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C. I\ Cl.AY, MANAU*:**, 

s KKTTKR J,ANK, K.i,\ 

KI- r. 

: F. A. 






R. D. HICKS, M.A. 










Page 15, critical notes, line 2, after iclicjui codcl. add lick. Trend. 

,, 48, critical notes, line ^for appenclicem read Fiagmenta i., II. r 3, p. 10*4 infra. 

,, 56, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Kodier. 

,, 56, critical notes, line 13, after Sitnpl. Soph. || add $&vruv V \\ . 

i 57* translation, line 7, for body read rest, 

64, critical notes, line 9, for append, read Fragment a n., 1. 61, p. 166 infra, 

,, 114, critical notes, line 6, for TOT,..$I. ytvcrcu read roVe.. 31. \ctt 6. 

n6, critical notes, last line, for 162 read 160. 

,, 145, critical notes, line 12, for Ilayduck read Ileinze. 

,, 150, critical notes, line 7, for 540 read 140. 

150, critical notes, line 13, after ap. crit. ad loc.) add Nek. Trend. 

152, critical notes, last line, after Bek. Trend, add Itiehl. 

,, 204, end of note on 403 b 8, add A similar confusion of oi \oyot with ot \tyoifT(<> 
roiV \6yovs may be noticed 407 b 13 17. 

,, 351, end of fust note on 406 b 13, add The moaning of ^wrarrt? /A* r/;y otVfas, 
so far as <i\Xofw<m Is concerned, is given less bluntly ami paradoxically 
414 a ii sq., 426 a 4 sq., where $\ rov VQIIJTIKW Kal KunjriKm' fWj>yf'ta U 
said to reside not tV T$ 7ro7nK$, but <V r< Tra^o^rt, 

,, 251, line % of note on b \y for Koch 7v<w/ Kock. 

35^1 end of note on 417 b 5, ao!r/ Cf. 4-29 b 5 -y, 430 a 14 o rtj; wavrft ^*wVto, 
The limitation, temporal or modal, which I find in tf<w/xnV, i^ often 
expressed by a dependent clause when the transition from f'^'t? to <V<'/vyaa is 
described, as hcio, in precise terms,' o.g. />rap 0/w^i} 417 b S f u'rax^ JQI} 
431 b r6, ilrav Owpfi 432 a 8, b 29, and generally VT& ftnpyii 415 b 29: 
cf. rd 1557; frtpyovv 417 a 12, 6 ^617 Qiwp&v 417 a iH. 

377, line u of note on 419 b i^ for xilf. r*vft/ No. xxx. (V(l. xni.). 

3^5i line 4 of First note on 420 a 31, add CC J/< i /<////. 1052 b ^5 31. 

n 400, end of first note on 422 a 22 add Anothei Mil tonic echo come:* from // 
J'twjr&vstr 13* rf> "Whose saintly visage is loo bright | To hit the sense 
of human sight, | And therefore to our weaker vie.w | < JVrUiid \\iih black.'* 

449, end of note on 427 a 2 add Perhaps a 3 <Vn $/)... a 4 jj d<5mt/>rro^ should rather 
be paraphrased thus: "There is, then, a sense in which the peictpient of 
two distinct objects is divisible ; there is another sense in which it perceives 
them as being itself indivisible." If *o, with $ dfoafyx ro we should supply 
TO"0a,v6jj,wov or rb alff0^ri>K6v 1 and not TO &flu//rr0p f as is done, on p. 1 19* 
,, 524, end of note on 430 b 26, add In an instructive note Torstrik (pp. 190- 198) 
calls attention to the distinction between &nr<{) and olw. The latter, he 
says, is used in citing examples or in passing from the gtmus to its sub- 
ordinate species ; the former extends u predicate from one subject t<> another 
in sentences like the following: "The Greeks ure sharp-witted, svs also 
(tiffirtp Kal) some of the barbarians. 7 * if this be so, w<T7re/> u quite in place 
in comparing the meaning of two terms* The tcnu $ct<rts denotes something 
predicated of something, as does the term K<xrii<a<m. Hut the writer passes 
from the term c<m to the thing denoted by the term when he ad<U in the 
next words that this predication is always true or false. 
> 532, line 15, after better instance is insert 6 81? vovs.,,o\'tffta. rts ottcra 408 b *8 sq* Cf. 


THE first English edition of this treatise appeared in 1882 
under the title of " Aristotle's Psychology in Greek and 
English, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Wallace." It 
has been for some time out of print and, if Mr Wallace had 
survived to see his work through a second edition, he would 
probably have made considerable alterations, owing to the re- 
searches of the last quarter of a century. Of these I resolved 
to make full use, when, with their accustomed liberality, the 
Syndics of the Cambridge University Press accepted my offer 
to prepare an independent edition. Among the fresh materials 
which have accumulated, two are of special importance : I mean, 
the critical edition of De Anima by the late Wilhelm Biehl and 
the series of Aristotelian commentaries re-edited under the 
auspices of the Berlin Academy. As regards the text, I have 
seldom had reason to deviate from Biehl's conclusions, but in my 
critical notes, which are based on his judicious selection, I have 
gone further than he did in referring to, or occasionally citing 
from, authorities. The interval of time has enabled me to cite 
with greater uniformity than Biehl could do from the Berlin 
editions of the Greek commentators. I have followed the example 
of Wallace in printing an English version opposite the Greek text 
A century ago, perhaps, the Latin of Argyropylus with the 
necessary alterations would have served the same purpose by 
indicating the construction of the sentences and the minimum 
of supplement needed to make sense and grammar of Aristotle's 
shorthand style. But fashions have changed. The terse sim- 
plicity, not to say baldness, of literal Latin is now discarded for 
that rendering into a modern vernacular which, whatever its 
advantages, is always in danger of becoming, and too often is, 
a mere medley of specious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge. In 
compiling my notes I have drawn freely upon all my predecessors, 
not only on the Greeks themselves, who even in their decline were 
excellent paraphrasts, but also on modern editors and translators, 
from Paeius and Trendelenburg onward ; while through Zabarella 
I have made some slight acquaintance with the views of the Latin 

viii PREFA CE 

schoolmen. Among modern critics few have the great gifts of 
Torstrik, who by his insight, candour and logic contributed beyond 
all others to improve Bekker's text of the treatise. Of this 
distinction nothing can rob him : haeret capiti cum multa laudc 
corona. In matters of punctuation and orthography I have taken 
my own line, but, lest I should be accused of inconsistency, I must 
add that when citing from other editions I have been scrupulous 
in preserving their peculiarities. Thus, while for my o\vn part 
I admit indifferently alel and dei, tyLyveo-Bat, and ywe&daf,, when 
I cite the Metaphysics from Christ, I follow him in always 
preferring alel and <yL<yve<r6ai, to the exclusion of del and ryLr<r8ai<. 
Again, though I regard %<$ov and pe^ei/crat, as alone correct, in 
citing from other editions where %S>ov and fjue^ttcrat are printed 
I have been careful not to alter the spelling. In references to the 
Metaphysics^ Ethics and Politics I have been content to t^ive 
Bekker's page, column and line without the addition of book 
and chapter, thus avoiding the confusion which arises from the 
double numbering of certain books and chapters. I have tried 
as far as possible to give in the notes the reasons for my 
conclusions, so that where I have erred it will be more easy for 
my critics to refute me. My own claims to originality are modest 
enough. In fact, in a subject like this, absolute novelty of view is 
almost unattainable, perhaps undesirable. 

I am indebted to Professor Henry Jackson, to whom the work 
is dedicated, for permission to publish sundry proposals, chiefly 
textual, taken from his public lectures delivered in the year 1903. 
Mr F. M. Cornford kindly placed at my disposal for this edition 
various notes on the third Book, which, after I had made use of 
them, were communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society. 
My book has profited by the vigilance and insight of several 
friends, to whom I desire to make fitting acknowledgment. In 
particular, Miss Margaret Alford, Lecturer of Bedford College, 
revised for me the first draft of the notes and added to them much 
of value. Nor must I pass over the good offices of Dr T. L. Heath, 
who assisted in correcting the proof-sheets, or those of the Rev. 
J. M. Schulhof, who aided me five years ago at the commencement 
of my task. Lastly, I must express very great obligations to the 
staff of the University Press, including their accomplished readers, 
for their able and zealous co-operation, 

R. U H. 
CAMBRIDGE, November^ 1907. 




INTRODUCTION I. : SUBJECT ...... xix Ixxii 

,, II. : TEXT ...... Ixxiii Ixxxiii 


NOTES ......... Ixxxiv 



NOTES 173588 



INDEX OF GREEK WORDS ...... 599 626 


Aristotelis DC Aiiima, ed. Trendelenburg (lenae, 1833); ed. Belger-Tren- 

delenburg (Berolini, 1877). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Torstrik (Berolini, 1862). 
Aristotle's Psychology, ed. E. Wallace (Cambridge, 1882). 
Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Guil. Biehl (Lipsiae, 1884); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 

Aristotelis De Anima liber B secundum recensionem Vaticanam, ed. H. Rabe 

(Gratulationsschrift der Bonner philol. Gesellsch. an Usener, Berolini, 


Aristote, Traitd de 1'ame, ed. G. Rodier (Paris, 1900). 
Translations of Do Anima (other than those of Argyropylus, Barco, Wallace, 

Hammond and Rodier) : 

DCS Aristoteles Schrift tiber die Seele, H. Bender (Stuttgart, 1872). 
DCS Aristoteles Schrift iiber die Seele, E. Rolfes (Bonn, 1901). 
For ancient commentaries on De Anima see Philoponus, Simplicius, Sophonias, 


Editions of Aristotle before Bekker: 

Aldina (Venctiis, 1495 T 498) [collated by Trendelenburg]. 
Basilcciibis (Basileae, 1531; 1539; 1550). 
Sylburgiana ( Francofurti, 1579; 1584; 1587). 

Aristoteles graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia regia 

Borussica (Berolini, 1831 1870): 
Vols. I, II. Graccc ex rec. I. Bekkeri. 1831. 
Vol. III. Latino interprctibus variis. 1831 [De Anima loanne Argyropylo 

Byzantio interprcte, pp. 209 226], 
VoL IV. Scholia, coll. C. A. Brandis. 1836. 

Vol. V. Fragmenta. Scholiorum supplementum. Index Aristotelicus. 1870. 
Aristotelis opera omnia* Gracce et latine ediderunt Bussemaker, Dubner, 
Heiti! (Parisiis, 1848 1874)* 

Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle: 

Organon, ed. Th. Waitz 1 (Lipsiae, 1844 1846). 

Physica, rec. Car. Prantl 1 (Lipsiae, 1879). 

J)c Caelo, DC Gcncrationc et Corruptione \ rec. Car. Prantl (Lipsiae, 1881). 

Mcteorologica, rec. J. L. Ideler (Lipsiae, 1834 1836). 

P/irva Naturalia, recogn. GuiL Biehl 1 (Lipsiae, 1898). 

De Sensu and De Memoria, ed. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1906). 

Ttfpl <<*>, Thierkunde, von H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer (Leipzig, 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle {continued) : 

De Partibus Animalium, ex recogn. B. Langkavel 1 (Lipsiae, 1868). 

(De Coloribus.) Ueber die Farben, von Carl Prantl (Munchen, 1849). 

Metaphysica, recogn. H. Bonitz (Bonnae, 1848 1849). 

Metaphysica, rec. W. Christ 1 (Lipsiae, 1886); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1895). 

Ethica Nicomachea, rec. I. By water 1 (Oxonii, 1890). 

The Ethics, by Sir A. Grant (3rd edition, London, 1874). 

The Politics, by W. L. Newman 1 (Oxford, 1887- 1902). 

Ars Rhetorica cum adnotat. L. Spengel (Lipsiae, 1867). 

Rhetoric with E. M. Cope's Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 


Ars Rhetorica, ed. A. Roemer 1 (Lipsiae, 1885). 
De Arte Poetica, rec. J. Vahlen 1 (3rd edition, Lipsiae, 1885). 
Fragmenta collegit V. Rose (Lipsiae, 1886). 

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae 
litterarum regiae Borussicae (Berolini, 1882 1907). 

Aetius, Placita: in Dicls, DoxogTaphici Graeci. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Anima cum Mantissa, ed. I. IJruns 1 (Dorolini, 

Quaesliones. De Fato. De Mixtione, ed. L Bruns 1 (Berolini, 1892). 

In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. Haycltick 1 (Berolini, 1891). 

In Aristotelis De Sensu, cd. Thtirot (Paris, 1875); ed. Wcmlland 1 

(Berolini, 1901). 

Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotclis latricis Mcnoniis et aliis mcidicis cologne, 

ed. H. Diels (Berolini, 1893). 

Argyropylus: see Berlin edition of Aristotle, Vol. in. 
Aristoxenus, Die harmonisdien Fragmente, von V. Marquurd ^Berlin, iS6,S); see 

also Musici Scriptorcs. 

Apelt, O., Beitrag*e zur Gesch. clcr tfricchischen Philosophic (Leipzig, 1891). 
Bacchius: in Musici Scriptorcs, cd, Jan. 
Bacuniker, Clem., T)cs Aristotcles Lehrc von clcn uussern uiui innern Sinnos- 

vermogen (Leipzig, 1877). 

in Philologische Rundschau 1882, Sp. 1356 1360. 

Das Problem dcr Matcric (Mimster, 1890). 

Barco, G., critica dclla psicologia ^reca. Dofinixione dell 7 aninia 
(Torino-Roma, 1879). 

Dcll J aniina vcgctativa e scnsitiva (Torino, 1881). 

Bast, F. J., Commentatio Palaco^raphica : api>endcd, pp. 7<\3 861, to (Jrc^orii 
Corinthii ct aliorum gram mat i corn m libri dc dialcctis linguae gract:ae, ccl. 
G. H, Schacfer (Lipsiae, 1811). 

Beare, J. L, De Anima u. 8. 3, 419 b 22 25; De Scnsu VH. : in Hcrmathena 
No. xxx., Vol. xni. (1905), pp. 73 76. 

Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcrnaeon to Aristotle 

(Oxford, 1906). 

Belger, Chr., De Anima A. r. 402 b 16: in Hermes xni. (1878), ]>p. 302, 303, 
Bergk, Th., Zu Aristoteles' DC Aniina I. 4: in Hermes xvm, (1883), p. 518, 
Bernays, J., Die Dialoge des Aristotelcs (Berlin, 1863). 
Bichl, W., Ueber den BegrifF vow bei Aristoteles (Linx 1864). 
Bonitz, H., Aristotelische Studien I. v. (Wicn, 18621867). 

. * My citations arc usually made from this edition. 


Bonitz, H., Ueber den Gebrauch von re yap bei Aristoteles : in Zeitschrift fur 
die osterreichischen Gymnasien xvm. (1867), pp. 74 76. 

Zur Erklarung einiger Stellen aus Aristot. Schrift liber die Seele: in 

Hermes vn. (1873), PP- 416436. 

Brandis, C. A., Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophic 

(Berlin, 18351866). 
Brentano, Fr., Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom 

vovs TroirjTiKus (Mainz, 1867). 
Bullinger, A., Aristoteles 3 Nus-Lehre (De Anima m. cc. 48 incl.) (Dillingen, 


Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). 
Busse, Ad., De Anima 434a 1215, in Hermes xxm. (1888), pp. 469 sq. 

in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift xn. (1892), Sp. 549 552. 

Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Aristoteles : in Hermes XXVIII. 

(1893), pp. 252276. 

Bywater, I., Aristolelia : in Journal of Philology XIV. (1885), pp. 40 525 xvil. 

(1888), pp. 5374- 

Chaignet, A. E., Essai sur la psychologic d'Aristote (Paris, 1883). 
Chandler, H. W., Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions (London, 1866). 
Christ, W., Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata (Berolini, 1853). 
Cornford, F. M., Plato and Orpheus : in Classical Review xvn. pp. 433 445. 

in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society LXXV. (1906), p. 13. 

Dembowski, J., Quaestiones aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. 1881). 

in Wocheiischrift fur classische Philologie IV. (1887), Sp. 430 433. 

Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1879). 

Studia Empedoclea: in Hermes xv. (1880), pp. 161 179. 

Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles : in Sitzungsberichte der 

Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften 1883, pp. 477 494. 

Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia in Rheinisches Museum XLII. 

(1887), pp. 114- 

Parmenides (Berlin, 1897), 

Poetarum Philosophorum fragmenta (Berolini, 1901). 

Herakleitos von Ephesos (Berlin, 1901). 

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). 

Dittenberger, W., Exegetischc und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen 
des Aristoteles (Metaphysik und de Anima). (Rudolstadt, 1869.) 

in Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, pp. 1601 1616. 

Dyroff, A., Demokritstudien (Leipzig, 1899). 

Essen, E., Der Keller zu Skepsis. Vcrsuch uber das Schicksal der aristotelischen 
Schriften. Gymn.-Progr. (Stargard, 1866). 

Ein Beitrag zur Losung der aristotelischen Frage (Berlin, 1884). 

Das erste Buch der aristotelischen Schrift iiber die Seele ins Deutsche 

tibertnigen etc. (Icna, 1892). 

Das zweite Buch in kritischer Uebersetzung (lena, 1894). 

Das dritte Buch (lena, 1896). 

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Freudenthal, J., Ueber den Begriff des Wortes <f)avracria bei Aristoteles 
(Gottingen, 1863). 

Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristoteles: in Rheinischcs Museum, 1869, 

pp. 8193, 3924I9- 

Gomperz, Th. } Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896), Vol. r., English translation 

by Laurie Magnus (London, 1901). 
Grangei-, F., De Anima (On the Active and Passive Reason): in Classical 

Review vr., pp. 298 301 : also in Mind 1893, pp. 307 318. 
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Naturalia (London and New York, 1902). 

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der mathematischen Wissenschaften, 1904, Heft 4, pp. 8 sqq. 
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in Classical Review xvi., pp. 461 463. 

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of Greek Philosophy from Thalcs to Aristotle (London, 1901), 
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Johnson, W. A. !., Der Sensual ism us des Demokritos (Plauen, rK68). 
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Phrynichi Eclogae nominum et verborum atticorum (Lipsuic, 1820). 

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324, 768. 

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1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


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Sp. 13171320; 1895, Sp. 1031. 

in Jenaer Litteraturzeitung iv. (1877), Sp. 707 sq. 

in Philologischer Anzeiger, 1873, pp. 683, 690. 

in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie, 1884, Sp. 1410. 

in Philologus XLVI. (1888), p. 86. 

Appendix to Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. Susemihl (Lipsiac, 


Tannery, P., Pour 1'histoire de la science hellfcne (Paris, 1887). 
Teichmuller, G., Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874). 
Themis tii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supers unt, cd, L. Spengel 
(De Anima in Vol. II., pp. i 231). 

In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinxe 1 (Bcrohni, 


Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia, ex rccogn. F. Wimnicr 
(Lipsiae, 1854 1862). 

Fragmentum De Sensibus, ed. H. Diels 1 in Doxographi Gracci, pp. 499 


See also Priscianus Lydus. 

Thompson, W. H., On the genuineness of the Sophist of Plato etc. : in Journal 
of Philology vin. (1879), pp. 290 322. 

Torstrik, Ad., Die Authentica der Berliner Ausgabe des Aristotelcs : in Philo- 
logus xii. (1857), pp. 494530; xin. (1858), pp. 204 sq. 

in Rheinisches Museum xxi. (1866), p. 640. 

Der Anfang-.der Physik des Aristoteles : in Neue Jahrbuchcr fiir Philologie 

xcv. (i?G/), pp. 236244. 

Zu Aristoteles' Psychologic (r 4, 429 b 10; r 3, 428 a 8 ; r 4, 429 a 29 

b 5): in Neue Jahrbiicher fur Philologie xcv. (1867), pp. 245 sq. 

in Literarisches Centralblatt (1877), Sp. 1462 sq. 

Trendelenburg, Fr. Ad., Geschichte der Katcgorienlehrc (Berlin, 1846). 

Historische Beitrage zur Philosophic II. (Berlin, 1855); in. (Berlin, 


Elementa log-ices Aristoteleae, ed. 8 (Berolini, 1878). 

Vahlen, J., Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik (Wien) i., 1865; " 1866; in., iv., 

Aristotelische Aufsatze I. (Wien, 1872). 

Grammatisch-kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles: in Xeitschrift fur die 

osterreichischen Gymnasien xvin. (1867), pp. 721 725. 

Grammatisch kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles, in Xcitschrift fiir die 

osterreichischen Gymnasien xix. (1868), pp. n 21, 253 256. 

Wilson, J. Cook, Conjectural emendations in the text of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, in Journal of Philology XI. (1882), pp. 119124. 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 


Wilson, J. Cook, Interpretation of certain passages of the De Anima in the 
editions of Trendelenburg and Torstrik, in Transactions of the Oxford 
Philological Society, 1882/3, PP- 5 1 3- 

in Philologische Rundschau (1882), Sp. 1473 1481. 

Wyse, W., The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge, 1904). 

Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente von R. 

Heinze (Leipzig, 1892). 

Zabarella, J., Commentaria in tres Aristotelis libros de anima (Venetiis, 1605). 
Zabarellae opera integra ed. I. L. Havenreuter (Francofurti, 1623, 1624). 
Zeller, E, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Band I., 5th edition (Leipzig, 1892); 

II., 4th edition (1889) ; II. 2 Abth. (in.), 3rd edition (1879) ; III. I Abth. (iv.), 

3rd edition (1880); in. 2 Abth. (v), 3rd edition (1881). 

English Translation of 3rd edition of II. 2 by Costelloe and Muirhead 

under the title "Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics" (London, New York, 
and Bombay, 1897). 

in Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie III., 303, 311 sq. ; vi., 406 sqq. ; 

viil., 134 sqq. ; IX., 536 sqq. 

Ziaja, J., Aristoteles De Sensu cc. r, 2, 3 bis 439 b 18 iibersetzt und mit Anmerk- 
ungen versehcn, Progr. (Breslau, 1887), 

Die aristotelische Lehre vom Gedachtniss und von der Association der 

Vorstcllungen (Leobschiitz, 1879). 


external soul, on which the life of the individual depends, plays the 
same part as in the folk-lore of savages to-day 1 . The opening lines 
of the Iliad &r&w a sharp distinction between the heroes themselves, 
left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to 
Hades or the invisible world. The ghost of Patroclus, which 
appears to Achilles in a dream, is an emaciated, enfeebled shadow, 
deprived of all its strength by severance from the body, which was 
the real man. In the underworld these pale, ineffectual ghosts arc 
much alike in general condition. Apart from a few notorious 
offenders punished for their misdeeds, they pursue the shadows of 
their former avocations. Whether in Greek language and thought 
two separate conceptions are blended, whether the sum of the 
intellectual and moral qualities was associated at one time with 
the blood and at another with the breath, whether the breath of life 
superseded an older smoke-soul, the exhalation arising from spilt 
blood, and whether these two conceptions were connected with the 
practices of inhumation and cremation respectively, are matters of 
speculation on which it is hardly possible to arrive at a definite 
conclusion 2 . When we pass from Homer to later poets we find the 
same primitive beliefs variously modified. In Hesiod the heroes 
go no longer to the underworld, but to the Isles of the Blest, and 
ancestral spirits have developed into " daemons " exerting a benefi- 
cent influence on their descendants . From the dirges of Pindar 
we have two important fragments 4 . One is a glowing picture of 
the lot of the happy dead. In the other we are told that, " while 
the body of every man folio weth after mighty death, there still 
liveth a likeness of his prime which alone is of divine origin, which 
slumbereth so long as the limbs are busy, but full oft in dreams 
showeth to sleepers the issue that draweth near of pleasant things 
and cruel." 

In the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods the primitive 
Orphic beliefs were moulded into a thoroughgoing doctrine 

doctrine. of transmigration. Three main conceptions underlie 

Orphic asceticism. First, there is the opposition between body and 
soul. The soul is better than the body and is buried in the body 
for its sins, the body is its temporary prison. Next comes the 
necessity for a purification of the soul. All evil is followed by 

1 Frazer, he, cit. t vol. n., c. iv. 

2 Etynnologically foftbi is connected with fumus : cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinker* I 

8 Hesiod, Works and Days, iai sqq. 
* . 95, 9<5- 


retribution. Through abstinence and penance alone may the soul 
hope to regain its former blissful state. Thirdly, there is the long 
series of incarnations in which, according to their deeds during a 
former existence, souls take a higher or a lower place in human or 
animal bodies or even in plants 1 . Though these ideas occupy so 
small a place in literature, they are clearly very old, for the extant 
burlesque of Xenophanes 2 attests the acceptance of metempsychosis 
by Pythagoras, and all probability points to his having derived 
it from the still older Orphic sect. At Athens the Eleusinian 
mysteries, at which some such ideas were symbolically inculcated, 
were under the patronage of the state ; but nevertheless the belief 
in an after life in the underworld, as set forth by Homer, for the 
most part maintained its hold upon the ordinary educated citizen. 

I-ittle is to be learned from the Ionian thinkers, whom 
Ionian Aristotle calls physicists or physiologists 3 . In the 

physicists. dawn of enquiries which, strictly speaking, were 

rather scientific than philosophical, men sought to explain to 
themselves of what things were constituted and how they had come 
into their present condition. Their problem, we should now say, 
was the constitution of matter and, if occasionally, when they found 
the primary element in air or fire or some other body, they also 
declared that this was the cause of vital functions, it was merely a 
corollary to their general doctrine and of no special importance. 
The subjects on which we find hints are the substance of the soul, 
the distinction between its various powers, and the nature of 
knowledge. So far as the substance of the individual soul was 
identical with, or a product of, the universal element, they all 
agreed in regarding it as not immaterial, but of an extremely 
refined and mobile materiality. The soul was credited with the 
power to know and perceive, as well as the power to move the body. 
Heraclitus, who had grasped the flux of matter in 

Hemclitus, . , . , , , . , , , 

constant circulation, held it to be governed by an 
universal law. Knowledge to him consists in apprehending this law. 
In comparison with such knowledge he deprecated the evidence of 
sense: eyes and ears are better than the other senses, but are 
bad witnesses, if the soul does not understand. Meanwhile in 
the West other schools of philosophy had arisen, the Eleatic and 

1 Cf. KoMe, Pjysfa, n* pp. 103 sqq. 
ft Ftsig* 7 IX 

* "Jfifoe philosophical $$>eculatlonfi dn the soul from Thales to Democritus and Anaxagp 
re reviewed by Rohde, n. pp. 137 198- C also Beare, Greek Theories 



Pythagorean. Xenophanes distinguished between truth and opinion. 
Parmenides derived the intelligence of man from the 

Parmenides. . 

composition and elementary mixture of his bodily 
parts, heat and cold being the elements of things 1 . The pre- 
ponderant element characterises the thought of the individual man. 
But the chief legacy of Parmenides to his successors was his 
doctrine of the one immutable Being, which alone satisfies the 
requirements of an object of knowledge. The element of the 
lonians did not satisfy these conditions, being endowed with the 
power to pass from one condition to another, whether intermittently 
or perpetually. Nothing, according to Parmenides, is ever generated 
or destroyed, however varied its manifestations and the changes it 
presents to the senses. On the foundation thus laid by Pannenides 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus constructed their systems, 
resolving apparent generation and destruction into combination 
and separation of primary elements or principles, themselves 
indestructible. They differed, Aristotle remarks, as to the number 
and nature of these indestructible elements 2 . Empedocles made a 
mistake in accepting a crude popular analysis into air, earth, fire and 
water, elements which do not so much as correspond to a rough divi- 
sion of matter into the solid, liquid and gaseous states. Anaxagoras, 
with his homoeomeries, was in our view still wider of the mark. 
Leucippus and Democritus at last found in the atoms a working 
hypothesis of the constitution of matter, which has lasted down to 
the present day. It is these three physical systems which most 
profoundly influenced Aristotle. He unfortunately accepted the first 
with modifications and opposed the last, by the merits of which he 
was nevertheless profoundly impressed. Each of these thrc k e systems 
took up the problem of the soul. But in the meantime medical 
enquiries had been actively prosecuted, and it is to a Pythaffo- 
rean ' Alcmaeon f Croton, that we owe the earliest 
advances towards the physiology of the senses. He 
was the first to recognise the brain as the central organ of 
intellectual activity. He dissected animals and by this means 
discovered the chief nerves of sense, which, like Aristotle, he called 
" conduits" or " channels," and he traced them to their termination in 
the brain. Deafness and blindness he held to be caused when by a 
concussion the brain was shifted out of its normal position and the 
channels of hearing and seeing respectively were thus blocked. He 
submitted the several senses to a searching examination, starting 

x Frag. 16 D. 

2 X>e Anima 404 b 30 sqq. 


with the anatomical construction of the sense-organ. The air in 
the ear he regarded as a sounding-board, and he attributed to the 
moisture, softness, flexibility and warmth of the tongue its capacity 
to reduce solid bodies to fluid as a necessary preliminary to tasting. 
He noticed the phenomenon which we call seeing sparks when the 
eye has received a heavy blow, and this suggested a crude theory 
of vision, postulating fire in the eye, a mistake repeated by Em- 
pedocles and by Plato. But it is with the glittering or transparent 
element of water in the eye that it sees, and it sees better according 
to the purity of the element. Vision is effected by the image of the 
thing seen and by the rays which issue from the eye within and 
pass outwards through the water. He derived memory from sense- 
perception and opinion from memory ; from memory and opinion 
combined he derived reason, which distinguishes men from the 
lower animals 1 . What scanty information we have about him 
comes chiefly from Theophrastus 2 , but it would be a great mistake 
to acquiesce in Aristotle's neglect of him. He is only once 
mentioned in De Anima^^ as having held that soul is immortal, on 
the singular ground that by its incessant motion it resembles the 
heavenly bodies, which he also held to be immortal. 

In Empedocles we are dealing not with a sober physical 

enquirer, but with a religious enthusiast and poet-philosopher. He 

accepted the transmigration of souls in a slightly 

Empedocles. , , ,. , . , , ,, , 

altered form ; he introduced wicked as well as good 
" daemons/ 7 condemned for their sins to wander for 10,000 years and 
to become souls of plants, beasts and men. In the course of their 
purification they become prophets, poets, physicians, princes, and 
again return to the gods 4 . Sensation in general he explained by 
the action of like upon like. Particles emanate from external 
bodies and enter our bodies by channels or pores. They cannot 
enter unless there is a certain proportion 3 between the emanation 
and the size and shape of the channel which is to receive it. Thus 
a sense-organ is a particular part of the body which, possessing 
channels of a certain size and shape, is adapted to receive 
emanations of a certain kind, of flavour, odour or sound. But his 
theory of vision was more complicated. Not only are there 

1 Plato, Phaedo 96 B, where, however, the name of Alcmaeon is not mentioned. 

* jDe Sensibtts, 25, 26 (Doxogr* Gr. 506, 25 sqq.) : cf. Philippson 0A*; di>6pU7rlt>ij> 
pp. 20 sq. and Julius Sander, Atkmaeon -von Kroton. 

* 405 a 29 sqq. * Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 248 D, E. 

& (rvfJLfjurpfa, >e Gen. et Corr. I. 8, 324 b 35 sqq. ; cf. Theophr. E>e Sensibus 7* 
Perhaps Bmpedocles was seeking to express the same fact as was Aristotle when he 
afterwards applied the word jAeo-brijs to sense. 

b 2 


emanations from visible objects, but there are also emanations from 
the eye. To this he was led by the analogy of the dark lantern, of 
which the camera obscura furnishes a modern illustration. The 
transparent plates of horn or linen in the lantern, made to protect 
the flame from the wind which might otherwise extinguish it, 
correspond to the thin coats or films in the eye covering the pupil, 
whose contents are partly of a fiery, partly of a watery, nature. 
From the pupil fiery and watery emanations leap forth through 
funnel-shaped channels to meet the fiery and watery emanations 
coming, the one from light, the other from dark* objects outside. 
The principle of "like by like" accounts for the mutual attraction 
of similar materials and their meeting, and, when the two sets of 
emanations meet, vision takes place. The preponderance of water 
or fire in the eye accounts for the fact that some animals see better 
in the dark, others in the daylight 1 . Thus, then, we perceive like 
by like, the four elements of all things, air, earth, fire and water, 
outside, because air, earth, fire and water are present in our bodies s 
Blood is the most perfect mixture of these four elements and to 
this blood where it is purest, viz. about the heart, ho attributed 
thought. As we see earth by earth which is in us* water by water, 
so we think by means of blood, the bodily tissue in which all four 
elements are most perfectly blended. Knipeclocles, then, con- 
sistently confined his attention to the bodily process. The mental 
or psychical state is either ignored in his explanation or reduced to 
its physical conditions. Yet on the problem of knowledges aware 
of the imperfection of the senses, he counsels us to withdraw our 
trust from them and prefer the guidance of reason* 

Anaxagoras distinguished sensation from intflHjft'iice and, 
whereas most of the Prc-Socratics agreed that we 

. - . , ,. ... .. ., 

perceive things by having within us something like 
them, he held that we perceive in virtue of the presence within us 
of something opposite to the thing perceived 3 . Knowledge is not 
to be gained from the senses, because their powers* cannot dis- 
criminate minute changes; while the reactionary physics which he 
propounded involved the presence in every sensible object of 
infinitesimal particles perceptible only in the ajfgre${ato and f 
blended with these, alien particles altogether imperceptible, because 
infinitesimal. Over against this infinity of homoeomeries he set 

1 Aristotle, Dt Gen. et Corr. i+ 8, 324 U 35 tjq. t Dt &tttu i f 437 1> 334^8 a 5, 
Theophrastus, De S&uibnti g 7 24. 

8 45k I 4 3I Theophrastus, Dt Sensibtts, *,, 


the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and 
unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is 
Nous 1 . The part it played was to communicate the first impulse 
to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in 
which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of 
the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in 
varying degrees. It governs and orders and knows. We fortu- 
nately possess the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, 
and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was 
its nature 2 . Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason 
and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing 
use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast 
necessary to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, 
for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. We 
know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, 
again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in 
a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. 
Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while 
animals with gleaming eyes see better by night. 

In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach 
t-eucippus mature development. The problem hitherto had been 

Dtfn,c..i.iu*. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus pro- 
pounded a working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient 
for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from 
sense, it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. 
Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge 
that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge 
which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given 
by the senses*. The existence of void apparently contradicts obser- 
vation, experiment fails even now to obtain an absolute void. The 
properties of body are all given by sense. The Atomists accepted 
the evidence of sense for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps 
Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it for 
colours, sounds, odours and flavours. Out of impenetrable atoms 
of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and the 
different qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or 
size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them 4 . 
The soul is no exception. It is a complex of atoms within the 

1 404a 25 sqq., 404 b i 5, 405 a 13 at, 405 b 19 2f, 429 a 18 20, b 23 sq. 

* Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 infra* 

9 Frag- ii D aj>ud Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathematieos, vir. 138 sq. 

4 De A. 404 a r 4, De Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 315 b 6 sqq. 


body. Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and 
mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire 1 . In thus postulating a 
body within the body to account for vital and intellectual functions, 
Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any 
previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he 
sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by 
supposing" that there is a little animal inside to move htm. But 
there is this difference, that the little animal is imagined to be ulivc, 
the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter*. Tints to push the 
implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con* 
sequences and make the half-conscious hylozoism of the early 
lonians blossom forth in materialism is the jjreat merit of 
Leucippus and Democritus. All processes of sensation* then, are 
instances of the contact 3 between bodies. They are caused by 
"idols" or films which are constantly streaming off from the 
surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the 
relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Knipcdoclrs ; 
but the latter made his emanations enter the body through chan- 
nels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void 
between the atoms. The same explanation would apply to thought, 
which is excited when the material image of an object enters the 
equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications 
of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and 
Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which 
produce the different varieties of taste 4 . Things made of atoms 
angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose 
atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and so cm. His 
four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for 
by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysts was 
not attempted for the objects of sound and smell. 

In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and 
of even Empedocles made to bring physics and physio- 
i gy j nto s hape is the retrograde system of Diogenes 
of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised 
for us by Aristophanes, He was not satisfied with the resolution 
by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies into 
infinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities, though he was 

1 403 b 314048. jr6\ 405 a 5 13. 
tt Cf. JDf A. 4$6b 15 zs, 409b 7 n. 

8 2)e Sffisu 4, 443 a 39 sqq. For what folio w see TheophnwtttK, /)* AVw/Awr, (& 49 
83, who treats of Democritus very fully. 
4 Theophrastus, De Smtibwt \ 64 qq* 


more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the 
seat of intelligence. But he supplemented this theory by reverting 
to the position of the lonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had 
chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air with 
sentience and intelligence. "All creatures," he says, "live and 
see and hear by the same thing " (viz. air), " and from the same 
thing all derive their intelligence as well 1 ." He thus made the 
air in us play an important part in the processes of perception 
and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea 
that the brain is the central organ ; the air in the sense-organs, 
the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the 
air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes 
place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented 
by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal 
air ; otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. 
He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed, 
blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the 
internal air is prevented. His account of hearing may be cited 
for the likeness it bears to that given in DeAnima. "The animals 
which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear 
(like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, 
and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in 
the ears sets in motion the internal air" [in or near the brain], 
" Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in 
the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct 
noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is 
not at rest 9 ." 

In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came 
to a halt. The progress of enquiry had been marked by the 
foundation of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in 
a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. 
The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing 
mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, 
but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a 
space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictory 
speculations. The professional educators, whom we know as the 
Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests and made human- 
ism, literary criticism, erudition their main themes. 
Protagoras, the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical 

1 See Simplicity in Physica^ p. 151, 14 153, 24, Theophrastus, De 


* Tbeophr* De Senf&uS) 41 : cf, JDe A* 4*0 a 3 sqq. 


attitude and maintained that man was the measure of all things, 
which, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to mc f 
so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There were 
many sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on which Greece 
had embarked. The followers of Hcraclitus pushed the doctrine of 
flux to an extreme. Things never are, but are always beromin;.;, 
they have no fixed attributes. When we say that a thing is, we 
must In the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are 
always two of these fluxes, one the movement or change producing 
sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives 
the sensations, the flux of our senses. The result of the contact 
between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and 
the eye becomes a seeing 1 eye. When the flux of Socrates well 
comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he is 
ill, it will be soun Both these statements will be true: in fact, 
all statements are true. What wine is depends entirely on the 
man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external 
things, they change so rapidly. On the other hand, Gorgms of 
Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hanlly 
caricatured the position of the younger Kleatics when he put 
forward the thesis that, if anything existed, it could not be known, 
and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be com- 
municated. Such views as these or that of Kuthydenuis that 
falsehood is impossible are by no means universal among the 
Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistinnologiYal 
theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the 
scepticism not of one school, but of many* Aristotle justifies the 
revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he holds that most of 
the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly to 
the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention to 
the importance of the knowing mind in every act of kno\vlxlj;r. 
In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems were 
discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time 
more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those 
who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholo^y 
can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical 
Socrates- When he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was 
confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his 
interlocutors could adequately define. 

Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not 

piato a ^ t * Lat ** e sa y s * s Bended to be taken serknutly* 

We must allow for the mythical element, and in 


particular for his imaginative sympathy with the whole mass of 
floating legend, myth and dogma, of a partly religious, partly 
ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but 
not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and 
Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods 1 . The Platonic myths 
afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all 
the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of 
the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its 
long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its 
task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in 
successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law 
of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancy 
of Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which 
the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir 
his imagination. His approval of ethical fiction is attested by his 
own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that 
any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical 
imagery, Plato never set about writing a treatise De Artima. We 
find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself. In each 
dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine 
the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. 
Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we corne across 
models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight 
have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something ab- 
solutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato 
fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored 
altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a 
mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought 
were regard cil as changes in the body. In the Tkcaetctus* we 
find the following argument. We do not perceive by but through 
the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot 
perceive through another. Consequently, if we know something 
about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through 
sense. Now we do know many such things ; that they are, that 
they are different from one another, that both are two things and 
that each is one. How do we know such facts? The soul appre- 
hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and 
Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity 
are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. 
The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the 

1 See Cornford, ** Plato and Orpheus*" in Clans. Rw. xvn. pp. +& 445. 
tt 184 


bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past 
or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from 
the moment of birth have by nature sensations which pass through 
the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in 
relation to Being 1 and expediency comes with difficulty and re- 
quires a long time, much trouble and education. It is impossible 
to attain truth and know it without attaining Being ; knowledge 
does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them 
attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is 
alone possible. 

In the Phaedo^ the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove that 
learning is reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, 
if questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing 
that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, e.g. of geometry, existed 
previously in the mind of the respondent This proof is as follows. 
The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lytv, 
a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Shntuius 
himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about either in- 
directly or directly. If it is effected directly and the object seen 
is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how tar 
the remembrance is exact For instance, we affirm thut there is 
an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our purcoptinn 
of sensibles which arc equal That this idea is something distinct 
from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensible* may appear 
equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of 
equality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to 
observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of 
the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our 
knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the 
sensiblcs. And whereas (i) this sense of deficiency in the .sensible* 
has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, 
(2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, 
it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have 
been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies to all 
ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtained 
this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in 
full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it ut 
birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on 
this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account of 
it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas ; it 

1 72 B 76 1>. In the summary of the ai-gumcnt I have mainly follow*! thai trtvcm i*y 
Mr Archer-Hind, p. 77. ** J 


follows then that the second alternative is true ; we lose this know- 
ledge and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our 
souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must 
have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more 
passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental 
process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former 
which he sought to explain. 

Though the various mental operations are often discussed and 
. e . distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification 

Classification te * J 

of mental m any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The vana- 

opera ions. ^.^ . g ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ct #&& each attempt at partial 

classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to 
prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in the 
Republic 1 the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite 
is brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, 
and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the 
analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the 
determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in 
the Timaetts* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor 
does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know- 
ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance 3 , or again, 
with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and 
conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between know- 
ledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repiiblic*. 
In the Sophist* discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with 
herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this 
results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. In 
the Philebus* Plato goes more into detail and distinguishes sen- 
sation, memory, imagination and recollection. When the affections 
of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said 
to be insensibility or unconsciousness. When the affections of 
the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there 
is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its 
non-retention, the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery 
of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is 
recollection. Later in the dialogue 7 the relation of memory to 
imagination is illustrated : the former is a scribe or recorder, what 
It records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter, 

1 434 C 445 K. 

3 171*, r. * 477 A sqq. 4 51 1 JD, R, 533 K, 534 A. 

ft 16% K sqq, Cf Tfoaefcttts, 189*;, Phtttb, 38 D. 

* 330-34 C. 7 38E~ 408, 


whose glowing pictures excite hope. In this dialogue also there 
is a practical end, all these distinctions being subservient to 
the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a 
memorable passage of the Ttoactetus* the introduction of two 
illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a dovecot 
or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knou'Icd^c- 
is true opinion. But the similes in themselves are contributions 
to psychology of permanent value. That of the waxen block 
presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation 
conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal 
upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of such 
impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals 
being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax: 
and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass". 
The other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the 
relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter bcing the 
deliberate recovery of lost impressions ; at the same time it shows 
the relation between the mere possession of knowledge and its 
actual application or exercise. 

The most comprehensive view of Plato's psychology is to be 
found in the Timaeits. lie starts with reason or with 


the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This 
process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe 
or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is *, omened with 
circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same 
and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference, 
the two most important relations, and without such jud^im-nt^ 
there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought 
from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results 
in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows 
upon the creation of universal soul, and it is to those particular 
souls, each united to a body, that the following desnipfinn applies. 
When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confim*cl 
in a body, a body, as Plato says, "in-flowing and out-flmvm;; 
continually," these revolutions, "being confined in a great river, 

1 191 c sqq., 197 <: sqq. 

u The comparison of a present sensation with a previous impression imptie* some 
representative faculty ; in this passage we hear of twota and S6$a, but not <if 4>a*ra<ri, 
Plato often uses frvoia for free constructive imagination. It i curious to fmtl that, f*r 
the sake of an Homeric allusion and perhaps* under the influence of a false etymoiugy, 
Plato substitutes ^vtnffuuv6j4eva fit roOro r6 r^t V*^* *' tt /> (>94 ) & *ff r&> r$* ^oggt 
wpt>- But it wouW be a mistake to infer that he here favour* the heart rather th*w thcr 
brain as the organ of MHSUS communh. 


neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne 
violently to and fro. For great as was the tide sweeping over 
them and flowing off which brought them sustenance, a yet greater 
tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against 
them ; as when the body of any one came in contact with some 
alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with 
liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds 
borne on the air." The body of the animal, be it remembered, is 
composed of the same four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with 
which the animal comes in contact in alien bodies, whether in the 
process of nutrition or in that of sensation. " And so the motions 
from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to 
the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been 
called and still are called sensations 1 . Then too did they produce 
the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining 
with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently 
shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered 
the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped 
it from governing and from going ; while the circle of the Other 
they displaced ____ So that the circles can barely hold to one an- 
other, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, 
sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted ____ And when 
from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to 
the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare 
its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, 
and show themselves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor 
or leader in them at that time. And whenever sensations from 
without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them 
the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern 
though they really are governed. On account then of all these 
experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the 
beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body 51 ." The soul, 
according to this account, is in ceaseless activity, and such normal 
activity, or thought, is from tixne to time disturbed by sensation, 
which has a tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood 
and error. We might compare the definition from the Philebns 
above summarised 8 , in which it is said that when the bodily 
affections pass through both body and soul and give rise there 
to a sort of shock or tremor not only peculiar to each, but shared 

1 Plato connects* aXo-Qyo'is with &l<r<rtv. 

3 Tim. 43 A sqq., Archer-Hind's translation. 3 55 *> 


by both in common, the movement which body and soul thus 
share may properly be called sensation. 

Plato started with intellect and thought. Rightly understood, 
he does not oppose body to soul, but rather sense to 

Sense and L A ' 

reason, reason, as one faculty of soul to another. But what 

are the limits of sense and reason ? To which should be referred 
the knowledge of relations of cause and effect, of good and evil ? 
Sense, we are told in the Republic^, is sufficient where a thing 1 does 
not tend to pass into or be confused with its opposite; where the: 
data tend to become confused, sense is insufficient and we must 
appeal to intellect. What sense perceives confusedly thought 
thinks distinctly and in isolation. Sense at the best can only 
give opinion, but reason and true opinion are distinct ** because 
they are different in origin and unlike in nature. The one is 
engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion ; the 
one is ever accompanied by right understanding* the other is 
without understanding; the one is not to be moved by m t 
the other yields to persuasion ; true opinion we must admit is 
shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very small 
portion of mankind 3 ." Sense and thought are concerned with 
different objects, the particular and the universal. The defects 
of sense are not in the subject, but in the object, because the 
particulars of sense are in flux and have no fixed being. Prota- 
goras held that sensible things have their so-called qualities only 
by acting or being acted upon and, as activity and passivity art? 
always relative, no quality belongs to any thing per jte*. We cannot 
say that they are per sc anything in particular, or even thai they 
are at all. They only become: things are always becoming, not 
being. When an object comes in contact with our scnso-organ 
and interaction takes place, a sensation arises in the organ and 
simultaneously the object becomes possessed of a certain quality. 
But the sensation in the organ and the quality in the object are 
results which are produced only by the contact and last only aw 
long as it lasts- In this doctrine of Heraclitus and Protagoras 
Plato acquiesced, so far as it relates to sense and sensibles. The 
testftnony of Aristotle on this point is explicit 3 and the dialogues 
confirm it But, instead of concluding with Protagoras that all 
presentations are relatively true and that there is no such thing 
as objective truth, he drew a different inference, viz. that, if there 

s Tim. 51 E, Archer-Hm<rs translation. 
9 Mttaph. 987 a 3* jq,, 1078 b 1317, 


is such a thing as knowledge, which he firmly believed, its object 
must be an intelligible object and an universal. 

The process of sensation in the separate bodily organs is 
Physiology of t ^ lus described in the Timaezis. " When that which 
the senses. j s naturally mobile is impressed by ever such a slight 
affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the particles one upon 
another producing the same effect, until, coming to that which 
is conscious, it announces the property of the agent : but a sub- 
stance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion round 
about, and thus merely receives the affection, but does not stir 
any neighbouring part ; so that, as the particles do not pass on 
one to another the original impulse which affected them, they 
keep it untransmitted to the entire creature and thus leave the 
recipient of the affection without sensation. This takes place with 
our bones and hair and all the parts we have which are formed 
mostly of earth : while the former conditions apply in the highest 
degree to sight and hearing, because they contain the greatest 
proportion of fire and air 1 ." For the process of vision Plato 
adopts with modifications the theory of Empedocles, for the 
process of hearing that of the Pythagoreans. As to smell, he 
holds that odours cannot be classified according to kinds. For 
no element in its normal state can be perceived by smell, because 
the vessels of the nostrils are too narrow to admit water or earth 
and too wide to be excited by air or fire. They can thus only 
perceive an element in process of dissolution, when it is being 
liquefied or decomposed or dissolved or evaporated. The object 
of smell, then, is either vapour, which is water changing to air, 
or mist, which is air changing to water. The only classification 
we can make is that scents which disturb the substance of the 
nostrils are unpleasant, while those which restore the natural 
state are pleasant. In his account of tasting Plato makes the 
sensation depend upon the contraction or dilatation of the pores 
of the tongue by substances that are dissolved in the mouth, the 
peculiar effect of the principal flavours being briefly indicated. 
He made the flesh the organ of touch and, considering the various 
tactile sensations as relative to the tangibles, proceeds to explain 
what constitutes bodies hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and 
light 3 . 

1 Cf. De A. 4*5 a 3 7, 435 a r i b 3. 

a For the various senses see Tim. 45 B sqq., 61 c sqq., 65 c sqq., 66 P sqq. t 67 A 68 D. 
See also The'opbr, Dt Sennbus, 6"*, 83 91, 


I have dwelt at what some may think inordinate length 
Plato, because in psychology, as elsewhere, making allowance for 
the fundamental difference between the two philosophers, we find 
nothing in Aristotle but the development in a systematic form of 
the Platonic heritage. It was the disciple's task to maintain on 
independent grounds the essentials of the master's doctrine on the 
subject of the soul, and to do this in face of the widely conflicting 
views and the general uncertainty which, as the foregoing sketch 
sufficiently shows, were prevalent at the time. With the conscious 
or half-conscious materialism of his predecessors Aristotle has no 
more sympathy than Plato and, as compared with this point of 
agreement, the differences between them count for little, howrver 
much Aristotle may exaggerate them. In the criticism which he 
passes upon the Timcteus 1 he affects to take the narrative literally. 
The point at issue is whether the activity which both Plato and 
Aristotle ascribe to the thinking soul can justly and reasonably be 
called a movement The doctrine of the two philosophers is on all 
important points the same: they agree that there is an immortal 
soul and a mortal soul, that the immortal element thinks always 
and that thinking must belong to its essence. What Plato calls 
41 movement" is familiar enough in Aristotle as "energy"' or 
41 activity-." If Plato would only say '* energy/ 1 there would 
seemingly be no room for objection. But in the tenth book of 
the Laws, the work of his old age, when he may have IHHMJ pre- 
sumed to have had some acquaintance with the views of his ciisdplt*, 
Plato obdurately refused to say "energy," and by his classification 
of the ten species of motion assimilated physical movement am! 
change to the only activity which in his view had malily, the,: 
"movement" of thought 3 , defining the soul as that which is ubU* to 
move itself. And after his death Xenocrates persisted in attribut- 
ing "movement" to the number which is the soul. At this point 
a brief summary of the first part of Aristotle's treatise m;iy htr 
Aristotle's the best means of indicating the way in which the 
treatise. writer approaches his subject and the conclusion* 

at which he arrives. 

At the outset, he says, we wish to ascertain the nutim: or 
substance, and the accidents, of the soul, which is a prindph- of 

1 De A. 406" b 36 sqq* 

2 "Breaking Plato's metaphor on the wheel," to cite n, happy phrase, ArKtMtk* *li| 
back occasionally into the use of the metaphorical term him*lf, an in AA/afA* 107111 30- 
Compare my note on 433 b 17- 

893 B 895 A, 895 E sqq. 


animal life. A few preliminary enquiries are suggested. Is soul 
" something " ? Substance ? Or quality ? Or to which category 
does it belong? Is it potentially existent or is it an actuality? Is 
it divisible or without parts ? This suggests the further question, 
Is it homogeneous in all species of animals ? If not, are the 
differences between souls generic or specific differences ? If it is 
without parts, it must be variable, there will be many sorts of soul. 
If it is homogeneous, the homogeneous soul must be made up of 
different parts. Ought we, then, to start with the whole soul or 
with the parts, ought we to study the parts first or their functions, 
and, if the functions, why not first the objects? As an apology 
for not deciding, it may be remarked that, while in order to 
know the properties of a thing, we ought to know its essence, yet 
knowledge of properties contributes to knowledge of essence : in 
fact, the one is involved in the other. 

The attributes of the soul cannot properly be separated from 
those of the body. The one that seems most separable is thinking : 
but, if this is akin to imagining or if it involves an image, neither is 
thinking separable. If any attribute is peculiar to the soul itself, 
then soul may be independent of body; if not, soul cannot be 
so independent. The attributes of soul are notions or forms in 
matter and, as such, fall within the province of the physicist or 
natural philosopher, while the dialectician studies and defines their 
form apart from their matter. Here is the point of difference 
between the objects of physics and of mathematics : the attributes of 
soul as such, e.g. fear and anger, are inseparable from the physical 
matter of the animals to which they belong ; the mathematical 
objects, e.g. line and surface, though really inseparable, are 
separable in thought from the concrete things to which they 

From this discussion of method we pass to consider the 
opinions of our predecessors. The characteristics of animate being 
are motion and sensation. Hence some have regarded the soul as 
J>ar excellence the cause of motion, Democritus, who thought it fire, 
and Anaxagoras, being typical instances. All assumed that if a 
thing causes motion, it is itself moved. Others, again, start with 
the assumption that like is known by like and infer that the soul is 
-composed of all the elements, whether they are one or many: 
Empedocles that 'it is composed of earth, air, fire and water ; Plato 
of number. All definitions maybe reduced to three : that it causes 
motion, Is perceptive, is incorporeal The last characteristic leads 
those to choose the finest matter, who acknowledge none but 

H. C 


corporeal elements. Subsequently it is objected that if the soul is 
a fine matter, as the soul is in all the sensitive body, we have two 
bodies in one. 

The application of the idea of motion to the soul leads, it 
is argued, to absurdities. There are four kinds of motion, loco- 
motion, qualitative change, decay, growth, and our enquiry is 
whether the soul is moved in and through itself, and not as sailors 
in a ship. All kinds of motion are in space ; therefore, if the soul is 
moved, the soul must be in space. As it moves the body, it would 
naturally move like the body ; and in that case it would o up and 
down in, and in and out of, the body. In general, we contend, 
the soul does not move the body, as Democritus supposed, by 
physical agency, but by means of purpose of some sort, that is, 
thought. The most thorough application of motion to explain 
soul, and in particular the soul which thinks, was made by Plato 
in the Timacus, and this is criticised at some length. Like other 
theories, it neglects the relation between soul and body in virtue of 
which the soul acts, the body is acted upon, the soul moves awl 
the body is moved. 

Another definition of the soul makes it a harmony or blending 
of opposites. This notion may be applicable to health or any 
bodily excellence, but will not apply to the soul. Harmony will 
not cause motion. Harmony means either (i) a close fit or adjust- 
ment of bodies, or (2) the proportion in which elements are mixed. 
It is needless to show that the first meaning is inapplicable, the*rc 
are so many fittings of the limbs. As to (2) t in flesh and blood 
the elements are mixed in different proportions; which mixturt* is 
the soul ? Returning to motion, we conclude that the only motion 
of which soul admits is motion per accident due to motion of the 
body, as whiteness is moved when a white body is moved* A 
stronger argument than any our predecessors have adduced is 
derived from the attributes of the soul, such as pain and pIwiMiiv, 
fear, anger, and other emotions, sensation and thought, all of which 
are commonly believed to be movements. In them, however, the 
soul is not moved: it is merely the cause of movement in the heart 
or some other bodily part It would be better to ascribe 
attributes to the man and say that he perceives or thinks or feels 
pleasure and pain with his soul. This leads to an interesting 
digression on intellect, followed by a refutation of Xcnucratcs, who 
< defined the soul as a self-moving number. How can the attributes 
which are known to belong to soul possibly be deduced from such 
a definition? It will not afford even the slightest hint of them. 


The same argument had previously been used against the definition 
of soul as a harmony. 

Two characteristics of soul, (i) that it moves itself, (2) that it is 
composed of very fine matter, have now been dismissed. Against 
the third, that it is composed of the elements and that like knows 
like, it may be urged that then the soul ought to have in it 
all compounds, all categories. Moreover, a unifying principle 
would be needed 1 . The soul is not to be held divisible into parts 
independent of each other, for in that case what keeps its parts 
together ? That must be the real soul. Again, as the whole soul 
keeps the whole body together, each part of the soul should keep a 
part of the body together : but we can assign no such function 
to intellect. 

Book II. begins by defining the soul. We premise that of 
entities to which categories are applied substance is one, where by 
substance we mean either (i) matter, which is not yet anything in 
particular, or (2) form, which makes it something in particular, or 
(3) the union of matter and form in the particular thing. Under 
substance in the last sense is included a natural body partaking of 
life. What we mean by life is the power of the body to nourish 
itself and to grow and decay of itself. Body is clearly matter here, 
therefore soul is form. And, if for matter and form we substitute 
potentiality and actuality and distinguish the first stage of actuality, 
corresponding to knowledge, from the second, corresponding to the 
exercise of knowledge, the soul will be the first actuality of a 
natural body furnished with organs, or of a body that has in itself 
the principle of movement and rest. Thus soul is the quiddity or 
formal essence, to which we have analogies in the cutting power of 
the axe and the visual power of the eye, both actualities in the first 
degree, as contrasted with actual cutting and actual seeing, which 
are actualities in the second degree. 

The definition thus found is the most comprehensive possible, 
applying to life in all its various forms, (i) intellect, (2) sense, 
(3) locomotion, (4) motion of nutrition, growth and decay. Plants 
exhibit life in its last form only. Animals, in addition to this, 
have sensation. Of the different senses touch is indispensable. 
Experiment shows that most of these vital functions are really 
inseparable from one another, though at the same time separable in 
thought Whether this holds of intellect also it is not so easy to 

1 Aristotle's own view is that the sense-organs are composed of the elements, in 
touch all are blended. But sense is not this corporeal organ itself, but rather the 
character or power which resides in the organ. 


decide. If to these vital functions be added appetence, which 
clearly is present where sensation is, a certain gradation can be 
recognised. They may be arranged in an ascending series. The 
lower can exist without the higher, but the higher in mortal 
creatures always involve the lower. And there is a similar 
gradation in the senses. It seems, then, that there is one definition 
of soul exactly as there is one definition of rectilinear figure. Alike 
in figures and in the various types of soul, the earlier members of 
the series exist implicitly and potentially in the later ; the triangle 
is implicit in the quadrilateral and the nutritive faculty in the 
sensitive. The definition docs not dispense us from investigating 
in detail what is the soul in the plant, in the brute, ami in man. 

Having reached this point, we naturally expect that each of the 
four main vital functions, nutrition, sensation, intellect, locomotion, 
will be investigated in detail ; and this in fact is what the writer 
proceeds to do. Nutrition, growth and decay and reproduction* 
are dealt with briefly in Book II,, c, 4; sense-perception at very 
great length, Book II., c. 5 Book HL, c. 2; and imagination, which 
is intimately connected with sense, in Book in., c* 3 ; upon 
imagination follows intellect, Book nt, cc. 4 8 ; and, lastly, the 
principle of progressive motion in animals, which is identified with 
appetence, occupies us in Book in., ce. y 11. The treatise ends 
with an attempt, from the standpoint of teleology, to answer the 
question why the various forms of life occur in this ascending scale. 

Aristotle himself was not consciously con^tructinj; a new 
science. His discussion of the soul was forced uwn 

Method, , . . t , A1 . , , , , 

him when, traversing the wide domain he had set 
apart for his science of nature or physics, he passed from mor#ani<t 
to the borders of organic life. The method of science laid down 
in the Qrganon, and hitherto pursued, is a method partly inductive?, 
partly deductive, aiming to establish rational theories on rmpinVal 
data and often falling short of its aim, because either the data wtw 
at fault or the theories inappropriate, or because there were defects 
in both. Natural science has to do with nature ami with natural 
bodies, which by common consent arc pre-eminently Milvi;iitL;t?s, 
sensible substances. Nature is itself a cause of thin^N, tin* jnwcr 
in the things themselves which makes them whnt they are. Its 
characteristic is that, like human intelligence, it devises means to 
ends 1 . In this respect natural bodies or natural substances may 
be compared with the products of art and skill, but in the former 

1 41 5 b 


case the cause is, and in the latter case is not, in the product itself. 
We wish to know what are (i) the concrete natural substances, 
(2) their properties, (3) their physical changes, (4) the causes of 
these changes. If we could answer these questions, we should 
know the ends of nature in making concrete substances, the 
means used to realise these ends, the form and matter of which the 
substances consist. In logic we proceed from one determination to 
another. Psychology is concerned with mental acts or operations. 
In some of these operations we are conscious of a process ; for 
example, in operations of reason we know how we reason, by what 
steps we advance. To search for a method is to aim at determin- 
ing the order and arrangement in which these processes follow one 
another in any science. In geometry certain principles are assumed 
and necessary conclusions are deduced from them. Induction 
generalises from known particulars in order to obtain principles. 
Both induction and deduction may be combined in a more com- 
prehensive method which, after establishing general principles, 
deduces derivative laws and verifies the particular conclusions 
which follow from them. But it may be impossible to apply this 
complete method directly in its simplicity. The effects, which are 
conclusions, may be known, while the causes are to seek. If so, it 
is necessary to infer backwards and discover the causes from the 
effects. The early progress of mathematics and astronomy, with 
their applications to optics and harmonics, led to the belief, which 
Plato endorses, that deduction is the method of scientific research. 
Aristotle agreed for pure mathematics, while in applied mathe- 
matics he regarded induction from the materials collected as, 
strictly speaking, lying outside of the science and subsidiary. But 
in the natural sciences, where we rise from effects to causes, a 
thorough description of facts is a necessary preliminary to the 
discovery of the ultimate principles, and the inverse method must 
be applied. The method of astronomy, we are told, was to collect 
the facts, the phenomena, and from them to deduce astronomical 
laws. The whole method is summed up with convenient brevity 
thus : " In every department of nature we must first ascertain the 
facts and then after that state the causes." The task to which the 
History of Animals is devoted is thus described : " First let us 
ascertain the existing varieties of animals and the properties of 
each, and after that we must try to discover their causes. This is 
the natural method which puts the collection of material first 1 /' 

1 Anal. Prior. I. 30, 46 a X9sqqr E>e Part* An. i. i, 640 a 14, //*>/. An. r. 7, 491 a 


Characteristic of Aristotle's mind is the notion that some things 
can be got at both deductively and inductively: it is the con- 
silience of fact and theory. The soul being a part of nature, 
psychology must needs be a branch of general physics, as all 
preceding thinkers, including Plato, agreed 1 . The presuppositions 
of Aristotle's metaphysics refer life to a cause. Vital phenomena, 
wherever found, are sufficiently alike in their manifestations to 
justify the assumption of one such cause. The treatise, then, is a 
preamble to all parts of the system dealing with plants, or animals, 
or with yet higher beings, if endowed with life. As one of the 
series of biological works, it stands in the closest connexion with 
the tracts known as the Parva Natnralia, with the morphological 
treatise De Partibits Animalhtm* and with that upon embryology, 
De Generations Animalinm. The part which the enquirer pr. .f-ssrs 
to take calls for very careful demarcation. It is impossible tn say 
what contributions, if any, Aristotle himself made in the field of 
psychology: the presumption is that they were but small. The 
evidence of his dependence upon Plato for all that relates to 
psychical phenomena is so overwhelming ', so constant, P"<sil>ty 
the repeated illustrations from zoophytes or stationary animals am! 
from worms, which give signs of life after they have been severed 
into parts 3 , are original; but in the main his facts are jm-rUfly the 
facts of his predecessors, the scantiest stock now at the disposal of 
any ignorant layman. Speculation had outrun observation. Nor 
is there any complaint of the scantiness of the data. No. Such 
as they are, they have already called forth too numerous and too 
divergent explanations. The writer's modest aim is by pivliminary 
discussion to settle a few, just a few, fundamental questions *H to 
the nature and attributes of the one principle of life and miiul, 

Aristotle's enquiry is founded on his motaphysirs. It is the 
Body and business of natural science to discover form and 

80Ul * matter in natural substances. Every animal, every 

plant is a natural substance, compomuU-d of body, which is 
matter, and soul, which is form, and the science of nature has 
therefore to investigate both body and soul Yet here a proviso 
is needed. Natural science does not necessarily treat of the whole 

1 Mttajk. ioa6a5, De Part. An, i. r, 64 x a 17 *<!<!; cf. I'totr*, /tfo*v/sw, I;OM^J, 
3 This holds for >e Anima at least ; but Arist<>tk's real merit cow* out con- 
spicuously in the tracts ft Somno and /V Mtmona* 

8 e.g. 410 b 19, 43* b 20, 411 b 19 sqq., 41 3 b 16 srjq. Aristotle may also b* fwlitol 
with the simple experiment of placing a Heiuctble object upon the *cn*e-organ iHiwJf as ti*l 
to show the necessity of a medium, 419 a i* f 4*1 b 14 sq< |M 4 a,j b 17 WHI., And the 
to experiment, as e.g, 421 b 19- 


soul. Wherever soul as form is in matter, wherever it employs 
a bodily organ, we are still in the domain of natural science ; but 
anything included under soul which is independent of the body 
and which cannot be thus defined must be reserved for meta- 
physics 1 . The meaning which Aristotle attached to independence 
or separate existence must be grasped, if we would understand what 
he conceived by a substance or thing. Primarily this separate 
existence is the attribute of concrete particulars presented to 
sense in the external world. They are bodies locally, numerically 
and by magnitude separate. From them the conception is trans- 
ferred to whatever the mind thinks as distinct, and even for 
immaterial notions Aristotle has no other formula. They, too, 
like concrete bodies, are described as being in time, in space and 
in conception separate or distinct 2 . In reducing soul to the logical 
essence or form of body Aristotle, according to his own presup- 
positions, so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for 
all the soul's absolute immateriality. The living body has in- 
dependent existence, has its own form and its own matter. Even 
a dead body or an inanimate thing is something existing inde- 
pendently, to which we can apply the pronoun " this 8 . 1 ' But the 
soul does not exist in the same way. Nor, again, is it a thing 
capable of being added to or subtracted from another thing, the 
body, any more than form in general is a thing which can in 
mechanical fashion be united to and separated from its appropriate 
matter*. If a brazen sphere be melted down, the brass remains. 
It is still "this" something, "this" mass of metal; but we cannot 
then say of its spherical shape that it is " this " anything or that 
it any longer exists. The lifeless body is like the eye which 
cannot see or the axe which is spoilt for use 5 . We may apply to 
them the same names as before ; but, as the nature is no longer 
the same, the application is irrelevant, misleading, equivocal. But, 
though the lifeless body is still a concrete particular and a sub- 
stance, the soul apart from its relation to the body is no such 
thing at all. Now the soul as form stands to the body as matter 
of the concrete individual precisely as the spherical shape to the 
brass, as vision to the eye, as cutting power to the axe. In every 
case the form is a quality predicable of the matter. But the 

1 >e J'art. An. i. i, 641 a 14 b io 
* Meta$h. ioi61> i 3. 

3 Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term "body** 
in two distinct senses by means of the term "organism*" 

4 Cf. Mttttfh. iO45b izsqq. 

5 412 b 10 sqq. 


body is not predicable of the soul, \ve cannot explain the soul 
In terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the 
materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of 
soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing; as 
determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in 
itself unknowable 1 . Therefore, if we would know the living body, 
we must study its activities and operations and all the attributes 
which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, arc not 
two distinct things, they are one thing presenting two distinct 
aspects. The soul is not body, but belongs to body 8 ; it is not 
itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the body 
makes a concrete particular ; it resides in a body and, what is 
more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means 
whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised The relation 
of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a 
relation of higher generality, that between potenco and act** be- 
tween the power to become and the realisation of that power in 
actuality. Before it is, a thing may be or may not be, and when 
it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not act- 
Now body stands to soul, and matter to form in general. *is the! 
potential to the actual which has reached the first sta^c and 
already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living 
body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actual- 
isation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of faculties 
unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation 
of potcnce to act Life itself* the use of actual power, is the 
second stage, energy. The actual use must be prrccdrel by actual 
power. Soul is actual power to live y but is not life. In Plato 
body is opposed to soul. The body could be trainee! to obey the 
soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural 
instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a parttYubr 
soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the 
Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd 4 . Soul is likewise 
both the final and efficient cause of the body*. It t's the final 
cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; 
it Is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of j;mj.;ri^>ivi- 
motion, but also in all the various changes which the body under- 
goes In the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, 

3 Met&ph. 036 a 9* a 411}) 6 &m^ 41 4 a 
* 413 a 9 sqq., a 12 qq. ? bay qc^ 

4 407 b ao 26. * 4 r $ 


Such, in brief, is the description of soul considered in and by 
classification ^self, including the various separate powers, which 
of vital are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and 

powers. , . , . 

psychical operations. The great problem is how this 
multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. Plato in 
some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason, 
and two mortal parts, passion and appetite. His pupil is more 
cautious. He does not go beyond the supposition of certain 
powers or faculties. In one sense, he says, this division into 
powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in 
number 1 . But he contends that his own groups are convenient 
groups. Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are 
only means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the 
nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all 
operations : there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the 
instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different 
powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his 
ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent 
assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave Aris- 
totle much in the same position as Plato. In order to get a clear 
view, special stress must be laid upon the statement that the 
powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale 2 . In mortal 
creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the 
lower, without which it cannot exist*. The lowest power, that of 
nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in 
plants it exists alone. Animals have sensitivity in addition : of 
the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on 
safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two 
ways. In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, 
tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while 
appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense*, is made 
the principle on which progressive motion depends". These con- 
siderations lead to the following scheme : 

r. Nutritive 2. Discriminative 3. Motive 

Sense Intellect Appetence Faculty of 


On the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our 
powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power 

1 432 a 11 sqq. t 433 b I 5- * 414 b 28 415 a i. 

* 415 a x -I I. 4 414 b i sqq. c 433 a ** sqq- 


of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an inter- 
mediate place must be found for the imaginative facult}'. These 
considerations suggest the following table of faculties : 

I. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive; (this is in 
most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4, Imaginative; 5. In- 

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the 
The soui of lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and 
the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. 

Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates 
their study. We accordingly assume 1 a power of self-nourishment, 
the nutritive faculty. But we must be careful to remember that 
this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduc- 
tion ; by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality, 
the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, 
though the individual members of the species perish. If we arc 
to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the 
plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. But 
if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must 
be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions 
of nourishment and growth are even more important than the 
end to which they are means. Food or nutriment is the cor- 
relative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how, 
things are nourished. It was a common opinion that contraries 
are nourished by contraries. This is generally, but not always, 
true of the elements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points out, 
is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was 
nourished by like. These two views can be reconciled, I "indi- 
gested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated 
to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by like* 
Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is easy to discm*cr the 
movent, the instrument and the moved* Soul is the nouri.shrr, 
food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, 
as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we 
have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move 
the rudder with which he steers the ship. 

Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, 
Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity- He admits that they 
are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate 
things are affected ; that is, they are simply heated and cooled. 

1 n M c- 4. Cf. also 411 b 1930, 413 a 35 sqq., 43 4 a 3* sqq., 43* b i? wjfj,, 434 a 

as 30, 435 a 25 stj. 


They cannot receive the form of objects without the matter, and 
this because they have no organ in which the elements are so 
blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and 
heat. When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical 
contact. Thus the excessive preponderance, as Aristotle supposed, 
of " earth " in the structure of plants precludes sensation, because 
it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be 
necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain 
tissues of the body, e.g. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a 
similar way as due to the pi-esence in them of too much earth : 
and in this erroneous view he followed Plato. 

The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is 
Sense . that they not only live, but have the power to per- 

perception. ccivo, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a 
cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense 
without perceiving something, and interpreted this something 
objectively, as something which exists. The distinction so im- 
portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception 
had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his 
predecessors, the main question is, in what does this operation of 
perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe 
the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving is 
related to thinking, since both are cognitive. One distinctive 
mark in that by sense we perceive individuals 1 . But we have 
much knowledge of individuals which the five senses cannot give. 
Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be 
referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or 
powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever per- 
ception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and 
fer se, only per accidens*. Directly sense perceives only "this," 
just as directly sense perceives it here and now. The operation 
of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend 
on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of 
essential form. One species of motion he defines as the production 
of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g,, the production 
of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror 
by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories 
as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to 
which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative 
change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes 

1 417 b ipsqq. 

* Atutl. Pest. L 31, 87 b 28 sqq., n. 19, tooa 17 ; Met&ph. xoSya 19 sqq. 


when it loses certain qualities and acquires new ones, remaining 
itself numerically the same. The form or essence without the 
matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient 
upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The form 
or essence is one in all the things thus affected. The one universal 
heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water 
heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we 
should define the particular motion or qualitative change which 
we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a 
particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a 
particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. But 
this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air 
receives odour, but they do not perceive 1 . It is not enough, then, 
to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted 
upon. Besides, what is affected ? Not the single organ, but the 
percipient as a whole ; and we have seen that the animal is a 
particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, 
the sentient soul form. Now it is with the soul that we perceive, 
as it is with the soul that we live and think 2 . Let us, then, amend 
the definition. Perception is an alteration in the soul. It consists 
in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive 
faculty. This effect is the reception of the form, without the 
matter, of the external thing perceived !) . 

Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views 
of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, 
while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to 
be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw 
about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The per- 
cipiendum is unlike, the perception is like, that which perceives it 4 , 
for, when the process of perceiving takes place, both the external 
thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause 
have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, 
is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act 
of vision in a way coloured 5 , for it receives the same one form of 
colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived, 
But we may go a step further. Where one thing acts upon an- 
other, both the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that 
which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are 
physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is 

3 414 a 12 sq., 408 b C3~ 18. * 424 a 17 qq, 

4 4 r< 5b 35 4*7 a *8 20, 418 a 36. * 4*5 b2. 


merely a potential patient, whatever else they may be actually. 
Applying this to perception, the external thing is always per- 
ceptible, a percipiendum^ a potential perccptum^ the sense-faculty 
is always potentially percipient : but in the process of perceiving 
the potential in both cases has been transformed into an actual. 
The eye, e.g., becomes a seeing eye, the whiteness whiteness per- 
ceived, and these two actualities reside in that which is passively 
affected, in the sense. In other words, the actuality of the sensible 
object is one and the same with (not merely similar to) the actuality 
of the perceiving subject 1 , sense and sensible having in the act 
of perception one and the same essence, since the whiteness seen 
in the object is transferred to the visual faculty and, being an 
universal, a form, is one and the same, wherever it resides. Is 
this, we ask, a doctrine of relativity? Most certainly not. The 
followers of Protagoras are supposed to argue that, if the sensible 
quality is alone real, nothing would exist at all unless there were 
living beings to perceive, for without them there would be no 
perception. I grant, Aristotle replies, that in the absence of living 
beings there would be no act of perception, no affection of the 
percipient. But for all that, it would be impossible to get rid of 
things, which are potential causes of perception even when they 
are never perceived. For perception does not perceive itself, there 
is something beyond the perception ; and this must be logically 
prior to the perception, since whatever causes motion or change 
must be prior to that which it moves or changes : and this is not the 
less true because sensible object and percipient are relative to each 
other". In other words, the object perceived actually exists with 
its own form, its own qualities, even when it is out of all relation 
to a percipient And similarly we may conceive a percipient out 
of ail relation to an object, none such being actually present It 
is then what it always was, a power of perceiving, a faculty of 
sense, mere sensitivity. 

These considerations apply most emphatically and most natur- 
ally to sense regarded as a whole, a single power which resides in 
the body of the animal, likewise regarded as a whole* But this 
power of perceiving is localised and pluraliscd. Wherever a part 
of the body subserves a particular end or function, it becomes 
an organ or instrument, and the general power of perception, as 
specialised in the five senses, employs its separate sense-organs, 

1 435 b a6 sqq, 

3 Mdaph* roiob 30 ion a 2* 


the eye, the ear, the nostril and the organs of taste and touch. 
For the detailed account of the modes in which they are employed, 
the medium which they necessarily imply and their special objects 
or provinces, the reader must be referred to Book II. ca 7 n l . 
Here there is space only for a few general remarks. First, the 
parallelism between sense as a whole and the single special sense, 
e.g. sight or touch, must never be overlooked. u As the sensation 
of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole 
to the whole sentient body as such 2 ." Thus the sense of vision 
presides over its own special province of colour, bounded by the 
opposites, white, black, and embracing every intermediate shade 8 . 
The sense of touching has its special province, or rather provinces, 
especially temperature and resistance, bounded the former by the 
extremes of hot and cold, the latter of hard and soft, and including 1 
all varieties of temperature and resistance intermediate between 
the extremes in each province. Vision resides in the eye, touch 
in the internal organ of touch (probably the heart) or in the 
intra-organic medium, the flesh, according 1 as we adopt the more 
scientific or the popular standpoint. To perceive is to undergo 
a qualitative change. In order, then, to become assimilated to 
the object, the organ must be capable of undergoing such change 
in the direction of either extreme or of any of the intermediate 
grades between these extremes. If it could not respond to the 
stimulus, as modern psychologists would say, at any point in the 
scale of colour, of temperature or of resistance* the failure on the 
part of the organ would be attended by mal-perception or non- 
perception on the part of the faculty. This is brought home to 
us whenever we try to employ our senses upon objects either 
altogether out of their range or such that the perception is at- 

1 As might be expected, the contributions to the physiology of the senses, and 
especially vision, are worthless. Sec Itaare* Creak Theories Introduction ; also 
pp. 9 ii. The mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans finally developed a wore 
correct doctrine of sound and its propagation, to which the spurious treatise />* 
Andibtti&w, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony. See Jan, Muski Vfw//ww 
pp. 50 57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in 
Plato's Ttmaeits. For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. teller, 
Aristotle, j. p. 443* Eng. Tr. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile 
at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while 
knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the 
nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful 
ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion* If Aristotle had been 
in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better ue of 
it than did Huxley's unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of /fttjctey, vol. n*, 
pp. 365 qq-)- 

u 4*3 b 23 25. 9 416 b 8 sqq, 422 b 19 sqq* 


tended by pernicious effects, when we try to see in the dark or 
to look at the noonday sun or to plunge the hand in boiling warer 
or to touch the air 1 . Now what is it which justifies our expectation 
that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be per- 
ceived ? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, 
with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He ac- 
cepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved all 
bodies into four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with four primary 
qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. These elements arc found in their 
compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four 
mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues or 
lumioLiiMU'inis parts of animal bodies, of which, again, the hetero- 
geneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence 
there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known 
by like. The characteristic of each object perceived depends not 
so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as 
upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its 
form. When Kmpedocles resolved bone into definite proportions 
of his four elements, he was not far from realising that this com- 
bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it is 3 . So, too, 
with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which con- 
stitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in 
the organ. Hence sense as u whole, and each special sense, is a 
form, because it is the determining; proportion or combining ratio 
of the tissues composing the organ 8 . In perceiving, form receives 
and apprehends form. In order that it may j>erceive all the quali- 
ties which come within its range, the sense must be neutral or 
indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes 
which it can perceive and be actually neither of them 4 . In the 
organ of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain 
way, e.g, the finger has a certain temperature. But, as by the 
definition perceiving is qualitative change, this temperature must 
be capable of variation in the direction of cither extreme or of 
any grade intermediate to the extremes, and the constituent 
elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way 
as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain 
the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole 
and to the single special senses. Whatever is intermediate be- 

1 494 a x r Jtfjrj. 

* 408 a 13 Hqq. f 410 a i MI* ; Mttoph, 993 a 15 sqq. 

* 4*9 b 14 xtf, 436 b fa 43* a fl M*J. 
4 433 b 30 434 a 10, 426 a 7~b 7* 


tween two extremes is differently related to the one and to the 
other. In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a line 
is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the end 
of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight dis- 
criminates two shades of colour. It is in a certain relation to the 
first when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the 
second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measures 
the difference between these two relations. 

The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special 
senses extends to the objects directly perceived. The objects which 
the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks : they 
cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate 
special sense cannot be mistaken about them 1 . The objects not 
exclusively belonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by 
two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, often 
called scnsits coinmnnis* Such percepts are shape and magnitude, 
unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what 
Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of 
body. About this common function of sense as a whole there has 
been much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, ant! 
all the more important and more intellectual of its functions belong 
to it in virtue of this unity. As one, it perceives the common 
sensibles ; as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and differ- 
ence between sensibles ; as a single faculty attendant upon each 
and every special sense, it is self-conscious*. That to sense as a 
whole, the so-called scnsits commnnis^ should be assigned functions 
which in degree, if not in kind 8 , exceed those of the separate special 
senses, need not surprise us* For in sense we have a whole which 
is something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis 
into its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple 
addition of these elements reproduce what was subjVcti'<l to 
analysis* The operation of this single faculty is temporarily 
arrested in sleep, permanently in death. Lastly, to this faculty 
belong imagination, dreams and memory, which we are now to 

1 418 a 7 sqq*, 435a 14 sqq. t 438!) iSsqq. 

* 425 a 37, 446 b ao sqq. ; >e Somno , 455 a 11 sqq. 

3 Some of these functions appear to be delegated by S&ISMS tommunis to the s|iecta! 
senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminate* the 
objects within its own province (4*6 b to), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we 
see (445!) 13 sqq k ). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, 
which the latter receives from >& Somno a, 455 a i a .sqq. Cf. Beare, Greek 
PP- *33 * 377. 


Sensation is defined as the production of an effect in the sense- 
images and organ, a part of the body, by an external object. It 
Sleep ' is, then, a movement or impression affecting the body 

and, so far as we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now 
this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of 
the object which caused it 1 . Instances may be given of its 
persistence, as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we 
have just left the sunlight ; or what is known as the after-image 
(more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after 
looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different 
colours 2 . It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains 
imagination. He defines it as a motion generated by actual per- 
ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which 
constituted the original sensation 3 , or, as Hobbes translates, " All 
fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense." 
In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty 
we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is 
often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things 
to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the 
coloured or sonorous body is and where it is 4 : and these errors 
of sense arc shared in and increased by imagination, especially 
when the .sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in 
general is due to the difference between imagination and judgment 
and between the standards they employ 15 . It may sometimes be 
corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the 
object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single . 
The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact are 
travelling past them, implies that a movement is set up in the eye 
of the same kind as would occur if we were stationary and the 
objects themselves were in motion. In fact, the bodily movement 
induces a picture of the very object which might have been its 
cause. It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be 
ascribed 7 . Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole 
or seiisus communis^ by which when awake we are conscious that 
we are awake and have sensations 8 . Plants, having no sensation, 

1 Cf. 408 b 18, 425 b 34 sq., 429*1 4? De Iitsomn* a, 459 a 24 28, 

3 De In$omn. 2, 459 b 5 ao 

* 438 b ro 439 a 5. 

4 418 a 15 q,, 48l> 20 sqq. 

ft De Insomn* a, 460!) i6qq., i, 458!) 9 sqq. 

* ib. i, 469!) so 27, 

7 Dt Insomn, z, 459 a 14 aa. , 

H JD* Somno r, 454 b 25 27, a, 455 a ia b a. 


do not sleep\ In order that sense, which is charged with motive 
as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep is 
necessary' 2 , and it is brought about ultimately by the process of 
nutrition 3 . An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to 
the head 4 , is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of 
drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there 
is in the system collects about the heart 1 "'. It is clear that dreaming 
is not a function proper to sense as a whole nor to any special 
sense, much less to understanding or opinion". Yet the images 
seen in dreams have sensible qualities. It only remains to refer 
dreaming to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hour*. 
The residual movements in the organs arc no doubt present in the 
daytime, but at night, when the action of the special senses is 
suspended 7 and the environment is peaceful, the imagination is 
most active 8 . Then #t* /lypot/iesi these persistent effects reach ant I 
stimulate the central organ of sense. We are most Habit* to 
illusions when labouring under emotion or morbid states'*, as, for 
example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall 
for real an i trials' 10 and even makes bodily movements to escape from 
them. In sleep, again, the judging faculty is weak 11 , owing to tin: 
increasing pressure of blood around the heart 1 ' 4 . There are, of 
course, cases in which dreams are the result of semi-conscious 
sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights |: \ which would have 
escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections anil ideas 
arc often added to them 14 . But in itself dreaming is simply the 
result of the movement of our sensations during the period of sleep 
as such". Dreams are movements which give rise to images within 
our sense-organs 1 ". 

The most important of all our images are those: of memory, If 
Memory- imagining is consciously referred to an earlier JKT- 

image. ceptioti of which the image is a copy, then we. call tt 

memory 17 . For memory there are two conditions, tin; affection now 

1 >t Somno r, 454 b 27 455 a 3, * /&, 2, 455 b \& -ja* 

a # 3s 45<>a 32 sqq. 4 ib* fa 456 b 17 **jq, 

fi #- 3 457ft ,$3 sqq* /> Insomn. 3, 461 a 3 sqq* 

c Z>* Insomn. r, 458 b 9 45 9 a 9, 7 tf. 3, 461 a 4, 

8 ib. 3, 461 a 14 b$o. 9 ib. a, 460 b jj ncjq, 

10 M. , 460 b II sqq. li ///. 3, jfii b $"-7. 

12 # 3> 4^* l > i* q f i-> *6 i- w /& 3> 461 R *y Mjq. 

*J #. T, 458 b 15 sqq., 3, 463 a 57, > /*. 3, 4/5ia 1931. 

1 \*7. 3, 462 a 8qq, 

17 tye Mt*w. r, 449 b 4 q* t 450 b 31 451 a a, 15 ^ard<tyi&r0r, lit *,l*&*<n nb 
<j>6rracrf>p 9 ^fty, -where ^ts, which is usually understocxl l< mean ** ret^ntftti^ 1 ' may 
mean "inference." 


present, and the perception of time 1 ; in other words, not only 
images, but images regarded as decayed copies of earlier im- 
pressions, and this involves the perception of time. By memory 
we see distance, not indeed in space, but in time 2 . As memory is 
not confined to man, but extends to some of the lower animals, 
these latter must be credited with the imaginative faculty and the 
perception of time-'*. Here are very promising beginnings of a 
comparative psychology, which Aristotle, though he desiderated it 
in his predecessors, did very little himself to supply. His denial of 
understanding to brutes was a prejudice which a little research 
would have been able to surmount. As a matter of fact, he not 
only holds absolutely that, though the lower animals remember, 
they have no reasoning power, but, further, that, if memory were a 
function of pure intelligence alone, even man himself could not 
remember, since intellectual acts cannot be remembered per se*. 
What, then, can be remembered ? The instrument of memory is 
the image. Hence whatever can be presented as an image can be 
directly remembered, all that cannot be presented as an image can 
only be remembered indirectly by means of the images with which 
it is associated. But how can we know the past which is not 
present, if our only instrument is a present affection, the image 
which survives after the original impression is gone 5 ? Let us 
revert to the formation of images. The fact that a present move- 
ment of sensation sets up a subsidiary movement of imagination 
may be expressed in a different way, if we employ the metaphor of 
an impression, by which perception has been so often illustrated". 
The act of perceiving, as it were, stamps a particular impression 
upon the sense-organ, as a seal ring stamps an impression upon 
wax. This impression, which remains, is a potential image so long 
as it is latent, an actual image when we become conscious that it is 
still present. Is it, then, this image, the reproduced impression, and 
not that of which it is an image, which we remember? If so, it 
may be urged, remembrance is not of the past at all. At that rate 
we might just as well suppose that in actual sensation also we see 
and hear what is not present to sense ; an objection which cuts at 
the very root of every representative theory of perception. The 
objection is met by pointing out that in a certain way it is true that 
actual perception has for its object what is not present 7 . We see a 

. r, 449 b *& *9> 45 b tl 20 > 

* *#. s, 45* b 7 sqq. 3 ib, I, 430*1 15 it. 

4 ib. t, 450 a 1014. 6 *<*. r, 450 a 25 sqq., 450 b jci sqq. 

* ih i, 450 a $o sqq. 7 td. x, 450 b so sqq. 


likeness of an absent person : the picture is present, the original is 
not The picture, though numerically one and the same, may be 
regarded in two ways, either as a simple picture or, in relation to 
the original, as a likeness. Apply this to the memory-image. It, 
too, may be regarded in itself simply as an image before the mind, 
or in relation to something else of which it is a representation. If 
viewed in the latter aspect, it is a memorial or reminder of an 
earlier perception which it recalls. It is distinguished from other 
Images by its reference to time past and by the fact that it is, what 
many images are not, a copy or representation. Memory may 
accordingly be defined not simply as a retention, but rather as a 
reference, of a mental presentation as a likeness to the original of 
which it is a likeness. All representations are likewise presentations. 
Images are before us in memory, in present sensation and in 
expectation, whether hope, fear, or desire, but we refer those 
images to the past, the present, and the future ivsptvlixoh" 1 . In all 
three cases something is presented, and the only way of clixtin^uUh- 
ing them is the accompanying perception of time, one of the 
common sensibles. Confusion of memory with imagination is one 
case of hallucination: thus Antipheron of Oreus was a lypc of 
mental derangement when he mistook what he only fanried 
for a past experience 2 . So far, then, like imagininj.; in j^omrrul, 
memory is a function of sensits communis^ and hence it is to the 
central organ of sense that we must refer this movement or 
impression or image, or whatever else we call the corporeal change 
in question. 

The distinction between memory and reminiscence or recollec- 
tion is never very clearly stated by Aristotle, but, if wo attoml to 
what he says about acquiring knowledge and ivac (jtiiiin^ it, i.e. 
about learning for the first time and learning over again what we 
have forgotten (neither of which, of course, is to be identified with 
memory or recollection), it seems that the case may be put as 
follows 8 . When we retain what we learn, whether by sense or 
thought, we are said to remember. Recollection implies the 
recovery of what has temporarily been obscured without going 
through the process of re-learning, and this whether the recovery 
is due to voluntary effort or is involuntary. We can remember 
without recollecting, if the image has never been lost, but Is Intent 
or potentially existent in us. When we recollect by voluntary 
effort we are conscious that it is lost and seek to recover it. Here 

1 Jfo Mem. i, 449 b 3538. * ft. I, 451 a K wjcj. 

* it. i t 451 a o b ro. 


I cite at length the account given by Wallace, p. xcv : " Recollec- 
tion may take place either intentionally or unintentionally : we 
may, that is to say, recall some event of past experience either 
accidentally as it were or by the help of a distinct effort to call it 
back to mind ; but in either case it is regulated by certain laws 
which it is one of the great psychological merits of Aristotle to 
have tabulated for us. The laws which thus express the mode 
in which the mind attempts to recall its past impressions are what 
have commonly been designated since Aristotle's day, the Laws of 
the Association of Ideas. But to Aristotle, it must be added, the 
laws in question have little or none of the significance which they 
have acquired in the hands of modern inquirers. To him they are 
simply a statement of the manner in which we seek to regain some 
fragments of knowledge which have for the moment got outside 
our consciousness. Recollection in short being the recalling of our 
past impressions, it follows that the success of our efforts to recall 
them will depend to no inconsiderable extent on the degree to 
which we can recall the order in which other impressions stood to 
that of which we are in search. But our impressions follow one 
another in memory in an order similar to that in which the actual 
sensations succeeded one another. Recollection thus involves 
a study of the laws of sequence in the order of our ideas : and 
Aristotle analyses the method of recalling past impressions in the 
following manner. 'When engaged in recollection we seek to 
excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that 
which the movement or impression of which we are in search was 
wont to follow. And hence we seek to reach this preceding 
impression by starting in our thought from an object present to us 
or something else whether it be similar, contrary or contiguous to 
that of which we are in search ; recollection taking place in this 
manner because the movements are in one case identical, in another 
case coincident and in the last case partly overlap 1 .' Similarity, 
contrariety and contiguity are thus to Aristotle the three principles 
by which for purposes of recollection our ideas and impressions 
have to be guided. Our sensuous movements and impressions really 
follow one another in an order corresponding to that of external 
nature* Thus, the more order and arrangement there is in the 
elements of our experience the better connected our ideas are 
the more easily will they be remembered 8 . And again the greater 
number of times we have established a connection between our 

De Mem. v, 451 1> 1622. 2 #. *, 45* a * 3 


ideas, the greater will be the ease with which we can recall them. 
Habit in short becomes a second nature : and the constant con- 
junction of two phenomena in outer experience will lead to their 
being so completely connected in the mind that the one will never 
show itself without the other 1 ." 

I have reserved to the last the highest employment of mental 
images in the service of the intellect. It is impossible to think 
without such an image before the mind-. When we arc contem- 
plating the object of thought, we must have an image before us. 
The past experience which we remember includes not only 
perceptions, but thoughts, and the reference of the image to 
sensus communis compels Aristotle to declare that nothing but 
what is sensible is remembered directly, per SL\ and that the whole 
of our thoughts, notions and conceptions are remembered indirectly, 
per accidents. Our thinking is conditioned by continuity, i.e. exten- 
sion, and by time. Just as in proving a geometrical proposition we 
are aware that the size of the figure does not affect the proof, but 
we nevertheless draw the figure of a determinate size, so in 
thinking, even though the object is not quantitative, we think of it 
as a quantum, and, if it is quantitative but indefinite, \ve neverthe- 
less think of it as of a definite size". What affections of sense are 
to the sensitive faculty, such images are to the thinking soul*. The 
total loss of a sense cuts off the man from all the knowledge 
available through that sense". Without the sensations in question 
he will not have the coin:-.pjiKling images, and without them he 
cannot have the thoughts and conceptions* Intellect itself duos 
not think external things without the aid of s^nsc- percept ion 11 . 
Further, the use of images in thinking implies their use in that 
process of deliberation in which the mind balances the present 
against the future, and after due calculation decides upon a course 
of action 7 . When reason is obscured by passion, images of sense 
themselves directly move to action, and such images control the 
movements of the lower animals generally". 

Intellect forms the subject of Book in., cc. 4 8, Hut the 
T . . detailed treatment there by no means exhausts what 

intellect. * 

is said about it in the treatise. It will be convenient 
to collect here the more important of the scattered remarks 

1 De Mem. 2, 457 a 27 30. 

2 De A. 431 a 16 sq., 433 a 813 ; De Mem. i t 449 b 3*. 

* De Mem. i, 450 a 114. * 431 a i4$q. 43* * 7 aq. 

6 &* Sftuu 6, 445 b 16 sq. * 43r t> s sq q 

8 429 a 4 sqq., 433 a 9 sq* b 2830, 415 a ir. 


previously made on thinking, on intellect, or even on the soul, 
where the context suggests that Aristotle, like Plato, is using soul 
for that which thinks. 

If to think is a species of imagining or not independent of 
imagining, even thinking could not exist apart from body. 
Anaxagoras made soul the moving cause when he said that 
intelligence set the universe in motion. But, whereas Democritus 
absolutely identified mind with soul and did not use the term mind 
to denote a faculty conversant with truth, Anaxagoras was less 
consistent. He often made mind the cause of goodness and order; 
elsewhere he identified it with soul, as when he attributed it to all 
animals, great and small, high and low. And yet, Aristotle adds, 
mind in the sense of intelligence is not so widely distributed as 
soul or vital principle. Anaxagoras took mind as his first principle 
and said it alone of all existing things is simple, unmixed, pure. 
He attributed to one and the same principle that it knows and 
that it causes motion. Mind, according to him, is impassive and 
has nothing in common with anything else 1 . 

The criticism 2 of the Timaetts suggests that in Aristotle's 
opinion the mind in the universe is not a magnitude ; it is one and 
continuous in the same sense as the process of thinking, which 
consists of a series of thoughts ; the unity of these thoughts is a 
unity of succession, the unity of number, not that of a magnitude. 
Hence, mind not being continuous like a magnitude, there are two 
alternatives : either it has no parts, or it has parts and is con- 
tinuous, but not like a magnitude. A magnitude is incapable of 
thinking ; if mind can apprehend with any one of its parts, it need 
not revolve nor have magnitude ; it has to think two kinds of 
objects, the one kind divisible, the other indivisible. Thinking, as 
we know it, has limits which determine it, viz. the end in view or 
the new truths that the thinker discovers. Both thinking and 
inference bear far more analogy to rest or pause than to motion. 
In thinking the thinker ought to realise happiness. Thinking is 
the essence of the mind. Many held that entanglement in the 
body was a hindrance to thought ; a satisfactory theory ought to 
explain why the thinking soul is enclosed in the body and 'under 
what conditions of the body. 

In criticising the doctrine of harmony, he asks, what part of the 
bodily compound combining with the rest, can we assume to be 
intellect 3 ? In another connexion Aristotle says that intellect 

1 405 a 8 10, 404 a 25 b 6, 405 a 13 19, b 19 ai. 
a 407 a * b 26, 8 408 a ia. 


would seem to be a self-existing substance which comes into play in 
us and is in itself imperishable, in spite of senile decay. Thought 
and its exercise are enfeebled when something- internal is destroyed, 
but the intellect in itself is impassive. Memory, love and hate are 
not affections of the intellect, which is something more divine and 
is impassive 1 . In criticising Empedocles, Aristotle remarks that it 
is impossible for soul, and still more impossible for intellect, to have 
anything superior to it and overruling it, to it belongs a natural 
priority and authority 2 . It is difficult to conjecture what part of 
the body intellect holds together or how it can hold together any 
part 3 . After soul has been defined, we are told that there is as yet 
no evidence to show whether intellect is, like some of the other 
faculties of soul, really inseparable and only logically separable, 
from the rest It would seem to be a distinct species of soul and 
capable of separation, as the immortal from the perishable 4 . 
Sensation is of particulars, knowledge of universals, which are in a 
manner in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think 
whenever we please . To think is not the same thing as to have 
sensation, though they were identified by the ancients, who believed 
both to be corporeal changes' 5 . Nor is thinking the same as 
imagination or as belief 7 . Imagination leads to action in the lower 
animals because they have no intellect, and sometimes in man 
when intellect is obscured by passion, disease or sleep**. 

What conclusions can be drawn from these scattered remarks ? 
Apparently in one passage we have a choice of alternatives : either 
intellect is without parts (and therefore by the presuppositions of 
the Aristotelian system must be immaterial and an energy), or it is 
something continuous, which is, however, continuous only like a 
number or series, by sequence, and not by coherence, like a 
magnitude, A bodily organ, which has parts, would alone secure 
the continuity of coherence ; and for such an organ there is, or so 
Aristotle believed, no evidence. With this agrees the tentative 
assumption that intellect is something impassive, independent and 
imperishable, since its decay in the individual is an accident and 
not its real essence. 

The account of intellect in Book in., cc. 48, is condensed and 
imperfect and falls far short of the clearness which marks the 
exposition of sense-perception. Intellect is especially concerned 
with quiddities and universals. It employs no bodily organ, for of 

* 4 o8b 18^9. * 4*ob la 15. * 411*1 18. 

4 4*3 k 4 37. * 417 1> s* Mjq, 

7 4*7 b 14 *qq- H 419 a 48, 


the functions of the nervous system Aristotle and his contem- 
poraries had no idea. It contains a divine element, which is 
independent of the body and immortal. This summary tells us 
hardly any more than we have collected from the casual or 
polemical remarks in the previous part of the treatise. But 
Aristotle might fairly claim to have set before us his view both of 
(i) the difference between intellect and sense, and (2) the way in 
which thinking comes about : and this is all he promised at the 
outset 1 . 

(i) There is an analogy between sense and intellect, there is 
also a difference. Both furnish knowledge, both pass judgments, 
both are intermittent, sometimes in act, sometimes not. When in 
activity both have an object, the transition from the dormant 
power to its actual exercise does not depend upon sense alone or 
upon thought alone, and, when the activity is over, the alteration 
thus undergone leaves intellect absolutely, and sense to a great 
degree, unaffected. Sensitivity in the abstract is "a form which 
knows or apprehends sensible forms. Similarly intellect is a form 
which knows or apprehends intelligible forms 2 . Moreover, in both 
sensation and intellection alike at the moment of apprehension, 
there is identity between the form which apprehends and the form 
which is apprehended. Again, sense-perception is always true of 
its own appropriate object, and similarly thinking is always true in 
respect of quiddities 3 . On the other hand, the external object which 
stimulates the sense-faculty to activity is an individual, a particular, 
and it is external to the percipient; whereas the universals, the forms 
which we think, are present in the understanding, at any rate, of the 
mature man. Sensation cannot dispense with a bodily organ, a part 
of the body appropriated to its special 'functions. For intellect no 
such organ can be discovered. Yet, when a sense-organ is wanting, 
the action of intellect is impeded, for all knowledge through that 
sense is cut off 4 . Moreover, excess in the sensible fatigues or 
destroys the organ of sense, but the activity of thinking cannot 
be thus impaired. Again, intellect is the higher faculty of the two 
and implies the lower ; the lower does not imply the higher. For 
actual thinking the indispensable condition is the presence of a 
mental image, for, as we saw above, we think of nothing apart 
from continuity. Even when the object conceived is not itself 
a quantum, we nevertheless think of it as such. And we never 
think of objects without thinking them in time 5 . 

X 429at2sq. a 431 b 20 432 a 3. 3 43 b 

4 432 a 7 sq. s >e Mem. r, 450 a 7 9. 


(2) The process of thinking an object is explained in much the 
same way as the process of perceiving an object by sense. In spite 
of the differences stated above, both, as acts of apprehending, are 
assimilated to the process of reciprocal action between physical 
bodies. Apprehension is reception of form. If the mind knows 
objects by receiving them, since nothing receives what it already 
has, it must be assumed to be at first without them ; and further, so 
long as it remains capable of thinking, the same condition must be 
fulfilled for every fresh act. Hence intellect must be impassive, 
suffering in no way by the change from power to act and, since it 
thinks all things or, in other words, is capable of receiving all forms, 
it must in itself be devoid of any form, though at the same time it 
* 4 provides room for forms." It may be called* then, a mere 
aptitude or capacity to think. Until it actually thinks them, it is 
none of its objects, but becomes each object in turn when it thinks 
that object. In physical action there is a transference of essence 
or form : in combustion the form of heat is transferred from fire 
actually alight to combustible fuel. When a white object is 
perceived, the form of whiteness is transferred from the object to 
the eye and, as there is but one such form, is the same in the 
percipient sense as in the external object. And so when we think 
a stone, a horse, a triangle, the form or essence in our mind, the 
object of thought, is identically one with the form or essence outside 
in rentm natitra. As a contribution to the theory of knmvlr<l^;t% 
this explanation is adequate. External things affect our sense. 
By sense we apprehend hot and cold and whatever other sensible 
qualities are accidents of flesh 1 . We think each sensible quality, 
generalising and abMracting the univcrsals, of which sense by itself 
informs us only per accidcns. The substance in which the attributes 
inhere, which is said to be indirectly perceived by sense, is directly 
judged and known by thought. 

So far intellect has been treated as one. It is possible to apply 
to this unity the analysis which resolves particular things. When 
nature generates or art produces a concrete particular, three 
conditions arc fulfilled. There is the efficient agent transmitting 
form, there is the passive recipient upon which form is impressed, 
and there is, lastly, the result of the process, the new particular into 
which matter impressed by form has been made. To manufacture 
a brazen sphere, we need the craftsman with the design in his 
mind and brass to receive that design. The form of a sphere is 

1 459 b 14 1<5. 


impressed upon the brass and a new particular is made, precisely 
as the form of humanity is transmitted from father to son 1 . Our 
knowledge and actual thinking answer to the manufactured 
product, they are generated in the receptive intellect by something 
which must be assumed in intellect itself to correspond to the 
efficient cause. That which on one view is the reception of essence, 
is on another the spontaneous transition from potence to act. This 
is true of sense. Sense becomes like its object, in quality identical 
therewith. But it is just as true to say that sense has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. So, again, thinking is reception of the form 
or essence, but it is just as true to say that intellect has risen from 
the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised 
itself in full activity. Perception, it is true, cannot be explained 
without assuming interference from without. The occasion which 
supplies the stimulus to the transition must be something given. 
With thought it is different. The occasion, the stimulus, are not 
external, but internal. I may say, if I like, that my potential or 
passive intellect has been acted upon and educed into actuality : 
but what brought this about ? A mental agent, the active intellect, 
has called forth this activity and produced the thought. In my 
individual experience the power to think precedes actual thinking, 
but the transition cannot be explained except by assuming the 
prior existence of the efficient cause which brought it about. This 
point once reached and the unity of intellect being resolved into 
agent and patient, it follows that the agent which we postulate 
must have the same attributes as the patient, of which we have 
experience. It must be separable, impassive and unmixed, because 
its essence is activity, as the essence of the other factor is poten- 
tiality. Could it be actually separated and exist independently, it 
would be eternal. But this eternity is not communicated to the 
other factor of intellect, or to the intellect as a whole. Is such a 
hypothesis necessary ? Can the potential intellect be affected by 
external things ? So far as these things have matter in them, they 
are objects of thought only potentially. The intelligible forms are 
Implicit in the sensible forms, and intellect ex hypothesi has no 
special bodily organ. But so far as knowable things are pure 
forms, no such expedient is required. The question, then, why an 
active ' intellect is introduced, may be thus answered. It is in 
order to provide a cause of that transition from potence to act 
which takes place whenever we actually think. 

1 Mctapk* 1032 a is 1033 b 26, 


The difficulty in understanding what Aristotle did or did not 
Diverse inter- intend by this analysis of the intellect, or rather this 
pretations. distinction of the intellect which makes from the 

intellect which becomes, is notorious. The scanty comments of 
Thcophrastus 1 develop various lines of acute criticism, which in my 
judgment are not incompatible with an acceptance of the doctrine. 
So much is clear, that Theophrastus considered intellect in both its 
forms, as making and becoming, to be our human intellect, which is 
connatural and in us from birth to death, though its origin is 
elsewhere. In face of the difficulties which he is at pains to 
develop he seems content to regard the passive intellect dependent 
upon the body and the human intellect which results from the 
union of the passive with the active as in a sense distinct, yet as in 
another sense one nature, in so far as the two are related to one 
another as matter and form are in the unitary thing. That the 
active intellect exists per se in man independent of the passive is 
nowhere stated or implied either by Aristotle or Theophrastus, 
From a casual criticism by Themistius 3 it appears that certain of 
his predecessors had identified the active intellect with the 
premisses from which all our knowledge is derived and with the 
knowledge itself which we gradually acquire. Alexander of 
Aphrodisias", who endeavoured to preserve faithfully the teaching 
of Aristotle and to present it as consistent, distinguished a material 
intellect and an intellect /;/ habitii* which the former becomes by 
actual thinking and reception of the intelligible form. The material 
intellect is the mere aptitude for thinking: this is a power or 
faculty of the individual human soul, the form of the body. Lastly, 
there is the active intellect which is not a faculty or part of the 
human soul, though it is in it from birth to death whenever we 
actually think : not only when we think it or any of the immaterial 
forms with which it is identical, but also when we think forms in 
matter, for it is only through the agency of the active intellect that 
actual thinking is possible. Being wholly immaterial, energy 
devoid of all matter and potentiality, it always is, even when it in 
not thought by men ; it is an eternal, imperishable, self-existent 
substance* There can be but one such substance: it must const*. 
quently be identified with the deity, the first cause of motion in the 
universe, whose nature and essence is activity, the energy of 

1 See Appendix, p, 389 sqq. 

51 103, 33 sqq. II., 189, 17 Ktjci. Hp* This view follow* from an extntmely OW/.MM 
interpretation of the {statement that ?oD* is T&. twjrd. 

n, So, 1693, u t MatttitMi 106, 19 113, 34. 


thinking. In individual men it supervenes as something coming 
in from outside. It finds in the capacity of thinking which does 
belong to the human soul an instrument ready for its use, upon 
which it can work and produce actual thinking. As to the reason 
why men think not always, Alexander has no better explanation to 
offer than a suggestion of his teacher 1 , that the craftsman is still a 
craftsman even when he has laid aside his tools. The eclectic 
Themistius 2 refused to identify the active intellect with the deity 
outside man. He appeals to two expressions of the master 
(l) "that these differences must be present in the soul," (2) "this 
alone is immortal and eternal," which he thinks Alexander's 
interpretation forces out of their natural meaning. As to (i) 
Alexander has his own explanation to offer, according to which the 
active intellect, and therefore the deity, is in our mind whenever we 
think : but there is some force in the contention that Aristotle 
would never have described the deity as "alone" immortal and 
eternal. However, the point in which Themistius agrees with 
Alexander is more important than the points in which they differ. 
He fully admits that the active intellect is one and the same in all 
men, it is distributed among different individuals as light is divided 
into single rays. Of the other commentators, the Neo-Platonist 
Simplicius 51 distorts Aristotle's account in order, as far as possible, 
to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions. According to 
him, the rational human soul is one immortal substance. It has 
three states: in the first it remains in itself; this is the active 
intellect. In the second it enters the body; it then knows nothing, 
but is the pure potentiality of thought. Intellect of the first stage 
acts upon intellect of the second stage, and the result is the third 
stage, when intellect is in habitu and acquires knowledge. The 
passive intellect is mortal, because it ceases to be passive and is 
absorbed in the higher or active intellect. It is not worth while to 
pursue the course of speculation further among Arabian philoso- 
phers and the schoolmen, in both of whom the theological bias is 
unmistakeable. Avicenna 4 was an original thinker who exerted a 

1 Jifanttssa iro, 4 fjicove-a. 82 Trepl vov roO Mpa&cv 7rap<3t 'Aptorror^Xot/y, a 
KT&. If this is not a pleasant fiction, which would be more incongruous in Alexander 
than the one joke in Thucydides (6 \4w erAoere), we must acquiesce in teller's con- 
jecture 3 A/w<rro/cX<kvy, Phil, der Cr. IV. 3 , p. 785. 

3 98, 13 -109, 3 H, 181, 3 200, 35 Sp. 

* 217, 23 sqq., 243, 10 245, a, 146, 1 6 348, 17. 

4 I have not studied the mediaeval philosophers at first hand. For my acquaintance 
with them I am indebted mainly to Zabarella, Brentano, Psychologic des Aristoteles* 
pp. 8 sqq., who gives copious extracts, Ueberweg, Geschichte dtr Philosophic, Siebeck, 
Geschichte der Psychologic 


great influence on his successors ; but neither his distinction of 
universals, ante res, in rebns, post res, nor his doctrine that these 
universals are at once substantial forms in things outside us and 
intelligible forms to the mind which thinks them by abstraction 
has any direct Aristotelian authority, and when he makes both 
forms alike emanate from the active intellect and ultimately from 
God, this doctrine becomes nearly akin to that of the Nco-Platonists. 
Averrocs and Aquinas, though both professing to interpret Aristotle, 
modify his doctrines to suit their own preconceptions. According 
to the former, neither passive intellect nor active intellect is part of 
the human soul as defined in the definition. In scholastic language 
each is forma assistens, snperveniens and not forma dans csse 
homini* Each is immortal and each is one and the same in all 
men. According to Aquinas, active intellect as well as passive 
intellect is a faculty of the rational human soul, which was created 
by the will of God and is yet immortal, having the power as form 
to provide a vehicle for itself after it is separated from its present 
body. Regarded as interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine, those 
two conflicting views, which divided the allegiance of the later 
schoolmen, cannot both be right, but may both be wrong. Aristutle 
himself was free from the preconceptions of his two commentators; 
he was not a Moslem mystic nor a Christian theologian. 

These successive attempts to fill in the meagre outline 
presented by the text of DC Anima proceed in two directions. 
Either they make the two intellects two faculties of the human 
soul, or they seek to identify one, if not both, of them, with an 
intelligence outside man, Alexander, Averroes, and in modern 
times, Ravaisson and Kenan, have gone to the greatest lengths in 
the latter direction. But, if the act of thinking is independent of, 
or alien to, man's nature, how can the aptitude for thinking be any 
longer a part of it ? Averroes no doubt is consistent : lie declares 
the passive intellect also to be an immaterial substance and no part 
of the soul which is the form of the human body* But, in order to 
maintain this, he is obliged to do violence to the language of the 
treatise. In particular, his virtus cogitatitw, with which, according 
to him, the definition of soul endows man, has to be divorced from 
intellect proper and reduced nearly to the level of sensus annmunis 
or imagination* Even then he is unable to explain why, after the 
definition of soul has been obtained, it should have been left an 
open question whether intellect properly so called is or i.s not a 
part of the soul 1 , or why it should be designated as a ** part " when 

1 413 b 13 26, 415 a 11 K<j, 


at last it comes up for special treatment 1 . But in fact all views in 
which human intellect or a part of it is identified with the activity 
of divine intellect are met by the same insoluble difficulty : what is 
to be made of the intellect which becomes all things ? Modern 
enquirers are hopelessly divided as to what the passive intellect is. 
Trendelenburg answers " all the lower faculties in contradistinction 
to the active intellect 2 ," Zeller "the sum of those faculties of 
representation which go beyond imagination and sensible percep- 
tion and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which has found 
peace in perfect unity with its object 3 ," Ravaisson " the universal 
potentiality in the world of ideas 4 /' Brentano " Imagination 5 ," 
Hertling <l the cognitive faculty of th'e sensitive part 6 / 3 and 
Hammond, if I understand him rightly, "the life of sensation as a 
potentially rational mass/' " the sum of the deliverances of sense- 
perception and their re-wrought form in memory and phantasy, 
regarded as potentiality 7 ." The last two would seem almost to 
identify its functions with those of sensus communis as a judging 
faculty. Now these various answers do not accord with the 
description in De Anima of the process and act of thinking, 
whether as apprehension of the intelligible object or as the 
judgment which makes two concepts one ; they do not fit either 
the conception of intellect in habitu, the process by which 
knowledge is acquired, or the sharp distinction drawrT between 
a thought and a mental image. Thinking is not the same as 
receiving or retaining or remembering or judging the percepts of 
sense, which are all individual and lack the universality required. 
Abstraction alone renders thought possible, and abstraction cannot 
be restricted to the active intellect Again, all the operations of 
thought imply a single judging power. This position, which 
Aristotle has maintained for sense, he would certainly maintain as 
strongly for thought. When he controverts the Protagorean maxim 
and points out that it must lead to universal relativity, he contends 
that there is such a thing as absolute existence, a something 
determinate in itself apart from all relations, for presentation of an 
object implies a subject to whom the object is presented 8 . The 

1 429 a xo. 

a p. 405: l *Omnes illas, quae praecedunt, facilitates, in unum quasi nodum collectas, 
qiiatenus ad res cogitandas postulantur, voQ? ira&fjriKbv clictas esse iudicamus." 
9 Aristotle, n. p. 102 Eng. Tr. 

4 JSssaisur la MttapLysique d'Arisiote, I., pp. 586 sqq.: cf. II., pp. 17, 19. 
* Psychologit ', p. 208 sq. 

6 Materie u. Form % p. 1 74. 

7 pp. Ixxxiii sq. 8 Metaph. ion a 17 ao. 


object of thought, then, implies a thinking subject If these 
modern interpreters were right in equating the intellect which 
becomes with one or other of the lower faculties or with the sum of 
them, then the functions of these faculties would be identical with 
the function of thought, so far as the intellect becomes all things. 
But the lower faculties, sense and imagination, never succeed in 
obtaining an object which is a true universal. 

If, however, we vindicate the right to think for the intellect 
which becomes all objects and is said to be in habit it when it 
acquires knowledge, it would seem that this can only be clone at 
the expense of the intellect which makes all objects. The functions 
of the latter are then reduced within the narrowest compass. 
According to some, it does not really think at all, it docs little more 
than "illuminate" the mental image, thus facilitating the abstrac- 
tion of the universal form. But Aristotle speaks of its perpetual 
activity, he says there is no intermission in its thought 1 . Vet it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that determinations so unlike us 
"pure potentiality" and "incessant activity 1 * refer to the same 
thing under two different aspects. Each describes it abstractly, 
and, to know the whole, the two determinations must be combined. 
If there is within us a thought which is continuous and always in 
activity, at any rate experience docs not tell us so% it can only bo 
a conclusion of reason* How, then, did Aristotle reconcile this con- 
clusion with the facts ? Apparently he made this thinking latent. 
The intellect always thinks, but we do not remember. This, then, 
is what the attribute " potential" means as applied to the intellect' 1 ; 
and this agrees with the conception of the powers or faculties of 
the soul in general, which are permanent possessions, all dormant 
and unconscious, until roused to activity in consciousness. Here 
we may recall a previous use of the antithesis between potential 
and actual in Aristotle's account of hnaginatinn. The images or 
survivals of sensation are not always present to, yet 
Aristotle treats them as still in existence; they continue, he says, 
in the organs of sense, they are potential images while they are 
dormant, actual images when they are revived and reappear, as we 
should say, in consciousness 4 . It may be worthwhile to hazard the 
conjecture that the intellect which does not consciously think is 

1 So, at least, I understand 430 a 22. 

3 Of* AnaL Post* n 19, 99 b a$ ir6rfpov r .<cd #etf...eV0D<rat XtX^#cur*p, 

3 Aristotle conceive work to be directly presented, much n mtxlcrn 
conceive perceptual objects to be directly presented and to form a jierct'iitu 
CC Met&pk* 1087 a 10 -55* 

4 Cf. 4.35 b 24 sq., De Jnsomn. 3, 460 b 3 nq., 3, 461 b n~- 17. See nl*o p, fiii 


similarly described as potential intellect, and yet all the time its 
thoughts are there, though its incessant activity is subconscious. 
It will be seen that, though I do not entirely agree with Wallace, I 
nevertheless recognise a certain element of truth in his solution of 
the difficulty. He thus conceives the relation of the two intellects : 
" the creative reason is the faculty which constantly interprets and 
as it were keeps up an intelligible world for experience to operate 
upon, while the receptive reason is the intellect Jipplyin^ itself in 
all the various processes which fill our minds with the materials of 
knowledge 1 ." And again: "the two it must be remembered are not 
'two reasons': they are merely different modes of viewing the 
work of reason V 

In the account of sense and thought, with which we have been 
r>esire and hitherto mainly occupied, the cognitive element is very 

volition. prominent. It is natural to infer that our philosopher 

regards man chiefly on the intellectual side, as a spectator of the 
universe, a being who contemplates. And this impression would 
seem to be confirmed when we learn from the Ethics wherein 
man's chief good consists. But no Greek could overlook the other 
side of human nature. The conclusions of the Ethics must be 
taken in conjunction with the wider generalisations of the Politics \ 
and, if the self or ego is identical with intellect, intellect is practical 
as well as theoretic. The true is in the same class with the good ; 
good, real or apparent, is the goal of all striving and effort. With 
his teleological bias, Aristotle would have endorsed the words of a 
modern psychologist 5 *: " Looking broadly at the progress of life, as 
it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards through the 
history of man, it seems safe to say that knowledge is always a 
means to ends, is never an end by itself till at length it becomes 
interesting and satisfying in itself. Psychologically, then, the sole 
function of perception and intellection is to guide action and 

1 p. xcviii. 

8 p. cxv. Wallace was not alone in holding that Aristotle never intended to affirm 
two distinct intellects, but only to distinguish two phases or aspects of the one intellect. 
A similar view is maintained on very different grounds by Bullinger, Nits-Lehre* pp. 34$qq. f 
and by Mr F. Granger, Class. Aev. vi. pp. 298 301, who states it as follows : "the reason 
is passive and affected by corporeal conditions, so far as it uses the tpavrda-^ara, grasping 
the tfo? from among them. It is purely active only when it concerns itself with 
voyjrd, among which itself is included." Cf. Brandis, Gesch. der JSiitw. I. p. 518, 
J&andbuch* II. b, 1178. Kampe and Grote came to the conclusion that intellect, though 
separable from the human body, is not separable from body in general. They affirm that 
it has for its necessary substratum the ether, the most divine of the elements : Kampe, 
j&rkenntnisstheorie, pp. 11 49, Grote, Aristotle, n. p. 220 sqq. See, however, Zeller, 
Aristotle , n. p. 95, n. i, Eng. Tr. 

* Professor James Ward, Jr. Brit.* Article on Psychology, p. 56". 

H. e 


subserve volition more generally, to promote self-conservation and 
betterment." In De Anima, a professedly biological treatise, with 
the soul in all living things for its subject, this part of the enquiry 
is not pushed far 1 . The main outlines are given, but \ve must look 
elsewhere, and particularly to the Ethics, for further details. The 
problem is presented in a very simple fashion. In the animal 
world motion, in the sense of locomotion > is an all-pervading fact, 
and but slight observation suffices to show that this motion is not 
random or irregular, but is directed to an end. To what power or 
faculty, then, is it to be ascribed? The nutritive faculty, Aristotle 
thinks, sufficiently accounts for movements of growth and decay, 
whether in animals or plants, but not for the progressive move- 
ments of animals, movements prompted by want and directed to 
an end. If the nutritive faculty were sufficient to produce such 
movements, Aristotle adds with unconscious irony, plants would 
move spontaneously and would have organs adapted for th: 
purpose. Nor can these movements be explained as due to the 
sensitive faculty, since there are whole genera of perfectly-developed 
animals of a low type which do not move from place to place. 
But if locomotion were implied in sensation, they, too, would have 
organs adapted for locomotion. Is intellect, then, the cause of 
which we are in search, as Plato thought ? No. Intellect is either 
theoretical or practical. The former issues no command as to 
what we should avoid or pursue and, although the latter does issue 
such commands, they are not necessarily obeyed. The analogy of 
the arts, too, shows that, in order to produce action, something 
else is required beyond the mere knowledge of what is to be 
pursued or avoided. Shall we say, then, that there are two motives 
to action, (i) desire and (2) the intellect which calculates moans to 
ends, the place of which latter in animals devoid of reason is taken 
by imagination? If so, how are the two connected? Desire is 
always of an end, and this end is the starting point for the calcula- 
tions of the practical intellect. Intellect and desire, then* are 
connected by the ultimate unmoved movcnt, the end of action. 
It is this which stirs desire, while intellect, assuming that the end 
can be realised, calculates the steps towards its attainment* Thus 
the physician whose aim is to cure an ague assumes this to be 
done, just as if he were trying to solve a geometrical problem, and 
then reasons backwards from the patient's recovery to the normal 
temperature which this implies, from the normal temperature to 
the production of heat or cold, and from that to some remedy at 

1 See Book in* cc, 


his command ; and thereupon, having reached the end of his 
calculations, he proceeds to act Hence the statement that there 
are two motives to action calls for qualification. Had there been 
two, they would have had some common character, but as a 
matter of fact intellect is never a motive apart from desire. On 
the other hand, desire does sometimes move to action in spite of 
reason. Desire is thus found in all forms of mental life. In reason 
it is rational wish, but there are also irrational desires, anger and 
appetite, or mere desire of pleasure. In fact, an appetitive faculty 
must be assumed in which Plato's anger and appetite are both 
included, and Aristotle says quite fairly that the soul may be 
divided into many faculties, any two of which are more distinct 
than these two of Plato. Wherever in the animal world there is 
sense-perception, there is also the feeling of pleasure and pain. The 
pleasurable prompts desire, the painful aversion, and the survival of 
sense-impressions, which is imagination in its lowest form, can 
prompt to desire no less than the present object in the moment of 
perception* For the intellect images take the place of present 
sensation. A conflict of desires may arise, for though reason will 
judge correctly, anger or appetite may be blinded. They may take 
apparent good for real good, or they may interpret good as the 
pleasure of the moment. Every desire, whether rational or 
irrational, implies a corresponding image of the object desired. 
Hence a distinction between images, according as they proceed 
wholly from sense (and this class of images alone belongs to 
irrational animals) or proceed from reason, calculation; in fact, 
deliberation. This latter class of images is peculiar to man. Yet 
even in man in the abnormal state of incontinence the irrational 
desire gets the better of reason and controls action. In order to ex- 
press the antecedents of action, whether of the normal or abnormal 
kind, Aristotle resorted to the analogy of the syllogism. From a 
universal major premiss and a particular minor a conclusion is 
inferred. For example, all men should take exercise, Callias is a 
man, ergo Callias should take exercise. His taking exercise is 
regarded as an inference from the premisses. It resembles the 
conclusion of a syllogism just in so far as a particular case is 
brought under a general rule. But this way of looking at the 
matter by no means ensures rational action or justifies the assump- 
tion that the intellect always calculates correctly, for incontinence 
has a syllogism of its own. For example, all sweet things are to be 
tasted, this thing before me is sweet: then, if you have the power 
and are not hindered, you cannot but at once put the conclusion 

e 2 


(this is to be tasted) into practice. In this way the triumph of the 
irrational impulse and the sacrifice of the permanent good to the 
pleasure of the moment may equally be considered to bring a 
particular case under a general rule. In other words, although 
reason has a natural right and ought to prevail, experience shows 
that it is not always effective, even in beings endowed with reason, 
who look before and after. When impulsive action has been 
distinguished from deliberative and we are dealing with the latter 
only, since purpose is desire following upon deliberation, if the 
purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or reasoning 
must be true and the desire right, and the very same things must 
be assented to by the reason and pursued by the desire 1 . 

In the foregoing sketch I have been content to let Aristotle 
speak for himself, piecing together various utterances and putting 
the best construction I could on what is obscure and enigmatical in 
them, but refraining as a rule from criticism. Obviously he studied 
psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it 
bore upon philosophical problems. He exalted tlu* cognitive* 
clement, while his treatment of the emotions and the will is 
wholly inadequate, even if the Ethics and the R/tttwi? he called 
in to redress the balance. It is now contended that the science of 
psychology, which has made vast strides since these humble be- 
ginnings, must be based exclusively upon individual experience 
and be made independent of physiology. Whatever can he set 
down to the credit of Aristotle as a psychologist rests upon the 
opposite assumptions, fie approached his subject from the 
psychophysical standpoint, as it is called ; he had his own repre- 
sentative theory of perception, his own account of the gradual 
ascent from sense, through memory, to science: and reason. He 
coulcl not escape the errors and confusion incident to such ^-.sump- 
tions, if after all they are not ultimately valid. Thus we are 
brought face to face with grave metaphysical problems, Hut this 
is not the place to examine Aristotle's system as a whole, and 
without such an examination it is impossible to do justice either 
to his* theory of knowledge or to the treatise on the soul 

3 liih. Nif> u 39 a 13 tf>* 



The text of DC Anima rests mainly on the authority of a single 
good manuscript, cod. Parisiensis 1853, better known by the symbol 
E, given it by Bekker. Trendelenburg 2 , p. xvi, describes it thus ; 
saeculi decimi, membranaceus, eleganter et perspicue scriptus, 
vocibus non seiunctis sed inter se ligatis. Torstrik adds, p. viii : 
In eo igitur codice qui sunt de Anim& libri duabus manibus scripti 
sunt, antiquissirnis, elegantissimis, simillimis, sed duabus. Book I., 
Book III. and the fragments of a recension or paraphrase of Book IT., 
different from the vulgate (see pp. 164 sqq. infra), are in the same 
hand as the Physics, which cod. E also contains, and have 38 lines 
to the page. Book n. in a complete form and 4 in practically the 
same recension as all other manuscripts present is the work of 
another hand and has 48 lines to the page. Cod. E has been 
scrutinised by Bekker, Trendelenburg, Bussemaker, Pansch, Tors- 
trik, Bichl, Stapfer and Rodier. For further information respecting 
its peculiarities I refer my readers to Trend. 1 pp. viii, xxiii xliii, 
Trend. 2 pp. vi\ xiv xviii, Torstrik pp. ii, viii xv, Stapfer, Studia in 
Aristotelis de anima libros collate, especially pp. 4 13. In Book 
III. cod. E is mutilated, one leaf, which should have come between 
fol. 200 and fol. 201, is missing: it doubtless contained upon its 
76 lines the text from 430 a 24 fivwovevo^v to 431 b 16 e/cetva, 
or 84 of Bekker's lines. Further, the last leaf is also wanting, 
which should have contained from 434 a 31, the -6&v of pyOev, to 
the end, 435 b 25, or about 86 of Bekker's lines. The loss of these 
two leaves is serious, but is in some measure compensated by the 
fact that for the whole of Book TIL we have cod. L, Vaticanus 253, 
presenting a text which agrees more closely with that of cod. E 
than with that of the other extant manuscripts. Cod. L, which 
contains only the third book of De Anima, is described by Trend. 3 , 
p. ix, as follows : codex chartaceus, foliis quaternis minoribus, satis 
recens, cuius librarius interdum scripturae compendia male in- 
tellexit. Hauthalius codicem bombycinum perspicue et diligenter 


scriptum saeculi XIV esse litteris nobis significavit. A lection um 
praestantia (saepius enim cum vetustissimo cod ice (K) conscntit) 
antiquior quam recent for essc vidcatur. 

Besides codd. E and L Bekker collated six other codices of later 
date, which he indicated by the symbols S T U V W X, To these 
in what follows I shall give the name of the S-X group. The six 
have, so far as I know, never been scrutinised or collated by anyone 
since Bekker. Torstrik consulted the manuscript materials (pre- 
served in the Royal Library of Berlin), which Bekker collected 
for his edition, and was thus enabled from Bekker's own evidence 
to correct a few errors in Bckker's report of the readings of cod. S, 
as of cod. K (Torstrik, p. vii sq.: cf. Pfiilologus XII. 3, pp. 494 
530, XIII. i, pp. 204 206). The conclusion which Stapfcr 1 reached 
after careful study was that without a fresh collation of these 
six inferior codices the question of their mutual relationship anil 
pedigree could not be definitely settled, but that the result of such 
a fresh collation would not be worth the trouble expended upon 
it (Kritischc Studicn sit Aristoteles 1 Scltrift von tier Swh\ pp. 33 sq.). 
What is certain is that, while codd. KL go back to one common 
archetype, those belonging to the S-X group go back to another 
and a different common archetype. This result is established as 
follows : 

(A) Cod, K has two lacunae, each, I conjecture, a line of its 
archetype, which the other six codices supply* These lacunae 
are 405 b 25 sq. <?XXo ? /col rrjv tyvxfyv 0/40/009 $v T* r<nV<w and 
425 b 30 sq* rare 77 tear iivepyetav (Ixaf) apa ywerat teal &. Further* 
cod. E in 44 several places omits a single particle, an arliclt*, 
adjective, noun or verb, or even two (and once three) words, which 
are supplied by the group S-X. On the other hand, there are 22 
cases where cod, E has a slightly fuller text than the S-X group, 
the latter having omitted most frequently a particle, sometimes 
a noun or verb, and twice a couple of words (tyto/af 8*- 426 a 31, 
6 vov<s 429 b 13). 

(B) When we come to classify the readings in which c<xl 1C 
differs 9 from the S-X group, we sometimes find (i) a different word 
or (2) a different inflexion of the same word. The following are 
instances. In all cases the reading put first is the reading of 
cod. E, that put second is the reading of the S-X group, while 

1 In all that follows upon the relationship of the manuscripts to ecuth other ! am 
largely indebted to Stapfcr's two pamphlets. 

2 I mean the first hand of cod, K. See below as to the corrections- 


the words within brackets denote variants in some of the six 
manuscripts of the S-X group. 

( i) 402 a 26 pbvov : jj,a\\ov, 403 a 19 O-TJ/AGLOV : pijvvei, 403 b 12 
%cra : OTrocra, 406 a IO Srcre39 : Si^cS?, 407 a 19 rf ; /cai, 409 b 9 fju- 
tcpds : CTfjutcpds, 409 b 1 1 rauras : avrd$, 4fO a 7 eveivai : elvac, 410 a 25 
re : T6, 4!Ob 1 8 Trr/crT?? : a7ra<7?79, 411 a 30 avgrj : avgycrts, 426 b 2 
\i7rapd : TriKpd, 427 b 1 1 ravro : TO avro, 428 a 14 evepy)$ : evapy&s, 

428 b 3 TroSi.09 : TroSialos, 428 b 15 avrijs : avrvj, 428 b 16 /card rav- 
TTJV : /car avrrfv, 429 a 9 Store : St,d ri, 429 a 14 on : r* 1 , 432 b 9 avj-rjv E 
(Trend.), av%w*R (Bek.) : av^a-w, 432 b 27 c/ceivcov : KLV&V, 433 a 1 8 
op/crdv : opeferifcov, 434 a 3 \VTT^V real fjSovqv ^x ovcra : ^VTT^ /cat rjSovrj 
^vowa, 434 a 1 4 vf} : yewijrat,. 

(2) 402 b 4 fjLovov : fj,6v7)$j 402 b 6 e/cdar^v : e/cacrrov (ere^ov), 
402 b 8 /carrjyopeLrat,* : fcaryyopoiro, 403 a 29 opicraivro : opicrairo, 

405 <^ 8 d7ro<f>at,i>6/A6i>o$ : d7ro<pr}vdfjLGi>os, 4^ a 1 8 vTrdp^ei : V7rup%t, y 

406 b 23 ravra ravrd : rovr avro (-Trore), 407 a II Copied : r&v 

, 407 a 26 97 JULGV o$v aTroSeigw : at & aTroSetfe*?, 4^ b 34 iSia : 
409 b 7 rofc o-co/tacr^ : raS fr^^ari, 410 b 6 *fv<*>pi%ei, : yvwptei, 
41 1 b 12 T; tyvxtf : rrjy tyvxrfv, 424 b 27 eKKnrelv : \e/7re6v, 425 b I 
r}v ort, : QTI %o\77, 426 b 4 ayerai : wyyrai) 428 b 1 6 virap^zi : inrdp- 
* 428 b 2O Siatyevvacrffat, : BiatyevSearOai,, 428 b 30 e'^o*, : e%6, 

429 a 2 ry(,<yvoftvr} : ^lyvofMevrj^^ 429 b 23 dTrafffo : ct7ra#9, 43 a J * 
e/c?z/o : etci&va, 431 b 25 Svvdjjt,i$ : rd ^vvdpei, 432 a 7 al&OavojjLevov : 
ai<r0av6/JLvo?y 432 a 12 sq. <f>dvrao" pa : <f>avrdcrfiara, 432 a 27 rai/ra?: 
ravra, ib. <pav&rat, : <f>aivrat, (fyaivovrai), 432 b I rk : T$. 

(3) Where the words arc the same in cod. E as In the other 
six codices, the order is sometimes different The following are 
instances: 404 a 5 rfj? 0X779 <v<r$ct>9 o-ro^ela \eyei: crroi^ela. 

r?79 3X779 <^i/oreco9, 404 a 28 ^v-fflv ravrov : ravrov (rrjv) 
406 b 32 /cv/cXoi/9 8vo : Svo Kvtc\ov<;, 407 b 2 av icwolro : tcivolro 
41 1 b 21 /**) KO\ : ical ^ 428 a 7 virdp'xpvros rovrcov : rovr&v VTrdp- 
%ovro9, 429 a 25 r*9 7<i/o ar : yap av rt9, I*, f) ^i/%/309 77 
06/^609 T) ^i>X/oo9, 430 a 1 8 oTraOfa /cal apiyrjS : d/Myfa /cal a 

430 a 19 S* azJr<5 : ai/ro S', 431 b 21 ^<rr^ vrdvra yap tf : e<rrc vrdvra. 
tf yap, 432 b 30 St&tcetv fj favyew : favyew f) Si&fceiv, 433 a 9 ravra 
&VQ : Svo ravra, 433 a 27 Kwsi pev : p&f icwel, 433 b 1 8 /civn<ri$ 

1 Stapfer's statement (Krit. Sted, p, CEJ) "E rt STU VWX 5rt" will mislead no 
one. By a similar inadvertence he has (p. 33) interchanged the authorities for 403 a *$ 
tvro and 6pl<rcuro. 
See Stapfer, Stud^ p. 5. 


From the instances given under (A) \ve may at once conclude 
that neither any single manuscript of the group S-X nor their 
common archetype was copied from cod, E, but we cannot directly 
infer that cod. E was not copied from the archetype of group 
S-X, for the omissions in cod. E, even the larger ones, are acci- 
dental. But the passages adduced under (B) sufficiently prove that 
cod. E is independent of the archetype of the group S-X. Chance 
might account for two or three or even a dozen variations, but 
not for 50. There can be no connexion between cod. E and the 
archetype of the group S-X. 

But had the six manuscripts of the group S-X a common 
archetype ? Yes : not because of the common omissions, which 
are few and insignificant, but because of such variants as the 
following: 403 a 19 crrj^elov : fAyvve^ the transposition of 404*1 5 
already noticed, 425 b I %oX^r/ on : f 6rt, %oX//, 426 b 2 \t7rapti : 
TriKpdy 434 a 3 XI/TTT;// /cal ffSovriv fyova'a : \VTTTJ fcal fj&oi'fy tVoucra. 
Taken singly, the manuscripts of the group S-X are full of 
mistakes. There are many cases where they diverge from each 
other in all manner of ways ; but, as soon as we get a reading 
or arrangement of the words which presents a noteworthy differ- 
ence from that of cod. E, they all agree. In fact, it has been 
proposed to use a fresh symbol for the agreement of the group 
S-X, as opposed to cod* E. 

But can we say how the manuscripts of the group S-X are 
related to each other? For example, in 403 b 2 UX have *Z&>s\ 
ST V W 6 Se or oSe. Possibly the genuine tradition of the arche- 
type may have come down to us in the numerical minority of the 
representatives of the group. It may be that four of the six 
represent one lost codex of equal value with the remaining two. 
Let us consider, besides 403 b 2 just mentioned, where U X have* 
elSoS) ST V, like E, 6 Se and W oSe, 402 a 19 tMSeigk m% when: 
ri9 is omitted, not only by T U W X, but also by K ; 403 b 26 
T U, Svew E, Svcrl SVWX; 404 b 31 dcrtop.ti'Tov^ X, 
E S T U V W ; 405 a 1 1 \7rro^peiay corn E and T, fiiKpo^p^ia^ pr* 
E U VWX, /M/cpoXerrrofttyecav S; 408 b 8 TO V, ry roliqui cocid.; 
410 a 6 ryevovro T V W, fyevovro E S U X ; 410 b 30 S* T W X and 
corn E, $rj reliqui codcl ; 425 a 2 rov &' TW, row L, om. E S U V X; 
426 a I etTTGMv T W, eltrotev E L, efaoi y, fojcrGtev S U V X ; 429 b 1 3 
fyovn T W X, cm. E L S U V; 429 b 20 &\\o T V X f &\\ V reliqui 
codd.; 43ib27riTW, room. ELS UVX; 432*15 *VTWX t <& 
cm. E L S U V; 433 b 16 sq, ri opeicntcov T W X, TO cm. E L S U V. 


Cod. T and cod. W almost universally go together in the third 

Another circumstance confirms the conclusion that the six 
manuscripts of the group S-X are derived from a common arche- 
type. After cocl. E had been copied, it was subjected to much 
revision and many corrections were entered, either between the 
lines or in the margin. A great number of these, which on palaeo- 
graphical grounds are attributed to a second hand, agree in the 
main with the readings of the S-X group. Hence it may be 
inferred that the reviser, whether the original scribe or someone 
else 1 , collated cod. E with a manuscript which, whether it was 
or was not the archetype of the group S-X, agreed generally with 
the distinctive readings of that group. In other words, corn E 
agrees in the main with the manuscripts of the group S-X where 
they differ from the first hand 2 of E. Let us assume, then, that 
the text of Books i. and III. has come down by two independent 
traditions. The variations in Book II. are of minor importance, 
whether because, as Torstrik supposed, cod. E in the second Book 
follows a different authority from that which it follows in the other 
two Books, or because the two traditions never diverged to the 
same extent in this Book as in the others. It cannot be claimed 
that cither is infallible. To begin with (A) omissions and insertions: 
if we examine the several instances in detail, the presumption is 
that the omissions are due to carelessness. The good manuscript 
E has this peculiarity in common with the late manuscript P 1 of 
the Politics*^ that it is apt to omit small words. It would be 
absurd to prefer a text which omitted 4033 6 Se, 403 a 18 
40/b 9 ye (cf. 407 b 32, 409 a 30), 408 b 15 060-99, 408 b 19 

1 In Books I, and in. Stapfer distinguishes three hands E, E*, E 3 , admitting that E 2 
is hardly to be distinguished from E and that E 8 is the same hand in which Book u. is 
copied : '* Kae igitur [correctiones] plurimae inveniuntur in primo et tertio libro, aliquot in 
secundo. AHerius vero manus scripture, proxime accedit ad prioris manus similitudinem. 
Ktenim ab utrius calamo manaverit scriptura, solum cognosci potesl cum ex aliarum 
quaruttdam Httcraram forma, turn ex diphthongo *et' facillime concluditur... Accedit, ut 
secunda manus aliquoties litteras radcndo, prior nonnisi expungendo deleat. Tertiae vero 
mantis Htterarum ductus idem stint ac librarii secundi libri" (Stapfer, Stitdia, p. 4). 

tt See Stapfcr, JKrit. Stud. p. 34 ; ' Derselbe [der Archelypus von S T U V W X] gilt 
allgemein flir verloren. Auch ich war dieser Ansicht, bis eingehendere Studien liber 
die Korrckturen in E niich Irclehrten, dass die von zweiter Hand nach keiner anderen 
Vorlage gemacht sein konnen als nach diesem Archetypus. Die Grlinde hiefiir sind teils 
paJaographischer, teils kritischer Natur." 

3 Since E is of the tenth century, P 1 of the fifteenth, it is quite possible that the 
archetype from which Demetrius Chalcondylas derived his copy may have deserved the 
censure which Newman passe* upon it, vol. 11. p. Ivii, ni. p. vii sq. Class. Rev. vii. 
P- 3<>5- 


429 b 21 apa, 430 a 4 97 before 6e&p<nTt,icri (cf. 43 1 b 29, 432 a 15, 
b 15, b28, 433 b 4), 431 b 24 et\, 432 b 13 rt, 433^ 3 1 *<"' = and 
these omissions are doubtless due to the same haste or care- 
lessness which has mangled the text by curtailment in 409 a 10, 
425 b 7, 428 b 3 sq., 432 a 2, as well as by the longer lacunae already 
enumerated. Only three times does it appear that cod. K is un- 
doubtedly right in its omissions; 426 b I, 429 b 8, 433 b 3. For 
my part, though I have not had the courage of my opinion, I 
think that in 428 b 2 fyaiverat, Se ^ real tyevSr) is an improvement 1 : 
while, if we compare 433 a 9 with 433 a 17, two passat;rs which 
ought to be similarly worded, the balance of probability surely 
inclines to the supposition that in both the scribe of 1C or of its 
archetype is at his old trick of omitting a small word, even though 
in the former passage all our other sources join in the error. On 
the other hand, cod. E seems redundant in 407 b 24, 411 b 4, 29, 
425 b 3, 429 b n, 1 3 (/;$*), 16: and that this, too, is due to care- 
lessness is very evident in the dittogniphy of Sto /cat 425 b 3 and 
the impossible article in 429 b x6, (B) A comparison, again, 
of the variations which depend either upon a different word {e.g. 
403 a 19 <rrjjuiiov : p,^vvei) or a different inflexion of the same word 
shows that, although E is undoubtedly the best manuscript, it has no 
decisive superiority over the common archetype of the S-X group. 
The text printed in this edition, which differs very little from Torstrik 
and still less from Biehl, agrees in this respect 23 times with cot!, 1C 
against the S-X group and 29 times with the latter against cud* 1C. 
On the other hand, out of 15 instances where the same words are 
differently arranged in cod. E and in the S-X group, I follow my 
predecessors in preferring the order of cod. 1C 12 times arid the 
order of the S-X group only 3 times, viz. 411 b 21, 433 a 9, 
433 b 18: though, as will be seen from my note on the last 
passage, I incline to think that there also the order given by 
cod. E may have been that of the original text Biehl himself, 
who of all editors adhered most closely to cod. 1C, sometimes 
departed from it, and I have gone still further in this direction, 
as in 402a 12, 402 a 19, 403 b 17, 407 a 26, 27, 408 a 21, 412,1 17, 
418 b 22, 420 a 4, 427 a 14, 428 b 4, 431 b 25, 26, 431 b 27, On 
the other hand, I return to the reading of cod, K in 404 b to, 
41 3 a 29 sq., 426 a 27, 433 b *7- 

Two other manuscripts have been collated since Bekker com- 
pleted his labours. The one is Parisiensis 2034, collated by 
1 To the lemma of Philoponus 505, 15 I attach little value for reason}* given 


Trendelenburg and called by him P. Belger, however, preferred 
to denote it by y and has been followed by subsequent editors. 
It offers many peculiarities, which may sometimes be due to 
conjectural emendation or to the arbitrary selection of a scribe 
who was acquainted with the variations in older manuscripts. 
The other is Vaticanus 1339, from which Rabe published a 
collation of the second Book in 1891. Its symbol is P. 

