See other formats

Full text of "Aristotle De Anima"

Kansas city public library 

srr ~** Kansas city, missouri 

Books will be issued only 

on presentation of library card. 
Please report lost cards and 

change of residence promptly. 
Card holders are responsible for 

all books, records, films, pictures 
or other library materials . 
checked out on their cards. 



ARISTOTLK 
DE ANIMA 



CAMHRIDOK UNIVKKSITY 1'RKSS \VAKK!1< il"M 
C. I\ Cl.AY, MANAU*:**, 

s KKTTKR J,ANK, K.i,\ 

KI- r. 



: F. A. 

, MIT NAM'S SXS* 




ARISTOTLE 

DE ANIMA 

WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 



BY 

R. D. HICKS, M.A. 

FELLOW AND LATK LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 



CAMBRIDGE : 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
1907 



1MUNTKI) BY JOHN t:i,AY, M.A. 
AT THIS UNIVERSITY I'KKSS. 



TO HENRY JACKSON 

WHO HAS INSPIRED MANY 

WITH HIS OWN LOVE OF 

GREEK PHILOSOPHY 



ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. 

Page 15, critical notes, line 2, after iclicjui codcl. add lick. Trend. 

,, 48, critical notes, line ^for appenclicem read Fiagmenta i., II. r 3, p. 10*4 infra. 

,, 56, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Kodier. 

,, 56, critical notes, line 13, after Sitnpl. Soph. || add $&vruv V \\ . 

i 57* translation, line 7, for body read rest, 

64, critical notes, line 9, for append, read Fragment a n., 1. 61, p. 166 infra, 

,, 114, critical notes, line 6, for TOT,..$I. ytvcrcu read roVe.. 31. \ctt 6. 

n6, critical notes, last line, for 162 read 160. 

,, 145, critical notes, line 12, for Ilayduck read Ileinze. 

,, 150, critical notes, line 7, for 540 read 140. 

150, critical notes, line 13, after ap. crit. ad loc.) add Nek. Trend. 

152, critical notes, last line, after Bek. Trend, add Itiehl. 

,, 204, end of note on 403 b 8, add A similar confusion of oi \oyot with ot \tyoifT(<> 
roiV \6yovs may be noticed 407 b 13 17. 

,, 351, end of fust note on 406 b 13, add The moaning of ^wrarrt? /A* r/;y otVfas, 
so far as yf'ta U 
said to reside not tV T$ 7ro7nK$, but rap 0/w^i} 417 b S f u'rax^ JQI} 
431 b r6, ilrav Owpfi 432 a 8, b 29, and generally VT& ftnpyii 415 b 29: 
cf. rd 1557; frtpyovv 417 a 12, 6 ^617 Qiwp&v 417 a iH. 

377, line u of note on 419 b i^ for xilf. r*vft/ No. xxx. (V(l. xni.). 

3^5i line 4 of First note on 420 a 31, add CC J/< i / "Whose saintly visage is loo bright | To hit the sense 
of human sight, | And therefore to our weaker vie.w | < JVrUiid \\iih black.'* 

449, end of note on 427 a 2 add Perhaps a 3 rro^ should rather 
be paraphrased thus: "There is, then, a sense in which the peictpient of 
two distinct objects is divisible ; there is another sense in which it perceives 
them as being itself indivisible." If *o, with $ dfoafyx ro we should supply 
TO a.to"0a,v6jj,wov or rb alff0^ri>K6v 1 and not TO &flu//rr0p f as is done, on p. 1 19* 
,, 524, end of note on 430 b 26, add In an instructive note Torstrik (pp. 190- 198) 
calls attention to the distinction between &nr<{) and olw. The latter, he 
says, is used in citing examples or in passing from the gtmus to its sub- 
ordinate species ; the former extends u predicate from one subject t<> another 
in sentences like the following: "The Greeks ure sharp-witted, svs also 
(tiffirtp Kal) some of the barbarians. 7 * if this be so, w u quite in place 
in comparing the meaning of two terms* The tcnu $ct 532, line 15, after better instance is insert 6 81? vovs.,,o\'tffta. rts ottcra 408 b *8 sq* Cf. 



PREFACE. 

THE first English edition of this treatise appeared in 1882 
under the title of " Aristotle's Psychology in Greek and 
English, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Wallace." It 
has been for some time out of print and, if Mr Wallace had 
survived to see his work through a second edition, he would 
probably have made considerable alterations, owing to the re- 
searches of the last quarter of a century. Of these I resolved 
to make full use, when, with their accustomed liberality, the 
Syndics of the Cambridge University Press accepted my offer 
to prepare an independent edition. Among the fresh materials 
which have accumulated, two are of special importance : I mean, 
the critical edition of De Anima by the late Wilhelm Biehl and 
the series of Aristotelian commentaries re-edited under the 
auspices of the Berlin Academy. As regards the text, I have 
seldom had reason to deviate from Biehl's conclusions, but in my 
critical notes, which are based on his judicious selection, I have 
gone further than he did in referring to, or occasionally citing 
from, authorities. The interval of time has enabled me to cite 
with greater uniformity than Biehl could do from the Berlin 
editions of the Greek commentators. I have followed the example 
of Wallace in printing an English version opposite the Greek text 
A century ago, perhaps, the Latin of Argyropylus with the 
necessary alterations would have served the same purpose by 
indicating the construction of the sentences and the minimum 
of supplement needed to make sense and grammar of Aristotle's 
shorthand style. But fashions have changed. The terse sim- 
plicity, not to say baldness, of literal Latin is now discarded for 
that rendering into a modern vernacular which, whatever its 
advantages, is always in danger of becoming, and too often is, 
a mere medley of specious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge. In 
compiling my notes I have drawn freely upon all my predecessors, 
not only on the Greeks themselves, who even in their decline were 
excellent paraphrasts, but also on modern editors and translators, 
from Paeius and Trendelenburg onward ; while through Zabarella 
I have made some slight acquaintance with the views of the Latin 



viii PREFA CE 

schoolmen. Among modern critics few have the great gifts of 
Torstrik, who by his insight, candour and logic contributed beyond 
all others to improve Bekker's text of the treatise. Of this 
distinction nothing can rob him : haeret capiti cum multa laudc 
corona. In matters of punctuation and orthography I have taken 
my own line, but, lest I should be accused of inconsistency, I must 
add that when citing from other editions I have been scrupulous 
in preserving their peculiarities. Thus, while for my o\vn part 
I admit indifferently alel and dei, tyLyveo-Bat, and ywe&daf,, when 
I cite the Metaphysics from Christ, I follow him in always 
preferring alel and ov and fjue^ttcrat are printed 
I have been careful not to alter the spelling. In references to the 
Metaphysics^ Ethics and Politics I have been content to t^ive 
Bekker's page, column and line without the addition of book 
and chapter, thus avoiding the confusion which arises from the 
double numbering of certain books and chapters. I have tried 
as far as possible to give in the notes the reasons for my 
conclusions, so that where I have erred it will be more easy for 
my critics to refute me. My own claims to originality are modest 
enough. In fact, in a subject like this, absolute novelty of view is 
almost unattainable, perhaps undesirable. 

I am indebted to Professor Henry Jackson, to whom the work 
is dedicated, for permission to publish sundry proposals, chiefly 
textual, taken from his public lectures delivered in the year 1903. 
Mr F. M. Cornford kindly placed at my disposal for this edition 
various notes on the third Book, which, after I had made use of 
them, were communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society. 
My book has profited by the vigilance and insight of several 
friends, to whom I desire to make fitting acknowledgment. In 
particular, Miss Margaret Alford, Lecturer of Bedford College, 
revised for me the first draft of the notes and added to them much 
of value. Nor must I pass over the good offices of Dr T. L. Heath, 
who assisted in correcting the proof-sheets, or those of the Rev. 
J. M. Schulhof, who aided me five years ago at the commencement 
of my task. Lastly, I must express very great obligations to the 
staff of the University Press, including their accomplished readers, 
for their able and zealous co-operation, 

R. U H. 
CAMBRIDGE, November^ 1907. 



SUMMARY OF CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CITED. . . . . xi xvii 

INTRODUCTION I. : SUBJECT ...... xix Ixxii 

,, II. : TEXT ...... Ixxiii Ixxxiii 

SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE CRITICAL 

NOTES ......... Ixxxiv 

GREEK TEXT, CRITICAL NOTES AND TRANSLATION. . 2 163 

FRAGMENTS OF AN OLDER RECENSION OF E IN BOOK II. 164 171 

NOTES 173588 

APPENDIX: FRAGMENTS OF THEOPHRASTUS ON INTELLECT 589 596 

INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES . . . 597 598 

INDEX OF GREEK WORDS ...... 599 626 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES. 

Aristotelis DC Aiiima, ed. Trendelenburg (lenae, 1833); ed. Belger-Tren- 

delenburg (Berolini, 1877). 

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Torstrik (Berolini, 1862). 
Aristotle's Psychology, ed. E. Wallace (Cambridge, 1882). 
Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Guil. Biehl (Lipsiae, 1884); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 

1896). 
Aristotelis De Anima liber B secundum recensionem Vaticanam, ed. H. Rabe 

(Gratulationsschrift der Bonner philol. Gesellsch. an Usener, Berolini, 

1891). 

Aristote, Traitd de 1'ame, ed. G. Rodier (Paris, 1900). 
Translations of Do Anima (other than those of Argyropylus, Barco, Wallace, 

Hammond and Rodier) : 

DCS Aristoteles Schrift tiber die Seele, H. Bender (Stuttgart, 1872). 
DCS Aristoteles Schrift iiber die Seele, E. Rolfes (Bonn, 1901). 
For ancient commentaries on De Anima see Philoponus, Simplicius, Sophonias, 

Thcmistius. 



Editions of Aristotle before Bekker: 

Aldina (Venctiis, 1495 T 498) [collated by Trendelenburg]. 
Basilcciibis (Basileae, 1531; 1539; 1550). 
Sylburgiana ( Francofurti, 1579; 1584; 1587). 



Aristoteles graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia regia 

Borussica (Berolini, 1831 1870): 
Vols. I, II. Graccc ex rec. I. Bekkeri. 1831. 
Vol. III. Latino interprctibus variis. 1831 [De Anima loanne Argyropylo 

Byzantio interprcte, pp. 209 226], 
VoL IV. Scholia, coll. C. A. Brandis. 1836. 

