholly 
dependent upon it (Hist. An. 
iii. 5; Part. iii. 4, 666, b, 13). 
Aristotle, however, does not ex- 
plain how the limbs are set in 
motion by the heart (see MEYER, 
p. 440). The heart is the primary 
seat. of sensation and of the 
sensitive life: Part. An. ii. 1, 
647, a, 24 sqq.c. 10, 656, a, 27 
sqq. b, 24, iii. 4, 666, a, 11, c. 5, 
667, b, 21 sqq., iv. 5 (see p. 41,n.3, 
supra); De Somno, 2, 456, a, 3; 
Juv. et Sen. 3, 469, a, 10 sqq. b, 3. 
Cf. Ch. X., part 3, infra. The 
blood vessels are the channels by 
means of which sensations reach 
the heart (Part. iii. 4, 666, a, 16), 
although the blood itself is with- 
out sensation (ibid. and Part. ii. 
3, 650, b, 3, c. 7,652, b, 5). The 
sense of touch transmits itself by 
means of the flesh (see p. 39, n. 4, 
supra), the others through pas- 
sages (épor) which extend from 
the organs of sense to the heart 
(Gen. An. v. 2, 781, a, 20), and 
by which we must suppose him 
to mean the veins, as MEYER, p. 
427 sq.,and PHILIPPSON, passage 
referred to above (in treating of 
the mépo: which lead to the brain : 
Hist. An. i. 16, 495, a, 11, iv. 8, 
533, a, 12; Part. An. ii. 10, 656, 
b, 16) show; cf. Juv. et Sen. 3, 
469, a, 12; Part. ii. 10, 656, a, 
29; Gen. An. ii. 6, 744, a, 1; 





* PHYSICS 43 


to the heart is the brain,' the purpose of which, as we 
already know,? is to cool the blood and temper the 
warmth arising from the heart. Aristotle directly 
contradicts the notion that it is the seat of sensation.* 
The lungs are also used for cooling the blood, the 
windpipe ‘ supplying them with air.® With a view to this 
purpose, their nature is varied according to the greater 
or less amount of internal heat an animal possesses. 
The lungs of mammals are the fullest of blood; those of 
birds and amphibious beasts, of air.’ Fishes, which are 


Hist. An. iii. 3, 514, a, 19, i. 11, 
492, a, 21. In the case of the 
senses of smell and hearing, 
between the objects perceived 
and the veins that lead to the 
heart, there is further interposed 
the mvetua ciuputoy; Gen. An. ii. 
6, 744, a, 1; Part. ii. 16, 659, b, 
15. The nerves are unknown to 
Aristotle ; cf. PHILIPPSON, ibid. 
and MEYER, p. 432: if he was 
led to the theory of the above- 
mentioned mdépor— by which 
SCHNEIDER (Arist. Hist. An. iii. 
47) and FRANTzIUS (Arist. ib. 
die Theile d. Thiere, p. 280, 54) 
understand him to mean nerves— 
by the actual observation of cer- 
tain of the nerves, this of itself 
would be a proof that he did not 
know them as nerves. See also 
Ch. X. part 3. 

! Part. iii. 11, 673, b, 10. 

? See p. 40,n. 1, supra, The 
spinal marrow is united to the 
brain for the purpose of being 


cooled by it. 


* Part. ii. 10, 656, a, 15 sqq. 
(where Aristotle has chiefly in 
view PLATO’s Timeus, 75, B sq.) ; 


cf. MEYER, p. 431. 


* See Part. iii. 3. Hist. An. 
iv. 9, where the windpipe is fully 


treated with especial reference to 
its function as the vocal organ. 

5 For the discussion of this 
point in detail, v. Part. iii. 6,and 
the treatise m. ’Avamvojjs, especi- 
ally c. 7, 474, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 sq. 
c. 13, c. 15 sq. The veins branch 
out from the heart to the lungs 
and serve to carry the air from 
the latter to the former; Hist. 
An. i. 17, 496, a, 27; MEYER, p. 


431 (see supra and Ph. d. Gr. i. 


730, 4). Plato had already assumed 
that the heart was cooled by 
the lungs. 

6 Respir. 1, 470, b, 12, c. 10, 
475, b, 19 sqq. c. 12 init. ; Part. 
iii. 6, 669, a, 6, 24 sqq. It is 
interesting to observe how Ari- 
stotle’s imperfect acquaintance 
with the facts lead him to false 
conclusions. His observations 
had led him to see that there is a 
connection between respiration 
and animal heat; but as he had 
no conception either of the oxi- 
dation of the blood or of the 
nature of combustion generally, 
or of the circulation of the blood, 
he held that its heat was merely 
cooled and not nourished by re- 
spiration. In Respir.c, 6, 473, as 
he expressly controverts the view 


44 ARISTOTLE 


less in need of cooling organs, are provided with gills 
in order to expel the water absorbed with their food 
after it has performed its cooling function.! Bloodless 
animals are without lungs, which, on account of their 
colder nature, they do not need.? The nutritive matter 
from which the blood is formed in the heart,? is 
prepared by the digestive organs,‘ which are separated 
from the nobler viscera in the case of all full-blooded 
animals by the midriff, in order that the seat of the 
sensitive soul may not be disturbed in its operations by 
the warm steam rising from the food.’ The food is 


that the air which is inhaled 
serves for food to the internal 
fire. 

1 Respir. 10,476, a, 1 sqq. 22, 
b, 5,¢. 16; H. An. ii. 13, 504, b, 
28, and other passages; see p. 
26, n. 9, supra. The earlier view 
that fish also breathe air, Ari- 
stotle expressly controverts, Re- 
spir. c. 2,3. A solution of the 
question was only possible (as 
MEYER remarks, p. 439) after 
the discovery of the conversion 
of gases. 

2 Part. iii. 6, 669, a, 1; Re- 
spir. c.9 (see p. 7 sq. supra), c. 12, 
476, b, 30. Aristotle knows, in- 
deed, of the respiratory organs 
of some bloodless animals, but 
he assigned to them another 
function. 

3 In Gen. et Corr. ii. 8, 335, a, 
9 sqq., De Sensu, 5, 445, a, 17, 
Aristotle remarks generally of 
plants as well as animals that 
this material is a mixture of all 
the elements ; see i. 482, n.3, sup. 
That which properly furnishes 
nutrition is the sweet part, for 
this, being lighter, is boiled 


away by the heat, while that 
part which is bitter and heavy 
is left behind; all else serves 
merely to season its sweet- 
ness (De Sensu, 4, 442, a, 2 sqq., 
cf. Gen. An. iii. 1, 750, b, 25; 
Meteor. ii. 2, 355, b, 5; Part. iv. 
1, 676, a, 35). Fat is sweet 
(De Sensu, 4, 442, a, 17, 23; 
Long. V. 5, 467, a, 4); sweet 
blood is the more wholesome 
(Part. iv. 2, 677, a, 27), and fat 
is well-boiled, nutritious blood 
(Part. ii. 5, 651, a, 21). 

4 The teeth perform merely a 
preliminary function (Part. ii. 3, 
650, a, 8). On the mouth, as the 
organ for taking up the food 
into the system, which, however, 
serves several other purposes as 
well, see Part. ii. 10 init. (cf. p.19, 
n. 1, supra), c. 16, 659, b, 27 sqq., 
lili. 1; De Sensu, 5, 445, a, 23. 

5 Part. iii. 10, 672, b, 8-24; 
cf. Ph. d. Gr.i. p. 729. That the 
vegetable soul (the vis) is 
situated below the midriff, is said 
also Gen. An. ii. 7, 747, a, 20. Cf. 
p. 41, n. 3, supra. 


a 


PHYSICS 45 


subjected to a preliminary process of preparation in the 
stomach,' and reduced to a fluid state, which admits of 
its entering the body.? It passes by evaporation into 
the veins that surround the stomach, and thence into 
the heart, where it is converted into pure blood. 
Leaving the heart, it is carried to the different parts of 
the body, according to their several necessities4 The 
passage of the blood from the stomach into the veins is 
effected by the mesentery, the tendrils of which are as 
it were the roots or suckers by means of which animals 
absorb their food from the stomach, as plants do from 
the earth. The fatty covering of the epiploon causes 
an increase of digestive warmth in the abdomen,® while 
the same function is performed for the blood by the 
liver and spleen,’ which also serve as a kind of anchor 








by which the network of veins is secured.*® 


' The nature of which in the 
different animals is described 
Part. iii. 14, 674, a, 21-675, a, 
30; H. An. ii. 17, 507, a, 24- 
509, b, 23, iv. 1, 524, b, 3, c. 3, 
527, b. 22, &c. 

2 Of. Part. ii. 2, 647, b, 26. 

8 Part. ii. 3, 650, a, 3-32, 
De Somno, 3, 456, b, 2 sqq. 

‘ It is pointed out, Gen. An. 
iv. 1, 766, a, 10, ii. 6 (see p. 
19, n. 2, supra), Meteor. ii. 2, 355, 
b, 9, that each part is formed and 
nourished out of suitable mate- 
rials, the nobler parts of better 
materials, the lower out of infe- 
rior; but we are not told how 
this is effected. From passages 
such as Gen. An. iv. 1, 766, b, 8, 
ii. 3, 737, a, 18, i. 19, 726, b, 9, 
cf. ii. 4, 740, b, 12 sqq., we gather 
merely that Aristotle supposes 
the blood as.the éoxdrn tpoph to 


On the 


pass spontaneously into those 
parts for which it is destined. 

° Part. iv. 4, 678, b, 6 sqq. 
ii. 8, 650, a, 14 sqq. According 
to these passages the stomach 
serves the same purpose for 
animals, as the earth does for 
plants ; it is the place where their 
food iskept and prepared for use. 

° Part. iv. 3,677, b, 14, where 
an attempt is made to explain 
the formation of the epiploon 
physically (€ dvdyens). 

” Part. iii. 7, 670, a, 20 sqq. 

* Part. iii. 7, 670, a, 8 sqq. 
(cf. c. 9, 671, b, 9) where the 
same remark is made of the kid- 
neys and the intestines generally 
(similarly Democritus compared 
the navel of the child in the 
mother to an anchor, see Part. i. 
807,6). It has already beenshown 
(p.20, n. 1, supra) that the spleen 


46 ARISTOTLE 


other hand, the gall is only useless matter which has 
been rejected by the blood.! The full-blooded animals, 
which on account of their warm nature need more fluid 
nourishment, are provided in their bladder and kidneys 
with special organs for rejecting the surplus matter 
which thus gains admittance into the body.’ Corre- 
sponding to the mouth, which receives food, and the 
gullet, which conducts it to the stomach,* all animals 
possess a conduit in their bowels for expelling the use- 
less refuse of their nourishment. But in the case of 
some animals a portion of the digestive function is per- 
formed by the bowels.® The narrowness and windings 
of these passages serve to moderate the appetite, and 
therefore the most voracious animals are those which 
have wide and straight canals like fishes ;° but the real 
need of nourishment depends upon the amount ot 


is not equally a necessity to all 
animals. Bloodless animals want 
this intestine as well as fat; 
Part. iv. 5, 678, a, 25 sqq. ii. 5, 
651, a, 25. For further descrip- 
tion of the form of these organs 
in different animals, see Part. iii. 
12, 673, b, 20, 28, c. 4, 666, a, 28, 
c. 7, 670, b, 10. De An. ii. 15, 
506, a, 13. 

1 See p. 20, n. 3, supra. Since 
only sweet. substances are nutri- 
tious, the bitterness of gall 
shows that it is a mepirrwua, 
Part.iv. 2,677, a, 24. It is accord- 
ingly not found in all animals ; 
ibid. 676, b, 25, iii. 12, 673, 
b, 24; H. An. ii. 15, 506, a, 20, 31. 

2 Part.iii. 8, 9; H. An. ii. 16. 
Aristotle knew of exceptions to 
the above rule and found means 
of explaining them, His treat- 


ment of the fat of the kidneys, 
672, a, 1 sqq., from the point of 
view both of physical necessity 
and of natural design is especially 
full and interesting. 

3 On the alimentary canal, 
which, however, is not found in 
all animals, see Part. iii. 14. 

4 Part. iii. 14, 674, a, 9 sqq. 
675, a, 30, 656, b, 5. 

5 Thid. 675, b, 28. 

6 Thid. 675, b, 22: b0a bev ovy 
elvar Set Tav Cowy TwoHpovéctepa 
mpos Thy THs Tpopis Tolnow evpv- 
xwplas wey ovk exer weydAas Kata 
Thy Kdtw Korlav, EAikas F exer 
maelous Kal ovK evOvévrepa eat. 7) 
Mev yap edpvxwpla more? mAnNOous 
éribuulay, n 8 edOdrns TaxuTira 
éribuulas &c. Tbid. 675, a, 18; 
Gen. An. i. 4, 717, a, 23 sqq. ; 
PLATO, Tim. 72, E sq. 










PHYSICS 47 . 


warmth or cold in the nature of the animal.' Support 
and protection are supplied to the softer parts by the 
framework of bones, or what corresponds to it in the 
lower animals.? All the bones of sanguineous animals 
start from the spine;* and here it is certain that 
Aristotle has the credit of being the first to indicate one 























oo Part. iv. 5, 682, a, 22: 7rd 
yap Oepudv Kat Setra: tpopijs kal 
WETTEL Thy Tpophy Taxéws, Td SE 
Wuxpoy &rpopor. 
* Part. ii. 8, 653, b, 33 sqq. ; 
see p. 39, n. 5, supra; ibid. c. 
9, 654, b, 27 sqq. On the parts 
analogous to the bones, see p. 
26, n. 4, supra. 
3 Part. ii. 9, 654, b, IL: apxh 
bi ray wey pAcBay 7 Kapdia, Tov 3’ 
doTav % Kadroumévn paxis Tors 
éxovow bo7d naow, ap’ hs cvvexys 
7) Tav GAAwy boTav éott Hiats. 
» ) * Hist. An. iii. 7, 616, ‘b, 22: 
mdvra 5 Ta (Ga boa Evaimud ori, 
Exe: pdxuv 2) da7wHdn I dxav6ad5n. 

> For the full treatment of 
this subject see Part. ii. 9, 654, 
b, 16 sqq. On one or two remark- 
able omissions in Aristotle’s 
Osteology, e.g. of ull mention of 
the pelvis and of the parallel 
between the legs of animals and 
human beings, see MbyYnER, p. 
441 sq. 
*£.q. in the treatise 7. 
mopelas C¢wv the statements: that 


of their common properties.‘ 
the spine by means of sinews and joints, which connect 
them all without impeding motion.® 
to motion and the organs of motion in their mechanical 
aspect, Aristotle has recorded several just observa- 
tions. In other cases he not unfrequently supports’ 
remarks of questionable value by artificial and inde- 


The limbs are united to 


With reference 


all that moves requires a fulcrum 
(c. 3); that two organic parts at 
least are necessary to produce 
motion, one to sustain the pres- 
sure and one to exercise it (ibid. 
705, a, 19); that there is always 
an even number of feet (c. 8,708, 
a, 21; Hist. An. i. 5, 489, b, 22); 
that all forward motion in 
organic beings is produced by 
bending and stretching (c. 9, ¢. 
10, 709, b, 26; this chapter far- 
ther contains discussions on the 
flight of birds and insects, and 
the importance of the different 
organs of flight); that in order 
that he may stand upright man 
may not have more than two legs, 
and that the upper parts of his 
body must be lighter in propor- 
tion to the lower thanin the case 
of the lower animals (c. 11 init.). 
The same is true of many of the 
remarks in c. 12-19 on the bend- 
ing of the joints and the means 
of locomotion both in men and in 
different animals, 


48 ARISTOTLE 


monstrable assumptions.!. Nor can we pretend that he 
made the least advance towards a physiological explana- 
tion of the circumstances which affect and accompany 
locomotion.? 

One of the most important distinctions between 
animals and vegetables is the difference in their manner 
of reproduction.* While vegetables have no sex, the 
separation of the sexes begins with animals, their re- 
union being only transiently effected for purposes of 


reproduction. 


1 Thus, c. 4 sq. (cf. i. 497, n.1, 
sup.), he endeavours, not without 
much subtilty, to establish the 
position that motion always pro- 
ceeds from the right, although 
he obviously derives it, not from 
scientific observation, but from 
the dogmatic presupposition 
(c. 5, 706, b, 11) that the top is 
superior to the bottom, the front 
to the back, the right to the left, 
and that therefore the dpxai 
must have their seat on the 
upper front and right side. 
Albeit he remarks himself that 
we may equally say that these 
are the superior situations be- 
cause the aépxa) have their seat in 
them. On the latter point cf. 
ibid. 705, a, 29 sqq.; De Calo, ii. 2, 
284, b, 26: adpxas yap radras 
A€yw BOev Xpxovtat tpHrov af cuvh- 
ges Tois Exovow, For. FE ard wey 
Tov &yw 7 avtnois, amd BE Tov 
Setiav 7) Kata rTémov, ard &t Tov 
Eumpoobey 7 kata Thy alc@now. He 
goes on to add, c. 6 sq., an 
equally artificial proof of the 
statement (which is made also 
c. 1, 704, a, 11, c. 10 init.; Hist. 
An. i. 5, 490, a, 25 sqq.) that 
sanguineous animals cannot 
move on more than four legs 


Since animals are not intended for mere 


(Hist. An. he says plainly four). 
His account moreover, c. 12 Sqq.s 
of the walk of animals, as MEYER 
shows, 441 sq., is not free from 
error. 

2 Weare told, indeed, that all 
motion proceeds from the heart, 
but it is not explained how this 
is possible (see p. 41, n. 6, supra). 
The explanation proposed, =. 
mvevmatos, Cc. 8 init., that the 
vital spirit streams through the 
sinews and is the moving force, is 
not Aristotelian. 

3 The work in which Aristotle 
has treated of this question, 7. 
(dwv yevéoews, has received the 
warmest recognition even from 
scientific men of the present day. 
LEWES, who is not certainly in 
other respects inclined to place 
an exaggerated estimate upon 
Aristotle’s scientific investigation, 
agrees with AUBERT and WIM- 
MER (p. v. sq. of their edition) in 
expressing his admiration of this 


‘treatise, which handles some of 


the deepest problems of biology 
with a masterly grasp, astonish- 
ing at so early atime, and is even 
less antiquated at the present day 
than Harvey’s celebrated work 
(Arist. § 413). 


a 
ahd 





PHYSICS 49 


life, but also for sensation, it follows that the exercise 
of their reproductive ' functions must be confined to 
certain occasions.” Only the ostreaceous tribes and 
zoophytes* are sexless; placed upon the boundary which 
separates the animal from the vegetable kingdom, they 
are deprived of the functions which belong to both: 
they resemble plants in not propagating themselves by 
copulation, and animals in not being generated from seeds 




























or fruit. 


to locomotion.° 


' The épyov tov (avros, the 
epyov Kowdy tav LévTwv mdyTwr. 

2 Gen. An. i. 23, from which 
quotation has already been made, 
p. 29, supra. 

3 Besides a few others, to be 
mentioned hereafter, which must 
be regarded as exceptions. 

* Gen. An. i. 23, 731, b, 8, 
c. 1, 715, a, 25, b, 16, ii. 1, 732, a, 
13, iii. 11, 761, a, 13-32. Only 
such relatively simple organisms 
can be produced in this way, and 
accordingly if it be true,as some 
hold, that men and quadrupeds 
are sprung from the earth, they 
must have been evolved from 
Worms or eggs which preceded 
them (Gen. An. iii. 11, 762, b, 
sqq.). Aristotle, however, does 

himself share this view, 
ough it is to be found in 


VOL, I. 


They are, in fact, reproduced by a process of 
spontaneous generation from slime.‘ 
biguity of nature is displayed in their case with regard 


And the like am- 


Passing tothe comparison of the sexes, we may remark 
that the male and female are related to each other as 
form and matter.’ The former is the active, the latter is 
the passive, part ; the one bestows the motive and plastic 
force, the other supplies the material to be moulded ;7 


Theophrastus. 

® Separation of the sexes is 
expressly confined to the (¢a 
mopevTika, and as_ testaceous 
animals are described in the 
passage just referred to as peratd 
bvta TeV (hwy Kal tev puTay, and 
accordingly of neuter gender, it 
is said of them, Zngr. An. 19, 
714, b, 18: ra dot paxddepua 
Kwerras Mey, KiveiTar dé mapa vow 
ov ydp éort KiwntiKd, GAN’ &s wey 
uéviua Kal mpoomepundra Kuwytixd, 
@s S€ mopevtinda pdviua, It is 
previously said that they move as 
animals with feet would move if 
their legs were cut off. 

® See i. 353, supra. 

” Gen. i, 2, 716, a, 4: rijs 
yeverews apxas ay tis 0dx Hora 
Gein 7d OAV Kal Td kppev, 7d wey 
ippey ws Tis Kwhrew> Kal ris 


E 


60 ARISTOTLE ; 


the one gives the soul, the other the body.’ Aristotle 
maintains this opinion so firmly that he denies any 
participation on the part of the malé seed in the 
material composition of the embryo,’ declaring that it 
only communicates the necessary impulse to the sub- 
stance derived from the female,’ as is the case generally 
with form in its relation to matter, active to passive, 


propelling to propelled. 


In each of these cases the 


former does not enter into any material union with the 


latter principle, but only operates upon 1t.* 


Just for 


this reason, according to Aristotle, is the male distinct 


yevéoews Exov Thy apxiv, Td BE 
OjAv ws Ans. c. 20, 729, a, 9: 7d 
bev &ppev mapéexeTat Td TE eldos Kal 
Thy apxny THs Kwécews, TH 5E OAV 
7) capa Kal thy BAny. L. 29: 7d 
tppev eotly ds Kivodv, Td SE OHAV, 7 
O7Av, ws wabnTikdy. Again, c. 21, 
729, b, 12, 730, a, 25, ii. 4, 738, b, 
20-36, 740, b, 12-25, and passim ; 
cf. also foll. notes. 

1 Gen. An. ii. 3 (see supra, p.6, 
n. 2): 7d THs yoris coma, ev @ 
cuvamépxeTar To amépua Td THIS 
WuxiKfs apxis. Ibid. 737, a, 29 
(see p. 52, n. 2, infra) c. 4, 738, 
b, 25: €or: 5 Td wey oOGua ex TOU 
Oreos, | SE PuXH €x TOD Uppevos. 

2 Gen. An. i. 21, 22: the 
young is formed in the mother, 
in whom lies the material on 
which the plastic force of the 
father is exercised but into which 
the male seed does not enter as 
any part of the embryo, &o7ep 
od’ amd Tov TéxTOvos Tpos Thy TAY 
EvAwy tAny ovr’ amrépxera ovder, 
obre udpiov ov0ev eotiy ev TH yryvo- 
Mév@ THS TEeKTOVIKHs, GAN’ 7H MopoH 
kal td eldos am’ exelvov eyylverat 
dia THs KwWicews ev TH DAN, Kal 7 
Mev Wuxh, ev i) Td e€ldos, Kal 7 


aad 


emioTHUN Kivodot Tas xEipas... ai 


dé xetpes Kal Ta Upyava Thy BAnv. 

% He compares the seed in 
this respect, Gen. An. i. 20, 729, 
a, 11, ii. 4, 739, b, 20, with the 
runnet which causes milk to 
curdle. Jbid. iv. 4, 772, a, 22, 
however, deprecates too exact an 
application of this comparison. 

4 Gen. An. i. 21, 729, b, 1: 
does the male seed contribute to 
the formation of the young és 
évuTdpxov Kal pdpioyv dy edvOds Tod 
yiwoméevov THmatos, pvyvimevoy TH 
vAn Ti wapa TOU O4Acos, ) TH MeV 
THpa ovdev Koivwrvel TOD omepuatos, 
n & év abr@ Sivas Kal Kivyots ; 
Aristotle decides for the second 
of these views; for, on the one 
hand, od gatverar yiyvdmevov ev ek 
Tov maOyTiKov Kal TOU woLOvYTOS Gs 
évuTapxovTos év TH ywomévw Tod 
mwotovvtos, ovd bAws Sh €x Tov 
Kivoumevov kal K.ivotyTos, and, on 


the other, it is supported by. 


several other facts which show 
that generation is possible with- 
out material contact between the 
male seed and the female matter, 
as in the case of the subsequent 
fructification of wind-eggs.. 


o-—- ¥ 








PHYSICS 61 


from the female, wherever it is possible; for if the 
form is superior to the matter, the more distinct they are, 
the better the result must be.! Accordingly, he is careful 
to distinguish between the procreative snbstance of the 
male, which is the seed, and that of the female, which he 
identifies with the catamenial discharge. He holds that 
they are both, generically, of the same sort and the 
same origin, being a secretion of nutritive matter, a 
product of the blood.? This fluid, however, is secreted 
in larger quantities and of a cruder sort with the 
weaker sex, forming the menses of women or what 
corresponds to them among other animals; in men, 


























however, it becomes seed.? 


' Gen. An. ii. 1, 732, a, 3: 
BeAriovos 5 Kal Occorépas thy ptow 
ovens Tis aitias THs Kwovans 
mpatns, n 6 Adyos bindpxe kal 7d 
eldos, tis HAns, BéAtiov Kal rd 
KexwploGa: Td Kpeirroy Tod xelpovos. 
bia Toir’ ev boos evdéxerar Kad 
Kad’ boov évbéxera Kexdpiora Tov 
OnAEos Td Upper. 

* The detailed investigation 
of the subject is to be found 
in Gen. An. i. 17-20. Aristotle 
begins (721, b, 11 sqq. cf. c. 20, 
729,a, 6,730, a, 11) by denying the 
opinion that the semen is asecre- 
tion drawn from all parts of the 
body (on whichef. ZELL. Pi.d.Gr. 
1.805, 2,720,6,AUBERT-WIMMER, 
p. 7 of their ed.), He then (724, 
@, 14 sqq.) shows that omépua 
must be one of two things, either 
an excrement from the organic 
s of used-up matter (a 
wa) ora surplus of nutri- 
ve matter (a repitrwpua), and in 
the latter case either a useless or 

uscful surplus. It cannot bea 
wa, nor can it be a useless 


iS Ot el 


eaten atin gee Pratl Oe aT ce A 


Thus the same substance 


mepitrwua; it must therefcre be 
a yart of the useful wepitrapua of 
the body. But the most useful 
nutritive substance is the rpop) 
éoxdry or the blood; the omépua 
is therefore ris aiuatiis mepir- 
Twua TPOPTs, THs eis TA wep Biadi- 
douevns TeAcvTalas (c. 19, 726, b, 
9). This is the reason why 
children resemble their parents : 
Smoov yap Td mpoterOdy mpds 7a 
Mépn TH brodchbevtTis Sore 1d 
omépua earl rd ris xeipds h rd 
tov mporwrov i) bAov Tod Cov 
adioplatws xelp ) mpdawmor fh bArov 
(Gov: kal olov exelvwv Exacrov 
évepyela, TowvTov Td omépua du- 
vdwer (ibid. c. 13). On the pro- 
perties and material composition 
of the semen, see Gen. An. ii. 2. 

* Ibid. 726, b, 30 sqq. c. 20, 
729, a, 20. Aristotte, c, 19, 727, a, 
15 sqq. explains the weaker veins, 
the paler colour, the smaller 
quantity of hair, and the smaller 
bodies of women on the ground 
of defective supply of blood, 


gE 2 


52 ARISTOTLE 


receives so different an application in the two cases, 
that where it takes the one form it cannot exhibit the 
other.! We see at once how well this theory of the 
two procreative substances fits into our philosopher's 
views about the generative process and the relation of the 
sexes. If the menses consist of the same material 
as the seed, except that it has not received in them 
the same development, we may compare them to im- 
perfect seed.? So they contain potentially what the seed 
possesses actually; they are the matter, while the seed 
communicates the impulse to development and form. 
Being a remnant of the essential nutriment, the menses 
and the seed continue even after their union in the 
embryo the motion which they previously maintained 
in the bodies of the procreative pair, and by the 
exercise of their native impulse to growth and nutrition 
produce something that resembles its parents.* If the 
being to be brought forth were merely vegetable, the 

1C. 19, 727, a, 25: éwel 5¢ 


rout’ éorly d ylyverat Tots OjAECoW 
ws ) yovh Tots &ppeoiw, 500 8 odK 


male. Cf. c. 5, 741, a, 15. 
3 [bid. 737, 4,18: tod 5¢ owép- 
Matos bvTos mepiTTmmaTos Kal KwW- 


evdéxeT a1 omepuariKas dua ylveoOar 
amoKploets, pavepdy Ott Tb ORAv ov 
ouUBAAAET AL OTE pua. Eis THY yéverw. 
ei pty yap omépua hy, TH KaTawhvia 
ovx dv jv viv b€ ba Td TadTa 
yiyvecOat éxeivo ovk e~orw. It is 
shown also, c. 20, cf. ii. 4, 739, a, 
20, that there is nothing else that 
can be taken for female semen. 
2 Gen. An. ii. 3, 737;a,-27: 
7) yap OnAv Sowep Sppev orl 
menmnpwucvoy, Kal Ta KaTayhvia 
omépua, ov Kabapby dé. Ev yap 
ovK exer pdvov, Thy THS wWuxns 
&pxhv, as may be seen in the case 
of wind-eggs, which are produced 
without the co-operation of the 


oumévou Klynow Thy avThy Kad’ hv- 
wep Td cama avtdverar mepiCouerns 
THs €oxaTns Tpopys, STav EAOn eis 
Thy borépay ouviotnot Kar Kiet Td 
mepittwua To TOU OHAEoS Thy adi 
K'vnow hymep avtd Tuyxdver Kivov- 
Mevov KaKeivo. Kal yap exeivo mep!T- 
Twua Kal mdvTa TH pdpia exer Sv- 
vauel, evepyela 8 ovbev, Kal yap Ta 
ToT’ Exe. wdpia Svvduer, 7) Sia- 
pepe. Th OAV Tov &ppevos. Sawep 
yap Kal ek memnpwmévev STE pwev 
yivera: wemnpwpeva dbré 5’ ov, obTrw 
kal éx OfAeos TE wey OAV btE F 
ov, GAN’ Uppev. Td yap OFAU &c. 
(see preced. n.), Cf, i. 19, 726, 
b, 13 (see n, 20n preceding page), 


- 
j 


PHYSICS 5a 


female, he holds, would suffice for its development, since 
the nutritive forces of the soul are already active in her 
portion of the procreative substance. For the birth of 
an animal, on the other hand, male seed is indispen- 
sable, since it alone contains the germ of sensitive life.! 
The matter of the male having thus begun to operate 
actively upon the passive substance of the female, an 
effect is produced corresponding to the nature of both. 
Their proper nature grows and develops from the two 
elements, not because the materials are spatially at- 
tracted to their like, but because each element when 
once set in motion moves in the direction for which it 
has a natural predisposition *—because, in fact, the seed 





' Gen. An. ii. 5, 741, a, 9: 
if the material for the birth is 
contained in the female repittwpa 
and the female portion of thesame 
had the same soul as the male, 
why is it unproductive by itself ? 
altiov 5° bri Siaéper 7d CGov rod 
guTod aicOijoe ... ei obvy Td 
iippev dar 7d Tis ToLavTHS TonTLKdY 
Wuxis, brov KkexdpiorarTd O7Av Kai 
7d uppev, adivarov td OnAV é€ 
airov yevvay (gov. It is seen, 
however, in the case of wind- 
eggs that the female is to a 
certain extent capable of unaided 
production. These have a cer- 
tain divauis vx), although 
only of the lowest kind, viz. 
Operrix), but as animals possess a 
sensitive soul as well, no animal 
can come from them. If there 
were animals of which no males 
are to be found, as perhaps is the 
case with the red sea mullet (al- 
though this is still far from cer- 
tain), in such cases the female 
would be self-begotten. On the 
other hand, where there is a 


separation of the sexes this is 
impossible ; otherwise the male 
would serve no purpose ; whereas 
in reality it is from the male 
that the sensitive soul comes at 
the beginning, 

* Ibid. ii. 4, 740, b, 12: 4 Be 
Sidupiois ylyverat tay mwoplwy [in 
the process of evolution] obx és 
tives drodauBdvovor dia 7d wepu- 
Kévat pépecOar Td Buoy mpds rd 
Suowv* [a view which he pro- 
ceeds to refute] . . . GAA’ bri 7d 
mwepittwua To Tov OhAEos Suvdmer 
Troovrdéy eo olov pice Td (Gor, 
kal Everts Suvduer Ta wdpia evepyela 
8’ ob@tvy, 51a trabrny Thy airiay 
ylverat Exacrov abra@y, Kal bri rd 
mointikoy Kal 7d mwabntindy Sav 
Olywow, dy tpdwov éort 7d piv 
mointikoy To 8 mabnrimdy, .. . 
edOds Td wey wore? Td BE wdoxen. 
bAny wey ody mapéxer Td OAV, Thy 
5° apxhv ris Kwhoews Td upper. 
The operative force is here the 
nutritive soul, whose instruments 
are cold and heat. c. 5, 741, b, 
7: the maie portion is the 


54 ARISTOTLE 

contains the germ and potentiality of the soul.! The 
operative forces which nature uses in this process are 
heat and cold;? but the character of the generative 
matter and of the germinal life which it contains, deter- 
mines and regulates these forces.*? Every germ brings 
forth a being similar to that from which it sprang, 
because the blood, the direct source of nutriment to the 
body, tends to form a body of a certain definite sort, 
and this tendency continues to operate in the seed. 
Hence it happens that the character of individuals. as 
well as of races comes to be propagated in the act of 


primary source of the evolution, 
as it is this which contributes 
the sensitive soul. évuvmrapxdvtwy 
5 év tH BAn Suvduer Tay pmoplwyr, 
drav apxh yévntat Kwhoews, dowep 
€y Tos avTOMdrots Oaduaot cvvelpeTaL 
Td épetijis Kal 6 BovdAovra A€yev 
Ties Tav puoiKkayv, Td PéperGa: eis 
Td Guowov, Aekréov ovX ws TOroV 
KeTaBdAAovTa Ta mdpix Kiveio Oa, 


G@AAG pévovta Kal GAAoLtovmeva 
juadakdtynte Kal oKanpdérynti Kal 


Xp@uac. kal Tals &AAas tais tov 
éuoomepa@v Siapopais, yiwwdmeva évep- 
yela & Swijpxey bvta Suvdwer mpdr- 
€pov, a view which had already 
been proved in detail in c, 1 
(from 733, b, 30, onwards). 

1 See on this, Gen. ii. 1, 733, 
b, 32, 735, a, 4 sqq. c. 3, 736, b, 
8 sqq. and p. 6, n. 2, supra. 

? In generation proper these 
spring from the vais tod yevvay- 
Tos; in spontaneous generation, 
from the kivnois kal Oepudryns Tis 
dpas ; ibid. ii. 6, 743, a, 32. 

* Ibid. c.1, 734, b, 31: cxanpa 
Mey obv Kal wardaKk Kc. H Oepudrns 
kal Wuxpérns mojoney by [rd 
pépix], roy BE Adyow, & Hn 7 wey 


capt To 8 dcrody, obKéri, GAN F 
kiyno.s 7) ard TOU yevyhoavTos Tov 
évteAexela bvtos & ear Suvduer 7 
[read 7d] e& ob yiverm, as is 
further expounded. c. 4, 740, 
b, 25 (see last note of preceding 
page). c. 6, 743, a, 3: 7 8¢ yéveis 
€otw ék Tov buotomepay bmd Wikews 
kat Oepusrnros. After explaining 
how different materials are 
formed in both ways, he continues, 
1. 21: airy 5& [heat] ofre 6 m1 
Eruxe moet odpka 7) dorovv, od8 
Onn Ervxev, AAA TL Tepunds Kal F 
mépune kal bre wépuKev. ove yap 
Td Suvduer dv brd Tod uh Thy evép- 
yelwv ExovTos KiyTiKod Exrat, ore 
To Thy évépyeray Exov Torhoe ex 
Tov tuxdvTos ... % 8 Oepudrns 
evuTdpxe ev TE owEpuaTiKG WeEptT- 
THMATL TocavTny Kal To.avTHyY 
Exovoa Thy Kivnrw Kal Thy evépyeiar, 
don ovmmeTpos eis Exactoy TaeY 
Mopiwy . . . 4 5é Whiis orépyors 
Oepudrynrdés éotiy. xpnra 8 
Guporépos 7 dais Exovor uév 
Sivauw e& dvdyens bore 7d wer 
Todl Th 5& rod) moeiv, dv pévra 
ToLs yivouevols Evekd Tivos cumBalver 
Td pev Wixew abra@v 7d 5E Oepual- 








PHYSICS 55 


generation.' If the male seed, which communicates the 
impulse of development, has sufficient vigour to mature 
the substance offered to it, the child follows its father’s 
sex: if it lacks the necessary warmth, a being of colder 
nature, a woman, is born. For the ultimate distinction 
between the two sexes is one of greater or less vital 
heat: the warmer nature can mature the blood to 
perfect seed, the colder must content itself with supply- 
ing the raw material of procreation in the catamenial 
discharge.? Woman is an unfinished man, left standing 
on a lower step in the scale of development.’ The gen- 


vew &c.; for all this takes ‘yap ofrws , . . rplrov dt mpds rov- 





place (1. 16) ri wey e& avdynns ti 
8 ob ef dvdynns GAA’ Evend Twos, 

' See p. 51, n. 2, sup. and p. 58, 
n. 3,inf. Gen. An. iv. 1, 766, b, 
7: 7) wey omépua drdKerra Tepir- 
Twa Tpopis by Td ErxaTov. Faxa- 
Tov 3 Aéyw Td mpbs Exacroy [i.e. 
each part of the body; see p. 45, 
n. 4, supra] pepdmevor. 5:d rat Eoure 
7d yevvdpevoy TE yevvioartt. 

_ ® After refuting various views 
as to the origin of the difference 
of the sexes, Aristotle proceeds, 
Gen. An. iv. 1, 765, b, 8: érel rd 
tppev kal Td ORAU didpiorat Suvduer 
tw Kal ddvvaula (7d pey yap 
duvduevov wértew Kal cuvotdvat 
Te kal exxpivew omépua Exov thy 
apxhy rod eldous tppev . . . Td Be 
Bexduevoy uty aduvarovy 8 cune- 
Tava Kad éxxplyew O7Av [similarly 
i. 20, 728, a, 18]) én «i waca 
mabis épydCerar Oepug, avdynn Kal 
Tay (pwy Ta Uppeva Ta OnrAéwv 
Gepudrepa elva:. [The proof being 
that the former excrete the pre- 
pared seed, the latter in menstrua- 
tion the raw blood.) .. . dua 
h otois thy re dvvauw arodiiwow 
éxdorp Kal rd iipyavov: Bédriov 


Tots Anwréov Sri etrep 7H POopa eis 
Tovvaytiov, Kal Td wh Kparovmevoy 
imdb tod Snutovpyodyvros ayvd-yKnn 
metaBdAdAew eis rovvaytiov. Hence 
the true explanation: Stay yap 
wh Kparh H apxh pnde ddynras 
méyar 5° Evderav Oepudrnros und 
aydyn eis td Y5roy eldos Td adrod, 
GAAG TaltTn HTTHOA, avdynn eis 
tovvavtioy meraBdAAew. . . . émel 
3° Exer Siapopay ev tH Suvduer, Exes 
kal Td ipyavoy Siapépov* Har’ eis 
TowvTov peraBbdAAe. The same 
account is repeated clearly and 
precisely, 766, b, 8. Cf. ¢.3, 767, 
b, 10. A number of facts are 
adduced, c. 2, in support of this 
theory. 

8 See p. 52, n. 2, wr sat ; Gen. 
An. ii. 3, 737, a, 27: 7d yap OAV 
dowep &ppev earl memnpwpévor. 
iv. 6, 775, a, 14: aoOevéorepa yap 
éort kal Wuxpétrepa Ta OhAea Thy 
piow kal bet bworAauBdvery dbowep 
avamnplay elvat thy Onddrnta 
guvouwhv. i, 20, 728, a, 17: Foxe 
dé kal Thy uopphy yuvh Kal ais, 
kal éotw 7 ‘yuvh domwep kppev 
tyovov. v. 3, 784, a, 4. Of. 
Probl. x. 8, The statement, 


56 ARISTOTLE 


erative organs themselves are adapted to their functions ; 
we must not regard them as the causes but as the signs 
of sexual difference.' We should rather look for the 
ground of sex distinction in the vital principle itself and 
in the central organ and seat of life: for though it is not 
complete until the sexual parts appear, yet its germs 
are laid in the formation of the heart at the very com- 
mencement of foetal existence.? On this account sex 
plays a most various and important part in animal life, 
influencing to a greater or less extent the temper as well 
as the physical structure of animals,* while castration is 
followed by vast changes in the nature of men and 


brutes.4 


Longit. V. 6, 467, a, 32, vavw- 
Séorepov yap Tod OndAeos Td kppev, 
the upper portions of his body 
being relatively greater, does not 
quite harmonise with this, for it 
is just the excessive size of those 
portions that constitutes the 
dwarfishness of children (Part. 
An. iv. 10, 686, b, 10; De Mem. 
2, 453, a, 31, b, 6), with whom 
women are compared. 

* See last note but one. 

* Ibid. 766, a, 30: et ody 7d 
Mev Uppey apxh Tis kal atriov, fort 
5° Uppey f Sbvarai ti, OAV BE F 
aduvare?, Tijs 5& Survduews Bpos ral 
THs aduvaulas TO memrikdy Elva }) 
Mh wemrixdy Tis dordrns Tpop9js, d 
év mev Trois évatuors alua Kadetras 
év 8€ Tois %AAos 7d avdAoyov, Tov- 
tou d€ 76 altioy ev TH apxi Kal TG 
woply TG exovts Thy ris pvohs 
Oepudrnros apxhy, dvayKaioy &pa 
ev Tots évaluors ovvioracbat Kapdlay, 
kal 7) &ppev ececOar 2 ORAV 7d 
yiwouevoy. ev Bt rois &AAots vyéve- 
ow omdpxe: Td OHAV Kal Td Sppev 
TO 7H Kapdig avGdoyov. 4% Mev obv 


given, H. An. ix. 503. 


apxi) Tod OnAeos Kal Hppevos Ka F 
aitla airy Kal éy rovtm éorly, 
OnAv 8 H5n Kal &ppev early, Bray 
éxn Kal ra udpia ols Siabéper 7d 
OA Tov &ppevos. 

% The chief passages on this 
head are H. An. iv. 11, where 
the peculiarities in the physical 
structure of each of the sexes in 
the various animal tribes, and 
ibid. ix. 1, where differences of 
character are discussed. 

* A description of which is 
Gen. An. 
iv. 1, 766, a. 28, gives the reason : 
dT. Evia tav poplwy apxat ciow. 
apxis S€ KwnOelons worAAa avd-yKn 
meBiotac0a: tay aKodovbotvrar, 
According to the passage just 
referred to, such an effect could 
not be expected to follow the 
excision of the testicles, but only 
of the heart: especially as Ari- 
stotle, Gen. An. v. 7, 787, b, 26, 
without knowing. their special 
functions, treats the former as a 
mere appendage to the seminal 
ducts. For the account of the 





PHYSICS 57 


Other phenomena besides the distinction of sex pro- 
ceed from weakness in the procreative power. ‘The 
movement communicated by the male seed tends to 
form a being similar to the parent from whose body 
was derived the motive force. If, however, the seed is 
not vigorous enough to overcome the generative sub- 
stance of the female, a woman is born; or if it cannot 
succeed in imitating the paternal type, then the child 
resembles its mother and not its father; again, should 
the seed fail in both of these attempts, which usually 
happens, a female child is born with a resemblance to 
its mother.! If the movement is itself deficient in force,” 
the child lacks the personal characteristics which the 
movement ought to reproduce, and only receives, in 
descending degrees, the generic properties which the 
parent had possessed over and above those of his own 
individuality. Instead of the parental type, that of the 
family is transmitted, so that the child resembles his 
grandparents, or still more distant ancestors. So it: 
may happen that nothing but the type of the race is 
communicated, so that the child, for instance, has a 
human form without any family characteristics. Lastly, 
it is possible that the offspring should turn out merely 
a living creature without even the human attributes, as 
in the case of children born with bestial forms.’ If 
the proper relation between the male and female 


matter which he gives in accord- guishes, ibid. 768, a, 14, 31, eay 

ance with the latter hypothesis, Avééow ai xwhoes, from the other 

see ibid. 788, a, 3 sqq. case, éay ph Kparion H Klynois 
1 Gen. An.iv.3,767,b,15sqq., [rod avdpds}. 

768, a, 2 sqq. 21 sqq. 3 Tbhid. iv. 3; cf. esp. 767, b, 
2 Aristotle expressly distin- 24, 768, b, 15, 769, b, 2 sqq. 


58 


ARISTOTLE 


is altogether wanting, then no conception at all fol- 


lows.! 


Among the phenomena of life which are common to 
all animals we may next mention Sensation, the most 
important point of difference between animals and 


vegetables.? 


Sensation is a change produced in the 


percipient by the object perceived,’ a movement com- 
municated to the soul through the medium of the body.‘ 


1 Ibid. c. 2, 767, a, 13 sqq. 
A number of other passages re- 
lating to the distinction of the 
sexes and to procreation, we must 
be content briefly to indicate. 
The sexual parts of different ani- 
mals are discussed Gen. An. i. 
2-16, ii. 6; Hist. An. iii. 1, cf. 
AUBERT-WIMMER, pp. 3 sq. of 
their edition of De. Gen. An.; 
puberty, menstruation, and lac- 
tation, Gen. iv. 8, ii. 4, 738, a, 9 
sqq.; the causes of fruitfulness 
and unfruitfulness, Gen. ii. 7, 
746, a, 29-c. 8 fin.;  modvroxia, 
oAvyotokla and povotokia, certain 
kinds of abortion, the perfect 
and imperfect formation of child- 
ren, superfoetation and the like, 
Gen. iv. 4-7; the formation of 
the bodies of animals and the 
order of the development of their 
parts, Hist. viii. 7 sq.; Gen. ii. 1, 
734, a, 16-33, 735, a, 12 sq. c. 4, 
739, b, 20-740, b, 25, c. 5, 741, 
b, 15 sqq. c. 6 (743, b, 20 com- 
pares nature to an artist, who 
first sketches the outline of his 
picture and then lays on the 
colours); the nourishment of the 
embryo through the navel, Gen. 
ii. 7, Hist. viii. 8; the production 
and development of birds, Gen. 
ili. 1 sq. 6; of fishes, iii. 3-5, 7; 
of mollusca and testacea, ibid. 


iii. 8; of insects, especially bees 
(with regard to which Aristotle 
holds that the queens and female 
workers are born of queens, 
drones of working bees, and 
that there is no marriage among 
them), ibid. iii. 9, 10, Hist. v. 
19 (cf LEWEs, Arist. § 188 sqq.); 
spontaneous generation, ibid. iii. 
11, i. 23 jfin., Hist. v. 15 sq. ce. 
19, 551, a sq. c. 11, 543, b, 17, vi. 
15, 569, a, 10 sqq.; the nature 
of the birth and the time of 
pregnancy, idid. iv. 9.—The dif- 
ferences which separate the vari- 
ous grades of animal creation in 
respect of their origin and method 
of propagation will call for fur- 
ther discussion below, and the 
origin and gradual evolution of 
the soul will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 

* See pp. 27 and 37, supra; 
and with the following account 
ef. BAUMKER, Des Arist. Lehre 
von den Sinnesvermigen (Leip- 
sic, 1877). 

3 De An. ii. 5 init. 

* «lynois tis 514 Tod odparos 
Tis Yuxis. De Somno, 1, 454, a, 
9. How far we may speak of a 
‘movement of the soul’ at all is 
the subject of subsequent dis- 
cussion. . 





PHYSICS 59 


The nature of this process may be explained and esti- 
mated by the abstract laws of action and passivity.! It 
is the object of perception which sets the change in 
motion, the percipient which undergoes the change. The 
former is active, the latter passive. Hence the latter 
is related to the former in the same way as the actual 
to the possible or as form to matter. The perception for 
which a subject is fitted by its nature is developed into 
actuality by the object perceived ; the form of the object 
is impressed upon the percipient.2. This relation, how- 
ever, is further conditioned by the nature of the perci- 
pient Like thought, perception can only legitimately 
be called a passive affection, if the phrase is taken to 
include the progress from mere capacity to actuality. 





' See the passages quoted vol. 
i. 454.sqq.,to which express allu- 
sion ismade De An. ii. 5, 417, a, 1. 

2? De An. ii. 5, 417, a, 9 to the 
end of the chapter, where the 
preceding discussion is summed 
up in the words: 7d 8’ aic@nrixdy 
Suvduer early oiov Td aicOnrdy 
Hin évredexeia, waldrep elpnra 
marxer wey ody obx buotoy dy, 
memovOds 5’ &molwrat Kal tori oloy 
éxeivo, iii. 2, 425, b, 25: 7 8 
Tov aigOnrod évépyema Kal Tijs 
aigOfhoews 7 ath mév eoti Kad ula, 
7d 8 elva: ob tabtoy abraiv: Aéyw 
8’ olov Wépos 6 Kar’ évépyesay Kar 
aKoh nat’ evépyeay ... Stray 8 
évepyii 7d Suvduevoy axovew Kai 
Yoon 7d dBuvduevoy Wopeiv, rére # 
kar’ évépyeiay akoh ua vyivera cal 
b kar’ évépyeiav Yopos. And as ope- 
rations and motions take effect 
upon passive subjects, this parti- 
cular operation takes place upon 
the percipient. Cf. infra, p. 60, 
n. 3, p. 61, n. 4; and see Part. An. 
ii. 1, 647, a, 5 sqq. 


° De An. ii. 5, 417, b, 2: 
ovk Ear: 8 GrAoby obdé 7d rdoxew, 
GAAG Td wey POopd tis bed Too 
évavtiov, Td 5& cwrnpla waddAov Tot 
Suvduer bvtos bmd Tod évredexela 
bvtos Kal duolov obtws ds Sbvaus 
mpos évredéxerav. Thus in the 
case of learning, we must either 
refrain altogether from saying 
that the learner is the subject of 
an operation or we must distin- 
guish between two kinds of 
mdoxew—rhy Te em Tas orepnTriKas 
diadécers ueraBoAhy Kal rhy ém tas 
tes kal thy pow (cf.i. p. 197). 
Similarly with perception: so 
soon as the percipient comes into 
the world, @xe. Hin domep emiorhuny 
kal 7d aicOdverOa. Kal 7d Kar’ evép- 
ryerav 5é duolws Aéyera TP Oewpeiv 
(as the latter is the actual appli- 
cation of a faculty which is al- 
ready possessed, so perception is 
the activity of a faculty which 
already exists in the percipient) ; 
Siapépe: 5é [sc. Td aicOdverOat Tov 
Gewpeiv|, Sti Tod wey ra womTiKd 


60 ARISTOTLE 


Perception, therefore, may be equally described as an 
act, or more accurately as the joint act of percipient 
and perceived,' which act, however, has its seat in the 
former.” Further, the perceived object can be said to 
stand to the percipient in the relation of actuality to 
possibility only in so far as the one is capable of being 
perceived and the other of perceiving. It is not the 
matter of an object which acts upon the sense in ques- 
tion, but only those properties of an object which the 
particular sense is designed to perceive. Hence it 
follows that it isthe sensible form of objects without the 
matter that is received in the act of sensation. The 
material object itself is not communicated to the percipi- 


ent, but only its operation.® 


THS evepyelas tEwOev, Td Spardy Kal 
7) axovotdv &c. iii. 7, 431, a, 4: 
galverar 5¢ 7d wey aicOnrdy ex 
Suvdwer dvtos «Tod aig OnTiKod 
évepyela mowovv: [The perceived 
object makes that which is 
capable of perception and which 
is only a dvvdue dy into an 
evepyeia bv.] ov yap maoxer vd’ 
GAAoovTaL, 5b AAO eldos TodTO 
kwhoews [something different 
from kivynots]. yap Klynots tod 
aredovs evépyera Fv, h 8 ards 
evépyeia Erépa 7 TOU TeTEAECoMEVOU 
(such also, however, is the aic: 
Onrikdy according to ii. 5, 417, b, 
29 sqq.). 

1 De An. iii. 2, 426, a, 15: 
€mel 5 ula wev dor 7 evépyera Fh 
TOV aigOnrod Kal 7) TOD aiadnriKod, 
7d 3° elvar &repov &c. Of. foll. n. 
There is here no question of any 
reciprocal operation of the sensi- 
ble object and the sensitive 
organ (PRANTL, Arist. v. d. 
Farben, 144, whom KAmpx criti- 


This apprehension of the 


cises, Lrk.-Theorie d. Arist. 80,4), 
for the object is not subject to 
any operation, but there is a joint 
operation, the result of which is 
perception. That this act gives 
a true account of the objects 
perceived, has already been said, 
in vol. i. pp. 208 sqq. 

2 De An. ii. 2, 456, a, 5: ef 
5h éotw 7 Klynois Kal 4 moinots : 
kal 7b mdBos ev TG Toovére, 
avaykn kal Tov Wodoy kal Thy &kohv 
Thy Kat’ évépyemav évy TH Kata 
Sivauiv elvat.. . ) mev ody Tov 
Wopntixod evépyerd eott Wdopos 3) 
Wépnots, H 5é Tov akoveTiKod ako} 
}} &kovors. Similarly with all the 
other senses: 7 Tod aicOyTod 
evépyeta Kal Tov aicOyriKod ey TG 
ais Ont ike. 

3 De An. ii. 12 init.: 4 péev 
alcOnois éore rd Sexrindy Tay 
aigOntav «iday &vev ris Ans, 
oiov 6 Knpds Tod SaxrvAlov dvev Tod 
odhpov Kal Tod xpvood déxera Td 
onuctov, AauBdver 57d xpvcody } Th 


PHYSICS 61 


form without the matter is only possible where there is 
in the soul a point of unity, a centre in which the sensible 
impressions can reflect themselves; and on this account 
perception first appears in the animal kingdom.' More- 
over, since the faculty of perception is the force and 
form of the physical organ, it presupposes a certain 
harmony in its component parts; and if this harmony 
is disturbed by too vehement an impression on the 
sense, then the faculty of perception is lost.? The seat 
of this faculty is invariably a homogeneous body* which 
must contain potentially both of the opposite qualities 
that may be communicated to it by the objects of 
sense ; but just for this reason it must itself stand mid- 
way between them.* ‘The operation of the object upon 








XaArKodv onuciov, GAA’ obx } Xpuads 
 xadnds, duolws 5¢ Kal 7 aloOnors 
éxdorou bird Tov ExovtTos xpaua 7) 
xumdv  Wopov mdoxel, GAA’ odx Fj 
Exacrov éxelywy A€yeTat, GAD’ 
Towvdl Kal Kata Tov Adyor. (There 
is no trace, however, in this pas- 
sage of what VOLKMANN, Grundz. 
d. Arist. Psychol. [Abhanal. d. 
bohm. Gesellsch. x.126sq. Psychol. 
i. 218} finds in it, viz. that 
‘sense is not affected by sounds 
&c. in so far as each of these is 
whatitis, but in so faras the sense 
is what it is.) Cf. foll. n. and 
De An, iii. 2, 425, b, 23: ro yap 
aigtnrhpiov Sexrixdy Tod aig@nrod 
ivev Tijs bAns Exucrov. Whence it 
follows that all perception is of a 
universal, a todvde; see i. 207, 
n. 1, supra. 

1 De An, ii. 12, 424, a 32: 
plants have no afo9nois, although 
they are not without souls; 
altiov yap Td wh Exew meodrnta, 
nde Troadrny apxhy olay Ta €ldn 


SéxeoOa: tay aigOntav, GAA 
marxew wera THs HAns. iii, 12, 
434, a, 29: those (@vra are 
without atc@nois, 60a wh dSexTiKd 
Tav eidav tivev THs Ans. CF£. also 
supra, pp. 33 sqq. and notes, as 
well as the remarks infra, upon 
the sensus communis. 

* De An. ii. 12, 424, a, 26: 
the aicdavduevoy is a body (uéye- 
Qos) ; atc@nors, on the other hand, 
is not méyeOos, GAAG Adyos Tis Kal 
Stvayis éxelvou [rod aigbavouévov). 
gavepdy 8 é€k rovtwy Kal bid Ti 
mote Tav aic@ntay ai imepBodal 
pbelpovor Ta aigOynthpia> edy yap 
} ioxuporépa rod aicOnrnpiov % 
kivnows, Averat 5 Adyos, TodTo 3’ 
jv HatoOnots, Somep Kal } cuupwv'a 
kal 6 révos Kpovomevwr opddpa Tov 
xopdav. Cf. iii. 13, 435, b, 15. 

* Part. An. ii. 1, 647, a,2 8qq., 
where aig@nrhpia in this sense are 
distinguished from the dpyamKad 
uépn (face, hands, &c.), 

* Aristotle remarks this spe- 


62 


ARISTOTLE 


the senses depends upon a medium which transmits it 


from the one to the other. 


Flesh is the medium of the 


sense of touch, air and waterof the other senses;! and 
to this medium the materials of which the organs of sense 


consist correspond. 


The connection, however, of the 


five senses with the four elements? is only tentatively 


adopted by Aristotle.’ 


cially of touch, De An. ii. 11, 
423, b, 29 sqq. This sense, he 
says, perceives the opposite 
qualities of bodies; 7d 5€ aicén- 
Tipiov avTav TO amTiKdy .. . TO 
Suvduet To.ovTdv eort wdpiov. Since 
perception is a mdoxew by which 
the dSuvdue: dy is made by the 
operative principle into some- 
thing like that which itself is 
éevepyela (cf. supra, p. 59,n. 2), did 
Tod duolws [sc. ws Td aicOnrhpior | 
Oepuov kal Yuxpov 7) oKAnpod Kal 
MaArako ovK aigbaydueba, AAG TOY 
bmEepBorA@y, ws THS aldOiacews oiov 
MecdtnTés Twos ovons Tis év Tots 


aig@ynrots evavtTidoews. Kal bid 
a / 
TovUTO Kplvet Ta aidOnTd. Td yap 


Bécov Kpitixdy: just as the eye in 
order that it may be able to 
perceive black and white must 
be neither of these actually but 
both potentially, so it is with the 
sense of touch. 

L Tbid. ii. T,. 419, ty 7-Sb. 
According to this passage, the 
medium of the perceptions of 
sight is light, of hearing air, of 
smell moisture; wep) 5& ap7s kal 
yevoews Exe wey Suoiws od halvera 
8€, Their medium (see supra, 
p. 39, n. 4) is flesh. For further 
details, see infra, and in i. 518, 
n. 3, supra 

? Aristotle remarks himself 
(Part. An. ii. 1, 647, a, 12; De 
Sensu, ¢, 2, 437, a, 19 sqq.) that 
several of his predecessors at- 


The higher tribes of animals 


tempted to establish this con- 
nection, but he does not say to 
whom he refers. The citations 
on the views of Empedocles and 
Democritus (ZELLER, Ph. d, 
Gr. i. 723, 817, 3) and from 
Plato (ibid. ij. a, 727, 3) on 
this head are not sufficient to 
explain the statement (in the 
above passage De Sensu) that one 
of the four elements was assigned 
to each of the senses, but that 
this only raised the difficulty of 
the discrepancy in their respec- 
tive numbers. 

* See the two passages, De An. 
iii. 1 and De Sensu, 2, 438, b, 
16 sqq. In the former of these 
Aristotle: desires to show that 
there cannot be more than the 
five senses (the opposite had 
been asserted by Democritus: see 
ZELL. Ph.d.Gr.i.817, 5), which he 
proves in this way: the properties 
of things are perceived either im- 
mediately or by means of a 
medium. The former is the case - 
with the perception of touch 
(only in the sense, however, that 
the medium is in the percipient 
itself: see n. 1, supra, and cf. 
De An. ii. 11, 423, b, 42). 1° In 
the latter case the sensitive 
organ for each class of percep- 
tions must consist of an elemen- 
tary material of the same kind 
as that through the medium of 
which the perceptions reach the 








PHYSICS 63 


possess all the five senses ; 


the lower are without one 


or other. It is only the sense of touch, and its de- 


senses. Properly speaking, how- 
ever, we have only water and air 
to deal with, as fire operates as 
vital heat in all the senses, and 
earth peculiarly (i3{ws) either in 
none or in touch (of which 
taste, according to Aristotle, is a 
subordinate variety: see p. 22, n. 
1, supra). Even flesh, however, 
the organ of the latter sense, 
does not consist merely of earth, 
but of a mixture of earth and 
water and uir. Although it is, 
therefore, the most material of 
all the organs of sense, it yet 
stands in the middle between 
the different kinds of tangible 
things, and is sensitive to them 
all. (De An. ii. 11, 423, a, 11 
sqq. iii, 13, 435, a, 1l-b, 2; 
Part. An. ii. 1, 647, a, 19, c. 8, 
653, b, 29.) The pupil of the 
eye is of water; sounds are per- 
ceived by air in the passages of 
the ear; the sense of smell 
resides in both air and water, 
The perception of universal pro- 
perties of things, however, such 
as form, size, motion, &c., cannot 
be confined to the organs of any 


-particular sense, being in its 


nature common to all (cf. infra, 


_pp.66 sqq.).—In the second of the 


above passages it is said: &or' 
elrep TovTwy Tt cuuBalve:, Kabdrep 
A€youer, pavepdy ws Set rovTov Tov 
tpdmov amrodiddvar kal mpoodmrew 
éxacToy tay aicOnrnp wy él tay 
oraxelay. Tod pey iuparos td 
dparixdy tdaros brodnmréov, depos 
b& 7d Tay Wégwv alaOntixdy, rupds 
5 thy boppnow. »% yap evepyela 7 
io¢pnots todTo duvduer 7d dappay- 
Tov... 8 dcph Kamvddys rs 


tory avabuplacis, 7 8 dvabuulacis 


h Kamvddns ee mupds... 7d 8 
amtixdy vis. 70 8 yevoricdy €id¢s 
Tt apis éorlvy, It is impossible 
(as ALEX. in loco, p. 80 sq. 


pointed out) to suppose that 


Aristotle here intends to assign 


the crgans of the various senses 


to the four.elements respectively. 
He here repeats what he says in 
the De An. of the organ of smell 
when he remarks that it is merely 
duvduer what boppnors is évepyela, 
duvduer yap Oepuh } Tod Wuxpod FAN 
éorly, and that, like the eye, it is 
closely connected with the brain, 
the coldest and dampest part of 
the body; but smell itself is 


assigned to fire, because it is 


produced by the heating of the 
cold olfactory organ by the dcp} 
kanv@dns, which is of a fiery 
nature. (So also c, 5, 444, a, 
8-22, where Aristotle explains 
on this ground the esthetic 
pleasure in smells peculiar to 
man ; see last note on next page.) 
But according to Bekker’s text, 
the words gavepdy as de? &c. would 
give the meaning just referred 
to as inadmissible. It is all the 
more welcome to find that, as 
BAUMKER, p. 47 sq. reminds us, 
four of the seven MSS. in De 
Sensu, 438, b, 17, give ei before 
dei, so that we may read: gavepdy 
@s ef del. . . T&Y oToLxElwy, TOD 
wey duuaros &c. In this view, 
Aristotle offers the explanation 
that, follows only hypothetically, 
and from a point of view differ- 
ent from his own. This view of 
the passage corresponds precisely 
with that of ALEX. ibid., who 
seems, therefore, also to have 
read ¢i before 8¢7; cf. p. 78: 


64 ARISTOTLE 


pendent sense of taste, which is quite indispensable.! 
Of touch Aristotle says that it is as impossible for an 
animal to be without it as for any other creature but an 
animal to possess it. It is, in fact, the most universally 
important sign of life; and therefore any excessive 
impression made upon this sense.would not, as in the 
case of the others, destroy a single organ alone, but the 
life itself of the animal.? These two senses are thus the 
commonest and lowest; they serve the baser needs of 
life: ° while sight and hearing, as the means of rational 
development, occupy the highest rank. Hearing, how- 
ever, deserves the preference, since we owe to this sense 
the possibility of oral instruction.‘ Of all living 
creatures man is furnished with the subtlest taste and 
subtlest feeling ; many animals exhibit the other senses 
in a greater state of acuteness,° but in the case of man 


they play a special part in his spiritual culture. 


ci obTw, poly, em THs dPews Exer 
kal dia TOTO, Kad eyAlxovTs TIVES, 
EkagTov aid@nThpioy exdoTw TaeV 
araxelwy avaridera &c.; p. 80: 
ov yap 3) apéoKxovta aitg Aé€yer 
&c.; cf. also Part. An. ii. 1, 
647, a, 12. 

1 On this point cf. the not 
wholly consistent statements, 
Hist. An. iv. 8; De An. ii. 3, 415, 
a, 3 sqq. ili. 12, 434, b, 11-29, c. 
13, 435, b, 17 sqq.; De Sensu, 
1, 436, b, 12 sqq.; De Somno, 2, 
455, a, 5; Metaph. i. 1, 980, b, 
23; MEYER, Arist. Thierk. 432 
sq, and p. 22, n. 1, swpra. 

2 De An. iii. 12, 13, 484, b, 
22, 435, b, 4-19. 

* Feeling is indispensable to 
every animal for the preservation 
of life, the other senses, on the 


other hand, are so od rod eivat 
évexa, GAAG Tov ed. De An. iii. 
13, 435, b, 19; cf. c. 12, 434, b, 
22 sqq. 

* De Sensu, 1, 436, b. 12 to 
end of chap. ; Metaph. ibid. 

° De An. ii. 9, 421, a, 9-26; 
De. Sensu, 4, 440, b, 30 sqq.; 
Part. An. ii. 16 sq., 660, a, 11, 
20; Gen. An. ii. 2, 781, b, 17. 

° De An. ibid. : man’s higher 
intelligence is explained on the 
ground of his finer feeling’; 
but it is certain that Aristotle 
regarded the human eye -and 
ear as also of higher signiti- 
cance for the development 
of the spiritual life than those 
of the lower animals; Hth. iii. 
13, 1118, a, 16 sqq., he remarks 
of smell, hearing, and sight, 











PHYSICS 


65 


Coming to the particular senses, Aristotle observes 


that the seat of sight is 


in the pupil of the eye. 


Formed of water, this organ is affected by colours which 
are communicated to it through a transparent medium.! 
Sounds acting on our ears through the medium of air 
are transmitted to the sense by the air in the auditory 
passages.’ Smells are conveyed to the olfactory organ 
by air and water: they are inhaled with the air by 
respiring animals; to non-respiring animals water is 
the medium of smell.* The primary qualities of matter 
which belong to all bodies and their particular modifica- 


De Sensu, 5, 443, b, 15-444, a, 9, 
ibid. 1, 28 sqq., of smell, that 
man alone takes delight in these 
sensations for their own sake and 
not merely for the sake of food 
(albeit smell is his lowest sense: 
De Sensu, 4, 440, b, 31; De An. 
‘li. 9, 421, a, 9); of the senses 
generally Aristotle says, Gen. An. 
ibid.: thy wey obv méppwlev axpl- 
Bewy trav aicdhoewy Fxora ds 
cimeiy GvOpwros exer ds kata ueyebos 
TaY (hwy, Tiv 5e wept Tas Siapopas 
Kéduora mdvtwy evaloOnror, his 
organs of sense being the purest, 
and the least earthy and material, 
and his skin being the finest. 
MebysrR, ibid. 435 sq.,_ brings 
together his statements with 
regard to the sensitive organs of 
the various animals. 
' See p. 64, supra; De Sensu, 
2, 438, a, 12 sqq. b, 5; Hist. An. 
i. 8, 491, b, 20; Part. An. ii. 8, 
653, b, 25, c. 10, 686, a, 37 8q.; 
_ Gen. An. ii. 6, 744, a, 5, and 
elsewhere ; cf. BAUMKER, 48 sq., 
_ andi 518, n. 3, supra. That the 
_ eyes also operate upon the 
objects (and that not merely by 


VOL, Il, 


reflecting the light) is proved, 
De Insomn. 2, 459, b, 23 sqq., by 
a fictitious experience. 

* Part. An. ii. 10, 656, b, 
13 sqq.; De An. ii. 8, 420, a, 
2 sqq.; cf. p. 478; BAUMKER, 
52. It is not quite clear how 
Aristotle conceives of the con- 
nection of this air with the 
central organ of sense; he merely 
remarks, Part. An. ibid., that 
the ears are united with the 
occiput (which, according to his 
Opinion, i. 262, n. 1, supra, is 
empty) by means of passages. 

° De An. ii. 9, 421, b, 8 
sqq. iii. 1 (see p. 6, supra); De 
Sensu, 5, 442, b, 27 sq. 444, a, 
8 sqq.; cf. p. 537, 3, 539, 6, 478, 
med.; BAUMKER, 53 sq. It has 
been already remarked, p. 62, n. 3, 
supra, that the sense of smell also 
is connected with the brain, but 
there is nothing said about any 
connection between it and. the 
heart. Aristotle shows, De Sensu, 
5, 455, a, 4 sqq., that smell 
occupies a middle position be- 
tween the aio@4ces arrtixat and 
5:’ BAAou aigOrt.Kal, | 


F 


66 ARISTOTLE 


tions are the proper objects of the sense of touch.’ The 
organ of touch is the heart : the medium through which 
impressions are transmitted to the heart is the flesh; ? 
and the same may be said of taste, which is nothing 
but a species of touch,’ the only difference being that 
the tongue is its sole conductor.*| How the sensations 
communicated by particular senses can have their seat 
in the head,® while the seat of the sensitive life itself is 
in the heart,’ and all sensation belongs to one and 
the same part of the soul,’ Aristotle fails to ex- 


1 De An. ii. 11, 423, b, 26: 
amral pev ody eiow ai diapopal Tod 
cépatos  Taua’ Aéyw SE Tas 
Siapopas at Ta ororxeia diopiCover, 
Oepudy  Wuxpdyv, Enpdy bypdv. Be- 
sides these fundamental qualities 
the sense of touch perceives also 
hardness and softness and others, 
and Aristotle asks accordingly, 
422, b, 19, whether it is only one 
sense or several. He rejects the 
latter supposition, however, 1. 27 
sqq., with the remark that the 
other senses also perceive more 
than one évaytiorns: by hearing, 
for example, besides height and 
depth we perceive loudness of 
sound, softness and roughness 
in the voice, &c. Therefore BREN- 
TANO’S assertion (Psychol. d. 
Ar. 85) that it is erroneous 
according to Aristotle to regard 
feeling as only a single sensitive 
faculty, is not accurate. 

* See p.39,n. 4, p. 62 n. 3, sup; 
De An. ii. 11, 422, b, 20, 35 sqq. 
423, b, 1 sqq. 22; Part. An.ii.10, 
656, b, 35; De Vita, 3, 469, a, 
5-20; BAUMKER, 54 sqq. 

5 See p. 22, n. 1, supra, and on 
the sources of taste, i. 518 sq. 

* De An. ii. 11, 423, a, 17 sqq. 
c, 10, 422, a, 34. 


5 BAUMKER, 78 sqq., shows as 
against SCHELL (Die Hinheit des 
Seelenl. nach Ar. 163 sqq.) from 
De An. ii. 1, 412, b, 18, 413, a, 2, 
ii. 11, 423, b, 17 sqq. iii. 2, 426, 
b, 8; Part. An. ii. 1, 647, a, 2 
sqq. c. 8, 653, b, 24 sqq., and 
other passages, that Aristotle 
assumes this to be the case in 
respect to the above three senses. 
Cf. De Sensu, c. 2 (p. 62, n. 3, 
SUPT). 

6 Videp.41sq. The view that 
the brain is the seat of sensation 
(ALCOM 0N, see ZELL. Ph.d. Gr. i. 
456,1; PLATO, Zim. 67, B, 76, D), 
is expressly refuted by Aristotle : 
Part. An, ii, 10, 656, a, 15 sqq. 
b, 11, c. 7, 652, b, 2; De Juvent. 
3, 469, a, 20. He holds himself 
that the brain is devoid of feel- 
ing, resting his view upon sup- 
posed experiences, upon which 
see MEYER, Arist. Thierk. 431. 

7 De An. iii. 1, 425, a, 31, and 
more fully De Sensu, 7, 449, a, 5 
sqq., where inter alia: dvdyKn 
tipa ev Tt elvat THs Wuxis, @ Grayra 
aigOdverat, . . HAAO Be yevos OL 
&AAov. Just as one and the same 
thing has different properties, so 
Beréov Kal em) ris Wuxis Td abrd 
kal &y elvat ap8ugd 7d alodntindy — 








PHYSICS 


67 


plain.' If his view is that the pictorial image is gene- 
rated in the organs of sense, while its reference to the 
object takes place in the heart,’ the question still 
remains, how can sensation originate in organs in 
which the sensitive soul does not reside ? 


madvrwv, To pévtor elvan Erepov Kal 
Erepoy Tav wey yéver Tay Be elder. 
dare xal aic@dvorr’ by Gua Tg aitG 
kal évl, Adyp 8 ob rg aitG. De 
Somno, 2, 455, a, 20: ort pev yap 
fla alc@nots Kal rd Kipioy aicOn- 
tipiov ty td 8 elva aicOjoe: Tod 
vyévous Exdorov Erepoy (its charac- 
ter is different in each kind of 
sensation). 

' Neither from Part. An. iii. 
4, 666, a, 16, ii. 10, 656, b, 3; 
cf. Hist. An. i. 4, 489, a, 23; De 
Somno, 2, 455, b, 6, nor from the 
passage in c. 3 of the m. évutviwyr, 
which seems to give the greatest 
support to this view, are we 
justified in saying with certainty 
that Aristotle regards the blood 
as the conductor by which the 
sensitive movements are led to 
the heart. He certainly assumes 
that a portion of the blood flows 
at intervals back to the heart, 
carrying its own natural motions 
with it (ibid. 461, b, 11). From 
this, however, he merely concludes 
(as will be shown, p. 71, n.3, infra) 
that the movements caused by 
previous perceptions and latent in 
the organs of sense, being no 
longer overpowered by. move- 
ments in the blood, are liberated 
and carried in like manner to 
the heart ; it appears, therefore, 
that he regards them as different 
from those in the blood. 

? This is the view put forward 
_ in the passage just referred to in 
the treatise upon Dreams, where 


461, a, 30 goes on to say: r@ 
bey yap éxeier [sc. amd ray aicdn- 


nie am apixveioOar thy Klynow 
mpds Thy apxhv Kal eypnyopas Boxer 


dpav kal axotew Kal aicddverOau, 
kal did 7d thy bw eviore Kweicba 
Sonetv od Kivoumévny dpav paper, Kad 
TE Thy aphy dbo Kwhoes cigay- 
yeArew 7d by B00 Boney. The 
words refer, as the repetition of 
doxetv shows, to the cases of self- 


deception discussed c. 2, 460, b, 


3 sqq. 11, 20, 22 sqq. c. 3, 461, b, 
30. These Aristotle explains on 
the ground that the judgment 
upon the object and the pictorial 
image are due to the exercise of 
different faculties (ibid. 460, b, 
16: afriov 8& Tod cupBalvew radra 
TO ph Kara thy abrhy Svvayw 
Kplvew 76 re Kbpiov [subj.] nal $ 
Ta pavtdopata yiverai). BAws yap 
[as c. 3, 461, b, roceeds] 7d aq’ 
exdorns aicdiocews pnow F &pxh, 
cay wh érépa xupwrépa av Tipy. 
palveta: uty oby mdvtws, SoKet 
3 0} mdvtws To hawduevoy [the 
sun, for example, appears to us 
to be a foot broad, nevertheless 
we refuse to believe it; ¢. 2, 460, 
b, 18], aaa’ éay [but only when] 
7d émixpivoy K2réxnrat h wh KwhTat 
Thy oixelay x'vnow. It is this 
kdpiov kal émixpivoy (461, b, 24 Sq.) 
which refers the sense-perception 
toits object. It, for instance,when 
sensation presents us with the 
image of a particular man, iden- 
tifies it with the man in question. 
In sleep, on the other hand, when 


¥2 


68 ARISTOTLE 


The separate senses, however, are insufficient of 
themselves to explain the fact of sense-perception. The 
universal qualities of things—such as time, motion and 
rest, unity and multiplicity, size and form—are not, like 
sound and colour, the peculiar objects of special senses ; * 
they are perceived by all the senses, and only indirectly 
by each. The faculty, therefore, by which they are 
perceived must be distinct from all the particular 
senses: it must be a sensus communis or ‘ common sense.’” 
This sense, moreover, enables us to compare and dis- 
tinguish the perceptions of different senses.’ When, 


consciousness is imprisoned, the 
image is taken for the object 
itself. The seat of this faculty 
cannot be other than a single 
Kvpiov aig@nrhprov (De Somno, 2, 
455, a, 21), of which sleep and 
waking are particular states (see 
p. 75, infra). 

1 De An. ii. 7, Aristotle dis- 
tinguishes between xa’ abra [not 
merely kata cupBeBykds | aicOnra 
between 7512 and Kowa, remarking 
418, a, 11: Aéyw 8 Yiov pev o wh 
évdéxerat Er epg aicdjoer aicddver Oat 

. Kowa d5€ Klvnos, Hpeuta, &p.8- 
pos, oxjma, weyedos. Similarly, iii. 
1, 425, a, 13: GAAG phy odde TaY 
Kowa oldv 7 elvat aia@nthpidy Tt 
Yiov, ov Kal éExdorn aicOjoe 
aicbavducbe. Kara cumBeBnkds [TOR- 
STRIK’S proposal to read sv k. o. 
is rightly rejected by BRENTANO, 
Psychol. d. Ar. 98), otov nwhrews, 
oTdoews, TXHuaTOS, weyeOous, apLd- 
uov, évds. De Mem, 450, a, 9. 
On time see p. 73, n. 4, infra. 

2 Weare informed of motion 
&c through the separate senses 

Karta cupBeBnkds (De An. iii. 1; v. 
preceding note). These qualities 
areaccompaniments of particular 


sense-perceptions, and the multi- 
plicity of the senses even assists 
us in distinguishing them from 
the latter (mws RrTov AavOdyy Ta 
&kodovbovvTa Kal Kowa, ibid. 425, 
b, 5). Were we therefore con- 
fined for our perception of them 
to the particular senses, we should 
know them only as accessory (¢.9. 
if we saw a white object, which 
moved, we should perceive only 
its colour and not its motion). 
Ttav 5¢ Kowav Hin Exouev alcOnow 
Koh ov KaTa& guuBeBnkds* ovdK up 
éotwy idla (ibid. 425, a, 24sqq.). De 
Mem. ibid. says that size and 
motion are known to us by the 
same faculty as time, kal 7d 
pdvracua [sc. abTis| THs Kowhs 


aicOhaews md0os eoriy. Cf. i. 435, 
n. 2, supra. 
3 De An. iii. 2, 426, b, 8: 


each sense perceives Tas Tov 
dwoKewévov aigOntov Siapopas, e.g. 
sight, those of colour. ézet dé kal 
To Aeukdy Kal Td yAuKd Kal ExacTov 
TaY aid@nTav mpds ExagToy Kplvo- 
bev, Tim, aiglavdueba Bri Siapéeper ; 
avayKkn 5h aicOnoe* aic@nta ydp 
€or... obre 8) KEexXwpiomevors 
evdéxeTat Kpiveww Ort eTEpoy Td 


PHYSICS 69. 


further, we declare the phenomena presented to us by 
the senses at one time to be objectively real, at another 
to be unreal, it cannot be our senses themselves that 
pronounce this judgment, for their presentations are in 
both cases alike ; nor if we are deceived in our judgment, 
are the senses to blame for the mistake, seeing that 
they always report correctly.'| The common principle of 
all sense-perception is alone responsible for the reference 
of the perception to the object, and therefore for the 
mistakes that are made.? The same principle, finally, is 
the basis of self-consciousness which accompanies all 
sense-perception: since perception is different from the 
thing perceived, the senses which supply us with the 
picture of the object cannot also inform us of its ob- 
jective reality.’ The organ of the ‘common sense’ is the 


yAuKY TOD AevKod, AAG Sef Evi Tit 
tudw d9Aa elva. It must there- 
fore be one and the same faculty 
by which we distinguish different 
kinds of sensations from one 
_ another: and to this, in order 
that these may be compared with 
one anotber, these must be 
_ simultaneously present, meeting 
_ init as two lines meet in a com- 
- mon point. (The details of this 
theory, which suggests many diffi- 
culties, cannot be here discussed ; 
besides TRENDELENBURG in loco, 
see the discussion of itin KAMPE, 
Prkenntnissth. d. Ar. 107; BREN- 
TANO, Psychol. d. Ar. 90 sqq.; 
BAuMKER, 70 sqq.). Similarly 
c. 7, 431, a, 20: rine 8 emixpiver 
tt Biapéper yAved Kal Oepudy.. . 
fori yap & 1: obrw BE Kal 7 
orvyuh Kal Saws 6 Spos [the bound- 
ary]&c. Just as one sense knows 
the distinction between white 
and black, so one and the same 






















faculty can know the distinction 
between whiteness and sweet- 
ness. De Somno, 2, 455, a, 17: 
kal xpiver 3) Kal Sdivara kplvew bri 
erepa Ta yAuKéa Tay AEvKGY, obTE 
yedoes ore ber ob7’ aupoiy, GAAd 
Twi Kow@ pmoplm tav aicOnrnplav 
amdytwv. tori wey yap ula aloOnois 
&c. (see p. 66, n. 7, supra). 

' Cf. i. 209, n. 3, supra. 

2 See p. 67, n. 2, supra, where 
this is shown to have been 
Aristotle’s view. 

3 De An. iii. 2 init.: érel & 
aig@avéueba Sri dpduev kal dkovo- 
pev, dvaynn ® TH dWEr aicOdverOa 
bri 5p, i) Erépa [sc. aic@joe:|. The 
former, however, is inadmissible, 
if for no other reason, because 
in that case we must assign 
colour to the seeing subject [the 
ébpav mp@rov), as to all visible 
things. De Somno, 2, 455, a, 15: 
ore 8€ tis Kal Kowh dtvauis 
&xodovboica mdoas, » Kat dri dpa 


70 


ARISTOTLE 


heart,! in which, as we have already seen, the general 
principle of the sensitive life resides.” 
To this single faculty of perception, or ‘common 
sense,’ Aristotle proceeds to attribute a number of 
.important mental phenomena.’ It is the source of 
imagination and memory,‘ which are therefore shared 


by many brutes as well as by man. 


Imagination is 


a movement produced by sensation, an after-effect of 
the sense-perception®—in other words a spent sensa- 


kat &kover aicbdverar [so BONITZ, 
Arist. Stud. iii. 72, reads accord- 
ing to the text of two MSS.; 
BEKK. has kal aio8.]* od yap 5) 7H 
rye ber bpG Ire bpG . . . GAAA TIM 
Ko boply tav aic@ntnplwv amdy- 
TW. 
1 The heart is the év kowwdy 
alcOnrhpiov, eis 9 Tas KaT evepyetay 
aicOhoes avaykaiov amayrav (De 
Juvent. 1, 467, b, 28); 7d ye Kipiov 
tov aicOhrewy ev tairyn Tors éval- 
pois waow. ev TOUTH yap avaryKatov 
elvar To TdvtTwv Tov aicOnTnplwy 
Kowov alg@nrnpiov (tbid. c. 3, 469, 
a, 10). 

2 Of. supra, p. 42 sq. and p. 
66, n. 6, and on the question how 
the sensations of the three senses 
which have their seat in the head 
are transmitted to the heart, p. 67, 
n.1. But the heart is also the seat 
of the sense of touch (see p. 67, n. 
1, supra) ; and to this the remark, 
De Somno, 2, 455, a, 22, seems to 
refer, where it is said that the 
Yiov and the xowdy of atodnois 
[for this we must suppose to be 
the meaning of rodro, |. 22, placing 
with BONITZ the words od yap... 
xpemaros, 1. 17-22, in a paren- 
thesis] @ua Te amrting@ pddio®’ 
imdpxet, this being the only one 
of the senses whose organ is 


also the central organ of sensa- 
tion. 

3 For the following account 
see FREUDENTHAL, Ueber d. 
Begriff d. Wortes avracta bd. 
Arist. 1863. 

4 De An. iii. 3, 428, a, 9, 21, 
c. 10, 433, a, 11, c. ll init. ; Hist. 
An. i. 1, 488, b, 25; De Mem. 1, 
449, a, 28, 450, a, 15, c. 2, 453, a, 
6; Metaph. i. 1, 980, a, 27, b, 25; 
cf. p. 71, n. 3, p. 73, n. 4, infra. 
Some animals, therefore, dream 
as wellas man, Divin. p. 8. 2, 
463, b, 12. 

5 After showing, De An. iii. 
3, that it is neither afo@nois, nor 
vovs, nor émiorhun, nor ddga, nor 
a combination of défa and afc @yors, 
Aristotle proceeds, 428, b, 10: 
BAN’? ered) ~ore KivnPévros tovdi 
kweicba Erepov bmd rovrov, 7 5é 
pavracla Kivnols tis Sone? elvan Kal 
ok &vev aicOioews yiryverOat GAN’ 
aicbavouévois Kal av alcOnots early, 
gore 5€ yiverOar Kivnow brd Tis 
évepyelas Tis aicOhoews, Kal rabTny 
duolay avdyKn elvar tH aicOjoes, ety 
dv abrn f Klvnots ode dvevaicOnoews 
évdexouevn odre wh aicbavouéevars 
imdpxew, kal TOAAG Kat’ abrhy Kal 
woteiy Kal méoxew Td Exov, Kat elvat 
kal &AnOH Kal Wevdp. L. 30: ef 
ody mnOev mev BAAO Exe TA Eipnueva 








PHYSICS Coe 


tion.' The motion caused by the external impression 
upon the sensitive organ not only produces an immediate 
effect in the sensation which follows, but continues in 
the organ,’ whence under certain circumstances it 
passes to the central organ, and in this way repro- 
duces the pictorial image,’ even in the absence of the ob- 


} pavracia [so the majority of 
the MSS. ; ToRsTR. with E reads 
} 4) payr., but considers the words 
spurious ; BEKK, and TREND. are 
certainly wrong in reading 4 uh 
gavtaciay)] tovro 8’ éor) [ TORSTR. 
conj. Exe:}] 7d AexGev, } pavtac.a 

ein kivnois bd Tis aicOhoews 
Tis Kat’ évépyeay yryvouevn. De 
Insomn. 1, 459, a, 17 (a passage 
which establishes the true read- 
ingin De An. 429,a, 2 as yryvouern, 
not -ns). 

' Fhet. i. 11, 1370, a, 28: 7 
bi gavtacia early aicOnois tis 
aabevhs. : 

* De Mem. 1, 350, a, 27: the 
md0os, where ێis is prin, con- 
sists of a kind of (wypdpnua, 
which afe@no1s produces in the 
soul (7.6. the yux? aigOnrih) and 
in the part of the body where iv 
resides; 7 yap yivouevn kivnois 
évonmalverat olovy timovy tid Tov 
aicOhuatos kabdmrep of opparyiCduevor 
Tots SaxtvAios. On this account, 
under deep emotion or in the 
early years of childhood, memory 
is weak, the excitement being 
too strong, xabamep ay cis fdwp 
péov éumimrovans Tis Kwhoews Kai 
Tis oppayidos; conversely in old 
age 8:4 7d YhxeoOa f wear] Kal dd 
oKAnpérnta Tov Sexouévov Td wdbos 
ove eyyivera: 6 timos. The same 
phenomenon is explained, c. 2, 
453, b, 4, as the result, not only 
in the case of children but of 
old men, of a xlynois caused in 


the former case by the’ rapid 
growth, in the latter by the 
rapid decay, of the body. The 
latter passage would of itself be 
sufficient to prove that in Ari- 
stotle’s view the persistence of 
the sense-impressions, which are 
compared to the impress of a 
stamp, is not that of actual 
material copies of the objects 
(even in his account of sense- 
perception itself, p. 58 sq. supra, 
Aristotle gives no countenance 
to such a view), nor even that of 
qualitative changes in the organs 
themselves, but is due to the 
continuance in the organs of the 
motions caused by the original 
sensation. This, however, be- 
comes still more obvious from 
the quotations that follow in the 
next note. On the whole sub- 
ject see FREUDENTHAL, p. 20 
sqq. 
%’ This is the sense of the 
passage in m. évumy. c. 3, already 
referred to. After showing in 
the beginning of c. %, 67: Kai 
amedOdvtos Tov Oipabey aigOnrod 
euucver Ta aicOquata aicOnra bvra, 
that the faculty which gives 
judgment upon the corresponding 
objects is different from that 
which supplies the sense with 
the images of them (cf. p. 67, n. 
2), and that in this way we get 
the delirious fancies of fever 
and other illusions of sense into 
which we are seduced by passion 


72 


ject.! 


ARISTOTLE 


To this power of reproducing images of sense Ari- 


stotle gives the name of Phantasy; and to the images 


themselves the cognate name of phantasms.? 


and emotion, Aristotle proceeds 
in c. 3: the motions caused 
partly by impressions made upon 
us from without, partly by those 
produced from within the body 
itself, are repressed during the 
day by the activity of sense and 
thought, and rendered imper- 
ceptible [apavifovra domep mapa 
mToAv mip €Aatroy—as the light of 
the stars before the sun] ; vixrwp 
5é 8: dpylay Trav Kata pdpioy 
aicdhoewv Kal ddvvautay rod évepyeiv 

. em thy apxnyv Tis aicOhjoews 
[the heart] katapépovra Kal -i- 
vovtat gavepal Kafiorauéervns tis 
tapaxis. The same thing takes 
place in sleep (461, a, 18 sqq.): Ta 
gavrdopuara kal al bréAotro KWHoes 
ai cuuBalvovoa amd tay aicOnudrwv 
[those lingering remnants of the 
motions produced by impressions 
upon the senses which are the 
cause of phantasms ; cf. p. 70, n. 5, 
supra] 6ré ev bd welCovos ovens 
THs eipnuevns kwhoews apaviCovrat 
maumav, Ste Se TeTapayucevar pal- 
vovTat . . . Ka0lorauévov 5€ Kal 
Siaxpivouévov Tov aiwaros éy Tots 
évaluos, cwCouevn Tov aicOnudrwv 
n kivnois ad’ Exdorov Trav aicbn- 
Tnplwy [the motion caused by the 
sense-impression which is trans- 
mitted from the organs of sense 
to the heart] éppwuéva re more? Td 
evirrvia, Kal [Sc. moet] halverOal TL 
Kat Soxety Sid wey Ta ard THs OWews 
karapepdueva dpav, dia 5& Ta amd 
THS akojs akovew. dSuotorpdmws Fé 
kal amd Tov wAAwy aicOnrnplwv. 
For the a&px} accepts as true 
what the senses report, so long as 
it remains uncontradicted by a 
more authoritative report (cf. p. 


Phantasy, 


67,n. 2, supra); bray yap KabevSn 
[as isexplained,461, b, 10], xaridy- 
TOS TOV TAEloTOU aiuatos én) Thy 
apxhy ovykarépxovra ai evodoa 
Kwhoes. These exist, however, 
partly duvdue: partly évepyela, the 
former appearing (émimoAd¢ew) 
when the others by which they 
have hitherto been repressed dis- 
appear; Kal Avdueva ev dAlyw 1¢ 
Aoiw@ atari TH ev Tots aicOnrnplas 
kwovvta [in the blood which is 
left behind in the organs of sense 
after the main body of it has 
flowed back to the heart, the 
sensitive motions contained in it, 
which have hitherto lain latent, 
become liberated owing to the 
exhaustion, by the diminution of 
the quantity of blood, of those 
motions which have hitherto 
restrained them], €xovca: duoid- 
TnTAa wowep Ta ev Tos vépeow, & 
mapend(Covow avOpdmos Kad revtav- 
pos taxéws petaBddAdAovra. So 
long as we keep hold even of a 
remnant of- consciousness in 
sleep we do not mistake those 
images for the things; if on the 
other hand we have lost all 
consciousness that we are asleep, 
we take the one for the other. 
Dreams (Ta gawdueva eldwra 
kadeddovTt, 462, a, 11) are there- 
fore only the remnants of the 
motions caused by sensation 
(461, b, 21), as which they are 
often clearly recognised at the 
moment of waking. 

1 Hence he says, De An. iii. 
8, 432, a, 9: Ta yap parrdopara 
domep aicOhuard ear. wAY dvev 
BANS. 

* For proof of this see BONITZ, 


PHYSICS 73 


moreover, he holds to be the source of the images which 
accompany thought.' To these it is impossible to apply 
the above sensational explanation: ? they must be con- 
sidered as in some way independent products of intellec- 
tual activity. Aristotle, however, has given us no account 
of their origin or their relation to the images of sense. 
While the reportsof the single senses in their own depart- 
ments are unerringly true, the imagination and the gene- 
ral reports of the ‘common sense’ are exposed to illusion.* 
If an imagination relates to earlier perceptions and pre- 
sents a copy of them, then we call it memory (wvypn) ; * 





Ind. Arist. 811, b, 11 sqq. 812, a, 
9, 25. 

1 See next chapter. 

? Aristotle actually distin- 
guishes between two kinds of 
gavracia. De An. iii. 10, 433, b, 
28: dpexrixdy 5¢ [sc. 7d (Gov early] 
otk vev payracias. gavracia Se 
masa  AoyworiKh 7 aicOnrixh. 
Tavrns wey ody Kal Ta HAAG (Ga 
peréxer. c. 11, 434, a, 5: f wey 
otv aic@ntuh gpavracia.. . Kai 
év trois %AAos Coors brdpyxet, | SE 
BovAevtixh ev ois AoyioriKots. 
As aic@nrixh day. can only here 
mean the power of reproducing 
from the motions that linger in 
the organs of sense the images 
represented by them, the avr. 
BovAevtixh (or Aoyiorixh : Td yap 
BovAeverOat Kal AoyiCerOa Tadrér, 
Eth. vi. 2, 1139, a, 12) must 
mean the power of projecting 
images of things in the future, 
of means and ends whose com- 
parative value it is the function 
of BovAevois to estimate with a 
view to the exercise of choice. 
Such images, however, are not, 
like those of memory, given in 


the excitations of the organs of 
sense. 

3 See i. 209, n. 3, and ii. 67, 
n. 2, supra. 

* De Mem.i:allmemory refers 
to the past and therefore presup- 
poses the intuition of time, 449, b, 
28: 80a xpévov aicOdverat, Tadra 
pdva Tov Cowy uvnuovede, kal TobT@ 
@ aicOdverat. (See i. 436, n. 2, ii. 
70, n. 4,and 71, n. 3, supra.) The 
faculty upon which memory de- 
pends is phantasy, for it always 
refers primarily to sensory 
images, and in a derivative and 
secondary sense to thoughts in 
so far as thought itself is impos- 
sible without a pictorial image, 
as is shown (450, a, 15) by the 
fact that brutes have memory as 
well as man. Cf. 450, a, 13: 
Sore tov voovmévov [voodyros or 
vod? ] Kara oupBeBnkds by em, 
Kad” aird 88 rod mpdrow aicOnrixod. 
450, a, 22: rivos wey ody trav Tis 
Wuxijs éorly  pvhun, pavepdy, bri 
obrep Kai } davracia’ Kal tori 
pynuovevta Kad’ abra uiv Boa eo 
pavtarra, Kata cuuBeBnkds 5t boa 
By Gvev payracias, The pdvracua, 


74 


ARISTOTLE 


and the conscious reproduction of a memory is recollec- 
tion (avayvnots). Man alone is capable of recollection, 
since he alone can reflect;! but memory, as we have 


said, is shared by brutes. 


Recollection depends upon 


the natural coherence of the movements which produce 
the imaginative pictures; by virtue of this coherence 
one image is called up by another formerly connected 


with it.? 


however, only becomes a recol- 
lection (uvynudvevya) when we 
recognise in it the copy of an 
actual perception, when we con- 
nect with it the thought that it 
is the repetition of a previous 
perception—a point upon which 
we are not always certain. Ac- 
cordingly we sometimes fail to re- 
cognise actual memories as such, 
and at other times mistake mere 
fancies for memories (450, b, 18 
sqq.). Tt pév ody éor uvhun [the 
chap. concludes] kal 7d mynuo- 
vevew, elpntat, bTt pavTdoparos, 
ws eixdvos ov pdvTacua, éfis (which 
should be taken, not, with 
FREUDENTHAL, ibid. 36 and 
elsewhere, in its narrowsense dis- 
cussed i, 285,n.3, supra, but inthe 
simple sense of having or keeping; 
cf. c. i. 449, b, 25) kal rlvos wopiov 
TaV ev Nuiv, STL TOU MpdTov aigOnTI- 
Kou kal @ xpdvou aicbavdmeda. 

1 Hist. An. i. 1 fin. ; De Mem. 
ii. 451, b, 2, 453, a, 6 sqq. As 
the reason of this, it is said in 
453,a,9: 871 7d dvaymrviioKxeobal 
éotw olov cvAAoyiouds Tis* STL yap 
mpdtepov 7) eldev 2} Heovoev H Tt 
Towvtov mabe, avddoyiCera 6 
dvauiuvnoKduevos, kal oti oto 
(itynols tis. todto 8 ois Kal 7d 
BovAeutixoy drdpxe, pice: pdvois 
ouuBéBnkev * Kal yap 7d BovAcveo Oat 


These movements have their seat in the 


acvddAoyiouds tis eorw. H. An. ibid. 
also connects BovAever Oa: with ava- 
MiuvhoKeoOa as peculiar to man. 
2 Perhaps Aristotle gives 
this explanation, ibid. 451, a, 10 
sqq., with a tacit reference to 
the mnemonics mentioned by him 
in other passages (De Ax. iii. 3, 
427, b, 19; De Insomn. 1. 458, b, 
20; Top. viii. 14, 163, b, 28). 
Recollection, he says, takes 
place, éweid}) mépuxey h kivnots 
nde yevéoOar wera tThvde; if the 
connection is a necessary one, 
the first is invariably recalled by 
the second; if it is merely 
habitual, only as a rule. Some- 
times, however, a single occur- 
rence creates a_ fixed habit. 
’AvauimvjoKeobat both in the case 
of intentional and unintentional 
recollection consists in recalling 
former motivns in their order 
until we arrive at the object of 
search. We start in this process 
ard tod voy [i.e. frum a present 
intuition] 4 %AAou Tivds, Kat ad’ 
duoiov 7) evavTiov 2} TOU aivEyyuS. 
Aristotle has not further deve- 
loped these hints upon the so- 
called laws of the association of 
ideas, nor has he _ explained 
whether of the two principles of 
avduvnos, avayen and é6os, the 
former embraces only those cases 








PHYSICS 


75 


heart.! Lastly, from sensation and imagination arise 
the feelings of pleasure and pain,’ and the appetites, 
whereof we shall have to treat in detail when we come 


to Anthropology.® 


Aristotle regarded Sleep and Waking as conditions 


of the common faculty of perception.* 


Sleep is the 


imprisonment of that faculty, waking is its free activity.” 


in which the physical movement 
that underlies the pictorial image 
spontaneously produces other 
such movements or includes also 
those in which the content of a 
given presentation conducts 
necessarily to the recollection of 
certain others. On the other 
hand, Aristotle gives us the 
general law which determines 
the succession of those associa- 
tions which depend upon habit, 
viz. that each presentation is 
recalled by that which imme- 
diately preceded it on its former 
occurrence: T@ yap er akodov- 
Oodtow ai xwhoes aAAfAas, de 
pera thvde (451, b, 28, cf. 1. 22). 

1 Ibid, 453, a, 14 sqq., where 
it is stated, dr: c@uarindy tt 7d 
md0os, kal  dvduynows (hrnots ev 
TowvTw davtaguaros ... 6 ava- 
Mimynokdpevos cwparucdy Tt Kiel ev 
¢ 7d wd@os; what this is is not, 
indeed, further explained. Since, 
however, the seat of memory in 
general is the heart, it must be 
this which is meant. 

* De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 23: 
bmov wey yap atoOnois, Kal Adwn Te 
kal Hdovh, Saou 5é radra, e& avdynns 
kal émiOuy'a. iii. 3, 414, b, 4: 
§ F atoOnois iadpxe, Todt Hdovh 
Te kal Atdrn Kal rd 750 Te Kal 
Aurnpév. (Similarly De Somno, 
1, 454. b, 29.) c. 7, 431, a, 10: 
fori Td Hdec0ar wal Avweioba 7d 


evepyciv ti aicOntiuy peodryti 


mpos To dyabby Kal Kandy, f Tor- 
atta. Phys. vii. 3, 247,a, 24: 4 
yap Kar’ evépyeav 7d THs jdovijs 
h bad pviuny } awd ris éAmidos. 
ei pev ody Kat’ évépyeav, alabnois 
7rd alriwv, ef 5 Sid pvhunvy H BP 
eamida, amo ravtns' yap ola 
emdbouev peuynuévors Td TIS Ndovijs 
4 ola weioducda eAniGovow. We 
shall return to pleasure in deal- 
ing with the Ethics, but neither 
here nor there do we find an 
accurate psychological account 
of the feeling. 

8 Of. meantime De Ax. ii. 2, 
413, b, 23, c. 3, 414, b, 1-16, iii. 
7, 431, a, 8 sqq. iii. 11; De 
Somno, i. 454, b, 29; Part. An. 
ii. 17, 661, a, 6. 

4 Ibid. c. 2, 455, a, 5-b, 13: 
sleep and waking do not belong 
to the senses individually, but 
to the kipiuyv trav tAdAwy mdvtwv 
aic@nthpiov, the mparov @ aicbd- 
VETOL WAYTWY. 

5 De Somno, i. @.g. 454, a, 32: 
ei tolvuy 7d eypnyopévar Spioras 
TG AcAvoOa Thy alaOnow .. . Td 
3 éypnyopévar Te Kabebderw evaytiov 

. torte 8 éorly ddvvaple o’ 
bwepBorAhy Tod eypnyopéva .. . 
avdrykn wav Td. eypnyopds évie- 
xeoGar nabedvdew > &dbvarov yap ael 
évepyetv. It is impossible, how- 
ever, that it should sleep for ever, 
for to sleep without awaking 
would be to lose the power of 
sensation. 454, b, 26: rijs 8 


76 ARISTOTLE 


Hence these conditions are only exhibited by beings 
capable of sensation : but with them they are invariable, 
for the faculty of perception cannot remain active 
without experiencing exhaustion from time to time.! 
The object of sleep is to maintain life, to refresh and 
restore ; and this again subserves the higher purpose of 
waking activity.?, The natural causes of sleep lie in 
the nutritive process. The vital warmth drives the 
fumes away from the food upwards; collecting there, 
they make the head heavy and induce sleepiness; but 
cooling in the brain, they sink down again and cause a 
refrigeration of the heart, in consequence of which the 
activity of this chief organ of sensation is suspended. 
This condition lasts until the food is digested and the 
purer blood, destined for the upper portions of the 
body, is secreted from the denser sort, which passes 
downwards.’ Dreams arise from the internal motions 
of the organs of sense, which continue after the trans- 
mission of external impressions has ceased. In the 
waking state these motions disappear beneath the action 
of sense and thought; but in sleep, on the contrary, 
and especially towards the end of sleep, when the dis- 
turbance of the blood has ceased, they stand forth more 
clearly. Hence it may happen that an internal motion 


> \ 4 
aicdhoews tpdrov tid Thy wey above, we must suppose that 
arivnolav Kal ofov Secudy tarvov these sleep also. 


elval payer, thy St Avow Kal Thy 
tveow eyphyopaow. 

‘ See preceding note and De 
Somno, 1, 454, b, 14-455, a, 3, 
where it is said that all animals 
except ostracea are actually 
observed to sleep, and that, on 
the general grounds mentioned 


2 Ibid. ii. 455, b, 16-28, c. 3, 
end. 

3 De Somno, c. 3, where this 
point is very fully discussed. 

* Asis shown and interestingly 
illustrated by careful observations 
from cognate fields, 7. évurviwy 
(see p. 71, n. 3, supra), cf. Divin, 


PHYSICS 77 


in the body, which would not be perceived in waking 
hours, makes itself felt in dreams, or that dreams, 
reversely, impel people to subsequent action by the 
images which they present to the soul. It is also 
possible that sensible impressions reach us in sleep 
which would not have struck upon our senses in the 
more disturbed atmosphere of the daytime, or would 
have failed to arouse our attention. Thus some pro- 
phetic dreams may be explained naturally; anything 
beyond this must be considered a casual coincidence, 
for we notice that many dreams do not come true at 








all.! 


Death, like sleep, must be explained by an altera- 


tion in the central organ. 


It happens when the vital 


warmth, which resides in the heart (or the correspond- 


p. S. 1, 463, a, 7 sqq. Dreams 
according to the account here 
given (c. 3, 462, a, 8, 29) are 
kwioes pavtactixal [movements 
caused by fancy] éy rots aic@n- 
tnplos, ... To pdvracuaTd ard Tijs 
kwicews Tov aicOnudrwy, bray év 
Te Kabevdew 7,  Kadedde, toi’ 
éorly évirvioy, 

' This is essentially the doc- 
trine set forth in the treatise 7. 
THs Kal’ brvov paytixis. It cannot, 
on the other hand, be regarded 
as the expression of Aristotle’s 
scientific conviction when in one 
of his Dialogues (see i. 390, n. 3, 
supra) he speaks of the soul in 
sleep and just before death, when 
about to withdraw from the body 

_into its true being, as possessed of 
a power of insight into the future. 
Such a view, it is much more 
i paoaag does not at all express 

is own conviction, but merely an 


opinion which, he thinks, may 
have given rise to the belief in 
the existence of the Gods. If at 
the time of the composition of 
this dialogue he attributed any 
real value to this opinion,it would 
be only one of the many proofs 
of the influence which the views 
of Plato still exercised over him. 
His whole treatment of the sub- 
ject as given above shows how 
far he was ata later time from’ 
regarding sleep as a higher con- 
dition of the spiritual life. The 
views that Cic. Divin. i. 38, 81 
attributes to Aristotle on the 
power of prophetic foresight 
(‘aliquid in animis presagiens 
atque divinum’) said to be pos- 
sessed by hypochondriacs were 
much more probably taken from 
one of the Dialogues, than from 
Divin. p. 8. c, 2 init.or Eth, Eud. 
vii. 14, 1248, a, 39, 


78 ARISTOTLE 


ing. member), is extinguished.! The cause of this 
extinction, which affects all fire alike, is generally the 
want of nourishment. This may be brought about in 
two ways: either the operation of antagonistic mate- 
rials? may prevent the fire from maturing its aliment, 
which in the case of life is the vapour rising from the 
blood; or else an excess of warmth may induce too 
rapid consumption of it.2 The latter takes place in the 
natural decay of old age. During a length of time the 
respiratory organs have been growing gradually harder 
and drier, moving themselves in consequence more 
slowly, and becoming incapable of providing the neces- 
sary covering process for the inner heart.* Accordingly 
the inner fire decreases more and more, until at last it 
is extinguished, like a little flame, by some insignificant 
movement.> The causes of greater or less longevity are 
discussed by Aristotle in a special treatise.® 

Up to this point we have dealt exclusively with 
the common conditions and peculiarities of animal life. 
These common characteristics are displayed in the most 
different forms and degrees of completeness by the dif- 
ferent races of animals. The animal kingdom exhibits 


5 De Respir. 17, 479, a, 7 sqq. 


1 De Vita, c. 4; see pp. 7 
cf. De Vita, 5, 469, b, 21, 470, a, 


and 42, supra, and cf. Respir. 17, 


478, b, 31 sqq. 479, a, 7 sqq. 

2 As in the extinction of fire 
by water. 

3 De Vita,c. 5, 496, b, sq. 
The third possible case, when 
the supply of the requisite ali- 
ment fails, as in death by starva- 
tion, is here unnoticed by 
Aristotle. 

4 That this is the purpose 
served by respiration has already 
been proved at p. 43. 


5 (where the suffocation of fire by 
coals is cited as an illustration, 
and explained in the same way). 
Meteor. iv. 1,379, a, 3; Longit. V. 
5, 466, a, 19, 22, b, 14; Gen. An. 
v. 3, 783, b, 6. 

§ Tlep) waxpuBidrnros Kal Baaxv- 
Bidtnros : cf. Gen. An. iv. 10, 777, 
b, 3. Upon the results there 
airived at, c. 5, 6, itis imprac- 
ticable here to enter more fully. 








PHYSICS 


79 


a gradual and continuous progression from the poorest 
and most undeveloped forms of life to the highest, and 
it is Aristotle’s undisputed distinction to have first dis- 
covered this scale and to have followed it through all 


aspects of animal life.' 


Even the local habitations 


of the different animals, the elements to which they 
belong, enable us to distinguish their several degrees 


of honour and importance.? 


1 As has already been gener- 
ally shown, p. 20 sqq. supra; cf. 
i. 466 sqq. 

* Aristotle frequently touches 
upon this point. His statements 
upon it, however, are not always 
consistent with one another 
either in regard to the birth and 
habitations, or in regard to the 
elementary constitution of dif- 
ferent living creatures. Meteor. iv. 
4, 382, a, 6 (De An. i. 5, 411, 
a, 9 relates to another subject) he 
says: év yi Kal éy tdaTt (Ga udvov 
éotiv, ev aépt 5€ Kal mvp) od« Eoriy, 
brit Tav gwudtwy bAn TadTra. (On 
the statement in the latter clause 
v. i, 483, n. 2, supra). On the other 
hand, according to Cic. J. D. ii. 
15, 42; PLut. Plat. V. 20,1 (4. Ar. 
19), he had declared, probably in 
the dialogue 7. p:Aogod‘as, that as 
there are land-, water-, and air- 
animals ((@a xepoaia, evvdpa, 
m7Tnva, or according to Cic. ‘cum 
aliorum animantium ortus in 
terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aére 
aliorum ’), there must also be @@a 
ovpdvia, and the stars must there- 
fore be animate. Again, Hist. An. 
v. 19, 552, b, 6-15, he speaks of 
worms which spring by spon- 
taneous generation from ice, flies 
which spring from fire, whereas, 
Gen, et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b, 29, he 
had expressly denied that any- 


Nor must the variations 


thing at all springs from either 
ice or fire. If we may put down 
to a popular mode of speech 
the mention of air-animals in 
the treatise 7. gAogoplas, by 
which are only meant winged ani- 
mals, yet the fire-animals men- 
tioned in his Natural History and 
alluded to by other writers (cf. 
FABRICIUS, on Sext. Pyrrh. i. 41. 
IDELER, on Meteorol. ii, 454; 
PHILO, Plant. Noé, 216, A, De 
Gigant. 285, A) cannot be recon- 
ciled with his other statements. 
But, secondly, with regard to the 
material constituents of living 
bodies, Aristotle holds (DeAn.i.5, 
411, a, 9. iii. 13 init., and the pas- 
sage referred to in i. 482, n. 3, sup.) 
that whileeach containsa mixture 
of all the elements, there may be 
a preponderance of different ele- 
ments in different bodies. Here 
also, however, his statements are 
not always consistent. De Respir. 
13, 477, a, 27, he says: 7a wey yap 
€x vis wAelovos yévover, olov Td Trav 
guta@y yévos [and acc. to Gen. An. 
ii. 6. 743, b, 10, shell-fish and 
crustacea], T@ 5° é& #5aros ofoy rd 
tav evidpwv* trav 3& ernvay Kal 
meCav Ta wey ef Gépos Ta ® ex 
mupés, €xagra 8 év tuis olxelors 
témos exe thy tdkw ad’rav. On 
the other hand, Gen. An. iii. 11, 
761, b, 13: 7a wey yap mura Cely 


80 ARISTOTLE 


in their vital heat be neglected, as that is a point of the 
greatest moment in determining the perfection of animate 
existence.! Together with the vital heat must be men- 
tioned the character of the blood and of the humours 
corresponding to it in other animals, on which depends 
the broad distinction between sanguineous and blood- 
less creatures.” The temper and intelligence of animals 
are regulated in a great measure by the constitution of 
their blood, while of course its influence over their 
physical structure is not less important.’ It is only 
sanguineous animals which have flesh, the bloodless are 


wis by ys, Udaros 5 Td Evvdpa, Ta 
5& mela adpos* To 5E waGAAoy kal 
HTTov Kal eyyvTepov Kal moppeTepov 
WoAAhy tot Kat Oavuacrhy d10- 
gopav. Td d¢ Téraprov yévos ovK emi 
TovTwv Tav Tomwy Set (nretv* Kalror 
BovaAeral yé Tt kata Thy Tov mupds 
elvat Tdéiv. .. GAAG Sel TO TOLOVTOV 
vyévos (nteiv emt ris ceAHYns* arn 
yap palverat Kowwvovoa Tis TETAp- 
Tns amoatacews. The whole class 
of we(a (land animals and birds) 
are here assigned to the air, just 
as De Sensu, c. 5, 444, a, 19, men 
and quadrupeds are classed with 
those boa metéxet maAAOY THs TOU 
&epos picews: fire-animals on the 
other hand are said to inhabit the 
moon, of which there is a sugges- 
tion also De An. ii. 3, 414, b, 18 
(see p. 20, n. 3, supra). But it 
remains to be asked how in the 
ethereal region, to which the moon 
also belongs, there can be beings 
constituted of all the elements. 
Cf. MEYER, Avist. Thierk. 413 sq 
393, and i. 472 sqq. supra. 

1 De Resp. 13, 477, a, 16: 7a 
Tipiwrepa TOY Cow jAclovos 1€TU- 
xnke Oeprdtntos* ua yap avaiyrn 


kal Wuxis TeTUXNKEVAL TILwTEepas. 
? On this distinction, of which 
Aristotle very frequently makes 
use, see, besides many other pas- 
sages, Hist. An. i. 4-6, 489, a, 30, 
490, a, 21, 26 sqq. b, 9. ii. 15 init 
iv. linit. c. 3 init.; Part. An. ii. 
2, 648, a, 1. c. 4, 650, b, 30, and 
the passages referred to 26, n. 1, 
supra. From Part. iii. 4, 665, a, 31 
(Anudkpitos & oixey od Kad@s d10- 
AaBety wept avTay, elrep @HOn dia 
pukpéTynta TaY ava'uwv Cow &SnrAa 
elvat ravtTa = their intestines) 
BRANDIS,ii.b. 1301 concludes that 
Democritus had made the dis- 
tinction between sanguineous and 
bloodless animals ; the inference, 
however, is a doubtful one, as 
Democritus may have mentioned 
only particular species of animals, 
and the general designation of 
them as &vaia may be Aristotle’s. 
3 Part. An. ii. 2, 648, a, 2 (see 
p. 39, n. 6, supra); c. 4, 651, a, 
12: moAAdv 8’ éotiv aitia 7 Tov 
oiuaros puots Kal Kara Td 00s Tois 
(dois Kal KaTao Thy alcOnow, 
evAdyws* An yap eort mavTds TOU 
odparos, 





PHYSICS &1 


provided with something analogous to flesh;! the 
former have a heart, the latter another kind of central 
organ.? The vital heat and composition of the blood, 
again, determine the development of the organs of 
refrigeration and secretion—the brain, lungs, kidneys, 
bladder, and their peculiar functions. In everything 
relating to the motion and posture of animals, Aristotle 
does not fail to recognise a special significance. Some 
tribes grow like plants adhering to the ground: the 
more perfect races, on the contrary, are capable of locomo- 
tion at will.‘ Furthermore, he traces very considerable 
differences in the organs of motion and the modes of 
progression displayed by the latter.’ It is only in the 
ease of locomotive creatures that we find the opposition 
of right and left, to which Aristotle attributed much 
importance,® together with a more complex organisa- 
tion.’ Lastly, while in shell-fish and plants the head 
looks downwards, and while in animals without feet or 
with many feet it is turned to the middle of the world, 
it is turned upwards in bipeds, and particularly in man.* 





See p. 26, n. 2, supra. 

® See p. 26,n. /; p.41,n.3, sup. 

* See p. 26, n. 8; p. 40, n. 1, 
and p. 43, n. 6, supra. 

* Hist. An. viii. 1, 588, b, 10 
sqq.; Part. An. iv. 5, 681, a, 12- 
20; Ingr. An. 19; De An. ii. 3, 
415, a, 6, and p. 49, n. 5, supra. 

5 Even birds seem stunted 
(xexoA0Bwrat) in this respect, but 
fish even more so (Part. An. iv. 
13 init.); in the motion of ser- 
pents and worms there is properly 
no distinction of right and left 
(Ingr. An. 4, 705, b, 22 sqq.); in 
the case of insects the multitude 
of their feet indicates deficient 


VOL. Il. 


unity and centralisation of the 
vital force (ibid. c. 7), while—in 
common with some birds—they 
have little power of steering their 
flight (ibid. 10, 710, a, 4). 

® See p. 33, n.3, sup.,and Ingr. 
An. 4,705, b, 13 toend. Aristotle 
there remarks (706, a, 18) that 
the distinction between right and 
left reaches its highest develop- 
ment in man, &:& 7d kata otaw 
uddora Exew trav wv. pice: be 
Berridv re 7d Betiby Tod apiorepod 
kal Kexwpituévoy, 

” Part. An. iv.7 init. 

* Part. An. iv. 7, 683, b, 18; 
Ingr. An. c. 5; De Vita, 1, 468, 


G 


82 - ARISTOTLE 


The structure of the body and the relation of its members 
correspond to these differences of posture." In human 
beings the upper portion of the body is lighter than the 
lower, for the sake of their intellectual activity, and 
because of their greater warmth. In quadrupeds the 
size and weight of these parts are greater. As 
the vital heat decreases, and the earthly ingredients 
begin to preponderate, the number of the feet is mul- 
tiplied, until at last they disappear, and the whole body 
becomes one great foot. Beyond this point the head 
begins to turn downwards, sensation disappears, the 
animal becomes a vegetable.’ The size of animals, again, 


a, 5. Man’s upright posture is 
explained, Respir. 13, 477, a, 20, 
as the result of the purity and 
abundance of his blood; Part An. 
ii. 7, 653, a, 30, iii. 6, 669, b, 4, it 
is accounted for by the cognate 
fact of his higher temperature, 
heat having the effect of raising 
the body, as is proved by the fact 
that warm-blooded quadrupeds 
(the (woréka) are the more up- 
right. Part. An. iv. 10, 686, a, 25, 
the argument is put teleclogic- 
ally: man has arms instead of fore- 
feet, dp0dv wey yap eort pdvoy THY 
Chov bid 7d Thy vow adtod kal Thy 
ovalay elvar Oeiav> Epyov be Tow 
Gerordrou Td voeiv Kal ppoveiv: TOTO 
8 od pddiov moAAod Tov kywHey emi- 
Keévov cematos’ Td yap Bdpos 
Svokivntovy moet Thy Sidvoray Kal 
Thy kowhy atoOnow. The increased 
weight of the upper portions of 
the body requires that it should 
he placed horizontally on several 
legs, ob duvauévns pépetv To Bdpos 
Ths Wuxis. mavta yap éori Ta CG a 
vavedn TaAAa twapa Tov &vOpwrov* 
yavades yap éotw ov Td wey tyw 


méya Td 5t Hepoy 7d Bapos kal weCedov 
puxpdv &c. [cf. i. 467, n. 2, supra) 
... 0d Kal &ppovéorepa mayvta To 
(ga TaY GvOparwy éotiy,... alrioy 
5°... Ste H Tis Wuxijs apxh morAAG 
5} Svonivntés ear: Kad TwuaTedns. 
ért 8 §=€AdtrToves. yevouévns Tis 
aipovons Oepudtnros Kal rod yed- 
Sous mAclovos, TA TE THuaTa e€AdT- 
Tova To¥ (awy éotl Kal moAdroda, 
TéAos 8 &roda ylyvera Kal TeTa- 
péva mpds Thy yiiv. puxpov F obtw 
mpoBalvovra Kal tiv apxhy Exovat 
Katw Kal 7d KaTa Thy Kepadrhy 
pdpioy TéAos akivnrdv éott kal 
avaicOnroy, Kal yivera puTor. 

1 Ingr. An. c. 11: since man 
is a biped and designed for an 
upright walk, the upper parts of 


his body must be lighter, the. 


lower heavier. Birds cannot have 
the upright posture; man on 
account of this posture cannot 
have wings (for the reason given 
for this, the student must consult 
Aristotle himself). Cf. prev. n. 
and Hist, An. ii. 4, 500, b, 26. 

2 Part. An. iv. 10; see p, 81, 
n. 8, supra. 


Oe Ae Se 








PEYSICS 83 


corresponds to their place in the scale of existence: the 
warmer animals, according to Aristotle’s notion, are ge- 
nerally speaking greater, and therefore the sanguineous 
animals are larger than the bloodless, although he 
does not fail to notice several exceptions to this rule.! 
Another obvious basis of classification may be found in 
the mode of birth and propagation. Some animals are 
viviparous, and form their offspring in the womb, either 
with or without the intervention of an egg.? A second 
class lay eggs, perfect in the case of birds, oviparous 
quadrupeds, and snakes ; imperfect in the case of fishes, 
molluscs, and molluscous ostracea. A third kind pro- 
pagate themselves by worms, produced sometimes with, 
sometimes without, copulation, and attaining their ulti- 
mate form only after repeated transformation: almost 
all insects belong to this class. A fourth series spring 
by spontaneous generation from slime or from the excre- 
tions of animals: as, for instance, the majority of shell- 
fish and some fishes and insects. The common funda- 
mental type of all these different modes of propagation 
is development from worms through eggs to organic 
form ;° but this process runs a different course, produ- 


' Respir. 13, 477, a, 18; n. 1, supra), ec. 5, 755, b, 20, 





Longit. V. 5,466, b, 18,28; Part. 
An. iv. 10, 686, b, 28; Hist. An. 


i? 5, 490, a, 21 sqq.; Gen. An. ii. 


1, 732, a, 16 sqq. 

* The former is the case ( Gen. 

An. ii. 1, 732, a, 32, i. 10, and 

elsewhere) with man, horses, 
cattle, dolphins, &c., the latter 

with cartilaginous fish and vipers. 

* Instances of monogenesis 

_ Aristotle finds in bees and some 
_ fishes ; Gen. An. iii. 10 (see p. 58, 


ii. 5 (see p. 53, n. 1, a); 
Hist. An. iv. 11, 688, 0,197 

* Gen. An. ii. 1, from 732, a, 
25 onwards; Hist. An. i. 5, 489, 
a, 34-b, 18; Polit. i. 8, 1256, b, 
10 sqq. On viviparous animals 
see especially Gen. An. ii, 4 Sqq. ; 
on the others and on spontaneous 
generation, the passage cited p. 
58,n. 1,and p. 49,n. 4, sup.,and also 
MBYER, Arist. Thierk. 453 sqq. 

* On the one hand, he holds 


G2 


84 


ARISTOTLE 


cing a more or less perfect result, according to the higher 


or the lower status of the animal. 


So, since the 


warmer and less earthy animals are the noblest, we may 
say that birth and development follow the warmth and 
material composition of the organisms.! The mode of 
their birth reflects the perfection or imperfection of 
their nature, and if we estimate the whole animal 
kingdom by this one standard, we obtain a scale which 
leads gradually from the most perfect down to the least 
perfect.? Nor are the senses equally distributed among 


that the embryo even of oviparous 
and viviparousanimals is vermicu- 
lar at first, and, on the other, the 
chrysalisation of insects which 
appear first as worms is a trans- 
formation into the form of an egg; 
so that even here the law of ana- 
logy does not desert us; Gen. An. 
iii. 9, 758, a, 832: oxeddv yap Coie 
advTa oKWANKOTOKE mpaTov* Td 
yap aredéoraroy Kinua rowdrdy 
éotw. ev waor 5& Kal Tots (wo- 
Tokovot Kal Tois @oTOKOdG? TEAELOV 
gov To KUnua T) MPaTov Bdidpirroy 
dy AauBdver thy abinow: roadiTy 
8 éorly TOU oKwANKOS vals. 
petra 8& TodTO Ta mev BoToKel Td 
Kinua TéAciov Ta 8 a&reAks, Ew SE 
ylyverat TéAcov, Kabdmep eml TaY 
ixOtov elpnrat modAAdKis, Ta 5 ev 
aitois (wotoKodvyTa Tpdmov Tivd 
pera To ototnua Td e& apxis 
goedes yiverar’ meprexeTat yap Td 
irypov jucm AewTG, Kabdwep by ef 
Tis &pbéAoe Td TaY Gav ’aoTpaKoY. 
(Cf. on this point Hist. An. viii. 
7.) The insect germ is a worm, 
whether it is born by ordinary or 
by spontaneous generation, and 
the same is true of caterpillars 
and of the supposed spiders’ eggs. 
mpocrOdyTa 5 mayTa TA TKWANKWSN 
Kal tod peyébovs AaBsyTa TEAOS 


‘case with moths 


ofoy @dv yiyvera [in chrysalisa- 
tion] . . . todrov 8 atrioy ort 7 
giois domepavel mpd &pas goroKe? 
51a Thy aréAciav Thy adrijs, ws 
ByTos TOD OKaANKOS ert ev advéqreL 
god padakod. The same is the 
and similar 
animals. Cf. n. 2, infra. 

1 Gen. An. ii. 1, 732, b, 28: 
(wotoker wey Ta TEAEOTEPA THY 
giow tev (gov Kal petéxovTa 
Kadapwrépas apxis* ovbev yap Cwo- 
Troxel ev avTG, mh Sexduevoy 1d 
mvedua Kal dvamveov. TedAcmrepa Re 
Ta Oepudrepa thy tow Kat 
iypdrepa Kal wh yeddn* Tis de 
Oepudrntos ths puoKs Spos 4 
mreiuwv bo0wv evayos eoTw... 
bomep 587d (gov TéAcov, 6 5é oKa- 
Ank kal 7d gov GreAts, ofTws Td 
TéAelov €k TOU TEeAELoTEpou yiver Bau 
mépuxev, Warmth and moisture 
are favourable, cold and dryness 
hostile to perfect development ; 
Aristotle tries to show, 733, a, 3 
sqq., how the various methods of 
production depend upon the 
various ways in which these are 
distributed and combined. 

2 Thid. 733, a, 32: Set 8 
vohiou as ed Kal epetis Thy yéveow 
arodidwow  ptos, Ta mey yap 
TeAreérepa Kal Oepudrepa Tay Cdwv 








85 


the different tribes: it is only the more perfect which 
possess all the five senses, while the others partake of 
them in more or less completeness.' Again, there are 
only a few animals in which memory and imagination 
are developed from sensation; and accordingly they 
differ widely in intelligence and docility.? In the last 
place, Aristotle turns his attention to the habits and 
character of animals, and is at pains to point out the 
characteristics which establish a closer or more distant 
resemblance between the life of men and brutes,’ 
noticing especially, for instance, how in the sexual 
life of animals and their treatment of their young we 
have all stages, from a merely vegetable indifference up 
to a species of moral conduct towards offspring.‘ 
Aristotle failed to combine these different points 
of view in such a way as to establish a complete and 
graduated classification of the whole animal kingdom: 
nor, indeed, did he succeed in avoiding constant errors 
and contradictions in his treatment of this subject, 
owing to the complicated and crossing principles of 


PHYSICS 


TéAewoy Grodidwor Td TéKvov Kata Td © Balver wdOos aitg, Sowep elpnra 





mowyv [ie. with perfectly deve- 
loped organs].... Kal yevyg 5h 
Taira (ga év abrois ebOds. Ta 5 
devrepa €v abrois pey od yerva 
Tércia edOVs ((woroKe? 5& goroKh- 
cavTa mpa@tov), Oipate 5é Cworoxe?. 
7a 5& (Gov ply ob TéAcov yevva, 
gov Be yevva Kal rodro TéAcLov 7d 
gov, Ta 8 Eri TrovTwy Wuxporépay 
Exovra Thy piow gov pty yeryg od 
Tédewov Bt Gdv, GAA’ %Ew TeAcLodraL, 
Kabdwep 7d Tay AEmBwTav ixOiwy 
yévos kal Ta padakdorpaka Kal 7a 
Maddnia, Td Bt wéurrov yévos Kal 
Wuxpéraroy od’ goroKe? e& adroi, 
GAAG Kal Tod [7d] roLdTov EEw oup- 


Ta yap evroua okwAnkoToKe Td 
mpa@tov’ mpocAOav 8 @ddns ylvera 
6 ox@drnét (} yap xpvoadAls Kkadov- 
Mévn Svvamivy god exer). elt’ ex 
tovrov ylvera (pov ev th tTpltn 
MeTaBoAy AaBdy Td Tis yevéoews 
TéAOs. 

1 Hist. An. iv. 8; De An. ii. 
2,415, a, 3; De Somno, 2, 455, a, 
5, and p. 64, supra. 

? See the passages referred to 
supra, p. 70, n. 4, and p. 38, n. 1. 

* See p. 38, n. 1, supra. 

* Hist. An. viii. 1, 588, b, 28, 
cf, Oecon. i. 3, 1343, b, 13. 


86 ARISTOTLE 


division which he followed.! He generally divides the 
brute creation into nine departments, between which 
some transitional forms intervene: these are viviparous 
quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, birds, fishes, whales, 
molluscs, malacostraca, testacea, and insects.? Close to 
the oviparous quadrupeds are placed the snakes, although 
in several points they resemble fishes. A more general 
law of classification is his opposition between sanguin- 
eous and bloodless animals. To the former belong the 
first five classes of those we have enumerated ; to the 
latter, the remaining four. But though this opposition 
has so broad an application,’ and though Aristotle uses 
it as an essential distinction,® he does not divide the 
whole animal kingdom into the two classes of san- 
guineous and bloodless, and then subdivide these into 


species as viviparous, &c.’ 


1 With the following account 
cf. MEYER, Arist. Thierk. 485 sqq. 

2 Hist. An.i. 6, ii. 15 init. iv. 
1 init., Part. An. iv. 5 wit., 
among other passages. Cf. 
MzyEpR, ibid. 102 sqq. 151 sqq., 
ihid. TL sqq., but especially 84 
sqq., upon Aristotle’s objections 
to dichotomy and to other artifi- 
cial classifications. 

3 See, on the one hand, Part. 
An. iv. 1 init., Hist. An. ii. 17, 
508, a, 8, among other passages, 
and, on the other, Hist. An. iii. 
7, 516, b, 20, ibid. c. 1, 509, b, 
15, v. 5, 540, b, 30; Gen. An. i. 
3, 716,b, 16; Part. iv. 13, 697, a, 
9. MBYER, ibid. 154 sq. 

* See the passages cited, p, 
80, n. 2, supra. : 

5 See p. 80, supra. 

8 Hist. An. ii. 15, 505, b, 25: 
Toure yap Siapéeper TA meyiora yevn 


His other systems of classi- 


mpos Ta AoiTa TAY BAAwY (Hwy, TE 
Ta pev evama ta 8 &vamua elvat. 
Part. iv. 3, 678, a, 33: 8rt ydp 
dort Ta piv evama Ta 8 &vama év 
TG Ady evurdpter TH SplCovte Thy 
ovolay avtav. Of. BRANDIS, ii. b, 
1294 sq. 

7 Cf. MEYER, ibid. 138 sq. In 
Part. An. i. 2sq. Aristotle sets 
forth in detail the reasons why he 
regards it as inadmissible to base 
his classification upon such a di- 
vision (see i. 241, n. 3, supra, and 
cf. i. 271, n. 2, sup.), expressly stat- 
ing, 642, b, 830: xaAemby pev ody 
SiadaBeivy Kal eis ToradTas Siapopds 
av éorw elin &o0 driody (gov év 
Tabtas bmdpxew Kal ph év wreloot 
ravtév... mavTwy 5 xakewaratov 
) adbvaroyv eis TA &varwa (a0 other 
word could have been used con- 
sistently with the context which 
follows), This characteristic is 


oe . 








PHYSICS 87 


fication are employed with even less rigour, as when he 
speaks of land- and water-animals,' of viviparous, ovi- 
parous, and vermiparous,’ of locomotive and non-locomo- 
tive,* of two-footed, four-footed, many-footed, and foot- 
less,‘ of walking, flying, swimming creatures,* of carni- 
vora and herbivora, and so on.® Nor does Aristotle, 
in tracing the subordinate species into which the summa 
genera are divided, make use of these distinctions for 
the purpose of classification. He rather tries to find the 
natural divisions by observation,’ and if he cannot 
suceeed in marking off the species by these means, he 
does not hesitate to assume intermediate races belonging 





partly to the one sort and partly to the other.® 


unsuitable for the differentia of 
a summa species, if for no other 
reason than because it is a nega- 
tive one, and negative conceptions 
cannot be further subdivided 
according to any inlying principle 
of classitication (642, b, 21, 643, 
a, 1 899: b, 9-26). 

' Hist. An. i. 487, a, 34, viii. 
2 init. ix. 48, 631, a, 21, ii. 2, 648, 
a, 25, among other passages ; cf. 
Part. i. 2, 642, b, 10 sqq. ; Top. vi. 
6, 144, b, '32 8qq.; Muyze, 84 sq. 
140. See also p. 79, n. 2, supra. 

* Hist. An, i. 5, 489, a, 34, 
among other passages; see 
MEYER, 97 sq. 141 sgq., and p. 
82 sq. a, according to which 
as a fourth class we should have 
self-generated animals. 

8’ Ingr. An. 4. 705, b, 13; 
Part. An. iv. 5, 681, b, 33 sqq. c. 
7 init. 

* Hist. An. i. 4, 489, b, 19; 
Part. An. iv. 10, 687, a, 2, 689, b, 
31 sqq.; Ingr. An. 1, 704, a, 12. c. 
5, 706, a, 26 sqq., b, 3 sqq. 

5 Nevorixd and mrnva are re- 


Lastly, 


presented, Hist. An. i. 5, 489, b, 
23, 490, a, 5, as separate classes, 
the latter being subdivided into 
TTEpwrd, MiAwTd and Sepudrrepa; 
opposed to these we have as a 
third class all those which move 
upon the earth. 

5 Hist. An. i. 1, 488, a, 14, 
viii. 3, 592, a, 29, b, 15, 28; 
Polit. i. 8, 1256, a, 24, among 
other passages ; v. MEYER, p. 100. 

7 MEYER, ibid. p. 158-329, 
gives an exhaustive account of 
these. 

* Such transitional forms are: 
the monkey standing between 
man and viviparous quadrupeds ; 
the bat between flying and walk- 
ing animals, but properly with 
as much claim to be reckoned 
among viviparous quadrupeds as 
the seal, which is assigned a place 
between land- and water- ani- 
mals; the ostrich, which, al- 
though a bird, in many points 
resembles a quadruped ; the cro- 
codile, which is an oviparous 
quadruped approximating to a 


88 ARISTOTLE 


though it cannot be denied that Aristotle’s system 
represents a gradual progression toward completeness 
in the animal creation which attains its summit in 
man,' yet the respective dignities of whole classes are left 
undetermined, and the different points of view from which 
he judges them intersect each other so awkwardly that 
the same class often ranks higher in one respect and 
lower in another. Zoophytes, generally speaking, are 
less perfect than true animals ; shell-fish are less perfect 
than locomotive creatures, the footless than those which 
are provided with feet, the vermiparous than the ovi- 
parous, and these than the viviparous; all animals than 
man.” But whether insects rank above molluscs and 
malacostraca, birds above amphibious animals, fishes 
above snakes, or vice versa, Aristotle does not enable us 
to decide. We may even doubt’ about the respective 
positions of shell-fish and insects. Again, though san- 
guineous animals are the nobler on account of their 
greater vital warmth and their more complex organisa- 
tion, still some insects, like bees and ants, are superior 
to many of them in intelligence and art. If birds as 
oviparous animals rank below mammals, their posture 
approximates them to man ;* it seems strange, there- 
fore, that they should be more remote from mankind in 
fish ; serpents (see p. 86, n. 8, sw- 


pra);among bloodlessanimalsthe 
nautilus and the hermit crab are 


2 See i. 487 sq. supra. 
3 As MEYER, p. 486, shows. © 
* Part. An. ii. 2, 648, a, 4 


molluscs which are related to 
crustacea. See the references 
given by MEYER, pp. 146-158. 
The zoological position of man is 
discussed infra, p. 90, n. 1. 
' See p. 25 sqq. supra; p. 28, 
n. 3, among other passages, 


Sqq.; see p. 39, n. 6, supra, where 
a solution of the difficulty i is sug- 
gested, which, however, is hardly 
an adequate one. 

5 Ingr. An. 5,706, a, 25, b, 3 ; 
Hist. An. i.5, 489, b, 20. 


aE ah Ss RA Ries al ee ee ee, 





PHYSICS 89 


mode of birth and physical structure than the mammals.' 
When we take the spontaneous generation of sexless ani- 
mals as a sign of a low rank, intermediate between the 
vegetable and animal worlds, we are surprised to find the 
same mode of propagation not only in insects but even 
in fishes.? On the other hand, since viviparous animals 
are the most perfect, whales and dolphins, as well as 
skates and vipers, take precedence of birds and amphi- 
bious animals, though inferior to them in many respects.‘ 
If we explain the transition from quadrupeds to mul- 
tipeds, and from these to footless creatures by a continual 
declension of warmth,* the bloodless insects ought to be 
warmer than the sanguineous snakes, fishes, and dol- 
phins.® It cannot be denied that the complex variety 
of the facts cannot always be harmonised with the presup- 
positions of the system, and that it is impossible to 
avoid disproportion and even contradictions in its appli- 
cation. The majority of these defects appear to have 
escaped Aristotle’s notice; others he tries to avoid by 
artificial means:7 but he never allows himself to be 
shaken in his great conviction that organic nature 
presents a graduated scale of progressive development 
towards perfection. 





' Since an upright posture is 
said to accompany greater vital 
heat ; see p. 81 sq. supra. 

? See p.82 sq. sup., cf. p. 48 sq. 

% Gen. An. ii. 4, 737, b, 26. 
Cf. p. 83, n. 2, supra. 

* In the case of cartilaginous 
fish and vipers this requires no 
proof; in the case of cetaceans 
their want of feet at least, and as 
compared with birds the position 
of their heads, are in Aristotle’s 
view important defects. 


5 See p. 81, supra. 

® Cf. MEYER, p. 487 sq. where 
further examples are given. 

7 See also Gen. An. i. 10 sq. 
where the viviparousness of 
sharks is explained on the ground 
of their natural coldness, whereas 
the same property in mammals is 
made to depend upon their 
greater heat and perfection ; cf. 
Part. An. iii. 6, 669, a, 24 sqq. ; 
Gen. An, ii. 4, 737, b, 26, and 
other passages. 


ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XI 


CONTINUATION 


Man 


THE end of this evolution is Man. 


His body unites 


him with the lower animals, and especially with the 


class of viviparous land-animals.! 


1 It might be doubted whether 
man is classed by Aristotle with 
viviparous quadrupeds or placed 
ina class by himself. Thus, Hist. 
An. i. 6, 490, b, 15 sqq., those 
yévn which have no subordinate 
species under them are compared 
to the genus &@pwros ; on the 
other hand, ibid. ii. 8 init., man 
is opposed to the rerpdzroda, and 
the monkey is described as an 
intermediate form between them. 
This apparent contradiction is 
due to the fact that Aristotle has 
no name for the whole class: as 
a biped, man cannot be classed 
along with rerpdmroda (wotokotrTa ; 
on the other hand, (woroxotyra 
would embrace the whole which 
he declares to be a separate yévos. 
In reality man is treated as a 
species of the same genus to 
which viviparous quadrupeds be- 
long. This is unmistakably the 
intention in Hist. An. i. 6, 490, b, 
31 sqq., where he is described 
along with the lion, the stag, &c., 
as an «los tov yévous Tov TaY 


But already even in 


rerpamrddwv (wy kal Cwotdkwv, and 
as one which has no subordinate 
species under it; Part. i. 5, 645, 
b, 24, where dpvis is adduced as 
an example of a évos, &v@pwios 
of an cidos; Hist. An. ii. 15, 505, 
b, 28, where the first class of 
sanguineous animals is described 
comprehensively as &v@pwrds Te 
kal Ta CworéKa trav TeTpamddwr ; 
ibid. vi. 18 init.: wept wey ody Tav 
trArwy (pov .. . oxeddy elpnra 
wept mavrwv .. , wept 5& ray meCav 
doa (worokel nal mepl avepmmov 
Aextéov Ta cuuBalvovta. Gen. An. 
i. 8, 738, a, 37: otre yap ta 
(woroKobtyta buolws exer wavra [sc. 
Tas toTépas|, GAA’ &vOpwror pmev 
kal Td we(a mavTa KdTw.. . TH dE 
ceddxn Cwotokovyta tvw. bid. 
ii. 4, 737, b, 26: Ta (woroKotyra 
kal toitwy &vOpwros. A certain 
distinction between man and 
other viviparous land-animals is 
doubtless referred to in these 
and other passages (e.g. Part. 
An. ii. 17, 660, a, 17), but Ari- 
stotle does not seem to have re- 


PHYSICS 91 


the characteristics of his physical organism we have 
evidences of something higher, which raises him far 
above the lower animals. His body is of a warmer 
temperature than theirs. He has therefore more blood 
in proportion and a larger brain.' In him alone, as the 
greater heat and nobility of his nature demands, we 
have true symmetry of form and the upright posture 
which corresponds with it.2 In man the distinction 
between the right and the left is most fully developed.* 
As his blood is the purest,‘ his sensibility is most delicate, 
his powers of perception the most refined, and his 
understanding the keenest.’ His mouth, his windpipe, 
his lips, and his tongue add to their other functions 
that of speech, which marks him out from all living 
things. Nature has not confined man, as she has the 
other animals, to one means of defence. His means of 
self-preservation are infinite, and can be adapted to 





suit his changing needs.’ His hand is the tool of all 


garded it as sufficiently funda- 
mental to constitute man a 
separate yévos. 

1 Part. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 27-37, 
ili. 6, 669, b,4,iv. 10(see p. 81,n.8, 
supra); Respir. 13, 477, a, 20. 
Upon this depends also length of 
life (in which respect man is 
held to be excelled only by the 
elephant) in so far as this de- 
pends in turn upon the corre- 
spondence between the composi- 
tion of the body and the sur- 
rounding atmosphere, and espe- 
cially upon the heat of its upper 
portions; Gen. An. iv. 10, 777, 
b, 3 sqq.; Longit. Vit. c. 5, 6, 466, 
a, 30 sqq. b, 14, 467, a, 31. 

? Besides the passages already 
referred to, cf. Ingr. An. 5, 706, 


b, 3, 9,c. 11, 710, b, 5-17; De 
Vita, 1, 468, a, 5, and i. 467, n.3, 
supra. 

8 Ingr. An. 4, 706, a, 18; see 
p. 81, n. 6, supra. 

* Respir. 13, 477, a, 20. 

5 See p. 64, n. 6, and p. 11, n. 
4, supra. 

5 Part. ii. 16, 659, a, 30 sqq. 
c. 17, 660, a, 17 sqq. iii. 1, 662, 
a, 20,25; Gen. v. 7, 786, b, 19; 
Hist, An. iv. 9, 536, a, 32. 

7 Part. An. iv. 10, 687, a, 23, 
in the celebrated upon 
the human hand, after the words 
quoted, p. 11,n. 2, supra, Aristotle 
says : GAN’ of Aéyorres ds cuvérrner 
od Kada@s 5 &vOpwros GAAG xelpiora 
tav (¢wv [because he is naked 
and defenceless; Aristotle has 


92 ARISTOTLE 


tools, ‘so ingeniously contrived for the most widely 
different purposes that it takes the place of every 
other.! In a word, man is the first and most perfect 
of all living creatures.? And for this reason, just as 
each less perfect thing finds its end in that which is 
more perfect,? so all lower forms of animal life are 
destined for the use of man.‘ 

It isin the soul of man, however, that this perfection 
has its proper seat. Even his physical superiority has 
only been vouchsafed to him because his body has to 
serve as the instrument of a nobler soul.® While the 
other animals are confined to the lower operations of 
the nutritive and sensitive life, man rises above them 


all by virtue of his faculty of thought.® 


probably in view PLATO’s Pro- 
tayoras, 21, C] ob« é6p0@s A€youcw. 
Td pev yap AAG piav Exe: Bonear, 
kal peTtaBddAdAccOa aytl TavTns 
érépay ovK @oriwv, GAN avarykaiov 
domwep brodedeuévoy del Kabevdew 
kat wdvra mparrew, Kal Thy mepl 
7) oGpa &dAedpay pndémore KaTa- 
OécOa1, undé petaBddrAdAcoOau 8 Sh 
eriyxavey Swdov exwv. TH GE 
avOpamm tas te BonOeias mwoAAads 
éxew Kal tavras del tkeore mera- 
BddAew, @rt 8 SrAov oiov bw 
BovAntat kal Sov dy BotAnra 
exe. 

1 See the further account in 
the passage just quoted, and p. 
19, n. 1; also De An. iii. 8, 432, 
a, 1, where the hand is called 
bpyavoy épydywr. 

* Hist. An. ix. 1, 608, b, 5: 
the ethical characteristics of the 
sexes are more prominent éy tots 
Exovgr waAAoy HOos kal udArora év 
avOpérw: toito [sc. Td (Gor] yap 
exer Thy prow amorereAcouerny. 


Nutrition, 


Gen. An. ii. 4, 737, b, 26: €or: 5e 
Ta TéAELA (Ga TPA@Ta, ToLadTa Se Ta 
(worokovvTa, Kal to’Twy tvOpwros 
™pP@T ov. 

3 Cf. p. 28. 

* Polit. i. 8,. 1256, _b, 16: 
Nature has provided that every 
creature should meet with its 
necessary food when it comes 
into the world; Sore duolws 5jAov 
drt Kal yevouévois oinréoy Td Te 
puta tay Cow Evexey ely kal 
TaAAG (Ga THv avOpdarwv xdp, Ta 
bev juepa Kal Sia Thy xphow Kal 
51a Thy Tpophy, Tav 8 aypiwy, «i 
By mwavTa, GAAG Th YE TWAcioTa TIS 
Tpopys Kal &AAns BonOeias Everev, 
tva kat éoOns Kal &AdAa bpyava ylyn- 
Tat ef avTay. ei ovv H pias pnbev 
mente aredés [without reason] more? 
BATE parny, avayKalov Tay avOpw- 
Tw eveKev QUTA TWaYTAa WEeToNnKEevat 
Thy piow. 

5 See p. 10 sq. supra. 

6 See p. 22 sq. supra. 





- 


PHYSICS 93 


propagation, the alternations of sleep and waking, 
birth, old age, death, sense-perception, even imagina-~ 
tion and memory, are common to man and beast alike ;! 
nor do these phenomena as they exhibit themselves in 
each differ essentially from one another.? And the 
same is true of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
and the desires that spring from them.* That which 
belongs to man alone of all known creatures is Mind or 
Reason (Nods).4 By ‘ Nous’ Aristotle means the power 
of Thought in its widest acceptation,® but also more 
specifically the faculty of thought in so far as it deals 
with supersensible reality,® and especially the faculty of 


! Voluntary recollection alone 
is beyond their power; cf. p. 73 sq. 

2 On these points, therefore, 
we have simply to refer to the 
previous chapter. 

8 See p. 22, n. 1, supra. 


4 Aristotle, like Plato, distin- . 


guishes for this reason between 
the rational and the irrational 
part of the soul; Zh. i. 13,1102, 
a, 26 sqq.; Polit. vii. 15, 1334, b, 
17, and passim. 

5 De An. iii. 4, 429, a, 28: 
Aéyw 38 voty & Biavoeira: kal 
brodauBave:  Wuxh. 

6 After explaining, De An. 
iii. 4, 429, b, 10 sq., the distinc- 
tion between the concrete thing 
with its ingredient of matter 
and the pure unadulterated form, 
Aristotle continues, 1. 12: 7d 
capri elva: kal odpea 7) GAAw Fh 
BAdAws ExovTs wplver. . . TS pry 
oty aicOnrie@ Td Oepudy Kal Td 
wuxpdy Kplver Kal ay Adyos Tis 7 
odpt* tAAw dt Fro xwpicre, i ds 
h KexAacuevn Exe: mpds abrhy brav 
exrabh, To capi elya [the pure 
conception of the capt] xplve.. 
The same is true of all abstract 


conceptions: érépy tpa } érépws 
ExovtTt Kplver. Kal Braws tpa ds 
xwpioTa TH mpdyuara ris HAns, 
ottTw kal ra wept roy vowv, The 
subject of kpive: is voids, as is 
shown by the preceding context. 
Tt may, indeed, seem strange that 
it is said of it that it knows (for 
we must give this more general 
signification to «plvew here, as in 
De An. iii. 3, 428, a, 2) heat and 
cold and the sensible qualities of 
things in general r@ aic@nrueg 
(where not only is it not neces- 
sary on account of the context 
to read alc@nr¢ with BRENTANO, 
Psychol. d. Ar. 134, but it is not 
admissible), But while the simple 
perception of the data of sense 
belongs to afe@nots, and not to voids, 
yet every judgment relating to 
them is shared in by thought (voids 
in the wider sense) (cf. i. 209, n.3, 
and 211,n.1,swp.), and to this ex- 
tent reason also may be described 
as that which by means of the 
perceptive faculty knows sensible 
things. Conceptions, on the other 
hand, as such, universal thoughts 
limited to no individual experi- 


94 


ARISTOTLE 


grasping in an immediate act of consciousness that 
which cannot be the object of mediated knowledge.' 
This part of the soul cannot be entangled in the life 
of the body. It must be simple, changeless, impassible.? 


ence are known by reason per se, 
although the material for them 
is supplied by sense-perception 
(as in the case of the conception 
of odpt). Instead of saying this 
simply, Aristotle expresses him- 
self in such a way as to leave it 
ambiguous whether these are 
recognised by a faculty different 
from that by which sensible ob- 
jects are recognised or by the 
same faculty acting in a different 
way. If we had here a dilemma 
between the two terms of which 
we had to decide, we could only 
say, as Aristotle does, that they 
are known &AAm (vots being 
another faculty) than by 76 aic@n- 
tudv. Butthe statement of three 
alternatives, if nothing else, 
shows that Aristotle regards each 
of the first two descriptions as 
udmissible in a certain sense, 
The Nous knows insensible things 
by a faculty different from that 
by which it knows sensible ob- 
jects, and, indeed, different in 
essence and actual reality (xwpt- 
ordv) from the faculty of sense- 
perception, seeing that it knows 
them by itself alone; but in so 
far as it is also true that the 
reason knows sensible things, we 
may say that it knows insensible 
things by a different method ; it 
knows the former directly, the 
latter only indirectly by means 
of the judgment it passes upon 
the data of sense. This is the 
meaning of the words } és 7 
KkexAacuevn &c., the further ex- 
planation of which is of minor 


importance in connection with 
the essential meaning of the 
passage, since this would be the 
same even although we take the 
illustration of the broken and 
extended line as merely explana- 
tory of &AAws Exe. - 

1 To this faculty belong first 
and chiefly the highest principles 
of thought, the aueoa; cf.i.197, n. 
4,swpra. Inthis way (according 
to i.197,n.3, sup., cf. the citation 
from Metaph. xii. 7, i. 203, n. 3, 
sup.) Nous knows itself by an im- 
mediate intuition, as thinker and 
thought here coincide. Whether 
the thought of God and other 
metaphysical conceptions are 
also the objects of immediate 
cognition, Aristotle, as already 
observed, i. 204, does not say. 

2 De An. iii. 4, 429, a, 18 (on 
what precedes seei. 199, n.2, 8p ): 
avdynn pa, ered mdyra voei, auryh 
civat, domep pnoly *Avatarydpas [see 
ZELL. Ph.d.G@r.i.886,1]iva xpath, 
TovTO 8 eotly iva yywp!(n - mapeu- 
gpawduevoy yap Kwrver Td GAAd- 
Tplov kal ayTipparrel, doTe und avrov 
elvan pvow wndeulay GAN } rabrny, 
drt duvaréy. 6 tpa Kadovpevos Tijs 
wuxns vovs .... od0éy ear 
evepye'a tev byTwy mplr voeiv. 
51d oddE meutx Oar evAoyoy abtoyv TO 
THuaTt. mods Tis yap ay ylyvorro, 
Wuxpds 7) Gepuds [it would in this 
case partake of the properties of 
the body and as it would thus 
bring with it definite qualities to 
the cognition of vonra, it could not 
exhibit that dmd@ea—see i. 199, 
n. 2, supra—and purity from 


eT 


a 


= ._——— 








PHYSICS 


95 


Just as it has for its object pure form abstracted from 
all matter, so is it itself free and unfettered by the 


body.! 


It has no bodily organ like the senses ;? it is 


not born into existence like the other parts of the 


admixture which it requires for 
the exercise of its universal 
faculty of thought: an expla- 
nation which seems to harmo- 
nise better with the meaning 
of 52 &c. than that of BREN- 
TANO, ibid. 120 sqq.], } Kav 
bpyavév tt ely, Sowep TE aicbnrixg * 
vov 8 ob8év éorw: b, 22. amophoese 
& ty tis, ei 6 vos amrAody eos 
kal drafts [HAYDUCK, Observat. 
erit. in loc. al. Arist. p. 3, not 
without reason regards these 
words as strange, inasmuch as it 
hardly requires to be explained, 
as is done l. 25 sqq., that rd 
amrafés is not subject to mdoxew ; 
he would therefore strike them 
out; we might prefer instead of 
amavis to read ‘duryts’— see 
429, a, 18 quoted above] «al 
pndert under Exe: kowdy, . . . Tas 
voice, ef Td voeiv mdaoxew i 
éorw. This independence of the 
reason explains the remark 
which is added, De Ax, ii. 1, 413, 
a, 4 sqq. to the definition of the 
soul as the entelechy of its body : 
it follows that the soul (or at any 
rate certain parts of it, if it has 
parts) is not separate (xwpiords) 
irom the body : od why GAA’ Enid ye 
ob0ev KwAver (see p. 6, n.1, supra). 
Of.furthern. 3 below, p. 96, n. 2, in- 
Sra, and the passages referred to 
below bearing upon voids rointinds ; 
ulso De An, i. 3, 407, a, 33: 7 
vénots ouev Tpeutioe tivl Kal 
emordoe uaidrdrov i) kwhioe. Phys. 
vii. 3, 247, b, 1: 0d8 ai od 
vonTiKod jépous Ekers GAAOWoets. 
Ibid. 247, a, 28: GAA phy odd: 


T@ SiavonrixgG peper THs Wuxiis 7 
&AAolwors &C.; nor is Afis em- 
orhuns a yéveois or GAAolwois, but 
rather an jpeula nal Kardoraois 
Tapa x7js—the removal of obstruc- 
tions which hinder the reason in 
the exercise of its functions, re- 
sembling the awakening from 
sleep. 

1 Seep 93,n.6,sup. Xwpiords 
is often applied to Nous, the lower 
faculties of the soul being a4xép:- 
oro; cf. preced. and foll. n. p. 96, n. 
1, infra. De An. ii. 2. 413, b, 24: 
wept 5€ Tov vow Kal ris Sewpnricis 
duvduews obdév rw pavepdy, GAN’ Fouce 
Wuxiis yévos €repov elvat, kal rodTo 
pdvou evdéxerar xwpl (er Oat [sc. rot 
océparos|, Kabdwep +d Gldiov rod 
peaprov. . 

* See preced. and foll. n, and 
the further statement De An. 
iii. 4, 429, a, 29: re 8 ody duola 
) ard0ea rod aic@nrixod Kal rod 
vonTiKod, pavepdy ém) tay aigOnr- 
npiwy kal rijs aicbhoews, 7 wey yap 
alc@nois ob Sbvara aicbdver ba 
éx rovTpdbpa aigOnrud . . . GAA’ S 
vous bray tivohon opddpavonrody, ovx 
ATTov voei Ta bwodeéorepa, GAAG Kal 
MGAAov* Td wey yap aicOnrindy obk 
&vev gHuaTos, 65 xwpiords. Inview 
of these definite declarations, the 
attempt (KaMPE, L’rkenutnissth. 
d,. Ar, 12-49) to attribute to the 
Nous a material substratum con- 
sisting of «ther must appear at 
the outset a profitless one. Not 
even the passage quoted p. 6, 
n. 2, from Gen. An. ii. 3 can be 
adduced in support of it, for 
even there the omépua of the 


96 


ARISTOTLE 


soul;! nor is it affected by the death of the body.? It 
is real, therefore, only in the act of thinking; apart 


Wuxixh apxh,so far as it refers to 
the Nous, is described as xwpiorby 
oéuaros and even although it is 
said that it enters the womb 
with the yovy, it does not follow 
from this that it is united to this 
orany other material substratum: 
the Nous is said, indeed, to be in 
the body during life, but not to 
be mixed up with it or entangled 
in its life; the yovy itself it enters 
from without; cf. p. 100, infra. 
Furthermore, even although the 
sether like the Nousiscalled divine 
and unchangeable, the essential 
distinction between them (the 
one is a body, the other is not) is 
not thereby abolished, for it has 
already been shown, i. 476, that 
we have nothing to do with any 
‘immaterial matter’; and when 
KAMPH, p. 32, 39, argues in sup- 
port of his view that the stars, 
which are made of szther, are in- 
telligent beings, he forgets that it 
is not the stars themselves that are 
so, but the spirits by whom they 
and their spheres are moved. 
Although, lastly, the Nous is said, 
Eth. x. 7, 1177, b, 34, as “com- 
pared with the multiplicity of the 
other faculties of the soul, to be 
‘of small compass (T@ d-yK@ mikpdy) 
‘but pre-eminent in power and 
value,’ we cannot fairly conclude 
from this metaphorical expres- 
sion that it is held by Aristotle 
to be united to a body. 