Besides certain essays by Alexander of Aphrodisias 1 and his own 
treatise De Anima, in which he follows the lines of Aristotle's, we 
have two paraphrases, one by Themistius and one by Sophonias. 
These are not, however, entirely paraphrase : a large proportion of 
commentary is interspersed. We have also two commentaries, 
one by Simplicius, the other ostensibly by Philoponus. Hayduck, 
who has re-edited Philoponus, inclines to think (p. v) that the 
commentary on Book in. is not by the same author as that upon 
Books I. and II., and attributes it conjecturally to Stephanus, the 
author of the extant commentary on IIe/>l epfj^veia^. Four of 
these writers go back centuries beyond our oldest manuscript. 
Alexander lived at the end of the second century A.D., Themistius 
belongs to the latter half of the fourth, while Simplicius and Phi- 
loponus were contemporaries in the reign of Justinian in the sixth 
century. Of Sophonias Fabricius 2 says: "Quis ille Sophonias 
fuerit et quando vixerit, non liquet." But an extant manuscript 
of his paraphrase is of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The 
writings of Alexander, including his lost commentary on De Anima, 
were used by all his successors, and Simplicius and Philoponus 
betray an acquaintance with Themistius 3 . So far, then, the sug- 
gestion of a continuous tradition among the commentators of 
Aristotle may be readily admitted. But with Alexander our 
stream of tradition stops : a gap of five centuries separates him 
from Aristotle and Theophrastus. It is a perfectly gratuitous 
assumption that these later commentators represent the unbroken 
tradition of the Peripatetic School 4 , especially as Alexander is the 

1 viz. those collected in pp* TOI 150 of the Mantissa (formerly known as the second 
book of his De Anima), also 'Airopiat *al X&reis r. 2, 8, na, nb, 17, 26, II. 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 
25, 6, 27, III. , 3, 6", 7, 8, 9, llepl tcpdcrew /cal ai>?J<rw$, pp. 213 sqq., ed. Bruns. 

2 Ah cited by Trend. 3 , p. xi. 

8 Simpl. 151, 14, Philop. 408, 25; 409, 3; 410, i. 35; 418, 25; 450, 9. 19; 508,20; 
514, 29. Of. also Priscianus Lydus, Prooem* Solutionum, 42, 18. 

4 Kodier, vol. I. p. ii: "En lisant ces commentaires, on s*aper9oit bienldt que ceux 
qui les ont ecrits posse*daient, pour Vexe*gese d'Aristote, des traditions qui remontaient 
ju&qu'a ses disciples immdiats." 


only one of them who can be reckoned as a genuine Peripatetic. 
For the interpretation and criticism of Aristotle in the earliest 
days of the school our only authority is Priscianus Lydus, a con- 
temporary of Simplicius and Philoponus, who wrote Jklctaphrasis 
in Theopkrastum. A portion of this is preserved and was edited 
by By water for the Supplementitm Aristoteliciint. 

What aid, then, do these testimonia furnish to the text ? From 
the nature of the case they must be subsidiary to ancient manu- 
scripts, A paraphrast may indeed be content to repeat his author 
without change, as Themistius frequently does. But his main 
object is to render the meaning clear, and the freedom with which, 
in the pursuance of this object, he varies either the actual words 
or the arrangement of the words and sentences of his author must, 
even under the most favourable circumstances, render him a very 
unsafe guide to the reconstruction of the text. If anyone thinks 
this a harsh judgment, let him consider what sort of an idea we 
should have of the text of this treatise, -.u|.|n,siu- the manuscripts 
and commentaries had been lost and only Themistius and Sopho- 
nias preserved. The problem of determining what text or texts 
the paraphrast had before him is analogous to the problem of 
determining the reading of the manuscript or manuscripts used by 
William of Moerbckc when he made his Latin translation, \Ve 
never can be sure that the paraphrast or translator confined him- 
self to a single manuscript In the particular case of Sophonias, 
however, the difficulty of this problem is greatly diminished. The 
attention bestowed upon him by Trondclonburjf, Torstrik, llayduek 
and Stapfor 1 has established this result, that his paraphrase agrees 
more nearly with cod. K than with any other of our manuscripts. 
The case of Themistius, Simplicius and Philoponus is different 
A study of the critical notes in this edition will show that tlu:ir 
evidence, such as it is, favours sometimes cod. K ami at other 
times the readings of the S-X group. Sometimes, as may he seen 
from my notes on ipo a 4, the words of Themistius suggest one 
reading, but can be shown to be in all probability an intentional 
variation upon the other. The evidence to be obtained from the 
commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus must in each case 
be weighed independently of the prefixed lemma. I heartily 
endorse the judgment of Torstrtk, p. vi : Philoponi ct Simplicii 

d nullius sunt rnomenti. He adds ; pertinent enim ad deterioris 

pp. 15- 35* 


familiae codices: licebatque eos negligere uno excepto loco Sed 
quum in Philoponi commentario passim natarent quaedam pyrd 
antiquiora et librariorum errore cum ipsa interpretatione com- 
mixta, haec exscripsi...cluabus de causis : prirnum quod habent 
quaedam bona : deinde ne nocerent: possunt enim facile pro iis 
haberi quae ipse Philoponus apud Aristotelem legerit. It is by 
no means certain that the lemma comes from the commentator 
at all : at most, he was probably content for brevity to indicate 
the first words and the last, with ea>? TOV interposed, or the first 
words followed by fcal ra 6^7)9, a practice which may still occasion- 
ally be detected in Simplicius, e.g. in Phys. 50, 5; 113, 20; 
114, 23 ; 440, 18; 935, 21 ; 1220, 27; l)e Anima 71, 11 sq.; 76, 13; 
93> r 5; 99> 5; ir >3> 2 7 : *9 2 > 22 5 cf. Philop. 431, 30. Subsequent 
copyists would expand the lemma 1 and piously supply the missing 
words from the best text of Aristotle available, without paying 
much regard to the indications of the commentary appended. 
This may be illustrated by a comparison of the Aldine editions 
of Simplicius and Philoponus with those recently edited by 
Hayduck. Trincavellus took his lemma with almost unfailing 
regularity from the Aldine edition of Aristotle. This fact is many 
times admitted by Hayduck in the course of his critical apparatus. 
Sec, e.g,, 315, 8; 374, 14; 3^> n; 394, 335 423* 2 SJ 4^5, *5 441, 12; 
45*1*9; 4<5i. 1; 467,25; 4733o; 43> *75 492,225498, 12; 505, 15; 
513, 31; 530, 28; 533, 14; 553, 17; 562, 5; 5^9, 25; 606, 3. But 
the same thinff is true of scores of passages where Hayduck has 
not pointed out the dependence of Trincavellus upon the Aldine, 
e.g., Philop. 179, 27 teal cm.; 181, 10 Se; 189, 8 7rapa\,oyd>Tpov ; 
189, 28 ftTroXafttft' ; ih. irepl insert; 192, 14 T$ om.; 210, 26 
236, 14 /col wtrwep; 236, 15 of/raj /cat,', 237, 27 teal Trorepov 
260, 4 Se TO; 260, 26 r& p>iv\ 263, 25 X^oz/; 267, 18 r&v ev rot? 
<ya>v; 273, 34 %<rn Se; 274, 25 rj ^V%TI ; 283, 21 
?t>'> 284, 30 7Tt S' ov', 320, 2 &rt cm.; 345, 31 Se 
423, 26 $fcSy\ov; 477, 3 sq. Atev, orav ay^ra^ elXucpivij teal 
Jtvra aytrat, *l<$\ 524, 1 8 avrov ; 585, 17 post K/OI)*> add 
In all these cases the reading indicated must have come from the 
Aldine edition. It is not known from any manuscript of De 
Anima. Besides these differences, wherever the Aldine edition 
presents a peculiar order of words, this order is adopted by Trin- 
cavellus for the lemma of Philoponus. Asulanus made a similar 
use of the Aldine Aristotle for his edition of Simplicius, as may 

1 Trincavellus certainly did thiff. See Hayduck '$ critical notes on Philop. 21 1, 9; 288, 
22 : %64. to; 461, r. 


be seen from such instances as Simpl. I r, i ; 16, 31 ; 23, I ; 72, 17; 
82, 13 ; 271, ir. It is reasonable to infer that the same thing had 
been done before. For, even when the interference of the Aldine 
Aristotle is excluded, as it is in Hayduck's edition, lemma and in- 
terpretation are not always completely in accord. See for example 
Philop. 247, 13 ; 303, 31 ; 461, i, where Hayduck has adapted the 
lemma to suit the interpretation (as he has also clone e.g. 475, 28 ; 
534, 17 ; S74> 23); 553> *7- Compare also 45, 16 crw/xaro? with 46, 5 
rov o-obpaTo?', 1 86, 22 with 1 86, 24 ; 241, 16 with 241,21 and 261, 15 ; 
315, 7 with 315, 10 ; 348, 9 with 348, 10; 377, 32 with 378, i; 
425, i with 425, 22; 493, 15 with 493, 17; 560, 23 with 560, 26. 
The same tendency is seen in Themistius, and the last editor, 
Heinze, may be within his rights in altering the words or the 
order of the words in the paraphrase, in spite of his manuscripts, 
to ensure consistency with the context as a whole. Two notable 
instances are Them. 116, 1 8, where Hcinzc has substituted rr/XXa 
for Tavra, and Them. 58, 9 sq., where the alteration affects the 
order of the words. The commentators, then, as distinct from 
their copyists, are only to be held responsible for those variants 
which they cither distinctly attest fry Sirrr; 7} ypa<f>}j and the like 
or cite verbatim in the course of their interpretations. liven then 
caution is needed, since Philoponus is not alone in using <f>?j<rlv 
for a paraphrase and alteration of the Aristotelian text, much as 
Froudc may be said to have violated the sanctity of inverted 
commas when he printed between them his own abstracts of the 
documents he cited. All beyond this is matter of inference, often 
no doubt correct, but seldom sufficiently strong to stifle a feeling 
of uneasiness and uncertainty. For the rest, the readings of 
Simplicius and Philoponus, and indeed of Alexander and Plutarch 
in the few cases where we have information about them, do not 
seem uniformly to favour either cod. K or the S-X group, A 
few instances of bad readings arc appended. In 431 a 24 Simpli- 
cius read 6/j,Q<yevfj: if he had consulted Philoponus 56 1 6 sq. he 
might have found the right reading, ^ 6j*oyevfy* In 416 b 27 
Alexander and Simplicius read wof)v powv with the S-X group, 
while cod. K has* the support of Theorist ius and Sophonias, PhJlo- 
ponus knew both readings (288, 10 sq.). Where the manuscripts 
leave us in the lurch, it is seldom that a commentator helps us out, 
as Simplicius undoubtedly does in 403 b 12 by reading $, not f/ t and 
in 431 a 23 by reading &>, not ov. It is very significant that in 
both these cases the change required is a change of breathing, 
which would not be indicated in an uncial manuscript or older 


kind of papyrus. The reader of an ancient book understood as 
no modern can the meaning of the line vovs opfj Kal vovs d/covi, 
ra\\a fcaxf>d /ecu Tv<f>\d\ On the other hand compare 431 a n, 
where Simplicius prefers 77 to the fj which is presented (rightly, 
as I think) by Philoponus. Again, the right sense could some- 
times be got out of a bad reading. Thus in 431 b 17 Simplicius 
read with most of the S-X group 0X0)9 Se o 1/01)9 ecrrtv o tear evep- 
<yeiav ra TrpdyfAara vo&v, but he escaped the absurdity which results 
from such a reading by suggesting that ra IT pay para should be 
transposed to precede 6 /car wep<yeiav (Simpl. 279, 7-9). In short, 
the text which the commentators had before them was substantially 
the same as that of our manuscripts. They all found in it 
TO vvv \e^6ev 410 a 29, rwv airl&v 4%ob 25, d\\d p,rjv ovSe dyev 
434 b 4 sq. Where we are perplexed, so as a rule were they, and 
we look to them in vain to solve the riddle of such passages 
as 403 b 2, 407 a 11, 407 b 28 sq., 408 a 25 sq., 411 b 25, 412 a 17, 
425 b I, 2, 426 a 27, 427 a 10, 13, 14, 428 b 19 sq., 428 b 30429 a 2, 
430 b Hsqq., 26sqq., 433 b 17, 18, 434a 1215. 

1 Epicharmus apud Plut., De Sollertia animaliitm^ 961 A. 



E, codex Parisiensis 1853. 
L, Vaticanus 253. 
P, Vaticanus 1339, ex ed. H. Rabe. 
S, 5, Lauren tianus Sr. 
T, Vaticanus 256. 
U, Vaticanus 260. 
V, Vaticanus 266. 
W, 5 , Vaticanus 1026, 
Xj Ambrosianus H 50. 
y, Parisiensis 20.34. 
m, Parisiensis 1921. 
Aid, editio Alclina. 
Hasil., , t Basileensis tertia* 
Syllx, Kylhurtiiana. 
Hek., Uekkcri Acaclemiea, 
Trend,, Trcndclcnburifii, 
Torstj Torstrikii. 
Ikib., , ? BuHseniakeri (Didottana). 
hl., Bichlii. 
Rr., M Rodicri. 
Hon., Honitx. 

Alex., Alexander AphrodisiensLs. 
Them., Thcmistius, 
Simpl., Siinplicius. 
Pliilop., Philoponus. 
Soph., Hophonias. 
Prise. Lyd., Prisoianus Lydus. 

vet. trans., vetusta translutio latina ex editionc Juntina, Vend, 135?^ t*t 
Thomae Aquinatis op. toin. XX +) ed. Parmae 1866. 

BJ., Jahrcsbcricht lib. die Fortschr. etc. herausg. v, C. Bursiun et<:, 



&v Kal Tipl&v rr)v 618770- iv u7roXaju,/3az>oi're9 T /xaX- 402 a 
S* Irzpav Ire'pas ^ /car' aKpifitiav 77 rc3 jSeXnovow re 
U Qavfjuao-MTepw elrat, St* a^orepa ravra ryv Trepl rr}^ i//v- 
V7j9 i&Topiav evXdy6>9 a^ eV TrpcJrots rt^eo^e^. So/cec Se Krat 
oos d\.rj0eiav a7racra,v TJ yvcocris avrrjs /aeyaXa (rvft^SaX- 5 
t, jLcaXicrra Se Trpos T^Z/ (/>vo-t^- ecrri ya/> oto/-' 
j)a>z/. 7rt^rovjocv Se ^wp^crat /cal y*/(5z>ai, r^ T 
criv avTTjs /cat r^v ovcrcav, et^* ocra (rvfAftzftriKe Trep 
&v ra jae^ tSta TTCX^T; 7779 ^v)(fj$ a/at So/cet, ret S St* 
2 iKzlvrjv Kal rot? ^<HS U7ra/>^t^. Tra^rp Se ?rcx^ro>9 cVrl r<S^ 10 
^aXeTTcwrarco^ XaySetv rivet TTI<TTIV Trepl avrr)?. Kal yd/) oi/- 
ros fcotvov roS {TjrTjjaaro? al 7roXXoi9 re/7ot9t Xcyct) Se rov Tr^l 
rb rt ccrrt, T<^X* ^ r ^ So^eie /jtta rt7 elz>ac 
irepl &V J3ov\6fjie8a yv&v&i ryv ov- 

c<T7T/) /cat r<^ Kara crvjjieYjKs &v aTroctts, 15 
117 r eOoSov ravrT. c Se x1 

Tt9 /cat Kot^>) /xe^oSo9 TTS/H ro rt eorrtf, ert 
ytj/erac ro Trpay/Ltarei/^-iJ^af Secret ya/> Xa^Setz/ 7re/3t oca- 
orrov rfs 6 r/)07ro9. ^ai/ Se (fravepov $, vrorepov arroSet^ rt9 
ecrrtv ^ Stat/>e<rt9 ^ Kat rt<? aXXTj /xe^?o8o9, ert TroXXa^ 

Codices ESTUVWXy: Hbro sccumlo !, Hiiro tcrtio L. 

i /AX\ox.,.3* eTp'at Alexander Philopono tesle spuria not aha t i. ; a* rcom. KTorst., Ic^c- 
runt Philop, Soph, || 3. raOra om, E Torot., log. Philop. Soph, ct, ut vitletur, Them* t t 18 J 
irepiom, STU WX lick* Trend., add* Soph. Torst. || r^s om. Vy Soph. !j <> *<KP& pro 
5t' iKelvviv y, r& W /eotvd Acai rot? io 5t* ^AC^V U, rcceptum t ex tutu tucntur Them* 
Soph, || 10* 8$ wal Trdyrwf STUVWy, irdyry $t irdvrbrt etiam Philop, |, n. xui mu 
EX Bek. Trend, Biehl Rodier || 13, rb] roO SVWX Willop, Hck. Trend., r^TU II 
15. d7r65et^ SUWX Bek,, 17 <tir63tftf T, &w6$e&i etiam Soph. |l 17. *U /fotyij nt 
UWXy l| r*J roD STUWX || 19, post T^TTOJ vir^Iftm Itok. |l efr<w S U W, t/ V, 


Cognition Is in our eyes a thing" of beauty and worth, and this 1 
is true of one cognition more than another, either because it is 
exact or because it relates to more important and remarkable 
objects. On both these grounds we may with good reason claim 
a high place for the enquiry concerning the soul. It would seem, 
too, that an acquaintance with the subject contributes greatly to 
the whole domain of truth and, more particularly, to the study of 
nature, the soul being virtually the principle of all animal life. 
Our aim is to discover and ascertain the nature and 

The sub- 
ject of essence of soul and, in the next place, all the accidents 


belonging to it ; of which some are thought to be 
attributes peculiar to the soul itself, while others, it is held, belong 
to the animal also, but owe their existence to the soul. But every- 2 
where and in every way it is extremely difficult to arrive at any 
trustworthy conclusion on the subject. It is the same here as in 
many other enquiries. What we have to investigate is the essential 
nature of things and the What. It might therefore be thought 
that there is a single procedure applicable to all the objects 
whose essential nature we wish to discover, as demonstration is 
applicable to the properties which go along with them : in that case 
we should have to enquire what this procedure is. If, however, 
there is no single procedure common to all sciences for defining 
the What, our task becomes still more difficult, as it will then be 
necessary to settle in each particular case the method to be 
pursued. Further, even if it be evident that it consists in demon- 
stration of some sort or division or some other procedure, there 

&tp etiam Simpl. p. 10, 4 [| rts post dir6detis om. pr. E T U W X, etiam Philop. Biehl (in 
alt. ed.) || <zo. post ^Bodos punctum, Bek. (I &ri W TroXXAs T U V W Bek., ft oin. etiam 


e)(ei Kal TrKdvas, /c rivw Set tyrelv aXXat yap 
a\\(*)V dp-^ai, Kaddirep dpiOfJi^v KCLL eTTtWSa)^. 

3 rrptoTOv S* tcra)$ dvayKalov SteXetv ez/ rtvt r<3v yez/alv /cat rt 
ecrrt, Xeya> Se Trorepov roSc rt /cat ovcria rj TTOLOV r/ TTOQTOV ^ /cat rts 

Statpe#eto-o3z> KaryyopLcov, en Be Trorepov T&V ev 25 
ovrwv rj jaaXXov evre\e^eid rts- Biat^epei yap ov rt 

4 a/it/cpoz/. cr/cerrreo^ Se /cat et jiceptoTTj -^ dfjieprfs, Kal 

aTraora ^v^rj fy ov* el Se JLCT) 6/>toiS^9, 

f) yevei. vvv ju,ez> yap oc Xeyovres /cal 77- 

5 cr/co^etv* v\a/3r)reov S' OTTCO? ju/i) \avddvrj Trorepov ?9 o Xo- 5 

3^.3/ /)/ y / * /)/ V T 

yos avrijs ecrn, /cac/avre/o 4^ ov > ^7 ^ a " eKacrryjv erepos, oiov 
TTTTTOV, /cwos, avdp&irov, Oeov, TO Se c poi> ro KadoXov TJTOI ov- 
Qev ecrriv rj vcrrepov* O/ZOLCOS /caz/ t re KOLVOV aXXo Karrj- 
6yo/)otro- ere 8* et /XT) TroXXal i^v^at dXXa //,o/na t trorepov Bel 
wporepov rrjv 0X77^ x/fv^i!)^ 17 ra popia. ^oXeiro^ Se Kal 10 

topLcra^ Trota rrecjtVKev erepa aXXifXco^, /cal Trorepov 
ra ju,opta ^/OT) {flretv irporepov r/ ra epya avrai^ otov ro 
vo6^ 77 rov z/ow /cal ro aicrOdvecrOai rj ro aicr^rt/c w * o/iotce>9 

7 Se /cal eVl r5^ cxXXcov. ec Se ra />ya irporepov, iroXiv av 
ri$ aTTOprjcreiev el ra avriKeipeva irporepa rovrcw tflrrfreov, olw ^5 

8 ro al&drjrov rou accr^rt/coC /cat ro voyrov rov z/ov, ot/c 8' 
oi \LOVOV ro rt (rrt yj>c3rat xprfcri.p.ov eivai rrpbs ro 

ra<$ atrta9 rv crviAftejSyKortov rats ov<rtat9, (Scrirep ev 

rt ro ev^v /cat /ca/i/jruXov ^ rt ypa^rj /cat eVt- 
-jreSo^ 7T/309 ro /cartSetv Trocrats opOais at roS r/>tyaJvou ytwtat 20 
t<rat, aXXa /cat ava?raXt^ ra arvp,jSJ3y)KOTa crv/x^SaXXerat /x- 
ya //,/>o9 Tr/oos TO etSeWt ro rt ecrriv irei&v yap 

ivo^ K (Trend.), /w&X<> tuentur Them. Philop. SimpU Soph* ij ri <>m 
SVWXy, legit Soph. || 402 b, . d/tow^s utrobkjuc T U V W X, 6/xa^ tucmtur 
Them. Philop. SimpL |1 4. AC^OP y Torst., ftiv^ff corr. E et reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. ^6, 
7 Soph. || 6. iKforyv pr. K Torst., etiam Soph*, !T<I/)OK V y, ^/ca<rrov reli(|ui ante Torstrikium 
omnes, etiam, ut vicletur, Simpl, 13,4^ Phttop. in prooetnio ad lib. II. 205* 30 || 7, 8t] 
ykp V, Alex, etTT, KO.I X';<r. (eel. Bruns) p, 21, 15. 27, a. 24, 4, ctiam Soph. |j ^. /catYyo/jJrat 
E, sed ^ in rasura (Trend.), Karijyoptircii Torst., Karrjyopotro rcliqui, etiam Simp!. Alex. 
43, 19 II xr. ro0ro V |J dU^wv ifrepa X || 12. &rf U WX || 15. wpbrtpw T If V W X 
Philop. Soph, Bek. Trend. || 16. voO KVX, in textum reccpit Uiehl (cf. 429 a 17), 
^07?roD S, >/<M;ri/coO reii^ui et script! et impress!, etiam Philop*, pro ateOyruiov et v<w;riieoO 
legi vult at<r8AvGffO<ii et vov Belger, Hermes, 1878, p. 302, at o&r^n/cofl etiam Philop. || 
1 9. ml rl r6 *. S U W y, ml T( /c, T X || at. /^at S T U W X y, eltfaw V* 

CH. i 402 a 21 402 b 22 5 

is still room for much perplexity and error, when we ask from 
what premisses our enquiry should start,, for there are different 
premisses for different sciences ; for the science of numbers, for 
example, and plane geometry. 

The first thing necessary is no doubt to determine under which 3 
The f t ' ie summa genera soul comes and what it is; I mean, 

problems. whether it is a particular thing, i.e. substance, or is 
quality or is quantity, or falls under any other of the categories 
already determined. We must further ask whether it is amongst 
things potentially existent or is rather a sort of actuality, the 
distinction being all-important. Again, we must consider whether 4 
it is divisible or indivisible ; whether, again, all and every soul is 
homogeneous or not; and, if not, whether the difference between 
the various souls is a difference of species or a difference of genus : 
for at present discussions and investigations about soul would 
appear to be restricted to the human soul. We must take care not 5 
to overlook the question whether there is a single definition of soul 
answering to a single definition of animal; or whether 
a single there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for 

definition? j j i *u ' i 

horse and dog, man and god: animal, as the universal, 
being regarded either as non-existent or, if existent, as logically 
posterior. This is a question which might equally be raised in 
regard to any other common predicate. Further, on the assump- 6 
tion that there are not several souls, but merely several different 

parts in the same soul, it is a question whether we should 

Questions * 11 

of pro- begin by investigating soul as a whole or its several 
cc ure. p ar ts. And here again it is difficult to determine which 
of these parts are really distinct from one another and whether the 
several parts, or their functions, should be investigated first. Thus, 
e.g. should the process of thinking come first or the mind that 
thinks, the process of sensation or the sensitive faculty? And so 
everywhere else. But, if the functions should come first, again 7 
will arise the question whether we should first investigate the 
correlative objects. Shall we take, e.g., the sensible object before 
the faculty of sense and the intelligible object before the intellect? 
It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing's 8 

essential nature useful for discovering the causes of its 
* *ood attributes, as, e.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what 
definition. .^ me ant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, 
aids MB in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a 
triangle are equal : but also, conversely, a knowledge of the 
attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is. 

6 DE AN IMA I CH. i 

aTToStSdvat Kara Try (jxivracriav irepl r&v 
, rj irdvr&v r/ r>v TrXetcrrcyv, Tore /cat Trept rTjs overtax 
eV rt \eyeiv /cdXXtcrra- 71010-779 yap dTroSetea>9 dpx?) ro 25 
rt eomv, cScrre /ca$* ocrov9 r<3v opKyptov /XT) crv/iySatvet ra crv/x- 
fteftyKora yvtopit,eiv, dXXd /^S* et/cdcrat Trept avr>v ev- 43 a 
papes, ST?XOZ> ort StaXe/crt/co>9 eipr/vrai /cat /cez>a>9 a7raz/r5. 
9 aTTOpicav 8' e^ei Kal ra Tra^Tj rrjs ^^X^ 9 ' irorepov ICTTL 

ra KOt^a /cat roS e^ovro^ r/ Icrri rt /cat rTjs t/a^s tScov au- 

rovro yap XaySct^ jnev dvay/catov, ov paStoz/ 8e. <^>atVe- s 
rat 8e rz^ />ti/ TrXetcrrcoz/ ovQzv avev rov 
7rotew>, otoz/ opyt^ecr^at, Oappetv, cVt^vft 
jLtaXtcrra 8* GQLKGV tStov ro voelv et 8* eorrt /cat rovro 
rts ^ ^77 cxvev <j&a^racrta9, ov/c ivftfywr ctz/ ov8e rovr* 
10 crctSjotaro? ^tvai. el /xe^ ow ecrrt rt r<S^ r7j$ \fjv)(v)$ epytov rj 10 
Tra^TjjLtarcu^ tStoz', ev^e^oir av avr^ ^CDpi^ecrdai' ei Se p,r)~ 
Qev evrw tStov aur^5, ou/c av etTy ^(opicrrrj) aXXa Kaddmp r<p 
evdel, y evdv, TroXXa o^v^at^et, oto^ a7rrea$at r'ij? 


v ro cv#v* a^a>picrrov yctp, t?rp del juera <r<i>/xaro9 rt- 15 
ecrrtjf. Ibt/ce 8e /cat ra TTJS ^vx*)** ff<x>fcl Trdvra clvat /x- 
ra orc3/x,aro9, ^v/id?, Trpadr^?, <j&c>ySo9, eXeos, Qdpcros, Irt 
/cat ro <f>iXv re /cat IM&V d/xa yap rovro 19 TT<- 
rt ro orcSjita. crrf^eiov 8e ro Trore fte^ tcrxvpcav /cat &>- 
v Trvi&rii&drtov crvfiftawovrtov /x/)?8e> Trapo^wea'^at ^ <^>o- 20 

, eVtore 8' VTTO jict/cpcoz/ /cat d/>tavp5z> /ctvetcr^at, oraz/ 
opya ro 0"c5/>ta /cat ovr6>9 ex^ ciJaTrep ora^ opyt^rat, crt 
8e rovro jttaXXo^ <f>avepov* fJLrjdevos yap <f>oj3epov <j"vp*f$aivov- 
ro? eV rot9 7rd#<rt ytvo^rat rots rov <j&o^ov/^eVov. a 8* ovra>9 

ort ra ird^ Xdyot evvXot to - t^. aJare ot opot 25 

25. rt Xyew T U V, n insert. E a Sira])l. Soph. || 3rt KdXXtirra T V X y, n K<lX\toy W, 
/cdXXtora etiam SimpI* Philop. || 7ip tucntur praeter omncs ccxld. Philop, Alex.apud Philop* 
Simpl. || 403 a, 6, W om. K || rt3y ^v EXy Philop. Soph. Torst., ^ om. reliqui ante 
Torst. omne || d^si/ roO rrci^u. E Philop. Soph. Torst*, roD om. reliqui ante TorsU omnes jf 
8. /5fw S WXy, Simpl, Philop. Trend, cd. pr. Wioi> etiam K, seel o^ in ras. w mtperHcr. 
(Bhl,), t^ov etiam Them. Soph- 1) 9, (fZi/eu roO <r^. Wy et, ut videtur, Philop. 46, 5, ro0 
om, etkm Them. Simpl. Soph. || 13. J rf^e? W et K^, J M'> K x (Stapf.) || 14. otfrw 
solus E et Bonitz (Hermes VII, 417), reliqui ante Biehlium omnes roi^ro^ etiam Philop, 
Simpl. et ut videtur, Soph. 7, *8 11 r8. *a2 r$ purrtv S W X || 7Ap et i$. n om. K, leg* 
Soph. || &no,.,.t$. <r&/ta unc. incl. Torat, tuentur haec verba praeter c<xld. Simpl. Philop*, 

CH. I 402 b 23 403 a 25 7 

For when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate 
most, of the attributes as they are presented to us, then we shall 
be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the 
thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a 
definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead 
to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even con- 
jecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and 
are void of content, one and all. 

A further difficulty arises as to whether all attributes of the 9 
Soul and sou l are a l so shared by that which contains the soul or 
body. whether any of them are peculiar to the soul itself: a 

question which it is indispensable, and yet by no means easy, to 
decide. It would appear that in most cases soul neither acts nor is 
acted upon apart from the body : as, e.g., in anger, confidence, desire 
and sensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be 
peculiar to the soul. Yet, if thought is a sort of imagination, or 
not independent of imagination, it will follow that even thought 
cannot be independent of the body. If, then, there be any of the 10 
functions or affections of the soul peculiar to it, it will be possible 
for the soul to be separated from the body : if, on the other hand, 
there is nothing of the sort peculiar to it, the soul will not be 
capable of separate existence. As with the straight line, so with 
it. The line, qitd straight, has many properties ; for instance, it 
touches the brazen sphere at a point ; but it by no means follows 
that it will so touch it if separated. In fact it is inseparable, since 
it is always conjoined with body of some sort. So, too, the 
attributes of the soul appear to be all conjoined with body : such 
attributes, viz., as anger, mildness, fear, pity, courage ; also joy, 
love and hate ; all of which are attended by some particular 
affection of the body. This indeed is shown by the fact that some- 
times violent and palpable incentives occur without producing in 
us exasperation or fear, while at other times we are moved by 
slight and scarcely perceptible causes, when the blood is up and 
the bodily condition that of anger. Still more is this evident from 
the fact that sometimes even without the occurrence of anything 
terrible men exhibit all the symptoms of terror. If this be so, 
the attributes are evidently forms or notions realised in matter. 

e.g. 50, 33, Soph. |j 19. <n7/x.etw> E Torst., fMjvtei reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Them. 
Soph. || fito M fax- TUVWX Soph. || ai. 5>] Kal UVWy, om. Kal etiam Them. 
Soph. (I tav ST VWX Soph., 8rai> etiam Simpl. || 23. AtaXXo? rouro STVWXy, rotfrou 
;*aXXo*> com. Torst., rotfry coni. Christ || 25. Sri Kal ri U Vy H & 0X97 ET, frt/Xot etiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. 


rotoGrot olov TO 6pytecr#aL Kivr]cri$ Tt9 rov TO&ovSt oroJ/xaros r) 
ii jaepovs ^ 8waju,O)9 VTTO ToSSe li/e/ca rouSe. Acat ota ravra 17077 
TO 06(t)pf)(rai Trept i/ru^s, ^ irdcrrjs ^ r^g Tota^T^. 
8* a> opicr&LVTO <ucri/co9 re /cat StaXe/crt/cos 
IK&&TOV avr>v, olov opyty TI ZGTLV* 6 jite*> yap ope^w avTikv- 30 
17 TI rotovrov, 6 Se ecrtv TOT) Trept AcapStaz/ ai/>caro5 

TOVTWV Se 6 ^ez/ r^z; v\7;^ cxTToStSwcrtv, 6 ro 43b 
/cat rov Xoyou* 6 /xev yap Xoyo? 1809 TO Trpay/xaro?, 
8' elz>ai rourov ei^ vXTj roiaSt, 6t ecrrai' cJcrTrep ot/cta9 
Xoyos rotouro?, ort cr/ceVacr/xa /ccwXurt/co^ <f>0opa<; VTT 

v Kal KavfiaTcov, 6 8e <f>ijcrt, \L6ov<$ /cat 5 
/cat fuXa, Irepo? 8' e^ rourots TO elSo? eV^/ca TO>Z/- 

St. TL9 OVl/ 6 <f)VCTLKO<S TOVTtoV ; TTOTtpOV O 7Tpl TV)V uX^V, TW Se 

Xoyor ayvo&v, ^ 6 Trept TO^ \6yov p,6vov; T) /.taXXov 6 e^ 

e 8?) Tt? 6/COTpO9; ^ OV/C CTTt Tt-9 6 7Tpt 

1^X779 Tel fir/ ^coptcTTa ftTjS* $ X a) / >torrc ^ T ^^* xo 
o <v<ri/co9 Trcpt aTravQ* ocra TOV TOtouSl crd5/iaT09 /cat T^9 TOt- 
avr^9 vX7j9 epya /cat Tra^* ocra S ffiy ^ rotaiJTa, aX- 

XO9, /Cat 7Tpt 



T09 7ra>7 /cat e a<)>atp<ra)9, /xaftaTt/co, 77 e /cc^^pt- 15 
, 6 7rpa5ro9 <jfctXocro<^09 aXX* eTravtreo^ o#J> 6 Xoyo?. 
8* oTt ra TTCX^ 7779 ^X^? 9 a>X ( **P La " ra rf* </>v<rt/c7j9 

/cat <>63o$ 

a>cT7rep ypa/t/x>) /cat 

25. Ktvyrw E Ktvyns ctiani vSinipl. Philop, Soph. (Jf. ad 402 a, 15 ]| n? om, KS S 
nj leg. ctiam Simpl. Pbilop. || 27. ^<57;] Sfy ST V Wy, oin. X ]} 29. optffairo <f>. \\ 
6 ^. S T U W X y Soph. || *ai 6 StaXeKn/c^ W y, 6 om. ctiam Soph. || 3 1 . rototlro S T U V W, 
rotoOrov ctiam Soph. || vcrba aJjuaroy al (vel ^) rcmovenda CSKC ceiwet Stcinhart, Synth. 
Crit. 1843 !| 403 b, i. ^] ai K Bek. Torst., ^ etiam Philop. Soph. Trend, |{ 2. <&0f rovj 
Wo* iwiht susi>ectum, tffa roO W ct, ut vuletur, Soph. 8, 35, fortasKe recte, ^ 3^ ro0 
ESTVy Simpl. Philop. Plutarchus ap. Simpl. si, 35 || 3. Tyat rotoOrov V, rovroy 
eZ^ai W || M o^/as Wy || 4* 3rt] r S, rw rt X^ a*' ^ TW, av e^ efn UV || 
5. KttvjjuSiTw Kal fycftsow W X, fyfipw Kal irvev/Adrw E, texlum tucntur etiam Them* 
Phiiop. Soph. 1| <t>-n<n S V X y || Kal ir\.] K al om. V || 6. to om. W || 9, pot 
intcrrogandi signum Bek,, correxit Trend* || ty om. UV || jo. post 
virgulam Bek. et Trend,, sustulit Torst. || n. Trdv^ T, &irw&* etiam K, cd a 
eras. (Stapf.) || roO om. SUW || rotovtt] 0v<rt/coO T || ra, &ra E Philop. Torst., reliqui 
ante Torst, omnes M<ra \\ fy E, aed ^ expunct. (Stapf.), ^ SimpU Bon. (Metaph. p. 184) 
Torst., omislsse videtur Philop. in interpr. 62, r6 t rcliqni ante Torst. omncs f || 13. nvw 
T, nm UWy, rt^^ etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 15, ^ om. E, leg. ettam Soph, if 

CH, I 403 a 26 403 b 19 9 

Hence they must be defined accordingly : anger, for instance, as a 
certain movement in a body of a given kind, or some part or 
faculty of it, produced by such and such a cause and for such and 
such an end. These facts at once bring the investigation of soul, u 
Digres- whether in its entirety or in the particular aspect 
sion. described, within the province of the natural philosopher. 

But every such attribute would be differently defined by the 
physicist and the dialectician or philosopher. Anger, for instance, 
would be defined by the dialectician as desire for retaliation or 
the like, by the physicist as a ferment of the blood or heat 
which is about the heart : the one of them gives the matter, the 
other the form or notion. For the notion is the form of the thing, 
but this notion, if it is to be, must be realised in matter of a 
particular kind ; just as in the case of a house. The notion or 
definition of a house would be as follows : a shelter to protect us 
from harm by wind or rain or scorching heat ; while another will 
describe it as stones, bricks and timber ; and again another as the 
form realised in these materials and subserving given ends. Which 
then of these is the true physicist ? Is it he who confines himself 
to the matter, while ignoring the form? Or he who treats of the 
form exclusively ? I answer, it is rather he who in his definition 
takes account of both. What then of each of the other two ? Or 
shall we rather say that there is no one who deals with proper- 
ties which are not separable nor yet treated as separable, but 
the physicist deals with all the active properties or passive affec- 
tions belonging- to body of a given sort and the corresponding 
matter? All attributes not regarded as so belonging he leaves 
to someone else: who in certain cases is an expert, a carpenter, 
for instance, or a physician. The attributes which, though in- 
separable, are not regarded as properties of body of a given sort, but 
arc reached by abstraction, fall within the province of the mathe- 
matician : while attributes which are regarded as having separate 
existence fall to the first philosopher or metaphysician. But 
to return to the point of digression. We were saying that the 
attributes of the soul are as such, I mean, as anger and 
fgg^ inseparable from the physical matter of the animals 
to which they belong, and not, like line and surface, separable in 

17. o$rc <bt x<*yw<rr& ex solo E Biehl Rodier, quasi 19. Kal o&x huic otfre respondeat, 
sed aut <o0r xwp i <^ r *> otfr aut o$$t pro otire minus incommodi haberet, x<*>P L <rT& T VX, 
ot xvpurrb Soph, Torst. Dembowski, Woch. f. class. Phil. 1887, p. 43> reliqui dxt6/>nrra, 
etiam Them, PhUop, ShnpU (I 18. fl W 7* U Simpl., et ye T, 4) X, fl 9) etiam Philop. 
Soph. || roMxtfr?? X. 

io DE ANIMA I en. 2 

2 'ETTtcrfcoTTOiWas 8e Trept ^VXYJS cu/ay/catoz> ajaa StaTro- 20 
powra? Trept aw eviropeiv Set TrpoeX^ovTas, ra? TaJz> irporepw 
So^as crv/^7rapaXaju/3ai/tv ocrot Tt Trept avrTj? direifiijvavro, 
OTTCO? Ta /jte^ /caXaJs etpTj/xeVa Xa/3ot>/xei>, et Se' Tt /*//} /ca- 

2 Xa>5, rovr 5 ev\aj37)6o}^ev. dp^rj ^ rf* ^Tifcrccwg 7rpo#e'cr#ai 
ra jLiaXtcrra 8o/cow#' virdpyeiv avrrj Kara <f>vcnv. TO e/xi/fv- 25 

J(0^ 7] TOV CXT//V)(OV SvOCl/ jLtaXtCTTa Sta<j^/0tV 00/Ct, ACtZ/7JCT6 

re /cat T<j3 alcrddvea'Bai. TTapeiX^ajice^ Se /cat Trapa rcSi' TT/OO- 
yV.crr4po)v cr^eSo^ Svo raSra Trept i//v^$" <^>aori yap ^tot 
Kat /xaXtara /cat Trpc^rco? ^v^v elvat TO KWQVV. olrjQzvres Se 
ro /a? Kivovpevov avro pr} v$%GrOai KIVCIV erepoi/, r<3v 30 

3 KivovfJiGvcov n Tr)p \}jv)(r)V VTreXaySoz/ tz/at. o^ev ATj^ao/cptros /xev 

rt /cal 6^p^6v <j&7jcrtv avr?)^ elvai' a?7tpa)v yap o^r 0)^404 a 

/cal dro/xwv ra cr<atpOt87? Trvp /cat 
yet, ofov ?/ raJ apt ra /caXov/x,cva ^v<r/>tara, a < 
rats? Sta T<3v ^uptScoz/ a/crtcrtz', <5v r^v jLtez/ 
TTJS 0X175 <5&v<TCt>5 crrot)(ta Xeyet' 6/xocct>s Se /cat ACVKCTTTTO^* TOU- 5 
row Se Ta cr<jSatpo6tS^ ifrvxyv, Sta TO /xaXtcrTa Stcx TravTOS Sv- 
va<rOai SiaSvvew rov$ TOtovTOvs pvor/xov? /cat /ctmz/ TCX Xoura 
/cal avTa, v7roXajit/8a?/ovT$ TTJ^ fax*!*' ^Tvat TO 
Tot? ^015 T^r KLvrfcrw. 8to /cat TOV ^^ opov eT^at 
dvaiTvoijv (rvvwyovros yap TOV Trepte'^ovTos T<i crc^p^cLra zo 
/cal e/c$Xty8oz>T09 T^ cryfrjuartov ra Trapfyovra rolg 
Kivi)<Tiv Sta TO ft^S* awa rjpefitiv ^Lt7j87TOT, 

yap avra /cat Ta 
Kpwcr0<u, crvv&veipyovra TO crwayov /cat Tryyvvov /cat f}z> 15 
4 Se <09 ^lv Swc)i/Tat TOVTO TTOtctv. eot/c Se /cat TO 


yap Tt^e^ avr<2*> ^X^l v cf^at Ta V T$ aept ft/cr/AaTa, ot 

ao. 8* r<iXiy irtpl S || 21. Trpodic\66i>ras S 1'hilop. Soph., 5w\$6vra,t X ct pr, T, 
ante rpotfX0<i?ray virgulam ponunt Tick. Trend* |J 22. <ru/t*7rtfptXa/Aj9A>'t>' TWX, 
0am? V, (ru/4Ta/5aXa^co/ty etiam Them. Philop. Soph. |] 23. KttX^aj <>m. T, \n>st 
ponit U || Mi)n U V || 24, roOr' dX^^^ ^wyutfv S || a6. 5uetV K, $wl S V W X |! 
ante 3f(ri W || tiotec tii&ijdpcur X || aft. ^a<ri] ^acri jn^y V || friot ykp W ji 29* T/J^JTO^ K T, 
rpt6rws etiam Philop. Simpl, Soph. |j 30. ^5' ^5. Vy j| 31* \^vx^ v offrwj inr. Uy 11 A^t, 
/t^y] /cai Aiy/i. V || 4040, x, atVrijy 09;<ra' T W |j a. rA <r^a^.,,.X^7* et 4* <&> tlelemla ct 
5. ^oiwf,..AeiJ/ft7r7rof parenth. incluclenda censet Madvig advcr-saria critica I, p, 471, 

CH. 2 403 b 20 404 a 1 8 ii 

In our enquiry concerning soul it is necessary to state the 2 
problems which must be solved as we proceed, and at the same 
Thc time to collect the views of our predecessors who had 

theorfe* anything to say on the subject, in order that we may 

adopt what is right in their conclusions and guard against 
their mistakes. Our enquiry will begin by presenting what are 2 
commonly held to be in a special degree the natural attributes of 
soul. Now there are two points especially wherein that which is 
animate is held to differ from the inanimate, namely, motion and 
the act of sensation : and +hese are approximately the two charac- 
teristics of soul handed down to us by our predecessors. There are 
some who maintain that soul is preeminently and primarily the 
soui cause of movement. But they imagined that that which 

because * s not i tse lf * n motion cannot move anything else, and 
movent. ^hus they regarded the soul as a thing which is in 
motion. Hence Democritus affirms the soul to be a sort of fire or 3 
The heat. For the "shapes" or atoms are infinite and those 

atomists. which are spherical he declares to be fire and soul : they 
may be compared with the so-called motes in the air, which are 
seen in the sunbeams that enter through our windows. The 
aggregate of such seeds, he tells us, forms the constituent elements 
of the whole of nature (and herein he agrees with Leucippus), 
while those of them which are spherical form the soul, because 
such figures most easily find their way through everything and, 
beiny themselves in motion, set other things in motion. The 
atomists assume that it is the soul which imparts motion to 
animals. It is for this reason that they make life depend upon 
respiration. For, when the surrounding air presses upon bodies 
and tends to extrude those atomic shapes which, because they are 
never at rest themselves, impart motion to animals, then they are 
reinforced from outside by the entry of other like atoms in respira- 
tion, which in fact, by helping to check compression and solidification, 
prevent the escape of the atoms already contained in the animals ; 
and life, so they hold, continues so long as there is strength to do 
this. The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems also to contain the 4 
certain same thought. Some of them identified soul with the 

motes in the air, others with that which sets these motes 

der Vorsokratiker, p. 363, 7 II 4 r & wr*- E (Trend.), Them. Torst., tfv om. reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. || 5. oroi^eta Xrf-yei rijs 8\w ^torews excepto E 
omneft codd., etiam Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 6. <r<f>aip. irvp ical ^vxhv V || 9. 5td... 
I. iclrqw cm- V |j 10. r^v doirvoty Kcd rijv Awnvofy S. 1! 13- otpav60w T [| etr' 
E, &weun.&t>rw etiam Them. Soph, et sine dubio Philop. et Simpl. 

12 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 

Se TO ravra KLVOVV. Trept Se TOVTOIV etp7?Tat Stem 

<atVeTat Kwovpeva, /cai> 77 z/^z/e/ua TravTeXTjs. eVt ravro Se 20 

/cat ocrot eovcri ryv r ar KWOVV eot- 

yap OVTOL Trdvres vTreiXrj^evat, r^v KLvrjcriv ot/cetoTaTOz> 


v, ravrrfv S* v<j>* eavrrjs, Sia TO ^f)Q\v bpav KLVQVV o 
KOL CLVTO /avetTcu, o/xotot)? Se /cat 3 Ai^a^ayo/oa<? 

Xeyet TTJI/ /cu>oucrai/, /cat et Tts aXXo? etpTj/cev, as TO 
e/ctv^cre z/ovs, ou /x^ 7ravT\>$ y tocnrep A7j/xo/c/5tTO9 * 

yap a,7rX<Ss $v)(f)v TOLVTOV /cat z/ov^ p TO yctp aX^^eg et- 
TO (^atvojitez/oy' Sto /caXcG^ TrotTjcrat TW ^O^pop a)? 

ov STJ "^pTJrai r<5 v& a>? Suz/a/jcet 3 
Trept TT)^ akij0i,av y aXXa TavTO Xeyet 
S' r^rrov Stacra^>et ?rept avTc 
yap TO alnov TOV /caXcUs /cat op0co$ rov vow Xeyet, Te'pct>$t 
Se TOVTOI^ eu>at TT^V il/vxtfv' eV aTracrt yap vTrap^etv avTOj/ 
Tot9 ^otg /cat /xeyaXots /cat jutt/cpotg /cat Tt^ttots /cat aTt/xo- 
Tepot?. ov <^>atvTat S' o ye /caTcx <j)p6vr)cnv Xeyd/xero? j/ov? Tracrt^ 5 
6/iOtO)$ vTrap^eti/ Tots C^ 06 ^j ^^" ovSe rotg avffp&Trois Traarw* 
6 ocrot /ae^ ouz/ em TO /avetcr#at TO e/xi//v^o^ <X7re)8Xe- 
\/fav, oftrot TO /ct^TtKci>TaTov uTre'Xa^o^ TT)^ ^foy^v ocrot 8* 
e?rt TO ywdtMTKeiv /cat TO ator^a^ecr^at T<iJ^ ovrtov* oijrot Se Xe x - 
yovcrt TT)*/ ^vyy)v ra$ dp^as, ot 
ot Se /xtaz/ TavTTj^, cocrTrep ^il/xTrcSo/cXTyg /xev e/c 
etvat Se /cat IKCLCTTOV 

/x,v yttp yatav 07r<i>7ra^<j', t/Sart S* 
S* al&ipa Slav, drap irvpl irvp 

S< T v6c<i' Xvy/xJJ. 

verba 19, 7rcf)i 5^ roiJTW^.^.-zo. 7rcwrX7)j Biehlio susjxjcta vidcnlur; l<*git quidem 
ca Philop. 70, 55 wj. Soph, u, 2 sq. Them. 9, 30 sq. qui tamcn vcrha Trtpl 
3^ roiJrwv efp^rat practerit, de Simpl. 16, 13 sqq* mm liquet || ry. virgubm |K>st 
etpyrtu sustulit Roclier || ^rt S, in interpr. dpyrai Si afrrc&t rotJro, &ri Soph* {} 
STVWX || 74. a^r^j E, y^ J ^avr^s ctiam Them. || a6* virgiilam jwwt 
posuit Diel || 27* 6 voOy S W X y, 6 om. etiam Them. Soph, || post AT?/*, colon 
Diels, vulg, punctum || 28. ^i/xV Tai)r6y /fat voOv ex solo K (Trend.) Biehl, rdiqui 
ante Bichlium omnes ra&r&v tyvxyv Kal VQ&V \\ 404 fo, r. woXXax? K, TroXXa^wy W^ 
TroXXaxoi? etiam Them, qui in interpr. jo, 5 sq. roXXa^^* posuit jj a- rd om. Vy, l 
etiam Them. || 3, roi5r6^ tyat r^y j/o(?v rij if/vxtf V, r6v wOv afrai rat'/ro^ r ^i/x? T W 
qui r^ ai)rd>' > Uy, similk veteres interprctes || 4. vulg. virgulan p<mt ftJwy t*t 

CH. 2 4043 19 404 b 15 13 

in motion : and as to these motes it has been stated that they are 
seen to be in incessant motion, even though there be a perfect calm. 
The view of others who describe the soul as that which moves itself 
tends in the same direction. For it would seem that all these thinkers 
regard motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul. 
Everything else, they think, is moved by the soul, but the soul is 
moved by itself : and this because they never see anything cause 
motion without itself being in motion. Similarly the soul is said to 5 
be the moving principle by Anaxagoras and all others who have held 
Anaxa- that mind sets the universe in motion ; but not altogether 
goras. j n the same sense as by Democritus. The latter, indeed, 

absolutely identified soul and mind, holding that the presentation 
to the senses is the truth: hence, he observed, Homer had well 
sung of Hector in his swoon that he lay 'with other thoughts.' 
Democritus, then, does not use the term mind to denote a faculty 
conversant with truth, but regards mind as identical with soul. 
Anaxagoras/ however, is less exact in his use of the terms. In 
. . many places he speaks of mind as the cause of goodness 

His view *>.r- o 

ambigu- and order, but elsewhere he identifies it with the soul : as 
where he attributes it to all animals, both great and 
small, high and low. As a matter of fact, however, mind in the 
sense of intelligence would not seem to be present in all animals 
alike, nor even in all men. 

Those, then, who have directed their attention to the motion of 6 
Soul as t ^ lc an i mate being, conceived the soul as that which is 
cognitive, most capable of causing motion : while those who laid 

derived * & 

from the stress on its knowledge and perception of all that exists 
identified the soul with the ultimate principles, whether 
they recognised a plurality of these or only one. Thus Empedocles 
Empcdo- compounded soul out of all the elements, while at the 
clett * same time regarding each one of them as a soul. His 

words arc "With earth we see earth, with water water, with air 
bright air, but ravaging fire by fire, love by love, and strife by 

KttKtulit Dicls || drt/tor/potv E (Stapf.) II . falveru v\>v te E (vv in rasura, Trend.) H 
f>, Tr&rtv om. ST WX |) <> rb post xai om. STVWy, leg, etiam Them. Soph. H & U 
Them*, om. V W || 10. irototirres ratras ol VW et vet. transl. Biehl Rodier, TTOLOVVTGS 
atfr&s ol in lemmate I'hilop. 72, 31 et in interpr. ol y&v irtelovs ehroyres dpx&s 73, 13, 
TroioOvre* rA* d/x&* ol TU, et Philop. v. 1. 72, 31, wotoOi/rcs r&s Apxfa rcttfras oi SXy et 
iu interpr. Them. Soph., 7roto0*>ry, ol E Bek. Trend* Torst. ratfray unc. includere malui, 
dckwlum ccnfcct etiam IJenxbowdci, p. 43'> om. Diels, p. 2x3, Fr. 109 || ante ratfrew et 
ix. ratfnjv virgutaH posuit Rcxlicr || n. plv om. STW || 11. otfrwy E (Trend.), o#ra> 
\iyw SU, om* T\V, vulgo ante Biehlmm o(Jrw || 13, 8' insertum E, leg. etiam Them. 
Soph, |} 14. 5?oi> T U V W, cliam Soph. 

14 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 

7 rov avrbv Se rpotrov /cat 6 TlXdrw eV r<5 Ttjuatcc) TT?V T/JV- 
XTJI> e/c TO>V (TTQi-xtitov fl"oter ytvaicr/cecr^at yap r<5 6//,ota) TO 
o/iotov, TO, Se 7rpayju,aTa e/c rcSz/ aprons etz>at. 6/u)ta)<? Se 
/cat eV Tots Trept <f)i\.oo-Q<f)ia$ Xeyo/zeVot9 StcyptV^T?, avro ^ter> 
TO <o&> e'^ avrrjs TTJ? TO ez/os tSe'as /cat TOU rrpa>rov /JLTJKOVS 20 
/cat TrXaTOus /cat $a#ovs, Ta 8' aXXa 6|UOtoTp07ra>9. ert Se 
/cat aXXa>5, z/ouz/ jLtei' TO eV, iTncrTrjfjiyjv Se TO, Svo* ju,oz/aj(a>5 
yap e'<^)' ez/ g TOf Se TOV OTtTreSov apid^ov So^az/, atcr^crtv Se 
TOV TOV (JTepeoC' ot /xez/ ycxp apiO^ol ra etS^ avTa /cat at dp- 
j(at eXeyo^To, etort S* e/c TW^ o-Toi^io^v. /cptVeTat Se m TT/XX- 25 

\ \ rs rc^>> / ^?^^C l ' / l^ NOIJ 

y/xaTa Ta )ae^ va), Ta o eTrto-TTj/x,?;, Ta oe oof]7> Ta o at- 

8 cr6rjo m L' etS*^ S 9 ot apt^/xot o^TOt TcSz/ TTyoay/xaTO)^. evret Se /cat 

eSc5/cet V * ^ ac Ka ^ vtoMTTiKov owTO>9 T eVtot 

9 KLvovvG* eavTov. ia<f>povTai Se Trept TO>^ apx&v, Tt//e9 /cat 30 
'Trocrat, ^LtaXtcrTa /xev ot crcojaaTt/ca? TrotovvTe^ TO?? dcrct)/xaTov<j, 
TouTots S' oc fjLiavT<s KOI air* a/jL^otv TO-9 apX^* 5 aTTOi/)"^- 4052 
10 VOL^GVQI. Sta(j&epo^Tat Se /cat Trept TO 77X^09* ot jix,e> yap 
ot Se TrXet'ovs Xe^ovcrtv. e7ro/i.eVa>9 Se TOVTOI? /cat TT}*/ 
yv cxTroStSoacrtv TO Te yap KwyTLKOv r^v <$>vvw rS>v 7rp<!>- 
IIT<UZ/ vTretX^acrtv, ou/c dXoya>9 o^ei/ eSoc;e Ttcrt 
/cat yap TOVTO XeTTTO/xepeVTaTov Te /cat /xaXtcrra T 
dcrcyjutaToz', ert Se /ctvetTat Te /cat /ctve? TO, aXXa 
12 ATjjmo/cptTOS Se /cat yXa<f)vpct)Tp&$ ipr)K,v a7 

Sia Tt TOVTa)^ e/cctTepov ^v^v /x,ev yap et^at TauTo /cat 
TOUTO S* ea>at Toi^ 7rp6)T<wv /cat dStatperco^ crco/xaTW, /ct^Tt- 10 
Sta XeTTTOju-epetav /cat TO o"xfjp,a' ?S>v Se 

i 6 E, 'ct Plato" vet. transl., om. STU VWy, 6 om. Hk Tr<m<L Tcvrst. :! 
/ post IVa^ U Wy t post ^ux^ ST 1! at. T^J 5' AXXat Them, et tnnquaiu variant 
lectionem IMiilop. commcmarat 79, 15, ri 5^ d\\a Sinipl., rdX\a & Soph, jj a^. t^' f**| 
7^<rat X, om. ST, leg. etiam Them. Soph. || 24. atfr& om. S X, leg. Soph. | } ai ante fyx a * 
exuno PZ addunt Bck. et Torst., om. Soph. Trend. || 27, <% 5^ /cai dpifywd coni. Sttjinhart, 
oCrot ai coni. Sascmihl, Jen. Lit. !<C. 1877, p. 708 || 8. virgulam post Q&rw Torfct* 
Belgcr in cd* alt. Trend. Kodier, etiam Soph. 14, 3, ante oOrws reliqui etiam SJmpl. 
Philop. || 30, ffia^ovTcu^^osb, 29. ^ix^ non atis ad pmecedcntia quadrarc videntur 
Susemihlio, Oecon. p. 84 || 31. r^j dtr^arou? e codd, solus X, ro?* d<rw/wro* Them. 
Philop. Soph. Trend. Tontt., cctcri codd. ct liek. ro?* d<rw/udroti J| 405 a, a. r0 rX^ot^f 
STVX II 4. re om, ST || 7. Irt 5^ K Jt Bed eras., in ras. /cal, /cai etiam VX, ^fn 8i xal 
STW || re om. STW || 8. AirojMwtptvos Torst. ex K, reliqui ante Torst. omnes 
d7ro097v^woy, etiam Soph. H 9. fvx^ E (Trend.) |j r&Mv STVX j| 10. <&><u IK r&v 
TU VWX || ii. Xerro/^pettt^ T et nunc K, sed XeTrro in ras. (Stapf.), " subtilitatcm ** 

CH. 2 404 b 16 405 a ir 15 

gruesome strife." In the same manner Plato in the Timaeus con- 7 
structs the soul out of the elements. Like, he there 


maintains, is known by like, and the things we know are 
composed of the ultimate principles. In like manner it was 
explained in the lectures on philosophy, that the self-animal or 
universe is made up of the idea of One, and of the idea-numbers 
Two, or primary length, Three, primary breadth, and Four, primary 
depth, and similarly with all the rest of the ideas. And again this 
has been put in another way as follows : reason is the One, know- 
ledge is the Two, because it proceeds by a single road to one 
conclusion, opinion is the number of a surface, Three, and sensation 
the number of a solid, Four. In fact, according to them the 
numbers, though they are the ideas themselves, or the ultimate 
principles, are nevertheless derived from elements. And things 
are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again 
by opinion and others by sensation : while these idea-numbers 
are forms of things. And since the soul was held to be thus 8 
The self- cognitive as well as capable of causing motion, some 
moving: thinkers have combined the two and defined the soul as a 


self-moving number. 

But there are differences of opinion as to the nature and number of 9 
various ^hz ultimate principles, especially between those thinkers 
w ^ ma ^ e t ' ie principles corporeal and those who make 
them incorporeal : and again between both of these and 


theories of others who combine the two and take their principles 

from both. But, further, they differ also as to their 10 
number : some assuming a single principle, some a plurality. And, 
when they come to give an account of the soul, they do so in strict 
accordance with their several views. For they have assumed, not 
unnaturally, that the soul is that primary cause which in its own 
nature is capable of producing motion. And this is why some n 
identified soul with fire, this being the element which is made up of 
the finest particles and is most nearly incorporeal, while further it 
is preeminently an element which both moves and sets other things 
in motion. Democritus has expressed more neatly the reason for 12 
each of these facts. Soul he regards as identical with mind, and 
this he makes to consist of the primary indivisible bodies and 
considers it to be a cause of motion from the fineness of its particles 
and their shape. Now the shape which is most susceptible of 

vet. transl. Torst., cui assenlitur etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 141, 
XeTTTO^eiav S, fUKpopfyeiw rtf. E et reliqui codd. Diels, p. 386, 33, quod rasurae subfuisse 
coni, Stapfer, Studia, p. 13, etiam Philop. Soph., O7u/c/oo/x^>etew Them. 

16 DE ANIMA I CH. 2 

evKwrjrorarov TO (T^aipoeiSes Xeyet' roiovrov 8' etvat TOZ/ T 

13 vovv KOI TO TTT)/>. *Az>aaydpa9 8' eot/ce //^z> irepov Xeyetv \/;v- 

J(7jV T /Cat VOVV, a><T7Tp 67TO/X^ /Cat TTpOTtpOV, ^pr)TaL S' 

d/j,(f)OLv a>5 /xca <jWo-et, TrX^v dp-^rjv 7 e r v vovv riderai pa- 15 
Xtcrra Travrav povov yovv <j>r)crlv avrbvr>v ovrcov airkovv elvai 
/cat ctyuyT? re /cat Kadapov. a/TroStScycrt 8* a/jLtjxo TTJ avTTy 
cipxfj* TO r ytvc5cr/ctz/ /cat TO /ctvetz^, \4ytov vovv Kivrjcrat, TO 

14 Tra^. eot/c Se /cat aXTjg, ef coz/ a,7TO[Jivr)p,ovevov(rL, KIV^TLKOV 
Tt T)}Z/ \fjvxrjv V7ro\a/3eiv, elirep rov \L6ov tyi) ^X^l v *X* IV > 20 

15 oTt TOV airipov Kivel. Atoyez/T;? 8* (Scnrep /cat erepoi Ttve5 
deyoa, TOVTOZ^ ot^^et? Travrwv \errr o[j,pcrTarov elvai /cat ap^ijv 9 
/cat Sta TOVTO yivcocTKtLv T /cat Kiveiv TYJV ifjvxyv, y f^kv TTpcS- 

TOZ/ CTTt, /Cat 6/C TOVTOV Ta XotTTCt, yWto<TKlV, fj Sc \7TTOTaTO^, 

16 KivrjriKOv tlvat. /cat 'Hyoa/cXetTog Se T^ &pxty ^Tz/at <jfjcrt 25 

)v avaOv/jiiacriv, ef 7j9 TaXXa crvi f io"T7)cnv * /cat 
Ov re /cat yoco^ at* TO Se KWovfMevov /ctvou/xerco 
ez/ /cu>7jo"et 8' ct^at T<X oz^ra /ccx/cetz/os <J>TO /cat 

17 o TroXXot. TrapaTrXTjcrta)? 8e TOVTOt? /cat *AX/cjLtata>i/ ot/cz> 
uTToXaySetv Tiept \fjv)(rj$' (frrjarl yap avrrjv addvarov elvai 30 
Sta TO Ot/ceWt Tot? dQavdrois* rovro 8* v f rrdp)(iv avrfi a>5 
act Kivovfievf)' /avet<r#at yap /cat Ta ^ta Trdvra crvz/e^fi^ 

18 aei, crekyvyv, y\iov, TOV? dcrrepOLS /cat TW ovpavov oXov, TO>V 8e 405 b 

/Cat v8ct>/> TtV5 CtTTC^^aZ/TO, Ka0dirp V j7T7rCi)V* 

8' eoi/cacrtv e/c ^9 yoz/T^s, OTt trdvrtov vypd* /cat 
yap eXey^et TOI)? al/xa </>acr/covTa9 TT)Z> ^v^tjv, on rj yovr/ 
ovx atjua* ravT'rjv 8' cT^at TT)^ 7rpa>rY)V V' v X 1 7 Jt/g Tepot 8* at- S 
/xa, KaOaTrep KptTta9, TO aicrQdvecrOai, ^X^ 5 ot/ctOTaTOv 
s, rovro 8' V7rdp)(t,v Sta T^ rov at/LtaT09 c^v- 
v. irdvra yap ra 

14, r cm. X || xP*M at E X, xp^rcu ctiam SimpU |j 16. Aw^rwi' S y Them. 
Rodier, Trdyrwn' reliqui, etiam E (Stapf.) SimpL Philop. || 17. r om SVWy || 
19. virgulam post Oa\^y ot post dTro/w. posuit I)iel8 || 20, faroXa/^mp TUVWy, 
dTToXa/u^d^eiv S, tookafieiv ctiam Them. || rV X^ov X Them. Simpl. Philop,, TOP etiam 
Soph. || 44. XeTrroAie^crraTOv TUVW |} 25. fan Tfo $. UW || 26. *ai 7^ dtr, T U || 
27. re] & SX 2etler Ph. d. Or. J. fi p. 646, adn. 3, 5^ TU Ikk. Trend., om, V, re 
etiam Soph, et, ut vidctur, Them. 13, 28, Torwt. j| 31. post dflctmroty virgulam vulg*, 
colon posuit Diels || 32* diravra STUVX || 405^ i. roi/y om. UVW, lej;. etiam 
Them. Soph. || . post ''iTnrtay vulgpunctum, colon I)iel || 3. jx^st tiypi punctum Dicls |j 
5. rfy om, S T, vp^r^v om. W, wfH^r^ 5^ ^u%V ( v -l T V faxty) X^et r^v 70^^ Philop. 

CH. 2 405 a 12 405 b 8 17 

motion is the spherical ; and of atoms of this shape mind, like fire, 
consists. Anaxagoras, while apparently understanding by mind 13 
something different from soul, as we remarked above, really treats 
both as a single nature, except that it is preeminently mind which 
he takes as his first principle ; he says at any rate that mind 
alone of things that exist is simple, unmixed, pure. But he refers 
both knowledge and motion to the same principle, when he says 
that mind sets the universe in motion. Thales, too, apparently, 14 
judging from the anecdotes related of him, conceived 
soul as a cause of motion, if it be true that he affirmed 
the loadstone to possess soul, because it attracts iron. Diogenes, 15 
however, as also some others, identified soul with air. 


Air, they thought, is made up of the finest particles and 

is the first principle : and this explains the fact that the soul knows 

and is a cause of motion, knowing by virtue of being the primary 

element from which all else is derived, and causing motion by the 

extreme fineness of its parts. Heraclitus takes soul for his first 16 

principle, as he identifies it with the vapour from which 

he derives all other things, and further says that it is the 

least corporeal of things and in ceaseless flux ; and that it is by 

something in motion that what is in motion is known ; for he, like 

most philosophers, conceived all that exists to be in motion. 

Alcmaeon, too, seems to have had a similar conception. For soul, 17 

he maintains, is immortal because it is like the beings 

which are immortal ; and it has this attribute in virtue of 

being ever in motion : for he attributes continuous and unending 

motion to everything which is divine, moon, sun, stars and the 

whole heaven. Among cruder thinkers there have been some, like 18 

Hippon, who have even asserted the soul to be water. The reason 

for this view seems to have been the fact that in all 

xppon. animals the seed is moist : in fact, Hippon refutes those 

who make the soul to be blood by pointing out that the seed is not 

blood, and that this seed is the rudimentary soul. Others, again, 19 

like Critias, maintain the soul to be blood, holding that it is 

sentience which is most distinctive of soul and that this 

is due to the nature of blood. Thus each of the four 

elements except earth has found its supporter. Earth, however, 

89, 3 sq., rV irpfaniv leg. etiam Soph. || 6. -nj? ^x^ Uy J| 8. y&p] 5 ' ofr> T V Them., 
08? Soph. , dpa Susemihl. 

18 DE ANIMA I CHS. 2, 3 

ravrrjv 8* ovffels dVoTrc^avrat, ?r\r)v et rt9 avrr)v ecp^/ce^ IK 
TTavTwv etvat rcov crrot^etcw ^ TrdVra. 10 

20 QpitpvroLi 8e 7rdW9 TTJV ^V^TJV rpicriv a>9 etTretv, jamjcrei, at- 
ordyjcreL, r dcrco/xdrcy TOVTMV 8* e/cacrroz/ dVdyerat 7rpO9 ra9 ap^as- 
Sib /cat ot raJ yivaxTKeiv 6ptojUz/ot avrrjv rj a-TQiyeiov rj e/cra>z/ 
orroi^eccdv TTOtovcrt, Xeyovres TrapaTrh.rjcritos aXA/tyXcHs, TrKyv evd^" 
<j&acri yap yLV<*MTKzcr6ai rb o/xoiov raJ oju-oto)- l-rreiSr] yap rj 15 
t/fv^ TrdVra yiyz/aicrfcet, CTWICTTOLO'IV avrrjv IK 7raa*<S^ r<3v dp- 

21 X^^* ocroc ju,v ovz^ jacav Ttz^a \eyovcrw alriav /cat 

^v *IJV)(Y)V ev Tideacrw, olov irvp ^ aepa* oc Se 

8e /xo^o? aTraOrj <j>r}crlv elvai TQV vovv, Kal KQIVQV 20 

' ' 9 

Sta riz/' alriav, ovr e/cetz^o? ecp^/cev ovr' 9 /c r^ ^Iprj^v^v crv/i- 
23 <^>az/9 ecrTcv. ocTOt S* evavTidxreis TTOLOVVLV ev rat? 

IK T&V zvovTitov wvicrTa&iv * OL 8 
itov, olov depfiov 77 x^/v^po^ 17 TL rotovroy dXXo, /cat 

Tt TQVT<*)V TiOzaffiv Sto /cat rots ovopacrw 
aKo\ovdovcrw oi /x*> yap rb Qeppav Xeyo^r9, ort 8ta rovro /cal 
rb ^T}^ toVQfjLacrTai, oi Sc rb $v)(pQV Sta r^v avairvo-riv Kal rr)v 

tyvxriv. ra p,ev ovv TrapaSeSofteVa 7Tpl 
a9 atrta9 \eyovcrw QVTO>, ravr iorriv. 3 

*RmQrK7rTOv Se Trp&TQv IL&V Trepi Kwrfcrew tcra)? yap ov 
x/fv8o9 ecrrc rb r7)v ovcriav avrfjs rocavryv zlvai olav 
riv ol Xeyo^T9 ^v^^ 6t^at rb KWQVV eavrb 
Kti/tz>, dXX* ez/ rt rc3i/ dSvmrcy^ ro virdp)(W avrg 
2 ore jue/ oSi/ OVAC dVay/catoz' ro KWQVV Kal avro KWGicrdai, ?rpo- 
rcpoz/ etp^rat. 8t)(c39 Se Kwov^evov TTOVTOS (fj yap KaG* erpoi/ 

9, dTro^afvtfrai ST V WX, diroTr^ayreu etiam Them. || 10. *) Trdvra nunc E HW! inter 
3) et rdvra ras. cui subfulsse coni. A Hodier, to Stapfer, ^ ^T Tebra Soph. 15, 7 |j u. 3^ 
pro 3^ coni. Haycluck, recepit Roclier, 5^? etiam Them. 14, 4 || Travres tl>t /*> r, ^. 
coni. Christ || r^y om. ST, r^v \fri>x^ om. V |J 15. 717^. *ai rd ^. U, r6 fl/wto? 
STy, fcai r6 #/AOMH> 747^. V W || r<JJ6/i* T^ ^- X || ^Tret^.,.16. dpx^ post 19. 
transponenda ccnset Stcinhart, Symb. Crit. p. 4, cui assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 84 jj 
$ om, E || r8. TrX^w U V W, ir\elova y || 19. irotoO<r^] X^7oy<rty S TU W y, 
Soph. || at* T^wpifet SU, yvuplfoi, y, futurum etiam Philop. 11 75. ^(XXo om. X T 
2^). TQ&TW om. E, tuentur haec vcrba Philop. 92, r Soph. J| 2/>. post riQfa 
punclum, colon posuit Diels i| 7 7Ap ex uno E restituk et post &Ko\<w$oti<rtv colon posuit 
nr/A^.f ^,,, 4 niteAntitur /fi*im Noett4 n. 1^.4. nraeterauam tiuod aut X^o^r^j post 28, 

CHS. 2, 3 405 b 9 406 a 4 ig 

has not been put forward by anyone, except by those who have 
explained the soul to be derived from, or identical with, all the 

Thus practically all define the soul by three characteristics, 20 
motion, perception and incorporeality ; and each of these 
c h arac teristics is referred to the ultimate principles. 
Hence all who define soul by its capacity for knowledge either 
make it an element or derive it from the elements, being on this 
point, with one exception, in general agreement. Like, they tell 
us, is known by like; and therefore, since the soul knows all 
things, they say it consists of all the ultimate principles. Thus 21 
those thinkers who admit only one cause and one element, as fire 
or air, assume the soul also to be one element ; while those who 
admit a plurality of principles assume plurality also in the soul. 
Anaxagoras alone says that mind cannot be acted upon and has 22 
nothing in common with any other thing. How, if such be its 
nature, it will know anything and how its knowledge is to be 
explained, he has omitted to state; nor do his utterances afford 
a clue. All those who introduce pairs of opposites among their 23 
principles make the soul also to consist of opposites; while those 
who take one or other of the two opposites, either hot or cold 
or something else of the sort, reduce the soul also to one or other 
of these elements. Hence, too, they etymologise according to their 
theories ; some identify soul with heat, deriving !fiv from eo>, and 
contend that this identity accounts for the word for life ; others 
say that what is cold is called soul from the respiratory process 
and consequent " cooling down," deriving tfrvxtf from ^tJ%w. Such, 
then, are the views regarding soul which have come down to us 
and the grounds on which they are held. 

We have to consider in the first place the subject of motion. 3 
criticism ^ or> un '- ess I am niistaken, the definition of soul as the 
of the self-moving, or as that which is capable of self-motion, 

soul is misrepresents its essential nature : nay, more ; it is quite 
impossible for soul to have the attribute of motion at 
all. To begin with, it has been already stated that a thing may 2 
cause motion without necessarily being moved itself. A thing 
is always moved in one of two ways; that is, either indirectly, 

poni, aut verba -29* /<aX<r0ac ^i/x^ eici vult, virgulam post X^yopres omissam post 
posuit Rodier || 28. post \f/vxpfa virg, Torst. Biehl Rodier, quod si recte est, illud 37. yd/3 
delendum est |[ 406 a, i.e&ai rty ^vx'hv U, rfy om. etiam Philop. (1 otfrd UW, 
etiam Them. Philop. 

20 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 

r\ KOL0* avro Kaff erepov Se \eyofjiev, ocra Kivelrai r< ev 5 

eu'at, diov 7rXcoT77pe9' ov yap opoicos Kivovvrai ra> 
* ro IJLGV yap xad* avro /ctz/eirat, oi Se TO> ez' KLVOV- 
elvat,. SrjXov S* eVt r<av fjiopi&v ot/ceta ^ev yap ecrrt 
cw /3aStGrt9, aur^ Se /cat dv0pd)7ra)v ov*% virap- 
Se Tot9 TrX&rrjpcrL rare) Stcrcra>9 6 Xeyo/xo^ov rov KLVZI- 10 
t, wz^ 7Tta"/co7roCjU^ TT/>I TTJS ^v^rj^ et /ca^* avrrfv /a- 
KOLL />cre)(et KLvtfcreo)?. T(ro*dpa)v Se Kwrjcrz&v ovcr<2v, 

ctz^ ^ 7rXetou9 ^ Tracras. et Se KwelrctL fjwi Kara crvp- 
o9 3 <j>vcri OLV vrrdpyjoi Kivvjcris avrrj* ei Se rouro, /cat 15 

Tracrat ya/> ac \c^6eia-ai Kwrjcreis h> TOTTW. et S* 
ecrrlv r) ovcrta r^9 ^X^ T xweiv zavrrfv, ov Kara cru/AjSe- 
avrf) TO Kiveicrdai vTrdp&i, tuorTrep r Xev/ca> ^ 
Kivsirai yap /cat ravra, aXXa /cara a-v/^ySe^- 
&> yap vrrdpyovcrw, GKZIVO Kwelrai, ro cr<5jaa. Sto /cal 20 
ecrrt TOTTO^ awrcuv" r^9 Se 

4 vijcreo)*; jaere^et, ert S' et 

0ei7]' K&V et y8ta 9 /cat (jWtret, roz/ avrov Se rpoirov e^ct /cat 
l ^pe/^tas* ets o yap /ctvetrat <^u<ret, /cat ^pejaet e^ rovra> 

oto>$ Se /cat et9 & /cwetrat ^St^t,, >cat ^pe^et eV roiJ- 25 
ra> y8t^. Trotat Se yStatot r^9 ^v^7j9 /ctV97cret9 ecrovrat /cat 

5 ^pe/x/tat, ovSe 7rXarretz> /3ovXo/xeVot9 paSto^ aTroSovJfat. ert S* 
et /x,ev avoj /ctv^crerat, Trvp ecrrat, et Se Karo), yf}* rovro>v 
yap rv <y&ndro)v at /ctv7jcret9 avrat, 6 S* avro9 Xoyo9 /cat 

6 Trept Ta>j> ^era^v. ert S* e-Tret <atverat /ctz/ovcra TO craJ/xa, 30 
ravra9 evXoyo^ Kiveiv ra9 /ctv^cr6t9 a9 /cat aw-y) /ctvetrat. 

et Se roSro, /cat avrtcrrpe^acrt^ etTT'eti/ aX>?#e9 ort ^v TO 

to. &cr<rs solus K Philop. JJichl Roclier, reliqui et scripti et impressi 5txw? ctiarti corr. 
re. E (Kr.) |[ 5^] oiV U, Them, in interpr., 597 coni. Susemihl, Jen. Lit. 1877, p. 707, 3e^ 
eliam Philop. || 12. aZ <oi5fc e>, vel /cal <oi)/c i *a0* ^rpo'> c<mi. Susemihl, /ceti 
<0tf<rtfi> Steinlmrt || 13. ^a-ws om, pr. K, lejf. tjtinm Them. Philop., Diitcnlirtjrcr, 
Gott. gelehrte Anzeigen 1863 p- i^x ex verbo <j*0tcrc<a$ in pr. E omisso suspicatur primum 
tres tantum motus species hoc loco nominatas esse: of. Soph. 17, 11 r/u$? 5^ outrwv 
Kivfawv QvetK&v || xB. farbpt-ti, praeter ceteros cotld* eliam K, sett in ra*. (Sttipf.), 
leg, et Soph. || r$ rpwfyxpi T U VW Bck. TremU TorsU, r(? om. etiam Philop* lot, 8 
(ad ici, ii v* Haydttcki adn. crit.) Soph. |J ao. virgulani post /cwetrat am. Ik k k. Trend*, 
addidit Torst. || ^3. eZ om. pr. K (Trend. Bus.) || xal #i>cr6tj /card ^<r<^ pr, K, verlwi /ca*' 
eZ ^9/a, /cal <j>titrei Trendelenburgio suspecta viclentur, leg. etiatn Philop. Simpl. Soph, j| 

CH. 3 406 a 5 406 a 32 21 

through something else, or directly, of and through itself. We 
say things are moved through something else when they are in 
something else that is moved : as, for instance, sailors on board 
a ship : for they do not move in the same sense as the ship, for 
the ship moves of itself, they because they are in something else 
which is moved. This is evident if we consider the members of 
the body : for the motion proper to the feet and so to men also 
is walking, but it is not attributable to our sailors in the case 
supposed. There being thus two senses in which the term "to be 
moved" is used, we are now enquiring" whether it is of 

Is the soul ' * 

moved and through itself that the soul is moved and partakes 

Perse? *> ^ 

of motion. 

Of motion there are four species, change of place or loco- 3 
motion, change of quality or alteration, diminution and augmenta- 
species of tion. It is, then, with one or more or all of these 
motion. species that the soul will move. If it is not indirectly 
or per acddens that it moves, motion will be a natural attribute of 
soul ; and, if this be so, it will also have position in space, since 
all the aforesaid species of motion are in space. But, if it be the 
essential nature of soul to move itself, motion will not be an 
accidental attribute of soul, as it is of whiteness or the length of 
three cubits ; for these are also moved, but per accidens, viz. by the 
motion of the body to which these attributes belong. This, too, is 
why these attributes have no place belonging to them; but the soul 
will have a place, if indeed motion is its natural attribute. 

Further, if it moves naturally, then it will also move under 4 
The theory constraint ; and, if under constraint, then also naturally. 
involves So likewise with rest. For, as it remains at rest naturally 

absurd , 

conse- in any state into which it moves naturally, so similarly 

quences. .^ rema j ns ^ rest ^y constraint in any state into which 
it moves by constraint But what is meant by constrained motions 
or states of rest of the soul it is not easy to explain, even though 
we give free play to fancy. Again, if its motion tends upward, 5 
it will be fire ; if downward, earth ; these being the motions proper 
to these natural bodies. And the same argument applies to 
directions of motion which are intermediate. 

Again, since it appears that the soul sets the body in motion, 6 
it may reasonably be supposed to impart to it the motions which 
it has itself: and, if so, then conversely it is true -to say that the 
motion which the soul has itself is the motion which the body 

E!, superscr. By E 3 (Stapf.). (| 30. &remi 5* tl corr. E || 31. eti\oyov 
ST VWXy, raiVas etfX. etiam Soph. 

22 DE ANIMA I CH. 3 

jua /az>etrat, Tavryv /cat avrtf. TO Se craJ/xa Kivelrai <j6opa'46b 
atcrre /cat 17 ^X^? [/>tra/?aXXot a^ /cara ro cr<3/>ta] T) 0X77 ^ 
/cara //,dpta /ze^tor 'apevr}. el Be TQVT a/Several, KOI ee\Qov- 
crav elcnevai TraXiv ev^e^oir av rovro) S* eVotr' av ro az/t- 
7 CTTaordai ra redve)Ta rS>v ^aicov. rr]i/ 8e /cara crv/x/^e^KO? 5 

KOLV v<fi erepov KWOITO- tbordeir) yap ai> /Sta ro 

sCv^rsv-P \et>e ^ ^/) > ^ '' ^/)* 

ov 0t oe a> ro i;<p eavrov /CLvetcrc/ai ^ ry OVCTLOC, rove/ 
aXXov KwelarOai, 77X7)^ i /JCT) fcara crv/ji/3/3r)KQ<$, to 
ro /ca^' avro aya^o^ ^ St* avrd, ro ftev S&' aXXo elvat, ro 
8* ere/oov evettev. rfy 8e \IJV)(Y)V /mXicrra (jtatTy rt? a^ VTTO r>v 10 

8 aicrdyToiv KivelcrQ&i, elrrep Kwe'irai. cxXXa />t7)v /cat et 
ye cLvrr) avrrfv, KOI avrr) KWQUT av, cScrr* el iracra 
CKcrracrts ecrrt rov Kivov^evov $ Kivelrai, /cal rj $v)(r) 

av eK rrjs ovcrta? avr^5, et /XT) /cara crvfJLfteftrjKOs eavrij^ /cti/t, 

9 aXX' IcrrtJ' 07 /ctv^crt? r^s overtax avr^g /ca^* avr^V. ei^cot Se /cat 15 
Kwelv <jf>acrt TT}*/ -fyvfflv ro cr&fjLa iv & ecrrtr, c&5 avr?) 

rov AatSaXov Kivov^evr)v 
ey^eWr' oipyvpov ^yrov* 6/101009 

/cat A77/xoKptro$ Xey^t /az/ov/JteVas yap ^crt ra.9 dStatperovs 
<r<^atpas, Sta ro 7T<v/ceVat jLt^ScVore /xeVetv, o"v 
10 feat Kivelv ro orS>p<a irav. r//xts 5* epc^r^aro^ev ei /cat 

Troiel ravra ravra. 7r<s Se TrotTyorct, ^aXcTro^ 17 /cat 
8* ovj( ovra> <j>aiverai, Kivelv y ^v)(fj 
ro ^<5ov, dXXa 8ti irpocupecretos rtvos /cat ^077(766)9. 25 

roy avrov 8e rpoirov /cat 6 Ttjaato9 ^vcrtoXoyet r>)^ ^X^ 
Kweiv ro <r5/xa' r<^> yap /cwetcr#at avryv /cat ro cr</xa Kwelv 
Sta ro crv/x7T7rXe)(^at 777)09 avrd. crwear^/cvtav yap /c rSy o*rot- 

406 b, . /farA r& tf-cJ/.ta omnes cocld*, ctinm Soph, et, ut vi<lctur t SimpL 37, 3. 4 
et vet. transl., ar& T^TTO^ coni. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 424, jutfra^<\Xot,,*<ruijua unc. 
inchisi, cf, Them. 16, 16 sq.; in vcrba genuina smnt, fort, legendum ^i'X^- /*Ta)3<iXXot 
<8'> &v /cr^ || 3. frWxoiro STVW, e/ 5^ roOro, frdtyotr* &t> al y Bon, I. L, 
^^erat etiam Soph, et vet. transl. II 4. ^S^otr 1 & om, SWXy Hon., leg. etiam 
Soph* et vet, transl. |] roiVy.,.5. ^^^ a nianu Christian i lectoris innerta esae suspicatur 
Trend., cui adversatur Bon. || 8* ^ om. K SimpU, leg. Plulop, || <). 5t' oi/r6 6v Ci>ni 
Christ || 12, yt om. STVW Alex, dr. rat M<r. 4 6 t 24 Soph. || ^ai/r^ STU VWy 
et corr. 3 $oph. || et] M Alex. 46, *5 || 13. ^t<rra/7 T, Ararat (omisso A*') S \V X> 
tgforaro y, ^f<rratro &^ Alex. 46, 26 || 14. o)<rias atir^ /ca^* aM''* setl f^ 1 aton}" cxpunct. 
E, atJr^y receperunt Bichl Ro<Uer, a^y hoc loco videntur Them. r8, n et 
Soph, r8, 36, omittunt ceteri, etiam SiinpL Philop. || r*>- /ca^' aM)v unc. incl. Towt., 

CH. 3 406 b i 406 b 28 23 

has. Now the motion of the body is motion in space : therefore 
the motion of the soul is also motion in space, whether the whole 
soul so move, or only the parts, the whole remaining at rest. But, 
if this is admissible, the soul might also conceivably quit the body 
and re-enter; and this would Involve the consequence that dead 
animals may rise again. 

To return now to motion per accidens^ soul might certainly 7 
thus be moved by something external as well : for the animal 
might be thrust by force. But a thing which has self-motion as 
part of its essential nature cannot be moved from without except 
incidentally ; any more than that which is good in itself can be 
means to an end, or that which is good for its own sake can be so 
for the sake of something else. But, supposing the soul to be 
moved at all, one would say that sensible things would be the 
most likely to move it. 

Again, even if soul does move itself, this is equivalent to saying 8 
that it is moved ; and, all motion being defined as displacement 
of the thing moved qua moved, it will follow that the soul will 
be displaced from its own essential nature, if it be true that its 
self-movement is not an accident, but that motion belongs to the 
essence of soul in and of itself. Some say that the soul in fact 9 
Democri- moves the body, in which it is, in the same way in which 
tus * it moves itself. So, for example, Democritus ; and herein 

he resembled Philippus, the comic poet, who tells us that Daedalus 
endowed the wooden Aphrodite with motion, simply by pouring 
in quicksilver : this is very similar to what Democritus says. For 
according to him the spherical atoms, which from their nature can 
never remain still, being moved, tend to draw the whole body 
after them and thus set it in motion. But do these same atoms, 10 
we shall ask in our turn, produce rest, as well as motion? How 
this should be, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say. And, 
speaking generally, it is not in this way that the soul 
motion is would seem to move the animal, but by means of purpose 

purposive, _ - , , - . . 

of some sort, that is, thought. 

In the same way the Platonic Timaeus explains on physical n 
The grounds that the soul sets the body in motion, for by its 

'Tunaeus.' own motion it sets the body also in motion, because it 
is closely interwoven with it. For when it had been made out of 

tuetur haec praeter omnes codd. Alex. 47, i. || 19. 5$ om. Wy || ai. post <r$alpas virg. 
posuit Diels, post t*rw virg. om. Biehl Rodier || 22. *ai] re KO.I TVy H ^pwr^crwyuev 
STUVW || tperftreut STUV W, fyeiu&v X, jptfupf etiana Soph. || 23. irotet rovr 
*tr6 ST U WX, TOUTO Trote? irore V, iroLe? rovro ai5r& y et E, sed in rasura, videtur sub- 
fuisse raOrct ratfrd (Belc. Trend.), roOro iro<,el aM Soph. 18, 31. 

24 DE AN IMA I CH. 3 

ytivv /cat /ze/Aeptcr/xeV/p Kara rovs ap/xoz't/cov? dpt#/x,ov9, OTTCU 

atcr&jcrtv re o"up,<j)VTOV apfMovias I^TJ /cat TO Traz/ t^epTjrat 3 

orv[JL<l>a>vov<s <j&opct9, TT)V evdv&piav et9 K.VK\OV 

/cat SteXfciz/ efc roG 1^09 KVK^OVS $vo Sto-cra^?? 

7raXtz> roz' eVa StetXez/ 69 eTrra Ku/cXov9, a>9 ovcra? ra? rov 47 a 

12 oupaj'oS <jiopa9 ras TT^S ^f^9 /aifTjcrets. TrpaJroz/ jueV o3z> oi5 /ca- 
Xa>9 TO Xeyetv TT)V ifjv^rjT/ jite'ye#O9 et^af TT)^ yap roS ?raz/- 
TOS S^Xoi' ort TOtavTT^v eTi/at /3ou\TaL oto^ TTOT* ecrTL^ 6 /caXou- 
/jivog voi)9* ov yap ST) otov y* 07 aicr6r)TLKT], ovS* olov V) eTTt^u- 5 

13 /xTyri/c^' TOT/TCOZ/ yap 17 KivrjcrLS ov KVK\o<f>opCa' o oe voGs 69 
/cat <rvi/-)(r]s cocTTrep /cat 17 vorjons- rj 8e ^0770*69 TO, 

ravra e T 779 z/, a>9 o apt/>c,09, a ov^( <s TO 

yap 8^ /cat z/o^cret fcy- 10 
^os <w; irorepov orcpovv ju-opta) T<3^ avrov ; /Aoptw 8* T^TOI 

14 /xey#o9 ^ fcaTci crTty/ji^, t Set /cat TOVTO jotopto^ et7reu>. 
/xev ovz/ /caTa orrtyju/)^, a^Tat 8* avretpot, S^Xov a>9 
Stefetcrtv et 8e /caTa /Lye^09, 7roXXa/ct9 ^ 

crt TO auro. <^>atvTat Se /cat aTra^ ev^^o^evov. et 8* t/ca- ^5 
or&ovv rS>v /xopt6>z/, Tt Set /cu/cX<j) KiveicrOoLi $} /cat 
et S' d^ay/caTov vo^crat TO> oX<w /cv/cXo> 
, Tt9 ecrTtv 07 T0t9 fioptot9 #tts ; ert Se 7r<39 VOTJ<T^I TO 
d/xepet 77 TO ct)Ltepe9 )aeptcrT<jI ; dz/ay/catoz/ Se TOI> 

5* >/\ ^ <s \ \ / / / 

eti^at TO^ KVKKQV rovrov vov ^tv yap Kwrjcns vorjcris, KV- 20 

15 /cXov Se rrepi^opd m et ovz/ 17 vo77crt9 Trept^opa, /cat vov9 &^ et?; 

30. TC] rc Kai T U, AcctZ om. ctinm Them. Philop. || dp^uovfa^ T U W Soph*, 
etiam Them. Pbilop. in interpr., v Hayducki ap. cril. 22, 27 || 32. / f ^Xoi? 6o ex imo 
1C rcccpit T<; reliqui ante Torst. onines 5t''o K<taXoi>! t Soph. i<> 23 <f roil V6y KtitsXov Mo \\ 
407 a, 5. 7* om. W y, log. etiam SimpL in prooemio acl lib. I, p. 4, r et Soph, il 6, ante 
6 W transpoucndum ttj. d^a7/ca?o>'.,.a2. ^crw ccnsct Susemihl, Oecon. p. 84 i! rciJTwv... 
KVK\o<t>opla, unc. inch Knsen, p, 18 || 7. Kai ewexfy unc. incl. Kssen || 8. 6 dpt^s pr K 
(Trend.) et U Simpl. Philop. (e<l princcps) Torst., reliqui ante Tornt- omncH onu arti- 
culum, etiam Philop. (Ilaytluck cum codtl.) || <> ot)5^ ^oD? U W, otf& delcre vult A. 
Martin, Revue Critique, 1902, p* 427 || oflrw liiehlio suspectum videlur, dclcmlum ccnset 
A. Martin, legit etiam Simpl. Soph. 20, 37 || vwexfa wnc. incl. Kss^n || 11. wv; ir6repov 
6r<^oOv jjapttp recepit Biehl ex solo pr. 1C (cf. Suseniihl, Oecon. p. 84), efo 8r^oiJv r&v popluv 
(omiHSO Tr^repoy) rc. K et ceteri cotM. (praeterquam quod V iv 6r. praebet) Philop,, 
quam lectionem etiam Bek. recepit, &v irtrepov Ka06\ov % bryow r&v fjiop. seripsit Trend. , 
sic etiarn vet. transsU, fiv; irbrepoi' KaO' faov fay&v $ uryovv rw^ pop. posuit Tort- c3v; 
irbrepw mO? $\w ij tot brtfotiv r&> noplw Simpl. 42, 38, Soph* ax, 7 (coll. 21, 30? ai f 
ir. 23), unde <&vj -r6r*p<w /ca^ f $Kw 17 &rtpovv T&V poplar Kadier !i rwv om. V Soph. I! 
T, en5roO y Aid. Sylb* Kodier, etiam Philop, Simpl. Soph. || poptw $' <>iune 

CH. 3 406 b 29 407 a 21 25 

the elements and divided in harmonical ratios in order that it 
might have a native perception of proportion and that the universe 
might move in harmonic revolutions, he, the creator, proceeded to 
bend the straight line into a circle; and then to split the one circle 
into two, intersecting at two points ; and one of the two circles he 
split into seven, the revolutions of heaven being regarded as the 
motions of the soul. In the first place, it is not right to call 12 
criticism the soul a magnitude. For by the soul of the universe 
m detail. Timaeus clearly intends something of the same sort as 
what is known as mind : he can hardly mean that it is like the 
sensitive or appetitive soul, whose movements are not circular. 
But the thinking mind is one and continuous in the same sense 13 
as the process of thinking. Now thinking consists of thoughts. 
But the unity of these thoughts is a unity of succession, the unity 
of a number, and not the unity of a magnitude. This being so, 
neither is mind continuous in this latter sense, but either it is 
without parts or else it is continuous in a different sense from an 
extended magnitude. For how can it possibly think if it be 
a magnitude ? Will it think with some one or other of its parts : 
such parts being taken either in the sense of magnitudes or in the 
sense of points, if a point can be called a part ? If it be with 14 
parts in the sense of points, and there is an- infinity of these, 
clearly mind will never reach the end of them ; while, if they be 
taken in the sense of magnitudes, mind will have the same thoughts 
times without end. But experience shows that we can think a 
thought once and no more. Again, if it be enough for the soul 
to apprehend with one or other of its parts, what need is there for 
it to be moving in a circle or to have magnitude at all ? But, if 
it is necessary to thought that the mind should bring the whole 
circle into contact, what does the contact of the several parts 
mean ? Again, how will it think that which is divisible by means 
of that which is without parts, or that which is without parts 
by means of that which is divisible? It must be mind which 
is meant by the circle in question. For when mind moves it 
thinks ; when a circle moves it revolves. If, then, thought 15 
is a revolution, the circle which has such a revolution must 

libri scripti et impress!, etiam Philop. (sed v. 1. popl?) Soph., poptv 5' e Susemihlii et 
sua coniectura Biehl, etiam Rodier H scripsisse Arist. v. 11. (&; irdrepov broody r&v 
ai^roO -c /AG^OW > ; poplojv 8' suspicor || 15. $aJivtTv,i,...&$exbiMvov a philosopho Platomco 
mterpolatum existimat Christ, non legisse videtur Philop., legunt etiam Them. Simpl. 
Soph. || ft B 9 coni, Suscmihl || 16. *ai om. S V W, leg. etiam Them. || 19. j TO E (Trend.) 
et y Phiiop. Soph. vet. transl. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes KO.I TO \\ dmyKotov] v. ad 
407 a, 6. 

26 DE AN1MA I en. 3 

o KVK\O<$, ov f) roiavrr) 7rept<opd [vorfcris]. det Se 817 Tt 1^007- 
o*6f Set ydp, etTrep di'8tO9 17 iTpL(j>opd t T&v fj&v yap Trpa- 
etois ort rrepara (rracrai yap erepou ^apiv)^ al oe 
l rots Xdyot9 6jicot<w9 6ptoz/Tat- Xoyo9 Se 7ra9 opt- 25 
07x09 ri d7roSett9 at /jte/ o3z> a7roSetet9 /cat CXTT' dpx??9, /cat 
fyovo-i TTOJS reXos TOZ/ orvXXoytcrjuov ^ TO crv/jCTrepacr/^a et 
JU,T) Treparov^Tat, aXX 5 ov/c avaKdpirrovcri ye TraXti/ err dp^T^v, 
7TpocrXajLLjSavovo"at 8' del jaeVov /cat a/cpov evOviropovcrw r) 8e 
7Tpt<opa TTctXti/ ITT' OLpXW dva/cd/X7TTt. ot S' optcr/AOt TTCXV- 30 

16 T5 7T7TpaO'/XVOt. Tt t 17 aVT>) 7Tpt<j6opa 

17 cret 7ToXXd/ct9 ^oet^ TO avTo. ert 8' 17 vo77crt9 

Ttj/t /cat 7rto"Tacr6t p,a\\ov r) /ct^Tjcret* TOZ/ avTO^ Se rpoirov 

18 /cat 6 crvXXoyto"/>co9. dXXa ^.T)V ovSe yita/captd^ ye TO />f>) pa- 
Stot' dXXa yStato^. t 8' ecrrlv 07 tciy/jcns avrrjs psr} ovo^ta, Tra- 407 b 

19 pa <j&ucrtz/ az/ /cti/otTo. ITTLTTOVOV Se /cat TO 



20 T Xeyeo^^at /cat 7roXXot9 O"vvSo/cet. 01877X09 Se /cat TOX) 5 
/cv/cXa) <f>4pe&6ai TOV ovpavov 07 atTta- owe yap 7*779 

ovcria atria rov Kv/cXa> ^cpea-^at, dXXa /caTa crv 
ovro) /ctvetTat, owe TO crS>p,a atTtov, dXX" 77 ^vj(>J 

21 e/c6tV<j>. dXXa /XT)*/ o8' oTt ^SeXTtov Xeyerat * /cai/rot y* 

StCt TOVTQ TOZ/ ^O^ /CV/cXa) 7TOtt^ <j>pCT0aL Tr)V ^V^^, OTt IO 

O KwztcrQai rov /*eVeu>, Kivticrdat, 8* ovT6>9 ^ aXXa>9. 
i' 97 roiavrrj cr/cet//t9 kr&fM&v \6ytov ot/ceto- 

22 Tpa, ravTfjv fjiev a<f))iJLtv TO w^. 6/Ctz/o 8^ aroTTOv 

/cat TOVT<J> T< ya> /cat TOt9 
' crvvdirrovcn yap /cat 
Sid Tt 

. /catTOt Sd^etcv iv TOVT* dvay/catov elvat* 8td yap TT) 

(rty tmc. incl. Torst., sine uncis Bichl Rcxtier, non Icgisse vidctur Suph- 
43, 17, virgulam ante vfyeris posuit Kodier || 5^ n voij<rf Soph, Bek. Trend., $7 r 
vo^crtft; Simpl. Torst. Bichl Kodier II 23. 7V *"07rtArw*' ^ irpaxr, SUWX, irot^n/tft5i 
^ non legisse videntur Them. Philop. (v. tamn Hayducki app. crit. awl 133, 8) Simpl. II 
35. ir8f 1? Uy || ^6. at 5* tirodd&is STUV WX Bek. Trend., a2 /t^ o^ djro^^<t y 
et, ut videtur, Soph. a$ -27, Toret., ^ /^v ov^ dr65etfty K, sed su|xsrKor. cti ct *t KJJ 
(Stapf.) Biehl Rodier || 27. fyovtra K Bichl Rodier, reliqui ct .script! et impreKsi l^om j| 
29. irpoffava,\at*p&vw<rat K, fted ava expunct. (Stapf*) Torst., T/w^faraXaft&U'owrcu y, 
reliqui irpocrXa^jSctvowo-at, etiam Philop. Soph, jj 30. ot 0* 6/>. coni. Christ 11 407 U i. A^ 
corrupta putat et coni. J otf<rfo Torst*, ^ oiJtr/a <ycai> 7 vel <&:<rra<w ^> r^Jf oWat 

CH. 3 407 a 22 407 b 17 27 

be mind. But then it will go on thinking of something for ever, 
for this is required by the eternity of the revolution. To practical 
thinking there are limits, for it always implies an external end; 
while speculative thinking is determined in the same way as the 
logical explanations which express it Now every explanation 
consists either in definition or in demonstration. But demonstra- 
tions have a premiss for starting-point and reach a kind of goal 
in the inference or conclusion; while, even if they never reach 
a conclusion, at all events they do not revert to the starting-point, 
but with the aid of a succession of middle terms and extremes 
advance in a straight line. But circular movement returns to the 
point from which it started. Definitions, too, are all determinate. 
Besides, if the same revolution recurs again and again, the mind 16 
will be obliged to think the same thing again and again. Further, 17 
it is a sort of rest or coming to a halt, and not motion, which 
thinking resembles : and we may say the same of the syllogism. 
Nor, again, will that which does not move easily, but under con- 18 
straint, even realise happiness. If the motion of soul be not its 
essence, it will be an unnatural motion. And the entanglement of 19 
the mind in the body without the possibility of release is painful ; 
nay, it is to be avoided, if indeed it is really better for mind to 
Jt>e independent of body, a view commonly expressed and widely 
accepted. Also it is not clear why the heaven revolves in a circle ; 20 
seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of 
soul (that form of movement being indeed merely accidental to it), 
nor due to the body : on the contrary it is rather the soul which 
causes the motion of the body. Besides, we are not even told that 21 
it is better so: yet surely the reason why God made the soul 
revolve in a circle ought to have been that movement was better 
for it than rest, and this form of movement better than any other. 

But such an enquiry as this belongs more appropriately to 
a different subject : so let us dismiss it for the present. We may, 22 
however, note here another absurdity which is involved in this as 
in most other theories concerning the soul. They attach 

Relation , . 

between the soul to, and enclose it in, body, without further de- 
body**? termining why this happens and what is the condition 

y et some such explanation would 
seem to be required, as it is owing to their relationship that the 

vel M # ofoiv coni. Susemihl, ac sane quidem Them. 22, 35 non leg. negationem, leg. ^ 
Philop. Simpl. Soph, et vet. transl. |j 2. bv Kivotro E Simpl., ceteri codd. KWQVT to \\ 9. y' 
ora, E (Trend.) et Torst,, etiam Soph. 24, ai || 10. iroietv /cikXw S VWy Torst, K&K\V 
KQI.V etiam Soph, JI 14- r&virepl, sic omnes codd., etiam E (Trend.) et Them., TOIS vepl Soph. 

28 DE AN IMA I 018.3,4 

TO fJiv 77Ott TO 7rcr)(l, KOI / KLVGLTQLl TO 

Se Ktvt, TOVTOOV 8* ovOev VTrdpx^ L ^rpos aXX7?Xa TOLS Tv^oOcrtv. 
23 ot Se IJLOVOV 7TL^t/ooS<rt Xeyetz/ Trolov n 17 ^f X 7 ?' n"pt Se TOU 20 

croo/iaTos ovdev ert 7rpoa'Stoptovcrtz>, cocrTiep a/ 
Kara TOV? TlvOayopiKOvs /JLV()OV<S TT)Z> rv^pvcrav 
TO rv)(Qv ^Svor^a6 <7<3//,a- SoKt yap eKacrrov tStov e^eu' ct- 
8os /cat fjLop(f>ijp. TrapaTrXTjoaov Se \4yovcriv o3cr7ryo et TIS 

t5 avXovs i^Svor^ai' Sec yap TT)I/ /xey 25 
TOI? opyavot?, TTJV Se ^v^rjv T< creo/xaTu 
Kat aXX7j 8e TI? Sd^a TrapaSeSoTat vrepl ^^9, TTI- 
ev TroXXoi? ovSejitcas TJTTOV TO)!/ Xeyojaevct)^, [Xoyou9 8*] 
ev^was <8e> SeSw/cvta icac TOCS ^ /cotz/<3 yivo^evoi^ Xo- 
?. appoviav yap TWO, avrrfv Xeyovcrt* /cat ya/> T-))Z/ dp- 30 
Kpacriv Kal crvvOzcrw zvcwritov elvat, /cat TO cr&p^a crvy- 

2 /cetcr^at ^ eVavTtoov. /catTOt ye 17 )u*ev appovlo. Xoyos Tts eo*Tt 
TOV ^v^Qlvr^v 7) crw^ecrt?, T^V Se ^wxyv ovSeVcpo^ otoz/ r* 

3 etvat TOVTO>X>. ert 8e TO /ctvetv ov/c etrTcz/ apfjiovtas, $vx$ ^ 
47ravTS <x7rovjLtouo"t ToGro jitaXtcr^ a>9 etTretv. app,6ei Se /LtaX- 408 a 

Xov /ca^* vyieta? Xeyeti/ appoviav, /cat oXct>s TO>V <rca/x,aT6- 
aper&v, TJ Kara ^v^9- <f>avpa>TaTOv 8" 6t Tt9 aT 

7rtpa$tT7 Ta TrdOrj /cat Ta epya TTJ^ ^ 
5 vta Ttvt * x a ^ /7r ^ T^P IcJMtpiAofetiV, ert 8* t Xeyofte^ r^ 5 

^ T0t9 Revere K'WV\<TW /cat Qicriv rr)v 
ovTOt) crwapfjLolsWcrw to&re p^^ev crvyy*>9 

c /cat TOP Tc5*> /^e/^ty/xeV<y^ Xd 
, 07 8e crwdzcns r>v TOV cr6jjitaT09 ftepoS^ Xtay 

1 8. ?rott r* r& STVWK |[ ^4* /cai] orw/^a /cat c .solo K scripsit Hichl, ccttiri script! ct 
impression!, <r<Djua, etiam Simpl. Philop. 139, 26sqq, || 5^/ SX, 8?J n T V VV t Them. '/ 
27. de loco 27. ,,408 a, 39. cf. Bon., Hermes VII, p. 428 qq. jj 28. iroXXot* /eoi o^/way 
TW pr. y Soph. || ^rrw^ TV WXy et corr. vS Soph* v. 1. (>?rr<w c corld. Haytluck, 
^5 5)i fl"*0aH? /iy oddc^eas ijo'o'o^ Them. |j Xdvots V X^yoc. coni. Torst., X^yov ^' $ffvt,p 
/caiconi. Bergk, Hermes XVIII, 518, X^oy ^ urai ^erTrep SuHemihl, X&yow 5 T omittendum 
censct Bernays, die Dialogc dcs Arist. p. 15, cui assentiuntur Haecker (Xcitschr. f, (lym* 
1864, p. ao4) et Bonitz (Hermes VII, p. 429), unc. inclusit X^ow log, Miilop. Suph* Y non 
Icgisse vidctur Them* || 29. <54> e Berntiysii conieclura scrips! (| ywonfrut \6yoti\ nic 
etiam SimpL, X70^oti Xdyo W Philop. in inturpr. 145, 22, Xeyoptvou S Ij ,^0. uiJr^ 
rwes V Wy, rtvet etiam Them, et Pliilop. 141, 31 legisse vklentur |! 33. ye om. K Soph. 
Torst. II 408 a, r. Airo^/AOUirt*' ^Tavrw roOro STV Wy foravre* dv. r X t irdvrtt ctinm 
Soph 1! 3. 0ave/>wrtrw^ E, ^avept^rarov corr. Kj (Stapf.) |j <;, Myofjw* pr, K (Trend.) 

CHS. 3, 4 407 b 18 408 a 10 29 

one acts, the other is acted upon, that the one is moved, and 
the other causes it to move; and between two things taken at 
random no such mutual relations exist. The supporters of such 23 
theories merely undertake to explain the nature of the soul. Of 
the body which is to receive it they have nothing more to say : 
just as if it were possible for any soul taken at random, according 
to the Pythagorean stories, to pass into any body. This is absurd, 
for each body appears to have a distinctive form or shape of its 
own. It is just like talking of a transmigration of carpentry 
into flutes : for the craft must employ the right tools and the soul 
the right body. 

There is yet another opinion concerning soul which has come 4 
down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any 
that is put forward, although it has been severely criticised even 
in the popular discussions of the present day. The soul 

The theory . i , i . , r , /. , 

of har- is' asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is 

mony ' on this view a blending or combining of opposites, 

and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this 2 
harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components 
or else the combining of them ; and the soul cannot possibly be 
either of these. Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of 3 
a harmony : yet this function more than any other is all but 
universally assigned to soul. Again, it is more in harmony with 4 
the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence 
generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to 
assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions 
of the soul : it is difficult to harmonise them. 

Further, if we use the word harmony with a twofold appli- 5 
cation ; first, and in its most natural sense, of those magnitudes 
T which have motion and position, to denote the combining 

meanings o f them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted 
term har- together that they do not admit between them anything 
mony " of the same kind; and then in a secondary sense to denote 

the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture: in 
neither sense is it reasonable to call soul a harmony. The view which 
regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly 

S T VX et, ut videtur, Soph. 25, 34, Torst- Bon., stud. Arist. II, III. p. 61, in 
Madvig 47 r, reliqui ante Torst. omnes \4yotjju-y || 8. ffwyevfoOai E, wtev p% <rvyyevts 
coni. Steinhart, fjajd^v </^re trvyyevis ^re /^> irvyyevls coni. Susemihl, Burs. 
Jahrb. XVII, 261, vulgat. leg. interpretes, etiam Alex. De an. 25, 10 || 9. post \6yov 
punctum Bek., colon Torst., virgulam Trend. 

3 o DE AN IMA I CH, 4 

racrro9. TroXXat re yap ai <rvv6l<Ti$ r&v juepcSv /cat TroXXa- 
X<S9' rlvos ovv ^ Trcti? i/TToXa/Setv roz> z>ow ^p?) crvvdecnv etmt, 

6 ^ /cat TO alcrOyriicov r/ ope/crt/cov ; 6jnota>9 8e aroirov /cat <ro> rov 
Xdyov r7)9 jU,t^<i)9 et^at r?)^ \fjv)(Trjv ov yap TOT/ avrov e>(et 
Xdyov 17 /xe^i? r<3i> o~rot^(eta>j> /ca$* TjV crapf /cat /ca$' ^i/ ocrroOv r S 
<Tv/x/37jcrerat oS^ TroXXa? re \fjv^a<5 eyjEw /cat /cara -?rav ro 
cr<3ju,a, t7T6/> irdvTQL pev e/c r<Sz/ (Troiyeitov ^^ly^evo^v, 6 Se 

7 T>]S jaet^6>9 Xdyos appovia Kal ^v^* dirairrj(ri S* az^ rts 
rovrd ye /cat Trap' 'E/xTreSo/cXe'ovs* e/cacrrov yap avr<3i/ Xoy<j) 

i <j>r)crw eTvat- irorepov ovv 6 Xoyos eart^ 17 ^^17, ^ /taX- 20 

ere/oov rt oScra eyytverat rot? jueXeort^ ; ert Se Trorepov TJ 
<j>i\ia r^5 rv^ovor^g atrta jaet^ea)? ?} rTj? Kara roi/ Xdyov ; /cat 
avr77 Trorepov 6 Xoyo? ecrrti/ ^ Trapa rov Xoyoz/ erepov rt ; 

8 ravra /xev o3v e)(et rotavra? ctTroptas. t S* eVrtv erepov TJ 
\j/ir)(r) rijs jLtet^a>9, rt 817 vrore a/x,a r^J crap/ct etz/at a^at- 25 
petrat Kal raJ rotg aXXots /xoptots rov <j5ov ; ?rpo9 Se rovrots et?rp 
/x,^ e/cacrrov rv /ioptcov V'^X^ ^X t> e ^ ^ ^ crriz/ ^ V^ 1 ^ 1 '? ^ Xdyo9 

rt ecrrtv o 


9 cure fcv/cX<> Trept^epecr^at, STjXov r<Sv etp^jLteVtov. /cara 

o*v^eyST7/co9 Kivzicrdai, Kaddirep t7roftv, ecrrt /cat /a- 

^etv eavrifv, otov /avetcr#at /xz^ eV ^ ecrrt 7 rovro 

UTTO r?j9 V^X^s* otXXa>9 8' ov^ olov r tavzLcrOat. Kara 

10 avr^V. evXoyciJrepov 8* a7rop7jcrtv av rt9 7T6pt 

t9 ra rotaCra a7ro^8Xt/fa9* <a/-tev yap 
XvTretcr^at ^atpetf, Oappziv fyofteiorOai* ert Se opyt- 
C r /cat atcr#cu>ecr#at /cat 8tavot<rl9af ravra 8e Trait/- 
ra KtV7j<rt9 eTvat 8o/covo - tv. o^ev ot^^ctTj rt9 &v avr^i/ /ctvetcr^at' 
ro 8* ov/c Icrrtz/ avay/catov* t yap /cat on yxaXtcrra ro XvTret- 5 

rr. al am, TV || /Atfpwj'] TroXXwv nunc K, subfuissc videtur /tep^ (Stapf.) ii n, x/*^ 
rii' voOv S T V Wy || 13. ai r X^o^ V X, quod probat Bon., stmt Arist. J. p. 97, a<ln. 
i, /cat r& TOV X670^ Soph., (lucnlin textum rcccperunt Biehl Kodier, malunt etiam Torst, 
et Bon v stud. Arist. II, lit. p- (Jr, reliqui /cai rd^ X^ov || 15. post ttrrotiv punctum vu!g* t 
colon posuit I)ids || 18. d7rat7T)<me.,,28. droXetTro^^s in parenth, Tornt. || 19. a^rOi' ^ 
X67V ^y Soph. II 7i- ptpeffw pr. KW t*t, ut vidctur, y Torst* Biehl Hwlier T pfaccru' re. 
ESTUVBck. Trend. Uicls, p. 175, fuxfalffw X Philop. 150, n Soph. JJ 26. r6Tet in 
interpr, PhUop. Simpl, Chaiget t Knsai sur la psych. <VAr* p. -246, adn. a, SuKcmihl, <mu 
S V W, r$ in interpr* etiam Them* Soph, (i 27* /x^ prius dclcndum essc cnsot C'huiguct, 
at Simplicium vulgat. non lejjiKse t?x interim 56, iH <jq. parum constaL t! aH. 
videntur corrupta, tuentur haec vrba praeter ouwes c<ld. Them. 

CH. 4 408 a ii 408 b 5 31 

open to criticism. For there are many combinings of the parts, 
and they combine in many ways. What part, then, is that whose 
combining with the rest we must assume to be the intellect, and 
in what way does it combine? Or again, what of the sensitive 
and appetitive faculties? But it is equally absurd to regard the soul 6 
as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are 
not mixed in the same proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it 
will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the 
body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements 
variously commingled and that the proportion determining the 
mixture is a harmony, that is, soul. This is a question we might 7 
Empe- as k Empedocles; who says that each of the parts is 
docies. determined by a certain proportion. Is the soul, then, 

this proportion, or is it rather developed in the frame as something 
distinct ? And, further, is it a mixture at random or a mixture in 
the right proportion which he ascribes to Love : and, if the latter, 
is Love the proportion itself or something other than the proportion 
and distinct from it? Such, then, are the difficulties involved in 
this view. On the other hand, if soul is something distinct from 8 
Difficulties ^e m i x ture, how comes it that it is destroyed simul- 
invoived taneously with the disappearance of the quiddity of the 
ing the flesh and of the other parts of the animal ? And, further, 
eory ' assuming that each of the separate parts has not a soul 
of its own, unless the soul be the proportion of their admixture, 
what is it that perishes when the soul quits the body? 

From what has been said it is clear that the soul cannot be 
Conciu- a harmony and cannot revolve in a circle. But inci- 9 
sion. dentally it can, as we have seen, move and set itself in 

motion : for instance, the body in which it is may move, and be 
set in motion by the soul : otherwise it cannot possibly move from 
place to place. The question whether the soul is moved would 10 

more naturally arise in view of such facts as the 
stated and following. The soul is said to feel pain and joy, con- 
answer e . fj c i ence anc j f ear? an< f[ again to be angry, to perceive and 
to think ; and all these states are held to be movements : which 
might lead one to infer that soul itself is moved. But this is no 11 
necessary inference. For suppose it ever so true that to feel pain 

Soph., egregie totum hunc locum explicavit Bon., Hermes VII, p. 435 |[ 6] f coni. Barco, 
assentitur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 84 |[ dTroXwroi^s T V X y Them., diroXeiTroifoT/s in paraphr. 
Simpl. Philop. 153, 4 Soph. v. 1. (dTroXtTrotfen/ff e codd. Hayduck 26, 37) || 408 "b, 3. re 
om- V II 5. cte hoc loco el y<3t/> rb 8fy vide Bon., stud. Arist, II, III. p. 22 sqq,, 
quern in textu restituendo secutus est Biehl, etiam, Rodier, nisi quod a verbis b, 9. 
$ parenth. incipere maluit Rodier. 



CH. 4 

etcrt /cat e/cacrroz/ /ct- 

O"0at T) ycLiptiv r/ Staz/oeicr#at 

velcr()aL TOVTCOV, TO Se KLVLcr()ai ZCTTIV VTTO rrjs \fjvx7)S> CHOI; TO 
opyi^ecrdai r/ <j>o/3eior0ai TO Tyv /capStaz/ a>St /ctz>icr#at, TO 
Se Staz'oetcr^at ^ TO TOVTO Zcrcx)$ rj erepov TL, TOVTM Se crvp,- 
f$aivi TO, fjiev Koura <j>opav TLV&V KLvovpevtov, TO, Se /caT* 10 
12 dXXota>cru> (nota Se /cat TTC^, erepos CCTTL Xdyos)* TO ST) Xe'~ 

TTJZ/ \pv^rjv opoiov /cav 
r/ ot/coSo^iU>" /3e\Tiov ya/ 
eXeetv ^ psavOdveiv r) SiavoticrQaiy dXXa 

5\\>c\ N / / e\c\>>>>/ t < 

aAX OTC jaez/ ^XP L eKtwys, OTC o a?r /ci 1/775, otoi' 77 
alcrdrjcri'S 0/770 Toi^Si, 17 S' wd^vrjcri^ air /cet^>j5 em Ta$ 

13 TO!? ato"6r)T'r)pLQi$ /ct^Tjcret? ^ ju,ova9. 6 Se ^01/9 eoixev lyyivzcr 
OVCTLCL Tt9 ovcra, /cat ov cf>0^ipcr0aL. /JLakicrTa yap <j>0iper 9 

V7TO T7^9 Z^ TO) yrfp<} a/AaVpCt>O - CJ9, Z^Gv S* tCTCt)9 

T<^ alcrdrjTripLtov o"v/jtySat^f et yayo \d/Boi o T 

TOtoz/St, ^SXcVot az/ aJcTTrep /cat 6 V X O9. o)<rT TO yrjpOi<$ ov 

TU TYJV ^V^TIV TI TTGTrovOevai, cxXX* eV cj, Aca^aTreyO eV /^- 

14 #ai9 /cat ^dcrot9- /cat TO voetz/ ST) /cat TO ^ecopetv lAapaiverat, 
aXXov Ttvo9 eo"6> <t>0Gcpo[jiVQv, atTO Se aTraOes GVTW. TO Se 8ta- 

/cat <^>tXtz/ i] ^crw OVK e<mv e/cet^ov Tra^, aXXaTOV- 
27 e/ctz/o e)(t Sto /cal TOVTOV <j>0ipo- 
OVT (j&tXet* ov yct/> ZKZIVQV fy, dXXa TOV 
, o d'TrdXcoXez/ 6 S 1/01)9 t<T6>9 ^etoT/ooz/Tt /cat iira&ls Icrrw. 

15 OT 




e/c TOUTCWV et 8* 0X0)9 ^ /ct^ctrat, 8-ijXo^ 0)9 ovS' 7;^* c 

aXoya>TaTO^ TO Xeyetv a 

16 TroXi; Se T<3v 

7. pro 8 coni. 5^, quotl probat Kssen, ct a vcrbis ro 5// aprxlosin incijwrc vult 
Suscmihl || 8. rd r^ /c, V Ban., reliqui ante Bon. omncs ry T^P ^* J| <), % rowOrov libri 
script! et ante Bichlium imprcHsi omne, efiam Philop., 17 r$ roOro conl. Tornt,, ^ r^ rot/ro 
coni* Hon., quod rcccpit Bichl || To\'rrw.. t ii. \tyos in pnrenth. Susemihl, Burs. Jahrh* IX, 
35 1 Rodier |j it i. TTO?<U K, litera < inserta quUlem se<l apcrte a prima mann (Trend.)ctiam 
I*liilop. || (7ro?a. , ,\6yos) in parcnth. Item. || rb tity ST IJon M qui ab his verbis apodostn 
incipit ad 5. e ^Ap, quod tain 1'hilop. disurtc fccerat 156, 10 scj[,, r5 3^ reliqui ante Bon. 
omncs, ctiam Philop. (j 15. 0^775 om. pr. K scd ab antiqua manu inscrtum (Trend.) |J 
i(5. F^xfM TVWX rhilop. || 18. 6 0...*<;* ^<rrt^ alieno loco inserta censet B. Hitter, 
Grundprinc. d. Arist. Seclenl. p. 29, ciu assent it ur Susemihl J| 19. o0<ro om, pr. E 
scd ab antiqua manu instrtum (Trend,), leg. ctiam Them. Philop, (exccpto Philop. 
cod. D) II ^20. vvvl d' <$<rmp STV WXy, uxFTrep ctiam Soph., vfr> 5^ 57r</>Them, -39, 26 j| 

CH. 4 408 b 6 408 b 33 33 

or joy and to think are movements, that to experience each of 
these is to be moved and that the movement is due to the soul : 
suppose that to be angry, for instance, or to be afraid means 
a particular movement of the heart, and that to think means 
a movement of this or of some other part, some of these move- 
ments being movements of locomotion, others of qualitative change 
(of what sort and how produced does not concern us here): yet, 12 
even then, to speak of the soul as feeling anger is as if one should 
say that the soul weaves or builds. Doubtless it would be better 
not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man 
does so with the soul : and this, too, not in the sense that the motion 
occurs in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches 
to, sometimes starts from, the soul. Thus, sensation originates in 
particular objects, while recollection, starting from the soul, is 
directed towards the movements or traces of movements in the 
intellect: sense-organs. But intellect would seem to be developed 13 
an^m- ve * n us as a self-existing substance and to be imperishable, 
perishable. For, if anything could destroy it, it would be the feeble- 
ness of age. But, as things are, no doubt what occurs is the same 
as in the case of the sense-organs. If an aged man could procure 
an eye of the right sort, he would see just as well as a young 
man. Hence old age must be due to an affection or state not 
of the soul as such, but of that in which the soul resides, just as is 
the case in intoxication and disease. In like manner, then, thought 14 
and the exercise of knowledge are enfeebled through the loss of 
something else within, but are in themselves impassive. But 
reasoning, love and hatred are not attributes of the thinking 
faculty but of its individual possessor, in so far as he possesses 
it. Hence when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory 
nor love: for these never did belong to the thinking faculty, 
but to the composite whole which has perished, while the intellect 
is doubtless a thing more divine and is impassive. 

From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is incapable of 15 
motion; and, if it is not moved at all, clearly it does not move 
criticism itself. Now of all the views that have been put forward 16 
the sltf- by far the most irrational is that which makes the soul 
Simbel a self-moving number. Its supporters are involved in 

22. E superscr. olov vos post roiovSL est interpretamentum (Bill.) || 23. TreirovOfrou n rV 
^f-o-ychv VWy Philop., rty ^"X^v ire'irov6&a,t, S Them. 29, 29 || 25. <rw] &=<a coni. 
Steinhart, to> $ coni. Bon., cf. Susemihl, Burs. Jahr. XVII, 264, adn. 24, fata tuentur 
etiam Simpl. p. 60, 30 Philop. Soph., efcrw Them. 29, 30 et 30, 14, &rw retineri volunt 
etiam Zeller, Gesch. d. Ph. d. Gr. II, 2, p. 570 et Neuhauser, Arist. Lehre von dem sinnl. 
Erkenntnissvermb'gen, p. 12. 

H. 3 

34 DE ANIMA I 011.4 

TrpSra \LZV ra IK TOV Kwti&dai orv/x^Satvo^ra, tSta 8* e/c rov 
Xeyetz> avrriv apt$/x,dz>, TnS? yap ^p?} vorjcrai juovaSa KLVOV- 
[Lvr\v, /cat VTTO TtVo9, /cat TTOS, ajuep-r} /cat d8id<f>opov oS- 

17 craz> ; et yap ecrrt KivyriKr} /cat /ctz-^TT?, Stac^epetv Set. ert S' 
eTret tjkacrt Kwr)0et<rav ypajLt/x^i/ eVtVeSov Trotetz/, crriy^v Se 
ypa/jt/XTjv, /cat at rSv /jiOi/dS&v /ctz^crets ypa^al ecrovrai' 5 
17 yap cTTLyfLr) povds ecrrt ^ecrtz/ e)(ovcra* 6 8' apt/^os 

18 *fjvj(fj$ ySr) TTQV ecrri /cat ^crt^ 9(t. ert ' dpiOpov jue^ 
d(j>\.r/ rts dpidiLOv T) /zova8a, XetTrerat aXXo? 

ra 8e <jf>vra /cat ra>^ ^wcov TroXXa Statpoifyieva 77 /cat 80- 

19 feet r-^v avTrjv $v)(r)v e^eti/ raJ etSet. So^ete S* av ov^ Sta- 10 
(f>p6iv /jiOvd$OL<$ Xe'yeu/ 'iy crou/xarta jLtt/cpa* /cat yap e/c rcuz/ 
A^/jto/cptrov <r</>atpt(y^ e J a^ y4v<t)vrai, crrtyp-at, /xo^oz/ 8e fteV$ 


wcnrep Iv rai o~v^^et* oi5 yap Sta TO p,ye6ei Sta^epetz/ ^ 
jitt/cpoTT^Tt crv/jt^Satvet TO \)(0P, a'XX* OTt TTOOW, Sto a^ay- 15 
/catoz/ etvat Tt TO KIVYJCTOV Ta? /xovaSas. et 8 s eV TOJ ^Jcp TO 
/cti/ovv 17 T / fV X 7 ?' /ca ^ ^ T< ? dpiO/Jito, cScTTe ou TO /ct? f ovr/ /cat TO 

20 Kwovfievov r/ ^vj(i7, aXXa TO KLVOVV povov. eVSexeTat 8e STJ 
TrcSg jLtovaSa ravryv elvai ; Set yap VTrap^et^ Ttw a^TjiJ 
8ta<jf>opav 7rpo9 T<XS aXXas. crTty^? Se p.QvaSiK:r)<s Tt9 av et?? 20 
8ta<jtopa 77X17^ ^e'crt5 ; t ^e^ ovi' etatv erepat at ev T<S 

s /cat at crTty/^at, eV T< avT<iJ ecror/Tat at 
t ycxp ^aipaz/ a"Tty/x^5. KQLLTOI Tt /ccyXvet ev 
ei Svo, Kat a?rtpov9; <5p yap 6 TOTTO$ a8tatpTO9, 
/cat avTa. et 8* at ev T<5 crtofjLari (myfial o dptfytos 6 TTJS 25 
et 6 T<3v e^ T<3 crco^taTt crny^v apt^/xos 17 


34. $ta 1C (Bus.) Simpl. p. 65, 17 Soph, et, ut vitlctur, Phtlop. 165, 31, rcccperunt liichl 
Kodier, /3f^ reliqui et .scripli ct ante Biehlium impressi unmet, etiam Thenu, f^w defemHt 
Vahlen in cd art. poet. tcrt. 1 19 || 409 a, 3. ei 7&p] ^ 7&/> T, -7 7&/> X, 77 AWV 7&/> Soph. 119, 
si [1 10. a^^ cm. K || ^%et^ ^i/xV S T U V y Them. j| 1 1. (ffutcpd S T Thc*m* ptwf/x ctiaiu 
Soph. || 13, <r4>aip&i>TX et re. E, fffiaiplw reliqui codd. et, ut videtur* pr, E (Trend.) j} 13. 
ttiJry] aOraty Soph. 30, 9 || pot Kan>tijjL&ov virgulam delevit Torst. ii 14. ffwx *3 fMyi&ti 
TWy Soph. || 15. fffUKptrniTi plerique codd,, etiam Them. Soph., fuicp&rqn K (Stapf.) 
Uck, Trend. Torst. || 16. Kirfcrav TWy, /ctj/^o^ etiam Soph. || 17. wore] T/X^TWJ 7* coni. 
Escn II rd post /cal om, S U W X y |j ift. 3^ om. S V W X y, leg. Them. |j 19. TTW* Them. 
Trend. Torst., TW* (enclit.) et post etvcu colon Bek. || rai/T^y] aiMy^ T X, etiam Phiiop, 
i(58, 16 || 2 a. Kal ai] /cat S U V Wy ^ T et re. K, /cai ai pr. K (Trend.), frtpat, ttl fy r<? 
/r^juart art-vwat /cai aZ /wvdfas coni. Christ |j 23, K<i>Xtf<ret V W Them, Trend., 

CH. 4 408 b 34409 a 27 35 

many impossibilities, not only in those which arise from attributing 
motion to the soul, but also in others of a special character 
due to calling it a number. For how are we to conceive of a unit, 
a thing which is without parts or differences, as in motion ? By 
what would it be moved, and in what way ? For if it is capable 
of imparting motion as well as of being moved, it must admit 
differences. Further, since they say that a line by its motion gene- 17 
rates a surface and that a point by its motion generates a line, the 
movements of the units will also be lines, for a point is a unit 
having position. But the number of the soul must, from the 
nature of the case, be somewhere and have position. Again, if 18 
you subtract a number or unit from a number, a different number 
remains : whereas plants and many animals continue to live when 
divided and seem to have specifically the same soul in each seg- 
ment. Besides, it would seem to make no difference whether we 19 
say units or tiny particles. For if the little round atoms of 
Democritus be converted into points and only their sum-total be ' 
retained, in such sum-total there will still be a part which moves 
and a part which is moved, just as there is in that which is 
extended. The truth of this statement does not depend upon the 
size of the atoms, whether great or small, but upon the fact that 
there is a sum-total or quantity of them. Hence there must be 
something to set the units in motion. But if in the animal the 
part which causes motion is the soul, then it is so likewise in 
the number : so that it will not be both that which causes motion 
and that which is moved which is the soul, but that which causes 
motion only. How then can this cause of motion be a unit ? 20 
For if it were so there must be some difference between it and 
the other units. But what is there to differentiate points which 
are units, except position ? If, then, the units, that is the points, 
in the body are distinct from the units of soul, the units of soul 
will be in the same place as the points, for each unit will occupy 
the space of a point. And yet if two things can be in the same 
place, why not an infinite number ? When the place which things 
occupy is indivisible, the things themselves are also indivisible. 
If, on the other hand, the number of the soul consists of the 21 
points in the body, or if the soul is the number of such points, 
why are not all bodies possessed of soul ? For in all bodies there 

etiam Simpl. Soph. || 25. 6 prius om. X, alterum insert. E a || 26. 6 r&v E Them. Philop. 
171, is Simpl. Soph., recepit Biehl, ceteri et scripti et ante Biehlium impress! omnes 6 K 
rQv, etiam Philop. in lemmate 171, 6, K insert. E 2 . 

36 DE AN IMA I CHS. 4, 5 

22 yap ev aVaa*t So/coverts etvat /cat aVetpoi. ert oe TTCU? otov re 
X&>ptcr$at ra? crrty/zas /cat diroXvecrOat, ra>v crco/xaTa>i>, et 
ye jLti) StatpowTat at ypa/x^itat ets crrty/xas ; 3 

g SvjLtySatWt Se, Kaddirzp etTro/Lev, TIJ /xez/ ravro Xeyeu/ 
rocs o"a>/xa rt Xe7TTOju,epe9 avrrjv TiOeicri, rfj S' ; tocrirep AT?- 
Kiveicrdai cfrTjcrw vrro TTJS $vxrj$> tStos TO aroirov. 
yocp ecrrti' 17 ^X 7 ? ^ 7rai/T ^ r< ? alcrOoLVo^evo) croi/^art^ 
e^ r^J avr<5 Svo etsat crco^ara, t orSjua rt 97 
rots 8* apid^ov Xeyovcrtv, cV rj7 jata crrty/^ TroX- 
Xas crrty/xas, ^ TraV crSjaa -^v^v e^etv, t /XT? 
rt? a/>t^ju.05 eyytz/crat /cat aXXos rt9 rcSv 

2 rot? crcojLtacrt crrty/A<S^. crujU^Sau'et re KiveicrOai TO ^a>03f VTTO 
TOT) apiOpov, KaGdircp /cat A^/xo/cptTOv avTo HjE>a^ei/ 

Tt yap Sta</>/)t crcjtatpa? Xeyetz/ ^tt/cpa? ^ fco^aSa 

Xa9 t TJ oXa>$ jLto^a8a9 fapoiievas ; a^or4po)<$ yap avay- 10 

3 KQiiov Kiveiv TO ^(5ov T^> /ctveto^^at TavTas. T0t9 

t9 TO avTO Kivycrw KCU apiOiwv ravrd 
Kat TroXXa erepa TOtavTa- ov yap \^6vov optcr/xov 
a8vvarov TOLOVTOV et^at, dXXa /cat crv/x-^SeyS^/cdg. S'iyXov S' t 
Tts 7rt^tpQ7crtef e/c Tov Xoyov TOVTOV Ta ?ra^ /cat T<X Ipya 15 
TTJS i//v^7j9 aTroStSo^at, oToi^ Xoytcr/xov?* atcr^7jcret9, 1780^1x9, 
Xi;7ra9, ocra aXXa TOtavTa* OKTTrep yap e 
ovSe /xavTvcraor#at pdiov It; awcSv, 

4 TptcJv Tp07rct)v TrapaSeSo/xeva)^ /ca^* OV9 opt^o^Tat 

X^v, ot jLtev TO KwrjTiK&TaTQV oLTT(f>i}isavTO T< Kivziv eavTO, ot 20 
cr&fJLa TO \errr o^p4crrarov r) TO dcro)fMaT(oTa 
ravra Be TtVa9 a7ropta9 T /cat V7re*>az>Ttc5a't9 

5 />te^ cr^eSo^, XetVeTat 8* 7Ttcr/cei/;acr^ai 7r<S9 Xeyerat TO e/c 

$9- fvxfa STU, <myij,fa E (Bus.) ct VWXy Soph. vet. transl. et, ut vitletur, 
Philop. 171, sr, Torst. || 30, 76 om, E || cfr rfa <rr. T W || 31* falso hie incipitur ttovum 
caput || ^ K<d KaO. K, pro & coni. $% Susemihl I! 409 b, i. tdtov om. S, rb om, X, 
verba Wto*' rb &TQTTQV unc. incK Torst., legerunt Philop. et sine dubio Them, ct SimpU, 
tuetur Vahlen in cd art. poet, tert* 1 19, non Icgisse videtur Soph. 31, 6 \\ 2. -rep om. pr. K j| 
<rt&/uan OKI. Wy, leg. Philop. Soph. U 5. pro ^ coni. Torst. /vo2, ^ in intcrpr, Sinipl. Philop. 
172, 25 scjq., clefendit fj DSttcnberger, Gott. gelehrtc Anx. 1863, p. 1615 Jl 7. roty <rtijua(rt 
E Torst,, rcliqui ante Torst. omncs r$ o*t6^art j| cru/ij8a^ E (Bck.) ; <rvfji.patm K (Hus.) jj 
re] # U X, om* S. 11 K, aW <f0ot/Acy EX, reccperunt Bichl Kodicr, tyapw &M reliqui t 
script! et impress! || 9, fAiKpfa E (Bus*) y, rcliqui ante BichHum omnes <r/*wc/jAj |) 1 1. ratJray 
** "- -J /..wx* it ift. aavriJ6<r^at STUVWy, 

CHS. 4, 5 409 a 28 409 b 23 37 

would seem to be points : nay, an Infinity of points. And, further, 22 
how can the points be separated and set free from the bodies to 
which they belong ; unless, indeed, we are prepared to resolve lines 
into points ? 

It comes to this, then, as we have said, first, that this view 5 
The ob- coincides with that which makes of the soul a body 
composed of fine particles ; next, that its agreement 

with Democritus as to the manner in which he makes 
the body to be moved by the soul gives it an especial absurdity of 
its own. If the soul resides in the whole sentient body, on the 
assumption that the soul is a sort of body it necessarily follows 
that two bodies occupy the same space. Those who call the soul 
a number have to assume many points in the one point, or else 
that everything corporeal has a soul ; unless the number that 
comes to exist in the body is a different number, quite distinct 
from the sum of the points already present in the body. Hence it 2 
follows that the animal is moved by the number in the same way 
precisely as we said Democritus moved it For what difference 
does it make whether we speak of small round atoms or large 
units, or indeed of units in spatial motion at all ? Either way it is 
necessary to make the motion of the animal depend on the motion 
of these atoms or units. Such, then, are some of the difficulties 3 
confronting those who join motion and number: and there are 
many others, since it is impossible that the conjunction of motion 
with number should form even an attribute, much less the defi- 
nition, of soul This will be evident if we try to deduce from this 
definition the affections and functions of the soul ; its reasonings, 
perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so forth. For, as we said above, 
from the account given it is difficult even to divine what these 
functions are. 

Three modes of defining the soul have come down to us : 4 
some defined it as that which, in virtue of its self-motion, is most 
capable of causing motion ; others as the body which consists of 
the finest particles, or which is more nearly incorporeal than any- 
thing else. And we have pretty fully explained what difficulties 
and inconsistencies these views present It remains to consider 5 
what is meant by saying that the soul is composed of the 

ju,avT6<ra<r0at etiana Them. Soph, et, ut videtur, Philop. 175, i II 20. oi ^...2 

in parenth. et post 11, dtXXw colon pro vulg. punct. posuit Rodier || 20. &ivr6] tavrfty 

Soph. || 22. re om. V W Philop. 

38 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

avrrjv etz'at. Xeyovcrt p.v yap, lv alcrOdvrirai re 
r>v ovra)v /cat eKacrrov yva)piy, avayKcuov Se o-vpftalveiv 25 
TroXXa /cat aSwara raJ Xdy&>. ridevrai yap yvvpi^eiv T(5 
TO Ojuoto^, cScTTre^o az/ et TT)Z/ $v\r)v ra Trpdy/Jiara 

Tt$ezres. OVK earn Se jadva ravra, TroXXa Se /cat erepa, 
6 /xaXXov 8 s toras aVetpa rov dpiO^-ov ra IK rovrwv. ef e5y 

ecrrt^ e/cacrro^ rovra)^, IOTCD yc^aJcr/cet^ TI)^ t/^X^ Ka ^ 3 

aXXa rb crvvoKov rivi yvtopiel rj ator^crerai, 
0^ rt ^ebs 17 dv6pa)TTO$ rj crap rj bcrrovv ; o/xotcos Se feat 
aXXo OTLoSz^ roll/ arvvQerw ov yap orroxrovv eyovra r<X4ioa 
crrot^ela TQVTWV eKaarrov, aXXa Xoya> rtvt /cai 
<p7]crl /cat ^EjaTreSo/cXTj? TO 6<jrow- 
17 Se x^w 

pa 8' ^^attrroto ' ra 8* ocrrca Xeu/ca yevorro. 

ovv o<t>G\o$ ivzlvai ra crro^ela lv rfj $vxj)> t JUT) /cat ot 
Xdyot Gv&crQvrai /cat 17 crw^ecrt?* yvapiel yap e/cacrro*/ ro 
o/totov, TO 8' ocrrow ^ TOV av6p&TTQv ou^eV, t /XT} /cat TaSr* 

rovro 8* OTI dSwarov, ov6tv Set Xeyetz/' Tt9 ya/) a^ 10 
et &ecrrtv e^ T$ ^VXV ^$$ $ avOpwrros ; 

Ck\ \N/)N NN \ > /) ' ^ >\CSX 

oe /cat TO oyauov /cat TO />t7) ayauov rov avTov oe 
7 feat 7T/?t TV aXX<w, ert Se 7roXXa^6>s Xeyo/i-eVou 

tj'et ya^o TO ju,ez> ToSe Tt, TO Se TTOOW 17 Troto^ 17 /cat 

TCWV 8tatp^etcr(3i/ /caT7jyopt<5/') Trorepov ef aTra^- 15 
eorat 17 V /V X^ ^ ^ ; ^^ ^ So/cet Koiva Travrtov etz/ac 

ap* o5v ocra T^ ovcrtaJ^, e/c 
yw<*><TKi /cat r<5v aXX<i>v e/cacrroz^ ; r/ 

eti/at orTOt^eta /cat dpxas ^8ta9, e| <3i> T^Z/ ^fV)(r)v crwecrra- 
t ; Jicrr&i apa 7ro<rov /cat Trotov /cat ov<rta. aXX* aSwarov e/c 

14* ft' 1 om. pr, K II ttMfjrat, T W ct corr. E (Trend, }, a^dv^rat etiam Them. Soph* II 
31. T&>I.,,#| o^..o^ r WX (I 410 a, i* 6no0? 4XXo excepto K omnes codd., c'tiam Soph. 
Tr*nd. || . roiJrwv] ruiv pr. K (Trend.) || post IKOUJTW virg. om. Di<tls, p, ao8 ji 5, rA ^5o 
V et re. E Bek. Trend*, rds 5t5o W et Alex, in metaph. p. 135, 16 (cd, Hayduck), r<l> 5tJo, 
qitod iam Steinhart conieccrat, scripscrunt Torst. Biehl in ed. pr. Rcxlicr Die!*, I term. XV, 
166 sqq., r&v Mo S T U X y ct pr. E (Bhl), etiam Them. Philop. Soph., scripsit Biehl in 
cd. alt. || iwp&w U V Wy et re. E Philop,, IM^V ut videtur pr. K (Trend.) c*t Alex. 1. U 
Them. Soph, |j 6. \rt*' SUX Alex. L I.Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. || *yrfw*ro SUX, 
Alex. Them. Soph, Bek. Trend., yfvovrc mine E sed ante 7 est una littcra erasa (Bhl.) j| 
7, ^Zvat solus Ej Tort, ceteri codd. et^at, etiam Soph. || n* ^(rrb UWX, 

CH. 5 409 b 24 410 a 20 39 

elements. Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements in 
soui is order that it may perceive and know each several thing. 
not a com- But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities. 
the eie- For it is assumed that like is known by like ; which im- 
men s. plies that soul is identical with the things that it knows. 

These elements, however, are not all that exists : there are a great, 
or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite number of other things 
as well, namely, those which are compounded of the elements. 
Granted, then, that it is possible for the soul to know and to 6 
perceive the constituent elements of all these composite things, 
with what will it know or perceive the compound itself? I mean, 
what God or man is ; what flesh or bone is : and so likewise with 
regard to any other composite thing. For it is not elements taken 
anyhow which constitute this or that thing, but only 
i- those which are united in a given proportion or com- 
bination, as Empedocles says of bone: 

"Then did the bounteous earth in broad-bosomed crucibles 
win out of eight parts two from the sheen of moisture and four 
from the fire-god ; and the bones came into being all white/' 

It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, 
unless it also contains their proportions and the mode of combining 
them. For each element will know its like, but there will be 
nothing to know bone or man, unless these also are to be present 
in the soul : which, I need hardly say, is impossible. Who would 
ask if stone or man resides in the soul? And similarly with that 
which is good and that which is not good : and so for all the 

Being, again, is a term which has various meanings, signifying 7 
sometimes the particular thing, sometimes quantity or quality or any 
other of the categories which have been already determined. Is the 
soul to be derived from all of these, or not? It cannot be: the 
general opinion is that there are no elements common to all the 
categories. Does the soul, then, consist of those elements alone 
which are the elements of substances ? How then does it know 
each of the other categories ? Or will they say that each summum 
genus has special elements and principles of its own, and that the 
soul is composed of these? Then soul will be at once quantity, 
quality and substance. But it is impossible from the elements of 

etiam Soph. || fy*ows...ia. fdj &ya,Q6v unc. incl. Susemihl H 13. M r&v TX Simpl. || 
17. T& <rr<ux* EyyrA om. Them. 33, 30 Soph. || post oftriwv virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || 
l*bvwv S T U V X || so. &rr<u...otf<rla Torst. suspecta sunt, agnoscunt haec verba et eodem 
quidem loco Philop. 179, 3 sq. Simpl. Soph., post 21. iroo*6> posuit Belger. 

40 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

TOV TTOCTOV crroiyeitov ovcriav etz/ai /cal /AT) TTOCTQV, rots or) 
\eyovviv IK irdvTtov ravrd re /cal ToiavO* erepa crv/^Satvei. 

