ARISTOTLE
DE SENSU AND DE MEMORIA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.
ILonHon: FETTER LANE, E.G.
laggofo: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.
1*1
II*!
ILetpjtg: F. A. BROCKHAUS.
Jgorfe: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY,
anti Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
[All Rights reserved]
ARISTOTLE
DE SENSU AND DE MEMORIA
TEXT AND TRANSLATION
WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY
BY
G. R. T. ROSS, D.PHIL. (EDIN/
CAMBRIDGE :
at the University Press
1906
^
X | \\
5
Cambridge:
PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,
ROBERTO PURVES HARDIE
AMICO
VIRO PHILOSOPHIA ARISTOTELEA ERUDITISSIMO
AMICUS, DISCIPULUS
HANC EDITIONEM DEDICAT
PREFACE.
IN the following pages I have attempted to give an
adequate translation of the first two tractates belonging
to the Parva Naturalia and I have appended a commentary
which, I hope, will elucidate the many difficulties occurring
in the interpretation of the text.
As regards the text I have been fortunate in having to
my hand the admirable edition prepared for the Teubner
series by the late W. Biehl. Before its appearance many of
the difficulties seemed absolutely hopeless, but now there are
but few passages where emendation seems to be desirable or,
at least, where any alteration that can come nearer to the
ipsissima verba of Aristotle may be successfully devised.
As my interest in preparing this edition was not mainly
textual, I have refrained from discussing variant readings at
great length unless they were of importance in determining
the actual doctrine of the treatise. My purpose was to give
a rendering of the Greek which should be accurate and
should meet the needs of students of philosophy who, not
being expressly classical scholars, have hitherto had no
adequate means of becoming acquainted with these two
important works. I have not prepared an apparatus criticus,
but simply reproduce Biehl s text, indicating at the foot of
the page little else than the alterations I have made. For
viii PREFACE
full information as to the MS. sources of our text I refer to
Biehl s introduction. Suffice it to say that the MSS. fall into
two main classes, L S U and E M Y ; the former, though often
agreeing with the excerpts found in Alexander s commentary
and drawn from a source of high antiquity, yet seem to be
specimens of an improved version in which the crabbedness
of the original text has been smoothed down, though often
with a loss of the significance which a more thorough-going
interpretation might have found in the concise and often
awkward phrasing of the authentic statements. The E M Y
group (of which Paris E loth century is the most im
portant), though full of misspellings and inaccuracies, seem
to have suffered less from editorial tampering, and thus
apparently give us hints as to the genuine reading ; they
are often supported by the ancient Latin translation of
William de Moerbeka used by Thomas Aquinas. Unfor
tunately the commentators generally have followed the
MSS. of the former group, especially Vatican L (i4th century),
and often expend great pains on explaining passages where
their version is hopeless.
In my commentary I have tried not only to give such
explanations of ordinary words and expressions as a student
not yet versed in the Aristotelian philosophy will find useful,
but to contribute an adequate elucidation of the undoubted
difficulties which continually arise. In dealing with these
I have derived much assistance from M. Rodier s monu
mental edition of the De Anima. Many of the ajropiai in
the De Sensu arise also in connection with the larger psycho
logical treatise and, as a result of M. Rodier s labours, the
path is now much clearer than formerly. Mr Beare s work
on Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition came to hand
just after I had finished the correction of the proofs of the
present volume. Though I notice some points in which we
PREFACE ix
are not in agreement, I see many more in which I should
have been able to profit by his great learning if the result
of his researches had been accessible at an earlier date.
It should be stated that the present work originally
formed a thesis, for which the University of Edinburgh
awarded me, in April, 1904, the degree of Doctor of Philo
sophy. Since that date it has been revised and slightly
enlarged.
It remains for me to thank the Syndics of the Cambridge
University Press for undertaking the publication of this
volume, and to express my gratitude also to the Press
Reader and Staff for their valuable assistance. I am much
indebted also to Mr J. A. Smith, of Balliol College, Oxford,
for many important criticisms and suggestions. Above all
my thanks are due to Mr W. D. Ross, of Oriel College,
Oxford, who has read the whole work both in proof and in
manuscript and whose counsels and criticisms have guided
me at every turn.
G. R. T. ROSS.
May, 1906.
NOTE. I should like to point out to readers that though I have
used Bekker s paging for purposes of reference, it has been found
necessary to take a larger number of lines than he requires for the
printing of each of his columns. Hence there is a tendency towards
a discrepancy (which increases as we approach the foot of the Bekker
page) between the number of the line in which a word or passage stands
in this edition and its line-number in Bekker s text.
G. R. T. R.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGES
I. INTRODUCTION 140
II. TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE DE SENSU . . 4199
III. TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE DE MEMORIA . 100119
IV. COMMENTARY ON THE DE SENSU .... 121243
V. COMMENTARY ON THE DE MEMORIA . . . 244286
VI. APPENDICES 287292
VII. INDICES 293303
INTRODUCTION
SECTION I. THE PARVA NATURALIA.
THE two treatises styled briefly the De Sensu and the
De Memoria form the initial members of that collection of
tractates on separate psychological topics known to the Latin
commentators as the Parva Nattiralia. The full list of these
opuscules is not found in De Sensu, ch. i, but practically
the whole of the topics to be discussed are there set forth.
They are essays on psychological subjects of very various
classes, and there is so much detail in the treatment that, if
incorporated in the De Anima, they would have detracted
considerably from the unity of the plan of that work. Con
sequent on the separateness of the subjects in the Parva
Naturalia, the method of treatment is much more inductive
than in the De Anima. There, on the whole, the author is
working outwards from the general definition of soul to the
various types and determinations of psychic existence, while
here, not being hampered by a general plan which compels
him to move continually from the universal to the particular,
he takes up the different types of animate activity with an
independence and objectivity which was impossible in his
central work.
Some plan, of course, there must be in any coherent
scientific exposition, and Aristotle seems to proceed from
a discussion of those activities which are ffitai to animals,
i.e. belong to animals qua animate, to those which are icowal,
viz. affections which, though found in animals, are not
R. I
2 INTRODUCTION
uniquely a feature of animate existence ; to the former
category belong sensation and memory etc., to the latter
evidently such phenomena as veorrjs KOI yrfpas, fan) Kal
ddvaros. I have selected the first two treatises of the
former class, on Sense and on Memory, for translation and
comment. They have perhaps more importance for general
psychological doctrine than any of the others, and in them
certain metaphysical problems of unusual interest are raised.
SECTION II. THE DE SENSU.
The Trepl alaOrjcrecos teal alcrOrfrwy Sense and its Objects,
is not merely a treatise on the subjects referred to in the title
but takes in also an account of the organs of sensation, not
an account of each organ in detail but of the general character
and ultimate constituents of the sensitive members. This
occurs in chapter 2, and thereafter the objects of the special
senses are discussed not merely as relative to sense but in
their own proper nature as modifications of external reality.
It is this which distinguishes the account of sense given here
from that in the De Anima\ there the objective physical
nature of that which stimulates the sense organ is only
glanced at The treatment of taste and odour is particularly
minute, and here we get involved in the details of the
Aristotelian physics which now-a-days seems so crude and
remote from our habits of thought. In fact, in the whole
of this treatise we seem to be immersed in detail, and there
is less of the wide generalisation and speculative insight
which characterise Aristotle s chief psychological work.
In the treatment of the special sense objects there are
notable omissions. Not a word is said about touch, while
the physical process involved in hearing has little more than
a reference made to it 1 .
In chapters 6 and 7 Aristotle goes on to discuss
certain problems which have arisen in the course of the
1 In ch. 6, 445 b 3 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 3
discussion, problems lying at the root of all perceptive
process. First, do the objects of perception have any part
too minute to be perceived ? Are there any imperceptible
magnitudes ? The answer is no ; but this is not stated
without an important reservation. Considered separately the
minute parts of an object are only potentially perceptible,
though taken in conjunction with the other parts that go
to make up the total object, they do make an impression on
the sense and hence are actually perceptible. The simple
converse of this proposition is proved at the end of chapter 7.
Every sensible object has magnitude ; whatever has magni
tude has parts and there is no atomic object of sensation.
If you suppose an object to be so far removed as, while
yet remaining visible, to be perfectly indivisible to the
eye, it must occupy a mere point in space ; any further
removal from us would render it invisible, while any nearer
approach would give it magnitude. It then occupies a point
where the distance at which it is invisible and that at which
it is visible meet ; but, since a point is an absolute numerical
identity and is without parts, the object occupying this point
must be simultaneously visible and invisible an absurd con
clusion.
In the second part of chapter 6 1 Aristotle raises points
about the process involved in the stimulation of sense by a
distant object, deciding that in the case of sight it is instan
taneous. In chapter 7, he inquires about the principle of
coordination in sense perception. He decides that, except in
the case of sensations which fuse, we cannot account for the
simultaneous perception of two objects unless we assume that
there is some unitary principle over and above the special
senses which, though numerically a unit like a point, yet has
a double aspect, like the point, which may be regarded as the
terminus of each of the two lines which it separates ; or again
the unity of the central sensitive principle may be regarded
on the analogy of that of the self-identical object which yet
may have diverse attributes. This central sense is \6yw or
1 446 a 22 sqq.
INTR OD UCTION
TO) emu plural, though it is ev dpidfjiw. Its organ is localised
in the heart, and to it other functions as well as those of
coordination are ascribed 1 .
SECTION III. THE DE MEMORIA.
The full title of this treatise is irepl fivyfirj? /cal
(Memory and Recollection), and the two subjects occupy
respectively the first and second of the two chapters which
the book contains.
Memory (JJLVIJ y^t?) depends upon the retention of a sense
stimulation after the object producing it has ceased to affect
us. The stimulus appears to persist in the heart and is then
known as an image ((^dvraa-^a). Memory consists in re
garding this <f)dvTao-[Aa as the image of the absent object and
not merely as an object of consciousness that does not refer
to a reality other than itself. The condition to be fulfilled, if
the image of an object is to be regarded as objective, is the
union with it of the image representing the time which has
elapsed since the experience took place 2 .
Memory may occur either through the persistence of the
original sense stimulation or through its reinstatement by
another process which has been originally experienced in
connection with it. This latter process of reinstatement it
is which Aristotle distinguishes by the term dvd/j,vijo-i<;. In
its most typical meaning it is the purposive revival of a
previous experience by a process of active search among the
contents of mind, but apparently involuntary recollection is
also grouped along with the voluntary 3 . In describing the
process Aristotle formulates definitely for the first time the
three well-known laws of the Association of Ideas, the laws
of Similarity, Contiguity, and Contrast. With some sub
sidiary discussions, e.g. that which shows the dependence of
1 De Mem. and Section IX. below.
2 De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 26 sqq.
3 Cf. De Mem. ch. 2, 451 b 26.
INTRODUCTION 5
memory and recollection on bodily processes, the treatise on
memory closes. On the whole this treatise is on a higher
level and contains more suggestive thoughts than the previous
one.
SECTION IV. ARISTOTLE S PHYSIOLOGY.
In order to understand the relation in Aristotle of the
Physiology to the Psychology of sense and memory we must
go back to the De Anima and seek the sources of our
discussion there. The common terms for the phenomena
belonging to both faculties alike are 7ra#o? modification,
and KLvr)o-is change or process. But the question is, of what
are they the changes or modifications? They are TraOrj of
the soul, but all the TrdQrj (with the exception of vov^) are
common to soul and body alike (De An. I. ch. i) and are
as much affections of the body as of the soul. The true
(frvaiKos scientist who studies the phenomena of life must
not leave out of account the material embodiment of the
psychic processes. Sight is, as it were, the soul of the eye
but it cannot be studied apart from the eye ; and this holds
good of all psychical phenomena generally. At the same
time Aristotle does not lose sight of the superiority of the
mental aspect of the facts. The soul generally is an evepyeia
or eVreXe^eta ; that is to say, in manifesting soul the body
realises its proper end and fulfils its proper function. eWe-
\e^eia means perfection and properly (like evepyeia) refers
to something mental. Aristotle illustrates the relation of
soul to body, by that existing between a manufactured
article (an axe) and the idea realised in it. Here once more
the vep<yeia or eZSo? is something mental (though of course
the cases are different, as the eZSo? of an axe is not an
immanent motive principle regulating the existence of the
thing through a series of changes, as the soul of a man
maintains his bodily life). Similarly an act of perception
which is a 7m#o? a passive affection, in so far as it involves
1 De An. II. ch. i, 413 a 7.
6 INTRODUCTION
a bodily affection, is, as an act of mind, an evepyeia and not
a mere 7rd0o<? or Kivrja-i^. Just as in the act of perception
or knowledge the passive bodily determination serves as the
instrument for the realisation of a mental act ; so in the
passive alteration which must be experienced in building up
a state of knowledge there is involved a transition which is
not ttXAmojoY? qualitative change, in the usual acceptation,
but is the realisation of a determinate state of mind the
existence of which alone makes the processes of transition
intelligible. We may generalise then and say that only in
so far as they are bodily affections are mental phenomena
processes or passive modifications ; mind as such is d-jradtjs ;
in thinking we are not passively affected 2 .
This is especially true of the highest faculty of con
sciousness, vovs or voTjcris, the apprehension of concepts, but
the question need not be raised here whether in the human
soul this impassivity or pure spontaneity of thought is any
thing that has a separate existence. Aristotle s answer in
his special discussion of the subject in De An. III. ch. 5,
leaves no room for doubt that in his view it is not so. The
human 1/01)5 is iraO^TiKo^, i.e. it is merely the cognitive aspect
of a process ultimately material.
Thus Aristotle s theory of the relation of mind and body
may in a way be designated as a doctrine of psychophysical
parallelism. But this should not blind us to the fact that
with him the mental aspect of the process is no epipheno-
menon. Mind occupies the higher place in the scale. It is
the important member of the pair of correlatives, is the end
for which the bodily changes exist and has all the dignity
implied in the epithets evepyeia, elSo? and eVreXe^eta. Having
made this reservation we may be quite untroubled at finding
in his account of sensation and memory what looks like the
crudest materialism. Objects exist in the physical world
external to and in relation with an organism; they, whether
when in contact with it, or at a distance, act upon this
1 De An. II. ch. 5 passim.
2 Cf. De An. n. ch. 5, 417 b 8 ; cf. also I. ch. 3, 407 a 32.
INTRODUCTION 7
organism and produce changes, whether mechanical (mere
<j>opd), or qualitative (aXXo/Wj?), in certain of its members.
The reception of these changes in the sense organ is per
ception. But why should the mere production of a process
in a bodily part be an apprehension of the object which
causes it? We must remember what Aristotle says about
sense being &6KTi/crj rov ei&ovs, and what he affirms about the
sense holds equally of the sense organ. In fact, he frequently
talks of a sense and its organ without discrimination of the
two 1 . Evidently then what gets inside the organ must be
the eZSo? of the external object. If we think of the eZSo? or
knowable character of the object as existing independently
in the external world, then the eZSo? which is present in the
sensorium cannot be numerically the same ; it will be only
specifically identical with it or analogous to it. With regard
to the subjective processes persistent in the central sensorium
and representative of absent objects this seems to be the view
held 2 . Again with sense a similar position seems at times to
be taken up. The eye is transparent and receives the light
which exists in the external medium 3 , and similarly the
movement of the air which sound is, is something aXXoT/^o? 4 ,
and merely sets in activity a corresponding movement in the
air of the internal ear. But from another point of view it
seems erroneous to talk of the elSo? in the object and that
in the organ as being numerically different. You may not
talk of the same concept when realised in two distinct
individuals as being numerically different ; it is rather the
individuals that are numerically distinct, while in concept,
i.e. specifically, they are one. Thus it is in eZSo? that the
object and the organ are one. The elSo? of the object is
its evepyeia. Hence the evepyeia of the object and that of
the sense organ are one ; it is only in respect of particular
existence (r&&gt; elvai) that they can be regarded as distinct 5 .
1 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 a 13 note ; cf. De An. in. ch. 2.
2 De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 16 note.
3 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b n.
4 De An. II. ch. 8, 420 a 17.
5 Cf. De An. in. ch. 2, 426 a 15 and 425 b 27.
8 INTRODUCTION
A grave difficulty 1 arises here ; the object as it is for
knowledge will, on this showing, only exist in the act of
perception ; it will have merely potential existence before
this. Such is the view taken in -De An. III. ch. 2, and
Metaph. IV. ch. 5, 1010 b 30 sqq. ; but there Aristotle is
quite sure that though the sense object as such only exists
in perception yet its viroKelpevov (substrate) exists indepen
dently. There is, however, no way of characterising this
substrate if all the qualities given in sensation are abstracted
from it, and yet it is clear that, when Aristotle talks of the
vTroKeifjLeva of sense objects, he cannot mean the mere un-
differentiated irpwrrf v\rj. He cannot, on the other hand,
mean by them objects with geometrical and kinetic qualities
only, the subterfuge by which atomistic physics avoids
the difficulty of the independence of the external object ;
Aristotle did not believe in atoms. Accordingly we con
tinually find expressions which imply that the evepyeia or
vre\^6La already exists as realised in some way in the
external object 2 . In truth, the fact that the external object
is the agent in perception and transmits its character to the
sense, shows that it must already possess that character 3 .
It is from this point of view that Aristotle discusses the
physiology of the sense organs.
It is obvious that, if the sensoria are to be capable of
receiving the same e2So9 as that existing in the external
object, they must consist of the same v\rj ; if, on the other
hand, the subjective affection were merely an dvdXoyov of
the external as is suggested in De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 17
it would hardly be necessary for the V\TJ to be identical.
The latter, of course, is the modern conception. Molecular
disturbances in the brain correspond one by one to different
transferences of energy in the external world ; every event
in the universe can have an appropriate and more or less
adequate symbolisation in the human brain. But one would
1 Cf. below, Sec. x. of Introduction, for a further discussion of the objectivity
of objects of sense.
2 e.g. De An. n. ch. 5, 418 a 3.
3 This is implied in De An. loc. cit. 417 a 6 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 9
hardly say that the formula of the neural process (if it could
be found) was the same as that which expressed the produc
tion of a red light or the flight of a projectile, nor would the
oscillation of particles in the brain be in the least like those
external phenomena. Aristotle, on the other hand, tried to
think of the subjective Kivrjais as occurring in pari materia
with the external event, and probably where he refers to the
subjective et&o? as an dva\o^ov of the external he does so
because he is thinking of the processes in the central organ
involved in memory ; the heart, probably to be identified as
the organ of memory, is not of the same character as the
external transparent medium ; but the eye, the organ of the
special sense of sight, is 1 .
SECTION V. PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SPECIAL SENSES.
The qualitative identity of the organ with the vehicle or
medium in which the objective sensuous quality is generated
is most conspicuous in the case of sight and hearing. The
cru/z(i>?}9 drjp of the ear 2 and the transparent pupil accept,
in the one case the impulsive movement set up in the
external air, in the second the light which is the basal
principle of all specific modifications of colour. The primary
constituent of the visible eI8o? of things is light. Light is
the activity of a transparent element which penetrates all
bodies in differing degrees and, at the extremity of solid
bodies, shows as colour. This colour is either positive or
negative, black or white, and all other colours are mixtures
of those two elements in different proportions 3 . The visible
form of a thing is therefore the determinate mixture of these
two constituents and, when we see, this (by a propagative
process said to be not a transition in time 4 ) gets, as it were,
stamped upon the sense-organ 5 . We hear that it is the
1 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 7 sqq.
2 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 21 ; De An. n. ch. 8, 420 a 3.
3 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 19 sqq. 4 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 446 b 31.
5 De An. in. ch. 12, sub fin., and De Mem. ch. i, 450 a 33 ; also De An. n.
ch. 12, 424 a 19.
io INTRODUCTION
colour which stimulates the medium 1 and consequently the
sense, and one would thus suspect that the colour was
something different from the process which it produces.
But that can hardly be so ; the colour or modification of
light must be the visible form of the object, and it is that or
something qualitatively identical with it which enters the eye.
The process of transition in the medium which results in the
establishment of vision, or indeed of any of the mediated acts
of sense perception, seems to be conceived as consisting in a
pushing forward of this sensuous character until it actually
gets embedded in the percipient organ. In the case of
hearing this process is mere (f>opd change in place, whereas
in smell it is a continuous qualitative change d\\oia)o-i,$, and
in sight something still higher, something not a transition
at all in the sense of occupying time 2 . There must be,
however, some object which originates the process, which
itself does not move. This is, we must suppose, the viro/cei-
lievov of the sensuous character. It is, however, Aristotle s
practice to allude both to the object which causes sensation
and to its sensuous character, the sound or colour, by the single
word TO aiaOijTOV,
It had been the ambition of the earlier psychologists to
identify each sense organ with one of the four elements. On
the theory that like is perceived by like each organ will
perceive the qualities of that element with which its nature
is identical. Aristotle shows that, prior to perception, the
organ must be unlike the quality perceived. The sense organs
are not all composed of a single element. As we have seen
two are (the eye and the ear); but the organ of smell con
sists of both air and water, or perhaps one element in some
animals, the other in others, while Trvp, if present anywhere,
enters into all and 77} into that of touch 3 . But we do not by
any organ perceive the qualities actually possessed by the
substance composing it. The qualities possessed by any of
the elements are tactual, while those apprehended by the
1 De An. n. ch. 7, 418 a 31.
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 446 b 30 and also De An. ill. ch. 12, 434 b 30 sqq.
3 Here I follow the account in De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 3 sqq.
INTRODUCTION n
senses of sight, hearing, and smell are not tactual. The organ
fulfils its function in being the vehicle or neutral receptacle of
qualities existing in a vehicle of the same nature outside it.
In being neutral in this way the organ will be capable of
receiving the opposite determinations which characterise the
contents of each sense. In the case of the qualities appre
hended by touch, the organs, being composed of the various
elements, must show a fieaoT^ of the various tactual qualities;
this must mean a combination in equal proportions of those
qualities in order that something neutral and capable of
registering the variations on this side and that of the mean
point may be formed. This organ would naturally be the
flesh, which is a composite formed from all the elements, and
we should expect that its Xoyo? r?)? //,/fea>? was the pea-ory? in
question, but though at times this is his doctrine, in the De
Anima Aristotle apparently will not have it so, probably,
however, meaning only that the external surface of the body
is not the sensorium but rather the medium which communicates
tactual impressions, the real organ or ecr^arov alaOrjTijpiov being
the heart. This, however, is after all a fleshly organ, and in
fact, on the analogy of the senses of sight and hearing, the
medium must be of the same nature as the receptive organ,
for it has to be capable of transmitting the stimulus which
ultimately reaches the organ and so causes perception 1 .
Evidently he conceives of the exterior flesh of the body
transmitting the tactual properties of things, heat, cold, hard
ness, softness, etc., by a progressive qualitative alteration like
the propagation of odour in the air, or, in a way, of light in the
transparent medium. Since in this case the organ and the
medium alike are bodily members and they receive and
transmit the differentiae of other elements than earth, they
cannot consist of one element alone ; they cannot be the hard
1 For confirmation of this view cf. De Part. Animal, n. ch. 8, 653 b 24.
Talking of the flesh he says : ravr-r^s (d0?}s) 5 alcrdijTripiov TO TOIOVTOV pbpibv ecrrtv,
17x01 TO irpCjTOV (Joffwep rj Koprj rrjs oi/ ews, 17 rb 01 ov ffvveiXruj.p.^vov^ wcnrep &v et rts
7rpocrXd/3ot rrj Koprf TO Sm^a^es TTO.V. The flesh functions both as organ and as
medium, cf. Baumker, Des Aristoteles Lehre von den Aussern imd Innern Sinnes-
vermogen, pp. 55, 56.
12 INTRODUCTION
parts of the body, e.g. bone, etc., which must be referred to
earth 1 , and hence there is nothing left for them to be but the
flesh.
The eye consists of water; though air would have served,
being also transparent, yet water is more easily retained in
position 2 . The material out of which it is constructed is
derived from the brain, which Aristotle describes as an organ
with an excess of moisture 3 . The material of the organ of
hearing is simply a avfjupvr)^ drfp. The ultimate organ of
touch seems, as we have seen, to be the heart, and consists
of flesh, a compound of all the elements. Yet, though not
consisting of 777 alone, the flesh, as something 0-&&gt;yu,aT<wSe?, i.e.
solid, seems to contain a preponderance of 777, that element
which is most characteristically a crania 4 . This fact may lend
some countenance to a statement made at the end of the
second chapter of the De Sensu 5 , according to which the
organ of touch consists of earth. This assertion as it stands
without qualification is in flat contradiction with the teaching
in the De Anima, and it is noteworthy that it occurs in a
passage where Aristotle is not stating his own final opinions,
but is discussing in a tentative way some possible working
interpretation of the theory which assigns a special element
to each organ 6 . Aristotle there tries to combine with it his
own theory that the organ is, before perception, only potentially
of the nature of the determination which it perceives. But
this will conflict with the doctrine that the organ of touch
actually consists of 77} ; for, in order to perceive the qualities
of 777, it will need to be only potentially of that nature, and is,
in fact, Aristotle says, warm, being connected with the heart,
the seat of the animal heat, and qua hot it must have the
character opposite to 777 (which is cold).
1 Cf. De An. III. ch. 13, 435 a 20 and De Part. Animal, n. ch. i, 647 a 14.
2 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 a 15.
3 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 30, and De Gener. Animal. II. ch. 6, 744 a 5 sqq.
4 Cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. i, 647 a 19 sqq. and ch. 8, 653 b 29, and cf.
also notes to De Sens. ch. 5, 445 a 20 sqq.
5 438 b 32.
6 Cf. De Sens. ch. 2, notes to 438 b 17 sqq., and Baumker op. cit. pp. 47, 48.
INTRODUCTION 13
Similarly the organ of smell will be only potentially warm,
if the nature of odour lies in heat. This will accord with a
derivation of the sensoriurn of smell, like that of vision, from
the watery substance of the brain. But, though heat is required
for the diffusion of the odorous principle, it is not that principle,
and consequently the theory breaks down once more. His
own doctrine, as we have seen, is that the organ consists both
of air and of water or of either one or the other.
The organ of taste is the tongue, though, as in the sense
of touch, there is a reference back to a still more primary
organ the heart 1 . Aristotle regards taste as a subvariety of
touch, evidently on the ground both that contact with the
object is necessary in each alike and that taste discriminates
in an indirect way the tactual properties of things which go to
make up their nature as the possible constituents of nutriment 2 .
A certain independence, however, is allowed to the tongue,
and, since tastes only exist in humid matter, the tongue must
have a neutral humidity 3 , once more the doctrine that the
sense organ shows a yueo-orr/? of opposite determinations. In
this case, however, the parallel to the other senses cannot
be consistently worked out The opposite determinations in
taste are not excess and deficiency of vyporrjs but rather
TO <y\vfcu and its negative TO TriKpbv, which are ultimately
reduced to TO Kovfov and TO ftapv respectively. Again, in
the passage from De An. n. ch. 10 referred to above, Aristotle
confuses two distinct conceptions ; if the tongue is only
potentially humid, as he says, it cannot be described as of a
neutral humidity.
The above inconsistencies only show the enormous difficulty
in giving any coherent account of the process of sense stimula
tion in terms of the ancient physics. They in no way detract
from the value of the central principle involved that the
organ is of a nature capable of manifesting in itself the
contrary determinations which characterise the objective
qualities falling under any one specific sense ; that apart
1 Cf. De Part. Animal, n. ch. 10, 656 a 29 and De Sens. ch. 2, loc. cit.
2 De Sens. ch. ^passim. 3 De An. n. ch. 10, 422 a 34 sqq.
1 4 INTR OD UCTION
from stimulation by an object the organ is perfectly neutral
as regards these determinations, and hence may in certain
cases (touch 1 at any rate) be regarded as a /uecroT?;?, for the
mean is neutral as regards opposite determinations and hence
is KplTlKOV.
SECTION VI. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SO-CALLED
COMMON SENSE.
In addition to the special senses there is an unifying or
central function of sense by means of which we perceive the
KOLVCL alffOrjrd, i.e. the determinations of number, unity, figure,
magnitude, and change involved in the apprehension of the
special sensations of colour, sound, hardness, etc. Figure and
magnitude are perceived at least by two senses, viz. sight and
touch 2 , and unity seems to be an idea involved in the functioning
of each single sense alike 3 . Again, the comparison and dis
crimination of qualities belonging to different senses require
a unifying principle in some way over and above the particular
sense organs 4 . Indeed, the simultaneous discrimination of
qualities given by the same sense seems to require the
existence of such a principle 5 . Lastly, to this also is to be
ascribed the self-consciousness that accompanies all perception,
e.g. the perception that we see, hear, and feel, etc. 6
This central function of sense 7 is localised in an internal
1 The explicit references are only to touch (De An. n. ch. n, 424 a 4, in. ch.
13, 435 a 21, Meteor, iv. ch. 4, 382 a 19) and the discrimination of pleasure and
pain (De An. in. ch. 7, 431 a n).
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 4 , 442 b 8.
3 Cf. De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 20 and De Sens. ch. 7, 447 b 27. It is specific
unity which is perceived by the functioning of a single sense.
4 De An. in. ch. 2, 426 b 12 sqq.
5 Cf. De An. loc. cit. infra and ill. ch. 7, 431 a 17 sqq. ; also De Sens. ch. 7,
449 a i sqq. and notes.
6 Cf. De Somno, ch. 2, 455 a 15 sqq. ; De An. in. ch. 2, 425 b 12 sqq.
7 It is well to note that the mere fact of talking about the common sense or
* the central sense may give a wrong impression of the way in which Aristotle
conceived this faculty to exist. Aristotle, in fact, does not talk except in one
instance (De Mem. ch. i, 450 a 12) of Koivr) ai<rdrj<ris but usually of TO. KOI.VO,
INTRODUCTION 15
organ, and that is universally admitted to be the heart 1 . But
great difficulties arise when we attempt to determine whether
it is the heart as a whole which is the organ, or only some part
of or constituent in it. Great uncertainty also surrounds the
question as to how the central and the peripheral organs are
connected, and similarly what is the exact relation between
the inner faculty and the special senses. As to the physiology
of the central organ there is but little said in the two treatises
which we are discussing (the passages, De Mem. ch. i, 450 b,
and ch. 2, 453ai6, do not help us much), while as to the
connection between central and end organ there is not a
word. Accordingly a full discussion of this subject belongs
rather to a treatise dealing with the De Somno, De Insomniis,
and De Juvent., De Resp., etc. At present it will be sufficient
to examine the main contentions of Neuhauser 2 as to the
subject in question in so far as they derive confirmation or
the reverse from passages in our text.
Neuhauser maintains (i) that, though many passages 3
would lead us to believe that the perception of the special
sense qualities is localised in the end organs, this is not really
so. The stimulation communicated from the external objects
or the medium to the end organ is continued right up to the
heart. Perception does not result unless the heart is in a
aicrdrjTa and TO Koivbv aladriTrjpioi . It is not a sense functioning in independence of
the special senses, as any one of these may function in independence of the others ;
as such it would require to have a special organ independent of the other sense-
organs a doctrine against which he argues in De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 13-21.
The common sense is, in fact, that common function which all the special senses
possess, namely that of discrimination, which, as common to all, is contrasted
with the special receptivity which each has for the separate kinds of objective
quality, e.g. sound, colour, etc. It is this function of discrimination which requires
the coordination of the stimuli received by the special sense organs in a central or
common sensorium. Perhaps then, in strictness, we should talk not about a
common sense but about the common discriminative function of sense. Cf.
section X. below and Neuhauser, Aristoteles Lehre von den sinn lichen Erkennt-
nissvermogen, pp. 30 sqq.
1 Cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a 10, ch. 4, 469 b 3. De Gener. Animal, n. ch. 6,
743 b 25, De Part. Animal, n. ch. 10, 656 b 24 etc.
2 Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntissvermogen und seinen Organen,
pp. 30-132.
3 Cf. Baumker, pp. 79, 80.
1 6 INTR OD UCTION
condition in which it can function 1 , hence it is the presence
of the Kivrjveis in the central organ that constitutes perception.
Secondly (2), the medium of communication between the
peripheral and central organs consists of iropoi canals (in
the case of the three senses of sight, hearing, and smell),
which are filled with a substance identical with that which
composes the end organs themselves 2 . This he extracts from
statements 3 (a) that these organs are in connection with the
heart, (b) that Tropoi from them extend into the veins of the
brain, (c) that the organs of hearing and smell are themselves
really jropoi full of air 4 (av^vrov 7rvv/j,a), and (d) that in the
case of the eye its substance has issued through the Tropot
from the brain 5 ; finally (V), it is neither the blood nor any
bloodless part which is the organ of sensation, but a structure
created out of the blood. Thirdly (3), the central organ of
sensation is not the heart itself, but a substance found in its
middle chamber and designated by Aristotle 6 TO Kd\ovfjuei>ov
Bep/jiov and also Trvevfia. We hear as well that this substance
is analogous to the element found in the stars (ava\oyov ovaa
rq> TWV aarpwv cnoi^eLw), yet it is not 7rvp, though we generally
identify TO ava) crwfAa the aether, with fire, and we hear else
where 7 that the ^v^rf is ooa-Trep e/jL7re7rvpev/jiev?j suffused with
fire. The point is that this substance is different from the
elements of the sublunary world and seems to serve as a basis
or substratum for terrestrial conscious life, just as the upper
aether serves as the substratum for the psychical existence of
the heavenly bodies. It is frequently named TO (frvaiKov 0ep/j.6v,
rb av^vTov Oep/jiov, and is to be identified with TO O-V/JL^VTOV
Trvev/jia, of which we hear so much in the Trepl %wa>v /a z//? crew? 8 .
Neuhauser seems to show pretty conclusively 9 that the
1 De Sonmo, ch. 2, 455 a 33 and b n.
2 Neuhauser, op. cit. pp. 123 sqq.
3 Cf. De Part. Animal, n. ch. 10, 656 a 27 sqq., 656 b 16; De Gen. Animal.
II. ch. 6, 743 b 32 sqq.
4 Cf. De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 21. 5 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 29.
6 In De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 3, 736 b 30 sqq.
7 Dejuventut. ch. 4, 469 b 6-17 ; De Resp. ch. 8, 474 b 12, ch. 16, 478 a 29,
8 Cf. Neuhauser, op. cit. pp. 94, 95.
8 pp. 104, 105 and p. 85.
INTRODUCTION 17
heart is properly characterised as the place in which the central
organ or faculty of perception is situated, not as the organ
itself (except surely in the case of the sense of touch 1 ); again,
if the organ of consciousness is not the heart as a whole but
only some constituent in it, the seat of this organ is probably
the middle chamber 2 of the heart.
Now these contentions may all be just, but the question
arises whether this element or anything of the nature of a
substance will serve as a counterpart of that principle of unity
which, according to Aristotle, the common sense must be.
This av jji^vrov Oepfjiov or avfjufivrov irvevfjia must be a substance
and hence quantitative. Aristotle tells us that the primary
organ of sensation or that which perceives must be a magni
tude 3 . It is the sense or its concept which is non-quantitative.
Now in the De Anima, III. ch. 2, 427 a I sqq., he likens the
principle of unity to something for which the only analogue
is a point, the point which, while remaining indivisibly one,
has yet a double reference as the end of the two segments
respectively of a line which it divides. This is also the
doctrine to be extracted from De An. III. ch. 7, 431 a 19 sqq.
and De Sens. ch. 7, 448 b 19 449 a 22 4 . In the latter passage
he takes up the supposition that different qualities could be
simultaneously discriminated by an organ which, while not
atomic, was yet atomic in the sense of being completely con
tinuous. Such a description would fit, if not the heart, that
supposed internal substance of celestial affinities which it
contains 5 . The hypothesis is negated, and Aristotle passes
on to the conclusion of the De Anima that that which
accounts for the holding of different sensations in unity must
be actually a perfect unity, though in aspect diverse. It is
true that he also compares the unity of this psychic principle
1 In the passage in De Part. Animal. II. ch. i, 647 a 28, where he talks of a
fj.t)pLov (evidently the heart) being capable of receiving all sense-qualities he is
probably referring to tactual atad^jra.
2 Neuhauser, op. cit. p. 86.
3 De An. II. ch. 12, 424 a 17 sqq.
4 Cf. notes ch. 7, below loc. cit.
5 The heat in the heart is KadapwrdT-rj ; De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 6, 744 a 29.
R. 2
1 8 INTRODUCTION
to the unity of an object with diverse qualities 1 . But, as we
shall see, this involves no difference of theory; the ascription
of two attributes to one spatial thing involves a reference to
an identity which is itself not spatial.
Hence we come to the conclusion that Aristotle in
accounting for apperception has to make reference to a
unity that cannot be described as a material organ. It is
true that in consonance with his general psycho-physical
parallelism he should be forced to try to think of it as an
organ, but it has that characteristic which nothing corporeal
can possess; it is aro/uo^rt 2 . Hence we cannot conceive both
the soul and its immediate substrate (numerically the same as
the central organ of sensation) as unity 3 .
It is naturally just here that the parallelism of mind and
body, aicrO^cr^ and alaO rjTrjpiov, should break down. It is
just in coordinating and distinguishing the contributions of
the senses that the evepyeia of a typical act of mind comes in.
It is as referred to a unity that sensations are anything for
mind. Now qua evepyeia, i.e. qua mental, a psychical phe
nomenon is nothing passive and nothing to be ascribed to
body. Mind in its proper nature is airaQ^, and hence, if we
were to ascribe the function of apperception of sensations to
anything, it would need to be assigned to the vovs, which is
aTraOrjs, and " comes in from outside 4 ." The essence of my
contention is, that it is impossible to ascribe to an organ that
which, not being an instance of irao-^eiv passive alteration,
it is the function of nothing corporeal to account for. Unless
Aristotle were to maintain that the substrate of the soul, the
ay fji<f>vTov Oepfjiov or Trvev/jia, were not extended (which would
be the same as making it immaterial) he could not attribute
to it the unification of consciousness. As facts are, he says or
implies in De An. II. ch. \2 ad init. that the organ is a fjbe<ye6os.
At the same time this psychical substance may very well
1 Both here and in De An.
2 I note that Neuhauser, p. 1 10, agrees with me in thinking that r drd/ty /ecu
, De Mem. ch. 2, 451 a 28, refers to the organ of sensation.
3 Neuhauser, p. 104.
4 De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 3, 736 b 28 rbv vovv p-bvov dvpadev
INTRODUCTION 19
be the organ which accounts for the plurality of impressions
which are united in one act by the mind. It may be this
which is the delicate structure capable of receiving and
retaining the multitude of impressions which function in
memory. In our treatise (the De Memoria) there is nothing
which bears this out. We hear about processes in TO alaOr]-
TIKQV being interfered with by the too great pressure of the
parts above them 1 , and of defects of memory being due to
excessive fluidity or hardness of the receptive structure 2 .
This last description would surely suit the heart as a whole
better than the mysterious Trvev/jia which it contains. It
really does not matter which was Aristotle s theory; anything
extended will suffice, so far as space goes, for the reception of
a plurality.
On the subject of the connection between central and end
organ there are, in our treatises, no materials to enable us to
come to a decision. We hear 3 of affections going on /cal
ev ffaOei, /cal eVtTroX?;?, i.e. both in the central and the end
organ, and we hear that it is the /civrjo-i,? going on in the eyes
which causes us to have light sensations still when we turn
aside out of the sun into the dark. Of course it may still be
the case that perception does not occur until the /aV^crt? reach
the heart, but it is not necessary to believe that the medium
of communication was, according to Aristotle, qualitatively
the same as that of the end organ, and that the process
transmitted to the heart was hence qualitatively the same
as that realised in the end organ 4 . An impression in the
central organ is known as a (jyavTao-fia 6 ; the question is
whether an ataOrj^a is, as Neuhauser maintains, numerically
the same as and only in aspect different from a fyavracrpa.
Without committing ourselves to an answer it might be
profitable to point out that a possible solution is that,
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 b i. 2 Ch. i, 450 b i sqq.
3 De Insom. ch. 2, 459 b 7.
4 Neuhauser thinks that in maintaining this doctrine Aristotle anticipated the
discovery of the nerves (due to Herophilus) or at least invented an analogue to
them.
5 Cf. De Mem. ch, i, 450 an,
2 2
20 INTR OD UCTION
though consciousness cannot arise unless the central organ
be stimulated, the stimulation reaching it might be only
analogous 1 to and not identical with the modification of the
peripheral organs.
SECTION VII. THE OBJECTS OF SPECIAL SENSATION.
(a) Colour. The ground-work of all colour phenomena
is TO 8t,a<j>ave$, which is a Koivrj Averts, a common characteristic,
of two of the four elements, namely air and water. We trans
late TO Sia^aves as the transparent medium, but though it
functions as a medium between the coloured object and the
eye, it is not merely as a medium that Aristotle considers it.
It is most frequently referred to simply as TO Siafyaves without
the further qualification that it is a medium. It is properly a
vehicle or ground-work for the manifestation of colour. It
penetrates all bodies to a greater or less degree 2 (doubtless
Aristotle means all composite bodies, which contain air and
water in some proportion), and it is in so far as they are thus
permeated by it that they are capable of showing colour.
The colour of a solid body is the limit, i.e. the surface, not of
the body itself but of the Siafyaves in it 3 . That is the colour
seen, but the same nature extends right through the body.
Similarly bodies that are not opaque but consist of a diaphanous
substance altogether (avr&v rwv Siaffravcov) 4 show colour 5 . But
that colour is light. This brings us to the consideration that
it is not merely the existence of the transparent vehicle that
causes colour or light phenomena to arise. In itself it is a
mere 8iW/u9; it must be raised to the state of evepyeia by
the presence of fire in it 6 . Hence light is the * colour of
the diaphanous quality in bodies and is due to some other
determining cause (Kara (rvftfteftriKos) ; it is not anything
self-existent. It is equally defined as the evepyeia or evre\e-
^eta ToO La<f)avov<>.
1 Cf. note to De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 16, 17.
2 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 9. 3 439 a 34 sqq.
4 439 b 3- 5 439 b i-
INTRODUCTION 21
The presence of fire causes the existence of actual light,
the positive determination of the transparent medium, its
absence that of darkness, the privation of light. These are
the contrasted determinations for substances typically trans
parent : in definitely bounded (opaque) bodies, in which, it
is implied, TO Siafaves does not exist in the same degree or
purity, the contrasted determinations are black and white 1 .
Thus far there is no particular difficulty in the Aristotelian
conception ; light and colour are determinations ultimately
identical, of the type evepyeia, affecting a material or vehicle
which, apart from these determinations, is neutral to them.
Light is to be perceived as an all-pervasive character of
transparent substances equally and instantaneously present
in every part. But when we come to consider the action of
a coloured object upon the eye, and remember that it is said
to affect the vision by means of a KLV^CT^ through the medium 2 , ,
it seems natural to consider this KLV^O-I^ to be light. When,
in De Sensu, chapter 6 3 , Aristotle talks of light proceeding
from the sun through the medium to the eye, it is evidently
thought of as the stimulation which causes sight. Similarly,
when in the latter part of the same chapter 4 he affirms that
all parts of the medium are affected at the same time 5 , e.g.
that light travels instantaneously (and hence is not really a
Klwr}<jis), he seems to be still thinking of it as an activity
exerted by the object on the eye (TO yap </>w9 iroiel TO opav).
Yet in other passages it seems to be rather the indispensable
condition of the operation of a coloured object on the eye.
The colour stimulates the transparent medium which already
is in a condition of actuality, i.e. is illuminated ; objects are
seen eV </>&&gt;Tt 6 . Again, in De Sensu, ch. 2, 438 b 4, light is
referred to as possibly itself the medium. It is the K.ivr\cn,<$
through the medium, whether that be light or air (in a state
of illumination), that causes vision. Hence from this point of
view light is not the activity exerted by the object on the
sense organ but merely the condition of the exertion of this
1 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 17. 2 Ch. 2, 438 b 5.
3 Ch. 6, 446 a 30 sqq. 4 446 b 30 sqq.
5 447 a 10. 6 De An. II. ch. 7, 419 a 7 sqq.
22 INTRODUCTION
activity. When in chapter 6 Aristotle denies that light is a
K.ivr)Gi<$ (equally whether that KIVIJCTIS be of the type cfropd
spatial transference, or d\\oia)o-is qualitative alteration 1 ) he
is still thinking of it as an activity, and the substance of his
contention is, that that evepyeia, which was elsewhere treated
as the indispensable condition of that activity, is itself the
activity which accounts for vision. It is very difficult to get
the two conceptions to blend. The transference of the eI8o?
of the object to the sense organ can only be thought of as a
KIVTIO-IS, i.e. a process involving time. The activity as such is
caused by the coloured object, whereas the evepyeia is caused
by the presence of the illuminating fire. Yet Aristotle, misled
by the apparent instantaneousness of light, wished to conceive
as not a /cLvrjais that which could only be a KIVTIGIS and to
raise it to the rank of an evepyeia, i.e. something not physical
at all.
The fundamental colour-tones are black and white, and
Aristotle thinks to account for all other tints by the mixture
of these two. He apparently wishes to make out that a
mixture or rather chemical union of the substances which
are black and white will give the chromatic tints 2 . One
might have thought that common observation would have
refuted this, and it is true that he does not say exactly this
but merely " when substances unite so do their colours."
True union of any two substances is one in which the original
character of the component substances is lost and a third
distinct qualitative character emerges as characterising every
minutest part of the compound. To our modern chemical
theory this holds true only if we stop our subdivision of the
composite at the molecule. Any further analysis is supposed
to give us parts which are not qualitatively identical, i.e. the
molecule is supposed to split into atoms which have the
qualities of the diverse component substances. But to
Aristotle this was not so ; the minutest conceivable sub
division of a true compound would still yield parts which
were qualitatively identical with the whole. The compound
1 Cf. notes ch. 6 ad loc. 2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 3, 440 b 15 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 23
was opoiopepes 1 . Of such a sort was the mixture of black
and white resulting in the chromatic tones supposed to be.
Mere juxtaposition of the minute parts of differently coloured
substances resulted only in the production of an indeterminate
neutral tint which varied with the acuteness of our perception
and our remoteness from the object. It is noteworthy that,
if one were to define black and white 2 in the modern way as
the capacity of a surface to reflect none or all of the light
cast upon it, one could still describe the chromatic tints as
intermediate between these, as diverse aptitudes for reflect
ing one portion and absorbing the rest of the total light.
But of course nothing like this is to be found in Aristotle.
What is suggestive in his theory is his contention that the
difference of the composite tones depends upon the different
proportions of the ingredients entering into them. This is an
attempt to assimilate the theory of colours to that of harmonies ;
the pleasantest colours are those in which the proportions are
simplest. This idea, if erroneous, is interesting as showing
his readiness to recognise that mathematical relations enter
into the constitution of reality. These relations are arith
metical ; from mere geometrical characteristics you cannot
derive any new quality, but, given a pair of opposed funda
mental sensuous attributes, you can by a proportionate com
bination of the two account for the intermediate qualities.
The same theory is worked out also in connection with flavour.
1 Cf. notes to ch. 3, 440 a 34 sqq.
2 In Metaph. x. ch. 7, 1057 b 8 sqq. white and black are distinguished as rb
v xpw/ict and TO avyKpiTLKov xp^Ma, and one might suspect that this
implied some theory that white was the active and black the passive element in
colour mixture in conformity with the principle in Meteorol. IV. ch. i, 378 b 22
TO yap avyxpLTiKov uxnrep Troit]Ti.Kbv TI e<mV. But from various passages in the
Topics, e.g. in. ch. 5, 119 a 30, iv. ch. 2, 123 a 2, we find that it is white which
is TO SiaKptTiKov ^pQifjia.. It is also said to be diaKpiTiKov 6^ews. I suppose
the fact alluded to by this term is that it dissipates and exhausts the energy of
the sense organ. If indeed the term is properly Aristotelian and not simply
taken by way of illustration from some current popular theory, it is to be
connected with the doctrine referred to in De An. in. ch. 13, 435 b 13 and else
where, that excessive stimulation destroys the sense organ, and white being the
purest and most characteristic colour will tend to this extreme.
24 INTR OD UCTION
(b) Sound is not treated at length in the De Sensu, and
the theory of taste and smell involves to a still greater degree
than that of light the crudities of the Aristotelian psychics.
Not that we should speak with entire disrespect of the genera
lisation which assigned the constituents of all things to but
four ultimate elements. The grouping of substances together
according as they were dry, fluid, gaseous, or manifested
warmth, implied something more than a mere universal of
sense in each case. The distinctions reappear in modern
science not as the designations of different primitive sub
stances but as marking distinct states in which all matter
can exist. At lea^t TO ^rjpov or 777, TO vypov or vScop, and o
dr)p correspond to trie solid, the liquid, and the gaseous states,
and in the celestial fire TO avw awfjua which though not
identical with is yet analogous to irvp, Aristotle in a way
shadows forth the conception of the ether.
(c) Flavour is, according to the De Sensu, a qualitative 1
affection of liquid by dry substance. This modification is
effected by the agency of heat (heat is the cooperating cause
avvaiTioii], and the process by which it is produced is a sort
of solution of the dry in the liquid (TrXvcrw, eVaTTOTrA.iWii 2 ).
Knowing Aristotle s theory of the qualitative modification of
one substance by another 3 , we shall, however, refuse to regard
this as a diffusion of the particles of the solid in the liquid.
It is no mechanical diffusion, but what we should call a
chemical union of the dry with the moist ; it is, in fact, a
union more intimate than our chemical union is supposed to
be. If it were not so, then really the particles of the solid
would stimulate the sensation, and there would be some
ground for the Democritean theory that it was the different
shapes of these particles that produced the different flavours.
This Aristotle entirely rejects 4 ; though taste is a tactual
sense, that does not mean that it is acted upon by the spatial
and mechanical properties of the minute parts of bodies,
1 Troi.6i> TI TO vypbv TrapaffKevd^ei, ch. 4, 441 b 21.
2 De Sens. 441 b 17, cf. also ch. 5, 445 a 15.
3 Cf. above in connection with colour mixture.
4 Ch. 4 , 442 a 31 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 25
analogous to those properties discerned by touch when the
bodies have an appreciable mass. It is not the particle
impinging on the tongue that causes the taste, but the
qualitative modification of the liquid medium which is
identified as the flavour. If we lived amidst this vehicle 1 ,
surrounded by it as we are by the air, then it would act as a
medium just exactly as the air does in odour or sound, and
the sense of taste would be a mediated one. In assigning the
sense of taste as a subvariety of touch 2 , Aristotle no doubt
has in mind the fact that, as things are, it is only effected by
contact with a portion of the substance in which the qualitative
modification known as flavour subsists ; he also, of course, has
in view his theory that the fundamental qualities of flavour,
sweetness and bitterness, are really indices of the tactual
properties of food which go to determine its value as nutri
ment. The sweet TO J\VKV is identified with the light
TO Kovfov, i.e. with that light substance which can be raised
up by the supposed vital heat operative in digestion and so
get incorporated in the organism. The bitter TO iriKpov
being heavy, sinks down and passes away as excrement 3 .
Those actual properties, be it noted, are not spatial or
dynamical according to Aristotle, but qualities given by the
special sensations of touch, and it is upon such tactual attri
butes of objects that their value or hurtfulness for our organisms
depends 4 .
All other tastes than sweet and bitter are composites of
those two qualities in different proportions, exactly as the
chromatic tones are compounds of black and white 5 .
(d) For odour to exist we require the prior production
of flavour ; we must already have TO ey%vjjbov vypov, i.e. liquid
modified by flavour, or, what is the same thing 6 , TO ey%v JJLOV
fypov, dry substance which has produced a qualitative modi
fication on liquid. The further solution of this flavoured
substance in either air or water is, it seems, that which
1 De Sens. ch. 6, 447 a 8. 2 Ch. 4, 441 a 3.
3 441 b 26 sqq. 4 De An. III., ch. 1 3, 435 b 4 sqq.
5 Cf. above (a) on colour. 6 Cf. notes to ch. 5, 442 b 31.
26 INTRODUCTION
produces odour 1 . The diffusing agency is again heat 2 , but
it must be a fresh diffusion of the sapid substance which
produces odour; if not, odour to creatures living in water
would be identical with taste, whereas Aristotle distinctly
assigns the sense of smell as such to them 3 . Similarly odour
to animals that respire is not simply the presence in air of
exactly the same thing that in liquid causes taste ; it is a
diffusion in the air of the flavour itself, not of the cause of
the flavour. But, since flavour is the basis of odour, differences
in the latter correspond to the varieties of the former 4 , and
the scents derive their names from those distinguishing the
tastes to which they correspond, owing to the similarity of
the actual sensations 5 .
Animals that respire perceive odour by means of the air
in which it is diffused entering the nostrils. The character
istic which modifies the air seems to be thus transferred to
the organ, which Aristotle probably thought was composed of
air alone in respiring animals 6 . The air in entering the organ
displaces a membrane 7 and so effects communication. But in
animals which dwell in water, the organ (probably consisting
of water) is uncovered, just as the eyes also of fishes have no
protecting covering ; though the manner of perception is
different the sense is still the same, for it is the same objective
quality which affects them as in us causes smell 8 .
Thus far odours are strictly parallel to flavours, and serve
as an index to the character of the food from which they
proceed. But we can classify them in a different way and
not according to the taste to which they correspond ; or
rather, as Aristotle says, there are two different varieties or
groups of odour. As we saw, heat is required in the propaga
tion of all 9 , i.e. the Svva/jLis or fyvaw of odour contains the heat.
Now in man 10 this heat entering the nostrils tempers the cold
1 De Sens. ch. 5, 443 b 7. 24431317. 3 443 a 4, 444 b 21.
4 443 b 9. 5 Cf. De An. II. ch. 9, 421 b i.
6 Cf. De An. ill. ch. i, 425 a 5 (Oartpov ro6ruv sc. atpos /ecu vdaros) and cf.
section v. above.
7 De Sens. ch. 5, 444 b 24. 8 Cf. notes to 444 b 21.
9 Cf. 444 a 27. 10 Ch. 5, 444 a 19 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 27
which is supposed to prevail in the brain and its neighbourhood.
Odours then appear to have a direct effect upon health and to
be regarded as pleasant or the reverse in proportion as their
action is beneficial or not. It is thus that Aristotle accounts
for the appreciation felt by man for the scents of flowers and
perfumes which have no association with edible things, an
appreciation not felt by the lower animals. In the latter the
brain, not being nearly so large in proportion to their size,
does not apparently need this tonic influence. Thus Aristotle
assigns to what we should call an aesthetic satisfaction a purely
physiological and naturalistic explanation.
SECTION VIII. PERCEPTION AS QUANTITATIVE.
In chapters 6 and 7 of the De Sensu Aristotle raises the
question (i) whether all perception is of a quantum 1 and
(2) whether all quanta are perceptible 2 . Both are answered
in the affirmative ; the reasons for maintaining the former
principle we have already seen 3 . Spatial quantity is to be
identified as the continuous (TO crvve^), and the continuous is
just that in which there is no least part, in which you never
come to the indivisible ; objects of perception may, however,
appear to be indivisible and therefore non-quantitative 4 . What
this admission amounts to we must now discuss. In raising
the problem whether there are an infinite number of perceptible
parts in any object (e.g. whether all quanta are perceptible),
Aristotle points out that the different species of qualities
belonging to any one sense must form a limited number 5 .
They can all be arranged in a linear series with the simple
qualities most opposed to each other forming the extreme
points and the others arranged in proximity to the two poles
in accordance with the preponderance of the one or the other
element respectively in them. But though thus arranged in
linear fashion, they do not form a continuum, i.e. in analysing
the whole of which they are constituent parts, you come
1 De Sens. ch. 7, 449 a 22 sqq.
2 Ch. 6, 445 b 3 sqq. ; cf. also ch. 7, 448 a 21 sqq.
3 Sec. n. above. 4 Ch. 7, 44 8 b 17. 5 Ch. 6, 445 b 24.
28 INTRODUCTION
ultimately to units which cannot be subdivided, i.e. you come
to the indivisible. Hence there must be a finite number of
parts or steps between the ends of the scale. This is a
general proposition that holds good equally of a series of
cognate qualities and of the number of middle terms to be
interposed between subject and predicate in the proof of any
proposition 1 . It is true equally of any finite magnitude.
There must be a finite number of assignable parts (equal,
i<ra, cf. ch. 6, note ad loc.) between point A and point B, or
else Achilles can never overtake the tortoise 2 . What then
becomes of the assertion that all quantities are perceptible,
i.e. that no matter how far you analyse the object the parts
obtained are still something for sense ? Aristotle solves the
difficulty by pointing out that it is one thing for a part to be
perceived by itself and another as in the whole. We come to
a limit at which a part ceases to be per se actually (evepyeia)
an object of perception. The very minute parts of bodies are
in their individuality only potentially (Svvd/jiei,) perceptible.
As taken along with the others and going to compose the
whole they are, no doubt, actually perceptible. They do
produce an effect upon the sense, but taken in their indi
viduality they do not ; in fact, if a very minute part of any
substance is actually isolated from the whole it is altered
qualitatively and reduced to the nature of the new medium
in which it is placed 3 . The conclusion of the whole doctrine
is, that the sum of distinct objects of consciousness into which
any total can be divided is limited, and that, for explicit
consciousness, such units are indivisible. All specific exist
ences are as such indivisible, and the mind can grasp absolute
unity. This must be the truth underlying the statements that
sense objects can appear indivisible ; as objects of mind they
may be indivisible, though, as existences in the physical
world and hence continuous, they cannot really be so 4 .
1 Cf. notes, De Sens. ch. 6, 445 b 24. 2 Cf. Physics, VI. ch. 9, 239 b 14 sqq.
3 De Sens. ch. 6, 446 a 8 sqq.
4 Cf. Metaph. x. ch. 3, 1054 a 27 where it is pointed out that rd TrXr^os and
TO diaiperov is /j.a\\ov aiff6r)T6f, and unity and the indivisible only known by
opposition to these.
INTR OD UCTION 29
Aristotle s distinction between the actual and the potential
perceptibility of a sense object may throw some light upon
the conception of the subconscious existence of ideas which is
so much in evidence in modern psychology. To many writers
it seems to be the case that ideas or sensations may go on
diminishing in intensity until they reach a zero point the
threshold of consciousness, after which they pass over into the
subconscious region and go on existing as petites perceptions
with a separate individuality just as good as that which they
had before. They are not unconscious mental modifications,
i.e. they are still in some way present to consciousness, for,
it appears, they may go on diminishing still further in inten
sity until they reach a zero of total oblivion. Now such a
conception of an intermediate subconscious zone interposed
between the conscious and the unconscious is quite self-
contradictory 1 . A sensation in its individuality is either an
object of consciousness or it is not ; if it is not you may
call it subconscious if you like, meaning by that that in
conjunction with others it produces an effect upon the mind,
but in its individuality it is not an object of consciousness
of any grade whatsoever. The subconscious region should
then be defined, not as a region, but as that state of an object
in which, as a separate thing, it cannot be distinguished, but
still in conjunction with others helps to produce a total
psychical disposition. Whether the object can ever become
a distinct element in consciousness per se depends upon
circumstances. Sometimes by straining the attention or
banishing other stimuli we can detect separate sensations
hitherto unnoticed ; sometimes sensations which, we know,
must to a more acute sense appear distinct, are known to us
only in the total volume which they produce. So too with
ideas and memories, some can be aroused in their individuality
by recollection, while others are real only in so far as by
their former existence they modify our total present mood.
Aristotle s doctrine of the infinite divisibility of sensation
1 This is what Lewes (Aristotle, p. 253) seems to have in mind in criticising
Hamilton s theory of latent knowledge. He by no means, however, makes his
point clear.
30 INTRODUCTION
(as above explained) fits in well with his general polemic
against the atomic theory. With his expressly physical
objections to atoms we are not here concerned. What his
teaching amounts to is, that, though the characters of the
minute parts called atoms are supposed to explain the sensa
tional quality of the total substance which they compose,
they themselves as occupying space will have parts and hence
will want explaining by the nature of their minute parts and
so on ad infinitum. Merely mathematical or mechanical
qualities will not explain the special differentiae perceived by
sense, and the atoms themselves, if corporeal, cannot be
thought of as having merely mathematical and mechanical
properties. To think of them we must invest them with the
attributes known to us by sense. Hence instead of assuming
that the sense-quality of an appreciable object is due to the
configuration alone of its parts, it is as well to suppose that
those parts have qualitative affections which, if not identical
with those of the whole, are yet like them sensuous and
contribute in some way to the resultant nature of the total
object.
SECTION IX. APPERCEPTION.
Apperception is, of course, a term not corresponding to
any expression in Aristotle, but by it we may designate that
function of sense in which it judges (/cpivei) and by so doing
coordinates in the same indivisible act different objects. The
physiology of the matter we have already dealt with ; Aris
totle localises the function in a central organ and hence it
may be held to correspond to what is known to modern
science as the action of the higher centres as opposed to the
stimulation of end organ and lower ganglia merely. The
latter affection does not result in perception of the typically
human kind, which requires that higher coordination which
has often been referred to by the current psychological term
apperception. The term alaOdveaOai with Aristotle in
cludes discrimination (Kpiveiv), and though in the discussion
INTRODUCTION 31
in the De Sensu he almost invariably employs the former
term, whereas in the De Anima the latter emerges more
conspicuously, he does not mean to distinguish two different
functions by the different expressions. P^laOdveaOai implies
both receptivity and discrimination, and would not be aio-Brjais
without discrimination. Accordingly, when Aristotle asks
how perception of two objects at the same time is possible,
he is not asking how two impressions may be received at the
same time ; the sense organ, being a /xeyetfo? and having an
indefinite plurality of parts within it, can easily account for
that the different parts may be differently modified. What
he wants to find out is how the different determinations can
be simultaneously discriminated, for that requires simulta
neous existence in the same individual entity, not merely
in different parts of it. Discrimination and coordination go
together; as he shows in the De Anima 1 , the consciousness
which discriminates must be single. The objects perceived
must not be present in separate moments 2 or to a divided
consciousness.
In chapter 7 of the De Sensu, Aristotle without first
hinting at his theory of how an indivisible unit of conscious
ness is possible, and thus leaving the field free for any
other theory, asks whether discrimination of different sense
elements in an indivisible moment can be effected. He
distinguishes the cases of (i) perception of opposite qualities
belonging to the same sense, e.g. black and white, and
(2) determinations due to different senses sweet and white.
If, he says, such discrimination were likely to occur, it would
be most natural to expect it in the case of the evavrla 3
contrary determinations of one single sense, /JLCI\\OV jap
cifjua r) Kivr)(Ti<$ r% /ua? 4 for the modifications due to
black and white colour being localised in the same organ are
more together than those caused by sweetness and white
ness (which exist in different organs), and hence they have
more chance of being coordinated. But, as it turns out, when
1 in. ch. 2, 426 b 17 sqq. 2 De Sens. ch. 7, 448 a 21 sqq.
3 447 b 23. * 447 b 9.
32 INTR OD UCTION
two modifications occur together one either drives out the
other or modifies it in some way, and, in the latter case, it is
so modified in return that a third and new modification arises
in which the individuality of the component elements is lost.
Two equal and contrary determinations might completely
annul each other l , but when we get qualities belonging to the
same sense simultaneously presented, what does occur is /uf*9,
a fusion of the two elements, as in the case of harmony ; they
form one thing, a compound, and though they are, as forming
such a thing, present to consciousness, their individuality is
lost and hence they cannot be discriminated. In an obscure
passage 2 which Biehl has had to reconstruct almost entirely,
Aristotle rejects the theory that this discrimination can be
effected by the determination in different ways of the different
parts of an organ which are yet continuous with each other
This leads up to his own theory that, if either contrary or
diverse qualities are to be simultaneously perceived there
must be an absolutely indivisible psychical unity which can
yet be viewed in two different ways at the same time. Its
nearest analogue is, as has been said 3 , the mathematical
point, or the unity of an object which possesses diverse attri
butes. It has been debated whether those two solutions of
the difficulty are the same, or whether the latter, if satis
factory for the case of qualities like white and sweet, belong
ing to different senses, will not be insufficient to account for
the harder* case of contrary modifications like black and
white. A passage in the De Anima* might make us think so,
but, as Rodier in his elucidation of De An. III. ch. 7 6 points
out, there is no real discrepancy between the two theories.
Opposed qualities evavria though existing in different parts
of the same total object must (if between them they cover
the whole extent of the ground) meet in a common indivisible
point if they are still to be ascribed to the same object, and
diverse characters (ere pa) like white and sweet, which do not
exist in different parts of the substance, must be deemed (as
1 De Sens. ch. 7, 447 a 27. 2 448 b 19 sqq.
3 Section vi. 4 Cf. notes to 449 a 4 sqq.
5 III. ch. 2, 426 b 28 sqq. 6 Traite de PAme, Vol. n. p. 501,
INTRODUCTION 33
bod-
. as the substance has those qualities) to belong equally
^0 its minutest parts, i.e. to be held together in a unity
which, like the point, is absolutely indivisible. Of such a
nature, then, is the psychic faculty involved in discrimination.
It would be natural, if we followed out the parallelism
between mind and body mechanically, to imagine that there
was some corporeal organ which had the same properties,
and there is a passage in the De Memorial > where, having
evidently the organ of consciousness in mind, Aristotle
refers to it as atomic ; hence there is some countenance for
Neuhauser s theory that this organ is the mysterious vital
heat of heavenly or transcendent origin. But as we have
seen, nothing corporeal can fulfil the functions of an absolute
indivisible unity ; the unity of apperception is generally
styled eV TL r^j? ^^X??? 2 , and perhaps the emphasis is on the
latter word. We might have expected that it would have
been in some way affiliated with the operation of z/oO?, which
is non-spatial and has a really transcendent origin. The
account of the activity of vorjo-w in De An. III. ch. 6, is almost
entirely parallel to his description of the higher function of
sense. However, the tendency of Aristotle to treat z/oO?
simply as the highest of the intellectual faculties that of
pure conceptual thought prevents us from making this
identification ; but, on the other hand, his refusal to see in
discrimination of any kind mere passivity or determination
by what is foreign to one s own being, leads us to surmise
that the faculties of Sense and of Reason must be in essence
one. This no doubt is his real belief but, as usual, it is veiled
by his cautious manner of presenting the subject.
SECTION X. MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
The text of the treatise on Memory and Recollection
presents some difficulties in interpretation which are perhaps
still greater than those met with in the De Sensu. The worst
1 Ch. 2, 451 a 28. Cf. above, Section vi.
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 7, 449 a 10, 448 b 23.
34 INTRODUCTION
t the
of these occur in passages where (e.g. 45 2 a iSsqq., 45 2 b i6s4, s
symbols are employed, and in one case at least it is not
claimed that a perfectly satisfactory explanation has been
arrived at.
The main results of the treatise now claim our attention.
(1) Memory (/jLvijfirj) * s use d in a very restricted sense,
one much narrower than that assigned to it in modern
psychology. It does not comprise retention : that rather is
an element present in the general faculty of Imagination, of
which Memory is a special determination. A sense impres
sion which persists as a psychic change resulting from an
actual perception 1 is an image ((pdpracr/jia) ; it is the ascrip
tion of this image to some object existing in past time which
is memory in the proper sense. In fyavradia generally
(though not apparently always 2 ) the object which has
produced the originating sense-impression is not present,
but that fact does not constitute the mental state a memory.
The sense of time, either determinate or indeterminate, must
enter into the apprehension before we can be said to re
member. Thus Memory is relatively a high mental function,
and though it is not denied of several of the lower animals,
it is nothing which need emerge in that assimilation of
present to past which must be found in any consciousness
which profits by experience.
(2) Aristotle thus thinks that a mental image may be
used and become an object of thought without the reference
to historical reality which memory implies. It was quite
natural that he should do so. As we have already seen,
the /clvrjo-ts in the body reproduces some /civrjffis which has
existed in the external world, and the tendency of his
thought is to ascribe as nearly as possible identity of nature
to the two ; at least his whole theory of sense-perception
implies this. Hence, if a bodily KLVTJO-IS give knowledge of
external reality in sense perception, there is no reason why
it should not do so when the source of sense stimulation is
no longer present. Certainly it is only when we remember
1 De An. in. ch. 3, 429 a i, 428 b n sqq.
2 Cf. De Mem. ch. i, note to 449 b 32.
INTRODUCTION 35
the strict sense, that the bodily /CLVTJO-^, which functions
as VOTJ/JLO, or Oetopij^a an object of thought, gives us know
ledge of the external object which caused the perception to
which it is due ; nevertheless it has an objective character,
just as the animal in a picture has a definite nature as an
object of consciousness independent of the reference to the
actual living model from which it was copied or which
suggested it 1 . From this account of the matter it might
appear that Aristotle believed that the physiological modi
fication in our bodies was the object of our thought when
we imagined anything. So it is in a way, but it is only
physiological per accidens ; it is the same eZSo? whether
existing in the external world or in the human body. To
our minds the disparateness between the physiological and
the merely physical seems extreme and we can think of
the physiological process only as being some very remote
symbolization of the external ; not so was it to Aristotle,
by whom the complexity of organic structures was very
inadequately comprehended. It is noteworthy that the
difference of the physiological and the physical seems to
have been much more clearly realised by the time of
Spinoza, who, when defining mind as t idea corporis, avoids
the objection we have instanced above by explaining that our
ideas involve the nature both of the external bodies and of
the human organism 2 ; he holds, however, that in perceiving
the external we perceive also the nature of our own body.
Nevertheless, the fact that no thought is the thought of
the physiological process occasioning it, but is rather the
consciousness of that which this process symbolizes, need
not conflict with Aristotle s definition of memory or his
account of the objective nature of a fyavTav^a apart from
memory. Just as the animal in a picture has an existence
Kaff avro qua animal, and not merely as a certain arrange
ment of paint devised to represent a living animal, so the
<j>avrao-fjLa may have an objective character without referring
to the particular event or object to which it owes its origin.
1 450 b 23 sqq. 2 Ethics, n. Prop. xvi. and Corollaries.
3-2
the
36 INTRODUCTION. i6s 4 .^
% not
When it does so refer and is used as an elicwv or /Jivn^
vevjjia 1 , the representation of the object is coincident with a
representation (either definite or vague) of the time which has
elapsed since it was present to sense, and it is this coincidence 2
alone which gives memory in the true sense.
To modern thought it may seem strange that Aristotle
should regard a (^avraa^a, a mere alteration in the bodily
organs, as something objective. But one must remember
that this Kivr)<Tis was to him something of a definite pattern,
as definite as that of any object external to the human
organism, and that the knowledge of the one would not
differ from that of the other in point of objectivity. The
stimulation of the sense organs by an external object might
originally cause the Kivrjai^. But this stimulation is nothing
else than the communication of the et&o? of the external
object to the human organism. It is this etSo<? which forms
the content of thought, and whether existing in the external
physical object or in the sense organ it is equally objective.
The psychological problem as to how we perceive and re
member and think is never for Aristotle the question of
how mind knows a real object. This latter, a metaphysical
difficulty, is quite distinct. That real objects existed and
could be known was the assumption from which he started.
Knowing was a fact which must be accepted, but how a
corporeal organism could manifest this function wanted ex
planation. The presence of the actual fact thought of in the
body of the thinking being and at the moment of thought
was the only solution he could offer. It is for modern
physiology to discover a better. But his was an attempt
in the right direction and a very natural answer also, for his
question was, not how mind thinks, but how we embodied
creatures think.
If it be asked : Is Aristotle s a theory of representative
knowledge or perception ? we must answer no, at least it is
not so in the modern sense of such a theory. In a sense, no
doubt, there is representation ; between the individual and a
1 De Mem. 451 a 3. 2 ch. 2, 452 b 26.
INTRODUCTION 37
body external to his organism the (clvrja-is in the sense organs
mediates, but between mind and its object nothing inter
poses, and our apprehension of an external object is direct,
the immediate awareness of an objective, real character
of things. Hence Aristotle could think of a ^avraa^a which
was not due to an object at the moment stimulating the
senses, but was merely retained in the organs, as having
objectivity apart from memory. This was so because the
eZSo? or character it had was equally real whether in the
body or out of it. Memory in fact adds nothing to the
objectivity of the ^avrdo-^ara involved in it. It is merely
the union of the KlvijGW caused by lapse of time and the
(fravTacrpa originated by an external thing.
(3) The characteristic of involving continuous quantity,
spatial or temporal, which cleaves to sense perception 1 infects
also imagery, and hence memory. Thus memory must be
assigned to the faculty of sense and its organ ; it is not a
function of pure thought 2 . The function of pure thought
(i/oO?) is the apprehension of concepts apart (Ke%a>picrp,va)
from this continuity which forms their v\rj vorjrrj ; the
concept (vorjfjia) is to the image as the equation to a curve
is to the curve in which it is realised. But memory, the
apprehension of time, which is a continuum, can thus never
belong to pure thought as such. Hence we may conclude
(indeed, if my interpretation of ch. I, 450 a 20 be correct, we
find it stated) that higher beings whose activity is purely
intellectual do not share in memory.
(4) Differences in powers of memory Aristotle accounts
for by the condition of the bodily organ (which is identical
with the central organ of sensation). In language suggested
largely by a passage in the TJuaetetus* of Plato he describes
the causes of variation between different individuals and the
different ages of life. Generally speaking too great fluidity
of the receptive structure causes impermanence of the im
pression ; too great density occasions a difficulty in getting
1 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 445 b 32.
2 De Mem. ch. i, 450 a \i sqq. and notes.
3 Theaeietus, 1910 sqq.
3 8 INTRODUCTION
any experience ever impressed. Similarly in the process of
recollection (which we shall next proceed to discuss) bodily
conditions influence the recall of ideas either by impeding 1
the series of changes which occur in the central sensorium or
by causing it to diffuse and so cause emotional disturbance 2 .
(5) Recollection (dvdpvrjaris) is to be distinguished from
memory, the ascription of an image to some event in the
past, which may be due either to the persistence 3 of a sense-
impression or to its reinstatement afresh ; dva/uLvrjais is just
that process of reinstatement and is so to be defined. It
must, however, be carefully distinguished from the process
involved in learning (which was identified with it by Plato).
We may actually have reproduced in us by learning some
knowledge previously possessed which might have been
recalled but has totally passed into oblivion ; under those
circumstances the process is quite different from recollection ;
the latter process is self-conducted, while, for the former, we
require instruction. Again, the basis from which we start is
different in the two cases ; much more than the meagre
knowledge required in order to be capable of receiving
instruction will be necessary, if we are to recall the previous
idea unaided.
The objects to be recalled are twofold ; they are
either those which have a necessary connection with one
another, like the concepts and judgments in mathematical
science, or again they may be contingently related. The
former are easily remembered, the latter not so, but in both
cases the order of recall depends upon the experienced
connection of the facts 4 , and the connection is either that of
like with like, or of things contiguous or opposed. The
ease with which an idea may be recalled depends upon the
frequency of the repetition of the particular series of con
nections by which it is reinstated. Frequent repetition due
to custom produces a natural disposition 5 which tends to
actualisation just like any other SiW/u? or </>ucrt?. Here,
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 b i. 2 453 a 16 sqq. 3 451 b i sqq.
4 45 lb 3 2 - 5 452 a 29 sqq.
INTRODUCTION 39
however, just because the disposition is due to custom, it is
liable to be interfered with, just as any tendency in nature
may be thwarted, only more so.
The laws of Association here formulated by Aristotle
(Contiguity, Similarity, and Contrast) are obviously merely
principles governing the reinstatement of ideas previously
experienced. Hence their scope is much narrower than that
assigned to them by modern psychology. Aristotle certainly
held no * Associationist Theory of Knowledge, but for that
the most recent theorists are hardly likely to blame him.
There are, however, other psychical operations like com
plication/ his atcrQijffts Kara o-v/jL/3e{3r}K6s, which many writers
would rank generally under association but which he left
unaffiliated to the process involved in recollection. This
discreteness in his treatment of mental functions is no doubt
due to his empirical way of approaching his data and his
caution in all but the widest generalisations.
(6) Finally we hear that recollection is a higher activity
than mere memory. It is peculiar to man 1 . Though it may
operate involuntarily 2 it is typically a purposive operation 3
and is to be regarded as a kind of search, like the search for
the middle term in demonstration or for the means to effect
the fulfilment of an end in practical deliberation. Its pur-
posiveness seems to argue to its higher nature; it is in this
way illustrative of the airdOeia which belongs to mind per se^.
In recollecting the soul seems to be active, producing an
activity which proceeds towards* the organs of sense. Apart
from the aspect of activity we must, however, recognise that,
in recollection, there is a process going on in the organs of
sense or rather in the central sensorium. The various ideas
which reinstate one another are all to be described as
/civija-eis, and the end of a process of recollection seems to
be attained when one particular Kiwrjcns is produced which
seems to constitute a terminus to the series namely the
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 an. 2 451 b 26.
3 Cf. Prof. Laurie s Instates of Education, p. 233 sqq.
4 Cf. Section iv. above ad init.
6 De An. I. ch. 4, 408 b 17.
40 INTRODUCTION
corresponding to the idea to be recalled. It is
throughout implied that these Kivrja-eis, prior to the act of
recollection, are dormant ; that is to say they are not, until
revived, icivijo-eis. What then persists or what is the Kwrj<ris
when it is dormant? Aristotle talks of the impression on
the organ being like an imprint TUTTO?, and, no doubt, he
must have thought of the impression left by an experience
as being some kind of structural modification of the organ.
He talks of the subjective affections involved in apprehending
magnitudes as being o-^/jLara 1 like the objective magnitudes
themselves. He does not work out his theory of the persist
ence of impression, but doubtless the dormant impression is
merely something of the nature of a cr^yu-a (at least in the
case of the perception of magnitude), while the affection
whether when first experienced or when revived is of the
nature of a KIVTJO-I,?, though a iclvrjcris which still has a spatial
configuration and can be represented by a motion passing
along a determinate path as in the construction of a
triangle. At any rate we find no hint in Aristotle of that
modern theory which would make psychical dispositions
consist in the faint functionings of the same parts as are
brought into play when an idea is explicitly realised.
1 Cf. De Insom. ch. 3, 461 a 8 sqq.
TTEPI AIS0H5EQ5 KAI AIS0HTQN
436 a HEPI AlZeHZEQI KAI AII0HTON
I
t Se 776/ot \JJV~XTJS KdO* avTrjv Stw/Dtcrrat /cat wepl
eKaio T rjs /cara fjiopiov avTrjs, iyopevov ICTTL
e77tO~/Cl//tZ> 77/3t TWZ ^OJCO^ /Cat TtoV
etcrtj> tcat /cat
5 Trpd^eis GLVTWV. ra /xe^ ovv tlprjfjieva wep ijvr^ VTTO
Trepl 8e ra>v \oiira)V Aeyw^ei , KCU irp&TOV irepl
7rp(i)T(jn>. fyaivtrai 8e ra jLteytcrra, KCU ra KOLVO, KOL
TO. tSia rw^ ^wa)^, Koiva r^5 tyvxys OVTOL KCU TOV crw/xaros,
olo^ atcr^crts /cat jJLvrjfJLf) /cat #u/xos /cat lTri9v^ia /cat
10 oXco? oyoefts, /cat 77/305 rovrot? 1780^17 re /cat XVTTT^ /cat
ya/o raura cr^eSo^ V7rdp\i TTOLCTL rot? {wots. 77/305 8e
rd uei^ TrdvTMV ecrrt TO>J> uereyo^ra)^ Cwn5 KOLVOL,
\5>\^v/ >/ / o.\ / v/
Ta O TWZ^ 4 WW ^ e^tot5. ruyy a covert oe TOI^TW^ Ta Lte-
ytora TTTape5 o~vuytat TOI^ oLpi@fji6i>, oiov ey/07iyopo~t5
15 /cat V77^O5, /cat veoTrjs /cat yfjpas, /cat dvatrvor) /cat
eKTTVoyj, /cat ^a)^ /cat OdvaTos rrepl (bv BeojpTjTeov, rt
T eKCLGTTOV (LVTtoV, KOL 8t(X TIVOL^ atTttt5 OTVfJL/BaiVL.
(frvcriKov Se /cat 77ept vytetas /cat vocrov ra5 77pcejra5 tSetz/
ap^a5 oure yd/3 vyUiav ovTe vocrov olov re yi
20 rot5 ecrr 6/007 [JLevoiS 0)7^5. Sto o~^eSo^ raif 77/ot
ot 77Xeto~rot /cat rai^ tar/oa>^ ot ^>tXoo~o(^wrepa)5 TTJ
/ e\ X r> >\ v /rer\>
4360 /XTtO^r5, Ot /Lt^ T^.VT(DO~iV 6t5 Ttt 77/3L LOLTpLKrjS, Ot O
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS. 436a
I
Now that we have given a definite account of soul in its
essential nature and of each of its faculties individually, the
next thing to do is to consider animals and all things possessed
of life and to discover which activities are specific and which
they have in common.
Assuming as a basis our exposition about the soul, let us 5
discuss the remaining questions, beginning with those that
are primary.
The most important of the characteristics of animals,
both generic and specific, evidently belong to soul and body
in common, e.g. sense-perception and memory, passion, desire
and appetite generally, as well as pleasure and pain. These 10
are found practically in all animals.
But further, certain of the phenomena in question are
common to all things which participate in life, while others
are shared by particular kinds of animals. Of these the most
important fall into four pairs of correlatives, to wit, waking
and sleep, youth and age, the inhalation and expulsion of 15
breath, life and death. These phenomena call for discussion,
and we must investigate both the nature of each and the
reasons for its existence.
It falls within the province of the natural scientist to
survey the first principles involved in the subject of health
and disease, for to nothing lacking life can either health or
sickness accrue. Hence pretty well the most of our in- 20
vestigators of nature do not stop until they have run on into
medicine, and those of our medical men who employ their 436 b
44 ARISTOTLE
IK TMV Trept <f)v<Tea)s apyovTai irepl rrjs larpiKrjs. on
Se TO, Xe^eVra KOLVGL TT}? re t/^X^ e(TTi /cat TOV crw/xa-
TOS, ou/c aS^Xor. TrdvTa yap ra yuez />ter* atcr^creajs
5 crvu/BaiveL, ra Se Si atcr^creajs* eVta Se ra /xez> Tra^Tj
oi^ra rvyyjivei, ra S* efetg, ra Se (j)v\aKal Kal
, ra Se <f)0opal KOL crTeprjcreLs. rj S ctLcrOrjcrLS
OTL Sia crw/xaro? yiyz/erai TT^ $v)(fj, SrjXov KOL Sia rov
Xoyov /cat rou Xoyov %a)pL$. aXXa Trepi jute^ aicr^crea;?
10 /cat rot) atcr^az/ecr^at, ri ecrrt /cat Sta ri crvfJi/Baivei rot?
TOVTO TO TTCt^o?, etp^Tat TrpoTepov iv rots Trepl
. rot? Se {wot?, 17 /xei^ ^woz^ e/cacrroz/, dvdyKT)
icrBrio iv TOVTOJ yap ro ^a)o^ etmt /cat ^T)
Siopt^o/>te^. tSta S* 1787^ /ca^ e/cacrro^ 17 /x,e^ a^)^
!5 /cat yevcrt? aKO\ov9ei TTOLO-LV ef az^ay/c^?, 17 /xei^ d^ Sta
r^ ipf)iLtwr)v alrioLV iv rots Tiept t//u)(??s> 17 Se yeOo"t5
Sta jr)^ Tpoffryjv TO yap r)8v SiaKpivei Kal TO \V7rrjpov
avTrj Trepl Trjv Tpo<f)rjv, c2crre TO p,ev (frevyeiv TO Se Stw/cet^,
Kal oXaj? 6 ^(u/xo? e crTt TOV OpenTiKov TrdOos. at Se
20 Sia TOJI/ efoj^ez^ atcr^cret? TOIS TropevTtfcot?
Kai aKorj /cat oi//t?, 7rao~t //-e^ TO??
eVe/cei^ vTrdp^ovo-Lv, OTTO)? Stw/cwcrt Te irpoai-
Kal TCL (avXa /cat Ta
437 a (j)vya)o-i, Tot Se /cat (frpovij crews Tvyyavovcri TOV ev
eW/ca TroXXa? yap eto ayye XXovcrt Sta^opa?, e f co^ 77
Te TWI^ vor)TMV iyyiv^Tai (frpovrjcns Kal rj TMV TrpaKTwv.
avTwv Se TOVTCUZ^ irpos JJLZV Ta az/ay/cata /cpetTTWZ 77 oi//t?
5 /ca^ avTrjv, irpos Se z^ouz/ /cat /caTa cru/xySeyS^/cos 77 (X/COT).
Sta^opa? /xez/ yap TroXXas /cat Traz/ToSaTra? 77 TT^? oi//ea>5
dyye XXet Swz/a/xt? Sta TO TrdvTa Ta o~cojLtaTa /xeTe^etz^
, cocTTe /cat TO, Koiva Sta TavTrjs aicrOdveo-Qai
19 7ei>0"riKoO LU Alex., dpeTrriKov etiam Bas. et Sylb. | post
addunt /j.opiov exceptis E M Y et script! et impress!, atque addit etiam r^s
vet. tr., Ope-n-TiKov sine ullo additamento pvobant etiam Hayduck et Biehl.
I
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 45
art in a more scientific fashion, use as the first principles of
medicine truths belonging to the natural sciences.
There is no lack of evidence that the phenomena we have
mentioned are jshared by both soul and body in common,
for they all either occur in concomitance with sensuous ex
perience or are due to it. Some are modifications, some 5
permanent dispositions of sensuous experience, while some
protect and preserve and others destroy and annul it.
That the psychical function of sensation depends upon
the body is clear both a priori and apart from such evidence.
However, the nature of sense and its function and the reason
why this phenomenon is found in animals, have already been 10
explained in the Psychology. Animjih__/^2 animal must
rjossess sensation, for it is by means of this that we dis
tinguish animate from inanimate.
To each animal in its own proper nature touch and taste
must necessarily accrue, touch for the reason given in the 15
Psychology, taste owing to the fact that it takes nutriment ;
for by taste the pleasant and unpleasant are distinguished in
food, so that as a consequence the one is pursued and the
other shunned ; to put it generally, flavour is a determination
of that which is nutritive.
In animals with the power of locomotion, are found the
senses which are mediated by something external, to wit, 20
smell, hearing, and sight. These exist uniformly for the
purpose of the self-preservation of the animals possessing
them, in order that they may become aware of their food
at a distance and go in pursuit of it and that they may avoid
what is bad and injurious. Where intelligence is found they 437 a
are designed to subserve the ends of well-being ; they com
municate to our minds many distinctions out of which
develops in us the intelligent apprehension alike of the
objects of thought and of the things of the ^practical life.
Of. these Jthree sight is per se more valuable so far as the
needsTpf life are concerned, but from the point of view~oF~~
thought and accidentally, hearing is the more important. 5
The characteristics are many^and various which the faculty
of sight reports, because all bodies are endowed with colour ; yvfl
* *
46 ARISTOTLE
/ActXto-ra (Xe yw Se KOLVOL cr^rjfjia /cat peyeOos, /ctVr?crtz>,
10 dpidpov} rj S a/cor) ras rou i//d</>ov Stac^opas (JLOVOV,
oXtyots Se /cat ras r^s <f>a>vfj$. /caret o-vfjL/BeftrjKos Se
Trpos (frpovrjcTLV TI aKorj TrXetcrroi <TU/x/3aXXerat /x,e/)O5.
6 yap Xoyo? atrtos ecrrt r^5 p.aOrjcreo)^ a/coucrTO9 wz>. ov
/ca^ OLVTOV aXXa /cara crvfjifiefirjKos ef 6^OjLtara>^ yap
15 cruy/cetrat, ra)^ 6^o/x,ara)^ e/cacrroi^ crvp.^oKov ecrrtz^.
Siorrep (j)povLp,a)TepoL TMV e/c ye^erTj? o~Tpr)p,va)v eicrlv
e/carepa? r^5 atcr^cre&)9 ot ru^Xot raw eVewi/ /cat
ii
Ilept jute
20 e/cacrTT?, TTporepov elpyjrai. rov Se craJ/xaro? e^ of? ey-
yiyvecrOcLi 7re<f)VKei> alo-OrjTrjpiOLS, vvv [L\V t^rovcri /caret
rot crrot^eta rw^ croj/xara)^ ou/c evrropovvTzs Se
rerrapa vreVr oucra? crvvayeiv, yXt^o^rat Trept
TrejjLTTTTjs. TTOLOVCTI Se TrdVre? r?)^ oi//ti^ Trvpos Sta ro
25 TrdOovs rt^o? ayvoeiv TTJV atrtW- ^Xt/5ofteVou yap /cat
Kivovptvov TOV 6(f)Oa\jJiov (^atVerat Trup e/cXa/x,7retJ> rouro
S ez^ ra> cr/cdret vre^u/ce o-v^aiveiv, f) TU>V ySXe^apaj^
e?rt/ce/caXv/>tjLteVw^ yti^erat yap /cat rdre cr/cdros. e^ct
S avroptav rouro /cat trepav. el yap pr) tern \av9dvew
30 atcr^az/d/xei/o^ /cat opai^ra opw/xe^o^ rt, dvayKrj ap avrov
tavTov opav rov o^OaXp.oi . Sta rt ow r^pe^ovvn TOVT
ov crvjit^atVet ; ra S atrta TOVTOV, /cat r^? awopias /cat
rou So/ceti^ 7T7)p eti^at T^V oifjus, ivrtvOzv \rjirreov. ra yap
Xeta 7T<f)VKp eV ra> cr/cdret Xa/ATretz/, ou //-eVrot (^a>9 ye
437 b Trotet, rou S d^^aX/xou ro KoXov^evov p.e\av /cat yite cro^
(^at^erat. <^>at^erat Se rouro KivovfJievov TOV op.-
Sta ro cru/x^8at^et^ cocnrep 8vo yiyveo~9ai ro e^.
rouro S 77 Ta^vrr)^ Trotet r^5 /ct^^crea)?, wcrre So/cetz^
5 erepo*> et^at rb opwz/ /cat rb opw^ite^or. Stb /cat ov
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 47
thus by this sense especially are perceived the common
sensibles (by these I mean figure, magnitude, motion, and
number). 10
But hearing gives merely differences in sound and, in a
few cases, in articulate utterance too. Hearing, however, has
the greatest jihare in the development ~6T intelligence, though
tftis_ js~~an accidental function(T~Speech ~being audible is in
strumental m causing us "to learn ; but this function it
possesses not per se but accidentally, for speech is a complex 15
of words, every one of which is a conventional symbol. A 1
consequence is that of those who from birth have been
without one or other of those two senses, the blind are more ,;
intelligent than deaf-mutes.
II
We have already given an account of each of the^sense
faculties. But each develops, according to the course of 20
nature, in a bodily sense organ, and these we shall proceed
to discuss.
Present-day investigators attempt to reduce them to the
ultimate elements of all bodies ; but, since the senses are
five, they have a difficulty in reducing them to the four
elements, and the fifth causes them anxious consideration.
Sight they all ascribe to fire owing to the misunder
standing of a certain phenomenon, viz. when the eye is 25
pressed and moved, fire appears to flash out from it ; and
it is the nature of this phenomenon to occur in the dark, or
when the eyelids are closed, for then, too, there is darkness.
But this theory that sight is of the nature of fire raises
a fresh difficulty ; for, if it is impossible for that which is
conscious of and sees some object to be unaware that it does 30
so, the eye will of necessity perceive -itself. Why then is this
not the case when the eye is at rest ?