Vol. V. Fragmenta. Scholiorum supplementum. Index Aristotelicus. 1870. 
Aristotelis opera omnia* Gracce et latine ediderunt Bussemaker, Dubner, 
Heiti! (Parisiis, 1848 1874)* 



Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle: 

Organon, ed. Th. Waitz 1 (Lipsiae, 1844 1846). 

Physica, rec. Car. Prantl 1 (Lipsiae, 1879). 

J)c Caelo, DC Gcncrationc et Corruptione \ rec. Car. Prantl (Lipsiae, 1881). 

Mcteorologica, rec. J. L. Ideler (Lipsiae, 1834 1836). 

P/irva Naturalia, recogn. GuiL Biehl 1 (Lipsiae, 1898). 

De Sensu and De Memoria, ed. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1906). 

Ttfpl <<*>, Thierkunde, von H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer (Leipzig, 
1868). 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 



xii LIST OF AUTHORITIES 

Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle {continued) : 

De Partibus Animalium, ex recogn. B. Langkavel 1 (Lipsiae, 1868). 

(De Coloribus.) Ueber die Farben, von Carl Prantl (Munchen, 1849). 

Metaphysica, recogn. H. Bonitz (Bonnae, 1848 1849). 

Metaphysica, rec. W. Christ 1 (Lipsiae, 1886); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1895). 

Ethica Nicomachea, rec. I. By water 1 (Oxonii, 1890). 

The Ethics, by Sir A. Grant (3rd edition, London, 1874). 

The Politics, by W. L. Newman 1 (Oxford, 1887- 1902). 

Ars Rhetorica cum adnotat. L. Spengel (Lipsiae, 1867). 

Rhetoric with E. M. Cope's Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 

1877). 

Ars Rhetorica, ed. A. Roemer 1 (Lipsiae, 1885). 
De Arte Poetica, rec. J. Vahlen 1 (3rd edition, Lipsiae, 1885). 
Fragmenta collegit V. Rose (Lipsiae, 1886). 

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae 
litterarum regiae Borussicae (Berolini, 1882 1907). 

Aetius, Placita: in Dicls, DoxogTaphici Graeci. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Anima cum Mantissa, ed. I. IJruns 1 (Dorolini, 
1887). 

Quaesliones. De Fato. De Mixtione, ed. L Bruns 1 (Berolini, 1892). 

In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. Haycltick 1 (Berolini, 1891). 

In Aristotelis De Sensu, cd. Thtirot (Paris, 1875); ed. Wcmlland 1 

(Berolini, 1901). 

Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotclis latricis Mcnoniis et aliis mcidicis cologne, 

ed. H. Diels (Berolini, 1893). 

Argyropylus: see Berlin edition of Aristotle, Vol. in. 
Aristoxenus, Die harmonisdien Fragmente, von V. Marquurd ^Berlin, iS6,S); see 

also Musici Scriptorcs. 

Apelt, O., Beitrag*e zur Gesch. clcr tfricchischen Philosophic (Leipzig, 1891). 
Bacchius: in Musici Scriptorcs, cd, Jan. 
Bacuniker, Clem., T)cs Aristotcles Lehrc von clcn uussern uiui innern Sinnos- 

vermogen (Leipzig, 1877). 

in Philologische Rundschau 1882, Sp. 1356 1360. 

Das Problem dcr Matcric (Mimster, 1890). 

Barco, G., Espo.si/.ionc critica dclla psicologia ^reca. Dofinixione dell 7 aninia 
(Torino-Roma, 1879). 

Dcll J aniina vcgctativa e scnsitiva (Torino, 1881). 

Bast, F. J., Commentatio Palaco^raphica : api>endcd, pp. 7<\3 861, to (Jrc^orii 
Corinthii ct aliorum gram mat i corn m libri dc dialcctis linguae gract:ae, ccl. 
G. H, Schacfer (Lipsiae, 1811). 

Beare, J. L, De Anima u. 8. 3, 419 b 22 25; De Scnsu VH. : in Hcrmathena 
No. xxx., Vol. xni. (1905), pp. 73 76. 

Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcrnaeon to Aristotle 

(Oxford, 1906). 

Belger, Chr., De Anima A. r. 402 b 16: in Hermes xni. (1878), ]>p. 302, 303, 
Bergk, Th., Zu Aristoteles' DC Aniina I. 4: in Hermes xvm, (1883), p. 518, 
Bernays, J., Die Dialoge des Aristotelcs (Berlin, 1863). 
Bichl, W., Ueber den BegrifF vow bei Aristoteles (Linx 1864). 
Bonitz, H., Aristotelische Studien I. v. (Wicn, 18621867). 

. * My citations arc usually made from this edition. 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES xiii 

Bonitz, H., Ueber den Gebrauch von re yap bei Aristoteles : in Zeitschrift fur 
die osterreichischen Gymnasien xvm. (1867), pp. 74 76. 

Zur Erklarung einiger Stellen aus Aristot. Schrift liber die Seele: in 

Hermes vn. (1873), PP- 416436. 

Brandis, C. A., Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophic 

(Berlin, 18351866). 
Brentano, Fr., Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom 

vovs TroirjTiKus (Mainz, 1867). 
Bullinger, A., Aristoteles 3 Nus-Lehre (De Anima m. cc. 48 incl.) (Dillingen, 

1882). 

Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). 
Busse, Ad., De Anima 434a 1215, in Hermes xxm. (1888), pp. 469 sq. 

in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift xn. (1892), Sp. 549 552. 

Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Aristoteles : in Hermes XXVIII. 

(1893), pp. 252276. 

Bywater, I., Aristolelia : in Journal of Philology XIV. (1885), pp. 40 525 xvil. 

(1888), pp. 5374- 

Chaignet, A. E., Essai sur la psychologic d'Aristote (Paris, 1883). 
Chandler, H. W., Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions (London, 1866). 
Christ, W., Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata (Berolini, 1853). 
Cornford, F. M., Plato and Orpheus : in Classical Review xvn. pp. 433 445. 

in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society LXXV. (1906), p. 13. 

Dembowski, J., Quaestiones aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. 1881). 

in Wocheiischrift fur classische Philologie IV. (1887), Sp. 430 433. 

Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1879). 

Studia Empedoclea: in Hermes xv. (1880), pp. 161 179. 

Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles : in Sitzungsberichte der 

Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften 1883, pp. 477 494. 

Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia in Rheinisches Museum XLII. 

(1887), pp. 114- 

Parmenides (Berlin, 1897), 

Poetarum Philosophorum fragmenta (Berolini, 1901). 

Herakleitos von Ephesos (Berlin, 1901). 

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). 

Dittenberger, W., Exegetischc und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen 
des Aristoteles (Metaphysik und de Anima). (Rudolstadt, 1869.) 

in Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, pp. 1601 1616. 

Dyroff, A., Demokritstudien (Leipzig, 1899). 

Essen, E., Der Keller zu Skepsis. Vcrsuch uber das Schicksal der aristotelischen 
Schriften. Gymn.-Progr. (Stargard, 1866). 

Ein Beitrag zur Losung der aristotelischen Frage (Berlin, 1884). 

Das erste Buch der aristotelischen Schrift iiber die Seele ins Deutsche 

tibertnigen etc. (Icna, 1892). 

Das zweite Buch in kritischer Uebersetzung (lena, 1894). 

Das dritte Buch (lena, 1896). 



Empedoclis Agrigentini carmmum reliquiae, ed. S. Karsten (Amstelodami, 1838). 
Eucken, R. De Aristotelis dicendi ratione (Gottingae, 1866). 

Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1868). 

Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872). 

Euclidis, De Musica: in Musici Scriptores. 

Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum, coll. Meineke (Berolini, 18391841); Comi- 
corum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. Th. Kock (Lipsiae, 18801888). 



xiv LIST OF AUTHORITIES 

Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach (Parisiis, 1860 1867, 1881). 
Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough (London and New York, 1890). 
Freudenthal, J., Ueber den Begriff des Wortes 'rrivr) (Berolini, 1831). 
Philoponi, JoanniSj In Aristotelis De Anima libros Commentaria, ed, Hayduck 1 

(Berolini, 1897). 
Poppeh-euter, Hans, Zur Psychologic des Aristoteles, Theophrast, Strata 

(Leipzig, 1892). 

Praechter, K., in Berliner philologische WochenschrifL, 1902, Sp. 193 201. 
Prisciani Lydi quae extant (Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, pp. i 37), ed. 

Bywater (Berolini, 1886). 
Riddcll, Digest of Idioms, appended to his edition of Plato's Apology (Oxford, 

1877)- 

Ritter, B., Die Grundprincipien der aristotelischen Seelenlehre (Jena, 1880). 
Rodier, G., Note sur un passage du De Anima d'Aristote, ill. 2, 426 b 3: in 

Revue des dtudes anciennes, 1901, pp. 313 315. 
Roeper, G., Zu De Anima II. 5, in. 3, in. 6: in Philologus vn. (1852), pp. 238, 

324, 768. 

Rohde, E., Psyche (3rd edition, Tubingen und Leipzig, 1903). 
Sander, Julius, Alkmaeon von Kroton (Wittenberg, 1893). 
Schaefer, G,, Die Philosophic des Heraklit von Ephesus und die moderne 

Heraklitforschung (Leipzig, 1902). 

Schell, J. H., Die Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der Aristo- 
telischen Philosophic entwickclt (Freiburg im Br., 1873). 
Schieboldt, F, (X, De irnaginatione disquisitio ex Aristotelis libris repetita 

(Lipsiae, 1882). 
Schlottmann> K., Das Vergangliche and Unvergangliche in der menschlichen 

Seele nach Aristoteles, Univ. Progr. (Halle, 1873). 
Schneider, G., Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima in. 3: in 

Rheinisches Museum XXI. (1866), pp. 444 454. 

Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima in. 3 : in Rheinisches 

Museum xxn. (1867), p. 145. 

Zu Aristotelis de anima (in. 3, 428 b 25): in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasial- 

wesen xxi. (1867), pp. 631634. 

Shorey, P., in American Journal of Philology, xxn. (1901), pp. 149164. 
Siebeck, H., Geschichte der Psychologic (Gotha, 18801884). 