‘1 Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, a, 31, 
Aristotle asks: mérepoy évumdpxet 
[nh wuxh] Te owéppart kal Te 

-kuhpat } ot, kal wé0ev ; to which 
he replies (b, 8): Thy pév ovv 
Operrikhy Wuxhy Ta omrépuara Kal 
rd KvhwaTa TH XwpioTa SHAov Sri 


Suvduer ey = Exovra Ger éov, 
evepyeia 8 odk exovra, mply 2 
kabdwrep TX xwpi(dueva TaY KvN- 
parwv €Aket THY Tpodphy Kal more? Td 
Tis To.wvTns Wuxis epyov. With 
regard to the ux aicOnrixh 
and vonrix) he then shows that 
either all their parts must come 
into being for the first time at the 
moment of birth or must all have 
pre-existed, or else that some of 
them do the one, some the other, 
and continues: 8r: uéy rToivuy 
ovx oldvy TE mdcas mpolmdpxew 
gpavepdy éeoTiv ek TaY ToOLOUTwY. 
Scwv yap éoTrw apxav 7 evépyera 
cwuarich, SHAov Bri TabTtas evev 
cdéuatos adtivarov tmdpxew, oiov 
BadiCey tvev modav: Sore kal 
Otipabev eiotévar Gddvaroyv. ode 
yap abras Kal’ airas ciovévar oidy 
te &xwplorovs otcas, ovr’ ev 
gouaTt eictevar’ To yap omépua 
mweplrrwua  pétaBadrdAovons Tis 
tpopjs éorly [and therefore not 
something coming from with- 
out]. Aelrerar 5& [84] Tov vody 
pdvov Otpabey emerorevar Kat Oeiov 
elvat pdvov: ov0ey yap avrov 77 
evepyela KoLvwvel TwMaTiKh evepyera. 
737, a, 7: 7d Be Tis yovas xc. 
see p.6,n.2,sup. De An.i. 4; see 
foll.n. For further discussion of 
the question of the entrance of 
reason into the body, see p. 80, 
supra. 

2 De An. i. 4, 408, b, 18: 6 
de vovs Eouey eyylvecOa ovola tis 
ovoa Kal od POeiperOa. puddAiora 
yap epOeiper’ dv bmd Tis &v TE 
yhpa auavpwoews, viv 8 tows Srep 
éml tov aicOnrnplwy cuuBalver* €i 
yap AdBo. 6 rpecBurns buwa tows}, 
Brera: by Somep kal db véos. ore 
Td yijpas ob TH Thy WuxXhy Tt wemoy- 





PHYSICS 


97 


from this it is the mere potentiality of thought.! And 
since actual thought in the sphere of nature precedes 
the mere potentiality to think, while in the sphere of 
the human mind potentiality necessarily precedes 
actuality,” Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of Reason 
in man—the Actual and the Potential, the Active and 
the Passive :* that which produces everything, and that 


which becomes everything.‘ 


The former alone is sepa- 


rate and distinct from the body—impassible, eternal, 
immortal, absolutely pure and perfect Actuality. Pas- 


Bévat, GAX’ ev & [ =GAAA TE wemor- 
Oévat Tt exeivo ev GH Wuxh eorww), 
Kabdwep év uébais Kat vdrois. Kat 
Td voeiv 5h Kal Td Oewpeiv uapaiverat 
AAou tiwds %ow [inside the body] 
pleipouevov, abrd 5 amabés eoriw 
[the subject of draGés is 7d voody, 
which corresponds to voids above 
and is to be supplied from voeiy] 
. . « 6 8 vods tows Oedrepdy ti 
kal arabes éoruy. iii. 5, 430, a, 22 
(see p. 98, n. 1, infra); Metaph. 
xii. 3, 1070, a, 24 sqq. (see Sec. 
on Immortality, infra). 

' De An. iii. 4,429, a, 21 sqq. 
b. 5 sqq. 30; see i. 199, n. 2, 
supra, where the meaning of this 
statement is further explained. 

? See i. 199, n. 2, supra 

* Aristotle certainly speaks of 
vols madnrixds (see p. 98, n. 1, 
infra) ; on the other hand, he no- 
where uses the expression zonti- 
ds voids (cf. BontTz, Ind. Ar. 491, 
b, 2; WALTER, Die Lehre v. d. 

rakt. Vern. 278 sqq.), perhaps 

creo he wished to avoid the 
ambiguity which might arise out 
of the opposition he elsewhere 
makes between moeiv and mpdrrew 
on the one hand, and Oewpety 
on the other (see i. 182, n. 2, 


VOL. II. 


supra), if the vots momr. were 
taken to be the antithesis of 
vous Vewpntixds (De An ii. 3, 415, 
a, 11, iii. 9, 432, b, 27, iii. 10, 433, 
a, 14), in the same sense as vods 
mpaxtixds (De An. iii. ibid.) must 
be. Butasthe vots rornr. is called 
altiov Kal romrtixdy, as it is said 
mdyta moweiv, and as moimrinds is 
elsewhere constantly used as the 
antithesis of ra@nrixds (Ind. Ar. 
555, b, 16 sqq.), we seem to be 
perfectly justified in speaking 
of the passive and the active 
reason, especially as this seems 
to be already a recognised mode 
of expression in ALEX. De An. 
140 (cf. WALTER, 282). 

* De An. iii. 5 init.: éwed 8 
Somep ev amdon 7H oboe earl v1 
7d wey HAn Exdorw yéver (rodro BE 
b mdyra Suvduer exeiva), Erepoy Bk 
7) altiov Kal womrucdy, T®@ woeiv 
ndyta, olov } réxvn mpos thy bAnv 
mémovOev, avdynn xa éy TH Wx 
imdpxew ravras Tas diaopds. Kal 
tory 6 wey roLodTos vols Te wdvra 
ylvecOat, 6 58 +H wdvra moriv, ds 
eis Tis, olov 7d pas: Tpéroy ydp 
twa Kal 7d bas woe? rad duvduer 
bvTa xpéuara evepyela xpéuara. 


H 


98 


ARISTOTLE 


sive Reason, on the other hand, is born and dies with 
the body, and is a partaker in its states.! | 

If we try, however, to reduce this account to a clear 
and consistent theory, we are met by many questions 
which Aristotle has left unanswered. , 


1 Tbid. where Aristotle con- 
tinues: kal obros 6 vots [6 morn- 
Tiukds| xwpicTos Kal amabhs Kal 
amryhs 1H odoig dv évepye'a [or 
évépyeia]. del yap TYuidrepov. Td 
mowvv Tov TacxovTos Kal 7 a&pxy 
ths tAns.. To 8 adrd eorw H Kat’ 
evépyetav emiothun Te mpdyuare: (cf. 
i. 398,n. 3, supra] 5€ card dbvauy 
xpdvq mporépa ev TG Ev, Baws 5e 
ovde [so TORSTR. reads instead of 
ov] xpdvp* GAA’ odx STE meV vo 
éré 8 ov voet, xwpiodels 8 earl 
pdvoy T0d0’ brep €or) [apart from 
the body it is only what it is 
without admixture of any foreign 
ingredient], kal totro wdvoy aéd- 
yatov Kal didioy, ov pynwovetouer 
8t, bt. TodTo wey amabts, 6 4é 
mwabntiKos vous pOaprds Kal &vev 
Tovrou ov0éy voet. The words at 
the beginning of this passage 
are interpreted by BRENTANO 
(Psychol. d. Ar. 175) and HERT- 
LING (Mat. u. Form, 173) as 
meaning ‘this Nous also is 
separate.’ This is opposed, how- 
ever, both to the grammar and 
to the sense of the passage; in the 
first place, the connection is thus 
broken between this sentence and 
the preceding (we should require 
at least kal,obros 5¢ 6 vows &c.), 
and, secondly, not only is there 
nothing in, the previous discus- 
sion about another kind of Nous 
whichis also xwpiords and arabhs, 
but Aristotle knows of none such, 
the voids ma@nrikds, of which he has 
just been speaking, being of course 
not ara$}s, while the Nous that 


is spoken of, c. 4 (as will be shown 
p. 101, n. 2, infra), is itself the 
active Nous. The words: 7d 8 avrd 
... xpév@ that follow are repeated 
at the beginning of c. 7; but as 
they there awkwardly interrupt 
the connection, TORSTRIK, p. 199, 
is doubtless right in holding that 
they along with the rest of c. 7, 
§ 1 (to rereAecuévoy, 431, a, 7) 
are out of place. On the other 
hand, TORSTRIK (p. 185) cannot 
be right in striking out the 
ovx in the words Gad’ ovbx 
éré wey voet &c. According to his 
reading no intelligible meaning 
can be attached to the remark 
that the Nous at one time thinks, 
at another it ceases to think; 
whereas it becomes quite intelli- 
gibleif wesuppose Aristotle to say: 
‘In the world as a whole merely 
potential knowledge does not pre- 
cede actual knowledge even inthe 
order of time (not to speak of that 
of being); it is not the case (in the 
world as a whole) that the Nous 
[this must in any case be supplied 
as the subject] at onetime thinks, 
at another ceases to think.’ (To 
make this sense more obvious 
a comma might be placed instead 
of a colon before GAA’ ovx &c.) 
Nor is this sense inconsistent with 
Mh Gel voeiv, c. 4, 430, a, 5, as 
these words refer to thought in 
the individual, in which the pas- 
sage before us also recognises the 
distinction between the potential 
and the actual, and therefore 7d 
bh Gel voety, 


SS EEE 


PHYSICS 99 


In the first place, with regard to Active Reason, it 
might appear that this is not only the Divine in man,! but 
that it is identical with the Divine Spirit itself. For while 
it enters each man along with the germ of his physical 
and psychical nature as something individual, yet at the 
same time the terms in which it is described are such as 
apply only to the Universal Spirit. It is at least difficult 
to understand what is left of individuality when we have 
abstracted from it not only all corporeal life, but also 
all active evolution,? all passive states, and with these 
all memory and self-consciousness.’ So far Alexander 
of Aphrodisias had excellent cause to seek for the 
Active Reason in the Divine Spirit rather than in a 
part of the human soul.‘ But this cannot be Aristotle’s 
meaning. For the extramundane Divine Spirit cannot 
be identified with the indwelling principle of Reason 
which passes into the individual at birth and is a part 
of the human soul.’ Yet how we are precisely to 
represent to ourselves this part of our soul, and what 
kind of reality we are to ascribe to it, it is difficult to 
say. Since it is said to enter the body from without,® 








* See the passages cited, p. 96, 
n. 1 and 2, supra, and Eth. x. 7, 
1177, a, 15: fre Octo dy Kad adrd 
[6 vos] etre r.iv ev quiv Oerdraroy, 
b, 30: €f 3) Ociov 5 voids mpds roy 
avOpwmoyr, 

* This can only be where there 
is a transition from the potential 
to the actual; in the active rea- 
son, on the oiher hand, there is 
nothing merely potential, for all 
is pure actuality. 

* That even these belong to 
the sphere of the passive reason 
is expressly stated De An. iii.5(p. 


97,n.1),and proved in the sequel. 

* Cf. Part. iii. a, 712, 4. 

° The distinction between the 
active and the passive reason is 
said (and to this THEMIstT. Die 
An. 89, b, pp. 188 sq. Sp. and 
AMMON. in PHILOP. De An. Q, 3, 
0, also appeal) to reside ev Th Wuxi 
(see ibid. supra); of one Mépioy 
Tis Wuxijs it issaid, De An. iii. 4, 
429, a, 10, 15, that it is arabes ; 
the vous xwpiords is called. De An. 
ii. 2, 413, b, 24, Wuxis yévos 
€repoy &c, 

° See p. 96, n. 1, supra. 


H 2 


100 ARISTOTLE 


it must have existed previously. And this is evidently 
- Aristotle’s view.! Since, moreover, even after it has 
entered the body it stands aloof from it and takes 
no part in its activity,” the independence of its life is 
not compromised by this union, nor is it conditioned in 
any way by the life of the body. But on the other hand, 
whether we look at the matter from our own or from 
Aristotle’s point of view, the individuality which belongs 
to Reason as a part of the human soul appears in this 
way to be sacrificed. For according to Aristotle the 
individual Callias or the individual Socrates is consti- 
tuted only by the union of the universal form of man 
with this particular human body.’ So, in like manner, 
only when Reason enters a human body and employs it 
as its instrument do we have an individual human 
reason. But how when it is united with no body, or 
when in spite of such union it has no material organ 
and is wholly unaffected by the body, it could be the 
reason of this definite individual—how, in other words, 
it could constitute a rational Ego, baffles comprehen- 


1 Inthe passage 736, b, 15 sqq. 
referred to at p. 96 sup., it is said 
with regard to the pux} aicOntuch 
and vontikh: &vayKaioy 5€ rot uh) 
otoas mpérepoy [sc. Tas Wuxas | éyyi- 
verbartdacas.)rdoas mpoimapxovcas, 
4) ras pev ras dé wh, Kal eyylver Oa 
4) év th tAn [therefore in the 
menses| w}) eloeAPodoas ev TO TOU 
&ppevos omépuart, 7) évrav0a [in the 
mother] mév éxeidev [from the 
onépua| edCovoas, ev 5& TG Upper 7) 
Ovpadev eyyivomevas amdoas 7) unde- 
pay } Tas wey Tas 5H. As the 
passage proceeds immediately to 
say (see p. 96,n. 1 , tt wey rolvuy 


ovx oidy Te mdoas moivmdpxe.y, 
gavepdy éorw [since some are 
united to bodily organs], cre ka) 
Ovpatey eiguévat addvaroy—it is 
obvious that according to Ari- 
stotle mpotmdpyew and Odbpadey 
eictévat are inseparably con- 
nected, and that accordingly if 
the latter is true of the Nous and 
of it alone, the former must also 
be true. 

2 Cf. p.94, n.2, p. 96, n. 1, sup. 
(od0ey adrod tH evepyeia Kowwve? 
TWUATIKN EVEpyEra), 


§ Cf, i, 369, n. 5, 6, supra. 





PHYSICS ~ 101 


sion.! 


Aristotle himself says,? indeed, that we do not 


recollest the former existence of active reason, because 
it is the passive reason which renders thought possible, 
and this is perishable;* just as he predicates con- 


' How its connection with 
the body is in this case possible 
at all is equally unintelligible, 
seeing that according to p. 106, 
n. 5, infra, the body is connected 
with the soul itself as its tool. 

* In thewords quoted p. 98, n. 
1, sup., from De An. iii. 5, 430, a, 
23 : od pynuovedouer 5¢ &c. It does 
not matter very much whether 
we understand these words in 
their simplest sense as meaning 
that in the present life we have 
no recollection of the former one, 
or that after death we have no 
recollection of the present life, or 
more generally that the eternal 
life of the active Nous is wholly 
without memory— for the reasons 
why ‘ we donot 1emember’ hold of 
the continuity of consciousness 


- ketween the life which the reason 


lives in union with the passive 
Nous and that which it lives in 
freedom from it both backwards 
and forwards. In the first in- 
stance, however (as is shown by 
Brun, Veb. d. Begr. des vois b. 
Arist. Linz, 1864, p. 12 sq., and 
TRENDELENBURG in loco, who, 
however, afterwards, n. on p. 404, 
2nd ed., changed his view), the 
words certainly mean that in the 
present life we remember no 
former one. This is the meaning 
suggested by the context and 
supported by the present tense of 
the verb. 

5 OD uynuovedouey 5 Sri TOdTO 
Mev Gmabls, 5 5 wabnrinds voids 
Ppeaprds Kal Evev rovrov odOey voi. 
TRENDELENBURG translates the 


latter words, ‘and as the passive 
reason does not think anything 
apart from the active reason.’ 
But it is not easy to see what 
they add to the explanation. If- 
memory belongs to the vovs ma67- 
Tikds Of course, as pOaptds (which 
as the antithesis of &l.ov refers to 
the beginning as wellas the end- 
ing of existence, cf. i. 366, n. 1 
Jin. supra) the latter can have no 
recollection of the time in which 
it did not yet exist, or at the time 
in which it no longer exists; and 
the remark «al &vev &c, is there- 
fore superfluous. If,on the other 
hand. it is the voids 4ra6}s to which 
memory belongs, the failure of 
memory is not explained at all, 
since it is said, not that it cannot 
do without the vots ra@nrixds, but 
that the vovs ra8. cannot do with-: 
out it in the exercise of its activity. 
We must take rotrouv, therefore, as 
meaning the vots maénr. and vagi 
either in an absolute sense, ac- 
cording to a familiar usage in 
Aristotle = ob@tv voe? 6 vody (or 7 
yvxn), no thought is possible, or 
as having the active Nous for its 
subject. The latter is not incon- 
sistent with the previous ody dré 
bev vot &c. (p. 98, n. 1); for 
even there it is admitted that in 
the individual potential know- 
ledge precedes actual, and there- 
fore odx éré wey voe? &C. does not 
apply to individual thought. It 
is of this, however, that we must 
understand Aristotle to speak in 
the words, &vev rodvrov obbety voei, 
which mean, therefore, nothing 


102 ARISTOTLE 


tinuous thought (which he attributes to active reason) 
only of reason in general, and not of reason in any 
individual,’ But where shall we look for that principle 
of reason which in unchangeable, eternal, unfettered 
by the body, and ceaselessly active, if it coincides 
neither with the Divine thought on the one hand, nor 
with the thought of any individual on the other ?. 

_ No less serious are the difficulties that surround the 
doctrine of the passive reason. We understand what 
led Aristotle to distinguish in the first instance a two- 
fold reason in man: he could not overlook the gradual 
evolutions of the spiritual life and ‘the difference be- 
tween the faculty and the activity of Thought; while, 
on the other hand, he was forbidden by the principles 
of his philosophy to think of Pure Reason as in any 
sense material, or at least to predicate of it attributes 
and states which can belong to matter alone. We see, 
also, what in general he meant by the phrase Passive 
Reason: viz. the sum of those faculties of representa- 
tion which go beyond imagination and sensible percep- 
tyon and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which 
has found peace in perfect unity with its object. The 
Passive Reason is that side of Thought which deals 
with the manifold of sense. It has its roots in the life 
of the body, and develops out of sensible experience.? 


more than the statement else- (Gesch. d. Entw. i. 518, cf. 


where made, that the soul cannot 
think without a pdvtacua (cf. p. 
108, n. 2, infra). 

‘ In the words of the passage 
we have been discussing (p. 98, 
n. 1): 4 5€ kard Sivauww xpdvq mpo- 
Tépa ér TE Evi &C. 

In this sense BRANDIS 


Handb. ii. b, 1178) understands 
by ‘passive spirit,’ spirit ‘in its 
connection with representation 
in so far as it borrows the 
material for mediating thought 
from it and sensible perception 
and requires mental pictures,’ or 
‘in so far as it operates as mediat- 


PHYSICS © 103 


But when we go on and try to form a more definite 
conception of this part or faculty of the soul, we find the 
theory full of the most obvious contradictions and 
defects. On the other hand, Passive Reason is iden- 
tified with Nous and the spiritual element in man. 
This Aristotle definitely distinguishes from all the 
faculties of sense-perception, so that it is impossible to 
identify it either, as Trendelenburg ! did, with the unity 
of these, or, as Brentano does,’ with fancy as the seat 
of mental pictures. All these man has in common 
with the beasts, whereas Nous is that which elevates 
| him above them.* And yet, on the other hand, every- 
thing is denied of the Passive Reason as such, which 
elsewhere is regarded as peculiarly characteristic of 
Reason itself. Speaking of Nous quite generally, 
Aristotle: says that it is neither born nor dies; it is 
liable to neither suffering nor change ; it is separate 
from the body and has no bodily organ ; it acts altogether 
independently of the body: it enters it from without ; it 





ing thought.’ Similarly, BreHL, 
UVeb. d. Begr. d. vots b. ARIST. 
(Linz, 1864, Gymn. Progr.), pp. 
16sq. But the difficulties above 
noted are not thus met. 

' Arist. De An. 493 (405): 
‘Qu a sensu inde ad imagina- 
tionem mentem antecesserunt, ad 
res percipiendas menti neces- 
saria; sed ad intellegendas non 
sufficiunt. Omnes illas, que praz- 
cedunt, facultates in unum quasi 
nodum collectas, quatenus ad res 
cogitandas postulantur, voty raén- 
tikwy dictas esse arbitramur.’ 
Similarly, HERTLING, Mat. wu. 
Form, 174, defines vois a0. as ‘the 
cognitive capacity of the sensi- 
tive part.’ 


2 Psychol. d. Ar. 208 sq. 

3’ Upon which see p. 108, n. 2, 
infra. 

‘ Cf. p. 58 sq., p. 61, with 
p- 93 supra. The name itself of 
vovs maénr. is a preliminary ob- 
jection to this explanation, For 
the faculties of sensation and 
presentation Aristotle has the 
fixed terms, afo@nors and oayracla. 
Why, then, should he make useof 
another incomprehensible and 
misleading one without giving 
any indication that it is synony- 
mous with these terms? Nor can 
appeal be made to Zth. vi. 12, 
1143, b, 4, as afo@nots does not 
there mean sense-perception ; cf. 
i. 250, n. 1, supra. 


104 ARISTOTLE 


neither comes into existence with it nor perishes with 
it.’ Yet in the sequel we learn that all this holds in 
truth only of the Active Reason. It alone is bodiless, 
impassible, eternal, imperishable, &c.2 By what right, 
then, Passive Reason can be regarded as Nous, or how 
two natures with characteristics so incompatible—the 
one mutable, the other immutable; the one passive, the 
other impassive; the one mere potentiality, the other 
ceaseless activity—how these two can constitute one 
being, one spiritual personality, passes comprehension. 
Nor do we require to look further than the impossibility 
of harmonising the Aristotelian doctrine of the twofold 
Reason with itself to find an explanation of the wide 


! Cf, p. 938: aq. 

See p. 98. The attempt 
to obviate this difficulty by the 
supposition of a third form of 
vous, asthe ‘receptive understand- 
ing, differing alike from the 
active and the passive reason and 
alluded to De An. iii. 4 (BREN- 
TANO, Psychol. d. Ar, 143, 175, 
204 sq. 208; HERTLING, Mat. wu. 
Form, 170 sq.) cannot be sup- 
ported. Aristotle indeed calls 
vois (De An. iii. 4, 429, a, 15) 
dexrixdy Tod etSovs, but there is 
not a word to indicate that he 
regards this ‘receptive’ reason 
as a third faculty different from 
the active and passive. He is 
speaking in De An. iii. 4 of Nous 
quite generally, as he does al-oin 
identical terms and with the same 
generality in De An. i.4. ii. 1,2; 
Gen. An. ii. 3 (p. 94, n. 2; p. 95, 
n. 1,p.96,n.2,sup.). It is equally 
difficult to obtain any clear con- 
ception of this ‘receptive under- 
standing’ or to find a place for 
it in Aristotle’s doctrine of the 


soul. Nor, indeed, would any- 
thing be gained by such an as- 
sumption. If itis said,in De An. 
iii. 5, that the active Nous alone 
is xwpiords, amabhs, duryhs, &0d- 
varos, aidios, and if the same pre- 
dicates are assigned in c. 4 to 
a different faculty, ie. the ‘re- 
ceptive’ reason (there is no ex- 
press mention, indeed, here of its 
eternity, but this is involved in 
Xwpiords), we have simply a con- 
tradiction in terms. If, on the 
other hand, those predicates are 
first assigned to Nous in general, 
and it is afterwards added that 
they belong only to the higher 
part of it, whereas the other 
statement made about it (that 
it is nothing évepyeia before it 
thinks; see, p. 94, n. 2, supra) is 
true of its lower part, there is at 
least no obvious contradiction in 
the explanation. In this case the 
difficulty arises later, when we 
further ask how are we to con- 
ceive of these two parts in de- 
tail. 





ar tt 








PHYSICS 


105 


divergence of the views of its critics as to its true 


} 1 
meaning. 


Reason realises itself in Thought, which regarded in 


its essence is not the mediate process 


of forming con- 


ceptions by the gradual union of their several parts, but 
is a single immediate apprehension of intelligible reality, 


constituting one indivisible act.” 


' Theophrastus had already 
found difficulties io Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the Nous (cf. 2nd ed. 
pp. 677 sq.) The example of Ari- 
stocles and Alexander of Aphro- 
disias shows (cf. ZELL. pt. iil. a. 
703 sq. 712) how the later Peripate- 
tics differed on the subject. Cf. 
further the citations and expla- 
nations of THEMIST. De An. 89, 
b, 9 sq. and PHILOP. De An. Q. 
2, and sqq. (less satisfactory is 
SimpL. De An. 67,b, f.). In the 
middle ages it was chiefly among 
the Arabian philosophers and the 
Italian followers of Averroés that 
the question was debated. The 
older and the more recent views 
upon the doctrine of the two- 
fold na: ureof the Nous, especially 
(p. 8-29) those of Avicenna, Aver- 
ro’s and Thomas, are fully dis- 
cussed by BRENTANO, ibid. 5 sq. 

2 Asalready shown (i. 203, n.3, 
sup.), Aristotle describes the 
thinking of vodsas a contact of it 
with the object of thought. In this 
way it has unity and especially 
qualitative simplicity, which is 
not, like the unity of space and 
time, again itself divisible ; De An. 
iii. 6 init.: 9 wav obv Tay GdiaipeT ov 
vénois ev Tovros, wept & ovK tort 
Tr) Weddos... 7d 8 adialperov 
erel Bixas, 4) Suvduer 7 évepyela, 
ovOty kwArver voeiy Td adialperor, 
Stay von Td piKos* adialperoy yap 


It deals, not with 


evepyela Kal ev xpdvye adiaiperyp * 
duotws yap 5 xpdvos Siaiperds Kal 
adialperos TE myer, otKouv éorw 
clmeiy ev TG Huloer Th evvoet Exa- 
rép@, od yap cot, by by Siaipeby, 
aad’ } Suvduer [i.e. in every spatial 
quantity, 1f it is presented, not 
successively, but simultaneously 
as a whole, an 4b.alperoy is 
thought, for though divisible it 
is not actually divided]... 7 
Bk wh) Kara woody adiaiperov &AAG 
r@ elder vow ev &diapéere xpsve 
kal adiapérp THs Yuxis. After 
showing further that in the case 
of space and time the indivisible 
quantities like the point are known 
only by antithesis to the divisible, 
and that thisis so also with evil, 
Aristotle continues, 430, b, 24: 
el 3€ Tun ph Sotw evavtioy TAY 
aitiwy [these words, which Tor- 
STRIK also, 193 sqq., endeavours 
to emend by a conjecture which 
is not quite clear, seem ob- 
viously to be most simply 
emended by assuming that rev 
airtwv, for which Cod. 8. gives 
+. evavriwy, hss arisen from 
évayriov by a reader’s error and 
duplication ; for the mp@roy, the 
divine reason, is said also to have 
no évaytiov by reason of its im- 
materiality, Metaph. xii. 10, 1075, 
b, 21, 24], abrd éavrd yweoket 
kal erepyela eorl Kal xwpiordv. 
That this knowledge is immediate 


106 ARISTOTLE 


any combination of conceptions, but with the pure 
conceptions themselves, which are the undemonstrable 
presuppositions of all knowledge. It is, therefore, 
absolutely true and infallible,’ and must be distin- 
guished from mediate apprehension? or knowledge.? Yet 
Aristotle fails to tell us what are the faculties upon 
which its exercise depends and what is its relation to 
these, although we can hardly but suppose that some 
operation of the Active upon the Passive Reason is here 
meant. Similarly Opinion* may be regarded as the 
product of Reason and Perception,’ although here also 


is implied both here and in pas- 
sages such as Anal. Post. i. 3, 
72, b, 18, ii. 9 init. (ray Ti eort 
To mev &ucoa Kal dpxai eiow, & Kal 
elvat Kal tL €orw smoGécOa Set 7 
&AAov tpdmov pavepa woijoa) ; C. 
10, 94, a, 9, where it is added 
that the reason is the faculty 
which has to do with first prin- 
ciples. Cf. i. 245 sqq., i. 197,n.4, 
supra. 

1 See i. 197, n. 4, supra. 

* This mediate knowledge 
was distinguished from vots by 
Plato by the name didvoia or ém- 
orhun (see ZELL. pt.i. 536, 2); 
similarly Arist. De An. i. 4, 408, 
b, 24 sqq. where it is called 
Sidvoww, and ibid. ii. 83, 415, a, 7 
sqq. where it is called Aoyiopds 
and didvo. Usuaily, however, 
Aristotle employs didvom and 
diavoeiobat in a wider sense, for 
thought generally (e.g. Metaph. 
vi. 1, 1026, b, 6; Polit. vii. 2, 
1324, a, 20, c. 3, 1325, b, 20; 
Eth. ii. 1 init.; Poét. 6, 1450, a, 
2, and elsewhere); 7d Aoyiorikdy 
indicates (De An. iii. 9, 432, b, 26) 
likewise the faculty of thought 
in general, although in most 


places (e.g. Eth. vi. 2, 1139, a, 12, 
sqq.; De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 12, b, 
29, c. 11, 434, a, 7) it is the delibe- 
rative faculty, or practical reason 
(see infra). On didvoia, cf. ALEX. 
on Metaph..1012,a, 2; THEMIST. 
De An. 71, b, 0; TRENDELEN- 
BURG, Arist. De An. 272; 
SCHWEGLER, Arist. Metaph. iii. 
183; Bontrz, Arist. Metaph. ii. 
214, and especially Wa1Tz, Arist. 
Org. ii. 298 ; on Aoyiouds BONITZ, 
ibid. 39 sq. 

3 Hth. vi. 3, 1139, b, 31 (after 
explaining the distinguishing 
characteristics of  émiorhun): 
f mev tipa emortin eoriy ekis aro- 
Sexxtixh See further ibid. above 
and of: i: 163). %."3. ¢bes 
further meaning of the word 
when in Anal. Post. i. 3, 72, b, 18, 
33, 88, a, 36, an émorhun avard- 
dexxtos is spoken of, and de- 
fined as wtmdéAnyis ris a&uéoov 
mpotacews (on which see i. 197, 
supra). 

4 On the difference between 
opinion and knowledge, see i. 
163, supra. 

5 On the one hand, 5éta has 
to do, not, like knowledge, with 


PHYSICS 107 


we are without any express statement. Moreover, it 
must be by the operation of Reason that man can recall 
at pleasure his former impressions and recognise them 
as his own.'. To the same source in Reason we must 
refer, lastly, practical wisdom or insight (dpdovnacs) 
and art. These Aristotle distinguishes from know- 
ledge in that they both refer to something that can be 
otherwise than it is; the former having for its object 
an action, the latter a creation.2, He remarks, however, 
at the same time that they both depend upon right 
knowledge, and he singles out wisdom especially as 
one of the intellectual virtues. But that which reveals 
more clearly than anything else the dependence of 
reason upon the lower faculties in Aristotle’s doctrine 








the necessary and immutable, 
bat with 7d évdexduevoy BAdAws 
éxew, it is trdAnbis tis &uécou 
mpordcews Kal uh avayKalas (Anal. 
Post. i. 33, 89, a, 2; cf. Metaph. 
vii. 15, 1039, b, 31; Eth. vi. 3, 
1139, b, 18); the contingent, 
however, can only be known em- 
pirically by perception. On the 
other hand, bréAmis, which in 
reality coincides »n meaning with 
déta (Lith. ibid.; Top. vi. 11, 149, 
8,10; Categ. 7, 8, b. 10; Anal. 
Pri. ii. 21, 66, b, 18, 67, b, 12 
sqq. and elsewh+re; Waltz, 
Arist. Org. i. 6523), is as- 
Signed to vols, and dédta is 
distinguished (De An. iii. 3, 
428, a, 20) from gavracta by the 
remark: ddim mey Ewerat mioris 
(oix eviéxera: yap d0td(ovra ols 
Sone? wh micrevew), Tav 5E Onplwv 
ov0ert imdpxe: mloris, payracia Be 
modAois. Eri mdon pey SdEn axo- 
Aovbe? wloris, ricre: 5é 7d wemeta Gan, 
medot S& Adyos* tay Be Onplov 


éviows pavtacia pev imdpxer, Adyos 
5° ob. 

' See p. 74, n. 1, supra. 

* Eth. vi. 4, 1140, a, 16: 
érel 5¢ wolnois Kal mpagis Erepor, 
avdyKn Thy Téxvny mworhoews GAR’ 
ov mpdtews elvax, Thus téxvn is 
defined (£th. vi. 4) €&s pera 
Adyou GAnPoiis mwointikh, podynors 
(ibid. and c. 5, 1140, a, 3, b, 4) 
efis GAnO}s mera Adyou mpaxTiKh 
mepl 7a GvOpémp a&yabd Kal KaKd. 
On the former see further i. 208, 
n. 1, supra; on the latter th. 
vi. 7 sq., c. 11, 1143, a, 8, c. 13, 
1143, b, 20, vi. 1152, a, 8; Polit. 
iii. 4, 1277, a, 14, b, 25; and on 
moinots and mpaéis i, 183,n.1, supra. 
We shall return to both in discuss- 
ing the Ethics. 

% See preced. n. and Rhet. i. 
9, 1366, b. 20: pdynois 8 early 
aper? Siavolas, nad” hy eb BovAcd- 
ec0a: Sivavrat mepi ayabay Kal 
Kakav Tov cipnu€vwy eis eddat- 
boviay. 


108 ARISTOTLE 


is his view of the gradual evolution of Knowledge out 
of Perception and Experience.! He remarks, also, that 
all thoughts are necessarily accompanied by an inner 
representation or imaginative picture, whose service to 
Thought is similar to that of the drawn figure to the 
mathematician. And for this he finds a reason in the 
inseparable union of insensible Forms with sensible 
Things.? This complete interdependence of reason and 
sense, however, only makes all the more palpable the 
gaps which Aristotle’s doctrine of Nous leaves between 
the two. 

The same is true also of the practical activity of 
Reason in the sphere of the Will. Even in the lower 
irrational animals Desire springs from sensation, for 
wherever there is sensation there is pleasure and pain, 
and with these comes Desire, which is indeed nothing 
else than the effort after what is pleasant.4 Sensation 
announces to us in the first place only the existence of 
an object, and towards this we place ourselves by 
the feelings of pleasure and pain in definite attitudes 


of acceptance or refusal. We feel it to be good or bad, 


1 See i. 205, supra. 

7 De An. iii. 8; see also 
thid. c. 7, 431, a, 14: 7H 88 
Siavontixh ux Ta hayvtdopara 
oiov aic@huara bmdpyer . . . dud 
ovdémore voet &vev pavTadocuaros 7 
Woxh. b, 2: Ta wey ody ef8n 7d 
vonrinyy évy rots payvtdcuact voe. 
De Mem. 1, 419, b, 30: érel 8é 

. vost ovK torw &vev maytde- 
Matos’ ocupBalver yap Td adtd dos 
€v TS voeiv bmwep Ka ev Ta Siaypa- 
Pel Exel Te yap ovOev mporxpeuevor 
T@ 7 wooby wpiouévoy ecivar Td 
Tprydvou, Suws ypdpouey dpioucvoy 


kara Tb wordy’ Kal 6 voev dcadbtws, 
Kay wh moody voh, riBerar mpd 
Ompdrav moody, voetd ovx § mocdy. 
ay 8 4 pats } Tey mocGy, adpioroy 
Se, ridera uty moody a&picuévor, 
voet 8 4) moody udvov. 

8 SCHRADER, Arist. de Volun- 
tate Doctrina, Brandenb. 1847. 
(Gymn. Progr.); WALTER, Die 
Lehre v. a. prakt. Vernunft in da. 
griech. Phil. 1874. 

* De An, ti. 9, 418, b,-23, 8; 
414, b, 4; De Somno, 1, 454, b, 
29; Purt. An. ii. 17, 661, a, 6; 
cf. p. 22, n. 1, supra. 








PHYSICS 109 


and there arises in us in consequence longing or abhor- 


rence—in a word, a Desire.! 


The ultimate ground of 


this desire lies in ‘the practical good,’ 7.e. in that of 
which the possession or non-possession depends upon 


our own action. 


The thought of this good sets the 


appetitive part of the soul in motion,’ which in turn 
through the organs of the body moves the living 


creature.* 


1 De An. iii. 7, 431, a. 8: 7d 
bev odv aigOdverOat Suotoy TE pavat 
udvov Kal voeiv* bray Se Hdd 7 
Aurnpdy, olov katapaca } arogaca, 
Sidker  pevyer’ [cf. Hth. vi. 2, 
1129, a, 21: ore 8, wep ev 
diavola Karddamis Kal amrdpacis, 
roit év dpéter Siwkis Kal puyn. | 
Kal ott Td Hder0a Kal Avmeicbau 
Td évepyeivy TH cicOntiKy perdryte 
mpos Td Gyabdy 3) Kakdy, 7 Tol1atTa. 
kal  puyh 5& Kal 7H dpetis TotTo 
[v. l. 7d adrd] H Kar’ évépyeiay, 
Kal ovx Erepov Td dpexrixdy Kal 
evatindy, ot’ GAALAaY obTE TOU 
ais@nrixov* GAA Td elvat BAAO. 

* All desire, therefore, pre- 
supposes a presentation, although 
the latter must by no means be 
mistaken for desire. Dr An. iii. 
10, 433, a, 9: paiveras 5é ye Sto 
TavTa KivovyTa, i) dpetis 7 voiis, ef 
Tis Thy pavraciay Tribe n ws vdnely 
Tia’ ®OAAG ap mapa Thy ém- 
ott puny akodovOoict Tais pavtacias 
kal ey Tois GAAvIs (wots ov voters 
ode Aoyiouds Cori, GAAA dayTacia 

. bore evAdyws tadra dv a ve- 
Tat Ta KivovyTa, vpetis Kal didvore 
mpaxrich ... kal h gavtac’a Be 
bray «wh, ov Kiet Gvev dp: tews. 
b, 27: 9 dpexrimdy 1d (Gor, radTn 
airod §=xwntikdy* dpexrindvy 5e 
obk avev pavracias* pavtacia 5+ 
maga } Aoyiotinh } aicOnrixn’ 
[See p. 73, n, 2, supra.) tadbrns 


The inner process by which desire arises 


bev ody Kal Ta BAAa (Ga mere xet. 
(Cf. c. 11, 434, a, 5.) Phantasy is 
thus (as SCHRADER, p. 8 sq. and 
BRENTANO, Psychol. d. Ar. 161, 
also remark) the link which con- 
nects our thoughts with the de- 
sires and ifmpulses which spring 
from them. Of the process, how- 
ever, by which thought thus 
passes into desire Aristotle gives 
no further analysis. 

3 De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 27: 
Gt Kivel wey Td dpextdy [vs Was 
previously proved, 1. 14 aq | 
GAAG TOUT’ éatly } Td ayabby fh + 
gdawduevoy Gyabdv. ov wav 8, 
GAAG TH mpaKxTdy ayabdy. mpaxrdy 
5° dort 1d evdexduevoy Kal &AAasS 
éxew. Sri uty oby H To.adTn diva- 
mus Kivel THs WuxXIs 7 Kadovmervn 
vpetis, avepdy ... ewel 8° earl 
Tp'a, tv wey Td Kwodv, Sebreooy 5° 
@® kivel, tplrov Td Kwodmevoy* td 
dé Kivody Sirrdy, Td wey axlynroy, Td 
5é Kivoty Kad xwovpevor [cf. i. 389, 
supra). For. be 7d wey axlyntoy 7d 
mpaxtoy ayabdy, Td 5& Kivodv Kal 
kivovmevoy To dpertikdhy (Kiveirat 
yap Td dpeyduevoy h dpéyerat, Kal 7) 
tpetis xlynals tis éorw [as TREN- 
DELENBURG rightly reads] { 
evépyeia) [v. l. } ev —TorstR. 
conjectures % évepyeia, but this is 
unnecessary ], Td 5é xiwvotuevoy 7d 
(Gov > @ 5& Kwel dpydvw  dpetis, 
dn Tovro cwuarnsy éotrw. We 


110 ARISTOTLE 


Aristotle represents as a syllogistic conclusion, inas- 
much as in each action a given case is brought under a 
general rule.’ In order properly to understand how 
bodily movements spring from will and desire we must 
recollect that all changes of inner feeling involve a 
corresponding change in the state of the body.? This 
is more fully developed in the treatise on the Motion of 
Ammals. The process by which will follows upon the 
presentation of the object, is, we are told, a kind ot 
inference. The major premiss is the conception of a 
general end; the minor premiss is an actual instance 
coming under the general conception; while the con- 
clusion is the action which issues from the subsumption 


of the second under the first.? 


shall recur to this at a later 
point. A good commentary on 
the passage before us is fur- 
nished* by De Motu An. 6, 700, 
b, 15 sqq., which is probably 
modelled upon it. 

' Hth. vi. 5, 1147, a, 25: F 
pev yop Kabddov ddta 4 8 érépa 
mepl tay Kad’ Exaord éoriv, ay 
atcOnois 75 Kupla - [Similarly De 
An, ili. 4, 434, a, 17.] Stay 8¢ ula 
yevntar €& abrtay, avdyen 7d ovp- 
TepavOey évIa mey pdvar Thy Wuxhy, 
év 5€ Tals moinrikais mparrety evs, 
oiov, ei mavtds ‘yAuKéos yeverau 
Set, TouTl 5& yAuKd, ds EY TL TOY 
Kal’ Exactov, aydykn Tov Suyduevov 
kal uy Kwdvduevoy &ua Todto Kal 
mpdtrew, c. 13, 1144, a, 31: of 
yap ovddoyiouol Tey TPAkT@v 
apxiv €xovrés ciow, émeidh rodvde 
Td TéAos Kal Td &piorov. Cf. c. 12, 
1143, b, 3 (see i. 197, n. 4, supra), 
where a ‘minor premiss’ is 
spoken of in reference to action. 

* De An. i. 1, 403, a, 16: Zoue 


Usually, however, the 


Se nal Ta Tis Wuyis wdOn wdvra. 
elvat weTa THuaros, Ouuds, TpaoTns, 
pdBos, @rcos, Odpoos, ert yapd Kal 
Td pirely te Kal piceiv: Gua yap 
TovTos méoxer Ti Td cua. This 
is seen in the fact that according 
to the physical state torcible im- 
pressions at one time produce 
nv effect; at another, light im- 
pressions produce a deep effect. 
€rt 5€ TotTo maGAAov pavepdv’ und- 
evds yap poBepod cupBalvoryros ev 
Tois MAeoL yivoyTat Tots TOD poBov- 
#évov [in consequence of physical 
states}. ef & oftws Eye, SHAov 
Ott TX whOn Adyou Evvadoi eiow. 
Gore oi bpor To1otra oiov rd dp- 
y (era KiYnois tis tod roiovdi 
odépmatos 7) uépous 7) Suvduews brd 
Tovde Evexa Tovde. Cf. Ath. ibid. 
1147, a, 15, and what is said, p. 
75, n. 2, on pleasure and pain as 
events in the aig@nrich weodrns. 

8’ Mot. An. 7, 701, a, 7: mwas 
de vody bre wéev mpdrret, bre 8’ od 
mparre:, Kat Kiwveira, dre 8’ od 





PHYSICS 


111 


syllogism assumes a simpler form by the omission of 
the obvious minor premiss;! while, on the other hand, 
the usurpation of the place of the major premiss by the 
demands of desire, in cases when we act without con- 


sideration, constitutes rashness.? 


The power of the 


will, however, to move the organs of our body is here 
explained as an effect of the heat and cold, which are 
caused by the feelings of pleasure and pain; these in 
turn, by the expansion or contraction of particular parts, 
produce certain changes and movements in the body.’ 


Kweira; foie mwapawAyolws oup- 
Balvew Kal mepl trav akwhtov 
diavoouvmévois Kal ovdAdoyCouévois. 
GAA’? éxel pty Oedpnua 7d Tédos 
.. « evTavda 8 €x trav Sv0 mpo- 
Tacewy To cuumépacua ylvera 7H 
mpakis, olov bray vénon bri mavtl 
Badioréov avOpamre, abros 3° tvOpw- 
mos, Badifer evOéws. After illus- 
trating this by further examples, 
Aristotle proceeds, 1. 23: ai 8é 
mpotdcets ai mointixal 51a Sto eidav 
ylvovrat, Sid TE TOD Gyalod Kal did 
tov duvarov [the latter perhaps 
with reference to £th, iii. 5, 
1112, b, 24 sqq. ]. 

1 Thid. 1. 25: &owep 5& ray 
épwravrwy Eviot, oitw Thy érépay 
mpéracw THY BhAnv o0v8’ fh Sidvora 
epioraca oKome? ovdév~* oloy ei Td 
B2diCew ayabdy avOpdre, bri abrds 
tvOpwros, od« évdiarplBet. 

2 L. 28: 81d nal boa wh Aoyio- 
duevor mpdrromev, Tax) mpdrrouer. 
bray yap evepyhon i} TH aicOhoe 
mpos T) 0b Evexa }) TH pavracia }) 
TE v@, oF dpéyeras evOds moe’: 
avr’ epwrhcews yap 2} vohrews 7 
THs opékews ylverar evépyeia. 
moréov mot, H emiBuula A€yer* Todi 
bt wordy 7 alcOnois elmev 4 7 
pavracta it) 5 vots. ecdOds wives, 

% Ibid. 701, b, 1: Just as 


automata, owing to the mechan- 
ical adjustment of the cylinders, 
are set in motion by a slight 
touch, so with living beings, in 
whom the bones take the place 
of wood and iron, the sinews 
that of the cylinders (cf. also the 
passage quoted p. 53, n. 2, from 
Gen, An. ii. 5). The impulse, 
however, in their case is given 
aitavouévwy tay poplwy 5:& Oepud- 
TnTa Kal mdAW cvoTEAAOMLEVwY Bid 
Wikw Kal dAAowvpevwy. GAAOLOdeL 
8’ ai aicOjoets Kal af pavraciat Kad 
ai Evvoi, ai wey yap aicOhoes 
e0ds bmdpxovoew aAAoWoes TiVes 
ovoat, ) 5& pavtacia Kal vdnots 
Thy Tov mpayudtwv Exover Sivamuy * 
tpdmov yap tia Td eldos Td voov- 
bevov Td TOU BEepuod 2) Wuxpod } Hdeds 
i) boBepod TowwvToy Tuyxdver dy oldy 
mep kal Ta&v mpayudtwy Exacror, 
51d Kal pirrover Kal poBotvra 
vol cavres wdvoy, tadra bt wdyra 
nd9n Kal addAowoes eicly. &dAot- 
ounévav 8° ev Te odpate Td py 
heim Ta 8 eAdrrw ylverar. Sri 
5é pixpa petaBorAh yevoueyvn ev 
apxn meydAas Kal mwoAAds ore? 
Siapopas Uwobev, ode UdnAov; a 
slight movement of the helm 
produces a great effect upon the 
bow of a ship, so a small change 


112 ARISTOTLE 


Under Will also Aristotle—who, like Plato, does not 
regard Emotion as a peculiar form of activity—classes 
all that we should rather place under the latter head. 
Love, for example, he refers to @uuds, by which he 
understands, not only spirit, but also heart.! 

As Aristotle proceeds, however, Desire is found to 
bear a different character according as it springs from 
rational representation or not. Granted that it is 
always the desirable that causes desire in us, yet the 
desirable may be either a real or merely an apparent 
good,’ and so the desire itself may either spring from 


rational reflection or be irrational].? 


in the heart causes flushing, pallor, 
trembling, &c. over the whole 
body. WU. 8: apxh pev odr, 
dowep elpntai, Tis Kivhoews Td ev 
TS mpaxt@e Siwxtdy Kal gpeverdv’ 
ef avayKns 5 akodovbe? 7h vonoe: Kad 
Ti pavtacia avtay Cepudtns kal 
Wukis. 7d wey yap Aurnpdy heuKrody, 
To 8’ nbd Siwerdr, . . . ors BE Ta 
Avrnpa Kal da mdvta oxeddy 
Meta Wteds Tivos Kal Bepudrytos. 
So with fear, fright, sexual 
pleasure, &c, pvijuat dé xa) éAmides, 
oiov eidwAos xpmuevor Tois ToL0v- 
Tols, 6TE wey Arrov dré SE waAAov 
aitiat Tay a’rav eicly, And since 
the inward parts from which the 
motion of the limbs proceeds 
are so arranged that these changes 
take place very easily in them, 
the motions follow our thoughts 
instantaneously. ra pév yap dpya- 
vikd wepn [accusative] mapackevder 
emitndelws Ta mdOn, 4 8’ Ypekis Ta 
min, thy 8 vpekw 4h havytacta: 
abrn d& yiverat 7) 31d vohoews } 31’ 
ais@joews. tua dé Kal raxd bid Td 
mowntikoy Kal madntindy Tov ™pos 
GAAYAG. eivat Thy piow, 


To the latter class 


1 Polit. vii. 7, 1827, b, 40: 6 
Ouuds eori 6 moray Td pidnricdy 
airn yap or h rhs Wuxhs Sbvams 
h piroduev. onuctov 5€+ mpds yap 
Tovs guvnbes kal gidrous & Ouuds 
alperas uiArov, }) mpds rods &yvaras, 
oArywpeto bat voutoas. Cf. foll pages. 

* De An. iii. 10; see i. 109, n. 
3, supra. 

* De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 9 (see 
1.109,n.2, sup.) ; 1.22: vov 86 wey 
vous ov patverat kivav tive dpétews ° 
n yap BovrAnois Bpekis: Srav Be 
kata Toy AoyioMdy KiVFTAL, Kal KaTd 
Bovanow kwweira. 4 8 vpetis kuvel 
mapa Tov Aoyioudy. 7 yap émOuuta 
dpetis tis eoriv. vods pev ody mas 
op0ds* bpekis BE Kai davracla Kad 
6p} Kat ove dp0h. b, 5: ewe 8 
opétes ylvovra: evavrlar &AAHAMS, 
TovTo 3&€ oupBalver Stay 5 Adyos 
kal ) érOup'a évayrian Sor, ylverat 
8 év trois xpdvov atcOnow exovow 
(6 pev yap vods Sie 7rd péArov 
avOérKew Kerever, 8° eribvula did 
Td Hon)... eer pev-tv by ely rd 
kivodv, Td dpektixdy, 7 dpexrixdy, 

. . apiOug 5 wAclw Ta KivodyTa 


Rhet. i. 11, 1870, a, 18: ray BE 





PHYSICS 113 


belong anger and the appetite for sensual gratification.! 
In so far as reason goes to constitute the conception of 
the end and reacts upon the desire it is called Practical 


or Deliberative Reason.’ 


emiOuuidy ai pev BAdovol eioww ai Se 
feta Adyov. Sensual desires are 
GAoyo, meta Adyou 5é baa ex Tod 
meiOjva ériOvuovow. Polit. iii. 
4, 1277, a, 6: Wuxh ee Adyou Kal 
dpétews. Ibid, vii. 15, 1334, b, 
18: Tis Wuxis dpGuev 5v0 wépn, 7d 
Te tAoyoy Kal Td Adyov Exov, Kai 
Tas ekeis Tas ToUTwy Bio Toy apib- 
mov, ay Td wey eorw dpekis TO Be 
vous. Cf. foll. note. 
! Following Plato, Aristotle 
often opposes these two forms of 
petis GAoyos to one another; 
dthet.i. 10 (see p. 114, n. 3, infra). 
De An. ii. 3, 414, b, 2: dpekis per 
yap ériuula cal Oupds Kal BovAnois 
(émOuula is then detined as dpegis 
Tov ndéos) ; iii. 9, 432, b, 5: & re 
TT dAoyiotK@e yap 7H BovaAnais 
vyivera, kal ev TE GAdy@ H emiupula 
kal 6 @uuds. Hth. iii. 4,1111,b, 10: 
while mpoalpeois is neither émidv- 
ula nor @vpds, since both the latter 
belong also to irrational beings, 
but the former does not. Polit. vii. 
15 (see p. 114,n. 3, infra), cf. Mot. 
An. 6, 700, b, 22, c. 7, 701, a, 32 ; 
Eth. Eud. ii. 7, 1223, a, 26; I. 
Mor. i. 12, 1187, b, 36. In the 
Topies (ii. 7, 113, a, 35 sq., iv. 5, 
126, a, 8, v. 1, 129, a, 10) the 
Platonic division of the Aoyic- 
Tidy, Oupoedés and émibuuntindy is 
employed as one which is gener- 
ally recognised, and Zth. vii. 7, 
1149, a, 24 follows Plato in the 
remark (Ph. d.Gr.i. 714) that it is 
less disgraceful to be unable to 
rule @uuds than the desires: fo:xKe 
yap 5 Oupuds axovew péy ti TOD 
Adyou, wapaxovey Sé; it yields to 


VOL. Il. 


Desire which is guided by 


the first impulse to tiywwpla given 
by the reason without awaiting 
its fuller commands: émduula, on 
the other hand, makes for plea- 
sure the moment that Adyos or 
atc@nois declares anything to be 
pleasant. Nevertheless in the 
stricter psychological discussion, 
De An. iii. 9, 432, a, 18 sqq., 
Aristotle rejects the view that the 
Aoyiotixdy, Ovmimdy and émibupn- 
T.ov are the three parts of thesoul 
which produce motions, partly 
because the distinction between . 
them is less than, eg., that 
between the Operrixdy and aicén- 
TiKobv, and partly because the 
dpexrixdy canuot thus be divided 
and the soul made to consist of 
three separate parts.—Aristotle 
gives no more accurate definition 
of @uuds ; even P. Meyer’s minute 
discussion of the passages that 
bear upon it (‘O @upds ap. Arist. 
Platonemque, Bonn, 1876) arrives 
at conclusions as unsatisfactory 
as the shorter one by Walter, 
ibid. 199 sqq. on the customary 
meaning of the word. According 
to this, it indicates as a rule 
the passions which prompt to the 
avoidance or retaliation of in- 
juries. Nevertheless the tenderer 
emotions are also assigned to it; 
cf, p. 112, n. 1. 

* De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 14: 
vous 5é [sc. kwntixdy] 6 Evexd tov 
Aoy:Céuevos wal 6 mpaxtinds* Sia- 
pépe 58 rod Oewpnrixod TE rérEKL, 
kal % bpetis Everd Tov maga’ ob yap 
H dpetis, airy apxh Tod mpaxtixov 
vod’ 7d 3° Exxarov apxh Tis mpd- 

I 


114 ARISTOTLE 


reason Aristotle, with Plato,’ calls Will in the nar- 
rower sense of the word,” appropriating the name Desire 
to its irrational exercise. ‘The latter stands in a two- 
fold relation to reason. On the one hand, it is 
intended to submit to it, and by this obedience to 
obtain a share in it. On the other hand, being in its 
own nature irrational it resists the demands of reason, 
and often overpowers them.‘ Between these two kinds 
of impulse stands man with his Free Will; for that we 


tews. bate ebAdyws tadra dvo gal- 
yeTat T& KivodyTa, bpekis Kal Sidvora 
mpaxtixy. See further, p. 109,n. 5, 
sup. Cf.c. 9, 432, b, 27. Hth. vi. 2, 
1139, a, 6: broKelcOw Sto Ta Ad-yor 
Zxovra, tv piv @ Oewpotmer Ta 
To.tTa Tav ivtwy, bowv ai apxat 
uh evdéxovTa BAAws Exe, Ev SE 
& Ta evdexducva’ mpds yap Ta TE 
yéver Erepa Kal TaY THS WuxiIs 
poptwy Erepoy Te yéver TH Mpos 
éxdrepov mepukds... Aeyéodw Be 
ToUTwY TO wey emLoTHMoViKdY Td BE 
Aoyotikdy. Td yap BovacverOat Kal 
AoylCecOar TaiTdy, ovOels Se Bov- 
Acverar mepl TaY wn evdexouevwv 
-&Adws Exew. L. 26: abrn wey ody 
h Sidvow. Kal ) GAGOELa mpakTiKh, 
Tis 5& CewpnTikjs Siavoias Kad wi) 
TpakTiKhs unde montis Td ed Kal 
Kaka@s TaAnOés éoTt Kal wevdos° 
TovTo yap éo71 mayTds SiavontiKkod 
oryov, Tov dt mpaxtiKod Kad diavon- 
TiKOD 7 GAGOEa Swordyws Exovea 
Th dpéker 7H OpbH. L. 35: Sidvora 
5° avth obey Kuvel, GAN’ H Everd Tov 
kal mpaxtixn. Ibid. c. 12, 1143, b, 
1; seep. 197,n.4, supra. Polit.vii. 
14, 1333, a, 24: Sujpyral re Six 
[7d Adyov exov], Kad’ bv mep eid- 
Oayev tpdmov Siopelv’ 6 ey yap 
mpaktinds €or Adyos 6 SE OewpnTikds. 
Cf. p. 106, n. 2,sup. For a closer 
view of the practical reason and 
the activity which proceeds from 


it see ch. xii. part 2, infra. 

1 Ph.d. Gr. i. p. 505. 

2 «Practical reason’ itself must 
not be mistaken for ‘ will,’ which, 
to Aristotle, is essentially a desire; 
the former is merely thought in 
relation to action. 

3 De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 22 
sqq. (see p. 112, n.3, swp7a), and c. 
11, 434, a, 12 (see foll. n.), where 
Bovanois is opposed to Zdpeéis, 
Rhet. i. 10, 1369, a, 2: %ort 8’ H 
bev BovdAnois Gyabod bpekts (ov0els 
yap BovAeta GAA’ 7) Srav oinOf 
elvar ayabdv) wAoyo: 8 dpékers Opyh 
Kal ériduuia. Hth. v. 11, 1136, b, 
7: ovre yap BotAeTar obels O 4:2) 
oferat eivat omovdaioy, 8 Te &kpatis 
ovx & ofeTa Seiv mpdrrew mpdrret. 
See further, p. 113, n. 1. Cf. 
PLATO’s statements, Fh. d. Gr.i. p. 
505, and p.719, 3. At other times 
the word has a wider meaning, as 
Polit. vii. 15, 1334, b, 22 (Oupds yap 
kal BovaAnots ér1 5é emiOupia Kal yevo- 
pévois evOds Snapxet Tis wadlots). 
In th. iii. 6, both meanings 
are concerned, where to the ques- 
tion whether BovAnors has refer- 
ence to the. good or to the ap- 
parently good, the reply is given 
that per se, and in a virtuous 
man, it is to the former alone; in 
a bad man, to the latter. 

4 Eth. i. 13, 1102, b, 18: we 


i i i i ti i il i ii ee iil 





PHYSICS 


115 


are the authors of our own actions, and that it lies in 


our own power to be good 


must distinguish in the soul a 
rational and an irrational part. 
The latter, however, is of two 
kinds. The one of its con- 
stituent parts, the nutritive soul, 
has nothing to do with action; 
Zoe SE Kal BAAN Tis dots Tis 
Wuxiis GAroyos elvat, peréxovoa 
éevtot ty Adyov. Both in the 
temperate and the intemperate 
man, reason operates on the one 
hand; ¢alvera: 8 éy abrots Kal 
HAAo Tt mapa Tov Adyoy mepuxds, 
& udxeral re Kad dytitelver TH 
Ady. Grexvas yap Kabdrep ra 
mapareAuméva TOU oduatos pdpia 
eis Ta Setia mpoaipounévwy Kivjoat 
Tovvayriov eis Ta dpiorepd mapa- 
péperat, Kal em ris Wuxis: én 
tavavtia yap ai dpual ray axparav 

_ kal év tH Wuxi vouordorv 
elval Ti mapa Tov Adyor, évayriovpe- 
voy tovTw kal dytiBaivoy . . . 
Adyou 5é xalrodro palvera ueréxesy, 
domep elrouev’ weidapxe? yoo To 
Ady Td TOU eyKparois ... palverat 
5h Kal td BAroyoy Birrdv. 7d uly 
yap putixdy oddauds Kowwyel Adyou, 
708’ émibuunrticdy Kal bAws dpexricdy 
meTexet Tws, } KathKody dot adrod 
kal meiOapxucdy . . . 671 dé weideral 
mws tro Adyou Td kAoyoy, unvies 
Kal} vov0érnots Kal waca éxitlunals 
T€ Kal mapdxAnots. ef 5& xph Kai 
TovTo dvar Adyoy eFxew, dirrdv 
fora: wal rd Adyov Exov, Td wy 
kupiws Kal évy aitg, 7d 3° Somep 
marpos dxovotixoy tt. Polit. vii 
14, 1333, a, 16: dufpnrar & v0 
Képn Tis Wuxis, Gv 7d wey exe 
Adyov Kal” abtd, Td 3 ob« Exer uty 
Kad’ abtd, Adyw 8 braxovew duvd- 
Mevov, De An.iii. 11, 434, a, 12: 
vind 8 évlore [7 “pestis kal Kwet 
thy BovAnow: drt 3 éxelvn ravrny, 


“h Kaxla, 


or bad,' is Aristotle’s firm 


donep apaipa [v. 1, -av] h dpetis thy 
dpetwv, Stay axpacla-yévnra. pio 
dé del 7 kvw apxixwrépa Kal Kuivei, 
Gore tpeis popas dn kweioOas. 
The various attempts made to 
explain and amend the last 
passage by TRENDELENBURG and 
TORSTRIK, in loco, BRENTANO, 
Psychol. d. Ar. 111 sq., and the 
Greek commentators (discussed 
in Tren.), it is the more justifiable 
here to omit as the thought ex- 
pressed isclearenough. Depart- 
ing from previous editions, Zeller 
would now suggest :...dré 8’ éxelyn 
TavTny, donep ) &vw opaipa Thy 
Karw, dre 8 Hdpetis . . . yévnra 
[ptoe ... Kwet], bore, &c. Ari- 
stotle’s doctrine differs from that 
of Plato as presented Ph. d. Gr. i. 
713 sq., only in this, that in place 
of the Platonic @vyss we have 
here the appetites as a whole. 

' Eth. iii. 7, 1113, b, 6: 颒 
huiv 5& Kal h dperh, duoiws 5 Kal 
év ols yap ep’ huiv 7d 
mpdrrew, kal rd wh mpdrrew, Kal 
év ols 7d wh, Kad 7d vals Sor’ ef rd 
mpdtrew Kaddv by éd’ tiv éort, 
kal 7d wh mpdrrew ep’ quiv Fora 
ainxpoy dv, Kal ef 7d wh mpdrrew 
kaddy by ep’ juiv, kal rd mpdrrew 
ainsxpoy by ep’ tyuiv. €i eq’ jpiv 
Ta Kaka mpdrrew kal rd aicxpa, 
duolws 5€ Kai Td wh mpdrrew, TovTO 
5° iv 7d ayadots Kal Kaxots elva, 
ep’ juiv &pa Td emencéor kal pavaAors 
elvat . . . } Tots ye viv eipnuévors 
dupicBnrnréov, Kal toy kvOpwrov 
ov paréov apxny elvat ovdé yervnrhy 
tav npdtewy, bowep kal réxvwr ; 
ei 5 ravra [if he is author.of his 
own actions] galvera: nal wh exo- 
bev eis GAAas dpxas dvayaryeiv mapa 
Tas ép’ iyiv, av Kal ai dpyad év 


12 


116 ARISTOTLE 


conviction, which he supports by the recognised volun- 
tariness of virtue,! and by the moral responsibility 
which is presupposed in legislation and in the judgment 
universally passed in rewardsand punishments, praise and 
blame, exhortation and warning.” In the case of settled 
moral states, it is true that he believes it to be partly 
otherwise. These in their beginnings, indeed, depend 
upon ourselves; but when we have once become good 
or bad it is just as little in our power not to be so, as 
when we are sick to be well.’ In like manner he admits 
that when the will has once acquired a definite bent, the 
external action necessarily follows.4 But when it is 
said that all desire what seems good to them, and that 
they are not responsible for this seeming, Aristotle 
refuses to admit it, since even the disposition which 
determines our moral judgments is our own creation.° 
Nor does he regard with more favour the attempt to 
prove from the nature of the disjunctive judgment the 


huiv Kal avra ed’ nuiv Kal Exovora, 
c. 5, 1112, b, 31: foe 5%, xabd- 
mep elpnrat, &vOpwmos elvar apxn 
Tav wodtewv, and elsewhere. On 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the free- 
dom of the will, see SCHRADER, 
ibid. ; TRENDELENBURG, Histor. 
Beitr. ii. 149 sqq. 

1 Aristotle frequently makes 
use of this argument, accusing 
the dictum of Socrates and Epi- 
charmus, ov@els Exay movnpds 008 
&xwv udkap(on which see Ph. d. Gr. 
i. 462, 5, iii. b, 119, 2, cf. 719, 3), 
of the inconsistency of declaring 
good to be voluntary, evil in- 
voluntary ; Eth. iii. 7, 1113, b, 
14, 1114, b, 12 sqq. 

2 Eth. ihid. 1113, b, 21, 1114, 
a, 31, where this is fully discussed 


and the question investigated 
how far and in what cases we 
are irresponsible for ignorance or 
mental and bodily defects, and 
how far, on the other hand, we 
are responsible for them as in 
themselves culpable. 

* Eth. WH. T,' 8, 1114, a, 12 
sqq., b, 30, cf. v. 18, 1137, a, 4, 
17: particular just and unjust 
actions are voluntary and easy, 
but 7d @8) @xovras ravra moleiy 
ovre pddioy ovr’ én’ adrois. 

4 Metaph. ix. 5, see i. 385, n. 2, 
supra. 

5 Tbid. iii. 7, 1114, a, 31 sqq. 
The question how far it is possible 
consciously to commit a mistake 
is more fully discussed in the 
Ethics. See infra. 





PHYSICS 


117 


logical impossibility of a contingent result.' On the 
contrary, he regards voluntariness as an essential condi- 
tion of all action that is the subject of moral judg- 
ment ;? and if this does not exhaust the conception of. 
volition (for Aristotle calls the actions of children and 
even of animals voluntary),’ at least without volun- 


tariness no volition is possible. 


If all that is voluntary 


is not also intentional, yet all that is intentional must 


1 Seei. 230, n.4, supra. It has 
already been there shown that 
Aristotle does not hereby avoid 
all difficulties; but this only 
shows more clearly how impor- 
tant he regarded it to rescue the 
possibility of volustary actions. 

2 Eth. iii. 1 init.: ris aperijs 
5) wept wdOn re wal mpdtets ovens, 
kal él pey rots Exovaolois éralywv 
Kal Wéoywv ywouévwv, ém Se Trois 
akovolois ovyyvéuns, Kc. In ce. 
1-3, cf. v. 10, 1135, a, 23 sqq. 7d 
éxovowv and adkotowy are fully 
discussed. According to the 
account here given, that is in- 
voluntary which is done under 
compulsion or in ignorance. We 
must distinguish, however, in the 
former between physical compul- 
sion, which constitutes absolute 
involuntariness, and moral com- 
pulsion, which is only relative; in 
thelatter,bet ween unconsciousac- 
tion (a&yvootvra moiety), which may 
also be voluntary (as when some- 
thing is done in haste or anger), 
and action from ignorance (8 
iyvoiay mpdrrew). As, further, 
there are many things on which 
an action depends (nearly corre- 
sponding to the familiar quwis, 
quid, ubi, &c., Aristotle mentions : 
tls wal ri wal wept ri } ev rin 
mparrer, éviore 5 wal tiv, ofov 
opydyy kal tvexa tlvos), we must 


ask to which of these the ignor- 
ance refers: the action being 
involuntary in the highest degree 
when the mistake concerns the 
essential points of its aim and 
object. Finally, it makes a differ- 
ence, according to Aristotle, 
whether an action committed in 
ignorance is matter of regret or 
not; if the doer does not regret 
it he acquiesces in it, so that 
while it cannot be regarded as 
voluntary, it is not involuntary 
in the sense of being against his 
will (c. 2 init. and fin. ; cf. vii. 8, 
1150, a, 21, c. 9 init.). On the 
other hand, that is (c. 3 init.) 
éxodorov ob 7 apxh ev abt@ idéTi Ta 
Kal Exacta ev ols  mpagis, or 
(1135, a, 23) d &y Tis trav ep’ aitr@ 
bvtwy eldws Kal wh ayvody mpdrry 
uhre bv wire @ whre ob Evera. Cf. 
Rhet. i. 10, 1368, b, 9: éxdyres 5 
moovaw baa e€iddres kal uh avary- 
ka(duevoz. On the other hand, 
deliberation is not a necessary 
condition of voluntariness: on the 
contrary, Aristotle expressly 
denies that passion and emotion 
destroy the voluntariness of an 
action. 

8 Eth. iii. 3, 4, 1111, a, 24, b, 
8. Will, however, in the stricter 
sense (see p. 114, n. 3, supra), 
cannot be attributed to either of 
them, ; 


118 


ARISTOTLE 


needs be voluntary.’ It is in his view the intention upon 
which in the first instance the moral quality of an act 
depends.’ In like manner deliberation is only possible 
with reference to those things which lie within our own 
power.* Aristotle, however, has not attempted to indi- 
cate more exactly the imner processes by which free 
volition operates, nor to solve all the difficulties which 
surround the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will. The 


} Eth. iii. 4, 1111, b, 6: 9 
mpoa'peats 5) Exovotov wey paiverat, 
‘ob tavroy 5&, GAd’ ém) wAgoyv rd 
Exovoloy* Tov wey yap Exovatov Kat 
matdes kal TaAAa Cea Kowwvel, 
mpoapecews 8’ od, kal Td eEalpyns 
Exovote ev Aéyouey, kaTa mpoalpecty 
3’ ov. 1112, a, 14: Exodoioy pév 
5h patverar [i mpoatpecis], Td 3 
ExovcLov ov wav mpoaipetov. (So 
also Rhet. ibid.: 80a mev ovdv 
exdytes [sC. Totovow], ov mdyTa 
Mpoatpovmevot, elddres G&mavra.) 
Aristotle then further distin- 
guishes mpoatpeois from émidup!a, 
Ouuds, BovAnots (by which he here 
means wish, rather than will as it 
is directed towards what is im- 
possible and beyond our power) 
and dé (or, more accurately, 
a certain kind of Sdédfa, e.g. 
right opinion upon what is 
right, what is to be feared, &c., 
and generally upon _ practical 
questions); its characteristic 
mark is deliberation (c. 5, 1113, 
a, 2: BovAeutdy 5é kal mpoaiperdy 
TO avTd, TAhY apwpicuévov Hdn Td 
mpoapetdv: To yap ex rhs BovAts 
TpoxpiWev mpoaperdy eotw); ac- 
cordingly, 7d mpoaperdy is defined 
as BovAeutoy dpexrdoy Tay ed’ hiv, 
and mpoalpecis as BovAeutixh vpekis 
Tav ep quiv (ibid. 1. 9 sq.); ee 
TOU Bovarcbocacbat yap Kplvayres 
dpeydueba Kata Thy BobAevow. The 


same description is repeated th. 
vi, 2, 1139, a, 23, cf. v. 10, 1135, 
b, 10 (rpocAduevar uty [mpdrrouer] 
doa mpoBovaAevoduevor, a&mpoalpera 
5é boa ampoBovAcvra). On the 
other hand, dpegéis in the narrower 
sense of mere irrational desire is 
said De An. iii. 11, 434, a, 12, cf. 
l. 5 sq., to be without part in 7d 
BovaAevutikdy. 

2 Te yap mpoaipetoOa Tayaba 4) 
Td Kaka tool Tweés open (ibid. c. 
4, 1112, a, 1). 

3 Bovaevdueba Sé wep) trav ed’ 
huiv mpaxrav, ibid. c. 5, 1112,a, 30. 
Aristotle further shows (1112, b, 
11 sqq. vii. 9, 1151, a, 16) that 
deliberation deals, not with the 
end, but with the means. We set 
ourselves an end and then ask, 
just as in mathematical analysis, 
what are the conditions under 
which it may be attained; we 
next inquire what is required to 
create these conditions,and so on 
until we arrive by a process of 
analysis at the first condition of 
the desired result which lies in 
our power. With the knowledge 
of this condition, deliberation 
ceases; with the endeavour to 
realise it, action begins. Cf. 
TRENDELENBURG, Histor. Beitr. 
ii. 381 sq.; WALTER, Lehre v. d. 
prakt. Vern. 220 sq. 








PHYSICS | 119 


credit of first clearly perceiving these points belongs 
to the Stoics, while it has been left to modern philosophy 
fully to appreciate their force. 

Before going on, however, to examine from the point 
of view of the Aristotelian Ethics the forms of activity 
which proceed from free self-determination, there are 
some anthropological questions which still demand inves- 
tigation. These have been already touched upon, but 
only now admit of a complete survey. | 

As Aristotle recognises in the collective sphere of 
animate existence a progressive evolution to ever higher 
forms of life, so he regards the life of the human soul from 
the same poiat of view. Man unites in himself every 
form of life. To the nutritive life he adds the power 
of sensation and motion, and to these again the life 
‘of reason. Thought rises in him from sensation to 
memory and imagination, and thence to reflexion and 
the highest stage of the pure intuitions of the reason ; 
action, from sensual desires, to rational will. He is 
capable not merely of perception and experience, but 
also of art and science. He raises himself in moral 
action above animal desire just as in the latter he 
transcends the merely vegetable processes of nutrition 
and propagation. Aristotle accordingly sums up his 
whole doctrine of the Soul in a single sentence: the 
Soul is in a certain sense all Actuality, inasmuch as it 
unites in itself the sensual and the spiritual, and thus 
contains the Form of both !—a description which applies 
especially, of course, to the soul of man. But just as 
we found it to be a defect in Plato’s theory that he was 


1 See vol. i. p. 199, n. 2, supra. 


120 ARISTOTLE 


‘unable to find any inner principle of unity in the three 
parts into which he had divided the soul, and that he 
undoubtedly failed to propound this problem with 
scientific accuracy,’ so we have to regret in Aristotle a 
similar omission. The relation between the sensitive and 
nutritive life might itself have suggested the question 
whether the latter is an evolution from the former, or 
whether they come into existence simultaneously, and 
subsist side by side separate from one another. And 
where, if the latter be the case, are we to look for the con- 
nection between them and the unity of animal life? This 
difficulty, however, is still more pressing in reference to 
Reason and its relation to the lower faculties of the 
soul. Whether we regard the beginning, progress, or 
end of their union, everywhere we find the same un- 
solved dualism ; nowhere do we meet with any satis- 
factory answer to the question? where we are to look 
for the unifying principle of personality—the one power 
which governs while it unites all the other parts of the 
soul. The birth of the soul, speaking generally, 
coincides, according to Aristotle, with that of the body 
whose entelechy it is. He not only rejects any 
assumption of pre-existence, but he expressly declares 
that the germ of the life of the soul is contained in the 
male semen and passes with it from the begetter into 
the begotten.‘ But, on the other hand, he is unable to 


' Ph. d. Gr. i. pp. T17 sq. complete consistency of the Ari- 
? Which Aristotle, however, stotelian doctrine is wholly un- 
does not forget to put to Plato; successful. Detailed criticism 
see p. 23, n. 1, supra. of it may here be omitted with- 
* Even SCHELL'Sattempt(Die out prejudice to the following 
Hinheit des Seelenlebens aus d. investigation. 
Principien d. arist. Phil. ent- * See p.10,n. 1, p.6,n. 2, p.53, 
wickelt. Freib. 1873) to prove the n. 3, .and p. 96,n.1, swora. 


= rl Tt—~—S— 








PHYSICS 121 


apply this to the rational part of the soul, since that is 
something wholly different from the principle of life in 
the body. While, therefore, it is held that the germ of 
this also is propagated in the seed, it is yet asserted ! at 
the same time that it alone enters man from without,? 
and is not involved in his physical life.* But how an 
immaterial principle which has absolutely nothing in 
common with the body and possesses no bodily organ 
can be said to reside in the semen and propagate itself 
through it, is wholly incomprehensible 4—-not to mention 
the fact that not one word is anywhere said of the time 
or manner of its entrance into it. Nor can this 
difficulty be met by the assumption that the Spirit 
proceeds direct from God,* whether we regard its origin 
as an event necessarily following the operation of 
natural laws, or as in each case the effect of a creative 
act of the Divine Will.6 For the former view, which 


‘ See p.9#96, vn. 1, 2, su- 
a. 
? It enters the womb, indeed, 
in the seed, but comes to the latter 
Odpaber, as is clearly explained in 
the passages quoted, p. 96, n, 1, 
Gen, An. ii. 3, 736, b, 15 sqq. 

* Xwpiotds (Gen. An. ii, 3, 
737,a,9; De An. iii, 5; see p. 96, n. 
1, and p. 98, n.1, sup.), which here, 
as perhaps also in Plato’s account 
of the Ideas, means not merely 
separable but actually separate, 
the equivalent phrase ob@ty yap 
avrov Ti evepyela Kowwve? cwuarixh) 
évépyeia being used for it, 739, a, 
28. 

* We cannot conceive of an 
immaterial being occupying a 
position in space, nor is the rela- 
tion of the active force to the 


implement it employs, which is 
used to explain the union of soul 
and body (p. 3, n. 2, supra), 
applicable to the reason, which 
has no such implement. Cf. p. 
94, n. 2, and p. 100, n. 2. 

° BRANDIS, @r.-Rém. Phil. ii. 
b. 1178. 

® The latter view, that of the 
so-called ‘ creationists,’ was not 
only generally assumed by medi- 
eval Aristotelians as undoubtedly 
Aristotle’s, but is accepted by 
BRENTANO, Psychol. d. Ar. 195 
sqq , whom FERTLING, Mat. und 
Form, 170 (more cautiously also 
L. SCHNEIDER, Unsterblichheits- 
lehre ad. Arist. 54 sq.), is inclined 
to follow. According to BREN., 
‘the spiritual part is created out 
of nothing by the immediate act 


122 ARISTOTLE 


coincides more or less with the doctrine of Emanation, 
there is not only no support whatsoever in Aristotle’s 
system, but it is wholly irreconcilable with his view of 
the unchangeable and transcendent nature of God." 
The assumption, on the other hand, of the creation of 
the human spirit by the Deity conflicts with Aristotle's 
express and emphatic statement” that God does not 
interfere actively in the world by an exercise of will.° 
Aristotle says, moreover, as distinctly as possible, that 
the spirit is exempt from birth no Jess than from death, 
thus attributing to it pre-existence,* though in a certain 
impersonal sense. It was impossible, accordingly, that 
the question how and by whom it was produced at the 
birth of the body should have even been raised by him. 
Even upon the only question that could arise—the 
question regarding the causes which determine the 
spirit’s union with a human body, and with this 
particular body in each particular case, and regarding 
the way in which this union takes place—Aristotle’s 
writings contain not a single word; whether it be that 
this question never suggested itself to him, or that he 


of God, and at the same time the to be an effluence from the ether, 


character of a human body is 
given to the material part’ (p. 
199); the reason is produced by 
God from nothing at the moment 
at which the foetus in its na- 
tural development reaches the last 
stage (which, according to n. 2, 
preceding page, must beat apoint 
of time previous at any rate tothe 
procreative act); see also p. 203. 

1 Cf. alsoi. 413 sqq. Still less 
of course can we, with GROTE 
(Arist. ii. 220, 230), regard 
the absolutely immaterial spirit 


the Oetov caua. 

2 On which see i. 399 sq. 

3 As is rightly remarked also 
by Brent (Ved. d. Begriff vows 
b. Arist. Linz, 1864; Gymn - 
Progr. p. 9). 

4 Cf. the passages quoted, p. 
96, n. 1, andp.101,n.2,sup. The 
obvious meaning of these pas- 
sages cannot justly be set aside 
upon the general grounds advo- 
cated by BRENTANO, p. 196 sq., 
which find no support either in 
the psychology of Aristotle or in 


PHYSICS 123 


regarded it as insoluble and preferred to leave it alone.' 
Nor is he more explicit with regard to the question of 
the origin of the ‘ Passive Reason,’ whose existence is 
said to begin and end with that of the body.? Although 
we should naturally assume that he regards it as the 
outcome of the union of the active spirit with the 
faculty of reproductive imagination, yet he gives us no 
hint to help us to form a definite conception of its 
origin.® 

If we further examine the union in man of different 
faculties, we find it difficult to understand how in one 
being two parts can be united, of which the one is 
exposed to passive states, the other incapable of pas- 
sivity ; the former bound up with the body, the latter 
without a physical organ. Does Reason, we may ask, 
participate in the physical life and the mutation of the 
lower faculties, or do the latter participate in the im- 
mutability and impassiveness of Reason? We might 
find support for both assumptions in Aristotle’s writ- 
ings, yet each in turn can be shown to be inconsistent 
with the presuppositions of his philosophy. On the 


anyrightlyinterpreted statement d. menschl. Seele nach Arist. 
to be found in his texts. Halle, 1873, p. 46 sq.) supposes 


' The words, Gen An. ii. 3, 
736, b, 5, to which BRENTANO, 
195, calls attention, point rather 
to this: 8d kal wep) vod, dre Kal 
mas perarAauBdve: cal mwdédey Ta 
peréxovtra tatrns Tis apxiis, Exe 
7’ amoplay mwAclorny Kai Sez mpo- 
Ouucioba: kara Sbvaputv AaBeiv 
kal naddcov évdéxerat. 

? Cf. p. 98, n. 2. 

8 SCHLOTTMANN (Das Ver- 
gangliche und Unvergingliche in 


the passive reason to be a radia- 
tion of the active on its entry 
into the body. This assumption, 
however, finds no support in any 
statement of Aristotle or in his 
system as a whole. According 
to Aristotelian principles, the 
reason, like all immaterial and 
unmoved being, can promote 
the development of other things 
by solicitation, but cannot de- 
velop anything else from itself. 


124 


ARISTOTLE 


one hand, in his account of ‘ Passive Reason’! the 
qualities of the perishable parts of the soul are trans- 
ferred to Reason; while, on the other hand, just as 
immaterial Form in general or the motive power as 
such is said to be itself unmoved,? so Aristotle denies 
movement and change not only to Reason, but also to 


the Soul in general.3 


The conception of the Passive 


Reason, in fact, concentrates in itself all the contradic- 


tions we are at present considering.‘ 


1 See p. 96 sqq. supra. 

2 See the passage already 
quoted, p 5, from De An. i. 
3, 4. Aristotle opens the dis- 
cussion at the beginning of c. 3 
with the explanation that not 
only is it not true to say that the 
soul can, from its nature, be an 
€avTd Kivovy, GAA’ Evy TL TaY Gdv- 
vatwv To brdpxew adrh Kivnow. 
Of the arguments by which this 
is proved, the first (406, a, 12) 
is to Aristotle completely con- 
vincing: Tecocdpwy 5 Kiviocwy 
ovoay, popas, GAAoLdoEws, POicews, 
avéjncews, 2) miav Trovtwy Kwoir’ by 
) wAelous } waoas, ef SE Kivetrau 
Bh Kara ounBeBnkds, oboe ay 
bmdpxor Klynots avr fh. el 5& TovTO 
kal TOs ° rdoa yap ai AexPetou 
Kuvijoets évy témm. ef 8 éorly 
ovala Tijs puxas Td Kively eavThy, 
ov Kata vunBeBnkds avTh Td Kiwel- 
a0 imdpye. After proving in 
detail how impossible it is that 
the soul should move, and espe- 
cially that it should move in 
space, Aristotle returns, c. 4, 
408, a, 30, once more to the 
original question and declares 
that it is impossible that the 
soul should be self-moving; it 
can move and be moved only 
kata auuBeBnkds, otov Kiwveicba 


The motionless- 


bev ev @ éorl, TovTO SE KiveicPan 
bmd THs Wuxis* &AAws BF odx ofdv 
Te KiweicGa KaTa Térov avTiy. It 
might, indeed, appear that it 
moves itself. qgauéey yap thy 
Wuxiv Avweicbat xalpew Oappeiv 
poBeicOat, ri SE dpyiCecbat te Kar 
aigbdverOar Kal diavocicbar* Tadra 
d¢ mdvta Kivioes eivat Soxvvow. 
obey oindetn : Tis dy abr hy Kiveta at ° 
7) 8 ovk éoriw dvaryKaiov 
BéATiov yap tows wh Aéyeuw ohv 
wuxhv eArccivy  pavOdvery } d1a- 
vociobat, GAAG Tov tiv Opwomov TH 
puxh. TovTo 5é uw) as ev éxetyn 
Tijs Kkwhoews otons, GAA’ dre ev 
HEXpL exelyns, été 8 ax’ éxelyns, 
olov H ev alcOnors ard Twvd) [it is 
a motion which proceeds from 
the senses to the soul], 7 & 
avduynots am éxelyns ém) tas év 
Tois aig@nrnplois Kivhoes 2) words. 
Phys. vii. 3, 246, b, 24, shows 
with reference to the higher 
faculties that neither virtue “and 
vice on the one hand, nor thought 
on the other, can be said to be 
an &AAolwoss of the soul, al- 
though they are produced by an 
GAAolwors Cf. p. 94, n. 2. 

© Cf. 1. -osG, a [: and i. 359, 
n. 1, supra. 

* See p. 103 sq. supra. 


PHYSICS 125 


ness of the lower faculties of the soul is contradicted 
among other things' by what has just been said about 
the characteristic difference between them and Reason. 
For how can they be susceptible of impression when 
they are wholly excluded from movement and change, 
seeing that every impression involves a change ? ? 
Where, finally, are we to look in this union of hetero- 
geneous parts for that centre of equilibrium of the soul’s 
life, which we call Personality? It cannot reside, it 
would seem, in Reason, for this is the permanent uni- 
versal element in man which is unaffected by the 
changing conditions of individual life; it is not born, 
and it does not die; it is free from all suffering and 
change; it is subject to no failure or error; neither 
love nor hate nor memory nor even intellectual activity? 
belongs to it, but only to the man in whom it resides.‘ 
Neither can Personality lie in the lower faculties of the 
soul. For, on the one hand, Aristotle, as we have just 
seen, combats the view that these are subject to motion, 
and finds the proper subject of the changing states of 
feeling and even of intelligent thought, not in the soul 
itself, but in the union of both soul and body in man. 
On the other hand, he asserts that the essence of each 


' As, for instance, the passage 
quoted, p. 109, n. 5, according to 
which, in desire, the appetitive 
part of the soul is both mover 
and moved, the (@ov is only 
moved; and the description of 
sensation, p. 58, n. 4. 

2 See i. 454, n. 2, 3. 

® A:dvoww in the sense of dis- 
cursive thought as explained, p. 
106, n. 2. 

* Besides the passages quoted, 


p. 99, n. 3, and p. 124, n. 2, 
supra, cf. De An. iii, 10, 433, 
a, 26: voids pév ody was dp0ds, but 
especially De An. i. 4, 408, b, 24: 
kal rd voeiv 5h Kal rd Oewpeiv ua- 
palverat &AAov tds ~ow pOeipo- 
Hévou, adtd 38 amabés ory (see p. 
96, n. 2, supra). 7d Be Siavocic@a 
kal pireiy 2) miveiy odk Forw exel- 
vou wd0n, GAAX Tovd) Tod Exovros 
exeivo, f éxeivo Exet, 3d Kal rovrov 
POetpouevov ore uvnuoveder obre 


126 ARISTOTLE 


individual is his reason,! by which he understands, not 
thought alone, but every kind of intellectual appre- 
hension.? And if he refuses to acknowledge the soul as 
the subject of emotion, he is not likely to find it in the 
body.? The most serious difficulty, however, arises in 
connection with his theory of the Will. Will cannot 
belong to Reason as such, for Reason taken in itself is 
not practical but theoretical. Even practical thought 
is sometimes regarded by Aristotle ds a function of a 
different faculty from theoretic.t Movement and action, 
in fact, come from desire, which in turn is excited by 
imagination.» Desire, again, can cause movement, but 
not rational movement,§ for it belongs to animals as well 


pirei* ov yap exeivou iv, GAAG Tot 
KoLvov, 0 aTwdAwAEV. 

1 Hth. x. 7, 1178, a, 2: Sdkeve 
3° dy Kad eivat Exaoros tovro (i.e. 
voos| elrep Td Kipioy Kal dpewvor. 
ix. 4, 1166, a, 16, 22: Tov d1a- 
vontikod xdpiv 8mep Exaoros elvat 
Soner . dofere & Sv 7d voody 
€xaotos elvat 7) mdAwora. C. 8, 
1168, b, 28: the good man might 
be said to be pre-eminently iA- 
avtos, seeing that love of the 
most essential (kupimraroyv) part 
of himself predominates in all 
he does. éoamep 5¢ kal méAis 7d 
Kupitatov pdAtor’ elvat Soxet Kat 
may &AAo ovoT HMA, OTH Kal &yOpw- 
wos . kal éyxparys 5é Kal 
akparys Aéyerar TH Kparety Tov 
vouv 7) ay), @s TovTOV ExdoTou bvToSs* 
kal mempayévat Soxodow avtol Kal 
Exovolws TH meTa Adyou madera. 

2 See p.93, n. 5, supra. 

* Heh. x: 2, 1173, b, Wet 
pleasure is an avamwAfpwois, the 
body must be that which feels 
pleasure, but this is not the case. 

4 Eth. vi. 2; see p. 113, n, 2, 


supra. 

5 See the passages from Eth. 
vi. 2, 1139, a, 35, already em- 
ployed, p. 113 sq.: Sidvom 3 
avTh obey KivEel, GAN’ H Evekd Tov 
kal mpaxtikh. De An. iii. 10, 433, 
a, 22: 6 wey vows ov patvera kway 
tivev dpétews. c. 9, 432, b, 26: 
GAAG phy ovde TL AoyioTiKdy Kal 6 
KaAovmevos vous éeotly 6 Kwev: 6 
bev yap SewpnTikds ovbev voet mpaK- 
Tov, ovdé A€yer wep! pevKTod Kal 
SiwkTod ovbéy, 7 5E Klynows 7) pev- 
yovrés tL }} Sidkovtds rh ear. 
GAN’ 0vd? bray Dewph TL ToLovTOY, 
Hn werdever hevyew 7) Simwew .. . 
ért kal émitdttovtos Tod vov Kal 
Aeyovons Tis diavolas pevyew Tt 7) 
Sidkew ov Kivetrar GAAX KaTa THY 
eriOuulay mpdrret, olov 6 aKparis. 
Kal BAws dpGmev Sti 6 Exwv Thy 
iarpixhy ovk idrat, ws érépov Tivos 
kuplov bvros Tod moteiy KaTa THY 
emiothunv, GAN’ od THs émoTh- 
uns. 
- 6 De An. iii. 9 fin., after the 
passage just quoted: GAAd phy 
vd’ % Opekis TavTys Kupla Tis KiVi}- 


7 PHYSICS 127 


as man, whereas the Will belongs to man alone.' Both 
Reason and Desire must therefore enter into Will as 
constituent parts.2 But in which of these two the 
essence of the Will or the power of free self-determina- 
tion resides, it is hard to say. On the one hand, the 
power of controlling desire is attributed to Reason, which 
is defined as the motive force, or more accurately the 
source from which the resolutions of the will proceed:* 
and immorality is treated as a perversity of Reason.‘ 
On the other hand, it is asserted that Reason initiates 


wews* of yap eykpareis dpeyouevor 
kal émiOvuodytTes od mpdrtovow av 
Exover thy Upegw, GAN’ &KxoAov0ovcr 


T@ Vv. 

1 Of. p.114,n.3,and p. 117,n.3. 

2See p. 114, n 3. and L&th. 
vi. 2, 1139, a, 33: 8:0 ob7’ Gvev 
yoo kal Siavolas obr’ avev HOnKijs 
eorly Etews H mpoalpeois, b, 4: did 
4) dpextixds voids  mpoa‘peots 7} 
dpetis Savontixh Kal fh TOLAUTN 
apx avOpwros. If, in opposition 
to the above view, it be said that 
the will belongs to dpegis, which 
is regarded by Aristotle as a 
separate part of the soul (SCHRA- 
pER, Arist. de Volunt. Doctr. 12), 
thiscannot beadmitted. Aristotle 
himself statesclearly enough that 
reason is an element of will, but 
reason is essentially different 
from the animal soul to which 
bpetis belongs. 

‘ Aristotle frequently says 
that the command in the soul 
belongs by nature to the reason. 
It is xdpiov in it (Lth. x. 7, ix. 8; 
see p 126, n. 1, supra); it has no 
superior (De An. i. 5, 410, a, 12: 
ris 8& Wuxis elval rt Kpeirrov Kai 
upxov, adivarov* aduyarérepoy 3° 
%7: row vov). Desire, on the other 


hand, must obey the reason 
(Polit. i. 5: 6 5 vows [&pxer] rijs 
dpétews moditixhy Kal Bacthuchy 
[apxnv]. De An. iii. 9, v. 598, 5 
above : émitdrrovros Tov vov. Eth. 
i. 13: the épextuxdy partakes of 
Adyos, } KatiKody eorw avTod Kal 
mweWapxiKdy, similarly Polit. vii. 
14, v. p. 588; Adyos, however, 
resides only in the reason), 
and this obedience it is which 
constitutes the difference be- 
tween the éyxpar}s and the 
axparns (De An, iii. 9, see p. 126, 
n.6). In th. iii. 5, 1113, a, 
5 (waverat yap Exaoros (nta@v mas 
mpater, Stay cis abtoy dvaydyn Thy 
apxnv [sc. Tis mpdtews when he is 
convinced that the action depends 
only on himself] «at adrod [this is 
the partitive genitive] eis 7d jyou- 
Mevov’ TOUTO yap Td Mpoaipovmevor), 
we must understand by 7d jyovjpe- 
voy the reason, not (as WALTER, 
Lehre v. d. prakt. Vernunft, 222 
sqq. prefers to take it) ‘the har- 
monious union of reason and en- 
deavour,’ ‘the man as a whcle, 
which could not be called the 
governing part of the man, 

* Eth. vii. 7, 1160, a, 1 sqq. c. 
9, 1151, a, 17 sq. 


128 ARISTOTLE 


no movement and is perfect and infallible! But if 
Reason cannot err, it cannot be the seat of the Will, to 
‘which belong the doing of good and the doing of evil. 
Where Aristotle actually supposes this to reside, it is im- 
possible to say. He is clearly drawn in opposite directions 
by opposite considerations between which he is unable to 
take up any decided position. His high conception of 
the nature of the spiritual element in man forbids him 
to implicate Reason in the life of the body, or to 
attribute to it error and immorality ; on the other hand, 
it is to Reason alone that the reins of government in 
the soul can be committed. But the two elements are 
in reality inseparable, and in deducing only what is 
good in our actions from Reason, while limiting to the 
lower faculties of the soul all that is faulty, every act 
which has for its object what is divisible and corporeal, 
all change in act or state, he breaks up human nature 
into two parts between which no living bond of con- 
nection can be discovered.? Similar difficulties would 


The difficulty remains even al- 
though we assume with BRANDIS 


1 Cf. on the former head, p. 
126,n.5, on the second, De An. iii. . 


10(p.125,n.4), and p. 197,n. 4, su- 
pra. Eth.i.13, 1102, b, 14: rod yap 
éykpatods kal rod aKpatrovs Toy 
Adyor Kal THs Puxis Td Adyov Exov 
eravotueyv* dp0as yap kal én 7a 
BéAtiota twapaxadet—so that in 
incontinence the mistake does 
not lie with the rational part of 
the soul; ibid. ix. 8, 1169, a, 17: 
mas yap vovs aipetrar Td BEATLOTOV 
éavtg@, 6 5° emenhs mevOrpxet TE 
v@, where virtue is said to con- 
sist in the subordination of the 
higher portions of the soul to 
the reason, which in its turn 
always chooses the right. 


(iii. a, 105 sq. ii. b, 1042 sq.) that 
freedom, according to Aristotle, 
consists ‘in the spirit’s faculty of 
self-evolution in accordance with 
its own fundamental nature.’ 
For we may ask to which part of 
the soul this evolution belongs? 
The active reason cannot cer- 
tainly evolve itself, for it is un- 
changeable; norcan the appetitive 
and sensitive exhibit free self- 
evolution, being always deter- 
mined by something else; only 
where there is reason do we find 
free activity. Lastly, the Passive 
Reason, which is the only other 


PHYSICS. 


129 


have arisen in regard to self-consciousness had Aristotle 
gone deeper into this aspect of the question. But just 
his failure to do so or to raise the question in the form 
in which it now presents itself to us, as to what it is 
that constitutes the permanent self amid our changing 
acts and states,! shows more clearly than anything else 
how imperfectly he grasped the problem of the unity of 


the personal life. 


Now, if reason enters man from without, and if its 
union with the other faculties of his soul, and with the 


alternative, is open to the same 
charge of indefiniteness and 
contradiction ; we cannot find 
any definite place for it between 
reason and sense. The above defi- 
nition of freedom is more like Leib- 
nitz’s than Aristotle’s. Here also, 
asin the case already discussed 
i. 413, supra, sq., BRANDIS seems 
to find too close a _ resem- 
blance between Aristotelian and 
modern German doctrines. The 
argument upon which he chiefly 
relies for the above view is that, 
if self-determination has its seat 
in the governing part of our 
nature, and therefore in the 
spirit, and if further the spirit is 
the essence of a man, we may 
conclude that it must develop 
by freeself-determination accord- 
ing to its original character as 
individual essence. But spirit or 
reason constitutes, according to 
Aristotle, only one side of the 
will; its reference to sense is as 
essential anelement. Will is not 
pure reason, but rational desire. 
And even were it not so, if will 
were exclusively an exercise of 
reason, we could only conclude 
that it is as incapable of evolu- 


VOL. II. 


tion as of error, for according to 
Aristotle’s expressed opinion 
change and evolution are con- 
fined to the sphere of sensation 
or even more strictly to the body. 
It is difficult, therefore, to say 
what Aristotle regarded as the 
seat of the freedom of the will. 

' He remarks, indeed, that we 
are conscious of every form of 
our activity as such, and there- 
fore of our own existence. Zth. 
ix. 9, 1070, a, 29: 6 8 dpav Ste 
6pG aig@dvera Kal 5 dxotwy Sri 
axover kal 5 BadiCwy bri Babies, ar 
ém) tTav bAAwy duolws tori ti Th 
aicbavduevoy bri evepyoduer, Sore 
aigbavolue®” &y S71 aicPavdueba Kal 
vooiuev br: vootuer. 7d 8 Bri 
aigbavdueba 7) vootmer, bre eomeér* 
7d yap elvat jv aicOdver Oat } voeiv) ; 
This consciousness, however, he 
regardsasimmediately given with 
the activity in question. In per- 
ception it has its seat in the 
sensus communis (seep. 69, n. 3). 
How the identity of self-con- 
sciousness in the different activi- 
ties which he refers to different 
parts and faculties of the soul is 
to be explained he does not 
inquire. 


K 


130 ARISTOTLE 


body, continues throughout to be merely an external 
one, we cannot but expect that a union which begins 
in time will also end in time.! Upon this point, Ari- 
stotle holds with Plato that there is a mortal and also 
an immortal part in the soul. These unite together 
at the beginning of the earthly life, and separate from 
one another again at its close. In the further develop- 
ment, moreover, of this thought he at first closely 
followed Plato. In his earlier writings he enunciated 
the Platonic doctrines of the pre-existence of the soul, 
its incarceration in the body, and its return at death to 
a higher existence.? He therefore assumed the con- 
tinued personality and self-conscious existence of the 
individual after death, although he failed, like Plato, 
fully to investigate the question how far this doctrine 
was consistent with the presuppositions of the Platonic 
philosophy. With the independent development of 
his own system, however, he was necessarily led to 
question these assumptions. As he came to conceive 
of body and soul as essentially united, and to define 
the soul as the entelechy of the body, and as, further, he 
became convinced that every soul requires its own 
proper organ, and must remain wholly inoperative 
without it, he was necessarily led, not only to regard the 
pilgrimage of the soul in the other world as a myth, 
but also to question the doctrines of pre-existence and 
immortality as they were held by Plato.* Inasmuch as 


1 Aristotle’s doctrine of im- 
mortality is discussed by 
ScHRADER, Jahrb. f. Philologie, 
vol. 81 and 82 (1860), H. 2, p. 
89-104; Leonh. SCHNEIDER, 
Unsterblichkeitslehre d. Aristot. 
(Passau, 1867), p. 100 sqq. 


2 The references on this sub- 
ject have already been given. 
Cf. Bernays, Dial. d. Arist. 
21 sqq. 143 sqq. 

8 On which cf. Ph. d. Gr. i. 
717 sq. 

4 Cf. p. 10, supra. 


PHYSICS 131 


the soul is dependent upon the body for its existence 
and activity, it must come into existence and perish 
with it. Only incorporeal spirit can precede and outlast 
the bodily life. But this, according to Aristotle, is to 
be found only in the reason and in that part of it 
which is without taint of the lower activities of the 
soul—namely, the Active Nous. Neither the sensitive 
nor the nutritive life can exist without the body. 
These come into existence in and with it, and can no 
more be conceived of apart from it than walking apart 
from feet.! Even Passive Reason is transitory, like 
everything else which is subject to impression and 
change. The Active Reason alone is eternal and im- 
perishable; it alone is not only separable, but in its 
very nature absolutely separated from the body.2 But 
what now is the active reason which thus alone outlives 
death? It is the universal as distinguished from the 
individual element in man. All personal forms of 
activity, on the other hand, are referred either to the 
lower faculties of the soul, or to the whole, which is 
made up of soul and body, and which at death ceases 
to be. If we think of reason as separate from the 
body, we must exclude from it love and hate, memory 
and intelligent thought ;* likewise, of course, all 


' See p.6, n. 1, andp.96,n.1, 4 vods: macay yap &dbvaroy Yous. 
supra. * See on this point the 


*See p 98, n. 1, supra, passages cited on pp. 125, n. 4, and 


ellen 


and Metaph. xii. 3, 1070, a, 24: 
ef 88 Kal Borepdy ti smoméver 
[whether anything remains after 
the dissolution of the constituent 
parts of a composite substance] 
oKenréov’ em’ eviwy yap ovbev KwALE:, 
oloy ef 4 Wux) ToL0dTov, wh maoa BAX’ 


101, n. 8, De An, i. 4, 408, a, 24 
sqq. iii. 5, 430, a, 22. In the 
first of these passages Siavociabai, 
pirciv, piceiv, uvnuovevew are ex- 


‘pressly denied of reason, and 


the statement that these belong 
in any sense to a rational being 


K2 


132 ARISTOTLE 


affections, together with the feelings of pleasure and 
pain, all of which belong to the sphere of the sensitive 
life; and since even will depends for existence upon 
the union of Reason with Desire, it also must perish 
with the lower parts of the soul.! Spirit or thought 
Aristotle doubtless conceived of as surviving death, and 
since it .realises itself only in the activity of thought, 
this activity also must remain untouched by death, as 
it is held to be proof against old age.? But of the way 
in which we are to think of this continuance of thought 
after its separation from the body and the lower faculties 
of the soul Aristotle gives us no hint whatever. Even 
thought is impossible without the aid of pictorial 
imagination,? which cannot be said to exist in any 
intelligible sense after the death of the sentient soul. 
And when the body, which the soul as individual pre- 
supposes;4 when perception, imagination, memory, 
reflexion; when the feelings of pleasure and pain, the 


- is qualified by the addition: 61d 
kal tovTov POeipomévov odTe pv7- 
poveder ore piAci. ov yap exeivou 
jv, BAA TOD Kowod, d GmWdAWAEY, 
With regard to the second, it has 
already been remarked, p. 101, n. 
2,sup., that the words ov pevnwovevo- 
pev dé refer in the first instance, 
indeed, to the failure to remember 
the existence out of time of the 
Nousanterior to its lifein time,but 
that what is true of the present 
life in relation to an anterior one 
must be eqnally true of the 
future life in relation to the pre- 
sent. Since memory (according 
to p. 70 sq.) is an attribute of the 


sensitive soul and depends upon | 


the bodily organs, and since 
without the passive reason, which 


perishes at death, no individual 
thought is possible (p. 101,n.3), it 
is obvious that neither can survive 
death. SCHLOTTMANN’S explana- 
tion (p. 500f the work mentioned 
p. 123, n. 3, supra), according to . 
which the words od uvnpovedouey, 
&c. refer tothe continuous activity 
of the vots momrixds in the pre- 
sent life as an unconscious one, 
is consistent neither with the 
connection in which they stand 
nor with the meaning which is 
constantly attached to uynuovevery 
in Aristotelian phraseology. 

1 Cf. p. 109, n. 1, 2, and p.126 
sq. 
" 2 See p. 96, n. 2. supra. 

8 See p. 108, n. 2, supra. 
* Cf, i. 369 sq., supra. 


PHYSICS 


133 


emotions, the desires and the will; when, finally, the 
whole being compounded of the union of soul and 
body has ceased as a whole to be, we are at a loss to 
see where that solitary remnant which he calls spirit 
can still reside, and how we can still speak of any 


personal life at all.' 


And, indeed, Aristotle himself in 


expressly rejecting the idea that the dead can be happy, 
and in comparing their state to the loss of all sense,? 


' Even BRENTANO’S Psychol. 
d. Arist. 128 sq. fails to finda 
satisfactory answer to this ques- 
tion ; while maintaining that the 
soul must remain an individual 
entity after its separation from 
the body, he yet admits that it is 
no longer a ‘ complete substance,’ 
repeating the statement, p. 196 
sq. But how a man can be the 
same person when he is no longer 
the ‘ perfect substance’ which he 
is in the present life, it is difficult 
to see: not to mention that the 
contradiction of an ‘imperfect 
substance’ finds no place in Ari- 
stotle’s system. 

? Eth. iii. 4, 1111, b, 22 al 
ois 8 éor ray Gduvdrwy, oiov &0a- 
vaglas) is not here in point, as 
aavacia must be understood to 
mean here, not immortality after 
_ death, but immunity from death, 
deathlessness. Jhid. c. 11, 1115, 
a, 26: the discussion is merely of 
the common opinion. On the 
other hand, /th. i. 11 is of im- 
portance for our question. Ari- 
stotle here asks whether the dead 
can be happy, and replies (1100, 
a, 13): } tovrd ye wayTeA@s &roroy 
GAAws te Kal Tois Aéyovcw tiv 
évépyeidy Tia Thy evdamoviay; ei 
BE wh Aéyouey Toy TeOveadra eddal- 
Kova unde SéAwv rotro BovAeta 
&c., obviously implying that the 


dead are incapable of any ac- 
tivity. He says, indeed, in the 
passage that follows: Sone? yap 
elval rs T@ TeOve@Ti Kal Kakdy Kal 
Gyabdv, elmep cal te (@vTt wh 
aic@avouéevw Sé,and p. 1101, 
b, 1: foume yap ex roirwy, ei Kai 
Siixvetrat mpds avtovs driovy, et7’ 
aydbdv elre rovvayriov, apavpdy rt 
kal uixpdy  awrdag 4 exelvois elvat, 
ei 5 wh, neaeitte ye kal To.ovTov 
bore uh) morety evdatuovas tois wh 
bvras [those who are not so] unde 
Tous bvTas apapeiobat Td wakdpiov. 
His meaning, however, cannot 
here be that the dead have a feel- 
ing of happiness or unhappiness 
which is increased by the pro- 
sperity or misfortune of posterity 
(which is the subject under dis- 
cussion). This is even expressly 
denied and would be wholly in- 
consistent with the rest of Ari- 
stotle’s teaching. He is here 
speaking of the esthetic estimate 
of human life, the question being 
how far the picture of happiness 
with which the life of a man pre- 
sents us is altered by the light or 
shade cast upon it by the 
fortunes of his descendants, just 
as (1100, a, 20) by the honour or 
disgrace which follow himself 
after death. How remote is 
an actual, personal immortality 
from Aristotle’s thought is 


134 ARISTOTLE 


seems to deny the existence of any such remnant, 
Under these circumstances it is impossible to say that 
Aristotle taught a doctrine of personal immortality! 
He taught merely the continued existence of thinking 
spirit, denying to it all the attributes of personality, 
and never explaining nor apparently even raising the 
question, how far this spirit can still be regarded as 
belonging to an individual, as incorporeal reason, in 
spite of its eternity and impassivity, certainly is.? In 
this omission we have only another instance of that 
defect which, taking its rise in the Platonic school, 
permeates the whole of Aristotle’s Anthropology. Just 
as his Metaphysics gives us no clear and consistent 
account of Individuality, so his Psychology fails with 
regard to Personality. As he there left it undeter- 
mined whether the ground of individual existence lies 
in Matter or in Form, so here we are left in the dark 
as to whether Personality resides in the higher or in the 
lower faculties of the soul, in the immortal or in the 
mortal part of our nature. We are left to conclude 
that each of these alternatives involves difficulties which 
Aristotle has done nothing to remove, and which, there- 


obvious also from Hth. ix. 8, 1169, 
a, 18. The good man, he there 
says, will do much for his friends 
and country, Kay dén dmepamobvh 
oKew . . . dAtyov yap xpdvov 
noOjvat op58pa MaAAOv EAT’ dy F} 
Tokvy jpéua, Kal Bid@oat Karas 


have referred in such a case to 
the recompense in the next life; 
in Aristotle there is no trace of 
any such conception. The same 
is true of “rh. iii. 12, 1117, b, 10: 
bow by paddov Thy aperhy ex 
magav Kal evdamoverrepos Hj, 


eviauT oy 1) TOAN Eryn texdvTws, Kal 
play mpagiy Kadi kal meydAny q 
mToAAas Kal Mukpds. tots 5 breparo- 
OvhoKovar tTovT’ tows oupBalver . 
aipodvta: yap wéya Kaddy éavrois, 
Besides the inherent worth of the 
noble deed Plato would certainly 


aAAov énl TQ Bavdre Aurnbhoerat * 
To ToovT@ yap udduocra Civ dEtoy, 
kal ovTos meylotwy ayabav dmo- 
ipeneaiees eidds. 
' SCHRADER, ibid. 101 sq. 
2 See p. 99, n. 5, supra. 


PHYSICS 135 


fore, we cannot doubt he failed himself to observe, 
Reason as such or Pure Spirit cannot, it would appear, 
be the seat of Personality, since it is the eternal, 
universal, and immutable element in man. It is un- 
touched by birth and death, and by the changes of the 
temporal life. It abides immutably within the circle of 
its own life, without receiving impressions from with- 
out or passing any part of its activity beyond itself. 
To the sphere of sense, on the other hand, are assigned 
all multiplicity and movement, all interchange between 
the world and man, all mutation and evolution—in a 
word, all that is definite and living in personal exist- 
ence. Yet the personality and free self-determina- 
tion of a rational being cannot be said to reside in the 
sensitive part of his nature. Wherein does it, then, 
reside ? ‘To this question Aristotle has no answer ; for 
just as Reason, on his view, enters the sensitive soul at 
birth from without and leaves it again at death, so 
during life also there is lacking any inner unity between 
the two. And what is said about the Passive Reason 
_ and the Will is wholly unfitted, on account of its vague- 
ness and uncertainty, to afford any scientific principle 
that can mediate between the heteRsgeneies parts of 
the human soul. 


136 ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XII 


PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 


A,.—LHthies 





HiTHERTO we have had for our aim the investigation 
of the knowledge of reality as such. We have now to 
deal with an activity to which knowledge serves only 
as a means. ‘I'his consists either in production or in 
action.’ The scientific investigation of the latter 
Aristotle embraces under the general name of Politics,? 
distinguishing, however, between Politics proper, or 
the doctrine of the State, and Ethics,* which naturally 


1 See i. 181, n. 3, supra, and 
upon the method of this science, i. 
168, n.2,supra. That it has not to 
do, however,merely with practical 
interests is obvious among other 
passages from Polit. iii. 8 init. : 
det SE pips 51a warporépwy eimeiv 
tis éxdorn tolTwy TaY WoATEL@v 
€otiv: Kal yap exer Twas amoplas, 
T@ 5 wepl Exdorny mébodov pidr0o- 
gopovrvt: kal wh wévov amo- 
BAéwovTt mpds Td mpdrrery 
oiketdy €oti Td wh mapopay pndé Ti 
kaTadelrew, GAAX Snrody Thy ep 
exactov aAnGeay. While, there- 
fore, practical philosophy gua 
practical has to do with action, 
qua philosophy it has the scien- 
tific interest of pure knowledge. 


* See i. 187, supra. Practical 
philosophy is also called 4 zepi 
TavOpariwa pirocopia, Hth, x. 10, . 
1181, b, 15. 

% The common view of the 
relation between them, which 
was adopted i. 187, viz. that 
Ethics treats of the moralactivity 
of the individual, Politics of the 
State, cannot, even in view of 
what NickEs, De polit. Arist. 
Libr. p. 5 sq., and BRANDIS, p. 
1335, remark, be admitted to be 
wrong. Aristotle certainly dis- 
tinguishes (Zth. x. 10) between 
the two parts of Politics on the 
ground that the second deals 
with the means by which the 
knowledge of virtue acquired in 


ETHICS 


precedés it. 


137 


Turning to the latter, we must ask first 


how the End of all human action is defined by Aristotle. 
We shall then proceed to his account of the nature of 
Moral Activity and of the particular Virtues; passing 
thence with him to the discussion of Friendship, which 
forms the link between Ethics and Politics. ~ 


the first is applied to life, and 
he proves the necessity of this 
further investigation on the 
ground that discussions (or know- 
ledge, Adyo:) are not able of 
themselves to make men virtuous. 
Accordingly, Zthics and Politics 
may be said to be related to one 
anothere as the pure and the 
applied part of one and the same 
science. But as those means are 
to be found, according to Ari- 
stotle, only in the life of the 
community, upon which the Zthics 
(as an account of moral activities 
as such) does not further enter, 
the above description corresponds 
to the actual relation in which 
the works stand to one another. 
Even Aristotle, moreover, dis- 
tinguishes (27th. vi. 8, 1141, b, 23) 
between two kinds of practical 
knowledge: that which refers to 


_ the individual, and that which 


refers to the community. for 
5t, he says, cal 7 woAitikh Kal 4 

ynois  avTh wey Ekis, To pévror 
€ ov Tairdy airais, and after 
distinguishing the different de- 
partments of politics (rijs epi 
moAwW, SC. €mtoriuns) he continues : 
doxet BF Kal ppdvnois wddror’ elvas 
} wepl adrdy Kal éva. While, how- 
ever, ¢pdéynois is knowledge in 
relation to moral conduct, ethics 
is simply the account of the prin- 
ciples which ¢pévnors establishes. 
Eudemus (v. i. 186, n. 4, supra) 
accordingly calls it by this name. 


—It is not true that the Magna 
Moralia subordinates politics to 
ethics (BRANDIS, idid.): thelatter 
is there described at the very 
outset as a mwépos THs moArTuchjs, 
it being added that the subject 
as a whole should be called, not 
ethics, but politics. When NICKEs, 
ibid., sees in the Ethics only a 
treatise upon the summum 
bonum, this description (in so far 
as it indicates merely the ascer- 
tainment and enumeration of the 
constituent parts of the swnmum 
bonum) is too narrow; the Ethics 
itself classifies its contents (x. 
10 init.) under the four titles of 
the summum bonum, the virtues, 
friendship, and pleasure—so that 
it is apparent, even on the sur- 
face, that it is not a mere descrip- 
tion of the summum bonum, but 
an account of moral action as a 
whole. If, on the other hand, we 
include in the discussion of the 
summum bonum the detailed 
investigation into all its condi- 
tions and constituent parts, the 
suggested description would be 
too wide, for its most important 
constituent, theoretic activity, is 
not fully discussed in the Lthiex. 

' We have already discussed 
(p. 96 sq.) the threefold revision 
of the ZLthics of Aristotle, and 
shall confine ourselves in the 
following account to the Vicoma- 


chean Ethics, which alone is. 


genuine, giving the parallel 


: Ps 
a 


138 


ARISTOTLE 


1. The End of all human activity! is the Good, or, 
more accurately, that Good which is within the reach of 
human action, for Ethics has no concern with the 


abstract Idea of the Good.? 


The final aim of all action 


must be the highest Good: in other words, it must be 
something which is sought, not for the sake of anything 
else, but simply and solely for its own sake, and is 
sufficient of itself to invest life with the highest worth. 


passages from the other two only 
where they elucidate or deviate 
from it in any important respect. 

? Cf. on this subject TEICH- 
MULLER (‘ Die Einheit der arist. 
Eudamonie,’ Bulletin dela Classe 
d. Sci. hist.-philol. et polit. de 
VAcadémie de St-Pétersbourg, 
t. xvi. N. 20 sqq. p. 305 sqq.), 
who rightly emphasises the dis- 
tinction between the constituent 
elements and the external con- 
ditions of happiness. : 

2 Eth. i. 1 iit. Maoa réxvn 
kal mica wé0odos, 6uofws dt mpatis 
Te Kal mpoaipecis, ayabov Tivos 
eplecOat Soxet* 81d Karas ameph- 
vavto Tayabby, ob mdy7’ édlerat. 
This good is called here (1094, a, 
18), and c. 2, 1095, a, 16, mparrdy 
and mpaktoy ayabdy. Aristotle 
next comes to speak more fully, c. 
4, of the Platonic Idea of the 
Good (Ph. d. Gr. i. 591 sqq.), and 
after bringing forward several 


other arguments against it 
says, ibid. 1096, b, 30: this 
discussion, however, properly 


belongs to another science; «i 
yap kab gorw €v 71 Kad [so RASSOW, 
Forsch. wb. die nikom. Eth. 
53 sq., with three MSS., for 7d] 
Kown KaTyyopotmevoy aryabdy 7 
xwpiotdy Tt abtd Kad’ abrd, SHAov 
as ok dy etn mpaxroy ovdé KTNTdV 
avOpamrw: viv 5é rovodrdy Ti Cnreirat. 


Nor is it true that the idea of 
the good, at any rate as an ideal, 
furnishes the guiding principle 
in the pursuit of the xrnrd Kal 
wpakTa Tav ayabev. Inter alia, 
he says: &ropoy 5é ral ritiopernds- 
cetat bpdyTns } TéxTwY mpds Thy 
aitod téxvny cidds aiTd Tayaldr, 
&e., as though moral philosophy 
were meant for the service of 
handicraft. This it certainly is 
not in Aristotle himself (as may 
herewith be expressly: remarked 
in view of the remarks of TEICH- 
MULLER, loc. cit. 315 sq.), and 
yet it must be if he is justified 
in using against Plato an argu- 
ment that with equal justice 
might be turned against himself ; 
for it must be confessed that the 
advantage to be derived by the 
weaver or the carpenter in the 
pursuit of his calling from Ari- 
stotle’s treatise upon happiness 
is not great. : 
3 Hth.i. 1, 1094, a, 18: ei 34 
Tt TéAOS €orl TOY TpcKToy 0 BV 
abTd Bovdducba, TaAAa Se Sia 
TovTo, Kal ph mdyta 8. €Erepov 
aipovueba (mpdeot yap obtw vy’ eis 
&mreipoy, dor’ eivar keyhy kal par- 
aiay Thy dpekw) BHAov as Todr’ by 
ely tayabdv [absolute good] kal 
70 &picrov. c.5: in every form 
of activity the good is that od 
xipw Ta AoiTa mpdrreroi—the 


ETHICS 


139 


This highest Good is admitted on all hands to be 
Happiness :' but when we ask in what Happiness itself 


Ttédos, Gor’ ef te Tav mpaxTav 
amdyvtwy éotl rédos, toir’ by etn 
7) mpaxrdv ayabdv, ei 5 mAclw, 
vavTa ... 70 8 apiorov réAcidv 
wt palverat . . . Tedreidrepoy Se 
Aéyouey 7d Kal’ abrd SwKrdv Tod 
5:’ Erepov Kal 7d undémore 5’ HAA 
aiperdy tay Kal Kad’ abra Kal bid 
7000 aiperay, kal awd@s 5) TéAciov 
7d Kal’ abrd aiperdy del Kal unidé- 
mote 8’ HAO. And further on: 
TO yap TéAcov ayabdy airapKes 
elva: Sone? . . To 8 avrapKes 
TiOeuev & wovodpmevov aiperov more? 
Tov Blov kal undevds evdea% (simi- 
larly PLATO, Phileb. 22, B); x. 6, 
1176, b, 3, 30. Cf. i. 12, where 
it is explained that happiness, 
as complete in itself, is not an 
érawerdy, but a Timor, something 
KpeirToyv Tay émaveTar. 

' Aristotle presupposes this, 
Eth. i, 2, 1095, a, 17; Rhet.i. 5 
init., as something universally 
acknowledged. He proves it more 
fully, Lth. i. 5, 1097, a, 34 sqq.; 
cf. x..6, 1176, b, 3, 30, from the 
points of view indicated in the 
preceding note. In #th.i. 5, how- 
ever, the words, 1097, b, 16 sqq., 
make a difficulty: ér: 8é, it is 
here said, rdvrwy aiperwrdrny [sc. 
Thy evdaimoviay oiducba elvat}] mh 
cvvapBuouperny, ovvapiOuovuévny 
5é SijAov ws alperwrépay pera Tod 
éAaxlorov tay ayabav: smepoxh 
yap ayabav yiverat 1d mpooridé- 
pevoy, Gyabay 5 +d peiCoy aipe- 
taétepoy del. The most obvious 
meaning of these words, viz. 
that happiness is in the highest 
degree desirable without the 
addition of anything else, and is 
increased by every addition 
although of ever so small a good 


(BRANDIS, p. 1344; MUnscHEr, 
Quest. crit. in Eth. N. Marb. 
1861, p. 9 sqq.), gives a wholly 
inadmissible sense to the passage ; 
how could what is complete still 
grow ? (as TEICHMULLER rightly 
asks, loc. cit. p. 312), or how can 
happiness, which contains all 
goods in itself, be increased by 
further additions? Moreover, it 
is expressly said, Hth. x. 2, 1172, 
b, 32, that nothing can be ‘ the 
good’ perd Tivos tay Kal’ aird 
ayalav aiperwtepoy vyiverat, TEICH- 
MULLER accordingly proposes to 
take the sentence as an apagoge : 
happiness is the most desirable 
thing, if we do not regard it as 
a sum, but if we do, then the 
addition of the smallest of goods 
must make it more desirable, 
and therefore we cannot regard 
it as asum of particular goods. 
The same explanation is given 
by THILO, Zeitschr. f. exacte 
Phil. ii. 3, 284 sq., and LAAs 
(see infra). The question, how- 
ever, in the passage is, not whether 
happiness is a sum of goods, but 
whether it is the most desirable 
of things or not; nor does ovyr- 
ap.Quotmevos mean ‘regarded as a 
sum ;’ ovvapiOuety can only here 
have the meaning which it has 
in the kindred passage (explained 
by Top. iii. 2, 117, a, 16, and 
ALEXANDER in loco) Ithet. i. 7, 
1363, b, 19; Polit. vi. 3, 1318, a, 
35; Soph. Hl. 5, 167, a, 25; Eth. 
ii. 3, 1105, b, 1; é.e. it must mean 
either to ‘count along with’ or 
to ‘count up;’ when used with 
a singular subject it can of course 
only mean the former, and ac- 
cordingly is explained, 1. 14 of 


140 


consists, differences at once arise.’ 


ARISTOTLE 


Some give the 


preference to pleasure, others to practical. activity, a 


third class to the scientific life.? 


The first of these 


views seems to Aristotle hardly to deserve refutation. 


the same passage, by povovdmevoy 
and understood in this sense, 
M. Mor. i. 2, 1184, a, 15 sqq.; cf. 
Rassow, Beitr. 2. Erkl. d. nik. 
Ethik (Weimar, 1862, Gymn.- 
Progr.), p. 5 sqq., where the ex- 
planations of LAAS (Evdamovia 
Arist. Berl. 1858, 7 sqq.), MUN- 
SCHER, and others, are also dis- 
cussed. RAssow’s own explana- 
tion (p. 10: ‘that happiness is 
not to be reckoned among goods 
nor regarded as a good beside 
other goods’) is not easy to 
harmonise with the language of 
the passage. If the text is cor- 
rect, we must explain it rather 
to mean: ‘We regard happiness 
as the most desirable of all 
things, so far as it can be com- 
pared with them without itself 
being classed as one of the mavra 
[it is more desirable than any- 
thing else]; if we desire to class 
it as a good together with other 
goods, it would become more 
desirable still if its value were 
increased by the addition of 
ever so small another good.’ 
But it is difficult to see the 
force of the latter remark, for 
the proof of the proposition 
that happiness is perfect good, is 
only weakened by this concession 
to a non-Aristotelian point of 
view. It is a question whether 
the words irepoxn yap... aipeto- 
Tepoy ael, or perhaps the whole 
passage from ouvapiOuovpervny 5é 
to aiperér. &el may not be an 
insertion by a later hand. In 


the former case, we may supply 
mdvtwy after aiperwrépay in the 
preceding words and explain 
them to mean: ‘ We hold that 
happiness is the most desirable 
of all things so far as it is not 
itself classed as one of them; or 
in so far as it is classed along 
with other things, combined with 
the smallest other good, that it is 
more desirable than all else be- 
sides.’ The most recent editor 
and commentator on the Nico- 
machean Ethics, RAMSAUER, pays 
no regard either to the inherent 
difficulty of the passage or to 
the attempts of his predecessors 
to solve it. 

1 See Lth. i. 2, 1095, a, 20 
sqq., c. 9 init.; Rhet. ibid. 1360, 
b, 14 sqq., where the things 
which are commonly regarded as 
happiness are enumerated and 
discussed in detail for the special 
necessities of the orator. 

2 Aristotle says previously, 
Eth. i. 2, 1095, a, 28, that he does 
not intend to investigate every 
view upon the nature of happi- 
ness, but only such as are the 
most commonly accepted and the 
most plausible. As such he 
names .these three, c. 3 inét.: 
Td yap ayabby Kal thy evdaimoviay 
ovk GAdyws eolkacw ex Tav Biwv 
bmorauBdavew of pty mwoddAol kal 
popticdrato Thy Hdovnv, 5d Kal 
Biov ayaraGou. Tov amodavoTikdy. 
Tpets yap ciot pddora of mpod- 
xovres, 5 Te viv eipnuévos Kal 6 
moAitiKos Kal Tplros 6 Oewpyrikds. 


ETHICS 141 


Without denying that pleasure is a good, he has a 
most thorough contempt for the life which is dedicated 
to pleasure alone. Pleasure, he remarks, cannot be the 
highest Good, for these among other reasons: that it is 
not self-sufficing ; that some pleasures are not desirable ; 
that many things have an independent value of their 
own wholly apart from the pleasure that they bring; 
that pleasure and enjoyment are only a recreation, and 
only exist for the sake of action; that even the worst 
men, whom we cannot call in any sense happy, are 
capable of sensual enjoyment, whereas that alone is 
truly good which the virtuous man recognises as such.! 
Just as little can honour or wealth be admitted to be 
the highest good. The former does not so much affect 
those to whom it is paid as those who pay it ;. its value, 
moreover, consists essentially in the fact that it pro- 
duces consciousness of worth, which, therefore, is of 
more value than the honour itself.? Wealth, again, is 
not desired on its own account, so that it wants the 
first characteristic of Good in the higher sense.* 
The happiness of man can, in fact, consist only in his 
activity,‘ or more accurately in that activity which is 


1 Eth. i. 3, 1095, b, 19, x. 2, 
1172, b, 26, 1173, b, 28 to the end 


of the chap.; c. 6, 1176, b, 12- 


1177, a, 9. 

2 Eth. i. 3, 1095, b, 22 sqq. 

® Thid. 1096, a, 5, cf. Bhet. i. 
5, 1361, a, 23. 

‘ Aristotle frequently  re- 
peats that happiness does not 
consist in the mere possession of 
certain advantages, in a mere 
é&s (on which see i. 285, n. 3, sup.) 
or «ros, but in actual activity. 


See e.g. Hth. i. 3, 1095, b, 31, c. 6, 
1098,a, 3; and the more definite 
statement, c. 9, 1098, b, 31: 
Siapéper St tows od uixpdy ev erice 
 xphoe 7d &pioroy bwodauBdverw 


wal éy Eker 2) evepyeia. thy méy yap 


eiiv evdéxera: undey ayabby aao- 
TeAelv bwdpxovoay, oloy Te Kabev- 
Sovti ) Kal GAAws mws eEnpynKédri, 
tiv 8 évépyemav odx oldy te- 
mpdter yap ef avdynns kal ed mpdter. 
As at the Olympic games it is not 


sufficient to be strong and fair, in 


142 ARISTOTLE 


proper to him asman.' What kind of activity is this ? 
Not the general vital activity, which he shares even 
with plants; not the sensitive activity, which belongs 
to the lower animals as well as to man; but the activity 
of reason.?, Now the activity of reason, in so far as it 
is rightly performed, we call Virtue. The proper hap- 
piness of man consists, therefore, in virtuous activity, 
or, inasmuch as there are several such, in the noblest 
and most perfect of these. But this is the theoretic 
or pure activity of thought. For it belongs to the 
noblest faculty and directs itself to the highest object ; 


order to win the crown of 
victory, but one must engage in 
the contest for it—so in life we 
win the good and the fair by 
action alone. In reference to 
these passages, see x. 6, 1176, a, 
33: efmouev 8 Sri odK Eat Ekes [7 
eVSamovla|* Kal yap TE kadevdorvre 
dia Blou trdpxo dy... Ka TE 
SvotvxovyTs TH péeyloTa.. . GAAL 
MGAAov eis evepyerdy tiva Beréor, 
ix. 9, 1169, b, 29:  eddamovia 
évépyeid tls éotw, 4 9 evépyeia 
dHAoy Sri ylverar Kal odx brdpxet 
domep Krijud TL. 

1 Hth. i. 6, 1097, b, 24: we 
shall discover wherein happiness 
consists, ef AnpOeln Td Epyov Tov 
avOpdrov. Sawep yap avdAnth... 
kal mavrl texvitn, Kal BAws ay 
- éorly Epyov tt Kal mpatis, ev Te 
epyw Sone? rayaddy eivat Kal Td ed, 
otrw Sdtevev dy Kal avOpdie, elrep 
éort TL Epyov avrov, 

2 Thid. 1. 33 sqq. 

8 Eth. i. 6, 1098, a 7: 8’ 
éotly Epyov avOpnrov Wuxis éevép- 
yea KATO Aébyov A bay dvev Adyou, 
To) 8 aitéd ghapev epyov civar TH 
ryéver TOVSE Kal TovdSe orovdalov . 
mpooTWeuerns THs Kar’ d&perhy & ‘bmrep- 


> ‘ > > cal 
Oikelay apeTiy amoTeActTat * 


oxis mpos Td Epyov' KiOapiorod 
Mev yap Td KiOapiCew, omovdaiov dé 
To et* ef 8 of tws, dvOpdémrov St 
Tidenev epyov (why tiva, Tabrny Sé 
Wuxins évepyevay Kal mpdters mera 
Adyov, cmovdalouv S avdpos eb radra 
Kal KaA@s, Exacrov 8 ed Kara Thy 
ei & 
otTw +b avOpmmivoy ayabdy Wuxis 
évépyeia yiverar Kat’ dperhy, ei 5& 
mAélous at dpetal Kata Thy dplorny 
kal TeAeioTarnv. x. 6, 1176, b, 2: 
activities are valued either for 
the sake of something else or for 
their own sake; the latter is the 
case when nothing is expected 
from them beyond the activity 
itself. Happiness (v. supra) must 
be an activity of the latter kind. 
To.atta 8 eivau Soxotow ai Kar’ 
anETHY mpagels. Te yep Kara Kah 
onovdaia mpdrrey tev 5: abra 
aiperay [sc. éotly]. Kal radyv madiav 
dé ai ndeiar. Happiness, however, 
cannot consist in these (see p. 141, 
n. 1, sup.), but(1177, a, 9) ev rats 
kat’ aperhy evepyelas ; it is (i. 10, 
1099, b, 26) Woxiis évepyeia Kar’ 
aperhy Tod Tis, Or More accurately 
(i. 13, tnit.), poxiis évépyend. THs 
kat’ aperhy TEeAElay, 


—_——————— 


_ 


{+S  ~- |, =e, ee. 


ETHICS 148 


it is exposed to the least interruption, and affords the 
highest pleasure; it is least dependent on foreign 
support and external expedients ; it is its own aim and 
object, and is valued purely for its own sake; in it 
man arrives at rest and peace, while ‘in the military 
and political, or in the practical life generally, he is 
ever restlessly pursuing ends which lie outside the 
activity itself. Reason is the Divine in us. It is the 
true essence of the man. The pure activity of reason 
can alone perfectly accord with his true nature. It 
alone can afford him unconditional satisfaction, and 
raise him above the limitations of humanity into the 
life of God.' Next to it comes moral activity, which 


1 Eth. x. 7, init.: «i 8 earl 
h ebd8amovia Kar’ aperhy évépyeia, 
eAoyor Kara Thy Kpariorny: airy 
5° dv elm rot aplorov. etre 5) vois 
Tovro elre HAAO TI, . . . elTe Ociov 
by Kal abrd elre ray ev tiv 7d Oerd- 
Tatov, ) Tovrov évépyea Kata Thy 
olxelay dperhy etn by H TeAcla edvdat- 
povia, Sr. 8 earl Oewpynrich elpn- 
ta. After proving this asabove, 
Aristotle continues, 1177, b, 16: 
ei 3h tTav wey Kata Tas dperas 
mpdtewy af moditixad Kad moAeuiKal 
KéAAa Kal peyéle: mpoéxovory, 
abra 8’ &rxodro Kal TédAovs Tivds 
épievra: wal ob 8: abras aiperal 
ciow, BF Tod vod evépyea omovd;;j 
Te diapéepery Sone? Oewpyntinh odoa, 
kal map’ airhy ovbdevds eplecda 
tédous, Exew te jdovhy oixelay, 
arn St cvvatte: thy évépyeiav, Kal 
7d abrapkes 5h Kad cxodacrindy Kal 
Grputoyv ds avOpdémw, kal boa &AAa 
7@ paxaplw arovéuera, kata Tav- 
Thy Thy evépyeiay palvera byra, 7) 
Terela 3) eddaimovia airy ky fn av- 
Opimov . . . 6 Bt rowodros by etn 


__ Blos Kpelrrwy 4) Kar’ &vOpwrov ob 





yap  kvOpwrds eorw ofrw Bidcerat, 
GAN’ Hh Ocidv te ey aitG bwdpyer: 
dow dé diapéper rovro Tod avyOérov, 
TocovTw Kal % évépyea Tis Kara 
Thv uAAnY dperhy. ei 5h Octo &e. 
(see p. 164. X. 8, 1178, b, 
1: we require many aids to 
action, T@ 5é Gewpodyri odderds Tay 
TowvTwy mpds ye thy évépyeay 
xpeia, GAA’ ws eiweiy kal eumddid 
€ort mpés ye thy Oewplav: # 8 
vOpwrds €or: Kal mreloor ouGh, 
aipetra: Ta Kat’ aperhy mpdrrew: 
Sehoera 5’ ody tay ToLodtTwy pds 
Th GvOpwrevecOar.  8& TerEla 
evdamovla bri Oewpnrixh tls eorw 
évépyera Kal evrevOey dy aveln. 
The gods are pre-eminently con- 
sidered happy ; but what actions 
can we assign to them? Shall 
we suppose that they exhibit 
their justice by buying and 
selling, their valour by en- 
countering danger, their liber.’ 
ality by gifts of money, their 
self-command by the conquest of 
evil desires? Nor will they 
sleep like Endymion, rg 3} 


144 ARISTOTLE 


thus constitutes the second essential element of happi- 
ness. Inasmuch, however, as it is the Divine in man 
which is called into exercise in thought, the latter may 
be regarded as a superhuman good; whereas moral 
virtue is in an especial sense the good of man.! 

While these are undoubtedly the essential and in- 
dispensable elements of Happiness, Aristotle does not 
exclude from that notion other gifts and advantages, 
some of which proceed from moral and rational activity, 
while others are independent of it.2 Thus, for instance, 


(Gvr1, &c. (see i. 297, n. 1, supra) 

. Tors mev yap Oeots amas 6 
Bios wakdpios, Tots 8° avOperois, éd’ 
dcov Suolwud TL THS ToLav’THS evep- 
yelas trdpxe* Tav 8 wAdAwv Chor 
ovdev eddamovet, ered) ovdauy 
Kowwvel Oewplas, ed Baov dy 
Siareiver 7 Oewp'a, Kal 7) evdatuovia, 
kal vis maAAov brdpxer Td Oewpeiy, 
kal evaimoveiv [ sc. waAAov bra pxet], 
ov Kata ouuBeBrykds, GAAG KaTa 
Thy Oewplav: aith yap Kal? abrhy 
Tyta. oor ein bw 7H evdamoria 
Oewpia tis. Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, 
b, 24:  Oewpia 7rd HdicTov Kat 
tpicrov. Cf. i. 398, n. 5, supra. 
The contradiction between these 
statements and Pol. vii. 2, 1324, 
a, 25, c. 8, 13825, b, 14 sqq. is only 
apparent. In the latter passages 
theoretic activity is not compared 
as such with practical, but the 
life of solitary devotion to science 
with the social life of the state; 
and while the practical life is 
declared to be the more excellent, 
the expression is used in its wider 
sense, and the theoretic activity 
whichisself-sufficing and directed 
towards no external end is ex- 
pressly said to be the most 
perfect form of mpatis. Cf. also 


Pol. vii. 15, 1334, b, 14. 

1 Hth. x. 7 (see preceding n.) ; 
c. 8 init.: devtépws F [eddaiuwr] 
6 Kara thy &AAnY dperhy [Blos]: 
ai yap Kat’ avrhy évépyerat dvOpw- 
mal . . . ovvecevaTa 5€ Kal 7 
ppdvnois TH TOU HOovs dpeTH ... 
cuvnptnueva 8 ara [the ethical 
virtues] Kal rots wdOeot epi rd 
obvberov &y elev’ ai 5¢ Tov cvvOéTov 
dpetal dvO@pwrikal. Kal 6 Bios dy 6 
kar avTas kal » evdamorvia. Ibid. 
1178, b, 5 (see preceding n.). 
As will be obvious from the pre- 
ceding account, the distinction 
here is merely in the mode of 
expression, nor can we say with 
RITTER (iii. 327) that, because 
Aristotle wavers in the mode of 
presenting his view, the theoretic 
understanding is intended to be 
left out of account in defining 
human happiness. 

* The statement that such 
things deserve to be called ad- 
vantages only in so far as they 
have a directly moral significance 
(TEICHMULLER, loc. cit. 337 sq.) 
is not Aristotle’s; he calls them 
often enough goods, and that 
which is a good is presumably 
an advantage. 


ETHICS 145 


happiness necessarily presupposes a certain complete- 
ness of life. A child cannot be happy any more than 
it can be virtuous, for it is still incapable of any rational, 
moral action.! Mere temporary happiness, moreover, 
is insufficient: one swallow does not make summer.’ 
Therefore, if we cannot say with Solon that no man is 
happy till he is dead, yet we must admit that happiness 
can, at any rate, only be looked for in a life which has 
reached a certain degree of maturity. Happiness, in fact, 
is the virtuous activity of the soul in a completed life.* 
Again, man requires for perfect happiness certain 
external goods. Happiness, it is true, is something 
other than good fortune.t Poverty, sickness, and mis- 
fortune may even serve the brave man as an occasion 
for noble conduct, and so far the really happy man can 
never be miserable. And yet, on the other hand, no 
one will call a man any longer happy if the fate of a 
Priam overtakes him;° and while the virtuous man 
can be content with few gifts of fortune,® yet in many 
respects they are indispensable to him : without wealth, 
power, influence, little can be accomplished; noble 


' Eth. i. 10, 1100, a, 1. 

2 Thid. i. 6 fin. 

8 Jbid. i. 11, 1191, a, 14: ri 
obv KwAver Aéyew evdalyova Tov 
Kat’ Gperhy redrclay évepyodvra Kal 
Tois éxtds Gyabois ikavas Kexopn- 
ynuévov, wh Toy TuxdvTa xpdvov 
GAAa TéAciov Blov; } mpooberéov 
kal Biwoduevoy otw Kal TeAcuTH- 
covta kata Adyoy ; cf. p. 133, n. 2, 
x. 7, 1177, b, 24: 9 TeAcla dh 
evdamovla abrn by ely avOpdrov, 
AaBoioa pijkos Blov TéAciov* ovdéev 
yap aredres dori Tay Tis evdaimovias. 

* Polit. vii. 1, 1823, b, 26; 


VOL, Il. 


Eth. vii. 14, 1153, b, 21. 

5 Eth.i. 11,1101, a, 6 (see p. 
150, n. 2, infra); cf. vii. 14, 1153, 
b,17; Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a, 19. 

6 Hth. x. 9,1179, a, 1: ob phy 
ointéov ye woAA@v Kal peydAwv 
dehoeoOa roy eddamorigorta, ei 
bh evdéxera dvev Tay exTds pakd- 
prov elvat* od yap év TH dwrepBoaAz rd 
avrapkes kal ) mpagis, Svvardy be 
kal uh &pxovra ys Kal Oadrdrrns 
mpdrrew Takadd, Private persons, 
it is remarked, are as a rule the 
happiest. Cf. Polit. vii. 1, 1323, 
a, 38 sqq. 


L 


146. ARISTOTLE 


birth, beauty, joy in one’s children, are elements in 
perfect happiness; friendship is even more necessary 
to the happy than-to the unhappy ; health is invaluable 
to all; in a word, for complete satisfaction in life, besides 
spiritual good, a certain supply of material and external 
advantages (yopnyla, evetnpia, ednuepia) is indispen- 
sable,! and this it is a mistake to suppose is neces- 
sarily bestowed by the gods upon the virtuous man.? 
The gifts of fortune taken in themselves, therefore, are 
certainly a good, although to the individual they may 


often turn out an evil.® 


Even pleasure Aristotle reckoned an element in 
happiness, defending it against the reproaches cast upon 


it by Plato and Speusippus.* 


1 See Zth. i. 9, 1099, a. 31 sqq. 
c. 8, 1096, a, 1, c. 11, 1101, a, 14, 
22, vii. 14, 1153, b, 17, viii. 1 
init. ix. 9, 11 (to which I shall 
subsequently return), x. 8, 1178, 
a, 28 sq. c. 9 imit.; Polit. vii.1, 
1323, a, 24, c. 12, 1331, b, 41, also 
Rhet. i. 5, 1360, b, 18 sqq. 

2 Aristotle says, indeed, Eth. 
x. 9 ad fin., c. 10 init., that he 
who lives according to reason is 
dear to the gods, who take plea- 
sure in that which is akin to 
themselves; if the gods care for 
men, such a one will be the most 
highly favoured by them, and if 
anything is their.gift it must be 
happiness. We have already seen 
that his system leaves no room 
for a special providence. The 
care of the gods, therefore, if we 
transfer the expression from po- 
pular to scientific language, must 
coincide with the natural opera- 
tion of the rationallife. External 
goods, on the other hand, he con- 


For he takes a quite 


sistently treats elsewhere as 
matter of chance; see Hth. x. 
10, 1099, b, 20 sqq. vii. 14, 1173, 
b, 17; Polit. vii. 1, 1323, b, 27, 
c. 13, 1332, a, 29. 

8 Hth. v..2, 1129, b,.1 sqq..; 
ef. c. 13 fin. 

4 ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. pp. 506, 
861,3. Whether Aristotle includes 
the Cynics is not clear; we might 
conclude so from th. x. 1; cf. 
ibid. i. 262, 2. For Aristotle’s 
doctrine of pleasure see the full 
discussion, Hth. x. 1-5, vii. 12- 
15. It is sufficient to quote 
x. 2, 1173, a, 15: Aéyovor Se 7d 
bev a&yabdy wplaba, tiv § 7dovqv 
adpistov elvat, Ste SéxeTar Td 
madAov Kal to Frtov (PLATO, 
Phileb. 27, E sqq. 30, & sq. and 
other passages, see ZELL. Ph. d. 
Gr.i. 506); but the same is true 
of the virtues or of health. It is 
further asserted that pleasure is 
a motion and a becoming (cf. Ph. 
d. Gr. i. 506, 3): butif it were a 





ETHICS 


different view of its nature. 


147 


Plato had relegated 


pleasure to the sphere of indeterminate, motionless 
Being or Becoming; to Aristotle, on the other hand, it 
is rather the natural perfection of every activity, and as 
such the immediate outcome of the perfected activity 
in as true a sense as health and beauty are the imme- 
diate outcome of bodily perfection. It is not a move- 
ment and a becoming, but the goal in which every 


movement of life finds rest and completeness,! 


motion it must continue for a 
certain lapse of time, and there- 
fore, like all motion, have a 
definite velocity ; if a becoming, 
it must have a definite product ; 
but neither of these is the case: 
pleasure is produced by a motion, 
but it is not itself a motion (ibid. 
], 29 sqq. c. 38, 1174, a, 19 sqq.). 
Furthermore, every pleasure in- 
volves a pain : it is a satisfaction, 
and every satisfaction pre- 
supposes a want but there are 
enjoyments which involve no 
pain, and do not consist in satis- 
faction of a want {these last, 
however, are merely causes_pf 
pleasure, not the pleasure itself 





; 
BRRIC™ aia, 1173, b, 7 sqq. vii. 15, 1154, 


wor 


: 


Cewplay . . 





b, 15). Lastly, there are evil 
pleasures ; but it does not follow 
for this reason that all pleasure is 
evil (x. 2, 1173, b, 20 sqq. c. 5, 
1175, b, 24 sqq. vii. 13 f. 1153, a, 
17-35, b, 7-13). 

1 Eth. x. 3 init.: pleasure 
is like intuitive perception, com- 
plete at every moment of time: 
bAov yap ti éort Kal Kat’ ovdéva 
xpdévov AdBa tis by Hdovhy fs ém 
mArclw xpdvov ywouévns TeAEw- 
Ohoera 7rd eldos, c. 4, 1174, a, 
20: Kara wacay yap alcOnaoly éorw 
Hdovh, duolws 8 Sidvoiwy ai 
. TeAciot BE Thy évép- 


The 


yeray 4 ndovh. 1174, b, 31: 
Tereiot 5 Thy evépyeray 7 Hdovh 
obx as 7 Ekis evumdpxovea [as this 
particular form of activity itself, 
as, for instance, virtue], GAA’ ds 
emvyvyvouevdv te TéAOS oloy ois 
axuaios ) dpa. It lasts, there- 
fore, as long as the activity in 
question continues as it was, but 
changes and fades with the 
activity itself, which in man can 
never but be an intermittent 
one (cf. vii. 15, 1154, b, 20 sqq.), 
c. 5, 1075, a, 20: &vev re yap 
évepyelas ob ylverar 7dovh, macdy 
Te évépyeiay TeAELot H Hdovh* SOev 
Soxovor kal TH elSer Siapépew> ra 
yap €repa Te cldea dp’ érépwv 
oldueda TerAciovcOa. This is fur- 
ther developed in the passage 
that follows, prominence being 
given to the fact that every ac- 
tivity obtains from the pleasure 
springing from it a heightened 
energy and power of endurance, 
whereas it is disturbed by that 
which proceeds from another; 
vii. 14, 1153, b, 14; see infra. 
The statement, Rhet.i. 11 init. 
is less accurate: broxeicdw & 
nuiv elvar thy Hdovhy klynoly twa 
THs Wuxijs Kal Kardoracw dOpday 
kal aic@nriv «is thy imdpxovcay 
giow, Adwny Bt rodvaytiovy, For 
on the one hand, strictly speak- 


L2 


ARISTOTLE 


' 


nobler an activity the higher the pleasure that accom- 
panies it. Thought and moral action afford the purest 
pleasure,! and the blessedness of God is nothing but 
the pleasure which springs from the most perfect 
activity. The universal pursuit of pleasure, therefore, 
according to Aristotle is an absolute necessity, and is, 
indeed, nothing else than the instinct of life.? Pleasure 
cannot, it is true, be the highest good itself;* and a 
distinction is made between the different kinds of plea- 
sure, each of which has a value assigned to it in direct 
proportion to the value of the activity which produces 
it; only the pleasure of the virtuous man is declared 
to be true and truly human.> Nevertheless, Aristotle 
is far from excluding pleasure in general from the con- 
ception of happiness, or assigning to it the subordinate 
place which Plato had marked out for it. 

We have now to consider in what relation these 
different conditions of happiness stand to one another. 
That the most indispensable element of it—the one in 
which the essence of happiness must primarily be 
sought—can only be the scientific and moral activity 
of the soul, is often enough asserted by Aristotle. In 
treating, for instance, of the relation between activity 


148 


ing, Aristotle does not regard 
the soul as moved at all, and, on 
the other, pleasure, according to 
the passage just quoted, is not a 
motion, but the consequence of a 
motion. This definition is again 
referred to, M. Mor. ii. 7, 1205, 
b, 6. 

1 Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 16, 
24; Eth. x. 2, 1174, a, 4, c. 4, 
1174, b, 20, c. 7, 1177, a, 22, b, 
20, i. 9, 1099, a, 7-29, vii. 13, 


1153, a, 20. 

2 Metaph. ibid.; Eth. vii. 15, 
1154, b, 25; see p. 898, n. 5, sup. 

3 vii. 14, 1153, b, 25-32, x. 2, 
1172, b, 35 sqq. c. 4 sq. 1175, a, 
10-21, ix. 9, 1170, a, 19. 

* See p. 140, supra. 

5 x, 2, 1173, b, 20 sqq. c. 4 
init. c. 5, 1175, a, 21 sqq. b, 24, 
36 sqq. 1176, a, 17, c. 7, 1177, a, 
23, 1.9, 1099, a, 11, vii. 14, 1153, 
b, 29 sqq. and n. 1, supra. 


ETHICS 149 


and pleasure, he asserts the unconditioned superiority 
of the former as definitely as could be desired. A life 
devoted to enjoyment seems to him unworthy of man. 
The only activity which he admits to be properly human 
is the practical: the only one that is more than human 
is the theoretic.! Pleasure is not the end and motive 
of our actions, but only a necessary concomitant of 
activity according to nature. If the two could be 
separated, a good man would unconditionally prefer 
activity without pleasure to pleasure without activity ; ? 
but as a matter of fact it is of the very essence of virtue 
that we cannot separate pleasure from it, and that we 
find immediate satisfaction in virtuous activity without 
any addition of pleasure from without. From this point 
of view the purity of Aristotle’s ethics and the distinct- 
ness of his utterances are beyond suspicion. His 
account of external goods might with more reason he 
accused of making man too dependent upon merely 
natural and accidental advantages. Yet even these he 


ra gice ndéa, Toiadra 8 ai Kar’ 


1 See p. 140 sqq. supra. 
aperhy mpdtes, bore xat rovros 


2 Eth. x. 2 fin.: ovdels a” by 


ovdey 


€rorro Gv madiov Sidvoray Exwv 
Bid Blov, HSduevos e—’ ols Ta wadia 
ds oldy re pdAota, ovde xalpew 
moiay Tt Tav aicxlotwyr, undéwoTe 
péAAov Avwnbivat. mept woAAd TE 
orovdhy moinoalued’ by Kal ei unde- 
play emipépor Adovhy, ofov dpay, 
pvnuovevew, eidévai, Tas apeTas 
tyew. of 8 2E avdynns Emovrat 
rovtois fdoval, ovdiy Siapéper: 
frolucba yap ty taita Kal ei wh 
ylvoir’ am’ abtay hdovh. Cc. 6, see 
p. 142, n. 3, supra. 

* Thid. i. 9, 1099, a, 7: Fore 
Be nal 5 Blos ab’ray Kab’ airdy Hdvs 
. . « Tos BE PidrondaAors early Hdéa 


cigly Hdeiar Kal Kal? abrds, 
3) mpocdeira tis hoovijs 5 Bios 
a’tav Sonep mepidrrou Tivds, GAA” 
exer thy hdovhy ev éavtg. mpds 
trois eipnucvors yap ob8’ early ayabds 
5 wh xalpwv rais Kadais mpdteow 
... € 8 obtw, xa abras dy elev 
ai kar’ dpethy mpdters Hdeiae . 
tpictoy tpa Kal kddAcoroy 
fdioTrov h evdaimovla, Kat ov did- 
pirat TavTa . dmravta yap 
brdpxe: Taira Tais aplorais évep- 
yelas. Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a, 22: 
rootrdés éorw 5 omovdaios 6 5a 
why dperhy Ta dyabd dort Ta GAGS 
ayabd., 


al 


150 ARISTOTLE 


only recognises in so much and in so far as they are the 
indispensable conditions of a perfect life and the instru- 
ments of moral activity ;! and in this he is undoubtedly 
right. On the other hand, he is far from wishing to 
represent man as the sport of fortune. He is convinced 
that man’s happiness and misery depend upon his 
spiritual and moral condition ; that here alone we can 
look for the foundation of lasting satisfaction ; that the 
happiness of the virtuous man cannot easily be shaken 
by external fortune or changed into misery by the 
hardest lot.2 Aristotle declares as unhesitatingly as 
Plato? that the true goods are those of the soul: 
external and physical goods, on the other hand, are 


1 Hth. vii. 14, 1153, b, 16: 
ovdeu'a ‘yap evépyera TEAcLOS eu- 
modicouevn, 8 evdamovia Tay 
rerclwy’ 51d mpocdetrar 6 evdaruwr 
Tav ev cépatt ayabay Kal Tov 
éxtds Kal THs TUXNS, STwWS MH euTrO- 
St(nra Taira. of S& Tov TpoxLCd- 
pevov Kal roy dvoTuxias meydras 
nepimimrovta evdaluova pdoKovTes 
elvar, éav H &yabds [the Cynics: 
cf. Ph. d. Gr. i, 258, 3, 267, 4; 
but perhaps also PLATO: see ibid. 
743 sq.], 2 éxdvtes 7) &rovtes ovdev 
Agyouow. 1154, b, 11: How far 
have certain bodily enjoyments 
any value? 4 oftws Gyadal al 
avaykaia, Ott Kal To ph KaKdy 
ayabdy dori; 7 méxpt Tov ayabal 
ibid. i. 9 sq. 1099, a, 32. adbvarov 
yap ) ob pxdiov Ta Kara mparrew 
&xophynrov iivta.  mordAdAa yap 
apdrrerat, Kabdmrep 51’ dpydvev die 
gidwy kal mAovTou &c. b, 27: TaY 
8t Aowrav ayabay [besides virtue | 
Ta piv brdpxew avarykatov, Ta de 
cuvepya Kal xphowa mwépuKer 
épyavunas. Polit, vii. 1, 1323, b, 
40: Blos wey Upirros, Kal xwpls 


éxdot@ Kad Kowh tats médcow, 6 
peta aperiis Kexopnynueyns éml 
TocovToy hore meTéexew T@V Kat’ 
dpethy mpdtewy, Cf. p. 1448q.; 
Eth. Eud. i. 2 fin. 

2 Eth. i. 11,1100, b, 7: 7d meéev 
Tais TUXaLs emrakoAovOEly ovdapUms 
bp0dv: ob yap ev ravrats Td ed 7) 
Kak@s, GAA mpocdetrar TovTwy 6 
avOpémwos Blos, Kabdwep efrauer, 
kvpiat 8’ cioly ai Kat’ aperhy evéep- 
yea THs evdamovias, ai 5° évayrias 
Tod évavriov ... mept ovdey yap 
otrws imdpyer Ttwov dvOpwrivev 
tpywv BeBaidrns as mepl tas évep- 
vyelas Tas Kat’ GpeThy’ moviudTepat 
yap kal tov émornuay aitat do- 
Kovow elvat. 1101, a, 5: &OAios 
mtv ovdémore yévoit’ by 6 ed3aluwv, 
ov phy pakdpids ye, dv Tpraucats 
TbxXaLS TEpimeon. OVdE ToLKiAos “YE 
kal evperdBodos: his happiness 
will be disturbed only by many 
grievous misfortunes, from which 
he will again recover only with 
difficulty. 