From the following considerations we shall discover the
cause of this circumstance and of the apparent identity of
fire and vision. It is the nature of smooth things to shine
in the dark, but, nevertheless, they do not produce light ; now
what we call the " black " and " middle " of the eye has a 437 b
smooth appearance and it shows on the eye moving, for the
reason that this occurrence is a case of the reduplication of a
single thing. The swiftness of the motion effects this, causing
that which sees and that which is seen to appear to be
distinct. Hence also if the motion is not swift and does not 5
48 ARISTOTLE
ylyvtrai, av /AT) ra^ew? /cat eV cr/coTet TOUTO cr^a/?^
ro yap Xetoz> eV TO) o~/coTet Tre c^u/ce Xct/ATretz , oloi^ /ce<aXai
iy6vo)v Tivutv KCU 6 TT)? crr)7rias #0X09- /cat flpaSews
juteTa/3dXXoz>T09 TOT) d/AjitaTo? ou crvjii/3atz>et, wcrre So/cetz>
10 ajita eV /cat Suo etrat rd $ opa>v /cat TO op^^vov.
e /cetz aj? S* aLTo? avrbv opa 6 6^>^aX/xo5, ajcnrep /cat ez^
TT; di^a/cXacret, e?rt et ye Trup T)Z/, KaOdirep EjutTreSo/cXTj?
^crt /cat eV TW Ttjutatoj yeypaTrrat, /cat crvv/3aive ro
opav I^LOVTOS ojcnrep IK \afji7rTfjpos TOV (^cord?, Sta rt
15 ou /cat eV rw o~/cdret ecopa av TJ di//ts ; TO a7roo~/3eV-
vvcr0ai fydvai iv TO) crKorei e^touo-a^, ajcnrep 6 Tt^ato?
Xeyet, /ce^dz^ eo~Tt Tra^TeXa)?- Tt? yap a7rdo-/3eo-t5 (^WTO?
; cr^eWuTat yap ^ ^7P^ ^ i//u^pa> TO Oeppov /cat
olov So/cet TO T ez^ Tot? dz^^pa/cwSeo-t^ elz^at
20 /cat 17 </>Xd^, cSz^ TO) (/)WTt ouSerepoz (^atVeTat VTra
et 8* apa vrrdp-^ei pev dXXa Sta TO ^pe/xa \av6dvti 17
e8et ju,e$ rjjjiepav re /cat ez^ TW {;SaTt aTrocr/BevvvcrOai TO
(^a)9, /cat eV Tot? Trayot? /xdXXoz^ ytz^eo-^at CT/COTOZ^* 17 yovz^
<^Xof /cat TO, TreTrvpwfteVa o~w/>taTa Tracr^et TOUTO- z^uz^ 8
25 ovSez^ o~L>/A/3atz et TotovToz^. EjitTreSo/cX^? 8 eot/ce
{oz/Tt oTe /xez/ e ftdz/TO? TOV ^XWTO?, cocrTrep etp^Tat
j3\TTiv Xe yet yoi)^ OVTWS
&)? 8 ore rt? TTpooSov voewv coTrX/crcraTO
Xei^pirfv Sta vv/cra Trvpos o^eXa?
30 a\|ra<? TravToictiv avefjiwv Xayu,7rT7}p
OLT ave/jiwv fJiev rrvevfJLa ia<TKivaat,v devrwv,
Trvp 8 e^co SiaOpaxTKOv, ocrov ravaoorepov r^ev,
\dfjLiTearKev tcara ftr)\ov dreipeaiv aKTiveo-cnv
0)9 Se TO T eV /JLTJviy^iv eepy^evov wyvyiov Trvp
4383 \7TTf)cn,v oOovrjcn \o%d^To fcvfc\07ra Kovprjv
at 8 #SaT09 /^e^ ftevOos aTreo-reyov a^Lvdovro^,
Trvp S e^a) SiaOpaxr/cov, oaov ravacorepov rjev.
OTe jitez^ ouTft)? opav (frrjo Lv, OTC 8e Tat? dVoppotats Tat?
5 avro TCOZ> o
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 49
occur in the dark, the phenomenon does not take place. It
is the nature of smooth things to shine in the dark, as e.g. the
heads of certain fishes and the juice of the cuttle-fish. When
"trie "eye moves slowly, the effect the apparent simultaneous
identity and duality of that which sees and that which is
seen is not produced. But in the former case that ofio
swift movement the eye sees itself as it does too when
reflected in a mirror ; this is so, for, if it really consists of
fire, as Empedocles alleges and we read in the Timaeus, and
if vision is produced by the issuing forth of light from the
eye as it were from a lantern, why does not sight function in
the dark as well as by day ?
The explanation in the Timaeus, that the sight issuing 15
from the eye is extinguished in the darkness, is quite without
point, for what can the extinction of light mean ? Heat and
dryness are annulled by damp or cold, as we see in the case
of the fire and flame in burning coals ; but neither of these 20
is a characteristic of light. If they are and we do not detect
their presence owing to the smallness of their amount, light
would of necessity be extinguished in broad daylight too,
when it was wet, and darkness would increase in frosty
weather. This at any rate, viz. extinction, is what happens
to flame and burning bodies, but nothing of the kind occurs
in the phenomenon in question.
Empedocles evidently holds the view at times, that we 25
see upon the issuing of light from the eye, as we mentioned
before. At any rate these are his words :
u As who a journey intendeth, himself with a candle equippeth
Thorough the blustering night with its fiery radiance gleaming,
And, to ward off every gust, in lantern-case fits it, 30
That this may part to this side and that the breath of the wild winds
While the fire pierces through, inasmuch as its nature is subtler,
And shines over the threshold with splendour that naught can conquer,
Thus too the world-old fire was confined in the delicate membranes
And lies hid neath the screens of the spherical-fashioned pupil ; 43&
These keep in check the ocean of water that circles around it,
But the fire pierces through, inasmuch as its nature is subtler."
Sometimes he says this is the way in which we see, but at
other times he explains it by a theory of effluxes issuing from
the objects seen. 5
R. 4
50 ARISTOTLE
5 A77/>to/cptT09 S 6Yt jitez/ vowp elvai
Xeyet /caXw9, 6Vt oierat TO 6pdz> etz^at TT)I> e
ov /caXw9* TOUTO /xa> yap o-vjJL/3aivL OTL TO o/x/ia
/Cat O~TLV OVK iv .K.lV(p dXX lv TO) Op&VTl dl>d/cXaO~t9
yap TO 7ra$O9. dXXd KaOoKov Trepl r&v e/xc^at^o/xe^wz/
10 /cat d^a/cXdcrews ouSe TTW 8rj\ov TJV, &&gt;s eotAcei^. CLTOTTOV
Se Acai TO /xi^ cTrcXOelv avra) dwopTJcraL Sia TI 6
opa povov, TO>V aXXw^ ovStv iv 015 ejU,^)at^Tat TO,
etSwXa. TO /ie^ ou^ TT)^ oi//i^ el^at v8aTO9 d
ou pevTOi o-vjJL/Baivei TO opd^ 17 vSa>p dXX
15 o /cat eVt TOU depos KOIVOV Icrnv. dXX eix
/cat evTriXrjTOTepov TO vSwp TOU depo?* StoVep 17
/cat TO o/xjita u8aT09 Icrnv. TOVTO 8e /cat evr avroiv TO>V
epywv SrJXo^ (fraLverai yap v8a)p TO tKpeov
/^eVw^, /cat ei^ Tots Tra/iTra^ e/x/5pvot5 Tiy
20 vTTepl^aX\ov /cat T|J \ap,TT POTTJTI. /cat TO Xev/co^ TOV
o/x/>taTO5 e^ Tot? \pvo"LV ai^oL Trlov /cat \nrapov onep
Std TOUT ICTTI, irpos TO Sta/xeWtz/ TO vypov OLTT YJKTOV.
/cat Std TOUTO TOU o~w/xaTO9 dpptyoTaTO^ 6 o<f)0a\fji6$
IO~TIV ouSet? yap TTO) TO ez^To? TW^ /3\.<f)dpa)v eppLyajcrtv.
25 TWZ 8 dz/at/xaj^ o~K\.r)p6opjJLOi ot O(f)0a\fJiOL eto~t, /cat
TO>TO Trotet T^ o-K7r7]v. cL\oyov Se oXw? TO I^LOVTI TLPI
TYJV oi//ti/ opdz/, /cat OLTTOTdveo-Oai ^\pi TMV ao-Tpw, rj
^XP L Ti vt>s e ftoucra^ o-v^vecrdaL, KaOdirep Xeyovcrt
Tti/e?. TOVTOU /xe^ yap fil\Tiov TO eV dp^i^ crv
30 TO o^u./xaT09. dXXd /cat TOUTO V7]0S TO T6 yap
Tt ccrrt
438 b OU ydp TO) TU^OI^Tt (TVjJi(j)V6Tai TO TV^OV. TO T
TO> e/cTo? 7raJ<?; 77 yotp /x^tyf /xeTa^v eo~Tt^. Trept
TOT) dVeu (^OJTO? jit T^ opav eiprjTai iv dXXot? dXX
<w9 etT* d^p eo~Tt TO /zeTafu TOU 6pw/ieVou /cat TOI)
5 OjLtjitaTo?, 17 Std TOUTOU Kivr)o~L$ IO~TLV r) 7roiovo~a TO opav.
/cat L>Xoya>9 TO e^To? eo~Tti^ vSaTO9. Sta^>az^e9 ydp TO
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 51
Democritus is in the right in saying that the eye consists 5
of water, but his theory that sight is the mirroring of an
object is wrong. This phenomenon indeed the visibility of
an object as in a mirror occurs in the case of the eye
because it is smooth, and exists not in it (the reflecting eye)
but in the spectator ; for the phenomenon is one of reflection.
But he seems to have attained to no clear general theory of
the mirroring and reflection of objects. It is ridiculous too 10
that it never entered his head to ask why the eye alone sees
and none of the other things in which images are mirrored.
Thus his theory is true that the sight-organ consists of
water ; but tiie^jeye functions not qua aqueous but qua
transrjareat ; this property it shares with air as well. But 15
water is more easily kept in, being denser than air ; and hence
the pupil and the eye are composed of water.
The facts themselves make this clear ; what issues from
the eyes when they are seriously hurt is evidently water, and
when they are quite in the embryonic stage it is excessively
cold and brilliant. Further, in sanguineous animals the white 20
of the eye is fat and oily ; this is designed to keep the
moisture unfrozen. Hence the eye is less liable to be chilled
than any other part of the body ; no one ever felt cold under
the eye-lids. In bloodless animals, however, the eyes have a
hard skin and this it is which protects them. 25
The theory is wholly absurd that sight is effected by
means of something which issues from the eye and that it
travels as far as the stars or, as some say, unites with
something else after proceeding a certain distance.
Than this latter a better theory would be, that the union
is effected in the eye the starting point; but even this is
childish. What can the union of light with light mean ? 30
How can it come about? The union is not that of any 438 b
chance light with any other chance light whatsoever. Again
how can the internal light unite with the external ? The
membrane of the eye divides them.
We have elsewhere stated that jvisioiL- without light is
impossible ; but whether it is light or air that intervenes
between the object seen and the eye, it is the motion
propagated through this that produces sight. Thus, as our 5
theory would lead us to infer, the interior of the eye consists
42
10
52 ARISTOTLE
v8a)p. opo/rat Se aicnrep Kal e^w OVK avev <a>ro9,
/cat eVro? Stac^ai es apa Set eivai. /cat dvdyKrj voojp
etVat, 7Tior) OVK drfp. ov yap eVt rov icryarov OjLtjLtaro?
77 ^x^ ^ T ^ s ^^9(779 T cdcrfhrfTiKov Icrnv, d\\d 877X0^
on eVros StOTrep avdyK Y) Stac^a^es elz/at /cal
TO eVro? rou o/x/xaros. /cat rouro K:at eVt
SrjXov 77877 yap TIO~I
Trapd TOV KpoTcufov ovrais OKTT eKTfJirjdTjvai rov? Tropovs
15 TOT) o/x-jLtaro?, eSo^e yevecrOai O~/COTO? (ixnrep \v^yov
d7roo-fiCT0VTOS, 8id TO olov XajJLTTTrjpd nva 0,7707/177-
TO 8ta<^a^e9, TT)^ Ka\ovp,vr)v Kopyv. O}<TT eunep
TOVTMV TL a-v^^aivei, KaOdwep Xeyo/^e^, (fxtvepov w? et
Set TOUTO^ TOf TpOTTOV (XTroStSoZ/at /Cat TTpOO-d7TTLV C/ftt-
20 O-TOZ/ rwi^ alcr@r]Tr}pLa)v evl ruv o-Tot^eta)^, rov /iez^
TO opaTiKOv uSaTO? ^770X77 TTTeoz/, aepo? Se TO
\fjo<f)a)v alcrOrjTiKov, wvpos Se Trp ocrffrprjcnv. o yap
Ivepytia 77 oor<f)pr)o-i<;, TOVTO Suz^a/iet TO 6cr(paz Tt/c6V-
TO yctp al(T0rjToi> zvepyeiv Trotet TT)^ aicrOrjcrLV, (ZcrO
25 vTrdp^ew dvayKatov avTrjv o ^vvd^ei irpoTepov. 77 S
OO-JLIT) KaTTvw&rjs aVa$u/uao-t9 IQ-TIV, 77 S d
77 KaiTVto&rjs e/c TTU/DO?. Sto /cat TCO ?re/3t
TOTTW TO T77? ocr^pyj crews aio-@r)Tirjpi6v icmv I oiov Svvd-
/xet yap BepfJirj 77 TOV ifjv^pov v\rj ecrTtr. /cat 77 TOI)
30 oja/x-aTos yeVeo~t? Tor avTOV ^X L TpOTrov a?ro TOU
lyK(f)d\ov yap <rvvO-T7]Kv OUTO? yap vypoVaTOs /cat
i//u^poTaT05 Twr ei^ TO) crw/xaTt popitov ICTTLV. TO S
439 a aTTTt/co^ yy)?. TO Se yevcrTiKOv etSo? Tt 0,^)775 I<TTLV.
/cat Sta TOUTO 77po9 T]7 /capSta TO alo~6riTripiOP avraiv,
T77? Te yevcrea)9 /cat TT)? 0,^)779 aWucetTat yap TW
ey/ce<^aXw avTr}, /cat eo~Tt OepfJLOTaTOv TMV [JLOpiuv. /cat
438 b, 1 8 ws ei 5e? (Biehl)] ws 5eZ E M Y et omnes edd., ws e/ 5e? reliqui codd.
vet. tr. et sine dubio Alex., etiam Baumker, Arist. Lehre von den Sinnesvermogen
S. 47, ita scribi vult, cui assentitur Zeller, Gesch. der gr. Ph. n. 2, S. 538.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 53
of water ; for water is transparent. Just as we cannot see
without the presence of light outside the eye, so without
light inside the eye vision is impossible ; this is the reason
why the eye must be transparent, and since it is not air it
must be water.
The reason for these contentions is that the_consciousness,
or the psychical faculty of sense perception, does not reside 10
on the surface of the eye but evidently within ; this is why
the interior of the eye must be transparent and receptive
of light. The facts make this plain ; for there have been
cases of people wounded in war by a blow grazing the
temple in such a way that the passages of the eye were
severed, to whom darkness seemed to ensue just as when 15
a light is put out ; this was because the transparency we
call the pupil was severed like a lamp that has its wick
cut.
Thus if our account is at all in accordance with fact and
if, as in the fashion proposed, we should reduce the sensoria
to the elements and correlate each of the former with one of
the latter, it is clear we should ascribe the eye s power of 20
sight to water and the capacity of perceiving sounds to air
and the sense of smell to fire.
This is because that which has the faculty of smell is
potentially what smell is in actuality; for the object of
sensation rouses the sense to activity, which hence necessarily
is that which, before stimulation, it was potentially.
Now odour is a smoke-like fume and smoke-like fumes 25
originate from fire ; hence the organ of smell is appropriately
located in the regions around the brain, as the substrate of
that which is cold is potentially hot.
The origin of the eyes is of the same fashion ; they derive 30
their composition from the brain, the coldest and most watery
of the bodily members.
The sense of touch is connected with earth ; ajid taste is 439 a
a species of touch. Hence the sensoria of both taste as
well as touch are closely related to the, heart, which has
qualities contrary to those of the brain and is the warmest
ofthe members.
54 ARISTOTLE
5 Trept fJiev Ta)v alo-0r)TLKa)v rov o-w/>taTO9 fJiOpLOJV ecrrco
TOVTOV TOV TpOTTOV StCJptCTjUeVa.
Ill
Ilept Se
olov Xe yw ^pwju,aTos /cat i//o^>ou /cat oo~[Jirjs Kal
Kal d(f)rjs, KaOoXov jJiev eTpi^Tat iv roi? Trept
10 TO epyov avTMV KCU ri TO tv^pytiv KaO* ^KOLCTTOV rcov
alo-0r]Tr]pia)i>. TL Se TTOTC Set \4ytiv OTLOVV OLVTMV, olov
TL ^p(t)jjia rj TL i//o(/)0^ f) TL ocrn,r)v r) yvpov, O/XOLW? Se
KOi TTf.pl Oiffrrjs, 7rLO-K7TTOV, KOL TTpWTOV 7Tpl
ecrrt fjiev ovv KacrTov Si^aJ? Xeyo/xe^o^, TO /xe*> e
15 TO Se 8vvdp,eL. TO /xez/ o5^ eVepyeia ^yow/xa KCU 6
7ra>9 e J o~T6 TO avTo -^ Tpov Tat? fear eVepycta^
olov 6pdo-L Kal ct/coucret, eLprjTdL eV Tot?
TL Se eKacrTov avTcov ov TrotT/cret TT)^ aLo-0rjo-Lv
Ivepyeiav, vvv Xe yfo>/xez>. ajo-nep ovv
20 Tre/n <f)0)To<; ev iKtivois, OTL eVrt ^yow/xa TOU S
/caTa o-vp./3e/3r}Ko<; oTav yap Ivf) TL Tru/owSes et^ S
17 /xe^ Trapovo-ia (^w?, 17 Se o-Te /^o-is e crTi cr/coVog- o Se
\eyojjiev Sia^ai^e ?, ov/c .O~TLV iStoi^ aepo? ^ uSaTO? ouS
, a\Xd
25 KOLVTj (frvOTLS Kal Swa/Xl?, 17 ^0)pLO~Trj fJiV OVK O~TLV,
TOVTOLS S ecrTt, /cat Tot? cxXXot? o-a>fJLacrLv e
Tot? />te^ paXXov Tot? S* ^TTOV wcrvrep ow /cat
(Tw/xaTcoF dvdyKrj TL etz/at ecr^aTov, Kal TavTrjs- rj
ovv TOV <^)COT09 (^ucrt9 eV aoptcrTw T&&gt; Sta^az^et I
30 TOV S eV Tot? (TajjLtacrt Sta^a^ou? TO <=o-\aTov OTL
LTJ dv TL, orj\ov, OTL Se TOVT* eo~Tt TO ^pa)fjia, IK
o-vjjL/3aLv6vTO)v (f)avepov. TO yap ^pw/xa ^ ei^ TW irepaTL
ICTTLV r) Trepa?- Sto /cat ot n^^ayd/Detot T^J/ eVt<dVetaj>
tKaXovv ecrTt />te^ yap eV TOJ TOU
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 55
Let this be the way in which we discriminate the sensitive 5
organs of the body.
Ill
In the Psychology we have given a general account of the
objects corresponding to the particular sense-organs, to wit
colour, sound, smell, flavour, and touch ; we have stated what
their function is, and described the mode of their operation in 10
relation to the several sense-organs. But thejiature we must
ascribe to any one of these objects we have still to consider ;
we must ask, for instance, what_ is colour, or sound, or odour,
or_fjavQur? So, too, what is the object of touch ? Let us
begin our inquiry with colour.
Now we can regard each of. these sense objects in two
ways, as potentially or as actually existent. We have ex- 15
plained in the Psychology in what sense actual colour and
sound are identical with or different from actual sense ex
perience, e.g. sight and hearing ; but now we are to discuss
the nature of those sense objects in virtue of which they cause
sensation and its activity.
It was stated in the work quoted above when we treated
of light that it is the colour of the transparent medium con- 20
tingently determined ; for when anything of the nature of fire
is found in the transparent medium its presence constitutes
light, its absence darkness.
What we have spoken of as tlje_ transparent element is
nothing which is found exclusively in air or in water or in
any one of the substances of which transparency can be
predicated; it is some sort of constitution and potency _which
they have in common, and which, not being an independent 25
reality, fin_ds its existence in these bodies and subsists in
varying degrees In the rest of material substances. Thus, in
so far as these bodies must have boundaries, this too must
have its limits.
Now it is in the transparent medium apart from its limits
that light has its being ; but it is clear that tlie_boundary of
the transparent element which exists in bodies is something 30
"real. "That this is colpur_ the facts make plain, for colour^
either exists in the boundary or constitutes the boulidary
of a thing, and hence (a corroborating circumstance) the
Pythagorean terminology identified the visible superficies
with colour. This was plausible, for colour exists in the
56 ARISTOTLE
35 dXX ou Tt TO TOV o~wju,aTO<? Tre pas, dXXa TT^ avrrjv
439 b Set vojjLi^Lv, yrrep /cat ea) ^pw/xaTteTat, TOLVT^V /cat
euro s. c^atVeTat Se /cat a7)p /cat vSwp xpwjutaTt^d/xez a
/cat yap 17 avyr) TotovToV Icrnv. dXX e /cet //,er Sta TO
eV dopto-Tw ov rrjv avrrjv lyyvOtv KOL Trpoo-Lovcn Kal
/ /) v \ -v/)> s \ y/l> e /3 \ >
5 TTOppcDuev ^i ^poioiv ovu o arjp ovu rj c/aAarra* tv
8e rot? crw/a,ao-tz/ eai^ /x^ TO 7Tpi)(ov TTOLTJ TO /xeTa^aXXetz/,
wptcTTat /cat 17 (^OLvracria T^? )(pda9. STJXo^ apa 6Vt TO
avTO /cd/cet /caz^dSe Se/CTt/co^ TT}? \poas ICTTLV. TO apa
8ta</)a^e? /ca^ oVo^ VTrdp-^ei iv Tot? o-w/xao-t^ (v7rdp)(ei
10 8e p.a\\ov /cat TJTTOV iv TTOLCTL) ^wjitaTos Trotet p*er)(W.
lirel S eV TrepaTt 17 XP oa > TOVTOV av iv TrepaTL elrj. OXJ-T
Xpwp>a av irj TO TOV Sta^a^ovs eV o-w/xaTt wptcr/xeVw
irepas. /cat avTwv Se TW^ 8ta</)a^ajr, otoz^ ^SaTO? /cat
et Tt aXXo TotouTOz^, /cat ocrot? <^atz/Tat
15 virdpytiv KCLTOL TO eo~)(ctTO^, o/x-otws 7rdo"t^
eo~Tt //-ei^ oi F eVetWt e^ TW 8ta<^a^et TovO* oirep /cat z^
17 TW dept TIG tet </)W5, eo~Tt 8e /XT^, dXX ecrT/37jo-^at.
17 "tlcnrep ovv
e/cet TO />te^ <^)W5 TO Se CT/COTO?, OVTW? eV Tots crw/xacrt^
TO \VKOV /cat TO /xeXaz^. Trept 8e TOJ^ aXXwv
et8^ SteXo/xeVovs Tioo-a^w? e^Se^eTat yiyvecr9ai
. eVSe)(Tat /xez^ yap Trap dXX^Xa TiOe^va TO
/cat TO jiteXaz^, acr^ e/cctTepo^ />te^ et^at aopaTov
8td CTfJLLKpOTTJTa, TO 8 ^ d[JL<j)olv OpaTOV, OVTO) yiyVO~6oil.
TOVTO ydp OVT \evKov oiov T <f)ati>o~0aL OUT
25 eVet 8 avdyKrj jiteV Tt e^eti ^pai/xa, TOVTOJV 8* ouS
dyKTi ^LKTOV Tt eT^at /cat etSo? Tt
eo~Tt /xe^ ov^ OUTOJ? vTroXa/Belv TrXetovs
Trapd TO Xev/coz> /cat TO /xeXai/, TroXXd? Se TW
Xdya>- Tpta yap Trpo? Suo, /cat Tpta Trpo? TCTTapa, /cat
30 /caT* d^XXov? dpt#/xoL>s eo-Tt Trap* dXX^Xa /ceto~^at, TO, 8
439 b, 20 ei5?7 conicio | ^5?; omn. codd. et edd.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 57
boundary, butjt by_no means is the boundary of the body ; 35
nay, we must believe that internally there exists the same 439 b
constitution as externally displays colour. So both air and
water show tint ; the sheen they have is a phenomenon of
this kind ; but here, because it exists in something with no
definite boundaries, the colour both of the air and of the sea
is not the same when regarded from afar and from near at
hand. In solid bodies, however, unless the surrounding 5
medium cause it to change, the coloured appearance remains,
equally with the surface, fixed. It is therefore clear that in
both cases it is the same nature which is capable of being
endowed with colour : hence the transparent element in so
far as it is found in bodies (and it exists in all in varying
degrees) causes them to be endowed with colour. But since 10
it is in a bounding surface that colour is found, it is in the
surface of this the transparent element that colour exists.
Colour then is the limit of the transparent element in a
determinately bounded body; and it is found in all bodies
alike, both in transparent substances themselves, such as
water and anything similar to it, and in those which appear
to have a surface colour of their own. Consequently, that, 15
which in air causes light, may be present in the trans
parent medium or it may not, i.e. may be awanting.
Thus, just as we can explain light and darkness re
spectively by the presence or absence of this cause in the
air, so in the case of solid bodies we can account for the
existence of black and white colour. But the other colours
still await classification and an inquiry into the various ways 20
in which they may be produced.
Firstly, white and black may be juxtaposed in such a way
that by the minuteness of the division of its parts each is
invisible while their product is visible, and thus colour may
be produced. This product can appear neither white nor
black, but, since it must have some colour and can have
neither of the above two, it must be a sort of compound and 25
a fresh kind of tint. In this way, then, we may conceive that
numbers of colours over and above black and white may be
produced, and that their multiplicity is due to differences in
the proportion of their composition. The juxtaposition may
be in the proportion of three of the one to two of the other,
or three to four or according to other ratios. Others again 30
58 ARISTOTLE
oXo>9 /caret /xeV \6yov /xi^SeVa, KaO* VTrepo^rji^ Se TIVOL
/cat eXXeti/Hi acrv jJLjJieT pov , /cat TOV avrov ST) TpoTrov
exeu> raura rat? cn;/x<&Wai9 * rd /xeV yap eV dpt#/xot9
euXoy LCTTO 19 xyoojjuara, KaOdnep e/cet ra? crtyz<aWas, rd
440 a -^Sierra ra>^ ^paj/xarw^ etj at So/cowra, otoz> ro aXovpyov
/cat <J)OIVIKOVV KOL 6Xiy drra rotavra, Si rjvirep atria^
/cat at crvjLt^coi/tat oXtyat, ra Se /XT) eV apiO^ol^ raXXa
XptojjLCLTa, r) /cat Tracra? ra? ^poa? eV api9^oi<; eivai, ra?
5 jne> reray/xeVa? ra? Se ara/crous, /cat aura? raura?, orai/
/xr) KaOapal <3crt, Sta ro /xr) eV apiO^oi^ eT^at rotai;ras
et? /xe^ ou^ rpOTro? rry? yez^eVeaj?
oSro?, efs Se ro <f)aivo-0ai SL aXXr^Xw^, otor
ez^tore ot ypa^et? TTOLOVCTLV, erepav y^poav IffS Tpav
10 eVapyeo-repai; eVaXet^oucrt^, ojcnrep orav eV {>Sart rt r^
eV de/ot /3ov\o)VTai Trot^crat (^at^o/xe^o^, /cat ofo^ 6 rJXto?
/ca^ OLVTOV jjiev Xeu/co? </>atVerat, Sta S* dx^
KOLTTVOV <f)OLVLKov<$. TToXXat Se /cat ourws ecroz^rat
roV avrov rpoirov rw Trporepov etpr^/xeVar Xoyo? yap a
15 etr; rt9 rw^ eVtTroXr^? Trpo? ra eV fidOei, ra Se /cat
ou/c eV Xoyw. [TO /xei/ our, ojcnrep /cat ot apx a
aTTOppota? et^at ra? ^poia^ /cat opacrOai Sta rotai/TTp
airiaiv droTrov TrdvTO)? y^p i d(f>rj^ dvayKOiiov aurots
Trotet^ rrp atcr^ot^, wcrr tvOvs Kptlrrov </>dVat rw
20 KLvelcrOaL TO /xerafu rr;9 alcrOij crews VTTO rov alo-O^rov
yivecrOai rr)^ ato~^o~tr, 0,^)77 /cat /xr) rat? avroppotat?. j
eVt /xei^ o^ ra)^ Trap dXXr^Xa /cet/xeVwi^ drdy/c?; wcrTrep
/cat iie ye$o9 Xa/x^dreti/ doparov, OVTW /cat y^povov dvaL-
crOrjTov, lv a. \d9d)criv at /ct^cret? dc^t/crou/xe^at /cat eV
25 SoKrj eivai Sta ro cx/xa (fiaivecrOaL IvravOa Se ouSe/xta
dvdyKrj, dXXd ro eVt7roX^9 XP<**l JLa dKivyrov ov /cat
VTTO TOV VTTO/cet/xeVov ou^ ofJioiav Trotrycret
440 a, 21 interpositis vers. 16 21 contextum interrumpi recte iudicat Thurot,
cui assentitur Susemihl, Philol. 1855.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 59
may be compounded in no commensurate proportion, with an
excess of the one element and deficiency of the other which
are incommensurable, and colours may, indeed, be analogous
to harmonies. Thus, those compounded according to the
simplest proportions, exactly as is the case in harmonies, will
appear to be the most pleasant colours, e.g. purple, crimson, 440 a
and a few similar species. (It is an exactly parallel reason
that causes harmonies to be few in number.) Mixtures not
in a calculable ratio will constitute the other colours. Or
again, all tints may show a calculable proportion between
their elements, but in some the scheme of composition may
be regular, in others not, while when those of the latter class
are themselves impure, this may be due to an absence of 5
calculable proportion in their composition.
This is one of the ways in which colours may be produced ; a
second is effected by the shining of one colour through another.
This we may illustrate by the practice sometimes adopted by
painters when they give a wash of colour over another more
vivid tint, when, for example, they wish to make a thing look 10
as though it were in the water or in the air. Again, we may
illustrate by the sun, which in itself appears white, but looks
red when seen through mist and smoke.
According to this account the multiplicity of the colours
will be explained in the same way as in the theory mentioned
before ; we should have to suppose there was some ratio
between the superficial and the underlying tints in the case
of some colours, while in others there would be an entire lack 15
of commensurate proportion.
[Thus we see that it is absurd to maintain, with the early
philosophers, that colours are effluxes and that vision is
effected by a cause of the efflux type. It was in every way
binding on them to account for sensation by means of contact,
and therefore it was obviously better to say that sensation was
due to a movement set up by the sense object in "the medium 20
of sensation, and thus account for it by contact without the
instrumentality of effluxes;]
According to the theory of juxtaposition, just as we must
assume that there are invisible spatial quanta, so must we
postulate an imperceptible time to account for the imper-
ceptibility of the diverse stimuli transmitted to the sense
organ, which seem to be one because they appear to _be,_
simultaneous. But on the other theory there is no such 25
necessity ; the surface colour causes different motions in the
medium when acted on and when not acted on by an under-
60 ARISTOTLE
8 60 Kal TpOV <j)aLVTOLL KOL OVT \VKOV OVT
. OKTT et /IT) e^Se^erat /rrySei et^at /xeye^os
30 dopaTov, aXXa Trdv e/c rtz/o? aTrooTT^u/aros oparov, KOLI
avTrj Tts cu> et77 ^po)fJidTa)v /xtt9 ; /ca/ceti a)? 8* ouoe^
/cajXuet <f)aive<T0ai nva ^poap KOIV^V rot9 Troppudev
on yap OVK ecrnv ovSe^ jneye^o? doparov, iv rots
7TLCrKTTTOV. L 8 CCTTt
44O b jLtl^ JJLOVOV TOV TpOTTOV TOVTOV OVTTtp OlOVTCLL Ttl^C?,
dXXrjXa TOJV eXa^tcrraj^ rt^e^teVa)^, dSijXcov 8 ^/xt^ Sia
r^ aicr6r)<TLv, aXX* oXw? TrdvTy Trdvrais, axnrep iv 7015
Trepl jLii^ew? eiprjrai Ka06\ov Trepl TrdvTcov eAcetVw? /xez^
5 ya^ [LiyvvTai TCLVTOL [LQVQV ocra e^Se^erai SieXeu> eis ra
eXa^tcrra, KaOaTrep dvOpwTrovs ITTTTOVS r) ra cnrepp^ara
TOJV pev yap dv6p<i>Tru>v dv0 pwrros e Xa^icrros, TOJI/ 8*
ITTTrtoV tTTTTO? WCTTC T]7 TOUTO)^ TTttp aXX^Xa ^CCTt TO
77X7)^05 jJiefjiLKTai Ttov (TVvafji(f)OTpa)v dvd pwiTov Se eVa
10 ei/t tTTTTOj ou Xeyo/^ez/ /xe/xt^^at- o<ra 8e /IT) Statpetrat ts
TO eXcx^icrTo^, TOVTCOI^ ou/c ej Se^eTcu fjii^Lv ytvtcrOaiL TOV
TOVTOV aXXa TW TrdvTrj p^efju^Oai, aVe/C) Acal
jitty^uor^ai 7T<f)VKV 7rco5 8e TOUTO yLyveo-Oai
SWCLTOV, iv Tots Trepi jaifeaj? eipTiTcu TrpoTepov aXX 6Vt
15 dvdyKT) iLiyv\)^ivu>v /cat TO,? ^poas p.iyvva Oai, 8r}\ov,
KOLI TavTrjv TT]v aLTLav eivoii KvpiOLV TOV 7roXXa<?
^poca?, aXXa /XT) TT)I^ eTTi/TroXacrii fjirjSe TJ]V Trap
6eo~iv ov yap rroppajOev p,ev lyyvOev 8 ov
fjiia xpoa TOJV fjiefjuyfjievajv, aXXa TtdvToOtv. TroXXat 8
20 eo-o^Tat ^poai 8ta TO TroXXot? Xoyot? eVSe^ecr
<r6ai dX\yj\ois Ta ^Liyvv^va, Kal Ta p,ev iv
Ta 8e /ca^ VTrepo^qv \LQVOV. Kal TaXXa ST) TW avTov
TpoTfov ovrrep Irrl TU>V Trap d\\rj\a
T; eVtTroXT)?, eVSe^eTai Xeyeti/ /cat Trept
44oa, 31 r(s.../a^is; Simon | rts...^ci ^ts. Biehl, Bek. et ceteri omnes.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 61
lying tint. Thus it appears to be something different, and
neither black nor white.
Therefore, if an invisible spatial quantity is an impossibility
and every magnitude must be visible at some distance, we
must dismiss the former theory and ask what sort of a colour 3
mixture this latter also is. But, on the former theory as well,
there is nothing to prevent distant objects appearing to have
a uniform colour ; for no magnitude is invisible, a problem to
be discussed later on.
But let us premise that substances are mixed not merely 440 b
in the way some people think by a juxtaposition of their
ultimate minute parts, which, however, are imperceptible to
sense but that they entirely_interpenetrate each other in
every part throughout ; how this happens in all cases was
explained in general terms in our dissertation on mixture.
The former theory accounts for the mixture only of those 5
things which can be resolved into ultimate least parts, e.g.
men or horses or seeds. In a division of men, a man is the
least part ; in the case of horses, a horse ; thus by the juxta
position of these individuals the mixture produced is a mass
consisting of both components, whereas we do not talk of
mixing single man with single horse. On the other hand, 10
things which cannot be resolved into least parts, cannot be
mingled in this way; they must entirely interpenetrate each
other ; and these are the things which most naturally mix.
We have already, in our treatment of mixture, explained how
this is possible.
Now, all this being so, it is clear that when substances are 15
mixed their colours too must be commingled, and that this is
the supreme reason why there is a plurality of colours ; neither
superposition nor juxtaposition is the cause. In such mixtures
the colour does not appear single when you are at a distance
and diverse when you come near ; it is a single tint from all
points of view. The reason for the multiplicity of colours
will be the fact that things which mix can be mixed in many 20
different proportions, and some mixtures will show a numerical
ratio, others only an incommensurable excess of one of the
elements. So far indeed as other considerations go, the same
account will apply to the juxtaposition or superposition of
62 ARISTOTLE
25 Sia TLVOL aiTiav eiSrj TOW ^
/cat ou/c aVetpa, /cat ^yp,a)p Kal \lj6<jx*)v, v&Tepov
IV
Tt /xei ow ecru ^paj^a KOI Sia TIJ>* aiTiav TroXXai
i elcriv, eiprjrai - Trepl Se \jj6<>ov KOL
Trporepov eV rot? Trepl \fjvxfjs ^epi 8e 6
30 i^i)^ Xe/creoz^. cr^eSoi y<^p ecrrt TO at ro TTCC^O?, OT;/C e^
rol? auroi? 8* ecrrlz^ eKarepov avrcov. Ivapyta Tepov 8
ICTTLV r)(jLLV TO TO)V ^vjjiajv yeVo9 ^ TO TT^? 607x779. TOVTOV
441 a 8 ainov OTL yjELpicrTriv e^ofjiei^ TMV a\\a)v ttytov rv)v
Kal TOJV iv THJLLV OLVTOIS alcr0TJ<Ta)V, rrjv 8
fitcrTdTirjv TUV a\Xa>v ^MV. rj 8e
4 OL(j)JJ T19 eCTTtV.
4 *H /xei^ ovv rov vSaTO? i//uo~t9
5 a^v/xo? eti^ai dvdyKr) 8 7^ eV auTw TO vSwp e)(et^ Ta
v dvaicrOrjTa 8ta fjuKpoTrjTa, KaOdnep
(j>r)<riv, 77 uXTy^ rcuavTrjv elvai olov TTOLV-
, KCU aTravTa /xez/ ef uSaTO? yi
d\\a 8 s cf dXXov fjitpovs, rj /x^S
10 TOT) vSa/ros TO TTOIOVV alnov eivai, OLOV el TO
Kal TOV T)\LOV (f)airj TI?. Tou7 w^ 8 , a)? jute^ EjiiTre
Xeyet, Xtai^ evcrv^oTTTOi/ TO i//7)Sos- 6pa)p.ev yap
VTTO TOU Oeppov TOVS
15 ou TGJ eV TOT) uSaTo? e\Keiv TOLOVTOVS yiyvopevov*;, aXX
eV avTO) TW TrepiKapTTico />ceTa/5aXXo^Ta9, /<at e^t/c/xa^o-
/xeVou? 8e /cat Kei^evov^, Sta TOZ^ ^povov, avcrTTjpovs e/c
y\vKea)V Kal TTLKpovs Kal TravTO?>a7rovs yiyvo^evov<;, /cat
eifjonevovs et? TrdvTa Ta yew] TO>V ^VJJLC^V w? etTretz
20 fjLeTa/3d\XovTas. 6/iota)9 8e /cat TO 7ra^o~7rep/xta9 etz/at
44 1 a, 14 Trvppov/m^uv conicio | irvpov/j^vuv Biehl, Bek. etc.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 63
colours as to their mixture. The reason why they, and like- 25
wise tastes and sounds, have definite species limited in number,
will be given later on.
IV
We have defined colour and accounted for the multiplicity
of its tints, while sound and articulate utterance have been
treated in the Psychology; we are now to discuss srnell and
taste.
-While as subjective phenomena they are practically 30
identical, their vehicle is diverse ; and tastes as a class are
more vividly presented to human perception than odours.
The reason for this is that our sense of smell is inferior to that 441 a
of other animals, and is the poorest of the human senses. In
delicacy of touch, however, we excel all other animals ; now
taste is a sort of touch.
To proceed to our discussion WJitejs characteristically
of a flavourless nature ; yet, either it must, tasteless as it is, 5
be the receptacle in which the various flavours reside in
amojants too minute to be detected the Empedoclean theory
or it must be a material adapted to be the matrix, as it
were, for the germs of all tastes. In this case all tastes will
originate out of water, but different ones will arise from
different parts of the matrix. Or we may hold that water
is entirely undifferentiated, and frrfpute the causality to that
which acts upon it, for instance heat or the sun. A glance 10
will suffice to show the falsity of the Empedoclean theory;
for we can observe that the alteration in flavour is due to heat,
when fruits are plucked, integument and all, and set in the sun
and reddened. Their new flavour, then, cannot be extracted
from water ; nay, the change must take place within the fruit- 15
covering itself. Through lying and drying fruits become, in
time, harsh and bitter instead of sweet, and display all sorts
of flavours ; further, any kind of taste, so to speak, can be
produced by subjecting them to the process of cooking.
Similarly water cannot possibly constitute the material of 20
64 ARISTOTLE
TO v8o)/3 V\^V dfivVOLTOV K TOV OLVTOV
Tpoffrrjs ytyz/o/xeVot>9 ere/oous ^v/xou?. XetVeTat Sr)
irdo~yeiv Tt TO uSwp jjiTa/3d\\Lv . OTL jite> TO IVVV
VTTO rrjs TOV OepfJiov Swa/iecos Xa/x/3dVet TavTrjv TJ)V
25 Su^a/xi^ 771; KaXovjJiev yv^ov, (ftavepov XeTTTOTaTo^
TO)V 7TOLVTO)V VypOJV TO vSa)p IcTTl, KOL OLVTOV TOV
CTTI TT\LOV TOV vSaros TO eXatoi^ Sia
TO 8* vSajp ifraBvpov ecrTi Sib KOI
(f>v\dai iv Trj x eL P^ L T0 vS^p TJnep eXaiov.
30 eTrei Se depiJiaLvo^evov ovSe^ <^at^Tai Trayyvoptvov TO
avTo [Jiovov, 8rj\ov OTL erepa Ti? az^ 177 atTia*
yap yyiJiol TrdvTes Tra^og eyovcri /xaXXo^* TO Se
crvvaiTiov. <f>aivovTai ot ^u/xot ocronrtp KOL
441 b ei^ Tots TrepiKapTTiois, OVTOL vTrdpyovTes /cat eV TT^ yi^.
Sto Kal TToXXot (/>acri TW^ apyaiaiv c^vcrioXoyaj^ TOIOVTOZ/
TO uSojp St oia? ai/ y^9 TropevrjTai. KCU TOVTO
COTTLV lirl TMV aXfJivptov vSoLTaiv /xaXccrTa- 01 ya/>
5 aXe? y^5 Tt etSo? eto iz . /cai Ta 8ta T^5 T(f>pas SirjOov-
p,eva TriKpas OVQ-TJS TfiKpov TTOICI TOI^ ^u/x-w. eio~t ?e
TroXXat at /ie^ vrt/cpat, at 8 o^etat, at Se TTOLVTO-
e^oucrat yvpovs aXXou?. Sto euXoyws e^ TOIS
TO TOJ^ ^f/iai^ yty^eTat yeVos /zotXtcrTa. ?ra-
10 cr^eti^ yotp TT(f)VK TO vypov, coo Trep /cat TaXXa, VTTO
TOV IVOLVTIOV tvavTiov Se TO r)pov. Sto /cat UTTO TO{;
TTUpO? 77CtO~^et Tf ^TfpCL yap Y) TOV TTVpQS ^)VO"t9. dXX
LLOV TOV TTvpos TO Oep^ov eo~Tt, y^5 Se TO
(jjcnrep tiprjTcu eV Tot? Trept crTot^etwi/. ^ /xe>
15 /cat 77 y^, ouSe^ Tre^v/ce Trotet^ /cat Tracr^etz , ouS aXXo
ovoev y S* vrrdpyei IVCLVTIOTTIS iv e/cao-Tw, TavTrj
/cat 7rotovo-t /cat Trdo-yovo-iv. (Zo-Trep ovv ot
ZV Tto VypO) TOL -^pa)fJiaTa /Cat TOV?
TrotoGo-t TO vSvp, OVTOJ? /cat 17 <f>vcri<$ TO
441 b, 8 5i6 cu\67ws L S U | eu\67o>5 5 Biehl et Bek.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 65
a universal matrix of flavours. It is a matter of observation
that out of the very same water taken as nutriment, plants
develop different flavours.
True, this leaves us with the theory that the water is acted
on in some way, and changes in consequence. Now, plainly,
it is not owing to the power resident in heat that it acquires
the potency we call flavour; water is the thinnest of all liquids, 25
thinner even than oil, though oil on the other hand spreads
out more than water on account of its viscosity. Water,
however, is non-cohesive, and hence is more difficult to keep
in the hand without spilling than oil.
Since water by itself is the only substance which shows no 30
thickening under the influence of heat, clearly something else
must be the cause of the phenomenon in question, for all
flavours tend to exhibit density. The heat is the cooperating
cause.
It is a conspicuous fact that all the savours found in fruits
exist also in the soil. Hence many of the early physical 441 b
philosophers allege that water takes its character from the
soil through which it passes. This is clearly so in the case of
saline waters, for salt is a species of earth. Filtration through 5
ash a bitter substance makes the taste bitter, and there are
many springs, some of which are bitter, some acid, and others
possessing manifold other tastes. Hence, as one would expect,
it is principally in plants that flavours as a class develop.
The reason for this acquisition of a specific character by
water is it is the nature of humidity, as of everything else,
to be acted on by its opposite ; now its opposite is dryness. 10
Hence fire too has an effect upon it, for fire by constitution is
dry. But of fire heat is a peculiar property, of arth dryness,
as we explained in discussing the elements.
Now, by constitution, fire qua fire and earth qua earth do
not display activity and passivity, nor do any of the other 15
elements per se ; it is in so far as they have opposing qualities
that the elements one and all react on each other. Thus, just
as men by dissolving colours or savours in water communicate
those qualities to the water, so nature acts upon that which is
dry and earthy in character ; by the aid of heat it causes liquid
R. 5
66 ARISTOTLE
20 /cat TO yeaiSes, /cat Sta TOT) r)pov /cat yecoSous
/cat Kivovcra rw OepfJLO) TTOLOV rt TO vypov 7rapao~/ceuaet.
/cat eo~Tt TOT)TO ^v/xo9 TO yiyvo^evov VTTO TOV etp^/jteVou
r)pov TraOos eV TCO vypo) TT}S yeuo-eco? T^S /caTa Svvapiv
dXXotam/coi ets IvlpyeiOLV ayet yap TO alcrOrjTLKOv et?
2 5 TOVTO SvvdfJiL Trpovirdpyov ov yap Kara TO
d\\a Kara TO Oewpeiv Icrrl TO atcr$dVecr#at. 6Vt 8
rjpov a\\a TOV Tpofajjiov ot ^v/xot ^ vr
^ crTepTycrt?, Set Xa^Seti/ evTevOev, OTL OVTC TO rjpov
TOV vypov ovTe TO vypov avev TOV rjpov Tpo<f>r)
30 yap o^X ^ v [AOVOV Tot? wot5, aXXa TO jLtejaty/xeVot . /cat
ea"Tt TI^S Trpoo-ffrepojjievrjs Tpo(f>rjs Tot? cJot? Ta /xe^ dirTa
alo~9rjTOi)v av f r)o~iv TTOIOVVTCL /cat <^6io~iv TOVTOJV
ev yap aiTiOv TJ Oeppov /cat ijjv^pov TO Trpocrc^epo/xero^-
442aTairra yap Trotet /cat av^rjo-iv /cat $6io-iv Tpec^et 8e 77
yeucrroz TO 7rpoo-(^epo/xe^o^ irdvTa yap Tpe^eTat TO;
yXv/cet, ^ (XTrXw? ^ jLte/xty/xeW?. Set /xer^ ov^ Stopt^eti^
Trept TOVTO)^ er Tot? ?rept ye^eVew?, i/v^ S ocroi^ di/ay/cato^
5 d\fjao~0ai avTtov. TO yap Oep^ov av^dvei /cat S^jittovpyet
TT)I> Tpo<j)jjv, /cat TO /xe^ Kovfov eX/cet, TO S aX^vpov
/cat TTiKpov /caTaXetTret Sta ^apo?. 6 ST) eV Tot? e^w
o-w/xacrt Trotet TO e^w OepfJiov, TOVTO TO eV TT^ <f)vo~L
TO*V ^coatv /cat fyvTwv Sto Tpe^eTat TW yXv/cet. cru/x/xt-
10 yvvvTai S ot cxXXot ^u/xot ets T^Z/ Tpofyr^v TOP avTov
TpoTTOV TW aXfJiVpco /cat ofet, cti Tt T^Sucr/xaTO?. TauTa
Se Sta TO dz^Tt irdvTMv \iav TpoffrifJiov elvai TO yXvKv
13 /cat eVt7roXao"Tt/coV.
13 a>o-7rep Se TO, ^pw/xaTa t ? /c Xeu/co?; /cat
/jteXa^o? juttfews io~Tiv, OVTW? ot ^v/xot e/c yXv/ce o? /cat
15 TTt/cpoC. /cat /caTa Xoyoz^ 817 TO> /xdXXoz^ /cat TJTTOV
e/cacTTOt etcrtz^, etTe /caT* apiO^ovs Ttz/a? T^9 /xtfea>s /cat
441 b, 30 ou% ^ p.6vov | oySev atrrcDi Biehl.
442 a, 12 di ri TravTuv Biehl | d^rto Traj T^J Bek. et reliqui edd.
SJVS AND ITS OBJECTS 67
to percolate and pass through dry and earthy substance, and 20
thus gives it a definite quality. This is flavour, the modification
which the said dry element produces in liquids, and which is
capable of stimulating the sense of taste existing as a poten
tiality into active operation. This effect which it produces
upon the sense-faculty has already potential existence in the
sense-faculty, for sensation is parallel, not to learning, but to
the exercise of knowledge.
It is not of all dry substance but of that which is nutritive 25
that flavours are a modification positive or negative. The
fact that neither does the dry apart from the humid nor
liquidity apart from dryness yield savour, supplies us with a
proof of this, for neither of these alone, but their mixture,
furnishes nutriment to animals. In the food of animals it is 30
the objects of tactual sensation that cause growth and decay;
it is qua hot or cold that the food they eat is responsible for
these phenomena, as heat and cold cause growth and decay. 442 a
On the other hand it is in so far as it affects the taste that
what is given to animals nourishes them, for they all thrive
on that which is sweet, either pure or mixed with something
else.
The full discussion of these facts which is entailed will be
found in the work On Generation ; at present we must touch
on them only so far as is necessary. Heat causes growth ; it 5
is the active cause in the preparation of food, making the light
elements rise and allowing the saline and bitter to fall on
account of their weight. In fact, in plants and animals, their
native heat performs the same function as that fulfilled by
external heat in the case of external bodies ; hence it is by
sweet things that they are nourished. Other tastes are com
mingled with food for the same reason as the saline and acid ; 10
they serve as seasoning. This is necessary because the sweet
is, in .comparison with all other things, excessively nutritive,
and tends to rise in the stomach.
Just as colours arise from a mixture of black and white, so
tastes are a product of the sweet and the bitter. Proportion
it is a difference in the quantity of their components, that 15
gives them individuality ; and either the mixture and conse-
52
68 ARISTOTLE
KLvrj(Ta>s, etre /cat aoptcrTcos. ot Se rrjv rjSovrjv
Ijuyvvnevoi, OVTOL eV dpiOp.o is. /xoVos JJLV ovv XtTrapos
o TOV yXu/ce os ecrrt ^Vjnd?, TO 8* aXjjivpov /cat Trt/cpoV
20 o-)(eSo> TO avTO, 6 Se avcrr^po? /cat Spt/xus /cat crTpv<f)vos
/cat o^us am /xe croz . o-^eSoz^ yap to~a /cat Ta
etS^ /cat Ta TCOI^ ^pw/xctTco^ ICTTIV. eTTTa yap
et8i7, ai^ Tt? Tt^, ajcnrep evXoyov, TO fyaiov peXav n
elvai Xet7TTai yap TO cw9ov jjiev TOV Xevitov etz/at
25 wcTTrep TO \nrapov TOV yXv/ceo?, TO ^OLVIKOVV 8e /cat
aXovpyov /cat Trpa<Tivov /cat Kvavovv ava fjLO~op TOV
\VKOV /cat /xeXa^o?, Ta 8* aXXa /xt/CTa e/c TOUTWI . /cat
d}o-7Tp TO /xeXa^ crTeprjcTLS eV TO) Stac^a^et TOU Xev/cov,
OUT&) TO aXfJivpov /cat iriKpov TOV y\v /ceo? e^ TO>
30 vyp<p> 8to /cat 17 T<j)pa TMV /cao/xeVw^ vrt/cpa
31 eft/cjutacrTat yap TO TTOTt/io^ e^ CLVTWV.
31 A^jito/cptTo? 8e /cat ot
TrXetoTTOt TWI> (j)vo~io\6ya)v, ocrot \eyovo~i Trept alo~0rjo~0)^,
442 b aTOTrajTaTo^ Tt Trotoucrtz irdvTa yap TOL alo~0rjTa OLTTTOL
TTOLOVO-IV. /CatTOt t /Cat TOVTO OVTO)? 9(t, 877X0^
/cat TWZ/ aXXcuz^ aio~0yjo~(t)i> Koio~Trj d(f)TJ Tt? eo~Tiv TOVTO
8* OTt aSvz^aTO^, ov ^aXeTroi/ crwtSetz . ert Se Tot? /cot^ot?
5 TW^ alo~0TJo-e(i)i Tra,o~a)v ^pai^Tat w? tStot? 4 /xeye^o? y<ip
/cat o~xrjp.a /cat TO Tpa^v /cat TO Xetoz/, Irt 8e TO o^u
/cat TO dfjifiXv TO Iv Tot? oy/cot? KOLVOL TWV ato-^o-ewz^
IO-TLV, el 8e /x^ 7rao~aj^, dXX* oi//ews ye Kat 0,^)779. 8to
/cat Trept )itez/ TOUTCO^ aTraTw^Tat, Trept 8e TWI^ tStW ou/c
10 aTraTw^Tat, otoi^ 17 oi//t9 Trept ^pw/xaTO? /cat 17 OLKOTJ Trept
\fj6(f)(t)v. ot Se Ta tSta ets TavTa a^ayovo~ti>, cJcrTrep
ATyjutd/cptTO? TO XevKov /cat TO p,\av TO /xez/ yap Tpayy
<j)r)o-LV eti^at TO Se Xetoi^, et? Se Ta cr^/xaTa d^ayet TOT;?
^yjjiov^. /catTot ^ ovSeyLtta? ^ />tdXXoz/ TTj? oi//eajs Ta
15 /cotz^a y^wpt^et^. et 8 apa T^5 yevcrew? /xaXXoi , Ta
442 a, 22 eTrrd] volunt legi Biehl et Susemihl, Philol. 1885.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 69
quent stimulus is in terms of some numerical ratio, or it varies
indefinitely.
The mixtures, however, which produce pleasure are in a
calculable proportion. Sweet flavours alone are oily ; saline
and bitter are practically the same ; but sour, pungent, 20
astringent, and acid occupy an intermediate position. The
species of tastes and colours are practically equal in number.
If, as is reasonable, one reckons grey to be a kind of black,
there are seven of each, for there remain yellow to be
referred to white, as oily was to sweet with crimson, purple, 25
green, and blue intermediate between black and white ; and
all other colours are got by combining these. Just as black
is absence of white in the transparent medium so salinity and
bitterness are a deficiency of sweetness in nutritive liquid.
Consequently the ashes of things which have been burned 3
are bitter, for the scorching they have received has expelled
their palatable fluid qualities.
Democritus and most of the physical philosophers who
treat of sensation commit a most senseless blunder. They 442 b
identify all sense qualities with the tactual. It is clear
that if this were true each of the other senses would be
a sort of touch ; but it is not difficult to see that this is
impossible.
In addition they treat the common sensibles as though }
they were the objects of a special sense ; but this is erroneous,
for magnitude, figure, roughness, and smoothness, as well as 5
the sharpness and bluntness found in material bodies, are
generic objects of sensation which, if not discerned by all the
senses, are common to sight and touch at least. Hence we
can explain the fact that we can make mistakes in perceiving
the latter, but are never deceived as to the special sensibles ;
sight, for instance, makes no mistakes about colour, nor does I0
hearing err in the matter of sounds.
These philosophers, however, reduce the special to the
common, following the example of Democritus in the case of
black and white. He identifies the one with the rough, the
other with the smooth, and he reduces flavours to geometrical
figures. But it falls to sight first, if to any sense, to discriminate 1
70 ARISTOTLE
yovv eXd^tcrTa TT)S d/cpt/SecrrdTT;? icrTiv alcrOijcrec ? Sta-
?rept e/caaroz yeo?, wcrre e^prv TT]V yeucrtz>
/cat TO>Z> dXXcoz; KOLVWV alcrOdvo~daL JLaXicrra /cat
etz/at /cptTt/ca>TaT77Z>. ert ra ju,ez>
20 7rdz>Ta e)(i eVaz Ttwcrtz , ofo^ eV ^yoaj/Aart rw peXavL TO
/cat ez ^vjLtot? TOJ yXv/cet TO TTt/cpoV* cr^fi^a Se
ov So/cet el^at ivavTiov rivi yap
TO 7rept,<f)pe<; ZVOLVTLOV ; ert aTreipcov OVTMV
o r X 7 ll JLaTa)l cLvayKOiiov /cat TOU? ^u/xou? etz^at
25 Sta Tt yap 6 /xe^ az^ 7rot^o~te^ aiO O rjo LV, 6 8* ou/c ai^
TTOtT^o-ete^; /cat Trept /xei/ TOU yevo-ToG /cat ^v^oi) Lprjrai
Ta yap aXXa TrdOrj ra>
ci TiJ (^vo toXoyta TiJ Trept
V
oi^ avrbv 8e rporrov Set vorjcraL /cat Trept TO,? 6o~/>tcts
30 oVep yap Trotet eV TO} vypa TO f^poV, TOUTO ?rott e^
aXXw yeWt TO ey^(v/xo^ vypov, iv de pt /cat vSaTt 6/xotco?.
KOLVOV Se /caTa TOVTOJ^ i^vz/ /^e^ Xe yo/Ae* TO Sta^a^e ?,
443 a eo-Tt S ocr^pavrov ov^ rj Stac^az^s, aXX* i^ TT\VVTIKOV r)
PVTTTLKOV 4y)(VfJLOV fypoTrjTOS ov yap povov ev de pt
aXXa /cat eV vSaTt TO TT)? 6 cr^pij crew? Icrnv. SrjXov S
eVt Taiz^ i)(0vu>v /cat TW^ oo-Tpa/coSep/xwz - fyaivovraLi yap
5 ocr^pat^o/xe^a OUTC aepo? o^ro? ez^ TO^ vSaTt (evrtTroXd^et
yap 6 a7^p, oVaz eyyeV^Tat) OVT* avrd dvairvlovra. el
ovv Tt? ^et?; /cat TOZ> aepa /cat TO vSwp a/>t<w vypd,
tir) av TI iv vypw TOT) ly^vjjiov r)pov Averts oo-fjirj, /cat
OvfypaVTOV TO TOLOVTOV. OTL S* ttTT* Cy^U/XOV CCTTt TO
10 irdOos, SrJXo^ e/c TWZ^ e^dz/Twz^ /cat /XT) fyovroiv OCT/A^
Ta T yap crTOt^eta ciocr/xa, oloz^ vrup ar)p y?y v8a)p, Sta
TO Ta Te vypd /cat f^pd avraiv d^v^u-a etz^at, dz^ /xrj Tt
Troifj. Sto /cat 17 Odkarra e^et o
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 71
the common sensibles ; it is, at any rate, the function of the
most delicate sense to discern the finest differences in its
particular domain, and so, if it fall to taste first to perceive
the common sensibles, taste would need to possess the finest
discrimination of figure and be as well the best means of
perceiving the other common sensibles.
A further objection is, that the objects of special sense
all show contrariety in their determinations ; for example, in 20
colour black and white are opposed, in taste sweet and bitter.
But there seems to be no opposition between one figure and
another. To which of the polygons is the circle a contrary ?
Again, as figures are infinite in number, there must be an
infinitude of tastes also, for why should one figure produce a 25
taste and not another?
This is our account of flavour and its efTect on taste. The
other qualities which flavours present find their special treat
ment in the Natural History of Plants.
v
The theory to be accepted about odour also is the same
as that about flavour. Precisely as dry substance produces 30
an effect in liquid, liquid impregnated with flavour acts in a
new field, operating in air and water alike.
We have just said that the transparent element is common
to these two substances, but it is not qua transparent that 443 a
they affect the sense of smell ; they do this in so far as they
dissolve and absorb by erosion dry substance which possesses
flavour ; both substances form a medium for this sense, for
smell is exercised not only in air but in water also. The
case of the fishes and the testacea makes this plain ; they
evidently employ the sense of smell and yet neither is there 5
air in the water (for it rises to the surface if ever it gets in)
nor do these animals breathe.
Premising, then, the fact that air and water are both
moist, we might define^ jpdour as the nature dry substance
possessing flavour assumes in the moist, and the object of
the sense of smell will be anything so qualified.
That this phenomenon issues from the possession of
flavour, is clear on a review of those substances that are and I0
those that are not odorous. The elements have no odour, to
wit fire, air, earth, and water, since they are flavourless
both those of them which are moist and those which are
dry except when forming a combination. Hence the sea
too smells, for it has a taste and contains dry substance.
72 ARISTOTLE
yap yy^LQv /cat ^rjpoTrjTa. /cat aXes ju,aXXoz> virpov
15 oo-juwSetg- 17X01 Se TO eft/c/xa^oz/ ef avrwv e\aiov TO
Se viTpov yjjs eo~Tt jutaXXoz^. ert Xt#os /xe> aoo-/xoi>,
v yap, TO, Se fvXa ocr/xajSr;, ey^u/xa yap /cat
Tot uaTw8i7 r\TTOv. en 7Tt Tai
aocrjiAO^, ayv^ov yap, 6 Se ^aX/co? /cat 6
). orav S eKKavdfj TO vypov, aoorfJiOTepaL al
o-/ca>ptat yiyvovTOLi Travrw. apyvpo? Se /cat /caTTtTepo?
TW^ /xez^ jLtaXXoz/ ocrjuwS^ TWI^ S ^TTOV vSaTwS^ yap.
So/cet S ei^tots 17 /caTT^wS^? ava0vfjLiacrLS eivou ocrp.TJ,
ovcra KOivrj yrjs re /cat aepos. [/cat Tr
25 eVt TOVTO Trept 6o*/A^9*] Sto /cat Hpa/cXetTos
ipT]Kv, a>5 et iravra ra ovra KCLTTVOS yiypoiro, on plves
av Stay^otez/. eVet Se T^ OCT^TIV irdvres
<eVt TOT)TO>, ot /xe^ &&gt;s aT/xtSa, ot S*
01 S a>9 afjif^o) ravTa- eo~Tt S* 17 /xe^ ctT/>its vypoT^? Tt?,
30 77 Se /caTT^wS^? dz/a^u/^tacrt?, wcrTrep etp^Tat, KOLVOV depo?
/cat yT^s* /cat o~wto~TaTat e/c ju,e^ e/cet^? v8cop, e/c Se
y7]5 Tt etSos- aXX ovSeVepo^ TOVTC/JZ^ eot/ce^- 77
yap aT/xt? ecrTt^ vSaTos, 77 Se KaTrv
ctSwaTO? eV uSaTt ye^eV^at ocr/xaTat Se /cat TO, e
443buSaTt, aicrTrep iprjTai Trporepov ert 77
ojJLOiws XeyeTat Tat? aVoppotat? et ou^ ^778
/caXa>5, ouS avrrj /caXws. 6Vt /xez/ ov^ ez^Se^eTat d?ro-
Xavetz TO vypov /cat TO eV TOJ TrvevfJiaTL /cat TO eV TW
5 vSaTt /cat Trctcr^et^ Tt VTTO T775 ly^y^ov fypoTrjros, OVK
a8rj\ov /cat yap 6 cu^p vypov rr)v fyvcriv ICTTLV. eVt S
et?rep o/xotw? e^ Tot? vypot? ?rotet /cat eV TW aept otoz/
Oi7TOTT\Vv6^JiVOV TO ^TJpOV, (j)OLVpOV OTL Set OLVOikOyOV
TO,? ocrjLtas Tot? -^vjjiol^. aXXa /XT)Z/ TOVTO ye eV
10 o~v/xySe7377/ce^ /cat yap Spt/xetat /cat yXv/cetat elcriv 6o~/xat
/cat av(TT7jpal /cat (TTpvffrval /cat \nrapai, /cat Tot? vrt/cpotg
443 a, 24 /cat...6o-/i^s 25 damnat Thurot. 28 ^?ri roOro om. codd. et edd.,
addidit Christ probat etiam Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 73
Salt smells more than natron, as the oil extracted from it 15
proves, while natron is more of the nature of earth. More
over, stone is odourless, since flavourless ; but woods, being
possessed of taste, are scented, the watery ones less so.
Again, among metals gold is odourless, having no taste ;
bronze and iron have a smell. The dross left, when the 20
fluid element is smelted out of these metals, in every case
possesses less odour than the ore itself. Silver and tin smell
more than the one class and less than the other ; for they are
aqueous.
Some people think that the smoky variety of fume
constitutes odour, since it is a joint product of earth and
air. [All ascribe odour to this.] Hence too the saying of 25
Heraclitus that "if all things were turned into smoke the
nostrils would distinguish them." Now all ascribe odour to
this phenomenon, some taking it to be steam, others a fume,
while some again ascribe it to both.
Steam is a sort of moisture, and smoke-like fume is a
joint product of air and earth, as has been said ; out of the 30
former water condenses, out of the latter some species of
earth. But neither of these seems to be odour; for steam
may be classed as water, while again smoke-like fumes
cannot exist in water ; but creatures living in water do
employ the sense of smell, as already said. Further the 443 b
theory of fumes is similar to that of effluxes and, if that
theory was erroneous, so is this.
It is clear that moisture, both as it exists in the atmo
sphere and as it exists in water, can derive something from
and be modified by dry substance which possesses flavour, 5
for air too has moisture in its constitution. Moreover if the
effect of the dry substance in liquids and in air, when it is, as
it were, dissolved in them, is similar to its previous action in
liquid alone, manifestly odours and tastes must be analogous
to each other. Indeed in several cases this correspondence
occurs ; odours are pungent and sweet, harsh, astringent and 10
74 ARISTOTLE
Tcts craTryoas av Ttg avakoyov etTrot. Sto ajfnrep
Sucr/caTdVoTa, ra craTrpd ^vcravaTrvevcrrd Icrnv. Srj\ov
dpa on otrep eV TO) vSari 6 ^U/AO?, TOUT* eV ra> ae pt /cat
15 L>SaTt 17 oo-ju/jf. /cat Sta rouro TO \^v^pov /cat 17 TTTjft?
/cat rou? ^Vjitou? a.jji/3\vvi /cat ra? ocr/xa? a^az^t^et TO
ya^> OepjJiov TO /ct^oO^ /cat SrjjJLLOvpyovv d^avi^ovcrLv r}
i//v^ts /cat 17 TT^t?.
EtS?; Se TOV ocrfypavTov 8vo l<niv ov yap ajcnrep
20 Tt^e? ^>acrt^, ov/c ecrTt^ etS^ TOV ocrfypavTov, aXX ecrTti/.
Stopto-Teot Se 770)5 ecrTt /cat TTW? ou/c ecrTti/ TO )Lte^ yap
eo~Tt Kara TOU? yy}Jiovs TCTay/xeVo^
/cat TO 1781; /cat TO \vn"Y)pov Kara
Sta yap TO OpermKov TrdOrj eT^at, e
25 rjoelau at 6o~/>tat TOUT<W eto~t, TreTrX^pwjLteVot? 8e /cat
fjurjSev SeojLteVotg ov^ ^Setat, ovS oVots ^ /cat 17 rpo<f)r)
rj e-^ovcra TO,? ocr/xas T^Seta, ouSe TOVTOt?. WCTTC auTat
/^eV, KaOdnep et7ro/xe^, /caTa crvjJi/Beft YjKos e^ouo-t TO 1787;
/cat \VTrr)p6v, 8to /cat irdvTtov etcrt /cotj^at TWI^ ojcoi> at
3 8e /ca^ avTa? i^Setat Tai^ 6o~/iw^ eto~t^, cto^ at
ovev yap paXkov ouS TJTTOV irpos TTJV rpcxfrrjv
7rapaKa\ovo-iv, ovSe crvfji/BdXXovTai 77^005 i
d\\d TovvavTiov paXkov dXrjdes y a p otrep
crKO)iTTa)v etTre ^TpaTTt?, " oTaj/ ^aK^v e\jjrjT, p
/xvpo^." ot 8e z^Gz/ ^lyvvvres et? TO, Tro^ara Tct?
Svi^a/xet? /3taoz Tat TT^ crvvrjOeia TT\V 1780^17^, ea)s ar e/c
8u atcr^T7o~ea)i/ yeV^Tat TO 1781; w? a^ /cat aVo jutta?.
TOVTO /X^ OVJ> TO O<T<$)paVTOV tStOZ^ Tft)^ dv9p(i)7TtoV eCTTtV,
5 17 8e /caTa TOV? ^VJLCOV? TeTay/xeV^ /cat TWI^ a\\o>v ^MOJV,
tocnrep eiprjTai Trporepov - /ca/cetVaJz/ /xeV, Sta TO /caTa
o-v{ji/3e/3r]Kos e^et^ TO 1787;, SiTjprjTaL rd etS^ /caTa TOU?
S ov/ceVt, Sta TO TT)^ <^V<TIV avrTJs eivai
z^ ^ \vrrripdv. aliiov Se TOU tSto^
10 dvOpa)TTOv TTJV TOiavTrjv OCT^TIP Sta
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 75
oily, and we might regard fetid odours as corresponding to
bittei tastes ; this would explain the parallel unpalatability
of the latter and noisomeness of the former. Thus it is clear
that smell is in air and water precisely what flavour is in water.
It is for this reason that cold and frost blunt flavours 15
and reduce odours to non-existence, for the Jieat which is ^
the active and creative cause is nullified by the cooling and
congelation.
There are two sorts of odorous qualities ; it is not the
case, as some allege, that there are not different species of 20
odour. They do exist ; but we must determine in what
sense they are authentic and in what sense not.
The^one set are in order parallel to the various flavours
as we have explained. Their pleasantness and unpleasantne ss
belong to them contingently, for, since they are qualities of
that which forms our food, these smells are pleasant when we
are" hungry, but when we are sated and not requiring to eat, 25
they are not pleasant ; neither are they pleasant to those who
dislike the food of which they are the odour. Hence, as we
said, their pleasantness and unpleasantness are contingent
and hence too they are common to all animals. But theother
class of smells are per se pleasant, for example the sceruTof 3
flowers. They have no influence either great or small in
attracting us to our food nor do they contribute anything
to the longing for it. Their effect is rather the opposite ;
there is a truth contained in Strattis s jibe at Euripides
" Pray perfume not the good pea-soup." Those who do as a 444 a
fact mix such elixirs with their drink get a forced pleasure
by accustoming themselves to it, so that the pleasantness
arising from the two sensations becomes apparently the
result of one. This sort of odorous quality is thus peculiarly
the object of human sense, but that coordinate with the
varieties of flavour is proper to the other animals as well, 5
as said before. Those odours, because their pleasantness is
contingently attached to them, are classified in species which
correspond to the several flavours, but in the other group this
feature disappears, as there agreeableness and the reverse
attach to the essential nature of the odour.
The cause of the restriction of odour of this kind to
human sense comes from the constitution of the body in the 10
76 ARISTOTLE
ToV ey/ce<aXoj>. ifjv^pov yap ovros TT?I> <$>V<JLV rov ey/ce-
, Kal rov at/xaTog rov rrepl avrov eV rot? <Xe/3tots
XeTTToi) /xez /cat Kadapov, evifjvKrov Se (Sto /cat
rpo(f>rjs dvaOvpiaons \lfv)(pp,ev7) Std TOZ> TOTTO^ rest
15 vocrrjfjiaTiKd pevfJiara Trotet), rot? dv6 pa>TTOi<$ irpos
TO
yap dXXo epyov ICTTIP avrrjs \_fj rouro]. rovro Se TTOICI
ovcra,
vypd, TToXXot/ct? z/ocrwS^? ICTTLV, r] 8* CITTO rot)
20 o&Jir r KCL0* avrrv <r$ia> OTTOHTOVV
act. /cat 8ta rouro yiyverai Sta 7^9 a
ou TTOicriv dXXct rocs dv6pa)7roi<s Kal r&v Ivai^v olov
rot? TTpa7rocrL /cat oa*a /xere^et jLtaXXo^ rrjs rov aepo?
^vcrecu?* dva(f)pop.eva)v yap ra>v ocrp.a)v Trpos rov ey/ce-
25 $a\ov Std r^ eV avrat? TT}? OepjJLOTrjTos
vyiLvoT6p(t><; e^et ra Trept roz^ TOTTO^ TOVTOV 17
6<Tju/yJ5 Sv^a/xt? Oepfjirj rr^v fyvcriv I&TLV. /cara/ce-
8 17 <f)vcris rfj dvaTrvofj eVt Suo, &)? e/>yw
et9 TOZ^ OupaKa fioTJOeuav, co? irapepya) 8
30 r^ OCT^TIV - dvaTTveovTos yap to<nrep e/c vrapoSou Trotetrat
Std TO)^ fJLVKTTJpCOV TV)V KiVrjCTLV. tStOZ^ Se T^5 TOV d^-
Opa)7TOv (^ucreaj? ecrrt TO T^? 6o"/x^9 T-rJ? TOtat/n^s yeVo?
Sta TO 7rXeto~TO^ eyK(f>a\ov Kal vyporarov t
dXXwr [QU>V a>5 /caTa /xeye^os* Std ydp TOUTO /cat
35 fo>5 etTret^ alo-Odverai TMV ^wv dv0pa)7ros Kal ^atpet Tat?
TWI/ dvOuv Kal Tat? TOJZ/ TotovTw^ ocr/xatg- cru/x/xeTpo? yap
auTco^ 17 OepjJiOTrjs Kal r] KIVTJCTLS vrpo? T^V viTpfto\ Y)v
rrjs iv TO) TOTTW vyporrjTOS /cat i/iu^pOT^TO? iornv. Tot9
S dXXot? oVa TrXeu/zoi a l^et Std TOT) dvaTrveiv TOU erepov
yevovs rrjs OCT/XT)? TT)J/ aicrOrjcriv aTroSeSw/cer 17
444 a, 17 77 roOro leg. LSU Alex. vet. tr. et omnes edd. excepto Biehl.
1 8 r/ ante ^r;pa et ante t>7p<x legunt exceptis E M Y et Biehl omnes codd. et edd.
19 et 20 TJ 5 dTro T?}S 6(r^?)s TT^S /ca^ aur-^i (eavrV L P U) eua>5oi;s (quibus verbis
7?5aa addunt LSU) habent omnes codd. et edd., text, recept. omisso r;5e?a Biehl.
444 b, 3 TO aj a7n>erv edd., roO P U et Wilson.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 77
region of the brain. The brain is of a cold nature and the
blood around it in the veins is thin and pure and is easily
chilled (this explains why the upward ascending fumes from
food on turning cold owing to the nature of that region cause
a morbid flow of rheum). Hence it is for man s benefit, for 15
the preservation of his health, that this species of odour has
come into existence. JThisJsJ.ts_.only function and it evidently
fulfils it. Food, though sweet, being both dry and moist, is
frequently unhealthy ; but the odour, per se pleasant, of a 20
fragrant perfume, is beneficial to us in whatever state we are.
It is for this reason that it is by means of respiration that
smell takes place, if not in all animals, yet in man and, among
sanguineous animals, in the quadrupeds and such as parti
cipate more largely in an aerial constitution. When scents
are carried up to the brain, owing to the lightness of the 25
warm element contained in them, the parts in this region
have a healthier tone ; this takes place because the power
in odour to produce an effect is constituted by heat.
Nature employs respiration for two purposes ; its chief
function is to maintain the action of the chest, its secondary
one subserves the ends of smell, secondary, for the passage 30
of the breath through the nostrils is, as it were, a cursory
contrivance.
The reason why the class of odours of this description is
restricted to man, is, that his brain is larger and more humid
than that of all other animals in proportion to his size. This
is why he alone, so to speak, among the animals, perceives 35
arid also enjoys the odours of flowers and similar scented
objects ; they are pleasant because their heat and activity 444 b
are proportionate to the excess of humidity and cold in that
part of the body.
Among other animals, in those which have lungs, breathing
is the means which nature has bestowed upon them for the
78 ARISTOTLE
5 OTTCOS /XT) alo-O^Tripia Suo TTOLTJ- diro^pr] yap /cat
OVCTLV, cocriTep Tots dvOpwTTOLS d^oTepaiv TWV 6o~(f)pavTa)v,
TOUTOtS TtoV TpO)V fJLOVOJV VTrdp^OVCTOL Tj aLO~Orj(TL^. TO,
Se /XT) dvaTTvloVTa OTi [JLV ^X L ULCrOrjCTLV TOV OO~(f)paVTOV,
<f)avepov /cat yap iyOves /cat TO ra>^ ivTopw yeVo? Trav
10 aKpi/3o)<; /cat iroppcoOev atcr^aVerat, 8ta TO 6ptiTTu<.ov
etSo? TTj? oa/xT]?, aTre^o^Ta vroXu T^g ot/cetas
at TC /xeXtTTat /cat TO TW^ fjuKpcov ^vp^K
/caXoucrt Ttz^es /cj tVa?, /cat TO>^ 6a\arTiu>v at irop(j)v-
pat, /cat TroXXa TW^ aXXa)i> TWI^ TotovTcoz^ {wa>^ ofew?
15 ato-#dVeTat T^S rpoffrrjs 8ta Tirp ocr/x^. OTOJ 8e alcr6d-
verai, ov*% o/xotw? (fiavepov. 8to /ca^ aTro^o-ete Tts TtVt
aivOdverai TT^S 6o-/x7y5, etTrep dvanveovcrL JJLCV yivtrai
TO ocrjJLacrOaL /xo^a^w? (TOUTO yap fyaivtrai eirl 7u>v
avaTTveovTaiv crv^^alvov TrdvTajv), IK.LVO)V 8* ov0ev dva-
20 Trret, aiorOdvtrai /xeWot, et jitTy Tt? irapa Ta? TreVre
erepa. TOVTO 8 ctSu^aTo^- TOI) yap ocrfypavTOv
, Kiva 8e TOVTOV aicrOavtrai, aXX ov TOZ/
avrov to~a)9 rpOTTOv, dXXa Tot? jutez/ avaTrveowi TO Trvev^a
d(j)aipL TO e77t/cet/xe^o^ a)O"rrp Trw/xa Tt (8to ou/c alorOd-
25 j/eTat juti7 avaTTveovTa), Tot? 8e /XT) avoir viovviv d^fjprjTaL
TOVTO, KaOaTrep eVt TWI^ 6(^)^aX/xwz/ Ta /xei^ e>(et /3Xecj)apa
TMV ^uxjuv, (Lv /XT) avaKa\v^)OevTO)v ov SwaTat opav, Ta
Se o-K\r)po<f)6a\iJia OVK e>(et, StoTrep ov Trpoo-SetTat ovSe^o?
TOV dvaKaXvifjovTos, aXX opa e /c TOU Su^aToi) O^TO? avTov
30 evOvs. 6/xotw? 8e /cat TO;^ aXXw^ ^wwz/ oTtov^ ovSev
Sucr^epat^et TWZ^ /ca^ avTa 8vo-wSw^ TT)^ oor/x^, az^ /XT)
Tt TV^Ty $6apTLKOV OV. VTTO TOVT(DV 8* 6/XOtW? <f)0lpTaL
Ka6oLTTp /cat ot dvOpoiTTOi VTfo Trjs TO)V av6paK(*)v aT/xtSo?
Kap7)/3apovo-i /cat (f)@eipovTai TroXXa/ct?- OVTCJS UTTO TT]?
444 b, 5 ^TreiVep icat tos di aTrj . leg. exceptis E M Y et Biehl reliqui omnes et
scripti et impress!, etiam Alex, et vet. tr. 29 oVros Biehl | opai L S U Alex.
et omnes edd., "a facultate existente" vet. tr. | ai)roO E M Y Biehl, airr< reliqui
et scripti et impressi.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 79
perception of the other genus of odour. This was to avoid
creating two sense-organs ; for if creatures merely breathe, 5
the sense of smell is sufficiently well provided for, in the case
of the animals the perception of the one class of odorous
qualities, the only one possessed by them, just as it is in man
who perceives both kinds.
That non-respiring animals perceive odorous quality is a
matter of observation. Fishes and the insect-tribe perceive 10
quite accurately and at a distance by means of the species of
odour connected with nutriment, even when they are far away
from the things that form their special food. For example
bees and the kind of small ants called knipes and, among
marine creatures, the purple-murex and many similar animals,
have a very acute perception of food by means of smell.
But the organ of perception is not so obvious and so one 15
might raise a difficulty and ask, " what is the organ with
which these animals perceive smell, if in all respiring animals
the sensation occurs in one way only, viz. by respiration (as
is evidently the case in all creatures that breathe), and none
of these breathe but yet do perceive odour ? Perhaps they 20
do not smell but have a new sense over and above the five."
This, however, is impossible ; it is smell that is the sense
of that which smells and this they perceive. Yet perhaps
the manner of perception is not the same ; perhaps in the
case of respiring animals the breath displaces a superficial
structure which serves in a way like a lid to cover the sense-
organ ; (this will explain why when we do not inhale the
breath we do not smell ;) but in the non-respiring animals 25
this is entirely lacking. A parallel for this is the eye ; some
animals have eyelids and, unless these are open, they cannot
see ; but hard-eyed animals, not possessing them, do not
require anything to open them, but see an object directly
out of the organ which itself has the capacity of vision.
Similarly in accordance with our previous distinction we 30
must notice that none of the other animals are distressed by
the smell of things per se malodorous, unless any of these
chance to be destructive to life. These noxious odours have
a destructive effect upon them, just as they have upon men
too, in whom the gas arising from coal causes headache and
frequently death. So too, sulphurous and bituminous fumes
8o ARISTOTLE
35 TOV 9eiov awa^ea)** /cat
445 a ToXXa a>a, /cat c^euyet Sta TO irdOos. avTrjs Se /ca$
Trjs Suo-a>Sta9 ouSez (^ponrt^ouo-tz;, /catYot TroXXa
<uojneVa)F SucrcoSets e^et ra? 6cr/x,ds, eaz/ JUT; Tt
TaL 77^005 TT)I/
5 eot/ce 8 17 aicr^cri? ^ rou o
rail/ alo~0TJo a)i KOL rov apuOfJiov e^o^ro? fjitcrov TOV
TrepLTTov KOI avrr) (jieonrj eivai ra)v re OLTTTLKOJV, olov
atfrrjs /cat yeucrew?, /cat rw^ St aXXou atcr^rt/cc3^,
oi//eco5 /cat a/coT]?. 8to /cat TO oo-fypavrov ra>v
10 eo~Tt ?ra^09 Tt (TavTa 8 eV TW aTrrw yeVet) /cat TOT;
d/covcrTou Se /cat TOV oparov, Sto /cat eV dept /cat eV
OCT/XOJ^Tat. 0)CTT* eVTt TO OCT^pOiVTOV K.QIVQV Tt
ap,<f)OTp(t)V, /Cat TO) T CtTTTOJ VTTapytl KCU TO)
fo /cat Stac^a^et- Sto euXoycos Tra/oet/cacrTat ^rfpo-
iv vypa) /cat X VT ^ ^^ fiatf* 7 ! Tt9 etz/at /cat
. 7TW5 />t^ ouz^ etS^ Set Xe yetz^ /cat TTOJ? ou Set
17 TOU ocrfypavTov, eVt TOCTOVTO^ elptjcrdci).
17 C O Se Xeyouo*t Twes
TlvOayopeiMV, OVK iicmv euXoyoz rpeffrecrOai yap
eVta {wa Tat? 6o~/>tat5. TTpaiTOv /xeV yap 6paj/xe^
20 6Vt Trp Tpcxfrrjv Set eivai o~vv0Tr}v /cat yap TOL rp(j)6p,i a
ov^ 0,77X0, ecrTtV, Sto /cat 7reptTTa>/>ta ytVeTat TT}? Tpo^rj^,
A V S J^cVON -V>- V ^ I ^ V O>
o /xez^ ei^ auTot? o oe egco, axnrep Tot? (pt>Tot9. eTt o
ouSe TO uSa>p eOeXeu avro povov OL^IKTOV ov Tpefyeiv
o-w/xaTOjSe? yap Tt Set eti^at TO crvo-riqo-o^vov. eVt
25 TroXu TITTQV evkoyov TOV depa o-aj/JLaTovcrOcu. Trpo? Se
TOUTOt?, OTt ira<TLV eO~Tt TOt9 ^WOt9 TO7TO9 Se/CTt/CO5
Tpo<f)rj<$, e ov orav elo-e\0rj \ap,/3dvi TO crwfJia TOV
S* ocrfypavTOv zv Trj K(j>a\fj TO alo~0r)Ty]pLov, /cat /xeTa
Tr^eu/xaTwSoi;? etcre^p^eTat dvaOvfJudo-eais, UHTT et? TOZ^
30 avaTrvtvorTiKov ySaSt^ot az^ TOTTOZ^. 6Vt /xez/ ovz^ ou
et$ Tpofyrjv TO oo-fipavTOv, rj ocr
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 81
have the power of causing death in the other animals and are 35
shunned by them in consequence. But they reck not at all 445 a
of the essential unpleasantness of the smell (though many
plants are malodorous) unless it make some difference to the
taste and to eating.
The number of the senses is uneven and the sense of 5
smell, since an uneven number has a middle term, seems
itself to occupy the intermediate position between the senses
which require contact, viz. touch and taste, and those where
the perception is mediated by something else, to wit, sight
and hearing. For this reason also odour is a quality both of
that which is nutritive (which falls within the class of things 10
tangible) and of the audible and the visible, and hence the
sense of smell is exercised both in air and in water. Thus
the object of smell is something common to both of these
and is found in things tangible, things audible and things
transparently s & <
We had, therefore, good reason in comparing it to an
infusion and solution of dry substance in that which is liquid 15
and fluid. This is the sum of our account of the sense in
which it is correct and that in which it is incorrect to talk
of species in odour.
The theory held by certain Pythagoreans that some
animals live on odours is an irrational doctrine.
In the first place, food must be a composite substance;
the creatures that it nourishes are themselves not simple in
structure. Hence from food a waste residue is developed 20
which in some is internal, in others plants, external;
secondly, water by itself alone and unmixed has no nutritive
tendency ; food which is to form a concrete body must have
solidity. Much less reason is there for supposing that air
can be solidified. Furthermore, in all animals there is a 25
receptacle for food and out of this the body is supplied upon
the entrance of nutriment. But the organ for perceiving
smell is in the head ; odour enters the body along with the
waft of the air we breathe and so must pass into the organs
of breathing.
It is clear, then, that the object of the sense of smell has, 30
R. 6
82 ARISTOTLE
877X01; oTt pevToi et? vytetai , /cat e/c 777?
/cat e/c TOJZ> et/)77/xeVa)^ fyavepov, ajcrTe Strep 6
TOJ OptTTTlKCO KOL TTyOO? TO, TyOe^O/Xei^a, TOVT* eCTTt 7T/)05
445 b vyieiav TO ovfypavTov. KaO* eKao~Tov jjLev ovv alcrOrjTTJ-
TOV TpOTTOV TOVTOV.
VI
ai^ ris, et TTOLI/ cra)/xa et? aireipa Stat-
dpa KOL ra TraO^jfJiara ra atcr^ra, olo^ -^paJjjLOL
5 /cat x v l ji ^ Ka ^ oo-fJirj Kal i//d(^)O5 /cat fidpos KOI ifjv^pb^
v Kal KOV^OV Kal crKkrjpov Kal ^a\aKov ; f)
TroLTjTLKov yap <TTLV ZKCLCTTOV avToiv TTJS
rw Su^acr^at y^ KWtiv avrr^v Xeyerai
(Scrr* dvayKr} TTJV re alcrOr^crip ets direupa 8tat-
10 pel&Oai Kal TTOLV elz^ai jneye$os alcrOr^rov a&vvarov yap
\evKov ^ev opav, /XT) TTCKTOV e. et yap /XT)
e^Se^otr ai^ et^ai ri crw/xa ^Se^ e)(o^ ^pw/xa
ftdpos ^778 aXXo rt TOLOVTOV TrdOos. a>oV ovS* ai
oXoj?- ravra yap ra alcrOrjTa. TO dp* alcrOrjTOi ecrrat
15 o-vyKi^vov OVK e alcr0r]Ta)v. aXX* dvayKalov ov yap
ST) CK: ye rco^ ^a6r]^ariK(ji)v. en rt^t Kpivov^ev ravra
rj yvtoo-OjJieOa ; TJ TOJ z/a5. aXX ou vorjrd, ouSe i^oei 6
ra e/crog JUT) jiter alcrOyjcrea)^. a/xa S ei raur
oiK jJiaprvptLV rot? ra dro/xa Troioucrt
20 OVTO) yap av XVOLTO o Xdyos. aXX aSu^ara* eiprjTai 8e
t avTOJV iv roi? Xdyoi? rot? vrept /ct^crew?. 7re/n 8e
Xvcreco? avrojv d/xa 877X0^ ecrrai fcal Sta rt Treirepavrai
ra 1877 /cal ^pw/xaro? /cat ^v/xov /cat cj)06yya>v Kal
25 TrenepdvOai rd ivros ra 8 Ivavricn ecr^ara. Trai^ 8e
TO alo-OrjTov e^et eVa^Ttwo"t^, otoz> eV ^/xw/xaTt TO Xev/co^
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 83
per se, nothing to do with nourishment. That it makes a
difference to health is, however, obvious ; both the experience
of the sensation itself and our argument prove it. Hence we
may conclude that odour has precisely the same office in
relation to health as flavour has in food and in relation to
the creatures that food nourishes.
This finishes our account of the objects relative to the 445 b
several sense-organs.
VI
The question might be raised whether, if all bodies are
infinitely divisible, the same is the case with their sensuous
qualities also, e.g. colour, flavour, odour, sound, weight, cold, 5
heat, lightness, hardness and softness. Or is this impossible ?
Each of those phenomena is able to cause sensation ; they
are all styled sense-qualities owing to their power of stimu
lating the sense. Consequently, on the former alternative
sensation will be capable of infinite subdivision and, as well,
every magnitude will be perceptible, since it is impossible to 10
perceive anything white which is not a quantum.
If this were not so, body might exist which was totally
without colour or weight or" any other similar attribute.
Consequently it would be totally imperceptible, for the above
form the list of the sense-qualities. The object of sensation
must then be composed of things which are imperceptible.
But it must be composed of constituents which are sen- 15
sible ; for it certainly cannot consist of mathematical entities.
Further how should we distinguish them or be aware of
them? By means of thought? But they are not objects
oL thought ; thought does notfTfimk external objects unless
sense cooperates.
At the same time also, this, if true, seems to give evidence
in support of the theory of atomic magnitudes, since that
would furnish a solution of the problem. But atomic magni- 20
tudes are impossible, as was explained in our treatment of
motion.
The solution of this problem and the reason why the
species of colour, taste, sound, etc. are limited in number, will
become apparent at the same time.