8 QLTQTTQV Se Kol TO craven, p,kv aTra^e? eti>at TO ofjioiov vrro TOV 
op,oiov, alcrddvecrdai Se TO O/JLOLOV TOV o/moiov KOI yiVtoVKtiv 
TO) ofjLoico TO o/JiOiov TO S* oiia'6dvO'6ai 7racr^etz> TL /cat /ct- 25 
veicrQa.1 Tideavw O/JLOLCOS Se /cal TO voeu> TC /cal yivtoVKeiv. 

9 TroXXas S' diropi&s /cal Sucr^ejoeuxs C^OVTO? TOV \4yeiv, /ca- 

/cal 77^09 TO QJIOLOV [/AapTVpel TO vvv 

oora ycxp icrnv kv Tots T<3^ ^o)^ crcy/x-acrt^ cxTrXoS? 7779, otbr/ 30 
ocrTa vevpa T/)ij(5, oi?^V09 aicrddvO"dai SO/CCL, COCTT' ouSe TaJz/ 4iob 
Kairoi TrpocrfJKev. Iri S* e/cacrT^ TCtJz/ dp^ojv ayvoia. 
r/ crwecris virdp^ei' yvtocTZTai ^tv yap ev / /ca<rro*', 
TroXXcx S' ay^oTforef Traz/Ta yap TaXXa. o"v/x,^Sati/i 8* 3 E/x,- 
ye /cal dffrpovecrTaTQV slvai TOV #eoz>- /LCWOS yap ToJz^ 5 
v 01; yvtopi&i, TO va/cos, TCX 8e &vr)Ta rrdvTQ** e/c 

ri irvTtoV yap /cacrTOv* ocos T tct TIV atrcav 


r) /c 
Tr\LQVtov r) iT&vTtov ; avay/caio^ yap ecruy ei/ Tt yc- 

12 vtocncew fj Ttva ^ TrdvTd* diropijcreie S* az/ Tts /cat rt TTOT* 10 

TO J^oTTotouv aT?Ta* vXp yap eot/ce T<X ye o r TOtj(eta' /cv- 
yap e/cetvo TO crwe^ov o TL TTOT* ecrTtf* T7)9 Se t//v- 

etvat Tt KpeiTTOv /cat cip-^ov aSwarov dSwcvrtoTepov 8* 
en, TOV z^ov' cvXoyov yap TOVTOI/ eTi'at Trpoyez/eVTaTOv /cat /cvpto^ 
/caTa (frvcriv, Ta Se oroi^eta <^acrt Trp^Ta T<Si^ OVTCD^ et^at. 15 

13 irdvres Se /cat ot Sta TO yz/capt^etv /cal atcr^ai/ecr^at Ta ovra 

e/c TaJf OTTOt^etcov Xeyo^T5 avTTjts, /cat ot TO /ct- 

25. 6'] -yd/3 TX Sartemihl I'hilop. in interpr* 180, 5, Koclier 11 r K Soph., reliqui rt, 
etiam Philop* 181, 4 || /ct^ei*' E, Troiet^ U X j| 26. re cm. E, n V, leg. r* etiam Soph. || 
9 T/>S rd tipowi'] sic omncs coclcL, ** t ad simile" vet. transK, pro his r<p 6/<ofy rd d/*o<ov 
scripsit Tort. Sophoniam sccutUH l| post w/>6s virgulam poswit post ^toy siiHtulit Rtnlicr || 
^vxft^tf^lMv ov T ct corr. U y, Soph, interpretatur ra l%ty Xex^^^^e^a, Xe^^ etiam 
Simpl. 70, 8 Philop. 180, 23, quorum uterque \e%6^(f^vov interprctatur vet, Iransl., 
verba /Aapri/peT ri n> Xex^^" unc. inclusit Torst., probat Susemihl J| 30. towrw ST U V 
Bek, Trend,, tcrnv etiam Philop. Soph. Torst. |( 410 b, 2, vpoirfiKw rk wOpa K&l rdj 
fplx** 7^7/?4 5Ttt TWV buolw <x.l<r&6,v<r&<u, trt W t de his nihil veteres interpreter |{ 
S U V W X y Soph., wXdw etiam Them. || ^7r</)x W X || ^^777 T W X Soph. <| 4, T 
7^/> raXXa om, pr Ji, leg. Them, et sine clubio Soph. t Dittcnl>erger, Oott. gel. Ans;., 
1863, p. i(>J4, ut superflua omitti vult || 6. yvuptfrt solus K Torst-, cui itsgentitur Nc>etd 
r, f. Gym. 18^4, p. 141, reliqui ante Tornt, omne yvtapttf, etiam Them- Soph. l| 

CH. 5 410 a 21 410 b 17 41 

quantity to derive substance or anything but quantity. These, 
then, and others like them are the difficulties which confront those 
who derive soul from all the elements. There is a further incon- 8 
sistency in maintaining- that like is unaffected by like and yet at 
the same time that like perceives like and knows like by like. 
But they assume that perceiving is a sort of being- acted upon or 
moved. And the same holds of thinking and knowing. 

Of the many problems and difficulties involved in holding with 9 
Empedocles that each thing is known through corporeal elements 
and by reference to its like \what has just been said is evidence\. 
For, it would seem, whatever within the bodies of animals consists 
entirely of earth, such as bones, sinews, hair, perceives nothing 
at all, and consequently cannot perceive its like ; as in consistency 
it should. Moreover, each one of the elemental principles will have 10 
a far larger share of ignorance than of intelligence ; there being 
many things of which it will be ignorant and only one which it will 
know : in fact, it will be ignorant of all besides that one. It 
follows, for Empedocles at any rate, that God is quite the most 
unintelligent of beings. There is one of the elements, viz. Strife, 
which he, and he alone, will not know, while mortal things, being 
composed of all the elements, will know them all. And in general, u 
seeing that everything is either an element or derived from one or 
more or all elements, why should not all things that exist have 
soul ? For they must certainly know one thing or some things 
or all. It might further be asked what it is that gives them unity. 12 
For the elements, at all events, correspond to matter. That other 
principle, whatever it be, which holds them together, is supreme. 
Yet it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul 
and overrule it ; and still more impossible that anything should 
overrule intelligence. This, it may reasonably be held, has a 
natural priority and authority. Yet we are told that the elements 
are prior to all other things that exist. 

And it is characteristic, alike of those who derive the soul from 13 
the elements on the ground of perception and knowledge, and of 
those who define it as the thing most capable of causing motion, 

$K TC&VTVV y&p $Ka<rrov unc. incL Torst., praeter codd. tuentur haec verba Them. 
Soph. 34, 15, et, ut videtur, Philop. 18 1, 28 sq., defendit Dittenberger, Progr. Rudolstadt 
1869, p. 19 II 7. 8t S T U V W, re etiam Them, et, ut videtur, Soph. 34, 15 || 8. irav om. 
pr. E, leg. Soph., irdvra Them. || -faroi crro^ov recepit Torst. ex solo E (Bus.), reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes rj <rr., etiam Them. || 9. yj *K ir\. T V W || r rt] *M S U X, $ &> W j| 
ii. 7 om. STWX H 11. ybp] ykp E, sed in rasura, Bek. 5* subfuisse coni. (Trend.) , 
7<ip etiam ceteri codd. et Soph., $' scripsit Torst* || 13. Kpeurvov EWX. 

42 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

z', ov Trept TracrTjg Xeyoucrt i/w^s. ovre yap rd 
alcrffavopeva irdvra KWYJTLKOL- (jxziverai yap elrai rtva /xo- 
ytjiia rc3z/ tty<&v Kara TOTTOV /catrot So/cet ye ravrrjv \LQvr\v 20 
r<5z/ KLVTJo"G)v Kiviv r\ ^X^l ( ? oz/ - o//,oto>9 Se /cat ocrot 
rov ww /cat TO aicrdr^riKov IK rS>v crrot^eta>j> Trotovcrtv <jf>ati>erat 
yap rd r <jJurd 77^ ov //,ere')(oi/ra <opct9 ouS' atcr$)jcrea>9 

14 /cat r^ {^wv TroXXa Sidvoiav OVK e^etz^. t 8e rt? Acat raSra 
iraipaxtoprf&tte KOI deirj rov vow />ipos rt rijs ^V^TJ?, 6jaotct)9 25 
Se /cat ro cda'9'r]TLKQv, ovS* a^ ourct> Xeyotez/ KadoXov 

15 Tracnjs fax*)* 5 v$ vepl 0X7^9 ovS/ua9. rovro Se 

/cat 6 ev rots *Op<^t/cot9 eirecri /caXot>ft^ot9 Xoyo9* ^crt yap 
\pv)(r)v IK rov oXov etorteVat di/aTrz/cdvrcov, <^epo/xV7jv VTTO 

K o^ oldf re ST) rot9 <vrot9 rouro <rufc^8atvt^ ovSe 30 
isioi<$, etTrep /^T) Trdvra avarrveovcriv rovro 8e 

16 XT^^C rovs ovro>9 u7rtXij<j&ora9. et r Set r^z/ \^V)(rjv IK 

Trotet^ ovd&s Set e aTrdvTW t/caz^o^ yap Qdrzpov 
ez/az/rta!orea>9 eavrc; re Kpiveiv /cat ro wrt/cet)uiei/ov. 
t yap ra> ev^et /cat avro /cat ro Ka^TT"u\ov ywdxrKOfitv* 5 
Kpirf)<s yap a/ji<jtot^ 6 KOV&V, ro Se /ca^TrvXoi/ ou^ eavrov 

17 ovre roS ^^09. /cat ei> r<jJ oX<j> Se' rtve9 avr>)z/ /jL^el^dat 
<f>acrw, odtv tcra>9 /cat ^)aX^9 ^^ Trdvra TrXijpr) Q&v etvat. 

18 rouro S' e^et rtva9 <X7ropta9' Sta rtr^a yap alriav eV /xe^ r< 
dept ^ r<j> TTfpt ovcra 07 i^vj(^ ov Trotet aioz/, e^ Se rot9 ftt- ro 

19 /crot9, /cat ravra /3eXrt w eV roi;rot9 etvat 8o/coOcra ; 
crete yap ar rt9 /cat Sta rt^* atrtav 17 ejf r<j) dept 

20 e^ rot9 ^<wot9 ^SeXrfco^ eVrt /cat d^az/ara>repa. 

repa>9 droTro^ /cat TrapdXoyov /cat yap ro 
ro 7n)p ^ rov depa r<3v TrapaXoycorepcoz/ eVrt, /cat ro x$ 

tH. rrdtflr^s K Them. Philop., btrdyi]* ceteri coclcl. et Soph, || o^rf] o^i ami, Steinhart I! 
20. fortasse legendum /*^ annotat Trend., /^yijv </j.6vrj> com, Sufiemihl, Ocam. p. 84, 
probat RoditT II, p. 154 || aa. rbv votiv Kctl rb alffQvyrticbv unc. inch, tuentur Them. 
Philop, et Vahlen, Oestcr. Gym. Zeilftchr. 1868, p. so j| t$. ^opSy o$& unc. XncL Torht, 
leg. ettam Philop. SimpL ct sine dubio Them. |j 26. o(Jrw] ourotThem. 55, 15 ii /co^Aouom. 
T U V Torst., tuentur eliam Them. Simpl. et Vahlen L 1. p. 21 |j 27. otfafufa] otti jtaaj 
ETU VW Bek. Trend., /tta? (omisso c&5t) Torst., otJ^^ irepi A*wt SX SimpL (of. Soph. 
35, 17 oi5^ ?pjOi ilXTys o^W T/>i /ua*), Mepias eliam Them, et sine dubio Philop., <|ui in 
interpr. bis Tpl a63e/uay ^y, semel 7r/)l ^utas 6X975, semel irepl &\ys /uay 1} roOro W, M 
411 a, , ^7TcXi706ray post 411 a, 7, eiJ^^oy transponenda coni, By water, Jfoum. of Phil. 
1888, p. 53 sq., cui assentitur Susemihl j| 28, /caXot/ju&oty 6re<rt TV Wy Them,, 
cm. S, KoXofycvos Soph,, Xeyo^oty Philop, 186, 34 (sed in lemmate / 

CH. S 410 b 18 411 a 15 43 

that their assertions do not apply to soul in every form. For not 
all sentient beings can cause motion ; some animals are seen to be 
stationary in one place. And yet it is at all events a received view 
that this, namely, change of place, is the one form of motion which 
the soul imparts to the animal. Similarly with those who derive 
intelligence and the faculty of sense from the elements. For plants 
are found to live without any share in locomotion or sensation, and 
many animals to be destitute of thought. If we waive this point 14 
and assume intellect to be a part of the soul, and the faculty 
of sense likewise, even then their statements would not apply 
generally to all soul, nor to the whole of any one soul. The account 15 
The or. given in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same 
cos- strictures. For the soul, it is there asserted, enters from 

^ e un j verse j n the process of respiration, being borne 
upon the winds. Now it is impossible that this should be so with 
plants or even with some animals, seeing that they do not all 
respire : a point which the upholders of this theory have over- 
looked. And if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, 16 
there is no need to employ them all, the one of a pair of contraries 
being sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. For by that 
which is straight we discern both the straight and the crooked, the 
carpenter's rule being the test of both. On the other hand that 
which is crooked is not a test of itself or of that which is straight 

There are some, too, who say that soul is interfused through- 17 
soul not out t ^ ie un i ver se : which is perhaps why Thales supposed 
thfoiTh a ^ ^ings to ke full of gods. But this view presents 18 
the uni- some difficulties. For why should the soul not produce 

an animal, when present in air or fire, and yet do so 
when present in the compounds of these elements : and that, too, 
though in the former case it is believed to be purer ? One might 19 
also enquire why the soul present in air is purer and more im- 
mortal than soul in animals. Whichever of the two suppositions 20 
open to us we adopt is absurd and irrational. To speak of fire 
or air as an animal is very irrational ; and on the other hand 

E x , \6yos corr. E 2 (Bhi.) || 30. St T W X et corr. E Soph., 5^ reliqui et script; et impressi 
et E! || 4tt a, i. d^j E, 6t etiam Simpl. et, ut videtur, Them. 35, 20 || 2. d SX Trend., 
eiVe/ S V W, efaep 5t T et nunc E, et re $& olim subfuisse nihil nisi coniectura Bekkeri 
(Trend.), elre U Bek. Torst., el /cai in interpret, Simpl. || 8. fcrws om. V Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 9. rlva, ptv y&p V y et corr. E, om. /*? Them. {| h i&v\ /*& om. S T V y, leg. 
Them. || ro. 4) 4* r STU || xi. pt\ri.ov E, pe\rtw etiam Soph. || evifrirlnretc... 
13. AewaruTtpa in parenth. Torst. Susemihl J| 12. 7&/>] 5* WX Soph, et, ut videtur, 
Philop. 189, 4, y&p reliqui, etiam re* E, sed Bek. coni. fuisse y (Trend.) || 15. wapa- 
\6yw S U X, 7rapapo\tT4pwv Them. 36, 2, Philop. 189, u (sed in v. 1. utriusque vulg.) j] 
rdom. TVW. 

44 DE ANIMA I en. 5 

21 /XT) \eyeiv o5a i/n/^s Ivovcr^ aroirov. v7roXa^6etz> S' ioiKacriv 
ctmt rrjv "fyv^qv Iv TOVTOts, 6Vt TO oXoz> rot? /xoptots o^oetSeV 
O$CTT' oWy/cato*' avrols \eyew KOI TT)I> -fyvyyv ojaoetS^ roc? 
jAOpiOt,<s eivai, et ra> aTroXa/zySaVecr^at re rov Trepce^oi/ro? ^ 
TCH9 fcJot9 eyxi//i;x a ra ala yiverai. et 8' 6 /xe^ dr)/) SiacrTrco- 20 

6jLcot7^5, 17 Se ifjv^rj dvo/xoio/xepTj?, TO /xeV Tt 
et 877X0^ ort, TO 8* ov^ vrrdp^Gi. avaryKaiov ovv 
U>cu ^ /XT) zvwrrdpyeiv zv OTMQVV p>opi(p rov 

22 veov ov /c T<Sz/ eirJLGVtov a>9 OUT TO 

TO /ct^ei- 25 

23 a^at avTyv /caXS? ovS' aXyd&s XeyTat. eVe! Se TO 
&K.w T7?5 $vX*l t * arl /cal TO aicrddvGcrdcLL TC fcai TO 
e<j>, ert Se TO iTTiOviitlv KoL ftov^tcrOcLi /cat oXa>9 at Q 
ytz/Tat 8e /cat 17 /caTa rorrov KLvr/cri<s TOt$ ^ot? UTTO 

>7 T /cat a/c/L^ /cat <#tcrts, Trorepov 0X^7 30 
GKOLCTTOV V7rapj( t > Ka ^ ^ctcrj? voov/xeV T /cat 4! I b 
/cat /cu>ouju,$a /cat TV aXXcyy 1/cacrTOv 7rotov/Af T 
/cat 7racr^(Oja^, ?) /utoptots Tpot? ercpa; /cat TO 4^^ STJ Trortpov ci/ 
TU/t TOVTCJV ecrTt^ ^ /cat eV TrXetocrtr ^ Tracrtz/, ^ /cat aXXo Tt 

24 O!TIOV ; Xeyovcrt 877 Tt^es /teptcrTT)^ avrrfv, /cat aXXo /tez/ 5 
votv aXXo Se eVt^u/jtetv. Tt ou^ 877 TTOTC crvvzyzi ryv ^V^T^V, 
t /jLepicrrr) 7T<j>vK.v ; ov yap S>) TO ye craijita* So/ct yap TOV- 
vavriov /xaXXor 77 V-'^X 7 ? r< ^ ^^^ crv^e^eti/- lekdovcn)<s yovv 
StaTTZ/etTat /cat cr777TTat. et ovi' Hrepov Tt /x,taz> avT7}v Trotet, 

1- xo 

t //,*> yd/) f, 8t(X Tt OU/C 

/cat 77 V^T > ; t e ^picrrov, TraXti' a Xoyo<? ^77- 

T77CTt Tt TO aUZ/e^OV /Ct^O, /Cttl OVTO) ST) 7rpOt<TtI/ 7Tt TO 

25 aVetpoz/. a < 7ro/?770"t 8' a^ Tts /cat 7TpL 

17. tvat om. SUX, rfy/ ^vxV ^ at TVWy Them. |j 5Xov ^ ro? K jj 19* 
om. pr. K || dTToXa/UjSd^wv S T U W y tuentur d7roXa/*j8^e<r^at Philop. Ht)ph. tl *o. rA 
om STU V Wy || a, biripfa tirfhw tin fort, inserta ex uiargiue putat Torst. t uumtur 
etiara Simpl. I'hibp. || 23, *) ante d/*. um* E, leg Simpl. j| 26. oW d\^<3 om. pr. K, 
leg. Soph., Dittenbcrger p. 1614 ut supcrflua omitti vult || ^T^ U Wy et corr. K, Uek. 
conl fuiRfie ^rri W (Trend.) || 17. T^S om. TWy || rd ante &>& om. STU W Soj>h. || 
8. Kal rd S U W X, /cal etiam Soph. || j3ou\tJ6<T^at T U V W X y et corr. K Them. 
3<J, 2 Soph, || a( om. TX, leg. Soph. || 29* ^ om. E (Treud.) || 30. o^<rt* S T U V W X 
et corr. E, atffi; etiam Soph, || 411 b r 2, eU<r^. K&1 Kwotijjufa K<d E V W Simph 8ph. (qui 
xa2 al<r0cLv6jju6a omittit) Torst., aivQ. /cal K(.VO$[J.IV Ka.1 X, Aral Kivo^^Oa om. rcliqui c<xi(U t 
etiam Bek. Trend. || 4. &rrb ^ ^l ^ E, sed 64 ^ expunct. (Bhl.), eVrif e>i 17 Uek. Trend. 

CH. 5 411 a 16 411 b 14 45 

not to call them animals, if they contain soul, is absurd. But 21 
it would seem that the reason why they suppose soul to be 
in these elements is that the whole is homogeneous with its 
parts. So that they cannot help regarding universal soul as also 
homogeneous with the parts of it in animals, since it is through 
something of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed 
in animals that the animals become endowed with soul. But if the 
air when split up remains homogeneous, and yet soul is divisible 
into non-homogeneous parts, it is clear that, although one part 
of soul may be present in the air, there is another part which is 
not. Either, then, soul must be homogeneous, or else it cannot be 
present in every part of the universe, 

From what has been said it is evident that it is not because the 22 
soul is compounded of the elements that knowledge belongs to it, 
nor is it correct or true to say that the soul is moved. Knowledge, 23 
however, is an attribute of the soul, and so are perception, opinion, 
desire, wish and appetency generally ; animal locomotion also is 
produced by the soul ; and likewise growth, maturity and decay. 
unity of Shall we then say that each of these belongs to the whole 
soul - soul, that we think, that is, and perceive and are moved 

and in each of the other operations act and are acted upon with 
the whole soul, or that the different operations are to be assigned 
to different parts ? And what of life itself? Does it reside in any 
single one or more or all of these parts ? Or has it a cause 
entirely distinct ? Now some say that the soul is divisible and 24 
that one part of it thinks, another desires. What is it then which 
holds the soul together, if naturally divisible ? Assuredly it is not 
the body : on the contrary, the soul seems rather to hold the body 
together ; at all events, when it has departed, the body disperses 
in air and rots away. If, then, the unity of soul is due to some 
other thing, that other thing would be, properly speaking, soul. 
We shall need, then, to repeat the enquiry respecting it also, 
whether it is one or manifold. For, if it has unity, why not 
attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset? If, however, it 
be divisible, then again reason will go on to ask what it is that 
holds it together, and so the enquiry will go on to infinity. It 25 
might also be asked what power each of the parts of the soul 

Torst. || % K al Traw T U W X y, # *ai & Trdffiv S V Soph. || 5. de S T U V || 5 et 6. XXo 
EW Torst., probat etiam Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gymn, 1864, p. 141, reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes cXX<p, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 37, 27 (v. 1. dXXo) vet. transl. || 7. ye ante TO 
TV, om. S UWXy || 10. ^ V/i/x^ TV Wy, ^ om. etiam Them. Philop. || 5 Kal TT<\LV 
T U V X Bek. Trend., Kal om. y et E (Bek. teste Torstrikio et Trend.) || 12. xal r^v 
& S U WX, Kal rty ^vxty & dvu Ty, ftp *ai TTJV ^"^v etvai V. 

46 DE ANIMA I CH. 5 

TIV )(i ^vvafJLiv KacrTov iv TO! (TtofJiaTi. el yap r) 0X77 15 
ifrvX^i 7J 'Q'V T crcSjua crwe^ei, TrpocnJKi Kai r<Sz> p^opMv 
eKacrrov crvvetfeiv n rov cra)/>caros. rovro 8* eo6/cez> dSwara>* 
TTOLOV yap [jiopLOv TI 770)5 6 z/ou5 crvvei~i, ^a\7rbi/ /cal TrXa- 

26 crat. <j>aiVTai 6 Acal ra <jE>vra ^laipov^va ,rjv Kal r>v 

evia T&V eWo/xcyz/, a>9 TT)Z/ avTr/v ey^ovra i/fv^i/ raJ 20 
i Kal JLCT) aptdfjico' e/carepoz/ yap rSi' fjiopicov 
KCU KLVtirau Kara TQTTOV ITTL riva yjpovov. el 8e 
, ovQev CXTOTTOZ/' opyava yap ov/c e^ot/criv cSorre 
<j6vcrti/. dXX* ovSez/ rjrrov ev l/carepo) r5z/ 
evvrrdp^i ra ^opia TTJ<$ ^u^s, /cat 6/jCOtSet5 etcrl^ 25 
L? /cat TJTJ oXij, dXXT^Xa)^ /xez/ cos ou ^a>yo terra oz/ra, 

27 r^s 8' 0X775 ^V)(7j5 005 SiaLperrjs overt)?. eoiKC Se /cac 17 i/ 

<^>vroi5 d/)^ ^X^ Ti ^ eivai- ^0^775 yayo raur>?5 
Kal a>a Kal (fwrd- Kal avrr) fcev x a) P^ erat ' 

8' ov^ev avev ravrrj<5 e)(t,. 30 

17. d&/*>aroi> Philop. || rS. <nWx<H K V ct fort. Simpl. (cf. p. 95, .^i), onW^et utiaiu 
Them. Philop. Soph. || 11. ^ Kal K || 7<ipl 70^^ HVX Soph, Ikk. Tren<L, otV U \V, 
7&p in paraphr* Them. Philop. || 25. fyoctSij eiffiv dXX7)Xots W ct nunc K (Trend.) Soph. 
lick. Trend. Rotlier, ojuoftfo?* d<rlv dt\X}Xttty relu|ui codd, et pr. K (Hek.), etiaia Philop. 
Simpl. Torst. Bielil || 76, dXXiJXwy] dXX-ijXois W Soph., dXX^Xeus V, dXX7iXaw> 
Simpl. Philop* || 28. T/'t'X^ ante d/^ T* Torst., oui. S U, ^v-fy post d/>x77 videntur I 
otiam Them. 38, 23 sq. Philop. 202, 5. ^> II 29. /cal rA fcDa E, ra om. ctiam Simpl. Soph., 
/cai ret ffa teal r& ^ur^ in intcrpr. Them, 

CH. 5 411 b 15 411 b 30 47 

exercises in the body. For, if the entire soul holds together the 
whole body, then each of its parts ought properly to hold together 
some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is 
difficult even to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together 
or how it can hold any part together. It is found that plants, and 26 
among animals certain insects or annelida, live when divided, which 
implies that the soul in their segments is specifically, though not 
numerically, the same. At any rate, each of the two segments 
retains sentience and the power of locomotion for some time : that 
they do not continue to do so is not surprising, as they lack the 
organs requisite to maintain their nature. But none the less all 
the parts of the soul are contained in each of the two segments, 
and the two halves of the soul are homogeneous alike with one 
another and with the whole ; a fact which implies that, while the 
parts of the soul are inseparable from one another, the soul as a 
The soul whole is divisible. It would seem that the vital principle 27 
in plants. j n plants also is a sort of soul. For this principle is 
the only one common to plants and animals; and, while it can 
be separated from the sensitive principle, no being which has 
sensation is without it. 


Ta pew 8?) VTTO r>v Trporepov TrapaSeSo/xe/a irepl T//V- 412 a 

ird\iv 8* alcrTrep e virap-)(rj$ e7raz/tci>fte&>, 7T66- 
Stoptcrat Tt ecrrt V^X 1 ? Ka ^ T ^ ^ "7 KOWOTCLTOS 5 

2 Xoyos avT7j9 \4yopev ST) yeVo9 cz/ Tt r<3^ ovr&v TT)V overtax, 
TavT?79 Se TO jae^ a;? vXyjv, o Ka6* avrb /x,ev ou/c ecrri 

rt, erepov Se /Jioptyrjv /cat 61809, /ca#* 07^ 07817 Xey^Tat 

re, /cat rpirov ro CK roi;r<w. ecrrt S' 07 /xey uXyy Swa^ts, TO 

8* ctSo? ^T\^eta ? /cat rovro St^S?, TO ^oz/ a>5 7n<rT f yjiJ/ifj t 

3 TO 8' <i>5 TO Oetopeiv. ovcriai 8e paXicrT etvat 8o/coS<rt TO, o 1 "^- 
para, /cat TouTCt)v Ta cjf>vcrt/ca' TavTa yap T^ aXX.6)z> dp- 

>r)v 8e XeyojLtei' TIJV 8t* avToS Tpo^v TC /cat av^crw/ /cat 
$8icriv. cScrT Trav <r<Sfta <f>vort,KQv /xTe)(o^ {0)779 ovata ai^ 15 
4 ct 1 )?, ovo"ta 8* OVTC09 cu? crwOerr)* evret 8* caTt /cat crcu/x.a TOt- 
ovS 3 <WT)V yap e^ov, ov/c a^ ctTj TO o r <3/>ta 17 ^X 7 ?" O1 & 
yap crTt Tc3v /ca^* v7ro/ct/x,eVoi; TO croi/>ta, /zaXXo^ 8* a>9 
VTroKifLvov KOI v\r). avoryKoiov apa 
elvai <&9 etSos cr<w/LtaT09 <f>v<riKQV 

17 8* ovoaa c^TeXe^eta. TOLOVTOV apa <ra!juaTO$ 

417 a, 3, Td /A<tv...4, ^Travfw^te^] T R7rl 5^ r& Trapad($OfJ,fra trfpl tf'V'xfis 7ra/>dl rcD? 
^^' 5crov (^<rwv X), ^Kacrros &vt<jrfp<tro (r&v K) ir/>6rfpov (irpurw \V X), <ljp^r 
^0^ (^Ov 5* W), wcrT/> ^ <ipx^ ^^ ivwlufuv SU WXm Soph, et E fol. rB6 (vide 
appcndiccm). Them. Simpl. I'hilop. et vctunta Iranslniio latina .sine <luhio vulgatam 
legerunt || 3, irportpM V y || 4. etf^ra^ tnargo K, ctptfff&w etiam Simp], || 5. 4<m ^i/xs? K 
et fol. 1 86 et 187 (Bhl.) ^ om. etiam Them. Soph. !I &? c??;]^flrri SU WX, ft*' ?*7 etiam 
Them. Soph, [j /cotvas UWX, Acotv6raro5 etiam Them. Simpl, Soph. || 6. X^o/tfv.*. 
i a. 0u<rt/c< vitl. append,, vulgatam legerunt etiam Alex. ATT, /cai XtV. 74, 34 ct Them. || 
6. & U V, ^ Alex. 1. L Them. || tt> n 7^0? S VV X, 7^0* l ri etiam Alex. 1. 1. Them. 
Soph. || 9. 5w<fyit y Philop. et, ut vitletur, Them. 39, 7, ro Simpl. 84, i (ef. 83, 30. 34), 
$tfra/uy etiam Soph. || u. <I>? r6 om. 1C et margo K, leg. Them. If 14. ^auroD Them*, 
ettfrotf etiam Simpl. Soph. 41, 5 (in cod. Vindob*, teste Hiehlio 5t a^roO e cotUU 
Ilayduck) || <S. 8$ 4<m Kj y et, ut videtur, Them. 39, 33, qui interpretatur rolvw^ re* E 


So much for the theories of soul handed down by our pre- 1 
1 . ,. decessors. Let us. then, make a fresh start and try to 

Soul in the ' 3 J 

widest determine what soul is and what will be its most com- 


of the term prehensive definition. Now there is one class of existent 2 

things which we call silbstance, including under the 
term, firstly, matter, which in itself is not this or that ; secondly, 
shape or form, in virtue of which the term this or that is at once 
applied ; thirdly, the whole made up of matter and form. Matter 
is identical with potentiality, form with actuality. And there 
are two meanings of actuality : knowledge illustrates the one, 
exercise of knowledge the other. Now bodies above all things 3 
are held to be substances, particularly such bodies as are the work 
of nature; for to these all the rest owe their origin. Of natural 
bodies some possess life and some do not : where by life we mean 
the power of self-nourishment and of independent growth and 
decay. Consequently every natural body possessed of life must 
be substance, and substance of the composite order. And since 4 
in fact we have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the 
possession of life, the body will not be the soul : for the body is 
not an attribute of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of 
attributes, that is, matter. It must follow, then, that soul is 
substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality. The soul, 

(Rr.) et reliqui 5' &rrl, etiam Soph. || real ante <r<tyx ora. U V WXP Soph. Bek. Trend. 
Rodier Zeller II, 2*, p. 480 || ra6vde E T P, KO! roiovBl TOVTO S U V W X Rodier, ical 
roiovdt y Trend. Hunc v. varie interpretantur ; tTrel o$x cwrXws <ro>/-ta, dAXA, <rw/*a roiovSt 
Them., Philop. modo ical <rQfA,d fort Kal roiov8L 215, 5, modo <rjj.d fori rotovSl 215, /.sq., 
4irel 8' tcrrl (rw/wt ai rot6v5e <rw/ua Soph, || 17. rb om. S U Zeller, Archiv f. G. d. Ph. 
IX, p. 538 || if ^vx-f) SUVWXy Philop. 215, n. 18. 22 Alex. ap. Philop. Zeller 1. L, 
i) om. ET Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl Rodier, etiam Soph., de Them, non liquet, qui, cum. 
39, 35 o$8el$ -ykp &v etiroi TO o-Qfjux, elSos rov f&vTOs <rd>fiaros t turn 40, 4 tfn ykp oil <TWJJM ^ 
tyirxfl dtdeiKTOit, interpretatur : cf. 40, 34 |f ettios pro ifsvxtf coni. Innes, Cl. Rev. XVI, 
p. 462. , 

H. 4 

So DE ANIMA II en. i 

5 TeXe>(ta, avTT) Se XeyeTat 89^9, ^7 

17 S' 0)5 ro 0ea>petv. fyavepov ovv on a>$ eiricrnfrii? e^ yap 
TO) vTrdpyziv rfy ^X 1 ) v Ka ^ ^ 7 ^5 KOI eypTjyopcrts ecrTtv, 

' 7) jitez' eyp7?yopcrts TO* #ea>petv, 6 S* v?n>09 ra3 25 
/cat /XT) evzpyeiv irporepa 8e TT} yez^e'cret eVt roC avToO 
17 eVtcmfju/rj. Sto ^ V^X 7 ? ^crTtj' eVTeXe)(eta 17 TT/DCWTTJ cral/xaro? 

6 <jf>VCTt/COt) Swaj^et ^TfV )(OVTO5. TOtOVTO , O cb 

opyava Se /cat ra 

a, CHOI; ro <f>v\\ov 7repu<apiriov cr/c7racrju,a, TO 8e 7T- 
/capTrov* at Se /ot^at ra> crrdjaart dvaXoyo^- a/ic/>o) 
yap IX/ct TTJV rpo<l>rjv. et 817 rt KOWQV em Trdcrrjs \jjv*)(rj$ 
Set Xeyetz/, efy a^ e^reXe^eta 07 Trpcorrj crci/jtaros ^>v<rt/cou 5 
7 opyavt/cou. Sto /cat ov Set ^rjrelv et er^ 07 ^v^ri /cat TO crfifta, 
cuo"7rp ouSe TOZ^ Krjpov /cat TO a"^rjfia^ ov$* oXoos T^Z/ e/ccxcrTOV 
/cat TO o5 ^ vX^ p TO yap ez> /cat TO etvat eTret 7rXeoz/a- 
\eytrai, TO /cvpt'cos 97 eVreXe^eta ecrTtv. 

KaOoKov /xef oSz/ etpijTai Tt ecrrtz/ 17 ^vj(>7 " oucrta yap 17 /caTa 10 
TOV Xdyov- TOVTO 8e TO Tt 77^ elvat TO> Tot<j)Sl o"c5ftaTt, /ca^aTrep et Tt 
T<3^ 6pyavo)i/ <j^vcrtKOv TJJ/ o r <3/ta, otbz/ 7reXe/cv$* ^ />te 
TO TreXe/cet ti>at 17 ovtria aurov, /cat ^ ^i^c?) TOWO* 
Se ravrys QVK av ert TreXe/cv? ^v, aXX* - 
vvv S* ecrTt Tre'Xe/cu?' ov yap TOIOVTOV crcijLtaTo? TO Tt 15 
^V etz/at /cat 6 Xdyos T7 ^X^> ^^ <J>VCTLKOV TOtovSt e 

TOS Q>*) V KwycrG(t)<$ /cat crraretos zv eavT<. ea>etv e /cat 

T<3v /xep<2i> Set TO Xe)((9eV. et yap TJV o 

avTov 17 OX/HS' avTT7 yap overt a 6<j6^aXftov 17 
/caTa TOV Xdyoz/. 6 8* Q^OaXpos v\,r) or/fe^?, 179 aTroXet- 

o Xt- 

a(J. 3f) K (Bus.) et Uy, rcliqui omnes 5^ || 27. $16 ^ ^. ET Vy BichI Kodicr, ^ om. 
rcliqui, ctiam Soph. || *B. rotoCrov HTVWX jj 4ib, 4. ^ ESTVy, ^ etiam Thm. 
5oph. JPhilop. ad 403 1>, 5 (37, 15) et in proocmio acl lib. II. (205, 15) Bek* Trend. Torst. |j 
5, -4 Tpifrr)? ^r, WX, vulgatam tuetur etiam Them. (| 8. off 8X17 SUWX Soph. Hck. 
Trend. Torst. l| 9. X^erai cm. SUWX Them., leg. ctiam Soph. || 12. $v E (Trend. 
Bus.) ct y Torst Belger in ed. alt. Trend, Biehl Kodicr, om. reliqui, etiam Philop. || 
13. r6] r& E T W ttt re. X || 14. 5^] >4p S X Bek. Trend. Torst., '< autem " vet. trans!., 
^td d7TX5oJ<r^ F || 15* i/0v 6' oiJ/c forty coni. Torst., neque Them, neque I'hilop. ncquc 
Soph, o^ legerunt || 16. rotwft etiam Soph., roD Alex. dir. ^ai X. 76, 14 tt l*hilop. |J 
17. aOr^) SUVW Alex. L K, a>/rcu X, <?i^v etiam Philop. II 20, TorKt. coni. o S* 
ri <r&vo\w, ^ ^ /c6/; 0X?7 tyews, iisdem fere verbis interpretatur Them., 
w in parenth, ponenda, puncto post X^o^ deJeto, censet By water, J. of Ph. 

CH. i 412 a 22 412 b 21 51 

therefore, is the actuality of the body above described. But the 5 
term 'actuality' is used in two senses; in the one it answers to 
knowledge, in the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in 
this case it is analogous to knowledge : for sleep, as well as waking, 
implies the presence of soul ; and, whilst waking is analogous to 
the exercise of knowledge, sleep is analogous to the possession 
of knowledge without its exercise ; and in the same individual 
the possession of knowledge comes in order of time before its 
exercise. Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having 
in it the capacity of life. And a body which is possessed of organs 6 
answers to this description. We may note that the parts of plants, 
as well as those of animals, are organs, though of a very simple 
sort : for instance, a leaf is the sheath of the pod and the pod of 
the fruit. The roots, again, are analogous to the mouths of animals, 
both serving to take in nourishment. If, then, we have to make 
a general statement touching soul in all its forms, the soul will 
be the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs. 
Hence there is no need to enquire whether soul and body are 7 
one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint are one ; 
or, in general, whether the matter of a thing is the same with that 
of which it is the matter. For, of all the various meanings borne 
by the terms unity and being, actuality is the meaning which 
belongs to them by the fullest right. 

It has now been stated in general terms what soul is, namely, 8 
substance as notion or form. And this is the quiddity of such 
and such a body. Suppose, for example, that any instrument, 
niustra- sa y> an axe > were a natural body, its axeity would be 

txon from its substance, would in fact be its soul. If this were 
taken away, it would cease, except in an equivocal sense, 

But the axe is after all an axe. For 
it is not of a body of this kind that the soul is the quiddity, 
that is, the notion or form, but of a natural body of a particular 
sort, having in itself the origination of motion and rest. 

Further, we must view our statement in the light of the parts of 9 

the body. For, if the eye were an animal, eyesight 
sight of an would be its soul, this being the substance as notion 
eye " or form of the eye. The eye is the matter of eyesight, 

and in default of eyesight it is no longer an eye, except equivocally, 

XVII, p. 54, cui assentitur Susemihl, vulgatam tuentur etiam Philop. 221, 24 Simpl. et 
vet. transl. || <&7roXroi5<r?7S TVW Them. Simpl. Trend., dTroXenrotfoTjf etiam Soph. || 
a i. O$K (ffrtv STU VW Bek. Trend., ofa^rt EX, ofa&-' Them. Torst., ofatn t<rrlv in 
interpr. Simpl. 93, 32, otf/cri &rrai Soph. [| 6/wc&/v/*os E. 


52 DE ANIMA II CHS. i, 2 

6ivo$ Kal 6 yeypa/x/xeVos, Set 8?) Xaftetv TO em //.epovs e<j&' 
oXov TOV O>Z/TOS craSjaaTOS' avaXoyov yelp e>(ei cus TO //.e- 
po? Trpos TO />iepo$, ovTa>$ 17 oX^ aicr^ijcris irpos TO oXoi' 

10 0-<3/>ia TO alcrOrjTLKov, 77 TOIOVTOV. CCTTL Se ov TO aTropepXrjKOS 25 

TTp \fjV*)(flV TO SwdfJ,L OV O><TT ^TJZ/, CtXXa TO ^OV * TO 

11 (rrrepjJLa Kal 6 /capTros TO Swajoca ToiovSi crcS/xa. a>g 
ovv 17 Tju/rjcris /cal T] opacTts, ovTCu /cat 17 eyp^yopcTL? 

Xaa, a)? 8* 17 ot//t? KCU 17 Swa/it? TOV opydvov, 17 ifsv^rj' 413 ^ 
TO 8e crcSjua TO Svz^a/tet ov dXX* alcrTrep 6<^^aX/xo9 17 

12 K:op77 Kal "17 o^t?, KOLKtl r) iffv^rj Kal TO crcofjia 

oSv ovfc ecTTiv 17 ^v^ ^copcorT-j) TOV crcSjicaT 
a avT7j9 3 et juepicm) 7re^>v/cV, OUK: aBrjXov kvlwv yap 17 5 
TW peptov <TTlz/ avTcSv. ov /IT)^ dXX' evict ye 
TO jt,r0vo<s etvai 

13 ere e ar)ov e otra>9 eTee^eca TOV 

TrXotov, TVTTO) /xez/ ovv 

/n;^$. I0 

2 'ETrel 8' 6K Tca^ acra<j>o)v p,ev 
rai TO cra<j&9 /cal /caTa TOV Xoyo*/ 

To?/ TraXti' OVTCU y* 67reX^eiv Trepl avTTjs* ov yap IL&VQV TO OTL 
Set TOV 6pi(TTt/cov Xoyov S^Xow, cScrTrep 06 7rXta*TO6 TcSv opa>v 
Xcyovcrtv, dXXd /cal TTJV amav ivvTrdp^eiv /cal 
vv 8* (3cr7rp crv/XTrepacrfta^* ot Xoyot 

T6Taa) vtcritog ; TO 

tcroirXevpov. o Se TOIOVTOS opo^ Xoyo? TOV 
6 Se Xeyoov 6Vt eVrlv 6 TTpaya>vto"/jco 
2 TOV 7rpay/xaT09 Xeyet TO atnov, Xeyo^ev o3v dp^v Xa/3ov- 20 

TO evov TOV 

TOV ^v Xcyo/zevov> /cav Iv Tt 

23. 5 VX, 5^ etmm Them,, ro^vv intcrpr* Simpl. H 24* odrwi om. UVWX 
leg, Philop. Simpl. || 45, rotoOro U W Bek. Trend, rowvrov reliqiu codd. et E (Ku.) 
Philop. Sopli. Tonit* 1] 27. rot^Se Alex. ATT* >cai X. 76, 35 j| 28. r/*^(rts codd*, a&r^o'w 
coni. Christ || 413 a, 2. 6 <5#0, TUWX Simpl. Soph, Bek. Trend, 6 om. Philop. ad 
41* b, 17 (931, ) et Them, || 3. rd f<Sov S U W X Them. Simpl Soph. lick. Trend, j) 
5. frtw 7^/5 ^ <^r\^x*ft] *w* 7<ip VreX^x*** forsitan legent Soph. 44, 29 || 8. r K, 
W etiam Philop. ad 411 a, a 6 (139, 35) et Soph. H 13, otfrw E (Uhl.) P, reliqui ct 
scripti et ante Biehlium imprcssi omnes oOrws || y 4irt\0efr EP Soph. reliqui el 
scripti et ante Biehlium impress! omnes om. ye, 4irwf\#tft> S Philop. 230, 6 Slmpl. }j 
17, tVrt rerfHtywurfifo VW Them. Soph. ttek. Trend. Torst. Ii 18. X^yoj om. KTV H 
KJ. b post ^crri^ om. WX Them* || %<rw TUWX 11 10, Xrfyw^iw TW Alex. 77, s, 

CHS. i, 2 412 b 22 413 a 22 53 

like an eye in stone or in a picture. What has been said of the 
part must be understood to apply to the whole living body ; for, 
as the sensation of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation 
as .a whole to the whole sentient body as such. By that which 10 
has in it the capacity of life is meant not the body which has lost 
its soul, but that which possesses it. Now the seed in animals, 
like the fruit in plants, is that which is potentially such and such 
a body. As, then, the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye n 
is full actuality, so, too, is the waking state ; while the soul is 
actuality in the same sense as eyesight and the capacity of the 
instrument. The body, on the other hand, is simply that which is 
potentially existent But, just as in the one case the eye means 
the pupil in conjunction with the eyesight, so in the other soul and 
body together constitute the animal. 

Now it needs no proof that the soul or if it is divisible into 12 
parts, certain of its parts cannot be separated from the 

Soul in- 

separable body, for there are cases where the actuality belongs to 
rom o y. ^ e parts themselves. There is, however, no reason why 
some parts should not be separated, if they are not the actualities 
of any body whatever. Again, it is not clear whether the soul 13 
A possible may not be the actuality of the body as the sailor is of the 
analogy. ship. This, then, may suffice for an outline or provisional 
sketch of soul. 

But, as it is from the things which are naturally obscure, though 2 
more easily recognised by us, that we proceed to what is clear 
and, in the order of thought, more knowable, we must employ 
this method in trying to give a fresh account of soul. For it is 
not enough that the defining statement should set forth 
good the fact, as most definitions do ; it should also contain 

and present the cause: whereas in practice what is stated 
in the definition is usually no more than a conclusion. For 
example, what is quadrature ? The construction of an equilateral 
rectangle equal in area to a given oblong. But such a definition 
expresses merely the conclusion. Whereas, if you say that 
quadrature is the discovery of a mean proportional, then you state 
the reason. 

We take, then, as our starting-point for discussion that it is life 2 
which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate. But the 
term life is used in various senses ; and, if life is present in but a 

\4yofjLev etiam Them. Philop. Soph. f| rty dpxV Alex. 1. I., rfy om. Them. Fhilop., 
tiXfaiv d/>xV coni. Susemihl [[ ai. a-xtyeus roO irpdyftwos SU WX Alex. 1. L, roO irpdy. 
om. etiam Soph. || 22, Ifiv] fcrijv fyovrt. <r<fycari Alex. 1. 1. 


avro (a^eis, QLOV vov$, atcr^Tjcrt?, /ct~ 

^770-15 /cat crracris 17 fcara Toirov, ert Kivrjcri^ y Kara rpo- 

3 (^z/ /cat <f>0i<ri$ re /cat av^cri?. Sto /cat ra tfrvofJieva 25 
Trdvra So/cet TJZ/' tpaiverai yap zv auTOts e^o^Ta Swa//.tv 
/cat Q-pyyiv roiavTrfv, St' 775 av&qcriv re /cat fyQlcnv Xa/u,- 
ftdvovcrL Kara Tovg ^az^rtov9 TOTTOV?* orJ ya^o az/o) juo' ave- 
rai } KOTO) 8' ov, dXX* 6/xota>s CTT* afji(f>a) /cat TTCU'TTJ, ocra act 
Tpefierai re /cat 77 Stcx reXovs, !a>5 az/ SwTjrat XajLcy8ai/tv 30 

4 rpo<j)tfv. '^capi^ea'daL 6 TOT!TO JLCCV rc3v aXXcov Swarov, rci 
S* aXXa TorJrov aSwaro^ i^ rots Owrjrots. tfravepov 8' em 

{>uo/>teVa)i'- ovSe/xta yap avrot? 

. TO )U,I> OU^ ^Z/ Sta T7J 

ro Se ^<5oi^ Sta T7p atcr^crtv 7r/Da>ra)9* ^cat ya/D ra 
/cti/ou/L6^a ^778* aXXcxrroz/ra TOTTOI/, fyovra 8* atcr^crtz/ 
/cat ou ^TJ^ yt>Qvov. alcr0ij<rea><5 Se Trp&rov vTrap- 
<f>ij. ucrirep 8e TO QperrriKOv Sv^aTat ^a)y3t^- S 
<r#at T-^5 0.^775 /cat irdcr^ atcr^crecas, owcos 77 <x< 
aXXa>v aicrdirjcretav. OpermKQv Se Xeyo/Jte^ TO TOtovTO^ 
TTJ$ ^^775 oS /cat Ta <j>vo^eva ftT)(f Ta Se ^a 
<j6at^eTat TT)P aTTTt/ci)^ atcrBrjorw ej(O^ra St* 77^ 8' amav 
e/caTepo^ rvvTtov crv/^^8e)S77/cev, varrepov epovfiev. 10 

6 vw 8* e-Trt TOCTOVTOV etp^cr^ct) fAovov, oTt ecrTti/ 77 

/ctv77<ret, irorepov Se TOVTO)^ GKacrrov Icrri 

Xoya> fjiovov ^ /cat TOTT^), Trept /x-e^ rwS>v TOVT&V ov 
8 tSetz/, !Wa 8e aTroptW ex^t. cJo"7rep yap e?rt T^ <J>VT>V 
8tatpov/tez/a faiverai ffivra, /cat ^capt^o/xei/a ctTr* 
(Ss OVO^-TJS T^S e*> TOVTOt? $v)(r}<s evTcXexet^t ft3^ /uas ev 
J, 8vj/aft6t Se TrXetovcov, ovToas opai/xev /cat Trepl 

X^ 9 crv/jt/Jatyoy CTTC T^^ evroptov Iv 
/cat yap alcrdfjorw tKarepov r*v ftepfiz/ 

23. iMpxi; SWX Philop. || 25, #tor*v et a^trtu SUWX Soph. Trend. Rentier If 

29, TrdvTij terptytrat re *cal S U X kodier, TT^TT; tf<ra del rptycral re jrai K T ct omistto 
r W, irdvroft /cat rp^^crat Kai V Bek. Trend., Trai'TcKre* *ai rp^^eraf TC *cai Torst., rdwy 
/fal rptyvrai $ik r4\ovs KG! ffi P, Tiyry ^<ra *ai r/^0cra*, jeal de caniectura scripsit Biehl II 

30. post r&ovy virgulam Bek. Trend*, om. Torst. || 41 3 b, t. ro?y {;] ra<rt ro? ^uwrt S U 
Them. Soph., roTj ^<ri v3<ri X || 4, Mpx" vpC)rov vfarw S, 7ro<ra' ^7r<px*t Trp&ro? X, 
irpwrov fafyxu irfoiv ceteri, etiam P jj 5, W] ?&/> X, W etiam Them. Philop. j| 8. 

CH. 2 413 a 23 413 b 21 55 

single one of these senses, we speak of a thing as living. Thus 
various there is intellect, sensation, motion from place to place 
Sensor 10 " an d rest > ^ e m ti n concerned with nutrition and, 
operations, further, decay and growth. Hence it is that all 3 
plants are supposed to have life. For apparently they have within 

themselves a -faculty and principle whereby they grow 
mum in and decay in opposite directions. For plants do not 

grow upwards without growing downwards ; they grow 
in both directions equally, in fact in all directions, as many as 
are constantly nourished and therefore continue to live, so long 
as they are capable of absorbing nutriment. This form of life 4 
can be separated from the others, though in mortal creatures the 
others cannot be separated from it. In the case of plants the fact 
is manifest : for they have no other faculty of soul at all. 

It is, then, in virtue of this principle that all living things live, 

whether animals or plants. But it is sensation primarily 

Sensation r r J 

in ail which constitutes the animal. For, provided they have 

sensation, even those creatures which are devoid of move- 
ment and do not change their place are called animals and are 
not merely said to be alive. Now the primary sense in all animals 5 
is touch. But, as the nutritive faculty may exist without touch 
or any form of sensation, so also touch may exist apart from the 
other senses. By nutritive faculty we mean the part of the soul 
in which even plants share. Animals, however, are found uni- 
versally to have the sense of touch : why this is so in each of the 
two cases will be stated hereafter. 

For the present it may suffice to say that the soul is the origin 6 
of the functions above enumerated and is determined by them, 
namely, by capacities of nutrition, sensation, thought, and by 
Mutual motion. But whether each one of these is a soul or part 7 
of?hese n of a soul and > if a P art > whether it is only logically 
functions. distinct or separable in space also is a question, the 
answer to which is in some cases not hard to see: other cases 
present difficulties. For, just as in the case of plants some of them 8 
are found to live when divided and separated from each other 
(which implies that the soul in each plant, though actually one, 
is potentially several souls), so, too, when insects or annelida are 
cut up, we see the same thing happen with other varieties of soul : 
I mean, each of the segments has sensation and moves from place 

S U X Bek. Trend. || 12. fywrrwcv $/>e/cn/c<:> coni. Susemihl || 13. post K/iJ<ri addendum 
d/^|ei putat Steinhart || 15. rotfrwi/ om. SUWX Them. Soph. || 18. a&rois SUVX 
Them. Soph. 


/cat Kiwrjcriv rrjv /cara TOTTOV, el S* aLcrOrjcrw, /cat <j)avracriav 
/cat opegw 0770V ju,ey yap atcr^crts, /cat XVTH? r /cat f]8ovrj, 
9 OTTOV Se ravra, e'f amy/c*?? /cat eTrtflv/ua. Trept Se roO rov 
/cat TTJS 0(*)pr)TLKrj$ Swctjite<*>s ovSeV 770) <$>avepov 9 aXX eot/ce 25 
\ljv)(rjs yeVog erepov el^at, /cat rovro JLCOVOV ez/Se'^erat X^P^' 
10 ecr#at, KaOaTrep TO cttSto^ roS <j>6aprov. ra Se XotTta /xopta 
Js 1 <pavepov IK TQVTCOV ort ou/c eorrt j(6)/) terra, 

rai 8e Xoya> ort erepa, <f>avepov 

yap eTvat *cac SofaorrtKoJ ertpov, etTrep /cat TO alcrddvecrdcu, 30 
roO Sofa^eiv. Ojucotco? Se /cat ri/ aXXcyv /cacrrov rcSv etpTjjute- 
va>v. ert S* eviois ftev ra>v <j>a)v aTra^^* v?rap)(t raCra, 
rtcrt Se x rtva rovrcov, erepotg Se ey povov (rovro Se TrotT^cret 
Sta<j&opoU> rcxli/ tf&tov}* Sta rtva S* atrta^, vcrrtpov CTrtcr/ceTrreo^. 
7ra/oa7rX?7crtoz>Se /cat Trept ras atcr^Tjcret? crv/^^e^/ce^' ra jLtez/ yap 
e^et 7ra<Ta5> ra Se rt^a^, ra Se /^taz^ r^ az/ay/catorar7j^, a^yv. 
eVet Se <5 ^(SjLte^ /cat atcr0az>dju,e0a Stx^J? Xeyerat, 
/ca^aTrep <5 eVtcrrajae^a (Xeyojitey Se ro /xey eTrtcrr^Tjv 5 
ro Se tyvxtfvt e/carepo> yap rovrcoi' <j>a/^ei/ en-tcrracr^at), 
6/xota)9 Se /cat <j) vytau/Ojaejf ro jaev vyttcx, ro Se /xopt^> 
rtvt rov craJjaaros ^ /cat oX^>' rovrcov S* 07 /xe^ eVtorr);/x>7 
re Kat vyteta pop<j>ri /cat etSos rt /cat Xoyos ^at ofov ei/ep- 
yeia rov SeKrt/coS> 17 /xj/ roi) eVtcrrTj/xovt/cov, 17 Se rov vytacrrt/cov ro 
yap eV r< 7ra<r)(ovrt /cat Start^e/^eVa) 17 rctlv Trotijrt- 
e^epyeta)* 17 ^V^T) Se rovro <5 c3/x.ez/ /cat 
/cat Stavooujite^a Trp^Jr&s cScrre Xoyo9 rt9 a&> et^ 

^a. /cai favrcurtw deled vult FreuUcnthal, Ucber den IJegrifif </>wTa<rta bei ArUu 
p. 8, cui assentiuntur SchieboWl, I)e imag. disquis., p. 44 et Susemihl, M J. 
LXXXVIII, 12, virgitlam j)ost afo0r)ffiv dclcrc, post ^avracrtay poncre in scholis nialuil 
H. Jackson || 23, >cai ante X^ om. SUWX Soph. || 15. D^TTW TUVNVXy et 
Philop. in prooctnio ad lib. i (n i) ct ad 411 a 26 (194, 10), scd hoc loco et ad 415 A it 
<(>i, 14, x6) oi^ irw, quod eliam Them, legit: cf. Them. pp. 46, 4* 102, n. 103, 7, j| 
6. /cat om. S. Cf, Hcituii erit. adn. ad Them. 46, 5* ioa T 13- 103, 7 [immo, ft] jj 
rcu omnes codd, Soph, et Philop. ter hoe loco et ad 411 a, 26 (194, n) sed ad 
zi (261, 15) frdfywO&i et earn quoque scripturam ferri et ab Alexandra Icgi tmdit 
ad hunc locum Philop., frtiiwtfQu etiam Them. 46, 5 || xw/>ifc<r^at om. X. Cf, Them. 
1. 1* H 33- roOro..*4X4.a, i. ^wi/ cum Torst. in parenthesi posuit Biehl H 33. Totet S U X I* 
Simpl. 103, 19 Philop. vet. trausl Bek. Trend. Torst., ^7roVSoph, || 4i4a, i. fazfopat 
T V X P, Jca^opA^ etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. |j 2. rAy om. E et re. T, lejy. etiam Soph. || 
4* de hoc loco 4rel,*,i4. ^ro^evo^ cf. Bon- tud* Ar. II, III. 120, ivd ^,,.8. Qwtpbi* 
&K rofaw sunpecta videntur Sascmihlio, Oecon. p. 84, pro tirel W coni. <fn W Trend., lirtl 
8t etiam Soph. || 5. post 6rt<rr<l/Ae0a virgulam Bek. Trend. Torst, delevit Bon. | 

CH. 2 413 b 22 414 a 13 57 

to place, and, if it has sensation, it has also imagination and 
appetency. For, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure 
and pain : and, where these are, desire also must of necessity be 
Theca f P resent - But as regards intellect and the speculative 9 
intellect faculty the case is not yet clean It would seem, how- 

not clear. . t 1-1 

ever, to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is 
capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from 
that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul are, 10 
as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way 
that some allege them to be : at the same time it is clear that they 
are logically distinct. For the faculties of sensation and of opinion 
taken in the abstract are distinct, since to have sensation and to 
opine are distinct. And so it is likewise with each of the other 
faculties above mentioned. Again, while some animals possess n 
all these functions, others have only some of them, others only 
one. It is this which will differentiate animal from animal. The 
reason why this is so must be investigated hereafter. The case is 
similar with the several senses : some animals have all of them, 
others some of them, others again only one, the most indispensable, 
that is, touch. 

Now " that by which we live and have sensation " is a phrase 12 
A second with two meanings, answering to the two meanings of 
deduction that by which we k now (the latter phrase means, 
definition. firstly, knowledge and, secondly, soul, by either of which 
we say we know). Similarly that by which we have health means 
either health itself or a certain part, if not the whole, of the body. 
Now of these knowledge and health are the shape and in some 
sort form, the notion and virtual activity, of that which is capable 
of receiving in the one case knowledge, in the other health: 
that is to say, it is in that which is acted upon or conditioned 
that the activity of the causal agencies would seem to take 
effect. Now the soul is that whereby primarily we live, per- 
ceive, and have understanding: therefore it will be a species of 

6". MercurOai in parenth. posui || Xyu coni. Torst, \4yofAev etiam Simpl. et sine dubio 
Soph. H S unc. incl. Bon., cui adversatur By water, p. 55 || 6. &car^o<p...^7r(rTacr0(u 
in parenth, posuit Bon. || 7. y unc. incl. Bywater || fyle<,a,v X et pr. S, reliqui codd. 
et Bek. Trend. j>ye<a, i^ytc^ de coniect. Trend, a Torst. receptum probat Bon., iryiclq, 
iam Soph. || 8. SXy. Tofrrw Bek. Trend., post flXv colon Torst. Bon. j| 9. Kal ante 
olov om. S U X || 10. T&V $eKTLK&i> X Philop. et in paraphr. Them. Simpl. || frytcLovou 
XP Simpl. Philop. Soph. 50, 19, quod probat Hayduck. progr. Gryph. 1873 p. I, 
recepit Rodier, byiaoriKov ceteri, etiam Bon. Ind. Ar. s.v. Barco (I 12. Torst. incipit 
apodosin ab ^ ^vxh, Bon. ab wVre 13, idque recte. || 13. irpdrrus, were Bek. Trend., post 
colon Torst. Bon. 

5 8 DE ANIMA II CHS. 2, 3 

13 /Cat tSo<J, dXX* OV-% V\T) Kal TO VTTOKZlptVQV. TplX^S J^P 

Xeyo/xeV/79 TTJS overlap, KaQdtrep i7rofjiv, &v TO jaev 1809, 15 

TO 8e vX?7, TO 8e e ap.(j>olv, TOVT&V S* 

TO Se eTSo9 a/TeXexaa, eVet TO e 

TO Grand eoTt*v e/TcXe^eta V'^X'*? 9 ' ^^^* a ^ T7 7 cra5/xaTO9 Tt- 

14 z>09, jcai Sta TOUTO /caXcSs viroXapfidvovcriv ol<$ Sotft JLLTJT* 

ri r \jv cr<2z.a x^ 20 

ya/> oufc ICTTI, cra>/xaTO9 8c TL, Kai Sta TOVTO 

i, /cat ez> crco/xaTt TOIOVTW, /cat ov^ cScrTrcyo ot TT/)OT- 
cts cra>^a ^ytjpfJLO^ov avryv, ovBtv 7ryoo0"Sto/otoz>Te9 ev Ttvt 
/cat Trota), Kaiirep ovSe fyaivofilvov TOV TIT^O^TO? Se^ecr^at TO 
15 rvyov. ovro) Se ywercni /cat /caTa Xoyo^* e/cacrrov yap 17 z/- 25 
TcXe)(ta eV T^J Swajitet VTrdpyovn /cat TTJ ot/cta vX?j TTC- 
<j>VK.v eyytvecr^at. oTt /x-ev o5v lvre\e^eid Tt$ ecrTt /cat Xoyo? 
Swa/xtv e^o^Tog etvat TOtouTov, <f>avepov IK rovr&v* 

8v^a/Aa>z/ T-^9 ^v^9 at Xe^etcrat T0t9 /^e^ 
Traorat, KaOdirep ewro^e^, T0t9 Sc Tt^9 wrcov, 3 
Se jotta fjLOvr). 8wajLtet9 8* elrro^v OpeirriKOi^ ops- 

2 /CTt/cor/, atcr^ijTt/cw, KIV^TIKOV Kara TOtrov, 

dp)(l> 8e T0t9 /XI/ <^UTOt9 TO OpZTTTlKQV 

TOVTO T Kal TO ala'O'^riKOv. t 8 TO atcr^Ti/cov, /cat T^ ope- 

/cTt/cw* opefts /xe^ yap emOvfAici Kal OvfAOS /cat 

TO 8e ^a Tra^T* ej( overt jitta^ y Tt3^ ata^cra)^ 

w 8* alcrOrfcr^ i7rap)(ct, TOUT<^> 1780^07 T /cat XVTH; /cat TO 

1781; T /cat \VTT7) pov, ot9 8e Tam-a, /cat 17 7Tt^v/xta' TOV 5 

3 yap 17S09 op^t9 aim?, ert Se T7j9 Tpo<j5>^9 aiordrjcriv HXQWIV 
r) yap a<f>v) rij$ rpo<f>rj$ atcr^o7crt9* ^)jpot9 yap /cat vypots 

/cat eo$ /cat ifVot9 TeTat TO- (z/Ta iravra 

8* aZcrOrjcns a<f>rf, r&v 8* aXXcoz> al<r&r)T<t>v Kara 

/co$)' ovdev yap t9 rpo^yv a-v/z/JaXXeTat \f/6<f>o$ ov8 ^pfifta 10 

14. otfjtf ^ W, otJx <* SUVXy Simpl. || pro -yip com* 5^ Hayduck* L I. jj f4.., 
19. cf. Bon. atud. Ar. II, III* 58 || t(>, 5* om, P (I ry. post ^vrX. colon Itek. Trcn<U 
Torst., virgulam Bon* || ^ircl r^] Ifftftra r6 E (Uek. Rr.) ^7fi r& r6 K (Bhl), ut vklctur, 
^Tfrf W r^ STP Ikk, Trend, in cd. pr. Towt M # auctorc Trend, cm. Iklgcr, quod 
probat Bon. stud. Ar. II, III. 58, leg. & Them. Philop. || 10. ^ om. SUX t 
leg. Them. Soph. || 13. wpotrfaopttfavrM S U X Soph., irp<Hr8u>ptQrT<t etiam Philop* || 
25. odrw] roOro Soph* 51, $B^ ubi verbatim laudarc vidtitur || 28. rotow5l ^I^eu SUX, 
Zi^at rowtJrot/ Them. Soph. 11 30. c5<rw<rj dirofuv W, om. Kl*y /ca^r<p l/ro/*<K etiam 
Them. Soph, || 31. fyeKructit post a,l?0i/rnK6v U VX Them. Helg,, vulgatam tuctur Soph* 
414 b, r. otW S WX Soph., ro0r<* etUm Philop. |{ a. <5p#t* K (Trend*) If 4. wU r^] 

en's. 2, 3 414 a 14 414 b 10 59 

notion or form, not matter or substratum. Of the three meanings 13 
of substance mentioned above, form, matter and the whole made 
up of these two, matter is potentiality and form is actuality. And, 
since the whole made up of the two is endowed with soul, the body 
is not the actuality of soul, but soul the actuality of a particular 

body. Hence those are right who regard the soul as not 14 
independent of body and yet at the same time as not itself 
nortden- f ' a species of body. It is not body, but something be- 
body. with ' longing to body, and therefore resides in body and, what 
is more, in such and such a body. Our predecessors were 
wrong in endeavouring to fit the soul into a body without further 
determination of the nature and qualities of that body : although 
we do not .even find that of any two things taken at random the 
one will admit the other. And this result is what we might expect. 15 
For the actuality of each thing comes naturally to be developed 
in the potentiality of each thing : in other words, in the appropriate 
matter. From these considerations, then, it is manifest that soul is 
a certain actuality, a notion or form, of that which has the capacity 
to be endowed with soul. 

Of the powers of soul above mentioned, namely, those of 3 
The vital nutrition, appetency, sensation, locomotion and under- 
hSw t di" : standing, some living things, as we remarked, possess 
tributed. a j^ others some, others again only one. Plants possess 2 
the nutritive faculty only : other things along with this have 
A etenc sensation ; and, if sensation, then also appetency : where 
implied under appetency we include desire, anger and wish. But 

in touch. i u ... i j. I i. j i- 

all animals have at least one sense, touch : and, where 
sensation is found, there is pleasure and pain, and that which 
causes pleasure and pain ; and, where these are, there also is desire, 
desire being appetite for what is pleasurable. Again, they have 3 
a sensation concerned with nutriment, touch being such a sense. 
For it is by what is dry and moist, hot and cold, that all living 
things are nourished (and these qualities are perceived by touch, 
whereas the other sensibles are not, except incidentally): for sound, 
colour and odour contribute nothing to nutriment, while flavour 

/card ro coni. Barco || 5. re om. ET, leg. Simpl. Soph. || real ^ om. S U, ^ om. V Philop. 
253, 22 sq. Soph. || 6. op%ls IffTiv atirTj S T UX, forlv ope&s a#ny Soph., tenv om. etiam 
Philop. II 5t om. E W y || 8. &* T U V X Bek. Trend. Torst., &VTO, etiam Them. Philop. 
250, 7 et vet. transl. || rotrwv...^. ffvufiepyKos in parenth. posui H 9. post d^ colon vulg. || 
rols 5* <SXXots afo&TiToTs Torst. et Belg. in ed. alt. Trend., secuti Sophoniam, qui interpre- 
tatur rots 5 AXXots rQv a0-0qr?, vulgatam praeter omnes codd. tuentur Simpl. Philop. 
252, 36 et Alex. ap. Philop. 253, 13 et, ttt videtur, Them. 47, 32 || 10. post avupepyKfa 
punctum Biehl Rodier || o^y...n. farr&v <rrlv ante ^pois...ffv^epifjK6s collocanda 
censet Christ || 10. otfW xp&fut om. E, tuentur haec verba Them. Philop. Soph. 


607^77, 6 Be X^os ^ Tt r ^ CWTTCUZ/ ecTTiv. treiva Be Kal 
7ri0v[j,Ca, Kal 77 />te^ 7retz/a fypov Kal 0epf4ov y 77 Be 
Sti//a \ljv^pov Kal uypou' 6 Se x^os otoi> rjBvcrp,d Tt rovrcov 
ecrTtV. Stacra^reo^ Se Tre/n avrcov vcrrepov, vvv S* 776 rocrovrov 
eiptfcrda), on T*V <wa>z> rots er^ovcriv afyrjv KCU opet9 vvrap- 15 

4 x^- 7Tyoi 6 <j&a^racria9 aS^Xo^, vcrrepov S' 7T6cr/c7rTew. evt- 


erepots Se /cat TO Stai^oTjrt/coi/ re /cat 7/01)9, otoz> avdpa>7rot,$ /cat 
t ri Totouroz> erepov ecmv rj rifjucl^repov. 

5 77X0^ ov^ ort ro^ avrov rpotrov et? av ti7 Xoyo? i/^X^ 9 T Ka ^ 20 

ovre ycxp e/cet crx^/^a Trapa TO rpiytovov ecrTt /cat TCX 
9, OVT' evravda $VXV ^apa Ta? et/o^/xeVa?. ytVotro 8* &*> 

/cat eTrt rc5z^ o"X>?/^ctT^^ Xoyos /cotvo9 ? 09 <j^a 

e /cat 7Tt rat9 et- 
\ltv)(aL$. Sto yeXotov ttfTtiv rov KQLVQV \6yov Kal 25 

7Tt TOUT6)^ /cat (^' T6/DCO^, O9 OvSeVO9 6O"Tat TCOV QVTtoV tSt09 

Xoyo9 ovSe Kara TO ot/cetoz^ /cat TO arojitov eT8o9, a<f>VTa<$ TQV 


ra Kara ^X 7 ?^" TP 1/ T< cs V7rp)(i 
TO TrpOTCpov eVt Te T<3v crx^/jtaTCu^ /cat ezrt T<i^ I{JL^V)(&V, 30 

rpiywvov, V atcr^Tt/caJ TO 


7 <I)VTQV Kal Tt9 avdpwTrov f) flypCov. Sta Tt^a 8* alriav rw l<f>- 
ij<; ovT6)9 Ixo vert, cr/ceTrTeov. avev ftev yap TOV #p7m/coD ^ 
al<rOr)TiKQV OVK zorrw rov 8* atcr^Tt/cou ^(^pi^rai 
sv Tot? <f>VTQ?<s. TraXtv 8* avv fte^ TOV aTTTt/cov 

etov ovB^/JLia virapyzi, a<f>r/ 8* at/ev T<Sz^ cxXXct)^ v?ra/>- 

TToXXa yap T<Z> <^w^ OVT* o^tz/ OVT* d/coTjv ^ovo"t^ 5 

* Qcrfji'fjs alcrdffcrw. Kal r5>v aicr6riTiK&v 8c T<X 
TO /caTa TOTTW Kt^Tt/cw, Ta 8* ov/c ^6t. 

1 1 post d0>w} punctum vulg, || 12. 0/3/*oC /cai f i7poD S X > fi;/>. /cai ^e/>. ctmm Th<!iu Simpl. 
Soph, || 13. fry/joi? /cai $VXPV X Soph,, *ai ^u^' ^ a ^ ^TP- ^> ^XP& taZ ^y/>oJ ctiam Thttm* 
Simpl. (| nom.SUVX, leg. Iliilop. II 15. toptor0MSUVXThem.Soph. |{ 18. /cAvpost 
d^p(67rotjX I'hllop. 255, (>, /rai rolKjui, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 19. ^cmv ^r^o>> S U V 
Them., ^rpAv &rru> cetcri, ctian* Simpl. Soph., ^m? om. I*hUop. |j ^ *al rt/** U X Them. 
Bek. Trend. Torst., *ai omisso $ PIrilop*, /fai om. ctianj Soph. J ^2* ^ v^^ 7 ? KVy 
Simpl., ^ om Soph* || Trf^otro S U V X Soph. Hck. TremU Torst. |i 25, ttowbv <!*&&? 
com*. Susemihl, r<J ^otv^ \6yt# d/>/ct<r^at /A<5yy intcrpretatur I'hilop^ 337, 13. (| 26, ^<rn 
S U X P Soph., Itfrai Them. || 27. post X^yot vulg. virguUm sustuli It otidl Bti furt. 

CH. 3 414 b ii 415 a 7 6 1 

is one of the tangible objects. Hunger again, and thirst are forms 
of desire, the one for what is hot or dry, the other for what is cold 
or moist. Flavour is, as it were, the seasoning of these. We will 
deal with these in detail hereafter : at present let it suffice to say 
that all animals which have the sense of touch are also endowed 
with appetency. Whether they have imagination is not clear : this, 
Higher ^j must be considered later. Some have in addition 4 
functions. ^ power o f locomotion. Others that is to say, man 
and any other species like man or, possibly, superior to him have 
also the thinking faculty and intellect. 

From this it is clear that there is one definition of soul exactly 5 
A single as there is one definition of figure : for there is in the 
of soiY,as one case no fig" ure excepting triangle, quadrilateral and 
of figure. f^g rest, -nor is there in the other any species of soul 
apart from those above mentioned. Again, a definition might be 
constructed which should apply to all figures, but not specially 
to any species of figure. And similarly with the species of soul 
above enumerated. Hence it would be- absurd here as elsewhere 
to seek a general definition which will not be properly a definition 
of anything in existence and will not be applicable to the particular 
irreducible species before us, to the neglect of the definition which 
is so applicable. 

The types of soul resemble the series of figures. For, alike 6 
in figures and in things animate, the earlier form exists 

The as- 

potentially in the later, as, for instance, the triangle 

vita? potentially in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty 

functions. -^ that which has sensation. So that we must examine 
in each case separately, what is the soul of plant, of man or of 
beast. Why they are related in this order of succession remains 7 
to be considered. There is no sensitive faculty apart from the 
nutritive : and yet the latter exists without the former in plants. 
Again, none of the other senses is found apart from touch ; while 
touch is found apart from the others, many animals having neither 
sight nor hearing nor sense of smell. Also of those which possess 
sensation, some can move from place to place, others " cannot 

Soph, interpretation! accommodatius esse censet Rodier II, 220 || teal rb arojiou E T y, ri> 
om. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 54, 30. Belt. Trend. Torst. || 28. Ktnl TO,... 30. crxn^rutf 
om. V || 29. Karti] irepl ryv SUVX || 31. /*&> rb rpl. V Soph. 54, 6 || 32. t&rre *cU 
KO.Q* sascepit Torst. e prima editione E, reliqui omnes om. /cai, etiam Soph. [| 33. rf] 
TO PU Soph., om. V || 4153, 3. olov v rots QVTOLS suscepit Torst. e prima editione E, 
olov om. reliqui. || 6. d<rw$ #Xwy o.tcrO'rj^v STUWX Soph. Bek. Trend., 5\wr om. E 
(Trend.) y Torst. Belger. 

62 DE ANIMA II CHS. 3, 4 

Se /cat iXd^icrra Xoytcrjitoz> /cat Stavotav ot$ ju<ez> yap VTT- 
r5z^ <j>6apTa>v y rovrois /cat ra XotTra Traz/ra, 
S' e/ceiWz/ e/cacrroz>, ov Tracrt Xoytcr/xos, aXXa rots /xez/ 10 
ovSe <az>racrta, rex Se Tcnvrr) l^ovg ^Sxrw. Trepl Se ro5 8eo)prj- 
TLKOV VQV erepos Xoyos. ort jitez/ ovz/ 6 Trept TQVT&V e/cacrrov 
Xoyos ovros ot/cetoraro$ /cat Trept ifsv"^?, S^Xoz/, 
4 'A^ay/catov Se rov /le'XXoz/ra Trept roiJrcuv cr/cet//tv 7rottcr^at 
Xaj8eu> l/cacrroz' OLVT>V rt ecrrtz/, e!$' ovrcos Trept rfiv e^o/jteVa)^ 15 
/cat ?7pt ro5v a\\cov OTt^Tjretv. et 8e j(/)^ \lyzw ri eKacrrov 
avrwv, olov rt ro vorjTiKQV TJ TO cdcrQrfriKOv f) TO ^p7rrt/coV, 
ere Xe/creoz' rt ro voctv /cat rt ro atcr^avecr^at* TT/>O- 
yap etaa raJ^ Su^a/iect>v at ez/e/>yaat /cat at Trpa^et? /cara 
rov Xoyov, et S* owcu?, rovroov S* ert irpoTtpa ra dvrt/cct^te^a 20 
Set Td<*)pr)Kv at, -jrept e/cetvwz/ rrpa>TOv az/ Se'ot Sto/>tcrat Stci r^z/ 

SN5/ 1 T N f *^ N>/J^\ rs ^ 

avTyv atrtaz/, otoz^ 7re/)t ryoocpTj? /cat atcrc/Tjrov /cat z^oojrov. 6>crre 
l Tpo<f>rj<s Koi y^^i7<Teco9 Xe/creoz>* 17 yap 
rots aXXots VTrap^et, /cat TrpcoTYj /cat 
eoTTt ^vx^Sj ^^^* >?^ VTrdp-^i TO fcfjv aTraortz/. 7^9 ecrrtz^ 25 
e/oya yz/^crat /cat Tpo<f>fj '^p'fjcrdaL' <uort/ccirarov yap raiz/ 
roTg <5o"tz>, ocra reXeta /cat /xi} Tnjpc^ara ^ 
(t, ro Trot^jcrat erepov olbv avro, 
8e </>vrov, t^a rov act /cat rov ^eto 

vravra yap eKtvov opeyerat, /cat e/cetz/ov Iz/e/ca Trparret 4*5 b 
ocra Trparret /cara </>ucrtv. ro S* o5 eve/ca 8trroz>, ro /^^ ov, ro 
8e <5. eVet ovv /cotz><t>z/etv aSv^aret rov aet /cat rov $tov r|j crv^- 
8ta ro /X7y8e^ IvB^^crdai r&v </>^apro3z/ ravro Kat lz> 
Sta/xez/etv, $ Swarat ^ere^et^ e/caaroz/, /cot3t/<w^t 5 

8. l\&wrw SUVWX t t\dxt<rT<i ctiam I'hilop. Soph. lj ^<ma^ T olo^ 6 (d on. K 
<it Soph,) fo&puTros $ n ($ tt rt Soph.) rotovroj' d\Xo fardpxu, ol$ Wy et a prima maim 
margo E (Trend,) ct Soph* II n ratJn; ^w SUX, ratirv /rivy Them* Thiltip. Soph, it 
15. r ^<rr^ am. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Thilop. |j 16, ij /cal SUX Bek. Tn.*nd. f ^ 
om. Simpl. Soph. Torst. || 18. Trp^rf/xiO vpfoepoy STUVWX Bck. Trend., Tp6rp(*t 
K (Trend. Bus.) y Them. Soph. Torst. Helgcr in ed. alt. Trend. I! ao. r^ om. K 
Soph* || J 1 ante n omnes cotld., insertum E (Trend,) J| *i. dt re0, om. \V, leg. 
Philop* Soph*, 5t& r^v aiJr^y a^r/ay poKt rtf^ewpT/^yat transponenda esse censet Christ || 
33, 7tf^<rwt T, /cat 7Wi$<rew* dcleri vult Kssen, progr. Stargard i86d p, 2 t v H 
a4- al ante rotf om. V, ante TT/>. om. UVXy i| ^5. 17?] oty VW, j etiam Them. 
Pliilop. Soph, H <>. ywrftfat re /caZ W, etiatu Philop. Soj)h. j| xpifaa0$at S T U V X 
Soph. Trend., xpQff$u Philop. ad hunc locum et ad 41^ a, 18 (779, x) J! fvffwttMfwv K 
(Trend.) ct pr. y, <j>wM<*rrarw ctiam Simpl. Philop* Soph* |{ 27. ft&ott S X, f^<r< Them. 

CHS. 3, 4 415 a 8415 b 5 63 I 

Lastly and most rarely, they have the reasoning faculty and 
thought. For those perishable creatures which possess reason are 
endowed with all the other species of soul, but not all those which 
possess each of the other faculties have reason. Indeed, some of 
them have not even imagination, while others live by imagination 
alone. As for the speculative intellect, it calls for a separate 
discussion. Meanwhile it is clear that an account of the several 
faculties is at the same time the most appropriate account of 

The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain what 4 
order of each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate 
procedure, fa^. questions next in order and so forth. But if we are 
asked to state what each of these is ; that is to say, what the cogni- 
tive, sensitive and nutritive faculties respectively are, we must begin 
by stating what the act of thinking is and what the act of sensation 
is. For activities and functions are logically prior to faculties. 
But, if so, and if a study of the correlative objects should have 
preceded, these objects will for the same reason have to be defined 
first : I mean, nutriment and the sensible and intelligible. Con- 2 
sequently we have first to treat of nutriment and of generation. 

The nutritive soul belongs to other living things as well as 
. man, being the first and most widely distributed faculty, in virtue 

ei ^ w h* c h a ^ things possess life. Its functions are repro- 
logicai duction and assimilation of nutriment. For it is the 

aspect of t f Hi-. i - ./- f 

most natural function in all living things, if perfect 

and not defective or spontaneously generated, to repro- 
duce their species; animal producing animal and plant plant, in 
order that they may, so far as they can, share in the eternal and 
the divine. For it is that which all things yearn after, and that is 
the final cause of all their natural activity. Here final cause is an 
ambiguous term, which denotes either the purpose for which, or 
the person for whom, a thing is done. Since, then, individual 
things are incapable of sharing continuously in the eternal and 
the divine, because nothing in the world of perishables can abide 
numerically one, and the same, they partake in the eternal and 

Philop. Soph. ([ 28. atr6fJLCLTOv S U W Soph., tvSrofjui'njv Them. Simpl. Philop. || 29. pert- 
XOVO-LV E (Trend.) et U Soph. v. 1. (fier^x^^v e codd. Hayduck, 57, i), ^r^taffw 
etiam Them. Philop. II 415 b, i. ical tKelvov T U V W et E (Bus.) Them., tcdiceLvov reliqui 
ante Biehlium omnes, etiarn Soph. || 2. post 0tf<ru> et post 3. f, pro vulg. punctis, cola 
posuit Rodier || rb 5' oC...^. f unc. incl. Trend, (cf. b, 20), leg. haec verba hoc loco 
Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 3. tirei O$V...TJJ a-vvexetg.'] Ka.Q6<rov S^VOLTM- dfoarai dt r% 
<rwex^P 1*6*1 in interpr. Them. 50, 19 || 4. TO atfrd S U X Soph., raeJrd Them. || 
5. Tatf-nj Koivuvel S U X Them. 

64 DB AN IMA II CH. 4 

TO jUi> /z,aXXov TO S' T^TTo^* /cat Staftej>et ov/c avro 
aXX* otoi> a^TO, apt#/>t<5 /i,ez> OT;^ eV, etSet 8* eV. 

3 ecrrt Se 17 ^f X 7 ) ro ^ ^ I/T0 ^ cr^^caros atria /cat apx^- Tavra 
Se TroXXa^oj? Xeyerat. 6/z-ouys 8 s 17 ^V^T? Kara rous StooptcrjueVovs 
rpoTTOvs rpets ama- /cat yap o#ei> 17 /averts avr^, /cat oS 10 
eVe/ca, /cat a>5 17 ovcrta r<5i> IfjLijjv^o)^ crcDftarcuv 17 

4 atrta. ort /i^ ow a>9 ovorta, S^Xov ro yap atrto^ rov 

^ < 9 / \ O \ i*^ ^ J* <> \ "5" / 9 > / O> \ 

Tracrtv 77 ovcrta, ro oe QYJV rotg 4 <w o rt ^o etvat ecrrtz>, atrta oe 
/cat a/)^ rourov rj ^fX 7 ?- ^ Tl ro ^ Swa/z,et o^ros Xoyo? 17 

5 e^reXe^eta. <f>avpov 8* a>s /cat ov li/e/cei/ 17 x/a^x^ atrta 15 
cocnre/) ycip 6 voCs ^e/ca rov Trotet, rw avroz> TpQTrov /cat 17 

s, /cat rovr* ecrrt^ avrTj? reXos. roiovrov 8* ev rots ^ot9 ^ 
^ /cat /cara c^vcrtv 7rdj>ra ycxp ret c^vcrt/ca crcijutara r^s 
opyava, /cat KadaTTGp ra r<3v ^ct)^, ovr<y /cat ra 
<f>vrSpj a>5 ei/e/ca TT/S i^v^ri** wra. StrrcSg Se ro oS 20 

6 ei/e/ca, ro re ov /cat ro <w. <3tXX<x /XT)Z/ /cat o^e?/ TrpaJroz/ 17 
/carcx TOTTO^ /ctz^crt?, V^X 7 ?- ^ 7r S- crt * vTrdp^ei ro?$ ^aJcrtr/ 

ts avrrj. ecrrt 8e /cat aXXotcucrts /cat av^crt? /card 
l V^ v y^P <*Z a '@ r J a ' t '5 aXXotct>crt9 rt$ et^at So/cct, at- 
8* ov&sv o p,r) jLterexet ^vx>?9. 6/>totct>9 8e /cat 

v /I/ v >C*\ x / /' >^> 

re /cat c/>^tcrecc>9 9(^t- ovoe^ yap <p^tvet ovo 

.7) rpe<f>6iivov, Tptyerai 8* ov^ev o 
*E/Jt7re8o/cX7j9 8* ov /caXSs t/>7;/ce rouro, TrpocmQels 

"V^aiviv rotg <j^vrot9 /caret) /iev cT 
Stcl ro r^ y^v ovra> c/>epeor^at /caret ^>vcrt^, a^ca 8 8ta ro 416 a 
O)o r avrca9. ovre yap ro cxz/a) /cat /caret) /caXcSs 
ou ycxp TO azJro Tracrt ro cxvot) /cat /carco /cat r<5 
<&5 17 K<f>aXy T>V t$<&V) ovra)9 at ptat 

7. post $' iff addit Sibircp rb <rvpfut rQv f^dw /caZ re!)*' ^i/r^y $pyw6v fort r^< 
T <*t singuli.s verbis mutatis vel omissis V X U m, apud vetercs commcntatorcs 
praeter Sophoniam nullum huius adclitfttnenti vestigium j| S. <<rn &L.?8. Jta?f num 
ah Ar. scripta fuerint clubitat Sttsemihl, Occon., p. 84, ct nc iicqucntia quidem 
aS. 'EM7r5o/c\7}y ...416 a, 18 0X17; Kalis conexa csse cum praecedcntibu.s et wcquentibus 
opinatur || 9* ^/*ws SUWX, i/to^s etiam Them. Philop. || toqwiirfvovt SU et pr. 
X, divpurfudvovt Them. Philop. 773? 9 {| ro. ai)rS unc* inclusit Biehl, i)r9 K.S, 
oOriy Rodier, aOn} rcliqui omnes 11 n, -^ ante od^a om. UK || 13. atrtov K, aMa 
etiam Fhilop. Soph, j] 14, rofrrov K fol. r r (vid, append.) P Soph. 58, 31 ct, ut videtur, 
Simpl. nr, 13 Thilop, 7r 34, 37. 373, 19 .sq,, recepit Rodier, ccteri ct script! et 
impressi rotfTW || roO 4? to, SUX, ^ om. Simpl. jj 15, ^eK<c STUVWX Soph* 11 
16. voJ ESTV, TOM? etiam Philop. Soph. | 17. a^ U V WX Soph. Bek, Trend, 

CH. 4 415 b 6 416 a 4 65 

divine, each in the only way it can, some more, some less. That is 
to say, each persists, though not in itself, yet in a representative 
which is specifically, not numerically, one with it. 

Now the soul is cause and origin of the living body. But cause 3 
Digression and origin are terms used in various senses : accord- 
as three ul ^ n S^Y sou l * s cause in the three senses of the word 
fold cause. a i re ady determined. For the soul is the cause of 
animate bodies as being in itself the origin of motion, as final 
cause and as substance. Clearly it is so as substance, substance 4 
being the cause of all existence. And for living things existence 
means life, and it is the soul which is the cause and origin of life. 
Furthermore, actuality is the not fun" or' form" of that which has -- 
potential existence. Manifestly, too, the oul is final cause. For 5 
nature, like intelligence, acts for a purpose, and this purpose is 
for it an end. Such an end the soul is in animals, and this in the 
order^of nature, for all the natural bodies are instruments of soul : 
and this is as true of the bodies of plants as of those of animals, 
shewing that all are means to the soul as end ; where end has two 
senses, the purpose for which and the person for whom. Moreover, 6 
the soul is also the origin of motion from place to place, but not 
all living things have this power of locomotion. Qualitative change, 
also, and growth are due to soul. For sensation is supposed to be a 
sort of qualitative change, and nothing devoid of soul has sensation. 
The same holds of growth and decay. For nothing undergoes ' 
natural decay or growth except it be nourished, and nothing is 
nourished unless it shares in life. 

Empedocles is mistaken in adding that in plants, in so far as 7 
they strike their roots downwards, growth takes place 

Error of J , 

because the earth in them has a natural tendency in 

this direction and that, when they shoot upwards, it 
is because the fire in them has a similar tendency upwards. He 
is wrong in his view of up and down. For up and down are not the 
same for all individuals as for the universe. On the contrary, the 
roots of plants correspond to the heads of animals, if we are to 

CL$TTJS etiam Philop. Torst. || 18. icat ante jcard 0tf<ra/ excepto U omnes codd., om. 
Trend., unc. incl. Torst., Kai leg. etiam Simpl. Soph.. || scripsisse Arist. tyt^i/xa o^ara, 
suspicatur Torst. H 20. 5trr<y...2i. $ leg. haec verba hoc loco etiam Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 25. fvxty *X t S UX Them. Soph., #x" ^vxfy W Bek. Trend., 
ETV Torst. || 26. atgdverat T VX, atfercu etiam Them. Philop. \\ 27. 
pertx* 1 f^s Philop., KOLvweT gwrjs Them. Simpl. Soph. || 28. post roOro virg. om. Diels ||' 
Trpocr64<Ti. com. Karsten, Eraped., p. 454 || 29. ftifovjjLfrw SUVWX, J>LOV ois T 
Soph., verbuin simplex etiam Them. || 416 a, 3. TO afrrd E (Bus.) Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Torst., ratfrd reliqui, etiam Soph. |[ ical rf irwrl unc. incl. Svisenxihl. 

H. 5 


et Xpi) Tct opyava Xe'yetv erepa Kat ravra Tot9 epyot9. 5 
7rpo9 Se TovTot9 ri TO crvvc^ov els ravavria fapofteva TO Trvp 
l ryv yrfv ; StacrTracr^creTat yap, et /XT? re ecrrat TO /ca>- 
et S* carat, TOVT* eoru> 17 ^^^ *at TO ainov TOV av- 
8 dz/ecr#at /cat Tpe<ecr#at. So/cet Se Ttcrtz; 17 TOV Trvpbs <jf>ifcrt5 

ama T7^5 rpocfrrjs Kal rrjs avtfcr0)$ et^at* /cat yap 10 
<jJ>atveTai povov TG>V crct)/xaTO)^ ^ T<S^ <TTOtj(ia)^ rpe<j>6- 
Kal avo/x^ov, Sto /cat ez^ Tots <$>VTOI<S Kal iv TO!? 
vTroXajSot Tts az^ TOVTo elvat TO Gpya&ptvQV. TO 8e 
Grvvalriov /xev TTCO? ecrrw, ov /j,r)i> a7rX5s ye atTtov, cxXXa 
fLa\\ov r) ^^07* 07 /xe^ yap TOU Trupos av^crts et$ a7Ti~ 15 
pov, ecy$ &i/ 77 TO /caucrTOZ/, T<3v Se <vcr6t crvvtcrTa/^eVa)^ Trai'- 
ccrrl Trepas /cat Xoyos ftcye^ovs T /cat avr/cr<o$' ravra 
T^$ "tyvxys* a-XX* ou 7rupO9, /cat Xoyov ftaXXoz/ ^ u 
e?rct S' 17 avTT) Swa/zt? TTJS ^^779 OpeTrrucr) Kal 
Trepl rpo<f>'fj$ avayKalov Stcoptcr^at Trp&rov* a<f>opi^rai yap 20 
s ras aXXas Swaftet? T6> epya) TOVTW. 8o/Ct S* eti/at 17 
i) TO zvavriov r< Ivavria), ov irav Se rravri, dXX* ocra v 
T) fiovov yV<rw & dXX7jX<x)i/ ej(ovcrti/ dXXa /cat 
yiverai yap iroXXa c^ dXX^Xa)^, dXX* ov irdvra 
irocra, ofo^ vytes e/c /ca/u/o^ros. tfrawerai S* ovS* Kt^a TOI> 25 
rpoirov a\\ij\.oi$ etvat rpo^tf, dXXa TO 

pO<j>1], TO Se TTVp OV Tpe<j>l TO v8ct>p, 

t$ cbrXots crcofiacri TavT* etvat So/cet fiaXicrra TO 
10 rpo<j>r) TO Se Tpe^o/jtevo^. arropiav S* e^ ^acrt yap ot 
juez> TO Oftotov T^> o/xot<j> rpefacrQai, /ca^aTrep /cat av^d- 
vcr#at, Tot? S* <5cT7rep etTTOftev TofyuraXw/ So/cet, TO ivavriov 
TO! evavTt<p, (is aTra^ovg OVT09 TOV oyxotov VTTO TOV 6/xotov> 
Se rpoffiv fteTa^SdXXet^ /cal TrerTecr^at 17 S 
Tracrtv et9 TO avriKtiiusvov fy TO /LtcTa^v, ert 
17 rpo<j>rj VTTO TOV Tpe<jf>o^eVov dXX* ov TOVTO VTTO T-iJ^ 35 

5. post tyyoty addunt edit. Aid. ct Basil, : rd $* a/r6 X^e^ ^/ryctKOv ^ Av ^J rd 

quae iluxiftse e prima cdztionc iudicat Torst., nihil huius additamenti habent 
vetcres iaterpretes II 7. ^cwX0<rov SUVW Soph. Bek* Trend. II n. ^ ruix <rroixW unc. 
incL Torst,, leg. haec verba omissis verbis r3i' o-w/tdrw*' 17 Them. Simpl., Soph* habiit 
TWV (rw/A. xal r^v tfro*x 59> 35 It *3 a&Zwbftww SUVWX Them*, &$%bjj,evQv ctiam 
Philop. Soph, II 15* ^ ante ^. insert. E A (BhL), leg. Them, |j 17* ^urx^ow r xctZ] r onu 
T U VX, Kctl )uey^ovr *oi S Them, li 18. -HJ* om. S U V W X Bek. Trend. Them. Soph. 
<it, ut videtur, Philop. 378, 9 || o. /cai ire/>l ETW, /faZ om, Philop. Them. Bek, Trend. 

CH. 4 416 a 5 416 a 35 67 

make identity and diversity of organs depend upon their functions. 
Besides, what is it that holds together the fire and the earth, 
tending, as they do, in opposite directions ? For they will be rent 
asunder, unless there is something to prevent it: while, if there 
is, it is this which is the soul and the cause of growth and nourish- 

Some hold the nature of fire to be singly and solely the cause 8 
of nourishment and growth. For it would seem that fire 

Fire not & 

the cause is the only body or element which of itself is nourished 
growt . an ^ g rows> Hence fire might be supposed to be the 
operative cause, both in plants and animals. Whereas, though it is 
in a sense a joint cause, it is not a cause absolutely : it is rather the 
soul which is so. For fire goes on growing to infinity, as long 
as there is fuel to be consumed, but in natural wholes there is 
always a limit or proportion which determines growth and size. 
But this belongs to the soul and not to fire, to form rather than 
to matter. 

The nutritive faculty of the soul being the same as the repro- 9 
ductive, it is necessary first to give a definition 1 of nutriment. For 
it is by the nutritive function that this faculty is separated off 
from the others. The common view is that contrary is nutriment 
to contrary ; though not in every case, but wherever each 
of two contraries is not only generated by, but derives 
growth from, the other. For many things are derived from one 
another, but not all of them are quantities: thus the sick man 
becomes well. But it is found that even the contraries supposed 
to derive growth from each other are not fed by one another in the 
same way: while water serves to feed fire, fire is not nutriment 
to water. It would seem, then, that it is in the simple bodies 
above all that of two contraries one is nutriment and the other 
is nourished. Yet here is a difficulty. It is said by the one 10 
side that like is nourished by, as well as derives its growth from, 
like; while the others, again, as we explained, hold that con- 
trary is nourished by contrary, on the ground that like cannot be 
affected by like, while food undergoes change and is digested. 
Now change is always in the direction of the opposite, or of the 
intermediate state. Further, nutriment is acted upon by that 
which it nourishes,- and not the latter by the former: just as 

Torst. || Siopta-cu U W Soph., 3iop{<ra<r0eu y Them., 5iwpfcr0ai etiam Philop. H 23. yfrvijffiv 
E, y&eo-w Sopb. et, ut videtur. Them. 51, 30 H 24. vdvra. om. SUXy et corr. E || 
-25. iro<rd om. U W, in rasura E (Trend.) || 28. AXXot? S UX Philop., airXots etiam Soph. || 
32. ford rov fyolov om. EW, tuentur Them. Philop. || 34. TO post tf insert, E (Stapf.), 
xal TO Them. codd. (ex Arist. corr. ? r6 Heinze) Philop. 



, (ScTTrep ovS' 6 TCKTCUV tWo TTJS vXijs, aXX' iV e/cet- 
i/ov avTT?- 6 Se TeVrajj' ju,Ta/3aXXet /zovoz/ ets evepyetav e 
ii apyias. irorepov 8' ICTTL^ 17 r/)o<^7j TO TeXevratoi; Trpocrywo- 

[JLt-VOV r) TO TTp&TOV, ^1 SlCL^Opdv. L S' <X/X^6), dXX* 07 

jicei> aTreTTTos 17 

rpofyyv Xeyctv # ftev yap aTreTTTOs, TO evavriov TO) 

T6G) Tpl$.TOLl, % 6 776^6^ jLteV^, TO OpOWV TO) 6/XOLCt). 

<j>avepov on Xeyovcri TWO, rpovrov a^orepoi /cat 6p^<3? 

12 OV/C 6p^?. 7Tt S' OV^V Tpe^GTat JLC7J ^r^OV o>7J9, TO - 

\fjvxov av ir] crto/Aa TO Tpefyopevov, rj epitvyov, (ScrTe /cat J o 

13 TJ T/)o<^>7j Trpos epfyvyov Icrri KOLI ov Kara (JV^^^KO^ ecm 
8' ertpov Tpo<f>fj Koi av^Tt/caJ caw 77 jnev yap TTOCTW Tt 
TO efct/fu^oz/, avgrjTiKov, y Se ToSe Tt /cai ovcrta, Tpo<t>tf- 
crcw^et yap TTJV ovariav, KOL /xe>(p6 TOVTOV ecrTtv la>5 av 
Tpe^TjTat Acal yez^eVecos TroiTjTt/co^, oz5 TOT) rpe<l>ofjLvov, cxXX* 15 
otov TO Tptfyopevov 178^ yap <7Tt^ auTov 07 ovcrta, yzvva, 8' 

awo eavro, dXXa orcw^et. cScrd* 17 /ICF ToiavTrj rrjs 
&PX*I 8wa/tis eariv ola o~a>eiv TO e^oz> avrr/v rj 
TOLQVTOV, rj Se Tpo<j>r) irapacrKevd&L eVepyetz/. Sto crreprjdev 

14 rpo^rjs ov SwaTat eti>a6. evrel 8* ecrTt Tpta, TO Tpe^o/ie^ov 20 
/cat w rptyerai KOI TO Tpefyov, TO /ACJ> Tpe<f>ov ecrrlv r) 
TrptoTr) V^X 7 ?' r< ^ ^^ Tpe<jJ>o/^^ov TO c^ov TavTyv crSjaa, ^ 

15 Se Tp^>eTat, 17 rpoffrrj. eTrei Se O-TTO TOT) TeXov^ airavra 
irpocrayopeveiv 8t/cato^, reXos Se TO ye^^crat oTo^ awo, 

1 6 etTj av 17 TrpcwTTj i/n;^ yevvrjTiKr) olov avro. eorTt Se w Tpe- 25 
<jJ>Tat SLTTOV, cuo-Trep feat w Kvftepva, /cat 07 ^etp /cat TO TTTJ- 
, TO /jte^ /ct^oCz/ /cat KIVOV^VOV, TO Se 

416 b, 3. irpoa-KpLv6fjLvop in interpr. Them. Philop., irpoffy^nevov etiam Soph. |f 
ir. ?rp6$ r6 ^ju^. Them. Simpl., post iial/vypv addendum $ fyi^vxop aut /cal delendum 
censet Susemihl || 12. rpo^ E Soph. v. 1. (rpo^S e codd. Hayduck 62, 6), rpo^J etiam 
Them. H 14. &P /cal rp^t T W 3 &v rp^ E (Stapf.), &?/ rp^rat P Soph., &? rp^ y r 
vulgo ^v /cai rp^iyrat || 15. 7evj>9$<rews ES Soph., 7e^^<rWj etiam Them. Philop, || post 
TronjTiriv virgulam posuit Torst. || 16. atfroi? -^ o^tr(a STVWX Soph., 
Philop., ai5r^ ^ oOtr^a E U vet. transl. Bek. Trend., Them, interpretatur rouro 
unc. incl. haec verba Torst. || 17. atfrd om. E (Trend.) et TV W, leg. Philop. Soph. (| 
18. %x v etiam Philop. Soph., Sextpevov EWy J| 22, rai^r^ TXy et E (Bue.) ct, ut 
videtur, Them. 53, 19, a,Mjv reliqui ante Biehlium omnes, etiam Philop. Soph. || 
23. iTel ^...25. ai)r6 collocanda esse ante 20 tird censet Torst, eodem loco, quo 
vulgata, haec verba legerunt Them. Philop. Soph. || 25. yevvnriKbv ESTWX, 
etiam Soph. || rp^ei Ty et, ut videtur, Them. 53, 26, rp^erai etiam Soph. |i 

CH. 4 416 b i 416 b 27 69 

the carpenter is not affected by his material, but on the contrary 
the material by the carpenter. The carpenter merely passes to 
activity from inaction. But it makes a difference whether by n 
nutriment we mean the final, or the primary, form of what is 
added. If both are nutriment, the one as undigested, the other as 
digested, it will be possible to use the term nutriment in conformity 
with both theories. For, in so far as it is undigested, contrary is 
nourished by contrary : and, in so far as it is digested, like by like. 
So that clearly both sides are in a manner partly right and partly 
wrong. But, since nothing is nourished unless it possesses life, 12 
that which is nourished must be the animate body as such : so that 
nutriment also is relative to the animate being which it nourishes : 
and this not incidentally merely. 

There is, however, a difference between nutritivity and con- 13 
ducivity to growth. In so far as the animate thine: is 

Growth, ...... - 

quantitative, what is taken promotes growth; in so far 
as it is a definite individual, what is taken nourishes. For the 
animate thing preserves its substance or essential nature and exists 
as long as it is nourished : and it causes the production, not of that 
which is nourished, but of another individual like it. Its essential 
nature already exists, and nothing generates itself, it only main- 
tains its existence. Hence the above described principle of the 
soul is the power to preserve in existence that which possesses it 
in so far as it is a definite individual, while nutrition prepares it 
for activity. Therefore it cannot live when deprived of nutriment. 
There are, then, these three things, that which is nourished, that 14 
with which it is nourished, and that which nourishes it. The last 
of the three is the primary soul, that which is nourished is the 
body which contains the soul, that wherewith it is nourished is 
nutriment. As, however, it is right to name all things from the 15 
end they subserve, and the end here is reproduction of the species, 
the primary soul is that which is capable of reproducing the 
species. That with which the living thing is nourished may be 16 

understood in two senses, just as that with which one 
and nutri- steers may mean the hand or the rudder ; the former, the 
ment * hand, both causing motion and being moved, the latter, 

26. Kal ante $ om. SUWX || teal ij %elp EVy, Aral om. reliqui et scripti et ante 
Biehlium impress! omnes, leg. Simpl. et sine dubio Them., qui interpretatiir r-fi 
re x et /l Kai I| 27. Kwotifj&vov < ywW? > ] Kwotifj,vov E sine rasura (Trend.) Rodier, 
reliqui codd. KWOVV phvov, etiam Sinlpl. Alex., teste Philopono, vet. transl., Bek. Trend. 
Torst., Kivotifievov fAfoov, ut videtur, Them. 53, 30 sqq., Ktvo^cvov pAvov interpretatur 
Philop., KtvotiiLcvov pAvus Soph., KLVO^^VOV phvov defendit etiam DIttenberger p. 1613. 

70 DE ANIMA II CHS, 4, 5 

TTacrav S 9 avayKalov rpo^v Svvacrdai Trerrecr^at, epyaerat 
Se TT)Z> Wr/fu> TO deploy* Sio 7rai> 
TV7TO) /z*V ow 07 Tpo(f>r) Tt l&Tiv 
ecrrlv vcrrepov Trept avrqs e&> TO!? otfcetots \oyot5. 
5 Ato>ptcr//,e;t>o>z> Se TOVTCW Xeyco//^^ KOIVTJ Trepl rrdarfs at- 
<T0yj crews* TJ S* atcr^crts ei> TO) KiveicrQai T /cat TracT^w 
KaOdirep elprjTai* Sofcet yap cxXXoLO)cri9 rts et- 
<^acrl Se rti^cs /cai TO O/JLOLOV VTTO rov O/ZOLOU Tracr^ii/. 35 
TOI)TO Se 7r5$ SW<XTOJ> -^ dSwaTov, elpiJKafjie^ ev rots 
2 Xoyot9 Trept TOU Trotetz^ /cat Trdcr^LV. ej(et S* aTroptaz^ Sta Tt 
/cat ToSz' aiorQifjcretov avrS)v ov yiverai ato^arts, /cal Sta Tt 
TcSz/ e^cw ov TTOLOVCTIV aiadTjcnv, Ivovros irvpbs /cat y^s /cat 

avra ^ ret 5 

TOVTOts. S>JXo^ ovi/ oTt TO dcrTiKOv oi/c 

evepyeta, aXXa Svra/x6t \LQVOV. Sto /ca^airep TO /cavoroj' ou 
/cateTat avTO /ca^' auTo a^ev TOT) KCLVCTTCKOV e/cate yap a^ 
eavro, /cat ovOev eSetTo TOU evTeXe^eta Trvpos O^TOS. e7ret8>7 
Se TO aicrOdvea'doLi \4yopev St^Ss (TO Te yap Su^ctjuet d/coi)ov 10 
/cat 6p<2v d/covetv /cat opav Xeyop,ev, /ca^ TV^ /ca^evSov, /cal 
TO 19877 e^epyoSi/), St^fis ai/ Xeyotro /cat 17 atcr^Tjcrt?., 17 yu,> 
a>5 Svm/>tet, 17 Se 0)5 eVepyeta. 6/xota)? Se /cat TO aicr^a^e- 
3 cr^at, TO Te ovvd/JLei ov /cat TO e^epyeca. ^rpcaTO^ JLLC^ oSz/ (is 
ToG avToS OZ^TOS TOT) Tracr^etz/ /cat TOV /ctz/etcr^at /cat TOV oepyeii/ 15 
Xeyw^e^* /cat yap eorti> 17 /ctz^crt? eWpyeta Tt5 
Tot, /ca^aTrep ez/ eTepots etp^Tat. TTOLVTCL Se Trctor^et /cat 
VTTO ToC 7Tot77Tt/cov /cat ei>epyeta WTOS. Sto eom /jteu a>5 wo rot) 
opoiov Tracr^et, ecrTt Se os VTTO ToG avopoiov, KaffcLTrep tmo~ 

yap TO awftotov, 7re7roj>0os S* Sfioiov ecrTtv. 20 

32. XifyoAiejc V WX Them. Soph., Mytopev etiam Alex. ATT. /eal Xtfcr. 82, ^3 || 35* re] 
rt STWX et sine dubio Them. Simpl. Marchl, Arist. Tierseele, p. 17,3, r* rd 
al<r0irrfipw V, Alex, variat, 1. 1. p. 82, 27 et 85, 20 Tt, sed p. 85, 5 re |( 41 7 a, I. er/^tu 
V, elf/Myrot /ti/ Simpl. Philop. ad hunc locum et Alex. ap. Philop., e^rai JM^ ol S et ad 
417 a, 14. Philop., 6ttf K afjLw K al T W X, reliqui eltficajuLei', etiam, ut videtur, Soph. 63, 23 (1 
*cU ^ STU WX II 2. post 7n<rxe> Alex. ap. Philop. tradit ferri etiam Icctioncm : 
Xe/cr&v 5^ /cat i^Oy, quod additamentum fort. leg. et Them, et Soph., non leg. Simpl. 
Philop. || 3. 01) post 2. ri S U X || 4. alo-dfreu S U X || 7. &6 om. V W, leg. Philop. acl 
417 t>> 16. || Kaedircp] Kal Ka,64.irep U, o^ afcr^ercu KaB&irep TX, KaOtLirgp ofa altrtidrtr&t 
S || 8. /ca^ f *avr6 E Torst, t)0* ^avrou S Them., ty' a^roO U V, jca5' a>r6 etiam Soph. (} 
9. aW UX || 10. TO <Llff8a,t>6fjLevov Soph. || d/covo* mi 6pwv omnes codd., etiam E 
(Trend, et, Torstrikio teste, Bek.) || 13. dfr*fu* et totpyim P 

CHS. 4, 5 416 b 28 417 a 20 71 

the rudder, being simply moved. Now it is necessary that all food 
should be capable of digestion, and digestion is promoted by heat ; 
this explains why every animate thing has warmth. This, then, 
is an outline of what nutriment is. It must be more clearly 
defined hereafter in the discussion devoted specially to it 

Now that these points have been determined, let us proceed 5 
sensation to * >enera ^ discussion of all sensation. As above ^\ 
remarked, sensation consists in being moved and acted j 
upon, for it is held to be a" "species of qualitative change. Some -, 
add that like is in fact acted upon by like. How far this is 
possible or impossible we have explained in the general discussion ' 
of action and passivity. The question arises why there is no 2 
sensation of the senses themselves : that is, why they produce no 
sensation apart from external sensibles, though the senses contain 
fire, earth and the other elements, which are the objects of sensation 
either in themselves or through their attributes. Evidently it 
Sensation follows that the faculty of sensible perception exists not 
tiai^^ac 1 -" * n activity, but only in potentiality. Hence it must be 
tuai. here as with the fuel which does not burn of and in 

itself without something to make it burn ; otherwise it would 
kindle itself and would have no need of the fire which is actually 
existent. Now to have sensation has two meanings: we use the 
terms hearing and ' seeing of that which has the capacity to hear 
and see, even though it be at the time asleep, just as we do of 
that which already actually hears and sees. And therefore sensa- 
tion, too, will have two meanings : it may mean either potential 
or actual sensation. Similarly with having sensation, whether 
potential or actual. 

Let us then first proceed on the assumption that to be acted 3 
Agent and upon or moved is identical with active operation. For 
patient. movement is in fact active operation of some sort, 
though incomplete, as we have elsewhere explained. But in 
every case things are acted upon and moved by an agent in 
actual operation. It follows that in one sense what is acted upon 
is acted upon by what is like it, in another sense by what is unlike 
it, as we have explained. That is to say, while being acted upon it 
is unlike, after it has been 'acted upon it is like the agenjfc. 

Trend, suspecta videntur, unc. incluserunt Biehl Rodier, aZa^rop pro ala-edpetrBat scripsit 
Torst. ex Alex. &ir. xad \tf<r. 83, 6, probat Brentano, die Psych, des Arist. 141, recepit etiam 
Rodier, totum hunc locum leg. etiam Them. Philop. vet. transl., defendit Batrco, Aristotele, 
dell 5 anzraa vegetativa e-sensitiva p. 43 H 15. post wd,<rxeu> addendum re censet Susemihl 11 
roO ante btfryeiv om. EVWy Philop. Soph. [I 16. Myow STUWXy Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || 17. Tdjra...2o. tirnv secludenda censet Susemihl. 


4 StatpeTOi> 8c /cat Tre/ol Swdju,ecos /cat 

yap aTrXais Xeyoju,z> Trepi avraiz/. ecrrt /xez/ yap ouras 

TI a>9 cU> etTrotjuez/ avdpwTrov eTTtcrnfjxoz'a, OTt o 
jfLW(ov KOL iyvvrtov emcrrTj^z' ecrrt 8* 

as 7787? \eyopev emo-Trj/Jiova rov e^o^ra TT)Z> ypa/^aTi/cTp 25 
/cdYepo? Se TOVTWV ov TW avTOZ/ rpoirov SwaTos ecrrt7>, dXX* 
6 jote^ OTL TO yevos rotoSro^ /cal 97 vX^, 6 S* OT6 foovhrjueis 
ew, av py TL Ka)\v<ry TVV eo)6ev 6 S' 17877 
&v KOI KvpCa)$ eTrtcrra/^ez/o? roSe ro A. 
01 7Tyo5roi Kara Svvap,w CTncrrTyjaoi'C?, 3 
a^77<Ta)9 aXXota)^et9 /cot! 
p,Ta/3a\a)v e^eoos, 6 e/c rov ej(6z> 
77 TT)^ ypafJL/jiaTLKyjv, ^77 evepyetv 8 s t? ro hzpytiv 

5 rpoiTov. OVK ecTTi 8" aTrXov^ ovSe TO Tracr^ei^, aXXa TO 
<f)6opd Tt? T3?ro TOI) evavriov, TO Se orcorrjpia /xaXXof TOV Swa- 

OI^TOS VTTO TOV e^T^e^eta O^TO? /cat O/AOLOV OVT&S a>? v- 

eL 7r/)05 ez>reXexeiaz> deajpovv yap ylyverai TO e^oi^ s 
TT)I> 7TicrT77jU77^, oTrep 77 ov/c !crnz> dXXocovor^at (et? avTO yap 77 
7TL8ocris ^ai ei? &TcXe^tav) 77 erepov yevo? dXXoLa>o"cos. 
Sio ov /caXcS? e)(i \eyew TO fypovovv, OTav <f>povf/, dXXotoC- 
cScTTrep ovSe TOI/ otKoSo/iov oVay oifcoSojaTj. TO 

e/c 8wct)xeL oWos /caTa TO voovv /cac 
(ppovovv ov SiSao~/caXta^ dXX* Irepav eTrtow/Aiav e^eiv 8t- 
TO 8* /c Sv^djitei WTO? pavOdvov /cat XajLcjSavov 
viro TOV e^TeXe^eta O^TO? /cat StSacr/caXt/coC 77TOt 

21. PW yuy 7^p TW, ^ om. Soph., o# ya/o ATrXws coni. Roeper in Philol. VII, 
p. 238 || 22. t\yofjiv coni. Torst., X^o/uef etiam Philop. Soph. )| 23. dirta^v 
ETUVWy, erroi/Aey etiam Soph. || 24. /cai r? ^- SUX H 25. ^17 hoc loco 
positum suspectum videtur Torst., defendit Vahlen, Arist. Aufsatzc II, p. 26 || 
26. d/cdre/>os...28. gfw^o' in parenth. Torst., quod vituperat Vahlen 1. 1. || 27. om, ^ 
Simpl. 121, 19, leg. etiam Philop. Soph. || 28. Ktak&g Simpl., /cwXi5a-y eliam I'hilop. II 
rptros 5' 6 Iffy e Soph, scripsit Torst., rptros 5* habet etiam Them,, sed haud dubie 
per interpretamentum, vulgatam defendit Vahlen 1. 1. || 29. post Btwp&v virgulatn 
Torst. || #X0a literis scriptum E (Trend.) || 30. irpQroi unc. incl. Torst., luentur 
Simpl. Soph, et sine duhio Them. 55, 24 || Torst. coni. &fjuf>6repot pkv oto ol Kttr& 
$tva.tuv ^Tto-nJ/AOJ'es tvepyeLq, ylvovrtu ^rto-r^oves, dXX*, tuetur vulgatam etiam Soph, || 
32. pro afo6ri<rip coni. Torst. dpLOwrticTji', quod re vera habet Them., afod7j<rij> leg. 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. (| 41 7 b, 4. virgulam post 6polov (Bek. Trend.) delevit Torst. || 
5- yap tuentur praeter omnes codd. Them. Simpl. Philop. Alex. ATT. /cal Xi5r. 80, 4. 
81, ir. 84, 7 || 6. riiv om. SX Alex. 80, 4 , leg. Them. Philop. Alex. 8r, rr, 84, 7 |j 
<favro X Soph., avrb Trend., probat Beare, Greek Theories, p. 234, adn. 2, atfrd leg. 

CH. 5 417 a 21417 b 13 73 

We must also draw a distinction in regard to the terms 4 
potentiality and actuality : at present we are using them without 
TWO mean- qualification. For instance, we may use the term wise, 
p"?en f firstly, in the sense in which we might speak of man 
tiaiity as w i SCj because man is one of the genus of beings 

which are wise and have wisdom ; secondly, in the sense in 
which we at once call the man wise who has learnt, say, 
grammar. Now of these two men each possesses the capacity, but 
in a different sense: the one because the genus to which he 
belongs, that is to say, his matter, is potentially wise ; the other 
because he is capable, if he chose, of applying the wisdom he has 
acquired, provided there is nothing external to hinder. Whereas 
he who is at the moment exercising his wisdom is in actuality and 
is wise in the proper sense of the term : for example, he knows the 
A before him. Thus the first two are both potentially wise : the 
first becomes wise actually after he has undergone qualitative 
change through instruction and often after transition from the 
reverse condition ; while in the latter case it is by another kind 
of transition that the man passes from the mere possession, with- 
out the use, of sensation or grammar to the use of it 

To suffer or be acted upon, too, is a term of more than one 5 
meaning. Sometimes it means a sort of destruction by the 
and of contrary, sometimes it is rather a preservation of what 

being acted is potentially existent by what is actually existent and 
upon " like it, so far as likeness holds of potentiality when 

compared with actuality. For it is by exercise of knowledge that 
the possessor of knowledge becomes such in actuality : and this 
either is no qualitative change (for the thing develops into its own 
nature and actuality), or else is qualitative change of a different sort. 
Hence it is not right to say that that which thinks undergoes 
change when it thinks, any more than that the builder undergoes 
change when he builds. That, then, which works the change from 
potential existence to actuality in a thinking and intelligent being 
should properly receive a different name and not be called in- 
struction : while that which learns and is brought from potential to 
actual knowledge by that which is in actuality and capable of 
instructing should either not be said to suffer or be acted upon at 

Simpl. Philop. Them. 55, 38. 38, 30. Alex. 81, 12. 84, 10 || 9. rb /&... xx. dUaLov suspecta 
videntur Hayduckio, progr. Meldorf 1877, p. n 11 10. Torst., cui assentitur Susemihl, 
coni. &yew t leg. &yov Alex. 81, 15 et, ut videtur, Philop. 304, 6. 306, 2 || KO.TO. imc, 
incl. Torst., leg. Alex. 81, 15 II 12. &c dvvdjtci Svros unc. incL Torst., tuentur Philop. 
Soph. Them. 28, 29 sq. || 13. Hayduck 1. 1. legendum esse censet: otdt TOVTO 

74 DE ANIMA II CHS. 5, 6 

7racrvti> <aTeoz>, [cSorTrep etp^Tat,] r\ Svo TpOTrovs etvat aX- 

Xotc5<TO)$, TTJI' T 7Tt TCtS CTTC^Tt/CCtS 8ta^eVet9 /ACTa^oXTJZ/ 15 

6 /cat TT?Z> 7Tt TO,? efet? /cat T?)v (frvo'iv. TOV S* alcrdrjTLKOv rj peis 
p,6Taj3o\.ri yiverai vrro TOV yevvS*vTO$, OTOLV Se ye/- 

/cat TO at<rz>e(rat. /cat 

TO KOT* evepyeicw Se opoicos Xeyerai r<5 Oewpelv 
Se, ort ro /iez/ ra ^oi^rt/ca r^? tvepyeias e^toQev, TO opaTov 20 
/cal TO aKowTov, o/iotCD? Se /cat Ta XoiTra Talz^ ator^TcS^. 
atrtov 8* OTL TV /ca0' eKacTTOV 17 /car* ivepyeuw atcr^Tjcrc?, 17 
8* emcrn;/^ T^ /ca^oXov TavTa 8* / CCUTT; 7rc59 ecrTt T^ 
V^X??* ^ l ^ vorjvcu ILZV 7r* auTaJ, OTTOTai/ ySovXojTat, accr^cx- 
veorBau, S* OUK CT* ai?T6> avayKoiov yap VTrdpyzw TO atcr^Tj- 25 

, KCU Sta TT)^ avTrjv aiTiav, OTL Ta alcrdyTa T>V Ka& 9 
e/cacTTa /cal TCW e^aOev. dXXa 7ryol /Aei/ TOVT&V Stacra- 

7 ^>?j<rat KOLipos yivour av /cat 6ta"a0^t5. z/S^ Se Stcoptcr^ft) 
TOCTOWOV, oTt ov^ cwrXoS O^TO? TOV Swa/i,ct Xcyo^te^ov, 30 
aXXa TOV jLtei/ <So-7T) az> et7rot/>tv TW TratSa Swacr^ac 


alo~07)TiK6v. CTret S* dvcovvfios OLVT&v r) Sicufiopd, SicopLcrTaL 
Se TTcpt avTcov OTL T/>a /cat 7r<s erepa, ^rjo'dai di'ay/catov T< 
f rrd<T)(iv /cat aXXotovor^at a? /cvptots ovo^ao-iv. TO 8* aiarOr)- 
TLKQV Svm/Ltet eoTTtv otov TO alorOrjTW 17877 cz/TeXe^cta, Ka6d- 
Trep etp^Tat. Trdcr^i p,ev ovv ov^ opoiov ov, TTCTTOV^OS 8* S 
a)ju,ot<i)Tat /cat IcrTtz/ ofov e/cetvo. 

6 Ac/creov 8e Ka^* eKdo-Tyv aicrO^onv Trepl T&V 
irp)Tov. XeyeTat 8e TO alo-07)Tov T/)t^5g, <*> Svo 
a?5Ta <a//,ei/ atcr^az/ecr^at, TO 8e e^ /caTa crv/t^Se 
8e 8vo TO /LIC^ tStw ecrTtv e/caa-T^g atcr^Tjcrea)?, TO 8e KOIVOV 10 

2 Tracrow. Xeyw 8* tSto^ juez/ o /A^ e^8e\;Tat eT/>a 
, /cat Trcpt S ///^ 

14. <&nre/> eTp^rai praeeunte Hayduckio unc. inch Biehl, om. SUX Alex. 84, 26 
Them. Philop., leg. quidem Soph., fort, post ^ transponenda censet Susemihl jj 
1 8. /cat post af<r0. om. E U, /cai TO om. V, leg. ical r6 Simpl. Philop. Alex. 85, 3 || 
19. 5^ om. SV, post 6/*ows ponit E, /car' Mpyeua> 8t leg. etiaro Philop. Alex. 85, 4 [| 
34. efrav VWX Soph. || 31. erTw/xey SUX, eTroc/cev etiam Soph. || 418 a, 2. r A T et E 
(Trend.) 3. 5* om. ES, r6 ^ Soph. || 4. KaOdirep etpirru ante 6. ^rti' transponenda 
censet Essen || 8. Svofr S U X || 11. pro iraffQv et 19. ir(<ratj Schieboldt, De imag. p. 15, 
coni. ir\ei6vuv et ir\eloirw || 12. ofo!/...^. Sia^opds in parentL posui. 

CHS. 5, 6 417 b 14 418 a 12 75 

all, or else two modes of change should be assumed, one to the 
negative states and the other to the normal habits and the true 

In the sensitive subject the first change is due to the 6 
parent : once generated it possesses sensation exactly in the same 
sense as we possess knowledge. And to have actual sensation 
Actual corresponds to exercise of knowledge. There is this 

cod?- tion difference, however, that in the one case the causes of 
tioned by the activity are external : as, for instance, the objects of 
temai sight, hearing and the other senses. The reason is 

sensible. ^^ actua } se nsation is always of particulars, while 
knowledge is of universals : and these universals are, in a manner, 
in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think whenever we 
please, but sensation is not in our power : for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. It is much the same with the sciences 
which deal with sensible objects ; and for the same reason, namely, 
that sensibles are particulars and are external. 

But we shall have a further opportunity of making this clear 
hereafter. For the present let us be content to have established 7 
that of the two meanings of potentiality, the one according to 
which a child might be called potentially a general, and the other 
according to which a man of full age might be so called, it is the 
latter which applies to the faculty of sense-perception. But as this 
distinction has no word to mark it, although the fact and the 
nature of the distinction have been established, we are compelled 
to use the terms to suffer or be acted upon and to be qualitatively 
changed as if they were the proper terms. Now, as has been 
explained, the sensitive faculty is potentially such as the 
sensible object is in actuality. While it is being acted 
upon, it is not yet similar, but, when once it has been 
sensation acted upon, it is assimilated and has the same character 

as the sensible object. 
In considering each separate sense we must first treat of their 6 

objects. By the sensible object may be meant any one 
bie object: of three things, two of which we say are perceived in 
themselves or directly, while the third is perceived 
f er acciden* or indirectly. Of the first two the one is 

several ^he special object of a particular sense, the other an 

object common to all the senses. By a special object of 2 
a particular sense I mean that which cannot be perceived by any 
other sense and in respect to which deception is impossible; for 

76 DE ANIMA II CHS. 6, 7 

ctyts xpoSjitaros /cat OXOT) $6<f>ov KOI yevcrts 

S* d<7? TrXetovs fief e^et ia<j>opa<$), dXX* e/cdarTj ye /cptvei 

?rept rovraw, /cat ov/c d-Trararai ort xp<S/m ovS' ort i//oc/>o$, 15 

3 clXXd rt ro Kexpoxr^lvov ^ TTOV, ^ rt ro \jjo<j>ovv f) TTOV. rd 
fie* ovV rotavra Xeyerat tSta e/ca<rrov, /cotm Se /averts, ?7pe- 
/ua, dpiffpos, or^jLca, jiceye^o? rd ydp rotavra ovSejiua? 
eVrtz/ iSta, dXXd /cotvd Trdoratg. Kal yd/) d<^^ KLvrjoris rt$ 

4 eVrtz/ alcr07]Tr) KOU or//t. /card crvjLi/Se/S^/cos Se Xeyerat at- 20 

o^, oto^ et ro Xev/coi/ etTj Atapovs vtos- /card 
o^ ydjD TOVTOV alo-Qdverai, ort ra5 \VK<5 
TOVTO ov alcrddveraL. Sto /cat ouSev Trdcr^ei ^ roiovrov VTTO rou 
alo-Orjrov. T>V Se /ca^' avrd alcrdrjr^ rd iSia Kvptcos ecrrtv 
alo-Orjrd, /cat TT^OO? a 07 ovcria trefyvKev e/cdcrrTjg aicrO'rjo'etoS. 2 5 
7 OS /jtev ov^ ecrrtz^ 07 oi//i9, rovr' Icrrlv oparov. oparov S* 
eorrt x/5<3jU,a /xe^, /cat o Xoy<y /u,ev ecrnv etTretz/, dvc&vvfiov 8e 
rvy)(dvi ov STjXov Se Icrrat o Xeyo^ez^ irpoe\6ov<Ti /za- 
Xtcrra. ro ydp oparov eorrt ^p5/xa. rovro S* eorrt ro e?rt rov 
/ca^ 9 avro oparov Ka0* avrb Se 01; r<5 Xoya>, dXX' ort ei> 3 

t rb alnov rov eti^at oparov. ?ra^ Se j(p5jLta KLVT)- 
ov earrt rov /car 3 e^epyeta^ Stac^az'ov?, /cat rovr' HOTTLV avrov y 4i8b 
s. SiOTrep ovj( oparov dVev ^fx^ro?, aXXd Trav ro e/cacrrou 
ez/ ^xwrt oparat. Sto Trepl c^coro? TrpaJroi/ Xe/creoz/ rt 
2 ecrrtv. ecrri 817 ri Sta^aveg. Sta^ave? 8e Xeya> o ecrrt /xe^ 
oparw, ov /ca#* avrb Se oparov a>9 a7rX<2s etTretv, aXXd St* 5 
dXXdrpto^ ^(pSjita. rotovrov Se ecrrtv di)p /cat vS^p /cat TroXXd 
crrepefi^- ov yap ^ vSa>p ovS* -y aT^p, Sta^az/e^, dXV ort 

13. post xvywoi3 vulg. punct. || 13. ^..,14. dia^opds in parenth. ponenda censet Susemihl 1J 
14. post SLa<f>op&$ vulg. colon, post 8ia<f>opds signum orationis imperfectae ponit Torst., cui 
adversatur Barco || ante l/cdo-rr? addendum tb? censet Essen || &ca<rr0y P || 17. ^/cda-r^s 
W Soph. 70, 33, de Them. 57, 36 non liquet, <k<<r'H7 X, vulgatam defendit Barco || 
19. TTcfcrais om. UX et pr. S, irtorwv re. S, 7ra<r&> vjdetur legisse Philop. 315, 10 || 7<i/) 
^ a^>5 E (Bhl.) f| 20. ^^ e O 7k"et coni. Steinhart || post 6^et editi ante Bekkemm omnes, 
ut videtur: /ca0' a^Ti /t^j/ oS^ &rrb> ttl(r6vrr& ravra, quae legit etiam Soph. || 41. fadppovs 
vibs ET Soph. v. 1. (Atd/ooi/s uios e codd. Hayduck 71, 4), &</>pov uZ6y V, uldy om. W, 
Atdpous ut6j Simpl., et Atdpou? ut6y et Aidpys Them., A/w?y Philop., qui in noimullis 
dvTifYpdQoLs etiam scripturam esse Algous uios commemorat || 73. o5 alffOdytrai ante 
22. avftptpwe transponenda censet Essen || Kal om. S U V || ^ om. S U X, tuenlur ct teal 
etT/Them. Soph. H 26. -% om. S U || 27. /tA' post x/>w/*a EW Biehl Rodier, re reliqui 
omnes, etiam Philop. Simpl. || 28. -jrpoe\eov<ri- ^dXttrra y&p coni. Kssea II, 42 || 
/^dXia-ra om. S U X, leg. Soph. || 29. rouro...3i. oparip unc. includenda censet Susemihl |( 
29, 30. TUP mtf a,M &pa,T&v T W et E! (Bus.), rou...6paroD etiam Simpl. Philop, Soph, || 

CHS. 6, 7 418 a 13 418 b 7 77 

example, sight is of colour, hearing of sound and taste of flavour, 
while touch no doubt has for its object several varieties. But at 
any rate each single sense judges of its proper objects and is not 
deceived as to the fact that there is a colour or a sound ; though as to 
what or where the coloured object is or what or where the object is 
which produces the sound, mistake is possible. Such then, are the 3 
special objects of the several senses. By common sensibles are 
or (a) by meant motion, rest, number, figure, size : for such 
inco^ 1 -^ 3 qualities are not the special objects of any single sense, 
mon - but are common to all. For example, a particular motion 

can be perceived by touch as well as by sight. What is meant 4 

by the indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we 
Xhichhave suppose that the white thing before you is Diares' son. 
SSesSe ^ r u P erce i ve Diares' son, but indirectly, for that which 
indirectly y OU perceive is accessory to the whiteness. Hence you 
are not affected by the indirect sensible as such. Of the 
two classes of sensibles directly perceived it is the objects special 
to the different senses which are properly perceptible : and it is 
to these that the essential character of each sense is naturally 

The object, then, of sight is the visible: what is visible is colour 7 
sight and and something besides which can be described, though 
colour. j t j ias no name- What we mean will best be made clear 
as we proceed. The visible, then, is colour. Now colour is that 
with which what is visible in itself is overlaid : and, when I say 
in itself, I do not mean what is visible by its essence or form, but 
what is visible because it contains within itself the cause of 
visibility, namely, colour. But colour is universally capable of 
exciting change in the actually transparent, that is, in light ; this 
being, in fact, the true nature of colour. Hence colour is not 
visible without light, but the colour of each object is always seen 
in light. And so we shall have first to explain what light is. 

There is, then, we assume, something transparent ; and by this 2 
The I mean that which, though visible, is not properly 

medium. speaking, visible in itself, but by reason of extrinsic 
colour. Air, water and many solid bodies answer to this de- 
scription. For they are not transparent quA air or qu& water, 

31. ccfo-tD X, atfrw U V, <*aim? videntur legisse Them. 58, 31 Philop. 320, 18 || post XP&V* 
add. & AXXv #xet et /ctvi7ri/c6v...b, I. Siatpwovs unc. inch Essen j| 418 b, 2. ir&vrus 
%Ka<rrov SUX Them, et fort. Simpl., TTO.V ri> &dcrrou etiam Soph. |J 3. oparat ETy 
Soph. Torst., reliqui ante Torst. omnes oparfo \\ 6. XP^a deleri vult Siebeck, Philolog. 
XL, p. 347, probat Susemihl, xp- teg- etiam Theoph. ap. Prise. 7, 28 J| 7. post ffrepe&r 
add. oTov (JeXos /r/>tf<rraXXo$ T et margo U, similia in paraphr. Them. Philop. Soph. 

7 8 DE ANIMA II CH. 7 

e c/werts vTrdp^ovcra r) avrrj IP rovrois a/Mji>OTepot9 /cat 

v T<5 di'Sto) T<5 az'to crty//,aTt. <jf>c!>9 Se' ecrrtz> 17 rovrov a>epyeta, 
TOV Sta<a^os 77 Sta^a^e?. Swaftet Se ez> a> TOUT* ecrTt feat TO 10 
OVCOTOS. ro Se <^c3? oto*> xp&fJLci ecrTt rov Sta<j6az>o9, ora^ 77 
evr\)(eia Sia<f>ave<s VTTO irvpbs rj TOLOVTOV otov TO a^a> 
cra/ta* /cat yap TOVTOJ Tt virdp^ei ev KOL ravrov. ri /x,ei> ovz/ 
TO Sta<^az/e5 /cat T6 TO ^5, elpirjrai, on ovre Trvp ovO* oXcw? 

o{>8' aTroppor) <jo>/xaTO5 ovSe^d? (CIT; yap az> <r5fca Tt /cat 15 * 
), dXXa TTupo? ^ TOIOVTOU Ttvo? Trapovcria e^ TO; Sta<j&a- 
z/t' ovSe yap Svo crw/zaTa a/^a Sv^aToi^ ev TO> avTW el^at- 


crrep^crt5 TTJ? TOLavrys e^ecos IK Sia<jf>az>o{)s, cScrTe S^Xo^ OTC 
/cat 17 TOVTOV Trapovcria TO </>>$ Icrriv, KCU, OVK 6pda>s "E/^Tre- 20 
, ovS' et TIS aXXo? OVTO)<S eip77/c^, a>5 ^epop^4vo 
/cat yiyvopevov rrore p,erav TTJ<S yyjs feat TOU 

Tafias Se \av0<ivovTO<$' rovro yap ecrTt /cat Trapa 
TOV Xdyov ei/apyetaz/ /cat Trapa Ta ^at^o/^eva* e)f /u- 
/cp<3 /jiei/ yap StacrTTj^aTt Xa#ot av, ATT* ai/aToX7j$ S' ert 25 
TO \avddvew fieya Xtaz^ TO atT7;/^a. ecrTt Se Ypc5- 
fte^ Se/cTt/coz> TO o^povv, i//o<j6ov Se TO ai/fO<^>oi/* 
S' ecrTt TO Sta^aveg icat TO ddpaTOv ^ TO /xoXt? 
, otov So/cet TO cr/coTet^dz/. TOCOVTOV Se TO Sta<iai/e9 
aXX' o^x QTav ^ evTeXexeta Sta^a^, <xXX s OTav Sv- 30 

07 yap avTi) Averts OTC ftei/ CT/COTO? OTe Se c/>co9 
<JTM>. ou Tra^Ta Se opaTa ez/ <j&a)Tt eo-Ttv, dXXa /xdvov e/cao-TOU 419 a 
TO ot/ceto^ xP^ a * ^ ia y^P ^ ^ei/ TO) <a)Tt ovx opaTat, 
4^ Se T$ cr/coTet Trotet atcr^crtv, otov Ta TrvpvSrj ^>atvo/xe^a 
/cat Xa/i-TrovTa (a^aJw/xa S' ecrTt TavTa e^t wd/xaTt), otov 

8. <?<rrt rts 0rfens UX Them. SimpL Soph. Torst, om. rty reliqui , 

S U V X Them. Bek. Trend. || KaL..<). <rc6/trt unc. includenda censet Susemihl || g, virgulam 
post tvtpy. om. Bek. Trend., frtpyeia ical rov Siafcwovs coni. Trend. || ro. virgukm post forl 
Bek., post a^Torst., Svvdpet & real fr $ TOVT <*<rrJ, rb <r/c6ros coni. Steinhart || n. ^ om. E || 
12. 97... 13. TO.MV unc. includenda censent Susemihl et Essen H, 43 || 14, e^rat /cai r rd 
^ V, similiter in paraphr. Them. || 15. post trco/za transferenda esse, quae nunc 
17. leguntur, ita: o-cS/^a (o^ 7A/5...eIyai), oW dwo/>/)o^ censet Torst., eundem, quern 
vulgata, ordinem servant Them. SimpL Philop. || otire T V W, ou^ etiara Them, jj 16". ^ 
rototfrov ni/6s unc. includenda censet Susemihl || 18. re] 5^ T U V X Bek. Trend, J| <r/c6rw 
E S || 6 T U, om. V || 20. rb <f>fa y rotrov irapovrta S U X, vulgatam tuetur Them || 
^22. rcvof&m, E V et vet. transl. Stapfer, Krit. Stud. p. 16 Biehl Rodier, vulgo W >/o^ou, 
etiam Them. 60, 28 Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokr. p. 170, 38 || TTOT^] ir/rirepov els T 'b 

CH. 7 418 b 8 419 a 4 79 

but because there is a certain natural attribute present in both 
of them which is present also in the eternal body on high. Light 
is the actuality of this transparent qud transparent But where 
the transparent is only potentially present, there darkness is 
actually. Light is a sort of colour in the transparent when 
made transparent in actuality by the agency of fire or something 
resembling the celestial body : for this body also has an attribute 
which is one and the same with that of fire. What the transparent 
Light not is, and what light is, has now been stated ; namely, that 
corporeal. ft j g ne jth er fire nor body generally nor an effluence from 
any body (for even then it would still be a sort of body), but the 
presence of fire or something fiery in the transparent. For it 
is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same space at the 
same time. 

Light is held to be contrary to darkness. But darkness 3 
is absence from the transparent of the quality above described : 
so that plainly light is the presence of it. Thus Empedocles and 
others who propounded the same view are wrong when 

The velo- ,. i - , . . 

city of light they represent light as moving in space and arriving 
mere i a t a given point of time between the earth and that 

which surrounds it without our perceiving its motion. For this 
contradicts not only the clear evidence of reason, but also the facts 
of observation : since, though a movement of light might elude 
observation within a short distance, that it should do so all the 
way from east to west is too much to assume. 

It is that which is colourless which is receptive of colour, as 4 
it is that which is soundless which is receptive of sound. And 
the transparent is colourless, and so is the invisible or the dimly 
visible which is our idea of the dark. Such is the transparent 
medium, not indeed when it is in actuality, but when potentially 
transparent. For it is the same natural attribute which is at one 
time darkness and at another time light. It is not everything 
visible which is visible in light, but only the proper colour of each 
thing. Some things, indeed, are not seen in daylight, though they 
produce sensation in the dark : as, for example, the 

Phosphor- , - -. . r -i - i 

escent things of fiery and glittering appearance, for which 

objects. there is no one distinguishing name, like fungus, horn, 

coni. Essen, coll. De Sensu 6, 446 b, 29, 30 || rfc ^...33. irepttxovTos unc. inch Essen |{ 
34. rijy tv rf \6y<p S U X Them. Bek. Trend. TT\V roD \6yov etiam Soph. H fr&pyeiay 
TWy Soph. 75, -27 Torst., Mpyaav E (Trend.), &M)0iav reliqui ante Torst. omnes, 
etiam Them. || kv /uKpf.,,i6. atfn^a unc. incl. Essen || 419 a, 3. <nc6rwi E, <rx6T<p Them., 
<r/c6r Soph. 


s, Ke<f>a\al l^Ovo^v Kal XexrtSes Kal 6<j&0aX- 5 
aXX' ovSews 6porat TOVTUV TO oiKtoz> XP&P- - ^ ^ v 

5 pa; ovv aiTiav ravra oporat, aXXos Xoyos* vvv S' err! ro- 
arovToi' (fravepov I&TLV, OTL TO pev iv <a>Tt opatpevov ^pai/xa. 
Sto Kal ovx oparai avev (JXOTOS- TOVTO yap TJI/ avTaJ ro 
vp&fjiaTt, el^a^ ro /ct^rtfcaJ eTz^ai TOV Kar* Ivepyeiav Sta<^>a- 10 
voOs' ^ S* e^reXe^eta ro5 Siacfravovs ^0)5 ecrrtv. crrj^lov Se rov- 
rou <}>avp6v iav yap TL$ ^ TO e\;oy ^pSt/Jia tir avTrjv 

OT//IZ/, oufc oi/fTaf dXXa TO j^ez/ ^poi/jca KIVCL TO Sta- 
olov TOZ^ acpa, VTTO rovrov Se o-v^e^ovs OI/TO? KLvelrou 

6 TO alcrdyTijpLOV. ov yap KaXSs TOVTO Xeyet AijjaoKpLTO^ oto- 15 

ei yevoiro KZVQV TO fjuera^v, opoL<T0ai av a/cptySSs, feat 
ev T<5 ovpavto *?) rovro yap aSvvaTW ecrriy. ?ra- 

yap 76 TOV at(T^7JT6/COV JLVeTOil TO OpOCZ/ ' V7T* aVTOV 

^cez/ ov^ TOV opctijjievov ^p<w/iaTO5 dSvvarov XetTreTat ST) VTTO 
TOV /jLera^v, GJCTT dvcuyKQiiov ri ivai /jLera^v- KCVQV Se yz/o- 20 
on a/cpi^8<2s, aXX* oXtu? OV&G.V o^^ifo-eTat. 

alriav TO ^pfijota cxi/ay/catov e^ <f>o)Tl opaLcrdcui, 


Kal TOVTO e^ a^ay/cTyg- TO yap Sca^ave? VTTO TOVTOU yiverai 

8 Sta<az>e's. 6 8' avTos Xoyos /cat Trepc i//o<jf>ov /cal ocr/x/Tjs 25 
0"Ttv ovffev yap avr&v aTTTOpevov TOV alcr6r)T f r)piov Trocei 
ala'6'qo'iv, aXX* VTTO ftez^ ocr/x,^? /cat \fjo<pov TO /xTa^v 

VTTO Se TOVTOV T<3^ a6cr#7?T7?p6a)z/ e/ccxTepov OTar 8* 
TI? eTTt^jj r ^ alvOrjTripiov TO $o<f>ovv r/ TO oov, 

8e ac^s /cat yevorect>9 ^t /xe^ 3 C> 
ov fyalveTai Se- St* 17^ S 5 amaz/, vcrTtpov Icrrat 

9 TO 8e /xeTa^v x//o^>0)v /xev aT/p, OCT/XT}? 8' cu><wv//,ov 

yap 877 TC 7ra#os OT' aepos feat vSaTos ecrrtz>, cSo - 7rep TO Sta- 

T<j3 e^oz/Tt oo-pj^v o Iv 

5. /c^pas] ycp^a? coni. Chandler, Sugg, and emend., p. 7 || \oirtdes E 1? XeiriSes ctiam 
Them. Philop. Soph. || 7. 6/)ar< E, 6/>arat etiam Them. Philop. Soph. j| 9. /cai oin. 
EUW Soph. |[ at3rd W Trend., aiJr<? etiam Them. Soph., tuentur Prantl, Aribt. Ub. (U 
Farben, p. 93, adn. 2, Barco p. 57, cttfrd 77? pro ^ o^ry coni. Essen II, p. 45 || rd] r<j? 
W, om. S Them. || 10. post x/>- cl^a* virgulam om. Bek. Trend. || 14. 5^ KTWy, 5 
^77 Them., a^ etiam Simpl, Soph. || 16. virg. post A*/>iws posuit Diels || itf. et 17, Arai 
efl /cat e etiam Soph. 83, 32, *&> e Philop. 350, 8 || 17. 4<rnv dS^aro^ S U X, Mfowrfr 
iffnv Soph. U 18. atcreyrwlov VW et, at videtur, Philop. 350, 13, afc^n/coO etiam 
Soph., aicrejreus in paraphr. Them. 62, 14 || 19, ^ ETW, 6t rcliqui ante Biehiium 

CH. 7 419 a 5 419 a 34 81 

the heads, scales and eyes of fishes. But in no one of these cases 
is the proper colour seen. Why these objects are seen must 
be discussed elsewhere. At present this much is clear, that the 5 
object seen in light is colour, and this is why it is not seen without 
light For the very quiddity of colour is, as we saw, just this, that 
it is capable of exciting change in the operantly transparent 
medium: and the activity of the transparent is light. There is clear 
evidence of this. If you lay the coloured object upon your eye, you 
will not see it. On the contrary, what the colour excites is the 
transparent medium, say, the air, and by this, which is continuous, 
the sense-organ is stimulated. For it was a mistake in Democritus 6 
Necessit to su PP ose ^at if the intervening space became a void, 
of a even an ant would be distinctly seen, supposing there 

me mm. were one j n the sky. That is impossible. For sight takes 
place through an affection of the sensitive faculty. Now it cannot 
be affected by that which is seen, the colour itself: therefore it 
can only be by the intervening medium : hence the existence of 
some medium is necessary. But, if the intermediate space became 
a void, so far from being seen distinctly, an object would not be 
visible at all. 