3 Laws, v. 743, EB; Gorg. 508, . 
D sqq.; cf. Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 505 sq. 





ETHICS 151 


valuable only as means to the former.' He even 
expressly says that since true self-love consists in the 
effort after higher goods, it does not hesitate for the 
sake of friends and country to sacrifice all outward 
advantage and even life itself. Yet in all such cases the 
highest reward—that of the morally beautiful action— 
is reaped by the doer of it, since a great and beautiful 
action is of more value and affords a higher happiness 
than a long life which has accomplished nothing great.” 
Similarly, he holds that it is better to suffer than to do 
wrong, for in the former case it is only our body 


1 Bth. i. 8, 1098, b, 12: veve- 
pnuévey 5) Tav ayabay Tpix7, Kal 
Tav pev extds Aeyoudvwr, Tay Se 
mepl Wuxhv Kal caua, ra epi 
Wuxhy Kupitata Aéyouey Kal pd- 
Mora ayabd. Polit. vii. 1, 1323, 
a, 24: the happy man must pos- 
sess all three classes of goods; 
the only question is, in what 
degree and proportion. In re- 
spect of virtue, most people are 
very easily contented (ris aperijs 
Exew ikavdy elva: voulCovow droc- 
ovodv); with riches, power, and 
honour, on the other hand, there 
is no satisfying them. We must 
point out to them, 67: Kxra@vra 
Kal pvAdrrovow ov Tas apetas Tots 
éxtds, GAA’ exeiva tavTats, Kal Td 
Giv eddamdvws . . . brit maddAov 
bmdpxe: Tots Td HOos pey Kal Thy 
didvoray Kekoounuevots eis bmepBo- 
Ahy, A tots exeiva piv Kextnwévois 
rclw Tay xpnoluwy, ev dt TovTos 
€AAcimovew. Material posses- 
sions, like every instrument, 
have a natural limit imposed by 
the purpose for which they are 


_ used; increased beyond this limit 


they are useless or mischievous ; 


‘4% 

ce 
‘ 

“> 

= 

) 
; 
o 
+ sf 


spiritual goods, on the other 
hand, are valuable in proportion 
to their greatness. If the soul 
is of more value than the body 
and external things, the goods of 
the soul must be of more value 
than bodily and external goods. 
tre BE ris Wuxiis Evexev Tavita 
mépuxev aipera wal dei mdvras 
aipeicOar rovs eb ppovoivras, GAN’ 
ovn exelvwy Evenev Thy Wuxhv. The 
blessedness of the gods shows 
that happiness depends for its 
amount upon the degree of virtue 
and insight, ds eddaluwr méy éore 
kal paxdpios, 57 obfty 58 Tay 
eEwrepixav Gyabay GAAd 80 adrdy 
avtds Kal T@ woids Tis €lvar Thy 
gvow, and accordingly we dis- 
tinguish evdamovrla from ebtuxia. 

2 Eth. ix. 8, 1169, a, 6 sqq., 
where, among other things (see 
especially the passage cited, p. 
132). it is said, 9: Ta KdAAoTa 
mpdrrew Kowf tT’ dy mdv7’ fn Ta 
Séovra [2] Kal idlq éxdory Td wéyi- 
ota Tav ayaa, elrep h apeTh ToL- 
ovrév dotw, 31: eixdrws 5h Sone? 
omovdaios elyat, dyri mdytwy aipod- 
mevos Td Kaddy, 


152 ARISTOTLE 


or property that suffers, in the latter it is our character.! 
Aristotle thus keeps fast hold throughout of the principle 
with which he started in the investigation of the highest 
good—namely, that happiness consists primarily and 
essentially in acting according to reason, or in the 
exercise of a perfected virtue. Other goods can claim 
to be considered as good only sub modo: in so far as 
they are a natural product of this activity, like pleasure, 
or a means to its attainment, like outward and physical 
goods. Should, however, a case occur in which a choice 
must be made between the different goods, all others 
must give way before the moral and spiritual, since 
they alone are absolutely and unconditionally good.? 
If, then, virtue is the essential condition of happi- 
ness, the problem of Ethics is to investigate the nature _ 
of virtue and to exhibit its constituent parts ;3 ‘the 


question being of course confined to spiritual perfec- By 


tion.* 


1 Hth.v. 15, 1138, a, 28: it is 
an evil both to suffer injustice 
swag and to do it, the former 
being an éAarroy, the latter a 
TA€ov Exew Tov mecov, but to do 
injustice is worse, as it alone is 
Mera Kakias. 

* We have already seen this 
(p. 149), and shall find further 
in his theory of virtue that Ari- 
stotle admits only those as genu- 
ine virtues which seek their end 
in the moral activity itself; Eth. 
iv. 2 init.: ai 5& Kar’ aperhy 
mpdters Kadai kal Tod Kadovd evexa 
- . . 6 5€ Sidods . . . uh TOD KaAOD 
Eveka GAAG Sid Ti’ BAANY atriay, 
ovK €AevdEpios GAA’ BAAOS Tis pnO7H- 
OEeTQl. 


8 Eth. i. 13: ere 8 early 7 


Now this, like spiritual activity~itself, is of a 


evdaiuovia Wuxis évepyed Tis Kat’ 
apethv teAclav, mepl dperhs ém- 
oKeTTéov' TaXayap oUTws by BEATLOV 
kal mepl tis evdamovias Oewph- 
TAlmLeV, 

+ By the word dper} the 
Greek meant, as is well known, 
not only moral excellence but 
every accomplishment or perfec- 
tion that belonged to person or 
thing. In this sense it is used 
by Aristotle, e.g. Metaph. v. 16, 
1021, b, 20 sqq.; Mth. ii. 5 init. 
and passim. Here, however, 
where we are dealing with human 
happiness it can only be a ques- 
tion of spiritual excellences ; 
Eth. ibid. 1102, a, 13: wept aperijs 
d€ emioxenréoy avOpwrivns diAov 
bri. Kal yap Tayabby ayOpdmwvoy 


ETHICS 153 


twofold nature: intellectual (Scavontixy) and moral 
(j0cxy). The former-relates to the activity of reason 
as such, the latter to the control of the irrational 
elements of the soul by the rational. The one has its 
seat in thought, the other in will.!' Ethics has to do 
with the latter. aay 


2. Moral Virtue. 


To aid us in the investigation of the nature of 
Moral Virtue, Aristotle begins by indicating where 
we must look fgr_yirtue in general. It is not an 
emotion or a mere faculty, but a definite-quality of 
mind.(é£s).? Emotions as such are not the object of 





— 
, 


é(nrovuer kad rhy eddaimovlay avOpw- 
mivny. aperhy 5 A€youer avOpw- 
mivny ov Thy Tov Tduaros, GAAG Thy 
Tihs Wuxis* Kal thy evdaimoviay 5é 
Wuxiis évépyerav A€youev. 

' After discussing (£th. i. 13) 
the difference between the ra- 
tional and the irrational element 
in the soul, and distinguishing 
two kinds of the rational, that 
to which rationality attaches in 
a primitive, and that to which it 
attaches in a derivative, sense, 
thought and desire (see p. 114, 
n. 4, supra), Aristotle continues, 
1103, a,3: S:opiCera: 5% nal H dperh 
Kata Thy Siapopay tabrny* A€youev 

avTav Tas wey Siavontinas Tas 
Be HOiKas, copiay wey Kad civeow 
Kal ppdynow diavonruas, eAevdepid- 
TnTa 5& Kal awhpoctvny OiKds. 
He returns to this distinction at 
the beginning of Zth. ii. 1, and 


vi. 2. Ethical virtue is thus 
_| Yegarded as the product of desire 


ruled by reason, i.e. of will (see 
p. 114, supra), a view of it 


which is consistently maintained 
throughout. 

* This is obvious, not only 
from the name of this science 
and from isolated statements 
which describe mp@fs as its sub- 
ject, e.g. those referred to p. 181, 
n. 3, and th. ii. 2, 1104, a, 1, 
but from the plan of the Wico- 
machean Ethics as a whole, 
which must have been different 
had the object been the propor- 
tionate treatment of dianoétic 
and ethical virtue. On this 
point and on the discussion of 
the dianoétic virtues in the sixth 
book, see infra. 

* §% The relation of these three 
to one another is explained Zth. 
ii 4 init.: wel obv Ta ev TH Wuxt 
ywoueva tpla err, wdOn duvduers 
eteis, TobTwy ay ti etn % apert* 
Aéyw 5t wdOn wey ewiOvulay, dopyhy, 
pdBov, Opdcos, pPOdvoy, xapay, pidriary, 


‘picos, wébov, ¢HAov, EAcov, SAws ols 


Ererat n5ovh 2} Adwn, Suvduers Be 
Kad’ &s wabntixol TrovTwy Acyducba, 


154 ARISTOTLE 


praise or blame. In themselves they cannot make us 
either good or bad. They a are involuntary, whereas 
virt resupposes will. They 
indent certain movements: virtue and vice, on the 
other hand, are permanent states. Nor can a mere 
faculty be the object of moral judgment. Faculty is 
virtue_a r mured.' These differ 
finally from a mere faculty as well as from science (and 
art) in this, that while the latter embrace both of two 
opposites, the former refer exclusively to one: {the 
man who has the power and knowledge of good has the 
power and knowledge of evil also, but he who wills the 
good cannot also at the same time will the evil. / It is 
equally necessary, on the other hand, to distinguish 


innate ; 


virtue from mere external action as such. 


He who 


would act morally must not only do the right, but he 


must do it in the right frame of mind.® 


It is this, and 


not the outwardeffect, that gives to the action its moral 


worth.4 


oioy Kad’ &s Suvarol dpyicPjvar 7) 
AumnOijvat 7) €Aejoat, Efers SE Kad? 
&s mpos Ta maby @xoper ed 7) KaKds. 


On efts cf. p. 285, n. 3, supra. 


Ibid. 1105, b, 28sqq., ending 
with the words: 6 71 wéy ody éotl 


TO yéever ] dperh, elpnra, Cf. c. 
1, 1103, b, 21 sq. 
? Eth. v. 1, 1129, a, 11: obde 


yap toy astoy Exer tpdmov emi TE 
Tay émigTnua@y Kal duvducwy Ka) emt 
TOV Efewy, dbvapus wey yep kal 
éemiotiun Sore? Tav evaytiwy } avTy 
elvau (See p. 224, n. 3, supra), efis 5° 
n evaytia rév evayt hwy od, olov ard 
THS bytelas ov parr era Ta évavTia, 
GAAG Ta dyed wdvor. 

8 Eth. ii. 3, 1105, a, 28: re 
5& kard Tas dperas ywwépeva ovk éav 


‘Aristotle 


It is just this which makes virtue and moral 


aitd tws &xn, dinalws } cwppdvws 
mpdrr eran, GAAG Kal éedy 6 mpar Tov 
ws eXwy mpattTn. b, 5: TH mev 
ovv mpdyuara Sika Kad odppova 
Aéyetat, Stay 7H ToiadTa ola by 6 


‘Olatos 7) 6 oh pwv mpaterey* Sirasos 


dé Kal cHppwv éorly ovx 6 Taira 
TpaTTwv, GAA Kal 6 oftw mpdrTwv 
@s of Sikcsor kal of cadppoves mpar- 
tovow., vi, 13, 1144, a, 13 sqq. 
accordingly  distin- 
guishes between the just charac- 
ter and the just act, ibid. vi. 10, 
init. et al. (see below’. 

* Ibid. iv. 2, 1120, b, 7: od 
yap ev TS TWANG Tov Sidouévwv Td 
€AcvbEpiov. GAA’ ev TH TOU d.dd6yTOs 
eter, airy S& Kara thy ovctay 
didwour. 


ETHICS 155 


insight so hard: that we are dealing here, not with 
particular actions, but with the general character of the 
actor." 

Aristofle defines this character more accurately as 
a character of the will. In so doing he defines the 
Iimits of the moral sphere in both directions, distin- 
guishing moral yirtue, which has to do with action, from 
mere natural and therefore non-moral disposition on 
the one hand, and from mere knowledge which-has—no 
reference to human action_on-the other. The founda- 
tion and presupposition of morality lies in certain 
natural qualities. In order to be able to act morally, 
one must first be a man with a certain psychological 
and physical constitution ? and with a natural capacity 
for virtue;* for every virtue presupposes certain 
natural qualities (Pvovcal &£e.s), definite impulses and 
inclinations in which the moral qualities already to a 
certain extent reside.t This natural disposition, how- 


1 Ibid. v. 13 imit.: of 8 &v- 


he might indeed perform, dAAa@ 
Opwra ép’ Eavrois ofovrat elvar rd 


Td Seiraivew nal Td ddieiy ov 





addineivy, 3d Kal rd Sikasov elvat 
padiov. 7d 8 obk Earw- cvyyer- 
éo0a piv yap TH Tov yelrovos Kat 
mwutdta: toy mAnoloy xa) Sovva Ti 
Xeyl 1d dpytpiov pddiuv Kal én’ 
abTois, GAAG Td wd) ExovTas TavTa 
mociv obte pddioy obr’ en’ adrois. 
duolws Be Kal rd ywdvar Ta Sixaa 
kal Ta Bbika obdtr olovtar copdy 
elvat, Sts wept ay of vduot Aéyouow 
ov xaAemby Evvievar, GAA’ od TadT’ 
éotl Ta Sixaia ddA’ }} kara ocupBe- 
Bnxds, GAAG mas mpatréueva kal 
mas veudueva Sixaa. To know 
this is not an easy matter. On 
the same ground Aristotle adds 
that the just man cannot act 
unjustly. Particular outward acts 


7) taltTa mwoeivy éorl, tAhy Kara 
ouuBeBnkds, GAAa 7d GL ExovTa 
tavTa moe, Cf. p. 116. 

2 Polit, vii. 12, 1332, a, 38. 

8 Eth. ii. 1, 1103, a, 23: of?’ 
ipa pce: otre mapa piaow eyyi- 
vovTat ai dpetal, dAAG wepuKdat mev 
juiv défacOat abras, TeAcovpévols 
5é 31a tov Wovs. Polit. ibid. : 
dyabol ye Kal omrovdaio yiyvovra 
bia tTpiay. ta tpla Be raird éore 
ptois Gos Adyos. 

4 Hth. vi. 13, 1144, b,4: war 
yap Soxel Exacta Tav HOay imwdp- 
xew pio mos’ Kal yap Sixaso: Kal 
gwppovikol Kat dvdpeio Kal TaAAa 
Exouev edOds ex yeverfjs. (M. 
Mor, i, 35, 1197, b, 38, ii. 3, 1199, 


156 ARISTOTLE 


ever, is not yet moral. Itis found, not only in children, 
but even in the lower animals.'| When, therefore, 
Aristotle speaks of physical virtues, he expressly dis- 
tinguishes these from virtue in the proper sense of 
the word,? which consists in the union of natural 
impulse with rational insight and its subordination to 
it.* Natural disposition and the operation of natural 
impulses do not depend upon ourselves, whereas virtue 
is in our own power. The former are innate in us; the — 
latter_is gradually acquired | by practice. Aristotle 
carries this principle of excluding all involuntary moods 
and inclinations from the moral sphere so far as to 
extend it to the earlier stages of the moral life itself. 
He not only excludes emotions such as fear, anger, 
pity, &c., from the sphere of praise and blame,® but he 











b, 38, c. 7, 1206,b,9.) Cf. Polit. 
vii. 7, on the unequal distribution 
of moral and intellectual capacity 
in the different nations. 

1 H. An. i. 1, 488, b, 12, viii. 
1, ix. 1; see p. 38, n. 1, SUPTA ; 
Lith. ibid. ; seen. 3. 

2 7d Kuplws &yabby — % Kupla 
apeth, Lith. ibid. 

$ Ibid. 1144, b, 8: kal yap 
matot kab Onptors ai puvoial bwdp- 
Xovow Ekers, GAN’ &vev vod BAaBepad 
palvovra otoa .. . domep thpart 
ioxup@ evev Kyews Kivounévm oup- 
Baiver opddrccOa ioxupas Bid 7d 
BH Exew obi, ottw Kal evradba- 
eay 5 AdBn vodv, ev Ta mpdrrew 
Siapeper. 7 8° fis buola odca Té7’ 
Errat Kuplws aperh. 

* Eth. ii. 1, 1103, a, 17: 48 
NnOiuKh aperh e& Zous mepvylverau, 
d0ev Kal tovvoua %oxnxe biKpoy 
mapekkAtvov amd Tov eOous. e€& 08 
kal dfAov bri oddeula Tov HOiKaY 
apetay pice: huiv eyylyera: odbty 


yap Tav pice dvTwy KAdws Ol CeraL 

. &rt boa wey pdboe fury mapa~ 
yiverat, Tas Suvduets Tobitwy ™pd- 
TEpov Koui(ducba, torepov Se ras 
évepyelas amodldouer. Sight, for 
example, we do not receive by 
perception: it is the antecedent 
condition of perception. as 8’ 
Gpetas AauBdvouev évepyhoarres 
mpérepov : we become virtuous by 
moral, vicious by immoral, action. 
=: 10, 1179, b, 20 (referring, 
doubtless, as also does i. 10 init., 
to PLATO’s Meno, 70, A, 99, E): 
yiverOat 8 ayabods otovra of mey 
pioe, of & ee, of 5é didaxh. rd 
Mev odv Tis picews SHAov bs odk 
€p’ juiv smdpxe, drAAX Sid Twas 
Gelas aitias Tois &s dAndas evTUXe- 
ow wtmdpxet. On voluntariness 
as characteristic of moral virtue, 
ibid. ii. 4, 1196, a, 2, iii, 1 init. ; 
c. 4 init. and p. 115 sq., supra. 

° Eth. ii. 4, 1105, b, 28; see 
p. 154, n. 1, supra. 


= 


ETHICS 157 


draws a distinction between continence (éyxpareva) and 
virtue, incontinence and vice in the stricter sense.! In 
like manner he regards modesty rather as an emotion 
than as a virtue.” In all these states of mind Aristotle 
fails to find the universality of consciousness—action 
proceeding from a principle. He holds that nothing is 
moral which is not done with rational insight, nothing 
immoral which is not done in defiance of it. 

While virtue is impossible without insight, insight 
and morality are not identical. As will in general 
consists of the union of reason and desire,’ the moral 
quality of the will must be treated under the same 
category. Moral virtue is concerned with pleasure and 
pain, since it has to do with actions and emotions which 
cause these feelings: pleasure and pain are the primary 
source of desire,‘ and the criterion of all our actions,® 





' Thid. vii. 1, 1145, a, 17, 35; 
ibid. c. 9, 1150, b, 35, 1151, a, 27. 
Moderation, according to these 
passages, is a omovdala Exis, but 
not an dperh. 

* Tid. iv. 15, ii. 7, 1108, a, 
80: it is praiseworthy, indeed, 
but not a virtue; it is a weodrns 
év Tois mdbect. 

* On the will, see pp. 113 sq. 
and p. 126. 

* On this cf. also pp. 107 sqq. 

> th. ii. 2, 1104, b, 8: wept 
Hoovas yap Kal Avwas early h HOiK) 
Gperh did ev yap Thy jdovhy re 
Paira mpdrromer 51a 5& Thy Adwny 
Tav Kah@v amexducda . . . err 
ei Gperal eiot wep) mpdters Kad rdOn, 
wavrl dérdbe: Kal rdon mpdter érerar 
Hdovh wal Adwn, Kal Bia TodT’ dy 
ein 7 Gperh wep) jdovas Kad Avras. 
All moral failings spring from 
desire for pleasure and dislike of 


pain, and for this very reason are 
to be counteracted by punish- 
ments; larpeta ydp tivés eiow, al 
5élarpeia dia Tay evaytiwy reptKact 
yiverOa. . . bréKerrat Epa 4 Hdovh 
elvat 7) To.alrn wept Hdovas Ka) 
A’was tay BeAtiotrwy mpaxtich, 
5é kala robvayrioy . . . Tpiav yap 
bytwy Tav eis Tas aipéces Kal Tpiav 
Tay eis Tas puyds, KaAod cupdé- 
povros ndé€os, kal Tpidy Tay evaytiwy, 
aicxpod BAaBepod Avmnpod, wep) 
mdvra piv tadra dé a&yabos Karopd- 
wrikds éotw 6 dé kaxds Guaprnrinds, 
Kadota Bt wep Thy Hdovhy~ Kowwn 
Te yap arn trois (dos Kad waor 
Tois br Thy alpeoww wapakoAovbe? - 
kal yap 7d Kadrdy kal 7d cuudépov 
ndv palverar . .. KavoviCouey 5é 
kal ras modteis, of wey paardoy oi 8 
ftrov, ndovp Kal Ady... Sacre 

. wept ndovas Kal Avmas waca 
7 mpayuarela Kal ri dper# Kal rp 


158 ARISTOTLE 


to which we refer in a certain sense even the motives 
of utility and right.' Aristotle, therefore, controyerts 
the Socratic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.? 
His objection to this view is, broadly speaking, that it 
neglects the irrational element of the soul, the patho- 
logical side of virtue.2 When he proceeds to a closer 
investigation of its fundamental principle, he shows that 
it rests on false presuppositions. Socrates had main- 
tained that it was impossible to do evil knowing that it 
was evil and hurtful;4 Aristotle shows, on the contrary, 
that to say this is to overlook the distinction between 
purely theoretic and practical knowledge. For, in the 
first place, he remarks, we must distinguish between the 
possession of knowledge as mere skill, and knowledge 
as an activity. I may know that a certain action is 
good or had, but this knowledge may in the particular 
case remain latent, and in this way I may do evil with- 
out being conscious at the moment that it is evil. But, 





moAiTiKn* 6 pev yap ev TovToLs 
xpdmevos ayabds ora, 6 5€ kakws 
kakds. II. 5, 1106, b, 16: Aéyo 
dé thy HOiuKhy [aperhy]* atrn yap 
éori wept wéOn Kal mpdtes, Ibid. 1. 
24, iii. 1 init. (see p. 117, n.2,sup.), 
vii. 12, 1152, b, 4, 1172, b, 21; x. 
7; see p.148,n.1, supra. Phys. 
vii. 8, 247, a, 23: nal 7d BAov Thy 
Houchy aperhy ev ndovais kat Avmas 
civat ouuBéBnkev? yap Kar’ 
evépyetay 7d THS dovyasS 7 Sie 
pevipnv 2 awd ris eamldos. Poi. 
viii. 5, 1340, a, 14. 

1 This statement (Zth. ii. 2: 
see preced. .) might seem sur- 
prising, as Aristotle draws a very 
clear distinction between plea- 
sure and the good (v. p. 140 sq.). 


It must be taken, however, in 
the light of what is said above, 
p. 149, n. 3. The thought of 
the good operates upon the will 
through the medium of feeling, 
the good presenting itself 
as something desirable and 
affording pleasure and satisfac- 
tion. 

2 Eth. vi. 18, 1144, b, 17 sqq. 
vii. 5, 1146, b, 31 sqq. cf. c. 3 
init. x. 10, 1179, b, 23; Hud. i. 5, 
1216, b, vii. 13 fin.; M. Mor. i. 
1, 1182, a, 15, c. 35, 1198, a, 10. 

3 As may be concluded from 
the statements in Zth. vi. 13, ¢, 
2, 1139, a, 31, and especially U. 
M.i.1. Cf. p. 157, n. 5, supra. 

4 See Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 118 sq. 


ETHICS 159 


in the second place, concerning the content of this 


knowledge, we have to distinguish between the general 


principle and its practical application. For if every 
action consists in bringing a particular case under a 
general Jaw,' it is quite conceivable that the agent, 
while he knows and presents to himself the moral law 
in its universality, yet may neglect the application of it to 
the particular case and permit himself to be here deter- 
mined by sensual desire instead of by moral principle.” 
While, therefore, Socrates had asserted that no one is 
voluntarily wicked, Aristotle maintains, on the contrary, 


that man is master of his actions, and_even makes this 


voluntariness s of, action | the distinguishing mark of the 
practical a as opposed to the theoretic life. In like 
manner practical activity is distinguished from artistic. 


In art the chief thing is knowledge or skill to produce 











certain works : in conduct, itis will. In the former the — 


object is that the production should be of a certain 
character; in the latter the essential thing is that the 
agent himself should be so. There the man who errs 
intentionally is the better man; here it is the man who 
errs unintentionally.‘ 

Moral activity, then, according to Aristotle,> con- 
sists in the union of the merely natural activity of 
impulse with the rational activity of insight, or, more 


' Cf. p. 110, n. 1, supra. 183, n. 2, and p. 107, n. 2, supra. 


2 Eth, vii. 5, which deals * See pp. 115 sqq. supra. 
primarily with excess. Another ‘ Eth. ii. 3 (see i. 6), vi. 5, 


characteristic of action as dis- 1140, b, 22; Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, 
tinguished from knowledge— _ b, 22. 

which, however, Aristotle does 5 Eth. vi. 5, 1140, b, 22 cf. v. 
not mention in this connection— i.1129,a,83 Metaph. v. 29 fin. 
has already been mentioned, p. 


‘% 


158 ARISTOTLE 


to which we refer in a certain sense even the motives 
of utility and right.' Aristotle, therefore, controyerts 
the Socratic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.? 
His objection to this view is, broadly speaking, that it 
neglects the irrational element of the soul, the patho- 
logical side of virtue.* When he proceeds to a closer 
investigation of its fundamental principle, he shows that 
it rests on false presuppositions. Socrates had main- 
tained that it was impossible to do evil knowing that it 
was evil and hurtful;4 Aristotle shows, on the contrary, 
that to say this is to overlook the distinction between 
purely theoretic and practical knowledge. Tor, in the 
first place, he remarks, we must distinguish between the 
possession of knowledge as mere skill, and knowledge 
as an activity. I may know that a certain action is 
good or had, but this knowledge may in the particular 
case remain latent, and in this way I may do evil with- 
out being conscious at the moment that it is evil. But, 





modiTiuKn* 6 pey yap ev TovToLs 
xpdmevos Gyabds ~orat, 6 5é kakas 
kakds. II. 5, 1106, b, 16: Aéyw 
dé thy HOiny [aperhy]* arn ydp 
eort wept wé0n Kat mpdtes, Lbid. 1. 
24, iii. init. (see p.117,n.2,sup.), 
vii. 12, 1152, b, 4, 1172, b, 21; x. 
T; see p. 143, n.1, supra. Phys. 
vii. 8, 247, a, 23: kal 7d BAov Thy 
Houchv aperhy ev ndovais kal Admais 
elvat ocuuBéBnkev® 7 yap Kar’ 
evépyeray Td THs TdovnS 7 Sid 
vipnv 2) ard ris éAmibos. Pol. 
viii. 5, 1340, a, 14. 

1 This statement (Zth. ii. 2: 
see preced. .) might seem sur- 
prising, as Aristotle draws a very 
clear distinction between plea- 
sure and the good (v. p. 140 sq.). 


It must be taken, however, in 
the light of what is said above, 
p. 149, n. 3. The thought of 
the good operates upon the will 
through the medium of feeling, 
the good presenting itself 
as something desirable and 
affording pleasure and satisfac- 
tion. 

2 Eth. vi. 18, 1144, b, 17 sqq. 
vii. 5, 1146, b, 31 sqq. cf. c. 3 
init. x. 10, 1179, b, 23; Hud. i. 5, 
1216, b, vii. 13 fin.; M. Mor. i. 
1, 1182, a, 15, c. 35, 1198, a, 10. 

8 As may be concluded from 
the statements in Zth. vi. 13, ¢, 
2, 1139, a, 31, and especially UW. 
M.i.1. Cf. p. 157, n. 5, supra. 

4 See Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 118 sq. 





ETHICS 159 


in the second place, concerning the content of this 
knowledge, we have to distinguish between the general 
principle and its practical application. For if every 
action consists in bringing a particular case under a 
general Jaw,' it is quite conceivable that the agent, 
while he knows and presents to himself the moral law 
in its universality, yet may neglect the application of it to 
the particular case and permit himself to be here deter- 
mined by sensual desire instead of by moral principle.? 
While,. therefore, Socrates had asserted that no one is 
voluntarily wicked, Aristotle maintains, on the contrary, 
that manis master of his actions, and_even makes this 
voluntariness of action the distinguishing mark of the 
practical as as opposed t to the theoretic life? In like 
manner practical activity is distinguished from artistic. 
In art the chief thing is knowledge or skill to produce 











certain works :in conduct, itis will. In the former the © 


object is that the production should be of a certain 
character; in the latter the essential thing is that the 
agent himself should be so. There the man who errs 
intentionally is the better man; here it is the man who 
errs unintentionally.‘ 

Moral activity, then, according to Aristotle,> con- 
ee the anion of the merely natural activity of 
impulse with the rational activity of insight, or, more 


' Cf. p. 110, n. 1, supra. 183, n. 2, and p. 107, n. 2, supra. 


2 Eth. vii. 5, which deals ® See pp. 115 sqq. supra. 
primarily with excess. Another * Eth. ii. 3 (see i. 6), vi. 5, 


preenctettatic of action as dis- 1140, b, 22; Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, 
ished from knowledge— _ b, 22. 
hich, however, Aristotle does 5 Eth. vi. 5, 1140, b, 22 cf. v. 
enn mention in this connection— i.1129,a,83 Metaph. v. 29 fin. 
has already been mentioned, p. 


“i 


162 ARISTOTLE 


that which avoids the extremes of excess and defect, 
and thus preserves the proper mean:! and conversely, 
wrong activity is that which deviates on one side or the 
other from this boundary line.? In further determining 
the nature and position of the ‘ pro an, we have to 
take into account, not merely the object of our action, 
but, what is much more important, our own personal 


nature. The problem of igealiay”"Sonio. HOM the 
proper mean relating to ourselves: in feeling and action 
neither to overstep or fall short of the limit set by the 
character of the agent, the object and the circum- 


stances.4 Aristotle admits, indeed, that this description 


nace &peth, ov dy Hh apeTh, advTd TE 
ed €xov amoteAct Kal 7d éEpyov 
avrov ev amodidwow . . . €t OY TOUT’ 
éml mavTwv obrws EXEt, Kal 7 Tov 
avOpa@roy apeT) ein av étis ap’ hs 
dyads tivOpwmos yiverat kal ap’ Hs 
ed Td EauToU Epyoy arodacet, 

1 Thid. 1106, b, 8: «i 8) waca 
emior hun oUTw Td Epyov ed emitEAEl, 
mpos To mécov BA€movoa Kal eis 
TovTo &youca Ta epya. (...@s THs 
pev bmrepBodjs Kal THs eAAchbews 
plepovans Td ed, Tis dé HeodrnTos 
cwCovons) . .  & apeth maons 
TEXTS: dupiBeor épa kal dpelveov 
early, domep kal 7 pvots, TOV pécou 
dy etn OTOXACTIKN. 

2 Aristotle remarks that either 
the virtue or the vice have not 
unfrequently no name tq desig- 
nate them in common language ; 
Eth. ii. 7, 1107, b, 1,.7, 30, 1108, 
a, 5,-16, iii. 10, 1115, b, 25, c. 14, 


1119, a, 10, iv. 1, 1119, %.34, o- 


10 sq., 1125, b, 17, 26, c. 12, 1126, 
b, 19, c. 13, 1127, a, 14. 

3 Thid. 1106, a, 26: €y marr) 
8) ouvEexet Kal diapere@s fort AaBelv 
Td mev mwretov To eAarrov Td 8’ 
icov, kat ratte % Kar? advrd rd 


mpérypuot } mpds nuas: 7rd 8 toov 
MEGOV TL drepBorijs kal eArelpews. 
Aéyw SE TOU ev mparymaros MEérov 
To toov améxov a’ Exarépov TeV 
&Kpwv, Sep early ev nal radrdy 
Tao, pds nuas be b ufre wmAcovacer 
bnhre eAdelimet. TovTOS odx Ev ovdE 
TavTov macw. If, for example, 
two cutlets are too little food, 
while ten are too much, the 
Mégov Kata To mpayua would be 
six: this amount, however, might 
be too much for one, too little for 
another: oitw 65) was émorhpwv 
Thy bmepBoAny bev Kal Thy EAAewiy 
pebyet, To 5 pwéoov Gnret kal TOO? 
aipetrat, HEeooy d€ ov 7d Tov mpty- 
Matos GAAG Tb mpds Tuas. 

4 Ibid. 1106, b, 16 (after the 
words quoted i inn.1 supra): Aeyo 
de thy HOuhy [aperfv] « airn yap 


éort wept mdOn Kal mpdtes, ev Ee 


TOUTOLS éorly dmepBord Kal EAAeupis 
kal Td wécov, oiov Kal poBnOjva 
kal Oappiica Kal emibuujoa Kai 
opycOjvat Kat eAejoa Kal bAws 
noOjva. Kal AvanOjva ~ore Kal 
MaAAov Kal ArTov, Kal aupdrepa 
ovk ed* Td 8 bre Sez Kal ep’ ois kal 
mpos ods Kat ov Evexa Kal ws Sei, 


ETHICS 163 


is still a very general one, and that we have to look 
closer if we would discover the proper mean, and with 
it the right criterion of action (the dp0ds Adyos) ;! but 
he can only here refer us to practical insight, whose 
business it is to mark out what is right in particular 


cases; and he therefore defines virtue as ‘that quality 
of the will which preseryes the mean suitably to our 


nature, conformably to a reasonable definition, such as 
the man of insight would give.’ ? 

| rom this point of view Aristotle goes on to deal 
with the particular virtues, without any attempt to 
deduce them from any one definite principle. Even the 
suggestions towards such a deduction which were to be 
found in his own theory as above stated, he left on one 
side. Seeing that he had investigated the idea of 
‘Happiness,’ and had found in ‘ Virtue’ the essential 
means thereto, he might have made an attempt to define 
the various kinds of activity which enable us to reach 
this end, and so haye sought to arrive at the main kinds 
of ‘ Virtue.’ He does, however, nothing of the kind. 
Even where he gives us certain indications of the points 
of view from which he deals with the order of the 















mécov Te Kat Uprorov, Srep dor) Tis 
Gperis. Suoiws dt Kai wepl ras mod- 
fers early daepBodr Kal EdAdrAEuis 
Kal Td wécov .... werdrns Tis bpa 
early h aperh, croxacriKh ye odoa 
Tov péoov, Cf. foll. n. 

' Eth. vi. 1: we ought to 
choose, as before remarked (ii. 5) 
the pécoy, not the dwepBoad? or 
EAAewis—td BE pévov eorly as 6 
Adyos 6 dpObs Ayer. In every- 
thing éorl ris oxowds mpds dy dro- 
Brera 5 toy Adyov Exwv emereiver 
kal avinow, «al tis eoriv bpos Trav 


pecorhnrwy, &s weratd payey elva 
Tis bwepBodr7js Kal Tis édAAchpews, 
ovoas Kara tdv dp0dv Adyor. For: 
dé 7d uty elteiy obs GAnbey wey, 
obey St capes... 51d Se? Kal ep) 
Tas THS wWuxis Ee wh wdvov 
GAnbes elvat rovr’ elpnuévoy, GAA 
kai BSiwpionevoy tls vr’ early 6 
6pOds Adyos kal robTov Tis Spos. 

* Tbid, ii. 6 init.: torw tpa 4 
aperh) Ekis mpoaiperinh ev pecdrnri 
otoa TH mpds has, dpirpéevy Adyp 
kal ws dv 6 ppdviuos dploeter. 


mM 2 


164 


ARISTOTLE 


ethical virtues in his treatment of them, these points of 
view are themselves in no way based on any principle.’ 


1 After defining virtue as 
uecérns, Aristotle continues, Lth. 
ii. 7: from the general statement 
we must turn to particular in- 
stances of the principle. ep) mév 
ody dBovs Kat Odppn avdpela 
peodrns, .. . jwept Hdovas SE kal 
Avmas [those, é¢e., as is here 
hinted, and definitely stated in 
iii. 13,1117, b, 27 sqq. of ap} and 
vedas] swppootvn ... . mepl Be 
ddow xpnudtrav Kal Ajww... 
éAcvOpidrns ; to these belongs also 
meyadompéemera* mept 5€ Tiuyv Kal 
arislay... meyadopuxla, and the 
corresponding anonymous vir- 
tue the dmepBoay of which is 
ambition. €or: 5¢ wal wep) dpyiiv 

. peodtns, which he calls 
mpaotns. Furthermore, there are 
three pecdtnTes which relate to 
Kowwvia Adywv kal mpdgewv, one to 
To GAnbés in these (ane), the 
two others to 7d 75%, the one 
(p. 169, n. 6, infra), ev maidiG, 
the other (p. 169, n. 4, infra), 
év mao. Tois kata Tov Blov, Of 
bravery and owopoctvn it is 
further remarked, iii. 13 : doxover 
yap Tav Gddywv pep@v abrat elvat 
ai dperai. This classification, 
however, is a loose one, nor is 
any clearly defined principle 
discoverable in it. HACKER’S 
attempt in his interesting essay 
(Das Hintheilungs- und Anord- 
nungsprincip der moralischen Tu- 
gendreihe in der nikomachischen 
Ethik, Berl. 1863) to show that 
Aristotle is guided by such a 
principle imports, apparently, 
more into his account than is 
admissible. According to this 
view, Aristotle intended to indi- 
cate in the first place those 


virtues which consist in the sub- 
ordination of the lower instincts 
that are concerned with the 
mere defence and maintenance 
of life: bravery the virtue of 
Ouuds, temperance the virtue of 
émiOuuta, The second group of 
virtues (liberality, love of honour, 
gentleness, and justice, which is 
placed last for special reasons) 
have for the sphere of their 
exercise political life in time of 
peace, and the part which the 
individual takes in affairs of 
state, as well as the positions he 
occupies in it; the third the 
amenity of life, rd ed (jv. Butit 
is impossible to show that Ari- 
stotle founds his classification of 
the virtues upon this scheme. 
In the first place, the reason 
which he himself gives for con- 
necting bravery and _ self- 
command with one another is 
that they stand for the virtues of 
the irrational parts of a man; 
this is only to say (unless, with 
RAMSAUER, we reject the words 
altogether) that it is suitable 
to discuss self-command along 
with bravery because it has 
been customary since the time 
of Plato to name these two 
together as the virtues of @uuds 
and 7d ém@uuntixdy respectively. 
Had he been governed by those 
principles of classification which 
Hacker ascribes to him, he must 
have classed mpgérns along with 
bravery. If the latter is the 
subordination of the instinct of 
self, the former is (iv. 11) the 
peodrns mepl dpyds: but anger 
springs from the instinct of 
revenge, which, like bravery, has 





ETHICS 


165 


There is therefore nothing for us to do bat to set out, 
without reference to any exact logical connection, what 
Aristotle has himself said as to those virtues which he 


enumerates. 


The preliminary proposition, that there are more 


its seat in @vuds (iv. 11, 1126, a, 
19 sqq.; Rhet. ii. 2 init. 12, 1389, 
a, 26: nat avBpedrepo [oi véor]: 
Oupdders yap . . . obre yap dpyt- 
(éuevos ovdels poBetrat, cf. p. 583, 
2), and which, like it (2th. iii. 
11, 1116, b, 23 sqq.), we share 
with the brutes. Anger and 
bravery, therefore, are so closely 
related that it is often difficult 
to distinguish them from one 
another (Zth. ii. 9, 1109, b, 16 
sqq., iv. 11, 1126, b, 1, ef. het. ii. 
5, 1383, b, 7), and in Rhet. ii. 8, 
1385, b, 30, anger is even called 
a mwd0os avdplas. If, notwith- 
standing this relationship, the 
peodrns mepl tas dpyas is said to 
belong to a different group of 
virtues from bravery, on the 
ground that the latter springs 
only from the instinct ‘to pre- 
serve the vegetative life,’ while 
anger is concerned chiefly with 
injuries inflicted upon the 
honour of a citizen (HACKER, 


- p. 15, 18), this is scarcely con- 


sistent with the statements of 
Aristotle. Eth. iv. 11, 1125, b, 
30, he says expressly of anger: 
rd St gumootvtTa ToAAG Kal diapé- 
povra, and, on the other hand, of 
bravery, that it does not consist 
in not fearing death under any 
circumstances, but in not fearing 
death év rois xadAlorois,especially 
in war (iii. 9, 1115, a, 28), which 
has a much more direct relation 
to political life than the loss of 
merely personal honour. So far 


indeed, is Aristotle from seeing 
in bravery only the weodrns of an 
animal instinct, in anger that is 
properly directed and controlled 
that of a higher instinct which 
is concerned with civil life, that 
he declares (th. iii. 11, 1116, b, 
23-1117, a, 9): when men 
despise danger from anger or 
desire for revenge (épy:(éuevor, 
Tiwpovmevor) they can no more be 
called brave than an animal when 
it rushes in rage [dia tov Oupdy, 
which here hardly differs from 
épyz] upon the huntsman who 
has wounded it. Nor does the 
position assigned to the virtues 
which are concerned with the 
use of money admit of being 
explained on the ground that 
riches always secure a certain 
social station to its possessor 
(HACKER, p. 16), for there is no 
allusion in Aristotle to this point 
of view, although in the case of 
peyadonpéreia (not, however, of 
éAevéepiorns) mention is made, 
among other things, of expendi- 
ture for public purposes. If, on 
the other hand, this had been the 
principle of classification, bravery 
in war would have found a place 
in this group. Finally, it cannot 
be said that the third group con- 
cerns 7d ed Gjv any more closely 
than the other two ; for ed ¢jv in 
the Aristotelian sense, self- 
command, liberality and justice, 
are certainly more important 
than 7rd 75d év mardi. 


166 ARISTOTLE 


virtues than one, is established by Aristotle, against 
the position of Socrates, who had reduced them all to 
‘Insight.’ Aristotle himself admits that all completed 
Virtue is in its essence and principle one and the same, 
and that with Insight all other virtues are given.! 
Yet at the same time he shows that the natural basis 
of virtue—the moral circumstances—must be different 
in different cases. The will of the slave, for example, is 
different from the will of the freeman: the will of the 
woman and the child is not the same as the will of the 
adult man. Therefore he holds that the moral activity 
of different individuals ls_must be “different. Not only 
willone individual possess a particular virtue which 
others do not possess, but it is also true that different 
demands must be made on each particular class. of 
men.” Aristotle says very little (and that not in his 
Ethics, but in his Gconomics) of the 











virtues of the 


1 Hth. vi. 13, 1144, b, 31: obx 
oidy Te ayabby ecivar Kupiws tvev 
ppovntews, ovde ppdviusy avev Tijs 
noicjs aperjs. It appears, indeed, 
as though the virtues could be 


avTov Ttpdmov, GAA’ Boov ExdoTw 
mpos Td abrov épyov. did Tov mer 
apxovra reAcay exew Sel Thy 
HOikhy aperhv, ... tov 8 kAdrwv 
exacroy cov émiBdAAEL avrors. 


separated from one another; ov 
yap 6 avtds edpvéctaros mpbds 
andocas, dore thy wey Hdn thy 8 
ovTw eiAnpas Era. This is not 
really SO: TOUTO yap kaTa& pmev Tas 
puornds operas évdéxerat, Kad’ ds Se 
awA@s Aeyerat Gyabos, ovK evdé- 
meres: Ga. yep TH ppovjce Mig 
oton macau Smdpkovaw, 

* See preceding n. and Polit. 
vi. 13, 1260, a, 10: waow évumdpxet 
wey Ta pedpec THs Wuxhs, GAr’ 
evumdpxet Staepdytws oa duolws 
Tolvuy dvarykatoy exe kal repl TAS 
Oucas aperds ° bwoAnmréov deiy 
uey meTéxerv mavTas, GAA’ ov Toy 


ore pavepby brit éorly Ouch aperh 
TOY cipnuevioy TAYT WY, Kal ovx n 

avTh cwppocvyn yuvaikds kad davdpds, 
&c. Although it is not here 
said that one virtue can exist 
without the others, and although 
on the other hand, this is ad- 
mitted Hth. vi. 13 to be the case 
only with the physical virtues, yet 
the imperfect virtue of slaves or 
women must be regarded as an 
incomplete and partial posses- 
sion, which excludes the com- 
prehensive virtue of insight, and 
therefore extends to some and 
not to others, 


ETHICS 167 


several classes. In the Ethics he treats of Virtue in its 
perfected form, which it assumes in man, whom alone he 
elsewhere regards as the perfect type of humanity, and it 
is of this alone that he describes the constituent parts. 
Bravery! stands at the head of the list of the virtues. 
He is brave who does not fear a glorious death or the 
near danger of death, or more generally he who endures, 
dares or fears what he ought to, for the right object, in 
the right way and at the right time.” The extremes 
between which Bravery stands as the mean are: on the 
one side Insensibility and Foolhardiness, and on the other 
Cowardice.* Nearly related to Bravery, but not to be 
identified with it, are Civil Courage and the courage 
which springs from compulsion, or anger, or the wish 
to escape from a pain,‘ or which is founded upon fami- 
liarity with the apparently terrible or upon the hope of 
a favourable result.® Self-control® follows as the second 
virtue, which, however, Aristotle limits to the preserva- 











' Eth. iii, 9-12. 

2 ©. 9, 1115, a, 33: 6 wept roy 
Kaddyv Odvarov adehs Kal boa Odvarov 
emipéper bméyuia byta. c. 10, 1115, 
b, 17: 6 wev ody & Sei Kal ob Evera 
brouévwv Kad poBoduevos, kal ws Sez 
kal bre, Suolws 5¢ Kal Oappar, avdpeios: 
kar’ atlavy yap, Kal as adv 6 Adyos, 
mdoxer Kal mpdrret 6 dvdpeios . . . 
Kadov dh evexa 5 advdpetos brouéver 
kal mpdrre: Ta KaTda Thy dvdpelav. 
Cf. Rhet. i. 9, 1366, b, 11. 

$C. 10, 1115, b, 24 sqq. 

* As in suicide, which Ari- 
stotle therefore regards as a 
mark of cowardice; iii. 11, 
1116, a, 12, cf. ix. 4, 1166, b, 11. 

-§ ©.88 (where, however, 1117, 
a, 20, the words 7 wal must be 
omitted). Of these, roArrixh av- 


VOL, I. 


5pela most closely resembles true 
bravery (1116, a, 27), Src’ 3: 
aperhy yiverar: 8: aida yap Kar 
dia KaAod Spetw (Tims yap) Kal 
guyhv dvelSous algxpov byrTos, 
Nevertheless Aristotle distin- 
guishes between them, moditix) 
avdpela being heteronomous to 
the extent that the brave deed is 
not done for its own sake, 

5 Swhpoctvn, c. 13-15, in 
contrast to dGkoAacia and to a 
species of insensibility for which 
there is no name, as it is not 
found among men (c, 14, 1119, a, 
9; cf. vii. 11 imit.: Aristotle 
would perhaps have ascribed this 
failing, of which he says, «i 5é 
Te pndév eorw dd pndt diapeper 
Erepov érépov, méppw adv en Tod 

*u4 


168 


ARISTOTLE 


tion of the proper mean in the pleasures of touch and 
in the satisfaction of the merely animal and sexual 
impulses. Next comes Generosity,’ as the proper mean 
between Avarice and Extravagance,’ the attitude in 
giving and taking external goods which is at once 
moral and worthy of a free man,* and the kindred virtue 


of Munificence in expenditure.‘ 


&vOpwros elva, to the Ascetics 
of a later time); cf. vii. 8, 1150, 
a, 19 sqq. and the passages re- 
ferred to below from book vii. 
upon éyxpdrea and axpacta; Rhet. 
ibid 1. 13. In the words with 
which he opens this discussion, 
mera 8& tab’rny [bravery] epi 
cwppocivns Aéywuev' SoKkotor 
yip Tav GAdywv pepGv abrar elvat 
ai dperat, Aristotle is referring to 
Plato’s doctrine; he himself has 
no reason to ascribe bravery, any 
more than moral virtue as a 
whole, to the irrational element 
in the soul. 

1 Or, more correctly, libera- 
lity, éAevBepidrns. 

” *AveAeviepia and dowria. The 
worse and more incurable of 
these faults is avarice, Hth. iv. 
3, 1121, a, 19 sqq. 

8 Eth. iv. 1-3. The noble 
spirit in which Aristotle handles 
this subject may be seen, among 
other passages, in c. 2 init.: ai 5€ 
kar’ dperhy mpageis nodal Kal Tov 
Kadod Evera. Kal 6 édevdépios ody 
déoet Tod Kadod Evexa Kal dp%as 

.. kal Tadta Ndéws 7) GAvMws* Td 
yap Kat’ dperhy 750 2 &AvTor, 
heiora € Auvmnpdv 6 5é didods ols 
ah Set, } wh Tov KaAOD Evexa GAAG 
did Ti’ BAAnv aitiav, ovK eAevIEpios 
GAA’ BAAOs Tis pyOhoera. ovd' 6 
Aumno@s* waAAov yap EAoit?’ dv Ta 
XpPiuata THs KAAS mpdtews, TOVTO 


Magnanimity°® (in his 


8 ovK eAevepiov. 

* Meyadompéreia, ibid. 4-6, 
which is defined, 1122, a, 23, by 
the words év peyé0e mpémrovea 
daravn: it stands midway be- 
tween pixpompémea, on the one 
hand, and Bavavola and d&mreiporarla 
onthe other. It differs from éAev- 
Oepidrns in having to do, not only 
with the right and proper, but 
with the sumptuous expenditure — 
of money (iv. 4, 1122, b, 10 sqq., 
where, however, 1. 18, we shall 
have to read, with Cod. L? M», 
kal éoTw Epyou pmeyadorpémeta 
&ipeTh ev meyeber : ‘ueyaromperesa is 
excellence of work in great 
matters,’ and explain 1. 12 as 
meaning either ‘the magnitude 
here is contributed by the peya- 
Aomper)js, being a sort of great- 
ness of liberality in respect to 
the same objects,’ or ‘it is the 
magnitude here which con- 
stitutes, so to speak, the great- 
ness in the munificence, &c.;’ 
unless we prefer the surmise of 
Rassow, forsch. tib. d. nikom. 
Ethik. 82, who inserts ‘ AaBovons’ 
after uéyed0s, which might easily 
have fallen out owing to the 
ovons which follows, so that the 
meaning is ‘liberality which is 
directed to the same object at- 
taining a sort of grandeur’ ), 
Rhet. i. 9, 1366, b, 18. 

5 MeyadoWuxia as midway be- 


— 


ETHICS 


169 


description of which Aristotle has, perhaps, before his 
mind the example of his great pupil), honourable ambi- 
tion,’ Gentleness,’ the social virtues* of Amiability,' 
Simplicity,’ Geniality® in company follow: and to these 
are added the graces of temperament,’ Modesty,® and 


righteous Indignation.°® 


tween meanness of spirit (u:xpo- 
Wuxla) and vanity (xavvdrns), iv. 
7-9; Rhet. ibid. MeyaddWuxos is 
(1123, b, 2) 6 weydAwy abrdy atia@v 
&iios Sv: this virtue, therefore, 
always presupposes actual ex- 
cellence. 

1 This virtue is described, 
Eth. iv. 10, as the mean between 
pirdotmla and apirdotimla, which is 
related to peyadoWuxla as éeAev- 
Bepidrns is to meyaAompéerea, but 
for which there is no proper 
word. 

* The peadrns mwepl dpyds, iv. 
11. Aristotle calls this virtue 
mpaérns, the corresponding vices 
dpyiAdrns and dopynala, remark- 
ing, however, that all these 
names are coined by him for the 
purpose. The mpgos is accordingly 
defined as 6 éq’ ofs Sez wal ofs Sez 
dpyComevos, ert BE Kal ws Se? kal 
bre xal bcov xpévor. Ibid. on the 
a«pdxoAdos and the xadends. 

% Which Aristotle himself, iv. 
14 fin., comprises under this 
title. 

* Using the word to designate 
the nameless virtue which, Zth. 
iv. 12, is opposed on the one side 
to complaisance and flattery, on 
the other to unsociableness and 
moroseness, and described as the 
social tact which knows déuiAciv 
@s Sez, Aristotle there remarks 
that it closely resembles :Aia, 
but differs from it in not resting 
upon inclination or dislike to- 


wards particular persons. Zud. 
iii. 7, 1233, b, 29, it is simply 
called $:Aia. 

° The likewise nameless mean 
between vain-boasting (4Aa(oveia) 
and self-depreciation (cipwyela, 
of which the extreme is seen in 
the Bavxoravodpyos),iv 13. 

® EvrpameAla or émidekiérns (iv. 
14), the opposites being Bwpodro- 
x'a and aypidrns. Here also it 
is a question of social tact (cf. 
1128, b, 31: 6 8h xaples Kar 
€Acvbepios obtws Eker, ofov véduos 
dy éavrg), with especial reference, 
however, to the entertainment of 
society. 

7 Mecérnres évy rots mdbect 
kal évy trois wept ra mdOn (ii. 7, 
1108, a, 30), called peodrnres 
madnrixai, Hud. iii. 7 init. Among 
these, Hud. iii. 7 classes also 
pirla, ceuvdrns, GAROea, and 
ardérns, evtpameAla, 

8 Aidés. See Hth. iv. 15, ii. 
7 (p. 157, n. 2, supra). The 
modest man, according to these 
passages, is the mean between 
the shameless and the bashful 
man (katrawAft). Modesty, how- 
ever, is not so much a virtue in 
the proper sense asa praiseworthy 
affection suitable only for youth, 
as the adult should do nothing 
of which he requires to be 
ashamed, 

* Only in ii. 7, 1108, a, 35 
sqq., where it is described as 
heodtns pOdvov kal emyaipexaxtas : 


ARISTOTLE 


Justice, however, claims the fullest treatment, and 
Aristotle has devoted to it the whole..of.the fifth book 


of his Ethics! Considering the close connection be- 
tween the Hthics and the Politics, it was necessary that 
special attention should be paid to the virtue upon 
which the maintenance of the commonwealth most 
directly depends. Justice, however, is not here to be 
understood in the wider sense in which it is equivalent 
to social virtue as a whole,? but in its narrower mean- 
ing, as that virtue which has to do with the distribution 
of goods, the preservation, namely, of the proper mean*® 


170 








or proportion in assigning advantages or disadvantages. * 


it concerns joy and sorrow at the 
fortunes of others, and consists 
in Td AvmeicOa emi Tots avatlws eb 
mpdtrovow. Similarly Fhet. ii. 9 
init. 
' 1 Of. on this subject: H. 
FECHNER, Ueber den Gerechtig- 
heitshegriff d. Arist. Clipz. 1855), 
pp. 27-56 ; HILDENBRAND, Gesch. 
au. System d. Rechts- wnd Staats- 
philosophie; i. 281-331, who also 
cites other literature; PRANTL 
in BLUNTSCHLI’s Staatworter- 
buch, i. 351 sqq.; TRENDELEN- 
BURG, Hist. Beitr. iii. 399 sqq. 
' 2°72 momtina nal pvdakrina 
Ths evdamovias Kal Tav poplwy 
aris TH modrtikh Kowwvia—the 
dpeth TeAela, GAA’ OX GrA@S GAA 
mpos €repov, of which it is said 
that it is od wépos aperjs GAA’ GAN 
dperh, 008’ ) évaytia Gdicla pépos 
kaklas GAN’ GAn Kakla... H mer 
Tis SAns aperis otoa xphaots mpods 
BAAov, ) 5& THs Kanias (Hth. v. 3, 
1129, b, 17, 25 sqq. 1180, a, 8, c. 
5, 1130, b, 18). . 

3 For‘the mean,’ as in thecase 
of every other virtue, is here the 


highest criterion; cf. Hth. v. 6 
init.: éwmel 8 8 7’ &dikos &ricos Kab 
To &Siucov &vicov, SHAov Sri Kab 
péaov tl éoti Tov avicov’ TovTo 
8 éorl ro toov .. . ei ody Td &d:- 
Kov &vicov, TO Sikawoyv toov, c.9 
init. 

‘ As the distinguishing mark 
of ad:xnia in this narrower sense, 
mAeovextery is mentioned (c. 4) 
wept tinny 7) xphuara 7) cwrnpiar, 
H ef tin Exomev Evi dvduari wepi- 
AaBety TavTa mavra, Kad 5: ndovhy 
thy amb Tov Kepdous; it consists 
(c. 10, 1134, a, 33) in 7d mAéov 
alte véuew Tav amrAds ayabav, 
éAatrrov 5€ Tay amAds Kaxay. Of 
justice, on the other hand, it is 
said, c. 9, 1134, a, 1: Kal 7 pev 
Sixaootvyn éot Kal? hy 6 Sleaos 
A€yeTat mpaktixds Kata mpcalpeoiv 
Tov Sikaiov, kal Siaveunrinds Kal 
ait@ mpos &AAov Kal Erépw mpds 
ETepovy, ovxX o'Tws ore Tod pev 
aiperod mAéov aitg@ edratrovy St TH 
mAnolov, Tov BAaBepod 8 dvdmaaduy, 
GAAG TOU toov Tov KaT’ davadoyiar, 
buoiws 6& Kal AAAw mpds BAAov. It 
is (het. i. 9, 1366, b, 9) dperh 


_— ae 
* 


ETHICS 171 


But this proportion will be different according as we 
are dealing with the distribution of civil advantages 
and the common property, which is the function of 
distributive justice, or with the removal and prevention 


of wrongs, which is the function of corrective justice.! 
In both gases the distribution of goods according to the 


law o must be the aim.? But this law demands 
in the former case that each should receive, not an equal 
amount, but_an amount proportionate to his deserts. 
The distribution, therefore, is here made in a geometrical 
proportion: as the merits of A are to those of B, so is 
the honour or advantage which A receives to that which 
B receives.’ In the other case, which relates to the 
correction of inequalities produced by wrong, and to 
contracts, there is no question of the merits of the 
individual. Eyeryone who has done wrong must suffer 
loss in proportion to the unjust profit which he has 
appropriated; there is subtracted from his gains an 
amount equivalent. to the loss.of the man, who has 
suffered the wrong. In like manner, in buying and 





50 fy Ta abray Exacta Exovow., 
Right and justice, therefore, find 
a place only among beings who, 
like man, may possess too much 
or too little—not among those 
who, like the gods, are confined 
to no limit in this respect, or 
who, like the incurably bad, are 
incompetent to possess anything 
at all; Zth. v. 13, 1137, a, 26. 

' We should speak rather of 
public and private right. 

2 Alxawy in this sense =%oor, 
&5ixov = Sor: in the wider sense, 
on the other hand, the former = 
véusmoyv, the latter = rapdvomor (v. 
5; cf. TRENDELENBURG, Hist. 


Beitr. ii. 357 sqq. ; BRANDIS, p. 
1421 sq.; Rassow, Forsch. wb. a. 
nikom. Eth. 17, 98). 

* This is referred to Polit. iii. 
9, 1280, a, 16. Conversely of 
public burdens, each would have 
to take his share according to his 
capacity for discharging them. 
Aristotle, however, does not touch 
upon this point, although he 
must have had it in view, Zth. v. 
7, 1131, b, 20, where he speaks 
of the €Aarrov and mei(ov Kaxdy. 

* By «épd0s (advantage or 
gain) and (nula (disadvantage or 
loss) Aristotle means in this con- 
nection, as he remarks, Ath. v 


172 


ARISTOTLE 


selling, renting, letting, &c., it is a question merely of 


the value of the article. 


Here, therefore, the rule is 


that of arithmetical equality: from him who has too 
much an amount is taken which will render both sides 


equal.’ 


In matters of exchange this equality consists 


in equality of value.2 The universal measure of value is 
eee aie 


7, 1132, a, 10, not merely what is 
commonly understood by them. 
As he comprehends under correc- 
tive justice not only penal but 
also civil law, as well as the law 
of contract, he has greatly to 
extend the customary significa- 
tion of the words in order to 
include these different concep- 
tions under a common form of ex- 
pression. Accordingly he classes 
every injustice which anyone 
commits as Képdos, every injustice 
which anyone suffers as (nula. 

1 Ibid. c. 5-7, especially c. 
5, 1130, b, 30: rijs 5€ kara weépos 
Sixaootvns Kal Tov Kat’ avrhy 
dixaiov ey mévy ear eldos Td ev 
Tas Siavouats Tiuns 2 xpnudrwy 
h TGV BAAwy boa pepioTa Tots 
Kolwwvovat THS MoArTelas, ... eV 
dé rd éy Tois cuvadAdypact S10p- 
Owricdy. Tovrov 5& wépn dv0* TaY 
yap cuvadAayudtwv Ta meyv Exovord 
éort Ta 8 Gkotvoia, Exovoin mey TH 
Towdde olov mpacis, wv), Savercpds, 
eyyin, xpos, mapakarabjKn, plo- 
Owos* Exodoia 5 A€yera, Tt 7 
apxn TeV ouvarharypder coy TOUTwV 
€xovows. Ttav 8 akovolwy Ta pmev 
Aabpata, oioy Khon, Motxela, pap- 
pakela, mpoaywyela, SuvAamarta, 
Sorogovia, yevdouaprupia, Ta 8€ 
Blaa, ofov _otelar, deonds, Odvaros, 
aprayh, mhpwois, Kaknyopla, mpo- 
mndakiopds. c. 6, 1131, b, 27: 
To wey yap Siaveunrindy dieaov 
TaY Kowdy Gel Kata Thy dvadroylay 





ae 


€or) tiv eipnuevny: Kal yap dard 
Xpnudtwyv Koway édy yliyynta: 7 
Siavoun, Eora Kata rdyv Adyov Tov 
avroyv bymep Exova. mpds XAAHAG Ta 
elvevexOévta’ Kal rd &dixov rd 
avrikelwevoy TH Sixaly TovTw mapa 
T) avddoydy eotw. Td 8 ev rors 
cuvadAdypuact Sikaov eo) pev toov 
Tl, Kal Td Bdikov &yicov, GAN’ ov 
kata Thy avadoylay éxelynvy GAAG 
KaTa Thy apiOuntichy. ovOey yap 
Siapeper, ef emieinys pavAov an- 
eorépynoev 7) pavAos émienkh . 
GAAG pds TOD BAdBous Thy Siapopay 
pévov BAéret 6 vouos &c. PLATO 
(Gorg. 508, A) had opposed icé- 
TNS yeweTpiKh to TAEovetia. 

* After discussing, in the 
above passage, both distributive 
and corrective justice, Aristotle . 
comes (c. 8) to the view that 
justice consists in retribution, 7d 
aytimetovOos (on which see Ph. d. 
Gr. i. 360, 2). This he rejects asa _ 
valid definition of justice in 
general, since it is applicable 
neither to distributive nor even, 
strictly speaking, to punitive 
justice. Only kowwviat dAAaktinal 
rest upon Td aytimerovbds, which, 
however, is here, not kar’ icdrnra, 
but kar’ dvadoyiay: Te dvturoteiv 
yap avddroyor cuppéver 7 méAts 


(1132, b, 31 sqq.): it is not 
the same, but di Age ent, though 
equivalent thingie Texchanged 
for one another, the norm 


for each exchange being con- 


ee 


ETHICS 178 


d ’ 


emand,_ which_is.the-seuree-of.all exchange.;and. 
symbol which _r A 


tained in the formula: as are 
the goods of the one to those of 
the other, so must that which 
the former obtains be to that 
which the latter obtains. Cf. 
ix. 1 init. It is thus obvious 
that the previous assertion, that 
corrective justice proceeds ac- 
cording to arithmetical propor- 
tion, is inapplicable to this whole 
class of transactions. But it 
does not even apply to penal 
justice. Even here the proportion 
is geometrical: as A’s act is to B's, 
so is the treatment which A re- 
ceives to that which B receives. 
Only indemnification for injury 
is determined according to 
arithmetical proportion, and even 
here it is merely an analogy, as 
it is only an equivalent that is 
granted (it is an obvious defect 
in Aristotle’s theory that it makes 
no distinction between indemni- 
fication and punishment, and 
here treats punishment, which 
certainly has other aims as well, 
merely as a loss inflicted upon 
the transgressor for the purpose 
of rectifying his unjust gain). 
When, however, TRENDELEN- 
BURG (ibid. 405 sqq.) distin- 
guishes the justice in payment 
and repayment, upon the basis 
of which contracts are con- 
cluded, from corrective jus- 
tice, and assigns it to distribu- 
tive, so that the latter embraces 
the mutual justice of exchange 
as well as the distributive justice 
of the state, while corrective 
justice is confined to the action 
of the judge, either in inflicting 
penalties or in deciding cases of 
disputed ownership, he cannot 


. the 
Now 


find much support for this view. 
From the passages quoted in the 
preceding note, it is obvious that 
by distributive justice, Aristotle 
means that which has to do with 
the distribution of xowa, whether 
these are honour or other advan- 
tages; by corrective justice, on 
the other hand, so far as it relates 
to éxovo.a ovvadAAdypuara, in the 
first instance, fair dealing in 
commercial life, and not the 
legal justice of litigation, as the 
expression €xotoi ovvad\Adypara 
indicates, since it isa name given 
to them (c. 5) because they rest 
upon voluntary contract. Even 
in these there are redress and cor- 
rection: the loss which, e.g., the 
seller suffers on the deliverance 
of his goods is compensated by 
the payment for the same, so 
that neither party loses or gains 
(c. 7, 1332, a, 18), and only when 
no agreement can be arrived at 
is the judge called in to under- 
take the settlement. They be- 
long, therefore, not to daveun- 
Tidy, but to di0pOwrikdy dixasov. 
On some other defects in Ari- 
stotle’s theory of justice, among 
which the chief is his failure 
clearly to grasp the general con- 
ception of right, and to deduce 
a scientific scheme of natural 
rights, see HILDENBRAND, ibid, 
p- 293 sqq. 

' Thid. 1133, a, 19: wdvra 
oupBAnta Set mws elvar, dv eoriy 
GdrAayn: ep’ 6 7d vdusow’ CAHAVOE 
kal ylveral mws wéoov* mdvra yap 
metpel . . . Set Spa evi trim wavra 
peTpeicba, Somwep €héxOn mpdrepov. 
tovro 8° éorl TH pev GAnbela 7 
xpela, ) wmdvra owvéxer. . . ofov 8 





174 ARISTOTLE 

justice consists in right dealing with reference to these 
relations: injustice in the opposite. Justice requires that 
a man should not assign to himself greater profit or less 
loss, to the other party greater loss or less profit, than 
rightfully belongs to each: injustice consists in doing 
so.' A just or an unjust man, again, may be defined 
as one whose will identifies itself with one or the other 
mode of action. These two, injustice in the act and in 
the agent, do not absolutely coincide. A man may do 
injustice without acting unjustly? and one may act 
unjustly without therefore being unjust ;? and accord- 
ingly Aristotle makes a distinction between hurt, 


wrong, and injustice.* 


imddAayua THS xpelas TO vomona 
yéyove kata cvvOqnny, whence the 
name véuioua, from vépos. Cf.b, 
10 sqq. ix. 1,1164, a, 1. See the 
further treatment of money, Po- 
lit. i. 9, 1257, a, 31 sqq. 

' See p. 170, n. 4, supra, and 
ibid. c. 9, 1134, a, 6. As justice 
thus consists in respect for the 
rights of others, it is called an 
GAAdTpiov a&yabdy, c. 3, 1130, a, 3, 
c. 10, 1134, b, 2. 

2 Hth. v.10, 1135, a, 15: dvrev 
dé tay Sinalwy Kal adikwv Tov 
cipnucvav, adiced ev Kat Sixao- 
mparyei, Stay éExdy Tis adTda mpdrry ° 
édravy 8 &kwyv, ovr’ adumet ovre 
dicatomparyet GAA’ 7) KaTa cuuBeBn- 
kés . . . Gdlknua 5& kad diucacompd- 
ynua Spiora Te Exovolw Kal 
axovolw dor’ ora Te &ducov ev 
ad5iknua 8 otrw édy wh Td Exodorov 
™poon. 

$C. 9 (see p. 170, n. 4,, su- 
pra), the dixaos had been defined 
as Mpaxtikos kata mpoalpecuy 
Tov dixaiov: c. 10 init. the ques- 


tion is asked: éwel 8 @orw abi- 
KotvTa phmw &dicoy elvat, 6 ota 
Gdikhuara adinav Hdn Bikds eorw 
éxdorny &diclay, olov KAérryns } 
Moxos 7) Anorhs; the reply is, 
that if one, eg., commits adul- 
tery from passion, not 51a mpoaip- 
évews apxiv, we must say: aduce? 
Mev ody, &Bikos 3° ovK Zari, ofov 
ovde KAerTns, Zxrebe St, odds 
potxds, euolxevoe Sé. Of. follow- 
ing note, and p. 116, n. 3. 

* Ibid, 1135, b, 11, all actions 
are divided into voluntary and 
involuntary, and the former again 
into intentional and unintentional 
(see p. 116 sqq. supra): rpidv dh 
ovoa@y BAaBav trav ey tails Koww- 
vias [in a passage which Ari- 
stotle has here, perhaps, in view, 
Lans, ix. 861, 8, PLATO had dis- 
tinguished BAdBy from adlenua, cf. 
Ph. d. Gr.i. 19,3 fin.] 7a wev per’ 
ayvolas GuapThuard éorw [or more 
accurately, 1. 16, either druyjuara 
Or Guaprhuara, guaprdver pty yap 
drav H apxh év aire H rijs airlas, 


ETHICS 


In discussing the nature of justice we must further 
take account of the difference between complete and 
incomplete natural and legal right. Rights in the 
fullest sense exist only between those who are free and 
equal ;! hence the distinction between political and 
paternal, domestic or proprietary right. Political 
right, again, is divided into natural and legal right ; the 
former of which is binding upon all men in like manner, 
while the latter rests on arbitrary statute, or refers to 
particular cases and relations ;* for however dissimilar 


175 





druxe 8’ Stray tiwbev] . . . dray 
Bt eldws pev, uh) mpoBovAedoas Bt, 
adiknua [wrong done in passion: 
eg. anger]... 8rav 3 éx mpoa- 
pécews, Udios Kal poxOnpds... 
duoiws St Kal Sixaos, bray mpo- 
eAdduevos Sixasompayh’ Sixaomparyet 
3t, dy pdvoy eExwv mpadtryn. But 
even involuntariness can only 
excuse 60a mh mdvoy ayvoovytes 
GAAG Kal B0 Gyvoiwy apaprdvover, 
not wrong committed in thought- 
lessness which is caused by cul- 
pable passion. 

1 C. 10, 1134, a, 25: 7d ¢H- 
rovmevdy cori kal To awd@s Bixasov 
Kal rd moditindy Sikaov. Tovro dé 
éorw em) Kowwvar Blov mpds Td elvat 
aitdpKeay, eAev0épwy kal Yowr 7) 
Kar’ dyadoylay ) Kar’ dpOudr. 
Where these conditions are ab- 
sent, we have not 7d modrtikdy 
5'katov, dAAG 7) Sixasoy [a particu- 
lar kind of justice, as distin- 
guished from 7d amA@s Sixasov] 
nat «nal duournra. The former 
(b, 13) is always kara vdéuov Kat 
év ols emepixe: elvat vdéuos* obTor 
8 joav ev ols twrapxe: isdtrns Tov 
tipxew kal &pxerOa. 

* Thid. 1134, b, 8: rd Be 


Seomorikoy Sikaov Kal Td warpixdy 


ob ravtoy rovTois GAN’ Suowy~ od 
yap é€otw adixla mpbs Ta abrov 
awda@s* Td 5¢ eriua Kal Td TéKvor, 
éws dy } mnAlkov Kal wh xwpic OH, 
dowep wépos adrov . . . 8d waddAov 
mpos yuvaikd éott Sixaiov 7) mpds 
Téxva Kal KThuaTa* TovTO ydp éoTt 
Td oikovouKdy Slkasov Erepoy 5 
Kal TOUTO TOU WoAiTiKOU. 

8 Ibid, 1134, b, 18: rod be 
moAitikod Sixalov 7d wey voikdy 
éott TO SE vomiKdy, puoindy pev Td 
mayvTaxov Thy a’thy Exov Sivauy, 
Kal ov T@ doKetvy 7 wh, vouucdy Se 
& e& dpxiis wey obPey Siapéper of rws 
}} HAAws, Bray BE Owvra Siapeper 
... tt boa em ray Kabéxacra 
vouoberovow. Cf. c. 12, 1136, b, 
33. Natural right is universal 
unwritten law [véuos Kowds &ypa- 
gos}; positive right [vduos t.0s], 
on the other hand, is described 
as written law (het. i. 10, 1368, 
b, 7; cf. c. 14, 1875, a, 16, c. 15, 
1375, a, 27, 1376, b, 23; Hth. viii. 
15, 1162, b, 21): but even here 
there is a distinction between 
the written and the unwritten 
(or that part which belongs to 
custom and habit), Rhet. i. 13, 
1373, b, 4; cf. th. x. 10, 1180, 
a, 35. 





| which, seeing that it is a mere general rule and cannot 
‘by its very nature take account of exceptions, attach 


When such an exception occurs 


| 
| 


| 


176 


ARISTOTLE 


and changeable human laws and institutions may be, 
we cannot deny that there is a natural right, nor is the 
existence of a natural standard disproved by the possi- 


bility of divergence from it! 


Indeed, such natural 


right. is the only means of supplementing the defects 


even to the best law.? 


it is necessary to sacrifice legal in order to save natural 


right. 
constitutes Hquity.’ 


This rectification of positive by natural right 
Several other questions, which 


Aristotle takes occasion to discuss in the course of his 
researches into the nature of justice, we may here pass 


' Hth. v.10, 1134, b, 24 sqq.; 
cf. Rhet. i, 13, 1373, b, 6 sqq., 
where Aristotle appeals for the 
pioet Kowdy Sixaoy to well-known 
verses in Sophocles and Empe- 
docles, and to the universal 
agreement of men. 

? Similarly PLATO, Ph. d. Gr, 
i. 763, 1. 

3 Hth. v. 14, especially 1137, 
b. 11: 7d éemienés Sixaoy wév eo, 
ov Td Kata vouov Bt, GAA’ eravdp- 
Owua voutuov Sixatov. And after 
proving the above, 1. 24: 61 
dikawoy pév eott Kal BéATiov Tod 
tiv0s dixalov [on which see p. 175, 
n. 1, supra], ov rod awd@s 5é[ which 
here as Polit.iii. 6, 1279, a, 18, and 
Eth. v. 10, 1134, a, 25=ovoudy 
Sixatov| dAAG Tod 81d 7d aad@s [for 
which rapa 7d ama, might be 
conjectured: the words, how- 
ever, may be explained by sup- 
plying after 8a 7d amA@s, not 
Sixasov, but épicacda, or a similar 
word] Guapriuaros. Kal ezorw 
aitn H pots h Tov emetkods, en- 
avépPwua vduov n edAAelrer Sid 7d 


kaOdAov. The émekys is there- 
fore (1. 35) 6 trav rotobrwy mpo- 
aipeTiKds Kal mpaxrtikds, Kal 6 ph 
axpiBodikaos &c., and émietkera is 
Sucatootvn tis Kal ovx Erépa Tis 
eéis, 

* Whether it is possible volun- 
tarily to suffer injury and to do 
oneself an injury, and whether 
in an unequal distribution the 
distributor or the receiver com- 
mits the wrong. Aristotle deals 
with these questions, Hth. v. c. 
11,12 and 15, He is prevented 
from finding any satisfactory 
solution of them, partly by the 
limitation of injustice to mAcov- 
etia, partly by the failure which 
is connected with it clearly to 
distinguish between alienable 
rights, of which it is true volenti 
non fit injuria, and inalienable, 
and similarly between civil and 
penal wrongs. Doubts have been 
entertained as to the genuine- 
ness of one part of these discus- 
sions. Chap. 15 is connected 


with the discussion of justice in 


a —-_ 


ETHICS 177 


over, especially as he arrives at no definite conclusions 
with regard to them. 

The discussion of the principal virtues serves to 
confirm the truth of the general definition of virtue 


previously given. In all of them the question is one of 


the rene b—peapas—snean—hatancaa— ime 
extremes of error. But how are we to discover the 


proper mean’ Neither in the previous general dis- 
cussion nor in his account of the individual virtues has 
Aristotle provided us with any reliable criterion of 
judgment upon this head. In the former, he refers us 
to insight as the guide to the discovery of the right ;! 
in the latter, it is the opposition between two vicious 
and one-sided extremes that reveals the proper mean. 
But when we ask what kind of conduct is vicious there 








a manner which is certainly not 
Aristotle’s. SPENGEL (Adh. d. 
Bair. Akad. philos.-philol. K1. 
iii. 470) proposes therefore to 
transpose c. 10 and ce. 14, but 
this does not get over the difti- 
culty, as c. 13 would still disturb 
the connection between c, 12 and 
15. FiscHer (De Eth. Nicom. 
fe. p. 13 sqq.) and FrRiITzscHeE 
(Lthica Eudemi, 117, 120 sqq.) 
regard c. 15 as a fragment from 
the fourth book of the Ludemian 
Ethics. BRANDIS, p. 1438 sq., 
leaves the choice open between 
these and other possible explana- 
tions (e.g. that it is a preliminary 
note to a_ larger discussion). 
The difficulties. seem to dis- 


- appear if we place c. 15, with the 


exception of the last sentence, 
between c. 12 and 13, It is not 
true that the question which it 
discusses has already been 


VOL. I. 


settled: in c. 11 it was asked 
whether what one suffers volun- 
tarily, here whether what one 
inflicts on oneself, is a wrong. 
This investigation is expressly 
said to be still in prospect at the 
beginning of c. 12, and while it 
is certainly not more, it is also 
not less satisfactory than the kin- 
dred investigations; ¢. 11 and 12. 
TRENDELENBURG declares him- 
self, ibid. 423, satisfied with this 
transposition, in support of which 
he appeals te M. Mor. i. 34, 1196, 
a, 28, compared with Eth. XV. v. 
15, 1138, b, 8. On the other 
hand, RAMSAUER has not a word 
in allusion to the difficulty of the 
position of c. 15. In the text of 
c. 15 itself, however, the order is 
certainly defective; ef. Ram- 
SAUER, in loco, Rassow, Forsch. 
tiber die nikom. Eth. 42, 7 7, 96 
' See p. 163, n. 2, supra. 


N 


178 ARISTOTLE 


isnone to enlighten us but ‘the man of insight,’ no ulti- 
mate criterion but the notion which he may have formed 
of the p oper. mean. All moral judgment, and with it 
all mova lala ight, is thus conditioned by ‘Insight.’ If, 
then, we would understand the true nature of moral 
virtue we must next face the question of the nature of 
Insight, and accordingly Aristotle devotes the sixth 


book of the Hthics to its discussion, illustrating it by 
comparison with kindred qualities, and explaining its 


practical import.’ 


1 It is usual to assign a more 
independent position to the sec- 
tion upon the dianoétic virtues. 
The Ethicsis thought to bea gene- 
ral account of all the virtues which 
are partly moral and partly in- 
tellectual ; the former are treated 
of B. ii.-v., the latter B. vi. But 
while EKudemus (according to 
Eth. Eud. ii. 1, 1220, a, 4-15) 
may have treated his subject in 
this way, Aristotle’s intention 
seems to have been different. 
Ethics, according to Aristotle, 
is merely a part of Politics 
(see p. 135 sq.) from which 
Eudemus (i. 8, 1218, b, 13) is 
careful to distinguish it as a 
separate science. Its aim is not 
(see p. 181,n.3, supra) yvaors, but 
mpatis (Hth. Hud.i. 1, 1214, a, 10, 
represents it as ‘not only know- 
ledge, but also action’), and 
accordingly it requires experi- 
ence and character to understand 
it (Zth. N. i. 1095, a, 2 sqq., see 
p. 161, n. 2, 3, supra). It would be 
inconsistent with this practical 
aim (an objection which, accord- 
ing to M. Mor. i. 35, 1197, b, 27, 
was already urged by the older 
Peripatetics, and which is there 


To this end he first distinguishes, 


inadequately met), if the Lthies 
were to deal with intellectual 
activity for its own sake, and 
without relation to human action 
in tle sense in which vi. 7, 1141, 
a, 28 declares that Politics has 
nothing. to do with it. The 
treatment, moreover, in the sixth 
book, as it stands, if it professes 
to give a complete account of 
dianoétic virtue, is very unsatis- 
factory. The highest modes of 
intellectual activity are precisely 
those which are disposed of 
most briefly. This, on the other 
hand, becomes perfectly intelli- 
gible if we suppose the true aim 
to be the investigation of opévn- 
os, the other dianoétic virtues 
being only mentioned here in 
order to mark off the province of 
opévnots from theirs and clearly 
to exhibit its peculiarities by the 
antithesis. Aristotle has to speak 
of ppévnois, because, as he him- 
self says, c. 1 (p. 163, 2, supra), 
he has defined: moral virtue as 
conduct according to ép#ds Adyos, 
or as the gpdéviuos would define it, 
and because the discussion forms 
a necessary part of a complete 
account of moral virtue. Cf. on 


ETHICS 


179 


as we have already seen, a two-fold activity.of.reasons~ 
the theoretic and the practical: that which deals with 


necessary truth, and that which deals with what is 
matter of choice.'\ Inquiring further how reason, know- 
ledge, wisdom, insight and art? are related to one 


another, he answers tha 


owledge deals with neces- 


sary truth, which is perceived by an indirect process of 


this head also vi. 13 (p. 166, n. 1, 
supra), X. 8, 1178, a, 16: ovp- 
éCeverat 5 Kal} ppdévnois TH Tod 
Hous dperh, cal airn tH ppovhcei, 
elrep ai wiv Tis ppovtcews apxal 
Kara ras HOiKds eiow aperas, Td 8’ 
Op9dy Tay HOikay Kara Thy ppdyvnory. 

' See p. 113, n. 1, supra. 

2 Eth. vi. 3 init.: €orw 5h ofs 
GAnbever h Wuxh TE Katapdva } 
amopdvat wévre Toy apiOudy* Taira 
8 éorl réxvn, emiothun, ppdvnois 
[which we have to translate by 
‘insight’ for lack of a better 
word], codia, vos, bmodAq er yap 
Kal ddim evdéxera SiapevderOau. 
Whether Aristotle intends to 
treat all five or only some of 
those virtues is, on our view of 
the aim of this discussion, not 
very important. At thesametime 
we cannot agree with PRANTL 
(Ueber die dianoét. Tug. d. 
nikom. Eth. Miinch. 1852) in re- 
garding godla and ¢pdynois as 
the only dianoétic virtues: the 
former, that of the Adyor éxov, so 
far as it has for its object 7d uh év- 
dexduevoy HAAws Exew; the latter 
with the qualities which are sub- 
ordinate to it (edBovAla, cbveois, 
youn, Sewdrns), in so far as it 
refers to rd évdexdéuevoy %AAws 
éxew; of vots, on the other hand, 
he says that as immediate it 


_ Cannot be regarded as a virtue, 


of émothun and réxvn that they 
are not virtues, but that there is 


an aper)) emiothuns, copla, and an 
aperh téxvns, likewise in the last 
instance gopla. Aristotle cer- 
tainly speaks of copla,c. 7, 1141, 
a, 12, as dperh réxvns, but only in 
the popular sense; as copla has 
to do only with the necessary, it 
cannot in this sense be dper) 
Téxvns, whose sphere is 7d évde- 
xépevov tdrdAws Exe. But, apart 
from this inaccuracy, Prantl’s - 
view is untenable, for in the first 
place Aristotle expressly says, 
c. 2 init., that the dianoétic 
virtues are the subject of the dis- 
cussion that follows, and nowhere 
hints that there is any difference 
in this respect among the five 
which he enumerates c. 3, and in 
the second place Aristotle’s deti- 
nition of virtue applies to all 
five. If every praiseworthy 
quality is a virtue ( Hth. i.13 jin. : 
Tav Be Etewr ras ewawerads dperas 
Aéyouev) emorhun and TéxVN are 
undoubtedly €éfes éwaweral (as 
example of €fis, ériorhun is the 
one which is given in Categ. c. 8,8, 
a, 29, 11, a, 24); if, on the other 
hand, we accept the definition of 
virtue elsewhere (Zop. v. 3, 131, 
b, 1), 8 rdv Exovra wore? erovdaiov, 
this also is applicable to both. 
The same is true of vods when 
conceived of, not as a special 
part of the soul, but as a special 
quality of that part, as it must be 
when classed along with émorfun, 


wn 2 


180 


ARISTOTLE 


thought—in other words, by inference ;' that necessary 
truth is also the object of reason (vods) in that narrower 
sense in which it means the power of grasping in an act 
of immediate cognition those highest and most universal 
truths which are the presuppositions of all knowledge ; ” 


&c.; c. 12 init., moreover, it is ex- 
pressly described as a ێs, but if 
‘it is a €fs it must be a €&fis 
erawerh: inother words, an &perh. 
1 Thid..c. 8; . cf. ‘p. 248, 
supra. 
* Ibid. c. 6, and frequently, 
v. p. 244, sqq. From reason 
in this sense vots mpaxrikds 
is distinguished. The difference, 
according to De An. iii. 10, Hth. 
vi. 2, 12 (p. 113, n. 2, cf. 118, n. 1, 
_ supra), is that the object of the 
practical reason is action, and 
therefore 7d éviex. HAAwS Exe, 
whereas the theoretic reason is 
concerned with all écwyr ai apxat 
bh evdéxovrar AAws Exe. In his 
further treatment of the prac- 
tical reason Aristotle is hardly 
consistent. In the passages cited, 
p. 113, n. 2, its function is de- 
scribed as BovAeveo@a or Aoyl- 
(ea0a1, while it-is itself called rd 
Aoyiorikdv ; itis of less import (ac- 
cording to p. 106, n. 2, supra) that 
for vods mpaxrikds stand also didvora 
TpakTiK), mpakTiKdv Kal S1avon- 
tuxdv. On the other hand we 
read, Hth. vi. 12, 1143, a, 35: ral 
6 vots tav éoxdrwy én’ dudrepa* 
kal yap Tay mpdtwv Bpwv Kal Tov 
éoxdtwy vous éort kal od Adyos, Kal 
§ pev kata tas amodei~es Tay 
aKwhtov dpwy Kal mpetwv, 6 9’ év 
Tais mpaktixais [Sc. emisThmats, not 
arodelteot, as the species mpakriral 
amodci~ters cannot stand as the 
antithesis to the genus amodeléts; 
moreover, the former phrase in- 


volves a self-contradiction, dé- 
dertts according to p. 243 sq. being 
a conclusion from necessary 
premises, whereas deliberation 
has to do with 7d évdex. %AAws 
Exew) Tov €oxdrov kal évdexouérov 
kal Tis érépas mpotdcews. apxal 
yap Tov ov Evera abrar’ ex yap 
Tav Kal’ Exacta Td KaddAov [the 
last clause, €« yap, &c., has 
hitherto baffled the commen- 
tators, and ought perhaps to be 
struck out]. tovtwy obv éxew det 
alcOnow, a’tn & éot vots. Ac- 
cording to this passage also 
there is, besides the reason which 
knows the unchangeable prin- 
‘ciples of demonstrations, a 
second whose object is rd 
Erxarov, To évdexducvov, h érépa 
mpdéraois, and which, therefore, is 
described as an avo@nois of these 
(rovtwy can only refer to these 
&pxal Tov of Evexa). By €rxarov 
can only be meant the same as iii. 
5, 1112, b, 23 (cf. vi. 9, 1142, a, 
24 and p. 118, n. 3, supra) where 
it is said, rb €oxarov ev TH dva- 
Avoet mp@rov elvar ev TH yevéeret, 
the primary condition (mpéroy 
atttov, 1112, b, 19) for the attain- . 
ment of a certain end, with the 
discovery of which deliberation 
ceases and action begins, as set 
forth, iii. 5, 1112, b, 11 saq.; De 
An. iii. 10 (see p. 113, n. 2, supra). 
As it lies in our own power to 
make this condition actual or not, 
it is described as évdexduevor. 
But it does not coincide in mean- 





ETHICS , 8h 


that_wisdom consists in the union of reason and know- 





ing, as WALTER, Lehre v. d. 
prakt. Vern, 222, assumes, with 
the érépa mpdéracis, ‘the second 
premise.’ The latter is the 
minor premise of the practical 
syllogism : in the example ad- 
duced, Hth. vi. 5 (see p.110, n. 1, 
supra), ‘mwavtTds yAuKéos yeveoOat 
det, rourl 5 yAuxi,’ &c., it is the 
clause ‘ this is sweet’; the éoya- 
tov, on the other hand, which 
leads immediately to action is 
the conclusion (in the given case: 
tovtov ‘yeverOut de?), which is 
called, De An. iii. 10 (see p. 113, 
n. 2, supra), Hth. vi. 8, 1141, b, 12, 
apxh Tis mpdkews, mpantdy ayabdr ; 
as,then, 7d mpaxroy is described as 
To Erxaroy, vi. 8, 1141, b, 27, c. 8, 
1142, a, 24 also, and only this can 
be meant by 7d évdex.in the 
passage before us, the minor 
premise (‘this is sweet,’ ‘ this is 
shameful’) does not refer to a 
mere possibility but to an un- 
alterable reality. It is certainly 
surprising to be told that both of 
these are not known by a Adyos, 
but by Nous, seeing that the 
minor premise of the practical 
syllogism is matter of perception, 
not of Nous,while the conclusion, 
7 rxarov, being deduced from 
the premises, is matter, not of 
vous, but of Adyos, not of im- 
mediate but of mediate know- 
ledge. Nevertheless, although 
in many cases (as in the above, 
tovtl yAvki) the minor premise of 
the practical syllogism is a real 
perception, there are other cases 
in which it transcends mere per- 
ception: as, for instance, when 
the major premise is ‘we must 
do what is just,’ the minor ‘this 
action is just.’ In such cases we 
can only speak of aYr@nais in the 


leas 


improper sense described p, 250, 
n. 1, supra (for another example, 
v. Eth. ii. 9, 1109, b, 20), and 
Aristotle himself remarks (¢. 
p. 183, n. 4, infra) that what he 
here calls afc@nois it would be 
better to call gpéynois. Buteven 
the &cxarov, ie. the mpaxror, 
must be object of afe@nois, as 
it is a particular, and all par- 
ticulars are so (cf. p. 183, infra). 
What is more remarkable is that 
the passage before us places the 
function of the practical reason, 
not in BovAeverPat (on which 
v. p. 182, n, 5, infra), but in the 
cognition of the érépa mpéracis 
and the &rxarov. It is wholly 
inadmissible to say, with 
WALTER, ibid. 76 sqq., that it is 
speaking of the theoretic reason 
and not of the practical at all. 
It is impossible to understand 
the words 6 pév kata ras aro- 
delters, &c., to mean that one and 
the same Nous knows both. If 
we examine c. 2 of this book (see 
p. 113, n. 2, supra) where, consis- 
tently with other passages, ra 
évdex. tAAws Exev are expressly 
assigned to the vots mpaxrixds as 
the sphere of its action, while 
the @ewpnrixds is confined to the 
sphere of necessary truth, and if 
we consider how important a 
place the latter doctrine has in 
Aristotle’s philosophy (cf. p. 197, 
n. 4, supra; Anal. Post. i. 33 init.: 
of the évdex. 4AAws Exew there is 
neither an émorhun nor a vois), 
we must regard it as more than 
improbable that what in all other 
passages is in the distinctest 
terms denied of this reason is 
here expressly affirmed of it. 
Such an explanation is unneces- 
sary: Aristotle says of ppdynais, 


182 ; 4 ARISTOTLE 


ledge_in the cognition of the highest and_worthiest 
objects.! These three, therefore, constitute the purely 
theoretic side of reason. They are the processes by 
which we know the actual and its laws. What they deal 
with cannot be otherwise than as it is, and therefore 
cannot be matter of human effort. On the other 
hand, art and insight? deal with human action: in 
the one case as it concerns production, in the 
other as it is conduct.* Insight alone, therefore, of all 
the cognitive activities can be our guide in matters of 
It is not, however, the only element in the 
The ultimate aims of action 





conduct. 
determination of conduct. 





are determined, according to Aristotle,! not by delibera- 
tion, but by the character of the will:° or, as he would 








the virtue of the practical reason, 
both that practical deliberation, 
and that the immediate know- 
ledge of the orxarov and mpakror, 
is the sphere of its operation 
(see p. 1892¢n. 3, infra).. He 
attributes, therefore, to it the 
knowledge both of the actual, 
which is the starting-point of 
deliberation, and of the purpose 
which is its goal. 

1C. 7, 1141, a, 16 (after re- 
jecting the common and in- 
accurate use of the word co¢‘a): 
dore SiAov ott H axpiBeardrn dy 
Tov émornuav ein H codla. Set 
tpa Tov copdv mh pdvov Ta ek TOY 
apxa@v €idévar, GAAG Kat wep) Tas 
apxas GAnbevew. dor’ eln by 7 
gopia votvs Kal éemiothun, omwep 
Kepadyy €yovoa emioThun Tey 
TuuwTatov, Of. p. 290, n.2, supra. 

2? It would be preposterous, 
Aristotle continues, c. 7, 1141, 
a, 20, to regard ¢péynois and 
moAitiky as the highest know- 
ledge; in that case we should 


have to regard, man as the 
noblest of all ‘beings. The 
former is concerned with what 
is best for man: on the other 
hand 4 copia éor) kal éemorhun 
kal vous Tav Tymwrdtwy TH poet, 
c. 8 init.: m 5& ppdynots wepl ra 
avOpémrwva Kal mept ay Eort Bov- 
Acvoac0at* Tov yap ppoviuovmdAtora 
TovT’ Epyov eival payer, Td €d Bov- 
AeverOat, Bovretera 8 odfels mepr 
Tov aduvdtwy BAdAws Exew, ovd’ 
dowy uh TéAos TL éott Kal TovTO 
mpaxtoy ayabdy. See also p. 183, 
n. 2, supra. 

3 See p. 107, n. 2, supra. 

4 As was rightly pointed out 
by WALTER, Lehre v. d. prakt. 
Vern. 44, 78, and HARTENSTEIN 
in opposition to TRENDELEN- 
BURG (Hist. Beitr. ii. 378), and 
the earlier view of the present 
treatise. 

wth, WH. DB, TEZ, Bees 
Bovaevdueba 5 od wept Tay TeAdY 
&AAG wep) Tov mpds Ta TEAN. SO 
the physician, the orator, the 


ETHICS 183 


explain it, while all aim at happiness,’ it depends upon 
the ideal Seaaeiee at cach oaleldpal skicein be sank 
it. Practical deliberation is the only sphere of the 
exercise of insight; ? and since this has to do, not with 
universal propositions, but with their application to 
given cases, knowledge of the particular is more in- 
dispensable to it than knowledge of the universal.* It 
is this application to practical aims and to particular 
given cases that distinguishes insight both from science 
and from theoretic reason.4 On the other hand, it is 








legislator: @guevor TéAos Tt mas 
kal 31a tlywy tora: cKorotci. Vi. 
13, 1144, a, 8: 7d Epyov amoreAcirat 
Kata thy ppdvnow Kal thy HOuhv 
Gperhy* 7 mev yap apeth Toy cKxomdy 
moet dpOdv, 7 5& ppdvnots Ta mpds 
tovrov,. L. 20: thy pey ody 
mpoalpeow op0hy moet 7 apeTh, Td 
3 boca éxelyns Evexa mépuKe mpar- 
TrecOa ovK tort Tis aperis GA’ 
érépas BSvvduews. See further, 
p. 186, n. 5, infra. ~ 

? See p. 139, n. 1, supra. 

7 C. 8 init.; see p. 118, n. 3, 
supra. 
® Eth. vi. 8, 1141, b, 14 (with 
reference to the words quoted n. 2 
preced. p.): 008’ éorly 7 ppdyvnois 
Tay KaddAov pdvoy, GAAG Bez Kal Ta 
Kabéxacra yvwplew* mpaxrix) yap, 
Hh 88 mpaiis wep) Ta Kadéxacra. 
And accordingly (as is remarked 
ulso Metaph. i. 881, a, 12 sqq.) 
experience without knowledge 
(i.e. witbout apprehension of the 
universal) is as a rule of greater 
practical use than knowledge 
without experience. 7 8¢ opéynots 
mpaxtinh* bore det tiupw exew 7 
tatrny [the apprehension of the 
particular] wa@AAov. For the same 
reason young people lack ppovnats 


(c. 9, 1142, a, 11), being without 
experience. 

* Kth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 23: ot 
8 i ppévnois obk emiatrhun, pave- 
piv* Tov yap éoxdrov early, Somep 
efpnrat* [in the passage quoted, p. 
182, n.2,sup., where it was shown 
to be concerned with the mpacrdy 
ayaidy ; cf. c. 8, 1141, b, 27: rd 
vip Wipioua mpaxrdy os érxarov] 
Td yap mpaxrdy Towdroy [sc. toxa- 
tov]. aytixerra: pty dh TE vG: 5 
Mey yap voids tay Spwy, dv ovK tort 
Adyos, H 5& rod eaxdrov, ov ovK 
éorw emiorhun, GAA alaOnots, ovx 
i tov idiwy, GAA’ ofa aicbaydéueba 
bri Td ev Tois uadnuariKois ErxaTov 
tTplyarov' orhoerat yap Kkakel, 
GAA’ aiirn paAdAov alecOnois 
ppovnais, exelvns 8 AAO eldos. 
This passage has been discussed 
in recent times by TRENDELEN- 
BURG (Hist. Beitr. ii. 380 sq.), 
TEICHMULLER (Arist. Forsch. i. 
253-262), and more exhaustively 
by WALTER (Lehr. v. d. prakt. 
Vern. 361-433), The best view 
of Aristotle’s meaning and the 
grounds on which it rests 
may be shortly stated as 
follows: péyyncis is here distin- 
guished from émorhun by marks 


184 


ARISTOTLE 


seen in both these respects to. be a manifestation of 
practical reason, the essential characteristics of which it 


Reine 


which are already familiar to us, 
When it is further opposed to 
Nous, which is described as con- 
cerned with indemonstrable prin- 
ciples, we can obviously under- 
. stand by Nous in this sense only 
the theoretic, not that reason 
which Aristotle calls practical 
and distinguishes from the former 
as a different faculty of the soul 
on no other ground than that it 
(like pévnots, according to the 
passage before us) has to do with 
the mpaxrdv, the évdexduevor, the 
egxarov (see p. 180, n. 2, supra). 
Finally, it cannot surprise us 
that the écxarov, with which 
insight is concerned, is said to 
be the object not of émorhun 
but of ate@nors. For this 2oxaror, 
which is found in the conclusion 
of the practical syllogism, is 
that in the fulfilment of which 
action consists, and is always 
therefore a definite and particular 
result; the €cxatoy is the source 
of the resolution to undertake 
this journey, to assist this one 
who is in need, &c. (cf. p. 180, 
n.2). But the particular is not 
the object of scientific know- 
ledge but. of perception; cf. 
p- 163 sq. While this is so, we 
have to deal in the conclusion 
of the practical syllogism (often 
also, as was shown, p. 180 sq., 
in its minor premise), not only 
with the apprehension of an 
actual fact, but at the same time 
with its subsumption under a 
universal concept (as in the con- 


clusion : ‘I wish a good teacher’ 


—Socrates is a good teacher— 
Socrates must be my teacher’); 
accordingly, not with a simple 


perception but with a perceptive 
judgment. The atc@nais, there- 
fore, which is concerned with the 
€rxarov of practical deliberation 


is not atc@nois Taév idiwy, i.e. the 


apprehension of the sensible 
qualities of objects which are pre- 
sent to particular senses (as was 
shown, p. 69 sq. sup., thisis always 
accompanied by particular sensa- 
tions), but an atc@nois of another 
kind. What that kind is is not 
expressly said, but merely indi- — 
cated by an example: it is like 
that which informs us é7: 7d év 
Tos wadnuaTiKots oXaTov Tplywvor, 
that in the analysis of a figure the 
last term which resists all analysis 
is a triangle. (For only so can 
the words be understood, as is 
almost universally recognised ; 
RAMSAUER’S explanation, which 
takes the general proposition to 
mean primam vel simplicissimam 
omnium figuram esse triangulum, 
is contradicted by the circum- 
stance noted by himself that 
such a proposition is not known 
by atc@nois.) In other words, 
this a¥c@nors involves a judgment 
upon the quality of its object. 
But such propositions as ‘this 
must be done’ differ even from 
the given instance, ‘this is a 
triangle,’ in that they refer to 


something in the gxetape-and not & V 7: 


merely to something present to 
the senses. They are therefore 
still further removed from per- 
ception in the proper sense than 
it is. Hence he adds: they are 
more of the nature of ppévnats ; it 
is moreakintoatc@nois. The pas- 
sage, therefore, gives good sense, 
and there isno reason to reject the 


ee aE a eC 


ETHICS 185 


so perfectly reproduces that we have no difficulty in re- 
cognising in it ‘the virtue of practical reason ’—in other 
words, practical reason educated to a virtue.! Its 
object is othe one hand the individual and his good, 
on the other the commonwealth: in the former case it 
is Insight in the narrower sense, in the latter Politics, 
which again is further divided into @conomics, and the 
sciences of Legislation and Government.? In the sure 
discovery of the proper means to the ends indicated by 
Insight consists Prudence ;* in right judgment on the 
matters with which practical Insight has to deal, Under- 
standing ;* in so far as a man judges equitably on these 


words from ér: 7d éy rots wad. to 
the end, in which case we should 
have to suppose that the actual 
conclusion of the chapter has 
been lost. 

' Aristotle does not, indeed, 
expressly say so, but he attri- 
butes to voids mpaxtixds (see 
p. 180, n. 2) precisely those 
activities in which gpévnois ex- 
presses itself, viz. BovdeverOa 
and occupation with the évde- 
xéuevoy, the mpaxrdy ayabdy, the 
€oxarov, and remarks of both 
that they are concerned with 
matters of atc@nois, not of 
knowledge (p. 183, n. 4, supra). 
These statements are consistent 
only on the supposition that they 
refer to one and the same sub- 
ject, and that insight is merely 
the right state of the practical 
reason. PRANTL’S view (ibid. p. 
15), that it is the virtue of 7d 


_ dogaorixdy, is refuted even by the 


passage which he quotes on its 
behalf, c. 10, 1142, b, 8 sqq., not 
to speak of c, 3, 1139, b, 15 sqq. 

7 C. 8 sq. 1141, b, 23-1142, 


a, 10; cf..p. 136. 

8 EvBovala, ibid. c. 10; cf. 
p. 118, n. 3, supra. According 
to this account of it, edBovAla 
must not be confounded with 
knowledge into which inquiry 
and deliberation do not enter as 
elements, nor with evoroxla and 
&yxlvow, which discover what is 
right without much deliberation, 
nor with dé, which also is not 
an inauiry; but it is a definite 
quality of the understanding 
(Savoia, see p. 106, n. 2), viz. 
dp0dérns BovAjs 7 kata Td MPEAmmor, 
kal ob Sei Kal &s wal dre. And we 
must further here distinguish 
between 7d amAds eb BeBovrActacba 
and rb mpés tt TéAos eb BeBova- 
evga. Only the former deserves 
unconditionally to be called 
evBovAia, which is therefore de- 
fined as ép0érns h Kata Td cuupépoy 
mpds Tt TéAos, ob Hh Hpdynots GANnOHs 
brdaAnvls eorw. 

4 Siveois, ibid. c. 11. Its 
relation to ppévnois is described 
1143, a, 6; wept 7a abra wey TH 
ppovice: early, od tort St radrdy 


186 ARISTOTLE 


matters towards others, we call him Right-minded.! 
Just, therefore, as all perfection of theoretic reason is 
included in Wisdom, so all the virtues of the practical 
reason are traced back to Insight.* The natural basis 

of insight, is the intellectual acuteness which \ enables us 
to find and apply the abi “means to a given end.° 
If this is turne : ‘becomes a virtue, in the 
opposite case a vice; so that the root from which spring 
the insight of the virtuous man and the cunning of the 
knave is one and the same.‘ The character of our ends, 
however, depends in the first instance upon our will, and 
the character of our will upon our virtue; and in that 
sense insight may be said to be conditioned by virtue.° 








aiveois Kal ppévnois: h ev yap 1142, a, 11 sqq.) that while vods, 


gpdvnots emiraktiKy eotw* Th yap 
det mparrew h wy, To TéAOS avTIS 
eoriv: H 5 abveots KpiTiKh pdvoy. 
It consists év r@ xprio Bat Th 5d&n 
emt 7d Kpivewy rep) TOUT @Y rep) & oy 
h ppdvyncis éorw, &ANov Aé€yorTos, 
Kal «plvew Kadrws. 

' Tyvdun, rad’ hy edvyvduovas ral 
Exe pauey yrduny, is according 
to c. 11, 1143, a, 19 sqq. # Tov 
€meikovs xKpiois 6p0h, similarly 
auyyvaun = youn Kpitukh Tov 
émexovs op64. All right conduct 
towards others, however, has to 
do with equity (c. 12, 1143, a, 
31). 

2 Aristotle accordingly con- 
cludes the discussion of the 
dianoétic virtues with the words: 
tl wev ody early  dpdvnots Kal 4 
gopia .., elpnra, so that he 
himself appears to regard these 
as representative of the two chief 
classes of the dianoétic virtues. 
There is this difference, moreover, 
between them and most of the 
others (c. 12, 1143, b, 6 sq. c. 9, 


cvveois and yvéun are to acertain 
extent natural gifts, copia and 
pévnors are not. 

3 Thid. c. 13, 1144, a, 23: gor 
ye Tis Sbvapuis hv KaAodaL Sewdrnra. 

aitn 8 earl toairn bore Ta mpds 
voy brorebévta cKkomrby cuvrelvoyTa 
Stvac0a Tadta mpdtrew Kal Tvy- 
xdvew avTay. 

4 Ibid. 1. 26: dv pev ody 6 
gkoTmbs 7 KaAds, emaverh Eotiv, dy 
dé avdAos, mavovpyia. VII. 11, 
1152,a, 11: dia 7d thy Sewdrnra 
Siapeper Tis Ppovicews Toy eipnu- 
évov tpdmwov .. . Kal Kard mev Tov 
Adyov éyybs elvan, Siapepew dé Kara 
Thy mpoa'pecwr. See above. Plato 
had already remarked (Rep. vi 
491 £) that the same natural gift 
which rightly guided produces 
great virtue, under wrong guid- 
ance is the source of great vice. 

5 Eth. vi.13, 1144,a, 8, 20 (see 
p- 182, n. 5, sup.). Ibid. 1. 28 (after 
the words quoted n. 3,4): €or & 
N ppdrvnois odx h Sewdrns, GAN’ 
ovk dvev THs Suvduews Taitys. F 


ETHICS 187 


But, conversely, virtue may also be said to be condi- 
tioned by insight ;' for just as virtue directs the will 


ta.good objects, insight teaches it the proper means to 
employ in the pursuit of them. oral virtue, there- 
fore, reciprocally condition : 


the former gives the will a bent in the direction of 
the good, while“the’ latter tells us what a 

SS eee rae 
volved is not really resolved by saying‘ that virtue and 
insight come into existence and grow up together by a 
gradual process of habituation ; that every single vir- 
tuous action presupposes insight, every instance of true 
practical insight virtue ;° but that if we are in search 
of the primal germ from which both of these are evolved, 
we must look for it in education, by which the insight 
of the older generation produces the virtue of the 
younger. This solution might suffice if we were deal- 
ing merely with the moral development of individuals, 











6° efs [which here, as p. 153, 
n. 3, supra, indicates a permanent 
quality] t@ dupart rodrm vyiverat 
THs Yuxihs [insight is compared 
to the eye also] od« &vev aperijs 

. Siacrpéper yap h moxOnpla Kal 
BioedderGar more? wep) ras mpakrti- 
Kas apxds. Gore pavepdy bri adv- 
varoy ppdvimoyv elves wh bvra ayabdy. 
Cf. c. 5, 1140, b, 17: r@ 5é dieq- 
Oapuévyp 80’ Hdovhy Kai Adany eidis 
od haivera: h apxh, od8e [sc. palverat 
avt@) Seiv rovtov Evexey Kal Sid 
Tove alpeicOa mdvra Kal mpdrrew. 
VII. 9, 1151, a, 14 sqq. 

1 Eth. vi. 13, 1144, b, 1-32. 
Cf. preceding note and p. 156, 
n. 3, supra. 
® See p. 182, n. 5, supra. Eth. 


vi. 13, 1145, a, 4: od« fora h 
mpoalpecits dpe) &vev ppovhaews ovd’ 
ivev Gperijs’ h wey yap 7d TéAos, 7 
5 ra mpds Td TéAOS Toe? mpdrTew. 

3 1144, b, 30: BijAov obv 
éx tav elpnudvwy Sti ovx oldy Te 
a&yabbdy elvat xuplws tvev ppovhrews 
ovdé = pdvimov vev tis HOiKis 
Gperijs. X. 8; see p. 178, n. 1 fin. 
supra. 

4 TRENDELENBURG, 
Beitr. ii. 385 sq. 

5 TRENDELENBURG refers on 
this point to MW. Mor. ii. 3, 1200, 
a, 8; obre yap hvev Tis ppovicews 
ai GAAa aperal ylvovra:, ob@’ 4 
gpdyvnois teAcla bvev Tay bAAwY 
dperav, GAA cuvepyodai aws wer’ 
GAAHA@Y, 


Histor. 


188 : ARISTOTLE 


and with the question whether in time virtue here 
precedes insight or vice versa. But the chief difficulty 
lies in the fact that they condition one another abso- 
lutely. Virtue consists in preserving the proper mean, 
which can only be determined by ‘ the man of insight.’ ! 
But, if this be so, insight cannot be Timritedto the mere 
discovery of means for the attainment of moral ends: 
the determination of the true ends themselves is impos- 
sible without it; while, on the other hand, prudence 
merits the name of insight only when it is consecrated 
to the accomplishment of moral ends. 

As insight is the limit of moral virtue in one 
direction, those activities which spring, not from the 
will, but from natural impulse (without, however, on that 
account being wholly withdrawn from the control of the 
will) stand at the other extreme. ‘To this class belong 
the passions. After the discussion, therefore, of insight, 
follows a section of the Hthics which treats of the right 
and wrong attitude towards the passions. Aristotle 
calls the former temperance, the latter intemperance— 
distinguishing them from the moral qualities of self- 
control (cmPpoctvn) and licentiousness,? by pointing 
out that while in the case of the latter the control or 
tyranny of the desires rests upon a bent of the will 
founded on principle, in the case of the former it rests 
merely upon the strength or weakness of the will. For 
if all morality centres in the relation of reason to desire, 
and is concerned with pleasure and pain ;* if further, 
there is in this respect always a wrong as opposed to 














1 Cf. p. 163. * P. 167 n. 6, supra. 
3 See p. 156 sq. supra. 


ETHICS 189 


the right, a bad as opposed to the good—still this opposi- 
tion may be of three different degrees and kinds. If 
we suppose on the one hand a perfected virtue, free alike 
from all weakness and vice, and on the other a total 
absence of conscience, we have in the former case a 
divine and heroic perfection which hardly exists among 
men, in the latter a state of brutal insensibility which 
is equally rare.' If the character of the will, with- 
out being so completely and immutably good or bad as 
in the cases just supposed, yet exhibits in fact either of 
these qualities, we have moral virtue or vice.? Finally, if 
we allow ourselves to be carried away by passion, without 
actually willing the evil, this is defined as intemperance 
or effeminacy ; if we resist the seductions of passion, it is 
temperance or constancy. ‘Temperance and intemper- 
ance have to do with the same object as self-control and 
licentiousness—namely, bodily pain and pleasure. The 
difference lies in this, that while in the case of the 
former wrong conduct springs only from passion, in 
the case of the latter it springs from the character of 
the will. If in the pursuit of bodily pleasure or in 
the avoidance of bodily pain, a man transgresses the 
proper limit from weakness and not from an evil will, 

! Eth. vii. 8 init.: trav wep) ra 


HOn peverar tpla éorly clin, caxla 
akpacia Onpidrns. Ta 3° evayria 


Aristotle speaks further c. 6,114, 
8, b, 19, 1149, a, 20, c. 7, 1149, b, 
27 sqq. Among bestial desires 





Tois pev Suol SiAa: 7d wey yap 
aperhy To 8 éyxpdreiav Kadoduer- 
mpos 5¢ thy Onpidtnta udducr’ by 
apudrror Acyew Thy imtp juas 
dperhy, hpwikhy twa Kal Ociay . . . 
kal yap amep ob5é Onplov éor) Kania 
odd’ aperh, obrws ovde Oeod, GAA’ h 
piv Timidrepoy aperiis, h 8 Erepdy 
wt yévos Karlas, &c, Of Onpidrns 


he reckons appodiova rots &ppeat, by 
which, however, as the context 
shows, he means only passive 
not active wadepagria, 

* See preceding note and the 
remarks which follow upon the 
relation of sw@pootyn and &koda- 
gia to éyxpdrea and axpacia, be- 
sides p. 160 sq. 


190 


ARISTOTLE 


in the former case he is intemperate, in the latter effemi- 
nate; if he preserves the proper limit, he is temperate 


or constant. 


1 Thid. c. 6: Ste wey ovv meph 
ndovas kalAvmas eioly of 7 éyKpareis 
Kai KapTepikol kal of &kparets Kal ma- 
Aakol, pavepdy. More accurately, 
these qualities, like cwppoodvn and 
axoAacla, refer to bodily pain and 
pleasure; only in an improper 
sense can we speak of xpnudrwv 
axpareis Kad Képdous kad Tiwijs Kal 
Ovuod. Tav S& wept Tas TwmaTiKas 
dmoravoers, mept &s Aéyouey Tov 
cdppova kal axddacrov, 6 wh TP 
mpoaperc0a Tay Hdavav Sidkwy Tas 
bmepBords kal rv AuTnpay pelywv 

. BAAR mapa mpoalpeow Kal Thy 
didvowy, dkparis A€yeTat, ov KaTa 
mpdadeciv, kabdrep Spyiis,aAr’ amras 
pdvov. Madakiarefers tothe same 
objects. The a&«parhs, therefore, 
and the dakdéaacros, the éyxparhs 
and the oddpwy, ciol péev mepl 
TavTa, GAN’ ovxX aoalTws eioly, 
@AN’? of pev mpoaipodyra of 8 ob 
mpoatpotyTat. 81d uwadAAov axdrAacTov 
dv elromev, doris ph emiOvuav 7 
hpéua didker Tas brepBoddas kal 
gevyer petplas Av’ras, 7) TovTov 
boris Sid 7d emiOvueiv opddpa. 
C. 8 init.: in reference to the 
said objects, €or: wey obtws Exew 
bore hrracba Kal av of moddol 
kpelrrous, tor. 5¢ Kpareiy Kal dy of 
moAdol Hrrovs* tovTwy 8 6 pmev 
mepl hdovas axparhs 6 8 éyxparijs, 
6 8& wep Adwas padrands 6 Ge 
kaprepikos . .. 6 pev Tas drep- 
Boras Sidkwv trav hdéwv Kal? 
bwepBodds 7 Sia mpoalperw, SV 
aitas kad undév 80 Erepov dmroBatvor, 
akdAacros...6 8 éAkelrav 6 
aytixeimevos, 6 SE pesos THppwr. 
dulows dt Kal 6 pedywy Tas TwpA- 
Tuas Avwas ph 8’ Frrav GAAG Bie 
mpoalpeowv. The padakds, on the 


The latter type of man still differs from 


other hand (who is defined 1150, 
b, Las eAAelawy mpds & of roAAol Kah 
ayvriretvovot Kal ddvayTra), avoids 
pain undesignedly. dyrixerra 
de TG ev axparet db eyKparhs, TE FE 
Madak@ 6 kaptepikds. c. 9, 1151, a, 
11: the &kdéaacros desires im- 
moderate bodily enjoyments on 
principle (8:4 7d memeic@ar), this 
desire having its roots in his 
moral character as a whole (da 
Td To.odTos elvat ofos Side adtds) 
..- €or 5€ tis Bid wdBos exora- 
TiKds Tapa Toy opbby Adyor, dv dare 
wey wh mpdrrew Kara Thy dpbbv 
Adyov Kparet 7d wdOos, hore 5’ 
elvat To.ovTov oiov memetabat SidKewy 
avédnv Sety Tas Towdtas Hdovas ov 
Kpatet’ ovTds eori 6 adKparhs 
BeAtiwy Tod &koAdoTov, vd padaAos 
amrdGs' od(erar yap Td BéAtiotor, 
n apxh. &AdAos 8 evaytios, 6 euuer- 
etixds kal ovk éxoratikds Bid ye Td 
wa@os (and so, previously, c. 4, 
1146, b, 22). C. 11, 1152,a, 15: the 
intemperate man acts indeed 
Ex, rovnpos 8° od h yap mpoaipecis 
émieikhs’ wo’? tuimdvnpos. He 
resembles a state which has good 
laws but which does not observe 
them; the woynpds one in which 
the laws are observed, but are 
bad. He differs, therefore, from 
the axéAaoros in that he feels re- 
morse for his actions (cf. Hth. 
iii. 2, p. 590 mid. above) and 
is therefore not so incurable as 
the latter. Accordingly, Aristotle 
compares excess with epilepsy, 
&kodacta with dropsy and con- 
sumption (c. 8, 1150, a, 21, c. 9 
init.). Two kinds of intemper- 
ance are further distinguished, 
dc0évera and mperérea, that 


ETHICS 191 


the man who is virtuous in the proper sense (coppar), 
in that he is still struggling with evil desires, from 
which the other is free." The general question of how 
and how far it is possible to act from intemperance, and 
to let our better knowledge be overpowered by desire, 
has been already discussed,? 


3. Friendship 


Upon the account of all that relates to the virtue of 
the individual, there follows, as already mentioned, a 
treatise upon Friendship. So morally beautiful is the 
conception of this relationship which we find here 
unfolded, so deep the feeling of its indispensableness, 
so pure and disinterested the character assigned to it, 
so kindly the disposition that is indicated, so profuse 
the wealth of refined and happy thoughts, that 
Aristotle could have left us no more splendid memorial 
of his own heart and character. Aristotle justifies him- 
self for admitting a discussion upon Friendship into 
the Ethics partly by the remark that it also belongs to 
the account of virtue,’ but chiefly on the ground of the 


which is deliberately pursued and 
that which, springing from vio- 
lence of temper, is thoughtlessly 
pursued; of these the latter is 
described as more curable (c, 8, 
1150, b, 19 sqq. c. 11, 1152, a, 18, 
27). The inconstancy of the in- 
temperate man finds its opposite 
extreme in the headstrong and 
self-willed man (icxvupoyvéper, 
id:oyvduwr, c. 10,1151, b,4). The 
excesses of anger are less to be 
blamed than those of intem- 
perance (c. 7, c. 8, 1150, a, 25 
sqq.; cf. v. 10, 1135, b, 20-29 
and p. 113, n. 1); still more 


excusable are exaggerations of 
noble impulses (c. 6, 1148, a, 22 
sqq.). Onanger, fear, compassion, 
envy, &c. see also Zhet. ii. 2, 
5-11. 

' ©. 11, 1151, b, 34: 8 re yap 
eyxpaths olos pndty mapa ty 
Adyov 8a ras cwpatids Hdovds 
moivy Kal 6 cédpwy, GAN’ b py 
Eéxav 6 5 obk Exwv pataas ém- 
Ouulas, mal 6 wey rowiros olos wh 
Hdec0a: mapa thy Adyor, 6 BF olos 
HderOar GAA wh Hyer Oa, 

* P. 155 ( 2th, vii. 5.) 

% ort yap aperh tis } per’ 
aperjs: viii. 1 init, 


192 ARISTOTLE 


significance it has for human life. Everyone requires 
friends:' the happy man, that he may keep his happi- 
ness and enjoy it by sharing it with others;? the 
afflicted, for comfort and support; youth, for advice; 
manhood, for united action; old age, for assistance. 
Friendship is a law of nature: it unites parents and 
children by a natural bond, citizen with citizen, 
man with man.’ What justice demands is supplied 
in the highest degree by friendship, for it produces a 
unanimity in which there no longer occurs any viola- 
tion of mutual rights. It is, therefore, not only 
outwardly but morally necessary. The social impulses 
of man find in it their most immediate expression and 
satisfaction ; and just for this reason it constitutes in 
Aristotle’s view an essential part of Ethics. For as Ethies 
is conceived by him in general as Politics, and the moral 
life as life in society,® so no account of moral activity 
can be to him complete which does not represent it as 


1 For what follows see th. 
s vill. 1, 1165, a, 4—16. 

2 Ibid. tvev yap pidrwy ovdels 
rot’ dy Civ, Exwv Ta Aowwa yada 
mwdvTa ... Th yap dpedos Tijs 
ToiavTns evernpias  apaipebelons 
evepyeolas, ) ylyverat udaAiota Kal 
emaiveTwTdTn mpds pidous. 

3 Thid. c. 16-26, where inter 
alia: io. 8 ay tis Kal ev tais 
mAdvais [wanderings] @s oiketoy 
iras tvOpwros avOpam@ Kat pidrov. 
Cf. ix. 9, 1169, b, 17: &romoy 3’ 
tows kal Td poverny moely Toy 
fakdpiov’ ovdels yap eAolr’ by Kad’ 
airdy ra waver’ Exew ayabd* woAt- 
TLiKoY yap 6 &vOpwmos Kal cuir 
mepuxds, On this see further 
infra. 


* Ibid. 1, 24 sqq.; hence, 
plrwy wey bytTwy ovdéy Set Sixawo- 
ovvns, Sikator 8’ byTes mpocdéovTat 
girias, kat Tay Sixalwy Td wdAiora 
pirixdy elvar doxet [the highest 
justice is the justice of friends]. 

° Lh. 28; od pdvov 8 avaynaidy 
€oT GAAG Kal Kardv. 

5 See on this line p. 186, n. 1. 
Hth. x. 7, 1177, a, 30: 6 pe 
Sixaos detrar mpds ods dixatompary- 
hoe Kal ue dv, duolws 5 Kal 6 
céppwy Kal 6 dvdpeios Kal tay 
&AAwv €Exaocros, only theoretic 
virtue is self-sufficient ; c. 8, 1178, 
b, 5: % 8 &vOperds eort rad 
TAcioot ouh aipetra Ta Kat’ dperhy 
mpartew. Cf. p. 144, n. 1, supra, 


ETHICS 193 


socially constructive. The examination, therefore, of 
Friendship, while completing the study of Ethics, 
constitutes at the same time the link which unites it 
with the doctrine of the State.! 

By friendship Aristotle understands in general 
every relationship of mutual good will of which both 
parties are conscious.” This relationship, however, will 
assume a different character according to the nature of 
the basis upon which it rests. The objects of our 
attachment are in general three: the good, the plea- 
syrable, and the ;* and in our friends it will 
be sometimes one of these, sometimes another, which 
attracts us. We_seek their friendship either on 
account of the advantages which we expect from them . 
or on account of the pleasure which they give us, or on 
account of the good that we find in them. A true 
friendship, howéver, tan be based only upon the last 
of these three motives. He who loves his friend only 
for the sake of the profit or the pleasure which he 
obtains from him, does not truly love him, but only his - 
own advantage and enjoyment; with these accord- 
ingly his friendship changes.‘ True friendship exists 




















' Aristotle inserts, however, 
two sections upon pleasure and 
happiness between them, in the 
tenth book—thus connecting the 
end of the Ethics with the begin- 
ning, where the end of human 
effort had been defined as happi- 
ness. 

2 VIII. 2, 1155, b, 31 sqq. 
(where, however, 1]. 33, u}) must 
be omitted after édv). Friend- 
ship is here defined as etvo.a év 
avtimemovOda: wh AavOdvovca, as 
mutual good will becomes friend- 


VOL, Il. 


ship only when each knows that 
the other wishes him well. The 
definition of the @idos, Rhet. i. 
5, 1361, b, 36, as one 8eris & 
olera: aya0d elvar exelvy, ™TpaKt ikds 
éotw avtay 8: éxeivoy, isa super- 
ficial one for rhetorical purposes. 

* Tbid. 1155, b, 18: done? yap 
ov wav pireiobat GAAA Td piAdnroy, 
tovTo 8’ elya: ayabby 4} Hdd 7) 
XPnT mor, 

* Ibid. c. 3, 5. Friendships 
for the sake of profit are formed 
for the most part among older 


O 


194 ARISTOTLE 


between those alone who have spiritual affinities with 
one another, and is founded upon virtue and esteem. 
In such a friendship each loves the other for what he 
is in himself. He seeks his personal advantage and 
pleasure in that which is good absolutely and in itself, 
Such a friendship cannot be formed quickly, for the 
friend must be tried by long intercourse before he can 
be trusted ;' nor can it be extended to many, for an 
inner relationship and a close acquaintance is only 
possible with a few at the same time.” It is, moreover, 
no mere matter of feeling and inclination, however indis- 
pensable these may be to it, but of character,’? of which 
it is as lasting an element as the virtue to which it is 


people ; those that are for the sake 
of pleasure, among the young. 
Only the latter require that the 
friends should live together, and 


they are least durable when the 


parties are unlike one another 
and pursue different ends: the 
one, for instance (as in unworthy 
love affairs), his own pleasure, the 
other his advantage. Cf. c. 10, 
1159, b, 15, ix. 1, 1164, a, 3 sqq. 

1 VITLI,. 4 init.: redreta 8 early 
h tav ayabdv iria Kal Kar’ dpe- 
Thv duolwys ovTo. yap Tayadd 
duolws BovAovta: aAAHAOLS H Gya- 
Bol* a&yabol & «ial Kal? aitods. vi 
5& BovAduevoar Tayaba Tots pidous 
€xelvwy Evexa, pddiora pido 8’ 
abtovs yap oftws éxovet kal ov KaTa 
cuuBeBnkds [they are friends for 
the sake of one another and not 
of merely accidental object]: 
Siaucver odbv h TodTwv pirla ews dv 
ayabol dow, i apern pdvimoyv, 
Ibid. c. 6 init.: of wev adda 
ExovTat plror av Adovny } 7d xph- 
Tov, TavTH Suotoe bvres, of & 
ayafol 5 aitobs pian fh yap 


aya%ol [for they are so in sO far as 
they are good |. ouToL wey oby 
anArA@s pido, éxeivor 5é kata cumBe- 
Bnwds Kat TG GmoiwoOau rovras. 
Cf. n. 2 on following page. 

* VIII. 7, 1158, a, 10 sqq., and 
still more fully ix. 10. 

$ VIII. 7, 1157, b, 28: Eowe 
5 6 6mey «pianos mde, H BE 
pirdia efer (on Efis, see p. 285, 
n. 3, and p. 153, n. 3, supra)* a 
yap lanois ovx HTTov wpos Ta 
ayuxd éoTly, avr upsdovor dé mera 
mpoapérews,  8& mpoalpecis ad’ 
efews, Kal Tayabd BovrAovra Tots 
piroumévors exelywy Evera, 0) Kara 
mdfos GAAG Kad’ EEy. But on the 
other *hand, as is further re- 
marked, mutual pleasure in one 
another’s society is an element in 
friendship; of morose persons it 
is said, ibid. 1158, a, 7: of rotod- 
To. evvoL Mev eiowv GAAGAOIs* Bod- 
Aorta yap Tayabd Kal amrayvT@ow 
eis Tas xpelas* pidor 8 ov mdvu 
cial bia 7d wh cuvnucpedew nde 
xalpew adAfAais, & 8 udder’ elvat 
Sone? pirird, 


ETHICS 195 


equivalent. Every other kind, attaching as it does to 
what is external and unessential, is merely an imperfect 


copy of this true friendship.' This requires that 
friegds should love only the good in that 
thet should Sooo oop oe and 
return only good.” “Virtuous men, on the other hand, 
neither demand nor perform any unworthy service to 
one another, nor even permit it to be done for them.’ 
But just as true friendship rests on likeness and 
equality of character and spiritual gifts, all friendship 











may be said to rest upon 


' See n. 1 on preceding page, 
and viii. 8, 1158, b, 4 sqq. c. 10, 
1159, b, 2 sqq. < 

2C. 4, 1156, b, 12: éorw 
Exdrepos amdas ayabbs kal To plrw 
[each is not only per se good, 
but a good to his friend]. of yap 
&yabol Kal amrAds arya8ol Kad addh- 
Aois @PEAmOo1. Suolws 5é Kad HBe7s - 
kal yap amdA@s of ayabol Hdeis Kal 
GAANAaS* ExdoTw yap Kad’ Hdovhy 
ciow ai oixeiar mpdters kal ai road- 
Ta, Tav ayadwv Se ai airal } 
Spo. c.7, 1157, b, 33: ptdody- 
Tes tov gidov 7d abrois a&yabdy 
pirovow* 6 yap ayabds pidos yevd- 
Mevos Gyaboy yivera 6 pldros: éxd- 
Tepos ody pidei Te TO abt@ aryabor, 
_ kal 7d Yoov aytam0dl5wor TH BovdrAh- 
ge Kal t@ Ader Adyera yap 
pirsrns 4 icétns [or with Cod. 
K> omit 7, so that the same pro- 
verb is here cited as ix. 8, 1168, b, 
8: Aéyera ydp* pirdrns iodrns] - 

a 3) TH Tay ayabav Tavd’ 
bmdpxet. 

* C. 10, 1159, b, 4. tv 

* See n. 
and viii. 10, 1159, a, 34: wa@Adov be 
Tijs pirlas otons ev TE pirciy Kad 
TaY pioplrwy eravoupévwr, piAwy 


equality.‘ The equality is 


apeTi Td pireiv Lounev [which we 
cannot explain with BRANDIS, p. 
1476, as ‘ the love of friends is like 
the love of their virtue,’ for the 
words preceding forbid this trans- 
lation; the meaning is: ‘inas- 
much as love is a praiseworthy 
thing, it isa kind of perfection 
in the friends, or is based upon 
perfection; as, therefore, the 
friendship that rests upon actual 
merits is lasting, that which rests 
upon true love must be so too]. 
dar’ ev ols rotro yivera: Kar’ atiay, 
otro: wdvimor plror Kad  TovTwy 
parla. otrw 3 dy nad of &noo 
MdAuor’ elev pidor: isd(owro yap 
ty. 7 8 iodrns xa) duotdrns 
pirdrns, kal uddrora uty h Tey Kar’ 
Gperhy duodrns . . . €& evaytiwy 
dé uddrAiora uty Bone? h Sia rd 
Xphowmoy ylyverbat pirla, oloy mwévns 
TAovoly, duabhs e€i8dci- of yap 
Tuyxdver tis evdehs dv, robroy 
Epieuevos dvriSwperrat trAAw. This 
is so even in the case of lovers, 
tows 5¢ 005’ eplerar rd evayrioy Tov 


évaytiov Kad’ aird, dAAa Kara 
TupBeBnkds, h 3° bpetis rod Méoou 
arly, TodTo yap ayabdv. Cf, 
n. 2, supra. 


02 


DICWMCE 


196 


ARISTOTLE 


perfect when both parties, besides having like objects 
in view, are like one another in respect of worth. 
When, on the other hand, the object of each is dif- 
ferent,! or when one of the parties is superior to the 
other,? we have proportional instead of perfect equality 


or analogy : 


each lays claim to love and service from 


the other, proportionate to his worth to him.* Jriend- 
ship is thus akin to justice, in which also the question 


is one of the establishment of equality ii thé’ rela- 








tions of human Society ;* but law and right ‘take 











SNE RELA) OM OI ART HIE 





1 As in the case of the lover 
and his beloved, or the artist and 
his-paipe#; in which the one party 
seeks pleasure, the other advan- 
tage; or of the sophist and his 
disciple, in which the former 
teaches and the latter pays; ix. 1, 
1164, a, 2-32: cf. p. 193, n. 4, sup. 

2 Hg. the relation of parents 
and children, elders and youths, 
man and wife, ruler and ruled, 
viii. 8, 1158, a, 8, and elsewhere. 

8 VIIL. 8 init.: eiol 8 ody ai 
cipnuevat pirlat év iodentt: Th yup 
avTa yhyverat am ’ ducpoty Kal Bobdov- 
TOL dAAAous o7 ETEpOY | av’ érépov 


GYTLKATAAAGTT OVTal, oloy dorhv 
ayr’ wpercias, Cc. 15 init.: tpit- 
tav & ovoav pitty... Kal Kal? 


Exdorny TOV pev ev igérnrs pirwv 
dvtwy Tav be Kad’ dmepoxiy (kat 
yep duoles ayabol pidor yivoyvra Kar 
delvwy xelpovi, duolws 5é Kal 7deis, 
kal did Td xphomov iodCovres Tais 
wperciats Kal Siapépovres) Tovs 
toous mev Kat’ iodrnra Set Te pirciv 
kal Tois Aowots icd(ev, Tos F 
dvlcous T@ dvddAoyov Tais bmepoxas 
dmodibéva. c. 8,1158,b, 17 (after 
citing examples of friendship in 
unlikerelations): érépayap &xdorov 
TovTwy dperh Kal Td Epyov, Erepa 
dt kat 57 & pirovow* Erepat ody Kal 


aut piagoets “Kad af T aiktas, Parents 
perform a different service for 
children from that which chil- 
dren perform for parents; so 
long as each party does the duty 
that belongs to it they are ina 
right and enduring relation to 
each other. dvddAoyor 5° év raécais 
Tais Kad’ smrepoxhv ovoais pidtais 
kal thy oiAnow Set yiverOau, ofov 
Tov duelyw pwaAAov gidcicba 7} 
pirciy, kal Thy w@peAma@repoy, Kai 
Tov tAdAwy ExaoTov buo!ws* ray 
yap Kat’ dtiay H plrnots yiyvnrat, 
Téte ylyveral mws icédrns 0 5h Tijs 
giAlas eivar Soxe?. Of. c. 13,1161, 
a, 21, c. 16, 1163, b, 11: 7d Kar’ 
ditav yap éemavioot Kal oo Cer Thy 
girtavy, ix. 1 imit.: ev médoas 
5€ tais dvowoedéot pirlous [those 
in which the two parties pursue 
different ends] Td dvdAoyov iod¢e: 
Kal ower Thy iAlay, Kabdrep 
elpntat, oloy Kal ev TH woAiTiKH TO 
ockuToTéum avtl trav smrodnudtwv 
&uoiBhH vyivera kar’ dtlar, &c. 

4 VIII. 11 tnit.: fome de... 
mept TavTa Kal éy Trois avrois elvat 
h} Te pirla. kal Td Sikaov: év amdon 
yap kowwvia Sone? rt Sieatov eivar Kal 
pirla 5€.... Kad’ bcov St Kowwvod- 
ow, éml rocodTdv éott piArla* Kal yap 
Td dixaov, Cf. p. 192, n. 4, supra, 





ETHICS 197 


account in the first instance of relations of inequality, 
in which individuals are treated in proportion to their 
worth, and only secondarily of relations of equality, 
whereas in friendship the reverse is the case: that 
which is primary and perfect is the friendship between 
equals, while that which exists between those who are 
not equals is only secondary.! 

Aristotle next discusses those connections which 
are analogous to friendship in the narrower sense. He 
remarks that every community, even such as exists for 
a special purpose, involves a kind of friendship, and he 
shows especially with regard to that form of community 
which embraces all others—namely, the political—what 
personal relations correspond to its principal forms, that 
is, to the various kinds of constitution.2? From these, 
which are more of the nature of contracts, he then pro- 
ceeds to separate the relationships of kindred and pure 








' VIII. 9 init.: ody du0'ws Se 
7 Yoov &y re trois Suxalois Kal ev 
TH pirla paivera txew* For yap 
év wey Tors Sixalors toov mpotws Td 
kar’ atiav [i.e diaveunrixdy Sikaor, 
which is based upon analogy; 
see p. 171 sqq.], 7d 8 Kara moody 
[i.e. S:opPwriudv, which proceeds 
upon the principle of arithmetical 
equality] devrépws, ev 3¢ ri pirla 
7d) ev Kata woody mpérws [since 
perfect friendship, of which all 
other forms are imperfect imita- 
tions, is that. which is concluded 
between persons equally worthy 
for the sake of their worth ; see p. 
194, n. 1, and 195, n. 2, supra), 7d 
dé kar’ délav devrépws : in support of 
which Aristotle points to the fact 
that where the inequality is very 
great, as in the case of men and 
gods or (c. 13, 1161, a, 32 sqq.) 


master and slave, no friendship 
is possible; but in such cases 
there are not even rights (c. 18, 
ibid. ; cf. x. 8, 1178, b, 10). The 
distinction, as a whole, is rather 
a trifling one, and it is obvious 
from the quotations on p. 196, n. 4, 
and p. 192, n. 4, supra, that it was 
not accepted even by Aristotle 
himself as exhaustive of the sub- 
ject. The reason is to be found in 
the obscurity caused by his failure 
clearly to separate between the 
legal and the moral side of 
justice. 

* On the special relations of 
travelling companions, comrades 
in war, members of clans, guilds, 
&e., cf. viii. 11; on the State 
and the various forms of consti- 
tution, c. 12 sq., and p. 196, n. 
4, supra. 


198 ARISTOTLE 


friendship.! On the same principle he distinguishes later 
on? two kinds of the friendship which rests on mutual 
advantage, which are related to one another as written 
to unwritten law: the legal, in which the mutual 
obligations are definitely fixed, and which therefore is 
merely a form of contract; and the moral, in which the 
services to be rendered are left to the good will of the 
individual. Aristotle further examines the occasions 
which give rise to discord and separation hetween 
friends. He remarks that it is chiefly in friendship for 
the sake of advantage that mutual recriminations arise, 
for where friendship is cherished for the sake of virtue 
there is a rivalry in mutual service, which successfully 
excludes any sense of unfairness on either side; where 
it is founded merely upon pleasure it is likewise 
impossible for either party to complain of unfairness, if 
he fails to find what he seeks. On the other hand, the 
man who performs a friendly service in the hope of 
obtaining a like return, too often finds himself disap- 
pointed in his expectations. The same may be said of 
friendships between unequals. Here also unfair claims 
are frequently made, whereas justice demands that the 
more worthy should be recompensed for that which 
cannot be repaid to him in kind by a corresponding 
measure of honour.’ Finally, misunderstandings easily 


‘VIII. 14 tnit.: ev Kowovia 
Lev ody raca piAla éorly, Kabdmep 
eipntar* dpopicee 8 &y Tis Thy TE 
ruyyevinhy Kal thy éroupuchy. at 
dé moditixal nal gudetixal kal 
TvmTAoikal, kal boat TowadTaL, Kol- 
vovikais éolkact uaAAov* oloy yap 
Ka? duodoylay Twa palvoyrat elvat. 
eis Tatras St rdtevev &y Tis kal Thy 
tevikjv. Relationships of kindred 


are discussed in c. 14, partly also 
c.12sq. Weshallreturn to these 
in the section upon the Family. 

? VIII. 15, 1162, b, 21 sqq. 

3 See the interesting discus- 
sion in viii. 15. Cf. also what is 
said on the relation of teacher 
and scholar, ix. 1, 1164, a, 32 sqq. 

4 VIIT. 16. me 


ETHICS 199 


arise where each party has a different object in view in 
entering upon the alliance.' Aristotle further discusses 
the cases where a man’s duty towards his friend con- 
flicts with his duty towards others, and he lays down 
the wise principle that in each case we must consider 
the peculiar obligations which the circumstances in- 
volve.2 He asks whether a friendly alliance should be 
dissolved if one of the parties to it changes, and he 
answers that separation is unavoidable in cases where 
the change is one in the essential conditions of the 
connection.* He surveys the relation between love of 
self and love of friends, recognising in the latter a 
reflection of the attitude which the virtuous man main- 
tains towards himself;‘ and he connects with this the 
question whether one should love oneself or one’s 
friend more, deciding it by pointing out that it is 
impossible that there should be any real opposition 








1 For the fuller discussion of 
this case see ix. 1; cf. p. 193, n. 4, 


a. 

2 IX. 2, especially 1165, a, 16, 
30: érel 8 Erepa yovetor Kat dder- 
ois «al éraipos Kal evepyéras, 
éxdorois Td oikeia Kal Ta apudr- 
TovTa amoveunréov ... Kal ovy- 
yevéot 5) Kal pudéras Kal moAlras 
kal Tois Aovrois Graco del reiparéov 
TO oikeioy amovéuew, Kad ovyKpivew 
7a éxdorots imdpxovra Kat’ oiKed- 
TnTa Kal dperhy 7) xpjow. When 
the relation is homogeneous this 
comparison is easier: when he- 
terogeneous, it is more difficult 
to make; but even in the latter 
case it cannot be neglected. 

_ §* IX. 3: this is, of course, 
the case where the friendship is 
based upon pleasure or advan- 
tage; or, again, when one has 


been deceived in a friend, sup- 
posing oneself to have been loved 
disinterestedly (8:4 7d H00s), while 
with the other it was only a 
matter of pleasure or profit. If 
a friend degenerates morally, 
the first duty is to aid him in 
recovering himself, but if he 
proves incurable, separation is 
the only resource, for one cannot 
and ought not to love a bad 
man. If, lastly, as is often the 
case in youthful companionsbips, 
the one outruns the other in 
moral and intellectual develop- 
ment, true fellowship becomes 
henceforth impossible; neverthe- 
less, the early connection should 
be honoured as much as it 
can be. 

* IX..4, ibid. 1166, b, 6-29, 
where the discord in the soul of 


200 ARISTOTLE 


between the claims of those two, since true self-love con- 
sists in coveting for ourselves what is best—i.e. the 
morally beautiful and great; but we participate in this 
only the more fully in proportion to the sacrifice we make 
for a friend.' In the same spirit Aristotle expresses him- 
self (to pass over other points?) upon the view that the 
happy man can dispense with friends. He denies this 
on many grounds.? ‘The happy man, he says, needs. 
friends whom he may benefit; the contemplation of 
their excellence affords a high sense of enjoyment akin 
to the consciousness of one’s own; it is easier to 
energise in company with others than alone; one gains 
moral invigoration for oneself from intercourse with 
good men. Above all, man is by nature formed for 
association with others, and the happy man can least 
afford to lead a solitary life;* for just as to each man 
his own life and activity is a good, and his consciousness 
of that life and activity a pleasure, so also the existence 
of a friend, in whom his own existence is doubled, and 
the consciousness of this existence, which he enjoys in 
intercourse with him, must be a joy anda good.’ But 


the wicked is depicted with re- 
markable truth, and the moral 
is drawn consistently with the 
practical aim of the Ethics: ei 5) 
70 oUTws exew Alay éotly KOALov, 
gpeveTéoy thy woxOnplay Siarera- 
beévos &e. 

' IX. 8, see p. 133, n. 2, supra, 
ad fin., p. 151, n. 2, supra. 

* The relation of evo. (ix, 
5) and déudvoa (c. 6) to girla; 
the apparent fact that the bene- 
factor usually loves the benefited 
more than the latter the former, 
every one loving his own produc- 
tion, as the mother does her 


children (c. 8); the number of 
one’s friends, which ought to be 
neither too small nor too great, 
but ought to include so many 
doo cis 7d ovGiiv ixavol, seeing 
that a close relationship is pos- 
sible only between few, the 
closest (pws as brepBodh piAlas), 
only between two; although of 
political friends (members of the 
same party) one can have a great 
number. 

% TX. 9, cf. viii. 1, 1155, a, 5. 

* TX, 9, 1169, b, 17; see p. 192, 
n, 3, supra. 

° Ibid. 1170, a, 13 sqq. where, 


ETHICS 201 


if we ask further whether we require friends more in 
prosperity or adversity, the answer is,! that it is more 
necessary to possess them in adversity, nobler in 
prosperity.” In the former case we are more in need of 
their help; manly natures, which know how to bear 
pain alone, have more need of friendly sympathy in the 
other case. A man ought to be eager to invite his 
friends to share his joys, loath to have recourse to them 
in sorrow; on the other hand, he ought to be more 
ready to hasten to them when they are in trouble than 
in joy. True friendship, however, demands both.? 
Friendship is an association and community of life, an 
extension of self-love to embrace others. Each takes 
the same delight in the existence and activity of his 
friend as he does in his own, and imparts to his friend 


what he most values himself.4 


after first referring to aic@dvec@at 
and voeéy as constituents of 
human life, Aristotle proceeds, 
1.19: 7d 88 Gv rev Kal’ abrd aya- 
Oav Kal ndéwy . . . didwep oie 


_ waow 7dv elvar. b, 1: 7d 8 aio- 


OdverOa bri Ch tav Hdéwv Kad? 
aité* pice: yap ayaboy (wh, Td 8’ 
dyabby Srdpxov ev éavtG aicbdy- 
ev0a 750. [In being conscious of 
perception and thought we are 
conscious of life: 7d yap elva: jv 
aic@dverOat kad voeiv,a,32.]... ds 
dé mpds Eavrdy Exe: 5 orovdaios, Kad 
mpos Toy pidrov* Erepos yap aitds 6 
piros éoriy. Kabdwep ody rd abrdy 
elvat aiperév éorw éxdory, obtw Kal 
7d Tov plrov  mapatAnalws. Td 5’ 
elvae jv alperdy 51d 7d alcOdvecOa 
adrod ayaot bvtos. h St Toratrn 
aloOnots jdeia Kad’ Eavrhy, cvvac- 
Odverbat tpa Set Kad rod plAou Sri 
tor, TovTo de yivorr’ by ev TE 


Friendship, therefore, 


cuGjv kal Kowwveivy Adywv Kal dia- 
volas* oftw yap by Sétee 7d ovliv 
em) Trav avOpdrwrv AéyerOat, Kal ody 
domwep ém trav Booknudtwv Td ev 
T@ avT@ véuerOa. 

EA, 11, 

* A similar distinction be- 
tween dvaykaioyv and ayabby or 
kadvy has already come before 
us, p. 165, n. 1 (from Metaph. i. 
2),192,n.5,supra. Cf. Polit. vii. 
14, 1333, a, 36: 7a 8 dvaryKaia Kal 
XPhowa Tay KaA@y Everer. 

3 9 mapovola 3) Trav pidwy, c. 
11 concludes, é€v @racw aiper) 
paiverat. 

* See n. 5 above, and ix. 12 (at 
the end of the section upon friend- 
ship): dp’ obv, domep rots épaor rd 
dpav ayarnrérardéy éort,... oftw 
kal rois plras aiperdrardy ori 7d 
ovGiiv; Kowwvla yap h piAla. Kal 
ws mpos éautby Exe, obTw Kal mpds 


202 ARISTOTLE 


is the most conspicuous example of the natural sociable- 
ness and solidarity of mankind. It is the bond that 
unites men to one another, not in any merely outward 
manner, as by a community of legal rights, but by the 
deepest instincts of their nature. In friendship indi- 
vidual morality expands into a spiritual communion. 
But this communion is still limited and dependent on 
the accidental circumstances of personal relations. It 
is in the State that it first receives a wider scope and a 
more solid foundation in fixed laws and permanent 
institutions. 


Tov pidov, wept abtoy 8 7 alcOynois SH* H 8 evepyem yiverar avTois 
btt €or aiperh* Kal wept tov pldov év THe cuchy, &c. 








208 


CHAPTER XIII 


PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY—(CONTINUED) 


B.— Politics! 
1. Necessity, Nature and Function of the State 


Or Aristotle’s theory of the State it may be said, as of 
some other portions of his philosophy, that there are 
several points in it on which it is difficult for us to obtain 
certainty or completeness of view, owing to the state 
in which his treatise on Politics has come down to us. 
So rare is the union, so unequal, where they exist, 
the distribution, of the powers and qualities which 
we here find combined in equal proportions, that the 
eight books of the Politics of Aristotle form, indeed, one 
of the most remarkable works that antiquity has be- 
queathed to us. With the most comprehensive know- 
ledge of the facts of history and the completest insight 
into the actual conditions of social life, Aristotle here 
combines the subtlest power of marshalling in the 
service of scientific thought the materials which are 
so supplied. But the completion of the work was 

* On the more recent litera- (Leipzig, 1860), i. B42 sqq.; 
ture which treats of Aristotle's UEBERWEG, G'rundriss, i. 203 sq. 
theory of the State as a whole (5th ed. 1876); SusmMIHL, Jahrb. 
and in its several parts, see H1t- f. Philol. vol. xcix. 593, ciii. 119, 


DENBRAND, Gesch. u. Syst. der and BuURSIAN’s Jahresbericht, 
Rtechts- und Staatsphilosophie 1874, p. 592 sq. 1877, p.372 sqq. 


204 


ARISTOTLE 


probably prevented by the death of the author;! and 
when the sketches which he had left came to be put to- 
gether,” it was impossible to avoid lacune, and these must 


1 See Appendix, 

2 Here, as in the case of the 
Metaphysics (see n. 76 sq. supra), 
the notes left by Aristotle seem 
to have been simply put together 
without revision or alteration. 
Tradition does not tell us who 
undertook this task; but as 
Theophrastus is named as the 
editor of the Metaphysics (p. 
79), it may have been he; 
which would explain the fact 
that the Politics seems to have 
been in circulation also under his 
name. Itis alluded to by Diog. v. 
24, in the curious words: moA- 
TIKHS akpodcews &S Hh Ocoppao- 
tovuda—nh. As they stand, these 
words give no conceivable sense, 
as it could not have been in- 


tended to explain the nature 


of Aristotle’s Politics by compar- 
ing them with Theophrastus’s as 
the better known. The question, 
therefore, rises whether the 
words oA. axpodcews d—H are not 
alone original, 7) @eoppderov hav- 
ing been first placed in the 
margin by another hand, and 
then incorporated in the text as 
n @eopp. with as taken from 
akpodoews preceding it. KROHN 
(ibid. 51) supposes that the con- 
junction of the works of Theo- 
phrastus and Aristotle in the 
cellar at Scepsis may partly ex- 
plain why much that belongs to 
Theophrastus should have found 
its way into the Politics of Ari- 
stotle, and why it finally came to 
be thought that Theophrastus 
was its author; but the indica- 
tions given, p. 150, supra, of the 
use of the work up to the time of 


Cicero, make it impossible to 
accept this view, even were we 
to grant that the note, as 4 
@copp., did not find a place in 
Hermippus’s enumeration until 
after Apellicon’s discovery of the 
books, and to treat Krohn’s eli- 
mination of the supposed Theo- 
phrastian passages from our text 
as less arbitrary than it is.—The 
same arguments hold good also 
against HILDENBRAND’S (Gesch. 
d. Rechts- u. Staatsphil. i. 360) 
and ONCKEN’S (Staatsl. d. Arist. 
i. 65 sq.) supposition that the 
Politics at the death of the 
author existed only in the original 
MS., and that between the death 
of Theophrastus and Apellicon’s 
discovery it had disappeared. It 
may, indeed, appear strange that 
during this period we find such 
meagre traces of it, but this finds 
sufficient explanation in the 
feebleness of the interest taken 
at this time in political investiga- 
tions, and the poverty of the 
philosophical remains that have 
survived to us from it. Even in 
the later ages, this most important 
account of Aristotle’s political 
doctrines is seldom mentioned 
(see the passages cited by SUSE- 
MIHL, p. xlv, who follows 
SPENGEL, eb. d. Pol. d. Arist. 
[| Abh.d. Miinchn. Akad. v.44,and 
Herz, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 242— 
hardly a dozen in fifteen centu- 
ries), and, apart from the extract 
in STOBAUS (see p. 203, supra), is 
not discussed with any fullness 
except by the Platonist EUBULUS 
(Part iii. a, 719, b, 408, 1, PorPH. 
V, Plot. 15, 20), a part of whose 


a 


listens to admonition nor understands it. 


POLITICS 205 


always remain a serious hindrance to the student of the 
Polities, even although the leading thoughts and funda- 
mental features of the treatise are hardly affected by them. 

However valuable individual virtue and the know- 
ledge which instructs us in it may be, Aristotle yet 
finds, as was to be expected in a Greek, that both are 
inadequate so long as they are confined to individuals. 
Morality finds its first perfect realisation in the State. 
In itself, the moral activity of a community is greater, 
more perfect, nobler, and more divine than that of 
individuals.!| But even the continuous production and 
maintenance of virtue is dependent wholly upon the 
State. Mere instruction is insufficient in the vast 
majority of cases: he who is a slave to desire neither 
It is fear of 
punishment, not aversion to evil, that moves him. He 
knows nothing of joy in what is noble for its own sake. 
How is it possible, then, to correct inveterate ten- 
dencies by mere exhortation? Habit and education 
alone are of any avail, not only with children, but with 
adults as well, for these also are for the most part amen- 
able only to legal constraint. But a good education and 
stringent laws are possible only in the State.* Only in 
the State can man attain his proper good.? Life in the 
State is the natural vocation of man. His nature has 


*Enloxeyis tav bm’ "Apiororédous év 
devtépw tay ToAitin@y mpds thy 
TiAdrwvos Todirelay dyreipnuévwv 
has been made public by MAI, 
Collect. Vatic. ii. 671 sqq. 

' Eth. i. 1, 1094, b, 7: ei yap 
kal rabrdéy éorw [rd rédos] Ev) Kad 
more, weiCdv ye Kal TeAedrepov Td 
Tis mérAews palvera: kal AaBeiy Kad 


oa(ew* a&yarnroy pev yap Kal é 
udvy, KddArov Bt Kai Oerdrepoy FOvei 
kal wéAcow. 


2 Thid. x. 10. 
% Polit. i. 1 init. Every so- 
ciety aims at some good, ora 


5¢ kal rod Kupiwrdrov wdytwy [sc. 
oroxacerat] ) macay Kupiwrdrn Kad 
wdoas Tepiexovoa Tas HAAas~ afrn 


206 ARISTOTLE 


destined him for society,' as is clear from the fact that 
he alone of all creatures possesses the power of speech.? 
In the State moral activity finds at once its condition 
and completion. The State is the moral whole, and is 
therefore prior in itself to the individual and the 
family :* only in the order of its origin in time and of 
human need does it come after them. Only a being 
who is more or who is less than human can live apart 
from the community of the State. To man it is in- 
dispensable. For as with moral culture he is the noblest 
of all creatures, so without law and right he is the 
worst—and the adjustment of rights is the function 
of the community at large.’ The morality, therefore, 


8’ éorly  Kadoupévyn mods Kad 7 
Kkowwvia 7 mwoditinh. Eth. i. 1, 
1094, b, 6: rd ravrns [THs ToAL- 
Tuns| TéAOS mepléexor Gy TA TOY 
tAAwy, Gore Tour’ by etn TavOpa- 
mov ayaldv. How far this is 
consistent with the higher place 
assigned to Oewplfa has been al- 
ready discussed, p. 143 sq. supra. 

1 Polit. i, 2, 1253, a, 2: Sr 
Tov pice) WoALs é€o7l, Kal BTL dy- 
Opwros piaet moAiTiKdy (gov. With 
a reference to this passage, iii. 6, 
1278, b, 19: pdoe pév eorw dyr- 
Opwiros (mov mwodrTiKkdy, 51d Kal wndev 
deducvor THS Tap’ GAAHAwY Bondelas 
ovK eAatTov dpéyovtat Tov aufiv. 
Eth. ix.9 ; see p. 192, n. 3, supra ; 
cf. preceding note. 

2 Polit. i. 2, 1253, a, 7 sqq. 

* Polit. 1.. 2; 12abe eee 
mpdérepoy 8) TH pioer wdAts F oikla 
kal ExaoTos jua@y éoTw, Td yap 
dAov mpdtepoy avaykatoy elvat Tov 


mépous. ... ei yap mh avrdpKns 
Exagros xwpicbels, suolws Tots 


&AAos. wipecw Eker mpds Td GAoy. 


1252, b, 30: 5 maca words pice 
éotly, elrep kal ai mp@rat Kowwviat* 
TEOS yap avTat exeivwr, h 5é piars 
Tédos early, 

* Only in this sense is it said, 
Eth. viii. 14, 1162, a, 17: %Opwrros 
yap Ti pioe cuvdvactiKdy madAov 
}) woditindy, bow mpdrepoy Kal avary- 
kadTepoy oikia méAews. That is 
avarykatov which serves to satisfy 
a physical need, and is there- 
fore definitely distinct from 1d 
kaddv; see p. 201, n.2, supra. 
But this does not prejudice the 
subordination of every other 
social bond to the political. On 
the other hand, the State and 
the household seem rather to be 
regarded by Kudemus as parallel 
institutions (see Hud. vii. 10, 
1242, a, 22: 6 yap &vOpwmros ov 
Mévov ToArTiKby AAG Kal oikKovoumoy 
(gov), economics being also 
separated by him from politics; 
see p. 186, n. 4, supra. — 

5 Polit. i. 2, 1253, a, 27: 6 8 
Mh) Suvduevos Kowwveiv, 2) under 


POLITICS 207 


of individuals has its indispensable complement in the 
State: Ethics is fulfilled in Politics. 

It follows from what has just been said, that the 
function of the State cannot, according to Aristotle, be 
limited to that which even then, it would seem, was 
held by some, as it has been held by a much larger 
number in modern times, to be its only one—namely, 
_certainly owes its origin, as Aristotle admits, primarily 
to ahuman need. Families unite in communities for 
purposes of intercourse ; communities again into States, 
But the conception of the State is not thereby ex- 
hausted. Its function does not stop with care for the 
physical wellbeing of its members, since this care is 
extended to slaves and domestic animals as well as 
citizens ; nor even with the common protection oe 
external enemies and security of intercourse. Such ¢ 
community is an alliance and not a commonwealth, nor 
is it less so because the allies form a geographical unit. 
While it is indispensable to the existence of a politica 
community that all these objects should be secured, 
yet a State, in the proper sense of the word, first. arises 
from the effort of the citizens to realise a perfect and 


Beduevos 3’ adrdpkeay, obey ucpos xwpicbtv vduov Kal dlkns xelpiorov 


wavTwy, 


wédews, dare } Onploy } eds (as he 
has said already at line 3 of the 
same page:—4é &mrodts bia piow 
kal ov Bia toxny Fro paiAds 
eorw } Kpeittwy 1 &vOpwros). pice: 
bev ody 7 Spun ev wacw em rhy rot- 
atrny kowwvlay’ 6 5 rperos cvord- 
cas peylotwr dyalay alrios. Somep 

kal reAewOty BéATIcTOY Tav 
(dav GvOpwrés ori, ofrw Kal 


xarerwrdrn yap adixla 
Exovoa bwda: 5 38 avOpwros brda 
Exwy pvera: ppovhae: kal dperh, ois 
émi ravavtia tort xpiobat uddwora, 
56d dvorwraroy Kal aypibratoy 
Gvev dperijs ... » 8% Sixawotvn 
mohitixdv’ %) yap Bien moduTuxis 
kowwvias Takis eoriv: ) 58 Bikn Too 
Sixalov «plats, 


208 


ARISTOTLE 


self-sufficing social life.! The aim of the State is, in 


a word, the happiness of the citizens.’ 