Where extremes exist the internal parts must be deter
minate. Now contraries are extremes and every object of 25
sense exhibits contrariety, e.g. in colour black and white,
62
84 ARISTOTLE
Kal TO jjL\av, iv X v ^ Ji< ? y^-VKV KOI TTt/cpoV- /cat eV rot?
dXXot? ST) 7racrLi> I&TIV Icr^ara ra ev curia. TO ^tv ovv
crvveyts el? aVetpa re/x^erat aVtcra, ets 8* tcra nene-
30 pacTjiteVa TO Se /XT) /ca$ auro crwe^es et? TreTrepacr/xeVa
1817. eVet OIL>Z> TO, /xez> TrdOrj w? 1877 Xe/creoi , vnap^ei
Se crv^e^eta ael ez^ rouroi?, \^TTT.OV OTL TO Si ^a/xei /cai
TO ivepyeia irepov Kal SLGL TOVTO TO fjLVpioo~T / Yj{ji6pLop
opaj/xeVr^s, KCLITOL TJ oi//t? eTreX^-
Stecret <^>$oyyos \av9dvei, KULTOI
6VT05 aKovei TOV /xeXov? Tra^TO?. TO Se 8ta-
o~T7]p,a TO TOV fjLTav iTpos Tou? ecr^aTou? \av9dvi.
5 o[JiOLa)<; 8e /cat ez^ TOI? aXXot? alo-0rjTols Ta
yap opaTa, eVepyeia 8* ou, oVai^ /xr) ^CD^I? rj*
yap evvTrdp^ei 8vvdp,i 77 TroSiata T?5 StVoSt, eVepyet a
8 7)877 Siaipe^etcra. -^Mpi^ofJievaL 8 at TrjXiKavTai vne-
po-^al euXoyco? jnei^ az^ /cat StaXuoti^TO et? Ta
10 ojo~7rep Kal afcayotato? ^f/xo? ei? TT)^ OdkaTTav e/c^
ov JU,T)I^ aXX 776187) ouS 77 TT}? ato-^crew? virepo)(r}
avTrjv alcrOrjTr) ouSe ^copLCTTyj (8vz/a/xet yap I
Iv TTJ dKpL/Beo-Tepa 77 VTrepo^jj), ov8e TO T-Y]\LKOVTOV
alo~0r)Tov ^copto~TO^ o~Tat eVepyeta aicrOdvecrOai, aXX
15 o/jLw? ecrTat aio-OriTov 8vpdp.ei T yap ivnv 7)877, /cat
ez^epyeta ecrTat Trpocryez^o/xez^oz^. 6Vt jitez^ ovz^ ez^ta /xeye^
/cat 7rd0rj \av6dvei, /cat 8ta Ttz^ amaz^, /cat TTW? aio~0rjTa
Kal 7TW9 ov, eiprjTai. oTav 8e 877 evvTrdpyovTa OVTW
77877 Trpo? auTa 19 WCTTC /cat eVepyeta atcr^Ta eTz^at, /cat
20 /X77 p,ovov OTL iv Ta oXa> aXXa /cat
az^ay/c77 etz/at TOZ^ apt^oz^ /cat ^pw/xaTa /cat
22 Kal <f)66yyovs.
22 ATTOpT^crete 8 aV Tt?, dp* d^t/cz^ouz^Tat T^ TO,
alo~0rjTa 77 at KLVTJO-LS at
446 a, 6 ^77 %wpts ^] ,1477 x w s 77 E M Y vet. tr., xupivOri Biehl, Bek.
; TToSc E M Y 18 evvrrdpxy TOVTU Toaavra L S U Alex.,
ovrw TTWS #TTCI rj P vet. tr. Bek. Didot text, recept. Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 85
in taste sweet and bitter, and in the others every one the
contrary qualities form extremes.
Now continuous quantity when divided falls into an
infinite number of unequal parts but into a finite number of
equal parts. On the other hand that which is not per se 30
continuous, falls into a finite number of species. Thus, while
on the one hand sense-qualities must be considered as species,
but on the other hand universally present the aspect of
continuity, we must, to solve the difficulty, bring in the
distinction between potential and actual. It is by this means
that we explain why the ten thousandth part of a visible 446 a
grain of millet escapes notice although the sight has encoun
tered it, and why a sound within a quarter-tone escapes
detection, although the whole series of notes in which it
exists, being continuous, is heard ; the interval between
the mean point and extremes is not discernible and so too 5
it is with very minute fractions in other objects of sense ;
they are potentially perceptible but not actually so unless
they be isolated. So even the one-foot measure has but
potential existence in the two-foot rule but, from the moment
bisection takes place, it is something actual.
But it is reasonable to believe that, when fractions so
excessively minute are isolated, they are moreover resolved
into the surrounding medium, just as a tiny drop of flavouring 10
is lost when spilled in the ocean, and so escapes perception.
However that may be, since not even in the perception of
minute objects is the excessively minute sensation in its
individuality appreciable or isolable (it has a potential exis
tence in that which is more accurately discriminated), neither
will it be possible to have actual perception of the similarly
minute object of sense in its separateness. Nevertheless
perceptible it is; for it already is so potentially and, when 15
taken in union with the whole, it becomes actually percep
tible. Thus certain magnitudes and their qualities escape
detection ; this is our account of them and of the reason why
that is so and of the senses in which they are and are not
perceptible. But when the constituents of anything are
already so related among themselves as to be also actually
perceptible and perceptible not merely in the whole but 20
individually as well, the determinations of colour and flavour
and sound must be finite in number.
It may be asked Do the objects of sense or the motions
which issue from sense-objects (whichever of the two theories
perception involves), when acting on us penetrate the medium
through which they pass, prior to causing sensation ? This is
86 ARISTOTLE
770T6 yverai 77 aicrrjo-LS, orav vepyaxTLV, et9 TO p.ecroi>
25 77po>Toz , olov 77 re OCT/HT) c^atVeTat 77Otovcra /cat 6 i//d<o9 %
irporepov yap o eyyv9 aicrdavtrai r^9 607x779, /cat 6
i//d<^>o9 vcrTtpov dc^t/ci etTat TT)S 7T\r)yrjs. dp* ovV OVTOJ
/cat TO 6poj/xez>oz> /cat TO <^>a>9 ; KadaTrep KOI E/xT
fyrfo lv acjjLKvelcrOai irporepov TO 0,770 TOT) rjXiov
30 TO fJLTav TTplv TTpOS TTjV OlfjLV T) CTTl
S av evXdycu? TOUTO o~v^^aiveiv TO yap
Kivelrai iroOev Trot, OJCTT avdyKrj elvai riva KOL
446 b ez^ w Kivelrai IK Oarepov 77/305 Odrepov 6 Se ^pd^os 770,9
StatyoeT05, WO~T 77^ OTC OV77W lajpdro dXX IT 4<f)pTo
TI dfCTi5 ez^ T< juteTafu. /cat et a77ai^ d/xa a/covet /cat
aKTjKoe /cat 0X0^9 atcr^d^eTat /cat rjcrO^rai, /cat ^17 eo~Tt
5 yeVcrt9 avTw^, aXX eto ti dz^ei; TOV yiyvecrOai ofJLO)S ovSei^
TyTTOi^, ojcnrep o i//d^)O9 ^7817 yeyevrjjjievrjs T7y9 TrXrjyfjs OVTTO)
77/009 TT; OLKorj. SrjXol Se TOVTO /cat 17
/cat
ov yap TO \y6kv fyaivovrai aKrjKoores Std TO
10 cr^ jnaTtecr#at (frepofjievov TOP depa. a/) or)*;
TO ^/Dwjuta /cat TO <^a>9; ov yd/D 817 TOJ 77^9 ^etz^ TO
6/Da TO 8 opdraL, ojcrTrep laa ICTTLV ovOev yap av
77ou KaTpov eivaL Tot9 yd/o to~ot9 yty^o/xeVot9 o
Sta^epet ^ eyyv9 17 Troppco dXX^Xa)^ elz^at. 17 77ept
15 TOI> \jj6(f)ov /cat TT)I^ oa-^v rovro cru/Lt^atVet
&&gt;o"77e/o yd/o 6 0,77/9 /cat TO vSa)p, CTwe^r) l^tv, /ute/Lte/3to"Tat
8 d[jL(f)OTepa)v rj Kivrjcns. 8 to /cat eo~Tt /ae^ a>9 TO OVTO
a/covet 6 77pwT09 /cat 6 vo-repos /cat oa-^paiverai, ecm
8 &)9 ov. 8o/cet 8e Ttcrti^ etz^at diropia /cat 77e/ot TOVTO)^ ?
20 dSvVaToi yap ^>ao~t Ttf 9 aXkov dXXa> TO OVTO a/covets
/cat opdv /cat 6o~(^)patz/eo~^at ov ydp ofd^ T* et^at 77oXXov5
/cat ^wpt5 d^Ta9 a/covets /cat 6o-</oatVeo-#ar TO yap li^
)(wpt9 dz^ avTO avTov etz^at. 77 TOV /utez^ Kivr\<TavTos
77pOJTOV, OtOZ^ TT79 /CwS&)^O5 77 \L/3aVO)TOV rj 77VpO9, TOV
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 87
evidently the case, e.g., with odour and sound ; he who stands 25
nearer perceives the odour earlier, and a sound reaches the
ear after the blow is struck. Is the same thing true of the
object of vision and light? Empedocles too had the very same
theory ; he says that the light coming from the sun penetrates
the medium first before meeting our sight or reaching the earth.
This looks like a reasonable account of the phenomenon, for 30
when a thing moves it moves from starting point to terminus
and hence there must be some lapse of time as well while it
passes from the one point to the other. Now every lapse of 44^ b
time is divisible and so there was a moment when as yet the
ray of light was not perceived but was still on its passage
through the medium. Though, in every act, hearing and
perception generally are complete as soon as exercised and
there is no process in the establishment of the content of
sense, yet sensation is not devoid of process on this account
nor possesses it any the less ; take for example the case of 5
sound which does not meet the ear simultaneously with the
striking of the blow. This is shown too by the distortion
of the letters of a word when uttered, which is explained by
their passage through the medium ; we appear not to hear
what has actually been said because the air in moving gets
distorted. Does the same lapse of time in transmission occur
in the case of colour and light? It is not, certainly, in virtue 10
of some such modal determination as constitutes the relation
of equality that subject and object in vision are related. If
it were, they would not require both to be in a definite place ;
when things are equal it makes no difference to their equality
whether they are near or far apart. In the case of sound and
odour it is reasonable that this lapse of time during trans
mission should occur. Like the air and the water they are 15
continuous, yet in both cases the motion of transmission falls
into a number of parts. Hence too there is a sens e in which
it is the same thing which is heard by the person who stands
nearest and by him who is farthest away and the same thing
which is smelled by both ; and there is a sense in which it is
riot. This seems to constitute a difficulty for some people ;
they say it is impossible that what is identical should be
heard or seen or smelt by different persons and that they 20
cannot hear and smell it because they are many and apart ;
if they could, what is one thing would itself become separated
from itself.
The solution is, that all do perceive the numerically
identical and self-same thing which is the originating cause
of the movement, e.g. the bell, the frankincense, or the fire,
88 ARISTOTLE
25 avTov /cat eVos dpiOjjict) aiaOdvovrai Trdvres, roC Se 819
tStov ere pou dpi9^a>, etSet Se rou CLVTOV, Sto /cat djota
TroXXot opcocrt /cat ocTjU-wz Tai /cat d/covoucru . eo~Tt
ovre crw/xara ravra, ctXXa irdOos /ecu fcti^cris Tt? (ov
yap ai^ rovro crvvefSoiivev), ou* ai^eu crcu^aro?. Trepl Se
30 TOV (^wro5 aXXos Xdyo?* rw eVet^at yap rt (^(S? ICTTLV,
clXX ov Kivrfcris. 0X0)5 Se ovSe OJJLOIOJS ITTL re dXXotw-
crea)5 e^ei /cat (^opa?- at /xe^ yap (f)opal e^Xoycog ts
TO fJiTav TTptoTov a<f)iKVOVvTai (So/cet S* 6 i//o(os el^at
447 a (frepofjievov Tt^os /ct^crts), ocra S aXXoto^rat, ovicen-
6/xota)S e^Se^erat yap aOpoov aXXoLovcrOai, /cat /x^ TO
77^ttcru irporepov, olov TO vScop a/>ta Tra^ TTriyvvcrOoii. ov
jjLrjv aXX cb> 7y TTO\V TO ^ep/xat^d/xe^oz^ 77
5 TO e^d/xei^o^ VTTO TOV e^o/xeVov Tracr^et, TO Se
VTT avTOv TOV aXXotowTO? /xeTa^aXXet, /cat ov/c avd
a/xa d\\oLOVcr0cu /cat dOpoov. r)v S a^ /cat TO yeuecr^at
a>o~7rep ^ ocrfJitj, et e^ vypco r^ev /cat TroppcoTepo)
Oiyeiv avTov TJ&OavoiJieOa. evXdy&j? S &V eo~Tt
10 TOU alcrOrjTrjpLov, ov^ a/xa Trdvra Tracr^et, 77X771; eVt TOU
Sta TO etTxeVo^. Sta TO auTo Se /cat evrt TOI)
opv TO yap (aj? Trotet TO
VII
Se Tt? aTropta /cat aXX?; TotaSe Trept alcrOrj
Trorepov e^Se^eTat Sveti; a/xa Sv^acr^at alcrOdvecrOai iv
15 TW auTw /cat drofjio) ^pova), rj ov, et Sr) aet 77 /xet^a)^
KivrjcTiS Tr)v eXaTTO) e/c/cpovet Sto TO e7Tt<^epdjuteFO^ eVt
Ta d/xjLtaTa oi /c aicrOdvovTai, lav Tv^wcrt cr</)dSpa Tt
e^^ov^Te? 77 (fao/Bovp.ei OL r} a/couo^Te? TroXvv \fj6(f)ov. TOVTO
Se ST) v7roKeio-0a), /cat 6Vt e/cao-TOU /xaXXo^ ecmv alo-Od-
446 b, 30 ry evelvai Alex., eli ai Biehl et codd.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 89
but yet the stimulus peculiar to each is numerically different 25
though specifically the same. We can hence explain how
many people may see and smell and hear the same thing and
do this at the same time too. Here we are dealing not with
bodies, but qualities and motions (if this were not so the
latter phenomenon could not occur), though they do not exist
apart from body.
About light a different account must be given. Light
is due to the presence of something but is not a motion. 30
Universally speaking there is not even similarity between
qualitative alteration and spatial transference ; motions of
translation, as one would expect, penetrate the medium first
before reaching us (sound seems to be a motion of something
which travels). On the other hand with things that suffer 447 a
alteration this ceases to be true ; they may be altered in one
mass, and not one half before the other ; for example water
freezes all at one time. However if what is heated or frozen
is great in bulk, one part is acted on by that which is
contiguous to it, the change in the first being due to the 5
agent itself which is the cause of the alteration ; and the
alteration does not necessarily take place at the same time
and over the whole. Taste would be like odour if we lived
in water and perceived things at a distance before touching
them. It is reasonable to believe that in those cases where
the organ of perception employs a medium the effects are not 10
all simultaneously produced ; but we except the case of light
for the reason given and, on the very same account, sight
too, for it is light which causes vision.
VII
There is a certain other problem also connected with
perception Can we perceive two things in the same individual
moment of time, or can we not? Not, if it is the case that a 15
stronger stimulus displaces one which is more feeble. This is
the reason why one does not see things that directly meet the
eyes, when one is in a state of profound meditation or of terror
or when hearkening to a loud sound.
Let us posit this as true, and likewise the fact that any
90 ARISTOTLE
20 ve&Oai 0,77X01) oVros 17 KeKpauevov, olov oivov aKpdrov
T] KeKpauevov, /cat juteXtro?, /cat ^pdas, /cat TTJ?
[jiovrjs 77 ev TO) Sta Trao~o)v } Sta TO d^avi^eiv a
TOUTO Se TTO let ef cS^ ev rt yiverai. et ST) 17 /Aia>i TT)I>
eXarrco Kiv-qo-iv eV/cpouei, avayKir), OLV apa cScrt, /cat
25 avTrjv ^TTOV aicrOrjTrjv elz/at 17 et ju,o^ ^v a^p^rat
/> rt 17 eXarrw^ ^tty^v/xeVr;, et77ep aVa^ra ra 0,77X0,
alcrdrjTa ICTT IV. lav apa to~at wcrt^ ere^at oScrat,
ecrrat atLcrOrjo LS a(/>a^tet yap 17 ere /oa 6/>totw9
r^ Tpav. 0,77X7)5 8 ov/c earn; alcrOapeo-Oai. wcrre
30 17 ovSe/^ta eo~rat aicrOrjcns rj aXXr^ e f a^olv. oirep /cat
ylyveordai 8o/cet e /c ra>^ /cepawujLteVwz ei^ w a^ jitt^^wcrt^.
eVet ovi^ e/c /xez^ eVtwi^ yt^erat rt, e /c eVtco^ ov ytVerat,
447 b rotavra Se ra u^) irlpav al&6ri<Tiv (^LyvvvTai yap a>v
ra ecr^ara eVa^rta ov/c ecrrt e /c Xeu/cou /cat ofe c? e^
yei^eV^at aXX r^ /cara crvfJifie/BrjKos, aXX* ot>^ a>5 ef
ofe og /cat fiapeos crvfJiffiajVLa) OVK apa ovS* ai&OdvecrOai
5 eVSe^erat avToiv a/xa. tcrat /xe^ yap ovcrat at /ct^cret?
afyaviovcriv aXXr^Xa?, e?7ej /xta ov ytVerat e f avruv av
8* az/tcrot, 77 /cpetrra)^ alcr6r)o-iv 77otet, eVet paXkov apa
Sueti> alo"OoiT av rj ^JVX^l T fj p 1 * ottcr^cret cSi^ /xta
ato-#7?crt9, oto^ o^eo? /cat fiapeos- fjiaXXov yap aua 77
10 /cti Ticri? T77? jutta? ravrrjs 77 rotz^ Suot^, olo^ oi//ew? /cat
a/coTys. r]7 /xta 8e a/xa Suotz ov/c ecrnv aicrOdvecrdai
av /XT) uL^Ofj TO yap jjuyua ev /5ouXerat etz/at, roG 8
eV6s /xta alcr0rjo-i<;, rj 8e ftta a/xa 0^777. wcrr ef dvdyKrjs
TMV fjieuiyfjievajv a/xa aivOdverai, ort ^ta atcr^o-et /car
15 ivepyeiav alcrOdverai eV6s /xe^ yop dpL0uct) rj /car
Ivepyeiav /xta, et8et Se 77 /caret ^vvapiv /x,ta. /cat et
ta TOLVVV 77 atcr ^770*19 17 /car* Ivepyeiav, ev eKelva epel.
apa dvdyKrj aura. oVa^ apa /XT) 77
447 a, 31 ^j y, fort. ^0 y.
SNSE AND ITS OBJECTS 91
single thing is more perceptible by itself than when in a 20
compound. For example, a wine is more readily distinguished
when pure than when mixed ; so with honey and tint, and the
tonic is more distinctly perceived when alone than when it is
sounded along with the octave, as the two when together annul
each other.
This result is produced by things out of which a unity
is formed. If it is the case that the stronger stimulus
displaces the weaker, it must, if they are simultaneous, itself
be less distinct to sense than if it were alone, having suffered 25
diminution to some extent by the admixture of the weaker,
if the pure is always the more perceptible. So if two different
stimuli are equal, neither will be perceived ; either will annul
the other to an equal extent. But they cannot be perceived
as pure ; hence either no sensation will result or another one 30
derived from "Bo tH, precisely as things when mingled yield
something fresh so long as it is true mixture.that takes place.
Thus in certain cases of the simultaneous presentation of
sensation something derivative results, but in certain cases
not, and such are instances of objects falling under diverse 447 b
senses. (Mixture occurs with objects when their most extreme
divergences of quality are related as contraries ; white and
shrill do not yield anything unitary except per accidens, but,
quite otherwise, low and high yield a concord.) Since then
this is so, neither will it be possible to perceive them together.
If they are equal in intensity the stimuli will cancel each 5
other, since no unitary sensation is derived from them, while
if they are unequal the stronger will produce sensation, and
both will not be perceptible, since consciousness would more
readily distinguish two objects by a single sense and if they
both belonged to a single sense, e.g. high and low, than it
would these, for the stimuli are more closely located in the
case of this selfsame sense than when we have two different 10
senses, e.g. sight and hearing.
But by a single sense we cannot perceive two objects
simultaneously unless they combine with each other. For
the combination requires to be something unitary, and of a
unitary object the perception is single and a single sensation
is one possessing internal simultaneity. Consequently things^
in combination must be simultaneously perceived, because^
apprehended by a single act of perception. It is of what is 15
numerically one that the explicit perception is single while it
is of the specifically one that the implicit perception is unitary.
Hence also, if the explicit perception is single it pronounces v .1 \
those objects to be numerically one. Hence they must have
entered into combination, and so, when they are not combined,
92 ARISTOTLE
Svo to-ovrai ato-^crets at KCLT ivepyeiav. aXXa /caret
20 HS LCLV SvvafJiLV /cat arojito^ y^povov ^iav dvdyKrj etz^at
eVepyetaz; - jutct? yap etcrdVaf jitta /ctV^crts /cat
jitta Se ^ Swa//,t9. ou/c apa e^Se^erat Suetz a/m ato~$a-
/xta atcr^cret. aXXa ja^ et ra TJTTO TT)Z> avrr)v
djJLCL aSu^aro^, ea^ ij Svo, S^Xoi^ ort rjTTOV ert
25 ra /card 8i;o atcr^Tycret? e^Se^erat ajLta atcr^a^ecr^at, olo^
\evKOv /cat yXv/cu. <^at^erat yap TO /AC^ rw dpiOfJio) ev
Tj ^V^TI ovSez^t Tpco Xeyetz/ aXX* 77 rw a/xa, TO 8e TOJ
etSet ez^ T^ Kpivovcry alcrOijcrei /cat TOJ Tpotra). Xeyw
Se TOVTO, OTt tcrco? TO Xef/co^ /cat TO juteXaz^, tTepov TOJ
30 etSet o^, 17 aiVnr) Kpivei, /cat TO yXf/cu /cat TO TTLKpov, rj
avrr) />te^ eavrfj, e/cetV^? 8 aXX^, aXX eTeputs tKOLTepov
TCOV tvavTLwv, a)9 8 a^TO)? eavTat? Ta o~uo~TOt^a, otoz^
448 a a) 9 ^ yeucrt? TO yXv/cu, OVTW? 17 o\//t9 TO Xeu/co^* w? 8
auTT7 TO jLteXaz^, OVTW? e/cetV-^ TO Trt/cpoV. ert et at
ivOLVTltoV KIVTJCTLS VOLVTLOLl, djJia 8e TO, IvaVTLOL
avTw /cat drofJiO) OVK e^Se^eTat vrrdp^eiv, VTTO 8e
5 aicr07}O"iv TT)^ jLttaz^ eVa^Tta ICTT IV, oto^ y\VKV
oi;/c az^ e^Se^otTO al<T0dvecr0ai a/xa. o/xotw? 8e
OTt ovSe Ta /XT^ tvavria ra /xez^ yap TOT) Xev/cov TO, 8e
TOV jite^a^o? ecrTti^, /cat eV Tot? aXXot9 6/>totoJ9, otoz^ TO^
)(VjJia)v ol jne> TOU yXv/ce o? ot Se TOV iriKpov. ovSe TO,
10 jute/xtyjiteVa d/xa- Xdyot yap eto~t^ a^Tt/cet/xeVwz^, ofo^ TO
Sta Tracrajv /cat TO Sta TieWe, az^ /xi^ a>s ez^ ato~^a^Tat.
ouTO)? 8* et? Xoyos 6 TWZ^ a/cpwz^ yivercni, aXXw? 8 ov*
eo~Tat yap a/xa 6 />tez^ vroXXoi) Trpo? oXtyoz^ 17 Trepirrov
TTpo? dpTLov, o 8 s oXtyou Trpo? TroXu 17 dpTiov ?rpo9
15 TreptTToV. et oSz/ TT\LOV en aVe^et aXX^Xa)^ /cat 8ta(/>epet
TO, o"7;crTot^aj5 /xez^ Xeyo/xez^a ez^ aXXw Se yeVet TOJZ^ ez^ TW
auTW yeVet Xeyd/xez/wz^ (otor TO y\VKv /cat TO \ZVKOV cxXX
a)? o-ucrTot^a, yeVet S erepa), TO yXu/cu Se TOU
ert TW etSet Sta^epet 17 TOU Xeu/cou, ert az^
448 a, 19 rou \evKov LSU Alex. Aid. Bus., TO \evKov reliqui codd. Sylb.
Bek. Didot, Torst. coni. 18 TOU Xev/cou et 19 17 ro / uAai> p. 169, cui assentitur
Thurot ; T et Set 19 deleri volunt Torst. et Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 93
there will be two explicit sensations. But when the faculty is
single and the time individual, the activity of sense must be nu- 20
merically one ; the stimulation and exercise of a single faculty
at a unitary time must be single ; and the faculty is single.
Thus it is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously
by a single sense. But certainly, when objects of the same
sense, if dual, cannot be simultaneously perceived, it is clear
that still less will this be possible in the case of objects of two 25
different senses, e.g. white and sweet.
Consciousness appears to recognize numerical identity not
otherwise than by the simultaneity of the perception, while
specific unity is given by the unity of the sense which dis
criminates it and the manner in which the perception occurs.
By this I mean that, though supposing it be black and white,
objects specifically distinct, which the same sense discriminates, 3
and sweet and bitter, which a sense that is self-identical,
though different from the former, distinguishes, yet there is a
diverse manner in which it perceives either contrary, and it is
in the same manner as each other that the senses apprehend
corresponding members of different pairs of opposites ; e.g.
sight perceives white in the same manner as taste does sweet- 448 a
ness, and the former perceives black as the latter does bitter.
Further, if contrary sensibles give contrary stimuli and
contraries cannot coexist in anything identical and individual,
but under a single sense we find things opposed to each other, 5
as, for example, sweet is opposed to bitter, it is impossible to
perceive them simultaneously. Similarly it is clear that neither
will things that are not opposites be simultaneously intuitable.
Some of them fall within the province of white and others of
black, and in the same way in other cases, e.g. flavours, some
are assignable to sweet, others to bitter. Neither can com
posites be simultaneously perceived unless as forming a unity, 10
for they are proportionate combinations of opposites, e.g. chords
of the octave and of the fifth. If they are apprehended as
one, a single ratio prevails between the extremes, but otherwise
not, for that would require the simultaneous apprehension of
the. ratio of greater to less or odd to even on the one hand,
and on the other that of less to greater or even to odd.
The consequence of all this is that, if there is a still greater 15
remoteness and diversity between qualities which, though
occupying corresponding positions in their respective genera,
yet are heterogeneous, than between those ascribed to the
same genus, e.g. sweet and white, which, though corresponding
to each other, nevertheless are heterogeneous, and if sweet
differs still more from black than from white in kind,
then they, sweet and black, are still less capable of being
94 ARISTOTLE
20 dfjia eVSe ^otro aura atcr#dVecr#at 17 ra r<5 yeVet ravrd.
21 wcrr et /XT) raura, ouS e /cet^a.
21 *O Se \eyovo-i rt^e? ra)z> Trept
ra? cru/x^aWas, STL ou}( a/xa juteV dfyiKvovvTai ot
Se , /cat \avOdvei, OTOLV 6 -%Pvos 77 dvaicr07)TOS,
trorepov opOcos Xeyerat 19 ou ; ra^a yap a^ (^aiT; rts Acai
25 ^0^ Trapa rovro So Kelp a/xa opa^ /cat a/covets, ort ot
i \cLvO dvovcriv. r) TOUT ov/c d\r)9es, ouS*
y^povov tivai dvaicrdrjTov f) o^SeVa Xa^^a^etz^,
dXXa Tra^ro? e^Se^erat aicr#dVecr#ai. et yap ore auro?
avTov rt? accr^a^erat ^ aXXov eV cru^e^et ^povo), p.r)
30 e^Se^erai rdre Xa^^a^etz^ art ecrrtV, ecrri 8e r^s eV rw
crwe^et icac rocroOro? ocro? oXw? a^aicr^rds eVrt, S^Xoz^
on rdre \cLv6dvoi av el ecrTiv avro? avrov KOI el opa
448 b /cat alcrOdveTai- /cat et alo-0dverai en, OVK av eiir] ovre
ovre Trpay/xa oue^ o alaOdverai r) ev w, et JLI^
ort eV TOVTOV TLVI rj ort TOVTOV rt opa, enrep
ecrrt rt ^eyeOo<^ /cat ^povov /cat TTpdy^aro^ OLvaio~9r]TOP
5 oXw? Sta [JiiKpoTrjTa el yap rrp oX^i/ opa, /cat / alo~0d-
vercLi TOV CLVTOV o~vvey)<$ ^povov, ov TWV vvv TOVTODV
nvi. d(j)ypjjo~0(t) rj [TO] FB, eV T) ou/c rio~9dveTo. OVKOVV
eV ravrrjs nvl rj ravTrjs rt, wcrTrep r^ yyj^ opa 0X77^,
ort roSt aur^5, /cat eV rw eVtaurw /Ba$i,ei, STL ev rwSt
10 ra> jutepet aurou. dXXa /XT)^ ez^ rw BF ouSe^ ato~^az^erat.
TW apa eV rovrou rtz/t rou AB atcr#dVecr#at Xeyerat rou
oXov aio-Odveo-Oai /cat r^ 0X17^. 6 S avros Xdyog /cat
e?rt r^5 AF det yap ei^ ru t /cat rt^d?, oXou 8 ou/c
eo~Tiv alo~0dveo~9ai. drra^Ta jjiev ovv alo~0r^rd eo~Tiv,
15 dXX oO ^atVerat ocra eo-Tiv TOV yap r)\iov TO peyeOos
opa /cat ro TeTpdnTj-^v iroppaiOev, dXX ou c^atVerat ocrov,
J\\> > / O / e ^ QN> J so, / e 5,* j /
aAA e^tore aotatperoz^, opa o ou/c aotatperoi>. T) o atrta
etp^rat eV rotg efJL7rpoo~0ev Trepl TOVTOV. ort /^ez^ ovz^
19 ov0eis eVrt ^povos cxz/atcr^ro?, e /c roi/rco^ fyavepov
19 Ilept 8e
448 b 7 77] TO omisso ^ L S U Alex,
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 95
simultaneously perceived than members of the same genus ; 20
hence, if in the latter case this is impossible, neither can it
occur with the former.
There is a theory mooted by certain people about concords,
that the sounds, though not arriving simultaneously, yet appear
to do so, their lack of simultaneity being undetected, when the
time between them is imperceptible.
Is this correct, or is it not ? If true, one might readily
assert that we also apparently see and hear at the same time 25
because the intervening moments are undetected.
We answer that it is not true, and there can be no imper
ceptible time, none that escapes us ; every moment can be
perceived. For if, when one has consciousness of one s self ,
or of another person during a continuous period of time, one
cannot at that time be unaware that one exists,jDut there is 30
within the continuous time a section of "sucTT minute size as to
be wholly imperceptible, clearly one would then be unaware
whether one was one s self and Whether one saw or perceived ;
if ^ne stiTT perceived, there would be neither time in which 448 b
nor thing of which one could be conscious except thus by
being percipient during part of the time or perceiving part of
the thing, -if there are magnitudes both in time and in things
which-their minuteness makes imperceptible. But this is not
so, for if one sees a whole line and perceives a time continuously 5
identical, one does not do so by means of one of the particular
"now s" contained in it. Subtract, from AB the whole line, a
part CB in which there is no sensation ; then perception in
one part of this whole or of one part of it gives consciousness
of the whole, which is like seeing the whole earth because one
sees this particular part of it, or walking a whole year because
one walks during this part of it. Remember, in BC there is 10
no consciousness; hence, -by being conscious in part of this
whole, AB, one is said to be conscious of the whole time and
see the whole extent.
The same reasoning will hold with the part AC, for percep
tion is always in a part and of a part, and it is impossible to
perceive anything in its entirety. Hence, the above conclusion
being absurd, everything is perceptible though its size is not
apparent ; we see the extension of the sun or a four-cubit : 5
measure from afar, though the determinate size is not ap
parent, and sometimes things seem not to have size but to
be indivisible.
We cannot, however, see the indivisible ; the reason for
this was stated before. Hence from these considerations it
is clear that no part of time is imperceptible.
But we have to discuss the problem raised before whether
96 ARISTOTLE
20 TT^S Trporepov \e\6eio"Y]^ dtropias crAceTrreW, Trorepov
eVSe^eTai ajua TrXeioVtoz/ alcrOdveo~9ai rj OVK eVS
TO S a^ta Xe ya) eV eVi /cat CXTO/XOJ ^poVw Trpos
Xa. TTpwrov jjiev ovv dp* wS eVSe ^eTai, a/xa ju,eV,
Se TT^S \jjv~xfjs aicrOdveo Oai, Kal ov TOJ droaa), OVTO)
25 S drofJLO) w? TTCLVTL own crvve\ei ; rj on TrpwTov /xez/ ra
/cara TT)^ /xtai^ aicrOrjcnv, olov Xeyw OI/HZ/, et ecrrat aXXw
alo-9avo^4vri dXXou /cat aXXou ^pw^uaro?, vrXeiw ye
efet eiSet ravra ; KCU yap alcrOdveTai TraXiv rw
yeVet. et 6 ore ws Suo o/x/^ara (^aLTy ns,
30 ovTO) Kal IP rfj ifjv^rj, on tcrws CAC /xez^ rourft)^ eV rt
yt^erat /cat /xia 17 eVe pyeia avrtov etSec Se T) jneV i^
TO e^ djji(f)olv, eV /cat TO aicrOavoiJievov ecrrai, el Se
^o)piS, ov^ ofjiotois efet. ITL alcrOijcrei S al avral TrXet ;?
449 a ecrovrai, cocnrep ei Tt9 eVtcrT^/xa? Sia(f)6povs (frairj ovre
yap TI Ivepytia dvev rrjs KaB* avrrjv ecrTat
OUT* a^ei; Tavrrjs eo~Tai aicrOrjcns. el 8e
feat aTo/xoj <fJi Y)> alcrOoLveron, STJ\.OV on Kal rcov
5 jLtaXXoz^ yap eVeSe^eTo TOUTW^ a/xa TrXetd^aji/ T^ TOJ^ TOJ
yeVei erepuv. el Se ST) aXXw ju-e^ yXvfce o? aXXw Se XevKov
alcrOdverai rj ^fv^j] ^epei, TJTOL TO e/c TOUTOJ^ eV TI eo~nv
^</ Jx\>S/ V t \ / V
17 OLX e^. aAA avayKrj ev ev yap n TO
earn /xe po?. T LVOS ovv ettelvo ev6<$ ; ovSev yap eic
448 b, 24 01) r(fj arb^ et mox 5 om. L S U et Alex., qui autem pro OVTU
5e habet Kal ourws, quam Alexandri lectionem genuinam esse putant Thurot et
Baumker (Jahrb. fiir Philol. 1886), praeterquam quod pro Kal Thurot nal ev vult
poni, Baumker autem Kav, sed nihil eorum satisfacit ; legendum videtur : ov ry
CLTO/J.^, 7] OVTU drofjiy ; vertit vet. tr. : et non indivisibili, sic autem indivisibili, ut
omni existenti continue. | oi/ rw 5e dr6/io^ E Y, aro/xa pro aT6fj.it) M. 28 raPra
E M et Biehl, ravrd reliqui omnes et scripti et edd. | yap] yap a L S U P et edd.
except. Biehl | TrciXt^ E M Y, ev rel. et edd. except. Biehl. 29 7^61 earlv L S U P
et edd. except. Biehl. | /cwXtfet E Y, KuiXveiv reliqui codd., etiam Alex. Aid. Basil.,
KuiXveL Sylb. 31 avrwL E Y | et Set de fj conicio, el de y E Biehl, el 5e i] M Y,
tKei Se el reliqui codd. et edd. etiam Alex, et vet. tr. 32 eV /cat Biehl, eKtlvo
LS U P Alex. vet. tr. et omnes reliqui edd. except. Biehl. 449 a, i d5ta06/jous
P vet. tr. 4 /my iam Alex, desiderat, probant Biehl, Thurot, Baumker,
Neuhauser, Poppelreuter. 7 ^/c om. Biehl,
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 97
it is possible or not to perceive several things simultaneously. 20
By simultaneously I mean, in a time which, for the various
things relatively to each other, is one and atomic.
Firstly, then, is the following solution possible that they
are indeed simultaneously perceived but by different psychical
organs, not by an individual organ, though by one which is
: ndividual in the sense of forming a continuous whole ? Or 25
is it the case that if so, in a single sense, for instance sight,
which will perceive different colours by something different
in each case, these partitions will assuredly form a plurality
specifically various ? This is so, for it, again, perceives by
means of generic identity.
If some one were to allege that there is no difficulty in the
psychical faculties being like the two eyes, specifically alike, 30
vve may reply that perhaps in the case of the eyes there is a
single product and the exercise of their function is unitary,
and, so far as they yield a unitary result, specifically the
sense-organs are also single, but when the sensations are
diverse the case is different.
Further identical senses will be rendered multiple and
distinct in the same sense as one talks of distinct sciences ; 449 a
for neither is there activity apart from its appropriate poten
tiality, nor without activity does sensation exist.
But if these contentions are correct and hence these
qualities cannot be perceived in a single individual moment
by means of a division in the organ of perception, it is clear
that no other qualities can, for there was a better possibility
of these in their severalness being simultaneously perceived 5
than of qualities generically different. If it is really the case
that the mind perceives sweet with one part, white with
another, the product of these must be either one or not one.
But it must be a unity because the sentient organ is a unity.
What is the unity then which that perceives ? There is no
such unitary product.
R. 7
98 ARISTOTLE
10 eV. dvdyKT) dpa ev n elicit rrjs i/iv^s, (3 arravra alcrOd-
vTai, Ka0dwp eiprjrai TrpoTepov, aXXo Se yeVos Si aXXov.
ap o5z> 77 //,> aStatperoV eVrt KOLT tvepyeiav, eV rt ecrrt
TO alo 6 YjTiKOv yXvKeos /cat XevKov, OTOLV Se Staipero^
yeV^rat /car tvepyeiav, erepov ; rj cocnrep eVl TO)!/ Trpay-
15 ^OLTO)v avro)v e^Se^erai, ovrw? /cal CTTI 77/9 i//vx^? : To
yap avro :ai, 1^ dpiOfJLO) \VKOV /cat yXt/cu eVri, feat
aXXa TroXXa, et /AT) ^wptcrra ra TrdOr] aXXij^wv, d\Xd
TO elvai trepov e/cacrrw. OJJLOLOJS TOIVVV Oereov KCU lirl
7775 \fjvxrjs TO avTO KOL ev elvai dpiOfjiO) TO aio-6r)TiKov
20 TrdVr&JZ , rw juceWot etz^ai erepo^ /cat eTepov TO)V pzv yeVet
TWZ 8e et8et. wcrre /cat atcr^dVotr az^ a/xa rw avrw /cat
f / \ / O>> J <" S ^
22 ei^t, Aoyo) o of rw avTO).
22 ort 8e ro aicrOrjTov nav e crrt ^ute-
ye^o? /cat ov/c eo~rt^ aStatpero^ alo~0dveo~0ai, 877X0^.
ecrrt yap o^ez jue^ ou/c ai^ 6<^>$et77, oLireipov TO d7r6o~Trjp,a,
25 o^e^ 8e opoLTaL, 7T7r/3acr/xeVo^ 6/>totw5 8e /cat TO 6o~-
(frpavTov /cat CLKOVO~TOV /cat OCTOJV p,7] GLVTCOV aiTTo^evoi
cdo-0dvovTai. ecrrt 8e rt ecr^aTOv TOV aTroo-r^aTO? o$ez/
ou^ opoiTai, /cat Trp&Tov oOev oparai. rouro ST) dvdyKrj
aStatperoz etz^at, ou eV /^e^ rct> eVe/cetz^a ov/c e^Se^erat
30 alo~0dvo~0aL oz^ro?, ez^ 8e rw evrt raSt dvdyKrj alo~0d-
V.o~0Oii. et 877 rt O~TLV aStatpeToz^ atcr^TiToV, oraz^ re^
eVt ra> ecr^ara) o^ez^ icn\v VQ-TCLTOV ^ev ou/c alo-0r)Tov
v 8 alo-0r)Tov, ajita o-^^crerat opaTov elvai /cat
TOVTO 8 a8uz^aroz/.
449 b Trept /xez^ ow ra>^ aio-0rjTrjpiO)v /cat TOJZ^ alo-0r)TO)v
Tiva TpOTrov e^et /cat Koivrj /cat /ca$ e/cacrroz/ aio~0r}TTJpLoi>
eiprjTai TU>V 8e XotTrwz^ irpuTov o /ceTrreoz Trept
4 /Cat TOU
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS 99
Hence there must be some unity in the soul by which we 10
erceive all things, as before stated, though" different genera
are perceived by different organs. Is that, therefore, which
apprehends sweet and white, a unit so far as it is actually
indivisible, but diverse in so far as it is actually divisible ?
We answer that in the case of the soul it is the same as with
things. An identical and numerically single thing can be 15
sweet and white and have many other qualities, so long as its
properties are not disunited from one another, though in aspect
of existence each is diverse. Accordingly we must in the
same way affirm that with the jspul ..too, that, which is per
cipient of everything, is self-identical and numerically single,
though, in apprehending objects now generically now in species 20
different, it has a corresponding diversity in the aspect of its
existence. Hence the mind may perceive things simultaneously
by means "of something selfsame and unitary though not
notionally the same.
That every object is a magnitude and that the indivisible
cannot be perceived, is clear. The distances from which an
object cannot be seen are infinite in number, but the range
from which it is visible is limited, and this holds true also for 25
the objects of smell and hearing and all things perceived
without actual contact. But there is a point which ter
minates the range from which vision is impossible and is the
first from which the thing becomes visible. That indeed
must be indivisible which, when at a distance beyond this 3
point, cannot be seen, but must be seen when nearer. If,
then, there is really anything indivisible which is an object of
perception, when placed at the terminal point which, while
the last at which it is not perceptible, is yet the first at which
it is perceptible, it will turn out to be both visible and invisible
at the same time, which is impossible.
This is our account of the sensoria and the objects of 449 b
sense and the manner of their existence both generally and
relatively to each sense-organ. Of the remaining subjects let
us consider first memory and the act of remembering.
72
0d-
449 b 4 nEPI MNHMHI KAI ANAMNH2EQI
I
4 Hepl Se //^T^u/tys KOL TOV
5 Xe/creW TL ecw /cal SLO, riV alriav yiyverai KOI T IVI
\jjv~)(fjs p<opi(i)v (Tv^/Bawd TOVTO TO irdOos KOI
TO a/u/xicTKecraL ov yap o OLVTOI ecri
KOL dvapsVYJCTTLKOL, CtXX O>9 771 TO TToXu
OL ySyaaSet?, a^a/x^crrt/cwrepot Se 01 ra^et? icai
10 TTpa)Tov jJiev ovv X^Trreo^ Troia eo~rt ra
7ToXXa/ct9 y^P e^aTTararat rouro. oure yap TO JJL\\OV
^vrnAOvevtiv, dXX ecrrt So^acrTo^ /cat
8 cu> /cat eTTLCTTyjfJi Yj Tt5 eXTTLO TiKTJ, KaOdirep
T7)V lAaVTLKTJv), OVT TOV
15 TavTr) yap oi;T TO /xeXXo^ OUTC TO
aXXa TO Trapov \LQVQV. T? 8e ^v^t] TO> ye^o/xeVou TO 8e
OTL Trapecrni , oto^ ToSt TO XevACOi^ OT opa, ouSet?
,vr)[JLOveviv, ovSe TO Oewpovpevov, 6Ve
KOL twowv aXXa TO /ie^ alcr
20 TO 8* emo~Tao~0ai JAOVOV OTOLV 8 aVeu
^X?? T ^ 7rio~TyjjJirji KOL T^V aZcrOrjo-iv, OVTCJ
[TO,? TOT) Tpiyw^ou OTL Svo opOals Lo~aL], TO /xe^ OTL
f) iOeatpricrev, TO Se OTL rjKOVcrev rj eez^ o TL
TOLOI)TO^* SCL yap oVa^ evepyfj KOLTCL TO
25 ouTft)? ez^ T X?? eyeL^, OTL TfpoTepov TOVTO TJKOVO~V
r) rjo~6eTO r) Ivorj&ev. CCTTL /xez^ ou^ 17 fJivrffjiT) OVT
ovTe vTrokr-is, aXXa TOUTWZ^ TLZ/OS e^L?
449 b, 22 rd5..,ftrat recte vohmt deleri Biehl et Freudenthal.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 449^4
I
We must define and account for memory and the act of
remembrance and assign the psychical faculty which provides 5
for this phenomenon and for the act of recollection. The two
phenomena are not identical, for it is not the same people
who have good memories and who have good powers of
recollection ; as a rule those people remember well who are
slow-witted, while on the other hand those excel in powers of
recall who are clever and quick at learning.
Hence as a preliminary to our argument the question 10
arises how are the objects of memory characterised ? Mis
takes are often made about this. Now the future cannot be
remembered ; it is rather the object of opinion and hope.
(There might be a science which belonged to the province of
hope ; some people say that prophecy is such a science.) Nor
does memory regard the present; it is perception which is
concerned with this, for by perception we apprehend neither 15
the future nor the past but the present only. Memory con
cerns the past; no one would say that he remembers that
the present is present, e.g. this particular white object, when
he is looking at it. Nor would he say that he remembers that
the object of thought is present whensoever he chances to be
engaged in thought or contemplation ; in the one case he says
he perceives, in the other merely that he knows. But when 20
knowledge or perception is present without actual experience
of the real objects, in those circumstances one remembers in
the one case that he learned something or thought of some
thing, in the other that he heard, or saw, or had some similar
sense-experience. When one actually remembers, he must
recognize in consciousness that previously he had heard or 25
perceived or thought of the thing remembered.
Hence memory is neither perception nor conceptual
0e-
102 ARISTOTLE
7ra#os, oTav yeVriTat ^pdz^o?. TOV Se vvv eV TO) vvv ov*
cart uvTJjjirj, /ca^dVep etp7?Tat /cat TrpoTepov, dXXa TOV
30 jutez^ Trapdz TOS atcr^crt?, TOV Se p,eXXoz TO9 eXTTts, TOV Se
yez^o/xeVov fJLvyjjJLrj. Sto /ACTO, ^povov Tracra
ocra xpovov aio~6dv.Tai, Tavra fjuova TO)V
/cat TOvYa> c5 alo-0dvTai. eVet Se
ez^ Tot? Trept ifjv^rj^, /cat z>oetz^ ov/c ecrTtz/
450 a (^a^Tctcr^aTOS crv/x^8atVet yap TO avTo TrdOos iv TO)
o?rep /cat ez^ T^5 Staypac^etz e/cet Te yap ovOev
fJLVOL TO) TO TTOCTOV 0)plCT^L.VOV lVai TOV TpiyO)VOV,
ypa(f)OfJiv o)pio-jJLvov /caTa TO Trocroz- /cat 6 voo)v o>o~av-
5 TO)?, /caz^ /AT) TTOQ-OV voy, Tt^eTat Trpo 6/x/xaTwz^ TTOCTO^,
O> > f> / -fO>e// *? /^
z/oet o ov^ 77 TTQO~OV av o rj <pvo~ts 17 TWZ^ TTOCTCUZ^,
aopio~TO)V o, TidtTai jjitv irocrbv o)pio~n,4vov, voet, o TJ
TTOO~OV IJLOVQV Sta Ttz^a /xez^ ov^ amaz^ ov/c eVSe^eTat
^oetz^ ovSez az^ev TOV crvz/e^ov?, ovS az^ev y^povov Ta /xr)
10 eV xpovoj ovTa, Xdyo? aXXog- p,ey0os S az/ay/catoF
/cat Kivrfo-iv w /cat y^povov /cat TO
atcr^crew? TrdOos ecrrtV wcrTe TOVTO
OTt TGJ TTpoiTO) alo~0r)TLKO) TOVToiv rj yvo)o~i<$ ecTTW rj Se
jjLVTJlJiTj /cat 17 TWZ vor)TO)v OVK aVev (^az^Tcicr/xaTd? IOTTLV
15 OKrre TOV vor)TiKov /caTa crv/x/^e^/co? az^ er^, /ca^ avTo
Se TOV irpo)Tov atcr^Tt/cov. Sto /cat erepot? TKTIV VTrap^et
TW^ o)0)i>, /cat ov JJLOVOV avOpo)7rois /cat Tots e^ovcrt Sd^az^
77 (f)povrjo~iv. et Se TO>Z^ vorjTiKOJV TI ^opio)v r^v, OVK av
VTTTJp^e TToXXoiS TWZ^ d\\O)V E ) OJO)V, tCTCt)? S OvSe^t TWZ^
20 0vrjTO)v, eVet ovSe z^vz- 7rao~t Sta TO /xr) irdvTa
aZo~0r)o~LV e^LV cxet yap 6Vaz^ tvepyfj Trj fjLvirjfjir), /
/cat TrpoTtpov etTro/xez^, 6Vt etSe TOVTO rj TJKovo-ev rj efjiaffe,
7rpoo-aio-0dv.Tai OTI TrpoTepov TO Se TrpoTepov /cat
449 b 29 /cai irporepov om. L S U M Them. vet. tr., deleri volunt Freudenthal
et Biehl.
450 a, 20 Qvt)T&v \ drjpLuv Rassow et Biehl.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 103
ught, but some permanent condition or modification
it Jaching to them dependent upon lapse of time. What is
7Tow present we do not now in present time remember, as has
been said before ; with the present perception is employed, 30
with the future hope, with the past memory. Hence all
remembering implies lapse of time ; and so> those tnat have
a~sense of time are the only animals that remember, and the
organ of memory is that which enables us to perceive time.
Imagination has been already discussed in the Psychology.
We cannot think without imagery, for the same phenomenon 450 a
occurs in thinking as is found in the construction of geometrical
figures ; there, though we do not employ as a supplementary
requirement of our proof a determinateness in the size of the
triangle, yet when we draw it we make it of a determinate
size. Similarly in thinking also, though we do not think of 5
the size, yet we present the object visually to ourselves as a
quantum, though we do not think of it as a quantum. If the
nature of the object be quantitative but indeterminate, our
resentation is of a determinate quantity, though we think of
as quantitative merely.
The reason why we can think of nothing apart from
ontinuity and cannot think of objects not in time apart from
rime, belongs to a different inquiry from this, but we must 10
apprehend magnitude and change by the same means as that
by which we are conscious of time. Imagery is a phenomenon
belonging to the common sense; so this is clear, that the
apprehension of these determinations belongs to the primary
organ of sensation: and memory, even the memory of con
cepts, cannot exist apart from imagery.
Hence since all this is so, indirectly it belongs to the 15
noetic faculty, but in its essential nature to the primary
principle of sensation. This is the reason why it is found in
several of the other animals and not only in man or those
possessing the power of entertaining opinions and endowed
with intelligence. If it belonged to the conceptual faculties
it would not be found in many of the other animals and perhaps
in none that are mortal, since, as facts are, all living beings do 2 o
not possess it, because not all have a sense of time. Always,
when in the act of memory, as already said, we remember
that we have heard or seen or learned this thing, we are
conscious also that it was prior ; now prior and posterior are
distinctions in time.
V
104 ARISTOTLE
VCTTpOV V XJ30VO) CTTLV. TLVOS p.V OVV TO)V TT1S l//V^
25 ICTTLV T) fjLVTJfJLrj, (fravtpov, OTL ouVep feat 17 ^az^Tacrta
ecrTt fJLVTjfjiovevTa KaO* avTa pev ocra eo*Tt (^az^TacrTa, /caTa
27 o-vjjifiefirjKos 8e ocra /XT) avev (^avTaoria^.
27 . n j,tt^ aTTOpn] crete 8 oV
Tt? TTwg TTOTC TOV /xez^ Trd^ov? TTapoz^TO? TOV Se Trpay/xaTo?
d7roz^TO9 fjLV7)iJiovVTaL TO /XT) irapov. SrjXov yap OTL Set
30 vorjcraL TOLOVTOV TO yLyvop.vov Sta TT^? atcr^creaj? eV TT^
TGJ QVTL O.VTVV, OlOV
^(Dypd^rjjjid TL TO TrdOos, ov (frap,v TT/P LV p,vfJW)v
f \ , , , !>>** ^ /^o x
r) yap yiyvojjievr) KLVYJCTLS evorrmoLLveTai OLOV TVTTOV Tiva
TOV atcr^/xarog, KaOdtrep ol o-^payi^ojJLevoL TOIS Sa/cru-
45obXtot?. 8to /cal rot? /xez/ e^ Kivrjo-ei iro\\fj Sia TrdOos rj
8C ^\iKiav ovcnv ov yiyveTai jjn>jjp,r], KaOdnep av et?
vScop piov jji7rL7rTOvo"rj<; TTJS /ai^creajs feat r-^5 o-<f)pay tSos
rot? Se Sia TO ijjyj^ecrdaL, KaOdnep TO, TraXata TO>^ OLACO-
5 So/xT^/xaTw^, /cat Sta crK\r)poTr)Ta TOV Se^o/xeVou TO
OVK tyyiyveTai 6 TVTTOS. SidVep ot Te cr^oSpa
ot yepo^Te? dfJivyjiJioves elcriv peovo~i yap ot jue^ 8ta
to\ov \ //)/ e / Ov ^ e
V, ot oe ota TT)^ q>vi<rw. o/xotw? oe /cat ot
/cat ot Xtai> ^SpaSet? ouSerepot (^at^o^Tat
10 ot /xe^ yap etcrtz/ uypoYepot TOU Seo^TOS, ot Se
Tpot- Tot? /xe^ oSi/ ov /xeVet TO ^ai^Tacrfia e^ TT;
8* ov^ aTTTCTai. dXX et 8r) TOLOVTOV ecrrt TO cru/x-
7Tpl TYjV fJLVJJjJirjV, TTOTepOV TOVTO p.VrjfJiOVVeL TO
TTQ-Oos, rj KLVO a</) ou cyeVcTO ; et /xe^ yap TOUTO, TW^
15 airovrcDV ovSei^ a^ ^vri^ov^voL^ev et 8 e/cetz o, 770)9
alo~0av6fJLi^OL TOVTOV p,vrjfjiovvofjiv, ov /XT) CLLo~6cLv6[jie0a,
TO OLTTOV ; et T l(TT\V OfJLOLOV OJCTTTep TU7TO5
rjfjiLv, TOVTOV avTOv 77 aLaOrjcTLS Sta Tt ai^ et^
eTepov, dXX ou/c avTOv TOVTOU ; 6 yap Ivepywv Trj
20 Beojpel TO wdOos TOVTO KOL aicrOdveTaL TOVTOV. TTOJ?
TO jitr) irapov fJLvrjfjLoveveL; eLrj yap av Kal opav TO
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 105
Hence it is clear to what psychic faculty memory belongs;
it belongs to that to which imagination must be assigned. 25
To r the class of objects of memory per se belong all things
that can be imagined; to the indirect, all that cannot be
divorced from imagination.
A difficulty might be raised as to how it can ever come
about that, though contemporaneously with our present mental
modification the real object is not present, yet it is the absent
object which is remembered. But this is no impossibility, for
it is clear that we must regard the modification arising from 30
sensation in the soul and in that bodily part where sense
resides, as if it were a picture of the real thing, and memory
we call the permanent existence of this modification. When
a stimulus occurs it imprints as it were a mould of the sense-
affection exactly as a seal-ring acts in stamping.
This is the reason why memory does not occur in those 450 b
who are in a rapid state of transition, whether owing to some
perturbing experience or their period of life ; it is as if this
stimulus, like the seal, were stamped on running water.
Again in others their worn-out condition like that of old
buildings and the hardness of the receptive structure, pre- 5
vent the sense-affection from leaving an impression. Hence
we explain why the very young and the aged have no memory;
in the former growth, in the latter decay, cause rapid transition.
For like reasons, neither very quick-witted nor very slow
people seem to have good memories; in the one class there 10
is too much fluidity, in the other too much density, and hence
the former do not retain the image in the mind, while in the
latter it never gets fixed.
If these are indeed the facts with regard to memory,
whether do we remember this resultant modification or that
which caused it ? If the former, there would be no such thing
as memory of things absent. On the other hand, if it is the 15
latter we remember, how, though perceiving the former, do
we remember the absent object which we do not perceive ?
Once more, if what is retained is like the original in the
fashion of an impression or copy, why is the perception of
this very thing the memory of some other thing and not of
it itself? It is this modification of consciousness which one
engaged in remembering has present to his mind, and it is
this that he perceives. How then can one remember what is 20
io6 ARISTOTLE
Trapbv /cat a/covets, rj <=CTTIV 0)5 eVSe ^eTat /cat cng^ei
~ -P \ \ > > 2 / | v
TOVTO ; oiov yap TO ev TO) mvaKi yeypafjifjievov (,0,
to6V ecrTt /cat et/coV, /cat TO avTO /cat eV TOVT ecrrtz/
25 TO /xeVrot etz/at ov TOLVTOV IQ-TIV d/x(^otz/, /cat ecrTt 6
/cat 0)5 {woz/ /cat o>5 et/coz^a, OVTO> /cat TO ez^ T^/xtz^ (dVTacr/xa
Set v7roXa/5et^ /cat avTO /ca#* eavTO eti^at OecDprjfJia /cat
dXXov <j)dvTao-jJLa. rj jLtez^ ov^ /ca# eavTO, 6ea)pr]^a rj
(frdvTacrjJid ecrTtz , 17 S dXXov, ofoz/ et/coV /cat /xz/7^/xo^ev/xa.
30 WCTTC /cat oTaz^ Ivepyfj rj KLvrjcns avTov, ai /xez^, TJ /ca^
avTO ecrTt, TavTrj atcr^Tat 17 ^^X 1 ? O-VTOV, otoi^
Tt T^ (^dVTacTLta (^atz^eTat e7re\9eiv av o r) dXXov,
eV TT^ ypa<f)rj 0)5 et/coz^a Oewpel, /cat /XT) eo>pa/co>s
Koptcr/coz^ 0)5 Koptcr/cov eWav^d Te dXXo TO TtdOos
451 a 0eo)yota5 TavTrjs /cat 6Vaz^ 0)5 {oJoz^ yeyyoa/x/xeVoz- Oeojpf),
eV Te TT^ ^^XV TO ^ v yfyveTai ajcnrep vorj^a ^LQVQV, TO
S* 0)5 e/cet OTt et/coV, /x^/xoz^ev/xa. /cat Sta TOVTO eVtoT*
ov/c LO-jJiev, iyyivQ^ivtov r]^iv eV Tr} V/v^ TotovTO)^ /ct^-
5 crewz aTTO TOV alcr0cr0ai TrpoTtpov, et /caTa TO rjo-0r)cr0ai
,, /cat et ecrTt /x^/xry ^ ov StcrTa^o/xe^- OTC Se
Ivvorjcrai /cat di>aiJivr)<T0rjvai OTL 7^/covo~a/xeV
Tt irpoTtpov rj etSo/xez^. TOVTO Se crv/x/3atVet, 6Vaz/ 0ea)pa)v
0)5 avYo jjLTaj3d\\rj /cat 0ea)prj 0)5 ctXXov. ytyz^eTat Se
/cat dXXot5 etcTTa/xe z>ot5* Ta yap (/)a^Tacr/xaTa
0)5 yez o/xez a /cat 0)5 /x^/xoz^evo^Te5. TOVTO Se
Tt5 TT)^ /XT) eiKova 0)5 et/co^a 0ea)pfj. at Se /xeXeVat
jJLV7Jp.r)p era* {overt TOJ eVai/a/>ttjLt^cr/cet^ TOVTO S I
15 ovSez/ f?Tpov rj TO Oeajpeiv ?roXXa/ct5 0)5 et/co^a /cat /XT) 0)5
avTo. Tt /xa> ovz^ eo~Tt /xz/jitT; /cat TO
6Vt <a^TacrLLaT05, o>s et/co^O5 ov
/cat Ttz^o5 fJiopCov TWV iv TJ/xtz , oTt TOV TrpojTov aicrurjTiKov
/cat GJ y^povov
450 b, 27 aur6 /ca^ eai;r6 E Y airnS TI /ca^ aL-r6 Biehl | om. 6e6pr)/u.a L S U
Them. vet. tr. Biehl, 0ewp. et <j>dvTa<rfj.a deleri vult Freudth.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 107
not present to one ? One might as well see or hear what is
not present.
But perhaps there is a way in which this can occur and it
does really come about ? That is so, for, as the animal depicted
on the panel is both animal and representation, and, while
remaining one self-identical thing, is yet both of these, though
in aspect of e^dstence the two are not the same, and we can 25
regard it both as animal and as copy, so too _the image in us
must be considered as being both an object of direct conscious
ness in itself and relatively to something else an image; in its
own nature it is an object of direct inspection or an image, so
far as it represents something else it is a copy and a souvenir.
Hence when the change connected with it is actually 30
experienced, if the mind perceives it in terms of its own
proper nature, it appears to present itself to consciousness in
the guise of an object of thought or an image ; but when it
is perceived as referring to something else, we regard it as the
copy in the painting and as the picture of Coriscus although
we have not then beheld him. Here this way of regarding
the thing is an experience different from what occurs when 451 a
we regard the object as an animal in chalk merely ; in the
latter case the psychical modification occurs merely as an
object of thought, in the former as a memory, because there
it is viewed as a representation.
Hence sometimes we do not know, when those psychical
changes due to previous perception take place in us, if it is 5
as connected with a previous perception that they occur, and
we are in doubt whether it is a memory or not. Sometimes
it chances that on reflection we recollect that we have heard
or seen the thing previously; this takes place when, after
regarding the object of consciousness in its own nature, we
change and refer it to something else. The reverse of this
also occurs, as befell in the case of Antipheron of Oreos and 10
other ecstatics ; they took their mental images to be objective
and said they remembered the occurrences. This comes
about when we take what is not a representation as though
it were one. But exercise strengthens the memory through
the repeated performance of the act of recollection, which is
merely to view the image frequently as a copy and not in its 15
own nature.
This is our account of memory and the act of remembering ;
it is the permanence of an image regarded as the copy of the
thing it images, and the member in us to which it appertains
is the primary seat of sensation and the organ employed in
the perception of time.
io8 ARISTOTLE
II
^^rcbS
20 Hepl Se TOV dvafJLLjjiV7j(TK<T0ai \OLTTOV etTreti . irpwrov
fjLev ovv ocra eV rot? eVi^et/D^/xari/cot? Xoyots ecrTtz> d\r)8rj,
Set Tt#ecr#at cog virdpyovra. ovYe yap p,vrjp,r)<s ecrrlv
77 dvdfJLvrjcris ouYe XT^I/US* orav yap TO Trpwrov
ovr d^aXaLt8a^et JLVT JLrv ovSeitia^ oi3-
25 Se/Aia yap irpoyeyovev) ovr e
Se eyyevrjTOLL yj eft? /cat TO Tra^o?, TOTe 17 ^vr\\j^(] ecrriv.
ojcrre jLteTa TOV TrdOovs iyyivo^ivov OVK lyyivtrai. ert S*
6Ye TO TTp&TOV eyyeyove TW aTOjjioj KOL eo~^aTo>, TO /ie^
7rd0o<; ivvTrdpyjE.1 77817 TO) TTOiOovTi /cat T) C7T Lcmj p,rj , et Set
30 KaXeiv I TTia TTJiJL rjv ?TIV ew rj TO TrdOos (ovOev Se fcwXvet
/caTa crviJi/3/3r]Kos Kal p,vr)p,ovVW evua d>v eVio~rafte$a) *
TO Se fjivriiJLOv.v.i.v KaO GLVTo ov^ VTrdp^eL Trpiv ^poi^LcrOrj-
vai- ^vr^jiOpev.i yap vvv 6 elSe^ 77 eVa^e trpoTepov,
451 b o ^u^ eVa#e, z^v^ ^vr]^ovvei. ert Se <f>avepov on
{Jioveveiv ecrn p.rj vvv ava^vy](yQ{vra, dXX
alcrOoyievov rj Tradovra. dXX 6Yaz/ a^aXa/xySd^
irporepov eT^ez^ eTncrTT/jfjLrjv 77 ai<jQf]<Tiv rj ov TTOTC
5 eftz^ \yofjiv fJLVtjfJirji , TOUT* eo~Tt /cat TOT TO dvap.Lp.VTJ-
CTK(T0aL TO)V lprjp.VO)V Tt. TO Se p,Vrjp,OVVLV O~V[JLfBaLVi
/cat TJ fJLvrjfJirj d/coXou^et. ovSe ST) TavTa aTrXaig, e dz/
efjiTTpoaOev virdp^avra irdkiv eyyevrjTai, dXX ecmv a>s,
eo~Tt S* w? ou. Sts ydp fjiaOtiv /cat tvpelv eVSe ^eTat TOZ^
10 auToi^ TO auTo* Set ovz/ Sta^epetz^ TO dvafjap^vrjo Keo Oai
TOVTUV, /cat evovcrrjs TrXeto^os dp^s 17 e f 179 p,av0dvovcriv
12
12 crvp.fiaLVOvcri S at dvajJLvrjcreLs, eVetSr)
77 /ct^crt? TjfSe yevecrdai perd ryjv8e- el p.ev
Tr)v
451 a, 28 rt post eyytyove inseri vult Freudenthal.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 109
II
Recollection remains to be dealt with. First of all we 20
must posit as fact all the conclusions come to in our " Tentative
Reasonings " which were correct. Recollection is neither the
recovery nor the acquirement of memory.
When, on the first occasion, one learns or experiences
something, he neither reacquires a memory, for none has
previously existed, nor does he acquire it initially then. But
when a disposition as well as the experience has once been 25
produced then memory is found ; hence it does not come
into being in conjunction with the origination of the experi
ence in us.
Further, when memory first has been produced in the
individual and ultimate organ of sensation, the experience
and the knowledge in question (if it is proper to call the
disposition or experience knowledge ; but there is nothing to 30
prevent our having indirectly remembrance also of some of
the objects of knowledge) have already existence in the
experiencing subject. But memory in the proper sense will
not exist till after the lapse of time. We remember in
present time what we have previously seen or heard, we do not
now remember what we have now experienced. But further, 451 b
clearly, we may remember, not in virtue of a present act of
recollection, but by being conscious or feeling the experience
from the start. On the other hand, when we reacquire the
knowledge or perception or whatever it was, the permanence
of which we called memory, here and now we have recollection 5
of any of these. As a result we remember them and memory
ensues; not that that can be said without restriction in all
cases when previous experiences are repeated in consciousness ;
in some cases it is so but in others not, for the same man may
learn or discover the same thing twice. Recollection then 10
must differ from the latter operations; it requires a more
considerable basis to start from than in the case of learning.
The occurrence of an act of recollection is due to the
natural tendency of one particular change to follow another.
If the sequence is necessary, it is clear that, on the former
i io ARISTOTLE
fw <vra-
15 Kivr)(Jiv KivrjOrjcreTai et Se JJLTJ ef dmy/cT?? dXX* e#et,
fo>5 eVt TO TroXv KLvnOrjcrerai. crvuBaivei 8 eVtou? a7ra
"^ ^ I v / / x
lOicrOrjvau, jLtaXXoz^ 77 aXXot>9 TroXXd/ct? KIVOVJJLGVOVS* Sto
eVta a7ra tSoi^Te? ^LtdXXo^ jLt^/^o^evo/xe^ 77 erepot ?roX-
6Va^ ouz/ dz^a/>tt/x^77O~/cajjLte^a, KivovfJieOa TMV
0)V TWO, KLVTJ(Ta)l>, COJ? CtZ/ KlVr)9o)H.V ILtff r^V
eiwOev. Sto /cat TO (f)e^rj<; 0r)pvop,v voTJcravres
aTTo TOV vvv T) oi\\ov Ttz^o?, /cat d^) OJJLOLOV rj ivavriov
rj TOV crvveyyvs. Sta TOUTO yiverai 77 dz^d/x.^crt? at
yap /ct^cret? TOUTWZ^ TOJZ^ /xez^ at a^Tat, TWZ^ 8 d/^a,
25 Se /xe po? e^ovo-tz^, WQ-TC TO \OLTTOV /^t/cpoz^ o
KLVO. QrjTOVCTi />t^ OT^ OVTO), KOLL
8
OUTW9 ava^iiJivria KovrcLi, OTOLV jjie repav
yCwfcll 1 ^
KLvrj yev-qrai - w? 8e Ta TroXXd irep
Kivfjcrewv oiwv eiTrofjLtv, lyevero eKeivrj. ovSev Se Set
30 crKOTTelv Ta Troppct), TTw? jJLep.^7J(JL0a, dXXd Ta
ST}XO^ ycty) oTt 6 auTO? eo~Tt rpoiros. Xeya) Se TO
ov TTpo^rjTTJcras ov$* apa^vrjo-Oei^. TW yap e$et d/coXou-
OOVO LV at /ct^cret? dXXTyXat?, T^Se jJLera TijvSe. /cat oVai^
TOLVVV d^ajLtt/x^cr/cecr^at /BovXyrai, TOVTO Trot^cref &JTTJ-
35 o~et Xa/3eu; apxqv /ct^o-ew?, /xe^ ^ Kivr) ecrTat. Sto
452 a rd^io-Ta /cat /cdXXto~Ta yivovrai an dp^5 at
/cat at KivtjcreLS. /cat eo~Ttz/ evfjivrj^ovevra ocra
Ttz/d 9(et, ajcnrep ra paOrnLOLTCL ra Se (j>av\a
/cat TOVTO) Sta^epet TO d^a/xt/i^r/cr/cecr^at
dveiv, on SvvTJ<rTa{ TTWS St avrov
7rl TO fJLTOL TJ)V dyO^T^Z/. OTtt^ Se /XT^, dXXd St
ou/ceVt p,cJuLJ^rac, TroXXd/ct? 8* 77877 jite^ dSv^aTet dz^a-
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION m
change occurring, the second will be summoned into activity ;
when, however, the connection is not necessary but due to 15
custom, the occurrence of the second process will take place
only in most cases. It so happens that some people receive
a greater bent from a single experience than others in whom
the sequence has frequently taken place, and hence, in some
instances, after seeing the things once, we remember them
better than others who have seen them frequently. Thus,
when we recollect, one of our previous psychic changes is 20
stimulated which leads to the stimulation of that one, after
which the experience to be recollected is wont to occur.
Consequently we hunt for the next in the series, starting our
train of thought from what is now present or from something
else, and from something similar or contrary or contiguous to
it. This is the means of effecting recollection; the change in
those cases is now identical, now concomitant with, and now
partially inclusive of the idea to be recalled, and hence the 25
remainder formerly occurring subsequently to the rest is but
small.
This is the way in which the search for the idea not
present is carried out, and, even when there is no search, it
is in this way that recollection occurs, when the one process
occurs after the other; and in general it is after experience of
other changes such as we have described that the process in
question occurs. We must consider, not how we remember
things remotely connected but those that are close to each 3
other, for it is clear that the method is the same in both
cases. I use the expression " next in order " without implying
a prior search or act of recollection; for it is owing to the
custom of their being experienced in sequence that one par
ticular process follows another. Hence, when one wishes to
recall something, this is what he does he tries to find the
starting point of a process after which the one in question 35
will recur. This is why the swiftest and best way of recol- 452 a
lecting is to start from the beginning ; the subjective changes
are related to each other in the same way as the facts
remembered stand to each other in virtue of their place in
the series. Those things are easily recalled which have an
orderly arrangement such as we find in mathematics ; but
things wanting in exactitude are with difficulty remembered.
To recollect and to learn a second time differ in this, that he 5
who recalls a thing will be able by his own agency to pass to
the process succeeding the starting point ; when this is not so
and the instrumentality of someone else is required, it is no
longer a case of remembering.
Often when as yet unable to recollect, by searching one
H2 ARISTOTLE
Se SwaTat /cat evptcr/cet. TOVTO
10 ytVeTOt KIVOVVTI 77oXXa, ews av TOLavTyv Kivijo-r)
y aKO\ov0yjcrL TO Trpdyua. TO yap ufJLvrjo-0aL ICTTL TO
eVetz/at SvvdjjieL TTJV Kivovcrav TOVTO St, WCTT* cf avTov
/cat cSz^ e^et KLVTJO-ZWV KLvr)0rjvai, wo~77e/3 tlprjTai. Set
Se Xa/^eV&u dp^?. Sto 0,770 TO77wi^ So/couo~t^ dvafjufjivyj-
15 cr/cecr^at ivioTe. TO S aiTiov OTL Ta^v 0,77 aXXou eV
aXXo tpyovTai, oiov 0,770 yaXa/CTo? 677t Xev/cdi^, 0,770 Xeu/cou
S 677* depa, /cat 0,770 TOVTOU e^) vypov, d<fi ov fJLVjjo~0rj
uTO7ra>pov, TavTTjv 7TL^rjTO)v TTJV ojpav. eot/ce Sr) Ka06\ov
T0 ^O-QV TTdvTW el yap JUT) TrpOTepov, OT&V
20 6771 TOVTO \0rj, fJLVrjO-0TJO-Tai, f) OVKT OVO a\.\O0l ,
t V / SJT *TT~1A"TlryTT /^V > N V
oto^ ei Tt? ^O7)o~eie^ e<p w^ ABlAl^/Hiy) et yap /XT)
22 6776 TOV < [JiVTJO-0r}, eVl TOV E JJLp,Vir}TCU, t TO H ^
22 TO Z 77i^Tt>* evTevOev yap 677* a/x<a> KWTjOrjvai eVSe-
, /<:at- 77t TO A KCU eVt TO Z. ei Se /X-T) TOVTWI^ TL
i, 77i TO F lX0ct)v nvr)o-0TJo-TaL, [et TO H r^ TO Z
V ~] >^^ /SVV A \X >/ ^S^
25 eTTlL^Tei \ L fJLTJ, 7TL TO A /CCU OUTW? al. TOV O
0,770 TOV avTov evioTe fjiev jJn > rjo~0rjpaL tvioTe 8e /xry, OLTIOV
TO 77t 77X610^ e^Se^ecr^at Ku>irj0 rjvai 0,770 T7^9 avTys dp^rj^y
T >\ ^Ti ^^rz^^A sv <S>O>c\ /\ s
OIOZ^ 0770 TOU F 6771 TO Z T y TO A. 6OI/ OU^ Ol O 77aXat OU
KLvr)07J, eVt TO o-vvr)0crTpov KiveiTai oJO-TTp yap
30 ^S^ TO e#os. Sto 77oXXa/ct5 a evvoov^v, Tayy d
o-KOfjL0a- tocnrep yap (frvcreL ToSe fteTO ToSe icniv, OVTW
452 b KOI ivtpyeia TO Se 77oXXaAci5 fyvo-iv Troiel. errel 8 eV
Tot? (f)vo~L yiyvtTai /cat Trapd fyv&iv /cat 0776 TU^?,
ert /xaXXo^ ei^ Tot? 8t e#o9, ot? 77 </)ucrt5 ye />tr) o/xotw?
452 a, 21-25 text - recept. habet Biehl, primus scripsit Freudth., Rh. Mus.
xxiv. et Archiv flir Gesch. d. Philos. II. 1889. 2I vulgo legitur : el yap /UT?
^?ri rou E yU^ui T/Tcu, ^7ri ToO E f^vfjffd^, sed eTTi roO E /j.<:/j,vr)Tai om. E M Y, pro
E 6 habet v d E, 77 Y, 6 L Them. Mich. Didot. 23 A] a E M. | pro Z vulgo
E, Z etiam vet. tr. 24 e^ret Biehl, eVi^T/re? S et reliqui edd., etiam Freudth.,
circprrei L | Z] ^ E Y. 25 ^irifj/rct habet etiam E (Bus.) | A] 5 Y. 28 E
pro T legi vult Freudth. | ^di oiV 5t a TrdXat ov Biehl, tav ovv /J.T) L S U Y et
omnes reliqui edd. | 5id iraXaiov L S U M Them. Mich. vet. tr. et omnes reliqui
edd., & a TrdXat ov Y et E (Bus.).
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 113
manages to do so and finds what he was seeking. Here what
happens is, that one initiates many processes before he arrives 10
at the stimulation of that one on which the object sought will
ensue. Remembering depends upon the potential presence
in^cpnscibusness of the causal process^ and upon this, on the
condition that, as mentioned, the transition be effected by
one s own agency and by means of processes that one already
possesses.
A starting point from which to begin must always be
found. Hence commonplaces seem to be often the initial
point in the act of recollection. The reason why these are 15
employed is that we pass quickly from one to another, e.g.
from milk to white, from white to air, from this to wet, passing
from which we call to mind the late autumn, which is the
season we had in view.
It is true that in general the middle member also of a
whole series of terms seems to be a starting point ; if one does
not recollect before, one will do so when he comes to it, or
else there is no other point from which he can pass to the 20
recollection of the thing in question. Suppose for instance
one has a series of thoughts ABCDEFGH; if one has not
remembered at H, one remembers at E, if he is seeking
for G or F ; for from that point we can go in either
direction both towards D and towards F. But if we are
not seeking for one of these members of the series, i.e. G
or F, by going to C we shall effect recollection ; if that is
not so, by going to A we can. This is universally the
process.
The reason why, though the same link is employed, 25
recollection sometimes is and sometimes is not successful,
is that we can pass to a further distance at one time than at
another from the same starting point, e.g. from C to F or to
D. Hence, if the transition is mediated by some connecting
link which has not lately been employed, one passes to the
more familiar consequent, for the newly acquired habit has
become exactly like a natural disposition. It is thus that we 3
explain why frequently we recollect quickly what we have
been meditating upon. It is just in accordance with a natural
tendency to follow one another in a particular order that
things actually happen ; and it is frequent repetition that
produces a natural tendency. But since in the realm of45 2 b
Nature we meet with events contrary also to the order of
Nature and due to chance, this is still more likely to occur
in things due to custom, among which a natural order does
R. 8
ii4 ARISTOTLE
virdp^ei wcrre KLvrjOrjvai eVioTe KOLKL Kal dXX&&gt;9, dXXa>9
5 re KOL orav d(j)\.Kr) eKtWev avrocre 7777. oid rovro KCLL
OTOLV SET? oVo/xa fjLvrjfjLoi evcraL, Trapo^oiov /ieV, ei9 e/cel^o
o~oXoifao/xez/. TO /xe> ow dvoLp.ip.vrj or Ko~ 9 ai TOVTOV CTVJJL-
8 fiaivtL TOV Tponov.
S TO Se p,yio~Tov, yvitipittiv Set TOZ>
J] fJiTp(i) 77 a,0/)LCTTW5. 60-TO) 8e Tt W KpLVL TOV 7T\LO) KCU
10 eXaTTw euXoyoz/ S cocnrep rd p-tyeOr] j^oel y^p TO,
/^eyaXa /cat iroppa) ov TO) aLTToreiveiv e /ct TT
ojcnrep r^v oifjiv (/>acrt Tt^e? (/cat yap ^17 oWa)Z>
^oi7O~et), dXXa T?J d^aXoyoz^ /ct^7^o~f eo~Tt yctp ez^ avrfj
Ta SfJLOia o-^^aTa feat Act^crei?. TiVi oSz^ SioiVet, 6Vai/
1 5 TO, jLtei^w 1/017 , 17 oVaz^ IK^IVOL vorj rd eXaTTw ; TrdvTOi ydp
TO, ez/To? eXotTTW, /cat d^aXoyo^ /cat TO, e/cTO9. eo~Tt *
ura>s axj-irep Kal Tot? etSecri^ cU dXoyoz Xa/Belv dXXo eV
avrw, OUTW9 /cat Tot? diroo Tri^aLO iv, cocnrep ovv el rrjv
A B BE Kivtirai, TTOLCL TTJV F A dVdXoyoz/ yap 17 A F
20 Kat ^ F A. TL ovz^ /ActXXo^ TT)Z> F A 17 ri)^ ZH Trotet;
17 a>9 17 A F TT/DO? T^ A B e^ei, OVTW? 17 [TO] C H ) 77^05
I ex et> Ta^Ta? ow dju-a Kiveirai. dp 8e TTp Z H
vofjcrai, rrjv JJLZV B E o/xotws t/oei, d^Ti Se
I TO,? K A ^oet* avrai yot/> e^oua"t^ &)9 Z A
25 77/309 B A.
a/>ia 17 TC TOU 7rpay/x,aT09
Kal rj TOV ^povov, TOTC TT^ p<vTJny eVepyet
8
452 b, 13 aurois E M Y, ai/r?; etiam vet. tr. et Mich. 14 r^t] nVa Biehl, err.
typograph. 15 vulgo : vorj; rj OTL eKelva voet, 77 ra eXdrrw ; 77 ante on om. P^ M Y,
Kii>a vorf 7) M, j oe?! L S U, textum receptum de conieclura Freudenthalii scripsit
Biehl. 16 /cot L M S U, uvwep Biehl. 19 T A Biehl M Sylb., AA
reliqui codd. et edd., etiam vet. tr. et Mich., qui autem 7 5 Aristoteli scribenduni
fuisse annotat, FA recte coni. etiam Freudenth. 20 17 TTJI/ om. E M Y.
21 AF] AZ con. Freudth., codd. et edd. except. Biehl AF | TO] K Y, ^ F>, om. M.
22 TTJJ/ I] rd /u L, TTJJ/ t E M Y, Tyv M Biehl. | odv fort. 70/9. 23. yuej/ om. E i
B] M, om. Y. 24 A] a E Y 25 ir/oos] f M.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
not prevail to the same degree. Hence in some cases we are
impelled to pass both to one point and to another, especially
when something diverts us from the one to the other. Hence 5
too, when we have to remember a name, we may recollect one
like it and commit a verbal blunder as regards the proper one. //
This is the explanation of the way in which recollection
occurs.
But there is a most important fact to be noticed that
we must have apprehension of time either determinate or
mcleterminate. Let us grant as real something by which we
discriminate greater and less periods. It is reasonable that 10
we should do so in the same way as we discriminate extended
magnitudes ; we know things that have great size and are at
a distance, not by our thought reaching out to them there, as
some say our sight does (for though they are non-existent
they can equally be known), but by a psychic process analo
gous to them : there exist in the mind figures and changes
similar to the external objects.
What then is the difference between knowing the objects
of greater size (the objective) and knowing the other set (the 15
subjective) which are smaller ? All the inner are smaller and
analogous to the outer, and probably, just as in the case of
the knowable forms of things the subject has another cor
responding one within him, so it is with distances. Thus, if
AB, BE be the process, that produces AC, CD, for AC and
CD are in the same ratio as AB and BE. Does not this then 20
give AF, EG quite as much as AC, CD ? No, for AC is to
AB as H is to I. These processes, then, occur together, but,
if one wants to think EG, while he equally at the same time
thinks BE, instead of the ratio of H to I he thinks that of
K to L, for the latter lines are in the same proportion as FA
stands in to BA. 25
Hence when the process corresponding to the concrete
object and that corresponding to the time are coincident we
have an act of memory. If one thinks that they are coincident
52
ii6 ARISTOTLE
TTOLWV, ot7at ^vq^ov^veiv ovOev yap /c&Auet Sta-
jvai nva /cat So/ceiV iivri^oveveiv /XT)
3 evepyovvTa Se rfj /X^T^UTT. /AT) oteo~0at d\Xa
jJLjJLV7]lJiVOV OVK O~TLV TOVTO yOLp J]V OLVTO TO
av TJ TOV TTyoay/xaro? ye^rou ^copi? r5 rou
r} avrrj KLvr)$, ov /xe/x^rat. r) 8e rou y^povov 817717
O7 X6Z/ OtO JLTO) OV JLlVVTOLL CLVTO, OLOV OTl
7/31777 r^JLpa o8lfJ7TOT TTOLr}0-V, OT O KCU
/Lte/Jt^rat Km 0,^ jitr) Kal jaeVpo). etw$acri Se Xeyetz/
oVi fjLefJivrjvTaL p,<lv, TTOT ^evroi OVK Icracriv, orav /xr)
5 yWplOHTl TOV 7707 7O TTOCTOJ fJiTpa).
5 OTI xez^ oSi^ ou ot
avTo fjLvrjfJiovLKo KOL ava^vr](TTiKo, v 7015 wpOTepov
ipr}Tdi. 8ia(f)pi 8e 7ou ^vif]^oveveiv TO
o~0ai ov IJLOVOV KCLTOL TOP y^povov, dXA. 6Vt 7ou
jJLvrjfjioveveiv KOLL T&V a\\(*)v ^coajv fJiT^ei TroXXa, TOV
10 8* dvafjaiJivrfcrKo-0cu ovoev w? eiTret^ 70)^ yv^pitp^iv^v
TC\r{V OLvOpMTros. OLTiov 8* oVi 7o dvap.ijJivirjo~KO~0ai
OlOV <TuXXoyi(T/XO5 719* O71 yayO TtpOTtpOV LO6V TJ
rj TL TOLOVTOV eTraOe, cruXXoyL{e7at 6 dva^i^vq-
, /cal ecr7t^ oto^ ^777770-15 715. 701/70 8* ol? /cat
T 5 70 fioV\eVTLKOV V7Tdp^L, (^VO~.l /XO^Ot? O-VfJL/3e/3rjKV KOL
16 yap 70 /Bov\veo-0aL cri;XXoyto-/xo9 715 ecrTiv.
,- v o> s \
071 O 6CT71 0*0)-
TO Tra^o? /cat TJ az^a/x 1/770-19 777770-19 ez/ 7otov7<w
TO
KOLL TTOLVV
20 Krai ov/ceV lTTi^.ipovvTOi^ dvafjiLiJLVijo Keo OaL ov8ev 77770^,
/cat /xaXto~7a 701)9 /xXay^oXt/cou9 7OU7OU9 ya/o (fravTaa--
^OLTOL KLvel />taXto-7a. OULTLOV Se 707; /XT) eV au7Ot9 etz/ai
70 di/a/>tt/A^770-/co-^at, 6Vt KaOaTrep TO t9 f$d\\ovo-iv
453 a, 19 eTT^wres Christ, Biehl, eir^xovras Bek. codd.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 117
without securing that they really are so one thinks one
remembers, for there is nothing to prevent one s being deceived
arjfi thinking one remembers when one does not. When,
nowever, one actually remembers, it is impossible not to 3
know it or to be unaware that that is so, for it is just in
being aware of this that memory consists. But if the object-
processes occur independently of that corresponding to the
time, or the latter take place without the former, there is no
memory.
The time-apprehending process is twofold ; sometimes one
does not remember the interval with exact precision, as e.g. 453 a
that someone did something the day before yesterday, but
sometimes our sense of time is accurate. All the same one
remembers, though not aware of the exact interval; we are
wont to say we do remember though we don t know when the
thing happened, when we cannot tell what is the exact extent
of the interval.
We have already asserted that it is not the same people 5
who remember well and who recollect well. Recollection
differs from remembering not merely in the superiority of the
sense of time which it involves, but in the fact that, while
many of the other animals possess memory, we may say that 10
none of those now known, except man, share in recollection.
The reason is that recollection is like a syllogism. One who
recollects comes to the conclusion that he saw or heard or had
some such experience previously and the process resembles a
search and, owing to its nature, recollection accrues only to
those that have the power of deliberation, for deliberation is 15
a sort of syllogistic process.
Evidence that this experience is of a corporeal nature, and
that in recollecting we search for an image in a corporeal
organ, comes from the fact that it distresses some people
when they cannot recall a thing though applying their mind
hard in attempting to do so and, when they no longer try to 20
recollect, none the less the disturbance goes on. This happens
especially with liverish people, for they are the class most
easily moved by images. The reason why recollection is not
under their control is, that, just as when one has thrown a
ii8 ARISTOTLE
e auTois TO crTrcrai, OUTWS KOI az/a^t/x^cr/c/xe^o? Ka
25 6r}pva)v (TGJjJiaTLKov TL Kwet, eV co TO TrdOos. p,d\Lo~Ta &
TOTTOV ov yap paSitos Travercu KwrjOelcra,
TO I^TOV^VOV KOL evOviropijcry y
8to /cat opyal Kal (o/3ot, oVaz^ Tt Kt^crajcri^, OLVTIKLVOVV-
30 TOW TTCtXt^ TOUTW^ OW /ca0LO~TO,Z TCU, aXX* CTTt TO aUTO
Kal eot/ce TO Trddos Tots ovofjiacri Kal
/<:al Xoyois, 6Va^ Std crTO/x-aTO? yeV^Tat TC avrwv
cr(f)6Spa Travo afjLei OLS yap Kal ov
TraXiv aSeiz^ 17 \tyeiv. elcrl Se /cat 01 TO, a
453 b \ovTS Kal ol ^a^wSets a/x
Std TO TToXv fidpOS ^X LV ^ T< ? alo-OrjTLKO), Kal
ef apxys TO,? Kii>rjo~LS 8vvacr0ai e/x/^eVet^ aXXd StaXv-
ecr^at ^T eV TW d^a/xt/xz/T/crAcecr^at yoaStw? evOvtropelv.
5 ol Se TrdjjiTrav vtoi Kal \iav yepovres a^vrnjiove^ Std
KLVY)<TIV ol p.ev yap eV <f)0Lo~i, ol eV
.lo~iv CTI Se Ta ye TraiSta /cat vav^rj Icrrl
/xez^ ov^ fjn yjp.r)^ Kal TOV
Kal TLVl TO)V TT^S ^X^ ^r]fJiOl>VL TOL
10 ^wa, /cat 7re/H TOV dvajJUfJivyjo Keo OaL, TL ICTTL KOL TTO>S
/cat Sta TiVas atTia?,
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION 119
thing one can no longer check its course, so a man engaged
in recollection and on the hunt for an idea stimulates into
activity a bodily organ in which the experience is localised. 25
Those feel the vexation most who happen to have fluid in the
region of the sensory organ, for once the fluid substance is set
in motion it is not easily brought to rest until the object
sought for returns to mind and the process resumes its direct
course. Hence, when they have set something in agitation,
emotions of anger and fear, owing to the reaction of these
organs, do not come to rest ; on the contrary they react once 30
more on them. The phenomenon resembles that which occurs
when a name or a tune or a sentence has come to be much
on one s lips ; after one has stopped, and without one intending
it, one is prompted again to sing or to speak.
Dwarfs and those who have a greater development in the
upper parts of the body have poorer memories than those of 453 b
the opposite type, because they have too great a weight
pressing upon the organ of consciousness ; the processes can
neither persist in it from the time of the initial experience (on
the contrary they are effaced), nor in the act of recollection
can they easily take a direct course. The very young and 5
the exceedingly aged remember badly because of their tran
sitional state : the former are growing, the latter decaying
rapidly ; and besides, children are dwarf-like in type up to a
considerably advanced time in their life.
This is our account of memory and remembering, the
nature thereof and the psychical organ employed by animals
in remembering ; likewise of recollection, its nature, mode of 10
occurrence, and causes.
COMMENTARY
DE SENSU
CHAPTER I.
436 a i. TTpl a!o-0TJ<rs K<X! aio%rv. This is the common title
of the treatise and that known to Alexander of Aphrodisias. As,
however, the discussion is to be not about the soul per se, but in par
ticular about its connection with the body, i.e. not merely psycho
logical but especially physiological, Alexander suggests that vrepi
ato-0r?r7piW re KCU alaOyTwv would be a more legitimate title.
Sometimes aur^o-is is used loosely instead of alaOrjTypLov, even
by Aristotle himself. Simon Simonius adopts this amended title,
translating it De Organis Sensuum et Sensilibus.
This is evidently the investigation promised in De An. i. ch. i,
402 b 15, where Aristotle asks if the objects of sensation may not be
more profitably treated of before the function of sensation itself. In
the whole passage 402 b 5 sqq. he points out that a definition of soul in
the abstract is not sufficient for a comprehension of what soul is, dAAa
KCU ava.Tra.Xiv TO. o"v/x/3e/?^KOTa avfJL/SdXX^rat /xeya /xepos Trpos TO elSevac
TO TL eo-Tiv. Thus we must proceed beyond our abstract definition
and give an account of the various /xopta faculties of soul, but these
again cannot be understood apart from their cpya functions, and,
once more, point to an account of their dn-tKei/xei/a objects.