Zu Aristoteles in Philologus XL. (1881), pp. 347 356. 

Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck 1 

(Berolini, 1882). 
Sophoniae in iibros Aristotelis De Anirna Paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck 

(Berolini, 1883). 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 



xvi LIST OF AUTHORITIES 

Stapfer, A. A., Studia in Aristotelis de anima libros collata (Landishutae, I 

Kritische Studien zu Aristoteles' Schrift von der Seele (Landshut, 1890). 

Steinhart, Car., Symbolae criticae, Progr. (Schulpforte, 1843). 

Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1892). 

Susemihl, Franz, in Jahresbericht iiber die Fortschritte der classischen Alter- 

thumswissenschaft (Bursian), Vols. TX., pp. 347 '35- ' xvn., 261 sqq,; 

XXX., 3548; XXXIV. 2535; XLII., 26, 238240; LXVII., 103- Ml: 

LXXV., 95100; LXXIX., 99 sqq., 279; T.xxxviii., 1215. 

in Philologische Wochenschnft, 1882, Sp. 1283 sq. ; 1884, Sp. 784; 1893, 

Sp. 13171320; 1895, Sp. 1031. 

in Jenaer Litteraturzeitung iv. (1877), Sp. 707 sq. 

in Philologischer Anzeiger, 1873, pp. 683, 690. 

in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie, 1884, Sp. 1410. 

in Philologus XLVI. (1888), p. 86. 

Appendix to Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. Susemihl (Lipsiac, 

1887). 

Tannery, P., Pour 1'histoire de la science hellfcne (Paris, 1887). 
Teichmuller, G., Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874). 
Themis tii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supers unt, cd, L. Spengel 
(De Anima in Vol. II., pp. i 231). 

In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinxe 1 (Bcrohni, 

1899). 

Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia, ex rccogn. F. Wimnicr 
(Lipsiae, 1854 1862). 

Fragmentum De Sensibus, ed. H. Diels 1 in Doxographi Gracci, pp. 499 

527. 

See also Priscianus Lydus. 

Thompson, W. H., On the genuineness of the Sophist of Plato etc. : in Journal 
of Philology vin. (1879), pp. 290 322. 

Torstrik, Ad., Die Authentica der Berliner Ausgabe des Aristotelcs : in Philo- 
logus xii. (1857), pp. 494530; xin. (1858), pp. 204 sq. 

in Rheinisches Museum xxi. (1866), p. 640. 

Der Anfang-.der Physik des Aristoteles : in Neue Jahrbuchcr fiir Philologie 

xcv. (i?G/), pp. 236244. 

Zu Aristoteles' Psychologic (r 4, 429 b 10; r 3, 428 a 8 ; r 4, 429 a 29 

b 5): in Neue Jahrbiicher fur Philologie xcv. (1867), pp. 245 sq. 

in Literarisches Centralblatt (1877), Sp. 1462 sq. 

Trendelenburg, Fr. Ad., Geschichte der Katcgorienlehrc (Berlin, 1846). 

Historische Beitrage zur Philosophic II. (Berlin, 1855); in. (Berlin, 

1867). 

Elementa log-ices Aristoteleae, ed. 8 (Berolini, 1878). 

Vahlen, J., Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik (Wien) i., 1865; " 1866; in., iv., 

1867. 
Aristotelische Aufsatze I. (Wien, 1872). 

Grammatisch-kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles: in Xeitschrift fur die 

osterreichischen Gymnasien xvin. (1867), pp. 721 725. 

Grammatisch kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles, in Xcitschrift fiir die 

osterreichischen Gymnasien xix. (1868), pp. n 21, 253 256. 

Wilson, J. Cook, Conjectural emendations in the text of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, in Journal of Philology XI. (1882), pp. 119124. 

1 My citations are usually made from this edition. 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES xvii 

Wilson, J. Cook, Interpretation of certain passages of the De Anima in the 
editions of Trendelenburg and Torstrik, in Transactions of the Oxford 
Philological Society, 1882/3, PP- 5 1 3- 

in Philologische Rundschau (1882), Sp. 1473 1481. 

Wyse, W., The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge, 1904). 

Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente von R. 

Heinze (Leipzig, 1892). 

Zabarella, J., Commentaria in tres Aristotelis libros de anima (Venetiis, 1605). 
Zabarellae opera integra ed. I. L. Havenreuter (Francofurti, 1623, 1624). 
Zeller, E, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Band I., 5th edition (Leipzig, 1892); 

II., 4th edition (1889) ; II. 2 Abth. (in.), 3rd edition (1879) ; III. I Abth. (iv.), 

3rd edition (1880); in. 2 Abth. (v), 3rd edition (1881). 

English Translation of 3rd edition of II. 2 by Costelloe and Muirhead 

under the title "Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics" (London, New York, 
and Bombay, 1897). 

in Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie III., 303, 311 sq. ; vi., 406 sqq. ; 

viil., 134 sqq. ; IX., 536 sqq. 

Ziaja, J., Aristoteles De Sensu cc. r, 2, 3 bis 439 b 18 iibersetzt und mit Anmerk- 
ungen versehcn, Progr. (Breslau, 1887), 

Die aristotelische Lehre vom Gedachtniss und von der Association der 

Vorstcllungen (Leobschiitz, 1879). 



xx INTR OD UCTION. I 

external soul, on which the life of the individual depends, plays the 
same part as in the folk-lore of savages to-day 1 . The opening lines 
of the Iliad &r&w a sharp distinction between the heroes themselves, 
left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to 
Hades or the invisible world. The ghost of Patroclus, which 
appears to Achilles in a dream, is an emaciated, enfeebled shadow, 
deprived of all its strength by severance from the body, which was 
the real man. In the underworld these pale, ineffectual ghosts arc 
much alike in general condition. Apart from a few notorious 
offenders punished for their misdeeds, they pursue the shadows of 
their former avocations. Whether in Greek language and thought 
two separate conceptions are blended, whether the sum of the 
intellectual and moral qualities was associated at one time with 
the blood and at another with the breath, whether the breath of life 
superseded an older smoke-soul, the exhalation arising from spilt 
blood, and whether these two conceptions were connected with the 
practices of inhumation and cremation respectively, are matters of 
speculation on which it is hardly possible to arrive at a definite 
conclusion 2 . When we pass from Homer to later poets we find the 
same primitive beliefs variously modified. In Hesiod the heroes 
go no longer to the underworld, but to the Isles of the Blest, and 
ancestral spirits have developed into " daemons " exerting a benefi- 
cent influence on their descendants . From the dirges of Pindar 
we have two important fragments 4 . One is a glowing picture of 
the lot of the happy dead. In the other we are told that, " while 
the body of every man folio weth after mighty death, there still 
liveth a likeness of his prime which alone is of divine origin, which 
slumbereth so long as the limbs are busy, but full oft in dreams 
showeth to sleepers the issue that draweth near of pleasant things 
and cruel." 

In the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods the primitive 
Orphic beliefs were moulded into a thoroughgoing doctrine 

doctrine. of transmigration. Three main conceptions underlie 

Orphic asceticism. First, there is the opposition between body and 
soul. The soul is better than the body and is buried in the body 
for its sins, the body is its temporary prison. Next comes the 
necessity for a purification of the soul. All evil is followed by 

1 Frazer, he, cit. t vol. n., c. iv. 

2 Etynnologically foftbi is connected with fumus : cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinker* I 



8 Hesiod, Works and Days, iai sqq. 
* . 95, 9<5- 



INTRODUCTION. I xxi 

retribution. Through abstinence and penance alone may the soul 
hope to regain its former blissful state. Thirdly, there is the long 
series of incarnations in which, according to their deeds during a 
former existence, souls take a higher or a lower place in human or 
animal bodies or even in plants 1 . Though these ideas occupy so 
small a place in literature, they are clearly very old, for the extant 
burlesque of Xenophanes 2 attests the acceptance of metempsychosis 
by Pythagoras, and all probability points to his having derived 
it from the still older Orphic sect. At Athens the Eleusinian 
mysteries, at which some such ideas were symbolically inculcated, 
were under the patronage of the state ; but nevertheless the belief 
in an after life in the underworld, as set forth by Homer, for the 
most part maintained its hold upon the ordinary educated citizen. 

I-ittle is to be learned from the Ionian thinkers, whom 
Ionian Aristotle calls physicists or physiologists 3 . In the 

physicists. dawn of enquiries which, strictly speaking, were 

rather scientific than philosophical, men sought to explain to 
themselves of what things were constituted and how they had come 
into their present condition. Their problem, we should now say, 
was the constitution of matter and, if occasionally, when they found 
the primary element in air or fire or some other body, they also 
declared that this was the cause of vital functions, it was merely a 
corollary to their general doctrine and of no special importance. 
The subjects on which we find hints are the substance of the soul, 
the distinction between its various powers, and the nature of 
knowledge. So far as the substance of the individual soul was 
identical with, or a product of, the universal element, they all 
agreed in regarding it as not immaterial, but of an extremely 
refined and mobile materiality. The soul was credited with the 
power to know and perceive, as well as the power to move the body. 
Heraclitus, who had grasped the flux of matter in 

Hemclitus, . , . , , , . , , , 

constant circulation, held it to be governed by an 
universal law. Knowledge to him consists in apprehending this law. 
In comparison with such knowledge he deprecated the evidence of 
sense: eyes and ears are better than the other senses, but are 
bad witnesses, if the soul does not understand. Meanwhile in 
the West other schools of philosophy had arisen, the Eleatic and 

1 Cf. KoMe, Pjysfa, n* pp. 103 sqq. 
ft Ftsig* 7 IX 

* "Jfifoe philosophical $$>eculatlonfi dn the soul from Thales to Democritus and Anaxagp 
re reviewed by Rohde, n. pp. 137 198- C also Beare, Greek Theories 



H, 



xxii INTRODUCTION. I 

Pythagorean. Xenophanes distinguished between truth and opinion. 
Parmenides derived the intelligence of man from the 

Parmenides. . 