Happiness, 


however, consists in the unimpeded exercise of virtue.® 
The happiness of a whole people cannot differ from that 


of individuals. 


Accordingly, the highest function of the 


\ State and of statecraft is to form and educate citizens, 


1 Polit. i. 2, 1252, b, 12: 9 
pev obv eis Tacay juépay ovverrn- 
kvia Kowwvia Kata tow oikds 
éorw. . . . 7 8° x rAcwWywy oiki@y 
Kowwvia mparn xphoews Evexev wh 
epnucpov Kaun. pddAwTa be Kara 
otow gouev } Kdun aroikla oiklas 
elvat. From the extension of the 
family springs the village com- 
munity, which in the earliest 
times is ruled by the head of the 
family ... 7 & ék mAedvwv 
KwUav Kolwwvia TéAEos TéALs, 7 OH 
wdons €xovoa wépas THs avTapKelas 
@s @mos eimeiv, ywouevn pey ovv 
Tod Civ Everev, odca, 5& Tod eb Chr. 
5.3 maca méAis pice: early, elrep 
Kal af mp@rat Kowwviar* TéAos yap 
airn éxelywv, 5 dois TéAos 
éorly. iii. 9, 1280, a, 25: Civil 
society exists not merely for the 
protection of property, nor yet 
Tov Civ wdvoy Eevekev, GAAG MaAAOV 
Tov ed Civ (Kal yap dy SovAwy Kal 
Tav trAAwy Cgwv hv woris* vov 
ovk @or 51a TH pH pmeréxew evda- 
povias undé Tod Civ Kata mpoatpecty), 
Mare ouppaxlas Evexev, Baws bd 
mndevds adindvra, wntre 81% Tas 
GAAayas Kal Thy xphow Thy mpds 
GAAhAovs. Being merely con- 
federates, such partners are 
neither under any common au- 
thority ore rod motouvs twas elvan 
de? ppovti Cove G&repot Tovs Erépous, 
ov8’ Srws pndels Hdikos ota Tov 
ird tas aovvOhKas pnd BAAnV 
pmoxOnplav eer undeulay, AAG wdvov 
brws pndev adixhoovow aAAhAouvs. 


mept 8 aperijs kal Kkaklas moAiTiKijs 
diackorovaw boo ppovtiCovew ev- 
voulas. % Ka pavepdy bri Sei wepl 
dperis emmedts elvar TH vy’ as 
GAnOas dvoualouevn WdAEL, U2) Ad-you 
xdépw. Every other combination 
isan alliance, not a State; every 
law which does not aim at 
making the citizens just and 
good is a ovv@hnn, not a vduos. 
Nor does it alter matters if the 
parties in question inhabit the 
same place. gavepdy tolvuy, br 
4 woAts ovK oT. Kowwvia Térov Kal 
TOU ph adiKety opas avTods Kal THs 
petaddoews xdpw* GAAG TadTa wey 
dvarykatov wmdpxew, elmep Fora 
moAts, ov phy ovd’ strapxdvTwv 
Tovtwyv andvrwy Hin wdAts, GAA’ 7 
Tov ev (Hy Kowwvia Kal Tais oikias, 
kal Tots yeveot, (wis TeAclas xaptv 
Kal abrdpkovs. 

2 Polit. iii. 9, 1280, b, 39: 
TédAos pev ody méAews Td ed Civ 
... TOs BE H yevav Kal Kwpav 
Ko.vwvia Cwis TeAclas Kad abtdpkKous. 
tovto 8 éotly, as payer, Td Civ 
evdaudyws Kal KaA@S. T@Y KaA@v 
tpa mpdtewy xdpiv Oeréoy elvat Thy 
moATiKhy Kowwviavy, GAN’? Ov TOU 
oudiv. vii. 8, 1328, a, 35: 7 
5& wéAis Kowwvia tis eort TaV 
bmotwy, Evexev 5E Cwijs tis évde- 
xouevns aplorns. éerel 8 early 
evdamovia Td apiocrov, arn 5é 
dperis evépyera Kal xpijols tis 
TéAeos KC. 

3 See p. 137 sqq. supra. 


POLITICS 


209 


to cherish in them all moral and spiritual fitness, and 
to furnish the impulse to an inherently noble and satis- 


fying activity.’ 


The qualities which make a good 


citizen and a brave man are thus seen to be the same: 
the completed virtue of a citizen is not a virtue, but 
virtue in its application to civic life.? Virtue, however, 


' See p. 208, n. 1, supra; Lth. 
i. 13, 1102, a, 7, ii. 1, 1103, b, 3; 
Polit. vii. 2 init., c. 15 init. * 

* Polit. iii. 4: Is the virtue 
of the avip dyads identical with 
that of the woAirns orovdaios or 
not? Absolutely identical they 
certainly are not (as has already 
been remarked, Zh. v. 5, 1130, 
b, 28), for not only does each 
different form of State make 
peculiar demands upon its mem- 
bers (civil virtue, therefore, will 
have a different character under 
different forms of constitution), 
but the State itself consists of 
heterogeneous elements, and not 
merely of men of mature virtue. 
In so far, on the other hand, as 
the State may be regarded as a 
free community, as being the 
government of freemen’ and 
equals (moAituch apxh, apxh tov 
duolwy Kal édcvOépwy, 1277, b, 7 
sqq.), they coincide, for no one is 
qualified to be a member of such 
a State who does not know both 
how to command and how to 
obey—in other words, who is not 
an dvnp ayabds. Hence, c. 18, 
1288, a, 37, with reference to c. 
4: év 8& roils mpdrois eSelxOn 
Adyos Bri Thy adthy dvayKaiov 
avSpds aperhy elvat kal wodlrovu rijs 
mwéAews THS aplorns. vii. 1, 1323, 
b, 33: Gvipla 5 wédrAews Kal 
Siucaroobyyn kal ppdvnois Thy abthy 
Exe Sivauw Kal popphy, oy mera- 
TX ExrzoToS TAY avOpdmwyv Aێyerat 


VOL, Il. 


Sikatos Kal ppdviwos Kal cdppwr. 
c. 9, 1328, b, 37: ev TH KdAAoTa 
moAiTevouevy méAee Kal TH KEKTN- 
Mévy Sixalovs tvdpas amrdas, GAAG 
Kh mpds Thy bwd0eow (in reference 
to a given State; the mpds rhy 
imdbeow Sixaos is he who, while 
he sides with existing laws and 
institutions, defends even what 
is severe and unjust in them), 
c. 13, 1332, a, 36: Kal yap e 
mavras évdéxera: orovdalous elvat, 
BH Ka Exaoroy bb tev ToALTaY 
[even although it be possible for 
the community as a whole to 
be excellent while each of the 
individuals is not, the imperfec- 
tions of the members being com- 
pensated for by the perfection 
of the whole; we shall have to 
allude to this further on in refer- 
ring to Polit. iii. 11, 13, 15], 
obtws aiperérepoy [yet the latter, 
viz. that all the individuals 
should be virtuous, is the more 
desirable] ; dxoAovde? yap 7@ Kad? 
éxacrov kal Td mdyras. oc, 14, 
1332, a, 11: As the virtue of the 
&pxwv and the best man is one 
and the same, but in the best 
State all are fitted to govern, the 
legislation must aim at making 
all the citizens in it good men. 
C. 15 init.: éwel BE... roy abrdy 
Spov dvarykaiov elvar te te dplarw 
dvipl Kal rij dpiory wodrrela. Ac- 
cording to these explanations, the 
words (iii. 4, 1277, a, 4) ef ph 
mdvras avaykaiov &yabovs elvat Tos 


P 


210 ARISTOTLE 

is twofold—theoretic and practical. ‘To ask which of 
these is superior is equivalent here to asking whether 
peace or war is to be the ultimate aim of civil life; 
since the proper occupation for times of peace is, 
according Aristotle, Science, whereas in war the main 
object is the acquisition of the greatest possible power 
of action.! But we have already seen that Aristotle 
places the theoretic life much higher than the practical, 
and accordingly we are not surprised to find him 
sharply criticising those constitutions which, like the 
Spartan and the Cretan, are adapted rather for war 
than for peace. Such States, he says, have only con- 
quests in view, as if every kind of dominion over others, 
upon whomsoever it may be forced and by whatsoever 
means achieved, were permissible; and on this account 
they nourish in individuals the spirit of violence and 
ambition, and estrange them from the arts of peace, and 
so when their dominion is secured and the martial activity 
should give place to the peaceful, such States forthwith 
fall into decay. Aristotle himself regards the peaceful 
occupations as the true object of social life; war he 
permits only as a means to peace, only, therefore, in so far 


ey Th omovdaia méAct moA!ras, 
occurring, moreover, as they do 
in a dialectical discussion (an 
&ropta), are not to be understood 
as though Aristetle himself in- 
tended to deny that necessity. 
He means them merely as a pre- 
‘liminary affirmation of the con- 
dition under which alone civil 
and individual virtue absolutely 
coincide. Whether and under 
what circumstances this condi- 
tion is present, is the subject of 


the discussion that follows. 

1 This parallel, however, is 
only partially relevant. Aristotle 
tells us himself (Polt. vii. 15, 
1334, a, 22 sqq.) that even moral 
virtues, such as justice and self- 
command, are especially indis- 
pensable in time of peace. 
Moreover, while scientific ac- 
tivity certainly needs peace most, 
yet it can only at best be prac- 
tised by a small minority of the 
citizens. 





POLITICS 211 


as it is necessary for self-defence or for the subjugation of 
those whom Nature has destined to serve. He de 

mands, accordingly, that besides bravery and constancy, 
which are necessary in order that the State may assert 
its independence, the virtues of peace—namely, justice, 
- temperance, and scientific culture (¢vAocodia)—should 
also be cultivated.! It cannot be denied that the aim o 

the State is thus placed sufficiently high. It is not, 
indeed, to Aristotle the absolutely highest, as it was to 
the Greeks of an earlier age. ‘To him as to his teacher 
the highest is that scientific activity which in itself can 
dispense with the society of others. This alone it is in 
which man attains the highest perfection permitted him 
by his nature, in which he transcends the limits of 
humanity and lives the life of God. Only as man does 
he require practical virtue and the community in which 
it manifests itself.2 As man, however, these are wholly 


indispensable to him. But the highest form of com- | 


munity, embracing and completing every other, is the 
State. Its aim comprehends every other moral aim, 
while its institutions not only give security and stability 





- to the moral life by means of law and education, but 
extend it over a whole people. We thus arrive at a 
definition of the highest function of the State as at 
of making the citizens happy by means of virtue. This 
is essentially the same view of civil life that we have 
already met with in Plato. In only a single feature 
do the two philosophers differ from one another, but it 

1 Polit. vii. 2, 3, c. 14, 15; 1256, b, 23. 
Eth, x. 7, 1177, b, 4. Cf. also p. 2 Cf. the citations from th. 


143, n. 1, and on war for the x, 8, and other passages, p, 143, 
acquisition of slaves, Polit. i. 8, n. 1. 


P 2 


aan 
-_—_— 


212 ARISTOTLE 


Vi is a fundamental ons. In Plato the State, like every- 


\ 


\ 
\ 
} 


| 


\ 


thing else upon earth, is essentially related to the other 
world, whence all truth and reality spring. This is the 
ultimate source of his political idealism. Just as the 


| Ideas belong to that supersensible world, so the philo- 


sophical rulers to whom he entrusts the realisation of 
these Ideas in the State have their home there also, and 
only unwillingly descend to take part in earthly affairs. 
The State, therefore, serves not only for moral educa- 
tion, but also as a preparation for that higher life of 
the disembodied spirit into which a beautiful glimpse 
is opened to us at the end of the Republic. Of this 
view of the State and of human life in general, we find 
no trace in Aristotle. We have simply and solely here 
to do with the -present_life and with that happiness 
which is the immediate outcome of moral and spiritual 
perfection. It is not the aim of the State to represent 
an ideal world beyond or to prepare for another life, — 
but to satisfy the wants of the present. And just as 
he does not require philosophy to be the ruling principle 
in politics, as we shall see immediately, so, on the other 
hand, he sees no opposition between these two, such 
as might make the political activity of the philosopher 
appear as a painful sacrifice. He holds that human 
nature has two equally essential sides which find their 
satisfaction in the practical activity of the statesman 
and the theoretic activity of the philosopher respectively. 
None but God can live in contemplation alone. Man 
as man cannot renounce practical life in a community. 
It is no mere compulsion, but a moral need, which makes 


the State and the life which it offers a necessity for 
him. 





POLITICS 213 


It is the aim of the Politics to investigate the means 
by which the State fulfils its functions, the various 
more or less perfect conceptions of the nature of these 
functions, and the institutions that correspond to them. 
But before applying himself to this investigation, Ari- 
stotle in the first book of his political treatise discusses 
the Family and the Household; for he holds that in 
order perfectly to understand the nature of the State, 
it is necessary to analyse it into its simplest con- 
stituents.' 


2. The Household as a Constituent Element of the State 


The State is the most perfect form of human society, 
and as such is prior to every other in order of thought. 
But just as elsewhere in Aristotle that which is first in 
essence is last in origin, the primordial principle the 
last result, so the first natural form of society —namely, 





the Family—precedes the political as the condition of 


its origin in time.” 


The family is constituted by means of the three 
relations of husband and wife, parents and children, 


master and servant. 


' Polit. i. 1, 1252, a, 17 (after 
touching upon the distinction 
between political and household 
economy): d7A0v 8 ora Td Aceyd- 
Mevov emirKorovat Kata Thy ipnyn- 
hévnv éOvdov [by which lie means 
not so much his method, as the 
plan which he intends to follow 
in the investigation, and which 
he had indicated at the end of 
the Ethics). orep yap ev ois 
GAAos 7d aoivOeroy péxpt Tav 
douvOérwy avdynn diaipeiv (Taira 
yap eAdxiota pdpia Tod mwayTds), 


VOL. IL. 


ottrw kal wéAw @& ay otyKerra 
oKorovytes oWdueda Kal wep) TovTwY 
MaAAov, Th Te Siapépovoew GAAHAwY 
Kal ef Te Texvixdy éviéxerat AaBeiv 
wept Exacrov Tav pnbevtay. Cf.c. 
3 init. 

2 Polit. i. 2. 

3 Ibid. c. 2, c. 3, c. 12 init. 
Aristotle describes, inc.2, the rela- 
tions of man and wife, slave and 
freeman, as the two fundamental 
ones. He begins with the dis- 
cussion of the latter, c. 3 sqq., 
and connects with it that of the 


*P3 


214 ARISTOTLE 


The relation of husband and wife Aristotle treats as 
an essentially moral one. A natural instinct forms, indeed, 
its basis, but the union must assume the higher forms 
of friendship, good will, and mutual service.' The reason 
of this is that the moral capacities of each are partly 
similar and partly different, and that therefore a free rela- 
tion between them is not only possible, but is demanded 
by the need of both to find their complement. They 
stand, in one sense, upon equal terms. ‘The wife as 
well as the husband has a will of her own and a virtue 
proper to herself. She, too, must be treated as a free 
person. Where the women are slaves, this is a proof to 
Aristotle that the men also are slaves by nature, since 
a free man can unite himself only with a free woman.” 
On the other hand, it is also true that the moral 
capacities of the woman differ in kind and in degree 
from those of the man: her will is weak (axvupos), her 
virtue less perfect and self-sufficient, her vocation, as a 
whole, is not independent production but quiet retire- 
ment and domesticity. The true relation, accordingly, 


different kinds of property— natural to us, i.e. to discuss the 


reserving the two remaining 
relations, c. 13, 1260, b, 8, for 
subsequent treatment, on the 
ground that the education of 
women and children and all 
household arrangements must 
depend upon the character and 
aim of the State. The discussion 
of these, however, is not resumed 
in the Politics as we have it, 
what is said in lib. vii. and viii. 
on education being without special 
reference to family life. For the 
purpose of exposition, it is best 
to take the order which is more 


family before slavery and _ pro- 
perty. 

1 Polit. i. 2 init.; Hth. viii. 
14, 1162, a, 16 sqq.; cf. He. i. 3 sq. 

2 Polit, i. 2, 1252, a, 1 sqq. c. 
13, 1260, a, 12 sqq.; Eth. ibid. 

3 Polit. i. 5, 1254, b, 13, c. 13, 
1260, a, 12, 20 sqq. iii. 4, 1277, 
b, 20 syg.; We. i. 3, ad fin.; cf. 
Hist. An. ix. 1, where differences 
of character and disposition are 
discussed in so far as they pro- 
ceed from difference of sex. See 
esp. 608, a, 35: Td OfAca warakad- 
Tepa Kal Kakoupydtepa Kal frTov 


POLITICS 215 


of woman to man can only exist where the man, as the 
superior, bears rule, while the woman is treated as a free 
partner in the household, and as such is not only 
protected from every kind of injustice, but also has her 
own proper sphere, with which the man does not 
interfere. It is an association of free members with 
unequal rights—in other words, it is, as Aristotle 
frequently describes it, an aristocracy.' 

Less free is the relation between Parent and Child, 
in discussing which, however, Aristotle confines himself 
characteristically enough almost solely to the relation 
between father and son.? In spite of the advanced 
views just quoted, mother and daughter have no 
further attention paid to them. As Aristotle had 
compared the married relation to an aristocracy, he 
compares that of father and son to a monarchy.® The 
child has, strictly speaking, no rights as against his 


amAG Kal mpomerécrepa Kal mrepl Thy 
TOY TEKVWY TPOh)Y PpoYTIATIKMTEpa, 
7a 8 ppeva evavtlws Ovuwdéorepa, 
kal Gypidrepa Kal amdotorepa Kai 
ftrov éwiBovaa ... yuvh avdpds 
éAenuovéorepoy kal apldaxpu uadAor, 
tri 5& MOovepwrepoy Kal weupimoipd- 
Tepov, kat pirodroldopoy maddoy kai 
mwAnktixwrepov, €or. 5é cal Svadvpov 
pGdAAov 7rd OFAU Tov Uppevos Kal 
diceAm, Kal dvaddorepoy xa 
Wevdéorepov, ebamarnrétepoy 5é Kal 
pvnovinerepoy, ert 5& &ypuTvdrepov 
kat dxvnpérepoy Kal Saws aKtvnrd- 
tepov th OnAV Tod Uppevos, Kal 
Tpopis ¢eAdrrovés éatw. Bonn- 
Tikérepov bt, domep erA€xOn, Kal 
dydperdrepoy rd Uppey Tod OnArEds 
éorw. We may contrast the 
careful observation upon which 
this comparison is based with 





the levity with which Plato (Rep. 
v. 452 B sqq.; cf. Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 
775) denies that there is any in- 
herent difference between the 
sexes beyond that of their natural 
functions. 

' Eth. N. viii. 12, 1160, b, 32 
sqq. c. 13, 1161, a, 22 ; cf. v. 10, 
1134, b, 15; Hud. vii. 9, 1241, b, 
29; Polit. i. 13, 1260,a,9; @e. 
i. 4, where details and practical 
directions are given upon this 
head. Cf. further, p. 222 sq. infra. 

? Such passages as Eth. viii. 
14, 1161, b, 26, ix. 7, 1168, a, 24, 
can hardly be regarded as rele- 
vant. 

% Eth. N. viii. 12, 1160, b, 26, 
c. 13 init. (Hud, vii. 9, 1241, b, 
28.) 


216 ARISTOTLE 


father, being still only a part of his parent,' but the 
father has a duty to his child—the duty, namely, of 
providing for its highest interests.? The reason of this 
is that the child has a will and a virtue of its own, 
although both are imperfect. ‘T’hey are both perfect in 
his father, and we may therefore describe the right 
relation between father and son as one in which the 
former imparts his more perfect virtue to the latter, 
while the son by his obedience appropriates the virtue 
of his father.® 

The position, lastly, of the Slave is one of complete 
dependence. To the institution of slavery Aristotle 
has devoted special attention, partly with the view ot 
investigating its necessity and justice, and partly of 
laying down the proper method of treating slaves: 
That slavery is, in the first place, a necessity, follows, 
according to Aristotle, from the very nature of the. 
household, whose requirements demand not only lifeless 
but also living and rational utensils. But utensils are 
the property of him who uses them. Hence to com- 


plete the accommodations 


1 Ibid. v. 10, 1134, b, 8; cf. 
viii. 16, 1163, b, 18. 

2 Polit. iii. 6, 1278, b, 37. 

8 Polit. i. 13, 1260, a, 12, 31; 
cf. iii. 5, 1278, a, 4. A complete 
discussion of the family would 
include that of the fraternal 
bond, but upon this Aristotle 
does not enter in the Politics; 
only in the Ethics does he touch 
upon the relation existing be- 
tween brothers, in treating of 
friendship. He remarks that 
brotherly love rests partly upon 
common parentage, which of itself 


of the household, human 


constitutes a bond of union, and 
partly upon community of life 
and education; and that friendship 
between brothers resembles that 
between those of the same age, 
&c. He compares their relation- 
ship to a timocracy in so far as 
the ‘parties in it are naturally 
upon an equality, and difference 
in age is the only ground of 
superiority ; and ends by tracing 
the bond of connection between 
more distant relatives in a similar 
analysis; viii. 12-14, 1161, a, 3, 25, 
b, 30 sqq. 1162, a, 9 sqq. 


POLITICS 217 


beings are required who shall be the property of their 
master '—in other words, slaves.? That, in the second 
place, slavery is just, that it rests not upon legal enact- 
ments merely, as some even then affirmed,* but also upon 
the laws of nature, Aristotle tries to prove from the 
difference in the natural condition of men. Those who 
are by nature fitted only for physical employments justly 
come under the power of those who are capable of 
intellectual activity, since these are their superiors, just 
as the gods are the superiors of men or men of the 
beasts, and since generally the intellect must rule the 
body.* Aristotle even goes the length of affirming that 
nature has willed a physical distinction between them, 
and that it is only a lusus nature when the soul of a 
freeman finds its way into the body of a slave.® And 
since this in general is actually the relation of Bar- 
barians to Greeks, the former are held to be the 
natural slaves of the latter.° Aristotle therefore regards 
would refuse them  uncondi- 


tional submission. The remark 
is characteristic of a Greek. As 


' Polit.i.4; Ge. i. 5 init. 
* A slave being (Polit. i. 4 
fin.) ds dy Kripa 7 bvOpwros dv 





(xrijua 5& dpyavoy mpaxtixdy [see 
ibid. 1254, a, 1 sqq.] Kal xwpic- 
Tév), a piace SovdAos is 6 uh abrovd 
pice GAA’ BAdAov, tvOpwmos Fé. 

% Polit. i. 3, 1253, b, 18 saqq. 
c. 6, 1255, a, 7; cf. Ph. d. Gr. 
i. 1007, 2, 4th edit.; ONCKEN, 
Staatsl. d. Arist. ii. 32 sq. 

4 Tbid. c. 5, 1254, b, 16, 34, 
vii. 3, 1325, a, 28. Plato had 
already expressed this idea; cf. 
Ph. d. Gr. i. 755, 2. 

- § Polit. i. 5, 1254, b, 27, where 
he adds: if one portion of the 
human race were physically as 
superior to the rest as the gods 
are represented to be, no one 


in his view the spiritual character 
naturally and necessarily ex- 
presses itself in a harmonious 
external form, he finds in the 
acknowledged beauty of his own 
race a direct proof of its absolute 
superiority to barbarian peoples. 
How much more from this point 
of view would the slavery of 
black and coloured races have 
seemed to him to be justified. 

* Polit. i. 2, 1252, b, 5, c. 6, 
1255, a, 28; ef. vii. 7. Aristotle 
certainly admits exceptions to 
this assertion; Nature, he re- 
marks, i. 6, 1255, b, 1, intends, 
indeed, that just as man springs 


218 ARISTOTLE 


not only slavery itself as justifiable, but also war for 
the acquisition of slaves,’ provided only the slavery be 
strictly limited to those who are by nature destined to 
it. It is unjust only when it is inflicted on those 
whom nature has destined to rule. ‘The practice, 
accordingly, of treating prisoners of war indiscriminately 
as slaves, is condemned by Aristotle on the ground that 
captivity may overtake even the best and those who 
have been unjustly attacked.? The nature of the rela- 
tion of master and slave must of course be ruled by 
these principles. A wife has a weak will and a boy 
an imperfect one, but a slave has none at all. His 
will resides in his master; obedience and usefulness in 
service are the only virtues which he is capable of 
exercising.’ ‘That the slave, being a man, must also 
possess a virtue proper to him as man is, indeed, 
admitted by Aristotle, but he immediately adds that 
the slave can only possess a minimum of this virtue.‘ 
Similarly he recommends a mild and humane treatment 
of slaves. He makes it the duty of the master to 


from man, and beast from beast, 
so the good should spring from 
“the good, but she does not always 
succeed in this. He continues: 
bre pev otv exer Ta Adyov 7 
aupisBytnois [the doubt about 
the lawfulness of slavery] «al 
ovx eioly of pev ptoe SovAX of & 
éAcdPepor SjAov. This can only 


mean that all slaves or freemen | 


are not so by nature, for he 
immediately adds: ral dr: év tTi9) 
Sidpiota Td ToLodToY, GY TuupéepeEr 
TH pev Td Bovrcvew ta SE Td 
Seomd (ew Kal dixaoy, There must 
thus nevertheless be tribes born 


to be slaves, as is presupposed 
c. 2, ibid., and must be assumed 
if war for the capture of slaves 
is to be justified. THUROT, 
Etudes s. Arist. 10, proposes in- 
stead of ‘ovx cicly of pév, ‘ ovK 
eloly ei uy,’ which, however, would 
yield the awkward meaning that 
all slaves are so by nature. 

1 Polit. i. 8, 1256, b. 23 sqq. 

2 Thid. c. 6, 1255, a, 21 sqq.° 

8 Polit.i. 18, 1259, a, 21 sqq. 
1260, a, 12-24, 33; Poet. 15, 
1454, a, 20, 

* Polit. ibid. 





POLITICS 219 


educate them in the virtue that is possible to them;! 
he commends the practice of promisiug them freedom 
as the reward of good conduct.? And yet he holds that 
the power of the master as a whole is despotic, and that 
love on his part towards a slave is as impossible as love 
of the gods towards man.’ That Aristotle holds this 
to be true of the slave gua slave and not qua man,‘ we 
can only regard as an inconsistency which does him 
honour. Greek morals and Greek ways of thought 
were too powerful within him to permit him to draw 
the more logical inference® that man qua man cannot 





be a slave. 


To the investigation of slavery, Aristotle appends 
more general discussions upon property and modes of 


» Polit. i. 7, c. 13, 1260, b, 8: 
gavepdy tolvuy bri Tis To.airns 
aperijs altriov elvar Set T@ SovAw Tv 
Seomdrny . . 51d Aéyovow ov Karas 
of Adyou Tobs SovAous &roarepovyTes 
kal gdoxovres emitdier xpioda 
uedvov' vovdernréoy ‘yap . uaAAov 
tovs BovAous } Tovs maidas. On 
the treatment of slaves see 
further in @c. i. 5. 

? Polit. vii. 10 fin., upon which 
HILDENBRAND. Rechts-u. Staats- 
phil. i. 400, pertinently remarks 
that this is inconsistent with 
Aristotle’s principles: for he 
whom nature condemns _ to 
slavery ought not to be set free; 
he whom nature has not so con- 
demned ought not to be held in 
slavery. 

% Eth. viii. 12, 1160, b, 29, c. 
13, 1160, a, 30 sqq.; ef. viii. 9 
(see i. 3.8, n. 1, supra). 

* £th. viii. 13 fin. 

5 As RITTER (iii. 2361) showed 
it to be, and as it continues to be, 


in spite of FECHNER's objection 
(Gerechtigheitsbegr. d. Arist. p. 
119) that according to Aristotle 
there are differences even within 
the sphere of human reason. 
Aristotle certainly assumes such 
differences and even asserts, as 
we have just seen, that they go 
so deep as to render a portion of 
mankind incapable of freedom. 
But the real question is whether 
this assertion still holds true if we 
are at the same time compelled 
to admit that even one who 
belongs to this portion of man- 
kind is duvduevos rowwvioa vduov 
kal ovvOiKns, Kal pidlas 5h, Kad’ 
bcov &vOpwros, and that there isa 
Sixaov wavtl avOpmmrw mpds mayTa. 
To a thing, a possession, no 
rights can belong. ‘To a man 
who has no will and either no 
virtue at all or only that of a 
slave friendship, on Aristotle’s 
principles, is impossible. 


220 ARISTOTLE ~ 


acquisition ' somewhat loosely, with the remark that 
slaves being a part of a man’s property, the subject of 
property here finds a natural place.2 He distinguishes 
two kinds of production: ‘ natural,’ and ‘ artificial.’* The 
former embraces all those modes of activity by which 
the necessities of life are obtained—the rearing of 
cattle, hunting, agriculture, &c.4 From the barter of 
the products of these arises, in the first place, exchange, 
which is likewise regarded as a natural mode of pro- 
duction, since it immediately serves the satisfaction of 


natural wants.® 


1 Poltt. i. 8-11, cf. Be. i. 6. 

* See Polit. i. 8. Slaves had 
been previously described (c. 4 
init.) as a part of kxrfos, and 
KTnTiK) as a part of oiKxovopla; 
nevertheless one cannot accept 
TEICHMULLER’Sstatement (p. 338 
of the treatise cited 137,n. 2, sup.) 
ihat this section is here quite in 
place. Forinc.3 only the three 
relations of master and slave, 
husband and wife, father and 
children were adduced as the 
proper subjects of economics, 
and in 1253, b, 12, the theory of 
property is only touched upon in 
a few words: @éor: 5€ Te mépos 
[? now also rejected by SUSE- 
MIHL] 6 Soke? trois wey elvar 
oikovouia, Tots 5& péyioroy meépos 
avis, Viz. xpnuariorinh, which is 
thus here regarded as merely 
supplementary to the study of 
economics. TEICHMULLER sug- 
gests that the remark in the 
text upon the way in which 
the theory of production is con- 
nected with the discussion of 
slavery, only betrays a confu- 
sion with regard to the meaning 
of external goods in Aristotle: 


But the introduction, for the sake of 


but his ingenuity has here dis- 
covered a connection which is not 
to be found in Aristotle, and has 
no existence but in the commen- 
tator’s own mind. 


3 ¢, 8 fin.: btt wev Tolvuy ore 
TIS KTNTIKH KaT& ovow Tots 


oikovduots Kad Tots woALTiKOTs, Kal 61’ 
hv aitlav, SjAov. c.9 init.: ore 
5é yévos HAAO KTHTIK|S, hy madre. 
KaAdodot Kal Sikatov avtd Kade 
Xpnuarioruny .... oT. 5 7 pev 
gtoe 7 8 ov hice a’Tav, GAA 
3° éumepias tivds Kal tréxvns vyiv- 
€TQL MaAAOV. | 

4 After enumerating the vari- 
ous kinds of natural production, 
and among them, strangely 
enough (1256, a, 36, b, 5), Anoreta, 
which is neither natural toa moral 
being nor a productive activity 
at all, he says of them (1256, b, 
26): €y wey oby eldos KrntiKis 
Kara pow Tis oikovouLKys mwépos 
éorly .... ay [a ‘constructio ad 
sensum,’ referring to the different 
activities comprehended under 
this class] éor @noavpiouds xpnu- 
drwy mpos Cady avarykaloy kat xpng- 
corte eis kowwviay WéAews 7) oikias. 

5 c, 9, 1257, a, 28, after the 


POLITICS 22] 


commerce, of money as the universal standard of value! 
was followed by the development of artificial produc- 
tion, which has in view, not the requirements of life, but 
the possession of money.? Only the former of these 
kinds of production is an indispensable part of domestic 
economy.* It has to do with veal wealth, which may 
be defined as the stock of household necessaries, and for 
this reason it is strictly limited by household needs.‘ 
Money-getting, on the other hand, is wholly unlimited, 
herein showing itself to be naturally bad and opposed 
to the true art of life, inasmuch as it serves, not to 
purify and exalt it, but only to provide the means of 
material existence and enjoyment.® Production as a 
whole is, accordingly, held by Aristotle in small esteem, 
and the more so, the more exclusively it is occupied 
with mere money-making business, since of all unnatural 
modes of production he believes money-lending to be 
the most unnatural of all.6 He confines himself, ac- 
cordingly, in what remains of this discussion, to a divi- 





account of barter: 7 wey ody rot- 
avTn peTaBAnTikh ore mapa pvow 
obre xpnuariotixis early eldos obdév" 
cis GvamApwow yap Tis Kata prow 
abrapkelas hy. 

' See p. 173, supra. 

2 ¢. 9, 1257, a, 30 sqq. 

3 o. 9 fin.: wept nev oby Tis TE 
Bh Gvarykalas xpnuariotiuys .. . 
elpntat* Kal wept rijs dvayxalas, 
bri érépa ev airiis oixovourh dé 
Kara pvow h wept Thy Tpophy. 

* c. 8, 1256, b, 30 (following 
the passage cited:p. 220, n. 4, sup.): 
kat Eouev 6 7 GAnOwds wAodTOsS ex 
TovTwy elva. 7 yap Tis To.abTns 
KTHTEwS abTdpkeia mpds ayabhy 
Cwhy obi &mrepds dor. . . . ovdey 


yap Spyavoy &mepov ovdeuras err) 
Téxvns obre TWANG obre peyébe:, b 
5é mAovTos épydvwy wAHOds gorw 
oikovoutk@y Kad woAuriKar. . 

°c. 9, 1257, b. 28-1258, a 
14, 

Sc. 10, 1258, a, 40: ris Be 
MeraBAntiKhs Veyouerns dixalws Cod 
yap Kata plow GAN’ am’ &dAAhAwY 
€otly), evAoyérara muiccira 4 
dBorAooratixh 847d dx’ adbrod Toi 
voulouaros elvar thy Kriow Kal 
od é€p’ Sep eroplobm [not from 
the proper use of gold]. yera- 
Bodjjs yap eyévero xdpw, 5 Be 
TéKos adrd moet mAgovy , . . bore 
kal udAwora wat pbow obros Tay 
Xpnuatiopav early. 


222 ARISTOTLE 


sion of it into its various kinds,! and to a few remarks 
upon the art of obtaining a monopoly of a commodity.? 
He places, however, a different estimate upon the 
scientific treatment of these matters and upon the con- 
duct of them in actual practice.’ Sharing as he does 
to the fullest extent the Greek contempt for manual 
labour,’ he naturally assigns to the latter a lower place 
in proportion as it makes less claim upon the moral 
and intellectual qualities, consists more exclusively of 
physical occupations, and stamps the body more deeply 
with the marks of toil.’ 

Plato had demanded in his Republic that the family 
and household should be absorbed in the State. <A 
community of wives, children, and goods had appeared 
to him to be the arrangement which was most desirable 
and alone suited to the perfect State. Aristotle rejects 
this view.® Plato desired that all things should be held 


' He enumerates in c. 11 
three kinds of xpnmariotiky : 
(1) agriculture, cattle-rearing, 
&C.—olkeLoraTn XPNMATLOTLKN | 


over such ~ subjects, as it is 
XPHTmov mev mpds Tas epyacias, 
gpoprixoy 5€ Td evdiar piBerv. 

3 ¢. 11 init: mdvta 8 Ta 


(2) wetaBaAnrich, with its three 
branches, éumopla,  ToKioMoS, 
sucOapvia, the last of which 
includes all mechanical indus- 
tries; (3) occupying an inter- 
mediate position — ddAorouia, 
MeTadAoupyia, &C. 

2 He desires that a collection 
of these and similar artifices 
should be made (1259, a, 3), 
such as is actually attempted 
afterwards in the second book of 
the Economics. He adduces him- 
self only two examples. As a 
rule, he refers to earlier writers 
upon husbandry, &c. (1258, b, 
59). He will not himself linger 


ToLavTa Thy ev Oewpiay €AEvPEpov 
exer, THY 5° eumeiplay dvaryraiay. 

‘ Further proofs of this will 
meet us in the section upon the 
constitution of the State. 

5 Ibid. 1258, b, 35: io 5¢ rex- 


VIKOTATAL bevy TOV epyaci@v Smcv 


eAdxioroy THs TUXNS, BavavodraT at 


& éy ais Ta chuata AwBOvta pd- 
Atora, SovAicérara: 5€ brov Tov 
gduaTos mTAELoTaL xphoes, ayev- 
veoratat 5€ mov €AdxioTov Mpordet 
aperis. With the definition of 
Td Bdévavooy cf. c 5, 1254, b, 24 
sqq. PLATO, ep. vi. 495 D 
(Ph. d. Gr. i. 754, 3). 

6 He expresses his views on 


POLITICS. 223 


in common in order that the State might be the most 
perfect unity possible. But a State is not merely a 
unity; it is a whole composed of many and various 
parts. If perfect unity without multiplicity were the 
highest, then must the State shrink into the Household, 
and the Household into the Individual.! But even if we 
granted that unity is the best thing for a State, yet the 
arrangements which Plato proposes would not, he thinks, 
be the proper means for its attainment. Not to speak of 
the difficulties which such proposals would involve in 
their application,? Plato had said* that the unity of the 
State will be the most complete when all call the same 
thing mine and thine. But this assertion, as Aristotle 
acutely remarks, is ambiguous. If all could treat the 
same things as their own private property, unity might 
perhaps be thus promoted. That however, is not pos- 
sible, If, on the other hand, children and goods are 
to be'the common property of all, the desired result will 
not follow. On the contrary, with the exclusiveness of 
these relationships, all their worth and all that gives 
them real significance would be destroyed: one who had 
the thousandth part of a claim upon each of a thousand 
sons, and was not even quite sure of that, would not 








this subject, not in the first book, 
which treats of the family, but 
in the second, which treats of 
earlier ideal States. This dis- 
cussion is, however, mentioned 
here out of its order for conveni- 
ence of exposition. 

* Polit. ii. 2, 1261, a, 9 sqq. 
(cf. c. 5, 1263, b, 29 sqq.) where, 
inter alia, he says : kalrot pavepdv 
erty as mpoiodca Kal ywouévn ula 
MGAAov Odde wdAus Fora’ TAHOos 


ydp Ti thy piow early h woris... 
ov pdvoy 3° ex mredvov dvOpdmwy 
ory i) mdAus, GAAG Kat e efder dia- 
pepdvtwy * od yap ylverar wéris ef 
éuolwy. This is the basis, more- 
over, of the self-sufficiency of the 
State ; ibid. b, 10 sqq. 

* For a, fuller discussion of 
which, see c, 3 sq. 1262, a, 14-40, 
b, 24 sqq. 

* Rep. v. 462 ©, 

? c, 3, 1261, b, 16-32, 


224 ARISTOTLE 


feel as a father towards any one.' ‘The same is true of 
property. Here, also, so far from leading to unity, 
community of possession would be an inexhaustible 
source of strife? What is required is the just distribu- 
tion of property and the voluntary surrender of it to a 
common use.* Community of goods, on the other 
hand, along with the desire of private possession, 
destroys also the joy of benevolence and generosity ; ; 
and just as community of women annihilates the virtue 
of temperance in the relations of the sexes, so community 
of goods renders impossible that virtue * 4 which consists in 
the right attitude towards property.’ In this opposition 
to the Platonic socialism we shall not only recognise 
Aristotle’s practical sense, his clear insight into the laws 
and conditions of actual life, his aversion to all ethical 
onesidedness and his deep knowledge of human nature 
and of social life, but we shall not fail to observe that 
here, as in Plato, the political views are closely connected 
with the principles of the metaphysical system. Plato 
had demanded the abolition of all private possession 
and the suppression of all individual interests, because 
it is only in the Idea or Universal that he acknowledges 


any title to true reality.® 


Aristotle refuses to follow 


him here. To him the Individual is the primary reality, 


1 Thid. 1261, b, 32 sqq. c. 4, 
1262, a, 40 sqq. 

2 ¢, 5, 1262, b, 37-1263, a, 27. 

3 Ibid, 1263, a, 21-40, where 
Jin. : pavepov Tolyuy bri BéATiov 
elvar mev id as Tas KTNHOELS mH dé 
xphoe mow Kowds. This is re- 
peated vii. 10, 1329, b, 41. 

+ ie. , ercudepisrns, as to which, 
see supra. 

> Ibid. 1263, a, 40-b, 14. The 


reproach with regard to ow@po- 
givn is certainly unjust, for ac- 
cording to Plato, each has to 
refrain from all women who are 
not assigned to him by the 
government. The Platonic com- 
munity of women is certainly not 
meant to be licence of desire (see 
the further discussion of this in 
ZELLER’S Vortr. wu. Abh. i. 76). 
5 See Ph, d. Gr. i. p. 780. 


‘POLITICS 225 


and has the first claim to recognition. In'his meta« 
physics individual things are regarded, not as the mere 
shadows of the idea, but as independent. realities ; 
universal conceptions not as independent substances, 
but as the expression for the common peculiarity of a 
number of individuals. Similarly in his moral philo- 
sophy he transfers the ultimate end of human action and 
social institutions from the State to the individual, and 
looks for its attainment in his free self-development.: 
The highest aim of the State consists in the happiness 
of its citizens. The good of the whole rests upon the 
good of the individuals who compose it.! In like 
manner must the action by which it is to be attained 
proceed from the individual of his own free will. It is 
only from within through culture and education, and 
not by compulsory institutions, that the unity of the 





State can be secured.? In 


' Plato had met the objection 
(Rep. iv. 420 B sqq.) that he had 
failed to make his ‘ guardians’ 
happy, with the remark that the 
question is of the happiness, not 
of a part, but of the whole; 
Aristotle replies (Polit, ii. 5, 
1264, b, 17): @8dvarov Bt edSamo- 
veiv bAnY, uh TAY TAcla Tw }) uh [we 
should omit this «}, or read ef uh 
instead of 4 mh] mdvtwy pepay 7) 
tTwav exdvtwy thy edvdamorviar. 
[Similarly, vii. 9, 1329, a, 23. «- 
Saluova St wéAw ov eis wépos tt 
BAévavras Sei A€yew airijs, adr’ 
els mdvras rovs woAlras.] ov yap 
Tay abtay Td eddamoveiy Gvrep Td 
lipriov’ rovro yap évdéxera Ta 
bA@w imdpxyew trav Be wepdv unde- 
Tépy, TO Be evdamoveiy advvaror. 
In these remarks we have only 


VOL, I. 


politics as in metaphysics 


the other side of the truth; nor is 
it any solution of the difficulty 
here raised to represent the life. 
uf the guardians, as Plato himself 
does in a subsequent passage 
(Rep. v. 465 E), as the happiest. 
Plato in principle denies what 
Aristotle asserts, viz: that the 
happiness of the individuals as 
such must be the test and crite- 
terion of all political institutions; 
and for that very reason he in the 
same passage demands that the 
individuals should seek their 
highest happiness in unselfish de- 
votion. 

2 Polit. ii. 5, 1263, b, 36: the 
true nature of the State must not 
be sacrificed to an exaggerated 
cunception of unity (see p. 223, n, 
1, sup.) ; GAAX Fe? wAHO0s dv... Hid 


*Q 


226 ARISTOTLE 


the central point with Plato is the Universal, with 
Aristotle the Individual. The former demands that 
the whole should realise its ends without regard to the 
interests of individuals: the latter that it be reared 
upon the satisfaction of all individual interests that 
have a true title to be regarded. 

These remarks form a natural introduction to the 
discussion of the various forms of political constitution. 
To this, after criticising earlier political sketches and 
theories,! Aristotle applies himself in the third book of 
the Politics. The link which we should look for between 
the family and the State, viz. the conception of ‘ Society,’ 
was not yet an object of inquiry. A science of Sociology 
belongs to modern, indeed to quite recent times. Even 
the idea of ‘the community,’ to which there then existed 
nearer analogies, is not a special subject of discussion. 
To Aristotle as a Greek the State is coincident with the 
City ; the community, therefore, so far as it is different 
from the State, can only be the Village; this, however, 
is a merely transitiona! form which is lost in the City 
or Nation so soon as a comprehensive social union takes 


posals of the Republic, Aristotle 


Thy madelay Kowhy Kab play roveiv 
proceeds to discuss (c. 6) PLATO’s 


[se thy wéAw]* Kal rév ye MEAAOVTOA 


madelay eiodryerv, kal voulCovTa did 
TavTns éoecOa Thy WéAW oTOVdalay, 
&romov tots Towotros [community 
of women and goods] ofec@a 
diopbodv, GAAG wh Tots Geo Kal TH 
pirocodia kal rots vdpors. 

1 One cannot here enter into 
the details of this criticism as 
they are to be found in the second 
book of the Politics. After a 
lively polemic (c. 1-5) against 
the community of women, chil- 
dren, and goods, and other pro- 


Laws [on these and other asser- 
tions with regard to Plato’s 
political philosophy see ZELLER, 
Platon. Stud, 288 sqq. 203-207] ; 
the proposals of Phaleas and 
Hippodamus (c. 7 sq.); the Spar- 
tan (c. 9), the Cretan (c. 10), 
and the Carthaginian (c. 11) 
constitutions; and, finally (c.12: 
see, however, Ph. d. Gr. i. 676), 
the laws of Solon, Zaleucus, 
Charondas, and other ancient 
legislators. 


7 
a 


—~ es 


————— OS eS -  lt(<i‘i' CU 





POLITICS 227 


the place of mere local association limited to the needs 
of trade.' 

But the particular institutions by means of which 
this social union has to realise its end, and the forms 
which it must take, will depend essentially upon the 
character of the individuals whom it includes. It is 
with these, therefore, that Aristotle next deals. peo 


3. The State and the Citizens 


The State is the composite whole, and the con- 
stituent parts of it—the subjects whose relations to one 
another are determined by the character of the con- 
stitution—are the citizens.2, What, then, constitutes a 
citizen or citizenship? One can live in a city without 
being a citizen of it. Foreigners may even be admitted 
to its courts of law. On the other hand, it is not neces- 
sary that the citizen should be born of citizen parents, for 
in that case neither the first founders of a State nor those 
who at any time have the franchise conferred on them 
would be citizens.? A citizen in the proper sense of the 
word is one who is entitled to take part in the govern- 
ment of the State and in the administration of justice. A 
State is an aggregate of such persons, which must be suffi- 
cient of itself to satisfy all the demands of their common 
life.* It is true that as the essence of a thing consists 


' See p. 208, n. 1, 

2 Polit. iii. 1, 1274, b, 36 Sqq.: 
the modirefa is Tay he wddur 
olkovyvtwy rdéis tis; the méAis, on 
the other hand, is a composite 
whole consisting of many parts— 
ToAita@y Ti wAROVOS. 


% Polit. iii, 1 sq. 1275, a, 7 sqq. 
b, 21 sqq. 

* Ibid. c. 1, 1375, a, 22: 
woAirns 8° ardA@s oddity Tay bAAwY 
dpi(erat marAAov } Te meréxew 
Kploews Kal apxijs (similarly, c. 13, 
1283, b, 42). After some further 


*a2 


228 ARISTOTLE 
in general not in its matter but in its form, the essence 
of the State must be sought for in its form or con- 
stitution. A State remains the same so long as its 
constitution remains unaltered, even although the indi- 
viduals who are the People should change; on the 
other hand, the State changes when its constitution is 
changed, even although the citizens remain the same.' 
Yet it is equally true that the constitution has to adapt 
itself to the character and condition of the men for 
whom it is designed. ‘The members of the State are 
not equal to one another in every respect, but neither 
are they unequal in every respect.? Now all constitu- 
tional law is concerned with the distribution of political 
rights and benefits. An equal distribution is just only 
on condition that the persons amongst whom they are 
distributed are themselves equal to one another. If, on 


explanations, in the course of 
which it is pointed out that under 
apxy we must include the busi- 
ness of the popular assembly, Ari- 
stotle concludes, ibid. b, 18: @ yap 
ekouvola kowwvel apxjs BovAevTikys 
2) Kpitixs, moAlrny dn A€youev 
civat Taitns THs méAews, woAw BE 
Td Tay ToLovTwy MAROS ixavdy mpods 
autdpKeray (wys. With the last 
clause, cf. p. 208, nn. 1 and 2. 

! c. 3, 1276, a, 34: How long 
may the wddus be said to be one 
andthe same? So long, it might 
be answered, as it is inhabited by 
the same race. But this is 
wrong: elrep ydp éott Kowwvia 
Tis 7 wéAdAts, ott. 8€ Kowwvla 
ToAit@y,  tjwodrtelas ‘yryvoueyns 
érépas T@ elder Kal Siapepovons THs 
moAttelas &varyKatoy elvou Sdterey dy 
kal Thy wéAww eivat wh THY adrhy 

. . MdALoTA AeKTéoy Thy avThy 


awéAw eis Thy wodttelay BAcrovras 
dvoua 5€ Kadreivy ErEpov 7) TavTov 
tteott Kal TOY avT@Y KaTOLKO YTMOY 
avThy kal mdumay EvTépwv avOpdrwyr. 
By. wodtrela, however, we must 
here understand, not merely the 
constitution in the narrower 
sense, but the whole social 
organisation. 

2 Cf. on the one hand p. 223, 
n. 1, andon the other Po/, iv. 11, 
1295, b, 25: Bodtrerar 5€ ye 7 
mérAis €&& towv elvar Kad duolwy Sri 
pdAora, for only between such 
is Ala and kowwvia moditiKkh 
possible. Cf. vii. 8, 1328, a, 35. 
The citizens, as we shall find, 
will be egual in freedom, in 
common political rights and to a 
certain degree also in common 
social virtue; they will be unlike 
in property, avocation, descent, 
and individual capacity. 


POLITICS 229 


the other hand, the persons are unequal, justice requires 
an unequal distribution. In order, therefore, rightly to 
judge of the character of State institutions, we must 
know wherein consists this equality and inequality with 
which the State has to deal.! 

Of essential importance in this regard are, first of 
all, the occupations and manner of life of the citizens.” 
Parallel to the distinction which we noted in the House- 
hold between freemen and slaves, we have among citizens 
themselves those who are exempt from menial labour, 
and those who have to devote themselves to it. One 
who performs menial offices for an individual is a slave: 
one who does so for the community is a day-labourer 
(9s) or artisan (Sdvaveos).* The importance of this 
distinction appears from the statement‘ that the rights. 
of citizenship belong to persons of this class only in 
imperfect States, but not in the best. The object of the 
latter is the happiness of the entire people; and so, as 
happiness is only attainable through virtue, no one who 
is incapable of true virtue can be a citizen in a State 
of which virtue is at once the basis and the end. 


' Polit. iii. 9 init.: Both clval gdacw. molwy 8 iadrns eorh 





oligarchy and democracy rest 
upon right : but neither upon per- 
fect right. ofov done? trov 7d Sixasov 
elvat, Kal orw, AX’ ob Waow GAA 
Tois too. Kal rd &rmoov Boxe? 
Sixaov elvar* nal ydp ear, GAX’ 
od maow GAAG Tois avicos. c. 12, 
1282, b, 16: for: 8& wodiTixdy 
ayabby Td Sikaoy, rodro 3° ear) rd 
Kown cuuépov, doKxet 3 wacww Yoo 
Tt 7d Sixaoy elvai, as is explained 
in the ethical discussions (see p. 
171, supra). ri yap Ka riot 7d 


Sixaov, Kal Seiv trois toois Yoov 


kal roiwy aviodrns, de? uh AavOdverw * 
éxer yap rovr’ dmopiay Kal dido- 
goplay moditiniy. c. 13, 1283, a, 
26 sqq. 

2 Polit. iii, 5, vii. 9. 

® iii. 5, 1278, a, 11. 

* iii. 5, 1278, a, 15 sqq. vii. 9, 
1328, b, 27 sqq. 1229, a, 19 sqq. 
On this conception, which will 
often meet us again, especially in 
treating of the best State, see 
further viii. 2, 1337, b, 8 sqq. c. 
4, 1338, b, 33, c. 5, 1339, b, 9, c. 
6, 1340, b, 40, 1341, a, 5, b, 14. 


230 ARISTOTLE 


Birth and property are two further important points 
for consideration. While freemen as such are all 
equal, the nobly born claim to have inherited higher 
ability and rank from their ancestors ; the rich, on the 
other hand, demand a greater share in the government, 
on the ground that the greater part of the national 
property is in their hands, and that propertied men in 
all matters of business are more reliable than un- 
propertied. Aristotle does not, indeed, admit these 
claims unconditionally, but he does not regard them as 
wholly unjustified, for although political privileges 
cannot be claimed on the ground of each and every 
superiority, but only of such as are of political im- 
portance, yet it cannot be denied that the advantages 
in question are ‘ political’! Thus while in speaking of 
property distinctions he rejects the oligarchical demand 
for a plutocracy with the pertinent observation that: it 
would be justifiable only on the supposition that the 
State is nothing but a mercantile company,” yet he can- 
not conceal from himself that distinctions of wealth are 
of the highest significance for the State. Riches and 
poverty both involve many kinds of moral evil: the 
rich commit outrage through arrogance, the poor 
through dishonesty ; the former know neither how to 
obey nor how to rule over freemen, the latter neither 
how to rule nor how to obey as freemen; and where a 
State has fallen asunder into rich and poor, it has lost 
the inner bond of its communal life, in the equality, 
unanimity, and social sympathy of the citizens. ‘The 
well-to-do middle class, being the mean, is the best: it 


! jii, 12 sq. 1282, b, 21-1283, a, 37. 2 iii. 9, 1280, a, 22 sqq. 








_ex—— SC Cr St—C Th eer Srt“‘(i‘i UU —_— 
oa 


POLITICS 231 


is best secured against excesses of its own and attacks 
of an enemy; it is the least anxious to put itself 
forward in political life; when the centre of gravity 
lies in it we have the most orderly and enduring form 
of government.'| Whosoever would give stability to 
his political institutions must secure the support of 
this class, seeing that it holds the balance between the 
two contending parties of the rich and the poor.? More 
important still, however, is the political capacity of the 
citizens. The essential aim of the State is the happi- 
ness and moral perfection of the citizens ; he who is able 
to contribute most to this will have the best claim to 
influence in the State. But that which more than any 
other quality fits a man to do so is virtue, especially 
justice and military ability, since, while the latter is in- 
dispensable for the preservation of the State, the former 
is that which lies at the foundation of all society and 
involves all other virtues.* There are thus different 
principles upon which political rights may be appor- 


tioned.* According as one or other of these is adopted, 


' iv. 11, 1295, b, 1—1296, a, 
21, where it is further shown 
that great cities are more exempt 
from disquiet than small ones, 
because they have a more nume- 
rous middle class; that demo- 
cracies are more stable than 
oligarchies, because the middle 
class finds itself more at home 
in them—only, however, on con- 
dition that it does so—and 
that the best lawgivers, e.g. 
Solon, Lycurgus, Charondas, have 
belonged to the middle class. 

? iv. 12, 1296, a, 34 sqq. 

® iii. 9, 1281, a, 2sqq. cc. 12 sq. 


1283, a, 19-26, 37. 


* The character and geo- 
graphical position of the country, 
and similar external circum- 
stances might also be here 
adduced. To the political import- 
ance of these, as may be seen from 
Polit. vii. 6, c. 11, 1330, b, 17, vi. 
7, 1321, a, 8 sqq., Aristotle was 
keenly alive. He admits that a 
maritime situation favours the 
rise of a numerous nautical 
population and thereby pro- 
motes democratic institutions. 
He remarks that an acropolis is 
favourable to monarchy and 
oligarchy, a flat country to de- 
mocracy, a number of fastnesses 


232 


ARISTOTLE 


or as several of them are combined in a definite manner, 
will be the character of the resulting constitution. For 
while the differences in the general character of States 
depend upon the view taken of their end and of the 
means by which it is pursued,! the differences in the par- 
ticular form of their constitution depend upon the share 
assigned to the different classes of the citizens in the 
public benefits and in the activities by which these are 
acquired.” The decisive question here, however, is: 


to aristocracy ; that where horse- 

breeding succeeds, and cavalry 
is therefore the chief military 
weapon, oligarchies are easily 
formed, &c. At the same time 
he suggests means (ébid.) to 
counteract such results, and as 
these circumstances do not in 
any case affect the form of con- 
stitution immediately, but only 
through the character of the 
people as that is determined by 
them, he leaves them out of 
account in the present investi- 
gation. 

1 vii, 8, 1328, a, 35: 7 5e 
aéAts kowwvia tls éott TOY Suolwy, 
éveney 5& wis Ths evdexouerns 
aplorns. émel 8° éoriy eidamovla 7d 
tpiorov, atrn 5& aperas évépyesa 
kal xpijois Tis TéAEos, TuuBEBHKE 
St obrws Sore tors pev evdéxe- 
cba meréxew ads, Tovs SE piKpov 
4) pndév, SHAoy ws TodT’ altiov 
Tov ylyvecOa médews e€l5n Kal 
Siapopas Kat modrrelas mAelovs: 
&AAov ‘yap tpédmwov Kal 8? GAAwy 
Exaotol TovTo Onpevoytes Tovs TE 


Blous érépovs mowodvrar Kal Tas 
mwoA.Telas. 
2 After enumerating the 


forms of activity which are in- 
dispensable to the existence of 
society, and the corresponding 


classes of citizens. (farmers, 
artisans, soldiers, proprietors, 
priests, judges and adminis- 


trators) Aristotle proceeds <bid. 
c. 9 init.: Biwpiomevwv Se rovTHy 
Aourdy cxevacba TéTEpoy WAL Kol- 
vevntéoy wdvTwy Tovrwy .. . Kab 
Exacrov Epyov Tay eipnuevwy &AAousS 
jmoberéov, 2) TH mev Tia TH 5E KOWa 
rovtwy é& avdyens early, (Cf. ii. 
1, 1260, b, 37.) Tatra yap Kab 
mou? Tas moAuTelas étépas* év mev 
yap ais dnuoxparias peréxovor 
mdyres mdvTwy, ev d€ Tals dAvyapxias 
rovvaytiov. Similarly, and with 
express reference to this passage, 
iv. 3, 1289, a, 27 sqq.: Tod mev 
ovv elvar mAclous moAttelas aiTiov 
bri mdons éor) pépn TAclw mérAcws 
Tov apiOudy. A State consists of 
an aggregation of households, 
of people of large, small and 
average means, of warlike and 
unwarlike, of farmers, merchants 
and artisans; further, there are 
differences of birth and capacity 
(aperh). Of these classes some- 
times fewer, sometimes more, 
sometimes all, share in the 
government (moArreia). Pavepov 
rolvuy &t. wActous dvarykaiov elvat 
moAitelas elder Siapepovoas GAA- 
hawy: Kal yap tadr’ cider Siapéeper 
Td pépn coav abtav. modirela wey 


POLITICS 233 


Who possesses the supreme power—who is sovereign ?} 
The different possible ways of adjusting the relations of 
the various classes to one another are therefore enu- 
merated by Aristotle with a view to preparing the 
way for an investigation into the comparative value of 
particular forms of constitution, the conditions of their 
rise and continuance, and the institutions which corre- 
spond to them. 


4. Forms of Constitution 


We are accustomed to understand by the term ‘ Con- 
stitution’ only the general form of government of a 
particular State—the sum of the arrangements which 
regulate the distribution within it of political functions.” 








yap ) Ta apxay Tdéis earl, TadTHY 
5 diaveéuovra mdvres } Kara Thy 
Sivauw Tov meTexXdvTwr } Kata TW’ 
avtav isdtnta Kowhy .. . avay- 
Kaiov &pa modrrelas elva: tocav’Tas 
Soaimep Tdéeis Kara Tas bmepoxds 
eiat kal Kara Tas diapopas Tay 
popiwy. With the same view of 
explaining the different forms of 
constitution, the different classes 
in a community are then again 
enumerated (c. 4, 1290, b, 21 sqq.) 
as follows: farmers, artisans, 
traders, day-labourers, soldiers, 
rich (e#mopo:) who serve the state 
with their money, magistrates, 
judges, and members of the 
supreme administration. (In 
this enumeration, the words 
€Bdopuov and bydoor, 1291, a, 33 sq., 
cause a difficulty, to avoid which 
Nickes, De Arist. Polit. libr. 
110, proposes to read éxrov and 
€B5ouor, while SUSEMIHL, in loco, 
with CONRING, supposes a lacuna 
before €8douor, in which he sup- 


poses the sixth class was men- 
tioned.) 

1 iii. 6 init.: We must ask 
how many and what constitutions 
thereare? or: dé wodrrela réAews 
Takis tTav Te tAAwy apxady Kal 
MdALorTa Tis Kupias wdyTwY. KUpLov 
Mev yap maytaxod Td ToAlTevma Tis 
mwéAews, woAirevma 8 eotly 7 woAs- 
tela, (Cf. c. 7, 1279, a, 25.) In 
democracies the people is sove- 
reign (xépios) ; in oligarchies only 
a minority of the people: hence 
the difference in these forms of 
constitution. 

* This is at least the scientific 
conception of the constitution ; 
the written documents which 
define the constitution certainly 
neither contain all that according 
to this conception is included 
under it, nor do they confine 
themselves to it, but generally 
they contain all those laws which, 
as fundamental to the State, seem 
to require special sanction. 


234 ARISTOTLE 

Aristotle meant far more by it. He comprehends under 
the corresponding word ‘ Polity,’ not only all this, but also 
the substantial character of the community in question, as 
that expresses itself in the accepted theory of the State 
and in the spirit of its government.' He has thus the 
advantage of exhibiting more clearly than is commonly 
done by modern writers the connection of the political 
institutions of a people with its life as a whole, and is 
less exposed to the danger of treating these as some- 
thing independent and equally applicable to all com- 
munities. Here as elsewhere in the. Politics the leading 
characteristic of his method is the care he takes 
scientifically to trace everything back to its real source, 
and to find the principle of its explanation in its own 
peculiar nature. On the other hand, it cannot be 
denied that the treatment of political constitutions 
suffers in simplicity when it does not confine itself to de- 
ducing them as the forms of an organised civil life from 
the spirit and mutual relations of the citizens, but mixes 
itself up with the discussion of the legal details of that 
life itself. Aristotle is not free from this confusion,’ 


1 As is obvious, inter alia, 
from p. 222, n. 1, with which cf. 
p. 232,n. 2, and p. 233, n.1, supra. 

? Besides the passage just re- 
ferred to above, see esp. Polit. 
iv. 1, 1289, a, 13: mpds yap tas 
moAiteias Tovs véuouvs Set TiOecOau 
kal Tievrat mavres, GAA’ od Tas 
moAitelas wpos Tovs vduous. WoAt- 
Tela mev ydp éore Takis Tais WoAcoWW 
n wept tas dpxas, Tiva Tpdmrov 
vevéunvrTat, Kal ti TO KUpioy Tis 
moritelas Kal ti rd TEAOS ExdoTNS 
THs Kowwvias eoriv: vduor 5 
Kexwpiopevo, Tov SndrobyTwy Thy 


moAtetav, Kad’ ovs det Tovs &pXovTas 
dpxew Kal pudAdrrew Tovs mapa- 
Batvoyvtas avrovs. So also vii. 13 
init., and throughout the whole 
discussion of the different forms 
of constitution, the question as 
to the nature of the mod:rela is 
taken to involve that of the 


ultimate aim of the State, and 


the investigation into the dplorn 
moditela (see infra) is more con- 
cerned with the laws upon educa- 
tion and the like than with 
questions properly constitutional 
in our sense. 


POLITICS 235 


although in general he has clearly distinguished be- 
tween questions of law and constitution.! 

In investigating political constitutions Aristotle 
complains? that previous writers had contented them- 
selves with representing an ideal State, or else with 
eulogising the Spartan or some other historical consti- 
tution. Aristotle himself aims at a more exhaustive 
treatment of his subject. Political science cannot, he 
says, any more than any other, limit itself to the 
description of an ideal. It must also show what 
form of State is the best attainable under certain given 
circumstances ; it must further take account of actually 
existing constitutions and of the conditions of their rise 
and maintenance ; and it must be able, finally, to declare 
what institutions are best adapted for the majority of 





States.? 


' See preced. n. and Polit. ii. 
' 6, 1265, a, 1; #th. x. 10, 1181, b, 
12: as his predecessors have not 
(sufficiently) investigated the 
question of legislation, he will 
himself treat generally of this 
as well as of the State (woArrela). 
L. 21: mola modtreia aplarn, kab 
mas Exdorn Tax Geioa, kal Tice vdpors 
- Kal Beor xpwuern. 

® Polit. iv. 1, 1288, b, 33 sqq. 
This complaint, however, is not 
altogether just in respectof Plato, 
who not only in the Zaws had 
placed a second State beside his 
ideal republic. but in the Rep. 
itself bad fully discussed the 
imperfect forms of constitution. 
It is true, however, that none of 
these investigations satisfies Ari- 
- stotle’s requirements. 
® Polit. iv. 1.. Aristotle here 


The description of the political ideal must 


sets before Politics a fourfold 
problem: (1) mroAtrelay rhy apiorny 
Oewpjoaa tis éott Kal mola tis by 
oboa pddor’ ely Kar’ edxhy, undevds 
éumodiCovros ray éxtds ; (2) besides 
the arA@s kparorn to discuss 
also Thy ek Tay brokemévwr aplorny; 
similarly (3), rhv e broécews, and 
(4) thy uddAwra mdoas Tals wéAcow 
apudrroveay (on which see c. 11 
init.). Of these four questions 
the third has notinfrequently been 
very strangely misunderstood, ¢é.g. 
by BARTHELEMY ST-HILAIRE, 
but also by GOTTLING in loco. 
Aristotle himself, however, states 
(1288, b, 28) his meaning quite 
unambiguously. é&r 8 tpirny, 
he says, thy €& bwodévews* Sei yap 
kal tiv dobcicay Sivac0a Oewpeiv, 
e& apxiis Te mas by yévorro, Kal 
yevouévn tlya tpdwov by ah (orro 


236 ARISTOTLE 


therefore be supplemented by a comprehensive survey 
of actual facts. Aristotle does not renounce such an 
ideal, but desires at the same time to investigate all 
other possible forms of State, the conditions under which 
they naturally rise, the laws which they adopt, and 
the institutions by which they are maintained. He 
examines States with the keen sense of the scientific 
investigator, who pays equal regard to the small and 
the great, to the normal and the abnormal, as well as 
with the practical eye of the statesman, who desires to 
do justice to the actual circumstances and adapt his 


ideal to the given conditions.' 


mAeiotov xpdvov' Aéyw 8’ ofov et 
Tit méoAeL oumBeBnke phre Thy 
dpiorny modrrteverOat  modrtelay 
axophyntéy re elva: kal Tay dvay- 
kaiwy [the necessary requisites 
for the best], uqre thy evdexouevnv 
éxk Tay bmapxdvTwy, GAAG TVA 
gpavrorepay. (Cf. iv. 11, 1296, b, 
9: Aéyw 5 7d mpds brdbeow, Sri 
moAAdKis ovens BAAS ToArTelas 
aiperwrépas éviois ovOty Kwdvoe 
guudépe €répay madrdov elvat 
moAiteiav ; also v. 11, 1314, a, 38.) 
The wodrrela e& brodécews is, ac- 
cording to this statement, identi- 
cal with 7 So00cica mod:reia, 
ird@eois indicating the given 
case, the particular circumstances 
that are actually present, and 
having, therefore, essentially the 
same meaning as on p. 247, n. 2, 
and Ph.d.Gr. i. 1015 med.,where it 
is distinguished from 0éo1s. With 
the above passage PLAT. Laws, 
v. 739, A sqq., has been compared. 
The resemblance, however, is a 
remote one; for (1) Plato speaks 
not of four but only of three 
States to be depicted; (2) he 


He possesses, moreover, 


enters into no details with refer- 
ence to the third of these (the 
first is that of the Rep., the 
second that of the Zaws), but he 
can hardly have been thinking 
of actually existing States; (3) 
even the second State, that of 
the Laws, does not correspond 
with Aristotle's moA:rela ék Tov 
brokeméevoy apiorn, for Plato does 
not show in this work what is 
the best that can be evolved from 
existing circumstances, but, just 
as in the Rep., sketches the 
outline of an ideal State, which 
only differs from that in the 
Rep. in bearing a closer resem- 
blance to reality. Still less can 
the State in the Laws be identified 
with Aristotle’s moArrela €& bmoG€- 
gews apiorn, nor would Grote 
have done so (Plato, iii. 357 sq.) 
had he not wrongly explained 
imd0eors to mean an ‘assumed 
principle.’ 

1 See his complaint against 
his predecessors, ibid. 1288, b, 
35: @s of mAcioro: Tav a&ropatvo- 
pévwv ep) modurelas, Kal ei TAAAG 


_ POLITICS 237 


the philosophic spirit, which traces political institutions 
-back to their inner sources, looks past individual facts 
to universal conceptions, and while engaged in the 
investigation of existing realities keeps an eye steadily 
fixed on the ideal. It is just this combination of dis- 
similar and rarely united qualities that makes Ari- 
stotle’s political philosophy so unique and unrivalled in 
its kind. 

Two points of view have emerged in the preceding 
discussion, from which we may distinguish and esti- 
mate the different forms of political constitution— 
viz. the recognised aim of government, and the distri- 
bution of political power. In the former respect the 
contrast is between those States in which the common 
good and those in which the advantage of the rulers is 
pursued as the highest end.' In treating, on the other 
hand, of the distribution of political power, Aristotle 
retains at first the customary arithmetical division of 
States according as they are governed by one, by some, 
or by all of the citizens. Combining these two principles, 
he enumerates six forms of constitution, three of which 
_are good and three bad, setting down all those as un- 
just and despotic in which the aim is not the common 
good, but the advantage of the rulers.2. Where the 














A€youvot Karas, tev ye xpnoluwv aims primarily at the good of the 
diopaprdvovow. ' governed, but in a secondary way 
' tii. 6. 1278, a,30sqq.: Asin also at that of the head of the 
the household the government of house in so far as he is himself 
the slaves aims at securing inthe a member of the family—so in 
first instance the advantage of the State we must distinguish 
the master, and only secondarily the two above-mentioned kinds 
that of the slaves asa means to of government. 
the former, and as the government * iii. 6 fin.: davepdy rolvuy ds 
of the family, on the other hand, Soa: uév woAureiau Td Kowy) cuupépov 


238 


ARISTOTLE 


administration has for its object the common good, if 
one is the sovereign, we havea monarchy ; if a minority, 
an aristocracy; if the whole body of the citizens, a 
polity; where it has for its object the advantage of 
the sovereign, monarchy degenerates into tyranny, 
aristocracy into oligarchy, polity into democracy.! This 


gkoTovow, avTa mev opal Tvyxd- 
vovow oboa KaTa TY, aMTA@S Sikaov, 
dca 5€ Td oérepoy pdvoy Tay 
apxdvTwy, huaptnuévar maoa Kat 
mapexBdoes TY Op@y ToAITELay * 
decmorikal yap, ) 5¢ wéAus Kowwvla 
tav édcvdépwy éorly. Hence iii 
17 init.: ori ydp Tt pice: Seoroc- 
Tov Kal &AAO BactAevtoy Kat %AAO 
moAiTiKoyv Kal Sikatov Kal cuppépor * 
tupavvicoy 8° ovK Ear. Kata piow, 
ovdt tTav BAAwy TodtTer@v boa 
mapexBdoes eloly' TaitTa ‘yap 
yiyverat Tapa pro. 

1 Polit. iii. 7, iv. 2, 1289, a, 
26, b, 9; th. viii. 12. Aristotle’s 
account is here essentially that: of 
Plato in the Politicus (cf. Ph. d. 
Gr. i. p. 784), of which he himself, 
Polit. iv. 2, 1289, b, 5, reminds 
us, while at the same time he 
differs from it ina single respect. 
There is, indeed, between the 
Ethics and the Politics this 
divergency, that while in the 
latter the third of the three true 
forms of constitution is called 
simply ‘ polity,’ it is said in the 
Ethics: tpirn 8 4 Grd Tinudrov, 
jv TimuokpatiKhy Aéyew  oikEtoy 
patverat, roArtelay 8° abrhy ei@bacw 


of mAeioro. kaderv. This dis- 
crepancy, however, is not so 


important that we may infer 
from it a change in Aristotle’s 
political views, or that to permit 
time for its occurrence we may 
place the Ethics on this ground 


considerably earlier than the 
Politics. For as a matter of 
fact the latter also describes its 
polity as a timocracy (see Ph. 
d. Gr.i. p. 745 sq.), so that the 
difference resolves itself finally 
into this: that in the Zthics, 
brevitatis causa, Aristotle calls it 
timocracy, whereas in the Politics 
he appropriates to it the common 


term odrrela, as he has room 


here to describe more accurately 
what he means by it. ISOCcR. 
Panath. 131, has been taken to 
refer to the passage just cited 
from the Ethics (ONCKEN, Staatsl. 
d, Arist. ii. 160), and the conclu- 
sion drawn that the Zthics cannot 
have been composed later than 
ann. 342-339 B.C. (HENKEL, Stud. 
stir Gesch. d. griech. Lehre vom 
Staat, 46; Oncken takes another 
view). Butitseems more probable 
that the passage refers to Plato, 
who in the Politieus (302 D sq.) 
adduces legal democracy, and 
in the Republic (viii. 545 B, C) 
timocracy, as peculiar forms of 
constitution ; for Isocrates does 
not say that the writer upon 
whom his attack is made identi- 
fies these two (as Aristotle does). 
If, however, we are to find here 
a reference to the followers of 
Plato as well, and especially to 
Aristotle, it would probably be 
better to suppose that the rhe- 
torician has in view one of his dia- 








POLITICS 239 


principle of arrangement, however, is not consistently 
preserved throughout; for while it might appear from 
the above statement that aristocracy and polity differ 
from monarchy only in the number of the rulers, we 
learn in another passage that this itself depends upon 
the character of the people. So the government hy 
one is natural where in a people one family has a pre- 
eminent faculty for government; aristocracy, where a 
community of free citizens is content to submit to the 
government of the fittest ; polity, where the population 
is a military one which, having distributed the offices 
of State among the propertied classes according to the 
standard of merit, knows both how to command and 
how to obey.'! Referring further to the distinction 
between democracy and oligarchy, Aristotle criticises 
those who look for it in the fact that in the former the 
whole body, in the latter a minority, of the citizens 
hold the sovereignty. This numerical distinction, he 
holds, is merely accidental and derivative: the essential 
opposition of these two forms of constitution consists in 
the fact that in the one the rich, in the other the poor, 
bear rule.2 In like manner that polity which stands 
between them is distinguished by the preponderance of 
the middle class.? Elsewhere he finds the characteristic 


awa <= 


* Jogues (such as that mentioned in 


Polit. iii 6; see i. p. 119, n. 1, 
supra). That the Lthics cannot 
have been composed so early as 
Henkel believes, has already been 
shown, i. p. 154 sq. 

' iii, 17,1288, a, 1: BaoiAevtdy 
bev oty Td Towvrdy ear: TAGs 
d wépuxe pépew yévos bwepéxoy Kar’ 

v mpds iyeuovias moduTiKhy, 
apioroxparixoy St wAj0os 8 wépure 


pepe wAR00s UpxerOar duvduevoy 
Thy Tav ehevdé pwr apx hy b3d Tay Kat” 
dpethy fryemovikay mpds moArriKhy 
dpxhv, moditixdy 5& wAROos ev G 
mepucey eyylvecOat mAHO0S wodeut- 
Kov, Suvduevoy EpxerOat kal Hpxew 
kara vduoy toy Kar’ atlay sia- 
véu“ovra Tots evmdpos Tas apxas. 

* Polit. iii, 8, cf. c. 7 fin. iv. 
11, 12, 1296, a, 1, b, 24 sqq. 

* iv. 12, 1296, b, 38. 


240 ARISTOTLE 


peculiarity of democracy in freedom and. equality, in 
the fact that all free men have an equal share in the 
government; and then combining this principle with 
the two others, he says that in democracy the majority 
of the poor and the free, in oligarchy conversely the 
minority of the rich and the noble, are the rulers ;! for 
since in a State where all are equal the majority of votes 
decides, and the poor always form a majority, these 
have necessarily the power in their own hands.?_ Fol- 
lowing up the same line of thought, he indicates virtue, 
wealth, and freedom as severally characteristic of dif- 
ferent forms of constitution: virtue of aristocracy, 
wealth of oligarchy, freedom of democracy.’ In a third 


1 iy. 4, where it is first said éy ais Syuoxparias ovpBalver 


(1290, b, 1): Simos wév eorw bray 
of édebOepor Kvpior aww, daryapxla 
3 ray of rAovoo, but afterwards 
at the end (1. 17): GAN gor 
Snuokparia wey bray of ercdPepor 
kad &ropo. wAclous OvTes KUpLor THs 
apxiis Gow, ddavyapxla 8 bray of 
mAovowt Kal evyevéorepo dAlyor 
bvres. Ibid. 1291, b, 34: elaep 
yap erevOepia wddAtor’ eorly ev 
Syuokpatia Kabdrep brodauBdvovol 
Ties Kat todrns. 

2 vi, 2 init ; bwd0eors wey odv 
THs OnuoKparikys woduretas éAev- 
Gepia [or as it is expressed 1317, 
b, 16; @AevOepla 7 Kata 7d toov] 
. . . CAevOepias SE Ev pev Td ev 
péper Upxeobar «al U&pxew, kal 
yap To Sikaoy 7d Snuotindy 7d 
Yoov éxew orl Kar’ apidudy adrArAa 
wh Kar’ aklay, rovTov 8 bvTos Tod 
Sicalov To TAHGos GvaryKaiov elvat 
kipioy, kal 8 ru dy BdéN Tots wAElooE, 
Tour’ elva: kal TéAos Kal TOUT’ eivat 
Td Sikaov: gaci yap Seivy toov 
txew Exacroy tav woditav: hore 


kupiwrépous elvar Tous dmdpous TaY 
eimépwv* mAcious ydp elo, kipiorv 
dt 7d ois mAeloor Sdtav. The 
equality of all citizens is thus 
seen to be the fundamental point 
from which government’ by 
majority follows as an infe:ence 
(ovpBatver) and from that again 
government by the poor. 

8 iv. 8, 1294, a, 10: apiocro- 
kpatias pv yap Spos apern, 
dAvyapxias 5& wAovTos, Shuov 8’ 
ércvdepia. L. 19: rpla éorl ra 
aupioBnrovvta THs iodrntos THs 
mor.telas, eAevOep'a mAodTOS apeTh 
(td yap Téraproy, % Kadovow, 
evyéverav, dkodovbe? Tuts Sucly* 7 
yap evyéverd cori apxaios mAovTOS 
kal dperh). Cf. iii. 12, 1283, a, 
16 sqq. (see p. 229, supra); v. 9, 
1310, a, 28; het. i. 8, 1366, a, 
4: ort 58 Snuoxparlas péev TéAos 
€rcubepla, dAvyapxias St mAovTos, 
apioroxpartas 5€ Trad mpds maidelay 
kal 7a véurma, Ttupavyldos 5é 
puaakn. 


POLITICS 241 


passage ' he enumerates four constitutions : democracy, 
oligarchy, aristocracy, and government by one: Ina 
democracy, he says, the offices of government are dis- 
tributed according to lot, in an oligarchy according to 
property, in an aristocracy according to education.? 
The government of one is a monarchy if it is founded 
upon law and order ; otherwise it is a tyranny. These 
statements are not altogether consistent with one 
another; but a still greater difficulty arises from the 
circumstance that in the further development of his argu- 
ment Aristotle diverges widely from the order of arrange- 
ment which is naturally suggested by the previous survey 
of the different forms of constitution. Thus we should 
have expected from Book IIT. 14 onwards a discussion 
first of the three good kinds of State, and then of the 
three bad. Instead of this, Aristotle follows up the 
introductory dissertations which occupy chaps. 9-13 
of the third book with a discussion of monarchy (III. 
14-17); he next proposes to investigate (III. 18) 
the best form of State, which, however, he only partially 
does in the books (VII. and VIII.) which ought to follow 
here; he next turns, in the fourth book (chap. 2), 
to the remaining forms of constitution, with the 
remark that of the six previously enumerated forms 
monarchy and aristocracy have been disposed of, as 
these coincide with the best State, and that it therefore 





remains to discuss polity, 


' Rhet. i. 8, 1365, b, 29. 

* TMadela bd rod vduou KEemmevn, 
by which we are to understand 
not so much intellectual culture 
as an education in accordance 
with law and morality and the 


VOL, IL. 


oligarchy, democracy, and 


political capacity and attach- 
ment to the existing constitution 
which spring from it: of yap 
euuemernndres ey Trois voulwots ev ri 
apioroxparia tpxovow, ibid, 1, 35. 


kK 


242 ARISTOTLE 


tyranny; he accordingly now proceeds to investigate, 
in the. first place (chap. 4, 1291, b, 14—chap. 6, end), 
the different forms of democracy and oligarchy; then 
(chap. 8 sq.) polity as the proper blending of these 
two constitutions, along with several kindred forms 
(chap. 7); and, lastly, tyranny (chap. 10). This 
divergence from the previous account is much too 
fundamental to permit of its being accounted for by the 
incomplete character of the Politics alone, and too 
indispensable to permit of its being explained away.! 
We are forced to admit that just as Aristotle in his 
account of the distinguishing characteristics of demo- 
cracy and oligarchy unites several different points of 
view which he fails completely to harmonise with one 
another, so also in his treatment of polity he is not free 


from a certain vacillation. 


reckons it among the good 
it is based upon the virtue 
the common good. On the 


1 H.g. in the manner pro- 
posed by FHCHNER (db. d. Ge- 
rechtigheitsbegriff d. Arist. p. 
71 sq.n., cf. p. 92, 1), who assumes 
that by the polity of Hth. viii. 
12 and Polit. iv. we must under- 
stand something different from 
the ‘true polity ’ which appears 
in Polit. vii. as the ideal State. 
Setting aside the unlikelihood of 
Aristotle’s describing two dif- 
ferent forms of constitution by 
the same name without qualify- 
ing addition, and of his totally 
omitting in his subsequent dis- 
cussion all further mention of the 
‘true polity ’ described in iii., we 


On the one hand, he 
States, on the ground that 
of the citizens and aims at 
other hand, he is unable to 


may point out: (1) that the 
perfect State described in vii. 
and viii. is never referred to 
(not even iii. 7, 1279, a, 39, vii. 
14, 1332, a, 34) as polity (moArrela 
simply), but as aristrocacy or 
aptarn modrtela (e.g. iv. 7, 1293, b, 
1, c. 2, 1289, a, 31), and that 
polity stands only third among 
true constitutions: (2) that in 
passages such as Polit. iv. 2 init. 
c. 8 init, we are expressly for- 
bidden to make any distinction 
between the polity of iv. and of 
the Hthics, and the polity pre- 
viously mentioned among the true 
forms of constitution. 


POLITICS 243 


place it on a level with true monarchy and aristocracy.! 
For it is still government by the many, and a majority 
can never atttain to so high a degree of virtue and 
insight as is possible to one or to few. The one field in 
which a polity can win distinction is the military, and 
accordingly the sovereign in it will naturally be the 
collective body of those capable of bearing arms.2. The 
virtue, therefore, upon which the State is here founded 
is an imperfect one. The natural antagonisms between 
the citizens are not removed, as in an aristocracy, by a 
comprehensive and uniform education of all and an 
equal freedom from meaner employments. The pro- 
blem, therefore, must be to devise for it such institu- 
tions that antagonistic forces will be held in equilibrium, 
the excesses alike of democracy and of oligarchy avoided, 
and the foundation laid for that predominance of the 
middle classes which constitutes in Aristotle’s opinion, 
as we shall see, the chief advantage of polity. While 
it is possible in this way to explain the place which this 
form of constitution occupies in Aristotle’s account, the 
ambiguity of its position remains a permanent defect in 





his theory of the State. 


' Cf. ZHth. viii. 12, 1160, a, 
35: tovrwy 5¢ [of the true forms 
of State] Beatiorn wév h Bactrela, 
xeiplorn 8’) twoxparia (which here 
=mohitela; cf. p. 238, n. 1, sup.) 
b, 16: democracy is chiefly related 
to timocracy, the majority of the 
citizens ruling in both witb equal 
right, and springs from it almost 
imperceptibly. 

? iii. 7, 1279, a, 39: Ga pev 

yap Siapépew Kar’ dperhy } dAlyous 
évdexerat, mAclous 8 Hdn xadrerdy 


The fundamental mistake, 


hkpiBacba mps macay aperhy 
GAAG pdALora Thy ToAcuKAY* abrn 
yap ev mrjOer ylyvera. d:dmep 
Kara TavTny Thy mwoArtelay Kupiw- 
Tatov Td mpowoAcuody Kal peré- 
xovow aris of Kextnuévor ra 
dwAa. In accordance with this 
passage and c. 17 (see 239, n. 1, 
supra) we should read in 1. 37 
(differently from SPENGEL, ADh. 
d. Miinchn. Ahad. philos.-philol. 
Kil, v. 23), instead of rd TARO0s, 
Td ToAEcuiKOY TAROOS, 


rR 2 


244 ARISTOTLE 


however, which is the cause of this ambiguity, consists 
in the crude division of political constitutions into good 
and bad, with which he starts. In polity and that 
improper form of aristocracy which is akin to it, there 
obtrudes itself between these two alternatives a third 
kind, which has no clear place assigned to it, unless 
we give up this division and supplement the qualitative 
opposition between good and bad by a quantitative 
difference in degrees of perfection.’ 

Inquiring next into the respective titles of these 
different forms of constitution, we must first recal what 
was said above—viz. that in each and all of them the 
question is of a distribution of rights and privileges 
which can only be determined according to the prin- 
ciples of distributive justice. These demand that 
equals receive an equal portion; unequals, on the 
contrary, in proportion to their inequality an unequal 
portion.? It is not, however, each and every superiority 
that entitles to political privileges, but only those which, 
like birth, freedom, wealth, virtue, stand in intimate 
relation to the qualities which are essential to a citizen, 
and are the indispensable elements in a full and satisfy- 


! Aristotle himself takes simply into good and bad, seeing 


occasion (iv. 8 init.) to justify the 
place he assigns to’ polity. 
"Eratapev 8 ovTws, he says, ovK 
odcav ore tavrny [polity] map- 
éxBacw ore Tas apts pydeloas 
apiorokparias, br. To mev GAnDES 
raga. Siuaprhkac: THs opOordrns 
moritelas, &c. But this only 
serves to corroborate the above 
remarks. For if polity is neither 
the best nor a vicious form of 
constitution, it is obvious that 
constitutions cannot be divided 


that what differentiates polity 
from the best State is a mere 
want, so that one and the same 
constitution presents itself in 
comparison with the best as a 
defective one (dimuaprhkact), in 
comparison with all others as a 
true one. Evenin respect of the 
other forms Aristotle admits 
that they may be relatively 
good; cf. eg. v. 9, 1309, .b, 
18-35. 
2 See p. 228 sq. supra. 





POLITICS 245 


ing social life.’ But even any one of such advantages 
as these confers no title to rule in the State. Those who 
demand to stand on a footing of equality with others 
in everything because they are equal in something, or 
who assert pre-eminence in all respects on the ground of 
pre-eminence in some, put forward an unfounded claim.? 
The problem therefore is, to determine the relative 
worth of those qualities upon which a title to political 
privileges can be based, and thus to estimate the value 
of the claims of the various classes to the sovereignty, as 
these express themselves in the various forms of con- 
stitution.* The highest of these qualities, and that 
which in the perfect State is alone of importance, 
Aristotle declares, as we have already seen,‘ to be 
virtue ; although he does not deny to the others their 
importance. But besides the character of individuals, 
we must also take into account their numerical propor- 
tion. It does not follow because an individual or the 
members of a minority are superior to all the rest 
individually in virtue, insight and property, that they 
must therefore be superior to the whole body taken 
together. A majority of individuals, each of whom 
taken by himself is inferior to the minority, may as a 
whole possess an advantage over them, as each member 
finds his complement in the other, and all thus attain a 
higher perfection. The individual contribution to the 





' iii. 12, 1282, b, 21- 1283, a, 
23; cf. p. 299 Sq. supra. 

2 iii. 9, 1280, a, 22, c. 13, 
1283, a, 26, v. 1, 1301, a, 25 
sqq. b, 35. 

3 Aristotle does not himself 
formulate the problem precisely 


thus, but the above statement of 
it corresponds to what he says 
ili. 13, 1283, a, 29-b, 9 upon the 
duproBirnats and the xplois tivas 
tpxew Sei, 

‘ P, 230 sq. supra. 


246 ARISTOTLE 


State in this case is less, but the sum of the contribu- 
tions is greater than in the case of the others.! If 
this does not hold of every body of people without 
distinction, yet there may be peoples of whom it is 
true.” In such cases, while it would certainly be wrong 
to entrust to individual members of the majority offices 
of State which require special personal qualifications, 
yet it must be the people as a whole who in the public 
assemblies and law courts pass decisions, elect magi- 
strates, and supervise their administration,’ all the more 
as it would be in the highest degree dangerous for the 
State to convert the majority of the citizens into 
enemies by completely excluding them from a share in 
the government. In answer to the objection that this 
is to set the incapable in judgment over the capable, to 


place the more important 


' Aristotle frequently returns 
to this acute remark, which is of 
so much importance in estimat- 
ing democratic institutions ; see 
iii. 11 imit.: Ore 5e Se? wdpiov eivar 
MaAAov Td TAHO0s 2) TOds dpiorous 
Mev dAlyous 8é, déterev dy AvecOu 
kat tw’ Exe dmopiay, Taxa de Kby 
GANGeay. Tovs yap MoAAods, Gv 
exactés €or ov omovdaios arp, 
duws évdéxerar cuvedOdvras civ 
BeAtiouvs éxelywyv, ox ws Exacrov 
GAN’ os obumavras, olov Ta cuudo- 
pnta Setrva tev éx mids Samdvys 
xopnynbevrwy [similarly c. 15, 
1286, a, 25]* moAA@y yap svTwy 
Exaorov mdpiv exew aperqs kar 
ppovicews, kai ylvecOa cvverAddvras 
domep eva tvOpwrov td wAROos 
mwoAvToda kal morAvxXEtpa Kal moAAaS 
Exovr’ aicdjoes. orm Kad rep) 
Ta HOn kal thy Sidvowy. c. 13, 
1283, a, 40: GAA& phy kad of 


function (viz. the highest 


TAclous mpds tovs éAdrrous [sc. 
duis Bnthoeay dy wept ris apxijs |° 
kal yap Kpeirrous Kal mAovoimreEpoL 
kal BeArious eioly, as AapBavo- 
Mévwv Tav TAEbvwY mpbs Tovs 
éAdttouvs. 1283, b, 33: obdtv yap 
KwAvet roTé Td TAOS elvar BéATLov 
Tov OAlywv Kal mAovoidrepoy, ovxX 
ws Kad’ Exaoroy AA’ ws dOpdous. 

? iii. 11, 1282, b, 15. 

* By the public scrutiny 
(ed0dvn), c. 11, 1281, b, 33, 1282, 
a, 26. 

*c. 11, 1281, b, 21 sqq., 
especially 1. 34: mdvres piv yap 
éxovar cvvedOdytes ixavhy atcOnow, 
kal puryvimevot tots Bearloor Tas 
méAEts wpedovow, Kaddmwep Hh ph 
Kabapda Tpoph meTa THs Kabapas Thy 
macay moet xpnojmwrepay Tis 
oAlyns* xwpls 8 Exacros &reAhs 
wept Td Kplvew early, 


POLITICS 247 


authority in the State) in the hands of those who are 
excluded from the less important (viz. the individual 
offices), Aristotle adds to the above exposition! the 
further pertinent observation that there are many things 
of which the user can judge as well as or better than 
the specialist who makes them:? in other words, that 
the people, although it may not understand much about 
the details of State and government, may yet know well 
enough whether or not a government is advancing its 
interests. The smaller capacity, therefore, of the indi- 


. viduals may be counterbalanced and even outweighed by 


their greater numbers; and vice versa, their greater 
capacity by their smaller number. The more capable 
have no claim to the possession of power if there are too 
few of them to govern or to form of themselves a State.* 
The first condition of the survival of any constitution is 
that its supporters should be superior to its enemies. 
But this is a question, not of quality alone, but of 
numbers. It is only by taking both of these elements 
into account that we can properly estimate the balance 
of political power. The stronger party is the one which 
is superior to the other, either in both these respects 
or so decisively in one of them that the deficiency in 


1 Cf. further c. 11, 1282, a, 
14: Fora yap Exaoctos wey yxelpwv 
Kpit)s tay e¢idédtrwv, G&ravres 8 
ouveAOdvres }} BeAtiovs } od xelpous. 
L. 34: ob yap 6 Bixacrhs ovd’ 6 
exkAnoiacths tipxwy early, AAAA Td 
dicacrhpioy Kal } BovA} Kal 6 SFuos: 
tay St pnbévrwy Exaoros mdpidy 
éott tovrwy . . . dore dixalws 
KUpiov merC6vwv Td wARO0s* ex yap 
modA@y 6 Bijuos Kal } BovA} Kal Td 
Sinacrhpiorv, Kal rd thunua 8 


wAciov to mdvtwy toltrwy Trav 
Kal’ Eva nal Kar’ dAlyous peydaAas 
apxas apxdvTwy. 

2 Thid. 1282, a, 17. 

3 iii, 13, 1283, b, 9: ef 8h roy 
apiOudy elev dAlyot wdumray of thy 
aperhy Exovres, tTiva Set Sierciv roy 
tpdémov ; 1) rd dAlyot pds 7d Epyor 
de? cxoreiy, ei Suvarol Sioiely thy 
wéAw 3) Togovro: To wARV0s Sort’ 
elva: wéAw ef abTay. 


248 ARISTOTLE 


‘the other is more than counterbalanced.! The influence 
of individuals or classes will be in proportion to the 
amount which they severally contribute to the stability 
of the State and the attainment of its end. The end, 
however, must always be the good of the whole, and 
not the advantage of any particular class.2. And since 
this object is more certainly attained under the rule of 
law than under that of men, who are continually subject 
to all kinds of weakness and passion, Aristotle differs 
from Plato* in concluding that it is better that good 
laws hold sway, and that magistrates be left to the 
freedom of their own will only in cases which laws fail 
to cover, owing to their necessary universality and the 
impossibility of taking account of every individual case 


that may occur. 


‘iv. 12, 1296, b, 15: de? yap 
kpeirrov elvat Td BovAduevoy wépos 
THs wéAews TOV ph BovdAomévov 
eve Thy mwodutelay. [So v. 9, 
1309, b, 16.] or: 5& waca wérus 
ék TE TOV ToLovU Kal Tod Togod. 
A€yw 5é wordy ev erevOeplay wrod- 
Tov watdelay evyéveray, moody de 
Thy TOD wANVos bmepoxhy. évdé- 
xerar 5€ 7d wey mov Smdpyew 
ETEpw meper THs MéAEws, . . . BAA 
d€ wéper Td woody, olov mAclous roy 
Gpiuov ecivar trav yevvalwy rovs 
ayevvets 2) TOV TAcvalwy Tovs amd- 
pous, My mévroe TocodTov bmrepéxew 
T@ ToTP Goov rAelwecOa TH Tog. 
51d Tadta mpbs BAANAG ovyKpiTéor. 
Omov piv odv stwepéxer 7d Tov 
arépwv TARO0s Thy cipnuevyny ava- 
Aoyiay, evrav0a mépuner elvar Snuo- 
kpatiav, kat écacroy eldos Snuo- 
kpatias [organised or lawless, 
&e.] kara thy Srepoxhy rod Shuov 
éxdorov [according as farmers or 


If it be objected that the law may 


labourers, &c., preponderate] ... 
drov 5& Tb Tay eibmdépwv Kal 
yvwpluwv uaddrov stmeprelver TH 
Tom 7) Aclmerar TH Toca, évTadvOa 


_ 8& dAryapxiay, Kal Tis oAvyapxias 


Tov avtToy tpdmov Exaoroyv eidos 
Kara Thy btEepoxhy Tod dAvyapxiKod 
mwAHOous . . . bmov 5é Td TY MécwY 
brepreiver wAHO0s 7) cuvauporépwy 
Tav uKpwy 2 Kat Oarépov mdvoy, 
évravd évdéxerat moditelay elvat 
pdvimoy, 

? ili, 13, 1283, b, 36: Ought 
the legislator to look to the ad- 
vantage of the better or of the 
greater number? 7d 8’ dépOdy 
Annréov tows’ Td 8 tows dpbdv 
mpos To Tis mTérAEws BANS TUUpepov 
kal mpds Td Kowdy TO Tay ToALTaY. 
Hence all forms of constitution 
which do not aim at the general 
welfare are resolutely regarded 
as bad. 

3 Cf. Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 762 sq. 


POLITICS 249 


itself be partial, Aristotle admits that it is true; the law 
will be good or bad, just or unjust, according as the 
constitution is so, since laws everywhere correspond to 
the existing constitution. But the conclusion which 
he draws is, not that persons instead of laws should 
adjudicate, but that constitutions should be good.! The 
final result of all these considerations is, therefore, the 
demand for an order founded upon law, and aiming at 
the common good of all, in which influence and privi- 
lege should be assigned to individuals and classes 
according to their importance for the life of the 
whole. 

We have next to consider the ¢ase in which an 
individual or a minority possesses personal qualities so. 
outstanding as wholly to outweigh all the others put 
together in ability and political importance. Would it 
not be unjust to place such persons on an equal footing 


' iii. 10: In whom shall the 
sovereignty reside? In the 
masses, the rich, the best, in 
some distinguished citizen, or in 
a tyrant? After recounting all 
these different views, and dis- 
missing the third and fourth 
with the remark that in that 
case the majority of the citizens 
would be excluded from all po- 
litical rights, Aristotle continues, 
1281. a, B34: GAA’ ows gain tis 
dy 7d Kipiov Saws tvOpwrov elva 
GAAG wh vduov paddrov, txovrd ye 
Ta oupBalvovra mdOn mepl Thy 
Wuxhv. He suggests, indeed, an 
objection: ty ofy F véuos pey 
dAvyapxinds 3& 4 Snuoxparucds, Ti 
Siolce: wepl ray jropnuévwy ; cup- 
Bhoera yap duolws [i.e. as in the 
case of the personal rule of the 


rich or of the people] ra Aex@évra 
mpérepov. Nevertheless he arrives 
finally at the conclusion (1282, 
b, 1): 4 8 mpérn AexOcioa dropia 
moter havepby ovdéy oftws Erepoy 
ws Sri Sei rods vduous elvar kuplous 
Keysévous dp0as, Toy &pxovTa dé, hy 
te eis by te mAelovs dow, wep 
TovTwy elvat Kvpiovs wep) Sowy 
etaduvatovow of vduot Aéyew axpt- 
Bas 51a 7d wh Padioy elvar xabddrov 
dnA@oat wept mdvrwy. But the 
character of the laws depends 
upon the constitution (woArrela 
in the wider sense explained p. 
232 sq.): GAAG why «fl TodTO, SAO 
Sri Tovs piv Kara ras dpOds mo- 
Airelas dvayKaiov elvat Sixalous, 
Tous 3¢ kata Tas mapexBeBnxvias ob 
dixaiovs, Onthe supremacy of law 
see p. 252, infra. 


250 ARISTOTLE 


with the others, whom in every respect they so far excel ? 
Would it not be as ridiculous as to ask the lion to enter 
on an alliance of equal rights with the hare? If a 
State will suffer no political inequality, nothing is left 
for it but to exclude from its pale members who thus 
excel the common mass. In that sense, the institution of 
the Ostracism is not without a certain justification : it 
may, under certain circumstances, be indispensable to the 
safety of the democracy. In itself, however, it is wholly 
unjust, and, as a matter of fact, was abused for party 
ends. ‘The true solution is to regard men of decisive 
superiority, not as mere members, but as the destined 
rulers of the State, not as under the law, but as them- 
selves the law. They dwell among men like gods—you 
can as little rule over them or divide the power with 
them as you can divide the sovereignty of Jove. Only 
one attitude is possible towards them—namely, voluntary 
subjection. They are the natural, born kings;! they 


' iii. 13, 1284, a, 3: ef 5€ ris véduos. And then follows the dis- 


€or eis tocottov Siabépwv Kat’ 
aperijs tbwepBoA\y, 7) mAelous pmév 
evis my pévtot Suvarol wAhpwua 
maparxécba: méAEws, SoTE wh) Tu- 
BAntiy elvar thy Tov HAAwY dperhy 
mavTwy unde thy dSivauw ater 
Thy wodiTiKhy mpds Thy éxelvav, El 
mAetous, ei 8 cis, rhyv éxelvov udvov, 
viKért Oeréov TovTous wépos méAEwS* 
adichoovTa yap akiovpmevor Tar 
lowy, &vicot ToTovTOV Kar’ apeThy 
ivtes Kal Thy mwodutixhy Sbvauiv* 
domwep yap Gedy ev dvOpdmois eixds 
elvar Tov TolovTov: bev SHAov rt 
kal tiv vouobectay dvarynaioy elvat 
wept rovs toous nal rq yéver ka TH 
Suvdwer. Kara 8& Tay ToLovTwY 
ov Ett véuos* adtol yap elon 


cussion in the text above, after 
which Aristotle continues, 1284, 
b, 25: Gar’ él rijs dptorns mo- 
Aurelas %xer moAAhv amopiay, ob 
Kata ToY BAAwy Gyabav Thy 
brepoxhy, oiov iaxtvos Kal mdrovrou 
kal rodupidlfas, GAA’ ay Tis yévnTat 
Siapepwv Kar’ aperhny, Tl xpi moveiy ; 
od yap 57) patey dy Seiv exBdArew 
kal meOtoravar Toy ToLodTOV. GAAX 
Mav ovd &pxew ye Tov ToLobTov’ 
mapawAhaov yap Kiy ei Tod Aids 
&pxeuw akotey, wepiCovtes Tas apxds. 
Aelwerat Tolvuy, Srep Zoe wedv- 
Kévat, welOecOa Te ToLo’T® TdvTAS 
aouevws, bore Baciréas elvar Tovs 
TowovTous aidtovs ev tais méAcow. 


Similarly c. 17, 1288, a, 15 sqq. 


POLITICS ' 261 


alone have a true and unconditional title to monarchy.! 
Such a monarchy Aristotle calls the best of all consti- 
tutions,’ believing as he does that under it the well- 
being of the people is best secured; for he alone is 
king in this high sense who is endowed with every 
excellence and free from every mortal defect; nor will 
such a one seek his own advantage at the cost of his 
subjects, but, like a god, will lavish upon them benefits 
out of his own abundance.* In general, however, Ari- 
stotle is no enlogist of monarchy. The different kinds 
of it which he enumerates,‘ he regards as mere varieties 
of two fundamental forms—namely, military command 


* Cf. iii. 17, 1281, b, 41 sqq. 

* Eth. viii. 12, 1160, a, 35: 
tovrwy 5& [of the true forms of 
constitution] BeArriorn piv fF 
Bacirela xeuglorn 8 H TimoKparia. 

* Ibid. b,2: 6 wey yap ripavvos 
7) éavt@ cuupépoy come, 5 Be 
Baoireds 7d Td apxyouévwr. od 
yap éort Bactreds 6 wh abrdpkns 
kal magi Tois d&yabots imepéxwy. 6 
5 rowodTos oddevds mpordeirar: Ta 
opéAma ody aitrG wey odk by 
gKoroln. Trois 3° apxouevos: 5 yap 
Mh To.wdTos KAnpwrds by Tis etn 
Baoireds. Cf. p. 250, n. 1, supra. 

* In the section wep) BaciAclas, 
which Aristotle inserts iii. 14-17, 
and which, as it is closely con- 
nected with the preceding dis- 
cussion, we must here notice. 
Besides true monarchy he there 
enumerates five kinds of mon- 
archical rule: (1) that of the 
heroic age; (2) that which is 
common among barbarians; (3) 
the rule of the so-called Ausym- 
nets or elective princes; (4) 
the Spartan; (5) unlimited mon- 
archy (mauBaoirela, c. 16 1287 


a, 8). The first of these kinds, he 
remarks (c. 14, 1285, b, 3 sqq., 
20 sqq., a, 7, 14), was rather a 
union of certain offices, judicial, 
priestly, military; similarly, the 
Spartan was an hereditary com- 
mand. The monarchy of the 
barbarians, on the other hand, 
is an hereditary mastership 
(apxh Seororix})—but the govern- 
ment of slaves is despotic, that 
of freemen political; Polit. iii. 
4, 1277, a, 33, b, 7, c. 6, 1278, b, 
32, 1279, a, 8), to which, how- 
ever, the subjects voluntarily 
submit, and which is limited by 
traditional usage (iii. 14, 1285, 
a, 16, b, 23), Elective monarchy 
is a dictatorship either for life 
or for a definite time or object. 
(On the aiperh rupavuls v. ibid. a, 
29 sqq. b, 25.) Only in an irre- 
sponsible monarchy is an indi- 
vidual actually master of a whole 
people; it is a kind of magnified 
domestic rule : éamep yap 4 oixovo- 
bikh Bacircla ris oixias éoriv, ofrws 
h Bacitrela méAews Kal EOvous évds }) 
mreidvwr oixovoula (ibid.b, 29 sqq.). 


252 ARISTOTLE 


for life and irresponsible sovereignty. The former, 
however, is applicable te the most diverse forms of 
constitution, and cannot, therefore, be the fundamental 
characteristic of any one of them. By a monarchical 
constitution, therefore, in the present inquiry, we can 
only mean irresponsible monarchy.'! But against this 
form of government there are, according to Aristotle, 
many objections. That it may, under certain circum- 
stances, be natural and justifiable he does not, indeed, 
deny. A people which is incapable of governing itself 
must needs have a governor. In such a case govern- 
ment by one is just and salutary.? If, on the other 
hand, the case be one of a people consisting of freemen 
who stand to one another in a relation of essential 
equality, personal rule contradicts the natural law, which 
assigns equal rights to equals; in such States the only 
just arrangement is that power should alternate; but 
where this is the case it is law, and not the will of a 
monarch, that rules.* If, further, it be said that govern- 
ment by the best man is better than government by 
the best laws, because the latter issue only universal 
decrees without regard to the peculiarities of particular 
cases, we must remember, in the first place, that even 
the individual must be guided by universal principles 


1 iii, 15, 1286, b, 33-1287, a, 
7, c. 16 init. 

? ili. 17 init., after stating the 
objections to monarchy Aristotle 
continues : &AA’ tows Tad’ em) pev 
Tiwwy exer Thy Tpdmov TodTov, em) 
S€ Twwv obx oftws. tort ydp TL 
pice Seamocrdv Kat %AAO BactAev- 
Tov Kal &AAo moduTixdy Kad Blkaov 
kal cuupéporv. c. 14, 1285, a, 19: 
monarchical power is as un- 


limited among some barbarian 
peoples as tyrannical. Neverthe- 
less it is legitimate (kar& véuov 
kal murpikh); did yap 7d SovAuKe- 
repo elvat Ta HOn piace: of wev Bdp- 
Bapot Tav “EAAhver, of 5 wep) Thy 
*Aclay tay wept Thy Evpdérny, bo- 
Mévouat Thy Seororichy apxhy ovdéev 
dvoxepaivovtes. Of. p.239, n.1, sup. 

3 iii. 16, 1287, a, 8 sqq. cf. c. 
17, 1288, a, 12, c. 15, 1286, a, 36. 


POLITICS 258 


of government, and that it is better that these should 
be administered in their purity than that they should 
be obscured by distorting influences. Law is free from 
such influences, whereas every human soul is exposed 
to the disturbing influence of passion; law is reason 
without desire. Where law reigns, God reigns incarnate ; 
where the individual, the beast reigns as well.' If 
this advantage seems to be again outweighed by the 
inability of law to take account of particular cases as 
the individual governor can, this is not decisive. It 
follows, indeed, from it that the constitution must 
admit of an improvement upon the laws ?—that the 
cases which the law does not take account of must be 
submitted to authoritative judges and magistrates, and 
that provision should be made by means of a special 
education for a constant supply of men, to whom these 


1 iii. 15, 1286, a, 7-20, c. 16, 
1287, a, 28: 5 wey ody Troy vduov 
KkeAcvov Upxew SoKxet Kedevey 
tpxew Tov Gedy Kal Tov vody udvous, 
6 & tvOpwrov Knedebwy mpoorlOnor 
kal Onplov. h Te yap émiduula 
to.ovTov [ perhaps better : ro1odrov 
br kal 5 Ouuds &pxovras diarrpepe 
kal rods aplorous uvdpas. S.dmep 
tivev dpétews vots 6 vduos éorir. 
Cf. p. 248 sq. vi. 4, 1318, b, 39: 
h yap ekovgia rod mpdrrew b ri bv 
€0€An Tis ob Sbivaras pudAdrrew Td 
év éxdotw Tay avOpdérwy paiAorv. 
Eth. v. 10, 1134, a, 35: 81d od« 
éGuev Epxew vOpwrov, GAAA Toy 
Adyov [al. véuov], br Eavtg TodTO 
motel kal ylverar TUpavvos. 

? Aristotle touches on this 
point, ii. 8, 1268, b, 31 sqq. He 
there says that neither the 
written nor the unwritten laws 
can be unchangeable. Govern- 


ment, like all other arts and 
sciences, reaches perfection gra- 
dually. From the earliest inhabi- 
tants of a country, whether they 
be autochthonous ora remnant of 
a more ancient population, little 
insight is to be expected: it 
would be absurd, therefore, to be 
bound by their precedents; written 
laws, moreover, cannot embrace 
every individual case. Neverthe- 
less great prudence is required in 
changing the laws; the authority 
of the law rests entirely on use 
and wont, and this ought not to 
be infringed unnecessarily ; men 
ought to put up with small 
anomalies rather than injure the 
authority of the law and the 
government and accustom the 
citizens to regard legislative 
changes lightly. 


254 ARISTOTLE 


functions may be entrusted; but it does not by any 
means: follow that the highest authority in the State 
should reside in an individual. On the contrary, the 
more undeniable it is that many are superior to one, 
that the latter is more liable to be fooled by passion 
and corrupted by desire than a multitude, and that 
even the monarch cannot dispense with a multitude of 
servants and assistants, the wiser it is to commit this 
authority into the hands of the whole people and cause 
it to be exercised by them, rather than by an individual ! 
—assuming always that the people consist of free and 
capable men.? Furthermore, we cannot overlook the 
fact that use and custom are more powerful than written 
laws, and that government by these at any rate hag the 
advantage over government by a man, even although 
we deny this of written law.* A monarch, finally (and 
this argument weighs heavily with Aristotle), will almost 
inevitably desire to make his sovereignty hereditary in 
his family ; and what guarantee have we in such a case 


' C. 15, 1286, a, 20-b, 1, c. upon a special case, in which 


16, 1287, a, 20- b, 35; cf. p. 246, n. 
2, supra. Rhet.i. 1, 1354, a, 31: it 
is best that as much as possible 
cases should be decided by law 
and withdrawn from judicial con- 
sideration ; for (1) true insight is 
more likely to be found in tlhe 
individual or the select few who 
make a law than in the many 
who have to apply it ; (2) lawsare 
the product of mature delibera- 
tion, judicial decisions of the 
moment ; (3) the most important 
consideration of all: the legis- 
lator establishes universal prin- 
ciples for the future, law courts 
and popular assemblies decide 


inclination, aversion and private 
advantage not unfrequently play 
a part. To these, therefore, we 
must leave, when possible, only 
such questions as refer to matters 
of fact—past or future. 

* Ibid. 1286, a, 35: éorw dé 7d 
TAGs of eActOepor, undev mapa 
tov vouoy mpdrrovres, GAA’ 7) aeph 
dv éxAcimew avaryKaiov adrév, We 
are dealing with dya0ol kal avdpes 
kal moAirat. To the further objec- 
tion that in large masses factions 
commonly arise, the reply is 
made: 87: omovdaior thy Wuxhy, 
omep Kaxcivos 6 els, 


3 ¢. 16, 1287, b, 5. 


POLITICS 255 


that it will not pass into the most unworthy hands, to 
the ruin of the whole people?! On all these grounds 
Aristotle declares it to be better that the State be ruled 


by a capable body of citizens than by an individual: in 


other words, he gives ‘ aristocracy ’ the preference over 
‘monarchy.’? Only in two cases does he regard the 
latter, as we have seen, as justified: when a people stands 
so low as to be incapable of self-government, or when 
an individual stands so pre-eminently oat over all others 
that they are forced to revere him as their natural 
ruler. Of the former, he could not fail to find many 
instances in actual experience ; he himself, for instance, 
explains the Asiatic despotisms on this principle. Of 
the latter, neither his own time nor the whole history 
of his nation afforded him any example corresponding 
even remotely to the description, except that of his own 
pupil Alexander.*? The thought naturally suggests it- 
self that he had him in his mind when he describes the 
prince whose personal superiority makes him a born 
ruler.‘ Conversely, we can imagine that he used his 
ideal of the true king (if he had sketched it at so early 
a period as his residence in Macedonia*) as a means of 
directing to beneficial ends a power which would endure 


1 c, 15, 1286, b, 22. 

2 oc. 15, 1286, b, 3: ef 5h thy 
wey tTav wActdywy apxhy awyabdv 
5 dpdpavy mdvtwv apiotoKpatiay 
Ceréov, Thy Sé Tov Evds BaciAciay, 
aipetwrepov dy ein méAcow apioro- 
kparia, BaoiAelas. Accordingly 
early monarchies have changed 
into republics as the number of 
capable people in the cities has 
increased. 

% Pericles alone might per- 


haps have been mentioned along- 
side of him; he was, however, 
not a monarch, but a popular 
leader, and in Polit. ii. 12, 1274, 
a, 5 sqq. is treated merely as a 
demagogue. 

* See ONCKEN, Staatsl. d. 
Arist. ii. 268 sq. 

5 He dedicated a treatise to 
Pages gi wept Baoidclas; see p. 
60, n. 1. 


256 ARISTOTLE 


no opposition and no limitation, and of saying to a 
prince whose egotism would admit no title by the side 
of his own that absolute monarchy can only be merited 
by an equally absolute moral greatness. These specula- 
tions, however, are delusive. Aristotle himself remarks 
that no one any longer exists so far superior to all 
others as the true king must needs be.! Moreover, 
throughout the Politics he accepts the presuppositions 
of Greek national and political life, and it is not 
likely that in his theory of monarchy he should have 
had the Macedonian Empire, whose origin, like that ot 
other peoples, he elsewhere traces to definite historical 
sources,” present to his thought.? It is better to explain 


1 v. 10, 1313, a, 3: od ylyvor- 
tat 5’ rt BaoiAcian viv, BAD’ &vmep 
ylyvevra, movapxlar Kad rupayvldes 
MaAdAoy, Sia Td THY BaciAclay Exov- 
gov pev apxiyv elvat, perCdvwr 5e 
kuplay, mwodAovs 8’ elvat rods du- 
olovs, kal wndéva Siapépovra 
TogovTov ote amapricery 
mpos Td mévyedos Kal rd aét- 
wha ths apxiis. bore 5d pév 
TovTo éxdytes ovX tromévovow* 
ay 5& di’ ardrns &pin tis 4 Blas, 
Hdn SoKet rovto eclva: rupavvis. 
This does not, indeed, primarily 
refer to the appearance in a state 
previously monarchical of a 
prince whose personality corre- 
sponds to that of the ideal king, 
but to the introduction of mon- 
archy in states which hitherto 
have had another form of consti- 
tution ; the words undéva .. .dpxis 
seem, however, to show that 
Aristotle in depicting the true 
king was not thinking of contem- 
porary examples. Had he desired 
historical illustrations he would 
have preferred to look for them in 


mythical times—perhaps in a 
Theseus—seeing that in iii. 15, 
1286, a, 8 he supposes that mon- 
archy is the oldest form of con- 
stitution, perhaps because the 
few capable people in antiquity 
stood more prominently out 
above the common man than in 
later times. 

* Polit. v. 10, 1310, b, 39, 
where the Macedonian kings are 
mentioned along with the Spartan 
and Molossian as owing their 
position to their services as 
founders of states. 

* Even although the passage 
vii. 7 (see infra) were taken to 
mean that the Greek nation now 
that it has become politically 
united (strictly speaking it had 
not received play modrrelay even 
from Philip and Alexander) is 
able to rule the world, and not 
merely that ‘it would be able to 
rule the world if it were politi- 
cally united, it could not be 
quoted in proof of the view that 
Aristotle (as ONCKEN, Staatsl. d. 


POLITICS 257 


his views on this subject upon purely scientific principles. 
Among the different possible cases in which virtue may 
be the basis of political life, he had to take account of 
that in which the virtue resides primarily in the prince, 
and in which his spirit, passing into the community, 
confers upon it that prowess which he himself possesses. 
It would certainly not be difficult to prove from Ari- 
stotle’s own statements about the weakness of human 
nature and the defects of absolute monarchy that such 
a case can never actually occur, that even the greatest 
and ablest man differs from a god, and that no personal 
greatness in a ruler can compensate for the legally 
organised co-operation of a free people, or can constitute 
a claim to unlimited command over free men. Deter- 
mined, however, though Aristotle usually is in his hos- 
tility to all false idealism, and careful though he is in 
the Politics to keep clearly in view the conditions of 
reality, he has here been unable wholly to rid himself 
of idealistic bias. He admits that the advent of a man 
who has a natural claim to sole supremacy is a rare 
exception; but he does not regard it as an impossibility, 
and accordingly considers it his duty not to overlook 
this case in the development of his theory.! 

After thus discussing the principles of his division 
of states into their various kinds, Aristotle next 
proceeds to investigate the separate forms themselves, 
beginning with the best, and passing from it to the 


Arist. i. 21, supposes) saw in its HENKEL, Studien, &c., p. 97. 
unity under the Macedonian ' SUSEMIHL, Jahresber. iiber 
sway the fulfilment of his class. Alterthumsw., 1875, p. 277, 
people’s destiny. Cf. SUSEMIHL, takes the same view. 

Jahrb. f. Philol. ciii. 134 sq. 


VOL, Il. s 


258 ARISTOTLE 


less perfect examples. The examination of the‘ Best 
State,’ however, as already observed, is incomplete. 
We must therefore be content to notice the section of 
it which we have before us. 


5. The Best State ' 


For a perfect society certain natural conditions are 
in the first place necessary ; for just as each art requires 
a suitable material to work upon, so also does political 
science. A community cannot, any more than an indi- 
vidual, dispense with external equipment as the con- 


dition of complete happiness.’ 


1 It has been frequently 
denied that Aristotle intended to 
depict an Ideal State (see HIL- 
DENBRAND, ibid. p. 427 sqq. 
HENKEL, ibid. 74); his own 
declarations, however, as_ is 
gradually coming to be generally 
admitted, leave no doubt on this 
head. Cf. eg. iii. 18 fin. vii. 1 
init. c. 2, 1824, a, 18, 23, c. 4 
init. c. 9, 1328, b, 33, c. 13 init. 
c. 15 init. iv. 2, 1289, a, 30. The 
subject of the discussion in Polit. 
vii. and viii. is described by all 
these passages without exception 
as the apiorn modrteia, the méAis 
MéAAovoa Kat’ evxhy cuverrdvat, 
and Aristotle expressly says that 
in depicting such a State many 
assumptions must be made, but 
these ought not to transcend the 
limits of possibility. This, how- 
ever, is precisely what Plato also 
had asserted of the presupposi- 
tions of his ideal state (Rep. v. 
473, c. vi. 499 ©, D,502 c; see Ph. 
d.@r.i. p.776), and so small is the 
difference in this respect between 


A State, in the first 


them that, while Plato declares 
Mh TayTdmracw Has evyas eipnévat, 
GAAG xarera pev Suvara 5€ wy 
(Rep. vii, 540 D), Aristotle says, 
conversely (vii. 4, 1825, b, 38, 
and almost in the same words 
ii. 6, 1265, a,17): Se? woAAd mpodro- 
TeOeicbar Kabdrep evxouevous, elvat 
pévror pnbey tovtwy advvaror. 
Aristotle certainly declares the 
most peculiar of Plato’s propo- 
sals to be unsuitable and im- 
practicable ; he is moreover not 
+o entranced with his Ideal State 
as to deny, as Plato does, to any 
other the name of State and to 
permit to the philosopher alone 
a share in its administration ; he 
demands of political science that 
it should study also the less 
perfect conditions of actuality 
and ascertain what is best in the 
circumstances; but at the same 
time he doubted as little as Plato 
that Politics ought also to sketch 
the ideal of a perfect State. 
2 Polit. vii. 4 init. 








POLITICS 259 


place, must be neither too small nor too great: since if 
it is too small it will lack independence; if too great, 
unity. ‘The true measure of its proportions is that the 
number of the citizens should, on the one hand, suffice 
for all wants, and, on the other, be sufficiently within a 
compass to keep the individual members intimately 
acquainted with one another and with the government. ! 
Aristotle further desires a fruitful country of sufficient 
extent, which itself supplies all the necessities of life 
without leading to luxury, and which is easily defended 
and suitable for purposes of commerce. In this last 
respect he defends, as against Plato,? a maritime situa- 
tion, prescribing at the same time means of avoiding 
the inconveniences which it may bring with it. More 
important still, however, is the natural character of the 
people. A healthy community can only exist where 
the people combine the complementary qualities of 
spirit and intellect. Aristotle agrees with Plato in 
holding that this is so among the Greeks alone, The 
Northern barbarians, on the other hand, with their un- 


1 Thid. 1326, b, 5 sqq. where moAvdv@pwros. Cf. Eth. ix. 10, 


ee Se Olle 
; 


at the end Aristotle says: d%Aov 
tolywy &s obrds errs médcews pos 
Spicros, } peylorn rod mAhOous 
brepBorAh mpds aitdpkeay (wijs 
edodvorros. At the same time he 
maintains that the general eri- 
terion of the size of a state is, 
not the 7A700s, but the dtivauis of 
its population, that the greatest 
is that which is best capable of 
answering the peculiar ends of 
the state, and that accordingly 
we have to take into account the 
number, not of the population, 
but of the citizens proper: od 
yap tairdby weydAn te wédus Kal 


1170, b, 31: otre yap ex déxa 
avOpdimrwy yévorr’ by wérus odt’ ex 
5éxa wupiddwv Eri words eorlv—we 
shall not consider the latter too 
low an estimate if we have in 
view the Greek states in which 
all full citizens share directly in 
the government (cf. Polit. ibid. 
1326, b, 6). 

* Laws, iv. init. ; this 
is, undoubtedly present to Ari- 
stotle’s mind, although he makes 
no mention either of it or of its 
author. 

3 Polit. vii. 5. 


s 2 


260 ARISTOTLE 


tamed spirit, may attain to freedom, but not to political — 
existence; while the Asiatics, with all their art and 
talent, are cowards, and destined by nature to be 
slaves.' The Greeks alone are capable of political 
activity, for they alone are endowed with that sense 
of moral proportion which fortifies them on all sides 
from extremes of excess or defect. ‘The conditions of 
all civil and moral life Aristotle, in a true Greek spirit, 
finds to exist only in his own people. Here, also, where 
it is more justifiable in view of the intellectual state of 
the world at that time, we have the same national pride 
which has already presented itself in a more repulsive 
aspect in the discussion upon Slavery. 

So far we have spoken only of such things as depend 
upon chance. ‘The most important of all, however, and 
that which constitutes the essential element in the 
happiness of the state, is the virtue of the citizens, 
which is no longer a matter of chance, but of free will 
and insight.2 Here, therefore, we must call upon 
political science to be our guide. In the first place 
we shall have to determine by its aid how best to take 
advantage of the external circumstances. Under this 
head comes all that Aristotle says of the division of the 
land, and of the site and structure of the city. With 


1 Polit. vii.7, where hesays of 
the Greeks (1327, b, 29): Td 8 
Tov ‘EAAhvwv yévos Somep mecevet 
kata Tovs Témous, ovmws dugoiv 
meréxel, Kal yap EvOvuoy kal dia- 
vontindy éotiv, didmep eAevOepdy Te 
SiareAci kal udAvora moArrev5mevov 
kal duvduevov &pxew mdvrev mias 
Tuvyxdvoy moArtelas (on which see 
p. 256, n. 1); cf. PLATO, Rep. iv. 
435 §, ii. 374 BE sqq. to the latter 


of ‘which passages Aristotle him- 
self refers. 

2 Polit. vii. 13, 1382, ‘a, 29: 
51d Kar’ evxhy edxyducba Thy Tis 
médAews ovoTacw, dv h TUXn KUpla* 
kuplay yap abrhy tardpxew TiOeuer * 
To 5€ omovdalay elvat thr moAw 
ovKert TUXNS Epyorv, GAA’ emtorhuns 
kat mpoatpéoews. Cf.c. 1, 1323, b, 
13, and the whole chapter. 











POLITICS 261 


reference to the first of these he proposes! that a portion 
of the whole territory be set apart as state property, 
from the produce of which the cost of religious services 
and public banquets may be defrayed, and that of what 
remains each citizen should receive two portions, one in 
the neighbourhood of the city, another towards the 
boundary of its territory.?, He requires for the city not 
only a healthy site and suitable plan of structure, but 
also fortifications, deprecating upon valid grounds* the 
contempt with which Plato‘ and the Spartans regarded 
the latter. Of much greater importance, however, are 
the means that must be adopted to secure the personal 
capacity of the citizens. These will not in the most 
perfect sort of state consist merely in educating men 
with a view to a particular form of constitution and to 
their own particular aims, nor again in making them 
efficient as a community, although imperfect as indivi- 
duals; on the contrary, since the virtue of citizens here 
coincides with the virtue of man universally, care must 
be taken to make each and every citizen a capable man, 
and to fit all for taking part in the government of the 
state.© But for this end three things are necessary. 
The ultimate aim of human existence is the education 
of the reason. As the higher is always preceded by 
the lower, the end by the means, in the order of time,’ 
so the education of the reason must be preceded by 


! Thid. c. 10, 1329, b, 36 sqq. ‘ Lanes, vi. 778 D sq. 

? There is a similar plan in 5 See vol. ii. p. 209, n. 2, sup. 
PLATO, Laws, 745 C sqq.; Aristotle, 5 Cf. p. 142 sq. and Polit. vii. 
however, in Polit. ii. 6, 1265, b, 15, 1334, b. 14: 6 88 Adyos juiv 
24, considers Plato’sarrangement, «al é voids rijs picews TéAos, Sore 
merely on account of a trifling: mpbs rotrouvs rhy yéverw kal thy 
difference, highly objectionable. ray e@av de? mapacKevd (ew wedérny. 

* Polit. vii. 11, 12. 7 Cf. vol. ii. p. 28, n. 3, supra. 


262 ARISTOTLE 


that of the irrational element of the soul—namely, 
desire—and the training of desire by that of the body. 
We must therefore have first a physical, secondly a 
moral, and lastly a philosophic training ; and just as the 
nurture of the body must subserve the soul, so must the 
education of the appetitive part subserve the reason.! 
Aristotle, like Plato, demands that state interference 
with the life of the individual should begin much earlier 
than is customary in our days, and that it should regu- 
late even the procreation of children. He does not, in- 
deed, as has been already shown,? go so far as to make 
this act the mere fulfilment of official orders, as Plato — 
had done in-the Republic. Nevertheless he also would 
have laws to regulate the age at which marriage should 
take place and children be begotten,’ careful regard 
being paid to the consequences involved not only to the 
children in relation to their parents, but to the parents 
in relation to one another. The law must even determine 
at: what season of the year and during what winds pro- 
creation may take place. It.must prescribe the proper 
course of treatment for pregnant women, procure the ex- 
posure of deformed children, and regulate the number of 
births. For those children who are superfluous, or whose 
parents are either too young or too old, Aristotle, sharing 
' Polit. vii. 15, 1334, b, 20: 


Somep 5& 7b cGua mpdrepov TH yevé- 


and desire, v. vol. ii. pp. 112 sq., 
155 sq. supra. [supra. 


vet THS Yuxis, obrw Kal Td HAoyor 
TOU Adyov Exovros ... 5id mpaSTov 
vey TOD oduaros Thy emyérciay 
avarykaioy mporépay elvar } Thy THs 
Yuxns, erevta thy ris dpétews, 
iveka mévror tod vod thy THs 
opétews, thy 5& rod oduaros Ths 
Yuxis. Cf. viii.3 fin. On reason 


? In the section on the Family, 
* Marriage ought to take place 
with men about the age of 
thirty-seven, with women about 
eighteen ; procreation ought not 


_to be continued beyond the fifty- 


fourth or fifty-fifth year of a 
man’s age, 


POLITICS 263 


as he does the indifference of ancients in general as 
to such immoral practices, roundly recommends abor- 
tion, justifying it on the ground that what has as 
yet no life, has no rights.' From the control of pro- 
creation Aristotle passes to education, which he regards 
as. beginning with the first_ moment of life, and extend- 
ing to the last.? From the earliest years of its life care 
must be taken to secure for the child, not only suitable 
exercise and physical training, but also games and 
stories as a preparation for its moral education. Chil-_ 
dren must be left as little as possible to the society ot 
slaves, and kept altogether out of the way of improper’ 
conversation and pictures, which, indeed, ought not to 
be tolerated at all.? Their public_education begins at 
the age of seven, and lasts till twenty-one.* Aristotle 
founds his argument in favour of state-regulated educa-_ 
_tion upon its importance for the communal life, for it is 
the moral quality of the citizens which supports the 
fabric and determines the character of the common- 
wealth ; and if a man would practise virtue in the abate 
he must begin early to acquire it.® As in the best 
state all must be equally capable, as the whole state 
has one common object in view, and as no man belongs 
to himself, but all belong to the state, this cdots 


ek i i ied alee 








1 All this is treated of in 
Polit. vii. 16. 

2 With what follows cf. LEF- 
MANN, De Arist.Hom. Educatione 
Prine. Berl. 1864; BIEHL, Die 
Erziehungslehre d. Arist. Gymn.- 
Progr. Innsbruck, 1877. For 
other literature on the subject, 
see UBBERWEG, Hist. of Phil. 
vol. i. p. 172 Eng. Tr. 

$ vii. 17. 


4 Thid. 1336, b, 35 sqq. 

5 Polit. viii. 1 init., where 
enter alia: Td yap HOos Tis woAt- 
relas éxdorns Td olketov Kal puddr- 
Tew elw0e Thy wodrtelay Kal Kad- 
lornow && apxiis, ofoy 7d wey Synuo- 
kparixoy Snuoxpatiay, Td 5 dAry- 
apxikdy dbdAvyapxlav: del 58 Td 
BéArioroy Hos BeAdriovos alriov 
mwoditrelas. Cf. v. 9, 1310, a, 12, 
and vol. ii. p. 209, n. 2, supra. 


264 


ARISTOTIE 


must be wholly in common and must be- regulated 
ifs every detail with a view to the wants of the whole.! 
/ Its one object, therefore, must be to train up men who 
shall know how to practise the virtue of freemen. 
The same principle will determine the subjects of in- 
struction and the method of their treatment.j/Thus 
of the arts which serve the wants of life, the future 
citizens shall learn only those which are worthy of a 
free man, and which vulgarise neither mind nor body,? 
such as reading, writing, and drawing, the last of which, 
2 besides its practical utility, possesses the higher merit 
| of training the eye for the study of physical beauty. 
But even among those arts which belong to a liberal 
education in the stricter sense, there is an essential 
difference between those which we learn for the sake of 
their practical application and those which we learn for 


1 Ibid. 1337, a, 21 sqq.; cf. 
p. 209. n. 2. Aristotle recognises, 
indeed (£th. x. 10, 1180, b, 7), 
that private education may beable 
more readily to adapt itself to the 
needs of the pupil, but replies that 
public education does not neces- 
sarily neglect these, provided that 
it is entrusted to the proper hands. 

2 viii. 2, 1337, b, 4: 8rt pev 
otv Ta dvaryKaia Set diddoKerOu 
TaY xpnoluwy, ovK BSnAov* Sri Se 
ov mdyra, Sinpnucvwy tev TE édev- 
Oépwv Epywy Kal rev dvedevbépwr, 
gavepoy bri Tay TowvTwy Set wer- 
éxew boa Ta XpnolwwY morhoe: TOY 
MeTéxovTa why Bavavoov. Bdvavoov 
5° Epyov elvat Sez rodro voulCew Kad 
Téxvny tavtny Kal pdOnow, boa 
mpos Tas xphoes Kal Tas mpdters 
Tas Tis dperiis &xpnoroy amepyd- 
Covra: Td caua trav edevbépwr 7 
Thy Wuxhv 4 Thy BSidvowwy.  Ari- 
stotle agrees with Plato (cf. Ph. d. 


Gr. i. p. 754) in regarding this 
as the effect of trades (u:c@apye- 
kat épyacia) generally ; they leave 
thought unexercised and generate 
low views. These, however, are 
to be found even with the higher 
activities (music, gymnastics, 
&c.) if these are pursued in a one- 
sided way as a vocation. There 
are many things, finally, that a 
man may do for himself or a 
friend, or for some good purpose, 
but not in the service of 
strangers. 

8 viii, 3, 13837, b, 23, 1538, a, 
13 sqq. Jbid.1. 37: among the 
useful arts are many which must 
be learned, not merely for the 
sake of their utility, but also as 
aids to further culture. Such are 
ypaumatixh and ypapinh. The chief 
value of the latter is 67: more? 
Oewpntixdy Tov mepl Ta odpata 
KdAAous. 


POLITICS 265 


their own sake. The former have their end outside of 
themselves in something attained by their means, while 
the latter find it within themselves, in the high and 
satisfying activities which their own exercise affords. 
That the latter are the higher, that they are the only 
truly liberal arts, hardly requires proof in Aristotle’s 
view.! As, moreover, of the two chief branches of 
education among the Greeks—music_and gymnastics— 
the latter is practised more as an aid to soldierly 
efficiency, while the former directly ministers to mental 
culture, it is not wonderful that he should disapprove 
of that one-sided preference for physical training which 
was the basis of the Spartan system of education. He 
remarks that where physical exercise and endurance are 
made so exclusively an object, a ferocity is produced 
which differs widely from true bravery; nor do these 
means suffice for the attainment even of the object 








sought— viz. superiority in 


’ Besides what is said sup. ii. 
p. 141 sqq., on the superiority of 
theory to practice, and, p. 209 sq., 
on peaceful and warlike avoca- 
tions, cf. onthis head vii. 14,1333, 
a, 35 : [avd-ynn] wéAcuoy wey eiphyns 
xdpw, doxoArlay 5 cxodrjs, Ta 3’ 
dvarykaia Kal xphowa tay Kad@v 
évexey. Similarly c. 15, 1334, a, 
14, viii. 3, 1337, b, 28 (on music): 
viv pey yap &s jdovns xdpw oi 
mAcioro peréxovow abrijs* of 8 é€ 
dexiis tratay év maidelq, Sia Td Thy 
pvow abthy Cnreiv . . . uh pdvoy 
aaxorcivy dp0ds GAAG Kal cxorAdCew 
divacOa KadG@s ... €i yap kupw 
mev dei, mGdAdrAov Be aiperdy rd 
oTxoAdCew Tis aoxoAlas, Kal bAws 
(nrnréov ri mowdvras de? oxoAdCew. 
Mere amusement (7aidi2) is not 


war: for since Sparta had 


in itself an end but only a means 
of recreation, and accordingly 
more necessary in aécxoAla than 
in cxoAh. The latter consists in 
the attainment of the end, and 
therefore results immediately in 
pleasure and happiness; the for- 
mer is effort after an end which 
is not yet attained. éore pavepdy 
bri Sef wal mpds thy ev TH Siaywyh 
cxoAhy mavOdvey arta Kal mat- 
SeverOar, Kal radra wey Ta wat- 
Sevuara xal tatras Tas pabhoes 
éavray elvar xdpw, Tas 5é pds Thy 
doxoAlay @s avaryKalas Kal xdpw 
drwy. ... Ste wey tolyuy éorl 
madela tis hy odx as xonolunry 
madevtéovy Tors vieis odd’ as 
dvaykalay, GAN’ ds eAevOépiov Kal 
Kkadhy, pavepdy ear. 


266 ARISTOTLE 


ceased to have a monopoly of gymnastic training, she 
had lost her superiority over other states. Aristotle 
“4 desires, therefore, to see gymnastics duly subordinated 
to the true end of all education, and to prevent the 
more exhausting exercises from being practised before 
the body has acquired sufficient strength and the mind 
has received a counterbalancing bias from other studies.! 
_ Turning to music, by which Aristotle means in the 
first instance music in the narrower sense of the word, 
in which it does not include poetry,” we have to distin- 
guish between several uses to which it may be put. 
It serves for purposes of pleasure and of moral educa- 
tion ; it soothes the spirit,‘ and furnishes an enjoyable 
occupation.’ In the education of youth, however, its 
ethical effect_is the main thing. The young are too 


— 


1 viii. 4, especially 1338, b, 
17: ovre yap év tots &AAos Cwors 
ot’ éml trav eOvwv dpauevy Thy 
dvdplay akodrovbotcay Tots aypiw- 
TdTos, &AAX MaAAOY TOs TuEpw- 
Tépos Kal AcovTddecw HOcow . 
ore Tb Kaddv GAD’ od Td Onpiddes 
del mpwraywvioteiv* ov yap AvKos 
ovdé Tay BAAwy Onpiwy tt aywvri- 
cato by ovféva Kadrdv xlvdvvor, 
GAAG MaAAov avhp ayabds. of SE 
Alay eis Tadra avévres TOvS Taidas, 
kal tov dvarykalwy daraidaywyhtous 
mohocayres, Bavavcous Katepydcov- 
Tat KaTd ye TO GANOEs, mpds Ev TE 
pévov Epyov TH moAiTiKh xpnotwous 
Toinoaytes, Kal mpds TodTo xeEipov, 
és pnow 6 Adyos, érépwr. 

* PLATO, on the other hand, 
in the section of the Rep. upon 
musical education, deals chiefly 
with poetry-its form and content. 
See Ph. d. Gr.i. pp. 773, 779 sq. 

* Polit. viii. 5, 1339, b, 11, ¢ 


7, 1341, b, 36. 

* By the kd@apois which is 
effected, not only by sacred music 
(mMéAn ebopyidovra), but by all 
music; Polit. viii. 1342, a, 4 sqq. 
For the fuller discussion of 
kd@apois, see ch. xv. infra. 

5 Ataywyh. By this word Ari- 
stotle means generally an activity 
which has its end in itself, and 
is therefore necessarily accom- 
panied by pleasure, like every 
activity which is complete in it- 
self (seep. 146sq.sup.). Hethere- 
fore makes a distinction between 
those arts which serve human 
need and those which serve 
Siarywyh (Metaph. i. 1 sq. 981, b, 
17, 982, b, 22), comprehending 
under the latter all kinds of 
enjoyment, both nobler and 
humbler. In this wider sense, 
mere amusements can be classed 
as Siaywyh (as in Hth. iv. 14 init. 


POLITICS 267 


immature to practise it as an independent occupation.! 
It is well adapted, indeed, for amusement and recrea- 
tion, since it affords innocent pleasure; but pleasure 
may not be made an end in learning, and to limit 
music to this would be to assign too low a place to it.? 
_All the more important, on the other hand, is its in- 
fluence upon character. Music more than any other 
art represents moral states and qualities: anger, gen- 
tleness, bravery, modesty, and every variety of virtue, 
vice and passion find here their expression. This repre- 
sentation awakens kindred feelings in the souls of the 
hearers. We accustom ourselves to be pleased or 
pained by certain things, and the feelings which we 
have accustomed ourselves to entertain towards the 
| imitation we are likely to entertain also towards the 
) reality in life. But virtue consists just in this: in 








feeling pleasure in what is good, pain in what is bad. 
___Music, therefore, is one of the most important means of 
education,.all the more so because its effect upon the 


x. 6, 1176, b, 12 sqq.; Polit. viii. 


b, 40, he distinguishes the appli- 
5, 1339, b, 22). In the narrower 


cation of music to purposes of 


sense, however, Aristotle uses 
this expression for the higher 
activities of the kind indicated 
(Siaywyh eArevdépios, Polit. viii. 5, 
1339, b, 5). Accordingly he calls, 
Eth. ix. 11, 1171, b, 12, the 
society of friends, or Metaph. xii. 
7 (p. 398, n. 5, supra), Eth. x. 7, 
1177, a, 25, the active thought of 
the divine and the human spirit 
diaywyh. In Polit. vii. 15, 1334, a, 
16, in the discussion touched 
upon on p. 209 sq., he mentions 
7X0A} and diaywyh together, and 
in the before us, c. 5, 
1339, a, 25, 29, b, 13, c. 7, 1341, 


madi and dvdravois from that 
mpos Siaywyhvy Kal mpds ppdvncw, 
saying (1339, b, 17) of the latter 
that 7d kaddy and fdorv} are united 
init. Cf. BoniTz, Arist. Metaph. 
ii. 45; Ind. Ar. 178, a, 33; 
SCHWEGLER, Arist. Metaph. iii. 
19 sq. 

' viii. 5, 1339, a, 29: they 
have no claim to d:iaywyh: odfer) 
yap areAe? moore: TEAS, 

* Ibid. 1339, a, 26-41, b, 14— 
31, 42 sqq. 

* axpodpmevar TOY wimhoewr yly- 
voyTat wdyTes cuumrabeis. 


268 ARISTOTLE 


young is in no small degree strengthened by the plea- 
sure that accompanies it.! ‘These considerations de- 
termine the rules which Aristotle lays down for musical 
instruction. It cannot, indeed, be separated from actual 
practice, without which no true understanding of music 
can be arrived at; but since the aim of musical educa- 
f tion is not the practice of the art itself, but only the 
cultivation of the musical taste, the former must be 
confined to the period of apprenticeship, seeing that it 
does not become a man to be a musician. Even in the 
case of children the line must not be crossed which separ- 
ates the connoisseur from the professional artist.2 To 
the latter, music is a trade which ministers to the taste 
of the uneducated masses ; so it is the occupation of an 
artisan, enfeebling to the body and degrading to the 
ymind. Tothe freeman, on the other hand, it is a means 
) of culture and education.? The choice of the instru- 
/-ments and melodies to be used for purposes of instruc- 
} tion will be made with this end in view. Besides, how- 
ever, the quiet and simple music which alone he would 
permit his citizens to practise, Aristotle authorises for 
public occasions a more exciting and artificial style, 
which may be either earnest and purifying for those 
who have received a liberal education, or of a less chaste 
description for the recreation of the lower classes and 
slaves.‘ 4 


" Ibid. 1339, a, 21 sqq. 1340, 38 ray &ydvwr eis Thy waidelay. c. 
a, 7-b, 19. 6, 1341, a, 10. 

* Aristotle deprecates in gen- 8 viii. 6, 1340, b-20, 1841, 
eral education t& mpds ods a, 17, 1341, b, 8-18, c. 5, 1339, b, 
ayavas Tous Texvixods cuyrelvorta, 8. 

Ta Oavudos Kad WEepiTTda TaY Epywr, 1 Thid. c. 6, 1341, a-b, 8, c. 7. 
& viv €AfjAvOer cis Tobs &yavas, ex 





POLITICS 269 

With these remarks the Politics ends, leaving even 
the discussion of music unfinished.' It is inconceivable, 
however, that Aristotle intended to conclude here his 
treatise upon education. With so keen a sense of the 
importance of music as an element in education, and 
with Plato’s example before him, it is impossible that 
he should have overlooked that of poetry ; and, indeed, 
he betrays his intention of discussing it in his proposal 
to treat ‘subsequently ’ of comedy.? It is also most 
improbable that a man like Aristotle, who regarded the 
scientific activity as the highest of all, and as the most 
essential element in happiness, and who considered 
political science of such vital importance as an element 
in social life,? should have passed over in silence the whole 
subject of scientific training.* Nor could he have desired 
to entrust it to private effort, for he says that the whole of 
education must be public. Aristotle himself repeatedly 
indicates that after ethical, he intends to discuss intel- 
lectual culture.® He promises, moreover, to return to 


1 For after viii. 7 init. we 


therefore be the goal and one of 
should have had a discussion of 


the most essential elements of 


rhythm; cf. HILDENBRAND, ibid. 
p. 453 (as opposed to NICKEs, 
De Arist. Polit. Libr. p. 93). 

2 vii. 17, 1336, b, 20: rods 8é 
vewrépous obr’ iduBwv otre Kwpy- 
dias Oearas vopobernT fov Re 
borepoy 8 emorhoavras Set dioploa 

ov, 

% See Zth. x. 10, 1180, a, 32, 
b, 20 sqq. 

4 It is the question of the 
education of the citizens that 
leads to the statement, Polit. vii. 
14, 1333, b, 16 sqq., that theoretic 
activity is the highest and the 
aim of all the others. It must 


education in the best state. 

5 Polit. vii. 15, 1334, b, 8: 
Acumdy 5 Oewpioat wérepoy mat- 
Sevréor TH Adyp mpdtepoy 7 Tors 
feow. Taira yap dei rpds KAANAG 
cuppwveivy cunpwvlay thy aplorny. 
The answer is, that moral educa- 
tion must precede (see p. 261, 
supra); by which it is implied 
that a section on scientific edu- 
cation will follow. Several de- 
partments are spoken of, viii. 3, 
1338, a, 30 sqq., as belonging to 
a liberal education, and it is pre- 
scribed, viii. 4, 1339, a, 4, that. 
after entering upon manhood 


270 


ARISTOTLE 


the life of the family and to female education (to which 
he attaches the greatest importance, and the neglect 
of which he severely censures), and to discuss these at 
greater length in connection with the various forms of 
constitution ;' in the text, however, as we have it, this 


promise is not fulfilled.? 


He further speaks of punish- 


ment as a means of education,® and we should accord- 


young people should receive 
preliminary instruction for the 
space of three years in the other 
departments (ua@qjuatra) before 
the more exhausting exercise in 
gymnastics begins, as the two are 
incompatible—physical exhaus- 
tion being inimical to thought 
(S:dvoiw)—so that a place should 
here be assigned to the discussion 
of scientific instruction. 

1 Polit. i. 13, 1260, b, 8: epi 
dé avdpds Kal yuvaiukds Kal Téxvev 
kal marpos, THs Te wept Exacror 
avtav adperis, kal Tis mpos spas 
avrovs dutAlas, TE TS KaA@S Kal wh 
KaA@s éorl, kal mas Sei 7d pev cb 
Sidkew Td 5€ Kakds Hever, ev Tois 
wep Tas toditelas dvaryKatov émed- 
ety: eel yap oikia wey maou mépos 
méAews, Tadta 8 oiklas, Thy 5é Tov 
Mépouvs mpos thy Tov bAov det 
BAérewy apeThy, avaykatov mpos Thy 
mwoAtrelay BA€movras madeverw Kal 
Tovs Taidas Kal Tas yuvatkas, elrep 
Tt diapéper mpds Td Thy wéaw elvau 
omovdaiay kal rods maidas elvat 
omovdalovs Kal Tas yuvaikas orov- 
Salas. dvaykaioy 5¢ Siapépew> ai 
Mev yap ‘yuvaikes hutocv mépos TOY 
eAevbepwv, ex 5& tTav maldwy of 
Kowwvot yivovrat Tis moArrelas. 
Cf. ii. 9, 1269, b, 17: év Beats 
modttelais pavrAws exer Td wepl Tas 
yuvaikas, To fuiov THs méAews 
elvat Se? voulCew dvouobérnror. 
BRANDIS, ii. b, 1673, A, 769. ° 


? For we cannot regard the 
occasional allusions which we 
find in ii. 6, 7, 9 as such a fulfil- 
ment. 

8’ The measure of punishment 
has already been found (see end of 
last chap.) in the principle of 
corrective justice, according to 
which each must suffer loss in 
proportion to the advantage 
which he has unjustly usurped. 
The aim of punishment, on the 
other hand, according to Ari- 
stotle, who here agrees with Plato 
(Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 744) is chiefly to 
improve the culprit and deter 
him from further wrong-doing, 
but partly also,in so far as he is 
himself incurable, to protect 
society against him. Cf. Rhet. 
i. 10, 1269, b, 12: Siapépea dé 
tiywpla Kal KéAaois* H mey yap 
KéAacts TOU mda xXovTos Evekd eoTLy, 
n 5& rTiywpia Tov motodyTos, tva 
arorAnpwOf. Hth. ii. 2; see p. 157, 
n. 5, swp. Ibid. x. 10,1179, b, 28: 
he who lives by passion cannot be 
improved by mere exhortation ; 
daws 7’ ov BSoxel Ady bwelkew 7d 
mwdbos GAA Bia. Ibid. 1180, a, 4 (cf. 
p- 271, n. 4, infra): the better kind 
of men, say some [4.e. Plato—but 
Aristotle himself is clearly of the 
same opinion], must be admon- 
ished, dmeiBodor 5é Kal apverrépois 
ovat KoAdoets TE Kal Timwplas ém- 
Tibévat, Tovs 8’ avidrous BAws eé- 








POLITICS 271 


ingly have expected a full discussion of its aims and 
application, with at least a sketch of the outlines of a 
system of penal justice ; but in the Politics, as we have it, 
thissubject is not touched upon. Similarly, questions of 
public economy,! of the treatment of slaves,? and of drink- 
ing habits? though proposed for discussion, are left 
untouched; and generally it may be said the whole 
question of the regulation of the life of adult citizens is 
passed over in silence, although it is impossible to doubt 
that Aristotle regarded this as one of the chief problems 
of political science, and that, like Plato, he intended 
that education should be continued as a principle of moral 


guidance throughout the whole of life.‘ 


The same is 


true, as already remarked, of the whole question of 
legislation : ifthe Politics gives us little light on this 


opi(ew* roy pey yap emeny Kad 
mpos Td Kaddy (avTa TE Adyw meid- 
apxnoew, toy 5& avaAov 7dovijs 
dpeyduevoy Abwy KorAd(ecOa Sowep 
trogiywv. Ibid. iii. 7, 1113, b, 
23: KoAd(ovar yap kal Tiuwpovyra 
Tovs Spavras moxOnpa... tos de 
7&4 KaAa mpdrroyvras Tiu@ow, ws 
Tovs pky mporpévoytes, rods 5t 
kwAvoovres, The aim, therefore, 
of punishment, unless we have to 
do with an incurable offender, is 
improvement: in the first in- 
stance, however, only that im- 
provement of conduct which 
springs from the fear of punish- 
ment, not that more fundamental 
one of the inclinations which is 
effected in nobler natures by in- 
struction and admonition: im- 
provement, therefore, only in the 
sense in which it corresponds to 
the determent of the offender. 


Cf, HILDENBRAND, ibid. 299 sqq. 
1 wept xthoews Kal Tis wepl Thy 
ovalay evmoplas mas det Kal riva 
tpémov éxew mpds thy xpiow 
airhy. vii. 5, 1326, b, 32 sqq. 

2 vii. 10 fin. 

8 vii, 17, 1336, b, 24, where 
the reference to the subsequent 
discussions does not apply to 
comedy alone. 

* Besides Polit. vii. 12, 1331, 
a, 35 sqq. c. 17, 1336, b, 8 sqq. ef. 
especially Hth. x. 10, 1180, a, 1: 
ovx ikxavby 8 tows véous byras 
Tpopijs kal érimedrcias Tuxeiv dp0ijs, 
GAN’ eweidh Kal avdpwlévras Sez 
émitndever alta kal e0ier@at, kal 
wept Tatra Seolued’ by vouwy Kal 
SAws wep) mdvta tov Biov~ of yap 
mwohAol dydykn pmaddAovy h Adyp 
meWapxovo. Kal (nulas rE 
KaA@. 


272 ; ARISTOTLE 


head, we must throw the blame, not upon Aristotle but 
upon the incomplete condition of the work. 

In the completed work we should also have had a 
more detailed account of the constitution of the Best - 
State. In the text before us we find only two of its 
characteristics described—namely. the conditions of its 
citizenship, and the division in it of political power. In 
reference to the former of these, Aristotle, like Plato, 
with a truly Greek contempt for physical labour, would 
make not only handicraft but also agriculture a dis- 
qualification for citizenship in the most perfect state. 
For the citizen of such a state can only be one who 
possesses all the attributes of a capable man; but in 
order to acquire these, and to devote himself to the 
service of the state, he requires a leisure and freedom 
from the lower avocations which is impossible to the 
husbandman, the artisan, and the labourer. Such 
occupations, therefore, must in the Best State be left to 
slaves and metceci. The citizens must direct all their 
energy to the defence and administration of the state ; 
they alone, moreover, are to be the possessors of landed 
estates, since the national property belongs only to the 
citizens.! On the other hand, all citizens must take 
part in the direction of the commonwealth. This, accord- 
ing to Aristotle, is demanded equally by justice and 
necessity ; since those who stand on a footing of essen- 
tial equality must have equal rights, and those who 
possess the power will not permit themselves to be 
excluded from the government.? But since the actual 

' vil. 9,1328, b, 24 sqq. similar dispositions have been 


1329, a, 17-26,35, c. 10, 1329, b, touched upon. Cf. p. 299, n. 4, sup. 
36, after the Egyptian and other * Wi. 9, 1829, a, 9; epee, 


ee 


ime, 





POLITICS 273 


administration cannot consist of the whole mass of the 
citizens, since there must be a difference between ruler 
and ruled, and since different qualities are demanded in 
the administrator and in the soldier—in the latter 
physical strength, in the former mature insight— 
Aristotle considers it desirable to assign different spheres 
to different ages: military service to the young, the 
duties of government, including the priestly offices, to 
the elders; and while thus offering to all a share in the 
administration, to entrust actual power only to those 
who are more advanced in life.! Such is Aristotle's 
account of Aristocracy.2 In its fundamental concep- 
tion as the rule of virtue and culture, it is closely 
related to Plato's, from which, however, it widely differs 





in detail ; 


although even here the difference is one 


rather of social than of strictly political organisation. 


1332, a, 34: tiv be wdvres of 


Tire weréxovot THs modrrelas. 


3. 14, 1832, b, 12-32. 

1 vii. 9, 1329, a, 2-17, 27-34, 
c. 14, 1332, b, 32-1333, b, 11. 

wiv. 7, 1298, b, 1: aipioro- 
Kpariav pey ody Karas exer Kaheiy 
wept fs SihrAPowev ev Trois mpwros 
Adyos * Thy yap éx trav aplotwy 
&mAG@s Kar’ Gpethy modutelav, Kal 
uh mpds dbrddecly twa ayabav 
avbpav [cf. viii. 9, 1328, b, 37], 
pévnv dikawoyv mpocayopevew apt- 
oroxpariay. Cf. c. 2, 1289, a, 31. 
Quite consistent with this is the 
definition of aristocracy, iii. 1, 
1279, a, 34 (see p. 237, supra), as 


‘the rule ta@y bAlywv wey wAcidvor 


8 évds in the interest of the 
common good, for, in the first 


VOL, Ll. 


place, Aristotle is there speaking 
only of common usage (KaAeiy 3’ 
ciébauev), giving it at the same 
time as the sole ground of its 
right to the title that it is the 
rule of the best for the common 
good; and, secondly, in the per- 
fect State it is always actually 
a minority who rule. There is 
therefore no ground for distin- 
guishing between the aristocracy 
mentioned in iii. 7 from that 
which is spoken of under the 
same name in iv. 7 and vii. (see 
FECHNER, Gerechtigheitsbegr. d. 
Arist. p. 92, n.). Still less can 
iii. 17 (p. 239, n. 1, supra) be cited 
in support of this distinction, 
inasmuch as it exactly suits the 
ideal State. 


274 ARISTOTLE 


6. Imperfect Forms of Constitution 


Besides the best constitution, there are others which, 
deviating from it in different ways and different degrees,! 
also call for discussion. All these, indeed, in so far as 
they differ from the ideal state, must be reckoned 
defective ;? but this does not prevent them from having 
a certain conditional justification in given circumstances 
or form, differing from one another in the degree of 
their relative worth and stability. Aristotle enumerates, 
as we have already seen,* three chief forms of imperfect 
constitution: Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny; to which 
as he proceeds he afterwards adds as a fourth, Polity, 
together with several mixed forms which are akin to it. 

Democracy is based upon civil equality and freedom. 
In order that the citizens may be equal, they must all 
have an equal right to share in the government; the 
community, therefore, must be autocratic, and a majority 
must decide. In order that the citizens may be free, on 
the other hand, everyone must have liberty to live as he 
pleases; no one, therefore, has the right to command 
another, or, so far as this is unavoidable, command, like © 
obedience, must belong to all. All institutions, there- 
fore, are democratic which are based upon the principles 
that election to the offices of state should be made 


1 See p. 235 sq. supra. 

* Cf. the passages which are 
cited p. 238, n. 1, swpra, especially 
Polit. iv. 2, 1289, b, 6: Plato says, 
if the oligarchy &c. be good, the 
democratic form of constitution 
is the worst, whereas if they are 
bad, it is the best. jets 5¢ SAws 
Tabras eknuaptrnuévas elva! paper, 


Kal Bedrioo Mev Odryapxtay &dAnv 
uAAns ov KaAGs ExeEL A€yew, Frrov 
dé mavAnv. The imperfect forms 
of constitution are usually called. 
mapexBdoes. 