Aristotle doubts if these subjects should not be treated in the
reverse order ; to do so would be to begin with things notiora
nobis ; for, as later psychology also has pointed out, it is the things
presented to our senses and not the psychical functions through
which they are apprehended, which are in the order of time the
primary objects of consciousness.
As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not adopt this reverse order in
his exposition, thinking it sufficient to have pointed out the danger
of resting content with a merely abstract treatment.
122 DE SENSU
Thus we come finally to a discussion of aicr^ra, the objects of
sense and the bodily organs through which they are apprehended.
It is not to be thought, however, that the separation of topics in
Aristotle s psychological writings is observed with perfect logical
rigidity. The general outlines of what is here laid down have already
been anticipated in De An. n. chs. 7-11, and the detailed treatment
of sound which is omitted from this treatise is to be found there
in ch. 8.
What in particular distinguishes this treatise from the De Anima
is the greater detail with which ala-Orjrd are treated and the attention
devoted to the bodily organ of each sense.
Siwpio-Tcu, Siopi eu/ is a technical term with Aristotle, almost
equivalent to to define (6 pos, opioyxos = definition).
Ka0 axi-r^v, another technical term ; it is defined in Anal. Post.
i. ch. 4, 73 a 34 sqq. Those characteristics of a thing without which
it would be impossible for it to be that thing, belong to it Kaff avro.
They are stated in the definition. Cf. also Metaph. vn. ch. 5,
1030 b 23 sqq. It is assumed that a thing can preserve its indi
viduality though stripped of certain qualities. These latter are
o-u/A/^e/^Kora. When Aristotle says he has given a definition of the
soul per se, he means that he has stated the ultimate attributes that
everything psychical (or rather everything living, for plants have
i//v^ ) must have. This definition appears in De An. n. ch. i,
412 b 5 : "? - v evTeXe^eta rf TT^COTT; <r<o/x.aTos (>V(TLKOV opyaviKOv.
The question is, whether the soul per se is here contrasted with
its faculties, or whether as Alexander suggests is also possible he
is opposing soul considered alone to soul considered in its relation
to the body. To this it may be objected that Aristotle never does
consider soul apart from body. It is clear that Aristotle here means
just what he says, after a discussion of soul in general and its
faculties he is to go on to investigate their 4 /oya or, as he here calls
them, the Trpa^as of the living creatures. This is a progress in the
direction of greater detail, for one and the same Swa/xts is capable of
being determined in various ways when it passes into activity or
ei/e pyeta. This will involve the more detailed treatment of the bodily
organ of each eve pyaa also. Hence the predominantly physiological
character of this treatise.
For the reason why a definition of soul in general is not sufficient,
see De An. n. ch. 3, 414 b 20 sqq. Things eV r<5 e^>e^?, like souls
and figures, have no common nature which can exist apart from the
COMMENTARY 123
particular type, e.g. triangle, quadrilateral, etc. Such things have a
nature, media inter univocorum et equivocorum naturam.
436 a 2. 8wd|Xwv, Swa/us is the regular word for potentiality
translatable by faculty, by which term we also render /xopiov.
This latter term Aristotle inherited from the Platonic psychology.
The word itself and the way in which Plato employs it suggest
rather a theory of the separable and independent nature of the
various faculties, the point of view, in fact, of faculty psychology.
Aristotle s is, however, far removed from any such theory.
436 a 3. Tri(TK\}/i,v Troiio-0ai is an equivalent for 6tu>p(.a.v
cf. Metaph. i. ch. 8, 989 b 24-27.
TWV T|v IXO VTWV. This brings in plants, which also have
and to which some of the phenomena proposed for discussion belong
(e.g. j/eoT?7s /cat y^pas, (077 KCU ^avaros).
436 a 4. KSuu, tStos is that which is the peculiar possession of
any one species.
Koival, KOIVOS is the reverse of i8ios. Alexander points out that
Aristotle desires not merely to classify the psychical functions of
animals but to discuss the things classified.
Simon would make out that the distinction falls wholly within
the functions of animals and that here iSwu and KOLVO.L mean re
spectively belonging to them qua animal and qua living because
there is no discussion of the functions of plants in the Parva
Naturalia. However, the missing treatise De Plantis (cf. De Long,
et Brev. Vit. 467 b 4) seems to have been intended to carry on the
discussion of the most universal of all the conditions of life. Simon
seems to be right in denying that by KOWO.L Aristotle is referring
merely to the functions which plants share with animals. But
neither is it evident that the distinction falls wholly within the
functions of animals as he asserts. As a matter of fact the Parva
Naturalia though dealing chiefly with the functions of animals
contain reference too to the phenomena of plant life. Possibly,
however, Aristotle had no strict and complete classification in his
mind, but merely wished to suggest that some functions might be
the peculiar attributes of a certain species and of certain wider
groups, as dvu/xv^o-ts of man and ava-rrvoij and eKirvotj of animals with
lungs. Simon s view, however, derives confirmation from a passage
further on (cf. note to 436 a 7).
436 a 5. irpdgcis, ?rpais is here employed in an unusual sense, as
though it were a general term action used instead of the specific,
124 DE SENSU
eve pyeia, which is par excellence the name for the function or activity
of anything possessing mind (Kvpiws yap 7rpats Aoyi/o) rj eVepyeta
cVrtv. Alex. p. 4, 1. 5 [W.]). But 7rpais has generally a very restricted
application, meaning as a rule distinctively human actions into which
deliberation and thought enter. Cp. passim in the Ethics, especially
i. ch. i, 1094 a i ; vi. ch. 2, 1 139 a 31 etc.
viroKicr6. v7roTt0(T0ai is to state as a vVd^eo-ts. This word
has both a technical and a general meaning. It is used to refer
(1) to certain of the undemonstrable but indubitable principles
which lie at the basis of the several sciences ; this is its most
common technical meaning.
Again it may be used (2) to indicate a statement which is
assumed as an ultimate principle without proof for the purposes of a
particular discussion, but which is demonstrable and will be proved
when it is convenient to do so (cf. Alex, 4, 1. 23 [W.]).
Alexander is wrong in saying that the virodctrts which is an
indemonstrable principle of science is an at o>/Aa. Aristotle (Anal.
Post. i. ch. 10) distinguishes three classes of first principles, (i) the
Kou/a a^iw^ara of all science, e.g. the Law of non-contradiction,
(2) definitions of the subject of demonstration (TO, vrpwra 76 a 32)
and their properties (TraOrj), (3) vVotfeVeis, which affirm the existence
of the subject to which the science is to attach predicates, e.g. lines
and figures in geometry (76 b 5). These two latter classes of oVaTrd-
SeiKra are i8x appropriate to the science in question ; they are both
species of Oe<ris(Anal. Post. i. ch. 2, 72 a 15 sqq.). It is thus evident
that, according to this technical use, a vTro^eo-ts is that which
renders conclusions unconditional and categorical (Poste, Posterior
Analytics, Appendix B, p. 140). It corresponds to what Mill (Logic,
Bk i. ch. 8, 6 and 7) calls a postulate the assertion that,
e.g. the figure in geometry, the triangle, exists, which renders our
conclusions un hypothetical. Without this postulate which asserts the
existence of the things defined there is no way of distinguishing
a science from any self-consistent system of mythology. Upon
definitions alone a science cannot be built.
There appears, however, to be another technical use of v-n-oOeo-^
which was common in Greek geometry. The V7ro 0ecn,s is the Q.E.F.
of a problem or g.E.u. of a theorem, the proposition set up for proof.
This seems to be the sense in which it is employed in Eth. Nic. vn.
ch. 9, 1151 a 17 (cf. Mr Burnet s note on the passag^), though
Poste (op. cit. p. 105 note) cites it as an instance of the former usage.
COMMENTARY 125
It is quite clear that here Aristotle uses vVoKei o-flw in the wider
sense of viroOea-is. The conclusions of the De Anima which can be
proved are to be used as apx at/ i n this treatise. These, therefore,
though not indubitable first principles, are still certain ; they are not
* hypotheses in the modern sense, which are statements the certainty
of which is still in doubt and which are assumed in a merely pro
visional way.
436 a 7. -irpcoTwv. In Posterior Analytics i. ch. 4, 73 b 33 sqq. it
is shown that what is a universal and peculiar attribute of a species
belongs to it primarily, e.g. the equality of its angles to two right
angles belongs to the species triangle primarily and not to figure, the
genus (TO KaOoXov Be VTrapxei TOTC, orav ITTL rov TV^oVros KOI irpa/rou
Seucvv^rat).
To be 7rp(3T09 then is to be 18105, and TrpwTwv will refer to the iSiat
mentioned above, 1. 4. To proceed from "Sia to KOLVO. is to follow
the ordo doctrinae, while from KOIVO. to tSta is the ordo naturae/ and
this latter is the method which on the whole Aristotle follows in the
De Anima in spite of his statement in De An. n. ch. 2, 413 an sqq.
Here, however, he is to begin with the iSia which belong to
animal qua animal (if we interpret iSuu as Simon will have it, cf. note
to 436 a 4), e.g. Sense and Memory, and later he will go on to those
functions which animals share with other living things.
The ordo doctrinae is also employed by him when he treats of
sight before touch in the De Anima, and in treating of animals before
plants ; it often proceeds from the yvo>pt/xwTpa rffuv to the yywpt/xw-
repa <vcrei, cf. Physics I. ch. i. Perhaps, however, TrpwVon/ refers to
o>W as opposed to TOM/ w^i/ e^ovrwi/ merely. This, which is Ziaja s
interpretation, makes the upshot of the whole matter that he is
going to treat of animals and their functions first, as in fact he does.
This interpretation relieves us from the necessity of limiting t8u
definitely to one or other of the two alternatives peculiar to animal
qua animal, and peculiar to individual species.
. 436 a 8. K<nvd rf)s v|/xx^s ovra. The most important both of the
generic and specific functions of animals are functions both of the
soul and the body, and hence (as Thomas says) the necessity of
a separate treatise.
436 a 9. |ivtfjtu|. Memory does not belong to all animals, cf.
De Mem. 450 a 16 and 453 a 9, also Metaph. i. ch. i, 980 a 29 sqq. ;
hence he says only that these functions belong to almost all animals
oV, 1. 1 1).
126 DE SENSU
436 a 10. #pis or TO opeKTtKoV (cf. Eth. i. ch. 13, 1102 b 30) is
the general name for the appetitive or conative element in the soul.
It appears in three specific forms, C7rt0u/u a, #17x09, and ftovX-rja-ts ; the
latter is a function of the rational soul. Cf. De An. in. ch. g, 432 b 5 :
tv TW AoyicrTiKu) 77 /BovXrjcTLs ytVcTCu Kat ev rw a Aoyu) 77 e-mOvfjiLa KCU
6 $u/xos.
The Aristotelian distinction between 0v/xo s and cirtdu/u a is not
the same as the Platonic (cf. Repub. in. and iv., especially
439 E sqq.), for Aristotle in Ethics i. ch. 13, no2b 13 sqq. assigns
both dv/Aos and l-mOv^ta to that irrational part of the soul which truly
is not absolutely irrational (jcupuos aXoyoi/) in so far as it partakes in
a way (/xcTe xct TTWS) in reason, but yet is irrational in so far as it
opposes reason (airercivci TO> Xoyw). According to Plato eiridu/ua
belongs to the wholly irrational part of the soul. Nevertheless
though, according to Aristotle, briOvfjua, and Ovjws belong to the
same <v o-ts T//S i/w^s, yet they are distinguished in a way analogous
to the Platonic; cf. Eth. vii. ch. 7, 1149 a 25 sqq. E7ri0v/ua is a
mere desire for what is pleasant as such, Ovpos is passion acting
without reflection, but not mere craving for pleasure, cf. Zeller, Arist.
and Earlier Peripatetics n. pp. 1 1 2-13. Anger is an inadequate render
ing of 0v/u.o s, as the tenderer emotions are also ascribed to it by
Aristotle, cf. Polit. vn. ch. 7, 1327 b 40. TO ope/a-i/coV has been already
treated in the De Anima. The accurate distinction of Ov^os and
cirt.0vij.ia really falls into the background in Aristotle, since their
demarcation was riot of importance for his psychology.
436 a 12. TV p.TxovTwv t^s, i.e. plants as well as animals. In
addition to the above class there is second a class of communissima
such as i/OT>ys Kat y^pa?, a>?J icai ^avaTo?, and a third class which are
Kowa a>o>v cvtots, e.g. a.va.Trvorj Kat tKTrvorj. If by tStat in 1. 4 Aristotle
means, as Simon maintains, peculiar to animal qua animal, then
the first list aiaO-qa-is etc. is the tale of the tStat, and the four
crvuytat form the constituents of the two latter classes.
436 a 14. o-vtvyfoi. Simon says, Est enim horum quasi pri-
vatio alterius. They are related as a positive quality, and its
o-Tep^o-i?, i.e. the contradictory, within the same genus.
436 a 1 6. TI T ilKao-Tov avrwv. The Tt eo-Ttv of anything consists
of the characteristics revealed in its definition the scientific con
notation of the name, cf. Anal. Post. n. ch. 3.
436 a 17. CUTUXS. ri atria or TO atnoi/ is cause, that, the existence
of which entails the existence of the thing of which it is said to be
COMMENTARY 127
the cause. According to Aristotle s logical theories it is impossible to
prove the ri ecmv of anything; only its existence, i.e. that it occurs
(o-v/x/foiVa), can be demonstrated ; and this is done by giving its amoi/.
436 a 18. <J>v<riKov. In De An. i. ch. i, 403 a 29 sqq. there is a
discussion of the spheres of the <txrtKos and the SiaXe/o-iKo s, and it is
first suggested that the physicist pays attention to the matter, the
other to the Aoyos or etSos (in his illustration the final cause) in
natural phenomena. But the conclusion is come to, that the real
^VO-UOK pays attention to both. Cf. also Metaph. vn. ch. n, 1037 a
1 6 sqq.
irepl v-yieias KCU vo<rov. This tractate, which should have followed
the irepl ai/a7n/o^9 (cf. 480 b 22), is not extant.
436 a 19. apx^s, the premisses from which deduction is made.
436 a 20. eo-TepTjpic vois. This word is applied both to those
that lack and those that have been deprived of a quality. Cf. Mdaph.
v. ch. 22, 1022 b 22 sqq.
436 a 22. IciTpiKfjs. Aristotle cites a case in which we can
explain a phenomenon in medicine by geometrical principles, that
circular wounds are slowest to heal (cf. Anal. Post. i. ch. 13, 79 a 15).
436 b 2. apxovrcH, a reference to df>\ai (cf. 1. 19 above).
436 b 4. [XT* alo-0T|<re<os. That sensation cannot exist apart from
the bodily life is affirmed in De An. n. ch. 2, 413 b 27. HSoi/?;,
\v-n-r], 0v/Aos, 7rt#ty>ua, and opeis generally, occur along with sensation ;
it enters into their being : cf. loc. cit. 413 b 22-24.
436 b 5. 81 alo-9T]<ra)s. /xvr;//,?; is due to atcr&yo is : it is a eis
(aj/Tacr/zaT09 (cf. de Afem. 451 a 17) and a <^ai/racr^ta is a Kurorts VTTO
TOV alo-Ota-Oai, i.e. a psychical affection originating with, and being a
persistence of, a sense stimulation ; it is the /U.OVT) TOV aicr^ /xaros
talked of in Anal. Post. n. ch. 19, 99 b 36 and De An. i. ch. 4,
408 b 1 8. Again the ^>aVrao-/xa is called a VTroAei^i/xa TOV aia-^/xaro?.
Cf. De Mem. ch. i, 451 a 4 and De Insom. 461 b 21, and also An.
Post. II. ch. 19, looa 3, e/< ^.v ovv a.l(T0r)<rsto<$ ytVerai fJLVTJjjLr).
7ra0T]. A 7ra0os is (i) in its most general signification, any
attribute of a thing whatsoever as opposed to the concrete reality
itself (cf. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 4, 3i9b 8 etc.). In accordance
with the etymology of the word there is, however, generally the side
implication of the -n-dOos, being a determination produced in a thing
which is passive and suffers modification (TraV^ei) by something else.
Hence (2) Wtfos, though often used indiscriminately, tends to be
demarcated from a permanent quality and to refer to a more
128 DE SENSU
temporary attribute : cf. Categ. ch. 8, 9 b 28. It is often indis
tinguishable from o-u/x/:?e/3?7/<6s.
If the subject the thing which has the 7ra#os is mind or one of
its faculties, then the 7ra#os is some modification of consciousness.
We must, however, distinguish as a special meaning that sense of
7ra#os (found in De Mem. ch. i, 450 b i), where it means mental
perturbation.
For the use of Traces cf. Burnet, Eth. Nic. p. 88. Here, accord
ing to Alexander, VTTVOS KCU eyprfyopons come under the designation of
TrdOrj T^S aiV&fcrews : cf. Comment, in De Sensu, p. 7 (Wendland),
1. 25 : TavTrjs yap rt Tracrxovo-ys 6 VTTVOS. The explanation is thai
exhalations from food proceed upwards to the brain, condense and,
descending once more, press upon the seat of consciousness (the
heart), and so produce sleep. Cf. also De Somn. 454 a 22: a/*$w
yap ecrrt TO. TrdOr) ravra irf.pi a.la Orja iv TOV Trpwrov ala@r)TiKov.
436 b 6. ggcis. A eis is a fixed and determinate disposition
(mere temporary disposition is Siaflccris). Cf. Categ. ch. 8, 8b 27.
Aristotle seems here to be describing the character of the four o-vv-
yoxi mentioned above in 436 a 14 sq. Hence by eeis he can hardly
be referring to memory, which indeed is a 2is of the image left by
sensation, not directly of sensation itself. Alexander thinks that
by c^eis sensation itself is referred to. But, if we hold that one
of the pairs of correlatives is indicated, perhaps I/CO T^S K<U y^pa?
may be intended, though in what sense these are eeis of <uo-0r;-
o-is is not clear ; they belong rather to TO OPCTTTLKOV the nutritive
soul.
436 b 7. <ro>TT]picu. dvcnrvo-rj preserves the life because it cools the
heart the ultimate organ of sensation, and prevents it from de
stroying itself by means of its own heat. Cf. Dejuvent. ch. 3, 469 a
5 sqq. and De Resp. chapters i, 8 and 16.
o-eis. i/ocros and 0avaros are <j>6opai and o-Tep^crets of life,
is used here in the sense of deprivation (cf. note to 436 a
20).
436 b 8. 8td TOV X(tyov here is equivalent to deductively as
opposed to inductively -Si* eVaywy^s (cf. Phys.iu. ch. 3, 2iob 8
sqq.). No reference to a priori in the Kantian sense is intended.
436 b 9. alo-Oiio-ews. The distinction between noun and verb
seems here to correspond to that between faculty and function. Cf.
/jLvrj/jL?} and iwripjoveutiv De Mem. passim. In the famous passage in
Anal. Post. n. ch. 19, looa 17 it is generally understood to be that
COMMENTARY 129
between content and function KCU alo-OdvtTai /JL^V TO Ka@*
oe aio-9r)0-LS TOV Ka@6\ov tcrTiv.
436 b 11-12. irepl vj/vx^s. The reference is to De An. n.
chapters 2, 3, 5 etc. Cf. 413 b i sqq.
436 b 14. !8ux. This supports Simon s interpretation of tSiat in
436 a 4 above. If touch belongs peculiarly to each and every
species, that must mean that it is a peculiar property of that nature
which they all have in common. It is something which they have
qua animal. The usual meaning of iSios is belonging to a species
exclusively/ but as each species is here said to have the properties in
question, the usual sense is out of the question.
436 b 15. Cf. De An. n. ch. 3, 414 b 2 sqq. By touch we dis
criminate dry and moist, hot and cold the ultimate properties of
things material and also important characteristics of rpo^i? (77 yap
cu^ T??S Tpo<f>rjs at o^cris). Compare also in. ch. 12, 434 b 9 sqq.
Touch is necessary for the animal s preservation.
In the former passage (n. ch. 3) we find that ycvo-ts also dis
criminates characteristics of rpo^tj and cf. below ch. 4. Taste dis
criminates flavour, but x^os is simply a 1781x77x0, of the fundamental
characteristics of rpo^yj the tangible ones, and hence yevo-is is a
species of touch (441 a 3 below).
436 b 19. TOV OpcTTTLKoi). The omission of /xopi ou (which is read
by L S U P and Bek.) after Ope-n-TiKov makes this passage intelli
gible. Aristotle here refers to that which nourishes, not to the
nutritive faculty of the soul, (i) In the first place, it is not x^/xos
but yevo-ts which should be a Traces of any of the faculties of the soul,
and (2) that would be a TrdOos, not T-fjs Ope-miK^ o\W/xews, but TOV
The first of the above reasons makes us reject Alexander s inter
pretation Of TOV OpCTTTLKOV /JiOpiOV 3.S TOV yeiXTTlKOV, which WantS
explanation and besides makes this statement a tautology.
Alexander himself suggests that the meaning is TO /xoptov Tptfaiv
owdfjievov, i.e. the nutritive object. But /xo ptov is strange and is better
omitted as in E M Y.
Hammond does not notice the importance of the alteration in
Biehl s text, and translates: flavour is an affection of the nutritive
soul, and explains that flavour as a property of food affects the pro
cesses of growth or the nutritive soul.
But TO OpCTTTLKOV here = TpO(f)TJ.
436 b 20. Aristotle is clearly demarcating animals in general
R, 9
130 DE SENSU
from the smaller number that possess local movement, by a distinc
tion in their sensational consciousness also. In all animals we have
touch and taste, but in those that have KU/^O-IS Kara roVov we have
also the senses which are stimulated by a medium external to the
body (Sia roCi/ lu>6ev). The objects of touch and taste are external as
well as those of the other senses, and hence it is no differentia of the
senses of sight, hearing, and smell to be excited by external objects
as Hammond translates: cf. De An. in. 12, 434 b 14: at yap aAAai
alo-6-tjo-tLS oV erepooi/ atcr^avovrai, olov 6cr(J!>pr](TL<; oi/as OLKO^.
For a discussion of the media (air, water and TO Sia^aW?) cf. ch.
3-5, the discussion of the special senses, and Baumker, Des Ari-
stoteles Lehre von den Aussern und Inner n Sinnesvermogen, pp.
38 sqq.
436 b 22. o-TT]pias vKev. For the question of Aristotle s teleo-
logical interpretation of nature cf. Zeller, Arist. i. pp. 359 sqq.
n-poai.o-0avofi.eva, i.e. perceiving their food before they are in actual
contact with it.
437 a i. <J>pov7] o-cos. <l>p6vr](ris is here used in a wide and
general sense as equivalent to SidVota the faculty which gives us
universals ; but used more accurately, as in Eth. Nic. vi., it is Trf.pi
wv torn j3ov\fvcra.o-0a.L (1141 b 9), i.e. knowledge of ra TrpaKTa. Cf.
Il4ob 4: Aet7TTai apa avTrjv (sc. fypovrjuiv} etvat etv dXyjOrj /xera
Ao you 7rpa.KTtKr/v Trepi TO, aV^pcuTTto dyaOa KOL KOLKOL.
The <^poVt/xos is able to determine what is good and profitable
Trpos TO cu /tfiv oXw9, i.e. for his general welfare. <j>p6vr]<TL<> is one of the
intellectual virtues. Some of the animals seem to have ^po vTyo-t? :
cf. Metaph. i. ch. i, 980 b 22, where some are said to be <}>povi-
/xwTepa than others.
437 a 3- VOTITWV. vorjTo. are the objective counterpart of i/o^ /xaTa,
which are concepts generally, the contents of i/o -^o-i? or vovs, i.e.
intellect. Cf. De An. I. ch. 3, 407 a 7 : r; i/o ^crts ra vo^ara, and
Metaph. XII. ch. 7, 1072!) 22: TO yap SEKTIKOF Tof; vorjrov. . . vovs.
<f)p6vr)<TLs TWV vorjTuv is equivalent to Oewpta or ^-n-LcrTTJ^rj, which are
regularly opposed to 7rpats as well as to a knowledge of TO, irpaKTa.
Cf. Eth. VI. ch. 5, H4ob I : OVK av ir) y (f>povr](TL<; CTnfTTij/Jir), and cf.
ch. 3, I139b 17 sqq. eTrto-T^/xT; concerns TO. e^ aVayKTys, (frpovrjcTLS
those things which cvSe^eTat aAAooq ^\ iv - Hence, in the strict sense of
the terms, the expression ^poi/^o-is TOM vorjr^v contains a contradiction.
437 a 5. Ka0 atiTTjv, i.e. sight in its own sphere, in the objects
directly presented to it. To the sphere of sight belong colour and
COMMENTARY 131
the mathematical qualities of objects perceived by sight TO. KOLVOL
alo-O-nrd (cf. 11. 9-10 below). Compare De An. n. ch. 6, 418 a 9, where
the KOIVO, aio-OrjTa are said to be perceived /x0 avrd. Besides those
things which are thus perceived there are others that are perceived
Kara o-u/x/^e/fyKo s, e.g. we perceive by sight qualities referring to another
sense, which are complicated with the visual one in the same
object, and again we can perceive all sorts of other determinations of
the visible object, e.g. that such and such a white object is the son
of Diares (418 a 21). Here some modification of the visual quality
must pass as a symbol for or mean the other characteristics which
we infer from it. But it is in the perception of these associated
elements that hearing contributes more to intellectual life, for to the
audible sounds we have by convention (Kara o-vvOvjKrjv) attached the
concepts by which we think the whole of reality so far as it is
known to us.
irpbs B vovv. vovs seems to be best described as the faculty of
conceptual thought. Though sometimes denned so widely as to
take in all mental activities superior to aio-Oyo-is (cf. De An. in.
ch. 4, 42 9 a 23 : Aeyw Se vovv o> Stavoetrat KCU vTroAa/x/^ai/et 77 \f/v)0:
cf. also De An. in. ch. 3, 427 b 27-29), in its most characteristic
application it refers to the highest faculty of all. That seems to be
the apprehension of concepts in abstraction from the imagery, the
sensuous setting or v\rj by which they seem generally to be attended.
Cf. De An. in. ch. 4, 429 b 21 and Rodier s notes to the preceding
passage, also ch. 6, 430 b 30. Such simple concepts seem to form
the starting point of all scientific knowledge, and in Eth. vi. ch. 6,
1 141 a 7 FOVS is said to be the faculty for apprehending them, not
a faculty of discursive thought. Cf. also Anal. Post. n. ch. 19,
ioob 12.
Kara <rv[i.ppTiKos. Cf above, note to Kd# avrriv. Aristotle does not
mean to equate Kara o-v/jL^^/SrjKo^ and vrpos vovv ; as we saw, by sight
we may perceive objects KUTO, cru/A/^e/^Ko s. But it is audible sound
alone which is elaborated into a system corresponding to the scheme
of ideas and in each item suggestive of them.
437 a 8. TCI Koiva. Cf. De An. n. ch. 6, 4i8a 17, in. ch. i,
4253 14, in. ch. 3, 428 b 22, and also below ch. 4, 442 b 2 sqq.
qpc/u a is here omitted from the list, though codex L reads orcum.
437 a ii. <j>o>vf)9. Cf. De An. u. ch. 8, 420 b 5 sqq. The
general description of c/xm^ is i//ocog TLS ecmv fi{jrv\ov. The
narrower usage appears in 420 b 32 ; o-^/xai/nKos yap 87; TIS i^o</>o5
92
1 32 DE SENSU
rj ^wrf. It is sound which conveys a meaning. In 420 b 22
we find that it is <f><i>vij which permits of the realisation of TO cv; cf.
above 437 a i. The avay/caia (cf. 420 b 19, where yevo-ts is said to
be aVayKcuov) are the things chosen crom/pias eveKev. Aristotle means
quite clearly that intelligence and the higher life generally depend
upon aKo>7 and its special object t^on^. For the special reasons why
sounds are best fitted to represent concepts, cf. Stout, Manual of
Psychology, pp. 464 sqq.
437 a 15. <rv|xpo\6v. A o-v/x/SoAov is the token given by any
of the parties to a compact (a-vvOijicrj). Hence the apprehension of
the meaning of a word is conventional and Kara O-V/X^C^KOS, for <f>v<rci
ran/ oVo/xa rcot/ ovSev TT/ (de Interp. 1 6 a 27). The opposite doctrine
had been maintained in the Cratylus (ch. ix. sqq.). Cf. also i6a 19.
No sound is a word unless it become a conventional sign.
CHAPTER II.
437 a 19. Svvdfieios. Swa/xis is the characteristic word for faculty
or potentiality, not function (as Hammond has it), the appropriate
word for which is Ipyov.
437 a 20. -rrpoTcpov. In De An. n. loc. tit.
437 a 22. o-Toixeia. The four physical elements the primary
differentiations of Trpurrj vX-rj are fire (TH)/)), water (vSwp), earth (yrj),
and air (aijp). Each has a pair of ultimate qualities one of which it
shares with another of the elements and the other with another.
Thus there are four ultimate qualities and those elements are most
opposed to each other which have no qualities in common. Thus
fire is hot and dry (#ep/xov KCU fypov) ; water is cold and moist
(\l/vxpbv Kal vypov). These are contraries of each other. But fire
and water share their heat and moisture respectively with air, their
dryness and coldness with earth. Thus these latter two elements
are relatively to each other contrarily opposed. Thus
TTVp
Cf. Zeller, Arist. I. pp. 480 sqq.
437 a 23. TcVrapa. The traditional four elements were first
distinguished by Empedocles. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 59,
also pp. 240 sqq. Empedocles referred smell to air also. Theo-
phrastus, De Sensit, 7 (R. P. 177 b, 8th ed.), says he did not assign
any particular element as connected with touch and taste. Aristotle s
statement here need not mean more than that there was a general
134 DE SENSU
tendency to correlate each sense with a particular element, and that
the disparity of the number of the senses and the elements respec
tively caused a difficulty when it was attempted to carry out the
correlation completely.
437 a 24. -rrc piTTTis. Hearing and smell on the Empedoclean
theory, touch and taste on the Aristotelian are grouped together.
437 a 25. eXipone vov. Apparently the sensation caused by con
cussion of the optic nerve owing to a blow in the region of the eye.
The words used however do not convey a very graphic description
of this experience. Perhaps Aristotle is here generalising so as to
include such light sensations as are caused by chemical changes in
the eye itself. The theory is to be referred to Alcmaeon of Kroton.
Cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu, 26 : cm S e^et irvp (6 oc/>(9oA^os) . . . 877 \ov
ttvai TrA-^ycVros yap e/cXa/XTretv.
437 a 31. lavrbv. Because in the dark no other object is
visible, the eye, being of the nature of fire, will be visible. It should
thus be visible at any time in the dark. As this is not the case, the
theory is rejected.
Aristotle next goes on to give his own account of the phenomenon,
which professes to explain why this sensation of light experienced in
the dark occurs only when the eye moves rapidly.
437 a 34- k ta< Cf. 437 b 7, where he adds confirmatory in
stances. From Meteor, in. ch. 4, 3 73 a 35: di/a/cAw/xeV^ ^lv ovv 77
oi//t,5 d-Tfo irdvTwv c/xxiVerai rdov AeiW, and 372 a 31 we should infer that
this was really a case of reflection. Though, however, smoothness
is assigned as the source both of luminousness in the dark and of
reflection generally, the two phenomena are never identified. Cf. De
An. ii. ch. 7, 419 a 2 sqq., where fungi, horn and scales are enumerated
along with the eye and the heads of fishes, as a class of avww/jia
which are Trvpw^rj c/>ati/o/x,va KOL Xa/XTrovra. Note Trvpw&r] <aivo/zeya is
all he says. He would not allow that they were really Trupw Sry, for in
that case they would really produce light. Thus according to Aris
totle these substances were not in the strict sense phosphorescent
(Baumker, p. 26).
4>s is the evepyeia or cvreXe^eta TOV Staffravovs (cf. De An. II.
ch. 7, 4i8b 9, 419 a n) the proper function of the transparent
medium.
Again, in ch. 3, 439 a 21 below, it is said to be the presence of
something of the nature of fire in the transparent medium. Since,
then, it requires something of the nature of fire to produce light and
COMMENTARY 135
the eye does not consist of fire, it cannot be said to produce light.
Hence it would be suggested that the phenomenon is one of re
flection, though where the light is to come from when the eyes are
closed is not apparent.
437 b 2. <j>ah/T<u (2). There are many instances of Qaivcrai
taking this sense (cf. 3, 440 a 8 etc.). But most interpreters take
<cuVeTcu Se TOVTO to mean This is evident, i.e. what was said before
about the eye not producing light is evident because of what follows.
But that is not the sense required. The one becoming two is not
the reason why the eye does not emit light. But the eye is seen
because, though really one, it appears when quickly moved to be
two.
437 b 3. 8vo ytyvco-Oai TO <lv. This is very difficult to understand.
Simon prefers to take Alexander s second interpretation, that one
part of the eye sees the other that which is in loco naturali sees
that which is not. But the interpretation does not explain why
swiftness of motion is essential to the phenomenon. Probably
Aristotle was thinking of common instances of a single object
appearing to be made double by rapid motion (as e.g. a vibrating
string) and applied this in a confused way to the present case. He
apparently thought that the eye, when at the one position, could see
itself at the other if the oscillation between the two was so rapid that
it appeared to be at both points at the same time. It will not do to
say, as Ziaja does, that the eye regains its former position before the
light from it, when at the place from which it has moved, arrives.
According to Aristotle the propagation of light is instantaneous and
one must not read into his words a theory of light vibrations.
437 b 5- TO opwfuvov. The eye at the position to which it
moves.
437 b 7- Cf. 437 a 34 above.
437 b 12. dvaK\do-u Aristotle does not mean to identify the
present phenomenon with reflection but merely to adduce another
instance illustrating the apparent duality of the eye by the apparent
duality of seer and seen caused by reflection in a mirror.
E|Air8oK\iis. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy , pp. 264 sqq.,
Meno 76 c, and De Gen. Animal, v. ch. i, 779b 15.
437 b 13. Tipata. For the Platonic theory of sight-perception
compare Timaeus ch. vii. 316 and ch. xxx. 67 c sqq., and especially
ch. xvi. 45 B sqq.
437 b 1 6. o TCjicuos. Cf. Timaeus, 45 D.
136 DE SENSU
437 b 17. KVOV. Kerds and its adverb KCVWS are constantly used
in the sense of * irrelevant : cf. De An. i. ch. i, 403 a 2 of definitions
that are mere vague generalities.
Cf. also Eth. Nic. n. ch. 7, 1107 a 30 etc. : but it may mean as
well unfounded, as in An. Post. i. ch. 3, 73 a 18. Here probably
both implications are to be assigned to the word. The thought is,
that it is absurd to talk of the aTrdo-ySeo-is of sight, because the notion
of quenching has nothing to do with the nature of light. Hence
the theory is groundless because of the irrelevancy of the ideas to the
phenomena in question. In addition, even if they were relevant, the
theory would conflict with facts. The argument of the whole passage
is that dTroo-^ecrts can be predicated only of TO Trvp and y <Ao, not
of light, for, as we saw before (cf. note to 437 a 34), light is not fire
though it requires the presence of TrvpuSe? . Plato and Empedocles,
however, when alleging that the light which issues from the eye
is quenched in darkness, imply that it is of the nature of fire which
is $ep/z6v KCU r)pov and is quenched by either moisture or cold, the
contrary qualities. (The Aristotelian theory is that things are neu
tralised by and pass into their opposites.) Now <f><Ss is not of the
nature of nvp and hence to talk of its avon-fieo-is is absurd.
Secondly, even if there were something of the nature of fire in
light though imperceptible, it would be extinguished by wet and
cold weather ; which is not true.
For the distinction of irvp and <ws cf. also Top. v. ch. 5, i34b 28.
437 b 20. TO> <j>om. The mere bringing forward of the fact that
light is not quenched by wet shows that Aristotle really means to
deny that it is of the nature of fire.
Alexander, however, evidently troubled by the fact that light is
warm and hence perhaps should be identified with fire, suggests an
emendation or rather a reconstruction of the passage which would
make out that Aristotle, while conceding that fire is dry and
1 warm, points out that darkness which is supposed to extinguish it
has neither of the opposed qualities and hence cannot do so. On
this interpretation the rest of the passage would run but if dark
ness is really, though imperceptibly, cold and wet, we should expect
the marked presence of those characteristics to make a difference to
sight by daylight. But this is not found to hold good.
437 b 22. tiSari. It would not be correct to say that light is
not diminished when it penetrates water ; vSup frequently signifies
rain or rainy weather.
COMMENT A RY 137
Similarly Trayos must be here frosty weather, not ice.
437 b 25. TOIOVTOV, i.e. the behaviour of light in cold or damp
weather.
437 b 27. otfrws. Cf. R. P. 177 b. Burner, Early Greek Philo
sophy, pp. 231-2. They are vv. (Stein) 316-23, Fr. 84 (Diels, Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker).
438 a i. Xoxatero. exvaro suffused, is another reading which
would make the construction easier.
438 a 3. 8ia0po><rKov. Su eo-Kov, suggested by Blass, N. Jahrb. /.
Phil. u. Pad. 1883, p. 19, would improve the grammar of the passage.
Translate * but they (at 8 ) let the fire through.
438 a 4. airoppofcus. Cf. Empedocles and Plato loc. cit. in note
to 437 b 13. Aristotle s words imply that Empedocles had no con
sistent theory but had recourse alternately to the doctrine that fire
issued from the eyes and illuminated objects, and to that according
to which effluences from bodies entered into the pores of the eye
and so created perception.
The fact seems to be that Empedocles intended to account for
vision by postulating that both those operations took place, but had
great difficulty in reconciling them, and that thus at one time we hear
more about the one than about the other.
The difficulties attending the acceptance of either one or Loth
theories are pointed out below by Aristotle in 438 a 26 sqq.
We may conjecture as Hammond does, Aristotle s Psychology,
p. 152 note, that he imagined that the images of things entering
by means of the pores through the outer covering of the eye are
illuminated by the fire issuing from the pupil. But it is not clear
that he said anything so definite unless Aristotle means (in 11. 29-30
below) that TO ev apxf) <rviJ,<f>v<rOa.i rov O/U/ACITO? was one of the
positions held by Empedocles. It is manifest from what Theo-
phrastus says (fi. P. i77b) that, according to the Empedoclean
theory, fire existed both in the external world and in the eye, and
that the effluences from things which produced the perception of
visible objects consisted of fire. Fire was the finest of all substances
and could thus penetrate the finest of the pores. Through the
passages of the water we perceived dark objects.
This must surely mean that objects throw off effluences composed
both of fire and water and that the fire penetrating through the fine
pores is perceived by its like fire, and the water, a crasser substance,
can enter only by the wider pores and is recognised by its like the
138 DE SENSU
water in the eye; cf. R. P. i7;b. Of course it is qua light that
objects are visible (dark being but a privation of light), and hence
the really important part in vision is that played by the fire. Thus
Aristotle is justified in regarding the Empedoclean theory as one
which referred vision to fire.
438 a 5. Arip-oKpiTos. Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Philosophy , n. pp.
266 sqq., cf. p. 268. This doctrine was also shared by Leucippus
and Epicurus.
The theory of Democritus was also one of diroppouu. Things
threw off ctSwAa which affected the sense organs. But in the case of
sight it seems to have been not actually the ei Sw/W thrown off from
the object but the impression caused by this in the air which was
reflected in the eye. (Cf. Theophrastus, de Sensu, 50, Zeller, op. tit.
n. p. 219.) This was connected with his doctrine that we did
not perceive things as they were in themselves but only as they
affected the senses. Nevertheless he seems to hold that the medium
is at the same time affected by an effluence from the seeing eye, but
how it is possible to reconcile this with any intelligible theory of
reflection it is difficult to see.
It is noteworthy that Plato too had some such theory of inter
action between the effluence from the eye and from the external
object ; cf. Timaeus, 45 c.
The effluences are, however, according to him, fire (cf. the com
parison of the eye to the sun in Rep. vi. 508). But he also agrees
with Democritus in holding that by like we perceive like and that
perception takes place with the whole soul.
438 a 6. g|x<J>a<riv. Cf. notes to 437 a 34 sqq. e^ao-ts means
the appearing or being visible of one body in another : cf. Meteor.
in. ch. 4.
438 a 8. eKivfa>. The visibility or being seen of the reflected
object exists not in the eye in which the reflection takes place but in
the eye of the spectator who sees the reflection.
I have here followed Ziaja and Bender in opposition to Alexander,
Simon, Thomas, St Hilaire and Hammond. Hammond appears to
make TOVTO refer to ryv l/x^ao-iv and then to supply a new subject
TO opav as the subject of IVTW. This is surely in defiance of
grammar.
If one took TOVTO to mean TO TT)V e/x^acriv opav the sense would be
plain enough and would be exactly what we require. This is how
ever to give a very liberal interpretation to TOVTO which should mean
COMMENTARY 139
TO e/A<aiV<7#cu, which is the appearance of an ciScoXov in a smooth
surface. Now, though Aristotle could not say that the etSwXov
(a special term used by Uemocritus) was not lv cKfwtp (the reflecting
eye), he can quite well maintain that the appearing of the etScoXov in
the reflecting surface is not itself in the surface. Alexander also
takes TO opav as the subject of eWtv and interprets a/ KVa> as lv rfj
/x<ao-ei. Simon and St Hilaire differ from him only in taking ev
e/ceivw to mean on TO o/x/x,a XLOV.
If, therefore, we were to follow Alexander we should render
For reflection occurs because the eye is smooth; but vision does not
lie in the reflection or take place by means of it, but occurs in the
seer, i.e. is an affection of one who has the power of sight. Accord
ing to Simon and St Hilaire we should turn the latter part of the
sentence thus but vision does not lie in this property of the
eye, etc.
In addition to the syntactical objections to these interpretations,
they have the demerit of making Aristotle reason in a circle. In
arguing against the theory that vision is reflection, to state as one s
reason that vision does not lie in the reflection of things in the eye
and in its property as a reflecting structure, is merely to reiterate
one s objection without proving it. cKtivtp must refer to TO o/x/xa and
the argument is to the effect that reflection must presuppose vision,
because the mirroring of anything is a fact not for the subject in
whose eye it takes place but for a second person who sees it.
438 a 13. &|/iv. Note that o\j/iv, the word for the sense-faculty,
is used as though it referred to the sensorium. Cf. Neuhauser,
Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermogen und seinen
Orga?ien, p. 79, and cf. note to 438 b 22 below.
438 a 14. SicujxxWs. The whole nature of TO Sta^ave s will be
treated below in ch. 3.
438 a 1 6. viri\T]T<$T6pov. ewTToX^TTTOTcpoi/ is the variant reading
(LSU Alex.) which, if possible, only repeats the idea of ev</>vXaKTo-
Tepov. With evTriXiyroTepoi/ the KOU becomes epexegetic.
. Aristotle is here referring to what are now called the aqueous and
vitreous humours.
438 a 21. rots x ov<riv alfia. The sanguineous and non-san
guineous animals were two main divisions in Aristotle s Zoology.
Cf. De Part. Anim. iv. ch. 5, 678 a 33. Insects and Crustaceans
were placed in the latter class as the fluids in their bodies, not being
red, were not thought to be blood.
140 DE SENSU
438 a 26. aXo-yov. Aristotle here returns to his criticism of the
Empedoclean and Platonic theory. Cf. above 437 a 24 438 a 5.
The transition to this topic once more is probably to be explained
by the fact that Democritus, too, held a theory according to which
something emanates from the eye. Hence Aristotle first mentions
the doctrine in its most general form (6 Aws TO e^toVrt /i...o/oai/) and
then glides on to discuss the specially Empedoclean and Platonic
theories.
438 a 28. o-v|i(}>v<r0cu. The fire from the eye unites with that
which is the effluence from external bodies.
438 a 29. rives. Probably the more scientific Platonists or
interpreters of Empedocles.
kv apxij. Alexander and Simon interpret as I have translated.
Aristotle proposes to simplify the phenomenon by supposing that
the union of fire with fire takes place in the eye itself before the
internal fire issues out, i.e. in the starting place of the internal fire
according to the more complex theory. It will be easier, he thinks,
to support the theory if one omits that part which makes the union
of fire with fire take place outside the eye.
One must not translate with Hammond It would be better to
assume that the combination of the eye with its object were in the
eye s original nature.
In the first place, this makes Aristotle propose to supersede the
older theory by an explanation which merely shelves the difficulty
and refers it to a faculty. Secondly, Aristotle is talking not of a
combination of eye with object but of fire with fire; as is apparent
from the next sentence, apart from which this one cannot be under
stood.
Simon quotes De Part. Animal, in. ch. 4, 665 b 14 (OTTOV yap eV
Se^erat /xiW fiiXnov rj -rroA-Aas) as an illustration of the principle of
parsimony in Aristotle.
438 a 31. <j>o)Ti irpbs <J>ws. Alexander affiliates this and the
following statement ov yap TW TVXOVTL K.T.\. to the doctrine ex
pounded in De Gen. et Corr. \. ch. 10, where we find, 327 b 20 : ov
yap airav aVaim /XIKTOV aAA vTrap^etv Set ^pia-rov eKarcpoi/ TWV fJLL%-
OevTuv, i.e. only concrete objects (^wpto-ra), i.e. o-w/xara, can be mixed ;
now light is a irdQos of the definite type eis (cf. De An. in. ch. 5,
430 a 15) and hence cannot experience /AI^IS. This explanation
assumes that the o-v/x<vo-is here talked about is a case of /xi is, which
is not quite evident. Neither is it evident that the union of light
COMMENTA RY 141
with light (o-v^Traycs yevo/xevov) mentioned in Plato, Tim. 45 c, against
which this argument is directed, is properly a case of p&s. Plato
uses the term av^ves below in 45 D probably hardly in the exact
sense in which o-v^vco-Oai is here employed. It need mean no
more than kindred.
o~vfjuf>vo-Qai means no more than to grow together or unite, and
not the union of two different substances which results in the pro
duction of a third distinct one, which is the sense in which Aristotle
employs ^tfe- Hence Alexander s discussion of the blending of
lights (he denies that they can be united) seems to be irrelevant, and
whether o-v/x^vo-ts can be brought under the category of /aiis is
not clear.
Besides, if Alexander s were the correct interpretation, a Platonist
might still reply that according to his theory light is nothing do-w/xarov,
and hence (according to Aristotelian principles) could combine with
other light. Cf. Timaeus, 45 c : ei/ o-w/xa oiKta>#i/ crwe cm; by the
union of the internal and the external light.
Perhaps Aristotle need mean no more than that the union of
light with light is on the Platonic theory quite unexplained. Com
pare next note.
438 b i. TO rv\6v. The commonest interpretation and that in
consonance with Alexander s explanation (cf. above) is Not every
thing will unite with anything else and that is referred to the
doctrine ov yap a-rrav airavri /JLLKTOV in De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 10.
According to the translation I suggest the argument would run,
How will this unexplained "union " of the Platonists produce sight?
When we see, we see something definite, i.e. it is not with TO rv^ov
that the union is effected. The theory is not capable of explaining
in detail how we see.
438 b 3. ev aXXois. De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b i, 419 a 9, in. ch.
5, 430 a 16.
438 b 5. This seems to contradict what is said below in ch. 6,
446 b 3 1 : O.A.A. ov KLvt](TL<; (TO </>u>s). It is true that /aVr/o-is is fre
quently used for all the four varieties of change and as equivalent
to /xTa/3oA.?j change in general, not merely to <opd local motion,
which is its most characteristic sense. The four species of change
are I. (KO.T ovo~iai ) yveo"i<j KOLL <f>0opd : 2. (KO.TO, TO TTOO~OV) av^rjcris KCU
<$>6icri<; : 3. (Kara TO TTOU) <opa : 4. (Kara TO TrotoV) aAAouoo-is. Hence,
if light is an dAAoiWis (qualitative change) and KtVr/o-t? is here used
vaguely as including it, there is no contradiction between the two
142 DE SENSU
statements. We shall, however, maintain when we come to chapter 6,
that in the Aristotelian theory the propagation of light is not even to
be described as dXXotWtq.
438 b 10. T| x|/vx^i is wider than consciousness, but Aristotle,
though of course meaning merely consciousness here, is forced to
use the wider term for want of a special word to designate conscious
life in general without suggesting any one special faculty. We shall
be forced to translate i/o^r? thus more than once.
438 b ii. evrds. This surely must mean eVros rov o/x/x,aro?.
The faculty or 8wa/u? of the special sense of sight resides within the
eye. If this statement is capable of being generalised at all, it can
be extended only so far as to include the organs of the other two
mediated senses (hearing and smell). This cannot be taken as
a reference, as Alexander (p. 36) and Neuhauser (pp. 65 and 127)
seem to think, to the central sense, which resides further within the
body (in the heart). It is not the function of this central faculty to
discriminate the objects of the special senses. It is the seat rather
of that self-consciousness which also discriminates the various special
senses (cf. De An. in. ch. 2), and is generally the organ of KOU/TJ
aiaOrjcns and <j>avTa(TLa..
If the faculty of vision resided in the central organ then surely
according to Aristotle s argument there would need to be a trans
parent medium extending through the body right up to it, and it
itself would need to have the same property. Neuhauser indeed
maintains that something like this is, according to the Aristotelian
theory, the case. But a much simpler explanation is possible.
Something internal is the organ, Aristotle says, and hence it must
be transparent. The interior of the eye is that which fulfils the
conditions. Why the organ should be transparent is due to his
general theory that it should be capable of receiving the same deter
minations as those existing in the world outside, i.e. should be Se/cn-
KOV TOV etSovs of the external bodies (De An. n. ch. 12, 424 a 18).
Cf. Introduction, sec. iv. pp. 7 sqq.
The statement that the sense faculty resides within is not a
deduction from what is said in the De Anima about the internal or
central sense ; it is a truth said to be given by observation (S^Xov)
and Aristotle at once proceeds to adduce a confirmatory instance.
If we hold with Neuhauser that the seat of perception is really
always a central organ even in the case of the special senses and
that Aristotle held a theory according to which substance of the same
COMMENTARY 143
kind as that composing the peripheral organ extended along the
Tro poi up to the central chamber of the heart, then perhaps euro s
might mean in the central region. Perhaps Alexander, when he
says TTopous ev ols TO Siaejfxxve s, may also be referring to a similar
theory. It seems an extraordinary hypothesis (cf. Introduction,
sec. vi.) and it is not at all clear whether Neuhauser has succeeded
in substantiating it or merely in disproving the rival theory, viz. that
the blood is, in Aristotle s eyes, the medium of communication
between the end organ and the central one. Cf. note to 439 a 2 :
Neuhauser, Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermogen
und seinen Organen, pp. 111-129.
438 b 14. TOVS iropovs. Those who (e.g. Thomas, etc.) think
that the reference is here to the central sense must hold that the
Tro poi are the optic nerves, which Aristotle imagined to be ducts
leading to the brain and ultimately to the heart. Cf. Hist. Animal.
iv. ch. 8, 533 a 13, De Part. Animal, n. ch. 10, 656 b 17. Alexander,
however, seems to understand them to be the Tro poi of the older
philosophers the passages through which (according to their view)
the eye s internal fire issued. Cf. Theoph. De Sensu, 7 (R. P.
176 b) and Arist. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 8, 324 b 26.
Alexander says TOUS Trdpovs eV ots TO Sta^ave s CO-TI and since the
nerves are not (except on Neuhauser s theory) transparent we can
assume only that he means the passages supposed to exist in the eye
itself. Blindness ensuing on the cutting of the optic nerve would
show rather that the sense was not localised in the eye, but we have
seen reason (see previous note) for maintaining that this is not the
Aristotelian view. Hence Aristotle is not here referring to such
a serious wound as one which would sever the optic nerve but to a
more superficial injury to the eye. This is also borne out by the
simile which follows. You cut the wick and the flame goes out ;
and so you destroy the channel communicating the external light to
the pupil and sight is destroyed. This interpretation also gives Trapa
its characteristic sense. On the other hand we must remember that
Trapa need mean no more than on. To read IOO-TC r/jiTjOrjvaL in this
line along with Mr Bywater (Journal of Philol. xxvin. p. 243)
would probably be better.
438 b 19. TOVTOV rbv Tpoirov. Cf. above 437 a 21. Aristotle
does not commit himself to the proposed reduction.
438 b 22. \|/6<|>&&gt;v. Cf. De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 4 : 77 8 aKorj de pos.
irupbs 8fc rf|v 6<r<J>pT]<riv. This statement seems to contradict what is
144 DE SENSU
said in De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 5 : r\ 8 oo-^p^o-t? Oarepov TOVTWI/ (sc.
vSttTO? KCU, 0,epOs)...TO 8e TTUp 7? Ol)OeVO<S ?) KOLVOV TrttVTOJV. If then WC
take oo-^pTio-is to be the sense organ here (a very common use; cf.
above 438 a 13, Bonitz, Ind. p. 538 a 30), the two passages are in
disagreement. Again the statement in 11. 25-26 beneath rj 8 007x77
KaTrj wS^? ava0v/uWis mv is in contradiction with ch. 4, 443 a 23
sqq., where it is denied that 007x17 is of the nature of dvaOvniacris.
These considerations have led Alexander and most interpreters
to maintain that here Aristotle is not putting forward his own theory
(ov yap 877 a peWoi/Ta avrw Xe yei, Alex. 38, 1. 14 [W.]), but merely dis-
cussing the consequences and the detailed working out of the doctrine
suggested by the earlier philosophers namely the ascription of each
sense organ to a separate element.
On this interpretation the reading of the majority of the codices
tos ci Set in 11. 18-19 above, which Biehl adopts and Baumker, p. 48,
prefers, is particularly welcome. E M and Y read merely favcpov ws
8ei and Bekker follows.
Thus it is contended that Aristotle s adoption of the correspon
dence of each sense organ to a separate element is merely hypo
thetical. Nevertheless it is strange that if this is so, Aristotle should
go on to work out the connection between smell and fire by the aid
of his own technical terms and connect it with his own theory of the
excessive coldness of the brain. It almost looks as though the
doctrine were one which had attractions for Aristotle and which was
left as an unexpunged suggestion even after the possibility of recon
ciling it with the rest of his philosophy had been removed.
But, as it is stated, there are great difficulties to be overcome.
The proof in 11. 22-25, as Alexander recognises, merely shows that
the organ of smell \& potentially (SWa/m) of the nature of fire and is
actually cold. It is not on all fours with the former two sense organs
which are actually (wcpytta) water and air respectively.
Hence Hayduck (Prog. Kon. Gym. zu Meldorf, 1876-7) proposes
not to take those lines (6 yap eVepyeta. K.T.X.) as a proof of the
previous statement and to read 6 Se cvcpycia K.T.X. He also pro
poses to omit 1. 25 ?? 8 607*77... 1. 27 Trvpds as being in hopeless dis
agreement with the other passage at 443 a 23 sqq. His explanation
is that Aristotle, beginning with a discussion of the organs corre
sponding to each sensuous function, naturally mentions the act of
smelling and so proceeds to discuss its peculiar organ, which, though
not parallel to the organs of sight and hearing in that it does not
COMMENTARY 145
consist of any single element, he yet takes the opportunity of dis
cussing. It seems however that Aristotle is really attempting to make
the sense of smell in some way parallel to the other two and that
11. 22 sqq. are intended to prove this. Hence the elaborate doctrine
about the coldness of the region in which the sense organ is situated
and which is potentially warm ; and we hear elsewhere that r\ T^S
ocrpy^s &vvafj.t.s Oep/Jitj rrjv fyvariv CCTTLV (444 a 27). So that, in spite of
the fact that he has not proved the sense organ to consist of actual
fire, Aristotle evidently wishes to establish some connection between
fire and odour. Hence Ziaja (De Sensu, p. 1 1) maintains that he does
not intend here to discuss the nature of the sense organ of smell and
that there is no conflict between this passage and any other. He
points out how, when the brain is said to be vyporaros /cat i^v^poraro?
TOOV ei TO) o-<jo/za.T6 /zop/W, that agrees with the passage in De An.
425 a 3 sqq. where it is held that the sense organs are composed
only of air and water. This latter statement however, it must be
observed, is not perfectly unqualified, for Aristotle goes on to say
that fire, though not a special ingredient of any one, may be said to
exist in all (ovOev yap aveu ^epjaorr/To? ai<r$r;Ti/coV) and that earth is
either in none or is specially incorporated in the organ of touch (cf.
below 11. 32 sq. : TO Se VLTTTLKOV 7175). This passage (</>z>.) shows the
difficulty which there is in extracting a consistent statement from
Aristotle as to the nature of the sense organs, and the fact that his
theories on this subject seem to fluctuate makes it difficult to avoid
thinking that here he at least starts with an attempt to work a parallel
between the organs of sight and hearing on the one hand and that of
smell on the other. It is quite evident, as Rodier, DC An. 11. p. 349,
points out, that rrjv ocr^prja-tv must here mean TO rrjs oo-^pr/o-ews
alo-OrjT /ipLov, otherwise it could not support the statement <ai/epoj ok
et 8et K.T.A. ; besides Aristotle plainly means the sense organs in the
Other cases TO opon/coV, TO TCOV if/ocjx^v alcrOrjTLKOi , TO OLTTTLKOV.
Hence, unless we adopt Hayduck s bold emendations, we must
conclude (i) that the doctrine here is a tentative construction of
a parallel between the organs of smell, touch and taste and those of
sight and hearing; (2) that the parallel consists in assigning each to
a special element (touch and taste, being generically the same, share
one between them) ; (3) that though Aristotle cannot work out the
parallel in the case of smell and the attempt to do so endangers
conflict with the rest of his teaching, the theory has attractions for
him owing to its symmetry and the fact that in so far as it can be
R. 10
146 DE SENS U
worked out it connects with his account of the nature of the brain ;
and hence it was not deleted, but became incorporated with the re
mainder of his preserved writings.
yap. On Hayduck s suggestion this is changed to 8e, and the
following statement is not a reason for the preceding one but a
new premise from which, in combination with the preceding one, 810
Kat K.T.X., 11. 27 sqq., is deduced.
438 b 23. Swd|ii. Cf. De An. n. ch. 5, 418 a 3 : TO 8 alcrOrjriKov
8tM a//.et ItTTiv olov TO a.icr6r)Tov -rjorj evreXe^eta. Cf. also II. ch. 12, 424 a
1720: if] fJiv aicrOrj(TL^ ecrrt TO OCKTIKOV TOOV alcrOrjTMv etScov avcu Tr/9
v\.r)s and III. ch. 2, 425 b 23 : TO yap alo-OrjTijpLov OCKTLKOV TOV ala-Orjrov
The theory is, that the sense organ is potentially capable of
receiving the form i.e. the perceptible properties of the object of
sense. In the act of perception object and sense are one, but, when
the sense organ is not stimulated, it is only potentially percipient,
the object only potentially perceived. Cf. 425 b 26 : r/ TOV alcrOyjTov
vepyeta Kat TT^S ato~0^o~a><5 rj avTT] CO~TL Kat /xia. In the act of percep
tion the organ becomes like its object previously to perception it is
unlike ; cf. 418 a 5, 6 : Trao-^et /xev ov^ O/JLOLOV 6V, TreirovOos 8 Gj/xo/Wat
KOL ZCTTLV OLOV 6KtVO.
Note that Aristotle has no need to assume that the sense organs
consist of the elements because like is perceived by like. The
organ was not like its object in consisting of the same material but
in receiving its et8os or Aoyos the pattern according to which it was
constructed. Cf. Introduction, sec. iv.
438 b 24. iroiei. The external object is the agent in percep
tion; the sense organ is passive. Cf. De. An. n. ch. 5, 417 b 20 : TO.
TroLirjTLKa T^S evcpyeias e^w^ev, TO opaTov Kal TO OLKOVO-TOV, 6/xottos 8e KOL
TO. XOITTO. TOJV aio-OrjTwr.
If we read o in 1. 25 below we cannot translate the latter (sc.
the sensation) must have an antecedent potential existence, as
Hammond does, but the sensation is what it previously had the
potentiality of becoming.
438 b 27. TOV eyKc <{>aXov. The brain was not the organ of sensa
tion according to Aristotle but played a subsidiary part in the bodily
economy as neutralising the heat of the heart. On the other hand
excessive cold in the brain was tempered (at least in man) by the
dry warmth of odours which were healthful and hence delightful.
Cf. below ch. 5, 444 a 9 sqq.
COMMENTA R Y 1 47
438 b 29. This is an application of the general Aristotelian
doctrine that opposites pass into each other. Things are only
opposite in so far as they have the same V\Y) and it is through having
the same vXy that they can pass into each other. Hence the vXrj is
potentially capable of being either. Cf. Phys. i. ch. 9, 192 a 21 :
(f>6apTLKa yap a\\7JXo)v ra evavrta, and IV. ch. 9, 217 a 22
v\rj fJiid TOJI/ ei/avTtwv, Oep/jLOv KOLL ij/v^pov KCU rwv aXXoov rcov <
erai Tito<Tecov, etc.
TOV ofijjiaTos. Cf. De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 6, 743 b 28 sqq., 744.
438 b 33. ^s. Cf. De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 7 : cf. above note
to 438 b 22.
TO 8e -yevo-TiKov K.T.\. Cf. 441 a 3 sq. : rj yeuo-is a(f>ij rts ecrrtV and
De An. in. ch. 12, 434 b 18. Comment on this doctrine will be
postponed until we come to chapter 4, where taste is discussed at
length.
439 a 2. irpbs TTJ KapSta. It is true that the organs of taste and
touch transmit Ku^tret? sense affections to the heart, but we cannot
translate Trpos rfj KapSla by conduct to the heart, as Hammond
does, because, according to Aristotle s general theory, all sense
organs should do so, and besides Aristotle is here not discussing the
question of the communication of the exterior sense organs with the
inner -n-pwrov ai&OrjT-rjptov, but the nature of the composition of those
sensoria. It is true that Aristotle does not make clear how the
Ktvfjo-fLs from the special senses are conveyed to the heart (cf.
Zeller, Aristotle n. pp. 67-70, English Trans.). Alexander says that
there are three TTO/OOI extending from the heart to the brain and then
to the three sense organs of sight, hearing and smell respectively,
but in the case of taste and touch the TTO/JOI communicate directly
with the end organs ; by these the /ai/^creis are transmitted. For
confirmation of this cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a 12 sqq. ; De Insom. ch.
3, 461 a i sqq. The blood seems to some to be the medium of
transmission but we cannot certainly say so. According to Neu-
ha u&er it certainly is not. The medium is a substance of the same
nature as the end organ extending (in the case of the three senses of
which the organs are localised in the head) along Tropot first to the
brain and ultimately to the heart. Cf. Introduction, sec. vi. and Neu-
ha user, pp. no sqq. It is true also that the heart, which is the organ of
the common sense (cf. De Juvent., De Insom. loc. cit. above and De
Somno ch. 2, 455 a 21 : TO Kvpiov atcr^^Tr/ptov), seems to be also the
special organ of touch (cf. 455 a 23 : TOVTO (TO Kvptov aiaOrjTrjpiov} T<3
148 DE SENSU
w /xaAto-$ vTra pxei)) between which and its object the flesh
seems to be the medium (cf. De An. n. ch. n, 423 b 26 : TO /xera^v
TOV a.7rTiKov ^ o~ap, and III. ch. 2, 426 b 15 : -rj aap OVK tern TO
t(T\a.Tov alcrOrjTTJpiov). But however that may be and if the latter
point is to be insisted upon we had better translate their organ is
situated in the region of the heart the question is here not one of
communication, but of the origin of the organs in question. If the
organ of smell is actually cold and potentially warm and apprehends
what is in actuality warm (ocr/x^), so conversely the organ of taste and
touch should be actually warm but potentially cold if it apprehends
what is actually cold, viz. yfj.
Alexander, however, will not allow that yr; is the proper object of
touch. Certainly it is the Aristotelian theory that touch perceives
not merely the qualities of yrj, i.e. TO \ffvxpw and TO rjpov, but all the
four ultimate (and primary in that sense) qualities of objects (cf.
above note to 437 a 22) and others as well (cf. De Gen. et Corr. n.
ch. 2, 329 b 17 sqq.). Hence once more we have evidence that the
above argument is at best only tentative.
If we take it that the organ of touch is actually of the nature of
earth and has the characteristic qualities of earth, then it is impos
sible to see how it is connected with the heart, which is the seat of
warmth. If it is potentially of the nature of yrj then it will, like the
heart, have actually the opposite qualities. But in that case we
shall have failed to account for the perception of TO Ocppov, as well as
other qualities, by it, in the sense of reconciling that to the general
Aristotelian doctrine that the organ is unlike the object before
sensation but in the act of perception becomes qualitatively identical
with it, as is stated in De An. n. ch. 5, 417 a 20.
Cf. also De Part. Animal, n. ch. 10, 656 a 29: KCU Sum at /xev
8vo (^ai epws TjpTTjfJievaL Trpos rrjv KapStW eto-tV, ry Te TMV a-rrTwv KOL 77 TOJJ/
alo-9r]TT)piov. One more proof that the whole passage is a dis
cussion of sensoria.
CHAPTER III.
(This chapter begins the treatment of the objects of the special senses.
It treats of colour.)
439 a 9. Iv TOIS ircpi \|/VX.TIS. Cf. DC An. n. ch. 712.
439 a 10. gp-yov. In DC An. i. ch. i, 4025 12 Aristotle talks
about the function (Ipyoi/) of the sense. The function of the sense
is to perceive, that of the object to cause perception ; but as we
shall see (cf. note to 439 a 17-18), when functioning, sense and its
object are qualitatively identical.
cvepyELv. This practically repeats the sense of cpyoi/. tvepyeia
contains more explicitly the notion of the realisation of an end
than epyov, but the two are often almost identical and tend to replace
each other in our texts, e.g. in De Mem. ch. i, 449 b 20.
439 a ii. TO TI eo-Tiv is the essential nature of a thing as
revealed in its definition (without going on to state its additional
properties). Aristotle is now to discuss what each object of sense is
in its own objective nature apart from its action on the sense organs.
439 a 17 18. tv TOIS irtpl ^vx.f}?. Cf. De An. nr. ch. 2, 425 b 26:
rj 8e TOV alo 6 rjTov erepycta Kal Try? aiir^freajs rj avrrj jjif.\> ecm KOL /JLLO., TO
8e eti/at ov TO avro avrals.
Similarly in De An. n. ch. 5, 417 a 20, we learn that, in the act
of sensation, object and sensorium are alike. Whatever is said in
this connection of the sensorium holds of the sense faculty and, as
we have seen, Aristotle often uses the name of the faculty inter
changeably for that belonging to the organ. His theory shows in
this, respect what we might call a thorough-going psycho-physical
parallelism.
It is by his distinction between the actual and the potential
object of sense that Aristotle attempts to explain the problem about
the independent existence of external objects of sense. Considered
Kara Swo/ui> or as {woKei /xem (cf. MetapJi. IV. ch. 5, 1010 b 30 sqq.)
they have an independent existence, KO.T eVepyciai/ not. Apart from
150 DE SENSU
actual perception the sense also is a 8wa/xi< merely and, as potentiali
ties, sense and its object are different and have different names
and ycvcrt?, {f/6<f)o<; and d/co?/, xpw/xa and oi/ag etc. But the
of each is one and the same, e.g. i^o^o-is and UKOUO-IS are
one and the same.
It is, however, impossible for Aristotle to maintain this attitude
towards external reality consistently. If the sense is that which is re
ceptive of the eI8os of things, how can it be said to receive that which
prior to this reception had no existence ? It is not sufficient to say
that its viroKeifjivov existed; if we strip the external world of all elSos,
nothing is left but the Trp^rrj v\yj, and this, being perfectly undiffer-
entiated, cannot account for the difference of the elSos which we
apprehend at different times. Aristotle is forced to think of the
elSos as existing antecedently to the perception of it, and conse
quently we find in De An. n. ch. 5, 418 a 3: TO Se ala-OrjTLKov
(Wa/xet e<TTiv otov TO ala-OrjTov 17817 ei/TeXe^eta. Thus the object apart
from perception, which is said (in Metaph.^ loc. at.) to cause the
perception and is yet called a uTro/cetficvov, cannot be regarded as
a mere vTroKeijucyoi/, for to exist eVrcXexetn. is to have i8os (cf.
Metaph. ix. ch. 8, 1050 b 2 and Bonitz ad 1043 a 18, cf. also
Ind. p. 219 a 25). According both to ancient and modern
physical atomism this NTTO/CCI/ACI/OV, which is yet something actual
and not mere vX-rj, would be described in terms of spatial configura
tion, mass and motion the primary qualities from the atomistic
point of view. This solution however could not be entertained by
Aristotle, for whom the qualities relative to the special senses
were as primary determinations of physical reality as motion, figure
and mass (cf. notes to ch. 6, 445 b 6 sqq.). The atomistic solution
is only a makeshift ; but we are left with a bad contradiction in the
Aristotelian theory.
439 a 20. irepl <J>WTOS. Cf. De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 1 1 : TO 8e <cos
olov xpoj/m eo-Ti TOV Siac/mi/ovs, OTO.V rj ei^TeAe^et a 8ta^>ai/es viro irvpos rj
TOLOVTOV olov TO ctvw (Tw/jLa (TO cxi/w crc3/xa is the upper fire, the celestial
ether).
roii 8ia(f>avos. For Aristotle s theory of TO Sia^ai es cf. Intro
duction pp. 20 sqq. At first sight it seems strange to define light as
the colour of the transparent medium, especially as he goes on (in 439 1>
n below) to define colour as the limit of the transparent element in
bodies. But that which renders bodies visible is colour and, though
an object must have a definite boundary or surface for this colour to
COMMENT A RY 151
be detected, still we are bound to assume that throughout, so far as
it is a coloured thing, its nature is the same (439 a 35 below). This
quality on which its colour depends and which transpierces it
through and through is light (<<os), which is, however, but the activity
or the proper function of that property TO 8ia<jfrcu/es -which per
meates all bodies to a greater or less degree. Cf. De An. n. ch. 7,
418 b 9: <tos Se ecrrtv 77 TOVTOV evepyeia, rov Sia<avovs fj $ia<j>av<s, and
419 a II : TJ 8 e^Te/W^eto, TOV 8ia^>avo{)s <aj<; eo~TiV.
Thus though <e3s is not xP^pa- i n the sense in which that is the
Trepas of the transparent element in bodies, still it is the colour
principle which transfuses all substances.
439 a 21. By Kara a-ufxpeptiKos Aristotle means, not casually,
but indirectly i.e. subject to some condition being fulfilled, not in
its own nature without further determination. Relatively to the
thing which has a certain attribute only upon the supervention of
some condition, that attribute is contingent, and it seems to be with
this in mind that Kant identifies the contingent and the conditioned
in the proof of the antithesis in the fourth antinomy. But, from
another point of view, when we take into account the dependence of
this attribute upon its conditions it is seen to be necessary. Kara
trv/A/Je/fy/cos in Aristotle is by no means equivalent merely to due to
chance but in its general sense is used simply as opposed to /ca$
auro, due not to the essence of the thing to which it belongs but to
some external condition.
rrupwSes. Cf. De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 12 quoted above in note to
439 a 20 and again 419 a 24: TO yap Sta^aves vVo TOVTOV (sc. Trupos)
yiverai Sta^aves. It is fire, then, or anything of the nature of fire,
the sun or the celestial ether (TO avu o-c3p;a), which raises the trans
parent medium from a state of mere potentiality in which it is
u-Xpwv colourless and invisible (418 b 28) to a state in which
colour is actually visible. The fire evidently makes it actually trans
parent, and this state of actual transparency, this evepyeia, is light.
We cannot say with Hammond that light is that which converts
the potentially diaphanous into the actually diaphanous. It is fire
which performs this function.
439 a 22. -n-apovo-ia (cf. De An. 418 b 16 and 20) seems here
to be reminiscent of its technical Platonic signification immanence,
and thus we could define light as the immanence of fire in the
transparent medium.
But there are two points of view from which light can be
152 DE SENSU
regarded, (i) as a state of illumination, cf. De An. HI. ch. 5, 430 a 15,
and (2) as though it were the stimulation proceeding from the
coloured object to the eye (cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 a 31: TTO.V Se
Xpou/xa KtvrjTiKov tvnv rov KUT efepyetay Sia<ayo{)s).
Yet according to this passage in the De An. it is implied that
the state of illumination must be already realised for the stimulation
which causes vision to take effect. Aristotle, though frequently
asserting that there is a stimulation proceeding from object to eye
and talking as though this were light, yet in chapter 6 below turns
round and says that light is not a stimulation at all. According to
the interpretation of that chapter which I adopt, it is not a stimu
lation of the type dAAenWis even (i.e. qualitative change). Yet light
is still said to cause us to see (447 a 12), and if it is not the
stimulus through the medium, what is that stimulus? It appears
as though Aristotle, influenced by the apparent instantaneousness of
light transference, were trying to combine into one the notion of it
(i) as a eis, the state of illumination, and (2) as an action passing
from the object to the eye, two notions which will not unite.
Compare chapter 6, 446 a 22 447 a 12, and Introduction,
sec. vii.
439 323. TO 8ia<|>av s is no proprium of air or any one trans
parent substance.
439 a 2 5- 4>v(ris KO.I Swaps. Cf. De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 8: eo-ri
Averts virdpxpvcra r/ avrrj Iv avrot? a^c^oTepois (sc. vSari Kal aepi) KOL Iv
T(p ttJ to (TuyxaTi.
Xwpio-TTj. Light is not a substance. x M P l(TT( *- s a common desig
nation for substances. Cf. De Gen. el Corr. \. ch. 10, 327 b 21.
439 a 26. Cf. below 439 b 10. TO Sia^xxrcs is found in all, not
merely in certain bodies.
439 a 29. dopio-Ttp. <o)s as the general colour principle permeates
bodies through and through in so far as they share in the material
condition of colour phenomena.
439 a 31-32. IK TWV o-vp-paivdvTwv. Cf. 438!) 12-13 an d note
CTTt TtoV OrVfJL/SaLVOVTMV $f)X.OV.
439 a 33. IIvOcryopeuH. Cf. Plut. Epit. Aleni. i. 15; Stobaei
Eclog. i. 15 quoted by Diels, Dox. Gr. p. 313.
439 a 3435. The point is that colour is not the boundary or
surface of the body but, as appears in 439 b 12 below, of the trans
parent element in the body.
439 b 2. We may supply eu/ai after cVro s, not necessarily
COMMENTA RY 153
Tie<r0<u. Aristotle does not actually say that colour, in the sense of
definite tint, pervades the body through and through. That resides
in the surfaces. But the colour principle, which is made definite
only when the body has a definite surface, must pervade the body in
every part in so far as it is Sia^ai/eV This colour principle can be
nothing else than </>ws, and its opposite is O-KOTOS.
Most of the commentators, however, will have it that here
Aristotle is distinguishing bodies which are coloured externally
e.g. air and water, which have no proper colour of their own, and
those coloured internally i.e. with a proper colour of their own,
opaque bodies, and that he here declares that it is an identical
principle in each class that makes them receptive of colour. The
difference between the two classes of objects is that the former set,
having no definite surface, have no definite limit of the Sta^aWs in
them and it is a definite boundary that gives definite colour. But
it is solely the want of definiteness in their limits which causes the
indefiniteness of the colour. Since they show colour of some kind,
they must have the constitution which renders colour possible.
This is their transparency, which we must hence ascribe to opaque
bodies also.
If we accept this theory the translation will run as follows : We
must, however, believe that the type of construction which internally
and of its own nature takes on colour is the same as that which
receives its colour from without. Now air and water show colour,
for the gleam they have betrays tint.
The advantage of this interpretation is that it does not make
Aristotle say that the colour pervades the whole of an opaque object,
for this, unless we explain the distinction between definite and in
definite colour as above, seems to conflict with his statement that
colour resides on the surface. Cf. also Top. v. ch. 8, 138 a 15.
4>cuveTcu. Simon would translate appear to be coloured, as
though they really were not. But, though colour were held to
pervade pellucid substances which have no definite surface, that
would not entail as a consequence that it permeated opaque bodies
as well which is the conclusion against which Simon wishes to argue.
439 b 3. avyr]. Thomas and Simon translate this by aurora,
on what grounds it is difficult to discover. Perhaps it means the ray
e.g. of the sun falling upon these bodies.
439 b 6. o-wjjiao-iv. Alexander says that Aristotle here means to
indicate arepeu solids, as though they were more properly
154 DE SENSU
than air and water. But the distinction should properly be between
pellucid and opaque bodies as in 11. 1315 below. Aristotle had
already, in De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 7, noticed that many o-repea
were transparent. Probably here he leaves this latter class out of
account. (Cf. ch. 5, 445 a i7sqq. and notes on o-d>/xa and o-w/xa-
cf. beneath 439 b 18.) The argument certainly requires
here to mean definitely bounded or solid bodies. The
omission of the class of transparent solids from consideration is
simply a sign of the inadequacy of the theory.
439 b 10. iroiei. TO Starves is the material cause of colour, i.e.
it accounts for its possibility.
439 b i2. xP"P a K.T.X. This is the definition, the ri IO-TLV of
Xp<"/*a per se, and, in stating this, the De Sensu makes an advance on
the De Anima which denned it merely in reference to the organ of
sight as KLvrjTiKov TOV KO.T Ivtpytiov 8ia<avovs.
439 b 14. 6<rois K.T.X. These are the corpora terminata or
o-repca of the commentators, which have a colour of their own and
eVros xpw//,aTieTai. Many interpreters, however, disjoining Kara TO
o~xa.Tov from vTrapxciv and uniting it with 6/xoiws, find themselves in a
difficulty and identify those referred to by KCU oo-ot? with con-on/ T<J~>V
439 b 20. SicXopc vovs. 8iaipeio-0iu constantly means to break up a
genus into species or to discriminate species from each other. But,
as Aristotle has not yet given any classification of the intermediate
colours, i.e. those over and above black and white, we must interpret
rjor) SteAo/AeVous (the reading of all MSS. and edd.) as meaning merely
after recognising the distinction between the other colours and
black and white. This is to take 8ieAo/xeVous in its vaguest sense.
It is thus much better to read et Sr/ instead of r/8?/. The phrase
then becomes a common one and gives 8ieAo/xeVovs its wonted sense.
Cf. Politics IV. ch. 10, 12 95 a 8: rupavn Sos 8 eiorj ovo (MLV 8teiA.oju.cv
etc. It is true that, owing to the aorist SieAo/aeVovs, we seem still to
be committed to the promise of a preliminary classification of the
species of colour which is not fulfilled. The full list of the colours
appears only in ch. 4, 442 a 22 sqq. Thus a minor inaccuracy is left
in any case, and it may be argued that r/Sry SieAo^cVovs need give no
more than this sense. But et 8^ is a rather tempting emendation,
Aristotle s theory is that the chromatic tones are obtained by a
mixture of substances which already have the basal tones of white
and black. The chromatic tones are intermediate between black
COMMENTA RY 155
and white, which appear to be regarded as lying at the two extremities
of a continuum in the centre of which the other tints are found.
Aristotle does not however attempt to assign its exact place in the
scale to any one colour or state its affinity to either of the extremes.
Each distinct colour depends upon the proportion in which the black
and white, out of which it is formed, are mingled. But he does not
venture to state the proportion which obtains in any one case. Cf.
also Metaph. x. ch. 2, 1053 b 30.
439 b 26. P.IKTOV. The doctrine of composition or mixture is
referred to again directly: cf. especially 440 b i4sqq.
439 b 29. A Aoyos appears to be the relation which prevails
between two numbers when a division of the greater by the less
yields a rational quotient. Numbers that are not so related are said
to be OVK eV Aoyco (cf. 440 a 1 6). Aoyos then is not ratio in general
but commensurate ratio. The incommensurate is the irrational
a Aoyoj . Thus we cannot translate OVK iv Aoyu>, /JL^ ei/ apifytots
etc. by disproportionate, for that applies to a ratio when one of
the terms is excessive, not to one where the quantities are in
commensurate.
439 b 34. euXo-yio-rois easily reckoned, from Aoyiecr$ai to reckon.
Cf. Metaph. xiv. ch. 6, 1092 b 27.
440 a 2. The reason is that the evAoyiaroi u/x$/W, i.e. propor
tions where the division of one term by the other takes very little
trouble, are few in number. The author of the Problems in 920 a 27
avers that the most agreeable harmony is that of the octave, and the
reason for this is that the terms are whole numbers 2 and i, or 4
and 2, and the division yields no remainder. The next harmony in
order of pleasantness is that of the fifth, where the two notes are
related as i to i-l, and so on.
440 a 5. Tercrypie vas. The proportion of elements may be uni
form in every part, i.e. the combination is according to a regularly
recurring pattern, e.g. 3:1, 3:1, 3:1 etc., not 2:1, 4:1,
3 : i. etc.
440 a 6. nf| KaOapal. Some commentators (e.g. Simon, Ham
mond) identify the uraKroi x^oai with the p.^ Ka0apat, but, unless we
read rots aurots before ape^/xots in 1. 6 as Biehl suggests, this is im
possible, for Aristotle has immediately before said that both the reray-
/aevtti and the araKrot are lv aptO/Aols.
The impurity referred to must be want of saturation, i.e. want of
colour, if it is caused by absence of proportion between the elements,
156 DE SENSU
and all chromatic colour involves a proportion between its com
ponents. But one may ask, why does impurity seem to occur only
in the second class of colours those due to an irregular structure ?
The reason I would suggest is this Aristotle identifies the most
pleasing colours with those which depend upon a regularly recurring
structure in the combination of their elements. Relatively to these,
other colours are not so pleasing and hence not regarded as so pure,
KaOapat, if purity is a mark of excellence (as frequently in Plato, cf.
Philebus 57 A et passim) ; but the colours of this second class
contain in themselves differences in purity. Their impurity we may
assign to a total want of commensurate proportion in their composi
tion. Unless some such explanation as this is adopted we shall have
to make auras ravras refer to both classes of colours ; but this is to
strain the Greek.
440 a 8. TO <Jxuv<r0ai K.T.X. Literally the shining of one colour
through another.
This second theory is, like the first, also rejected by Aristotle.
440 a 12. 8ia 8 axXvos. The reason for this is discussed in
Meteorology in.
440 a 16-21. It is difficult to see what connection this para
graph has either with what precedes or what follows. Thurot and
Susemihl (Philol. 1885) think that it is misplaced in the text. It
refers back to the theories of Empedocles and Democritus mentioned
in chapter 2.
440 a 17. diroppoias. Cf. 438 a 4.
440 a 19. tiiOvs directly, without the intervention of any inter
mediate steps in the argument.
440 a 2i. cujnj. Why was it necessary for the atomists to
identify all sensation with touch ? Surely because differences in
sensation corresponded to differences in the tangible properties of
things. Cf. chapter 4, 442 b I and II : ot Se ra tSux ets ravra avd
yova-tv K.r.X. The argument runs if sensation is to be effected by
contact, contact with a medium which is sensitive to stimulation will
explain perception better than a theory according to which the
actual particles of the distant objects impinge upon the sense organs.
On the other reading (LSU Alex. vet. tr.) rj a<f>fj KO.L rais ewrop-
poiais there is no argument.
Thomas and Alexander try to connect this with what follows ; but
Aristotle goes on to talk of /ai^Veis impinging on the sense organ,
not effluxes.
COMMENTARY 157
440 a 23. (jLe -yeOos is almost always a spatial quantum, but cf.
\povov ch. 7, 448 b 4.
The discussion on the possibility of the existence of imperceptible
quanta is contained in chapter 6, 445 b 3 sqq.
Xpovov <xv<xio-0T]Tov. Aristotle argues at length against there being
any such thing as an imperceptible time in ch. 7 below 448 a 21 sqq.
The two moments of time in which the two sensations arrive
would, on this hypothesis, be indistinguishable as two distinct
moments, but would appear as one single moment which had no
parts. Now, as time is a continuum, each part of it must be capable
of resolution into other parts. Hence the supposition of an atomic
time is absurd, no part is imperceptible. Cf. notes to chapter 7,
and Introduction, sec. vin.
440 a 26. <XKIVTITOV when not set in motion. The surface
colour sets in motion the medium and so affects the sense (cf. De
An. II. ch. 7, 418 a 31 : TTU.V Se xpto/za KLVYJTLKOV ecrri rov KO.T ei/epyetav
Sia^arow). But Aristotle thinks that the action of the surface colour
would be different if it itself were acted on by an underlying tint.
E M Y read Kivyrov, which would imply that the surface colour
was independently itself in motion ; but this is not an Aristotelian
doctrine.
440 a 30-31. The common reading is KCU avTrj rt? av cfy xpw-
|UttT(ov yiui<j. Alexander interprets this to mean that Aristotle admits
that the superposition theory is one which accounts for one way of
mingling colours. But it is strange that, after rejecting the juxta
position theory of mixture, Aristotle should say KCU avrrj this too
is a theory which accounts for the mixture of colours. Simon,
thinking that the difficulty about ^y^Or] dopara still applies to the
superposition theory, suggests the punctuation and accentuation
I have adopted and contends that here Aristotle is calling in question
this second theory as well. If this is not so, he says, Aristotle must
be convicted of carelessness, for he nowhere else points out the
defect in the theory.
Without accepting his argument (which seems to be unfounded)
I think we can still accept his interpretation of the intention of the
clause. Aristotle calls the tViTroAao-ts theory in question because it
really is not an account of the /AIIS of the colours. The two colours
are simply juxtaposed, in this case one on the top of the other
instead of in minute parts side by side. This is merely a case of
the o-wfeo-is of the colours, not of their true mixture. We may
158 DE SENSU
anticipate the doctrine which Aristotle refers to further clown and
which is expounded in De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 10, 327 b 32 sqq.
There are two spurious kinds of mixture, /u,iis merely 777)0?
a.Lcr0r)criv, i.e. the substances appear to sense to be mixed but arc
really not so. (i) First there is the juxtaposition of things that
can be resolved into ultimate individual parts, e.g. grains of corn,
men, etc. (ei<? TO. eXa^to-rct 440 b 5 sq. below); orav...oimi>s et<?
[JUKpa Sia.iptO fj TO. fJLiyVVfJLl CL, KO.L T6fj TTttp aAA/^Aa TOVTOV TOV TpOTTOV
tocrre /AT/ BrjXov eVao-rov eli/at rfj alarOtjar^L. This is the kind of
/AIIS referred to in 440 b 4 below, which explains the xpoW KOLVIJV
(440 a 32) of distant objects, which vanishes when we approach
them. This is a case in which o-vvOecns and /u.i is are identical in
the sense that o-w$eo-is is the only ^uis of which the objects are
capable. (2) Secondly, when there is no limit to the minuteness
of the parts (e.g. in liquids), the mere juxtaposition of minute parts
is merely apparent mixture (Trpos auur&qo-w). To more accurate
vision the appearance of mixture ceases to exist. In true mixture
(which seems to be analogous to what we should call chemical
combination; cf. Mr Joachim in Journal of PJiilol. xxix.) every
part of the compound produced by the union of two substances
must be homogeneous with the whole: cf. 328 a 10: TO fjn^Olr
6/Aoto/x,eps etvat and below 440 b 3 : Trai/rr/ vrai/Tcos. Each part of the
one must completely interpenetrate the other, or rather, in union the
two substances must completely change their nature so as to be
incapable of being found in actuality in any part however minute.
(This implies a still closer union than that of chemical combination,
according to which the atoms are juxtaposed in the molecule, which
is not homogeneous in every part.)
Now superposition of colours one over the other does not imply
their mixture in the true sense.
440 a 31. K<xKiva>s must mean on the former/ i.e. the juxta
position, theory, not in this way (referring to the lirnroXavis account)
as Hammond has it.
The argument is, that the one colour shines through the other
and that at close quarters the duality of the tint can possibly be
detected, though at a distance the two produce a certain common
(KOU/T/I/) tint. But, says Aristotle, this general indeterminate tint can
equally well be produced by the juxtaposition of parts of different
colour provided they are minute enough or we are far enough away.
But it is not this neutral tint, which varies with the accuracy of the
COMMENTARY 159
vision, that has to be accounted for. Composite colours are on a
different footing, and neither of the two theories has succeeded in
accounting for them, cf. 440 b 16-19 beneath.
440 a 33. There is no need for substituting 8 for yap with
Susemihl (Philol. 1885).
The fact that no magnitude is invisible is the reason why we can
account for the juxtaposition of minute parts differently coloured
producing a common tint. If the parts were really invisible they
would not produce any colour sensation either alone or together.
Compare chapter 6 below and notes.
The theory of juxtaposition is then rejected in so far as it implies
the existence of invisible magnitudes, and retained to explain the
production of neutral tints relative to the keenness of our vision, in
so for as it is conceded that the parts do produce an effect upon our
sight. The parts, as we shall see, are perceived evcpyeia only in the
whole (eV TO) oA.u>); individually taken they are only (Wa/>iei perceptible.
440 a 34. From ct S 440 a 34 to b 14 is one long protasis.
440 b 2. TWV tXaxiorrwv. Cf. De Gen. et Corr., loc. cit. and note
to 440 a 30-31. TO, eXa^to-ra are not infinitely minute parts, but the
smallest parts that can be treated as individuals. Many things on
division do not present such parts, e.g. water and other continuous
substances are specially evSmtpera and prone to mix. Cf. beneath
11. 10 sqq., De Gen. et Corr. 328b 3: TO, vypa /JLIKTO. /xaXio-ra TCOF
cro)/xaVcoi tvopicrrov yap p,aAio-ra TO vypov rwv StaipcTwi , since /xi/cpa...
/jtiKpois 7rapaT(.$jU.eva jjiLyvvrai p,aXA.ov, 328 a 33.
440 b 3. irdvTT) -n-dvTws. Cf. De Gen. ct Corr. 3 28 a n.
Iv rots -n-epl p.C6cos. Probably only the passages referred to above.
440 b 10. oo-a 8e [r?| K.T.\. e.g. water. Cf. above.
The modern atomic theory holds that there is a limit to the pro
cess of resolution and that that is found when the atom is reached.
But there is a difficulty here, for the atom, if anything occupying
space, must be divisible into smaller components.
. 440 b 16. Kvpwxv. This is the reason of the real constant
colour of objects.
440 b 22-23. TOV currbv rpoirov K.r.X. i.e. the mathematical de
velopment of all three is alike.
440 b 25. wpto-fic va. How Aristotle reconciles this with the
undoubted continuous graduation between colour and colour will be
discussed when we come to chapter 6.
440 b 26. i!o-Tpov. Chapter 6.
CHAPTER IV.
440 b 28. This is the only place where Aristotle mentions the
omissions in the De Sensu. Hence Biehl conjectures d^? instead of
<f>wvrjs (as otherwise the absence of any other treatment of touch will
be unnoticed), ^wrj is denned in De An. n. ch. 8, 420 b 32 as
orrj/jiavTLKos TIS i//oco< and again in 420 b 5 as i//o^>o5 n? /JL^/V\OV. It is
significant sound uttered by a living creature (cf. above chapter i,
437 a ii and note).
i//o<o9, of which dW>7 is thus a species, is denned in De An.
420 b n as depos Kivrjais TIS: cf. below ch. 6, 446 b 34: So/cei 8 o
i//ocos etvcu </>epo/xeVov TIVOS KU/^Q-CS. This movement of the air is
of the nature of a rebound. The air rebounds when struck in
the same way as smooth bodies rebound from a smooth surface
(cf. De An. 420 a 21 sqq.).
440 b 29. ev rois irepl ^vx^s. De An. ii. ch. 8.