composition and elementary mixture of his bodily 
parts, heat and cold being the elements of things 1 . The pre- 
ponderant element characterises the thought of the individual man. 
But the chief legacy of Parmenides to his successors was his 
doctrine of the one immutable Being, which alone satisfies the 
requirements of an object of knowledge. The element of the 
lonians did not satisfy these conditions, being endowed with the 
power to pass from one condition to another, whether intermittently 
or perpetually. Nothing, according to Parmenides, is ever generated 
or destroyed, however varied its manifestations and the changes it 
presents to the senses. On the foundation thus laid by Pannenides 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus constructed their systems, 
resolving apparent generation and destruction into combination 
and separation of primary elements or principles, themselves 
indestructible. They differed, Aristotle remarks, as to the number 
and nature of these indestructible elements 2 . Empedocles made a 
mistake in accepting a crude popular analysis into air, earth, fire and 
water, elements which do not so much as correspond to a rough divi- 
sion of matter into the solid, liquid and gaseous states. Anaxagoras, 
with his homoeomeries, was in our view still wider of the mark. 
Leucippus and Democritus at last found in the atoms a working 
hypothesis of the constitution of matter, which has lasted down to 
the present day. It is these three physical systems which most 
profoundly influenced Aristotle. He unfortunately accepted the first 
with modifications and opposed the last, by the merits of which he 
was nevertheless profoundly impressed. Each of these thrc k e systems 
took up the problem of the soul. But in the meantime medical 
enquiries had been actively prosecuted, and it is to a Pythaffo- 
rean ' Alcmaeon f Croton, that we owe the earliest 
advances towards the physiology of the senses. He 
was the first to recognise the brain as the central organ of 
intellectual activity. He dissected animals and by this means 
discovered the chief nerves of sense, which, like Aristotle, he called 
" conduits" or " channels," and he traced them to their termination in 
the brain. Deafness and blindness he held to be caused when by a 
concussion the brain was shifted out of its normal position and the 
channels of hearing and seeing respectively were thus blocked. He 
submitted the several senses to a searching examination, starting 

x Frag. 16 D. 

2 X>e Anima 404 b 30 sqq. 



INTRODUCTION. I xxiii 

with the anatomical construction of the sense-organ. The air in 
the ear he regarded as a sounding-board, and he attributed to the 
moisture, softness, flexibility and warmth of the tongue its capacity 
to reduce solid bodies to fluid as a necessary preliminary to tasting. 
He noticed the phenomenon which we call seeing sparks when the 
eye has received a heavy blow, and this suggested a crude theory 
of vision, postulating fire in the eye, a mistake repeated by Em- 
pedocles and by Plato. But it is with the glittering or transparent 
element of water in the eye that it sees, and it sees better according 
to the purity of the element. Vision is effected by the image of the 
thing seen and by the rays which issue from the eye within and 
pass outwards through the water. He derived memory from sense- 
perception and opinion from memory ; from memory and opinion 
combined he derived reason, which distinguishes men from the 
lower animals 1 . What scanty information we have about him 
comes chiefly from Theophrastus 2 , but it would be a great mistake 
to acquiesce in Aristotle's neglect of him. He is only once 
mentioned in De Anima^^ as having held that soul is immortal, on 
the singular ground that by its incessant motion it resembles the 
heavenly bodies, which he also held to be immortal. 

In Empedocles we are dealing not with a sober physical 

enquirer, but with a religious enthusiast and poet-philosopher. He 

accepted the transmigration of souls in a slightly 

Empedocles. , , ,. , . , , ,, , 

altered form ; he introduced wicked as well as good 
" daemons/ 7 condemned for their sins to wander for 10,000 years and 
to become souls of plants, beasts and men. In the course of their 
purification they become prophets, poets, physicians, princes, and 
again return to the gods 4 . Sensation in general he explained by 
the action of like upon like. Particles emanate from external 
bodies and enter our bodies by channels or pores. They cannot 
enter unless there is a certain proportion 3 between the emanation 
and the size and shape of the channel which is to receive it. Thus 
a sense-organ is a particular part of the body which, possessing 
channels of a certain size and shape, is adapted to receive 
emanations of a certain kind, of flavour, odour or sound. But his 
theory of vision was more complicated. Not only are there 

1 Plato, Phaedo 96 B, where, however, the name of Alcmaeon is not mentioned. 

* jDe Sensibtts, 25, 26 (Doxogr* Gr. 506, 25 sqq.) : cf. Philippson 0A*; di>6pU7rlt>ij> 
pp. 20 sq. and Julius Sander, Atkmaeon -von Kroton. 

* 405 a 29 sqq. * Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 248 D, E. 

& (rvfJLfjurpfa, >e Gen. et Corr. I. 8, 324 b 35 sqq. ; cf. Theophr. E>e Sensibus 7* 
Perhaps Bmpedocles was seeking to express the same fact as was Aristotle when he 
afterwards applied the word jAeo-brijs to sense. 

b 2 



xxiv INTRODUCTION. I 

emanations from visible objects, but there are also emanations from 
the eye. To this he was led by the analogy of the dark lantern, of 
which the camera obscura furnishes a modern illustration. The 
transparent plates of horn or linen in the lantern, made to protect 
the flame from the wind which might otherwise extinguish it, 
correspond to the thin coats or films in the eye covering the pupil, 
whose contents are partly of a fiery, partly of a watery, nature. 
From the pupil fiery and watery emanations leap forth through 
funnel-shaped channels to meet the fiery and watery emanations 
coming, the one from light, the other from dark* objects outside. 
The principle of "like by like" accounts for the mutual attraction 
of similar materials and their meeting, and, when the two sets of 
emanations meet, vision takes place. The preponderance of water 
or fire in the eye accounts for the fact that some animals see better 
in the dark, others in the daylight 1 . Thus, then, we perceive like 
by like, the four elements of all things, air, earth, fire and water, 
outside, because air, earth, fire and water are present in our bodies s 
Blood is the most perfect mixture of these four elements and to 
this blood where it is purest, viz. about the heart, ho attributed 
thought. As we see earth by earth which is in us* water by water, 
so we think by means of blood, the bodily tissue in which all four 
elements are most perfectly blended. Knipeclocles, then, con- 
sistently confined his attention to the bodily process. The mental 
or psychical state is either ignored in his explanation or reduced to 
its physical conditions. Yet on the problem of knowledges aware 
of the imperfection of the senses, he counsels us to withdraw our 
trust from them and prefer the guidance of reason* 

Anaxagoras distinguished sensation from intflHjft'iice and, 
whereas most of the Prc-Socratics agreed that we 

. - . , ,. ... .. ., 

perceive things by having within us something like 
them, he held that we perceive in virtue of the presence within us 
of something opposite to the thing perceived 3 . Knowledge is not 
to be gained from the senses, because their powers* cannot dis- 
criminate minute changes; while the reactionary physics which he 
propounded involved the presence in every sensible object of 
infinitesimal particles perceptible only in the ajfgre${ato and f 
blended with these, alien particles altogether imperceptible, because 
infinitesimal. Over against this infinity of homoeomeries he set 

1 Aristotle, Dt Gen. et Corr. i+ 8, 324 U 35 tjq. t Dt &tttu i f 437 1> 334^8 a 5, 
Theophrastus, De S&uibnti g 7 24. 



8 45k I 4 3I Theophrastus, Dt Sensibtts, *,, 



INTR OD UCTION. I xx v 

the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and 
unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is 
Nous 1 . The part it played was to communicate the first impulse 
to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in 
which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of 
the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in 
varying degrees. It governs and orders and knows. We fortu- 
nately possess the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, 
and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was 
its nature 2 . Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason 
and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing 
use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast 
necessary to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, 
for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. We 
know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, 
again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in 
a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. 
Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while 
animals with gleaming eyes see better by night. 

In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach 
t-eucippus mature development. The problem hitherto had been 

Dtfn,c..i.iu*. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus pro- 
pounded a working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient 
for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from 
sense, it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. 
Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge 
that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge 
which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given 
by the senses*. The existence of void apparently contradicts obser- 
vation, experiment fails even now to obtain an absolute void. The 
properties of body are all given by sense. The Atomists accepted 
the evidence of sense for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps 
Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it for 
colours, sounds, odours and flavours. Out of impenetrable atoms 
of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and the 
different qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or 
size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them 4 . 
The soul is no exception. It is a complex of atoms within the 

1 404a 25 sqq., 404 b i 5, 405 a 13 at, 405 b 19 2f, 429 a 18 20, b 23 sq. 

* Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 infra* 

9 Frag- ii D aj>ud Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathematieos, vir. 138 sq. 

4 De A. 404 a r 4, De Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 315 b 6 sqq. 



xx vi INTRODUCTION. I 

body. Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and 
mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire 1 . In thus postulating a 
body within the body to account for vital and intellectual functions, 
Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any 
previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he 
sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by 
supposing" that there is a little animal inside to move htm. But 
there is this difference, that the little animal is imagined to be ulivc, 
the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter*. Tints to push the 
implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con* 
sequences and make the half-conscious hylozoism of the early 
lonians blossom forth in materialism is the jjreat merit of 
Leucippus and Democritus. All processes of sensation* then, are 
instances of the contact 3 between bodies. They are caused by 
"idols" or films which are constantly streaming off from the 
surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the 
relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Knipcdoclrs ; 
but the latter made his emanations enter the body through chan- 
nels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void 
between the atoms. The same explanation would apply to thought, 
which is excited when the material image of an object enters the 
equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications 
of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and 
Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which 
produce the different varieties of taste 4 . Things made of atoms 
angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose 
atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and so cm. His 
four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for 
by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysts was 
not attempted for the objects of sound and smell. 

In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and 
of even Empedocles made to bring physics and physio- 
i gy j nto s hape is the retrograde system of Diogenes 
of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised 
for us by Aristophanes, He was not satisfied with the resolution 
by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies into 
infinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities, though he was 

1 403 b 314048. jr6\ 405 a 5 13. 
tt Cf. JDf A. 4$6b 15 zs, 409b 7 n. 

8 2)e Sffisu 4, 443 a 39 sqq. For what folio w see TheophnwtttK, /)* AVw/Awr, (& 49 
83, who treats of Democritus very fully. 
4 Theophrastus, De Smtibwt \ 64 qq* 



INTR OD UCTION. I xx vii 

more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the 
seat of intelligence. But he supplemented this theory by reverting 
to the position of the lonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had 
chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air with 
sentience and intelligence. "All creatures," he says, "live and 
see and hear by the same thing " (viz. air), " and from the same 
thing all derive their intelligence as well 1 ." He thus made the 
air in us play an important part in the processes of perception 
and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea 
that the brain is the central organ ; the air in the sense-organs, 
the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the 
air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes 
place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented 
by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal 
air ; otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. 
He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed, 
blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the 
internal air is prevented. His account of hearing may be cited 
for the likeness it bears to that given in DeAnima. "The animals 
which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear 
(like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, 
and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in 
the ears sets in motion the internal air" [in or near the brain], 
" Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in 
the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct 
noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is 
not at rest 9 ." 

In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came 
to a halt. The progress of enquiry had been marked by the 
foundation of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in 
a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. 
The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing 
mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, 
but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a 
space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictory 
speculations. The professional educators, whom we know as the 
Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests and made human- 
ism, literary criticism, erudition their main themes. 
Protagoras, the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical 

1 See Simplicity in Physica^ p. 151, 14 153, 24, Theophrastus, De 

3943. 

* Tbeophr* De Senf&uS) 41 : cf, JDe A* 4*0 a 3 sqq. 



xxviii INTRODUCTION. I 

attitude and maintained that man was the measure of all things, 
which, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to mc f 
so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There were 
many sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on which Greece 
had embarked. The followers of Hcraclitus pushed the doctrine of 
flux to an extreme. Things never are, but are always beromin;.;, 
they have no fixed attributes. When we say that a thing is, we 
must In the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are 
always two of these fluxes, one the movement or change producing 
sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives 
the sensations, the flux of our senses. The result of the contact 
between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and 
the eye becomes a seeing 1 eye. When the flux of Socrates well 
comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he is 
ill, it will be soun Both these statements will be true: in fact, 
all statements are true. What wine is depends entirely on the 
man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external 
things, they change so rapidly. On the other hand, Gorgms of 
Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hanlly 
caricatured the position of the younger Kleatics when he put 
forward the thesis that, if anything existed, it could not be known, 
and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be com- 
municated. Such views as these or that of Kuthydenuis that 
falsehood is impossible are by no means universal among the 
Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistinnologiYal 
theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the 
scepticism not of one school, but of many* Aristotle justifies the 
revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he holds that most of 
the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly to 
the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention to 
the importance of the knowing mind in every act of kno\vlxlj;r. 
In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems were 
discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time 
more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those 
who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholo^y 
can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical 
Socrates- When he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was 
confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his 
interlocutors could adequately define. 

Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not 

piato a ^ t * Lat ** e sa y s * s Bended to be taken serknutly* 

We must allow for the mythical element, and in 



INTRODUCTION. I xxix 

particular for his imaginative sympathy with the whole mass of 
floating legend, myth and dogma, of a partly religious, partly 
ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but 
not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and 
Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods 1 . The Platonic myths 
afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all 
the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of 
the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its 
long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its 
task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in 
successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law 
of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancy 
of Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which 
the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir 
his imagination. His approval of ethical fiction is attested by his 
own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that 
any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical 
imagery, Plato never set about writing a treatise De Artima. We 
find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself. In each 
dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine 
the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. 
Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we corne across 
models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight 
have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something ab- 
solutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato 
fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored 
altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a 
mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought 
were regard cil as changes in the body. In the Tkcaetctus* we 
find the following argument. We do not perceive by but through 
the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot 
perceive through another. Consequently, if we know something 
about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through 
sense. Now we do know many such things ; that they are, that 
they are different from one another, that both are two things and 
that each is one. How do we know such facts? The soul appre- 
hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and 
Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity 
are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. 
The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the 

1 See Cornford, ** Plato and Orpheus*" in Clans. Rw. xvn. pp. +& 445. 
tt 184 



xxx INTRODUCTION. I 

bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past 
or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from 
the moment of birth have by nature sensations which pass through 
the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in 
relation to Being 1 and expediency comes with difficulty and re- 
quires a long time, much trouble and education. It is impossible 
to attain truth and know it without attaining Being ; knowledge 
does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them 
attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is 
alone possible. 

In the Phaedo^ the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove that 
learning is reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, 
if questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing 
that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, e.g. of geometry, existed 
previously in the mind of the respondent This proof is as follows. 
The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lytv, 
a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Shntuius 
himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about either in- 
directly or directly. If it is effected directly and the object seen 
is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how tar 
the remembrance is exact For instance, we affirm thut there is 
an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our purcoptinn 
of sensibles which arc equal That this idea is something distinct 
from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensible* may appear 
equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of 
equality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to 
observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of 
the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our 
knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the 
sensiblcs. And whereas (i) this sense of deficiency in the .sensible* 
has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, 
(2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, 
it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have 
been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies to all 
ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtained 
this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in 
full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it ut 
birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on 
this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account of 
it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas ; it 

1 72 B 76 1>. In the summary of the ai-gumcnt I have mainly follow*! thai trtvcm i*y 
Mr Archer-Hind, p. 77. ** J 



INTR OD UCTION. I xxxi 

follows then that the second alternative is true ; we lose this know- 
ledge and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our 
souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must 
have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more 
passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental 
process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former 
which he sought to explain. 

Though the various mental operations are often discussed and 
. e . distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification 

Classification te * J 

of mental m any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The vana- 

opera ions. ^.^ . g ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ct #&& each attempt at partial 

classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to 
prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in the 
Republic 1 the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite 
is brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, 
and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the 
analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the 
determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in 
the Timaetts* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor 
does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know- 
ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance 3 , or again, 
with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and 
conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between know- 
ledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repiiblic*. 
In the Sophist* discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with 
herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this 
results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. In 
the Philebus* Plato goes more into detail and distinguishes sen- 
sation, memory, imagination and recollection. When the affections 
of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said 
to be insensibility or unconsciousness. When the affections of 
the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there 
is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its 
non-retention, the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery 
of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is 
recollection. Later in the dialogue 7 the relation of memory to 
imagination is illustrated : the former is a scribe or recorder, what 
It records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter, 

1 434 C 445 K. 

3 171*, r. * 477 A sqq. 4 51 1 JD, R, 533 K, 534 A. 

ft 16% K sqq, Cf Tfoaefcttts, 189*;, Phtttb, 38 D. 

* 330-34 C. 7 38E~ 408, 



xxxii INTRODUCTION. I 

whose glowing pictures excite hope. In this dialogue also there 
is a practical end, all these distinctions being subservient to 
the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a 
memorable passage of the Ttoactetus* the introduction of two 
illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a dovecot 
or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knou'Icd^c- 
is true opinion. But the similes in themselves are contributions 
to psychology of permanent value. That of the waxen block 
presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation 
conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal 
upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of such 
impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals 
being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax: 
and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass". 
The other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the 
relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter bcing the 
deliberate recovery of lost impressions ; at the same time it shows 
the relation between the mere possession of knowledge and its 
actual application or exercise. 

The most comprehensive view of Plato's psychology is to be 
found in the Timaeits. lie starts with reason or with 

Sensation. 

the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This 
process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe 
or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is *, omened with 
circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same 
and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference, 
the two most important relations, and without such jud^im-nt^ 
there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought 
from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results 
in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows 
upon the creation of universal soul, and it is to those particular 
souls, each united to a body, that the following desnipfinn applies. 
When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confim*cl 
in a body, a body, as Plato says, "in-flowing and out-flmvm;; 
continually," these revolutions, "being confined in a great river, 

1 191 c sqq., 197 <: sqq. 

u The comparison of a present sensation with a previous impression imptie* some 
representative faculty ; in this passage we hear of twota and S6$a, but not a*ra (>94 ) & *ff r&> r$* ^oggt 
wpt>- But it wouW be a mistake to infer that he here favour* the heart rather th*w thcr 
brain as the organ of MHSUS communh. 



INTRODUCTION. I xxxiii 

neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne 
violently to and fro. For great as was the tide sweeping over 
them and flowing off which brought them sustenance, a yet greater 
tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against 
them ; as when the body of any one came in contact with some 
alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with 
liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds 
borne on the air." The body of the animal, be it remembered, is 
composed of the same four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with 
which the animal comes in contact in alien bodies, whether in the 
process of nutrition or in that of sensation. " And so the motions 
from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to 
the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been 
called and still are called sensations 1 . Then too did they produce 
the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining 
with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently 
shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered 
the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped 
it from governing and from going ; while the circle of the Other 
they displaced ____ So that the circles can barely hold to one an- 
other, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, 
sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted ____ And when 
from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to 
the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare 
its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, 
and show themselves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor 
or leader in them at that time. And whenever sensations from 
without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them 
the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern 
though they really are governed. On account then of all these 
experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the 
beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body 51 ." The soul, 
according to this account, is in ceaseless activity, and such normal 
activity, or thought, is from tixne to time disturbed by sensation, 
which has a tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood 
and error. We might compare the definition from the Philebns 
above summarised 8 , in which it is said that when the bodily 
affections pass through both body and soul and give rise there 
to a sort of shock or tremor not only peculiar to each, but shared 



1 Plato connects* aXo-Qyo'is with &l 



xxxiv INTR OD UCTION. I 

by both in common, the movement which body and soul thus 
share may properly be called sensation. 