We have explained the reason why colour must be seen in 7 
light. Fire is visible both in light and in darkness : and necessarily 
so, for it is owing to fire that the transparent becomes transparent. 
The same argument holds for sound and odour. For no sound 8 
or scent produces sensation by contact with the sense-organ : it 
is the intervening medium which is excited by sound and odour 
and the respective sense-organs by the medium. But, when the 
body which emits the sound or odour is placed on the sense-organ 
itself, it will not produce any sensation. The same holds of touch 
and taste, although it appears to be otherwise. The reason for this 
will be seen hereafter. The medium for sounds is air, that for odour 9 
has no name. For there is assuredly a common quality in air 
and water, and this quality, which is present in both, stands to 
the body which emits odour in the same relation as the transparent 

omnes, etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 20 w'<rr'...jit6rarf om. S U X, leg. Soph. (cf. Prise. 
L. 10, 10) || 22. dt? 77^... 25. 8ia<f>av& tmc. incl. Susemihl et Essen || 23. <r/c6rcot E> 
<TK&Ttp Soph. || 29. res tiridfi om. pr. E || TO ante al<rd. om. E || 32. codd. hoc loco non 
variant, vulgatam leg. etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 84, u, sed Them, 
inlerpretatur : r6 $ fccra^d -fi6<f>ov Kal fopsrjs &7ip /cai $8<ap, unde Brandisius com. Them. 
legisse rb 8 /uerau \f/6<pcw Kal 607*775 dvc&'Vyuoj', Torst. coni. ah Arist. haec fere scripta 
fuisse: rb 8 /ueraty ij/6<j>ov i&v Kal 6<rjuLTJs dtfp re Kal i)8<ap* rb 5 KOLVOV &.v&vviMv m Kowbv..,, 
vulgatam defendit Barco, p. 58, rb fe juerai!'...b, 3. Xex^ererat unc. incl. Essen jj 33. &# 
om. SUVWXy |) 34. xpAparos P \\ post do-pty virgulam posuit Rodier 1| 5 fr] 5v S X, 
ov to P, <bTV. 

H. 6 

82 DE ANIMA II CHS. 7, 8 

rovrots* <atz/erat yap /cat ra eWSpa r5>v &o)v 35 

)<Tiv ooyx/qs. dXX* 6 jue^ av#pa>7ro$ /cat 
ocra dvGLTTvet, aSwaret o<r/zacr#at /Z,T? dvarrveovTa. rj S' at- 
rta /cal Trepi rowcoz> vcrrepov Xe^Tjcrerat. 

8 Nw Se 7rp<Sroz' Trept ^ocfrov /cat a/co7js Stoptcra>/^ei>. ecrrt 
Se Strros 6 i/fo<os- 6 jitez/ yap ei'epyeta rts, 6 Se Swdpei* S 
ra jitey yap ov <^a/>c^ e^etf \fj6<j>ov, oiov cnroyyov, pta, ra 
8* e>(t^ ? ofoz^ ^aXKoz/ Kat ocra crrepea /cat Xeia, ort Svz/a- 
rai i/fO^Tjcrai. rovro 8* ecrrtv avroi) jaera^v /cat ryjs a/co^5 

2 cjHTrot^crat ijfo^ov ez^epyet^. ytVerat S' 6 /car* eVepyetav i/fo- 
<^o$ act r(z>o$ Trpos rt /cat ei^ rtz/t* TrX^yTj yap ecrrt^ 17 Trot- 10 
oScra. Sto /cat aSwaro^ e^o? oz^ros yGvecrOai $6(/>ov' erzpov 
yap ro TVTTTOV /cat ro TVTTTQILZVOV coo-re ro ^o<f>ow Trpos rt 
t/fO(j&t* TrKyyr) 8' ov ytz/erai az'ev <^opa?. cSorTrep S* et7ro/xi>, 
ov rcoz' rz/xo^rcoz' TrX^yTj 6 i/fo^os* ou^eVa yap Trotet \jjo<j>ov 
Ipta az> Trhriyfi, aXXa ^aX/co? /cat ocra Xeta /cat /cotXa, 15 
o jaez/ xaX/co?, ort Xetos- ra Se /cotXa r^ cx^a/cXacret TroX- 
Xas Trotet TrX^ycx? /xera r^ TrpcorTj^, aSwaroiWos 

roC Kivri6lvTO<$. ert a/coverat ez' aept /cat vSart, aXX* 

3 OVK eo^rt Se iffofov /cvpto^ 6 a^p ovSe ro u8a>p* aXX<i Set 
crrcpefi^ 7r\riyr)v yevecrOai Trpos aXXijXa /cat ?rpos rw aepa. 20 
rovro Se ytVerat, oraz^ vTro^r) TrX^yct? 6 <XT?p /cat p,^ 8ta- 
Xv#jy, Sto eaz/ ra)(ea)5 /cat o-<oSp<2$ ^XTjyTj, i//o^>et- Set yap 
<j>0dcraL rrjv Kivr\a'iv rov paTrt^ovro^ r^v 0pv\pw rev aepog, 
cticnrep Kv et arwpov $) 6pp,a0ov if/dfAfAov rv?rrot rt? ^>po/x- 

4 z>oi/ raj(v. ^a^ Se ytverat, ora^ CITTO rov aepos ez/os yez/ojue- 25 

Sta ro dyyetov ro Stoptcrav /cat /c^XOcraz/ 

419 b, i. 65^s et 2. 6$Maor0at ET |j dXX',.,4. Stop^w^ev] ex Themistii t Sophoniae 
interpretationibus Torst. coni. Arist. haec fere scripsisse : dXX* 6 ^ fatipwiros xal rtbv wefiv 
8<ra AvcnrveZ d5wctret 6<r(j&<r&&t, f^ dixtirrfovTa, ret 5^ lyuSpct <5o>carcu /cai M dvatrvtovra,. -^ 5' 
aMa ml Trepi roiJrwi' frrrepoi' Xex^^erai. ^0^ 5' ^AC raw elpyi^vtov $TJ\OV rt forw tyis, yiteri 
5^ raOra \exr4ov irepl &KOTJS nal 6o-0/^a-fiws' /cai irpQrov p&v irepl ^6^>ou /cai dfco^s StopiffUftcv, 
Simplicium vulgatam legisse et ex interpret, hnius loci et quae p. 138 de Alexandro dicit 
certum est, vulgatam defendit Wilson, Trans, of Ox. Philol. See. 188-2/3, P- ^ II 4- cUo^s] 
<S(r0p^TWs E WXy et Soph., reliqui d/co^s, etiam Them. {( 5. ^epye^at (i.e. casu dative) 
E (Trend.) et 5uvd/Aet E Them. Simpl. Philop, Soph. Torst., frtyyeio, el &!va/us reliqui 
ante Torst. omnes || rw post frepyelg. om. Soph., leg. Them. Simpl. || 7. xX/r6s T, 
%aX/cdy etiam Them. Soph. || 8. rovro 5' ^rlv. t .g. frepyelq. unc. incl. Essen || to. post 
ru>t addendum TXTJrroj/raj censet Chandler || n. ylveff6ai, X Soph,, probat Susemihl H 
E, rbv om. Soph. || 15. fyw 4 irem(eur jf wXiry^, dXXA VX et margo U, 

CHS. 7, 8 419 a 35419 b 26 83 

to colour. For the animals that live in water also appear to have 
the sense of smell. But man and the other land-animals which 
breathe are unable to smell without inhaling breath. The reason 
for this, too, must be reserved for future explanation. 

Let us now begin by determining the nature of sound and 8 
sound and hearing. There are two sorts of sound, one a sound 
hearing. which is operant, the other potential sound. For some 
things we say have no sound, as sponge, wool ; others, for ex- 
ample, bronze and all things solid and smooth, we say have sound, 
because they can emit sound, that is, they can produce actual 
sound between the sonorous body and the organ of hearing. When 2 
actual sound occurs it is always of something on something and 
in something, for it is a blow which produces it. Hence it is 
impossible that a sound should be produced by a single thing, 
for, as that which strikes is distinct from that which is struck, that 
which sounds sounds upon something. And a blow implies spatial 
motion. As we stated above, it is not concussion of any two 
things taken at random which constitutes sound. Wool, when 
struck, emits no sound at all, but bronze does, and so do all smooth 
and hollow things ; bronze emits sound because it is smooth, while 
hollow things by reverberation produce a series of concussions after 
the first, that which is set in motion being unable to escape. 
The Further, sound is heard in air and, though more faintly, 

medium. j n wa ter. It is not the air or the water, however, which 3 
chiefly determine the production of sound : on the contrary, there 
must be solid bodies colliding with one another and with the air : 
and this happens when the air after being struck resists the impact 
and is not dispersed* Hence the air must be struck quickly and 
forcibly if it is to give forth sound ; for the movement of the striker 
must be too rapid to allow the air time to disperse: just as would 
be necessary if one aimed a blow at a heap of sand or a sandwhirl, 
while it was in rapid motion onwards. 

Echo is produced when the air is made to rebound backwards 4 
like a ball from some other air which has become a single 
mass owing to its being within a cavity which confines 

vulgatam leg. sine dubio Philop. 359, 23 et fort. Soph. 84, 33 & (v.l. e/) TrX^yJ [| 18. iv\ 
jjfo fr coni. Torst. || d\V JJTTOV unc. incl. Torst., om. Soph., videntur legisse Them. 
63, 20 Simpl. 140, 15 Philop. 359, 28 || 19. otfre TW, off-re 61 E, o5 etiam Simpl. 
Soph. || 20. teal] Torst. coni. ^ iea.1, quod iam Steinhart coniecerat, vulgatam tuentur 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. H 21. ^Tra^eLvifji E et fort. Simpl. 140, 27. 141, 6, {nroftfr-g Soph. || 
24. wo-irep &F...25. ra^ unc. incl. Susemihl || 24. &v om. STUX, leg. Soph. || a-upbv 
$ delendum censet Essen || ns] TI coni. Essen || 25. rdxet P |j fab rov om. S U V X 
Torst., leg. Soph, et Alex, de anima 48, i (sed &irt> pro dwd) || ywofAfrov U VWX Soph. 



ird\iv o dr/p dircoo-Ofj, ajcnrep cr<j>alpa. Ibtfce 8' det ytz/ecrtfat 
77X<u, dXX' ov crcu^ifr, eVci crv/^atVet ye em rov t/ro'<ov 
Kadd-rrep /cat eVt rov <a>ros- *ai yap TO <<Ss del dva/cXa- 
Tat (ovSe yap oU> eytWo TrdVfl <<$, dXXa CTKO'TOS lfa> roS 30 
T^Xtov/xeVov), dXX' OL^ ovras az/a/cXarai aJcTTrep a^>* uSaros 
^ X^XKOV r/ KOLI TWOS d\\ov rwv XctW, cucrre <r/aaz> Troieiv, 
Sy TO <<3? opi&fjiev. TO Se KCVOZ^ op^oi? Xe-yerai Kvpiov rov 
ciKovtiv. So/cet yap etvat KSVQV 6 wf)p> OVTO$ 8' ecrTtv 6 Troiaiv 
aiKoveiv, OTOLV Kivijdfj <rvv)(ri<$ Kol el$. dXXa Sea TO \fja0vpbs 35 
etrai ov yeyoDyei, ai/ /L^ Xetoz> 7; TO TrXTjyeV. TOTC 15 yt- 420 a 
i/rat a/jia Sta TO ImireSov* iv yap TO ToC Xetov 
6 \jjo<f)r)TiKOV pkv ovv TO KIVY)TIKOV evb<$ aepo9 
aKorjs. dtcoTJ Se crVjac^fTjs d?yp' Sta 8e TO e^ aept eivai, 
vov TOT) 1^0) 6 etcrco KLV^LTCHI. StOTrep ov TrdVrj? TO ^<i5oz/ ex/covet, 5 
ovSe iroii>Ty Siep^eTat 6 diyp ov yap Trdvrr) )(L depa TO fci- 
vrjordfjLGvov /xepo? /cat e/jtt/ar^OK avTO9 /^^ ST!) a^ofyov o dr/p 
d TO evdpviTTOV orav Se K0)\vdy 6pv f rrrea'8ai, r] rovrov 
i//o<^O9. 6 S' ev TOIS cwofiz^ y/caT6)ACo8o/X7yTat Trpo? TO 

?i/ai, OTTOt)? aKpt^8<3s atcr^a^TaL Tracrag T<X? Sta- to 
s T7?9 Kivycretos. Sta TavTa 8e /cat i> vSaTt d/couo- 
OTt ov/c etcrep}(Tat Trpos avTOZ/ TOZ> crvfji^v^ depa' aXX* 
et$ TO oS? Std Ta$ cXt/cas. oTai^ 8e TOVTO crv/jtj8^, ov/c 
ovS* az/ 17 ptfwy K&IVQ* tocnrep TO evrt T^ /cop|7 8ep- 
/cdju/rj]. dXXa feat crrj/jielov rov aKOvew r/ pr) TO 15 

30. otf ST UVX Them., otf5 etiam Soph. || 33. -J] <JJ scripsit Torst. e solo Philop., 
77 etiam Soph. || 33. r& 8 ..35. cts partim corrupta partim alieno loco posita esse 
putat Torst., vide ems comment, crit p. 148, tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. H 
420 a, i. Torst. suspicatur Arist. scripsisse r6re 6t els ylverai /cai &IJLO, d^dXXerai, 
$10, r6 l7rTe5ov, similiter in interpret. Them, et Philop., vulgatam leg. etiam Soph. (| 
2. (LfMa, 7<ip SL& U, flXos 7<ip a/*a Kwelrai Philop. in paraphr. 363, 27 || 4. AACO^ 
5e o-vAt^s d^p W P y Simpl. Philop. Prise. Lyd. 16, 22 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
Erkenntnissth. d. Ar., p. 75 Bon., Ind. Ar. 720 a, u Rodier, ceteri libri et script! 
et impress! d/co-^ Se o-u/*^u^s clfyt, etiam Them. 64, i6sq., sed 64, 17. 28 777 p-fivtyyi 
<ru/0vi)s || 5td r6 fra d^pa cZVat coni. Steinhart, quod iam lul. Pacius coniecerat, fort. 
recte, probat Beare, did re rd, virgula ante 5:A posita, coni. dubitanter Susemihl, textum 
tuentur Simpl. Philop. || 5. rb SUVX Bek. Trend., & leg. etiam Them. Philof. 
Torst. || &rw SU || KIVCI STVW Bek. Trend., ^etrat etiam Philop. Simpl. vet. 
transl. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 2 || rdvra r6 $ov 
dyco^ec, dXX* &<rtv, otdt irdvra, Jt^pxerat <5 d-tfp P, vrwrl ^pet rb $ov dKOiJei d\X' ticrtv' 
ottfe Trarraxou roO ffdbfULTos SifyxeTai.' 01) ykp Wy, similia habent et Them, et Philop., 
fluxisse e priori editione putat Torst., sed nihil nisi interpretamentum est, vulgalatn 
tuentur Soph. Simpl. || 6. 6 tfy unc, incl. Torst., leg. Soph. || d^pa, (JXXi T& K. coni. 

CH. 8 419 b 27 420 a 15 85 

it and prevents its dispersion. It seems likely that echo is always 
produced, but is not always distinctly audible : since surely the 
same thing happens with sound as with light. For light is always 
being reflected ; else light would not be everywhere, but outside the 
spot where the sun's rays fall there would be darkness. But it 
is not always reflected in the same way as it is from water or 
bronze or any other smooth surface ; I mean, it does not always 
produce the shadow, by which we define light. 

Void is rightly stated to be the indispensable condition of 5 
conditions hearing. For the air is commonly believed to be a void, 
ance S and an< * ^ * s t ^ ie a * r which causes hearing, when being one 
hearing. anc j continuous it is set in motion. But, owing to its 
tendency to disperse, it gives out no sound unless that which is 
struck is smooth. In that case the air when struck is simultaneously 
reunited because of the unity of the surface; for a smooth body 
presents a single surface. 

That, then, is resonant which is capable of exciting motion in 6 
a mass of air continuously one as far as the ear. There is air 
naturally attached to the ear. And because the ear is in air, when 
the external air is set in motion, the air within the ear moves. 
Hence it is not at every point that the animal hears, nor that the 
air passes through : for it is not at every point that the part which 
is to set itself in motion and to be animate has a supply of air. Of 
itself, then, the air is a soundless thing because it is easily broken 
up. But, whenever it is prevented from breaking up, its movement 
is sound. But the air within the ears has been lodged fast within 
walls to make it immoveable, in order that it may perceive exactly 
all the varieties of auditory movement. This is why we hear in 
water also, because the water does not pass right up to the air 
attached to the ear, nor even into the ear at all, because of its 
convolutions. Should this happen, hearing is destroyed, as it is 
by an injury to the membrane of the tympanum, and as sight is by 
an injury to the cornea. Further, we have evidence whether we 
hear or not, according as there is or is not always a ringing sound in 

Torst., dXX& non leg. Philop. Soph. || 7. / u.^i/x<w etiam Philop. Soph., fyifsotpov coni. 
Torst., cui assentiuntur Hayduck et Dittenberger, p. 1615, fyfaxov, wcnrep -^ K6p7) TO 
tiyp6v* atfrd W Py et margo U vet. transl. et, ut videtur, Philop. 366", 9. 10. n, non leg. 
Soph., Kal y&p ?rp6s fyt^vxov atfrdy, puncto post /u^pos posito, legendum censet Essen |( 
atfrds e Them, scripsit Torst., cui assentiuntur Biehl et Rodier, ceteri atfro |j 7. atir6s /*& 
drj... g. $6<f>os ante 419 b, 33.r6 8& transponenda coni. Steinhart, Susemihl vero, mutato $ij 
in yap, fort, ante 419 b, 25. fa&.ll IO - tiperaKlvrrros coni. Hayduck || 12. TOV <ru/u,0u$;... 
13. Xt/cas unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. Philop. Soph. [[ 14. otfr' ET || 15. STCLV xdjj.'ff 
unc. inclusit Biehl, om. ETWPy Soph* || dXXa usque ad 18. iftioy unc. incl. Torst., 
tuentur Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 

86 DE ANIMA II m CH. 8 

TO /cepag- aet yap ot/ceuu> TWO, /ct- 


6 OTjp Kivzlrai 6 h rot? c&<rw>- aXX* 6 \/fo<os aXXo- 
Tptos /cat ov/c tStos. /ecu Sta roCro <ao-w aKQveiv T(S Kva> /cat 

7 ^^owrt, on aKovo^v ra5 e^ow apiorptvov TOV aepa. vrOTepov 
Se T/fo<et TO rvrrTOpevov rj TO TVTTTOI/ ; r) KOI a/x^a>, Tpo'- 
TTOI> 8' erepov ecrTt yap 6 t/fo<os Kivr)crt,$ rov Svvapwov KL- 
veiaQai rov rpoirov TOVTOV ovirep TOL d<f>a\\6p,eva airo rcov 
Xei&v, orav Ttg Kpova-r^ ov Sr/ nav, aicrirep ^Ip^rai, ^o<et 
TVTTTO^eyov /cat TVTTTOV, otoz^ av TraTafjj /3eXoV>j ^eXoV^v 
aXXa Set TO TVTTTO/^e^o^ op^akop elvai, a!crre TW ct/)a aOpovv 25 

8 oL<f>dX\cr0ai /cat cretccr^at. at Se Sia<f>opal T&V ^ofovvTW 
ev TO> /caT* evepyetaz/ i/fo^w SiyXoC^Tat- (Scnrep yap avzv 
^>o)T05 o^ oparai ra x/xw/taTa, OVTOOS ovS* aWv \l/6<f>ov TO 
ov /cat TO fiapv. ravra Se Xe'yeTat jcaTa /xTa<jf>opav CITTO 

TTCt)^' TO /xi^ yap o^v /cti^et TT/V ato"^ortv & oXtya> 30 
eTrt TroXv, TO Se jSapv ei/ TroXXaJ eTr' oXtyoi^. ov 8^7 

TO 6|v, TO Se /3api) /3pa$v, clXXa ytveTat TOV />te^ 
Sta TO TCC^OS 07 KtV7jcrt9 ToiavTTj, rov Se Sta /3pa$VTrJTa, 
/cat eoiKev dvakoyov eyfw T<3 Trept T^I/ d^Tjz/ o^et /cat a/x- 420 b 

O\ \ \ \ 3 >\ ^ rx \ O 3 /)\ \ "? > /) ^ 

pA.f TO /xev yap ogu oto^ /ce^Tet, TO o aftpAu otov 6>f7t 
Sia TO Kivziv TO pkv eV o\iyy TO Se ei^ TroXXw, cScrTe crv/x- 
ySat^et TO jaez/ Ta^i) TO Se )8paSv eT^at. 

9 Trept /iei/ ow \jj6<f)ov TavTy Sicopicrdw. 77 Se ^6)^77 ^6<f>o^ Tt? 5 

i/ry^ov T^ yap afyvyjtiv ovdev ifitovel, aXXa /ca$* O/JLOLO- 
XeyeTat <j6(wvetv, otov avXo? /cat Xvpa /cat ocra aXXa TI/ di/fi;- 
aVoTacrtz/ ej(et /cat jaeXo? /cat StaXe/croi>. eot/ce yap OTt 
/cat 17 <^ot>^ TavT 5 ej^et. TroXXa Se T^ ^a^ ov/c fyovcn 
<j><t)vtfv 9 oiov Tcf Te avat/xa /cat T<3z> evaifjicov t^^ve^. /cat 10 
TOVT' evXoya>s, et^rep depo? /averts Tt? <TTIV o \jjo<f>o<s. dXX* 

16. afei ante r6 om. SVX, leg. Them. Soph. || del ykp] teal y&p coni. Essen || 
17. 6 ante to om. STUWX, leg. Soph. || 19. r6^ om. SUVX, leg. SimpL || 
22. dAX6M'a SVX, d0ttXX6/Ae^a Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph* || 13* Kpofoy] imicpo&ay 
coni. Essen || ^4. /cai riJTrroj' om. SUVX, leg. Philop. SimpL Soph, (qui ^ pro 
Kal habet) || 25. W P 6ov STUVWX || 26. ^60w^ Ty Them. Soph. Theoph. ap. 
Prise. 17, 25, \fso<f>ofoTcw etiam Philop. Simpl. || 31. ^r 7 om. SUVWy, leg. Them. 
Philop. Simpl. || oi5 5^] wVre ofy* TW Soph., wcrrc o^W V, oflru X, oiJ ^ etiam 
Simpl., otf ^...33. j3pa5ur^ra unc. incl. Susemihl, adversatur Kodier II, 299 || 
33. :^(rts] oftrft^ts coni. Essen || 420 b, 2. pro dya/SXv oloy habet papb u<nrep P || 
3^<rvp.pabeut E S, o-ujujSa^et Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 8. vAp] te S U V, yAp etiam Soph. 
post 7fy> virgulam posuit Rodier || 10. dXX' ot8t rA ^i/at/t Trdvra, ofoj' fyOtts P || post 

CH. 8 420 a 16 420 b ii 87 

the ears, as in a horn : for the air imprisoned there is always moving 
with a proper motion of its own. But sound is something of external 
origin and is not native to the ear. And this is why it is said that 
we hear by means of what is empty and resonant, because that by 
which we hear has air confined within it. 

Does that which is struck emit the sound or that which strikes ? 7 
Is it not rather both, but each in a different way ? For sound is 
motion of that which is capable of being moved in the same 
manner as things rebound from smooth surfaces when struck 
sharply against them. Thus, as above remarked, it is not everything 
which, when struck or striking, emits sound : supposing, for instance, 
a pin were to strike against a pin, there would be no sound. The 
thing struck must be of even surface, so that the air may rebound 
and vibrate in one mass. 

The varieties of resonant bodies are clearly distinguished by the 8 
sound they actually emit. For, as without light colours are not seen, 
so without sound we cannot distinguish high and low 
or acute and grave in pitch. These latter terms are used 
by analogy from tangible objects. For the acute, that is, the high, 
note moves the sense much in a little time, while the grave or low 
note moves it little in much time. Not that what is shrill is 
identically rapid, nor what is low is slow, but it is in the one 
case the rapidity, in the other the slowness, which makes the 
motion or sensation such as has been described. And it would 
seem that there is a certain analogy between the acute and 
grave to the ear and the acute and blunt to the touch. For 
that which is acute or pointed, as it were, stabs, while the blunt, 
as it were, thrusts, because the one excites motion in a short, the 
other in a long time, so that per accidens the one is quick, the other 
slow. Let this account of sound suffice. 

Voice is a sound made by an animate being. No inanimate 9 

thing is vocal, though it may by analogy be said to be 

vocal, as in the case of the pipe, the lyre and all other 

inanimate things that have pitch and tune and articulation : for these 

qualities, it would seem, the voice also possesses. But many animals 

have no voice: that is to say, all bloodless animals and, among 

animals that have blood, fishes. And this is what we might 

expect, since sound is a movement of air. Those fishes which 

et post n. ^60os virgulas ponendas et jroi...ii. ^6^>os post 13. roiotfry trans- 
ponendum censet Susemihl || n. efrre/>... \M0oy fortasse corrupta esse putat Torst., leg. 
Philop. Soph. Them, (qui pro if/6(j>os habet 0<uviJ) |] rls om. S U V X et in paraphr. 
Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || n. dXV,..i3. TOIOI$TV unc. incl. Torst., leg* Them. Philop. 
Soph., defendant Wilson, Phil. Rundschau 1882, N. 47, Trans, of Ox. Phil. Soc. 1882-3, 
p. 9 et Susemihl. 


01 Xeyojuez'ot (jxovelv, olov h TO! 'AxeX<sJa>, x/fo^ovcrt rot? 
/Jpayx^'ots 3 rlvl &epV TOLOVT&. <jxwr) 8* e<rrt <wov i//o<os, 
/cat ov T<5 TV^OVTI popiq). dXX' eTret TTCU' i//O(j&et TV7TTOz>Tos 
TWOS /cat Tt /cat ez> nvi, TOVTO 8* eortz> ctTjp, t5Xoya>s a*/ 15 
(fxovoiT) ravra pova ocra Se^erat TOZ> depa. 17877 yap raJ 
dva7n>eo/xeVa> /caTa^pTjTat 17 $v<ri$ lirl Svo epya, KaOdtrep 
ry y\d)Trr) ITTL re TT?Z> yeScrtz^ /cat TTJZ^ SiaXe/croz^, c5z> ^7 jite^ 
avayKaA,QV (8 to /cat TrXeiocriv vTrap^ei), T) 8* 

eVe/ca TOT) e, ovro> /cal raJ TTPevjaari TTyoo? re T^I^ ^e/>- 20 

TT)V e^ros cos a^ay:atov (TO 8* atTtoi^ e^ erepots t- 
ii pTJo-eTai) /cat vrpos r^ (frtovijv, OTTWS vTrdp^ri TO e5. o/oya- 
z/ov 8e T^ avairvori 6 <f>dpvyg* ov 8* !W/ca /cat TO /AOpiov 

CCTTL TOVTO, 7T\VfJi<W' TOVTCt) yap TO) JUO/HO) ir\tOrTO^ 6)(t TO 

0epp.ov ra 7T^a TO>^ a\\a)v. SetTat Se T^S dvaTn/OTys /cat 25 
6 7T6/ot T^^ KapBiav TOTTOS 7rp>ro$. 8to oivayKaiov etcra) cx 
etcrtevat TOV de/Da. <^crTe 07 77X777^ ToS d 


aprypiav (frcwy Icrriv. ov yap Tras 

KaOdirep etTro/xe^ (co-Tt yap /cat TT? yXa>TTy \jjo<f>iv /cat 30 
cos ot ^TJTTOVTCS), dXXa Set e/zi//tr>(oz/ TC etz^at TO 
/cat ju,Ta ^>a^Taa"tas Tt^os* orTjjoca^TtKOS yap 817 Tt 
ecrTt^ 77 <jf>a)^7/' /cat ov ToO dvairveofjievov ctepos, ojcnr^p 
12 dXXa TOVTO) TWTet TOZ^ eV TTJ apT^pta ^rpos avTyv. cnrjpeLOV 421 a 


dXXa /caTe^o^Ta /ctz/et yap TOVT<JJ 6 
/cat StoTt ot t^ves d(j>o)voi m ov yap e^owi <j>dpvyya. rovro 
S TO [jiopiov OVK e^ovo'tv, oTt ov 8ej(ovTat TOV depa ovS* ova- 5 
Si r)v [AGV ovv alriav, erepos ecrTt X<Jyos. 

13. post ^<50oy Torsi, censet excidisse: oi5 -n-as 5^, vulgatam tuetur Soph., c^ui 
14. /cal omisit, oiJ irayrbs $4, dAA* o^5^ Travri /*opy in paraphr. Them. [{ 15. /caf ante 
rt om. TW Soph., leg. Philop. SimpL H 18. re om. SUVWX, leg. Them. Soph. 
v.l. (om. re cum codd. Hayduck 88, 36) || 19. /rai om. ET, leg. Them. Soph. '|( 
20. ^exev STU VWX || 21. e^rat SVWX Soph, et sine dubio Philop. 381, 4 |1 
22. ih-c/>x<>t EV, hrdpxei TW || 23. /cal om. ES U Wy || 24. irvefyw STUVWXy 
Them. Philop. SimpL Soph. || 7r\clov SU VWy Them. Soph., v\tov T || 28. tvxttfs 
dvvdpew irpbs Wy et Philop., vulgatam tuentur SimpL Alex, apud SimpL Soph, 1! 
30. Kal prius om. SUVX, posterius EW, leg. KO.I utrobique Soph. || 31. re leg. etiam 
Soph., n SUVX || rb rfaTov unc. incl. Essen || 32. ftj om. SUVWX, leg. Soph, || 
33. Avaweofifrov'] fodyw iKKveop&ov coni. Essen [| prfeu ETyThem. (sed v. I. 

CH. 8 420 b 12 421 a 6 89 

are said to possess voice, such as those in the Achelous, merely 
make a noise with their gills or some other such part. Voice is 10 
sound made by an animal, and not by any part of its body in- 
differently. But, as in every case of sound there is something 
that strikes, something struck and a medium, which is air, it is 
reasonable that only creatures which inhale air should have voice. 
For here nature uses the air that is inhaled for two purposes, just 
as it uses the tongue for tasting and for speech, the former use, for 
tasting, being indispensable and therefore more widely found, while 
expression of thought is a means to well-being. Similarly nature uses 
the breath first as a necessary means to the maintenance of internal 
warmth (the reason for which shall be explained elsewhere) and, 
further, as a means of producing voice and so promoting well-being. 
The organ of respiration is the larynx, and the part to which this n 
part is subservient is the lung : for it is this organ, namely, the 
lung, which enables land animals to maintain a higher temperature 
than others. Respiration is also needed primarily for the region about 
the heart. Hence, as we draw breath, the air enters : and so the 
impact upon the windpipe, as it is called, of the air breathed is 
voice, the cause of the impact being the soul which animates the 
vocal organs. For, as we said before, it is not every sound made 
by an animal that is voice. Noise can be produced even with the 
tongue or as in coughing: but it is necessary for voice that the 
part which strikes should be animate and that some mental image 
should be present. For voice is certainly a sound which has signifi- 
cance and is not like a cough, the noise of air respired : rather with 
this air the animal makes the air in the windpipe strike against the 
windpipe. A proof of this is the fact that we cannot speak while 12 
inhaling or exhaling breath, but only while we hold it in : for 
anyone who holds his breath uses the breath so held to cause 
motion. And it is evident why fishes are voiceless. It is because 
they have no larynx. And they are without this part because 
they do not take in the air nor breathe. Why this is so does 
not concern us here. 

$ etiam Philop. Sim pi. Soph. || 421 a, i, r< oflrw -rd^reiv coni. Essen || 3. 
Kar^xovra om. E y et Soph. || rovro E V W Bek. Trend., rotfrv Them. Philop. Simpl. 
Soph. vet. transl. Torst. || 81] ykp STU VW || 5, toairvtovortv. d\\' ol \tyovres otfrws 
dt* SVW et vet. transl., dXV oi Myovres 6rt favoveti' ol IxMe* $ca/*a/>- 
81' X, et certe Philoponus legit tale additamentum 384, n sqq. II 6. pev otiv] 
5 r VX, om, S U |j &TTCU S U VX Soph., &TTW in paraphr. Philop. 


9 Ilepl 8e 0071/9$ Kal oarcfrpavTOV rjrrov evStoptcrTou Icrn T>V 
elpifpevcov ov yap $f)\ov iroiov ri ecrrtv r) ocr/Jitf, OVTO)<$ cos o 
\lf6<f>o<$ TI TO xp<S/xa. OLITLQV 8' oTt rr]v dio-Brjcriv ravrvjv OVK 

KpiftTJ, aXXa yelpto TTO\\&V ,<o(ov <j>av\a)$ yap 10 
ocrftarat, /cat ovfews ocrfypaiverai T<2z> ocr^pavrS^v 
avev rov \v7rrjpov rj rov ^Seos, ^>5 ov/c o^ros aKpijSovs rov ai<r07)- 
2 rrjpiov. evXoyov 8* ovrca /cat ra crK\7)p6<j>0a\iJia r>v XP^^" 
TCOV al(T0dvcrdaLy Kal pr) SiaSofXov? avrots tz/ac ra? Sta- 
<f>opa$ T&V xp(o/JidTa)V 77X07^ raJ <j>oj5epS Kal a<f>6pq) ovrco 15 
Se Kac ra9 6<r/x,a$ ro rz^ avdp&TTtov yeVog. COL/CC />ti/ yap 
^ei^ 7r/)05 r^ yevcrt^ /cat o/iota)? ra e?8^ TV 
TOL<$ r^s ocrjx^?, dXX* aKpiflecrrepav e)(OfjLv rr)i> yev- 
Sta TO eTz/at avrr/v a^r/v Tiva, ravryv 8* e^etz^ T^ at- 
ordycriv rov avOptoirov aKpiftecrTaT'Yjv kv \L\V yap Tai9 aXXats 20 

aKpifiot. Sco feat ^>povi^rar6v ecrri 
8e TO /cal ez/ TW ye^ec T<3&> avd p&rrtov irapa 
TO alcrOrjTTJpiov rovro elvai eu^vets /cat d^>vets ? Trap* aXXo 
8e jLLT^Sev ot jLtet' yap cr/cX7jpdcrap/cot a<j)vei$ TTJV Stavotav, 25 
3 01 Se /jiaXaKocrapKoi ev<f)vei$. ecrn 8', c5a*7r 
y\vKv$ 6 Se 7T6/cpo5, OVTO> Acal ocr/Lac (dXXa Ta 

dvaXoyov oorfirjv Kal ^v/io^, Xeyca 8e otov 
LTJI/ /cat ykvKvv xy[i6v y ra 8e rovvavriov) O/JLOIOOS 8e /cat 

/cat avcrrrjpa Kal ofeta /cat XiTrapa eo^Ttv 6o r /t77* 30 
aXX' cocnrep etTro^e^, Sta TO ^77 cr<fro8pa StaSifXovg eti'at Ta? 
oor/xa? too-rrep TOV? yyiLovs, O.TTO TOVTCOV etXiy^e Ta 6vo/xaTa 
/ca^ s ofjLQLOTTjra r>v Trpay/JidTtov rj fiev yap yXv/ceta [CXTTO 42 ib 
TOV] KpoKov Kal /xeXtTo?, 17 Se Spt/x,ta 6vp,ov Kal T>V rotov- 
TG)v rov avrbv Se rpOTrov Kal eirl Toiv aXXa>i/. eorTt 8* coo'Trcp 
/cat 17 CI/COT) /cat e/caoTT? Tflz/ atcr^crea)^, 17 /z^ ToO d/covo r Tov 

8. 4 om. SUX Philop., leg. Simpl. 151, 33 || 6M ETW, ^r/ti) Them. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph, ii 9. ^. ^ r6 <ws ^ TWXy Philop. 388, 4 SimpU et, ut vidctur, 
Them. 67, 29, om. $ r* 0ws Soph. || 10. x^/^a SW Philop. 386, 5 (v. 1. xfyw)i 
Xeipwv E, xeipoi' X Simpl. 157, i || n. do-Qpatverat ETW vet. transl. Torst., al<r6dt>CTat 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes et, ut videtur, Them. 67, 33 || 16. <55yucts E T Wy || /cai 7r/)Z rd? 
fopfa P, iral /cari ris 6<rfJLfa com. Christ j| 21. ToXXw?] roXX<g ESUVBek., ^roXXaiK 
sine dubio Them. 67, 30 Philop. 388, 19 Simpl. 151, 21. 30, *roXXo?r Soph. 91, I || T&V 
ante ^wv om. XP || T-oXXw ESTU VWy, etiamThem., qui 68, 9 trfyirwra, TrXeoi/exroD- 
/icy T& fya interpretatur, Philop. 386, 6. 388, 19 sq. Soph. 91, a Trend. Torst., om. X, 

CH. 9 421 a 7 421 b 4 91 

Of smell and the object of smell it is less easy to speak de- 9 
finitely than of the senses above-mentioned : for the nature of 
odour is by no means so clear as is the nature of sound or of 
colour. The reason is that this sense in us is not exact, but 
_ . inferior to that of many animals. In fact, man has 

Smell in J ' 

man de- a poor olfactory sense and perceives none of the objects 

fective. J \ - ... 

of smell unless they be painful or pleasant, which im- 
plies that the organ is wanting in accuracy. It is reasonable to 2 
suppose that animals with hard eyes perceive colour in the same 
vague way and do not distinguish the varieties of colour except in 
so far as they do, or do not, inspire fear. And this is the way in 
which mankind perceive odours. For it would seem that, while 
there is an analogy to taste and the varieties of flavour answer 
to the varieties of smell, our sense of taste is more exact because 
it is a modification of touch and the sense of touch is the most exact 
of man's senses. In the other senses man is inferior to many of 
the animals, but in delicacy of touch he is far superior to the rest 
And to this he owes his superior intelligence. This may be seen 
from the fact -that it is this organ of sense and nothing else which 
makes all the difference in the human race between the natural 
endowments of man and man. For hard-skinned men are dull of 
intellect, while those who are soft-skinned are gifted. 

As with flavours, so with odours : some are sweet, some bitter. 3 
(But in some objects smell and* flavour correspond ; for example, 
varieties they have sweet odour and sweet flavour : in other 
of odour things the opposite is the case.) Similarly, too, an odour 
flavour. may be pungent, irritant, acid or oily. But because, as 
we said above, odours are not as clearly defined as the corre- 
sponding flavours, it is from these latter that the odours have 
taken their names, in virtue of the resemblance in the things. 
Thus the odour of saffron and honey is sweet, while the odour 
of thyme and the like is pungent ; and so in all the other cases. 
Again, smell corresponds to hearing and to each of the other 4 
senses in that, as hearing is of the audible and inaudible, and 

nulla codicum, quos quidem contulit, auctoritate Bek., confirmat P || T&V &\\cw 
om. X |1 23. /calro E S T W, om. /cal X. || 27. 6SfjLat et 28. et 29. 68^v E || 27. iXXa... 
29. rofowrlw in parenth. ponenda censet M. Alford, post 27. <5oyicU et post 29. Totipavrtov 
punct. vulg. || 29. rk 52 rofoavTLov ante 28. Xyw S U V X, eodem loco, quo vulgata, etiam 
Them. Philop. || 30. ddftf sine articulo E (Bhl.) ]| post der/ttfr punct. vulg. || 32. 65fifo E || 
421 b, i. ATTO rou solus E vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Biehl, d?r6 rov unc. incl. Rodier, 
om. reliqui, etiam Simpl. 153, 34 Torst., qui virgulam post y\VKeia et post 2. Spt^ta 
posuit II 2, KO.I rov p. T Bek. Trend., rov om. Simpl. || 4. /cai ^ om. SUVX, /cal om. 
W Them. Bek. Trend., ^ d/roi? exstingui vult Madvig. 

9 2 DE ANIMA II CH. 9 

Kal disrjKovorrov, r) Se TOV oparov Kal dopdrov, KOI rj ocr(f>p7)- S 
crts TOV 6cnpaz/TOv Kal dvoa^pdvTOV. dvo<r<j)pavTOv Se TO 
Trapd TO oXo>s dSvvarov e^et^ oo-firfv, TO Se /u/cpaz> 
Kal TO (fravX'Yjv. opoicos Be Kal TO dyev&TOv Xeyercu. 
5 ecrrt Se /cat 17 ocr<j>pr)crL$ 8 id TOV fjuera^v, olov depos 
/cat yap TCC eWSpa So/coverts OCT/ITJS atcr#dVeo"#at, 6ju,ota>9 /cat 10 
/cat avai^a, tocnrcp Kal T<Z ^ TO} dept* /cat 

ez^ta 'TroppcoOev drravTa Trpog TT)I/ 

6 ytvdju-eva. 8to /cat aTropov tfraCveTat,, el -xrdVra 
6cr/jLaTai, 6 8* dvdpa)7ro$ dvarrve&v, JUT) 

TJ /caTe^a)^ TO TT^ev/xa OVAC ocrftaTat, OVTC 15 
OVT eyyvdev, ovS' av eVt TOU fjiVKTypos eVro? 
feat TO /*!/ 77* auTo> TtOefJLevov T< alcrd^T^pico dvaicr 
eivai KQWQV irdvTw aXXa TO a^et; TOV dvarnvzLv (trf alcrOd- 
veo"6ai ZSiov .TTL T&V dvdp&Trw S^Xov Se 7retp6)/>teVot5' (WCTTe 
T<X avai/ia, CTreiS^ OVK dvairveovariVy erepav dv TLV ala-Q^criv 20 


17 yap TOV ocrc^pavTOv accr^crt? /cat 
/cat evcwov? ocr^prjo'^ ecrw. ert 8e feat <^9eip6^ev 
VTTO TOJV layyp&v ocr/xalv v<' SvTrep dv0p<t)7ro<s, olov acr<^aX- 
TOV /cat 0tov Kat TW^ TOLOVTW. ocrfypaivecrOaL fikv oSv az/ay- 25 

7 Katoz>, aXX* ov/c dvomvzovTa. lot/ce Se Tot9 a^ 
peti^ TO aicrO^Tripiw TOVTO Trpo? TO TOZ^ aXXcov 

Ta o/i/xaTa Trpo^ Ta TO)V cr/cX^pocj&^aX/^a)^' Ta /i4^ yap 9(61 
^cat cwcrTrep e\vTpov Ta fi\e<f>apa, a /i-i) icti/^cra? 
a^acrTrao-ag ovj( opa- Ta Se o-K\r)p6<j>Oa\fji,a, ovSkv 30 
ejjct TOIOVTOV, cxXX* v^ea>5 opa Ta ytvo/jteva e^ T<p Sta- 
(fravel* ovTco? ow /cat TO oatfrpavTLKov aicrOrfTiypLOV Totg p,e^ 
a/caXv^>es elvat, wairep TO op,[ia, Tot9 Se TOP aepa Se^o- 4223 
/xeVocs ^Xetv cTrt/caXv^jaa, o a^airveovT<ov aTro/caXvTrrecr^at, 

8 StevpwojiteVooz/ TWP <^Xe)8ta)v /cat T6>p Trdpojv. /cat Std TOVTO 

5/Kal TOU dij/c. XX || <cai rou dop. TX, utroque loco om. roO Them. || T> om. 
SVX, leg. Them. || 6. /cai roD dyocr^p. STUX, om. roO Them. || 7, <5fy^ EW || 
8- TO ante 0ai>X^ om. S WX Bek. Trend., leg. Them. [| 10. <5^s E || ^o^a>? /cai 
SU VX Philop. Bek. Trend., <5^ws /cai E (Trend.) et T W || n. rA ^at^a /cal rA ^ 
SU VX Bek. Trend. Philop., rA #vaiAta Soph. 92, 14 (<*ai rA &)Kupa>* a Soph, omissa 
add. Hayduck) || 13. Ka l om. E || 14. et 15. (J5/*. E || 14. ^v post iv<ncvtov SUVX 
Bek. Trend., /t^ icr/wirat W, ^^ om. etiam Them. || ^ kvwrvtw Ik om. SUVX, leg, 
Them. || 15. dXV iKTrvtw om. Wy Them. || 16. post re^f 16. et post iretjwfA&ois 19. cola 

CH. 9 421 b 5 422 a 3 93 

sight of the visible and invisible, so smell is of the odorous and 
inodorous. By inodorous may be meant either that which is wholly 
incapable of having odour or that which has a slight or faint odour. 
The term tasteless involves a similar ambiguity. 

Further, smell also operates through a medium, namely, air or 5 
The water. For water animals, too, whether they are, or 

medium. are not ^ p OSseS sed of blood, seem to perceive odour 
as much as the creatures in the air: since some of them also 
come from a great distance to seek their food, guided by the 

Hence there is an obvious difficulty, if the process of smell is 6 
inhalation everywhere the same, and yet man smells when in- 
a neces- haling but does not smell when instead of inhaling he 

sary con- & 

dition in is exhaling or holding his breath, no matter whether 
man * the object be distant or near, or even if it be placed 

on the inside of the nostril. The inability to perceive what 
is placed immediately on the sense-organ man shares with all 
animals : what is peculiar to him is that he cannot smell without 
inhaling. This is made plain by experiment. Consequently blood- 
less animals, since they do not breathe, might be thought to have 
a distinct sense other than those commonly recognised. But, we 
reply, that is impossible, since it is odour which they perceive. 
For perception of odour, be it fragrant or noisome, constitutes 
smelling. Moreover, it is found that these bloodless animals are 
destroyed by the same powerful odours as man, such as asphalt, 
brimstone and the like. It follows then that they do smell, but 
not by inhaling breath. 

It would seem, again, that in man the organ of this sense 7 

differs from that of the other animals, as his eyes differ from those 

of hard-eyed animals. Man's eyes have, in the eyelids, 

a sort of screen or sheath and without moving or open- 

ing them he cannot see : while the hard-eyed animals have nothing 

of the kind, but at once see whatever is taking place in the trans- 

parent medium. So, too, it seems, the organ of smell in some 

animals is unenclosed, just as is the eye, but in those which take 

in the air it has a curtain, which is removed in the process of 

inhaling, by dilatation of the veins and passages. And this is the 8 

ponenda censet Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 1873, P- 3 recte II *9' P ro toOp&rav legi vult 
6cr(j>pavT&i> Hayduck, quod probant Susemihl, Jen. Lit. Zt. 1877, p. 708 Rodier II, 312 
Beare, p, 150, adn. i || 21. dXX' ddtivaTov a sensu suspecta videntur Trend., leg. Soph, et 
sine dubio Them. || 23. S^j Ey, 5* etiam Them. || 19. QpAyfta.'] irQ^tt W, quod ex priore 
editione hue illatum esse suspicatur Torst. || 31. et>6vs SUVX et in interpret. Them. 
Soph., e04us Simpl. || 422 a, 3. 0\ew*> ET Them., 0Xej3w? etiam Philop. 



rot avairveovra OVK ocr/xarat eV raJ vypar avayttalov yap 

i dvanvevcravTa, TOVTO Se Trotetv eV TO? vy/^aJ 5 
. ecrrt S' 17 007^77 rov &)pov, acnrep 6 x v p$ TOV vypov, 
TO Se ocrfypavriKov alorOrjTrjpiov Swa/zet roiovrov. 
10 To Se yevcrrov ecrrtz/ (XTTTOV rt- /cat TOVT alnov rov p,r) 
eti>at alor0r)Tov Sta rov peTa^v aXXorpiov o^ro? crcu/xaro?* 
ovSe yap rj a^rj. /cat TO crSjua Se e^ ^ 6 ^vjitos, ro yev- 10 
O-TOI', e^ ^ypw <W5 vXy TOVTO S 5 avrrov rt. Sto Kav el iv 
v8ari ^/JLZ/, gV&xz/o/xetf' av e/jcjSXTj^eVros rou yXu/ceo?' 

2 OVK 77^ 8* av 17 atcr^crt? 07^1^ 6a rov /xerafv, cxXXci ra5 
[^L-)(drjvoiL TO) vypai, KaOaTrep ITTL rov irorov. ro 8k )(/5<S/xa 

ovra>5 oparai ra5 {Jbeiyvvcrffai, oiSe rats ctTroppouus. a>5 15 
ow TO [JLeroL^v ovffev ecrriv a>s Se ^ptofjia TO oparov, OVTO) 
TO yevo~Tov 6 p^v/>co9. ovffev Se TTOLCI ^y/^ov <ucrdr]crLV avzv 
vyp6rr)To<$, ccXX' ej(et evepyeia T) Sv^a/^ec vyporrjTCL, o1ov TO 
aXjLcvpdz/' evT^KTOv TG yap avrb feat crvvrrjKTiKOv yXcaTT^?. 

3 GJCTTrep Se /cat 17 oi//ts ecrTt TOV Te oparov KOL rov aopdrov (TO 20 
yap cr/coTO? aopaTov, Kpivei Se /cat rovro y oi/us), ert TOU 
Xtaz/ \a/jL7rpov (/cat ya/> TOVTO aopaTov, a\\ov Se rpotrov rov 
OT/COTOVS), 6/xotG)s Se /cat 17 a/co'i) ifro^ov re /cat o-ty^s, cS^ 
TO /x,ei> aKovcrrov TO S' ov/c a/coucrroz>, /cat peyakov \fr6ipov, 
KaOdirep 07 oi/ft? TOT) Kapirpov (tocrirep yap 6 jiu/cpos \^6<j>os 25 
a^7/cov(TT09, rpoTTOv nva /cat 6 /x/eya? Te /cat 6 y8tato$) 5 ao- 
parov Se TO /^ev 0X0)5 XeyeTat, tocnrep /cat CTT* aXXtov TO 
dSwaTov, TO S* eav TTC^V/CO? /XT) I^T; 77 <j&avXa>9, Gxyrrep 
TO SJTTOVV /cat TO aTrvpvjvov ovrco S^ /cat 77 yevcrts TOV yevcrTOV 
Te /cat ayevorov, TOVTO Se TO piKpov TJ (f>av\ov e^ov ^V/JLOV 30 
^ (j>6aprLKOv T77? yevcreo)?. So/cet S* et^at dp^r) TO TTOTOV /cat 

7. a^. TO 5. SUX Them., r6 om. Soph. || 10. 5^ om. SUX, leg. Simpl. || 
u. tfXij E (Trend.), 8X171 E (Bek. Bus.), dXj/ etiam celeri codd. et Them. 70, 33 et Simpl. 
t Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex., qui etiam #5<m pro (J\^ legi tradit || K&V] wl S U V WX, 
^c&i' etiam Them. ,|| 12. el/tei' -solus E, sed et in rasura positum, videtur subfuisse foe? 
(Trend.),> Bek. Torst. || 12. al<r6avotfAe6' solus E Bek. Torst.', a,l(rdav6^0' T et, ut 
videtur, Them. 70, 24, )$/*> et ^6^6^ leg. Philop. Soph. Trend, "essemus et 
sentiremus" vet. transl. || 17. aXffdfi<nv xvpov SUV, x^MoO a?^. etiam Soph. || 18. &\\... 
typbrrira om. E, post &\/wp6v ponit T, vulgatam tuentur Them. Simpl. Soph. || 19. ryKr6v 
SUX Soph. 11 yXdxrffys S U V || 20. de hoc loco w<rirep,..$r. yefaews vid. Bon. stud. 
Arist. II, III, 43, quern in distinguendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte 
Biehlio, secutus sum || 20. re om. E W, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || roD ante dop. om. 
STUWy, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. (| 26. virgulam post &V/IKOWTOS Bon. et Madvig, 
Advers. crit. I, p. 472, et iam Them, hunc locum ita interpretatus est. cost nvk Rele. 

CHS. 9, 10 422 a 4 422 a 31 95 

reason why animals which breathe cannot smell in the water. For 
it is necessary for them to take in breath before smelling and 
this they cannot do in the water. Odour is included under that 
which is dry, as flavour under that which is moist, and the organ of 
smell is potentially dry also. 

The object of taste is a species of tangible. And this is the 10 
reason why it is not perceived through a foreign body 
as medium : for touch employs no such medium either. 
The body, too, in which the flavour resides, the proper object of 
taste, has the moist, which is something tangible, for its 
external matter or vehicle. Hence, even if we lived in water, 
me mm. ^^ should still perceive anything sweet thrown into the 
water, but our perception would not have come through the 2 
medium, but by the admixture of sweetness with the fluid, as is 
the case with what we drink. But it is not in this way, namely, by 
admixture, that colour is perceived, nor yet by emanations. 
Nothing, then, corresponds to the medium ; but to colour, which is 
the object of sight, corresponds the flavour, which is the object of 
taste. But nothing produces perception of flavour in the 
absence of moisture, but either actually or potentially the 

producing cause must have liquid in it : salt, for instance, 
for that is easily dissolved and acts as a dissolvent upon the tongue. 

Again, sight is of the invisible as well as the visible (for dark- 3 
ness is invisible and this, too, sight discerns as well as light) and, 
further, of that which is exceedingly bright, which is likewise in- 
visible, though in a different way from darkness. Similarly hearing 
has to do with noise and silence, the former being audible, the latter 
inaudible, and, further, with loud noise, to which it is related as 
vision is to brightness, a loud and a violent sound being in a manner 
just as inaudible as a faint sound. The term invisible, be it noted, 
is applied not only to that which it is wholly impossible to see, 
which corresponds to other cases of the impossible, but also when 
a thing has imperfectly or not at all its natural properties, answer- 
ing to the footless and the kernel- less. So, too, taste has for object 
The object nat only that which can be tasted, but also the tasteless, 
of taste. ky w hich we mean that which has little flavour or hardly 
any at all, or a flavour destructive of the taste. Now in flavour 
this distinction is supposed to start with the drinkable and the 

Torst. Trend. || 27. </ut^ fyov xpw/*a> post tfXws addendum censet Essen || 27. wirep... 
28. Adfoarov in parenth. posuit Rodier || 28. &c E || 29. airrbv S, &ir\ovv E, farow 
Philop. Simpl, || rb ante <bn5/>. om. ETU Simpl. || 81 ETUW Simpl., T? etiam 
Them. 71, 7 et Soph. 94, 28 videntur legisse || 30. ical TOV Ay. SV Them., om. rov 
Simpl. || 77] Kal VX. 

96 DE ANIMA II CHS. 10, 11 

airorov yevcris yap Tts d^orepa 9 dXXd TO /ie*> 
4 Kal (j)0apTiKr) rrjs yeucrews, TO Se /caTa <f>vcrw. ecrrt oe /cot- 
j>oi> d^Tjs /cat yeva-eeus TO TTOTOV. eVet S' vypo*' TO yev<TTOi>, 
dvdyKrj KOI TO ato-^T^/HOp avrov pyre vypbv eti/at >TeXe- 422 b 
X % ju,7jT dSwaTov vypatz>eo"#at. Tracr^et yap Tt 17 yev- 
<rt$ VTTO TOV yevaTov, 77 yevcrTO^. avayKaiov apa vypavOrjvaL 
TO Swa^ei^ov jLcev vypaiveo'6aL crw^djLtej'o^, /AT) vypbv Se, TO 
yevcrTLKov aicrSyTrfpiov. oryiLeiov Se TO /XT/TC KaTa&qpov ovaav 5 
TVJV y\.>TTav OLiaOavtvOai ^rjre \iav vypdv avTTj ya/> 

rov TTpcorov vypov, oScrTrep OTCCJ' Tr/ooyev/xaTtcras 

yevrjrai Irepov /cai ofoi' Tols Kapvovcri 

Sid TO TTJ yX^TT^ TrXypei Toiavrrjs vypo- 
5 TTJTO? aio-ffdvecrdai. rd S' etS?; T^ yyp 1 ', wcnrtp Kal CTTL 10 
xp ) l UL( X' ra) v 3 aTrXa jxei^ Tavavria, TO yXv/cv Kat TO 
Se ToS juev TO \nrapov, rov Sc TO akfjwpov 
v Se TOOTCD^ TO TC Sptjitu ACCU TO avcrr^pov Kal crrpv^vov 
Kal 6v' cr^eSov yd/) avTat SOKO<TW et^at $ia<f>opal -^yfjL&p. 
TO yevcrriKov ecrri TO bvvdpei, TOLOVTOV, yevcrrov Se TO TTOIT;- 15 

TI/COZ> e^Teeeia avrov. 

11 Ilepl Se TOV aTTToO /cat Trept d<^>7j5 6 avTo? Xdyos' et yd/) 17 
d^ /XT) /ua ecrTtv atcr^Tjcrts dXXd TrXetov?, avayKalov Kal rd 
aTTTa alordrjTd TrXeuo etj/at. e)(et S* drropiav Korepov TrXetov? 
eto~tz/ ^ //-ta, /cat Tt TO alo'O^rrlpiov TO ToG aTTTt/coi), norepov 20 
17 crdpf; /cat ei' Tot5 dXXotg TO dz/dXoyov, ^ ov, dXXd TOVTO 
/AG/ eo*Tt TO jLceTafi;, TO Se Trp&rov alcr0r)Tr)piov aXXo Tt 
2 eo-Tt^ e^T05. Tracrci Te yap atcr^Tjortg jata$ ez^a^Tt6>Grea)9 ea>at 
So/cet, ofo^ ox/ft? Xev/cov /cat jueXaz^os /cat d/co 1 ^ o^eos /cat 
ySapeos /cat yevcrts iriKpov Kal yXv/ce'os- ez^ Se TO> cUrra? 25 
iroXXat e^etcrt^ e^a^TioJo-et?, Qep^ov $vxpov, ^f)pov 
orK\r)pov //,aXa/coi>, /cat T<Sv d\\o)v ocra roiavra, c^ 
nva \v<rw Trpos ye ravrr)v rfy diropiav, oTt /cat ITTI 

32. 6,fL<f>oTtpov com. Trend. || 422 b, i. /cai om. STVX Them. || 4. ^ om. 
SUVWX, leg. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 71, 34 || 6. y\Q<rffav TU V W H atfr^J 
coni. at5roO Torst., tuentur aifr^ Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 7<xp ^ d0^ E Simpl,, ^ om. 
Philop. Soph. || 8. xvp,ov om. E, leg. Them. Soph. || 9. r^v y\S>rra.v ir\^prj TWy |[ 
13. rb ante a^<rr. om. SVW || 16. post aiJroO excidis&e putat olojf aM Torst., ac re 
vera in interpret, habent olov atir6 et Them, et Philop. || 17. Kal irepl] ml S U VX Soph., 
Kal TTJS W et fort. Simpl., Ka.1 irepl a<j>ys etiam Philop. Torst, f| 20. TO ante roD om. 
S VX Simpl. || airriKw omnes codd. praeter W, qui CLTTTOV habet, aTrn/cov etiam Simpl. 

CHS. 10, 1 1 422 a 32 422 b 28 97 

undrinkable. Both are tastes of a sort, but the latter is poor or 
destructive of the faculty of taste, while the former is naturally 
adapted to it. The drinkable is the common object of touch and 4 
The of taste. But, since the object of taste is moist, the 

organ. sense-organ which perceives it must be neither actually 

moist nor yet incapable of becoming moist. For taste is acted 
upon by the object of taste as such. The organ of taste, then, 
which needs to be moistened, must have the capacity of absorbing 
moisture without being dissolved, while at the same time it must 
not be actually moist. A proof of this is the fact that the tongue 
has no perception either when very dry or very moist. In the, latter 
case the contact is with the moisture originally in the tongue, just 
as when a man first makes trial of a strong flavour and then tastes 
some other flavour ; or as with the sick, to whom all things appear 
bitter because they perceive them with their tongue full of bitter 

As with the colours, so with the species of flavour, there are, 5 
species of firstly, simple flavours, which are opposites, the sweet and 
flavour. t j ie bitter ; next to these on one side the succulent, on 
the other the salt ; and, thirdly, intermediate between these, the 
pungent, the rough, the astringent and the acid. These seem to 
be practically all the varieties of flavour. Consequently, while the 
faculty of taste has potentially the qualities just described, the 
object of taste converts the potentiality into actuality. 

The same account is to be given of touch and the tangible. 11 
If touch is not a single sense but includes more senses 
than one, there must be a plurality of tangible objects 
also. It is a question whether touch is several senses or only 
is it a one ' What, moreover, is the sense-organ for the faculty 

single of touch ? Is it the flesh or what is analogous to this 

in creatures that have not flesh? Or is flesh, on 
the contrary, the medium, while the primary sense-organ is 
something different, something internal ? We may argue thus : 2 
every sense seems to deal with a single pair of opposites, sight 
with white and black, hearing with high and low pitch, taste with 
bitter and sweet; but under the tangible are included several 
pairs of opposites, hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft and 
the like. A partial solution of this difficulty lies in the con- 
Soph, et, ut videtur, Them. 73, Ii 9 &TTTOV airriKbv de coniect. scripsit Bek., quern secuti 
sunt Trend. Torst. |J *i. ij om. SUVW, leg. Them. Simpl. Soph. H 23. re om. X, 
huic T respondet 25. 6t, cf. Bz. Oestr. Gymn. Zeitschr. 1867, p. 680 || 26. 

H. 7 


al<r6ijcre<l>v elariv evavrito&eis TrXctovs, olov ev <f><t)vf) ov 
povov 6gvTY)<s /cat /3apvrrjs, aXXa real /xey0o9 /cat fJLLKpor^ 3 
/cat 'Xetorqs /cat Tpa^vr^s <j>c0vr)<; /cat roiav&* erepa. etcrt Se 
/cat 7Tpt xpSjua Sta<opat roiavrai trepan. aXXa Tt TO ez/ TO VTTO- 
Kefyevov, <w<r7Tp a/co# ^o<j&os, ovro T# d<j&]7, ov/c ecrrw evSyXov. 

3 TTOTepou S* ecrrt TO alcrdyrrfpiov ez/Tos, -^ ov, aXX* ev- 

17 cra/>, oiSev Sofcet <nf)peiov cti^at TO yivtcrOai TTJI/ at- 4 2 3 a 

apa Qtyyavopevtov. /cat yap i>w ct TC^ Trepl TT)^ crap- 
/ca TreptTeiVetcr otoz^ vpeva fl-owfcras, ofcotcy? T^I/ atcr^crt^ v- 
^Ct>9 *di/fa)u.cvo9 evcr-rjiLaivei* KOLITQI $ffkov a>9 ov/c ZVTLV kv rovrcp 

4 TO alcrOriTYipiov el 8e /cat crv/Ji<f)V$ yivoiro, Oarrov ert St- 

9 av f) aLcrdrjcris. 810 TO TOLOVTO juoptoz^ TOV craJ/jtaTOs cot- 

av el /cv/ca> 1 v 7T667r<VfCt 

aijp- eSoKovpev yap av evi nvi alorGdveorOai Kal iftotpov /cat 
XP<w/jtaT09 /cat ocr^s, /cat /xta Tts atcr^crts et^at oi/ft9 CC/COT) 
ocr<p7jcrts. ^i)^ Se Sta TC) Sta>ptcr0at St* o5 yivovrai at /avifcrets, 10 
fyavepa ra elp^y^eva alo"6r]T^pia erepa ovra. eiri 8e 
TOVTO w^ aS>yXov e^ acpo? /i^ev yap o) vSaTOS 
crvcrT^i/at TO epfyv^pv a"<jna Set yap Tt crrepeov etvai. Keiirerai 
8e peiKTov IK yfj$ /cat TOVTCWV etz/at, otw /3ov\erai <elvai> 07 crap^ 
/cat TO dvdXoyov to&re avayKalovKal TO cr5/xa elz/at TO fjiera^v TOV 15 
aTTTi/cov 7rpo<T7re<^v/co5, St* ov yivovrai at atcr^Tjcret? ir\eiov$ ov- 
S orat. 817X0? S' art TrXetov? 17 e?rt T-^? yXcoTTT/g a 
yap r&v airrStv alcrOdverai Kara TO avTo /xoptov /cat 
et /x,ei^ ovv /cat 17 aXX^ crap^ ya"0dvero TOV p(v/xov, eSo/ct av 17 
avTTj /cat /ita cti/at ator^crts 07 yevcrts /cat 17 a<>7' vvv 20 
Svo Sta TO jLt-^ dvncrrp<f>et,v. 

33, S^Xov S U V X, & 5i3\o^ E, $v $77X0? T, ^5>;Xov etiam Simpl Philop, || 
423 a, i. post erd/> signum interrogationis Bek. Trend,, virgulam Torst. !| r<fit E || 
2. j'Di/ om. SUV, leg. Them. || 4. tyd/terov P, tyapfrots in interpret. Them., A^ct/^otj vcl 
tyaftfry coni. Trend., &^a^vov coni, Torst. || ^o-^^ete X, A>/ ^cny/ia^a T || 6. roiouro^ 
STUVWX, TOWUTO Philop. Them. (v.l. TOIOUTOV) || 9. <Jfy*fc KT W, dr^s Philop, || 
10. wfia-eLs Kal al alffdifiareis U, a,la-B-/iffLi yp. S et Them. 73, 18, textum tuetur Soph. || 
i. roGro f*h vw ET W 5 om. /xev etiam Simpl. || y&p] ofo coni, Essen || 13. pro $i*,\l/\rxjw 
coni. jtiera^v oV Susemihl, Burs. Jahrb. IX, 351 || 14. ty VW Them, Bek* Trend. J| 
post j9oi5Xerat excidisse clj/at /cai coni. Torst., elvat e Themistio et Sophoniii reccpit 
Biehl, nihil desiderandum censet Rodier || 15. &vd\oyov cl ybp Trfoa a.fa6vi<w fab roO 
/ierafi?, Kal TJ d^ Aid. Basil., quod additamentum e Themistio (cf, 73, 47) fluxisse 
recte iudicat iana Basil, in margine || wayKcuov /cai] toasyKcfiov elva.L Kal E, om* Kal U 
Torst. 1] TO crw/wt eTvai] eTvat ro <rw^a U |) ro ante /*eratf TXyThem. SimpL Tort M 

CH. 1 1 422 b 29 423 a 21 99 

sideration that the other senses also apprehend more than one pair 
of opposites. Thus in vocal sound there is not only high and low 
pitch, but also loudness and faintness, smoothness and roughness, 
and so on. In regard to colour also there are other similar varieties. 
But what the one thing is which is subordinated to touch as sound 
is to hearing is not clear. 

But is the organ of sense internal or is the flesh the immediate 3 

organ? No inference can be drawn, seemingly, from 
is the the fact that the sensation occurs simultaneously with 

contact. For even under present conditions, if a sort of 
membrane were constructed and stretched over the flesh, this would 
immediately on contact transmit the sensation as before. And yet 
it is clear that the organ of sense is not in this membrane ; although, 4 
if by growth it became united to the flesh, the sensation would be 
transmitted even more quickly. Hence it appears that the part 
of the body in question, that is, the flesh, is related to us as the 
air would be if it were united to us all round by natural growth. 
We should then have thought we were perceiving sound, colour 
and smell by one and the same instrument: in fact, sight, 
hearing and smell would have seemed to us in a manner to con- 
stitute a single sense. But as it is, owing to the media, by which 
the various motions are transmitted, being separated from us, the 
difference of the organs of these three senses is manifest. But in 
regard to touch this point is at present obscure. 

In fact, the animate body cannot consist of air or water 
singly, it must be something solid. The only alternative is that 
it should be a compound of earth and of these elements, as flesh 
and what is analogous to flesh profess to be. Consequently the 
body must be the naturally cohering medium for the faculty 
of touch, through which the plurality of sensations is communi- 
cated. That they are a plurality is made clear by touch in the 5 
case of the tongue, for the tongue perceives all tangible objects, 
and that at the same part at which it perceives flavour. Now, if 
the rest of the flesh also had perception of flavour, taste and touch 
would have seemed to be one and the same sense: whereas they 
are really two, because their organs are not interchangeable. 

quod probat etiam Steinhart, om. TO reliqui ante Bieblium omnes || 18. afoderat ST U (| 
19. Ktd om. S U, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. 




6 a7ro/>7jcri S* av rts, el Trap crcS/xoc ftd0o<s t^et, TOVTO o earl 
ro TP'LTOV /xeyetfos* <5z/ 8' ccrrt Svo cr^arcy^ peragv crai/xa rt, 
ov/c ^Se)(erat raura d\\tf\(x)v aVrecr^af ro S* vypov ov/c ecrrtz> 
crcojuaros, oiSe TO Siepov, d\X* dvayKalov vSwp elvai f) c^cti/ 25 

vSan, ///>) frip&v r>v 

ra e 

6VrotJz>, dvayKCLiov vScop exew neragv, ov ava^Xca ra 
t Se ro.Gr 5 d\7)0es, aSwaroz^ d^acrdai aXXo aXXov ez/ 
roz/ avrov Se rpoirov KOI iv r<5 dept (6/xota)S yap ej(i 6 
Trpos ra ev avrw /ecu ro vScop TT/OO? ra e^ r vSart, Xa^- 30 
Odvei Se /laXXoz/ ^fta?, coo-7re/) /cat ra c^ r<5 vSan <a, 

7 6 Siepov Sizpov aTrrerat)* vrorepov ovv iravrcov 6/^010)5 
ecrrcz/ 17 aicrdrjcris, y aXXcu^ aXXcw5, KaBdirep vvv So/cet 97 
/^^ yeBo^s /cat 17 a<]E>^ r<5 aTrrecr^ai, ai S* aXXat axroOtv. 
TO S* ov/c ecrnv, aXXa /ecu ro crKkrjpov Kal ro /zaXa/coV Si* 
Tpa)v aicr0avdp,0a, tocrirep KOL ro ^o^riKov /cat ro oparov 5 
/cat ro 6o-<f)pavr6v' aXXa ra /xez/ Tr6ppcx)9ev, ra S' eyyvdev* Sto 
Xav^aVet' CTTCL aia-Oavo/JLedd ye Ttdvrw Sta rov p,eo-ow aXX' 
?rl rovrot)i/ \av6dvzi. /catrot Kaddirep eiTranev /cat -Trporepo^, 
/cav et St s vpevos alcrdavoi/JLedcL rcov aTrrStv atrdvrtov \av0d- 
vovros on Stetpyet, ofioia)<s av e^ot/iei' cScrTrep /cat wv ei' 10 
TO! vSart /cat e^ ra5 aept* So/cov/ici' yap vBv avr<3v aVrecr^ai 

8 /cat ovBeis elvai Bid /iecrov. aXXa Sta<j6cpt ro cwrrov rS^ opa- 

/cat T<*> \fO<>rriK&v 9 ore 

ro fLeratfv Troieiv rt oj/xa$, r^ Se drrr&v ov^ VTTO roS /uc- 
ra^y aXX* a/i/a raS /xcra^v, cScrTrep 6 St* dorTrtSos TrXojyets' 15 
ov yap 17 dcrTrts TrX^yctcra 7rdYaev, dXX* aja* dp,<f>o) 
9 awe/Si; TrXijyT/^at. oXdas S* eoiKZv rj crdp /cat 17 yXSrra, a>s 

4a. dwo/Mj(Tcte...423b, 3. 7ro^6y. De hoc loco vid. Torst. et Bon., stud. Arist. II, III, 62, 
quern in interpungendis singulis enunciationis membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum jj 
23. 5rfo om. SUVX, leg. Soph. || 24. afrra EWy, raiSra Them. Soph. || 25* 0$aror 
SVX, leg. iJSwp Simpl. f| 27. ou] toSTUVX, o^Them. Soph. || 8. post Wan punct. 
Bek, Trend. Torst., colon posuit Biehl Ii 30. TO om. T et E (Trend.), leg. Soph. |J 
& atirQ rw iJ5. ETWy, fr a$rf US. Soph., reliqui et script! et impressi A> r^? (f5. |j 
31. i)i&s 6 AV pro ^y, wWep coni. Rodier II, 328 || ante Kal, omisso w<r7rep, legisse 
videtur rA ^v r<f Mpt Philop. 428, 26, fortasse etiam Soph. 98, 5 [I post &a vujg. 
virg. sustulit Rodier || 423^ I. dr^rwy SUVW || 2. d^XXws; jca^. Torst., <&Xwr, 
xa^. Bek. Trend. Bon. || 3. /^v yeOirts] fjy ykp yeOo-ts W, 7eiJ(rts, omisso /dv, P JJ 
faoBcv; TO Trend., cLiroOeit. r6 Bek. Torst. Bon. || 5. \f/o<fnjri>p SX, fyov ^6<pov P )| 
6. r6 SVX || rd SUVX, ra utroque loco Soph, rcfc W Sta rd \lw tyyvs ^wQtou P || 
dXXa ra ^...7. Xai/^dm interpolata esse censet Rodier II, 328 j| post tyy&Qer 

CH. 1 1 423 a 22 423 b 17 ioi 

Here a question arises. All body has depth, this being the 6 
third dimension, and, if between two bodies a third body is inter- 
posed, the two cannot touch one another. Now that 

Contact * 

in water which is fluid is not independent of body, nor is that 
which is wet : if it is not itself water, it must contain 
water. But when bodies touch one another in the water, since their 
exterior surfaces are not dry, there must be water between them, 
the water with which their extremities are flooded. If, then, all 
this be true, no one thing can possibly touch another in the water, 
nor yet in the air: for the air stands to the objects in the air 
as water to the things in water, but this fact we are more apt 
to overlook, just as aquatic animals fail to notice that the things 
which touch one another in the water have wet surfaces. The 7 
question then arises : is the mode of perception uniform for all 
objects or does it differ for different objects? According to the 
prevalent view, taste and touch operate by direct contact, while 
The the other senses operate at a distance. But this view is 

medium. incorrect. On the contrary, we perceive the hard and the 
soft also mediately, just as much as we do the resonant, the visible, 
the odorous. But the latter are perceived at a distance, the former 
close at hand : and this is why the fact escapes us, since we really 
perceive all objects through a medium, though in touch and taste 
we fail to notice this. And yet, as we mentioned above, even if we 
perceived all objects of touch through a membrane without being 
aware of its interference, we should be just in the same position 
as we are now with regard to objects in the water or in the air : 
for, as it is, we suppose that we are touching the objects them- 
selves and that there is no intervening medium. But there is 8 
this difference between the tangible on the one hand and visible 
and resonant things on the other: the latter we perceive because 
the medium acts in a certain way upon us, while tangible objects 
we perceive not by any action upon us of the medium, but con- 
currently with it, like the man who is struck through his shield. 
It is not that the shield was first struck and then passed on the 
blow, but, as it happened, both were struck simultaneously. And, 9 
generally, it would seem that the flesh and the tongue are related 

colon Torst. || 7. post \avBdvet virgulam Bek. Trend., colon Torst. || verba 7. 
8. \cur9Avet. unc. incl. Essen 1| 8. etiraftev solus E, reliqui codd. etirofj.^ excepto P, qui 
(Sffirep etptjraL irp&repov habet || 9. fyffOwoifJLe&cL E, at<r0cur&ju,8a, STUVX, al(r0a.votju,e6a 
etiam Them. f| TI. & om. SVWy || vvv om. SUVX Bek. Trend. Torst., leg. etiam 
vet. transl. J| is. 6paTi/cv ETy (( 13. r&v om. EPy Soph. || ^refra ESTUVX, 
ticelvtw P, etiam Soph. |[ j*fr om. P || 16". d\V aft &fi,<f>(a e codd. solus E, etiam. Them. 
Scph. vet. transl. Torst., O/A* om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes j| 17. 7Xw<ro*a S TU VXy. , 

102 DE ANIMA II CH. ii 

6 arjp /cat TO vS<op Trpos TY/V o$w /cat TY)V aKoyv /cat Tr/v 
i^ova-iv, OVTCDS CX.ZLV TTpos TO ator^TTjptoi/ cScrTrep 
KacrTOv. avTOv 8e TOV atcr^T^ptov drrTOpevov 20 
OVT* e/cet OVT* evTavQa yevoLT* av alo~6r)O'i<$, OLOV et Tts crS/x-a 
[TO^| Xev/cw 7rt TOV o/>t/jcaTOs ^etrj TO <r^aTOv. v) Kat 077X01^ 
OTt Z>TO? TO TOV ctTTTov alo"6r)TLKov. ovTa) yap av crvfjifiaCvoi 

07Tp /Cat CTTt T<3^ aXXo)!' ' 1TLTL0IJiVG)V yap 77t TO aiCTUTfTfj^ 

OVK alcrOdveTai, eTTt Se TTJV crap/ca eTTiTiO^ii^v^v alordd- 25 

cScTTe TO [jLera^v TOV dirrikov 17 

10 aTTTat fte^ oSjf etcrtj' at Sta^opat TOV a-c5/AaTO5 17 cr5/z,a' Xeycw 
8e Sta^opcts at Ta crTotxcta Stopt{ov<rt, Oeppo 

VypOVy TTCyOL cSl' tyO^/Ca/tV TTpOTtpOV Iv TOtS 7Te/)t TO)^ 

11 TO 8e cdcrO^r^piov avr&v TO GLTTTLKOV, /cat ev qi fj /caXovfte^ 30 
a^r) vTrap^et ator^art? TT/XWTW, TO Swa/xt TotovTo^ IcrTt popiov 
TO yap aivOdveorOai Tracr^etv Tt ICTTIV. <2orT TO TTOLOVV olov avTo 
evcpyeia TOLOVTOV c/cet^o Trotet Sv^a/>tet oz/. Sto TO ofjLoi&s 
Oepiiov /cat \f/v\pov rj crK\r)pov /cat /xaXa/cov ov/c al<T0av6p,0a, 
dXXa Toiv v7re/))8oXSv, a>s T^9 atcr^crctos otov ftecroT^TO 

OVOTJS TT]? e^ Tots atcT^TOts ez/avTta)cr<os. /cat Sta TOVTO 
Ta atcr^TjTa. TO ya/o filorov KPLTLKOV yiverai yap irpo? t 

aVT&V 0<LTpOV T&V (X/Cpft)I>* /Cttt Set cJcTTTCp TO fteXX 

o"e<rdai \CVKOV Acat /zeXa^os jLnyScrcpov avT&v eTz^at 

SiW/>tet S* aifji^a) (OVT<O 8e /cat CTT! T<3z/ aXXcy^), /cat 7Tt TTJ? 

12 a^^5 ^T Oeppov /x7jT \fsv)(p6v. ert 8* a>a"7re/> opaTov /cat 10 
aopaTOv TJI> 7roe>9 17 o^t?, OjLtota)? Se /cat at Xot?rat TcSv ew/Tt- 
/cet/te^ct)v, OVTCD /cat 17 a^ TOV CCTTTOV /cat dvaTTTOV avaiTTov 

8* CTTt TO T plKpaV )(QV TTa/^TTai/ 8(,a<f)OpaV TtoV 

OLOV TreTrovGev o dijp 3 /cat T^ diTT&v at vrrep/3o\ai 

Ta <f>0apTui. KaO* K(io"rr)v pkv ovv T&V alcrdijcretov etpTyTat 15 

20. aTTTOfdvwv U VX || 21, r& ante (rwyua e priori editione suscepit Torst || 22. rd ante 
om. S U V X, unc. incl. Biehl || ^ W, om. S U V, 5 etiam Simpl. || ^3. al<r0irrtpt<n> 
T W, oi(r^ru6v etiam Simpl. || 24. c&nrcp S U VX lUai om. S T U V W X y |( 27. drrA 
TUV PHlop. Soph., a^rat P, drral etiam SimpL 158, 23 sed aura* ad hunc locum 
etiam in interpr. 164, 17. 18 || 28. als S U V X et fort. Soph. 100, 28 || 29. Trcpi TWV <rr. 
ETy Philop., rwv om. Simpl. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. fadpxei at<r07j<ns irptirq 
E Simpl. 158, 25, fordpx et etf<r^<ris /cai w/xirw TW, ttf<r^rts T/)t&Tws y, "in quo sensus 
vocatus tactus" vet. transl., af(T^<riy om. reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. Bek, Trend. 
Torst. }| 424 a, 2. post tvepyeig. vulg. virgulam sustuli || ro 8wd/jiei fo e prima editione 
scripsit Torst. || 2. O/AO/QU TUX, ofio/ws etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 3. ical prius] ij 

CH. ii 423 b 18 424 a 16 103 

to the true sense-organ as are air and water to the organs of sight, 
hearing and smell respectively. But neither in the one case nor in 
the other would sensation follow on contact with the sense-organ ; 
for instance, if a body that is white were placed on the outer 
surface of the eye: which shows that the instrument that appre- 
hends the tangible is within. We should then get the same result 
as in the case of the other senses. What is placed on the sense- 
organ we do not perceive : what is placed on the flesh we do 
perceive: therefore flesh is the medium for the faculty of touch. 

It is, then, the distinctive qualities of body as body which are 10 
the objects of touch : I mean those qualities which determine the 
Tangible elements, hot or cold, dry or moist, of which we have 
qualities. previously given an account in our discussion of the 
elements. And their sense-organ, the tactile organ, that is, in n 
which the sense called touch primarily resides, is the part which has 
potentially the qualities of the tangible object. For perceiving is 
a sort of suffering or being acted upon : so that when the object 
makes the organ in actuality like itself it does so because that organ 
is potentially like it. Hence it is that we do not perceive what 

Sense * S J USt aS ^ Ot Or CO ^' ^ard Ot SO ^ aS W6 are > ^ Ut n ^ 

a mean. t k e excesses of these qualities : which implies that the 
sense is a kind of mean between the opposite extremes in the 
sensibles. This is why it passes judgment on the things of sense. 
For the mean is capable of judging, becoming to each extreme 
in turn its opposite. And, as that which is to perceive white and 
black must not be actually either, though potentially both, and 
similarly for the other senses also, so in the case of touch the 
organ must be neither hot nor cold. Further, sight is in a manner, 12 
The in- as we saw f ^ ie invisible as well as the visible, and 
tangible, j n ^ same wa y the remaining senses deal with oppo- 
sites. So, too, touch is of the tangible and the intangible : where 
by intangible is meant, first, that which has the distinguishing 
quality of things tangible in quite a faint degree, as is the case 
with the air ; and, secondly, tangibles which are in excess, such as 
those which are positively destructive. Each of the senses, then, 
has now been described in outline. 

SUW Them. Soph. || 97] Kal V || /cal] 7? SUV Them. Soph. || 5. xal om. E, leg. 
Soph. || 6. aJ(T0i7rij/Ha STUX, abrffirrd etiam Philop. Soph. || 9. ofru...&\\wv in 
parenth. Torst. || ty SUW Bek. Trend., om. X || tirl ante r?)y om. STVX. 



12 Ka06\ov Se rrepl Traces atcr#7?creot>s Set Xa/?ew> ort 17 
ju,ez/ aur^Tjcrts ecrrt ro Se/crt/coz' r<3z> aicrffrjTcov el8>v aveu TTJ? 
15X779, otoi> 6 /ctypos roS Sa/cruXcov az'ev rov cr^pov /cat roC 
Xpvcrov Se^erat TO cr^juecoz/, Xa/x,j8az/et Se ro ypvcrovv r) TO 20 
^aX/cow crrjpeiov, aXX* ov^ i? XP vcr ^ 
/cat r] aicrOricns e/cao-rou VTTO roC CX.OVTOS 
iffofov irdcrxei, dXX' ovj( 97 ZKOLCTTOV eKtivwv Xeyerat, ciXX* 

2 |j roioz/Sc, /cac Kara roz/ Xdyov, alo'ff'rjT'YJpLOV 8e Trpfiroz/ ez/ 

<S 17 ToiavTif) Swa/its. ecrrc /xei/ ow ravroz^, TO S' et^ai ere- 25 
pov fieyeOos pas yap av TL eiT) ro alcrBcwoiLevov ov /XTJI/ ro 
ye alcr0r)TiK< elvai ov8* 07 aiardrjO'i^ ^eye#os ecrrt^, dXXa Xo- 

3 yos rt9 /cat Swafjus e/cetz'ov. favepov 8' e/c TOVT&V /cat Sta 
rt 'Trore ro)^ alo-ffvjT&v at VTre/)^8oXat ^^etpouort ra atcr^rof- 
/)ta f eav yap ^ ioyvpoTepa roO atcr^r^ptov 17 /ct^o"t9, Xve- 30 
rat 6 Xoyos (rovro 8* T?Z> 07 atcr^crts), cSorTrep /cat 17 o-u/jt* 

4 (fxovia /cat 6 roz>og Kpovopevtov a(f>68pa T&V ^op8z/* /cat Sta 
rt Trore ra <f>vTa ov/c a^^az/erat, C^OVTCL rt /Jiopiov 

/co^ /cat Tracr^o^ra rt VTTO r<S^ otTrrS?/ avr3z>" icat yap 
rat icat ^epjuatverat* atrtoz/ yap ro /IT) e)(etv /x-ecror^ra, 
rotavr^i^ a-pX'*)*' ^ av r ^ ^ 7 ? S^ecr^at r<5z> alcrffyTtov, dXXa 

5 irdcrxew /-tera r^5 vXT;?. oi f rrop f rjcreie S' dz^ rt? et Tra^ot av 
rt VTT* oo-jLt7j$ ro aSwaroz/ 6or<^pav^vat, ^7 VTTO xP < **P' aro< > r 
fir) Bwd/Jievov tSetv 6/>tota)5 Se /cat errt r<3z^ aXXct)i^. et Se 5 
ro ocrifrpavTov ocr^y, et rt Trotet, r?)z/ oor^p^ortv 17 OCT^T) Trotet" 
coo-re r<3z^ ctSwara>*> 6cr<j!>pav^7/^at oWev otov re Tracr^etv VTT* 

c5 S* avros Xoyo9 /cat e?rt rz^ aXXcw ovSe 
tov, aXX' ^ olcr9^TiKOv e/cacrroz/. ajw,a Se 877X0^ /cat 
ovre yap q!>e5$ /cat or/coro? ovre t/fo<os oure 60-^19 ovSev Trotet 10 
ra orai/iara, cxXX' ez/ ots ecrrtv, otoi' a7)p 6 /xera ySpovr^? 

6 Sttcrr^crt ro v\ov. ctXXa ra ciTrra /cat ot x v t^^ iroiovcrw et 

18. e(3v om. SUX Soph. Torst., leg. Them, et sine dubio Simpl. Philop. || 
19. 6 om, ETy, leg. Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 23. tedvuv} kxdvivov coni. 
Essen || 24. ro*/ om. E (Trend.), rotovSJ /cari X^oy Soph. || 25. raW Ty Torst., 
ra^r< S X, rai5r<5v Them. Philop. Simpl. || 26. rt efy] ijv X || 28. ^/ceti/o E, rf<ce^ou 
etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. |] 31. ^y om. ETWy, leg. Them. Soph. || roDro...or<r^<rts 
in parenth. Torst. [| 34. rt om. SUX Them. If a,Trrw atrQv teal ETW, afrrfo om. 
ceteri codd. Them. Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl in'ed. pr. || 424 b, a. Wx<r0eu rA 
eWfi SVX, textum tuetur Them. || 4. rt om. ETWy Torst., leg. etiam Them. |[ Mftffc 
ET (| 5. <J/} E || virgulam post Trotei omissam post o<r<f>pijcrw ponit Bek., correxit 

CH. 12 4243 17 424 b 12 105 

In regard to all sense generally we must understand that sense 12 
what * s ^ at w ^ich is receptive of sensible forms apart from 

- their matter > as wax re ceives the imprint of the signet- 

seal ring apart from the iron or gold of which it is made : it 
upon wax. fakes the imprint which is of gold or bronze, but not qu& 
gold or bronze. And similarly sense as relative to each sensible is 
acted upon by that which possesses colour, flavour or sound, not in 
so far as each of those sensibles is called a particular thing, but 
in so far as it possesses a particular quality and in respect of its 
Faculty character or form. The primary sense-organ is that in 2 
and organ. w hich such a power resides, the power to receive sensible 
forms. Thus the organ is one and the same with the power, but 
logically distinct from it. For that which perceives must be an 
extended magnitude. Sensitivity, however, is not an extended 
magnitude, nor is the sense : they are rather a certain character or 
power of the organ. From this it is evident why excesses in the 3 
sensible objects destroy the sense-organs. For if the motion is too 
violent for the sense-organ, the character or form (and this, as we 
saw, constitutes the sense) is annulled, just as the harmony and the 
pitch of the lyre suffer by too violent jangling of the strings. It is 4 
why evident, again, why plants have no sensation, although 

hav'eTno they have one part of soul and are in some degree af- 
sensation. fected by the things themselves which are tangible : for 
example, they become cold and hot. The reason is that they have 
in them no mean, no principle capable of receiving the forms of 
sensible objects without their matter, but on the contrary, when 
they are acted upon, the matter acts upon them as well. It might 5 

be asked whether what is unable to smell would be in any 
sensible way acted upon by an odour, or that which is incapable 
things f seeing by a colour, and so for the other sensibles. But, 

without if the object of smell is odour, the effect it produces, if it 

sensation ? J r 

produces an effect at all, is smelling. Therefore none 
of the things that are unable to smell can be acted upon by odour, 
and the same is true of the other senses : nor can things be acted 
upon when they have the power of sensation, except as they 
individually possess the particular sense required. This may also 
be shown as follows. Light and darkness do not act upon bodies 
at all ; neither does sound nor odour : it is the things which possess 
them that act. Thus it is the air accompanying the thunderbolt 
which rives the timber. But, it may be said, things tangible and 6 

Trend., quern secutus est Torst. || ? UW, om* SVX || 68^ E H 7. inr* 68^5 om. 
S UX |l 9* trcd<rrov pro &ecurro? fort, legendum esse censet Rodier II, 336 [| ir. 6 e%> S, 

106 DE ANIMA II CH. 12 

yap fitf, VTTO TU>OS av Trdcr^oi ra cw/arj(a jcai 

ap* ow KaKsiva e///rro6ec; ^ ov Trav cr&fJia TraQrjriKov VTT* 

\p6<f)ov KCU ra irdcr^ovra aoptcrra, /cat ov jneVei, otb^ 15 
o^6 yap cSo-irep 7ra0a>v TL. ri ovv icrri TO ocr/aacr^at 
TO TT(Lcr\iv n ; ^ TO jaep oor^acrffon /cat aio~^avecr^at, 6 
S* di)/) Trad&v Ta\l<t)$ aicrdrjTos yiverai. 

14. ^ju-TTotet ETWy Biehl, fairorf&et, U, xoiet Philop. in lemmate 443, 9, iroti}<rct 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || post ^turote? interrogationis punctum om. Biehl in ed. alt. 
Rodier || 65ju^s ETV |] 16, et 17. n om. S U X || 17. Kai ante alrQAveffOcu. ex solo E 
(Bus.) addidit Torst, /cai om. Philop. 

CH. 12 424 b 13 424 b 18 107 

flavours do so act : else by what agency are inanimate things acted 
upon or changed ? Shall we, then, conclude that the objects of the 
other senses likewise act directly? Is it not rather the case that 
not all body can be affected by smell and sound, and that the 
bodies which are so affected are indeterminate and shifting; for 
example, air? For odour in the air implies that the air has been 
acted upon in some way. What then is smelling, besides a sort of 
suffering or being acted upon? Or shall we say that the act of 
smelling implies sense-perception, whereas the air, after it has been 
acted upon, so far from perceiving, at once becomes itself per- 
ceptible to sense? 


S* OVK laTW atcr^cri? erepa Trapd rds trevrz (Xeya> 22 
Se ravra? oi//w>, aKoyv, ocr^pTrjariv, yevcru', a^v), eVc TOVTOW 
Tncrrevcreiev av TIS. ei yap irai/ros, oS ecrrlv atcr^crt? a^f, feat 
vvz> aicr^Tjcrw e^p^ev (irdvra yap ra rov oLirrov y aWoz/ tradr/ 25 
777 a<^>7j TjjLit^ atcr^Tjra eo-ri^), di/ayfc^ r", C7Tp efcXetTTCL rcg 
0,10*07) ens, KCU alo'd f r)Tripi6v n rfpSiv e/cXetTretz/ /cat ocraw ^e^ 
avr>v dirTopevoi aior0av6/Jie()a, ry d<f>fj atcr^ra ecrrw, rjv 
e^ovre?, oora Se Sta rSv i^era^v Kal ^ av- 
rot 9 aTrXot?, Xe'ya) 8* oto^ ac/)i /cai vSar& 30 

v O9V V>\^>e\ \/ * A \ v v 

2 ej(t o oura>5, 6><rr t jtxev 01 ^05 TrAeta) aicrurjra erepa ovra 

yeWt, ar/ay/c^ roz> e^ovra ro rotoCroi' aicr07)TTJ- 
dfjL<j)ow aicrO'qTLKQV elvai (oiov et ef ac/)05 ccrrc TO acc 
rrjpiov, KOI Icrrtv 6 <XT)/O Kal \lso<f)ov fcal ^poag), t Se 
rov auroS, otoi/ 'XPOQ'S KCLL &Y]p KOI vStop (d^a) yap Sea- 425 a 
^>a^rj), fcac 6 TO erepov avr>v ej(ooi/ /JLOVOV alcrd^a-erai rov Bi a/z,- 

3 <f>otv rS>v Se a7rX<Sz> e/c Svo TQVTW aia'd'rjT^picL povov ecrriv^ 
^ depo$ Kal vSaTOS (17 /xe^ yap /copij vSaTOS, 07 S* a/coi) 
depos, r) S' oo-^pyjort,? darepov TOVTO>V), TO Se TriJp ^ ov^evo? ^7 5 
KOIVOV Trdvrtov (oWev yap aWv 6epp,6r7)TO$ atcr^TiKoz/), y-^ & 
^ ov^evo9, ^ ez/ Tip a^ ftaXicrTa ^efteiKTat tStw?' Sto XetTrotT* 

4 Ai^ p,r)6ev elvat, alcrOrjrijpLOv ea) vSaTOS Acal depos* ravra S^ 

22. Hinc etiam cod. L I| 23. rotfrwy EW Soph., r^5e $^Xoy SX, rQvBe Bek. Trend. 
Torst. Biehl in ed. pr., etiam Them. || 24. huius enunciationis el ykp,.. apodosin incipit 
ab <3<rre 42 5 a, 11. Torst., ab a, 9. rao-at dpa Bon., quod iam Simpl. fecerat, in inter- 
pungendis singulis comprehensionis membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon* || 
2 5- fywev aX<ret)ffw STUW, vulgalam tuentur Alex., AT. ical XiJ<r. 89, 27 et Simpl. |j 

27. Tt om. L, post *UMV ponit W, o^-nJ/H^ rt etiam Alex, et Simpl. || t&nrtfv 
pr. E (Bek.) nunc teXelirew (Trend.), tieXetireut etiam Alex. 90, 15 Them. Simpl. [1 

28. atfrol TWy Alex. 89, 30 et 90, 21, atfrQv etiam Simpl. 178, 29. 187, 21 et 
Soph. || 30. AirXofc $iacrr/iv,affi X. T W et margo U, d?rXo?ff bwoirriinw Simpl., 
vulgatam tuentur Alex. 89, 32. 90, 23 Philop. Soph. || 32, dXXi$Xe* tvra rf yfret. 
STUVWy, textum receptum tuentur Alex. 90^35 et SimpL || rb om. TUy SimpL, 


That there is no other sense distinct from the five, by which 1 
NO sixth I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, anyone may 
sense. convince himself on the following grounds. Let us 

assume that, as a matter of fact, we have sensation of every 
sensible object for which touch is the appropriate sense, all qualities 
of the tangible, as such, being perceptible to us through touch. 
Let us further assume that, when any sense is lacking to us, an 
organ of sense must also be lacking ; and further, that whatever 
we perceive by actual contact is perceptible by touch, a sense 
which we do possess, while whatever we perceive mediately and 
not by actual contact is perceptible by means of the elements, 
namely, air and water. And here are implied two cases. Suppose, 2 
first, we have perception by one and the same medium of two several 
things, different in kind from one another, then whoever possesses 
the appropriate sense-organ must be percipient of both : as, for 
example, if the sense-organ consists of air and air is also 
the medium of both sound and colour. Next suppose several 
media to transmit the same object, as both air and water 
transmit colour, both being transparent, then he who possesses 
one of these alone will perceive whatever is perceptible through 
both media. Now, of the elements, air and water are the only 3 
two of which sense-organs are composed. For the pupil of the 
eye is of water, and the ear is of air, and the organ of smell 
is of one or the other, while fire, if present anywhere, enters into 
all, since nothing can be sentient without warmth. Earth, again, 
belongs to none of the sense-organs, or, at most, is a constituent 
peculiar to touch. It follows, then, that outside water and air there 
is no sense-organ. Now sense-organs composed of air and water 4 

leg. etiam Alex. 90, 36 || 425 a, 2. rou Si'] roof L, om. STJVX et pr. E Philop. 
452, 21 Bek., rou &' T Wy Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst. || 6. rn $*] ^ & yij S U W, 
7*7 5 etiam Them. Philop. |] 7. fl prius om. pr. E (Trend.) W, leg. Simpl. Philop. 
453 * Soph. 106, 39, $ oMevbs $ om. SUV, unc. incL Essen [| Idtws om. LUVXy,, 
leg. Simpl. || 810 in rasura EJJ (Bhl.), om. LSUVX || Xfcrotr' E^ Xe/Trotr' E a (Bhl.). 



Kal vvv evovcrw evia <' Tracrai apa at aicr^Tjcrets e^ovrai 
VTTO r&v fJLrj dre\>v ///^Se irTrr]p<0p<va)V* (fraivtrai yap /cat 10 
77 ao-TraXaf VTTO TO Sep//,a e^ovcra o<j>0a\[jiov<s- uxrr el pvj n 
erepov ecrrt cr<S/x,a, /cat 7ra#os o f^rjdevo^ earn r&v evravBa 
crtofjidrtov, oitSefLia av e/cXet-Trot aicruvjo'is. 

5 dXXa /^T)^ ouSe r>v KOLVCOV olov T* elvat alcrdrjrijpLOv TL LOLOV, 
<v e/caerTTj atcr^Tjoret alcrdavofLeOa Kara crvp>ft/3r]K6$> olov 15 
Kivrjcrecos, <TTao"Cus ; 0*^77 juaTO 9, [jueyedovs, apiO^oVy cvos* TavTa 
yap irdvra Kivrfcrti aiorQavofieOa, olov p,eye6os Kivvjcrei* ucrre 

fjLy0o$ ydp ri TO cr^T^/jta* TO o* ripepovv ra> p^rj 
i 6 8* apidfibs rrj aTTO^dcrei rov crvve^ov^ 9 /cat TO 19 
yap 1^ al&Odverai ai<r0r)cri<;. (Scrre $r}\ov on dSvvarov 20 
OTOVOW ISiav alcrO'YjO'LV elvai rovrcov, olov Kwijcrecos* ovrco 

6 yap ecTTat cS<T7Tyo vBt' T77 oi/fec TO yXv/cv alo'davop.eda. rovro 
S' OTC d^olv )(ovr$ rvyxdvo/mev aZcrdrjo'iv, rj Kal orav (TV/A- 

dfjLa yv^pi^o^ev el Se /Z-TJ, ouSajLuS? av dXX* 77 Kara 
/cos ycrOavo^eda^ olov rov KXecovos vto^ ov^ OTC 25 
~K\(*>vos vtos, dXX* OTI Xeufcos- TOVTW Se o'vpfiepyKev viaJ 

7 KXeawos etvai. TO)^ Se /coiv5v 77877 e)(OfJiv alcrO^criv Koivrjv 9 
ov Kara crv/j^Se^/cos* OVK dp 9 ecrrlv iSia' ovSa/xfis yap av 
f flar0av6p,60a dXX' 77 OVTCO? c5o - 7rep eipyrat rov KXewvos vtov 

i r . <T7rc\a E S Bek. , 7rdXa y, d(T7T(\a^ Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. Trend. Torst. || robs 
4<j>6a\IJ.otis T U Wy, rous om. etiam Them. Philop. Soph. || 13. jAlav \tiro(, E, 
Ly SimpI M /-ifa &v XefTrocroT, /*a &?/ foXehroi E 2 S Alex. 90, t Them. Torst., jufa 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 14. dXXd..,b, 3. elvai. Totum hunc locum transponendo et 
emendando restituere voluit Susemihl, Burs. Jahresber. XXX, 42, aliter vero Essen II, 
79 sqq., Ill, 14 || 15. &v Kal ^K&O-TQ E Torst., Kal om. ceteri codcl. et Simpl. rB3 T i 
Philop. 457, 19 1| ov a Torst. coni. et a Neuhaeusero, Ar* Lehre, p. 36, probatum in 
textum recepit Biehl, quamquam omiserunt omnes codd. et Them. Philop. Simpl,, "non 
secundum accidens" vet. tran$L, 01) non necessarium esse iudicant Zeller, Gesch. cL I'hil. 
d. Gr. II, 2, p. 543 Brentano, 1. 1. 82 Kampe, d. Erkenntnistheorie des Arist. 104 
Rodier || 15. otov...ig. <rvvxoOs in parenthesi ponenda et ante 19. Kal ro?s Idiots lacunam 
sse censet Susemihl || 16. post dpiOpov virgulam posuit Torst., iam Philop. hunc locum 
ita interpretatus est 457, 34 j| M* om. V || 17. Kwfoet, prius] KOIV% e SimpL scripsit 
Torst., sed et Simpl. 183, 4. 30 habet /ct^or t (quod etiam 184, 7 scnpsit Hayduck), 
Kwtiffet. etiam Them, et Soph., probat Neuhaeuser, p. 32, r^ Kwrfo-et, Prise, L. 21, 17, 
addendum (JXXfl ante Kwfiffei. censet Essen II, 79 || post oto^ lacunam esse eamque sic 
explendam putat Torst.: Ktvyw rb Sd, vulgatam leg. Simpl. || 18. peytQovs coni. Torst., 
/tye0of ^ejtiam Philop. Soph., defendit Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 396 If n Kal ro 
LTW, KO^ om. etiam Philop. Soph. || 2J. otfrw...a4. yyupi^o/jLev et 27. rfiv ^...28. ISla 
posterioris, -.sed 24. el 5^... 29. etp^rac prioris recensionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refcllit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 32 || 23. Kal om. praeter E omnes codd. || 24. apa yvtoplfrpev E Simpl. 
Torst., avayvupLfrfAev T Bek. Trend., yvuplfruw reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Philop. || 

CH. i 425 a 9 425 a 29 in 

certain animals do, in fact, possess. We may infer, then, that all the 
senses are possessed by those animals which are fully developed 
and are not crippled : even the mole is found to have eyes 
beneath its skin. And thus, unless there exists some unknown 
body or some property different from any possessed by any of the 
bodies within our experience, there can be no sixth sense which 
we lack. 

Nor, again, can there be any special sense-organ for the common 5 
common sensibles, which we perceive incidentally by every sense ; 
sensibles. ^ or example, motion, rest, figure, magnitude, number, 
unity. For all of these we perceive by motion. Thus it is by 
motion that we perceive magnitude, and consequently figure, figure 
being one variety of magnitude ; while that which is at rest we 
perceive by the fact that it is not moved. Number we perceive 
by the negation of continuity and by the special sense-organs 
also : for each sensation has a single object. Clearly, then, it is 
impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of these ; 
for example, motion : for in that case we should perceive them in 
the same way as we now perceive sweetness by sight (and this we 6 
do because we have a sense which perceives both, and by this 
we actually apprehend the two simultaneously when they occur 
in conjunction). Otherwise we should never have more than an 
incidental perception of them ; as of Cleon's son we perceive not 
that he is Cleon's son, but that he is a white object, and the fact 
of his being Cleon's son is accessory to the whiteness. But of the 7 
common sensibles we have already a common perception, which 
is direct and not indirect, so that there cannot be a special sense 
for them. For, if there were, we should never perceive them other- 
wise than in the way in which we said we saw Cleon's son. 

25. afoeavolpcOa, L, al<r6av6ju,eea E T U V W y Philop. |[ 26. K\WOS y&p vl6s S T V W [| 
TOVTO LVX et, ut videtur, pr. E (Rr.) || 27. rS>v $.. .30. bpSLv post b, 3. elvai trans- 
ponenda censet Dembowski, Quaest. Ar. duae, pp. 8591, probat Susemihi Jl 27. fyow 
1^77 afoQijo-w LTUW, x/* I/ txXo-^ffii' tffy SVX || 28. o# Kar^...^o. 6pav unc. incl. 
Essen III, 15 || 28. oi>K dp'] otf yip coni. Essen II, 81 || ot>5a/uws...3O. opav, quae 
etiam Trend, suspecta sunt, ut prorsus hie inepta delenda censet Stehxhart, cui assentitur 
Susemihi || 28. ykp] &p' coni. Essen 1. 1. || 29. % om. ELTV, leg. Simpl. Philop. (I 
rov,..6paLv unc. inclusit Torst., quodprobant etiam Neuhaeuser, p. 34 et Kampe et etiam 
dubitanter Dembowski, p. 89 : sed v. p. 15. 

ii2 DE ANIMA III CHS. i, 2 

7?ju,as opav. ra 8' dXX7?Xct>z> tSta Kara crvpfiefi'YjKbs atcr#d- 30 
vovr&i al ato-0770-et9, ov^ 77 avrai, dXX' 77 /ua, orav 
d//,a yeifTjTat 77 atcr^cri? em TOV avTov, olov ^oX^z/ on TTI- 425 b 
/c/od /cat cu>#77' ov yap 817 Irepas ye TO etTretv 6Vt a/x<<w 
eV- S^o /cai anararaL, /cat ed*> 77 av66v, x^l v oierat et- 
8 z>at. > r)TTjo*ie 8* aV rts TM/O9 eW/ca rrXeiov 
dXX' ov ju,taz> povyv. 77 OTTCDS ^rroi' \av6dvj] ra 
/cat /cotz/a, olov /averts /cat jotey^O9 /cat dpt^os- t 
17^ 17 oi/fts jLtovT^, /cal avTTj Xev/coC, \aivdavv av 
/cai/ e8o/ct ravra etvat Trdvra Sta TO a/coXov#eu> 

)(/>SjLta /cat ju,eye#os. vv^ S* eTret Kat ev repa> at- 

TCt KOLVO* VTTCtOet, SXo^ 7TOtt OTt CtXXo Tt /CaO r TO^ 10 

2 *E7Tt 8* alaOavo/JbeOa OTt 6pa>p,ev /cat d/covo 
77 Ty oi/fet alcr0WO'0(tL on opa, 7^ er^oa. dXX* 77 avT>) tcrrac 
T77 oi/fo>? /cat TOV VTroKeipevov ^pcujitaTos. <WOTT 77 Svo TOV 
avTov ecrovrai 77 avT>7 fl^TTj?' ert 8* et /cat erepa t77 77 TT^S 15 
oi//ect>9 atcr^crts, ^7 et? ameipov etcrtv T^ avTT^ Tt? ecrTat avT779. 

2 iSo-T* eTTt T?7S TT/ocyTtys TOVTO TTOirjTGOv. )(L 8* aiTOpiav t yap 
TO TTJ ot/ft alcrOdvecrOai ICTTIV opav, oparai Se )^p5/xa 7^ TO 

et oijera Tts TO p^ /cat 

3 TO?/, fyavepov roivvv on oir% & ^o T]7 oi/ret ato"#dVecr#af /cat 20 

yd/) oTaz^ JLCT) opwpev, rr) oif/ei Kpivopev /cat TO CT/COTO^ /cat 

TO ^9, dXX* ov^ a)cravTO)9. ert Se /cat TO 6/>5^ ecrTt^ 0*9 /ce- 
f TO yap alorQyrijpiov Se/crt/coz> TOV atcr^TOv 

30. ofl ante /card eru^e^/cos addendum esse censet Essen || 31. J ai)ra/ TVW 
Simpl. 1 86, 5 Torst. Brentano, p. 97 Denabowski, ai aiJrai EL, 77 al atfraJ SUy Bek. 
Trend., J ai/ra, ut videtur, Philop. 461, 5 sq., 5 vr at X Soph. 107, 29 et v* 1. 
Philop., cf. Prise. 22, 4 o#x 5 A*e/^pt<rrac dXX' J cruy^Trrat rj /$ || 425^ i. y^rat 
om. SUV |f x<AV ehr*] 3rt X oXfj STUVWXy, X oX^ 3rt E, sed i> eras. (Trend, 
Bhl.), xM ^ T * Biehl in ed. alt. Rodier, otw %o\ijs firt Simpl. 186, 11 || 2. &&$<*> frj 
& AM^W coni. Susemihl || 3. /cai ^ctv] $10 /fal ^y E, /cal <&v omisso 5ti etiam Simpl, H 
4, rXeiomj TW Philop., irXcfous Simpl. Soph. }| 5. pfoov SUX, ^^y etiam Simpl. || 
5rrov] ^ TVWXy, ^ S, yrrov etiam Simpl. Soph. || 7. ^ om. STUVWX It 
^oy L, om. pr. E |j oifr^ coni. H. Jackson, aMj vulg,, /ca2 ai)r^ XewcoO unc. inch 
Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 108, 25 || &v] K&V E, sed /c in rasura 
(Trend.), &v etiam Simpl. Soph. || 8. /c&/] /cai Ey Soph. Bek. Trend., K&V reliqui 
et corr. 3 (Bhi.) || raMv TX Simpl., rat>r6 Wy Bek. Trend. Torst., roOro SU> 
ra^rd E (Bhl.) LV Soph. || irdvra] irdvrw coni. Essen II, p. 82, probat Rodier II, 
364 || g. pro ZfM coni. deZ Torst., leg. afta Simpl. Soph. || 12. <?irel 5'] Ari^ ^ Them,, 
A/) Philop. || 13. # r^ ^et] ^frot 6V Alex., d^r. /cai XiJtr. 91, a6 (1 e(n] et rt 

CHS. I, 2 425 a 30 425 b 23 113 

But the various senses incidentally perceive each other's 

Perception proper objects, not as so many separate senses, but as 

dens a of " forming a single sense, when there is concurrent per- 

speciai ception relating to the same object ; as, for instance, 


unity of when we perceive that gall is bitter and yellow. For 
sense. ft j s certainly not the part of any other sense to declare 

that both objects are one and the same. Hence you are sometimes 
deceived and, on observing something yellow, fancy it to be gall. 

But, it might be asked, why have we several senses, instead of 8 
why have only one? I answer, it is in order that we may not be so 
^nsT^ re Hkely to overlook the common attributes, such as motion, 
than one? magnitude, number, which accompany the special sen- 
sibles. For, if sight had been our only sense and whiteness its 
object, we should have been more apt to overlook the common 
sensibles and to confuse all sensibles, because colour and magnitude, 
for instance, must always go together. As it is, the fact that the 
common attributes are found in the object of another sense also 
shows that they are severally distinct. 

Inasmuch as we perceive that we see and hear, it must either 2 
Perception be by sight or by some other sense that the percipient per- 
p^reei^e is ceives that he sees. But, it may be urged, the same sense 
by sense. w hich perceives sight will also perceive the colour which 
is the object of sight. So that either there will be two senses to 
perceive the same thing or the one sense, sight, will perceive itself. 
Further, if the sense perceiving sight were really a distinct sense, 
either the series would go on to infinity or some one of the series 
of senses would perceive itself. Therefore it will be better to 
admit this of the first in the series* Here, however, there is a 2 
uiffi. difficulty. Assuming that to perceive by sight is to see 

cuities. anc j jj^j. t j s co i our or that which possesses colour which 

is seen, it may be argued that, if you are to see that which sees, that 
which in the first instance sees, the primary visual organ, will 
actually have colour. Clearly, then, to perceive by sight does not 3 
always mean one and the same thing. For, even when we dp not 
see, it is nevertheless by sight that we discern both darkness and 
light, though not in the same manner. Further, that which sees 
is in a manner coloured. For the sense-organ is in every case 

Alex. 1. 1. ]| 15. Kal el E, om. Kal y \\ TJ ante TTJS ex solo E recepit Torst. || 16. wctw 
LUWX, irpdeio-u' in interpret. Them. |[ 17. TOIIJT&V] com. Qertov vel Sortov Torst, 
Troiifrtov etiam Philop. Soph., 8<yrov in interpret. Srmpl. 188, 23. 31, vulg. defendit 
Bon., Ind. Ar. 609 a, 23 || 20. Kal TO bpaiv post TO T$ o^ei atoddveaOat. addenda esse 
censet Christ. 

H. 8 

ii 4 DE ANIMA III CH. 2 

v\^5 1/caoTw. Sto /cat avreWovrcov T>V aicrQrjTtov evet- 
al alcrdrfcreis KOI <a*>racrtat iv rots ator&yr^ptots. 25 

4 17 Se rov atcr#7?rov evlpyeia KOI TTJ? aicrOTjcrews *f) avrr/ ^iv eorrt 
/cat /Aid, rb 8 s elvai ov TO ai)TO avTOLis* Xeyo) S* olov 6 i/fo<os 6 /car* 

v KOI r) a/coi) y /car* eWpyetav eoTt yap aKor/v e)(o^ra 
a /covetv, /cat TO e^ov i/;o<ov ov/c aet \jjofal. orav ' evepyfi 
TO SwdfJievov aKoveiv KOL $o(f>7J TO SvvdfJievov ifjofaiv, rdre 30 
37 KOLT zvepyeicw O-ICOTJ a/xa yiverdi /cat 6 /car' evepytiav i/fo- 
<os, <wi/ etirtiev av rt? TO /xe^ elvat CLKOVCTIV TO Se \}/6<j>r)crw. 426a 

5 i ST^ ecrrtv 17 /ctz^Tjcrts /cat 17 Trot^crc? /cat ro Tra^og ez> ral Trototr- 
jue^a>, avdyK?) /cat roz> \jjo<f>ov /cat TT)V d/coT^ TT)^ /car 5 Ve/>- 
yziav sv rfj /cara Swa/^tv et^at 1 17 ya/> rov TTOITJTIKOV /cat Kivrf- 
rt/cov e^pyeta ez^ ral Tracr^o^rt eyyt^erat* Sto ov/c dvdyKrj TO 5 

KivtlcrdoLi,. fj pv ovv rov i//o</>7jrt/coi) evepyeid Icrrt 
7 ^0^77 crts, 17 Se rov a/covcrrt/coO a/co7j 77 a/cof crt9* Strrov 

6 ya/> 17 QLKor), /cat Strrov 6 \jj6<f)o$. 6 S' avro? Xoyog /cat eVl rfii/ 

v aicr0ij(rCi)v /cat alor0^T&v. cScrTrc^o yap 17 wofycris /cat ^ 

e^ ra) Trcicr^o^rt aXX* ov/c ez/ T(5 TTOLOVVTL, OVTCO /cat 07 10 
TOV alcrBYjTov ci^e/oyeta /cat 17 rov alcrO'rjTLKov v raS atcr$7?Tt/c<y. 

err vtov fj*v <yvo/xacrrat, ooi' io<)r)cn,$ /cat 17 

dv&vv/jiov daTepov opacrts yap Xeyerat 17 r^ 

17 6 rov ^pcy/Aaros az^a5wjito9, /cat yevcrts 07 rov 
7 ycvcrrt/coC, 17 rov ^v/xov dvd!)vv^o^. TTL Se jata /xev ecrrtv 15 
07 Gvepyeia, f) rov atcrftjrov /cat ^ rov atcr^rt/cov, ro S* eTi/ac er- 
avdyKr) afta ^^etpeor^at /cat crto&crQai Tyv ourot) Xeyo- 
^v /cat \fjo<l>ov, /cat x v t JL 1 ' ^ Kl ^ yzv&w /cat ra 
aXXa 6jLtotct>9' ra Se /cara 8vva/juiv Xeyo/^ez/a ov/c a^a 

25. at om. SWX Them. Simpl. Soph. || 26. -^ 5^... 426 b, 7* 00^/)et spuria essc 
suspicatur Susemihl, Oecon. p. 85 || 27. otf ro' aW ai5ra?s E (Trend.) I/ Torst, oiJ 
raiirov a^Ta?$ Bek. Trend., a^rats ort rar;T<5v S T U VWy Soph., atireus od r^ atV6 Them. || 
otov 6 ^<tyo? 6 E L W Soph. Torst, ofoj/ ^6<os 6 reliqui ante Torst. omnes 1! 28. /col ^ 
<Uo$? ^ EL Soph. Torst., Kal..Jvtpyeiav otn. T, ical A/co-^ ^ reliqui ante Torst. omnes j| 
0. r6re /cai ^ T W || r6re,.,3i. ybe-Tcu om. E, sed. in marg. add. (Stapf) [| 426a I. cJv] 
t5<rr' T W, wVre ml SUV, v leg. etiam Soph. || etirow E L, utiroi y Soph., <tf(r<uei> 
S U VX || 2. e/..,r2. oroy e duabus recensionibus contaminata iudicat Torst., prioris esse 
9. wtrire/)...!!. aZo-^ri/cy, posterioris 4. ^ 7^/0, ..6. KivewQcu |j 2. 5' ^(rrw W Bek. Trend., 
&l fort* E (Trend.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. || Trotou^^] Kivovidvy Aid. Hywater, 
J. of Ph., p. 55 |1 6. &rrl? ante frtyyeia EL, post 7. ttxpya-is Ty, om. Soph. j| 9. tlWtfp,.. 
ii. alffOr)Ti.K(f post 6. jttpet<r0cu transposuit Biehl, eodem quo vulg. ordine leg. ctiam 
Philop. 474, 1 6 sqq. Soph, in, 30 sqq. |f 9. wo-Tre/) 7<ty>] xal &<rirep TWy, 

CH. 2 425 b 24 426 a 19 115 

receptive of the sensible object without its matter. And this is 
why the sensations and images remain in the sense-organs even 
when the sensible objects are withdrawn. 

Now the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same 4 
_ with that of the sense, though, taken in the abstract, 

Identity of i i 

sense and sensible object and sense are not the same. I mean, for 
in%he je act example, actual sound and actual hearing are the same : 

f r ft is possible to have hearing and yet not hear; again, 
that which is resonant is not always sounding. But 
when that which is capable of hearing operantly hears and that 
which is capable of sounding sounds, the actual hearing and the 
actual sound occur simultaneously, and we might, if we pleased, call 
them audition and resonance respectively. If, then, motion, action 5 
and passivity reside in that which is acted upon, then of necessity it 
is in the potentiality of hearing that there is actual sound and there 
is actual hearing. For the activity of agent and movent comes 
into play in the patient ; and this is why that which causes motion 
need not itself be moved. The actuality of the resonant, then, is 
sound or resonance, and the actuality of that which can hear is 
hearing or audition, hearing and sound both having two meanings. 
The same account may be given of the other senses and their objects. 6 
For, just as acting and being acted upon are in the subject acted 
upon and not in the agent, so also the actuality of the sensible 
object and that of the sensitive faculty will be in the percipient 
subject. But in some cases both activities have a name ; for 
example, resonance and audition : in other cases one or the other 
has no name. Thus, while the actuality of sight is called seeing, 
that of colour has no name ; and, while the actuality of the taste- 
faculty is called tasting, that of the flavour has no name. Now, 7 
as the actuality of the object and that of the faculty of sense are one 
and the same, although taken in the abstract they are different, 
hearing and sound thus understood as operant must simultaneously 
cease to be or simultaneously continue in being, and so also with 
flavour and taste, and similarly with the other senses and their 
objects : but when they are understood as potentialities, there is no 

-y&p real EL |j 10. dXV] Ka.1 LTU, AXX' etiam Soph. || O$K tv~\ ofl K&V E (Rr.) H 
IT.<r8T)Tucov om. TU Wy, tuetur Philop. || i. Kal c&j/6/*, rec. E (Trend.) 
TUWXy Philop., Kal om. Soph. (| **' frlw 8 r L, en tvluv 8k Them. Soph. || 
16. TJ Mpyeta E Soph. v. 1. (om. ^ cum codd. Hayduck, 112, 14) Torst., om. -ft 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes |] ^ post tvtpy. om. TVWy Soph. H ij post Kal solus 
E, om. etiam Soph. (| 17. &pa <f>0. STy, $6. apa L, ofta <j>6. etiam Philop. Simpl. 



8 aXX' ot Trporepov (jtacrioXdyot TOVTO ov /caX<Ss eXeyoz;, ov^ev 20 
oid/uez'ot ovre Xev/coz' ovre p,4\av etvai aVev o\fjea)$, ov8e ^v- 
/AOZ' aVev yevorea)?. rj7 fcev yct/> eXeyoz/ op0>s, rff o OVK op- 
05)$- Scx<2$ y&P Xcyo/i.ez'Tys rfjs ato-^'creo)? /cat rov alo~07)TOv, 
T>V pels Kara Swa/up T&V Se /caT* evepyetav, errt rovrcav 
[lev crv/jLJ3aiv6L TO Xe^^eV, 7rt roSz^ erepw ov o-v/jL/SaCvei. 25 
dXX' KivoL a/7rX<s i=\eyov r>v \eyop.4v(DV oir% a^XcSs. 
g et 8?) crv^coma ^vr\ ris ecrrtv, 17 Se ^60)^17 /cal 77 
a/co-^ orru> cy? e/ ecrrt, [/cat eo-riv w? ov^ ez' TO CU&TO], Xd- 
yos S* rj o~vp,<f>(x)i>ia, avdyKT) /cat rrjv a/co7j^ Xdyoz^ nva ei- 
vai. Kal Sta TOVTO Acal <j>0ipi e/cao"TO^ vTrep/SctXXor, /cat TO 30 
o^u /cal TO ftapv, rrjv aKoijv 6//,ouus Se /cat ev )(v/xo6s TT)Z/ 
yeScrii^, /cat ei/ ^patfjiacrL rr)v o^iv TO cr<[>6Spa, XajucTrpov ^ ^o- 426 b 
<f>pov, Kal v ocr^yOTjcret 17 tcr^vpa. ocrpjY) /cat yXv/cta /cat TTi/cpa, 
a>s Xdyov Tt^os O^TOS TT^? ato"#T7o~a>s. Sto /cat oySea /xev, oVai; 
ctXt/c/otz/7j /cat a/xtyTj o^Ta ayr^rai ets TO^ Xdyo^ oto^ TO ov rj 

a\p>vpov ^Sea yap TOT oXco? Se /itaXXo^ TO /Xrt/c- 5 
<TVH,$UVLCL ^ TO o^i) ^ TO /3apv, aipy oe TO depiLovrov rj i//v/c- 
17 S* alcr0r)(ri<$ 6 Xdyos 1 vTrcp/SaXXoz/Ta Se XvTret 17 <f>6eipeL. 
ecacmj /x,ei/ ow atcr^o'ts TOV VTroKtifLtvov alordifjrov 
Wy vtrapyovara ei/ T<5 alcrdyjTTjpio) y aicrdyTripiov, /cat 
T<XS TOT) VTro/cet/zevov aicrdif)rov Sta<oyoas, otoi^ Xev- 10 

/cat fLe\av oi/ft9, yXv/cv Se /cat nutpov yevcrts- 
6/>tot<ws 8' ej^et TOVTO /cat 7rt TZ> aXXa>^. eTret Se /cat TO 

20. w/>6re/ooi UVW, irpfrrepov Them. Soph. |] 24. irepi ESTV, ^Ti etiam Simpl. 
Soph, || 27. ei? E (Trend.) SXy Simpl. Plutarch, ap. Simpl. Philop. Trend. Rodier, 
5i; ^ W, 5' ^ reliqui codd. et Bek. Torst Biehl, el 5' ^ 0w^9) ffvjufiwta rts tortr 
mavult Trend., probat Bywater, p. 55, secutus Prise., qui praebet p. 22, 24: 77 ^>wv^ 
ffvjuufxavLa, etpijTOLL irapa, r$ 'Aptcrr., ac sane in interpret, habet ^ 5^ 0w^ ffvftjxai'La. 
TIS Soph. || ^ post icaZ om. LSTUVXy Philop. 476, 10, leg. Soph. 112, 30 sq, || 
28. fort post ^ solus E, om. etiam Philop. Soph. ]| /col ^<rrtv...adr6 unc. incl. Torst., 
quern secutus est Biehl in ed. alt., leg. etiam Soph., tuetur Rodier |] ri at>r6 tantum 
in priore ed. unc. incl. Biehl, non legisse videtur Philop., ^ oiJ rt> a.M STXy, o^ 
rk a&rb V, Kal rd atirb coni. Susemihl || 30. Kal post roOro om. LW, leg. Simpl, 
Soph. || 31. tfjLolusdtom. STUVWXy, leg. Soph. || 4 26b, i. ^ rb . STU V WXy, 
rb om. etiam Soph. || 2. a-i/rpd] Xtrapd EL et fortasse Philop. 476, 30, irtKpd etiam 
Soph. || 3. $16 om. S X et pr. U, 5t6 /cal om. V || 4. d/*i7^ 6vra\ d/jutf E Bek. Trend., 
Atuyij rj Svra L t fyiKra fora, STVWXy et in paraphr. Simpl., dfuyi) ovra U Soph. 
Torst. || dfyercuEL, S,ytjraL post 3. &rav STUVWXy || 6. ante <rv/n(j>wla addendum 
esse el censet Essen, < et fr > <rvn,<t>wtq coni. Susemihl, < uxrirep > crv/w^w^a vel < ^v > 
Shorey, A. J. Ph. XXIT, p. 162, fort, d/coj? >a^ ante (rvnQwla. intelligas 

CH. 2 426 a 20 426 b 12 117 

such necessity. On this point the earlier natural philosophers were 8 
Mistake in error > when they supposed that without seeing there was 
of^eariier neither white nor black, and without tasting no flavour. 

Their statement is in one sense true, in another false. 
For the terms sensation and sensible thing are ambiguous. When 
they mean the actual sensation and the actual sensible thing, the 
statement holds good : when they mean potential sensation and 
potential sensible, this is not the case. But our predecessors 
used terms without distinguishing their various meanings. 

If, then, concord consists in a species of vocal sound, and if vocal 9 
sound and hearing are in one aspect one and the same, {though in 
another aspect not t/ie same], and if concord is a proportion, it 
follows that hearing must also be a species of proportion. And 

this is the reason why hearing is destroyed by either 
hearing, so excess, whether of high pitch or of low. And similarly, 
th^s^le in the case of flavours, excess destroys the taste, and in 
porti5n~ colours excessive brightness or darkness destroys the 

sight, and so with smell, whether the excessive odour be 
agreeable or pungent. All this implies that the sense is a proportion. < 
Hence sensibles are, it is true, pleasurable when they are brought 
into the range of this proportion pure and unmixed ; for example, 
the shrill, the sweet, the salt : in that case, I say, they are pleasur- 
able. But, speaking generally, that in which ingredients are blended 
is pleasurable in a higher degree, accord more pleasurable to the 
ear than high pitch or low pitch alone, and to touch that which 
admits of being still further heated or cooled. The due proportion 
constitutes the sense, while objects in excess give pain or cause 

Now each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being 10 
resident in the organ, qua sense-organ, and judges the specific 
differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon 
white and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest. 

licet H <rv/j,<t><t)vta,...\//vKT6v unc. incl. Torst,, qui colon post jteucrdv posuit, &$%... I//VKT&V 
eici, sed <rvfj,<p(avla,.,pap$ retineri et post fiLfcr6v virgulam poni vult Dittenberger, p. 1614, 
totum locum interpretantur Simpl, Philop. || &<j>rj...if/vKr6v post 5. &\fjivp6v transposuit 
Biehl, quod iam Dittenberger 1. 1. voluerat || 4) TO fiapt E (Trend.), Ktd rb fiapt L, teal 
(3apt UVW, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes 4) a/>tf (| post papti virg. Trend., vulg. 
punctum [| a0i? y Philop. Trend., &<f>)i E (Bhi.) reliqui codd. et Bek., Soph. 113, 15 
interpretatur rb cuJri 8t ical tirl r&v #XXwy olov rwv r^s d0i$s, unde a<f>7js eum legisse 
suspicatur Biehl, a<f>rjs probat etiam Steinhart, & ry d0# in interpr. Simpl., dXa 8' % pro 
<&0?7 8t coni. Madvig, p. 473 || Oepfj.OLVTi.Kbv et ^u/crt/c^ W X, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 7. 6 om. S U V y || XUTTC!] Met Soph. Bywater, p. 55, e Prise. 22, 
27 "|| 12. Kal post 8t om, T U V W y. 


/cat TO y\vKv /cat HKCLCTTOV T&V alcrffrjT&v TT/OOS e/caoroz' 
rivi KOI alo-Bavo^eBa on Sta<epet; avdyKrj ST) at- 

11 o-07?cret- alordrjra yap IVTLV. 77 /cat 7jXov on 17 <ra/o OVK tern 15 
TO GO-XUTOV atcr^T^ptov aVay/oj yap rp airTOpevov avTov 
Kpiveiv TO npivov. OVT 877 /ce^a>y06crjLieVot5 e^Se^erat Kpivzw OTL 
erepov TO y\vKV TOV \evKOv, ctXXa Set evt Ttz^t a/x,<a> S-ijXa^ 
eu>at. OVTO ftez> yap Kav el TOV [Lev eya> TOV Se crv atcr#o/ c o, 
S^Xoi/ av eiy OTL ere/)a dXX^XcDv. Set Se TO Iz/ Xeyewtf on 2 
erepov erepov yap TO y\vKv TOV \evKOv. Xeyet apa TO t^av 

12 <ucrT 0)9 Xeyct, OVTCU /cat z^oet /cat aio-Odverai. OTL ILGV ovty 
olov T K<i>)Lor/x,eVot5 Kplvciv TO. /ce^coyota-jiceVa, S^Xoz/^ 6Vt 

S* o^S' h Kcxtopio-plvcp y^povtoy evTtvOev. wcnrep yap TO 
Xeyet OTL erepov TO ayadov KOI TO Kaicov, OVTCO /cat OT^ 0d. 25 
Tepov Xeyet oTt erepov /cat daTepov (ov AcaTa crv^cySe/S^/c^s TO 
OTC- Xeyw S', otoj' *w Xeya) OTt lrzpov> ov pzvroi OTL vvv ere- 
poi^ aXX' OVTO) Xeyet, /cat vvv, KOL OTL v\>v) a/jta apa. 

13 a^picrToy /cat ez^ a^picrTCf ^povco. aXXa ju^ dSwaT 

Ta? cvaz/Tta$ Ktz/Tjcrets Kiveio-dai TO avTo $ a&Laiperov /c{at ez/ 30 
dStat/)er<y XP^V' * L 7^P y^- VK ^> &$l Kivei TT)V aia'^r/o'Lv 

y) TY)V VOTTJCTLV, TO Sc TTLKpOV VaVTtO>5, /Cat TO XeV/CW ^/)Ct)9. 4^7 a 

<x/> 9 ovz/ a/xa /xcz^ /cat apL0p,<3 a&iaiperov /cat a^p^^-rov TO 
Kplvov, T<p et^at Se /cc^coptcrfteVov ; Icrrt ST^ Trctjjx^ 70 Stat- 
perov T&V $iripr)nlvo)v alcrdaveraL, ecrTt S* &$-* dStatpeTov* T^> 

14 elvat j^ez' yap StatpeToi/, TOTTO) Se /cat dpt^/x^J dStatpcTov. 77 5 

14. Ti^d L, rt^/i Soph. Bek., f&i sine dubio Them., correxit Trend., qui post 
interrogationis signum posuit, secutus est Torst. jj r/vt ifai] rwl KQLV$ coni. 
Essen || 16. 7^/9 &y ^y W Torst., A? om. reliqui, eliam Philop. Soph. || cuJroO] atJro 
coni. Essen, cui assentitur Susemihl || 19. 7dp] ^et LV, yfy tyet. K (TromU), legit 
oflrw ^ 7&/> icAi' e^ etiam Them. 85, 15 || 20. verba 5e?...2i, Xcu/coO post., ai. X^et,.. 
22. afoefoerai pr., recensionis esse iudicat Torst. || 21. Xyei dtpa r& ai)r6 ut inertem 
repetitionem eiecta vult Trend., legit etiam Philop. in interpr. 483, 14 || 42. teal om. 
STV (I voe?] ^poyet UX, cui lectioni favet Rodier II, 386, ol vo? etiam Philop. || 

24. ?v] evi E, o&d' hi to in textum recepit Torst., reliqui o^5' to *# etiam Soph. || 

25. rd ante /ca^ om. ELy || 26. /coZ ante otf KWT&, trv^e^K^ et Them. 85, 15 et 
Philop. 483, 22 legisse suspicatur Rodier || o& /cttra,..28. efrt I^OF in parenth* poni voluit 
Bywater, p. 55 || 30. SiaLperov pr. E (Trend. Bus.), d addidit antiqua manus (Trend.) || 
31. ri> -yXu/ciJ TW et rec. E Bek. Trend., defendit etiam Barco, p. 94, ri> om. pr. E 
et reliqui || 437^ i. -ft] ical rec. E in rasura (Rr.) STW || *. ap ofo...$, Mxppwi^vov 
post., 3. fort, 5^.. .5. AStalperov pr., editionis esse iudicat Torst., quod refellit Neuhaeusor, 
p. 40 || 2. *ai post i^v om. W, leg. real etiam Alex., dir. K al X^ 94, 12 || d/)*^ ^ 

pr. E (Trend. Bus.), fr tpiOw ASiatperov rec. E (Trend. Bus.), &pt6fuf dhat- 

CH. 2 426 b 13 427 as 119 

But, since we compare white and sweet and each of the sensibles 
with each, what in fact is it by means of which we 
perceive the difference between them ? It must be by 
sense, for they are sensibles. And thus it is clear that n 
the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense ; for, if it were, it would 
be necessary that that which judges should judge by contact with 
the sensible object Nor indeed can we with separate organs judge 
that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly 
presented to some single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere 
fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving another would 
make it clear that the two things were different. But the single 
faculty is required to pronounce them different, for sweet and white 
are pronounced to be different. It is one and the same faculty, then, 
which so pronounces. Hence, as it pronounces, so it also thinks 12 
and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible with separate organs 
to pronounce judgment upon things which are separate: nor yet 
at separate times, as the following considerations show. For, 
as it is one single faculty which pronounces that good and bad 
are different, so when it judges "A is different from B" it also 
judges "B is different from A" (and in this case the "when" is 
not accidental ; I mean, accidental in the sense in which I may 
now say " Such and such things are different" without saying that 
they are different now. On the contrary, it pronounces now and 
pronounces that A and B are different now). That which judges 
judges, then, instantaneously and hence as an inseparable unit in an 
inseparable time. But, again, it is impossible for the same thing, in 13 
so far as indivisible and affected in indivisible time, to be moved at 
the same instant with contrary motions. For, if the object be sweet, 
it moves sense or thought in such and such a way, but what is bitter 
moves it in a contrary way, and what is white in a different way. 
A pro- Is, then, that which judges instantaneous in its judgment 

hypo?* 1 anc * numerically undivided and inseparable, although 
thesis. separated logically ? Then it is in a certain sense that 

which is divided which perceives divided objects ; in another sense it 
is qu& indivisible that the divided perceives them : that is to say, logi- 
cally it is divisible, locally and numerically it is indivisible. Or is 14 

etiam Alex. 1. 1. || Kal XP^ VU &x^P iffrov U y et re. E in litura (Trend. Bus.) Philop. 
484, to, Kat rbirtp dx<6pt(TTov coni. Susemihl, textum receptum tuetur Alex. L 1. et vet. 
transl. H rb xpTvoy om. corr. E (Trend. Bus.) || 3. 5^] d S U Alex. H pro TO dicup. coni. 
Sv Stew/). Steinhart ||"4. J>s om. T W, leg. Alex. || $] ro X, om. Alex. |j 5tai/or6v pr, E, 
ddialperov etiam Alex. || 5. r6inp 8c Kal XP& V V K<L ^ &P<-0V-f U Ka -l XP& V< V non habent Alex. 
Them. Simpl. Philop. ]] otf Sicuperfo T, ddiatperov etiam Alex. Simpl. Philop. 

120 DE ANIMA III CHS. 2, 3 

oi>x o*6v r ; ovvdfjiei fjiev yap TO avro Kal doiaiperov rd- 
vavrLa, TO! S* etvat ov, aXXa r<3 evepyetcrdai StatyoeTbV, /cat 
ov^ oTov re a//,a Xev/cov /cat /-teXav elvat,, alcrr* ovSe ra etS^ 
rfacryeiv OLVT&V, el roiovrov rj aior6rjo~i^ /cat 17 vo^erts. dXX' 
GJCTTrep 17^ KaXovcri rives o-rvypjijv, y pia rj Svo, ravry 10 
/cat Siaiperyj. y fJiev ovv dSiaiperov, ev ro Kpivov ecrri /cat a/ia, 
77 oe StatyoeToV, ov^ ev vvrapxet** Sts 7-/> ^<?> ctvraJ ^yOT^rat 
/>cev ovv Svcrt ^p-ijrat raJ Trepart, Svo Kpivzi /cat 
ecrrtv &>9 /cej^cuptcr/Ltevcp 77 S' ez't, <lv> /cat a^ita. 

x*)* y <j>a/jLev ro <Sov alorOr^riKov etvai, Sta>- 15 
TOV rpotrov TOVTOV. 

3 'E-jret Se Svo Sta<^o/oat? opi&vrat, /xaXtorra TT^I/ ^X 7 ?^ 
Kivrjcret, re TTJ Kara r&irov /cat r<5 voetv /cat raJ Kpive.iv /cat 
aicrOdvecrdai, SoKei Se /cat TO voe'iv /cat TO tfrpove'iv a)o~rrep 
ai<r6dve<T9ai ri elvai (ev d^orepoi^ yap rovroi<$ Kpivei re rj 20 
I/TU^T) /cat yva>piei r>v ovroiv), /cat ot ye dp^aioi ro <f>po- 
veiv /cat TO aio-9dvecr9aL ravrov elvaL <f>acrLV, ajanrep /cat *Ejtx- 
TreSo/cXiJ? eipr/Ke " Trpos irapeov yap firjris de^erat, dv0p<!>- 
TTOicriv '* /cat ev aXXots " o^ev cr^tcrtv atet /cat TO <j>povetv 
aXXota TrayotcrTarat," TO S* avTo TovTot? ySovXeTat /cat TO 'Oft?/- 25 

2 />ov "Totos yayo z/dos ecrriv," 7rdvre<$ yap ovrot* ro voeiv cra)fj*a- 
Ttfcov tocrrrep ro alcrddvearOai vTroXa/^aVovcrtv, /cat aiorOdve- 

6. Ko.1 bfaaLperov] 5taiper6v a2 &8ta.[perov U Wy Torst., jeai Staiperbv Kttl Adtaiperov 
Them., otf 5tatperdv /cal diypif pfr ov T, dSiafperoj' /cai di^pifj^vov rec. I in marg. (Kr.) X, 
textum receptum tuetur Alex. 94, 16 et vet. transl., defendit Neuhaeuscr, p. 42 fi 
/cai T&vavrla, EU, om. y et, ut videtur, Them. 86, 11 Torst,, leg. rfoavrta (omisso 
etiam Alex. Philop. et vet. transl., Kal rotvavrtov coni. Susemihl || 7. Jtatpe 
coni. Torst. (quod quidem habet Philop. in interpr. 484, 21), dStaipcrov Susemihl |( 
10. Sa-jrep fy] &<nrep fr coui. Trend. || *} pla $ 5i5o E, ^ ^ ol 5ifo L, j /*a ai J 5i5o Bek. 
Trend. Torst., " ant unurn aut duo " vet. transl., $ fdav V) Si5o Alex. 94, 20, ^ /ta al 6to 
in codd. Alex. 96, 10, ^ /ta, 5 5tfo coni. Rodier j| 11. Kal om. L, /cat adtatperos Kal 
8tat/>er^, quod in interpret, habent Them, et Simpl., in textum recepit Torst., vulgatam 
tuetur Alex. 1. 1. et vet. transl. || ^...14. a/ta e duab. rec. contam., post. ut. 5 
^...13. Sfut, pr. 13. J ^y...i 4 . ^ tt iudicat Torst., cui adversatur Neuhaeuser, p. 4 p (| 
rr. d^ta^eroy E, sed s in lituia (Trend.), STU Alex. [| Ktd nfta om. y || 12. ^taepcrd^ 
tirapxe*- oi>x ftc Aid. Sylb. Basil. Torst., 5up T6i> oi5x ^ tonpx* 3 (Bhl.) Ty 
Soph., 'non unum " vet. transl., o^ & om. reliqui codd. et Alex. 94, 21 Bek. Trend., 
quibus assentitur Neuhaeuser, p. 45 || dls yap rf E 3 T W vet. transl. Aid. Sylb. Basil. Torst., 
5t6 yap r y et, omisso yap, Soph., yap om. reliqui codd. et Alex. Bek. Trend. |J 13. 
fyia] pa pr. E, add. a rec. E (Rr.) || dn 8v<rl coni. Trend, et Torst. || virgulam a Bek. post 
Xp^rat positam sustulerunt Trend. Torst. || ante KexwpurfjLfra add. ra rec. E (Rr.) || 
,14. Kex<api.<rt*.4v(e] ita E L T Torst. Belger, reliqui codd. aut K^C^W^^JV aut /cx/>^M^a> 
, Kx<api<rfjLfroy Soph. 114, 38 || 5 S fr, <?vl T Wy Alex. Simpl. vet. 

CHS. 2, 3 427 a 6 427 a 27 121 

this impossible? For the same indivisible unity, though in poten- 
tiality each of two opposites, in the order of thought and 

Objection. . J , . i - .,..,,.. 

being is not so, but in actual operation is divided : it is 
impossible that it should be at the same time both white and black, 
and hence impossible that it should receive at the same time the 
forms of white and black, if reception of the forms constitutes 
sensation and thought. Rather is the case parallel to that of 15 
A , the point, as some describe it, which is divisible in so 


of the far as it is regarded as one or two. Well then, in so far 

P m * as the faculty which judges is indivisible, it is one and 

judges instantaneously ; but, in so far as it is divisible, it is not 
one, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. So far as 
it treats the boundary-point as two, it passes judgment on two 
separate things with a faculty which in a manner is separated into 
two ; so far as it treats the point as one, it passes judgment on 
one thing, and that instantaneously. So much, then, for the principle 
in virtue of which we call the animal capable of sensation. 