440 b 30. iraGos (cf. note to chapter i, 436 b 5 above) may
mean phenomenon or affection generally, though it is not phe
nomenon in the widest sense in which that term is employed by
modern thought, viz. as including concrete substances. TrdOos is
phenomenon in the sense in which that means an affection, event or
attribute ascribed to any concrete subject. Now trdOos is often
used for a peculiarly psychical affection and so perhaps the subject
to which, as TrdOrj, smell and taste are relative, is the perceiving soul.
Hence it will be as subjective phenomena that they are almost
identical. This seems to be borne out by a passage in the De An.
II. ch. 9, 421 a 31 sqq. : Sta TO ^\ a<oSpa StaS^Aou? ea cu ra? ocr/x.aq
wcrTrep Toi>5 ^v/xov?, OLTTO TOVTOJF eJ A^<^> TO. ovo/mara KaO 6/xotOT^ra ran
Trpay/xarwj : odours not being distinctly presented like flavours have
borrowed their names from the latter owing to the resemblance of
the actual experience in the two cases. This is to follow Alexander
and render rwv Trpay/AaVwv by the sensation. Cf. Rodier, Traite de
rAme, Vol. ii. pp. 309-311.
COMMENTARY 161
For the connection between taste and smell cf. also De An. n.
ch. 9> 421 3- 16: eoi/ce /xt/ yo/> dvoAoyov ex etl/ ^pos T ^
6/XOKO<J TO. 1877 TWV X^/AO)!/ TOIS TT^S OCT/XT^? and 421 a 26
6 /xcv yA.UKt>s 6 Se Trtfc/jo s, OUTCO /ecu ooyxcu.
Alexander, Thomas and Simon, however, seem to interpret
7ra$o9 here not as subjective affection but as objective quality. It
is true that this subjective similarity rests upon an objective
foundation. Alexander explains the identity by means of the
passage in ch. 5 beneath, 442 b 29 sqq. Odour is produced by the
further modification of a substance in which flavour has been
already developed; TO fypov is needed as a basis for both and the
effect produced in the first case by TO gypov is obtained by disso
lution (evaTroTrXweiv), the same process as that by which TO ly^v/xov
vypdv produces odour both in air and water : cf. Rodier, op. cit.
Vol. ii. pp. 309316, Alex. De Sens. pp. 66, 67, 88-91 (W.).
But though the similarity has an objective foundation it does not
cease to be a subjective phenomenon, and it is as such that we
should infer TO avro 7ra 0o? to be understood in antithesis to OVK /
rots auToig, which must be interpreted as non in eisdem subjectis, as
Simon renders it, following Thomas and Alexander. The vehicle of
taste is water, that of smell is air and water alike, or rather that
common nature which both have, named by Theophrastus TO Si-
OQ-/XOJ/ (cf. chapter 5 beneath). St Hilaire and Hammond think that
OVK ei/ TOIS avrols refers to the diversity of the organs of the two
senses. But \ v l ji0 s an d 007x77 could hardly be said to exist eV TOI?
aio-$?iTr7piois, and if Aristotle meant here to refer to the organs his
statement is singularly obscure.
441 a i. al nov K.T.X.. This is the explanation of a difference
in function by a difference in faculty, a method much derided in
modern psychology. But when one remembers that the faculty
is a determinate structure or disposition of the sense organ, and was
so. to Aristotle, the explanation, though not a genetic one, is seen to
be adequate to the purpose in hand.
441 a 3. dKpipeo-TaTTjv. a,Kpt/3eia contains at once the notions of
complexity and delicacy, or precision. The emphasis is probably on
the former in the famous passage in De An. i. ch. i, 402 a 2, where
Psychology is said to rank among the first of the sciences in point
of a/cpt /Seia. For the want of definiteness in our sense of smell
cf. De An. II. ch. 9, 421 a 9 sqq.: TYJV atarOrjo-w Tavr-rjv OVK
(3.KpL/3rj, a\\a %CLpii} TTQ\\WV ww, The reason is <a
R. II
1 62 DE SENSU
6<r/>(aTcu, KCU ovOei OS ocrc^patVcTat raJr 6cr<f>poiVT<ji)V avev TOV \v7nrjpov rj
rov T/Seos. That is to say, where feeling-tone enters largely into the
sensation there can be no exactitude in our perception, as modern
Psychology teaches is in most cases true But the final reason for
both phenomena is the indefmiteness of the structure of the sense
organ (ok OVK ovros aKpifiovs rov alaOrjrrjpLov). Compare De An. II.
ch. 9, 42 1 a 21 : Kara Se rrjv a.<j>rjv TroAAw TOJI/ aAAtoy Sta^epoVrws
a.Kpi(3ol.
The reason for the superiority of touch in man is the greater
softness of his flesh. Softness of flesh is an index not only of
tactual discriminativeness but of intellectual endowment. Cf. De
An., loc. cit. 421 a 26 and De Part. An. n. ch. 16, 660 an: /xoXaKw-
Tar?7 8 77 o~ap 77 TCOV avOpwTrwv V7rrjp^v. rovro Be. Sia TO alcrOrjTiKoj-
rarOV LVO.L Ttol/ (l)0)V TfjV OLOL TT^? O.ffi fjS OLO OrjO lV.
Aristotle s ideal of a evcfrvrfs would, on this showing, be the skilful
surgeon or mechanician. But we must remember that TO Oepfiov KCU.
TO ifaxpov were among TO, a-n-Ta, and probably by softness of flesh he
means sensitiveness to these influences as much as anything else and
hence merely delicacy of constitution in general. At least so Alex
ander understands him. Would this be an argument for the mental
superiority of the female sex? If so, Aristotle is forgetting himself.
441 a 3-4. TJ 8* ywa-is <i<}>TJ TIS i<rriv, and hence is more
aKpi/3^<s than smell. Cf. De An. n. ch. 9, 421 a 18-20, also ch. 10,
422 a 8: TO Sc yewTo v eo-Ttv OLTTTOV n and De Sens. ch. 2, 439 a i : TO
8e yevo-riKov elSc s n a^s eortV. Compare also Z?^ ^f. ii. ch. 3, 414 b
n and in. ch. 12, 434 b 18, likewise De Part. An. n. ch. 10, 656 b
37 and ch. 17, 660 a 21.
The chief arguments to prove the identity of taste and touch are
(i) that by taste we are sensible of the presence of food which is an
object of tactual sensation (414 b 7 sqq., 434 b 18-19), (2) that TO
vypov is the vAr;, the vehicle of taste, and it is dirrov n (422 an).
But (3) Aristotle finds strong confirmation for his theory in the fact
that neither requires an external medium for its operation as the
others do (422 a 8 sqq.). The flavoured substance impinges directly
upon the sense organ the tongue. Again (4) the division into
right and left parts, which is not to be detected in the case of the
organ of touch, is almost unnoticeable in the tongue (656 b 33 sqq.)
and (5) the softness of the human tongue causes its greater sensi
tiveness, just as softness of the flesh generally causes delicacy of
touch (660 a, 17-21, cf, De An. n. ch. 9, 421 a 20 sqq. and
COMMENTARY 163
last note). For this doctrine compare also the passage beneath,
441 b 26 sqq.
441 a 6-7. Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Phil. (Eng. Trans.), n. p. 166,
Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 231, Empedocles v. 312 (Stein).
But cf. Theophrastus De Sens. 7 (Dox. 500, R.P. iy7b), who says
that Empedocles did not push his investigation of taste or touch
further than to say that in them too sensation was caused by
particles fitting into the pores of the sense organ.
441 a 7-8. The meaning of Travo-Trep/xta is best illustrated by a
passage in the De Gen. Animal, iv. ch. 3, 769 a 26 sqq., where he
explains a theory that the various qualities of animals all lie com
mingled in the semen which forms as it were a Travo-Trep/xia of all
characteristics, by comparing the 701/77 to a liquid in which many
different flavours are dissolved. Travo-Trep/xi a then evidently means a
substance in which the germs of all things lie.
Trendelenburg (De An. p. 214) thinks that the word is a
Democritean term. It certainly is employed by Aristotle three
times (Physics, in. ch. 4, 203 a 21, De Coelo, in. ch. 4, 303 a 16 and
De An. \. ch. 2, 404 a 4) to describe the mixture of atoms out of
which, Democritus asserted, the world was fashioned. It is however
once employed with reference to the theory of Anaxagoras (cf. De
Gen. et Corr. i. ch. i, 3 14 a 18 sqq.), according to which bone and
flesh were the simple elements out of which air, fire, earth and
water were constructed : ot Sc (sc. ot Trepi Avagayopav) ravra ^\v a-n-Xa
/cat (TTOt^eta (Ae yovcri), yrjv Se /ecu Trvp KOU vBwp KCU a epa crvrOera TTO.V-
o-Trcp/xiav yap etvat TOV TOK : i.e. for they -flesh and bone constitute
that in which the latter all lie in germ. Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Phil.
n. p. 332, Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 290 and note. It is quite
likely that the term originated with Anaxagoras, whose interests lay
more in biological phenomena than those of his predecessors, but
there seems to be no doubt that Democritus, however inconsistent it
may have been with the general drift of his mechanical philosophy,
also employed it.
This special theory that water is otov Trava-Trep/xia ^v//x3v must
be assigned to Democritus, at least in the first form in which it is
stated (see next note). As Alexander (p. 68) points out, we must
assume a spatial difference to be responsible for the difference of
flavour in different parts, and this, says Alexander, stamps the theory
as Democritean.
The first theory differs from the second in that it supposes that
II 2
1 64 DE SENSU
flavours exist in water evcpyeta in actual fact though imperceptible
to sense, while the second gives them only potential existence ;
according to it they exist in water only in germ. This second theory
is then contrasted with a third, according to which water is quali
tatively identical in every part, and any flavour can be derived from
any portion of it, the differences which we actually find being caused
TW /uaXA.01/ rj rjTTov Ocppaivciv by the different amounts of heat to
which different portions of water are exposed. Simon acutely con
jectures that this third theory must be assigned to Anaxagoras owing
to its compliance with his doctrine of -n-avra eV Trfio-tv. It still com
prises the doctrine that water is otov irava-vepfjiia in which tastes lie
in germ, but assigns their actual differentiation out to an active
external cause. (Note that Aristotle says TO TTOLOVV not TTOLOVV TI.
All theories may have recognised the agency of heat in producing
taste but not in producing differences in flavour.)
441 a 14. This passage causes difficulty, for at first sight it
seems strange that, if Aristotle meant that the fruits were plucked,
he should not have said Kapiruv instead of TrcptKapTriW. Hence
Thurot and Susemihl (Philol. 1885) propose to read Kap-n-wv. But
though the word properly means o- WTT aa-^a Kap-n-ov, yet there are
passages in which it can only mean the fruit as a whole, e.g. Meteor, iv.
ch. 3, 380 a ii and Problems, 25, 925 b 30, and cf. below 441 b i.
Alexander suggests that it is possible to use TrepiKapTriov in its literal
sense and, in that case, the point will be that fruits change in taste
independently of the removal or permanence of the husk or peel.
But this is hardly the meaning required. The other interpre
tation is possible, and the point is that, as the connection with the
root has been severed, the water drawn up by the plant through its
roots (TO CKTOS v Swp) does not give the change in taste.
Trvpovfjitvw is the MS. reading, but it should mean, on the whole,
ignited : cf. De Part. Animal, n. ch. 2, 649 b 5, where nvpovv is
distinguished from 0ep/Wi/u/ and identified with <Ao ya iroitiv. Where
it does not mean actually to ignite, it at least denotes such intense
heating as occurs in roasting or baking (cf. De Gen. Animal, in. ch. 2,
753 b 4, and Problems, 927 b 39 sqq.). Now, here, in the case of
the sun s action, no such intense degree of heating is involved.
Hence I propose to read 7ruppov//,ej/<ov which means reddened, and
suggest that Aristotle is thinking of the reddening effect the sun
produces on many fruits as it ripens them. He is here then refer
ring to the ripening effect of the sun which actually makes fruits
COMMENTARY 165
become sweet. (Mere cooking without adding a sweetening in
gredient does not.) In the next clause he contrasts it with the
effect produced by drying and withering which makes them bitter
(cf. Problems 925 b 36 : eAcucu /ecu /?ct/Vavot TraAcuou/xei/ai TriKpat yivovTCu).
It is in the final clause 1. 18, /cat ei^o/xeVovs K.T.A. that he talks of
the effect of cooking.
441 a 20. The sense is the same whether we read Travo-Trep/xta?
(which is grammatically preferable) or Trcu o-Tre/a/xiW. The water is a
material in which the germs of the flavours lie commingled.
441 a 21-22. ws Tpo<|>T]s. Alexander, who reads ws IK. r-fjs
avrfjs rpo(f>rjs, explains that many tastes arise out of the same water,
as many different parts of the body bones, flesh etc., are formed
out of the same nourishment, and again different trees are nourished
by the same water; and thus similarly each part of the same tree,
root, bark and fruit, has a characteristic flavour though feeding on
the same moisture. He is followed by Thomas who nevertheless
used the early Latin translation which gives the equivalent of our
reading. Both readings no doubt render such an interpretation
possible, but ours rather suggests the translation I have given. In
that case the sense is simpler. There is no parallel between water
and food in general. Aristotle simply says that different tastes are
developed by plants that live upon the same water; he may mean
either the different tastes found in bark and fruit or the different
flavours of different fruits. The latter is more probable since he has
just been talking of fruits. He means that the same water can
be supplied to different trees, yet you get different flavours, which
ought not to be the case if one definite flavour resides in one
definite portion of water as the second the Democritean theory
would make out. The Travo-Trep/xia theory in its first form is thus
refuted and Aristotle passes on to the opinion of Anaxagoras.
441 a 24. BVVOJUS, in this line and again in the next, is practi
cally equivalent to <ris; cf. above ch. 3, 439 a 25: KOU/TJ <f>vats
/cat Swa^ii?. Cf. also De Mem. ch. 2, 452 a 31 and note.
441 a 25. XeirroTcxTov. The argument is directed merely against
the proposition that water acted on by heat, without any other
determinant, will develop flavour. Water alone when heated does
not thicken, but all flavours reside in substances that show traces of
thickening to a greater or less degree. Hence water plus heat is not
alone the cause of flavours. That which causes the thickening in
fluids must be the cause. This is earth (yrj) or rather one of the
1 66 DE SENSU
qualities of yf) TO ?7poV. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. n. ch. 2, 330 a 4:
TO Tra^y TOV r)pov.
The whole of the above discussion is a good example of the
dialectical development of an Aristotelian argument. Previous
theories are dealt with in an order relative to the amount they con
tribute to the final solution of the problem. Though each is in turn
set aside, some part of it remains unabrogated in the next, and the
last to be discussed is that which approaches most nearly to the true
account of the matter.
441 332. irdxos ^x ov<ru It is not sufficient for the argument to
say that flavours thicken when heated, but that at all times they
show traces of density.
441 a 33. o-waCnov. Cf. De An. n. ch. 4, 416 a 14 where
vvp is likewise said to be the o-wamov of the growth of bodies. The
O.LTLOV is ^vx^- (truvamov /xeV TTWS eo-Tii/, ov i^rjv curXaSs ye CUTIOV.)
Some translators render (f>atvovTai apparently, but with the
participle it should mean evidently. The sense also requires it,
for this to Aristotle s mind is not merely an apparent fact, but a real
fact which furnishes the proof positive that ^r^os is dependent on
TO rjpov. The previous proofs have been merely negative and
directed against the claims of other circumstances to fill the position
of cause.
This reasoning will support the reading Sio evXoyw? in 441 b 8
below.
441 b 5. yf\s n ctSos. Cf. Meteor, iv. ch. 7, 383 b 20 sqq. The
TroXXoi in 441 b 2 above are Metrodorus and Anaxagoras, according
to Alexander.
441 b 8. 8iJ> v\<tyo>s is the reading of MSS. L S U and evidently
of the ancient Latin translation. Alexander also interprets as though
this were the reading : Sia rovro ovv (frvjalv evAo ycus KCU
TO!? CK Trjs y^S 0DO/Ae vOl5, TOVT(TTIV V TOIS </>VTOt<>, KOU
yueVois fJLra vypoT^Tos eyyiWo-#ai (jLaXicrra : the vet. tr. renders terra
nascentibus as though it actually read e/c T^S y^s. Whatever the
reading, Alexander s must be the correct interpretation (cf. note to
441 a 33). It is on account of the savours being primarily in earth
that they can enter into plants. Aristotle does not say evAo yoj?
without being able to produce reasons.
441 bio. w<rirp Kal raXXa. Aristotle is no doubt thinking in
particular of the other elementary qualities TO ^7/poV etc., but this
statement is with him a universal principle.
COMMENTAR Y 167
441 b 14. 4v TOIS irepl <rT<HX" wv. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. ii. ch. i sqq.
The fuller discussion (lv erepois d*pi/:?e o-Tpov, 32Qa 27) referred to there
seems to be lost, as all other references to the subject are more brief.
Up to this point the argument is clear. Aristotle is explaining
what he has already proved as a fact. Earth in possessing the
quality of dryness can act on TO vypov, since opposites modify each
other. It is a case of explaining the qualities presented to the other
senses by the interaction of the tactual properties of things. Cf.
De An. n. ch. 5, 417 a 6, where he talks of the other alaOrjTa. as the
avfjiftefirjKOTa of fire, earth, air and water. (Though he insists that
in one way the former are prior to the latter, cf. De Gen. et Corr. n.
Ch. 2, 329 b 14: KO.LTOL TTpoVepOV 6\f/L<S Ot^S.)
The difficulty which now ensues is in connection with the function
of TO 0ep/xoV in helping to produce flavour.
441 b 15. ovScv ITE ^VKC K.T.\. This statement seems to conflict
with that in De Gen. et Corr. n. ch. 2, 329 b 22: Set Se TTOL^TLKO.
KCU TraOrjTLKCt. TO. ^Toi^eta, fLiyvvrai yap KOL ^tTa^3aXXet. eis
But probably there Aristotle is simply stating his doctrine
in a rough provisional way. Really as <ro)//.ara and hence ovo-uu the
elements cannot be opposed to each other and act on each other.
(So Alexander explains.) Cf. Categ. 3 b 24 : ^Trap^ei Se Tats ovo-uus
/cat TO fjirjBkv avTcus evavriov eu/at, and it is evai/Tia that act on each
other; ovcria is merely SCKTI/O) TOJV ei^avrioiv. The upshot of the
matter is, that it is not as substances, but as possessed of opposite
qualities, that the elements act on each other. This sentence is
then inserted as a caution, but how it furthers the main argument
here is not apparent, unless indeed we connect it with that pre
ceding clause in which we find it stated that heat is the peculiar
property of fire, dryness of earth. Liquidity (TO vypov) will thus be
the special characteristic of water, and the implication will be that
the latter element will be acted on in a more pronounced way by
earth, the element which has in an especial degree the attribute most
opposed to its most characteristic quality. Fire possessing TO
fypov in a less marked degree will act upon it also, but not in the pre
eminent way in which yrj does.
When Aristotle says that TO 0ep/x,oV is the ISiov of Trvp, this cannot
be in the full sense of iStoi/ consistent with the rest of his doctrine,
for TO Otpfjiov is also shared by arjp and, as we have seen, Trvp is also
4-?7p6Y. He must mean, as Alexander explains in conformity with
De Gen. et Corr. iv. ch. 4, 382 a 3: TWV oroixeiW tSuurara rfpov /w,ev
1 68 DE SENSU
yfj, vypov B vSto/a, that earth is the principal illustration of dryness
or possesses dryness in a special degree, as fire does heat, and so on.
Cf. Alex. De Sens. pp. 72-73 (W.). Cf. also De Gen. et Corr. iv.
ch. 5j 382 b 3 : vypov crw^aa vouip.
441 b 17-18. vairoirXvvovTs. A cognate word TrAvo-ts is used
in 445 a 16 for the corresponding process which produces odour.
Susemihl (Philol. 1885 and Burs. Jahresb. 17) wishes to delete
TOVS xy/jiovs, but in mentioning flavours here Aristotle is not illus
trating a thing by itself. He compares the solution of the primitive
r)p6v which produces flavours to the solution of flavours actually
produced.
441 b 19. >] <}>v<ris. No personification of Nature is implied
here. Aristotle merely means that this is a natural process. The
function of Trvp in the process is obscure. Alexander makes it the
cause of the percolation as well as of the /aV^cris which renders TO
vypov determinate in quality ; /ai/ovo-a he renders by aAAoio>o-a, i.e.
changing qualitatively. But it is possible to understand it literally
of the motion involved in the percolation. Some, e.g. Hammond
and St Hilaire, translating KU/OVO-O, in different ways, will have it to
be concerned only with the former process. But, unless we adopt the
conjecture that the function of TO dcp/xoi/ is to act on TO ycwSe?,
we may as well understand it to bring about local motion in this case
as beneath in 442 a 6, where it is said to cause the light particles in
food to rise upwards.
441 b 23. Here 7ra0os is used in a wide sense, but still with
the signification of being the attribute of a subject that is passively
affected when it (the attribute) comes into being.
441 b 24. dXXouoTiKov. Ci. De An. II. ch. 5, 416 b 34: SOKCI yap
(77 cua diverts) aAAoiaxrts TIS etvat- a AXotcocrts is that kind of Kivrjcns
denoting qualitative change. a\\otovo-6ai is practically identical
with -rrao-^Lv (cf. Phys. VII. ch. 3, 245 b 13 : TO TrtTTovObs KOL yXXouo-
/xeVov TT poo-ay optvofjitv : cf. Alex. De An. 84, 12), and both words are
employed indifferently in the De Anima for psychical modifications
(cf. ii. ch. 5, 418 a 2 and 417 b 14). But Aristotle points out that,
though they both are used as though they were the proper terms (ws
KVPLOLS) for all psychical changes, there are some operations to which
they are really not applicable.
i. In the first place, the transition from the state in which man
possesses knowledge to the exercise of that knowledge is hardly
a case of Trda-^Lv or dAAoiWis in the usual sense. The change is not
COMMENTARY 169
produced by anything external. To exercise his intelligence is in a
man s own power eVavTco for the universals which are the objects of
knowledge are in a way in the soul. Again it is a case not of <#opa VTTO
TOV evavriov but of trtoTypia, />. the realisation of a predetermined end.
2. Secondly, change such even as that from a state of ignorance
to a state of knowledge, where the alteration is in a definite direction
and towards the establishment of a definite higher development,
towards the realisation of the potentialities of the individual in
question (eVl ras e^eis KOLL Tyv <j>vaiv 41 7 b 1 6), is hardly aAAoiWis
proper, even though in the acquisition of knowledge one requires
an external agent the teacher.
With these reservations Aristotle proposes still to use the terms
a AAoiWts and 7rdax LV They are no doubt, in one way, specially
applicable to sensuous processes, because there must be an external
agent the individual object (cf. 417 b 25 : aVay/caiov yap virdp\civ TO
alo-OyTov, and cf. 417 a 6 sqq.). But Simon points out that even
sense perception cannot be properly a case of Trao-^eiv, for agent
and patient must be in the same genus (De Gen. et Corr. I. ch. 7,
323 b 32 sqq.), which the sense faculty and its object are not. Cf.
Introduction, sec. iv.
441 b 25. It would be possible to make TrpoiJTrdpxov agree with
the subject of ayet, namely To...7ra#os, and this interpretation
would give a meaning consistent with Aristotle s general doctrine,
for previous to the act of perception the object is only Swa^ei alo-Br)-
roV. The next clause, however, requires us to construe it with TO
ala-OrjTLKov (as Hammond, Bender, St Hilaire do), or still better with
TOVTO (Simon), for it is not the sense faculty which existed SWa/xei
before the act of sensation, but its operation. The SiW/xis, the
faculty, actually exists before the sensational experience.
For the doctrine of this passage see De An. n. ch. 5, 417 b 19 :
KOL TO K<XT vepyiav (cuor#aj/0-$cu) of. o /xotW AeyeTcu TO) ^eajpetj/. In
knowledge (cf. last note) there is a two-fold transition, (i) from a
state of ignorance to the acquisition of a definite body of know
ledge, i.e. from mere indeterminate Sm/a/xts to a determinate one or
eis; (2) there is also the change from the possession to the exercise
of this e^is (eis eVTeXe ^eiav, b 7). There is a corresponding double
transition in sensuous process. The first is effected by the parent
(VTTO TOV ytvywi/ros, b 17) of the sensitive individual and is the creation
of a being with fully developed sense faculties. The second, corre
sponding to the exercise of knowledge, is the actual exercise of the
1 70 DE SENSU
sense faculty and is produced by the object of sense. In sense >
then, the formation of a permanent psychical disposition is due to
natural agency, in knowledge to instruction ; actual exercise of a
faculty is in both a higher process, originated in the first case
externally, in the second internally.
441 b 26-27. 01& """a-vTos Tjpoi). Alexander thinks that this state
ment is made in order to rule out odour, which also owes its exist
ence to TO rjp6v. But, as 007x77 is produced by TO ly^y^ov fypov, it is
clear that those words are not used for the purpose of excluding it.
By TO gypov Aristotle surely means dry substance, and it is the same
substance as has flavour that is odorous. The intention is obviously
to rule out all fypdv that is not /xe/x,iy/xeVov, i.e. does not enter into a
compound.
441 b 27-28. T| ird0os...TJ crrlpT)<ns. The positive modification is
TO y/Vi>Ku, the negative TO irucpdv : cf. 442 a 7 sqq.
441 b 30. I read ov\ eV povov instead of ov&v O.VTWV with Bekker
and Biehl. Wendland restores o^x ci/ povov to the text of Alexander,
p. 77, and the vet. tr. renders non est unum solum, which, in spite
of what Biehl says, can be a translation only of ov% ev /xovov. This
version apparently read also ouSe avTots TOI<J <f>vroL<s after 0101$
for it inserts neque ipsis plantis. ov\ ev povov gives the best sense,
but fjiovov might be dispensed with.
441 b 31. TO. |iv a-TTTa K.T.X. Alexander points out that avdveiv
and rpe^etv are not identical. Things so far as quantitative cause
increase ; only in so far as potentially capable of forming the sub
stance of the body which they nourish are they said to be nutritive.
Cf. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 5, 322 a 20 sqq. and also De An. n. ch. 4,
416 b 12 sqq.: CCTTI 8 cVepov rpcxfrfj KOL av^TiKo) clmr y /Jilv yap TTOO-OV
TI TO efjuf/v)(ov av^rjTLKOV (sc. TO Trpoo-iov or TO 7rpocr^epo/xei/ov : cf.
Rodier, op. at. II. p. 242), J 8e ToSe n KOL ovcrta. Tpo(f>tj. That is to
say, rpo(f>rj (the abstract term) or rptfaiv is the continuous renewal
of the individual which preserves its identity as an individual
of definite type, i.e. as an ova-la; av^o-ts is that renewal in its
quantitative aspect.
The point here, however, seems to be not to hold av^o-i? and
Tpo</>?7 apart, but to show that that which has the function of causing
growth must also have the properties of nutritive food, and re
ciprocally TO Tp6(f>Lfjiov is known to sense as TO ycvo-ToV (442 a 2)
and the fundamental positive characteristic of things that have
flavour is sweetness.
COMMENTARY 171
But food, as that which causes growth, is that which can rise
up (owing to the agency of heat for fire is the lightest element)
and so become incorporated in the body. Hence it is both warm
and light (each of which is a tactual quality); but that which is
light is sweet, and hence that which causes growth is just that which
has the gustatory quality of nutriment.
The whole argument rests upon the identification of TO KO</>OI/
(one of the cforra) and TO yXiW, the basal quality of TO ycixrroV, and
hence of TO rpo^i^ov.
442 a i. Tpe <j>i K.T.X. This is treated simply as a statement to
be verified by observation. It is not a proposition established by
any special proof elsewhere. It gives the first obvious definition of TO
For the facts cf. Problems, 930 a 34 and Meteor, n. ch. 2, 355 b
7, also cf. note to 1. 5 below.
442 a 3. T( airXws K.T.X. We must not translate whether pure or
mixed, as thus we should assume that it was indifferent whether
the sweetness was pure or mixed. As a matter of fact Aristotle,
below in 1. 12, says that pure sweetness makes the food in
digestible.
442 a 4. v TOIS irepl ^Wo-ews. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 5, pp.
350-352. Alexander also refers to the De Gen. Animal. , but it
is difficult to find any strictly relevant passage there.
442 a 5. av<xvi must be used absolutely, much as it looks as
though it should govern Tpo<f>-rjv along with 8rjfjnovpyL. Aristotle
is discussing not the production of food but the growth of the body
owing to feeding. For the process cf. De Part. Animal, u. ch. 3,
6503 2 sqq. : eTret 8 dvdyKTfj TTO.V TO avav6p.iov Aa/x/^avetv rpo^Tjv,
17 Se Tpo<>) Tracriv c vypov KOU rjpov, /ecu TOVTCOV -r\ Treats ytVcTcu KCU
TI p.Taf3oXrj 8ta Tiys TOV Otp/Jiov 8wa/xea)5...8ta Tcurr^v (rrjv aiTtav) avay-
The ultimate dpx 7 ? of heat in the body of sanguineous animals is
seated in the heart. Cf. De Juvent. ch. 4, 469 b 9 : dvayKolov Sr)
For Neuhauser s theory, that this CTV/X^VTOI/ ^cp/xoV, which seems
to be the ultimate substratum both of the sensitive and nutritive
soul, is also to be identified as the central organ of sensation, cf.
Introduction, sec. vi.
For the connection of lightness and sweetness, bitterness and
weight, cf. Meteor, n. ch. 2, 355 b 4 sqq.: TO /xev dX/xvpov VTro/xeVei Sia
i?2 DE SENSU
TO /3apo<;, TO Se y\vKv KO! TTOTI/XOV aVayerat Sta TT/y K
v ToTs ^ujwy <rco/Aa<rtv...TO yap yAvKv Kat TTO TI/XOI/ VTTO
tXitvcrOev t< TO,? a-ap/cas Kat TT)V aAAr/i/ crvvra^iv rf\.6 TUV
K.T.A..
The bodily heat is, however, only the o-vi/amov in the production
of TO avdYeo-#at Kai Tpe<o-0at. The natural process due to heat is
indefinite and has no direction. Fire burns on until its material is
exhausted. But in living organisms there is a Trepas KOU Aoyos fteyc-
Oovs T Kat au^o-W5, i.e. there is a definite scheme and restriction in
the development and this is due to i/or^ which is the real alriov.
Cf. De An. n. ch. 4, 416 a 8-18.
In De Resp. ch. 20, 480 a 8 we hear that the blood eV TV) KapSta
^/xtovpyetTat. Aristotle probably there refers to the very same
process. We read in De Part. Animal, n. ch. 4, 651 a 14: TO
8 ai/jia ff icr^a.r f] Tpcxfaij.
442 a 8. TO 4v TTJ 4>v<ri. Cf. De Juvent. ch. 4, 469 b 6 sqq. :
oe Ta (Jtopia Kat Trav TO awfjid. ^(et Ttva o~v/x0f TOV ^
cf. also above and the passage there quoted from Meteor, n.
Aristotle is there talking to begin with of the evaporation from
the sea, one of TO, ew aw/jLara. He expressly compares evaporation
by the sun to the process of animal nutrition. The sea remains salt
though the moisture which is evaporated from it and descends again
in rain is not salt.
442 a 9. Cf. quotation in note to 442 a 5 above. He has now
explained what was previously proved as a fact that x v /*os TOV Tpo-
<f>i/jiov eo-TtV, and he has done so by identifying flavour par excellence
with sweetness. Positive flavour is sweetness, just as positive
colour is white. Their opposites are o-TepT/Vets defects of being.
442 a n. TavTa must refer to the latter TO dX^vpbv KCU ov,
or else it means simply this fact.
442 a 13. There is no one English word which will translate <bri-
TroAao-TiKoV. It is almost the technical expression for * indigestible/
but it implied a theory of indigestibility that the food tended to
rise too much. Cf. one of Aristotle s illustrations of final causality.
The final cause of taking a walk after eating is TO /XT) iTwroXd&iv ra
criria An. Post. II. ch. n, 94 b n sqq.
Biehl s reading dvrl Trdvrwv in 1. 12 instead of dvrLcnrav TOJ
is doubtless correct. It does not, however, alter the general
meaning.
442 a 17. KivT|<rs. It is not clear what exactly Ktvrjtris refers
COMMENTAR Y 1 73
t o the sense stimulus caused by x^/xos or the Kivrja-is which produces
442 a 1 8. LSU and all editions prior to Biehl s have ovroi eV
apt$/x,ots fJiovov 6 jw,i/ ow AiTrapos TOV yXuKtos K.T.X. But there is no
reason for making Aristotle say that the pleasant flavours alone were
due to proportionate combination. On the analogy of the corre
sponding theory about colours they would rather be the class where
the ratio of the ingredients was a simple one. Cf. ch. 3, 43 9 b 33 sqq.
above.
442 a 22. All MSS. give eTrra but Susemihl (Philol. 1885) argues
that it is quite impossible to reconcile this with the rest of the
passage. Yellow is assigned to white, as oily is to sweet ; hence, if
the two lists are to square, the number must be either six or eight,
as Alexander too maintains. (It is by distinguishing <au>V from
/xe Xai/ and dX/AupdV from TriKpoV that eight members are distinguished.)
Hence, followed by Biehl, he boldly substitutes e for eTrra. The
difficulty, however, disappears, when we recognise that TO av9ov is
included in the list, though, as an afterthought, assigned to white.
In other passages the different position of grey from that of the
true chromatic tones is not noticed. They are both said to be aVa
fjiiaov rov XevKov KCU /xe Xai/os : cf. Categ. ch. 10, 12 a 18, Top. I. ch.
15, io6b 5, Metaph. x. ch. 5, 1056 a 27 sqq. The reason doubtless
for ascribing grey to black rather than white when it is relative to
both (cf. Physics, v. ch. i, 224 b 31 sqq., and ch. 5, 229 b 17 sqq.)
is that it is less positive than white, in a way a o-repr/o-ts of white, as
black also is.
442 a 24. XefrreTcu K.T.X. The ascription of yellow to white seems
to be a recognition of its higher luminosity than that of the other
colours. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 68 B, who brings in TO Xa/ATrpoV into its
composition. For the correspondence of the tastes and the colours
generally and the ascription to sweet and bitter of TO Xiirapov and
TO dX/xupoV respectively, cf. De An. n. ch. 10, 422 b losqq. The
ground for the identification of TO XnrapoV and TO yXv*v seems to be
the lightness of both. Cf. De Part. Animal, in. ch. 9, 672 a 8 sqq.
TO XiTrapov Kov<f>ov lam KCU e7ri7ro/Vaei lv TOLS vypots. TO AiTrapoV is
light because it is warm. Cf. also De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 2, 735 b 25.
Similarly TO aX^vpov and TO TriKpoV are both heavy.
442 325. (JxuviKovv K.T.X. Three of these are the colours of the
rainbow (with av66v intermediate between <OU/IKOW and Trpacru/oi/ :
cf. Meteor, in. ch. 2, 372 a 8 sqq.). They alone are said not to be
174 VE SENSU
obtained by mixing (other chromatic tones presumably); KVO.VOVV is
less frequently mentioned.
442 a 2 7 . TOVTWV should naturally refer to rov XZVKOV KOL /xe Xavos,
but it is generally held to signify the other colours. Both statements
would be in conformity with Aristotle s teaching.
442 331. TO iroTip.ov. Cf. De An. n. ch. 10, 422 a 31 : TO TTQTOV
KGLL dtTTOTov are equivalents for J\VKV and iriKpov. For the doctrine
cf. Theophrastus, De Causis Plantarum, vi. i, 2.
442 b i. airra. Cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu, 60-82, R.P. 199.
Zeller, Presocratic Phil. n. pp. 265-270. This is part of the doctrine
of airoppoiai ; the atoms which emanate from bodies actually impinge
upon our sense organs and so cause sensation by contact. It is
against this that Aristotle wishes to argue in the first place.
The transition to this discussion is not mediated by the dis
tinction between avgdvcw and Tpe<eiv as Alexander thinks, but by
the connection between taste and touch which suggests the Demo-
critean theory that all sensation is effected by contact.
442 b 4. ci8i>vaTov. Alexander (p. 83 [W.]) gives four separate
reasons which might be employed. But the most important
consideration is the fact that the other senses require an external
medium. It is the absence of this that makes taste a kind of touch.
The other senses do not act by contact (cf. De An. n. ch. 7, 4i9a 26:
ovQev yap auTaJv (sc. i//o<ov, 007x179 K.T.A.) aTrro/xei ov rov alaOrjrrjpfov
7roti rrjv ator^crtv).
TOIS KOIVOIS. For the distinction between the Koivd and the tSta
ala-Orjrd cf. De An. n. ch. 6, 418 a 17, in. ch. i, 425 a 14, in. ch. 3,
428 b 22 and above 437 a 8, etc. The former comprise motion and
rest, figure, magnitude, number and unity. The latter are the
qualities, e.g. colour etc., reported by the special sense organs. The
Koiva ala-6-rjTd are known however in modern philosophy as the
primary qualities of bodies (cf. Hamilton s Reid^ note D). They
must be distinguished from what the commentators call the primae
qualitates in the Aristotelian scheme viz. 0cp/u>r, i/o^poV, liypoV,
vypov. It has been pointed out (e.g. by Hamilton, p. 829) that
these Koivd are hardly sense qualities at all and confirmation for this
contention is drawn from Aristotle himself (cf. De An. n. ch. 6, 418 a
24: TO, tSia Kvptws <TTIV ala-O^Td; and below b 1415: r/ ov8efitas...Ta
Kotva yvwpieiv). They may be all described as the mathematical
and dynamical qualities of body and, according to the Atomistic
philosophers, these were the only objective attributes of things, all
COMMENTARY 175
the rest being merely changes in our sensibility. (Cf. Theophrastus,
De Sens. 63 : TOJV o aAAcov ala-O-rjTwv ouSei/os etvat <u<rii/, aAAa Trai/ra
TTct^T/ r/7? ato-^o-ews aAAoiov/AevT/s.)
This holds good without qualification of four of the senses, but
to some tactual qualifications they did assign objective existence,
e.g. TO /xaAa/coV, TO crK\vip6v, TO ftapv and TO Kov<f>ov, deriving these
however ultimately from /-ieye0os and o-x^/u-o. ; things that are light
have more of void space in them than others. TO rpa^v and TO
AeioF with TO ov and TO apfiXv seem to have been modifications
of o-x^ia. Here Aristotle also treats the latter four attributes as
belonging to the category of TO, KOLVOL. He takes care to define
TO 6v and TO d/x/SAv as TO eV TOIS oy/cots (the word commonly
employed also for the atoms themselves as well as for mass in
general) as these are also the names for determinations of such 1810,
as i/fO(o5 and x^/u-o?. He commonly puts rpa^yrr]^ and AeioYr/s along
with other O-<JO/ZO,TIKCU Siax^opat or o-co/xaTtKo, TrdOrj as /xaAaKoV and
o-K\r)pov which are consequent upon the primary determinations
0ep//,oV, i/o>xpoV etc. Cf De Part. Animal, n. ch. i, 646 a lysqq. :
at 8 aAAcu Sta^opat TatJTat? aKoAoD^oGcrti , otov /?apos.../cat Aeior^s K.T.A.
Among such, even /xe ye#os is included in 644 b 14; but this
is simply one of his rough general classifications. Aristotle did
not, of course, mean to imply that o-x^/xa and /xe yetfo? are in them
selves tactual differentiae of the same nature as hard and soft.
but it was his view that you do not have the concept of body
without some characteristically tactual datum. It is impossible to
construct bodies out of merely mathematical determinations, a point
which modern Atomists do not sufficiently consider. You cannot
analyse body into something that has no sensuous qualities, not even
tactual ones.
If /xeye^o? and crx^a are to be regarded as the ultimate charac
teristics of bodies, they must be treated as though they already
possessed a tactual content, as though they were merely tactual
differentiae, and this is exactly Aristotle s point here. The Atomists
treat determinations of figure as though they in themselves contained
a reference to tactual experience as though they were given by one
special sense, that of touch, whereas as a fact they, though given in
connection with tactual experience, are not simply to be identified
with it, and in fact can be discerned by means of other senses,
notably that of sight.
In the De Anima, in. ch, i, 425 b 4 sqq., Aristotle points out
176 DE SENSU
that it is owing to the fact that these mathematical and dynamical
qualities of objects are given by more than one sense that they can
be readily discriminated. Otherwise they would be confused with
the special data of the single sense to which they were attached,
just as he contends that, if the whole surface of the body gave the
same sensations as the tongue (which discriminates both flavour and
tactual properties) taste and touch would seem to be the same sense.
For a discussion of a<j>-rj cf. De An. IT. ch. n. Aristotle does not
there fully debate the question of the plurality of the evai/Tiaxreis,
e.g. Ocpjjiov and ifaxpov, grjpov and uypov, /xaXa/cdi/ and cr/cA^poV, which
touch presents to us, nor does he consider to what extent determina
tions like ov and /3apv, rpa^y and Aeioi , which appear in <j>tavij
apparently as tSta, must be treated as Kotva in the case of touch. His
definition of rpa^v and Aetov in Categ. 8, TO a 22 sqq. confirms his
inclusion of them here in the list of the KOLVO. Aeiof /xev TU> CTT
7TO>5 TO, [JLOpLO. KCWT&U* T/Ott^V T(5 TO fJiV V7Tp^LV TO Se
i.e. these qualities are due to variations in figure.
442 b 8. el 8e jx^i ircurwv. Cf. De An. n. ch. 6, 418 a 10 KOIVOV
7rao-wi/, where however he illustrates only in the case of a.^ and
m/a<>. Number and unity seem to be given by the exercise of any
sense (cf. 425 a 20 : ^Kaa-rrj yap ei/ al(rOdveTai ai(rOr)<rL<s). On the
other hand all are said to be perceived by means of /aV/yo-t? (425 a 17)
and, in the case of the mathematical qualities such as are mentioned
here, the KIV^O-IS which discriminates them can be nothing else than
the motion of the only two sense organs which have a surface
continuously graded in sensitiveness, the eye and the surfaces of
the bodily members. Aristotle does not work this out, but hence,
probably, the reason why the discrimination of size and figure is
limited to sight and touch.
442 b 9. Cf. De An. n. ch. 6, 418 a 15 ; in. ch. 3, 428 b 18, 25,
where he qualifies the statement that tSt a alvOrja-L^ is true, by the
expression rj on oXiyivrov ex ovo " a T0 ^cu8o5. Apparently he did not
know of colour blindness.
442 b ii. ol 8 cannot mean another set of people as Simon
and St Hilaire think. It is part of the same doctrine as the
preceding one to reduce the tSta to the KOLVOL. The error is (i) to
assume that all sensation takes place by means of contact; (2) not
to discriminate universal qualities of objects from the purely tactual,
i.e. to treat them all as the data of a single sense ; (3) to reduce all
the sense qualities to these quasi-tactual determinations.
COMMENTARY 177
442 b 13. o-xTiK-ara. Cf. Theophrastus, de Sensu, 65: TOV pev
ACTTTOV, ...rpa^w 8 orra KCU yamoi8>7...T6i 8e yAvKw K
cruyKCio-flai ^^//.aTWj/, OVK ayav /xtKpwv K.T.X.
Angularity was a characteristic of the atoms which caused acid
and harsh tastes, roundness of those that caused the sensation of
sweetness ; but their size and their difference of impact on the body
together with the heat supposed to be thus caused (vid. loc. cit.}
played a part also.
For the Democritean theory of colour cf. Theophrastus, 73
and 80. The behaviour of the atoms relative to the Tro pot (cf. above
on Empedocles, ch. 2, 43 7 b 12) also was a determinant, as well
as the density of the atmosphere, according to Democritus.
442 b 14. Alexander says that the preference is given to sight
rather than touch because the latter does not perceive 5t<um?fia
(distance outward) and TrXrjOos (a multitude of units). But surely
the clause ra yovv K.T.X. contains the reason. The illative force
of yow is continually backwards. The clause TO. yovv K.T.\. cannot,
of course, be a consequence of ct 8 apa...r^ yewctos /mXXov. It
must be the ground for it. Hence the construction is loose ; after
/xaXXov should follow e xpryi/ without wo-re and the TO. yovv K.T.\. clause
should succeed. But that would make the argument too long and
lumbering. Hence the TO, yovv clause is brought up and has the
additional function of confirming the KO.LTOL rj o8e/uas K.r.X. clause.
It is clear that if it confirm the d 8 apa clause, it will, whether
intended or not, support the previous one. Aristotle argues if it
is the function of taste to discriminate the /coti/a, and this we should
infer from the atomist theory that taste discriminates the most
minute spatial difference TO rpa^y and TO Xctov in particles im
perceptible to the other senses, then it must in addition to perceiving
the other KOLVO. be the best judge of figure.
But if the claim of taste to perceive best the KOLVO. rest on the
fineness of its discrimination (falsely asserted), surely the real
delicacy of the sense of sight is the cause of its justifiable claim.
The superiority of the sense of sight is as a rule assigned to its
intellectual character: cf. ch. i, 437 a, Metaph. i. ch. i, 980 a 25,
De An. in. ch. 3, 429 a 3, ch. 13, 435 b 21. In the Problems, 886 b 35,
we read that sight is fvapyeo-repa than hearing, which comes to much
the same thing as aKpi/3eo-Te pa in the sense of distinct. It is not said
that touch generally is the most delicate of the senses ; it is only
R. 12
178 DE SENSU
contended that relatively to the senses of the other animals it is
most delicate in man (441 a 2-3).
It looks, of course, strange to assign the discernment of the
common sensibles to one sense when they are said to be common.
Aristotle no doubt means their accurate discrimination. Simple
experience would show that this is best obtained by sight.
442 b 20. vavTu0criv. Cf. JDe An. n. ch. n and below ch. 6,
445 k 26 sqq.
442 b 22-26. Surely an account of proportionate elements in
figure could be given analogous to the theory of proportionate
numbers which he accepts.
442 b 28. Aristotle s treatise on plants is not extant. Two
by Theophrastus survive, De Causis Planlarum and Historia
Plantarum.
CHAPTER V.
442 b 29. T6v avrov K.T.\. Alexander maintains that this refers
to ch. 4, 440 b 30, where smell and taste are said to be o-^cSov TO
avro TrdOos. He is now to explain the analogy between the two.
Its objective basis is the fact that the process involved in the genesis
of each is the same ; it is otov fia.^ TIS KOL TrXucris (445 a 15); it is a
process of infusion or solution. Add to this the fact that in both
cases TO r)p6v is the agent, with the sole difference that in taste it is
not already modified, but in producing odour it must have been
previously mingled with liquid. Further, as the vehicle of taste is
TO vypoV, so that of odour is vypov, for, as pointed out in 443 b 6, air
as well as water is vypos. Heat also seems to be operative or rather
co-operative in the production of both (cf. 443 b 17 and note).
Here Aristotle calls the agent operative in the production of
odour TO lyxyi^ov vypov. Elsewhere he names it TO tyyy^ov rjpov,
and cf. De An. n. ch. 9, 422 a 6: eo-Ti 8 ?J 6cr/x?j TOU fypov. Hence
Thurot, Torstrik. De An. p. 158, and Neuhauser (Aristoteles* Lehre
von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermogen und s. Organen, p. 25)
propose to read fr?poV here instead of vypov, and Susemihl (Burs.
Jahresb. xvn. p. 266) has lent his support to this conjecture. But,
as Alexander points out, it makes no difference whether we call the
agent here fypov or vypov. We can call it either dry substance mixed
with liquid or liquid mixed with dry. The main point is, that it
must be /xe/xiy/xeVov TI i.e. TO yor) ^yfJiov t\ov.
442 b 30-31. v <x\\o> -ye vei. The new yei/os is the identical
element in air and water of which it is the function to form a vehicle
and medium for odour. Alexander (p. 89, 1. 2 [W.]) has named this
TO oioa-fjiov (following Theophrastus) on the analogy of the term
TO 8ia^>ai/5 which is applied to the common constitution of air and
water which enables them to form media for light. Cf. De An. n.
ch. 7, 419 a 22 sqq., where however he says (1. 32) that the medium
of smell has no special name.
The expression ec aAAw yeVa is, however, quite vague and may
12 2
i8o DE SENSV
mean merely lv TW oo-^pai/rw in the domain of odorous quality,
TO oo-</>pai ToV is the object of smell as TO a/covo-ToV is the object of
hearing.
443 a 12. fl TrXvVTlKOV TJ pVlTTlKOV. Cf. ch. 4 VaTTOTr\VVOVTC<S
441 b 17, and beneath 443 b 8 airoTrXvvo^v and 445 a 16 TrXvo-ts.
TrXww is to wash; PVTTTCLV seems to contain more definitely the idea
of scouring; the Latin rendering for it is abstergere. In the ex
amples of its use in Aristotle (e.g. Problems, 93 5 b 35) it takes the
accusative of the thing cleansed. Hence evidently pv-rrriKw 77/00 -
T/7Tos means able to cleanse, by scouring off and absorbing the
surface of dry substance. St Hilaire translates fj TT\WTIKOV 77 PVTTTIKOI-
en tant qu il peut transmettre et retenir, Hammond, by virtue of
its capacity to exude and throw off (dry savour). But these render
ings are impossible.
443 a 3. KCU Iv vSan. Cf. De An. n. ch. 9, 421 b 10: /cat yap
TO, ci/uSpa SOKOVVLV ooyx^s ato*$aveo-$at, and beneath passim.
443 a 4. 6<rTpaKo8p(ji(ov. Testacea must not be taken as a
modern zoological designation. Any animal with a shell from the
turtle to the sea-urchin is ranked under the oo-Tpa/co Sep/xa : cf. Hist.
Animal vin. ch. 2, 590 a 19 sqq. Aristotle is, no doubt, thinking
here of shell-fish. An example is afterwards given in 444 b 13
(at TTop^vpaa) the purple-murex which, he asserts in Hist. Animal.
vin. ch. 2, 590 b, goes in pursuit of its prey and feeds on minute
fishes.
443 a 5. liriiroXatci. Air rises upwards by a natural motion.
Cf. Meteor. IV. ch. 7, 383 b 26: /cat yap 6 drjp <e/oTai aVw.
443 a 6. otfr avTcx K.T.X. Aristotle thought the motion fishes
make with their gills was not breathing. It is the expulsion of the
water, which is taken in with their food, and which performs the
cooling function effected in respiring animals by the air. Cf. Zellcr,
Aristotle, n. pp. 43, 44, and Aristotle, DC Resp. 476 a i sqq. especially
I o : TCI Se /3payp(ta Trpos rr\v aVo rov voWos Ka.Taif/viv.
443 a 7. -u-ypa. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. n. ch. 3, 330 b 4,
331 a 5, etc.
4433 8. c|>v(ris. Cf. note to 442 b 30-31. Mr Cook Wilson
(Journal of PhiloL XL p. 119) conjectures TrX^o-ts instead of <vo-t5.
This is possible but not necessary. TO oo-^pai/ToV is indifferently the
7ra$o<? of the thing that smells and the odorous thing itself.
443 a ii. aoo-jxa. Cf. 437 a 22, 441 b 14 and notes. For the
sources of the whole discussion cf. Meteor, iv.
COMMENTARY 181
443 a 12. For the doctrine contained in this statement cf. De
Gen. et Corr. n. ch. 2, 3295 u; the elements differ only Kara cu
4433 14. \v|xbv teal |r]poTT]Ta. Cf. De Gen. Animal. 761 b 9:
77 Oo.Xa.rra vypd re. KOL o-u>/xaToj8r;<j. The dry element is of course the
salt contained in it; cf. 441 b 4: ot yap aA.cs y^s n eTSos dviv. The
reference for X$os below is Meteor, iv. ch. 7, 383 b 20: (Ai 0os) y>?s
/xaXXoi/, for |vA.a also ch. 7 and for xp^o-ds etc. chs. 8, 9, 10.
443 a 15. gXaiov. Either the oil said to be extracted from salt
has more smell than that which comes from natron and so the
previous statement is directly verified, or there is a greater quantity
of this product derived from salt and thus the strong smell of salt is
explained by the fact that it contains more vypov than the other
substance.
What the process referred to is, one can hardly tell. Aristotle in
Prob. 935 a 8, talks ot TO iv TOIS aXaviv v^iard^vov e Xaioi/, and this
should mean a deposit or sediment. eiK/xaoj/ should point to some
process in which heat was employed, virpov was compounded with
oil to form soap. Perhaps something similar was done with salt.
Impure salt and oil may have been boiled together, and the product
which distilled over collected. This would rather confirm the sug
gestion that Aristotle is referring to the stronger smell of the one
compound than of the other.
virpov is any salt of sodium or potassium that has a strong alkaline
reaction. It is not potassium nitrate our salt-petre.
443 & 20. TO v-ypov. For apyupos, KaTTirepos cf. Meteor, iv.
ch. 10, 389 a 8. Anything that melted with heat was held to be
aqueous. We must remember however that the concepts of TO vypov
and v Swp are wider than what we understand by moisture and water.
They correspond more nearly to the modem concept of the fluid
state of matter. Hence Aristotle could talk of TO vypov in metals
without meaning exactly that water, the actual particular substance
known as such, was found in them. He was under the necessity of
using popular terms with a more or less restricted denotation and a
particular intension, for wide and far reaching scientific generalisa
tions. To our mind this inevitably suggests both a fancifulness in
the generalisation and a vagueness in the concept of the particular
substance which permitted the name for it to be so widely applied.
Both those characteristics are true of all primitive theories for, as
Aristotle himself remarks (P/iys. i. ch. i, 184 a 21): cWt 8 r//xti/
1 82 DE SENSU
Koi cra<t>7j TO, (TvyKtyv^zva [jiaXXov. TO vypov is fluidity or the
fluid element generally, of which v Swp is the typical example. The
concept corresponds, as modern science shows, to an important
objective distinction in the condition of matter. The peculiarity of
the Aristotelian theory lies in regarding TO vypov not as a state into
which matter may pass but as a quality which certain species of
matter (drfp and vftwp) always possess.
443 a 23. Cf. above ch. 2, 438 b 26 sqq. and notes. dvaOvfjiiao-is
(cognate of Latin fiimus] is used in two senses: (i) in its generic
meaning it corresponds more exactly to our word reek ; it is any
vapour which rises up and is wafted upwards from a substance. As
such it has two species (cf. especially Meteor, n. ch. 4, 359 b 27 sqq.)
which are distinguished as being respectively moist and dry or at
least as containing a greater proportion of vypov or fripov respectively.
The former is steam or moist vapour, the latter is more accurately
described as smoke. Aristotle expressly proposes to use the general
term to represent the latter variety (as he does in i. ch. 3, 340 b
27 sqq.) and this (2) is its second and more restricted meaning. Both
species of di/a$u//tWis are hot by nature. The dryness of the
smoky kind comes from the earth which enters into its composition
(340 b 26).
443 a 24-25. KCU TrdvTs...oo-(XT]s. This seems to be a case of
dittographia of the passage beneath 1. 27. In consequence of the
scribe s mistake 1. 27 was mutilated and hence we must restore to it,
with Christ, the CTTI TOVTO which appears here.
443 a 25. Heraclitus, fragment 37 in By water s edition : cf. Burnet,
Early Greek Phil. p. 136. Hence Heraclitus must have held that
odour was smoke.
443 a 28. cn-piSa. Cf. Meteor, i. ch. 9, 346 b 32 : eon 8 y /xei/
c vSaros ai/a#v/AiWis aT/xts. Cf. also note to 443 a 23.
443 a 34- oo-fxarai K.T.\. Cf. De An. ii. ch. 9, 421 b losqq.
443 b 2. diroppoicus. If the sense of smell were stimulated by
effluxes it would be really a sense of touch, cf. 440 a 21 and note.
Another reason against the efflux theory (noticed by Alexander) is
given in Problems, 907 a 33. If that theory were true, odorous
objects would evaporate away in time. Aristotle does not deny that
smoke and vapour are odorous (cf. above ch. 2, 438 b 26 and Prob.
906 a 21 sqq. where he talks of the odorous qualities of 0iyxta/xaTa) ;
he only means that exhalations are not the mechanism for trans
mitting odour. The sensation of smell is not caused by the evapo-
COMMENTARY 183
rated substance impinging on the sense organs (cf. De An. 421 b 16).
The /xera^u in respiring animals is the air, and when that enters the
nostrils it can be described as an dvaOvfuao-Ls indeed, but it is
TTi/cu/AaTw ST/s (cf. below 445 a 2 9) a wa ^ f a ^ r>
Aristotle has, however, great difficulty in not regarding odour
as a gas or the analogous diffusion of a solid in a liquid. Cf.
438 b 26 and below ar/xt Sos 444 b 33, De An. 421 b 24, and below
444 a 24 sqq.
443 b 4. Tri/eiyxa air or wind is more especially the air we
breathe.
443 b 7. 6[ju>s. Between what is the similarity? Aristotle is
explaining the correspondence between tastes and odours; he has
already pointed out one identity the vypor^s of the vehicle of both.
Now he asserts that the process which generates the two is identical
aVoTrXvcris. The argument is If in this case the production of
odour the action of dry substance on moist is the same as in the
production of taste aTroVAvcris, then we can explain the analogy of
the two. He is not comparing the effect of TO ^pov on air with its
effects on the fluids proper, otherwise he would have said ev rots
a AXois uypois after just pointing out that drjp vypov rrjv fyva-iv ffTTLv.
He means rot? v-ypols to include air and then gives air as the example
of TO, vypd which is most important for present purposes. It is a
very common function of KCU in Aristotle to coordinate the generic
and the specific, the latter coming second and illustrating the former
or denning it more exactly (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 357). Cf. in this
treatise 439 a 18 sq. : rr/v aia-Orja-iv KOL TT/V evepyaav, 441 a 10 sq. : TO
OepfJiov Kul TOV ^ /Viov, 441 b 19 sq. : TO rjpov Kal TO yeouSes, etc.
The above is Alexander s interpretation, but he suggests that the
argument may be intended to compare the action of TO eyxv/zoi
grjpov in producing odour in air and in the fluids proper. If it is
the same, then, assuming already that odour is produced by flavoured
substance, we could explain why the odours we are cognisant of
(which are propagated in air) correspond singillatim to flavours
(which exist in liquid), Alex. 94, 1. 20 (W.): Kara yap Tas TOJJ/ yy^v
86a^>opas O"ovTat KGU oo~/xtuv Siac^opcu, et ye VTTO TOVTCOV eKtvat yivoyTCu,
a><s eVeo-^at eKtVco o <f>L\ov KeiVa>, t OWTW? ^X ot "
One thing seems certain, that Aristotle is not comparing the
action of TO fypov in producing tastes in water, with its action in
diffusing odours in air, for in that case all mention of the propa
gation of odour in water would be omitted, and it would be natural
1 84 DE SENSU
to infer that it did not exist in water: but this is the reverse of the
theory for which he contends.
443 b 8. dvdXo-yov K.T.\. Cf. De An. n. ch. 9, 421 a 16-18 : 4 otKe
pJtv yap di/aXoyov X tJ/ Trpos TYJV ytvaiv KCU o/xotojs TO, i$r) TWV \v{Jiiov rots
rrj<s 607x779. But further on (loc. /.), in 26 sqq. he points out that
though smells are distinguished as y\vKv, Tri/cpoV, SpL^v etc., the epi
thets applied to taste, yet not all objects have the taste and smell
designated by the same name TTJV dvdXoyov ocr/xr/i/ K<U xypov. Some
are sweet, both to taste and smell, others not.
443 b 15-16. Cf. Meteor, iv. ch. 3, 380 b 2, where unripe
flavours are said to be \j/vxpoi. Cold generally is the principle which
counteracts heat (dvrurrpo^tov rfj Ocp^oTrjTL De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 6,
743 b 28), which is the great principle of life or activity according to
the Aristotelian philosophy.
443 b 17. KIVOVV Kal S^iovp-yovv. Cf. the similar role played by
heat in the development of taste and nutrition (chapter 4 especially
442 a 5). Its function in producing odour is not brought into such
prominence; but cf. 444 a 26: rj yap r^s ooyx^s Swa/us Ocpjjn) rrjv
<}>V<TIV mv and 438 b 27 and also Problems, 906 b 37 : r\ ocr/xrj Oepfio-
rr)$ rts eori, and elsewhere for the influence of heat in producing smell.
443 b 19. eK8T]...8vo. It is unlikely that Aristotle here refers
to TO 77*81) Kal TO XvTrrjpdv as Hammond (p. 173) thinks. If that were
so it would mean that odour per se was exhaustively divided into
two species, the pleasant and the unpleasant, but nothing is said to
confirm this. Aristotle certainly implies that all odours are either
pleasant or unpleasant, but he does not elevate those epithets into
specific differences. Alexander (De Sens. p. 97, 1. 23 sqq. [W.]) con
jectures that perhaps TO ^v and TO \virrjp6v are the primary species
of that kind of odour which is independent of taste, and that the
others are subsequent to them and, possessing no names of their
own, correspond to the particular flavours and perfumes from which
they originate.
This would make the classification of odours per se pleasant
and the reverse correspond on the whole to the classification of the
species of the other sense qualities. But it is hardly possible that
TO rjSv and TO \v7rrjp6v can be regarded as objective determinations
like yXvKv and TUKpoV. Besides, it is clear from De An. n. ch. 9,
421 b i sqq. that the same epithets mark the species of odour per se
pleasant as those which distinguish the varieties dependent on taste.
Among odours per se pleasant are included the scents of flowers
COMMENT A RY 185
(1. 30 below) and to these in the De Aninia are applied the terms
y\VKV, S/ot/xu etc. ?; fJitv yap yXvKtla [oVo rov] KpOKOV /cat jueAtTos, rj 8e
opt^cta Ovfjiov /cat T<OV TOIOUTWV.
The smell of honey is, no doubt, one of the class of odours
which follow the taste. That of crocus or saffron is a scent per se
pleasant, for the taste of the substance is not sweet. Probably
Aristotle would have explained the phenomenon that many things
did not have the corresponding odour and flavour by this distinction
between the two different orders of smell. The problem is, however,
not worked out.
Alexander, though lending some colour to the suggestion that
TO ij&v /cat TO AvTrr/poV are the species of odour per se pleasant and
the reverse, yet does not hold that ctSr/.-.Su o here refers to them.
Aristotle is referring to the two great divisions of odour 007*77
Ko.0* avrrjv TJScta, and that which is only Kara (Tv/JLJ3t/3-r]KO<s T/ Seta. The
latter is called TO OPCTTTLKOV to\>s in 444 b 10. It is true it should
rather be a yVos and that term is employed in 444 a 32 and b 4, but
Aristotle frequently uses yeVos and eTSos indifferently to designate
a class.
Here it certainly looks strange that Aristotle after using ct8os
to denote a wide group should in the next line employ it to refer to
infimae species, but this is characteristic of the carelessness of his
style. He says There are two species of odour meaning by that
two divisions, and then the word species suggests to him the fact
that some people have denied the existence of any species at all
in odour.
443 b 23. KUTCI crvfiptpTjKos, i.e. indirectly: cf. note on Kara
O-U/X/?/:??;KO S chapter i, 437 a 5, n.
443 b 33- Evpnr8^v. Euripides is criticised by the comic poet
for sickening over-refinement of style. Cf. Meineke, Frag. Com.
Grace. Strattis, p. 298.
Perhaps there may be a hit in comparing to (fxiK-fj what would be
left if the meretricious additions were removed, /xvpov is a perfume,
not a spice. Cf. Cic. ad Att. i. 19, 2.
Perhaps the force of the taunt may be thus rendered : Don t
put hair-oil in your soup !
444 a i. viiv. Aristotle is not necessarily to be regarded as
mourning the degeneracy of his own time. The vvv need not have
that signification.
444 a 2. pidtovrai. Anything contrary to nature (</>ucrts) is
1 86 DE SENSU
: cf. the famous /Jwuos rts or ftia OO-TI? in Nic. Eth. i. ch. 3,
1096 a 6.
The idea here seems to be that gourmands get a pleasure from
odour which appears to arise from taste. It is in the exercise of the
latter sense (along with that of touch) that men are intemperate.
Cf. Prob. 949 b 6, etc. and Sir A. Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, n. p. 49.
444 a 4. i8iov here and in 1. 9 below is interpreted as /aaAioTu
i&iov by Alexander who, influenced by 21-24 below (g.v.), thinks that
other respiring animals also perceived, though in a less degree, this
kind of odour. But in 21-24 Aristotle is talking merely of odour in
general and explaining why it is perceived by means of inhaling the
breath. It is because of its higher function in man that odour is
drawn in with the breath, and the same mechanism is provided for
animals (in which the higher functions are lacking) in order that
Nature might not have to devise a new organ for them (444 b 5).
Independently, however, of the influence of 11. 21-24, there was
some reason for Alexander interpreting tSiov as fidXicrra I Stov, for
otherwise Aristotle appears to make an absolute qualitative dis
tinction in sensation depend upon a mere quantitative difference
the greater size of the human brain as compared with that of other
animals.
444 a lo-n. Cf. De Gen. Animal, n. ch. 6, 743 b 28sqq.
444 a 13-15. This is obviously the same account of the origin
of catarrh as is given in De Somno, ch. 3, 458 a 2. The di/a$v/x,ta<m
is not an exhalation from food as it exists outside the body; it arises
from the food that has been eaten. The process by which the
nutritive element in food is diffused into the blood is called by
Aristotle an avatfv/xiWcs volatilisation in 456 b 3. It is an excess
of this exhalation which, when carried up to the brain, produces a
flow of phlegm.
vyteta is defined in Phys. vn. ch. 3, 246 b 5; Prob. 859 a 12, etc.
as a o-u/x/xerpta balanced proportion of heat and cold (cf. beneath
i. 3 6).
4443 18 sqq. Cf. above ch. 4, 441 b 30. Food is always a
mixture. Alexander explains that it is always the cold associated
with the liquid element in food which is the cause of its un-
healthiness. He, however, identifies the aW0i>/Ata<ris from food
which causes catarrh with the odour which is connected with taste.
There is, however, nothing in the text to justify this and Aristotle
has just refused to identify odour with afuflv/xt acm. Probably in
COMMENTARY 187
order to get my translation ovaa should be inserted after vypti. This
is ugly but possible. If we render whether dry or cold there is no
point and, indeed, there is disagreement with the doctrine that all
food has both characteristics.
Aristotle is probably thinking of the supposed efficacy of some
perfumes in expelling colds and warding off infectious diseases.
444 a 20. TjScia must be understood, if not read, after y Ka(f avrrjv.
It appears after euwSous in MSS. L S U. Alexander interprets ?j8etu.
007x77 and Aristotle does not elsewhere talk of rj KaO avrrjv 007x77 ,
but of 77 Ko.6 1 avrrjv T/Scta (007x77): cf. 443 b 30. Bekker s text is 77 8
(X7TO T77$ 607X775 Trj$ K(X$ OLVTiqV VU)8oi>S OTTUMTOVV K.T.X.
If we retain this reading the missing substantive after
cuwSous cannot be rpo<j>tj as Bonitz (I/id. p. 533 a 3) suggests.
Aristotle is discussing not the food but the odour which is
Hayduck (Prog. Kon. Gym. zu Meldorf^ 1877) suggests
TJ after cuo>ou?, as also does Mr Cook Wilson {Journal of
Philol. xi. pp. 119-120); but it is doubtful whether 77 c Soi 77 could
designate the objective quality of odour which is supposed to
promote health. The latter also suggests rj 8 O.TTO rr}s 007x77? T^S
I suggest 77 8 aTTo T77? 007x771; KO.$ avrrjv e^co8t a. Cf. 445 a I :
Se KaO* avrrfv TT^ST 8vo-(jo8tas ov8ev <^>povTt^ouo - iv.
Aristotle could quite well talk of ev wSt a Ka9 avrr)v and 8vo-w8ta
KaO avrrjv. 77 KaO avrrjv tuwSta would mean odour essentially pleasant,
whereas 77 KO.@ avrrjv OO-^YI would mean smell which is essentially
smell. But Aristotle does not wish to show that the opposite kind
of odour is not essentially odour, but that it is not essentially
pleasant.
444 a 21. Sux TOVTO. Because of its function in maintaining
health in man who is the final aim and end of all the endeavour
of nature. Aristotle is talking of smell in general ; he does not
mean that its higher function is shared by any of the animals.
444 a 23. p.6T xi K.T.X. Aristotle seems to think of the air as
entering into the constitution of the body. Certain organs e.g. that
of hearing (cf. ch. 2, 438 b 21 and De Gen. Animal, v. ch. 2,
781 a 24 sqq.) seem to contain air. Animals that do not breathe
have a av^vrov Tn/eDpx which performs the same function as the
breath. (Cf. De Somno, 2, 456 a 12.) The probably spurious
writings Trepl Trveu/xaros and Trept <i>wi/ Kivrjvws also declare that
there is a o-tyx</>uToi/ Tri/eiyxa in the lungs of respiring animals and in
1 88 DE SENSU
the heart. This doctrine may be a legitimate deduction from such ,
passages as the present. Cf. 481 a i, 27, 482 a 34, 703 a 15 etc.
Cf. Introduction, sec. vi. and the passage there quoted where the
crvfJi<f>VTOv Oeppov is also called Trveu/xa.
444 a 26-27. T| yap TT)S oo-jjtijs K.T.X. Cf. Prob. 9075 9: oXws 77
OCT/XT; Sia OtpnoTrjra ytVercu and cf. note to 443 b 17.
444 a 27-31. There is no reason for considering that Kora-
KcxpY)TaL...Kivr)(nv should be postponed till 444 b 7 as Susemihl
(Philol. 1885) an d Hammond think, or for deleting it as Hayduck
(op. tit.) wishes. It is certainly better to postpone it than to delete
it and it comes in quite well at b 7, but it may stand here quite well
as a note to amplify what has been already said. It points out the
double function of avaTrvotj, the operation which has just been under
discussion.
s irape p-yw. Cf. De Resp. 473 a 24. The windpipe is the
essential organ for conveying the breath. When it is closed death
ensues. Not so in the other case.
4443 34. Kara pryeBos. Cf. De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 14, 658 b 8.
444335. x a ^P cl - St Hilaire (p. 61) has a marvellous notion
that Aristotle in distinguishing the higher kind of odour is erecting
a personal liking into a theory. But for evidence that the distinction
was widely recognised cf. Eth. Eud. in. ch. 2, 1231 a n : 816 e/x/xeAws
<>7 ^TpOLTOVLKOS TttS /XF KO.\OV O^Cll/, TttS & >/8t .
444 b 3. Biehl and Bekker read 8ia TO ava-n-vtlv which, of course,
must be taken along with 6 o-a TrAeiyxoi/a e ^ei. In that case we must
understand Sia TO dva-n-vtlv to be equivalent to dvaTrvorjs eVcKei/ because
we learn from De Resp. 476 a 7 that breathing is the final cause of
the existence of the lung (6 ^kv 7rA.evyu.cov T^S UTTO rov Trvev^aro^
KaTai/a;ea)s eVeKeV C CTTIV) ; the determining cause in the ordinary
sense both of the existence of the lung and of ava-Trvorj alike is
rather the greater vital heat of respiring animals (cf. 47 7 a 14).
But if we take this reading, the sense becomes very difficult.
The sentence TOIS 8 aA.A.ois...Sv o TrotrJ 11. 2-5 will mean that Nature
gave the rest of the respiring animals the kind of smell not necessarily
connected (for health reasons) with the head, in order not to make
two organs and one of them have no functions. The thought will
be that the animals, having nostrils, may as well smell by them.
This is to make OTTCOS /x,?} ala-OrjTtjpia Bvo Troir) equivalent to the well
known Aristotelian doctrine that Nature does nothing in vain. But
this doctrine may be variously interpreted ; here it would mean that,
COMMENTARY 189
having once made a thing, Nature must assign it a use. But such a
"maxim is hardly to be identified with the principle of parcimony
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem which is
surely the true import of the Aristotelian doctrine. If Nature really
does nothing in vain and does not wish to make a superfluity of
organs, it would surely be better not to give the lower animals
nostrils at all if the species of smell connected with food has no
necessary connection with the upper part of the head. A still
greater objection to the above interpretation is, that ala-OrjTypia has
to be taken as referring (i) to the organ of smell and (2) to the
organ of breathing the windpipe which is not an ala-Oyrypiov at all
(Alexander notices this).
It is as above that St Hilaire, following most commentators,
takes this passage, but Simon proposes to detach Sm TO dvairvelv
from what precedes and connect it with what follows translating
as I have done. The reading must thus, of course, be Sia TOV
dvairveiv which is the version found in MSS. P U pr. S. This is also
supported by Mr Cook Wilson (Journal of Philol. XL p. 120).
Cf. De Resp. 475 b 19: (TT}V Kard(l/v^Lv Trotemu) Sia TOV a.va.irveiv
Kai eV7n/eu/. The argument then is, that Nature made respiration
the means of perceiving odour in the case of the other respiring
animals in order to avoid making a separate sense organ for them.
The aLo-Orjnjpia. Bvo are the nostrils in man and the problematical
new organ of sensation in the other animals. Nature, in making
the lower respiring animals perceive odour by means of the nostrils,
avoided making a second sense organ of a new type a type not
found in man, her chief creation. But in the case of the non-
respiring animals, as he goes on to say, probably some other
contrivance has to be resorted to. It is thus that Alexander
interprets from d-n-oxprj onwards ; hence it is strange he does not
notice the ineptitude of the reading Sta TO aVa7rveu>.
44455. dirrfxpT] K.T.X. Biehl, following E M Y, strikes out
cVeiVep before and o5s after the KCU which precedes dva-rrveova-tv.
These stand in Bekker s text, which if retained will hardly give the
sense required. St Hilaire renders et il leur sufiit, quoiqu ils
respirent les deux especes d odeurs comme les hommes, d avoir
uniquement la perception de 1 une des deux, a mistranslation.
Hammond It is enough for these respiring animals that they
have the sensation of only one class of smells etc. But this is
merely an obvious and insipid deduction from what has been said
1 90 DE SENSU
about the greater size of the human brain, and besides it throws no
light, as it should, on the previous clause.
444 b 8. Cf. De An. n. ch. 9, 421 b 26.
444 b 9. evTojjiiov. Though insects live in air they do not respire,
thinks Aristotle. He had not the means at our disposal for obser
vation, which show that the opposite is the case ; cf. Packard, The
Study of Insects, p. 40 ; Owen, Compar. Anatom. and PhysioL of the
Invertebrate Animals, p. 368. Cf. OU K wajrvCi ra Ivro/xa, De Resp.
475 a 2 9- ^ u ^ they employ TO VV^VTOV TTV^V^O. in a way analogous
to respiration: cf. De Somno, ch. 2, 45 6 a n sqq. Cf. Hammond,
P- 35-
444 b 1 3. Kvuras. Not the species known by the name knipcs
in modern Zoology, which is a beetle allied to the Cryptarcha.
Cf. Hammond, p. 176.
444 b 13-14. oil irop<J>vpcu. Not purple sea-fish nor lesrougets
de mer. Aristotle asserts in Hist. Animal, vin. ch. 2, 590 b2 sqq.,
that rj TTop^vpa. is among the class of shell-fish that move and that it
is caught by a bait, as it feeds on small fishes.
444 b 21. ere pa. Cf. De An., loc. cit. 421 b 20.
TOV -yap K.T.X. Cf. De An., loc. cit. 21-23. ^ i strange that
Wallace (Aristotle s Psychology*, p. 246) should think that Aristotle did
not really mean that the manner of perceiving smells was different
in respiring and non-respiring animals when he quotes ( 7) the
passage from the De Sensu here beginning ov rov avrw rpoirov.
By a difference in manner Wallace must mean a difference in
the quality of the sensation. He blames Aristotle for being misled
by language in assuming that odorous quality should be perceived
by the sense of odour.
But Aristotle throughout proceeds on the principle that the only
way for establishing the identity of sensations is the identity of their
objective ground. It is really impossible to tell whether the quali
tative character of the mere subjective affection is identical in any
two people or any two species. We have to assume that, where the
objective content is the same, the quality of the sensation is the
same. Thus I believe that my sensation when I enjoy the perfume
of a rose is the same as my neighbour s. We apprehend something
that is chemically identical.
Now, though Aristotle knew nothing of chemical qualities in our
sense, he tries to prove the objective identity of that which is
perceived both by respiring and non-respiring animals. He points
COMMENTARY 191
out in De An., loc. at. 23, that it has the same physiological effect.
Strong odours and he meant by odours practically chemicals
diffused either in air or water (cf. note to 443 b 2 and Introduction,
sec. vii.) have a destructive action upon both classes alike and
hence are the same. This inference was all the more easily made
because he conceived their- effect to be exercised upon the organ of
smell or, at least the head, the region in which it is situated and out
of the material of which it is formed (cf. beneath 1. 34 Kapypapova-i).
That there should be chemical qualities apart from taste or smell,
and qualities of any kind which are not perceived by some of the
senses, would have appeared strange to Aristotle and the normal
Greek mind, for which had not been shattered the harmony between
Nature and man, in whom evolution has developed senses to give
warning of most of the ordinary collocations of qualities which affect
his well-being. But, if Aristotle had discovered that any quality,
not distinguishable directly by man, still had an effect upon the
sentience of some other form of life (e.g. the ultra-violet rays on
ants), he would have been bound by his own principles to assume
the existence of a new sense in these creatures, if the quality which
affected them had a sufficient amount of objective difference from
the qualities which stimulate human sensibility.
444 b 24-25. d<j>aipi K.T.X.. Cf. De An. 421 b 26-422 a 6, for a
closely parallel account. 42 2 a i : rots Se rov dtpa
[ir\ dvairveovTa Cf. De All. 421 b 14 : fJirj ai/aTTi/ewj/ 8e aXX I
are^wv TO TrvtvfJLo. ovK ooyxarcu.
444 b 26. Cf. De An. 421 b 28 : TO, /xei yap e^et <pay/xa KOI.
ZXvrpov TO. /3A.e<apa, a /AT; /ai/iycras ^178 dvacnrdcras ov)( opa.
444 b 28-29. Cf. De An., loc. cit. (continuing): ra Se a-K\r)p6(f)-
ovSei/ er^ei TOLOVTOV aAA. eu^eo)? opa ra yti/o/xcva ei> TW Sia^arer.
Alexander and all other editors read eV TOV Swarov opav avrw
cvOvs. In that case the meaning would be from the possession
of. the faculty or from the time when the faculty (of seeing) exists.
The ancient Latin translation has a facultate existente.
444 b 31. 8vcrxpcuvi. In Hist. Animal, ix. ch. 40, 626 a 26
he points out that bees dislike unpleasant smells. He probably is
thinking of this here and below in 1. 35 Oeiov.
But in the De An. in. ch. 13, we hear that excessively strong
odours, colours, sounds do not destroy life except Kara
435 b 10.
192 DR SENSU
444 b 35. 0iov. Cf. De An. 421 b 25.
445 a 8 - 8l> ^ ov - Cf. above ch. i, 4365 20: at Se 8ta rah/
The flesh (cf. Z> ^#. n. ch. n, especially 423 b 26) really forms
a medium for touch. But the difference between this and an
external medium forms an important basis for classifying the senses.
Cf. De An. in. ch. 12, 434 b 15, and ch. 13, 435 a 16 sqq.
4453 n. KCU 4v de pi K.T.X. Because the objects of sight and
hearing exist in air and water. Alexander says that so far as the
ycVeo-is of ocr/xi? is due to *?poT?7<j it is related to taste and touch, so
far as eV vypois ytVcrat it is related to the externally mediated senses.
Note below TW Sta<avet = TU> oparw : cf. chapter 3.
445 a 15. olov pa<f>rfj TIS. Note that Aristotle does not say that
this is anything more than an analogue to the process which
produces odour.
445 a 18-19. Cf. De An. in. ch. 12, 434 b 20: i^o<os Se *a!
Xpw/xa KOL 6o-/xr} ov rpe^ci. The Pythagoreans may have observed
the stimulating effect of some odours. Cf. Alex. De Sens.
p. 1 08 (W).
445 a 21. Alexander thinks that Aristotle means that, because
7rptTTw/x,aTa (TreptrTw/xa = excrement) are both dry and liquid, they
show that the food from which they are secreted is composite,
i.e. consisting of both yfj and v6\op. (This must be so indeed
according to the doctrine of the Hep! fjiaKpopioTrjTos, ch. 3, 465 b
18-19, where Trepirroj/xa is said to be uVoAei/x/xa TOU TrpoTe pov, i.e.
the food.)
But probably the argument does not run quite in this way.
Aristotle says that food must be composite. But probably he
means a little more than merely /uc/xiy/xeW as in chapter 4,
441 b 30 sqq. o-vV0ero5 when applied to the objects of sense tends
to mean more than merely composite, but refers continually to
things that have density : cf. Meteor, iv. ch. 5, 382 a 26 sqq. : airavra
av fir) TO. (rw/xara TO, (rvi/flera KCU <Jpicr/w,eva OVK aveu Tn/^eoo?. TO
avvOerov TO (rvvfarrjKOS. Cf crvcrT ir](r6fjLvov below, crw/^a once more
tends to have the same application : cf. beneath 1. 25 : ZTL TTO\V ^TTOJ-
cvXoyov TOV depa crw/xaTOvo-^ai, and o-w/xaTwSe? above. Though al!
the four elements, fire and air included, are o-^ara, yet we hear in
Prob. 932 b 2 : TrvKvorepov y OdXarra KOL /xaXXoi/ (rw/xa. crw/xaTO>8r;<;
and yewS^s are constantly conjoined: cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 745 b 21 sqq.
Now 007*77 is nothing crassly material in this sense; cf. Prob.
COMMENTARY 193
865 a 21 : TJ oovxrj ov o-wju-arwSr;?. Hence he must prove that yrj,
the most bodily of the elements, is an essential constituent of Tpo<f>ij.
Hence he is probably thinking of Treptrrw/xa as something solid (it
is the heavy element in food (cf. 442 a 7), and hence is to be
identified with 7/7, the heaviest element; cf. De An. in. ch. 13),
and more or less ytwScs, and yfj is rjpd. The argument is the
excrement proves that in the compound of which food consists there
must be solid matter. But it might be objected that the water in
it (and water is one of the media of odour) is the really nutritive
element. No, says Aristotle, water alone does not nourish ; some
of the more solid elements must be mingled with it and, if that is
so, still less likely is it that air, which cannot be solidified, should
support life. The reasoning is very much condensed. Water, <X/UKTOI>
6V, cannot nourish a solid body. But cannot it be solidified?
Not unless something yewScs is mixed with it. This would be true
(cf. 441 a 30: 6pfj.aii 6iJLVov ovScv <au/Tai Tra^woyuei/oi/ TO v8wp} except
in the case of freezing, which would certainly not produce a nutritive
solid ! Still less likely is it that air could be solidified. On this
interpretation there is no need to insert d after CTI 8 , 1. 22, as
Hayduck, op. tit., suggests.
The waste residue in plants is, Alexander explains, such sub
stance as gum, the bark and in a way the leaves, etc.
445 a 26. TOTTOS SKTIKOS, i.e. tj KotXta : cf. De Soinno, 3, 456 b 2, 3:
T-TJS fjiti> ovv OvpaOev Tpo<i;s ettrioucr^s is TOUS SCKTIKOVS TOTTOVS.
4453 29. ava0v[ii<xo-es. Cf. note to 443 a 23 and cf. 444 a 24.
Aristotle allows the ai/aflu/xiWis theory in this modified form. The
medium may be described as an aVa^v/uiWts. Just as in the previous
( hapters, here also he adopts something from previous theories.
The medium is a gas, in the case of breathing animals at least, but
not an exhalation from the odorous substance. But he can only
explain odour as a quasi-diffusion of substance in this gas. With
Aristotle, however, it is difficult to distinguish medium and object
(cf. above 445 a 14 where he identifies TO oparov and TO Sta^c^e s),
and so we should be bound to say odour was an aVa^v/xtWts of
some sort ; cf. Introduction, sec. vn. That is however not quite
accurate, as it is some nature common to both gases and liquids
that is TO StW/xov or the Kou/r) </>v o-is of the two to Aristotle.
He seems here to have in a way anticipated the discovery of the
truth that the diffusion of a substance in a liquid is analogous to its
behaviour as a gas. Once more he differs from modern theory in
R. 13
i 9 4 VE SENSU
regarding TO SiW/xov as a KOIVTJ <vVis which had a permanent existence
of its own instead of as a mere state, or disposition to act, of matter
which may cease to be so characterized.
445332. alo-6T|o-(os. This perhaps points to some subjective
experience of his own.
445 b i. As Biehl suggests, Trept TWV aio-Orjrwv must have fallen
out or must at least be presupposed before KO.& tKaa-Tov alvOrjTTJpiov.
Aristotle has not discussed the aurOyjnjpLa since chap. 2, except
incidentally in chap. 5, and at the beginning of chap. 3 (439 a 7) he
proposes to give an objective account -nfpl TO>V ala-OrjTwv ran/ K<X#
IKO.OTOI/ aiaOrjTTjptov.
CHAPTER VI.
445 b 3. cl irav <r[ia K.T.\, This is a principle with Aristotle. Cf.
De Coelo, i. ch. i #r/ /#//. o-u>/u,o. is /xy0os eVl rpta a tridimensional
magnitude. More strictly /ae yeflos is the quantitative determination
that all bodies possess, /xe yeflos is that which is divisible into con
tinuous parts (cf. Metaph. v. ch. 13, 1020 a n: /xe yeflos Se TO eis
o-vvexfj (StcupeToV)). The continuous (TO o-vve^s) is that which is
infinitely divisible. Compare De Coelo, 268 a 6 : owc^c? ftev core TO
o tcupeToi ei9 act 8i<upTa, cr<3/u.a 8e TO TTOVTQ SuupeToV. Cf. also Phys.
in. chs. 6, 7. There Aristotle tells us that /xtye 0?; are infinitely divisible
only; /.. though the process of division can be carried ad infinitum
there are no actually existing infinitely small parts. Compare peyeOos
1. 10 below, o-wex^s 1. 29, etc.
445 b 4. ira0TinaTa, a variant for irdOr}: cf. Bonitz, /;/^/. p. 554.
In De Coelo, i. ch. i Aristotle tells us that the objects of physical
science are fieyeOrj KCU o-w/xaTa with their TrdOrj and KIVTJO-CIS, and the
a pxcu, />. the elements.
445 b 7. ironrriKov. Cf. ch. 3, 439 a 18: vonjarei TTJV a*<rOrja w etc.
This is not intended as an argument for the alternative aSvvarop, but
is rather a development of the positive thesis that infinite divisibility
of the o-dJ/xa entails infinite divisibility of the irdOos.
445 b 9. Tiiv T al <r0T]o-iv. Infinite divisibility of the Tra^^/xaTa
alo-Oyrrd means infinite divisibility of the aur&jo-i?. Hence all bodies,
however minute, will cause sensation and be perceptible.
445 b 10. aSvvaTov K.T.X. This looks as if it established not the
proposition to be proved but its converse. But the reasoning no doubt
is could we not have aurtfi/o-i?, extremely minute, which is not the
perception of a body? No, says Aristotle, we cannot have any
perception, take colour for example, in which the content is not a
quantum and hence a determination of o-cu/xa.
Cf. below ch. 7, 449 a 22 : TO alarOrjTov TTO.V eo-Tt /ne yc^os K.T.X.
445 b 1 6. TWV jiaOrj^aTiKwy, e.g. lines, points, planes etc. It had
been part of the Pythagorean doctrine to give these substantial exist
ence and to make everything consist of them. (Cf. Metaph. i. ch. 8,
132
196 DE SENSU
989 b 29sqq., and also Metaph. xin. ch. i.) Aristotle distinguishes
the objects of mathematics from those of physics in Phys. u. ch. 2,
and elsewhere. They are determinations of number and magnitude
taken in abstraction from the concrete TO. e d^aipeVcws (cf. De
An. i. ch. i, 403 b 15) and more particularly considered apart from
the motion or change of the objects to which they belong. Compare
also Metaph. vi. ch. i, 1026 a 7 sqq. They are not really separable
from the things of sense like the object of metaphysics but are con
sidered as such. Cf. De An. in. ch. 7, 431 b 15 : TO, /uat%umfca ov
K^wpiorfjLva. ws Kc^wptcTjixeVa votl (6 fj,aOrjfjLaTLKo<s). The argument is that
if the constituents of sensible objects are not themselves sensible, the
only alternative left is that they are mathematical entities.
<in K.T.X.. We must take this as a further argument against the
existence of imperceptible bodies.
It has been conceded that if sensation is not divisible adinfinitum
the ultimate constituents of bodies are not objects of sense, and
further they cannot be objects of consciousness at all, as they cannot
be merely mental entities vor/ra. We know objects either by
awr^trts or by vovg or, as in the case of mathematical entities
(already ruled out of court), by a union of the two.
445 b 17. vovs is that faculty of the soul which is peculiar to
man among mortal creatures and which receives the et8rj forms or
intelligible character of things without their matter (vAry). Cf. De
An. in. chs. 48. The objects of i/o{5s are vorjrd and these
evidently are simply conceptual contents, as they are said to have
their concrete existence in the sensible forms of things. Cf. De
An. in. ch. 8, 432 a 2 sqq. voOs in operation (ei epyct?) is identical
with its objects (431 b 17, Metaph. xn. ch. 7, 1072 b 21).
ov& voei K.T.X. These insensible objects are the constituents of
external bodies and hence must be external. They must be o-w/xara
and contain v\r), and aur^cris is indispensable for the apprehension
of such objects. Cf. Metaph. vin. ch. i, 1042 a 25: al & aurOujTal
ova-Lai Traaai v\rjv l^ovcnv. They must be Ka6 cKuora, and these are
the objects of auHfycris: cf. De An. n. ch. 5, 417 b 22, etc.
Though Aristotle does not employ this argument here against
the existence of imperceptible magnitudes, it raises a difficulty which
besets all modern theories of atoms, ether etc. Physical scientists of
a certain school continually talk of the atom as a mere concept.
They do not explain how it is possible for solid bodies to be composed
of concepts. Cf. Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, ch. vn. passim.
COMMENTARY 19;
445 b 19, The theory of atoms lies at the basis of the doctrine
of aTrdppoiai, previously discussed, chapter 4 ad fin. It consists in
finding the reality of physical bodies not in their sensuous cha
racteristics, but in some quantitative determination of their minute
parts. But Aristotle refuses to entertain the theory that there are
bodies with no sensible and only mathematical qualities, and in par
ticular that they are atoms in the strict sense of bodies perfectly
indivisible.
445 b 21. rots irepl KivTJo-tws. The reference is to the Physics
frequently styled ra ncpl Ku/r/o-eaxr, and in particular, as Alexander
says, to the last books. Thomas is still more explicit and says the
sixth, where indeed the chief discussion of the doctrine of indi
visible magnitudes is to be found. The theory that magnitude is
infinitely divisible will be found in the third book, chs. 6 and 7
(cf. note to 445 b 3) and the definition of continuity which, being
the characteristic of all magnitude, entails its infinite divisibility, is
to be found in Book v. ch. 3. Things that are continuous have a
common boundary OTOV ravro yeV^rat Kal ev TO e/carepou Trepas ots
aTTToi Tcu (22ya n). This is practically repeated in vi. ch. i : a-wex?)
pcv v ra IcrxaTa Iv (231 a 22), where he goes on to show that nothing
continuous can be made up of indivisible parts. Indivisible parts
must be either entirely discrete or entirely coincident, and so cannot
compose the continuous.
Hence Aristotle arrives at another definition of the continuous.
It is that which is divisible into parts themselves infinitely divisible
Ae yw Se TO o-wc^c? TO SiaipeToi/ ets del SiatpeTa (232 b 24). Since
continuity is the universal characteristic of magnitude, this yields us
the further proposition that magnitude is that which is divisible into
magnitudes TTOLV /xeyctfos ets fMeycOr] SicuperdV (232 a 23). Aristotle
shows in addition that, if magnitudes were composed of indivisible
parts, motions would be impossible; every distance would be tra
versed as soon as entered upon if motion, like magnitude, were made
up of indivisible parts. Motion is continuous and likewise time.