3 P, 237 sqq. 

* vi. 2, 1317, a, 40-b, 


16, 
inter alia; see p. 239 sq. 


ee Sy ee 








POLITICS 275 


either by universal suffrage, by lot, or by rotation ; that 


no property qualification, or only an inconsiderable one, 


be attached to them; that their duration or their powers 
be limited; that all share in the administration of 
justice, especially in the more important cases; that 
the competence of the popular assembly be extended, 


‘that of the executive restricted, as much as possible ; 


that all magistrates, judges, senators, and. priests be 
paid. The senate is a democratic institution. When its 
functions are merged in those of the popular assembly, 
the government is more democratic still. Low origin, 
poverty, want of education, are considered to be demo- 
cratic qualities.'! But as these characteristics may be 
found in different degrees in different states, as more- 
over a particular state may exhibit all or only some of 
them, different forms of democracy arise.? As these 
variations will themselves chiefly depend, according to 
Aristotle, upon the occupation and manner of life of 


the people, it is of the highest political importance 
-whether the population consists of peasants, artisans, 


or traders, or of one of the various classes of seamen, 
or of poor day-labourers, or of people without the 
full rights of citizenship, or whether and’ in what 
manner these elements are combined in it.* A popula- 
tion engaged in agriculture or in cattle-breeding is in 


1 Thid. 1317, b, 16-1318, a, 


8, iv. 15, 1300, a, 31. 


2 vi. 1, 1317, a. 22, 29 sqq. 
8 ivy. 4, 1291, b, 15 sqq. c. 6 
init. c. 12 (see p. 248, n. 1, supra), 


‘vi. 7 init. c. 1, 1317, a, 22 sqq. In 
. the. latter passage both grounds 


of the difference in democratic 


VOL. HU. 


constitutions—the character of 
the population,and the extent to 
which the institutions are demo- 
cratic—are mentioned side by 
side. From other passages, how- 
ever, it is evident that Aristotle 
regards the second of these as 
dependent upon the first. 


*7r2Q 


276 ARISTOTLE 


general content if it can devote itself to its work in 
peace. It is satisfied, therefore, with a moderate share 
in the administration : as, for example, the choice of the 
magistrates, their responsibility to itself, and the par- 
ticipation of all in the administration of justice. For 
the rest, it will like to leave its business in the hands 
of sensible men. This is the most orderly form of 
democracy. A community of artisans, traders, and 
labourers is a much more troublesome body to deal 
with. Their employments act more prejudicially upon 
the character, and being closely packed together in the 
city they are always ready to meet for deliberation in 
public assemblies. If all without exception possess the 
full rights of citizenship ; if those who are not freeborn 
citizens are admitted to the franchise; if the old tribal 
and communal bonds are dissolved and the different 
elements in the population massed indiscriminately 
together ; if the force of custom is relaxed and the 
control over women, children, and slaves is weakened, 
there necessarily arises that unregulated form of demo- 
cracy which, as licence has always more attraction for 
them than order, is so dear to the masses.’ In this 
way there arise different forms of democracy, of which 
Aristotle enumerates four.? The first is that in which 
actual equality reigns, and in which, while no exclusive 


1 Polit. vi. 4 (where, how- 
ever, 1318, b, 13, my must be 
struck out); cf. iv. 12, 1296, b, 
24 sqq. 

2 iv. 4, 1291, b, 30 saqq: co, 4, 
cf. c. 12, tbid., vi. 4, 1318, b, 6, 
1319, a, 38. A fifth form seems, 
iv. 4, 1291, b, 39, to be inserted 
between the first and the second ; 


its peculiarity, however, accord- 
ing to this passage, Td Tas apxas 
amd Tyunudtrwy eivat, according to 
iv. 6 init. is rather a character- 
istic of the first form. With 
SUSEMIHL and others, it will 
therefore be better to omit &AAo 
dé in the passage referred to, Cf. 
HENKEL, ibid. p. 82. 


POLITICS 277 


influence is conceded either to rich or poor, a certain 
property qualification—although a small one—is at- 
tached to the public offices. The second form is that in 
which no condition is attached to eligibility for office be- 
yond citizenship and irreproachable character. A third 
is that in which, while the public offices belong by right 
to every citizen, the government is still conducted on 
constitutional principles. The fourth or unlimited 
democracy is, finally, that in which the decrees of the 
people are placed above the laws ; in which the people, 
led by demagogues, as a tyrant by his courtiers, becomes 
a despot, and in which all constitutional order dis- 
appears in the absolute power of the many-headed 
sovereign. ' 

Oligarchy consists, as we already know, in the rule 
of the propertied classes. But here, also, we find a 
progress from more moderate forms to absolute, un- 
limited oligarchy. The mildest is that in which, while 
a property qualification sufficient to exclude the mass 
of poorer citizens from the exercise of political rights is 
demanded, the franchise is yet freely conceded to all 
who possess the requisite amount. ‘The second form is 
that in which the government is originally in the pos- 
session only of the richest, who fill up their own ranks by 
co-optation, either from the whole body of the citizens 
or from a certain class. The third is that in which 
political power descends from father to son. ‘I'he fourth, 
finally, as a parallel to tyranny and unlimited demo- 

1 With the account of this Rey. viii. 557 A sqq. 562 B sqq. 
form of democracy, ibid. 1292, a, vi. 493, with the spirit of which 


4 sqq. v. 11, 1313, b, 32 sqq. vi. it has obviously much incommon. 
2, 1317, b, 13 sqq., cf. PLATO'S 


278 ARISTOTLE 
cracy, is that in which hereditary power is limited by 
no laws.’ Aristotle, however, here remarks, in terms 
that would apply equally to all forms of government, 
that the spirit of the administration is not unfrequently 
at variance with the legal form of the constitution, and 
that this is especially the case when a change in the 
constitution is imminent.? In this way there arise 
mixed forms of constitution ; these, however, are just 
as often the result of the conscious effort to avoid the 
one-sidedness of democracy and oligarchy, as is the case 
with ‘ aristocracy ’ commonly so called and with polity. 

Although the name aristocracy : belongs, strictly 
speaking, only to the best form of constitution, Ari- 
stotle yet permits it to be applied to those forms also 
which, while they do not, like the former, make the 
virtue of the whole body of the citizens their chief aim, 
yet in electing to public office look, not to wealth only, 
but also ‘to capacity. This kind of aristocracy, there- 
fore, is a mixed form of government in which olig- 
archical, democratic, and genuinely aristocratic elements 
are all combined.* To this form ‘polity’ is closely allied.‘ 


! Polit. iv. 5, 

2 Ibid. 1292, b,. 11. 

® So iv. 7, where Aristotle goes 
on to enumerate three kinds of 
aristocracy in this sense: mov 
moAtTela BaAére: els Te TAovTov Kal 
aperiy kal dijuor, ofoy év Kapynddut 
... mal év ais eis ra 500 udvor ofov 
h Aakedamoviov eis aperhy re kad 
Sjmov, Kal gore pléis trav dvo 
TovTwyv, Snuokparlas re Kal dperns 
+... Kal tpitoy Scat Tis Kadouué- 
vys ™odirelas férovo. mpds_ thy 
oAvyapxlay maAdrov. 


v. 7, 13807, a, ~ 


7: Gpxh yap [rijs MeTaBoAjs] rd 
wh peuixOar Karas ey wy Tf 
moAtelg Snuoxparlay Kal déAvy- 
apxiay, ev 5 rij &pioroKparia radrd 
Te Kal Thy dperhv, uddAora dé Ta 
dv0* Aéyw BE Ta Bo Shor Kal 
dAryapxiay* Tadra yap al modrreial 
TE TEpavTat uvyvivat Kal ai meAAal 
THY KadroULevwY apioToKpAaTIOV ... 
Tas yap &rokAwoioas maAAov mpds 
Thy dAvyapxlay. dpioroKparias Ka- 
Aovow, Tas 5& mpds T) TAHRVOS TOAL- 
Telas. 

-* See. preceding note, and iv. 


Po eS 


POLITICS 279 


Aristotle here describes it as a mixture of oligarchy and 
democracy.! It rests on a proper proportion between 
rich and poor;? it is the result of the union in one 
form or another of oligarchic and democratic institu- 
tions;* and accordingly it may be classed equally, 
in so far as this union is of the right sort, as a demo- 
cracy and as an oligarchy.‘ Its leading feature is, in a 
word, the reconciliation of the antagonism between rich 
and poor and their respective governments. Where the 
problem is solved, and the proper mean is discovered 
between one-sided forms of government, there must 
result a universal contentment with existing institutions, 
and as a consequence fixity and permanence in the con- 


11, 1295, a, 31: Kal yap &s Kadov- 
aw dpictoKpatias, wep) ay viv 
elrouev, TA pty eEwrépw mimrovor 
rais wAclorais Tav méAcwy, TA 5E 
yerTviaot TH Kadoupévy morrrela 
Bid wept duoiv as wias Aexréov. 

1 iv. 8, 1293, b, 33: €or: yap 
h mwoditela Gs amda@s eimeiv pigs 
dAvyapxias kal Snuoxpatias, cidbacr 
bt Kadeiy Tas wey GroKxAwwobcas as 
apos Thy Snuoxpariay wodrrelas, Tas 
Bt mpds Thy dAvyapxiay paddov 
apirroxparias. Cf. preceding note. 

2 Ibid. 1294, a, 19: émel 8e 
tpla éort td dupicByrovyTa Tis 
iaédrnros tis modrrelas, éAcvdepia 


mdodros dperh, ... pavepdy Sri Thy 


mtv tow dvow pli, Tay ebrdpwy 
Kal tay ardépwy, modrrelay AEKTéov, 
Thy 8 Tay Tpi@y apioToKpariay 
udAkicra «Tay BAAwy mapa Ty 
GAnOwhv Kal mporny. See p. 278, 
n. 3, supra. 

% iv. 9: in order to obtain a 
‘ polity’ we must fix our attention 
on the institutions which are 
peculiar to democracy and olig- 
archy, elra é« tovTwy ag’ éxarépas 


éamep ciuBodrov [on this expres- 
sion, cf. inter alia, Gen. An. i. 
18, 722, b, 11; PLATO, Symp. 
191 D] AauBdvovras cuvberéov. 
This may be effected in three 
ways: (1) by simply uniting dif- 
ferent institutions in each: ¢.9. 
the oligarchical custom of punish- 
ing the rich if they refuse to take 
part in court business, with the 
democratic custom of ‘paying 
poor men a day’s wage for appear- 
ing in court; (2) by a compro- 
mise: e.g. by making neither a 
high nor a low but a moderate 
property qualification a condition 
of admission to the popularassem- 
bly ; (3) by borrowing one of two 
kindred institutions from olig- 
archy, another from democracy : 
e.g.from the former, appointment 
to office by election instead of by 
lot; from the latter, the abolition 
of all property qualifications. 

4 Thid, 1295, b, 14 sqq., where 
this is shown more fully from the 
example of the Spartan constitu- 
tion, 


280 ARISTOTLE 


stitution as a whole.' Hence polity is the form of 
government which promises to be the most enduring, 
and is the best adapted for most states. For if we 
leave out of consideration the most perfect constitution, 
and the virtue and culture which render it possible, and 
ask which is the most desirable,? only one answer is 
possible: that in which the disadvantages of one-sided 
forms of government are avoided by combining them,? 
and in which neither the poor nor the rich part of the 
population, but the prosperous middle class, has the 
decisive voice.‘ But this is exactly what we find in 
polity. lt exhibits the antagonistic forces of rich and 
poor in equilibrium, and must itself, therefore, rest on 
the class which stands between them. It is the inter- 
mediate form of constitution,? that which is more 
favourable than any other to common well-being and 
universal justice,® and presupposes the preponderance 


1 Thid. 1.34: 56? 8 év rh woa- 
Tela TH MEMLYMEVN KAaAds aupdrepa 
Soxeiy elvan kal undérepoy, kat odCe- 
cba 50’ abrijs Kal uh eEwOev, rat 81’ 
atTis myn Te wAelous ekwley elvau 
tous BovAouevous [not by the fact 
that the majority of those who 
wish another form of constitution 
are excluded from participation 
in State management] (ef yap dy 
kal movnp& moArreig TOVO brdpxov) 
GAAG TE nd’ by BodAcoOa moAL- 
Tela érépay undivy Tay THs wéAEws 
Loplwy BrAws. 

2 Cf. iv. 11 tnit.: tis 8 apiorn 
mokiteia Kat tis &pioros Bios tais 
twAclorais wéAeot Kad Tols TAEloTOLS 
Tav avOpdrwv pnre mpos aperhy 
ovykplvover Thy bmép rods ididTas, 
MATE mpds madelay  picews Seirat 
kal xopnylas tuxnpas, whre mpos 


TOALTELaY THY KAT EvXHY ywoueyny, 
GAAG Blov re Tov Tots mAeloTols 
kowwvjnoa Suvaroy Kal moditelay js 
Tas mAeloras méAeis évdéxerat 
hetacxeiv. To this question (with 
which cf. p. 235) the answer is 
then given as in the text. 

3 iv. 11, 1297, a, 6: b0@ 8 ay 
&mewov 7 worrtela mx0f, rocovTw 
poviuwrépa, Cf. v. 1, 1302, a, 2 sqq. 

* v. 11; seep. 248, n.1, supra. 

5 wéon modirela, iv. 11, 1296, 
a, 37. 

§ iv. 11, 1296, a 22: why is 
the best constitution, that which 
is intermediate between olig- 
archy and democracy, so rare ? 
Because in most cities the middle 
class (Td mécov) is too weak; 
because in the wars between 
parties the victors established no 


POLITICS 281 


of the middle class over each of the other two.' The 
more any one of the other forms of constitution approxi- 
mates to this the better it will be, the more widely it 
differs from it—if we leave out of account the circum- 
stances which may give it a relative value in a particular 
case—the worse.? And as virtue consists in preserving 
the proper mean, it may be said that polity corresponds 
more closely than any other form of government to the 
life of virtue in the state;* and accordingly we shall 
be quite consistent in classing it among good constitu- 
tions, and in representing it as based upon the diffusion 
among all classes of a definite measure of civic virtue.‘ 
If, further, this virtue be sought for pre-eminently in 
military capacity, and polity be defined as the govern- 


mokitela Kkowh Ka ton; because in 
like manner in the contest for the 
hegemony of Greece one party 
favoured democracy, the other 
oligarchy, and because men are 
accustomed unde BobAcobat Td too 
GAA’ } Upxeww Cnreiv 2) Kparouévous 
brouevery, Speaking of the influ- 
ence tay év iyeuovia yevouévwr 
THs “EAAddos, Aristotle here re- 
marks, 1, 39: for these reasons 
the péon modrrela is either never 
found or éAvydxis Kal map’ dAlyois - 
eis yap avhp cuvereicOn udvos Tay 
mporepov ed’ iyyeuovia yevouevwy 
Tatrny amodovva thy trdéw. The 
eis avhp was formerly taken to be 
Lycurgus ; others have suggested 
Theseus (SCHNEIDER, ii. 486 of 
his edition; SPENGEL, Arist. 
Stud. iii. 50), Solon (HENKEL, 
ibid. 89, SUSEMIHL, in Bursian’s 
Jahresbericht for 1875, p. 376 sq.) 


and others. It cannot be said of ' 
any of these, however, that the | 
hegemony of Hellas was in his i 





hands. ONCKEN, on the other 
hand, Staatsl. d. Arist. ii. 269, 
refers the passage to Philip of 
Macedon; but while he certainly 
left each state its own constitu- 
tion in the treaty of 338, it is not 
known that he anywhere intro- 
duced (&rodovva) or restored the 
uéon modurela, Can the reference 
be, to Epaminondas and the com- 
munities of Megalopolis and Mes- 
sene which were founded by him? 

' iv. 12; see p. 248,n. 1, supra. 

2 Ibid. 1296, b, 2 sq. 

8 Cf. Polit. iv. 11, 1295, a, 35: 
ei yap Kad@s ev Tots HOucois elpnra 
Td Tov evdaluova Bloy elva: Toy Kar’ 
aperhy aveumddiorov, peodtyntra de 
Thy apethy, Tov pécoy ayvaryKaioy 
Blov elva: BéArioroy, Tis éExdorois 
evdexouevns Tuxeiv ueadrnros. Tovs 
5 ad’to’s TovTous Spous dvayKaiov 
elvat kal méAews Gperijs Kal caxlas 
kal modirelas* 7 yap moArtela Blos 
tls éort wéAews., 


* See p. 243, n. 1, supra, 


282 ARISTOTLE 


ment of the men able to bear arms,' it may be pointed 
out in support of that view, first, that the only form of 
constitution which will be tolerated bya military popu- 
lation is one founded upon universal freedom and 
equality ;* and, secondly, that the heavy-armed foot- 
soldiers who constituted the main strength of the 
Greek armies belonged chiefly to the well-to-do portion 
of the people.* Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the 
position of polity in Aristotle’s account of it, to which 
attention has already been called in this chapter, cannot 
be said to be either justified or explained away by these 
remarks, — 

The worst of all forms of constitution is Tyranny, 
for in it the best—namely, true monarchy—has been 
transformed into its opposite. In the course of the 
brief discussion which he devotes to it, Aristotle distin- 
guishes three kinds of tyranny, applying the same name, 
not only to absolute despotism, but also to the elective 
monarchy of some barbarous peoples, and to the dicta- 
torship of the old Greek Aisymnetae. True tyranny, 
however, is only to be found in a state where an indi- 
vidual wields absolute power in his own interest and 
against the will of the people.® 


' ili. 7,17; see p. 243, n. 2, sup. 

? On this head, cf. iii. 11, 
1281, b, 28 sq. 

* vi. 7, 1321, a, 12: 7d yap 
OmAitiKdy Tay evTépwy eoTt uaAAOY 
i) Tav ardpwyv. The reason of this 
is to be sought for partly in the 
fact that the equipment of the 
hoplites was expensive, but 
chiefly in the preliminary train- 
ing in gymnastics required by 
the service. Cf. also Polit. iv. 
13, 1297, a, 29 sqq. . 


* iv. 2, 1289, a,-38 sqq. (cf. 
also vii. 1313, a, 34-1314, a, 29). 
On the same principle, according 
to this passage, oligarchy is the 
second worst, as aristocracy is 
the second best, constitution, 
while democracy is the most 
tolerable of the false forms, being 
a perversion of polity. For a 
fuller statement of the sameview, 
see Hth, viii. 12. 

5 Polit. iv. 10; cf, iii. 14, 





POLITICS — 288 


Aristotle next proceeds to examine what division of 
political power is best adapted to each of the different 
kinds of constitution,' distinguishing here three sources 
of authority: the deliberative assemblies, the magi- 
strates, and the law courts.” The functions, however, 
of these three were not so defined as to permit of their 
being completely identified with the legislature, the 
executive, and the judicature of modern political theory.’ 
He does not omit to draw attention here to the tricks 
and sophistries by which the predominant party, in one 
or other form of government, seeks to circumvent its 
opponent and to advance its own interests,‘ making it 
clear, however, that he himself sets small store by such 


av éxdvTwy Karas 


petty and hollow devices.’ 


He further discusses the 


qualities that fit a man for the discharge of the more 


important offices of state. 


He demands for this end 


not merely experience, business capacity, and attach- 
ment to the existing constitution, but before everything 


1285, a, 16-b, 3, and p. 240 sq. 
supra. 

1 iv, 14-16; cf. vi. 2, 1317, 
b, 17-1318, a, 10. 

2 iv. 14, 1297, b, 37: gor: 5 
tpla udpia Tay woAiTElay Tarav, 
mepl dy Set Oewpeiy roy orovdaiov 
vouodérny éxdoTn To oumpépor* 
dvarynn Thy 
modirelay txew Karas, Kal Tas 
mwoditelas GAAHAwY Biapépew ev TH 
Siapépew Exacroy toirwy* ort dé 
Tav Tpiav TovTwy ty wey ti Td 
BovAevouevoy mepl Tay Kowdr, 
devrepov 5& rd wepl ras apxds.. - 
tptrov d& ri 7d dixdCov. 

* Thid. 1298, a, 3, Aristotle 


‘continues: «ipioy 8 éort 7d Bov- 


Aevspevoy wept moAcuou Kal ciphyns 


kal ovupaxtas Kal Siartoews, Kal 
mepl vduwy, kal wept Oavdrov Kai 
guys Kal Synuedoews, nal Tay 
ev0uvav, so that conformably to 
Greek usage the deliberative as- 
sembly, in addition to its legisla- 
tive functions, has important 
judicial and executive duties to 
perform. 

4 "Oca mpopdoews xdpw ev Tais 
moArtelais copl(ovra: mpds tov 57- 
pov, the dAvyapxixda coplopata tijs 
vouobecias, and on the other hand 
& év rats Snuoxpariais mpds Tair’ 
avricoplCovra, iv, 13. 

5 y, 2, 1307, b, 40, he advises: 
ph morevew Tos coplouaros xdpiv 
mpos To wAOos ouyKemmévois* ef- 
eAdéyxetat yap brd tay Epywr: 


284 ARISTOTLE 


else that kind of culture and character which is in 
harmony with the spirit of the constitution.! He passes 
in review the various offices of state,? leaving off at the 
point where we should naturally have expected that 
portion of the missing discussion of the laws which 
relate to public offices. He treats with especial care, 
however, the causes which produce change and dissolu- 
tion in particular forms of constitution® and the means 
to counteract them.4 Here, also, he is true to his 
method of specifying as fully as possible, as the result 
of wide observation and reflection, all the various causes 
which are at work and the nature of their effects; 
and accordingly he challenges the conclusions of Plato’s 
Republic on the subject of the revolutions in states. and 
their causes, with justice indeed, in so far as his theory 
of politics is in stricter accordance with facts, but at 
the same time not without a certain misunderstanding 
of their true character.> This whole section is excep- 
tionally rich in examples of acute observation, sound 
judgment, and profound knowledge of the world; it 
is impossible, however, to do more here than mention a 
few of the chief points of interest. ‘T'wo of these stand 
out in special prominence. In the first place, he warns 
us against under-estimating small deviations from the 
status quo, or insignificant occasions of party strife. 
Important though the objects for which parties contend 
usually are, the actual outbreak of hostilities may be 


1 vy. 9, where the third com- ay, S. 
monly neglected pointof the aper?) Biv 17,10. 
Kal Sicascocdyvn év exdorn modelo tev, 85-95 Vly vi BT. 
h mpos Thy moAtelav is discussed Vin 12, 1315, a, 40 sqq.; cf. 


with especial fullness. Cf.p.286, ZELLER, Platon. Stud, 206 sq. 
n. 3, infra. 


POLITICS 285 


occasioned by the pettiest of causes,' and small as the 
change in a government may be at first, yet this may 
be itself the cause of a greater, and so there may 
gradually come about from small beginnings a complete 
revolution in the whole.? Secondly, we have the prin- 
ciple which constitutes one of the leading thoughts in 
Aristotle’s Politics, and is not the least of the many 
proofs of political insight exhibited in the work— 
namely, that every form of government brings ruin on 
itself by its own excess, and that moderation in the use 
of authority, justice to all, good administration and 
moral capacity are the best means of retaining power. 
Democracies are ruined by demagogy and by injustice 
towards the prosperous classes; oligarchies, by oppres- 
sion of the people and by the limitation of political 
rights to too small a minority ; monarchies by arrogance 
and outrage in the rulers.* He who desires the main- 
tenance of any particular form of government must 
endeavour above everything to keep it within the limits 
of moderation, aud prevent it from courting its own 
destruction by any one-sided insistence on the principle 
of its constitution; he must endeavour to reconcile con- 


Uv. 4 init.: yiyvovra pey obv 
ai ordoes ov wep) miKpa@v GAX’ 
€x mikpav, aotacid(ovor 5& epi 
meydAwy. wdAtora 5é Kal ai uixpad 
isxvovow, S8rav év ois xuplos 
yevovTa. .. ev dpxt yap ylyverat 
T> audprnua, i 8° apxh A€yerat 
hywsov elvat mayrds &c.; in support 
of which there follows a rich 
collection of examples. 

2 v. 7, 1307, a, 40 sqq. c. 3, 
1303, a, 20. 

* v. 5, c. 6 init., ibid. 1305, b, 
2, 1306, a, 12, c. 10, 1311 a, 22 


sqq. These are not the only 
causes of their ruin, according to 
Aristotle, but they are among 
the most frequent and important. 

* v. 9, 1309, b, 18: wapa mdvra 
bt ravra Sei uh AavOdvey, d vov 
AavOdve: Tas mapexBeBnxvuias o- 
Aurelas, Td wéoov* TOAAG yap Tay 
Soxovytwy Snuotikay Aver Tas Snuo- 
kpatias Kal tay dAvyapxikay ras 
ddAvyapxlas, as is well shown in 
what follows. Cf. vi. 5, 1320, a, 
2 saq. 


286 ARISTOTLE 


flicting factions ; he must counterbalance the prepon- 
derance of one by assigning corresponding influence 
to the other, and so preserve the former from excess.! 
Above all, he must be careful to prevent the public 
offices from being worked for selfish ends, or one portion 
of the people from being plundered and oppressed by 
the other. Here the right course is precisely the 
opposite of that which is commonly pursued : it is pre- 
cisely the natural opponents of a constitution that require 
most consideration, lest by unjust treatment they be 
transformed into active enemies of the commonwealth.? 
In another respect what is required by the nature of 
the case is the opposite of that which commonly occurs. 
Nothing is of greater importance for the preservation of 
any form of state than the previous education of those 
in whose hands the power is placed.’ But capacity for 
rule depends solely upon modesty and hardihood;. the 
power of the oligarch is incompatible with effeminacy, 
the freedom of the people with licentiousness.4. And 
this is true of all forms of constitution without excep- 


1 v. 8, 1308, b, 24. 
2 v. 8, 1308, b, 31-1309, a, 32, 
c. 9, 1310, a, 2 sqq. vi 5, 1320, a, 
4 sqq. 29 sqq. c. 7, 1321, a, 31 
sqq. 
3 v. 9, 1810, a, 12: pwéyioroy 
5 rdvtwy Tey eipnucvwy mpds 7d 
Siauevery tas moAitelas, oo vov 
OAtywpovor mdvres, TH TadederOat 
mpos Tas moAditelas. Spedos yap 
ovdey Tay wpEeAmwTdrwy vduwr 
kal cuvdedoiacuévwv bad mdvTwv 
TwY TWoALTevouevwy, ei ph ~oovTas 
e(touevor Kal memadeunevor ev TH 
_ workitela, Cf. pp. 261, 284, n. 1, 
supra. 
* Ibid. 1, 19: €ort 5& 7d we- 


madevo0a: mpds Thy moArTelay ov 
TovTO, T) To.eiy ols yxalpovow of 
OAryapxobvTes 7 of Snuoxpariay 
,BovAduevot, GAA’ ois Suvhoovta of 
Mev dAvyapxety of 5¢ Snuoxpareio Oa. 
viv 8 év pev tais ddrvyapxtas of 
Tav apxdvtwy viol tpupaaw, of 5é 
Tav &mdépwy yiyvoyTa ‘yeyuuvac- 
Mévot Kal memovnkdtes, Sote kal 
BovAovrat paAdrov Kal Sdvavra 
vewrepiCev.. Similarly in demo- 
cracies: (7 éy Tats To.adraus Syyo- 
kpatlais Exaoros @s BovAeTa . .. 
tovTo 8 éotl, pavrAov: ob yap Set 
olecOat Sovrclay civar Td (hy mpds 
Thy ToAiTelay, GAAG TwTnplay, 


t 


POLITICS 287 


tion. Even the absolute power of the monarch depends 
for its continuance upon its limitation ;! and the un- 
righteous rule of the tyrant can only make men forget 
the odium of its origin by approaching in the form of 
its administration to monarchy. The best means for 
the maintenance of tyranny is care for the common well- 
being, for the embellishment of the city, and for the 
public services of religion, a modest household and good 
economy, ready recognition of merit, a courteous and 
dignified bearing, commanding personality, sobriety 
and strength of character, regard for the rights and 
interests of all.? So in like manner with regard to 
oligarchy, the more despotic it is, the more need is there 
for good order in the government: for just as it is the 
sickly body or the cranky vessel that demands the most 
careful management, so it is the bad state that most 
requires good administration in order to counterbalance 
its defects. And so we arrive always at the same con- 
clusion—-namely, that justice and morality are the only 
security for durability in states. However deep the 
philosopher goes in the scientific analysis of the forms 
of constitution which more or less lack this foundation, 
it is only to arrive in the end at the same result, and to 
show that in them also the government must be con- 
ducted upon the principles which more obviously under- 
lie the true forms: that which in these last is the 


‘vy. LL init.: odCovra &e fal Tikol Kal Tots HOecw Toot waddAov 
Movapxla:] TG Tas wey Bacirclas Kal bwd ray dpxoudvwv POovoivra. 
hryew em Td perpidrepov. Bow yap Frrov. 

erAartévev dor xipior, wrelw xpdvov * v. 11, 1314, a, 29-1315, b, 
dvarykaioy weve waow Thy apxhv: 10. 

abrol re yap hrrov ylvovra decmo- * vi. 6, 1320, b, 30 sqq. 


288 ARISTOTLE 


primary object of government—namely, the well-being of 
all—is in the former an indispensable means for retaining 
the sovereignty. 

The fates prevented Aristotle from developing his 
political views with the fullness and completeness he 
intended in his plan, and philosophy is, doubtless, 
greatly the loser. But even in the incomplete form in 
which we have it, the Politics is the richest treasure that 
has come down to us from antiquity, and, if we take into 
account the difference of the times, it is the greatest con- 
tribution to the field of political science that we possess. 


289 


CHAPTER XIV 
RHETORIC 


ARISTOTLE regards Rhetoric, as we have already seen, as 
auxiliary to Politics.! His treatment of this, as of other 
branches of science, was thoroughly revolutionary, and 
his labours may be said to form an epoch in its history. 
While his predecessors had contented themselves with 
what was little more than a collection of isolated 
oratorical aids and artifices,? he sought to lay bare the 
permanent principles which underlie a matter in which 
success is commonly regarded as a mere question of 
chance, or at best of practice and readiness, and thus 
to lay the foundations for a technical treatment of 
rhetoric. He seeks to supply what Plato* had de- 
manded but had not actually attempted—namely, a 
scientific account of the principles of the oratorical art. 
He does not limit the sphere of this art, as did the 


1 Cf. p. 185, n. 1, supra, and €tews. ewel 8 dudorépws éevdé- 


on Aristotle’s rhetorical works, 
vol. i. p. 72 sq. 

2 Besides what PLATO, Phed- 
rus, 266 © sqq., and Aristotle 
himself, het. i. 1, 1354, a, 11 
sqq., remarks, see also Ph. d. Gr. 
i. p. 1013 sqq. 

* Rhet. i. 1, 1354, a, 6: trav 
bev ody woAAGy of wey cikh TadTa 
Spaow, of BE Bid cuvfeav ard 


VOL. IU. 


xeTat, SiAov bri etm by adrad Kal 
ddomaciv: 3: d yap emirvyxdvoveww 
of re 31a cuvhbeay Kal of ard 
TavToudtrov, thy airiay Oewpeiv 
évdéxerat, Td S& rowdroy Hdn 
mdvtes hv duodroyhoaey réxvns 
Epyov elvat. 

* Phedr. 269 D sqq. ; cf. ZELL. 
Ph. d. Gr. p. 803 sq. 


290 ARISTOTLE 


ordinary view, to forensic and perhaps political oratory. 
He remarks, as his predecessor had done, that since the 
gift of speech is universal and may be applied to the 
most diverse purposes, and since its exercise, whether 
in public or in private, in giving advice, in exhortation, 
and in every kind of exposition, is essentially the same, 
rhetoric, like dialectic, is not confined to any special 
field ;! as dialectic exhibits the forms of thought, so 
must rhetoric exhibit the forms of persuasive speech in 
all their universality, and apart from their application 
to any particular subject-matter.? On the other hand, 
as Plato had already observed,’ the function of the art 
of oratory is different from that of philosophy : the latter 
aims at instruction, the former at persuasion; the goal 
of the one is truth, of the other probability.* Aristotle, 
however, differs from his teacher in the value he attaches 
to this art and to theoretical discussions devoted to its 
exposition.» He agrees, indeed, with Plato in reproach- 
ing ordinary rhetoric with limiting itself to aims which 
are merely external, and considering it merely as a 
means for exciting the emotions and winning over the 
jury, and with neglecting the higher branch of oratory 


1 Rhet.i. 1 init., and 1355, b, 
7, c. 2 init., ibid. 1356, a, 30 sqq. 
ii. 18 init. c. 1, 1877, b, 21.3. cf. 
PLATO, Phedr. 261 A sqq. 

2 Rhet. i. 4, 1359, b, 12: bo@ 
5 ay tis 2) thy Biadrexrinhy }) radryny 
[rhetoric] w) Kaddrep &v Suvdmes 
[dexterities] GAA’ émiorimas tet- 
para: KaTacKevd ew, AhoeTat Thy 
olvow airav apavicas te wetaBal- 
ve emiokevd(wy eis emorhwas 
STOKE MEeVwY TIVOY MaywaTwv, AX 
by) mdvoy Adywr. 


3 Cf. Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 803 sq. 

4 Rhet. i. 1, -1355, a, 25, c. 2 
init. See also infra. 

5 He does not, indeed, men- 
tion Plato in het. i. 1, 1355, a, 
20 sqq., but that he had him, and 
especially his Gorgias (Ph. d. Gr. 
i. p. 510), in his mind is rightly 
observed by SPENGEL (Ueb. die 
Rhetorik des Arist.: Abh. d. 
philos.-philol. Kl. d. Bayer. 
Akad, vi. 458 sq.). 


RHETORIC 291 


—in which these means occupy a secondary place—for 
the lower, political for forensic eloquence. But on the 
other hand he recognises that the one essential function 
of the speaker, under all circumstances, is to convince 
his audience,' and accordingly he admits no rhetoric as 
genuine which is not based upon dialectic or the art of 
logical demonstration.2 He even expressly declares 
that all rhetorical artifices must be rigorously excluded 
from the law courts, and orators forced to confine 
themselves exclusively to logical demonstration.2 He 
recognises, however,‘ that all are not open to scientific 
instruction, but that for the majority of men we must 
start from the level of the common consciousness, which 
moves in a region of probability, and not of abstract 
truth. Nor does he see any great danger in so doing, 
for men, he holds, have a natural sense of truth, and 
as a general rule are right.’ He reminds us that in 
the art of oratory we possess a means of securing the 
victory of right, as well as of defending ourselves ; and 
that in order that we may not fall a prey to the arts of 
opponents, it is indispensable that we should ourselves 
understand their nature.6 As, therefore, in the Logic 





1 Rhet.i. 1, 1854, a, 11 sq. 
b, 16 sqq. 

* Ibid. 1355, a, 3 sqq. b, 15, c. 
2, 1356, a, 20 sqq. 

* i, 1, 1354, a, 24: od yap Bei 
Toy Bixagrhy diacrpépew eis dpyhv 
mpodyovras  pOdvov 4 ercov- 
Sumov yap Kay ef tis, 6 perare 
Xpiicba Kavdi, TodTov rorhoese 
orpeBaAdy. Of. iii. 1, 1404, a, 4. 

* Ibid. 1355, a, 20-b, 7; cf. 
iii. 1, 1404, a, 1 sqq 

§ 1355, a, 14: rhetoric is 
based upon dialectic ; ré re yap 


GAGs Kal Td Suoroy TO GANVE? Ti}s 
avris eri Suvduews ideiv, Gua 
8& Kal of kvOpwror pds 7d aANDEs 
mepixacw ikayvas nal ta mrele 
Tuyxdvovot Tijs dAnBelas > B,d mpds 
Ta &vbota oroxaoriKas Exew tod 
duolws Exovros Kal mpds Thy &d4F- 
Oelay dor. Cf. p. 256, n. 2, supra. 
° Ibid. and 13565, b, 2: the 
misuse of the art of oratory is 
certainly very dangerous, but 
this is true of all accomplish- 
ments except virtue—the more 
so in proportion to their value, 


v2 


292 


ARISTOTLE 


he had supplemented the investigation of scientific proof 
by that of probable proof, in the Politics the account of 
the best with that of defective constitutions, so in the 
Rhetoric, he does not omit to treat of those aids to the 
orator which supplement actual proof, and to discuss the 
art of demonstration, not only in its strict sense, but also 
in the sense of probable proof, which starts with what is 
universally acknowledged and obvious to the mass of 


mankind.! 


' Aristotle therefore treats 
rhetoric, not only as the counter- 
part of dialectic (aytlotpopos ti 
diadextinn, Rhet. i. 1 init. — 
which, however, primarily re- 
fers merely to the fact that 
they both deal, not with the con- 
tents, but with the universal 
forms of thought and speech), 
but as a branch (see p. 185, n. 1, 
supra) and even as a part of it 
pdpidv Tt THS Siadrextinjs Kal 
duotwua (het. i. 2, 1356, a, 30— 
that SPENGEL, Rhet. Gr. i. 9, 
reads for dpotwua ‘“dpuola,” is for 
the question before us unimpor- 
tant, but the alteration is not 
probable) ; a science compounded 
of analytic and ethics. In a 
word, it consists for the most 
part in an application of dia- 
lectic to certain practical pro- 
blems (described p. 295, infra). 
While, therefore, we cannot di- 
rectly apply to rhetoric all that 
is true of dialectic in general, 
and still less all that is true of 
it as applied to the service of 
philosophy, and while the dis- 
tinctions which THUROT (LHtudes 
sur Aristote, 154 sqq. 242 sq.; 
Questions sur la Rhétorique @ 
Aristote, 12 sq.) seeks to point 


But as he regards the former as the most 


out between the two sciences 
are, so far, for the most part well 
grounded, it does not follow from 
this that the above account of 
their relation to one another is 
incorrect, and that we have a 
right, with Thurot, to set aside 
the definite statement in Rhet. i. 
2, by altering the text. For the 
orator’s most important function, 
according to Aristotle, is demon- 
stration, which, as only probable, 
falls within the sphere of dia- 
lectic (Rhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 3 sqq.); 
rhetoric is demonstration é 
evddtwy in. reference to the sub- 
jects which are proper to public 
speaking, as dialectic is a like 
kind of demonstration with refer- 
ence to all possible subjects. Nor 
can we accept THUROT’S proposal 
(Etudes, 248 sqq.) to read, Rhet. 
i, 1, 1355,.a, 9, ¢.2,1366,' a, 26, 
Anal. Post, i. 11, 77, a, 29, 
“@vadutTixh” instead of diadexrirh. 
As the doctrine of ovAAoyiopds 
e& évddtwy, dialectic necessarily 
deals with inferences in general, 
and as it is precisely inferences 
of this kind which are the sub- 
ject-matter of rhetoric, it is better 
to connect it with dialectic than 
with analytic, using diadextixh, 





a 


RHETORIC 293 


important sense, he devotes the fullest discussion to it. 
Of the three books of the Rhetoric, the first two, being 
the first section of his plan, treat of the means of 
proof (wioreis); while the second and third parts, on 
style (Ags) and arrangement (rd£is), are compressed 
into the last book, whose genuineness, moreover, is not 
beyond dispute.! , 

Proofs, according to Aristotle, are divided into those 
which fall within the province of art and those which 
do not. Rhetoric as a science has to do only with the 
former. These are of three kinds, according as they 
depend upon the subject, the speaker, or the hearer. 
A speaker will produce conviction if he succeeds in 
showing that his assertions are true and that he is him- 
self worthy of credit, and if he knows how to create a 
favourable impression upon his hearers. Under the first 
of these heads, that of the subject-matter, we shall have 
to discuss demonstration; under the second, or the 
character of the speaker, the means which the orator 
takes to recommend himself to his audience; under the 
third, or the disposition of the hearers, the appeals that 
he makes to their emotions. The first and most 
important part of rhetoric, therefore, falls into these 
three sections.‘ 


however, in a somewhat wide 
sense. On the relation of dia- 
lectic to rhetoric, see also WAITz, 
Arist. Org. ii. 435 sq. 

* Cf. vol. i. p. 74, supra; Ph. 
d, Gr. i. p. 389. 

? Rhet.i. 2, 1355, b, 35: ray 


8 miotewy ai wiv trexvol eiow ai 


8° &rexvot. trexva 5& A€éyw Boa 
Bh 80 judy memdprotat GAAS mpodr- 
ipxev, oloy udprupes Bdoavo: ovy- 


ypapal kat bca rowira, tyrexva 
5é boa Sid THs weOddou Kal bv Hud 
KkatackevacOjva: Suvaréy. hore 
det roUTwy Tois wey xphoacba Ta 
5é edpeiv. 

* i, 2, 1356, a, 1 sqq. ii. 1, 
1377, b, 21 sqq. iii. 1, 1403, b, 9; 
cf, i. 8, 9, 1366, a, 8, 25. 

* wept ras amrodelfeis, r, Ta HON, 


mw. TH WaOn, 


294 ARISTOTLE 


These, again, are found to deal with subjects of 
different intrinsic importance,! and it is therefore not 
unnatural that Aristotle should treat the first of them, 
the theory of demonstration, at the greatest length. 
Just as scientific proof proceeds by syllogism and induc- 
tion, so rhetorical proceeds by enthymeme and instance.” 
The exposition of the various points of view from which 
a subject may be treated,’ the topics of oratory, occupies 
a considerable portion of Aristotle’s treatise; nor does 
he here limit himself to universal principles which are 
equally applicable to every kind of speech, but discusses 
those peculiarities in each which depend upon the par- 
ticular aim it has in view and the character of its 
subject-matter; * he thus seeks to exhibit the principles 
of oratory, not only in respect to its general form, but 
also in respect to its particular matter. With this 
aim he distinguishes three different kinds or classes of 


1 See p. 291, n. 2, supra. 

2 Rhet. i. 2, 1356, a, 35-1357, 
b, 37, where the nature of these 
means of proof is fully explained, 
cf. ii. 22 énit.; Anal. Prt. ii: 27, 
70, a, 10. An enthymeme, accord- 
ing to this passage, is a svAAoyio- 
mos €& eixdtav }} onuelwy. Lhet. 
1356, b, 4 gives another defini- 
tion: KarAd 8 evOiunua pev pn- 
Topikoy audAAuyiomoy, mapdderyya 
dé éraywyiy pntopixhy; it comes, 
however, to the same thing, as 
the orator, gua orator, is limited 
to probable evidence. 

3 In Rhet.i, 2, 13868; a, 2,41. 
26 init., and ii. 1 init., Aristotle 
speaks only of the principles of 
the enthymeme; but as the ex- 
ample only calls to mind in an 
individual case what the enthy- 


meme states in a universal propo- 
sition, his account refers, as a 
matter of fact, to demonstration 
in general, as he, indeed, also 
includes in it (eg. ii. 20, c. 23, 
1397, b, 12 sqq. 1398, a, 32 sqq.) 
example and induction. 

4 Rhet. i. 2, 1358, a, 2 sqq.: 
the enthymeme consists partly of 
universal propositions which 
belong to no special art or science 
and are applicable, e.g., to physics 
as well as ethics, partly of such as 


are of limited application within 


the sphere of a particular science, 
e.g. physics or ethics ; the former 
Aristotle calls témo., the latter 
YS.a or el6n, remarking that the 
distinction between them, funda- 
mental as it is, had almost 
entirely escaped his predecessors. 


| 
| 





RHETORIC 295 


speeches : deliberative, forensic, and declamatory.' The 
first of these has to do with advice and warning; the 
second, with indictment and defence; the third, with 
praise and blame. The first deals with the future; the 
second, with the past ; the third, pre-eminently with the 
present. In the first, the question is of advantage and 
disadvantage ; in the second, of right and wrong; in 
the third, of nobility and baseness.? Aristotle enu- 
merates the topics with which each of these has to deal.* 
He indicates‘ the chief subjects upon which advice may 
be required in politics, and the questions which arise in 
connection with each, and upon which information must 
be sought. He discusses minutely the goal for which all 
human actions make—namely, happiness; its con- 
stituents and conditions;* the good and the things 
which we call good ; ° the marks by which we distinguish 
goods of a higher or a lower character ;? and, finally, 
he gives a brief review of the distinguishing charac- 
teristics of the different forms of government, inasmuch 
as these must in each case determine both the orator’s 
actual proposals and the attitude he assumes towards 
his hearers. Similarly, with a view to the orator’s 
practical guidance in the declamatory art, he enlarges 
upon the noble or honourable in conduct; upon virtue, 


' Aristotle was also un- marks in Rhet. i. 4 init. 


doubtedly the first to point out 
this important division, for we 
cannot regard the Rhetorica ad 
Alexandrum (c.2 init.), as has 
been already remarked, vol. i. p. 
74, supra, as pre-Aristotelian. 

* Rhet. i. 3. 

* See the more general re- 


* Ibid. 1359, b, 18 sqq., where 
five are enumerated: revenue, 
war and peace, defence, exports, 
and imports, legislation, 

at 

‘Le 

? Ibid. c. 7. 

® 1.8,cf. vol. ii. p. 240, n.3, sup. 


296 eae ARISTOTLE 


its chief forms, its outward signs and effects; and upon 
the method which the orator must adopt in treating of 
these subjects.! For behoof of the forensic orator, he 
discusses, in the first place, the causes and motives of 
unjust actions, and since pleasure as well as good (which 
has already been discussed) may be a motive, Aristotle 
goes on to treat of the nature and kinds of pleasure and 
the pleasurable.? He inquires what it is in the circum- 
stances both of the perpetrator and of the sufferer of the 
wrong that tempts to its committal? He investigates 
the nature, the kinds, and the degrees of crime ;* .and 
adds, finally, in this section rules for the employment of 
those proofs which lie outside the province of art, and 
which find a place only in a judicial trial.6 The views 
he propounds on all these subjects agree, of course, 
entirely with what we already know of his ethical and 
political convictions, except that here, in accordance 
with the aim of the work, they are presented in a more 
popular, and therefore sometimes in a less accurate 
and scientific, form. Only after thus discussing the 
individual peculiarities of the different kinds of oratory 
does Aristotle proceed to investigate those forms of 
proef which are equally applicable to all,® discussing 
under this head the universal forms of demonstration— 
namely, enthymeme and instance, together with a few 


409. _ ésupra),with SPENGEL, before the 
74, 10 go. ' first seventeen chapters of the 
° mas éxovres Kal rivas &5i- second book. But even if, with 
Kovow, FRhet. i, 12. BRANDIS (iii. 194 sq.) and THUROT 
* 1. 13 sq., cf. ¢. 10 init. (Hiudes sur Arist. 228 sqq.), we 


° i, 15, cf. p. 293, n. 2, supra. take the traditional order as the 

° ii. 18 (from 1391, b, 23 on- original one, we must admit that 
wards), c. 26, if, thatisto say, we the contents of the section are 
place this section (see vol. i. p.74, more in place here. 





RHETORIC 297 


rhetorical commonplaces.! Of the two other means of 
proof, besides demonstration proper—namely, the per- 
sonal recommendations of the speaker and the impres- 
sion upon the audience—the former is only cursorily 
touched upon, as the rules relating to it are deducible 
from other parts of the argument.? On the other hand, 
Aristotle goes into minute detail. on the subject of the 
emotions and their treatment: on anger and the means 
of arousing and soothing it;* on love and hatred, desire 
and aversion, and the means of exciting each of them; ‘ 
likewise on fear, shame, good will, sympathy,° indigna- 
tion,® envy, and jealousy.’ To this he finally adds an 
account of the influence which the age and outward 
circumstances (tvyav) of a man exercise upon his 
character and disposition.® 

These observations -conclude the first and most 
important section of the Rhetoric ; the third book treats 
more shortly of style and arrangement. In regard tothe 


" According to the announce- mend him to his audience the 


ment made c. 18 fin., c. 19 treats 
especially of possibility and im- 
possibility, actual truth and false- 
hood, relative importance and un- 
importance (ep) duvarod Ka) ddv- 
vdrov, Kal mérepoy yéyovey } ov 
yéyover kal Errat hod Forat, er. 5é 
wept peyébous kal pixpérnros Tay 
mpdypatwv, 1393, a, 19); c. 20 of 
illustration, c. 21 of gnomology ; 
c. 21-26 of enthymemes, for which 
Aristotle gives, not only general 
rules (c. 22), but a complete topi- 
cal account of the formsemployed 
in proof and disproof (c. 23); of 
fallacies (c, 24); of instances 
for combating enthymemes (c. 
25) 
i 


1378, a, 6: to recom- 


orator must get credit for three 
things: insight, uprightness and 
benevolence: 60ev wey olyupy 
gpévimot Kal omovdaio: paveiey by, 
ex Tav mept ras dperas dinpnucvwr 
(i.9 ; see p. 296, n.1, sup.) Anwréoy 

. wept & edvolas Kal pidlas ev 
Tois wept Ta wdOn AEKTEoy viv, 

ak Be Pas 

“ee. 

® c. 5-8. 

* The displeasure at the un- 
merited fortune of unworthy 
persons (véueois), the account of 
which in 2het. ii. 9 harmonises 
with that in Zth. ii. 7 (see p. 
169). 

* ity 20. 24. 

8 ii, 12-17. 


298 ARISTOTLE 


former, a distinction is in the first place drawn between 
delivery and language. While desiderating a technical 
system of instruction in rhetorical delivery, the author 
regrets the influence which so external a matter exer- 
cises on the general effect of a speech.! He next calls 
attention to the distinction between the language of 
the orator and of the poet, demanding of the former, 
as its two most essential requirements, clearness and 
dignity,” and advising as the means best fitted to secure 
them that the speaker should confine himself to appro- 
priate expressions and effective metaphors,’ upon the 
qualities and conditions of which, he proceeds to enlarge.‘ 
He treats further of propriety of language,> fullness and 
suitability of expression,® rhythm and structure of the 
sentences,’ grace and lucidity of presentation.8 He 
examines, finally, the tone that should be adopted in 
written or oral discourse, and in the different kinds of 
oration.” It is impossible, however, to give here in 
detail the many striking observations which the writer 
makes upon these subjects. ‘They clearly show that 


' ili. 1, 1403, b, 21-1404, a, 23. 
Aristotle does not go fully into 
the discussion of what is good or 
bad delivery ; he merely remarks 
that it depends upon the voice— 
especially upon its power, melody 
(appovia) and rhythm. 

* 7d mpémov, the proper mean 
between 7d tarewdy and 7d sbrép 
Td dtiwua, between a bald and an 
overloaded style. 

3 iii. 1 sq. 1404, a, 24—b, 37. 

* Thid. to c. 4 fin. 

° 7d €eAAnvCeLy, iii. 5, in which, 
besides correct gender, number 


and syntax, are included definite- 
ness and unambiguousness of 
expression, as well as Td evap- 
dyvworoy and evppacroy, 

5 dyKos THs A€kews, c. 6, Td 
mpémoyv T. AcE. c, 7, which consists 
chiefly in the true relation be- 
tween matter and style. 

7 The former c. 8, the latter 
G.'93 

8 The aorefov and evSoxiuour, 
the mpd dupator moreiv, &c., c. 10 
sq. 

“Cc, le 





RHETORIC 299 


even if the book did not come direct from Aristotle in 
its present form, it is yet founded upon his teaching. 

In the last section of the Rhetoric, which treats of 
arrangement, prominence is in the first place given to 
two indispensable parts of every speech : the presentation 
of the subject-matter,’ and the demonstration. To these 
are added in the majority of speeches an introduction 
and a conclusion, so that there are four chief parts in 
all.2 The method of treatment which each of these 
parts demands, and the rules both for their arrangement 
and execution which the character of the circumstances 
require, are discussed with great knowledge and pene- 
tration. And just as Aristotle’s theory of oratory as a 
whole does not neglect the external aids to success, so 
here also devices are touched upon which are permitted 
to the orator only in consideration of the weakness of 
his hearers or of his case. The /hetoric stands in 
this respect also as the exact counterpart of the J'opies. 
But here, as there, it is impossible to follow these 
discussions into greater detail. 


' wpd0ecis, eapositio. Narra- sq. the proofs, c. 19 the conclu- 


tion is merely a particular kind 
of it which is employed only in 
forensic speeches; c. 13, 1414, a, 
34 sqq. 

2c. 13. In accordance with 
this division Aristotle discusses 
first (c. 14 sq.) the introduction, 
secondly (c. 16) the exposition of 
the subject (which, however, he 
here again calls Slnynais), c. 17 


sion. 

2 Cf. 6.0..-C.-24, L415, by:4 
det FE uh AavOdvew Sri wdvta Ekw 
Tov Adyou Ta To1adTa* mpds pavAoy 
yap axpoathy kal ra ew Tod mpay- 
aros Gkovorta, ere) &y uh TOLWvTOS 
fh ov0ey Set mpoomstov, &AA’ 4) Boo 
Td) mpayyua cimeiy Keparawdas, iva 
tx Sorep cOua Keparty. 


300 ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XV 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART! 


BEsIDES knowledge and action, Aristotle distinguishes, 
as a third branch, artistic production, and to theoretic 
and practical he adds poetic science. The latter, how- 
ever, he fails to treat with the same comprehensive 
grasp as the two former. Of such of his works as have 
come down to us only one is devoted to art, and that 
not to art as a whole, but to the art of poetry; and 
even this we possess only in an imperfect form. But 
even of those which are lost none treated of art, or even 
of fine art, in a comprehensive manner.? Apart from a 


1K. MUuuer, Gesch. der 
Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, 
ii. 1-181 BRANDIS, ii. b, 1683 
sqq. ili. 156-178; TEICHMULLER, 
Arist. Forsch. vol. i. ii. 1867, 
1869; REINKENS, Arist. 
Kunst bes. tb. Tragidie, 1870; 
DorInG, Kunstlehre d. Arist. 
1876. For further literature on 
the subject see below and cf. 
UEBERWEG, Grundr. i. 204 sq.; 
cf. SUSEMIHL, Jahrb. f. Philol. 
Ixxxv. 395 sqq. xcv. 150 sqq. 221 
sqq. 827 sqq. cv. 317 sqq., in the 
preface and notes to his edition 
of the Poetics (2 ed. 1874), and 
re" rae Jahresbericht for 

» Pp. 594 sqq. 1875, p. 381 sqq. 
1876, p.-283 ne ‘ : si 


tiber 


2 See vol. i. pp. 106 sq., 182. 

3 There is, according to Ari- 
stotle, a great difference be- 
tween these ; to téxvy belong all 
the products of intelligence, 
beautiful and useful alike; see 
inter alia p.107,n. 2, sup.; Metaph. 
i. 1, 981, b, 17, 21. While re- 
marking, Metaph. ibid., that some 
of the réxvatserve mpbs Tavarykaia, 
others mpds Siaywyhv, while ai wh 
mpos hdovny unde mpds ravarykaia 
TeV éemioTnuay are different from 
both, he fails, nevertheless, to 
give any fuller account of the 
marks which distinguish the fine 
from the merely useful arts—in 
Phys. ii. 8, 199, a, 15 he is dis- 
cussing, not (as TEICHMULLER, 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 301 


book upon Music, whose genuineness is highly doubtful,! 
we hear only of historical and dogmatic treatises upon 
poets and the art of poetry, among which some were 
probably likewise spurious. We cannot, therefore, look 
to Aristotle for a complete theory of art; nor are his 
views even upon the art of poetry fully known to us 
from the sources which we possess. 

Aristotle’s philosophy of art is founded, like Plato’s,? 
not on the conception of beauty in the abstract, but on 
that of art. The conception of beauty remains vague 
and undefined to the last. In dealing with moral beauty 
Aristotle compares the beautiful with the good inas- 
much as the latter is desirable on its own account,? 
remarking at the same time elsewhere that, looked 
at from other points of view, it is as compared with 








————e—————— ae = 


Ar. Forsch. ii. 89 sqq. believes) 
two kinds of arts, but a twofold 
relation of art generally to 
nature. Cf. p. 303, n. 3, infra, and 
DORING, p. 80 sq. 

' On this treatise see vol. i. p. 
103, n. 1, supra. The fragment in 
PuLuT. De Mus. 23, p. 1139, which 
Rose (Fragm. 43, p. 1482) and 
Heitz (Fr. 75, p. 53) refer to 
the Hudemus, but for which a 
suitable place could hardly be 
found in this dialogue, seems to 
me to come from it. We cannot, 
however, regard this little piece, 
with its Pythagoreanism and 
copious style, as Aristotle’s work. 

2 Of which account is given 
Ph. da, Gr.i.p. 795. BELGER, De 
Arist. in Arte Pottica componenda 
Platonis discipulo, gives a full 
and careful account of the points 
in which Aristotle’s theory of 
art agrees with Plato’s, and those 


in which it differs from it. 

* Rhet.. 1. 9, 1366, a, 838: 
Kaddy ev ody éeorly d dv br abrd 
aiperdy bv éemawerdy 7, } 9 by 
ayabdy by nbd F, Ste Gyaddy. ii. 
13, 1389, b, 37: 7d Kaddv as dis- 
tinguished from 7d cuupépoy or 
that which is good for the indivi- 
dual is the @mAds ayady. Of the 
numberless passages in which 
7d kaddy is used of moral beauty, 
i.e. of goodness, several have 
already come before us, ¢@.g. p. 
149, n. 3, p. 151, n. 2, and 
p. 192, n. 6, supra. We can- 
not find, however, in Aristotle 
(as P. REE, Tod Kadod notio 
in Arist. Eth. Halle, 1875, 
attempts to do) any more accu- 
rate definition of this concep- 
tion; neither in the ethical nor 
in the esthetic field does he 
seem to have felt the need of 
such definition, 


802 


ARISTOTLE 


goodness a wider conception, for while the term good 
is applied only to certain actions, beauty is predicated 


also of what is unmoved and unchangeable! 


As the 


essential marks of beauty he indicates, at one time 
order, symmetry and limitation,” at another right size * 


and order.‘ 


And yet how vague the conception of 


beauty is still left, and especially how remote is held to 
be its relation to sensible appearance, is obvious above 
all from the assertion ° that itis chiefly in the mathe- 


1 Metaph. xiii. 3, 1078, a, 31: 
emel 5& 7d Gryabby Kal Td Kadrdy 
Erepov, TO wey yap del ev mpdter, Td 
dé kal ev trois &kwhros. Accord- 
ingly Mathematics (whose object, 
according to p. 183, is the un- 
moved) has to deal in a special 
sense with the beautiful. Ari- 
stotle applies, indeed, good as 
well as beautiful to the deity, 
who is absolutely unmoved (cf. 
p. 397, n. 3, and p. 404, supra), as 
he attributes to Him pags in the 
wider sense (vol. i. p. 400, n. 1, ad 
fin. ). But this does not justify usin 
converting the passage before us 
(as TEICHMULLER does, Arist. 
Forsch. ii. 209, 255 sqq.) into the 
opposite of its plain sense. It 
offers merely a further proof of 
the uncertainty of Aristotle’s 
language with reference to 7d 
ayadoy and 7d Kadédv. In Metaph. 
xiii. 3 he is thinking only of good 
in the ethical sense. 

* Metaph. ibid. 1. 36: rod de 
KaAod péyiora €l8n Tdéts Kal 
cunpetpia Kal Td wpicuevov. The 
ei5n here are not different kinds 
of beauty, but the forms or 
qualities of things in which 
beauty reveals itself. How 
these points of view are main- 
tained in Aristotle’s rules of art 


is shown by MULLER, p. 9 sqq., 
who compares also Probl. xix. 
38, xvii. 1. 

. Practically identical with 
To wpiopevoy, as RANTS rightly 
observes, p. 97. 

* Poet. 7, 1450, b, 36 (cf. 
Pol. vii. 4, 1326, a, 29 sqq. b, 22; 
see p. 259, n. 1, supra, also Eth. iv. 
3, 1123, b, 6): 7d yap Kadrdy év 
meyé0e Kal rdger earl, 5d obre 
TdupiKpoy &v TL yévorTo KaAdy (Gov 
(cvyxetrat yap h Oewpla eyyds Tod 
a.varcOjrov xpdvou yivopnevn) ovre 
Topueyebes* ov yap dua n Oewpia 
yiveran, GAN’ olxerat Tois Pewpovar 
7d €v kal rd BAov ex THs Oewplas, 
olov ef wuplwy oradiwy etn (Gov. 
As a visible object must be easily 
taken in by the eye by virtue of 
its size, so a mythus must be 
easy to retain. The parenthesis 
(ovyxeira: yap, &c.) means: if 
an object is too small, its parts 
become merged in each other, 
and no clear picture of it is pos- 
sible. It is probable that xpévou 
after avato@jrov has crept into 
the text from Phys. iv. 13, 222, 
b, 15 (see BONITZ, Avist. Stud. 
i, 96; SUSEMIHL, t loco). 

5 Metaph. ibid. 1078, b, 1. 
In reply to TEICHMULLER’S 
objections to the above remark 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 8038 


matical sciences that the above characteristics find 
their application. If beauty is a quality not less of 
a scientific investigation or a good action than of a 
work of art, it is too vague a concept to serve as the 
foundation of a philosophy of art. Aristotle accord- 
ingly at the beginning of the Poetics sets it wholly 
aside,' and starts from the consideration of the nature 
of Art.? The essence of art Aristotle, like Plato, finds, 





generally speaking, to be imitation.® 


(Arist. Forsch. ii, 275 sq.), SUSE- 
MIHL (Jahrb. f. Philol. cv. p. 
321) has pointed out the con- 
fusion between the concrete 
phenomena of sense (¢ g. colours, 
sounds, &c.) and the abstract, 
mathematical forms of sensible 
existence. 

1 The words here used, més 
Sef cuvlotacba: Tots piOous, ei 
méeAAaEL KaAd@s Etew 7 Tolnois 
(TEICHMULLER, ii. 278), are of 
course no argument against this 
view. It is hardly necessary to 
point out that such expressions 
as Kadws Exew, Kadrd@s Aéyew, &c. 
(e.g. in Meteor. i. 14, 352, a, 7, 
11; Polit. iv. 14, 1297, b, 38; 
Metaph. xiii. 6 init. ; Lth. vii. 13, 
and innumerable other passages), 
have nothing to do with the 
specifically aesthetic meaning of 
Td Kadrdv. 

2? TEICHMULLER, indeed, in 
a detailed discussion of beauty 
and the ‘four aesthetic ideas’ 
(order, symmetry, limitation and 
size), ibid. p. 208-278, has at- 
tempted to show that Aristotle's 
theory of art is based upon the 
conception of beauty. This 
attempt, however, is rightly dis- 
credited by D6rING, p. 5 sqq. 
93, sqq. If the abstract con- 
ception of beauty had been his 


It has its origin 


starting point in his theory of 
art, Aristotle would have de- 
voted himself before everything 
else to its closer investigation, 
and would have used the result 
of this investigation as the 
criterion of the claims of art. 
This, however, he does not do: 
and while, of course, he de- 
mands of a work of art that it 
should be beautiful, while he 
speaks of a kad@s Exwy piOos, a 
MvO0s KadAAiwy, a KarAAoTH Tpary- 
pdia, &c. (Poet.c. 9 fin. ce. 11, 
1452, a, 32, c. 13, 1452, b, 31, 
1453, a, 12, 22, and passim), yet 
he never deduces any rule of art 
from the universal conception of 
beauty, but rather from the spe- 
cial aim of a particular art. 

3 Poet. i. 1447, a, 12 (on the 
different forms of poetry and 
music): maoca: tuyxavovew otoa 
fiujoers Td obvordov. c. 2 init. 
c, 3 init. and often. In the words, 
Phys. ii. 8, 199, a, 15, BAws re 4 
TEXvN TH phy emreAe? & H iors 
Gduvarei Gmepydoacba, tao Be 
Muuetra, artis used as fineart. It 
is mere imitation, but it may, 
indeed, be also regarded as a 
perfecting of nature, as in the 
training of the voice or deport- 
ment. 


304 ARISTOTLE 


in the imitative instinct and the joy felt in its exercise 
which distinguishes man above all other creatures ; 
hence also the peculiar pleasure which art affords.! In 
this pleasure, springing as it does from the recognition 
of the object represented in the picture and from the 
enjoyment thus obtained, Aristotle further recognises 
an intimation of the universal desire for knowledge.” 
But as knowledge is of very different value accord- 
ing to the nature of the object known, this will of 
necessity be true of artistic imitation also. The object 
of imitation in art is, generally speaking, nature or the 
actual world of experience. But nature includes man 
and his actions ; indeed, it is with man alone that the 
most impressive arts—viz. poetry and music—have to 
do ;° and the object which it is the essential aim of the 
imitative artist to represent consists not merely of the 
outward appearance of things, but to a much greater 


1 Poet. 4 init., where it is 
added: this is obvious from the 
fact that good pictures. delight 
us even when the objects repre- 
sented produce themselves quite 
the opposite impression: as in 
the case of loathsome animals 
or corpses. Cf. foll. n. 

2 Poet. 4, 1448, b, 12, Ari- 
stotle continues: atriv dé Kal 
rovrov | joy in works of art], dr: 
To pavOdver ov pdvoy Tots ptAocd- 
gos Hdicrov, dAAG Kal Tots &AAots 
duotws' GAN’ él Bpaxd kotywvovow 
avTod. 51a yap TovTO xalpovor Tas 
eixdvas dp@vres, Ott ocupBalver 
GewpodyTas mavOdvery Kal cvAdoyi- 
CecOa ti Exacrov, oiov bt. ovTos 
ékeivos, émel edv mh TUXN Mpoewp- 
akws, ov Sid miunua momnoe: Thy 
dovyvy GAAG 81a THY drepyactay 


he THY xXpoidy Sid Toradtrny Tid 
&rAaAnv aitiay. Rhet.i. 11, 1371, b, 
4: éwel 5¢ rd wavOdvew re Hdd Kal 
Td Oavud(ew, Kal Ta Todde dvdyKn 
ndéa elvar ofoy Td TE weutunuévor, 
domep ypadinh nal dvdpiavrororta 
kal mwoinTihy, Kal wav 0 bw e@b 
MEeMiLNuevoy H, Kav H UH dD abd Td 
Meuinuévov’ ov yap én) rovTe 
xalpet, GAAG avAdAoyiouds eoriy 
bTt ToOvTO exeivo, Hote pavOdvew Tt 
oupBaiver, 

° Cf. p. 303, n. 3, supra. 

* Phys. ii. 8: see p. 303, n. 3. 

5 Cf. foll.n. and page. Even 
of the art of dancing it is said, 
c. 1. 1447, a, 27: Kal yap obror 
bua TOY oXNMaTiCoMévwy puOuar 
MimovyTa Kal H0n Kal mdOn rad 
mpaters, 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 305 


degree of their inner intelligible essence. He may 
confine himself to what is universal and actual, or he 
may rise above it, or he may sink below it.!' He may 
represent things as they are, or as they are commonly 
supposed to be, or as they ought to be.’ It is in re- 
presentations of this last kind that the chief function 
of art consists. Art according to Aristotle must re- 
present not the individual as such, but the universal, 
the necessary and the natural. It must not be content 
to reflect naked reality but must idealise it. The 
painter, for instance, must both be true to his subject 
and improve upon it;* the poet must tell us, not what 
has been, but what must be according to the nature of 
the case, and on this account Aristotle prefers poetry to 
history, as higher and more nearly allied to philo- 
sophy, seeing that it reveals to us not only individual 
facts but universal laws.‘ And this holds not only of 


amodidévtes thy idtay poppy, 
édmolovs mo.ovvtes, KaAAlous 
ypdpovo.v. The idealism of 
the Greek statues of the gods 
did not, of course, escape the 


1 Poet. 2 init.: @wel BE u- 
podvra: of pmimovmevor mpdrroyTas, 
avdynn 5& rovTous 2) arovdalous 7) 
- gataous clvar . . . fro BeAtilovas 
) Kad’ tas 4 xelpovas h Kal 





rowvrovs, which Aristotle pro- 
ceeds to illustrate from painting, 
poetry, and music. 

2 Ibid. 25, 1460, b, 7: émel 
ydp dort pmiunths 6 months, dowep 
ty ef (wypdpos H Tis UAAOS ¢iKovo- 
mows, avdyen mimeioOa Tpidv byTwy 
Tov dpiOudy Ev re del * 4 yap ola Fv 7) 
ori, }) ofa pact Kal Soe, 7) ofa elvar 
de?. We may these words 
as genuine, although they stand 
in a rather suspicious section. 

% Poet. 15, 1454, b, 8: eel de 
plunols dori h Tparyydla Bertidver, 
huas Set pmucioOa ods aryabods 
eixovoypdpovs’ Kat yap ékeivot 


VOL, LU. 


philosopher’s notice; cf. vol. ii. 
p. 217, n. 5, supra. 

* Poet. 9 init.: ob Td Ta yt- 
voueva A€yev, TOVTO woinTod Epyov ~ 
éoriv, GAN’ ofa by yévorro, Kal ra 
duvara Kata Td eikds 7d avary- 
kaiov. 6 yap ieropixds kat 6 romrhs 
ov TH Eupetpa Aéyew 7) amerpa 
Siapépovow* etn yap dy Ta “Hpodd- 
Tov eis méerpa TeOjvat, Kal ovdéey 
fttov by ein ioropia tis mera 
métpov i) kvev métpwv, GAAG ToiT@ 
diapeper, TE Tv wey Ta ~yevdueva 
Aéyew, Tov BE ola by yévorro. Sid 
kal irocopérepoy Kal omovdaid- 
tepov moinats ioroplas éotiv> h ev 


x 


306 


serious poetry but also of comic. 


ARISTOTLE 


The former in 


bringing before us forms which transcend ordinary 
limits must give us an ennobled picture of human 
nature, for it must represent typical characters in whom 
the true nature of certain moral qualities is sensibly 
exhibited to us;' but the latter also, although dealing 
necessarily with the weaknesses of human nature,” 
must nevertheless make it its chief end not to attack 
individuals but to present types of character.° While, 


yap moinais MaAAOV Ta KabdAou, 7 
8° ioropla ra Kad? Exaorov réyet. 
Yars Bt KaddArov pev, TG wWolw TH 
mov urrTa cumBalver Aeye } mpdr- 
Trew Kata TO €ikos 2) Td GvaryKatoy 
_. . te 8 Kal’ Exaotor, Ti *AAKI- 
Biddns kmpatev 7) th erabev. Ibid. 
1451, b, 29: Kav &pa ouuBy yevd- 
. peva morety [dv rointhy| ovdev 
Artov womnths ¢oTw' Tov yap 
ryevouevey Evia, ovdev KwAvEL TOLAVTA 
clvac ofa tw eikds ‘yevéoOu kal 
Suvata yeverOau. Cf. c. 15, 1454, 
a, 33: xph 5& Kat ev Tots Hoeow 
bomep kal ey TH TOV T pay Lat wy 
cvotdoet, wel Cnreiv 2} Td avaryKatoy 
} 7d cixds, Sore Tov ToOLOUTOV TO 
roadra Agyew } mparrew 7) avary- 
kacov #) eiKds, Kal TOUTO meTa TOUTO 
yiveo@ar 7) avaykatoy ) eixds. C. 1, 
1447, b, 13 sqq.: it is not the 
metre but the content that makes 
the poet. Empedocles (whose 
Homeric power Aristotle praises 
in Diog. viii. 56) has nothing but 
the metre in common with Homer. 

1 Poet. 15 (see p. 305, n. 3, 
supra), Aristotle continues: ovTw 
kal Tov TmomThy pimodmevoy kat 
dpyidous kal peOdpous Kal TGAAG TH 
rowwita exovTas em trav nOav, 
emieucelas  moiy mapdderywa 7) 
ckAnpérntos det &c, Cf. following 
note and c. 13, 1453, a, 16. 


2 ©. 2 fin.: ) wev yap [comedy | 
xelpous  8& BeAriovs pimetobar 
Bovaera trav viv. C. 5 init.: 1 
dé Kwuwdia eorly, domwep elrouer, 
ulunots pavdorépwy mév, ov MévTOL 
Kara wacav Kaklay, GAA® TOU 
aisxpod éorl rd yeAoior udpiov. 7d 
yap yedoidy cor Gudprnud tt Kal 
aloxos avéduvov Kal ob pbaptiKdr. 

8 Cf, Poet. 9, 1451, b, 11 sqq. 
c. 5, 1449, b, 5; Bth. iv. 14, 1128, 
a, 22. Aristotle here gives the 
New Comedy the preference over 
the Old because it refrains from 
abuse (aicxpodoyla). He gives 
Homer, moreover, the credit 
(Poet. 4, 1448, b, 24) of being 
creator, in the character of Mar- 
gites, of comedy, ov Pdyor GAAG 
To yeAoiov Spayarorahoas. ‘The 
Poetics are doubtless the source 
(cf. vol. i. p. 102, n. 2) of the re- 
mark in CRAMER’s Anecd. Paris. 
Append. I. (Arist. Poet. p. 783 
VAHL. p. 208; Fr. 3 SuS.): diapéper 
4h kwpwdia THs Aowdopias, eel 7 Mev 
Aodopia arapakakimTws Ta mpoo- 
dvta Kana Siékerow, % SE Setrae 
Ths Kadoupevns eupdoews [indica- 
tion]. To this subject belongs 
the remark in Rhet. iii. 18, 1419, 
b, 7, where it is said that cipwrela 
is more worthy of the freeman 
than Bwuodrocxia. This also had 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 807 


therefore, Plato and Aristotle agree in regarding art 
as a species of imitation, they draw very different con- 
clusions from this account of it. Plato thinks of it only 
as the imitation of sensible phenomena and accordingly 
expresses the utmost contempt for the falsity and 
worthlessness of art;! Aristotle, on the other hand, 
looks upon artistic presentation as the sensible 
vehicle to us of universal truths and thus places 
it above the empirical knowledge of individual things. 
We are now in a position to explain what Aristotle 
says about the aim and the effect of Art, In 
two passages? to which we have already had occa- 
sion to refer, he distinguishes four different uses of 








been particularly treated of by 
Aristotle in the Poetics (Rhet. i. 
11, 1372, a, 1: didpiorar 5& epi 
yerolwv xwpls év Tots wept moinTicijs : 
cf. VAHLEN, ibid. p. 76; Fr. 2), 
from which must come Fr. 9 of 
the Anecd. Paris. ibid.: %0n 
Kwoppdias thd Te Bwpwordxa Kal Ta 
cipwvika Kal Ta Tav GrAaCdvay, 

' See Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 799—a 
view which is not consistent with 
the fact that art is at the same 
time regarded as one of the most 
important means of education 
whose function is the presentation 
of moral ideas (ibid. p. 532 sq. 
772 sq. 800 sq; cf. Symp. 209 
D 


2 Pol. viii. 5, 7, see p. 266, 
supra. In the former of these 
passages no mention is made of 
purification ; it is merely asked 
(1339, a, 15): rlvos de? xdpw 
meréxew adrijs, wérepoy matdias 
évexa kal dvamavoews ... % uadAov 
ointéov mpos aperiy ti relvew Thy 
povoihy, as duvauevny . . . Td 


HOos moby Te moreiv, COiCovoay dv- 
vacOa xalpew dopdas. 7) mpds dia- 
ywryhy Tt oupBddrAcTat Kal ppdynow * 
Kal yap rovTo Tpitov Oeréoy Tay 
eipnuevwy. On the other hand it 
is very definitely referred to in 
the second (1341, b, 36): paper 
3° ob pias Evexev wedcias TH 
ovo xphoba Seiv GAAA Kal 
mArcidvev xdpw (Kal yap madeias 
évexev kal KaOdpoews . . . Tplroy 
5¢ mpds diaywyhy, mpds kveoly Te 
kal mpbs Thy THs ovvtovlas avdmav- 
ow). But, on this account, to 
change the text of the latter 
passage with SPENGEL (Veber 
die xd0apois Ta&v wadnudrwy, Abh. 
der philos.-philol. Kl. der Bayr. 
Akad. ix. 1, 16 sq.), and to read : 
Kal yap madeias evexey kal Kabdp- 
wews, .. . mps diavywyhv, tpiroy 
5 mpds &veoiy Te KC. or K. y. Tard. 
év. x. wabdpo., mpds tvecly tre— 
avdmavow, tplroyv 5& mpds Siaywyhy, 
is a violent expedient against 
which BERNAYS (Rhein. Mus. 
xiv. 1859, p. 370 sqq.) rightly 
x2 


308 ARISTOTLE 

music!: it serves (i) as a relaxation and amusement ; 
(ii)as a means of moral culture; (iii) as an enjoyable exer- 
cise ; and (iv) as a purifying influence. Whether each 
form of art has this fourfold function or not, he does not 
expressly say; nor could he in any case have regarded 
them as all alike in this respect. Of the plastic arts he re- 
marks that their ethical effect, although considerable, is 
inferior to that of music,? while he probably hardly 
thought of attributing a purifying influence to them. 
Where they confine themselves to the exact imitation 
of particular objects, they serve in his view no higher 
purpose than the satisfaction of a rather shallow 


protests. The first of these pro- 
posals is hardly permissible, even 
from the point of view of style, 
while neither of them finds any 
support in the alleged contra- 
diction between c. 5 and c. 7, as 
it is not unfrequently the case in 
Aristotle that a preliminary divi- 
sion is supplemented in the sequel 
(cf. e.g. what issaid, vol.i. p. 400, 
sqq., on the different classifica- 
tions of constitution) ; both, more- 
over, are inconsistent with the 
distinction between edifying and 
purifying music, as that is defi- 
nitely set forth in c. 7, and calls 
for immediate notice. 

‘ Not merely three, as BER- 
NAYS ébid. represents by taking 
dydravois and Siaywy) together. 
Aristotle differentiates the two 
very clearly: young people, he 
says, are incapable of diaywyn, 
whereas they are very much 
inclined to madi and ayeois (see 
vol. ii. p. 267, n. 1, supra); the 
_former is an end in itself [réAos ], 
the latter a mere means (c. 5, 
1339, a, 29, b, 25-42 ; cf. Hth. x. 6, 


1176, b, 27 sqq. p. 140, supra); 
the former presupposes a higher 
culture (see p. 309, n. 3, infra), 
not so the latter: and accordingly 
they are completely separated 
from one another, 1339, a, 25, b, 
13, 15 sqq., ibid. 4; cf. a, 33. 
Cf. p. 266, n. 5, supra. 

2 Pol. viii. 5, 1840, a, 28: 
cup BeBnke 5 T&v aicOnTrav ev meyv 
Tots &AAos pndey brdpyxew duolwpa 
Tois #Ocow, oiov év tots amrois Kal 
Tois ‘yevoTois, GAA’ év Tots Sparois 
npeua* oxhmata yap é€ort TomvTa 
(i.e. moral attitudes and ges- 
tures), &AA’ ém) puxpdy Kal mdytes 
[read od mdyres, as MULLER ibid. 
10 sq. 348 sqq. conjectures] Tis 
ToLaUTYS aicOhoews KOLywyovoL. ETL 
dé ovK ort Tav’Ta dmotdpara 
TeV OGY, AAG ONMETA MaAAOY TE 
yiyvoueva oxhwara Kal xpouara 
tay 70av. Nevertheless, young 
men ought not, dcov diapeper kal 
mepl thy tovTwy Oewplay, to be 
allowed to study the pictures of 
a Pauson but those of a Poly- 
gnotus Kay ef Tis BAAOs TOY ypapewy 
h tav ayadustonoiay eotiv nOiKds. 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 809 


curiosity.' Nor does he seem to expect from Comedy 
(on which see below) either morally edifying or purify- 
ing results. On the other hand, the purification of the 
emotions is the chief end, as we shall see, of serious 
poetry, although that art is not, of course, thereby ex- 
cluded from exercising upon the hearer other effects as 
well which are either connected with or flow from the first. 
Granted that a part of this effect—viz. the amusement 
—is due to the pleasure derived from sensible appear- 
ance, yet the higher and more valuable portion is due 
to that ideal content which, according to Aristotle, it is 
the function of Art to present. As a means to nobler 
intellectual enjoyment (dsaywyn) the higher poetry 
must appeal to our reason, since according to Aristotelian 
principles the measure of our rational activity is also the 
measure of our happiness;” and, as a matter of fact, 
Aristotle regards this purifying effect of art as standing 
in the closest relation to intellectual culture.* In like 
manner poetry can only serve for moral edification by 
exhibiting to us the nature and aim of moral action in 
examples that excite our admiration or abhorrence, as 
Aristotle holds it ought undoubtedly to do.* Finally, 
as to the purifying effect of Art, we must admit 


1 Cf. vob. ii. p. 304, n, 2, sup. 

2 See the quotations from 
Eth. x.8, sup. vol. ii. p.143,n. 1. 

$ In the words quoted from 
Pol. viii.5, p. 307, n. 2, supra: mpbds 
Siaywyhy rt cuuBddrdrcra: al ppd- 
yvnow. SPENGEL, ibid. p. 16, and 
independently of him THuRoT, 
Etudes sur Arist. 101, propose to 
read, instead of gpdvnow, edppo- 
sbvnv (or 7d edppalvew), remarking 


that ¢péynois would not belong 
to d:aywy) but to the previously 
mentioned aperh. This, however, 
is incorrect. By aper) Aristotle 
means moral virtue, the training 
of character; by Saywyh kal 
ppévnois, the training of the in- 
tellect and the taste. Cf. what 
was said about diaywyh supra, 
vol. ii. p. 266, n. 5. 

* See p. 304 sq. 


510 ARISTOTLE 


that to this day, after all the endless discussions to which 
Aristotle’s definition of Tragedy has given rise,' no 
agreement has been arrived at upon the question 
wherein, according to his view, it consists and what are 
the conditions of its production. This is, however, the 
less extraordinary, since in the extant portion of the 
Poetics the fuller discussion of ‘ purification ’ contained in 
the original work is missing,? though the want may be 
partly supplied from other passages. These show, in the 
first place, that the purification of the emotions which 
is effected by art takes place not in the work of art itself, 
but in those who see or hear it. We further learn that 
the immediate object is not, as was formerly supposed,‘ 


' For a review of these see 
SUSEMIHL, Arist. m, mont. p. 36 
sqq. and elsewhere (see p. 300, 
n. 1); REINKENS, p. 78-135, and 
DORING, p. 263 sqq. 339 sq.; the 
last discusses some seventy 
essays and treatises bearing on 
the subject, most of them written 
within the previous fifteen years. 

2 See supra, vol.i.p. 102, n. 2. 

3 GOETHE (Nachlese zu Arist. 
Poétik, 1826; Briefwechsel mit 
Zelter, iv. 288, v. 330, 354) ex- 
plained the words 8’ éAéov kal 
odBov mepatvouca Thy T@Y TOLOUTwY 
matnudtwy Kd0apow in the defi- 
nition of tragedy, Poet. 6, 1449, 
b, 24 sqq. as referring to the 
tranquillising effect upon the 
actors themselves. This expla- 
nation, however, is now univer- 
sally acknowledged to be inad- 
missible (e.g. by MULLER, ébid. 
380 sqq.; BERNAYS, ibid. 137; 
SPENGEL, ibid. 6). Apart from 
the linguistic difficulty, Pol. viii. 
7, 1342, places beyond a doubt 


that the kd@apois is effected in 
the audience, and the same may 
be proved, as MULLER well shows, 
from the Poetics; for it could be 
said that tragedy, through fear 
and pity, effects a purification of 
these emotions in the actors only 
on condition that they came upon 
the stage in a condition of fear 
or pity, which (as LESSING, 
Hamb. Dramat. 78 St. has re- 
marked) is by no means usually, 
and in the circumstances cannot 
possibly often be, the case. Ari- 
stotle, however, has expressed 
himself on this point as clearly 
as possible, c. 14 init. Aci yap 
[he says in treating of the produc- 
tion of the poBepdy and éAcewdy] 
kal &vev Tod dpav ottw cuvertdva 
Tov mo0ov Sore Tov AkovovTa Ta 
mpdyuara yiwoueva kad pplrrev ral 
éAceiy ek TOV cvmBawdvTwv. 

* Thus LESSING, with all pre- 
vious writers, Hamb. Dram. 74-78 
St. (Werke, vii. 382 sqq. Lachm.): 
‘this purification depends on 





THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART _ sil 


moral improvement, but primarily the production of 


an effect upon the emotions. 


Aristotle himself defi- 


nitely distinguishes between purification and moral 
culture as separate aims:! he would use for the latter as 
opposed to the former a style of music which is wholly 
different and requires different treatment.? He describes 


purification, moreover, as a 


nothing else than the trans- 
formation of the passions into 
promptitudes to virtue’ (p. 352). 
He has been followed by many 
others, e.g. SPENGEL in the 
treatise referred to, p. 307, n. 2, 


supra. 

1 Pol. viii. 7, 1341, b, 36, see 
supra c. 6, 1341, a, 21. ért 3 od 
tori 6 abdAds HOukdy GAAG waAdAov 
dpyacrixdy, Sore mpds Tovs ToLod- 
rovs a’TtG@ Kapovs xpnoréoy ev ois 
h Sewpla Kdbapow wadrov Sivarar 
} wdOnow, 

2 See preceding n. and c. 7, 
1341, b, 32: since we must dis- 
tinguish a moral, a practical and 
an exciting and inspiring kind of 
music, and since further music 
has to serve the different ends 
stated at p. 307, n. 2,—there- 
fore gavepby Sri xonoréov perv 
mdcais Tais Gpyoviais, ov Toy 
abrdy 3 tpdrov mdoas xpnoréoy, 
GAAG mpds wey Thy madelay Tais 
HOiuwrdrais mpds Se axpdacw éErépwv 
xepoupyovytwy Kal Tais mpaxtiKais 
Kal rais évOovotactixais. % yap wepl 
évias cuuBalver wdBos Wuxas irxu- 
pas, TovTo év mdoas brdpxet, TG Se 
Artrov Siaéper Kal T@ maAAov [there 
does not seem to be any reason 
to doubt these words with REIN- 
KENS, p. 156], ofov ZAcos kal pos, 
txt 8° evOovoiacuds. Kal yap imd 
TavTns THs Kwhrews KaTaKwxipol 
twés claw é 5 Trav lepady weday 
épGuev tovrous, Stray xphowvrat 


species of healing and as a 


rots ekopyidCover Thy puxhy méAeat, 
Kafiorauéevous Somwep iarpelas -tv- © 
xévras Kal Kabdpoews. tavTd 5) 
TovTo avarykaiov mdoxew Kal Tods 
éAchuovas Kal tovs poBynricods Kat 
tovs bAws mabyntixods [the MSS. 
reading for which Spengel un- 
necessarily suggests 8Aws ods 
ma0.|, Tos 8 &AAous Kad’ oor ém- 
BddAAet TeV ToLWWvTwY ExdoT@, Kal 
mao. ylyvecOal twa Kdbapow Kal 
kovolCecbar ed” Hdovijs. duolws 5é 
kal Ta wéAn TH KabapTiKda wapéxet 
xapay aBAaB7 Tors avOparois. 
(This isa further effect of purify- 
ing music, different from the xd- 
Gapois itself: it purifies the ra@n- 
tikol and affords enjoyment to 
all; the lacuna therefore which 
THuROT, Etudes, 102 sq. surmises 
before duolws 5 cannot be ad- 
mitted.) From this passage, 
(however we may interpret its 
general meaning) this at any rate 
seems obvious, that according to 
Aristotle there is a kind of music 
which produces a_ catharsis, 
although it possesses no ethical 
character, and may not, there- 
fore, be used in the education of 
the youth, nor practised by the 
citizens, although it may be 
listened to by them—namely, 
exciting music ; but if this is so, 
the catharsis, while not without 
an indirect moral influence, 
yet cannot in _ itself, as re- 
garded from the ‘point of view 


312 ARISTOTLE 


mental alleviation accompanied by pleasure,! and accord- 
‘ingly looks for it not in any improvement of the will or 

in the production of virtuous inclinations,? but in the 
equalisation of disturbances produced by violent emo- 
tions and the restoration of equanimity.? It is here of less 
importance, in point of actual fact, whether itis the reli- 
gious or the medical meaning of ‘ purification ’ that is pro- 
minent in Aristotle’s mind ;* since in either case alike we 
are dealing with a figurative expression, in the sense that 
the term does not admit of being transferred literally 
from the one sphere to the other,’ and we can only decide 


of its immediate effect, consist 
in the production of a definite 
character of will. That this is 
true also of the 
effected by tragedy admits of less 
doubt owing to the fact that pre- 
cisely those emotions with which 
it has to deal (see infra) are 
here expressly connected with 
excitement, 7.¢. pity and fear. 

1 Seepreceding n. Similarly 
in Poet. c. 14, 1453, b, 10 the aim of 
tragic representation, which ac- 
cording to c. 6 consists in cathar- 
sis, is placed in a pleasure: od yap 
mwacav det (nrety ndovhy amd Tpayy- 
dias, GAAd Thy oikelay, ered 5é Thy 
amd éA€ov Kal pdBov 51a piuhoews 
det ndoviy mapackevd ew Toy ToLn- 
Thy, &e. 

* Viz. xalpew op0as Kal Avrel- 
70a, Pol. viii. 5, 1340, a, 15, 22; 
see p. 266, supra. 

* This is the sense in which 
many writers in antiquity took 
purification, ¢g. ARISTOXENUS 
(Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 714), Ps. JAMBL. 
Myster. Aegypt. p. 22, PROKL, in 
Plat. Remp. (Plat. Opp. Basil. 
1534) p. 360, 362, PLuUT. Sept. 
Sap. Conv. c. 13, p. 156 ©. 


purification . 


Quest. conviv. III. 8, 2, 11, p. 
657 A; cf. BERNAYS, Grundziige 
der Verlorenen Abhandlung d. 
Arist. tiber Wirkung der Tra- 
godie (Abh. der Hist.-philos. 
Gesellschaft in Breslau 1.1858), 
p- 155 sqq. 199.; id. Ueber die 
trag. Katharsis bei Arist. (Rhein. 
Mus. xiv. 374 sq.) 

* After B6ckh had indicated, 
in 1830 ( Ges. kl. Schriften, i. 180), 
this reference in kd@apois to 
medical purgation it was taken 
up first by A. WEIL (Ueb. d. 
Wirkung der Trag. nach Arist. 
Verhandl. der 10. Vers. deutscher 
Philologen, Bale, 1848, p. 136 
sqq.), more fully and’ indepen- 
dently of his predecessors by 
Bernays in the treatises men- 
tioned in preceding note which 
go deeply into this question. 
These were followed by THUROT, 
Etudes, 104, and many others; 
cf. DORING, ibid. 278 sqq. who 
likewise resolutely defends this 
view, ibid. p. 248 sqq. 

® On the other hand it cannot 
be supposed that Aristotle uses 
the word kd@apois, which he had 
coined to express a definite effect 





THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 313 


how far he means to extend the analogy contained in it 


-by a reference to other passages and to the whole scope 


of his doctrine. It seems probable that he took «a@ap- 
cus, as we might use ‘ purgation,’ in the first instance to 
mean the expulsion from the body of burdensome or inju- 
rious matter,! but that inasmuch as he was here dealing 
with the application of this conception to states of the 
emotions, he came to connect with it,as he went on, the 
idea of deliverance from pollution and spiritual disease as 
well ?—just as in general one readily combines notions 
connected with the same expression in a confused com- 
pound without clearly discriminating them from one 


of artistic representation, in the 
Politics of music in a different 
sense from that in which in the 
Poetics he.employs it of tragedy, 
nor does Pol. viii. 7, 1341, b, 38 
give the remotest justification to 
the presumption that the tragic 
catharsis is specifically different 
from the musical. The one may be 
produced by different means from 
the other, but the effect indicated 
by xdGapois must itself in both 
cases be essentially the same, 
unless we are to attribute to 
Aristotle a confusion of terms 
which is wholly misleading. 
STAHR, Arist. und die Wirk. d. 
Trag. p. 13 sq. 21 sq., does not 
sufficiently distinguish between 
these two. 

' Aristotle’s own expressions, 
Polit. viii. 7, 1342, a, 10, 14: 
éomep iatpelas tuxdvtas Kad Kabdp- 
wews... Tact ylyverOal tia Kdd- 
apow Kal Kkovpl(ecbar ped’ jdoris, 
the remark in Ps. JAMBL. De 
Myst. i. 11 that the emotions 
(Suvduers TOv radnudtwy) &rowAnp- 
otyra Kal évredOev dmroxabapdue- 
vat... dromavoyra, andin PROCL, 


in Remp. 362 that Aristotle 
objects to Plato that he was 
wrong in forbidding tragedy and 
comedy, efrep 51a rovtwy duvardy 
€umérpws dromiumAdva ta why Kad 
amonrAhcayras évepya mpds Thy mat- 
delay Exew, Td wemovnkds avtav 
Geparevdoaytas all point to this. 

* According to Polit. viii. 6, 
1341, a, 21, orgiastic music is in 
place éy ofs 7 Oewpla [the repre- 
sentation] xd@apoww parddov Sivarat 
} wdOnow, and c. 7, 1342, a, 9 
larpela and kd@apois are attributed 
to ekopyid(ovra thy Wuxhy méAn. 
A definite kind of religious music 
is therefore compared in its effect 
with medical purgation. Aris- 
totle seems also to have employed 
the word agoctwois, which refers 
to the cancelling of transgressions 
by offerings and other religious 
acts, to express the same effect. 
PROCL. ibid. p. 360 represents him 
as asking Plato why he rejected 
tragedy and comedy, kal raira 
cuvtedovcas mpds apoclwow tay 
mradeyv, and replying himself, p. 362, 
that it is not true that they serve 
as an adoolwors. 


314 ARISTOTLE 

another. This very notion of purgation, moreover, was 
one in which the ancients were unable to keep the ideas of 
healing and expiation distinct from one another.’ All the 
more, however, are we bound to investigate the question 
as to the internal processes which according to Aristotle 
are the means and condition of the purification effected 
by art. So much we learn from his own utterances, that 
the purification consists in deliverance from some 
dominating excitement of passion or overwhelming 
mental depression ;* and accordingly we must under- 
stand by the expression in the first instance not* any 
purification within the soul of permanent affections, but 


the removal from it of unhealthy ones.* 


1 Whoever is possessed of 
enthusiasm or any other violent 
and enslaving emotion which 
presses on him as a burden is 
katakoxiwos, as Aristotle ex- 
presses it, Pol. viii. 7, 1342, a, 8. 
KaTAKwX)) OF KaToKwx?, however, 
is originally conceived of as Oca 
Kkatokwxh, from which deliverance 
is to be obtained by reconcilia- 
tion with God, the malady is a 
divine visitation, the cure is the 
result of propitiation (cf. PLATO, 
Phedr. 244 Dsq.). 

2 In the words quoted, p.311, 
n. 2, supra, from Polit. viii. 7, en- 
thusiasm is spoken of as a form of 
excitement by which many per- 
sons are possessed (karaxwx1m0L), 
and of which, by means of orgi- 
astic music, they are ‘as it were 
cured and purified,’ and the word 
couvpiCerba is used to express the 
same effect. 

3 As Zeller formerly thought. 

4 The words xd@apots T@y Ta- 
Onudrwy might themselves mean 


When we ask 


either a purification of the emo- 
tions or deliverance from them, 
for we may say either kadalpew 
Tia Tivos, to purify one of some- 
thing, or Ka@alpewv vl, to purge 
away a defiling element. Medical 
language adopted this use of the 
word «d@apsis from the time of 
Hippocrates (see REINKENS, Pp. 
151 sq. who follows Foesius). It 
was transferred to the moral 
sphere, ¢.g. by Plato, in the 
Phedo 69 B, when he says that 
virtue is nd0apots Tis TAY ToLOvTwY 


gdvrwy a deliverance from plea- 


sure, fear, &c. Aristotle himself 
uses kd@apois in the sense of a 
‘purifying secretion, ¢g. Gen. 
An. iv. 5, 774, a, 1, where he 
speaks of a KdOapcis karaunviwy, 
ibid. ii. 4, 738, a, 28 of a KdOapors 
Tav mepittwudtrwv (for which, 
1. 27, amdxpiots is used). These 
examples, combined with the 
passage referred to, n. 2 above, 
make it probable that xd@apors 
Tav wadnudtrwy means a deliver- 


| 
| 
| 





THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 


315 


How does Art effect this removal ? we are told by some 
that it produces this result by engaging and satisfying 
in harmless excitements man’s innate need of at times 


experiencing more violent emotions.’ 


The peculiar 


character of the effect produced by art is not, however, 


to be thus easily explained. 


How is it that the cure is 


effected in this case by homceopathic and not as in other 


cases by allopathic treatment ?? 


ance from ma@quara. This view 
seems indeed inconsistent with 
the terms of the well-known defini- 
tion of Tragedy (see p. 320, n. 4, 
infra) in which it is said that it 
effects by pity and fear riv tar 
TowlTwyv mwadnudrwy Kdbapow ; for 
it seems as though the emotions 
of pity and fear could not possibly 
be banished by exciting them. 
In answer to this, however, it has 
already been pointed out by 
others (as by REINKENS, p. 161) 
that the artificially excited emo- 
tions of tragic pity and fear serve 
to release us from the emotions 
(already, according to p. 311, n.2, 
supra, existing in each in weaker 
or stronger form) of a pity and fear 
which are called forth by common 
facts, and that this is the reason 
why Aristotle writes ray roioiTwy 
radnudrwy instead of rottrwy, the 
two kinds of pity and fear 
referred to being related to one 
another, but not identical. (On 


. the other hand, the fact that he 


writes wa@nudrwy instead of ma- 
6éy is unimportant, both words, 


as Bonitz, Arist. Stud. 5, H, has 


shown in opposition to BEKNAYs, 
being used by Aristotle as per- 
fectly synonymous.) 

1 Thus WEIL, idid. 139; but 
even Bernays falls short here 
when he says that the catharsis 


And why has the 


effected by art is a discharge of 
solicited emotions: as purgative 
means. produce health in the 
body by the expulsion of un- 
wholesome matter, so purifying 
music produces a soothing effect 
by providing an outlet for the 
ecstatic element in us, &c. Cf. 
171, 176, 164 and other passages 
in his treatise of 1858. Similarly 
his successors, ¢.g. DORING, who 
declares, p. 259, that xd@apots is 
‘an excretion of diseased matter 
by an increased production of it, 
or rather an acceleration of 
Nature’s own healng process, 
which is already tending towards 
both these results ;’ and UEBER- 
WEG, Zeitschr. f. Phil. L. 33 sqq. 
who says it is ‘a temporary de- 
liverance from certain feelings 
(which, according to Ueberweg, 
spring from a normal want) by 
the excitement and indulgence 
of them ;’ but he overlooks the 
fact that wd@nua does not mean 
every possible or even normal 
feeling (still less ‘normal 
wants,’ p. 33, and Grundr. i. 213; 
see Eng. Tr. Hist. of Phil. vol. i. 
p- 179), but only morbid or 
oppressive moods, and that it is 
only from such that we require to 
be ‘ purged.’ 

2 Eth. ii. 2, 1104, b, 17 of 
punishments: larpeta: ydp rwés 


316 ARISTOTLE 


artistic excitement and not any other excitement of the 
emotions the effect of producing peace and purification by 
the expulsion of the morbid matter, whereas the frequent 
recurrence of certain emotions in real life has rather 
the effect of producing an inclination to repeat them ?' 
Aristotle did not overlook this circumstance ; but if he 
observed it we may be quite sure that he also attempted 
to explain it. And this, as a matter of fact, he has 
done. The ‘catharsis’ is indeed effected in his view by 
exciting the emotions and is a homeopathic cure of 
them ;? but this effect is not to be expected from all 
excitements indifferently, but only from such as are 
artistic—and by artistic Aristotle here means, as we 
clearly gather from his account of tragedy, not that 
which produces the most violent emotion in us, but 
that which produces emotion in the right way. Had 
the artificial catharsis depended in Aristotle’s view 
merely upon the excitation of certain emotions and not 
also essentially upon the manner and means of exciting 
them, he must have sought for the criterion of a work 
of art, not in its contents and their proper treatment, 
but singly and solely in its effect upon the spectators. 


This he is far from doing.® 


elow, af 8& iarpetar Sia TOY evayTiov 
mepukact ylyecOat. 

1 Cf, £th. ii. 1, 1103, b, 17 sqq. 

2 Tragedy by pity and fear 
effects the purification of these 
emotions (Poet. 6): sacred music 
by producing in usastate of mental 
excitement effects the cure and 
purgation of excitement (Polit. 
- viii. 7, 1342, a, 4 sqq., cf. c.5, 1340, 
a,8sqq. See p. 311, n. 2, supra). 

3 To mention only one thing, 


We are forced, therefore, 


Aristotle cannot reiterate too often 
that both the action and the 
characters in a tragedy must 
evolve according to the laws of 
necessity and probability (Poet. 
7, 1450, b, 32. Zbid. and c. 9, 
see p. 305, n. 4, supra, c. 10, 1452, 
a, 18, c. 15,1454, a, 33 sqq.), and 
he blames the poets for abandon- 
ing the development which is 
demanded by the nature of the 
facts out of regard for the taste 


EE  —=— 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 317 


to look for the reason why, according to Aristotle, the 
excitement of the emotions produced by Art has a 
soothing effect, whereas their excitement in real life is 
followed by no such result, in the peculiar nature of 
artistic representation itself—in other words, in that 
which constitutes the generic difference between art 
and reality. The latter presents us only with the par- 
ticular, the former with the universal in the particular ; 
in the latter chance largely rules, the former must 
reveal to us in its creations the fixity of law.' Aristotle 
certainly nowhere expressly says that this is the reason 
why art exercises a purifying influence; but if we would 
supplement the mutilated fragments of his theory of art 
which have come down to us in the spirit of the rest of 
his system we can hardly resist this conclusion. Art, 
we should then have to say, purifies and soothes the 
emotions in that it delivers us from such as are morbid or 
oppressive by exciting such as are subordinate to its 
law, directing them, not towards what is merely per- 
sonal, but towards what is universal in man, controlling 
their course upon a fixed principle and setting a definite 
limit to their force.2- Thus, for example, tragedy in the 
fate of its heroes gives us a glimpse into the universal 
lot of man and at the same time into an eternal law of 
justice;* music calms mental excitement and holds it 


of the public (c. 9, 1451, b, 33 
sqq. ; cf. c. 13, 1453, a, 30 sqq.). 

' See p. 304 sq. supra. 

2 We have at least a hint of 
this thought in the statement 
from Proclus, cited p. 313, n. 1, 
to the effect that tragedy and 
comedy serve as a cure of morbid 
states of feeling by rendering it 


possible éuuérpws aromimAdva Ta 
1wa0n. 

8’ According to Poet. c. 13, 
those who pass in it from fortune 
to misfortune must be neither the 
wholly innocent nor the wholly 
bad: they should be characters 
distinguished neither by merit 
nor wickedness, but standing 


318 ARISTOTLE 


spellbound by its rhythm and harmony.' Although 
we do not know how Aristotle further developed this 
thought, still we are forced to assume that he expressed 
it somehow.? | 

If we now turn from these general views upon Art 
to the special arts, Aristotle himself provides us with 
different principles according to which they might have 
been classified. All art is imitation, but the means, 
the objects,and the manner of this imitation are different. 
The means of imitation are sometimes colour and form, 


rather above than below the 
common standard of morality 
(4 ofov eipnrat, 2) BeAtiovos waAdAov 
4 xelpovos), wh die woxInplay GAA 
3: Guapriavy weyddAnv. The tragedy 
must therefore be so constructed 
that we can put ourselves in the 
place of the hero, that we can say 
what happens to him might 
happen to each of us, while at 
the same time we feel that the 
fate which overtakes him is not 
wholly undeserved, but is brought 
on him by his own action, so 
revealing the laws of the moral 
order of the world. Kock, Ueb. 
ad, Arist. Begr. d. Catharsis, 1851, 
p. 11, strangely misunderstands 
the sense of this passage in hold- 
ing that the purification of pity 
depends upon the thought that 
we do not need to pity the 
sufferer so immoderately, as he 
does not suffer wholly un- 
deservedly; the purification of 
fear, on the conviction that we 
can avoid the misfortunes which 
overtake the hero if we avoid the 
mistake which has brought them 
in its train, If the effect of 
tragedy had consisted for Ari- 
stotle in this trite moral applica- 


tion he would have recommended 


above all those pieces which he 
so decidedly rejects (ibid. 1453, 
a, 1, 30)—those, namely, in which 
great transgressions are punished 
and virtue is rewarded, for in 
these the spectator has ‘the tran- 
quillising sense that he can avoid 
the penalty of transgression and 
reap the reward of virtue in a 
much higher degree. Aristotle 
is aware of the satisfaction which 
these moral reflections give, but 
says (ibid.) that they belong to 
the sphere, not of tragedy, but 
of comedy. 

1 STaAHR (Arist. und die 
Wirk. d. Trag. 19 sqq.) curiously 
enough expresses himself as satis- 
fied with Bernays’ explanation on 
this head, and in this way in- 
volves himself in the difficulty of 
having to explain the catharsis, 
which Aristotle describes in like 
terms in connection with different 
arts, quite differently in one case 
and in the other. Cf. p.312, n. 5. 

2 In this view Zeller is at one 
with BRANDIS, ii. b, 1710 sqq. iii. 
163 sqq. and SUSEMIHL (A7ist. 
mw, mont. 43 sqq.). 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 319 


sometimes the voice, sometimes words, harmony, and 
rhythm; these means, moreover, are sometimes em- 
ployed singly, at other times several of them are com- 
bined.'! The chief objects of imitation are living and 
acting persons ;? and these differ from one another in 
moral worth.’ The manner (here, however, Aristotle 
is speaking of poetry only) differs according as the 
imitator himself speaks or brings forward other 
speakers ; and in the former case according as he speaks 
in propria persona, or merely reports the words of 
others. Aristotle, however, has not attempted to use 
these differences as the basis of any systematic division 
of the Arts as a whole. Upon the particular arts, 
moreover, with the exception of the art of poetry, very 
little has come down to us in his works: we have only a 
few occasional observations upon painting,’ and a fuller 
discussion of music,® the chief contents of which have 


» | Poet. i. 1447, a, 16 sqq. 

2 umodvvra of uimovmevor mpar- 
rovtas,c, 2,1448,a,1. This state- 
ment suffers only slight modi- 
fication from the passages quoted 
p. 804, n. Land 2,swp.,on the repre- 
sentation of particular natural 
objects. Aristotle would not 
therefore have recognised land- 
scape painting, which in his time 
did not yet constitute an inde- 
pendent branch of art, as art 
at all. 

* C, 2, see p. 305, n. 3, supra. 

4 Poet. c. 3 init. Aristotle 
here distinguishes, as Susemihl 
rightly observes, (a) pimctobau 
amayyéAAovTa, (b) wigmetoOa mdytas 
Tovs wimouLevous ws mpdTTovTas Kal 
évepyouvras. Drama is constituted 
by the latter ; in (@) it is possible 


to imitate (1) } €repdy m [twa] 
yvyvouevoy (by assuming the part 
of another), (2) #) @s tov adrdy Kal 
uh petraBdAdAovra. Under this 
second category, along with per- 
sonal narration would fall also 
lyric poetry, although Aristotle 
nowhere expressly refers to it in 
the Poetics as we have received 
them. While very closely con- 
nected with Plato’s division of 
the forms of artistic presenta- 
tion, Aristotle’s does not wholly 
coincide with it. 

5 Poet. 2, 15, see 305, n. 1 and 
3, supra. Pol. viii. 5, v. vol. ii. 
p- 308, n. 2, supra; also Pol. viii. 
3, v. vol. ii. p. 264, n. 3, supra. 

§ Pol. viii. 3, 1337, b, 27, c. 
5-7. 


320 ARISTOTLE 


already been given.! Finally, the extant portion of Ari- 
stotle’s writings which deals with poetry limits itself 
almost entirely to tragedy. The art of poetry, we are told, 
sprang from the imitative instinct ;* from the imitation 
of noble men and actions came epic poetry ; from the 
imitation of ignoble, satire ; subsequently as the form 
best adapted for the nobler poetry, tragedy was deve- 
loped ; as the best for satire, comedy. Tragedy is the 
imitation of an important completed action, of a certain 
length, expressed in graceful style, which varies in the 
several parts of the piece, to be acted, not merely narrated, 
and effecting by means of pity and fear the purification 
of these emotions. ‘The first effect, therefore, of tragic 
poetry is to excite our sympathy by means of the fate 
of the actors: their sufferings claim our pity; the 
dangers with which they are threatened. excite in us 
fear for the final issue—that tragic suspense which in 
the further development finds relief® at one time in 


1 Sup. vol. ii. p. 266 sqq. cf.p. 
311,n.1&2. While Aristotle here 
attributes to music especially (as 
is there shown) the power of re- 
presenting moral qualities, yet 
he does not explain in the Politics 
the grounds of this advantage 
which it possesses over the other 
arts. In Probl. xix. 27, cf. c. 29 it 
is asked: 8:0 Ti Td GkovaTov wdvov 
HOos exe Tay aic@nrav ; and the 
answer is given: because we per- 
ceive movements through the 
hearing alone, and the 7480s ex- 
presses itself in actions, and 
therefore in movements. But this 
passage can hardly be Aristotle’s. 

2 See p. 303, supra. ; 

ade Oe iY 


4 C. 6, 1449, b, 24: Eorw ody 
tpaywdla ulunots mpdtews orovdatas 
kal reAclas, méeyeBos exovons, hdv- 
ouevp Ady@, xwpls Exdorov TaY 
eiddv év Tots moplois [i.e. as is im- 
mediately afterwards explained, 
so that the different kinds of 
novomevos Adyos—Aééis and pméAos 
—are employed in the dialogue 
and chorus of the tragedy respec- 
tively ; cf. c. 1 fin.] dpévrwv kal 
ov 8 amayyeAlas, 51’ eAgov kal 
pdBov mepaivovoa Thy TaY TOLOVTwWY 
[on which see supra, p. 314, n. 4, 
ad fin.| wadnudtoav Kdbapow, 

5 Since the time of LEssING 
(Hamb. Dramat. 75. St.) whom 
Zeller followed in the previous 
edition, the ‘fear’ in Aristotle’s 





THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART $21 


an unfortunate, at another in a fortunate, turn of 
events." But since the tragic poet sets before us in his 
heroes and in their fate universal types of human nature 
and life, our sympathies do not confine themselves to 
these particular characters, but extend to the common 
elements of human nature; and while thus on the one 
hand self-regarding humours akin to pity and fear are 
created in us by our participation in the experiences of 
the actors, on the other our own pain gives way before 
the feeling of others’ pain, our personal woes are silenced 
at the spectacle of universal destiny, we are delivered 
from the oppressions that weigh on us, and our 
emotions find peace in the recognition of those eternal 
laws which the course of the piece reveals to us.2. This 


definition has been commonly 
understood of fear for ourselves 
excited by the thought that those 
whom we see suffering are like 
ourselves, and the fate which 
overtakes them might overtake 
us. This view rests partly on 
the observation that fear for the 
heroes of tragedy is already in- 
volved in pity, and that there is, 
therefore, no reason to make par- 
ticular mention of it; partly on 
Ethet. ii. 5 init. ii. 8 init., where 
péBos is defined as Adan ee dayra- 
alas méAAovTos Kakod pOaptixod 4 
Aumnpov, EXeos as AvTn Tis emi 
pavoudvy Kaxp pOaptins Kad 
AuTnp@ Tov avatiwd rvyxdvew. But 
it is not asserted that the fear 
refers only to such evils as 
threaten ourselves—any such as- 
sertion, indeed, would be wholly 
false; and, on the other hand, 
it holds also, as the distinction 
between fear for others and pity 
for them, that the former is ex- 
cited by evils which are still 


VOL. Il. 


future to them, the latter by 
those which have already be- 
fallen them. On the contrary, 
it is rightly objected to Lessing’s 
explanation (SUSEMIHL, Poet. 57 
sqq., and the authorities quoted 
by him), that according to Ari- 
stotle’s own indubitable state- 
ment the primary object of tragic 
fear is not ourselves but others ; 
for he says, Poet. 13, 14653, a, 4, 
of €rcos and oédBos: 6 pey yap 
wept Tov avdkidy éorw Svervxodyta, 
6 5& wept rdv Buoy, Eros uty weph 
tov dvdtwv, pdéBos 8& mepl ady 
duoov. ‘lo this explanation there 
is the further practical objection 
that fear for ourselves produced 
by the spectacle of a tragedy 
would hardly be the proper 
means of delivering us from this 
same selfish fear, 

* The latter, however, as is 
remarked c. 138, 1453, a, 12 sqq. 
35 sqq., less to the character of 
tragedy than to that of comedy. 

* See supra, vol. ii. p. 316 sq. 


Y 


322 


ARISTOTLE 


impression depends in the first place upon the nature 


of the events represented. 


These, therefore, are the 


important thing in every tragic representation. ‘Myth,’ 
as Aristotle says, is the soul of tragedy,’ and accord- 
ingly he sets himself to investigate, in the first place, 
the qualities which are necessary in a tragedy that it may 
effect its end : viz. natural development,” proper length,’ 


To distinguish from this purify- 
ing effect of tragedy the moral 
effect as a second and different 
result (as UBBERWEG, Zeitschr. 
ft. Philos. xxxvi. 284 sqq. does) 
seems to be incorrect. Although 
Aristotle, in treating of music, 
places maidela, Siaywyh, Kdbapors 
side by side as'co-ordinate aims 
(see p. 307, n. 2, supra) it does 
not follow that. tragedy also 
has to pursue all these aims 
in like manner. On the contrary, 
as there is both a moral and a 
cathartic kind of music (@.e. one 
which directly affects the will, 
and one which primarily affects 
only the emotions and, through 
them, moral character), there may 
also be a kind of poetry whose 
primary aim is catharsis. We 
mustassume that tragedy, accord- 
ing to Aristotle, is actually such 
a cathartic species of poetry, inas- 
much as in his definition of it 
he must have given its aim in an 
essentially complete form if he 
gave it atall. It is quite com- 
patible with this to attribute to 
tragedy a moral effect, but it is 
added as a second, which ‘is co- 
ordinate with the cathartic, but 
follows from it as result, and 
consists in the peaceful state of 
feeling which is produced by the 
purification of the emotions and 
the habit of self-control which it 
creates in us. 


1 Poet. c. 6, where, inter alia, 
1450, a, 15 (after the enumeration 
of the six elements in tragedy, 
mo0os, On, Aێts, Sidvora, dis, 
meAorroiia): pwéyioroy 5& TovTwy 
éotly 7 TaY Tpayudrwv cboTacts ° 
hi yap tpayydla plunots éorw ovK 
avOpomwv GAAX mpdtews Kal Biov 
kal evdaiuovias Kal KaKkodamovias 

. . ovKouv bras TA HON myhowryTat 
mpatrovolw, GAAG Ta HON oTvmTeEpt- 
AauBdvovor dia Tas mpdters. Hore 
To mpayuata Kat 6 wvOos TéAos Tips 
tpaywdias. L. 38: apxy mev ody 
kal olov Wuxh 6 pibos THs Tpayy- 
Stas, Sedrepov 5¢ Ta HO. Cf. c. 9, 
1451, b, 27: Tov moinrhy maddAov 
tav uvowv elvar Set moinThy 7) TOY 
péetpwv. On the other hand, the 
effect produced by the mere 
spectacle (8s) is declared to be 
that which has the least artistic 
value; ibid. 1450, b, 16. 

2 0. 7, see supra, vol. ii. p. 316, 
n. 3. 

8 This question is decided, 
ibid. 1450, b, 34 sqq., in like 
fashion to that in the Politics 
(see p. 259, n. 1, supra) as to the 
size of the State. The longer and 
richer presentation is in itself 
the more beautiful, provided that 
the plot does not suffer in clear- 
ness (7d evdotvorrov) owing to its 
length; the true criterion here 
is: ev Bom peyéOer Kata Td cixds 7) 
7) dvaykaiov epetis yryvouévwv 
oupBalver eis evtuxlay ex Svoruxias 





THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 523 


unity of treatment,' and the representation of events 
that are typical and of universal interest.2 He dis- 
tinguishes simple events from complicated ones, and those 
in which the change in the position of the characters is 
brought about by some recognition or by some reversal of 
fortune in the course of the piece. Again he shows how 
myths must be treated in order to excite the emotions 
of pity and fear instead of those of moral indignation 
or satisfaction’ or of mere wonder, and in order to 
produce this effect by means of these emotions them- 
selves and not merely by means of the outward repre- 


sentation.° 
proper character-painting ° 
finally to speak of the style 
to tragedy. We cannot, 


} e& edruxlas eis Svctvxlay wera- 
Bade. 

1 Of the so-called three Ari- 
stotelian unities of the French 
school, only the ‘unity of action’ 
is to be found, as is well known, 
in Aristotle himself; see Poet. c. 
8; cf. c. 9, 1451, b, 33 sqq. c. 18, 
1456, b, 10 sqq. The ‘unity of 
place’ he nowhere mentions, and 
on that of time he only remarks 
(c. 5, 1449, b, 12) that tragedy 
endeavours to compress the action 
into one day, or, at any rate, to 
keep as nearly as possible within 
this limit, but he gives no rule. 

2 C.9; see sup. ii. 305, n. 4, 

3 ©. 10, 11, 16, where dava- 
yvépiois and mepiméreia are dis- 
cussed. On the genuineness and 
position of c. 16, cf. SUSEMIHL, 
at p. 12 sq. of his ed. 

‘ In thissense, viz. of the satis- 
faction of that moral feeling with 


He further discusses what is required for 


and composition,’ passing 
of expression best adapted 
however, here linger over 


the violation of which Nemesis 
(see sup. vol. ii. p. 169,n. 9) has to 
do, we may interpret Td piAdvOpw- 
mov Which, according to Aristotle 
(c. 13, 1453, a, 3, c. 18, 1456, a, 
21), attaches to the deserved mis- 
fortune of the transgressor. It 
is commonly taken (as it was by 
Lessing) to refer to the human 
interest with which we accom- 
pany even the transgressor in 
such a case; but Aristotle ap- 
pears, especially c. 18, to find 
Td piddvOpwmrov precisely in the 
punishment of wrong as such: 
one who wishes well to humanity 
can wish no good to its enemies. 

§ ©. 13, 14. 

* 0. 17a. 

7 C. 15, on the text and ar- 
rangement of which see SuUSsE- 
MIHL, p. 10, 13 sq. 

§ Aéiis c. 19-22, with which 
cf. MULLER, tdid. 131 sqq. 


¥2 


324 ARISTOTLE 


these technical details. With regard to the section 
dealing with narrative poetry,' with which the Poetics, 
as we have it, closes, we need only remark that Ari- 
stotle here also lays the main emphasis upon the unity 
of the action, finding in it the mark which separates 
epic poetry from history, which is the narrative of con- 
temporaneous events without reference to their inner 
connection.” It is chiefly, moreover, on the ground of 
its greater unity that in comparing tragedy with epic 
poetry he assigns to the former the higher place as.a 
form of artistic composition.? Of the remaining kinds 
of poetry the extant portions of Aristotle’s work do not 
treat. Comedy alone is briefly touched upon in an 
earlier passage*; and cursory as are his allusions® to 
it, we can yet see from them that Aristotle was not 
inclined to concur in Plato’s harsh estimate of its 
value.® 


' C, 25-26. does he admit it as a means of 
2: ©, 93: moral education (see Ph. d. Gr. i. 
$C. 26: 800, 802). Aristotle admits that it 


4 See supra, vol. ii. p. 304 sq. 


has to do with human infirmity, 
5 Supplementary to these (as 


but he adds that it deals only 


was shown by BERNAYS) are 
some statements to be found in 
the editions of VAHLEN and 
SUSEMIHL, as was already re- 
marked, vol. i. p.102. Besides the 
quotations, sup. vol. 1. p.306, n. 3, 
p. 313, u. 1, the division of comedy 
into yéAws éx Tis Aé~ews and yéAws 
éx Tov Tpayuatwv is of especial 
interest in this connection. Cf. 
BERNAYS, Rhein. Mus. N. F. 
vili. 577 sqq. 

6 Plato had conceived in a 
general way of comedy only as the 
representation of deformity, and 
the pleasure produced by it as 
malignancy. Only in the Zamns 


with harmless infirmities, and in 
demanding of it at the same 
time that it should devote itself 
not to the ridicule of particular 
persons but to depicting types 
of character, he opened the way 
to the recognition of it as a 
means of purifying and elevating 
natural sentiments. Whether 
Aristotle actually adopted this 
view, and whether he assigned 
to comedy a higher position than 
the music which, in Polit. viii. 
7, 1842, a, 18 sqq., he withholds 
from the common people, cannot 
be positively decided. 








325 


CHAPTER XVI 


RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY 


In the preceding section we had to deal with a 
fragmentary account of a theory which Aristotle him- 
self developed more fully. In the section now before 
us we have to deal with a subject which he has made no 
attempt to treat scientifically, but has only touched upon 
occasionally in detached passages. Aristotle has not 
any more than Plato a philosophy of Religion in the 
scientific sense;! his system even lacks those features 
which give to the Platonic philosophy, in spite of the 
severe criticisms which it passes on the existing religion, 


‘a peculiar religious character of its own. He does not 


require to fall back upon the popular faith, as Plato 
had done in his theory of myths, although at the same 
time, on the principle that universal opinion and un- 
reflecting tradition are never without a certain truth,” 
he willingly makes use of the suggestions and links of 
connection which it supplies.’ -His scientific researches 


1 His view of the Divine gion especially in its relation to 
Being, indeed, is set forth in the philosophy, is nowhere fully 
Metaphysics; but the question investigated. 
with which the philosophy of 2 See supra, vol. i. p. 256, n. 2, 
religion starts, as to the distin- and p. 29!, n. 5. 
guishing characteristics of reli- 8 For proofs of this, see infra. 


326 ARISTOTLE 


do not exhibit that constant direct reference to the 
personal life and circumstances of men which in an 
especial degree gives to the Platonic philosophy its 
religious tone;' even in morals the motives which he 
assigns for action are strictly ethical and not religious. 
His whole view of the world rests-upon the principle 
of explaining things as completely as may be by a 
reference to their natural causes; that the universe of 
natural effects must be referred to a Divine cause he 
never in the least doubts;? but as this affords no 
scientific explanation of them he never connects indi- 
vidual facts and events, as Plato so often does, with 
divine agency. ‘The conception of Providence, common 
to Socrates and Plato, as of a divine activity exercised 
in individual cases, finds no place in Aristotle. We 
miss, therefore, in his system that warm glow of religious 
feeling which in Plato has ever so strongly appealed 
to susceptible minds, and in comparison with which 
the Aristotelian philosophy seems to be cold and 
lifeless. 

"Tt would be wrong to deny or under-estimate the 
difference which exists in this respect between the 
two philosophers. They certainly treat their subject 
in a different spirit. .The inner bond which in 
Plato unites philosophy with religion is not indeed 
completely severed in Aristotle, but it is so widely 
expanded as to give to science the freest scope in 
its own field. No attempt is ever made to answer 
scientific questions by means of religious presupposi- 


1 Cf. Ph. d. Gr.i. p. 793 sq. ? See vol. i. p. 421 sq. 
3 Cf. supra, vol. i. p. 399 sq. 






—_ == 


RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY = 327 


tions. On the other hand, all positive treatment of 
religion itself, as a science in the same sense as art or 
morality, is as far from Aristotle’s thoughts as from 
Plato’s. Different as is the attitude which each 
actually takes up with regard to religion, yet in 
their scientific views of it they approach very near to 
one another, the main difference in this respect being 
that Aristotle is more strictly logical in drawing con- 
clusions whose premises are no strangers to Plato’s 
thought. Aristotle, as we have already seen, is con- 
vinced like Plato of the unity of the Divine Being 
(in so far as we understand by this Deity in the proper 
sense of the word, or the highest efficient cause), of his 
exaltation above the world, of his immaterial and purely 
spiritual nature, and of his faultless perfection; and 
he strives to demonstrate with greater fullness and more 
scientific accuracy than his predecessor not only the 
existence but also the attributes of Deity. But 
while Plato had on the one hand identified God with 
the Idea of the Good, which can only be conceived of 
as impersonal, on the other he depicted his creative and 
governing activity in conformity with popular repre- 
sentations of it, and not without sundry mythical 
embellishments. This ambiguity is removed by his 
pupil, who defines the Divine Nature clearly and 
sharply on both sides: on the one hand God, as a 
personal supernatural Being, is guarded from all con- 
fusion with any merely universal conception or im- 
personal power ; while on the other, as he is limited in his 
activity to pure thought and absolutely self-contained, 
and he operates upon the world only to set in motion the 


328 ARISTOTLE 


_ outermost of the cosmic spheres.! Individual events 
do not therefore upon this view admit of being referred 
directly to divine causation. Zeus does not rain in 
order that the corn may grow or be destroyed, but 
because, according to universal laws of nature, the 
rising vapours cool and descend as water ;? prophetic 
dreams are not sent by the gods to reveal to us the 
future, but, in so far as the question is here of causality 
at all and not merely of chance coincidence, they are 
to be referred as natural effects to physical causes 3 
Nor is the case in any degree altered by the fact that 
between God above and earth beneath numerous other 
eternal beings find a place;‘ since the operation of 
those heavenly beings is likewise limited to causing the 
motion of their own sphere, any interference on their 
part with individual events of the kind that popular 
belief attributes to its gods and demons is out of the 
question. The essential truth of the belief in Provi- 
dence, however, Aristotle does not certainly on this 
account resign. He also recognises in the order of the 
universe the operation of Divine Power and of rational 
design ;° he believes especially that the gods care for 
men, that they interest themselves in those who live 
according to reason, and that happiness is their gift® ; 


1 See supra, vol. i. p. 388 sqq ; 
cf. Ph.d. Gr.i. p. 785 sqq. 591 sqq. 

2 See supra, vol. i. p. 361, n. 1. 

3 See supra, vol. ii. p. 75 sq. 
Dov. 1, 462, b, 20. 


* See supra, vol. i. p. 494 sq. ° 


5 See vol. i. p. 420 sq. 

§ Hth. x. 9, 1179, a, 24: ei yap 
Tis emmédera Tay dvOpwrivwy bird 
GeGy yiverat, domep Soxe?, wad €fy 


ay e¥Aoyov xalpew re adrod’s TE 
aplotw kal tg cvyyevertar@ (TodTO 
3 av ely 6 vows) kal rods &yarayras 
uddAucra TovTo Kal TiwavTas dvTeEv- 
moveiy @s TaY plAwY adTois émrtueAov- 
Bévous Kal é6p0eés tre Kal Kadrds 
mwparrovras. i, 10, 1099, b, 11: e 
fev otv kal &AAO Tt Cot) Bedy 
Sépnua avOpdros, eAoyov Kal Thy 
evdamoviav OedcdoToy elvat Kal 














RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY 329 


he also opposes the notion that God is envious, and 
might therefore, if he liked, withhold from man his 
best gift of knowledge.' But this Divine Providence 
coincides completely for Aristotle with the operation of 
natural causes ;” all the more because in setting aside 
the Platonic eschatology he left no room for that direct 
agency of the Deity which Plato had so largely ad- 
mitted into his pictures of the future life and its retribu- 
tions. God stands according to Aristotle outside the 
world, engaged in solitary self-contemplation ; he is for 
man the object of admiration and reverence;* the 
knowledge of him is the mind’s highest aim ;* in him 
lies the goal towards which, along with all finite things, 
man strives, and whose perfection excites his love. 
But as man can expect no reciprocal love from God,® 


udAwora tay avOpwrlvwy bow Bér- 
tiorov, Vili. 14, 1162, a,4: gor: 
3 4 mtv mpds yoveis piria réxvois, 
Kal GvOpdémois mpos Geods, ws mpds 
@yabby Kal twepéxov: eb yap’ re- 
mwoihkact Ta weyiora. 

1 Metaph. i. 2, 982, b, 32 (see 
sup. Vol. ii. 163, 3): €f 5h A€yous!t 
Tt of mointal Kal wépuKe pOoveiy Td 
Ociov, er) robrov cuuBalvew udrdLora 
eixds .... GAA’ ode Td Oeiov Plove- 
poy evdéxerat elvatr, &c. Cf. Ph. d. 
Gr. i. 602, 1, 787, 1. 

2 Eth. i. 10: Aristotle con- 
tinues: galvera: 5¢ wav ci wh 
Oedreumrés eorw GAA BV aperhy 
kal ria pddnow h &oKnow wapayi- 
vera Tav Ocordrwy elvar* Td yap 
rijs aperts GAov Kal TéAos Kpiorroy 
elvat gaiverat wal Ocidv rt Kal 
paxdpioy. If we compare with 
this the passage quoted from 
Eth. x. 10 on p. 156, n. 4, supra. 
we shall see that the happiness 


which is O@eécd0r0s consists 
merely in the moral and spiritual 
capacities of man—in the natural 
possession of reason in which he 
has still to secure himself by 
actual study and practice. 

3 Metaph. xii.7 (see supra, vol. 
i.p.184,n.1). SENECA, Y. J. vii.: 
eqregie Aristoteles ait, nunquam 
nos verecundiores esse debere quam 
cum de Dis agitur. 

‘The Divine Being is the 
highest object of thought (see 
supra, Vol. i. p. 398n. 2), and theo- 
logy therefore (vol. i. p. 184, 
n, 1), thehighest branch of philo- 
sophy. 

5 Of. vol. i. p. 404, sqq. 

® See supra, vol. i. p. 398, n. 1, 
which places the passage quoted, 
p. 328, n. 6, supra, from LZth. viii. 
14 in the proper light; there is a 
love (:Ala) of men towards the 
gods, but not vice versa. 


330 ARISTOTLE 


neither can he experience any influence from him 
which would be different from that of natural causes, 
and his reason is the only means whereby he enters into 
direct communion with him.! 

Holding these views, Aristotle could not concede to 
the popular religion the same significance which Plato 
did. That it must certainly have its own truth, fol- 
lowed for him from his view of the historical evolution 
of mankind and the value of common opinion. Uni- 
versal conviction is for him of itself a mark of truth,? 
all the more so when we are dealing with convictions 
which have been transmitted by mankind from time 
immemorial. Since the world, according to Aristotle, 
is eternal, the earth must be so also; and if the earth 
is so, man must be so as well.? But all parts of the 
globe undergo continual change,‘ and one of the con- 
sequences of this is that man’s development does not 
proceed in an unbroken line but is ever and anon 
interrupted by relapses into a state of primitive bar- 
barism and ignorance,’ from which a fresh start must 
be made in the cyclic process of creation. In this way 
all knowledge and all art have been lost and re- 
discovered times without number, and similar notions 
have recurred to mankind, not once or twice but with 
incalculable frequency. Nevertheless, a certain recol- 


1 Cf. on this point, swpra, vol. 
i. p. 329,n. 2, and p. 403 sqq. 


2 See supra, vol.i. p. 291, n. 5. 
3 Cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 32, n. 1. 


* See supra, vol. ii. p. 29 sq. 

5 Cf. Polit. ii. 8, 1269, a, 4: 
cixds Te Tovs mpéTous, etre ynye- 
veis hoay el’ ex POopas Tivos eow- 


Onoar, Suotous elvar kal To¥s tuXdv- 
Tas Kal Tovs dvohrous, domep Kal 
A€yerat Kata Tov ynyevav, dor’ 
&romwovy Tho méevew ev tois TobTwy 
Sdyuacw. 

§ Cf. Phys. iv. 14, 223, b, 24: 
gaat yap Kixdov elvar Ta avOpdmiva 
TpdyUar a. 


RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY 331 


lection of particular truths has been retained amid the 
changes in man’s condition, and it is these remnants of 
departed knowledge that, according to Aristotle, form 
the kernel of mythical tradition.'! Even the popular 
faith, therefore, has its roots in the search for truth, 
whether we trace it back to that intuition of the divine 
which even Aristotle is unwilling to contradict,? and 
to those experiences which he regarded as the source 
of the popular theology,’ or whether we trace it to a 
tradition which, as a remnant of an older science or 
religion, must yet in the end have its roots in human 
reason. More particularly there are two truths which 
Aristotle, like Plato, finds to be contained in the 
popular belief of his country: first, that God exists; 
and secondly, that the stellar universe is in its nature 


divine.* 


1 Metaph. xii. 8; see p. 
508, n. 2, supra. De Celoi.3; 
Meteor. i. 3, 339, b, 19: it is 
not we alone who have this view 
of the mpatov croixeiov as the 
substance of the celestial world, 
galverat 8’ apxala tis brdAnlis 
airn kal trav mpdrepoy avOporwy 
. +. 0d yap 5h Hhoomer Grak ovdé 
Sls ob8’ dArydeis Tas abras Sdéas 
dvakukAely yiwouevas ev Tois avOpa- 
mois, GAA’ Gmeipdeis. Polit. vii. 
10, 1329, b, 25: ocxeddv pty odv 
Kal Ta GAA Set voulCew edpjoba 
moAAdKis évy TH TMOAAD xpdvy, 
maAAoy 8 drrecpdxis, as like needs 
and states must always have led 
to the same discoveries. 

* De Calo, ii. 1 fin.: Ari- 
stotle’s view of the eternity of 
the world is not only truer in 
itself, @AAG Kal rH mavela TH epi 
tov Oedy pdvedis dy Exomev odtws 


With the further details of Greek mythology, 


duodoyoupévws aropalverOar ocup- 
davous Adyous. Cf. the appeal to 
marpiot Adyo, ibid. 284, a, 2. Me- 
taph. xii, 8, see supra, vol. i. 
p. 508, n. 2. 

* See supra, vol.i. p. 390, n. 3. 

‘ The first hardly requires 
proof; see, however, the quota- 
tions, vol. i. p. 390, n. 3, 4, from 
SEXxTUuS and CICERO, and p. 395, 
n. 6,from the treatise De Calo, i. 
9; in the latter passage a trace of 
true knowledge is discovered in 
the name aidy, just as elsewherein 
that of the ‘aether’ («al yap rodro 
Trovvoua Oelws epOeynra: mapa Tay 
apxalwy). In support of his doc- 
trine of the divinity of the 
heavens and of thestars, Aristotle 
appeals to the existing religion 
in the passage just referred 
to. 


332 ARISTOTLE 


on the other hand, with all the doctrines aud stories 
which transfer the properties and weaknesses of human 
nature to the gods—in a word, with the whole range of 
anthropomorphic theology—Aristotle is as completely 
out of sympathy as Plato was; the only difference is 
that he no longer considers it necessary, as Plato had 
done, expressly to confute such representations, but 
treats them simply as preposterous fables.' If we ask 
how those false elements have found their way into the 
popular faith, Aristotle refers us to the inherent ten- 
dency in mankind to anthropomorphic representations 
of the gods,? which offended even Xenophanes,? or to 
the fact that statesmen had accommodated themselves as 
a matter of policy to this tendency, and used it for their 
ownends. Even ancient tradition, he says,‘ recognises 
that the heavens and the heavenly bodies are gods, and 
that the whole world is encircled by divinity. ‘ All 
else, however, is mythical embellishment, devised to 
attract the multitude, to aid legislation, and to forward 
the common interest. While therefore Plato had 
permitted the legislator to employ myths (the origin of 


rovs @Oeovs St 81a TovTO wayTes 


1 Metaph. xii. 8; see p. 508,n. 


2, supra. Ibid. iii. 2,997, b, 8 ; see 
vol. i. p. 315, n. 2, c. 4, 1000, a, 18: 
GANG wep) ev TOY pvOiKas copiCop- 
évwv ovk&é.ov meTa omovdis oKorTelv. 
Poet. 25, 1460, b, 35: a poetic 
representation is justified by its 
correspondence either with the 
ideal or with the actual; «7 5€ 
pnderépws, Sti o8tw pacly, oloy Ta 
mep) Oeadv. tows yap ore BEeATLOV 
oftw Acyew, oT’ GAnNIn, GAN 
éruxev bowep Bevopdyns* adn’ ob 
pact Tae. 


2 Polit, i. 2, 1252, b, 24: nat 


pact BacircderOa, Sts Kal avtol of 
mev @rt kal voy of b& Tb dpxaiov 
éBaciAevovto* Samep St kad ra ef5y 
éavTois adouowdow of &yvOpwrot, 
orw Kal Tovs Blous Trav OeGv. This 
deduction of the belief in a 
sovereign of the gods is all the 
more remarkable, because Ari- 
stotle might equally well have 
himself found in that tradition 
a proof of the unity of God. 

8 Of. Ph. d. Gr. i. 490. 

4 In the passage quoted from 
Metaph. xii. 8, invol.i, p.508,n. 2. 


—- ——— 


RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY = 333 


which he did not explain) as pedagogic lies in the 
interest of the State,' Aristotle goes a step farther, 
and thus comes a step nearer the view of sophistic 
free-thinking as to the origin of religion,? in maintain- 
ing that these myths, or at least a great part of them, 
had been from the beginning invented for no other 
purpose. This, indeed, is what we should expect from 
the strictness with which he himself excludes all that 
is mythical from his scientific investigations, his refusal 
to introduce religious considerations into his naturalistic 
view of the world,’ and the exclusiveness with which he 
relies in his Ethics upon moral motives to the neglect 
of the religious. Religion itself, indeed, he always 
treats as an absolute moral necessity. The man who 
doubts whether the gods have a claim on our reverence 
or not is a fit subject, he says,* not for instruction but 
for punishment, just as would be the man who might 
ask whether his parents have a claim upon his love. 
As in his system the world cannot be thought of apart 
from God, so neither can man apart from religion. 
But to rest this religion upon such palpable fables as 
the myths of the popular belief can be justified only on 
the ground of the aforesaid political expediency.> Ari- 
stotle himself sometimes makes use of these myths, as 
of other popular opinions, in order to point to some 


1 See Ph. d. Gr. i. 792. 

2 Thid. i. 1010 sq. 
_ * The expression is used in no 
depreciatory sense, but as indi- 
cating the view that everything 
in the world is the effect of 
natural causes. 

* Top. i. 11, 105, a, 5, cf. Eth. 
viii. 16, 1163, b, 15, ix. 1, 1164, b, 


4, and supra, vol. ii. p. 329, n. 3. 

5 It is possible, indeed, that 
if he had completed the discus- 
sion of education in the best 
state, he would have accepted 
Plato’s doctrine, that myths were 
indispensable in education, as 
easily reconcileable with the 
argument. 


334 


ARISTOTLE 


universal truth embodied in them,’ just as he likes to 
trace back scientific assumptions to their most in- 
significant beginnings, and to pay respect to popular 


sayings and proverbs.” 


But apart from the few uni- 


versal principles of religion embodied in mythology, 
he ascribes to it no deeper significahce; and just as 
little, on the other hand, does he seem to aim at its 
purification. He presupposes for his State the existing 
religion,® just as personally he did not renounce its 


1 Thus Metaph. i. 3, 983, b, 
27, c. 4 init. xiv. 4, 1091, b, 3. 
Phys. iv. 1, 208, b, 29, hints of 
certain scientific views of the 
world are discovered in the cos- 
mogonic myths of Hesiod and 
other poets ; Meteor. i. 9, 347, a, 
5 the Oceanus is interpreted of 
the air-current that encircles the 
earth; the myth of Atlas proves 
that its inventors, with later 
philosophers, attributed weight 
to the heavens (De Celio, ii. 1, 
284, a, 18, in the treatise De 
Motu Anim. 3, 699, a, 27, Atlas 
is interpreted to mean the world's 
axis ; the same treatise, c. 4, 699, 
b, 35, finds in Homer’s lines upon 
the golden chain a reference to 
the immobility of the primum 
movens); Aphrodite is said to 
have obtained this name because 
of the frothy character of the 
semen (Gen. An. ii. 2 fin.); Ares 
was united with this goddess by 
the first inventors of this myth 
because warlike natures, as a 
rule, exhibit amorous propensities 
(Pol. ii. 9, 1269, b, 27); in the 
fable which tells how the Argo- 
nauts had to leave Heracles 
behind there lies a true political 
observation (Polit. iii. 13, 1284, 
a, 22); the story that Athene 


threw away the flute expresses 
the truth that this instrument is 
unnecessary for mental culture 
(Polit. viii. 6, 1341, b, 2); the 
worship of the Graces points to 
the necessity of reciprocity 
(Hth. v. 8, 1133, a, 2); the 
number three derives its signifi- 
cance in the popular religion from 
the fact that it is the first number 
which has beginning, middle, and 
end (De Celo, i. 1, 268, a, 14). 

2 Thus, H. An. vi. 35, 580, a, 
15, ix. 32, 619, a, 18 he quotes 
several myths about animals; in 
the fragment from the Eudemus 
(PLUT. Cons. ad Apoll. c. 27 fr. 
40) he makes use of the story of 
Midas and Silenus; on his pre- 
dilection for proverbs, cf. supra, 
vol. i. p. 256, n. 2. 

8 As is obvious from Polit. 
vii. 8, 1328, b, 11, c. 9, 1329, a, 
29, c. 12, 1331, a, 24, c. 16, 1335, 
b, 14. But that he went so far 
in his zeal for religion as to as- 
sign the fourth part of the land 
collectively to the priesthood for 
the support of religion cannot be 
concluded (as has been suggested 
in Ferienschr. N. F. i. 303) from 
Polit. vii. 10, 1330, a, 8. Ari- 
stotle says indeed here that the 
land should be divided into pub- 


———————— 


RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY — 335 


rites, and expressed his dependence on friends and 
relatives through the forms which it had consecrated ; ' 
but of the Platonic demand for the reform of religion 
by philosophy we have not a trace in him, and in his 
Politics he admits into the existing cultus things which he 
disapproves of in themselves.? Aristotle’s philosophy 
stands thus as a whole in the loosest relation to positive 
religion. It takes advantage of its ideas as links of literary 
connection, but makes no further use of them. Just as 
little, however, does it desire to see religion purified or 
reformed; on the contrary, it seems to accept its im- 
perfections as something which could not possibly be 
otherwise. Each stands to the other in an attitude of 
essential indifference ; philosophy goes its own way, 
without much troubling itself about religion, or fearing 
from it any interruption in the prosecution of its own 
work. 


lic and private, and the latter # Adyous aoxjmovas. émimeAts ev 


again into two parts for the sup- 
port of religion and the syssitia 
respectively, but he does not say 
that these parts should be of the 
same size. 

1 Cf. in this reference the 
quotations on the subject of his 


votive offerings and gifts to 


the dead, in chap. i. ad jin. 

2 Polit. vii. 17, 1336, b, 3: 
bAws mtv ody aicxpodroylay ek rijs 
médews, homep AAO Ti, Set Toy 
vomobérny eEopiCew . . . emel 5é rd 
Aéyewy Tt Tay ToLo’Twy eEoplCouer, 


pavepdy Sri Kal Td Oewpeiv 2 ypapas 


ody orw Tois %pxovor unbey ure 
&yadua whre ypaphy elvat rowdTwy 
mpdtewy plunow, el mh mapa riot 
Geots TotovTots ols Kal Toy TwHacmdy 
arodliwow 5 vduos+ mpds St rovTots 
apinow 6 vduos Tovs Exovras HAL- 
Klay wAéov mponjkovcay Kal dwép 
abrav Kal réxywy Kal ‘yuvaKey 
Timadgev Tovs Geos. The latter 
admission clearly shows how 
Aristotle endeavoured to make 
things which he disapproved of 
and only unwillingly permitted, 
at least as harmless as possible. 


336 ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XVII 


RETROSPECT 


THE peculiar traits of the Aristotelian philosophy are 
due to the fusion in it of the two elements to which 
attention was called at the outset,! namely the dialectic 
or speculative, and the empirical or realistic. On the 
one hand the system finds the true essence of things to 
consist in immaterial form, true knowledge of them in 
the apprehension of their concept; on the other hand, 
it insists that the form should not be conceived of as a 
transcendental ‘idea’ existing apart from things, and that 
it is the individual, and not the universal notion or genus, 
that is the ultimate reality. It therefore represents , 
experience as the only source of concepts, which are 
obtained, not by turning away from the actual to an 
ideal world, but by apprehending in their essence the 
data of experience themselves ; thus, while pursuing the 
dialectic development of the concept, it unites with it 
a comprehensive observation of the facts. Both traits 
have their roots equally in the intellectual capacity of 
its author, whose greatness just consists in this rare 
union in equal measure of qualities which in most men 
are found to be mutually exclusive of one another: the 


! Vol. i. p. 170 sqq. 





RETROSPECT 337 


faculty, namely, of philosophic thought and the power 
of accurate observation applied with living interest to 
the world of fact. Hitherto these elements have been 
combined in very different proportions in philosophy. 
In the school of Socrates and Plato the art of developing 
the concept had far outstript the power of appreciating 
the fact. They had directed attention to what is 
inward in man to the neglect of the outward world, 
and had regarded thought itself as the immediate source 
of our truth. Thought, that is to say, conceptions, stood 
for what was absolutely certain, the criterion by which 
the truth of experience was to be tested. The strongest 
expression of, as well as the most remarkable deduction 
from, this theory is to be found in the Platonic doctrine 
of Ideas. Aristotle indeed shares the general presup- 

positions of this idealistic philosophy ; he also is con-— 
vinced that the essence of things is only known by 
thought, and consists only in that which is the object 
of our thought, or, in other words, in the form and not 
in the matter. He justly takes exception, however, to the 
transcendental character of the Platonic Ideas. He can- 
not conceive of the form and the essence as existing 
separately from the things whose form and essence 
they are. Reflecting further that our own conceptions 
are not independent of experience in their origin, he is 
the more convinced of the error of the Platonic separa- 
tion between the Ideas and the phenomena. In place, 
then, of the doctrine of Ideas he presents us with an essen- 
tially new view. It is not the genus but the individual 
which, according to Aristotle, constitutes the substantial 
reality; the form does not exist as a universal apart from 

VOL. U, | Z 


338 Nis ARISTOTLE 


the thing, but in it as the special form of this or that 
particular. While the general principle upon which the 
Platonic Idealism is founded is thus retained, the special 
development of it into the doctrine of Ideas is rejected. 
The ‘ Idea,’ which Plato had conceived of as transcenden- 
tal and supersensible, has a new place assigned to it as the 
formative and efficient principle in the phenomenal 
world. As the inner essence of things, itis sought for in 
the facts themselves, as these present themselves to us 
in experience. The Aristotelian doctrine may thus be 
described as alike the completion and the confutation of 
the Platonic. It confutes it in the form which Plato 
had given to it: yet at the same time it develops his 
fundamental thought still more fully and logically than 
Plato himself had done, in that it attributes to form not 
only, with him, complete and primary reality, but also a 
creative force to produce all else that is real. Aristotle, 
therefore, traces the potency of thought much deeper 
than Plato had been able to do throughout the whole 
field of phenomena. 

From this fundamental principle all the leading 
doctrines of the Aristotelian philosophy logically follow. 
Since the universal cannot exist apart from the indi- 
vidual it cannot form an independent reality by itself, 
the individual alone has substantial reality. And since 
the form is conceived of, not as absolute essence, 
abstracted from phenomena, but as the efficient cause 
which works in them, it cannot stand as it does in Plato 
in a relation of mere opposition to that which is the 
substratum of phenomena—namely, matter. If form is 
the absolutely real, matter cannot be the absolutely un- 





RETROSPECT 339 


real and non-existent ; for, in order that form may be able 
to realise itself in the matter, there must exist between 
the two a kinship or positive relation as well as the 
apparent antagonism. So matter is merely unrealised 
form, it is the potentiality of which form is the actuality.' 
From this mutual relationship arises motion, and with it 
all natural life, all growth and decay, all change and 
transmutation. But since the two principles of form and 
motion stand originally towards one another in a relation 
of mere antagonism and opposition, this relation itself, 
or in other words motion, presupposes for form an 
absolute existence ; if it is the cause of all motion, it 
must itself be unmoved, and precede all that is moved— 
if not in order of time, at least in the logical order of 
reality. From the sum of the forms which are em- 
bodied in matter we must therefore distinguish the 
primum movens, or God, as pure form or pure reason 
whose only object is itself. Since all motions pro- 
ceed from form, they must all be striving towards 
a certain definite form as their goal. There is nothing 
in nature which has not its own indwelling end; 
and since all motion leads us back to a primary 
source of movement, the sum total of things is subor- 
dinate to some highest end, and constitutes an organic 
whole—in other words, an ordered world. But since 
form operates in matter which only gradually develops 
into that which it is destined to become, the formal 
design can only realise itself under manifold restraints, 
and in conflict with the resistance of matter, at one time 
with greater at another with less perfection. Thus the 


» Cf. p. 340 sqq., vol, i. 
z 2 


340 3 ARISTOTLE 


world is composed of many parts, which vary infinitely in 
worth and beauty ; these again fall apart into the two 
great sections of heaven and earth, of which the former 
exhibits a gradual diminution, the latter, contrariwise, 
a gradual increase in perfection. But while all parts of 
the world down to the most imperfect and insignificant 
are essential elements in the whole, still the definite and 
peculiar character of each has a claim upon our regard, 
and accordingly it is not less in harmony with the 
demands of the system than with the personal inclina- 
tions of its author to investigate great things and small 
alike with scientific thoroughness, and to treat nothing 
with contempt as if it were insignificant and worthless for 
science.' ‘This does not, of course, exclude such degrees 
of importance among things themselves as Aristotle has 
sought to point out in the sphere, for example, of animate 
nature. So among mundane beings the first place is 
assigned to man, since in him alone spirit reveals itself 
as spirit. The chief end of man, therefore, consists in 
the cultivation and exercise of his spiritual capacities: 
in other words, scientific knowledge and moral will are 
the essential conditions of happiness. But as no 
work is possible without appropriate material, it is 
impossible for man to dispense with external aids for 
the realisation of his end; and as all things develop 
into that which they are capable of becoming only 
by a gradual process, so in the spiritual life of man 
there is exhibited a gradual process of development. 
Thus from sense perception spring imagination and 


‘ See on this head, vol. i. p. 167, n. 3, p. 169, n. 3, and also 
PLATO’S statements noted, Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 665. 








RETROSPECT 341 


memory, from these arises thought; natural capacity 
precedes moral action, practice and habit precede moral 
knowledge; reason appears first as passive and as 
entangled in the lower faculties of the soul before it 
realises itself as active in the purity of its being. The 
highest perfection of our spiritual life consists, however, 
in scientific contemplation, for here alone reason is in 
immediate contact with the pure forms of things, while 
at the same time it is beyond question that reason 
cannot confine itself to the immediate knowledge of 
first principles, but methodically pressing forward from 
phenomena to conceptions, and tracing causes to their 
effects, must finally embrace the whole sphere of reality. 

This short survey has already shown us in the Ari- 
stotelian system a well-planned doctrinal structure, the 
outlines of which are drawn with a firm hand in 
accordance with one fundamental thought. The care 
and consistency with which the design is executed down 
to the minutest detail is manifest from the whole pre- 
ceding account. It is nevertheless true that, as we 
have already had frequent occasion to remark, all the 
joints of the fabric are not equally secure; and the 
ultimate source of this defect must be sought for in 
the fact that the foundations of the whole have not been 
laid sufficiently deep. Putting aside all those points 
in which the want of experimental knowledge has led 
Aristotle to draw false conclusions and put forward un- 
tenable explanations, and limiting ourselves merely to 
the question of the self-consistency of his doctrine, 
without entering upon that of its absolute truth, 
we cannot deny that Aristotle has failed to unite the 


342 ARISTOTLE 


chief points of view in his system in a manner free from 
self-contradiction. Just as in his scientific procedure 
dialectic and observation, the speculative and the em- 
pirical elements, are not equally balanced, but the 
a priort method common to Socrates and Plato con- 
tinually re-asserts itself over the more strictly empirical," 
so also in his metaphysical speculations we detect 
a similar phenomenon. There is nothing in the 
Platonic system which is so distasteful to him as 
that dualism between Idea and phenomenon which 
expressed itself sharply in the doctrine of the abso- 
lute existence of the Ideas, and of the non-reality of 
matter. His opposition to this dualism is the key-note 
of his whole reconstruction of the Platonic metaphysics 
and of the fundamental ideas peculiar to his own system. 
And yet, earnest and thorough as are his efforts to over- 
come it, he has not, after all, succeeded in doing so. 

He denies Plato’s doctrine that universal class notions 
possess substantial reality; but he asserts with him 
that all our conceptions are of the universal, and depend 
for their truth upon the reality of their object.* He 
combats the transcendental character of the Platonic 
Ideas and the dualism between Idea and phenomenon. 
But he himself leaves form and matter in a like funda- 
mental opposition to one another, in that he fails to trace 
them back to a common source; and the further develop- 
ment of these two principles involves him in the 
contradiction’ of maintaining that the essence and sub- 
stance of things is in the form, which at the same time 


See sup. vol. i. p. 175 sq. p. 258, sqq. 2 Cf. vol. i. p. 334 sqq. 
8 On which cf. vol. i. p. 372 sqq. 








RETROSPECT 343 


is a universal, and yet that the source of individuality 
and therefore also of substantiality must be the matter. 
He takes exception to Plato’s doctrine on the ground 
that his Ideas contain no principle of motion ; neverthe- 
less his own account of the relation between form and 
matter leaves all actual motion equally unexplained. He 
places God as a personal being outside the world; but 
lest he should derogate in anything from his perfection, 
he thinks it necessary to deny to him the essential 
conditions of personality. So, to escape involving him 
in the transmutations of finite things, he limits God’s 
operation (herein contradicting the more living idea of 
God which he elsewhere entertains) to the production 
of motion in the outer cosmic sphere, and so pictures 
that activity to himself, as to assign spatial existence 
to the Deity. 

Connected with this is the obscurity which surrounds 
his conception of Nature. In the spirit of antiquity he 
describes Nature as a single being who operates with 
a purpose, as a rational all-efficient power: and yet his 
system supplies no subject of which these attributes 
may be predicated.' Far as Aristotle has advanced 
beyond the superficial teleology of Socrates and Plato, 
he has none the less failed actually to solve the opposi- 
tion between physical and final causes ;? and while we 
must admit that the problem with which he is here face 
to face is one that still taxes our resources, and that we 
cannot therefore reproach him with having failed to 
solve it, itis yet curious to note how easily the two prin- 


1 Cf. with the above remarks ? As will be obvious from p. 
vol. i. p. 420 sq. 358 sqq. p. 464 sqq. and p. 17, sup. 


344 3 ARISTOTLE 


ciples which he had posited at the outset of his philo- 
sophy of nature might in the sequel become mutually 
contradictory and exclusive of one another. A further 
difficulty arises in connection with the Aristotelian 
account of animate nature, and especially of man, 
inasmuch as it is hard to discover any inner principle 
of union between the various elements of the soul, and 
harder still to explain the phenomena of its life, if, like 
every other moving force, the soul is held to be itself 
unmoved. ‘The difficulty, however, becomes greatest 
when we ask how we are to comprehend in the unity 
of personal life the reason of man and the lower 
faculties of his soul, and to determine the share of the 
former in his spiritual acts and states; how we are to 
conceive of what is passive and incorporeal as at the 
same time part of a soul which by its very definition is 
the ‘ entelechy ’ of the body, and to assign to personality 
its place between the two constituent parts of human 
nature of which the one transcends it while the other 
sinks below it.' 

Turning finally to his Moral Philosophy, we find that 
here also Aristotle strove with much success to correct 
the one-sidedness of Socrates and Plato. He not only 
contradicts the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is Know- 
ledge, but sets aside also Plato’s distinction between 
ordinary and philosophic Virtue. To him, all moral 
qualities are a matter of the Will, and have their primary 
source not in instruction but in habit and education. 
Nevertheless in the account of the intellectual virtues 
there reveals itself an unmistakable vacillation as to 


1 P. 119 sqq. 


RETROSPECT 345 


the relation in which moral knowledge stands to moral 
action, while in the preference for theoretic over 
practical activity ' (which follows indeed quite logically 
from the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul) there reap- 
pears the same presupposition which lay at the root of the 
very views that Aristotle controverted. So, too, even 
in his political philosophy, however deep its insight 
in other respects into the actual conditions of social 
life, and however great its superiority to Plato’s politi- 
cal idealism, we yet find remnants of the old idealism 
—if not so much in the picture of the best State, yet 
in that distinction between true and false forms of 
government the untenableness of which becomes 
manifest by the ambiguous position which the doctrine 
itself assigns to ‘ polity.’? There thus runs through 
every part of the Aristotelian system that dualism 
which it had inherited from Plato, and which, with the 
best intentions, it never succeeded, after it had once 
accepted it as one of its fundamental principles, in 
wholly overcoming. The more earnestly, on the other 
hand, Aristotle strives to transcend this dualism, and 
the more unmistakable the contradictions in which he 
involves himself by his efforts, the clearer it becomes 
how heterogeneous are the elements which are united 
in his philosophy, and how difficult the problem which 
Greek philosophy had to face when once the opposition 
between idea and phenomenon, spirit and nature, had 
been brought so clearly and sharply into view as it was 
in the Platonic doctrine. 






’ Cf. p. 142 sq., supra,andthe toGod—which Aristotle expressly 
proposition (p. 396, vol. i.) that applies to Ethics. 
only theoretic activity belongs * See p. 243, supra. 