There are two different characteristics by which the soul is princi- 3 
pally defined ; firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly, 
thinking and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intelli- 
gence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the 
soul in both of these judges and recognises something existent, 
sensa ^e anc i ents > at an 7 rate > identify intelligence and per- 

tion and ception : thus, in the words of Empedocles : " Wisdom 
of old for mankind is increased according to that which is 

identified. p resent to them": and again "Whence they have 
also continually a shifting succession of thoughts." Homer's 
meaning, too, is the same when he says : " Such is the mind of 
men." In fact, all of them conceive thought to be corporeal 2 

transl. Bek. Trend. Torst., M om. pr. U, J ft kvl apa, omisso Kal, etiam Soph., fort, jf de 
tvl, & Christ |! 15. alffB^riK^v clvai rk &ov ST U II opla-du E (Bek., etiam Bhl.) bpttrBw E 
(Rr.), 8iupt<r6w E 2 Soph. || 18. Acai rb Kplveiv Kal voelv W, Kal rG> voetv Ka.1 rw tppoveiv SUV, 
rf Kplveiv Kcd voelv Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam in interpr. Simpl. 202, 8 sq. Philop. 
489, 13 Soph. 115, 1 8 [| 19. anno tat in margin e Bas.: post al(r0dvecr6(u deesse videntur, 
quae Argyropylus reddidit his verbis : considerandum est, si quid intersit inter intelligere 
ac sentire. cui opinioni assentitur Torst., negat excidisse quicquam Bon., stud. Arist. 
II, III, 131, qui cum Plutarcho, Philopono, Simplicio apodosin, quam iam Alex, apud 
Philop. 489, 9 desiderayerat, ab 427 b, 6. STL ptv o$v incipit; in interpungendis singulis 
membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. || 19. 8] ybp coni. Susemihl H icol post 8t 
om. L T i| 20. ^dp] re ybp E S U, re om. etiam Soph, || KpLvei re T] fax*] T, ^ \J/VXTJ 
KptveL rt S U VWy, ^ ifrvxh Kptvci re X, vulgatam tuetur etiam Soph. || 21. ye corr. E, 
re S U V || 23. ^a^eroc Ej, nunc atferai (Bhl.), d^erctt etiam Them. Philop. 485, 24 
Soph. || 25. rd S* aro...b, 6. ^ a^rr; etvai in parenth. ponenda putat Susemihl, Oecon., 
P* 35 II 25. /SorfXcrat rotrots STUVWy, rb a^ra TQVTO sed post o rasura Eg (Bhl.) || 
W. wcrirep xal TO StTV. 


crdai re Kal fypoveiv ro3 OfJLoico TO o/iotov, tticnrep /cat iv TO is 
dp^as Xoyots Stcwptcrajaez'- /catTOt ISet a/ia /cat Trept 
r/rrarrjcrffaL avTOi>9 \eyeiv, ot/cetoTepoz' yap Tots 
/cat TrXetcw ^povov Iv TOVTO) StaTeXet 17 ^1^77 Sto 
T^rot, cScnrep li>tot \eyovo~i, rrdvTa ra ^aivofieva elvai d\.r)0rj, 
7) rr\v rov aVo/xotov #ttz> aVa^v etz/at, roSro yap zvavriov r<3 
TO Ofjioiov T<5 O/AOLO) yvtopit^iv ' So/cet Se /cat 17 aTTctTTy /cat 5 

3 17 erncrryjju/ty TV evavTtcov 17 avTTj etvat. OTL juiez/ oSv ov TCLVTQV 
<TTL TO alorOoLvecrdai /cat TO tfrpovelv, <j>avpov. rov p,ev 
yap TTacn, /jLereari, rov Se oXtyots TV &a>v. aXX 9 ovSe TO 
voeiVi ev <w ecrTt TO opffcos Kal TO p,r) op0><s, TO peis op0a)<s 
<j>p6wr)O'i$ /cat emcrTT^jicT? /cat So^a aXydrfs, TO Se /ATJ opdS><$ 10 

TOUTCOZ', ovSe TOVTO [8 s ] ecrTt TavTO TW alcrOaveo'dai 07 
yayo ator^crt? T^ tStW at dXTj^Tjg, /cat iracriv VTrdp- 
Tot? ^<5 6? 3 Staz^oetcj^at S' e^Se^eTat /cat T//vSai9, /cat 

4 ovSez>t virdpxei <5 /x^ /cat Xoyos. <$>a,vTacrCa yap erzpov /cat 

/cat Stai/otas* awi? T ou yiyverai avev aiardy- 15 
/cat avev TavT^s ov/c IcrTtv ^0X771/^9. OTt 8* ou/c ecrTtv 
07 avTT7 vor)cri$ /cat VTroXiyi/ug, <}>avp6v. TOVTO fj^kv yap TO 
7ra^o$ e<^ 9 ^/xtv ICTT'IV, OTav ^SovXco/jie^a (TT/OO o/jL/iaTO)!/ yap 
IcrTt Tt TTOiijcracrdaL, tocrirep ot e^ Tots /x-^/xo^t/cots Tt^e/ie^ot /cat 
tSo)Xo7rotowT5), So^d&w S* ov/c (j&* ^fLtJj' avdyKV) yap 77 20 
i)jv$O'dai 77 dX^GeveLp. ert Se oTaj> jaei' 8odo"a)fjL.i/ Set^ov 
Tt 77 <f>oj3ep6i>, evdvs crvp,'vdcr)(pp<v, 6/^otct>$ 6 /cav Qappa- 
Xeov /caTa Se TT^V <f)avTacriav axrawcus e^o^ev toinrep av t 

5 ^ccSjLtevot ez> ypafyjj TCL Setz^d 77 0appa\ea. etcrt Se /cat auT779 
T77? v7ro\.Tj\fj0)$ 8ta<j6opat, eincrrijiJLi) /cat Sofa /cat ^>p6vrj crts /cat 25 

TOVTO)V, Trept (Sz' T779 8ta<^>opa9 erepos <rTcu Xoyo?. 

29. /caroi...b, 2. ^ ^x^ unc. incl. Essen III, p. 17 H 427 b, 2. roiJrots ST Vy, rotfry 
etiam Simpl. Soph. |] 4. r<^] r6 S, cS L, om. T U || 5. r6 o/AOiojf rfi> i/*ow ST U VXy 
et E (Trend. Bhl.), rw o/u. r6 ^. T W Bek. Trend. Torst. II 5o/cet 5^ oflrw coni. Susemihl 
B. J. XXX, 47 I) 6. tfn...i6. ^7r6Xi7^w. Hunc locum restituere tentat Essen III, 17 sqq. || 
6. Tofrrbv] rb afrrb pr. E (Trend.) y || 9. /A^V y&p 6p6Q$ T U W y et rec. E, om ^A/? etiam 
Soph. || ii. 5* om. y Philop., 5' delendum esse censet etiam Vahlen, Oest Gymn. 
Ztschr. 1868, p. 256 || Tai5rto> L Philop., rd a^r6 S T U V W X || 14. post X^os punctum 
posui, vulg. colon || (f>avT<L<rla 7&p...24. 6appa\ta ab hoc loco aliena esse iudicat Freudenthal, 
p. n, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch, 1882, p. 1283 || f M Kal <f>avra<rla' frrtpov 
ykp (sc. TJ (f>avr.) ical KT\. coni. Steinhart || 15. S pro re coni, Susemihl || 16. tin ^'...25. 
Siafopal unc. incl. Essen III, p. 19 || 17. % ante atf-Hj delendum esse censet Schneider, 
Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 448, unc. incl. Rodier || vfojiris] om. y, quod probat Madvig, p. 473, 
<J>arra<ria margo U, quod probant Susemihl Chaignet, Ess. sur la Psych. d'Ar. p, 445, in 

CH. 3 427 a 28427 b 26 123 

like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as perceive, 
like by like: as we explained at the outset of the discussion. 
This view They ought, however, at the same time to have dis- 
refuted. cussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristic 
of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part 
of its time. It follows from their premisses that either all pre- 
sentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contact 
with what is unlike must constitute error ; this being the converse 
of the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledge 
of contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is error 
with respect to contraries one and the same. 

Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the 3 
same thing. For all animals share in the one, but only a few 
in the other. And when we come to thinking, which includes right 
thinking and wrong thinking, right thinking being intelligence, 
knowledge and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites of 
these, neither is this identical with perception. For perception 
of the objects of the special senses is always true and is found 
in all animals, while thinking may be false as well as true 
and is found in none which have not reason also. Imagination, in 4 
fact, is something different both from perception and from thought, 
and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than 
is belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the same 
thing as believing. For the former is in our own power, whenever 
we please : for we can represent an object before our eyes, as do 
those who range things under mnemonic headings and picture them 
to themselves. But opining is not in our power, for the opinion that 
we hold must be either false or true. Moreover, when we are of 
opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel the 
corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But 
when we are under the influence of imagination we are no more 
affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror 
or confidence. There are also different forms even of belief; know- 5 
ledge, opinion, intelligence and their opposites. But the difference 
between these species must be reserved for another discussion. 

textum recepit Biehl in ecL alt., reliqui codd. vtrrjo-is, etiam Simpl. Philop. || 19. <m n 
E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, om. U, <m n etiam Soph., rt om. reliqui omnes |j 20. $ om. 
STUWXy, leg. Soph. || 21. 5of <'/' LSUW, 8o^dff(afjL&f etiam Philop. Soph. || 
22. *&>] xai tev Ty, K&V TJ L, Kal ikv % S U V W X Soph., K&P etiam. Them. U 23. c] ol 
T W Bek. Trend. Torst., <rirep &v el etiam Simpl. 221, 3 Soph. 118, 32, uxrirep Bedftevoi 
ird<rxflf*'v in paraphr. Them., "sicut si essemus considerantes " vet. transl,, el recepit 
Biehl || 24. 4} E Simpl. 221, 4 et Soph., reliqui codd. KO\ \\ ettrl $... 26. \6yos ab hoc 
loco aliena et fort, spuria esse putat Susemihl II ical aMjs] atfrip /cai Essen || 25. xoii 
rotfrwv unc. incl. Essen || 26. ra fravrla S U V W X || #<rrai X. 


Trepl Se TOV voeiv, eVel irepov rov atcr0dVeo-0at, 
rovrov Se TO pev ^avracria So/cet elvat TO Se 770X771/^5, 
Trepl <az>Tacrtas SiopicrcLVTas ovra) Trept Oarepov Xe/cTeoz'. 

6 6 877 eartz/ 17 <f>avTacrla /ca#' r\v Xe'yo/z-ez/ <jf>aWao>Ld Tt428a 

yiyvecrffat, /cat ftr) et Tt /caTa fjLTa<f>opav Xeyoftez;, 
t$ eo-Tt TOVTWZ' wa/u? 77 es, /ca0' ^v Kpivopev /cat 
rj \jjev86fjie0a. roiavrai S' eicrlv ator^crt?, Sol'a, 

7 eTTlCTTTyfGT^ Z^oO?. OTt /ACl' OW OVK eCTTlV atCT^TJCTtS, OTjXo^ /C 5 

T<3z/Se. aiorOrjo-is i*<ev yap TJTOI Swa/xts 17 e^epyeca, oto^ or/as 
/cat o/)acr65, (^aiVeTai Se TI /cat pjjStTepov vTrdp^ovTos rov- 
TO)V, olov ra li/ TOI? VTTVOIS. etTa ato-dycris p,h del 7ra/>ecrr&, 
<^az/racrta 8* ov, et Se TT; ez^epyeta TO avTo, tracriv av eV- 
Sej(otTO TO?? #77ptot$ fyavTacrlav vTT&pyew 9 So/cet 8* ov, otov 10 
fjLvp/ui'rjKL r) jLteXiTTTj ^ cr/ccuX^/ct. etTa at /^ dXTy^et? atet, 
at Se <az>Tacrtat yivovrai at ?rXetoi;s \//evSet5. erretT 5 ouSe Xe- 
yo/jtez/, OTa^ ez>e/>y<i/x,ei> d/cpt^85s 7re/>t TO (dcrOyrov, 6Vt <^>at- 
veTat TOVTO ^jictv avQptoiros aXXa /jLoXXov orav p*r) evap- 
ya>5 ai<r0ava>fji0a [rore rj a\r)0r)<s r) t/feuSif?]. /cat 6Vep Se 15 

8 eXeyojitev irporepov, <^at^erac /cat /JLVOVCTLV opdp,a,Ta. aXXa 
jXT]z/ ovSe TO)V del aXifjffevovT&v ovSe/ita eo~Tat, oToy eTrtcrT^/xij 77 
z>ov$' eo-Tt yap <j>avracrioi /cat i/fevS^g. Xet-TreTat apa tSetz/ et 
86a- yiverai yap So^a /cat aXrf0r)$ KOL i/fevS^^. dXXa 
So]7 fiei' eTreTat 7rtcrTt9 (ov/c ez>Se'^eTat yap So^d^o^Ta oT?2o 
So/cet /XTJ Trivreueiv), ?5>v Se dr/pC&v ovOzvl vTrdp^et 

27. roO acr0. E, sed nunc v eras. (Stapf.), roO etiam Simpl. 221, 6 || 428 a, i. -^ om. 
W et pr. E, leg. Soph. || 2, ywMcu S T VX, tyytve<r6ai Wy Them. 89, 30 || 3. *'negatio 
aut certe dubitatio in liac apodosi desideratur" Trend., ante /u/a addendum esse far&p.ei' 
l coni. Bywater, p. 56 || ica^' As coni. Torst, /ca^' ^v etiam Philop. Soph. || /cal] 4) 
ESUWX, /cai etiam Soph. || 4. ^] /cal ESTUW, 4) etiatn Soph. || rotavra SVy, 
TaCra LWX, rotavrai etiam Them. Philop. || 5. T/OUS brurrfipn STUWX Philop., 
^7rwT9$/A77 voOs etiam Them, Simpl. Soph., ktct.G'H\iu(\v pr. E sed nunc v eras. (Rr.) || oS?' 
om. SUX, leg. Them. Soph. || 6. afo6yffis ^...15. /cal 37re/3. Hunc locum restitucre 
tentat Essen III, 21 || 6. n& om. y, leg. Soph. |J 7. ante Qatverai aliquid excidisse 
censet Freudenthal, p. 55 || rotruv tirdpxovTos STUVWX Soph. || 8. legendum 
proponit Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1867, P- 2 4^ : a^^crts JLC^ del <roi? > > irap6vros k<rri> 
QavTCLfflo, 5' otf, quod improbat Freudenthal, qui pro del legi vult Trcurt (quod probat 
Susemihl) et fadpxei pro irdpeffrt, p. 12 et Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 400, utrique adver- 
satur Schieboldt, De imag. disquis., p. 12, aftr077<rts JJL&V $ Svv&fiei del irdpeffn coni. 
Christ || n. (TK6\fjKi pr. E (Rr.) I! Torst., Them, et Soph, secutus, scripsit : olov ^pj^Kt 
/JL& % peKtrru, o-/cc6Xi?/c4 5' otf, quod etiam Belger in alt. ed. Trend, recepit et, omisso 
pev t Rodier, quibus assentitur Schieboldt, p. 9, ac profecto Them, ita legisse videtur, 

CH. 3 427 b 27 428 a 21 125 

To turn to thought : since it is different from sense-perception 
imagi- an< 3 seems to include imagination on the one hand and 

nation. conception on the other, we must determine the nature of 
imagination before we proceed to discuss conception. If, then, 6 
imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image 
presents itself to us, and if we exclude the metaphorical use of the 
term, it is some one of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we 
judge, and judge truly or falsely. Such faculties or habits are sensa- 
Not tion, opinion, knowledge, intellect. It is clearly not 7 

sensation sensation, for the following reasons. Sensation is either 
a faculty like sight or an activity like seeing. But we may have an 
image even when neither the one nor the other is present : for 
example, the images in dreams. Again, sensation is always present, 
but not so imagination. Besides, the identity of the two in actuality 
would involve the possibility that all the brutes have imagination. 
But this apparently is not the case ; for example, the ant, the bee and 
the grub do not possess it. Moreover, sensations are always true,, 
but imaginings prove for the most part false. Further, it is not 
when we direct our energies closely to the sensible object, that we 
say that this object appears to us to be a man, but rather when 
we do not distinctly perceive it \then the term true or false is 
applied}. And, as we said before, visions present themselves even 
if we have our eyes closed. 

Neither, again, can imagination be ranked with the faculties, 8 
nor like knowledge or intellect, which always judge truly : it 

opinion, ma y a i $o b e false. It remains, then, to consider whether 
it be opinion, as opinion may be true or false. But opinion is 
attended by conviction, for it is impossible to hold opinions 
without being convinced of them : but no brute is ever convinced,. 

quamquam suspicionem movet vocabulum tbrws, quod addidit 90, 8, et fort. Alex., qui 
scribit De An. 67, 2 : Kal a&r0^<rews fitv irdvra. /jer^xei ra f$ a <pa.vTcurLas 5 otf 5oKi 9 u?r 
rd re derTpe&dii T&V QaXawltov xal ol (rKd>\rjKe$, et Soph, alieno loco, p. 55, 27, haec 
verba habet : fju&pfM}%i Kal /xeXtrrcus xctl rots 6fioloL$...avdyKy Trapewai fiavracrlav..,, <na&XijKer 
S Kal pviat...7) otf SOKOVO-W fiXws &x*w $ d^vSpdv rtva, similiter Philop. ad 413 b, 22. et 
ad 414 b, 33. (258, 32), hoc vero loco diserte vulgatam lectionem agnoscit et interpretatur, 
quare neque ex Philop. neque ex Soph, lectionem a Torst. receptam confirmari posse 
iudicat Biehl ; vulgatam tuentur praeter omnes codd, etiam Simpl. hoc loco et p. 308, 19* 
et vet. transl. et Barco, p. 62; cf. ad hunc locum 434 a, 4 |j 12. S-Treir'] ri T et com E, 
grrecra leg. etiam Soph. || 14. tvepyQs E, frapy&s etiam Them. Soph. || 15. 17] om. pr. E,. 
Kal U, Kal $ Ty, xal TJ SV || TJ] Kal % S V || rbr $ dX. # ^. unc. inclusit Torst., quod 
probat etiam Madvig, leg. Soph, et vet. transl. H 8% S T U V X y Soph. By water, p. 56 !J 
19. dXXd...24 S* otf e duab. ed. contain, iudicat Torst., cui assentitur Freudenthal, 
Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 405, pr. 22. rt 7rdcnj...24. 5* otf, post. tp. dXXct...22. iroXXots || 
21. SoKet] dogdfri L U W Philop. 500, 20, 8oKei etiam Them. Soph. 


(jxtvroLO-ia 8' ev 7roXXot9. en irdcrr) p,ev 80^77 aKoXovOel 7rtcrrt9, 
Trio-ret Se ro iremlcrOaL, neiOoi Se Xdyo9' r<3^ Se dypiav 
9 ez;tot9 <j>avrao-ia pV VTrdp^ei, Xdyo9 8* ov. fyavepov roLvvv 
ort ovSe Sda juer' ato-07?crea>9, ovSe St' atcr^creft)?, ovSe CTUJU,- 25 
7rXo/c7) 80^779 /cat atcr^crecu? <]E>az>racrta av 117, Sta re 
ravra /cat 877X0 v ort ov/c aXXov rtz/09 ecrrtz/ 17 Sda, aXX 3 
K6ivov ecrrlv ov /cat ^ atcr^crts Xeya) S', K TT}? TOU Xev/coS Sd- 
^9 /cac alo-O-rjo-etos 17 crv/^TrXoAa) ^avracrta co-riv ov yap 877 
e/c T7/5 80^5 ftez/ r?79 roS aya^ou, aicr6rjcrea)S Be rrjs rov 30 
Xev/cov* TO ov&> <j>aivecr()ai Icm TO Sofa^eir OTT/> alcrddvercu, 
10 /XT) /caret crv^e^/cd?. ^ati/erat Se /cat \fjev8TJ, Trepl &v 
a/^a vTTokri^iv d\r)0rj e?(t, otov <^>atz/rat /t^ 6 ?puos TTO- 
Staco?, Tremcrreurat 8* etz/at fjiei^cov rrjs oi/cov/xeV^g* 

ovv Tjrot a7TOj8j8X77/cVat TT)Z/ eavroS d\7)6rj Sd^av, T^V et)(, 5 

rot 7r/)ayju,aro9, JLCT t 

77 et ert )(t, dvdyKT] TYJV avrfy dX-rjOr) et^at /cat 
\JjevSrj. dXXa t/fvS7}9 eytvero, ore \ddoi /xeraTrecror/ ro 
TrpayjLta. ovr' apa ev rt roura>r ecrrtj' ovr' e/c roura>^ 77 <^avracrta. 
ii aXX* 7Tt877 ecrrt Kivri64vros rovSt /cu>eto~#at erepov VTTO 10 
rovrov, 77 8e <^>a^r aorta Kivqcris rt9 So/ct clvat /cat ov/c ai/ev 
ato"#770-6>9 yiyve&Oai aXX' alo-OavopevoLs /cat <uv atcr^crfe 
eo*rtv, ecrrt Se yti^ecr^at Kivycrw VTTO rrjs ez/e/oyeta? ri^ cdcrdrj- 
<T0)9, /cat Tavrrjv 6/xotaz<> az/ay/c7j ti;at rjj ator^cret, 6t?7 av 
77 /ctv77crt9 oure a^ev ator^7jcra)9 cvSe^o/x/eVT; ovre /Z,T) at- 15 

vrrdp^(LV } /cat TroXXa /car* avrr)v Kal 
/cat Trao-^etv ro 9(0^, /cat tz>at /cat dkrfdrj /cat 

22. 5* ^ EL, 5^ & Soph., ^ om. reliqui ante Biehlium omnes || verba ^...24. 5' 01) unc* 
inclusit Biehl || Trdcr^] eZ 7rd<r^ S X y, e^ insert. E 2 (Bhl.) || 26. ^ ^>ayr. coni. Torst. j| virgulam 
post elf?; delevit, post 27. rai/ra posuit Rodier, SimpL 212, 12. 28 Philop. 504, 31 et Them. 
90, 32 secutus. Idem Rodier dubitanter foci 76 raura coni. || 5i<i re raOra...28. at<r^<rts 
ante 24. (frwepov poni vult G. Schneider, Rhein. Mus. 1866, p. 449 || 27. /fcti ^rt 
{omisso 5^X0^) vel /coi ort ^Xop 5rt et ^o-rat pro &mi> coni. Shorey, p. 150 [| &\\y rts 
STVW, aXX^y y, aXXov etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || ^ om, SVX It 28. ^eH ST, 
^e^i;? y, TJ tKelvrj Philop. || terlv'] %Trep &r\ S, fairep k<rnv y, etirep tffrlv T W Torst., 
vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. [| ov Kal ^] ov Kal E L Bek. Trend., Kal ^ y, ov-jrep tvrt Kal ^ 
U V, ou Ktd i) STWX, scripsit Torst., ovirep tertv, 6/ioO Kal 1j vSimpl. || &] el V Trend. 
G. Schneider, 6re ^/c y, vulgatam tuetur vet. transl. || 29. 17 trvjuTrXoKT} unc. incl. Torst. || 
428 b, i. ^<rrat coni. Trend., scripsit Torst., cui assentitur G. Schneider, e<m etiam 
Philop. et vet. transl. H 2. W] te 76 ST U V WXy, fort, recte, iudice Biehlio l| 3, ^x^ 
ES I! iroStos pn E || 4. T<hrerrcu STUX Torst., TTioreiierat L || ^fiwv LUWX Bek. 
Trend., /uetfw E S T V y Torst. Biehl Rodier || 5. a5rou E L || dX^^ post eTx^ S U W X || 

CH. 3 428 a 22 428 b 17 127 

though many have imagination. Further, every opinion implies 
conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and 
persuasion implies reason. Among brutes, however, though some 
have imagination, none have reason. It is evident, then, that 9 
imagination is neither opinion joined with sensation nor opinion 
through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sen- 
opinion sation, both on these grounds and because nothing- else 

combined ^ 

with is the object of opinion but that which is the object of 

sensation* - T -,-,1 i /--, .. /- 

sensation : I mean, it is the complex of the opinion of 
white and the sensation of white, not surely of the opinion of good 
with the sensation of white, which alone could constitute imagina- 
tion. To imagine, then, will be on this supposition to opine directly, 
not indirectly, that which we perceive. But there are false imagin- 10 
ings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a true 
conception. For example, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, 
but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world : 
in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and 
without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument, 
we have abandoned the true opinion which we had about it; 
or else, if we still retain it, the same opinion must be both true and 
false. It could have proved false only in the event of the object 
having changed without our observing it. It is not, then, either 
one of the two, opinion and sensation, singly, or a combination 
of the two, which constitutes imagination. 

Now when one thing is moved, something else can be moved n 
by it. And imagination is thought to be a species of motion and 
not to arise apart from sensation, but only in sentient beings 
and with the objects of sense for its objects. Motion, again, may 
. be produced by actual sensation, and such motion must 

movement resemble the sensation which caused it. From all this 


to sensa- it follows that this particular motion cannot arise apart 

from sensation nor be found anywhere except in sentient 

beings: and in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to do 

and experience many things : imagination, too, may be both true and 

6. Tri\av9av6jJ.voi> L T U V W X H 7. r^v atirrp om, pr. E, ante tod-yKij ponunt L W y |{ 
post eivtu addendum iruTrebeiv censet Essen III, p. 23 || 8. tytvero E, sed in litura 
{Trend.), LSUVXy Torst., eyfrero reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Susemihl, B. J. 
XXX, 47 || dXXd.,.9- TrpayfJ-a. Torst. suspecta sunt, non legisse videntur Them. Simpl. 
Soph., leg. etiam Philop. || 9. oti/c #pct ELTWy || 10. route SUVy || n. ad verbal 5e... 
12. afo6i)<ris tcrnr annotat Torst. : vereor ne, etsi sunt Aristotelis, in posteriore edit, non 
fuerint scripta, leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 12. ato-B^a-ex elarlv T U V W et, omisso verbo, S, 
numerum singularem afoQvjrts leg. etiam Philop. 512, 24 SimpL 215, 3 Soph. 119, 34 |[ 
15. afa-Tjs E || 1 6. tHrdpxei E || ICCCT& rwfir^v EL, KCLT atiTty etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. 
Soph. || *oi om. TVXy, tuentur etiam Them. Soph. 

128 DE AN IMA III CH. 3 

12 roCro Se crvpfiaLveL Sid TaSe. 77 aXarOycris r<3v /xei> tStW d 

rj on 6Xiytaroz> e^ovcra TO i/;eSSo5. Sevrepov Se TOT) 

, ravra' /cat evravOa 77877 ei>Se)(erat Sta\|/ev- 20 
Seo-#at- on ftez> yap Xev/coV, ov i/revSeTat, 6 Se roDro TO Xev- 
/co;t> 17 aXXo TL, favSerai. rpirov Se T*V KOW&V /cat eTro/^e^co^ 
Tots <rv/^/3e/3'>7/coVa', ots vrrdp^ei ra tSta- Xeyoa S* oW /a- 
^crts /cai jtteye#os, a crv/Ji/Se/SrjKe Tots ator^TOtg, Trept a 

13 ftaXtcrra 1787; ecrT6*> d7raT7)0'Y)v<u Kara r^v alo-Oyo'iv. 17 Se Act- 25 
^TJCTIS 77 IJTTO T77? evepyetas ywo/jceV?; Siotcrei [7175 accr^Tjcreoos] 

07 CCTTO TOVTWV T^ rpicov alo-dijcreoov. KOL 77 jite^ TrpcorY] Tra- 
povcrrjs rrjs aicrBrjo-ecos 01X77^775, at S* erepat /cat Trapovcrr)s /cat 
CXTTOVO^S elei^ av \fjevSels, /cat //,aXto-Ta oTaz^ 7roppa> TO alcr07)- 
TOV 77. et ovv \Lr\Q\v peis aXXo ej(Ot 77 ra eipyfjieva 77 ^>a^- 30 
Taorta, TOVTO S* e<TTt TO Xe^^e^, 77 (fravracrta av eirj Kivrforis 429 a 

1475-776 rrjs ato"^77creo)s TT^S /caT* e^epyetav ytyz/Ojae^. 7ret S* 77 
oi//ts fJidX-icrra atcr^crts ea"T6, /cat TO ovo^a OLTTO rov <f)dov$ et- 

15 X77q&ev, oTt aVev <^a)T05 ov/c eorTtv tSetz/. /cat Sid TO e/xjaeVetv 
/cat Quotas etvat Tat$ aicrdtf&ecri, TroXXd /caT* avTa9 TrpaT- 5 
Tet Ta ^aJa, Ta /xe^ Std TO /LT) e)(etz/ ^ov^, o?o^ Ta #?7pta, 
Ta Se Std TO eTrt/caXvTTTecr^at TOV voSi^ evtoTe irddei 77 

ot a^o)7rot. TTept /iei/ o5&> <^avTacrtas, Tt CCTTI 

/cat Std Tt ecrTtv, elpijo-Oct) eTrt 

19. rw tr^jSe^/cA'at raura E (recte Bus., sed rw sine t adscript.), roG <rvfJt,pp7)K6ros X, 
rov y <rvfj,ptpiiK xal raura Aid. Sylb. Basil, et vet. transl., Them, interpretatur : dtfrrepov St 
T&V ifvoK^^vtav roTs I8tou ical ols tKeiva a-vfip^Ke, ex Simpl. et Philop, interpr. colligit 
Biehl, eos legisse ant roO (ru^j9e^/f6ros aut rou 6 o-v/^^S^yce rotfrow, quod scriptum esse ab 
Ari&t. coni. Torst., pro rai/ra coni. roi5rc^ Steinhart, fort, legendum raOra roiJr^ censet 
Rodier || 20. v. ad b, 24 |J 8ia\//t<ra<r0a.i E, 5ta^e^e<r^at etiam Them. || 21. r6 om. E S VX t 
leg. Philop. || 11. rt et 24. a ante <ruAt)3. om. S T U V W X || 23. Tots...f5ta unc, incl. Essen 
III, p. 25, ols...tdia delenda censet Maier, Syllogistik des Arist., p. 9 in adn., Simpl. et 
Philop. videntur legisse /coi TO Wta, fort. ol5...rt tfaa, non leg. Them. || 24.<r07ir<tis 
unc. inclusit Torst., post 20. Tavra transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, B. J. LXVII, 109, in parenth. posuit Rodier || 25. &] ty T U Rodier, 5' ^ W || 
26. TWP al<r6'/i<reui> T, T^S a/<r^o'e w s unc. inclusit Torst., fort, transponendum esse post 
frepyeias putat Biehl, et iam idem G. Schneider suaserat ; etiam facilius post yivo^vrt 
traici posse censet Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86 || 27. ^...aZo-^o-ewv om. SUVW, leg. etiam 
Philop., pro $ sine ullo cod. scripserunt T^S Bek. et Trend., $ coni. Christ, ^ delendum 
censet G. Schneider, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1867, p. 631 || 29. alffOyrfytoi' TUVWX |[ 
30. pb om. ST U VWX Philop. || &ot ^ E, recepit Biehl, *x ^y et Philop. cod. D, 
#Xj omisso TJ, reliqui omnes, etiam Torst. Zeller Rodier || Nescio an 77 TOL lpi)in&a unc. 
includenda sint, nisi forte, deserto cod. E, totus locus ita est purgandus : el o%v 
[^ favracrta, TOVTO 5' 6rrl 

CH. 3 428 b 18 429 a 9 129 

false. The reasons for the last conclusion are as follows. Perception 12 
of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimum 
of error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes : and 
at this point error may come in. As to the whiteness of an object 
sense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whether 
the white object is this thing or something else. Thirdly, there 
is perception of the common attributes, that is, the concomitants 
of the things to which the special attributes belong : I mean, 
for example, motion and magnitude, which are attributes of 
sensibles. And it is concerning them that sense is most apt 
to be deceived. But the motion which is the result of actual 13 
sensation will be different according as it arises from one or other 
of these three kinds of perception. The first kind, so long as the 
sensation is present, is true : the other kinds may be false, whether 
the sensation is present or absent, and especially when the object 
perceived is a long way off. If then, imagination possesses no 
other characteristics than the aforesaid, and if it is what 

nation it has been described to be, imagination will be a motion 


generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the 14 
principal sense, imagination has derived even its name (<j>avrao-ia) 
from light (<ao?), because without light one cannot see. Again, 15 
because imaginations remain in us and resemble the corresponding 
sensations, animals perform many actions under their influence ; 
some, that is, the brutes, through not having intellect, and others, 
that is, men, because intellect is sometimes obscured by passion 
or disease or sleep. Let this account of the nature and cause of 
imagination suffice. 

TJ] solus E, vj LSTUVXy, 77 ^ W Rodier, "si igitur nihil aliud habet ea quae dicta 
sunt quam phantasia" vet. transl. , rj /J.TJ Bek. Trend., secuti edit. Sylburgianam, vel 
potius eiusdem typothetarum errorem, tf ^ <f>avraffia unc. incl. Torst., non legisse Philop. 
514, 32 idem Torst. censet || Qavrafftav S Bek. Trend. ; scriptum fuisse ab Aiist. : el ctiv 
y^Qkv d*\Xo #x et Ttt ^tpfjiJ^va, rouro 5' x et % ffxuTcurta SLV efy /cherts coni. Torst. |( 
429 a, i. rouro 5* &rri Biehl, etiam Them. 93, 22 || ra#r6 S' <rrl sive xatfrd 5* x et coni. Christ H 
2. yvyvofj&ni pr. E (Trend.) Ly Them. Philop. Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., quod etiam 
probat Zeller, p. 545, yiyvo^vrjs reliqui codd., etiam Bek. || 3. 4<m om. S T U V "W X (| 
5. 6/^olas E, sed as in rasura (Bhl.), TUX Them. Simpl. vet. transl. Torst., fytofwy 
reliqui ante Torst. omnes || /card ratfras El/y, /car 9 ai5rds etiam Them. Simpl. [| 
irp&rreiv E [| 7. vfou TUV, v6(fois etiam Them. Simpl. 221, 12 |[ 9. di6rt E Soph. 
121, 20. 

H. . Q 

1 30 DE ANIMA III CH. 4 

4 Ilept Se TOV popiov rov Trjs I/O^T?? (5 ywoScr/cet re r) 10 
t/ruX'*? /cat fypovei, etre ^a)pLcrrov oVrog etre /cat ^77 -^piarrov 
Kara jue'yefos aXXa /cara Xoyov, or/ce7rreo^ ru/ exet Sta- 

2 <j&opdV, /cat 7T<Ss Trore yiver&i TO fc'oetv. et 877 eo~Tt TO voeiv 
<yo-7rep TO alorddvecrdaL, r} Trdcr^iv n av EL?) VTTO rov voyrov rj 

3 TL TOIOVTOV erepov. aira^e? apa Set etvcu, Se/cTtAcw oe TOV et- 15 
Sovs feat Sv^ajucct TOIOVTOV aXXa JOCT) TOVTO, /cat O/AOIOJ? e>(U>, 
cScr-Trep TO ai(rdr)TLKOv Trpos Ta ato-^m, OVTO) TOV i/ow 77/365 
Ta vofjroi. avayKr) apa, CTTCL rravra votl, d/xiyi} etvai, a>o-- 

, Tva Kpary, rovro 8* ecrTtv tva y^a>- 
yap /ca>Xvei TO d\X6rpiov /cat az^Tt- 20 
* avTov elvai <$>vcriv /z^Se/^ta^ dXX* 17 

ravrrjv, OTI Swarov. 6 apa /caXov/^evo? TTJS tyvxfjs vov<$ 
(Xcyw vovv <S StavoetTat /cat v7roXa/i,/6dVet 17 

4 ovQiv <TTW evepyeia r>v QVTW irplv voelv. Sto ovSe 

avrov TW crt&iiaTi,' Trotos Tt? yap az> ytyz/otTo, 77 i/fv- 25 
depfjios, rj K.av opyavov n etTy, (Scrmp r<2 ator^Tt/c<3* 
8* ovdas eoTti'. /cat eS ST) ot Xeyo;fTS TT)V i/fv^Tji/ etvat TO- 
TTOZ> ctSSv, TrX'ijv oTt owe oX>j aXX* 17 i/o^Tt/cTj, OVT 

5 ^eta dXXa Swajxet Ta etS?;. OTt S* ov^ o^uota 17 aird 

rov alcrdrjriKov Kal rov voyrutov, <f>avepov em T<2z> alcrdiqr'rfpictiv 30 
/cal TT^S atcr^crecos. 17 jLtev yap aZcrdrjcris ov SwaTat alcrOdve- 
crdai IK rov <j<oSpa atcr^Tov, otoi' \jj6<j>ov IK r>v {Atyaktov 429 b 
\lso<f>a)v, ovS' : T<3v icryypSiv -^pcofjudrco^ Kal ocr^v ovre 
opav ovYe 6cr)Ltao"^at* dXX' 6 vovs oTav TC vo^a*^ <r<f>6Spa vor)- 
rdv, ofy f/rrov voel ra vTroSeeorcpa, dXXa /cat fjiak\ov * TO 

6 /xv yap aicr6r)ri,Kov OVK avev o*o5/xaTO9, o ^cyptaros, OTav 5 
8* ovT6>s l/cacTTa y4wr)rai a>5 o eVtcrTTj/ia)^ XeyTat o /caT 9 z/ep- 
yetav (TOVTO Se orv/x/8atvet y oTav Svwjrai, tvepyeiv St* auTOv), 

10. roO ante r^s om. L S T U W X Philop., rou r^Js ^vx* /uo^ov y, leg. roi? Them, || 
ir. K<d post efre om. E (Bus.) et Simpl. || 14. rt] 5rt E L, rtleg. Philop. Soph. SxmpL, hoc 
loco et p. 264, 17 || 15. dfpa tuentur omnes codd. et Them. Simpl. Philop. || 18. dvAyKy.., 
17. c&0& fonv e duab. rec. contam. iudicat Torst., pr. . 6 Apa... a 7. IcrrtP, post. 
1 8. dvd7/n7. f .22. 5war6p, quod negant Noetel, Ztschr. f. Gymn. 1864, p. 140 ct 
Dittenberger, Getting, gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, p. 1610 |l x8. tireity SUVWXy 
Them. || ao. /cwXiJo-et coni. Essen, Beitr. 2. Los., p. 44, scripsit II, Jackson, Texts to 
illustrate, p. 93 || dyri0pd(t SVX, foruppttei UWy Essen H. Jackson, Aim<f>pdr 
leg. etiam Soph. || 25. yfyfcTifLSTUVWX, TM6t rts av ytyvotro Soph. || 77 ^. 77 e^. 
E, ^. ^. S TU VWX Philop., r? $. j #. y, VVXPOS ^ Bep^ Soph. Bek, Trend. Tort. || 

CH. 4 429 a 10 429 b 7 131 

As to the part of the soul with which it knows and under- 4 
intellect stands, whether such -part -be separable spatially, or not 
or Mind. separable spatially but only in thought, we have to con- 
sider what is its distinctive character and how thinking comes about. 
Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a 2 
being acted upon by the object of thought or in something else of 
this kind. This part of the soul, then, must be impassive, but recep- 3 
tive of the form and potentially like_this form, though not identical 
with it : and, as the faculty of sense is to sensible objects, so must 
mEEltect 'be related to intelligible objects. The mind, then, since 
it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be 
tmmbc^_with_ any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by 
'intruding its own form it hinders and obstructs that which is 
alien to it ; hence it has no other nature than this, that it is a 
A poten- capacity. Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call 
*' th^piace intellect (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul 
of forms." thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually before 
it thinks. Hence, too, we cannot reasonably conceive it to be 4 
mixed with the body : for in that case it would acquire some par- 
ticular quality, cold or heat, or would even have some organ, as the 
perceptive faculty has. But as a matter of fact it has none. There- 
fore it has been well said that the soul is a place of forms or ideas : 
except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul 
which can think, and again that the forms are there not in actuality, 
but potentially. But that the impassivity of sense is different from 5 
that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense-organs and at 
sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible object 
has been too intense : thus it cannot hear sound after very loud 
noises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can neither 
see nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on 
an object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to 
think of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not in- 
dependent of body, whereas intellect is separable. But when the 6 
intellect has thus become everything in the sense in 
which one who actually is a scholar is said to be so (which 
happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even 

26. $ *a*>] Kal K&V S, K&V T W Soph. Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86, K<d U V X [| 29. on 8 ...30. 
yoTjrucov unc. incl. Essen III, p. 38 || 429 b, i. oTov rov $. S T VXy, oTov K rov ^. E, e/c 
-rov ^&4>ov rov peyAXov [77] T&V [UKpCov tybQw Them. 104, 34 || IK om. E, otov i^6ef>ov IK r&v 
Atey. ^. etiam Soph. || 4. verba dXXa /caijLtaXXop interpolata esse censet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. 
1867, p. 246, leg. etiam Them. || 5. 6 te vovs x<*P- y et in interpr. Soph., om. vovs etiam 
Them. 105, 4 || 6. 6 post ws om. S W Theoph. ap. Prise. 31, 8 Bek. Trend. || 6 ante 
' om. S U V WX Theoph. ap. Prise. 31, 9. 



ecTTt /j,ez; /cat rore Swajuet 7ra>5, ov JUTJV opoCcos KOI rrplv 
//,a#tj> rj evpti>* KCU avros 8e avrov rore Svvarai voetv. 

7 eTret 8* aXXo earl TO />tey#os /cat TO peyedei elvac /cat 10 
$>a>p /cat vSaTt cti>at (ovrec> Se /cat e<* erepwv 7roXXa5z>, aXX* 

OV/C 67Tt iraVTCOV 7T J a'tCe)^ yap TaUToV <yri), TO CTapKl etvat 

Kal crap/ca [/cat] 77 aXX<) 77 aXXa>? e^ovri /cptVet- 77 yap crap 
OVK avev T7J5 vX^s, aXX' (ScrTrep TO cri/xoz/, TO e^ ToJSe. TO! 
/xe/ oSz/ OLicrdTjriKy TO Oeppov /cat TO ^v^pov Kpivei, Kal >v 15 
Xoyos Tts 17 croip' aXXa> 8e ^Tot ^a>/3tcrTcJ> TJ a>5 17 K/cXa- 
crfJievT} )(<ei 7T/3OS avryv orav Kra6y } TO <rap/ct eli'at /cpt- 

8 z^et. TraXtv S* eTrt TCWZ^ V a<aipeoret ovrwv TO eu^v cos TO 
<Tt/jLOZ/ /xTa crvvexpvs yap 9 TO Se Tt 77^ etvai, el ecrriv erepov 
TO evOet etz/at /cat TO ev^v, aXXo* ecrTco yap Suas. eTep<^ 20 
cxpa 77 erepcos expvn Kpivei. teal oXct>s apa 0)5 \o)pLorra ra 

g Trpdyfjuara rfjs vXoy?, OOTO) /cat Ta Trept 
8' aV Tt?, et 6 vov? a-TrXoSv ecrTt /cat 


KOLVOV, cScTTTep ^)7jcrtv 'A^aayopa?, 7rs vorjcrei, t TO 
Tt earu'. ?J yotp Tt KOLVOV dfjifyotv UTrap^et, TO 25. 

10 /xev Troteti/ 8o/cet TO Se 7racr^t^. ert 8* t Z/OTJTOS /cat avrog. 
77 yap Tot? aXXots vous virdp^ei, et ^t?) /caT* aXXo a^Tos 
Z^O^TOS, ez^ Se Tt TO voyrov etSet, 77 ^e^eiy^evov Tt ^t, o 

11 Trotet vorjTov avrov ajcnrep TaXXa. 77 TO ^aev rrdo'xeiv Kara 

8. /*&>] /x^v o5^ LW Theoph. 1.1. 31, 10 Them- || /cai r<5re E m. pr, y Them. 
Philop. Torst, /cai r6re opottas insert. E 2 (Rr.), ofAotws /cai r6re rcliqui ante Torst. 
omnes || oftoLws cm. SUX, leg. Them. Simpl. Theoph. 1.1. 31, n || 9, ?] /cai 
Theoph. 1. 1. || 52 ai^rov] &' a^roO coni. By water, J. of Philol. XIV, p. 40, cui 
assentitur Susemihl, Oecon., p. 86 || n. Kal rb tf&m E, sed TO expunct. (Stapf.), r6 
om, reliqui omnes || otirw St. ..12. raOr6v &rrt in parenth. Bon., Stud. Arist. IV, 376 || 
n. otfrw 5^ om. LT, leg. Them. || 12. rai5r6 E (Trend.) |l colon post ^<rrt omissum 
post 13. a-dpKa ponit Bek., corr. Trend., iam Them, hunc locum rectc interpretatus 
est 96, 6 sqq. || 13. Kal rj dtXX^ solus E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, Kal fiXX^j y, 
jj d\\y, omisso /cai, reliqui || ^%ovrt om. L S U V, leg. Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph, et 
insert. E 2 || KpLvei 6 vovs L et E, sed 6 vovs exp. (BhL) I| 14. virgulam post <n^6v a Bek. 
Trend, omissam ponunt Torst. Bon. (| 15. al<r6ijr$ pro atff6vinK$ legi vult Brentano, 
p. 134 || rd ante ^xp. om. EL || 16. 6 \6yos E, 6 om. etiam Simph Philop* || 17. adr7;v 
y et E (Trend.) || etvai xal Kplvei, LS, Kal om. etiam Simpl. || 19. ^,..20. e)^iJ unc. incl. 
Essen III, 40 || 20. virgulam post $0$ om. Bek., corr. Trend. || #X\o TVX et Bon, 
1. L, &\\(f reliqui ante Bon. omnes, quod defendere studet Torst., Jalirb. f. Phil. x86*7, 
p. 34-5 || 21. Kal om. LSTU VX et, ut videtur, Philop. 532, 12 |] apa om. pr* E, leg. 
etiam Philop. || 23. dTratf^y pr. E (Bus.), verba Kal airaQls in interpr. ignorare videtur 
Them. 97, 8 sq., delenda esse censet Hayduck, progr. Gryphisv. 1873, p. 4, cui assentitur 
Susemihl, Phil. Anzeig. 1873, p. 683, pro airadh coni. afuyls Zeller, p. |(58 || 24. fyw 

CH. 4 429 b 8 429 b 29 133 

then it is still in one sense but a capacity : not, however, a capacity 
in the same sense as before it learned or discovered. And, more- 
over, at this stage intellect is capable of thinking itself. 

Now, since magnitude is not the same as the quiddity of 7 
HOW the magnitude, nor water the same as the quiddity of water 
form or (and so also of many other things, though not of all, the 
is appre- thing and its quiddity being in some cases the same), 
we judge the quiddity of flesh and flesh itself either with 
different instruments or with the same instrument in different 
relations. For flesh is never found apart from matter, but, like 
" snub-nosed," it is a particular form in a particular matter. It is, 
then, with the faculty of sense that we discriminate heat and cold 
and all those qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion. But it 
is with another faculty, either separate from sense, or related to it as 
the bent line when it is straightened out is related to its former self, 
that we discriminate the quiddity of flesh. Again, when we come 8 
to the abstractions of mathematics, the straight answers to the 
quality " snub-nosed," being never found apart from extension. But 
the straightness of that which is -straight, always supposing that the 
straight is not the same as straightness, is something distinct : we 
may, for instance, assume the definition of straightness to be 
duality. It is, then, with another instrument or with the same 
instrument in another relation that we judge it. In general, there- 
fore, to the separation of the things from their matter corresponds 
a difference in the operations of the intellect. 

The question might arise : assuming that the mind is something 9 
some simple and impassive and, in the words of Anaxagoras, 

k as nothing in common with anything else, how will it 
think, if to think is to be acted upon? For it is in 
so far as two things have something in common that the one of 
them is supposed to act and the other to be acted upon. Again, 10 
can mind itself be its own object? For then either its other objects 
will have mind in them, if it is not through something else, but in 
itself, that mind is capable of being thought, and if to be so capable 
is everywhere specifically one and the same ; or else the mind will 
have, some ingredient in its composition which makes it, like the rest, 
an object of thought. Or shall we recall our old distinction between n 
two meanings of the phrase " to be acted upon in virtue of a 

S U V || vofoew TV X |1 26. 5' om. pr. E || 27. 6 voDs S T U W X Philop. Bek. Trend. 
Torst. 1| 29. de verbis ^...31. vofi vide Torst., cui mutfla et corrupta videntur; tuetur 
etiam Simpl,, defendit Brentano, p. 137. 

I 3 4 DE ANIMA III CHS. 4, 5 

KOWOV n 8t7j/077rat irporepov, on Swapa THUS ICTTL ra 
6 vovs, aXX* evTeXexeicL ovSeV, Trplv cLv VOT)* S<waju>a 8' OVTO>$ 
to&Trep iv ypafJLfJLareia) a> p^Ow virapx^ ez/reXc^eta yeypa/z- 430 a 
12 pivov oTrep crv/x/3aiWi ITTI rov z/ov. Kai avTOs Se vo^ro? ecrru> 
aJcrTrep ra por/rd. em peis yap T&V avev v\.rj<s TO avro ecrrt 
ro Z/OQW KOL TO voovpevov 17 yap liricrnfiw) r) GetopvjTiK'Y) KOI 


kv Se Tot? zxovcriv v\7)v Swa/zei e/cacrTW 


yap v\ys Swa)ats 6 vovs TcSz^ TOLOVTCDI/), e/cetvw Se TO 


*E-7ret S* tocrirep B/ aTracrg T^ <^vcreL ecrTt Tt TO /Jiev vX.T7 10 
aj yeVet (TOVTO 8e o Trdvra Swajaei efcciva), irepov Se 


TT/OOS T>)J> v\9j^ TreTro^^, avdyKi) KCU iv ry ^v^ 
Tavras TCCS Sta^opa?. fcal IcrTti/ 6 jocev TOIOVTOS vovs 

, o Se TO! rrdvra TTOLGLV, &>? e^t9 T6S, o?ov TO (j&aJ?- 15 
ydp nva KOI TO ^3? -Trocec Ta Swa/^6 oi^ra 
eW/oyeca ^pco/jiara. KOL OVTOS 6 z>ous 

fcal afLiyrj^ rrj ovcrta <3v eWpyeia. act yap 
TO noiovv TOV 7rdcr)(ovTos Kal 17 apx 1 ? T/ *?^ vX^s- TO 8* 
avTO icrriv r/ KO,T eWpyeiav eTrccrTif/AT/ TO! Trpay/xaTi* 17 Se 20 
fcaTa SwajLctz/ ^pova> TrpoTepa IV T<5 ez/6, 0X005 Se ov ^poz/6)* 
aXX' ovx QTe jLte^ voet OTC 8* ov z^oet, ^wptcr^el? 8* ecrTt povov 
rovff oTrep ecrTi, /cat TOVTO \LQVQV aOdvarov real dfStoz/. ov 

30. puncto post K0tv6i' rt posito, pro diypijTai leg. 5*6 ef/Hjrai Aid., quam secutus 
est Wallace |I 31. a*'] Av ^ LVW et inter versus UX, &*> insert. E 3 , Trplv voefr 
Simpl. Prise. 35, 33, Trplv bv voy etiam Them. [| post voj vulg. punctum || Swdpei 
coni. Cornford, 5 reliqui et script! et impressi omnes || post o^rws excidisse faro- 
\apeTv coni. Torst. || 4303, i. f om. ESUVXy et vet. transl. || brdpxw SUVX (| 
KCLTayeypawfrov L et E, sed Kara expunct, (BhL), yeypap* etiam Them. |i 2. post yeypW- 
fdvov punctum Bek. Trend., colon posuit Torst., sustulit Rodier || 4. ^ ante Be. om. E, leg, 
Them. Simpl. || 6. trivov HKQUTTOV y Aid. Sylb. || 8, 5^a/*(s 4<rrw 6 L S U V W X It lo^Trec- 
STJ coni. Essen III, p. 43, cui assentitur Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1893, p. 1321 |j irdtro Ty 
Theoph. ap. Them. 108, 20 Simpl. 240, i in lemmate, cf. tamen 241, 27, birdey etiam 
Philop. 539, T 3 Them. 103, i Soph. 125, 15 || n. d] tfn U VX, om, y, 3 etiam Soph. 11 
heivo E, o in a mutat. Eg (Bhl.), faeiva etiam Philop. Soph. || 12. /cal rd TT. L W || rfl 6 rw 
LTX || 17. CWTOS] o^x ciy S || 18. bfMyys ical dtraeijs STU VWXy Phiiop., dirae. Kal 
dyiwy^s E Them. Simpl. || ^/yya ex Simpl. restituit Torst., idem habent etiam Simpl.cod. 
Marcianus A in Phys. 1162, 3 Theoph. ap. Prise. 28, 12. 29, 25 Bon., Ind. Ar. 491 b 4, 
frepyetg, omnes codd., etiam Them. 106, 5 Philop. Soph. |( 19. rb 5* ai5rd,.,2i. 

CHS. 4, 5 429 b 30 430 a 23 135 

common element/' and say that the mind is in a manner 
potentially all objects of thought, but is actually none of them 
until it thinks : potentially in the same sense as in a tablet which 
has nothing actually written upon it the writing exists potentially ? 
This is exactly the case with the mind. Moreover, the mind itself 12 
is included among the objects which can be thought. For where 
the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is 
thought are identical. Speculative knowledge and its object are 
identical. (We must, however, enquire why we do not think always.) 
On the other hand, in things containing matter each of the objects 
of thought is present potentially. Consequently material objects 
will not have mind in them, for the mind is the power of becoming 
such objects without their matter ; whereas the mind will have the 
attribute of being its own object. 

But since, as in the whole of nature, to something which serves 5 
T as matter for each kind (and this is potentially all the 

Intellect , v r J 

passive members of the kind) there corresponds something else 
which is the cause or agent because it makes them all, 
the two being related to one another as art to its material, of 
necessity these differences must be found also in the soul. And 
to the one intellect, which answers to this description because it 
becomes all things, corresponds the other because it makes all 
things,' like a sort of definite quality such as light. For in 
a manner light, too, converts colours which are potential into 
actual colours. And it is this intellect which is separable and 
impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. 
For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, 2 
the cause or principle to the matter. Now actual knowledge is 
identical with the thing known, but potential knowledge is prior 
in time in the individual ; and yet not universally prior in time. 
But this intellect has no intermittence in its thought. It is, how- 
ever, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its 
essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not 

alieno loco posita esse indicant Kampe, p. 282 Bruno Keil, Analect. Isocrat. spec., p. 52 
Susemihl, Phil. Woch. 1884, p. 784: cf. Alex. ap. Philop. 558, 5 sqq. [J 19. rb $' afrrt 
EL, etiaro Soph., atirb 6' reliqui codd. || 21. ot E Philop. Bek. Trend., ot8t insert. E 2 
(Rr.) et reliqui codd. Soph. Torst. (cui assentitur etiam Zeller, p. 571) Rodier, otfte & 
Them. 101, 23. 28 || post XP&V virgulam poni vult Zeller, p. 572 in adn., posuit Rodier |j 
22. otfx om. Wy Plut, ap. Philop. 535, 13 Simpl. 245, 34 et 263, 8 Soph. Torst. Kampe, 
p. 282 Susemihl, Phil. Anz. 1873, P- 6 9 Oecon., p. 86 Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psych. I, 2, 
p. 64, ot>x leg. Them. 101, 24 et 99, 35 Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex. Plotinus Marinus 
vet. transl., retineri malunt etiam Zeller, p. 571 Brentano, p. 182 Schlottmann, das 
Vergangliche und Unverg. in der Seele nach Arist., p. 43 II 23- A#*OF KO.I &.6foa.rov W, 
KO.I dtdtov etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. 

I 3 6 DE ANIMA III CHs. 5, 6 

ju,z>77ju,ovVOjitz> 6, ore TOVTO jitev aTTdOe?, 6 Se rrra8 f y]TiKo$ 
voGs <j>0apTo$, Kal avev rovrov ovOev voei. 25 

6 "H [Lev ovv T&V a$iaLperct)v vo^crtg ev TQVTOIS, irepl a OVK 

OTt TO 1/fcSSoS. 6V OtS Se /cat TO l/fl)So9 KCU, TO dX 

Tts 17877 vorHidrtov axTTrep &> ovrwv, Kaffdirep ' 

eneira vvvTidecrOai TTJ <iXia, OVTCD /cat TavTa fce^coptor^eVa 30 

2 crvvTiOerai, olov TO acrv^erpov /cat 17 StajaeTyoo? az^ Se yez^o- 
fi&tov fj eoro/Jtv<ov, TOV yjpovov TTpocrevvo&v KOLI orvvTideLs* TO 43ob 
ya/> t//evSo5 1^ orvvBeorei aet- fcal ya/> av TO Xcu/co^ JLCT) 
Xev/cov, TO /AT) \CUKQV crvv0r)Kev. ^Se^eraL Se /cat Stat/oecrt^ 
(f>dvai Trdvra. aXX' ovv ecrrt ye ov povov TO T//e{)8os ^ dX^- 

^65, OTI Xev/cog KXea)^ eo-TLz/, dXXa /cat 6Y& rfv ^ co-Tat. TO Se ei/ 5 

3 TTOLOVV, ToCTO 6 VoSs 1/CaCTTOJ/. TO S* d8tatpTOV 3 7Tt St)(6), 7) 

Swa/jtet ^ 6^e/)yta, ovOkv K<o\vei voeiv TO a&i&iperov, orav 
vof) rb (ArJKOs (olStatpeTO^ yap a>epyt#), /cat e^ XP V( P ^8tat- 
yap 6 y^povos Stai/oeTos /cal dStaipeTO? TO! 

OVKQVV eCTTtZ^ Ct7Tt^ ^ T<5 ^/UCret Tt VVOl KaTO)' 10 

ov ya/) ICTTIV, av pr) Stai/De#$, aXX* ^ Sv^a/xei. 

tKarepov voS>v T&V f)p,Lcra)i/ Statpet ical TOV -)(jpovov a/ia* TOTC 

8' otovcl p,i)Kr). el 8' 0)5 e^ apfyo'iv, Kal ev TO! )(pdvoj TO? 

4 CTT' djLt<^otv. TO Se ft^ KaTa Trocrbv dStatyoeTOz/ dXXa T^! t- 

24. /^97juoi/6jJo/xej'...43i b, 16. /cefra desunt E, folio excise inter folia 200 et 201 || 
27. /cal om. L || ^eOffos ^ Kcd ST U V WXy et, ut videtur, Them. 109, 9 || 27, eV 
ots 5^,..b, 5, ^orat e duabus ed. contam., pr. b, r. TO. ..5. ^o-rat, post, a, 27. P ots... 
b, i. irpoffevvow, iudicat Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsatze I, p. 4 sqq. 
et Noetel, Zeitschr. f. Gym. 1864, p. 140 || 30. <^tX^, o(frw Vahlen, p. 6, 0iM#. o(Jrw 
Bek. Trend. Torst. || 31. owr0<r0cu STVWy j| post Sid^erpos adclunl ^ r6 (nJ/a- 
jj&rpov real i) 5td/ierpos W Simpl. Torst., quod additamentum reicit Vahlen, p. 7 sq., 
om. etiam vet. transl. || ywofdvw VWX Bek. Trend., yevopfrw etiam Them. 
Simpl. Torst. Vahlen Steinhart || 430 b, i . irpbs & VQ&V L X, Trpoorc^ow^ etiam 
Simpl. et sine dubio Them. 109, 18 || Kal ffwrtfels unc. incl. Torst., leg. Simpl. 
Philop. Soph, et defendit Vahlen, p. 9 sqq. || 3. r6 (ai TO solus T) w \evnbv 
o-vvtOiriKev omnes codd., r& ^ Xev/cdv unc. incl. Trend, in prima edit., cui assentitur 
Dittenberger, Gott. gel. Anz., p. 1615, in alt. ed. scripsit Belger de coniectura Roeperi, 
Philologus VII, p. 324: TO pi) \evicbv \evKbv <ruv., quod iam Torst. coniecerat, <ical 
Xevjrop> r^ fjLrj \evK6v, vvvQ'r)K&f coni. Vahlen, p. 12, </cai> rb fit) \VKOV <\eu/cdf >, 
ffwtOyKev Biehl, quod legisse videtur Philop. 548, 10 sq., '* si album non aibo aut si non 
album albo componit" vet. transl. |J ^5^xerc...4. irfora fort, post 5, &rrcu transponenda 
censet Maier I, p. 30, in adn. || 3. /coi o'tcUpe^if] Kal Kara (vel Kara) 5topo*ti/ coni. 
Chandler, p. 8 1| 4, pro irdvra coni. TauTa vel TotauTa Torst., leg. iravrct. etiam 
Them., #/* in interpr. Philop., irdrra. defendit Vahlen, p. 14 sq. || 7^ eici vult Torst., 
def. Vahlen, p. 17 j| verba otf pfow post dX^^s transponi vult Torst., cui adversatur 

CHS. 5, 6 430 a 24 430 b 14 137 

remember because this is impassive, while the intellect which can be 
affected is perishable and without this does not think at all. 

The process of thinking indivisible wholes belongs to a sphere Q 
judgment from which falsehood is excluded. But where both 
or^a- 8 truth and falsehood are possible there is already some 
rates. combining of notions into one. As, in the words of 

Empedocles, " where sprang into being the neckless heads of 
many creatures, 3 ' then afterwards Love put them together, so these 
notions, first separate, are combined ; as, for instance, the notions 
incommensurable and diagonal. And, if the thinking refers to the 2 
past or to the future, the notion of time is included in the com- 
bination. Falsehood, in fact, never arises except when notions 
are combined. For, even if white be asserted to be not-white, not- 
white is brought into a combination. We may equally well call every 
statement a disjunction. But at any rate under truth and false- 
hood we include not only the assertion that Cleon is white, but 
also the assertion that he was or will be. And the unifying prin- 
ciple .is in every case the mind. 

Since, however, the term indivisible has two meanings, accord- 3 
single ' m as a whole is not potentially divisible or is actually 

undivided, there is nothing to hinder us from thinking 
an indivisible whole, when we think of a length (that 
being actually undivided), or from thinking it in an indivisible time. 
For the time is a divisible or indivisible unit in the same way as 
the length thought of. We cannot therefore state what the mind 
thinks in each half of the time. For, if the whole be undivided, 
the half has only potential existence. But, if the mind thinks 
each half separately, it simultaneously divides the time also. And 
in that case it is as if the parts were separate lengths. If, how- 
ever, the mind conceives the length as made up of the two halves, 
then the time may be regarded as made up of corresponding 

Again, that which is not quantitatively but specifically an 4 

Vahlen || 5. STJ U X || 6. ^catrrore coni. H. Jackson || 7. rb d$.] rb tlwuperto $ 
com. Torst., potest tale quid legisse Philop. 549, 18, n dfoaLperov coni H. Jackson |] orav\ 
olov orav coni. Torst., &s tfrc> Steinhart || S. &8...ivepryelg, in parenth. Torst. || post y&p 
addendum ri dwdfici Arrcu censet Essen III, p. 49 II 9. 6/-tos,..2o. jtt-tfm e duab. rec. 
contam. iudicat Torst., pr. 17. &37r...4O. /$*, post. 9. /u^/cet, quod negant 
Noetel et Dittenberger || 9, /cal d5.] /coi otf Siaiperbs T, om. X et pr. W, KO! dSialperos 
etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. || 10. &6ci L Torst., Mtis y, tvvo&v TUW, tempus praesens 
etiam Them. Simpl. || 13. T&J> ijid<ruv ante voQv S U, om. TX || 14. rb & ^.-.15- 
post 20. Kal ju,j)Ki transponenda censet Bywater, p. 58 j| 14. Karb rb irovbv T X f] 
Tbv pro ddialperov coni. Wallace, cui adversatur Susemihl, Oecon., p. 86. 

1 3 8 DE ANIMA III CHS. 6, 7 

Set wet ez> aStatperew XP P V KC ^ L aStatpera) rf* $VXYJ$- 15 
fcara <rv/x/3e^KO9 Se, /cat ovx fl e/ceu>a StatpeTa, a> i>oet 
/cat Iv <w xpova), ctXX* y aStatpeTa- a/ecrrt yap /cav rovrocg 
Tt aStatpeToz/, aXX* tcrcos ov ^ajp terror, o Trotet eva TOI> 
voz> /cat TO fJLr)KO. /cat TO#' 6/zota>s e^ airavri earc T< 

5 /cat xpovto K0 ^ L A t7 7 K6( " ^ <^ cmy/JLY) /cat Tracra Statpecrts, /cat 20 
TO ovTo>9 a^iaiperov, S^XovTat wcnrep 17 crreprjcrts. /cat o/^oto? 

6 Xoyog eTrt T<Sz^ a\\<ov, o?ov urS? TO KUKQV yvo^pit^i T) 

6 TO fc\az>' T(S evai/TLto yoip -TTCOS yi>a>ptet. Set 8e Svra^et 
elvat TO yvtopitpv /cat Iveivai ev avrS. el Se Tt^t JLCTJ icrnv 
evavTiov \r>v atTtcuv], a^TO av TO yt^cicr/cet /cat e^epyeta eo"Tt 25 

7 /cat ^topKTTov. earn S* 17 /zei^ ^>ct<rts Tt /caTa Tti/o?, axnrep rj 
/caTa<acrts, /cat a\7)0r)s f) ifjvSr)S iraa-a* 6 Se i^ovs ov Tras, 
dXX" 6 TOV Tt cart /caTa TO Tt 17^ ti>ai d\7)0ij<$y /cat ov Tt 

aXX* cScrTrep TO 6yoaj> TOV tStov aXydes, el 8* cxz^- 
TO Xeu/cw ^ JU.TJ, ov/c dK7)0e$ act, oirrcos ^(^t ocra 30 

To S 3 avTo eo^Ttv 17 /caT* e^epyeta^ 67rtcrT7^jit7; T(3 -Trpay- 431 a 

17 Se /caTa Swa/xtv xpovcp irpOTepa ev TO) ei/t, oXa>5 
Se ovSe j(/)dva>' ecrTt yap e e^TcXe^et^t OZ/TOS Traz^ra Ta yt- 
yvoftez^a. <j>oLiveraL 8e TO jLtev ata-^Tov e/c Swa^ei OI/TO? TOV 
alcr07)TU<ov evepytia, TTOLOVV ov yap Tracr^et ovS* aXXotovTat* 5 

15. T/'UX??* vo^o-et /cara <rvfjt,f}epTjK&s sine interpunctione TV, vo^o-ct etiam legisse 
videtur Them, no, 19, j/oet leg. Simpl. || 16. mallem hoc loco o#x J [^/ce?i/a] et 
17. d\X' ^ -cJm?/a> || virgulam post dicuperb Bek. Trend. Bywater, p. 58, post 
Torst. Biehl Rodier || d^iatp^ry TT}J ^v%^s, /car& (rv/*/3e/37?/c6s 5^ /cai oiJx 77 ^/cetica 
$ voet /cat coni. Christ || <J] ^ re coni. Torst., re om. Simpl., 6 cum Vicomercato Bywater, 
p- 59 II V PO&... if. xpfoty interpolata esse censet Wilson, Trans, of Ox. Phil. Soc. 
1882/3, p. jo, cui adversatur Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 29 |l 17. dXV 77 d5. unc. incl. 
Torst. Biehl, totam hanc enunciationem a Torst. sanatam esse agnoscit etiam Hayduck, 
progr. Gryph. 1873, p. 5, contra Bywater haec verba, ut necessaria, retinere vult, p. 59, 
etiam Maier I, p. 32 in adn., leg. Simpl., sine uncis etiam Rodier, qui tamen i5XXfl pro 
dXX' 5 scripsit || 19. /cat rd /x^/cos interpolata esse censet Wilson, 1. 1. , probat Susemihl J| 
teal rou^'...2o. jU,i5/cet post io./x^/c transponenda esse censet Susemihl, B.J. XXXIV, tg || 
21. Kcd 8fjLotos...i3. p4\w delenda esse censet Hayduck, p. 6 || 24. yvuplfavV || ^etyat 
S U y Simpl. Philop. Bek. Trend. Brentano, p. 115, fr efrou LT V WX vet. transl. Biehi, 
Kctl v$ & etvai atirQv coni. Torst., fravrtov elvcu tv atfr$ coni. Bywater, p. 60 II & ante 
a#r$ om. solus W Biehl, leg. etiam Simpl. || 25. alrltav'] fravrlw S, alrtuv etiam Them* 
Philop. Simpl. Brentano, p. 183 Bullinger, Arist Nus-Lehre, p. ix, vel tvwrlw vel 
coni. Torst., cui assentitur etiam Kampe, p. 275, adn. i, A8iaip4rw coni. Essen, 
dubitanter coni. Rodier II, 487, rGv alrtuv delenda esse censet Zeller, p. 578, cui 
assentiuntur Susemihl et Bywater, p. 60, unc. inclusi || frfyyeia fort. Them. 112, 3 Simpl. 
258, 27. 31 || 26. n] rts L, unde rts ^d<rty /cara rtvoy coni. Rodier II, 489, &m d* j) fjv 

CHS. 6, 7 430 b 15431 ^5 139 

Indivisible whole the mind thinks in an indivisible unit of time and 
by an indivisible mental act. Per accidens^ however, such specific 
unity is divisible, though not in the same way as they, the act of 
-thought and the time required for the act, are divisible, but in the 
same way as they are whole and indivisible. For in these specific 
unities also there is present a something indivisible, though certainly 
not separately existent, the same as that which constitutes the 
unity of both the time and the length. And, as with time and 
length, so in like manner with whatever is continuous. But the 5 
point and every division and whatever is an undivided whole in 
the same sense as the point is clearly explained by the analogy 
of privation. And the same explanation holds in all other cases. 
How, for instance, is evil apprehended, or black ? In some 
fashion by its contrary. But that which apprehends must poten- 6 
tially be, and must contain within itself, the contrary which it 
Hypothe- apprehends. If, however, there be something which has 
think f ing lf " no contrary [some one of the causes'], then it is itself the 
thought. content of its own knowledge, is in actuality and is 
separately existent. 

Now every proposition, like an affirmative proposition, predi- 7 
eating something of something, is true or false. But with thought 
T ^ this is not always so. When its object is the What in 

Intellect J J 

sometimes the sense of the quiddity and there is no predication, 
thought is in every case true. But, as the perception by 
sight of the proper object of sight is infallibly true, whereas in the 
question whether the white object is a man or not, perception by 
sight is not always true, so is it with immaterial objects. 

Now actual knowledge is identical with the thing known. But 7 
potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, and yet 
not universally prior even in time. For it is from something 
actually existent that all which comes into being is derived. And 
manifestly the sensible object simply brings the faculty of sense 
which was potential into active exercise : in this transition, in 
fact, the sense is not acted upon or qualitatively changed. Conse- 

/card TWOS, wWep /cat rj d3n$0ao-ts coni. Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam Simpl. 
Philop. 556, 8 || (Sffirep Kal ^ W Torst., *ai non leg. Simpl. H wrirep -fj Ka.Tdtf>a<ns t /cai 
unc. incl. Essen || 27. -J)] Kol L |] 28. xal unc. incU Essen |j 29. dXX' dvirep...^. &\7)8ts 
Ael unc. incl. Essen III, p. 51 || 29. 6pav <&ri> coni. Beare, p. 90, adn. 2 || 30. post 
otfrcos in lemmate add. 5 Simpl. cod. A [| 431 a, i. r6 8* a^rd.-.y. rereXecr/A^ov alieno 
loco posita esse iudicat Torst., cui assentitur Zeller, p. 571, leg. veteres interpretes, 
nisi quod rb 6' atfr6...3. yiyvdfisva, praeterit Them., in quibus etiam. Alex. ap. Philop. 
ofFendit H I. TO atfrd $' TUVXy || 2. nvd, rStv pLp\ltav fyovriv 6Aws, rfvdt W 
annotat Philop. 

i 4 o DE ANIMA III CH. 7 

Sto aXXo etSos TOVTO /aircrews- 07 yap Kivrjcr^s TOV aTeXovs 
eVepyeta tfv, rj 8' oTrXSs ez/e'pyeta erepa 07 TOV rereXecr^evov. 

orav Se 1781; 07 XvTnjpov, olov Kara^acra rj aTro^acra, 8ta5- 
/cet -^ c/>euyet- /cat cart TO ^Seor^at /cat XvTretcr^at TO eVep- 10 
yetz^ T^ ala-BrfTLKr) ^ecror^i Trpos TO dyadov rj KaKov, fj Tot- 
avTa. /cat 17 <^>vy^ Se /cat r) ope^ts TOVTO 17 fcaT* ez/epyetai>, 
/cat ovy erepov ro 6pe/cTt/coz> /cat (j>evKrLKOv, ovr a\Xij\a)v ovre 
3 TOV atcr^Ttfcov' aXXa TO elvat aXXo. TT; Se SiavorjriKf) i/^X?? 
Ta fiavracrfJiaTa olov alardijp^ara vTrap^et. OTav Se ayadov 15 

A \ // *>j/ i / *Sk 7 /S< v - 

77 K&KOV (prjo'rj rj airotpYjcrr)) cpevyet TJ otcu/cet ^oto c 

17 v> tocnre e 

eVot^crez/, avrr? 8* erepov, Kal rj CC/COT) 

TO)S, TO Sc CT)CLTOV V, Kal fJLia ^(TOTI^S, TO 8' etvdl CLVTrj 

4 7r\eia). rivi S D IrrLKpiveL ri Sca^cpet yXv/cv /cat deppov, t- 20 
PTJTCU fiev /cat vporepov, XCKTCOV 8e /cat cSSe. CCTTL yap ev 
TI, OVTCO Se Kal a>s opog. /cat TaSTa, ev T avakoyov rj 
TaJ dpt^jLta) ov, ex^t Trpo? e/caTpo^, <y$ e/cetz^a 7Tpo$ aXX^Xa* 
TL yap 8ia<f)pi ro aTropew TrS? Ta /x^ Ofjioyevfj Kpivci rj 

6. <rI5os om. SX, post roOro TUVy Them. 28, 36, post /ctv^ews \V, vulgatam 
tuetur Simpl. || 7. -Jv om. LSUVX Them. 28, 37 et Simpl. || 77 post er^pa om. L, 
leg. Them. 29, i || post rcreXeo-ju^ou lacunam esse iudicat Susetnibl, Burs. Jahresb. 
IX, 351 || 9. tfrcw/] tfrt coni. Essen III, p. 58 || 10. }) \wr. TUX r W Simpl. || 
TJ. -Trp^s rd ante rj transponendum putat Essen, 1. 1. || TJ TOLOVTO L, om, X, 97 rotaDra 
etiam Philop., ^ ra roiaOra Simpl. || 12. 5^ SUWX, om. TV || raur6v T, TO ai>r6 
LV Rodier, ratfrd scripsit Biehl, roOro reliqui et Bek. Trend. Torst., qui conicit r6 
a^ro roOro, veleres interp. quomodo legerint, incertum est || ^ om. V, aut clelcndum 
aut scribendum censet Trend., unc. incl. Rodier |j 13. ical rb <f>. L et interpret. Them. 
Simpl. || 14. rjj 8 5ta'....i7. ^ ^X^ i n parenth. ponenda et fort, ante 431 b, 2. ri fj^v 
oZv etSy transponenda censet Cornford || 15. alcr$-/fjj t ara] alffByrb coni. Schell, Eiuh. d. 
Seelenleb. p. 19 || 15. &ra.v...i6. 5ct6/cei post 17. if/vxtf ponenda esse iudicat Susemihl || 
1 6. 0Vfl ^ d7ro0^o-77 solus L, uncis incl. Torst., Karatfrfo-'r} % faro<j> i fio"(i y, <pvjfflif 
T X, KardfiiffU' $ &Tr6<j>7}<TL U, ^<TTC KQ,T&<j>'ti<rw $ d7r60^<rty V, fart, 
corr. S, Kard(f)CL(T(.t $ d7r60cwts W, Philop. 559, 31 interpretatur r& faoKtl/Jwa oiovel 
KaTa,<f><L<reis elo-t ical a.iro<f>&<ris \\ K&l 0ei>yt ST U V WX, -^ ^ci^yet y || 16. &6...r7. ^i'X^ 
secludenda esse coni. Torst., in parenth. posui || 17. totum hunc locum ab 3<r7re^...b, i, 
Xev/c^ a re proposita alienum esse iudicat Torst., non interpretatur Them., recte explicat 
JsTeuhaeuser, p. 51 sqq. || post ^ fux^ virgulam Bek. Trend., punctum Torst. Biehl Rodier |j 
W] yap coni. Essen || 18. aMj U VWy Bek. Trend., aVrr) etiam Simpl. Soph. Torst. |j 
8' unc. incl. Essen || ig. post (ieratfrw? colon Bek. Trend. Rodier || ai5r^ om, S U VX || 

10. post TrXe/w signum enunciati non absoluti cum Torst. posuit Biehl, adversatur Rodier 

11, 499, etiam, Simpl. et Philop. hoc loco desiderant apodosin, putant autem earn ex 
praecedentibus supplendam esse; verba 17. w<nrep...2o. 7rXecj post 21. et 22. Hv re trans- 
ponenda et apodosin sic conformandam esse : otfrw 8tj Kal ravra (omissts verbis /col &$ 

CH. 7 431 a 6 431 a 24 141 

quently this must be a different species of motion. For motion is, 
as we saw, an activity of that which is imperfect ; but activity in 
the absolute sense, that is, activity of that which has reached 
perfection, is quite distinct. 

Sensation, then, is analogous to simple assertion or simple 2 
sense apprehension by thought and, when the sensible thing 

affirming j s pleasant or painful, the pursuit or avoidance of it by 
pursues ' the soul is a sort of affirmation or negation. In fact, 
or avoi s. ^ ^j pleasure or pain is precisely to function with 
the sensitive mean, acting upon good or evil as such. It is 
in this that actual avoidance and actual appetition consist : nor 
is the appetitive faculty distinct from the faculty of avoidance, nor 
either from the sensitive faculty ; though logically they are different, 
so, too, But to the thinking soul images serve as present sen- 3 
the mind. sations i and when it affirms or denies good or evil, it 
avoids or pursues (this is why the soul never thinks without an 
image). To give an illustration : the air impresses a certain quality 
on the pupil of the eye, and this in turn upon something else, and 
so also with the organ of hearing, while the last thing to be impressed 
is one and is a single mean, though with a plurality of distinct 

What that is by which the soul judges that sweet is different 4 
from warm has been explained above, but must be restated here, 
It is a unity, but one in the same sense as a boundary 

The unity J s J 

of sense point, and its object, the unity by analogy of these two 
sensibles or their numerical unity, is related to each of the 
two in turn as they, taken separately, are to each other. For what 
difference does it make whether we ask how we judge the sensibles 
that do not fall under the same genus, or the contraries which do, 

censet Freudenthal, Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 398, cui assentitur Susemihl, Burs. Jahresb. XVII, 
p. 264 et Phil. Wochenschr. 1882, p. 1283 II 21. <a8e] i>vv T Wy et in interpret. SimpL 
Philop. || &m 70,;),.. 23. d\\YJ\a ante 20. rlvt, transponenda censet Essen II, p. 88 H 22. /cal 
t*)s] Kal 6 Xy, 7} (rriyp,^ K<d 6 T, om. cum ipso 6'pos LV, in interpret. cSo-Trep teal 6 tipos 
Simpl., dcnrep 8pos Philop,, qui ^ <rri.vf*f} non legerunt; otfrw 8 Kal -^ a-ny/my KCLL 5\ws 
6 tipos de coniectura scripsit Torst. [[ post ravra, virgulam posuit Rodier || & LSVX 
Trend*, fr etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph, in marg. Bek. Torst. || 22. et 23. ^ rf] 
% re? Ly, ^ UVWX Simpl., om. S, Kal r< T Philop. Bek. Trend. Torst. Biehl 
Rodier 1| 23. 6V] 8v omnes libri scripti et ante Biehlium impressi, ov restitueritnt 
Freudenthal, 1. 1. et Neuhaeuser, confirmant Simpl. et vet. transl., quae vertit ens || 
Kal ravra $v rf to&Koyov. Kal TO tiptOpf & % et ^pos &tdrepoj> ci>s in schoiis coni. 
H. Jackson || cK&repa, Simpl., post &or. excidisse tvavrlov coni. Torst., cui assentitur 
Freudenthal || &$...&\\'q\a unc. incl. Torst., legit etiam Simpl. et fort. Philop., defendit 
Neuhaeuser, p. 57 || cbs] $ Simpl. || 24. vh OTO. T VWy Simpl. Bek. Trend., leg. etiam. 
Philop, Soph. vet. transl. 



rot evwTia, olov \ZVKOV /cat /WXaz/; eor<i> 8r/ a>9 TO A TO 25 

Xev/cov 77/009 ro B TO fjb\av } TO T 77/009 TO A [a9 e/cetz/a 

77/309 aXXTyXa]- aWe /cat ez;aXXa et ST) Ta TA eVt 677 

vTrdp-xovra, OLT6)9 efet cocrTrep /cat TO, AB, TO avTO 

/cat ei>, TO S* etz>at ov TO avTO, /ca/cetz>o 6ju,ot(H9. 6 S* 

Xoyos /cat et TO juez> A TO yXu/cv efy, TO Se B TO Xev/coi'. 43 I b 

5 Ta jicev o3z> etS^ TO VOT)TI,KQV eV Tot9 ^avrdcr^ao'i ^oei, 

a)? ez/ e/ccu>o&9 cSptcrTai auTO) TO SKOKTOV KCU <f>evKTOv, 

orav errl r>v $<wr&(TiLwrtov 77, 
otov aicr^az/djLce^os TO^ <j>pVKrbv on irvp, [TTJ /cot^] 5 

6 yv<pLti, op&v Kwovpevov, on ^roXe/jcto^. OT 8e TOI? IP rrj 
fa XV 4* ai 'TdioriJLaa'LV f] vorji^acriv wcrirep op&v Xoyt^eTai fcal 
ySouXeveTac Ta /xeXXovTa 7rpo9 Ta Trapovra* /cat OTav ^7777 
a>5 e/cet TO 0781) ^ \vrrrjp6v, evTavffa <^euyet ^ Stcw/cet, 
/cat oXa>5 eV 77/>aet. /cat TO aVev Se 7rpafa)9, TO aX^^e? 10 
/cat TO T^eSSo9, eV T<5 avToI yeVet eo~Tt T<5 aya#aJ /cat /ca/caJ- 

7 dXXa T<5 ye a7rX9 Sta^>/)t /cat Ttvt. Ta Se ev a<j>ai- 
pecrei Xeyofte^a z/oet cScrTrep av et TO cripoVy fj peis crt/x,oz>, 
ov /ce^(co/)tcr)LteV<y9, J7 Se /cotXoz> 5 et Tt9 eVoet eVe/)yeia, aVev 
T7)9 crap/co9 a^ e^oet eV 77 TO /cotXoz/- OVTCW Ta p,a0r)p.aTt,Ka 15 

8 oi Ace^coyotoT^eVa a>9 Ke^copLorpjeva ^oet, OTav ^077 e/cetva. 0X0)9 
Se 6 ^ou9 ea'Tti' 6 /caT* eVepyetai' Ta 77/>ay/JtaTa [i/o5^]. a/)a 
S* eVSe^eTat Taiz/ /ce^cw/)tcrju,eVa)^ Tt z'oetv oz>Ta awov /XT) /ce- 


25. rdvavrta S W X y Bek. Trend., ra fravTla etiam Soph. Torst. || 26. t&s.. .27, &\\y\ci, 
interpolata esse iudicant Christ, Stud, in Ar. libb. met. coll. (in thes.) Freuclenthal et 
Baeumker, p. 74, unc. incl. Biehl Rodier, leg. Philop. 561, TO (| 27. &> Ty || 28. /ccci ra] 
/cal TO S T V, K&V el ri coni. Torst. || 29. pro /cd/cet^o, quod etiam leg. Philop., coni. 
/rd/ce^a Jul. Pacius Torst. Brentano || 431 b, i. Kal] K&J> SUVX Simpl. || ^v rb 
S U V WX || 3. wptoro U X et corr. S, etiam Simpl. || 4. afo-0. ov $TO,V S T U V X, atotf, aJf 
^rcw Wy H 5. 0eu/cr6^ TUVWX 4 <j>pvKrbi> etiam Simpl. Philop., de Them. codd. v, 
Hayducki ap. crit. ad 114, i || Sri trvp unc. incl. Torst., leg. Philop. Simpl. i| T KLV^I 
Basil, in marg., scripsit Torst., r^ /cot^J reliqui, etiam Simpl. Philop., delendum ceuset 
Bywater, p. 61, cui assentitur Susemihl, cf. Praechter, Berl. Phil. Woch., p. 196 sqq., unc. 
inclusi || g. post {vraMa excidisse ro d.ya,dov $ KCLKOV coni. Torst. || 10. 67^ws] oCrws coni. 
Trend. || Kcd ante rb 6,\i)6& leg. Simpl. in lemmate || n. ro om. L et fort. Philop. in 
interpr. 562, 10 || Kal r KO,K$ L U X, -ft T< W, r<jj om. etiam Simpl. || ia. ye om. S Wy || 
12. r^ S.. .19. tia-repov a re proposita aliena et 12. ri 5^...i6. ^Ketva corrupta esse iudicat 
Torst., locum ita restituit Bywater, p. 62: -rd 5' ^v <tycupl<r6i \ey6(j,eva votf, drirep & 9 
f <r> r6 <ri/A6i/ ^ /tp o-tjitdu otf [/cexwpto-ju^ws], J 5^ fcotXop [e? rts] ^6et, frepyetg, 
<^OWP> Aveu r^s (rap/c6s &? ^6ct ^ 5 r K0i\ov t ourw T& /xa^^art/cd /cr^. || 12. ^ om. 
STUXThem., leg. Simpl. Philop. || 13. &v om. SVX, leg. etiam Philop. || 14. $ M 
Kol\w~\ el 6t /ca/xTTiJXoj/ X, /ca/wrtfXov in interpret, etiam Simpl. Philop., /coZXo? Them. || e? 

CH. 7 431 a 25 431 b 19 143 

like white and black ? Suppose, then, that as A, the white, is to B y 
the black, so C is to D \that is, as those sensible^ are to one anotfier\ It 
follows, convertendo, that A is to C as B to D. If, then, 7 and D are 
attributes of a single subject, the relation between them, like that be- 
tween A and B, will be that they are one and the same, though the 
aspects they present are distinct : and so, too, of their single subject 
The same would hold, supposing A were the sweet and B the white. 

Thus it is the forms which the faculty of thought thinks in 5 

mental images. And, as in the region of sense the objects 
move to of pursuit and avoidance have been defined for it, so also 
ac l n * outside sensation, when engaged with images, it is moved 

to action : as, for instance, you perceive a beacon and say " That is 
fire"; and then \by the central sense\ seeing it in motion, you 
recognise that it signals the approach of an enemy. But at other 6 
times under the influence of the images or thoughts in the soul 
you calculate as though you had the objects before your eyes and 
deliberate about the future in the light of the present. And when 
you pronounce, just as there in sensation you affirm the pleasant or 
the painful, here in thought you pursue or avoid : and so in action 
generally. And, further, what is unrelated to action, as truth and 
falsehood, is in the same class with the good and the evil. Yet in 
this, at any rate, they differ, that the former are absolute, the latter 
relative to some one concerned. 

But the abstractions of mathematics, as they are called, the 7 
Mathe mind thinks as it might conceive the snub-nosed ; 

maticai q u & snub-nosed, it would not be conceived apart from 
how con- flesh, whereas quA hollow, if anyone ever had actually so 
conceived it, he would have conceived it without the flesh 
in which the hollowness resides. So, too, when we think of mathe- 
matical objects, we conceive them, though not in fact separate 
from matter, as though they were separate. And, speaking 8 
generally, mind in active operation is its objects \when it thinks 
them\. The question, whether it is possible for the mind to think 
anything which is unextended without being itself unextended, 
must for the present be postponed. 

ns] et TI Ly Simpl., om. X, efrrep coni. Trend. || vvoet S, Ivvbsi V || c3<nrep &vv coni. 
Torst., quod refellit Vahlen, Oest. Gymn. Ztschr. 1867, p. 722 [f 15. &v secludendum esse 
coni. Susemihl, Oecon., p. 86 || & % om. SUV, leg. Simpl. || 16. c&s /C6%.] tZxrei /ce^. T, 
r?7 &3ro<mi<m L, rrj itirovrfaei d* Ke%. W, alteram quoque lectionem ferri : otf *cex w ipwfdvws 
cl>s /cexw/>t<r/u,&c7S commemorat Simpl., &s /cexwpw>va etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 114, 22 H VOTJ <$>- K&>O. legendum proponit Bon., cf. Oest. Gymn. Ztsclir. 
1867, p. 722 || 17. vo&v om. LU pr. E et Torst., uncis incl. Bon., Ind. Ar. 491 a, 61 
Susemihl, B. J. XLII, 240 Busse, Hermes XXVIII, 271, legit Simpl. et vet. transl., 
non leg. 566", 22 24 neque ad 402 b, 7 (37, 26 sq.) Philop. || 18. cctfrto/ Svra S V WXy. 


8 Ni5i/ Se Trept ^XTJS ^^C^vra crvy/ce^aXatcycrav- 20 
res, etTTcy/xez' iraXiv on rj $UX7) T< * cwra ^5 ecrrtz>' 
yap rj atcr^T/ra ra o&>ra ^ z/o^ra, eort S 3 07 e 
ra eTrtcrr^ra TTMS, y S' aicrOrjcris ra atcr#7?ra' 7T<3s Se rouro, 

2 Set tflrew. TefJLVtTai ovv rj eVto-rT^u,?; /cat 17 atcr^cri? ets ra 

r) ptv Swd/JLti et? ra Suz>a//,et, 07 8* ez/reXe- 25 
69 ra eVreXexeca, rrjs Se ^V^T)? ro alorQriTLKOv /cat 
ro ZTrLCTTrjUQVLKov $vvd/JLi raCra eorrt, ro /xe^ eTTicrr^rov ro 
Se alcrOyrov. avdyKi) 8 s 77 avra ^ ra 1817 etz/ai. avra 
8^ oi;- ov yap 6 XL^OS eV r?j ^XV 9 ^XXa ro t- 
afcrre 17 ^X 9 ? ^crTrep 17 X 6 V ^" T6Z/ * ^^ 7^P ^ X 6 ^/ 5 
Qpyavov Icrriv opydvcov, /cat 6 voC? etSos etScS^ /cat ^ at- 

3 cr^crts etSos atcr^Tjra)^. eTret Se ouSe TTpaypa ov04v ecrrt 
Trapcx ra /xeye^, is 8o/ct, ra alor&7)Ta Kextoptscr/JLevov, iv 
rot? etSecrt rots ato^rots ra voyrd eorrt, ra re ei' cx^>at- 5 
pecrei Xeyd/xe^a, /cat oo r a rfiv alcrOrjrcov e^ets /cat 

/cat Sta rovro ovre /XT) aicrOavofJievos ju/^ev ov0ev av 

orav re decopfj, dvdyKrj a/ia c/>avracr/jtart 
ra yap ^avracrjaara JcrTrep alcr9rjp.ard ecrrt, 
aVeu vX^s. ecrrt 8' 07 c/>az>ra<rta erepov ^acrews /cat 10 
acre<os f cri/^7rXo/c^ yap voTjpdr&v ecrrt ro aXrjdGs r/ 
?/;eOSos. ra Se Tipoira ^07j/>cara rtj^t Stotcret roi) ^ <^az/- 
racr/x,ara et^at ; ^ ovSe rdXXa </>avrccrjLtara, aXX* ou/c 

21. et 22. ex solo E &TTW Tnfpra 7ap ^ scripsit Biehl, leg. etiam Soph. 138, 33 (?) in 
tmo Soph. cod. A), <m (ra X) irAvra. ty y&p (om. yip L) afo0. reliqui codd., etiam Them. 
Philop. 567, 17 vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Torst. Rodier, qui tamen pro puncto post Tr^ra 
colon posuit, ^<rn Trdvra. Tnfcvra 7a/) ^ coni. Torst. || 22. 5 J ] 5?? E L, 8t fy Them. Soph. || 
24. <rp67ro^ rtya r<? wAyea-Ocu^ e^s coni., vel potius interpr., Essen, Beitr. z. Los. d. ar. 
Frage, p. 34, eZs om. L Soph., insert. 2 (Stapf.), ws coni. Susemihl, B. J. IX, 352, qui 
etiain ^s pro 25. et 26. efr scribi vult, B. J. XXXIV, 305 cf. tamen Susem. ibid. XLII, 
238, LXVII, 104, utnrep Kcd ri jTpoy. coni. Torst. || 25. ^ prius re. E in ras. 
et 26. 4vT\xelas L et pr. E Torst. Biehl, rds dvvdpets et r^s fapyetas Soph., r d 
et T& ^TeXexe^ reliqui codd. omnes (praeterquam quod etiam SX ras 
praebent), etiam Them, Simpl. Philop., qui ra tvepyeLg. interpretantur, et vet. transl. 
Bullinger, Metakr. Gange, p. 6, Nus-Lehre, p. 17 Susemihl, B. J. XXXIV, 30 
Marchl, p. 18, e/j Sweets et ets e^reXexelas scribarum errore ex e& 8vvdfjLt et eft 
&T6\exep (sc. irp&yfjutTa) orta esse suspicatur Christ || 27. TO om. ELSUVX, leg. 
Soph. 1| TaMy EL Bek., ra^rd corr. E 2 (Bhl.), scripsit Biehl in ed. alt., raOra corr. Ey 
(Rr.), raOra etiam Soph, et vet. transl. || tirurTyrbv] tirurrnnoviKbv S U V et 28. al<r$ifjTiK6y 
S, unde TCLVT& cm, t rb pv iinffTri^ovLKbv r6 kiriarffr^v^ TO d al<r$7jrtKbv rb 
scripsit Torst., rb JJL&V <r6> frrurryrbv TO 8 <ro> altrBif}T6v coni. Hayduck, 

CH. 8 431 b 20 432 a 14 145 

And now let us sum up what has been said concerning the soul 8 
summary by repeating that in a manner the soul is all existent 
of results. things. For they are all either objects of sensation or 
objects of thought ; and knowledge and sensation are in a manner 
identical with their respective objects. How this is so requires to be 
explained. Knowledge and sensation, then, are subdivided to 2 
correspond to the things. Potential knowledge and sensation 
answer to things which are potential, actual knowledge and sensa- 
tion to things which are actual, while the sensitive and the cognitive 
faculties in the soul are potentially these objects ; I mean, object of 
sensation and object of cognition respectively. It follows that the 
faculties must be identical, if not with the things themselves, then 
with their forms. The things themselves they are not, for it is not 
the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone. So that 
there is an analogy between the soul and the hand ; for, as the 
hand is the instrument of instruments, so the intellect is the form 
^ f rms anc * sensation the form of sensibles. But, since, 3 

inteiiectu apart from sensible magnitudes there is nothing, as it 
prius in would seem, independently existent, it is in the sensible 
forms that the intelligible forms exist, both the abstrac- 
tions of mathematics, as they are called, and all the qualities and 
attributes of sensible things. And for this reason, as without 
sensation a man would not learn or understand anything, so at the 
very time when he is actually thinking he must have an image 
before him. For mental images are like present sensations, except 
that they are immaterial. Imagination, however, is distinct from 
affirmation and negation, for it needs a combination of notions 
to constitute truth or falsehood. But, it may be asked, how will 
the simplest notions differ in character from mental images? I 
reply that neither these nor the rest of our notions are images, 
but that they cannot dispense with images. 

Chandler, rb fjiev rb tirLffryrbv rb 8t rb aivOyTov etdos Essen, p. 72, vulgatam 
tuetur etiam vet. transl. || 29. yhp ante ^ STUX Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst., om. 
etiam Philop. et vet. transl. || 6 om. E L Them. Philop., leg. Soph. || 432 a, 2. voOs- 
tvrlv SVy, vovs W TW |J elSos om. E, tffrlv eXSos marg. E || 5. & om. ELSUV 
Them. Philop., leg. Simpl. || 7. alffdavh^evov L et E (Trend.) || 8. wfy LSXy Philop., 
w/oi reliqui codd. Trend., ZweLij Bek. Torst. || dt T U V || (pavrda-fAOLra S V W X, 
0cu>r(o7x,aTi E, t in rasura, etiam Them. Philop., scripsit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium 
omnes 0dvrao>d rt, etiam Simpl. vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Torst. || 9. alo-dtffta.Td] 
alo-djird coni. Kampe, p. 101 || 10. et 11. xcd diro<f>d<rec l )s om. SUV, leg. etiam Soph. [] 
ii. <rn j>07}jui,dTwv SUV |] 12. rlvi EL, reliqui rL t etiam Them. Philop. 569, 21 et ad 
403 a, 8 (45, 22) || <f>dvra<rjj,a E, ^avrd^ara, etiam Them. Philop. || 13. roXXa] raura 
Them. 116, 18 (sed raXXa ex Arist. scripsit Hayduck) Aid. Torst. Freudenthal, p. 13, 
rSXXa vel rk flXXa etiam Simpl. et Philop. 569, 28 et ad 403 a, 8 (45, 23). 

H. 10 


9 'ETTCL Se 17 t/>ux?) *<wa Svo cSptorat Swa/xets 17 row 15 
q>a)v, TW re KpiTiKto, o Stawtas epyoz> ccrrt /cat 
/cat ert ra> Kiveiv rr/v Kara TOTTOV Kivrjcrw, irepl p*ev 
crecys /cat I'ov Stcwptcr0<y rocraSra, Trept Se rov 
rt Trore' ecrrt TTJS T//VXTJS, arKeirr4ov, irorepov ev n 

rrov ov rj //,eye#et rj Xoyw, rj Tracra 07 ^v^of, 20 
6t jAopiov ri, TTorepov I$i6v TL irapa ra elcoffora Xeye- 

2 crBai KOL ra et/OTjjice^a, 17 rovrcyv ez/ ri. e^et Se a,Tropiav 
evOvs TTS re Set popta Xeyetz^ TTJ? ^X^ 5 Ka ^ 'Trocra. 
rpoirov yap rwa aireipa <f>aiverai 3 /cat ov ILOVOV a rives 
Xeyovcri Siopi^ovres, \oyio-TiKov KOL Ov^iKov Kal eTTLdv^rjrL- 25 
KOV, oi Se TO Xoyoz' ^X9 V f^al TO aXoyov /cara yap ra<s 

* as raCra ")(a)pL^ovcrL 9 Kal aXXa <j&az/etrat 
oidarTavw JfyovTa TOVTW, Trept &v Kal vvv et- 
prjrai, TO re BpeirTiKOv, o Kal rots <urots vTrdp^ei Kal 
iracn rots ^ots, ^cat ro accr^rt/co^, o oiJre c&s aXoyov ovre 3 

3 cus Xo-yoi^ exov ^etiy av rts /5aSid>s. ert Se ro ^avracrrtKW, 

o T$ /ie^ etz^at iravrw ereyooz^, rtvt Se TOVT&V raurw ^7 ere- 432 b 
/OOP, exet TroXXTp airopiav, et rts dijcrei K)(<x)picrpva joto- 
pta rijs $vxf)$' Trpos Se rovrots ro 6pe/crt/cw, 6 /cat Xoya> 
/cat Swa/^et erepoz> av So^ete^ el^at TrdvTcov. Kal OLTOTTOV Srj 
TO TOVTO oiacrTrav ev re ral Xoyta-rt/c^J yap 17 ^SovX^crts yt^erat, 5 
/cat ev ra> ciXoyo) 17 errttfu/ua Kat 6 ^v/^os* et Se rpta 07 

4 ^VX>?> ez> e/ca<rrot) ecrrat ope^ts. /cat ST) /cat Trept oS 1^0^ 6 
Xo'yos eveVr^/ce, rt ro KIVOVV Kara TOTTQV ro ^<5w ecrrt^ ; 
jUre^ ycip /car* av^rjo'iv Kal fyQiuw KIV^O-IV, aTra&iv 

crav, TO Trao'iv virdpyov So^etez^ a^ KW&V ro yevvrfTitKOv Kal to 
Trept Se a^aTT^OTjs /cat e/CTT^o^s /cat VTTVOV Kal 

eyp>7yopcrea)s vorrepov eTTtcr/ceTrreo^ e^et yap /cat raSra 
5 X^ airopiav* aXXci Trept rfjs /cara TOTTQV /ct^crec^s, rt ro 

15. -^ante rwy om. L et pr. E (Bus.) Soph. || 20. ^ post ov om. SUW Soph., leg. 
Simpl. || 23. re] Trore W, om. L, re leg. Soph. || 5et] ^ E (Trend.), 5e7 corn E || 
X^yetj' ^ux^s X, ^i/x^s X^yet^ STUVWy Soph. || 27. raiJras EL, raCra etiam 
Soph. |1 <j>alverai TUWXy, (f>alvoi>Tcu LSV, <f>welr<u etiam Soph. |j 29. re om. 
STUVWX, ft y, re etiam Soph. [[ a om. SUV, leg. Them. || 30. 3 om. UV || 
432 b, i. a om. E Them. 117, 15 Philop. 574, 11 in lemmate, leg. eliam Soph. || 
T& EL, rf leg. Them. Soph. || nvl Bek.,r/yt etiam Philop. Soph. || 4. irtoruv om. Wy, 
leg. etiam Them. Soph. || :o2 ante dtroTrov om. T U V W y || Sif rb rovro] 8i rovro T V y, 
^ rd rovro W, 8)j rb rovro E Soph., artic. rb etiam Them. Simpl., reliqui ante Torst. 
omnes 6^ rovro, etiam Bek. Trend., ^ rb, uncis includens rovro, Torst. J| 9. ati&iv E 

CH. 9 - 432 a 15 432 b 13 147 

The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, 9 
Animal lo- not on ly by its capacit3' to judge, which is the function 
Demotion. o f thought and perception, but also by the local move- 
ment which it imparts to the animal. Assuming the nature 
of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we 
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates 
motion : whether it is some one part of the soul, which is either 
locally separable or logically distinct, or whether it is the whole 
soul : and again, if a separate part, whether it is a special part 
distinct from those usually recognised and from those enumerated 
above, or whether it coincides with some one of these. A question 2 
Digression at once arises in what sense it is proper to speak of parts 
pSrts^f f the sou ^ an d how many there are. For in one sense 
the soul. there appear to be an infinite number of parts and not 
merely those which some distinguish, the reasoning, passionate and 
concupiscent parts, for which others substitute the rational and the 
irrational. For, if we examine the differences on which they base 
their divisions, we shall find that there are other parts separated 
by a greater distance than these; namely, the parts which we 
have just discussed, the nutritive, which belongs to plants as 
well as to all animals, and the sensitive, which cannot easily be 
classed either as rational or irrational. Imagination, again, is 3 
logically distinct from them all, while it is very difficult to say 
with which of the parts it is in fact identical or not identical, if we 
are to assume separate parts in the soul. Then besides these there 
is appetency, which would seem to be distinct both in concept and 
in capacity from all the foregoing. And surely it is absurd to split 
this up. For wish in the rational part corresponds to concupiscence 
and passion in the irrational. And, if we make a triple division of 
soul, there will be appetency in all three parts, 

To come now to the question at present before us, what is it 4 
that imparts to the animal local movement? For as for the 
motion of growth and decay, which is found in all animals, it 
would seem that this must be originated by that part of soul 
which is found in all of them, the generative and nutritive 
part. Inspiration and expiration of breath, sleep and waking, 
subjects full of difficulty, call for subsequent enquiry. But to 5 
return to locomotion, we must enquire what it is that imparts 

(Trend,), o.\j^<nv etiam in interpret. Them. Philop. Soph. || cwrcww b-jrdpxovcrav E et 
."Soph., ^ irciffiv tnrdpxovffa W, ctt iraffiv f>irdpxov<ri reliqui codd. I! 10. Kal Qpeirrucbv om. 
EL, leg. etiam Them. Soph., Kal rb dp. S [J n- K l ante ftrpovom. E || 13. rl om. E, 
leg. etiam Them. Soph. 



o^x rj dpeTTTLKr) Swa/xt?, SfjXov aei re yap Iz/e/ca rov 77 /aborts 15 
avT?7 3 /cat ^ jLtera <j>avracria<s 77 opefeoog ecrTtz/' ovdev yap 
ftr] 6pyo/xez>oz> ^ <j&evyoz> /ctz/etTat dXX* ^ ^% ^ rt Kaz> T & 
<j>vra KtzJTjTt/cd r/v, KOV t^ Tt /j*6piov opyaviKov TTpos TT)Z> 
6 Kivti&w TCLVTIJV. O/J,OLO)$ 8e ovSe TO aio-OyriKov TroXXa yap 
CO~TI rSz^ tty&v a atcrd'qo'iv /JLGV ^(et, /xoj/tjoca S 5 ecrTt /cai <XACL- 20 
Sia TeXovs. et ow 17 <f>vcri<$ juifre 'Trotet 
aTToXeiTra TL TV avayKai&v, irXrjv ev rots 
ra 8 

ecrTtv crr)[LLov 8' OTC eari yevvrjTuca KOI 

^EL KOL fydicTLV 3>&T L^V CLV KOLl TCL QpyOLVLKa H>ep7) T7J5 25, 

7 iropeias. dXXa /XT)^ ovSe TO XoytcrTt/cov Acat 6 /caXov/xe^o? z^oS? 
<TTt^ 6 Kiv*v 6 jnei/ yap 6eo)prjriKo<s ovOev voet irpaKTov, ovSe 
Xeyet Trepl favKTOv /cat Stca/CTOu ov64v, aet 07 /ct^crts ^ (hevyov- 

T09 ^ StCW/COZ'TOS Tt 6CTTtV. dXX* OvS* OTttV 0<x)pfj Tt TOtOVTOZ', 

07877 /ceXevet Stcu/cetv ^ (^euyet^ otoz> TroXXa/ctg Staz'oetTat 30 
fofiepov Tt ^ 1781;, ov /ceXcvet Se <j&o;8etcr^at, 17 Se /capSta 
8/ctz>tTat, av 8' oJSv, erepov n /xoptov. ert /cat ImraTTOVTos 4333 
TOI) voS /cat Xeyova-^s T^S Stavotas <^evyetz^ Tt ^ Suy/cetz> ov /ct- 
z^etTat, aXXa /caTa TT)Z/ eiridv^iav TrpaTTet, ofoz/ 6 a/cpaTTjs. 
/cat oXcus 8e opfi/xez' oTt 6 ej(6)v T^V taTpi/c7jz> ov/c taTat, c&s 
Irepov Ttz^os Kvpiov ovros rov iroieiv KOLTOL rrjv eTrtcrT^^z/, dXX* 5 
ou T^S eTTtcrT^Tjs. aXXa /x^ ovS' 17 ope^ts ravrrjs Kvpia TT}$ 
' ot yap ey/cpaTt9 opeyojitez'ot /cat 7rt^v/x,owTe$ ov 
rr)v opegiv, dXX* a/ 

15. re ET, om. reliqni codd., leg. etiam Philop. 581, 39 Soph. || 4 ante /c/i/Ty^s 
om. pr. E (Trend.) || 16. 1? post /cai om. SW Soph., leg. Philop. Simpl. |j at. &A 
r^Xouj] SiareXe? W y || ei ofcr.../^] hie variant SVWX, vulgatam tuentur etiam 
Simpl. Soph. || 22. rt EV, om. reliqui codd. et Simpl., leg. etiam Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 23. Ar om. LTV Them. Simpl., leg. etiam Soph. || 24. &m solus E, om. 
reliqui codd., etiam Them. Soph. || 27. KLVW] ttelvuv pr. E || Oeupe!: EL et, ut 
videtur, Them. 118, 9, j'oet legisse videtur etiam Soph. 141, 4 || 28. 77 5^ W 
Bek. Trend. Torst, del 81 ij STUVXy et vet. trans!., ij insert. E 2 (Bhl.) |J 
fatyovrbs rt ^ fo<6/c. r omnes libri et script! et ante Biehlium impressi exceptis E 
et Soph., rt prius om. Biehl || 30. (fHfryeiv $ 8i6ieeij>, exceptis EL et vet. transl., omnes 
script! et ante Biehlium impressi || 31. rt 0o/3e/>6? TUV || 0o/3ei<r0af ^ 64 ye KapSia, 
com. Torst. || 433 a, 3. irpdmiv E (Trend.) et y || 6 om. STUXy, leg. Them. ||, 
4. o om. L, leg. Them. Soph. || T> om. TW, leg. Them. Soph. || oik expellendum 
esse censet Christ. 

. 9 432 b 14433 a 8 149 

to the animal progressive motion. That it is not the nutritive 
The cause faculty is clear. For this motion is always directed to 
motion" an end and is attended either by imagination or by 
SStritive appetency. No animal, which is not either seeking or 
faculty, avoiding something, moves except under compulsion. 
Moreover, if it were the nutritive faculty, plants also would be 
capable of locomotion and thus would have some part instrumental 
nor in producing this form of motion. Similarly it is not 6 

sense, ^ e sensitive faculty, since there are many animals which 

have sensation and yet are throughout their lives stationary and 
motionless. If, then, nature does nothing in vain and, except in 
mutilated and imperfect specimens, omits nothing that is indis- 
pensable, while the animals we are considering are fully developed 
and not mutilated as is shown by the fact that they pro- 
pagate their kind and have a period of maturity and a period of 
decline, it follows that, if locomotion was implied in sensation, 
they would have had the parts instrumental to progression. Nor, 7 
nor again, is it the reasoning faculty or what is called 

intellect, intellect that is the cause of motion. For the specula- 
tive intellect thinks nothing that is practical and makes no assertion 
about what is to be avoided or pursued, whereas motion always 
implies that we are avoiding or pursuing something. But, even if 
the mind has something of the kind before it, it does not forthwith 
prompt avoidance or pursuit. For example, it often thinks of some- 
thing alarming or pleasant without prompting to fear ; the only effect 
is a beating of the heart or, when the thought is pleasant, some other 
bodily movement Besides, even if the intellect issues the order and 8 
the understanding bids us avoid or pursue something, still we are 
not thereby moved to act: on the contrary, action is determined 
by desire ; in the case, for instance, of the incontinent man. And 
generally we see that, although a man possesses a knowledge of 
medicine, it does not follow that he practises ; and this implies 
that there is something else apart from the knowledge which deter- 
mines action in accordance with the knowledge. Nor, 
potency again, is it solely appetency on which this motion de- 

sol el v 

pends. The continent, though they feel desire, that is 
appetite, do not act as their desires prompt, but on the contrary 
obey reason. 


10 <J>ati>erat Se ye Svo ravra <rd> KIVOVVTCL, 77 opets 77 vovs, et 
rts 7r}v (fravTdo-Lav TiOeirj o>s voycriv nva* TroXXa yap Trapa 10 
TT)Z> 7TLcrTr)fJi7)i> d/coXov$o50"t rats <az>rao"tats, /cat ez> rot? aX- 
Xots wot$ ou zJOTjcrt? ovSe Xoyto^o? <TTIV, dXXd <az>racrta. 
apc/xt) apa raSra KLV^TLKOL Kara TOTTOV, vovs /cat opet$, 

2 z>ovs- Se 6 ei>e/cd rou Xoyt^d/iez'os /cat 6 Trpa/crt/cos * Stac^epet 
Se rou OetopTjTiKov r<5 rcXet. feat 17 ope^t? l^e/ca rov Tracra- ov 15 
yap 17 o/oe^$, aim; ap^ ro ^ ^P^KTLKOV vov- TO S' lorxarov 
apj(77 r^s Trpafetys. cScrre evXdya)$ ravra Svo <az>era(, ra 
KWOVVTOL, opc^L? /cat Sidvoia iTpaKTLKtf- TO optKTOv yap fct- 
vet, /cat 8ta roSro T; StdVota /cti/et, ort ap^ avrirjs ecrri ro 

3 ope/croz^. /cat 77 <^az/racrta Se orai^ Actv^, ov /ctvet aj'ev ope- 20 

Iv ST; rt ro /ctz^ovv ro ope/crt/cov. et yap Svo, i^ovs /cat 
?, e/aVow, /cara KOWOV av rt e/cu/ow elSog. wv Se o jitez> 
ov <f>awTai KW>V avev ope^ect)?' 77 yap fiovXycns ope^ts* 
Se /cara ro^ Xoytcr/xo^ /cti^rat, /cat /cara /SovX^crt^ /a- 
vetrai. 17 S' opet$ /cwet Trapci rov Xoytor/Jiov 07 yap CTTL^V- 25 
4/^ta ope^t? rt? ecrrtv. z^oS$ /xez^ oSi^ Tras op66<$ ecrrtz/' 
Se /cat <az>racrta /cat op^>) /cat ov/c opOrj. Sto det Actz^et 
ro ope/crov, dXXa roOr* eorrtv 7^ ro wyaOov 77 ro 
asyadov ov TTCW Se, aXXa ro irpaKTov dyaOov. Trpa/crw 8* 
eo-rt ro ei'Se^o/ie^o^ /cat aXXeos e^et^, 30 

5 ort jitez' ow 77 rotavrTy Swa/us /ct^et r?^? I/TV^TJS 77 /caXou/^e'- 
1^17 opefts, <j>avepov. rots Se StatpoOcrt ra ju-epi; r77s V rv X^^ 433 ^ 
ed^ /caret rets Swa/jtets Statpfio't /cat ^a>pt ^<ocrt, Tra/zTroXXa yt^erat, 

9. roura Srfo E L, 5i?o TaOra etiam Them. Soph, et vet. transl., post raura addendum ra 
coni. Bywater, p. 64, <T&> recepi || 10. #6/17 W Philop. || woXXi] TroXXoi coni. Bywatcr, 
cui assentitur Susemihl, B. J. LXVII, no || 1-2. oi> j/6?7<rts] /3oi5X?7<r(s videLur habuiyse 
pr. E(?) (Rr.) || oiJ] oi) x ^ L, 4 S T V X Essen III, p. 56 |] ofl] 01) T VX et pr. E Essen, 
vulgatam utroHque tuentur Simpl. Philop. || 14. colon post 7rpaKrt/t6y sustulit et 15. 5^ 
unc, inch Essen III, p. 56 || 15. ou 7Ap...i6. vov post, 18. rd 6pKr6v. tt 2o. fyeKrbv pr. 
edit, esse iudicat Torst., quod negat Noetel, p. 540, et refellit Pansch, Philologus XXI, 
P- 543 qui, ut Torstrikii contaminationem evitet, legendum proponit: 01) y&p y tpefa 
jiMt || 16. atrii X || 17. 6to ravTd STUVXy Them. [| ri om. E, insert. K 2 || 
18. 8ifo. j) irp. TX || <5pe/croy E Them. vet. transl., ceteri codd. <5pe^n/c^ || 20. 6/>e/cr5v 
EL Them. vet. transl., reliqui codd. dpeKririv \\ KIV& om. pr. E (Trend.) || 21. r6 ante 
/ctyoO^ unc. incl. Essen III, p. 57 || 6peicr6v ELW Them, et fort. Philop. 585, 17 
(cf. Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc.), et dpenrdv et ape/rrt/c6i/ legi commemorat Simpl. 297, 
31 sq., 6pKTuc6v corr. Eg et Torst., 6pKr6v defendere studet Pansch, L 1., cui assentitur 
Belger in alt. ed. Trend. || 22. elSos tetvow SUV WXy et Simpl., eZ3os secludendum 
esse coni. Torst. || post vvv 5^ addendum tircl censet Essen, 1. 1. || 25. wet ical Philop. et 

CH - I0 433 a 9 433 b 2 151 

The motive causes are apparently, at any rate, these two, either 10 
appetency or intelligence, if we regard imagination as 
ne s P ecies of thinking. For men often act contrary to 
practical knowledge in obedience to their imaginings, while in the 
other animals there is no process of thinking or reason- 
ing, but solely imagination. Both these, then, are causes of loco- 
motion, intelligence and appetency. By intelligence we mean that * 
which calculates the means to an end, that is, the practical intellect, 
which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at which 
it aims. Appetency, too, is directed to some end in every case : for 
that which is the end of desire is the starting point of the practical 
intellect, and the last stage in this process of thought is the start- 
ing point of action. Hence there is good reason for the view that 
these two are the causes of motion, appetency and practical thought. 
For it is the object of appetency which causes motion ; and the 
reason why thought causes motion is that the object of appetency is 
the starting point of thought Again, when imagination moves to 3 
action, it does not move to action apart from appetency. Thus there 
is one single moving cause, the appetitive faculty. For, had there 
been two, intelligence and appetency, which moved to action, still 
they would have done so in virtue of some character common to both. 
But, as a matter of fact, intellect is not found to cause motion 
apart from appetency. For rational wish is appetency ; and, when 
anyone is moved in accordance with reason, he is also moved 
according to rational wish. But appetency may move a man in 
opposition to reason, for concupiscence is a species of appetency. 
While, however, intellect is always right, appetency and imagina- 4 
tion may be right or wrong. Hence it is invariably the object of 
appetency which causes motion, but this object may be either the 
good or the apparent good. Not all good, however, but practical 
good : where by practical good we mean something which may 
not be good under all circumstances. 

It is evident, then, that motion is due to the faculty of the 5 
soul corresponding to this object I mean what is known as ap- 
petency. But those who divide the soul into parts, if they divide 
it according to its powers and separate these from one another, 
will find that such parts tend to become very numerous : nutritive, 

fort. Them. 119, 13 sq., scripsit Torst. || 26. vous /*&>.. .&rr' unc. incL Essen III, p. 57 || 
26. dp66s tew dp. et 27. jj,tv wel STUVWXy, 6p66s ^<rnv etiam E 2 (Bhl.), KLVCI fjv 
etiam Them., om. &mv Bek. Trend. Torst. || 27. xal ^cwrcierfa] /card <j>a,vra<rlw coni. Essen, 
1. 1. (I 31. Kivei] Kotvi) W Essen, 1. 1. || 433 b, r. rots $t 5u/>ou<ri...4.. 0vfuic6v alieno loco 
inserta iudicat Torst., p. 216 || rA fj^prj rijs 'fivxys sivepost jcarfc transponenda sive delenda 
censet Essen III, p. 58. 

152 DE ANIMA III CH. 10 


ravTa yap TrXe'oz' Sta<epet aX\tf\a>v r) TO eTriOv^TiKov KOI 

6 KQV. eirel S* ope^ets yivovTai Ivavriai aXX^Xats, rovro Se 5 
crvfjiftaivei orav o Xoyos /cat at eVt^u/xtat eVa^Ttat a>cn, yiverai 
S* ev rot? xpoVov aicrdr/cnv eyovcrtv (6 jtteV yap vous Sta TO 
jae'XXoz/ av#eX/ceti> /ceXeuet., rj S* eTTiOvfjiCa Sta TO 17817 <at- 
verai yap TO TyS^ 7781) /cat ctTrXS? 7)81; /cat dyad OP aTrXais, 
Sta TO /XT) opaz' TO /xeXXov), etSet /jtez/ zv av ecrj TO KLVOVV TO 10 


yap Kivet ov KivovfJitvov TGJ vorjdrjvai rj <f>avrao'd f YJvai), d 

7 Se TrXcccy Ta Kivovvra. eVetS^ S* ecrTt T/)ta, er^ ju,e> TO 
SevTepov 8* a> Kivei, ert rpirov TO Kivovpevov TO Se KLVOVV SITTOI/, 
TO /jce^ aKivrfTov, TO Se /apoG^ /cat KWOVIACVOV ZCTTL Se TO /xez^ 15 

TO TTpaKTOv dyadov, TO Se /cti^ovj' /cat Kivovp,vov TO 
(/ctvetTat yap TO KLVOV/JLGVOV y opeyeTat, /cat ^ 
i^ Tt? <TTLV T) eVepyeta), TO Se Kivovpevov TO ^MOV 
$ Se /ctvet opydvto r) ope^tg, i^S^ TOUTO crtopaTiKOv iamv* Sto 
ez/ TOCS /cotz^ots cra>fiaTO$ /cat V^X^^ epyot? 0ea>pr)Tov Trept 20 

8 avroi). i^Cz/ Se &>? ev /ce<aXaia> etTretr, TO KWOVV opyavt/cais 
OTTOV ^PX^ ^^^^ TeXevT'i) TO avTo, ofov o ytyyXv^os* ^- 

yctp TO KvpTov /cat TO /cotXov TO ftev TeXevTTj TO S* 
Sto TO fte> ^pe/aet TO Se /ctvetTat, Xoy<j> /x,ez/ erepa 
oz/Ta, jaeye^et 8* a^coptcrTa' TfdvTa yap a>o"et /cat e'Xfet /ct- 25 
Sto Set cScnrep ei^ /cv/cXo> ///eVetv Tt, /cat ivTevdev dp- 

3. vQV)TiK6v unc. incl. Essen, 1.1. [| pov\VTCK6v n coni. Essen, 1.1. (| ^rc 5^ STU VWX, 
5^ insert. E 2 , te om. Simpl. || 4. TrXeZop LSU, TrXe/w TVWXy Them. || <i\Mi\cw %] 
% dXXoJXwi' in interpr. Simpl. 299, 16 || r6 om. L et E (Trend.) || 5. yb. nal fr. SUV 
Them., icai om. etiam Soph, et, ut videtur, Philop. 586, 18. ai. 23 || 6. &'ra? 5 re 
X67os iced al tTTLOvjmtai E (Bhl.) || 8. dv^X/cet, /ceXeiJei 5* y coni. Essen III, p. 60 I! 9* -#$17 
insert. E 2 , leg. sine dubio Them. || 10. AC^] ^ oCj^ insert. E 2 (Rr.), t^v odv T VXy Them., 
^ 8 W, ofo> om. etiam Simpl. || Av ef>; ^z/ S U W, &/ fr efy Simpl. || 11. parenthesin a 
irp&rov ordiendam putat By water, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemihl, B. J. LXVII, no U 
13. ehrei Ey Simpl., ^iretS^ etiam Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex, et Plut. Athen. || 14. *rt 
rptrov E (Trend.) LS Torst., KO! #rt rpfro^ TXy Philop., ?ri om. U VW Bek. Trend. || 
15. KLVOVV KO! orn. E, leg. etiam Them. Simpl. Philop. || d] 84) coni. Susemihl, 
Oecon. p. 86 || 16. TO post KIV. om. ELSUV || 17. dpeKrfo corr. E (Trend.) || 
tpey6fwov TXy vet. transl. Torst. Belger in alt. ed. Trend. Biehl, MVOVI* sine dubio 
Philop. 591, 12 (v. quae ad loc. adnotavit Hayduck), reliqui Kwotipevov, etiam Simpl. 
Bek. Trend., quibus assentitur Pansch, p. 545 || 18. Ktvyo-is Spefa E L et, ut videtur, 
Them. 120, 31 sq, Bek., #/>eis Klv^a-ts etiam Simpl. vet. transl. Trend. Torst., opefty 77 
Klvrjffts Philop. || rls om. TWXy, leg. Simpl. || ^ frtpycia, E (Bek. Stapf.), 77 Mpyua 
E (Bhl.), # Mpyeia U Philop. Rodier, /toi Mpyeta, Them., 5 Mpyeta. Bek. Trend., etiam 

CH. 10 433 b 3 433 b 26 153 

sensitive, intelligent, deliberative, with the further addition of an 
appetent part : for these differ more widely from one another than 
the concupiscent does from the passionate. Now desires arise 6 
conflict of which are contrary to one another, and this occurs when- 
desires. ever reason and the appetites are opposed, that is, in 
those animals which have a perception of time. For intelligence 
bids us resist because of the future, while appetite has regard 
only to the immediate present ; for the pleasure of the moment 
appears absolutely pleasurable and absolutely good because we do 
not see the future. Therefore, while generically the moving cause 
will be one, namely, the faculty of appetency, as such, and ultimately 
the object of appetency (which, without being in motion itself, causes 
motion by the mere fact of being thought of or imagined), numeri- 
cally there is a plurality of moving causes. 

Now motion implies three things, first, that which causes motion, 7 

secondly, that whereby it. causes motion, and again, 
animal thirdly, that which is moved ; and of these that which 

causes motion is twofold, firstly, that which is itself 
unmoved and, secondly, that which both causes motion and is 
itself moved. The unmoved movent is the practical good, that 
which is moved and causes motion is the appetitive faculty (for 
the animal which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and 
desire is a species of motion or activity) and, finally, the thing 
moved is the animal. But the instrument with which desire moves 
it, once reached, is a part of the body : hence it must be dealt with 
under the functions common to body and soul. For the present, 8 
it may be enough to say summarily that we find that which 
causes motion by means of organs at the point where beginning 
and end coincide ; as, for instance, they do in the hinge-joint, for 
there the convex and the concave are respectively the end and the 
beginning, with the result that the latter is at rest, while the former 
moves, convex and concave being logically distinct, but locally in- 
separable. For all animals move by pushing and pulling, and 
accordingly there must be in them a fixed point, like the centre in 

Simpl., qui tamen et $ tvepy. scribi (immo, id quod H scribebatur legi) posse dicit, fy v- 
tpyelq, scripsit Torst., els frtpyetav coni. Chaignet, p. 433 || 21. a&rQv E (Trend.) y, 
-etiam, nisi fallor, L U V W, quorum scripturam errore, ut videtur, typographico, Bek. 
atirQv esse rettulit, atirou etiara Them. Soph, et, ut videtur, Simpl. 303, 15 sq. || -22. &rov 
&*/ &PX)) EW Soph. || yLvyhv/MS E et Trend., 717X14110$ X, yiyXvarfris STV, yLyyXitr^s 
U W X, 7177X1/07*05 Soph., ylyy\vfjt,os Simpl. Pkilop. et ap. Simpl. Alex, et Plut. Athen., 
yi.yy\vfMs Them. (v. 1. yt,yy\v<r/j,6s) Bek. Torst. || 23. Kal rb /cotXop X et re. E (Bus.) 
Soph., recepit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes om. rd, etiain Bek. Trend. Torst. || 
7&/> ante reXeirrfy insert. E 2 (Rr.) || 24. 8ib...Ku>eiTai in parenth. et post 25. 
punctum posuit Bywater, p. 64, cui assentitur Susemihl, B. J. LXVII, 1 10. 

1 54 DE ANIMA III CHS. 10, n 

. o\a)<$ /iev ovv, (Zonrep elprfrai, y 6pe/crt/coi> 
TO <ov, ravrr) eavrov KivyriKov ope/cTt/coz; Se OVK civtv <f>av- 
Tacrtas' (fravTacria 8e Tracra 77 Xoytcrrt/cT) 77 ato^TjTt/cT?. rav- 
T77$ /xev ovz> /cat ra aXXa <5a ju-ere^et. 30 

11 S/ceTrrew Se /cat Trept T<S*> dreXaiv, rt TO KLVQVV ecrrtv, 

ots d<j?>77 fjiovov vTrap^et atcr^T/crt?, Trorepov evSe^erat <^>a^- 434 a 

-undpyeiv Tovrots, 77 01!, /cat eTTiOv^iav. ^aiverai yap 
/cat 7jSoKi7 e^ovcra. et Sc ravra, /cat 7Tt^i;/xta^ a^ay/c^. 
8e TTCOS av eveiT); rj toinrep /cat Kiveirai <iopLO"Ta)$, 
/cat ravr* eit/ecrrt /xe^ aoptcrros 8' ez/ecrrtv. 07 ^ev ow 
^>avTao"ta, cScrTrep et/^rac, /cat ez/ rots aXXots 
)(t, 17 Se /3ovXei>Tt/c7j e^ rots Xoytcrrt/cot? (rrorepov yap rrpd- 
&L rdSe ^ roSe, Xoytcr/xoC 97877 ecrrtv epyov /cat owdyKY) evl 
TO iLti&v yap Stai/cet. wcrre Swarat ei/ e/c -TrXeto- 

Trotetv). /cat atrtoz/ TOVTO rov So^av /XT) So- 10 
ort TT)^ e/c crvXXoytor^oi) o/c e>(et, avT?7 Se e/cet- 

StO TO /3OV\VTLKOV OVK C)(t 77 OyOC^tS' Vt/Ctt 8* J>IOT 

/cat /ctz^et T7)z/ fiovXycriv, ore 8' e/ceti^ ravrrjv, cScrTrc/) cr<atpa, 77 
ope^tv, oraj> d/cpacrta ye^Tat- <jtvo-et 8e det 77 
/cat /ctz/et- cScrTe Tpets <j>opa<s 77877 /az/etcr0at. 15 

28. eauroO V Them., 5' aiJroO EL Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes a^rov || 
31. /cal om. E, leg. Soph. || dreX^v etiam Them. Simpl. Soph., <XXXwi/ L, dirXw^ y || 
434 a, i. o?<r^.] 77 ofcr^<rty E, 97 afoer}<ris L, a^ ^77 afo-^<ris iirdpxct. Simpl. || 
2. /cai irL8viJ,lav unc. incl. Essen || 3. typwra. E, ^o/ra etiam Them. || 4. elf^ 
L S U V W || $ om. E S || aopurros exceptis E S reliqui codd. omnes, &opi<rr<a$ etiam 
Them. || 5. robots LX et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 26 Soph. 144, 37, raur 9 reliqui et corr. 
E || ddptcrros y et fort. Simpl. in interpr. 307, 24. 308, 3 Soph. 144, 38, Aopbrus etiam 
Them. 122, 11 Philop. || 6. 0avTaer!a] ^efts coni. Essen III, p. 62 || dXo^ots T Wy 
Them. 121, 21, AXXow etiam Simpl. in lemmate 308, 2 et, ut videtur, Philop. 592, 22: 
cf. tamen rd dXo 7 a 593, 5 || 7. 77 S^ j5ouXwa^ Trotet^ in parenth. posuit Rodier || 
7. T< Troiew in parenth. posui || 7. XoyiKoa WXy || 8. ^rty ^77 L || Hpyov 
forlv y || dvdyKvi del nerptiv hi W, vulgatam tuentur etiam Them. 121, 2 4 Philop. in interp. 
59 2 30 II 8. KO.I &vdvKi). r .ii. tKftvyv unc. incl. Essen || 9. TrXcoW E, <ir\eu$vw Them. 
Simpl. Philop. || 10. Kal atnov...i2. ope&s mutila vel corrupta esse censet Torst, leg. 
Simpl. Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 121, 29 sqq. || 10. roOro roO] roiJrovro corr. E 2 (Rr.), 
quod legisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 593, 4 || 1 1 . post oi5/c *% add. < raXXa {fa, > et a^; 
8i tKdvqv hoc loco delevit By water, aVrq 5* /cti/et, coll. a, 19, coni. Cornford || 12. 5t6 <T?> 
r6 pov\VTiK6v t ..viK$ [5'] tvlore...^^, [M 5' toby Tcrfnp] wirep <r<i>aipa 
coni. Essen III, p. 62 || 13. TT> jSo^cr^ om. S V W || post pot\y<nv colon vulg. 
/civet V ai!m}v pro 6r^ 5' ^1/17 raiJrr;!' coni. Cornford || ffQaipw y || 1 3 et I 4 . ?} 5' tfpef 
coni. Trend., 77 97 opeis TT>V 6>. coni. Chandler, totum locum sic restituendum esse : vuc$ $ y 
More Kal K. r. pot\>q<ru> 3 Brav &Kpa<rta ytwrjTcii- M $' techy r^Tt\v' 6r 5', wtrirep afatpav 
<r<t>aipa, 77 6p. r^v op. coni. Torst., VLK$ 5' Jr. Kai K. T. p., 6rav top. y., dr* imbni ra^rrjv, <% 

CHS. 10, u 433 b 27434 a 15 155 

a circle, and from this the motion must begin. Thus, then, in 9 
general terms, as already stated, the animal is capable of moving 
itself just in so far as it is appetitive : and it cannot be appetitive 
without imagination. Now imagination may be rational or it may 
be imagination of sense. Of the latter the other animals also have 
a share. 

We must also consider what is the moving cause in those im- 11 
The low- perfect animals which have only the sense of touch* Is 
ofhfe^ow fr possible that they should have imagination and desire, 
moved. or i s j t not p i t i s evident that they feel pleasure and 
pain : and, if they have these, then of necessity they must also 
feel desire. But how can they have imagination? Shall we say 
that, as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so, though 
they have these faculties, they have them in a vague and indeter- 
. minate form ? The imagination of sense, then, as we a 

have said, is found in the other animals also, but delibe- 

nation. . - , , . , ., 

rative imagination in those alone which have reason. 
For the task of deciding whether to do this or that already implies 
reasoning. And the pursuit of the greater good necessarily implies 
some single standard of measurement. Hence we have the power 
of constructing a single image out of a number of images. And 
the reason why the lower animals are thought not to have opinion 
is that they do not possess that form of imagination which comes 
from inference, while the latter implies the former. And so ap- 3 
petency does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it 
overpowers rational wish and moves to action ; at other times the 
latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, appetency. Thus one 
appetency prevails over another appetency, like one sphere over 
another sphere, in the case where incontinence has supervened. 
But by nature the upper sphere always has the predominance and 
is a moving cause, so that the motion is actually the resultant of 
three orbits. 

6pe!-Ls rfy op. coni. Steinhart, pot\7j(riv dWep <r0a2)oa <6r p&v a& 
TatfTijv 7} fye|ts T?> op. com. By water, p. 67: cf. ad a, n, or 5' tKelvy Tcrfrqv, &nrep 
07 &>w> <70aTpa <.TTJJ> fcdrw, 6r 5*> 77 opeis TT> 6p. ttrav &Kp. y. (0rf<rei 5 del 
TJ AM dpxiK' Kal KLV.), ware coni. Zeller, p. 587, adru 4, 0tf<ret 8 del 17 &vw dpxt/c.* 
Kal Ka>t TJ &p. TTjv 6p. 8rav &Kpa<rla yfr., wore coni. Busse, Hermes XXIII, 469 sq., 
5' frtore K(d KWCI -rty /SotfX^o't*', 6r 3' ^xelvrj rafrnqv, wtrrrep ij &vu apalpa 
i 8e dt ^ &v<a dpx- KO.\ KW.) ork d' i) 6p. ri)v op., &TW dico\a<rla y^VTjraf wore 
coni. Susemihl, B. J. LXVII, n, vulgatam Rodier et certe Simpl. et vet. transl., 
vulgatam legisse videntur etiam Them. 121, 33 sqq. Soph. 145, u sqq., <dr^ 5'> 
ante wo-Tre/) de coniect. inseruit Biehl || 14. ^77 EL, etiam Philop. 593, 12, v. 
Hayducki ap. crit. ad loc., yfrijTai, corr. E 2 II 15- w<rre icard rpecy 5ta0opas coni. 
Essen III, p. 63. 

i S 6 DE ANIMA III CHS. 11, 12 

4 TO S' e7rtoT7?ju<oz>t/c6z> ov Kiveirai) dXXd /zez/et. e?ret S" >J 
Ka66\ov vTroXy^is /cat Xdyos, 77 Se TOT) /ca#' e/cacrra (77 
yap Xeyec OTI SeZ TOZ> TotoSToz; TO TOtdz>Se Trpdrrew, 77 Se OTC 
ToSe Toivvv Totd^Se, /cdyo) Se TotdcrSe), 7787? avrr) /ctz>et rj 
Sd^d, ovx tf xaffoXow fj dpjf>a>, dXX' 77 jnez> ripe/xovcra |U,aX- 20 
Xo^, TJ 8 s ov. 

12 TT}Z; juez/ ow OpeirTLKriv ^JVX^v avdyKT) irav fyew on 
7T.p a^ ^77, Kal $vxr)v e^ec aTro ye^eVeco? /cat /^e^/H <$>0opa$- 
avdyKr) yap TO yevoyisvov av^criv eyeiv KOL aKprjv /cat 
<f>6icriv, rcLvra S* avei) rpoffis dSwaToi/* dvdy/cTj apa eVeti/at 25 
TT)^ BpeTTTUcqv ^vvafiiv & Traari Tol$ ^uojitez/ot? /cat (^^t^ovcrt^, 

2 (ucrffrjcriv 8* ov/c dz/ay/cato^ ez> (XTracrt Tots ^(3o r tz^* owe yap 

TO crfijLta aTrXoCi', e^S^(CTat a<f>r]v e^etz^, [OVTC ai^ev 
ofdi' T ovdeis eti/at <5oz>] OVTC ocra JUT) Se/cTt/ca TO)V 

3 etS<3^ a^eu TT/? vX?js. TO Se ^a>oz^ dvajKalov alo-Oycrw ^eiv, 30 
et fjLTjdev p,drr)v Trotet 77 Averts, ei^e/cd TOU yap irdvra v? 

)^et TO, <jf>vcret, 77 crt>jL(,7rTa5/>taTa ecrrai r&v eVe/cd TOU. et 
7raj> craijLLa TropevTi/cdv, JXT) e^oi^ accr^crtz/, fyOeipoiTQ av /cat 
ts Te'Xos ou/c av eX^ot, o eort <^vcrecos epyov 77^9 yap #pe- 434^ 
;//eTat; Tot? /ze^ yap //,oin/x.ots vTrdp^et TO o^ez/ 7re<u/cao-u>. 

4 ov^ ofd^ Te Se crS/x/a e^eiv /x/ez^ ^vyjjv Kal vovv K.PLTLKQV, at- 
crdrjcnv Se /x^ e^ew^, juci] juidvtjuto^ oz/, yevTjTOv 8e x . [dXXa /i^z/ 
ovSe dyez^TOv] Sta Tt yap eet; ^ yap TTJ ^v^jy fieknov 5 
^ T^3 craJ/xaTi. z>5z> S* ovSerepo^* 77 ^u,ez/ yap ov juaXXoz' 

TO S* ovOev ecrTat jLtaXXoz^ St* e/cetvo. ovdev apa ej^et 

1 6. jcwe? TVVX, vel /cim vel Kimrat hie legi commemorat SimpL 311, 9 sq. || 
17. %Ka<rrop Ey Them. || 19. rofrw] TO yu^ E, sed ita ut lacuna sit minuta inter 
TO et w (Trend. Bus.) Bek. Trend., ^ Xy, om. LSTUVW, ro^i/y Simpl. 
Torst. || 19. 97 8^ aC/ri7...2o. KaOfaov, TJ &^w coni. Spengel in com. ad Ar. rhet. 
II, 300 II ao. /caflo'Xou; T? scripsit Torst. || a 3. /cal ^xeij' coni. Christ, #X77 Xy Bek. Trend., 
^%et etiam Philop. Torst., ^x tl/ videtur legisse Them. 122, 22 || Kal om. TU VXy 
Bek. Trend. || 27. alios ^"wo-i^, alios ftJois legere tradit Philop. 598, 17 sq. || 28. fowv\ (Sv 
EL Philop., 8(rw etiam Simpl. 320, 38 et, ut videtur, Them. 122, 29 sq. (| otfre...29. $w 
suspecta erant Trend., unc. inch Torst., leg. Simpl., non videtur legisse Them. Philop. 
Soph. || 29. ot>6kv otov re LT W, orov re oMfr etiam Simpl. || 30. TO te $ov] rl 8t fiv 
coni. Essen III, p. 64 || 31. ^-] exit E || Hiram LTVX || 33. pro Tray coni. Torst. 
efy vel -V^OITO, cui assentitur Dittenberger, p. 1615, pro $x v coni. Trend. #xot, quod 
probant Steinhart et Susemihl, Oecon, p. 86, post iropevrLKov virgulam posuit Biehl || 
434 b, 2. ro] roOTa W, TOUTO STU VXy Trend. (| 861. U, ffri S VX, 6'^ etiam Philop. 
Simpl. |j 4. vwnrbv et 5. AyfrijTov Simpl. Them. Philop. ex cod. D Hayduck Torst., reliqui 

CHS. ir, 12 434 a 16 434 b 8 157 

The cognitive faculty, however, is not subject to motion, but is 4 

at rest. The major premiss is universal, whether judg- 
practicai ment or proposition, while the minor has to do with a 
S y ogism. p ar ti cu i ar f ac t : for, while the former asserts that such and 
such a person ought to do such and such an act, the latter asserts 
that a particular act is one of the sort and that I am such a person. 
Now it is the latter judgment which at once moves to action, not the 
universal. Or shall we say that it is both together, but the one is 
akin to the unmoved movent, the other is not ? 

Every living thing, then, must have the nutritive soul and in fact 12 
Teleology: has a sou l from its birth till its death. For what has 
been born must necessarily grow, reach maturity and 
decline, and for these processes nutriment is indispens- 
able. It follows, then, of necessity that the nutritive faculty is 
present in all things that grow and decay. But sensation is not 2 
necessarily present in all living things. For wherever the body is 
uncompounded there can be no sense of touch {yet without this sense 
animal existence is impossible\ : nor, again, in those living things 
which are incapable of receiving forms apart from matter. But 3 
the animal must of necessity possess sensation, if nature 

Sensation . - . 

necessary makes nothing in vain: for everything in nature sub- 
to animals. , 1 . t1 - - - . 

serves an end or else will be an accessory of things 

which subserve an end. Now every living body having the power 
of progression and yet lacking sensation would be destroyed and 
never reach full development, which is its natural function. For 
how in such a case is it to obtain nutriment ? Motionless animals, 
it is true, have for nutriment that from which they have been 
developed. But a body, not stationary, but produced by genera- 4 
tion, cannot possibly have a soul and an intelligence capable of 
judging without also having sensation. \_Neither can it y if it be not 
generatedl\ For why should it have the one without the other? 
Presumably for the advantage either of the soul or of the body. 
But neither of these alternatives is, in fact, admissible. For the 
soul will be no better able to think, and the body will be no 
better off, for the absence of sensation. We conclude, then, that no 
body that is not stationary has soul without having sensation. 

ante Torst. omnes yevvTfrbv et &y4vvtjroy 3 etiam Them. v.l. Philop. ed. Trincavelli || dXXA , . 
5. ayfryrov unc. inclusit Torst., leg. quidem omnes libri scripti et impressi, etiam Them. 
Philop. 599, 32 Soph, et apud Simpl. et Philop. Alex, et Pint, et vet. transl., omisit Simpl., 
qui annotat 320, 28 : ft* rwt 5 &vTi,ypd<j>Qis Trpdcr/remu rb dXXd fj^v ot$& &y&v)Tov \\ 4. o$ IM\V 
dXX& dy. coni. Essen III, p. 65 || 5. yap otfx get TUVWy Pint, apud Simpl. et apnd 
Philop. et vet. transl., om. otfx reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. Alex. || verbis SIOL rL yap (sc. 
r6 juidvifAov) ; 7j yct,p...j. 5t' &ce?vo parenthesi inclnsis apodosin sententiae conditioiialis el ovv 
irciv ab oWtv apa # inclpere statuit Christ || 7. r L W, TO etiam Them. 

158 DE ANIMA III CH. 12 

5 aXXa \M)V etye ato"#7?crti/ eyzi, dWy/oj TO croijuia etz/at r/ aT 

^ /JL^LKTOV. ovx otdi> re Se o/TrXovV d<f>r]v yap oi>x ?ec, ecm Se 10 

6 aVay/oj Tavrrjv eytiv. TOVTO Be IK rcovBe S^Xov. eTret yap TO 
<5oz/ cr<Sjita J-pjrv'XQv ecrrt, cnSjuta Se aVa^ aTTTW, aTTTW Se ro 
aio-0r)Tov a</>7/, aVay/CT? /cat ro TOV &Jov cral/z-a CLTTTLKOV 
etvat, ei fieXXet crcyecr#at TO tfeov. at yayo aXXat alcrOifj- 

erepo)v alcrddvovrciLy oiov ocr^pTjcrts OI/HS aKorj* 15 

V , t ft^ ^6 CUCrdrjCnV, 0V SviSTJO-GTCU, TCC jLteZ^ 

ra Se \aj3eiv. t Se roSro, a8waroi> ecrrat craJ^e- 

7 cr^ai TO ^(5oz^. Sto fcal T) yeScrts k<mv wo-irep d^tf TL$* rpo- 

rTtv, ry Se Tpo(f>r) TO crS/x-a TO a7TTOZ>. i/fo<^>O5 Se 
/cai OCT/AT) ov rptyet,, ov8e Troiec OUT' owfrjcrLV ovre 20 

cal TT)Z/ yeDatz^ dvdyKrf <X<^T)V elvai rwa, Sta 
TO TOV CXTTTOV feat 0pe7TTiKOv cdcrd'rjcriv CLvai' avTai /^e^ ovz/ 
dvayKalou T(S &(>, Kal (fcavepov on ov^ olov re avev 

8 d<(>rjs eivaL ttyov. at Se aXXat TOV Te ev !z>e/ca /cat yeVet 

OV TO) TV^OVTl, dXXa TtCTtV, OtOZ> T<5 7TO/)VTt/CaJ 25 

rdp^zW et yap jaeXXet crco^ecrOai, ov povov Set 
alcrddveordai aXXa /cat ctTro^e^. TOVTO S' av t>7, 
et Sta TOV jueTa^v alo-O^riKOv et^ TaJ e/cet^o juez> VTTO TOV 

9 atcr^TOv Trcxor^etv /cat KivelcrdaL, avTO S* vV e/cetvov. c5o-7re/> 
yap TO KLVOVV Kara TOTTOV fte^pt TOV /x,eTa;8aXXetj> Trotet, 3 
/cat TO tocrav erepov Trotet cocrTe oJ^etz/, /cat eort Sta /^tecrov ^ 
/curorts, /cat TO jaei/ TrpcaToz/ /ctvet /cat cw^et ov/c ^6ov^vov 9 
TO S* CT)(aTOv IAOVQV ci^etTat ov/c cScra^, TO Se ftecrov ap,<j>a), 
TroXXa Se jLtecra, OVTO> </cat> err' aXXota>crea;$, 77X07^ oTt /jtez>oi>TO5 435 a 
eV TO) avT<5 TOTT<W aXXotot, oto^ et ets Krjpov )8at/fte Tts, 

TOVTOV iKWijOv), eiws e^Sa^ei/' Xt^os Se ovSez^, aXX* 

9. ^xot L, om, S U V II 9. dvd7/7...i3. ct$7 unc. incl. Essen || 17. &m TX, #<rrat etiam 
Philop. || 18. 5i6 /cal...i9. Airr^ post., 31. wore... 22. eT^at pr., edit, esse iudicat Torst. || 
19. post d7rr6j/ addendum /cal Bpeirrucdv censet Bywater, p. 67 || 24. r6 fijoj' L, rd om. 
Them. || 27. (r<bfr<r6ai TWX, al<r& Area-Bat etiam Soph. || 30. rou Torst. et, ut videtur, 
Them. 124, 30, Soph, interpretatur ^x/' 3"Aj roiVou S, reliqui ante Torst. omnes roO || 
31. wcrov] (oo-^ coni. Torst,, wo-ay etiam Sixnpl. Soph, et, ut videtur , Philop. 605, i || 
Kal &m,..32, KtvyjffLs] Kal %<rTL raura 5ia ju&ov coni. Torst., vulg. tuetur Soph. || 32. /cai rb 
Itlv rp. W Torst. , ro 5^ irp. L, Kal rb irp. pkv T X, Kal ^v ^ TO ?rp. S U, Kal 5% rb i&v irp. 
Vy Bek. Trend. || KW& Kal Mel Ly Soph., reliqui ante Biehlium omnes Kivofo &6el, 
KIVOVV unc. incl. Torst. [| 33. w<rav] &&ovv X || 435 a, I. otfrw 5); ^r* vel otirca 8% Kal ^TT* 
coni. Torst., o#r&> vel o(Jrws /cal M Them. Simpl. Philop. Soph. vet. transl., om. Kal 
omnes codd., </rai> in textum recepit Biehl || yct^o^ra VWX Trend., /U&OPT-OS etiam 

CH. 12 434 b 9 435 a 3 159 

But, further, the body, assuming that it has sensation, must 5 

be either simple or composite. But it cannot be simple, 
necessary for then it would not have touch, and this sense is indis- 
preserva- pensable. This is clear from the following' considerations. 6 

The animal is an animate body. Now body is always 
tangible and it is that which is perceptible by touch which is tan- 
gible : from which it follows that the body of the animal must have 
tactile sensation, if the animal is to survive. For the other senses, 
that is to say, smell, sight, hearing, have media of sensation, but 
a being which has no sensation will be unable when it comes into 
contact with things to avoid some and seize others. And if 
this is so, it will be impossible for the animal to survive. This 7 
is why taste is a kind of touch, for taste is of nutriment and 
nutriment is body which is tangible; whereas sound, colour and 
smell afford no nourishment and promote neither growth nor 
decay. So that taste also must be a kind of touch, because it is 
a sensation of that which is tangible and nutritive. These two 
senses, then, are necessary to the animal, and it is plain that 
without touch no animal can exist. 