Those proofs, it is obvious, affect only atoms that are held to be
spatially indivisible. To the modern theory which recognises that
the atom must have a definite bulk and even a composite structure
Aristotle s refutation does not apply. The atoms are only physically
not spatially discontinuous, and there is no more difficulty in
imagining minute discrete bodies than in the perception of discrete
masses appreciable to sight. Aristotle s other objections to an
198 DE SENSU
atomic theory are to be found mostly in the De Coelo and the De
Generatione et Corruptione (cf. Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics, Vol. i. pp. 430 sqq., pp. 445 sqq.). As Zeller says,
without the modern theories of chemical, molecular and gravitational
attraction, it was difficult to see how discrete atoms could cohere in
a solid body, and hence Aristotle s criticism of the ancient atomists
was justified. At the same time also, the arguments in the Physics
form a valuable corrective to such modern thought as regards all the
individual things of sense as really discrete in structure and only
apparently continuous. They are only discrete from one point of
view; relatively to the molecule or the atom they are discrete, but
relatively to other composite structures water and iron are continuous.
To be continuous is to be thought of merely as a magnitude so far as
internal structure is concerned. So elastic balls may have many
properties and many forms of action on each other and on other
things; but these are relations to external things that affect them as
a whole; when regarded in this way they are considered as being
internally merely magnitudes, i.e. as continuous. The atom itself
relatively to which they are discrete must itself relatively to them be
regarded as merely a magnitude, i.e. as continuous. One does not
inquire what makes the parts of the atom cohere together and, if one
did, one would have to think of the atom as being composed of
smaller atoms which again must be continuous. But there comes a
point where this continual division and subdivision of matter ceases
to have interest. Hence we cannot look to the discreteness of
matter for its reality. The reality of objects must lie, as Aristotle
said, in the form or, as modern theory would put it, in the law of
the combination of their elements and the qualitative difference to
which that gives rise.
445 b 24. v n*v -yap K.T.\. The passage where we find the
doctrine expounded is in the Posterior Analytics I. ch. 20, 82 a 21 sqq.
(Cf. also ch. 22, 84 a 29.) There, however, it is set forth in another
connection. Aristotle shows that the number of terms to be inter
posed between the subject and predicate of any proposition which
we desire to demonstrate, is not infinite. If it were, the proposition
could never be proved, as it is impossible to traverse the infinite.
All the terms in the series must be contiguous, with nothing inter
vening between them . . . c^o /xti/a aAAv/Atoi/ aWe /AT) etvat /<iTav (82 a 3 1 ).
If there were an infinity of terms to be inserted at any point in the
series, it would constitute a break and the terms would not be
COMMENTARY 199
contiguous. (For I lie definition of typ^tvov cf. Phys. v. ch. 3,
227 a 6 f^6fjivov St. o a.v <e?7s ov aimjrat) and 226 b 23 aTrrecr^ai
Sc a>v TO, a/cpa a/xa.)
There is some difference, however, between a series of terms
bound together by the identity of the subject of which they are pre
dicated and a number of specifically diverse but generically identical
qualities. According to Aristotle, in both cases they are to be con
sidered as a series arranged between two extremes. In the case of
qualities these extremes are the members of the series with least
specific resemblance and, if one takes seriously the spatial designation
(ra evros or TO, dva />u<rov) applied to them, the intermediate members
of the group must be thought of as being arranged in accordance
with the amount of the resemblance they each possess to the
extremes. We have seen, however, (chapters 3 and 4) that Aristotle
dees not prefer to think of them as forming a continuum like a line,
but as being formed by different proportions in the admixture of the
two fundamental extreme qualities, e.g. black and white, sweet and
bitter. Though forming a linear series, they do not constitute a
uniformly continuous line. Thus though he may, as here, talk of
opposites (erai/Tia) in terms of spatial relation and call them lo-^ara
(cf. Categ, ch. 6, 6 a 17: ra TrAeioTov d\\ij\<DV SteCTTT/Kora ran/ ev TU>
auT<3 yevfi tvavr ia. optfcovrai) qualitative difference is really other than
spatial diversity. It is this that causes the number of species in a
genus to be limited in number. If a genus were really a spatial
whole, its parts, the species, would need not merely to be e^o/xeva
contiguous, but <rw(xfj continuous, and hence capable of resolution
into an infinite number of subdivisions (cf. note to 445 b 21). If the
members of the series were not merely contiguous but had a common
boundary, as things continuous have, it would mean that there was
no reason for drawing the boundary between any two at one point
rather than another. The only common boundaries are spatial exist
ences point, line and surface, and these can be drawn anywhere.
It is magnitude that is per se continuous, but in so far as genera are
not magnitudes they are not per se continuous (KO.&" O.VTO o-vi/e^es, 1. 30)
and besides do not present this aspect of infinite divisibility.
445 b 25. ?<rxara. Cf. notes to 11. 21 and 24 above.
irav Si K.r.X. Cf. 442 b 2O.
445 b 28-30. Division into unequal parts is, Alexander tells us,
progressive division of the parts which the first division yields into
the same fraction as that which they are of the whole, e.g. the division
200 DE SENSL r
of a line into two and again of the half into two and so on. This is
the special example of unequal division which Aristotle, in Phys.
vni. ch. 8, 263 a 3 sqq. in reply to Zeno, shows to be infinite lv Se
TW <rwep(t ve<TTi /xcv aTTcipa TqfJLtcrr), aXX OVK ei/reXe^eta aXXa 8vra/xei
(263 b 28). Any actual division of a continuum into distinct parts is
finite. In order for the parts to be distinct the termini of adjacent
parts must be, at least, reckoned as distinct. Hence the whole,
which was continuous, by the division ceases to be so and ipso facto
loses that capacity for infinite division which, as continuous, it
possessed.
True the parts again can be divided, but any division of them
into distinct elements which can actually be realised is once more
finite.
All this seems to point to the conclusion that the very spatial
determinant by which we are able to construct a continuum, e.g. a
line, and to consider it as resoluble into distinct parts, is itself a
qualitative distinction (e.g. direction right or left) which exists over
and above the characteristic of magnitude, which is the universal
attribute of spatial quantity. Aristotle goes so far as to say (263 b 7)
crvfJifleflrjKC yap ry ypa/x/xir} aTretpa i^uVca etyai, r; 8 oucrta ecrrtv erepa
KCU TO ctvat. Thus, not only has a line (with all other figures) a
non-quantitative aspect, but the possibility of determining it as a
quantity depends upon this qualitative character. (Cf. also for the
general doctrine in. ch. 7, 207 b 10: aVeipoi yap ai Si^orofiuu TOV
peycOovs.) The result, however, of this is that anything considered
as a continuum divides into a limited number of units (urn can mean
little else than units; all things considered as units are held to be
equal) but an infinite number of diminishing fractions. Units are
the constituents of a continuum, species of a genus.
445 b 30. TO & \L-f\ K.T.X. Cf. note to 1. 24 above.
445 b 3 1 - virdpx.ei 8 K.T.X. Cf. above 445 b 10 sq. : dBvvarov
XevKOV /xev 6poV, fj.rj irocrov 8t. Spatial quantity or /zeyeflos
Cf. also De An. III. ch. 3, 428 b 24: Kivr]<ris KOL /xeycdos a
TOIS ai(r6r)TOL<;.
445 b 32 sqq. There is a somewhat similar passage in Phys. vn.
ch. 5, 250 a 20 sqq. The sound which one single grain of millet
makes in falling exists as a separate sound (*aff avro) only potenti
ally in the whole, i.e. it is not actually a separate sound ov8e yap
ovSev <mv aXX } Swa/Aet tv TO> oXa> (2503 24). For the general
question as to how far Aristotle by his distinction between potential
COMMENTARY 201
and actual settles the difficulty about petites perceptions and sub-
consciousness generally, cf. Introduction, sec. vin.
446 a 2. SwW. A quarter of a tone was the least interval taken
notice of in Greek music. Hence, I fancy, d tv rfj SieVei <0oyyo<?
must be a sound with difference in pitch from that of the one before
it within, i.e. less than, a quarter-tone. Aristotle means that the
interval of a quarter of a tone is not thought of as resoluble into
parts, as larger intervals are. The parts of an interval are not
however sensations. Hence this phenomenon is hardly parallel to
that in the illustration from sight or that quoted in note to 445 b 32
above from the Physics. In those instances we have sensations
which/^r se are not actually appreciable when existing concomitantly,
being merged in the whole of which they are elements.
For Steo-is cf. Anal. Post. I. ch. 23, 84 b 38 : r/ o-pxn (i- e - ultimate
simple (dirXovv) constituent) lv /xeXet SiWi?. In Metaph. xiv. ch. i,
1087 b 35 it is called vTrojcei/xePov \v dp/x,oia a.
446 a 3. <rwxoCs OVTOS. The notes are still continuous in time.
446 a 4. XavOdvci. Hence there seems to be no ftera^u; the notes
seem to be l\6^va aXAi?A.ci>i , i.e. contiguous but separate, and hence
the continuity of the scale is broken up.
446 a 6. 8wci[ii K.T.X. The difficulty in this obscure passage is
increased by the discrepancy between the MSS. E M Y read orav ^
Xcopt? 77; orav xwpurOfj is the reading given by most others and by
Alexander. I have followed that of E M Y, which is supported by
the ancient Latin translation, because of the difficulty of giving any
sensible interpretation to the following sentence, KCU yap...3uupc0e?<ra,
if we read xtapurOfj; the sense it gives does not really conflict with
what is said later on.
Aristotle says that the very minute parts of the objects of sense,
if not separated, are perceived only potentially and not actually. But
this does not commit him to the statement that, if severed from the
whole, they are actually perceptible. This is no doubt the general
rule; an object like a one-foot measure which has only potential
existence in a larger whole is made actual by being marked off. It
then becomes an explicit object of consciousness, not merely a
potential one. But, he goes on to say, very minute fractions cannot
exist in isolation from the whole, as the larger parts of a whole can
when broken off. They lose their identity (cf. note to 446 a 9 below,
De Gen. et Cor? , i. ch. 10, 328 a 24sqq.) and become parts of the
new substance into which they are absorbed, and increase its bulk.
202 DE SENSU
As such they cannot be even merely potentially perceptible as parts
of the substance to which they belonged originally. They are, no
doubt, potentially perceptible parts of the new substance but, if they
have lost their eI8os, as Aristotle says in De Gen. et Corr., loc. /., they
cannot be on the same footing as elements which have entered into
a true mixture and which, on resolution of the mixture, become
actually what they were before.
These considerations make it clear that, when in 1. u 77 njs
cuo-07Jo-ea>s v7repox>7 is mentioned, Aristotle means the minute sen
sation which can be even potentially per se perceptible only when
coming from a part of the object which is not separated from the
whole. He argues the minute aur^o-is which has only existence
in a more distinct sensation (lv rrj aKpi/Seo-Te pa) and, as such, is only
potentially in its individuality a sensation, is not per se actually per
ceptible and hence capable of isolation ; hence the similarly minute
object of sense (TO -nyXt/couTov cucr^ToV), which causes it, must be in
the same case. It is not per se actually perceptible, but added to
and taken along with the other parts of the whole it is actually
perceptible and, since that is so, it, even in its individuality, must be
thought of as being only potentially an object of sense.
It is, I suppose, 7rpoo-yvo/xei oi/ (1. 1 6) which has prompted some
interpreters to think that Aristotle is considering the fortunes of the
minute part of the grain of millet in actual isolation. But, if it were
per se potentially perceptible when in actual isolation from the whole
to which it belongs, one would expect that the change caused by
addition to the whole would be to raise it, as such, to actual
perceptibility; but this Aristotle will not allow. Trpoo-yei/d/Acvov, as we
see from 1. 20 below and Phys. 250 a 24, just means ei/ TU> oXw.
There is no reason why it should not be used of intellectual as well
as of actual addition.
TO alcrOrjrov x M P i(rT v aurOdvea-Oat (1. 14) does not imply that the
alo-OrjTov exists x w pfe; ^ means, practically, to perceive it *a0 av.
Similarly things that exist \wpis x w P tcrT< * are identified with ova-Lai,
the independent existences which are the subjects of predication,
and which Aristotle in Anal. Post. i. ch. 4, 73 b 9 calls *aff avrd.
Cf. Metaph. Vil. ch. 3, 1029 a 28: TO x w / 3to " roi/ K0t ^ T To8e TL v
8oKt yaaXio-Ta rrj ovo-ia.
We can easily explain the substitution of x^P^V f r
by an editor who read on and found that x w P l/s tne minute parts of
objects were not actually perceptible, and indeed could not exist
COMMENTARY 203
and retain their previous character, if his logic led him to believe
that if not separate then not actually perceptible contradicted the
statement if separate not perceived (xwpto /xvat K.T.X.). Such
statements are only apparently in opposition. If we retain xup^Orj,
we shall have to translate they are potentially perceptible but not,
when in isolation, actually so. [This is different from the case of]
the one-foot measure which exists potentially in the two-foot rule
and actually when bisection is made. But the ellipse to be supplied
is so extraordinary that one might justly, with Biehl, suspect the
authenticity of the whole clause if x M P L(T ^V is to De read. Its
genuineness, if we adopt the better attested reading, is confirmed by
the force of /cat yap. Aristotle is pointing out that even in the case
of large objects like the one-foot rule the same thing holds good as
Of TCI fJLlKpa TTa/XTTttV.
446 a 8. 8up0icra is here equivalent to dfaipeOelo-a if it is to
make any sense. It is not the one-foot rule which is bisected but
the two-foot measure. Hence one would expect o\atpe0eio-fl (Bywater,
J. of P. xvm. p. 243) or Statpe&io-r/s ravrrj^. But perhaps this sense
of Siaipeii/ is idiomatic. Cf. note to ch. 3, 439 b 20 SieXo/xeVov?.
446 a 9. KCU 8ta\voivTo. In addition to being so very minute as
to surpass (vVepe ^eiv) the discrimination of the sense, these minute
particles lose their self-identity on being isolated.
vTrcpoxJ is, as the commentators notice, employed in rather a
different sense from the usual. It naturally means excess in great
ness: cf. chapter 3, 439 b 31.
For the doctrine cf. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 10, 3 28 a 24 sqq. :
ocra t8iaipTa, TroAXa \ikv oAt yots /cat /u,eyaAa /xt/cpots crvi/Tt^e/xej/a ov
Trotet IAI$W, aAA av&rjo-w rov Kparovvros /xera^aAXet yap Qa.rf.pov eis
TO /cpaTouv, otov orraAay/xos olvov /xvpc ois ^oei5(rti/ tSSaro? ov fLiywrai
Xvcrat yap TO cISos /cat /ATa/3aXAet ts TO TTOLV vo<i>p.
4463 ii. The minute fraction of substance in isolation from
the rest is not perceptible at all. Aristotle goes on to discuss what
happens when we do perceive it in some way when c-rreXyjXvOti y oi/a?.
446 a 12. 8vvc4ii -yap. We are not now discussing the separate
existence, but the separate perceptibility of the object TO ato-^ToV,
but in the sensation (aur^o-ts) to exist and to be perceptible is the
same; hence it is indifferent which of the two we assert to be
potential.
4463 18. eVmrapxciv means practically to form a constituent;
cf. Metaph. V. ch. 13, I02oa7: TTOO-OV AeyeTat TO oLaiperov et? eVira-ap-
204 DE SENSU
and Anal. Post. i. ch. 22, 84 a 14 sqq. ; odd
in the definition of number, while number iirdp^ti belongs to, or is
a predicate of, odd. Cf. also the definition of v\r) e ou yivcrai TI
tvv-rrdpxovTos, etc., cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 257. Hence it is probable
that Aristotle is thinking of the /xeye 07? which compose finite bodies
as the subject here, as twrrdpxtiv is generally used of that which
stands to anything in the relation of vXrj.
Perhaps, however, he is thinking of xp^ - 70 - tc. as the subject.
In that case the translation will run But when determinations of
colour, taste or sound, existing in the concrete are so related to each
other as to be also actually perceptible and perceptible, not merely
in the whole but individually, they must be limited in number.
This would mean that he is talking once more of the TrcTrc/aacr/xcVa
eufy of sense qualities. But they have already been accounted for,
and this seems to touch on the only case left undescribed the
distinguishable parts of a continuum, which are tvcpyeia perceptible
not merely in combination but in isolation. If this be the inter
pretation, the argument is that, in the case when the constituents of
the objects perceived are distinct and individually perceptible and
hence limited in number, the qualities presented by them must
have the same limitation. xpw/Aara etc - are but items of sensuous
determination, though, no doubt, Aristotle is thinking of the different
colours and sounds etc., as presented in the form of segments in a
continuum.
446 a 19 irpds aura. Alexander reads roo-avra which perhaps, if
understood as meaning of sufficient size or intensity, i.e. roa-avra TO
/xeycdo?, improves the sense. We must not understand sufficiently
numerous, i.e. rocravra TO vXrjOo?, as no multiplication of the numbers
of the insensible parts of objects makes the parts any the more per
ceptible per se. ?rpos avra can, however, quite well mean in relation
to each other. Cf. eavrats below ch. 7, 447 b 32.
446 324. OTO.V Vp-yw<rtv may be taken either with the clause
before or with dtfuKvovvrai.
TO (Uo-ov = TO /Aerav, which is defined in terms of this pheno
menon in local movement in Phys. v. ch. 3, 226 b 23 :
8e cis o TTC^VKC TrpwTOV a<iKVUT#ai TO /xeTa/JaAAof, r; cts o
/ATa/3dAAei Kara, (frvaiv crvve^ws /xTa/?aAAov.
4463 28. Ejjnr8oK\T]s. Cf. De An. II. ch. 7, 418 b 20: nal OVK
OpOtoS E/X7T8oK\^S...WS <epO/AeVoV TOU <<DTOS KOU TtLVOfJitVOV TTOTC
rrjs y^s xat To9 Trepte^ovTOS,
COMMENT A R Y 205
Aristotle goes on to say that it is asking too much to wish us to
believe that light passes from east to west across the whole sky
without the movement being detected. It was, of course, impossible
without modern scientific instruments and methods to discover the
movement of light. For the Empedoclean theory cf. chapter 3.
Cf. also R. P. 177, Zeller s Presocratic Phil. (Eng. Trans.), n. p. 158.
According to Philoponus, on this theory light was a cr<3/u,a issuing
from the illuminating body, vide below 446 b 30.
446 a 32. iro0v irot. Cf. Metaph. xii. ch. 2, 1069 b 26 and Nic.
Ethics, x. ch. 3, 1174 a 30, and Phys. vii. ch. i, 242 a 31 : TO KLVOV-
/XCVOV TTttV K TtVOS 19 Tt Kll>lTai.
446 b i. Time is infinitely divisible like motion and magnitude ;
cf. Phys. iv. chs. n, 12; vi. i, 2, 3 etc.; vin. ch. 8, 263 b 27: ofy
otov TC eis aro/zous xpoi ovs Siaipei(7$ai TOV yjpovov.
446 b 3. a^a K.T.X. This is equivalent to saying it is instan
taneous. An act of perception is in this characteristic distinct from
local movement, which cannot be instantaneous : cf. Phys. vi. ch. i,
23 1 b 30: et ij(3a^ TIS /?aStei, aSvvarov a//,a J3a$icw -ijj3a^ KOL
/3e/3aSiKeVai 77/?ae. Perception is an et/e pyeia, which as such has no
yeVco-is : cf. Alex. Zte ,&#.$. p. 126 (W.) and above, Introduction,
sec. iv.
446 b 5. The construction here seems to be defective. As I
have translated, instead of ovSev ^TTOV, ovSev /xaXXoi/ should have
been written ; but it was natural to say yrrov when denying that
they possessed the aspect of process any the less on account of the
instantaneousness of the act of perception considered as a psychical
event. Perhaps, indeed, Aristotle wrote /xaAXov, for which by a
blunder r^rrov was substituted; or he may have written aX/V OVK daw.
Thomas and Simon, however, punctuate after yiyi eo-flcu, making
the apodosis begin at o/xo>5. In this case we must regard 6^X01.. .
ae pa, 11. 7-10, as a parenthesis and translate from 1. 4 KCU /xr/ K.T.X.
and if sensations have no genesis, but exist without coming to be,
yet, as sound, etc...., is not the same true of colour and light?
Cf. Phys. vin. ch. 6, 258 b 17, De Coelo, i. ch. TI, 280 b 27.
Aristotle means that the instantaneousness of the psychic act
does not detract from the lapse of time in the physical process.
Though there is no ycWo-ts in the former, there is in the latter.
Hammond conjectures S/AOUD? for O/AWS and translates, Also if every
thing at the same moment hears and has heard, and in a word
perceives and has perceived, and there is no time process in sensa-
206 DE SENSU
tions, nevertheless they lack this process in the same way in which
sound, after the blow has been struck, has not yet reached the ear.
But I fail to see how a sound which is on its passage to the ear can
be said to lack process and how, if this were so, it would help
Aristotle s argument. Moreover Aristotle does not say that we are
unaware of the lapse of time which takes place while a sound is
being transmitted. He implies the opposite. He only says that in
the psychical act there is no process.
446 b 8. p.6Ta<rxT)[j.aTicn,s is a change of shape: cf. De Coelo, n.
ch. 7, 305 b 29 (yiyvc<r0at) rrj /xerao xi^xaTicrct, KaOdirfp e* TOV avrov
Kfjpov yiyvorr av <r</>atpu /cat KV/?OS. /xcTacr^-^/xaTt^eo-^at is also COn-
joined with (though differentiated from) dXXoiovaOai. It consists in
the rearrangement of elements which retain the same nature, while
indicates qualitative change.
^at is that form of yei>*<ri9 that would specially suit
an atomic theory and hence Aristotle applies it to the propagation
of sound, which he conceives of in quite a mechanical way. He
evidently thinks of the air taking on a different o-^fia for every
different articulate sound. These are subject to alteration in pro
portion to the distance we are from the person with whom we are
talking. He is evidently thinking mainly of mistakes in following
some one s words, not merely of inability to hear at all. That would
rather be accounted for by the absence of definite <rj(f/xa than
by change of o-x^/xa in the air which communicates the motion or
in the motion transmitted.
446 b ii. TO* irws ^x tv - Alexander interprets TO> Kara ax /0 " <v/
flvat. He distinguishes three classes of relata :
(1) Those which are Kara cr^eo-ic, e.g. ura, ofiota etc., in which
the mode of their relation (the cr^c tris) does not depend upon their
relative position in space.
(2) Those which are Kara o^e tru/, but where the a^ecris con
sists in spatial relation (/ TTOICL 0co-ct), e.g. SetoV.
(3) Those, e.g. aiaOrja-is and alcrOijrov, which, though requiring
some <rxns which consists in spatial relation (ov^...<S /xr/Sei/ avrr/
(sc. T$ oi/fet) Sta</>epeiv rrjv Qeorw T<OV opwfJievwv KCU TO Sicurr^a Trpo? TO
opav) are not strictly *v o-xecret, like TO Sc^toi/, but require a 8vi/a/u$
avTiX^TTTtKTy on the part of the ato-^r;o-ts. Light might travel from
object to eye on account of the spatial relation of the two, but vision
would not result unless the eye were endowed with a certain faculty.
This, in the minds of certain other commentators, e.g. Simon and
COMMENT A R Y 207
Thomas, seems to connect with the distinction drawn between certain
classes of relata in Metaph. v. ch. 15, 1020 b 26sqq.
In this chapter there are likewise three main divisions of relata :
1 i ) TO, KO.T dpiOfjibv Aeyo/xt a, e.g. ra Ida.. Things are equal of
which the quantity is one (?o-a Sc an/ TO TTOO-OV eV, 1021 a 12).
(2) TO, Kara. Svva.fj.iv Acyo/xeva, e.g, TO Ofpfnalvov Trpos TO $ep-
fjiai.vofjif.vov.
(3) Such as TO eTrio-TrjTov and cTricm///?;, alo-Orjrov and aiorOyo-is.
In the first two classes (cf. Bonitz, Metaph. p. 261) the whole
notion of the relata can be discovered in the relation. A is under
stood by being referred to B, and B by being referred to A. In the
third class, however, the relation is not mutual; one of the terms
requires independent explanation; TO alo-Orjrov can be explained by
referring ato-^o-is to it, but euo-^crig requires other definition than
reference to TO aurOijrov. We advance no further by saying that
vision is relative to those things of which there is vision, Sis yap
ravTov fiprjfjLtvov av fir) (1021 a 32).
Aristotle s meaning, however, is no more than this, that oi/as
is not explained by being regarded as relative to TO op^evov, but if
we refer it to XP^P - ^ can verv vve ^ he defined and we obviate any
useless repetition. Hence the distinction does not affect the real
relation of the object of vision (xpc3//,a) to vision (oi/as), but only the
mental way of relating them when the former is styled not XP^P* but
the object of vision TO opoyuvov.
Thus there is no justification for Simon s attempt to connect this
distinction with that here. He says, the ratio in a relation of this
kind pendet ab alio, and hence there must be activity on the part of
TO ala-OrjTov which, hence, must be at a distance.
Nor is there necessarily a reference to the SiW/xts avrLX-^-miKij of
sense, as Alexander conjectures.
Aristotle simply states that seer and thing seen must occupy
definite positions; their relation must depend to some extent at least
upon their relative #e o-is. They are not like things of which the
relation is purely non-spatial like equals. It is not the manner and
mode of their being which relates them, as in the case of equal
quantities, but something else which entails a definite spatial position.
We cannot translate TTUXJ purely indefinitely as anyhow. Things
that are equal do not exist anyhow but somehow.
The result of the argument is to establish the necessity of deter
minate spatial position for seer and thing seen and hence it advances
208 DE SENSU
a plea in favour of the transmission of light in the same way as sound
is carried to the ear. The last argument had shown that the
object which sounds and the hearer must be in determinate spatial
positions.
446 b 12. If we do not read o.v before KSei the clause will refer
to urn not to TO 6pwi/ /<at TO opw/xevov, and becomes identical in mean
ing with the following one and TTWS above will have to be translated
as utcunque. It is not by being anywhere etc. But this is
not possible.
446 b 1 6. The air which is if/aOvpos (as water also is: cf. above
ch. 4, 441 a 28) is made continuous by being struck by an object that
is smooth of surface and so continuous; it is thus that sound is
transmitted : cf. De An. n. ch. 8 passim. Sound is caused by a
movement (a blow, which involves <f>opd or spatial movement, occa
sions it, cf. 419 b 10-13) which is quick enough to strike the air
and make it continuous. If the movement is too slow the air
disperses (419 b 20 sqq.). It is hard and smooth bodies which, when
struck, have this effect upon the air, though apparently the air itself
when imprisoned in any closed or partially closed space can function
in the same way as in the case of the echo (419 b 25 sqq.).
Sound is this movement (?O-TI yap o i/fo</>os /aViyo-t? TOV
KivtivOai TOV TpoTTov TOVTOV ovTrep TO, a<^aXXo /Xi/a aTro TWV
6 rav rts Kpovvr], 420 a 21), or rather this movement is sound, for
Aristotle does not, like the modern physicists, think of sound as
being merely a movement when outside the ear; its peculiar quality
seems to exist objectively though entirely relative to the act of
hearing (cf. Introduction, sec. iv. and De An. in. ch. 2, 425 b
26 sqq.).
At the same time it will not do to go so far as Rodier (Traiie
de V Ame, Vol. n. p. 286) and say that sound is not to be identified
with the motion that causes it but is an objective quality in the
same way as, according to Aristotle, colour is to be regarded, and
that its transmission to the ear is not a movement any more than the
transmission of light is.
(Rodier appears to me to misunderstand /xcrao-x^/xaTto-ts ; it
(cf. note to 446 b 8) is not qualitative change and, even if it were,
his argument would not be advanced any the further. Aristotle
distinctly says above (1. 10) that, in the transmission of sound,
the air experiences (f>opa, and if in 7-10 Aristotle were describing
the increase in faintness in sound (which he is not) it would be only
COMMENTARY 209
caused by a transition of the air from a state of motion to some other
condition.)
At the same time there is a difficulty here. In the De Anima
Aristotle describes the <f>opd, the movement which causes us to hear,
as a rebound and quivering of the air all in one mass ware TOV de pa
dOpovv d<f>d\\(r6ai KOL veUvOai (420 a 25) and again in 420 a i he
says TOTC Se (when struck) ets yu/ercu a//,a. That would make this
(f>opd have the same characteristics as that species of aAAoiWis which,
below, in 446 b 32 sqq, he wishes to distinguish from <opcu (and
among them the $opd which constitutes sound) as being in
stantaneous evSe^crat yap dOpoov aXXoiorxrOai, KOL /XT) TO -fjfJLiav
TrpoVepov, otov TO v8o>p dfJia TTO.V 7njyvv(rOai (447 3. 2 Sqq.). It seems
then that in the De An. Aristotle is simply emphasising the assertion
that the air is rendered one and continuous throughout the whole
extent of the space between the sonorous object and the ear /6s
aepos (TvvextLa /xe^pis a/<o^s. dOpovv need mean no more than this ;
but a/xa, if by a/xa is meant at the same moment (vide Rodier,
ad loc. cif.) t is putting the point too strongly. Here he plainly affirms
that though the medium is continuous, the movement (in which
it becomes continuous) falls into successive parts, just as qualitative
change may also betray succession, as appears from the passage
below and Phys. vn. chs. 4 and 5 esp. 250 a 31 sqq.: KOL TO
d\\OlOVV KCU TO aXXoLOVfJLGVOV UKTaUTWS Tt KCtt TTOCTOV KttTtt TO fJid\\OV
KO.I TfTTOV r/XXotWTttt, Kttt V TTOCTU ^pOVO), J/ SlTrXaQ-lU) SL7rXd(TLOV
K.T.X.
It is indeed necessary to grant this, as 007x77 is an aAAowixrts and
occupies successive times in propagation.
446 b 17-18. TO avTb K.T.X. On a theory which reduced all the
senses to a^?/ this could not be so; each person would perceive only
the tangible things that impinged upon his own sense organs.
ifori jiv ws...<(crTi 8* ws. This continually means in one sense... and
another not at one time and at another as Bender and Hammond
take it. Cf. Meteor, in. ch. 6, 378 a 32 and cf. TTWS /XCV...TTWS
Se, Phys. in. ch. 6, 206 a 13, 7rak...7rws above 446 a 17-18; cf. also
Phys. viii. ch. 8, 263 b 5, etc.
If the KtV7/o-is has /xe pr;, then the TrpwTos is in contact with one
/xe pos, 6 vo-Tcpos with another. Hence in one sense it is not TO avVo
which they perceive.
446 b 19. d-n-opCa. Hammond seems to regard this as a new
problem. But TOI TWV naturally refers to what has just been said.
R. 14
210 DE SENS [7
446 b 20. There is no need for adding in the same way a?
Hammond does ; aAAu> cannot bear such a meaning. The doctrine
controverted is the unqualified assertion that the same thing can
be perceived by only one person. It seems to be an echo of
nominalism. It was left to Aristotle to resolve the difficulty by
pointing out that there are different ways of perceiving the same
thing.
446 b 25-26. TOV 8c 8fj ISCov. Alexander explains this as TO
Trpocre^e? KOL tSiov //.epos TOV depos yj TOV voWog, and SO Simon also.
It is the part of the medium in contact with the sense organ what
he might have called TO O-\O.TOV KLVOV^VOV (cf. De An. in. ch. 12,
434 b 33) as opposed to the sense object which is TO -n-pwrov KLVOVV
(tayarov can, however, be used in both senses, that of nearest and of
farthest ; cf. Phys. vn. ch. 2, 244 b i sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. \.
ch. 7, 324 a 26 sqq.). The meaning is, that this nearest part of the
medium is numerically different in each case, though it is qualitatively
identical in all ; the qualitative change or motion produced in the
medium by propagation outward from the sense object must be
numerically a different TraOos or a different /xepos of the Kivrjcris when
issuing to the right and to the left and when near and far, but it is of
the same kind. Aristotle, it must be remembered, thinks of the
sense quality, and that is to him an atcrOrjTov, as existing objectively
in the medium. The word to be supplied after toYov is no doubt
aicrOvjTov and, as a sense quality is an aurOrjrov to him, perhaps he is
thinking of TOV iStov more as quality the quality relative to the
special sense, than as the portion of the medium which is nearest,
We might paraphrase his meaning thus The qualitative affection
of sense proper (tSio. aurOija-Lf) is numerically different for each person
though specifically, i.e. qiui quality, identical, while an object
numerically one and identical is perceived by all. u/oifyto s and
eV are among the contributions of wivy ato-^o-t?. Hence perhaps
Aristotle is obscurely hinting that, as toYa ourftprts gives an object
numerically different in each individual, it is the function of *ou/r/
Cuervo-is to introduce numerical identity and hence real objectivity
into the perceptible world.
446 b 26-27. 04101 iroXXoi. This is an additional point; if per
ception is due to KLv-fjoris of the medium, and numerical difference in
the /averts directly affecting the sense does not necessitate difference
of TO TrpwTOf KLVOVV, perception of it TO irpurov Kwovv may be
simultaneous in different people.
COMMENT A RY 211
446 b 28. If sound etc. were cra/xara then, in perception, the
object would really be divided from itself as a body can only
be in one place at the same time. According to the aTro ppoiai
theory, the sound, scent and light are crw/xara material particles.
446 b 29. ov8 &vv o-wjAaTos, i.e. the /aV/o~is or dAAoiWm which
is propagated in different parts must be the Traces of a cro3/xa (which
has /xopta). The plurality of the sense experiences depends upon
the medium having /xo pia and hence being a o-w/xa. Thus this
sentence refers merely to what goes before. As we shall see it
makes no sense if taken with what follows.
446 b 30. TW evtvai -y<xp TI <|>s <rrv. I have here followed
Alexander and cod. P, as no other reading seems to give an
adequate meaning. Alexander connects this with the doctrine
in De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 16 sqq. where light is defined as the
7rapovcria...7rvpos r) TOIOVTOV TIVOS. Cf. also above ch. 3, 439 a 2i sq. :
orav yap enry n TrvpwSes ev Siaufravti, 77 /aev Trapowia </><3s. The argu
ment, then, is, that though light is due to the presence of something,
yet it is not, as one might expect, a movement set up by it. It
is hence, if not a movement, an evepyeta as said before (418 b 9).
eve pyeux in the proper sense is not /aVr/o-ts (cf, De An. n. ch. 5,
41 7 a 1 6) nor even dAAoiWt?. Compare also Phys. VH. ch. 3,
246 a 10 where it is said that bodily and mental I^ets are not
aAAoiwo-eis. Light is described as a eis in De An. n. ch. 7, 418 b 19
and in. ch. 5, 430 a 15. The change from SiW/us to eVepyeia in the
proper sense is not mere alteration from one quality to its opposite,
but is a movement CTT! ra<s !eis KCU TT)V <J>VO-LV. A positive eis like
virtue is a rcXctWis, or state which reveals the true nature of the
thing which possesses it. It is Alexander s contention that light is
something of this kind and is not to be described as an dAXoiWts
like odour. Hence it does not require time for its propagation.
Cf. Introduction, sec. vn.
If we read TW etvat we shall have to render with the vet. tr. per
esse enim aliquod lumen est which Thomas expands into per
unum aliquod esse, id est, per hoc quod totum medium sicut unum
mobile, movetur uno motu a corpore illuminante. Or else we must
suppose that there is some contrast between being and motion.
This, however, is not an Aristotelian doctrine, though there were
other theories which identified motion with TO ^ oV: cf. Phys. in.
ch. 2, 2Olb 20 : evtot, erepoT-^ra KCU di/tcrorr/ra KCU TO p.1) ov
142
212 DR SENSU
Bender (p. 29) renders das Licht ist Licht durch ein
gewisses Sein, which seems to require some such explanation as
the above.
St Hilaire (p. 81) gives rather a different interpretation. Light
exists because it is un etre particulier. Hammond (p. 184) seems
to follow him in rendering Light has a substantial nature. eu/ai
TL may mean to be an ovcrtu something x^P L(TTOV - Cf. Phys. iv.
ch. 6, 213 a 31 OVKOVV TOVTO otl otiKVVvaiy on cart TI o aijp. But, if
it meant that here, it would imply that light was something concrete,
a o-w/xa, which it is not. To imagine, then, that Aristotle here
declares that light is a o-w/xa as opposed to sound and smell which he
has just declared not to be o-w/xara, is quite unwarranted and besides
it does not in the least help us to understand how the transmission
of light is instantaneous.
Perhaps we might translate TU) etvat (it should possibly be
TO eli/at) as frequently elsewhere (cf. 449 a 19) by in aspect and
render In aspect light is something real i.e. light may be regarded
as something real ; it is not concrete owrta in the ordinary sense,
but ova-La o>s etSos (as the soul is said to be in De An. n. ch. 2,
414 a 13 sqq.). Light is an etSos or evepyctu. If this be the
interpretation and we adhere to the reading TU> eu/cu it will give
exactly the same meaning as Alexander requires, who gets it by
other means.
The difficulty remaining, however, is how what is said in the first
clause should lead one to expect that light is a movement. The
presence of ov in the dXXa clause gives the Greek this sense. On
Alexander s reading there is some ground for expecting light to be a
KiVrjo-ts, which it is then denied to be ; not so much according to my
interpretation of the other reading.
I suggest TW Kii/eu/ ydp TL <co<? eVrtV rt, i.e. light shows its reality
by stimulating something. Light /avet stimulates something
TL viz. the sense, but is not a movement itself.
446 b 31. dXX ov KIVTJO-IS. The question here is What does
Aristotle mean by KtVryo-ts? Does he mean un simple mouvement
(St Hilaire) i.e. <opa, or motion generically, i.e. /xera^oA.?;? It is
quite impossible, from Aiistotle s use of the term, to decide whether
he employs it here in its specific or its generic signification. In the
Physics KLvrjo-Ls is continually used in the sense of <J>opd but, where he
has occasion to distinguish the various kinds of change, he employs
the specific terms if there is any likelihood of confusion arising. Cf.
COMMENTARY 213
Phys. m. ch. i for the distinction between the four kinds of
change ycv0-i9 /cat <J>6opd, dAAotoKris, avc^orts /cat <$to-ts, <opa. They
are divided according to the categories respectively of ovVta, TrotoV,
TTotrov and TTOV, which have nothing in common. Hence the diversity
alluded to here oAws K.T.\. 1. 31. If the light is to be identified as
a kind of dAAotWts, as Thomas thinks, then this latter statement
is brought forward in support of the former. The argument runs
light is an dAAotWt?, which may be (cf. below 447 a 12) instantaneous,
and hence not <j>opti and hence not /aV^o-ts, for KU/^O-IS proper is <f>opd.
Cf. Phys. viii. ch. 7, where it is contended that <f>opd is Trporrr? ruv
On the other hand, as we have seen, if Aristotle is in earnest
about light being an ei/epyeta, it cannot be even aAAotWts. This
is Alexander s contention and according to his interpretation, oA.ws...
<opas must come as a reply to a possible objection Is it not true
that a AAot too-is is different from </>opa , i. e. /aV^o-ts Kara TOTTOV, and that
hence light may be an a AAoiWts ? Aristotle replies It is true
that they are distinct, for aAAotWts may take place in all parts at
once ; however (ov ^v a AA , 447 a 3 sq.), when the quantity is large
(of substance to be changed) this is impossible. Hence light is not
an a AAotWts and hence not a /civ^o-is at all.
As against this theory and in support of the former view we have
these statements in the De Anima, viz. the medium /cu/en-at by
the object of vision and again itself /avei the sense. There /aV^crt?
is apparently used vaguely in its generic sense without distinction
from aAAotWts, so that it seems necessary to hold that, if, in the
stimulation of the sense by the object of vision, a /ciV^o-ts, in the strict
sense of <opa, is not set up in the medium, at least a AAotWts is.
Cf. De An. n. ch. 7, 419 a 13 sqq. : aAAa TO /xev ^pw/xa Kwei TO
otoi/ rot ae pa, VTTO TOVTOV Se crvvf^ov<s OI/TO? Ktvetrat TO
v ] III. ch. 12, 434 b 30 sqq.: wo-Trcp yap TO KLVOVV Kara
T07TOV...OVTW Kttt tTT* aXXoiCOO-0>5 and 43 5 a 4 & Q-"nP 7Tl TrXeiCTTOV
KivetTat Kat 7rott /cat 7racr^t . . . /Je ATtov . . . TOV a epa Trao-^etv VTTO TOV
<r^r/)aaTOs Kat Xpw/xaTos...Sto TraXtv OVTOS TTJV o\f/w /ctvet. Cf. also Phys.
vii. ch. 2, 244 b 10 sqq. esp. 245 a 6.
The explanation of the difficulty seems to be that Aristotle
regards light in two different ways which are not properly reconciled.
(i) According to his own peculiar conception it is the eve pycia TOV
Stac/>avovs caused by the presence of fire. This is the concept of the
objective nature of light. It is a qualitative determination of certain
2i 4 DE SENSU
objects and, considered as such, it has absolutely no connection with
any such thing as motion or transmission. Light is the colour of the
medium realised, its true activity, just as the soul is the true activity
of the body. This is its teleological definition. But (2) Aristotle
likewise inherited from previous philosophy and popular thought the
theory that light was something passing between seen thing and seer
or vice versa. He allows that there must be some action whether
mechanical or qualitative exerted by the object directly upon the
medium and indirectly upon the sense.
According to the popular idea this exactly was light. So, when
the question was raised does light take time to travel ?, Aristotle,
if he had wished to identify light with the KIWJCTIS or aXXotWts
that stimulates sense, should have answered in the affirmative or
admitted that it was at least possible. But, instead, he recoils
upon the teleological definition of light to which the notion of move
ment is irrelevant. Hence his doctrine really is, not that it is an
instantaneous movement but rather (what that really is) no move
ment at all.
But, as his opponents mean by light a movement between the
eye and the object, it appears as if, in denying that light is a
movement, he were denying his own theory that an actual movement
of some kind did take place between object and eye. Without
doubt too there was a confusion in his own mind on the subject.
His raising it in connection with sound and odour shows this.
Naturally the fact that there is no noticeable interval between the
production of any object and our seeing it led him practically to
contradict his previous assertions.
4473 2. d0pdov. Cf. Phys. i. ch. 3, i86a 16 and vin. ch. 3,
253 b 23 : ov yap ct /xeptarov et? aTrttpoi/ TO a AXotov/xevov, Sia TOVTO
Kai 77 aAAowixris, aAA dOpoa yiWrat TroAAa/as, a><77rep 77 irijts.
We cannot say that all qualitative change proceeds continuously
(o-we^ws) or is (rwejpfc in the full sense of the word which is explained
in Phys. v. ch. 3, 226 b 27 sqq. It is not sufficient that the time
should be continuous but that the action should be continuous also
(p.?) rov xpovou (ovStv y a P KwXveL SioAetTToi Ta, /cat tvOvs Se ytxercx rrjv
VTrdryv <$eyacr$ai rrjv vearryv) aXA.a rov Trpay/xaro?, ey a> /amrai).
Themistius (Paraph, ad Phys., loc. cit.} explains that movement such
as the galloping of horses is not continuous, though the time in
which the movement takes place is. Qualitative change seems to
be more comparable to this and appears to take place by a series of
COMMENTARY 215
successive bounds. There seem to be ultimate sections in the process
which are instantaneous and not divisible into smaller sections each
diverse in point of time.
So it is too with aborts Kai <#m. If a drop wears away so
much of a stone in a given time, the half of it does not perform so
much of the attrition in half the time. It does it in no time. What
is washed away is divisible, but its parts were moved not separately
but all together.
In Phys. vn. ch. 5, 250 a 28 sqq. it had been admitted
(cf. above) that, in general, qualitative change falls into different
time sections just like Kivrja-is proper, yet the half of the cause of
change need not cause a change of half the extent. But this is true
also of Kivrfcris proper. Though two men push a boat so far in a
given time, one man need not be able to move it at all. The point
here is different. It is, as said, that often change either in quality or
bulk proceeds in sections.
447 a 3. TTT^IS is congelation of any kind (cf. Meteor, iv.
chs. 5-7) and is produced either by heating or cooling. dcp/xatVco-dcu
and if/vxto-QaL are examples of aXXotoxris (cf. Phys. vn. ch. 3,
246 a 7 sqq.). Compare also Phys. 253 b 25 quoted above. By TO
Oepfuuvofjievov KCU Tryyvvptvov (cf. note to 443 b 7 on the function
of KOI) no doubt the thickening of milk or some such substance by
heat is indicated.
447 a 8. 6<r|jLT| seems to be propagated by an a AAoiWis and is
admitted not to be instantaneous (1. 10 beneath). The instantaneous-
ness of the sections of qualitative change does not make the aAAotWt?
as a whole instantaneous in this case. Obviously there is much to
be changed. If light is conceived of as an aAAotWt?, then the
whole distance from object to eye must be thought of as being
one section. How this can be reconciled with 01 MV a AA av y
7roA.v K.r.A. it is difficult to see, for, if a considerable quantity of
water cannot undergo qualitative alteration all in one moment,
a fortiori the vast extent of medium intervening between eye and
object should require a long time to transmit the light. If the
words ov fjLrjv dAA K.T.A. only affect such qualitative changes as
#/>/xav<ri9, Aristotle should have pointed out in what respect those
differ from the oAAoiWis involved in light and should have ascribed
the slowness of the change in these cases to those peculiarities,
ycvo-is is brought in as a qualitative change too which would be
perceived in the same way as odour if we were surrounded by water.
216 DE SENSU
As we have seen, Aristotle does not distinguish between the diffusion
of a quality in that which serves it as a vehicle and its transmission
through a medium. The difference between the mediated sense
qualities and the others is, that in the former their vehicle is a
medium always in contact with the sense organs, while in the other
cases it is not so. Special contact has to be effected between the
body possessed of the quality and the sense. Hence one reason
why the latter are both called tactual senses.
Aristotle s declaration here is interesting, because from it we may
infer what we already know from ch. 4, 442 a 29 sqq., that he did
not conceive even taste to be a diffusion of the actual particles of the
flavoured substance, since he would not allow that to be the means
of producing smell, and the only difference between taste and smell is
due to the fact that we do not live in water.
Hence we must lay stress on the fact that diffusion is only a
metaphorical term for the process by which odour and flavour alike are
propagated; cf. 441 b 17 : wcnrtp ovv ol evaTTOTrXvi/ovres ; 443 b 7 sq. :
otov aVoTrAwo/aevov ; 445 a 15 sq. : otov /3a<f>yj TIS KCU TrAuo-is.
447 a 9. jjLcraiv. Cf. 445 a 8, 436 b 20, De An. in. ch. 12,
434 b 15 : at yap aXA.at ai<70^<7is oY ercpcov alcrOdvovTai, otov ocr^p^crts
oi//i5 aKorj, etc.
447 a ii-i2. As we have seen, his customary way of stating
the matter is, that xp^ a causes sensation, while without <a>9, which
is the cvcpycia of the medium, colour cannot stimulate the sense
(De An. n. ch. 7 passim). That TO Sta^avc? should be illuminated is
a precondition of the perception of colour. (Cf. Rodier, op. cit.
Vol. n. p. 281.) In that sense it could be said TTOLCLV TO 6poV. From
another point of view <ws is the x/ 30 ^ 01 T0 ^ Sicw^avovs and as such is
the object of sense itself and Trotct TO 6/ooV. Thus Aristotle might use
this expression without thinking of light exactly as the KIWJO-IS which
produces sight (cf. above notes to 446 b 30 sqq.). TO ala-Orfrov means
both the quality spread over the medium and TO TrpwTov KIVOVV itself.
Cf. above note to 446 b 25 sq. But in so far as the sense object
which causes sensation is a quality and hence an eTSos and hence
also an epepyeta, process cannot be imputed to it. Though due to
an a AAoiWts it is not, itself, an a AAotWis ; it is an evcpyeta. But
all sense qualities may be so regarded and hence there should be no
grounds for supposing that in the case of one sense there was not to
be found that process of transition by which the objective quality
was realised in the particular consciousness in the case of the others.
CHAPTER VII.
447 a 15. aTd|xw. Alexander explains that this is not an abso
lutely atomic time, for such according to Aristotle does not exist,
but a time which, when divided, does not yield one part qualified by
one sensation another by another : cf. beneath 448 b 22.
447 a 16. iKKpovei. Cf. De Gen. Animal, v. ch. i, 780 a 8,
with reference to light stimuli, and for the general case De Insom.
ch. 3, 460 b 32 sqq.
447 a 19. Cf. note to ch. i, 436 a 5 for the interpretation of v-rro-
KtiaOw.
P-aXXov K.T.X. This seems to be a self-evident principle with
Aristotle, but perhaps it might be held to be in antagonism to such
passages as De An. i. ch. i, 402 b 21 sqq. : dAAa KCU dvaTraXtv TO. o-v/x-
/SfBrjKora oru/x/JaXXcTat /xe ya /xepos Trpos TO eiSeycu TO ri ecrTtv. Aristotle
would, however, distinguish between the two cases. The entering
of one sensation into relation with another by means of combination
alters the essential nature of the sensation. You no longer have the
same sensation to investigate but a new one a compound. Hence
we may say that the original sensation may be more adequately
perceived per se when in isolation than when in composition.
aio-9dv<r0(u. ato-^oris is a 8wa/xis KpLTiKij (cf. Anal. Post. II. ch. 19,
99 b 35) and by it we recognise a thing as what it is. We must, as
Alexander points out, remember that alaOrjo-is has two aspects, one
of 7ra0os the other of Kpio-is. Its function as Kpto-ts is the function of
mind in general and hence, as e.g. above in ch. 6, 445 b 16 sqq.. we
get the terms applicable to mind in general (Kpivov/xcv, yj/<oo-o/x0a)
applied in the special case of sense perception. Cf. also De An. in.
ch. 9, 432 a 1 6 : TO> TC /cpmKu>, o Siaroias tpyov eo-Tt /cat alffOtjafd)*;.
447 a 23. TOVTO, i.e. in the case of harmony when the two tones
combine to form a third thing a concord. Aristotle is arguing
against the simultaneous perception of two things which remain
diverse. His point is that, if they are to be perceptible at one and
218 DE SENSU
the same time, they must combine or, in some way, form a third
thing. The combination is obvious in the case of harmonies.
cl 8f| K.T.X. Aristotle goes on to argue that where the combination
is not obvious, as it is in harmony, still the result of the simultaneous
presentation of the two sensations must result in a modification of
the stronger, if one is stronger than the other.
447 a 30. tfirep K.T.X. Aristotle is arguing from the case of the
objective mixture of things to the intermingling of subjective sensa
tions. He may do this in virtue of his realism. To a modern
sensationalist who holds that complex things are simply fused sensa
tions this would not be possible ; the argument would need to run
the other way. For Aristotle s doctrine of //its cf. notes to ch. 3,
440 a 30 sqq.
447 a 3 1 - ev w av paxOwonv. Alexander explains that he is ex
cluding such cases as those mentioned in ch. 6, 446 a 8 sqq. where
there is no proper mixture but an absorption of a minute volume of
one thing into the substance of the other. l<$ u> would give the sense
required more easily than h u>.
447 b i. Toiavra. Cf. below also in 449 a 6 sqq. esp. 1. 9 :
ovSw yap IK TOVTOIV Zv.
TOVTCOV = objects of different senses. There is no qualitative union
such as occurs in the combination of tones and, on his theory, of
colours, tastes etc. ; the union is Kara o-u/z/^e/^Kos co-existence in
one thing (TO avro /cat ei/ apiOjjiw, 1. 16). How the perception of such
union is possible is discussed in that passage and in De An. in. ch. 2,
426 b 8 427 a 16.
pfyvvvTcu K.T.X. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. i. ch. 10, esp. 328 a 32.
447 b 3- Kct "uji|3pT]Kos. This is a case in which the percep
tion of the object of one special sense may be effected indirectly,
through the instrumentality of another. Cf. De An. in. ch. i,
425 a 30 sqq.: TO, 8 dXX^Xwv tSia KOTO, o-vfjLpel3r]Ko<s alcrOdvovTCLi 0.1
aicr$77<reis, . . . Giov x^7 ri 7rtK / :) ^ *ai avOifj. The union is union in
one thing, not a qualitative union of the sensations.
447 b 4. al(r6dvor0at. He is arguing once more from the
absence of objective unity to the absence of subjective unity.
447 b 7. Reading 7rei with Biehl we should have to regard this
clause as an explanation of the reason why we can argue a fortiori
from the case of objects falling under a single sense to the case of
heterogeneous senses. It is not a confirmation merely of the previous
clause.
COMMENTARY 219
If we read en with Alexander and L S U, the sequence of the
argument is not so clear, but the possibility of connecting this with
the previous clause too intimately is removed.
447 b 10. KIVTJO-IS. By the KLvyo-is is indifferently meant either
the sense affection or the stimulus. We may therefore translate
the stimuli are more closely located. This clause forms a premiss
on which the previous one rests. It, itself, seems to be an accepted
topical maxim which connects the possibility of simultaneous
functioning with the physical connectedness of the two elements ;
they are both Kivrjcreis in the same organ and hence ayu,a in space.
Aristotle means more than that they are similar, as Alexander
interprets.
447 b 12. av n^| fuxOij. This contention that if not combined
two things cannot be simultaneously perceived, i.e. if simultaneously
perceived then combined is not proved by the clauses which
immediately follow but by the section from KCU d /ua 1. 16 avrd
1. 1 8. Lines 12-16 rather prove the simple converse that, if combined,
sensations are perceived a/xa.
The argument runs A mixture is a unit. Perception of a unit
is unitary and a unitary perception occurs in a unitary time, i.e. a/ua.
For support of the statement that perception of a unit is unitary (i.e.
the last premiss) we get on /ua...StW/x/ /u,ia in lines 14-16. The
perception of a unit with which we are concerned, the perception
that occurs in unitary time, is explicit perception (evepyeta.) and
the explicit perception of a unit is numerically one, i.e. unitary ; it is
of a specific unity that the potential perception is single.
(This is the very idea of eWpyeta to be complete in one and
the same moment, not to be a KLvyaris which varies from moment
to moment. Cf. De An. n. ch. 5, 41 7 a 16-17 an d Rodier, ad
loc. tit.}
447 b 15. Ivbs K.T.X. By saying that it is of the specifically single
that the implicit perception is one, Aristotle means that the percep
tion of various white objects is specifically identical. It is the same
qualitative affection ; but actual perception is the perception of this
particular white object here and now ; it is numerically different
from the perception of any other white object. It is only as a faculty
that the sense of white colour is a unity and its unity is the specific
unity of the various sensations of white. Again, relatively to black
and white taken as numerical units the sense of sight itself is a
specific unity.
220 DE SENSU
447 b 1 6. KCU el. Here the proof of the proposition first laid
down begins. The sequence of the argument is best seen by
beginning at the other end 1. 22, /x-t a 8 77 8wa/us. We are, by
agreement, considering the case of a single faculty, e.g. sight. The
act of vision must occur in a unitary time 1. 21 /uas yap euraira
K.T.X. ; when the faculty is single and the time a unit, the act of
sense or vision must be unitary 1. 19, dXXa Kara play 8wa/uv. Going
back to 1. 1 6, KCU ci /xt a K.T.X., we find it further stated that if the act
is single the objects perceived by it must be single. We still lack
the completing premiss that if two things are perceived as one they
must be combined. This is not explicitly stated unless, instead of
apa before py in 1. 18, we read yap. If we read yap we make the
train of reasoning complete and much improve what is at best a very
ill-arranged argument.
447 b 24. dSvvarov. Cf. above 1. 7 and beneath 449 a 4.
447 b 27. Consciousness is here an adequate interpretation of
i/or^, though the term i/ vx 7 ? has generally a wider meaning.
This sentence <aiWat yap K.T.X seems merely to support the
argument generally or rather one of the previous statements viz.,
that if you perceive simultaneously it is a unit which must be
perceived.
447 b 28. fl>i. Alexander will have it that here Aristotle
includes generic identity. The different qualities falling under one
sense are specifically distinct, merely generically identical (cf. 1. 30),
and according to Alexander it is these which have their relative
identity recognised by the same sense, while it is a single sense
functioning in a certain manner which recognises actual specific
identity. This latter contention is correct, but Alexander can hardly
be right in saying that here generic identity is included in specific. .
The train of thought is rather as follows Specific identity is per
ceived by a single sense functioning in a certain manner (cf. De An.
III. ch. I, 425 a 20 : cKaarrf] yap ev aio-^aVcrai aur^tris). I add the
latter qualification, says Aristotle, because a single sense without
specifying the manner of its functioning merely recognises generic
identity (the identity e.g. of black and white) not specific ; (the
function of a single sense is to discriminate the specifically diverse.
Cf. De An. in. ch. 2, 426 b 8 sqq. esp. 10 : Kai KptW ras TOV VTTO-
Ki/AcVoi> alaOrjTov Sta<opa s) ; but, in recognising various white things
as white, i.e. as possessing specific identity, it operates in a definite
different mode, and one other than that by which it recognises the
COMMENTAR V 22 1
contrary quality black. There is a corresponding difference of mode
in which each sense recognises the corresponding positive qualities
e.g. white and sweet, and the corresponding negative qualities like
black and bitter.
Thus the conclusion is, that it is the same sense functioning in a
definite manner which is different in the case of each of two con
traries, though corresponding in the various senses according as
the contraries are efis or o-TepTfo-eis. As Alexander points out,
numerical difference of the sensations can be discerned only by tem
poral difference of the perception, specific difference by the difference
of the manner, generic by the difference of the sense faculty.
447 b 32. 0-vo-roixa. Cf. beneath 448 a 17-18, cf. Bonitz, Ind.
p. 736b 61, o-TXTToix" *ea sunt, quae in eadem serie continentur.
The series (o-vo-roi^ia) need not be a genus ; generally it is not.
Aristotle here ranks the opposed qualities of all the generically
different senses under the two heads of ets and o-rc/37/crts. It is these
which form the titles of the two series. Cf. Metaph. iv. ch. 2,
!OO4b 27: TWV evavTtW YJ trtpa. crvo-TOt^ta (TTpr)(TL<s. Cf. also the
Pythagorean distinction of two O-VOTOIX"", the one headed by TO Trepas
the other by TO aVeipoi/. Metaph. i. ch. 5, 986 a 23 sqq.
(The use of O-UOTOIXX in Metaph. x. 1054 b 35 and 1058 a 13
seems to be somewhat different.)
For the use of cavrai? cf. above ch. 6, 446 a 19 : wpos aura.
448 a 2. <?TU This section further shows that the opposition of
the KWTJcrcLs of the respective sense affections which are specifically
distinct makes simultaneous perception of them impossible.
448 a 3. a|xa K.T.X. Cf. De An. in. ch. 2, 426 b 29 : aAXa //,T/I>
aouvaroi ayxa TO.? efavrtas Kivrjcrets KLV^icrBoa TO auro 77 doiatpCTOV /cat, Iv
dSicuperu) p^pova). t yap yXvKv, wSi Ktvei T^V ai(r@r](riv ^ TT)I/ vor]<Tii , TO
8e TrtKpoV eVarrtW This comes in the Zte Anima in a different con
nection ; there he is proving that there must be something unitary
which distinguishes the opposed sense modifications, something which
is only in aspect divisible (cf. beneath at the end of the chapter).
Cf. also De Coelo, II. ch. 13, 295bl4: a/xa 8 dfivvarov ts rdvavria
TTOulaQai TTjfV KLVrjVW.
Alexander understands \povu after avrw (1. 4). The whole dis
cussion, he thinks, is one about time. We are not at present
raising the question of the unity of what perceives as in the De
Anima. But this restriction of TU> avTo) to time is impossible. It
must be one thing that is diversely affected if there is to be any
222 DE SENSU
controversy as to the possibility of the two affections being simul
taneous (a/xa). Aristotle denies as a general principle that they can
be so.
448 a 7. TO, p.f| Ivavrfo. These are evidently the intermediate
qualities. It is not quite clear whether the theory about them here
is quite the same as that presented in earlier chapters. There they
are held to be mixtures of the two extreme qualities and, if by
saying that some can be assigned to one extreme, others to the other,
Aristotle simply means that there is a greater proportion of the one
element in one case, of the opposite one in another, then the two
theories can be reconciled. This is Alexander s explanation.
On the other hand rd /u,e/Aiy//.eW seem to be introduced in 1. 10
as a fresh class and are explicitly illustrated only by musical
examples.
But probably there is no real discrepancy between this chapter
and previous ones. By ra /xet/ and ra Se in 1. 7 he probably refers
to TO ai-0oi and TO <j>ai6v which are assigned to white and black
respectively, aX/xupo? and \tirap6v which are claimed by iriKpw and
y\vKv (cf. ch. 4, 442 a 1 8 sqq.) ; and by rd /xe/uy/xeVa to the other
qualities.
448 a 9-10. Though TCX /xe/ouy/xeVa are illustrated only by
musical examples, Alexander thinks that the words in which he
describes the ratio between the components of these compounds
make it evident that he is thinking of colours and tastes as being
composed by the intermixture of various amounts of two original
components. Cf. 1. 13: 6 /xei/ TTO\\OV 777309 oAi yoi ... 14 : 6 8* oAtyov
Trpoq TroXv. But this is to confuse the matter. When Aristotle says
it is impossible to perceive TCL /xe/xty/x-eVa a/na, unless as one, he does
not mean to repeat that we cannot perceive their components simul
taneously unless as one. He has already said that contraries cannot
be perceived simultaneously unless perceived as one, i.e. unless they
form an intermediate colour, taste, etc. Aristotle is here asserting
that we cannot perceive two intermediate colours simultaneously unless
they coalesce.
448 a 10-11. TO 8id irao-wv K,T.\. By this Aristotle surely means
the harmony of the fifth with the tonic and of octave with tonic.
It is difficult to see how the different notes of the scale could be
regarded as mixtures.
This is, in fact, the case in connection with which a difficulty is
raised beneath in 448 a 21 sqq.
COMMENTARY 223
The chords in question are, in modern terms, composed of two
sets of vibrations, one of which is in the case of the octave concord,
twice as rapid, in the case of the fifth, i \ times that of the other.
4483 12. ds \<tys- Aristotle s point is that two blended
sounds, e.g. the chord of the fifth or the octave, themselves depend
upon a relation between tones of different pitch and hence cannot
themselves be simultaneously perceived unless they form a new com
bination. If they do there is a single ratio formed once more, but
if not we shall have the impossible task of presenting together two
incompatible relations, that of the fifth 3 to 2 i.e. odd to even
and that of the octave 2 to i or even to odd, and this is impossible.
The only difficulty left is to explain why Aristotle seems to iden
tify the former relation with that of much to little and the latter
with that of little to much. But probably he does not mean to identify
them. The explanation will be, as Alexander suggests, that by the
mention of the ratio of much to little he is indicating the composi
tion of some mixed colour, e.g. red, which contains a large proportion
of one quality, e.g. white, and, by the relation of little to much,
another colour, in which the proportion of white is small compared
with the other component.
Alexander and most of the commentators seem to think that
Aristotle is in this passage discussing, not the simultaneous percep
tion of qualities themselves composite but of the components in
composite qualities. This (cf. note to 11. 9-10 above) is erroneous
and ma\es them distort the sense and take co-rat yap a/xa K.T.X., 1. 13,
as explaining the ovTws.-.yiVeTai, 1. 12, not the aAAws 8 ov. They
would translate Thus and not otherwise we get a ratio between the
extremes, for there will be in the one case the simultaneous pre
sentation of the relation of odd to even, etc., in the other case of
even to odd, etc. As Alexander explains, Aristotle is referring to
the difference of the single ratio in each case. But the point is, that
the simultaneous presentation of two such diverse ratios is im
possible. Besides, the other interpretation requires us to take a/xu
as applying separately to both clauses 6 /tev K.r.A. and 6 8 oAiyov. Hut
there is no sense in saying that the relation of odd to even is simul
taneous ; the simultaneity must apply to the two ratios.
In my interpretation I am on the whole in agreement with
Hammond.
448 a 1 6. yvi. It is wrong to confuse specific and generic
difference as Hammond does. The point is that, if specific diffe-
224 DE SENSU
rence renders simultaneous perception impossible, a fortiori generic
does.
448 a 1 9. irXeiov K.T.X. We now proceed to a still wider diver
gence. Sweet and white, though heterogeneous, are still in the same
o-uo-Toixia; sweet and black lack even that connection. Torstrik s
conjecture of TOV A.CVKOV for TOV /xe/Xai/os and TO /x,eA.ai/ for TOU
AevKov weakens the sense. It makes this clause merely a deduction
from the principle quoted above and not an advance on it. Bekker s
reading of r6 Aev/coV for TOV ACVKOV brings a perfectly irrelevant pre
miss into the argument.
TU> fl>i, deleted by Torstrik, is unnecessary and, if allowed
to stand, can only be translated vaguely in the manner given.
Still it is quite in Aristotle s manner to change readily from the
restricted to the wider use of a technical term, and we must bear in
mind the essential identity of the notion of etSos as species, and
tSo9 as form. We might render in ideal content.
448 a 21 sqq. The case cited is apparently not the simultaneous
perception of two different chords but of the two tones in one
concord. The theory put forward is that really the perception is
not simultaneous but only apparently so. With the first part of the
conclusion Aristotle does not disagree, if it be meant that the two
tones cannot be heard together as two separate units. But, on the
other hand, when they form a <//,<ama they have coalesced and are
heard simultaneously. Thus his argument becomes an attack on the
doctrine that the coalescence is not real but apparent merely.
448 a 23. <j>aivovTat. The contention is, that the union of tones
is merely apparent, just as it was contended in the juxtaposition
theory of colour in ch. 4, 440 a 22 sqq. that the union of elementary
tints which produced an intermediate one was of the same nature
that it was effected by a mixture Trpos alo-Orjo-Lv merely (cf. notes ad loc.
at.). The means by which such an apparent union can be obtained
is in both cases the same ; it is owing to the interval between the
sensations being imperceptible that this happens. Without this being
granted the theory will not hold, and, accordingly, Aristotle proceeds
to argue against the existence of a XP VO< * avcucr^Tos.
448 a 25. If the theory, that imperceptible moments of time
exist, is true, it will be as possible to have simultaneous sensations of
sound and colour as of different tones. But this conclusion is
repugnant to Aristotle. Sensations of different senses cannot com
bine hence cannot be simultaneously presented.
COMMENTARY 225
This is the first ground on which he rejects the theory.
448 a 26-28. We must remember the principle laid down in
Physics iv.ch. 14, 223 a 16 sqq., that apart from ^xq time cannot
exist. Hence a time in which we are not conscious is not time.
A xpo^os dvaia-OrfTos is strictly a time in which we are not conscious,
for, as Alexander points out, time is not perceived KO.@ avro but by
means of the events which happen in it. Aristotle expresses this
frequently when he says, e.g. De Gen. et Corr. n. ch. 10, 337 a 23,
that time does not exist apart from change.
The argument here is derived from the continuity of time (cf.
Physics iv. ch. n, 2193 13, etc.), which itself depends upon the
continuity of the change apart from which it cannot exist. If in a
single continuous time there are sections in which no consciousness
occurs, the continuity of the consciousness will be broken ; but, when
one is continuously conscious, one is not aware of breaks.
Alexander apparently reads ct bpa KOI OVK alo-Oavtrai (1. 32), the
iatter words merely repeating the sense of \av6dvoi dv (1. 32).
Simon follows the reading KCU OVK aicrOdveTai KCU ala-OdveraL, which
simply states more explicitly the contradiction implied above.
448 b i. The ancient Latin version does not translate KCU et
alvOdverai (1. 33), nor does Alexander read it. It is probably a
gloss. In that case we should have to remove the comma after In,
making the sentence start with that word.
If we retain the clause, the sense will be " But if there are no
breaks in our consciousness and we still perceive whatever object is
before us during the whole of the time even though certain sections
of it are imperceptible, then we shall have to say that perception
throughout any whole time is really always effected by perception in
some part of it only." Thus, as Alexander says, we do not perceive
this time o-TrXcos KCU, Ktynoos, but only indirectly. We do not perceive
a whole as a whole. The argument then goes on to show how by
subtracting the xP 0/)/ot avourftyroi from any whole and from the
remainder successively ad infinitum, you could show that no time,
however small, was, per se, an object of consciousness.
448 b 2. Trpd-yfj-a. Bound up with and illustrative of the proof
we have just outlined (note to 448 a 26-28) of the non-existence of
insensible moments of time, there runs a parallel proof of the non-
existence of insensible material magnitudes. Alexander explains their
conjunction by making out that it is the supposed o-w/xara dvaicrOrjra
KO.I a/xep>/ which have motions in imperceptible times. These have
R. 15
226 DE SENSU
already been disposed of in chapter 6 and in the Physics etc. But it
is obvious that this proof which shows that there are no xP r L
avaurOrjToi, will equally well get rid of crw^ara ai/aicr6>r?Ta., indeed of
insensible magnitudes of all kinds, for the discussion is carried on
wholly in terms of /xeye#os.
Here the two cases are argued out concurrently, and so closely
interwoven that they seem to get confused.
448 b 5. rf|v o\T]v. It is absurd to make this refer to ri]v
yrjv (1. 8) as Bender and Hammond do. How can CB be taken
away from the whole earth ? Alexander correctly explains that
Aristotle is illustrating both magnitudes, the temporal and the spatial,
by a line AB, and the feminine inflection here refers to the ypa^yj.
The contention of the whole passage leads to the conclusion that
here, as in many cases, our text consists of notes either written for or
taken from a lecture in which there were many cursory explanations
and asides, which have not come down to us. Probably by this
stage in the proof Aristotle had already drawn the line on something
analogous to our blackboard, and this explains the sudden appear
ance of the feminine inflection in the adjective without the previous
introduction of any feminine substantive for it to agree with.
If we make the apodosis begin at Kai we must say that Aristotle
implicitly, if not explicitly, identifies perception of a whole time with
perception during a continuous time, i.e. during the whole of it.
That is in fact what he means by the latter, and what he frequently
expresses, e.g. in 448 b 2 by aiaOdveo-QaL ei> : cf. also 1. 9 cv TOJ
cViavru) = during a whole year, and ei> rj OVK TJo-flaVtro 1. 7, 448 a 29
ev (rui/e^ei xpovw.
For this way of translating r&v vvv TOVTUV, cf. Phys. vi. ch. 6 5
237 a 16, iv. ch. 10, 218 a 15.
448 b 7. In order to carry on the parallel proof affecting an
extended magnitude he should have added to iv rj, 77 775. The
reference to the extended magnitude appears once more, however,
in the next clause 77 ravr^s n.
448 b 8. cv ravins nvl TJ ravTTjs TI. We must remember that the
same line is representing indifferently either a temporal or a spatial
magnitude.
T^|V yfjv K.T.X. Simon and St Hilaire rightly say that this is the
reductio ad absurduin of the theory that, by perceiving a part, we can
perceive the whole. On this interpretation we must render eV TM
i/taimi> during the whole year, totuin annum, Simon, p. 257.
COMMENT A RY 227
Alexander does not give quite the same interpretation. He
thinks that a><nrp r-rjv y-rjv is an illustration of how we may have
indirect (Kara //.epos) perception of a whole. We may, in an improper
and unqualified way (aTrXws), say that we perceive the whole earth
by perceiving a part, or assign the Olympic contest to such and such
a year because it occurs in a certain time falling within the year.
Whichever interpretation we follow, the result is the same. Such
perception is only indirect perception of a whole, not of a whole per
se, and, if there are imperceptible moments, it alone is possible, and
we can never have perception of a whole as a whole.
448 b 10. ov8cv aurOavtrcu. This is doubtless put in as a reply
to an objection that the line AB by which he was illustrating was
perceived as a whole
(A_. Cl B).
He reminds the objector that they have agreed that CB shall repre
sent an imperceptible part.
448 b 14. cnravTa fjiev ov K.T.X. We must understand that the
conclusion reached in the previous clause is rejected. For the
doctrine cf. chapter 6, 445 b 30 sqq. where he shows that the minute
parts of objects, though not per se actually perceptible, are still
perceptible cvcpyewi in the whole, i.e. when taken in conjunction
with the other parts, and that even per se they are potentially
perceptible (446 a 15 sq. : 8wu/xi re yap lariv rj&rj, KOL evfpyeiq. rrai
7rpo<ry cvd/xci/ov) .
The doctrine involved in both passages is the same and the
conclusion the same, viz. irav /xe ycdo? altrOffrov.
448 b 1 6. aX\ ov <J>aivTai tfcrov ciXX ivtort dSiaipcrov, 6p 8 OVK
dSiaCperov. This should probably be connected with what is said in
De An. in. ch. 3, 428 b 29 sqq. about the falsity which may attach
to <ai/Tacriu. <j>avTa<rLa may be exercised along with sensation
(Trapow^s 1-775 cuo-#>7o-(os). In the case of the perception of size
(and the other KOIVO. aurora) which may itself be erroneous, the
^avracria which results from this perception may also be false,
whether the perception is present or not, K<U /aaXio-ra orav Troppw TO
aixrOriTov y. If, with Freudenthal (Ueber d. Beg. d. Wort. </>avr. b.
Arist., p. i2), we take Troppoo as referring to spatial distance, as
TToppw^ev does here (but cf. Rodier, Vol. n. p. 433), then Aristotle is
instancing the error which attaches to our idea of distant objects.
Cf. also 428 b 3 : olov </>UU/TU<, /xei/ 6 y/Xtos TroStcuos and De Insom.
ch. i, 458(3 28, and ch. 2, 460 b 18. But though, in the above
15-2
228 DE SENSU
passages, the discrepancy between ^avraa-ta and belief (TTIO-TIS) is
discussed, we nowhere meet with an explanation of any conflict
between imagination and perception of the common sensibles which
goes so far as to assert that something which is imperceptible is yet
imageable.
Hence we may conclude that, when Aristotle says that magni
tudes sometimes appear to be indivisible, he would not probably
refer the act of mind to ^ai/rao-ta in the strict sense defined in
De An. HI. ch. 3 (KIWJO-LS VTTO T??? cuo-0>7<re<os ytyi/o/xeV^ 429 a l) or as
the faculty of images (cf. 428 a i). It is rather to be classed as a
mistaken opinion and to be ascribed to So a. In fact ^cuVcrat is
here used vaguely, and Kara ju,era<opaV (cf. 428 a 2), but in a sense
which is very common (cf. above 448 a 23 and frequently elsewhere)
as implying appearance in the modern sense, as opposed to reality.
(For a discussion of the minimum visibile cf. Introduction, sec. vni.)
448 b 1 8. ev rots gfxirpoo-Ocv. I hold (following Alexander s
second alternative) that this refers to ch. 6, 445 b 1 1 : tlSwaroi/
yap XVKOV /ao/ bpav. ^ TTOOW Se, not to the subsequent discussion
(cf. note to 448 b 14), for the principle involved is not irav /xe yetfos
alcrO-qrov but TTO.V al(r6rjTov /xe yetfos, the simple converse, which is also
discussed at the end of this chapter, 449 a 22 sqq.
448 b 19. This passage from 448 b 19 to 449 a 22 presents very
serious difficulty. In the first part of it the text has been practically
reconstructed by Biehl, who attaches great authority to MSS. E M Y.
Consequently the interpretations of Alexander and most commen
tators who follow a very different version have to be in many places
discarded. This in itself is small loss, as it can hardly be said that
those interpretations were consistent either among themselves or
with the previous part of the treatise. But the difficulty still remains
of extracting the exact drift of the argument from the crabbed Greek
of the reconstructed and, it is supposed, more ancient version.
Down to 449 a 10 runs an argument to which we can find no strict
parallel in the De A?iima, and it is here that the textual reconstruc
tion takes place. From this point onwards we can trace an identity
between the reasonings here and those passages in De An. in. ch. 2,
426 b 8 427 a 16 and ch. 7, 431 a 19 sqq., which are themselves
already so famous for their obscurity. Consequently the advantage
resulting from a greater unanimity as to the text is annulled by a
greater divergence of opinion as to the purport of the argument.
In order to arrive at a conclusion as to the general meaning of
. COMMENTARY 229
the passage we must, as it were, take our bearings and recapitulate
the results attained in the previous part of the chapter together with
the main conclusions arrived at in the De Anima.
The solution already given of 1-775 -rrporepov \\$urr^ diropias is,
that consciousness of two sensations simultaneously is only possible
when the two combine to form a unitary product (447 b 1 1 : ry /xia
Sc [aicr&fo ei] a/xa &VOLV OVK ecrni/ aicr@a.v(T@a.i av /xv) fJn^Ofj). Only
sensations, however, belonging to the same sense can give a unitary
product (447 a 32 sqq.), and, as an illustration of this unitary product,
he gives the concord which two different tones compose and, though
Aristotle does not explicitly mention them (cf. notes to 448 a 7 sqq.),
everything points to his having in his mind the composite colours,
odours and flavours which in previous chapters he asserted to be
formed by the combination of the two qualities which in each sense
are most opposed to each other (e/c /xev cviwv ytWrat TI. ..fityvwrai yap
wV ra lo-xara ei/ai/Tm). Qualities of diverse senses do not combine
(ex 8* evi wv ov yiWrai, TOiavra Se TO. vfi frepav a.icrOr)(nv...ovK COTI
8 e/c Aev/cov xal oeos eV yei eVtfai aXX rj Kara avfJi/Bf/SrjKos}. This State
ment is repeated again in the passage we are to discuss 449 a 9-10 :
ovSev yap e/c TOUTOOV [yAv/ceos KCU Xev KOV] eV.
The conclusion then is, that sensations of different senses cannot
be simultaneously present in consciousness, while those belonging to
the same sense escape the same disability only by sacrificing their
individuality and merging in a compound (/xty/xa) in which they are
not evepyeia, actually, discernible.
Now, in view of the opposition between this conclusion and the
passages in the De Anima as well as the solution finally come to at
the end of this chapter (we re /cat alcrOdvoLT aV a/xa T<3 avraJ KOL evi,
449 a 21), which is evidently Aristotle s final opinion, how are we to
treat the arguments in the earlier part of the chapter? Are they
merely dialectical ? Or do they merely emphasise a point of view
which, while so far legitimate, is modified and transcended by the
final presentation of the subject ? To us who have followed Aris
totle s method of developing an argument in previous chapters, this
seems the more likely answer, but whether he has made the relation
between the two points of view quite plain, and whether indeed he
was clear about it in his own mind, is another question.
In the passages in the De Anima there is no mention whatsoever
of the sensations coalescing with each other. The question is raised
how we distinguish the various sense qualities, and the word chiefly
230 DE SEN Sir
used for this action is KpiVeiv, which is paraphrased once (426 b 14)
by alcrOdvecrOaL on 8ia^>cpct [TO, atcrBifjTa\. The reply is, that they
must be distinguished by something unitary and in a unitary moment
of time (a/na). If the first condition were not fulfilled, consciousness
would be divided into independent parts, separate like the minds of
different individuals; if the moment of their distinction were not
a unit, qualities could not be pronounced to be distinct at one and
the same moment.
Obviously Aristotle is there not discussing qualities which have
merged with each other and lie indistinguishably commingled in
their product. It is noteworthy also that, apparently, he finds the
greatest difficulty in explaining the simultaneous distinction of
contrary qualities, not of those belonging to diverse senses. (Cf.
Rodier, Vol. n. pp. 388 sqq. and pp. 501 sqq. On the whole
I follow Rodier and Alexander.) (i) The first explanation proposed
is, that what perceives is in aspect or mode of existence (TO)
diverse, though a numerical and spatial unit (roVco Se KCU a
aSicupcTov 427 a 5), just as things have various diverse qualities, but
yet are numerically and spatially one (cf. beneath 449 a 16 : TO yap
avro KCU ei/ api#/Aw \CVKOV KCU y\vKv eon). (I agree with Rodier and
Alexander in identifying the second solution in this chapter of the
De Sensu with the former of the two explanations in the De Aninia
in in. ch. 2.)
But (2) it is only potentially that contrary qualities (as distin
guished from those merely diverse) can form a unity. When actual
they cannot be realised in the same subject. When forming a mixture
they have potential existence and thus can be realised in the same
subject. Hence we must think of the soul, not as being analogous
in this case to a thing in which diverse qualities are combined, but
rather to something incorporeal, e.g. a point, which is at one and the
same time actually one or two, according to the way in which it is
viewed. A point per se is a mere unit and indivisible, but, viewed
as the end of one line and the starting point of another, it is two.
In the line AB which is intersected at the point C
A ^1C ______ B
C is employed in two ways at the same time, as the terminus of AC
and the Starting point of CB (8ts yap TW avrto ^p^rou <n?/Ata> a/xa
427 a 12).
This is, without doubt, the same solution as that mentioned
briefly below in 449 a 12 sqq. In so far as that which perceives
COMMENTARY 231
sweet and white is actually indivisible it is one, in so far as actually
divisible it is diverse.
Note that in the De Sensu Aristotle applies the explanation, which
he had reserved in the De Anima for contraries, to mere differents
like white and sweet, afterwards returning to the more general solu
tion which he had given in the De Anima (rj WO-TTC/O TTI ran/ Trpay/xaTwi/
avrwv ei Se xerai, OVTWS KCU err) T^S 1^^175 449 a 14-15) and which
seemed to be inadequate to account for the perception of contraries.
This need not mean a recoil on Aristotle s part from the teaching in
the Psychology. From the discussion there in in. ch. 7, it appears
that he thought the cases of contraries and of differents not to be
fundamentally diverse. (I follow here Rodier s text and interpreta
tion.) Vide 431 a 21 : ICTTI yap eV rt, OVTW Sc KCU to? 6 pos. KCU ravra,
ev TO) dVaAoyov KOL TO> dptp/xa) ov, c^ct Trpos eKarepov, 005 Kiva. Trpos
aAAr/Xa- TL yap Sta(/>epei TO aTropeu/ TTCOS TO. /JLTJ ofjioyevrj KptVct 17 ra
ei ai/Tta, otov Xev/cov /cat ^ueXav ; /c.r.X.
Here we find (i) that that which discerns the sensibles is ws
opos, as it were a limiting point (cf. Wpas in the previous passage) ;
(2) that the sensations (ravra) are, in virtue of this principle, related
to each other as the qualities (eKctm) are among themselves ; (3) that
this numerically identical consciousness relates the various pairs of
evavTia in an analogous fashion (as we can gather also from De Sensu,
ch. 7, above 447 b 32 sqq. : OK 8 avTco? eavrats ra (Tvo-roi^a K.r.A..).
Hence, if white bears to black the relation that sweet bears to bitter,
the proportion will be transposable, as we may say that white is to
sweet as black to bitter. Here now we are relating to each other ra
/ar) bfjioytvrj and hence it follows that the mode of distinguishing them
is not essentially different from the way in which we discriminate
contraries.
It follows, then, that Aristotle s final opinion contained both
elements and that the two are really complementary to each other
(cf. Rodier n. p. 501), viz., (i) that the relation of sensations in con-
.sciousness is the same as that of objective qualities in things, (2) that
the only parallel we can find for the relating consciousness is the
mathematical point with its double function of oneness and duality.
Notice that Aristotle is confident that this perception of two
qualities is simultaneous, while it must be different from the only
kind of simultaneous perception of qualities yet accounted for (up
to 448 b 17) in the De Sensu. This was the perception of qualities
in fusion ; that is the distinction (xpt o-is) of the different sensations.
232 DE SENSV
It is true that in De Sensu, ch. 7, 447 b 28 sqq. Aristotle says it is
the function of a single sense to discriminate specifically different
and opposite qualities like white and black. But there is no indi
cation at that point that this discrimination must be instantaneous ;
the drift of the argument seems rather to be that what is perceived
at a single instant must be a numerical unit. Alexander (De Sensu,
p. 167, 11. 10 sqq. [W.], p. 352, 11. 10 sqq. [Thurot]) professes to find
the account given of the perception of contraries here unsatisfactory.
It is merely, he thinks, the same as that first hazarded in the De
Anima and there set aside. The same thing cannot be both white
and black, and hence, if the union of sensations in the soul is similar
to the union of qualities in things, we have left the case of contrary
sensations unexplained. Hence he thinks that either discrimination
of contraries can only be effected by means of memory, not by
present sensations, or that it is by the central organ (the heart) being
affected in different parts simultaneously (just as it must be different
parts of the same object that have contrary determinations) that we
can at the same time distinguish different sensations. Hence, though
the simultaneous experience (Wflos) of two opposite qualities is not
possible, simultaneous discrimination (/cpuris) is.
This seems to me to be an untenable position. Though, in
perception, there can be distinguished the two different aspects of
discrimination and experience or reception of the sensations, yet they
cannot exist apart from each other ; at any rate the discrimination of
the diversity cannot exist without the presentation of the differents,
and simultaneous discrimination of the differents cannot exist without
simultaneous modification of the same thing by the differents.
Besides, this theory seems to be exactly that which Aristotle, in
anticipation of his final solution, is going to disprove below in
the passage from 448 b 19 449 a 9: afj(.a //ei/, ere/aw Se r^s i/tt^rj?
alo-OdvcaOai. This is impossible, he says, even though the different
parts belong to one continuous whole ovrw 8 ch-ofou w? TTCU/TI ovn
o-wexei (cf. infra 23 sqq. and notes). This would be a good descrip
tion of the central organ functioning by means of different parts.
The way out of the difficulty is found by paying close attention
to the conclusion established in De An. in. ch. 7.
There is no essential difference, Aristotle says, between the dis
crimination of differents and of contraries. Similarly we might add
there is no essential difference between the way in which both classes
of qualities are realised in things. Incompatible qualities must, if
COMMENT A RY 233
realised in one thing (by belonging to different parts of it), meet in a
common point which is two or one according to the way of looking
at it, just as much as a particle of matter which is both sweet and
white has both a dual and a unitary aspect.
If this is Aristotle s final opinion, what is to be thought of the
purport of the earlier part of this chapter? It might be suggested
that in the De Sensu he is talking of alcrOdvea-OaL in the sense of
TrdvxcLv, in the De Anima as Kpivuv. But this can hardly be
accurate ; the final verdict in the De Sensu is the same as in the De
Anima, while there is no indication that he is at the end thinking of
ato-^o-ts merely as Kpuris. As we have seen, there cannot be simul
taneous Kpt o-iq without simultaneous -rrdOos, while again sensation is
always with him a Swa/xts Kpirua/, always cognitive. Perhaps the
meaning to be extracted from the discussion is as follows Sense
qualities as such cannot be perceived simultaneously. True, if the
sensations they give rise to can combine, as they may do if they
belong to the same sense (since the corresponding stimuli are in
closer proximity than in other cases paXXov yap a/xa r] /aV^o-is 447 b
9 sq.), they can both be experienced. But in combination they
cannot be discriminated, hence not perceived. But since, as we
learn in the De Anima, to be discriminated they must be simul
taneously apprehended, it is to their objective realisation in things,
to their unity Kara o-u/A/Je/fyico?, i.e. as accidents of the same substance,
that we must look for the grounds of the possibility of their dis
crimination, while their discrimination is effected by a consciousness
which has a unity, not like that of different spatial parts in a whole,
but like that of the different qualities in one object.
If this be the meaning of our author, it forms a remarkable fore
shadowing of the psychological doctrine that discrimination and
objectification go together -and, if objects can exist only in space, it
is an argument for the necessity of the spatial form of things for the
development of knowledge.
Aristotle says that this faculty which distinguishes the sense
qualities belonging to the different genera is still a form of sense, for
the qualities distinguished are sense qualities (aixrOvfrd yap eortv, De
An. in. ch. 2, 426 b 15). Yet it cannot be t&Ya aio-^o-is, which
merely discriminates qualities belonging to a single sense. It is not
located in the organ of any special sense, nor in the flesh. Its
organ he calls TO Kvpiov awr&pnfpiov, which is evidently to be identified
with what he elsewhere calls TO *vpioi> alcrOrjnjpLov, De Sow. ch. 2,
234 DE SENSU
455 a 21 sqq., TO Trpwror atcrOyTi/jpiov ibid. 456 a 21, etc., and TO KOLVGV
alcrOrjTijpiov De Juvent. ch. i, 467 b 28, ibid. ch. 3, 469 a 12, namely the
heart or some constituent found in it. This is the organ of the KOU/T/
aio-Orjais, one function of which we have already discussed, namely
the perception of the common sensibles, number, figure, magni
tude, motion, and unity. If we look however to De Som. ch. 2,
455 a J 3 sc l c l- we fi n d that the faculty by which we distinguish the
various genera of sensations, e.g. white and sweet, is also called a KOMJ
Swapis aKoXovOovcra Trao-cu?, and this it is, too, which enables us to be
not only conscious but self-conscious (# KCU on opa KOU OLKOVZI ala-Od-
verat). It resides in the KoivoV alaOrjTijpLov (nvl KOIVW //.opia> TWV
Hence we come to the conclusion that the faculty by which we
discriminate and hence objectify sense qualities is also the same as
that in virtue of which we are self-conscious, a striking anticipation
of Kant s doctrine of the objectifying function of the transcendental
unity of apperception. Cf. Introd. sec. ix.
448 b 22. dTO[Aft> xpovw. Cf. note to aVo /xu; above 447 a 15 ; this
has been the sense in which Aristotle has used individual time
throughout. Cf. Physics vin. ch. 8, 263 b 27 : ov\ otov TC e CITO/AOVS
XpoVovs oia.LpL(r@ai rov \p6vov, cf. also VI, ch. 9, 239 b 8.
448 b 23. 6Tpo) 8c. This seems not to be exactly the theory
rejected in De An. in. ch. 2, 426 b 17 sqq.: ovre Srj KexwptoTxeW?
ei Sc^erai Kpivf.iv on erepov TO y\vKv rov XCVKOV, K.r.A.
There it was shown in general terms that it is not by separate
organs or faculties that the soul discriminates diverse sensations.
Here it is proved that not even though the different organs were to
form a continuous whole could it be said that through them the dis
tinction of the sensations is effected.
In short, both arguments are directed against the contention that
it is by means of spatially different parts that the simultaneous
presentation and discrimination of two different sense qualities is
rendered possible. In the De Anima these different parts seem to
be regarded as the various end organs, but as it might have been
objected that they need not be regarded as separate in that way, since,
on Aristotle s own theory, the various sense organs all connected with
the heart, and the real organ of discrimination might hence be the
various parts of that member, Aristotle here refutes this second version
of the theory.
448 b 24. ov TW aTfy.<j>. This is omitted by MSS. L S U and
COMMENTA RY 235
also by Alexander, who reads, instead of the subsequent oimo 8* dro/xw,
KOL OUTCOS dro/xto to? TravTi oi Ti (Twe^*^ This he takes to refer to the
a/xa in 1. 2 1 above and to be a second attempt to define the sense in
which the organ is individual (Alex. p. 157 11. 17 sqq. [W.], p. 331 1. 7
[Th.]). This reading and interpretation is supported by Thurot and
also Baumker (Jahrb. fur Class. Philol. 1886, p. 319) who, of course,
assign the ov TW a ro/xo) to dittographia. But, if the interpretation is
to be supported and OVTW? aVo/xo> is to be referred to time, we must
read either /cat ev ovrws with Thurot or /caV OVTWS with Baumker.
However, it is impossible that ws iravrl OVTI a-wc^ei can elucidate the
meaning of a/xa or be a relevant description of the atomic time
mentioned above (cf. previous notes). That is a time which rela
tively to the two sensations is atomic, which is such that the two
sensations are not subsequent to each other, but both experienced
concurrently throughout the whole duration of the time. But, though
the time is continuous, one sensation may quite well be subsequent
to another, for the time uniting two events in immediate succession
is continuous.