346 ARISTOTLE 


Whether Aristotle provided the means of satisfac- 
torily solving this problem, and what attempts in this 
direction were made by the later schools, it will be the 
task of this work to investigate as it proceeds. ‘Those 
early followers who continued to build on Aristotelian 
foundations and who belonged to the Peripatetic school, 
could not be expected to find a more satisfactory answer 
to the main problem than Aristotle himself had suc- 
ceeded in finding. Aristotle’s own conclusions were much 
too deeply rooted in the fundamental presuppositions of 
his system to permit of their being altered without a 
reconstruction of the whole. Yet on the other hand, 
thinkers so keen and independent as the men of this 
school continued to be, could not shut their eyes to the 
difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine, and it was there- 
fore natural that they should devise means of escaping 
them. But since these difficulties ultimately arose from 
the fact that idealism and observation, a spiritual and a 
naturalistic view, had been united without being com- 
pletely reconciled, and since such a reconciliation was im- 
possible on the given premises, there was no way of solving 
the contradiction but by the suppression of one of its 
terms. It was, however, to be expected in the circum- 
stances that the scientific should obtain the preference 
over the dialectic element, for it was the former that 
constituted the distinguishing characteristic of the 
Aristotelian school in opposition to the Platonic, and the 
new interest thus implanted in it by its founder naturally 
exercised a stronger fascination than the older doctrine 
of Ideas which had’ been handed down by the common 
tradition from Socrates and Plato. It was just this 





RETROSPECT 347 


side of the Aristotelian system which might be expected 
chiefly to attract those who gave their allegiance to the 
later philosophy, and so to have an undue prominence 
assigned to it in subsequent deductions from Aristotelian 
ideas. The further development of the Peripatetic 
school corresponds to this expectation. Its most im- 
portant result in the immediately succeeding period was 
to bring the purely naturalistic view of the world more 
and more into prominence, to the neglect of the spiritual 
side of things. 


348 


ARISTOTLE 


CHAPTER XVIII 


THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 


AmonG the numerous pupils of the Stagirite, Theo- 


phrastus occupies the first place.! 


Born at Eresos in 


Lesbos,” he came early (perhaps even before the death 
of Plato) into connection with Aristotle,* from whom in 


1 Dio0G. v. 35: tov 54 Srayei- 
plrov yeydvact ev moAAo) yydpimot, 
Siapepwy 5& wddrAwTa Oedppacros. 
SIMPL. Phys. 225, a. and: T@ 
kopupa'y Tay "ApiotoréAous éralpwy 
®coppdctw; id. Categ. Schol. in 
Ar. 92, b, 22: toy a&pioroy Trav 
avTov mabytav toy Oedpp. That 
he was actually so is evident 
from all that we know of Theo- 
phrastus and his position in the 
Peripatetic School. 

? He is constantly called 
’Epéowos. According to PLUT. Adv. 
Col. 33,3, p. 1126; WV. p. suan. vivi 
sec. Epic. 15, 6, p. 1097, he had 
delivered his native city twice 
from Tyrants. No particulars, 
however, are given, and we are 
not in a position to test the his- 
torical character of the state- 
ment. 

% According to D1oa. v. 36 he 
first attended at Eresos the in- 
structions of a citizen called 
Alcippus, «ir’ dxotcas TlAdtwvos 
[this is chronologically possible] 
weTéotn mpds *ApiororéAnv—by 
which it can only be meant that 


Theophrastus, like Aristotle him- 
self, remained a member of the 
Academy until the death of 
Plato, and after that event con- 
tinued with Aristotle. From 
several indications, moreover, we 
gather that Theophrastus was 
with Aristotle in Macedonia; for 
unreliable as is AELIAN’S state- 
ment (V. H. iv. 19) that he was 
highly esteemed by Philip, it 
makes it all the more certain 
that he was a friend of Callis- 
thenes, whom he could only have 
come to know at that time, and 
that he lamented his tragic end 
in a work entitled KaAAioOévns 4} 
wep) mévOovs (C1c. Tuse. iii. 10, 
21, v. 9, 25; Diog. v. 44; ALEX. 
De An. 162, b fin.). The posses- — 
sion of a property at Stagira 
(DioG. v. 52) and the repeated 
mention of this town, and of the 
museum in it, also go to prove 
that he was there at the same 
time as Aristotle. The expres- 
sion which the latter is said to 
have used with regard to him and 
Callisthenes (D10G. 39) is all the 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 349 


point of age he was not far removed.' 


Before his death 


Aristotle committed to his charge not only his private 
affairs’ but also his School, which he had probably 
already handed over to him on his departure from 
Athens. Under Theophrastus the school grew even 


more suspicious as it is also 
attributed to Plato and Isocrates 
(see Ph. d. Gr. i. 842, 1). Similarly 
the assertion that Theophrastus 
was originally called Tyrtamus, 
and received the name @cdppa- 
oros from Aristotle on account of 
his graceful style (STRABO, xiii. 
2,4, p. 618; Cic. Orat. 19, 62; 
QUINTIL. Jnst. x. 1, 83; PLIN. 
H. Nat. praef. 29; Dioa. 38; 
SUID. Ocdpp.; AMMON. De Interpr. 
17, b,and: OLYMPIOD. V. Plat.p. 
1) is justly called in question by 
BRANDIS, iii. 251, and MEYER 
( Gesch. der Botanik, i. 147). 

1 The year of Theophrastus’s 
birth and death can only be 
determined approximately. Ac- 
cording to APOLLODORUS (Diog. 
58) he died Ol. 123 (288-284 
B.C.), but the year is not given; 
that it was the third year of the 
Olympiad (BRANDIS, iii. 254; 
NAUWERCK, De Strat. 7), and 
that he was himself the head of 
the school for thirty-five (BRAN- 
Dis ibid.) or thirty-six (RITTER 
iii. 408) years is mere conjecture. 
Dtoa. 40 gives his age as eighty- 
five, and this is far more prob- 
able than the statement of the 
spurious letter prefixed to Theo- 
phrastus’s Characters, that he 
composed this treatise at the age 
of ninety-nine, and of HIERONY- 
Mus (Zp. 34 Ad Nepotian. iv. b, 
258 Mart., where our text has 
*Themistoclem’ instead of ‘ Theo- 
phrastum’), that he was 107, for 
Diog. probably here follows 


Apollodorus; these statements, 
moreover, make him older than 
Aristotle, and much too old to be 
destined by the latter (see follow- 
ing note) as the husband of his 
daughter, who was not yet grown 
up. According to Diog., Theo- 
phrastus’s birth falls between 
373 and 368 B.C.; he was there- 
fore from eleven to sixteen years 
younger than Aristotle. 

* He begs Theophrastus, along 
with some others, until Nicanor 
can interest himself inthe matter, 
emmerdciobar . . . eay BovAnra 
kat evdéxnrat abt@, Trav Te matdlwy 
kal ‘EpmuaAAldos kal tay Karade- 
Aeysuévwy, and in case Nicanor, 
for whose wife he had destined 
his daughter Pythias, should die 
before the marriage took place, 
he enjoins upon him the duty of 
marrying her in his stead and 
becoming the guardian of her 
younger brother. (See his Will, 
Dio@. v. 12, 13.) Theophrastus 
actually undertook the education 
of the latter, as he also after- 
wards did that of the sons of Py- 
thias (see p. 20, n. 3, vol.i.; Drog. 
53; SExT. Math. i. 258), and his 
affection for him gave occasion 
to one Aristippus, wep) madaas 
tpuvjs, to accuse him of erotic 
relations with him (D10G. 39). 
In his Will (#bid. 51 sq.) Theo- 
phrastus leaves directions for 
the execution of pictures of Ari- 
stotle and Nicomachus. 

* See p. 37, and p. 39, n. 1. 


350 


ARISTOTLE 


more flourishing,! and when, after holding the presi- 
dency for more than thirty-four years,” he died, honoured 
in spite of many hostile attacks* both at home and 
abroad,‘ he left it as an endowment the garden and the 


hall in which henceforth it had its settled abode.® 


1 Drioa. 387: arhvrwy te eis 
Thy SiarpiBhy avrod pabyntral mpds 
SicxiAtous. If by this is meant 
that he had this number during 
his whole life we must suppose 
that the inner circle of his stu- 
dents is referred to; if he had 
them all at one time it can only 
have been at single lectures, per- 
haps on rhetoric or some other 
popular subject. Zeno’s expres- 
sion (PLutT. Prof. in Virt. c. 6 
fin. p. 78; De se ipso laud. c. 
17, p. 545) 6 éxelvou xopds melCwy, 
6 éuds 5€ cuudwvdrepos refers to 
the number of his students. 

2 See p. 349, n. 1, supra. 

3 See following note. Of the 
Epicureans besides Epicurus 
himself (PLuT. adv. Col. 7, 2, 
p. 1110) the hetaera Leontium 
also wrote against him; Cic. 1. 
D. i. 33, 93. 

4 Of foreign princes Cassan- 
der and Ptolemy, according to 
Diog. 37, gave him proofs of 
their esteem; to the former of 
whom was dedicated a treatise 
aw, Baciretas, the genuineness of 
which, however, was doubted by 
some (DioG, 47; Dtonys. Anti- 
quitt. v. 73; ATHEN. iv. 144, e). 
The esteem in which he was 
held at Athens was shown at his 
burial (DioG. 41), as also pre- 
viously in the matter of the 
accusation of impiety brought 
against him by Agnonides, which 
failed completely (perhaps AE- 
LIAN, V. H, viii. 12, relates to 


Nor 


this), and in the matter of the 
law of Sophocles (cf. also ATHEN. 
xiii, 610, e; KRISCHE, Forsch. 
338), which made the consent of 
the Senate and people necessary 
for the opening of a philosophical 
school. When, in consequence 
of this law (prob. ann. 306-5), 
all the philosophers, and among 
them Theophrastus, left Athens 
it is said to have been chiefly 
regard for him which-caused its 
repeal and the punishment of its 
author; DioG. 37 sq., cf. ZUMPT, 
Ueber den Bestand der philos. 
Schulen in Athen, Abh. der Berl. 
Akad. hist.-phil. Kl, 1842, 41 sq. 
5 DIoG. 39: Adyerar 8 airdy 
kal (iv Kimov oxeiv meta Thy 
*ApiororéAous TeAeuTHY, Anuntptov 
Tov Padnpéws . . . TOUTO cuuTpd- 
~avros. Theophrastus’s will, ibid. 
52: roy 8 Kyjwov nal roy epi- 
marov Kal Tas oikias Tas mpos TE 
Kite waoas Sidwui Tay yeypauméevoy 
pirwy del trois BovAouwévois cuexo- 
Ad ew Kal cuudiAocopely ev avrats 
(éreidhmep ov duvardy maotw avlpo- 
mois Gel emidnucty) pnt ékaddAo- 
Tpiovor mht’ efdiaCouevov undevds, 
BAA’ &s by lepdy Kowh KexTnuEvols 
... €otwoay 5é of KowwvovyTes 
“Immapxos Kc. It is probable that 
the sanctuary of the Muses, de- 
scribed § 51 sq., with its two 
chambers, in one of which were 
hung the mivanes év als ai ris yiis 
meptodol eiow, belonged to the 
buildings here mentioned. From 
the words, § 39, mera Thy “Apt 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 351 


were his services to the Peripatetic doctrine less con- 
spicuous. In creative power of intellect he is not 
indeed to be compared with Aristotle. But he was in 
an especial degree fitted for the work of strengthening, 
extending and completing the system which the latter 
had left behind him. ‘The interest in science by which 
he was governed even to excess, and which led him to 
subordinate all other concerns to its peaceful pursuit and — 
even to forego the pleasures of the family life;' the insati- 

able thirst for knowledge which drew from him even 
when dying complaints of the shortness of human life ; ” 
the industry which scarcely relaxed in extreme old age ; * 
the penetration, conspicuous even in what has come 


ororéAous TeAevT}v ZUMPT infers, 
ibid. 31 sq., that Aristotle had 
previously possessed this garden, 
and that as it was to be sold 
after his death Demetrius man- 
aged that it should be trans- 
ferred to Theophrastus. BRAN- 
DIS (iii. 253) considers this infer- 
ence a rash one, but also sup- 
poses that Aristotle taught in a 
house and garden of his own in 
the Lyceum. We have no infor- 
mation, however, on this point; 
yet the opposite cannot, after 
what has been said p. 38, vol.i., be 
inferred with any certainty from 
the fact that Aristotle’s will 
makes no mention of any such 
property. Even the words upon 
which ZuUMPT relies, if they have 
any special force, may with 
equal reason be held to imply 
that the Peripatetic school did 
not become the owner of property 
till after Aristotle’s death. It is 
most probable, therefore, that 


. Aristotle did not give his in- 


structions in a garden of his own. 


According to ATHEN. v. 186, a 
(i. 402, Dind.), Theophrastus 
left behind him also means to 
provide common meals for mem- 
bers of the school. 

' That Theophrastus was still 
unmarried at the time of Ari- 
stotle’s death is obvious from the 
will of the latter (see p. 349, n. 
2, supra); that he remained so is 
obvious from his own and from 
the total absence of any state- 
ment to the contrary. The reason 
why he disdained the married 
state he himself gives us in the 
fragment in HIERON. Adv. Jovin. 
i. 47, iv. b, 189, Mart., hereafter to 
be discussed, where he dissuades 
the philosopher from it, chiefly 
on the ground that it brings 
with it disturbances incompatible 
with the scientific life. 

2 Cic. Tuse. iii. 28, 69; Dio. 
v. 41; Hieron. Zpist. 24 Ad 
Nepotian. iv. b, 258 Mart. 

® DioG. 40: éreAcdra 5h yn- 
pads... eresdhwep dAlyov aviKe 
Tay TéveY, 


352 ARISTOTLE 


down to us of his writings; that grace of lan- 
guage and delivery, the fame of which survived him,! 
as well as the independence of his outward circum- 
stances? and the possession of all the requisite means 
for the prosecution of his learned labours *—all these 
must have contributed in a high degree to promote his 
success as a scientific investigator and teacher. The 
numerous writings which he left behind him as a monu- 
ment to his diligence extend to every part of the field 


of knowledge that was then open.* 


1 Cf. besides the passages 
quoted supra, p. 348, n. 3 fin.: 
Cic. Brut. 31,121: quis... Theo- 
phrasto dulcior? Tuse. v. 9, 24: 
hic autem elegantissimus omniwm 
philosophorum et eruditissimus. 
In his case, as in Aristotle’s, this 
merit belongs chiefly to his 
popular writings, and especially 
to the dialogues, which, like Ari- 
stotle’s, are described as exoteric 
(see p,. 111, 2.3 38,0 ROi wa. 
PROKL. In Parm. i. fin. p. 54 
Cous. complains that the intro- 
ductions in them do not hang to- 
gether with the main content. Ac- 
cording to HHRMIPPUS (ATHEN. 
i. 21, a) his personal adornment 
was excessive and his delivery 
too theatrical. Frequent men- 
tion is made of his witticisms, 
e.g. PLUT. Qu. Conv. ii. 1, 9, 1, v. 
5, 2, 7 (vii. 10, 2, 15); Lycurg. 
c.10 (Cupid. Div. c. 8, p. 527; 
PoRPH. De Abstin. iv. 4, p. 304). 

2 We may infer Theophras- 
tus’s opulence from his will 
(DioG. v. 51 sqq.), which speci- 
fies considerable property in land, 
slaves, and money, although the 
total amount of the last (§ 59 
sq.) is not stated. 


To us only a small 


$ Mention is made of his 
library, of which Aristotle’s 
constituted the ground floor, in 
STRABO, xili. 1, 54, p. 608, and 
in his will (Diog. 52; ATHEN, i. 
3, a, Where trovrwy shows that 
Theophrastus’s name has fallen 
out after that of Aristotle). 0. 
KIRCHNER, Die Botan. Schr. d. 
Theophr. (Jahrb. f. Philol. Sup- 
plementbd. vii, 1874, p. 462 sqq.), 
makes it appear probable from 
Theophrastus’s botanical works 
that besides many parts of Greece 
and Macedonia he had visited 
Crete, Lower Egypt, perhaps also 
Southern Thrace, and the coast 
of Asia Minor, and thus added 
the knowledge of foreign coun- 
tries to his other means of re- 
search. 

* Hermippus and Andronicus 
had made lists of his works (see 
p. 49, n. 4, vol. i.; PLUT. Sudla, 
26; cf. PorPHYyR. Vit. Plotini, 
24); Dioa. v. 42-50 has presented 
to us one (upon which cf. the 
minute investigations of Uss- 
NER, Analecta Theophrastea, 
Leipsic, 1858, 1-24; and on the 
treatises on logic which it con- 
tains, PRANTL, Gesch. der Log. i. 


| 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 353 


portion of these multitudinous works remains: the 
two on botany,' a few shorter treatises on natural 


350). This list not only omits 
some known writings (USENER, 
21 sq.) but follows a strange 
order. After two alphabetical 
lists, of which the second is 
clearly supplementary to the 
first, but both of which probably 
give only those of the writings 
of Theophrastus which were to 
be found in the Alexandrine or 
some other great library, follow 
two more supplements; the first 
of these is not arranged accord- 
ing to any definite principle, the 
second, if we exclude some in- 
sertions, is again alphabetical. 
It is not improbable that this 
list, as Usener thinks, is Her- 
mippus’s, come to us (cf. RosE, 
Arist. Libr. Auct. 43 sq.) through 
Favorinus, from whom D10a. 
immediately before (v. 41) quotes 
Hermippus, and whose name is 
also introduced before the list of 
ARIST.’S writings (v. 21) and 
before PLATO’s will (iii. 40). 
How far the writings here enu- 
merated are genuine we have 
scarcely any means of judging ; 
USENER, p. 17, makes it probable 
that a few of them (the History 
of Geometry, Astronomy, and 
Arithmetic, perhaps also the 
History of Theological Opinions, 
v. 48, 50) belonged to Eudemus. 
' Il. purav foroplas nine books; 
™. put@y aiti@y six books. It hasal- 
ready been shown (supra, vol. i.p. 
93, n. 2), that these works are by 
Theopbrastus and not by Ari- 


stotle ; in determining the date of 


theircomposition we have further 
to take into consideration the 
allusions, Hist. Pl. v. 2,4, to the 
destruction of Megara by Deme- 


VOL, Il, 


trius Poliorcetes (Ol. 118, 2= 
306 B.C.), vi. 3, 3, to the archon- 
ship of Simonides (O]. 117, 2), 
iv. 2, 2, to the expedition of 
Ophellas (Ol 118, 1), ix. 4, 8, to 
King Antigonus. Hist. Pl. v. 8, 
1, also refers to the period sub- 
sequent to the conquest of Cy- 
prus by Demetrius Poliorcetes 
(Diopokus, xx. 47 sqq. 73 sqq.), 
and was therefore written after 
Ol. 118, 2. (Cf. BRANDIS, iii. 
322 sq.) SIMPLICIUS’S state- 
ment, Phys. 1, a, that Ari- 
stotle treated of plants partly 
historically and partly ztiologi- 
cally can hardly refer to these 
two works, and isthe less impor- 
tant since SIMPL. (as already re- 
marked, vol. i. p. 93, n. 2), had no 
personal acquaistance with Ari- 
stotle’s treatise upon plants. In 
the two works of Theophrastus, 
besides many corruptions in the 
text, there are a number of 
lacune. In the m. gutéy airiéy the 
last sections (perhaps two books, 
since DioG. 46 speaks of the 
treatise as consisting of eight) 
are unmistakably lost (cf. 
SCHNEIDER, Theophr. Opp. v. 
232 sqq.). The ascription by 
Dio. 46 of ten books to the 
ioropla is perhaps to be explained 
by the supposition that one of 
those which we have (SCHNEI- 
DER, ibid. thinks the fourth, 
which certainly has a break, c. 
12 jin.) was divided in some 
manuscripts; contrariwise the 
fact that Hist. viii. 4, 5 and ix. 
18, 2 are quoted by APOLLON. 
Mirab. 33, 41, as respectively 
from ¢‘ and 7’ wep) pura points 
to the loss of one of the earlier 


AA 


354 


ARISTOTLE 


science,! fragments of a work on metaphysics? and of 


the important history of physics * (which seems to have 
been the treasure-house from which later tradition chiefly 


books or its combination with 
another. On the other hand, 
the view that the ninth book of 
the botanical treatise did not 
originally belong to it (WIMMER, 
Theophr. Hist. Plant. 1842, p. 
ix.) is with good reason rejected 
by KiRcuNER, De Theophr. 
Libr. Phytol, 34 sqq.: itis known 
as part of the treatise not 
only to Dioa. (ibid.) but to 
APOLLON., who in c. 29 quotes 
ix. 18, 3; 20, 4,6. 31, 1x, 17,4, 
c. 41, ix: 18, 2, c. 48, Ixe44,-44, 
c. 50, ix. 17, 3 (here expressly as 
the écxdrn Tis mpoywarelas) ; it 
is unmistakably referred to in 
the sixth book De Caus. Plant., 
even quoted ii. 6, 4 (cf. Hist. ix. 
18, 10), its contents are forecast 
i. 12,1, andin 1, 4; 2, 23.8, 35 
19, 1, it refers back itself to the 
earlier books. Similarly MEYER 
(Gesch. d. Botanik, i. 176 sq.) 
and BRANDIS, iii. 32 sq., are 
right in again setting aside the 
view that the sixth book De 
Causis Pl. could be a separate 
work or wholly spurious. Even 
the remarks upon the number 
seven, c. 4, 1, 2, which Brandis 
finds strange, contain nothing 
surprising; Aristotle had already 
counted seven primary colours 
and seven tastes corresponding to 
the seven notes (see supra, vol. i. 
p. 518, n. 3), and a statement 
similar to that which is here made 
about the number seven, is to be 
found in THEOPHR. De Ventis (Fr. 
5), 49, about the number three. 

1 See SCHNEIDER, Opp.i 647 
sqq. WIMMER, vol. ii. of his 
edition (1862). 


2 Metaphysical aporize, with 
regard to which we do not know 
whether they belonged to a more 
comprehensive work or merely to 
an introductory treatise. Ac- 
cording to the scholium at the 
end, the work of which they 
were a part was not included 
either by Hermippus or by An- 
dronicus in their lists but quoted 
by Nicolaus (of Damascus). On 
the wanifold corruptions of its 
text, see besides the edd. of 
BRANDIS (Arist. et Theophr. 
Metaph. 308 sqq.) and WIMMER 
(Fragm. No 12), USENER in the 
Rhein. Mus. xvi 259 sqq. r 

8 This work is called some- 
times voy icropia (ALEX. 
apud SIMPL. Phys. 25, a, 0.), 
sometimes vod (DIOG. ix. 22 ; 
Simei. De Celo, Schol. in Ar. 
510, a, 42; Stop. Rl. i. 522), 
elsewhere puvoixal 56a (DIOG. v. 
48), wept muoikay (thid. 46), 7. TOV 
pvotkay (ALEX. Metaph. 24, 4; 
Bon. 536, a, 8 bk.), 7. trav puoik@y 
dofav (TAURUS apud PHILOP. 
Adv. Procl. vi. 8, 27). Di0a. v. 
46, assigns to it eighteen books, v. 
48,16. USENER, Anal. Theophr. 
30 sqq., has collated the frag- 
ments of it; but the treatise, 
wept aicdjoews Kal aicOnrav (WIM- 
MER, fr. 1), which Philippson 
deals with, tAn av@pwrivn (1831), 
81 sqq. (cf. USENER, ibid. 27), 
seems also to have belonged to 
it. On the other hand, the sup- 
position that the extract ap. 
PHILO. dtern. m. c. 23-27, p. 510 
sqq. Mang., is taken from it 
(USENER, p. 38; BERNAYS, Zheo- 
phrast. tb. Krimmighk. 46) does 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 355 


drew its accounts of the earlier physicists') besides a 
number of other fragments.? The ‘ Characters’ are only 
an incomplete extract, with several foreign additions, 
probably from Theophrastus’s treatise upon Ethics.’ 
The chief feature of the scientific labours of Theo- 
phrastus, so far as these are known to us, is the 
endeavour to complete the compass and define more 
sharply the contents of Aristotelian doctrine. The 
fundamental principles of the system suffer no change 
and are not unfrequently stated in the very words of 
Aristotle. Theophrastus, however, exerts himself to 
develop his doctrine as completely as possible on every 
side, to increase the number of scientific and ethical 





not commend itself; for a dog- 
matic and polemical discussion 
with Zeno the Stoic (as ZELLER 
has shown this to be in HERMEs, 
xi. 422 sqq.) can have formed no 

of an historical ‘work, nor 
does it at all resemble the treat- 
ise m. ailc@fjoews, either in tone or 
treatment. In the first book of 
the gvouh ioropfa THEOPHR. (as 
is shown in the Abhandl. d. 
Berl. Akad. 1877, p. 150 sqq.) 
had given a review of the prin- 
ciples of earlier philosophers, in 
which he connected his work 
with the first book of ARIST.’s 


Metaphysics. 


! Fuller proof of this fact, 
which he was the first to per- 
ceive, will be found in H. DIELS’ 
recent work, Doxographi Greci, 
as also ibid. p. 473 sq. the 
fragments of the voumal dda. 

* To those collected in Wim- 
mer must be added chiefly the 
remainder of the treatise ep) 
etoeBelas, which BERNAYS (Theo- 


phrast. Schrift iiber Frimmig- 
keit) cleverly recovered from 
PoRPHYRY’s De Abstinentia. 
The treatise on indivisible lines 
was also attributed to him, 
perhaps rightly. By some even 
ARIST.’s Politics (see vol. ii. supra, 
p. 204, n. 2) was referred to Theo- 
phrastus. More recent writers 
have attributed to him the trea- 
tises upon colour (SCHNEIDER, iv. 
864, who, however, considers 
them only a portion of a larger 
work; on the other side see 
PRANTL, Arist. v. d. Farben, 84 
sq.), upon Melissus, Xenophanes 
«ce. (on this see Ph. d. Gr. i. 476 
87q.)- 
* On this and on the ethical 
writings of Theophrastus see in- 


Sra. 


* As among others, Krron- 
NER, Jahrb. f. Philol. Supple- 
mentb, vii. 532 sqq. has shown 
in respect of the botanical 
works. 


AA 2 


356 ARISTOTLE 


observations, to apply the Aristotelian rules to particular 
cases, especially to those which had been overlooked by 
Aristotle, to correct the vagueness of particular con- 
ceptions and to set them in a clear light.' His starting- 
point is experience. As Aristotle in all his investiga- 
tions had taken his stand upon the firm ground of fact 
and had established even the most universal conceptions 
upon the basis of a comprehensive induction, Theo- 
phrastus also is convinced that we must begin with 
observation in order to attain to true conceptions. 
Theories must coincide with the data of experience, and 
they will do so if we start with the consideration of the 
individual ;? perception furnishes the material which 
thought may either straightway apply to its own ends 
or by solving the difficulties which experience brings to 
light may utilise for future discoveries.* Natural science, 
bv bri ToAAAXas pavepdv. 7H yap 


atcOnois Kal tas Sdiapopas Oewpet 
kal tas airias (nret. taxa 8 


Of. Boretn. De Interpr. p. 
292: Theophrastus, ut in aliis 
solet, quum de similibus rebus 


tractat, que scilicet ab Aristotele 
ante tractate sunt, in libro 
quoque de affirmatione et nega- 
tione tisdem aliquibus verbis 
utitur, quibus in hoe libro Ari- 
stoteles usus est... in omnibus 
enim, de quibus ipse disputat post 
mayistrum, leviter ea tangit, que 
ab Aristotele dicta ante cognovit, 
alias vero diligentius res non ab 
Aristotele tractatas exsequitur. 

2 Caus. Pl. i. 1, 1: €d0b yap 
Xp) TuUpwvetcba Tos Adyous Tots 
eipyuevois. 17, 6: ee Se Tay 
KadeKarta Oewpodar aiupwvos 6 
Adyos Ta yryvouévev, ii. 3, 5: 
mepl 5& tav ev Tois KabeKacrTa 
uaAdAov evropodmey* 7 yap alo Onos 
Sidwow apxds KT. A. 


$ Fr. 12 (Metaph.), 19: 7d 8¢ 


GAndéorepov eimeiv ws tmroBdAdet 
TH Siavola, Ta wey arAasS (nTrovca 
7a 8 Gropiay épyaouervn, 8: hs 
Koy pn Sdvntat mpoBalvew, buws 
eugatverat Tt Pas ev TE wh wT 
(nrotyvtwy emt madov. Tbid. 25: 
béxpt wey ovv tivds Suydueba 80’ 
aitiov Oewpeivy, apxas amd Tar 
aicbjcewv AauBdvoytes. CLEMENS, 
Strom. ii. 362, D; Oedpp. SE Thy 
alcOnow apxny elvat ticTeds pnow* 
Grd yap tavrns ai apxal mpds Toy 
Adyov roy év july kal Thy Bidvoray 
exreltvovta.. SEXT. Math. vii. 
217: Aristotle and Theophrastus 
have two criteria, atc@now pméy 
Tav aic@ntayv, vinow 8 T&v von- 
Tav’ Kowdy St adupotépwr, as 
ereyev 6 Oedpp., Td evapyés, 








° 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 357 


moreover, must rest upon perception because it has to 
do wholly with corporeal substance.!| Theophrastus 
accordingly keeps this principle steadily in view. Where 
universal laws fail to explain particular facts, be does 
not hesitate to-refer us back to experience ; where no 
complete certainty is possible he will content himself, 
like Plato and Aristotle, with mere probability ;* where 
more exact proofs fail, he, like his master, brings analogy 
to his aid,‘ but he warns us at the same time not to 
carry analogy too far or to mistake the peculiar 
characteristics of phenomena,® just as Aristotle had laid 
down as a fundamental axiom that everything must 
be explained upon principles peculiar to itself.6 We 
cannot say, in truth, that Theophrastus has entirely 
renounced the comprehensive and universal points of 
view ; but his own inclinations and scientific researches 


1 Fr. 18: éwel 5€ ob Gvev wey 
Kwhoews ovd€ wept évds AeKréor, 
mavTa yap ey Kwhoe Ta THs 
gpicews, bvev Bt GAAoWwTKAs Kal 
mabntixns ovx bmwép trav wep) rd 
Méoor, cis Tadrd Te Kal wept rovT wy 
Aéyovras obx oldy re Kkatradureiv 
thy alc@now, GAX ard tadrns 
apxoucvous meipacba xph Oewpeiv, 
} Ta pawdueva AauBdvovras Kab’ 
éavrad, 7) amd rovTwy, ef Twes tpa 
kupi@repar Kal mpdrepat TovTwy 
apxal. 

2 Caus. Pl. ii. 4, 8: GAN’ ev 
Tois Kabéxagra Td akpiBis waAdAov 
tows aigOnrixfis Seira: cvvécews, 
Adye@ Bt oik eipapts dpoplom. Cf. 
Hist. i. 3, 5. The differences 
between botanical species are 
somewhat vague; 5a 5% raira 
domrep A€youev ok axpiBodroynt ov 
T@e Spw Te TUMw Anwréov 


Tous &popiomous. 

$SrmpL. Phys. 5, a, m: 
natural science cannot arrive at 
the complete certainty of know- 
ledge; GAA’ obk aripacréoy Sid 
TovTo puctwAoylay* GAA’ apKeirBat 
XpPn TE kara Thy huerépay xpijow 
kad divauw, os kal Ocoppdore doxe?, 
Cf. also supra, vol. i. p. 167 sq. 

4 See Caus, Pl. iv. 4, 9-11; 
Hist. i. 1, 10 sq. 

5 Hist. i. 1, 4: we must be- 
ware of comparing plants with 
animals in every respect. dere 
TavTa pev ovtws trodnmréoy ov 
pdvoy eis Ta viv GAAQ Kal Tav 
meAAbytwv xdpw* Sea yap uh olov 
Te &ponowovy weplepyov Td yAlxe- 
cba mavrws, va wh Kal rhy oikelay 
dmoBdAAwpev Oewplay, 

5 See supra, vol. i. p. 249, n. 
1, 2, 3. 


358 ARISTOTLE 


have an unmistakable bias in the direction of particulars 
rather than fundamental principles. 

This is the method which Theophrastus and, follow- 
ing him, Hudemus have adopted in their treatment of 
logic. While holding fast by Aristotelian principles, 
they have permitted themselves many divergences in 
detail." In discussing the Conception, for instance, 
Theophrastus refused to admit that all contraries belong 
to the same genus.? The doctrine of the Judgment, 
again, to which both Eudemus and he devoted separate 
treatises,’ received at their hands various additions, 
which, however, so far as we know, were of no great 
importance. They introduced a slight change in the 


’ Cf. PRANTL, Gesch. der Log. 
i. 346 sqq., who, however, seems 
to undervalue the contributions 
of Theophrastus and Eudemus 
to Logic. 

2 Cf. fr. 15 (Srp. Categ. 
105, a’; Schol. in Ar. 89, a, 15). 
ALEX. on Metaph. 1018, a, 25; 
also supra, vol. i. p. 224, n. 3. 

3 Theophrastus in the treat- 
ises wept katapdcews Kal aropd- 
gews (Diog. 44, 46; ALEX. in 
Anal. Pr. 5, a, m, 21, b, m, 
124, a, 128; Metaph. 653, b, 
15; GALEN, Libr. Propr. 11, 
xix. 42, K; BorntH. Ad Arist. 
de Interpr. 284, 286, 291, 327, 
(Bale); Schol. in Ar. 97, a, 38, 
99, b, 386; PRANTL, 350, 4), =. 
A€tews (DioG. 47; Dionys. Hal. 
Comp. Verb. p. 212, Schiif.), 7m. 
Tav Tov Adyou oroxelwy (as 
PRANTL, 353, 23, in SIMPL. Categ. 
3, 8, Bale, rightly emends), 
As to Eudemus, m. Aéfews, see 
ALEX. Anal. Pr. 6, b, in Metaph. 
566, b, 15, Br.; Anon. Schol. in 


Arist. 146, a, 24; GALEN, ibid. On 


their other logical treatises cf. 


supra, Vol. i. p. 64,n.1.. PRANTL, 
p. 850, and Hth. Hud. i. 6 fin. ii. 
6, 1222, b, 37, c. 10, 1227, a, 10. 
* Theophrastus distinguishes 
in his treatise 7m. Karapdoews 
between different meanings of 
mpétacis (ALEX. Anal. Pr. 5, a, 
m ; ibid. 124, a; Top. 83, a, 
189, a. Similar distinctions are 
quoted from the same treatise 
and that 7. tod TloAAax@s (which 
was probably on the modelof Ari- 
stotle’s—see sup. vol. i. p.76 sq.); ° 
Kudemus noticed the predicative 
force of the verb ‘ to be’ in exis- 
tential propositions (Anon. Schol. 
in Arist. 146, a, 24, and for 
another remark of Eudemus on 
the verb ‘to be’ see ALEX. Anal. 
Pr. 6,b,m). Theophrastus called 
particular propositions indeter- 
minate (see swp. vol. i. p. 233, n. 1, 
and BorTH. De Interpr, 340, m ; 
Schoi. in WAttTzZ, Ar. Org. i. 40; 
PRANTL, 356, 28), and Aristotle’s 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 859 


theory of the Conversion of Propositions, with which 

Aristotle’s treatment of the Syllogism begins, by sub- 
stituting a direct, in place of Aristotle’s indirect, proof 
of the simple converse of universal negative proposi- 
tions.! As they further approached the question of the 
Modality of Judgments from a different side, they con- 


indeterminate ex perabécews (see 
supra, Vol. i. p. 232, n. 2; Stepha- 
nus and Cod. Laur. in WAITZ, 
ibid.41 sq ; and onhis reasons for 
doing so, PRANTL, 357). He dis- 
tinguished in particular negative 
propositions between ‘not all’ 
and ‘some not’ (Schol. in Ar. 
145, a, 30). In regard to the 
modality of judgments he made 
a distinction between simple ne- 
cessity and necessity resulting 
from particular circumstances 
(ALEX. An. P. 12, b, u.). He 
elucidated contradictory opposi- 
tion, which he declared in general 
to be indemonstrable (ALEX. on 
Metaph. 1006, a, 11, p. 653, b, 15, 
Br.), with the remark that con- 
tradictory propositions are abso- 
lutely exclusive of one another 
only when their meaning is fixed 
and definite (Schol. Ambrvs. in 
Waltz, ibid. 40), a caution 
against sophistical objections to 
which PRANTL, p. 356, unneces- 
sarily takes exception. 

' In Arist. Anal. Pr. i. 2, 25, 
a, 15, it stands: ei unde trav B 
Tr) A bwdpxet, ovdt Tay A ovderl 
imdpte: 72 B. ci ydp tint, olov TH 
T, ob GAnbes ora Th under rev 
Br) A émdpxew* 7d yap T trav 
B ti éorw. ‘Theopbrastus and 
Enudemus put it more simply: 
‘ifno B is A, A is separate from 
all b, B is therefore separate 
from all A, and therefore no A is 
B’ (ALEX. An. Pri, 11, a, m. 12, 


a.; PHILop. An. Pr. xiii. b; 
Schol. in Ar. 148, b, 46; cf. the 
scholium which PRANTL, 364, 
45, gives from Minas). PRANTL 
criticises this ‘ convenient’ proof: 
ZELLER, on the contrary, con- 
siders it the right one, and says 
that he cannot find for that of 
Aristotle ‘reasons founded on the 
very nature of genusand species’ 
as Prantl professes to do, 

2 Aristotle had taken the con- 
ceptions of possibility and neces- 
sity, as has been remarked (see 
sup. Vol. i. p. 234 sq.) to express a 
quality of things, not of our know- 
ledge of things. By the possible he 
does not understand that which 
we have no reason to deny, nor by 
the necessary that which we are 
forced to accept, but by the 
former that which by nature may 
equally be or not be, by the latter 
that which by its nature must be. 
Theophrastus and Eudemus, in- 
deed, have left us no general 
statement on this subject (even in 
the passage quoted by PRANTL, 
362, 41, from ALEX. Anal. Pr. | 
51, a, only the words ‘ rpiroy 
7») imdpxov [sc. dvaynaidy éotw)* 
Sre yap Swdpxe rére obx oldy 
re ph omdpxew, seem to be- 
long to THEO.’s Prior Analytics, 
while the rest belong to Alex- 
ander himself); but it is obvious 
from their departures from Ari- 
stotle, which we are about tomen- 
tion, that they take possibility 


360 ARISTOTLE 

sequently denied what Aristotle had affirmed, that 
every assertion of possibility implies the opposite possi- 
bility, and they maintained, against his denial, the 
convertibility of universal negative judgments of possi- 
bility; while with regard to conclusions whose pre- 
mises are of different modality, they held: firmly by the 
principle that the conclusion follows the weaker premise.” 
We further know that Theophrastus added to the four 
Modes which Aristotle had assigned to the first Figure 
five new ones, obtained by the conversion of the con- 
clusions or the premises, a development in which we 
certainly fail to see any advantage,’ and it is possible 
that he treated the two other Figures in the same way,! 
asserting at the same time, in opposition to Aristotle, 


that these also give perfect conclusions.’ 


and necessity only in the forn:al 
logical sense. 3 

* See sup. vol. i. p. 234 sq. and 
ALEX. Anal. Pr. 14, a,m.; Anon. 
Schol. in Ar. 150, a, 8. The proofs 
of the two Peripatetics are given 
ina scholium which PRANTL, 364, 
45, prints from MINAS’s notes on 
Galen’s Eicaywy) Siadextixh, p. 
100. The same writer’s quota- 
tion, 362, 41, from BoErTH. Jn- 
terpr. 428, upon Theophrastus 
relates merely to an unimportant 
explanation. Similarly a modifi- 
cation of an Aristotelian argu- 
ment mentioned by ALEX. Ana’, 
Pr, 42,'‘b, n. is, as PRANTL, p. 
370, also remarks, insignificant. 

* From an apodeictic and a 
categorical premise follows, they 
said, a categorical; from a cate- 
gorical and hypothetical, a hypo- 
thetical; from an apodeictic and 
hypothetical also a hypothetical 
conclusion (see sup. vol. i. p. 234 


He also 


sq.and on the third case, PHILOP. 
Anal. Pr. li.a; Schol. in Arist. 
166, a, 12; on an argument of 
Theophrastus relating to this, 
ALEX. Anal. Pr. 82, b.). 

® For details see ALEX. Anal. 
Pr. 22, b. 34, b.—35, a; Anon. 
Schol. in Ar. 188, a, 4, and 
PRANTL’ citations, 365, 46, from 
APUL. De Interpr. (Dogm. Plat. 
iii.), 273 sq. 280, Oud.; KOETH. 
Syll. Cat. 594 sq.; PHILOP. An. 
Pr, xxi. b (Schol. 152, b, 15); ef. 
also UEBERWEG, Logik, 282 sqq. 

* As PRANTL, 368 sq., conjec- 
tures from ALEX. Anal. Pr. 35, 
a. Cf. following note. 

° Schol. in Wartz, Arist. 
Org. i. 45: 5 8& Bonds... 
evavtiws TG ’ApiotoréAc ep) Tov- 
tov éddtage . . . Kal awédertev, bri 
mavres of év Sevtépp ai rpire 
oxhmar. Tél iow (which Ari- 
stotle denies, see supra, vol. i. p. 
240,n. 4)... . palverar 5¢ nal O<d- 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 361 


changed the order of several of the Modes.’ It is more 
important, however, to note that Theophrastus and 
Eudemus introduced into logic the theory of Hypo- 
thetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms.? Both of these 
they embraced under the name Hypothetical, pointing 
out that in the Disjunctive also that which is undeter- 
mined at first is afterwards determined by the addition 
of a second clause.* They distinguished further two 
kinds of hypothetical conclusions: those which, consist- 
ing of purely hypothetical propositions, only assign the 
conditions under which something is or is not the case,* 





gpacros .. . Thy évaytiav abTe 
(Aristotle) wept robrov ddgav Exwv. 

! In the third figure he placed 
the fourth of Aristotle’s modes 
as simpler before the third, and 
the sixth before the fifth (Anon. 
Schol. in Ar. 155, b, 8; PHILOP. 
ibid. 34, 156, a, 11), adding a 
seventh mode which he obtained 
by dividing the first (APUL. ibid. 
p. 276). 

2 As ALEX. An. Pr. 131, b.; 
PHILoP. An. Pr. 1x. a; Schol. 
in Ar. 169, b, 25 sqq., expressly 
state. According to BorETH. 
Syll. Hypoth. 606 (in PRANTL, 
379, 59), Eudemus treated this 
subject more fully than Theo- 
phrastus.—Much less important 
are the citations from Theophras- 
tus’s discussions upon syllogisms 
’ Kara mpdcanpw given by ALEX. 
An. Pr. 128, a., cf. 88, a, m.; 
PHILOP, cii. a; Schol. in Ar. 189, 
b, 12; Anon. ibid. 1. 438, 190, a, 
18, cf. PRANTL, 376 sq. These 
are syllogisms formed of propo- 
sitions such as those mentioned 
‘by Aristotle, Anal. Pr. ii. 5, 58, 
a, 29,b, 10: ¢ 7d A undert 7d B 
mavtl imdpxer &c. According to 


ALEX. 128, a, Schol. 190, a, 1, 
however, Theophrastus expressly 
said that these differ from ordi- 
nary categorical propositions only 
in form; that he nevertheless 
entered with such minuteness 
into the discussion of them is 
only one of the many proofs of 
the frequently misspent industry 
with which he traversed every 
detail. 

3 Cf. PHILOP. An. Pr. lx. b; 
Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 30 sqq.; 
ALEX. An. Pr. 109, b, m. That 
both these writers in the passages 
named follow the Peripatetic 
view, as presented by Theo- 
phrastus and Eudemus, is obvi- 
ous from the whole context. 

4 Oi rivos bvros 4 wh byTos tT 
ovn totw th Ears Secevivres (‘if 
A is, B is—if Bis, C is—if A is, 
C is’), which are called by Theo- 
phrastus 8:2 tpi@v bwoberixol or 
d:’ SAwv bro%erixol, as also on 
account of the similarity of the 
three propositions kat’ avadoylay, 
Theophrastus distinguished three 
forms of these syllogisms corre- 
sponding to the three Aristote- 
lian figures of the categorical] 


362 


ARISTOTLE 


and those which prove that something is or is not.’ Of 
the latter a further division is made into those with a 
hypothetical and those with a disjunctive form,? both 
of which classes, however, agree in this—that what is 
stated in the major premise as possible is either affirmed 


or denied in the minor ? 


Under the hypothetical are 


finally classed Comparative,4 or, as the Peripatetics 
called them, Qualitative Syllogisms.* 


syllogism, except that he trans- 
posed the order of the second 
and third. ALEX. Anal. Pr. 
109, b,:m.. 110, a.; cf. $8,.b.% 
PHILOP. zbid. 170, a, 13 sqq. 179, 
a, 13 sqq. 189, a, 38. 

1 PHILOP. Schol.in Ar. 170, a, 
14,30 sqq. Cf. ALEX. An. Pr. 88, b. 

2 PHILOP. ibid.: taév Td eivat 
h wh elvar xatackevaCdvtwy srro- 
 OetinaGy of ev akodovOlay Kara- 
okevd(ovow of 5€ SidCevtw &c. Of 
the first, two forms are next enu- 
merated: those which by affirming 
the antecedent affirm the conse- 
quent, and those which by deny- 
ing the consequent deny the 
antecedent (‘If A is, Bis. But 
A is, &c.; and: ‘If A is, B is. 
But B is not,’ &c.). Of the second 
by a more complicated classifica- 
tion three forms: (1) ‘A is not 
at the same time B and C and D. 
But it is B. Therefore it is 
neither C nor D.’ (2) ‘A is either 
Bor C. Butitis B. Therefore 
it is not C.’ (3) ‘A is either B or C. 
Butit isnot B. Therefore itis C.’ 

% This categorical minor pre- 
mise following on a conditional 
or disjunctive major, for which 
the Stoics afterwards invented 
the name mpdéoAnfis, the older 
Peripatetics (of dpxato, oi mepl 
’"AptororéAny, cf. PRANTL, 385, 
68), following Arist. (Anal Pr. 
i, 23, 41, a, 80; cf. WAIT2, in 


loco; c. 29, 45, b, 15), called 
pmerdAnvis (ALEX. An. Pr. 88, a, 
o. 109, a, m.; PHILOP. Schol. in 
Ar. 169, b, 47, 178, b, 6). If this 
minor itself receives proof from 
a categorical syllogism we have 
the so-called ‘mixed syllogism’ 
(ALEX. 87, b, m.sq.). The con- 
ditional sentence is called ovynp- 
pevov, the antecedent being the 
nyovuevov, the consequent the 
erduevov (PHILOP. Schol. in Ar. 
169, b, 40). Theophrastus, how- 
ever, remarked the difference 
here between those conditional 
sentences in which the condition 
is introduced problematically by 
an Ei and those in which it is 
introduced affirmatively by an 
’Erel (StmPu. De Celo, Schol. 
509, a, 3). He remarked also 
(ALEX. Anal. Pr. 131, b. Ald.; 


cf. PRANTL, 378, 57) that the 


meTdAnyis again is either a mere 
hypothesis, or immediately cer- 
tain, or demonstrated either in- 
ductively or deductively. 

4 Of awd Tov paAdAov Kal TOU 
duotov Kat Tov 7TTov, e.g.: ‘if the 
less precious is a good, so also is 
the more precious; but wealth, 
which is less precious than health, 
is a good, therefore health is so 
also.’ Upon this see ALEX. An. 
Pr, 88, b, m. 109, a.—b. ; PHILOP. 
An, Pr. lxxiv. b ; PRANTL, 389 sqq. 

5 Kara roirnta, probably fol- 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 3638 


No contributions of any importance to the second 
main division of the Analytics—the doctrine of Demon- 
stration—have come down to us from Theophrastus or 
Eudemus,' and we may therefore assume that neither 
of them differed in any important point from the con- 
clusions of Aristotle on this subject. The same is 
in substance true of the Topics, to which Theophrastus 
had devoted several treatises.? It cannot be proved that 
he interpreted the subject-matter of the science dif- 
ferently from Aristotle ;* nor do the isolated utterances 
on this head which have come to us from Theophrastus 
and Eudemus go beyond a few formal extensions of 








Aristotelian doctrines. 


lowing ARIST. An. Pr. i. 29, 45, 
b, 16—where, however, this ex- 
pression is not further explained. 

1 Even PRANTL (p. 392 sq.) 
has failed to find more than two 
statements referring to this sub- 
ject: one in PHILOP. An. Post. 
17, b.; Schol. in Ar. 205, a, 
46, distinguishing between 4 
avrd and xa’ aérd, the other the 
remark in the anonymous scho- 
lium, ibid. 240, a, 47, that defi- 
nition is embraced under demon- 
stration. Equally unimportant 
are the remarks on xaé’ aird in 
ALEX. Qu. Nat. i. 26, p. 82, 
Speng.; on definition in Borrn. 
Interpr. ii. 318, Schol. 110, a, 
34; on definition and demonstra- 
tionin Hustrat. in Libr. ii.; Anal. 
Post. 11, a, 0.; Sehol. 242, a, 17; 
cf. ibid. 240, a, 47: on the im- 
possibility of proving contradic- 
tory propositions in ALEX. on 
Metaph. 1006, a, 14; SYRIAN. in 
Metaph. 872, b, 11 (from the 
treatise m. xarapdcews): and the 
definition of atwua in THEMIST. 


Anal, Post. 2, a; Schol. 199, 
b, 46. 

2 Cf. PRANTL, 350 sq. nn. 11- 
14. 

% PRANTL, p. 352, infers it 
from the statement (AMMON, 
De Interpr. 53, a.; Schol. in 
Ar. 108, b, 27; Anon. ibid, 94, 
a, 16) that Theophrastus dis- 
tinguished a twofold relation, 
one to the fact in regard to which 
the question is one of truth or 
falsehood, the other to the 
hearers; but the latter is here 
assigned not to dialectic but to 
poetry and rhetoric. The cita- 
tion from the Analytics of EUDE- 
Mus in ALEX. Zop. 70, is also 
quite Aristotelian. 

‘ Theophrastus distinguished 
between téwos and mapdyyeAua, 
understanding by the latter a 
rule which is general and in- 
definite, by the former one that 
is definite (ALEX. Jop. 72; cf. 
5, m. 68); of the topical heads, 
which Aristotle had enumerated 
(yévos and Biapopa, Spos, ior, 


364 ARISTOTLE 


The conclusion to which we are so far led, namely, 
that Theophrastus is by no means inclined blindly to 
accept the Aristotelian doctrines, becomes still more 
obvious from the fragment on Metaphysics.!. The diffi- 
culties (azropéav) suggested in this fragment are directed 
in great part to Aristotelian assumptions, but we are 
left wholly in the dark as to whether and in what way 
the author found the solution of them. Starting from 
the distinction between First Philosophy and Physics, 
Theophrastus here asks how their respective objects, 
the supersensible and the sensible, are related to one 
another; and after proving that there must be some 
common bond of union between them and that the super- 
sensible must involve the sensible, he goes on to examine 
how this is possible? The principles of Mathematics 
(to which Speusippus had assigned the highest place) 
are insufficient for the solution of the problem; we 
require a higher principle, and this we can find only in 
God.’ God, therefore, must be the cause of motion in 


cunBeBnkds, tavTdv) he placed 
TavTov, as well as Siapopa, under 
yéevos (ibid. 25), and all others 
except ouuBeBnkds under Spos 
(ibid. 3\1—this is all that we 
are told, but PRANTL, p. 395, 
seems to be wrong in his in- 
terpretation, cf. BRANDIS, iii. 
279). He asserted—to pass over 
some still more unimportant 
remarks which are quoted by 
ALEX. on Metaph. 1021, a, 31, 
and Zp. 15 (Schol. 277, b, 32) 
~—that opposites do not fall under 
one and the same generic con- 
ception (see sup. vol. ii. 358, n. 2). 
Theophrastus’s divison of yv@mat 


(GREGOR. CORINTH. ad Hermog. 
de Meth. vii. 1154, w.), Hude- 
mus’s division of questions(ALEX. 
Top. 38), and his classification 
of fallacies mapa thy Adéw (that 
is if GALEN. m. 7. mapa 7. Aéé. 
copicu. 3. xiv. 589 sqq. follows 
him), will be found in PRANTL, 
397 sq. 

1 See supra, vol. ii. p. 354, n. 2. 

2 $1 sqq.; § 2 read apxn de, 
mwétepa, &c., ‘we begin here with 
the question whether,’ &c. 

3 § 3sq. according to USENER'S 
emendation (see p. 354, n. 2, 
supra) of which WIMMER, p. 151, 
11, ventured to accept even oid re 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 365 


the world. He produces that motion, however, not in 
virtue of any movement in himself, but of a causality more 
accordant with his nature : he is the object of desire to all 
the lower creation, and this alone is the cause of the 
endless movement of the heavens, Satisfactory though 
this view undoubtedly seemed in many respects,' it was 
not without its difficulties. Ifthere be only one moving 
principle, why have not all the spheres the same move- 
ment? If there are several, how can we explain the har- 
mony of their movements? But a satisfactory reason must 
also be assigned for the multiplicity of the spheres, and, 
in fine, everything must be explained as the outcome of 
design. Why, moreover, should this natural desire of 
the spheres be directed to motion rather than to rest ? 
And does not desire presuppose a soul, and therefore 
motion ?2 Why do not things under the moon as well 








for dere; § 4 we might propose to 
read : éy éAlyous elvarkalrpwrots, 
ei wh Spa kal ev TE TPSTY. 

1 § 6: méxpe pev 3} TOUT WY 
olov &prios 6 Adyos, apxty TE Tow 
play mdvtwv, Kar thy évépyeav Kal 
Thy ovolay amodidods, err SE wh 
Siaiperdy unde woody Te A€éywv, GAN’ 
“Gmda@s ekalpwy cis xpelrtw Tid 
pepida Kad Gevorépavy. That every- 
thing has a natural desire for 
the good is also stated by 
Theoph. in the fr. (from sept 
mdavrov) Schol. in Plat. Legg. p. 
449, 8 Bekk.: ef (why elxev 6 
mAovros, mpos pdvous by anjrde 
rovs w&yaBots. Exacroy yap Tov 
oixelov éplerar dyadod, for this 
alone accords with its nature, 
advra Bt ris Kata piow dpéeyerat 
diabécews. 

2 § 7 sq. (where 1. 12 W 


for dvjvuvtrovy we should perhaps 
read &piorov). In § 8 the remark 
relating to the Platonists (ri ob 
Gua TH myuhoe, &c.) is hardly 
intelligible, probably on account 
of the corruption of the text. 
The sense ascribed to it by 
BRANDIS, iii. 328 sq. (q.v.), seems 
to be neither contained in 
the text nor admissible in itself. 
In the following words («i 5) 
Epecis, AAws Te Kal ToD adplorov, 
eva Wuxis, ef mh Tis Aéyot Kad" 
dpodrnta Kal diapopay, Fupuy’ by 
ein 7a kuvdvpeva) USENER, p. 267, 
in place of d:apopdy happily reads 
erapopav: ‘unless the expres- 
sion épeois is used by a mere 
analogy and improperly.’ Even 
the fragment quoted in the 
previous note speaks only of 
living things. 


366 ARISTOTLE 


as things above it desire the best ? And how is it that 
in the heavenly sphere this desire produces nothing 
higher than rotation? For the movements of the soul 
and the reason are of a higher order than this. To this, 
however, it might be replied that all things cannot 
attain to like perfection. Finally we might ask whether 
motion and desire are essential or merely accidental 
attributes of the heavens.'' Touching further on the 
necessity of deducing not only some but all reality from 
first. principles,? we find that even in reference to these 
first principles themselves many new questions are sug- 
gested. Are they formless and material, or endowed 
with form, or both? And if the first of these assump- 
tions is obviously inadmissible, there is also a difficulty 
in attributing design to everything however insignifi- 
cant. We should therefore have to determine how far 
order extends in the world and why it ceases at certain 
points? Again, what are we to say of rest? Has it, 
like motion, to be deduced as something real from our 
first principles, or does positive reality belong only to 
energy—among sensible objects only to motion—and is 
rest only a cessation of motion ?4 How, again, are we to 
describe the relation of Form and Matter? Is matter 


the Platonists are accused in the 
sequel of doing. 
*§ 14 sqq.; § 15 n.—where 


’§ 9-11. In§ 10 instead of 
ocupBalve. USENER reads AauBdver ; 
it would be better to read: 


oupBatver yap elvar x. sump. 

2 § 11-13 where, however, p. 
153,W.n. we must punctuate thus: 
amd 8° oty tabrns } TotTwy Tay 
apxav akimoeey ty Tis, Taxa SE Kad 
amd TOV tAAwY dp’, dv Tis TIOATAL, 
7a epetiis edv0ds amrodiddvar Kal wh 
MExpt Tov MpoeANdyTa TaverOa1—as 


instead of aird we ought to read 
abd 76. 

4 This apparently is the sense 
of the first half of § 16: what 
follows, however, as it stands, is, 
as BRANDIS, p. 332, says, unin- 
telligible, 


‘ 


) 


—__——————— ——— —E—————————— 
r ]  __ - = Eee SC 


PERIPA TETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 367 


non-existent although endowed with potential reality, 
or is it an existence although still void of any definite 
form?! Why is the whole universe divided into contra- 
ries so that there is nothing without its opposite? Why 
does the worse far exceed in quantity the better ?? And 
since on account of this diversity in things knowledge 
also is of different kinds, the question rises what method 
we are to adopt in each case and how we are to define 
the nature and the kinds of knowledge.* ‘To assign 
causes to everything is impossible, for we cannot go on 
ad infinitum either in the sensible or the supersensible 
world without renouncing the possibility of knowledge ; 
but we can go a little way in that direction in advancing 
from the sensible to the supersensible. When, however, 
we reach ultimate grounds of reality we can go no 
further, either because these have themselves no cause 
or because our eyes are too weak to penetrate into the 
brightest light. But if it be thought that the mind 
knows these by immediate contact and therefore in- 
fallibly,> yet it is not easy, however necessary, to say 
what it is of which we make this assertion and which is 
the object of this immediate knowledge.° Granted, 


1 § 17. Instead of Suvdued’ @y and p. 246 sqq.) in the same 
(Br.) or duvdue: wey bv (W.) we direction as the statement 
ought probably toread durdues 3’ dy. Metaph. ii. (a) 1, 993, b, 9: 


18. 

® §§ 19-20. We cannot here 
enter into particulars ; ; see, 
however, BRANDIS, iii. 334 sq. 
UsEneiR, ibid. p. 269 sq. places c. 
8 Br. (§§ 19-27 W.) between cc. 
3 and 4 Br. ($§ 13 and 14 W.) 

4 The latter is a deviation 
from Aristotle’s doctrine (on 
which cf. supra, vol. i. p. 205, n. 2, 


domep yap kal Ta TeV vuKTepldwy 
Tupara mpds Td péyyos Exer 7d wed’ 
juépay, otrw Kal Tis tuerépas 
Wxiis 56 vovs mps Ta TH hice 
paveparata TAaVT MY, 

> For Aristotle’s view see sup. 
vol, i. p. 197, n. 4. 

® So weshould understand the 
words § 26: xaAemrh 58 Kal eis adrd 
7000 % aiveots Kal h wiotis. .. . ey 


368 | ARISTOTLE 


further, that the world and the structure of the heavens 
is eternal! and that we cannot, therefore, point to the 
causes of its origin, the problem yet remains of assign- 
ing the moving causes and the final aim of the con- 
stitution of the world, and of explaining individual forms 
of existence, down to animals and plants. Astronomy 
as such is inadequate to meet the former of those 
demands ; since motion is just as essential to the 
heavens as life is to living creatures, we must seek a 
deeper origin for it in the essence and ultimate cause 
of the heavens themselves.2, Upon the question of 
design in the world it is not always clear, apart from 
other considerations,? whether a thing exists for a 
definite end or only in consequence of a chance coinci- 
dence or natural necessity ;* and even assuming design 
in the world, we are yet unable to prove its presence 


equally in every case, but must admit that there is much 


tive montéov Tov Bpov. BRANDIS, 
p. 336, explains: ‘where we are 
to place a limit on inquiry,’ 
which the text does not seem to 
permit. For the rest see §§ 24 
sq. 

1 § 26 fin. must be read: 
mépucev* boot dé Toy ovpavdy aid- 
tov broAapBdvovow ér Se, &e. 
SPENGEL (see BRANDIS, p. 337) 
had already changed the un- 
meaning juépwy into 7) mepav. 

2 This at any rate seems to be 
the meaning of § 27 sq. (ei obv 
aotporoyia, &c.) 

’ These are indicated § 28. 
USENER, Anal. Theophr. 48, here 
proposes: &AAws 0’ 6 dopiopds ov 
pddus .... Kal 5) TE Evia wy 
Soxeivy, kc, In that case ‘ wdébey 


7 u&ptacba xpn’ may be sug- 
gested instead of (fddi0s....) 
wé0ev 5 &pkacOa xphv. Otherwise 
one might, still reading &AdAws, 
omit the wdrnv which precedes as 
an explanatory gloss: twép dé Tov 
adv’ everd Tov Kal unbev 4AAws, 6 
aopiopods ob padios, Kc. “Agopicuds 
here is equivalent to dpiopds, asin 
the passage from THEOPHRASTUS 
in Simp. Phys. 94, a. 

* Theophr, gives examples 
§§ 29 sq. where, however, § 30 
instead of to’Twy xdpw we must 
read with USENER (Rhein. Mus. 
xvi. 278) rod xdépw. In what 
follows, it seems that the words 
kal ravr’, &c. are somewhat out 
of order, 


a 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 369 


that seems to oppose its realisation and even that the 


amount of this is largely in excess of that which clearly 


exhibits design—in other words, that ‘ evil’ is largely in 
excess over ‘ good,’ ! 

It is impossible from so mutilated a fragment to 
obtain any very exact information as to the views of 
Theophrastus upon the ultimate grounds of reality. 
We only see from it that he was not blind to the diffi- 
culties of the Aristotelian doctrine, and that he brought 
these into prominence especially in connection with the 
question of the relation between the movens and the 
motum and with the teleological view of nature. We must 
nevertheless admit that even in his Metaphysics he has 
kept closely to the main lines of the Master's doctrine, 


- as is obvious from his own express statements on several 


important heads,? and from the general fact that we 


1 §§ 28-34. In § 31 read: 
ei 5¢ uh Tove [or ravd’| Everd tov 
kal eis Td Upiorov, Anmréov, and 
immediately after: kal adds 
Aeydueva (Br. and W. Aéyouer &) 
kat Kad’ Exacrov. In what follows 
éml trav (ywy will then correspond 
to xa? Exacroy. In § 32 we ought 
perhaps to read: Gkapiaioy rd 
BéArwv Kal rd elvar. . . . modd 
5¢ wAH 00s (without # or elva) rd 
kakdv. In what follows the text 
may have originally been: ov« év 
dopiotig 5& pdvoy Kad ofoy #Ans 
elSet, xabdrep Ta Tis piaews (in 
the world of men—for the allu- 
sion must be to this—there is not 
only, as in nature, indetermi- 
nateness and materiality, but also 
evil). After this, however, there 
seems to be a gap; and of the 
missing words auadeordrov alone 
has survived, Similarly in .the 


VOL. Il. 


following passage to the protasis 
ei yap-—éxarépw0ev (Ph. d. Gr. i. 
852, 3, where, however USENER’S 
conjecture, ibid. 280, ra 3 dOpda 
kal éxatépwev ought to have 
been mentioned) an apodosis is 
needed : this (the rarity of good- 
ness) is even truer of Man. Of 
the next passage we have only a 
fragment in the words 7a péy ody 
—évra, The remainder is pro- 
bably complete or nearly com- 
plete; the discussion, however, 
then breaks suddenly off and we 
are left without means of con- 
jecturing its further course. In 
$ 33 USENER'S conjecture (édid.) 
Tiimetobat Td Oeiov &mayra (for 
emi. ye O€Aew Gr.) has much to 
support it. 

* Besides the theological 
doctrines hereafter to be dis- 
cussed we may note the distinc- 


BB 


370 ARISTOTLE 


nowhere hear of any deviations from it. Even what 
little has come down to us of Theophrastus’s theo- 
logical views harmonises in every respect with the 
doctrines of Aristotle. It is indeed urged against him 
that he declares God at one time to be Spirit, at 
another Heaven and the Stars;! but the same objection 
is urged against Aristotle,? whose view we must have 
wholly misunderstood if we do not find an easy ex- 
planation of it in the fact that while he identifies God 


tion between form and matter 
(Metaph. 17, Tuumist. De An. 
91,a,m) with all that it involves, 
and the Aristotelian teleology. 
The latter Theophr. expresses in 
Aristotelian phraseology, Caus. 
Pl. i, 1,. 1 (o€; ti. Ay 23 site 
giois ovdiy more? pdrny Hera de 
éy trois mpétois Kal KupiwrTdrots. 
Ibid. i. 16,11 (where moreover 
we must read ‘y 8’’ in place of 
8): del mpds 7d Bertioroy épyg 
[n pues]. Cf. iv. 4,2; 1,2. Art, 
again, is partly an imitation 
(Caus. ii. 18, 2), partly a support 
and completion (ébid. ii. 16, 5, i. 
16, 10 sq. v. 1, 1) of the designs 
of nature; it differs, however 
(Caus. i.16,10, cf. sup. vol. i. p. 
418,n. 3), from nature in that the 
latter operates from within out- 
wards, and therefore spontane- 
ously (é« tev abtoudrwy), while it 
works from without by force, and 
therefore only piecemeal ( Caws. i. 
12,4); hence itis that art produces 
much that is unnatural (ébid. i. 
16, 11,'v. 1, 1 sq.). Even this isnot 
without a purpose, but it serves 
not the original design of nature 
but certain ends of man (ef. v. 
1, 1); these two, however, do 
not coincide and may even con- 


tradict one another (Caus. i. 16, 
1; 21, 1 sq. iv. 4, 1—Theophr. 
here distinguishes in reference 
to fruits and their ripeness ri 
TercLdTyTA Thy TE Mmpos Nuas Kal 
Thy mpos yéveow. 7] pev yap mpds 
Tpophy  S& mpds Sivauw Tod. 
vyevvav). Nevertheless even the 
unnatural can by habit change 
its nature (Caus. ii. 5, 5, ili. 8, 4, 
iv. 11,5, 7); and on the other 
hand many vegetables and 
animals are, Theophr. believes, 
entrusted by nature herself to 
the care of man, whereby only 
they can reach perfection, and 
just herein consists the difference 
between wild and tame (Caus. i. 
16, 23) which, as we shall find 
hereafter, he regards as nob 
merely an artificial but a natural 
distinction. 

1 The Epicurean in Cro. WV. D. 
i. 18, 35: nec vero Theophrasti 
inconstantia ferenda est; modo 
enim menti divine tribuit princi- 
patum, modo celo, tum autem 


signis sideribusque calestibus. 
CLEMENS, Protrept. c. 5, 44, B: 
Ocdpp. .... TH wey ovpavoy mh. 


de mvedua Tov Gedy brovoei. 
2 Circ. ibid. § 33, cf. KRISCHE, 
Forsch. 276 sqq. 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 371 


in the highest sense with infinite spirit alone, he yet. 
conceives of the motive forces in the stellar spheres, 
and especially in the highest of them, as eternal and 
divine beings. ‘Theophrastus holds this view also. To 
him also God in an absolute sense is pure reason,! the 
single cause which co-ordinates all reality, and which, 
itself unmoved, produces motion in everything else, since 
everything else desires it.? In proof of this assumption 
Theophrastus had appealed, it appears, like Aristotle,? 
to the universality of religious beliefs.‘ He also de- 
scribed its universal operation as Providence,° without, 
however, distinguishing this divine causality from the 
ordinary course of nature,® and he demanded of man that 





» Metaph. § 16: &ore be [7d 
Kivovv Erepoy kal & Kwei] dy tis 
én’ avtoy &yn Toy vodv Kal Toy Bedy. 

* Ibid. § 4 sq. (see supra), 
where inter alia: Ocla yap 7 
mdvrwv apx) 3: hs Grayta Kai tort 
kal Siaméver . . . . eel 3° dxivnros 
Kad’ abthy, pavepdy as ovK by ety 
T@ kweicbat Tots THS picews aitia, 
GAAG Aowmdy BAAH Tw BSuvdue 
Kpelrtovt Kal mporépa. To.atTn 3 
Tov dpextod vats, ad’ fs 7 
kukAuch = [sc. xKlynois, which 
USENER ibid. p. 263 wishes to 
supply] 7 aie kal &mavoros. 

* On which cf. sup.vol. i. p.390. 

* We may at least infer this 
from the fact that in PoRPH. De 
Abst. ii. 7 sq. (see also BERNAYs, 
Theophr. ib. Frimm. 56 sq.) he 
treats the neglect of all worship 
as an exceptional outrage, on 
account of which the Thracian 
Thoans were destroyed by the 
gods; probably the same people 
of whom SiMPL. in Epict. Hnchir. 
38. iv. 357 Schweigh. says: 


mdvtes ‘yap tivOpwro... . vopl- 
(ovo. elvar Oedy wAhy ’Axpoboirar, 
ods iaropet Ocdppacros abéous 
yevouevous bmd Tis ys aOpdws 
KatramoOjvat, 

° Minuc. FEL. Octav. 19, 11: 
Theophrastus et Zenon, Se... . . 
ad unitatem providentie omnes 
revolvuntur, Cf. PROCL. in Tim, 
138, e: i) yap udvos 4} wddAwora 
TlAdtwy ti amd tod mpovoodyros 
airig KaTexphoato, pynolv 5 Geddp. 

* Asisseenfrom ALEX. APHR., 
who says at the end of his 
treatise De Anima: pavepérara 
5€ Oedppacros Selkvvcr rabrdy by 
7d Kal? eiuapuévny Te Kata piow 
ev t@ KadAvobévec—for eiuapyévn 
indicates the course of the world 
as divinely appointed, which 
therefore Theophr. according to 
his manner identified with the 
order of nature, as he identified 
the lot which God has appointed 
to each individual with a man’s 
natural state. Cf.SToB. Zel. i. 206: 
pepera b€ mws cis 7d civapyéyny 


BB 2 


372 


ARISTOTLE 


he should imitate its ceaseless intellectual activity.! At 
the same time he follows Aristotle? in also attributing 
a soul to the heavens,’ whose higher nature reveals 


itself in its orderly motion ; 


4 and since he is likewise 


in agreement with the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
eether as the material of the heavenly structure® and of 
the eternity of the world,® he could attribute blessedness 
or divinity not only to the highest Heaven, of which it 
is expressly asserted,’ but also with equal right to the 


elvar thy Exdorou piow* ev h Témov 
TeTTdpwv aitiay woilAwy, mpoaipe- 
cews [ pdoews HEEREN andothers], 
Toxns Kal avdykns. As regards 
the two last, rvxn means accident, 
avdykn constraint (either of other 
“men or of natural necessity) as 
distinguished from vets or 
nature acting with a purpose.— 
From the allusions to Theophr.’s 
views upon Providence in 
Olympiodorus in Phed. ed. 
Finckh, p. 169, 7 nothing can be 
inferred. 

1 JULIAN, Orat. vi. 185, a 
Spanh.: GAA& ka) TlvOaydpas of Te 
am éxelvov péxpt Oeoppdorov 7d 
Kata Sivauty duoiacOa beg pact. 
Plato especially expresses himself 
to this effect; how far it was 
the view also of Theophr. is seen 
from the note: Kal yap Kal 6 
"ApirroréAns: ‘9 yap hucis wore, 
TovTo 6 Oeds del’ (see supra). 
According to Diog. v.49 Theophr. 
wrote a treatise against the 
Academics on the blessedness 
of God. 

2 See supra, vol. i. p. 495, n. 4. 

3 Procl. im Tim. 177, a: 
Theophrastus deems it unneces- 
sary to base the existence of the 
sonl, as the cause of motion, 


upon higher principles, as Plato 
had done. €upuxov yap kat abrds 
celvat d8wor Toy ovpavoy Kal 51a 
TovTo Belov" ei yap Getds ear, Hyot, 
kal thy apiorny exer Siaywyny, 
Zubuxds eorw ovdev yap thoy 
&vev Wux7s, as ev TH wept Ovpavov 
yéypabev. (See also on the last 
head p. 281, b. Plat. Theol. i. 12, 
p- 35 Hamb.) 

* Upon this see Metaph. § 34. 
Orc. Tusc.i.19, 45 : hee enim pul- 
chritudo etiam in terris patriam 
illam .et avitam (ut ait Theo- 
phrastus) philosophiam cognitionis 
cupiditate incensam excitavit 
refers to the beauty of the 
heavens. By mdrpios nal mada 
giAogopia is meant, as the con- 
text also shows, knowledge of 
the heavens, or astronomy. 

5 According to TAURUS 
(Scholiast to Timeus, Bekker’s 
Scholia p. 437 and PHILOP. 
Attern, mM. xiii. 15), Theophr. 
rejected Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the aether on the ground of 
Plato’s assertion (Jim. 31 B) 
that all that is solid and visible 
must consist of fire and earth. 

6 On this see infra, p. 380. 

7 See n. 2 and the quotation 
from Aristotle sup. vol. i. p. 474. 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 3738 


other heavenly spheres.' Between him and Aristotle 
there is in this regard no difference of doctrine. 
Theophrastus, however, devoted much more attention 
to scientific than to metaphysical inquiries, and had 
indeed much more talent for them. That here also he 
continued to build upon the foundations laid by Ari- 
stotle is beyond question; but we find him exerting 
himself not only to supplement the results of his 
teacher by further observation, but also to correct them 
by re-examination of his scientific conceptions. With 
this view he instituted an inquiry in a work of his own ? 
into the conception of Motion which lay at the root of 
the Aristotelian doctrine of Nature;* and he found 
it necessary to deviate in some respects from the teach- 
_ingof Aristotle on this head. He asserted, for instance, 
that Motion, which he agreed with Aristotle in defining 
as the realisation of potentiality,‘ may be predicated in 





1 As Theophr. according to 
the passage quoted, sup. vol. i. p. 
461, 3 accepted Aristotle’s theory 
of spheres, he was obliged to pre- 
suppose also with Aristotle an 
eternal mover for each sphere— 
an hypothesis which was forced 
upon him also by the principles 
of the Peripatetic philosophy 
with respect to mover and 
moved. 

* The three books 7. kwihcews. 
On these and on the eight books 
of the Physics (if there were 
really so many) see PHILIPPSON, 
“TAn &rOp. p. 84, USENER, Anal. 
Theophr, 5, 8, and BRANDIS, iii. 
281. The last rightly remarks, as 
Rosh, Arist. libr. ord. 87 had 


already done, that the ‘eleventh’ 


book 7, «vhoews and the ‘ four- 


teenth’ of the Physics in SIMPL. 
Phys. 23, a, and Categ. 100, B 
(Schol. 331, a, 10, 92, b, 23) have 
arisen out of mere clerical 
errors (T@ 1a’ and r@ 1 out of 
TQI A). From évdexdr@ in the 
former passage came next dexdr@ 
in the Aldine text. 

* Theophrastus also says that 
physics have to do only with the 
motum (see sup. vol, i. p.417 sq.) ; 
see supra, Vol. ii. p. 357, n. 1. 

4 évépyeia Tod Suvduer Kiwnrod 
f xuwntby kara yévos Exacrov Tay 
KaTnyopiav—h Tov Suvduer byros 
TowvTov évredéxeia—evépyend Tis 
&reArs Tov Suvdwer Svros f Towdrov 
Kad’ Exaorov yévos Tay KaTnyopiay 
(THEOPHR. Fr. 19sq. 23b, SIMPL. 
Phys. 201, b, 94, a, m. Categ. 
ibid.) &rerhs yap 7 Klvnos (TH. 


374 


ARISTOTLE 


all the categories ; as change is not confined, as Aristotle 
tried to prove,' to substance, size, quality, locality, but is 
also applicable to relation, position, &c.? Again, Aristotle 
had asserted that all change takes place gradually, and 
therefore that everything which changes must be divi- 
sible; ? Theophrastus maintained, on the contrary, the 
possibility—which Aristotle himself elsewhere * admits 


apud THEMIST. De An. p. 199, 20 
Sp.). It isplainfrom the quota- 
tion, sup. vol. i. p. 383, n. 1, that 
this completely agrees with Ari- 
stotle. Nor isit easy to see in 


SIMPL. Categ. 77, «. Phys. 202, a, © 


the deviation from Aristotle 
which RITTER (iii. 413 sq.) finds. 
The first passage (Fr. 24) runs: 
TouT@ pev yap (Theophrastus) 
ducer mh xwpiCecOar Thy Kivnow 
Tis évepyelas, elvar St Thy mer 
Kiynow Kai évepyeiav ws by ev adTh 
‘meprexouevyy, ovKETL mévTOL Kal THY 
evépyeiav Kiyvnow: Thy yap éxdorov 
ovolayv Kal Td oixetoy eldos evépyerav 
elvat éxdorov ph ovcay TravTny 
kivyow. This means, however: 
every motion is an energy, but 
every energy is not a motion; 
energy is the wider, motion the 
narrower conception. It is 
almost the opposite, therefore, 
to RITTER’s explanation : that he 
refuses to comprehend either the 
conception of energy under that 
of motion ‘ or the conception of 
motion under the conception 
of energy.’ Phys. 202, a, 
SIMPL. says: 6 Oedppacros (ynreiv 
Seiv pnor wept Tay KwWioewy ei ai 
bevy Kuhoes eioly, ai S& dSomep 
évépyeiai tives, which he cites, 
however, only as proof that 
Theophr. uses xlynots not merely 
of motion in space, but of any 


change. In this more general 
sense he may have understood 
particularly the ‘motion of the 
soul’ (see infra). Aristotle also, 
however, frequently uses kiynots 
synonymously with jperaBodrr, 
and even he calls motion energy 
as wellas entelechy (see swp. vol. 
i. p. 383, n. 1) : while, on the other 
hand, Theophr. as well as Ari- 
stotle says that it is only an in- 
complete energy. According to 
Priscian (in his paraphrase of the 
Physics bk. v. p. 287, Theophr. 
Opp. ed. Wimm. iii. 269) he says 
expressly: attra 5é | évépyeia 
and xlynois] Siapdper’ yxppardau 
d€ avaykaiov eéviore tots avrois 
évéuaciy, 

1 See supra, vol. i. p. 423, n. 1. 

2 THEOPHR. Fr. 19, 20, 23 (cf. 
sup.vol. ii. p.373,n. 4). The remark 
in Fr.20 on the motion of relation 
is obscure, andin the words: 7% 
yap evépyeta klynois Te kal Kad? abrd 
the text is probably corrupt. 
Perhaps we ought to read: yap 
évepyeia Klynows tov Kab’ adrd. 
But even so the passage is not 
quite clear. 

3 Phys. vi. 4 init. (see supra, 
vol. i. p. 439, n. 3), cf. c. 10. 

+ Phys. i. 3, 186, a, 13, and in 
the discussions upon light see 
supra, Vol. i. p. 518, n. 3. 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 375 





—of a simultaneous change in all parts of a mass.' Ari- 
stotle finally, in connection with the same subject, had 
assumed that, although there is a moment at which a 
change is completed, there is none at which it begins ;? 
Theophrastus rightly held this to be inconceivable.* 
He further took serious exception to Aristotle’s doctrine 
of space. If space is the limit set by the surrounding to 
the surrounded body, the latter must be a plain surface ; 
space would move, along with the surrounding body, 
which is inconceivable; nor would every body be in 
space, since the outermost circle would not be; more- 
over, all that is in space would cease to be so, without, 
however, itself suffering any change, if the surrounding 
body coalesced with it in one whole or were wholly 
removed.® Theophrastus was himself inclined to define 
space as the order and position of bodies relatively to 





1 THEMIST. Phys. vi. 4, p. 381, 
23 sqq. c. 5, 389, 8 sqq. Cf. 
Smmpi. Phys. 233, a, m (Fr. 
54 sqq.). On the other hand the 
citation from Theophrastus in 
StmpL. Phys. 23, a, is not 
directed against Aristotle, but is 
in agreement with him against 
Melinus. 

2 See supra, vol. i. p. 439, n. 4. 

8 SimPL. Phys. 230, a, m. 
THEMIST. Phys. p. 386, 16 Sp. 
(Schol, 410, b, 44, 411, a, 6). Cf. 
Eudemus in SIMPL. 231, b (Fr. 
67 Sp.). 

‘ In respect to time, on the 
other hand, he wholly agreed 
with Aristotle ; Simp. Phys. 187, 
a,m. cf. Categ. Schol. in Av. 79, 
b, 25; controverting apparently, 
like Eudemus (according to 
Simp. Phys. 165, a, and b, Fr. 


46 Sp.), Plato’s views upon time. 

5 Fr, 21, b, Simp. Phys. 141, 
a, m.; Theophrastus objects in 
the Physics to Aristotle’s defini- 
tion of space, 8r1 7d capua Fora 
év émipavela, Sti Kwodmevos Earan b 
témos [but according to SIMPL. 
Phys. 131, b, 136, a. 141, b, 
143, a, Theophrastus and En- 
demus treated it as an axiom 
that space is immobile, as Ari- 
stotle also had done, see sup. vol. - 
i. p. 432 sq. Phys.iv. 4, 212, a, 18 
sqq.], drt od way oGpa ev rémyw (ovde 
yap  ardavhs), Sri, dav cvvaxdaow 
al opaipa, Kal bAos 5 odpavds odk 
gorau ev tom (cf. ARIST. Phys. iv. 
4, 211, a, 29], dri ra ev tTér@ svra, 
mndey abrda weraxwnbévta, edy ap- 
ape) Ta mwepiéxovTa aiTa, obKér 
gorau ev Tér@. 


376 ARISTOTLE 


one another.' Of less importance are some other state- 


ments quoted from the portions of his Physics which 
dealt with more general questions.? In his treatise 
upon the elements* to which the extant passage upon 
fire belongs, while holding fast to Aristotelian prin- 
ciples,* he nevertheless finds certain difficulties. While 
all other elements are themselves definite materials, 
fire (whether we take it to include light or not) 
only exists in materials which burn and give light; 
how then can it be treated as an elementary substance ? 
This can only be the case if we assume that in a higher 
region ® heat is pure and unmixed, whereas upon earth 


1 SIMPL. ibid. 149, b, m. (Fr. 
22): Theophrastus says, though 
only as a suggestion (as év dmopia 
mpodywv tov Adyov): ‘ uhmore ovK 
ott Kal’ adtoy ovcia tis 6 TéTOos, 
GAAR TH TaEEL Kal Odor THY TwUd- 
Twv Aéyerat Kata Tas pices Kal 


Suvduers, Suolws 8 emi Cdwv nar 


gutay Kal bdrws TaY dvomoiomepar, 
etre supixwv elre apiywv, Eupoppov 
deriv ptow exdvtwy* Kal yap Tov- 
Ttav Takis Tis Kal Cols THY pepov 
éott mpds Thy BAny ovctav: did Kai 
ExaoTov év Ti avTov xdpa Aéyerat 
T@ Exew Thy oixelay rdgww, ered Kal 
TOY TOU GauaToOsS mepav EkacToV 
emimoOnoeey dy kal amourhoere THY 
EavTov xapay Kal Oéouy.’ 

* At the beginning of his 
treatise he had illustrated the 
beginning of Aristotle’s with the 
remark that all natural existences 
have their principles as all natural 
bodies are composite (SIMPL. 
Phys. 2,b, 5, b, m. Schel. in Ar. 
324, a, 22, 325, b, 15. PHILOP. 
Phys. A, 2, m.); in the third 
book, which was also entitled 
™. ovpavod, he distinguishes three 


kinds of becoming: by means of 
something similar, something 
opposite, and something which is 
neither similar nor opposite to 
that which comes to be but only 
in general a previous actuality 
(Fr. 16, b, SIMPL. ibid. 287, a). 

% According to Alex. in SIMPL. 
De Ceelo, init., Schol. 468, a, 11, 
Theophrastus had discussed these 
in the treatise a. ovpavod, which 
however (ibid. 435, b, 33, and 
previous note) is the same as 
Physics, Bk. iii. Stmpu. De Celo, 
517, a, 31, however, cites also a 
special work by him, wep) rijs ray 
oToxelwy vyevéeoews (USKNER, 
Anal. 21, thinks perhaps the 
same as Diog., v. 39, calls 7. 
EVETEWS). 

‘ The composition of the ele- 
ments of heat, cold, &c. (see sup. 
vol. i. p. 478 sqq.; to this account, 
e.g. De Igne, 26: Tb yap rip Cepudy 
kal &mpdv refers). Similarly the 
theory of the natural weight and 
levity of bodies; cf. De Vent. 
22, De Sensu, 88 sq. 

5 év avti TH mpetn ocpalpa, by 


———E—————— ee 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 377 


it is only found in union with something else and in 
a process of becoming; but in this case we must again 
ask whether terrestrial fire springs from the heavenly 
element or owes its origin to certain states and move- 
ments in burning material.' Again, how are we to 
explain the sun? If it consists of a kind of fire, this 
must be very different from other fire; if it does not 
consist of fire, we should then have to explain how it 
can kindle fire. In any case we should have to admit 
that not only fire but also heat are properties. But how is 
it possible to admit this with regard to heat, which is a 
far more universal and elementary principle than fire ? 
Thissuggests further questions. Are heat, cold, &c. really 
first principles and not merely attributes ?? Are the so- 
called simple bodies not rather composite things ? since 
even moisture cannot be without fire, for if it were it 
would freeze; nor can the earth be wholly without 
moisture, for if it were it would fall to pieces. We 
are not, however, justified in ascribing to Theophrastus 
on account of these criticisms an actual departure from 
the Aristotelian doctrine.* He is only following his 
general custom of pointing out the difficulties which his 
Master’s view involves, without necessarily giving it up. 

It is the less necessary to follow Theophrastus 


which, however, only the first 
elemental sphere can be meant. 

1 De Igne, 3-5. Cf. also 
OLYMPTODORUS in Meteorol. i. 
137, id. 

2 Ibid. 5-7, where § 6 with 
the words: éy droxemévm ti) Kal 
To mip kal 5 HAs Td Oepudy we 
must supply @xe. 

8 Thid. 8: palvera: yap obtw 


AauBdvovor 7d Bepudy Kal 7d Wuxpoy 
dborwep win Tivav elva, obk apxal 
kal Suvduers* Gua 8 nal Tar 
amwA@y Aeyouevwy pois piKTh Te 
kal évurdpxovoa &AAHAOS &C. 

‘ Aristotle also says that the 
elements do not present them- 
selves separately in actuality ; 
see supra, Vol. i. p. 482, n. 4. 


378 


ARISTOTLE 


farther in his discussion of fire, inasmuch as, in spite 
of many true observations, he not unfrequently proceeds 
upon false assumptions and fails to bring to the elucida- 
tion of the facts any actual knowledge of the processes 


of combustion.! 


Nor need we enter into his account of 


wind ? (the cause of which he traces to the motion of the 
sun and warm vapours *), of the origin of rain,‘ of the 


signs of the weather,’ of 


1 Thus, for the explanation 
of several actual or supposed 
phenomena, we have such as- 
sumptions as that the smaller 
fire (as also ARIST. supposes, 
Gen. et Corr.i. 7, 323, b, 8) is 
consumed by the greater, or that 
it is suppressed and suffocated 
by the density of the air (Fr. 3, 
10 sq. 58; Fr. 10, 1 sq ); that a 
cold environment increases the 
interior heat by repulsion (ayti- 
mwepioracis) (ibid. 13, 15, 18, 74, 
mw. idpér. 23, wm. Aecropvx. Fr. 10, 
6; Caus. Pl. i. 12, 3, vi. 18, 11, 
and passim ; cf. the Index under 
avtimeploracis,  dvrTimepiloracbat. 
PLUT. Qu. Nat. 13, p. 915) and 
the like. Hence also the state- 
ment (in SimpL. De Colo, 268, 
a, 27; K. Schol. 513, a, 28) that 
there have been cases of sparks 
darting from men’s eyes. 

2 TI. avéuwy (Fr. 5). In § 5 
of this work mention is also 
made of.that 2. tddrwy (cf. DIoG. 
v. 45; USENER, Anal. Theophr.7). 

8 Toid. §§ 19 sq. ALEX. in 
Meteorol. 100, b; cf. sup. vol. i. 
p.514sq. Theophrastus had spoken 
more fully on this subject in an 
earlier treatise—De Vent. 1. 

* On this see OLYMPIO- 
DORUS on Meteorol. i, 222 id. 

5 TL. onuelwy b8dTwv Kad mvevua- 


stones,® of smells,’ tastes,® 


Twv Kal xemmdvwy kal evdiv(Fr. 6). 

6 TI. Al@wy (Fr. 2), according 
to § 59 written during the Ar- 
chonship of Praxibulus (Ol. 116, 
2,315 B.c.) At the beginning 
of this essay the treatise on 
Metals, on which cf. USENER, p. 
6, and supra, vol. i. p. 84,n. 1, is 
mentioned. THEOPHR. (ibid.) 
makes stones consist of earth, 
metals of water, herein (see sup. 
vol. i. p. 514) connecting his doc- 
trine with that of Aristotle, 
whom he follows in general in 
the treatment of this subject 
(see SCHNEIDER’S references in 
his Commentar, iv. 535 sqq. and 
passim), except that he goes 
much more deeply into particu- 
lars than Aristotle did in the cor- 
responding section of the Meteor- 
ology Gili. 6). 

7 On smells and tastes cf. 
Caus. Pl. vi. 1-5 (on those of 
plants, the rest of the book); on 
smells alone: wep) dcuay (Fr. 4). 
Theophrastus here treats of the 
kinds of smells which do not 
permit of such sharp separation 
as the kinds of tastes, and next 
with great fullness of particular 
fragrant or offensive substances, 
their mixture, &c. Cf. also PLUT. 
Qu. Conv. i. 6, 1, 4. 

8 On these also he had written 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 379 


light,' colours,’ sounds. His view of the structure of 


a special treatise, according to 
Diog. v. 46, in five books (cf. 
USENER, p. 8, and sup. vol. i. p. 
84,n.1); Caus. Pl. vi. 1, 2, 4,1, he 
enumerates seven chief tastes 
with an obvious reminiscence of 
Arist. De Sensu, 4, 442, a, 19 (see 
sup. vol. i. p. 85). Ibid.c.1, 1 he 
gives a definition of xuuds, which 
agrees with that of Aristotle (see 
sup. vol. i. p. 518). OLYMPIOD. in 
Meteorol. i. 286 id. mentions an 
assumption with reference to the 
briny taste of sea water (that it 
comes from the nature of the 
bottom of the sea). 

! Theophrastus had explained 
his theory on this subject in the 
fifth book of the Physics, of 
which fragments have been pre- 
served to us in PRISCIAN’sS Para- 

hrase (see PHILIPPSON, “YAn 

vOpwrivn, pp. 241 sqq.; WIMMER, 
Theophr. Opp. iii. 232 sqq.). On 
light and transparency cf. § 16 
sqq. The dapavés is, according 
to the view here presented, which 
agrees with Aristotle’s (see sup. 
vol. i. p. 518, n. 3), not a body but 
a property or state of certain 
bodies, and when Jight is called 
the évépye:a rod diapavois (§ 18), 
évépyerw must be understood in 
the wider sense of a md@nua or 
certain change in the transparent. 
The idea that light is a material 
emanation is rejected. 

* All that can be obtained 
on this subject from the works 
of Theophrastus (to which, how- 
ever, the pseudo Aristotelian 
treatise on Colours does not be- 
long ; cf. supra, vol ii. p. 355, n. 2) 
is almost entirely in agreement 
with Aristotle, and it is brought 
together by PRANTL, Arist. ib. d. 


Farben, 181 sqq. Fr. 89, 3, 6 
also belongs to this group. 

* Theophr. had discussed 
these in the treatise upon 
Music. In the fragment of this 
treatise which Porphyry has pre- 
served (Fr. 89) in Ptol. Harm. 
(WALLISH, Opp. iii. 241 sqq.) 
he controverts the assumption 
that the difference between 
higher and lower notes is merely 
a numerical one. We cannot 
assert that the higher note either 
consists of more parts or moves 
more swiftly (mAelovs apiOuods 
xweirat § 3, which according to 
§ 5 jin. seems to refer to the 
greater swiftness of motion by 
means of which in the same 
time it traverses a_ greater 
number of equal spaces) than 
the lower (the former was Hera- 
clides’, the latter Plato’s and. 
Aristotle’s assumption ; see Ph. d. 
Gr. i. 887, 1, 655 n. and sup. vol. i. 
p.519). Forin the first placeif the 
essence of sound is number, then 
wherever we have number we 
must also have sound; on the 
other hand, if number is not the 
essence of sound, sounds are not 
distinguished by number only ; 
in the second place observation 
shows that for a low note an 
equally strong movement is re- 
quired as for a high one; and 
again the two could not accord 
with one another if they moved 
with unequal velocity or con- 
sisted of an unequal number of 
movements. If a higher note is 
audible at a greater distance, 
this is only because it is trans- 
mitted in a merely forward 
direction, whereas the deep note 
is transmitted in all directions. 


380 


ARISTOTLE 


the universe agrees in every respect with Aristotle’s.’ 
He shares also his doctrine that the world is without 
beginning or end, defending it, @ propos of Aristotle’s 
physical theory, with great fullness and success against 


the founder of the Stoic school.? 


He holds that intervals do not ex- 
plain the difference in notes, 
they merely make the latter per- 
ceptible by omission of the inter- 
mediate notes. In their case 
much more than in that of colours 
a qualitative difference must be 
admitted. Wherein this differ- 
ence, however, consists, Theophr. 
does not seem more precisely to 
have defined. 

1 We see this from the state- 
ment of Simplicius on the retro- 
gressive spheres quoted sup. vol.i. 
p. 502, n.1, and that of Pseudo- 
Alex.in Metaph. 678, 13 Bon. (807, 
b,9 Br.) which agrees with it. The 
remark Fr. 171 (1. r@v “Ix Odwr) 6 
that the air is nearer the fire 
than is the water refers to Ari- 
stotle’s assumption that the 
elements lie round the earth in 
the form of asphere. We need not 
believe that Theophr. held the 
Milky Way, as Macros. Somn. 
Scip. i. 15 supposes, to be the 
band that unites the two hemi- 
spheres of which the celestial 
sphere is composed; he may 
have compared it with such a 
band, but the idea that the celes- 
tial sphere is really composed of 
two parts is inconsistent with 
Aristotle’s doctrine that the 
world by reason of She nature of 
its materials can only have the 
form of a perfect sphere (see sup. 
vol. i. p. 486sq.). It has already 
been remarked sup. vol. ii. p. 372, 
that Theophrastus follows Ari- 


And since among 


stotle in his general view of the 
world. 

2 The extract from his 
treatise on this subject given in 
the pseudo: Philo has already been 
considered, swp. vol. ii. p. 354, n. 3. 
Theophr. here (c. 23 sqq. Bern.) 
controverts four arguments of 
his opponent and maintains 
against them (as is shown in 
ZELLER’S Hermes, xi. 424 sq.) c. 
25, p. 270, 6 sqq. that in the first 
place their assertion that if the 
world were without beginning 
all unevenness in the earth’s 
surface must long ago have been 
levelled, overlooks the fact 
that the fire in the earth 
which originally heaved up the 
mountains (cf. on this Theophr. 
F. 2, 3) also keeps them up; and 
in the second place if from the re- 
treat of the sea which has taken 
place at particular places, a final 
exhaustion of it and an absorp- 
tion of all elements in fire are 
inferred, this overlooks the 
fact that that decrease (as Ari- 
stotle had previously taught, see 
sup. vol. ii. p. 30, n. 2) is amerely 
local one and is counterbalanced 
by an increase at other places ; 
just as little in the third place 
does it follow from the transi- 
toriness of all particular parts of 
the world, that the world as a 
whole is transitory, inasmuch as 
the destruction of one thing is 
always the birth of another (cf. on 
this swp. vol. i. p.485). If finally 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 381 


other presuppositions of the Peripatetic system the 
eternity of the human race was involved in the eternity 
of the world,' while on the other hand the relatively 
recent origin of civilisation was recognised by Theo- 
_ phrastus and illustrated by researches into the origin of 
the arts upon which it depends? and of religious rites,* 
he assumed with his Master that there occurred from 
time to time overwhelming natural disasters which, 
covering vast territories, either totally annihilated the 
inhabitants or reduced them again to the primeval state 
of barbarism. The mistake, in fact, which Aristotle 
made in assuming with the old astronomy that in the 
eternity of the universe is involved also that of the earth 
and the human race, reveals itself again in Theophrastus. 

Striking proof of Theophrastus’s ability in the field 
of natural history is afforded by his two works upon 





man and therefore also the world 
is said to have had a beginning, 
because the arts without which 
man cannot live have had one, 
Theophr. opposes to this view 
the theory developed in the 
text. 

1 Cf. swp. voi. ii. p. 32, n. 1. 

2? Diog. v. 47 mentions two 
books by him . edpnudrwr. 

8 See more on this subject, 
infra. 

4 It is not permissible, says 
the pseudo-Philo, c. 27, p. 274, 
3 sqq. Bern., to judge the anti- 
quity of man from that of the 
arts. For @opal ray kata viv 
ovk GOpdwy amdytwy GAAG TaY 
mrelorwy Svol ais pmeylorais 
airlas dvaridevra, rupos Kal bdaros 
dd€xtos popais. Katackywreyv 3 
éxarépay év meper pacly év mdvu 


paxpais éviavt@y mepiddois: and 
after further explaining how 
both kinds of devastation occur, 
and how the inhabitants of the 
mountains are swept away by 
the one, those of the valleys and 
plains by the other, he proceeds : 
kata 8h) Tovs AexOévras tpdrovs 
dixa puplwy GAdAwvy BpaxuTépwv 
pbeipouévov tov wAclorouv pmépous 
dvOpdmwy emiAcreiy €& dvdynns Kal 
ras téxvas ... eweiddy 5t af perv 
Kowal vécot xardowow, Uptnrat 
5é dvnBav Kal BAacrdvew 7d yévos 
éx Tav wh mpokatadnpbéytwy Tois 
émiBploact dewois, &pxerOa Kal Tas 
téxvas méAw ouvicracba, ov Td 
mp@Tov yevoucvas, GAAA TH memoes 
Tav exovtwy drooravicbeloas. 

> Cf. on this Phil,-histor. 
Abhandl. der Berl. Akademe, 
1878, pp. 104 sq. 


382 ARISTOTLE 


plants.' Observations are there collected with the most 
unwearied diligence from all regions of the world acces- 
sible at that time. All the information attainable by 
the insufficient means and methods at the disposal 
of the investigator of the period, not only upon the 
form and parts, but also upon the development, the 
cultivation, the use, and the geographical distribution 
of a large number of plants,? is there set down. His 
statements are moreover in general so reliable, and 
where they rest on the testimony of others so cautious, 
that they give us the most favourable impression of his 
power of observation and critical skill. Neither ancient 
nor medizval times have any botanical work of equal 
importance to compare with the writings of Theo- 
phrastus. The scientific explanation of the facts, 
however, was necessarily in the highest degree unsatis- 
factory, since neither botany nor science in general 
was as yet adequate to this task. Aristotle was 
able in his geological works to compensate in some 
degree for the like defect both by the general grandeur 
of his fundamental thoughts and in particular by a 
multitude of brilliant conjectures and startling observa- 
tions; but Theophrastus cannot be compared with his 
Master in either of these respects. 


1 According to KIRCHNER, 
Die Botan. Schrift. d. Th. (Jahrb. 
¥, Philol. Swpplementb. vii.) p. 
497, he names 550 plants, and of 
these there are about 170 with re- 
gard to which we do not know 
whether they had been previously 
known. As, however, he omits 
several with regard to which it 
can be proved that they were 


known before his time, we cannot 
assume that he intended to 
enumerate all that were known 
to him. 

? Cf. what BRANDIS, iii. 298 
eqq., KIRCHNER, 499 sqq., have 
collected from the writings of 
Theophrastus on the sources and 
compass of his botanical know- 
ledge. 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 3838 





The fundamental ideas of his botanical theory are 
taken from Aristotle.' Plants are living creatures.’ 
Theophrastus does not make express mention of a soul 
in them ; he regards their natural heat and moisture 
as the seat of their life,* finding in these also the chief 
ground of the individual peculiarities by which they 
‘are differentiated from one another.‘ But in order 
that they may germinate and grow, a suitable external 
environment is indispensable.® Their progress and 
perfection, their improvement or deterioration depend, 


therefore, in this respect, primarily upon the heat and 


' KrRCHNER, ibid. 514 sqq. 
gives us a comparison of Theo- 

' phrastus’s botanical theory with 

Aristotle’s so far as we know it. 

2 Zavra, Caus i. 4, 5, v. 5, 2; 
18,2; €uBia, ibid. v. 4, 5; they 
have not @n [%0n] and mpdters, 
like the animals, but they have 
Blovs, Hist. i. 1, 1. 

8 Hist. i. 2,4: Gray yap purby 
éxer Twa bypdétnta Kal Gepudryta 
aipoutoy &omep Kal (gov, ay 
brodermdvrwy ylverar yipas Kal 
o0lois, Terdclws 8 strodurdéyTwv 
Odvaros «al atavois. Cf. 11, 3; 
Caus. i. 1, 3: for germination 
there is required éuBios bypdrns 
and atuutov Oepudy as well as a 
certain proportion between them. 
Hist. i. 11, 1: the seed contains 
the cvuguror bypdy Kal Gepudy, and 
if these escape, it loses the power 
of germination. See further 
Caus. ii. 6,1 sq. 8, 3, and other 
passages. 

* Cf. Caus. i. 10, 5. Thbid. c. 
21, 3: ras idlas Exdorwy icets 
elt’ obv iypérntt Kal EnpdrynTs Kal 
muxvérntt | WIMMER’S conjecture | 
kal pavdrnt: Kal tois Towvras 


Siapepotoas elre Oepudrnti Kal 
Wuxpérntt. The latter, however, 
he remarks, are difficult to mea- 
sure: he accordingly exerts him- 
self here and in c. 22 to dis- 
cover marks by means of which 
we may recognise the degrees 
of temperature in a plant, an 
endeavour in which, as we might 
suppose, he meets with very 
little success. 

5 Caus. ii. 3, 4: ael yap Set 
Adyov Twa Exew Thy Kpaow Tijs 
picews mpos Td wepiéxov. 7, 1: 
To avyyevis TIS pioews ExacTor 
yer mpos Tov oixeiov [rémoy] .. . 
olov 4 Oepudrns Kal 7 Wuxpérns Kal 
h Enpérns Kal h bypétyns* Cyre? yap 
Ta mpdopopa Kata Thy Kpaow. Cc. 
9, 6: h yap emOupla waar rod 
avyyevovs. The statement of 
BRANDIS (iii. 319) that the effi- 
cacy of heat, &c., is conditioned 
also by the opposite is not to be 
found either in Caus. ii. 9, 9, or 
anywhere else in Theophrastus, 
although he states in another 
connection, J/ist, v. 9, 7, that 
passive and active must be 
heterogeneous. 


384 ARISTOTLE 


moisture of the air and the ground and on the effects of 
sun and rain.!. The more harmonious the relation in 
which all these factors stand to one another and to the 
plant, the more favourable are they to its development,? 
which is therefore conditioned partly by outward in- 
fluences and partly by the peculiar nature of the plant 
or the seed, in reference to the latter of which we must 
again distinguish between the active force and the 
passive susceptibility to impressions from without.’ 
This physical explanation does not, of course, with 
Theophrastus any more than with Aristotle exclude the 
teleological, which he finds both in the peculiar perfec- 
tion of the plant itself and in its usefulness for man, 
without, however, going deeper into this side of the 
question or developing it in relation to the rest of his 
botanical theory.* 

The chief subjects discussed in the remaining por- 
tions of the two works upon plants are the parts, the 
origin and development, and the classification of plants. 

In considering the first of these Theophrastus en- 
counters the question whether annual growths such as 
leaves, blossoms, and fruit are to be regarded as parts 
of the plant or not. Without giving a definite answer 
to this question he inclines to the latter view,> and 
accordingly names as the essential external parts of the 


1 Cf. Hist. i. 7, 1; Caus. i. n. 1, of the compression of in- 
21, 2 sqq. ii. 13, 5, iil, 4, 3; 22, 8, ternal heat by external cold. 


iv. 4, 9 sq. 13, and other passages. 2. Caus. i..10, 6; 6,'8, ii. 9,18, 
In the explanation of the pheno- iii. 4, 3, and passim. 

mena themselves, Theophrastus 3 The Sdvauis tod moety and 
indeed not unfrequently gets Tov mdcyew, Caus. iv. 1, 3. 

into ditliculty, and rescues him- * See supra,vol. ii. p. 369, n. 2. 
self by assumptions such as that 5 Hist. 1.:1, 1-4. 


referred to supra, vol. ii. p. 378, 





PERIPATETIC SCH OOL: THEOPHRASTUS 885 


plant' the root, stem (or stalk), branches and twigs.? 
He shows how plants are differentiated by the presence 
or absence, the character, the size, and the position of 
these parts,* remarking that there is nothing which is 
found in all plants as invariably as mouth and belly are 
in animals, and that in view of the infinite variety of 
botanical forms we must frequently be content with 
mere analogy.‘ As ‘internal parts’® he names bark, 
wood, pith, and as the ‘ constituent parts’ of these again, 
sap, fibres, veins and pulp.6 From these, which are 
permanent, he distinguishes finally the yearly changing 
elements, which, indeed, in many cases are the whole 
plant.’ Here, however, as not unfrequently elsewhere, 
he takes the tree as the basis of his investigation ; it. 
seems to stand with him for the perfect plant, just as 
humanity stands with Aristotle for the perfect animal 
and man for the perfect type of humanity. 

In his treatment of the origin of plants, Theophras- 
tus points out three distinct methods of propagating 
them, viz. from seed, from parts of other plants, and by 
spontaneous generation.* ‘I'he most natural of these is 


‘7a &w pdpia (ibid.), the 
dvopoouep (ibid. 12, cf. supra, 
vol. i. p. 517, n. 6, and vol. ii. 
p. 28, n. 1. 

2 pla, kavads, dxpeudy, KAddos 
- +» Fore Be pila wey 8 of Thy 
tTpophy émdyera [it depends on 
this, i.e. on the dbvayis pvowh, not 
on the position in the ground, 
fist. i. 6, 9] wavads 8 els 8 
péperar. Kxavddy 38 Aéyw rd itp 
Yiis mepunds ep’ Ev . . . axpeudvas 
8& rods amd tovTov oxiCoucvous, 
obs tor Kadrodow bCovs. KAddov 
Sérd BAdornua rd éx robTay eg’ 


VOL. II. 


év olov udAtora Td éméresov, Hist, 


‘i. 1, 9. Aristotle’s view was not 


altogether identical; see supra, 
vol. ii. p. 35, n. 4. 

° Thid. 6 sqq. 

* Ibid. 10 sqq. 

® 7a évrds, ibid; rd et Sv rabra, 
duotomeph, ibid. 2, 1. 

* Hist. i. 2, 1) 8. On the 
meaning of ts, drt, odpt of 
plants, see MEYER, Gesch. der 
Bot. i. 160 sq. 


” Hist. i. 2, 1 sq, 
* Here he follows Aristotle ; 
see supra, vol. ii. p. 36. 


cc 


386 ARISTOTLE 

from seed. All seed-bearing plants employ this method, 
even if individuals among them exhibit another as 
well. This law, acceording to: Theophrastus, is not only 
obvious from observation, but follows still more clearly 
from the consideration that otherwise the seed of such 
plants would serve no purpose, in a system of nature 
where nothing, least of all anything so essential as the 
seed, is purposeless.! Theophrastus compares seed, as 
Empedocles had done, to eggs,? but he has no true con- 
ception of the fructification and sexual differences. of 
plants. He often distinguishes, indeed, between male 
and female plants,’ differing in this from Aristotle ;* but 
when we inquire what he means by this, we find, in the 
first place, that this distinction refers always to plants 
as a whole and not to the organs of fructification in 
them, and can apply, therefore, only to the smallest 
portion of the vegetable kingdom ; that, in the second 
place, it is applied by Theophrastus only to trees, and 
not even to all these ; and, thirdly, that even here itrests 
not upon any actual knowledge of the process of fractifi- 
cation, but upon vague analogies of popular language.° 


1 Caus. i. 1; 1 -sq. 4, 1; cen 
a1, 1; 153 
 ® Caus.i. 7,1, cf. Z.BLUER, Ph. 
4. Gai, TL, So onig Aristotle, 
Gen. An. i. 22, 731, a, 4 

3 See supra, vol. ii. p. 34,n.1, 
and p. 48. 

* See Index under tiopny and 
OnAvSs. 

+ 3 it is clear from his whole 
mode of applying the distinction 
between male and female plants 
that Theophrastus was not the 
first to make it. It is plain 
that he found it already exist- 


ing, and that it belongs in fact 
to the unscientific use of lan- 
guage. He nowhere gives a 
more exact definition of its 
significance or its basis; on the 
contrary, he frequently marks 
it as a customary division by 
the use of xadovor or a similar 
expression :(¢.g. Hist. iii. 3, 7, 8, 
1,°42, 6,' 16, 3, 18,' 5). -The 
division in his text is limited to 
trees: trees, he says, are divided 
into male‘and female (Hist. i. 
14, 5, iii. 8, 1; Caus. i. 22, 1, and 
passim); and nowhere does he 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 887 


On the other hand, he instituted accurate observations 
upon the process of germination in some plants.! 
Among the different methods of propagating plants by 
slips, bulbs, &c., which Theophrastus minutely dis- 


call any other plant but a tree 
male or female; for although 
he says (Hist. iv. 11, 4) of a 
species of reed that in compari- 
son with others it is @jAus rij 
_mpoodyer, this is quite different 
from a division into a male and 
female species. . Theophrastus 
speaks also (Caus. vi. 15, 4) of 
an écuh OjAvs. Even trees, how- 
ever, do not all fall under the 
above division ; cf. Hist. i. 8, 2: 
kal ta Uppeva BE Tay OnrAcLav 
d(widorepa, ev ofs doriv &ugw. 
This is enough to show that the 
division is not based on any 
correct conceptions as to the 
fructification of plants, and all 
that he further states concerning 
it proves how little value must 
be set upon it. The distinction 
between male and female trees 
is found to consist in the former 
being barren, or at any rate 
less fruitful than the latter 
( Hist. iii. 8, 1). The most general 
distinction between trees is that 
of male and female, dy 7d piv 
kapropdpov to 5t &xaproy ém) 
twav. ev ols dt dupw Kapropdpa, 
7) OAV KadrAiKaprétepoy Kal 
moAvkapmérepoy : some, however, 
contrariwise call the latter kind 
of trees male. Cuaus. ii. 10,1: 
Ta wey Exapma ta dé Kdprma Toy 
ayplav, & 5) Ohrea ra 3 Uppeva 
kadovow, Cf. Hist. iii. 3,7, ¢. 9,1, 
2, 4, 6, c, 10, 4, c. 12, 6, c. 15, 3, 
c. 18,5; Caws.i. 22, 1, iv. 4, 2). 
Moreover, it is remarked that 
the male have more branches 


(Hist. i. 8, 2), and that their 
wood is harder, of closer tissue, 
and darker, while the female are 
more slender (//ist. iii. 9, 3, v. 
4,1; Caus. i. 8,4). Only of the 
date tree does Theophrastus say 
that the fruit of the female 
ripens and does not fall off if 
the pollen of the male fall upon 
it, and he compares this with 
the shedding of the spawn by 
the male fish; but even in this 
he cannot see fructification in 
the proper sense, as the fruit is 
supposed to be already there; 
his explanation of the matter 
rather is that the fruit is warmed 
and dried by the pollen, and he 
compares the process with the 
caprification of figs (Cuwus. ii. 9, 
15, iii. 18, 1; Hist. ii. 8, 4, 6, 6). 
He never supposes that all seed- 
formation depends upon fructifi- 
cation. InCwus. iii. 18, 1, he ex- 
pressly rejects the idea which 
might have been founded upon 
this fact: mpds 7d reAcioyovety wh 
abrapkes elvar 7d OfAv, remarking 
that if it were so there would be 
not only one or two examples of 
it, but it would necessarily esta- 
blish itself in all, or at any 
rate in most, cases. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that he 
says (Caus. iv. 4, 10) that in the 
case of plants the earth bears 
the same relation to the seed as 
the mother does in the case of 
animals, 

' Hist. viii. 2, on grain, pulse, 
and some trees, 


cc2 


388 ARISTOTLE 


cusses,! he reckons grafting and budding, in which he 
says the stem serves as soil for the bud or the graft ; * 
and, as a second method of a similar kind, the annual 
sprouting of plants.’ In reference, finally, to spon- 
taneous generation, Theophrastus indeed remarks that 
this is not unfrequently merely apparent, the seeds of 
many plants being so minute as to escape observation, 
or having been carried by winds, water and birds to 
places where we least expect to find them.* But that 
it does actually take place, especially in the case of 
smaller plants, he does not doubt,’ and he explains it, like 
the spontaneous generation of animals, as the result of 
the decomposition of certain materials under the in- 
fluence of terrestrial and solar heat.® ? 

In classifying plants, Theophrastus arranges them 
under the four heads of trees, bushes, shrubs and herbs,’ 
calling attention at the same time to the unsatisfactori- 
ness of this classification.* He further distinguishes 


1 Hist. ii. 1 sq. Caus. i. 1-4 
and passim. Also propagation 
by the so-called tears (Sdxpua), on 
which see Caus i. 4, 6, Hist. ii. 2, 


KAadov ... . pptyavor 5€ rh ard 
pl(ns moAvoTéAexes Kal ToAvKAGBOV 
; . wéa 5& Th amd pins puaddrAo- 
pdpov mpoidy aaréAexes ov 6 KavAds 


1,and cf. MEYER, Gesch. der Bot. 
i. 168. 
2 Caus. i. 6. 
3 (aus. i. 10, 1, where this 
subject is further discussed. 
4 Caus. i. 5, 2-4, ii. 17, 5; 
Hist, iii. 1, 5. 
- & OF, Causa. i.. 1,2, 8, 1.11, 9, 
14, iv. 4, 10, Hist, iii. 1, 4. 
6 Caus.i.5, 5; cf. ii. 9,6, 17, 5. 
7 Hist. i. 3, 1, with the 
further explanation: dévdpoy pmev 
obv eort TO amd plens movorréerexes 
wodvKAadoy oCwrdy obK edamdAuTOV 
. . Oduvos Se Td awd AlQns modrdv- 


omeppnopdpos. 

8 Ibid. 2: Set Se rovs Spous 
oUTws amodéxerOa Kal AauBdvew 
as Tum Kal em) Td Wav AEyomevous * 
évia yap tows emaddAdrrew ddtere, 
Te 5é Kal mapa thy aywyhvy [by 
culture] GAAodTepa yiverbar Kal 
éxBalvey THs picews. And after 
explaining by examples and 
further enlarging upon this fact, 
that there are also bushes and 
herbs with the form of trees, and 
that we might thus be inclined 
to lay more stress upon the size, 
strength and durability of plants, 








Dee a pee ee ae 
eee 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 389 


between garden and wild plants, fruit-bearing and 
barren, blossoming and non-blossoming, evergreen and 
deciduous ; while admitting that these also are vanishing 
distinctions, he yet regards them as the common natural 
characteristics of certain classes.' He lays special stress, 
however, on the division into land and water plants.? In 
his own treatment of plants he follows the first main 
division, except that he classes trees and bushes toge- 
ther.’ Into the further contents of his botanical writ- 
ings, however, we cannot here enter.’ 

Of Theophrastus’s work upon Zoology * hardly any- 
thing remains to us; nor does the information which 
we possess from other sources as to his zoological doc- 
trines justify us in attributing to him more in this field 


he concludes again, § 5: 8: 3) 
Tavta domwep A€yomev obk axpiBo- 
Aoyntéov TH Spy GAA TE TUT 
Anrréov tovs &popiopods. 

! Hist. i. 3, 5 sq. and some 
further remarks c. 14, 3. In 
respect to the distinction be- 
tween garden and wild plants 
especially he observes here and 
iii. 2, 1 sq. that this is a natural 
one, as some plants degenerate 
under cultivation, or at least do 
not improve; others, on the con- 
trary (Caus. i. 16, 13), are de- 
signed for it. 

® Hist. i. 4, 2 sq. 14, 3, iv, 6, 
1; Caus.ii. 3, 5. 

* Booksii.—v. ofthe History of 
Plants treat of trees and bushes, 
therefore of ligneous plants; 
book vi. of shrubs; books vii. 
viii. of herbs; book ix. dis- 
cusses the sap and _ healing 
qualities of plants. 

* BRANDIS, iii. 302 sqq., gives 

* 


a review of the contents of both 
works ; see also a shorter one in 
MEYER, Gesch. der Bot. i. 159 
sqq. 
5 Seven books, which D1o4. v. 
43 first enumerates singly by 
their particular titles, and then 
comprehends under the common 
title +. (gwyv. Single books are 
also cited by Atheneus among 
others; see USENER, p. 5, 
Theophrastus himself refers 
(Caus, Pl.ii. 17, 9, cf iv. 5, 7) to 
the ioropla: rept (wy, He does not 
seem, however (if we may judge 
from the single titlesin Diogenes), 
to have intended in this work to 
give a complete natural history, 
but only (as was his general plan 
where Aristotle had already laid 
down the essential principles) 
to supplement Aristotle’s work 
by a minute treatment of par- 
ticular points. To this work 
belong Fr. 171-190. 


890 


ARISTOTLE 


than an extension of Aristotle’s labours by further obser- 
vations and some isolated researches of minor value.! 
His views upon the nature of life and of the human 


soul are of more importance.? 


' The citations from him re- 
lating to this, apart from isolated, 
and sometimes rather mythical, 
references to his natural history 
(eg. Fr. 175 and the statement 
in PLUT. Qu. conv. vii. 2, 1), are 
limited to ithe following :— 
Avimals. occupy a higher stage 
than plants: they have not only 
life but also &m [#@y] and 
mpdteis (Hist. i. 1,1); they are 
related to man, not only in body, 
but also in soul (see infra, p. 394, 
n.1). Their life proceeds in the 
tirst instance frcm a native, in- 
ternalheat (Fr.10 7. Aerropvx. 2); 
at the same time they require a 
suitable (oduuerpos) environment, 
air, food, &c. (Caus. Pl. ii. 3, 4 
sq. iii. 17, 3); alterations of 
place and season produce in them 
certain changes (Hist. ii. 4, 4, 


Caus. ii. 18, 5, 16, 6). With 
Aristotle (see Chap. X. supra) 
Theophrastus emphasises the 


marks of design in their bodily 
organs as against the older phys- 
ics: the physical organism is the 
instrument, not the cause of vital 
activity (De Sensu, 24). Here, 
however, Theophrastus does not, 
any more than Aristotle (see Ch. 
VII. supra), overlook the fact that 
even in the case of animals it is 
impossible to trace in every parti- 
cular a definite design (Fr. 12, 29: 
see supra, Vol. ii.p.11,n.2). A dis- 
tinction is occasionally made be- 
tween land- and water-animals 
(Hist. i. 4, 2,14, 3. iv. 6,1; Caus. ii. 
3,5); wild and tame (Hist. iii. 2, 2, 
Caus. i. 16, 13) ; on the latter dis- 
tinction in Hist. i. 3, 6 he remarks 


Several of the funda- 


that the measure of it is relation 
to man, 6 yap &vOpwros 4 udvov h 
pdAvota Huepov. The use which 
the different animals are to one 
another Theophrastus had referred 
to in the Natural History ( Caus. 
ii. 17; 9 cf. § 5). Concerning the 
origin of animals he also believes 
in spontaneous generation even 
in the case of eels, snakes and 
fish ‘(Caus. i. 1, 2, 5,5, ii. 9, 6, 
17,6; Fr. 171,)9/11,. 174.2, 6; 
cf. PoRPH. De Abst. ii. 5, accord- 
ing to which the first animals 
must have sprung from the earth, 
and the treatise 7. ray abroudtwy 
(gwv in Dioa. v. 46); their meta- 
morphoses are mentionedin Caus. 
ii. 16, 7, iv. 5, 7. Respiration 
he conceives, with Aristotle, to 
serve the purpose of refrigera- 
tion: fish do not breathe, because 
the water performs this service 
for them (fr. 171, 1, 3; cf. Fr. 
10,1). Lassitude is traced (Fr. 
7, 1, 4, 6, 16) to a ovyrnéits, a de- 
composition of certain consti- 
tuents of the body (cf. the 
obvtnyua, Vol. ii. p.51,n. 2, sup.) ; 
vertigo (Fr. 8, 7. iAlyywv), to the 
irregular circulation of the 
humours in the head. Fr. 9, 7. 
iip@rwy investigates the proper- 
ties of perspiration and their 
conditions. Fainting is the re- 
sult of the want or loss of vital 
heat in the respiratory organs 
(Fr. 10, m. Aerwopuxtas); simi- 
larly palsy results from cold in 
the blood (Fr. 11, 7. mapaAdcews). 

* Theophr. had spoken of the 
soul in Physics, Bks. iv. and v., 
which according to THEMIST, De 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 3891 


mental conceptions of the Aristotelian doctrine are here 


called in question. 


Aristotle had described the soul 


as the unmoved principle of all movement, and had 
referred its apparent movements, in so far as they can 
properly be regarded as such, to the body.' Theo- 
phrastus held that this is true only of the lower activi- 
ties of the soul : thought-activity, on the contrary, must, 
he thinks, be regarded as a movement of the soul.? 


An. 91 a, Spengel ii. p. 199, 11, 
were also entitled ‘x. puxjjs.’ 

1 See supra, Ch. XI. 

2 According to SIMPL. Phys. 
225, a, he said in the first 
book 7m. xwhoews: br. ai pey 
dpéters wal al emibvular Kad doyal 
gwparikal kwhoes eiol Kal amd 
rovtav apxhy exovow, boa 5é 
kploeis Kal Oewplar, rabras odk Eoriy 
eis Erepoy ayayeiv, GAN’ ev abti 
Th Wuxi Kal  apxh Kal 7 évépyera 
kal Td TéAos, ei 5& 5H Kal 6 vows 
kpeirrév Tt mépos Kal Oerepov. dre 
5h FEwOev emreioidy Kal wayTéAcios. 
Kal rovros émdyer’ tmtp wey obv 
TovTav oKemtéoy ef Twa Xwpiopdy 
Eyer mpds tov Spov, ered Td ye 
kwhoets elvat Kal TavTas duodoyou- 
pwevov. We know that. Theo- 
phrastus also described music as 
kiynoits Wuxis. To him, also, 
RITTER, iii. 413, refers THEMIST. 
De An. 68 a, Sp. ii. p. 29 sq., 
where divers objections to Ari- 
stotle’s criticism of the assump- 
tion that the soul moves, 
are cited from an unnamed 
writer who is described with the 
words 6 tév ‘Apiororédous 
ékeraotrhs. THEMIST. 89 b. Sp. 
p. 189, 6, certainly says @c«dppac- 
ros év ols berate: Ta “Apior ot éAous: 
and Hermolaus Barbarus trans- 
lates (according to Ritter) both 
passages Theophrastus in iis 


libris in quibus tractat locos ab 
Aristotele ante tractatos. But 
this very similarity makes it 
possible that Hermolaus merely 
transferred Theophrastus’s name 
from the second passage to the 
first —a transference hardly 
justified by that passage itself. 
The statements of Themistius 


seem rather to refer to another, 


and indeed far later, writer 
than Theophrastus, e.g., when he 
reproaches his anonymous Op- 
ponent (68, a), with having 
apparently wholly forgotten 
Aristotle’s views upon motion, 
Kaito. avvopw  exdedwKas TaY 
mepi kwhoews ecipnuévwv ’Apioro- 
téAex (Theophrastus can hardly 
have written such a_ treatise 
— éxdedwxas moreover points to an 
original work—nor was it neces- 
sary to appeal to this to prove 
that Aristotle’s theory of motion 
might have been known to him); 
when he reports of him (68, b.): 
dporoyav thy Klynow Ths Puxis 
odclay elva: kal piow, dia Todrd 
gonow, bom by: waddAov Kwijras 
TogovTw madAov THs ovclas av’Tijs 
eticracba, &c. (this Theophrastus 
would certainly not have said) ; 
when he says: to. him with refer- 
ence to this that he appears not 
to know the distinction of motion 
and energy. The general tone 


392 ARISTOTLE 


Aristotle had spoken of a Passive Reason, declaring 
that only the capacity of knowledge is innate, and that 
this capacity can only develop gradually into actual 
knowledge ;' but the development of that which is 
present at first only as a capacity—in other words, the 
realisation of possibility—is movement.” It is improbable 
that Theophrastus on this account defined the nature of 
the soul differently from Aristotle ;3 but on the other 
hand, he found serious difficulty in accepting his view of 
the relation between active and passive reason. The 
question, indeed, as to how reason can at once come from 
without and be innate, may be answered by assuming 
that it enters at the moment of birth. But a further 
difficulty arises: if it be true that reason is at first 
nothing actually, but everything only potentially, how 
does it accomplish that transition to actual thought 
and passion, which we must attribute to it in one sense 
or another, when it performs an act of thought? If it 
be said that it is impelled to think by external things, 
it is hard to understand how the incorporeal can be acted 
upon and altered by the corporeal. If it receives the 
impulse from itself—the only other alternative to im- 


of Themistius’s argument conveys 
the impression that he is dealing 
with a contemporary. 

1 See supra, vol. ii. p. 96. 

2 See supra, vol.ii.p.380,n. 1. 

* JAMBLICHUS says, indeed, 
in SToB. Hel. i. 870: Erepo Se 
[sc. ray ’ApiororeAu@y] TeAcid- 
TnTa avThy apoplCovTa kat’ ovolav 
Tov Oelov cduaros, hy [the rereud- 
Tns perhaps, not the detoyv capa] 
evTeAéxey Karel “ApiororéAns, 
omep dh év éviors Oedppacros. But 


Aristotle had himself defined 
the soul as the entelechy of an 
organic body. Theophrastus, 
therefore, would have merely 
added that the first substratum 
of the soul, the @ciov cGpua, is the 
ether ; which, however, he prob- 
ably meant in the same sense in 
which Aristotle also (see supra, 
vol. ii. p. 6, n. 2) conceived of the 
soul as united to a substance 
like the ether. 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 393 | 


pulse from the senses—then it is not passive at all. In 
any case this passivity must be of a different kind from 
passivity in general: it is not the mobilisation of that 
which has not yet reached completion, but it is a state 
of completion. If, moreover, matter is defined as that 
which exists only potentially, does not reason, conceived 
of as mere potentiality, become something material ? If, 
finally, the distinction must be made in the case of rea- 
son, as elsewhere, between the efficient and the material 
cause, the question yet remains, how are we further to 
describe the nature of each? what are we to understand 
by the passive reason? and how is it that the active 
reason, if it is innate, does not act from the very first? 
if it is not innate, how does it afterwards originate ?! 








! Theophrastus in THEMIST. 
De An. 91 a, Sp. 198, 13 sq. 
(the same in a rather poor and 
corrupt extract in PRISCIAN’S 
paraphrase, ii. 4, p. 365 sq. 
Wimm.): 6 8& vots mas more 
Eiwbev dv nal Somwep érideros, duws 
ounguts ; nal tis H piois aiTod ; 
Td) wey yap under elvar kar’ évép- 
yey, Suvduer St mayra, Kadds, 
donep xal 7 aloOnois. od yap obtw 
Antréoy, as obdé abrés* epiorixdy 
yap’ GAA’ a@s bwoKremévyy twa 
Sivauiw, Kabdrep nal em ray bAiKav 
{the above statement, that it is 
nothing «ar’ évépyeay, must not 
be taken to mean that it is never 
present itself: rather is its pre- 
sence as faculty presupposed by 
every exercise of reason]. aAAd& 
Td Ewhev tipa ob ws ewiderov, GAN’ 
as év Th mpoTn yevéoe: ovprepi- 
AauBdvov [-Bavduevor| Oeréov. mas 
dé more yiverat Ta vonra; [how 
does reason become the object of 
thought? how does it unite itself 


with it? Aristotle had said of 
divine as well as of human 
thought that in its exercise it is 
the object of thought ; see supra, 
vol. i, p. 197, n. 3, and p. 199] 
ka. tl 7d mdoxew aitrév; bet 
yap [sc. mdoxew], elwep eis evép- 
yerav tke, Sowep fH aloOnois:. 
dowpdtw 5¢ bed odparos tri td 
wmda0os; 2 mola petaBodAn; Kal 
métepov am’ éxelvou ) apxh 2) am’ 
avtov ; Td wey yap [for on the one 
hand] wdoxew am’ éxelvov ddfecer 
tv [sc. 5 vows] (ovdty yap ag’ 
éavrod [sc. mdoxet] Tay ev mdber), 
7d 5é apxnhy [l. apxn, as PRISCIAN 
also has] mdvtwy elya: kal én’ 
ait@ Td voeiv kal uh Sowep ais 
aicOhoecww an’ abrod [thought must 
lie in its own power, and not come 
to it from the object as sensation 
to the senses—airod must be re- 
ferred to éxelvov; BRENTANO’S 
changes, Psychol. d. Ar, 219, are 
unnecessary], tdxa 3’ dy gaveln 


kal tovTo &romov, ei 6 vots bAns 


394 


ARISTOTLE 


That Theophrastus nevertheless held fast by the Ari- 
stotelian doctrine of the twofold nature of reason is 
beyond dispute ;' what we know of the way-in which 
he silenced his doubts shows merely that he took the 
various terms, as applied to reason, in a different sense 
from that which they bear in other fields, holding that 


exer puow pndey dv, Gravta 5 
duvatés. Themistius adds that 
Theophrastus continued these 
discussions in the fifth book of 
the Physics, and in the second 
on the Soul, and that they are 
MeoTa TOAAGY fev ATopL@Y, TOAA@Y 
d& emiordcewy ToAAGY BE Adoewr. 
The result is, éts kal wept rod 
Suvduer vod cxeddy Ta aiTa dia- 
mopovow, elre tiw0év eotw etre 
auuouys, Kal SioplCew mepavrat, 
mas pev ewbey mas 5 ocuppu7s: 
Aéyovot Se Kal avrdoy amabj Kal 
xwpiotdy, Sowep Thy mointiKdy Kal 
Toy évepyela* ‘dmabhs’ yap, pnow, 
‘6 vows, et uy apa &AAwS TabyTiKds’ 
[PRISCIAN also has these words, 
but he also quotes, as an intro- 
duction to them, the remark 
that we cannot suppose 
reason to be wholly impassive: 
‘ei yap bAws amrabis, nor, 
ovdev vonoe]. Kat Sr. 7d wabntiKdy 

[l. ex] adrod ox as Td 
KWyTiKoY ANWTéoV, aTEANS Yap 7 
kivnot, GAA’ ws évépyerav. [So 
also PRISCIAN.] kal mpoidy pnor 
[following Aristotle, see sup., Vol. 
ii. p. 61, n. 3] Tas wey aicOhoers ovK 
dvev odparos, Tov 5é voov xwpiordy. 
(8:6, here adds PRISCIAN, c. 9, p. 
272 W., tav ew mpocrBbvrav [1. 
mpocend. | ov Setrar mpds Thy TEA- 
elwow.) aduevos dé Kal tay meph 
TOU TomTiKoD vod diwpiopéevwv 
"AptororéAc, ‘ éxeivd, dynow, ém- 
oxemtéoy } [perhaps 71] 34 papey 


év wdon pice, TO-mev ws BAny Kar 
Suvduer, TO SE altiov Kal woinrikdy, 
kal Bri Gel TimidT epov TO ToL.ody TOU 
mdoXovros kal  &pxnh THs BAns.’ 

TavTA Bey jbmodexerau, Stamopet dé, 
tives obv avtat ai 5v0 picess, Kad Ti 


mdAw Td bmoKeluevoy 7) cuvrnprn- 


Mévov T@ wontiuge: pwurdy ydp 
wws 6 vous &k TE Tov mount ucov kal 
TOU Suvdjet. ‘el wey odv obupuTos 
6 kway, Kal evbds expr kal del 
[sc. Kiev]. ef 5€ Borepov, mera 
tivos Kal ma@s 7] yEeveois ; Eoikev ody 
kal ayévynrtos, elmep Kah &pbapros. 
évumdpxav 5’ ody, bud tl ovK Gel ; 
} 81a TL AHO Kal ardrn Kar petdos; 
5a thy wlty; The last para- 
graph THEMISTIUS gives, 89 
b, Sp., 189, 8, more literally, 
apparently, as follows: ef mey 
yap ws etis, pnoly, 7 Sivas exeiv@ 
[the vovs moinrt.], ef wey cbupuTos 
del, Kal evOds exp: ei 8’ borepov 
&c. The development of the 
active reason from the potential 
is described also in the fragment 
in PRISCIAN, c. 10, which has its 
place here, as the acquisition of 
a és (in the sense discussed, 
vol. i. p. 285, n. 3, supra). Forthe 
text in the above, besides SPEN- 
GEL and BRANDIS, iii. 288 sq., 
TORSTRIK, Avist. de An. 187 sq. 
and BRENTANO, ibid. 216 sqq. 
may be consulted. 

+ Cf. previous note and supra, 
vol. ii, p. 391, n. 2.' 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 395 


its evolution has no relation to the incorporeal, which 
is always present to it, but only to the corporeal, of 
which it furnishes the explanation.' 

In the views to which we have just referred, and 
especially in attributing motion to the activity of the 
soul, Theophrastus shows an unmistakeable inclination 
to identify the spiritual element in man more closely 
with the physical. Similarly a statement has come 
down to us in which he asserts that the soul of man is 
of the same nature as that: of animals, that it exhibits 
the same activities and states, and is only distinguished 








' Even the intimations in 
THEMISTIUS take this turn. The 
passivity and potentiality of 
the reason is taken to be of 
another kind than that of cor- 
poreal existence; as independent 
of the body it does not require 
external impressions in order to 
reach completeness as active, 
but is self-evolved from Stvauis 
to €fis; error and forgetfulness 
are explained by its union with 
the body. On similar lines is the 
Theophrastean defence of the Ari- 
stotelian doctrine which PRIs- 
CIAN gives us (see ii. 17, p. 277, 
W.): mda Bt brouimrvhoKe piro- 
coperata 6 Oedpp. ds kad aitd 7d 
elvat Ta mpdyyata Tov vody .Kal 
Suvduer wal évepyela Anwréov 
oixelws* iva uh ds emi ris Ans 
kara orépnow 7d duvdue, } Kara 
thy tiwbey kal mabnrichy TerAclwou 
7) évepyela trovontwuev* arAG 
pwndt &s em ris aicdhoews, %vOa 
51a Tis tTav alcOnrnplav Kivfoews 
i Tav Adywr ylvetas mpoBorAh, Kal 
aitrn trav tw Kemévwy odca bew- 
PNTiKH, GAAA voepas em) vod Kal 7d 


Suvduer wal 7d evepyela elvas ta 
mpdyywara Anwréov ...c. 20, p. 

81, W.: rovro 5€ [the previous 
citation from Aristotle] d:apepay 
6 ©, emdyer* GAN Bray yévnra Kal 
vonO7, djAov bri tavra eter, ra SE 
vonta ael, elmep 7 emiothun 7 Oew- 
pnTiKh) TavTd Tos mpdypacw* abry 
5& 9 «Kar? evépyemv Sndovdri, 
Kupiwrdrn ydp. [We must point 
in this way and take arn... yap 
as probably an explanation of 
Priscian.]  T@ v@, onol, Tra wey 
vonta, Touvtéot: Ta ida, del 
bmdpxer* reid} Kar’ ovolay abrois 
civeot: kal fori[y] dwep Ta vonra: 
Ta 5é Evvaa, bray vondf, Kal aira 
TO v@ bwdpte, ox ds cverolxws 
ait@ vonOnodueva’ oddémrore yap 
Ta Evvdka TH ve abAw byti: GAD’ 
bray 6 vos Ta ev abTG uh ds adra 
udvoy GAAG Kal ds altia Tay evbAwy 
ywooky, Tite Kal TE ve bwdpte ra 
évvAa kata Thy aitlav. In making 
use of these passages it must not 
be forgotten that we have in 
them the words of Theophrastus 
only in the paraphrase of a Neo- 
platonic. 


396 ARISTOTLE 


from it by a greater degree of perfection.! This, how- 
ever, can only refer to the lower powers of the soul 
exclusive of reason.? The relation of the lower to the 
higher elements of the soul seems also to have offered 
insuperable difficulties to him; we know at least that 
in regard to the imagination he was in doubt whether 
it ought to be referred to the rational or the irrational 


part.? 


From what we know of his treatment of the 


doctrine of reason we may conjecture that he found this 
subject also full of difficulty.‘ 
We have fuller details of Theophrastus’s doctrine of 


' PorPH. De Abst. iii. 25 
(apud BERNAYS, Theophr. wber 
Frimmigh. 97, 184; for the frag- 
ment there given belongs, as 
BERNAYS proves at p. 99, to this 
book and not to the m. (@wy 


ppovicews): Oedppacros S€ kal 
ToLOUT@ KéxpnTaL Adyw. Tods ek 
TOY aUTaY yevynOévTas . .. . Oik- 


cious elvar ptoe: pauev GAAHAwY. 
So also of people of the same race, 
even if they are not of the same 
descent : mdvras 5¢ robs avOpémous 
GAAHAOLs =pauty oikelouvs Te Kal 
ovyyeveis elvar Svoiv Odrepoy, }} 7G 
mpoydvwv elvat Tov aiTay, } TE 
Tpopis Kal 70av Kal Tabrod yévous 
Kowwvely .... Kal uy Kal mace 
Tos (wos al Te TOY TwUdTwY apxal 
mepvxacw ai avrat [i.e. seed, flesh, 
&e.]. word 5€ wadrdrAov re Tas ev 
avtTots puxds adiapdpous mepuKévan, 
Aéyw 6h Tals éwiOvulas Kal rats 
Opyats, rs & rots Aoyiocmois, Kal 
Mddista mdvtwy Tals aic@hoecw. 
GAN’ Bowep Tae céhmara, Kal Tas 
Yuxds oftw 7d wey aankpiBwmevas 
exer TOY (hwy, Td BE Ft Tov ToLabTaS, 
naot ye why abrois ai avral mepi- 
kao apxal. Sndot b& 7 TaY Tabay 


fection, 


oixerdtns. The rest concerns 
Porphyry, not Theophrastus. 

* The Aoyiouol, which with 
the beasts are different in per- 
are not in any very 
different position from the 
‘analoga’ of voids and ¢pédvnois, 
ascribed to the beasts by Ari- 
stotle (supra, vol. ii. p. 27, n. 6, 
and p. 38, n. 2). 

3 SIMPL. De An. 80, a. As 
to the difference between phan- 
tasy and perception, see also 
PRISCIAN, c. 3, 6, 263, W. 

* With this theory of the 
imagination was connected a 
question referred to by PRISs- 
CIAN (see PLOTIN. p. 565, ed. 
Didot, cf. BRANDIS, iii. 3738). 
It is to be noted, however, that 
Priscian does not expressly name 
Theophrastus; and that the sup- 
position that he is here referring 
to him is a conjecture of DUB- 
NER’S. The question is, why do 
we remember our dreams when 
we ure awake, and. forget our 
waking life in dreams? We do 
not get any clear answer from 
Priscian. : ; 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 397 


the senses.! Here, however, he adopts Aristotle’s con- 
clusions without important modification.” The views 
of previous philosophers upon the senses and the objects 
of sense-perception are accurately presented and tested 
from the point of view of the Peripatetic doctrine.* 
‘Theophrastus himself explains sensation, with Aristotle, 
as a change in the organs of sense by means of which 
they become assimilated, not in matter but in form, to 
the object of perception.‘ This effect proceeds from 
the object.? In order that it may be produced it is 
necessary that the latter should stand to the organ of 
sense in a certain harmonious relation, the nature of 
which accordingly here forms an important subject of 
discussion ;° it may not, however, be sought for either 





in the homogeneity or the 
stituent parts of its terms 


1 We can only notice in pas- 
sing another anthropological 
inquiry: namely, the discussion 
on Melancholy, which is to be 
found in the Aristotelian Pro- 
blems (xxx. 1, pp. 953-955), the 
Theophrastean origin of which 
(i.e. from the book m. Meday- 
xoAtas mentioned by D10G. v. 44), 
Rosk, De Arist. libr. ord. 191 has 
detected by means of the refer- 
ence therein (954, a, 20) to the 
book on Fire (§ 35, 40). The 
diverse effects which it was cus- 
tomary to attribute to the wéAawa 
xoA} are explained, with the aid 
of an analogy drawn from the 
effects of wine, by the theory 
that the uéAawa xoAh was of its 
own nature cold, but was capable 
of taking on a high degree of 
heat, and that accordingly it 
produced according to the sur- 


heterogeneity of the con- 
alone.” The operation of 


rounding circumstances, some- 
times a condition of cold and 
weariness, and sometimes a heat- 
ing and exciting effect. 

2 For which see p. 58 sqq. of 
vol. ii. supra, 

% In the De Sensu, as to 
which see vol. ii. p. 354, n. 3. 

4 PRISCIAN, i. 1, p. 232, W: 
Aéyer pev ody Kal abrds, Kara Ta 
el5n kal Tos Acryous uvev Tis HAns 
ylverOar thy eopolwow., The 
theory of an amoppod, i.e. an ef- 
fluence from the object to the 
sense, is attacked in the De 
Sensu, 20, cf. Caus. Pl. vi. 5, 4. 
Compare the passages cited from 
Aristotle supra, vol. ii. p. 59 n. 2. 

5 PRISCIAN, i. 37, p. 254, W. 

6 De Sensu, 32, Prise. i. 44, 
p. 258, W, Caus. Pl. vi. 2, 1, 5, 4. 

7 Both views are attacked by 
Theophrastus in the De Sensu, 


398 --"". ARISTOTLE -~ - 


the object upon the senses is always mediated, accord- 
ing to Theophrastus, by a third term.’ In developing 
his own doctrine, as in criticising his predecessors, he 
doubtless discussed each of the senses separately, but 
only a meagre report has here come down to us.? 
Like Aristotle, he distinguished the sensus communis 
from the other senses, but did not wholly agree with 
that philosopher’s view of the way in which the uni- 
versal qualities of matter are perceived. He defends 


the veracity of sensation against the attacks of Demo- 


critus.4 


31; the first also ibid., 19, and 
‘the second apud PRIsc. i. 34, 
p. 252. Cf. supra, vol. i. p. 454 sq. 

1 Cf. supra, vol. i. p. 519 (on 
the dinxés and didcuov). Prise. 
i. 16, 20, 30, 40, p. 241, 244, 250, 
255; Caus. Pl. vi. 1,1. Theo- 
phrastus here says, in agreement 
with Aristotle (vide supra, vol. ii. 
p. 64), that all sensations reach 
us through some medium, which 
is in the case of Touch our own 
flesh, and in the case of the other 
senses certain external sub- 
stances: for Sight the trans- 
parent medium ; for Hearing, the 
air; for Taste, water; for Smell, 
air and water together. He also 
considers that the immediate 
organs of sense-perception in the 
case of Sight, Hearing and Smell 
are formed out of water and air. 

* Besides the passages already 
cited, we ought to.mention here 
the observations (Fr. 4 De Odor. 
4, Caus. Pl. vi. 5, 1 sq.; which 
follow Aristotle, as to whom see 
supra, vol. ii. p. 65, n. 3) that 
although Smell is in man the 
feeblest of the senses, yet he 
alone cares for a pleasant smell 
for its own sake, and that sensa- 


object in the air. 


tions of Hearing make the 
keenest impression on our emo- 
tions (PLUT. De Audiendo, 2, p. 
38, a); and the account of eyes 
that send out fire (apud SIMPL. 
De Celo, Schol. 513, a, 28; with 
which the citations supra, vol. ii. 


p. 65,n. 1, should be compared) ; | 


and the criticisms of the theory 
of Democritus (see ZELLER, Ph. 
d. Gr. i. p. 818) as to the exist- 
ence of an image of any visible 
Nevertheless 
THEOPHRASTUS himself said 
(ap. PRISCIAN, i. 33, p. 251, W) 
as to images in mirrors: ris 
Moppis Somrep amorirwow ev TH 
aépe yiveoOa. 

* Aristotle had said (in the 
De Anima, iii..1, 425, a, 16 sqq.) 
that size, form, &c. were per- 
ceived by means of motion; &ro- 
mov 5€6 Ocdgp. [pnolv], cithy wopohy 
Th Kwhoe (PRISC. i. 46, p. 259, W). 

* In the De Sensu, 68 sq. 
(where, however, for the corrupt 
xvuuov in 68 we should read, not, 
with Schneider and Philippson, 
xvaov, but rather @epuod) he com- 
plains that Democritus treated 
weight, lightness, hardness and 
softness as things in themselves, 


ae 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 399 


As a Peripatetic, Theophrastus of course asserted 
the freedom of the will.! In his treatise on voluntary 
action? he fully discussed this subject, and possibly 
took notice of the Stoic doctrine of determination that 
was just then rising into notice. But on this point, as 
on so many others in Aristotle’s psychology which 
demanded further investigation, little is known of 








Theophrastus’s contribution to science. 
We have somewhat fuller information as to his 


ethical doctrines.* 


and yet considered cold, heat, 
sweetness &c., as merely relative 
qualities of things. He argues 
that if these qualities depend on 
the form of the atoms—ey. if 
warmth is said to consist in 
roundness of atoms—then such 
qualities must be in some sense 
objective. If they are supposed 
not to be objective because they 
do not appear alike to all men, 
then the same conclusion should 
follow as to all other qualities of 
things. Evenas tosuch qualities 
as sweetness and _ bitterness, 
people are deceived only as toa 
particular case, and not as to the 
nature of sweets and _ bitters. 
Properties so essential as heat 
and cold, must be something be- 
longing to the bodies that have 
them. Cf. on this the references 
supra, vol. i. p. 209. Epicurus 
defended the atomic view against 
THEOPHRASTUS (ap. PLUTARCH, 
Adv. Col. 7, 2, p. 1110). 

' STos. Hel i. 206: Oeddp. 
mpoodiaipe: (Mein. -ap9por) ais 
aitiais Thy mpoa'peciy. PSEUDO- 
PLUT. V. Hom. ii. 120, p. 1155. 

2 TI. €xovalov a’, Dioa. v. 43. 

* DroG. v. 42 sq. (with which 
cf. the further information in 


Here also he merely continued the 


UsSENER, Anal. Theophr. 4 sq.) 
attributes to Theophrastus the 
following ethical works: § 42, 
m. Biwy three books (if this work 
really treated of the different 
pursuits in life, eg. the Blos 
BewpnTtixds, mpaxtikds, a&moAavoTt- 
kos, &c. [cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 140, 
n. 2], and was not merely bio- 
graphical); § 43, épwrikds a’ 
(ATHEN. xiii. 562, e. 467, b. 606, 
c), m. Epwros a’ (STRABO, x. 4, 12, 
p. 478), m. evdamovias (ATHEN. 
xli. 545, xiii. 567, a; BEKKER, 
Anecd. Gr. i. 104, 31; Cre. Tuse. 
v. 9, 24, cf. ACLIAN. V. HZ. ix. 
11); § 44, ©. ndovijs as ’Apirro- 
TéAns a’, 7, NSovijs GAAo a! (ATHEN. 
xii. 526,d,511,c; ibid. vi. 273, c. 
viii. 347, e, where he adds, how- 
ever, that this work was also at- 
tributed to Chameleon); KaAAi- 
obévns i) mw. wévOous (ALEX. De An. 
fin., C1c. Zuse. v. 9, 25, iii. 10, 
21); 45, mw. girAlas 3 B. 
(HIERON. vi. 517, b, ed. Vallars.; 
GELL. NV. A. i. 3, 10, viii. 6, and 
infra, p. 409 sq.), m. idoriulas 
2 B. (Cio. ad Att. ii. 3 ad Jin.) ; 
§ 46,2. Yevdois Hdov7js (OLYMPIO- 
DoR. Phileb. 269); § 47, x. 
edtuxlas : HOiKav oxoraGy a! : }OuKol 
XapaKrijpes (v. infra) : mw. KoAakelas 


400 


ARISTOTLE 


work of Aristotle, his chief merit being the greater 
fullness with which he develops it in details. We can- 


a (ATHEN., vi. 254, d): bmiAnrtiKos 
a’: 3, Spkova': wm. tAovTOV a (ASPAS. 
in £th. N. 61, and Cic. Off. ii. 16, 
56). mpoBAhuara woditind 70iKe 
quod épwrikda’ ; § 50, 1. eboeBelas 
(Schol. in Aristoph. Av. 1354; 
as to BERNAYS’ view vide supra 
ii. p. 355, n. 2), 7. masdelas H 7. 
aperav 2 @. cwppooryns a’ (to this 
work the Fragm. apud STOB. 
Floril. iv. 216, No. 124, ed. Mein. 
might be referred). A work ™. 
mwade@v not named by Diogenes is 
referred to by SIMPL. Categ. 69, 
$. Schol. in Ar. 70, b, 3.  Theo- 
phrastus, however, also wrote two 
larger ethical works, of which one 
may possibly be the 70:Kal oxoAal 
of Diog., which must in that case 
have had more than one book. 
'The two are referred to as "HO: 
and m.’H@év. Out of ‘ @edqp. év 
tots HOiKois, PLUT. Pericl. 38 
quotes a story about Pericles. 
‘’Ey trois 7, 0av’ Theophr. had, 
according to the Scholiast in 


CRAMER’S Anecd. Paris. 1. 194,: 


made mention of the avarice of 
Simonides, and according to 
ATHEN. xv. 673 e,acontemporary 
of this scholar named Adrantus 
wrote five books mepl tay mapa 
Ocoppdatm ev tots wept Oar Kad’ 
ioroplay Kat Aééw Cnrovmevwy, and 
a sixth book wept tay év ois 
"HOikois Nixouaxelois "Apiororedous. 
We must assume from this that 
this ethical treatise of Theo- 
phrastus was on a more compre- 
hensive scale than Aristotle’s, 
since it gave occasion for so much 
more voluminous an_ historical 
commentary ; and we also gather 
expressly that it, like the Wico- 
machean Ethics, comprised seve- 


ral books. In fact, EUSTRAT. in 
Eth. N. 61, b, tells us, obvi- 
ously from a_ well-informed 
source, that the verse éy 8 
Sixaootvn, &c. (ARIST. Eth. v. 2, 
1129, b, 29) was ascribed by 
Theophrastus in the first book 7. 
"HOGv to Theognis, and in the 
first book of the ’H@:na to Pho- 
cylides. From one of these 
works, or perhaps from both, the 
sketches of various faults which 
are collected in the Characters 
as we have it appear to have 
been borrowed. That this, as it 
stands, is an authentic work of 
Theophrastus is incredible ; and 
that a genuine treatise on Cha- 
racters by him underlies it, as 
BRANDIS, iii. 360, thinks possible, 
is in fact very unlikely. The 
origin of the collection above 
suggested explains, on the one 
hand, the fact that it does not 
form a connected whole, and, on 
the other, the fact that it exists 
in several ditferent recensions, as 
to which cf. PETERSEN, Theoph. 
Characteres, p. 56 sqq., SAUPPE, 
Philodemi De vitiis, I. x. 
(Weimar, 1853), p. 8. SPENGEL, 
Abhandl. der Miinchener Akad. 
Phil., Philos. Kleinschriften, iii. 
495, and PETERSEN, Theoph. 
Characteres, p. 66, have also sug- 
gested that this Theophrastian 
treatise has been used for 
the statement of the ethical 
teaching of the Peripatetics in 
STOBAEUS, cl. ii. 242-334, 
HERREN having already con- 
nected a part of the account (v. 
his remarks on p. 254) with 
THEOPHR.’S book m. ebruxias. In 
any case, the sources from which 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 40) 


not, however, fail here to observe a certain deviation 
from Aristotle’s point of view, consisting not so 
much in new or different conclusions as in a slightly 
altered estimate of the relative importance of the dif- 
ferent elements which it is the problem of ethics to 
combine. Aristotle had not overlooked the significance 
of external goods and circumstances for the moral life 
of man, but he regarded these only as aids and instru- 
ments of moral activity, and insisted on their subordina- 
tion to practical virtue. In Theophrastus, on the other 
hand, we find springing from his desire to escape from 
all disturbances a tendency to attach greater importance 
to outward circumstances. With that preference for 
theoretic activity which is so deeply rooted in the 
Aristotelian system, there is united in Theophrastus 
the demand of the student to be permitted to devote 
himself without hindrance to his work as well as that 
limitation to private life which was the outcome of the 
altered conditions of the time. As a consequence of 
this his moral tone lacks some of tke rigor and force 
which, in spite of his cautious regard for the external 
conditions of action, are so unmistakable in Aristotle. 
The objections, however, which were urged against him, 
especially by his Stoic opponents, on this ground, are 
manifestly exaggerated; the difference between him 
and Aristotle is an insignificant one of emphasis, not a 
fundamental one of principle. 


Sropzvus drew must have been of Theophrastus himself, except in 
of amuch later date (cf. ZELLER, the one passage (at p. 300) where 
Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 546 sq.) and we he is named. As to this, ef. 
cannot use his statement as BRANDIS, p. 358-9. 

evidence concerning the teaching 


VOL, I. DD 


402 ARISTOTLE 


The character here attributed to the ethical views 
of Theophrastus shows itself especially in his account of 
happiness, which he holds to be the goal of philosophy 
as of human activity in general.' While he agrees 
with Aristotle in holding that virtue is absolutely 
desirable, and regards it, if not alone, at least in.a special 
sense as good,” he yet was unable to admit that outward 
conditions are indifferent. He denied that virtue alone 
was sufficient for happiness, or that the latter could 
exist together with extreme forms of physical suffer- 
ing. He complained of the disturbances to which our 


1 Cro. Fin. v. 29, 86: * omnis 
auctoritas philosophiz, ut ait 
Theophrastus, consistit in vita 
beata compararda. beate enim 
vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes 
sumus ’—assuming that the words 
‘ut ait Th.’ are to be transposed to 
this place, as appears probable. 

2 CicHRO, Legg. i. 13, 37-8, 
counts Theophrastus and Aristotle 
among those ‘ qui omnia recta et 
honesta per se expetenda duxe- 
runt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis 
numerandum, nisi quod per se 
ipsum laudabile esset, aut certe 
nullum habendum magnum bo- 
num, nisi quod vere laudari sua 
sponte posset.’ To Theophrastus, 
however, we ought to ascribe only 
the latter of these opinions, and 
this the more confidently be- 
cause it is probable from the con- 
text that CICERO is here, as else- 
where, following ANTIOCHUS, 
whose eclectic point of view led 
him to minimise the differences 
between the ethics of the Stoics 
and of the Peripatetics, just as 
muchas the Stoics, on their side, 
were accustomed to exaggerate 


the distinction. In Tusc. v. 9, 24, 
CicERO himself tells us that 
Theophrastus admitted three 
kinds of Goods—as did Ari- 
stotle (supra, vol. ii. p. 151, n. 1), 
Plato and the Academics (see 
ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr.i. 808, n: 3, 
and 879, n. 2). Lor 

3 Cie. 7usc.v. 8,24: ‘Theophr. 

. cum statuisset, verbera, tor- 
menta, cruciatus, patriz ever- 
siones, exilia, orbitates magnam 
vim habere ad male misereque 
vivendum [so said Aristotle also ; 
v. supra, Vol.il. pp. 145, 150, nn. 1, 
2], non est ausus elate et ample 
loqui, cum humiliter demisseque 
sentiret . . . vexatur autem ab 
omnibus [by the Stoicsand, above 
all, the Academics]... quodmulta 
disputarit, quamobrem is qui tor- 
queatur, qui crucietur, beatus 
esse non possit.’ Cf. Fin. v. 26, 
77, 28, 85. It is no doubt the 
same part of the teaching to 
which CICERO, in Acad. ii. 43, 
134,alludes when he remarks that 
Zeno hadexpected of virtue more 
than human nature admitted, 
‘Theophrasto multa diserte copio- 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 408 


intellectual life is subjected from the body;! of the 
shortness of human life, which ceases just when we 
have arrived at some degree of insight;? and of the 
dependence of man upon circumstances which lie 
beyond his own control.?' It was not indeed his inten- 
tion to depreciate in this way the worth of virtue, or to 
seek the essence of happiness in accidental advantages 
and states,‘ but he certainly seems to attribute to out- 
ward relations greater importance than his master had 
done. The explanation of this trait must be sought, 
however, in his predilection for the peace and quiet of 
the life of study. He is not accused of attributing to 
external goods as such any positive value.» Even his 








seque [contra] dicente’; and also 
when he complains, in Acad. i. 9, 
33, that ‘Theophr. . . . spoliavit 
virtutem suo decore imbecillam- 
que reddidit, quod negavit in ea 
sola positum esse beate vivere’ ; 
cf. Fin. v. 5, 12: ‘ Theophrastum 
tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, 
dummodo plus in virtute tenea- 
mus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis 
et roboris.’ 

' Apud PLUT. De Sanit. tu. 24, 
p. 135,e. In PorpPH. De Abstin. 
iv. 20, p. 373 we have the saying : 
WOAY TH THuarti TeAKiv evolKiov Thy 
Yuxtv : that is, as it is explained 
in the Plutarch Fragment i. 2, 2, 
p. 696, the Adwai, PdBo1, eriBvula, 
(nAotumiat. 

* Vide supra, vol. ii. p. 351, 
n. 2. 
® Cio. Tuse. v.9, 25: ‘Vexatur 
idem Theophrastus et libris et 
scholis omnium philosophorum, 
quod in Callisthene suo laudavit 
illam ‘sententiam; vitam regit 
fortuna, non sapientia.’ Cf. PLuT. 
Cons. ad Apoil. 6, p. 104, a. 


* Cf. supra vol. ii p. 402, n. 1. 
The ‘story about Pericles in 
PLuT. Pericles, 38, can only be 
intended to lead up to a negative 
answer to the question which is 
there proposed by Theophrastus, 
ei mpos tas rbxas Tpérerar Ta HOn 
kal Kiwotmeva trois Tov cwoudTwr 
wdberw etlorara rijs aperjs. As 
to the words cited from Calli- 
sthenes, they are (as CICERO him- 
self remarked and indicated by 
his metrical translation) a phrase 
of some other writer, probably a 
tragic orcomic poet, which Theo- 
phrastus quoted ; and, besides, it 
would be necessary, before we 
could draw a safe inference from 
them, that we should know the 
context in which Theophrastus 
introduced them. An isolated 
excerpt such as this in an attack 
by an opponent is not a safe basis 
for a conclusion as to Theo- — 
phrastus’s real teaching. 

* He is blamed merely be- 
cause he holds that sorrows and 
misfortune are a hindrance to 


Dpd2 


404 


ARISTOTLE 


statements about pleasure closely accord with the 


Aristotelian teaching.’ 


But that preference for the 


scientific life which he shared with Aristotle? was in 
his case not free from one-sidedness, and he held him- 
self aloof from all that might in any degree disturb him 


in the practice of it. 


We see this especially in the 


fragment of his work upon Marriage ;* from which he 
dissuaded the philosopher, both on the ground that the 
care of a house and family withdrew him from his 
work, and that he especially must be self-sufficient and 


happiness; but this is genuine 
Aristotelian teaching: v. sup. vol. 
ii. p.402,n.3. But, on the other 
hand, he required (ap. STos. F'lo- 
vil. iv. 283, No. 202, Mein.), that 
men should by simplicity of life 
make themselves independent of 
external things; he desired, ap. 
Puiut. Lyc. 10 (see PORPH. De 
Abst. iv. 4, p. 304), Cup. Div. 8, 
p. 527, to see man become by a 
proper use of wealth &rAoutos kal 
&Cndos; and he finds (ap. CIc. 
Off. ii. 16, 56) the chief value of 
riches in the fact that they serve 
for ‘magnificentia et apparatio 
popularium munerum.’ 

1JIn the passage given by 
Aspasius (Class. Jowrnal, xxix. 
115; cf. BRANDIS, iii. 381) 
THEHOPH. says, as Aristotle also 
might have said, that it is not the 
desire of a pleasure which is 
blameworthy, but the passion- 
ateness of the desire and the want 
of self-control. According to 
OLYMPIODORUS (in Phileb. 269, 
Stallb., he maintained against 
Plato, uh elvac aAndy Kal wpevd7 
ndovnv, GAAd mdoas GAnGets. By 
this, however, he cannot have 
meant to deny the differences in 


' preference 


quality between different sorts of 
pleasure, which the Peripatetic 
school always admitted. He 
meant merely, as is clear from the 
fuller explanation given by 
OLYMPIODORUS, that the ascrip- 
tion of ‘truth’ and ‘ falsehood’ 
to pleasure is inappropriate, be- 
cause every pleasure is for the 
man who feels it a true pleasure, 
and the predicate ‘ false’ is there- 
fore never suitable. If the words 
} pnréov &c. which follow still 
refer to THEOPH., it seems that 
he even admitted the use of the 
words ‘true’ and ‘false’ in this 
connection, if only they were 
properly explained. 

2 Circ. Fin. v 4, 11, says of 
both, ‘ vitze autem degende ratio 
maxume quidem illis placuit 
quieta, in contemplatione et 
cognitione posita rerum,’ &c. Jb. 
25, 73, and Ad Att ii. 16, we are 
told that Diczarchus gave the 
to the practical 
life, and Theophrastus to the 
theoretical. 

* HIERON. Adv. Jovin. i. 47, 
iv. 6, 189, Mart. Vide Theo- 
phrasti Opp. (ed. Schneid.) v, 
221 sqq. 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 406 


able to dispense with family life.’ It is quite consistent 
with this attitude of thought that Theophrastus should 
shun, as a hindrance to perfect happiness, such external 
fatalities and sufferings as threaten freedom and peace 
of mind. His nature was not adapted for the battle 
with the world and with the ills of life. The time and 
strength which this would demand would be withdrawn 
from the scientific labours which were his only happi- 
ness; it would interrupt quiet contemplation and the 
intellectual peace that accompanied it. Therefore he 
avoided everything which might involve him in such a 
conflict. Both the Stoic and the Epicurean school at 
this time aimed at making the wise man independent 
and self-sufficient. Theophrastus pursued the same 
end, except that, true to the spirit of the Peripatetic 








' Theophrastus in this pas- 
sage is answering the question, 
Whether the wise man would 
take a wife? He begins by say- 
ing that he would, ‘si pulchra 
esset, si bene morata, si honestis 
parentibus, si ipse sanus ac dives.’ 
But he promptly goes on to say 
that all these conditions are 
seldom combined, and therefore 
it is more prudent to avoid 
matrimony. ‘Primum enim im- 
pediri studia philosophizw, nec 
posse quemquam libris et uxori 
pariter inservire.’ ‘The best pos- 
sible teacher might be to be 
found abroad, but one could not 
go to seek him if one was tied to 
a wife. Again, a wife has no end 
of costly wants. She fills her 
husband’s ears, as Theophrastus 
explains in lively mimicry, with 
hundreds of complaints and 
reproaches, night and day. A poor 


woman is costly to keep: a rich 
one is unendurable. A man does 
not discover his wife’s faults 
until after marriage. Her de- 
mands, her jealousies, ber insis- 
tences on what is due to her and 
her family are endless. A beauti- 
ful wife is hardly to be kept 
faithful; yet a wife without 
beauty is a burden, &c., &c. It is 
wiser to leave one’s housekeeping 
to a faithful servant, and to trust 
to one’s friends in case of sick- 
ness. As for company, a man 
needs no wife: the wise man is 
never alone, for he has the wise 
men of all ages for his com- 
panions; and if men fail him he 
can speak with God. Nor should 
one set store by children, for 
they often bring one rather 
trouble and expense than joy or 
help. For heirs, a man does 
better to choose his friends. 


406 ARISTOTLE | 


ethics, he refused to overlook the external conditions of 
the self-sufficient life.’ 

As in the points hitherto discussed the diferéribe 
discernible between Theophrastus and Aristotle is one 
of degree only, which does not admit of being strictly 
defined, so also in the remaining portions of his mora} 
philosophy which are known to us it is but seldom that 
any important divergence of view is visible. Theo- 
phrastus, like Aristotle, defined virtue as the preserva- 
tion of the true mean according to reason between two 
vices, or, more accurately, as the quality of the will 


directed to this end, under the guidance of insight.? 


! We should not, however, be 
justified in referring to Theo- 
phrastus the line of argument set 
out in Cio. Fin. v. 6,17, 9, 24. sqq. 
and Sros. Zel. ii. 246 sqq., in 
which the Stoic dogma of the 
life according to natureis brought 
into relation with the Peripatetic 
theory of the different kinds of 
Good ; for Cicero’s account is de- 
rived, according to c. 3, 8, 25, 75, 
27, 81 from Antiochus, and that 
in Stobwus (ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. 
ili. a, 546 sq. 2nd ed.) from Arius 
Didymus, and the later Eclecti- 
cism has manifestly coloured both 
of these sources 

7 Sros. “el. ii. 300: 7d obv 
mpos Nuas wécov &picroy, oiov, pnaly 
6 @edhpacros, év Tals évruxiats 68t 
Mev TOAAG SieAOov Kal maxp@s ado- 
Aerxhoas, 651 8 dAlya Kal [which 
GaIsF. unnecessarily deletes | 
ovde TavayKaia ovTos be aura & eer 
By Toy kaipby cAaBev, at ™ ueodrns 

mpods nas, altn yap bg’ nuay &pt- 
ora TH Ady. BY d Eorw H apeTh 
Ebis Tpoaiper uth, év meodrnte otra 
TH mpos Huds, piruéevn Adyw, Kal 


ws by 6 ppdvimos dpiceey [this is 
word for word the Aristotelian 
definition ; supra, vol. ii. p.. 163, 
n. 2]. celta mapa0euevos tivas 
autuylas, akoAov0ws TH dpnynThi 
(ARIST. Hth. N. ii. 7) oKoTeEtv 
éreita Kal? Exxorov émdywv éet- 
pan tov tpdmrov tovToy [perhaps 
we should read oxomety éereipadn 
kK. EK, emdywv T.Tp. T.]* eAnPOnoay 
de mapaderyudrov xdpw aides ow- 
~pocvyvn, akoAacia, dvaicOnoia: 
mpadTns,  opyiAdrns, davadynota: 
avdpeia, Opaciryns, SetAla* Sixaso- 
atyn* edevOepiétns, aowrla, ay- 
eAevepia * weyadompéreta, uiKpompe- 
meta, oadracwvia. After an ex- 
planation on these lines of the 
nature of the virtues named, he 
adds, at p. 306: rovro wey 70 Tay 
NnOikav aperav eldos mabyntixdy kal 
kaT& pecdrynta Oewpotmevov, 0 Sh 
kal tiv ayvTaKoAovilay ~xer [add 
Ti ppovhce|, wAjy odx duolws, 
GAN’ 7 ev Ppdvynots Tals HOucais 
Kata Td Wioy, abta 8 exelvy Kare 
gupBeBykds. Sti [read 6] méev yap 
Stkaros éotl Kal ppdvmos, 6 yap 
toad. avtby Adyos eidomotet, ov 











PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 


407 


In the description of the different virtues and their 
opposite vices we cannot doubt that he went into 
greater detail than his master,' although we can follow 
his work here only in respect of some of the vices under 


the uncertain guidance of the Characters. 


He did not, 


however, conceal from himself that the distinction be- 
tween the separate virtues is to a certain degree a 
vanishing one, inasmuch as they all find in moral 
insight a common root and connecting principle.? That 


hv ort [6] ppdvyos Kal Sixaos 
kata 7d Ydiov, GAN’ Brit TeV Kad@v 
Kayabav Kowa@s mpakTikds davAou 
5 ovdevds (i.e. ppdrnois is con- 
tained in the idea of justice 
immediately, since justice is the 
adjustment of relations concern- 
ing rights according to ppéynoets ; 
but justice is contained in the 
idea of gpévnats only mediately). 
—Down to this point the extract 
seems to come from THEOPHRAS- 
TUS, because there is an unbroken 
grammatical connection from the 
words elra mapadéuevos, Kc., 
which can only refer to him. 
The reading év rats évrvxlas in 
the second line of the passage is 
rightly supported by PETERSEN, 
Theophr. Characteres, 67 sq., 
against HEEREN’S conjecture, év 
Tois wept etruxlas. PETERSEN, 
however, himself distorts THHO- 
PHRASTUS’S meaning (which in 
this evidently incomplete excerpt 


isnot very clearly expressed) when - 


he reads kal why roy Kaipdy 2Aa- 
Bev,in place of uh Tt. «. €A. For the 
words otros... AaBev indicate, 
not the correct course, buta third 
kind of error, that, namely, in 
which what is done may be right 
in itself but not right in relation 
to the particular circumstances of 


the persons acting: where, that 
is to say, the peodrns mpds rd 
mpayua is observed, but not the 
Mecérns mpos juas (cf. supra, 
vol. ii, p. 162, n. 3). 

' This cannot be said to be 
proved with any certainty (as 
has been already pointed out), 
from what we find in STos. Zel. 
ii. 316 sqq., and Cic. Fin. v. 23, 
65. It is, however, probable in 
itself, arguing on the analogy of 
the general lines of Theophrastus’s 
work, and it is made still more 
probable when we remember the 
detailed description of a series of 
failings which we have in the 
Characters. We are told by 
HERMIPPUS (ap. ATHEN. i. 21,a: 
cf. supra, vol. ii. p, 352, n. 1), pro- 
bably with some exaggeration 
(as BRANDIS, p. 359, justly re- 
marks), that Theophrastus in his 
lectures carried even a mimicry 
of outward characteristics to 
great lengths. His tendency to 
and talent in such pictures of de- 
tail is obvious from the Fragm. 
just described at p. 405, n. 1, 
supra. The notice of Adrantus 
(supra, p. 400) is probably one of 
numerous examples introduced 
by him to illustrate his Lthies. 

? ALEX. APHR. De An. 155, 


408 ARISTOTLE 


one who so preferred scientific to practical activity 
distinguished dianoétic from moral virtue cannot be 
doubted ; nor could he easily avoid touching upon it in 
his Hthics; but whether he here discussed it at length 
it is impossible to tell.1_ Nor have we fuller informa- 
tion as to his treatment of the passions.” We are only 
informed that he maintained, seemingly against Zeno, 
the naturalness and inevitableness of certain emotions, 
such as anger against wrong-doing and under excite- 
ment.’ For the rest he demands that no one should act 
under the influence of passion—for instance, that no 


one should inflict punishment in anger.‘ 


b: waoo. bv Erowro ai aperal TH 
ppovhcer, ovdé yap pddiov Tay aper av 
kata Tov @cdppacrov Tas Siapopas 
ottw AaBelv, as mH Kara TL KoLWw- 
veiy avTas G&AAHAas. ylvovra 8 
avTais ai mpooryopiat Kata Td 
mwAetotov. Cf. the end of the 
passage from STOB4Us quoted in 
the preceding note. Zbid. p. 270: 
dpévnots decides, both for itself 
and for all other virtues, what is 
and what is not to be done, trav 8 
dAAwy Exdorny aroréuvesOa pdva 
Te Kad’ EauThy, 

' That he did not, PETERSEN, 
ib. 66, concludes (with SPENGEL, 
Abhindl. der Miinchen. Akad. 
philol.-philos. Kleinschriften, iii. 
495) from the absence of the Dia- 
noétic Virtues in the Magna 
Moralia. It is, however, to be 
observed, on the one hand (as 
BRANDIS, ii. 6, 1566, iii. 361, 
suggests), that these virtues are 
not in fact unknown to that 
book, and, on the other hand, 
that it is impossible to prove 
that the bo .k here follows Theo- 
phrastus. In SroBpmus, Eel. ii. 


Of the sins 


316, we find the €fis Oewpytixh, 
to which belong codia, ériarhun, 
and $pévnais, distinguished from 
the €fs mpaxtikh. Since, how- 
ever, Aristotle himself (see 
supra, vol. ii. p. 178, n. 1) only 
discussed the theoretic activities 
in his “thies so far as was neces- 
sary for the complete explana- 
tion of the ethical aspect of life, 
we cannot assume that Theophr. 
treated the subject in any other 
way. 

* SIMPL. Schol. in Ar. 70, b, 3, 
citing the 7. radar (d. g.v. supra, 
vol. ii. p. 399), tells us that 
THEOPHR. distinguished the no- 
tions of wis, dpyh and dupds by 
the formula of ua@AAov kal ArTov. 

3 SenEcA, De Tra, i. 14, 1, 
12, 1,3; BARLAAM, Eth. sez. Sto. 
ii. 13 (Bibl. Max. patr. xxvi. 37 
D,and apud BRANDIS, iii. 356). 
Against the Stoics were doubt- 
less also directed the arguments 
mentioned by SIMPL. Categ. 
Schol. 86, b, 28, as to the muta- 
bility of the virtues. 

* Stos. Ploril. 19, 12. 





—— 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 409 


of passion he declared those of desire to be worse than 
anger, since it is worse to succumb to pleasure than to 
pain.! 

Theophrastus, like Aristotle, had devoted special 
attention to the moral relations which rest upon com- 
munity of life. We know of special treatises written 
by him upon Friendship, Love, and Marriage.? He set 
the highest value upon Friendship—provided it is of the 
right kind, which, however, is not often the case. He 
even went so far as to permit slight violations of duty 
if the interests of a friend could thereby be greatly 
furthered, holding that in this case the qualitatively 
higher worth of moral virtue was outweighed by the 
quantitative preponderance of the counterbalancing 
advantage to a friend, just as the value of a little piece 
of gold might be exceeded by a large quantity of 
copper.‘ All the more necessary must prudence in the 
selection of friends have appeared to him.’ The three 

1 M. AUREL. mp. éavur. ii. 10, 


Schol. apud CRAMER, Anecd. 
Paris. i. 174. So also Aristotle : 


21-28, who gives partly the 
Greek text, partly a translation 
and summary. CicHuRO (Amie. 








v. supra, Vol. ii. p. 190, n. 1 and 
p. 118,n. 1. 

? Supra, vol. ii. p. 399, n. 2. 
Theophrastus’s three books on 
Friendship were extensively used 
by Cicero for his De Amicitia: 
‘ef. GELL. WV. A. i. 3, 1. 

* HIERON. in Micham, iii. 
1548,Mart.: ‘scripsit Theophrastus 
tria de amicitia volumina, omni 
eam praeferens charitati, et tamen 
raram in rebus humanis esse con- 
testatus est.’ Cf. the remark 
quoted supra, vol. ii. p. 405, n. 1, 
that to be cared for by a friendis 
better than to be tended bya wife. 

* See GELL. WV. A. i. 3, § 10, 


11 sqq. 17, 61) passes, as Gellius 
rightly complains, much _ too 
lightly over this point. He de- 
claims passionately against the 
view, which nobody set up, that 
a man should commit treason or 
other gross crimes to oblige a 
friend; but at the end he con- 
cedes in two words, that if a 
friend’s interests are very deeply 
involved, ‘declinandum sit de via, 
modo ne summa turpitudo se- 
quatur.’ BRANDIS (iii. 353) sees 
in thisa criticism of the teaching 
of Theophrastus; but this does 
not seem to be necessary. 

* Put. Frat. Am. 8, p. 482, 


410 - ARISTOTLE 


kinds of friendship which Aristotle had distinguished 
he also recognises," and doubtless in his treatise upon 
them made many fine observations upon the pecu- 
liarities of each of them and the divers relations in 
which friendship involves us.2 He ‘has much less 
sympathy with the more passionate affection of the 
lover: to him this is an irrational desire which over- 
powers the soul, and, like wine, may only be enjoyed in 
moderation.? This, however, is not the ground of his 
own disinclination to marriage ;4 upon which, notwith- 
standing, as upon the education and the conduct of 
women, he may be credited with having said much 


that is true.® 


Of Theophrastus’s political writings we know, apart 


b (Stos. Floril. 84,14; SENECA, 
Hp. i. 3, 2; see Schneider, v. 
289): ‘we must try friends, 
before we love them: with 
our family, the converse is true. 

1 KUSTRAT. in Eth. N. 141, a 
(BRANDIS, iii. 352, by a slip re- 
fers it to Aspasius); Theo- 
phrastus and Eudemus held that 
friendships of persons in unequal 
relation were divisible into the 
same three classes as friendships 
of equality. Cf. Hth. Hud. vii. 4 
init., and see supra, vol. ii. p. 196, 
n. 3. 

* Examples are the citations 
given in GELLIUS, viii. 6: ‘In 
reconciliations with friends ex- 
planations are  dangerous:’ 
Piut. Frat. Am. 20, p. 490: ‘If 
friends have everything in com- 
mon, it must especially be true 
that they have their respective 
friends in common :’ PLutT. Cato 
Min. c. 37; ‘Excessive friend- 
ship easily passes over into hate.’ 


Stos. Floril. 3, 50: ad fin.: ‘Itis 
better davelcayvra ppoviuws dmoAa- 
Beiv pirrkas,  ocvvadrdAdgayra 
piravOparws Kouicacbat pidamrex- 
Onudvws. Further interesting 
fragments of this work of 
THEOPHR. will be found in 
HEYLBUT, De Theophr. Libr. x. 
piArlas, 13 sqq. 

3 STos. Floril.. 64, 27, 29; 
ATHEN. xiii. 562, e. 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 405, n. 1. 

5 See STOB. Floril. 74, 42: a 
woman should neither wish to 
see nor to be seen; ibid. 85, 7: 


not politics but housekeeping is" 


her sphere; ibid. vol. iv. 193; 
No. 31 Mein. : education in ypdu- 
Mara is necessary for girls also, 
but it should not be carried 
beyond what is needful for house- 
keeping. 

6 In the passage cited in 
Stos. Floril. 3, 50, he insists on 
sympathy and friendliness to- 
wards. wife and children.—The 


—_—— 





. iY 
PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS Atl 


from a number of historical statements, only the general 
fact that here also he endeavoured to supplement the Ari- 
stotelian teaching and that to Aristotle’s account of the 
different kinds of States he added a collection of laws. 
In his own investigations into the nature of the State 
he gave special prominence to the discussion of the 
magisterial offices, and to the treatment of the problems 
that arise in connection with special circumstances. 
It is not to be supposed that Theophrastus deviated in 
any respect from the principles of Aristotle’s political 
doctrine ;' and if in addition to the national bond of 








remaining fragments of Theo- 
phrastus’s -ethical texts give 
us only isolated remarks, often 
keen and finely observed, but 
without any special philosophic 
interest. Such are the apoph- 
thegms preserved by STOB.&ZUS in 
the Florilegium (see the index 
thereto) and by PLUTARCH, Avis, 
c, 2, and Sertur. c. 13: the 
statement as to his commenda- 
tion of hospitality in Cic. Of. 
ii. 18, 64: the remark (probably 
aimed at Anaxagoras) as to the 
relation between pleasure and 
pain, cited by ASPASIUS in Arist. 
Eth. (Classical Journal, xxix.) 
114. The note ap. ULYMPIOD. 
in Phileb. 169 as to the three- 
fold Weddos, relates, not to moral 
falsehood, but to the possible 
meanings of wevdhs Hdovh (cf. 
supra, vol. ii. p. 404, n. 1.) 

' For almost everything we 
know of his politics we are in- 
debted to CiczRO. We know, 
in fact, that he was one of 
Cicero’s favourite political 
authors (Ad Att. ii. 9,2). Cicero 
tells us, not only that Theo- 
phrastus had thoroughly worked 


out a political philosophy, with 
great knowledge of the subject 
(Divin. ii. 1, 3: the ‘locus de re- 
publica’ was, he says, ‘a Platone 
Aristotele Theophrasto totaque 
Peripateticorum familia tractatus 
uberrime’; Legg. iii.6, 14: ‘Theo- 
phrastus vero institutus ab Ari- 
stotele habitavit, ut scitis, in eo 
generererum’), but he gives us fur- 
ther details as to the contents of 
his politica writings. Legg. iii. 5, 
14: ‘Sed hujus loci de magis- 
tratibus sunt propria queedam, a 
Theophrasto primum, deinde a 
Dione [? Diogene] Stoico quesita 
subtilius.” Sin. v. 4, 14: *Om- 
nium fere civitatum, non Greecize 
solum, sed etiam barbariz, ab 
Aristotele mores instituta dis- 
ciplinas, a Theophrasto leges 
etiam cognovimus; cumque uter- 
que eorum docuisset, qualem in 
republica principem esse con- 
veniret, pluribus preterea cum 
scripsisset, quis esset optimus 
reipublice status: hoc amplius 
Theophrastus, que essent in re- 
publica inclinationes rerum et 
momenta temporum, quibus esset 
moderandum utcumque res pos- 


412 


ARISTOTLE 


fellow-citizenship he gives express prominence to the 
natural brotherhood of all men,! yet this is quite in 
harmony with the spirit of his master,” however signi- 
ficant the approach in it may be to the cosmapolitannis 


of the Stoics.* 


In one of his ethical writings Theophrastus expressed 
views upon sacrifice in which the ascetic Aristotelian 


tularet.—Of Theophrastus’s poli- 
tical works we know from 
Diogenes, &c., the véuo: in twenty- 
four books (see #7. 97-106; the 
émiTouy vouwy in 10 bks. can only 
be a later extract from the 
vduot); 1 bk, w. véuwy and 1 bk. zm. 
rapavduwv (D1I0G. 47), perhaps also 
excerpts from the vdéuo.; 3 bks. 
vowoberav (the title was no doubt 
vouobéra: Or mept vouod.); 4 bks. 
modiTtiK@v €0av; 6 bks. woArinov 
(D. 45), and again 2 bks. roAitinay 
(D. 50), which were probably a 
duplicate or excerpt of the others 
[unless we are to read in D. 50 
with COBET and HBNKEL (Stud. 
t. Gesch. d. griech. Lehre vom 
Staat, p. 20), not mwoarrixav, but, 
on the analogy of the Aristote- 
lian modrtixds (supra, vol. 1, 
p. 59) wodAcrixod]; 1 bk. x. tis 
aplorns moditelas (D. 45) or 
(D. 49) was apior’ ay wddts 
oikotro ; 2 bks, émrouy ris MAdrw- 
vos wodutelas; 1 bk. mw. BaciAcias 
(D. 42) and 1 bk. m. rupavvidos 
(D. 45), both probably combined 
in the 2bks. mw. BaotAetas (D. 49); 
mpos Kdooaydpov m. Bactaelas 
(D. 47), which according to 
ATHEN. iv. 144, e, was also as- 
cribed to Sosibius ; 1 bk. w. raidelas 
Bao tréws ; 4 bks. wodrtin@y mpds 
TOUS Katpovs (to which also the 
2 bks. kaipav, D. 50, may be re- 
ferred). This work is often cited 


(by Cic. Fin. v. 4, 11 as the 
‘momenta temporum ’),—Further 
notes as to these writings and the 
evidence about them will he 
found in USENER, Anal. Th. 
6 sqq., HENKEL, ibid. 19 sqq.; 
and as to the véuo in particular, 
see USENER, Rhein. Mus. Xvi. 


470 sqq. 

1 See the passage apud 
PoRPH. De Abst. iii. 25, cited 
supra, Vol. ii. p. 396, n. 1. 

7 See the passage from 


Eth. viii. 13, 1161, b, 5 referred 
to supra, p. 219,n. 5, where Ari- 
stotle says that a friendship with 
a slave is possible, not indeed 
h SovAos, but 4 &vOpwros* Soxet 
yop eivat Tt Sikatoy mavT) avOpamp 
mpos mavra Toy Suvdmevoy Kowwvij- 
gat vduov Kal gouvOhqnns: Kal 
prrata 5, kal baoov &vOpeo- 
TOS. 

3’ Cf. BERNAYS, Theophr. ub. 
Frommigkh. 100sq. His remark that 
in the Aristotelean Ethics there 
is no note of the love of humanity 
must be somewhat limited by the 
passage just cited; but we may 
concede that in Theophrastus 
this side of things, which in 
Aristotle was far less promi- 
nent, obtained much greater im- 
portance in conformity with the 
spirit of the new epoch which 
came with Alexander. 











PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 4138 


followed Empedocles and anticipated Porphyry.! He 
not only sought historically to prove that originally 
only the simplest products of nature? were used for 
sacrifices, and that animal offerings especially were of 
later origin,® but he also demanded that men should 
abstain from the latter, and confine themselves to the 
more harmless presentation of fruits of the field.t The 
slaughter, moreover, of animals in general and the use 
of their flesh, in so far as the former was not rendered 
necessary by their ferocity, the latter by lack of 
other provisions, he was consistent enough to condemn, 
on the ground that these beasts are akin to us, and 
therefore possess rights as against us which forbid us 
forcibly to rob them of life.® He did not, however, on this 
account desire to renounce the national rites of sacrifice.® 
He merely said that their moral value lay, not in the 
greatness of the gift, but in the disposition of the giver.’ 








‘The m. evoeBelas, d. gy. v. 
supra, Vol. ii. p. 355, n. 2. 

* Lg. first grass, then fruits; 
first water, then honey, and, still 
later, wine. 

% PoRPH. De Abdstin. ii. 5-8, 
12-15, 20-1, pp. 39, 56, 62, 79, 
&c., Bern, He dealt with human 
sacrifices (ibid. c. 7) and with 
the peculiar customs of the Jews 
as to sacrifices (ii. 26) ; see, as to 
the mistakes in the latter section, 
BERNAYS, p. 109 sqq. 184-5. 

* Ibid, c. 12 sqq. 22 sqq. 

5 Ibid. c. 12-18, 22-23, and 
cf. supra, ii. p. 396. 

® Ibid, ii. 43, p. 184: &ore 
kara Th elpnucva @coppdoty 
Gicouevy wal jyeis. The theory 
which Porphyry here sets out, 
that this view was founded on a 


belief in Demonology, cannot be 
taken from Theophrastus; and, 
in fact, Porphyry does not as- 
cribe it to him. Nor have we 
any sufficient ground in PLurT. 
Def. Orac. 20, p. 420, to assert 
that Theophrastus believed in 
Demons. Evenif it be true that 
the passage correctly represents 
his attitude to the belief, it 
would only prove that, while he 
could not accept it in the pre- 
vailing form, he did not feel free 
to reject it absolutely. 

7 Apud StToB. Floril. 3, 50, 
he says: xp} tolyuy roy uéAAovra 
Bavpacdicerba: wep Td Beto pidro- 
Ourny elvar uh TE WOAAG Ovew GAA 
T@ wuKva Tidy 7d Oeiovs Td yey 
yap ebroplas 7d 8' bardrnros anueior, 
and ap. PORPH. De Abstin. ii. c. 


414 ARISTOTLE 


His whole conception of religion was undoubtedly iden- 
tical with that of his master.! 

From the numerous works of Theophrastus upon 
Rhetoric? only a few not very important observations 
are preserved.? Of his works upon the theory of art‘ 


19, he goes on to say that the 
costliness of the offering is not 
the important thing, but rather 
the purity of the intention; for 
the Godhead will be best pleased 
by the right direction of that in 
us which is akin to Himself, and 
most divine: with which cf. 
ARIST. Eth, ix. 9, 1179, a, 24. 

1 We have shown this of his 
theology, see supra, vol. ii. p. 370 
sq. As to matters touching popu- 
larreligion and its myths,it would 
be quite in the spirit of Aristotle 
if Theophrastus explained the 
Prometheus myth by the theory 
that Prometheus was the first 
teacher of men (Fr. 50, b. 
Schol. in Apoll. Rhod. ii. 1248), 
and the myth of the Nymphs 
nursing Dionysos by reference to 
the ‘tears’ of the vine (ATHEN. 
xi. 465, b). 

2 De quo cf. USHNER, Anal. 
Theophr. p. 20 whose conjecture, 
that the words ef5n .¢’ wep) Texvev 
pntopikov are the general title 
covering the books separately 
set out in the list, seems very 
probable. 

* The definition of the craupa 
as dveidiouds duaprias mapecxnua: 
Tiopevos (PLUT. Qu. Conv. ii. 1, 
4,7, p. ¢31), which is certainly 
taken from one of the rhetorical 
books (or perhaps, as BRANDIS, 
iii. 366, suggests, from the -z. 
yeAoiov) and afew similar details 
(see W’r. 93-96, the Index to the 
Rhetores Graeci s. v. <Theophr.,’ 


Cic. De Invent. i. 35, 61), and 
also the statement of AMMONIUS 
(Theophr. Fr. 74 sq. cf. swpra,vol. 
ii. p. 363, n. 3) that Theophr. dis- 
tinguished in speech a double 
relation—that to the hearers, and 
that to the subject in hand. 
With the former Rhetoric and 
Poetics are cuncerned, and these 
studies accordingly have to do 
with choice of expression, charm 
of utterance, pleasing and effec- 
tive presentation of the subject, 
&c.: Tis 5€ ye mpbs Ta mpdryuara 
Tov Adyou oxécews 65 piddcodos 
Mponyouuevws emipmedAhoera, TO TE 
Wevdos dieAéyxwy kal 7rd dAnbés 
amodeikvis, 
sentence to prove that the za. 
épunvetas dealt only with the 
amropaytinds Adyos: it must ac- 
cordingly have referred in the 
text of Theophr. only to the 
form of oral statement, and it 
cannot have been intended as a 
statement of the distinction be- 
tween philosophy in general and 
Rhetoric and Poetics. 

* DioG. 47-8, 43 mentions 
two wm. woinrikjs, and one 7. 
Kwuwdias; ATHEN. in vi. 261, d, 
names the latter, and in viii. 348, 
a, also the zm. yeAolov, but what he 
professes to cite from it is quite 
incredible. The statement that 
Tragedy was 7pwikijs toxns tepl- 
oracis (DIOMED. De Oratione, p. 
484, Putsch) could not have 


satisfied Theophrastus as a com- 


plete definition, after the elabo- 


AMMONIUS cites this 


SS 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: THEOPHRASTUS 415 


the books on music,' which were highly valued by the 
ancients,’ are the only ones of which we have any 


detailed information. 


Even this for the most part 


refers to the physical explanation of sounds, and has 


already been dealt with in that connection.’ 


Other- 


wise we learn merely that Theophrastus ascribed the 
effect of music to a movement of the soul,‘ by means 
of which we are delivered from the trouble and annoy- 
ance caused by certain affections;® that he further 


rate investigation of the subject 
which Aristotle had already pro- 
vided. 

'PLur. NV. P. Suav. V. sec. 
Epie. 13, 4, p. 1095, argues thus 
against Epicurus: ri Aéyeis, & 
’Emlkoupe ; «iOapwidy Kal abaAnray 
Ewlev axpoarduevos eis Td Oéatpov 
BadiCeis, év 5 cupmogiw Ocoppdarov 
wept cuupwvidy diareyoudvov Ka) 
"Apiototévov mep) ueraBoAay kai 
"Apioropdyvous wep) ‘Ouhpov ra dra 
Kkarakhyn tais xepoi; He thus 
places Theophrastus on a level 
with the famous musician Ari- 
stoxenus. The reference to 
Theophrastus cannot be ex- 
plained (BRANDIS, iii. 369) of 
table talk about Music found in 
one of his books or otherwise 
published by him, any more than 
the reference to Aristoxenus 
could be. 

? Tl. povowxys 2 bks. (D. 47 cf. 
infra, n. 3); appovixey a’ (D. 46); 
mw. pv@uav a’ (D. 50). For a 
Fragm. from bk, ii. r. wove. (Fr. 
89) see supra, vol.ii. p. 379, n. 3. 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 379, n. 3. 

* So CENSORIN. Di. Nat. 12, 
1: ‘haec [musica] enim sive in 
voce tantummodo est .. . sive, 
ut Aristoxenus, in voce et cor- 
poris motu, sive in his et pre- 


terea in animi motu, ut putat 
Theophrastus.’ 

5 At the end of Fr. 89 he 
says: ula de pdots Tis movers, 
kivnois Tis Yuxis [or, as he put 
it earlier, kivnua peAwdnrixdy rep) 
Thy wWuxhy], fh Kara drddvow 
yiyvouévn Tay 51a Ta way KaKiay, } 
ei wh Hv. The manifestly defec- 
tive clause at the end is amended 
by BRANDIS, p. 369, by reading, 
not ) kara dwéd., but 4 x. dwda, 
meaning: ‘Music is fitted to 
give us relief from the pains that 
arise from the emotions, or to 
awake them where they do not 
exist.’ This sense, however, 
would require, instead of ei uh 
qv either Sov obk éo rly or day ph 
#. Besides, the sense so obtained 
is not altogether satisfactory. 
ZELLER suggests that the text 
may have been somewhat as 
follows: } «. a@mwéA. . . . KaKidy, 
BéAriov Exew huss more? 4 el wh Fv: 
‘Music is a movement of the soul 
which brings relief from the pains 
produced by the emotions, and so 
produces in us a higher kind of 
wellbeing than we should have 
had, if these emotions had never 
been aroused ’—which is exactly 
the Aristotelian idea of Cathar- 
sis: cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 309 sqq. 


416 


ARISTOTLE 


enumerated three of these affections: pain, pleasure, 
and possession ;! that he connected the lively impression 
produced by music with the peculiar susceptibility of the 
auditory sense ;? and that he held that even physical 
disease could be cured by music.* So far as we may infer 
from these few fragments the nature of Theophrastus’s 
theory of art, it cannot have been different from that of 


Aristotle. 


1 PLUT. Qu. Conv. i. 5, 2, p. 
623: Aéye: SE Oeddp. pmovoiks 
apxas Tpeis elyar, AUmny, Hdovyy, 
évOovciacpov, ws Exdorov TolTwy 
maparpémovTos ek Tov cuvndous Kal 
éykAlvovtos Thy gwvhy. See 
also JoH. Lypus, De Wens. ii. 
7, p. 54, Roth., and in CRAMER’S 
Anecd. Paris. i. 317, 15. 

2 PLuT. De Aud. 2, p. 38, a: 
mwepl Tis akovoTiKs aig@hoews, Hv 
6 Ocdpp. tabntinwrdrny eival pnot 
awaoca@v ; whether the further argu- 
ments are also taken from Theo- 


phrastus it is impossible to say. 

3 ATHEN. xiv. 624, a: Sri 5€ 
kal vdcous idra: povaoikh Oeddp. 
iordpnoev ev 7G Tepl evOovoiacpov, 
igxiaxods pdoxwy avdcouvs diare- 
Aeiy, ef KaTavAhoot Tis TOV TémoU 
TH ppvy.ott apuovia. The like in 
PLIn. H. N. xxviii. 2,21. We 
are told that viper bites and 
other hurts were, according to 
THEOPHR., healed by flute-play- 
ing (GELL. iv. 13, 2, APOLLON. 
Mirabil. c. 49). 











417 


CHAPTER XIX 


EUDEMUS, ARISTOXENUS, DICH ARCHUS, AND OTHERS 


NExT in importance to Theophrastus of the immediate 
disciples of Aristotle' comes Eudemus of Rhodes.? 
Rivalling Theophrastus in erudition, he also wrote 
numerous treatises on the Peripatetic philosophy and 


the history of science.’ 


1 We know nothing further 
of his life. He is often referred 
to as ‘the Rhodian’ and as ‘ the 
scholar of Aristotle,’ to distin- 
guish him from other men of the 
same name (v7. FRITZSCHE, Lth. 
Eud. xiv). As he seems to 
have framed his JZogic under 
Theophrastus's personalinfluence, 
but corresponded by letter with 
him about Aristotle’s Physics (v. 
supra, Vol. i. p. 136, n. 2, p. 143), 
we may conjecture that he lived 
for a time at Athens under Theo- 
pbrastus’s teaching, and that he 
afterwards went to his home, or 
to some other country. Cf. 
infra, p. 419, n. 2. 

2 He is so described in the 
story referred to supra, vol. i. 
p. 39,n. 1, and in the statemert 
(ibid. p. 80, n.) that he edited 
Aristotle's Metaphysics. This 
story, however, is made doubly 
improbable by the statement 


(AscLEep. Schol in Ar. 519, b, 


VOL, I, 


All that we know of him, 


38 sqq.) that Aristotle sent it to 
him to ask if it should be pub- 
lished, for the book is obviously 
incomplete; cf. Hist.-phil. Abh. 
d. Berl. Akad. 1877, p. 156. 

* We know of the following 
books by Eudemus (for the pas- 
sages where they are named see 
FRITZSCHE, ibid. xv., and for 
the Fragments, see SPENGEL, 
Hud. Fragmenta, ed. ii. 1870): 
Tewuetpixal ioroplat, ’Apid- 
Mntikh toropla, ‘Aarpodo- 
yinal ioropla:, the chief and 
almost the unique source of all 
later information as to the ancient 
mathematicians and astronomers. 
To these may perhaps be added a 
history of theological ideas; at 
least, that he went into this 
inquiry closely, and that in this 
connection (following Aristotle : 
cf. supra, vol.i. p. 57, n.) he dealt 
with the cosmogonies of Orpheus, 
Homer, Hesiod, Acusilaus, Epi- 
menides, and Pherecydes, and 


EE 


418 


ARISTOTLE 


however, goes to show that his merit as a philosopher 
consisted far more in his appropriation and propagation 
of Aristotelian doctrines than in any independent deve- 
lopment of them.' In logic, indeed, as has been already 
shown, he found it necessary to deviate from his master 
on isolated points, and in one or two not unimportant 
respects to supplement the Aristotelian theory ;? but 


also with the Babylonian, 
Zoroastrian, Phoenician, and (less 
accurately) the Egyptian theo- 
ries as to the origin of the world, 
we learn from DAmAsc. De 
Prine. c. 124-5, p. 382 sqq.; cf. 
Dioc. L. Prowm. 9 (Fr. 117-8): 
cf. also supa, vol. ii. p. 352, n. 4 fin. 
In the same connection he may 
well have treated of the Platonic 
Cosmogony, and the remark pre- 
served by PLuT. An. Procr. 7, 3, 
p. 1015, as to Matter, may have 
belonged to this discussion, al- 
though it might also belong to 
his Physics. There were also a 
m. yovias, an ’AvadvTind in at 
least two books (supra, i. p. 67, n. 1, 
ii. p. 358, n.3; Fr. 109 sqq.), am. 
AێEews (supra, vol.i. p.66,n.1; Fr. 
113 sqq.); but probably not Cate- 
gories or ™. Epunvelas (supra, vol. 
i. p. 65). Then there was the 
Physics, which we shall speak 
of presently, and the Ethies, of 
which we still possess the first 
three books and the last (supra, 
vol. i. p. 98, n. 1). A zoological 
work was also current under his 
name in later times, as we know 
from APUL, Apol. c. 36 (Fr. 109), 
ABLIAN, Hist. An. iii. 20, 21, iv. 
8, 45, 53, 56, v. 7; but what 
A®lian tells us of its contents does 
not make for its authenticity: 
To this Eudemus Rose (A7vst. 
Libr. Ord. 174) also assigns 


those anatomical inquiries for 
which a writer named ‘ Eude- 
mus’ is mentioned with praise by- 
GALEN (vide Index ; Rose, tbid. ; 
SPRENGEL, Gesch. d. Arzneik 4, 
ed. i. 539-40), Rurus, Eph. i. 9, 
20, and the Homeric Scholiast 
(v, FRITZSCHE, ibid. xx. 49-50). 
Since this ‘ Hudemus,’ however, 
is not in any of these places de- 
scribed as the Rhodian, and since, 
according to GALEN (De Ut. 
Anat. 3, vol. ii. 890, De Semine, 
ii. 6, vol. iv. 646, Hippocr. et 
Plat. Place. viii. 1, vol. v. 651, 
Loc. Affect. iii, 14, vol. viii. 212, 
in Aphor. vol. xviii. a, 7, Libr. 
Propr. vol. xix. 30) he was clearly | 
not the senior of Herophilus, and 
probably not of Erasistratus, 
who was a pupil of Theophrastus 
(Diog. v. 57), nor of the Me- 
trodorus (SEXT. Math. i. 258) 
who is referred to as the third 
husband of Aristotle’s daughter 
(supra, vol. i. p. 20,n. 3) ; we may 
more probably suppose that he is 
another Eudemus.—tThe rhetori- 
cian Eudemus (De Gen.: cf. 
FRITZSCHE, p. XvVil) is also 
to be distinguished from our 


philosopher. 

1, SimpLt. Phys. 93, b: 
paptupel 5¢ TH Ady@ Kat EVSyuos 6. 
ynowwtatos tav ’ApiototéAous 
éTraipwr. 


2 Cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 358 sqq. 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 419 


he rightly held fast by its fundamental principles, and in 
-such changes as he made, we gather that he coincided 
for the most part with Theophrastus, who, as the more 
independent thinker of the two, probably here led the 
way.! In his account of Aristotle’s Physics? he followed 
step by step the lines of the original, as a rule retaining 
its very words.’ In his own Physics he seems to have 
permitted himself scarcely any important departure 
from his master,* his modifications consisting merely of 
a reduction of the number of books,® a few transposi- 
tions,® historical and doctrinal explanations, and such 


1 This is indicated by the 
fact that, beyond those points 
which they have in common, 
there is very little noted which 
is peculiar to Eudemus, but much 
more which is peculiar to Theo- 
phrastus. 

* Apparently he undertook 
this work primarily as a text- 
book for his oral lectures : cf. his 
words ap. SIMPL. Phys. 173 a: 
ei 5€ Tis miorevoee Tois TMuOayo- 
pelos, ds mddAw Ta adbra dpibu@ [i.e. 
that in a future world each in- 
dividual entity will recur], 
Kaye puvbodrAoyhow 7d paBdloy [the 
Professor’s rod] @xwv iuiv nabnue- 
vos. If we take this passage 
along with that quoted supra, 
vol. i. p. 136, n. 2, it will be seen 
to be probable that Eudemus set 
up aschool of his own in some 
city other than Athens, and that 
it was for this school that he 
compiled his Physics. 

% See the very full references 
given supra, i. p. 148, n. 4. 

‘ SIMPLICIUS, who so often 
speaks of EUDEMUs, notes only 
a single such variance, and that 
is sutticiently doubftul. He tells 


us (ibid. 93, b, 94, a; Fr, 26) 
that EvuprEMus in his second 
book aseribed change in time 
(i.e. a becoming old) to the four 
Aristotelian kinds of motion (v. 
supra, i, p. 423,n. 1). Yet we 
know that he did not agree with 
Theophr.’s extension of move- 
ment to all the categories (see 
supra, ii. p. 373), and that, in 
explaining ARIST. Phys. v. 2, 226, 
a, 23, he expressly pointed out 
that we could only talk of a 
motion of relation by using the 
word in a secondary sense (cf. 
ibid. 201, b). Apart from this 
question, we shall find no vari- 
ance beyond the expression of a 
few slight doubts as to unim- 
portant items of detail. 

5 SIMPL. names only three 
books in the work of Eudemus ; 
and as the citations he gives us 
extend over all the six earlier 
Aristotelian books, (cf. following 
notes) while the seventh was 
passed over. by Eudemus (supra, 
i. p. 82), there cannot in all have 
been more than four books in the 
Eudemian Physirs. 

® The inquiries which in Ari- 


EE2 , 


420 


ARISTOTLE 


changes in the mode of expression as seemed to him to 
be necessary for the sake of clearness.’ In the numer- 
ous fragments of his treatise we cannot fail to recognise 
a true apprehension of the Aristotelian doctrine, careful 
consideration of the different questions involved in it, 


stotle occupy Phys. vi. 1-2 were 
dealt with by Eudemus (acc. to 
SimPL. 220, a)—in connection 
with the question as to the di- 
visibility ad infinitum of Space 
and Time, which is discussed in 
Arist. Phys. iii. 6 (cf. supra, i.p. 
430,n. 1)—either wholly or in part 
in his second book; whereas Space 
and Time in general, discussed 
by ARIST. in the fourth book of 
the Physics, were by Eudemus 
placed in the third (SIMPL. 124, 
a, 155, b, 167, b, 169, b, 173, a; 
THEMIST. Phys. 40,a). So also 
Eudemus dealt in the second 
book (perhaps in the same con- 
nection) with the question (which 
ARISTOTLE discusses Phys. vi. 5 
ad fin.) how far we may say of 
qualitative change that it takes 
place in an indivisible time. 
Otherwise Eudemus seems to 
have followed the order of the 
Aristotelian works, excepting 
always the seventh book. For at 
the beginning of his commentary 
on this seventh book, at p. 242, a, 
SIMPL. says: Kal 8 ye EVSnwos mexpt 
Tovde Tois bAas oxEddY TIS Tpay- 
parelas Kepadalors axodovhoas, 
TodTo TapeAOy ws mepiTTdy em) Ta 
év TG TeAevtalm PiBAl~ KepdAaa 
pernagev. According to what is 
said at p.216,a, Eudemus passed 
directly from the end of the 
fifth book to the sixth book. 
Therefore the main part of the 
fifth and sixth books must have 
come with Eudemus, as with 
Aristotle, between the matter of 


% 


the fourth and that of the 
eighth. 

1 In the present edition ZELL. 
has not considered it necessary 
to demonstrate this position bya 
review of the Fragments of the 
Eudemian Physics, mostly found 
in SIMPL., as was done in his 
second German edition, pp. 701- 
703; partly because BRANDIS, 
iii. 218-240, has fully gone into 
the contents and character of the 
work, and partly because the 
materials are also fully given by 
SPENGEL, /7. 1-82. The only 
items the latter has passed over are 
the remarks, apud SIMPL. Phys. 
2, a, (cf. ARIST. Metaph. xiv. 1, 
1087, b, 13, and D104. iii. 24) that 
Plato was the first who called the 
material causes ororxeia, and the 
passage cited from PLUTARCH, 
supra, ii. p. 418. In the introduc- 
tion to this work, Eudemus (v. 
SIMPL. 11, a; #%. 4) raised the 
question, not touched in the 
Aristotelian Physics,whether each 
of the different sciences should 
deduce its own principles, or 
whether they should in common 
derive them from one higher 
science. Here also, however, as 
ZELLER shows (AHist.-phil. <Ab- 
handl. d. Berl. Akad. 1877, p. 159 
sqq. and supra, i. p. 79, n. 1) 
EupEMus was following one of 
his master’s texts—i.e. the Me- 
taphysics (iii. 2, iv. 3, 5), of 
which we also find echoes else- 
where in the Eudemian Physics. 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 421 


and a skilful elucidation of many statements and con- 
ceptions; but we shall look in vain in them for fresh 
scientific ideas or observations.! 

Passing over a noteworthy peculiarity in his doctrine 
of the Categories,? we may observe an important devia- 
tion from his master in the borderland between physics 


and metaphysics. While 


in general agreeing with 


Aristotle’s theological conceptions,’ Eudemus yet rightly 
finds the assertion that the primum movens must itself 


' «Kudemus,’ says BRANDIS, 
p. 240, very rightly, ‘ shows him- 
self in his Physics as a scholar 
who follows with care and com- 
prehension the lines of his 
master’s thought, and who only 
leaves them reluctantly and in 
minor matters.’ When Fritz- 
SCHE, Lith. Hud. xviii. rests the 
opposite view on WEISSE’s state- 
ment (Arist. Phys. p. 300) that 
Eudemus in the Physics varied 
greatly from Aristotle, this only 
shows that neither of them had 
accurately examined the state- 
ments of Simplicius. 

? In £th. N. i. 4, 1096, a, 24 
ARIST. named 6 Categories: ri, 
nowy, moovv, mpds tt, xpdvos, 
téwos; KUDEMUS, on the other 
hand, says in the Hth. Fud.i. 8, 
1217, b, 26, that Being and the 
Good occur in many mrdceis, the 
ti, mowv, woody, mére, ‘Kal mpds 
Tovras Td wey ev Te KweicOa 7d 
5é ev 7G Kweiv,’ where the latter 
two, not found in Aristotle 
(supra, i. p. 274), appear to re- 
place the Aristotelian zoeiy and 
waoxel. 

* Fr. 81, b, SIMPL. 319, a 
-and b, says that the primum 
movens has its seat (cf. Aristotle ; 
supra, i.p.409,n. 4) in the largest 


of the spheres, that, namely, 
through the pole of which the 
axis of the heavens passes, inas- 
much as this moves quickest 
(following the reading which 
SIMPL. found in Alexander, and 
which is clearly better than that 
of the Simpu. MS. text itself). 
He maintained, however, follow- 
ing Aristotle (supra, i. p.395), that 
it had no parts : ef. p. 422, n. 2, in- 
Sra, and Spengel, p. 109: ef duepés, 
gnolv, éort To mpétws Kwody xal 
BY) Gmrerat Tov Kwoupévov, mHs Exet 
mpos auté; Eudemus also re- 
peats the saying that God thinks 
only on himself (4th. Bud. vii. 
12, 1245, b, 16: ob yap ofrws 6 
Oeds ed Exe: [like a man], adda 
BéAtiov }} Sore GAAo Tt voeiv abros 
map’ abtév. alriov 8 bri huiv pev 
Td €b Kab’ Erepov, exelvyp Be aitds 
airov Td ed éorly), and therefore 
he deduces the further proposi- 
tions that the Godhead needs no 
friends, and that God, by reason 
of his wide separation from man- 
kind, does not loveman, orat least 
does not so love man as man 
loves God (see Zth. vii. 3-4, 
1238, b, 27, 1239, a, 17, c. 12, 
1244, b, 7, 1245, b, 14 ; supra, i. p. 
398, n. 1). 


422 


ARISTOTLE 


move with the world in order to move it! inconsistent 


with the immateriality of the movens. 


He does not seem 


to have observed, however, that the assumption which he 
himself shares as to its position in space is equally so, nor 
does he appear to have given any further explanation 
of the way in which God moves the world.” 

It is to its theological side, again, that we must look 
for the most distinctive peculiarity of the Hudemian 


ethics.® 


1 Supra, i. p. 409. 

2 Of. supra,ii. p.421,n.3; 2%. 
82, SIMPL. 320, a: 6 5€ EWS. rovro 
Mev ovK Gropet Smep 6 "ApiotoréAns, 
ei evdéxeTtal TL Kivotmevov Kiveiv 
gvvEexX@s, Gmoper 5¢ ay) rodrou, et 
evdéxerarTd dkivnrov Kiveiv* § SoKet 
yap, pnol, Td Kivovy Kata Témov 7} 
wOovv 7 EAkov Kwety [supra, i. p. 
423, n. 1]. ei 5 uh udvor otTws, 
GAN’ ody amrrduevdy ye 2 avd } BV 
&AAou, 7) 80 Evds 7) wAcidvwv, Td BE 
Gmepes oddevds evdéxeTar Garba * 
ov yap eat avrod Th wey apxh Td 
dé wépas, Tay 5& Gmwroudvwv Ta 
mépara &ua [supra, i. p. 438, n. 1). 
Tas odv Kivioer Td dmepés » Kal AvEL 
Thv amopiay Aéywy, Ort Ta per 
Kiovpeva Kivel TH SE Hpemovyra, 
kal Td wey Kivotmeva Kivel amrd- 
eva &AAws [1]. amrdueva, Ta 5e 
npemovvTa &%AAws; BRANDIS, iii. 
240, conjectures, Grr. &AAa BAAwS, 
and SPENGEL, p. 110, amr. 
&AA wv; but the words following 
show that before the &AAws there 
must be some reference to that 
which is at rest], ovx duotws BE 
WAYTa* Ov yep as Yn Thy cpaipay 
pipdetcay én’ abrhy yw éxives, 
ottws Kal Td mpdtws KWicay* ov 
yap mpoywouevns Kwihoews éxeivo 
Kivet’ ov yap by ert mpdtws Kivoly ° 
n S€ yi ovdérore Hpemotoa mpoTws 


Aristotle had confined himself entirely to the 


kwhoet, It is the less easy, to 
see any solution of the question 
in this argument, that the con- 
nection of the primum movens 
with the earth is not satisfactory 
either in itself or on the lines of 
the Aristotelian system. For in 
the theory stated by Eudemus the 
earth does move by contact, and, 
further, a thing which by its 
nature is unmoved cannot be 
taken as analogous to a thing 
that is at rest, sines rest (see 
supra, i. p. 419,n.5 ad fin.) can 
only be predicated of that which 
has motion. 

$ It has already been pointed 
out (supra, i. p. 98, n. 1, ef. ii, 
p. 176, n. 4) that this text is really 
a work of Eudemus of which only 
the first three books and the 
seventh are preserved ; and that 
FISCHER and FRITZSCHE are in 
error in referring to it book v. 
15, and books. vi. and vii. of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Eth. Eud. 
vii. 18-15 (which Fritzsche, with 
the majority of the MSS., counts 
as an eighth book) contains 
certain fragments of a larger 
tract, the text of which is much 
injured. There is, however, no 
doubt that this tract did in fact 
stand at the end of the Hudemian 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC, 4238 


natural side of human aims and capacities in his theory 
of morals; Eudemus connects human action in its 
origin and end more closely with the divine. With 
reference to the origin of action he remarks that many 
people without acting from insight are yet fortunate in 
all that they do; and as he was unable to regard this 
phenomenon as accidental on account of the regularity 
of its occurrence,' he held that it must be referred to a 
fortunate gift peculiar to these persons—a natural up- 
rightness of will and inclination. But whence comes 
this gift? Man has not given it to himself: it must 
therefore come from God, who is the source of move- 
ment in the world.? Insight, moreover, and the virtue 








Ethics proper (as FRITZSCHE, 
p. 244, says, and BRANDIS, ii. b, 
1564-5, proves), and not before 
bk. vii. as SPENGEL supposed 
(p. 401-2, of the text cited supra, 
i. p. 98, n. 1), by reason of M. Mor. 
ii. 7 (from 1206, a, 36 onwards) 
8, 9. 

' On the principles set out 
supra, i. p. 362, n. 5, p. 462, n. 3. 

2 In Lud. i. 1, 1214, a, 16, it 
was said that men could become 
happy either by mdé@nois or by 
&oxnots, or in one of two other 
ways: fro. Kabdrep of vuupdAnrrot 
kal OedAnmro tay avOpamrwy, ém- 
mvola damovlov twds dowep évOov- 
oid(ovres, 51a TUXHY. He goes 
on in greater detail at Hud. vii. 
14: with many people almost 
everything succeeds, however 
little @péynois they have (&ppoves 
bvres KaropOovct moAAa ev ols 7 
Tixn Kupla* rt dt wal ev ois réxvn 
aor, wodd pévra Kal rixns év- 
umdpxet), and this, on the above 
principles, is to be attributed, not 
to chance, but to the dois, so 


that such people are not so much 
evTuXEis as evpueis. Ti dt 5h ; [he 
goes on at 1247, b, 18] ap’ ov« 
évecow dpual ev TH Wuxn ai mey 
ard Aoyiruod, ai 8 amd dpetews 
aArdyou, kal mpdrepar abra; ei ydp 
eats pice 7 50 emibuplay 7déos 
bpedis, pioe ye em 7d ayabby 
Badifo. dy way. ei 5h tTwis ciow 
evoueis, domwep of @dicol ovK éem- 
orduevat Gdev, otws eb mepixact 
kal Gvev Adyou dpu@ow}P arr’ bri 
ovois eb wépuKe, Kal emiOupodcr Kal 
tovtov kal rére Kal obtws as Sei 
kal ov Sef wal bre, obTo: Karop0d- 
govot Kay Tixwow &poves dvres 
kal HAoyo.... exelvous wey rolyuy 
evtuxeiy 51a iow evdéxera. F 
yap Spun kal i Spekis odca ob Fe 
Kkatépbwaoev, d 5& Aoyiouds jv HAL- 
6ios. We may ask, he adds, at 
Bud, 1248, a, 15, ap’ abrod rodrov 
TUX aitla, Tov émiOuutoa ob det 
kat Sre Se? ; and having, as will 
be seen presently, answered this 
in the negative, he adds, at line 
24: rd 5 Cyroduevoy rovr’ ear, 
tis ) THS Kwhoews apxh ev TH 


424 ARISTOTLE 


that springs from it, however much they may differ in 
themselves from this unreflecting apprehension of right, 
point to the same source,! since every rational activity 
presupposes the existence of reason, which must itself be 
the gift of God.? And just as virtue in its origin is 
referred to God, so God is held to be the ultimate end 
of all intellectual and moral activity. While Aristotle 
had described scientific knowledge as the highest intel- 
lectual activity and the most essential element in happi- 
ness, Hudemus further conceives of this knowledge as 
the knowledge of God, and accordingly converts Ari- 
stotle’s proposition that happiness is coextensive with 


thought (Gewpia)* into the statement that everything 


Wuxi: dHAov by, Sowep ev TE GAq, 
eds kal év [so Fr. for ray] exelv 
[— n]. Kwel yap mws mayta Td ev 
juty Oetov. Adyou 5’ apxh ov Adyos 
GAAG TL KpeitTov, Th ovy by xpeir- 
Tov Kal émothuns ein [Kal vod, as 
SPENGEL and FRITZSCHE add] 
mwAnv Oeds ; 7) yap apeTh TOD vod 
[better, perhaps, éxelvov or rod 
Oeov | dpyavoy . éxovor ‘yap 
apxhy todbryyv, h Kpelrtwy Tov voov 
kal Bovdedoews —they hit the 
right measure without Adyos, not 
through practice or experience, 
but 7@ 6e¢. In the same way, 
adds Kudemus, prophetic dreams 
are to be explained: foiKe yap 7 
apxm [Nous as the principle of 
immediate knowledge} amoAvo- 
Mévou TOD Adyou ioxvew pmaAdAor. 
Cf. ii. p. 1225, a, 27: the condi- 
tion of the év@ovoi@yres and mpodré- 
yovres is not a free one, although 
the resulting activity is ra- 
tional (d:avolas Epyov). We find 
a similar view of réxy in Ari- 
stoxenus. 


’ Since this is without Adyos ; 
see last note, and Hud. ibid. 1246, 
b, 37, 1247, a, 13 sqq. 

2 Hud. ibid. 1248, a, 15:.in 
the caseof such happily organised 
natures does the ground of their 
fortunate p@vois lie in tuxn? 9 
ottw ye mdvtwy %ora; Kal yap 
Tov vonoa Kat Bovdedoacba’ ov 
yap 5%) é€BovAevocato BovAevoduevos 
[their insight is not the out- 
come of a previous consideration], 
GAN’ Ear apxh tis, odd’ evdnce 
vojoas mpdtepov vojoat Kal TodT’ 
eis Greipov. ovK &pa Tod vojoa 6 
vous apx, ovdé Tod BovrAedoacbat 
Bova. ti obv %AAO mA TdxN 
dor’ amd rixns aravta eorat, ei 
Cott Tis &pxXn hs ove Forw BAAN 
ew. airy b¢ dia rh rotrn Te 
elvat ore TovTo divacOa moreiv ; 
To d€ (nrovpevoy, &c. (see last two 
notes). 

° Eth. N. x. 8; supra, ii. p. 
143, n.1. Eudemus shows how 
exactly he agrees with Aristotle 
also in the statement (th. Hud. 











PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: ELUDEMUS, ETC. 425 


is a good in proportion as it leads us to the contempla- 
tion of God. All that hinders us on the other hand by 
reason of excess or defect from the contemplation and 
worship of God is evil; and it is just this conception which 
supplies what is wanting in Aristotle, namely a more 
exact definition of the kind of action that is according to 
reason. ‘The more persistently we keep that goal in view 
the less shall we be distracted by the irrational element 


in the soul.! 


vii. 12, 1244, b, 23 sqq. 1245,a, 9; 
cf. supra, 200, 5), that life is 
nothing else than aic@dvec@a xa) 
yvwpilev,.... Bote dia TovTo Kah 
Gjiv det BodAeTa: [men wish always 
to live], Sr: BotbAerar del yrwpl- 
Ceuv. 

1 Hth. Eud. vii. 15, 1249, a, 21 
(probably the conclusion of the 
whole work): as the doctor has 
a definite point of view [pos], by 
reference to which he judges 
what is, and how far anything is, 
healthy, oftw xal rq@ crovdalp 
wept tas mpdteis Kal alpéceis Tay 
pvoe pty ayabdy obk éraweray 5é 
Set twa elvar Spov Kal ris Eews Kah 
Tis aipéoews kal mepl puyns xpn- 
adrwv mAjGous Kal dAryétnTos Kai 
Tav evtuxnudrav [1 Kal pvyijs, 
Kal wepl xpnudtrev mAjOos Kal dAL- 
yotnta, &C.]. ev pty ody Tots mpd- 
Tepov €A€EXOn TH Bs 6 Adyos..., 
tovTo 8 dGAnbes uty, ob cadis 5é 
[sup.ii.p. 163,n. 1]. 825% Sowep xal 
év Tois GAAOLS pds TH &pxov (hv Kal 
mpos thy eiw Kata Thy evépyeay 
Thy Tov upxovTos.... emel 5E Kal 
uvOpwros pice auvéorneey é 
&pxovtos Kal apxouevou, kal Exac- 
tov d¢ déo: mpds Thy éavTay apxhv 
Civ. airy 5 birth: GAAws yap 7 
iarpikh apxh kal GAdAws 7 vylea, 


But while the effort after the knowledge 


Taurns 5& evexa exelyn* ottw & 
éxer Kara Td Oewpntikdy. ov ‘yap 
émitaxtin@s &pxwy 6 Beds, GA’ ob 
evexa  ppdvnots emirdrre: (Sirrdy 
bt 7d ob Evena* Bidpicra 8 ev 
&AdAos), emel exeivds ye odderds 
detra. By this reading, in which 
the words before and after 
di@picrat are a parenthesis, the 
argument is that: ‘A man should 
direct his life by that in him 
which naturally rules; but that 
is twofold, the active power 
which determines a man’s work, 
and the end towards which that 
power works. The former is 
Reason or ppdvnois; the latter is 
found in the Godhead: and the 
Godhead as the highest end of 
our activity rules us; not, how- 
ever, like a ruler who gives orders 
for his own ends, since the God- 
head has no need of our services ; 
and God is the end,not in thesense 
in which manis, butin that higher 


‘sense in which he can be also 


the end forall men.’ As to this 
twofold meaning of the ob €vexa 
Aristotle had stated his views in 
his work on Philosophy ; but his 
extant works give us only a few 
hints, from which we gather that 
a distinction is to be drawn be- 


426 


_ ARISTOTLE 


of God is, according to Eudemus, the ultimate source of 
all morality, yet the form under which the latter first 
appears and the principle which gives unity in the first 
instance to all the virtues is that goodness of disposi- 
tion: which he calls uprightness (kaXoxdaya0ia), and 
which consists in the habitual desire for what is abso- 
lutely worthy, the noble and the laudable, for its own 
sake-—in other words, in perfected virtue based on love 


of the good.' 


tween that which profits by an 
activity and that which is its 
final end; cf. Phys. ii. 3, 194, 
a, 35: éopmev ydp mws Kal jets 
TéAos: dixas yap Td ov EveKa* 
elpntat 5° év Trois mepl pidocodias. 
Metaph. xii. 7; supra, i. p. 355, 
n. 3, ad fin. De An. ii. 4, 415, 
b, 1: mdavra yap éxelvou [Tov Oelov | 
Opéyerat, Kakelvov Eveka mparret 
boa mpdtre: Kata iow. Td 8 ov 
evexa Sirtdv Td wey ov Td BE @. 
Eudemus seems, in the passage 
quoted above, to have this last 
passage in his mind; even if the 
words 7d 8 ob &y. &c., which 
recur in line 20, should, as TREN- 
DELENBURG thinks, be rejected. 
Eudemus then goes on: ris ody 
aipeots kal KTijois TaY pice aya- 
Oay moijoet THY TOD BEod mdALoTAa 
Gewpiav. 7) cwmaros 2) xpnudtwr 7 
pitov } Tav tAdwy ayabav, airy 
apiorn Kal ovTos 6 bpos KdAALOTOS * 
Hris 5° 7 bu Evderay } 8v bwepBoarry 
kwAvet Toy Oedy Sepamevew kal bew- 
petv, abrn d¢€ patan. 
[se. 6 €xwv: te. ‘but we have this 
in our soul’] 7H puxh kal ovros 
THs Wuxis 46 [which is not in 
Cod. R. and should be omitted] 
Spos upioros, Ta [1. 7d] Hriora 
uisOdverbat Tod %AAOU [ Hr. rightly 
ardéyou] mépous Tis Puxis } T0100 roy, 


éxet SE TovTO. 


Aristotle had indeed touched upon this 


1 Kth. Eud. vii. 15, init.: 
Having dealt with the several 
Virtues, we must also consider 
the whole which is made up:by 
their union. This is caAoKayalia; 
As the well-being of all parts of 
the body is the condition of 
Health, so the possession of «all 
virtues is the. condition of 
Rectitude. It is, however, not 
the same thing as the mere 
&yabdv elvar. Only those goods 
are ‘Kadd,’ boa 80 abta tyra aiperd 
(so read with SPENGEL, in lieu 
of the unmeaning mdyra; cf. Rher. 
1. 9, supra, ii. p. 301, n. 3) émrai- 
veté éorw, and only of the virtues 
(cf. 1248, b, 36) can this be said. 
"Ayabds pev ody éoTw @ Ta pice 
ayabd €or ayaba(v. sup.,ii.p.149, 
n. 3,and #th. N. v. 2, 1129, b, 3), 
which happens only when the 
right use is made of these goods 
(honour, wealth, health, good 
fortune, &c.); Kadds 5& Kayabds 
TS TaV ayabay TA KAAG dmdpxew 
avTe 5. abta nal Te wpaxtiKds 
elvar TOV KaAav Kal avT@Y Evexa, 
If a man proposes to be virtuous, 
but only for the sake of these 
natural goods, then he may be 
indeed ayabds avhp, but he cannot 
have kadoxaya0la, for he desires 
the beautiful not for its own 


— 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 427 


perfect virtue under the name of justice, but only 
incidentally, and in so far as it presents itself in men’s 
relations to one another:! the proper bond of union 
between the virtues being, in his view, insight.2 In 
giving express prominence to the quality of will and 
disposition which lies at the foundation of all the virtues, 
Eudemus supplies a lacuna in the Aristotelian account. 
In effect, however, Aristotle had stated the same prin- 
ciple in his discussion of the essential nature of virtue.’ 

In other respects the EKudemian Hthics, so far as it 
is known to us, differs, like the Physics, from the Ari- 
stotelian only in individual transpositions, elucidations, 
and abbreviations, in changes of expression and the mean- 
ing of words,’ Eudemus indeed breaks the close connec- 
tion between the Hthics and the Politics by inserting 
Economics as a third science between them.’ In his 
Ethics, moreover, he gives a more independent place 
than Aristotle to the cognitive activities and to the 
corresponding dianoétic virtues.6 But these diver- 


sake. To those of whom this 
latter is true, on the other hand 
(before kal mpoapotyra, at 1249, 
a, 3, there seems to be a small 
lacuna), not only the beautiful in 
itself, but also every other good, 
comes to be ‘ beautiful,’ because 
it subserves an end which is the 
beautiful: 6 8’ oiduevos ras dperas 
_ Exe Seiv Evera trav éxrds Gyabav 
kara 7d gupBeBnnds Ta KaAa 
mpdrter, torw ody KadoKayabia 
dperh rére00s, 

1 Supra, ii. p. 170. 

2. “Supra,ii. p. 166, n. 1. 

3 Supra, ii. p. 154, nn, 3, 4; 
155, n.1; p. 149, n. 3. 

‘ With what. follows cf. 
FRITZSCHE, Lth. Lud. xxix. sqq. 





and also see BRANDIS, who at 
ii. b, 1557 sqq. iii. 240 sqq. has 
put together the variations of the 
Eudemian Ethics from the 
Nicomachean. 

5 Cf. svp., i.p.186,n.4. It will 
be shown infra, in discussing 
the Pseudo-Aristotelian LZeo- 
nomics, that it is possible that 
Eudemus himself wrote a treatise 
on Kconomics, and that it may 
perhaps be preserved to us in 
bk. i. of that work. 

5 Supra, ii. p. 178,n. 1. That 
EUDEMUS, i. 5, 1216, b, 16, includes 
the poetical and practical sciences 
under the term mromrixal émorj- 
wat, in contradistinction to the 
theoretical, is unimportant, 


428 


ARISTOTLE 


gencies have no perceptible influence upon his treat- 


ment of ethical questions. 


the Eudemian WHthics are. still more unessential.! 


1 Eup. condenses the open- 
ing (Hth. Nic. i. 1) into a few 
words and begins with Mic. i. 9, 
1099, a, 24; he expressly does 
away in i. 2,1214, b, 11 sqq. with 
the distinction drawn between 
the constituents and the insepa- 
rable conditions of happiness (cf. 
supra, ii. p.150,n.1; i.p.360,n.1): 
he expands in i. 5 Mie. i. 3 (partly 
by using JW. vi. 13; v. supra, ii. p. 
158,n.2); inserts in i. 6 methodo- 
logical observations which are in 
fact entirely in agreement with 
Aristotle’s views; extends in c. 8 
the discussion of the Idea of the 
Good out of Mic. i. 4 with certain 
general observations; omits the 
inquiry in Vic. i. 10-12 (cf. supra, 
ii. p. 144 foll.) and modifies the 
argument of Vic. i. 8-9 by com- 
bining it with what goes before. 
In the discussion of the nature 
of Virtue, Hth. Hud. ii. 1, 1218, 
a, 31-1219, b, 26 is Aristotelian 
matter (Vic. i. 6, x. 6 énit. i. 11 
init. 1. 13, 1102, b, 2 sqq.) freely 
worked up; what follows is 
more closely connected with Mic. 
i. 13; and ii. 2 follows Nic. ii. 1; 
so li. 3.is Mic. ii. 2, 1104, a, 12 
sqq. il. 5, 1106, a, 26, ii. 8 init.; 
the sketch of the virtues and 
vices 1220, b, 36 sqq. (which 
seems, however, to include later 
additions: see FRITZSCHE, ad 
loc.) follows Nie. ii. 7; 1221, b, 
9 sqq. rests on Wie. iv. 11, 1126, 
a,8sqq. With Hud. ii. 4, cf. Vie. 
ii. 2, 1104, b, 13 sqq. and c. 4 
init. Nic. ii. 1 (genesis of virtue 
by virtuous acts) is passed over, 
and Vic.ii. 5 (virtues are neither 
duvduers nor wd0n, therefore Ekets) 


The further peculiarities of 


On 


is hardly touched; that virtue 
was, however, called not merely 
egis (Hud. ii. 5, c. 10, 1227, b, 8, 
&c.), but also d:d@eors (ii. 1, 1218, 
b, 38, 1220, a, 29) is nothing. 
Hud. ii. 5 is in essence taken 
from ic. ii. 8. The inquiry as 
to free will, &c., is opened 
by Eudemus, ii. 6, with an intro- 
auction which is peculiar to him, 
after which he gives, at c. 7-10; 
in a free selection and order the 
main points of the Aristotelian 
argument in Wie. iii. 1-7 (cf. 
BRANDIS, ii. b, 1388 sqq.), and 
closes in c. 11 with the question 
(which is not put by, but for the 
solution of which Jie. iii. 5, 1112, 
b, 12 sqq. is used) whether it is 
will (apoatpects) or insight (Adyos) 
that virtue directs aright? Hude- 
mus decides for the former, be- 
cause the main question in virtue 
is the end of our action, and 
this is determined by the will; 
whereas the protection of our 
power of insight from distortion 
by desire is the business of éyxpa- 
tet, Which is a praiseworthy 
quality, but is to be distinguished 
from aperh. In the treatment of 
the specific virtues Eudemus 
follows his master, with unim- 
portant variations, as follows: iii. 
1 (avdpela) is Mie. iii. 8-12; iii. 
2 (cwppootyn) is Nic. iii. 13-15 ; 
then we pass (c. 3) to mpadrns 
(Nie. iv. 11), and next (c. 4) to 
éAevbepidrys (JV. iv. 1-8), and in 
c. 5 to meyadopuxla (WV. iv. 7-9), 
and c. 6 to peyadompéerea (JX. iv. 


4-6). These are generally 
abbreviated, and show only a 
few explanatory additions. 











PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC, 429 


the other hand, the connection of ethics with theology, 
discussed above, resting though it obviously does upon 
Aristotelian doctrines, nevertheless presents an unmis- 
takable departure from the spirit of the Aristotelian 
philosophy and an approach to the Platonic.' 

With the religious attitude which characterised Eu- 
demus, the naturalism of his fellow-disciples Aristoxenus 
and Diczearchus stands in striking contrast. The former 
of these,? who, before he became acquainted with Ari- 


Finally, inc. 7 (cf. V. iv.12-15, and 
supra, i. p. 169) Eudemus deals 
with véuects, aids, pirla, ceuvdrns 
(absent in Vic.), GAf@ea and 
amddérns, and edrpameAfa, all of 
which, with a certain variance 
from Aristotle, he treats as 
laudable qualities, but not as 
virtues in the strict sense, as 
being merely peodrntres rabnrical 
or gvoial dperal (1233, b, 18, 
1234, a, 23 sqq.), because they do 
not involve a mpoaipecis. tAo- 
tiuta (Nic. iv. 10) is passed over ; 
and for certain virtues left with- 
out a name by Aristotle (g:Ala 
and 4GA/@ea) Eudemus, as usual, 
has a technical term—a note of 
the later date of his book. The 
three following books we possess 
only (v. supra, i. p. 98, un. 1) in 
the Aristotelian orginal. The 
seventh has in c. 1-12 chiefly an 
original restatement of the 
matter of the inquiry as to 
Friendship (in ic. viii. ix.) so 
constructed that new ideas only 
appear in minor points, and con- 
tradictions of the Aristotelian 
teaching never. The three final 
chapters of this book (more cor- 
rectly bk. viii.) have been already 
dealt with, supra, ii. p. 422, n. 3. 

' With Eudemus in this con- 


nection should be named his 
nephew Pasicles (ap. PHILOP. 
‘Pasicrates’), who is also called 
a scholar of Aristotle, if it be 
true (according to the views set 
out supra, vol. i. p. 79) that he 
was the author of bk. ii. (a) 
of the Metaphysics. See c. 1, 
993, a, 9: Sorep yap kal ra Tov 
vuxtepliwy Sumatra mpds Td héyyos 
Exe: Td pel’ jucpay, ofrw Kal tis 
huetépos uxis 5 vods mpds ra TH 
pioe paveporata maytwy, and cf. 
with this PLATO, /ep. vii. init. 
Otherwise the contents of this 
book show no remarkable pecu- 
liarity. 

? For the life and works of 
Aristoxenus see MAHNE, De Ari- 
stoxeno, Amsterd. 17938, and 
MULLER, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 
269 sqq., where the Fragments 
are collected. He was born at 
Tarentum (SUID. ’Apiordt.; STE- 
PHANUS Byz. De Urb. Tdpas), 
and was the son of Spintharus 
(Di04. ii. 20, Sex. Math. vi. 1; 
as to his alleged second name, 
‘ Mnesias ’ apud SuID., see MUt- 
LER, p. 269), who was a cele- 
brated musician (ASLIAN, A. 
Anim. ii. 11, p. 34, Jac.). He 
learned also, according to Surp. 
from the musician Lamprus (de 


430 


ARISTOTLE 


stotle, had been a student of the Pythagorean philo- 
sophy, acquired by his writings on music! the highest 
reputation among musicians of antiquity,? and what we 


know of his works amply justifies his fame. 


While far 


outstripping all his predecessors in the completeness of 


quo v. MAHNE, p. 12; cf. ZELL. 
Ph. da. Gr. i. p. 45, n.3), from the 
Pythagorean Xenophilus (thid. i. 
p. 310, n. 5), and from Aristotle. 
Asa scholar of Aristotle, he is 
named by Cic. Zuse. i. 18, 41, 
and GELL. WV. A. iv. 11, 4. He 
himself refers in Harm. Elem. p. 
30 (ZELL. ibid. p. 596, n. 3), to 
an oral statement of Aristotle’s, 
and at p. 31 of the same he 
relates that Aristotle used, in 
his lecturing, to give out before- 
hand the subject and general 
lines of his discussion. SUIDAS 
relates that, being one of the 
most notable of Aristotle’s scho- 
lars, he had expectations of be- 
coming his successor, and that 
when this did not come about he 
abused Aristotle after his death. 
ARISTOCLES, however (supra, i.p. 
1l,n.1, p. 12, n. 1), refutes the 
last suggestion, and possibly it 
was merely the statement cited 
on p. 11, n. 1 (which refers really 
to another person), that started 
the story. We learn further that 
Aristoxenus lived at first, prob- 
ably in his youth, at Mantinea, 
and that he was a friend of 
Diczarchus (Cic. in Tuse.i.18,41, 
calls him his ‘ zqualis et condi- 
scipulus, and in Ad Att. xiii. 
32, he mentions a letter then 
extant from Diczarchus to Ari- 
stox.). We know not on what 
grounds LUCIAN’s story, Paras. 
35, rests, that he was a ‘ parasite’ 


of Neleus (? Neleus of Scepsis; 
but he is of too late a date; 
supra, i. p. 137, n. 1, p. 139, n. 3). 
In any case, we cannot rely on it. 
The period of the life of Aristox., 
of which we cannot fix either 
limit, is broadly determined by 
his relations to Aristotle and 
Dicearchus: when CYRIL. C. Jud. 
12 C, places him in Ol. 29 he is 
confusing him (see MANNE, 16) 
with the much earlier Selinun- 
tian poet; he is, however, more 
correct in 208, B, when he calls 
him younger than Menedemus of 
Pyrrha (ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. p. 365, 
n. 2, p. 837). 

1 The list of those known to 
us, in MULLER, p. 270, includes 
eleven works, some of them in 
several books, on Music, Rhythm, 
&c., and also on the Musical 
Instruments. We still possess 
the three books 7. dpuoviray 
orotxelwy, a large fragment of 
the m. fuOuiKnov ororxeiwy, and 
other fragments (ap. MAHNE, p. 
130 sqq. and MULLER, p. 2838 
sqq.). For the literature covering 
Aristoxenus’s harmonic and 
rhythmic theories, see UEBER- 
WEG, Grundr. i. 216. 

-? ‘O Movorixds is his regular 
description. As the chief autho- 
rity on music, ALEX. in Top. 49 
classes him with the great men 
of medicine and mathematics, 
Hippocrates and Archimedes. 
Cf. also PLUT. sup. ii. p.415,n.1 ; 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 481 


his investigations,’ he was distinguished also in a high 
degree by the strictness of his method,? by the accuracy 
of his definitions, and by the thoroughness of his musical 
kriowledge. He occupied himself besides with questions 
of natural science, psychology, ethics, and politics,? as 
well as with arithmetic‘ and with historical sketches.° 
Of the reliability of these last, however, his fabulous 
statements about Socrates and Plato,® obviously inspired 
in part by a depreciatory motive, give us anything but 
a favourable impression.’ 

The views of Aristoxenus, so far as they are known 
to us, exhibit a union of the severe morality of the 
Pythagoreans with the scientific empiricism of the Peri- 








Cic. Fin. v.19, 50, De Orat. iii. 
33, 132; SIMPL. Phys. 193, a; 
VITRUV. i. 14, v. 4. 

' He frequently himself calls 
attention, with a certain pride, 
to the number and importance 
of the inquiries which he was 
the first to undertake: eg. in 
Harm. El. pp. 2-7, 35-87, &e. 

* It is his custom to preface 
each inquiry by a statement as 
to the procedure to be followed, 
and -an outline of the argument, 
so that the reader may be clear 
as to the way which lies before 
him, and the exact point at 
which he finds himself; Harm. 
Lil, p. 30-1, 3-8, p. 43-4. 

* His works of ethical inter- 
est included, not only the 
TlvOayopixal amopdces but. also 
a great part of his historical 
writings about the Pythagoreans. 
Besides these, we hear of his 
véuor wmaidevTixol and vduot moA:- 
tixo!l, The books about the 
Pythagoreans may have contained 
the passages concerning the soul 
cited in the following notes, 


since they are closely connected 
with Pythagorean views. From 
the cbupicra brouviuara, we have 
in MULvtER, 290-1, extracts 
which relate to natural history. 
* In the Fragm. from the z. 
apiOunrixjs, STOB. Lel. i. 16. 
> He composed a History of 
Harmonics (cited in Harm. El. 
p. 2) a work on Tragic Poets, 
another on Flute-players, and 
also a work called Blo: dvdpav 
which dealt apparently with all 
the famous Philosophers down 
to Aristotle ; and also the irouvh- 
pata ioropixa, from which we 
have citations referring to Plato 
and Alexander the Great. In 
his other books also there was 
no doubt much historical matter. 
® Cf. ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. pp. 
48, 51, 2, 54, 6, 59 sqq. 342, 372, 
1, 373, 6, and the story cited by 
LUCIAN, Paras. 35 from Aristoxe- 
nusas to Plato's Sicilian journeys. 
7 Generally speaking, the re- 
putation for learning which Circ, 
Tuse. i. 18, 41; GELL. iv. 11, 4; 
HiEron. Hist. "Eel. Pref. accord 


432 ARISTOTLE 


patetics. Of a stern and ascetic disposition,! although 
a Peripatetic, he found himself so completely in agree- 
ment with the ethical teaching of the Pythagoreans, 
that he puts his own views into the mouth of philo- 
sophers of this school.2 The views he attributes to 
Pythagoreans commendatory of piety, moderation, 
gratitude, fidelity to friends, respect to parents, strict 
obedience to law, and a careful education of the young,’ 
while harmonising with the inner spirit of Pythagorean 
ethics, at the same time unquestionably express his own 
opinion. Similarly he connects himself with Pyth- 
agoreanism in going a step beyond Eudemus,‘ and 
referring good fortune partly to a natural gift and 
partly to divine inspiration.” Hven in his views upon 
music the same tendency asserts itself. He attributes 
to music, as Aristotle, following the Pythagoreans, had 


him, may be as well deserved as 
the reputation for style which Crc. 
Ad Att. viii. 4 concedes to both 
Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus. 

1 $0 at least we are told: 
ARLIAN, V.H. viii. 13, calls him r@ 
yeAwtT. ava Kpdtos modAguios, and 
ADRAST. ap. PROCL. in Tim. 192 
A, says of him: ov mdvu 76 eidos 
avinp exetvos movotkds, GAA’ Srws dy 
ddin Te Kawoy A€yelv TWEepporTikes, 

2 We must assume that he 
himself composed, or so far as he 
took them from ancient sources, 
at least fully accepted, such 
Pythagorean sayings as those in 
the Life of Archytas cited infra, 
in the following notes. 

3 In this connection, ° cf. 
the Fragm. quoted in ZELL. Ph. 
d. Gr. i. 428-9, and that apud 


Stos. Floril, x. 67 (see MULLER, 


ibid. Fr.17), concerning artificial, 
natural and morbid desires, and 
the Fragm. given by ATHEN. xii, 
545,a, out of the Life of Archytas 
(fr. 16), of which, however, he 
has given only the first half, i.e. 
the speech of Polyarchus in 
praise of pleasure, while its re- 
futation by Archytas, which 
must have followed, is not 
quoted. 

4 Supra, ii. p. 422 foil. . 

5 Fr. 21 ap. Stop. Eel. i. 
206 (taken from the v0. drood- 
ges): mepl 5¢ rbxns Tad’ Ehackor : 
elvar mévrot [WYTT. conj. wey ti] 
kal daiudviov pepos adrijs, yevéo0au 
yap exlavoidy Twa mapa Tov Samovtov 
Tav avOpamwy éviows em) 7d BéATiOV 
i él Td Xetpor, kal elvar bavepas Kat’ 
aivTd TovTO ToOvs Mey edTUXEIS TOUS 
d€ aruxeis, as may be seen by the 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 438 


also done, a moral and educative,’ and at the same time 
a purifying, effect, inasmuch as it calms emotion and 
alleviates morbid states of'feeling.? But while insisting 
that music in this aspect should be permitted to retain 
its original dignity and severity, he holds that the same 
demand is made by its character as art; and accord- 
ingly we find him bitterly complaining of the effeminacy 
and barbarism which in the music of his time had 
usurped the place of the earlier classic style.* Neverthe- 


fact that the former without any 
judgment reach a _ fortunate 
result, and the latter with every 
care do not. elva: 5& «al Erepov 
rixns eldos, Kab? } of mev edpueis 
kal etoroxol, ot Se apueis Te Kal 
évaytiav éxovres paw BAdoroey, 
&e. 

1 STRABO, i. 2, 3, p. 15-6: 
Poetry as an instrument in edu- 
cation acts not by wWuxayevyia, 
but for cwppovicpds; even the 
musicians metamootyTa: THs GpeThs 
rabrns* madevtixol yap elval pact 
kal émavopwrikol tTav 7Oay, as, 
following the Pythagoreans, 
Aristoxenus said also. Cf. #’r. 
17,a (Stop. Floril. v. 70, taken 
from the mv@. d&rop.): the true 
gidoxaAla is not concerned with 
the outward adornment of life, 
but consists in a love for the 
Koda %0n emirndeduata and 
 émoriua. Harm. El. 31: 7 pev 
roatrn [wovouh| BAdwre: Ta HOn, 
h Sé rovadrn @peAct —but we must 
not on that account demand of 
Harmonics, which is only a part 
of the science of ovoid, that it 
should make people morally 
better. ‘The moral effect of music 
is referred to in the remark of 
Aristotle, ap. PLUT. Mus. c. 17, 


VOL. Ul. 


1136, e, in opposition to Plato’s 
preference for the Dorian tones: 
and the matter cited by ORI- 
GENES ap. PROCL. in Tim. 27 ©, 
from Aristoxenus also belongs to 
this subject. 

2 Marc. CAPELLA, ix. 923 
(fr. 24): Aristox. and the Pytha- 
goreans believed that the ‘ ferocia 
animi’ can be softened by music. 
CRAMER, Anecd. Paris. i. 172, 
the Pythagorean, according to 
Aristox., used for the purification 
of the body iarpix}, and for that 
of the soul wovowh. PLUT. Mus. 
c. 43, 5, p. 1146-7: Arist. said 
eiod-yeoOat movoikhy tes banquets } 
map’ cov & mev olvos opddArAcw 
mépuke Tav &SnY adTe xpnoauévev 
Td Te comata Kal Tas Siavolas. h 
dé povorkh tH wepl abrhy rate Te 
kal cummerpla eis Thy évaytiay Kard- 
oracw w&ye Te Kal mpaive:, Aristox 
himself is said by APOLLON. 
Mirab. c. 49 (who cites as his 
authority Theophrastus) to have 
cured by music a man afflicted 
with a mental ailment. 

%’ THEMIST. Or. xxxiii. p. 364: 
’Apiord— 6 povoikds @ndAvvoueyny 
Hdn Thy movouhy eweipato avappw- 
viva, avtés Te wyamay Ta dvdpiKd- 
TEpa THY KpovmaTwy, Kal Tois wabn- 

FF 


434 ARISTOTLE 


less Aristoxenus confronts his Pythagorean predecessors 
as the founder of a school which remained opposed to 
theirs down to the latest ages of antiquity.’ He 
reproaches them, not only with their imperfect treat- 
ment of the subject,” but also with their capricious 
method of procedure: since, instead of following the 
guidance of facts, they had, as he believed, imposed 
certain a priori presuppositions upon them. He himself 
demands, indeed, as opposed to an unscientific empi- 
ricism, principles and proofs; but he starts from the 
data of experience, and refuses to seek for the essence 
and causes of that which perception reveals to us in 


any other field than that which these supply.* 


Tais ekKeAevwy TOU madOakod 
&euevous pidrepyety Td appevwrdy 
év tots méAcow 3; whereon follows 
an attack on the theatre music of 
his own time. Aristox. himself 
says in Fr. 30 (ap. ATHEN. xiv. 
632, a): as the people of the 
Italian Posidonia, who were first 
Greeks and now Tyrrheneans or 
Romans, still celebrate yearly 
the Hellenic festival of sorrow 
because they have become bar- 
barians, ottTw 57) oy, ono, Kat 
huets, eretdy Kal Ta O€atpa éexBap- 
Bdpwrat Kad eis peyddny Sta Bopav 
mpocAhrAvdey 7 mavdnyos avTn 
povoikh, Kal? abrovs ‘yevduevor 
OAtyét avaumvnokdueda ofa jv 7 
povoixh. Cf. also Harm. Hl. 23, 
and the remarks apud PLUT. 
Qu. Conv. vii. 8. 1,°4, p. 711 C, 
where Aristox. calls his oppo- 
nents &vavdpo Kal SiareOpuupevor 
Ta Ota 80 dovotay Kal Gmetpo- 
kaAlavy, and De Mus. c. 31, p. 
1142, where he tells a contem- 
porary how ill it becomes him to 
conform to the taste of the day. 


In order, 


‘ Cf. as to this opposition of 
the Pythagoreans or Harmonists, 
and the Aristoxenians, whose 
differences Ptolemzeus seeks to 
solve, BoJESEN, De Harmon. 
Scientia Graec. (Hafn. 1833) 
p. 19 sqq. and the citations there 
from PTOLEMzUS, Harm. i. (C¢. 
2, 9, 13, &c.), PoRPHYR. in Ptol. 
Harm. (Wallis. Opp. iii.) 189, 
207, 209-10, CasAR, Ln ioe: der 
Ehythmik, 22-3. 

2 Supra, vol. ii. p. 431, n. 1. 

8 Harm. El. 32: guouchy yap 
df Twa dauevy juets Thy povhy 
klynow Kiveicbai, Kal ovX @s EruXE 
didornua Tibévar, Kal TodT@y aro- 
Belgers meipdueda Aeyew Smororyou- 
péevas Tots paivouvors, ov Kabdamep 
of €umpooter, of wey GAAOTPLOAOY- 
odvres Kal thy wiv atcOnow eKKAl- 
VOVTES, WS OVTLY OUK axpeBi, vonTas 
d¢€ KaracKevdCovrTes aivias, Kat 
pdokorTes Adyous Té TWas dipiOudv 
elvat Kat TaxN mpos udAnAa, év ols 
76 Te O&) Kal Bapd yiveroL, mdyT@V 
GAAoTpiwTadtavs Adyous Aé€yovTEs 
Kal évayTiw~dtous Tots patvomevats * 














PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 485 


moreover, to establish his conclusions upon an inde- 
pendent basis, he excludes on principle all those which 
might be borrowed from another science: the theory of 
music, he holds, must be limited to its own proper field, 
but it must completely exhaust it.' 

We cannot here enter more fully into Aristoxenus’s 
theory of music, and must be content with the statement 
of its most general principles as an indication of its 


character and tendency.’ 


of 5& amobcomiCovres Exacta tvev 
aitlas kal amrodelfews, ovde adta Ta 
gawdueva Karas efrpiOunkores. 
jyucis Bt apxds Te weipmucba AaBeiv 
pavouevas amdoas Tois éumelpos 
povotkijs Kal Ta ex TovTwY TUuBa!- 
vovta amodekvivar.... dvdyerat 
8 7H mpayyuarela cis B¥0* els Te Thy 
&xohy Kal eis thy Sidvoiay, TH wey 
yap akon xplvomey Ta TaY SiacT7- 
pdrov peyéOn, TH 5é Siavola Pewpod- 
ev Tas TovTwy Suvdueis. Music is 
not like Geometry. The latter 
has no need of observation; 7a 
bt wovowg axeddy eoTw apxiis 
Exovoa tat h THs aicbhoews 
axplBea, p. 38, ad fin.: é« dbo yap 
TovTwy 7 THS moves avvecls 
éorw, aic@joeds te Kal uyhuns. 
P. 43, ad jfin.: three things are 
needful—right apprehension of 
the phenomena, right arrange- 
ment of them, and right conclu- 
sions from them. As to the 
somewhat hostile criticisms of 
later writers, such as PrOLEMZUS 
(Harm. i. 2, 13), PoRPHyR. (in 
Ptol. Harm. Wallis. Upp. iii. 211), 
and BorTHius (De Mus. 1417, 
1472, 1476) upon the method of 
Aristoxenus, see MAHNE, p. 167 
sqq. BRANDIS, iii. 380-1. 

' Harm. El, 44: Harmonics 


must begin with data which are 
immediately established by per- 
ception. KaOdAov bt év Te Epxe- 
o6at maparnpnréov, Saws utr’ eis 
Thy dwepopiay eumirrwuev, amd 
Twos pwvis i Kwhoews dépos 
Gpxéuevol, wht’ ad Kdurrovtes 
évrds [narrowing the bounds of 
our knowledge] roAAd tay oixe!wy 
amoAmmdavenev. In fact, however, 
Aristox. does not go into the 
physical inquiries as to the nature 
of tones; see next note, and ef. 
ibid. pp. 1 and 8, 

* The basis on which Aristox. 
proceeds in his Harmonics is the 
human voice (cf. Harm. El. 19, 
20, and CENSORIN. c. 12, who 
says that Aristox. held that music 


.consisted ‘in voce et corporis 


motu ’—but he cannot conclude 
from this that he considered it 
to consist merely in this and to 
have no deeper basis, especially 
as this would bein contradiction 
with the quotation supra, vol. ii, 
p. 432, n. 5, and as CENSORIN. in 
the same passage, says of So- 
crates also that, according to 
him, music was ‘in voce,tantum- 
modo’). The voice has two kinds 
of movement: that of speech 
and that of song. For speech it 


FF? 


436 


ARISTOTLE 


Aristoxenus turther described the Soul as a harmony, 
and more definitely as the harmony of the Body. The 
activities of the soul were held by him to spring from 
the concurrent movements of the bodily organs as their 


has a continuous motion; for 
songa movement of intervals (kiyn- 
ois guvexys and Siaornwatixh) : 
that is, in speech we have a con- 
tinual change of tone, while in 
singing each tone is held for a 
certain time at the same level 
(ibid. p. 2,8). Whether a tone 
is in itself a form of motion or 
no, Aristox. says he will not 
inquire (ibid. p. 9,12); he says 
a tone is ‘at rest’ so long as it 
does not change its note, but 
allows that this may be an actual 
rest or may be merely a same- 
ness of motion (é6uaAdérns Kiwhoews 
7) tavtérns); nor will he go into 
the question whether the voice 
really can hold exactly the same 
note, for it is enough that it 
appears to us to do so. amAds 
yap, Stray by otTw KIWRTH 7} dwrd, 
dare wndauod doxety foracba rh 
Gkon, cuvexn Aéyouey Ta’trny Thy 
kivnow, Stay dt orjval mov Sétaca 
elra wdAw SiaBaivery tivda Térov 
pavi}, kal rovTo moijcaca maAw éd’ 
érépas tdcews [level of tone] 


oThvat Odd&, Kat TovTO évaAAdE: 


moteiy paivouevn cuvexas diaredg, 
SiactTHnmariKyy Thy To.abTHny Kiynow 
Aéyouev. The result of this must 
be a bad ‘ circulus in definiendo,’ 
by which the éxiracis dwrijs is 
defined as a movement of the 
voice from a low to a high note, 
and the &veos pwr7js a movement 
trom a high to a low one, while 
oturns, conversely, is defined as 
To yevduevoy Sia THS émitdoews, 
and Baputns as Td yevdueroy did 
Ths avécews (p.10). Again, the 


lesser dieois (quarter tone) is 
given as the smallest perceptible 
and stateable difference of tone 
(pp. 13-4), while the greatest 
which can be represented by the 
human voice or by any single 
instrument is said to be the dd 
mévre Kal dis 51a macev ( =two oc- 
taves and a fifth) (p. 20). The 
notions of tone and interval are 
defined (p. 16-7), and the differ- 
ent tone-systems are given (p. 
17-8) with the statement that of 
these the diatonic is the most 
original, the chromatic the next, 
and the enharmonic the last, so 
that the ear is with difficulty 
accustomed to it (p. 19), &c. The 
further course of the inquiry 
cannot be followed here. That 
Aristox. (as in Harm. pp. 24, 45- 
46) fixed. the compass of the 
fourth at two and a half, of the 
fifth at three and a half, and of 
the octave at six tones, whereas 
the true compass is rather less, 
because the half-tones of the 
fourth and fifth are not a full 
half, is matter of criticism in 
PTOLEM. Harm. i. 10; Borrn, 
De Mus. 1417; CENSORIN. Di. 
Nat. 10, 7. Cf. also Put. An. 
Procr, ¢. 17, p. 1020-1 (where 
the apuovirol are the followers of 
Aristox., elsewhere called dp- 
yavikol or povoirol). It is pos- 
sible that in his treatment of 
rhythm Aristox. also treated of 
the letters of the alphabet as the 
elements of speech; see D1onys. 
Comp. Verb. p. 154. 











' PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 487 
common product ; a disturbance in one of these parts, 
which destroys the concord of their movements, causes 
the extinction of consciousness—in other words, death.' 
In this doctrine he only followed a view which had been 
already adopted by others—probably Pythagoreans— 
before him.? It would commend itself all the more to 
him as an empiric in that it offered an explanation of 
the soul which harmonised with his views upon music. 
Just as in music he confines himself to the facts of 
experience, so in treating of the life of the soul he 
confines himself strictly to its sensible manifestations ; 
and just as there he sees harmony arising from the 
concurrence of particular sounds, so he holds that the 


! Cro. Tuse. i. 10, 20: ‘ Aristox. 
. . . ipsius corporis intentionem 
[révos| quandam [animam dixit]; 
velut in cantu et fidibus que har- 
monia dicitur, sic ex corporis 


_totius natura et figura varios 


motus cieri, tanquam in cantu 
sonos.’ Cf. c. 18, 41, where, on 
the other hand, we are told: 
‘membrorum vero situs et figura 
corporis vacans animo quam 
possit harmoniam efficere, non 
video.’ OC. 22, 51: ‘ Diczarchus 
quidem et Aristox. ... nullum 
omnino animum esse dixerunt.’ 
LACTANT. Jnstit. vii. 13 (perhaps 
also following Cicero): ‘quid 
Aristox., qui negavit omnino 
ullam esse animam, etiam cum 
vivit in corpore?’—but held that 
as harmony is engendered out of 
the tension of strings, ‘ita in 
corporibus ex compage viscerum 
ac vigore membrorum vim senti- 
endi existere. Lact. Opif. D. 
c. 16: ‘ Aristox. dixit, mentem 
omnino nullam esse, sed quasi 


harmoniam in fidibus ex con- 
structione corporis et compagi- 
bus viscerum vim sentiendi ex- 
istere . . . scilicet ut singularum 
corporis partium firma conjunctio 
membrorumque omnium consen- 
tiensin unum vigor motum illum 
sensibilem faciat animumgue 
concinnet, sicut nervi bene in- 
tenti conspirantem sonum. Et 
sicuti in fidibus, cum aliquid aut 
interruptum aut relaxatum est, 
omnis canendi ratio turbatur et 
solvitur, ita in corpore, cum pars 
aliqua membrorum duxerit vi- 
tium, destrui universa, corruptis- 
que omnibus et turbatis occidere 
sensum eamque mortem vocari.’ 

2 ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 413. 
Aristox. probably stated this 
view in his books on the Pytha- 
goreans ; but what is quoted from 
him by JAMBL. Theol. Arithm. p. 
41, as to the Metempsychosis of 
Pythagoras does not prove that 
Aristox. himself believed in that 
doctrine. 


438 


ARISTOTLE 


soul originates in the concurrence of bodily move- 


ments. 


Along with Aristoxenus his friend and _ fellow- 
disciple! Diceearchus of Messene? is usually classed, 
on account of his views upon the nature of the soul,* 
which he appears to have made even more expressly 


and thoroughly the subject of his investigations.‘ 


He 


also held that the soul has no absolute independent 


1 As to this, see Cro. Tuse. i. 
18, Ad Att. xiii. 32, and supra, 
vol. ii. p. 429, n. 2. 

2 According to SUID. s. v., he 
was the son of Phidias, born at 
Messene in Sicily, a scholar of 
Aristotle, a philosopher, a rhe- 
torician and a geometrician. He 
is often called a Messenian and a 
scholar of Aristotle (eg. CIC. 
Legg. iii. 6, 14; ATHEN. xi. 
460-1, xv. 666, b and a). Why 
THEMISTIUS names him among 
the traducers of Aristotle 
(supra, vol. -i. p. 40, n. 1), it is 
difficult to say; for neither the 
circumstance referred to by MUL- 
LER (Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 225-6) 
that he gave more importance to 
the practical life than Aristotle 
did (see below), nor the fact 
(which OSANN, p. 46, connects 
with this accusation) that Dice- 
archus departed from Aristotle’s 
teaching as to the soul, has any- 
thing to do with their personal 
relations, of which THEMIST. is 
speaking. It is possible that 
THEMIST. or his copyists have 
inserted the wrong name: De- 
mochares, for example, might be 
‘suggested instéad.—We have ho 
further information about Dicze- 
archus, except that he lived in 
the Peloponnesus (Cic. .Ad ‘Att, 


vi. 2) and that he was employed 
by the Macedonian kings to 
measure the heights of mountains 
(PLIN. H. Nat. ii. 65,162), which 
work we know that he did in the 
Peloponnesus, for SUIDASascribes 
to him katayetphoes Tay ev TleAo- 
movviow opav. His learning is 
praised by PLIN. (doc. cit.), by Cic. 
Ad Att. ii. 2 and elsewhere, and 
by VaRro, De FR. R. i. 1 (ef. 
MULLER, ibid. p. 226). His dates 
of birth and death cannot be 
exactly determined. As to his 
life and writings, see OSANN, 
Beitr. ii.1-119; FuuR, Diewarchi 
Messen. que supersunt (Darmst. 
1841); MULLER, Mragm. Hist. 
Gr. ii. 225 sqq., from whom the 
Fragments hereafter cited are 
taken. 

3 Cic. Tuse. i. 18, 41, 22, 51. 

4 We know from Cic. Ad Att. 
xiii. 32,. Tuse. i. 10, 21, 33, TH 
PLUT. Adv. Col. 14, 2, p. 1115, 
that he wrote two works on the 
soul, which were dialogues, one 
laid at Corinth, the other in 
Lesbos. Whether with either of 
these (OSANN, 40-1, suggests the 
Kopiv@iaKds) the work De Interitu 
Hominum (Cic. Off. ii. 5, 16; 
Consol. ix. 351) was identical 
must remain an unsolved pro- 
blem ; but it seems improbable. 














PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 439 


existence of its own, but is merely the result of the 
mixture of material constituents, being in fact nothing 
else than the harmonious union of the four elements in 
a living body: only as it is united to the body accord- 
ingly and diffused through all its parts does the soul 


partake of reality.’ 


It was only, therefore, to be 


expected that he should from this point of view vigor- 


ously combat the belief in immortality.’ 


It is more 


surprising to be told that he believed in’ revelations 


through dreams and ecstatic states.® 


1 Circ. Fuse. i. 10, 21: Dic. 
makes a certain Pherecrates 
maintain, ‘nihil esse omnino 
animum et hoc esse nomen totum 
inane ... neque in homine 
inesse animum vel animam nec 
in bestia; vimque omnem eam, 
qua vel agamus quid vel sentia- 
mus [«lynois and alo@ynois were 
already indicated by ARIST. De 
An. i. 2, 403, b, 25, as the distin- 
guishing marks of the €upvxor], 
in omnibus corporibus vivis 
sequabiliter esse fusam, nec 
separabilem a  corpore esse, 
quippe que nulla sit [cf. 11, 24. 
nihil omnino animum dicat esse], 
nec sit quidquam nisi corpus 
unum et simplex [the body 
alone], ita figuratum ut tempera- 
tione nature vigeat et sentiat ;’ 
Ibid. 18, 41: ‘[Dic.] ne condo- 
luisse quidem unquam videtur, qui 
animum se habere non sentiat ;’ 
22, 51 (v. supra, vol. ii. p. 437, n. 
1, and Acad. ii. 39, 124). SEXxT. 
says he taught Bh elvar thy Wuxhy 
(Pyrrh. ii. 31), pndty elvat airy 
mapa Td was Exov cGua (Math. vii. 
349). ATTICUS, ap. Eus. Praep. 
Er. xv. 9, 5: he soe Tv bAnv 
brécracw Ths Wuxis. JAMBL. ap. 
Stos. Zel. i. 870: the soul was, 


These, however, 


according to Dicsarchus, 7d Th 
poe TUMMEMLYHEVOY, } 7d Tov 
odparos ov, donep 7d eupvxaobar: 
avTh be ah mapoy TH Wuxi Sowep 
imdpxov. (2?) SIMPL. Categ. Schol. 
in Ar. 68,a,26: Au... . Td Mev 
(gov ouvexdpes elva:, Thy dé aitlay 
avrov Wuxhv ayipe. NEMES. 
Nat. Hom. p. 68: Atxaiapxos 8 
[Thy Wuxhy alae apuovlay Tay 
Tecodpwy oroxelwy (so also 
PLuT. Plac. iv. 2,5; STOB. Eel. 
i. 796; HERMIAS, Jrris. p. 402), 
which is the same as xpaots ral 
cuugpovia tav oroixelwy. For it 
is not the musical kind of ‘har- 
mony,’ which is meant, but the 
harmonious mixture of the warm, 
cold, moist and dry elements in 
the body. Accordingly he is 
said to have considered the soul 
as dvotcws (which means, not 
immaterial, as OSANN, p. 48, 
translates it, but non-sub- 
stantial). ‘The meaning of TEuR- 
TULL. De An. c. 15 (cf. infra, 
under STRATO) is not clear. 

* Circ. Tuse. i. 31, 77, Lac- 
TANT. Jnstit. vii. 7, 13; and cf. 
next note. 

% Ps.-PLUT. Plac.v.1,4:’Apioro- 
TéAns kal Aix. 7d Kar’ évOovaimoudy 
| -yévos pavrixijs | udvoy maperod-youc: 


440 ARISTOTLE 


ke was doubtless able, like Aristotle,! to reconcile with 
his doctrine of the soul by means of a natural ex- 
planation.” That he was no friend of divination and 
the priestly arts of prophecy can easily be gathered 
from the fragments of his work upon the Cave of Tro- 
phonius.* | | 
Connected with Dicearchus’s view of the soul is 
his assertion that the practical life is superior to the 
theoretic.4| One who held, as he did, that the soul was 
inseparably united to the body could not ascribe to that 
activity of thought in which it withdraws from all that 
is external in order to become absorbed in itself, the 
same value as, Plato and Aristotle, following out their 
view of the nature of mind, had done. Conversely, one 
who found the highest activity of the soul only in the 
practical side of life must necessarily have been all the 
more ready to conceive of it as not in its nature 
separable from the bodily organs, but as the operative 


force that pervades them. 


kal Tous dvelpous, &Odvarov mev elvat 
ov vouicovTes Thy Wuxhv, Belov Sé 
Twos meTéxev avThy. Similarly 
in Cic. Divin. i, 3, 5, 50, 113. Cf. 
ibid. ii. 51,10: ‘magnus Dice- 
archi liber est, nescire ea [que 
ventura sint] melius esse, quam 
scire.’ 

* Cf. supra, vol. ii. pp. 76, 328. 

* The proposition (PsEUDO- 
PLUT. in the last note but one) 
that the soul has something 
divine, would not stand in his 
way, for even Democritus (ZBLL. 
Ph. d. Gr. i. 812-3) admits as 
much. It is, however, question- 
able whether the Placita have 
any right to couple Diczarchus 


But Dicezearchus demands 


with Aristotle in this connection. 
Certainly we cannot ascribe to 
him what Cic. Divin. i. 50, 1138, 
says as to the loosing of the 
soul from the body in sleep and 
in excitement, and, in fact, 
Cicero does not name Diczearchus 
for his view. 

8 Fr. 71-2, ap. ATHEN. Xiv. 
641, e, xiii. 594, e; cf. OSANN, 
p. 107 sqq. 

* Cio, Ad, Att. ii, AGB 
‘quoniam tanta controversia est 
Dicearcho, familiari tuo, cum 
Theophrasto, amico meo, ut ille 
tuus Tov mpakricdy Bioy longe om- 
nibus anteponat, hic autem Toy 
Oewpntixdy.’ Cf, ibid, vii. 3. 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 441 


that just as this psychic force penetrates the whole 
body, the moral force should manifest itself throughout 
the whole of human life: it is not the lecture that 
makes the philosopher ; it is not the public oration or 
the official business that makes the statesman; but the 
philosopher is he who carries his philosophy into every 
circumstance and action of his lifé, the statesman he 
who dedicates his whole life to the service of the 
people.' 

With this strong practical bent Diczearchus naturally 
found political studies especially attractive ; and accord- 
ingly we hear, not only generally that he gave special 
attention to these,? but also that he wrote accounts of 
Greek Constitutions ; * particularly we know that in his 
Tripoliticus—a development of Aristotelian ideas *—he 
proposed a combination of the three pure forms of con- 
stitution (democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy) as 
the best, and pointed to Sparta as an example of this 
combination.®> Beyond this we know hardly anything 





1 This is the leading idea of 
the passage in PLUT. An seni $. 
ger. resp. c. 26, p. 796, of which 
we may assume that its general 
content belongs to Diczarchus 
and not merely the single sen- 
tence kal yap To’s év Tais oroais 
avaxdurrovras mepimareivy gacty, 
as deve Atxalapxos, obxért 5& Tos 
eis &ypdy 2) pirov BadiGovras. The 
meaning of that sentence will 
then be as follows: as people use 
the word -epimareiy only of 
walking, which is done directly 
for the sake of movement, so 
they commonly use the words 
pirocopeiy and modArrevecOa only 
of those activities which expressly 
and directly serve a philosophic 


or a political aim; but the one 
use is as incorrect as the other. 

2 Cro. Legg. iii. 5, 14. 

$Cic. Ad Att.: ii, 2 (cf. 
OSANN, p. 13 sqq.) names ac- 
counts by him of the Constitu- 
tions of Pella, Corinth, and 
Athens, which probably were 
parts of a general History of 
Constitutions, if not indeed of the 
Blos ‘EAAddos (infra); SUID. says 
that his modArrela Zmapriarav 
(which may also have been part 
of the Tripoliticus) was publicly 
read in Sparta every year. 

* Cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 230 sq, 
and especially pp. 278 sqq. 

5 That this was the main idea 
of the Tprrodrtiuds and that 


442 


of Diczarchus’s political philosophy.' 


ARISTOTLE 


We may pass 


over the fragments of his numerous writings upon 
history, geography, and the development of literature 
and art, especially as the views expressed in them are 
of no particular philosophical interest.? 


CICERO,who studied and admired 
Diczarchus (swpra, vol. ii. p. 440, 
n. 4; Yuse. i. 31, 77, ‘ deliciez 
mez Diczarchus’; Ad Att. ii. 2), 
borrowed from him the theory of 
the amalgamation of these forms 
of Constitution and the idea of 
exhibiting this amalgamation in 
a working polity, and that pro- 
bably POLYB. vi. 2-10 also follows 
Diczarchus, has been shown by 
OSANN, ibid. p. 8 sqq., who, 
however, is wrong in treating as 
genuine the political Fragments 
of Archytas and Hippodamus, 
and in citing in support of his 
view PLUT. Qu. Conv. viii. 2, 2, 
3, p. 718, where Diczarchus is 
merely speaking of the combina- 
tion of Socratic and Pythagorean 
elements in Plato. This infer- 
ence assumes the highest degree 
of probability when we observe 
that PHoT. Bibl. Cod. 37, p. 8, a 
(following some scholar of the 
sixth century) speaks of efdes 
moditetas Sikasapxikoy, which con- 
sists in an amalgamation of the 
three kinds of constitution, and 
is the best kind of government, 
and that (according to Fr. 23° b. 
ATHEN. iv. 141, a) the 7ripoli- 
ticus contained an exact descrip- 
tion of the Spartan Phiditia, and 
when we compare with these 
data the fashion in which both 
Cicero in the Republic (e.g. i. 29, 
45-6, and ii. 28, 39) and Polybius 
loc. cit. deal with the subject. 
OSANN also suggests (p. 29 sqq.) 
that the work for which Cic. 


Ad Att. xiii. 32 says he wishes to 
make use of the WTripoliticus, 
was the ‘ De Gloria.’ 

1 Direct information on this 
head we have none, except the 
remark (cited by PLUT. Qu. Conv. 
iv. Procem. p. 659), that we should 
seek the good will of all, but the 
friendship of the good. We 
gather from PorpPH. De Abst tr. 
1, 2 (see next note), and from 
the saying (Cio. Off. ii. 5, 16, 
Consol. ix. 351 Bip.) that many 
more men have been ruined by 
the hands of men than by wild 
beasts or catastrophes of nature, 
that Dic. denounced’ war. 
According to PorpH. ibid. it 
seems that Dic. (like Theo- 
phrastus) saw even in the custom 


of slaughtering animals, the 
commencement of a downward 
tendency. 


? His views as to the conical 
form of the earth (F. 53; 
PLIN. H. N. ii. 65, 162) and the 
eternity of the world and of the 
races of men and animals are 
purely Aristotelian (Fr. 3, 4 ap. 
Cens. Di. Nat. c. 4; VARRO, 
FR. Rust. ii. 1); and inasmuch as 
he strove (using the myth of the 
rule of Kronos) torepresent with 
much intelligence the original 
condition of mankind and the 
gradual transition from a primi- 
tive state of nature to pastoral 
life (with which began the 
eating of flesh and war) and the 
further advance to an agricul- 
tural life (77. 1-5, b; PoRPH. 











PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 448 


Of another Peripatetic known to us by name, 
Phanias,' the friend and fellow-citizen of Theophrastus, 
we possess only isolated statements upon history and 
science.” The same is true of Clearchus of Soli;* since 
although among his writings, so far as they are known 
to us,‘ none are historical,’ yet almost all the quotations 
from them which we possess relate to history, and these 
are for the most part so paltry and insignificant,’ and 


De Abdstin. iv. 1, 2, p. 295-6; 
Hieron. Adv. Jovin. Il. t. iv. b, 
205, Mart.; CENSOR. c. 4; 
VaRRO, #. £&. ii. 1, i. 9) he must, 
like Aristotle and Theophrastus 
(supra, vol. ii. pp. 30 sq. 378 sq.), 
have supposed that the history of 
human civilisation moved in a 
settled cycle. 

’ Our information as to the 
life of this man (from SUID. 8. #. ; 
STRABO, xiii. 2, 4, p. 618; PLUT. 
Themist. c. 13 ; AMMON. in Categ., 
Schol. in Ar, 28, a, 40) is limited 
tothe statements that he belonged 
to Eresos, that he was ascholar of 
Aristotle, and lived in and after 
Ol. 111 (in Ol, 111, 2, Aristotle 
returned from Macedonia to 
Athens). DIOGENES, v. 37, quotes 
a letter which ‘Theophrastus, 
when he was advanced in age, 
wrote to this Phanias, de quo cf. 
also Schol. in Apoll. Rhod. i. 972. 

2 We hear of various historical 
works of Phanias; a-work 7. 
mwoint@y, another on the Socratics 
(which may have dealt with other 
philosophers also); a book pds 
Tovs copioras, of which the pds 
Addwpoy (Diodorus Kronus) was 
perhaps a and a ™. guTéy, 
to which the matter cited by 
Pun. H. Nat. xxii. 13, 35 from 
‘Phanias the physicist’ may have 
belonged. He is also said to 


have written works on Logic 
(AMMON, ibid., and v. supra, vol. 
i. p.64,n.1). The information 
which exists about these texts, and 
the fragments of them which are 
preserved, have been collected by 
VoIsiIn (De Phania Eres. Gand. 
1824) and after him by MULLER, 
Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 293 sqq. 

* Heisoften called ZoAeds; and 
that the Cyprian, not the Cilician, 
Soli is meant, is clear (as many 
have observed, and as MULLER, 
ibid. 302, maintains against VER- 
RAERT, De Clearcho Sol. Gand. 
1828, p. 3-4) from ATHEN. vi. 256, 
c.e.f. We know nothing more 
about his life, except that he 
was a scholar of Aristotle. (See 
notes on next page.) 

4 See the list and Fragm. 
apud VBRRAERT and MULLER, 
ubi supra. 

5 Even the z. Bley, which 
seems to have been his chief 
work, and from which we have 
citations of books 1, 2,3, 4 and 
8, cannot have been, if we are 
to judge by these Fragments, a 
biographical work, but only a 
discussion of the value of differ- 
ent kinds of lives: cf. MULLUR, 
ibid. p. 302. 

6 This cannot be wholly due 
to the fact that we owe the cita- 
tions to a gossip like Athenzeus, 


444 ARISTOTLE 


exhibit so little critical power, while Clearchus’s own 
conjectures are so devoid of taste,' that they give us 
but a mean opinion of their author’s powers. Generally 
it may be said that what we know of him is little fitted 
to establish the assertion that he is second to none of 
the Peripatetics,? although, on the other hand, it must 
be confessed that we do not know what those departures 
from the true Peripatetic doctrine were with which 
Plutarch charges him.? Besides a few unimportant 
scientific assertions, and a discussion of the different 
kinds of riddles,> some hints as to his views upon 
ethics can be extracted from the fragments of Clearchus: 
these, however, merely amount to the statements that 
luxury and extravagance are in the highest degree repre- 
hensible,® although, on the other hand, Cynic and Stoic 
indifference to external circumstances are far from 


' K.g. his explanation of the 
myth of the egg of Leda, ap. 
ATHEN. ii. 57, e: ‘the ancients in 
place of irepgoy used gdy simply, 
and so, since Helen was begotten 
in a dmepgov, the story,arose that 
she came out of an egg’ !—his 
statement, ap. DiIoG. i. 81, as to 
Pittacus (evidently founded only 
on the well-known verse ap. 
PuLutr. VII. Sap. Conv. c. 14, p. 
157, e): TolTm yuuvacia Fv cirov 
aAeiv—and his idea that (Fr. 60 
ap. Miller) the man-eating 
steeds of Diomedes meant his 
daughters ! 

2 JOSEPH. C. Apion. i. 22, ii. 
454 Haverc.: KA. 6 ’ApiorotéAous 
dy pabnrihs kal rev ex Tod mepimd- 
Tov pirocdpwv oddevds dedrepos. 
ATHEN. xv. 701, c.: KA. 6 Sodeds 
ovdevds devrEpos Tav Tod scopod 


*"AptororéAous pabntav. 

3 De Fac. Lun, 2, 5, p. 920: 
iuérepos yap 6 avhp, "AptororéAous 
TOU TaAaLod yeyorws cuvhOns, €i Kar 
TOAAG TOU wepimdTou mapéerpeer. 

* Fr. 7-74, a, 76, 78; cf. 
SPRENGEL, Gesch. d. Arzneik. 
(fourth edition) ; vy. RosENBAUM, 
i. 442-3. 

5 Fr. 63, apud ATHEN. x. 
448, c. cf. PRANTL, Gesch. d. Log. 
i. 399 sq. 

6 So Clearchus, in his 7. Biwv, 
had recounted the numerous 
examples of. these failings and 


their consequences, which 
ATHENZUS cites from him 
(Fragm. 3-14, cf. Fr. 16-18, 


21-23); and, on the other hand 
(fr. 15, ap. ATHEN. xii. 548, d), 
named Gorgias to prove the 
wholesome effects of moderation. 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: EUDEMUS, ETC. 445 


praiseworthy ;' that a sharp distinction must be drawn 
- between friendship and flattery ;? that passionate and 
unnatural love should be avoided,* and such like. On 
the whole, Clearchus gives us the impression rather of a 
versatile and well-read, though somewhat superficial, 
man of letters,‘ than of a scholar and philosopher. 
Among the pupils of Aristotle is sometimes reckoned 
Heraclides of Pontus. It has already been re- 
marked,” however, that neither the chronology nor the 
character of his doctrines is favourable to this assump- 
tion, although his learned efforts show that he was 
certainly closely akin to the Peripatetic school. 
Aristotle’s influence may have had a more decided 
effect upon the orator and poet Theodectes, who died, 





however, before 


' Apud ATHEN. xiii. 611, b, 
he distinguishes (apparently in 
opposition to the Cynics and per- 
haps to the Stoics also) between 
Bios Kaprepuds and the Blos 
kuvikds. 

2 Cf. Fr. 30, 32 (ATHEN. vi. 
255, b, xii. 533, e) with the bold 
sketch of a young and weak 
Prince ruined by flattering cour- 
tiers, &c. Fr. 25-6 (ATHEN. vi. 
255, c. 258, a). 

8 Fr, 34-36(ATHEN., xiii. 573, 
_a, 589, d, 605, d, e). 

* The conversation between 
Aristotle and a Jew reported by 
Clearchus (/’r. 69, ap. JOSEPH. 
C. Apion. i. 22), may be regarded 
as a literary invention, together 
with the accompanying explana- 
tion that the Jews derived their 
philosophy from India. The 
book cited (7. érvov, de quo Bur- 


Alexander’s 
Several other Aristotelians, such as 


Persian expedition.® 


Callisthenes,? 


NAYS, Abh. d. Hist.-philos. Ge- 
sellsch. in Breslau, i. 1858, 190, 
‘Theophr. tib. Frémmigk.’ 110, 
187) need not, from our extant 
information as to Clearchus, be 
considered spurious. 

° Supra, vol. ii. p. 387, n. 1, p. 
433 sqq.; cf. ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 
p. 843, n. 1. 

6 On this writer, who is often 
quoted by Aristotle,and of whom 
we have suggested (supra, vol. i. 
p- 72, n., following PLU’. Alea, ¢. 
17) that he was with Aristotle in 
Macedonia, see WESTERMANN’S 
Gesch. d. Beredsamk. bei d. 
Griech. u. Rim. i. 84, A, 6, 142, 
A, 21, and supra, vol. i. p. 40, 
n. 2, p. 72. 

? This kinsman and scholar 
of Aristotle is referred to supra, 
vol. i. p. 22, n. 1 ad fin. (see also 
VALER. MAX. vii. 2, ext. 8, Surp. 


446 


ARISTOTLE 


Leo of Byzantium,! and Clytus,? are known to us 
only as writers on history, Meno® only as the author 


of a history of pharmacology.‘ 


Of a theological work 


of Hipparchus“of Stagira only the title has come 


down to us.° 


Of those who are not accredited with 


any written or oral teaching of their own, we need say 


nothing.® 


KadA.o8.), and as to his death, see 
supra, Vol. i. p.32sqq. Further 
information about him and his 
writings will be found in GEIER, 
Alex. Hist. Script. 191 sqq. ; 
MULLER, Script. Rer. Alea. 1 sqq. 

1 The little we can glean of 
this historian (whom SUID. Aéwy 
Bu¢. confounds with an earlier 
politician of Byzantium of the 
same name) from SvuID. tbid., 
ATHEN, xii. 553-1, and PSEUDO- 
Puut. De Filuv. 2, 2, 24, 2, is set 
out in MULLER, Fragm. Hist. 
Gr. ii. 328-9. 

2 ATHEN. xiv. 655, b, xii. 540, 
c; Dioc. i. 25; MULLER, ibid. 
333. 

8 GALEN, in Hippocr. de Nat. 
Hom. vol. xv. 25-26 K., says this 
physician was a scholar of Ari- 
stotle’s, and wrote an iatpiky 
guvaywyh in several books, erro- 
neously ascribed to Aristotle him- 
self. It is clear that this was an 
historical collection of medical 
theories, both from the title 
(which is the equivalent of the 
Texvay cuvaywyh supra, vol. i. p. 
73, n. 1), and also from the 
remark of Galen, that he had used 


for this work all the writings of 
earlier physicians then extant. 

4 Of the historian Marsyas 
(supra, vol. i. p. 22, n. 1) we can- 
not tell whether and how far he 
adhered to the Peripatetic phi- 
losophy. 

5 SUID. “Immapx. (cf. LOBECK, 
Aglaoph. 608) names a work of 
his: ti 7d &ppey Kal O7AV Tapa 
ODeois kal tis 6 yduos, Kal AAG Tivd, 

§ Including Adrastus of Phi- 
lippi (STEPH. Byz. De Urb, bidur- 
mot); Echecratides of Methymna 
(STEPH. Byz. MfOuura); King 
Cassander (PLUT. Alew. c. 74); 
Mnason of Phocis (ATHEN. Vi. 
264, d.; AULIAN, V. H. iii. 19); 
Philo, whom, according to ATHEN. 
xiii. 610-11, and DioG. v. 38, 
Sophocles, the author of the law 
referred to supra, vol. ii. p. 350, 
n. 4, indicted for an offence 
against the constitution; the 
Eucairos named supra, vol. i. p. 
97 (cf. Hettz, Verl. Schr. 118 - 
19), and the ‘Plato’ named by 
Diog. iii. 109. Antipater was 
Aristotle’s friend, but not his 


pupil. 











447 


CHAPTER XX 
SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS : STRATO 


Wir the majority of those who belonged to the 


school of Theophrastus, the literary and _ historical 
tendency seems also to have been the predominating 
one. Most of those who are mentioned as belong- 
ing to it have confined themselves in their literary 
labours to history, the history of literature, ethics, po- 


litics, and rhetoric. 


This is true of Demetrius of Pha- 


lerus, distinguished as a scholar and statesman ;! of 


' OSTERMANN bas studied his 
life in the most thorough manner 
in De Demetrii Phal. Vita, &c., 
published (Part I.) Hersf. 1847, 
and (Part Il.) Fulda, 1857; the 
titles and fragments of his writ- 
ings are given by himin Part II., 
and by Herwic, Ueber Demetr. 
Phal. Schriften, &c., Rinteln, 
1850. Born about the middle of 
the fourth century (Ost. i. 8), 
and probably while Aristotle was 
still alive, DEMETRIUS studied 
under Theophrastus (C1c. Brut. 
9, 37, Fin. v. 19, 54, Legg. iii. 
6, 14, Off.i. 1,3; Dio. v. 75), 
and (according to DEMETR. 
MAGN. apud Dio. v. 75) he 
made his first appearance as a 


popular orator about the time: 


that Harpalus came to Athens, i.e. 
about 324 B.c. On the termina- 
tion of the Lamian War he seems, 


with Phocion, to have played 
some part as one of the chiefs 
of the Macedonian aristocratic 
party, for when, after Antipater’s 
death (318 B.C.), the opposition 
party came into power for a 
while, and Phocion was executed, 
Demetrius also was tried and 
condemned to death (PLuT. Phoe. 
35). He escaped his sentence, 
however, by flight, and when, in 
the following year, Cassander 
made himself master of Athens, 
he handed over to Demetrius the 
direction of the State under an 
oligarchical republican constitu- 
tion. For ten years Demetrius 
occupied this position, and even if 
it be admitted that his rule may 
not have been blameless, he did 
most important service for the 
prosperity and order of Athens. 
He is accused of vanity, hanghti- 


448 


ARISTOTLE 


Duris,! and his brother Lynceus? of Chameeleon,’? and 


ness, and immorality by DuRIs 
and DIYLLUS, ap. ATHEN. Xii. 
542, b sqq. xiii. 593, e, f (though 
AXLIAN, V. H. ix. 9, transfers 
the statement to Demetrius 
Poliorcetes); but the untrust- 
worthiness of Duris and the 
animus of his statements lead us 
to suppose a high degree of 
exaggeration. When Demetrius 
Poliorcetes, in 307 B.c., took the 
Pirzeus, an insurrection broke out 
in Athens against Demetrius 
Phal. and Cassander’s party. 
Protected by Poliorcetes, he 
escaped to Thebes, and finally, 
after Cassander’s death (Ol. 120, 
2, 298-99 B.c.}, went to Egypt. 
Here Ptolemy Lagiaccorded him 
an honourable and influential 
position, in which he was spe- 
cially active in founding the 
Alexandrian library (OST. i. 26- 
64: who, however, on p. 64 makes 
a very improbable suggestion, 
ibid. ii. 2 sqq.; cf. GRAUERT, 
Hist. u. phil. Analckten, i. 310 
sqq.; DROYSEN, Gesch. d. Fel- 
lenism. ii. b, 106 sqq). After 
the death of this prince (and 
according to HERMIPP. apud 
Diog. v. 78 immediately after, 
which would be 283 BC.) Pto- 
iemy Philadelphus, whose suc- 
cession Demetrius had opposed, 
banished him to a place in the 
country, where he lived some 
time as a political prisoner, and 
where he eventually died from 
the bite of an adder (Cic. Pro 
Rabir. Post. 9, 23, says this was 
a suicide; but HERMIPP., wt 
supra, states it as an accident). 
CICERO speaks very highly of 
his talents as an orator and as a 
scholar (see Brut. 9,37 sq. 82, 
285, Orat. 27, 92, De Orat. ii. 


23, 95, Offe. i. 1, 3, ‘and ‘cf: 
QUINT. Jnst. x. 1, 33, 80, and 
Diog. v. 82), although he does 
not find in his speeches the fire 
and the power of the great 
orators of free Athens. That he 
brought about the translation 
of the so-called Septuagint is 
palpably a fable, as to which 
OSTERMANN ought not to have 
credited the lying Aristzeus (ii. 9 
sqq. 46-7). So also the work on 
the Jews is a forgery, although 
both HERWIG (pp. 15-16), and 
OSTERMANN (ii. 32-3), have 
accepted it. 

1 All we know of DuRIs is 
that he was a Samian and a 
pupil of Theophrastus (see 
ECKERTZ’s account of him, De 
Duride Sam. Bonn, 1846; MUL- 
LER, Mragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 466 
sqq. and ATHEN. iv. 128,a). To 
detine the exact date of his life- 
time (cf. MULLER, bid.) is not 
possible. According to ATHEN. 
viii. 327, d, he had, at some 
period, governed bis native town, 
but when we cannot say. His 
untrustworthiness in historical 
matters is very unfavourably 
criticised in PLUT. Pericl. 28. 
That this criticism is borne out 
by what we know of the state- 
ments citedfrom DURIS, ECKERTZ 
has amply proved. Nor is his 
literary talent highly thought of 
either by PHot. Cod. 176, p. 121, 
a, 41 sqq., or by Dionys. Comp. 
Verb. v. 28 R. 

2 See ATHEN. tbid. A list of 
his writings is given by MULLER, 
ibid. p. 466. 

3 See KOPKE, De Chameleonte 
Peripatetico, Berl. 1856. Of him 
also we know but little. He was 
a native of Heraclea in Pontus 














SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 449 


Praxiphanes.! 


Even from the ethical writings of these 


men, however, nothing has come down to us of a 
philosophical character.? Of a few other disciples of 


(ATHEN. iv. 184, d, viii. 338, b, 
ix. 374, a, &c.), and is probably 
the same person as he whose 
courageous answer to king Seleu- 
cus is mentioned by MEMNON 
(apud Puor. Cod. 224, p. 626, a). 
He is described as a Peripatetic 
by TATIAN, Ad Gr. 31, p. 269, a: 
and the circumstance that his 
book z. 750r7%s was attributed 
also to Theophrastus (cf. ATHEN. 
vi. 273, e, viii. 377, e) corrobo- 
rates that description. From this 
circumstance KOPKE (p. 34) 
concludes that Chamzleon was 
in fact a pupil of Theophrastus. 
He may, however, have been bis 
co-disciple, since he (apud 
D10G. v. 92) criticised his com- 
patriot Heraclides, who was one 
of Plato’s elder pupils (ZELL. 
Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 842, 2) for a 
plagiarism.— Besides Chameleon 
we have also a mention by 
TATIAN, in the same passage 
(cf. also ATHEN. xii. 513, b, 
EvusTaTH. in Ji. a’, p. 84, 18, 
SuID. ’A@nvalas, and HESYCH. 
*AOnva), of a Peripatetic named 
MEGACLIDES (or Metacl.) from 
whose work on Homer a critical 
remark is cited. 

' Described as éraipos Ocoppda- 
tov, by PROCL.in Zim. 6, c. Ac- 
cording to this passage he objected 
to the beginning of the Timaus ; 
according to TZETZEs, in Hesiod. 
Opp. et Di. v. 1, he considered 
the introduction to this book as 
spurious. STRABO, xiv. 2, 13, p. 
655, calls him a Rhodian, and 
EPIPHAN. Zap. Fid. 1094, a, 
adds that his doctrine was in 


VOL. I. 


accord with that of Theophrastus. 
Whether he is the same person as 
the Praxiphanes described as a 
Peripatetic and Grammarian, to 
whom Callimachus dedicated a 
work (BEKKER’s Anec, ii. 729, 
where, however, our text gives 
map’ ‘“Efipdvous ; seealso ARAT, ed. 
Buhle, ii. 432), is uncertain (as 
ZuMPtT, Abh. d. Berl. Ahad. v. J. 
1842, Hist.-phil. Kl. p. 91, has 
remarked), inasmuch as CLEM. 
Strom. i. 309, says that a Myti- 
lenean named Praxiphanes was 
the first person who was called 
ypaumarinds. Nevertheless, it 
seems probable that it is one and 
the same person who is intended 
in all these passages.— A pupilof 
Praxiphanes, named PLATO, is 
mentioned by Drog. iii. 109, and 
expressly distinguished by him 
from the other Plato referred to 
supra, Vol. ii. p. 466, n. 6. 

* Of PRAXIPHANES we know 
nothing at all except what is 
stated in the text.— Of the eight 
works of DuRIs known to us, 
the most important were un- 
doubtedly the three historical 
ones (the Greek and Macedonian 
Historiez, the Agathocles, and 
the Samian Chronicles). Four 
other works treated of festival 
plays, of tragedy, of painters, 
and of sculpture. The work m. 
véunwv may have been philosophi- 
cal, but we have from it nothing 
but two mythological notes.— 
From Lynceus, who was a writer 
of comedies and also a gourmet, 
and author of a book on the art 
of cookery (ATHEN., iv. p. 131-2, 


GG 


450 


Theophrastus some 


ARISTOTLE 


are known to us only by name,! 


while others hardly merit the title of philosophers.? 
Much more important asa contributor to philosophy 


vi. p. 228 c¢, vii. p. 8313-4; cf. iv. 
p. 128, a), ATHENZUS, in his 
numerous quotations (see the 
Index to ATHEN. and MULLER, 
ibid.), and PLUT. Demetr. c. 27, 
Schol. Theoer. to iv. 20, give us 
only a few notes and stories, 
chiefly about cookery.—Of the 
sixteen writings of CHAMA- 
LEON which KOPKE, p. 15 sqq., 
enumerates, twelve related to the 
epic, lyric, comic, and tragic 
poets, and were concerned merely 
with literary history. Only a 
few unimportant historical re- 
marks have reached us from the 
IIporperrixos and the treatises 7. 
heOns, mw. Ndoviis, m. Seay (see 
KOPKE, p. 36 sqq.: the citations 
are to be found in ATHENZUS, 
passim, in CLEMENS ALEX. Strom. 
i. 300 A, in BEKKER, Anecd. i. 
233, and D104. iii. 46).—DEME- 
TRIUS was one of the most fertile 
authors of the Peripatetic school, 
and besides the forty-five works 
of his which Diog. v. 80 men- 
tions, we hear of others. OSTER- 
MANN (op. cit. ii. p. 21 sqq.) and 
HERWIG (op.cit.p.10sqq.) identify 
fifty writings, some of them com- 
prising several books; from this 
list, however, must be withdrawn, 
in any case, those on the Jews 
(see supra, vol.ii. p.447,n.1) and 
perhaps those on the Egyptians 
(see OSTERMANN,p. 34). Amongst 
the genuine writings there were 
a good many treatises on moral 
subjects (including the eight 
Dialogues, which appear to have 
been of this class), as well as two 
books on statecraft, and one =. 


vouwv. There were also historical, 
grammatical and literary re- 
searches, a Rhetoric, acollection of 
speeches, which Cicero must have 
known, and another collection of 
letters. Nevertheless, out of all 
this mass of literary matter 
nothing, except a quantity of his- 
torical and grammatical scraps 
and a few insignificant remarks 
of moral and political interest, 
has come down tous. (Fr. 6- 
15, 38-40, 54, OSTERMANN, from 
Dog. v. 82, 83; Stos. Floril. 8, 
20, 12,18; PLUT. Cons. ad Apoll. 
c. 6, p. 104; DioDoR. Hae. Vatie. 
libr. xxxi., also five in MAr’s 
Nova Collect. ii. 81, POLYB. Fre. 
l. xxx. 3, ibid. 434 sq., Hee. 1. 
XXXivV.-xxxvil. 2, ibid. 444; ibid. 
x. 22, RuTiL. Lupus, De Fig. 
Sent. i. 1.) 

1 This is so of all the men 
who are named in the Will of 
Theophrastus (DioG. v. 52-3; 
cf. supra, ii. p. 350, n. 5) to suc- 
ceed Strato in the enjoyment of 
the ground bequeathed by him 
for the School, i.e. HIPPARCHUS, 
NELEUS (supra, vol. i. p. 137, 
and p. 139, n. 3), CALLINUS, DE- 
MOTIMUS, DEMARATUS, CALLIS- 
THENES, MELANTHES, PANCREON, 
NicIPPus; thesame may besaidof 
NicoMACHUS and the three sons 
of Pythias (cf. swpra, vol. i. p. 20, 
n. 3 ad fin., and SEXT. Math. i. 
258),PROCLES, DEMARATUS, ARI- 
STOTLE; and of Theophrastus’s 
slave, POMPYLUS (D10G. v. 36). 

2 Like MENANDER, the comic 
poet, who is also said to have 
been a pupil of Theophrastus. 











SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 4651 


is Strato of Lampsacus, the successor of Theophrastus, ' 
and the only one of his pupils of whom it is known that 
he followed out with success the scientific lines laid 
down by him and by Aristotle? After Theophrastus 
he is the most distinguished of all the Peripatetics,’ a 


' Strato, a native of Lam- 
psacus (D106. v. 58, &c., Aauwarn- 
vos is one of the epithets com- 
monly used with his name) was 
a pupil of Theophrastus (ibid. 
Cic. Acad. i. 9, 34, Fin. v. 5, 13. 
SIMPL. Phys. 187, a, 225, a, &c.). 
He succeeded him as chief of the 
School, held that post for eighteen 
years, and died (ibid. p. 68) in 
Ol. 127, between 270 and 268 B.c. 
If, as Dioa. ibid. says, he was 
really the teacher of Ptolemy 
' Philadelphus (who was called 

to govern along with his father 
in 285 B.c., and succeeded him on 
the throne in 283 B.c.) he must 
have stayed some time at the 
Egyptian court, to which he may 
‘possibly have been invited on 
the suggestion of Demetrius 
Phalereus. His letters (or letter) 
to Arsinoé, Ptolemy’s sister and 
wife (quoted by Drioc. p. 60), 
would lead us to suppose that 
such was the case. The story 
that his princely pupil gave him 
eighty talents, DioG. himself 
tells only witha gaol. His will, 
however (apud D104. p. 61 sqq.), 
shows him to be a wealthy man. 
He left in his testament the 5:a- 
TptBh (the garden and club-house 
of the School), with all arrange- 
ments necessary for the Syssitia, 
and his library, with the excep- 
tion of his own MSs., to Lyco; 
the rest of his property he left to 
Arcesilaus, a namesake, either a 
son or a nephew of Strato’s 


father.—For other details, cf. 
NAUWERCH, De Stratone Lam- 
psaceno, Berl. 1836; KRiscHe, 
Forschungen Se ,p. 349 sqq.; and 
see also BRANDIS, iii. p. 394 sqq. 

* Erasistratus, the celebrated 
physician, was also considered by 
many as one of Theophrastus’s 
pupils (DrioG. v. 57; see also 
GALEN, Nat. Facult. ii. 4, vol. 
ii. 88, 90-1, K., De Sang. in 
<rter. c. 7, vol. iv. 729, as the 
assertion of the followers of Era- 
sistratus). This is not improb- 
able, but according to GALEN 
(Nat. Facult. ii. 4, ibid. in Hip- 
pocr. de Alim, iii. 14, vol. xv. 
307-8, and cf. De Tremore, c. 6, 
vol. vii. 614) his doctrine differed 
in mauy ways from that of the 
Peripatetics. He even affirmed 
ovdéy dp0as eyvweévar mepl picews 
Tovs weprmarnticods, It appears 
that it is only in the acknow- 
ledgment of the complete tele- 
ology of nature (whereon cf. 
GALEN, Nat. Facult. ii. 2, vol. ii. 
78, 81) that he agreed with them ; 
and even to this he did not 
always adhere. So far as we 
know, he never made any inde- 
pendent philosophical researches; 
see SPRENGEL, Gesch. d. Arzneik, 
4th. ed.; ROSENBAUM, i. p.321 sqq. 

* Cf. following note; and 
D10G. v. 58: avip eAAoymeéraros 
kal puaoixds emixAndels amd Tod wep) 
Thy Oewplay tairny map’ dytwovy 
emmcrAcorara diarerpipévat, SIMPL, 
Phys. 225, a; rots adpieros Mepi- 


6a 2 


452 


ARISTOTLE 


position which he merited not only by the extent of his 
knowledge and his writings, but also still more by the 
acuteness and independence of his thought, for he sur- 
passed Theophrastus himself in the originality of his 
scientific labours.! His numerous writings, which seem 
to have aimed rather at the thorough investigation of par- 
ticular questions than at a systematic and comprehensive 
treatment of the subject, extend over the whole field of 


philosophy.” 


marntiKols apiduovpevos. Kven 
Cicero, who was not at all well 
disposed to Strato, calls him, in 
Fin.v.5, 13, ‘[in physicis] magnus,’ 
and in Acad. i. 9, 34 praises his 
‘acre ingenium.’ Nevertheless, 
his school was not so much fre- 
quented as that of Menedemus 
(of Eretria), as to which STRATO 
(apud Puut. Tranqu. An. 13, p. 
472) consoles himself with the 
remark: ti ov Oavuaordy, et 
aAelovés eiow of AoverOar OéAovTeEs 
Tav arelperbat BovAomevay ; 

1 This independence, of which 
we shall find several proofs, was 
also recognised by the ancients ; 
Puut. Adv. Col. 14, 3, p. 1115: 
Tav tAdwy TleperarntinGy 6 Kopv- 
gadtatos Xtpatwy ovr’ *Apioro- 
TéEAEL KATA WOAAA ouuHEepeTat, KC. 
Pseudo-GALEN, Hist. Phil. c. 2, 
p. 228 K.:[’ApiororéAns] tov Srpd- 
Twva mpoohyayey eis tdidy Twa 
xapaktipa pucwrdyws [-tas]. CIC. 
(following Antiochus) Fin. v. 5, 
13, ‘nova pleraque;’ Acad. i. 
9. 34, ‘In ea ipsa [ie. in 
Physics] plurimum discedit a 
suis.” Pourys. Ewe. Libr, xii. 25, 
c. vol. ii, 750 Bekk.: kal yap 
exeivos [Srpdtwv 6 pvoiKds| ray 
eyxeipnon tas Tav wAAwy ddéas 
diaoréAAcoOat Kal Wevdororety Bav- 


But his strong point was the study of 


aos éotiv, Stay 8 e& abTov TL 
mpopéepnta. Kal tt tay idlwy ém- 
vonudtwy eknyirat, mapa mwoAv 
gaiverat Tois émioThuocw evnde- 
orepos attod Kal vwbpdrepos — 
which last statement, however, is 
difficult to accept as unbiassed. 

2 Diog. v. 59-60, gives (be- 
sides the Letters and the irour7- 
pata, the authenticity of which 
was doubted), some forty-four 
writings, to which may be added 
the book zep} rod dvrus mentioned 
by PRocu. in Zim. 242 sq., and- 
also the 7. kwhoews mentioned 
by Simei. Phys. 214, a, and 
225, a. His works may be 
classed as follows: (1) Logic: m. 
Tod dpov. mw. TO mpoTepou ‘yEevous. 
mw, Tov idlov. Témwv mpoolua. (2) 
Metaphysics : m. tod bytos. m. TOU 
mpotepov «at borépov (mentioned 
also by SIMPL. in Categ. 106, a, 
107, a, Schol. in Ar. 89, a, 40,90, 
a, 12). m. Tod maAAov Kal Frrov. 
mw. TOD cuuBeBnkdros. mw. TOD MéA- 
Aovtos. w. Oeav y’. (3) Physics: 
x. spxav y (which treated of 
heat and cold, «c., as physical 
principles). 7. dSuvduewy. m. Tov 
KEevov. ™, xpdvov, 7. KWiTEwS. T. 
plkews. mw. kovpov Kal Bapéos. T. 
TOU ovpavov. mT. TOU TvEvmaTosS. T. 
Xpwudrov. mw. Cworyovias. m. TpUPHS 








— 








SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 458 


Nature, which was pursued by him in a spirit which 
justifies the name, bestowed upon him pre-eminently 


Kal avéhoews. mw. brvov. w évur- 
viev. mw. aicOhoews. mw. dews. Tt. 
TaY dmopouvpévwr Cow. ™. Ta wv80- 
Aoyounévwy (wv. mw. picews ayv- 
Opwrivns. 1. évOovciacpov. T. viowr. 
mT. Kp‘cewy, ™, Awod Kal cKoTacewr. 
(In the case of these three works 
it is possible that there is a con- 
fusion with writings of the 
physician and follower of Erasi- 
stratus presently to be mentioned, 
but it is to be remembered that 
Theophrastus himself wrote 
about vertigo and such subjects. ) 
The Avcoets &ropnudrwy and the 
work 7. aitié@v appear to have 
dealt with certain problems of 
physics; and the book 7m. ray 
METAAALKGY unxavnudtwy also was 
concerned with the mechanical 
side of physics. (4) Lthics: 7. 
Tayabod 7. ©. Hdovijs. m. evdammo- 
vias. m@. Blwy (if this was not an 
historical work). 7. dvdpelas. 7. 
Sixasocivns y'. mw. Gdlkov. mw. Baot- 
Aclas 7. m. Bacthéws pidrogdpov 
(these two works, especially the 
latter, may have been written for 
Ptolemy Philadelphus; it is only 
COBET, however, who gives the 
title mw. Bac. giA., for the earlier 
texts give m. piAogoplas). There 
is, moreover, the work eipnudrwy 
€Aeyxo: 500, which is evidently 
the same as that which CLEMENS, 
Strom. i. 300, A 308, A (and 
EUSEB. Prep. Fr. x. 6,6, quoting 
him) cites by the words év r@ or 
év Tois wept eipnudrwy. PLIN. H. 
Nat. i.; Ind. Libri, vii. (‘ Stratone 
qui contra Ephori edphuara scrip- 
sit’) says it was written against 
Ephorus (probably, however, 
against others as well), and this 
accounts for the title given by 


Diogenes. Strato wished to cor- 
rect the opinions of earlier 
writers on the subject of the 
origin of the various arts. Be- 
sides the above-named works 
(the authenticity of which can- 
not, except to a very limited 
extent,be tested), it would appear 
from GALEN (De Vene Sect. 
adv. Erasistratum 2, vol. xi. 151, 
and De V. 8. adv. Erasistrateos 
2, vol. xi. 197) that we must also 
refer to this philosopher certain 
works on medicine, if the Strato 
named in these passages is in 
fact the same person. D104, v. 61 
expressly makes a distinction be- 
tween the two, and though in this 
heonly follows Demetrius of Mag- 
nesia, there is the less reason to 
doubt his testimony (as Rose, 
De Arist. Lib. Ord. 174, has 
done) since the physician Strato 
is described as a follower of 
Erasistratus, not only by GALEN 
(as is clear in the passages 
already cited and still more clear 
in De Puls. Differ. c. 17, vol. 
viii. 759), but also by ORIBAs. 
Collect. xlv. 23 (ap. MAI, Class. 
Auct. iv. 60), and by ERoTIAN 
(Lea. Hippoer. p. 86, Franz) ; 
while TERTULLIAN, De An. 14, 
contrasts the views of ‘ Strato and 
Erasistratus ‘ with those of Strato 
the philosopher on the question of 
the seat of the soul. If, according 
to Dioa. idid., the physician was 
a personal pupil of Erasistratus, 
he is probably the same as the 
person whom GALEN, De Comp. 
Medic. iv. 3, vol. xii. 749 calls a 
Berytian; cf. on this subject 
SPRENGEL, Gesch. d. Arzneikh, 4, 
559 (ed. 1). 


454° ARISTOTLE 


among all the Peripatetics, of ‘ the Physicist.’! What we 
are told of his contributions to logic and ontology? 
is not very important. On the other hand, the whole 
difference between his point of view and that of Ari- 
stotle becomes at once manifest when we ask how he 
conceived of the principles of existence and change in 
the world. Aristotle had referred these to Nature, which 
in the first instance he conceived as universal efficient 
cause, but also further described as God or the First 
Mover, without, however, clearly defining the relation 


} Examples of the use of this, 
the commonest description ap- 
plied to Strato (as to which see 
generally KRISCHE, Forsch. 351), 
we already have in the notes on 
p.451,n.1,3, sup. Compare also 
Cic. Fin. v. 5, 13: ‘ primum Theo- 
phrasti Strato physicum se voluit, 
in quo etsi est magnus, tamen 
nova pleraque et perpauca de 
moribus.’ This Cic. Acad. i. 9, 
34, says with even less qualifica- 
tion ; and he will not allow that 
Strato should be considered a 
Peripatetic, partly on this account 
and partly on account of the 
variance of his opinions on phy- 
sics. The list of his writings, 
however, gives evidence that he 
did not leave ethics out of ac- 
count. SENECA states the posi- 
tion more justly when he says of 
him (Nat. Qu. vi. 18, 2): ‘hance 
partem philosophizw maxime co- 
luit et rerum natuiz inquisitor 
fuit.’ 

? Weare told by SExt. Math. 
viii. 13, that he did not, like the 


Stoics, distinguish between idea, © 


word, and thing (onuavéyeror, 
onuaivoy, tuyxdvov), but only, 
with Epicurus, between the on- 
Maivoy and the truvyxdvov, and that 


thereby he placed truth and 
error merely in the voice (i.e. in 
the words). ‘The second half of 
this statement is probably merely 
a deduction drawn by Sextus; 
and the first half of it does not 
accurately reproduce _ either 
Strato’s expressions or his mean- 
ing. Strato is further said to 
have given as the definition of 
Being: 1d év éori 7d Tijs diamoris 
atrtov, i.e. he defined it as the 
permanent, element in things 
(PROCL. in Zim. 242, E). We 
see further from SIMPL. in Categ. 
106, a, 107, a sqq. (Schol. in Ar. 
89, a 37, 90, a, 12 sqq.), that he 
distinguished various significa- 
tions of the terms mpérepov and 
dorepov, which SIMPL. ibid. takes 
the trouble to reduce to the five 
which Aristotle reckons in cap. 12 
of the Categories. Finally ALEX. 
Top. 173, and ALD. (Sehol. 281, 
b, 2) criticise an attempt which 
Strato had made to amplify an 
Aristotelian rule (Zop. iv. 4, 125, 
a, 5) for ascertaining the rela- 
tions of subordination between 
two concepts. It is impossible, 
however, to discuss the point 
here. 








SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 4655 


of these two conceptions to one another.' Strato, on 
the other hand—whether because he recognised the 
obscurity and fundamental contradiction in the Ari- 
stotelian view, or because the whole bent of his thought 
was opposed to an external supernatural cause—re- 
nounced the idea of God as a Being separate and distinct 
from the world as a whole, and contented himself with 
‘Nature.’ This itself, however, he was unable otherwise 
to conceive of (agreeing in this with Aristotle *) than 
as a necessary Force operating without consciousness 
and reflection. He regarded the world, as Plutarch 
says,* as a lifeless whole, and all natural phenomena as 
the effect of natural necessity. He was convinced with 
Democritus, in spite of his opposition to his doctrine of 
Atoms, that the explanation of everything must be 
found in gravity and motion, and he is accordingly 
accused by Cicero and others of maintaining that God 
was unnecessary in the constitution of the world.‘ 


1 See supra, vol. i. pp. 388, to be the basis of nature. He 








420 sqq. 

* See supra, vol. i. p. 464, 
n. 1. 

8 Adv. Col. 14, 3, p. 1115 (v. 
sup. vol. ii. p. 452, n, 1): o&7’ ’Api- 
ororéAet KaTa TWOAAA ocumpéeperat 
kal TlAdrat tas évaytias Erxnxe 
Sdégas wept Kwhoews wept vou Kal 
wept Wuxijs Kal epi yevérews * TEA- 
evtay [St] tov Kéopmoy adtdy ov 
(Gov elva gnol, Td St Kara piow 
érecOat TH Kata TUXNV’ apxhv yap 
évdiddvar 7d abréparoy, elta obtTw 
mepaltverat tay gvoiKay malev 
éxacorov. We must guard our- 
selves against believing Plutarch 
(as of Democritus, cf. ZHLLER, 
Ph. d. Gr. i. 788-9) when he tells 
us that Strato held chance (r’x7) 


can only mean that Strato main- 
tained the necessity of nature 
(abrduarov) ; it is Plutarch’s own 
idea to identify this necessity 
with ‘chance,’ because both 
stand equally in antithesis to the 
teleological conception of nature 
(cf. supra, vol. i. pp. 357 sqq.). 

4 Circ. Acad. ii. 38, 121: 
‘ Negas sine Deo posse quidquam, 
ecce tibi e transverso Lampsace- 
nus Strato, qui det isti Deo im- 
munitatem magni quidem mu- 
neris . . . negat opera Deorum 
se uti ad fabricandum mundum, 
Quecunque sint docet omnia esse 
effecta natura: nec ut ille, qui 
asperis et levibus et hamatis un- 
cinatisque corporibus concreta 


456 ARISTOTLE — 


It would be truer to say that his view identified God 
with Nature, in which he saw nothing personal, nothing 
akin to man, but only the universal energy which is 
the source of all change and becoming in things:' and 
on this ground accurate writers represent him as 
denying that the Deity has a sou!,? and holding that 
the heavens and the earth, in other words the universe, 
are God.® 

Passing to his account of natural causes, we find 
that Strato, as already remarked, was unable, in spite 
of his naturalism, to reconcile himself to any such 
mechanical explanation of the world as that of Demo- 
critus,t partly because he found in it no adequate 
explanation of phenomena,* and partly because he held 
that indivisible bodies were as inconceivable as an 


hee esse dicat, interjecto inani. the idea of God... . Kay in- 


Somnia censet hzc esse Demo- 
criti, non docentis, sed optantis. 
Ipse autem singuias mundi partes 
persequens, quidquid sit aut fiat 
naturalibus fieri aut factum esse 
docet ponderibus et motibus.’ 

1 The Epicurean in Cio JW. D. 
i. 13, 35 says: ‘nec audiendus 
ejus [Theophrasti] auditor Strato, 
is qui physicus appellatur; qui 
omnem vim divinam in natura 
sitam esse censet, que causas 
gignendi augendi minuendi 
habeat, sed careat omni sensu 
[consciousness] et figura [7.e. the 
human form of the Epicurean 
gods]. This is repeated almost 
word for word by LACTANT. De 
Ira, D. c. 10 init. and more con- 
cisely by Minuc. FELIX, Octav. 
19, 9: ‘Straton quoque et ipse 
naturam [sc. Deum loquitur].’ 
So likewise MAx. TyR, i. 17, 5 
says that even the atheist has 


adAdéns thy pvow [even if he 
puts nature in God’s place], as 
Srpatwv. 

2 SENECA apud AUGUSTIN. 
Civ. D. vii. 1: ‘ hoe loco dicet 
aliquis . .. ego feram aut 
Platonem aut  Peripateticum 
Stratonem, quorum alter fecit 
Deum sine corpore, alter sine 
animo?’ 

3 TERTULLIAN, Adv. Mare. i. 
13: ‘Strato coelum et terram 
[Deos pronuntiavit].’ 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 455, n. 4. 

5 At any rate this appears to 
be the meaning of Cicero’s © 
‘somnia non docentis sed optan- 
tis’ (supra, vol. li. p. 455, n. 4): 
the atoms are a capricious hypo- 
thesis, of which it is asserted 
and hoped, but not proved, that 
it will explain the facts it was 
invented to explain. 


SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO — 4657 


infinite void.!' The essential causes consist rather, on 
his theory, in the properties of things,’ or more accu- 
rately in the active forces that cause these properties.’ 
The ultimate properties he further held to be Heat and 
Cold,t which Aristotle had already recognised as the 
active elements in things,* apparently attributing, with 
Aristotle,® the higher reality to that which he considered 
the primary and positive principle of life and being.’ 
The primary substratum of cold he held to be water; 
of heat, fire or warm vapour.* Heat and cold are 
continually at war; where the one forces an en- 
trance, the other is expelled. This alternation ex- 
plains, for example, the phenomena of the thunderstorm 





and the earthquake.° 


' On both points see further 
infra. The hypothesis of a vacu- 
um was dealt with by STRATO (v. 
sup., Vol. ii. p. 452, n. 2) in one of 
his treatises, presumably directed 
against Democritus. Whether he 
went farther into the refutation 
of the Atomistic theory,or con- 
tented himself with Aristotle’s 
elaborate criticism, we know not. 

? Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 33 (and 
nearly word for word GALEN. 
Hist. Phil. c. 5, p. 244): 
Srpdtwyv 5t b puorkds Tas TordTyTas 
[apxhv Aéyer]. So also, as Fa- 
BRICIUS has already remarked, 
we must in the Clementine Re- 
cognitions, viii. 15, for ‘Calli- 
stratus qualitates [sc. principia 
mundi dixit]’ read ‘ Strato’ for 
‘ Callistratus.’ 

* STRATO dealt with this ques- 
tion in the three books 7. apxar, 
and perhaps also in the m. duvd- 
pewy (supra, Vol. ii. p. 452, n. 3). 


Given these corporeal forces, 


4 Stop. Hel. i. 298: Srpdrwv 
oroxeia To Oepudy Kal Td Puxpdr. 
Cf. infra, n. 9. 

5 Supra, vol. i. p. 480, n. 3. 

& Supra, vol. i. p. 483, n. 2. 

7 EPIPHAN. Exp. Fid. 1090 
A: Srparwvlwv [1]. Srparwv] ex Aau- 
Wadkov thy Oepuhy ovciay Erevyev 
aitlay mavrwv omdpxev. 

§ PLUT. Prim. Frig. 9, p. 
948: of wey Srwikol re aépi rd 
mpotws  w Wuxpy  amodiddvres, 
’EumedoxaAjs 5& Kal Srpdrav TE 
édart. As to warmth, though 
positive information fails us, 
the parallel is self-evident. All 
this is also Aristotelian; v. 
supra, Vol. i. p. 483, n. 2. 

® SENECA, Nat. Qu. vi. 13, 2 
(on Earthquakes): ‘hujus [Strat.] 
tale decretum est: Frigidum et 
calidum semper in contraria 
abeunt, una esse non possunt. Ko 
frigidum confluit, unde vis calida 
discessit, et invicem ibi calidum 


458 ARISTOTLE 


Strato found that he could dispense with the incor- 
poreal.! 

We are nct told how Strato connected the primary 
opposition of heat and cold with the other elementary 
kinds of opposites, or how he deduced the elements from 
it; on the latter point he probably followed Aristotle. 
On the other hand, he combated his views upon gravity. 
Aristotle assigned to each element its place in the uni- 
verse according to the direction in which it tended. The 
earth he accordingly held te be alone absolutely heavy ; 
fire, on the other hand, to be absolutely light ; while air 
and water were relatively heavy and light.? Strato, 
on the other hand, asserted, with Democritus, on the 
ground of a very simple observation, that all bodies are 


est, unde frigus expulsum est.’ 
Wells and pits are therefore 
warm in the winter, ‘quia illo 
se calor contulit superiora possi- 
denti frigori cedens.’ If, then, 
there is a certain amount of heat 
accumulated in the earth’s 
interior, and a further quan- 
tity of heat, or of cold, is 
thereupon added under pres- 
sure, the excess must find for 
itself an outlet by force, and 
thereby earthquakes arise: 
‘vices deinde hujus pugnz sunt: 
defit calori congregatio ac rursus 
ertuptio. Tunc frigora compes- 
cuntur et succedunt mox futura 
potentiora; dum alterna vis 


cursat et ultro citroque spiritus 


commeat, terra  concutitur.’ 
SToB. Hel. i. 598; Srpdrwv, Oepuod 
Wuxp@ tapeliaytos, érav exBiachey 
TUXN, TA TOLAdTA yiyverbat, BpovThy 
bev a&mopptier, oder 5& aorparhy, 
tdxer 5& Kepawvdv, mpnotipas Be 
kal tupavas TG mAcovacue Th 


Tis bAns, hv Exdrepos aitayv épéa- 
ketal, Oepuotépay uev & mpnorhp, 
mwaxutTépay 5¢ 6 tupdyv. Cr. here- 
with what is said supra, vol i. 
p- 515, n. 2; vol. ii. p. 378, n. 1, as 
to the theory of dvrimepictacis 
in Aristotle and Theophrastus. 

1 PLUT. ibid.: Td aicOyrd 
tavTl, év ois "EumedoxAjs te Kab 
Stpdtwv Kal of Srwixod ras odcias 
Tievtat tv Svvauevwy, of ey 
Zrwikol&c. Cf.also what is said 
on Light and Heat, infra, p. 460, 
n, 2, and see PLUT. Plae. v. 4, 3 
(GALEN. H. Phil. c. 31, p. 322): 
Ztpdtwy Kal Anudkpitros Kal Thy 
Sivauw [sc. Tod orépuaros] cGua- 
mvevpatixy ydp. Strato isas little 
likely as Democritus to have 
called a cua a Sdvauis; he only 
affirmed, as the genuine text of 
Plutarch correctly says, that 
forces are attached to material 
things as to their substratum 
(ovcta). 

* Supra, vol. i pp. 447-8, 477, 








SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 459 


heavy and press towards the centre ; and if some of these 
mount upwards, this is because of the pressure which 
the heavier exercise upon the lighter.!. How he further 
explained this difference of degree in weight— whether 
he conceived that while everything had weight, yet, 
on account of the qualitative difference in materials, 
everything had not the same weight; or whether, with 
Democritus,? he held that all matter was equally heavy, 
and explained the difference of the specific gravity of 
bodies by the assumption of empty interspaces within 
them—we do not know. The views he elsewhere 
expresses rather support the latter supposition. For 
while strenuously combating with Aristotle the atomic 
theory and asserting the infinite divisibility of bodies,’ 
he yet agreed with Democritus in assuming the exist- 
ence of void: while rejecting as indecisive most of the 





1 Srmpu. De Colo, 121, a, 32 
sqq. K., Schol. in Ar. 486, a, 5: 
Sri Bt vbre TH bm’ GAAHAwY KOA 
Bia(dueva xweira: [the elements, 
by movement in their natural 
positions] Selkrvow ([’Apiot, i 
epetns. trairns 8 yeydvacr rijs 
Sdins met’ adrdy Srpdrev 6b Aau- 
Waxnvés te Kal ’Emlxoupos, nav 
capa Bapitynra Exew voulCovres rat 
mpos Td pwécov péperOu, Ta Se Ta 
Baptrepa ipiCdvew Ta Hrrov Bapéa 
bm’ éxeivwy exOAlBecOa Big mpds rd 
tvw, Sore ef tis bpetaAe Thy viv, 
eAdeivy dy Td Bdwp eis 7d KévTpor, 
kal ef tis Td Hdwp, Toy dépa, Kal ei 
Tov Gépa, Td wip ... of Be Tov 
advra mpos Td pécoy péperOa Kata 
piow Texuhpiov KoulCovres 7d Tis 
vis drocrwpévns Td BSwp em) 7d 
Kdrw péperOa xal rod bdaros roy 
dépa, &yvoodo: &C. loréoy St Sri 


ov Srpdrwyv udvos odd ’Emixoupos 
mdvra tdeyov elvat ta odpare 
Bapéa nal pice piv em rd Kdrw 
hepdueva mapa piaw 5 émi rd kvw, 
GAAG Kal TlAdrwy olde epouévny 
thv Sdtavy Kal Bueréeyye. STOB. 
Eel, i. 348: Srparav wey rpoceivat 
Tois chuact muoiwdy Bdpos, Ta Be 
Kovpdérepa Tois Bapurépos émimoAd- 
Ce olov éxrupnyiCsueva. 

* ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 779. 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 455, n. 4, 
and SpEext. Math. x. 155: nal 3h 
otrws hvéxOnoay oi wept roy Srpd- 
Tava toy voidy: rods pty yap 
xpdvous eis dmepés bwéAaBoy Kata- 
Afqryew, Ta 8E cduara Kal rods 
témous €is Gmreipoy réuverOa, Kw- 
eigdai te Td Kiwoduevov ev ducpet 
xpévm SAov BOpovy pepiordy did- 
ornua Kal ob wepl rd mpdérepov mpéd- 
tepov. Of. infra, p. 462, n. 2. 


460 


ARISTOTLE 


reasons adduced in support of this assumption,' he yet 
believed it impossible to explain many phenomena—as 
for instance those of light and heat—except on the pre- 
supposition of empty interspaces into which light and 


caloric may find an entrance.” 


Since, however, this 


only proves the existence of empty spaces within the 
material world, and since his definition of space, which 
resembled Aristotle’s,? excluded the conception of a 


1 The three reasons for the 
assumption of a vacuum, which 
ARISTOTLE reckons in Phys. iv. 
6, 213 (cf. supra, vol. i. p. 424), 
Strato (according to SIMPL. Phys. 
153, a) reduced to two, etfs re 
Thy Kata témov Kivnow Kal eis THY 
Tov cwudtwy wiAnow [i.e. that no 
movement in space and no con- 
densation would be possible with- 
out a void]; tplrov S¢ mpooriOnor 
7) amd THs SAKHS* Thy yap o8n- 
pit AlOov Erepa oid7pia dv ErEepwv 
EAkev cuuBalve: (as SIMPL. fur- 
ther explains). He cannot, how- 
ever, have found that any of 
these arguments was convincing, 
for we find that as’to the first of 
them SIMPL, 154, b, after citing 
the examples with which Ari- 
stotle had confuted it, goes on 
to remark: ‘still more striking 
is the refutation which Strato 
brings against it—namely, that a 
small stone in a closed vessel 
filled with water will move to- 
wards the mouth when one turns 
the vessel round.’ So again, as 
to the third argument, SIMPL. 
says in 155, b: 6 6& Srpdrwrv Kai 
Tov amd ris EAkews [sc. Adyor] 
avadvwy* ovde Hh EAgis, nov, 
avaykdace: TidecOa Td Kevdy. ovTE 
yap ei €otw Saws EAkis Havepdy, 
bre cal TlAdtwv abtds Thy éAKTiK}y 


Sdvauiy avaipety Soxe?, ove, ei ori 
€Akis, SjAov. ef 51a Td Kevdy H AlBos 
€Aket Kal uy 5 HAA aitiav. ovdée 
yap amrodeuviovciv, GAA’ Soti- 
Oevra: Td Kevdy of odtw Aé€yovTes. 
These arguments, as well as the 
other remarks we find in SIMPL, 
on this subject, must be directly 
or indirectly derived from STRA- 
TO’S book . Kevov. 

2 Simp. Phys. 163, b: 6 pev- 
to. Aapaxnvos Srpdtwyv Seuvivae 
meipatat, Ort Eats TO Kevdy Siadap- 
Bdvov 7b wav cGua bore ph eiva 
ouvexts, Aéywy Ort ovK dy 5: Haros 
hh} Gépos 2) &AAOv odmaros eSdvaro 
Siextinrew TO Pas ovde H Oepudrns 
ovde BAAN Sdvauis ovdeula cTwua- 
Tih. TOS yap ai Tod HAlov aKTives 
dieEémimrov eis TO TOU ayyelou 
edapos ; ef yap Td dypdy ph elxe 
mépous, GAAG Bia SieareAAoy avd 
ai avyal, cvvéBawev brepexxeirbat 
Td TAN TAY ayyelwy, Kad ovK dy ai 
Mev TeV axTivwy aveKA@YTO pds 
Tov &vw Témov ai 5é Katw SiegémiT- 
tov. From this passage we also 
gather that Strato, even more 
definitely than Aristotle, con- 
sidered light and heat to be 
material. 

3 StToB. Hel. i. 380: réroy 5 
elvat [according to Strato] 7d 
perakd Sidornua Tov wepiexovTos Kal 
Tov mepiexouevov—which differs 


SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 461 


space outside the world, Strato confined the existence 
of void to the world itself, and rejected the view of 
Democritus that there is an infinite void outside our 
world.' On time,? likewise, he held views different 
from his predecessors. Aristotle’s definition of time as 
number or count of movement appeared to him to be 
false. Number, he remarked, is a discontinuous, time 
and motion are continuous quantities, which cannot, 
therefore, be counted. Time is continually beginning 
and ending; with number this is not the case. The 
parts of number exist simultaneously ; this is never so 








with portions of time. 


from the Aristotelian definition 
(supra, Vol. i. p. 432, n. 4) only in 
the circumstance that the latter 
assigned the inner boundary of 
the surrounding bodies as the 
space which the surrounded body 
occupies, whereas Strato, who 
allowed that bodies were sepa- 
rated by a void, considered the 
void between the surrounding 
and the surrounded bodies as the 
space of the latter. 

1 Srop. ibid.: Stpdtwy étwrépw 
pev &pn Tod Kéomov ph elvar Kevor, 
évdorépw 5¢ Suvardy yeveoda. From 
the same source, as it appears, we 
have in THEODORET, Cur. Gr. 
Aff. iv. 14, p. 58: 6 3& Srpdrwv 
gumadw [sc. 7) of Srwikol], EEwbev 
pev pdtv elvar Kevdy, Evdobev dé 
duvardy elvasz. Herewith, and with 
n. 2 on p. 460, agrees SIMPL. Phys. 
144, b: some hold the xwpnrixdy 
to be unbounded, as did Demo- 
critus, of 8 igduerpoy aiTo TH 
KOTMIKG OdpaT. mowvo1, Kal dia 
TovTO TH pmev éavTod pice Kevdy 
elvat A€youct, mewAnpaoOa Se ard 
cwpdtwy det Kal udvy ye TH emwoig 


If time is number, present 


Bewpeiobar ws al’ aitd iperras, 
olol ries of woAAol ray MAatwm- 
Kav pirocdgwy yeydvaci, Kal Srpa- 
tava Sé oluat Toy Aaupaxnvydy Tis 
ToavTns ‘yevéotar Sdtns. For 
SIMPL., it will be observed, does 
not absolutely ascribe this view 
to Strato; and, besides, he is in 
this passage dealing only with the 
proposition that Space is entirely 
occupied by the body of the 
world, which excludes the notion 
of an exterior void, but not the 
possibility of smaller interior 
vacua. But SIMPL. is inaccurate 
when, at 140, b, he says that 
‘some believe that space is to be 
found without matter, as Demo- 
critus and Epicurus: of 3 dd- 
oTnua Kal del capa Exov Kal éxirh- 
decoy mpds Exacroy, ws... 6 Aau- 
Yaxnvds Xrpdrwv. The empty 
spaces inside bodies are here 
ignored, 

? Which subject, as well as 
that of ‘the vacuum,’ he treated 
in a separate work; supra, vol. ii. 
p. 452, n. 2. 


462 


ARISTOTLE 


time and unity must be the same. Why, finally, should 
time, as the measure of earlier and later, refer only to 
motion and not equally to rest, to which earlier and 
later also apply?! | He himself defined time as amount 
of activity,? the quantity or amount of motion and 
rest ;* he carefully distinguished* between time and 
that which is in time,* and accordingly refused to admit 
that days, years, &c., are portions of time: they corre- 
spond rather to real and definite events, whereas time 


' See SIMPL. Phys. 187, a, for 
a detailed account of these objec- 
tions. Strato also remarked, as 
is observed in the latter part of 
the same passage, that if ‘ éy 
xpévp elvar’ =<‘ brd Tod xpdvov Tepi- 
éxeo0at,’ then Eternity is not in 
time. SIMPL. goes on as in next 
note. 

2 SIMPL. 187, a: Kal &AAa Ee 
TOAAG GyTemav mpds Thy ’AptoTo- 
Térous amddoow 6 Srpdrwy airds 


Tov xpdvoy Tb ev Tais mpdteot mocov. 


eivat TiBerat. moddy yap, no, 
xpévov pauev amrodnucivy kal mAciv 
kal orpatevecOa: Kal modeueiv, 
duolws S€ Kabjoba Kal Kadeddew 
kal pnOty mpdrrewv, Kal modrdy 
xpdvov dauév Kat dAlyov, dv mev 
éatt TO Tocdy TOA, ToAdy xpédvor, 
dv 8 bAlyov, dAtyov: xpdvos yap 
To év ExdoTois ToUTwy wocdv. We 
have a similar definition of Time 
from Speusippus, if the state- 
ment in ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 859, 
n. 4 is correct. 

3’ STOB. Hel. i. 250: Srpdrwv 
[tov xpédvov] tay év Kwhoer Kar 
npeula moody. SExt. Pyrrh. iii. 
137 (Math. x. 128): Srpdrwy 46, 
}) &s tives “AptororéAns [xpdvov 
gyoly eivatl pérpov nwvhocews rab 
bovis. Math. x. 177: Srpdrwyr 6 


guciuds ... . edeyey xpdvov sin- 
dpxew uérpoy mdons Kiwhoews Kal 
bovis * maphke: yap Tact Tots Kwov- 
Mévots OTE KiWetTa: Kal waot Tois 
axwhtos 8re axwnyricer kar did 
ToUTO mdvTa Ta yivdmeva ev xpdvy 
ylverau. 

4 SIMPL. 187, a, Strato dis- 
cusses the concepts of the taxv 
and Spadd, and says the former is 
ev @ Td wey Toodv, ap’ ob Hptaro 
kal eis } ématoaro, dAtyov, Td 5é 
yeyovbs ey ait mod’, and the 
latter the opposite, drav 7 7d wéev 
mwogoy év avT@ wodd, Td SE wempay- 
Mevov oAtyov. In rest we have no 
such distinctions, and so ina 
state of rest time is neither quick 
nor slow, but only greater or less; 
for it is only action and motion, 
not the roodr, év & 4 mpatis, which 
can be faster or slower. 

> Or more correctly, that in 
which time is; forin SIMPL. 187, 
b, d, he expressly says : 51d rodro 5é 
mdvTa é€v xpdvm elvar pawev, bre 
mwaot Tb moody akoAovdet kal Tots 
yivouwévots kal rots obo. In such 
a case we use the word ‘in’ con- 
versely (xara 7b evayriov), as when 
we say, ‘ the town is in confusion,’ 
or ‘mankind in terror,’ Tt radra 
ev €keivois. 











SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 


is only the duration of these events.! 


463 


The statement 


that time according to Strato consists of indivisible 
minima, and that motion does not proceed continuously 
in these several portions of time, but completes itself 
moment by moment,? seems to rest upon a misappre- 
hension.’ Strato had shown in a more comprehensive 
fashion than Aristotle that motion,‘ like Space and 
time, is continuous.> The seat of motion, especially in 


' SIMPL, 187, b: fuépa 38 Kal 
vd, nol [add. xa why] Kad eriav- 
Tos ovK Ear: xpdvos ovdé xpévov 
KEpN, GAAG TA wey b pwricuds Kal } 
oxlacis, Ta 58 Tis ceAhvns Ka n 
Tov HAlov meplodos, aAAG xpédvos 
eorl rd moody év @ Taira, (What 
follows is not from Strato, as 
BRANDIS, iii. 403, aflirms, but 
rather a criticism of his view by 
SIMPL.) On the other hand, we 
must not conclude from SIMPL. 
ibid. 189, b (ée 8& Tobrwy ray 
Atoewy Kal ras rod Srpdrwvos 
amoplas wep) 705 wh elvan roy xpdvov 
diadrvew Suvarov) that Strato 
denied the reality of time; he 
simply brings forward this aporia 
in the same sense as Aristotle 
himself had done in Phys. iv. 10 
init. 

* SEXTUS, sup. vol. ii. p. 452, 
n. 1. 
* Strato expressly says, apud 
SIMPL, Phys. 187, a, that time 
cannot be the number of motion, 
Bids 5 ety apiOuds diwpisuévov 
moody 7 5é Klynois Kal 6 xpovos 
ouvexhs* Td Bt cuvexts ovK dpid- 
Hntéy, On the continuity of mo- 
tion, more will be found infra. 
Probably Strato only repeated the 
teaching already worked out by 
Aristotle (supra, vol. i. p. 439, 
n. 2; p. 417, and Phys. i. 3, 186, 


a, 15) as to the indivisibility 
of the present and the d@pda 
beraBoaAy. 

* On this also Strato wrote a 
separate book. 

° SIMPL. Phys. 168, a: 6 88 
Aauwpannvds Srpdrwv ok amd rod 
MeyéGous udvoy ovvexh Thy klynow 
elvat pnolv, dAAa kad Kad’ €avThy, 
ds, ei Siaxomeln [if it were not con- 
tinuous], ordoe diaAauBavouevn 
(L-vnv), kal 7d perati S00 dia- 
ordcewy (1. ordoewv) lvnow obcay 
adidxowov. ‘ Kal woody é T1, pnoly, 
H Kivnows Kat Siciperdy eis ded Sias- 
peta.” What follows is not de- 
rived from Strato, but is an 
explanation of the Aristotelian 
text, as is shown by the words: 
GAAG mos elev [i.e, ARIST. Phys. 
iv. ll, 219, a, 13] 80n yap 4 
kivnows, &c. It is not until 
the end of this section, i.e. in the 
middle of 168, a, that SIMPL. 
returns to Strato with the words: 
GAA’ 6 wey ’ApirroréAns fouxev ex 
TOU gapeotépov morhcacba Thy 
émtBordy* 6 5¢ Srparwy pironddws 
xxl abthy Kad’ abthy thy klynow 
edeike Td cuvexts Exovcay, tows Kal 
mpos tovTo BAérwy, iva wh udvoy 
éml rijs kara rémov Kwhoews, dAAG 
kal éml Tay GAAwy racav cuvdynra 
7a Aeydmueva, 


464 ARISTOTLE 


qualitative change, he sought for, not only in the 
material that is moved, but also in that which ceases 
and that which comes into being with the motion.! He 
corroborated the theory of the acceleration of motion 
by simple observations of the fall of bodies.? 

A fundamental departure from the Aristotelian cos- 
mology is attributed to Strato by Stobzeus, who tells 
us that he held that the heavens are made of fire, and 
that the stellar radiance is a reflection of the sun’s 
light. As to the former of these doctrines we may 
wonder that it is nowhere else mentioned, as it in 
reality involves nothing less than the abandonment of 
the theory of the ether and all the deductions founded 
upon it; yet we are not therefore justified in denying 
that the difficulties which beset the Aristotelian as- 
sumptions as to the light- and heat-giving power of 
the stars‘ may have caused Strato to attribute a fiery 
instead of an etherial nature to heaven and the heavenly 
bodies. Nor need the statement as to the light of the 
stars cause us any serious difficulty in view of the 
state of astronomy at that time. Yet the evidence of 
Stobeeus gives us no sure guarantee of the truth of 
these statements.° The assertion that Strato conceived 


1 SIMPL. 191, a (referring to 
Phys. v. 1): kal Karas ye, olwat, 6 
Stpdtwy thy Kivnoww ov pdvov ev TO 
Kiwoupéevm pnoly elvat, GAAG Kal év 
To €& ov Kal év TG eis 0, HAAOr BE 
tpémov ev éxdoTm. Td pev ‘yap 
brokelmevoy, pnol, KivEetTal ws meTa- 
Bdaddov, Td Se €& oF Kal Td Eis 0, Td 
bev @s POeipduevor, TH BE ws yivd- 
pevov. On the corresponding 
definitions of Aristotle, see vol. i. 
p. 417, n. 2, supra. 


2 See the Fragm. of the book 
m7. Kwhoews apud SIMPL., ibid. 
214, a. 

3 Hel. i. 500: Tappevtdns, 
‘HpdkAe:tos, Srtpdrwy, Zhvwy wipi- 
vov eivat tov ovpaydy. I. 518: © 
Srpdtav Kal ards Ta Borpa brd 
Tov HAlov owriCecban. 

* Supra, vol. i. p. 509 sq. 

5 In the first place what 
Strato says only of the fiery 


sphere could not be transferred to 





SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 


465 


of the parts of the world as infinite! is obviously untrue, 
if this involves, as it appears to do, the infinite exten- 


sion of the world in space.’ 


Other reported doctrines 


of Strato relating to the fixity of the earth,* comets,‘ 
meteorological phenomena and earthquakes,* the forma- 
tion of seas,® to colours’ and sounds,’ cannot be fully 


discussed here. 


the heavens ; and, in the second 
place, that which related only to 
the planets cannot be extended 
to all the stars. 

1 EPIPHAN. Lap. Fid. 1090, 
A: Gmreipa St frevyer elvar Ta méepy 
Tov Kécpou, 

2 For this view was not held 
by Strato, as shown supra, p. 
461,n.1. The statement is pro- 
bably only a misinterpretation 
of his teaching as to the un- 
limited divisibility of matter, as 
to which see supra, p. 459, n. 3. 

% That Strato (like Aristotle) 
held this view, and that he sup- 
ported it by a special argument of 
his own, appears from CRAMER, 
Anecd. Oxon. iii. 413: rH 88 
mpouevyn [l.mpoxemévy] viv aitio- 
Aoyla TH wep Tis axwnolas Tis vijs 
Srpdrwv Soxei mp@ros 6 puainds 
xphoacda. The argument un- 
fortunately is not given. 

4 Sros. Zl. i. 578 (PLUT. 
Place. iii. 2, 5; GALEN, ZZ. 
Phil. 18, p. 286). A comet accord- 
ing to Strato was: &orpov pas 
meprrnoeey véper muxvg, Kabdrep 
em) Tav Aaumripwv ylverat. 

5 See supra, vol. ii. p. 457, 
n. 9. 

® According to STRABO, i, 3, 
4, p. 49 (from ERATOSTHENEs, 
who, however, without doubt is 
only quoting Strato as far as the 
words, on p. 50, Thy Sxv0av 


VOL. Il. 


épnulay; the rest is his own), 
Strato propounded the hypothesis, 
which he justified by palzonto- 
logical observations, that the 
Black Sea was originally sepa- 
rated from the Mediterranean, 
and this sea from the Atlantic, by 
isthmuses, which were broken 
through in course of time. 

7 As tothis, the excerpts from 
JOHAN. DAMASC. i. 17, 3 (STOB. 
Floril. iv. 173, ed. Meineke) give 
us only the not very clear remark : 
Srpdtwy xpeuard pnow amd tay 
cwudtwy péperbar avyxp¢ Corr’ 
avrois Toy metatd dépa, 

’ ALEX. APHR. De Sensu, 
117 (p. 265, 9 sqq., ed. Thurot), 
intimates that Strato explained 
the fact thatit is impossible to dis- 
tinguish tones at a great distance 
—not, like Aristotle (De Sensu, 
6, 446, b, 6) by the theory that 
the form of movement in the air 
was altered on the way—but r¢ 
exrverOar thy révav Tis mAnyis 
-.. . ov ydp now ev Te oxyAa- 
ticecbal mws Tov dépa rods Siaddpous 
POdyyous yiverOai, GAAA TH Tis 
rAnyisavicérntt. (What followsis 
not the view of Strato, but of 
Alexander, as THUROT reminds 
us at p. 451 of his edition.) 
These words harmonise exactly 
with the beginning of the pseado- 
Aristotelian fragment 7. axovoray, 
800, a, 1: Tas 38 gavds ardoas 


HH 


466 


ARISTOTLE 


Upon his physiological views also we have only 


isolated and unimportant statements.' 


cupBalver yiyverOor Kal ovs 
Wégpous . .. . 08 TE Ty Gépa 
oxnuatiCerOa, Kabdwep otovrat 
Twes, GAA TH KivetoOat mapa- 
mAnolws avtoy ovoTedAduevor Kal 
éxrewduevoy, &c. This coinci- 
dence, however, does not go far 
enough to justify the suppo- 
sition (BRANDIS, ii. b, 1201) 
that that treatise is the work of 
Strato, however well and care- 
fully considered, and however 


worthy of him it may appear. 


It is not, therefore, necessary 
here to go into the manner in 
which the tones of the human 
voice and of musical instruments 
and their various modifications 
are in that tract explained. The 
general basis of the theory is 
most clearly set out at p. 803, b, 
p. 84 sqq. According to this 
passage, which reminds one of 
Heraclides’s theory (ZELLER, Ph. 
d. Gr. i. p. 887, 1) every sound 
is composed of particular beating 
vibrations (mAnyal), which we 
cannot distinguish as such, but 
perceive as one unbroken sound ; 
high tones, whose movement is 
quicker, consist of more vibra- 
tions, and low tones of fewer. 
Several tones vibrating and 
ceasing at the same time are 
heard by us as one tone. The 
height or depth, harshness or 
softness, and in fact every 
quality of a tone depends (803, 
b, 26) on the quality of the 
motion originally created in the 
air by the body that gave out 
the tone. This motion propa- 
gates itself unchanged, inasmuch 
as each: portion of the air sets 
the next portion of air in motion 


His doctrine of 


with the same movement as it 
has itself. 

1 GALEN, De Sem. ii. 5, vol. 
iv. 629, informs us that Strato 
explained the origin of the differ- 
ence of the sexes (supra, vol. ii. 
p. 55, n. 2) in a somewhat more 
material manner than Aristotle 
(without, however, adopting the 
views of Democritus, d. q. . 
ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 805, 2), by 
the theory that either the male 
seed has the preponderance over 
the female (which Aristotle would 
not admit, swpra, vol. ii. p. 50 
sq.) or the female over the male. 
According to PLuT. Place. v. 8, 2 
(GALEN, H. Phil. 32, p. 325), he 
allowed that abortions originated 
mapa mpdcbecw, 2 ahatpeoiv, i 
per dbeoty [misplacement of parts] 
} mvevudtwow [evaporation, or 
perhaps addling of the seed 
caused by air contained therein]. 
Finally in JamBuicH. Theol. 
Arithm. p. 47 (which MACROB, 
Somn. Scip. 1, 6, 65, repeats ; cf. 
also CENSORIN. Di. Nat. 7, 5) we 
have his views on the first stages 
of the development of the em- 
bryo week by week.—Similar 
opivions on this subject are also 
attributed to the physician Dio- 
cles, of Carystus, who, accord- 
ing to Ast’s notes on the 
Theol. Arithm., flourished about 
Ol. 136 (ie. about 232 B.C.), 
and who, according to IDELER, 
Arist. Meteorol. i. 157, was a — 
pupil of Strato’s, and one of 
the persons charged (see DI0G. — 
v. 62) with the execution of his 
testament. SPRENGEL, however — 
(Gesch.d. Arzneik. fourth edition, 
p. 463), believes him to have — 





SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 467 


the human soul,' on the other hand, owing to its diver- 
gence from that of Aristotle, claims our attention. 
That he should adopt an independent view was to be 
expected from what we already know of his general 
theory as to the efficient forces of the world. If these 
in general are inseparable from matter, this must be true 
also of the powers of the soul. While it does not follow 
from this that Strato must necessarily have explained 
the soul, with Aristoxenus and Diczarchus, as the har- 
mony of the body,’ yet he could not admit Aristotle’s 
doctrine that it is motionless, and that a part of it is 
separate from all other parts and from the body. All 
activities of the soul, he asserts still more emphatically 
than Theophrastus,* are movements—thought, as well 
as perception—since they all consist in the action of a 
hitherto inactive force; and in proof of the view that 
between the activity of sense and reason there is in this 
respect no essential difference, he appealed to the fact 

which had been already observed by Aristotle,‘ that we 








been of an earlier date, and 
rightly ; for even if it be true, as 
is alleged without proof, that ‘he 
lived a short time after Hippo- 
crates,’ nevertheless GALEN (in 
‘his Aphorisms, vol. xviii. a, 7) 
expressly counts him amongst 
the predecessors of Krasistratus ; 
and what we know of his views 
(SPRENGEL, ibid.) confirms this. 

' Which subject he treated in 
the works 7. picews avOpwrivns 
and r. aig@joews. 

? OLYMPLODOR. Schol. in Phe- 
don., p. 142, does indeed say: 
brit ws Gpuovia apuovias dtuTépa 
kal Baputepa, ofrw Kat Vx) puxis, 


gnoly 6 Srpdrev, dturépa nal vw- 
Gearepa, Whether he really meant 
to show that the soul is a har- 
mony, or whether this remark is 
only meant to serve as an argu- 
ment against the Platonic ob- 
jection (Phed. 92 E sqq.), o7, 
finally, whether the phrase merely 
belonged to the statement of 
someone else’s opinion, we do not 
learn. TERTULL. De An. 15, dis- 
tinguishes Strato’s view from 
that of Dictearchus, and we shall 
see that he is right. 

% Supra, vol. ii. p. 391, n. 2. 

* Supra, vol. i. p. 195, n. 1, 
and p. 206, n. 2. 


HH? 


468 ARISTOTLE 


are unable to think anything of which we have had no 
previous perception.! But, on the other hand, he re- 
amarked that perception and sensation are conditioned 
by thought, since often when we are thinking of some- 
thing else the impressions which our senses have 
received fail to rise into consciousness.? In general, 
however, the soul and not the body is the seat of 
sensation ; for when we believe ourselves to feel a pain 
in the part affected, this is merely the same delusion as 
when we think that we hear sounds outside, whereas in 
reality we apprehend them only in the ear. Pain is 
caused by the sudden transmission of the external im- 
pression from the part affected to the soul; if the 
connection is broken we feel no pain.* Strato accord- 


' Srmpu. Phys. 225, a: «al 
Stpdrev 5€ .. . Thy Wuxhv dyo- 
oye? KivetoOat ov pdvoy Thy 


2 PLuT. Solert. An. 3, 6, p. 961 
(and from him PoRPH. De Abst. 
iii. 24): walrot Srpdrwvds ye Tov 


&Aoyov, GAAd Kal Thy AoyiKhy, 
Kihoes A€ywy elvar Tas evepyelas 
THs Wuxis, Aéyer ody ev TH epl 
Kivhoews mpds &AAos mwodAois Kat 
Tade* ‘hel yap 6 vody Kuveirat, 
domep wal 6 dpav kal akovwv Kai 
dopprwvduevos* evépyea yap 7 
vénois THs Siavolas Kabdmep Kal 7 
dpacis THS Spews’ [he means that 
both are duvduer dyros éevépyerat, 
movements]. al mpd rovrov dé 
Tov pntovd yeypapev* ‘ Bri ody iow 
af wAcloTa. Tay KiWhocewy altia. &s 
h wuxh Ka? abrhy Kuwetra d1a- 
vooupevn Kal &s bd THY aicOhrewv 
exivhOn mpdrepov, SHAdv eotwv. Boa 
yap wh mpdtepoy édpaxe TadTa ov 
Suvarat voeiv, viov Témous 7) Alméevas 
}) ypapas 7?) avSpidyras 7) avOpmmous 
) Tav &AAwy TL TOY ToLoOvTwY.’ The 
words 67: otv—atria: are more 
or less incomprehensible, as we 
do not know the context, 


guaikod Adyos early amodexviwr, 
@s 005’ aigOdvecOar Tomapdmay &vev 
Tov voc tmdpxe.* Kal yap ypdu- 
fara woAAdKis €mimopevomévous TH 
der kal Adyo. mpoomlmrovtes TH 
akon SiadravOdvovow jas Kal dia- 
gevyovot mpds €Erépois Toy vovv 
éxovras, elt’ adlis éravHAde kal 
metabe? Kat [wera ]d:mKer Tay mpoie- 
pévov Exacrov exrAeyduevos. [The 
rest is most probably not taken 
from Strato.] % Kal A€AeKTaL: 
voos dph &c. (v. ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. 
i. 462, 5), os rod wepl Ta dupara 
kal @ta mwdbous, dy ph maph 7d 
ppovorr, alaOnaw ov To.ovyTos, 

3 PLutT. Utr. An. an Corp. sit 
Libido (Fragm, i. 4, 2, p. 697): 
of ev yap &rayra cvAANBSny TadTa. 
[sc. ra wdOn] TH Wuxi épovtes 
avedecay, borep Stpatwv 5 pvorkds, 
ov pdvov tas émibuulas, GAAd Kal 
ras Avwas, ovdé Tos PdéBovs Kal 








= 








SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO. 


469 


ingly combated the distinction which Aristotle drew 
between the rational and the sensitive part of the soul. 
The soul, according to his view, is a single force ; reason 
(which, with the Stoics— preceded, however, by Aristotle! 
—he seems to have called 16 #yenorexdr *) is the totality 
of the soul, and the different senses are only particular 


expressions of this central force.* 


Tovs POdvous kal Tas emixatpexaxias, 
GAAG Kal mévous Kal fdovas Kal 
adynddvas kal bAws wacay alaoPnow 
év TH WuxH ouvicracba pduevos 
kal THs Wuxis Ta Tora wdyTa 
elvas* wh Toy wé8a movotyTwy hudy 
bray mpookpotowper, unde Thy Ke- 
party bray Kard—wuev, ph Tov 
SdetrvAoy bray exréuwpev: dvalo- 
OnTa yap Ta AoA TAHV TOU 7TYyE- 
Movixod, mpds 8 THs TAnyHs dkéws 
dvapepouervns Thy alcOnow arynddva 
Kadovuey* ws SE Thy pwrvhy Tots 
woly abrois évnxovoay tiw Soxodmev 
elvat Td amd Tis apxis éml Td hye- 
povindy Sidornua TH aicbioe mpoo- 
Aoy:(éuevot, mapamAnolws toy ex 
Tov Tpavuatos mévov ovx Smrov Thy 
alaOnow etrAnber, GAr’ Bev Ecxe 
Thy apxhy elvat Soxodvuer, EAkouéevns 
én’ exelvo THs Wuxijs ad’od wémovbe. 
5d wal mpoockdWaytes aitixa tas 
éppis [here must be the seat of 
the soul, v. infra] ovvhyayov év 
TH TAnyéevtt poplw Tod jryemovixov 
thy alaOnow dtéws aGrod:ddyT0s. 
kal wapeykéwrouey ec8’ bre Td 
mvetua Koy Ta mépn Secuots dia- 
AauBdyntra xepot opddpa méComerv 
[WYTTENB. conjectures ay r. u. 
5. diaA. kal rats xepod &c.; but it 
would, perhaps, be better to read 
by rd mépn Secu. diarauBdynra 7 
Tais xepot opdipa méCwuer] lord- 
Mevos epds Thy Siddoow Tod mdBovs 
Kal Thy wAnyhy év trois avacOfrots 
mAntrovres [WYTT. conj. pvAdr- 


The seat of the soul 


tovtes| iva wh ovvdbu [-aca 
Wy] mpos 7d ppovody adryndav 


yevnta. Tadrta wey oiv 6 Srpdtwv 
éml moddois @s elkds Towvrais. 


Plac. iv. 23, 3: Srpdrwy nab ra 
wa0n THs Wuxis Kal Tas aicOhoes 
ev T@ hryewoving@, ok év Tots weroy- 
Odor rémos cuvloracba. ev yap 
tavtn [TovT~?] Ketcba thy bro- 
hovny, dowep em) trav Sewav kal 
Grayewav Kal bomwep em) davdpelwv 
kal delAwy. 

' V. supra, vol. ii. p. 127, n. 3. 

* See preceding and following 
notes. 

3 See p.468,n.3, supra; SEXT. 
Math. vii. 350: oi is 8 diaépe 
aithy [Thy puxhy] Tay aicbfcewy, 
@s oi wAeclous* of 5€ abrhy elvat Tas 
aic@jces Kabdrep Sid Tey éTay 
ta&v aic@nrnplay mpoximrovoay, is 
ordoews hpte Srpdrwy te 5 puoikds 
kal Aivnoldnuos. TERTULL. De 
An. 14: ‘non longe hoc exem- 
plum est a Stratone et Enesi- 
demo et Heraclito; nam et ipsi 
unitatem anime tuentur, que in 
totum corpus diffusa et ubique 
ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per 
cavernas, ita per sensualia variis 
modis emicet, non tam concisa 
quam dispensata.’ Since Strato 
did not, at the same time, like 
Dicwarchus, regard the soul as a 
separate substance, but only as 
a force which is inseparable from 
the body through having therein 


470 


ARISTOTLE 


Strato placed in the region between the eyebrows! and 
in the part of the brain which is there situated. Thence 
he held that it permeates the whole body, and especially 
the organs of sense,” connecting it probably with the 


anima vitee.® 


its appointed place, and in which 
the unity of the life of the soul 
is to be distinguished from its 
individual manifestations (see 
following note), TERT. De An. 15, 
is able to cite Strato, along with 
Plato, Aristotle, and others, in 
opposition to those who, like 
Dicearchus, ‘ abstulerunt princi- 
pale, dum in animo ipso volunt 
esse sensus, quorum vindicatur 
principale.’ On the other hand, 
Sextus can also say that accord- 
ing to Strato the soul is identical 
with the aic@foeis, inasmuch as 
Strato, like Aristotle, did not 
allocate different parts of the 
soul to feeling and thought. 

1 PLut. Plac. iv. 5, 2 (GALEN, 
H. Phil. c. 28, p. 315; THEO- 
DORET, Cur. Gr. Aff. v. 23, p. 
73): Srpérav [7d Tis wpuxis 
iryeuovikoy elvas Aevyer| ev uecoppvg. 
POLLUX, Onomast. ii. 226: kal 6 
bey vos Kal Aoyiopos Kal jryEewoviKov 

. elre kata Td pecdppvoy, ws 
éAeye Stpdtwy. TERTULL. De An. 
15: ‘nec in superciliorum medi- 
tullio [principale cubare putes], 
ut Strato physicus.’ Cf. supra, 
vol. ii. p. 468, n. 2. 

? Such is the result when we 
combine the passages quoted 
supra, vol. ii. p. 468, n. 2 and 
n. 3, with the statement as 
to the seat of the soul. The 
expressions employed supra, p. 
468, n. 2—namely mpoxirre,, 
emicare, which imply, on the 
one hand, that outer impressions 


Sleep is the retreat of this spirit,‘ but in 


reach the jyeuovikdy, and, on the 
other hand, that the soul is 
affected by the part in connec- 
tion therewith—prove that the 
soul is not always spread all over 
the body, but has its seat in the 
head, whence after receipt of 
the impressions it streams to 
the organs of sense, &c. How 
Strato believed this was brought 
about, we do not learn. We can 
only suppose that he had in his» 
mind either the nerves, which 
had at that time been discovered 
by Herophilus and Erasistratus, 
and which (or at any rate the 
ophthalmic nerves) were, as 
appears from SPRENGEL, Gresch. 
ad. Arzneik. 4th ed. i. pp. 511-2, 
524 held by them to be conduc- 
ting tubes—or, more probably, 
that he was thinking of the 
arteries, which, according to 
Erasistratus, carried, not the 
blood, but the mvetua Cwrindy 
through the body (207d. p. 525sq.). 

% This view is referred to in 
the following note. It also 
accords with what is said supra, 
vol. ii. p. 468, n. 2, about the 
interruption of the rvedua flowing 
to the jryenovixdy, and on p. 458, 
n. 1 about the ddvamis mvevuatinh 
of the seed. 

4 TERTULL. De An. 438: 
‘Strato [here the natural philo- 
sopher and not the physician is 
meant] segregationem consati 
spiritus [somnum affirmat].’ 








SCHOOL OF THEOPHRASTUS: STRATO 471 


what way dreams were brought into connection with 
this view it is impossible to say.' 

As on this theory reason no longer constitutes the 
distinctive mark of the human soul, as a peculiar higher 
element in it, so Strato was free, on the one hand, to assert 
that all living creatures participate in reason, which for 
him coincided with consciousness, and without which he 
found sense-perception inconceivable ;* while, on the other 
hand, he was forced to extend to the whole of the soul 
what Aristotle had taught as to the finitude of its lower 
elements. We find him accordingly not only combating 
the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence,*® but criticising 
in a hostile spirit the proofs of the immortality of the soul 
advanced in the Phedo,' in a way which leads us to sup- 








' PLuT. Place. v. 2, 2 (GALEN, 
Hist. Ph. 30, p. 320) says: 
Srpdrwyv [rods dvelpovs yiverGat] 
arAdy@ [Twi add. GAL. | oboe TIS 
Siavolas év Tois barvois aicOntiKxw- 
Tépas pev mws (THs Pux7s add. 
GAL.) yryvouevns, map abtd be 
TOVTO TH yyworiuK@ kiwouerns [GAL. 
gives incorrectly yyworinijs yivou- 
évns|. The meaning appears to 
be that, during sleep the irra- 
tional nature of the mind is 
stronger, and the action of 
thought being interrupted, the 
mind receives and takes in many 
images or impressions, all more 
or less confused, which if awake 
it would allow to pass unnoticed 
(cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 75 sq. and 
p. 439, n. 3). 

2 EpPIPpHAN. Lap. Fid. 1090, 
A: wav (gov Ereyer ov [1]. Freye 
vou | dexricdy elvat, 

% See the extracts, probably 
from the work m. picews avOpw- 
nivns, in OLYMPIODOR. Schol. in 


Phed. ed. Finckh. p. 127 (also 
Puiut. Fr. vii. 19) p. 177 (follow- 
ing Alexander of Aphrodisias, as 
this commentary so often does, 
as may be seen by the context), 
p. 188, a’, B’. 

4 The arguments against the 
proofs brought forward in the 
Phedo, 102, A sqq. which are 
given by OLYMPIODOR. in Phed. 
p. 150-1, p. 191, are as follows: 
If the soul is immortal because 
as essentially life it cannot 
die, the same can be applied 
to all living bodies, of animals 
and of plants, for they also can- 
not, so long as they live, be 
dead ; to every natural being, for 
the natural state of such excludes 
anything unnatural ; to all things 
composed and created, for com- 
position is incompatible with 
dissolution and existence with 
destruction. But death is not 
something which approaches life 
while it lasts, but it is a loss of 


472 


ARISTOTLE 


pose that along with these proofs he had abandoned the 


belief in immortality itself. 


From the Ethics of Strato only a definition of the 
Good, which in substance agrees with that of Aristotle, 


has been preserved to us.! 


life. It has not been proved that 
life is a quality inseparable from 
the concept of the soul, a quality 
inherent (€mipépovea) ; and not 
imparted (éripepouévn), and even 
if this be the case, it can only 
impart life as long as it exists 
and as long as it is without 
death. Admitting all this, there 
always remains the consideration 
that, as a finite thing, itcan only 
possess a finite and limited power, 
and consequently must in the end 
become weaker and die.—Strato 
also brought arguments against 
the assertion in the Phed. 70 © 
sqq., that as the dead proceed 
from the living, so must the living 
proceed from the dead. This 
statement he proves (ibid. 186) 
to be incorrect, for existing 
matter does not orizinate from 
destroyed matter. Further, if a 
part—for example,an amputated 
limb—does not again live, this is 


not the case with the whole. Also 
that which is derived from 
another resembles it only in 
species and not in quantity. 
And, again, we do not always 
find any such law of reciprocity, 
for food becomes flesh, metal 
turns into rust, wood into coal, 
and the young man becomes an 
old one, but the reverse changes 
never happen. Thus nothing 
can come of the contrary, unless 
the substratum is retained and 
not destroyed. That without 
such a reciprocity further origin 
of individuals must cease is not 
correct: it is only requisite that 
similar beings, and not the same 
individuals should be produced. 

‘ Srop. Eel. ii. 80: Srpdrov 
[ayaboy nol] 7d TeAEwody Thy 
duvauw 8.’ hy rhs évepyelas tvy- 
xdvouev. Cf. herewith, supra, 
vol. ii. p. 141 sq. 














478 


CHAPTER XXi 


THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AFTER STRATO TILL TOWARDS 
THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY 


EvEN after Strato there were not wanting men of 
the Peripatetic school who won distinction by their 
extensive knowledge and their powers of teaching and 
exposition ; but there is no evidence that it henceforth 
produced any philosopher who merited the name of an 
independent thinker. It continued to be one of the 
chief centres of the learning of the time; and of the 
contemporary schools none but the Stoic, which had 
risen to eminence under Chrysippus, could rival it in this 
respect. It cultivated especially the historical, literary 
and grammatical studies which marked the Alexandrian 
age above all others, and in connection with these it 
jealously devoted itself to rhetoric and ethics, but even 
in these fields contributed little that was original. Its 
efforts in science and metaphysics, if they did not 
remain altogether barren, seem to have been wholly 
confined to the propagation of older doctrines. Nor 
can we make the scantiness of our information re- 
sponsible for this seeming poverty ; for not only have we 
express complaints of the unfruitfulness of the Peri- 
patetic school in the period referred to,! but we are 


' STRABO, xiii. 1, 54, p. 609, Peripatetics being under the dis- 
says that after Theophrastus the ability that they possessed of 


474 


ARISTOTLE 


forced to suppose that if there had been anything 
important to relate of Strato’s successors there would 
have been a richer stream of historical allusion to them, 
and especially that the learned commentators upon 
Aristotle, who preserve so deep and significant a silence 
as to the Peripatetics between Strato and Andronicus,} 
would have found more frequent occasion to mention 


them. 


Strato’s successor, Lyco of Troas, who was president 
of the Peripatetic school for nearly half a century,? and 


Aristotle only a limited number 
of treatises, and these mostly 
‘exoterical,’ undey exew gidoco- 
petv mpayyatinas [in the way of 
real scientific advance], aAad 
Gécers [commonplaces] AncvOiCew 
[t> embellish]. PrLur. Sudla, 
26: of 8€ mpeoBiTepor TMepira- 
TnTtKkol [ before Andronicus] ¢at- 
vovTa mev Kad? éavrods yevduevot 
xaplevtes kal pidoddyor, but ‘it 
is plain that they did not possess 
the texts of Aristotle and Theo- 
phrastus.’ The last suggestion 
is, of course, incorrect; asis also 
the idea that the philosophic 
barrenness of the school began 
only after Theophrastus (v. supra, 
i, pp. 138-9 sqq.). ‘Ignoratio 
dialecticz’ is also charged against 
the Peripatetics by C1c. Fin. iii. 
12, 41. 

‘ Zeller has been unable to 
find, among the countless cita- 
tions of ancient philosophers in 
the various commentaries, a 
single one which refers to any of 
these writers. 

? Lyco of Troas (D104. v. 65, 
PLutT. De Fwil. 14, p. 605) was 
a pupil both of Strato and also 
of the dialectician Pantoides 


(Diog. 68). He was named by 
Strato his heirin the school (supra, 
vol. ii. p.451,n. 1), and succeeded 
him in his chair as a young man, 
about 270-268 B.c., and after 
conducting the school for forty- 
four years, died at the age of se- 
venty-four, about 224 B.o. (D104. 
68 and supra, vol, ii. p. 451, n.1). 
Lyco was a famous orator (see 
next note but one); busied him- 
self greatly with public affairs 
and, according to D1oa. 66, did 
great service to Athens, where he 
must have become a citizen (if 
by oun BovaAévew Diog. here means 
that he spoke in the public 
assemblies). We hear that he 
was esteemed and rewarded by 
the earlier Pergamenian kings, 
admired by Antigonus, invited 
by Antiochus to his court in vain 
(Diog. 65, 67: meaning, no 
doubt, Antiochus II., surnamed 
Theos), and his will (apud Dio@. 
69 sqq.) shows that he was a 
wealthy man. According to 
HERMIPP. (apud Di10G. 67) he 
lived as one; but the account 
which ANTIGONUS (apud ATHEN. 
xii. 547, d) gives of his pride is,'no 
doubt, grossly exaggerated. The 














PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 475 


left behind him a number of works,' was distinguished 
by the grace and brilliancy of his style rather than by 


the originality of his contributions.’ 


The little that 


has come down to us of his writings is confined to a 
definition of .the Highest Good,* and a few remarks 


upon ethical subjects.‘ 


Contemporary with Lyco, but diverging more widely 


from Aristotle, was Hieronymus of Rhodes.° 


same authority (ibid. 548, b) and 
DioG. 67 show him to have been 
greatly occupied with gymnastic 
arts. His testamentary direction 
as to his funeral (D10G. 70) is 
that it should be seemly but not 
extravagant. 

' To a slave, who had, no 
doubt, helped him in his work 
and to whom he gave his freedom, 
he bequeaths (apud Di0G. 73) 
Tapa BiBrAla Ta aveyvwouéva; the 
unpublished writings, on the 
other hand, he left to his pupil 
Callinus, to edit for publication. 

2 Oic. Fin. v. 5, 13: ‘Hujus 
[Stratonis] Lyco est oratione 
locuples, rebus ipsis jejunior.’ 
Also Diog. 65-6, praises the 
exppactindy kal mepryeywvds ev TH 
Epunvela, and the ei@dia of his 
speech, for which he was also 
called TAvcwy (as in PLUT. ibid.), 
but he adds the remark: év 5¢ rq 
ypdpew Gyduows aitg@. The 
examples cited by Dioa. confirm 
his judgment. Cf. THEMIST. 
Orat. xxi. 255 B, as to his cele- 
brity in his own time. 

% CLEMENS, Strom. i. 416 D: 
Avwos [Lyco must be meant] 6 
Tlepirarnrixds thy GAnOiwhy xapav 
THS Wuxis TéAos EAeyery elvat, ds 
Aevumos [7] thy eml trois Kadois. 
This does not conflict with, 


Our 


though it certainly does not 
exhaust, the Aristotelian defini- . 
tion of happiness ; but we do not 
know whether Lyco meant it to 
be an exhaustive definition or 
not. On the trifling worth of 
worldly possessions, see following 
note. 

4 Apud Cio. Tuse. iii. 32, 78, 
talking of ‘ wgritudo,’ Lyco says, 
‘parvis eam rebus moveri, for- 
tunz et corporis incommodis, 
non animi malis.’ Apud STOB. 
Floril., Hac. e Jo. Damasce.ii.13, 
140 (iv. 226,ed. Mein.), Lyco says 
of matdela that it is iepdy &ovaAor. 
Diog. 65-6 describes him as 
ppactixds avhp Kal wept maldwv 
arywyhv txpws cuvretaypévos, quot- 
ing at the same time some of his 
sayings. 

’ Cic. Fin. 3, 8; ATHEN. x. 
424-5; Diog. ii. 26; STRABO, 
xiv. 2, 13, p. 656, and others, all 
speak of HIERONYMUS as a 
Rhodian. He was a contempor- 
ary of Lyco, Arcesilaus, and the 
sceptic Timon at Athens (DIOG. 
v. 68, iv. 41-2, ix. 112). When 
ATHEN. x. 424-5 calls him a 
disciple of Aristotle, he is merely 
using the phrase loosely as mean- 
ing a Peripatetic. Not to this 
man, but to the historian Hier- 
onymus of Cardia, who was the 


476 


ARISTOTLE 


knowledge of this philosopher, who was distinguished, 
according to Cicero,' for his learning and versatility, is 
confined mainly to historical observations,” the titles of 
books, and unimportant isolated quotations.’ We are told 
that he declared the swmmum bonwm and the ultimate 
end of all action to consist in painlessness, which, how- 
ever, he sharply distinguished from pleasure, going 
beyond Aristotle’ in denying that the latter was in any 


companion in arms of EKumenes 
and Antigonus, must we refer the 
statement of LUCIAN, apud 
MACROB., 22, as toa person of this 
name who lived to be 104 years 
of age, as is clearly shown at the 
beginning of the chapter. 

' Circ. in the Orutor, 57, 190 
calls him ‘ Peripateticus inprimis 
nobilis, and in Fin. v. 5, 14, he 
speaks of: ‘pretereo multos, in 
his doctum hominem et suavem 
Hieronymum.’ Cf. also Fin. ii. 
6,19. Sundry details are to be 
gathered also from the passages 
cited infra. 

* For example: ATHEN. ii. 
48, b, v. 217, e, xiii. 556, a, 557, 
e, 602, a, 604, d (chiefly from the 
ioropika dmrourhuara, which is 
named at 557, e, and 604 d), xiv. 
635-6 (from the fifth book 7m. 
twointav, which treated of odes 
for the xi@dpa), x. 424-5, xi. 499- 
500 (from the work 7. wéé@ns), x. 
434-5 (from the etters) ; 
DioG. i. 267 (from the second 
book of the omopdiny irouvjuara, 
which are no doubt identical 
with the ior. drour.), ii. 14 (the 
like), 26, 105 (év r@ wm. éeroxijs), 
Vili. 21, 57, ix. 16; PLUT. Qu. 
Conv. Procem. 3, mentions his 
Adyo. mapa moTov yevduevor and 
also reckors him (NV. p. suav. 
Vivi, 13, 6, p. 1096) amongst 


the writers on music. That the 
Hieronymus mentioned in Dam- 
ASCIUS and JOSEPHUS is not the 
same as this writer has been 
shown by ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr.i. 
84. 

3 As in Circ. ibid. (from a 
work on Rhetoric or Metre); the 
citation of about thirty verses in 
Isocrates ; aremark inPLUT. Qu. 
Conv. i. 8, 3, 1, p. 626, on the 
shortsightedness of the aged; a 
word in SENECA, De Ira, i. 19, 3, 
against anger, and in STOB. 
Floril., Eae.e Jo. Dam.ii. 13. 121 
(vol. iv. 209, ed. Mein.), against 


‘education by pedagogues. 


4 The chief source of informa- 
tion here is CICERO, who often 
refers to this view of Hieron. 
So Acad. ii. 42, 131: * Vacare 
omni molestia Hieronymus 
[finem esse voluit].2 And Fin. 
¥; 11, 3b, 25; 73; Tuses F320, 
87-8; Fin. ii. 3, 8: ‘Tenesne 
igitur, inquam, Hieronymus 
Rhodius quod dicat esse summum 
bonum, quo putet omnia referri 
oportere? Teneo, inquit, finem 
illi videri, nihil dolere. Quid? 
idem iste de voluptate quid 
sentit? Negat esse eam, inquit,: 
propter se ipsam expetendam;’ 6, 
19: Nec Aristippus, qui volupta- 
tem summum honum dicit, in 
voluptate ponit non dolere, neque 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 


477 


sense a good. ‘To the same period belongs also 


Prytanis.' 


After Lyco’s death Aristo of Ceos? was elected by 
the choice of his fellow-disciples to the presidency of 


Hieronymus, qui summum bonum 
statuit non dolere, voluptatis 
nomine unquam utitur pro illa 
indolentia; quippe qui ne in 
expetendis quidem rebus numeret 
voluptatem.’ v.5, 14: ‘Hierony- 
mum; quem jam cur Peripateti- 
cum appellem, nescio, summum 
enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem 
doloris.’ Cf. CLEMENS, Strom. ii. 
415,c: 8 re ‘Iepévuuos 6 Tlepi- 
marntikds TéAos wey elvar TO 4dx- 
Antws Giv* TeAudy 8 ayabby udvoy 
Thy evdamovlay, Here Clement 
seems to have derived his in- 
formation from the same source 
as CICERO, Acad. ii. 42,131; and 
there ANTIOCHUS is indicated as 
Cicero’s authority. That Cicero 
was directly acquainted with an 
ethical as well as a rhetorical 
work of Hieronymus cannot 
really be inferred from Fin. ii. 6, 
19. This édoxAnola is also re- 
ferred to by JAMBL. apud STOB. 
Fel. i, 920, and the jovxla by 
Put, Sto. Rep. 2, 2, as the ideal 
of Hieronymus. The latter adds 
that, like Epicurus, he lived up 
to his theory. 

1 This Peripatetic was em- 
ployed by Antigonus Doson (B.c. 
230-221) in various State affairs, 
and PoLyn. v. 93,8, reckons him 
among the émipaveis tvdpes ex Tov 
mepirarov. He must have been 
at that time already considerably 
advanced in years, if his pupil 
EUPHORION was really born (as 
SUIDAS says) in Ol. 126, B.c. 
277-273. PLur. Qu. Conv. 


Procem. 3, names him among the 
distinguished philosophers who 
have written table talk. 

2 Aristo is called Keios in 
Lyco's will (Dioa. v. 74) and it 
has since been the custom to 
name him thus, in order to dis- 
tinguish him from the Stoic of 
the same name, ’Aplotwyv 6 Xios, 
who is, nevertheless, often con- 
founded with him on account of 
the similarity of their surnames. 
Another surname, "lovArqrns or 
"IAcjtns (D10G, vii. 164) shows 
that his family came from Julis, 
the chief town in the island of 
Ceos, as is remarked by STRABO, 
x. 5, 6, p. 486, and STEPHANUS, 
De Urb. "lovAus, PLUT. De Lzwil. 
14, p. 605 names ’Apiorwy é« Kéw 
between Glyco and Critolaus; 
Lyco himself speaks of him 
as his pupil (see following 
note) and Cic. Fin. v. 5,.13. 
When we find that not he but 
Aristo is in SEXT. Math. ii. 61 
called the yvépmos of Critolaus, 
it is hardly possible to suppose 
that a younger Peripatetic of the 
same name is meant, but we must 
suppose that yy@piuos, which is 
ordinarily used of a pupil, has 
here a_ wider _ signification; 
QUINTILIAN, xi. 15, 19. seems to 
have used the same expression: 
‘ Critolai peripatetici discipulus.’ 
Again, we hear that he was a 
(nawrhs of the Borysthenean 
Bio: see STRABO, x. 5, 6, and 
ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. i, 294,4. The 
meaning may be merely that he 


478 


the school.' 


ARISTOTLE 


He also is said to have been distinguished 


rather for the grace and finish of his style than for 


originality of thought,’ 


Of his numerous writings 


only some of the titles,’ and a few fragments, chiefly 


of an historical character,* have 


admired Bio’s writings, or it 
may be that he was _per- 
sonally acquainted with Bio, 
who must have been still living 
during Aristo’s youth (cf. 
ZELLER, Ph. d. Gr. i. 294, 4).— 
It is not Aristo of Ceos, but of 
Chios, that worked with Ar- 
cesilaus (who died 241 B.C.) 
according to STRABO, i. 2, 2, p. 
15; Suxt. Pyrrh. i. 234; Dioe. 
iv. 33. For further information 
about him and his works see 
HuBMANN, in Jahn’s Jahrb. 
Supplement. iii. 1834, p. 102 
sqq.; RITSCHL, Aristo d. Peripat. 
apud Cic. De Sen. 3 (Rhein. 
Mus. N. F. 1842, i. 193 sqq.); 
KRIScHE, Forsch. 405-6, 408. 

! Aristotle appears to have 
at least indicated Theophrastus 
as his successor; Theophrastus 
bequeathed the mep‘raros to ten 
friends ; Strato to Lyco (v. supra, 
vol. i. p. 39, n. 1, and vol. ii. p. 
350, n. 5); Lyco left it in his 
will (apud DioG. v. 70) tay 
yvepiuwy tots BovAouéevors and 
particularly to ten friends there 
named (all of whom except Aristo 
are otherwise unknown), with 
the proviso: mpoornodcbwoay 5 
avrol dv dy brodapBdvwor Siameveiy 
én) tod mpdyuatos Kal ocuravtew 
pdduora Suvicecba. If, however, 
what THEMIST. Or. xxi. 255 B, 
relates is true, he must have 
allowed Aristo a precedence even 
before himself. 

2 C1c. Fin. v. 5, 13: ‘ Concin- 
nus deinde et elegans hujus 


come down to 


[Lyconis, sc. discipulus] Aristo; 
sed ea que desideratur a magno 
philosopho gravitas in eo non 
fuit. Scripta sane et multa et 
polita; sed nescio quo pacto 
auctoritatem oratio non habet. 
The same is meant by STRABO 
(ut supra) in the ‘comparison 
with Bio. 

3 Of his works we know a 
‘Lyco’ (mentioned by PLUT. 
Aud. Po. \ init. p. 14, where no 
one else can be meant; cf. CIC. 
Cato M.1, 3, and also RITSCHL, 
ibid.), which is there classed with 
Asop’s Fables and the Abaris of 
Heraclides, and which must, 
therefore, like this latter, have 
been a collection of fables; and 
also the ’Epwrikd Suoum, cited by 
ATHEN. x, 419, c. xiii. 563-4, xv. 
674, b. It appears, however, 
from DIo4. vii. 163, that all the 
works there said to be by the 
Stoic Aristo (except the Letters 
of PAN/TIUS and SOSICRATES) 
were also ascribed to our Aristo 
of Ceos ; probably, however, only 
some of them were so ascribed, 
and it is only of some that the 
ascription could in any case be 
true. 

4 All the Fragments in ATHE- 
NmuS (see Index)—except that 
at1i. 38, 9 (a note on beverages )— 
as also the notices apud PLUT. 
Themist. 3, Aristid. 2, SOTION, 
De Fluwv. 25, are concerned with 
historical. matter. No doubt 
DIOGENES (v. 64, supra, vol. i. 
p. 37, n. 4) took from Aristo the 





OO ee SS ae eee eee 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 479 


us. His successor,! 


testaments of the Peripatetic 


* philosophers, besides other in- 


formation about them; and this 
is probably the reason why his 
history of the Lyceum does not 
go beyond Lyco. There has also 
been handed down to us, in 
Sros. Fel. i. 828 (where it is our 
Aristo that is meant), a division 
of the dyriAnrruh Sivauis rijs 
Wuxijs into the aic@nrimdy and the 
vous, the first working in connec- 
tion with the bodily organs, and 
the latter working without 
organs; and also in SExT. 
Math. ii. 61, QUINTIL. ii. 15, 
19 (cf. infra, p. 483, n.1) a de- 
finition of Rhetoric, whichallows 
us to suppose that he wrote some 
work on the subject.—The Frag- 
ments from Aristo in STOB&XUS, 
Floril. (see Index), belong to the 
Stoic of that name, as is clearly 
shown in various passages: for 
example, 4, 110; 80, 5; 82,7, 11, 
15, 16. The information about 
an Aristo given by SIMPL. Catez., 
Schol. in Av. 65, b, 10, 66, a, 38 
evidently refers to a younger 
Peripatetic, one of the successors 
of Andronicus, and probably the 
same as he whom SENECA, Lp. 
29,6, makes fun of. It is not 
clear which Aristo is meant in 
PLUT. Amator. 21, 2, p. 767, 
Prec. ger. Reip. 10, 4, p. 804. 
In PLuT. Demosth. 10, 30 the 
printed texts, at any rate, give 
‘Xios.’ As to the work 7m. kevo- 
detlas, as the extract therefrom 
anud PHILODEM. De Vit. x. 10, 
23, SAUPPE makes it probable 
(Philocl. de Vit. Lib. Dec. pp. 
6-7, 34) that they refer to our 
Aristo. 

' That Critolaus was Aristo’s 
direct successor is not expressly 


Critolaus of Phaselis in Ly- 


said by any of our authorities ; 
for CLEMENT, who gives a list of 
the Peripatetic ‘ Diadochoi’ in 
Strom. i. 201 B (or, at least, the 
printed text of that passage) 
passes over Aristo (‘after Ari- 
stotle diadéxera: Oedppacros* dy 
Srpdrwv' dv Avewy: elra Kpird- 
Aaos* elra Aiddwpos’). PLUT. De 
Evil, 14, p. 605, does not give a 
full list, but only names those 
Peripatetics who came to Athens 
from abroad, when he says: 
"ApiororéAns hv ex Srayelpwv... 
TAvcov éx Tpwddos, ’Aplorwy ex 
Kéw, KpiréAaos @acnAlrns. Neither 
does Cic. Fin. v. 5, 13-4 intend 
to state the order of sequence of 
the heads of the school, for 
he is only speaking of the 
relation of the later Peripa- 
tetics to Aristotle and Theo- 
phrastus; and so, after naming 
Strato, Lyco, and Aristo, he con- 
tinues, ‘Pratereo multos, in 
his ... Hieronymum ;’ also after 
a few remarks about him, he 
adds, ‘ Critolaus imitari antiquos 
voluit, &c. Thus there appears 
to be a possible vacancy for 
further names between Aristoand 
Critolaus, and this is made some- 
what more probable when we con- 
sider the time which elapsed 
between Lyco’s and Critolaus’s 
death, which seems very long for 
only two school directors. Lyco 
died 226-4 B.c., but Critolaus 
(see foll. note) was in Rome 
156-5 B.c. Supposing that he 
took this journey during the 
latter part of his life, we have a 
period of more than seventy 
years to cover his and Aristo’s 
school-directorship, and if we add 
the forty-four years of Lyco’s 
directorship it makes in all for 


480 


ARISTOTLE 


cia, seems to have been more important. All that we 


the three men nearly 120 years. 
Zumpt (‘Bestand d. Philos. 
Schulen in Athen.’ Abh. d. Berl. 
Akad, Hist.-phil. Ki. 1842, p. 90 
sqq.) is inclined to interpose 
other names between Aristo and 
Critolaus, and he cites the Anony- 
mus of Menage, who at p. 13, 8, 
West., says: Siddoxo: 8 avrov 
[Arist.] tis oXoAjs KaTa Tdtw 
éyévovTo oide* Oedppactos, Srpd- 
tw, MpatiréAns, AvKwv, ’Aplotwr, 
Avkiokos, Tpatipdyns, ‘lepéyupos, 
TIptravis, Poputwy, KpiréAaos. Un- 
fortunately, this evidence is not 
satisfactory. For we _ cannot 
accept as a trustworthy list of 
the school-chiefs correctly set 
out Kara Tdéwv, a statement which 
places between Strato and Lyco, 
who undoubtedly followed 
directly one upon the other—an 
unknown individual, Praxiteles, 
not even mentioned in Strato’s 
will (whom we cannot make a 
contemporary and colleague of 
Strato, as ZUMPT would have 
it, any more than his d:dd50x0s), 
and describes as the second in 
order after Aristo, Praxiphanes, 
who was a scholar of Theo- 
phrastus (supra, vol. ii, p. 449), 
and as the fifth after him at 


Athens Phormio, who, as we 
learn from Cic. De Orat. ii. 
18, 75-6, was in 194 B.c. an 


old man, and in Ephesus, evi- 
dently not merely on a journey ; 
and inserts the still earlier 
Prytanis (supra, vol. ii. p. 477, 
n. 1) as Aristo’s fourth suc- 
cessor: and supplies us in all with 
as many as seven ‘ Diadochoi’ be- 
tween the years 226 and 156 B.o. 
—On the other side we must 
remember that CICERO’s words 
do not necessarily imply any 


gap between Aristo and Critolaus, 
but that it rather seems most 
likely that he did not know of 
any intervening directors: Hier- 


onymus and the ‘multi’ whom. 


he passes over are those whom he 
could not insert in the list of 
diddoxor since they were not 
school-directors. Also the state- 
ment that Andronicus (or, accord- 
ing to some, his pupil Boéthus) 
was the twelfth director in suc- 
cession from Aristotle, is de- 
cidedly against ZUMPT’s theory. 
And why, after all, could not the 
presidencies of Aristo and Cri- 
tolaus have lasted seventy or 
eighty years, just as well as 
that of Lyco lasted forty-four, and 
that of Theophrastus thirty-six 
years? The latter two, by the 
way, were no longer young when 
they were appointed. And we 
know from LucIAN, Macrob. 20 
that Critolaus (not as ZUMPT, 
p. 90, says, Aristo) lived in fact 
to over eighty-two years of age. 
The Stoics Chrysippus and Dio- 
genes held the presidency for at 
least eighty years, and the first 
five Stoic Diadochoi presided in 
all for a period of 140 years. 
Similarly, from 1640 to 1740, and 
again from 1740 to 1840, only 
three princes, and from 1640 to 
1786 (i.e. in 146 years) only four 
princes occupied the throne of 
Prussia. 

' The native town of Critolaus 
is determined by PLuT. ibid. and 
other evidence. Otherwise the 
only certain piece of information 
we have relating to his life is 
that he took part, in conjunction 
with Diogenes and Oritolaus, in 
the celebrated embassy which 
(according to CIC. Acad. ii. 45, 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 481 


know of his views ' shows him to have been in the main a 
true adherent of the Peripatetic teaching,” who, however, 
differed from Aristotle on several points. Thus he 
conceived of the soul, including the reason, as consist- 
ing of ether,* and in his Ethics he went beyond Ari- 
stotle in asserting that pleasure was an evil.‘ In other 
respects his views upon the nature of the summum 
bonum are thoroughly Aristotelian: he describes it 
generally as the perfection of a natural life, and further 
claims for it more particularly that it should embrace 
the three kinds of Goods,’ among which, however, he 








137, during the consulship of P. 
Scipio and M. Marcellus, i.e. 598— 
9 A. U.C., or 156-5 B.C. ; see CLIN- 
TON, Fasti Hellen.) was sent to 
Rome by the Athenians to de- 
precate the fine of 500 talents 
which had been imposed on the 
Athenians for the sack of Oropus. 
Yor further information on this 
subject see PAUSAN. vii. 11; C1c. 
ibid., De Orat. ii. 37, 155, Tuse. 
iv. 3, 5, Ad Att. xii, 23; GELL. 
NV. A. vi. 14, 8, xvii. 21, 48; Pun. 
H. N. vii. 30, 112; Puiu. Cato 
Maj. 22; Mu. V. H. iii. 17 (see 
also infra as to the historical 
bearings of the story), That 
Critolaus, as well as the others, 
lectured in Rome is expressly 
stated (see following note), It 
is also apparent from what has 
been stated in the foregoing note, 
and from what we know of the 
age of his successors, that Crito- 
laus made this journey late in 
life. Except by the fact that he 
lived to be over eighty-two years 
of age (v. ibid.), it is not possible 
to indicate the date of his death. 

' Cf. also Cic. Fin. v. 5, 14: 


VOL, I. 


‘Critolaus imitari antiquos voluit, 
et quidem est gravitate proxi- 
mus, et redundat. oratio, attamen 
is quidem in patriis institutis 
manet.’ In reference to his lec- 
tures in Rome, GELL. vi. 14, 10 
(following Rutilius and Poly bius) 
says: ‘ Violenta et rapida Car- 
neades dicebat, scita et teretia 
Critolaus, modesta Diogenes et 
sobria.’ 

* As CICERO indicates; see 
preceding note. 

* Stop. Hel, i, 58: Kpirddaos 
Kat Addwpos 5 Tips voiy ax’ 
aidépos amafois. TERTULL. De 
An. 5: ‘ Nec illos dico solos, qui 
eam [animam] de manifest is cor- 
poralibus effingunt ..,. ut Cri- 
tolaus et Peripatetici ejus ex 
quinta nescio qua substantia [the 
méuntn ovaia, the ether].’ 

* GELL. J, A. ix. 5, 63 ‘Cri- 
tolaus Peripateticus et malum 
esse voluptatem ait et multa alia 
mala parere ex sese, injurias, 
desidias, obliviones, ignavias,’ 

° CLEMENS, Strom. ii. 316, D: 
KpirdAaos 5¢, 6 kat abrds Meprmarn- 
TiKds, TeAcidTnTa eAeyey [sc,. 7d 


II 


482 ARISTOTLE 


gave so unconditioned a preference to those of the 
soul that the others shrink into complete insignificance 
beside them.! Similarly in Physics he came forward as 
the defender of an important Aristotelian doctrine in 
maintaining the eternity of the world and of the human 
race against the Stoics.? He rests his arguments chiefly 
upon the immutability of the order of nature, which 
excludes the supposition that man has ever come into 
existence in any other way than as he now does; he 
adduces as indirect proof of the same the multiform 
incongruities involved in the idea that primeval man 
sprang from the earth; and concludes that man, and 
therefore also the world, must be eternal, nature having, 
as Plato and Aristotle had already declared,* conferred 
upon the whole race by means of propagation the 
immortality which she was unable to bestow upon 
individuals. He further remarks that a self-caused 
existence like the world must be eternal; if the world 
had a beginning, it would exhibit growth and evolution, 
not only in respect of its material frame, but also of 
the indwelling reason that governs it; this, however, is 
impossible in a being, like it, already perfect. While 
sickness, age, or want destroys living creatures, they 


réAos] kara paw edpootyros Biov. 
Thy ex tay tpiav yevav [the 
three kinds of Goods] cupmAn- 
povpéevny mpoyourny [2 avOpwmurchy | 
Trercdrnta pnviwy. STOB. Lel. 
ii. 58: bwd 5¢ trav vewrépwy Tlepi- 
maTntikav, Tav amd KpiroAdouv, [sc. 
Tédos AéyeTat] Td ex mdvTwY TaY 
ayabav ocuumemAnpwuévoy. TovTO 
de hy Td ek TAY TpLaY yevar. 

1 Cr1c, Tuse. v. 17, 51: ‘Quo 
loco quero, quam vim habeat 


libra illa Critolai: qui cum in 
alteram lancem animi bona im- 
ponat, in alteram corporis et ex- 
terna, tantum propendere illam 
bonorum animi lancem putet, ut 
terram et maria deprimat.’ 

? PHILO, tern. Mundi, p. 
943 B—947 B, Hosch., c. 11- 
15, Bern. 

3 Supra, voi ii. p.. 35, n. 2 
cf. ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 512, 3. 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 483 


cannot affect the world as a whole; if the order or 
destiny of the world is acknowledged to be eternal, 
this must also be true of the world itself, which indeed 
is nothing else than the manifestation of this order. 
While the leading thoughts of this argument are not 
new, yet we must recognise in them an able defence of 
the Peripatetic doctrine. What we are further told of 
Critolaus ' is of little importance. 

Contemporaneous with Aristo and Critolaus was 
Phormio, the Peripatetic, whom Hannibal met at 
Ephesus (circ. 195 B.c.),? but of whom beyond the un- 
seasonable lecture which he delivered to the Cartha- 
ginian hero upon generalship, nothing further is 
known.* To the same period belong apparently Sotion’s‘ 
much-read work on the schools of philosophy * and the 








' According to STos, Hel. i. 
252, Critolaus held time to be a 
vénua } wérpov, and not a birdora- 
os. See also SEXT. Math. ii. 12, 
.20. According to QUINTIL. ii. 
17, 15, he made sharp attacks on 
Rhetoric (of which Sext. tells us 
something), defining it, accord- 
ing to QUINT. ii. 15, 23, as usus 
dicendi (and QUINT. adds, nam 
hoc tpiBh significat), which means 
(as PLATO had said in the Gorg. 
463 B) that it was not an art 
but a mere readiness of speech 
acquired by practice. Further 
information as to what he said 
in connection with this criticism 
of oratory may be found in GELL. 
xi. 9. 

2 We have this incident from 
Cic. De Orat. ii. 18. As Hanni- 
bal was then with Antiochus in 
Ephesus, it must have been about 
the time stated in the text; and 
as he called the philosopher a 


delirus senex, Phormio . must 
have then been advanced in 
years. 

* For, as already remarked, 
we can make nothing of the 
statement of the ANON. MEN. 
cited at p. 480, n. supra. 

* That Sotion was a Peri- 
patetic is not expressly stated, 
but is evident from the whole 
character of his writings. Cf. 
SoTION, De Flw. 44 (WEsTER- 
MANN, Tapadogdypapo, p. 191). 

> Cf. WESTERMANN, Tlapa- 


dotéypapor, p. xlix; and see 
particularly PANZERBIETER, 
‘Sotion,’ in Jahn’s Jahrbb. 


Supplement, v. (1837) p. 211 sqq. 
where it is shown from the data 
given by DiIoGEeNESs that the 
Aiadoxh Tay pirogdpwy must have 
been written between 200 and 
150 B.c.—probably between 200 
and 170 B.c.: inasmuch as, on 
the one hand, Chrysippus, who 


112 


484 


histories! of Hermippus and Satyrus. 


died about 206, was mentioned 
in the book (Dro. vii. 183), and, 
on the other hand, Heraclides 
‘Lembus (de quo infra) made an 
extract fromit. PANZERBIETER 
also makes it probable that the 
A.adoxy consisted of 13 books, 
whose contents he endeavours to 
indicate. To this work belong 
also the references in ATHEN. 
iv. 62, e, viii. 343, c, xi. 505, c; 
Sext. Math. vii. 15.—ATHEN. 
viii. 336, d, tells us of another 
work of Sotion’s, rept tay Tiuwvos 
ciAAwv. It is very questionable 
whether it is chronologically 
possible that he could have 
‘written the 12 books AtoxAeiwy 
éréyxov directed against Diocles 
of Magnesia (v. DION. x. 4). 
At any rate the Képas "AuaAJdelas, 
(GELL. WV. A. i. 8, 1, cf. with 
Pun. H. N. pref. 24), the frag- 
ment on rivers and springs (in 
WESTERMANN’S Tlapadotdéypapai, 
p. 183 sqq., cf. with PHot. Bibl. 
Cod. 189), which was probably 
part of the last-named work, the 
writing 7. épyis (StoB. Florit. 
14, 10, 20, 53, 108, 59, 113, 15) 
and those from which are derived 
the Fragments apud  STOB. 
Floril. 84, 6-8, 17, 18, belong to 
one or perhaps to two younger 
men of the same name. We 
should say to one, if the Peri- 
patetic Sotion mentioned by 
GELL. as author of the Képas ’Au. 
is identical with the Sotion who 
was Seneca’s (Hpist. 49, 2, 108, 
17-20) teacher in the school of 
Sextus (ZELL. Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 
600, 3, 605, 3); MULLER, Fragm. 
Hist. Gr. iii. 168 takes it for 
granted that this is the case, 
but there seems to be some pro- 
bability that they were different 


ARISTOTLE 


Heraclides 


persons. In this case we must 
also attribute to that Peripatetic 
(ZELL., ibid. iii. a, 694, 2nd ed.) 
the citations in ALEX. APHR,. 
Top. 123 (which appear to be 
from a commentary on Ari- 
stotle), and in CRAMER'S Anecd, 
Paris. i. 391, 3; and _ the 
same man is perhaps meant in 
PLutT. Frat. Am. c. 16, p. 487, 
and Alew. c.61. On the other 
hand, the moral maxims cited by 
Stopzus belong to Seneca’s 
teacher. It is impossible to say 
who was the Sotion frequently 
cited in the Geoponica, but he 
was in any case not the author 
of the Asmdoxn7. M. HERTZ 
‘Ramenta Gelliana’ (Bresl. Uni- 
versitatschrift, 1868) p. 15-6 
attributes the Kepas “Award. to 
the elder Sotion, but this does 
not follow from what is said by 
GELL. i. 8, 1; cf. ATHEN. xiii. 
588 c; DioG. ii. 74. 

1 See Lozynski, Hermippi 
Fragm. Bonn, 1832; PRELLER, 
in Jahn’s Jahrb. 1836, xvii. 159 
sqq.; MULLER, Pragm. Hist. Gr. 
iii. 35 sqq.; NIETZSCHE, Rhein. 
Mus. xxiv. 188-9, Zz. HERMIPPUS 
is described by HIERON. De 
Script. Eccl. c. 1 (whose autho- 
rity is not of much value) as a 
Peripatetic, and by ATHEN. ii. 
58-9, v. 213-4, xv. 696-7 as 6 
KadAAmdxeios, i.e. ‘the pupil of 
Callimachus’; he is, therefore, 
probably the same Hermippus as 
is said to be a native of Smyrna 
in ATHEN. vii. 327 c. As we 
hear that in his chief work he 
mentioned the death of Chrys. — 
ippus (DIoG. vii. 184) whereas — 
he is not referred to as an autho- 
rity for later events, we may 
infer that he must have written 





SE ————-—--— 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 


485 


Lembus,' Agatharchides and Antisthenes of Rhodes 


about 200 B.c. or svon after. 
The citation in the Ltymol. M. 
118, 11 would carry the date a 
little further—to about 203 B.c. 
—if the work there referred to 
was by him ; see MULLER’s note 
to Fr. 72.—Of his books, we hear 
of a great work of biography, 
the Buoi, different parts of which 
seem to have been known by 
various separate names,—A 
second work 7m, tay év maidela 
diadauypdyvrwy (tym. M. ibid.), 
of which the 1. ray diampeWdytwv 
év matdela SovAwy cited by SUIDAS 
8. v. “lorpos was no doubt a part, is 
with a great balance of proba- 
bility ascribed by PRELLER, 
MULLER and others to the later 
Hermippus of Berytus. As to 
other writings not belongingto our 
Hermippus, see PRELLER, p. 174 
sqq. Forthe list of the works of 
Aristotle and Theophrastus pro- 
bably given in the Bfot, see vol. i. 
p. 51.—In like manner, SaTyRuS 
is described as a_ Peripatetic 
in ATHEN. vi. 248, d. xii. 534, 
b, 541, c. xiii. 556, a. His 
chief work was a collection of 
biographies, cited as the Blo 
(cf. ATHEN. vi. 248, d, f, 250 f, 
xii. 541, c, xiii. 557, c, 584, a; 
D104, ii. 12, viii. 40, 53 ; HiprRon. 
Adv. Jovin. ii. 14, De Script. 
Feel. c. 1), and called more 
fully (as is inferred by BERNAyYs, 
Theophr. iib. Frimm. 161 from 
Hrgr. Adv. Jov.) Bio evddtwv 
avdpav. Further ATHEN. iv. 168 
BE, cites from a writer who 


-is evidently our Satyrus, a frag- 


ment from a work 7. xapaxrhpwyv. 
Another book in which a list of 
the Demes of Alexandria was 
given (THEOPHIL. Ad Aufol. ii. 
p. 94), and a collection of pro- 


verbs (Dionys. HAL. Antiguitt. i. 
68) are probably, but not cer- 
tainly, the work of a later 
scholar of whom (if he existed) 
we do not know whether he was 
or was not a Peripatetic (for in 
ATHEN. xiii. 556, a, only our 
Satyrus can be meant, and he is 
in fact always designated in the 
same manner). We can say 
with more certainty that the 
poem on precious stones, which 
PLIN. H. N. xxxvii. 2, 31, 6, 91, 
7, 94, cites as by a Satyrus, was 
not the work of our Peripatetic. 
Cf. MULLER, ibid. 159, and the 
Fragments there, which in so far 
as they are genuine, contain 
only historical matter, excepting 
those from the ‘ Characters.’ 

' See MULLER, Hist. Gr. iii. 
167 sqq. HERACLIDES, surnamed 
Lembus (cf. MULLER, idid.), came, 
according to Drog. v. 94, from 
Calatis in Pontus or from Alex- 
andria; according to SUIDAS, 
8.v. “HpakA. from Oxyrynchus in 
Egypt. According to Sump. he 
lived under Ptolemy Philometor 
(181-147 B.c.) in a distinguished 
position. Sup. calls him qiad- 
sopos, and adds that he was the 
author of philosophical and other 
works. As his helper Agath- 
archides (see following note) is 
counted among the Peripatetics, 
and his own literary activity lay 
in this direction, we may include 
him also as one of the school. 
The AeuBevrixds Adyos, which is 
said to have been the origin of 
his surname (D1oa. ibid.), was 
probably a philosophical work; 
but the most important of his 
works were, in any way, those 
which were historical. We know 
of an historical work in at least 


486 


are rather later.! 


ARISTOTLE 


No single utterance on philosophy, 


however, has been preserved to us from any of these. 
More important for us is Diodorus of Tyre,” the suc- 


cessor of Critolaus. 


In his view of the soul he agreed 


with his master,* but differed from him and from 


thirty-seven books, an extract 
from the biography of Satyrus 
(D104. viii. 40, 44, 53, 58), and a 
A.aiox} in six books, which was 
an epitome of Sotion’s work 
(Diog. v. 94, 79, villi. 7, x. 1). 
See the Fragm. of these, apud 
MULLER, ibid. 

1 AGATHARCHIDES of Cnidos, 
5 ék tTév wepimdtwy (STRABO, xiv. 
2, 15, p. 656), was secretary 
to the above-named Heraclides 
Lembus (PHOT. Cod. 213 init.), 
and was afterwards (as we learn 
from his own words apud PHOT. 
Cod. 250, p. 445, a, 33, 460, b, 6) 
the tutor of a prince (MULLER, 
ibid. 191 supposes, with WESSE- 
LING, that it was Ptolemy 
Physcon II., who reigned from 
117-107 B.c.). Agatharchides 
wrote several historical and eth- 
nographical works, of which one 
on the Red Sea has been pre- 
served in great part by PHOT. 
Cod. 250, pp. 441-460; as to the 
rest see MULLER, p. 190 sqq.—So 
ANTISTHENES is spoken of by 
PHLEGON, Mirab. 3, as a Peri- 
patetic and a _ distinguished 
author, of whom he tells us a 
wonderful story about an alleged 
occurrence of the year 191 B.C. 
He is probably the same as the 
Peripatetic whose A:adoxat Dio- 
genes often cites, and is, perhaps, 
also to be identified with the 
historian from Rhodes, who, ac- 
cording to POLYBIUS, xvi. 14, 
was still alive during the first 
thirty years or so of the second 


century (MULLER, Hist. Gr. iii. 
182, believes the two to be 
different persons). The citations 
in Diogenes do not carry wus 
beyond the death of Cleanthes 
(MULLER, ibid.). That the 
pseudo-Aristotelian May:nds prob- 
ably belonged to this Antisthenes 
of Rhodes has been already re- 
marked, supra, vol. i. p. 81, n. 1. 

2 STos. Fel. i. 58, calls this 
Diodorus a Tyrian, and in Clic. 
De Orat.i. 11, 45, Fin. v. 5, 14, 
and CLEM. Strom. 1, 301 B, 
he is described as the disciple 
and successor of Critolaus. Other- 
wise nothing is known about 
him, and it is impossible to 
define the date of his death or 
of his accession to the headship 
of the school; if, however, we 
can trust what CIC. says in the 
De Orat. ibid., he must have 
been still alive in 110 B.c. (see 
ZuMPT, ‘ Veber d. Bestand d. 
philos. Schulen in Athen., Adh. 
d. Berl. Akad. Hist.-phil. Kl. 
1842, p. 93); but this, in view of 
the facts set out in n. 3 on p. 487 
infra, is questionable. 

* So Srop. ibid.; see supra, 
vol. ii. p. 481, 0.3. Still, he did 
not propose to overlook the 
difference between the rational 
and the irrational in the soul; 
for, according to PLUT, Fragm. » 
1, Utr. An. an Corp. c. 6, 2 (if 
here Avddwpos may be read for 
A.ddorvtos, or if we may take the 
‘ AiddoTos’ adopted by Diibner as 
being another form of the same 














PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 487 


Aristotle in his ethics, uniting with their views upon 
the swmmum bonum those of Hieronymus, and to a 


certain extent combining 


the Stoic and Epicurean 


ethical principles with one another by maintaining that 
happiness consists in a virtuous and painless life ;' as, 
however, virtue was declared by him to be the most 
essential and indispensable element in it, this deviation 
is in reality less important than at first appears.’ 
Erymneus,’ the successor of Diodorus, we know only 


name), he allowed that the 
Aoyixdy of the yx? had its 
special d@y, and that the oup- 
gues [sc. TG cduari] and &Aoyov 
had special +d@n also; which can 
be reconciled with the ‘ draGts’ 
of Stob. by supposing that he 
held that the modifications of 
the rational portion of the soul, 
including the activities of 
thought, were improperly de- 
scribed ‘ dos.’ . 

' Orc. Fin. v. 5, 14: ‘Diodorus, 
ejus [Critol.] auditor, adjungit 
ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. 
Hic quoque suus est ; de summo- 
que bono dissentiens dici vere 
Peripateticus non potest.’ So also 
25, 73, ii. 6, 19, and Acad. ii. 42, 
131; cf. Fin. ii. 11, 34: ‘Callipho 
ad virtutem nihil adjunxit, nisi 
voluptatem : Diodorus, nisi va- 
cuitatem doloris.’ Zwuse. v. 30, 
85: ‘ Indolentiam autem honest- 
ati Peripateticus Diodorus ad- 
junxit.’ IZbid. 87: ‘ Eadem [like 
the Stoics] Calliphontis erit Dio- 
dorique sententia ; quorum uter- 
que honestatem sic complectitur, 
ut omnia, que sine ea sint, 
longe et retro ponenda censeat.’ 
CLEMENS, Strom. ii. 415 C: Kad 
Arddwpos duolws, ard Tis adrijs 
aipérews ‘yevduevos [as Hierony- 


mus], TéAos amopalverar Td dox- 
Anrws Kal Karas Civ. 

* We find also a definition of 
Rhetoric ascribed to a Diodorus 
(NikoL. Progymn. Rhet. Gr. 
apud SPENGEL, iii. 451, 7), which 
implies that he wrote about 
Rhetoric. There is the less 
reason to doubt that this Dio- 
dorus is the Peripatetic, since we 
have seen that the same question 
arose in the cases of Aristo and 
Critolaus ; supra, vol. ii. p. 483, 
n. i. 

’ The long and detailed frag- 
ment of PosIDONIUS, preserved 
by ATHEN. v. 211, d sqq., gives 
the history of one Athenion, de- 
scribed as a Peripatetic, who had 
studied first in Messene and in 
Larissa (the addition that he 
became head of the school in 
Athens is plainly a blunder of 
Athenzus, which is refuted by 
his own quotation from Posi- 
donius), and had then contrived 
by flattery to ingratiate himself 
with Mithridates, and so to make 
himself for a time the master of 
Athens (meaning evidently the 
same man who is called ‘ Aristion’ 
by Piut. Sulla, 12, 13, 23, and 
elsewhere, and who is described 
by APPIAN, Mithr, 28, as an Epi- 


488 | ARISTOTLE 


by name. With regard to Callipho and Dinomachus, 
two philosophers who in ethics occupy an intermediate 
position between the Epicureans and the Peripatetics, 
we are wholly ignorant to which school they belonged.! 

Among our sources of information with regard to 
the state of the Peripatetic philosophy during the third 
and second century B.C. are probably to be reckoned 
most of the writings which our previous investigation 
excluded as spurious from the collected works of 
Aristotle. While the contribution they supply is an 
insignificant one, yet it is not so wholly worthless but 
that it will repay us to examine its contents. To this 
class belongs, in the field of logic, the second part of the 
Categories, which has probably come down to us in its 
present form from that period.? Important as these so- 
called ‘ Postpreedicamenta’ of the later logic may have 
been, yet the treatment which a few of the principles 
of Aristotelian logic here receive cannot but appear 


curean); and Posidonius says 
explicitly that this man was a 
natural son of Athenion, a pupil 
of Erymneus. As Athens re- 
volted from the rule of the. 
Romans in 88 B.c., it follows 
from the account given in this 
Fragment that Erymneus cannot 
have begun his headship of the 
school later than 120-110 B.c. 

1 What is known of these two 
philosophers through C1c. Fin. 
ii. 6, 19, 11, 34 (supra, vol. ii. p. 
487, n. 1), v. 8, 21, 25, 73, Acad. 
ii, 42, 131, Tuse. v. 30, 85, 87, 
Offic. iii. 34, 119, and CLEM. 
Strom. ii. 415 ©, limits itself to 
this: that they thought to find 
the highest happiness in the 
union of pleasure and virtue, or, 


as CLEMENT says, they sought 
it in pleasure, but they further 
explained that virtue was equally 
valuable; or rather, according to 
Tuse. v. 30, 87 indispensable. 
According to Cio. Fin. v. 25, 73, 
Callipho was older than 
Diodorus, and according to Acad. 
ii. 45, 1839, older, or at any rate 
not younger, than Carneades. 
It is not stated to what school 
he and Dinomachus belonged ; 
but HARLESS (fabric. Biblioth. 
iii, 491) makes a gross mistake 
when he suggests that this Dino- 
machus is the Stoic mentioned 
by Luctan, Philopseud. 6 sqq. 
for the latter was evidently a 
contemporary of Lucian. 
2 Supra, vol. i. p. 64, n. 1. 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 489 


insignificant to us, and a like judgment must be passed 
upon the last chapter of the work wept “Epynveias.' 
The spurious treatise on the Elements of Metaphysics ? 
contains, with the exception of a passage in the second 
book already touched upon,* scarcely any modification 
of the Aristotelian doctrine. The work upon Melissus, 
Zeno and Gorgias, of the date of whose composition 
we know absolutely nothing, proves its spuriousness 
not so much by any positive deviations from the Ari- 
stotelian teaching as by the defects of its historical 
statements and critical expressions, as well as by the 
general obscurity of its aim.‘ Of works upon Physics 
the book upon the World will hereafter engage our atten- 
tion as an example of the eclectic method of combining 
Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines.* The treatise upon In- 
divisible Lines which, if it is not the work of Theo- 
phrastus himself,° appears to date from his time, ably 
combats a view which Aristotle had rejected. To the 
school of Theophrastus and Strato perhaps belong the 
treatises upon Colours, Sounds, the Vital Spirit, and the 








1 The Postpredicamenta treat 
of (1) c« 10-1, the four 
kinds of opposition which have 
been described already, supra, 
vol. i. p. 223 sqq.; (2) c. 12, the 
different significations of the 
mpérepov, with a slight, but 
merely, formal dissent from 
Metaph. v. 11; (3) oc. 13, the 
signitications of the dua, this sec- 
tion being only based ‘in part 
upon the earlier texts and in 
part original (cf. WaITz, ad 
loc.), though not contrary to the 
views of Aristotle; (4) c. 14, 
concerning the six kinds of 


motion, in agreement with the 
views stated supra, vol. i. p. 423, 
n. 1; (5) c. 15, on the exew, 
the meanings of which are set 
out rather differently from the 
Aristotelian account in Metaph. 
v. 23. 

2 Cf. with supra, vol. i. p. 66, 
n. l. 
% Supra, vol. ii. p. 429, n. 1. 

4 Cf. herewith ZELL. Ih. d. 
Gr. i. 464 sqq. 

5 ZEuL. Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 
558 sqq. 2nd ed. 

® Cf. supra, vol. i. p. 86, n. 1, 
and ZELL, Ph. d. Gr. i. 868, 4. 


490 - ARISTOTLE 


Motions of Animals—works which are not without inde- 
pendence, and exhibit evidence of respectable work in 
the field of science. ‘The first of these, differing widely 
from Aristotle, traces the origin of the colours to the 
elements, of which fire is said to be yellow while the 
rest are naturally white; black is caused by the trans- 
mutation of one element into another, the burning up 
of air and water and the drying up of water.! All 
colours are said to be mixtures of these three elements.? 
Light is described as the proper colour of fire ;3 that it 
is conceived of as corporeal‘ is obvious, not only from 
its being classed, as we have just seen, with the colours, 
but also from the way in which the lustre and the 
dulness of thick transparent bodies are alike explained.® 
Upon the further contents of this treatise, as it goes on 
to discuss in detail the preparation of colours and the 
natural hues of plants and animals, we cannot here 
stop, to enlarge. With regard, similarly, to the short 


1 De Color. c 1; PRANTL, 10, c. 3, 793, b, 33. For more 


Arist. v. d. Farben, 108, finds in 
this treatise a confusion of two 
views : (@) that darkness is either 
the absence or partial absence 
of light (the latter in the case of 
shadows or of rays penetrating 
through the density of some 
transparent body); and (0) that 
blackness is to be explained in 
the manner stated in the text. 
The inconsistency, however, is 
only apparent: for the oxéros, 
which produces the appearance 
of the blackness (791, a, 12), is 
to be distinguished from the 
béAay xpG@pua, which is the quality 
of bodies tending to check light 
and produce oxéros (791, b, 17). 
20,1, 791, a, 11, c. 2, 792, a, 


detailed theories on the origin 
of the different colours, see c. 2, 3. 

3 C. 1, 791, b, 6 sqq.; cf. with 
791, a, 3. 

* Strato held the same views 
on this, but not Aristotle or 
Theophrastus ; swpra, vol. i. p. 
518, n. 3, vol. ii. p. 879, n. 1. 

5 Lustre (orTiABov) is (c. 3, 
793, a, 12) a cuvéxeta dwrds Kal 
mukvorns: transparent matter 
looks dark, when it is too thick 
to allow the rays of light to pierce 
it, and bright when it is thin, 
like air, which when not present 
in too dense a. form is overcome 
by the rays: xwpi(ouevos bm’ abtav 
mTuKVOTEpwy ovoaY Kal Siapavouevwv 


5’ avrod (c. 3, 794, a, 2 sqq.). 


—— 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 491 


work upon Sounds, which in tone and method is related 
to that on Colours, and is to be attributed perhaps to the 
same author, it will be sufficient to refer to our previous 
quotation from it.' We must assume a different author 
for the work upon the Vital Spirit,? which discusses in a 
somewhat sceptical tone the origin, sustenance, dif- 
fusion, and operation of the anima vite accepted by 
Aristotle as the primary substratum of the soul.? This 
book, on account of its fragmentary character and the 
numerous corruptions in the text, is sometimes almost 
incomprehensible to us. Its general presuppositions of 
design in nature, and of a soul and vital spirit united 
with it ® in man, are Aristotelian. Peculiar to itself, on 
the other hand, is the assumption that the vital spirit, 
as Hrasistratus had held,® spreads from the heart by 
means of the arteries through the whole body, and that 
it is this (and not, as Aristotle held, the flesh) which 
is the primary organ of sensation.’ Respiration, the 
pulse, the consumption and distribution of the food,’ 
are effects of the operation of the vital spirit, which 
nourishes itself from the blood, the breath serving only, 
as Aristotle had taught, to cool it.° The relation of the 





? Supra, vol. ii. p. 465, n. 8. 

* As to which ctf. also supra, 
vol. i. p. 89, n. 3, ad fin. 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 6, n. 2. 

* Cf. c. 7, 484, b, 1¥, 27 sqq. 
c. 9, 485, b, 2 sqq. 

® C. 9, 485, b, 11; cf. with c. 
1, 480, a, 17, c. 4, 482, b, 22, c. 
5, 483, a, 27 sqq. The subject 
of the treatise did not give any 
occasion for the statement of any 
view as to the Nois. 

* As to this physician, who 
was probably a pupil of Theo- 


phrastus (supra, vol. ii. p. 451, n. 
2), and as to his theory of the 
dissemination of the pneuma 
through the arteries, see SPREN- 
GEL, Gesch. d. Arzneih. 4 ed. i. 
525 sqq.; on the relations of the 
m™, mveduatus to his teaching 
see Rose, Le Arist. Libr. Ord. 
167-8. 

7 C, 5, 483, a, 23 sqq. b, 10-26, 
c. 2, 481, b, 12, 18. 

§ C, 4-5. 

* Cf. supra, vol. ii. p. 6, n. 2, 
p. 43. 


492 ARISTOTLE 


operative pneuma,' which was said to reside in the 
sinews and nerves,” to this vital principal is not made 
altogether clear.* 

Of a later date than this treatise,t and much more 
clearly written, is one upon the Motion of Animals, 
which professes to be the work of Aristotle,> inad- 
missible as this claim is.6 The contents of this work are 
almost entirely drawn from Aristotle, but are in parts 
so combined as wholly to contradict the spirit of his 
teaching. It starts from the principle that all mo- 
tion must ultimately be referred to a self-moving and 
unmoved entity,’ but proceeds by a singular applica- 
tion of it to draw the conclusion that every mechanical 


1 C. 1-2, c. 5 ad fin. where 
at p. 484, a, 8 we must read: 
atupuTov mas 7 Siamovh, &c. 

2 The sinews and nerves were 
not distinguished by Herophilus, 
the first discoverer of nerves, or 
by his contemporary, Erasi- 
stratus, or indeed for a long time 
afterwards, but they were desig- 
nated as a whole by the common 
term vevpa, which had originally 
signified the ~sinews only; 
SPRENGEL, ibid. 511-12, 524-25. 

3 C. 8 init. (where at p. 485, 
a, 4 we should probably read: 
mdvtwy 8 éott Adyov BéATIOV ws 
kal vov Cnreiv): ov by Sdkeve Kivh- 
Tews Eveka TA GOTH, GAAA paAAOV 
72 vedpa Td dwddoyov, ev @ 
TpOTH To TvEDUA TH KWNTIKOY. 

4 As we see from the fact that 
the 7. rvevpatos is quoted in the 
wT. (wv Kiwioews Cc. 10, 703, a, 10: 
cf. supra, vol. i. p. 92. The pos- 
sibility that both works have the 
same author is not excluded: 
but the style and manner of ex- 
pression differ too much. 


5 The first words of the 7m. 
(gwv Kivhoews present it as the 
completion of an earlier inquiry, 
which is evidently meant to in- 
dicate the 7m. (¢wv -opelas. 
Again inc. 1, 698,a, 7 we have 
a reference to Phys. viii. in c. 
6, at p. 700, b, 4, lines 21 and 9 
(cf. supra, vol. i. p. 80) to the 
mw, wuxjs and the wm. ris mperns 
piAocogias ; inc. 11 ad fin. to the 
mw. (@wv popiwy, the m. Puxijs, the 
mw. aicOjoews Kal brvov kal uvhuns, 
and to the 7. (gw yevécews as an 
immediately preceding treatise. 
These references are made jush 
in the way in which Aristotle 
himself was accustomed to quote 
his works. Nevertheless the x. 
(gw Kwhoews is so free, both in 
style and matter, from any of the 
marks which would betray a very 
late date, that we should not be 
justified in referring it to a time 
subsequent to the work of Andro- 
nicus. 

6 Supra, vol. i. p. 93, n. 1. 

7 C. 1, 698, a, 7 sqq. (where 


PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 498 


motion presupposes two unmoved entities: in the 
thing itself a motionless point from which the motion 
proceeds, and outside of it a motionless body upon 
which the thing rests;' from which it again con- 
cludes that the unmoved principle which propels the 
world cannot be within the latter, but must be out- 
side of it.2 It further shows in a discussion with 
which we are already familiar, how the presentation of 
the desirable object to the mind creates the desire, and 
this in turn the physical movements,’ which all proceed 
from the centre of the body as the seat of sensation—or, 
to be strict, from the soul, which there has its abode.* 
The soul thus operates upon the body by means of the 
expansion and contraction, the rise and fall of the vital 
spirit (rvedpa cipputov). In order that it should so 
operate, however, it is not necessary that it should leave 
its seat in the heart and act directly upon all parts of the 
body, since, in virtue of the principle of order that 
governs the whole, its decrees find automatic fulfilment.’ 


we should read rovrov 8 7d Aristotle’s belief as to the still- 








axlynrov), and c. 6, 700, b, 7. 

1 ©. 1, 698, a, 11, c. 2. ad fin. ; 
and c. 4, 700, a, 6 sqq. We have 
also at 698, a, 11 the remarkable 
statement: 5¢? 5¢ Todro wh wdvov 
T@ Ady Kabddrov AaBeiv, AAG Kal 
ém) rev Kabéxacra Kal Tay aisdnTay, 
80 Garep Kal tovs Kabdrov (nTovmev 
Aéyous—which is an exaggeration 
of the view which is indicated 
as that of Aristotle, supra, vol. i. 
p. 167. . 

2 ©. 3-4, where the myth of 
Atlas referred to in De Cela, ii. 
1, 284,-a, 18, is proved to be 
mechanically impossible. We 
might conclude from 699, a, 31 
that the author did not share 


ness of the earth, but this is 
hardly his meaning. He is only 
carried away in the heat of con- 
troversy into usipg an argument 
which would make, in fact, 
against Aristotle himself. 

8 ©, 6-8; supra, vol. ii. p. 110 


sq. 

$0. 9. 

5 ©.10. This recalls both the 
work quoted, the 7m. mvedmaros, 
and also the 7. xécuov, which, in 
the discussion it contains as to 
the action of God on the world 
(c. 6, 398, b, 12 sqq, 400, b, 11 
sqq-), appears to have in view 
the passage referred to in the 
text, as also c. 7, 701, b, Ll. 


494 ARISTOTLE 


The pamphlet ends with some remarks upon involun- 
tary movements.' 

Among the superior pseudo-Aristotelian writings 
we must reckon also the Mechanical Problems,? which, 
however, contain too little of a philosophical character 
to detain us here.—Even the work on Physiognomy, 
however mistaken the attempt as a whole, furnishes us 
with an example of logical methods and careful, some- 
times even keen, observation. Its leading thought is 
the complete interdependence of body and soul ;* from 
which it concludes that there must be certain physical 
indications of moral and intellectual characteristics, the 
extent and subtilty of which may be measured both by 
the analogy of certain of the lower animals and by the 
impression produced by the figure, features and gait. 
On this latter subject many of its observations are not 
without value.—The tenth book of the Natural History+ 
deviates from one of the fundamental principles of the 
Aristotelian physiology ° by the assumption of a female 
seed, but in other respects gives evidence of careful 
observation, remarkable for that time. At the earliest 
it belongs to the school of Strato..—The pseudo- 


ao 

2 Supra, vol. i. p. 86, n. I. 

3 C. 1 init.: Ort ai Sidvoim 
EmovTat Tols THuacl, Kal OvK eioly 
a’ral Kad’ éavTas arabeis obcal TaV 
TOU o@maros Kihoewy . . . Kal 
tovvaytiov 5) Tots THs Wuxs Tabh- 
aot Th Cua cuumdoxov pavepdy 
yivera &c.; Cc. 4 init.: Sone? SE 
horn Wuxh Kal Td cGua cupmradety 
adrAnaos &c. This cuumdbea re- 
calls the terminology of the 
Stoics. . 

+ Probably identical with the 


bmép Tov wy *yevvav, which has 
been mentioned supra, vol. i. p. 
87, n. 1. 

5 C. 5, 636, b, 15, 26, 37, c. 6 
Jin. ©. 2, 634, b, 29, 36, c. 3, 636, 
a, 11, c. 4 fin. &c., wherewith cf. 
vol. ii. p. 50 sq. 

6 The female seed has already 
been discussed in connection 
with Strato, swpra, vol. ii. p. 466, 
n.1. This book differs still 
further from Aristotle (as Rose, 
Arist. Libr. Ord. 172, points 
out) in that it incuicates that the 











-PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 495 


Aristotelian Tales of the Marvellous cannot be adduced 
as examples of independent research, but only as a 
proof of the uncritical eagerness with which the later 
learning was wont to collect even the most improbable 
statements, if only they were surprising enough; and 
the same is in the main true of the form in which the 
Problems have come down to us. ‘These works are 
useless to us in a history like the present, if for no 
other reason, because we are entirely ignorant through 
how many hands they have come, and when they 
received their present form.! 

Among the ethical works in the Aristotelian collection 
there are three besides the Hudemian Ethics which are of 
later Peripatetic origin : the essay upon Virtues and Vices, 
the so-called Magna Moralia, and the Heononucs. The first 
of these will come before us hereafter among the evidences 
of the Eclecticism of the younger Peripatetic school.— 
The Magna Moralia is an abbreviated reproduction of 
the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics, which (apart 
from the books which are common to both of these) 
for the most part follows the latter,? although in indivi- 
dual sections preferring the former. ‘The essential points 
of the earlier works are as a rule intelligently grasped 
and placed in due prominence, sometimes even receiving 








seed is absorbed through the 
mvevua, and not, as Aristotle 
believed, by the warmth of the 
uterus (c. 2, 634, b, 34, c. 3, 636, 
a, 4, c. 5, 637, a, 15 sqq.). That 
the book is post-Aristotelian is 
again proved by the passage on 
the plan, c. 7, 638, a, 10-18, 
which is copied, word for word, 
from the Gen. An. iv. 7, 775, a, 
27 sqq. on 


' See supra, vol. i. p. 96 sqq. ; 
and see also p. 85, n., as to the 
Aristotelian fragment on the 
Signs of the Weather; and as to 
the books on Plants, which do 
not here concern us, see p. 93 
n. 2. 

* Cf. SPENGEL, Abhandl. d 
philos.-philol. Kl. d. Bayr. Akad 
iii. 515-6; BRANDIS, ii. b, 1566. 


496 


further development and elucidation. 


ARISTOTLE 


The manner of 


presentation is in parts clumsy and not free from repe- 
titions, nor is the proof always convincing,’ while the 
atroptat, which the writer frequently delights to propose, 
receive an unsatisfactory solution, or none at all.” In the 
original parts of the work we find much that is more or 
less at variance with the spirit of the Aristotelian 


ethics. 


1 Kg. B. i. 1, 1183, b, 8 sqq. 

2 So ii. 3, 1199, a, 19—b, 36, 
ii. 15, 1212, b, 37 sqq. i. 35, 1127, 
b, 27 sqq. 
seriously discussed at ii. 6, 1201, 
a, 16 sqq. are curiously and 
characteristically petty. 

3 In this respect the following 
points may be noticed :—i. 2-3 
gives us various divisions of the 
kinds of Good, of which only that 
into spiritual, bodily, and exter- 
nal goods (in c. 3) is Aristote- 
lian, and the subdivision of the 
spiritual goods into ¢pdrnots, 
GpetH, and 7dovh is taken from 
Hud. ii.. 1, 1218, b,.°34, where, 
however, these three are not 
given as a division, but are only 
intended as examples of spiritual 
goods. Peculiar to this author 
is the division of goods into the 
tiuia (God, the Soul, the Nous, 
&c.), the éranverd (the Virtues), 
the Suvduers (a curious expression 
for the dvvduer. ayaa, i.e. the 
things, such as riches, beauty, 
&c., which may be used for good 
or evil), and. fourthly, the cwori- 
Kov Kal moinTiKdy Tov ayalov; pecu- 
liar to him also are the divisions 
into things which are good un- 
conditionally or good condition- 
ally (i.e. virtues and exvernal 
goods), into TéAn and ov TEAy (as 
health and the means to health), 


The difficulties so 


The author avoids the religious view of ethics 


and into réAem and areAH. The 
methods already introduced by 
the Stoics seem to have influenced 
the writer of the M. Mor. in 
this matter, for we know some- 
thing of their fondness for mul- 
tiplying | distinctions between 
différent senses of the ayabbdv, de 
quo v. STOB. ii, 92-102, 124-5, 
130, 1386-7; DioG. vii. 94-98; 
Cic. Fin. iii 16, 55; Sext. Pyrrh. 
iii. 181; SeNHCA, Zpist. 66, 5, 
36-7. As these Stoical classifi- 
cations had their origin chiefly 
in the work of Chrysippus, we 
might found upon this circum- 
stance an inference as to the 
date of the M. Mor. itself.— 
Again, though it is not true that 
the M. Mor. leaves out the dia- 
noétic virtues (for only the name 
is wanting, and at i. 5, 1185, b, 
5, i. 35, the subject is really dealt 
with), yet, on the other hand, it 
is against the Aristotelian prin- 
ciples to say, as the author does, 
that only the virtues of the 
&Aovyov (i.e. the ethical virtues, 
which, therefore, are alone named 
Gpetal) are émaiveral, but that 
those of the Adyov éxov are not 
(i. 5, 1185, b, 5 sqq. c. 35, 1197, 
a, 16). Theauthor, inthis respect 
dissenting from Aristotle, under 
the head of the dianoétic virtues 
combines téxvn with émorhpn, 








PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 497 


which he found in Eudemus.! 


Of the later combina- 


tion of the Peripatetic teaching with Stoic and 
Academic elements his work contains hardly a trace ; ? 


which term in the M. Mor. is 
constantly used for réxvy (i. 35, 
1197, a, 18, cf. with the Vic. Lth. 
vi. 5, 1140, b, 21; and 1198, a, 32, 
ii. 7, 1205, a, 31, 1206, a, 25, cf. 
Nic. Fth. vii. 12-13, 1152, b, 18, 
1153, a, 23; ii. 12, 1211, b, 26, 
cf. Vic. Hth. x. 7, 1167 b, 33; 


only in M. Mor, i. 35, 1197, a, 12 


sqq. is téxvn used in the same 
way as in Nic. Hth. vi. 4, 1140, 
a, 11; see SPENGEL, ibid. p. 
447); while, on the other hand, 
the M. Mor. oddly adds to the 
four remaining dianoétic virtues 
bréAnuis as a fifth (i. 35, 1196, b, 
37). When the author defines 
justice in a wide sense as apet?) 
TeAcia, and adds that in this sense 
a man can be just for himself 
alone (i. 94, 1193, b, 2-15), he 
overlooks the closer definition 
given by Aristotle, that it is the 
aperh TeAcla mpds Erepoy (supra, 
vol. ii. p. 170, n. 2). As to the 
question whether a man can do 
himself an injustice, which Ari- 
stotle had dealt with in the Vic. 
Eth. v.15 ad fin. metaphorically 
as referring to the injustice of 
one part of the soul towards 
another, the author of the M. 
Mor. takes it literally (i. 34, 
1196, a, 26, ii. 11, 1211, a, 27). 
So the question if a man can be 
his own friend was similarly 
treated by EUDEMUS, vii. 6, 1240, 
a, 13 sqq. b, 28 sqq. and M. Mor. 
ii. 11, 1211, a, 30 sqq. The 
Mor. is very unaristotelian in 
the circumstance that (at ii. 3, 
1199, b, 1) it includes Tyranny 
as one of the things which may 
be good in. themselves, even if 


VOL, Il, 


they are not always good for 
individual people ; and when the 
author (in ii. 7, 1204, b, 25 sqq.) 
describes pleasure as a movement 
of the sensitive part of the soul, 
he follows Theophrastus rather 
than Aristotle; cf. supra, ii. pp. 
147, 391, n. 2. 

' In the discussion on edrvx‘a, 
(M. Mor. ii. 8; Hud. vii. 14) the 
author suggests that it consists 
in an émiméAeia Oeay, in that he 
supposes God to apportion good 
and evil according to merit ; and, 
with Eudemus (supra, vol. ii. p. 
424 sq.), he traces it back partly 
to a meTdrtwois TaY TpayyudTwv, 
but partly also and chiefly to the 
happy disposition of the person’s 
nature (the dois &Aoyos), the 
operation of which he compares 
with that of an enthusiasm, 
admitting, however, as did his 
predecessors, that it is directed 
by a Divine Being. The author 
of the M. Mor. further agrees 
with Eudemus (supra, vol. ii. p. 
425, n. 1) as to the union of all 
the virtues to form kadoKayabla 
(ii. 9), and concludes with him 
that the real function of ethical 
virtues is that they guard the 
active reason from derangement 
by the passions; but he omits 
the consideration of the relation 
of reason to the Godhead and the 
doctrine that the knowledge of 
God is the final aim of life. 

* The only passage in which 
we can find any,positive refer- 
ence to the doctrine of the Stoics 
is that just cited, i.¢. i. 2; there 
is, perhaps, a negative reference 
in ii. 7, 1206, b, 17: @wAds 8 


K K 


498 ARISTOTLE 


and partly on this account, and partly on account of the 
poverty of its language as contrasted with the richness 
of such writers as Critolaus, it must be referred to the 
third or at latest to the second century; but in 
scientific independence it is decidedly inferior even to 
the Hudemian Hthics.—Of earlier date than the Magna 
Moralia is without doubt the first book of the Giconomics. 
The contents of this small but well-written treatise 
consist partly of a recapitulation and summary, partly 
of an expansion of the view Aristotle had taken in the 
Politics of the Household, the relation of Man and Wife, 
and Slavery ;' the last of these he does not attempt to 
justify.2 The most original part of it refers to the 
separation of Kconomics as a special science from 
Politics—a modification of Aristotle's views which we 
have already met with in Eudemus.* ‘The book in 
general reminds us of Eudemus; its relation to the 
economical sections of the Politics very much resembles 
that of the Hudemian to the Nicomachean Ethics, and 
the whole style of treatment, and even the language— 
which is clear and elegant, but lacks the nerve of 
Aristotle’s —would afford further support to the con- 
jecture that Hudemus was its author. Philodemus, 
however, attributes it to Theophrastus; ° and although 


ovx, ws olovrat of &AAo, THs certainly cannot attribute to 


dperis &pxh Kal nyeudy éorw 6 
Adyos, GAAG MGAAOY TA AON. 

1 Supra, vol. ii. p. 213 sqq. 

2 This circumstance amongst 
others goes to prove that this 
work is not _an Aristotelian 
sketch antecedent to the Politics, 
but is based on the cognate 
section of the Politics itself and 
is an elaboration of it which we 


Aristotle. 

3 Supra, vol. i. p. 186, n. 4. 

* It is difficult to find, as in 
the thics of Hudemus, any 
doctrine that can be calied un- 
Aristotelian ; but the expression 
Thy Tay iarpov Sivamy, c. 5, 1244, 
b, 9, is surprising. 

5 De Vit. ix. (Vol. Here. iii.) 
Col. 7, 38, 47, 27, 15, where chaps. 





PERIPATETIC SCHOOL: AFTER STRATO 499 


all we can conclude from this is that several MSS. bore 
his name,' yet there is no decisive consideration that 
can be urged against the correctness of this view.2 The 
second book of the (economics, which has no connection 
with the first, is as unmistakably later in origin as it 
is inferior in value. Its contents consist chiefly of a 
collection of anecdotes in illustration of a point in Ari- 
stotle’s doctrine,* introduced by a dry and somewhat 
singular enumeration of the different kinds of Economy.‘ 
This book, while without doubt proceeding from the 
Peripatetic school, is only one of the many proofs of the 
paltry pedantry which after a few generations became 
its predominating feature. 

The LRhetoric dedicated to Alexander, which, as 
formerly remarked,* cannot be previous to Aristotle, is 
the work of a rhetorician whose date cannot be further 
determined. It need not here delay us, as it exhibits 
no philosophical originality. 

Even with these pseudo-Aristotelian books, our 
knowledge of the written works which proceeded from 
the Peripatetic school of the third and second centuries, 
and of their contents, must be admitted to be in the 
highest degree defective as compared with their number 


1-5 of the Zeonomics are sub- 
mitted to a detailed and search- 
ing criticism. Cf. as to this and 
as to certain variations of the 
Philodemian from the common 
text which it indicates, the notes 
of the ‘editor and his preface 
(vii.—viii.). 

' Supra, vol. ii. p. 204, n. 2, 
vol. i. p. 86, mn. 1 (m. arduwv 
yeaupav) 104, and ZeLL. Ph. d. 
Gr. i. 476, 1, where it is shown 
that this was the case with 
many of these works, genuine 


or spurious, attributed to Ari- 
stotle. 

? The absence of the Eeono- 
mies from the list of works by 
Theophrastus given by Diogenes 
proves little, : 

* Supra, vol. ii. p. 222, n. 2. 

‘The BaciriKh, catparuch, 
modituch, and idiwrix?)—followed 
by a catalogue of the various 
sources of income belonging to 
each of these. 

° Supra, vol. i. p. 74, n. 3, 


KK2 


500 ARISTOTLE 


and copiousness. Nevertheless such imperfect know- 
ledge as we have places us in a position to form a true 
estimate of the development of this school as a whole. 
We see it, under Theophrastus and Strato, taking an 
honourable place till towards the middle of the third 
century ; we see it especially making important con- 
tributions in the field of natural science, and under the 
influence of this scientific interest modifying important 
Aristotelian doctrines in a direction which seemed to 
promise greater unity to the system, but which if con- 
sistently followed out must have involved the abandon- 
ment of many of its essential features. But the spirit 
of the time was unfavourable to these efforts, and the 
Peripatetié school could not long resist its influence. 
Soon after the time of Strato all independence of thought 
in science, and simultaneously also in logic and meta- 
physics, ceased, and the school began to confine itself 
to ethics and rhetoric, and that historical and philo- 
sophical erudition which with all its extent and variety 
compensates us neither with a healthy criticism of 
tradition nor a broad treatment of history for its poverty 
in philosophic thought. This was the signal for its 
relapse into a position of subordinate importance. It 
continued nevertheless to do good service in propagat- 
ing the knowledge of earlier researches, and in forming 
by the moderation of its ethical doctrine, which differed 
from Aristotle’s only in a few isolated particulars, a 
wholesome counterpoise to the one-sidedness of other 
schools. But the lead in the scientific movement had 
passed into other hands, and we have to seek in the 
younger schools the true exponents of the philosophy of 
the age. 





APPENDIX 





ON THE FORM OF THE ‘POLITICS’ 
(Being vol. ii. p. 204, n. 1.) 


Tue form in which Aristotle’s Politics has come down to us (as 
to which see also i. 100, n. 1) presents many peculiar features. 
After a short introduction, bk. i. discusses the Household as an 
element in the State—chiefly on the economic side. On the 
other hand, the Family and Education are reserved for a later 
place, on the ground that they have to adapt themselves to the 
general form of political life (c. 13, 1260, b,8). Passing in bk. ii. 
to the doctrine of the State itself, Aristotle proposes, in the first 
place, to investigate the Best Form of State (i. 13 jin. ii. 1 init.), 
proceeding by way of introduction to criticise the most famous 
States, whether actually historical or merely imagined by philo- 
sophers. After examining the idea of the state and of the citizen 
(iii. 1-5), he goes on in bk. iii. (6-18) to distinguish the different 
Forms of Constitution and to discuss the various points of view 
from which their value may be estimated. In iii. 14 he turns to 
Monarchy as the first of the true forms, devoting four chapters 
to its discussion. Chapter 18 proposes to take up the discussion 
of the Best State, but breaks off with an incomplete sentence, 
which is not resumed till bk. vii. 1 init. Meanwhile the subject 
also has to stand over. Bk. iv. treats of the Constitutions which 
remain after Monarchy and ‘Aristocracy have been disposed of, 
viz. Oligarchy, Democracy, Polity and Tyranny. It discusses 
which is the best suited for the majority of states and under 
what conditions each is natural. Finally (cc. 14-16) it investi- 


502 Rs ARISTOTLE 


gates the various possible arrangements for the bodies entrusted 
with legislative, executive and judicial powers. Bk. v. is devoted 
to the question of change in the different forms of government, 
their decay and the means for their preservation. Bk. vi. 
introduces us (2-7) to the subordinate species of democracy and 
oligarchy, and (c. 8) to the discussion of the different offices of 
state. Bk. vii. begins (1-3) the treatment of the best state 
promised in iii. 18, with a discussion of happiness in the indi- 
vidual and in the community, and then proceeds to sketch the 
outlines of the best state itself (c. 4 bk. viii. jin.), devoting 
especial care to the subject of education and kindred questions 
(vii. 15, 1184, b, 5—-viil. 7). The work ends informally with the 
discussion of Music. 

Even earlier scholars recognised that neither the scope nor 
the arrangement of the work ‘as it stands corresponds with 
Aristotle’s original plan, and recent critics are still more pro- 
nounced on this head. After Nicot. ORESME (1489) and SEGNI 
(1559) had remarked that the subject of bks. vii. and viii. con- 
nects with bk. ii., Scatno pa Sato (1577) was the first to 
propose actually to place them between bks. iii. andiv. Sixty 
years later (1637) Conrine not only independently repeated 
this suggestion but went on to attack the integrity of our text, 
indicating in his edition of 1656 a number of lacwne of greater 
or less extent which he suspected to exist. In more recent 
times the subject attracted the attention of BARTHELEMY ST- 
HiuatreE (Politique d’ Aristote, 1. pp. cxli-clxxii), who, while he 
denied that the work as we have it is either incomplete or 
mutilated, held, on the other hand, not only that bks. vii. and 
viii. should come after iii., but that bks. v. and vi. should like- 
wise be transposed (the latter coming between iv. and v.). He 
himself observes this order in his translation, and he has been 
followed by BrExKxeER in his smaller edition and by CONGREVE. 
Both of these suggestions are accepted by SpencEL (‘ Ueb. d. 
Politik d. Arist.’ Abh. d. Miinchn. Akad. philos.-philol. Kl. v. 
1-49), Nicxres (De Arist. Polit. Libr. Bonn, 1851, p. 67 sqq. 112 
sqq.), Branpis(Gr.-rd6m. Phil. ti. pe 1666 sqq. 1679 sq.), and others. 
Wottrmann (‘Ueb. d. Ordnung d. Biicher in d. Arist. Politik.’ 
Rhein. Mus. 1842, 321 sqq.), on the other hand, while accepting 
the transposition of v. and vi., rejects the removal of vii. and 








-— 


APPENDIX ; 508 


viii. from their present place. H1~pENBRAND (Gesch. u. Syst. d. 
Rechts- und Staatsphil. i. 8345-885 ; cf. FEcHNER, Gerechtigketts- 
begr. d. Arist. p. 65, p. 87, 6), on the contrary, defends the 
traditional order of v. and vi., but inserts vii. and viii. between 
iii. andiv. The traditional arrangement of both these sections 
has been defended by GOrr.ine (Preface to his edition published 
1824, p. xx sqq.), ForcHHAMMER (Verhandl. d. Philologenvers. in 
Kapsel, p. 81 sq., Philologus, xv. 1, 50 sq.; on the former with 
its curious suggestion that the Politics follows the order of the 
four causes, see SPENGEL, loc. cit. 48 sq., HILDENBRAND, op. ctt. 
890 sq.), Rose (De Arist. Libr. Ord. 125 sq.), BENDIxEN (Zur 
Politik d. Arist. Philol. xiii. 264-301 ;. see H1i~pEnBranp, 
p. 496), and others. No modern scholar accepts CoNnRING’s 
judgment on the integrity of the work without reservation ; 
several—e.g. GOTTLING (loc. cit.), and especially NickEs (p. 90, 
92 sq. 109, 123, 130 sq.)—even controvert it. SPENGEL, however 
(p. 8 sq. 11 sq. 41 sq.), BRANDIS (p. 1669 sq. 1673 sq.) and even 
Nickes (98 sq.) admit several not inconsiderable lacune 
especially at the end of bk. viii., while VAN ScHWINDEREN (De 
Arist. Polit. Libr. p. 12; see HILDENBRAND, p. 449) held that 
greater part of the discussion on the best state, is lost. Lastly, 
HILDENBRAND (p. 387 sq. 449 sq.) surmises that at least three 
books are wanting at the end of bk. viii., and at the end of the 
whole the last section of bk. vi., besides, perhaps, four books on 
the philosophy of law. 

If, finally, we ask how we are to explain the present state of 
the text, the common opinion is that the work was completed 
by Aristotle himself, but that it was subsequently mutilated and 
fell into disorder. Branpis, however (p. 1669 sq.), is inclined to 


* consider bk. viii. unfinished rather than mutilated, and this view 


is more fully developed by H1iLDENBRAND (p. 355 sq. 379 sq.), 
who holds that Aristotle intended to insert the essay on the 
ideal state which is begun in bks. vii. and viii. between iii. and 
iv., but postponed its completion till he should have written 
bks. iv. and v. and was overtaken by death before he had 
finished either it or bk. vi., which was to follow v. 

(Some further references to the literature of the subject will 
be found in Barrutéiemy St-HILarre, p. 146 sq.; Nickgs, p. 67 ; 


504 SF ARISTOTLE 


BENDIXEN, p. 265 sq.; HILDENBRAND, p. 345 sq., from whom 
the above are partly taken.) 

Zeller’s own view, the grounds of which can here be only 
shortly given, is as follows: 

(1) As regards the order of the text, the majority of recent 
scholars are undoubtedly right in holding that Aristotle intended 
bks. vii. and viii. to follow immediately after iii. The contents 
of bk. i. as well as its opening words taken with the conclusion 
of bk. i. are clearly preparatory to a discussion of the best state. 
‘This discussion is expressly taken up at the end of bk. iii., and 
the interrupted sentence with which it closes is resumed at the 
beginning of vii. in a manner that can hardly be explained 
except upon the hypothesis that the passage was continuous in 
the original. Finally, the section upon the best constitution is 
quite certainly presupposed by such passages as iv. 2, 1289, a, 
80, b, 14, c. 8, 1290, a, 1 (cp. vii. 8, 9), c. 7, 1298, b, 1, also ec. 4, 
1290, b, 38 (cp. iv. 8, vii. 8), and even ec. 1 (on which see 
SPENGEL, p. 20 sq.). If it be urged that the words xai Tept 
Tas Gas Trodireias Hiv reOewpytat mpdrepov appear to refer to the 
contents of bks. iv.—vi., it may be replied that these words may 
just as well be taken to refer to the ideal constitutions criticised 
in bk. ii. (ras addas rodureias, ii. 1, 1260, b, 29) as HILDENBRAND 
takes them (p. 863 sq.). The words in question, however, fit so 
ill the passage in which they occur that it is best to consider them, 
with SPENGEL (p. 26) and most other critics, as a later gloss. 

(2) On the other hand, there seems no necessity to transpose 
bks. v. and vi., as has already been shown by Hi~pENBRAND. 
The only valid ground for this change is the close connection of 
the contents of iv. and vi. taken together with the preliminary 
review in iv. 2, 1289, b, 12 sq.—The other arguments, e.g. that 
the words ¢v rj jeOdd5@ rij spd ravrns in vi. 2, 1317, b, 34, refer 
to iv. c. 15, as though it immediately preceded, and that v. 9, 
1309, b, 16, rd wodAdkis eipnuévoy refers to vi. 6 as well as to 
iv. 12, are of little value: the ‘ uéOodos m™po TavTns ’’ May denote 
not only the immediately preceding book (the division into 
books can hardly be Aristotle’s) but the whole preceding 
section, including bks. iv. and v.; while ‘zoAAd«s’ is more 
naturally taken as referring to v. 8, 6 than to vi. 6, if indeed it 
is necessary to see in it a reference to any other passage besides 














APPENDIX 505 


iv. 12, where the principle that the supporters of the existing 
constitution should consider their opponents, although only 


expressly stated in this general form, is applied with so much 


detail that it might very well be said to have been here 
repeatedly (1296, b, 24, 31, 37, as well as 15) emphasised.—The 
argument, however, above referred to rests upon a gratuitous 
assumption as to the plan of the work. The contents of iv. and 
vi. are undoubtedly closely related, but it does not follow that 
they must have formed a continuous whole. It is possible that 
Aristotle first completed the general theory of the imperfect 
forms of constitution (iv. and v.), and afterwards in vi. returned 
to the first section of the earlier investigation, because he wished 
to make a more special application of the principles there laid 
down. So far from contradicting this view the passage iv. 2, 
1289, b, 12 sq. is quite satisfactorily explained on the supposition 
that it is intended merely as a sketch of the plan of bks. iv. and 
v. Of the five points here mentioned, the first three are dis- 
cussed in iv. 3-13, the fifth (the @Oopai and cearnpia trav 
moktrec@v) in v., while it is all the more likely that the section 
iv. 14-16 is meant for the discussion of the fourth (riva rpérov 
Set xabiordva tavras ras moXireias), as Aristotle expressly says 
(1289, b, 22) that he intends here to touch only lightly on all 
these subjects (rdvtav rovrav érav romodpeba ovrvrépws Thy 
evdexouerny pveiav: hence also the viv iv. 15, 1800, a, 8), and as 
the scheme of this discussion which is laid down in iv. 14 init. 
is actually carried out in c. 16. It is quite natural, therefore, 
that v. 1 should open with the words zepi pév odv ray dAdov Sv 
mpoeopueba oxeCor eipntat rept wavrwy, nor is there any necessity 
to take these words as referring to bk. vi. as well. That we 
should even be wrong in doing so is proved by the passages in 
vi. which admittedly refer to v., viz. c. 1 init. and fin. c. 4, 
1319, b, 4, c. 5, 1319, b, 37; since in all these passages the 
rejection of the words in question or the change of a reOewpnrat 
mporepov With a OewpnOnoerat Vorepoy could be justified only-as a 
last resource. Finally, the incompleteness of the discussions in 
vi. is more easily explained if we suppose it to have been com- 
posed subsequently to v. 

(8) With regard to the integrity of the text, we have to 
acknowledge, in the first place, that many single sentences are 


506 ARISTOTLE 


irremediably corrupt. In the second place, we have several 
isolated passages which are undoubtedly insertions by a later 
hand, e.g. ii. 12, which was suspected by GOrriine (p. 345 sq. 
on the passage in question) and Branpis (1590, A, 586), though 
defended by Spence (p. 11) and Nicxes (p. 55 sq.), and 
rejected from 1274, a, 22 onwards by Susem1Hx (no impartial 
critic can accept Kroun’s conclusion in the Brandenburger 
Programm, ‘Zur Kritik Arist. Schriften,’ 1872, p. 29 sq. 
that scarcely the half of the Politics can be attributed to Ari- 
stotle). Lastly, we have every ground to believe that important 
sections of the work were either left unfinished or have been 
lost. The treatment of the best state is obviously incomplete: 
Aristotle himself refers us for the further discussion of musical 
education with which he breaks off to essays on rhythms (viii. 
7 unit.) and on comedy (vii. 13, 1336, b, 20); but besides these 
we had a right to expect a full discussion of the question of the 
proper treatment of poetry, and the scientific training of the 
citizen, which Aristotle’s principles could hardly have permitted 
him to leave untouched (see vil. 14, 1833, b, 16 sq. c, 15, 1834, 
b, 8, viii. 4, 1839, a, 4, and more fully on this and other points the 
section on the best state); the life of the family, the education 
of women, the treatment of children (ra:dovopia), property, the 
treatment of slaves, drinking booths, are merely mentioned to 
be expressly reserved for later treatment (see i. 13, 1260, b, 8, 
vii: 16, 1835, b, 2, vii. 6, 1826, b, 82 sq. vii. 10 jin. vii. 17, 1836, 
b, 24); the constitution of the ideal state is only sketched on 
the most general lines, vii. 15; similarly we look in vain for 
any account of the laws for the regulation of adult life, indis- 
pensable as they are declared (Ethics, x. 10, 1180, a, 1) to be for 
the welfare of the state, and of legislation in general in the nar- 
rower sense as distinguished from the constitution, although 
earlier writers are expressly reproached (Ethics, loc. .cit. 1181, 
b, 12) with the neglect of this point, while Pol. iv. 1, 1289, a, 11 
requires that the discussion of the different constitutions shall 
be followed by that of the laws (on the distinction between them 
see also ii. 6, 1265, a, 1), not only of the best absolutely but of those 
which are best adapted for each form of constitution, and express 
reference is made in other passages to a section upon legisla- 
tion (see v. 9, 1809, b, 14: dmda@s Se, baa év Tots vopows ws oUp- 

















APPENDIX 507 


hépovra Aéyopev Tais rodereias, dravra raira ode Tas Todtrelas, 
and iii. 15, 1286, a, 2: rd pev ody repli rijs Tovavtns oTparnyias 
erurkorreiv vouwov exer paddov eldos  wodureias Gor’ adeicOo thy 
mpotnv). Cf. HILDENBRAND, 351 sq. 449 sq. If we consider 
how much space all these discussions would have required, we 
can easily understand how large a part of the essay on the best 
state which Aristotle had designed is wanting. But the last- 
quoted passages prove also that the discussion of the imperfect 
forms was to be supplemented by a section on legislation to 
which bk. vi. appears to have been designed as an introduction. 
As moreover the discussion of the dpyai in iv. 15 is resumed in 
vi. 8, we should have expected similar discussions of the legis- 
lative assemblies and the law courts (iv. 14,16). Finally, seeing 
that vi. 1, 1316, b, 39 sq. expressly notes the absence in the 
foregoing discussions of all reference to the forms of constitution 
which result from the union of heterogeneous elements (e.g. 
an oligarchical senate with aristocratic courts of law), and 
proposes to remedy this omission, we must reckon this section 
also among those which either have been lost or were never 
completed. 

(4) Which of these alternatives we ought to accept, and how 
accordingly we ought to explain the form in which the work 
has come down to us, we have not sufficient data to decide. 
But the circumstance that the chief lacwne are at the end of 
the second and third of the main divisions of the work lends 
countenance, as HILDENBRAND rightly remarks (p. 356), to the 
view that neither was completed by Aristotle himself. We 
must suppose, moreover, that he developed coincidently the 
doctrine of the best state and of the imperfect forms, although 
he intended on completion of the whole to combine them in 
strict order of succession. This view gains some support from 
the fact that there is no evidence that the work ever existed in 
a more complete form, and that even Dioa. v. 24 (Hermippus) 
gives only eight books, while the extract from Arius Dipymus 
given by Stopaus, Hcl. ii. 326 sq. (cf. vol. iii. a, 546 sq.) at no 
point goes beyond what is contained in the Politics as we have 
it. The view here taken is accepted by ScurntrzER (Zu Arist. 
Politik Eos, i. 499 sq.), and with more hesitation by UEBERWEG 
(Grundr. i. 178, 5th ed.). | Susemrmx, on the other hand 


‘508 ARISTOTLE 


(Jahrbb. f. Philol. xcix. 593 sq. ci. 843 sq 349 sq. Arist. Polit. 
li. sq.), and ONCKEN (Staatsl. d. Ar. 1. 95 sq.) follow Barthélemy 
‘St-Hilaire even in the transposition of bks. v. and vi. Upon 
Oncken’s hypothesis that the Politics and other works of 
Aristotle have come down to us only in the form given to them by 
students, Zeller has already expressed his opinion (swpra, vol. i. 
p- 133), which coincides with what Susemihl had previously 
held upon the same point (see Jahrbb. f. Philol. vol. exiv. 1876, 
p- 122 sq.). The passage from Politics, vii. 1, discussed in 
vol. i. p. 115, n. 4, itself contradicts this hypothesis. On 
similar grounds we must reject the view (BERNays, Arist. 
Politik, 212) that the work we have consists of a collection of 
‘notes which were designed for the philosopher’s own use in-his 
oral instructions. In this case his style would have been much 
terser and more condensed, nor should we have had those forms 
of transition to which attention has been called by ZELLER (supra, 
vol i. p. 185, n. 2) and by OncxeEn, i. 58 (for further examples 
see 1. 8, 1253, b, 14, i. 8 inzé. i. 9, 1257, b, 14, vii. 1, 1823, b, 36, 
vii. 2, 1825, a, 15), or of reference, as in iii. 12, 1282, b, 20 
(ot xara pirrocopiay Adya, ev ois Siwpiorat wept TOV HOuKov), Viil. 
7, 1841, b, 40 (wddw ev rois wept mountixns épodpev capéorepor), 
vil. 1, 1323, a, 21, iii. 6, 1278, b, 80 (see supra, vol. i. p. 115, 
n. 4). The Politics, in fact, together with the Hthics and the 
Rhetoric, belong to that class of Aristotle’s works in which the 
reader is most plainly before his eyes, the style being much too 
full for notes designed for the author’s exclusive use. Let the 
reader take the passages i. 2, 1252, a, 34~b, 27, c. 4, 1258, b, 
33-39, c. 9, 1257, b, 14-17, i. 11, 1258, b, 39-1259, a, 36, vii. 1, 
1323, a, 2-1324, a, 4, vii. 2, 1824, a, 25-1325, a, 15, iv. 1 init. 
and then ask himself whether anyone would write in such a 
way for his own private use. 














INDEX 


—_ oe 


ACADEMY, i. 10, 29, 142; ii. 497 

Accidents, i. 213, 223, 281 

Actuality, i. 278, 340; ii. 97 

Alexander the Great, i. 21-43, 
169, 396; ii. 255 

Analytics, i. 67, 124, 147, 191, 
211, 232, 265; ii. 363 

ras, i. 307, 442; ii. 11 

Andronicus: his edition of Ari- 
stotle’s works, i. 49-51, 112, 
137; of Theophrastus’ works, 
ii. 352 

Animals, ii. 21, 37, 85-89, 90 

— History of, 87-88, 125, 149, 
155, 494; smaller tracts as to, 
i. 91, 152; ii. 39, 110 

Aristo, ii. 477-79 

Aristocracy, ii. 215, 241-44, 255, 
273, 278-82, 501 

Aristotle, Life and Character, i. 
1-47 

— Philosophy, general view of, 
i. 161-71; method, i. 171- 
80; divisions, i. 180-90; ii. 
336-37 

— Works, i. 48-160 

Aristoxenus, i. 11; ii. 429-38 

Art, i. 464; ii. 301-24 

’Apxal, i. 344, 355, 392, 409, 507 

Atomists, i. 305-08, 426, 434, 
442-58; ii. 455-56 

Axioms, i, 248-52 


BEAUTY, ii. 191, 264, 301-04, 331 

Becoming and Being, i. 294-95, 
297, 302, 310, 324, 341, 347, 
366 





Body and soul, ii. 4, 90-98, 101, 
130, 390-92, 436-38, 467-70, 
480 


CALLISTHENES, i, 32; ii. 348, 445 

Categories, i. 64, 147, 155, 192, 
274-90; ii. 421, 488 

Categories, i. 274 foll. 

Catharsis, ii. 307, 311-17 

Cause, i. 355; ii. 456-57 

Change, i. 302, 347, 366, 395, 
423, 441 

Citizen, ii. 227-33, 261-62 

Clearchus, ii. 443-45 

Concepts, i. 192, 212, 298, 376; 
li. 336 

Constitution, forms of, ii. 233- 
58, 441-42, 501 

Contingency, i. 362-64 

Contradiction, principle of, i. 
225-51, 304 

Conversion, i. 236, 240 

Corpus Aristotelicum, i. 105, 131, 
145, 177 

Courage, ii. 167 

Critolaus, ii. 479 foll. 


De Ana, i. 89, 150, 378; ii. 1 

Death, ii. 77, 133 

Definition, i, 70, 75, 192, 213, 
265-70 

Demetrius of Phalerus, i. 142; 
ii. 351, 447 

Democracy, ii. 
77, 501 

Democritus, i. 210, 442-58; ii. 
5, 36, 455-61 — ; 


238-41, 274- 


510 


Demonstration, ii. 294 foll. 

Desire, ii. 108-15, 160 

Dialectic, i. 173, 185, 252, 255; 
ii. 290-92 | 

Dialogues, i. 55-61, 177 

Diceearchus, i, 151; ii. 438-42 

Difference, i. 70, 223 

Diodorus, ii. 486 

Diogenes, Catalogue of Aristotle’s 
works, i. 2, 48, 144-52 

Dreams, ii. 72, 76 


EDUCATION, ii. 262-72, 307 

Eleatics, i. 309-10, 323 

Elements, i. 469-520 

Empedocles, i. 804, 442, 450; ii. 
5, 12-13, 413 

Epicurus, i. 9; ii. 350 

Essence, i. 163, 194-95, 213, 
220, 337; ii. 10 

Ethical Theories: of Aristotle, 
i. 159, 168; ii. 136, 225 

— of Plato, ii. 147, 161 

— of later Peripatetics, i. 157; 
ii. 399, 410, 412, 422-91 

— of other schools, ii. 158, 432 

Ethics, Nicomachean, i. 44, 73, 
98, 116, 132, 250, 318; ii. 137, 
153, 166-67, 177-78, 333, 
495, 498 

Eudemian Ethies, i. 97,115, 143, 
157, 250, 397, 427, 495, 497- 
98 

Eudemus, i. 55, 80, 110, 135, 142; 
ii. 115, 148, 234-35, 358-63, 
417-29, 497-98 

Evolution, i. 196; ii. 24 

-Exoteric teaching, i. 
121, 223 

Experience (see Knowledge) 


27, 110, 


FINAL CAUSE, i. 174, 356, 404, 
459 

First Philosophy, i. 76, 184, 189, 
273, 290, 417; ii. 4 (see also 
Metaphysics) 

Form and Matter, i. 179, 204, 
329, 340-80; ii. 339 ; 





ARISTOTLE 


Freedom of the Will, i. 
363 ; ii. 114-18, 129, 399 

Friendship, i. 29; ii. 148, 191, 
202 


230, 


Gop, i. 389-416, 470; ii. 122, 
211, 327-33, 343, 364, 370-. 
71 

Goods, external, ii. 139, 144- 
53, 496 

—- community of, ii, 222-24 


HAPPINESS, i. 116, 
138-53, 208, 487-88 
Hieronymus, ii, 475 
History of Animals, i. 87 
Household, ii. 213-27 


1613 38 


IDEAS, Platonic theory of, i. 


162, 204, 296-97, 313-27, 
436; ii. 387-47 
Identity, i. 223 
Imagination, ii. 70; 85 
Immortality, ii. 129-30, 134, 


134, 471-72, 482 

Impulse, ii. 155-56 

Individual, i. 167, 195, 296, 329, 
369-74 ; ii. 224, 338 

Induction, i. 202, 212, 252 

Infinity, i. 350, 427 

Insight, ii. 157-59, 163, 166, 
177, 182-88 (see also &pd- 
vnots) 


JUDGMENT, i. 229 foll. 
Justice, ii. 170-176, 192, 196 


KNOWLEDGE and Opinion, i. 46, 
70, 163, 194-203, 319, 336 ; ii. 
180, 367, 392 


LOGIC, i. 191-273 
Lyceum, i. 27, 36; ii. 479 
Lyco, ii. 474-75, 479 


Macna Moratta, i. 80, 97,150; 
ii. 137, 495-96 

Mathematics, i. 
ii. 364 


183-84, 418; 














INDEX 


Matter (see Form and Matter) 

Mean, doctrine of the, ii. 162- 
64, 168, 170, 177-78 

Melissus, i. 309, 311; ii. 489 

Memory, ii. 70, 85 

Metaphysics, i. 62, 76, 124-36, 
160, 274-327, 328-416; ii. 
204, 364, 369 

Meteorology, i. 83, 149, 155, 512- 
20 

Methodology, i. 193, 212 

Modality, i. 233 

Monarchy, ii, 243, 249-55, 501 

Motion, i. 380-89, 394, 422, 
473; ii. 339, 365-66, 373- 
75, 463, 492-93 

Music, ii. 266-68, 301, 308, 311- 
14, 319, 415, 432-35, 465- 
66 


NATURAL HisTory, 29-30, 259- 
60, 417-68; ii. 16-49, 81-89, 
381-90. (For Aristotle’s 
Natural History, see Animals, 
History of) 

Nature, i. 359-64, 
ii. 10-21, 343, 454 

Necessity, i. 358, 362 

Nous, i. 199, 201, 248; ii. 93- 
105, 131-32, 181, 184 


417-68 ; 


(Economics, i. 100, 151, 186; ii. 
166, 495-98 

Oligarchy, ii. 239, 274, 277-78, 
501 ; 

Opinion (see Knowledge) 

Organon, i. 69, 193-194 


Tl. épunvelas, i. 49, 50, 66, 114, 
147, 192; ii. 489 

Il. wv yevécews, i. 50, 90, 92, 
125; ii. 48 

Tl. (gwv poplwy, i. 50, 83, 92-93, 
125 

Il. Wux7s, i. 55, 89 foll., 158 

Perception, 202-11; ii. 59,60, 
106, 468 

Peripatetics, i. 27, 137, 441; ii. 
105, 340-47, 348-500 





511 


Personality, i. 402; ii, 125, 134- 
35 


Phanias, ii. 443 

Phormio, ii. 483 

Physics, i, 81-86, 124, 417, 520; 
ii. 6, 376, 419, 489 

Planets, i. 501; ii. 464 

Plants, i. 93-94; ii, 33-37 

Plato, Aristotle’s relations to: 
personal, i. 6-18; philoso- 
phical, i. 161-62, 296, 420, 
428, 477, 508; ii. 161, 259 

— wsthetics of, ii. 301, 307 

— Ideal Theory, i. 313 foll.; 
ii. 337 foll 

— Religion, ii. 325-35 

— Republic, ii. 222-23, 262 

— (see also Ideas) 

Pleasure, ii. 75, 108-11, 
146-49, 157, 481 

Poetics, i. 102, 127, 151, 155; ii. 
204, 303, 310, 501 

Poetry, 301-06, 309, 319 

TloArreia, i. 30, 49, 58, 101 

Politics, i. 100-01, 127, 133, 
155; ii. 137, 178, 203-88, 
335, 501 (Appendix) 

Polity, ii. 234, 274, 280, 345, 501 

Possibility, i. 340-48, 278 

Postulates, i. 248-49 

Potentiality, i. 347-55, 
85 

Pre-Socratics, i. 161, 313 

Problems, i. 87, 96, 106; ii. 495 

Production, ii. 220 foll. 

Proof, i. 68, 128, 191, 212, 243- 
56; ii. 293-98 

Property, ii. 220-27 

Pseudo-Arist. Writings, i. 63-64 ; 
ii. 379, 488-99 

Ptolemy, i. 52, 91, 96 

— Philadelphus, i. 139, 142, 144; 
ii, 448, 451, 453 

— Lagi, ii. 448 

— Philometor, ii. 485 

— Physcon, ii. 486 

Punishment, ii. 172, 271 

Pythagoreans, i. 63, 282, 311, 320, 
428; ii. 9, 431 


141, 


378- . 


512 


REASON, i, 180; ii, 93-109, 113, 
120-35, 179, 182, 392-95 

Religion, ii. 325-35 

Republic, ii. 249 

Rhetoric, i. 72-74, 107, 127, 155; 
ii. 289-99 

Rhetoric to Alexander, i. 73-74, 
148; ii. 499 

Rhetoric, school of, i. 28, 414 

Right, ii, 175 foll. 


ScEpsis, cellar of, i. 137-41; ii. 
204 

Science, i. 164, 178, 194, 211, 
290, 335; ii. 355 

Self-control, (cwppoctvn), 
167, 188 

Sensation, i. 305; ii. 438, 58, 66, 
70, 108, 468 

Senses, ii. 62-70, 396-98, 468-70 

Sex, ii. 48-58, 466 

Slaves, ii. 161, 166, 216-19 

Sleep, ii. 68, 75, 470 

Socrates, i. 1, 162, 171-80, 213, 
313, 392; ii. 100, 337, 344 

Socratic Schools, i. 313 

Zopict, ErAeyxo1, i. 69 

Sophists, i. 162, 296-97, 312 

Sotion, ii. 483 

Soul, ii. 1, 92-94, 119-23, 130-35, 
344, 395-96, 467-72, 481, 486, 
491, 493 

Space, i. 282, 432-37 ; 
461 

Speusippus, i. 19, 320-22 

Spheres, i. 304, 489- 501. 

Stars, i. 492 foll., 504; ii. 464-65 

State, ii. 193, 202-13, 411, 501 

— the best, ii. 241, 258-74 

Strato, i. 141-2; ii. 450-72 


ii. 


ii. 105, 


Substance} i. 284-90, 293, 330- | 


37, 373 


| 
P] 





ARISTOTLE 


Syllogism, i. 67, 70, 191-92, 238 ; 
ii. 361 


TEMPERANCE, ii, 188-89 
Theophrastus, i. 36, 79, 135, 137, 
148, 234-35 ; ii. 32, 105, 349 
Time, i. 282, 433; ii. 105, 461-64 
Topics, i. 68, 107, 124-36, 191, 

265; ii. 363 
Tragedy, ii. 310, 316-24 
Tyranny, ii. 241, 274, 282, 501 


UNIVERSALS, i. 167, 194-95, 214, 
296, 329, 338-39, 369; ii, 224, 
338, 343 

Universe, i. 469, 520; ii 377-81 

Uprightness (kadonayabia), ii. 426 


VIRTUE, ii. 90, 142, 153-62, 185, 
208-10 

Virtues, ii. 163-77, 496-97 

— intellectual, ii. 107, 177-202, 
344, 496-97 

Virtues and Vices, ii. 495 


WILL, ii. 108-18, 126-29, 135, 155, 
160, 188-89, 344 

Women, ii. 214, 220, 224, 262, 
270, 506 

World, eternity of, i. 
331, 482 

— structure of, i. 472 

— unity of, i. 485 


469; ii. 


XENOCRATES, i. 15, 320 
Xenophanes, i. 309 ; ii. 332 


ZENO, i. 296-97, 310, 439; ii. 355, 
489 


pdynors, i. 186; ii. 107, 178, 184, 
309, 496 (see also Insight) 


THE- END, 





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2 





Morris (WILLIAM)—continued., 


THE ROOTS OF THE MOUNTAINS, 
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| a 
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_ LONGMANS AND COS STANDARD AND GENERAL WORKS. 23 





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JS. 


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Beddard.— THe Srrucrure AND} Butler.—Our HovusEHoLp INsEcts. 


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24 LONGMANS AND CO.'S STANDARD AND GENERAL WORKS. 


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LIGHT SCIENCE FOR LEISURE Hours. 
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la 


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BIOGRAIHICAL TREASURY. With ng 
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SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY TREASURY. 
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Roget.--THESAURUS OF ENGLISHWORDS 
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Crake (Rev. A. D.). 

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THE FURTHER DOINGS OF THE THREE 
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Stevenson.—A CHILD’s GARDEN oF 
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fep. 8vo., 55. 


Upton (FLORENCE K., and Berta). 
THE ADVENTURES OF Two DutcH 
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