But the other senses are means to well-being, and are necessary, 8 
The higher not to any and every species of animal, but only to cer- 

tain species, as, for example, those capable of locomotion. 

For, ^ ^ e ar *imal capable of locomotion is to survive, it 
animals. must have sensation, not only when in contact with any- 
thing, but also at a distance from it. And this will be secured if it 
A medium can perceive through a medium, the medium being capable 
forsenss^ ^ being acted upon and set in motion by the sensible 
tion. object, and the animal itself by the medium. Now that 9 

which causes motion from place to place produces a change oper- 
ating within certain limits, and that which propels causes the thing 
propelled to propel in turn, the movement being transmitted 
through something intermediate. The first in the series initiates 
motion and propels without being itself propelled, while the last 
is simply propelled without propelling; the numerous middle 
terms of the series both propel and are propelled. So it is also 
with qualitative change, except that what is subject to this 
change remains in the same place. Suppose we were to dip 
something into wax, the movement in the wax would extend just 
so far down as we had dipped the object, whereas in the like case 

Philop. et, ut videtur, Them. 124, 28 || 2. dXXoiot, olov] AXV olov S Poppelreuter, zur 
Psych, d. Ar., p. 17 || 3. rov UX. 

160 DE ANIMA III CHS. 12, 13 

vSa>p p>expt< TTOppa)' 6 S* drjp eTrt 7rXetcrrov Ktveirai /cat 

TTOiei /Cat TTdV^et, Idv p>Vr) /Cat L<S 77. StO KOL TTepl oW- 5 

K\dcrea)$ fteXnov 3) rr]v oifjiv e&ovcrav aVa/cXaor#at, rov depa 
7rd<r)(eLv VTTO rov cr^/x,aT05 /cat -^pco^arog, ^XP 1 7r / ^ 
av 77 et9. errl Se rov Xetou eorrlv efs* Sto TrdXiv oSro? TT}V OIJJLV 
Kivi> tocnrep av el TO ev raJ /c^yoaS cn7/Ltov SieStSoro ^^X.pi 
rov Treparos. 10 

13 *O ' ov^ oioz/ r aTrXoCi' etvat TO TOV t>cpov crS>p,a, 
6v, Xeyco 8 s otoz> rrvpivov r] aepwov. avev p,v yap 
ov'oe^iav ez/8e^Tat aXX^v alvOifjcriv fyew TO ycxyo 
airriKov TO l)u,t//v^o^ TTO,^, ajcnrep elpi/jrai. ra Se 
efa) 7^9 alcrdrirr]pia ILZV av yeVotTO, rravra Se TaJ 15 
Si' erepov alcrffdvecrdaL Trotet T^ alcrOricriv KOI Sid rS>v p,- 
rav. TJ 8* 0.^77 T(5 avr>v aTrrecrOal Icrnv, Sto /cat rovvopa 
rovro ^)(t. /catrot /cat TO, aXXa ator^TT^pta a<^>^ alcrOdve- 
rai, cxXXa 8t s erepov a^TTj Se 8o/cet jad^ St* CIVTTJS. cSo"T TO)!/ 
TOLOVTCDI' orTOt^etft)^ ovQsv av eiy a*S/x/a TOV ^<wov. ovSe ST) 20 

TravTOJv yayo 17 d^&7) TO>Z> dirrcov eorrlv 

/cat Se/cTt/coz> TO alcrdrfri/jpLov ov povov ocrai Sta^&o/oat 
eJcrtv, aXXa /cat Oeppov /cat -fyvyjpov /cat T<S&> aXXwv dirrtov dirdv- 
rtov. /cat Sta TO)TO Tots OCTTOIS /cat Tatg ^/ot|-t /cat Tots Tot- 
owot9 fJiopioLS OVK olcrOavo^eBa, on yrjs ea~riv, /cat Ta ^>VTCL 25 
Sta TOVTO ovSe/uai> e>(t aicrffrjO'LV, on yijs ecrriv dvev Se a- 435 b 

ovSe/jiiav o?6v re aXX^v VTrdp^ew, rovro Se TO 
ov/c ea-Ttz^ ovre yyjs owe aXXov T<3^ crroi^eLo^v ovSevos. 
<j>avepov roivvv on dvdyKrj ^01^779 ravrys 
aio'Qrfcrecos rd ^o>a aTroOvijo'Kew ovre ydp ravrrjv 5 

toi^ TC jit^ C^^> OVT ^<5o^ 6V dXkrjv fyew 
dvdyKT) 7r\rjv ravrrj<s, Kal Sta TOVTO Ta pev aXXa aicr07)rd 
Tat9 V7Tp/3o\al<s ov $ia<f>9eCpei TO ^o^, 
/cat ^0(^)09 'cat OOT/ITJ, dXXa JJLOVOV rd atcr^TTjpta, &j/ 

4. post TTtJppw punctum Bek. Trend. Torst., colon Biehl, virgulam Susemihl B. J. 
IX, 352 || 5. (JLclvrj SUXy Them. Philop., i^vy etiam Soph. || -irepl foaK\dffews unc. 
incl. Torst. Essen III, p. 66, leg. Them. Philop. Soph. || 6. di/a/cXac-flai LW Them. 
Soph. Trend. Torst., reliqui ante Trend, omnes /c\a<r^cu || 7. &?/ ov ^ eT? L, ov &v y eZs 
T WX Soph. Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium omnes ov SLV els J || 8. rou Xe^ou] re\elov Xy || 
TrdXtv om. L, leg. Them. Philop., T<Xw /cai W || 9. ^^et X [| 13. aXX^v ^S^erat S U V || 
17. obr-ruN/ W, rtSj/ ATTTWV y, CLVT&V etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. 148, 21 || 18. Kalroi... 
19. atfr^y unc. incl. Essen III, p. 67 || 19. ^/jw>/ LV || 435 b, I. aUG-rjtrtv fy LW || 
T VX || 2. oXXiyv oW^ TC VWy, o^v re <SXX??>> etiam Soph. || 6. oft? re M ^0)0? oV 

CHS. 12, 13 435 a 4 435 b 9 

a stone is not moved at all, while water is disturbed to a great 
distance and air is disturbed to the farthest extent possible and acts 
and is acted upon as long as it remains unbroken. And, to revert 
to the reflection of light, that is why, instead of holding that the 
visual ray leaving the eye is reflected, it would be better to say that 
the air is acted upon by the shape and colour, so long as it is one 
and unbroken. This is the case over any smooth surface : and ac- 
cordingly the air acts on the organ of sight in turn, just as if the 
impress on the wax had penetrated right through to the other side. 

It is evident that the body of an animal cannot be uncom- 13 
A mixture pounded ; I mean, it cannot consist entirely of fire, for 
efemeSts 1 instance, or of air. An animal, unless it has touch, can 
STtScfSi- h ave no other sense, the animate body being always, as 
mai body. we have remarked, capable of tactile sensation. Now the 
other elements, with the exception of earth, would make sense- 
organs : but it is always indirectly and through media that such 
organs effect sensation. Touch, however, acts by direct contact 
with objects : hence its name. The other sense-organs, it is true, 
also perceive by contact, but it is by indirect contact : touch alone, 
it would seem, perceives directly in and through itself. Thus, then, 
no one of the three elements referred to can constitute the body of 
the animal. Nor indeed can it be of earth. For touch is a sort 
of mean between all tangible qualities, and its organ is receptive 
not only of all the distinctive qualities of earth, but also of heat 
and cold and all other tangible qualities. And this is why we 
do not perceive anything with our bones and our hair and such 
parts of us, namely, because they are of earth. And for the same 
reason plants, too, have no sensation, because they are composed 
of earth. Without touch, however, there can be no other sense ; 
and the organ of this sense does not consist of earth nor of any 
other single element. 

Thus it is evident that this is the only sense the loss of which 2 

necessarily involves the death of the animal. For it is not possible 

for anything that is not an animal to have this sense, nor is it 

necessary for anything that is an animal to have any other sense 

besides this. And this explains another fact. The other 

Why * 

tangibles sensibles I mean, colour, sound, odour do not by their 

destroy excess destroy the animal, but only the corresponding 

sense-organs : except incidentally, as when concurrently 

%X e w W, olbv re x eLV M & ov & v 7> ^ v r M $ ov ^X t1f #"?*' Soph., JJ.TJ fypv olbv re 
ffiov coni. Steinhart, olbv re fjAi &xew foi> coni. Hayduck, progr. Gryph. 7 || ov ante 
&\\i)v om. S U Vy Soph., ffiov oV delendum esse censet Hayduck 1. 1. || 7. ratinjv U Xy 
et T (supra posito s) . 

H. II 

1 62 DE ANIMA III CH. 13 

Kara crv/x/JeyS^/cos, otov cb' a/jua TO> *jjo<f>a) cScrtg yeV^rat 10 
/cat 77X77777, /cat UTTO opapdT&v /cat oo-ju/yjs ere/oa 

a T a< <et>et. /cat 6 

3 aWt/eov etvcu, ravry <j>6eipei. 17 Se 

OlOV 0pfJLQ)V KOil lfjV)(p5)V KOL GrK\V)p)V, aVCLLpzL TO ^<5o^* 

TTOJ/TOS /x,e^ ycx/) vrrepfioXr/ alorffyjrov avaipzi TO alo-0r)T7)piov, 15 
tocrre KOL TO UTTTOV TYJV d^tfv, TavTrj Se ajpiarTai TO ^771^' 
az'eu yot/o d<j>rj$ SeSetffrat ore O&VVCLTOV elvaL tfyov* Sio r) 
T*V diTTiSv V7repj3o\r) ov povov TO aicr()r)Tijpcov ipdeipei, aXXa 
/cat TO yov, OTL dvdyKri ^6wr}v e^ecz/ TavTTjv. T<XS S' aX- 
Aas aicr^o"65 ^\[t TO ^MOV, aicnrep eipijTat,, ov TOV elz^at 20 
VKa, cxXXd TOV eu, otw OIJJLV, eTrei e^ aept /cat vSaTt, 
O7ra> oyoa, oXcos S' eTret e^ Sta<^az/t, y ever iv Be Sta TO 
i^Sv feat Xvirrjpov, iva alcr0dvr)Ta,i TO ev Tpo<f>f) /cat 
/cat KiwfJTaij aKorjv Se OTTCUS crrji^aimrjTai Tt 


15. vireppoXy al<r0ir]Toti LW Them. Soph., recepit Biehl, ato-eyrucov itireppoXi) T U V, 
reliqui ante Biehlium omnes ala-dyrod -bTrepfioXri || 16. dtc6pt<rrat S T U X, alptcrrat etiam 
Soph. U fwo?' TX, quam lectionem probat H. Jackson, ^ etiam Soph. || 22. #7rws 6p 
post dta^aj'et transponendum esse dubitanter coni. Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86 || 5^ 5t&] re 
5tA TVy Bek. Trend., $ etiam Soph. Torst. || 24. ayfiavT] TUX, ffwatvy SVWy 
Soph. Bek. Trend., ff^fJLatvrjrat (om. n) L Torst., vy/jLalviriTal, ri etiam sine dubio Them. 
-et vet. transl. II a^r^p restituit Torst., vulgo a^rip || 24. 'yXwrra>/...25. Mptf unc. incl. 
Torst. Essen III, p. 68, leg. Them. Philop. Soph, et vet. transl. 

CH. 13 435 b 10 435 b 25 163 

with the sound some thrust or blow Is given, or when objects of 
sight or smell move something else which destroys by contact 
Flavour, again, destroys only in so far as it is at the same time 
tactile. Tangible qualities, on the other hand, as heat, cold and 3 
hardness, if in excess, are fatal to the living animal. For excess 
of any sensible object is fatal to the organ, and so consequently 
excess of the tangible object is fatal to touch. And it is by this 
sense that the life of the animal is defined, touch having been 
proved to be indispensable to the existence of an animal. Hence 
excess in tangible qualities destroys not only the sense-organ, but 
also the animal itself. For touch is the one sense that the animal 
The cannot do without. The other senses which it possesses 

seises are, as we have said, the means, not to its being, but to 

its well-being. Thus the animal has sight to see with, 
being. because it lives in air or water or, speaking generally, 

in a transparent medium. It has taste on account of what is 
pleasant and painful, to the end that it may perceive what is 
pleasant in food and feel desire and be impelled to movement. It 
has hearing in order that information may be conveyed to it, and 
a tongue, that in its turn it may convey information to its fellow. 




lib. II, 4 i2a, 312. E. fol. 186 v. 

'E^ret Se ra iTapaSe8o/xe>a Trept t/rv^5 Trapa r<3z> aXXa>z/, 
<' o<roi> eKacrros dTrec^varo TGth> 7rpdrepoi>, etp^rat 
vvv (Scrirep ef apx>J$ TT&^W etrcLvitofiZV 7retpc5^ez>ot 
TL I&TIV r) *]svj(r) Kat Tt$ az^ et^ Xoyo5 avrrjs 


TTJS 8e ovcrias rb ^tev a>s vXiji/ Xeye<r#cu rid^ev, o Ka^ s avrb 
</uez> ov/c ecrrt roSe rt, rb> Se 17 /juop<f>jj, TO S* e/c TOVTCOV. 
ecrrt S' 17 jicev vXij Sv^ajLtec, TO S* ctSos ezn-eXe^cta, avrij S* 
V7rdp)(i St^S?, ^ yap a>9 17 eTTicrrT;^, -^ a>? ro Oecapeiv, 
ovcrtac Se jLLaXccrra So /cover W et^aL ra crcS/uLara Kat rovra)i/ ra 


lib. II, 414 b, 13 4i6a, 9. E. fol. I, r. 

*O 8e x^A 1 '^ 5 cocTTrep ^Svcrjua rovrots ecrru>' StoTrep o<ra 
e^et r<Sz/ efJeDi> a^v, iraa-w VTrap^ct /cat opefc?. Trept Se 
^avracrias dSrjXov /cal vcrrepov eTrtcrAceTrreoz^. criots Se raSra 
re VTrap^ec /cac rb fcara TOTTOI^ KivrfriKov, TO?? S* en Trpb? 
rovrots Scavoia KCCI i>ov9, otov av0pa>7ra> /cat ei rt aXXo 5 
2^o^ erepdi/ ecrrt TOLQVTQV rj /cat rtfttcorepo^. S^Xo^ ovv 
<i)$ ojxoto)? cr^^aros /cat t/rv^s eT? av etiy Xoyos. ovre 
yap e/cet cr^^fta Trapa rptycoi/di/ ecrrt /cat ra e<e>?9, oSr* 
e^rav^a ^v^ 'rrapa ras etpTjjoie^as. yez/otro S" &i/ /cat en"t 
rcii/ cr^jutarcy^ Xdyo?, 05 e^ap^tdcret </>te^> Tracrt^, ov/c ecrrat ia 

I. 7. A^ev otf/c ^<rri r65e rt, r6 supplevit Torst. || II, 5. rotfrots /cai E (Bus.) || 8. 
ro r/3. coni. Torst. j| 10. ^v om. E. 


tSto9 ovdevos o^^aros. o/z,ot6>9 Se /cat en-t rat9 1/077- 
\jjv)(cu$. Sto yeXotw tflreiv rov KOWQV \6yov Kal err* 
dXXct>z/ /cat e?rt rourcov, 09 ou/c ecrrat ov#ei>o9 T<Z> ovrcov tSto9, 
ovSe Kara TO oiKeiov KOL aro/j,ov eTSo9, ro^ Toto5roz> d<ez>ra9. 
TrapaTrX?7crt<y9 Se a>anrep /cat CTTL Ta5i/ cr^/^ara)^, exei Kal ra 15 
aei yap ei> ral e<^e^7j5 vTrdp^ei Svvdfjiei TO irpore- 

T T<2l/ <T7JidTCt)V Kal 67TL 

fiev TpLy&vov> ev ai<rd7)TuS Se ro dpenriKov. cScrre 
/cat jca6P e/cacrTo^ Set ^Tjreiv ri? 17 e/cacrrov ^X 7 ?* otov ri? <f>vrov 
/cat rt? avOptoirov Kal rtg Oypiov. Bia TWO, S* alrLav rq> 20 
<f>erj$ ovrct)? er^ovcrt, crfceTrreo^. ai'ev /xe^ ya/) roS QpeimKov ov- 
64v ecTTiv atcrftjrt/eoy rov S" aicr^rt/cou ^<uyOL^erat ro 6petm- 
KOV, olov eV rots ^>vroi9. TT<i\iv S' az/v ToS aTTTi/cov ovSe/>tta 
r<3i/ aXXcai^ aicr0j]cra)v, a<j>ri S* dvev rail/ aXk&v vTrap^et* 
TroXXa ya/o ea*rt T<3z/ ^CDV, a ovr* ot/rti' e^et ovr* aKotfv. Kal 25 
r<Sz> aio-dvjTiKoiv Se Act^crt^ rotg /i,ei/ VTrdp^ei rot? S 3 ovj( 

- reXevraio^ Se Sta^ota /cat Xoytoyz,os' ol? /x,ez^ yap 
Xoytcr/jtoSj Acal roi^ aXXcwi/ eicacrro^ To3z> etp^/^eVajz/, 
of? S* eKeivtov e/cacrroi/, ov Tracrw VTrap^et Xoytcr/>td9. aXXd ra 
/>te^ ovSe <j>avTao-iav e^et \LQVOV. ort fte^ oSi^ 6 Trept rovrct)^ 30 

Xoyos ot/cetdraro? Trept 1/^^779 ecrrt, 
IV. 'Avay/cij Se rov Trept rourct>v /xeXXovra 

rt eWacrrov avrojv ecrrtv, et^ s orra> Trept raz^ 
Kal rS>v dXXco^ Trotetcr^at r^v eTrlcTKefyiv. ei Se Set 
Xeyetz^ rt e/cacrroi', oto^ rt ro vorjTiKov rj rt ro alo-drjTLKov rj 35 
dpeiTTiKOV, irpOTtpov Xefcreoi/ rt ro voetv feat rt ro atcr^az^ecr^at 
at yctp 7rpaet9 /cat at e^epyetat Trpdrepat /card roz> Xdyoz^ 
et<rt rfiv $vvdp,ea>v. aXXd /JLTJV et ye ravra Trpdrepov ert 
TOVTCOV Stoptcrreoi/ rd d^rt/cet)Lte^a, otov Trept rpo<^7y9 /cat at- 
<r0r)Tov /cat ^o>yrov Std r>)i> avrTjv atrtav. cScrre 7rpS>rov 40 
Trept rpo^9 /cat yew)7crec09 Xe/creov avr>7 T^P ^ 1 A V X'*? Ka ^ 
ro?9 dXXot9 VTrdp^et, TrpaSriy Se /cat Koivordry) i//v)c^9 ecrrt Sv- 
^a/itt9, /ca^* ^v vTrdp^et ro ^v Trao"tv. 779 epyoz/ ecrrl yzvvif)- 
<rt9 /cat TO xpTjcr^at rpcxfyfj TOT)TO yap epyov /i^aXtcrTa <f>variKov 
Tracrt Tot9 al<rt^, oa"a /JIT) aTeX?7 i? TnypcS^ard ecrriv, rj avro- 45 
ftaToz> ej^et r^z/ y/ecrt^ ro Trot^crat otov a^ro irepov, tfyw 

20. 21. ro ^0. E (I 42. irp&TT) Kal KOLvorarvj i/svxijs 5" ^crri E. 


fjiev <Sa, fyvrov Se <f>vrd, Iva TOV del /cat TOV Oeiov ^re^y l/ca- 

crrov oz> SwaTat rpoTrov irdvTa yap eKeivov opeyeTat, KaKeCvov 

eW/ca TTpdrrei ocra Trparret /cara <j&vcru>. TO yap ov ei^e/ca Strrov, 

TO jLiev ov 3 TO Se <w* CTree ovv ov Tjj crvve^eia TOV ael Kal TOV 50 

$etov SwaTat KOivcovelv ov yap ez/Se^eTat TO avTo exec a 

etvcu oi)6kv T&V <f>0apTa>v ov T 

6iyydvei, TO /tez/ ^a\\ov s TO Se rJTTov Kal Sta/xe^ei ov/c 

otoi/ auTO, dpid[Ji(S fcez/ 01% e^ 3 etSet 8' ez/. ecm S* 17 

a\X 9 17 dpx^l KO ^ T O OLTLOV 55 
' T 

TOV? icoptcr/jiei/ovs' Aca ycx/o ov 17 Kivijcrt? /cat o e/e/ca 
feat G>S ovoria TO>V fj,\fjv'}(cw orco/JidTtov eo'Tiv y ^^X ?' ort /^^ 
oSv a>9 ovcria SyXov TOV yap elvai r/ ov&La avriov Tracri, 
TO Se ^y Tots ^(3crt TO etvat ICTTIV^ aiTiov Se /cat dp^r/ r/ 60 
t/ar^7j TOVTOV <TTtV. <f>avepov Se /cat a>9 TO ov l^e/ca 07 ^X 7 ?" 
feat yap 17 <jiucr69 e^e/ca TOV Trotet JcrTrep 6 vov9, /cat TOVT* 

ZCTTIV aVT-^9 TO T6\O9. /Cat TJ ^X^ TOtOVTOI/ 6V TOt9 /CaTCt 

, Kal irav TO cr<5/za opyavov TTJ $VXV* towtp Se TO 
/cat TO TcS^ <f)VTO)v. d\\d ^v KOI oBev r} Kdnqcris 65 
KaTa TQTTOV, TOVTO eVrt ^V^TJ* a\X' OT; uraort TOt9 
17 ToiavTy virdp^i 8wa/U9. crt S* aXXoteyo"t9 /cat avr)~ 
<Tt9 /caTa i/iv^iyv 17 p,ei> yap at<r^77crt9 So/cet Tt9 aXXota>crt9 
et^at, JLCT) e^oi' Se t/n/^ip ovOev av alorBoiTo. o/xot<i)9 Se /cat 
Trept avtfcrea)$ Kal <0tcre6)9 ^J(t* ovdev yap av^dverai ovSe 70 

dXXa TOVTO *E)it7reSo/cX^9 ov/c 

v^ortv orv//,/8at^etv TOt9 ^VTot9 /caTO) jnev Sta TO 
<vcret OVTCD <j>epO'dai ) ava* Se Sta TO Trvp. ovTe yap 
TO /cctTft) /cat ai/o) Xa/x/3az/et 6p0a>9* ov yap TO avTo e/caarov 75 
TO avw /cat TO /caT6) /cat TOV ^ravTO9" aXX* a>9 17 /ce^aXi) TaJi^ 
<i)fc)^ ovT<w9 17 pt^a TG>^ <f>vTtov IcrTLv TO Se avTo Set Xeyew 
opyavov, <Sv av r} TO avTo epyov. ert Se Tt TO crvvfyov et9 

TOVTO yap atTtoi> TO T7j9 av^<rea>9 /cat 

Tpo<j>fjs m el Se ^77, ovdev /auXvcret St -- . 80 

50. ow et ovn; incerta Torst., 70^ o^/c^T (? semideletum) Bus. || 56. O/AWS E l| 
61. Cf. ad 41 5 b, 14 || 65. ^ ante Ktvn<n$ om. E. 



lib. II, 42 1 a, 5 422 a, 23. E. fol. II, r. 

STL ov Se^o^Tat TOV depa ovS* dvairveovo'LV St* rjv 8* 
airiav erepos ecrrai Trepl avrcov Xdyos. Tlepl Se 607x779 /cat 
roS ocr<f>pavTov OVK ecrrt /aaStov Stoptcrat o/JLoias Tots 

, re eaTti> 07 607x7) OVTCOS a>s 6 t//d<o$ Kal ro <<39, 
alnov 8* OTt OUK exp/JLCis aKpififj TavTTjv *rr\v a,icr9 f ri<ri l v 9 d\\d 5 
^eCpicTTa oor/xarai avdpaiTros rw Lty<$v> KOLL ovSejaLav avev 
TOV XvTrrjpov Kal T^Seos Swarat aur#ecr#a6 ocrfjiTjv, a>s rov at- 
cr0'rfTrjpLov O^TOS OVAC a/cpi/3oGs. cScrTrep oSz/ roc? <TK\r)po<f>daX- 

<s 9 aXXa rw <j>o/3ep< KCU rw d<f>6j3a) Siopi^eiv JJLOVOV, 10 
feat ra Trepl ra acr^ds rots dvdp<&TroL<$> eTrei eot/ce 
re cx^aXoyov execz/ Trpos yeucriv /cal o/^oia r<i 61817 r<Sz/ 
yyi&Siv rots TTJS OCTJU/TJS, aXXci ri)^ yeCcrtz^ e^o/>tez^ aKpiflecrrepaT/ 
Sta TO etz^at a^yqv rtz/a avrijv ravryv 8* ej^ct T^P at- 
o~6 f qcriv a/cptySecrraT^i/ dvOptoiros* e^ /xa/ yap ratg aXXat? 15 
Xct'Trerat TroXXfiv ^wcoi/, r5v 8 s dtrrcov alcrddverai /xaXtcrra 
dxpi,j3>$. SLO KCU (frpoviptoTaTov r>v tfgwv la-rCv. 

Ck/ \ \ j^ ^\ */!' 'J' 1 * * ^> * 

O* ACat yCt/> CLVTQJV TO)V QLVU p&TTC&V V<pVL$, Ot O Ct 

etcrt Trap 3 ovSez/ atcr^TTjptoi/ Irepov cxXXa Trapa roSro. c5v 
ya/> 77 crdp jLtaXa/c-^, evcfrvels, oi Se crK\.r)p6arapKOL dfaels 20 
Stcw/otcw. ecrrt 8* tocrirep j^v/to? 6 /xei' yXv/cy? 6 8e 
/cat ocrfJLOL TOV avrbv e^ovcrai Tpovrov. aXXa ra /i 
a,vd\oyov do'p^jv /cat ^u/zor, ra Se rovvavriov. o/jtotws Se /cat 
Spt/^eta /cat avcrrrjpd /cat ofeta /cat XtTrapa ecrrtv 607x77. 
dXX* ajcrirep eiprjrai Sta TO JUT) cr^dSpa StaStjXovs el^at 
6o-fta cycTTre/o rov? ^v/zovs, d?ro rovrcov etX^^e ra OPO- 
Kaff ofJLOioryjTOi rS*v Trpay/jLaroDi/' 17 /jtev yXv/ceta /c/)d- 
/cov /cat /jteXtros, 17 Se S/ot/xeTa Ovpov /cat roS^ 
TOV avrov Se rpoTrov /cat em Taiv aXXcov. ecrrt S* 
/cat 77 a/col) /cat Kd<rrr) T&V atcr^creewi/ TOV TC d/cova-Tov 30 
/cat disrjKOvcrTov /cat oparov /cat dopdrov, /cat. 17 
crts TOV Qcr^pavTov /cat dvocrifipdvTov. dv6<r<f>pavrov Se TO 

III. 14. TatiTyv om. E. 19. TOUTO] TcrtTyv E || 20. ^ (T^tpf E (Bus.), ^ om. E 
(Torst.) || 26. ct7r6 re E || 27. /cat dAcotdr^ra E. 


Trapa TO oXws aBvisarov e)(iv ocrpriv, TO Se fJLiKpav 
/cat TO <$>av\r]v 3 toO'TTtp TO ayevcrTov oxravro)? Xeyerat. ecrrt Se 

/Cat ?7 OCT^pyCTLS Std TOV /JiZTagv, olov vSaTOS KOL de/OOS' KOU35 

yap ra ewSpa <f>aLVTai aio~0av6p*va 607x779, /cat ra evai/JLa 
/cat dVat/xa 6/>tota>9, ajcrirep /cat ra iv T< aepi* KOL yap 
TovT<av evict, troppcodev arravTa TT/OOS TTJV Tpofirjv al<r6avo- 
ocrfAyjv Sio Kal ^)(e.i asiropiav el TravTa i^ev ajcravTtog 
6 8' av0pa)7ro$ ava,7rv4a)v fjiev, fir) ava7rvea)v Sc 40 
KaT)a>v TO TTVCVILCL r) e/cTTJ/ecaz/ OVK ocr/xarat, ovre 
iroppct) ovr* eyyv5 3 ov8* av cinQr) rt? ec? TOV fJLVKTrjpa evrd?, 
t TO IJLV CTT* avr^I r<5 alcrdrjTrjpiq) TiQl^evov ava,icr6r}TOv 
KOIVQV TrdvTcov aAAa TO a^ei; TOU avairvzLv fjurj aiorda- 

ov 7rl T>V dvffptoTTtov CTTiv TOUTO Se 7retpa>/xez/ot> 45 
877X0^. L ovv Ta avcufjia fir) dvaTrvel, eTepav av TWO, ^ot 
ala'6 r r)cru> Trapa T<XS Xeyo/ie^a?. aXX* einep TTJS ocrfj,r]$ alcrdd- 
verai aSwaTOV* 17 ydyo TOV bcrtfrpavTov KOLL evcoSovs /cat 8ucr<y- 
Sovg aicrBrjcris ocrtfrpvjo'is ICTTLV. fyaiverai Se /<al <f>0eip6fjiva 

vvrb T>V Icrxyp&v 6a")a5v -v<fi SvTrep /cat ai/^/>a>7TO5, ooi^ aaxa- 50 
TOV /cal Oeiov /cat T(Sz> TQLOVTC*>V. ocrfypaivzcrdaL pevTOi vvv dvay- 
, cxXX* ov/c dvaTTveiv. cxXX' eot/ce 8ia<f>pLV TO at 
TOVTO Tots dv0ptoiroi,<s 7r/)O9 TO Tail/ aXXcov q>o)v, 
real Ta oppaTa 77/509 Ta TO>^ crKXr)po<f>0d\pa)v Tci /xev 
e>(t ircofjia /cat atcnrcp \vTpov Ta? ySXe^aptSa?, as az> /XT) 55 
/cat Kwtjo'rj, ov^ op^' 8e or/cXryyod^^aX/jta ov/c 
zvOvs opa, OTL av Te0y kv T 8ta^>a^et* OVT&) 
/cat TO ovtfrpavTiKOV alcr0r)TrjpLov Tots //.ev aKaXv<^>ov etvat, 
(Scnrep TO o/^/ta, TO is 8e Se^ojaei/ots TOV depa ej(w eTrt/caXu/JL/xa, 
o dvaTTveovTW aTro/caXvTTTecr^at, SievpvvoiLevtov T&V <f>\e/3a)v 60 
/cat TO>Z> TTO/OO)!/. /cat Stci TOVTO Ta dvarrveovra ev T> vypa> 
OVK ocr/jtaTat, OTC avay/ciy dvaTrvevcravTa 6r<f>pav0f)vai,, iv Se 
T^J vypq> aSwaTov TOVTO Trotetv. ecrTt 8* T) 6070,77 TOV ?)pov 
o ^v/xos TOV vypov* TO 8' 6o"</>pavTLKOv alcr0 f Y}T7jpLOv 

To 8e yevcTTdv ecrTtv a7rroz> Tt /cal TOVTO avriov TOV 
i} etvat alvOirjTOV Sid TOV /xeTav dXXoT/otov OI^TO? crd)fjLa- 
ovSe yd/) 77 d^Tj. /cat TO cr&fj,a, ev <5 6 xv[Ji6<$ 9 TO yev- 

40. fte^ om. E || 62. aPCMrpetfowros E || 63. TOUTO om. E || 64. r6 alffO^r^piov rb Svv. E. 


z/j, iv vypoJ o>s v\y rovro 8* OTTTOV rt. Sio /ccu> e! 

vSari cfypev, alcrffavo^ffa lfjL/3\.r)0evTO$ yXu/ceos, ov Std 70 
TOT) fjLerav Se 77//,tz> 17 atcr^crts, dXXd ra> fjLL^9fjv 
TTOTO)* TO Se )(yoct>/jta ou^ OVTCOS opa/rat T&> 
Tats aTroppotats. a>s ^e^ oSi' TO fjiera^v ovQev 

' TO oparov, ovra) yeu&rov ^v/zos. ovBev 8e Troiet 
criv x^v ai/et; vyponqros, aXV e>(et ez/epyeta TJ Swa/jtet vypo- 75 
Tyro,, OLOV TO aXpvpov rrjrcrov re yap avro KCU crvvTrjKTiKov 

T7JS y\(WTT179. c5cT7Tp KCU 17 OT/f6S e<TT6 TOV T OpOLTOV KOI 

rov aopdrov (6 yap <r/)TO5 aopaTos, KpLvei Se /cat TOVTOI^ 17 
), T6 TOT) Xtaz^ Xa/jurpov (KCLL yap TOVTO TTCO? doparov, 

rpOTrov Kal 6 o-fcoTOs)^ 6/^ot<ws Se feat 07 <XACOT) \Jjo<f>ov 80 
/cat crt5, <Sz^ TO 


lib, II, 423^ 8 4Hb, 18. E, fol. 196 r. 

eipvjrai irporepov Sri Kal SL vpevos av irdvT&v aicrdavoi- 
jJL0a T&V aTTT&v, Kav el \auv6dvoi Sieipycov, oftotcos av e^ot- 
rTTCp ^S^ e^ Tc5 vSaTt /cat e^ T^I aept" SoKOvpev ydp 
Oiyydveiv Kal ovdev el^at Sta jLtecrov. dXXa ^ia^>4pei TOVTO> 
TO- aTTTa Tc5z> 6parS)v Kal \jja<f)7)TLK&'p i oTt eK^ivtov alo'davofLeBa 5 
TGJ TO fjuera^v TTOLV ri T^/xa?, TWP S* d-TTTfiz/ ovj( VTTO TOV /ze- 
Ta|^ dXX," ajita TG> /juera^v, wcrTrep ot 8ta T^S dcrTrtSo? 77X77- 
ouSc yap 77 ao-TTt^ rrhqyeicra eTrdroL^ev, dXX* <x//,a d/x- 
eprf 7T\7)yfjvai,. oXa5 8* eot/ce /cat 77 crap^ Kat 77 yXaiTTa, 
&5 6 a7)p /cat TO vSa>p Trpos rrjv o\tyiv Kal rrjv aKorjv Kal 10 
rjCTLv e^ovcrt^, OVTCJS c^eiv Trpbs TO aicrdrfT'yjpiov acr- 
KeCva*v Ifcao-Tov. avTOv Se Toi) al<rdr)T7)piov GLTTTO^VOV 
OVT* e/cet OVT* a/TavOa yeisot/r av atar^crt?. oto^ t Tts TO 
<ra>/xa TO \GVKOV eTTt TOW o/L/^aTos ^t77 TO ecr^aTor. 7j /cat 877 Xoi> 
OTt IZ^TO? TO Tot) aTTTOv alcrdrjTiKov. ovrco ydp av crvpfiai- 15 

Z'Ot O7Tp 7Tt TO)V aX\O)V C7TLTL0[JLVOV ydp CTTt TO atO-^TTJ- 

ovfc atcr^dvcTat, 7rt Se TT}V crdp/ca 7rtTt^e/xvov atcr^d- 
' COCTT fjLeragij dpa rov dirriKov 77 crap (XTTTat /xe^ oSz/ 
at 8ta<^>opat TOV orco^aTOS TJ croi/jta* Xeyco 8e 

70. afodavotpeQ' &v coni. Torst. |[ 74. r6 ^ev^rbv coni. Torst. || IV. 8. oi>W] oih- E. 


at ra crroixeta S top to vert, deppov Kal \j/v^pov Kal ^rjpov Kal 20 
vypoz>, Trepi &v eipyrai irpoTepov iv rot? -rrept T<V CTTOI^LO^V. TO Se 
^Tijpiov avTcov ro airriKOV, Kal e v & 77 KaXovpevr) d<pr) vTrdp- 

TTpCOTCp, TO 8wd/JLL TOLOVTOV e<TTt fJLOpLOV TO yap alo~0d- 

6^ Tt ecrTW* cScrre TO TTOIOVV olov CLVTO IvepyeLa, 


r) ^vyjpov rj crK\.rjpov r) />caXafco5 OVK aicr0av6fji0a, aXXa 
T>V vTrepfioX&v, cws av TTJS accr^creo)? olov juecroT^Tos rti/o? 

T7j$ ^ TOIS ai<Tdr)Tol<$ evavTioxrea)?. KCU Sta TOVTO 
TO, aiordyjTci. TO yap fjiecrov KpiTiKov yiverai yap 

vv avT&v Qa.Te.pov TCOV aKpcov Kal Set cScrTrep TO 30 
fji\\ov KevKOv alorddvecrOai rj jiLeXai/o? ^Serepoz/ etvac 
yeta, aXXa Swa^ei, OVTCO Sr) KCU eirl TCOV d\X<ov KCU eirl 
a^-yj? JLC^TC depfjibv JLL^TC ifjv^pov. eri S 3 cScrTrep TOU T opaTov /cat 
TOV dopaTov rjv TTCO? 17 ot/ft9, O/JLOLGJS Se /cat at aXXac T<3&> d^Tt- 


Se TO TC {JiLKpav udfJiTrav fyov Sia<f>opav TOJV dirTtov, olov 
7r.7rov8zv o dijp, Kal at v-rrepjSoXal T>V diTTcov, tocnrep TOL 
<>0apTiKd. Ka0* eKacrTrjv IJLV ovv alcrdifjcriv etpTyTat a>s ev 
TVTTG* et-Trecv. 

Ka^oXov Se ^rept Trdcrrjs atcr^Tjorecos Set Xa/8eti> oTt r) 40 

ecrTt TO Se/cTt/cov T<3z/ accr^Taiv az/ev T^9 
, ofov 6 Kr)pos TOV SaKTvXiov dvev TOV criStfpov Kal TOV 
Se^eTat TO cnrfiAGLOV, XafjijSdvei, Se TO ^a\Kovv 77 XP V ~ 
crovv <r7)p,iov, aXX* ov^ fj ^aX/cos r) ^pvcro9. o/xota>9 Se 
/cat 17 ator^crts l/cacrT^ VTTO TOV e^oi'TO? ^p<3/>ta 77 i/rd^ov 45 
7) yypov Trao^et, aXX' ov^ 77 GKO.OTOV Kiva)v XeyeTat, aXX* 
27 TotwSe /cat /caTa TW Xoyoi>. ai<T0r)TrjpLOv Se 7rpa>TOv, eV 
<5 77 TOLavTf) Swa/^t9. ecrTt /xev ovi' TO avTo, TO S* ctz/at ere- 
poj'* /xeye^os /xev yap av Tt et77 TO al<r6avo^vov* ov jae^Tot 
TO ye ai<r0v)TLK<p elvat, r) aio-dtfcret, /xeye^ee, ICTTIV eT^at, aXXa Xo- 50 
yos Tts /cat Swa//,i9 e/cetvov. <f>avepov S* e/c TOVTG)^ *cal Sta 
Tt TTOTe T6>v alcr6^TO)v ai vTrep/SoXal <f>0ipovcri, Tag atcr^- 
cretg- az/ yap Tj 77 /ctz^crts tcrj^vpoTepa TOV aio-0rjT'r)pLOV, Xve- 
Tat 6 Xoyos, TOVTO S* 77^ atcr^crt?, axrTrepavel 77 

20. a?$ E |1 24. crop om. E. || 27. &s ft^ rou a,l<r$T)Tir)ptov rys cUe-Qfaew E || 29. 
ylverat ybp irpbs om. E || 32. 5^] 5 E [| 37. ATTTWI/ focurroi, wirep E || 54. ^ ^ coni. Torst. 


via Kal 6 TWOS a~<f>6Spa KpovofLevoiv T<OV ^opScSv. Kal Sid 55 
ri Trore rex <j>vra OVK alo-ddverai, ityovTd TL popLov t/n^i- 
KOV Kal TrdcrxovTa VTTO TOJV aiTTtov' Kal yap i/ar^erac KCLL 

anov Sc TO *r iv J cecroT7ra, //Te rotav- 

olav Toi eiSrj reap aicrdrfra^y Se^ecrdaL 9 d\Xoi 
fj,era T'yjs vX.7)$ TTOLCT^LV. dTropyjoreie 8' av rts, apa ird6oi CMS 60 
VTT oorfjiTjg TO /Jirj vv&nvov ocnfrpavdrjvou,, rj VTTO ^ptw^aaro? TO 
/XT) Swa/jtevov u$U>' 6/jtoteos Se KOLL CTTI TOJV aXXcu^. et 8* 77 
6cr/x/y) ro ocrfypavrov, el rt Troiei, TTJV OCT^PTJO-LV TTOII OOT^TJ. 
oScrre ovQev TrQ.vyf.Lv r&v dSvvdrwv oo~<f>pav0'fjvai. 6 8' av- 

\ \/ \9\ V\\ . ^N ^^ ^ \\T-' 

ro5 Aoyos Acat 7rt r<y^ aAAa)^ ovoe rct)^ ovva.TO)v, aAA, ^-^5 
ai<T0'y)TLKOv eKacrrov. a/jia Se 877X0^ /cat ovrcos. oure yap 
\po<f)05 ovre TO <f)<2<s KOL cr/coro? OVTC 77 oor/iTl) ovBev Trote? ra 
9 aXX* e^ ofs ICTTIV, olov dr/p 6 ftcra rijg fipovTrjs 
e TO v\ov. aXXa 877 ra d^rrd /cat oi -^V/JLOL TTOIOVCTW el 
yap fj/rf, VTTO TLVOS Kv Tracr^ot TO, dijjv^a rj dXXoio^TO ; ap* 70 
ovv KaKeiva iroiei; 77 oi) TTGLV craS/jia ira6r)TiKov VTT" oa'fJL'fjs 
Kal \}j6<l>ov Kal rot irdcrfcovTa dopicrra, /cal ov i^evei, OLOV 
drfp* o^et yap a>5 Tradtov TL. TL o$v eorrl TO ocr/jtacr^at wapd 
TO Trdcr^eLV TL; r) TO fjiev ocr^ao-Oai Kal aicrddvecrOa^ 6 8* 

TOVTO TO)(V alcrffriTos yiyveTai. 1$ 

59. dtov E |j 61. ^ om. E || 63. -fj fop.'/) com. Torst. || 71. ^ om. E || 74. /cai] at E. 



<4O2 a 1 2222. In this introductory chapter A. first touches upon the 
importance and utility, especially for physics, of an enquiry into the soul, and 
next enlarges upon the difficulties besetting such an enquiry. Its object is to 
determine the nature of the soul and its essential attributes [ i]. There is the 
general logical difficulty, viz., the absence of any uniform recognised method of 
obtaining definitions and the uncertainty as to the premisses from which the 
investigation should start [ 2]. 

402 a i Twv...4 Ti6eti]|jiv. Universam hanc periodum sic recte inter- 
preteris : Quarum rerum cognitio pulchra et honore digna est, earum etiam 
investigatio est pulchra et honore digna : quarum igitur ilia magis est honore 
digna, earum et haec. At pulcherrima facile est animae cognitio : pulcherrima 
igitur etiam investigatio eius quid sit (Torstrik, p. 112). According to Philop. 
(24, 3 sqq., 17 sqqO these apparently harmless propositions caused Alex. Aphr. 
so much perplexity that he condemned as spurious the whole passage a i paXXov 

,..3 elvai and explained Si" a^orepa rarira as Sia ro Ka\r)V rtfMLav etvai. If the 
report is correct, Alexander's suspicions must have been aroused because he 
supposed the supremacy of metaphysics to be challenged and even the place 
claimed for psychology among the natural sciences to be inconsistent with 
such passages as, e.g., Eth. JVic. 1141 a 33 b 2. See note on 402 a 4 4v 

a i. TWV icoXav Kal Tijifov TPV ctS-rjo-iv. The partitive genitive becomes a 
predicate here after v7ro\ap{3dvoi>Ts. This is fairly common with to/at, e.g. 
infra 402 a IO ccrri T&V ^aXcTrcordrcDv, 417 a 24, 422 a 6. So also with yiyvea-Oai, 
Pol. 1304 a 1 6 yev6jjLvos TG>V dpx6vT<w, as in other writers ; with iroietv, Rhet. u. 
23 II, 1398 b 13 AaK8ai/j,6vioi XtXo>i>a r>v yepovrav eiroirj<rav ; with nQ^vai^ 
TiQea-Qai, ypdcfreiv [Kiihner-Gerth, Gr. Gr. 418, p. 375]. After tJ7roXa/jL/3ai/iv 
A. omits upon occasion the infinitive [here i/at], thus converting the verb into 
one of incomplete predication, and assimilating its construction to that of T&ivai 
(405 b 1 8, 26), TiQevQai (405 a 15), ITOLCIV (404 b 10, 31, 405 b 13 sq., 19), KaXelv 
(405 b 28 sq.) when similarly used. Thus, to confine ourselves to I., c. 2, the 
infinitive elvai after V7ro\afj.(3dvei,v is found 403 b 31, 404 a 8, 22 sq. and omitted 
404 b 8, 405 a 5, 20, b 7. The same freedom of construction is permitted with 
Xeyetv, see 404 a 5, 21 compared with 26. For TI\L(G>V cf. 430 a 18 sq., Zte Part. 
An. I. 5, 644 b 22 645 a i, Metaph. 1074 b 21 (where it is an attribute of vovs) 7 
26, 30 (where it is applied to the object of thought). 

The rare word ctSTjo-is is apparently used by A. here only. It may be his 
own coinage, for, though occurring in Theophrastus (e.g. frag. LXXXIX. 4), in 
scholiasts on Homer and Sophocles, and, as might be expected, in commentators 
like Philop., it seems to have found little favour. Later it was affected by 
Clement of Alexandria and Sextus Empiricus. Hesychius explains it by yvS><Ti$, 
and like yvSxri^ 402 a 5, it is a comprehensive, general term for knowledge of 

174 NOTES I. i 

any and every kind. Cf. Ind. Ar. 158 b 42 pro synonymis vel in eodem 
sententiae contextu vel in iisdem formulis yvw/nfeiv, yiyvoxj-Kav, yv&viv Xa/z/3d- 
VCLV, p.av8dviv, cidevai, errtVrao-tfai leguntur. In 402 b 1 6 sqq. yv&vcu, tfeopTjcrat, 
KaTidciv, flbevai) yv<op[eiv are used in succession. Like other verbal nouns in -is 
e'ldr)<ris is strictly the act or process of knowing, as vorja-is is thinking, iroiijcris 
producing, CIKOVO-LS hearing, opegis longing, avgrjo-is growing, vvvQwis combining, 
though sometimes the strict sense is not maintained, o\l?i$ and aicrSrjo-is being 
notoriously ambiguous. 

a I, 2. jxoXXov 8" Prepay er^pas. Supply ra>v KO\G>V /cat ri/uW. Cf. Metaph. 
996 b 1 6 O.VT>V Be TQVT&V erspov erepov fiaXXoi' [int. eldevai (pa/Mev]. A. is fond of 
arranging kinds of knowledge in a scale of increasing dignity or intrinsic worth. 
Thus in Metapk. 980 a 27 981 a 12 and AnaL Post. IT. 19, 99 b 34 100 a 9 
we have such a scale of knowledge rising from sense-perception through 
memory and experience to art, and finally to science (<?V 10-1-77/^7). The sciences 
themselves are variously classified. See AnaL Post. I. 13, 78 b 34 79 a 6. 
In Metaph. 1026 a 18 23 a scheme of three theoretical sciences is projected in 
outline, First Philosophy (called ^eoXoyt/c^) is the highest, next comes Mathe- 
matics, next Physics, 1064 b i 6. Cf. Top. vm. i, 157 a 8 TO de faaipctcrQai 
TQLOVTOV olov ort 7ri<TTr)jj.Tj 7ricrT7)p.7]s jSeXrtwj/ rj r< d.KpL/3eo-Tpa clvai rj ra> 

a 2. Ko/r 1 etKpCpeiav. The meaning of the term varies according as it is 
applied to aTrd&et^s 1 or iri<rrf)prj. (i) The rigorous accuracy of a demonstration 
depends upon the correctness of the reasoning and the truth of the premisses, 
In sciences which deal with the contingent it often happens that premisses and 
therefore conclusions are only general, not universal, truths. The rigorous 
accuracy of mathematical proof is not to be looked for in ethics (Eth* NIC. 
1094 b ii 27) because the premisses are contingent. Cf. 1104 a i 6. In this 
sense all scientific reasoning and all theoretical science is exact, and to a*/n- 
/Se'crrepov SCIKVVVCU, Metaph. 1064 a 6 sq., is opposed p,a\aK.&Tpov &etKi/vi/cu, to 
reason loosely or inconclusively. But (2) in another sense dKpiftrjs is applied 
to a science or knowledge in respect not of the proof but of the method 
of treatment employed. It then means "abstract," like dTrXofo, and it is 
implied that the objects with which such a science deals are themselves 
by comparison more abstract, more simple and logically prior ; for aKplfteia 
is a relative term. Thus of First Philosophy, the highest of the sciences, 
and also the most abstract, A. says (Metaph. 982 a 25) : " Those amongst 
the sciences are most exact which have especially to do with the first 
causes, for the sciences which start from fewer premisses are more exact 
than those which are complicated with additional determinations : Arith- 
metic, for example, is more exact than Geometry." On this Bonitz ad loc^ 
"aKp//3etav sive exactam et omnibus numeris perfectam cognition em turn maxime 
possumus consequi, cum in simplicissimis versainur notionibus. Simplicissimae 
autem notiones eaedem maxime sunt universales et summae et sua natura 
primae...Itaque aKpifteiav praecipuam qui tribuunt sapientiae [i.e. First Philo- 
sophy], earn referre debent ad prima et simplicissima rerum genera." Ib. 1078 a 9 
Kal o<r<p drj &v irepl irpor^pottv TO> Xdy<jt> KCW dTrXovcrrfpcov [sc. eTrtorriJftT; ecrrt], rocrovrc) 
L TaKptpte' TOVTO 8e r& dir\ovv <rriv. &cnr aveu T f^eyeOovs /u,5XXoz> rj 
pey46ovs 9 KOI fidXurra avev KWT}ar<&s, eaj/ Sc Kivrjo-iv^ /iaXtcrra rrjv yrp&rrjv 
yap, <al ravrrjs y 6pa\r). 6 d* avros \6yos Kal rrepl dpfjLOvtKrjs KOL 
ovdercpa yap ft %-fyt$ y fi <f>a>vr) Sc&pei, dXX s fj ypappal Kal dpi0p.oi* otxeta 
rara Trd&rj CKCLV&V. Kal rj fjirjxaviKr) 8c wo-avTcos 1 . First Philosophy con- 
siders its objects, qua existent, as possessing but one attribute, that which is 

I. I 402 a r 402 a 4 175 

postulated in all the rest; Arithmetic regards its objects as numerable, but 
takes no account of extension; Geometry complicates its investigations by 
regarding its objects, CK Trpoo-tfeo-eow, not only as numerable, but also as ex- 
tended. All mathematical sciences are more abstract than the physical sciences, 
for the former treat their objects as unmoved, while physics takes account 
of motion. Optics does not deal with the physiological properties of vision, 
nor harmonics with those of voice : the former treats the ray of light as a line, 
the latter a chord as the ratio of two numbers : and so on. It often happens 
that the more abstract science discovers the cause which is necessary to explain 
the facts investigated by a more concrete science. AnaL Post. I. 27, 87 a 31 
*AKp4/3e<rrepa 8' 7ri<TTf}fj,r) f-marTrjiJ.Tjs /cat Trporepa (l) fj re rov orCKal Siori 77 CLVTT;, dXXa 
/-"? X^P^ S r v OTL T *l s T v &o r *? K 0* (2) ^ /**? KO>& vrroKeijjLevov rrjs KO.&* v-rroK.tfjLvoV) olov 
dpi6fJ.7)TiKr) &pjj,oviK.r}, KOL (3) f) e eXarrovccv rfjs K 7rpo<r0ecre6>$, olov 

Xeya> " CK TrpocrQecre&s, olov povas ova-la aQero?, cmy^r] de ovaia 
K irpoa-Geo-eas. Of these three conditions it is easy to see that the 
last is the most fundamental and that the others rest upon it. Trendelenburg's 
translation " quod vel acrius ingenii acumen requirit " has no sort of justifi- 
cation, and the discrepancy which he discovers between these words and 
a 10 is imaginary. First philosophy is at once the most abstract and the 
most difficult of the sciences (Metaph. 982 a 24 sq.), and psychology presents 
more difficulties than the other biological sciences precisely because it is 
more abstract than the rest. Its a/cp#?eia is relative. In AnaL Post. II. 19, 
99 b 33 A. speaks hypothetically of a (dvvajus) TOVT&V rifueorepa *car' aKpiftsiav, 
and ib. 99 b 27 of aKptfavrepas yvd>(ri? d7rodfigea>?. Of course as a matter of 
fact (100 b 8) oudcv cTTtcrTrjjj.rjs O.K pipe ore pov. Plato, Philebus 59 D, uses of vovs 
and <j>povr)o-is the words & y ca> TLS TL^o-eLe /urXicrr* ovo^ara and aTT^/cpt/Soo/iei/a. 

a 2 4j r$...3 etvai. The subject-matter (TO eVtcrnjToV, the province or yfros 
with which the science deals) also helps to determine the place of a science in 
the scale, quite independently of the question whether the treatment is abstract 
or concrete. For this reason in the realm of Nature the sciences which deal 
with the Trpcorov crT-ot^eloi/, &<t>6apTOv, dycvrjrov, KvxXtp <poprjr6v 9 rank higher than 
the rest : De Cael. ill. r, 298 b 6 sqq. Cf. Metaph. 1026 a 21 KOL TTJV n/zicaranjv 
(sc. eirio-Tijf&Tjv) Set Trept TO TI/ZICOTCITOV ycvos ctvat. Ib. 1064 b 5 jSfXrtcov Se KOLL 
Xetp&v Kao~rrj Xeyerat KOTO. TO ol<iov sTrio-TrjTov. The genitive of relation ex- 
pressing the object of a cognition, as of any other mental act, may be freely 
illustrated from the terminology of this treatise in reference to sensation and 
the sensible object. Cf., e.g., 418 a 13, 26, 421 b 4 -6, 422 a 2029, 422 b 23 
25, 424 a 10 12, 426 b 8, 434 b 18, 

as. 8t' dp,<j>oT6pa TOVTO, "for both these reasons," i.e. for its exactitude 
(aKpifteia) and for the importance of its subject-matter. In this treatise our 
subject is ro eptyvxw $v 27 p*lrvxov, and we deal preeminently with the form 
(which is a.Kiv7)Tov) not with the matter ; and in proportion as we do this 
we regard the ep^x ov ov not concretely as made up of crdp, oorroOv, vevpov^ 
and the like, but abstractly as living, moving, perceiving, thinking, these 
attributes being due to soul as cause. Cf. notes inf. on a 9. 

a 4. urroptav loco nostro non esse eandem ac TTJV et&jo-u', sed significare 
indagationem et investigationem, ex universi prologi ratione intelligitur : omnia 
enim spectant ad viam ac rationem qua ad animae cognitionem perveniatur 
(Torst.). A. modestly styles the science which he is inaugurating a study : an 
enquiry concerning soul. As applied to his Natural History, fcn-opiat Trept 
f<j>W, the term denotes researches undertaken and materials collected to serve 
as the basis of a future science. 

176 NOTES i. i 

a 4. v irpwTois, relatively to other natural sciences. Cf. De CaeL m. 7, 
306 a 27 sq.j where mathematics are styled al aKpiftlo-rarai, fVtcrr^/xat. The only 
conceivable ground on which absolutely first rank can be claimed for psychology 
is the doctrine of vovs xot>purr6s 430 a 17, but I cannot see that A. makes the 

a 5. irpos dXijOetav a/irao-av. How necessary it is for practical philosophy 
can be seen from Eth. Nic. i. 13. (Cf. Them, i, 20 2, 6 H., 2, 18 28 Sp.) 

a 6. ?rpos r^v cfwcriv, to the study of nature, of which biology was and is a 
main department. The importance of soul as Trrjyr} Kal dpxfj Travis KivTja-eas, 
t&a>$ fj.ev Kal rracri rolff cra>jLia<rt, ftaXtrrra e rols 1 r<i> (pa>v Kal ra>v <pvr>v (Them. I.e.), 
will be greatest to the science, viz. tpvcriKrj, which treats its subject-matter so 
far as it is capable of motion \Metaph. 1026 a 12]. &rrt -yap, sc. TJ ^xn- fo" 
^PX 1 !' More explicitly 41 3 b II ecrrlv 17 tyvxn ra>v elprfjjLsvouv rovrav dpx^ Ka * L 
rovroLS <iopto-rat, 6pTrrtKcp, alcrfyriKCft 8t,avor]TiK&, KLvrjcrei. For the proof see 
415 b 8 41 6 a 1 8, where the various senses in which soul is rov >vros o-co/xaros- 
am'a Kal apxn are discriminated and we are plainly told that the bodies of 
animals and plants are instruments of the soul (415 b 18 sq.). Why olov ? 
Confuse legends (Zabarella) : cf. 414 a 9 ofoi> evepyeia. The mode of expression 
should mislead no one : A. firmly holds that soul is apxfj, as that health I.e. is 
vepyeia. It remains to be seen in what precise sense soul is dpxn- If we 
compare the expression ras ev v\rjs eidci alrLas applied to the dpxai of the Ionian 
philosophers (Metaph. 984 a 17), we may perhaps see a characteristic reserva- 
tion for which the vagueness of the prevailing views (cf. i., c. 2) is responsible. 

a 7 4iTLt i nTov( virapxetv. In this section A. maps out his enquiry. 
If there is a science of soul it must conform to the conditions laid down in 
Anal. Post, for all sciences and particularly for all physical sciences, as it is 
plainly a branch of physics. On the formal side the main work of the enquirer 
will be to delimit his province, to define it and to deduce the essential properties : 
Anal. Post. I. 7, 75 b 7 sq., Metaph* 1004 b 7 fKfivrjs TTJS eVicmyp;* (e'crrt) /cat rt 
earn yvcapt'crat /cat ra crv^e^Kora avrols. 

a 7. 0ecopfjcrai Kal -yvwvai. Kat explicative = " that is," yv&vai being the 
more general term. As to de&petv see Ind. Ar. 328 a 40 apud animum con- 
templari. The precise and specialised meaning can be best gathered from 
De A. itself, esp. 417 a 21 b 26 and 432 a 8 sq. : in particular, to apply know- 
ledge already acquired, evcpyelv Kara rrjv eVtcrrTj/zT/j/ 41 2 a 9 n, 25 sq., 417 a 
28 sq., b S sq. Here, however, the verb is used more generally without any such 
implication, the two terms 6. and y. being as nearly synonymous as in 402 b 17 
except that even in this unrestricted sense Qf&pctv is always an active operation, 
not a latent capacity. It is the act of apprehending by mental vision (and so 
a-KOTrelcrSai, cVtcTKOTretv are synonyms): e.g. Phys. III. 5, 204 b 4, 10 Xoyt,K&$ 
pev aK07roi>/iei/oi...(ucriKoff 5c 0ea>po<r/..., Metaph. 1003 a 21, 23, 1004 b I sq. 
Cf. Anal. Post. I. 18, 8l b 2 dftvvarov de ra /catfoXou Bcapijcrai ft^ i s 7raya>yrjs y errei 
Kal ra if a<f>aip areas \ ecrrai $L 7ray&yrjs yvwpijia TTOLCLV. 

a 8. Kal T-IIV ovorfav, "that is to say, its essence": /cat again explicative. 
Ind. Ar. 545 b 23 pariter atque cldos vel \6yos cum ova-La syn conjungitur Averts, 
Metaph. 1014 b 36, 1070 a 9, 12, 1031 a 30, b i, De Part. An. n. i, 646 a 25 sq. 
De CaeL II. 4, 286 b II rg ova-ia Kal rfj </>i5<r, Phys. II. I, 1 93 a 9 ^ Averts /cat 17 
ovata, Metaph. 1053 b 9 Kara rf)v ova-Lav Kal ryv <f>vcriVi ib. 1019 a 2 Kara <f>vartv 
Kal ova-lav, 1064 b II. Our first task is to discover rt eVr> rj \l/vx^ We 
must obtain a definition which will express its "essential nature." This last 
expression, retained in modern writings, attests how completely $>v<ris and ovcria 
in the sense here intended are synonymous. 

I. I 402 a 4 a 8 177 

a 8. te*=next in order. Z. contrasting 415 a 1416 remarks : hie loquitur 
de ordine doctrinae, ibi de 'via, non de ordine. Z. further maintains that this 
programme is so far carried out that the whole of De A. treats properly of the 
ri fern, the nature of soul, its crvfjLpefirjKora or accidents being reserved for the 
Parva Naturalza* appealing to De Sensu 436 a i 5. But Z. is obliged to admit 
that in in. cc. 48 the treatment of intellect is exhaustive, including properties 
as well as essential nature. There is no need to lay such stress on this formal 
division of the task before us. Every science must delimit its y'z/os-, and define 
its subject, before it can proceed to deduce the essential properties : Metaph. 
1003 a 21 26, b 19 22, 1004 b 58, 1017, 1025 b 3 sqq., esp. b 5 13 and 
1063 D 36 1064 a 7, which is a convenient summary of Metaph. E. i. 

a 8. o<rtt <ru|i,p^pt)K, i.e. all essential attributes, often styled ra K.aff avra a-u^e- 
prjKQTa and (Anal. Post, and Metaph^} TO. Ka6* avra VTrap^ovra, also (402 a 15) ra 
Kara o~vp(3pT)KQs i'Swx ( = properties). The usual example is the property of a 
triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles (402 b 20). This forms no- 
part of the definition, but can be deduced from it. Ind. Ar. 713 b 43 inde 
crv^aiveiv, avp^^7j<vai, o-uppeprjkos id dicitur, quod cum non insit ipsi alicuius- 
rei notioni, tamen concludendo ex ea necessario colligitur. It is not enough 
that a science should delimit its province and obtain a definition. From this 
definition it must deduce all the essential properties of the subject under investi- 
gation. We shall presently see (402 b 16 403 a 2) that essence and properties 
are mutually implicated, and that in some cases the study of the property is the 
best road to the determination of the essence. In this treatise there are various 
designations and enumerations of the attributes of soul (or, more correctly, 
of the animate being which possesses the soul qu& animate), e.g. pya KOI irddr] 
(409 blS, cf. 407 b 1 8), evepyeiai <al Trpdfeis (415 a 19), iradrnLora (403 a II, cf. 
403 a 5 7, 1 6 1 8, 411 a 26 b 5). Cf. De Sensu i, 436 a i 18. They are 
seldom styled o-v/i/SejSTjKora. See, however, 409 b 14. In general terms, what- 
ever the possessor of soul does or suffers in virtue of such possession, 411 b 2 sq. 
TTOLovjjiev re KOI IT ao")(o\t.v ( c f- 43 a 6 sq. Tcaxr^eiv ov8e 7rotiv), A. regards as a 
"function" or operation of soul. 

In this well-established sense <7Vftj3e/9j;Kop=(rv^tj3. <aff avro, But the term is 
ambiguous, and is more commonly used by A. to denote something quite 
different, i.e. an accident, a purely fortuitous attribute, white and musical in 
man being the stock instances (Ind. Ar. 714 a 20). As o-vju^e^jedra in this 
latter sense are never necessary, are neither universal nor even general attri- 
butes, they do not fall under demonstrative science. Metaph* 1025 a 14 <rvfj.ftc$r)K.b* 

\lyerai o virdpxei JJLCV rtvt K.CLL dXrjQes clireiv, ov pevTOL O$T e dv&yKrjs o#r* eirl TO 
TroXv, olov el ris 6pvTTo>v <f>vT<p fioQpov cvpc 0T](ravp6v ; 1026 b 27 37. Compare 
for the two meanings JPhys. I. 3, 186 b 17 el yap M o-rrep ov ri, o-v/i/Se^Kora 
<rrai. rj ofiv T< dvQp&ircp rj aXXd> rtvi uiroKi]jtv&...crvfji(3cl3rjK6s re yap \4ycrai 
rovro, rj o cVde^frat vndpx^v K.OL pf) -i)irdpx fLV [accident proper, non-essential 
attribute], rj ov v r<S Xoyco evu^rdp^ct TO ^ crv/xjQcjS^icev, rj ev & o \6yos virdpxei 
$ o-VfJLpeftijKCV, olov TO p,cv Ka0rjo-0ai wr x a> P i t J ' VOV 9 *** $* r w^ vtrdpx^ o \6yos 
6 Tijf pivos 27 <papev o~vp,pcpr)Kvai TO <rt/tov. Anal. Post. I. 22, 83 b 17 24 
viroKciTai $e cv K.a&* evbs KaTrjyopeLcrdaij avra 5c avrfav, ocra pr) TL com, pr) Karrj* 
yoptcr6at. (rvp,^^rjK6Ta ydp ecrrt Travra, aXXa ra p,ev icaQ* avra, ra de ica^' erepov 
Tpoirov * ravra de irdvTa Ka6* viroK.eip.evov TWOS K.arrjyopelcr$aL (frafiev, TO dc arvpfte- 
ftrjKOf OVK etvai VTrOKeipevov rt. ovo'cv yap T&V TOLOVTO>V Ti&e^Lcy eiyat, o ovx Tp6v 
TL "ov \4yeToi b Xeycrai, aXX* avTo aXXoiff, *al aXX' arra K.a&* eTepov [i.e. aXX* avro 
SC. TO o-vjJipepTjKos, aXXots- SC. o-u/ijSe^Kevai 0a/*v Acal aXX* arra <a& erepov- 
SC. Kari/yopeicr^aJ. Cf. Phys. VIII. 5, 256 b 9 sq. ov yap dvayxalov TO 

H. 12 

i;8 NOTES I. i 

<IXX* evdcxopwov p.f) clvcu. eav o$v Q&pev TO bvvarbv t/ai, ovSeV advvarov 
rai, ^edos $' taw. iwpl cw-rrjv, i.q. TT)V ^rux^ v - The usual construction with 
<ruppaiviv as with virapxeiv is the dative, 402 b 18 rods overiW. Properties 
belong to or go with the things of which they are predicated. For the variant 
with frepl c. ace. cf. Metaph. 997 a 29 -rrepl etao-rov yevos, 33 frepl rrjv OL>criai>, 
De Part. An. I. 5, 645 b I ra <ru//-/3ej377/cora irepl CKCLCTTOV yevos, ocra <a0' aura... 

a 9. <v rd |JV...SOKC. As a logical term TraQos, li 
denotes an attribute: Metaph. 1037 b 16 orav vTrdpxtl [sc. Qarepa ddrepov] /cat 
Tratfi; ro vTroKeLpevov i cf. 403 a 17, 25, 403 b 17 and ^/^. Regarded as 
attributes of a subject, v-rroKeipevov, the active operations, no less than the 
passive affections, of soul are idta traB^ as they are o-v/i/Se/^/edra icafl* aura : and 
this applies to all the acts or operations enumerated 411 a 26 sqq. See also 
417 a 14 sqq., b 12 sqq., 431 a 6 sq. On the surface the words before us imply 
that there are thought (So<ft) to be properties of soul which are not properties 
of the animal to whom the soul belongs. What are they ? ^ OV ^P^ V X OV f/^ 
and when the question arises below (403 a 3-^10) A, inclines to the view that 
there are none such. 

a 9. rd 8fe SL* kKctvr\v ical roDs frpois virapxeiv. This is the normal type of attri- 
butes of soul, whether active operations or passive states. As expressed below, 
403 a 3 10, the body as well as the soul shares in them, and therefore their 
definition ought to take account of the body (403 a 16 27), and psychology 
becomes a branch of physics (403 a 27 b 7) ; in other words this second class 
of attributes or " states " of soul are ax^p^ra TTJS (pvcriKfjs V\TJS r&v (<QV 
(403 b 17). If so, the subject, v7roK.cLp.cvov, to which they belong is properly 
the animal (o>ov l/i^vx oj/ )> anc ^ we are often reminded that such is really the 
fact, e.g. 408 b 13 15, 411 b 2 *roioi)/z/ 77 ird<rxp>v, 415 b 8, H, 416 b 22, 
434 b 12; cf. Metaph. 1038 b 5 8<>X** S vrrdicwa*, 7 rode ri ov &or7re/> ro <uoi> rots- 
Tra0*(TH/, rj KTC. 

a 10. 4<rrl TWV xaXe-n-wTdTtov, i.q. earl x a ^ 7r< *> TaTOV - This predicative use 
of the partitive gen. has become a mere trick of style, e.g. PoL 1339 a 17 ra)ra 
yap K.a.6* avra p.v ovre T&V cryrov8aiG)v aXX* r/d4a- Cf. T*V adwar^v eartV, Pol* 
1287 b 22, 1294 a I, 1329 a 9 ; eo-rl r>v auayKaiorarcoi/, ^*3. 1273 a 32. Occasion* 
ally the fuller form is retained as below, 406 a 2 %v rt r>v abwdr^v. Cf. PoL 
1291 a 8, 1332 b 32, 1340 b 23 sq. ; Ind. Ar. 149 b 2 ; Waitz ad Top, iv. 2, 
121 b 36. 

a n. Xaptvrivd irCo-riv. As generally, Xa^elv means to "get," "ascertain J7 or 
"find out," just as x iv== ^ have as a result of enquiry (cognovisse). TriVri?, 
like Latin fides^ is trustworthy information, or "ground of belief." 

a ii Kal -ydp...i2 T^pots. Why the enquiry is so difficult is now explained; 
yap introduces the reason, which, stated in the briefest terms, is the absence of 
any uniform logical method of obtaining a real definition. The complaint is 
familiar to the readers of Anal. Post,, much of Bk n. of that work being devoted 
to pointing out the defect and proposing various ways of remedying it. iroXXote 
4rpois, masculine, other enquirers, distinct from 6 irepl fax^s etno-KOTr&v. 

a 12. TOV irepl Tifjv ovc-fciv Kal TO T lrTi, sc. ^r^aroff, Xe-ya) having no effect 
upon the construction, /cat is again explicative, ovo-ia is now glossed by ro ri 
ctm as just before (a 7) by <j>vcri$. ri ea-ri has become a sort of indeclinable 
noun. Cf. TC ?jv civai and various prepositional phrases, e.g. Ka0* tKacrrov, 
K.a66\ov. Ind. Ar. 763 b 10 qui quaerit rt eo-n is ipsam rei naturam quaerit, 
non quaerit eius accidentia. ad earn quaestionem, qua respondetur formula TO 
-rt eWf nominis vim induit, cuius usus eandem habet varietatem, ac verbi elvat et 


402 a 8 a 15 179 

nominis ova-La. But the answer to the question ri eo-n is wider than a true 
definition. It might be any rough description sufficient to identify the thing in 
question provided it excluded everything merely unessential or accidental, 
leaving only what is dvayKalov. Thus the genus will answer the question ri 
CO-TI, but without the differentia would not be a complete definition. See below 
a 23, where the summa genera are meant, and Top. I. 5, 102 a 31 35. Compare 
Top. VI. 5, 142 b 27 TO 6V yevos ftovXerai TO rl ICTTL en? paw civ, /cat 7rpS>rov virorLQerai 
T>V cv r 6pto-ftc5 \>v. Or again, either V\TJ or TO crvvoXov e v\rjs KOL e'&ovs 
would answer the question ri eWt, but would not furnish the definition we seek. 
We arrive at the true definition when we have collected all that can be thus 
predicated of the thing iv T ri ecmv, and arranged these various parts in the 
proper order. Ind. Ar. 763 b 47 si quis ra 4v TG> rl eVri Kar^yopov^eva et omma 
compleverit et suo ordine posuerit, TO rl rjv elvcu. vel TOI> opia-pov constituit. 
Anal. Post. I. 22, 82b37 sqq., Top. vn. 3, 153 a 15 21, Anal. Post. II. 6, 92 a 7 
TO rl TJV flvai TO CK T>V eV T$ rl O~TIV 'Lbiov (Wz., ldia>v Bk.). Cf. also De A. 430 b 28. 
In the foregoing the definition of a thing is made prominent. But science has to 
investigate and define attributes and properties as well as things. Thus we may 
enquire ri IO-TL \CVKOV; ri e<m. rpLtrrjxv; rl etrrt KLVIJO-IS; and SO through all the 
categories. Hence TO ri l<m as a noun may denote any of the categories, 
Metaph. 1030 a 18 20. It belongs &TT\>S to ouo-io, and in a derivative sense to 
the rest, just as eti/cu itself does : ib. a 2O So-irep yap <al TO CO-TIV vyrapxei TTOLO-LV 
dXX* o^ 6fJLoia>S) oXXa T5 p,v Trp&r&s rols $* eTro/ifVcoff, OUTCO KO\ TO ri <mv &ir\a>s 
JLACV 777 ova-t'a 7r>$ Se rols aXXots. And the same applies to TO ri ijv e/at: ib. 
1030 b 4 7. Lastly, there is a further case, of which XCVKO? av6pa>7ros is a 
type. This, too, has its ri eWt and can be defined, though again in a different 
sense from either avSpairos or \CVKOV: ib. 1030 b 12 sq. 

a 13. jj.ia TLS lvat pcGoSos Kara irdvrwv. A single method, it might be 
thought, applies to all the objects which we seek to define scientifically. The 
natural expectation that there is some such universal method of finding a defi- 
nition which all the sciences may adopt proves to be without foundation (see Anal. 
Post. II. cc. 3 7. Cf. ib. II. c. 13). The ordinary procedure of the sciences as 
they existed in A.'s time was to assume the definition or to collect it by induc- 
tion on the evidence of the senses, Metaph. 1025 b 8 irao-ai a%rat [sc. al cVicrnJ/zat] 

TrepL ov TL KOI yvof TI 7Tpiypa\lsdjJLvai irepl rovrov 7rpayp,arvovrai}...ov$e rov rl 
cmv oti6Vj/a \6yov irotovvrai, aXX* < rovrov [sc. TOV ycvovi] al p.v alo-Qqcret, 

7roif]<rao-at avro drj\ov, at 5* viro&ecriv \a/3ovcrai TO TL <mvj OVT& TO. K.a6* aura 
virapxovTa TO> yevci irepl 6 eltriv drro$LKvvov(rtv fj dvayKaiorepov ?j /LtaXaiccoTepov. 
SioTrep (pavcpov oTt OVK eoTW a7r68ftt,s ova-Las ovde TOV ri ivnv CK. TTJS roiavrrfs 
<7raya>yri$, dXXa TIP aXXos Tp67ros TTJS S^XcbcrettS' o/zo/coff d' ou5' el ccrrtv 77 p,rj ecrn TO 
yevos Trepl o Trpayparcvovrai, ovdev Xeyovcrt, 8ia TO TTJS avTTJs elvai SiavoLas TO T 
T-t (rri drjXov iroLelv Kal cl <mv. In mapping out a new province of knowledge, 
and in projecting the organisation of a new department of enquiry, the defect 
here mentioned, the want of a short and easy road to definitions, would naturally 
be felt. Kara c. gen. is used after clvat and vsrap^civ, and even after K.OIVQV, in 
much the same sense as after verbs of predication, Xc'yeo-tfai, KaT^yo/^icr&u, the 
technical expressions Ka66\ov and Kara iravrbs (AnaL Post. I. 4, 73 a 28 sqq.) 
being evidence how wide this usage is : Eucken, Uber die Praepositionen^ p. 40, 
observes that cirl c. gen. et dat., wept c. gen. et ace. are almost equivalent. 

a IS o-irip...a,ir6Si|ts. The nature and functions of demonstration or 
demonstrative proof are the subject of AnaL Post. I., where they are fully 
treated. Very briefly, A.'s position is that, since all extension of knowledge 
depends upon previous knowledge, demonstration implies undemonstrated 

12 - 2 

i8o NOTES i. i 

premisses or principles, from which by syllogistic reasoning conclusions true 
and necessary are obtained in a particular province. Geometry is the typical 
demonstrative science, and Euclid's elements illustrate its application to the 
extension of knowledge. Cf. Anal. Post. I. 7, 75 a 39 rpia yap ecm. TO. ev rats 
aTroSe/f ecrii', ev JJLGV TO dTrofteiKvvpevov TO crv//-7repaoy-ia roro S* ecrrl TO VTrdp^ov 
yevi TLvl K.O.G* avTo [the Kara <rup.p. ibiov of our present lemma. Cf. Them. 
2, 14 sq. H., 3, II Sp., Philop. 31, 22 sq. 3 Simpl. 9, 33 sq.], tv Se ra a|ia>/iara- 
afick/iara * eVrti/ e &V. TpiTOv TO ycvos TO virOKei/jLcvoi/^ ov TO. TrdBrj /cat ra K.a.6* 
avTa o-vfjLJSf^TjKOTa drf\o1 ri aTrodeigis. Occasionally A. twits those whom he is 
criticising with dyraLdeva-La on the ground that they have not mastered the true 
nature of demonstration with its three indispensable elements, the yevos or 
irepl o, the premisses l &v and the conclusion, so that they irrationally demand 
a proof of everything, e.g. Metaph. 1006 a 5 n, 1005 b 2 4. As to the con- 
junction of "dta and Kara cru^^rjKos 9 the latter must be taken in the sense 
explained above (on a 8) ocra O-V^^KC ; otherwise they could not be demon- 
strated : Anal. Post. I. 6, 75 a 18 T&V o~u[J./3ff3r)K6Ta>v p,rj Katf avTa...ovK ZCTTIV 
7ri<rTT)M dTroSetKTtKri, ib. I. 30, 87 b I9sqq. The passage in Top. v. i, 128 b 16 sqq. 
(cf. ib. 3, 131 a 27, b i 6), where L&IOV is divided into (i) Ka6* O.VTO KOL act, and 
(2) vrpos <ETpov /cat Trore, belongs to dialectic not science, and the examples given 
of (2) lie outside theoretical science in which all the attributes demonstrated 
must be albia KOL dvayKota. Cf. Metaph. 1025 a 30 Xeyerat $ /ecu aXXo>ff crufi^e- 
prjKOf, olov ocra vfrdp^i eKacrrcp /ca^* avro p.7) ev rj) ovcrta ovra..../cat raCJra p.ev 
evbex* rai d& La fafah KLVO>V S* [accidents proper, rS>v py Ka0' avra] ovdev. As a 
technical term of logic ttoi/ is defined, Top. I. 5. 102 a 18 6 p? 77X0? p.ev TO TL 
3\v efvat, puircp 5' V7rdp)(i /cat aVrtAcar^yopeircu rot? irpdyp-oros (i.e. eius notionis, 
cui tamquam tStov tribuitur ; Ind. Ar. 339 b 18). Contrast Top. l. 5, 102 b 4 26. 
Cf. Metaph. 1025 b 713 : each separate science having marked off its province, 
y4vos, and somehow empirically obtained or provisionally assumed a definition 
of it, proceeds to deduce the essential attributes of that yevos, ra <a6* avra 
VTrdpxovra r<p yevei, here called "$ia. 

a 18 Seirfcrci Y^P'-^P T ^s 6 Tpoiros. If we assume that there are various 
methods of arriving at a definition, the difficulty is increased, because in investi- 
gating any single department (fl-ept e/caorrov T&V ovra>v) we must first ascertain 
which of these various methods is appropriate to that department (rtV 
Them. 2, 18 H., 3, 16 Sp.) : cf. Philop. 32, 2 trola petiodcp *Vt 

a 19. eav Sfc <J>avep^v fj. Philop. 32, 5 roOro ws- cv viro0o~i Xeyet. This 
suggestion seems reasonable. A. himself would not seriously identify the 
method of obtaining definitions with dirodeLgi? TI$ or dtalpecris. See next notes. 
What he now urges is that the application as well as the choice of the method 
is attended with difficulty. Simpl. 10, 4 sqq. thinks the whole sentence an expla- 
nation (%r}yT}o-<,s) of the words (a 18 sq.) befjo-ciyhp \apctv irepl e/ca<rroz/ ris 6 Tpoiros. 
The problem of determining which method is applicable to a special case is the 
problem of discovering from what principles we must start in framing the- 
appropriate definition. Simpl. IO, 7 eTrsrat yap /cat rewrote ^rfir, K riv&v 
dp)(>v 6 Idtof*TOV arro&o^O'crat optcrfjLOf. 

a 19. iroTpov a,Tr6StCs rCs &TTIV. Tty quod in quibusdam libris omittitur, id 
casu factum est Nam quoniam (a 15) posuimus demonstrationem esse T&V /cara 
o-vppe/BrjKbs t8i'a>v, si demonstratio etiam est TTJS ov&ias /cat rov rl eamv, erit sane 
alia species demonstrationis, aVodeiffc TIS. Metaph. 1059 a 30 el yap ifpt ye ra 
Q-vp.{3cj3rjK6Ta aTrddei^is (mv, ircpi ray ovo~taf OVK e<mv. 997 a 2 sqq. 6 quibus 
haec opponimus, (a 25) ert Sc Trdrepov Trept TCIS ovvias 17 Oeupla povov ecrrii/ T) /cat 

I. i 402 a 15 a 21 181 

ra 0-vp.peprjKOTa Tavrate...ei p,ev yap TTJ? avrfjs, airodctKTiKrj ms av ^477 KOI 77 rrjs 
ovcrias- ov do/cet 5e rou ri <mv airoSeigcs ivai (Torst. p. 113). Cf. 3fcfaph. 
1025 b 14 bioirep <pavpov on OVK (rriv aTrddcL^LS ova-Las ovde rov rl CCTTLV CK TTJS 
ToiavTrjs 7raya>y7J$, aXXa rts aXXos rpOTros rrjs 8r}\G>ora>. Stapfer, Krit. Stud., 
p. 28, urges that the alternatives would be more sharply defined if, with E, we 
omit -riff, contrasting the use of the pronoun, "richtig gesetzte TLS" 402 a 13, 20. 
But, in view of Torstrik's citations, even the hypothetical mention of aTrdSetfw 
in this connexion needs some qualification, and rw="of a sort" is half ironical, 
half apologetic. The relation of demonstration to definition is fully discussed 
in Anal. Post. II. cc. i n. The two processes are wholly dissimilar. It is 
impossible to demonstrate essence or to obtain a definition by demonstration 
alone. All such attempts involve a petitio principii. Cf. Anal. Post. II. 3, 
especially 90 b 18 91 a 8, ib. II. 7, 92 b 35 39, ib. II. 8, 93 b 15 20. But 
where to know what a thing really is is the same as to know why it is (Anal. 
Post. II. 2, 90 a 15, 31), and the question, "What is the real nature of a thing?" 
can be interpreted to mean, "What is the cause which makes the thing what it 
is?," then the search for definitions becomes virtually a search for causes in 
which demonstration and the syllogism play an important part: AnaL Post. 
II. 8, 93 a i 15 (the passage ends with the words: otiros pev ovv 6 rpoiros 
this method of defining OTL OVK av ilrj a-rrobei^is elprjrai Trparcpov. aXX' ZCTTL 
XoyiKos cXXoyto-/xos roO TL <TTLV\ ib. II. io, 93 b 38 94 a io. This subsidiary 
use of demonstration is illustrated 413 a 16 20. Similarly at the end of in. 3 
A. claims to have ascertained at once the essence and the cause of imagination ; 
having explained the process from its causes, 428 b io sqq., he has been able to 
define it : 429 a 8 Trepl ptv ovv <pavra<rias, TL <m KCLL dia ri crrw/, flpfjcrQo eVl 
rocrovrov. No logical instrument demonstrates that a combination of certain 
elements makes up the essence to be defined, AnaL Post. n. 5, 91 b 24 sqq., 
Metaph. 1037 b io sqq. : all we show is that (ort), or why (tort) an attribute can 
be predicated of a subject. In other words, given a knowledge of the facts 
(TO ort) and the cause (TO &OTI), the definition can be discovered and recognised 
as such, and the practical rules laid down employ demonstration, especially 
demonstration a posteriori of the cause from the effect, and demonstration that 
the elements of the definition are essential attributes of the definiend. 

a 20. i) SiaCpcns. Analysis of a genus into its species, of these into their 
sub-species, and so on until we come to the lowest or ultimate species containing 
only individuals. This process of obtaining a definition is employed by Plato, 
e.g. in Sophist and Politicus* A. criticises the process (AnaL Prior. I. 31, 
46 a 32 sq., AnaL Post. n. 5, 91 b 14 sqq.), pointing out that it always involves 
a petitio principiL But in his own practical rules A. employs division as a 
subsidiary process, ib. II. 13, 96 b 25 sqq. -fj ica TIS aXXtj ^6080$. If these 
suppositions are not seriously meant, it is unimportant what the reference 
is. In AnaL Post. n. 6 A. rejects the claims of hypothetical proof of definition 
and proof by definition of the opposite. When all false claims are disallowed 
we fall back presumably upon sense-perception and induction : see note on 
a 13. A.'s own method as elaborated in AnaL Post, is designated by Them. 
(2, 20 H., 3, 19 Sp.) o-vvBeo-Ls fjLo\\ov. Zabarella calls it via compositiva* 

a 21. irXdvas. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1094 b 15 TOVOVTTJV ?x et 8ta<f>opav <al yrXdvrjv. 
A favourite Platonic term for mental perplexity and error, e.g. Rep. 444 B, ib. 
505 C, Phaedo 8l A, Parm. 135 E rfjv ir\av7jv cTrio-Koirclv. K rCvoov Set J-qTetv. 
The search for a definition may start from a higher genus: Philop. 32, 12 
TOVT<rriv VTT TTOLOV ycvor avdfofJiev TO -po/ctftvov irpaypCL, fircidrj oi>x V yivof 
TV ovratv dXXa #6*ea ...... 22 frjrovp^v otfo, <f)r}<riv, virb irolov yevos avdysrai TO 

1 82 NOTES I. i 

TroXXcov yap TO yevos a/z^to-^r^o-^ov), Iva cvpovTcs roOro Kal 8ie- 
\6vTes elf ras oiKfias 8ta<popas ovro> TOVS opLcrfJiovs a7roda>/z.ez/. Or, again, it may 
start from particulars and proceed by induction, though this procedure will 
require subsidiary processes ; see the rules laid down in Anal. Post. n. 13 and 
Top. VI. i. The procedure in De A. II., c. i resembles in the main the former, 
though with peculiarities of its own. 

aXXai -yap aXXeov apx^. The definitions of the unit and of number as 
the sum of units (TO CK povadant avyKcifjLcvov 7r\rj0os) belong to discrete quantity 
(8i<t>pio-iJ,evov Troo-dv), whereas those of surface and of line belong to continuous 
quantity (TO trwexes). Such definitions form the starting-points or principles 
of the respective sciences. To the conclusions of the science they are related 
as cause to effect (dia TL) : Phys. II. 7, 198 a 16 18 rj yap els rb TL CCTTLV dvdyeTat 
TO 8ia TL co-xa-fov eV rots- aKii/qrow, olov ev TOLS LLa0r)LLao~Lv (els opiVLLov yap TOV 
cuGeos rj o-VLLfJiTpov rj aXXov TWOS dvdyerai eo^a-rov) T) els TO Kivrjcrav 7rp>TOi>, olov BLO, 
TL eVoXe/z7<rai'. See also note on 402 b l8 wo-irep ev rots fwx(hi|xa<ri. 

4O2 a 23 b 8. The problems which more particularly concern the 
definition of soul and the investigation of its essential properties are : (i) To what 
category does the soul belong? (2) Is it potentially or actually existent? [ 3] 
(3) Is it divisible or indivisible? (4) Is it throughout homogeneous? If not, 
does the difference between soul and soul amount to a difference of genus or 
only of species ? In contemporary discussion the soul of man stands for soul in 
general [ 4]. (5) Does soul, like animal, admit of a single definition, or must 
we rest content with definitions of the several species of soul ? [ 5]. 

a 23. TTpwrov 8 s <rs. If we mean to proceed with the task of defining the 
soul, there are certain problems to be solved which A. now states explicitly^ 
though, contrary to his usual custom, he omits the arguments for and against, 
except in the case of the last, 403 a 3, and even then the discussion is of the 
briefest. Ind. Ar. 347 b 32 saepe 'io-a>s non dubitantis est, sed cum rnodestia 
quadam asseverantis. Cf., e.g., 405 b 31. SicXctv, "distinguish" or rather 

"determine." Ind. Ar. i8oa 22 ex distinguendi significatione [cf. ib. I79b54 
distinguere genus aliquod in species] diatpeiv abit in notionem disputandi, 
explorandi, explicandi. Cf. Pol. 1339 a 14 O#T yap rlva e^i dvvapw padiov Trepl 
civTrjs 8i\lv, ib. 1299 a 12, 1300 b 18, 1341 b 31. On Pol. 1321 b 4 Newman 
remarks, "Aiaipelv seems here to be used in the sense of diopig e>, as in 12895 12 
and elsewhere." rSv y e vv = (a 35 anc j ^ I0 a ^ r % v faaipeQeur&v /car^yo/uau/, 

the table of the ten categories being at once a classification of predications or 
attributes predicated of a subject and the sttiuma genera of all that exists (yevij 
TOV 6Vroy). Ultimately these ten summa genera may be reduced to two, viz. 
substance on the one hand, and its appendages quality, quantity, relation, etc. 
on the other. See Metajph. 1028 a 10 b 7, 1045 b 27 32, 1069 a 18 24. 
Kal rl &TTI. KOI explicative, as also in the following line rode TL KCU ovarta : Simpl. 

IO, 27 7rpOOT&tK KO.I T IcTTI, VCHprfVlgcdV TL $7^Xot TO V yVL LVCtL 9 OTl KC10* O TL CTTLV 

(i.e. in what respect it is something), &o-7rcp ev 8ia<l>opaLs naO* o Totdvde: Philop* 
33, 1 6 K Siaipco-fcos Set Xo/Setv CLVTJJS TO yevoy, oirep ycvos ev r rt e'orri KaT^yopetrat. 
Philoponus, anticipating II., c. i, means that soul will ultimately be found under 
the category of substance, TO TL etm^ToBc TL KCU ova-La. 

a 24 Xfy 8i. 25 KanjYOpuov. Simpl. 10, 28 a/A^Ma^retrai 5e eVi ^X^> 
el TO yivos avni|s owrfct TJ iroiov T) iroo-6v. Simplicius thinks that substance^ 
quality and quantity are explicitly mentioned because they found support in 
the views current at tne time: e.g. the Pythagoreans and Plato made soul 
a substance, the theory of harmony (i. 4) made it a quality and Xenocrates 
a quantity. But the enumeration of Categories takes precisely the same form 

! i 402 a 21 b 2 i8j 

in 410 a 14 sq., whez-e there is certainly no such allusion- It is indeed quite 
a common form of citing the categories, being found in eight other passages,, 
while in six more these three most important categories are specified without 
the addition of "et cetera," See Apelt, Beitrage zur griech. Philosophic^ 
p. 140 sq. 

a 25 rt 8fe... 26 IvTcX^x^ta TIS. To explain this second problem we must 
bear in mind that of the four significations of the ambiguous term Being or oV 
the last is possible and actual being (Metaph. 1017 b i). This distinction 
concerns merely the modality of Being in whatever category it is found, and 
A/s examples are in fact drawn from various categories. He gives 6p>v, eVi- 
(rrao-fiaL, rjpe/jLovv IOI7 b 2 sqq., TO Qeppbv 1046 a 26, oiKo8op.civ 1046 b 30 sqq., 
ftabLov 1047 a 23. Simpl. 1 1, 3 6 equates evrc\exeta with ftSop, and supposes 
ev bwdpci ov to include not only v\rj but also TO crvvQsrov ef vXijs- KOL etSov?., 
A. had the category of substance chiefly in view, but his statements ought to 
admit of extension to the other categories. Cf. Them. (2, 38 H., 4, 16 Sp.) 
devrcpov rjviKa av TO yevos 8iaKpt0fj, eVeioS) oY^cos 1 eKCurrov \cycrat yei/os...ewrp avv 
TTJV ova-Lav vpoip,v rrj? V^X^J *v rivi rStv $La(popa>v rovr&v d7rorfjLrj@r)<rcrai, ap* <>$ 
dvvafjits viroKeLpevr) KOL frpof ov<rtav f^ovo-a ixf>vas, rj paXXov a>ff eWeX^eia; the 
addition of n$ points to the probability that further qualification is necessary ; 
Simpl. II, 15 on pfj a7rpocr&opt<rra>ff KCLL dir\>s ecrnv VT\4x ia *^* viro@c0riKdrrci>f 9 
though I should not go so far as Them. (3, 4 6 H., 4, 26 28 Sp.), who sees a 
distinct anticipation of 412 a 10 sq., 22 28. 

402 b x. p,purrr ^ ajj^p-qs. This question, to which A. returns 41 1 b 5 30, 
413 b ii 414 a i, 432 a 22 b 7, does not admit of an unqualified answer. It 
depends upon the meaning we assign to the term part and Its correlative whole 
(cf. Metaph. A. 25 sq.). Speaking generally, peprj^els a SiaipciTat KOL 1% <av 
o-u-yKemu TO oXov, but A. is careful to add (iO23b 20) ?? TO elbos rj r6 l^ov TO eldos. 
Any quantity (TTOO-OV) has quantitative parts : in this sense part is not applicable 
to the soul, if it is neither ptycQos (407 a 2sq.) nor TTOO-OV at all (410 a 21). Cf. 
Alex., De A. 30, 29 r\ de faxy ov povov oi>x &s /teyt^os-, aXX* ovS* a>s apiBpos tm 
p,cpi<rrr). But non-quantitative wholes may be broken up by logical analysis, 
genera into species, species into sub-species : cf, 430 b 14, Them. (3, 7 H., 5, 
I Sp.) icat e'lirep (fraveirj pcpHrTrj, TroTcpov as (r&pa teal oyicor, r) cos rexvrj /cat sVior^- 
P,TJ. Further, the definition has parts (ra ev T& Xoyo> drj\ovvri, eKcurrov) more 
general than itself, Metaph. 1023 b 24, cf. 1034 b 20 sqq Hence, when A. 
returns to this question 413 b 13 sqq., 429 a 11, he contrasts the logical dis- 
tinctness of the parts, their separateness to thought (Xoyc> -erfpa, ^6>pto-ra) with 
spatial distinctness, the separateness of extended objects (Kara roVoi/, Kara 
peyetios x^pio"*). 

b I, inSrepov 6}toi8iis. Them. (3, 16 H., 5, 13 Sp.) Tcraprov av c"r) rJTrjp.a rS>v 
ipT]p.VQ>Vi apa opoeidfis Tracra ^vx^l *pos- rracrav eWtv, T) ovbapcos, K.OI eivrcp v<f>* 
Tpov Kal erepov 6tdo9, 5p* ovd" v<f>* cv yevos ; olov 17 av0p7rov Kat ttrrrov el de pf} 
TCLVTQV exovcriv eldos ^vx^Sy ^P* ovde yevos TQUTOV ; ciXX' 6 ftev av6p&7roff Kal iiriros 
VTTO TO f<ov, ac tyvxal 8c avrobv OVKCTI Kal v<j>* V yevos ^vxn s " ravTa & ovx olov re 
faaKplvai ra flpo^X^/iaTa fj-rj Trepl rrdcr^s ^ux5 ff irurKOiraufJLvavf 9 oircp cvioi rav 
irp6rpov irape&p&v. The term 6potdf)s is applied to air (411 a 21 : cf. a 17, 18) 
and to the other elements, e,g. water, Metaph. 10143 30 sq., fire, De Caelo I. 8, 
276 b 5 sq. : again, to the plurality of mathematical objects, Metaph. 1002 b 14 21 
(with TroXX* &rra 6>o6^ cf. 987 b 17 TroXX' &T-a o>"*> Tlie ^ reat examples 
are arithmetical units, which are a&a^opot, 409 a i sq. : cf. 409 a 18 20. 

b2. airoo-a. Atticorum more, sicut Trao-a, unaquaeque; cf. Heind. ad 
PL Phaed. p. io8B. Neque enim quaeritur, ut ex sequentibus patet, an animus 

1.84 NOTES i. i 

totus similes in se partes habeat sed potius an animae eandem inter se speciem 
referant (Trend,)- Heindorf s note is as follows : "anas <j>evy<-L. Sic, de quo vir 
-doctus dubitabat, avras-, tinusquisque^ pro TTCLS positum et Politic. 2590 (3a<ri\vf 
anas* De Legg' I- 628 B ov /zaXtora juev anas &i> /SouXowo p.r)$ yevevQai Trore, etc. 
Eurip. Bacch. 70 oro/za r" fij^fjiov aTras 6crtovo-0<*>." Cf. Them. (3, 1 6 H., 5, 14 Sp.) 
Tratra Trpos Tracrav... (cited above) ; Simpl. 12, 2 a\\rj\aL$ ai -^u^at yrdcraL. Philop. 
36, 9 CLUTCLL ovv, (jb^criV, cu <?V TTCLViv CL7r\c>$ rots ^-^TVx oLS i/r^at. But i n Tacra ^lsvx.rj 
aQdvaros the word is hardly distributive, rather "all soul" or "soul in all its 
forms." This meaning need not be excluded here. Cf. 411 a 18 sq. 

b 2. ir6rpov 6t!8ei 8tcuf)^povcrtv r\ yivi. On the terms ercpov ro5 si&ei, crcpov r< 
yevct see Metaph. 1057 b 35 1059 a 14. If we assume a plurality of souls more 
or less unlike corresponding to the plurality of animals (cf. b 9 TroXXa! ^u^ai), 
and if we further assume that they belong to a variety of species, is this the 
limit of the difference between them, or are they so unlike that they are 
incapable of being brought under the same genus? Any two things erepa 
T<5 6i& must belong to the same genus, Metaph. 105 7 b 37 rb yap TOIOVTOV ytvo? 
KoXfby o /z<&> $v TOVTQ XcycTCii fjurj Kara crvfjL^epTjKos ^ov bicKpopav, eW o)ff v\rj ov 
etr" aXXtop. Thus, if these conditions are fulfilled, there would be a genus soul. 
If however the soul in some cases is immortal, in others mortal, these souls 
could hardly belong to the same genus, cf. 41 3 b 26* 

b 3. vvv. Cf. Eth. Nic- 1 144 b 21, Pol. 1268 a 1 1 and note on 408 b 20. 

b 4. irepl TTJS dv0p<oirvTjs, int. T/TV^S-. It is implied that they neglected the 
phenomena of life in all its other forms, including plants. Obviously the 
solution of the present problem presupposes a comparative study of all species 
of animals and (cf. 41 ib 27 sq.) plants. For A.'s own procedure the precept 
given 4I4b 32 is <3crr K.a6* efcacrrov ^r^reov, rLs CK.O.CTTOV ^^17, olov TLS ffrvrov KCU 
TLS avQp&irov TJ Qijpiov. Alex. Aphr. apud Philop. 36, 13 and Simpl. 12, 31 sqq. 
think the criticism is aimed at Plato, especially in the Timaeus, where, however, 
the soul even of the plant is distinctly recognised (77 A, B), and everything 
which partakes of life is declared to be a f<5ov and to have some sort of soul. 
Philop. 36, 1 6 sqq. takes the reference to be general, including Democritus and 
the other physicists. 

b5 Tn$Tpov ts...8 -fj vorepov. Knowledge is of the universal, definition 
of the universal, i.e. the form (Metaph. 1036 a 28 sq.). Particular souls and 
particular animals 4iff er s but all animals belong to the genus animal, though 
they also belong to different species, horse, man, dog. Is, then, the genus 
animal the type of universality by which soul is known and defined, or shall we 
seek distinct definitions of the species ? The settlement of this question will 
have a direct bearing on procedure. If we take the first alternative, a study of 
the genus, in which are united all the common characteristics of soul, will 
precede the study of the different varieties. If we favour the second alternative, 
the study of the varieties should come first, for the genus is a logical entity and 
not the constitutive form of any of the particulars of which it is predicated. It 
is part of that form and part only. There is another view of the passage. 
Some take it that the preceding question is presumed to be decided in the 
sense that the difference between souls is a specific and not a generic difference, 
so that it only remains to consider what is the nature of the genus to which 
they all belong. It may be (i) such that they are, in technical language, 
(^tllf^v^;/za (2w TO re ftvofjua K.OIVOV KOI 6 \6yos 6 auros, Cat. I. I a 6). If not, they 
are either (2) o^wovv/uta, having nothing in common but the name, or (3) trpos cv 
\cy6p,va, forming a ycvos KCLT* avoXoyiW, of which cv and oi' are examples. It is 
assumed that animal cannot illustrate both alternatives : it cannot, as genus, be 

I. I 402 b 2 b 5 185 

the object of a single definition and at the same time be the non-existent or 
posterior universal of particulars which admit of several definitions. Hence it 
is inferred that in the second alternative animal replaces soul and that what is 
said of it is only true of animal in a supposed and not an actual case : in other 
words, that soul, unlike animal, is not a genus, because souls form a series, 
and such a class is destitute of true generality. Alex. Aphr. first gave this 
explanation, though he afterwards modified or retracted it. He tells us (air. KCU 
XiV., pp. 22, 23sqq.) that in his lost commentary on De A. he had shown that 
A. may possibly have used <5oi/ as an example to illustrate the different species 
of soul regarded as related in a definite order of succession (22, 24 sq.). If so, 
Alex, considered, the example chosen would be fictitious. If man, horse, dog 
were not o/xoyej/?;, were not, as they are, species of the one genus f<Sor, each of 
them would require to be separately defined, and either the common term 
" animal " as applied to all of them would denote no characteristic nature (oiK.da 
<f>v<rii), but would be employed in an ambiguous or equivocal sense, or, if there 
were anything objective corresponding to it, it would be like a term of various 
meanings, of which one is always prior to the other, ra TroXXax&r Xeyd^ej/a eV ols 
co-Tl r6 TTpoTcpov KOL vcTTcpov, or classes arranged in series having a definite order 
of succession. [Examples are found in the numerical series 2, 3, 4, etc., in 
rectilinear figures (Metaph. 999 a 6 sqq.) and in constitutions (Pol. 1275 a 
34 sqq.) : probably also in such notions as -uytetrov and ayaBov. The common 
characteristic is present in varying degrees in different members of such a class, 
being hardly discernible in some : Pol. 1275 a 37 9 ro rrapdirav ouS" evecmv, $ 
rotavTa, TO KOIVOV, 77 yX/o-^poos.j Alex, continues (23, 13) TO 6 s eV ols TO Trporepov 


petrai, &io OVKCTI 7rpS>TOv aXX* vorepov yiverai. rotovrov de dei^et KCU. rrjv ^Isvxrjv oV. 
This, the earlier explanation of Alex., is accepted amongst others by Zabarella, 
who argues that in Book II. A. declares soul to be commune quid analogum, 
and therefore its generic definition is insufficient : we need the specific 
definitions of the several parts of soul in order to complete our knowledge. 
According to him, animal is genus univocum, soul is genus aualogum with 
nothing objective answering to it except the name and the individual souls. 
Hence the definition of animal gives some information, though incomplete ; 
the generic definition of soul gives no knowledge, unless accompanied by the 
knowledge of the several parts of soul. The obvious defect in this explanation 
is the choice of a fictitious example. To remedy this defect Alex, proposes 
to show (OTT. KOI Xucr., 21, 19 ; 23, 21) that after all A.'s words tj oitdev SOTLV rj 
v<rrpov are true of animal and of genera properly so called, provided that we 
carefully distinguish between <pov = ova-La 6/n/n^off aftrdqmeq, which is something 
existent, a thing with attributes (6V TL irpaypa\ and TO o>r y4vos <T<oi>, animal as 
genus or universal, which is properly nothing but merely an attribute of things 
(riv>v ovy (rviAJSefirjKos Trpay/xaT*, <rvfj,7rrG>fj.a firi rwt, ytvofifvov TT pay part) . Strictly 
the genus is not 6V TI, but, if by courtesy we include it among ovra, it is 
decidedly posterior logically to the individual members which belong to it. 
This Alex, proves in the usual way. Suppose the genus animal annulled in 
thought, this would leave unaffected the existence of particular animals, whereas 
the destruction of the members of the genus necessarily implies that the genus 
ceases to exist. Here, it will be observed, he comes to a conclusion concerning 
the true genus diametrically opposite to that which he had previously reached 
in his commentary on the De A., viz. (23, ir) TO /xev yap obr yc^os- nvcov Karrjyo- 
avaipovfj,vov crvvavaipel a^T<5 iravTa ra v<ff auTo, 2>i/ oiidevi avaipovpcv&v 
tb irpStTov rff <jbvo~ei. It may perplex some to find the problem 

1 86 NOTES I. i 

first stated for soul, animal being adduced as an illustration, while afterwards 
A. goes on to speak of animal, the illustration, leaving soul out of sight. But 
to lose the immediate subject in the illustration is quite in A.'s manner. Cf. 
403 a I2sqq., 431 a 17 sqq. Further, there is good reason why he should begin 
with soul and continue with animal ; for the latter term is in his view equally 
applicable to both ; at any rate he allows such a view to be tenable. Cf. 
Metaph. 1043 a 34 KOL <$ov Trorepov ^vxn ev crapon, 77 ^11^17... eLrj d* av KOL eV 
dfj,<poTpots TO f<Soz/, oi>x o*e vl \6y<p \y6}JLfvov aXX* wff rrpoff ev. The possibility of 
such a double application is impartially admitted Metaph. 1036 a 16 19, 24 sq., 
1037 a 5 10. When we speak of defining, it is always with the tacit assumption 
that the particular, as such, the compound of form and matter which is perish- 
able and subject to change, is incapable, properly speaking, of being defined : 
Metaph. 1039 b 20 1040 a 7. If animal denoted an infima species instead of a 
genus, the identity of animal and soul for the purpose of definition would be 
complete ; but this is not the case. Animal, as universal, like man as universal, 
denotes a class which, like its individual members, is a o-vvo\ov or compound of 
form and matter, form capable, matter incapable, of definition : Metaph. 1035 b 
27 30, 1037 a 5 7. Such a class is not ova-La (1035 b 28, 1038 b 8 16, 35), 
for it denotes not i-o'd* n but roidvde (1039 a i sq., 16). This is what A. means 
by rj ovbev ecmv=iQVK. cmv ovfrLa rov cpov rov K.aB6\ov. As a mere universal 
notion or class-name, animal denotes the common characteristic or charac- 
teristics by which species are combined in a genus ; and similarly man, as 
mere universal, denotes the common characteristic or characteristics by which 
particular men are combined in an infima species. In other words, animal is 
neither ev irapa ra TroXXa nor Iv eVi TToXXaiv, but simply ti> Kara TroXXcai/ or KOivfj 
Karr)yopov/Mvov (402 b 8). Nevertheless, it is ov rt, a logical entity, owing its 
existence to thought : cf. Philop. 38, 3 e^c* yap rr\v vTroorraa-tv eV T<5 voctcrdac, <> 
pevroi *ea0* aurb vfaorrjKOS ovdev eo-rt. As thus described, it is v&repov, posterior 
to every member of the class, to every possessor of the characteristic or charac- 
teristics which it predicates as held in common : for naBy are necessarily 
posterior to ova-Co. ; otherwise they would exist independently, apart from ova-la 
{Metaph. 1038 b 23 29). 

But it may be urged that elsewhere icatfoXov is described as Kara travr6s^ Ka0* 
avrd, $ avro. Anal. Post. I. 4. 73 b 26 sq., whereby it is given a place *v r< rt 
carnv, and that yivos is part of the definition and, as such, prior to the definition 
of which it is a part (Metaph. 2. c. 10, especially 1034 b 31 sq., 1035 b 14 20). 
We cannot define man, horse, dog, if we do not know animal, which forms part 
of the definition of each of these species. A. himself allows full weight to this 
objection : 1039 a 14 23, But, instead of modifying his view of the universal 
as M ova-La and therefore posterior, he is content with the remark that an 
objection which, if true without qualification, would make definition impossible, 
must somehow admit of qualification (1039 a 21 sq.). He held that, strictly 
speaking, infimae species were alone capable of definition, because to them 
alone belongs the form or quiddity (1030 a n), which we define (Xyos TTJS 
ova-Las) by collecting the essential, and excluding the accidental, characteristics 
shared by the members of the infima species. Thus we obtain a single 
definition for the entire species : Metaph. 998 b 12. This method of comparing 
individuals and obtaining a KadoXov or common predicate is an aid to defining 
and well adapted to the conditions under which human knowledge is acquired : 
but the community of predication has really nothing to do with ova-La. If the 
species were reduced to a single member, the specific form would continue to- 
be the quiddity of the sole survivor ; whereas the genus, e.g. ova-La 

I. i 402 b 5 187 

aio-07}TtKfi or TO Tpixfj didcrrarovy is but the matter of a definition and requires to 
be informed by a differentia before it can express the quiddity of any actual 
particular: Metaph. 1038 a 5 sqq., 1043 b 30 33, 1045 a 34 SO L- ^ * s because it 
is TO fI8os TO VQV^ &$ 'Idtov vTrdpxov r< ? irpdypaTi, inhering" in the particular and 
informing it, that form or quiddity is defined ; and not because it is shared in 
common by a certain group of particulars. This may be seen if we either 
enlarge or contract the groups (i) by including horse and dog under the logical 
entity quadruped, man and fowl under biped, or (2) by setting up a similar 
logical entity in the artificial groups pointer, pony, albino. When we have 
reached aro/xa TO> ett either from above or below, the end of classification has 
been attained. 

I have assumed that animal, here called TO /ea0oXow, is a genus. We know 
from Metaph. 992 b I2sq. that in some cases it is impossible for the universal 
to be a genus (e.g., the highest universals, / and &/, are not genera in the same 
sense as biological classes : 998 b 22, cf. AnaL Post. II. 7, 92 b 13). Not that 
all the things called 6Wa are homonyms without any link of connexion save 
this common predicate r on the contrary, they are all so called from their 
relation to ova-ia, substance or Being proper, Metaph. 1003 b 5 15. There 
can, however, be no doubt that animal is a true genus and man, horse, dog 
true coordinate species or mutually exclusive classes. Yet animal is the 
example which A. takes when examining the claim of the universal to rank 
as oucrio, Metaph. Z. c. 13, and his emphatic rejection of the claim, io38b 
10 1039 a 2, has been referred to above. 

In this chapter A. simply states his problems without solving them. This 
one is solved in 4i4b 20 sqq., whence it appears that there is a single definition 
of soul, as of rectilinear figure, number and, we may add, of animal or any other 
genus (quadruped, biped, etc.), more general than the infima species. But in all 
these cases the definition obtained by comparison of individuals is imperfect 
and inadequate. It needs to be supplemented by the study of the species. 
I agree with Mr Innes that A. does not base his argument on TO cfagfjs at all 
(CZ Rev. xvi., p. 462) : it would be just as valid if the different types of soul 
were mutually exclusive, like biological classes. In fact, A. studies them as if 
they were mutually exclusive : he treats, not of the soul of the plant, the jelly- 
fish, the non-stationary animal, the rational animal, but of OpcimKov, ala-BijTi^ov^ 

b 5 ir<$Tpov els o Xo*yos...6 tti-nffs lor*. If souls belong in all cases to the 
same genus, as all animals to the genus Animal, there will be a single definition 
of Soul the genus, as there is of the genus Animal. Them. (3, 23 H., 5, 23 Sp.) 

TTJV Ka06\OV <f>VO~W 7rtO-K7TTOV, aptt ds <5pt<T/4-OS KCU I V TO TL ?fV clvai TTaOTJS 

jjs, rj oXAoJ p>cv Trjs TOV avQp&iro-U) cKXXos e Trjs TOV CTTTTOU ; Philop. 36, 25 
* &v els 6pia-p6?, ^oiV [int. at ^X a *] K0iv ov yevof, So-Trep TOU <aou 
yevovs OVTOS Zirirov KCLL avdp&rrov *cat TO>V AOITTWV Sa>v els opio-fJLOS dirodi&OTcu, 
Simpl. 13, 3 t fj,v yap dftoeideZ? Tratrat, els etrrat Tratnjs Xayos, Scrirep KCU av6pd>irov 
KOI cos avTos <f>rj f<ou, eZ 8e avo/xoeidets, Ka0* e<aarov etdos ercpos d7rodo0r)<TTai 
Xoyoff. The unity of the definition depends on the unity of that which is 
defined: Metaph. 1045 a 12 6 6* opta-pos \6yos e'orlv els ov o-wdeo-fjup KaGdircp f) 
'iXtaff, aXXa TW cvos eti/at, cf. 1037 b 24 26. But this unity in the object, in the 
thing to be defined, must have a cause, 1037 a 19 sq. The Iliad is one by the 
stringing together of the parts, the definition because it signifies a natural 
whole, of which the parts are held together, not by the coherence of matter, 
or by coacervation, or by external force, but by an immanent form (cvTe\ex la 
Kal <frv<ri$ TIS cKdtTTTj, Metaph. 1044 a 9), distinctive and peculiar : Poet. 20. I457a 

1 88 NOTES i. i 

28 30, Metaph. 1052 a 16 25. This form or quiddity of an infima species is 
the object of definition, and strictly speaking, the only thing that can be 
defined: MetapJl. 1037 b 25 o yap opta-pos \6yos TLS CO-TIV els KCU ova-las, d>0-0' 
4v6s TIVOS Set avTOv dvaL Xoyoi' KCLL yap 17 ovcria ev n KOL rode TL cr^jumWt, obff 0a/zeV, 
1030 a II 13, 1038 a 19 17 reXevrcu'a diatpopa 17 ovvia ro5 Trpdy^aros ecrrai 6 
opto-jMos. The reader is referred to Metaph. Z. 12 and H. 6. 

b 6. KCL0' eKacm]v, restored from the first hand of E by Torstrik who 
remarks : Quanquam enim notum est substantiva cuiuslibet generis si re- 
petuntur per pronomina vel adiectiva pronominalia, haec posse neutro quod 
vocamus genere poni, id tamen hoc loco minus commode factum erat : nam 
K.a.0* tzacrrov vult quidem illud referri ad animam, quum vero &ov interiectum 
esset, verendum erat ne ad <pov videretur referendum. Accuratius igitur et 
ab omni ambiguitate remotum Ka0* cKdo-rrjv. Cf. 414 b 32, where the neuter 
involves no ambiguity, and 418 a 17, note. The question here raised aporetically 
recurs 414 b 20 33, where, as above remarked, it receives its solution. 

b 7. Oeoii. This should cause no surprise. Top, V. 4, I32b losq. TO ^v 
&ov errLcrTrjfiijs fjLCTcxov aXrjflevcrai Kara rov Oeov (cf. 128 b 19 sq.), Metaph. 1023 b 32 
olov avQpcoirov, ITTTTOV, tfedi/, OTL &iravra a, IOJ2, b 28 sq., 1088 a IO et & avdptorros 
Kai IITTTOS KOL &os y &ov tcrajff i Plato, PJiaedrus 246 C, D. On ra albia r&v alcr&rir>v 
as gods, cf. 1074 b 2 spiPt-a 1026 a 18 sqq. 

b 7. TA 8^ ^<?ov T& KaGoXo-u. The genus of which man, horse, etc. are species. 
Like all the rest of the series, this problem is proposed tentatively, as if A. 
himself had not taken sides in the controversy. His own views on the relation 
of genus to species are laid down in the Metaphysics. See for instance 1038 a 5. 
Two alternatives are possible, (i) that the genus simply does not exist apart from 
its species, (2) that it does exist, but &s vXrj ; 1038 b 34 1039 a 3, 1039 a 30 b 2 
and Z. c. 14 generally ; 1040 b 26 drj\ov OTL ovdev r>v KadoXov vrrdpxft> rrapa ra 
KO.O* cKavra x&pt-* 5 1041 a 3 5. See also H. M C L. Innes, On the Universal 
and Particular in Aris toilers Theory of Knowledge. 

b 7- TITOI ov64v Icrriv rj vo-rcpov. So Metaph. 1042 a 21 ZCTTL roivvv ovre TO 
xaQ6\ov ovcria o#re TO ycvoe, where A. is recapitulating the results obtained in Z, 
especially c. 13. Zabarella insists that essentia, not existentia^ is intended. He 
adds " existentiam A. ut notam supponit." An instructive parallel is Metaph. 
1038 a 5 ** vv TO yevos &TT\&S fJJj ecrrt Trapa TO. cos yevovs c'idij, r) el <m fj,v ws- v\r) 
' ea-TLV (17 jjiv yap <pa>vfj yevos KOL v\rjj al e dia<popal TO. effir) ical TO. crrotxela CK 
TavTrjs iroiova-iv). The coalescence of genus and last differentia in the definition 
is parallel to the union of matter and form in the particular. For yevos o>? i>X?, 
cf. 1024 b 8, 1043 b 10, 1058 a 23 sq. : perhaps also De A. 417 & 27. 

b 8. opofas 8i Kciv.-.KaTT|YopoLTo. This appears to mean that whatever 
difficulty is raised by the genus animal or the genus soul attaches similarly 
to any common predicate or universal \_Ka66\ov~Ka0* l>\ov Kar^yopov/zci/oj/], 
e.g. to body (cf, Metaph. 1069 a 25 30, I cite (a 26) ol f*v o\tv vvv ra 
<aQ6\ov ovcrias /zaXXov TiQcaarw TO. yap yevrj Ka66\ov y a (fraviv dp%a? KCU oi.>(ria$ 
eivai p,a\\ov Sta r6 Xoyt/cSs fT/rciv ol fie TraXat ra K.a6* cfcacrrov, olov irvp fcai yrjv, 
aXX' ou ro KOIVOV o-Qfj.a) : or to geometrical figure, cr^^ta. In the parallel passage 
(414 b 22 28) what A. says is that " in the case of kinds of soul as in that of 
geometrical figures, the only general notion which will fit all is one which is not 
proper to any particular kind of soul or any particular figure, and that it is absurd 
to look for a general notion in these as in other cases without investigating 
the injimae species " (see Innes, Class. Rev. XVI. 462). Cf. Metaph. 1038!^ n TO 
& fcotfoXou K.OLVQV. TGI/TO yap Xc-yerat jca^dXou, 6 TrXetotriv VTrap^civ 7rf<u/cei/. TIVOS 
ofiv oucrca TOUT* tcrrai, 17 yap airdvTa>v rj ovdfvof. airdvTG>v d* ov^ oldv re KT. 

I. I 402 b 5 b 15 189 

<4O2 b 9 1 0. Further, if instead of a plurality of souls, we recognise a 
plurality of parts of a single soul, we have to decide whether our study should 
begin with the whole soul or with the parts, and how these parts are severally 
distinct ; whether the study of the parts should be preceded by a study of their 
functions [ 6] ; and, if so, whether we should begin with an examination of 
the objects with which the several faculties and their functions are respectively 
concerned [ 7], 

b 9. frri, 8* el jirj...dXXd jxopta. We return to the fourth problem rrorepov 
opofidrjs aTracra ^x 7 ? ^ v. The intervening passage (402 b 2 cl de ^77 o/toet&fc... 
8 Kar77-yopoiro)has traced the consequences of assuming the negative, prj 6/j.oeto'fjs 
anaa-a ^^77, or, which is the same thing, of assuming a variety of kinds of soul 
(iroXXal -v/ru^a} KCU avojuLocidets). The alternative now taken is to assume a variety 
of parts (yroXXa ftop*a) in the one kind of soul : cf. 413 b 13 irdrepov $ TOVTCOV 
K.acrr6v ecrri ^v^f] rj fjiopiov "^^X^ s ^re., Simpl. 13, 27 Et prj TroXXat -^/r^a/, (ftrjo-iv^. 
el pf] KCLT* el8os aXXi}X<oi> dicupepOLev al re 4v rots o*ia<f>6pois KCLL i> eVt r< 
>, aXXa /jiopia TO did(popov ov KOT* eldos e^ovra Sia TO cvos elvcu fidpia, aXXa 
Kara \6yovs, ws TO Kov<pov KOL <$><&Tia* TOV irvpos. TOVTO de eirl JJLCV evos <pov 
e'lTe dv6paj7Tov etre TWOS aXXov aX^^e^, Iva pia fj vos e/cacrrov rj ^v^rf. tr o&v 
/xdpta ctre bwapfis TCLS TroXXas- ev KacrT<o Xe/crcov f^ar, 6/j.oeLdels pev Kara \6yov 
de diafapovo-as prjTeov. The unity of each particular soul is safeguarded, but 
the diversity between soul and soul is attributed to a plurality of parts which 
may or may not all be found in any two diverse particular souls selected for 
comparison. Them. (4, 12 H., 7, 2 Sp.) confines his attention to the individual, 
citing PI. Theaet. 184 D for the absurdity that each of us carries several 
souls as it were in a Trojan horse : apa TroXXas- 6ereov 

OtOV (pvTLKTJV 6p7rTLItf)V 6pKTLKr)V SlaVOIJTlfC^V, *<' <$V KOL 

animalia has quoque habent), j) n-oXXal fj,ev OVK elcrlv ev e/caoT-a) -^vxaL^fjLias de 
o\rjs avTTJs VTrapxovcrrjs TO. popia Stfvfjvoxe. 

b IO yjaXirbv...lI dXXijXcov. Tovr6>i/ = ra)v /xopicov. Them. (4, 17 H., 7, 9 Sp.) 
KOI el fjiias Q*TQV pfprj, ^aX^TTOi' ro SiOpiVa*, Trota KOL TT&S olov V0vs y ap' Tpov TO 

6p7TTLKOV TOV aV^TJTLKOV KCU afJL<p<& TOV yfVVTJTlKOVi T) TO X<jyS> fJ.V Tpd, T& d* 

v7roK.ip,vq> TavTa; The limits between thought and imagination or sense and 
intellect are hard to determine, and A/s predecessors did not recognise all parts 
of the soul. 

b 15 TO, dvTiK(ji,va. Cf. 41 5 a 20. The examples given ro alarQrjTov, TO 
VOTJTOV explain the meaning clearly. When we perceive by sense or think, we 
perceive something and think something, viz. the sensible object or the object 
of thought, but why these objects are said to be dvTLKelpcva is not so clear : 
Bonitz associates this application of the term with the local sense by which 
one thing is said to be over against or opposite to another, Ind. Ar* 64 a 15 
sensu locali, De CaeL I. 8, 277 a 23 f) KVK\& [sc. <opa] ex el ^^ dvriK.eip.eva TO. 
Kara dta/xerpov ["circular motion virtually has opposite limits in the two ex- 
tremities of the diameter of the circle" i.e. the circle travels from one end A 
of the diameter to the other end B> and back again]: id. ll. 2, 284 b 21 sq. ra 
TTpoo-Btv Kal TO dvTLKeijjLfvov (cp. b 32 KiTLcrQev). Ad hunc usum v. dvTiKelo-Qat refe- 
rendum videtur, quod res sensibus obiectae avTiKfipcva nominantur De A. 402 b 
15, 2*^.41 5 a 20. At first this seems simpler than the old explanation which 
refers the term to the opposition of relatives, Them. (4, 36 H., 8, 7 Sp.) KO\ yap 
dvTLKiTat o)ff ra irpos TL TO fj.ev VOTJTQV irpo? TOV vovv, TO 8e alo-QijTov irpoe TTJV 
aio-dTja-Lv. Philop. 39, 36 ; Simpl. 14, 17 21. This is one of the four subdivisions, 
of logical opposition or contrast as laid down in Cat. 10. 1 1 b 17 : Xe'yerai de eTcpov 
^ff, ? (0 ks ^po? Tt, fj (2) &s ra evavria, rj (3) <>? oreprjcris- 

1 90 NOTES I. i 

KOI etff, 5) (4) < Kard<j)acrif KO.L atrocfracris [cf. Metaph. IOl8 a 2O sq.]...oora yu.i> oz> 
Trpos TL dvTiK.ciTa.1) avra a-rrep <TT\ TO>V dvTiKeifjievav \lyerat, TJ OTraxrovv XXo>ff, 
atira, olov TO di7r\dcri.ov, avro oTrep c<rrtv, erepov di7T\do-tov Xcyerat- TWOS yap 

diir\dariov. KOL 17 eTTtcrTTjfjirj 8e ra> eVior^rcS a>s ra Trpos TL avrtfcetrat, KGU Xeyerai 


ro avTiKcifAevov Xeyercu, rj)v cTrterr^/Ltjyj/ * TO -yap eTricrTrjTov TLV\ Aeyerat 
rrj 7rta"rr}fjirj. As Trend, remarks, (p. 1 68) if dvTiKLfjt,cvov here bears 
its technical meaning, it can only denote the opposition between relative 
terms : hoc loco sola TO. Trpos TL conveniunt. Nam quae percipiuntur, quae 
cogitantur, ad perceptionem et cogitation em duplici modo pertinent, ut hae 
turn ab illis moveantur, turn ad ea regantur. Quo pertinet locus categoriarum 
10. nb 24 oo-a p,ev ovv TTJ eVto-r^?; [cited above]. Quo quidem oppositorum 
genere quod res est non tollitur sed servatur. In eo enim, quod scitur, sciendi 
notio manet. But in evavTtoTrjs and c-Teprjo-Ls the presence of one opposite 
implies the absence or destruction of the other. Whatever the precise explan- 
ation, it is clear that ai/riKe//zei/oi/=the object of a mental operation, the external 
thing to which we are attending. We shall presently find vnoKel^vov used 
in the same way for the object of perception, e.g. 422 b 32, 426 b 8, 10. Thus 
colour is the " subject-matter," the peculiar province, of sight, sound of hear- 
ing. Plato in the Republic (511 D, E) had described the faculties as set over 
against (eVi) things sensible and things intelligible respectively. 

b 15. TrprfTcpa TOVTWV, sc. T&v epy&v. This we should naturally expect, 
because TO. cpya have just been mentioned. Further in 415 a 20 the same 
question is proposed and solved, where TOVT&V is clearly the operations ro voelv 
<al TO alo-Gdveo-tiai. So the commentators. Them. (4, 32 H., 8, 2 Sp.) KCU el 
irepi T>V eVepyetcov, apa rrpl CLVT&V rrpoTepov f) Trcpl T&V v7TOKLfJiva>v Tatf evep- 
yflais; SimpL 14, 17 24, Philop. 39, 35 sqq. Philop. remarks that A. ought 
to have written in b l6 ro alo-QrjTOv T^S alcr0r)orG>s KOI TO VOIJTOV Trjf vof)o-G>s. 
But if it is once settled that the operation of sense-perception (as better 
known) is to be studied before the faculty, if we further determine to study the 
sensible object before the operation, plainly the sensible object will be studied 
before the faculty. And as the ultimate aim is to arrive at knowledge of the 
obscure (part or) faculty, it is natural enough to speak of the study of the 
sensible object as preliminary to this. 

4O52b 16 4O3a 2. It would seem that, while the determination of 
the essence or What is of use, as in geometry, for the study of the essential 
properties which follow from it, at the same time the study of these essential 
properties also materially contributes to the knowledge of what a thing really 
is. In fact, when we are in a position to give an account of all or most of the 
properties as they are confusedly and imperfectly presented to us, we shall best 
be able to define what a thing really is, such a definition forming the starting- 
point of all demonstration. Hence definitions which lead to no information 
about attributes are of use .for dialectical purposes only and have no scientific 
value [ 8]. 

b 16. OIK 8* KT|. This section deals generally with the logic of science 
conceived as an instrument of discovery, in particular with the relative im- 
portance of a study of essence and a study of properties, the two co-ordinate 
parts of the enquiry proposed (402 a 7 sq.). The series of problems (a 23 to 
b 1 6) is nearly complete. Only one remains (403 a 3 sqq.) avroplav 5* l^et /ere. 
They have all been propounded with perfect impartiality, no clue being vouch- 
safed as to a future decision ; but the alternatives presented in the last 
section (b 9 16) suggest the possibility that we may have to proceed indirectly 

I. I 402 b 15 b 21 191 

a posteriori by reasoning from the effect to the cause, and studying the 
properties in order to obtain a definition of the essence. Accordingly A. faces 
this possibility and justifies the procedure in question. The fields of enquiry 
are diverse. Sciences like geometry deduce properties from definitions, else- 
where the study of the properties precedes and contributes to the discovery of 
the definition. In any case, the possibility of deducing properties serves as a 
test of a scientific definition. See note on b 26. Cf. Metaph. 1035 b J 6 cxao-rov 
yovv TO jjiepos eav opifrrat Ka\a*f t OVK avev rov epyov optelrai) & ouy virdpet. avev 

b 17. TO T lori -yvttvcu. Knowledge of the "What" is knowledge of the 
essence, (a 7) rrjv re <j)vo~iv KCU TTJV ova-lav, (a 13) TTJV ovcrLav KOL ro ri co-re, and is 
expressed in a definition. This becomes a principle or premiss of demonstra- 
tion (b 25), and from such principles science deduces the essential properties 8f 

b 17. Oecop-qcrai ras alrCas. Science is the knowledge of causes, Anal. Post. 
I. 2, 71 b 9 1 6, b3o sq., I. 6, 75 a 31 37, I. 14, 79 a 23 sq. The conclusions of 
a particular science must be demonstrated, i.e. the facts they state must be 
shown to follow from premisses better known and causally connected with the 
first principles of the science (ib. 1.2, 71 b 17 sqq.), the middle term in all such 
syllogisms denoting the cause of the effect stated in the conclusion. Leaving on 
one side such conclusions as are merely accidental and depend upon extraneous 
causes, the rest are the essential properties of the peculiar province (yivos) of 
the given science, and ought therefore to admit of being demonstrated syllo- 
gistically from the first principles of that science upon which remotely or 
proximately they depend. 

b 18. TV o-unppiiK6Tv rats ovorCats, here as below b2i, 23, 26, the 
essential properties of things as explained above a 8 and a 15. Them. (5, 4 H., 
8, 13 Sp.) 0G>prj<Tai, TO, K.a.6* avra o-vpfteprjKora r Simpl. 14, 30 ra Ka0* 
avrd o-vfjL/Sc/BTjKora Qe&pelv rats ova-Lais. Philop. 4 I2 yv&vai ra ovcncodS)^ vTrdp- 
)(OVTa Tois 7rpay/xacrtv...2O 17 yv&cris rSxv Ka6 3 avro KCU Trpcorajy 'virapxavT&v roty 
rrpdyp,aa-L. ravra yap tfrrjcri <ri;/A/3j8j7/cdra evravBa. The plural seems to show that 
ova-Lais means the things with which the science deals and not essences as 
opposed to properties. Thus unit is ova-La aBeros and point is ova-la 0Tos-, 
Anal Post. I. 27, 87 a 35 sq. 

b 18. 4v rots na0ijiia<ru These definitions of "straight" "curved" 
"line" and "surface" illustrate what A. means by the fundamental princi- 
ples of Plane Geometry (a 22 dpxai eirLirtdtnv). Similarly the proposition 
that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles (Eucl. I. 32) 
excellently illustrates what is meant by a property ((ruppfftrj /coy) to be deduced 
&' d-jTo8eig<*>s : Anal. Post. l. 4, 73 b 30 74 a 3, I. 5, 74 a 25 b 4. 

b 21. TO, <rujjLppTiK<5Ta <ru^pdXXerai,. The properties contribute to the know- 
ledge of the essence : exactly how A. does not state, for (b 22) eVeiSav yap. ..25 
KaAAicrra is just as vague. It is presumed that we are acquainted with certain 
properties of a thing which we have still to define. Our knowledge of these 
properties cannot at this stage be scientific. Them. (5, 9 H,, 8, 21 Sp.) dbvvarov 

yap avcv rov yv&ptuov ycvo~9ai rov opto-jJLov @r)pV(rai rt T>V vrrap^ovrcov 81? 
a7rodet^cos. Cf. Philop. 43, 3 Trees' yap ey^copft dTroSetKrtfccoff fide vat, rLva cVrl 
ra virdpxovra /car* ovtrLav r<p TT pay pan rov pr) rrjv ovarLav avrov zyv&Kora ; This 
statement is fully borne out by Anal. Post. I. 6, I. 31 and emphasized below 
(b 25) ird<rr]s yap aTrodeigcw It would seem, therefore, that in such cases 
the properties are better known to us, and we become acquainted with them, by 
sensation and experience before we know that they are deducible from the 

1 92 NOTES i. i 

definition of the thing ; the method pursued throughout Book II. of the present 
treatise exemplifies this. Philop. 40, 3041, 6 adduces from the Physics the 
definitions of roTros, ci-n-fLpov, KCVOV, xP ovos an d tnat f na ^ from Meteor. I. 12, 
347 b 34 sqq. as obtained in this way. pe-yct jxepos. So De Sensu I, 437 an 
7r\icrrov crv/z/SaXXerat /-tepos. Cf. the Latin maiorem partem. 

b 23. Kara rqv 4> aVTa<r ^ av - /* -47". 8ll a 59: i.e. Kara TOVTO 6 ^aiverai 
fjjjuv. This meaning must not be confused, as Trend, appears to confuse it, with 
that which the term bears when used technically for imagination, whether 
operation or result. As Bonitz explains, s.v. : verbo tpalvccrdcu rei obiectae 
species significatur, quatenus sensu animove percipitur ; ex hac duplice vocabuli 
$aivcr6ai notione explicatur, quod descendens inde verbum <pavrdgecr6ai ac 
nomen (pavrao-ia modo speciem rei obiectae significat sive veram sive fallacem, 
i.q. TO <$>alvcr6a^ modo earn actionem, qua rerum imagines animo informamus. 
For the meaning "appearance to sense " or simple presentation, whether true or 
false, cf. De A. 428 b 3 <atWrat pev 6 77X10$ Tro&cuoff, TT 7T icrrevrai 6* elvat peL^w rrjs 
olKovfjifvrjs with the parallel De Insomn. 2, 460 b 1 8 (paiverat, p,v 6 fj\tos TroStatos, 
dvri<pTj<n Se TroXXa/as erepov n irpos TIJV <f>avTa(rtav ; De Caelo II. 13, 294 a 7, De 
Sensu 3, 439 b 6 dpio-Tai y tpavrao-ia rrjs ^/ooas-, " the colour produces a definite 
impression." Here (402 b 23) it is used of appearance to the mind, de rebus 
COgitatis Bz, as in Eth. JVz'c. 1114 a 31 sq. irdvres etpicvrai rod (ftaivopevov ayaOov, 
Trjs 5e $avTao-ias ov Kvpioi (i.e. OVK. eicri Kvpioi rov tfraLvearQai TL a.ya.66v\ where 
<pavTa<ria is used as the verbal of <f>aiv<r6ai in the sense of the presentation 
or appearance to the mind. Especially in the phrase cpTroieLv <pavTa<riavssto 
produce an appearance or impression there is an approximation to the technical 
term imagination: Ind. Ar. 811 b 7 ex ipsa formula epTroiilv (pavracriav apparet, 
quam prope coniunctus hie usus sit cum eo qui infra proponitun Metaph, 1024 b 
17 frpayfta ijsevdos \\yerat\ KOL rovrov TO /JLCV rtp pr) <rvyKt(r6cu rj aSvvctTOv fwat 
crvvT6rjvcu t .OVT& yap OVK oi/ra rawra. TO. &e oara ecrri fMV ovra, 7T<pitK fjt,4vTot 
<t>aivc<r0cu 17 pjf old <rriv rj a fj.rj e'crriv, olov 77 crx:iaypa0/a /cat ra evvirvia' rara -yap 
ea-Ti [j.v re, aXX' ofy >v fpiroiel TTJV <pavTa<riav [the things exist, but not as they 
are presented ; they produce or convey a false impression]. TT pay para p.ev o$v 
iffcvdfj QVTto Xeyrrfu, rj roJ p,rj elva.L avra, 2j r TTJV CLTT* CLVT&V fyavraarlav fj,rj OVTOS wat : 
1025 a 5 ra TTpdyfjiaTa (papev \^evdrj e?vat, o<ra epiroicl <pavTa<rLav -\jrv^rj. So also 
in the Topics^ e.g. I. I, loob 26 avBlv T>V Xfyopevtov vdotav eiwroKaiov X l 
TravTfX&s TT)v <j)avTa(riav (i.e. ev&vs <paivTat -v/rcLiScff) : ib. IX. 4, 165 b 25^ IX. 6, 
1 68 b 29. In our present passage there is no suggestion that the presentment of 
the (ruppepriKOTa is erroneous. It may, however, be imperfect or confused, if we 
compare it with the knowledge of the same crv/A$j8?7/cora obtained by demon- 
stration (5t* arroteooff). Until deduced from the definition of the essence the 
properties can never be known as necessary. In the enquiry concerning soul 
'the operations are crv/i/Sc^Kora, effects presumably demonstrable from the 
essence or definition if we knew it. But with these operations we are to a 
certain extent familiar, whereas we are still in search of the definition from 
which they ought to be demonstrable. Trend, denies that the properties can in 
this way be known in the full sense of the term : Restat igitur, ut cru^eftrjKOTa^ 
donee a sensibus suscipiuntur neque a principiis demonstrantur, <j>avTacria 
tribuantur; nondum enim cognita sunt. Cf. Simpl. 15, i $>v [r>v K.a6* aura 

<ruiJ$ftr}KQT&v*\ <al 77 aiaQycrif KOI rj <f>avTatria dvTtXrjTTTiKrjy Them. (5, IO H., 8, 23 
Sp.) aXX' IKOI>&V KOI TO (paivofj-evov /cat r; <pavTacria [sc. ov di aVo^t'feoos], Philop. 
42, 6 fpavTacriav <f>ijcri f/TOi oXocr^epecrrepov yvSxriv rjyovv ra (paivo^eva KOI fvapyrj, 
(pavracrlav Ka\cras irapa r6 (pavepa elvai. <fravTa<rLa seems to be used in the latter 
sense in Phys. IV. 4, 211 b 34. 

L i 402 b 21 a 2 193 

To sum up. The fundamental meaning in ^avraa-La is presentation to the 
mind, first in the act of perception and afterwards when by the faculty of 
imagination in the technical sense this appearance is recalled and again 
presented to the mind. In modern psychology the distinction between the two- 
is marked by the two terms presentation and representation, and A/s technical 
<pavracria or TO <pavracrTLKov is what would be called a representative faculty, 
though loosely used, as A. includes among its effects the production of the after- 
mage. Etymologically the earlier meaning of <pavraa-ia, as of <f)aiveo-0ai. } is pre- 
sentation or appearance and this, its normal sense in Plato and earlier writers, 
is often retained by A., as here. See further note on 404 a 28. 

b 23. d-iroSiS6vai. Ind. Ar. 80 a 54 aTrodiSovctL sequente enunciatione 
interrogativa syn opL&w : cf. 406 a 27, Eth. Nic* 1095 a 20 Trepl Se TTJS evdai/jLovias, 
TL CTTLV y dp,<picr{3r]rovcriv KOL oi>x 6/x.oiW ol TroX^oi Tols a-cxpols a.7ro8t,d6acnv. For the 
construction a?ro5tdvat Trcpi nvos without the dependent question Bz. cites Z>e 
Gen. et Corr. II. 6, 333 b 4, Meteor. I. i, 339 a 7, Top. I. 14, 105 b 26 opicrp.^ 
OVK V7reTs dirobovvai Trepl avT&v. 

b 25. irdcrqs -ydp diroSEi^ccos. Metaph. 1034 a 31 lv rols cruXXo-ytcr/zoTs: TTCLVT&V 
Q-PXn *} ova-ia. CK yap TOV TL ecrrtv ol crv\\oyicrfJLol elaiv. Simpl. 15, 9 regards this 
as a reason given for trying to discover the definition : "We must after all find 
a definition, for without it we are unable to demonstrate any of the properties." 
Similarly Philop. 42, 15 sqq. TOVTO 8rj\S>v on el KOL CK TTJS evapyeias y(Ofj.ev TIVCL 
yvS>o~Lv T&V <rupfBef3T)K.QTa>v TOLLS ovo-lais, dXXa Tavrrjv TTJV yv&criv e^ofj-ev e alo-0T)cra>? 
KOI OVK aTrodeiKTLKTiv. eav de TOV 6picrp.ov yvafiev, rdrc iriarr)p.Qvt,K.&s bwapcQa Trjy 
yvaxriv O.VT$>V eXelv dp^ais Kexprjpevoi Tols opia-pols. This was the view of Alex* 
Aphr. apud Philop. 43, i 8. On the general notion as an dpxn cf. Maier, Syllo- 
gistik, II a, p. 404, n. 2, who has valuable remarks on the synthetic and analytic 
processes of thought. 

b 26 wo-T...403a 2 airavres. From the scientific definition all essential 
properties can be deduced. Hence we are furnished with a test of a good 
definition. A. applies this to previous definitions of the soul, 408 a 3 5, 409 b 
14 18 ; cf. Grote, Aristotle, p. 452, 2nd edition (Vol. II. p. 179, ist edition) : 
"Aristotle rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent philosophers... he 
pronounces it incorrect to say that the soul is moved at all. He farther observes- 
that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the full meaning or all 
the varieties of soul : and that none of these defective theories suffices for the 
purpose that every good and sufficient theory ought to serve, viz. not merely to- 
define the essence of the soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the 
concomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be deducible from it." 

403 a 2. StaXcKTtKws. Philop. 44, I ov <J>VO-LKOV dXX' &7r\S>s irpbs 86gav 6pS>vra 
KOL TO doKelv TL \eyLv . A definition would be sufficient for the purposes of 
debate if it were accepted as valid by the interlocutor. A. opposes dialectic to 
demonstrative science (see Topics, passim) ; the two agree in employing the 
syllogism and arguing strictly from premisses to conclusion. But the premisses 
of dialectic are not necessarily or invariably true, they may include any current 
opinions (/doa) which both the disputants agree to accept. Cf. Metaph* 
995 b 23 irepl oo-cov ol dia\eKTiKol iripS>VTai crKOTreiv < T>V vd6a>v p.6vov TTOIOV- 
P.CVOL Trjv O-KC^IV. Philop. 44, 2 1 1 compares the dialectician's definition of 
anger given below, a 30 sqq., viz. opegis dvrib.virrja-e&s, with the physicist's &O-LS 
TOV 7TpLKap8Lov ajLfj.aTos 8t opfiv dvTL\v7rf}o"t>^ The former fails to explain the 
accompanying symptoms (ra TrapajcoXoutfoOvra naBrf), palpitation (TraX/id?), rise of 
temperature (SeppoT^s) and a flushed face. When the abstract logical con- 
sideration of a subject is censured and a preference is expressed for physical 

H. 13 

I 9 4 NOTES I. i 

enquiry into things in the concrete, A.'s complaint comes to this, that the 
premisses with which the reasoning starts are not appropriate and the con- 
clusions do not apply to the facts, De Gen. An. n. 8, 748 a 8 ot -yap /^ IK. r&v 
olKei&v dpx&v \6yoi KCVO'L, aXXa dozovarw elvai r&v irpaypdr&v OVK ovrcs. Yet 
such formal, superficial discussion, XoyLK&s i"?Ttv, has its place and A. is content 
to employ it, e.g. Metaph. 10290 13. 

a 2. Kvws. Simpl. 15, 22 <5>s rrjs (pvcrccas K.OI TOV (3d6ovs ra>v ovra>v aTTOTrtV- 
TOV KGVOV 7rpoo*a-yopevt : Philop. 43s 34 TOVTCCTTL Kara Kvov (fiepeo-Qcu, /cat JJLTJ 
<j>dirTcr6a.i rrjs (pvcreats TOV Trpay/xaroff, prjfte olovcl a-Trcpetftetv TO> Trpdyu^ari TTJV 
7reav rrjs Siai/oia?, aXXa fieTecopov cTvai. Cf. Etk. Eud. I. 8, I2I7b 21 \oyi<S>$ KOL 
Kv&$, De Gen. An. n. 8, 748 a 8 Ka&6\ov \Lav *al KCVOS, Eth. Nic. 1096 b 20 
jutarmov e<rrat TO elftos, Pol. 1260 a 25 Ka66\ov yap ol Xc-yoi/reff e^airarS^a-Lv cavrovs. 

4O3 a 3 1O. As regards the attributes or affections of the soul, there is 
the important and difficult problem, whether they are all shared with the body 
or whether the soul has any affection peculiar to itself. The dependence of the 
soul upon the body is apparent in most of its functions, whether active or 
passive, e.g. in anger, desire, sensation. Thinking would seem to form an 
exception, though if it be a species of imagination, or not independent of 
imagination, even thought would be dependent upon the body [ 9]. 

a 3. cxiropfav 8 s <?x l - The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the last 
problem, viz., Are there any properties of soul which are independent of body ? 
Its discussion leads to a digression on the subject-matter of various branches of 
science, from which A. returns in the concluding sentence, b 16 19. 7r6rep6v 
,..4 KOLVO. This is best understood if we revert to 402 a 9 sq., where the 'dis- 
tinction drawn must be the same, though the order of the alternatives is 
reversed. Consequently the attributes or properties here said to be shared by 
the possessor of the soul are those referred to in the earlier passage as belong- 
ing to the animal in virtue of the soul (St* CKCIVIJV'), i.e. belonging to the animal 
as a whole because it is animate (ep^v^ov}. Such attributes or properties are 
distinguished from those that are peculiar to the soul itself and not shared 
by the body which it animates. As in Metaph. 1038 b 10 sqq., t'&ov o oi>x 

a 4. TOV SXOVTOS. By this we must understand TOV <pov=rov 
<r&]jLaT05. The two phrases TO f<5ov CX*L ^f^xn v ano ^ T $ CVW virdpx*i> tyvxn are 
equivalent, cf. Metaph. 1040 b 23 ovdevl yap V7rdpx*i> ~h ovcria aXX' 77 OVTTJ re Kal 
T<> ZXOVTL avryv, o$ earn/ oucrta. The soul is not the ovcrta of an inanimate or of 
a dead body, 412 b 25 sq., but of a living body, 415 b 8 TOV >VTOS 
alrta KOL CLpxn> b II ra>v cfjL^vx&v o-w/iaTtov 17 ^X 7 ? a ""* So 4I2ai5 

ffji'^vxov. Parallels may be cited for TOV C^OVTOS, e.g. 416 b 18, 21 TO 
etrrlv 17 Trp&nj ^v^, TO 5c Tpe^>o/*6i/ov T^ %X OV T o-^ rr l v o'&p.a (i.e. TO 

^ 9 S^-j ^ IJ )? 4 2 ^ ^ I 7 ano ^ 4^ D 2 ^ S< 1' Tovdt TOV e^oj/TO? 
^- 48 b 28 TOV icou/ov, 6 d7rdXa>X<:i/). As the whole body is 
animate by the presence of soul, so also is any part of it : cf. Metaph. 1036 b 30 
32. See note on 422 b 23, Ivnfe : also De Part. An. II. I, 647 a 24 31 where, 
a 27, we read T& %x ov irp&Tov poptov ras roiavras dpxds (viz. rrfv al<r6rjTLKrjv and 
rfyv Kara TQTTOV Ktv^Tt/cijv). In De Mem. I. 45 a 3 r ^ yiyv&\*,*vov dta rrjs 
v T{J tyvXTl Ka * T f-op^*J> TOV o-eo/iaTosf T< ^xovri av-njv the last word 
may possibly replace aio-^o-tv, but, as the heart or its analogue is the 
bodily part in question, a comparison of Metaph. 1035 b 25 sq. would suggest 
that T< e^ovTt avr^v [int. rrjv alo-0rjri.Kr)v < ^X'7 V ] corresponds to ev <5 7rpooT6> <5 
Xoyos- <al ff ovo-t'a, or, in other words, ^ "^vx^. 

a 5. <(>avTat 8^, sc. 17 fax*!* <paiverai evidentiam significat, non dubitationem. 

I. i 403 a 2 a 10 195 

The appeal is to experience, to the facts, especially the evidence of sense. Cf. 
404 b 5, 406 b 24 with the infinitive, as 406 a 30, 407 a 15 with the participle, et 
Stiepe. So also (>avep6v Icrrw. 

a 6. iraerxtv o-uS^ iroietv. The soul has no passive affection or active 
function, i.e. no passive or active property of its own (iSioz/). Cf. a 10 sq. *pya>v 

rj TraSrjpdrcoVj 409 b 1$ TO. TraOrj K.CL Ira epya rrjs ^LI^S, 411 b 2 T$>V aX\&v enacTTOv 

7Totovfj,v re KOL Trdcrxofjiev. That the reference to a subject is the more correct 
mode of expression follows from 408 b 13 15. 

a 7. oXoos alor0cveor6ai. Cf. De Sensu I. 436 a 7 K.OLVCL rrjs tyvxn s v ra Ka ^ TV 
<ra>/zaTO, olov a/Lcr&Tja-LS KOL fj,vf)fj.rj /cat 9vp.os <ai CTridvfjiia KOL oXoo? opetff, KOL irpbs 
TOVTOLS fjdovr] T KOI \vTTr). A. sums up his own view of sensation thus, De Sensu 
I. 436 b 6 j] 8* aicrdrjcris OTL dt,a o-wparos ylyvsrai TTJ ijsvxf], drf\ov. Apparently anger 
and courage, as well as desire, are referred to the sensitive soul, TO alcr6rjTLK.6v. 
In Plato, e.g. Tim. 69 D, 77 B (cf. 42 A), there is an attempt to distinguish 
two uses of the word aLcrdrjo-is^ which In Greek had to do duty for the feeling of 
pleasure or pain as well as for the cognitive element of sensation proper. As 
Professor Beare points out (Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, pp. 270, 
n. 3, 273, n. 3) there was an analogous double use of the English word 'feeling.' 
In psychological works of the last century feeling had to do duty for the sense of 
pleasure and pain as well as for the factor of cognition. oXcos (jnd. Ar. 505 b 47) 
ab enumeratis singulis rebus transitum parat ad universum genus. Cf. 429 b 21, 
431 b 10 and 436 a 9 quoted above. 

a 8. [idXwrTa. Join with tdiov. ical TOVTO, sc. TO i/oetj/. So in a 9 ovde rovro. 
4>avroo-a rts. A species of imagination. The term is here used in its technical 
sense, and not as in 402 b 23. See III., c. 3 and 433 a 9 e'l rts- rfjv <f>avra<riav 

TL0Lrj Wff v6t](TLV TLVCt. 

a 9. -ij p^ aveu cjmvTcurtas. This more closely approximates to the results 
obtained in ill., cc. 4 8, especially 431 a 14 sq., 16 sq. 3 431 b 2, 4 8, 432 a 8 sq., 13 
sq., De Mem. I. 449 b 30 sq. OVK 4v8lx | '' r * &v K 1 "^ because <f>avraa-la in the 
technical sense implies antecedent sensation and therefore body. Cf. 427 b 15 
avrf) T [sc. 17 cfravTacria] ov yiyverat avsv alo'dfjcrec&S) 429 a I fj cpavraa-ia av CLTJ 

KLVrjCTLS &7TO T7JS atCT^J7<T6O)S TTJS KCLT VpylCLV yiyvOp,VTf^ 42,$ b 24 a.7T\d6vT(OV T&V 

al(rdr]rS>v evGicrw al alo-df)<ri$ KOL (pavracriai, Iv TOLS al(r6rjTrjpLOLs 9 Rhet. 1370 a 28 
sqq., De Mem. I. 450 a 27 32. Memory is the revival of this mental picture, 
and of memory A. says drj\ov yap 3n del vorjcrai TOLOVTOV TO yLyvop,vov diet TYJS 
al(r6r)crea>s Iv TTJ ^vxS Ka * T< ? ju-opta) roO crfapciTOS T& e^ovrt awr^v, olov gcdypdcfrrjfjid 
TL TO TrdQos, ofi <pafj.v rr}v eiv fivfjprjv eTvai' rj yap yiyvofjievr} Kivrja-is [i.e. <f>avTaaria] 
Tcu. olov TVTTOV TWO. row mcr^/xaTOS', KaQairep ot o"<f>payL6p.vot Tolff SCIKTV- 
The optative with av expresses the logical consequence, as often, e.g. 
403 a ii, 12, 406 b 4, where it follows 406 a 31 tuXoyov, and 32 elireiv a\rj&s. 

4O3 a 1O 27. This involves the further question of the soul's separate 
existence. If there is any activity or affection of the soul in which, the body 
does not share, its separate existence will be possible : if not, it will not be 
separable from the body. In the latter case its mode of existence is comparable 
to that of the straight line, which has many properties, qu& straight, but is never 
found apart from something corporeal on which its existence depends. Ex- 
perience confirms the view that most attributes of the soul are similarly 
dependent upon the body, as the necessary condition of their existence, and 
this is shown quite clearly by such emotions as anger or fear. It follows 
from this that they are forms or notions immersed in matter, i.e. the matter is 
a necessary condition of their essence, and this dependence upon matter is seen 
when they come to be defined [ 10], 

196 NOTES i. r 

a ii. tSuov, sc. rrjs ^vx^l s ( so a I2 *8iov a ^ s \ i- e ' not shared by the body, ^17- 
KOL rov e^ovroff. x^P^^o-i, as in 413 b 26 ; cf. 403 a 12 QVK. av */ x<P<>"rfj. 
This terminology is regularly employed to indicate separate or independent 

a 12. OVK av cut) \topicrn}. If there is no property or function of the soul 
that is not shared by the body, the soul will not have a separate or independent 
existence. A decision in this sense excludes the possibility which the other 
alternative leaves open. dXXd KaGdircp T<J> e^Oet. fnd. Ar. 3 54 a 26 omittitur 

etiam aliquoties ea enunciatio demonstrativa, ad quam enunciatio a KaOairep [vel 
G&crTrsp] incipiens referatur, cf. Probl. ill. 17, 873 b 20 (on te -4. 409 a 32 and 431 a 
17, &o-7Tp with no comas' apparent, see 720/r ad loc.). Something must be supplied, 
e.g. 7Tpl 7-171; tyvxrjv ouro>s f^et. A. pursues the comparison, but does not return 
to the main proposition for the sake of which the comparison is instituted. 

a 12. T evfal fj ev0v, "the straight line as such," i.e. the straight line in 
abstracto as defined in geometry, which is unquestionably the meaning* of TO 
v6v in a 15, rectum qud rectum. Qud, the Latin equivalent of #, was made 
familiar by the schoolmen. By T&> *v&el Sophonias understood r<5e r<5 e-vOel r<5 
ev x a ^ K< ? i? eV X/0<, the edge of the brazen or stone ruler. To this Bonitz 
(Hermes vil. p. 416 sqq.) objects as not justified by the language, and incon- 
sistent with the purpose for which the illustration is introduced. As to the 
language : " Soil <-\>6v in dem Dativ r<5 evQei eine andere Bedeutung haben, als 
in dem bestimmenden Zusatze fj evtiv, so scheint es ein imerlassliches Erforderniss 
zu sein, dass zu evSei noch ein bestimmendes Wort gesetzt sei, aus dem dieser 
Unterschied ersichtlich wiirde, z. B. rw cvtiel fuXa>, o-oo/zart, rtSSe r<p evtisi ; ohne 
einen solchen Zusatz hiesse es doch mehr als billig ist von dem Leser bean- 
spruchen, wenn er auf clen blossen Anlass des jj unter dem Worte *v0v in dieser 
Verbindung verschiedene Begriffe denken soil." This is a strong argument, but 
not absolutely convincing. Philoponus is right in saying (49, 18 sq.) that r<i> 
etj0i is ambiguous, and Torstrik satisfied himself that the words might mean not 
only (i) abstractam recti notionem, ro ri rjv elvcu, definitionem recti or (2) lineam 
rectam. mathematicam, rectum mathematicum quod mathematico corpori insit, 
but also (3) in materia sensili rectum expressum. Further, the mention of the 
brazen sphere is confusing. But when we turn to the purpose of the illustration 
all ambiguity is cleared away. If for the illustrative example we substitute the 
proposition which it is introduced to suggest, we shall have to write with 
Bonitz : rfj faxS ( not r< P <?*?)> 27 ^X'?* ^"oXXa o-v/ijSaiVet, olov aicr6dv*ordai r&v 
al<rdrfTCov t ov /JLCVTOL y ater^crcrat ^<ptcr^eT(ra O.VTTJ Ka6* avTrjv 17 ^u^f). This implies 
that by TO> evtift as well as by (a 15) r6 evSv is meant the straight line in abstracto 
and not the edge of the ruler or any other concrete object. For the simile is 
introduced merely to show that under certain conditions the soul in itself, and 
not the animate being, OVK &v &) ^oopto-r^. Themistius, then, has caught A.'s 
intention in using the simile when with unusual freedom he paraphrases 
(6, 34 H., II, 24 Sp.) 7r5>$ o$v \eyofjiev rr\v ^vxyv <f)i,\iv KOL pta-Glv xal opyi&crBat; 
rrS>s 5e \4yo/mv rrfv cv Gsia.v c^r^aQai rrjf <r<f>aipa$ Kara o-rtypyv ; ov y&p on % 
v6tla Kd0' eavrfjv (ovdev yap corrtv), aXX* [sc. \cyofiev} on 6 K.CIV&V 6 v6v$, ovde on 
rye cr<paipas KO.0* eavrrjv^ aXX* on rrjs xa\Krjf ax&pKrrov yhp KCU TO evQ-b KCU TO 
ivov Kavovos KCU TTJS ^aXic75<p cr<paipa$ 7 KCU f} KOTO, cmyp.'rjv af/>rj t /xaXXoi/ 
r) rov crvvoXov irpo? r6 cr\)vo\ov. ovra> de teal ra rrjs ^vx^s waGr} iravra. 
elvai KOLVO. pera rov or&ftaros. 

a 13. iroXXo. orvjxpafvcu Compare the passage where the nature of the 
objects of mathematics is fully discussed, Metapk. 1078 a 5 TroXXa de 
Kd6* avr^. rols irpayiMLO-iv % e<ao-rov vTrdpxet r&v roto-urais,... chore KOI fj 

I- I 403 a ii a 15 197 

Sa [sc. TToXXa <rvfjLpfj3r]K K.a.6* ara]...l7 <<rr* et rts 64{i. 

TG>V (rvfAfieftrjKOTav o-KOTrel TL irepl TOVTC&V TJ rota)ra, ovdev 8ia TOVTO ifsevo'os -v 
*.., 21 apicrra 5* ai/ ourco Be&prjOeir) eKaorov, el TLS TO ftj) Keycap icrpevov Qe'trj 
Cf. 1077 b 22 30. In these passages prJKOS^cvdela ypappr]=Tb ev0v r) cvQv. 

a 13. rtjs x^^s <nj>apas. So in Metaph. 1036 a 21 A. speaks of r\ 
opd-f). Possibly a sphere and other geometrical figures in brass were familiar 
objects in the lecture room. Cf. also id. 997 b 35 OVT* yap al auroral ypaju^ai 
TotavTai eltrw otas \eyei 6 ye&peTprjs (ouev yap ev#v rcov al<r0rjTa>i> OVTGOS ov orpoy- 
yvkov CLITTCTCLL yap TOV Kavovos ov KOTO, (rriy^v 6 KVK\O^ aXX* acrirep Hp&rayopas 
\yfv \yx&v rovs yea* per pas). Note that, as there 6 KVK\O$ without qualification 
touches the ruler, the example of an ala-Srjrr) ypap.^ so here (403 a 13) TO evdv $ 
v0v has the property of touching rJj? x a ^ K ^ s P- e - ol<r6rfTrjff] <r<j>aipas. Protagoras 
objected that the objects of the geometer were not sensible objects. Contact at 
a point, as the point is defined in geometry, is not borne out by sense. 

a 14. OT&TCO. So E alone : all the other MSS- have TOVTOV, which was also the 
text of Philoponus and Simplicius. Whether they join rovrou with x a >P La 'G* v 
or make it governed by a-fyerai is, in the opinion of Bonitz l.c. 9 not clear : Philop. 
49? 34 / Se r<5 eiTreu/ ov JJLCVTOL ye a^/erai, TO^TOU \a>purQev T& 6-uOv rrjv v&vTr)ra 
avTrjv [sc. Xa/xj8avet]. avrtj ovy, (prjcrt) ^fopicr^eto-a TOV v7TOKijj,cvov OVKCTL Tre/crerat 
TOVTO, Simpl. 18, 13 ov JI^VTOL a4/Tai To-Grou x o) P t<r ^* v T ^ rfW. TO^TOV p.ev TOV 
v7TOKifj,vov Xe-y, evWi Se vvv TO cos x a P aKT ^P a Ka%t T & & s evQvTTfTa. Trend, and 
Torst. keep the reading TOVTOV, which they join with x^P Lcr ^ v ' The latter 
indeed pronounces ovrca to be an error due to the scribe of E (scripturae vitio) 
and adds "rovro enim rem sensilem quasi digito monstrat." But the usual 
Aristotelian pronoun for a concrete thing is o&?, not o&ro*, and even then some 
addition is required as in ode 6 av9pa>7ro$, roSe TL. On the other hand ovr<&, if 
taken with a^erat and as = fcara oriyf^v, gives the following sense ; the abstract 
straight line will not touch the brazen sphere at a point, for it has no separate 
existence. The properties of soul may be illustrated by the properties of a 
straight line, one of them being contact with a sphere at a point. To this will 
correspond some active or passive function of soul (e.g. ata-Qrjcris). But just as 
contact implies concrete bodies, so that the straight line in abstracto will only 
have this property as long as it is embodied in something concrete, so the soul 
will cease to exercise its active or passive functions when separated from the 
body. As a matter of fact, the straight line in abstracto has no separate 
existence apart from the particular concrete things which are straight, Philop, 
50, 3 eVcl fjLT)8e v<l>(rrr}K, and, in the hypothetical case we are considering, the 
soul will be like it in this respect. That the comparison of soul to the mathe- 
matical straight line is introduced for a special purpose in working out one of 
the two alternatives suggested by the problem we are considering is clear from 
403 b 19 Kal ovx <o-7rp ypafjLftrj. 

a 15. cLx*&P l <rrv ya,p...nv6s kcrriv. A.'s doctrine as to the question what are 
the objects of the mathematical sciences is most fully explained in Metaph. M. 3. 
See also the excerpts above in the note on a 13 iroXXeL rv|Lf3avu It is thus 
summarised Ind. Ar. 860 a 50 ra paQrjfuiTiKa a^o>pto-Ta, ^copto-ra rg vo^cret, 
TI x<k>prra. Metapk. 1026 a 9 on pevTOi evia p.adrjfjLaTa % dicivrjTa Kal 
$<rcopet, diJXov, ib. 13 17 ftev yap (frvcriKf) Trept ^ooptOT-A /xcv dXX* OUK dfciV^ra, 
p,a6rjfj,aTt,K.fjf evia irepl aKivrjTa ftev ov ;<prra 8* r<Bff [V<rrtv] aXX* oof ev v\v). 
13 x^P 1 ' 71 ' ^ y**P QVT&V [sc. T&V fjLa0TffjLaTuca>v] ovdev, Phys* II. 2, 193^ 2 4 
xal yap 7TLir&a Kal crrepea l^ ra <f>v<riKa crco/xara *cat fflKr) Kal cmy/ids, rrepl ev 
o-KOTret 6 paj6rjfjLaTiK6s. *TI r) aorpoXoyia [astronomy in general, both mathematical 
and physical] erepa ^ pepos TTJS c^ucrt/c^' y^p TOV <f>v<rutov TO TI eVrtv rJXtos- Kal 

198 NOTES I. i 

etbcvaJL, r&v 8e orvjJifa/SrjKOTCov K.a6* avra p,r)bev, aroirov, aXXos 1 re KCU ort 
(paivovrai \eyovres ot 7Tpl tfivcrec&s /cat irepi (rj^jLtaroff creXrjvrjs KCU TJ\LOV, KCtl irorcpov 
rjs 6 Kocr^tos- /cat fj yrj 77 o#. Kepi rovrajv pev ovv Trpcryyuareuercu K.OL a 
Kos, aXX* o&x rj <pvcriKov ovojuaros- rrepas eK.a<jrov. oude ra crv/JL^e/BrfKora 
17 TQiovTois ovvi crvppeprjzev. 16 iccu x <D ptt L * X^P^ T"/ 3 T V VOTJO-CL 
s fern, teal ovdev dicxpepei, oue ytWrat -^sevSos ^ooptfdvreov, z'. 194 a 9 
f) fj.V yap yetoperpLa irepl ypapjJLrjs <pv<rLKr)s o-fco7r, aXX* ot/^ fj (pvcriKf), fj ' OTTTLK.^ 
fj.a@rjiJ.aTiK.yv p,ev ypafJLjArjv, dXX' o\>x TJ ^a^rjfiartKr) aXX* t ^ <^U<TIK^. This doctrine is 
consistently maintained throughout the De A. and is the basis of the phrase by 
which the objects of mathematics are often denoted, viz. ra eV aqtaipe'crsi 6Wa 
(or Xe-yd/teva). The relevant passages include 403 b 14 sq., 429 b 18 20, 432 a 
3 6, where see notes. 

a 16. irc6T) must be understood as in 403 a 3 in the wider sense of attributes 
generally (402 a 8 note) and not restricted to specific emotions (animi pertur- 
bation es, afTectus, afFectiones) as defined and enumerated by Aristotle, Eth. 
Nic. 1105 b 20 sqq., and described in detail, Rhet. n. cc. 2 n. That the 
word has the wider sense in 403 a 3 sqq. is plain from the mention of ala-6dvecr6at> 
and i/o<-tv (cf. Traor^etj/ ovde TTOLCLV a 6 sq.), and to restrict it now would be fatal 
to the argument. A.'s object in what follows is to prove that every mental 
operation has its bodily concomitant As many of the bodily changes are 
internal and unperceived, he argues indirectly (<rr]p.lov fie a 19) from the 
difference of temperament in man and man. This difference of temperament 
cannot be due to the object, i.e. the external causes (iraQripdrtov a 20) which 
tend to excite emotion, for in that case the same slight would rouse all 
men alike to anger, the same terrors would excite fear in all alike, whereas it 
is notorious that the choleric temper is prone to anger on trivial occasions and 
the melancholic temper so timid that it gives way to groundless alarms, these 
differences between man and man being due to the bodily constitution. Thus 
anger cannot take place without the body, without a concomitant affection of a 
definite part of the body, and this bodily affection cannot take place without the 
soul, for the body in which it takes place is at all events animate : ro Zpyov ovx 
virdpxet, civev alo-Qffo-e&s. What is said of anger and fear must be understood to 
apply to all the mental functions. A. chose the emotions to illustrate the wider 
sense of operations or attributes simply because the dependence on the body, 
though nowhere perfectly clear, is more obvious in their case. The analogous 
argument from the dependence of sensation upon sense-organs will be found 
408 b 20 sqq. 

a 18. ajia -y<ip TO^TOLS ira<rxi TI, is in some degree affected simultaneously 
with them, i.e., whenever there is a mental affection, a bodily affection accom- 
panies it. The mental and the bodily processes go together. The bodily 
change may, however, be internal and not capable of direct verification ; hence 
A. resorts to the argument from signs. 

a 20. iraOi^dTtov. " Causes of mental change," Alex. Aphr. De An. 13, i 
a 17 opyrjv rj <j)6f3ov fj irt.Qvp,iav fj n rotovro ird6os oXXo Kiveiv old re. BonitZ, Ind* 
Ar. s.v., after saying that the meanings of ira&os and n-dBrj^a in general agree, 
notes as one point of dissimilarity usum voc. irdSos excedit Tra^^ta, ubi non 
motum et mutationera, sed eius causam significat (554 b 26 sqq.). Thus this 
shade of meaning must be distinguished here from that, with which some 
have confused it, of rrpagis QQapriKr) 37 odvvijpd, for which cf. De Resp. 17, 

479 a J 5 Ka * p>i>K.po>v yraQijpdT&v liriyivofjiev&v ev r<p yi)po< ra^/eos reXevTaxriv. 
The incentives to anger or fear are not necessarily calamities or painful 

I. i 4033 15 a 26 199 

a 22. opya. . .op-yCJ-rjTai. The word opyav is used of buds swollen to bursting 
(Lat. tttrgescere) : but also of the human body, when the blood is up or in a 
ferment, cf. ProbL vn. 2. 886 a 32 ta^ opy>v TVXTI TO o-5/za. That A. observed 
the etymological connexion of opyL^ecrQaL with opyav seems plain from the 
context. But the subject to opyifrrai must be personal. This is one of many 
instances of subject omitted. The subject omitted can generally be supplied 
from the verb, as 6 opyt^evos here: cf. 418 a 22, 23 (bis), 428 b I, 3, 5, 7, 
43 b 3> 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 22, 23, 431 a 20, 24, b 6, 7, 8, 9, 13. For a typical case 
see 421 b 30 6p%: cf. 425 b 13. Sometimes it is safer to supply a subject in the 
neuter, especially with ala-ddveo-Qai or vodv, on the analogy of 417 a 10 sq., b 8 
TO <f>povovv, oTav <ppovfj) 426 b 17 Kpiviv TO Kplvov, 4$o b 24 ro yvcopigov. Some- 
times the first person plural has preceded, e.g. 420 a 14, 425 b 13. There are 
doubtful cases, e.g. 423 a 18, 429 b 13, 430 a 25. hid. Ar. 589 b 47 tertiam 
personam singularis non addito pronomine ris notum est ad significandum 
subiectum universale (germanice "man") ita usurpari, ut iam In superioribus 
aliquo modo, veluti in infinitive (cf. Kruger, gr. Gr. 6r, 4, 5) vel in substantivo 
numeri pluralis, a quo ad singularem indefinitum transitur, illud subiectum 
universale contineatur, Hos fines vulgati usus raro excedit Ar. (pleraque 
exempla quae congesserunt Zell. ad Eth. N. in. i. 6, Wz. ad Org. 3b 22 a 
vulgari usu non differunt), veluti Eth. Nic. H52b 16 eW e/wrdoW r<5 (f>poviv at 
rfdovai, KOI o<r<o fj.a\\ov x a ' L P t i paXXov. Ind. Ar. 763 a 25 in omittendo pron. 
indef. ris, rl Ar. easdem fere leges observat ac reliqui scriptores : ad exempla 
allata insolentioris omissionis adde JDe Gen. et Corr. I. 4. 319 b n. 

a 24. iv -rots <in6c<rb -yCvovrat, sc. ol avtipwrroi, the ellipse so common with 
<f>ao-L. The expression eV row iraQea-L -yLvea-Qai (cf. Eng. "get in a passion") is 
an elaboration of the simple verb 7racrxi> used above, Cf. Pol. I287b 3 eV 
tra&ei ovres, De Insotnn. 2. 460 b 3 a7raro/if^a...eV role Tra&euLv oz/rer, aXXot d* eV 
aXXots 1 , ofov <5 S^tX6? V <o'/3a>, d * cp&riKOS v epcori. 

a 25. \6^ot ^vvX.oi. Aoyos= notion, content of definition, which is opposed, 
precisely as is form or quiddity, to matter. Cf. 403 b 2, first note. The com- 
pound adjective %vv\os might conceivably be taken, on the analogy of evvdpo?, 
in either of two ways, as (i) immanent in matter, or (2) having matter in it, 
apparently favoured by Metaph. 1033 a 5. Ind. Ar. s. v. mentions no other use 
of the compound in A., but it is frequent in the Greek commentators, who- 
interpret it according to (i) and in 430 a 6 replace A/s ra fx ovra ^n v ( as 
opposed to ret avev v\rjs) by cwXa : Them, 97, 37 sq. H., 180, 12 sqq. Sp., SimpL 
2 39> 7j Philop. 534, 13. So Alex. Aphr. 'ATT. <al \v<r. 55, 9 interprets ew\ov 
ftdoff as TO TWO? eldof. Cf. ad h. L Them. 7, 25 H. 3 13, 8 Sp. eV v\y TO eZvac 
exovres, Philop. 54, 15 sq., Simpl. 20, 6. See also 403 b n and note. 

a 26. otov TO ^p-y^eo-eai. In the Rhetoric 1378 a 31 sqq. anger is defined as a 
painful desire (opegis) of apparent vengeance, on account of an apparent slight 
done to one's self or one's friends, when the slight is unjustifiable. This definition, 
which leaves out the physical aspect, is represented in a condensed form by opegis 
avTiKwrrrjo-ecos below. KVT]OTLS. This word covers at once physical movement 
and psychical change. And thus the definition which it introduces includes in 
brief both types of definition, the physicist's and the dialectician's, which are 
distinguished below. <re6|j.ttTos tj p^povs t] 8wc|X<D$. By thus adding " or of a 
part or of the faculty belonging to it" Aristotle is providing for those cases 
where the mental process is thought not to affect the body as a whole, but to 
be confined to some particular organ, as seeing to the eye. Such an organ 
operates or functions in virtue of the faculty which resides in it and constitutes 
it an organ or instrument : the organ implies the faculty, the eye vision, as will 

200 NOTES I. i 

be explained 424 a 24 28. The physical fact accompanying anger is, as we 
shall see, a ferment of the blood, or of the heat, about the heart. 

a 27. vir* ToGSc. The external cause which excites anger is defined in the 
Rhetoric I.e. as <f>awofj.4vr) oXtywp/a. gveica rovSe. The final cause of anger is 
defined below as avriXinrrja-is and in the Rhetoric I.e. as ri^^pLa. 

-4O3 a 2 7 b 1 9. A digression upon the relation of psychology to physics 
or the science of nature. To study the soul as thus dependent upon the body falls, 
then, to the natural philosopher. The emotions would be differently defined 
by the mere dialectician and the mere biologist: e.g. anger to the one 
is a desire of revenge, to the other a ferment of blood about the heart, or the 
like ; just as a house may be defined, on the one hand, by its end, protection 
from the weather, on the other hand, by the particular materials, the stones, 
bricks and timber, of which it is composed. A complete definition, whether of 
anger or of house, must include both end and materials ; it must take account 
of the form as well as of the matter : and such a complete definition alone 
satisfies the requirements of physics, the true science of nature. But what of 
the two incomplete definitions, viz. that which takes account of the form, 
neglecting the matter, and that which deals with the matter to the exclusion 
of the form? The truth is that the properties of things are forms which fall 
for investigation under different branches of science according to the varying 
degrees in which they are implicated in matter. There is no science that investi- 
gates the properties of matter which are not separable, nor even regarded as 
separable, from matter. Physics treats of all the properties of such and such 
bodies and of such and such matter, viz. of natural bodies capable of motion, and 
of sensible matter. When the properties of bodies are not thus regarded, they 
lie outside of physics and in some cases fall within the province of the arts and 
crafts. Properties of bodies which, though really inseparable, are for scientific 
purposes treated as separable, i.e. as not bound up with the particular bodies to 
which they belong, fall under mathematics, while, if they are regarded as 
wholly separate from body and from matter, they fall under First Philosophy 
or metaphysics. 

To return from this digression. As we were saying, the affections or 
properties of the soul, in so far as, like anger or fear, they are implicated in 
matter, are inseparable from the physical matter of the animal, while at the same 
time, unlike the mathematical properties of bodies, they cannot be abstracted 
and treated as separable in thought [ n], 

a 27. Sid Tavra TJ8t|, i.e. because the emotions are "implicit in matter," 
because they imply bodily movement, or at least modification (oXXoiWc?) of a 
faculty of an animal. No sooner is this recognised than an inference can at once 
(7^17) be drawn. On this idiomatic use off/drj see Cope on Rhetoric I. i, I354b 7. 

a 28. cfyuorxKov. Cf. jfafetaph. 1026 a 5 &tori al Trcpl >//*vx5* evias $ea>p7}<rai TQV 
<vo-iKoi3, oen; prj avev rfjs v\rjs eoriv, De Part. An. I. I. 641 a 14 32 and the 
remarkably clear discussion 641 a 32 b 10 of the diropia ir6rcpov ircpl vdcrrjs 
^vxns rrjs <pv<rLKrjs etrrt r6 flvrflv % yrepi TWOS, terminating in the conclusion 
641 b 8 drpiov o$v a>s ov irept yrdcnjf ^v^rjf \ficreov * ovde 'yap 7ra<ra tyvxh ^vcrts^ 
aXXo TL poptov avrrjs \v r) KOL wXa'ox Cf. De Sensu I. 436 a 17 b 6, De Juvent* 
27 (De Res$. 21), 480 b 23 sqq., Phys. vni. 3, 253 a 32 b 9. 

a 28. T| TTJS ToiavTTjs, int. rjs ra Trddrj \6yot vv\oi 6i<m>, i.e. soul as the form 
of an animate body, leaving undecided for the present the question as to 
whether there is any faculty of soul independent of body. But the treatment 
of vovs in III., cc. 4 8 belongs rather to First Philosophy than to physics, 
if we accept the conclusion of De Part. An. 641 b 8 just cited. 

I. i 403 a 26 b 2 20 1 

a 29. <f>vo-iic6s. To be understood in a narrower and less accurate sense 
than in the preceding line, a 28 ; the "physicist" popularly so called con- 
cerning- himself with the matter only to the neglect of the form. Against this 
limitation of the sphere of <pvo-LKr) A. protests forcibly (e.g. P/iys. n., De Part. 
An. I.) : compare the question below (b 7) ris ovv 6 ^VO-LKOS rovruv, and the 
answer (b 8) 9 paXXov 6 <r| apfyotv. SiaXeimKos. See note on 403 a 2 

$ supra. As here diaXeKriKos is opposed to <pv<rLKo$, so elsewhere 
$>s is opposed to (pvo-iK&s [see Zeller, Aristotle &c., Eng. Tr. I. 174 ?i. 2]. 
The definition of the physicist will be scientific ; that cited above from the 
Rhetoric is dialectical, for rhetoric and practical philosophy generally, owing 
to the nature of their subject-matter (viz. what is contingent and only generally, 
not universally true), are content with something less than the accuracy (a*cpt/3eta) 
of theoretical science. Maier, l.c* II. b, p. 61, remarks that, by this contrast, we 
are reminded of Plato's diaXeKrixo?, who is the true philosopher. 

a 31 &riv...32 fappov. This piece of old-world lore survives in the phrase 
"to make one's blood boil." Cf. De Part, An. II. 4. 650 b 35 SepfjLorrjros yap 
6 &vjj.6s y TO. &e crrepea QeppavQevra /j,a\\ov Oeppaivet, ra>v vypS>v al &' 
[fibrine] o-rpov KOL ye&dee, &<rr yLvovrat olov Trvpiat ev ro> aip.a,Ti KOL fetriv 
ev rots Gvpois. In other words, what is meant is a corporeal expansion 
due to the Ctcn? of the blood implied by the idea of " bursting with rage," which 
finds its external sign in the swelling of the veins. Cf. a 22 opya ro cr&pa, note. 
Fear, on the contrary, chills the blood, I.e. 650 b 27 sq., zb, 111.4, 667 a 13 19, 
IV. 5, 679 a 25. Both fea-if and Karctyvgis, being aXXoio><rs or qualitative 
changes, fall under the KIVTJVIS of 403 a 26. 

403 b 2. T& ctSos Kal TOV Xo-yov. The /cat is explicative, as is obvious 
from the next clause. Cf. Phys. iv. i, 209 a 21 elo$ KCLI \6yo? T&V 7rpay/zar6>v, 
JMetofih. 1044 b 12 TO S* cbff el8os (sc. CLLTIQV) 6 Xdyo?, dXX* ^7/Xos 1 , eav pf] JJLCTCL rrjs 
air Las $ 6 Xdyor, 996 b 8 rd J efdoff & Xoyoy, Phys. I. 7. 1 90 a 1 6 r& yap eidei X^yo> 
xa\ Xdy<p [sc. Iv] ravrov. The analysis of the concrete particular is sometimes 
into matter, v\rj, and form, etSos Kal popcfrf}, sometimes into matter, V\TJ, and 
notion, X6yo$ KCU poptprj: compare 412 a 8 with Metaph. 1042 a 28 sq., also 
1058 b IO o 8e Ka\\Las evrlv 6 \6yos pera rrjs v\rjs. 

b 2. 6 p^v ydp Xo-yos ctSos TOV irpd-y}ittTos. The text is uncertain. So far from 
agreeing with Trend. "ctdo? facilius est et rei aptius," I suspect the word 
(i) because of its inadequate authority, two inferior MSS. U and X, (2) because, 
even if cidos had the strongest evidence, the sentence would still be a truism, 
which there seems no sufficient reason for repeating when it has just been 
assumed in the preceding sentence. The great majority of our MSS. read ode 
or 6 dc, and this is confirmed by Simpl. and Philop. Obviously the uncial OAE 
is the common source, and this might be read oSe, as W. and possibly Them., 
or divisim Q SV, as Simpl. Plutarchus Atheniensis apud Simpl. and Philop. took 
it to be. Simpl. 21, 35 OVK &s 6 cj>i\6a-off)0f el-yye'irat TL\ovTap^of, dvrt8iaip>v rov 
Xci-yov Trpof TOV rov irpdyfJLaros, aXX* eZrrobv njv optv TTJS dvrtXviri^aro>s eldos elrai 
/cat Xdyoi/, T&V 8^ Xo^yov TOV irpd^jxaTos elvai <pr)o~^ roureoTt TO 6t5os, Kad* o eZ5o7rote?Tat 
ff opyrj. eTTel 5e crvvQeros fj opyr) y dvayKTj /cat rov \6yov Kal r& eldos ev v\j] 6pav, el 
<rrai, 7reio~rj ro dvai avr& OVK avcv vXrjs. It appears to me that Simpl. represents 
our sentence by the words TOV 8fc Xo^ov TOV irpovyn-aTos efvat tpijcrc. If we turn 
this back from oblique to direct we get the text of SimpL, viz. o de \6yos rov 
ir pay par o$. That SimpL did not read clSos is clear from his introduction of 
the word after rovretm. It would seem, then, that Plutarch, like Philoponus, 
explained "The one definition is the form, the other belongs to the thing," 
i.e. not to the form, for Plutarch made the two clauses stand opposed. Simpl., 

202 NOTES i. i 

having precisely the same reading, explained rather differently, "The one 
definition is the form and the form belongs to the thing," i.e. implies the 
crvvo\ov of which it is the form. Philop. 59, 15 virocrrtKreov e'is T TOV -yap 
cruvfecrpov /cat els rbv 8^, Iva $ ovr&s* 6 pev yap TO>V opicrp.a>v 6 \6yos crrl KOI fj 

atria TJTOL TO ddoS TOV &VfJ.QV, 6 5* TpOS TOV TTpdypOTOS <TTW OplO'p.QS) TOVTO"Tl TYfS 

ova-Las KCU TTJS v\rjs. That is, Philop. would punctuate 6 pev yap, Xo'yos- 6 &<', 
TOV TrpdypcLTos. He did not read eldos. The evidence of Them., it is true, is 
indecisive : (7, 32 H, 13, 18 Sp.) 6 /zei> yap \6yos rrjs opyfjs opegts aWtXvn-qcreajff. 
dvdyKTj yylvCT0ai TOVTO TO ef^o? ev v\rj rotaSe" c^crrrep olicias 6 pv TO eldos KCLI 
rov e'&ovs TOV \6yov aVoStSacru/, KT. Them, means " for the notion of anger is a 
desire of retaliation, but this form must be manifested in matter of a certain 
kind." This does not prove that he had el8os in the first clause, and in the 
second he may have simply substituted TOVTO TO etSos- for A.'s TOVTOV [sc. TOV 
Xdyov], as he was quite justified in doing, for A. has in the preceding sentence 
(b 2) TO Ldof KOL TOV \6yov. Whence did Them, get opegis avTt\virr)<ra>$ in his first 
clause ? Possibly from eTdos (cf. b 2), but more probably from ode. No weight 
can be attached to Sophonias 8, 35 yap dvdyKrj TOV \6yov roVSe TOV irpdypaTos- 
cv vXy rotate clvac, for his Tovde may replace (b 3) TOVTOV. There is no proof 
that he read ecSor. If ode is right, A. means "for this (viz. desire of retalia- 
tion) is the notion of the thing," i.e. of anger, ode being attracted to the 
gender of Xd-yo?. This gives a satisfactory sense and avoids tautology. 
If we accept tl&os, the lectio facilior, the question arises, why should A. 
reiterate the identity of \6yos and eldos which he had assumed already (403 a 25 
Xdyot evv\oi 9 b 2 TO etdoff ical TOV \6yov) ? A. may have done so, being on occasion 
as pleonastic as he is elsewhere elliptical, but, if so, the text of all the Greek 
commentators was faulty in this place. Did A. write simply 6 fj.ev yap \6yos TOV 
TrpdypaTos (6 p,ev subject, Adyop predicate, the masculine pronoun again by 
attraction), and are ode and sfSo? two divergent supplements to fill a non-existent 

b 3. roi^SC, of a definite sort (not Trj TVXOVO-TJ), i.e. the appropriate matter, 
cf. 412 b II, 414 a 26 eV..r7) ol<eia vXrj. el goreu, if it is to exist at all. 

A. uses ecrrat, not yevrjo-erai, the form being eternal: Metapfi. 1044 b 21 eVcl 
d y Ifvia avev ycveVecos KCU <p6opas e<m /cat OVK ecrTiv, olov...Kal o\a>s TO. eldij ical al 
/, cf. 1039 b 26. But A. is not always consistent and freely uses cyyLyvea-Oa^ 
or simply ylyvecrQai (e.g. Metaph. 1035 a 5) of his immanent form. 
House, like anger, admits of three definitions. The first, cr/ceVao-^a KO>\V- 
TIKOV tpQopas KTC.) is the definition Kara TOV \6yov povov, corresponding to ayyelov 
o-Kfirao-TtKov KT. of Metaph. 1043 a r ^* It answers to opegis dvTtXvTrrfo-ffos in the 
case of anger. The second, mentioning only the materials (stones, bricks and 
timber), answers to the &ro TOV ircpl Kapdiav aZparos of 403 a 31 ; while the 
third, only indicated in outline, is the one which A. accepts and to which he 
refers in b 8 6 c dfj^olv [sc, opif Apevos] , cf. Metaph. 1043 a 14 19. The four 
causes of a house are specified Metaph. 996 b 6 8. For olitodopiKr) as (#) the 
form, cf. 1070 b 33; as (&) the efficient cause (TO KLVOVV) 1070 b 29, Phys. n. 4, 
196 b 26. 

b 6. repos 8*, int. <j>r)<ri. 

b 6. 4v TOVTOVS ri etSos &>ica rwvSC, will give as definition the form residing 
in these, viz. in the materials aforesaid. The third definition takes account not 
only of the matter, lv TOVTOLS> but of the form as well. It goes on to mention 
the "final cause" eWfca T&vdL "with a view to this or that end," i.e. protection 
from the weather, Them- 7, 36 H., 13, 24 Sp. erepo? d* a/z0o> cruXXajScoy, ort 

e, Simpl. 22, 7 

I. I 403 b 2 b 8 203 

KOL TrXivQois TO etSoff, TOVTZCTTL TO ovce'Tracr/Aa, irpoo-Qcis K.OLL TO reXos 1 , 7ret.8rj ev rots' 
re^vr/rots 1 Stapto-rat ro ov evK.a CK TOV e'lSovs. Biehl's omission of the comma after 
eldos- is confirmed by this remark of Simplicius. The construction <rV TOVTOU 
TO eT8os in A.'s Greek hardly presents any difficulty. It differs from e.g. 429 b 14 
rode ev r<SSe only in being object to c^o-ei instead of subject to (unexpressed) 
eVr/. "Ez> TaBe there must be an attribute as well as ev TOVTOLS here. Compare 
the prepositional phrases with irepl cited in note on 402 a 8 trcpl avnjv. 

b 7. 6 <J>IKTIKOS. Which of these three definitions Is truly scientific as be- 
longing to <pvo-LKrj and therefore to be employed by the physicist ? TOVT&V denotes 
those who define, as in b i (like 6 p.v...6 e...eWpo?). The man who studies the 
concrete realities of the natural universe, natural bodies, sensible substances, 
things concrete of form and matter, is 6 <J>VO~IKOS. His ytvos comprises ra e^oi/rct ev 
zavTois dpxrjv K. wr] o-os-. In his treatment of them he will ignore neither the formal 
nor the material cause. The point is frequently urged by A., e.g. P/iys. II. 2, 
194 a 12 27, 194 b 9 sqq. 3 II. 7? *9^ a 22 " 8* at curiot TTrapSj irepi Tracr&v TOV 
<J)VCTLKOV elftevai, teal el? irdaras dvdy&v TO dta TL airoo&crei <f>vo~iK>) TTJV V\TJV, TO 
eldoSy TO Kivrjo~aV) TO o$ eveKa. e/)^crat de ra rpia ets- ev 7ro\\aKts' TO jj,ev yap TL 3 <nrt 


remark explains why here in De A. and in Phys* II. 2, I.e., A. confines himself 
to insisting upon attention to the form as well as the matter. Metafih. 1037 a 14 
7T\ TpoTrov Tivci Tijs ff>vo~tKrjs KO.I $VTpa$ <f>i\oo~o<f)[as epyov f] ircpl TO.? alo-0T]Tas 
ovo~Las QscopLa' o yap povov rrepl TTJS uXijff del yvapigeLv TOV <pvcrLKov, aXXa Kcti TTJS 
KOTO. TOV \6yovy Kal pSXXov. Or again, he may adopt a threefold division, 
Phys. II. 7, 198 a 31 cao-re TO Sia TL Kal elf rr^v v\ijv dvdyovrt aTro&'&orai, KOL ^Zp 
ro TI O m TL > feat els TO TTp&Tov Kivrjo-av. 7Tpl yVO-&>s yap fid\io~ra. TOVTOV TOV 
TpQTrov ras- cCiTLas O"KOiroveri 9 TL LICTO. TL yiveTai, Kal TI irp>Tov 7TOLrj(rev TJ TL Gira&i 
KOL ourcos act ro efagfjs. In Phys. II. 9, 200 a 30 b 4 A. returns to the twofold 
division of end and necessary condition, the former taking the place of form, 
the latter being identical with matter. This is also his standpoint in De Part. 
An. I. I. 

b 8. r\ |iaXXov. Here as often ^ introduces the writer's answer to his own 
question, i.e. the solution of the problem which he tentatively proposes. This 
solution, however, frequently expresses the full strength of his conviction, so 
that the apparent modesty of the suggestion becomes a mere trick of style, 
like t'croff which, e.g. 402 a 23, under the veil of " perhaps " implies " beyond all 
doubt." Similarly ^ thus used ceases to be interrogative (" or shall we rather 
say?") and tends to become frankly affirmative. 2nd. Ar. 312 b 57 quoniam 
rj solennis est particula in altero membro interrogationum disiunctivarum idque 
alterum membrum plerumque ad affirmationem vergit, inde factum esse videtur, 
ut saepissime, ubi 77 usurpatur non antecedente priore interrogation is membro 
a TroTcpov exordiendo, interrogationis natura fere delitescat eaque enunciatio 
respondents potius et modeste affirmantis, quam quaerentis esse videatur. 
itaque exposita aliqua aVo/>/a eius \VO-LS per particulam rj induci solet. This 
usage is stereotyped in the treatise entitled from its contents Problems, where 
Sta TL introducing the problem is regularly followed by 77 ort introducing the 
solution. Cf. also PoL I338b i where, as Mr Newman says, instead of ^ LIO\\OV 
modeste affirmantis we expect dXXcc or oXXa /laXXov (but aXXa has preceded). 

b 8. 6 g dn,<j>oiv = 6 a/i<o> raiJra r<S op<p vvvTiSeis. Cf. Phys. I. 3, 1 86 b 34 
Kal fca$' ov a/Li c^) oo ? /cat efcdrepov Kal r5 CK rourcav Xcyccr^oo, Metaph. IO43 a l8 oZ 8 
afjL(p<D TavTa <rvvTi6evTS TTJV TpLTrjv Kal rrfv e/c TOVTCDV oifo~iav [sc. \eyovo-iv~\. One 
might be tempted to think that the subject to be supplied was opoy, which 
is grammatically impossible if we consider b 7 TOVTCDJ/ (cf. b i), b 8 dyvoSi/, to 

204 NOTES i. i 

say nothing of b 7, 8, 9 o Trept fere, compared with b 13 rexvtrrjs, 156 
1 6 6 7rpS>Tos <iXo(7o<j>o. It is, however, the definitions and not their authors 
that are really under comparison, and Simplicius is therefore justified in ex- 
plaining the meaning thus, 22, 9 diaKpivas drj TOVS opovs O? 7 " 6 ^ \otrr6v y ri$ CK 
TOVTCOV 6 cfrvo-iKos, Kol yKpivi ivai TOT % afiffrotv. For the carelessness of 
expression cf. Cic. De Fin. n. 44 Cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, 
quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, i.e. Epicurus defines the 
summum bonum so as to include under it two kinds of pleasure ; what Cicero 
says is, "Epicurus is a compound of two kinds of pleasure." It is just possible 
that if A. had taken the trouble to complete the sentence it would have run 

G djjLcfroLv rrjv ot/c/av <5>s crwcarSxrav opi^o^vos : but with his love of brevity 
and ad sensum construction &v is the more natural supplement 

b 9. &v<ov Si, the other two, the proposers of the imperfect definitions 
which give (i) the form without the matter, (2) the matter without the form. 
Is there a branch of science or of enquiry to which one or other of these 
imperfect definitions is appropriate ? In other words, what science, if any, treats 
of either (i) the form of concrete things, neglecting the matter, or (2) the 
matter, neglecting the form ? There seems no direct answer, unless we suppose 
that, question (i) being dropped, (2) is answered in the clause b 9 r) OVK eo-rt... 

1 x^pwrd, a view which Philop. favours, 60, 28 31. We have instead, b 10 16, 
four branches of enquiry distinguished. The first three, viz. physics, the pro- 
ductive arts and sciences, mathematics, when they define, certainly include both 
\oyos and v\rj in the definition. But not all in the same way, and the difference in 
the mode is referred to the different degrees in which "the things are separable 
from the matter," cf. 429 b 21 sq. With 403 b 7 16 it is instructive to compare 
429 b 10 22, 431 b 12 19. TJ OVK &TTU See on b 8 rj paXXov. 

b 10. TO, ird0Tj.,.-Q ^api^rra, the inseparable properties of matter which are 
not even regarded for purposes of study as separable : secondary matter is 
meant, ecrxdrij v\rj, iam formata materia, like the stones, bricks and mortar of 
b 5 : v\rj is used in the same sense throughout the discussion of yeveo-is in 
Metaph. Z., cc. 7 9. Legebatur 10 ra ^ x a >P LarTi ' t i W^* V x ( *P LO " rf *> et recte 
Trend, observavit requiri potius ra /) x a> P LO " rc *i V T M x c P la " r( ^ At non hoc 
voluit Aristoteles. Delet& virgula et grammatica ratio constat et philosophica. 
Dicit enim hoc : OVK. earn rw 6 irepl ret TrdQrj Tfj$ vXije a^wptcrra ovra /x,??' y x<k>picrra 
TTJV eTrio-Ke-fyiv Troiovpevo^ ne ita quidem quatenus separabiles sunt,' hoc est 
quatenus generates sunt : genus enim a rebus singulis xa>p/crai vel quod nos 
dicimus abstrahitur (Torst.). (Bonitz however, Ind. Ar. 539 a 38, classes 
this with other passages where ov or p.rj prefixed to a whole sentence 
negatives one particular word in it: he explains p7$' $ x^p^ra by KOL y w 
X&purrd.) Some generalisation there must be in any science, and b 1 1 rotoudi, 
roiavTijs imply as much, Cf. Metaph. 1033 b 22 aXX& r6 rowvde anjfjtaivtt, rode 5e 
Kctl O)pLcrfJ>vov OVK. torn/, 98 1 a IO TOioicrde K.CLT eidos ev d^optor^etcrt, 1060 b 2o rcov 
<a6o\ov KOI TOV TOLovftl dist. rode n Koi ^^ptcrrcJi/. The force of the limiting jj with 
a negative prefixed can be easily understood from the following parallels, all 
from Metaph. M. 3 : 1078 a 14 ovScrepa ybp ft ctyts ^ 77 <pavf) Qccopei, a 26 o0^' y 
ctvdp&iros ov&* abiaiperoS) dXX" ij crrepeov, a 2 el crv^fftrfKev al(r6r]T& elvai, ?bv ecrri 
[int. rf y6)p,rpia], w ftm d* ?j al<r0rjTd, " if the attribute of being* perceptible by 
sense belongs to the objects with which geometry deals, but geometry does 
not deal with them quA perceptible by sense," 1077 b 22 w rj de alo-drjrd, d\X* 
y roiadl, b 28 oix $ Kivov/jieva, dXX' rj crcb/xara fjt.6vov, b ig oi>x fi $e roiavra. Cf. also 
1 036 a 1 1 vorjrf 8e [t/Xi;] fj ev TOLS alo-QrjTols ifrrdpxovcra /LIT) $ alcrOrjTd. 

b 10. dXV 6 <|>vriK&s. The relation of the clause beginning thus to the 

I. i 403 b 8 b ir 205 

preceding is, I think, misunderstood by Them. (8, 4 6 H., 14, 4 6 Sp.), SimpL 
(22, 27 29), Trend, (p. 174), who interpret as if A.'s meaning were "no one, 
except the physicist, treats of the inseparable properties belonging to natural 
bodies and to sensible matter and treats them as inseparable : quae a materia 
separari non possunt (ra ^ ^copio-ra, Metaph. 1026 a 19, 25 sqq.) ea sunt ipsa 
ilia, quae physicus, qui qualis sit qualis corporis natura inquirit, exploranda 
sumit (Trend.). But Torstrik has shown a better way of taking the words TO. ^ 
X^PLO-TO. Mb* TJ ^wpio-ra : see last note. According to him,- the physicist is 
excluded from this clause because, though dealing with ra ^ ^/Ko-ra, he treats 
of them ?; x<wpto-ra when he generalises about them. 

b II. TOV Totov8i crto|j.aTos Kal TTJS Totavn|s vXijs. Of a body of the given, 
kind and of the matter implied therein. Physics treats of bodies regarded as 
in motion or capable of motion : in order that they may be in this sense <uo-iAca 
crcbjuara they must have a certain kind of matter, viz. the matter conditioned by 
this requirement. Cf. Metaph. 1077 b 22 24, 30 32 ; Phys. II. 2, 193 b 35 
194 a 15, 194 b 7 9, 9 13. It is owing to the contingent character of their 
matter that, strictly speaking, neither definition nor demonstration is applicable 
to particular physical substances: Metaph. 1039 b 27 31, 1036 a 2 9. The 
terms <pv<riKov a&aa, <ucmc?7 v\rj (412 a 12, 403 b 17) convey no information, 
when the province of physics is what we are defining. All natural bodies can 
be described by such attributes as Kiz/T/roV, al<r0T]T6v, V\IKOV (cf. Bonitz ad 
Metaph. 1026 a 3). If any single adjective could replace TOLCLVTTJS it would be 
KLvrjTtjs. Cf. Metaph. 1069 a 36 sq., 1036 a 10, 1026 a 12, 1026 a 2 sq. It must 
be wider than ycwrjrrjs KOI <p&aprfjs, Metaph. 1042 b 5 sq., cf. 1069 b 25 sq. 
All natural bodies are self-moved or have in them an inherent principle of 
motion and rest (De A. 412 b 16 sq., Metaph. 1025 b 20 sq.) ; this serves to dis- 
tinguish them from the products of art. From the objects of mathematics, again, 
they can be distinguished, in that, whereas the latter, e.g. the circle or the line, 
can be defined apart from the particular matter in which they are found, natural 
bodies are concrete of form and matter and incapable of definition apart from 
the particular matter belonging to them. A.'s favourite phrase for such a con- 
crete thing is robe ev r<Se, the particular form residing in particular matter, 
cf. 429 b 13 fj yap crap OVK avev TTJS vX^s-, aXX* &<rirp rb o-ipov, roSe ev r<5e. 
The matter as well as the form of flesh is relatively determinate. r6 a-ipov 
is not TO KoTXoj/ wherever found, but only <rV pivL The subject-matter of physics 
is less capable of independent existence than the subject-matter of mathe- 
matics, Phys. II. 2, 193 b 36 sq. ra yap (pvo-LKa x>pt&v<riv TJTTOV ovra ^ojptora r&v 
pa6r]fjiaTiKG>v, as may be seen* if we attempt to define either the subject-matter 
or its attributes in physics and in mathematics respectively. For the several 
mathematical objects will be defined as incapable of motion (i.e. change, &rr<u 
3 dvv Kivrjcre&s [i.e. aKivrjTa]), but not so the objects of physics, 194 a 5 crapg e 

KOL O&TOVV KOI aV&pGbTTQS OVKGTt,, CzXXtt TOUTO. &O"trep pis O-ljJ.7) oXX" OU^ 0>$ T& KCLfJL- 

TTvXov \eyercu. They are concrete things, like flesh and bone and man, and 
imply a particular matter as cr^orr}* implies pis. This is very clearly explained 
Metaph. 1025 b 28 1026 a 7 : I will merely cite b 34 el 8fj iravra ra <j>vcriKa 
OJAOUOS T(O 0-ip.oi \eyovrat, olov pis, 6<j>0a\fj.6s, irpocr&Trov, <rap, oarovv, oXo>r f<So*>> 
<uXXoi/ 9 pi'fa, ^>Xofe, oXojs ipvrov, where the sentence beginning eZ $17 expresses 
the writer's own conviction. The fullest explanation of concrete things as ra 
oi>x air\a aXXa crvvfieSuacr^j/a is to be found Metaph. 1030 b 14 1031 a 14, 
1032 a 2O airavra be ra yiyvopeva r} (pvtrci rj re^vy l^ct V\TJV dvvarbv yap <at 
elvai Kal (JL^ elvai Kacrrov avrStv^ rovro S* ecrrlv f) ejcdora) V\TJ. ica^oXov Se Kal 
e o5 (pvcns KOL Ka6 y b $vcn.S' TO yap yiyvdpevov 

206 NOTES I. i 

<al -up ov, f) Kara r& eiSos Xeyopevr} (Averts 77 opoeidrjs' avrrj &' ev a\\cp- 
TTQs yap &v9p&frov ycvva. ovrat pev ovv yLyverai ra yiyvopeva 8ia TTJV 
v, 1034 a 5 ro d" airav TJ$T) TO roiovdc cldos eV rcucrSe rats 1 crapgl /cat co-rots- 
KaXXtas 1 /cat ^aoKpaTrjs' Kal erepov ftv did rrjv V\TJV, erepa yap, ravrb de TO> eidef 
aro/iOi> yap TO ct&off. Cf. 1036 b 3 ofov ro roO avQp&'rrov elftos alel eV crapgl 
(paiveTat KOL o<rroi$ Kal TOLS TOIQVTQIS /xepecrtz/- af ovv teal Icrrlravra fJ>epij TOV e'tdovs 
Kal TOV \6yov; r) ov, dXX* v\r), dXXa bid ro p.r) Kal eV* nXXcoj/ eVtytyvccr^at a6wva- 
Tovpcv ^wptVat. eVci d roiJTO Sot /lev evoV^eo-^ai, ddtj\ov e Trore, aTropoDcrt 
Ti^es- ^77 Kal eVl rov KVK\OV Kal rou rptyooi/ovj a)? o irpocrrJKOv ypa^als opi^ecr&ai 
Kal r<3 crvve^e'ij aXXa iravra ravra opioi&s \eyearSat ajcravet ardpKes: rj ocrra rou 
dv0pa>7rov KOL ^aXfcos- feat Xi^os- roiJ avdptaz/roy, 1035 a I e2 owi/ eo-ri ro pev v\tj TO 
5* t5os- ro ' e/c rovro>i/, KCU ovcria 37 re vX?y Kal ro efoff a: ro e/c rovrooi/, corrt /ACV 
o)ff Kal f) v\rj jaepos rtvos- Xcyerat, eari S' o)ff oC?, dXX* ef S)v 6 ro5 etftov? Xoyos 1 . otov 
TTJS /xev KOL\oTrjTos ovK <m jj,pos fj crdpg (avTr) yap r) v\r) e'c' ?js ylyvcTai), TTJS de 
<nfj,oTr]TO$ pepos (sc. 37 o-dp$;\ ib. 25 28 oo-a p.v o$v crvvcChjp.p.eva TO elftos Kal 17 
V\YI zcrrivy olov TO o"ijijiov rj 6 ^aX/coOff KVK\Q$, TavTa jj.ev (pGeipeTaL els raOra Kal ju-fpos 1 
avToov f) vX?7 3 1036 b 22 dio Kal ro Travr' dvayeii/ ourw /cat dc^atpetv r^v {fX?;v ireplep- 
yov evta yap "O-QDS ro'S' ev r<S5' eVrtv, ^ codt ra&t %ovTa 3 ib. 28 alcrdrjTOv yap rt ro 
>OV) Kal avev Kivrjcre&s OVK ecrriv opifracrQat,, Sto ou5* aveu rcov pepcov C^OVTCOV rrcds. 

b 12. o<ra 8 p-i] TOtaaJra, i.e. 6Va e ^77 ^ewpetrat ^ ro rotouo^t a*a)ju.aroff at 
r7s TOLavTTjs v\rjf epya Kal iraQi\. Legebatur [apud Bekkerum et Trend.] on-do-a 
6e JUT) t ^ roiaiJra : scripsimus oo-a de ft?) # rotaijra, et oora quidem ex codice E, 17 
vero ex Simplicio : (22, 30), ft?) f rotaCra, TOVTSCTTL prj g ^o)ptcrrd : quae inter- 
pretatio, etsi falsa est, de eo quod legerit Simplicius dubitationem non relinquit. 
Ceterum e scriptura unciali HI modo y modo fi factum est (Torst). The text of 
Simpl., as given by Hayduck, is (22, 30) : OTrocra de w r/ rotaOra, aXXoy] rovreVrt 
M S axcopto-ra, dXX' cos ^pta-rd, aXXos-, but this does not affect Torst's argument. 
b 13. irpl TIVWV H-^ Philoponus 64, 2 sq. and Sophonias 9, 3 explain rtvwv 
as particulars and Torstrik inclined to the same view, though he was aware 
that, to make this meaning clear, the article rwv before TLV>V is required. 
There seems no reason why nadav should not be understood. It is quite true 
that the physician is concerned with the individual patient (Metaph. 981 a 15 
24), but it is also true that health and disease are accidents, not essential 
properties, of a natural body, and the physician studies them solely in order 
that he may substitute health for disease. Hence in his case rtvj/=such as can 
be produced by i/oOr, Tcxvrj or dvvafus and not, unless it be diro rauro/idrov, by 
matter left to itself (Metapk. 1032 b 21 26). Similarly with the carpenter, but 
the properties which he seeks to impart to his materials are even more plainly 
adventitious and artificial, such as could not have been even spontaneously 
produced. Cf. Metaph. Z., c. 9 throughout, also c. 7, especially 1032 a 32 b26, 
Them. 8, n 17 H., 14, 13 22 Sp. The close connexion between the practical 
science of medicine and theoretical physics is emphasised De Sensu i. 436 a 
27 b r. TxvCTT]s apparently represents any of the constructive arts and 
sciences in which human intelligence, imitating nature, works for an end. See 
note on 406 a 1 4. 

b 14. TV 8fe JMP x a> P lflrnSv H^J sc - ^a^" : the genitive being, like b 13 r/v, 
governed by *rep : or possibly, the preposition being forgotten, the genitive is 
simply one of relation. That none of the objects of mathematics have inde- 
pendent existence is fully established Metaph. M., cc. 2, 3. Cf. 431 b 15 ra 
fj.aQr)fLaTiKa ov Kc^picrpeva a>s /ce^coptcr/xei/a i/oel. ^ 8^ JJLI] TOLO-^TOV crw|j.aTOs, 

but not considered as properties of the concrete body to which they belong. 
Before the mathematician can treat of them he must by abstraction separate 

i: i 403 b ii b 16 207 

them from their concrete surroundings* It matters not whether the sphere be 
made of brass or of some other material, nor what its size or its position, Metaph. 
1036 a 31 b 3. Hence the objects of mathematics, e.g. the geometer's circles 
and spheres, are not sensible but intelligible objects : that is, though they have 
matter, it is intelligible and not sensible matter, Metaph. 1036 a 2 12, 1036 b 32 
1037 a 5 vorjTr} v\7] = f) ev rols al<T&rjTm$ vfrdp^ova-a 7117 77 accr^ra, olov ra p.a&r]^a- 
TtKa (1036 a n) 5 quae, licet sit in rebus sensibilibus, tamen non eatenus in iis est, 
quatenus sunt sensibiles (Bonitz ad loc.\ e.g. quantity and extension, TTOVOV and 
a-wexes. Thus the geometer's circle and sphere cease to be objects of physics, 
whereas the circle or sphere in brass is a natural body which both physicist 
and artist study, but under different aspects : and, as with every other such 
body, its notion or definition must take into account its particular matter, 
Metaph. 1033 a 4 d &) ^oX/coOs KVK\OS ^x l * v r< ? ^oy<? r *) v V\T)V. Contrast the 
definition of the sphere given by the geometer 1033 b 14 TO *K TOV pearov cr^xa 
1<rov 9 which ignores sensible matter. 

b 15. 4| a4cup6res. Ind. Ar. 126 b 16 d^aipecrts 'abstractio logical ra 
e a<fraip<r(ds Xtyd/xci/a, eae notionis cuiusque partes, quae cogitatione separari 
possunt (Waitz). Ita praecipue res mathematicae significantur. De Cael. ill. i, 
299 a 15 ra jj,v ef d<J>aipcr(QS \eysa~6ai ra jj t a& l K.a ) ra 8e <f>v<rtKa e/c nrpocr- 
0<ra>$, Metaph. 1061 a 28 b 3. See Bonitz ad Metaph. 982 a 27. Cf. De A, 
429 b 1 8 sq., 431 b 12 sqq., 432 a 5 sq., where ra iv dcfraipecrei &VTO. (Xeyd/*ez>a) are 
the objects of mathematics. The opposite of e d<p<up(r(os is e/c irpoo-Qecre&s, 
Metaph. 1077 b IO K 7rpo<rQe<rea)f yap r<5 Xeu/coi 6 \CVKQS a.v&pc>'iros \eyeraij for 
by determination, through white, arises the concept of "white man." See 
Bonitz ad loc. (p. 533) : per TO XCVKOV, quod additur ad hominem, exsistit homo 
albus. By e, "in consequence of," is expressed the process by which the 
abstract notion is attained : we take away or leave out of account certain marks 
or attributes and fix attention upon those which remain, e.g. the geometer dis- 
regards all sensible properties, weight, hardness, heat, etc. and regards the 
things with which he is dealing solely as quantities and as continuous (1061 a 32 
P.OVQV 5e KaraXeiVei ro irovbv <al crvvexes) and investigates solely the properties 
that belong to them as such (at ra TTCL^TJ ra TOVT&V 77 Trocra ecm /cat cruvex^ 
Ka\ oil naff cTepov TI Setopci). 

b 15. ^ Si Kxpio"H^va, so far as they have a separate existence Trap a 
ra K.aQ* /caoTa, trapa Tas alvQrjTas ova-las. Cf. 431 b 1 8 roiv K^o>ptcr/xi/a)j/ ri, 
Metaph. IO26 a l6 17 8e trp&Tri [<J>iXoo-o<f>ia] <al irepl x^P 10 ^^ * a ^ ci/az/J/ra. Cf. 
IO26 a 27 30 el fj.v ovv fiy etrrl TLS erepa ovo'ia irapa TCLS (frva'ei <rvvcrTT}KvLas 17 
av irj TrpwTrj 7TL<rr^fjLi]. i 8* etrr/ TLS ovcria aKivijTOSy avTrj rrporepa ttai 
Trpcony, In Metaph. 99^ a 15 KC^tttpior/^evat T&V al(T0r)Ta>v and cvwrrdp- 
ev TOVTOLS are alternative and mutually exclusive determinations of ov<ricu 
as applied to mathematicals. Metaph. 1039 a 7 ^ -yap eWeX^eia ^wptfw. Hence 
that of which First Philosophy treats is cWeXc^/a cfv or rather eVreX^ta (cf. 
Metaph. 1074 a 33 dXX* oa-a dpi6p& TroXXd, v\rjv cfcet. elff yap Xdyos Kal o avroff Se rt rjv elvai OVK ep^t v\r)v r& TTpSrov efr^Xe^eta yap), whereas of 
sensible substance we are told 1040 b 5 rcov 8oKovo-3>v elvai ovcri3>v al 7r\ii<rraL 
etcrt, ra re popia TO>V a>coi/ (avdev yap K^a>pf-crp.4vov OUT&V corlv oTav 8e 
? KOI rore ovTa a>s v\rj orai/ra, ical yrj KCLL TrDp jcal d^p xre.). In 1041 a 8 
First Philosophy is said to be irepl Keivr)s TTJS ovcrlas IJTIS ecrrl Kextopivpevr) T>V 
alv6riTa>v ov<rtwv, i.e. ^ dKivijTos ova-La of A., CC. 6 IO, cf. 1069 a 33, 1073 a 22 b3, 

also 1041 a 9 n, 27 31. 

b 16. liravLT&v. Cf. Eth. Nic. IIOO a 31 dXX* CTrava-eov eirl TO irp6Tcpov dyro- 
Similarly Metaph. 993 a 26 cVai/cX^o/xei/ TraXtv, 1038 b I, Eth. Nic. 10973. 15. 

208 NOTES I. i 

b 16. o8cv 6 \6-yos, sc. pere^r) probably. The words recur Metaph. 
IOOO b 9. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1097 a 24 pera^aivcov o"f} 5 \6yos els TOVTOV dtpLKrat, 
1144 b 25 sq., ./W. 1335 a 4 o<9ev dpxopevot, devpo /zer^/Agp, 1284 b 35. 
Similarly Plato saepe, e.g. CV^/. 438 A eVaveX0o>/iev 77 TraXii/ o#i/ SfOpo yu-ere- 
prjpev. The point from which the digression started would seem to be 403 b 9, 
but it may be the first introduction of 6 <PVCTLKQ$ 403 a 27. At all events A. 
re-states somewhat more explicitly his proposition 403 a 25 ra 7rd9rj \6yoi ew\oL 

b 17 TO, ir<i0Tj...i8 oW. The verb to be supplied is probably vT 

(rfjs isvxqs) being equivalent to (rfj ^VXT)) virapxew- The precise meaning 
of dxG>prra is defined by the clause b 19 KOL ouX"'* 7rt ' 7r Sox>, u inseparable and 
yet not in the same way as line and surface are inseparable " : that is, while the 
affections of the soul are inseparable [belong to it as inseparable] from the 
animal body, at the same time they do not belong to it as mathematical objects, 
line and surface, belong to their v-rroKd^va (viz. the sensible things from which, 
though inseparable in fact, they are abstracted in thought). This qualification 
is necessary, because above (403 a 12 17) the affections of the soul were, for 
a special purpose, compared with the straight line as being inseparable from 
body. The fuller discussion which follows and the digression (403 a 27 b 16) 
have shown that this is not the whole account of the matter, and that the 
physicist's treatment of soul differs from the mathematician's treatment of line 
and surface. By rfjs <f)vo~iKrjs' vXrjs r&v f<pa>i/ is meant the body of the animal. 
Cf. 403 a 1 6 TTuvra LVCLL ^Ta o~d>fJLarof y 403 b 3 ev vXrj roiafti, b IT avravQ* ocra 

rOV rOLOvdl (TO) Kal TTJ? TOiaVTTjS V\rjf. It might be gloSSed by TTJf a 

v\rj?. So Them. 8, 33 H., 15, 14 Sp, eXcyopev be on ra Tra&t) rijs 
d^ooptcrra rrjs (f>v<riKrjs V\TJS rStv <a>v eari, KOL ovx facnrep ypa^p,rjv 
rw Xoyw ftvvarov airo(rnjcrai rrjs ^TTOKei^evrjs v\rj$, ovrca KCU 6vfj.6v KCU (pojSov, a\Xa 
i rove opovs rovrovs cru/iTrXeKeer&xt rots TT'i rov cra>/>taroff 5 Simpl. 23, 1 8 30. 
As to the text, I am not satisfied to follow E blindly (see critical notes) : otire 
followed by /cat OVK seems very questionable. In dx&pto-ra we have the general 
sense, even if the precise form of the sentence cannot be recovered. My own 
suggestion o{/Ve...o#re.../cai oi/x is not very unlike De Part. An. IV. 14, 697 b 16 a>s 
OVK obv opvis ovre irerarcu fiereccpi^of^evosy Kal ra irrepa ov xpn^P 1 * 1 wpu? Trrrjcriv. 
b 18. 8i] Toiav0" vTToipxct, Ovjxos Kal <j><*Ps- These words tend to define 
the affections of the soul and might perhaps have been introduced immediately 
after b 17 TTJS ^vx^js. The expression is unusually precise and full But cf. 
Metaph. 1078 a 5 ^roXXa $6 o~vfJLJ3ef3r]K. K.a.6* avrb* role irpa.y f fj.a<riv fj ocacrrov 
virapxtt T &v Toiovra>V) ir\ KOL fi 6rj\v ro <pov Kal $ <ippev 9 Wia rraBrj ccrrLv* 
A. is more often content to omit the verb as above 403 a 12 sq., b 10 37 x<p <rr> 
b 12 17 roiavra and elsewhere ro uv fj ov, ro aTTcipov $ olTrcipov. Pol. 1275 a 37 
ovdev eo-riv, fi rocn)ra, r6 Koiv6v. For fi drj Simplicius reads fj ye and this is the 
reading of U, but S^j ^ n Eucken's words : vim relativi tantum urguet *welcher 
eben,' 'welcher gerade.' Cf. Eth. Nic. H58a 10 ^ drj ^aXtorr* ea/ai doKel 0tXt/ca, 
Metaph. 1032 a 19, 986 a 13 aXX s -o df) \aptv eTrepxop-tOct, IOOO b 9 aXX' otiev d^) 6 
\6yos, roCro ye <pavepov, where 817 and ye each have their proper meaning : 
PoL 1278 b 38, 1295 b 36 sq., with Newman's notes; Eucken De Part. Usu 9 
p. 43. Qvpos Kal <jf>d/3off recall the longer list a 17, 18 from which they are taken 
as typical instances. They stand here exactly as they stood there in apposition 
to ra yra&rj. Simplicius 23, 24 explains the words thus : ra roiavra Tra^, 6vp.ov 
\eya> Kal <f>6/Sov KOL ra op,oia, a fj,rj8e c d(/>ai.peo-(0f 9 &o-7Tp ypa/JLfJLrj Kal errLTT^ov^ 
Svvarat avev rrjs v\rjs y ebs- ica^o roiavra crvve<pe\K6jJ,cva rfjv v\rjv, Kal 
coo-irep ro eVtTTfSov avev rov ^aX/coi) *ea! 8\a>s rov avrirvirov. rb /JLCV yap 

I. 2 403 b 16 b ig 209 

S TO K.OL\Q1/ *?X fL ^ vv pl>VOS 7TiirOOVfJ,VOVj 6 B &VfM&S fib? T& ( 

<rifj,ov fj ev pLvl Koi\oTrjSj <BS- 77 opyrj opegis avTL\VTrTjcrG>s ev rfj fecrct TOV 

b 19. icol ovx...irfrir8ov. Has afFectiones a corpore separari non posse, 
{ait A.) nee tamen ut lineam et planum sese habere ; quae quidem ubi exstant, 
materiae adhaerent, sed quarum natura, materia posthabita (ef dc/zaipca-ccos) 
mente quasi ab oculis revocata, cognoscitur: in illarum afFectionum vi et 
natura corpus in numerum venire (Trend.)- The inseparable matter in which 
his objects are presented to the mathematician is wholly indifferent, whether 
e.g. the line is drawn in sand, or presented as the edge of a brass ruler. But 
to the biologist the particular sensible matter is all-important : that of which he 
treats is analogous to o-tpov not to KoiXov. Alter the matter, and a hand or an 
eye in marble or wood ceases to be a hand or eye at all except equivocally (o/zco- 
-) ; the epya Kal Trddrj of soul can only be studied in living animals when 
TOVTOIS yrdcrx^ TI TO cr>p.a. Mr Shorey neatly sums up as follows (A. J. PA. 
Vol. XXII. p. 152): "The 7ra0*7, qua such ; i.e. qua^ e.g. Bvpos and <dj3or, are 
&x&P f ' a " ra * inseparable even in thought from their material embodiment, and not 
like the line which, qua line, is separable in thought from physical matter." 


The first chapter has introduced to our notice in a somewhat tentative and 
summary fashion the problems and the method of psychology as conceived by 
A. Before going on to his own exposition, he devotes the remainder of the first 
book to a review and criticism of the received opinions on the subject. Such a 
critical review forms a part of many Aristotelian treatises, the best known 
instances being the first book of the Metaphysics and the second book of the 
Politics, and is often of the highest value alike for the information given as to 
the views of other philosophers and for the insight thus afforded into the founda- 
tions of his own constructive theory and the interdependence of its parts. In a 
subject so obscure and difficult as the present it is not to be expected that much 
can be gathered from the general body of current opinions usually designated 
i/doa, to which he frequently appeals in a popular treatise like the Nicomachean 
Ethics (403 b 25 sq., 29 sq., 404 b 17, 28, 405 a 28, b25, 26 sqq.). Even cita- 
tions from the poets and remarks of men eminent in other departments of life 
yield very little (404 a 29 sq., 410 b 27 sq,, 411 a 8). The opinions stated and 
criticised belong almost without exception to the philosophic schools of his 
predecessors. The great physicists of the fifth century Democritus, Empe- 
docles, Anaxagoras, on the one hand, and on the other Platonism as presented 
in the Timaeus, and again as taught by A.'s own fellow-pupil and personal 
friend Xenocrates in the contemporary Academy, receive the fullest treatment, 
while the theory of harmony, familiar to us from the pages of the Phaedo^ a 
theory which at first sight bears a remarkable likeness to that of the ente- 
lechy, is also singled out for discussion and refutation (407 b 27 sqq.). Slight 
.attention is bestowed upon other thinkers: certain Pythagoreans (404 a 18), 
Thales (405 a 19), Diogenes of Apollonia (405 a 21), Heraclitus (405 a 25), 
Alcmaeon (405 a 29), Hippon (405 b 2), Kritias (405 b 6) : but their contribu- 
tions are obviously regarded as unimportant by comparison, and even the claim 
of Alcmaeon, Hippon, and Critias to rank as philosophers is doubtful. 

H. 14 

210 NOTES 1.2 

A. makes some attempt to classify the divergent theories before him (403 b 
25 sqq., 405 b ii, 409 b 19). Starting with the common opinion that both the 
motion and the perception of living creatures are due to soul, the various 
theories may roughly be classified according as they emphasise the one or the 
other of these functions. In the former case, soul is described as the most 
mobile of things, as by the Atomists, who identified it with heat, both fire and 
soul owing their mobility to the small size and spherical shape of their com- 
ponent atoms. If, however, perception and knowledge be taken as the pre- 
eminent functions of soul, and if it be further admitted that like knows like, it 
follows that soul is a compound of the elements which go to make the world. 
Under these two heads (i) the most mobile substance and (2) the primary 
element or (if there be more than one such) a compound of the primary elements, 
there is room for a wide diversity of opinions, for the most mobile substance 
may be taken to be material, e.g. fire, or immaterial, e.g. a self-moving number, 
whilst both the number and nature of the primary element or elements has been 
notoriously open to discussion. There is no general agreement whether they 
are one or many, corporeal or incorporeal. Sometimes the two views 'are com- 
bined. Sometimes the substance declared to be soul would seem to have been 
selected because of the fineness of its particles, so that, if not indeed actually 
incorporeal, it would appear such in comparison with grosser matter. Hence 
we have another head (3) the incorporeal, and virtually incorporeal. As a 
general rule, there is a close affinity between the views of various philosophers 
regarding the elements of the universe and the composition of the soul. In this 
respect, however, Anaxagoras forms a notable exception. 

In c. 2 A.'s attitude is for the most part expository, except that in 405 b 19 
23 an objection is raised to the theory of Anaxagoras. The fact is that he is in 
partial sympathy with the views expressed under each of the three main heads 
under which he arranges his predecessors. He holds that soul is (i) KLV^TKOV^ 
(2) yvwpicrriKov, and (3) ao-oytaroi/. His quarrel is with the one-sided way in 
which these various characteristics of soul have been presented and with the 
inadequacy of all the formulae hitherto devised for their expression. Thus as 
regards (i) he agrees that soul is KLV^TLKOV but denies that it is Kivovpevov (see 
c. 3) ; as regards (2) he combats the inference that, because soul is that which 
knows, it must therefore be compounded of the elements of the things which it 
knows (see 409 b 19 sqq.). Similarly the theories which at first sight would 
seem to make the soul incorporeal are found upon examination (see I., c. 4) to be 
vague or inconclusive. For contributions to a better understanding of A.'s own 
positive view we may refer to other later criticisms, e.g. 407 b 1 3, 408 a 34 b 29,, 
411 a 24 sqq. 

4O3"b 22O 4O4b 8. Introduction to the critical review of previous 
opinions on the subject. Motion and perception, the primary characteristics of 
living things, have been taken to be the primary characteristics of soul, and 
motion has been taken to imply mobility ( i 2) e.g. by Democritus and 
Leucippus ( 3), by certain Pythagoreans ( 4), and by Anaxagoras. But there is- 
a difference between Democritus and Anaxagoras. The former identifies intelli- 
gence with life, vovs with fax*!* th e latter is not so clear. He appears some- 
times to distinguish them, as when he makes intelligence the final cause of 
the universe, sometimes to confound them, as when he attributes intelligence 
to even the humblest of living things ( 5). 

The important part which the conception of motion played in all previous 
speculation is fully recognised by A. Among other passages we may refer to- 
Phys. VIII. 9, 265 b 17 266 a 5. There he starts with the remark that all who- 

I. 2 403 b 20 b 25 2ii 

have treated of motion (KLVTJ<TLS} agree in considering spatial motion, <popd, as the 
primary motion. Their first principles are causes of spatial motion. This is 
exemplified by those who explained qualitative change by means of combination 
and separation (probably the lonians), by Empedocles, whose Love and Strife 
bring about motion in space, and by Anaxagoras and by the Atomists. The 
other kinds of change (Kivrjcris) they attribute not to the primary elements or 
principles of things, but to the compounds to which they give rise. So, too, 
with those who introduce condensation and rarefaction to explain change. 
A. then continues 265 b 32 en 8e rrapa TOVTOV? 01 rr\v 
K.ivr}cr<cs' TO yap avro cavro K.IVOVV ap%r)v elvai <atri T 

<f>CtfJ,V JJLOVOV TO KLVOVfJLVOV KCLTO. TOTTOV &V &' ^P^^fj ^V V T& aura), av^dvTJTat. S' T) 

<pQLvr] 77 aXXotov/Lievo*' Tvyxdvrj, irfj KLveia-Gat, dirX&s e KivelcrSai ov (papev. "And 
so, again, with those who make the soul the cause of movement. For they say 
that the self-movent gives rise to motion in things which are moved. The 
animal and indeed every thing which has life moves itself with local movement. 
And movement in the proper sense of the term denotes only local movement. 
If a thing", while remaining at rest in the same place, grows or decays or under- 
goes qualitative change [i.e. by sense-perception], we say that it moves in a 
certain respect, but not that it moves absolutely." 

b 2O ajxa Siairopouvras ... 22 crajp/irapaXajApdveiv, Properly SiaTropeLV = foep- 
XecrQai raj oVo/ncw, Ind. Ar. 187 b II. It is one of A.'s canons that the 
complete enumeration of difficulties is an indispensable preliminary to their 
solution. The implication is, not only must we state the problems but we must 
also take into consideration the attempts of our predecessors to solve them. 
The problems have been stated 402 a 23 sqq- The review of previous opinions 
g-oes on to the end of the book. In the Metaphysics, the first book contains the 
review of previous speculation, while a comprehensive statement of diropiai 
follows in Book III (B). The most explicit account of this procedure by stating 
received opinions and discussing- difficulties is found in Rth. JVz'c. 1145 b 2 Set &*, 
TO>V a.\\o>v, Tiflcvras TO. (pawopfva KCU 7rp>Tov 8ia.7ropr)cravTas OVTC* 
/idXtora JJLCV iravTa TO. evdoa -rrepl Tavra TO, irdflr)? el de, TO. TrXetorra icai 
eav yap XvrjTai re ra dixr^ep?} KCU KaraXetTTTjrat ra i>doa, dedeiypevov 
&v elrj IKCLV&?. Cf. >e Gael. II. 13, 294 b 6 13. For cviropctv cf. Metaph. 
993 a 25 27 and especially 995 a 27 b 4. <rujj.irapaXaiJ.pdvetv i.e. (Them. 8, 

39 H., 15, 22 Sp.) KOIVC&VOVS crufjurapaXajSelv els a-K\l^tv. Cf. Metaph. 987 a 2 e*c 
[&& ovv T&V elpr)/jLi/<ov KOL rrapa TOHS a-vvrjftpcvKQrow TJdrj r<5 XdyG> <ro<P&v Tocravra 
irap 61X17 <f> ape v . 

b 23. o-rra>s rd jiev KoXws ctpTifxcva icrl. This statement of the end in view is 
almost stereotyped. Cf. Pol. I26ob 32 sqq. iva TO T op0>$ *x ov ^^fl KC " T O 
Xpr)O-t,fj,ov 9 GTL 8e TO ^IJTCLV TL Trap* CLVTCLS erepov prj SoKrj iravT&s Given, o~o<pi^ecr&ai. 
ftov\>v } aXXa ta TO p.rj KO\COS- e^eu/ ravras: TCLS vvv VTrap^ovo-as [sc. TroXtretas 1 ], 
dta TOVTO TOVTTJV SoKobfjiGv ewtj3aXecr(9afc TTJV /zc^odov, Metaph* 983 b I o/xcos 1 de 
irapa\d/3a>fj.v /cat TOVS 7rpoTpov jjftwv els e'TTtcrAcex^iv T&V OVTO>V \66vras*..ld 5 7 y^P 
Tp6v TI yevos evp'^a'Ofjt.ev atrtaff, rj rats vvv \yop,vats /zaXXov yrto-Tevcro/jLev (cf. 993 a 
II sqq., 1073 b IO 17). cl 8^n |x^ KoXcos, sc. etpTjrat. 

b 24. apx.i] 8^ TTJS S'T'^o'cws, sc. eVr/. A more impersonal mode of state- 
ment than "we begin/' cf. PoL 1274 b 32 r<5 Trepi iroXtreias eVto-KOTroOi/rt... 

irp&TTJ CTKtylS 7Tpl TToXfCOff IdftV, I&S b 35 dpX^ T&V XoLTTOJV fl'TTCLV^ D 

Vit. 464 b 21 dpxn $* rfs a"Ktyca>s dvayKCtla 7TpS>Tov e*/c TOV 

b 25. rcL (JidXto^ra SoKovvd* ^irdpxctv avrfj Kara <j>-i5<riv. By what Is called 

14 2 

2i2 NOTES .1. 2 

hyperbaton jzoXicrra has b'een separated from KOTO. <f>vo-Lv inrdpx LV with which it 
is to be taken and prefixed to doKovvra with which it has nothing to do. Cf. for 
another glaring instance n)v Kara roVoi/ lavro KLvrjcriv, Phys. 266 a i cited p. 211 
supra. This constantly recurring idiom Mr Newman explains (see his Politics, 
Vol. in. p. 579) as intended to emphasise the words thus separated from their 
natural place. But sound had always more to do than sense with this trick 
of style : its inventor, Isocrates, used it as one means of avoiding a harsh 
collision of vowels. The natural attributes of soul must be regarded as identical 
with (402 a 8) 6Va avjjLpeftrjKt Trepl avryv, some of which we were told (402 a 9) &' 
eKeLvrjv [So*eZ] KOL Tols foW vTrdpx^v. Adventitious attributes are excluded by 
Kara CTJO-W, just as they are when Ka0' auro is added to crvpjBalveiv. 

b25 TO ?tAx|n>xov...26 8oKt. This is an evboov, or prevalent opinion. The 
method of comparing e/z-v/^xoi/ and ii-fyvx ov A- himself adopts 41 3 a 20 sqq. 
Popular opinion had seized upon two characteristics of animate beings, over- 
looking or confusing with them others which A. distinguishes l.c., as e.g. nutri- 
tion and intelligence. 

b 26. KIVIIO-I TC Kol T< ol<reoCvcr0ai. Though inadequate, this opinion re- 
ceives some countenance from A. himself: see 427 a 17 sqq. and 432 a 15 
sqq. From the former passage it appears how vaguely TO alcrBdveo-Qat was 
construed, since, as A. remarks in the sequel, the upholders of this view make 
thought a species of perception. In ill. 9 loc. tit. only rj ^vxn 3 T&V fcpW is in 
question, to the exclusion of that of plants. 

b 28. <rx8ov 8-rfo ravra, " approximately these two characteristics,'* i.e. 
KLVTJO-L? and ro alo-QdvevQai) which represent, more or less precisely, the qualities 
distinctive of soul in the view of the earlier thinkers. For the addition of r6 
aa-faparov see below 405 b 1 1 sq., 409 b 20 sq. 

b 29. KaX [idXtcrra KOL\ irpiSrws. Ind. Ar. 652 b 33 VOC. Trpwros, 7rpeora>s USUS 
philosophicus latissimum habet ambit um... (6 5 3 a 27) syn KvpiW, air\S>s, /ea0' avro, 
significat ipsam per se rei notionem et naturam (ut quae iam a principio sit et 
rem constituat). Metaph* 1030 b 5 6 Trpomas- /cat &7r\>s opwr^o?, 1031 a 14 TO rl 
rjv elvai T&V ovcri&v Ivriv /zaXtcrra /cat 7rptt>ra>r KCLL dTrXcof, Ctlteg* 5, 2 a 1 1 ovtria de 
(TTIV 7} KvpiatTcrra Tf KOI irp&r&f teal fj,d\tcrra Xeyopevfy ,th* JVzc. 1157 a 30 (jfrtXia 
jrp&Tvs Kal Kvpias dist. *ca^' oyu-otor^ra, cf. Bz. ad Metaph. IO!5b II. Thus 
.wpwrcos emphasises the primary notion of soul, the original meaning of the 
term ; its first and foremost characteristic is that it is the movent. There is an 
interesting note by A. himself on the application of irp&ros and Trp&T&s to 
motion in Phys. vin, 7, 260 b 16 19. Of the three meanings of priority there 
given (i) ontological independence or self-dependence, (2) temporal, and (3) 
logical priority the last seems best to suit 7rp&Ta>s here. 

b 29 otr]6vTs 8fe...3O Kivetv ^rcpov. That the power to originate motion in some- 
thing else belonged exclusively to objects which themselves move was another 
prevalent opinion which appears in various forms among the earl": phil-'-^'-phrv:. 
Cf. e.g. infra 405 a 24 fj de XeTrroraroj', KIVT^TLKOV t-lvai. That A. -I ....... i li H-. 

this view we shall see in the next chapter. 

b 31 o6v Atjji6KpiTos ^...404 a i avn^v etvai. There seems nothing to 
answer /-ici/ until we come to 404 a 16 eotxe Se, for 404 a 5 (6poia>s de KOL Aei5- 
KtTrTroff) is parenthetical. We have no means of checking this statement, for 
A. is our oldest and most credible authority for this as for most of the opinions 
of the Atomists. The more precise definition of later writers (see Diels, 
Doxographi Graeci^ p. 388) is derived ultimately from A. J s pupil Theophrastus. 
Observe that there are two statements here : (#) that Democritus identified soul 
.with fire or warmth,. () that his reason for doing so was the mobility of the 

I. 2 403 b 25 404 a 2 213 

atoms of which fire or warmth consists. A. repeats both statements infra 
405 a 8 13. See note on 406 b 20 sqq. On A.'s criticisms of Democritus 
generally cf. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik I., DyrofF, Demokritstudien ; 
for D.'s psychology Hart, Seelenlekre des Demokrits ; for his theory of cognition 
Natorp, Erkenntnissprobletn, and for his theory of matter Baumker, Problem 
der Materie. 

4043 I irvp TL Kal 0cf>p,6v 2 ra o-^atpoeiSt} 4 dierEcriv, v 5 X^Y- 

The suspicions of Madvig were first excited by 404 a 2 TO. cnpaipoetdf) yrvp KOL 
'4 ru xn v ^y which he bracketed as well as a 4 &v. This left the comparison of 
atoms with motes untouched, Diels, Fragwiente der Vorsokr. p. 363, 18 regards 
the whole of the passage a 2 ra <r<j>aipoci8rj a 4 aKrlo-tv, <$v as an interpolation : 
"Die an tike Glosse ra o-<paipot.8rj a<rl<riv benutzt das a 17 folgende Bei spiel 
der gva-paTaJ* It must be granted that the omission of this as an intruding gloss 
or marginal summary relieves the construction considerably. As the traditional 
text stands, it is just possible to extract a grammatical sense if by a 4 &v we 
understand crxni^ar^v not gvo-paraiv. But a 5 TOVT&V e also refers to the atoms. 
This is not surprising, the introduction of the parenthetical sentence (a 5) O/JLQI&S 
S* Kal AeuKiTTTror having interrupted the regular course of the sentence which 
might otherwise have run <v rfjv pev Tracer 7r*pfuaj/...Xe-y, ra $ (r<f>aipoidfj ^fru^p. 
Here at any rate p.ev and d* present an antithesis between atoms in general and 
spherical soul-atoms in particular, which is destroyed if with M. Rodier we 
refer <$v on strictly grammatical grounds to a 3 ra KaXovpeva gvo-ftctTa or a 2 ra 
a-<pcupoid7} (r&v drd/ia>v). Themistius (9, 9 H., 1 6, 6 Sp.) with his usual insight 
has selected the essential clauses in this rambling parenthetical sentence and 
re-arranged them thus : otiev ArjpoKpiTos rrvp <al 6pp,6v {frrjcrt rfjv ^ruxn v ' dircip&v 
yap OVT<OV r5>v o-^ftarcDv a rats: drd/xotr rrpocrri^o'i, TTJV ftev iravcryrfpp,iav avr>v ' 
crroixela ITOLC'L rrje 0X775- (pv<re<x>$, rourcov de ra <T<j>ai.pOi87J rrjs TJfV)(7J$ /ere* But his 
further remarks prove that he, like the other Greek commentators, had the 
simile of the motes in his text and probably in its traditional place. The 
repetitions (a 2, 6) and the parentheses (a 3 4, a 5) can be paralleled in other > 
passages where A. is writing carelessly. It is not imperative that anything 
should be sacrificed, for even against v the case is by no means clear, 
Themistius inserts O.VT&V afterr^v Travatrcp^Lav although aircip&v yap <$VT<*v T>V* 
<rxrffjLa.T<0v has preceded. 

404 a i. <lirpv, "unlimited," i.e. infinite in number and in variety of 
shapes. Cf. De Sensu 4, 442 b 21, De Cael. ill. 4, 303 a 5 TrX^i HGV oVeipa, De 
Gen, et Corr. I. I, 3 14 a 21 ATjjJLOKpirof 8e KCU ACVKLTTTTOS CK o'co/xarooi/ dtatpra>v 
r5XXa cruyKcia-Qai (fracrt. ravra $" aircipa K.CLL TO ir\rjdos clvai Kal rag p.ap<f>ds. Here 
(404 a i) the latter seems emphasised. 

a 2. o-xt](jwTwv iced ar4pa>v, " shapes or atoms," /cal, as often, being explana- ^ 
tory. Sometimes A. calls the infinitesimal solids of the Atomists cr^fuxra, i.e. 
things which have figure, o-x?/i, 404 an, De Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 315 b 6 A^/LW- 
Kpiros- 8e feat AevKLiriros troif}<ravTfs ra o-^ftara TTJV dXXotcao-tJ/ Kal rtjv yevea-iv K 

rovrcov TTOLOVO-L. Here they are described first by the positive quality of shape 
or figure, and next by the negative quality of indivisibility. Similarly Lucretius 
(ill. 246 et al.) uses figurae for atoms. The other qualities Democritus ascribed 
to matter were magnitude, solidity and mobility. 

a 2. TO, <r<(>oupoi8TJ : cf. 405 a 9 13, 406 b 20 sqq., De Resp. 4, 472 a 3 Xeyci 
8* a>s fj ^rvxrj Kal ro 0pp.ov ravrov ra wp5ra cr^^ara r&v o-<fiaLpOLdcov. Other ' 
testimonia: Aetius Plac. IV. 3. 5 (Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 388) A^/zofcptroy Trupw^ff- 

eic reov \6yq> 0a>pr)TG>V) <r(f)aiptKas ftcv e^ovTODv ras id/af, rrvpivijv 5e ri)v 
i/at, i.e. the atoms which constitute soul have spherical 

214 NOTES i. 2 

shapes and a fiery nature, Cic. Tusc. Dis$. L 22 Democritum...levibus et 
rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito omittamus, 
Nemesius, De Nat. Horn. C. 2 Aiy/xoKptros- $ Trvp. ra yap cr^aipoeidrj cr^^ara 
TCOV arofjuav 0-vyK.pivop.ev a irvp T KOL drjp tyvxn v flToreXetv [ZfortfgT'. GV. p. 388^ 8, 
cf. p. 49> n. 2]. 

a 3. olov KTC. So far we have had a clear statement, which is resumed at 
404 a 5 rovrcov 8e TO. cr<f>cupocidTJ TJruxn v : where the reason why spherical atoms 
were selected is given. But the interspersed simile of the motes in the sunbeams, 
as well as the more general reference to atomism as contained in the words <Jz/ 
7-37^ fjLev iravcTTrepfJLiav rrjs oXy? (frvcre&s errot^eTa Aeyet* dfjLoicas de KCU A-evKirnrof, 
tend rather to confuse the exposition ; probably " soul-atoms," and not atoms in 
general, are compared to motes in the sunbeam : and, if we lay unusual stress on 
<acVerat, the point of comparison may be, as Them. (9, 13 19 H., 16, 12 20 
Sp.) says, that soul, though invisible, may be corporeal, as are the motes which, 
ordinarily invisible, are seen in the sunlight under certain conditions. With 
this Simpl. 25, 30 26, i and Philop. 67, 21 28 in the main agree, though 
they lay more stress upon the minuteness than upon the invisibility of the 
atoms. But the atoms are wholly imperceptible to sense ; they are not, like the 
motes, though usually invisible, visible under exceptional circumstances. The 
point of the comparison between motes and atoms must be the incessant 
mobility (a 20) and endless multitude of the motes : in Milton's words " Shapes thick and numberless as the gay motes that people the sunbeams." The 
fact which Them, advances, their partial and occasional visibility, really makes 
against them as suitable illustrations of the invisible atoms. Lucretius u. 1 14 
141 uses the simile of the motes to illustrate the incessant motion, not of soul- 
atoms but of atoms in general : conicere ut possis ex hoc, primordia rerum | 
quale sit in magno iactari semper inani (121 sq.). We see, he says, the motes, 
impelled by unseen blows, change their course and tumble restlessly, now in 
one direction, now in another, and we must infer that this restlessness and 
change of direction are due to unseen movements of the atoms. For the atoms 
move first of themselves ; next those bodies which form a small aggregate are 
impelled and set in movement by the unseen strokes of the atoms, and they next 
in turn stir up bodies which are a little larger, till by little and little they become 
visible and are seen to move in the sun, though why they move is not seen. 
a 4. <Sy, sc. o-^jLtarfiov not gvo-fjidr&v. 

a 4. T^V n^v irava-irp|xCav. Of Travorirep^ia Trend, says vox, ut videtur, Democrito 
in hac re propria. Cf. Phys. III. 4? 203 a 19 00-01 $* airtipa TTOLOVCTI ra croc^eta, 
KaBdircp ' h.vaay6pas /cat ATy/LtoKpiros-, o JJLCV GK rS>v 6fj,oiOfjL*p>v 7 6 8* CK rrjf TravcTTrcp- 
fiias T$>V arxyparoovy ry &fj>ff (rvvexes TO aTretpov ivai fj>ao-lv. The word is also used 
of the chaotic mixture of atoms in air, earth and water according to the 
Atomists, De Cael. Hi. 4, 303 a 14 depa de ical vdoop KOI r<JXXa peytfet /cat /uicpd- 
TTJTI diL\ov y a>y ovcrav auT&v TT^V tfrvariv olov TravarTrepfJiiav iravrav r8>v (rro^etcoj/. 
On the other hand it serves to denote on the view of Anaxagoras what others 
call the four elements: De Gen. et Corr. I. I, 314 a 28 ol de [sc. ol Trepl 
*A.vagay6pav'] raura JJ.GV [sc. rcli o/iotoftfp^] dTrXa KCU cr-ro^ela, yfjv de KCU irvp 
KCU vd&p KOI aepa. o-vvOcra' 7rava"Trcpp.iav yap eivai TOUTCOJ/. Cf. also of Anaxagoras 
De Cael. in. 3, 302 b i aipa dc <a\ irvp (juypa TOVTVV [flesh, bone, and the like] 
ical T&V oXXooi/ o-irspfjLa.Ta>v TTCLVTCOV' elvai yap eKarepov avr>v e aopara>v 6p,otOfMp&v 
iravrtov rj0poi<rjJ,va)v. While (rirep/jLara xprjpaT&v occurs in the fragments of 
Anaxagoras/r. 4 Diels, we have no such evidence for the use of the word by the 
Atomists. In De Sensu 4, 441 a 6 Travo-Treppia xvp&v is applied to water as a 
reservoir or receiving-house of all possible flavours. 

2 44 a 2 a 9 215 

a 5. ActfKLinros. That a work irepi vov was ascribed to him we know from 
the single citation of his writings which has come down to us on good 
authority (see Aet. Plac. I. 25, 4, p. 321 Diels, Doxogr. Gr.}\ A... \tyei cv T& Ucpl 
vov "ovSev XP*}P a P<*TTJ V yiveTcu aXXa rrdvra K \6yov T KOL vir* avdyKys" Diels 
thinks that such a work probably dealt with the soul (35 PhiloL-Vers^ p. 102). 
The Atomists identified vo\>s with tyvxn : see note on 44 a 2 ^ a-rrXws /ere. What 
information we have about Leucippus is collected by Diels in Fragtnente der 
Vorsokratiker 54, pp. 356365. Leucippus (in view of Diog. Laert X. 13, be 
it remarked) is always treated by A. as a historical person, distinct from 

a 5- TotfTwv 8^, " of these atoms." The demonstrative refers to the same 
thing as the relative &v, Greek idiom being averse to the repetition of the 
relative. So 417 a 5 sq. &v CCTTLV fj a'ta-GrjcrLS K.a.8* OVTCL rj TO. crv^e^Kora TOVTOIS. 
The pronouns <$v and TOVTOLS both replace o-To^eta, which has preceded. 

a 6. T& o-<f>aipoei8T). Spherical atoms are asserted to be the constituents of 
fire, infr. 405 a n sqq., De Gael. in. 4, 303 a 12 irolov dc <al TL etao-rov ri 
TO>V (rrot^etcov, ov&ev eVtdKBpicrav, czXXa povov r<p Trvpl TTJV cr<f>aipav dirc- 
v, ib+ III. 8, 306 b 29 aXXa prjv KCU irpbs TO. Trddrj re /cat ras SwdpcLs KOL TCLS 
Kivr)crei$ do-vfji<J)a>va ra cr^/iara rols- <ra>ftao - i', cc^ a /xaXitrra jSXe'-^ai/reff oura> 


lirolrjvav avro ox^alpau, ol Se [the Platonists] irvpap.ib*a. ravra yap VK.Lvrjr6rara 
p.V SLCL TO eXa^to-rcav airrecrBai teat rJKicrTa (3J3r)Kcvai) QcppavTLK t&rara 8e KOL 
KavaTiKtvTara, 8 tori TO JJLGV [the sphere] oXov ecrrl y&via^ TO 8e [the pjrramid] 
6gvya>ma>raTOv } Kaifi 8e /cat QeppaLvei Taif y&viais, <5>r ^>a<rtV, 75^ Gen. et Corr. I. 8, 
326 a 3 KaiToi rovro -ye aroTroi', TO ft-oi/ov aTroSovj'at r<5 TTfpKpfpel cr^juaTt TO ^ep/xov. 
dvdy^rj yap /cat TOVVOVTLOV TO '^rvxP ov ^^> TtJ/ * TrpooTjKew TO>V Q-xVftdr&v. 

a 6 8id TO... 7 8i.aSvviv. The spherical body meets with less obstruction in 
its course because, as explained in Zte CaeL III. 8, 306 b 34 (see last note), its 
contact with an obstacle is confined to the smallest extent of surface, Sta TO 
eXax/o-raw a,TrTcrQai, further it is the least stable of all solid bodies. 

a 7. TO^S TOIOVTOVS p-uo-|Aovsj such, i.e. spherical, atomic shapes, " figures." 
The Ionic pvcrpbs was used by Leucippus and Democritus, and the Attic 
was substituted for it by A., as he himself explains Metaph. 985 b 1 5 dia 
ydp <pa<ri TO ~bv pv&p.a> /cat biaQiyfj KOI Tpoyrrj JJLOVOV' TOVT&V de 6 ficv pvcrpo? 
cmv, TI dc diaOiyf) Tagts, rj 5c Tpoirf) Becris- 8ia(pepL yap TO pev A TO N 
Herodotus uses pvBpos of the " shape " of letters, V. 58 iiercfiaXov /cat TOV pvBp.ov 
T>V ypafjL/j,dT<ov. But cf. Archil. ./r. 40 olos- pvo-pos dvQp&yrovs x : and the use of 
the form pva-pos by Callimachus proves that the form comes from the earlier 
Epic diction. 

a 7 Kal iavtv...8 ical avTd: cf. infr* 406 b 15 sqq. 

a 8 viroXap.pdvovTs...9 TI^V KCvTjo-tv: cf. 403 b 29 TO KLVOVV, infr. 404 a II T>I 
cr^rj pdrtov TO. irapexovTO, Tots &ot$ TTJV KIV^CTIV^ a 21, 23- 

a 9. opov, "determinant," i.e. determining factor or principle, distinctive 
mark. Ind. Ar. 529 b 44 omnino id significat, quo alicuius rei natura consti- 
tuitur et definitur, De Gen. An. IV. i, 766 a 31 TTJS 8e 8wd/j.eays opos KO\ rrjs d8wafj,ias 
TO TreTTTiKov elvat TJ pr) irfirTiKov, "potency or impotence is determined by the 
animal having or not having a good digestion": PoL 1294 a 10 apicrroKparias 
opos dpcTri : 1294 b 14 TOT? d* e5 ^-e/At^^at o^ftoxpaTiov *cal oXiyap^iav opos KTC. 
This sense of the word is quite distinct from that of the standard to aim at ; it 
is more akin to, yet distinct from, that of definition. So Plato, e.g. Rep, 551 A 
vopov TL0VTai opov 7ro\iTLaf oXiyapx^fy Tofdptvoi ir\7j6os ^pi7/xaTa>v, Politic. 
A ol6fJLc6d TWO. TOVTOW T&v iro\iTiS>v opQrjv elvai rovTOif Tots 1 opois 

216 NOTES I. 

CVI KOI 0X17015- Kal TToXXotS, Kal TrXoTJTO) KO.I 7Tvia, KOI T<3 pldLGp KCtl KOV<rt<j>, 6.g. 

wealth and a paucity of rulers are character! sties which help to determine olig- 
archy. Cf. also Metaph. 1049 a 5 opos de TOV p.ev drro Siavoias VT\x*ia yiyvoptvov 
K TOV oVros, orav KTC. 

a 10. TOV irepi^xovTos, "the surrounding atmosphere"; "the physical en- 
vironment " in which animals live. This term seems to have been vaguely used. 
It has a wider sense in Anaxagoras fr. 2 and 14 D : and similarly Hippol. ref* 
haeres. I. 12 \_Doxogr. Gr. 564, 29], in what professes to be an account of the 
views of Leucippus, Kocrpovs Se [&8e inseruit de coniectura Usener] yivt-o-Gai 
\eyei- orav els peya Kevov CK TOV -rrepiex OVTOS [i.e. from the universe outside this 
void] a9poi<r6fi TroXXa crco/xara KO\ <rvppvfj, irpoo~KpovovTa aXX^Xotr KTC. 

an TWV <rx*ip.ATttv TOL irapfyovra. . . 12 rr\v KCvqcrtv, i.e. spherical atoms; 
v. supr. 404 a 2, 6, notes. 

a 12. po-qOeuxv YC-yvecrdat flvpadcv, i.e. the soul atoms within (ra ewirdpxovTa) 
are recruited or reinforced by the arrival of fresh soul-atoms from without. The 
function of respiration according to Democritus is further explained in de Resp. 
4. 471 b 30 472 a 26. I cite 472 a 5 o-uyKpivofievtov o$v CLVT&V [the spherical 
soul-atoms] virb TOV Trepiexwrof K&\lf3ovTo?) PorjQziav yLvecrSai rrjv avaTrvorjv <j>rjcrtv. 

a 15. <rvvavpYovra TO oruvdyov Kal irr\yv$ov, int. TO rrpi4xov (supr. a 10 
(rvvdyovTO? yap TOV Trepifxovrof TO. cra>/iara) : cf. De Resp* 4? 47 2 a 3 1 >J/ y**P TOLS 
aXeais 0epp.aLv6fJ.evoi ftoXXov Kal Trjf dvairvorj? /iSXXov deop.e0a Kal rrvKvoTepoir 
dvaTTveofjLev 7rdvTs' OTov TO TTcptf $ ^VXP^ V KC " o~vvdyrj Kal o-v{J.7rrjyvi>fl T& cr(>p.a 7 
KaTexeLv (Tv/i/3atVet r& Trvvp,a. A. is there urging that the facts are inconsistent 
with this atomistic theory. It is when we are hot that we breathe quickly; 
when the surrounding atmosphere is cold, when it compresses and contracts 
the body, we hold in our breath ; and yet, A. continues, that was the time for 
the external air to enter and counteract the compression (a 35) /ecu-rot TOT-' *XP*I V 
TO QvpaQev flcrtov KG\vct,v TTJV a-uv&kityw. The verb irrjyvvvai is used of com- 
pression by cold or by heat (De Gen. An. II. 6, 743 a 5 crvvicrraTat, Kal TrfiyvvTat, 
TO. p.ev tfsvxPV Ta ^ GcpP or f pressure generally, as here. 

a 16. lo>s &v Svvwvrat TOVTO iroiciv, i.e. avatrveiv. The account in De Resp. 
4 is more explicit : 472 a IO Kal Sta TOUTO ev TG> dvatrvelv /cat eKirveiv etvai rb r}i> 
jcal diro6vr)<TKiv " 6Yav yap KpaTrj TO Trepte^ov o~ui>0Xiov, Kal fjajK^TL OvpaQev ely-iov 
bvvrjTai aveLpyiv 9 //-?) Swapevov dvatrvetv^ Tare crvp,f3aivei,v TOV Bdvarov TOIS Vots 
elvai yap TOV &Q.VOTQV TTJV TO>V TOIOVTC&V O'X'JP'dT&v GK TOV o-cap^xros e^oSov K TTJS TOV 
7Tpifx ovrof cK0^tyc>s> Though A. does not mention the fact, it is highly 
probable that the Atomists gave a similar explanation of sleep as the partial 
expulsion of warm soul-atoms. Cf. Aet. Plac. v. 25, 3 {Doxogr. Gr. 437, 13). 

a 1 6. TO irapa rcov ITuBa/yopcCav Xcyop-evov. Note that Trapa replaces VTTO used 
of the agent. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. n. 10, 336 b 16 TOW irap* fj^mv Xoyott, 
Metaph. 985 b 22 egrjTijo-dai irapa T&V irpoTtpov, 986 b 6 $t,f)p0pa>Tai rrap* Kiva>v. 

a 17. SL<VOLCLV. Cf. Ind. Ar. s.v. : didvota denotes the sense and meaning of 
a term, " vis ac significatio vocabuli/ 3 as opposed to the term oVo/xa itself (fnd* 
Ar. i86b 15): or again (ib. 19) the intellectual element of a speech as opposed 
to the language and style (Xe'ty, \6yos) ; and so it is used of a writer's spirit or 
intention as distinct from his words, literally understood, cf. Metaph. 985 a 4 
Xa/A/3aveii> irpos TT^V 8t.dvoi.av Kal p.rj Trpbs ci ^\\iferai \ya>v. 

a 19. ircpX 8^ TOVTOV fl'prjTat SI^TU TOVT&V =T&V gvo-fJidT&v and d$Tt=oTt, 
that: Philop. 70, 3$ eiprjrai ydpy (frtjo-i, irp\ avr&v, OTL 6pu>TOi deiKLVijTay Kav fi 
vTjvffjLLa., o>y oLKoticv Kal pr) V7r6 ToO dvfiov ^t TJ}V Kivrjo'iv. To whom this state- 
ment is to be attributed is not clear. It may be A. himself, though the fact 
that the constant motion of motes is noticed, Probl. XV. 13, 913 a 8 sqq., is no! 

I. 2 404 a g a 28 217 

proof. Or Sophonias may be right in assigning it to the Pythagoreans in. 
question, II, 22 c'lpTjrat. Be avTols TOVTO, eyrel crvvfx* s <f>aivcrat Kivovp,va. Obviously 
he understood &ort to mean "because" as did Themistius (9, 30 H., 17, 5 Sp.)- 

a 21. Kal &CTOI...T& avro KIVOVV, a doctrine of Plato and his school main- 
tained amongst others by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, 
who is seldom referred to by name. His theory is sharply criticised infr. I. 4. 
408 b 32 sqq. Philop. 71, 6 probably on the strength of 405 a 29 sqq. also names 
Alcmaeon, dvirr^rai els UXdrava KOL SevoKpdrrjv K.CLL 'AXjc/iaiWa. Philop. adds 
71, 9 on $e 6 nXora>z> avroKLVTjTov \eyc*v TTJV ^vx^v ov rr\v KOTO, TOTTOV e\eye 
KivrjcTLv, avTos cratpS>s Xy ev TOLS Ndpow, presumably 895 E, 896 B. The 
passage in the Laws begins thus, 895 E A0. T &i &J fax^ Tovvopa, ris TOVTOV 
\6yos ; xop-V oXXov irXrjv TOV vvvdrj prjtievTa [894 C], TTJV dvvapevrjv avrrjv avrfjv 
Kiveiv Kivijcrtv ; KA. To CO.VT& Ktveiv <f>fj$ \6yov *X * iV TJ 7 I/ o^*"nv ova-lav^ rjvirep Tovvop,a y 
6 8rj 7ravTS -fy-vxyv ^pocrayopvop,v ; A0. &ijfj.i ye KTC. To the same effect Simpl. 
25, 14 24 (citing PL Legg. 8940) and 26, 21 31. As to Plato, the locus 
classicus is Phaedr. 245 c E, where it is proved /w) oXXo n clvai TO avro eavrb 
KIVOVV T) ^ruxn v * The tenth book of the JLaws^ especially the important section 
894 c 896 E, proves that Plato maintained this doctrine to the last. This is 
recognised by A. in Metaph. 1072 a I r\v oterai 6 v tore apX*)v elvou^ TO avro eavrb 
KIVOVV, where the context shows that soul is meant. 

a 21 ioCiccuri -yap... 25 avro Ktvctrau Here the inference is more apparent 
than in the previous statement, 403 b 28 31. But the reasoning by which the 
conclusion is reached is A.'s own. He is too fond of interpreting his pre- 
decessors from his own point of view and too apt to read more into their 
suggestions than was originally intended. 

a 25 ojiofos S^^.xf^x'nv tvai...26 Tijv Kivov<rav. The feminine by a curious sort 
of attraction for ro KIVOVV the neuter (cf. 403 b 29). Anaxagoras declared vovs to 
be the cause of motion which communicated motion to the primitive chaos and 
brought like to like (404 a 26 ro irav eicivrjcre vovr). (Cf. Anax.yK 12 D KOL rrjs 
Trept^oopiyo'tos' rfjs arv^Trdo-rjs vovs e<pa.TT)crv, &CTT Trept^cop^o-at TTJV ap^ijv, and 
fr. 13 D /cat 7Tt ^pfaro 6 vovf Kiveiv^ airo TOV Ktvovpevov iravros aTrexptvcro.) As 
the context shows (404 a 27 ou p^v iravreX&s y wo-irep Arjp.oKpiTos\ A. is aware 
that the identification of this vovs with -^vx^ as he uses it throughout the 
treatise for the vital force of animals, Is not satisfactorily made out. Cf. infr. 
405 a 13 and note. 

a 26. t ns &XXos. Possibly a reference to Hermotimus of whom we hear 
. 984 b 19 alriav 8* X fl vrpfaepov [sc. *Avaay6pov] 'Epftortftos- 6 

a 27. iKtvos K^V yap, sc. Democritus, who is for A. in the background now 
that we are immediately concerned with Anaxagoras, 

a 28. dirXcfc ^nixflv Tavrov Kal voiiv, sc. clvai \eyei (the latter word must also 
be supplied above with a 27) which A. himself supplies (a 31). The identity 
between -^vx^i and vovs in the Atomic system is again asserted (405 a 8 13) and 
De Re$* 472 a 7 rS>v TOLOVT&V [sc. o-XTj/xaroi/] a tca\i citelvos vovv KCLL '4n)xn v - & 
Aet, IV. 5. 12 (Doxogr. Gr, 391) TLapp.vidrjs Kal *Ep,trcdoK\rjs KCLL &Tjp,OKpiTOs ravrov 
vovv KOL \lsvxf)v, KaQ* ovs ovtev av 07 f^ov a\oyov Kvpias. The Atomists are no 
doubt included by A. among the older philosophers who did not distinguish 
between thought and sense-perception, but explained both as a corporeal 
change. See 427 a 21, 26. Cf. Theophr. De Sensibus 58, 72 [Doxogr. Gr* 
515, 22 sqq., 520, 13 sqq.], Aet. IV. 8. 5 \Doxogr. Gr. 394, 26 sqq.] AVK*W*TO$ 
TO.S alo-Qrio-fis KOI ras vofjo-fis frepoubcrftf eivai TOV crcdfj.aros, 8. id 
Gr. 395, 25) AevKiiriros Ai7/xoxptro$ "ETT/xovpoff TTJV altrOijO'LV Kal r^jfl 

218 NOTES I. 2 

VOTJO-II* yivc<r6ai. 8o>Xa>i' e^dev irpoo-iovrcov. prjdevl yap 
X&pls TOV irpoa-TTLTTTovTos. The identity of vovs and ^vx 7 ? is more completely 
implied in the line of Empedocles frag, no, 10 D, 313 Karsten irdvra yap 'in-Qt, 
<j>p6vr)<riv exciv <al z/a>/zaTos al<rav. So far from confining intelligence to certain 
animals only (V5a), as did A. (404 b 5 sq., 427 b 7 sq., 1214), Empedocles 
here ascribes intelligence and the power of thought to all things, including, as 
Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vui. 286 says, even plants. Thus there would be no 
aXoya a in the strict sense of the term, Aet. IV. 5. 12 (cited above). Again, if 
the identity of vovs and ^xh be maintained, the problem el uepurrri fj ^u^ 7 ? 77 
appl]s (402 b i) must be regarded as foreclosed, Philop. 35, 12 dp.epjj yap <j>r}<riv 
avTrjv [sc. rfjv ^i^v] &W>OKpiTos clvat, Kal ov TroXvdvvafjiov, ravrbv elvai Xe'yo>z/ TO 
voelv TO> alcrQavea'Qai Kal diro /uas- raura irpoepxecrQat Sui/d/zeco?. 

a 28. TO -yap 0X^8*9 etvat TO 4>aLv6jx6vov. This proposition, which recurs as the 
doctrine of " some " thinkers 427 b 3, is understood by A. to mean the denial of 
objective truth, and to it he opposes his own position, Metaph. loiob i sq. &s 
ov irav TO ^>at,v6{j.vov d\rj0s* Democritus is classed with Empedocles as 
holding the doctrine of relativity, ib. 1009 b i 17: "the opinion that appear- 
ances are true has been derived by some from sensible things, which do not 
appear the same (e.g. sweet or bitter) to different men at the same time, or to 
the same men at different times, or the same to men as they appear to other 
animals " : id. 9 ?roia ofiv TOVT&V d\rj6fj rj -\jrcvdrj adrj\ov ' ovdev yap jj,aX\ov Tads 
T) rdde dXrjQfj, aXV OIAOI&S. &6 ArjpOKptTos ye (prfcriv fJTOt ovdev elvai dXrjQcs fj TJJJUV y 
adrj\ov. oXo)? Se dia TO VTro\afj,^dvLv (ftpovrjcrtv /MV TTJV ato-Brjcriv^ ravTrjv S* elvai 
aXXotco<rti/, TO <paiv6p.cvov /caret TTJV ato-Qrjcriv c dvdyK.rjs dXrj^es flvai (patriv CK 
TOVToyv yap /cat 9 ^fjL7TdoK\rjs Ka\ A77/x,(5/cptros jcal T&V aOvXcov cbs JETTON eiTreiv'TOS 
TOLavrais doai? yeyevrjvTai evoxoi. More explicitly of the Atomists alone JDe Gen. 
et Corr. I. 2. 315 b 9 lirei S" &OVTO TdXrjQes v ra> (fraivecrflai, cvavTta $ Kal a-rrcipa TO. 
<paiv6fj,va 9 TO. o~xf]fj.aTa arrcLpa 7rot7;<jav, coo"T6 raty ftfrajSoXats- TOV o~vynifj.ifov TO 
avTo evavTiov doKflv aXXfi) Kal aXXa), Kal /zcraicii/ cltrdat fw/cpo5 e/x/ztyvv/xcvou, icat O\G*S 
<j>aivo~Qai evbs uTaKivrj6cvT05 m K T&V OUTG>V yap 

Zeller, Pre-Socratics^ Eng. Tr. Vol. II. p. 272, points out the inconsistency 
between this supposed tenet of Democritus and the whole tenour of his system, 
especially with his famous distinction between fj a-Korirj yvd>w, i.e. sense- 
knowledge, and fj yvrja-Lrj yvaprj, whereby atoms and void are afHrmed to be the 
only reality, for which sttfrag: n ap, Sext. Emp. vn. 139. Zeller continues: 
" If, therefore, Aristotle attributes to Democritus the opinion that the sensible 
perception as such is true, the statement is founded merely on his own 
inferences ; because the Atomistic philosophei- did not definitely distinguish 
between the faculty of perception and that of thought, therefore Aristotle 
concludes that he must have put both on the same footing in respect of their 
truth." Cf. Natorp, Erkenntnissproblem^ p. i64sqq. The passage I have above 
cited from Metaph. 1009 b i 17 is part of A.'s defence of the law of contradiction, 
that a thing cannot be at the same time and in the same respect both A and 
not-A, which we are justified in asserting D. held as firmly as A. himself. 
Cf. further 426 a 20 sqq. Dyroff, however (Demokrit-Studien^ pp. 74, 88), 
inclines to think that D. himself and not A. drew this inference. Dyroff 
thinks A. is right in holding that because ala-Odvt-a-Oai, = voelv and sense- 
perception is an aXXotWis (ioo9b 13: Zeller and Natorp overlook this), there- 
fore that which appears by means of sense-perception is true. Instead of 
"thought and perception both depend upon body" D. said "thought is 
perception, both are corporeal," and this, Dyroff thinks, justifies the conclusion, 

I. 2 404 a 28 b i 219 

even if A. drew it. Whether D. did, or did not, deny objective existence 
altogether, his position as regards the sensible qualities of matter is clear. 
He was the first to lay down the distinction between the so-called "primary" 
and "secondary" qualities. The atoms have no secondary qualities. Thus 
colours, flavours, smells per se have no objective existence : they, at all events, 
are subjective affections of the percipient. Colour belongs not to the atoms, 
but to the natural objects which are produced by the aggregation of atoms, and 
is due to the order, shape and position of the atoms in such aggregates, whereby 
they act upon our sense and qualitatively alter it. Cf. Theoph. De Sensibus 63 
Trdvra. ira0rj TTJS alo~0f}O~ecos d\\OLOVfjLevrjs y e iyV yivecr&ai TTJV (pavTacrinv^ 69 TO 8e 
y\VKv KOL 6\a>$ TO alcrOrjTov irpos aXXo Kal lv aXXots, d>ff fao-iv, 64 TO. Trepl TOVS 
%v\ovs dva<f)epo>v TTJV <j>avTaoriav irpbs av&pco7rov. For the doctrine of universal 
relativity as applied to sense-perception by the followers of Heraclitus and 
Protagoras the locus dassicus is PI. Theaet. 153 157, where again the salient 
example is colour (1560 E), though all sensible qualities are expressly in- 
cluded, 156 B, E. 

a 30. "EicTttp Kt/r dXXo<t>pov^o>v. The actual words do not occur in our text 
of Homer. In //. 23, 698 however the word d\\o<l>povEovTa in the required sense 
of "swooning" is used of Euryalus after the boxing-match (/cad ft d\\o<f>poveovTa 
ftcra o-QLtriv ewrav ayovTs\ while in II. 22, 330 it is said of Hector in his last 
fight with Achilles that he "fell in the dust" (rjpnre $' eV KOVLTJCT*) and then at 337 
that "faint and weak he bespake Achilles 3 ' (TOV 8 6\iyo8pavea>v -rrpoo-e<j>rj). 
Cf. Metaph. 1009 b 28 <pao~l de /cat TOV ^Qpjjpov TOVTTJV e^ovra <f>aLV<r0ai TTJV 
$6av [the theory of relativity on TOIOVT avrois eo-rcu ra ovra ola &v vTroXdjScocrtj/], 
ort iroLr)cr TOV "Exropa, a>ff egeo-rrj VTTO TTJS TrXrjyrjs, Kt<r6ai aXXo^poveoi/ra, a>s 
<j>povovvTas ftv /cat roue rrapa<frpovovvTas aXX* ou TOVTCL. 8rj\ov o$v ort, el a/xq^orepat 

<j>pOlfT](TLS 9 KCU TO. $VTCL a/J.CL OVTC& T K.CLL OV% OVTWS eX Ct ' ScnSC aS Well aS thought 

suffered from the blow, so that (frpovclv and aXXo^poveTv must be understood of 
consciousness in the widest sense. (On ucr0aye<r$ai=to be conscious, an 
extension of meaning not really analogous, see 425 b 12, note.} Democritus had 
firmly grasped the dependence of the normal consciousness upon the healthy 
physical condition alike of the body and the equally material soul. This point 
is brought out by Theophrastus De Sensibiis 58 (Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 515, 23sqq.) 
yivcTcu [int. ro <j>poveiv] a~ujjf.jjLTp<of ex o ^ (T7 J s r *l s ^ v xn s * ara ^^ Kpacriv [Schneider's 
COrr. for fj.Ta.Tr)v Kivrjo-iv]' av de irepiOcp^os TLS TJ irpfyvxpo$ yevrjrcUy fj,ra\\dTTiv 
<f>7jcri. 8ib /cat TOVS TraXatovff /caXo>s TQV&* V7ro\aj3flv OTI ea~rlv e dX\o(ppoveTvJ In 
Hector's case the chill of approaching death is the disturbing cause. 

a 30 ov 8-q xpiyraU'-S 1 vow. xp5 ra > sc - Democritus. The divergence between 
his use of the term vovs and A.'s comes out more clearly here. To A. vovs is a 
distinct faculty, one of several concerned with truth, cf. 428 a 17 sq., a 3 5, Eth. 
lt. II39b 15 crra> ftrj ols d\7)0evt. f) ^"^77 r<3 xara^avat ^ dirotpdvai, ircvre TOV 

TCLVTCl d* OT4 TCX^T] 7TlO~TT)fJLr} <j>p6l'7)O'l,S tTQ<j>la VOVS' V7TO\T)\lsL yap KOL Sogfl 

&aA//-evdeo-0<u. That neither 0/jovetv nor uoeTv can be identified with 
ala-Bdvea-dai is argued succinctly 427 b 6 14. Democritus (and Leucippus, if 
the work Hepl vov is rightly ascribed to him) has not so differentiated the term, 
but employs it in the older and vaguer sense for soul in general as the 
animating principle or part. This is the usual meaning of voos in Homer and 
the older poets (eVt o^rfjBecro-iv drdpftrjTos v6os ccrr/i/, evfj.vei voop) frequent in 
Hdt., e.g. VIIL 97 C'K TTCLVTOS voov, and at all periods in the phrase icara voi/. 

404 b i. TJTTOV 8ta<racf)t. A. is perfectly sure that Democritus uses vovs and 
-^vxn as interchangeable terms. That Anaxagoras did so is not so clear. Cf. 
note on 404 a 25. Here A. argues that the vovs which Anaxagoras finds in all 

220 NOTES I. 2 

living things must be what A. himself means by ^v;^, and that it cannot be 
o Kara <j>p6vrjo-tv vovs: but below (405 a 13) he decides that by vovs Anaxagoras 
intended something different from ^x 7 ?* thus widely diffused through all 
animate beings. Cf. b I TroXXa^ov /Ltz>...2 MpaQt 8e. ircpl avrwv, i.e. Trepl TJsvxrjf 
<al vov. Both terms are found in frag: 12 D Kal ocra ye ^vxnv %xci Kal ftetfo> /cat 
fXaa-cro, Trdvrav vovs /cpar*t, where fax*!" %X eLV ~*pfy v X a ^ vai as m f ra & 4^ 
Kal dv0pa>7rovs re o-v^Trayrjvai Kal ra aXXa fwa ocra tyvx*) v *X i - PI- CV(/. 400 A 
joins tyvxn with vovs- when he refers to the principal doctrine of Anaxagoras : 
xal rrjv rcov aXXcai/ atravrav (pvcnv ov Tricrrcveis 'Auaa-ydpa vovv re Kal ^vxn v ^IvaL 
rrjv Sta/cocr pova- av /cat e^oucrav. 

b 2. TO alVtov roi5 KaXoSs Kal opOws, sc. ^ftv. The view that Anaxagoras 
regarded vovs as the cause of the beautiful and orderly arrangement in the 
world is also expressed in Metaph. 984 b 8 23, esp. 15 vovv Srj TLS elirav evfivat^ 
xaBcLTrep ev role fojotff, Kal cv rfi (pvcret. rov CLLTLOV rov Koo-pov KOL rrjs ra^ws- Trdcrrjs- 
olov vT)<pav <j>dvT) 'Trap* LKrj \eyovras TOVS irp6repov. Cf. jfmg. 12 D KOI ra 
(rvfji[j.iary6fJLva. re AC at aTTOKptvd/iei/a /cat 8iaKpi.v6fjLfva iravra. cyvo* vovs. KCU OTTO to, 
fL\\v farecrQat. Kal oirola qv, acrcra vvv JUT; corri, Kat o^roTa corn, jravra ^LeKocrpnja-f 
jrov?, Kal rr)v Trepi~xti>pvicn,v ravrrjv, TJV vvv 7rep^a>pe ra re acrrpa /cat o fjXios /cat 77 
o-e\r)V7j /cat (5 aTyp fcai <5 alBrjp ol d.7roKpiv6fj,VOi. 

b 2. T^pa>0L S^-.-ilrux-nv. The yap of the following sentence seems to show- 
that this identification of vovs and -^u^ is A.'s inference from the fact that 
Anaxagoras declared vovs to be everywhere present in all living things. He 
cannot have meant o Kara (ppovrjo-iv \ey6pevos vovs'j he must therefore have 
meant what A. calls tyvx*)- 

b 3. Iv aircun. -yctp virdp^eiv avrov Tots a L S. avrovrov vovv. SGefrag". 12 O" 
/cal oo-a...7rdvra>v vovs /cparct (cited above w. on 406 b I ircpl a-UTcSv). But in this 
fragment it is not clear that Kparel bears out A.'s virdpxeiv, in other words, 
whether, according to Anaxagoras, the intelligence which rules all animate 
beings is, or is not, immanent: in 429 a 19 A. himself glosses tva Kparfj by 

b 5 ov <f>avcrai...6 TOIS t$ois. This is one of the premisses from which the 
conclusion is drawn that Anaxagoras uses vovs in the sense of ^rvxn- By 
<t>atvo-6a.i an appeal to the facts is introduced. Cf. 403 a 5 nofe^ 414 a 24 Kaitrep' 
ovde (f>at.voiJLvov, De CaeL II. 13, 294 b 4 vvv 8* ov (paiverai rovro yiyvopevov. In 
o Kara 4>p<5vT|<riv vovs, the preposition has a determining sense, cf. 417 b 9 r6 ftcv' 
ovv els evrcXe^etav ayov CK $ Kvros Kara ro voovv KOL <^>povov, 41 2 b IO sq. 
ovcrta fj Kara rov \6yov : also such common phrases as KOT dptBp.ov ev, Kara. 
*car* evtpyeiav, Kara n (as opposed to d-rrX&s or oXcop), /eatf* avro, Karb. 
That <f>povLV) <pp6v7j<ris B.S more precise should be used to define 
voelv, vovs may appear surprising: see, however, 427 a 17 27 where the two 
terms are used indifferently, 427 b 8 r& voelv, *v < e(rrl...<pp6vrja-is, KOL eVttrr^T; - 
<at doga aXrjGrjs, 429 a IO ^ [sc. r<S i/(5] yivd>o-Kei re rj ^VXTJ <at <j>povel. The State- 
ment of our text that vovs is something rare and exceptional if we look at the 
animal world as a whole recurs in 415 a 7 1 1, 427 b 8. 

4O4 b 8 4O5 b 1O. The other view, which regards soul as that which 
perceives and knows, identifies soul with the constituent elements of things 
perceived or known (i.e. of the universe), because like is known by like. Thus ' 
Empedocles ( 6), Plato in the Timaeus, in Ta irepl <tXoo-o<taff and elsewhere ' 
( ?) Others [i.e. Xenocrates], combining motion and perception, have defined * 
the soul as a self-moving number ( 8). We have thus classed together 
philosophers whose views as to the nature and number of the constituent 
elements of things are widely different, some considering them as corporeal, 

I. 2 404 b I b 12 221 

others as incorporeal ( 9), some admitting but one ultimate principle, others 
a plurality. But the view taken of the soul and the view taken of the universe 
will be found to agree ( 10). This agreement is exemplified in Democritus 
( n, 12). The views of Anaxagoras ( 13), Thales ( 14), Diogenes of 
Apollonia ( 15), Heraclitus ( 16), Alcmaeon ( 17), Hippon ( 18), Critias 
( 19) are briefly stated. 

b 8. oo-oi 8" lirl TO ytvt6o-K6i,v Kal TO alo*0d.Vo-dai TWV OVTO>V, SC. a7rej8Xe-^ai>. 
Here A. passes from the conception of soul as moving principle to the con- 
ception of soul as cognitive or perceptive. 

b 9. OVTOL 8. Note the resumption after OVTOL of the $ already expressed 
at b 8, ocroi $6, and cf. Jnd. Ar. i66b 58 ubi demonstrativa enunciatio sequitur 
relativam, non raro particula 5e relativo addita iteratur apud pronomen (ad- 
iectivum, adverbium) demonstrativum : De Gen. et Corr. I. I, 3 14 a 8 6Voi jxfev 


Tt6ao-iv...Tovrots 8^ erepov. 

b IO. 01 JJL^V -rrXefovs iroiovvTes [TaiSra$], o 8fe ptav Tatf-r^v. I follow Bek., 
Trend., Torst., Diels in bracketing rain-as, which is omitted in E. The other 
authorities vary. See critical notes* M. Rodier who retains rain-as rightly, on 
his view, places a comma before the word and another before b 1 1 ravrrjv, thus 
making the text a condensed expression for ol pev ir\cLovs ras dpxas TOLOVVTCS 
ravras aval rrjv ^VXTJV, ol 5e p.iav rrjv apxfjv Troiovvres ravrrfv ewai TTJV TJsvxfjv 
Xcyovo-fj/. But, though this is unambiguously expressed later on (405 b 17 19), 
it is not necessary to anticipate it here. 

b II. wo-irep 'Ejj/rrcSoKXfjs JJL^V IK TWV o-roix^fwv TrdvTfiov, SC. Xeyet rrfv ^^xh v *i va *- 
By ra a-TOLx^a travra are meant the four so-called elements or o-afiara air\a of A., 
earth, water, air ( = al0f)p of Empedocles), and fire, as well as the two moving 
forces, attraction and repulsion, personified as Love and Strife. As Zeller shows 
(Pre-Socratics, Eng. Tr. IT. pp. 167 sqq.) this is A-'s inference and involves a mis- 
conception : " A. concludes in his usual manner that according to Empedocles 
the soul is composed of all the four elements, an assertion which is then 
repeated by his commentators. It is, however, incorrect. Empedocles did not 
hold that the soul is composed of the elements : but what we call the activity of 
the soul he explained by the elementary composition of the body ; a soul 
distinct from the body he did not assume. Thought, like all other vital 
activities, arises from and depends upon the admixture of substances in the 
body.... It is in the blood especially, because there the elements are most 
completely mingled, that thought and consciousness have their chief seat, and 
particularly in the blood of the heart \Jrag. 105, 3 D]. But other parts of the 
body are not excluded from participation in thought, provided the elementary 
particles are tightly compressed and mixture is homogeneous. If the right 
admixture is limited to certain parts, the result is sense-organs with their special 
endowment." What Empedocles meant is best seen in the case of the special 
senses. As our sense-organs are composed of the very same elements as the 
objects outside the organism, knowledge of these objects is obtained through 
these organs. Thus the fire in the eye enables us to see fire, and so on. 

b 12. ?vai 8fe KaX ^KOOPTOV ^xV TOVTWV. This also is A-'s inference. If 
soul is compounded of the elements and a part of each element enters into its 
composition, then, in virtue of being such part, any one of the elements may be 
said to be a soul. De Gen. et Corr. II. 6, 334 a 9 OTOTTOV e Kal fj -^vx^ I* r&v 
orotxei&v 17 ev n avr&v* A. is there dealing with Empedocles and continues 
334 a IO at yap aXXowkcrew al rfjs ^VXTJS TT&S eaovrai, olov ro fiovcr*xo> elvai /cat 
v, rj fJ>vr)fjL7j T) \rjBrj; 3fj\ov yap on d pev Trvp 17 tyux*!* ra ' ir ^ r l 

222 NOTES I. 2 

avrfj ova irvpl g n-up ptKrov, ra o-oj/zarnca- rovrav " [i.e. the aXXoiaxreis 1 , ro 
ILOvoriKov elvai Kal iraXw apovarov rj pvyprj rj Xrj^rj] ovdev (r&parLKov. In the latter 
case, the properties of the compound may be different from those of the 
constituents, although still of course properties of a corporeal substance. Cf. 
Zeller, op. tit. p. 137, n. i. The inference is virtually repeated 410 b 2 sq., 7 10- 
and, as Simpl. remarks, it rests on the assumption already formulated by A* 
that "that by which we know anything whatever is soul" (27, 36) ov JJLQVOV rb CK 
7racrS>v fuyaa ^X^ v Xeyoi/ra, dXXa Kal eKacrrrjv apxh" yvco(rrLKr}v ofi&av TOV 6/Wov* 
TO yap yvfoa-TLKov orovovv ^rvx^} v elvai. 

bi3 ^aCt) jxiv -yap... 15 X^p$. Frag. 109 D (11. 321323 K) cited also in 
Metaph. looob 6 sqq. and by later writers, e.g. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. I. 303, 
VII. 92, 121 with drjp substituted for aiQfjp in the first citation. 

b 16. TOV avrov Sfc T$ Ti|Aaa>. The reference is to the &vxoyovia 
in Timaeus 34 C sqq, 

b 17. -yivccrK<rOai. *y<*P T $ op.oCa> TO ofxoiov. That like is known by like is the 
assumption underlying the language of Tim. 37 A c where Plato accounts for 
the generation of "sure opinions and true beliefs" (dogai <al TTICTTCIS fi$aioi ACCU 
akrjGc'is) as well as of vovs and fVio-T^/zi?. Plato with his immaterial principles 
gives a wholly original application to the maxim c like is known by like.' Here 
he stands quite apart from all his predecessors, although no doubt in his theory 
of vision (Tim. 45 B 460) he followed Empedocles. 

b 17. IK TWV o-Toixfc>v. In our context <rrotxa and apxal are synonymous 
terms, and we might fairly infer that this was so in the latest speculations of 
Plato and in those of his immediate followers. A. expressly asserts this of those 
who held the ideas to be numbers, Metapk. 1087 b 12 ras ap^as as 
KaXocriv. Cf. 1086 b 37 1087 a 4. 

b 18. TO, 84 irpd^ixara IK TWV apxv etvai. What are here called 
para are to Plato yiyud^i/a, though he also, as well as A., sometimes calls 
them ovra. As to the principles from which " things " or phenomena are 
derived, see Tim. 270 sqq. : ideas are the causes of phenomena, of the entire 
sensible universe with all things included therein. 

b 19. Iv rots irepl <|>LXo(ro<)>fa,s Xc-yofUvois. The form of this reference would 
suggest a treatise entitled Uep\ fa\ocrotf>ias. But our authorities inform us that 
certain oral lectures of Plato's are intended, of which A. and possibly other 
disciples of Plato had made summaries or compendia (cf. Heitz, Die verlorenen 
Schriften des A. pp. 180, 2ll). In Phys. II. 2. 1 94 a 36 eiprjrai S* eV rots vrcpi 
<f)i\ocro<j>ias the reference, on the other hand, is to a dialogue written by A. 
himself. SuDpfa-fa]. With what follows cf. Metaph. 1090 b 20 24. 

b 19. avr& p.fev rA t$ov, sc. the universe, which is explicitly termed a 
"living thing" or "organism" (f<5oi/) in the Timaeus (cf. e.g. 306 rovde TOV 
Koa-fjiov <pov fj.\jsvxw evvovv re, and many other passages). Cf. Them. 12, i H., 
21, IO Sp. T& fJLGV ofiv avro<pov, rr>VTcm rov Koarpov rbv vorjrov, e/c r&v 
ciroiovv apx&v, TCL fie c'flrl fjifpovs [sc. f^a] < rS>v u^eifj.evfiov* tovirep yap ra aia 
CX^L TTpoy aXX?;Xa, ovra> Kal raff Ideas avr$>v Trpos aXXi^Xa? cxetv. 

b 20. TIJS TOV cv&s IS^as, the idea of the One. In Greek mathematics 
one, though an apxn apiQp&V) is not itself a number (Metaph. 1088 a 4 8) : 
rd cv Kal ol dpiQfjiol is a stereotyped phrase. ro9 irpoarov ^KOVS. The idea- 
number Two : as Three is the irp$>rov ir\dros and Four the irp&rov ftdOos. 
In this phase of Platonism the attempt was made to derive the three di- 
mensions of space from the idea-numbers Two, Three and Four. Metaph. 
992 a 10 sqq.: cf. 992 b 13 sqq., 1085 a 7 sqq., and, most explicitly, 1090 b 21 
yap [sc. ol ras Ideas ritfe/xei/ot] ra pfyetifj CK rrjs v\rjs Kal dpiQpov, e'/t p,cv rrjs 

I. 2 404 b 12 b 23 223 

TO. /L"7K7, K TplddoS 5* TG>ff TO. STTtVc&a, f/C $ TTJS TTpd8o$ TO. CTTpa TJ 

aXXo)i> dpt0p.a>v. Them. II, 30 H., 2O, 26 Sp. eireidrj yap ev ra> i/o^ 

raff dp-^as irapcfjL<j>alvo-0at. TOV aZo^roO, o Se al<rdrjrof CK p,r)<ov fjftr] /cat 
/cat (3auovy TOV p.ev P.TIK.QVS Idcav eivat TTJV Trp&Trjv dTrecforjvavTO i>aSa* diro 


TTJV TTp&Trjv Tpiddo.' iTp>TOv yap T&v eTTtTTedojj/ o~x^ p-dr&v OT ro Tp[ycovov f 
Cf. Met&ph. IO36b 13 KCU TG>V rds tSe'as- Xeyoyrcov ol fjt,ev avToypap.p.^v TTJV dvd8a f ol 
$ TO eldos TTJS ypafjLfjJfjs evia f*.v yap elvai TOVTCL TO elbos KOL ov TO eldo^ olov Svdda 
Ka} TO eidos dvddos* V1 ypapprjs 5* OVKCTL. Duality is assumed by A. as an 
equivalent for the formal cause of the straight line 429 b 20 ecrr< yap Svds 
[SC. ro evtiel eivat]. 

b 21. ToL 8* aXXa. If we may follow Timaeus 30 C, D these will be the 
genera and species of living things included in the universe ov * eo- raXXa f &a 
K.a6* ev /cat /cara yivr\ popia, TOVT& irdvT&v O^LOLQTCLTQV O.VTOV clvcu TiQ$*p.v. TO. yap 
Srj VOTJTO. "<a iravTo. IKGLVQ ev cavro ireptXaftov ex l i ^addTrcp ode 6 /cocr/zos- 
Sara T aXXa Bpe^ara vv<TTT)Ki' opara. Them. 12, I H. } 21, IO Sp. ro ovv 
avTog<pov...Xtv [cited above in note on b 19 auro p*v TO f<pov]. 

b 21. ^TI Si Kal aXXws : TOV avTov drj TOVTOV \6yov peryeo-av is the supplement of 
Them. (12, 5 H., 21, 14 Sp.). The world of objects which the soul knows having- 
been derived from idea-numbers it remained to show that the faculties which 
soul is assumed to employ for apprehending these objects admit of a similar 
deduction, in other words that soul has vovs in it from the idea of Unity, 
7ria"rfjp,rj from the idea-number Two, Sofa from Three, Sense-perception from 
Four. The soul which knows, as well as the things which are known, is 
ultimately constituted by idea-numbers. Mr Shorey (A. J. Ph. xxn. 152) 
protests against associating these ' fooleries of Xenocrates,' as he calls them, 
with the teaching of Plato himself. 

b 22. (i,ovax<$* Philop, 79, 26 glosses /JLOVCLX&S by OVK. aXXor* aXXa*s-. In 
Euclid's language there can only be one straight line between any two points : 
in other words, from any point there is only one way of going to any other 
single point (^oV li/), Them, n, 33 H., 21, 2 Sp. oVo yap evos *<* ev TO /J.TJKOS, 
TOVTCO-TLV airo o-rjfielov cVt o^/ietoi/ as already cited on b 20 supra, ib. 12, 8 H., 
21, 1 8 Sp. TJ]v de eTTKrTTjfjLrjv IK. Trjs Trp&rrjs dvddos [sc. T-T\V ^^X^ v *X LV 
d<p* vos yap e(f>* ev /cat 17 CTrtoTTy/iT;, a^ro yap T&V Trporcurcoov eirl TO 
. Cf. 407 a 26 9. 

b23. TOV 8fe TOV lirwreSov dpL0fj.ov S6av. Cf. Them. 12, 9 H. 5 21, 21 Sp. TTJV 86gav 
de K TTJS TTpdiTijs rpiaoff, GO-OS- %v /cat roi) eTwredov dpiflfjios. According to Them. 
(12, 10 H., 21, 22 Sp.) this was because the triangle is the first, or most 
elementary of plane figures : TTJS yap Sogrje rjbri /cat ro d\rj6es /cat TO 
K TO>V 7rpOTdo"G>v. So Philop. 79? 2 8 Sqq. rov $e rpta dpi6p.ov TTJ 86 
ov yap /xova^cot ff 6\>fa yiveTat, &a"n-ep q eiriarfjfjLr]' (rri yap /cat 0^X77^37? $oa /cat 
\lsv8r)$, cTrio-Tripr) 5e Tracra d\rj&f)?. 

b 23. a^o-eT]crtv 8i TOV TOV o-Tpov. Cf. Them. 12, II H., 21, 24 Sp. alordrfo-LV 
Se diro TTJS irp&Trjs rerpaSos 1 c $js /cat 17 roO crTpOv o~a>fJiaTos Idea' irp\ yap TO 
TOIOVTOV o-co/xa YJ aicr6rjo-tf. At first this explanation seems strangely out of 
keeping with what precedes. But a clue to its meaning and at the same time a 
proof of its correctness is furnished by Laws 894 A. Plato asks, " What are 
the conditions of all becoming ?" and replies diJXov, is- oVorav dpxy \aftovcra 
els TTJV devTcpav \&fl p.Td/3a&tv jcal aVo TavTrjs els TTJV 7r\rjar[ov y /cat ftXP fc 
i&v \6ovcra ata-Qria-iv o^xfj ro ^ al<r0avofj,vois* /iera/3aXXov p.ev ovv OVT& Kal 
y[yvTat irav O"Ti SVTCOS ov, OTTOTOV pevrj' pcTaftaXov &e is 
di4<t>0apTai iravT\>?. The mathematical character of the language 

224 NOTES I. 2 

would be apparent even if A. had not told us that Plato eschewed the term 
"point" and preferred to speak of " origin of a line, 7 ' apx^j ypapws (Metaph. 
992 a 21), just as modern geometry calls a point the "origin" of coordinates. 
The point, receiving increase, grows or developes into the line, the second stage 
or /z6Ta/3ao-4ff ; from that it passes to the next stage, for a line by its motion 
generates a superficies (409 a 4 sq.) : by the fourth stage it reaches three 
dimensions and is perceptible to sense. Here, as in Tim. 53 c 57 D, Plato 
substitutes a mathematical deduction of body for a physical deduction. The 
world of becoming is a fleeting show, a phantasmagoria : all the reality in 
which it shares is derived from its Trepara, point, line, surface and solid (Metaph. 
1028 b 16 sqq.). By what arguments this conclusion was recommended may 
still be seen in Metaph. 1001 b 26 1002 a 14. Cf. also Metaph. 1089 a 3 1 sqq- 
(fralvcTai de r] fq-nyo-w TT<S TroXXa ro ov TO KOTO, ras oitcrias \ey6p.VQv apiQ^oi yap 
KOL fJ>7jK7) <al croofjLara ra yewu>\isva e&riv. Bonitz in his commentary (p. 57^) 
assumes that Plato is here criticised. How much of the views criticised in 
Metaph. M., cc. 6 10, N., cc. i 6 belongs to Plato himself, how much to his 
school, it is very hard to determine. 

b24 ot jifcv -yap... 25 IK r<Sv aroixefov. Cf. Metaph. 1078 b 9 12, 1 080 a 12 
14, where it is implied that in Plato's teaching there was first a period in which 
the ideas were quite distinct from numbers, and later a period in which they 
were presented as virtually numbers. Of this later phase there is apparently no 
trace in the extant dialogues. The subject of clcrl is still ot apiOpoL We might 
paraphrase thus : The numbers were affirmed to be just what the ideas had 
(always) been, and, whereas other philosophers had chosen material principles 
as principles of all existence, Plato made them numbers, only they were not 
ultimate, but were themselves constituted of component elements (oroi^eTa). 
This phase of Platonism, in which the idea is a number and at the same time, 
as an- idea, the cause of being for particulars is attested Metaph. 1090 a 5 etTrsp 
Ka<rTos r>v dpiOfJL&v Idea Tts-, 17 6"* Idea rols ciXXow atria rov elvai ov 817 irorc rpoirov 
?orro> yap vTroKeifj.ei'ov avrols rovro. A. himself admits there the efficiency of 
the ideas as causes on this view (ib. a 4) TO> fj,ev yap Ideas TiQepeva rrapcxovraL 
TLV* alrLav rots ovcrtv. This is probably an exaltation of Plato at the expense of 
Xenocrates, who is the object of the polemic 1090 a 7 15. A. usually mentions 
two arroixfta of idea-numbers. The first is always unity, the second, the prj ev 
(Metaph. 1001 b 23), is variously called the indeterminate or the unequal two, 
aopio-ros 8vde (Metaph. loSi a 14 sq.) ? avio-os 8vd$ or avurov (Metaph. 1087 b 5, 7, 
n, 1089 b 10 sqq.), appearing sometimes as great-and-small, sometimes as 
much-and-little etc. according as magnitude or number is the product. By 
these elements or ultimate causes of the ideas or idea-numbers, however 
designated, we may understand unity and plurality: Metaph. 1001 b 19 aXXa p.rjv 
Kal i ris ovTcof V7ro\afj,(3&Vi oo>aT yWcT0(, Kadairep Xeyotxr/ rives, CK rov v&? avrov 
KOL a\\ov /XT) eves nvos rov apt^/xdv, ovftev ^rrov ^rjrr^reov Sta ri Kal wStf ore p,v 
apiQiJLOs ore. $e peyeGos ecrrat TO yevofjicvov, clirep ro pfj Iv f] avio~orri$ jcat 17 avrfj 
<j>va-is ?v. One consequence of assuming elements from which the idea-numbers 
were derived did not escape criticism : being derived, the idea-numbers are 
posterior to the elements from which they are derived, and A. objects that there 
are entities a juaXXov ftovXovrai, ea>> ras Ideas elvai : cf. Metaph. 1079 a 14 
19, 990 b 17 22. 

b 25. xptverai S ra irpdy^tara. This distinction of four fatuities correlating 
with four classes of object is found in slightly varying forms in several Platonic 
dialogues. In the Republic 509 E 511 E the main division is into vo^ra and 
opara and thus the former are divided into objects of pure reason (v^rja-is) and 

I. 2 404 b 23 405 a 3 " 225 

objects of understanding (Siciz/ota), while thing's visible or, more comprehensively, 
sensible objects, are subdivided into objects of belief (TTLCTTI^ and objects of 
conjecture (elKacria) : where, however, iria-ris and ei/cao-ta seem to be but species 
of 86a. Thus in the Reptiblic at any rate the spheres of opinion (da) and 
sense-perception (aia-Bijcrif) are not regarded as mutually exclusive. When we 
get to the Timaetts we have again, first, a dual division of objects (51 B sqq.)> 
intelligible realities and sensible phenomena, inferred from the irreconcilable 
distinction between vovs and So|a d\rj0r)$. The latter class of objects, sensibles, 
are in the same passage (52 A), however, described as apprehended by opinion 
with the help of sense-perception (So# /^T S alo-Qrjcrecos'). And in 37 B, c we have ap- 
parently the full fourfold division of faculties vovs^.eTrta-Tr)^ re...dof<u KOL TTiVreis. 
b 27. el'Si] 8* . . .TV irpaYpaTcov, " forms of things/ 3 in A.'s technical sense of eZSos-. 
A. adds this remark in order to make clearer the nature of the numbers first 
introduced in b 20 sqq. : hence o&rot, " with which we have been dealing" in this 
account of the Platonic views." It adds nothing to the previous remark b 24 
ol p,ev yap apiOpOL TO. eiSrj avra KCLL at ap^at eXeyovro, except that TO>J/ TTpaypaT&v 
is appended to ef&y. It seems unlikely at first sight that A. should describe the 
idea-numbers in the terms of his own system as forms of things. But, if we 
give 1817 the Platonic sense, it is misleading to speak of " ideas of thing's " 
without qualification. It is true that in Metaph. 98 7 b 7, io78b 31, ra rotavra 
r&v OVT<OV Ideas 7rpoa-rjyopvcr^ Bonitz joins ran/ OVTCCV with iSeay, but he does SO 
without warrant from Alex. Aphr. and TO, roiavra is more naturally taken with 

TO>V OIST&V. The more correct phrase TTO.VTC&V Ideas elvai T>V K.CL&O\OV \eyojjievcov 
occurs Metaph. 1078 b 33. Cf. 990 b 7, 12. Them., however, has no scruple in 
writing (n, 27 H., 20, 20 Sp.) eiSrj rS>v OVT&V and even (12, 3 H., 21, 13 Sp.) ras 
Ideas avro)v [sc. ra>v alcr6i]r>v'\. 

b 27 4irt Sfe...28 ^vwpto-TtKov OVTWS. With this punctuation OUT-CDS- r<p e/c rS>v 
crTOL^LG>if clvaij so that it limits the sense of yvcapia-Tticov. Torstrik cites for 
a similar use of our6>ff Metaph. 1053 a 13 K.OL Tavra iravra ev TL ourooff, oi>x &s 
K.OLVQV TI TO 6i/, aXX' oxTTT^p clprjTai. The punctuation of ouroos- 105 1 b 35, where 
Bekker put the comma before, and Christ after, otmos>, presents a similar problem. 
Cf. Maier, Syllogistik I. p. 20, n. 2. 

b 28. gvioi, namely Xenocrates : cf. infr. 408 b 32 sqq. : quum substantia 
eorum quae sunt numerus sit, cognoscatur vero simile simili, cognoscat vero 
anima, sequitur ut anima numerus sit (Torst. p. 1 1 7). 

b 30. Sicu^povTai Se. Thus under the conception of soul as cognitive and 
therefore related to the principles of things are collected philosophers as dis- 
similar as Empedocles and Plato. While they agree in reducing the soul to 
elements or principles they are not agreed on the fundamental question what 
these elements or principles are and how many of them must be assumed. 

b3I. xots acrafjLaTous, int. TTOLOVOTL. 

405 a i. TO-UTOIS, int. 8ia<j)epovTai. dir d|jw|>oiv, i.e. from both corporeal 
and incorporeal principles. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are instanced by 
Simpl. (30, 30) and Philop. (82, 20), who consider the Intelligence of the latter, 
as well as the Love and Strife of the former, to be incorporeal. 

as. 4iro|x4v<s Sfc TOVTOIS, conformably with these various assumptions, i.e. the 
assumptions made by each philosopher as to the nature and number of the 
principles of things. Their view of the soul was coloured by their view of the 
universe ; the ap# a * and <rroLx ^ a of the one correspond to the ap%al and trrot^eTa 
of the other. A. implies that this correspondence holds, not only when cognition 
is taken to be the primary characteristic of soul, but quite as much when soul is 
reg-arded, e.g. by Democritus, as the moving principle. 

H. 15 

226 NOTES I. 2 

a 4. TO T -ydp KIVKJTIKOV rtjv 4>v(rvv Ttov irpwTwv viriX^c(>a(riv. With Bonitz 
(Hermes vil. p. 419 sqq.) join T&V Trp&raiv which is a partitive genitive with 
TO KLvrjriKov and supply after vTreihrjipao-iv rr\v fyvyriv or TT)V ^^Xl v fW"M. By ro 


(frvo-iv : they conceived the soul to be that amongst first principles or primary 
elements which is by its nature capable of causing motion, i.e. they too, as well 
as those who explained the soul from cognition, assumed the soul to be the one 
element or one of the elements of things : they selected an element by its nature 
adapted to produce motion, and declared soul to be that element. The elements 
of the early philosophers, their 7rpS>ra or dpxai, corresponded more or less exactly 
to A.'s material cause. But sometimes a distinction was drawn between some 
elements which were inert, and one (or more) which was active and able to 
move the rest. The best commentary is furnished by Metaph. 984 b i where, 
as here, A., is dealing with the early philosophers, whether they assumed a single 
first principle or a plurality, and remarking the scarcely discernible trace of a 
motive cause in such systems TG>V \LSV ovv IV <$>aa-K.6vTG>v elvai ro irav ovdcvl 

<TVV/3ri TYJV TOLaVTTjV [int. TTfV Tf)GLV dpX^ <*>ff O> fjfJ,LS <palrjp.V, 66*V JJ dpX^ TTJff 

KLvr)(Ta>si] cruvibclv alrlavj TT\TJV i apa Happ.vLbrj [in ra Trpof dogav, where he 
apparently admits two principles]... (b 5) rots- de 8rj TrXetco TTOIOVO-L pa\\ov cVd^crat 
Xeyeiy, olov roi$ Qeppov KO.L -^rvxpov rj Trvp KOI yrjv' xP^ VTaL 7^P ** f KLvrjriKrjv e^ovn 
r<5 Trvpl TTJV (pvcrLv, vdari 5e fcai yfj KOL rots rotOTjrots TOVVCLVTLOV. Cf. 983 b 7 sqq. 

An alternative would be to take r&v Trp&r&v as predicate with vTrctXfj^aa-iv, 
by the same construction as that of r&v Ka\>v (402 a i): and so the Greek 
commentators. " They supposed that what in its own nature is capable of 
causing motion is one of the primary causes. 3 ' If the words are so taken, 
then, since they regarded the soul as capable by its own nature of causing 
motion, it follows that the soul is one of the primary causes : Them. (13, 7 H., 
23, 15 Sp.) V\oyov yap KOL \iav iriBavov rrjv KLvrjrtK&TdTijv alriav eV rais irp&rais 
dpxais KarardrreLv. Cf. Philop. 82, 36 and Simpl. 30, 33 sqq. Bonitz objects 
that it is the apx*} which determines what the soul is, and not the soxil which 
determines what the dpxn shall be (405 a 3 eVofteVoos rovroir). This is clear from 
the parallel case of those who explained the soul as cognitive. Quite apart 
from this, the passage cited from Metaph. 984 b i sqq. seems conclusive as 
against such a recognition of the moving principle, at any rate by the earlier 
Ionian philosophers, who nevertheless are subsequently adduced as considering 
soul from the side of motivity, e.g. Thales, Diogenes, Heraclitus. By rS>v TTP&TGW 
we are to understand the first causes (aLrta) or principles (dpxai) or elements 
(<rrot^ia) which the philosophers in question assumed, and these, as we have 
seen above, were generally what A. calls material causes, e.g. the atoms are r 
irp>ra of Democritus, cf. Meteor. I. I. 338 a 2O ra Trpcora atria rrjs <jbv<T6>s-, 
Phys. VIII. 9, 265 b 27 r>v 5' cStXXow (sc. KW^crecov) ovd^piav VTrap^eiv rots Trp&Tois 
d\\a rols < rovrcov oiovrai^ Metaph. 982 a 26 eTricrrjjfj.aL at pd\tcrra rS>v irpar&v 
elorivy AnaL Post. I. 2, 72 a 6 ravro yap \4yco Trp&rov KOI dpxhv, Top. IV. t, 
121 b 9 77 T yap dpxn irp&TOv /cat ro rrpeoTOV dpxfy Met&ph. 1013 a 2 drro TOTJ 
irpo>TOv /cat TTJS rov irpdyp-aros dpx^s. Lastly, as to re -yap, it IS probable that this 
should be added to the passages in A. where re yap=etenim. See Shilleto 
Dem. De Falsa Leg. 176. 2nd. Ar. 7 50 a 13 relinquuntur certe loci quidam, 
in quibus coniunctis particulis re yap non aliam apparet vim inesse quam 
simplici ydp vel *al yap veluti Pol. 1333 a 2, 1318 b 32 sqq., Post. AnaL I. 9, 
75 b 41, De Part. An. ill. i, 66 1 b 28. Cf. Bz. Ztschr. J. bst. Gym. 1867, 
pp. 672 682. 

a 5. o0ev. This must go back to a 3 7ro/j,va>$ tie TOVTOLS. The general 

I. 2 405 a 4 a 9 227 

agreement between the choice of dpxol and the explanation of soul applies 
particularly in the case of fire. In Metaph. A., c. 8, Aristotle is criticising those 
who assumed a single material principle, corporeal and extended, 988 b 22 60-01 


peyeQos e^ova-av. He remarks that the transformation of the an-Xa cra>/zara may 
be regarded as the effect either of o-vyKpio~is or of fod/eptcrw. The former view 
requires in strict consistency that fire as being fUKpopepecrraTov and 
should be taken for the primary element, 988 b 32 ra fteV yap [sc. r&v 
crco/idrcoj'] or>yKpicrei, ra de Sia/eptcret e d\\T)\Q)v ytyverai^ TOVTO 8e Trpos- TO 

LVCLL Kal TJQ~TpOV dlCL<pepL 1T\L(TTOV. Tfl fJLCV yap CLV d6^L OrTOl^LG>beCrTaTOV e 

el- ov ylyvovrat, o~uyKpicrL 7rpo>rou, TOLOVTOV Se TO p.iKpOfj.pO-TaTOv Kal 
ov av elrj T>V traj/xdrcoi'. diorrep OCTOL vrvp dpx*]v TtQeacri fj.dXi.o-Ta OfJioXoyov- 
av ra> \6y<p TOVTO> Xeyotev. irvp elvai, int. TTJV i/x-u^i/. 

a 6 \ < n p TO|j(,pe<rTaT6v T Kal. ..7 clcrc|jiaTov, int. early. Kai explicative. A. cannot 
mean that fire is incorporeal absolutely or in the strict sense of the term, but 
only that it is so relatively to the other three ciTrXci o-oftara air, water and earth. 
The same meaning must be given to 405 a 7 acroyiaroi/, 405 b 12 do-a>/idTO and 
409 b 2 1 TO acreo^tarcoT-aroi/ TO>V aXXcoi/. Cf. Philop. 83, 27 a.<ra>p.arov B CLITG TO irvp, 
ov Kvpicos ao-a>]j.aTov (ovftfls yap avT&v TOVTO eXey\ dXX 9 a)? ev <rd>pa<riv dcrd>/j.aTOv 

[fOlt. leg. &Z/] 8LCL \TTTOp.pLaV. 

a 7. $ri 84 KLVira TC Kal KIVCI Td aXXa irpwreos. Not only is fire the element 
most suitable for dpxh or material principle, if we put ourselves in the position 
of the early philosophers accepting their presuppositions and the explanation of 
yeveo-is by o-uyKpLo-LS : it further appears (ert) that fire satisfies the condition laid 
down above (403 b 29) KOL /tdXicrra icat 7rpa>Ta>? ^u^^v elvai TO KLVOVV, which, as 
we there saw, under the same presuppositions involved the assumption T&V 
KtvovjjiVG)v TL Trjv ^vx^ v clvcu. For Trp&Taj$ see on 403 b 29. 

a 8. -yXa<t>vpo>rlpci)s. The term implies praise (Philop. 84, 9). It is used of 
Charondas PoL I274b 8 'X.apoavdaf TTJ anpifteiq T>V vojjwyi' earl y\a<pvpd>Tpos K.OL 
T>V vvv vofjiodeT&v, and the Cretan constitution is said to be " less neatly finished " 
than that of Sparta 1271 b 21 rj-rrov y\a(pvp>s x*h f r which cf. 1271 b 24 TJTTOV 
^iiyp^pcorat ; De Part. A.n. II. 4. 650 b 18 o~vp./3aivi " /td y KCL\ yXa<jvp<orcpav 
X lv T7 7 V Stdvotav ro>v rotoijTQjv, in certain animals intelligence attains a more 
finished perfection. A. was fully alive to the relative superiority of Democritus 
so far as purely physical explanations are concerned. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 
315 a 34 b i, 316 a 5 sqq., 325 a 28. In Zeller's words "he explained all 
phenomena in a strictly scientific manner from the same principles." Cf. 
DyrorT, op. tit., p. 79, pp. 116 122. 

a 9. 8id T TOVTCOV cKoVepov, int. <rvfj.fS@r}Kv (as in 41 3 b 10) : why the soul 
(i) is XeTrro^epeo-rarov and (2) KiveiTal T /cm mvel. The common view that the 
power to impart motion implies mobility (cf. 403 b 29) was shared by the 
Atomists (404 a 7 9), so that these two attributes need not be separated : 
but the fineness of the texture or structure of a body has a limit in the 
indivisibility of the atoms of which it is composed. This I take to be the 
point of the words a 10, TOVTO d'...<rcoyudTcDv. Having thus proved (i) A. goes 
on to prove (2), a 10 13 KLVTJTIKOV d...irvp. The Greek commentators were 
divided. Simpl. (31, 8 sqq.) apparently took TQVTCOV to mean rou yv&pio-rtKov Kal 
rov KivrjTtKov, a view adopted by Zeller, Phil, der Grieck. I. 5 p. 902, n. 4. When 
we find below (405 a 17) that A. himself uses a/z,$<a and adds an explanation TO 
re yiv&o-Keiv Kal TO KLvelv, it is natural to explain KaTpov here in the same way, 
viz., cognition and motivity. But the plain sense of a 9 13 excludes this 
explanation, nothing being there said of cognition, while both the motive and 


228 NOTES i. 2 

mobile qualities of fire and of the soul are there attributed to the minuteness 
and the spherical shape of the atoms of which they are composed. On the 
other hand Them. (13, n sqq. H., 23, 20 sqq. Sp.) and Philop. (84, 10 sqq.) under- 
stand Ko.Tpov to mean simply (i) TO K.IVSIV and (2) TO Kiveio-Qat : and the proof 
of these attributes is certainly contained in a 9 13. The words of Them, are 
&rjfj.. Kdrpov...e8eLKWy TO p,v KLVflv Sio, rrjv o-piKpofjiepeiav, TO 5e Kivelo-Qai 8ca TO 
o-XWa-' &\*><$& yap o'lcTat v<rrapx*w TOIP a-(f>aipoi$4o-tv aTopois. But the superiority 
of Atomism over other physical theories is that it can explain both facts : the 
finest atoms account for the fineness of a material structure, spherical atoms for 
mobility and therefore for motive power. 

a 10. TO-UTO 8* tvat...o-o>|jLa.Ta)v. The neuter TOVTO seems influenced by the 
preceding TOVTO. Cf. 430 a 23, where the change from masculine to neuter is due 
to ro0* o-rrep eo~rL To insert the preposition ex after elvai with some MSS. 
would, as Torstrik explains, not so well accord with the view expounded 404 a 
IQ 16 : nam id quod constat ex elementis, quodammodo diversum est ab iis : 
elementa enim plura, hoc unum est. At Democritus animam esse voluit potius 
ipsa rudia elementa nullo unitatis vinculo comprehensa. The atoms are now 
designated cr^ara^ above (404 a 2, 7) they were called "shapes" or "figures," and 
below (406 b 20 sq.) they are called " indivisible spheres." 

a ii. \errro|jL6pLav. If this is the genuine reading, we may trace a con- 
nexion with the view of Democritus as reported by Theophrastus De Setisibus 
75 (Diels Doxogr. 521, 24), probably in reference to the fusing of metals, that 
things which are red hot are not so hot as those at a white heat (Qeppbv yhp TO 
X*7rroV), the rapid motion of the finest particles thus generating both white 
colour and intense heat. Philop. 84, 21 85, 16 conjectures that in making 
spherical atoms fu/cpo/zepeo-raras Dem. was guided by the geometrical pro- 
position that of all solids with equal surface the sphere encloses the greatest 

a 12. TOVOVTOV, i.q. cr^cupoeioVs. Cf. 404 a 2, 6. 

a 14. irporepov, viz. 404 b I 6, where see notes. XP*n TCU &' dp,<f>otv <os fu$ 

<j>tfo-i, : a^olv refers to ^xn anc * vove, which according to 404 b i 3 Anaxagoras 
sometimes distinguished, sometimes confused. Here A. virtually admits that 
Anaxagoras treated them as identical, as two different terms for one and the 
same objective entity. The word <pvo~i$ in A. sometimes denotes vaguely an 
entity or thing, e.g. Metaph. 1052 b 12 Trpay^d ri KCU <f>vcris> It is used of a 
faculty in the soul, Eth. Nic. 1102 b 13 aXXj? n$ Averts TTJS ^vxns aXoyos-, of 
A.'s causes, especially the material cause, 983 b 13, 17, 988 b 22, and the final 
cause 988 b 12, of the category of relation 1089 b 7, 1089 a 13, even of Not-being 
itself 1089 a 19 TavTijv rr}v <pvcriv Xeya ro oti/c ov. Sometimes it is almost peri- 
phrastically joined with a genitive, e,g. infr. 405 b 7 rr\v TOV at/xaros <jbw<rti/, the 
entity which is blood, 416 a 9 fj TOV irvpos Averts-. There is a close parallel to 
the language here in Metaph. 985 a 33 ov ^v xPV ra * y* C sc - Enipedocles] 
rerrapa-iVj aXX* a>s ftva-lv ov<ri JJLOVOLS, irvpl pev KCL&* avro, rots ' avTtKifjLvotf oas 1 

fJLLO, <f>VOTl : yfj T KO.I KO.I vdaTl. 

a 15, irXtiv dpx^v yc. In his own account of the evolution of the world from 
chaos Anaxagoras uses the term vovs and not ^X*? ( as to Plato Crat. see note 
on 404 b I supr.\ From Metaph. 984 b 20 22 ol /xei/ ovv OVT&S v-iroKapftavovrcs 
...rots OVO-LV it appears that A. regarded this vov? of Anaxagoras as at once 
a final and a moving cause, though at the same time he complains (985 a 
18 20) of the inadequate use which Anaxagoras made of his principle. 

a IS H tt ^ lOPTa iravrav. I take this, with SimpL 31, 18 and Philop. 85, 34, as a 
stronger /*aArra (c e.g. Metaph. 991 a 8, 1001 a 22 and iravrw ifiacrra 1088 a 23), 

I. 2 405 a 9 a 20 229 

just as TravTos /naXXov is an emphatic paXXov, both expressions being- favourites 
with Attic writers, especially Plato. Themistius, however (13, 16 H., 23, 28 sq. 
Sp.)> "i ves a different turn to the sentences, paraphrasing thus : dpxnv fao-i o~xed6v 
re T>V ovTotv cLirdvTtov. It is quite easy to see how he reached this interpretation. 
If vovs is described by Anaxagoras as " divisible and as ' inhabiting some 
things, 5 i.e. all things which have life," clearly it does not so inhabit all things 
whatever. Thus Them, must have conceived dpxn * n the sense of internal 
principle, ewTrdpxov TL or crro^etoi/. It is most improbable, however, that A. 
intended dpxn to bear this sense, it must mean what it means below a 18, what 
in 404 b 2 is expressed by TO OLTLOV TOV KaX&s KOI op6>, and apx*i standing alone, 
as in a 1 8, would be sufficient to indicate this. In any case /laXtcrra should not 
be separated from TrdVrcov, as if the former word went with rLBcrai in the sense 
of potissinmm and the latter with dpxn- As to aVoWo)?, the variant of 
codd. S y, the testimony of Them, is of little weight, as he is very fond of 
changing iras of the text into oVa?, as anyone may easily verify for himself. 

a 16 povov yovv*..ij Ka9otp5v, "at all events he asserts that mind and mind 
alone of all things that are is simple, unmixed and pure." Cf. Anax. frag. 
12 D. This long fragment begins thus : TO. yv oXXa Ttavrbs p.olpav /-tercet, 
vovs &e eo-Tiv a.7Tipov Kal avTOKpaTcs Kal fjLfj.eLKTaL ovftevl xphp >arf> ^ aXXa fj.6vos 
avTos e<p* eavTOv eoriv. el JJLY) yap e(f)' eavrov ijvj a\Xa reo) fj,p.iKro aXXop, /zeret^ev 

&V dirCLVTCdV XP r lP' l * Ta>V ) l fJ,fJLlKT6 TCp ' V irCLVTL yap 7TCLVTOS fJLolpd V(TTIV) 

<So~rrp ev rot9 irpocrdev \_fr. 1 1] fiot XfXexrat. /cat av e'/cwXvev CLVTOV ra crv/i- 
/A/ieiy/iVa, Strre prj^evos xP^f JLaTOS Kparelv O/IOICD? cbs 1 K.CLL JJLQVQV eovTa Itfi eavrov* 
ecfTL yap X^TTTorctToi/ re irdvT&v ^pT/^cara)!' KCLL K.a.6 ap&TCLTOv KOL yv&fjLrjv y Trepi 
travrbs irao-av tercet KOL Zcr^uet ^eytcrroi/. KOL o<ra ye ^u^i/ l^et KOL fteifo) /cat 
eXaucra), TrdvTccv vovs Kparei. KCLL TTJS Trtp^op^o'tos 1 rrjs crvfj.Trdo'Tjs vov? 

<SaT 7TplX a >p7J fJ " ai ' T T} V <*PX*i V * /Ca * TTp&TOV CLTrb TOV Q-fUKpOV TJp^CtT 

7rl de irXeov Trepixtope^ ^al Trepi^ospTJo-et eVi TT\QV. KOL rh o-vfjLfju.cry&]JLvd re KOL 
diroKptvofJLcva KOL ^ irdvTa eyvco j/ow. KCLL OTrota JJL\\V za-ecrQai /cat 
OTroTa ^v, acrcra vvv pr) e<m KCU OTrota ecrrt, iravra Ste:dcr/i7?cre vovs, Kal TTJV 
'7TpLx^p^o~Lv TavTTjv, 7]v vvv Trept^cope'et ra T a<rrpa /cat o rj\ios KCU fj 
KOL 6 drjp KOL 6 aldrjp ol aTTOKpi.v6fj.evoL. rj ds TrepLx^prfO-is avn) c-zrofyo-ev 
KpLvO-0ai* /cat aTTOKpivercu diro re TOV dpaiov TO TTVKVOV Kal CLTTQ TOV TJsvxpov TO 
pbv /cat aTrb TOV fo^epov TO \ap.7rpbv /cat airo TOV Siepov TO rjp6v. polpai 
TroXXal 7ro\\>v elfTL. TravTdTraa'i de ovdev diroKpLveTdi ovde Sta/cptVerat erepov 
TOV erepov Tr\rjv vov. vovs Se tras o/zotdy e'crrt /cat o /zetfcov Kat o eXarrcoi/. ercpov 
de ovftev eVrcv op,oi,ov ovdevi, dXX* OTGOV TrXeto-ra eVi, rai/ra cvdrjXoTara ev eKatrrov 
ecTTL /cat tfv. 

To vovs as thus described A. returns infr. b 19, 429 a 18 20, b 22 sqq. and its 
great influence on A.'s own doctrine must be my apology for citing the 
fragment in full. 

a 18. TO T6 yiv<&CTKeiv. Cf. Anax. frag. 12 D /cat ra crvfjLp.Lo~y6fj.evd re Acat 
diroK.pLv6fjLva /cat dLaKpivopeva irdvTa eyv<o vovs^ and supr* /cat yvoap,rjv ye Trepl 
vravTbs 7rao~av tor^ 5 cited in last note. Cf. 429 a 18 20. Kal TO KLVCLV. Anax. 

fr&g. 12 D Kal T7JS TTepLX&pfjCTLOS TTJS O~V p.7T 6.0*1]$ VOVS KpaT7JO-fVy &O~T 7Tfpt^a>p7)crat 

TTJV dpxn v ) and frag. 13 D /cat eVct Typfaro 6 i/ot3ff Kivelv^ CLTTO TOV Kivovpevov 
iravTOS aTre/cptVero, /cat oa-ov eKLvrjcrev 6 vovs, irav TOVTO $LeKpi&rj* KIVOV/JLZVCOV de Kal 
diaKpivofJ,va>v r) Trept^tDpTycrtS' TroXX^ pdX\ov liroiei dta/cptWcr^at. 

a 19. 0oXtfs. Cf. 41 1 a 8, Metaph. 983 b 20 sqq., 984 a 2. 

a 20. T&V XCOov, sc. TOV fjidyvrjTCL, the Magnesian stone, the magnet or lode- 
stone, so called from the town (probably the Lydian, though according to Pliny 
the Thessalian, Magnesia). Cf. Plat. Ion 533 D cSo-Trep ev rjj \L6^ 

230 NOTES I. 2 

MayvrjTLv uvofjiaa-ev, ol &e TroXXm e Hpa*XeiW. KCU yap OVTIJ T\ \L6os ov p,6vov 
TOVS daKTvXiovs ayet TOVS (ridrjpovs, a\\a KCU bvvap.iv evrlQ-rja-i rots- daKTV- 
Xt'ois, GXTT av $vvao*6ai TO.VTOV TOVTO Troieiv, oTrep rj Xido?, a\\ovs ayew $aKTv\iovs, 
<5>crr* vloT opiia&bs paKpos irdvv (riSrjpitov Kal daKTv\i<cv If* dXX^Xcov fjpTrjTat. 
Cf. Lucr. VI. 908 sq. 

quern Magneta vocant patrio de nomine Grai, 
Magnetum quia fit patriis in finibus ortus, 

where see Munro's note. Diog. Laert. I. 24 "Apio-roreX^s 1 de Kal 'iTTTrias <pacrlv 
[Thales] Kal rois a-ijsvxois peradidovaL ^Isvxfa re/c/xaip6ftei/oi/ CK rrjs Xtdou TTJS 

s Kal rov r)\KTpov. 

a 21. Aio-y^vT|s, i.e. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diog. Laert. IX. 57) : a town in Crete 
according to Steph. By2. 106, 13, although Aelian V. H. II. 31 referred him to the 
Phrygian Apollonia. He is ridiculed in the Clouds of Aristophanes, 227 sqq. 
(cf. Diels in Rkein. Mus. XLII. 12 sqq.), wrote a Hepl 0uo-<rcos ? from which Simpl. 
quotes (In Physica 151, 28 sqq., 153, 17, 20), and is criticised by Theophr. 
De SensibuS) 39 45 (Doxogr. Gr. p. 510 sqq.)- See further concerning him 
Siebeck, Gesch. der Psych. I. 82 sqq., 115 sqq., 132 sqq., 150, Burnet, Early 
Greek Phuosojbhers^ p. 359 sqq., Gomperz, Greek Thinkers^ Bk ill. ch. 3, 
p. 370 sqq., Eng. Tr. The latter regards him as an eclectic influenced by 
Leucippus arid Anaxagoras (Simpl. In Phys. 25. 3) in spite of his antagonistic 
attitude to the main principles of their systems. Cf. Simpl. In Phys. 152, 18 
\_frag. 4 D] avSpoairot, yap KOL ra a\\a f5oc av airviovra a)L r depi. /cat roOro 
alrols KOI ^vxn ^^ Tl - K ^u vorj(ri,$, and Simpl. Phys, I. 152, 22 \_frag. 5 D] KO.I pot, 


travras teal K.vftpvacr6ai Kal TTCLVT&V Kpareiv avro yap pot TOVTO 6eos doKel ivai Kal 
ITT\ irav d<plx&ai Kal iravra diaridevai, Kal ev iravT\ eveivai. Kal e<mv ovde ev 3 TL p.rj 

}LTeXl TOVTOV. /X67*^et C Ovfie Iv OfJLOLCDS T^ TpOV TO) Tp<p, aXXflt TToXXot TpOTTOl 

Kal avrov TOV aepos Kal Trjs vorjcrtos elcriv. <TTL yap 7ro\vrpO7ros Kal 0pfjLOTpos Kal 
TJsvxporepos: Kal rjp6Tpo$ Kal -vyporepos Kal <rrao r tftcorepos' Kal o-vTpr)v KIVTJCTIV e^cor, 
Kal a\\at TroXXal crfpoioxrtes 1 fveicrt, Kal rjBovrjs Kal xpoirjs aircipot, /c.r.X. See also 
Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition. 

a 21. trepot rives. Cf. Aetii Plac, IV. 3. 2 \Doxogr. Gr. 387 b lo] * kvagipevrj? 
'Avajayopaff "Ap^eXaoP Aioyevrjf ap<br) [int. TYJV ^u^v a7T<f>rjvavTo~\, Theodoret 
Graec. off. Cur. V. 18 9 Avatfj.6vr)$ de Kal *Avaifj,av8pos KOL *A.vaay6pas KOI 'Ap^Xaoff 
apa)8r) TTJS i/ru^Tjr TTJV (pva-iv elprfKoa-iv. Aetii Plac. I. 3, 4 [Anaximenes frag. 2 D 
Doxogr. Gr. 278 a 12, b 8] olov f) ^x^j ^crLv^ f) ^/u-erepa a'^p o^cra (rvy/cparct 
ypa?. In PL Pkaedo 96 B the views irorepov TO alpd ecrrw < cfrpovovuevj fj 
o d-iip, 77 ro Trvp y are mentioned side by side as familiar to Socrates when engaged 
in the study of nature. A. is reticent about Anaximenes, who, however, is 
credited with this view by later authorities, cf. Tertull. De Anima c. 9 
(secundum quosdam), Macrob. Somn. Scifiion. I. 14, 20. 

a 23. YLVMOICCI.V re Kal Ktvtfv T^V ^Ax i 1 v - That to Diogenes knowledge included 
all forms of sense-perception is clear from the last words of frag. 5 o/xcos- de iravTa 
Tip avTai Kal fj Kal opa Kal aKOvei Kal Tr)v a\\r)v vorjcriv ex t <^ 7r ^ r O.VTOV irdvTa. 
The evidence for Kiveiv is not so obvious from the scanty fragments extant, but at 
the beginning of frag. 5 the functions of governing and controlling ink TOUTOV 
irdvTas Kvj3pvd(r0ai Kal TTOVTW KpaTelv appear to be transferred to air from the 
vovs of Anaxagoras. This would suffice for Aristotle, who has argued above (404 a 
25 sqq.) that the Anaxagorean vovs is KLVTJTIKOS (cf. 404 b 8). The following 
sentence (a 23 5)17 fj.ev trpa>Tov...Kivr)Ti,KQv ctvai reads like an inference drawn 
by A. himself in his constant endeavour to interpret more precisely the vague 
theories of his predecessors. Cf. 404 b I ^TTOV diao-afal and the notorious 

I. 2 405 a 20 a 30 23 1 

reconstructions of the Empedoclean and Anaxagorean teaching, Metaph. 993 a 
15 24, 989 a 30 b 21. 

a 26. el'irep : cf. the similar clause about Thales a 20. In both cases the 
sentence with eiVep gives the ground of an inference drawn by A. rnv dvafto- 
|icurLv. Probably a term first used by Heraclitus : at any rate the verb occurs 
in frag. 42 Byw., 12 D=Arius Did. (ap. Euseb. in Diels, Doxographi^ 471, 
I sqq.) Zrjvtov rr)v ^nj^v Xeyet al<r@7)TiKT)v dvciGvjjLLacrLV, KaBdirep 'Hpa/cXewoy 
jSovXd/AO/os 1 yap ffjL^avLcrai^ OTL al 'V/fu^at dvaQvfud>fLvai voepal del yLvovrat^ ciKacrev 
avTas TOLS ^rora/iolp Xeywv OVTO>?* iroTapoia-i TOLCTLV avTolcrtv p$aivov<riv erepa 
Kal %Tpa v8a.TCL eTTippci' Kal ^i^at $ a7ro T&v vyp&v dvaQvfjiLcovTai. dvaBvp.Lao'LV 
fjiev ovv Ofjioicos Tip t ~RpaK\LTCd rr\v ^v^v d-Trcxpalvci Zrjv&v. Hence By water 
concludes : est igitur hoc dictum Zenoni tribuendum, scilicet Heraclitea verba 
libere citanti inque suum usum accommodanti. Thus, according to Heraclitus, 
the soul is vapour or heat rising from moisture (Auch die Seelen diinsten aus 
dem Feuchten hervor, D). As to the grammatical construction, supply from the 
preceding clause elvai fao-i ^xn v - If? according to Heraclitus, all other things 
are derived from vapour, vapour is his dpxn '- if this vapour be identified with 
soul, then his dpxn is sou l : which is the same thing as saying that the soul is 
his apxn* <rvv(<rnr]o-LV, " constructs," i.e. represents as constructed. Cf. supr. 
404 b 17 Trotet. Heraclitus also called his dpxrj "fire," which he does not seem 
to have clearly distinguished from dry air or heat (Latin vapor}. Compare 
the well-known dictum avrj fyvxn cro<o>rarJ7, frag. 74 Byw., n8D* 

a 27. <Jur|iaT<ii$TaTov, as above 405 a 7, relatively incorporeal or least 
corporeal. T& 8^ Kivovpepov Ktvovp^v<a yw<6<rKcr9a,i. A special application of 
the maxim 404 b 17 yLvd>o-Ke(r6at r<5 6/zo/<p TO opoLov: if the object known be 
in motion, then the soul by which it is known must also be in motion, 

f)OV CLL. 

a 28. tv Kiv^crei 8' etvcu TO, ovra. For this doctrine cf. Plato, Crat. 402 A 
\eyei TTOV 'HpafcXciros-, or* irdvra X&P^ Ka ^ ovBev fJLevei, /cat Trorapov pofj airLK.aa>v 
ra oi/ra Xeyet, a>? dls e'ff rbv OVTQV Trorapov OVK av epfSairj?. Also Theaet. l8oD, 

where the doctrine ort Trdvra Kivelrai is ascribed to the later Heracliteans, 
facetiously styled "philosophers in flux" (revs peovras), ib. 181 A. 

a 29. Toti-rots, i.e. Thales, Diogenes of Apollonia, Heraclitus. 

a 29. *AXKp,ttv of Croton : physician of the 5th century, of whom we learn 
some interesting particulars, e.g. that he regarded the brain as the seat of 
sensation, Theophr. de Sensibus 26 (Doxogr. Gr. 507), Plut. Plac. IV. 17 
(Diels, Doxogr. Gr. 407, 2). But he distinguished between sense-perception and 
intelligence, the latter being, according to him, peculiar to man. av8pa>irov yap 

[<jfej7<r!] T>V a\\a>v dcafapetv ori JJLQVOV ^vvirfO't^ TO. 5* aXXa alarQdverat p>v, ov vvirj<rt, 
de (Doxogr. Gr. 506, 26). See Beare, op, cit. p. 251. It is probably Alcmaeon's 
view which is cited in some detail in Pkaedo 96 B $ rourov p.*v ouScV, 6 ' 
eyic<jE)aXd$- etmv 6 ras al<r6j]<Ti$ Trapcx&v TOV aKoveiv /cm opav K.CU 6(r(j>paivar0a^ e< 
TOVT&V &e yiyvoiro pvr)fJLTj Kal Sofa, e< de fjLvrffjirjs Kal 86rjs, Xaftovcnjs TO r)pfp,Lv t Kara 
ravra yLyv<r0ai eVtcrr^/zTjv. The speech of Eryximachus in PL Symp. i86B sqq. 
seems to owe not a little to Alcmaeon. 

a 30. dOdvarov etvai. This tenet is attributed to Alcmaeon by Boethus, 
apud Euseb., Praep. Ev. XI. 28. 5, Diog. Laert. vin. 83, Stobaeus Eel. i. 49 
\Doxogr. Gr. 386 b 4 sqq.] : cf. Theodoret Graec. off. Cur. v. 17 \Doxogr. Gr. 
386 t b 6], On the other hand Alcmaeon held, according to Arist. ProbL 
xvil. 3, 916 a 33, that men are nevertheless perishable beings (dflroXXvo-^ot) 
because they cannot join their beginning to their end (OTL ov SvvavTat, TTJV 
dpxn v r< P T\L 7rpoa-d\^at). This means, according to Gomperz, that " if old age 



were not merely figuratively but literally a second childhood, men (and animals) 
would be able to live for ever, since a cycle would be created which could be 
constantly renewed. But the series of changes suffered at the various periods 
of human (and animal) life follow a progressive and not a cyclical line" (Greek 
Thinker^ Eng. Tr. I. p. 151). 

405 b I. TOV oupavov oXov. This term originally meant the firmament, 
but was naturally employed by philosophers for the world or universe (like 
fcdo-fioy). In certain passages it is matter of doubt in which of these ways it 
should be interpreted, e.g. Metaph. 986 b 24 els TOV o\ov ovpavov aTrojSXe'i/raff TO li/ 
elvcLi <j)r]o-i, rov 6c6i> (sc. &vo<pdvr)s). Cf. the Epicurean criticism in Cic. De Nat. 
Deor. I. n. 27 Crotoniates autem Alcmaeon, qui soli et lunae reliquisque 
sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortahbus rebus 
immortalitatern dare; Clem. Alex. Protrept. 66. 58 P. 6 yap TOI KporaWr^ff 
/ Seovs <pero TOVS do~Tepas elvai ejj.-ijsvx.ovs ovray. 

b i. rcov 8fc <j>opTiKWTpcov icol vSttp TtvU cwr<|M]vavTo, int. rfjv -^vx^v. The term 
$>opTtKos is found in Eth. Nic. as the opposite of 7re7raidvp.vos and ^a/nets, an d 
means approximately " vulgar." As applied intellectually, it serves to censure 
crude thinking or incapacity to seize distinctions. Thus in P/iys. i. 2, 185 a 10, 
3, 1 86 a 8 the theory or reasoning (Xdyos-) of Melissus is called <f>opTiK.6$, while 
in Metaph. 986 b 27 Melissus himself and Xenophanes are termed dypoiKorepoi 
as opposed to Parmenides who is p,a\\ov jSXeVcoj/. In Metaph. 1001 b 14 the 
subtler Eleatic Zeno is said <f>opTLK>s Qeapetv. Again, in De Part. Anim. n. 7, 
652 b 8 those who identify the soul with fire are censured as making a crude 
assumption (fpopTiK&s n64vTs\ as is Hippon here. 

b 2. Ka6oLirp "Iinrwv. The fuller form of the name 'l-mro^va.^ is preserved 
Aet. Plac. v. 7. 3 (Doxogr. Gr. 419 a 24) : cf. Anonymi Londin. Ex Arist. latr. 
Menon. eclogae, 1 1, 22 sqq. ' / l7T7r<ooi/> [or e l7r7r(ooz/af)] de 6 KporccvLdnjs oierm <rV 
rjfjiiv OIK.GLCLV ctvat vyporrjTa^ Ka.6* rjv /cat alaO avowed a K.OLL rj fcojusi/ * orav JJLCV ovv oLKeicos 
exfl rj TOiavTr) vypOTys, vyiaivei TO f<5ov, orav de ava^rjpavOfi, dvaicr6r)TL de TO >ov KOL 
aTro^vTJorAcet. dta ^17 TOVTO ol yepovTf f^poi KOI dvaicrBrjToij QTL ^oopi? vypdrrjTOS' 
dvaXoyas de TO, TrAfcara dvaio-Qj)TCL^ OTL afjioipa vypoTTjTOs. KOI rara p.ev aXP L 
TOVTOV (prjcriv. ev aXXa) de /3t/3Xiop auro? dvrjp Xcyet rrjv Ka.TGOvofjLaa'fj.evTjv vyporijTa 
/^erajSaXXeti/ 5t' V7rp(3o\r)v 6pp.6T7]Tos KOL t' V7Tp(3o\rjv \jsvxp6rr)Tos /cat OVT a>$ vocro vs 

7TL(ppLVj fJLTapd\\lV f (frr}O~lV dVTTJV YJ CTTt TO 7T\loV VypOV 7) C7T TO r)pQTpQV T) 

ir\ TO 7raxvp>*peo-Tpov rj eVt ro XCTTTO p,pO~Tpov rj i$ erepa, KCLL TO CLLTLOV OVT<X>$ 
vocroXoycl, TO,? de votrovs ra? ywoptvas ovx vrrayopevei. This important fragment 
shows that Hippon, like Diogenes of Apollonia, Alcmaeon and Philolaus, was a 
physician as well as a philosopher, and, like Diogenes of Apollonia, an eclectic 
adapting one of the older Ionian theories (this time that of Thales) to the 
newer speculations introduced by Parmenides. From Schol. Ven. ad Aristoph. 
Nub. 96 sqq. we learn that Hippon had been ridiculed in the Havo-n-Tai of 
Cratinus before Aristophanes brought out the Clouds^ so that he must have 
lived in the age of Pericles, and that Cratinus attacked him for his impiety (Schol. 
Clem. Protrept. i. 422, 23 sq. Dind., IV. 103 Klotz), and the epithet fitieos seems to 
have stuck to him (Philop. adhunc loc. 88, 23, Simpl. in Phys. 23, 22, Clem. Alex. 
Protrept. 24, p. 20 P., loann. Diac., Alleg. in Hes. Theog. 116). In Metapk. 
984 a 3 A. passes him over scornfully with a sneer at the tenuity of his intellect. 
A better summary is furnished by Hippolytus, Refut. haeres. I. 16 [Doxogr. 
Gr. 566] "I. de 6 t Pr)yivos apxas e^ty "^\JXP OV T0 VS&P *<" Ofpfibv TO Trvp. yevofievov 
Be TO Trvp V-JTO vS&To? KoraviKrjo'aL TJ]V TOV yevvfjaravTos dvvafj.ii/ o~vo'T7Jo'ai re TOV 
/cocr/xov, rr\v de ^v^v ey*<t>aXov \eyei, TTOTC 8e vdup* KOL yap TO eryreppa clvm, 
<K.a.TO>- ro <f)aivdp.evov rj^Vj 1% vypov, el- o$ <f>rjcrl \jsvxrjv yiv<r6ai. Croton is 

I. 2 405 a 30 b g 233 

more likely to have been his birthplace than either Rhegium or Metapontum 
(Censorinus). According to Aristoxenus apud Censorinum, De die natali^ c. 5, 
and lamblichus V. Pyth. 267, it was Samos. 

b 3. ircurGijvcu 8* 4oicacri.v IK mffs -y^s- A. makes much the same remark 
about Thales, Metaph. 983 b 26. 

b 4. Tois at|ia <f>da-Kovras ri^v *I'ux i i v - Doubtless with special reference to 
Empedocles, frag. 105 D, 317 K alpa yap av6pv>7rois TrepiKapdiov <m vorjpa. 
Hippon's polemic against Empedocles recalls Diogenes of Apollonia's correction 
of Anaxagoras,y?v7-. 5 D. 

b 5* Tavnrjv, SC. rrjv yovfjv. 

b 6. Kpi-rias, the famous Athenian oligarch, leader of the Thirty. There 
seems no reason to question his identity, in spite of the opposite opinion cited 
as Alexander's by Phllop. 89, 8 KpirLav etre rbv eva royv rpia/coi'ra, os Jcat 
Soxparovs rjKpoaararo^ rj /cat aXXoi/ TLVCL Xey, ovdev biafapopeQa. tpaarl de /cat 
aXXov 1&,piriav ytyovevai o-ofaorfjv, ov KOI TO. <f>ep6p,eva cruyypa/^ara elvai, o>? 
*A.\eavdpo$ \eyei' rbv yap TO>V TpiaKOvra fjuyde yeypa<pvai aXXo rt 7r\rjv HoXireias 
*p.p.Tpov$. Philoponus in the introduction to his commentary had previously 
referred to Critias as follows : 9, 3 K.a66\ov de r-ffv -^rvxnv ol fteV <pa<riv do-aparov 
eivaiy ol de crapa.' KOL rS>v crco/xa ol p.v &ir\ovv, ol de crvv&eTov K.CLL TO>V arvvderov ol 

fJLV 6AC O"VVrjp.^LVf>V (TOO [JLCLTCCV , OL a<rWCL7rTGtV . ,.. 9j 1 9 ^ ^^ ^ K Q"UV JJ fAJJLV CDV ^ GJff 

Kpir/a?, 6 cis r)v TpiCLKOVTo.' alfia yap tfXeyev elvai rrjv ^v^rjv^ * e alpa yap," (J^r/trw, 
^ c avQp&irois irepiKCLpdiov ecm v6ijfj.a." The blunder in the citation of this verse of 
Empedocles as if Critias were the author is attributed to Philoponus himself by 
Diels, Doxogr* Gr. 214. 

b 7- Toi)TO 8', int. TO alcrBaveaQai. virdpxctv, int. rfj ^VXTJ* 810, nqv TOV 
at'(j.aTos <J>V<TLV. See on 405 a 14 &s pia <pv<rei.. Here <pv<ris is virtually ova-la. 
The parts without blood, e.g. bones and hair, are destitute of sensation, as 
Aristotle points out 410 a 30 sqq. 

b 8. irdvTtt -yo-p.-.TrXiiv TTJS Yrfs "have secured the vote of at least one 
adjudicator. 3 ' The metaphor, of which A. is fond (cf. Metapk. 989 a 6 sqq., 
Pol. 1337 a 42), comes from the method of awarding the prize in dramatic 
contests. Similarly in Metaph. loc. cit A. remarks that fire, water and air have 
each been selected by one philosopher or another as the material principle of 
things : rS>v de Tpi&v eKacrrov (rrot^ci^v %\rj<j>e Kpirfjv Twa' ol pey yap [sc. r>v 
ev Xcydvroi/] Tvp, ol d* vdcop, ol S* depa TOVT* eivai (j)ao~tv. KCILTOL dt,a T'L Tror* ov 
KCU TTJV yrjv \eyovo~iv, eoo~7rep ol TroXXot TO>V dv^po^iroov ; 

b 9. Ta^TTjv, int. rr)v yrjv. irX-^v \I TIS avr^v. ..IO TJ ircxyra. avrfiv i.e. TTJV ^vxrjv- 
Empedocles includes earth amongst the four elements of soul (404 b 13). For 
the difference between oe iravT&v elvat T>V crroixfi&v and iravra (elvat. TO. 
o-Tot^eta) cf. 404 b 12 elvai e nal eKaorov ^TI/^IJJ/ rovrav and Torstrik's remark 
cited in note on 405 a 10. The same distinction seems intended by Philoponus 
in the classification of theories given 9, 3 sqq. (cited in note on 405 b 6), 
where he divides those who made the soul crvvQerov into ot fj.ev CK. o-vvrjfjLfjLeva^v 
<T<>p.a.Ta>v > e.g. Critias, and ol de <c|> a<rvvdirTa>v, e.g. Leucippus and 
Democritus. Cf. Philop. 9, 16 sqq. 

4OS b 1 1 3O. Recapitulating, we may reduce all previous views to 
three heads, according as motion, perception or incorporeality is taken for the 
characteristic of soul. Further, the agreement pointed out between the account 
of the soul given by the several philosophers and their theory of the universe is 
confirmed with modifications in detail. When the soul is defined by perception 
and knowledge, this agreement rests on the assumption that like is known by 
like ( 20, 21, 23). But here Anaxagoras is an exception, for his principle, intel- 

234 NOTES I. 2 

ligence, is affirmed to be impossible, and to have nothing in common with 
the other elements of the universe ( 22). 

b II opitovrai 8...Tpt<rlv ws ttreiv...i2 TO dcra>fi,aT<p. In spite of its position I 
take a)? d-rceiv with Travres. A. goes to great lengths with hyperbaton, and 
irdvres is again separated from cos ei7r*iz/ by three words, 408 a I. It would 
indeed be possible to take obs- d-ireiv with Tpio-Lv. So Philop. 90, 20 sqq. Of, 
crxedbv dvo, 403 b 28. But A.'s fondness for constructions of the type iravr^s^ 
ol fMv...ol de... makes the former view more probable. In any case it comes 
to this, that, since no definition falls outside of the three characteristics (cf. 
Metaph. 988 a 20 23, 993 a n 15), all are based upon one or more of 
them. To 6pLovTcu, corresponds the use of opos in 404 a 9. This triple division 
is repeated 409 b 19 sqq., and seems there to be finally adopted as more precise 
than the twofold division at the opening of the chapter 403 b 25 sqq. The 
present statement must be carefully compared with both the passages referred 
to, to avoid misconception of the meaning. In 409 b 20 we have, not Kivrjcrei, 

but OL fJLV TO KLVrjriK&TOTOV (SC. TTJV ^l/X^v) a7T<pr)V CIVTO r<J> KLVelv <faUTO, which 

combines both TO KIVOVV and T&V Ktvovfj,va>v TL of 403 b 29 sqq. Instead of 
alo-Qfjcret, we have in 409 b 23 (Aeycrai) TO CK. T&V oroi^eta)!/ avryv slvai which 
agrees exactly with the inference given 404 b 8 sq. o<roi & cirl TO yiv&o-Ketv 
KOI TO alo~BdvfrOai T>V OVT&VJ O&TOL de \eyovo~i rr\v "^V^T/I* TCLS dp%ds [whether 
these dpxal be many or only a single one]...<or7rep 'E/ZTT edoKXrj? JLLCV tc T>V 
(TToixeL^v -rrdvTtov. Finally, ro> dorw/xaro), which at first sight would apply only 
to the theories of Plato and Xenocrates, who made the soul immaterial like 
their immaterial dpxoi (cf. 404 b 29 405 a 4), is proved to bear the elastic 
and relative meaning pointed out in the notes on 405 a 6 and 405 a 27, 
for in 409 b 20 sqq. the corresponding theory is thus stated, ol dc cr&fia TO 
\f7TTOfjiepeo~TaTov rj TO aerfi>jaard>raroi> T>V #AA6>i> (int. TTJV tyvxfiv direfpr/vavTo)^ 
The classification is accommodated to the general theories of TO. ovra and 
their ap^al held by A.'s predecessors and reviewed in Metaph.) but even so 
the choice of the term dcrw/zarov is unfortunate when we find A. there com- 
plaining that some of these theories have taken no account of do-oo/iara proper 
(e.g. Metaph. 988 b 24, T&V yap o-wpdT&v TO, oro^Za rtBeatrt /j,6vov y T$>V d* 
dtrojLWiroM/ o#, ovTcctv Kctl dcr<o/>tar6)v : cf. also 989 b 29 990 a 8). 

It may be asked, why 7rdvTcs...a>$ etTrelv ? Either this is one of the cautious 
expressions with which A. habitually guards himself when making a sweeping 
statement (cf. 403 b 28 ax^ov vo) : or else he may have in view the theory 
of frppovia, since in one of the two forms to which he reduces it in I., c. 4 that 
theory cannot easily be made to square with any of his three divisions. 
Philop. 9, 2O comments thus: Tavra (hc-irep dvaK<pa\aLa>cri etm roil' flp 
6pLovTai 8e olov Trepiypdfpovo-L KCLL x a P aKrT JP^vcri. TrpOTepov S* TT<I/ Kivfjcrct, 
TTJV '^X'5 V J vvv Trpocredrjice Kal r<5 do-<i)^), o>ff c/c 
K.CU TOVTO dvaKvtyav KCU evpedev. T<p yap VKivriT<p Kal 
TO do~<bp.aTov. d<ra>^tarov ou TO Kvpt&s \4yci vvv 9 aXXa T^ 
The last remark accords better with 409 b 21 than does 
the paraphrase of Themistius (14, 4 H., 25, 6 Sp.), ingenious as the latter 
undoubtedly is : CK dy Trjs Icrropias SfjKov <rrtv, OTI dvo p.ev irpOTiQcvTat, Trepl rfjv 
tyvxyv Qeapciv Kivrjcriv <ai yvfiicrtv, VTrofapovTai de &virep Kal a,K,QVTs eir\ Tpfaov 
erepov ro do-ooftarov ol yap Xf 7rro/iepe<rraroj/ avTqv TLQepcvoi Kal dta TOVTO 
cvKivrjTov &vcLpoiro\clv coLKaon Tavrrjv TIJV tpvo-iv, \eyco de TTJV d<ra)/jtaTov. This 
was evidently suggested by Metaph. 984 a 18 sq., 984 b 8 n, 993 a II 24. 

b 12. TOVTWV S* ^KCUTTOV dva-yereu trpcs rds dpx<is, i.e. we trace the connexion 
with the first principle or principles assumed by the thinker in question. This 

I. 2 405 b ii bis 235 

connexion is most obvious in the theories which start from alcrtirjo-i? and declare 
soul to be ro yvapio-TiKov : 404 b 8 sqq., 404 b 30405 a 7. But A. now 
proceeds to show in detail that it can also be traced in the other theories, so 
far at least as concerns the number and nature of the dpxai assumed (404 
b 30 Ttv$ KOL iroo-aC]. 

b 13. TJ orroixetov f\ IK TWV oTOLxe&ov irotovori, sc. TTJV tyvxyV' The inference 
is presented in this twofold form in order to include Diogenes of Apollonia, 
Heraclitus, and Hippon, who. as we have seen, assuming a single <rroixeiov 
for nature, explained cognition by making the soul consist of this o-rot^Ioi/- 
Anaxagoras (see next note and that on 405 b 19) is reckoned with this group be- 
cause, as was explained 405 a 17, he assigns to his principle Nos both functions, 
TO re yivdxTKeiv KCU TO Kivelv. Empedocles and Critias, on the other hand, 
and, in a very different region, Plato assume a plurality of elements for the 
universe and derive the soul, which is a compound, from these same elements. 

b 14. Xe'vovres, irX-qv cv<5s. The exception is Anaxagoras. He must however 
have been influenced by Heraclitus, who is joined with him by Theophrastus 
De Sensibtts I (Doxogr. Gr. 499, I sqq.) irspl & ala-Gfoeas at fiev TroXXal KOL 
Ka06\ov 86cu 8v* elcriv ' oi fJLev ycip r(5 ofiotcp iroLOvcriv, ol 8e T<5 evavTicp. 
HapjuLvio*7js fjLev /cat 'E/ATre^ojeXTys KOL HXaro)V TO> 6fto/a>, ol 8e irepl *Avaayopav 
KOL 'HpdicXeLTov TO cvavrfy. But aivQrjo-is (and v6rj<ris) regarded as oXXo/GHTiff 
is to these early $i;<rtoXo'yoi (cf. 427 a 26, 416 b 33 sq.) merely a particular 
case of activity and passivity in general, the corporeal ala-BrjTQv acting upon 
the equally corporeal ala-6a.vop.evov or alo-tirjTiKov which in turn 7racrx WTTQ 
rov ironjriKov. Accordingly in his fuller discussion of alcrdyo-Ls (417 a i) A. 
refers us to De Gen. et Corr. I. 7, 323 b i sqq. (see the citation in note 
on 410 a 23) where we find a similar conflict of opinion on the general 
question. A. concludes that two bodies capable of mutual interaction must 
be evavrta in his sense of the term, i.e. members of the same genus, but 
belonging to different species of it, so that something may be said for 
each of the two conflicting views. Cf. De A. 416 b 6 9. In the special 
application to perception and cognition Anaxagoras consistently adhered 
to the first of the two views set forth in De Gen. et Corr. I. 7, Theophr. De 
Sensibits 27 'Avagayopas 8e yiv<r6a.i [int. rfjv aio-drja-Lv] rots evavriois' TO yap 
ofjLoiov airaOts VTTO TOV opoLov. The inconsistency of those who, like Empedocles, 
supported this view as a physical doctrine, but deserted it when they treated 
of sensation and cognition, is urged 410 a 23 sqq. If Anaxagoras was the only 
exception, it would seem that A. did not share the doubt of Theophrastus 
about Democritus, De Sens. 49 : cf. the admission of Theophr. 50 ra yhp 
6p6<f>v\a K.a<rrov yveoptfav. In fact, since to the Atomists all sensory processes 
were physical processes and all the senses modes of touching or physical 
contact (De Sensu 4, 442 a 29), and since, further, all matter was homo- 
geneous, there is no room to doubt that Democritus carried out the principle 
"like is known by like" more consistently than any other of the earlier 

b 15. 4>a<rl Yap...T<? ojioOp. The explicit statement can hardly be substan- 
tiated beyond Empedocles as cited above 404 b 13 15. A. and Theophrastus 
are however right in declaring that some such assumption was made by most 
of the natural philosophers who attempted an explanation of cognition starting 
usually with sense-perception. Theophrastus confesses that it was originally 
not so much a philosophic principle as a maxim or saw derived from observa- 
tion and experience, much like the proverbs: "Birds of a feather," "noscitur 
a sociis," o>? afcl TOV opoiov ayei 6fbs els TOV opotov. Cf. De Sensibus loc. cit* 

236 NOTES I. 2 

(Doxogr. Gr. 499, 4) ro Se TTI&O.VQV eXaftov ol p,ev OTL T>V ahXcw re ra TrXeiora 
rfj 6fj,oLOT7jTL deatpelrai Kal on crv^vrov eVrt Traort rots- <pots- ra o-vyyev?} yz/copifeir, 
ert S* cos- T& /AGP alcr6dvO'6ai rrj atroppoLa ytverat, TO S 7 o/toiov <peperaL Trpos ro 
cfjioiov. The last sentence alludes especially to the theories of sensation put 
forward, amongst others, by Empedocles and Democritus, who supposed particles 
emanating (aTroppoai) from the object perceived, or as Democritus called them 
8eiK\a ( = i&aXa), films, to be brought into contact directly or indirectly with 
the sense-organ (418 b 15, 422 a 15). For A.'s criticism of the maxim as 
presented by Empedocles, see 410 a 27 sqq., also 427 a 26 b 6, 416 a 29 sqq. 
One consequence of such a theory is that all the senses become modes of 
touching. See De Sensu 442 a 29 sqq. 

b 15 iirciSi} -yelp.. .19 iroioSonv. A summary recapitulation which helps to 
explain 404 b 8 II, 405 a 24. When A. has interpreted in his own fashion 
the theories before him, supplying de suo the grounds for some of the con- 
clusions reached, he combines them under this general formula. Cf. Them. 
14, 25 H., 26, 8 Sp. TTjv JJLSV ovv TrapadoQelo-av fjfjLiv icrropiav rrcpl tyvxn s I>\TI\V- 
QaptV) TO. fj,V ols Xeyoucrtv a,Ko\ov6ovvTGs y ret Se oi$ duos avrovs /3ov\<r@ai \eyciv. 

b 16. c-uvicrrdo-tv, as in b 24. Cf. a 26 crvi/tVr^crtv, 404 b 17 TroieT. 

b 19 *Avo|aYopas Si... 21 ^x etv - We return now to 405 b 14 TrXrjv evos. The 
passages from the fragments of Anaxagoras cited in notes on 405 a 16 sq. 
sufficiently explain why vovs is there said to be dTrXoOs-, dfjLiyfa KaQapbs and 
here KQLVOV ovQev olQevl r&v #\\&v e^eiv (repeated 429 b 23 sq.). With regard 
to aTraBri the case is different: the presumption of a verbal citation in 429 b 23 
raised by ooo-Trep <f>r]crlv 'Avagayopas need not extend beyond the words 
immediately preceding Kal wQevl prjBev ex L K i-v6v. It seems best therefore 
to regard diraQr) as A. 7 s own inference. The extant words which most nearly 
approach this idea are frag. 12 D. dXXa p.6vos avros *<* eavrov eo-nv. el ^17 
yap <p* eauToO ^v, aXXd Te^> e/i.e/x.etKTo aXXa>...av Kti>\vev avrov TO. 

&<TT flT/SeVO? XpfjfJLClTOS KpaTctv OflOlCOf (Lff fCttt pQVQV OVTCL <fi* faUToC, but 

words hardly go beyond the meaning of d/uy^y. A. however had convinced 
himself that Anaxagoras regarded vovs as aTraOys, see Phys. vm. 5, 256 b 20 
cVet 5' 6p>p,v rb ea-^aroVy ^ K>ivio~6ai fJLev ftitvarcu, Kivrjarecos & apxyv OVK. ^i, 
^cal o Kivei ftev, VTT* aXXou fie <Cii/iTai>, dXX' OL>^ v<f>* avrov, e#Xoyo', Iva fjirj 
di/ayKoiov ^tTrca/^et', KCU TO rpirov elvcu & KLVCI CLKLVYITOV ov. Btb KCU *A.vaay6pas 
op65)$ Xe'yei, TQV vovv a/Tradr) <f)da'K<nv KOL afjLiyrj eZi/at, 7Ttdf]7Tp 
auTOv TTOLei ccz/at" OUTOJ yap &v fj.6v<of Kivottj aKtvrjros cSr/ KOL Kparoii] dptyrjs 

The meaning of diratifo in A. is fairly uniform = 0/^77 oid? re 
incapable of suffering, that cannot be acted upon or affected. The Anaxa- 
gorean vovs is so unlike all other things that it cannot be affected by them, 
so 408 b 25, 410 a 23, 29, 416 a 32. The definition need not be pressed, cf. 
Metaph. 1019 a 30 diradrj Sc r3>v TOLOVTCCV civ fjioyis K.OL rjpp.a Trdo'Xfl di& dvva/j,LV 
Kal ro SiivacrQat, /cat TO e^etv TT&S. In Poetic. 14, 1453 t> 39 diraties seems to 
mean p.rj fyov iraQos. When he regarded mind as having nothing in common 
with the other things in the universe which are all material, Anaxagoras was 
on his way to declaring it immaterial, and as we shall see in the sequel 
(e.g. 408 b 29, 430 a 1 8) A. uses dyraO^s combined with other adjectives like 
Belos and x G3 P La " r ^ s to express immateriality. 

b 21. TOIOVTOS 8* &V...22 o-u|u(avs ioriv. Cf. 429 b 22 sqq. where the same 
difficulty recurs in regard to A.'s own theory. 

b 23. <<rot 8* IvavTiwcreus iroio-wn.v. For vavTt,d>o~is iroiovo'tv Them, sub- 
stitutes riQeao-w IvavTlaxriv. Here A. distinguishes between philosophers who 
introduced contrariety in their first principles, e.g. Empedocles (cf. 411 a 3) 

1.2 45 bl 5 b 28 2 37 

and those (b 24) who took for their single principle an element which has a 
contrary, e.g. Heraclitus or Hippon. An attentive perusal of Phys. I., c. 5 will 
show that in his view the distinction is not fundamental. In the explanation 
of nature and becoming, he maintains, the upholders of a single principle 
have recourse to contrarieties of some sort (Bep^w KOI 'fyvxpov, pavw Kal 
frvKvov? frrepeov KOL KCVOV). Thus he reaches the conclusion iSS a 26 OTL pev 
ovv ravavrla Trots Trdvres TTOIOVQ-L ras dpxds. Cf. Met&ph* 1075 a 28 sq., 1087 a 
29 sqq. and 1004 b 29 TO, d* ovra Kal rr/v ovariav ofioXoyovo-iv e fvavrl&v 
drravres <TvyK.icr6a.i* irdvres yovv rde apxas evavrias \4yovu~Lv ol IJLCV 
rrepirrov K.OL apriov [some Pythagoreans], ol de depfjiov Kal ifsvxpov [Parmenides 
in ra Trpos Sofai/], ol 8e ire pas Kal aTreipov [the Pythagoreans], ol de <pi\Lav Kal 
vctKos [Empedocles]. Cf. further Metap/i. 1005 a 3 sq., 1061 a 10 15, 

I. 6, 189 a 13, b 26. In A.'s own system (Ind. Ar. 248 a 27) al ev avr 
tamquam devrepov ponuntur inter rfjv V\TJV et ra crroix*"*, De Gen. et Corr. 

II. I, 329 a 34, 26, 329 b 1 8, De Sensu 4, 442 b l8 ra ato-^ra iravra CX L 
evavTitotriv. According to A. the tertium quid^ matter, solves the difficulty 
noticed Metaph. 1075 a 29: TT>S CK T>V vavrio>v eo-rai [how from contraries 
as principles existing things can be derived] ou Xcyova-w aTra&rj yap ra vavria 
VTT* dXXi^Xcov. Tjfjuv de \verai. rovro v\6ya*s r<5 rpirov rt aval. 

b 24. -r^v 4*vx^v IK TWV ivavrCwv (rvvicrrao-Lv. Philop. (91. 33) gives 
Empedocles as an instance, his four elements and two moving principles 
being contraries. Upon A.'s own physical theory the true contraries are the 
qualities of heat and cold, dryness and moisture, which belong to Empedocles' 
four elements De Gen. et Corr. n. i, 329 a 31 sqq. If the remark applies also 
to Plato, tvavria must be understood in his case as loosely used for avriKcL^cva. 

b 24. 01 8fc 6drpov...26 TtOccwriv. Philop. 92, 2 sqq. cites Heraclitus for 
dcpfjiov and Hippon for ^vxpov. Diogenes of Apollonia probably regarded 
air as f^pov, see Theophrast. De Sens^bu$ 44, where he attributes ro cfrpovelv 
to the dryness of the air inhaled. 

b 26. 8us Kal TOLS ovojiacriv aKoXo-uOoSoav. Ind, Ar. 26 a 1 8 d/coXou^cIi/ roi 
Xoy<jp, r<5 vofjico, rats do^ats-, raZs- o/zoioTTjcrtv, rois ^>atyo/xer/ot-, PoL 1295 b 8, 
1298 a 38, 1273 a 40, Eth. JVic. 1137 b 2, 1139 b 19, Metaph. 986 b 31, 990 b 21. 
Similarly we should expect 6v6p.a<riv a.Ko\ovQovo~iv to mean a follow the lead of 
names," "are guided by etymologies." But this would not suit the context. 
Philop., who (92, 3 sqq., cf. 2, 3) attributes these etymologies to Heraclitus and 
Hippon respectively, says quite correctly cKdrepos ovv rovra>v t cfnja-l, Kal cVufto- 
\oyelv cTTLx^eipe'L ro rrjs iffvxijs &vo]j.a Trpos rfjv olneiav doav, i.e. Heraclitus derived 
gfjv from felv while Hippon derived ifaxn from -^VXPOV (6 e -^-v^v KK\rjo~6aL 
< roC tffvxpov \eya>v). They were not guided by etymology when in search 
of a first principle, but having adopted their first principle, they found an 
etymology which would support it. The underlying assumption is of course that 
the name, when its correct derivation is known, unfolds the true nature of the 
thing. The Cratylus of Plato furnishes many similar examples. Cf. 436 A 
ei rts grjr&v ra irpdyuara a,K.o\ov0oL role ovd/iao-t, a-K.oir&v olov eKaorov (SovXerai. 
elvai. Thus what A. means is that they etymologise to suit their respective 
theories, npos rrjv oiKtiav 86gav, as Philop. says. 

b 27 ol p,h/ Yap... 28 TO t}v cavd^aorraL. With \4yovres supply rrjv -^rv^v elvat. 
and from the participle understand \4yovo~Lv before 8n dta rovro = 5a TO 
or 8ta rb elvai TO fappov rrjv ^ruxn v - It would be possible to repeat 
ovopao-iv a.Ko\ov0ovcrLv but it would be impossible to connect rots 6V. OK. with 
the accusative and infinitive clause following ol de. 

b 28. o Sfe rA $v\p6v, int. X^youo-tv or <f>a<riv. There is no need precisely 

238 NOTES i. 2 

to assimilate the construction of this clause to the foregoing. See critical 
notes. The whole and part construction with the omission of yap would be 
tempting, if it did not require us to translate b 27 on " because." But in that 
case the etymology would determine the theory and not, as I consider, be 
adduced in support of it. 

b 28. 8ux TTJV avaTrvo-qv Kal TT^V KaTcu|nj|ji,v. The cold air inhaled as breath 
was supposed to cool the blood, De Resp. 8, 474 b 19. This derivation of 

by Plato Ciat* 399 D sqq. of/uu n TOLOVTOV voetv TOVS rfjv 
s^ a>s TOVTO apa, orav iraprf ra> crcopari, aiTtov ecrrt TOV ffjv avrco, 
TOV avcLTTveiv dvvafj.iv Trape^ov Kal ai/a^v^ov, a/za 8e K\i7rovTQS TOV dva^v^ovTOf 
TO crG>fJ.a aTroXXurat re KOI TeXeura* oflev drj JJLOL SoKOVtrtv avTo tyvxrjv Ka\<rai. 
As an alternative to this obvious derivation, the Platonic Socrates offers a 
<c more scientific" derivation, connecting V^V^T? with (pvo-w ex LV * In Aristoph. 
Nub. 627 Socrates uses the oath pa rrjv avairvo^ implying that respiration is so 
essential to life as to be justly deified. 


This chapter begins with a criticism of soul as a thing in motion 
or capable of motion. With the early philosophers, as we have seen in the 
last chapter, this conception of soul is a necessary inference from the belief 
that soul is the cause of animal motion (403 b 28 31). A., too, shares 
the current belief that soul is Kivr)Tt,Kov or TO KWOVV, but he disproves in a 
series of nine arguments the necessity of the inference that it must be 
TG>V Kivovpewv TI. There follows a critical examination of the theory of soul 
laid down in the Timaeus, 1121 (406 b 26 407 b n). The chapter 
closes with some suggestive remarks on the futility of defining soul without 
taking account of the body to which it belongs ( 22, 23, 407 b 12 26). 

405 b 31 4O6 a 4. Our first subject of enquiry is motion. The 
definition of the soul as that which moves itself, or that which is capable 
of self-motion, is false. It has been already stated that the moving cause is 
not necessarily itself in motion. Against the proposition that soul is moved 
the following objections may be urged (which equally apply to the definition 
of soul as that which moves, or is capable of moving, itself). 

406 a 412. When anything is said to be in motion this means 
either that the thing moved has a derivative and adventitious motion, or that it 
has an independent motion in and by itself. [The ship moves in the latter way 
in and by itself, the passengers conveyed by it in the former, through being in 
something which is itself in motion, as appears from the fact that they do not, 
in the case supposed, employ their own proper mode of progression with their 
feet.] In accordance with this distinction we proceed to enquire whether the 
soul has an independent motion in and by itself, 

4O6 a 12 16. (i) Understanding KIVOV/JLCVOV to mean Ka&* avro 
Kivovpevovy and assuming the four species of motion to be qualitative change 
(dXXoiWir), growth (a%grio-i$\ decay (<0tW), spatial motion (<opa), we affirm 
that, if the soul is moved na6* avro, it is moved naturally, <^v<r, and if it is 
moved with any of these species of motion the soul must be in space, V TOTT^. 

4O6 a 16 22. (2) Further, on the same presuppositions, if it is 
the nature of soul to move itself, there will be a locality in the universe 
towards which as a <j>vo~ci KLVOV^VOV it tends to move [but there is none such]. 

I. 3 405 b 28 239 

4O6 a 22 27. (3) If the soul is moved naturally, it is also moved by 
constraint, but of such constrained motions it is impossible to form any idea. 

4O6 a 27 3O. (4) According to the doctrine of De Caelo, that the 
nature of which is to be moved upwards is fire, as earth is that the nature 
of which is to be moved downwards. Consequently the soul must be either 
fire or earth, according as one or other of these rectilinear motions is attributed 
to it as its essential nature. 

4O6 a 3O b 5. (5) It is a fact that soul sets body in motion, and 
it may be reasonably supposed that the motions produced in the body are those 
to which the soul is itself subject. Hence, convertendo^ the motion of the 
soul must be that of the body. viz. spatial motion (<j>opd\ whether the soul 
moves as a whole or by successive movements of its parts, the whole remaining 
at rest. If so, it would be possible for the soul to leave the body and return 
to it, and the resurrection of the dead would cease to be impossible. 

4O6 b 5 11. (6) It may be maintained that the soul is moved 
indirectly or per accidens. [A-'s own opinion, see 408 a 30 34.] In that case 
such motions might be imparted to it by external agency. But if this be admitted 
by our opponents, it is inconsistent for them to maintain that something (r) 
has self-motion in its essence, and (2) is at the same time moved by external 
agency, unless the concurrence of the impulses from within and from without 
is merely accidental. The soul however, if it is moved at all, is moved by 
objects of sense. 

4O6 b 11 15. (7) The self-motion of soul implies not only that 
it causes motion qud soul and in respect of its essential nature, but also that 
it is subject to motion qud soul. Now everything subject to motion or change 
in whatever respect undergoes a transition or transformation from one condition 
to another in that respect. If then the soul is moved qud soul, it is always 
passing out of that condition in which its essential nature consists [in other 
words, in such movement it quits one condition for another it is dislodged 
from the condition of its existence and loses its essential nature]. 

4O6 b 15 25. (8) If it be maintained with Democritus that the 
soul is subject to exactly the same motions which it communicates to the 
body, we shall enquire if the soul's remaining at rest is due to the same 
causes, a result which seems inexplicable. (9) And, generally, the facts show 
that it is not in this way that the soul moves the body, but through a species 
of purpose and thought. 

As to the method which is followed in the above objections, Bonitz well 
observes, Hermes vn. p. 421, " Gemeinsamer Charakter der einzelnen zur 
Widerlegung dieser Definition angewendeten Beweise ist, dass Aristoteles 
seine eignen Lehren iiber das Wesen, insbesondere iiber die Arten, der 
Bewegung als sichere Grundlage voraussetzt und durch Anwendung derselben 
auf die fragliche Definition zu Consequenzen fuhrt, welche entweder an sich 
unhaltbar sind oder doch der Absicht derer selbst widerstreiten, welche jene 
Definition aufgestellt haben." The same method is pursued throughout 
cc. 3 5 : A. deduces absurd and inconsistent conclusions by combining* the 
doctrines of his own system with the propositions which he undertakes to 
refute. He does not stop to enquire whether those who maintain these 
propositions would have accepted the doctrines of his own system. In the 
present case, there is the further difficulty that the mobility of the soul which 
he is combating is regarded as one and the same tenet when advanced by 
two opposite schools, viz. by the Pre-Socratics, of whom Democritus is the 
type, who considered soul to be something corporeal, and by the Platonists, 

240 NOTES I. 3 

who as emphatically declared it to be incorporeal. The cogency of the 
objections will naturally vary according as they are advanced against the one or 
the other. No doubt he tries to follow the rule which he lays down De Caelo 
II. 13, 294 b 10 3et TOV fj,\\ovTa KaXcos r}Tr)criv eWrartKoi/ elvai diet T&V ofcetW 
vo-Tao-tov r< yevei. The supply of objections is inexhaustible: but their 
relevancy to the subject is just what his opponents would dispute. In c. 4 he 
deals with harmony exactly as here he deals with motion. 

405 b 31 I'crws y^P---4^ a 2 KVT]<TIV. Two propositions are here repudiated 
as untrue and even impossible. The first is the proposition that soul is that 
which moves itself, as defined by Plato in the Laws (see note on 404 a 21). 
The second is the more general proposition that motion in any sense is an 
essential attribute of soul. In other words, it is false to say that soul moves 
itself, and further it is false to say that soul is moved at all. The term motion 
is used throughout in a wider sense than in the present day, viz. to express 
several varieties of change. To render it more precise A. often affixes /Ltera/SoXiJ 
(just as Plato does, e.g. Laws 894 A, c, E and 895 A, etc., v. Stallb. ad 893 C, p. 161, 
8940, p. 165), KLVTJO-LS teal /zero/SoX?}, motion, that is to say, change, Phys. IV. 10, 
2l8 b 19 fJLijdev dicxpepeTca \eyeiv rjfjuv ev TO) vrapovTi KLVYJCTLV ^ fterajSoXi^v. Sometimes, 
however, KLVTJCTIS is made a species of ^era/SoX?? : cf. Pfiys. v. 5, 229 a 31, b 13 sq* 
As we shall see below (406 a 12) motion includes not only (a) (f>opd, spatial motion, 
change of place, locomotion, Kara TOTTOJ/, the meaning which we now attach to 
the term motion, but also (b} afl^o-is-, growth and c^to-i?, decay, two forms of 
quantitative change, Kara TO TTOO-OI/, and (c) dXXouacrts, qualitative change, the 
internal alteration or transformation which the thing changed undergoes when, 
though it remains in being, it is modified in respect of its condition or character, 
Kara TO TTQLOV. These are the three species of motion finally recognised by 
A. in the Physics, where he employs the word as a scientific term and determines 
its connotation. Though his language varies, he must be taken to exclude 
from Kivrjcrcs proper the sense of yevfcris KOL $6opd, generation and destruction. 
See note on 406 a 12. For A/s attempt to reduce the other species to <opa, 
spatial motion, see note on a 16 inf. Finally what A. means by motion (KLVYIO-LS) 
must be carefully distinguished in another direction from what he means by 
evepyeta, active operation or actualisation. On this important question there 
will be more to say later, e.g. 417 a 1517, 425 b 26 426 a 8, 431 a i 7. 

406 a I. TJ 8vvoL|j,vov Kivtv, int. COUTO. Them. 14, 29 H., 26, 14 Sp. &s KOL 
TOV opov avTTJs TOLQVTOV aVo$i&oz>at, ifsvxyv elvai TO KIVOVV eavTO f) bwdp.vov 
Kivciv eavTO' OVTK> yap KOL HXartov ev TO> de/cara T$>V No/ueov (viz. 896 A). The 
exact words are TTJV dvvafjLevrjv avTTjv aurqv Kivelv Kivrjcriv (see the context cited 
in note on 404 a 21). 

a 3. irpoTepov. Philop. and Them, refer us to the Physics i , where, in vm. 
$9 256 b 23 sq., it is argued that not everything which causes motion is necessarily 
itself moving: and in the last resort we must postulate a prime movent 
KIVOVV) itself unmoved. Cf. Metafh. 1072 a 25, Phys. vm. 5, 258 b 7 
cru/z/Sati/ei TO Trp&Tcas KIVOVV Iv airao~iv elvai roTs Kivovpevois CLKLVTJTOV. 
a.\ ivai KOI jj,7j SiaX^tTretv, avdyK.rj elvai n dtdiov o irp&rov 
t/o), KCU TO irpS>Tov KLVOVV CKLVIJTOV. Bonitz, however, declines 
to accept this reference. Cf. 2nd. Ar. 99 a i Phys. vm. 5 ; quod Trdlbg de 
an. i. 2. 403 b 29 respici putat, probari non potest. Them. (14, 33 15, 17 H., 
26, 20 27, 21 Sp.) gives a good abstract of the argument in the Physics. 

a 4. 8txs. The distinction is between independent and derivative motion, 
i.e. change, generally: not primarily, as the illustration might suggest, be- 
tween direct and indirect locomotion (e.g. the free motion of the ship and 

I. 3 405 b 3i 406 a 4 241 

the motion, by conveyance, of the passenger). It is a metaphysical or logical 
(cf. a 10, \yop.4vov) not a physical distinction. The principle on which it 
depends can be best understood if we go back to the fundamental antithesis 
between the logical subject and its accidents or attributes. Change or motion 
is predicated of the various substances or things, regarded as particulars. 
Each of these is a distinct something or whole, roSc n or o\ov, and the motion 
predicated of it belongs to it as such, r<5 elvai avrb o ea-n /ca0' avro, because it is 
what it is, independently of all other existing things. Thus icatf* avro is ex- 
plained by Kara T^V ovcriav. But besides the wholes which thus exist and 
are moved independently, we must take account of parts and accidents, the 
existence of which is conditioned by that of the things to which as parts and 
accidents they belong. Of such parts and accidents motion can also be predicated, 
but their motion, like their existence, will not be independent and unconditioned, 
but dependent, derivative and conditioned. In the Physics this distinction is 
usually expressed by Kara O-V^C^KOS KLVOVJJLCVOV as opposed to *a0* ar6 
K.t.vovp.vov, where Kara crvjj.p. conveys the idea of accessory, concomitant or 
adventitious. By a vague or extended use of the phrase ra Kara o-vpfi. 
Kivovp,va are sometimes made to include parts of a whole as well as accidents, 
both parts and accidents being regarded as accessories or concomitants. See 
e.g. Phys. vin. 4, 254 b 7 12, as contrasted with the more precise distinctions 
of Phys. V. i, 224 a 21 34, and compare Simpl. in Phys. 1207, 15 ra yap 
virdpxovra TOIS Ka6* OVTO KIVOVCTLV TJ KivovpevOL? r) &>$ fieprj TJ a>$- iraQj] rj <ff egei? 
rj &>s opyava TJ aXXos OTTGXTOVV^ ravra Xeyera* Kara avfjLpeftrjKos K.WCIV TJ Kivela'&aL : 
and SimpL in Phys. 554, 23 Kupccoran; yap ai/r^eo-i? ro{) <aff airo Tfpbs TO 
K.atf erepov olov TO Kara fiepoy, cbff VVT \Phys. 2IO a 27], TJ TL eg&dcv, ore TO 
Kvpia>$ KOTO. O~V^^KOS TroieZ. " Other " may be interpreted to mean a part of 
the first thing, part being distinct from whole, or a second thing wholly distinct 
from the first. Language, we must remember, is apt to designate the whole of 
a thing from its parts (Pkys. iv. 3, 211 b i). The choice of KCL&* erepov instead 
of Kara <rvfjL{ enables A. to include the case of the passenger, who is, 
strictly speaking, neither a part nor an accident of the ship which conveys 
him, though, qud moved, he may be regarded for the time being as one or 
the other, since his motion in the case supposed is as much conditioned by that 
of the ship as if he were the ship's mast or its tonnage. C SimpL in Phys. 
802, 17 dLOplet yrpSyrov Tas TTJS fj.ra/3o\fjs 8t,a<popd? y TTJV jj,V Kara crvfJL^e^rjKOf 

\ya>v orav rbv ev rfj vrjl TjpefjLOVvTa TrXomJpa \ya>p.v Ktveccrdat, ort, rj vows? 37 

rpOTrov nva <rvjJL^eftrjKV 6 TrXwr^p, K.a6* avrfjv Ktvclrai KOL fj,Taf3aX\i. Strictly 
speaking, the ship and its contents, and most probably the man on horseback, 
are artificial systems, each with its own KIVOVV and Kivovpevov, just as the <$ov is 
a similar natural system. See Phys. vin. 4, 254 b 12 17, 27 33. The latter 
passage ends thus : eot/ce yap &cnrp ev rots TtXoiois KCLL rots' fir] <f>vcri 
o-vvi<7Tap,evoiS) OVTQ) KOI ev Tols fot>s elvat. SiTjprjpevov TO KIVQVV KCLL ra Kivovjjievoi/} 
KCtl OVTCO TO airav avro OVTO Kivelv. 

a 4 KaO* ^Tpov...5 KaO* a^ro, per aliud...per se, indirectly... directly. These 
phrases, like KOTO. (rup./3{3TjK6s...Ka0' avro (per accidens*+.per se) in the Physics, 
express the manner: they answer the question "How is the thing moved ?" 
English has no preposition to express *ara in this connexion as distinct from 
VTTO c. gen. (Latin ab\ but "in respect of, ; ' "in virtue of" come near to it. The 
attribute whiteness (a 18) is moved in virtue or in respect of its concomitance 
with the body of which it is an attribute. We may note parenthetically the 
bilateral use of /card: Phys. V. I, 2 24 a 23 ro 8e T$ rovrov ri fjLerafiaXXciv dir\>s 
Xe'yeroi /irra/SaXXstj/, olov oo~a \eyerat, jcar<i peprj [int. fterajSaXXetv] vytaf crai yctp r^ 

H. 16 

242 NOTES i. 3 

on 6 o<t>6a\fjLOf rj 6 $a>pa, ravra Se peprj rov 6\ov <ra>/xaros. Here, be it 
observed, the whole is " moved " (e.g. healed) in respect or in virtue of a part. 
Cf. Phys. vili. 4, 254 b 7 12. Thus, then, Kara expresses the logical relation 
of dependence in the order of thought. We can think of the motion of a ship 
without implying motion of a passenger: we cannot think of the motion of the 
passenger from port to port without implying that of the ship. As is pointed 
out by Them. (15, 21 H., 27, 27 Sp.) and by Simpl. (in Phys. 802, 19), the 
passengers may be assumed to be at rest in the ship, for in any case their 
walking up and down the deck is not the species of motion with which they 
and the ship are propelled : and it is the latter motion alone with which the 
argument is here concerned. If the passenger misses the vessel, walking, his 
own mode of progression, will not avail him in the water. If this holds when B, 
TO K.a.6* Zrepov Kivovpcvov, is a particular thing separately existing, it holds 
a fortiori when B is a part (whether poptov o-v/jL<pvs or eruvexes) of A, ro *#* 
avrb Kivovpevov, by whose motion its own is conditioned : or again when B is 
an accident, whiteness or the height of three cubits (a 18) of A. For, as we 
saw, neither part nor accident can be thought of as existing, much less as being 
moved, independently of the particular thing, ovo-La or roSe , in which it inheres, 
It would be a mistake, then, to treat Kara as simply equivalent to VTTO. See Phys. 
VIII. 4, 254 b 12 r&v de K.a.6* OVTCL ra p.ev v<p* eavrov ra S" vir 9 ti\\ov [int. KiueTrat], 
The passenger might conceivably propel the vessel by rowing, but in that case 
it would Still be true of him ov Kad* avrov aXXa <a6 f erepov Ktvelrat, viz. r<3 ev 
Kwovpevcp elvai. 

a 5. T 4v KivovjUvtp clveu. The phrase ev rwi elvai has a wide meaning. 
It could be applied to the parts of a whole or the accidents of a logical subject, 

e.g. \VKOV, Tpiirijxv. Them. 15, 22 H., 28, I Sp. ouro 5* tiv <f>a[rjs KOL ra 
cruftjS^^KOTa rots' croa/xacrti' olov XcuKorqra ^\aviav TO diTrrj^v KOL TpLTrrjxv Kivel&Qai, 
KO.&* Tpov Se, r<5 ev Kivovpevois virdpxciv ra de rovrov rov rpOTrov Ktrou/xeva 
(vdexcrat prjre <ro>ftara civai pyre Trpocrfielcr^at roirov KCL& eavrd. If the reader 
consults Phys. IV. 3 with the valuable commentary of Simplicius he will not 
merely find a supplement to A/s vocabulary of philosophical terms, Mctapk. A., 
but will derive considerable assistance for the proper understanding of the 
antithesis between *ca0* avro and /car* aXXo (ere/jov), which often recurs, e.g. 
429 b 27, where it is used to determine the meaning of voyros. 

a 8. SrjXov 8 s &irX TWV p-opCcov, on OVK eonrt rov 7r\a>rjjpof oltceia. f} roicwrr) 
Kivrjo-Ls (motion of conveyance). If his locomotion were independent and due 
to himself, not accessory and derivative, the passenger would be walking, not 
sailing in the ship. 

a 9. paSio-is, the appropriate species of locomotion, <opa, as distinct from 
Trrjjo-is, ^p-^-iy, vcvo-w, d\o~is, which are severally appropriate to other animals ; De 
Part. An. I. i, 639 b 3, Eth. NIC. 1174 a 31. 

a 12. Kal |o.T^x L - Probably KOL is explicative and ^r^x^ Kt,vr)o~a>s simply 
duplicates Kivtlrai. In a 21 etn-ep </>uo- Kivr)o~e<i>s ftr^ seems to take up the 
conclusion of (a 15) <t>vo-t. &v vTrdpxot KIVYJO-LS avrfj, and it is followed (in a 22) by 
2rt 8* ei <uer KtvfTrat, as if all three were equivalent phrases. In any case KaO* 
airrfjv must be taken with /ier^ei as well as with Ktvctrat. I follow Trend, in 
rejecting the attempt of Philop. to give a different sense to fiere'^w Kivrja-e^f : 
Philop. 98, IO ra p.v o-vvovo-t&pevrjv ex i r n v Kiv7)o-iv...a>s ra ovpdvia, ra de 
<rvvovcri<ii>fjLvr]v avrrjv OVK. fx l " r *} v P*VTOL dvvafuv rov Kivclo-Oai ev rff (jbvoret 
cxovcriV) ware dvvacrOat, jncrexetv rfjs Kivycrfte?, orav fj rb KIVOVV, &>s y (3<a\os. 

a 12, Trcrdpwv. See note on 405 b 31 supr* where three distinct species 
of change or motion in the wider sense are enumerated. This is the mature 

* 3 406 a 4 a 16 243 

view, ycveais KOL <$>0opa being excluded, as not properly KCV^O-LS (P/iys. v. i, 

225 a 26, 32) : Tnd. Ar. 391 b 36 adduces Phys. n. i, 192 b 14, v. i, 225 b 7, v. 2, 

226 a 25, vii. 2, 243 a 6, vin. 7, 260 a 27, De Gael. iv. 3, 310 a 23, Metaph. 
1068 a 10, b 17. In spite of re cra-dpcov this is virtually the doctrine of the present 
passage. The number "four" is made up by distinguishing "growth" (atf^o-w) 
from " waning ;; or u decay ;? (<f>6Lcrts): whereas these are merely the positive 
and negative aspects of quantitative change (/cara TO TTOO-OV, Kara p.ye6os\ i.e. 
increase* and diminution. The reason assigned by Simplicius and Philoponus 
Is doubtless correct, viz* that there is no common term in Greek comprehending 
both (pQicrif and av^rjcrts and so corresponding to dXXoa<rtff and <popd. In Categ* 
14, 15 a 13, the writer by adding yevecrw and <f>6opa, as two separate species, 
to the four here enumerated constructs a list of six *I$TJ Kivfj<r&s. 

a 13. KLVOIT av. This chapter affords many instances of the opt. with av 
expressing the logical consequence as a 15 av virapxoi, a 22 K&V K.LvrjBei^ b4 
evdcxoiT* av and CTTOLT* &v, b 12 K.LVQLT av and b 13 e&crratT* av, 407 a 21 av ew?, 
407 b 2 av KIVOLTO. Cf. note on 403 a 9. For the future indicative as an 
equivalent compare 406 a 18 uTrdpfci, 407 a 10 vo^erei, a 14 diegeicriv, and vo^erei. 

a 14 el Se KtvtTat...i5 avrfj. The protasis must follow from the definition 
of soul impugned above (405 b 31 406 a 2). See below 406 a 16 19. If motion 
is not an accidental or adventitious attribute but belongs to the essence of this 
unknown X, the soul, the soul must be assigned to the domain of nature and 
not to the domain of art. Motion is found in both 3 but what is subject to 
motion is a natural object, a product of nature, only when it contains within 
itself the principle of motion: Phys. II. I, 192 b 13 ra pev -yap <f>vo-i ovra irdvra 
(f)aLVTai CXOVTCL ev eavrols apxyv Kwrfo~O)S KCU ordo'coos-, TCL /j.ev Kara TOTTOV, TO. Se 
/car' aij^a-Lv <al <f>6L(riv, ra $c /car' aXXoiWu/, Anything which does not possess 
within itself such a principle of motion must be assigned to the products of art 
or manufactured articles, e.g. K\ivrj or t/zcmov, although the materials of which 
they are made are natural objects: 192 b 15 (cXiVq Se /cat 4/xdrtoi/, /cai rt 
TQIOVTOV aXXo yevos etrriV, ^ p-ev rerv^/ce rrjs Karyyoptas K.d(rrrjs KOL <a6* ocrov earriv 
U7ro re^j'^ff ? ovdefJLiav oppjjv *X i f'cra^oX^s eptpvTOV) $ Sc (rujjifiefSrjKCv avrols elvai 
\i0ivots rj yqivois rj fjn,KTol$-K rovrov^ e^et, KOL Kara TCHTOVTOV, coy o&crrjs TTJS <f>vo-G>s 
apxns TWOS icai alrlas roO KLvela-Gai, <ai rfpepelv iv <$ VTrdpx^ Trpwrcoff *a0* avro real Kara O-U/X/SC/STJKOS, To explain p,fj Kara. (ru/x^ejS^/cds A. then gives the illustra- 
tion of the physician who treats himself and so is at the same time larpos and 
vyLa6jJivo$, but it is only Kara crvppefiijKbs and not <a& eavrbv that 6 vyiagopevos 
is in this instance larpos : 192 b 22 Xeyco 5e TO p,rj KOTO. <rvp.pcprjK.6s, ort, yevotr* 
av avTos aur<5 TLS atrios vytcias &v larpof dXX* ofio)f ov ma6o vyid^rai TTJV larpiKTjv 
^- a <rviJ.I3ef3rjK rbv avrbv larpbv elvai Kal vyia6p,vov Sib KOL ^oop/fcrat iror 
r* dXXjjXooj/ [int. 6 larpbs KOI 6 vyiafo^vos]. opoias dc /cat rv aXXwi/ e*cacrroi/ 
TroiovfjLev&v ovdev yap avratv x<ei rrjv apx^v v eaur<u TTJS 7rot,rj<rcof, dXXa ra 
ev aXXoif icat c^w^ev, olov otKLa /cat TCOV aXXcov T>V ^cipo/c/xiyrcoi' e/cacrroj/, ra S' 
ev avrols fJ,ev dXX" ov Kod* avrd, ocra Kara <rvpfBJ3rjKos atria yvaiT* av avrolp [int. 
TTJS TTOirjcre&s]. Cf. Phys, VIII. 4, 254 b 14 TO re yap auro v<* avTOv Kivovpvov 
<j>v<ri KivfLTai, olov Ka<TTOv T&V f o5a>v ' Kiveirai yap TO ov avro v<* avrov, oo-cov 
d* 17 dp^Tj cV avTots TTJS KLvr)o~ca>S) ravra <pv<rci ipapev Kivcia-Qau Cf. PL JLaufS 895 C, 

a 15. i 8^ TOVTO, int. OVT&S exet. Cf. a 32. Kol r^iros^ int. av U7rdpx<><> 

a 16. trao-at y^P---^ TO^W. Otherwise expressed, two of the three species 
of motion (or three of the four above enumerated) imply <opd, spatial motion, 
and therefore cannot take place except in space. For growth and decay 
-compare Phys. VIII. 7, 260 b 13 dXXa p^v <al rov avgavopevov Kat fy 

16 2 

244 NOTES I. 3 

Xet Kara TOTTOV TO peyeOos. De Gen. et Corr. I. 5, 320 a 1 8 ro 8* 
fjievov KOL TO (pdlvov [int. tpaiverai e' dvdyKrjs fj,Ta/3d\\ov Kara roVoj/], aXXoi> de 
Tpoirov TOV (frepopevov. TO fteV yap <pp6jjLevov oXoi/ dXXdrret TOTTOV, TO 6 avgavofj.evov 
&O"TTp TO \avv6fJievov TOVTOV yap jj.vovro$ TO. popta /zera^dXXet Kara ro7rov...ra de 
roO avavo{J.evov [int. fterajSdXXet] del CTTL TrXeteo roTrov, eV* eXdrra> de ra TOV 
<f)6ivovTos. Since dXXoiWtff implies an agent and patient, that which produces 
and that which suffers the alteration or transformation, and these two can only 
be brought together in actual contact by spatial motion, it follows that spatial 
motion is also necessarily implied in dXXoiWts-. P/tys. vill. 7, 260 b i dXXa ^v et 
ye dXXotorat, Set TI elvai, TO dXXotoSi/ K.CLL iroiovv CK TOV dvvdp.L 0ep/xo TO [om. ro codd. 
E K] eVepyeta 6epfi6v. 8rj\ov ovv OTL TO K.LVOVV ov% 6p,ota>s ex L ) ^XX* ore yneV eyyvTepov 
ore 5e iropp&Tepov TOV d\\OLOv}jLvov eariv. rara d* aVev <j>opas ov< eVSe^erat 
virdpxeW) 260 b 7 eri de TTQVT&V T>V Tra^fiarcov PX^ i rrvK.v&o~i$ /cat /zava>o-iff.,. 
TrvKV&orts de K.OL pdv&CTis criJy/cptcrtff /cat ^taKpto-ty, Aca^* as yevetrts 1 icat <p6opd Xeyerat 
ra>z> oucri&v, <rvyKpiv6jJ,eva de KOL Sta/cptz/d/iei/a dva.yK.rj Kara roTroi/ /xera/SaXXetv^ 
Z? ([r^?. ^/ C<?rr. I. 6j 322 b 9 dXXa /ziyv ov5' dXXotovo-^at SVVCITOV, ovSe diciKpiveo-QciL 
KOI Q-vyKpLveo-Oai, fjLTjdevos rrotovvTOf fj.rjde 7rdcrxovTOS..>22 oijTf yap TTOICIV rai/ra /cat 
rrda'x^f' v SvvaTai Kvpias a pr) ol6v re cfyaarOai aXXijXa>i>...32 oju-<aff de ro KVpiws 
\ey6p,vov [int. ^(jt)'?] r/Trdp^et rot? e\oucrt 0(rtv. Qecris d* ota"7rep *cat roTros 1 . Thus 
ro' 7roff= space : /7?<r/. Ar. 767 a 26, aliquoties pro synonymo x*>P a Icgitur, veluti 
jPAy^- IV< J > 2 Sb 7, 209 a 8, 2, 209 b 15 etc. Properly rcVos is the portion of 
space which a body fills: Phys. IV. 4, 2 12 a 20 ro rou Trepte^oz^ros 1 Trepas dKivrjTov 
7Tp>TOV : cf. 21 2 a 14 eorrt 6 &o"rrep TO dyyeiov TOITOS jjieTacfroprjTos, OVT& KOI 6 TOTTOS 
dyyfiov d/u-erafcti'^ror. 

a 2O. ^ -yap vnxipxovoav, int. ro Xev*:6i/ at ro TpiTrrjxv. That which has the 
quality white or the length of three cubits may be in motion ; and so incidentally 
the quality or quantity in question may be said to be moved. Phys. IV. 4, 
21 1 a 22 ravra (i.e. rj XevKor^S 1 /cat 17 eVtOTrj/iiy) yap otnro) f^Ta(3e^\7jK TOV ro7roi/ > 
ort eV $ vyrdpxovo-L /nerajSdXXei. This, be it remarked, is precisely the way in 
which, on A.'s own theory, soul is moved, viz. as being practically the form 
of a concrete living thing ($ov e/z^-u^ov or crvvo\ov) which has motion. Cf. 
injfr. 408 a 30 34. 

a 21. OVK &rru TOTTOS ttvrwv. There is no place assignable for the quality 
white or the length three cubits, but only for the concrete things to which they 
respectively belong, i.e. to the existences (ovo-tat) of which they are, in the widest 
sense, accidents (arvppfprjK&rd). rrjs Sfe ifrvx^s fo-nu, int. roVos-. The argument 
amounts to this : If soul is a thing to which the attribute motion essentially 
or of its own nature belongs, then it will be in space, and, what is more, will 
have a place peculiar to it, a region in the universe to which it tends. Them. 
I5j 34 H., 28, 18 Sp. et $f] cra/^a rj ^^17, oSJXov ort KOI TQTCOV oliteiov e^et. rivo. 
o$v TOVTOV ; els ezeivov yap (va*et Ktrijorerat KOI yevopevrj ev cKeivca <f>vo-fi r^pep.rjcreL. 
Thus Them, gives roVo* a different meaning here (a 21) from that which it 
has above (a 16). This is plausible, for otherwise, as M. Rodier remarks, 
A. would elaborate a second argument to obtain a conclusion already reached 
almost at a step. 

a 22 n 8* el. . .23 ical <j>v(Ti. Aut scribendum est et rt aut certe intelligendum. 
Quae enim sequuntur ostendunt haec in universum dici, non de sola anima 
(Torstrik). This proposition holds of the four simple bodies, fire, air, earth 
and water ; each of which has its natural rectilinear motion, upward from 
the centre of the universe to its circumference, or downward from the circum- 
ference to the centre, according to its own proper region or locality (roVos- 
and yet may be constrained to move in the opposite or some other 

I- 3 406 a 1 6 a 29 245 

direction. Similarly its tendency to move with its natural motion may be 
counteracted, and it may be thus brought to a standstill. Thus fire (according 
to A.) is a simple body whose natural motion is upwards ; but the pressure 
of the air, as in a strong wind, may either cause the flames to go actually 
downwards, or at any rate may hinder them from ascending : $la = Trapa <f>vcrw. 
Cf. Phys. v. 6, 230 a 29, De Resp. 472 a 18. Or, as each simple body has 
its own proper motion, a constrained or unnatural motion = that which naturally 
belongs to some other body : De CaeL I. 2, 269 a 7 ftia pcv yap v$ex Tai *& 
XXou Kal Tpov (int. Kivrjcnv <f>pO"Qcu\ Kara <f>vcnv 8e ddvvarov, e'tTrep pia Kao~Tov 
Kivrjcris f) Kara <J)VO-LV rS>v dTr\a>v. Our first proposition is stated again De 
CaeL III. 2, 3 3. 23 dXXa p^v el Trapa <pv<riv 3 <rr/ ns KLVTJCTIS, dvdyKrj elvat, Kal 
Kara <pva~iv t Trap 9 f}V CLUTTJ- Kat el TroXXai al Trapa <v<rii>, TTJV Kara (pixriv piav' Kara 
<j>v<rtv p,ev yap dVXws 1 , Trapa <pv<riv 8* *x L ^o^Xas eKaorrov. The converse is stated 
De Gen. et Corr. II. 6, 333 b 26 eri 6* eVet (paLverai Kal fila Kal Trapa <t>v<rw 
KLvovfjieva TO. cr&fjLaTa Kal Kara <J)VO-LV, olov TO 7rvp ava> pcv ov jBia, Kara df $la t 
r<a de ftiq TO KUTO. (pva-tv evavTiov, ccrrt ^6 TO jS/a" ecrriv apa [the apodosis begins] 
Kal T& Kara <j>v<riv Kweia-Qat. AJso P7iys, IV. 8, 215 a I Trp&Tov pev ovv [int. 
\KTOV\ OTL TTcio-a KLvijo"ts rj ftlq 7j KOTO, (pvcTiv. dvdyKrj d* av TTp f) ftiaioff, flvai, 
Kal TTJV KOTO. <f>variv 17 p.ev yap fBiaios Trapa <f)v(riv larriv-, 17 ^e Trapa (fivarw vcrrepa 
Trjf Kara (^vcrtv, De CaeL I. 7, 274 b 30 TI yap Kara (frvcrw Kivrj&r]<rTat rj |3iV 
Kal el jSta, (TTIV avT Kal fj <ara <pvcriv (sc. KLVTJO-LS). 

a 23 TOV avrov 8fc rpoirov ?x l Ka ^ """^ < >ip^^s...26 pq Similarly De CaeL 
I. 8, 276 a 22 a-rravTa yap Kal fiVi Kal KO/etrai j6ta Kal Kara <^)ucri,j/, Kal Kara 
(pvo-tv ftei/, ev <p jjievei pr} fila, KOL <pepTai, Kal els ov <ppTai, Kal pcvei, V & 
dc j3ia [sc. p,evi], KOL ipeperai $/a, /cat els ov jSta (eperat, ftLq Kal pevfL. Cf. II. 
13, 295 a 2 7, whence it is argued that, if the earth is at rest /3ta, it must 
have been brought into its present position at the centre of the world dtv-ffa-ei 
(295 3. 9 e ^ i/a v vv rj yrj p.evci, Kal cruvrjj\@ev CTT* ro (Jieo'Ov <f>epop.VT] &ta rryv ^LVTJO'LV). 

a 27. otfSi irXarrciv povXop.evois, "even if we chose to allow fancy free 
play." Cf. 411 b 1 8 and De CaeL ill. i s 299 b 16 TT>S faopiovo-t p,rj povXoucvot, 
Tr\dTTLv ; frag: 173, 1506 b 44 ouS* tyevero [sc. ro rci^os], 6 8e 7r\dcra? Troir)Tr)s 
rj<j>dvio-v. There is here an obvious allusion to the Platonic myths. The 
verb TrXorretv is frequent in Plato in this sense, but metaphorically of fashioning 
speech, e,g. AjtoL 17 C TrXdYroi/ri XeJyovs, and in this more extended sense 
of imagining or inventing (fingere animo) as e.g. Phaedr* 246 c -n-Xarro/xev 
OVTC 'idovTes o$6 9 iKavG>$ vorjcravTff 0e6v t Laws J12.R TrXarrtw r<5 Xd-yo) TOVS 
v6p.ovf, Rep- 588 B etKova ir\d<ravTs TJJS ^vx^f s ^-oyo), Tim. 26 E p.r} TT\acr0evTa 
jjivGovj dXX s d\r)6ivov \6yov. The passage last cited opposes TrXao-Qels to d\rj6tv6s 
and illustrates the Aristotelian use of ir\dcrfJLa and ^ao-furr/as- for fiction and 

a 28. TOVTWV -yap TWV o-wjuiTwv at K\.vr\arti$ avrai.; as explained in De CaeL 
IV., CC. 3, 4, e.g. 311 a 19 fyaiverai irvpos pev TO TV)(OV pAyeQos civu> fapojjifvov) 
eav p,Tj Tt T-UXQ KO)\VOV erepov, yrjs dc KOTO). Cf. ib. III. 5, 304 b 17 coo-jrfp Kal TO 
Trvp OOTG) av ir\elov yLyvrjTai, <f>epTai Qarrov ava> rrjv OVTOV (popdv, IV. 2, 308 b 13 
vvv yap r6 p,ev rrvp del Kov<pov Kal eivo) <f>epTaL, rf 8e yrj Kal TO. yerjpd -rravra icdrw KOI 

a 29. 68* awes Xtyos Kal irepl TWV jtcralv, int. ica^o-caj/, as Barco saw. 
The elements air and water rise above earth but sink below fire. Their 
motions, then, being directed to quarters of the universe intermediate between 
the extremity and the centre, may be justly termed u intermediate motions." 
" The same argument " is as follows : if the soul tends to move towards the 
intermediate regions of the universe, it will be composed of either air or 

246 NOTES I. 3 

water, since these are the elements which naturally tend to move towards 
the localities intermediate to the centre and the extremity of the universe. See 
the chapters referred to in the last note, especially De CaeL iv. 4, 311 a 22 
3\\co$ de @apv KCtl Kov<f>ov, ois dptpoTcpa VTrap^i' Kal yap cViTroXaf ov<ri ncri KOL 
v<f)LO~raifTaij KaBdtrep drjp Kal v8a>p ' drr\S>s fJ.ev yap ovdfTcpov TOVT&V KOV((>OV rj 
ftapv' yrjs fJ.ev yap afj,<f)a> Kovtporcpa (eVtTroXa^ei yap avrrj TO TV%OV avTa>v popiov), 
Trvpbs de j3ap\>Tpa (ixpicrraTai yap avTatv OTTOCTOV av g ^idpioz/), Trpos eaura de 
dnX&ff TO JJLEV ftapv TO de KOTJ<J)OV* drjp fj.ev yap OTTocroff av 17, eViTroXdfWi art, 
v8(j>p 5e OTTOO-OV av 77, dtpi v<t>icrrarat. The result is summed up C. 5, 312 a 26 
Kal VQ&p JJ.GV TT\T)V yrjs Traviv v<icrrarai, drjp & ir\f]v Trvpos TTCKTLV eViTroXczfct. 

a 31. Kivetv rets Kivtiorets, "move it with those motions," i.e. "impart those 
motions." For the contained accusative with the transitive verb cf. infr. 
432 b 13 TI TO KIVOVV Tr]v 7ropVTtK7)v K.lvr]criv and with the middle or passive 
supr. 406 a 13 sq., infr. a 32 sq., b 5 sq., 410 b 20, Ind. Ar. 391 a 16 21 : 
and for the argument P/iys. vni. 5, 257 b 25 ert fjv KLVC! KLVIJCTIV, KO\ KLVOLT J av 

a 32. avTL<rrp\|/aartv, " convertendo, 7 ' " conversely," the logical term which 
denotes the inference of a new proposition, having for its subject the predicate 
and for its predicate the subject of the proposition from which the inference 
is drawn. Thus from the proposition, Some philosophers were Athenians, 
we may infer convertendo that some Athenians were philosophers. By thus 
converting the proposition we no longer make that which is prior in the order 
of causation prior for knowledge, but conversely ; i.e. we argue a posteriori 
instead of a priori. We have to start with the motions of the body as prior and 
better known to us, 413 a n note, because that which essentially and in the 
order of nature is prior, viz. the motion of soul, is unknown to us. Cf. 
Philop. 106, 1 8 K TO>V cra<f>crrcpa>v Troietrcu TTJV fii&iovcaXiaz/ not qfjitv yvc^pip r G>Tpa)V > 
Xeyca dfj TOV crcofMZTOS-. 

406 b I. TO Sfc orcofjia Kivcirai <f>op* wore Kal ^ ^v)Cn- Bonitz (Hermes VI r. 
pp. 421 8) thus sums up the argument of a 30 b 5 : It is a fact ((fralve- 
rat) that soul sets body in motion. For those who ascribe to soul self-motion, 
it is reasonable to assume that the soul pi'oduces those motions in the body 
to which it (the soul) is itself subject. Of the motions of body it is certain 
that they are motions in space. Hence the logical conclusion for the soul is 
&(rr Kal fj ^vxn^"f^6icrrafjLvrj t What (asks Bonitz, I.e. p. 423) do these words 
mean? The two premisses are (i) The motions of soul are those of the 
body, (2) the motions of the body are motions in space. In (2) only <opa, 
a ycvos Kivr)o-a>?, is posited, not the particular species (paSta-is, aXans, Trr^crtsr. 
Cf. 406 a 9 note, and Ind. Ar. 132 a 44). There can, then, be no other 
conclusion than this : " Hence the motions of soul are motions in space " 
(es kann mithin nichts anderes erschlossen werden, als: folglich sind die 
Bewegungen der Seele raumliche Bewegungen). The result thus obtained 
seems absolutely incontrovertible. Bonitz goes on to enquire : Can the 
conclusion logically required be found in the words of the text ? (Steht 
dies in dem vorliegenden Worten ?) It seems to me that this is undoubtedly 
the case if we make a pause after wore KCU ^ ^x*) L mt - Kwelrai <t>opaj. A. 
sometimes omits the predicate after wore, 2nd. Ar. 873 a 18 ware sine verbo 
Meteor. IV. IO, 388 a 22 v\rj TO qpbv Kal vypov, cSerrc vdap <al yrj. A few 
examples may suffice: PJiys. viu. 6, 259 b 18 /itera^aXXct -yap rov TQTTOV TO 
<rw/za, (Sore KOL TO ev r^J orw/zan ov Kal TO ev Trj fto^Xeia K.IVOVV eavTO (sc. ftera^aXXti 
TOV TOTTOI/), Pol. 1252 b 2O Traora yap oiKta jSacriXevfTai VTT& TOV Trpeorflvrdrov, 
<al at aTTOiKicn, Sia TTjv o~vyy4vciav [int. /Sao-tXet/oirai], 1253 a 14 6 de 
<5 drjXovv e&rl r6 crvfj.<p4pov Kal TO /3Xa/3epoV, <^<rre /cat [sc. eirl r< 

I. 3 406 a 29 b 2 247 

ro diKatov Kal r6 abiKOv, Eth. Nzc. 1 1 33 a 2O nrdVra yap ^.erpei, <ore *ai r^z/ 
V7rpoxriv Kal Tr)v \\^tv [int. /zerpet] , 7ro<ra arra 17 V7ro&7/tar' ta-ov OIKLO. 7} rpo<J7> 
Metapk. 1039 a 33 ol>o-re ai TO ov [int. dvdyKrj rdoV re (rrjfJLalveiv KTC.], 
1055 a 22 oXo>? re ct eVrtz/ 37 evavTiQTrjs 8uxf>opd, 17 e diaffropd Bvolv, axrrc Kal rj 
rc\off [sc. dia<j>opa duoij/], 1078 a 8 &<rre KOI $ MKJJ povov KOL fi eViVsda [int. 
idia iraQrj eVrtv], 1078 a II &<rr avev T p.ey49ovs fj,a\\ov 17 ^tera fJLeyeSovS) KOI 
/xaXtorra aW whereas [int. # rd/cpieY]. By a similar ellipse here also 
exactly the conclusion which the premisses warrant is left to be understood : 
&O-TC Kal 17 ^v x f) [int. KLVflTOL <opa]. Cf. Them. 16, 16 H., 29, 15 Sp. ro 
8e a-apa Kivcirat Kara rorrov, &(TT* KOL 37 ^^17 Kara TOTTOV TJTOL ye 0X77 $7 Kara /zdpta 
pcd terra p,vrj. If so, p.crapa\\OL av Kara TO <ra>/za should not be emended but 
simply excised. It may be objected to the minor premiss that the body under- 
goes not only <f>opa but also aXXo/coo-t? and aiS^rjcris. The reply is that, as we have 
seen (see note on a 16 sitpr.}, both aXXoxWi* and atigrjo-is imply <>opa and are at 
any rate ei/ TO'TTG). 

b 2. ficTapdXXot &v Kard TO <rp,a. Bonitz l.c. 3 having clearly laid down that 
the conclusion of A.'s syllogism ought to contain a determination of the kind of 
change or motion which belongs to soul, viz. motion in space, examines the 
traditional text to see whether this determination is implied (i) in ^tfrn/3aXXoi, 
(2) in xara ro o-3>pa, (3) in pcBta-rafjievrj. (i) Trend, explains " /z*raoXXot av, i.e. 
roTroy," but, if pTafia\\Lv of itself here meant " to move from place to place," 
as it unquestionably does in the passages cited, Ind. Ar. 458 b 50 54, then 
A. in his conclusion has expressed the general term, change or motion, and left 
the reader to supply for himself the particular kind of change or motion to 
be inferred from the premisses. This seems very improbable. Again, if (2) 
we look for what we want in KOTO ro o-ca/xa we do indeed find it there, provided 
that the words are understood with Simpl. 37, 4 rovrecm Kadairep <rS>p.a roTri/cfiff, 
and that this agreement between the motions of soul and body be construed 
generally, and not as an exact correspondence in every detail, such as is 
implied at b 15 sq., which would render impossible the further inference that 
the soul may leave the body and return to it. There is no objection on 
the score of language to interpreting ^erajSaXXew icara ro o-w/,ta " to undergo 
the same species of change as the body." But the expression is almost 
incredibly clumsy, because then the conclusion would be an exact repetition 
of the major premiss, ftcraj8aXX Kara ro o-oo/ia being identical with fj tfaxn 
KOL avrf) ravrrjv rrjv Kivrjtrtv Kivflrat rjv rb o-fta (a 32 sq.), while there is no 
inference from the minor at all, and in particular no technical term corre- 
sponding to <opa to indicate the kind of change or motion inferred for the 
soul. Can the missing complement to /ieraoXXoi av be discovered (3) in 
p.c0i<Trap.vr}? The verb is used Ind. Ar. 449 b 13 proprie de mutato loco. 
But Bonitz replies that the whole meaning of the words fteraaXXoi av... 
neBio-Tapevrj would form part of the conclusion from the premisses, whereas 
this whole meaning goes far beyond the premisses. Further, if /cara ro o-wfwx 
is to be taken with juetfio-rafiei'jy, the further inference that soul can leave 
the body and return to it is again rendered impossible. 

Thus failing to obtain from the text the conclusion logically required, 
Bonitz proposed to alter icara ro o-co/za into Kara roTroi'. In support of the 
emendation he urges that, in all places of his paraphrase which correspond 
to the words, Themistius has Kara rdVov : 16, 13 H,, 29, n Sp. ITCO^CVOV av OVT& 
Kal eflXoyov etrj Kal rov rporrov rrjs KivTj<Ta>? rov avrbv avrrjv re Kivi<r6ai /ca^ 
Kivfiv ro cr>p.a~ el 8e rovro aKoXovQov, 8rj\ov6ri Kal avTiorptyacriv a\7)0es, &s KLveirai 
TO o^co/za, OVT& Ktvi(T0ai Kal TTJV tjsvxfiv* TO 8e crco^ia Kivelrcu, Kara TOITOV, &OTC KOI 

248 NOTES I. 3 

37 VTL^T} KOTO TOITOV, iJVoi ye 0X77 r) KOTO, popia peQurrapevr) (cf. 16,35 s< 3' : J ^5 3^ H., 
30, 13: 30, 15 : 30, 1 8 Sp.) without ever indicating that these words are an ex- 
planatory Inference from another expression. So, too, Philoponus, who twice 
refers to our passage, viz. 106, 19 eVetSr) yap TO o-oyia, ^o-t, <j>opav K weir at, KCU rrjv 
TJfVxrjv dvdyKT] (popav Kivelo'0aiy 107, 2O <Sore *ai CEVTT) Ktvrjdrjo-erat, Kara TOTTOV 77 0X77 
7; Kara /jtopta /MfBiorafjievT] wrcof, 0X77 /ii> 6Xoi/ javoucra TO <raiyza, Kara p-opia $e fjiepof 
auroi) Kivovcra. Neither Them, nor Philop. mentions Kara TO trayta, but the 
words are found in the text used by Simpl. (37, 4), whose explanation of them has 
been cited above. As I have already said, the end proposed by the emendation 
is as easily attained by excising /zrra/SaXXo*. av Kara TO o-wjua from the text 
as a clumsy marginal comment, by which some reader unfamiliar with A. J s 
ellipses supplied what seemed to him to be the missing conclusion. It will 
be observed that the words of Simplicius rovre<m KaQdirep cr^a TOTTIM? would 
be equally in point if his lemma stopped short at &O-TC KOL fj ^vxh^ while 
the explanation of Philop. (107, 20) favours an elliptical conclusion with &a-re 
quite as much as does that of Them. (16, 16 H., 29, 15 sq. Sp.), both already 
cited. It would of course be possible to place a full stop after 
by inserting 8* before av to make a new sentence /xcra/SaXXot S" mf 
This new sentence would not be the conclusion of the syllogism, and so far 
some of the difficulties pointed out by Bonitz would disappear, but others 
would remain. If we must retain and may not emend pcTapaXXoi av Kara 
TO erco/zo, I am inclined to accept Mr Shorey's suggestion (A.J. Ph. XXII. 153) 
that Kara TO cr>jj,a may be taken locally " within the body, 5J and not in the sense 
given to the words by Simplicius (37, 4). Cf. KOTO nav TO o-ojfta 408 a 16, where, 
however, motion is not implied. " This gives point," Mr Shorey urges, " to the 
following antithesis : (if it can move in the body) it would follow that it can also, 
Kciiy go forth from the body and return. The same thought seems to be 
implied in the comparison with the quicksilver," 406 b 18 sqq. 

b 2. tj oXt] -fj Kar& fiopia p-cOwrrajji^vti. When it has been proved that the 
soul is subject to spatial motion, KLVCITOL <$opa or Kara TOTTOV, two alternatives 
present themselves. There are two species of spatial motion. Either the 
whole of a thing may change its place : this is motion of translation. Or 
the parts may move relatively to each other while the whole remains in the 
same place, e.g. when a sphere revolves or a top spins. Cf. De Gen. ct Corr* 

&CT7Tp TO c\avvop,vov' TovTOv yap plvovTO? TO. popiCL /xeTajQaXAfi Kara TOTTOI/, 
oi>x &a-7Tp TO, TIJS cr<paipa$' TO. p.ev yap [the parts of the revolving sphere] cv 
Tp t(T(p roTTO) ftTa/3dXXt rou 8\ov PCVOVTOS, TO. df TOV av^avo^vov del rrl TrXeco) 
[sc. ftTa^aXXfi], PL Laws 893 C TO. TTJV T&V ferrwTCov fv fiecrc* \apftav ovra 
Xeyety, ^^cro/x^v, v evl KtveTer^at, Ka&aTrep rj T>V ecrrdvai Xfyoft^j/cov icuicXcoi/ 

cu TTcpupopd, where the rotation of a sphere upon a fixed axis is illustrated 
by a simpler case, viz. the revolution of a circle about a fixed centre. Them. 
and Simpl. do not comment on these words : the inference is that they found 
no difficulty in them. Philoponus gives an erroneous interpretation (107, 21) 
5X77 pcv 6\ov Ktvovcra rd tra/ia, KOTO. p6pia dc pfpos afoov Kivovcra, possibly 
understanding /le^wrra/jtev^ in an active sense, at all events reading into the 
second , clause <ara . popta pcOiorapevr) an alien idea derived from a forced 
interpretation of o\r)...fjLe6i<rTatJ,vrj. Conrad Gesner gave approximately the 
right explanation : " rj #X;, ut si recta moveretur, 77 Kara p6pia, ut si circulo," 
which Trend, deliberately rejected : ^ Minime ; neque enim ad motus genus 
pertinet. Haec potius est sententia ; Sequeretur animam vel omnem vel eius 
inter se facultates tanquam partes locum mutare." For this he is rightly 

I. 3 406 b 2 b 6 249 

censured by Bonitz, I.e., p. 426, who remarks that to introduce the faculties 
of the soul at this point is quite inadmissible, since the inconsistencies 
which A. deduces from the theory under examination all relate to the nature 
of the soul itself conceived as existing and moving in space. 

b 3 el Si row* IvS^xe"- In editione A videtur fuisse fl 8e TOW-TO, eVS^oiT* 
av KOL l^e\6ova-av clfrievcu TraXtv. Torstrik inferred this from the variants of 
the inferior MSS. (see critical notes\ and it is actually found in y, of which 
he had not a collation. Bonitz (I.e.) argues that the reading of the inferior 
MSS. ought here to be preferred to E, because it is not a question of possibilit}^ : 
that the soul moves in space has been demonstrated as necessarily true. Even 
granting this, A. might make a compendiary use of eVd/xcrai : " If this, as 
already demonstrated, is possible, a further possibility will follow, viz. etc." 
Torstrik himself regarded the variation here between what he calls the two 
editions as due merely to considerations of style: videtur autem correxisse, 
quia paulo ante usus erat formula ea quae est d de TOVTO a 32, an admission 
which goes a long way in the direction of those who see in the so-called 
editio prior of Book II. merely a paraphrase. 

b 3 Kal 4eX0oO<rav etcrt&ai irdXiv kvSfyoir &v, int. rr\v -^vx^v. This is 
intended by A. as a reductio ad absurdum of the supposition that the soul moves 
in space. Such absence from the body and return to it are common in the 
folklore and magic stories of all ages. Cf. Frazer, Golden Bough^ ch. ii. 2, 
" The nature of the soul," and ch. iv. 3, " The external soul in folk-tales." ' 
Cf. also Vol. li., pp. 123 5 (ist ed.), on traces in folk-tales of belief in the 
resurrection of animals. 

b 4 dvC<rrao-0ai. Trend, compares //. xxi. 55 rj /mXct 89 TpG>$ jLLc-yaX^Topcff, 
ovo-7Tp c7T<f>vov, ] duns ava.vTY)Vovrai tiro 6(pov rjfpoevTos. His suggestion 
that the clause is the interpolation of a Christian scribe hardly merits serious 
consideration. That the dead should rise again is to Greek ideas the typical 
instance of an event antecedently incredible as reversing the established order 
of nature. Cf. Hdt. III. 62, cited by Bonitz ai>T6s...6a^d p,iv x P^ L ^fl " 4 
ov. el fi,v vvv ol T&veG>Ts aveoTatri, Trpocrdciced Tot KOL 'Atrruayca TQV 
tTrai'acrrijcreo'tfcu" cl d* ffcrri &O"7rep yrpo TOV, ov prj ri TOL UK ye Kivov 

b 5 ri]v Si Kara 0-vp.pep-qKos KCv^cptv. This really goes back to 406 a 14 
de Kiveirai py Kara {rv/zjQe/SijKos. The supposition there brought forward has 
now been exhaustively treated. A. next turns to the alternative hypothesis 
and shows that, if the motion asserted of the soul be merely accidental (Kara 
o-vpfteprfKos, not Ka& avrb or <$v<ri\ such motions may equally well be due to some- 
thing Other than the SOUl itself. Philop. 109, 15 TO pev yap Kara o-upfif/SrjKbs 


aXXov TT\V avrfjv ravTTjv Kiveio-dai. A movement of the animal is occasioned 
by an impulse of its soul (KQTCL "^V^IKTIV oppriv KLvovpevov rov <ov) : in this case 
the soul of the animal is adventitiously moved, but by itself (v<* eavrrjs Kara 
o-v/t/S^KOff Kivclrai). But suppose the animal to be impelled by external 
agency ; in that case it is also adventitiously moved, but by something else. It 
is important to remember that A. is stating his own opinion in the sentence 
before us, supported by the evidence of facts. See the recapitulation, 408 a 
30 34. The body is moved by something external (v<j>* mpov) and the soulj 
through its inclusion in the body thus moved (406 a 5 r& cv KIVOVJJ,CV<P etvai), is 
also moved, but indirectly, per accidens. The optatives with &v in b 6 KIVOITO 
av) oHrQciij &v are purely potential. 

b 6 K&V v<|>* crlpov, by something else as well as by itself, in the way 

250 NOTES I. 3 

described in 408 a 32 sq. : cf. 408 a 31 Kivelv eavrfjv (KOTO. arvjjifaprjKoe). Cf. on 
this point Phys. VIII. 6, 259 b 28 OVK ecrrt Sc TO avTo rb K.ivL<rQaL Kara 
crvfji^e^rjKOS v<p* avrov KCLL {xp* erepov' TO p.ev yap v<p* Tpov virdpxet KCLL TO>V ev 
TG> ovpava evlais dpxais (the spirits of the spheres), ocra TrXeiovs- (pepcrcn. <o/?a$, 
Qarepov $ TOLS (j)0apTo1s p6vov. 

b 7 ov Set 8*... 8 tr\r\v cl nij Kara <nj|ippTiK<$$. "But that which has the 
attribute of self-motion as part of its very nature ought not, except accidentally, 
to be moved by something external." 2nd. Ar. 604 a 28 TT\TJV l prj, pleonastice 
addita negatione Anal. Prior. I. 27, 43 a 39, Waitz ad loc. " TrXfjv et prj pleo- 
nasmus est, qui tamen ferri potest, quum TrXrjv saepius non excipiendi vim 
habet, sed definiendi et limitandi." A. is still objecting to the proposition, 
"The soul is self-moved," although the ground is shifted from Ka& O.VTO 
Kivcla-Qai to KOTO. trv^c^K^s KLveivQai. Cf. Philop. 109, II /SouXercu vrpbs ro 
avTOKtvrjTov v<rnjvai. The ancient commentators were puzzled by the last 
clause, ce except accidentally." What, we ask, is the exceptional case in 
which that which has the power of self-rnotion is also per accidens moved 
by something external? Philoponus thinks that the motion communicated 
by external force is never the same as that which the self-moving soul 
possesses in its own nature. But this is doubtful. Themistius and Simplicius 
agree in thinking that it is precisely the concurrence of the external impulse 
with the soul's self-motion which happens only incidentally. 

b8 wcnrcp ere'pou vKv. This sentence serves, by two instances, 
to show how much is meant by u<* CCLVTOV Kwelo-Qai as an essential attribute. 
The chiasmus should be noted : ro <aF avro ayaQbv is opposed to (r6) ere'pov 
eveKev, that which is good in itself to that which is so only as a means to 
something else : while (TO) 6Y avro is opposed to (ro) 6Y aXXo. In Eth. NIC. 
1096 b 16 we read *a0 s avra 5e iroia Beit] TLS av ; TJ ocra /cat povovfjicva 6\a>Kera, 
otoi* TO ffrpovetv KOL opav KCLL ffdovai Tives Kal ; ravra yap el KOI df aXXo TI 
8id)KOfj,v, o^tcoy T>V Kad* avTa ayaQ&v BeLrj TLS av* To meet the case of such 
goods we must suppose the qualification el /zi) Kara O-V/^/SJJKOS-, which stands 
in the main clause (406 b 8), to be repeated in the illustration. 

bio rr\v Sfe t|nxTiv...ii diirep Ktvcirau This statement becomes clearer as 
A.'s own tlieories of ato-^cr^ and opcgis are unfolded in the present treatise, 
As to the former, we may anticipate by a reference to 416 b 33 sq., 417 a 13, 17 *?q., 
where KiveiarQai., Trao-^etv and aXXoioocris (a species of K.iv7)<ns\ are used almost 
indifferently to describe the effect which the atcrdrjTbv produces upon the soul in 
actual perception. Subsequently 417 b 2 sqq. fvepytiv is preferred (els auTo yap 
fj 7r idea-is KOI elf VTe\4^Lav 417 b 6 ; cf. 425 b 26 426 a 8, 431 a 4 7), and on 
the whole woieti/, ird<rx,civ are more in favour than Kivetv, Kiveia-Oai. For Kpegis 
it is sufficient to refer to in., cc. 10, n, e.g. 433 a 1830, 433 bii 18, 
433 b 27 434 a 9. Occasionally even the rational soul is said to be " moved " : 
e.g. 431 b 5 and possibly 433 a 24. 

bii aXXd JJ.TJV ical el Kt,vu,.i5 avrtjs Ka0' avrqv. Another objection* Motion 
is displacement, and therefore any motion of the soul would mean that the soul 
is displaced or dislodged from its nature, whence we are intended to infer that 
it would cease to be soul. So that the hypothesis of self-motion as belonging to 
the nature of soul is self-destructive. Alex. Aphr. discusses this expression, oV. 
<al \va-. II. 2. 46, 22 47, 27 (Bruns). 

b 13. licarrcurfe IOTI TOV KivovfUvov -g Kivctrai. This definition is not to be 
found in the Physics, but it can be easily deduced from the more abstract form 
of the definition usually given, viz. "the realisation of what is potentially 
existent as such," or " the actualisation of what is undeveloped." This may be 

I. 3 406 b 6 b 21 25 1 

made clear by considering one or two of the species of motion, e.g. under 
qualitative change (aXXo/eao-is) a thing which was formerly white becomes black 
and then there is a displacement (eKcrraa-ts) of the quality " white." Again, take 
quantitative change : a tree grows to twice its former height, which has thus 
been displaced. Finally, and here the meaning of eKoraa-is is best seen, in the 
case of locomotion (<f>opa) from A to -Z?, the " place " or spatial position of the 
thing which has moved is no longer A but B. 

b 13. IgCcrratr* civ IK TT)S oticHas. The last three words are added because 
the soul is supposed to move by its very nature. The inference is obtained by 
pressing the analogy with the motion of material things regarded as displacement. 
Take the moving body of the previous note. When at B it is no longer at A, 
though this change of place leaves it in other respects unaffected : whereas 
aXXoiGxris destroys or modifies the former quality when it substitutes a new one, 
and atigrjo-t? alters the quantity of TO Ktvovpevov. Cf. Phys. vin. 7, 261 a 20, where 
A. is arguing that <popa is less liable to this u displacement of essence " than the 
Other modes of motion : fJKi<rra rrjs ovcrias e^iorarai TO Kivovpsvov r>v Kivrjo-f&v lv 
T& <ppcr0at,* K.ara JJLOVTJV yap ovo*v /tera/SaXXet TOV eivat, atcrirep aXXotou/ievov /Zi> ro 
TTOIOV, avgavo/jLcvov de KOL <f>6'u>ovTos TO irocrov. Similarly the soul, if self-motion is 
its essential nature, its logical essence, is, qttd moved, no longer after motion what 
it was before. It might even be said to have become Trapa fyvcrw. Cf. De Cael. 
I. 3> 2 86 a 1 8 2O varcpov de TO Trapa <f)v<riv TOV KUTO, <f>va-iv y Kal CKtrraa-is TLS 0~Tiv 

V Tfl yV0"L TO TTapa <u<T/ TOV KaTO. <f>VO~tV. Cf. Philop. I 1 3, 14 KOL Tf 1/^V^ ^ V ^ 

<a0o ^VXTJ eoTi Kal icar* ovo~iav uLivevrai^ K.ffrairj av Ttjf ov&ias avrijs /cat <f>Saprja'Tau 
Philop. appeals to PL Phaedr. 245 E. He justly remarks (114, 12) that A.'s 
contention is OVK avTrj eavrrjv Kivel, dXX* O"Tiv ev avrfj TO p.ev KIVOVV TO de 
Kivovp.vov. Cf. 409 a 10 1 8. 

b 15 gytoi Sfe...i6 ws ttvr^ KLvetrat. This view attributes not merely spatial 
motion in general to the soul but movements corresponding exactly in detail to 
those of the body (406 a 31). It might have been held by any pre-Socratic 
philosopher who regarded the soul as a material thing enclosed in the body. 
The view implies (i) the soul is in the body, (2) the soul has definite spatial 
motions, (3) these it communicates to the body in which it resides. From 
Lucretius in. 370 3 it would appear that atoms of soul and atoms of body are, 
according to Democritus, arranged alternately in the animal, singula privis 

b 17. otov AtfljLcSicptTos. Cf. 409 a 32 b 4, Aet. IV. 3, 5 (Doxogr* Gr~ 388) oTrep 
cr>fj,a clvai. ^iXir7ro>. Frag-. Com. Gr. ii. 172, fr. 22 Koch. Philippus was a son 
of Aristophanes, and a poet of the Middle Comedy. He wrote among other plays 
a Daedalus. Them. (19, 10 H., 34, 27 Sp.) says that Daedalus in this play claims 
to have made a moving Aphrodite : <^>jj(rl yap 6 AatSaXos Trap' avr<3 Kivovp.cvr)v 
TroLTjo-ai TJ]V gvXivyv ' A<f>podtTr}v lyxects apyvpov X VTOV " Cf. Meineke, Frag, Com. 
Gr. I. 340 sqq. ; Philop. 114, 37. 

b2O Ktvoojp.^vas -y^P*-- 22 T & crwjxa irav. Join dia TO 7re<pvKvaL p.r)d7TOT }LVtv 
with K.ivovfi4va$. Cf. 404 an sq. This quality of restless mobility is due 
ultimately to their shape, 405 a 8 13. The spherical atoms are here designated 
"indivisible spheres." Cf. 409 a 12 o-^atptov, 409 b 9 o-<f>aipas piKpds. Being 
mobile themselves, they communicate motion to whatever they come in contact 
with, in this case the atoms of the body in which they are enclosed. Cf. generally 
404 a 5 16, 409 a 31 b n. 

bax. onuv<j>IXKtv = crv'yKtvti/ avTals. This explanation of the motion of the 
body reduces it to a species of push and leverage (Philop. 114, 29 r<S weia-dai 
Tr)v 'fyvxty Kii/civ TO (Too/ia oScrct KOI /lo^Xd'a rtvt), which, as Philop. observes, 
is equally involved in the argument adduced above (406 a 30 b 5). 

252 NOTES I. 3 

b22 wets S J po>Ti^<ro|jiv. . .23 Tttvrcx ravra. The constant motion of the 
atoms of soul is put forward as the reason why the body moves : what then is 
the cause of its rest? Cf. Phys. VIII. 6, 258 b 23 8fj\ov yap a>s ainov TOLS aura 
cavra KIVOVCTLV eori ri rov ore ptv clvai ore de p,fj. 

b24 oXo>s 8' ovx o\mo,..25 voii<rws. A general argument, disposing of the 
whole theory that soul moves itself and the body thus mechanically by an 
appeal to the fact (<<uWrai) that man is acted upon by final causes. Cf. the 
sweeping argument De Gen. et Corr. II. 6, 334 a 10 15. We may paraphrase 
OVT& "by impact and pressure," physical causes which imply contact. To this 
mode of causation A. opposes a species of purpose irpoaipccrls rts-, which he 
subsuines under the general notion of thought (i/d^crw). Cf. 433 b n rovro yap 
[int. ro opeKTov'] Kivet ov KtvovfJ-evov r<5 vorjGrjvai ft (pavrao-Qrjvai. In the full 
discussion of irpoaipeo-is in Eth. Nic. ill., c. 2 we are told, amongst other things 
(i 1 12 a 15), T) vrpoaipecris pera \6yov Kal Siavoias, and, as Trend, remarks, vorja-is in 
the present passage must be taken in this wider and vaguer sense. It does not 
bear the special sense emphasised e.g. in 430 a 26, or of the passages in which vovs 
fa&prjrt.Kos' is distinguished from vovs vrpaKTLKos. Cf. III., c. 10, esp. 433 a 9 13, 
which shows, if proof were needed, that for irrational animals <pavracrla ranks as 
vorja-ts TIS. Cf. also 429 a 4 9. Properly speaking, no irrational animal has 
irpoaipe<ris. jEth. Ntc. 1 1 1 1 b 8 sq. rov pev yap CK.OVO-LOV Kal 7raldes <al rSX\a <$a 
Koivcovei) Trpoaipecre&p d 9 ov, /cat ra e^ai(pvrjf fKOvo'ia jj,v Xcyo/tev, Kara irpoaLpecriv 
S* ov. Alex. Aphr. neatly sums up De An. Mantissa (106, n) fj de -^vx^i Kivel 
r<5 Kar 9 avryv fjp.a$ voelv re KOL TrpoaipGlcrBai* rb p.v ovv ayaBov ra> vorjQrjvai KLVL^ rj 

b26. 6 Tfyiaios. The article denotes Uie principal speaker in the dialogue 
of Plato. The form of the reference can be paralleled elsewhere in A., e.g. 
Pol. 1342 a 32 6 lv rfj HoXirciq 2<oKpdrr)e 9 I26ib 19, 21, I3i6a2 et sacpc. 
Again ib. 1265 a 1 1 irdvrc? ol rov 2a>Kpdrov? Xdyot, where by an odd lapse of 
memory A. includes the Laws^ although Socrates is not mentioned as taking 
part in that Platonic dialogue. Similarly 1260 a 22 28 there seems to be a 
clear reference to the Meno, although the practice of Gorgias is merely 
reported in the dialogue, in which he takes no part. We may suppose that 
Plato in putting his views into the mouth of Timaeus, the Pythagorean 
philosopher of Locri in Italy, was in this case guided by the consideration that 
a physical discourse would have been unsuitable in the mouth of Socrates. 
Cf. Xen. Mejuor* I. i, n 15 ; PI. ApoL 19 B D, 26Dsqq. ; Ar. Mctaph, 
987 b i sq. 

b26 4>v<rioXoYt. , .27 T o-tojia. A. uses qbvcrioXdyoff in nearly the same sense 
as <f>v<riKos. In treating of the history of philosophy he is fond of applying the 
name to the early lonians, ol 7rpS>Toi <j>v<rLo\oyr)<ravTes. Metaph. 986 b 14, 
989 b 30, 992 b 4. The verb, elsewhere used absolutely, ATetaph. 988 b 27