It is true that the time in which the sensations are presented
must be continuous, i.e. must be capable of resolution into still
briefer times : cf. the general discussion of continuity in the notes to
ch. 6, 445 D 3 an( ^ 28 SQQ-
But to point this out in no way shows how the sensations are
a/xa ; on the contrary, it would lead one to believe they were not
really a/xa, i.e. eV ru) avrw XP 1 ^ (Physics iv. ch. 10, 218 a 25, Categ.
ch. 13, 14 b 25) in the sense of being concurrently present in all
parts of it, but that one was iWcpov, the other Trporepov. Cf. Physics,
loc. tit. a/xa elvat Kara ^povov = /xr/re Trporepov /XT/TC ucrrepoi/ TO ev TW
avrw clvat.
Hence, if it was said that the individuality of the time in which
two sensations were presented consisted in its being composed of
continuous parts and that they were together, a/xa, merely in the
sense of occupying different parts of this continuous whole, this
would contradict the definition of their simultaneity given above in
1. 22, which Alexander explains as not being merely immediate suc
cession in time.
In short, if it can be asserted that a time of continuous parts is
atomic in a sense (i.e. in the sense that no division in it has been
made), yet this is not the sense in which the time in which sensations
are simultaneously perceived is atomic.
236 DE SENSU
Hence if oimo aro /xo) refers to time, it is a misleading irrelevancy.
It must refer to the organ or faculty of perception. (For the sense
in which TO o-vvexes is a unity cf. Metaph. x. ch. i, 1052 a 19 sqq.)
The ancient translation runs et non indivisibili, sic autem indi-
visibili ut omni existenti continue.
Biehl s conjecture KCU ov TO> aro/xw 77 ovTa>[9 ?] aro/Au) seems to
give little visible improvement.
448 b 28. ravra. All Mss. except E M and all editors except
Biehl read ravrd. Accordingly, following that reading we should
have to interpret there will be a plurality of organs specifically
alike. Not only the interpretations but the readings also which
we are to accept in the subsequent passage will depend upon our
decision here.
Firstly, it is clear that whatever reading we accept we must not
have the temerity to translate yeVci in this line species. Hammond
reading ravrd renders : it will then have parts specifically the same.
For its repeated sensations belong to the same species. This is
certainly to cut the knot and leave the difficulty unsolved.
Supposing that ravrd be read, then we may, throughout the subse
quent lines also, follow pretty closely the version of the class of MSS.
which gives us that reading.
Bekker gives KOL yap a alaOdvtraL, ev TW cu>ru> yei/et errrtV, which we
may render for the objects of a single sense belong to the same
genus. This does not seem to be a confirmation of the ravrd unless
we remember that, though the actual sensation is identical with the
sense quality as actually perceived and that, hence, as qualities are
specifically diverse so are sensations, yet as a Svra/xt? the sense
is specifically a unit. The perception of black and of white
is SwdfjLCL specifically one. What has a generic unity eVepyeia has
specific unity potentially.
The senses considered as faculties are only specifically distinct.
Now the sense faculty and the sense organ are from many points of
view one and the same thing. They are, of course, relatively to
each other a-ua opyaviKov and 19 the eis of the particular organ ;
but they are often referred to by the same term ; aio-Qrjo-is is often
equivalent to aurO^mjpiov (cf. above ch. 3, 440 a 20, and oi/as is even
used for o/x/xa : cf. ch. 2, 43 8 a 13: TO pev ovv "rijv o\f/iv cu/ai voVrros
dXijOes /"-eV), and so aKorj for the ear, oo-^p^o-ts for the organ of smell
(cf. De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 4 : vj 8 aKor) depos, x.r.X. and De Sens.
ch. 2, 438 b 21-22 and note).
COMMENTARY 237
lf Hence we might argue that, corresponding to the specifically
Hentical faculty which perceives objects specifically distinct, there is,
if it requires a separate organ to apprehend every separate determi
nation, a corresponding plurality of sense organs which yet are speci
fically identical, for, if the faculty is specifically one, so are the organs.
Hence we should have to interpret el Se on <os 8vo o/x/xara, K.r.X.
1. 29 sqq. in some such way as this If it be said that this may
very well be the case because (t.g-) the eyes are specifically alike, and
so the soul may have a plurality of similar organs, it must be observed
that the cases are not parallel.
The two eyes have an identical function, not two images but
one alone is present when we see ; but the case you try to explain
is that of the perception of diversity. (This would require to be the
sense to be arrived at, whatever reading we follow.)
Once more, if the organs are specifically alike, so will the faculty
of perceiving black, white, etc., be specifically identical, i.e. you will
have different sense faculties only numerically distinct (alvQtjcreis ai
avral TrXeiovs eownu 1. 33) which is like saying that there may be
different sciences of the same subject.
But this last argument is sufficient to throw suspicion on the
whole proof. If it is the case that, as the authors of this interpreta
tion would themselves admit, the perception of black and the per
ception of white are only as actualised specifically different, and
Swdpci, or as a faculty, they are specifically identical and only numeri
cally to be distinguished as different possible acts of the same sense
(cf. Alex. De Sens. p. 158, 1. 15 [W.], p. 333, 1. 6 [Th.] : TWV yap ev TU>
yeVci 17 avrv) /car etSos aur^r/crts. Alexander, however, shows some
perplexing hesitation between 6/xoyci/j? and o/xoetS^), then it is clear
that Aristotle would not have the least objection to saying that the
same sense faculty may be reduplicated, provided one understands
what this means. If it mean, as is the only view consistent with the
reading ravta, that it is one sense faculty which is particularised and
made determinate in the perception of black, white, etc., then this is
precisely his theory.
(Compare 447 b 27 sqq. above. There he cannot maintain the
unqualified assertion that, corresponding to a specifically identical
object, there is a single (specifically identical) sense. A single sense
corresponds to and discriminates specifically diverse objects (cf. 447 b
29). It is the single sense functioning in a determinate manner which
gives specific identity in the object.)
238 DE SENSU
Hence it would be Aristotle s own theory that the different orgai, , ]
by which we perceived white and black, if there were any, must bV^j
specifically alike, just as the eyes are alike.
But his argument is this If you postulate a diversity of organs,
you will have to make them specifically unlike each other. Where
we have different organs, as is the case with diverse senses, the unit)
of the senses is only generic ; hence here too, within one sense, if
you are to have separate organs, they will only have a generic
resemblance to each other. You object and say there are the two
eyes, specifically alike, but yet serving the one sense sight. I reply
that these have a single function; the sensations given by each
combine to form one product. So too the different sensations
mediated by specifically identical (etSct Se 1. 31) parts of the same
organ may form a compound, e.g. black and white, and sounds of
various pitch, which combine. But, when that is so, the different
sensations are not discriminated. Your proposal was to account for
the perception, i.e., discrimination of the sensations, by the diversity
of the organs by which they are apprehended. If, as shown, a mere
numerical difference in the organ does not render that possible, you
will have to try specific disparateness. The different organs must be
specifically diverse.
But, if so, contained within each sense there will be diverse
faculties, distinct from each other as the various sciences are dis
tinct and as the admittedly different senses are distinct. Distinct
sciences have each an appropriate SvVa/xis and so have distinct
senses. The perception, then, of (e.g.) different colours will, because
each has, as shown, its appropriate uVa/us, be distinct in the way that,
the sciences are.
This carries us down to 449 a 3, after which the argument takes
a new turn.
448 b 28-29. TW avrw yfrci. Cf. 447 b 29-30; where you have
different organs you have only generic identity in the sense.
448 b 29. If we read ovfev KwAvet in this way as governing on
(see translation), we must supply XCKTCOV before on itrtos in order to
avoid an ugly anacoluthon. This, however, is very common in
Aristotle. Cf. ^ OTL "7>um>i/ 1. 25 above. The on 10-019 clause can
hardly be an argument against the suggestion that we may have
different organs specifically alike, as in the case of the eyes ; it will
rather be in support of it. Alexander, however, wishes to take cm
as an objection to a different thesis (cf. note to ravra above).
COMMENT A RY 239
If it is intended as an argument in support, it can only be the plea
of an intelligent supporter. He (the supporter) says here you
have two eyes of identical construction functioning alike and co
operating in the act of perception. Aristotle in the next sentence
replies * that is exactly the point, the objects they perceive are
numerically one, not diverse as is required in the case of the organs
which are to perceive both white and black simultaneously.
448b 31-33- Bekker reads CKCI Se, d /xev ev TO e a^olv, /<eti/o
TO ai<r6a.v6fAevov eWat, t 8e ^lapfe, ov^ 6/xouos eei, following L S U P
and Alexander.
Biehl s text is d Se, 17 /x,v ev TO e d/x^otv, ei/ Kai TO atcr$ai/o//,evoi>
K.T.A.; he bases his restoration on readings in E M Y. This would
give us But if that is so, then, consequent to the unity of the
product, the perceptive organ (faculty?) is single, while again if the
sensations are separate the case is altered. We may extract a
meaning out of it somewhat like that which Alexander gets from the
other reading viz. that in the case of the eyes you have really a
single psychic faculty functioning through the two organs and not two,
as is claimed. This will give a sense satisfactory to our argument ;
but it is difficult to see how TO al<rBa.v6^vov could be said to be
numerically single when it is quite as naturally an epithet for
the eye as for the faculty, and the eyes are manifestly double.
Hence I propose, while following Biehl and the older class of
MSS., to read ctSet Se d instead of d 8e in 448 b 31, and interpret as
in note to 448 b 28. The point is, that two perceptive organs
specifically alike will account for the perception of a single object,
but that to account for the perception of two things (simultaneously),
the organs must be specifically unlike.
Hammond translates, following Biehl s text, "If, however, the
continuation of both forms a unit, then that which is perceived will
be a unit and, if they remain uncombined, then the result will
likewise be uncombined.
448 b 33. 2 alo-Otja-tLs K.T.A.. For Alexander s interpretation
cf. note to b 28 above.
449 a 3. It seems to be the universal practice to take Team;? as
referring to ei/e pyeio. in 1. 2. We thus get a syllogism if aio-Qrjais
then eyepyeta, if ei/e pyeia then otKeia Swa/zis ; hence all ar$?ycreis
have their oiKta Suva/us. Hut perhaps there was no need to prove
this. Whether we read ravrd or TO.VTO. in 448 b 28, we might prefer
here to be taken in the sense which it has in 448 b
2 4 o DE SENSU
33 as a distinct sense (not as sensation as I have translated). Now
a sense is by definition a Swa/us (cf. De An. HI. ch. 9, 432 a 16)
and more accurately a Svra/u? in the sense of eis (cf. Zte *&;. ch. i,
436 b 5, and note to ch. 4, 441 b 25, and De An. 11. ch. 5). A sense
is like a distinct science, a determinate potentiality; the actual
exercise of both alike depends upon this, which may be called the
otKeia Swa/uus of the ci/epycta in each case. It may be of these princi
ples that Aristotle reminds us here. It has already been shown that,
if the organs by which we perceive white and black are distinct, they,
and therefore the faculties which reside in them, must be distinct.
Hence these latter will be distinct in the sense that sciences are
distinct. The two clauses oirre...Swayu,ecos, ovT...ato-^o-is will
then form only a single premiss in the argument which proves that
a distinct sense is like a distinct science.
449 a 4. Unless ^ be read before aio-0avcr<u we get a shocking
piece of bad reasoning ; though if B can be perceived, a fortiori
A can be perceived, we cannot infer that if A then B (B = TWF TW
yem Irepwv, A = TO, IvavrCa). Besides the presence of fjirj does not
incommode the argument, in fact improves it.
The best defence of this emendation (which though authorised
by no text is seen to be necessary by Alexander unless TOVTUV
= CKCI VO^, i.e. heterogeneous objects, aAAwv = 6/x,oiSwi/. So St Hilaire
and Leonicus) is by Baumker in the Jahrb. fur Class. PhiloL 1886,
p. 320. He points out that though in classical Greek if /MJ is read
we should expect ovSe not KCU after on in the next clause, yet we
find instances of the contrary usage in Aristotle, e.g.. De Coelo, \.
ch. II, 28ia 16: olov 6 ^tAta /3aoYo~ou crraSia /mrj 8wa/x.cvos, Si^Aoi/
on KGU ^i\ia KCU eV.
The presence of the KCU, being so contrary to common usage,
probably led to the omission of the I^TJ.
For the principle compare above 447 b 7 sqq. and 448 a 15 sqq.
ci> evl KCU ard/xo) must refer to time (cf. 448 b 22-24 and notes). It
is the simultaneous!) ess of the perception which is under discussion,
and which cannot be accounted for by the theory that the faculty or
organ is diverse.
449 a 7. From 171-01, 1. 7, to CK TOVTWV cV, 1. 9, the passage is
almost hopelessly obscure.
TOVTWV, 1. 7, must surely refer to yAWos and XCVKOV. The phrase
TO eV TOVTUV continually refers to a compound. Cf. De An. n. ch. i,
412 a 9, where ovo-ta o-wfleV?/, consisting of v\rj and eTSo?, is so
COMMENTA RY 241
designated, and Metaph. vn. ch. 3, 1029 a 3, etc. Thus if here TO IK
roirrwv refers to the organ or faculty of perception, it can hardly
imply that it is a substratum or vTroKei/xci/ov, as Alexander (De
Sensu, p. 162, 1. 23 [W.], p. 343, 1. 6 [Th.]) and Rodier (n. p. 390)
take it.
However, apart from this, all except Simon (Simon, De Sensu,
p. 261) admit that (TO) e* TOVTUV in 1. 9 refers to a compound of
qualities or sensations, and it is hardly likely that in three lines Aristotle
would employ the same expression to refer to two different things.
Moreover the meaning of TO e d^olv in 448 b 32 above, as well as
^ <av 447 a 23, eK...ei/i(i)i/ 447 a 32, etc., all point to this phrase
referring to a fusion of sensations, and so St Hilaire takes it. On
the other hand, Alexander, Thomas, Simon, and Rodier wish to take
it as referring to the soul or the central organ, the heart. The only
advantage resulting from this is that the connection of aXX aVa y/o;
ev and eV ydp TL TO alaOrjTLKov eo-Tt //.epos is quite clear, but it leaves the
connection between the latter clause and those which follow it
absolutely unexplained.
Simon is more consistent than others in thinking that the refer
ence may be to the central sense and its organ throughout.
If we take TO CK TOVTWV as referring on both occasions to a
product of sensations, then the argument will be clear except as to
the connection between aAA dvdyKf] ev and ev yap TL TO alcrOirjTLKOV ecm
fjicpos. The only way I can see for explaining this is as follows :
It is claimed that we perceive black and white simultaneously
by means of a single organ with spatially diverse though continuous
parts. But in such a case the two sensations must coalesce and
form a unity, and hence, if it is by the same means that we per
ceive sweet and white, then they too must form a unity. But
such a unitary product does not exist. Hence it is not by the
spatial diversity of the organ that those qualities are perceived simul
taneously.
The question is still as to the means of perceiving the two
simultaneously (which he is sure can take place), and the objection
to the solution proposed is not that it postulates different organs, for
he admits that such exist (d\Xo Se yeVos 8Y aXXov, 1. n), but that
it is through a spatial diversity of the organ that they are supposed
to be related in the same moment of time.
Thus, in the whole of this section from 448 b 19 onwards
Aristotle has been working up to his own theory. He rejects the
R. 16
242 DE SENSU
solution proposed in the form in which it is offered but, more suo,
abstracts from it the legitimate part. There are different faculties, but
it is not qua located in different physical organs that they are able
to allow their different contributions to be correlated in a single
consciousness.
449 a 8. dXX avd-yKT). If Aristotle is still discussing the solution
hazarded in 448 b 23-25, as he must be, this is proof positive that
according to that theory the soul must be a unity of a kind, and so
our interpretation of oiVw 8 drofjua in 448 b 24-25 is confirmed. If it
were under dispute whether what perceives is something unitary or
not, Aristotle could not bring in without proof the very statement
which was denied ev yap n TO alo-QyTiKov eo-rt /xepog. Indeed if
he knew this to be true and to be excluded by the other theory
aXAu) jacv yXv/ceos aXXw Sc Xev/cov atcr^ai/erat 77 i/^X 7 ? /x-epci he would
need to start with a direct proof of it.
449 a 10. Biehl proposes to read Se instead of apa, no doubt
because, apparently, all that has been said is in opposition to what
follows. But, as we have seen (note to 449 a 7), what precedes is
directed not against the doctrine of a unitary principle (indeed
that has been affirmed in 1. 8), but against the interpretation of
it given.
449 a 12. TJ pev d8icu pTov K.T.X. The meaning of this is
elucidated in De An. in. ch. 2, 427 a 10 sqq. Cf. note to 448 b 19
above.
449 a 17. Alexander reads, 1. 17, d yap pr) x<opio-ra K.T.X.
The sense then is One and the same thing numerically can be
white and sweet and have many other qualities, for, though the
qualities do not exist in separation from each other, yet in mode of
existence they are different from each other.
Bekker and Biehl both reject yap, though Rodier accepts it.
The latter also translates TO civai by essence. Cf. next note.
449 a 1 8. TO elvcu. Alexander seems to countenance Rodier s
translation of essence by giving as equivalents Xdyos and TO ri fy
eu/ai. But, though not so far from Xoyos in meaning, TO eu/ai is
hardly as a rule equivalent to essential nature or real being/
which is the special force of TO TL Jjv emu. It is rather aspect of
existence ; we might almost say existence for consciousness. TO>
elvai almost = notionally : cf. note to ch. 6, 446 b 30, and for a
typical case De An. in. ch. 2, 425 b 27, where it is said that though
the ei/epyeta of the sense object and that of the sense faculty are one
COMMENT AR Y 243
and identical, yet in aspect of existence, i.e. as related to an external
object in the one case and the human organism in the other, they are
different TO 8 e!Wu ov TO avro avrais.
We may take Aoyw in 1. 22 (with Bonitz, Ind. p. 221 a 60) as
equivalent to TW elvai and translate but notionally not the same/ or
we may take Xo yo? here as equivalent to * ratio and say but not by
means of an identical relation [to them], i.e. to the two sensations.
449 a 24. aimpov. Aristotle cannot mean that the point from
which a thing ceases to be visible is infinitely far away. Of course
the point from which it ceases to be 8wa/m, i.e. potentially visible, is
infinitely far away, i.e. is non-existent. This is a consequence of tht
doctrine, that every magnitude is sensible, discussed in the first part
of chapter 6. But here we are discussing the converse proposition
which answers the question raised in ch. 7, 448 b 17 and mentioned
in ch. 6, 445 b 10. Simon (p. 256) is wrong in thinking that it is
this issue which is raised in ch. 3, 440 a 29 ; it is the other statement,
TTO.V /u.ey0os oparov.
Alexander at first takes aircipov as iroXv T K<U o-xeSov aircipov, but
later on gives the correct interpretation : ov yap TTI \a/3elv TO
ficyuTTOV Sicurr?7/xa d<j> ov OVK aio-$avo /z$a (De Sens. p. 1 68, 1. 27 [W.],
p. 356, 1. 6 [Th.]).
The argument is worked out in terms of sight, but applies to all
other senses which employ a medium. It is as the distance
between object and seer increases, we arrive at last at a point
beyond which the object is invisible, though short of it vision is still
possible. This is a single mathematical point, and the object, as it
diminishes, will, if indivisible to sight anywhere, be indivisible when
this point is reached. But this point is the first in the series from
which vision is possible, the last where it is impossible. Hence,
when at this point, the object will be both visible and invisible ;
which is impossible.
449 a 28. TOVTO. Alexander takes this to refer to the peragv,
the mean point at which vision begins and invisibility ceases. Thus
all others too. But, if we interpret it so, it is difficult to construe
(Wo?, 1. 30. The indivisibility of the point seems to be implied
strongly enough in the last clause TTI oc TL co-\arov K.T.X., and, at
any rate, whether expressed or not, it is a necessary part of the
argument that an indivisible ala-Orjrov will be found at this point if
anywhere.
449 b 2. KOIVTJ. For this sense of KOU/O? cf. ch. i, 436 a 7.
16 2
DE MEMORIA
CHAPTER I.
noi
, ! 449 b 4. |ivTi|jLovveiv is simply the verb corresponding to
and means to have something (consciously and at the time) in one s
memory. It is paraphrased by eVepyetv rfj /XVTJ/X.T; in 450 a 21 beneath.
It is to be distinguished from aVa/Ai//,v?7o-Ko-#cu, which implies the
active search for the memory of some particular item of one s past
experience. Though we employ * to remember for the former, to
recollect for the latter, the English words are hardly so sharply
contrasted as the Greek ; in fact, in ordinary use they are hardly to
be distinguished, as is natural considering that both contain the
prefix corresponding to the Greek aVa. But even in Greek, and
sometimes in Aristotle himself, the terms are not used with perfect
precision. Cf. Freudenthal in Rheinisches Museum, 1869, p. 403.
449 b 8. p.vT]jjt.oviKol. This is one of the characteristics enu
merated in Aristotle s hardly complimentary list of the peculiarly
feminine qualities. Cf. Hist. Animal, ix. ch. i, 608 b 13.
449 b 10. XT]ITT&&gt;V = we must make an assumption. Aristotle is
going to show grounds for this assumption, but he could not say
vTroKL<rOu, because that would imply that the grounds had been
already shown. Cf. note to De Sensu, ch. i, 436 a 5. This seems
to be the distinction generally maintained between Xa/jL/Sdvcw and
449 b 12. 8o|ao-Tbv. Soa, as a faculty, means generally the
power of forming opinions and thinking, in the widest sense of the
term. When defined more closely, however, it takes rank as the
lowest of the rational faculties ; it is practically equivalent to vTro AT/i/a?
in its most restricted application and is opposed to eVto-r^/z^ which
has for its object necessary truth. Cf. De An. in. ch. 3 ; Anal. Post.
i. ch. 33 ; Metaph. vn. ch. 15, 1039 b 32 sqq.
449 b 14. There is a special treatise Ilepi rrj<s Ka@ vwov
462 b 12 sqq., on supposed prevision of the future by means
COMMENTARY 245
of dreams. Aristotle accounted for the phenomena in question by
me ( ans of natural agencies.
449 b 1 6. Here Aristotle agrees with Locke (Essay , Bk. iv. ch.
ii. 14 andch. xi.) with whom sensitive knowledge occupies pretty
much the same place as ato-^o-ts with Aristotle.
Though only the present is known by perception, this does not
mean that only perception knows the present. In 1. 18 beneath, TO
#e<opov/x,vov is given as an example of TO irapov.
449 b 17. Biehl prefers cm before napta-riv instead of 6Ye, the
reading adopted by all other editors. The point to be made out
is that qua present an object of consciousness is not an object c"
memory. One might remember, while he was looking at a white
thing, that he had seen it before ; but he cannot remember that it is
now present. This is the only point to be made out here, viz. that
memory is the apprehension of a thing not as present but as past.
How this is possible is discussed in 450 a 27 sqq. That which is
present to consciousness when we remember, is not the object
remembered but its copy (CIKCUI/). When the present object of con
sciousness is recognised as a representation of something in the
past, then we have memory.
449 b 20 - ^ Vv v VpYiwv. Themistius and Michael read
tpywv. Themistius explains thus epya Se Ae yw oto> TOO! TO woi/ 77
ToSt TO A.CUKOV Kai TO ev TO>S TU> /?i/3A.io> rpiywvov, i.e. as practically
equivalent to TT pay para = the real things. Whatever the reading be,
the sense must be the same ; ei/epyetwv must mean the actual
operation of the real objects, or something similar ; avev TCOV ei/epyeicGv
cannot mean * without actually having knowledge or perception,
which would imply that only the e^ts providing for knowledge or
perception existed, for these may persist throughout unconsciousness,
e.g. in sleep. There really is perception or knowledge of something
present whenever we remember; an evcpyeia is realised (cf. 450 b 30:
OTO.V cvepyi? rj Ktnyo-ts avrov K.T.A.), but to be memory it depends upon
whether or not this evepyeia is referred to something else (aAAou 1. 32)
existing in the past.
What is actually present in the act of memory we shall find to be
a (fxivraa-^a ; a ^ai/Tacr/xa is a persisting sensation or sense content.
Now, though it is true that this is in most cases the intermediary
employed by memory, yet that intermediary might in certain cases be
an actual perception, as e.g. when we see a thing for the second time
and remember we have seen it before.
246 DE MEMORIA
449 b 22. Biehl and Freudenthal (Rheinisches Museum, x:
p. 394) wish to delete rag TOV Tptyojvov...i(7at, on the ground the. _.
these words are left standing we shall have to translate he remem
bers that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right, in the one
case because he learned or thought of it, in the other because he
heard or saw it or had some sense knowledge of the fact. But
Freudenthal points out that we cannot have sensuous knowledge of
any mathematical principle according to Anal. Post. i. ch. 31,
especially 87 b 34 sqq. : ovS eTmrracr^cu oY aicr^crews to-riv. dXA.a
*fj\ov cm Kat t r}v atcr$ave<r$at TO rpiycovov K.T.A..
t 44C Freudenthal quotes Themistius, who paraphrases he remembers
and IT that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and that
mem Socrates is white, in the one case because he learned, in the other be
lt i cause he heard or saw it (Themist. ^. ii. p. 233, 11. 12 sqq.). The writer
act- of the paraphrase, he thinks, felt the same difficulty and accordingly in-
exy serted Kat TO^ ^COK/DCITT/V on ACUKOS as an example of sensuous memory.
re This, however, is not convincing ; it is not a case of knowing in
c the full sense of having scientific knowledge of a fact but of remem
bering it. Perception is of the particular, but there is no reason why
we should not perceive in a particular case and without proof that
the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ; cf. Anal. Post.
loc. at. infra : we can perceive that the moon is eclipsed without
knowing the reason. However, there is an additional reason for
rejecting ra?...tcrat (which is such a common Aristotelian example
that it might easily have crept into the text) ; it is the necessity of
translating cm before tpaOw and ^KOVO-CV by that, not by because.
The point to be brought out is that memory refers to the past ; we
are not here explaining why memory takes place. Cf. next clause
Set yap...Xtyiv, ort Trpdrepoi/. The disputed words are probably a
gloss that has crept in at the wrong place. Some such expression
inserted after e^ewp^o-ev would be quite in harmony with the thought
here.
449 b 27. farrf\T|i|us is here used in its widest sense as equivalent
to conceptual thought. It seems to include Oetopta : cf. 1. 18 above
and 450 b 25, 35 etc. The present objects of consciousness are
objects either of alo-Gijo-is or vvroA^t?, sense or thought, ala-O^ara or
In its more restricted application viroXrujsLs is the poorest of the
intellectual faculties. Cf. De An. in. ch. 3, 427 b 17, 25, 28, and
Anal. Post. i. ch. 33, 88 b 37, and cf. Rodier, n. p. 411.
COMMENT A R Y 247
r 449 b 29. Freudenthal (op. tit. p. 395) rejects KOL Trporepov
^^cause these words cannot refer to a statement which immediately
precedes, while here it is simply to the previous paragraph that
reference is made.
Themistius, the ancient translation, and LMSU also omit the
two words.
449 b 30. atV0T]<ris. As we have seen above, vTroA^i/as also
deals with the present ; but Aristotle is here talking generally and,
in fact, a sensuous element is always involved in knowledge of the
present, because the object of thought, as we shall see, is always
accompanied by imagery which, again, depends upon sense.
449 b 33. TOVTO). The heart (or according to Neuhauser, (T
Introduction, sec. vi., the (TV^VTOV -n-v^v^a contained in it) is the
organ of the Koivr) cuo-^o-ts : cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a u, cf. also
beneath 450 a n sqq. and notes.
At eTret begins a protasis, the apodosis corresponding to which is
not reached till 450 a 15 : wcrre rov VOTJTIKOV K.r.X. ^avracrca is
treated in De An. in. ch. 3. There it is denned as a (psychic)
change due to sensation (/aV^o-is VTTO rfjs aicr^Vecos TI^S KO.T evepyaav
429 a i). Again we find in ch. 8, 432 a 9 : ra yap <an-a-
to-^ /xara m, irXrjv ai/ev vXys, i.e., an image is identical
in character with a perception except that in the former case the
real concrete thing which contains v\r) is absent ; only the eTSos of
the sensible object is present. As Themistius (Sp. n. p. 237, 1. 18)
says, it is that which is left over (after perception), and remains even
though the sense object is not present, which is called ^avraaia.
Besides the fact of the absence of the real object in ^ai/rao-ta, the
only other difference between it and sensation seems to be its
greater liability to error (428 a 26 sqq.), and that it is weaker in
intensity : cf. RJiet. I. ch. n, 1370 a 28 : y Se ^ai/rao-ta eorti/ ala-Orja-k
TIS do-^e^s. It is like Hume s idea as opposed to his * impres
sion.
On the other hand it does not seem to be perfectly necessary
that the real object should cease to be present ; e.g. in 428 b 2 the
appearance of the sun as of a foot in diameter is given as a case of
(pavraaia, and again, from 428 b 28, it is clear that ^avrao-ia and
aLvOrjcns can synchronize. But the cfravTaa-ia is probably to be dis
tinguished as the Ktvrja-Ls which has penetrated to the heart the
apX 7 ? > f- De Insom. ch. 3, 461 b 12, 461 a 6 ; cf. also ch. 2, 459 a 23
sqq.: at least special emphasis is laid on this aspect. Sensations
248 DE MEMORIA
or stimuli travel from the end organ to the central one and persist
after the exciting object is removed, KCU ev /3a 0et KCU eTrnroA^s. { It
must be the former which is the </>ai/Tao-//,a proper, for we hear in
450 a ii sq. below that it belongs to the KOLVJ) aurtfo/o-ts and the
TrptoTov alo-OrjTrjpLov (cf. note to 450 a n).
This all goes to emphasize the sensuous character of imagination,
but however they are to be related to each other, we must not go so
far as Themistius, who practically makes c^avracrta a genus, which is
known as atcr^o-is if the object is present, as fJt-vujfirj if it is absent,
n and irakes the fyavTavia. in both cases the presentation of a TVTTOS
ht 4/r imprint left by the external object in the sensorium the heart.
- and 4ut, after all, TVTTOS is only a metaphor to Aristotle. The aio-^/xa
mer (sensation) is not strictly a TVTTOS; it is rather the Aoyos of the
It aurOvjTov, and the ^aVraor/xa present in memory is not per se a rvVos,
at but only in so far as it represents the original perception. Even
e? then it is only olov <i>ypa^?/Aa. Themistius himself sees that, accord-
r ing to his theory, only the very vaguest sense could be given to Vos
(238, 1. IO : \ptf] oe Koworcpov TOV TVTTOV TTI TYJS <ai/Ta<rias aKoueiv)
449 b 34. votv OVK &TTIV K.T.X. Cf. De An. in. ch. 7, 431 a 16 :
816 o^SeVore voet avev (^ai/raor/xaros >? ty^X 1 ! an( ^ 43 1 b 2 : TO, JAW ovv
t8^ TO vorjTLKov iv TGI? (ftavTOLCTfJiacrL voct, also ch. 8, 432 a 8 : orav T
Oewpy, avdyKfj a/xa (^ai/rao /xart ^ea>petv.
The reasons which Aristotle adduces for this contention seem to
be twofold, (i) firstly that brought forward in chapters vi De Anima
in., that nothing self-dependent or isolated (KexcopioyxeVov 432 a 4)
exists beyond the extended things given by sense perception ; know
ledge can occupy itself only with the etSr;, forms of or concepts
realised in sense objects. Hence, when the actual object is not
present, thought is possible only if the <<xvTao-//,a originated by per
ception is present to the mind. Secondly (2) there is the reason
obscurely implied in ch. 7, which culminates in the statement in
431 b 10 that truth and falsehood, the distinctions applicable to
theoretical consciousness (cf. 431 a 14: ry SiavoyTiK-fj iftvxfi) are
generically the same as good and evil, the objects of pursuit and
avoidance in the practical life (cf. also Eth. Nic. vi. ch. 2, 1139 a 26);
cf. Rodier, n. p. 515; affirmation and negation are at bottom the
same as pursuit and avoidance (the germ of Pragmatism). Now, it
is by means of sense that animals are able to distinguish between
the pleasant and the unpleasant (cf. 431 a 10). Hence the pursuit
of truth, which is distinguished from the quest of the good merely by
. COMMENTARY 249
. ,4g an absolute as opposed to a relative end (431 b 12), will
tituent in , & . . .,>,,
, sloy the same sensuous images as the latter. Ihis doctrine
to be implied in Aristotle s statements, and we must remember
that it in no way conflicts with what he elsewhere teaches that
there are entities capable of existing in isolation from the things of
sense. There are rd ajuVr/ra TOV ovpavov e?S?7 the intelligible natures
of the heavenly bodies (cf. Alexander ap. Simp., De An. 284,
23; Rodier, 11. p. 524) which seem to be referred to by TO, ^ eV
Xpwu oV TO. beneath (450 a 9-10). Again vovs Reason is said to be
X<opto-To s, and we need not understand this of the human reason, but
as applying to the mind of God, who is held to exist beyond the
confines of the world and to stand to it in the relation of TO
KLVOVV the ultimate source of change in it. His activity is
and, if he exists in isolation from things sensible, one would expect
that the contents of his thought would be likewise transcendent,
and would not exist merely as realised or realisable in the world of
change and decay. (Whether, if that is so, the object of the divine
consciousness is a differentiated scheme of distinct intelligible entities
existing apart from the material world, or whether the activity of
God, the voT^o-ts vo^Vews, is merely the affirmation of a blank
identity the eternal assertion of I am I it would be difficult
to decide.)
But such statements constitute no assertion of the real separa
bility of certain concepts, the Platonic doctrine of transcendent 1877,
which is so consistently attacked by Aristotle. Though he con
tinually talks of Ke^wptcr/xeVa or a/aV^ra KCU ^topiara as being the
objects of metaphysical science (De An. i. ch. i, 403 b 15 ; Metaph.
vi. ch. i, 1026 a 8 sqq.), (/xxi/rcumx may be necessary for the realisa
tion of such science in the mind of man. (In the passage in De An,
in. ch. 8, where Aristotle says, as it appears no objects but sensible
magnitudes exist, we need find no denial of the objective existence
of x^picrra, but merely his reiterated doctrine, that for human reason,
which is not airaO^, there are no objects of thought not realised in a
sensuous material.)
450 a 9. &v TOV o-vvexovs. Quantity, TO Troow, which is either
discrete (as in number) or continuous (as in space or time) is here
alluded to in the latter form, in which indeed it has been illustrated
just above. It is the continuity which forms the perceptual element
in the concepts of mathematical objects. We read in De An. in.
ch. 8, 432 a 5 that concepts, including those belonging to mathe-
250 DE MEM OKI A
*sist
matics, exist in the perceptual forms of things (ev rots etSco-
cuo-flr/Tois TO, vorjTa CO-TI) which, therefore, when we think, forn .
total object of consciousness from which the mind disengages triv.
higher concept or vorj^a. vovs is eT8os etSwv, whereas perception (as
actualised) is the etSo? alaO-rjTwv. The perceptual setting, as opposed
to the higher concept, will form the vXrj vorjT-tj of which Aristotle tells
in Metaph. vn. ch. n, 1037 a 4 and ch. 10, 1036 a 9 sqq. : vA.^ 8
TI /ULCV al(rOrjTij ecrrtv TJ 8e VOT^TT^, alcrOrfTr] /xei/ olov ^aXKOS /cat gvXov KGLL
oo~?y KivrjTr) V\T], vorjTy 8e 77 iv rots alorBrjTols VTrapxovcra. p.r] 77 alcr6r]Ta,
otoj TO, /Aa#77//,cmKa. (Cf. the discussion of ZV ^;z. in. ch. 4, 429 b
3t 10-22 in Rodier, n. p. 442 sqq. The vXrj ala-OrjTrj is the actual
a(s< matter of the physical substance apprehended. It is not this which
c gets into the soul when we perceive, but the eTSos of the thing ; cf.
- De An, in. ch. 8, 43 ib 29: ov yap 6 XiOos Iv rfj i/ ^xfl dXXa ro
etSo?.) But this perceptual form itself supplies a matter for the
higher concept, e.g. in mathematics. The pure mathematical concept
is not TO vOv or TO KotXoi/, the straight line or the curved, but TO
tvOti. cu/cu and KOiXoTys straightness or curvature (cf. loc. cit. 429 b 18
and ch. 7, 431 b 12, also Metaph. vi. ch. i, 1025 b 30 sqq., x. ch. 8,
1058 a 23, etc.). But these concepts cannot exist apart, though they
are for mathematical purposes assumed to exist apart (TO. e d<jtau/o-
o-eoos)^ TO, fjLaO^/j.arLKa ov K\(apt.crfJLV(i ok Ke^copio-jaeva voet. The
general expression for this matter, matiere logique/ without which
these concepts cannot exist, is TO o-vj/e^es (cf. 429 b 19 : /XCTO,
yap, and Philop. De An. 531, 15, v\v] yap ICTTLV, to?
\p6vov. Aristotle here mentions a different class of ob
jects from the mathematical entities referred to in the last clause.
He seems in particular to mean the heavenly bodies (cf. note to
449 b 34), which he continually refers to as diSia and a<f>8apTa (cf.
Phys. iv. ch. 12, 221 b 3), and as not being in time. They differ
from other bodies in not having a Z\-r) which admits of growth and
decay, but one which admits of motion only. Cf. Metaph. vin. ch.
4, 1044 b 7.
One may say with Freudenthal (pp. cit. p. 396) and Hammond that
Aristotle here refers also to eternal laws ; they must be those of
existence generally, and not merely the laws governing the motions
of the heavenly bodies, as is implied by Hammond, for we hear in
Phys. IV. ch. 12, 222 a 5: TO dcn^u/xtTpov tlva.L r^v 8ia/xeTpov act lanv.
He does not, however, talk of laws or principles as existing apart
COMMENTARY 251
,he passage ^ O bjects which obey them. They at least are not on the
nt in the pro^ o f objectivity as the objects.
a Xpovov, 1. i T ^ppose him to do so would be to impute to him the
co-TiV after /theory of eftfy xwpiora. 1 ne concepts involved in thinking
of Thenns^hings of sense are not ova-Lai, e.g. neither the point (ori-iy/x^,
^ f f bf. Metaph. vm. ch. 5) nor the infinite (TO aTretpov, cf. Phys. in. ch. 5,
204 a 23, and Metaph. xi. ch. 10, 1066 b i3sqq.) are ouVt cu. Again,
TO ayaOov and TO /caA.6V are not ei&y x^P 10 ". Though in the case of
some concepts their essence and their existence is identical (De An.
in. ch. 4, 429 b 12, and Rodier, ad loc. pp. 442 sqq.) this does not
mean that these are to be regarded as substances (e.g. that their
t tl essence involves their existence, as according to Spinoza s definition of
e nt substance), but that their existence is a purely conceptual one. The
*-6 cra aVeu v\rj$ mentioned in De An. in. ch. 6, 430 b 30, which are
the ultimate simple constituents of intellect or objects of vovs (dSiat-
OSt S/0Ta, TO, avev avjJi,Tr\OKfj<s, TrpwTa voij^ara, De An. III. ch. 8, 432 a 12)
reu d and which are to be identified in part with the categories (cf. Rodier,
^ n g ii. p. 474, and Metaph. vin. ch. 6, 1045 a 33 SC 1 C 3-) partly with vague
therconceptions like the Good, Being, and the One, or again with TO
3 ^j.aTmpoi/, 0-Tiyp.iji /xoi/a?, etc., are not to be regarded as existing apart
is ffrom sensible things. If Aristotle says that they have neither v\r)
cts (vo-irjT-r) nor v\y ala-0rjr->j (Metaph., loc. cit.}, that simply means that they
jniare ultimate and simple and are not formed by a complex of con-
^ T/>ituents, even mental constituents. These concepts must in fact be
:er in " constituents out of which the complex ones are formed. In that
*h thoU;C they themselves must be avev vX.r)s but they are not \wpLa-ra.
^50 a ifjvaiai in the sense in which the individual is ovo-ta.
d eitherVhe connection with the thought here and the main contention
3). Brr.hought cannot function apart from ^avraa-ia ^is not quite
50 a i$, Why should the impossibility of a thing being thought apart
re cjxxvraflime require the presence of a <aWao7Aa when it is appre-
m . Thev. ? Doubtless it is because of the continuous nature of time
450 a 20. :rues to it owing to its connection with change. Cf. Phys.
chlMSt l i, 219 a 12 : Sta yo-p TO TO yueye$os elvat o~i;^^5 Kat rj
St of the ex^Sj ^ l , 8e T-^I/ KLvrjcriv o ^povos- 00-7; yap
er aniinayi/os del SOKCI yeyoi/eVai. Time is the measure or number
r to thetirge ; cf. ch. 12, 220 b 8 sqq. (though not number in the
I But Sh sense, for that implies discreteness) : and change is the great
1 cuaracteristic of the sensible world. No doubt it is because the
1
j heavenly bodies are /xeye^ and participate in /aVryo-i?, though merely
2 5 2
DE MEMORIA
Kara TOTTO^, that they must be represented as l^
characteristic of the sensible world, and that they too can /
hended only by means of ^avracrio (cf. note to 449 b 34). \
450 a ii. <S. By this, as we have seen, Aristotle
differently to the faculty or the organ and there is no gro
FreudenthaPs refusal to think that the organ is here referred to.
is certainly here not the simple equivalent of TO TTOOW above ;
til!
I
it is, rather, a particular example of quantity. Aristotle in this
clause merely particularises what he had said before more uni
versally of TToo-oV in general, and at the same time the mention of
KtVT/o-ts and xpovos carries us beyond the particular example of spatial
quantity which was indicated by the triangle, /xe yetfos, /aV^o-t?, andf/jl
Xpovos, are all united (cf. previous note) as species of TO awex^t and j^Jf
it is pointed out that, in consequence, it must be the same functior
(and hence faculty and organ) which apprehends them all. If w
keep the following sentences in the order given in the text, th
argument will then be, " Magnitude, motion and time are perceivec
by the same faculty. But they (being continna, cf. previous note
form the sensuous and hence imageable element in consciousness
Now imagery belongs to the sensus communis. Hence the appni
hension of these determinations of quantity belongs to the organ o
the common sense the primary sensorium. But memory, even tha
which deals with concepts, implies imagery. Hence it is a functior
of the primary organ of sensation directly, though indirectly it co,,.
cerns the faculty of thought." / V
The whole argument as it stands is not well arranged and
Freudenthal proposes to remodel it, but it is not much more con
than many others in the Parva Naturalia and the want of ord
be explained. There are two conclusions to prove, (i) the
premiss of the final conclusion that thought must employ i
enunciated first in 449 b 34 sq. ; (2) that, since that is so, e
memory which deals with the objects of thought must be ^
of the organ to which imagery is due. Involved in all thl
also the briefer argument that memory in general, employing^
must be attributed to the primary organ of sensation.
It is the involution of these three difficult discussioi/
causes the apparent want of coherence. There is more<\
premiss which is merely implicit and never formulated tha
identifies the imageable element TO ^avracrrov with TO <
Aristotle simply assumes their identity as obvious, and any arrange-
COMMENTARY 253
lent of the passage would have to fall back upon this principle as a
jnstituent in the proof. Freudenthal proposes (pp. tit. p. 397) to
pass from XP VOV > ! 1 1 to oWe, 1. 1 2, and insert the clause KCU TO <f>dvT.
...7ra0os eo-TiV after <ai/Tao7zo.Tos eoTiv, 1. 14. For this he has the
jupport of Themistius. Accordingly he gives the following as the
sketch of the argument " Every memory is bound up with a
perception of time, every concept accompanied by a ^>ai/rao-/xa. To
perceive time is identical with the perception of magnitude and
motion, and is provided for by the Trponw awrfliyriicov, Memory also
uses concepts, but not apart from imagery, and this belongs to the
Trpwrov alvOrjTLKov. Hence, memory belongs to it also."
But this does not do justice to the real complexity of the
argument or bring out the main point that even conceptual memory
is a function of the primary sensorium. To prove that memory
which does not specially deal with voryra is a sense function would
ot cost so much argument.
Freudenthal seems to have been led astray by his misunder
standing of the reference to xpovos in 11. 9 and u. He thinks
that there Aristotle refers to memory as a sense of time, as in
449 b 31. But there is no particular reference to this here. Aris
totle is forced to talk of xp /J/ s because he wishes to illustrate the
objects of thought which cannot be apprehended without an image in
the mind, not only by the concepts of mathematics, TO, e d^aipeVews,
e.g. TO rpiywov, the scientific interest in which does not affect the
matter in which they are realised, but by the eternal substances,
which, though appearing in time, are not conditioned by it.
450 a 1 5. The texts all have VOOV/ACVOV, which must be a mistake in
stead either of VO^TLKOV or of Siavoov/xeVou (By water, J. of PhiloL, xxvm.
p. 243). Biehl relying on the vet. tr. " intellectivi " has VO-TJTLKOV.
450 a 16. Kal ere pois. Cf. De An. in. ch. 3, 428 a 10, n,
where <f>avTa<rCa is attributed to the ant and the bee but not to the
I worm. Themistius brings in the dove (Trepiorepa) also.
450 320. The reading of all MSS. is Ovrjrwv, but Rassow, Prog.
\d. Joachimsth. Gym. 1858, suggests 0-tipltov, which Biehl accepts.
\Most of the commentators certainly take BVTJT&V as referring to the
(lower animals. Themistius writes oAoycoi/. If Aristotle meant to
irefer to them, certainly OypLw is the more suitable term.
But Simon (p. 287), who also leans to the view that by Ovrjrwv
" bruta " are meant, suggests as an alternative an interpretation which
jgives its proper sense to Ovrjrwv. If Memory belonged to the faculty
254 DE MEM OKI A
of pure thought it would not belong to many animals (for few possess
reason), and perhaps to none that have a perishable body (which
requires their thinking to be mediated by imagination). Relying on
the famous passage at the end of De An. in. ch. 5, where the
impassivity of the eternal vo9? is set forth, and it is declared that we
have no memory of a previous state of existence, because our
thought depends upon the perishable reason which alone can ex
perience impressions, he contends that, in Aristotle s opinion,
memory does not belong to the superior and divine reason but only
to the human, being exercised by the latter only through the instru
mentality of <fra.VTa.a-ia.
Whatever be the exact interpretation of the passage in the
De Anima referred to, it is clear that, according to the Aristotelian
teaching, vorg, in the sense of a faculty of pure thought, cannot
exercise memory. Its function is the dStcu/oertDi/ vo^o-is (De An. in.
ch. 6, 430 a 26) which must be something totally different from the
apprehension of time in which there is no part which is indivisible.
Again, in its characteristic sense, it is not a faculty of synthesis
(ibidem] such as human thought and memory must be. (When we
remember we must affirm that the image is like the real object,
i.e. there must be synthesis : cf. below.)
Simon, however, takes the next clause (eVet ouSe vvv Traon, K.T.\.)
to refer to the lower animals which have not even got (fravravia (cf.
De An. n. ch. 3, 415 a 10 : aAAa rot? ^\v ovSe ^avratrta); but, if that
is so, it is difficult to see what it has to do with the previous state
ment. Even though we read flr/piW or interpret Ovyruv as 6fypiW, we
should have to render" If memory were an affair of the intellect
not many, perhaps none, of the lower animals would possess it, and,
as a fact, as things are (memory being not an affair of the intellect),
not all the lower animals do possess it, seeing that they do not all
have the sense of time." But CTTCI can hardly carry this meaning,
and, even if it did, the latter clause adds nothing to the argument
That some animals, being without ^aj/rao-i a, do not remember, does
not in the least show why, if memory were a matter of pure thought,
none would remember.
Yet it must be in some such way that Rassow and Biehl, reading
OrjpiMv, take the sentence; and Simon, taking the last clause as ht
does, rather inclines to give up his first interpretation and follow the
other commentators.
Hammond (p. 198) translating Biehl renders " perhaps in nonq
COMMENTARY 255
of the brutes, seeing that they do not, as a matter of fact possess it,
because they all lack the sense of time." This is an impossible
rendering of ouSe vvv TTOLO-L and Sta TO /x^ 7rai/ra...^etv, and, besides,
contradicts 11. 16-17 immediately above, where memory is said to
be found in certain other animals Sto /cat erepois TIO-IV v-rrdp^cL ran/
Rassow, defending his emendation, maintains that it could not
be said that if memory depended on thought it would be absent in
m^n, one of the Ovyrd. But that is not so : memory exists in man
only because he possesses the faculty of ^ai/racrta ; if he were a being
whose sole activity was pure thought he would not remember. It
should be clear that, if memory depends solely upon the vovs -n-aOrj-
TI/COS (which involves ^avraa-La and cuo-^o-ts), a being whose reason
is not similarly to be described as passive will not remember.
Hence the solution of the difficulty is to take eTrei ovSe vvv TroVi,
/c.T.X. as referring to that being or those things whose sole activity is
the exercise of vovs #ewpta, i.e. #eos God, or perhaps to the
heavenly bodies. Hence, after TTOLO-L we are not to understand rots
OvrjTols bllt TOIS u>Ol9.
It is not at all unprecedented for ov to refer to living beings
generally, nor is it impossible for it in this wide acceptation to
include 0eo s and the heavenly bodies. Cf. De An. n. ch. 3,
41 4 b 15 sqq. : rcov oKoi/...ei/iots 8e...V7rap^et /cat TO Kara TOTTOV KLvrj-
oV, eTepots Se /cat TO otavo^Ti/cov TC /cat vous, otov dv^pajTroi? /cat ei TOI-
ITC/OOJ/ CO-TW rj Tt/xtooTepov. By the latter Simplicius (De An.
106, 27) tells us the stars are meant; cf. also De Caelo, n. 12, 292 a,
20 sqq. and ch. 8, 290 a 32. The stars are in the last passage called
o>a. Cf. De An. i. ch. i, 402 b 7, where it is implied that 0eo s
is a species or particular example of <3oi>. Cf. also Metaph. xn.
*" ch. 7> IO72b 28: ffta/Ji^v Se TOV 6tov etvat ^wov dtoiov apto"To^, also
xiv. ch. i, 1088 a 10. Since the activity of God is vo r/o-ts (1072 b 18),
a and since, being dt Stos and a^^apTo?, he is not in time, it would be a
"safe deduction that he has not the xp vov o-icrBrja-Lv which is indis-
or pensable to memory.
Hence, the sense of the passage is clear " Memory is not a
por
function of pure thought for, if it were, none of the living creatures
"that are mortal, i.e. have perishable bodies and think by means of
the sensuous images which are bound up with bodily changes would
33 have memory. (Cf. De An. i. ch. i, 403 a 13 sqq. The psychical
changes we experience are Aoyot ZvvXoi 403 a 25.) In fact certain
256 DE MEM OKI A
living beings, which are freed from the conditions of human life, do
not possess it."
450 a 22-23. Rassow (pp. tit.} proposes to read $ t/xafle irparc-
poi>, ala-OdveraL and make cuo-0avTcu govern on e!8e /c.r.X. The chief
ground for the change is that 7rpoo-cuo-0ai/eTcu seems to be a a-n-a^
Xcyo /xcvoi/. But Biehl lets it stand, reading tvepyfj rfj /u-v^fl as
equivalent to /^/Aoj/euti and as governing cm eT8e.
450 a 27. So-a jif| &vv <|>avTa<ras. The question is whether there
are any concepts which can be divorced from all imagery. Cf.
previous notes.
450 a 32. Freudenthal (pp. tit. p. 401) proposes either to omit TO
7ra0os or to read it after roiovrov, 1. 30. Certainly the words seem
out of place and Rassow, who proposes either to delete TO after
TOLOVTOV or to read TI, interprets the sentence following an order
which places TO W^os, ou...eu/at after vo^o-at 1. 30.
450 a 34. Aristotle uses the metaphor of the seal-ring in
another connection in the De Anima, in. ch. 12, 435 a 2. The
object as it were stamps an impression on the air which as it were
transmits it onwards until it meets the sensory organ. Again in n.
ch. 12, 424 a 19 the impression on the organ produced by the sense
object is compared to the impression left by a seal-ring on a surface.
But cf. above note to 449 b 33.
450 b i. irdfios Themistius renders by votrov. Cf. De An. in.
ch. 3, 429 a 7.
450 b 2. 81* rjXiKiav. This, in consonance with the common use
of rjXiKia (cf. Bonitz, Ind.\ seems to refer both to the aged and the
young. In both the mind seems to be too " fluid " to retain im
pressions, cf. pe ovo-i, 1. 7 beneath.
450 b 4. TO \J/T|Xor0<u. This may be another simile for the minds
of the aged, and Aristotle may have in view the crumbling condition],
of an old stone surface. But in the light of its conjunction with
orK\rjp6rr]Ta 1. 5, perhaps it refers to the inner walls of a building,
that had originally a prepared surface in which a design was cut, but s
which gets worn off and leaves nothing but the hard layer beneath. t
This is suggested by a perusal of the famous passage in the Theaetetus
(191 c sqq. especially 194 c sqq.) from which Aristotle seems to hav^g
drawn almost all the illustrations here employed. There the heart is^
compared to a waxen tablet (/cr/pn/oi/ iKpaytlov) on which impres- ie
sions are stamped. The surface must be neither too soft nor
too hard, for, in the former case, the mind, though easily receiving^
COMMENT A RY 257
an impression, soon loses it (wv /xev vypoV, ev/aafleis /xeV, eT
8e yiypoi/rai), while, with the hard surface, the opposite is the case.
For a mind of good capacity, the waxen surface must be not only of
the proper consistency but deep (/3a9v<s re /ecu, vroAvs KCU Aetos /cat
/xeTpiojs ajpyaoyxeVos). People with such an organ are both ev/u,a0er<;
and fjLvt]jjiov < s.
Now an cV/xayeiov or prepared surface need not be composed of
wax ; it may consist of gypsum (cf. L. and S.), and probably the
decorated parts of Greek houses and buildings (where marble was
not employed) may have had a layer of plaster imposed on the
stone, with bas-reliefs cut thereon.
450 b 6-7. Cf. also ch. 2, 453 b 5.
450 b 1 8. Freudenthal proposes to read rj TOVTOV aicrOrja-^
instead of TOVTOV CIVTOV >J aio-^o-ts with Themistius (Sp. n. p. 239,
1. 25). The change is not important.
450 b 27. Biehl brackets Oewprj^a, while Freudenthal (pp. cit.
p. 401) deletes both it and <^avTao-/xa, on the ground that if we read
avTo Tt /ca# avTO elmi ^eoo p^/xa the next line r) fj.ev ovv KOL@ eavTO,
0ecop>7/xa rj <j!>avTao-/u.a ecrTti/ forms a tautology and, if we read aAAov
<avTaoyxa, is contradictory.
Biehl has the support of L S U, Themistius and the ancient
translation, in omitting 0c<op>7/aa. If we read ^wpr;/xa it will be
better to follow E Y and read KCU <XVTO Ka6 } eavro eti/ai ^ewp^/xa KCU
aXAov <^avTao-/xa "is both an object of consciousness per se and the
image of something else." Then the next sentence goes on to
explain and correct this statement. " Per se it is an object of con
sciousness or an image ; so far as it is the appearance of something
else it is a copy and souvenir."
The contradiction, or rather the duality, in the use of ^dvraa-^a.
here, which causes Freudenthal to expunge it from the former clause,
is really one which goes right down into the heart of the concept of
^caTcuna and t/xxtVeo-flai as used by Aristotle. A </>aj/Tao-/za is at once
a sensuous image posited like a simple sensation or a fundamental
concept before the mind, and at the same time it claims to represent
something objective. In its first aspect, as a simple element in the
content of consciousness, it has nothing to do with either truth or
falsity ; in its second capacity it falls within the domain of synthesis,
in which truth and error reside. (Cf. note on <ai/Tcuria above 449 b
33.) Here Aristotle uses it first in the second of the two above
senses, but immediately reminds us that properly and per se the
R. 17
258 DE MEM OKI A
<j>dvTa<Tfjia has no reference to the object, that, so far as it has this, it
is considered in a new light as an CIKWI/.
Hence, if Aristotle is in the second sentence really guarding his
former statement, it would not be out of place to repeat that part of
the former statement with which part of the second is identical.
Hence, we may retain tfewp^a ; it is no doubt used to signify the
direct, immediate object of consciousness, something that is present
as if to the senses (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 328). It would include a
present perception and so cover the case, never separately treated by
Aristotle, of the recognition that an object in present perception has
been seen before.
On the other hand vov^w. is substituted in 451 a 2, which rather
makes it appear as though Oeu>pr)(j.a meant a concept specially. But
probably this change is not significant.
450 b 29. Freudenthal proposes to omit KO.I after ei/cwi/, tr.
"a memorial after the fashion of a copy." /xv^/xoVev/xa is a d-rag
Aeyd/xefoi/ in Aristotle.
45 b 33- H opa,Ko>s. It is not hereby implied that we can re
member without a prior sensuous experience. That would contradict
what has been already said (cf. 449 b 24 sqq. above). ^ ewpaKws
must mean without having then had present to vision the veritable
Coriscus.
450 b 34. vrav0a K.T.X. All commentators from Michael Ephesius
to Freudenthal notice that this paragraph is mere repetition. If
more condensed and obscure it is not thereby less Aristotelian.
451 a 13-14. Cf. chapter 2, 451 b 15 and 32, e0.
CHAPTER II.
451 a 21. cv rots irtxtpTi|xaTiKois Xd-yois. Themistius (Sp. n.
p. 241, 1. 7) says 7TL^Lpr]iJiaTLKOi<; KOL TrpofiXrjiJLaTiKOis, and, if we trust
Diogenes Laertius, R. V. 23-24, there was more than one work
falling under the first title, viz. v7rofjivTfjfj.ara eTrixeip^/xaTiKa y and
cirt;(ctpi?ju.arQ>y a /? . Hence it is probably to them that we are
here referred. Michael Ephesius thinks rather that the Problems
are indicated, but in the extant Problems no such discussion is
found.
An cTrixeiprj/Ao, is defined in Topics, vn. ch. n, 158 a 16 as
<nAAoyioyx,6s otaAeKTiKos, and ITTL^LPCLV very often means to discuss
controversially (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 282 b 59). Now Aristotle fre
quently, even in the same book, prefaces his proper scientific treat
ment of a subject with a dialectical account. This seems to be
necessary in his view in order to attain a preliminary clearing up
of notions, and hence we may conjecture that he wrote several
popular tentative tractates (the literal sense of circ^ctpcd), = to attempt,
seems to linger about cirix*W r H JLa ) on various matters, and that
these, owing to their tentative character, have been dropped out
of the canon. Certainly we cannot here translate with Hammond
treatise On Argumentation? A reference to recollection could
occur only as an illustration in a logical work, and Aoyoi eTrixeip^a-
riKot could not be discussions on dialectical argumentation but
discussions of a dialectical nature.
451 a 23 sqq. We may set aside Simon s theory that by X^tg is
here meant not Ar^ig /U^/M?? but the acquirement of fresh knowledge.
There is no evidence that that is an Aristotelian usage, nor will the
Greek bear the interpretation.
At the same time it is difficult to see what relation this statement
bears to the following one. Having asserted that recollection is
neither the reacquirement nor the first acquirement of memory,
he goes on to point out that in /xa^o-is the first acquirement of
172
260 DE MEMORIA
knowledge, there is no such thing as recovery or acquisition of
memory.
The doctrine that recollection is to be thus described is, as
Freudenthal, Rheinisches Museum, p. 404, points out, not a Platonic
one; but, of course, the teaching that /ud^o-is is dva/ui/^o-ts is the famous
tenet set forth in the Meno and other dialogues; cf. esp. Meno, 850:
TO Se dva/\a/x/3di/iv avroi/ eV aura) eVtcm////^ ou/c dvd/xvrycris ; Hdvv
ye. Phaedo, 72 E sqq. Hence the tortuous argument here seems
to be . . . When you recollect, you do not reacquire or acquire
memory. If you take di/a/xv^o-ts with the Platonists as equivalent
to fj-dOyo-LS it is certainly not SO (orav yap 1. 23...eyytVeTai 1. 27),
nor when taken in the ordinary sense, as the remembering again of
something forgotten, is it strictly denned either as the acquisition or
reacquisition of a memory (IVi 8 ore K.T.\. 1. 27 sq.).
Freudenthal (loc. rit. p. 403) points out that Plato really anticipated
the Aristotelian distinction between dvdpvrja-Ls and nvTJiuq (cf. Phaedo,
770 sqq.). Recollection is a knowing again of what has been
forgotten. It is to be reminded of something by oneself or by another ;
cf. Phaedo, 73 B, ava/Anyafl^ai = commonefieri : ^e/Ai/iyrat = meminit.
Recollection implies ^rrjcrfs Meno, 81 D. But the scientific dis
crimination of the two functions belongs to Aristotle.
(Plato also noticed the three ways in which ideas may be
associated; cf. 451 b 22 sq. infra, contiguity, similarity, and contrast.
Cf. Phaedo, 73 (i) A lyre or garment belonging to the beloved one
puts the lover in mind of him and from seeing Simmias you may
remember Cebes. (2) From seeing the picture of Simmias you may
remember him. (3) Recollection may be derived from things unlike
as well as from similar things.)
451 a 25. If we translate e dpx^ as at the beginning, then
this argument becomes practically identical with the next, and
Freudenthal will be right in saying that we have here the same
thought as is repeated in 2 8 K.r.A. 11. 27 sqq.
But perhaps the sense is rather... when we learn, we neither have
a memory reinstated in us, nor derive it (as a memory) from some
origin, i.e. some other experience. Once the present experience
is produced you may remember it ; qua present experience it is
not remembered. To start memory you need present experience,
and hence you cannot derive the present experience from the
memory.
Aristotle is thus dealing here not with the temporal but the
COMMENT A RY 261
logical priority of present experience. It is in the next paragraph
that he goes on to show that memory requires, in addition to
the originating experience, a period of time to have elapsed before
it can he called memory. In addition, this is now brought in when
he is dealing with dva/xvrjcris in the customary sense, not as identical
with pdOria-is, and hence the point of view is different.
But without adopting this hypothesis we may detect a note of
individuality in the present passage. Perhaps in oVav Se K.T.\.
(11. 25-27) the emphasis is on the necessity of there being a eis -a
disposition to remember as well as an experience (?ra^os) which is to
be remembered, while in the next paragraph the lapse of time neces
sary becomes more prominent.
451 a 26. ^is. As I take it, this means the permanent dis
position which itself is memory ; it is not to be identified with rrjv
eii/ in 1. 30 beneath, which is a disposition produced by learning
regarded as a source of memory. It is, however, somewhat misleading
to think of that as being a source of memory in the same way as
a -n-dOos is. Qua fis nothing is an activity (evepycio.) of consciousness
and all memory must start from a present activity.
4513 28. TO Trpwrov cyyc-yove, Biehl and Bekker ; TO Trpwrov
eyyeyoVci ei/, L S U.
Freudenthal proposes to insert TI after fyyeyove in order to provide
it with a subject, TO TT/HOTOV being taken adverbially.
TW dT6><t> teal eo-xotTO). All commentators take this as referring
to time, and that would be the most likely meaning of the Greek
if we read eV TW a rofiu> with L S U. But the dative which eyyiyi/eo-flai
governs should rather indicate the real v7roKi/xei/ov in which the
7ra0os originates, not the time. Hence perhaps we should interpret
TO) aTo/xw K.T.A.. as referring to the alcrOrjT^pLov which is the primary
seat of sensation and which, we learn in De Sensu, 7, is O.VTO KCU eV
api0/A(3 and is also elsewhere called TO l^^arov aio-O-rjTtjpiov, De An. in.
ch. 2, 426 b 16 and 7, 431 a 19. This is also Neuhauser s inter
pretation: cf. Introduction, sec. vi.
The argument then is, that the mere realisation of the impression
in the primary organ of sensation the heart or its av^vrov Tn/cv/xa
is not memory. There must be lapse of time before it can function
as an et/cwi/ of the absent object.
If we take aTo/xw /<at eVxara> as referring to time, it is difficult
to interpret eVxaTu). We should have to translate in the same
individual and proximate moment of time. But the proximate is
262 DE MEMORIA
not the same moment, unless in the improper sense in which the
same thing may be said to be proximate to itself.
Michael Ephesius thinks that the reference here is to the
moment after complete perception and that this is here distinguished
from the moment of perception mentioned in the last sentence.
Freudenthal finds this too * spitzfindig and accordingly chooses
to regard this passage as another version of the former one (cf. note
to 1. 25 above).
451 a 31. Kara crufippT]Kbs. Cf. ch. I, 450 a 15-16.
451 a 32. irplv xpovurOfjvai. Cf. ch. I, 449 b 28.
451 b 2. Unless we accent IOTI with Freudenthal the sentence
will not construe.
The interpretation of e apx 1 ? 5 here confirms our rendering of the
same phrase in 451 a 25. The o.p\^ is the starting point in time
rather than the original experience from which the continued con
sciousness known as memory is derived.
451 b 3. oXX* orav K.T.X. Here at last is the distinction between
ava/xi/^o-i? (in the proper and customary, as distinct from the Platonic
sense) and /xv^/xr;.
Recollection is the reproduction of a previous experience (apart,
of course, from renewed sense perception or repetition of the ex
perience, whatever its nature, afresh), which has passed out of the
mind, and a revival aVaveuxns (Themistius) qua experience,
not qua memory. The memory, holding the present experience
as the eiKwV of the past, can be produced either by the continued
presence in consciousness of the previous experience or by its
reinstatement through recollection. It is a consequence (eru/A/ftuVei 1. 6)
that, when we reinstate an experience identical in character with the
previous one, we should remember, i.e. that it is an ewcwv of the
previous one. But it is the act of reinstatement which is accurately
to be described as aVa/xi/^o-is, not the referring of the reinstated
experience to the past.
451 b 6-7. Michael (132 a), Simon (p. 301) and Gesner,
apparently (cf. Freud. Rh. Mus.\ read r<3 Sc /xi/^/xoveueti/ <rv/x/?cuV
KCU fjLvyj/jirjv di<o\ovOciv. This Freudenthal (p. 407) approves of,
objecting to the absolute use of tnyx/fcuW in the other reading
and trying to make out that we should, if we kept it, have to
distinguish as different from each other, (i) avofinycri?, (2) /UP^/AOVCVCU
and (3) fJLi tjfjiTj. That is surely captious and, on the reading which
he approves, we should have (with Gesner) to interpret /xv^/xovevctv as
COMMENTARY 263
; but Freudenthal admits (p. 403) that, where
Aristotle is distinguishing the two functions, he never employs a
term, which refers to remembering merely, to designate the act
of recollection, however much he may depart from this rule on other
occasions.
Themistius says CTrerat Se ry ai a/xv77<rei e dvdyK7j<; 77 /xv^/xry,
understanding by eVerctt apparently (and if there is any sense in his
explanation) mere logical implication. He explains recollection
implies memory because, to recollect, you must remember something
connected with the thing which you are trying to recollect... the
starting point in the 17x170-15 which is recollection (cf. infra 26 sqq.).
Not only, however, is this a strange interpretation of cru/x/fou/av and
aKoXovOelv, but, if recollection may start euro TOV vvv (1. 22 infra)
it is not necessary for its starting point to be an object of memory.
451 b 7. raOra refers vaguely and inclusively to aVa/xi/xv^ crKeo-tfat
and fjLwjfjLovevtiv. The sense is... you do not get recollection and
memory every time an experience which has lapsed from the mind
is repeated. It may be repeated without your remembering you had
it before. In such cases the repetition of the experience is not
recollection. This is pretty nearly Simon s interpretation. St Hilaire,
evidently basing upon Themistius s interpretation of the preceding
sentence, thinks that here Aristotle is making explicit his distinction
between the revived and the non-revived elements in consciousness
in the act of recollection. (St Hilaire, p. 123) : Ce ne sont pas du
reste des choses anterieures qui se reproduisent completement de
nouveau dans 1 esprit ; mais il y a alors une partie des choses qui
se reproduit et une partie qui ne se reproduit pas; car la meme
personne pourrait tres bien deux fois de couvrir et apprendre la
meme chose. But this interpretation can only be come at by
reading eyyiWrai 1. 8 (impossible Greek) or by supplying it after
eyye n^xai ; further TO.VTO. would have to refer to eVicT-r^ta/i etc., 1. 4,
which is rather too far back and would suggest the use of eVelm ;
thirdly the thought is still more elliptical and loosely arranged than
on the interpretation I give. The previous experience is not
wholly reinstated for, if it were, it would be a case of /xa^o-is
not am/xv^o-i?. This renders a AA rxii>...rxi 8 equivalent to partly
...partly and makes us refer Sis yap paOtiv not to the clause
immediately before it but to the previous one.
Hammond (p. 204) gives a totally new rendering, Neither do
the phenomena of recollection, if their occurrence is the repetition
264 DE MEMORIA
of a previous recollection (stc), follow absolutely the same order, but
sometimes they occur in one way, sometimes in another. It is
possible for the same individual to learn and discover the same thing
twice. Recollection then must differ from learning and discovery,
and there is need of greater initial latitude (sic) here than is the case
with learning. He elucidates this in a note, In the case of learning
and discovery there is a definite and exact process by which a given
result may be twice arrived at. (What Aristotelian doctrine is
this?) ...In the case of recollection, on the other hand, there is
not the same fixity of procedure. There are not only many forms
of suggestion and association, but a given suggestion may not effect
the same result in two instances. This is to introduce a point
mentioned in 452 a 27 below but not relevant here. It is in no way
apparent that Aristotle ever meant to compare the acquisition and
the revival of knowledge with regard either to the relative fixedness
of the processes or the fixity of the starting point.
St Hilaire quite fails to see that TOVTW (1. n) refers to paOelv
KOL evpeiv, and so he completely distorts the sense.
451 b ii. KCU Ivovo-ijs K.T.X. On the whole this favours my
interpretation of the previous passage rather than St Hilaire s. On
his theory, relearning a thing implies complete reinstatement of
everything in consciousness and it is difficult to see how there would
be any apxn at a ll m that case.
It is Aristotle s theory that in learning (either for the first or
second time) as well as in recollection there is an dpxy from which
we set out. We find no contradiction to this in 45 i a 25 above;
there he simply says that in the process of learning memory does
not begin concurrently with the initial step. Here he merely
distinguishes learning and recollection according to the amount of
the dpxij involved ; but we can gather his doctrine from other
passages. We learn either by deduction or induction (Anal. Post. i.
ch. 18, 81 a 38 sqq.) and, in either case, we must have some previous
knowledge which is the starting point of our deduction or our
induction. (Cf. Anal. Post. i. ch. i, 71 sqq. and Metaph. i. ch. 9,
992 b 30 sqq.) In the one case we must know the premises of any
particular conclusion and ultimately the constituents of the definitions
of the terms (which enter into our premises) ; Set yap e u>v 6/3107x0?
TrpoetSe i ou KCU eu/at yvwpi/xa (992 b 32). In the latter, the knowledge
of particular cases which are given in perception (rd /ca0 e/cacrra, ra
eyyu repov Trjs aia^o-coos Anal. Post. i. ch. 2, 72 a 2, 3) and which are
COMMENT A RY 265
less intelligible naturally (TWV rJTrov yvwpijawv <>7xr6 Metaph. vn. ch. 4,
1029 b 4), is required before we can gather from them the universal
law. But in learning by induction we do not have previous know
ledge of the universal law, nor in deduction have we a prior
acquaintance with the particular case. (It is only in so far as the
particular is implicit in the universal that it is previously known. In
its particularity and in the full sense of the word it is not known :
aTrXcos 8 OVK eTruTTarcu 71 a 28.) If it had been explicitly thought of
previously, then we should have a case of recollection not of /xa^o-ts,
which must be distinguished from ava /xi T/o-ts and is thus to be
distinguished.
Another point of difference is that mentioned below in 45 2 a
5 sqq. Learning requires a teacher ; the process of recollection is
self-originated.
There is also a sense in which the act of learning is not a process.
Cf. Phys. vn. ch. 3, 247 bio sqq. and also De An. I. ch. 3, 407 a 32.
This however comes to no more than the familiar doctrine that
per se the intellectual life is not a o-co/xariKw 7ra#os like memory and
recollection. But in this sense it cannot apply without qualification
to the functioning of the vovs Tra^n/co s which is realised in finite
individuals.
451 b 14. e dvtrytois. Hamilton (Reid, p. 894) points out that
Locke too, in Essay II. ch. 33 5, distinguishes between those ideas
which are naturally connected by a * union and correspondence
which is founded in their peculiar beings and those that are asso
ciated through chance or custom. By those necessarily connected
Aristotle means notions which objectively imply one another, like
centre and circumference. As Hamilton indicates, it was typical of
members of the empirical English school (other than Locke) to
ascribe all collocations of ideas to custom.
451 b 16-17. Freudenthal s reading (op. cit. p. 407) o-v/x/fruVet
8 tvias /xaAA.oi/ rj ere pas TroAAa/a? /avou/ixeVas seems unnecessarily to
anticipate the doctrine of 452 a 3 sqq. infra.
451 b 20. Freudenthal s conjecture of ru/as instead of TWO. makes
the reading smoother, we experience a number of previous changes
conducting to the stimulation of that one etc.
451 b 22. TOV vvv rj &\\ov TIVOS. By this Aristotle cannot mean
merely * a time present or otherwise. It is difficult to see how one
could start a process of reflection otherwise than from the present
time. The idea is that the object, the thought of which starts the
266 DE MEMORIA
train of recollection, can be given either in present perception or in
memory.
d<f> ojioiov K.T.X. This describes the character of the object or
content of the notion which starts the process.
It is the first recorded formulation of the celebrated laws of
association, though they are all to be found instanced in the Phaedo.
Cf. above note to 451 a 23.
451 b 24. TWV 8* ap.a. This evidently is capable of being illus
trated by the eravrieu KIV^O-CIS which, being affections of a single sense
organ, must be a /xa; cf. De Sens. ch. 7, 447 b 9 sq. : /xaXXoi/ yap a/m
77 Kivr)(ris T^S /xtas Tcurn/s (aur^vyVews) rj rotv Svoti . Here of course the
Kuny<reis seem to be regarded as existing in the central not in the end
organ, but evidently the characteristic of being a/xa, which dis
tinguishes <h/aimai KLvtjatis in the end organ, is regarded as attaching
to them when they are transferred to the heart.
If this interpretation be correct Association by Contrast is to be
assigned to Contiguity.
451 b 27. 8* otfrws. S 0/x.ws Freudenthal, G. A. Bekker. The
change is immaterial unless with Themistius, Leonicus, and Simon we
take the OUTWS with ^rowres and translate and we recollect, even
though we do not search in this way. But we see from 453 a 18 sqq.
below, that Aristotle does not limit dra/xv^o-is to the volitional process
which reinstates an idea. Recollection is there said in some cases
not to be CTT avrots, i.e. subject to the will.
Cf. also Hamilton op. at. p. 902, note.
451 b 30. |X6(ivTj|i0a here must be used inaccurately for dvafiifi-
vfja-KofJieOa : cf. 452 a 8, 1 1.
TO. iroppw. Hamilton, op. cit. p. 903, takes this as things remote
and irrelevant to our inquiry and (apparently) not as the object of
/xe/xvTy/xc^a. This is surely very unnatural ; the use of TO, Troppw and
TO. o-vi eyyus to denote something else than objects and processes
which are connected in the train of recollection, just where the
series has been described in terms of similar notions, would be a
most flagrant instance of slipshod writing on the part of Aristotle.
Hamilton translates, Nor is there any necessity to consider things
remote [and irrelevant] how these arise in memory; but only the
matters coadjacent (and pertinent to our inquiry). For it is manifest
that the mode is still the same that, to wit, of consecution, fin
which a thing recurs to us, when] neither pre-intentionally seeking
it, nor voluntarily reminiscent. For \1iere too\ by custom, the several
COMMENT A R Y 267
movements are concomitant of one another this determinate ly following
upon that? Hamilton, reading TpoVo? TTWS (A.eyw 8e TO e^e^?) ov
K.T.A., thinks that reference is still being made to the case of voluntary
and involuntary reminiscence, and that it is the manner of occurrence
of these two which is said to be identical. But irpo&jnjo-as and aVa-
/xi/ryo-flets cannot distinguish intentional as opposed to unintentional
recollection. (What can pre-intentionally mean?) It is the
method of recalling TO, Tro ppw and ra o-vVeyyvs which is the same. As
the remoteness of two distantly connected ideas can be bridged over
by inserting intermediate ones, it is the mode of connection of these
latter we have to consider.
451 b 31-32. Xfyw 8...ava[AVTicr0is. A gloss according to Freuden
thai. But, if we let it stand, it simply points out the fact that he
refers to the order of a series of psychic changes determined, not
by any previous act of recollection, but by the way in which
they are accustomed (TO) yap !0 1. 32) to be experienced together.
45 1 b 35. apx^v KivT|<ra>s. This is simply the term for efficient
cause used in Phys. n. ch. 7, 198 b i, Metaph. i. ch. 3, 984 a 27, etc.
Here we are dealing with that class of efficient causes or sources of
change which are themselves motions or changes. The series of
changes in conscious process is conceived by Aristotle quite in the
same way as all other changes occurring in the world of generation
and decay. The whole series is a Kivrja-is which is made up of parts
which are themselves Ktv^ o-ct?. Hence Themistius s illustration of the
series of mental sequences by a chain in which, if one link be lifted,
the next will also be moved (Sp. n. p. 243, 1. 12) is inadequate. The
links in the series are themselves nothing static but processes also.
So far as we have gone, the KIVTJO-CIS which are stimulated in the
act of recollection seem to be dormant in the soul or its organ the
heart prior to stimulation, and this is apparently the view maintained
through the De Memoria. In De An. i. ch. 4, 408 b 15 sqq., how
ever, a rather different attitude is taken up. In recollection the
Kiv7)<TL$ is said to pass from the soul to the affections (also Ktn/ o-ct?)
or their traces (//.ova?) existing in the sense organs ; this is opposed
to what occurs in sense perception, where the /aVrjo-is proceeds in the
reverse way. In neither case is the process in the soul.
By this however Aristotle probably means no more than to em
phasize the fact that in the higher faculties the mind is an originating
cause. Of course, in all cases the soul is an upX 7 / ( c ^ -De An. i.
ch. i, 402 a 7) and to be regarded as an efficient as well as a final
268 DE MEMORIA
cause (De Part. Animal. \. ch. i, 641 a 27). But, just as none of
its modifications, even a primitive one like perception, is mere
passivity (cf. De An. n. ch. 5) so we seem to find a progressively
greater absence of passivity as we pass from lower to higher faculties;
e.g. scientific knowledge eirwri/fu? is not passive change of the type
aXXoiWts in the proper sense at all (417 b 6). A mechanical deter
mination of psychic processes by each other may go on and be beyond
the control of the individual in whom they occur (cf. 453 a 18 sqq.
infra). This is held to show the corporeal nature of such changes,
or rather their dependence upon corporeal conditions. Hence it is
suggested by implication that a function which was exclusively
psychical would not be determined in this mechanical way but would
be completely under control (eV O.VTOIS : 453 a 22). Notwithstanding
Aristotle s determination to make out all human faculties to be con
ditioned by the bodily organism, and thus establish a thorough-going
parallelism of psychical and corporeal changes, notwithstanding the
fact that he declares the human vovs to be TTO&JTIKOS, there seems to
be this tendency to free itself from bodily conditions which is always
manifested by that which is most characteristically psychical. It is
significant that in this passage where Aristotle talks of the process
in recollection proceeding outward from the soul, he immediately
goes on (as if impelled by association of ideas) to talk of the
which is impassive and imperishable, and practically identifies
with it. The decline of the mental faculties is just like the dimness
of sight in an old man, due to the bodily organ becoming impaired.
It is not the ty&xf\ which suffers change but its organ (wore TO yvjpas
ov TW TT/I/ {j/vxflv rt irtTTovOevai, aAA ei/ (S, 408 b 22). Hence the
ultimate core of the tyvxi seems to consist of this imperishable i/oCs,
which, no doubt, relatively to the body will be like the divine voOs in its
relation to the world, the prime source of movement TO TrpurroF KWQWV.
Aristotle, however, does not state this explicitly, and though,
indeed, he tells us that the vovs enters the living being from outside
and its activity has nothing in common with that of the body (De
Gener. Animal, n. ch. 3, 736 b 28) yet the relation of this to the
other mental faculties is most obscure in his philosophy, and really
leads to difficulties much the same as those surrounding the relation
of the Platonic iSea to the things of time and sense.
452 a 2. TO, Trp<r/p.aTa (the facts) may be either static elements,
e.g. contiguous objects or different parts of a mathematical theorem,
or events themselves. The series may be either temporal or not.
COMMENT A R Y 269
452 a 4. <j>av\a is the version of L S U. Themistius and
Michael read <auXo>g KCU xa^Trws. For <auXos in the sense of inexact
cf. Thuc. vi. 18. Cf. also Metaph. vn. ch. 4, 1029 b 10.
452 a 8. fX>vTrrcu. Referring a reinstated process to the past is
a characteristic of remembering as distinct from learning a second
time : cf. 451 b 6. Hence Aristotle is justified in using memory here
as the generic term to include recollection.
452 a 10. KIVOVVTI iroXXd. This surely refers to many different
starts not to many different items in a single series.
452 a 1 1-12. TO <ydp nnvT]<r0ai K.T.\. The act of memory cannot
be the merely potential existence of a process in the mind.
Sw|i6i. Svvafjuv L S U, Themistius, vet. tr. But we do not else
where hear of a special Suva/it? Ktvov&a in the mind. It is an actual
process which functions in recollection.
452 a 14. dirb TOITWV. This, surely, as the illustration below
bears out, refers to the TOTTOI commonplaces of thought in general
which Aristotle defines in their most universal sense in Rhet. i. ch. 2,
1358 a 12 : (ot TOTTOI) ewriv 01 Koivf) Trept SiKauov /cat (^VCTIKOJI/ KCU
TToXlTlKtol KOL 7Tpt TToXXwV SlCK^epOVTCOV ClSci, otov 6 TOV /AGlXXov KOU %
TOTTOS: cf. also 1. 32. The TOTTOS is a rule or general statement
that will readily recur to one and hence it may be used as the apx 7 /
of a train of ideas in recollection. E.g. it is a TOTTOS of the Aris
totelian philosophy that air is damp, and apparently from Meteor.
in. ch. 4, 374 a 2 that it is XCVKOS ; that milk is white and the autumn
damp are given by ordinary perception.
Unfortunately Aristotle in illustrating the use of roVot in recollec
tion by those drawn from his own philosophy gives a series of ideas
which would hardly with plausibility be used in the purposive recall
of an idea. Hence Hamilton (followed by St Hilaire) proposes to
read an aToVwr. But if the series is an absurd one still less likely is
it to be employed in voluntary recollection, which is now being dis
cussed. Themistius (Sp. n. p. 247, 11. 8 sqq.) gives a variety of alterna
tive explanations to TOTTWJ/. TOTTOUS Se r; a? apx<*<; eVctWi Sciv rfj if/v)(rj
Xeyo/xcv, 77 TOI" Kara TO, a-vcrroi ^a. KCU o/xoca KCU a vTtKei /oui a ws tv ry
SiaXeKTtKr] etpr^rai, rj TOVS (rw/xaTtKOu? /cat ras v T(2Se TW /xepet Secret?.
Thomas interprets it as meaning the last merely. In that case, the
reference would be to the art of memorising objects by attaching
each to a special point in a spatial series an art said to have been
discovered by Simonides of Ceos and referred to by Cicero in De
Orator e, n. ch. 86.
2;o DE MEMORIA
So Hammond and Freudenthal, loc. tit. p. 409 (who indeed in
consequence wishes to read Ta^io-ra instead of e^torc in 1. 15). But
it is strange that Aristotle after mentioning this method of memo
rising should give an example which has no reference to it.
452 a 1 8. TO KaOoXov is read by L S U Y, Themistius and
Michael. Both those commentators, however, render it by co s eVi TO
TroAv, a meaning which, according to Freudenthal (Archiv fur Gesch.
d. Philos. ii. 1887, p. n) KaOoXov can certainly have. They thus
interpret TO KaOoXov as though the TO were inessential. Siebeck how
ever in Philol. 1 88 1, pp. 350-2, and his Untersuchungen zur Philoso
phic der Griechen, p. 155, wishes to retain TO and to make it essential.
He thinks that here Aristotle identifies the middle of a series o f
terms employed in reminiscence with the /AC O-OV of logical inference
which is a universal and furthest from sense. The connecting bond
in recollection is a universal concept which binds together various
particulars by means of their implication in it.
This comes to pretty much the same as Mr Bradley s doctrine
that Association marries only Universals, or more simply, that there
is a bond of identity between the thing remembered and the thing
that brings it to mind. This however has been already made clear
enough in 451 b 21-26 above, and it is strange that Aristotle should
confuse that implication of a predicate in the middle term of a
syllogism, which accounts for the truth of the conclusion, with that
relation between psychical states which causes the presentation of the
one to entail the presentation of the other. In the latter case you
are accounting for a process, in the former for a connection which is
independent of process. Moreover the universal which connects
different ideas in reminiscence is hardly the universal of logic that
which is furthest from sense ; it is often of the most sensuous
character. Once more, it would be unfair to represent it as a separate
member in the train of connected ideas ; it is rather the identical
element pervading any two.
In the details of the subsequent passage Siebeck s interpretation
is beset with at least no fewer difficulties than Freudenthal s.
Cf. also next note sub fin.
452 a 21. }> wv ABTAEZH0 K.T.\.
Biehl s text, which I print, follows Freudenthal s reconstruction of
the passage. I have translated it as it stands. But it can hardly be
said that all difficulties have been removed even by this radical altera
tion of Bekker s text. The general drift seems to be that the
COMMENTARY 271
middle term of a series of connected ideas is of unique importance
because from it you can go in either direction to the other members.
If you have a series of ideas A B C D E F G H and want to remember
F or G and are not able to do so when you think of H, by thinking
of E you may be able to recall them. Then from E you can get
either to D or F, or from C you can pass to B, the term before it.
But this is not at all persuasive. Why should the final possibility
of recall be the starting from A, which is an extreme in the series, if
it is the employment of the middle term which Aristotle is illus
trating? Besides, as Freudenthal himself points out, there is no
single middle term in a series of eight.
Again, Freudenthal does not seem to give sufficient weight to the
objection that this makes Aristotle talk of recollection as proceeding
in a reverse order with equal facility.
Bekker s text is as follows (1. 2l) : ct yap /XT; eVt TOV E /xetm/Tat,
eVi TOV E epvyo-Or) ZvTtvOtv yap eV a/xt/xo KLvrjOfjvaL eVSe xerai, /cat
CTTt TO A Kttl 7Tl TO E. t Of. fJLV] TOVTWV Ti 7Tl^Tt 7Tl TO T \0(JJV
pvrjo-Orjo-eTai, d TO H rj TO Z eVi^rfret. et Sc to?, eVi TO A (11. 19-23, Bek.).
Now, perhaps Aristotle only means that, after all, it is the con
necting link, the intermediate term, which accounts for and must
universally account for the recollection. If one does not remember
by thinking of another term in the series one does so by coming
to / /. It is the proximate and universal (i<a.06\ov, 1. 18) cause of the
recall of the idea in question. Hence I propose to read and translate
as follows, 452 a 21 sqq.:
/ABT AE ZH\
VA B C D E F G H/
i yap /XT) eVi TOV E e[jLvrjo-0r) eVt, TOV H TO (TOU ?) /xe/xvT/Tar IvTtvOcv
yap TT a/x<co KivijOrjvai eVSe ^eTai, Kat evri TO H Kat errt TO Z. ct Se
fl?) TOVTWV Tt ^1/Tl, eTTt TO T \OtoV fJ.Vrja6lj(T^TaL, t TO A r; TO E 7Tt-
ZflTel t O [AT], 7Tt TO A* Kttt OVTOJS ttCt.
* If one has not remembered at E, at G one does remember H.
The reason why one does not remember at E is that from that
point one can pass to both G and F. If one does not want to
remember these he will remember by going to C if he is seeking for
D or E ; if he is not seeking for these he goes to A. This is uni
versally the process.
MS. Y reads TOV H (1. 20, Bek.). The omission of the TOV before
would easily occur. For the other changes of letter no MS. authority
is available, except that the vet. tr. reads Z in 1. 23 (1. 22, Bek.),
272 DE MEMORIA
a change approved by both Siebeck and Freudenthal. The other
alterations are mild in comparison with those made by Freudenthal.
The point is that it is the term just before the one to be re
called that you must get. There is no intention of dealing with a
fixed middle term of the whole series. When Aristotle says the
middle term may be considered as the ap^y/ , he means that in a way
it is really Trpurrov. It is TrpwTov in the sense of being the proximate
cause. Now it is anything Trparrov in this way that is universally
(*a#o Aov) a cause.
Hence Ka66\ov may be read in 1. 18 and its normal meaning
universally given to it, if my conjecture as to the meaning of the
subsequent passage is adopted. It is the intermediate link between
any two terms which is universally the cause of the transference
from one to the other, just as it is the proximate cause which uni
versally produces an effect, or as it is qua triangle, the middle term,
that we can universally predicate equality of the angles of any figure
to two right angles. Cf. Anal. Post. I. ch. 4, 73 b 25 sqq.
But another interpretation has been suggested to me (by Mr
W. D. Ross, of Oriel College). It is proposed to adopt the following
text instead of that of Bekker :
452 a 2 1 sqq. t yap ^ rt TOT) A [AtfjLvrjTai CTTI TOU E Cfj,vrjv6r)
evrtvOev yap CTT a/u.<co KwrjOrjvaL evSe^erat, Kai CTTI TO A /cat 7ri
TO Z. et Se /r) TOimoi/ Tt e^TCt, evri TO Z eA$wv fj-vrjo-OyoreTaL, et TO H rj
TO fTTL^r)TL 1 Se /U/7, 67Tt TO A.
The only changes here for which there is no MS. authority are A
instead of E in 1. 22 (1. 20, Bek.) and Z instead of T in 1. 24 (1. 22, Bek.),
while the other variations from Bekker and Biehl follow the best MSS.
The translation will then be as follows :
4 If one does not remember at A he remembers at E, for from
that point he can pass in both directions both to D and to F. But
if he is not searching for one of these (D or F), by going to F he will
remember, if he is looking for G or H ; while if he is not (looking
for G or H, but those in the other direction C and B) he goes
to D.
In explanation of this interpretation it is maintained that A is
not included in the series of terms of which TO /xeo-oi/ TTOLVTIDV is said
to be the apx 1 ? (hence they form an odd number and E becomes
a real middle term). A is rather a term immediately outside the
group in which the idea to be recalled is contained.
Aristotle is held to be illustrating the well-known process of recall
COMMENTARY 273
in which, when we wish to revive an idea, we pass first of all to the
group of former presentations within which we must already know it
to lie. E, then, will symbolize the central idea or nucleus of this
group from which it is possible to pass, in more than one direction,
to the idea lying in the outskirts of the group.
This interpretation is ingenious and gets rid of minor difficulties,
e.g. it does not require that Aristotle should be held to commit him
self to the statement that we can recall ideas by proceeding back
wards among terms experienced in a linear series like the letters
of the alphabet. Though Aristotle symbolizes his terms by the
letters of the alphabet he is thinking not of a series following the
direction of the time process but of a set of notions formed
by those notions being frequently thought of together and grouped
round one striking topic.
452 a 28. Freudenthal, in conformity with his interpretation of
the above passage, proposes to read E instead of F (C). The
associative process may go in either direction. But the meaning is
quite satisfactory and does not involve the special difficulties of this
contention if we keep the MS. version. Aristotle has just before
said that the intermediate term is universally the ground of
recollection. But it is objected that from a given term sometimes
you pass to a certain other one and sometimes not. That will be
true, he says, of the remoter terms in the series, for sometimes from
C we pass all the way along to F, sometimes to the next member D
only. Again, the particular series CDEF may become obliterated
and the association branch off in some other direction that has
become more familiar. Hence, though starting from C, we may
not arrive at F.