Plato started with intellect and thought. Rightly understood, 
he does not oppose body to soul, but rather sense to 

Sense and L A ' 

reason, reason, as one faculty of soul to another. But what 

are the limits of sense and reason ? To which should be referred 
the knowledge of relations of cause and effect, of good and evil ? 
Sense, we are told in the Republic^, is sufficient where a thing 1 does 
not tend to pass into or be confused with its opposite; where the: 
data tend to become confused, sense is insufficient and we must 
appeal to intellect. What sense perceives confusedly thought 
thinks distinctly and in isolation. Sense at the best can only 
give opinion, but reason and true opinion are distinct ** because 
they are different in origin and unlike in nature. The one is 
engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion ; the 
one is ever accompanied by right understanding* the other is 
without understanding; the one is not to be moved by pcrsua.su m t 
the other yields to persuasion ; true opinion we must admit is 
shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very small 
portion of mankind 3 ." Sense and thought are concerned with 
different objects, the particular and the universal. The defects 
of sense are not in the subject, but in the object, because the 
particulars of sense are in flux and have no fixed being. Prota- 
goras held that sensible things have their so-called qualities only 
by acting or being acted upon and, as activity and passivity art? 
always relative, no quality belongs to any thing per jte*. We cannot 
say that they are per sc anything in particular, or even thai they 
are at all. They only become: things are always becoming, not 
being. When an object comes in contact with our scnso-organ 
and interaction takes place, a sensation arises in the organ and 
simultaneously the object becomes possessed of a certain quality. 
But the sensation in the organ and the quality in the object are 
results which are produced only by the contact and last only aw 
long as it lasts- In this doctrine of Heraclitus and Protagoras 
Plato acquiesced, so far as it relates to sense and sensibles. The 
testftnony of Aristotle on this point is explicit 3 and the dialogues 
confirm it But, instead of concluding with Protagoras that all 
presentations are relatively true and that there is no such thing 
as objective truth, he drew a different inference, viz. that, if there 



s Tim. 51 E, Archer-Hmar excellence the cause of motion, Democritus, who thought it fire, 
and Anaxagoras, being typical instances. All assumed that if a 
thing causes motion, it is itself moved. Others, again, start with 
the assumption that like is known by like and infer that the soul is 
-composed of all the elements, whether they are one or many: 
Empedocles that 'it is composed of earth, air, fire and water ; Plato 
of number. All definitions maybe reduced to three : that it causes 
motion, Is perceptive, is incorporeal The last characteristic leads 
those to choose the finest matter, who acknowledge none but 

H. C 



xxxviii INTRODUCTION. I 

corporeal elements. Subsequently it is objected that if the soul is 
a fine matter, as the soul is in all the sensitive body, we have two 
bodies in one. 

The application of the idea of motion to the soul leads, it 
is argued, to absurdities. There are four kinds of motion, loco- 
motion, qualitative change, decay, growth, and our enquiry is 
whether the soul is moved in and through itself, and not as sailors 
in a ship. All kinds of motion are in space ; therefore, if the soul is 
moved, the soul must be in space. As it moves the body, it would 
naturally move like the body ; and in that case it would o up and 
down in, and in and out of, the body. In general, we contend, 
the soul does not move the body, as Democritus supposed, by 
physical agency, but by means of purpose of some sort, that is, 
thought. The most thorough application of motion to explain 
soul, and in particular the soul which thinks, was made by Plato 
in the Timacus, and this is criticised at some length. Like other 
theories, it neglects the relation between soul and body in virtue of 
which the soul acts, the body is acted upon, the soul moves awl 
the body is moved. 

Another definition of the soul makes it a harmony or blending 
of opposites. This notion may be applicable to health or any 
bodily excellence, but will not apply to the soul. Harmony will 
not cause motion. Harmony means either (i) a close fit or adjust- 
ment of bodies, or (2) the proportion in which elements are mixed. 
It is needless to show that the first meaning is inapplicable, the*rc 
are so many fittings of the limbs. As to (2) t in flesh and blood 
the elements are mixed in different proportions; which mixturt* is 
the soul ? Returning to motion, we conclude that the only motion 
of which soul admits is motion per accident due to motion of the 
body, as whiteness is moved when a white body is moved* A 
stronger argument than any our predecessors have adduced is 
derived from the attributes of the soul, such as pain and pIwiMiiv, 
fear, anger, and other emotions, sensation and thought, all of which 
are commonly believed to be movements. In them, however, the 
soul is not moved: it is merely the cause of movement in the heart 
or some other bodily part It would be better to ascribe the.sc 
attributes to the man and say that he perceives or thinks or feels 
pleasure and pain with his soul. This leads to an interesting 
digression on intellect, followed by a refutation of Xcnucratcs, who 
< defined the soul as a self-moving number. How can the attributes 
which are known to belong to soul possibly be deduced from such 
a definition? It will not afford even the slightest hint of them. 



INTRODUCTION. I xxxix 

The same argument had previously been used against the definition 
of soul as a harmony. 

Two characteristics of soul, (i) that it moves itself, (2) that it is 
composed of very fine matter, have now been dismissed. Against 
the third, that it is composed of the elements and that like knows 
like, it may be urged that then the soul ought to have in it 
all compounds, all categories. Moreover, a unifying principle 
would be needed 1 . The soul is not to be held divisible into parts 
independent of each other, for in that case what keeps its parts 
together ? That must be the real soul. Again, as the whole soul 
keeps the whole body together, each part of the soul should keep a 
part of the body together : but we can assign no such function 
to intellect. 

Book II. begins by defining the soul. We premise that of 
entities to which categories are applied substance is one, where by 
substance we mean either (i) matter, which is not yet anything in 
particular, or (2) form, which makes it something in particular, or 
(3) the union of matter and form in the particular thing. Under 
substance in the last sense is included a natural body partaking of 
life. What we mean by life is the power of the body to nourish 
itself and to grow and decay of itself. Body is clearly matter here, 
therefore soul is form. And, if for matter and form we substitute 
potentiality and actuality and distinguish the first stage of actuality, 
corresponding to knowledge, from the second, corresponding to the 
exercise of knowledge, the soul will be the first actuality of a 
natural body furnished with organs, or of a body that has in itself 
the principle of movement and rest. Thus soul is the quiddity or 
formal essence, to which we have analogies in the cutting power of 
the axe and the visual power of the eye, both actualities in the first 
degree, as contrasted with actual cutting and actual seeing, which 
are actualities in the second degree. 

The definition thus found is the most comprehensive possible, 
applying to life in all its various forms, (i) intellect, (2) sense, 
(3) locomotion, (4) motion of nutrition, growth and decay. Plants 
exhibit life in its last form only. Animals, in addition to this, 
have sensation. Of the different senses touch is indispensable. 
Experiment shows that most of these vital functions are really 
inseparable from one another, though at the same time separable in 
thought Whether this holds of intellect also it is not so easy to 

1 Aristotle's own view is that the sense-organs are composed of the elements, in 
touch all are blended. But sense is not this corporeal organ itself, but rather the 
character or power which resides in the organ. 



xl INTRODUCTION. I 

decide. If to these vital functions be added appetence, which 
clearly is present where sensation is, a certain gradation can be 
recognised. They may be arranged in an ascending series. The 
lower can exist without the higher, but the higher in mortal 
creatures always involve the lower. And there is a similar 
gradation in the senses. It seems, then, that there is one definition 
of soul exactly as there is one definition of rectilinear figure. Alike 
in figures and in the various types of soul, the earlier members of 
the series exist implicitly and potentially in the later ; the triangle 
is implicit in the quadrilateral and the nutritive faculty in the 
sensitive. The definition docs not dispense us from investigating 
in detail what is the soul in the plant, in the brute, ami in man. 

Having reached this point, we naturally expect that each of the 
four main vital functions, nutrition, sensation, intellect, locomotion, 
will be investigated in detail ; and this in fact is what the writer 
proceeds to do. Nutrition, growth and decay and reproduction* 
are dealt with briefly in Book II,, c, 4; sense-perception at very 
great length, Book II., c. 5 Book HL, c. 2; and imagination, which 
is intimately connected with sense, in Book in., c* 3 ; upon 
imagination follows intellect, Book nt, cc. 4 8 ; and, lastly, the 
principle of progressive motion in animals, which is identified with 
appetence, occupies us in Book in., ce. y 11. The treatise ends 
with an attempt, from the standpoint of teleology, to answer the 
question why the various forms of life occur in this ascending scale. 

Aristotle himself was not consciously con^tructinj; a new 
science. His discussion of the soul was forced uwn 

Method, , . . t , A1 . , , , , 

him when, traversing the wide domain he had set 
apart for his science of nature or physics, he passed from mor#anie Part* An. i. i, 640 a 14, //*>/. An. r. 7, 491 a 
8sqq. 



xlii INTR OD UCTION. I 

Characteristic of Aristotle's mind is the notion that some things 
can be got at both deductively and inductively: it is the con- 
silience of fact and theory. The soul being a part of nature, 
psychology must needs be a branch of general physics, as all 
preceding thinkers, including Plato, agreed 1 . The presuppositions 
of Aristotle's metaphysics refer life to a cause. Vital phenomena, 
wherever found, are sufficiently alike in their manifestations to 
justify the assumption of one such cause. The treatise, then, is a 
preamble to all parts of the system dealing with plants, or animals, 
or with yet higher beings, if endowed with life. As one of the 
series of biological works, it stands in the closest connexion with 
the tracts known as the Parva Natnralia, with the morphological 
treatise De Partibits Animalhtm* and with that upon embryology, 
De Generations Animalinm. The part which the enquirer pr. .f-ssrs 
to take calls for very careful demarcation. It is impossible tn say 
what contributions, if any, Aristotle himself made in the field of 
psychology: the presumption is that they were but small. The 
evidence of his dependence upon Plato for all that relates to 
psychical phenomena is so overwhelming ', so constant, P"ty 
the repeated illustrations from zoophytes or stationary animals am! 
from worms, which give signs of life after they have been severed 
into parts 3 , are original; but in the main his facts are jm-rUfly the 
facts of his predecessors, the scantiest stock now at the disposal of 
any ignorant layman. Speculation had outrun observation. Nor 
is there any complaint of the scantiness of the data. No. Such 
as they are, they have already called forth too numerous and too 
divergent explanations. The writer's modest aim is by pivliminary 
discussion to settle a few, just a few, fundamental questions *H to 
the nature and attributes of the one principle of life and miiul, 

Aristotle's enquiry is founded on his motaphysirs. It is the 
Body and business of natural science to discover form and 

80Ul * matter in natural substances. Every animal, every 

plant is a natural substance, compomuU-d of body, which is 
matter, and soul, which is form, and the science of nature has 
therefore to investigate both body and soul Yet here a proviso 
is needed. Natural science does not necessarily treat of the whole 

1 Mttajk. ioa6a5, De Part. An, i. r, 64 x a 17 *e Anima at least ; but Arist<>tk's real merit cow* out con- 
spicuously in the tracts ft Somno and /V Mtmona* 

8 e.g. 410 b 19, 43* b 20, 411 b 19 sqq., 41 3 b 16 srjq. Aristotle may also b* fwlitol 
with the simple experiment of placing a Heiuctble object upon the *cn*e-organ iHiwJf as ti*l 
to show the necessity of a medium, 419 a i* f 4*1 b 14 sq< |M 4 a,j b 17 WHI., And the 
to experiment, as e.g, 421 b 19- 



INTRODUCTION. I xliii 

soul. Wherever soul as form is in matter, wherever it employs 
a bodily organ, we are still in the domain of natural science ; but 
anything included under soul which is independent of the body 
and which cannot be thus defined must be reserved for meta- 
physics 1 . The meaning which Aristotle attached to independence 
or separate existence must be grasped, if we would understand what 
he conceived by a substance or thing. Primarily this separate 
existence is the attribute of concrete particulars presented to 
sense in the external world. They are bodies locally, numerically 
and by magnitude separate. From them the conception is trans- 
ferred to whatever the mind thinks as distinct, and even for 
immaterial notions Aristotle has no other formula. They, too, 
like concrete bodies, are described as being in time, in space and 
in conception separate or distinct 2 . In reducing soul to the logical 
essence or form of body Aristotle, according to his own presup- 
positions, so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for 
all the soul's absolute immateriality. The living body has in- 
dependent existence, has its own form and its own matter. Even 
a dead body or an inanimate thing is something existing inde- 
pendently, to which we can apply the pronoun " this 8 . 1 ' But the 
soul does not exist in the same way. Nor, again, is it a thing 
capable of being added to or subtracted from another thing, the 
body, any more than form in general is a thing which can in 
mechanical fashion be united to and separated from its appropriate 
matter*. If a brazen sphere be melted down, the brass remains. 
It is still "this" something, "this" mass of metal; but we cannot 
then say of its spherical shape that it is " this " anything or that 
it any longer exists. The lifeless body is like the eye which 
cannot see or the axe which is spoilt for use 5 . We may apply to 
them the same names as before ; but, as the nature is no longer 
the same, the application is irrelevant, misleading, equivocal. But, 
though the lifeless body is still a concrete particular and a sub- 
stance, the soul apart from its relation to the body is no such 
thing at all. Now the soul as form stands to the body as matter 
of the concrete individual precisely as the spherical shape to the 
brass, as vision to the eye, as cutting power to the axe. In every 
case the form is a quality predicable of the matter. But the 

1 >e J'art. An. i. i, 641 a 14 b io 
* Meta$h. ioi61> i 3. 

3 Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term "body** 
in two distinct senses by means of the term "organism*" 

4 Cf. Mttttfh. iO45b izsqq. 

5 412 b 10 sqq. 



xliv INTR OD UCTION. I 

body is not predicable of the soul, \ve cannot explain the soul 
In terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the 
materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of 
soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing; as 
determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in 
itself unknowable 1 . Therefore, if we would know the living body, 
we must study its activities and operations and all the attributes 
which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, arc not 
two distinct things, they are one thing presenting two distinct 
aspects. The soul is not body, but belongs to body 8 ; it is not 
itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the body 
makes a concrete particular ; it resides in a body and, what is 
more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means 
whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised The relation 
of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a 
relation of higher generality, that between potenco and act** be- 
tween the power to become and the realisation of that power in 
actuality. Before it is, a thing may be or may not be, and when 
it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not act- 
Now body stands to soul, and matter to form in general. *is the! 
potential to the actual which has reached the first sta^c and 
already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living 
body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actual- 
isation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of faculties 
unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation 
of potcnce to act Life itself* the use of actual power, is the 
second stage, energy. The actual use must be prrccdrel by actual 
power. Soul is actual power to live y but is not life. In Plato 
body is opposed to soul. The body could be trainee! to obey the 
soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural 
instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a parttYubr 
soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the 
Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd 4 . Soul is likewise 
both the final and efficient cause of the body*. It t's the final 
cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; 
it Is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of j;mj.;ri^>ivi- 
motion, but also in all the various changes which the body under- 
goes In the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, 
sensation. 



3 Met&ph. 036 a 9* a 411}) 6 &m^ 41 4 a 
* 413 a 9 sqq., a 12 qq. ? bay qc^ 

4 407 b ao 26. * 4 r $ 



INTR OD UCTION. I xlv 

Such, in brief, is the description of soul considered in and by 
classification ^self, including the various separate powers, which 
of vital are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and 

powers. , . , . 

psychical operations. The great problem is how this 
multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. Plato in 
some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason, 
and two mortal parts, passion and appetite. His pupil is more 
cautious. He does not go beyond the supposition of certain 
powers or faculties. In one sense, he says, this division into 
powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in 
number 1 . But he contends that his own groups are convenient 
groups. Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are 
only means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the 
nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all 
operations : there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the 
instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different 
powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his 
ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent 
assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave Aris- 
totle much in the same position as Plato. In order to get a clear 
view, special stress must be laid upon the statement that the 
powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale 2 . In mortal 
creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the 
lower, without which it cannot exist*. The lowest power, that of 
nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in 
plants it exists alone. Animals have sensitivity in addition : of 
the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on 
safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two 
ways. In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, 
tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while 
appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense*, is made 
the principle on which progressive motion depends". These con- 
siderations lead to the following scheme : 

r. Nutritive 2. Discriminative 3. Motive 

Sense Intellect Appetence Faculty of 

locomotion 

On the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our 
powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power 

1 432 a 11 sqq. t 433 b I 5- * 414 b 28 415 a i. 

* 415 a x -I I. 4 414 b i sqq. c 433 a ** sqq- 



xlvi INTRODUCTION. I 

of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an inter- 
mediate place must be found for the imaginative facult}'. These 
considerations suggest the following table of faculties : 

I. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive; (this is in 
most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4, Imaginative; 5. In- 
tellective. 

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the 
The soui of lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and 
the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. 

Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates 
their study. We accordingly assume 1 a power of self-nourishment, 
the nutritive faculty. But we must be careful to remember that 
this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduc- 
tion ; by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality, 
the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, 
though the individual members of the species perish. If we arc 
to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the 
plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. But 
if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must 
be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions 
of nourishment and growth are even more important than the 
end to which they are means. Food or nutriment is the cor- 
relative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how, 
things are nourished. It was a common opinion that contraries 
are nourished by contraries. This is generally, but not always, 
true of the elements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points out, 
is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was 
nourished by like. These two views can be reconciled, I "indi- 
gested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated 
to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by like* 
Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is easy to discm*cr the 
movent, the instrument and the moved* Soul is the nouri.shrr, 
food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, 
as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we 
have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move 
the rudder with which he steers the ship. 

Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, 
Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity- He admits that they 
are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate 
things are affected ; that is, they are simply heated and cooled. 

1 n M c- 4. Cf. also 411 b 1930, 413 a 35 sqq., 43 4 a 3* sqq., 43* b i? wjfj,, 434 a 

as 30, 435 a 25 stj. 



INTRODUCTION. I xlvii 

They cannot receive the form of objects without the matter, and 
this because they have no organ in which the elements are so 
blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and 
heat. When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical 
contact. Thus the excessive preponderance, as Aristotle supposed, 
of " earth " in the structure of plants precludes sensation, because 
it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be 
necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain 
tissues of the body, e.g. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a 
similar way as due to the pi-esence in them of too much earth : 
and in this erroneous view he followed Plato. 

The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is 
Sense . that they not only live, but have the power to per- 

perception. ccivo, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a 
cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense 
without perceiving something, and interpreted this something 
objectively, as something which exists. The distinction so im- 
portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception 
had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his 
predecessors, the main question is, in what does this operation of 
perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe 
the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving is 
related to thinking, since both are cognitive. One distinctive 
mark in that by sense we perceive individuals 1 . But we have 
much knowledge of individuals which the five senses cannot give. 
Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be 
referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or 
powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever per- 
ception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and 
fer se, only per accidens*. Directly sense perceives only "this," 
just as directly sense perceives it here and now. The operation 
of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend 
on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of 
essential form. One species of motion he defines as the production 
of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g,, the production 
of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror 
by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories 
as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to 
which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative 
change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes 

1 417 b ipsqq. 

* Atutl. Pest. L 31, 87 b 28 sqq., n. 19, tooa 17 ; Met&ph. xoSya 19 sqq. 



xlviii INTRODUCTION. I 

when it loses certain qualities and acquires new ones, remaining 
itself numerically the same. The form or essence without the 
matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient 
upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The form 
or essence is one in all the things thus affected. The one universal 
heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water 
heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we 
should define the particular motion or qualitative change which 
we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a 
particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a 
particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. But 
this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air 
receives odour, but they do not perceive 1 . It is not enough, then, 
to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted 
upon. Besides, what is affected ? Not the single organ, but the 
percipient as a whole ; and we have seen that the animal is a 
particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, 
the sentient soul form. Now it is with the soul that we perceive, 
as it is with the soul that we live and think 2 . Let us, then, amend 
the definition. Perception is an alteration in the soul. It consists 
in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive 
faculty. This effect is the reception of the form, without the 
matter, of the external thing perceived !) . 

Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views 
of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, 
while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to 
be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw 
about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The per- 
cipiendum is unlike, the perception is like, that which perceives it 4 , 
for, when the process of perceiving takes place, both the external 
thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause 
have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, 
is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act 
of vision in a way coloured 5 , for it receives the same one form of 
colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived, 
But we may go a step further. Where one thing acts upon an- 
other, both the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that 
which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are 
physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is 



3 414 a 12 sq., 408 b C3~ 18. * 424 a 17 qq, 

4 4 r< 5b 35 4*7 a *8 20, 418 a 36. * 4*5 b2. 



INTRODUCTION. I xlix 

merely a potential patient, whatever else they may be actually. 
Applying this to perception, the external thing is always per- 
ceptible, a percipiendum^ a potential perccptum^ the sense-faculty 
is always potentially percipient : but in the process of perceiving 
the potential in both cases has been transformed into an actual. 
The eye, e.g., becomes a seeing eye, the whiteness whiteness per- 
ceived, and these two actualities reside in that which is passively 
affected, in the sense. In other words, the actuality of the sensible 
object is one and the same with (not merely similar to) the actuality 
of the perceiving subject 1 , sense and sensible having in the act 
of perception one and the same essence, since the whiteness seen 
in the object is transferred to the visual faculty and, being an 
universal, a form, is one and the same, wherever it resides. Is 
this, we ask, a doctrine of relativity? Most certainly not. The 
followers of Protagoras are supposed to argue that, if the sensible 
quality is alone real, nothing would exist at all unless there were 
living beings to perceive, for without them there would be no 
perception. I grant, Aristotle replies, that in the absence of living 
beings there would be no act of perception, no affection of the 
percipient. But for all that, it would be impossible to get rid of 
things, which are potential causes of perception even when they 
are never perceived. For perception does not perceive itself, there 
is something beyond the perception ; and this must be logically 
prior to the perception, since whatever causes motion or change 
must be prior to that which it moves or changes : and this is not the 
less true because sensible object and percipient are relative to each 
other". In other words, the object perceived actually exists with 
its own form, its own qualities, even when it is out of all relation 
to a percipient And similarly we may conceive a percipient out 
of ail relation to an object, none such being actually present It 
is then what it always was, a power of perceiving, a faculty of 
sense, mere sensitivity. 

These considerations apply most emphatically and most natur- 
ally to sense regarded as a whole, a single power which resides in 
the body of the animal, likewise regarded as a whole* But this 
power of perceiving is localised and pluraliscd. Wherever a part 
of the body subserves a particular end or function, it becomes 
an organ or instrument, and the general power of perception, as 
specialised in the five senses, employs its separate sense-organs, 

1 435 b a6 sqq, 

3 Mdaph* roiob 30 ion a 2* 



1 INTRODUCTION. I 

the eye, the ear, the nostril and the organs of taste and touch. 
For the detailed account of the modes in which they are employed, 
the medium which they necessarily imply and their special objects 
or provinces, the reader must be referred to Book II. ca 7 n l . 
Here there is space only for a few general remarks. First, the 
parallelism between sense as a whole and the single special sense, 
e.g. sight or touch, must never be overlooked. u As the sensation 
of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole 
to the whole sentient body as such 2 ." Thus the sense of vision 
presides over its own special province of colour, bounded by the 
opposites, white, black, and embracing every intermediate shade 8 . 
The sense of touching has its special province, or rather provinces, 
especially temperature and resistance, bounded the former by the 
extremes of hot and cold, the latter of hard and soft, and including 1 
all varieties of temperature and resistance intermediate between 
the extremes in each province. Vision resides in the eye, touch 
in the internal organ of touch (probably the heart) or in the 
intra-organic medium, the flesh, according 1 as we adopt the more 
scientific or the popular standpoint. To perceive is to undergo 
a qualitative change. In order, then, to become assimilated to 
the object, the organ must be capable of undergoing such change 
in the direction of either extreme or of any of the intermediate 
grades between these extremes. If it could not respond to the 
stimulus, as modern psychologists would say, at any point in the 
scale of colour, of temperature or of resistance* the failure on the 
part of the organ would be attended by mal-perception or non- 
perception on the part of the faculty. This is brought home to 
us whenever we try to employ our senses upon objects either 
altogether out of their range or such that the perception is at- 

1 As might be expected, the contributions to the physiology of the senses, and 
especially vision, are worthless. Sec Itaare* Creak Theories Introduction ; also 
pp. 9 ii. The mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans finally developed a wore 
correct doctrine of sound and its propagation, to which the spurious treatise />* 
Andibtti&w, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony. See Jan, Muski Vfw//ww 
pp. 50 57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in 
Plato's Ttmaeits. For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. teller, 
Aristotle, j. p. 443* Eng. Tr. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile 
at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while 
knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the 
nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful 
ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion* If Aristotle had been 
in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better ue of 
it than did Huxley's unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of /fttjctey, vol. n*, 
pp. 365 qq-)- 

u 4*3 b 23 25. 9 416 b 8 sqq, 422 b 19 sqq* 



INTR OD UCTION. J li 

tended by pernicious effects, when we try to see in the dark or 
to look at the noonday sun or to plunge the hand in boiling warer 
or to touch the air 1 . Now what is it which justifies our expectation 
that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be per- 
ceived ? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, 
with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He ac- 
cepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved all 
bodies into four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with four primary 
qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. These elements arc found in their 
compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four 
mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues or 
lumioLiiMU'inis parts of animal bodies, of which, again, the hetero- 
geneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence 
there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known 
by like. The characteristic of each object perceived depends not 
so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as 
upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its 
form. When Kmpedocles resolved bone into definite proportions 
of his four elements, he was not far from realising that this com- 
bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it is 3 . So, too, 
with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which con- 
stitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in 
the organ. Hence sense as u whole, and each special sense, is a 
form, because it is the determining; proportion or combining ratio 
of the tissues composing the organ 8 . In perceiving, form receives 
and apprehends form. In order that it may j>erceive all the quali- 
ties which come within its range, the sense must be neutral or 
indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes 
which it can perceive and be actually neither of them 4 . In the 
organ of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain 
way, e.g, the finger has a certain temperature. But, as by the 
definition perceiving is qualitative change, this temperature must 
be capable of variation in the direction of cither extreme or of 
any grade intermediate to the extremes, and the constituent 
elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way 
as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain 
the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole 
and to the single special senses. Whatever is intermediate be- 

1 494 a x r Jtfjrj. 

* 408 a 13 Hqq. f 410 a i MI* ; Mttoph, 993 a 15 sqq. 

* 4*9 b 14 xtf, 436 b fa 43* a fl M*J. 
4 433 b 30 434 a 10, 426 a 7~b 7* 



lii INTRODUCTION. I 

tween two extremes is differently related to the one and to the 
other. In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a line 
is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the end 
of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight dis- 
criminates two shades of colour. It is in a certain relation to the 
first when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the 
second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measures 
the difference between these two relations. 

The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special 
senses extends to the objects directly perceived. The objects which 
the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks : they 
cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate 
special sense cannot be mistaken about them 1 . The objects not 
exclusively belonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by 
two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, often 
called scnsits coinmnnis* Such percepts are shape and magnitude, 
unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what 
Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of 
body. About this common function of sense as a whole there has 
been much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, ant! 
all the more important and more intellectual of its functions belong 
to it in virtue of this unity. As one, it perceives the common 
sensibles ; as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and differ- 
ence between sensibles ; as a single faculty attendant upon each 
and every special sense, it is self-conscious*. That to sense as a 
whole, the so-called scnsits commnnis^ should be assigned functions 
which in degree, if not in kind 8 , exceed those of the separate special 
senses, need not surprise us* For in sense we have a whole which 
is something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis 
into its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple 
addition of these elements reproduce what was subjVcti'e Somno , 455 a 11 sqq. 

3 Some of these functions appear to be delegated by S&ISMS tommunis to the s|iecta! 
senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminate* the 
objects within its own province (4*6 b to), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we 
see (445!) 13 sqq k ). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, 
which the latter receives from >& Somno a, 455 a i a .sqq. Cf. Beare, Greek 
PP- *33 * 377. 



INTRODUCTION. I liii 

Sensation is defined as the production of an effect in the sense- 
images and organ, a part of the body, by an external object. It 
Sleep ' is, then, a movement or impression affecting the body 

and, so far as we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now 
this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of 
the object which caused it 1 . Instances may be given of its 
persistence, as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we 
have just left the sunlight ; or what is known as the after-image 
(more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after 
looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different 
colours 2 . It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains 
imagination. He defines it as a motion generated by actual per- 
ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which 
constituted the original sensation 3 , or, as Hobbes translates, " All 
fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense." 
In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty 
we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is 
often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things 
to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the 
coloured or sonorous body is and where it is 4 : and these errors 
of sense arc shared in and increased by imagination, especially 
when the .sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in 
general is due to the difference between imagination and judgment 
and between the standards they employ 15 . It may sometimes be 
corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the 
object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single . 
The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact are 
travelling past them, implies that a movement is set up in the eye 
of the same kind as would occur if we were stationary and the 
objects themselves were in motion. In fact, the bodily movement 
induces a picture of the very object which might have been its 
cause. It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be 
ascribed 7 . Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole 
or seiisus communis^ by which when awake we are conscious that 
we are awake and have sensations 8 . Plants, having no sensation, 

1 Cf. 408 b 18, 425 b 34 sq., 429*1 4? De Iitsomn* a, 459 a 24 28, 

3 De In$omn. 2, 459 b 5 ao 

* 438 b ro 439 a 5. 

4 418 a 15 q,, 48l> 20 sqq. 

ft De Insomn* a, 460!) i6qq., i, 458!) 9 sqq. 

* ib. i, 469!) so 27, 

7 Dt Insomn, z, 459 a 14 aa. , 

H JD* Somno r, 454 b 25 27, a, 455 a ia b a. 



liv INTRODUCTION. I 

do not sleep\ In order that sense, which is charged with motive 
as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep is 
necessary' 2 , and it is brought about ultimately by the process of 
nutrition 3 . An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to 
the head 4 , is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of 
drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there 
is in the system collects about the heart 1 "'. It is clear that dreaming 
is not a function proper to sense as a whole nor to any special 
sense, much less to understanding or opinion". Yet the images 
seen in dreams have sensible qualities. It only remains to refer 
dreaming to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hour*. 
The residual movements in the organs arc no doubt present in the 
daytime, but at night, when the action of the special senses is 
suspended 7 and the environment is peaceful, the imagination is 
most active 8 . Then #t* /lypot/iesi these persistent effects reach ant I 
stimulate the central organ of sense. We are most Habit* to 
illusions when labouring under emotion or morbid states'*, as, for 
example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall 
for real an i trials' 10 and even makes bodily movements to escape from 
them. In sleep, again, the judging faculty is weak 11 , owing to tin: 
increasing pressure of blood around the heart 1 ' 4 . There are, of 
course, cases in which dreams are the result of semi-conscious 
sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights |: \ which would have 
escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections anil ideas 
arc often added to them 14 . But in itself dreaming is simply the 
result of the movement of our sensations during the period of sleep 
as such". Dreams are movements which give rise to images within 
our sense-organs 1 ". 

The most important of all our images are those: of memory, If 
Memory- imagining is consciously referred to an earlier JKT- 

image. ceptioti of which the image is a copy, then we. call tt 

memory 17 . For memory there are tw