452 a 28-29. *- v ^ v 8t* * irdXcu ov KivTjOr]. All editors except
Biehl, following L S U, read lav ovv /XT) Siu TraXaiov KivfJTat and
Freudenthal wishes to follow the same text with the omission
of /xr/. All difficulties, however, vanish when we take TraAcu as
| lately, , a sense which it often bears in Aristotle (cf. Bonitz, Ind.
P- 559. a T 9 : <T " TraAou Ae^eVra, oi TruAai Aoyot refertur ad ea
| quae antea in eodem libro exposita sunt ) and in other writers.
One may not have lately experienced the succession CDEF,
and hence when C occurs one goes off on some more familiar route.
452 a 30. TroXXeiKis a : L S U and all editors before Biehl read
I a 7roAAa/as, especially since the explanation is based upon the
I frequency of the repetition; cf. 452 b i below : TO Se 7roAAa/as
R. 18
274 DE MEMORIA
Trout. But the idea of frequency or continued action is contained in
the imperfect tense twoovptv.
452 b i. 4vcpY<^. Mr Cook Wilson (Journal of Philol xi.
p. 120) conjectures <run?0cfa ; but this makes the sentence simply
a repetition of 11. 29-30 above. Though Themistius reads OVTW KGU
0ei, that is no guide. It is just the practice of that commentator to
reduce significant statements to idle repetitions.
Every one of those who read evcpycia will have it that the
reference is to the activity of mind and, as it is the function of
intellect which is most appropriately styled an cvcpyeia, the term
may perhaps be used absolutely as referring to that without further
qualification. But the meaning will not be, as some think, that the
order of connection of things in nature must be reproduced in the
mental process of recollecting. That would only be the case if the
order of recall was always identical with the order of notions in
science, which is admittedly a reproduction of the objective order.
(Cf. De Interp. ch. 9, 19 a 33: 6ju.ouo< ot Xoyot aA^cT? worTrcp ra
vrpay/xaTa and Metaph. ix. ch. 10, 1051 b 3.) It is only the order of
experience, though at times that might coincide with the scientific
order, which is reproduced in association, and it is doubtful if it
could be said that that takes place <v<m. The meaning would then
rather be that, just as in the order of nature things succeed in
a definite sequence, so it is in the functioning of thought. It is
the occurrence of a particular order which is common to both.
Perhaps, however, the meaning is much wider than this. One
of the MSS. (M) inserts r) Swa/xet after <vV and this, which seems to
be a gloss, may, however, give us a clue to an interpretation
Things when actually produced in a definite order do so by virtue
of a natural disposition (or Swa/xis) to do so. Now frequency of
repetition produces this <vVi9, and hence you explain the way in
which we actually associate such and such ideas, since the Wos
produced by frequent repetition is a kind of qta cn?. This </>u <m
might well have been called a eis, as the tendency to virtuous action
produced by practice is called in the Ethics. This e6s is, it must be
noticed, a SvVa/xis, though determinate, and from Averts you can
never dissociate the idea of potentiality. Thus it can quite well be
opposed to ei/e pyeta. In fact ^uVts as the world of Nature is, apart
from actual sensation, merely the potentiality of a sensible object,
a vTTOKti/xci/ov. Cf. Metciph. in. ch. 5, 1010 b 31 sqq. : TO ^\v
ovv /x>fre TO, CUO^TO, etvat /W-^TC TO. cuo^^aTa torws aAr^e?..., TO 8
1
COMMENTARY 275
TO. VTTOKct/xeva fJirj elVai, a Troiet r^v ater^(riv, KOL aivev aia^crew? aSv-
Something must exist to cause sensation, but it is a VTTOKCL-
Cf. also De An. n. ch. 5, 417 a 12 and in. ch. 2, 426 a 15 sqq.
The one sense of <v<rts is not totally dissevered from any of the
others. It is not a homonymous term. Here in this line fyva-iv is used
in a way which would suggest natural tendency or constitution
as a translation and it is used in the same connection as ev rots </>ucret
and Trapa (f>v<nv (452 b 2) which imply a reference to the world of
Nature. Cf. Introduction, sec. iv.
452 b 2. irapa <J>vcriv. Cf. P/iys. ii. ch. 8, 198 b 35 sqq. and in.
215 a 2, etc. roavTo^arov or ru^r/ is the source of what we should call
exceptions to the laws of Nature. Those deviations from the normal
which we should ascribe to the operation of special subsidiary and
counteracting laws Aristotle did not regard quite in the same light.
As the action of Nature is not merely according to law, but
purposive, Aristotle seems to consider these deviations from the
general rule as being opposed to this purpose which aims for the
best and as thwarting it. Hence the expression Trapa. <f>vaiv. Cf.
Zeller, Arist. i. pp. 465 sqq. (TO avrofj-arov and TV^ may be dis
tinguished, the former being specially the tendency to produce the
unexpected found in natural phenomena). Cf. Bonitz, ad Metaph.
xi. ch. 8, 1065 a 30.
452 b 5. d^e A/ojTcu which Christ suggests, would make the read
ing smoother. But Aristotle continually works with an exceedingly
indefinite subject, especially when discussing mental phenomena (cf.
Rodier, ad De An. in. ch. 5, 430 a 25); it is, indeed, possible
for the subject to be changed between KLvr)6rjvon and
452 b 6. 8e fl tfvojjia : CTTI^ Christ : E Y have eire
452 b 8. -yvwpCtciv Set rbv xp^vov. This is not a special character
istic of recollection, but is common to it and memory: ch. i, 449 b
32 et passim. From here up to 453 a 5 Aristotle deals with the per
ception of time, a common function of both activities, and there
after he goes on once more to contrast the two.
452 b 9. TU This is evidently the common sense or its organ,
the tv 11 rrjs if/vxfjs mentioned in De Sensu, 449 a 10. To perceive
time is a function of the common sense: cf. above, ch. i, 450 an and
notes.
452 bio. TOL (jLe-ye OT]. Compare the way in which the perception
| of time is illustrated by the perception of a spatial magnitude in
De Semu, ch. 7, 448 b 3 sqq.
1 8 2
276 DE MEMORIA
452 b ii. iirorviv K.T.X. This would be a device for effecting
thought by contact. Plato suggests in the Timaeus that thought is
effected by contact (cf. De An. i. ch. 3, 406 b 26 sqq. and Rodier,
ad toe.). But thought would thus be itself a yuc ye^os. Cf. Timaeus,
34 c sqq. and especially 37 A. Aristotle, however, does not disdain to
speak of the activity of intellect as a contact with its object which
is itself. Cf. Metaph, xn. ch. 7, 1072 b 21: 6i.yya.vw KCU vow (o
rovs).
Plato, though making thought to be effected by contact, does
not suggest that it issues from the body and reaches out to the
things thought of, but as we see in De Sensit, ch. 2, he, along with
Empedocles, holds this to be true of sight.
452 b 1416. Bekker reads TLVL ovv SUHCTCI, orav TO. /Aeito ^077; r/
on cKelva vocl, TJ TO. eAaTToo ; Travra yap TU. CVTO? eAarTw, wcrTrep
dvaAoyor KCU ra KTOS. This is pretty nearly the traditional version
of the commentators and it seems to have given rise to the inter
pretation descending from Themistius, which is to the effect that
Aristotle is comparing the relation of external magnitudes and
objective time to subjective processes by some relation between a
whole and its parts. The inner processes in the subject are eAarro),
but so are the parts contained in a whole. Themistius takes the
ei/To s as referring to the parts which are contained in the whole, not,
apparently, as referring to ev awry (sc. rrj Siavoia), 1. 13. Never
theless, ra evros- the parts contained in the whole do correspond
to the subjective processes but, when they are described as
that primarily characterises their relation to the whole (TO,
and only secondarily the relation of inner process to the external
reality.
The argument then is (Themistius, Sp. n. p. 250) that, if you
know the whole, the knowledge of the part is annexed to it, but that
knowledge first attaches to the parts (TO. eVros) and then, because
they are analogous to each other, and to the whole, proceeds to the
whole. The relation between whole and parts is like that in the
Timaeus between the demiurge, or rather the animal of perfect figure
which is to contain all others (Timaeus, 33 A), and the created gods
which are within it and yet like to it.
It looks as though Themistius, having consulted the Timaeus in
connection with the passage above, has been led on by some
similarities of expression in the two works (TO. eVro s, O/AOIO TT;? and
the notion of figures containing one another) to introduce as a parallel
COM ME NT A RY 27;
something perfectly irrelevant. As Freudenthal points out, though a
whole contains its parts, the parts do not contain the whole and it is
impossible merely from the relation of part and whole to understand
how a part can represent a whole. Among the commentators
Simon and Thomas dismiss all this construction and take TO.
WTO* as referring simply to the inner psychic affections which
correspond to the external objects and periods of objective time.
It might seem at the first glance that ra o/xoia o^/oara which
reside within the soul or its organ are what corresponds to the
external spatial magnitudes, the /av^Veis what answers to the periods
of real time ; but this distinction can hardly be maintained. All
internal affections must be Ktvr/o-et? and those by which time is
apprehended must themselves be spatial, i.e. capable of being
represented by figures (cf. De Insom. ch. 3, 461 a 8-n). The
relation of inner to outer is represented by similar triangles (cf.
1 8- 1 9 below). Though Themistius employs such triangles (the one
including the other) in his elucidation of the passage, the one does
not, according to him, represent the psychic states, the other the
external realities, but one is held to symbolize time, and its smaller
parts the subjective processes apprehending time, the other the
objective thing, with its parts representing the concepts by which we
know the objective, and what is asserted is not merely a proportion
between the inner elements of each triangle and the whole, but
between the two triangles as a whole and consequently between the
inner elements of each triangle. Cf. Themistius, Sp. n. p. 250, 1. 23:
ok TO lAarroj/ Trpay/txa Trpos TO ^et^ov t^et, /cat o eAaTTtoi/ ^poVos 717369 rov
/u.etova d/Aouo9 et, KOI ya,A.A.a, cos TO 7rpay//,a <7rpo9> aTravTu. TOV
XpoVof e^ct KCU TO, /xt pr; Trpos TO. ftpi7- (Spengel conjectures 7rp6s
before a-n-avra.) But Themistius has completely missed the point,
which is how can the internal represent the external ? He is
continually using vorjf^a and Trpay^a as interchangeable (cf. 1. 21, loc.
tit.); but the question is how is it possible to use the vo ^/xa (in
the sense of psychic process) instead of being in actual contact with
the Trpay/Ao. ? How are they related to one another ?
Freudenthal, in Rheinisches Museum, xxiv. p. 415, conjectures
practically the identical reading which Biehl reproduces and which
makes quite plain to what TO, CI/TO? and TCI CKTOS refer. We must,
however, depart from Biehl to some extent and delete before avd-
\oyov in 1. 1 6 the oSo-Trep which obscures the sense and may have easily
crept in from the subsequent line. We read KCU with Freudenthal.
2; 8 DE MEM OKI A
452 b 17. St Hilaire and Hammond take ciSeo-if to mean
figures (mathematical); just as a figure may contain a proportionate
one within it, so with distances. But eiSoq is never used as identical
with vxniJia figure, though o-x^a may be regarded as an instance of
cTSos in the most general sense ; and besides, since the sides of
geometrical figures are aTroo-nj/xaTa, in comparing the relations of
aTroo-TT/ /xara to those which exist between proportionate figures,
Aristotle would only be comparing a thing with itself.
Bender translates etSeo-u/ by Bildern, and this may be founded -
on an illustration which Simon gives when he compares the psychic
states to statuettes of equal size reproducing on the small scale the
lineaments and features of two different men. Simon, however,
seems to agree with Thomas that ei/ avrw (11. 17-18) refers not to
the ctSos as Bender seems to take it ( in der Sache but that
would rather be lv avrw or ei/ avrots) but to the perceiving subject
in ipso cognoscente, and he thinks that Aristotle is comparing the
function of the internal quantum in representing external quantity to
the function of the internal eTSos in representing that which exists in
the objective universe. In both cases the internal is analogous to
the external. This account of the eTSosin the soul is rather different
from the usual one. Aristotle generally says that the cTSos of the
object gets into the soul. For example, sense is a faculty for
receiving the T8os the form without the matter; cf. De An. n.
ch. 12, 424 a 1 8, and so of vous in in. ch. 4, 429 a 15, but again in
429 a 27 the soul is said to be the TOTTOS ciSwv. Now, if the tSo<? of
the sensible object only exists actually (eVepyeia) when it is perceived
or thought of, the eTSos in the soul will be identical both numerically
and specifically with that in the object so far as the latter exists
evepyaa, and this seems to be from one point of view the Aristotelian
theory: cf. De An. in. ch. 2, 426 a 15 sqq., and Metaph. in. ch. 5,
loiob 30; but here we seem to have the more common-sense
position that the eTSos exists realised in the external object inde
pendently of the percipient mind and that what exists in the mind is
at least numerically different from the objectively existing one. Here
indeed Aristotle would seem to go so far as to suggest that the eTSos
in the mind is only analogous to that existing in the external world.
In this passage, then, Aristotle s purpose is to illustrate the repre
sentation of an external aTroo-r^/xa by an internal (r^/xa, by the
function which the eTSos of an external object communicated to the
sense organs has in giving us knowledge of that object. He refers
COMMENTARY 279
to the latter operation as to something already agreed upon. Cf. De
Interp. ch. I, i6a 6: 7ra@-ijfjLa.ra rrjs 1/^779, KCU o>v ravra o/xotcJ/xara,
Trpay/xara K.T.A.
452 b 18. In the following lines, while I adhere to one of the
emendations which Biehl adopts from Freudenthal (FA for AA in
1. 19), I disagree with the latter in his interpretation of the passage.
My interpretation enables us to read AF with Bekker and all other
editors and MSS. instead of AZ in 1. 21, and I instead of M in 1. 22,
a lection supported by MSS. E M Y.
The figure I give in illustration of the text (for which, along with
this interpretation, I am indebted to Mr W. D. Ross of Oriel College)
differs from that suggested by Freudenthal as much as from the one
found in Themistius ; it will be found to be simpler than either and
open to fewer objections. My contention is that Aristotle s sole
point is to show how external curoo-r^ara and Ktv^o-ets may be repro
duced in parvo in the psychical organs. His explanation is that the
internal ax^o-Ta and Ktv^o-ct? are analogous to the external ones,
just as the sides of a small triangle are in the same proportions as
those of one any number of times larger, obtained by producing the
sides to any distance and drawing the base parallel to the base of
the small one.
He accordingly draws the triangle AFA with BE near the apex
and parallel to FA. (That this is the first figure to be drawn is
evident from the fact that the letters round it succeed each other in
the order of the alphabet.)
The internal erx^a or KI I/T/O-IS then represents the external just as
the sides AB, BE represent AF, FA by being proportional to them.
But the question arises, why should the internal <rxw* a or KU/^O-I?
symbolized by AB, BE represent the external AF, FA rather than
AZ, ZH (obtained by producing AF and AA and drawing ZH parallel
to FA), which are equally proportional to AB, BE ?
280
DE MEMORIA
Will not an internal <TX^I^OL which represents a length of six feet
at a certain distance represent one of twelve feet at double the
distance ? Aristotle replies that this is so, but that in the two cases
we are conscious of a different proportion between the external and
the internal. We have some standard by which we measure real
size. We are conscious of the real distance from the eye outwards
of the various objects, and hence (to state the case in modern terms)
we know that an affection of the retina, which may mean a size of
two inches in a near object, may mean two miles in a distant one.
This is what Aristotle means when he says that AT is to AB in the
proportion of to I, but AZ is to AB in the ratio of K to A.
This interpretation requires us to regard , I, K and A as the
names of single lines, not as referring to points at the ends of lines
as Freudenthal and Themistius would have it. This usage is common
in Euclid. On the other hand it is impossible that r<3i/ I or ra?
KA could refer each to single lines as Freudenthal maintains ; nor is
there anything in the passages he quotes (Phys. vin. ch. TO, 266 a 16,
Meteorol. in. ch. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, n) to show that Aristotle could, by
or M (I) in 1. 22, be referring to a single line by means of a point at
one end of it, if the point at the other end is denoted by another
letter. The difficulty is increased by the fact that his interpretation
requires the full designation of the former line to be [M] , of the
latter [K] M. There is nothing to show that M was in Aristotle s
original scheme ; it seems to have crept into some of the MSS. from
the figure of Themistius where it is found along with several other
superfluous letters. For further
criticisms of the figure of Themis
tius, cf. Freudenthal in Rheinisches
Museum, loc. cit.
Freudenthal s text is as follows :
45 2 b 1 8 sqq. : uxnrep ovv ei rr/v
AB BE Kti/cirai, TTOtct rrjv FA avd-
Xoyov yap rj AF KOL r) FA. TL ovv
/xaXXov rrjv FA rj rrjv ZH Trout; rj
cos rj AZ Trpos ryv AB e^ei, ovrws
77 Trpos rrjv M e^ci. (The rest is
identical with the version followed
here.) He constructs two diagrams,
i. afy and P.OL are two similar
triangles one inscribed in the other and both are intersected by a
Fig. Themist.
COMMENTARY
281
line K/2eA. drawn parallel to OL or 77 so that
also drawn parallel to r?.
Then the following result will hold :
a
Also
ay
= .
a/3 p Kfj.
~ UK : K$ : : aft : ft. yS is
Fig. Freudenth.
/
7 /
/ /
7
// A
/
/ /
Finally ^ = ~ = -
pc /cA /}a
According to Freudenthal, aft, ftf
represent inner affections; ay, y8 con
cepts ; a, 77 are objective magnitudes,
while UK, K\ represent our idea of time,
u6, Oi actual objective time.
This scheme is not wholly unlike that of Themistius whose outer
triangle represents time and its subjective apprehension, while the
inner one symbolizes objects and the ideas by which they are
thought.
But, as the whole point of the argument is, that the internal
o-^ /Aara and Kt) ?7 o-et<j, though much smaller, are still analogous to the
external magnitudes and periods of time, it is strange to find the
internal /aV^cris, which is the means of apprehending time, symbolized
by lines in the external triangle. If there is any point at all in
drawing inserted triangles to represent the relation in question, the
inner one should certainly represent the subjective and smaller
process. A series of similar triangles, the one enclosing the other,
would be a much better means of bringing out Aristotle s contention.
It would thus be shown that differences in magnitude are non-
essential ; the proportions in the sides of the smallest interior triangle
are still analogous to those of the largest exterior one. There is no
need for Aristotle to represent objective time by different lines and
symbols from those which represent external spaces (cf. De Sensu,
ch. 7, quoted above), nor need the internal Kivrjo-is be distinguished
by different letters from the internal <TX^". In fact, the internal
state corresponding to both spatial and temporal magnitudes must be
a KiVrjo-ts (and perhaps it is this that Aristotle means when he says in
De An. in. ch. i, 425 a 17-18, that we know both figure and
magnitude by means of KU^O-IS). But this KIK^O-IS can be represented
by a figure, i.e. it is spatially determined, it is a kind of (opa, and it
282 DE ME MORI A
is as such that it can represent the objective magnitudes whether of
time or space. What the difference is between the /aVrjo-is which
represents a magnitude which is itself a /aVr/ons (as in time) and
that which represents a space, Aristotle does not say ; he seems
merely to be bent on describing everything internal in terms of
Again, it is difficult to believe that here Aristotle is distinguishing
inner affections ( innern Affectionen, Freudenthal in Rheinisches
Museum, p. 417) from concepts (Begriffe). In the previous sentence
(11. 16-18) he had (by implication) distinguished the apprehension of
61877 from that of a7ro(rr^/.iaTa, holding that in both cases there is
something analogous in the soul which corresponds to the objective
elSos or a7roo-T?7/xa. Now the distinction between elSos and a7roo-Tr;/xa
magnitude or spatial figure generally is quite different from that
between inner affection (<ai/Tao-/xa ?) and concept. Further, elSos is
not a psychological term ; it could not be used to mean concept as
opposed to image. Though the eTSos of a thing means the concept
or knowable character of a thing, it is used only in the epistemo-
logical reference not in the psychological. The appropriate term to
designate the concept as a psychical entity is vot^a not eZSos. Com
pare the usage all through this treatise as in De An., especially
432 a 12, 430 a 28. Further, even though one did take eTSos in the
sense of vo^/xa and held that the lines ay, yS represent vorj^ara or
t8>7, yet, as they are not of the nature of spatial quantity, what;
is here said about their analogy to the objects they represent will be
the merest metaphor. A concept represents the external reality by
having the same Aoyos, or in fact being the Ao yos of the external
thing (cf. De An. n. ch. 12, 424 a 24); but that Ao yos is not a spatial
proportion, neither in the external object (for that would be the
Democritean theory) nor, consequently, in the soul. On the other
hand the <aVrao>ia is spatial in character; as we saw in ch. i,
450 a 9, not to be able to think without <avTouryuaTu is just the same
as not being able to think avev TOV o-we^ov?. (This a-W^eta, as we
saw, forms the v\rj vorjrrj of the concept.) Hence the analogy
between the <f>dvraorfia (or aur&y/xa which is equally a spatial /ciir/tris)
and the objective magnitude whether temporal or not, can be ade
quately symbolized by spatial figures, e.g. by the identical ratios
which may be found in similar triangles of diverse magnitudes,
whereas the analogy between the vorj^a proper and its external
object must be something very different.
COMMENTARY 283
Hence, even though we were to keep Freudenthal s figure, we
need not appropriate special lines to the symbolization of particular
classes of psychical states. The point seems to be merely that
within a triangle of the same apex the shorter lines may be propor
tional to those obtained by producing the sides.
2. Freudenthal gives another illustration with three triangles,
the smaller progressively inscribed in the larger, but the alteration
is not material.
The only reason for following Themistius s explanation of the
passage the alleged correspondence of the triangulum rei and
triangulum temporis would be the difficulty of accounting for ovv
at the beginning of the next paragraph (1. 26) by any other. Hence,
(since the process corresponding to the time and that corresponding
to the thing may themselves correspond), we may explain memory.
When they occur together we remember, etc. But the alleged
correspondence of time-apprehending and object-apprehending pro
cesses does not account for the fact of remembering. It is their
coincidence that does so. It is also difficult to see what sense there is
in making out a correspondence between an object and the time in
which it is apprehended or between the subjective processes pro
duced by each. Both may be illustrated by the same lines and
figures as above, but that need not imply an analogy other than
generic between the two classes of processes. The ovv does not
imply that the act of memory is explained by the previous passage ;
j all that has been accounted for is the possibility of an internal
j process representing external reality, whether that be spatial magni-
! tude or temporal process. Memory, as such, is accounted for by the
i coincidence merely of the two subjective processes.
(In 1. 22 yap instead of ovv would give a smoother sense, but the
! change is not necessary.)
453 a I ~ 2 - Bekker reads olov on rpLrr^v rjfj.pav oS^Vore en-oii/crci ,
ore of. KOL /xerpo). This gives no material difference. But Freudenthal,
(op. cit. p. 419) pointing out that rpi-rr^v -tj^pav makes one think of
an exact interval of time, and hence can hardly be employed as an
instance of indeterminate time, wishes to read olov on Tpiryv -rjucpav,
I OTt fJifVTOi TTOTf f.TTOLr)O~f.V OTL Of. KOL /ATpO). OTl fJitVTOl IS TCB.O. by
LS Michael and vet. tr.
The change is surely not essential. I take on rpiry yj^pa oS^Vorc
tiro{r)o-f.v to be an example of remembering /xerpo). Aristotle says
284 DE ME MORI A
that sometimes one does not remember the exact interval, as e.g.
that it was an interval of three days, but at other times one
does.
FreudenthaFs objection against oS^VoTc is not convincing. The
indefiniteness of the subject acting need not entail any mdefiniteness
in the act performed.
453 a 7-8. Evidently to have recollection proper one must
remember /xcVpw.
453 a 10. yvo>pU;H^vv. The reading of LSU yv^pi^v is per
haps a little smoother.
453 a 12. olov <ruX\<ryur[x<$s TIS. This would point either to
Siebeck s theory or to the one I have given as to the meaning of
45 2 a 1 8 sqq. Beginning with your present thought, as it were
with a minor premiss, you develop it further by a series of middle
terms which finally lead to the idea you are in search of, just as
your middle terms in a. deduction finally bring you the ultimate
predicate which is to be attached to the subject.
Here Aristotle lays emphasis on the purposive character of dvd-
/xi/^o-ts. He treats it as a 17x770-19 depending on will. It is evidently
as such only that it is the exclusive possession of man. But aVa-
(jLvrja-Ls is not in all cases purposive: cf. 451 b 26, and 1. 28 below.
4533 14. (3ov\6vaL<> is also a species of ^TTJO-IS : cf. Eth. Nic.
vi. ch. 10, 1142 a 32, and again we have in 1142 b i : 6 Se /?ouAcvo-
/xcvo? r/Tet KCU Xoyterat. Cf. also in. ch. 5, 1 1 12 b 20 sqq. It is a
search for means to an end and for means which are in our power.
There is another kind of ^ifnycris theoretic, such as in mathematics is
a kind of avaA.vcn.9. Aristotle calls it in Metaph. ix. ch. 9, 10513
22 sqq., Siatpecri? (at least he says Siaipowrc? yap evpioveov(rii>. This is
of course not the Platonic Swupeo-ts). The process involved is thus
explained by MrBurnet in The Ethics of Aristotle, p. xxxv. Figures
are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which
are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the
proof would be plain ; as it is, we must make a construction which is
always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why
are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles ? It is because
the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the
line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be
plain at first sight.
This process is obviously just a7ro 8eiis demonstration, or o-uXXo-
COMMENTARY 285
the finding of the middle term. Scientific analysis and
demonstration are just the same thing, as is borne out by the name
of the treatises on demonstration ra avaAvriKa. Recollection is
then like a syllogism in being an analysis, though a psychological
one, corresponding to the logical analysis involved in scientific
reasoning.
453 a 16-17. ora>(j.aTi,KOv TO ird0os. (rw/xartKov TL TrdQos is read by
L S U, the commentators and all editors other than Biehl.
ev TOIOVT<P. Cf. De An. i. ch. 4, 408 b 17 and above, note to
451 b 35, dpxrji KIK^O-CCDS.
453 a 1 9- eirc xovTts. For this Christ is responsible. If we read
eTrc xorras with the MSS. and Bekker we must place a comma after
dva/j.vr)(rOrjva.i and, taking the e7re^ovra9 along with eTri^eipovfTas,
translate it and though they restrain their thoughts. The vet. tr.
however, though taking it along with Tn\eipovvTa^ has adhibentes
intellegentiam.
453 a 20. After ov8ev TJTTOV I understand with Simon Trupei/-
o-X\tir. It is this which it is the purpose of the proof to maintain.
So Thomas also. Themistius explains that the search still goes on.
This is not far wrong though it is difficult to see how what is against
one s will can be a ^ TT/O-IS (cf. Themistius, Sp. n. p. 253, 1. 29).
Hammond and Bender wish to have it that people remember when
they are not trying and in fact trying not to. This does not suit the
Greek so well and is hardly the point. Aristotle does not attempt
to show the bodily nature of recollection by its occurring involun
tarily (though that it does so is also implied, cf. 11. 27 sq.). In fact
he has lately understood by aya/xviycris the voluntary recall of an idea.
He wishes rather to show its corporeal connection by pointing out
that it may stimulate bodily disturbances beyond the control of the
will. This is the meaning of TOV pr) CTT avrots en/at TO aVayu. 1/^77 -
cTKeo-tfai (11. 22 sq.) and the subsequent illustration.
453 a 2 5- <rwp.aTiKov TI. The heart, according to everyone but
Neuhauser : cf. Introduction, sec. vi. In De An. i. ch. 4, 408 b 18
Aristotle talks of the KU^O-CIS stimulated in recollection as being in
the sense organs (lv TOIS aier^Tiy/Hois), but that is probably only
a vaguely worded statement.
We have seen above in ch. i, that the organ of Koivrj aio-^o-t? and
<j>avra(TLa. is the heart, or is situated in it. Cf. also De Juvent. ch. 3,
469 a 12. These KtvTyfrcis or TrdOrf are
286 DE MEMORIA
4533 28. irav\9Ti L S U. Michael, Themistius, and almost all
editors read rcA.0$, which does not give the sense of returning which
is involved in e7rai/e A#r/ and seems to be required.
453 a 34- >wrl & K - T -k- Another proof of the bodily nature of
memory and recollection. Dwarfs are people with the upper parts
of their bodies more developed than the lower extremities just like
young children.
453 b 56. 8id Tty/ KIVTJO-IV. Cf. ch. i, 450 b 7 sqq.
APPENDIX I.
THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF LIGHT.
It is difficult to reconcile Aristotle s doctrine that light is a c is
(cf. pp. 211-14 above) with his other statements which imply that,
if not a motion, it at least has direction in space.
We must, indeed, disregard those passages (e.g. Meteorol. i. ch. 8,
345 b 10 and n. ch. 9, 369 b 13-14) where his use of language which
has such an implication is due to the fact that some Empedoclean
doctrine is under discussion ; and again in Anal. Post. n. ch. u, 94 b
29 sqq., where he talks of the passage of light through the enclosing
walls of a lantern, he expressly safeguards himself by saying ciTrep
</>ws yiVertti TO> SueVcu. Once more, statements in the Problems (e.g.
904 b 17 : TO /xev <ws KO.T evOelav </>e/jerai) may be set aside as not
being of necessity genuinely Aristotelian.
Nevertheless, in Meteorol. in. ch. 4, 374 b 4, Aristotle speaks
of rays proceeding from the sun, and the whole of his account of the
phenomena of eclipse and illumination rests on the assumption that
light has direction; in De A?i. 11. ch. 8, 419 b 29 sqq. he explains
the diffusion of daylight by the reflection of the sun s light from the
spots directly illuminated.
It is noteworthy, however, that when he talks of the formation
of images in mirrors and tries to show that rainbows, haloes, etc. are
due to reflection (e.g. in Meteorol. in. ch. 2, 371 b 17 sqq.) he always
speaks of the reflection of sight, not of the reflection of light. More
over it is evident that he was as far as his predecessors from
understanding that the visibility of an object which is not self-
luminous is a phenomenon of reflection.
It is precisely when he comes to explain the perception of such
an object that his theory, like that of prior philosophers, breaks
down. The perception of anything which is a source of light
(n TTvpwSes) is relatively a simple matter. The luminous body, by
288 APPENDIX I
producing a ci5 in the medium intervening between it and the eye,
is enabled to act upon the organ of vision and so cause perception
of itself. But the non-luminous object must also act upon the eye,
if it is to be seen, and yet, not being of the nature of fire, it cannot
produce a eis in the medium. The fact that it is illuminated, i.e.
endowed with the eis produced in the transparent medium (which
penetrates it to a greater or less extent) by the presence of a source
of light, may be a prior cause of its visibility (TO yap <w? TroieT TO
opai ), but does not explain how it acts upon the eye. Light can be
the proximate cause of vision only in the case of a self-luminous
body. We may think it strange that Aristotle, whose general
doctrine of perception involved the action of all visible objects upon
the eye, and who in De Sensii, ch. 2, 438 b 5, is content to call this a
KO^O-IS, did not leap to the conclusion that illumination is itself due
to a Kivqo-ts which is identical with this. As things stand, his theory
of the perception of bodies which are not self-luminous is left
incomplete and is not reconciled with the rest of his teaching.
It can only be described as an advance upon the Empedoclean
doctrine, which made the act of vision a phenomenon of illumination
the illumination of an object by the eye, and thus took as obvious the
fact most in need of explanation, namely the perception of an illumi
nated object.
APPENDIX II.
THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF TIME-PERCEPTION
A TENTATIVE rendering of the difficult passage 452 b 8-25 (Bek.
7-22) has been suggested to me by Mr J. A. Smith and Mr W. D.
Ross. The same figure is retained in illustration of the text and the
explanation is of the same general type as that which I have adopted
in pp. 279 sqq. But the reading in 11. 14-16 (Bek. 13-15) is altered
to TIVI ovv Si06<rei, orav TO. /xet^co 1/017, Tt ^/ceii/a voei fj TO. eXctTTw ;
Travra yap TO. CFTOS eA.arTa>, wcnrep ai/aXoyov KCU ra CKTOS. When
one thinks of the greater (and more distant) objects, what is the
difference between thinking of them and of the smaller (and nearer) ?
For all the internal (subjective) are smaller (than the external) as it
were in proportion to the external (objective).
The internal AB, BE is smaller than Ar, TA, but preserves the
same proportion as AT, FA, and also as AZ, ZH. What then is the
difference between interpreting AB, BE as meaning Ar, TA and
interpreting it as meaning AZ, ZH? The difference lies in the
power (assumed by Aristotle 1. 9 above eorrw Se n o> KptVei roV
TrAeico KCU eAciTTU)) of knowing the distance in space or time of the
object for which our mental object stands, and knowing, therefore,
K
by what to multiply AB and BE whether by y or -^ . This tells
us (to take the case of ptytO-rj) whether the image in us stands for
a cat at ten yards distance or a tiger much farther away. Similarly
it enables us to say whether the Kivya-is in us represents an event
which took ten minutes a week ago or twenty minutes a fortnight
ago. When the image is multiplied by us in the same ratio as that
in which its distance from us is multiplied, we think of (or recollect)
the right object at the right distance of space or time. When
different ratios are used we get a false thought or a false recollection.
According to this interpretation AB is the aVoVrry/xa of the image
from us, Ar and AZ the a^oo-T^ara (in space or time) of the objects
R. 19
290 APPENDIX II
from us. BE represents our subjective image or KU/^O-IS, FA and
ZH the objects (spatial or temporal) which we think of. If you wish
to think of ZH rather than FA you must think of the cxTroo-T^ara as
being different too, and multiply AB by not by .
The chief objection to this interpretation is that it implies that
Aristotle thought of the image in the mind as existing at a distance
from us, as though there were within us an inner spectator (the real
self) whose relation to mental images merely reproduced on a small
scale the relation between a percipient being and the spatial objects
external to his organism. In fact we have the scholastic and
Cartesian theory of the relation of the soul to the motions in the
animal spirits. But surely such a doctrine is definitely non-
Aristotelian. Further if AF and AZ can be interpreted as being
designed to represent distances in time of past events, AB will also
(when compared with these) represent an aTroVn^a in time. But
how can a present image or /av^o-ts (BE) be said to be distant from
us in time ? It will thus be seen that there are difficulties in working
out the consequences of this tempting and ingenious theory. I
myself cannot believe that Aristotle meant his symbols to be anything
more than a general illustration of the relation which internal
/avryVas bear to external Kti/^o-ei? and /xeye^r/. The fact that motion
always implies extension made it possible for the former class to
symbolize both the latter.
APPENDIX III.
LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO
TEXTS :
Aristotelis Parua Naturalia, ed. Biehl, Leipzig, 1898 (Teubner).
Bekker s Aristotle, Berlin, 1831.
TRANSLATIONS :
Barthelemy St Hilaire : Psychologie d Aristote Opuscules Paris,
1847.
Bender : Parva Naturalia, Stuttgart.
Hamilton : Note D** in Reid s Works (Commentary on and transla
tion of part of the De Memoria\
Hammond: Aristotle^ s Psychology, 1902.
Ziaja: De Sensu 436 a i 439 b 18, Breslau, 1887 (P r g-)-
COMMENTARIES :
Alexander: De Sensu, ed. Wendland, Berlin, 1901; ed. Thurot,
Paris, 1875.
Maynetius : De Sensu, Florence, 1555.
Michael Ephesius : De Memoria (Aldine).
Simon Simonius : De Sensu et De Memoria, Geneva, 1556.
Themistius : Paraphrases Aristotelis, ed. Spengel, Leipzig (Teubner).
Thomas Aquinas : De Sensu et De Memoria, Parma ed., vol. xx.
WORKS BEARING ON THE SUBJECT :
Baumker : Des Aristoteles Lehre von den dussern und innern Sinnes-
vermogen, Paderborn, 1877.
Bonitz : Index Aristotelicus ; Aristotelis Metaphysica, Bonn, 1848.
Bur net: Early Greek Philosophy, 1892; The Ethics of Aristotle,
1900.
Bywater in Journal of Philology, xvin,
192
292 APPENDIX III
Cook Wilson in Journal of Philology, XL
Freudenthal in Rheinisches Museum, 1869; Archiv fur Geschichte
der Philosophic, 1889.
Hayduck : Prog. Kon. Gym. zu Meldorf, 1876-77.
Neuhauser : Aristoteks Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnisver-
mogen und semen Organen, Leipzig, 1878.
Rassow : Prog. d. Joachimsth. Gym., 1858.
Rodier : Trait e de T Ame, Paris, 1900 (2 vols.).
Siebeck in Philologus, 1881 ; Untersuchungen zur Philosophic der
Griechen.
Torstrik : De Anima, Berlin, 1862.
Trendelenburg : De Anima, Berlin, 1877.
Wallace: Aristotle s Psychology, 1882.
Zeller : Presocratic Philosophy (English Translation, 1881), Plato and
the Older Academy (E. Tr., 1876), Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics (E. Tr., 1897).
INDEX I (Greek).
ddialpeTos 448 b 17; 44Qa 12, 23, 29,
3 1
dovvaTfiv 452 a 8
aivruv (Emped.) 437 b 31
di7/>. 6 dr?p t7p6v TT> 0i5o-^ e<rriv
443 b 6 ; 443 a 7. o/c ftrru drjp tv
r(fJ #5aTi 443 a 5, 6
ai6ofj.voi.o irvpos (Emped.) 437 b 29
alffdavecrdai. ov Kara TO ^avdaveiv
dXXd /card TO dewpelv ecrri TO aladd-
ve<r#at 441 b 26. /ecu et d?ra^ d/coi/et
/caJ d/o7/coe /cat 6 Xws aladdverai /cat
fjffO-rjTai 446 b 3. e/cdcrrou fj.d\\ov
ZffTiv alcrddveadai dirXov OVTOS ?) /ce-
Kpa.fj.tvov 447 a 19, 27. TrcDs evoexe-
rcu d ,ua ir\fibvut}v aiaddveadai 448 b
19 sqq. ; 449 a 21. alcrddveffdcu o^ws
444 b 15. 6 re auros avrov TIS aicrdd-
verai 448 a 28. XP 01 05 &/ w aladd-
verai 448 b 2
<ra)/iaros 436 a 9, b 7. TrepLrral at
aladrjcreis 445 35. et ^ rts ?rapd
rds Trevre a.la9~f)aei.s ertpa 444 b 21.
at alffdriaeis aTTTt/cat dist. at 5t d\\ov
a.iffd rjTiKai 445 b 7, 8; 4363 20. TCJ
Kiveicrdai TO /j-era^v T^S atV^^crews UTTO
ToC aladr/Tou ylveedai rr\v
440 a 20, 21 ; cf. 438 b 5. 77
aiV^crts 450 a 12 ; cf. 442 b 4 sqq.
i] afodr)<Tis TOV Trap6vTO$ ^crriv 449 b
14, 30. irddrj, ^^ets atV^^crews 436 b
5,6. r/ TT^S at cr^Tjcrews virepoxrj 446 a
II
ots atV^rjTTjpi ots ^7-
yiyveadai TretyvKev TJ atcr^r?crts, ^vtoi
i"rjToOcrt /caTa Ta aTot%era TW^ crw/xaTwi
437a 21 ; 438 b 20. OTTWS /i?) alcrdr]-
Trjpta 5i^o 7Toti7 (17 0i/<rt$) 444 b 5
. dyeL (TO alffdijrbv) TO aicrffrj-
TIKOV et s tvtpyeiav 441 b 24. oi)/c e?rt
TOO ^(T^dTOi; OfJ.fJ.aTOS T! faxy ~f) TTJS
tyvxris TO aiffd-riTiKov <TTIV 438 b 10.
QTOI> Kal tiri TTJS / I X^s T0 a WTO /cat
v elvai dpi6u TO aladtjTiKov irdvTuv
449 a 19, 8. TO TrpCoTOV alffdrjTiKov
450 a 13, 16; 451 a 1 8. TroXu /3dpos
453 b 2
os. TUV alaO^TCiv r&v Ka.6 e/ca<r-
TOJ alo~6r)Tripiov, ...T L TO epyov avTuv
dist. Tt eo-Tt eKao-Tov avTuv 439 a 7,
1 8. HCTTUS eKa<TTov Stx^s \ey6fj.evov,
TO fj.ev tvepyeia TO 5e dvvd/u.ei 439 a
14, 15. TO alffd^Tov tvepyeiv TTOICI
rqv ai<r0T)<riv 438 b 24 ; 445 b 7. ouTe
ai.cfj.aTa (TO, atV0r;Td), dXXd
/cat Kivir)o~is TIS, oi^S d^ei/ (
446 b 28. TO a.lffdr]Tbv irdv ecm
fj-tyedos 449 a 22 ; cf. 448 b 14 sqq. ;
440 a 30 ; 445 bio. TCI atVtfrjTd $ at
lavf/vets at d?r6 TcD^ alcrQrjT&v 446 323.
Ta ira6r]fj.aTa TO. aiffdr/Td 445 b 4 ; cf.
439 a 8. T<i Koiva opp. Ta ?5ta (aiffd-rj-
Td) 442 b 4 sqq.; 4373 8. irdv TO
alffdfjTbv ?xei tvavTiuffLv 445 b 26 ;
442 b 19. Ta fJ.iKpd -rrdfj-Trav \avddvec
5vvdfj.ei yap opaTa, evepyela 8 o$ 446 a
5 sqq. irdvTa Ta aicrB-qTa d-rrTa iroiei
Arjfj.oKpiTOs Kal oi irXeiffToi r&v <pvo~io-
\6ywv 442 b i. atV0r?T6s, dist. vorjr6y
445 b 17
am os 437 a 13
d/captatos 446 a 10
d/cor? 437 a 10, 12. Trpos T?7 d/co?? 446 b 7
d/co()etj 446 b 3, 1 8
d/coucrts /caT J frtpyeiav afodyo ls CQ-TLV
439 a 17
d/cowrr6s 437 a 13. T6 dKovaTbv 4453
ii
447 a 20
d/cpt/3r5s 441 a 3; 442 b 1 6
ct/cpt/ycDs 444 b 10
d/cpos 448 a 12
d/cTi s. aKTiveffffiv (Emped.) 437 b 33
dXXotoui 447 a i , 2
dXXoiwcm 446 a 31 sqq.
dXXotWTi/cos 441 b 24
d\/j.vp6s 441 b 4. TO d\fj.vp6v 442 a 19
d\ovpy6s 440 a i ; 442 a 26
d Xs. d Xes 7775 TI eW6s eicriv 441 b 5.
d Xes 6<r/xc65ets clfftv 443 a 14
d /ua. 8vew dfj.a aiffdaveadai. 447 a 14
sqq. dfj.a Kive iadai. 448 b 22, 26
&np\6vetv 443 b 16
dfj.iKTos 445 a 23
dfj.v-fiij.uv 453 b i, 5 ; 450 b 7
294
INDEX I (GREEK)
d/j.opyo6s (Emped.) 437 b 30
d/ui(pivdovTos vdaros (Emped.) 438 a 2
dvdyetv 442 b 1 1 , 13
dvdyKT], e dvdyK7)s dist. 26ei 451 b 13
dvadvfj.La<ris 443 a 23 sqq. r; Trvevfj.a-
T&drjs dvadv/j.iaffis 445 a 29. 17 T?)S
rpo(pfjs dvadvfj.ia(ns 444 a 14
(rd) ava.L/j.0. 438 a 25
dvaiffdrjTos 440 a 23 ; 441 a 6 ; 448 a
27, b 4, 19
dvaKaXvirTeiv 444 b 27
dra/cXacm 437 b 12; 438 a 10
dva\a/ji(3dveiv fjivrj/mijis 451 a 24
dvd\i]\{/is fj.fr] /j.r)s 451 a 23
dVdA<>70* . dvdXoyov elvai rds ocr/xds
rots xwris 443 b 13. di d\070J rd
("KTOS Tots evTos 452 b 16 sqq.
dva/j.L[j.vr]ffKcr6ai 451 a 20 sqq. ; dist.
fj.v-rjtj.oi eveiv 451 b 2 ; 453 a 10; dist.
ird\u> /j,avddveii> 451 b lo
di djUj Tjais; cf. di>a[J,i/J.vr]ffK<r6ai
dita.jj.ifrja-Ti.K6s dist. fj.vrjfj.ovLK 6s 449 b 8;
, 453 a 6
dvaTn etV ; cf. dvcnrvor)
dvaTTvor). yiyveTai (TO 6ayxdV0ai) did
TTJS dvaTTvoijs 4443 21 sqq.
dvatyepew 444 a 24
&v8os 443 b 31; 444 a 36
dvdpaKudTjs 437 b 19
&v0pa 444 b 33^
dvdpwTros. TrXetoToi eyKe(pa\ov /cat
vypoTaTov ^x ei r & v tyuv 444 a 33.
fj,6vov ^cu /jfi ra?s TW dvdtjov ocr/uais
444 a 36. %et So^aj /ecu (ppovriaiv
450 a 17; cf. 453 a 1 1
445 b 29 ; 447 b i
4483 10
453 a 29, 31
6 fipetTT?? 451 a 10
d6paTos 439 b 22; 440 a 30
d6/3i0"ros 439 a 29, b 4
dWyUos 443 a 1 1
d?ra^ 451 b 15
diraTacrdai 442 b 9
dVeipos opp. wpttr/w^os 440 b 26. vel
TreTrepa.ffiJ.evos 445 b 29, 3 ; cf. 449 a
24 ; 442 b 28, 29
dirtxei" 444 b 1 1 ; 448 a 1 5
&TTTJKTOS 438 a 22
dirXovs 445 a 2 r ; 447 a 20
aTrXcos dist. /j.e/u.iyfj.e i us 442 a 3
dTToSiSoi cu 438 b 19
dVoTrXiyp et^ 443 b 8
diropetv 438 an; 444 b 1 6 ; 445 b 3 ;
446 a 22 ; 450 a 27
diropla 437 a 29; 446b 29; 447 a 13;
448 b 20
dn6ppoia 438 a 4; 440 a 17, 21 ; 443 b 2
diroafievvvvai. 437 b 15; 438 b 16
437 617
(Emped.) 438 a 2
dTr6aT-r]fj.a 4403 30; 449 a 24, 27;
452 b 18
4383 27; 452 b n
438 b 16
444 b 5
. a\j/as (Emped.) 437 b 30
d-rrTecrdai 442 a 5 ; 450 b 1 2
d7TTl/c6s. TO aiTTLKOV (atffd
439 a i. at dTrrt/cat aiffd^aeis 445 a
7
dTTTos. TO aiTTOv 441 b 31; 445 a 13.
TO dTTTOJ yevos 445 a 10
dpid/Ji.6s. dpi.diJ.os TrepLTTQS 445 a 6.
/caT dpL0/j.ovs sive ^P dpi^/uots 442 a
16, 18; 439 b 30, 33; 440 a 4 , 6,
b 21. ev\6yLffTOL dpiti/Jioi 439 b 34.
26 ,
446 b 25 ; 447 b
449 a 1 6 sqq.
(ot) dpxatoi 440 a 16
45i b 35 ; 452 a 7, 19, 27 j e^
451 a 25, b 2
d(rvfjLfj.eTpos 439 b 32
dff<t>a\TudT>]s 444 b 35
oVa/rros 440 a 5
dT/its. ^ TtDi dvdpdKuv dTjJils 444 b 33;
dist. dTa6ufj,ia<ns 443 a 28 sqq.
dVoMos. ^ Ty auT^ /cat aTd/uup XP V V
447 a 15 ; cf. 448 b 22 ; ^449 a ^ 4 .
Ty aT6/j.i{} (opp. eT^py T?}S i/ t X^ 5 )
aivddveadai. 448 b 24 ; cf. 451 a 23.
T<X dVojiia p-cyedy 445 b j 9
dVoTTos 448 a 10 ; 442 b i
avyrj 439 b 3
avdveiv 442 a 5
atilyets 442 a i ; 450 b 8 ; 453 b 6
442 a 20 ; 443 b 1 1
452 b 5
d<f>acpeiv 441 b 32; 441 a 13; 444 b
24, 25; 448 b 7; med. 447 a 25
dcpavifeiv 443 b 16, 17; 447 a 22
d(f)e\Keiv 452 b 5
d</>77 436 b 14; 439 a i; 4413 3, 4 ;
442 b 8
440 a 12
441 a 6 : 443 a 12
padlfriv 448 b 9; 445 a 30
fiddos. Td eV /Sd^et 4403 15
/3dpo$ 445 b 5 ; 442 a 7 ; 453 b i
fiapvs opp. 6i5s 447 b 4
jSa0Tj coni. TrX^o-ts 445 a 15
/3?7\6s. /caTd /377X6v (Emped.) 437 b
33
j8iafle<r0ai 444 a 2
jSX^Tretj/ 43 7 b 27
(3\"(papoi> 444 b 26
fiovXeffBai. rj TOV vdaTos <pvai.s
dx^Ms eli/at 441 a 4; cf. 447
pov\evea0at 453 a 1 6
INDEX I (GREEK)
295
/3oi>XeiTi/c6s. TO fiovXevriKov 453 a 15
fipadvs. fJ.vr/fj.oviKUTepoi ol /3pa5ets 449 b
9
7fVe<Tts 446 b 5. v Tols Trepl yevtcrews
442 a 4
7eVos 443 b 27, 32 ; 448 a 16-20, b 29;
449 a 20; 445 a ro; 441 a 19
450 b 7 ; 453 b 5
447 a 7
436 b 15; 439 a 3; 4413 3,
b 23; 442 b 15, 17
7ei/<rri/c6s. r6 yevariKOV 439 a r
7ev<rros 442 a 2, b 26
yeuSrjs 441 b 20
777, 777$ tSioi ro r/p6v 441 b 13.
XVfJ.ol ... virdpxovTes /cat eV rrj yfj
441 b i. oi d Xes 777$ TI et56s eicriv
441 b 5. 77 Kcnrvud-ris dvadv/u.ia(Tis <TTL
KOWTI 777$ re /ecu dtpos 443 a 26, 30.
TO airTiKov 777$ e crTtj/ 439 a I
yrjpas 4363 15
446 b 5, 6
441 a 28
7\i xe<r0cu 437 a 23
7Xu/ci/s. e*/c yXuK^os /cat Trt/cpoC (/x,tews)
ot x v l j - 1 - 44 2 a 14. TO 7\u/ciy 4423 3
sqq. ; 448 a 17, 18 ; 449 a 6
yvwplfriv 449 b 15; 453 a 5, 10
ypdfpeiv 450 a 4, b 23; 451 a i
ypa(f>evs 440 a 9
450 b 17, 33
SCKTLKOS. deKTiKov 0cor6s 439 b ir.
deKTiKov TTJS xpoas 439 b 8. TOTTOS
5e/cTi/f6s Tiys rpb^ i 445 a 26
442 a 5 ; 443 b 1 7
438 a 5; 442 a 31, b 12
443 327
5iaypa.<peiv 450 a 2
SLadpuffKov (Emped.) 437 b 32; 438 a 3
StcupetV. ets aTretpa (crcD/ict) Statpeti
445 b 3. ets TO, eXaxto Ta 440 b 5
sqq. 77 7ro5tat a...5tatpe^et(7a 446 a 8.
5trjp77Tat Ta ei 57? 444 37; cf. 439 b
20
StatpeTos 449 b 13
5ia.Kplvi.v 442 b 1 6
BiaXueu* 446 a 9
Stdvota. eTT^xoi Tes TTJI Sid^otai 453 a
19. &m 7<ip ev aurrj rd 6/j.oi.a
o - X 1 7A tara f 01 ^ Kivrjcreis (TO?S e/cTos)
452 b 1 1
StaffKidvaffiv (Emped.) 437 b 31
StcuTTT/jtta 446 a 3
8ia.<pa.vris. TO dicKpaves KOLVOV TOV df pos
/cat uSaTOS 438 a 14 ; 442 b 32 ; cf.
439 a 23 sqq. TO diatpaves xpw/xaTos
Trotet /j,T^x iV 439 b 9. 8ia.(paves ecrri
TO ^TOS ToO &fj./ma.Tos 438 b n sqq.
TOU ^P Tots <rc6ytiacrt diacpavovs TO tax.-
TOV 439 a 30 sqq.
dia^etideffdac 452 b 28
5te(Tts 446 a 2
QLrjOeiv 441 b 5, 20
oLopifriv 436 a i, b 14 ; 439 a 6 ; 442 a
3; 443 b 21 ; 445 b 2
dto-Taetj/ 451 a 6
56a 450 a 17
oo^atTTov 449 b 12
dpi/u,vs xiy-tos 442 a 20. Spt^eta <5<r/i?7
443 b 10
Swayuts 43736; coni. 0&71S 439 a 25.
77 TOU ^e/oi; ovvafjus 444 b 35. /uyvvv-
TCS ets TO, Tro^ttTa Tas Tota^Tas Syj d-
/xets 444 a 2. 5wa/its opp. tvpyet.a.
445 b 32 sqq. ; 447 b 16 sqq. ; 449 a 2.
77 7eO<rts 77 /COTOL duva/j-iv 441 b 23.
dvvdfjiei Trpovirdpxov 441 b 25. eVetVat
5vvd/j,ei 452 a 12
Si/crai aTri ei O Tos 443 b 13
8v<rKaTdiroTos 443 b 13
SfcrxepatVetj 444 b 31
6Wa>6>s 444 b 31; 4453 3
5i (rw5t a 445 a 2
<:7/ce0a\os 438 b 27, 31; 4443 n,
33
eypr/y opens 436 a 14
442 b 31; 443 a 2, 17
445 a 4
<!de\iv 445 a 23 ; cf. j3ov\eadai
tOifciv 451 b 17
e flos. wcTTrep 0^<Tts TO ^^os 452 a 30.
e^et dist. e di ^/c??? 451 b 15. 5t
Itfos dist. 0iycret 452 b 3
f?5os=: forma 452 b 1 7 ; dist. yevos 449 a
21, =; ; 448 b 28, 31. et 577 species,
442 a 22, 23; 445 b 23; 439 b 20;
444 a 7. et 5T7 = varietates 443 b 19.
et Set 5ta0epeti> 4483 19. et 5ei %v,
447 b 16, 28. ef5et frepov 449 a 21
ei 5o;Aoi> 438 a 13
CLKUV 450 b 24, 26, 33; 451 a 15, 17
elvat. TO eli ai = notio 449 a 18, 20;
cf. T evelvai. vel eli at 446 b 30,
pp. 211, 212
. ci>s fiireiv 444 a 35, 21; 441 a
T 9
eepy/j-evov (Emped.) 437 b
34
els. li dpi0/j,u) dist. e 1 ^ etSft 446 b 25;
447 b 16, 26, 28; 4493 1 6 sqq.
iffayy\\eiv 437 a 2
etVa7ra 447 b 2 1
ei wfla 453 a 3
eKKaieiv 443 a 20
cKKpoveLv 447 a 16
e/c\d/x7retj> 437 a 26
e/cpetf 438 a 1 8
2 9 6
INDEX I (GREEK)
438 b 14
ZXaiov 441 a 26
<?X/ceti> 441 a 15
eXirts ToD AiAXoi Tos e<rrti 449 b 30
s 449 b 13
453 b 3
437 b 12, 25 ; 441 a 6, n ;
446 a 28
/n<f>ali>ea6ai 438 a 9, 12
gfjupacrts 438 a 6
evavrios 441 b iosqq.; 442 b 22. TO,
evavriab 25. at TUJ? tvcLvriuv /ctj/^(reis
448 a 3
441 b 1 6
442 b 20 ; 445 b 26
fLV 441 b 17
evapyrjs 4403 10, b 31
coni. /cw<6s 437 a 17
eia ; cf. vvajj,is. evepyeiq. opp.
0wret 452 b i. dWu TOW tvepyei&v
449 b 20
evepyeiv 446 a 24. tvepyelv TTJ /u.vri/j.y
452 b 26, 30; cf. 449 b 24
tvvoelv cr(f)65pa TL 447 a 18
evo-x\civ 453 a 26
vffr)/j.aivcr6a.i. 450 a 33
^aTrardv 449 b 1 1
tj-itvcu. etoi>Tos TOV 0wrds 437 a 26;
cf. 438 a 26 sqq.
441 a 1 6 ; 442 a 31 ; 443 a
(TT}S aicr^Tjo-ews) 436 b 6.
s 451 317; 450 a 32 ;
451 b 5. rr\v e%iv TT)v Trepl rbv yi<-
0aXoj/ 444 a 10. ts r) -jraOos 449 b
27 ; 45 1 a 30. r) eis /cai TO Tr
451 a 26. TO TTCI^OS, 06 0a^ev
^iJ fJLvri^v elvcu 450 a 32
i<rTacr6ai 451 a n
^oi/ce vo[j.iovTi. 437 b 25. ^oi/ce d/
/tat TO [Aeaov 452 a 18
7ra\ei(peLV 440 a lo
45 1 a 14
opp. ^Trt Ta5i 449 a 29
441 a 27
450 b 31; 438 a 10; cf.
453 a 28. ^ire\7i\vdev i] 6\J/is 4463 i
ireX eLV T V Sta^otay 453 a 19
eiri. TO UTj ^TT ai)To?s eZVcu TO avafj.Lfj.vf]-
453 a 22
etV 452 a 18, 22, 25
virreLv 437 a 28
eiri.Tro\d.eiv. eirnroXdfei 6 dr/p 443 a 5
^7ri7r6Xa(rtj (xpw / ua,Twi ) 440 b 1 7
e7ri7roXa<TTt/c6s 4423 13
440 a 15 sqq.
436 a 3
451 a 31
449 a i ; 451 a 29, 30
431 a 33
iri(pepeu> 447 a 16; med. 443 a 24, 27
et" (Strattls) 443 b 34
453 a 20
(oi) ^Trt^eip^aTi/coi X67ot 451 a 21
Zpyov. eir avr&v rGiv pyuv dij\ov
438 a 1 8. />7ov dist. irapepyov 444 a
28, 17
449 a 26, 32. TO O.TO/J.OV KOL
451 a 28. TOL ^xo-ra 445 b
24, 25; 447 b 2; cf. evavrios
eu. TOU eu eve/to. 437 a i
ei)T7^s 438 a 30
evdvTropeiv 453 a 28, b 4
ev\6yiffTos 439 b 34
eu Xo7oj 445 a 18. ev\6yws 438 b 6;
441 b 8; 445 a 19
ev/j.adr]s 449 b 9
ev/uLi>ti[j.6i>VTos 452 a 3
438 a 16
437 a 22
443 b 33
s 441 a 12
438 a 15
444 a 1 3
444 a 19
eii 441 a 19; (Strattis) 443 b 34
reiv 451 b 26; 452 a 24
jTriffLS. olov ^rjTTjo is rts (i)
453 a 14, 17
77 436 a 16^
?} f^ov 439 b 12.
Ta fya 445 a 26. TO, <XXXa fwa
444 a 5-445 a 4 j 450 a 16 sqq.
TO, yj>wpi6fj.ei>a ^a 453 an
T/^OJ/T) 442 a 17; 444 a 2; 436 a 10
r)5vs. TO i]5v /cat TO \vinipbv 443 b 23
sqq. ; 444 a 20. T<Z TJdicrTa
440 a i
i]dv(Tfj.a 442 a 1 1
TjXt/cta. 5t ri\LKiav 450 b 2.
Troppw TTJS r/Xt/cias 453 b 8
Tj Xtos 440 a ii. T6 aTro rov i]\Lov 0cDs
446 a 29. et s TOV T/ Xtov 441 a 14
r,pefj.eii> 437 a 31
6d\cLTTa 439 b 5, 443 a 13
0aXdTTios 444 b 13
ddvaTos 436 a 1 5
0eioi>. TO ddov /cat TO, dff<pa.\T&8 r] 444 b
35
6 ep fJLaiv av 441 a 30
6epfj.6s 441 b 33. 6epfj.rj TTJV <f)ijo ii> (?) TTJS
6ff/j.7)S dwa/Ms) 444 a 27. TO depfiov
441 b 1 3 ; 442 a 5
0&rts. 77 irap 1 aXXrjXa ^^<rts 440 b 8,
17^
deupeiv 45 b 20, 25; coni. evvoelv 449 b
17
INDEX I (GREEK)
297
0eu>pTJ/ua 450 b 27, 28
6r)pe6eiv 451 b 21 ; 4533 24
Biyydvew 447 a 9
0Xt/3eu> 437 a 25
0oX6s (6 TTJS o-r;7r/a$) 437 b 8
Ope-TTTiKos. TO dptirTLKov 436 b 19 ;
443 b 24; 445 a 9, 34. TO epeirTiKw
el<5os T77? oVyU^s 444 b 10
0wpa 444 329
(77) larpiK-f] 436 b i
(6) t aTpos opp. 6 Trept 0i5(rea>s 436 a 21
fo-os 445 b 29; 446 b 12; 447 a 27
Kadapos 440 a 6
KO.Q iaro.ffQa.1 453 a 30
Ka06\ov 452 a 1 8
/cdXXtcrra 452 a i
/caTn^s. et Trdvra. ra. 6Wa /ca7rz>6s
7t 7?/oiTo (Herac.) 443 a 26
(-7) Ka.Tn>(!)8-r)S dvadv/miaais 443 a 23 sqq.
KaraKaieiv 4.423. 30
KaraXcLTreiV 442 a 7
Ka.TaxpTJffda.1 444 a 27
/caTTiVepo? 443 a 2 i
/cev6s = vanus 437 b 1 7
Kepavvvvai 447 a 20
/cu/et^ 437 a 26; 440 a 26; 441 b 21.
TO /i>ouz> /cat 8rnj.iovpyovv 443 b 17.
TO KLVOVjAfVOV 446 a 31. TO
Kivijorav 446 b 23. Klvrjaiv KLVf]dr)ffe
441 b 15 ; cf. Ktv-rjffts
dist. dXXotWts 446 b 31 sqq.
r/ juet ^u> Kivrjffis 447 a 16 sqq. 77 5td
(sc. ToO ytieTai>) KivTjcris 438 b 5.
/cat Kivrjcns 446 a 28. /diverts
447 b 22. ^cm? ^ OI)T^
(sc. T^ 5tai o/a).../cti 77(rets 452 b 14; cf.
451 b 1 2-453 b 6. ^J> KlVr)<Tl 7TOX\77
i 450 b i
444 b 13
; cf. i Stos. TO, KOLVO. alad-qra 437 a
9; 442 b 9 sqq.
*6p?7 438 a 16, b 17
K6pt(r/cos 450 b 34
Kovprj (Emped.) 4383 i
/co00os 442 a 6
444 a 25
441 b 7
Kpiveiv coni. yiyi>u<TKeci> 445 b 16; coni.
yvwplfciv et voe?^ 452 b 8 sqq. 77
Kpivovffa a Lffdrj(ns 447 b 28, 30
KplTlKOS 442 b 19
Kp6Ta0os 438 b 14
Kvai/ous 442 a 26
KVK\w\f/ (Emped.) 438 a i
K<i)5ui> 446 b 24
437 a 18
451 a 25. evrevdev
437 a 33 ; 445 b 32 ; 449 b 10 ;
cf. 441 b 28; 440 323
\dfj.irLv 437 a 34
XafMTrecrKeiv (Emped.) 447 b 33
Xa^TTTTjp 438 b 16; (Emped.) 437 b 30
\tyeiv. \KTeov 439 b 21; 440 b 30 ;
v rfj \fsvxy \tyeii> 449 b 25; cf.
447 b 27
Xe?os. TCL Xela 437 a 34, b 7
XetTretv. \eiirerai 441 a 22; 4423 25
XeTTTos. \TTTrj<nv oddvyo-i (Emped.)
438 a i
XeuKos. TO XevKov 439 b 19; 4423 13;
447 b 26 sqq.
X^s dist. dvd\y\j/is 451 a 23
Xt/3ava>T6s 446 b 24
XtTrapos. XtTrapos 6 ToO y\vxeos earl
XI/^UGS 442 a 18, 25
X67os = oratio 437 a 13; 453 a 32.
= disquisitio 445 b 21; 451 a 21.
argumentum 445 b 20. o^Xop did
rou \6yov /cat ToO Xo7ou x w P s 43^ b
9. =notio, Xo7^ Ta^To 449 a 22.
= ratio (mathematica) 439 b 29, 31 ;
440 a 14, 16 ; 440 b 20 ; 4483 10, 12
XoxdfcTo (Emped.) 438 a i
\veiv TOV \6yov 445 b 20
Xi5(rts 445 b 22
\vxvos 438 b 15; (Emped.) 437 b 28
452 a 4
16
w/iaTa /u.a^7;/u.aTt/cd 445 b
IJLO.vddveiv. Kara TO /J.ai>0di>eiv dist. /caTa
TO deupelv 441 b 25. [JLOiUelv rj iraOeiv
451 a 24. TO wd\Lv v-avBdveiv 452 a
6; 451 b 9, n
/j.avTiKr) 449 b 14
/j-apTvpelv 445 b 19
/j.tyedos. ZVLO, fj.ey07] \avddvei 4463 17.
trav /mtyedos alad irjrbv 445 b 10; cf.
440 a 23, 29; 448 b 15-17. T6
a.i<r6r)Tov irav earl /J,tyedos 449 a 22
sqq. fj.tye6os teal xp^ vov Kai irpdy-
yttaTos 448 b 4
(ot) /j.e\ayxo\tKoL 4533 21
/x^Xas. TO /u.\av 442 328; cf. Xei/c6s
fj.e\trr) 4513 13
/xAtTTa 444 b 1 2
(TO) /m.t\\oi> 449 b 1 1
446 b 1 6
TO ToO 6(pda\fj.ov /j.ffov 437 b I.
/if (77? (?) 5(T0p770rt?) 445 a J. TO /X^O-OV
Trdj/TW^ 452 a 19
(TO,) yueTaXXei6 / uez a 443 a 18
446 b 10
446 b 8
rr\v
452 a 1 8
438 b 2; (Emped.) 437 b 34
298
INDEX I (GREEK)
fj.iyfj,a 447 b 12
fj,iyvvi>ai 440 b 5 sqq.; 444 a i. TO,
/ie/At7 / ueva44ob 19 sqq. ; 447 b 12 sqq.;
Cf. JU.U-LS
/ut/cpos 440 b 2 sqq.; 4463 5
448 b 5
440 a 31 sqq.;
442 a 13 sqq. rd Trepi yut^ewj 440 b 4
fj.vf)fj.r). Trept fj.vrjfj.Tjs 449 b 4 sqq. ; def.
449 b 26 sqq. ; 451 a 14 sqq. tvepyeiv
T-fj fj.vf)fj.rj 450 a 21 ; 452 b 27
fj.vrjfj.oveveiv , cf. fj.vrjfj.-t]. rb fj.vr)fj.oveveiv
Ko.6 avr6 dist. /card av/j-^e^riKos 451
b 31, 32; dist. TO dvafJ-ifJivrjcTKeadai.
451 b 2 sqq.; 4533 7 sqq.
/j.vrifj,6vevfj.a 450 b 29 ; 451 a 3
fj,vr)[j,ovevT6s 449 bio. rd fj.vr)fj,ovVTa
K0.6 aura Kal /card (TU^/Se/fy/cos 450 a
26
fj.vrjfj.ovLK 6s. oi fj.vrjfj.ov i KoL dist. ot d^a-
fj.vr)<TTiKoi 449 b 7 ; 453 a 6
(TO) fj.vpLoaTrjfj.6pLOV \avddvei 445 b 33
444 b 12
(Strattis) 444 a i
vavudrjs 453 b i, 7
vtos. ot o-065pa i^ot 450 b 6 ; 453 b 5
veoTrjs 4363 15
(77) V77TT7 447 a 21
wet* 442 b 29; 451 b 21 ; 4523 21.
TdeKTOs oeti>445b 17; 452 b 10 sqq.
poetV ou/c GTLV avev <f>avTaa(j.aTos
449 b 34 sqq.
v6r)fj.a 450 b 31 ; 451 a i
vor]TLK6s. TO vorjTLKbf fjiopiov 450 a 15, 18
vorjTds. TO. vo-rjTd dist. Td irpaKTa
437 a 3; dist. Td cuV07?Td 445 b 17 ;
450 a 14
(TO) voffTifAaTiKa peufj-ara 444 a 15
voff&S-tis 444 a 19
j ous 445 b 17; cf. voeij/
^av^6s 442 a 24
TO wpov 441 b ii sqq.; 442 b
30 sqq.; 4443 18
443 a 2, 14, b 5
443 a 17
ev rols 6yKoi$ 442 b 7
e 453 a 2
(Emped.) 4383 i
ot/cetos 442 b 27; 444 b 11
6"\os 448 b 5 sqq. 6* T< 6 Xy 446 a 20
6/j.fJ.a 438 a 7 sqq. T^ I>TOS TOV 6/u./ua.TOS
438 b 6, 21. e?rt ToO ecrxdTou o/J.-
/XOTOS 438 b 9. TO \eVKOV TOV OyU/iaTOS
438 a 21. ot Tropot TOU 6/AAtctTos 438 a
15. ?rp6 6 / u.//,aTOJJ rideffdat 450 a 5
6/iotos. d0 6/j.oiov (dvipeveiv, dvafj.L/j.vr}-
451 b 22
ovo/j.a. TO. ovofMara 437 a 15; 4533 31.
oVoyita fj.vrj/Jiovevo ai 452 b 6
6i S opp. d/i/SAtfs 442 b 6; opp. /3apus
447 b 4. 6^i)s xwi* 44i b 7 ; 442 a
II, 21. o^ews alcrddveffdai 444 b 14
u>7rAt(ro-aTo (Emped.) 437 b 28
opav 437 a 30 sqq.; 440 a 17. 77 Kivrjais
i) TroLovffa TO opciv 438 b 5 ; cf. 447 a 1 2.
opat* rel. ad 6pd<r6a.i 446 b 12. d /xa
TO avTo bpav Kal 6<rfj.dffdai Kal aKoveiv
446 b 27; 448 a 25. evdbs bpav 444 b
29. oiecrdai TO bpav elvat. TTJV u<paai.v
438 a 6
6 pao-ts 439 a 17
opcm/cos. TO opaTLKov TOU 8fj.fj.aTos 438 b
21
Tb bpaTov 445 a 1 1
7 ? 453 a 29
439 b 7; 44 b 25; 4503 3, 4
6(Tfj.d<r6ai. 443 a 34; 444 b 18 ; 445 a 12;
446 b 2 7
607-177 438 b 26 sqq.; sed cf. 443 a 23 sqq.;
444 a 10-4456 2. 607177 /cat xi^os
440 b 29 sqq. ; 442 b 29 sqq.; 443 b
9, 16; 447 a 8. TO dpeirTiKOv eloos
TTJS 60707? 444 b 12. at T&V dvduv
OffjJLai 443 b 30. 77 TT}? ocr/i^s 8uva/J.is
444 a 27. 77 60-^77 /cat 6 ^<50os 4463
25
6o7tu>o"?7S 4433 15, 20
(Td) oa-TpaKodep/j-a 443 a 4
6<r0patVeo-#at 443 a 5 ; 445 a 5 ; 446 b
1 7 sqq.; cf. da/uacrdai
6<T(f)pavTiK6s. TO 6ff<ppavTiK6v 438 b 23
dfffppavTOS. TO ocrcppavTov 443 a I sqq.
TO 6ff<ppavTOV Kal TO OLKOV^TOV K.T.\.
4453 9 sqq. TOV ocrcppavTov TO aifftfr,-
TTIPLOV 4453 28 ; cf. 444 a 31 5^438 b
28. TO 6<T<t>pavTbi> TO idiov rQ>v dv-
dpwjrwv 444 a 4 sqq.
6a<j>prj<ns ; cf. 6<r<ppaive<rdai et offfj-rj
OTL pleonastice positum. tos...6 n 443 a
26
6(j>dd\/ji.6s ; cf. 6 yUAtct. TOU 6(f>6a\/j.ov Tb
Ka\ovfj.evov fj,\av Kal fj.e<rov 437 b I
o^ts 437 a 24 sqq.; cf. 4373 4. TO
(i.6vTi Tivl Trjv 8\f/Lv opdv 438 a 27;
452 b 12. d(pLKVlffdaL TO 0WS 7Tp6s
T?y 6 ^ti 446 a 30
7rd7os 437 b 23
TradrifJ,aTa 445 b 4
dist. e^ts 436 b 5 ; 449 b 28; dist.
441 b 27; coni. ts 451 a
26, 30. Trddos TTJS Koivrjs atV^crews
450 a 12; cf. 450 a i, 28, 33, b 5;
437 a 25. TO irdtios TTJS Oewpias TavTtjs
450 b 34 ; cf. 453 a 17 sqq. ; 440 b 30.
5td Trdtfoj 450 b i. 5td TO Trdffos
445 a i. Trddr) = Td Tra07]fj.aTa TCL
INDEX I (GREEK)
299
alff6r)Ta 445 b 13; 4463 17; 4493
17; 445 a 10
Travcnrep/j-ia 441 a 7, 20
TrapaxaXetJ Trpos rrjv Tpocprjv 443 b 32
7rapa0vceud*etf 441 b 21
7rapei/cdfeii> 445 a 14
7rapei>ox\di> 4533 18
irdpepyov 444 a 29
wdpodos 444 a 30
Trap6/j.oios 452 b 6
irapovaia 439 322
?ras. TO 5td Tracrujj 447 a 22. TroW??
Trdi Tws 440 b ^
7rdcr%eti/ L-TTO TOU tvavriov 441 b 10, 15
Trd^os ^x etl/ 44* a 32
Trax^etf 441 a 30
Trepaivetv 445 b 25. 7re7repa(r / u.ej a et 5?7,
fj-eyed-r) 445 b 30 ; 446 a 20
rr^pcts (ToO tfWyUdTos) 439 a 32 sqq.
(T&) Trepiexov 439 b 6 ; 446 a 9
Trept/ccipTrtoi 441 a 14, 16, b i
TreptTTOs 445 a 7 ; 4483 15
TreptTTCo/xa 445 a 21
7rept0ep??s 442 b 23
*?? 452 b 5
iniyvtiva.1. 4473 3, 4
$ 443 b 15/18
442 a 7, 15, 19, 29
450 b 23
443 b 25
438 b 13
443 a i
445 a 16
. . = drjp 443 b 4 ; /ct^o^e^os d?)p
437 b 31 ; 444 b 23
Tn>ev/j.aTd}8ir)S 445 a 29
TroStcuos. rf TTodtaia 446 a 7
TroLfiv 7r\v FA 452 b 19, 20. ot TO, tiro/ma
TrotoOfTes /j-eyedTj 445 b 19; cf. 4373
24
Trotoi Tt rb vypbv irapaaKevd^eiv 441 b
21
TroXuyuvos 442 b 22
7r6fj.a 444 a i
Tropevfffdat. (TO vdiop) 441 b 3
(TO.) TropevTLKa T&V <J)<j}v 436 b 20
(ot) irbpOL TOV 6/m/maTos 438 b 14
7r6ppw 446 b 14; 452 b ii. TCI 7r6ppw
/j.efji.v7J(Tdai 451 b 30
irbppuOev 440 b 1 8
(i}} irop(pvpa 444 b 13
TTOCTOV 445 b II. Wpta/Lt^OS KCtTCl TO
Troo-oi 450 a 3 sqq.
7r6TtyU,OS 442 331
IT pay /ma. tiri TUI> TrpayudTuv opp. e?ri
TVJS i/ ux^s 449 a 14; cf. 450 a 28;
452 a 2, ii, b 26. Trpdy/ma /cat
448 b 2, 4; 452 b 26, 32
7rpdis = tvepyeia 436 a 5
442 a 26
436 b 22
(Emped.) 437 b 28
ddveffOai 450 a 23
Trpo<ryiyve<T0at 446 a 1 6
irpoafptpeLv. 17 Trpocr(ppofj,^vrj
441 1 31, 33 ; 442 a 2
Trpov -rrapxeii 441 b 25
(ot) Ili ^opeiot 439 a 33; 4453 18
?rOp. ^ TOU irvpbs <t>v<ris 441 b 12 sqq. ;
437 a 24 sqq.; 438 b 22^sqq.
trvpovv. rd TreTrvpu/jLeva (TWyuaTa 437 b
24
irvppovv 441 a 14
Trvpwdijs 439 a 2 1
TTtD/ua 444 b 24
pe?i/ 450 b 3, 7
peO/m 444 a 1 5
pvTTTiKds 443 a 2
crctTrpos 443 b i 2
fffievvvvai 437 b 18
crTjTrt a 437 b 8
<TKTrr) 438 a 26
ffKTTTov 448 b 2o j 449 b 3
cr/c^ts 442 b 27
crK\-r)p68ep[j.os 438 a 25
ffK\rip6(p8a\fj.os 444 b 28
451 b 30
ros 439 a 22, b 18. ei ffK6rei 437 a
27 34, b 6, 7
443 b 34
ao\oudeu> 452 b 7
arepelv 4363 20; 439 b 17
ffrep-fjats com. (pBopd 436 b 7 ; opp. ?rap-
oi/cria 4393 22; opp. Trciflos 441 b 28
ffToixetoj 437 a 22 ; 443 a n. rd irepi
ffTOL^eLfjjv 441 b 14
2/rpdTTts 443 b 34
442 a 20 ; 443 b 1 1
445 b 15
ffvvyia 436 a 14
crv\\oyifeffdai 453 a 13
(Tv\\oyi<T/ui.6s 453 a 12, 16
avfj.fiaivei.v 451 b 6; 437 b 3. eiri T&V
av/j.^a.LvbvT(j}v (df)\oi>) 438 b 13; cf.
439 b 32
ffvfjfid\\ctr0ai 443 b 32; 445 a 31
<rv/j.po\oi> 437 a 15
aufj./meTpos 444 a 36
ffv[j./j,iyi>vvai 442 a 9
ffv/j.(pvtrdai 438 a 28, 29, 30
ffvfjufiwvia 439 b 33 sqq.; 447 b 4;
448 a 22
avvdyeiv 437 323
ffvvalnos 441 a 33
avvx eia - 445 b 3^
tri^j ex ?? 446b 16 ; 448 b 25. TO avvex^
445 b 29, 30; 450 a 9
<rvi>r]6eia 444 a 2
300
INDEX I (GREEK)
452 a 29
438 b 31 ; 443 a 31
442 b 4
447 b 32; 4483 18
448 a 16
<r06o>a 447 a 17; 450 b 6; 453 a 33
ff<ppayteo-da.L 450 a 34
(Tcppayis 450 b 3
(TX^/AO 442 b 21, 22
<r to/Act 446 b 28; 445 b 12. TO, o-c6^ar
437 a 7. 0-cDyua upia fj.fr oi> 439 b 12
ff<jt}fj.ariK6s 453 a 16, 25
(rufji.aTovadai 445 a 25
445 a 24
ia 436 b 7
viroKetffdcu. viroKeltrdu 436 a 5 ; 447 319.
Tb viroKeifJievov dist. TO eTniroXrjs 440 a
27
V7ro\afj,f3dvew. vTroXrjTTT^ov 438 b 21
449 b 27
J/aos. Tava.tjjTf.pov irvp (Emped.) 437 b
32; 438 a 3
^ii ^xeti 452 a 4
TTeiv 443 b 22 ; 444 a 5. TCTay/mfros
opp. dVa/CTOs 440 a 5
xfo. oi Xtaj/ Ta%e?s 450 b 9
rt/JLveiv. els dVeipa Te^veaOou 445 b 29
(rd) TTpd~rroda 444 323
T^0pa 441 b 5 ; 442 a 30
TidevaL. dv TIS Tt#?7 ro (paibv fj.\a.v TI
CLVOLL 442 a 23 ; cf. 443 a 7. dtTeov
449 a 18
(6) TVatos 437 b 13, 16
T/)a%i^s 442 b 6
Tpecpeiv dist. ati^Tjo-tv iroitlv 442 a i sqq.
Tpt<pcr0ai Tats 007*015 443 a 19
Tplywvov 449 b 22; 450 a 3
Tpotpri 441 b 29 sqq.; 443 b 26 sqq.;
445 a 20
Tp60t,uos. TO Tpo(pifj.ov ^pov 441 b 27.
TO Tp6(pi/ji,ov vypov 442 a 29. XtW
Tp6(pLiJ.ov (TO y\VKv) 442 a 12; cf.
ryyxdi etj . r6 TV~)(OV (0ws) ry
ou (rvfj.(pvTaL 438 b i
TI^TTOS 450 a 33; 450 b 6, 17
iryt eta 4363 18. Trpos (3or)6etav vyieias
444 a 16; 445 a 32
vyieivos 444 a 26
vypbs opp. (r/c\77p6s 45ob 10. a-fifrvvffdai
r(p ii-ypo; 437 b 18. TO vypov Trdcrxft
UTTO ToO evavTiov 441 b 10 sqq. ; 442 b
30 sqq.; 443 a 20. ev uypw elvai
447 a 8
444 b 2
>5?79 4433 1 8, 22
438 a 17; 439 a 21; 441 a 4, 29,
b 3, 19; 442 b 31; 443 a 7, 33,
b 5> 14
v\r) TravaTrepfj.ia.5 44 1 a 20, 7
. Tideffdou cos VTrdpxovTa 451 a
opp. AAeti/ ts 439 b 31 ; 440 b
22. =pars exigua 4463 13
<paii>e<rdai. (paiveTat TO TOV 6(p8a\/u.ov
fj.t\av 437 b 2 ; cf. 439 b 2. ou 0at
verat OCTOJ (TO ToO r/\iov fj,yedos)
448 b 15, 16
</>cu6s 442 a 23
(paKrj 443 b 34
<pa.vTa.cria. TJ (pavTaaia Trjs XP^as 439 b
7. Trept (pavTaffias 449 b 33; 450 a 25
(pavTacr/ma. votlv OVK <TTLV avev (f)0.v-
Tao>iaTos 450 a i sqq. 6eupr)fj.a -ij
<pdvTacr/Jia 450 b 29, 32.
/cat &\\ov (pdvTao~iJ.a 450 b 28.
e is 451 a 17
450 a 26
0aOXos. Ta <pav\a coni. TO,
436 b 23. Ta 0aOXa opp. 6 cra TO-^LV
^X" 452 a 4
(pepeiv. (pepo/mfrov TIVOS Kivyffis 447 a
i ; cf. 446 b 2
(pdapTiKos 436 b 23; 444 b 32
(pdtipei.v 444 b 32 sqq.
(pdoyyos 445 b 23; 4463 2
(pdopd coni. (TT^/)77<ris 436 b 7
<pi\6cro(pos. T(2v iaTp&v ol 0tXoc
TTJJ T^\Vf]V /J.TIOVTS 436 321
^ 437 b 20
453 a 29
vs 440 a 2, 13; 442 a 25
0opd 446 b 8; dist. dXXot oxns 446 b 32
<pp6vt]<ns 4373 i, 12; coni. 56a 4503
1 8. -7 TO)?/ vor)T&v (ppovriats dist. 7?
TWV irpaKT&v 437 a 3
(ppbvLfj.03 437 a 1 6
(ppovTi^eiv 445 a 2
<pv\a.Kr) coni. ffUTypia 436 b 6
(TO) (pv6peva. 441 b 9 ; 445 a 3
0i>crt/c6s. 6 (pvaiKos 436 b 18
(pvaioXoyia. i] irepl TUV (pvT&v <pvcr.
442 b 28
(oi) (f)v<no\6yoi 442 332
0i5cris. TO, Trepi (putTfws 43^ b 2. 17
0tf(m 441 b 19; 444 b 4. (puaei
dist. Trapd (pvtnv 452 a 31, b 2. 0ucrts
coni. Swa/us 439 a 25. 0iy(rti ironlv
452 b i. uairep <pv<ris ijoi) TO ZOos
452 a 29. i] TOV vdaTos (fivcris 441 b
4; cf. 4393 35; 441 b 12; 443 b
6; 444 a ii, 24; 450 a 6; 453 b 9
442 b 28
5s 437 a 34, b 14, 20 ; 438 a 31 sqq.
irepl 0WTOS 439 a 20 sqq.; 439 b
iSsqq.; 4463 28-4473 12
Ta?s TU)V dvd&v d<r/J.cus 444 a 35
INDEX I (GREEK)
301
XctX/c6s 443 a 19
XeLfj-epiyv 5td VVKTOL (Emped.) 437 b 29
xp^ts 447 b 2 1
Xpoa sive xp^ a (cf- XP^ a ) 439 b 28 ;
440 a 9, 17, b 17, 20, 28
Xpovifeadat 45 1 a 32
Xpbvos 450 a 22. xp vov o.iffd ijffts 450 b
18; 450 a ii ; 4513 19; 452 b 8 sqq.
i} TOV XP OVOV Kiv-rjffis 452 b 27 sqq.
Kara rbv XP OVOV 453 a 8. ra /JLTJ ev
Xpo v V ovra 450 a 10 sqq. XP OJ/OS
dLvalffdijTOS (OVK effrtv] 440 a 23 ;
448 b 19. oi fj-era^v xp ovoi (X<w0d-
povcrtj/) 448 a 26 sqq. XP 01/OS ^ v V
KtveiTai rb Kivov^evov 446 332
443 a 19
i ; cf. xP a - TTfpt xpu/J-aros 439 a
13 sqq. TO evepyeiq. XP&fJ-a 439 a 15.
Xpco/ciaTos ^erexd-v 439 b 10; 437 a 8.
TO, xpufJ-aTa 439 b 20 sqq. ; 442 a
13 sqq. TO. TJdiffTa rwv
440 a i. TJ yeveffLS ruv ^ r
440 a 7 sqq. TO, Trap cL\\rj\a 7
XpWjttaTa 440 a 22, b 23. TO ei
...TO V7TOKeifjt.ei>ov xP^M a 44 a ] 5? 2 ^.
Ta 6t5?7 Tui xpk /^d.Tcoi 44^^ ^5 > 445^
23 sqq. ; 4463 21
Xpw/iaTt^e(7#at 439 b i, 2
Xf^6s 440 b 29 sqq. TO TcoV ^vfiOv
yfros 440 b 32; 441 b 9. TO, yevi]
T(JV vfjitcov 44^ a o. ot "YVfjioi 44^ a
32 ; 442 a 14 sqq. TO, etS?; TCOJ> x 11 !^^
440 b 26 ; 445 b 23. ot TIJV r/dovrjv
"j Tes x v f ji0 - 44 2 a 17- dvdXcxyov
Tas ocr^ds TO!S x^A 10 ^ 443 t 3 9
coni. iryp6s 445 a 16
;t^ 446 a 8
H S 446 a 6, b 22, 23
Xcopto-T6s 439 a 25; 4463 12, 14;
449 a 17
\l/advpb$ 441 a 28
\fr/FXCff6at 450 b 4
i^60os 4463 25 sqq.; 446 b 33. at TOU
t/ / 60of 5ta0opat 437 a 10. TO TCOI
\l/b(j)uv aiff6 r}Ti.K.bv 438 b 22
i/ i /l" 443 b 1 8
T/^UV77. 7? At V?? Cli(TOoLVTCtL 45O O ^ I .
\tyeiv iv Ty \frvxo 449 b 25.
ep T^ ijsvx fj 450 b ii. yiyveo~6ai
T V ^ V XV 45 a 30. Td T?J
^t6pta 436 a i; 449 b 6; 450 a 18,
24; 451 a 18; 453 a 17, b ii. T?}S
^ux^s TO alo 6 tjTi.Kbv 438 b 10. %v TI
TT)S ifsvxrjs, $ oLiraiVTa. alffOdvcrcu 449 a
10, 19; cf. 448 b 24 sqq. TO, ?rept
i//i;X^s 436 a 5, b 12, 16; 439 a 9;
449 b 34. TO, Koiva TTJS i/ i X^ 5 oira
/cat TOU crcoyitaTos 436 a 8, b 3. ?rept
a^ avTTjv /cat Trepi TCO^ 5i>m-
ai)r^s 436 a i
Trup (Emped.) 437 b 34
u)s. ^(TTt fj,ev cos TO auTd d/coi;ei...^(rTt 5
ws ou 446 b 17-19. e/c ToO auToO cos
Tpo0^s 441 a 22. ws etVeti 441 a 19;
444 a 21. cos /card neyedos 444 a 34.
cos TO, TroXXd 451 b 28. cos eTri rd
TroXi/ 449 b 8
INDEX II (English}.
Alcmaeon, 134
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 121-286
passim
Anaxagoras, 163, 166
Apperception, 30-33
Association, 38-40, 266 sqq.
Atomists, 30, 150, 175
Atoms, 197 sqq.
Baumker, n, 15, 130, 235, 240
Bender, 138, 169, 209, 212, 278
Bonitz, 144, 150, 183, 187, 207, 221,
2 43> 2 73. 275
Bradley (F. H.), 270
Burnet (Professor), 128, 133, 137, 163,
182, 284
By water, 132, 253
Christ, 275, 285
Chromatic tones, 23, 154 sqq.
Cicero, 269
Colour, 20-23, H9-I59
Cratylus, 132
Crustaceans, 139
Democritus see Greek Index
Ear, 9, 144 sqq.
Elements, 10, 133
Empedocles see Greek Index
Eye, 12, 142 sqq.
Faculty- Psychology, 123
Flavour, 24, 160-178
Freudenthal, 227, 244-288 passim
Gesner, 262
Grant (Sir A.), 186
Hamilton (Sir W.), 174, 265, 266, 269
Hammond, 137-288 passim
Hayduck, 144, 146, 187
Heart, 15 sqq. , 147, 248
Heraclitus, 73, 182
Hume, 247
Hypotheses, 124
Insects, 139, 191
Joachim (H. H.), 158
Kant, 151, 234
Leonicus, 240, 266
Lewes, 1 1
Light, 20-23, 134 sqq., 150 sqq., 205
sqq., 287-288
Locke, 265
Meno, 260
Metrodorus, 166
Michael Ephesius, 258 sqq. passim
Mill (J. S.), 124
Nature, 168, 275
Neuhauser, 15-20, 33, 39, 142 sqq.,
171, 179, 247, 261, 285
Odour, 25-27, i79- J 94
Pearson (Professor Karl), 196
Phaedo, 260
Philebus, 156
Philoponus, 205
Physiology (Aristotle s), 9-20
Plato, 37, 126, 135, 137, 138, 249,
260
Poste, 124
Potentiality, 8
Quantitative character of Perception,
27-30, 194 sqq.; of Imagery, 36-38,
249 sqq.
Rassow, 206, 253, 255
Rodier, 32, 131, 161, 170, 208, 230,
241, 242, 251, 276
Ross (W. D.), 272, 279, 289
St Hilaire, 138-286 passim
Siebeck, 2 70 sqq.
Simon Simonius, 121 286 passim
Simonides of Ceos, 269
INDEX II (ENGLISH)
303
Simplicius, 255
Smith (J. A.), 289
Sound, 24, 206 sqq.
Spinoza, 251
Susemihl, 156, 159, 164, 168, 173,
1 88
TheaetetuS) 37, 256
Themistius, 214-286 passim
Theophrastus, 133, 137, 138, 163, 174,
175, 177, 181
Thomas Aquinas, 138-286 passim
Thurot, 156, 164, 179, 235
Timaeus, 135, 138, 141, 173, 276
Torstrik, 179
Touch, n, 1 43 sqq.
Trendelenburg, 163
Wallace (E.), 190
Wendland, 170
Wilson (Professor J. Cook), 180, 187,
189, 274
Zeller, 126, 130, 147, 163, 180, 205,
275
Ziaja, 135, 138, 144
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
PR:
