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THE EVACUATION
OF
NOETH RUSSIA^
1919.
Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
M$^i^
LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY fflS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICK
To be puiclKiBtiil thiough any Bookseller or directly from
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1920.
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[CuJ. 818.]
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
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can be purchased in the mannfer inrficftted on tte first page of this wrapper.
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The following is a list of some recent ParliamentaTy and Official Publications. {AU prices are iStl, and those
in jxirentheses include postage) : —
NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS AND OTHER EXPENDITURE
ARISING OUT OP THE WAR.
Vote of Ceemt Appeopbiation Account, 1917-1'918.
Kepobt of the Comptroller and Auditor-General upon the Appropriation Account of the Vote of Credit
in the year ended March 31, 1918 :— Outtonie of the Accotmt ; Total Expenditure, 1914-15 to 1917-18 ; Raw
Materials controlled by the Army Cotmcil ; Wool, Kips and Raw Hides ; Leather, Tanning Material,. Flax and
Flax Seed, Jute and Manila Hemp ; Raw Materials, &c., controlled by the Ministry of Munitions ; Fltx Supplies
Account, Pyrites Account, Superphosphates Account, Lands Cultivation ; Loans to Dominions, Allied Powers,
&c. ; Loan to Navy and Army Canteen Board ; Relief to British Prisoners of War, &c., in Enemy Countries ;
Food Supplies ; Meat, Rabbits, Cheese ; Railway Agreements — Pajm.ents to Executive Com.mittees ; Timber
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(Liquor Traffic) ; Sugar Supply ; Purchase and Sale of Wheat and other Cereals ; Delay in furnishing Accounts,
Australian Wheat, Bread Subsidy ; Restriction of Enemy Supplies Departn.ent, Loss on Dulcli Potatoes,.
Trading Accovmts of Restriction of Enemy Supply Schemes ; Grants under Civil Liabilities Scheme Admin-
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Sales on behalf of other Departments, Central Live Stock Food ; Ministry of Information ; Food Production
Department ; Agricultural Executive Committees, Operations imdertaken by the Focd Production Depart-
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to Contractors, Horse PIcughing Scheme, Loss on Seed Potatoes (1917), Loss on Superphosphate Transac-
tions ; Services not hitherto specified ; Chartering of Detained Ships (Coal) ; War Risks Insurance ; Marine
Supplies; Nickel; Board of Agi'iculture and Fisheries. Special Services (Wheat, &c.) ; Rotiii anian Grain-,
Subsidies in the Middle East ; Extra Receipts.
H.C. 97 of Session 1919. Price 4d. {bid.).
Vote of (Credit J Appropriation Account, 1918-1919.
Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General upon the Appropriation Account of the Vote of Credit
for the year ended March 31, 1919 :— Outcom.e of the Accoimt ; Expenditure charged to Vote of Credit, 1918-19 ;
Receipts arising on Vote of Credit Services, 1918-19; Total Expenditure, 1914-16 to 1918-19; Method of
Utilizing certain Receipts arising out of Vote of Credit Services ; Trading Accounts — General : Military Lands
Cultivation, Mercury Reserve Stock Account, Shipbuilding Suspense Accoimts, Asbestos Pool Beard, Detained
Ships ; Raw Materials and other Services controlled by the Ministry of Munitions ; Flax Supplies, Fertilisers,
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Fabrics, Chemicals and Drugs, Focd Containers, Wool, Flax and Flax Seed, Raw Jute, Manila Hemp ; Loans
to Dominions, Allied Powers, &c. (net) ; " Laurentic " Gold ; Halifax Relief Fund (Govenunent Contribution) ;
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of Ships ; Destruction of Roumanian Oilfields ; Relief of Prisoners of War, &c. ; Refugees'from Russia ; Food-
stuffs for Northern Russia ; Arab Bureau; Advances to General Al exit ff ; Polish National Conmiittce ; Refugees
from Vladivostock ; Russian Bank Control Schem^e and Financial Assistance to the South Eastern Confederacy ;
Roun anian Grain ; Han-adim Board of Control ; Propaganda Abroad — Expenses incurred in ; Italian Oranges ;
Railway Agieen>ent8, &c.' — ^Payn^.ents to Executive Com.mittees ; Investn ent in Irish CoMieiries Railways ;
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Petroleum Ctnpany ; Canals, Cm pensaticn ; War Risks Insurance ; Marine Supplies ; Feed Supplies
(Administered by the Beard of Trade) ; Zinc Concentrates ; Siberian Supplies ; Tin ber Supplies ; Pool Board
(Petroleum Supi)lies) ; FJax Prcducticn ; Feed Prcducticn (Scotland); Department of National Service,
Ireland ; Additional Allowances to Old Age Pensions ; War Trade Department ; Diug Supplies ; Sugar Supply ;
Purchase and Sale of Wheat and other Cereals ; Restricticn of Enemy Supplies Departm.ent ; Ministry of Pen-
sions ; Coal and Oil Trading Account ; 0\-ersea Prize Disposal Committee ; Ministiy of Food ; Focd Production
ARMI.
THE EVACUATION
OF
NOETH RUSSIA,
1919.
Presented to Pcerliament by Command of His Majesty.
\
LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HTS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
To be purchased through anv Bookseller or directly from
H M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
iNi 1 RIAL House, Kingsway, London, W.C. 2, and 28, Abingdon Street, London, S.W. 1;
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23, Forth Street, Edinburgh;
or from K PONSONBY, Ltd., 116, Grafton Street, Dublin.
1920.
Price Is. 6d. net.
[Cmd. 818.]
V
it<\ ''^^'--°-L^°'.S^ CONTENTS. m
01 979067 1
• ' w u I PAGE
I. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial Genei-al Staff . . • . . ■ • . . . . . 5
III. Narrative . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9
IV. Attached Papers A to V (see list below) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
LIST OP ATTACHED PAPERS.
A. — Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Secretary of the War Caljinet on the situation in
North Russia, pointing out the necessity for sending administrative reinforcements and pres.sing for
a definite policy. (2nd January, 1919.)
B. — Note by the General Staff drawing attention to the unsatisfactory position of our troops in North
Russia, and pointing out the need for administrative reinforcements, &c. (31st January, 1919.)
C. — Appreciation of the situation on the Archangel Front by the General Staff, emphasizing the necessity
of despatching reinforcements to Russia. (4th February, 1919.)
D, — Minute by the Director of Military Operations on the situation in North Russia, drawing attention to
the dangerous situation existing at Archangel. (27th March, 1919.)
E. — Telegram from General Maynard to the War Office asking for 400 reinforcements in consequence of
dangerous situation due to unrest in the Finnish Legion. (31st March, 1919.)
P. — Telegram from the War Office to Generals Ironside and Maynard announcing that all troops who had
spent the winter in North Russia should return to England by the autumn. (4th April, 1919.)
G. — General Staff Paper on the situation in North Russia, discussing measures already taken to deal with
the situation and making proposals for further action, (loth April, 1919.)
H. — Telegram from General Maynard to the War Office on operations in the vicinity of Urozero and
discussing the possibility of advancing to the northern end of Lake Onega. (17th April, 1919.)
I. — ^Telegram from General Maynard Co the War Office asking for permission to carry out further operations
with the object of capturing Medvyejii Gora and Povyenetz. (25th April 1919.)
J. — Telegram from the War Office to General Maynard sanctioning an advance to the northern end of Lake
Onega at his discretion. (29.th April, 1919.)
K. — Telegram from the War Office to General Ironside authorizing him to make preparations for an
offensive in the direction of Kotlas. (4th May, 1919.)
L. — Telegram from General Ironside to the War Office giving details with regard to proposed operations.
(6th June, 1919.)
M. — Telegram from the War Office to General Maynard informing him that he must limit his operations to
holding his present line south of Medvyeja Gora. (17th June, 1919.)
N. — Telegram from the War Office to General Ironside informing him that his proposed operations would
be reconsidered by the Cabinet on 27th June. (18th June, 1919.)
0. — ^Telegram from General Ironside to the War Office giving his views on the proposed offensive towards
Kotlas. (19th June, 1919.)
P. — General Staff Paper on General Ironside's proposed operations, describing their objects, and recom-
mending that he should be given a free hand as to their limits and conduct. (25th .Tune, 1919.)
Q. — Telegram from the War Office to General Ironside sanctioning liis proposed advance. (27th June, 1919.)
R. — General Staff note on the evacuation of North Russia. Short summary of proposals. (15th July, 1919.)
S. — Minute by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff recommending that Archangel and Munnansk should
be placed under one commander for the purpose of evacuation, and that General Sir H. Rawlinson
should be sent out to take command. Notification of the approval of the Secretary of State.
(30th July, 1919.)
T. — Telegram from the War Office to General Maynard informing him that the evacuation of Murmansk
sbould follow that of Archangel, and that in the meantime he could withdraw from his present front
as might be necessary. (29th July, 1919.)
U. — Telegram from General Ironside to the War Office giving an outline of the plan of evacuation of
Archangel. (6th August, 1919.)
V. — Details of troops and civilians evacuated from North Russia from 1st June, 1919, to the completion of
the evacuation, 12th October, 1919.
MAPS.
1. Map of European Russia, showing strengths of anti- Bolshevik Forces and lines held 15th April, 1919.
2. Sketch map of North Russia.
(B19/408) 2000 7/20 H&S, Ltd b389wo
THE EVACUATION OF NORTH RUSSIA.
L-MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WAR.
This Blue Book was prepared six months ago in fulfilment of the undertaking
given by me on 12th September last year that at the close of the operations in
North Russia " when it is certain that the lives of British soldiers will not be
endangered by publicity or the interests of the National Russians prejudiced, a full
account of the measures taken and the military reasons for them will be prepared by
the General Staff and presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State."
It affords a complete statement of the reasons underlying the various phases of
the military operations connected with the British evacuation of North Russia, and
will enable all those who wish to understand to measure the difficulties and anxieties
which attended the successful attempt to withdraw from North Russia without being
involved in disaster or discredit.
The general policy towards the Bolshevik Government, of which the operations in
North Russia were a single part, was settled by the Supreme Council of the Allies.
Every important step in its execution was approved by the War Cabinet. Parliament
was kept continously informed at every stage to the utmost limit possible without
compromising the success of impending or contemplated operations, and the House of
Commons at every stage by overwhelming majorities approved the course that was
being adopted,
W. S. C.
War Office,
15th July, 1920.
Extract trom a speech delivered by the Secretjiry of State for War on the Army EHtimates, in
the HouBe of Commons on 2yth July, 1919, explaining how the situation iu North Russia at
the beginning of 1919 arose out of the war against Germany.
" Aft er Lenin and Trotsky had signed a
shameful peace wlierehy they betrayed their
country and falsified its engagements to its
Allies, and whereby they liberated more than
1,000,000 Germans to £ome over and attack
our people in the West — after that fateful
eveut iu history had occurred there was a
Czech army of about two corps made up of
prisoners taken from the Austrians by the
Russians whose hearts were always on the side
of the Allies, and this army refused to continue
any longer with the Bolsheviks in Russia, and
it demanded to be set free from Russia, and to
make its way over to the Western front, where
it coidd continue the stmggle which the
Bohemians were waging against German-
Austria. After an attempt to secure the exodus
of this army by Vladivostock it was proposed
that they should cut their way out by Viatka to
Archangel. There was the danger of Archangel
becoming a submarine base for the Germans,
and the danger of the loss of all that great
mountain of stores we had accumulated there
in order to keep that means of contact with
Russia, and for ail these reasons, combined
with tlie fact that it was hoped the Czechs
would make their way out by that route, the
Allies in 191><, as an essential military operation
and as part of the war, decided to occupy
Archangel and Murmansk and put an inter-
Allied forc(! on shore there. This took place in
August, 1918,
The pressure upon us at that. time was very
(8889)
great indeed, and it was not possible to spare
any large force from any of the countries of
the Allies, but a number of French, American,
British and Italian troops, the British in
larger numbers, were landed at Archangel
and Murmansk, and the population generally
welcomed them. The town and suiTounding
district passed into our hands, and we became
very deeply involved in the fortunes of that
region. We were not able to send enough
troops to occupy the whole of the area from
which it was hoped a sufficient uprising of
Russian manhood would have resulted to
enable a really large unit of Russian Govern-
ment to be established. We were not able to
go to Vologda or Viatka, and we had to confine
ourselves to the comparatively small region of
Archangel and Murmansk, and about 100 to
120 miles in various directions from those
towns. The Czech troops who were trying to
escape from the country via Archangel were
unable to get as far a.s Viatka, and they got only
to Ekaterinburg. Their advance slowed down
and what had originally been intended to be a
measure for effecting a junction with these
troops and securing their safety, became a
mere occupation of Archangel.
But the Committee would make a great
mistake if they condemned the decision of
policy which led the Allies and this country to
make this movement. Although it did not
achieve all the results we expected of it, it
achieved results greater than anyone would
have dared to hope for. Let the Committee
A 2
consider this. Up to the titne we landed in
Archangel in Augiist, 1918,* German divisions
were passing from the Eastern to the AVestern
front at an average rate of six divisions per
mouth to attack the Allied forces. From the
time we had landed there not another division
was sent from the Eastern front, and the line
there remained absolutely stable, the whole of
the German forces being rivetted by this new
development, and the anxiety they had about
Russia until the complete rebuff occurred in
October or November of that year. Therefore
it is very wi-ong to regard this as a mistaken
enterprise either from the political principles
which inspired it or still less by the results by
which it was attended.
" Before the German resistance was broken
and the Armistice signed, the winter had settled
down on the North Russian coast, and the port
of Archangel was icebotind, or practicsally ice-
bound, and our men were forced to spend the
whole of last winter in this bleak and gloomy
spot in circumstances which caused the greatest
anxiety, because it was evident that the
Bolsheviks with whom they had been in
collision, could, if they chose, have concentrated
against this particular sector of the cu-cle by
which they w'ere invested a force of indefinite
size, and because our men were utterly cut
off from the outer world except as far as
* This sentence should read " Up to the time we
landed in Murmansk in May, 1918, &c. . . ."
small parties were concerned. Therefore their
position was one of much anxiety. They
were men mostly of the 0 3 class, but they had
a fine spirit, and once they were assured and
promised that they should be brought hcjme
before another winter occurred, they discharged
their duty with great determination, and
maintained the position against some quite
serious attacks, and others which might well
have become very serious had they been
allowed to proceed, and maintained the
situation throughout this dark period. Not
only was there considerable unrest amongst
these troops during their imprisonment, on tiis
coast during the winter but also, as the
Committee recognizes in the exhaustion and
prostration of the public mind which followed
the triumph in the great struggle owing to the
general dispersal of energies which had been
so long held up by the great strain, there was
the greatest difficulty in sending out any form
of relief or assistance to those troops for several
months.
" Such was the situation that I inherited
when I was sent to the War Office in the middle
of January of the present year. But although
1 had not been responsible for any of the events
which called this state of things into being,
although I heartily agree mth them, no one
could view that situation without the gravest
anxiety."
II.— MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL
GENERAL STAFF.
Secretary of State.
1. The accompanying documents have been prepared in accordance with your
instructions to affoi'd a comprehensive narrative of the campaign in North Russia,,
together with the various decisions of His Majesty's Government and the instructions
issued by the War Office in connection therewith.
I have already reviewed the course of Allied intervention in Russia from
17th November to 19th February and laid particular stress on the point that this
policy originated entirely as an anti-German measure. It is unnecessary to labour
this point further, but it is interesting to note that in Ludendorffs recently published
memoii-s he more than once alludes to his pre -occupation regarding the possible
reconstitution of an Eastern front, which it was our primary object to effect.
2. The present narrative deals specially with the campaign in North Russia from
February, 1919, to the final withdrawal of the Allied Forces at the beginning of October.
The outstanding feature of this year's operations has been the difficulty imposed
on the military authorities, both in the theatre of operations and at liome, by the absence
of any clearly defined policy on the part of the Allied Governments.
Having been initiated as an anti-German measure the signature of the German
armistice robbed the campaign of its original purpose. It may then be asked why did
we not immediately withdraw our troops from North Russia in November, 1918. There
were two main obstacles in the way of doing this. In the first place, owing to climatic
conditions, we could not be sure of being able to remove the whole force from Archangel
before the Port was closed by ice. In the second place, the prosecution of our anti-
German policy had involved us in obligations to those loyal Russians who had remained
true to the Allied cause and had thereby compromised themselves with the Soviet
Government. We could not precipitately abandon these without doing our utmost to
ensure their subsequent safety.
The Allied Governments consequently found themselves committed to the retention
of their contingents at Archangel throughout the winter, although they had not
decided on any definite policy with regard to the Bolsheviks.
The difficulties of the Entente in formulating a Russian policy have, indeed, proved j,
insurmountable, since in no Allied country has there been a sufficient weight of public j'
opinion to justify armed intervention against the Bolsheviks on a decisive scale, [
with the inevitable result that military operations have lacked cohesion and purpose.
In these circumstances the action of our Commanders on the spot has been dictated
largely by the exigencies of the immediate situation on their front, which itself has
been continually changing, thereby adding stiU further to their difficulties.
3. The want of a clear-cut policy during this period has reacted equally on the
departments at home, whose duty it has been to provide for the maintenance and
reinforcement of our forces in Nort^ Russia. In the early part of this year the situation
in this respect was critical, when discontent in the Army, Navy and Air Force was
rife, and was being exploited to the utmost by political agitators for their own
mischievous ends. Our efforts were hampered at every turn and our difficulties were
aggravated by the fact that, for international reasons, some of the causes of anxiety
could not be made public. It says much for the staunchness of the national spirit that
when the danger was made known as far as it could be, the response was as prompt
as it was gratifying. Incidentally we owe a great deal to the Press for their
assistance in the matter.
4. Later on, when it had been definitely decided to withdraw the British Forces, the
fact of this decision having to be made public added immensely to the difficulties of the
6
situation. For we were in honour bound to support the loyal Russian forces, at whose
invitation we had originally landed troops, and to do all that was possible to enable the
North Russian Government to maintain itself after our departure. Alternatively we
had to arrange to evacuate the large number of people who were unwilling to risk
massacre at the hands of their bloodthirsty foes.
The problem to be solved was thus a complicated and lengthy operation, involving
a withdrawal of 1 70 miles in the face of an enemy who was fully informed of our intentions.
The political situation in our rear was also such as to give cause for anxiety. The
moral of the North Russian Government and its supporters, which had never been
brilliant, was seriously impaired by the knowledge of our Intended withdrawal, while on
the other hand, all the forces of anarchy and disruption were encouraged to seize the
opportunity of stabbing us in the back at the critical moment. The position was thus
fundamentally dlflPerent from that presented by the Galllpoli evacuation, and, in some
respects, even more perplexing.
5. To deal with the situation two things were clearly essential. Firstly, a
sufficiency of reliable British troops to reheve the weary and dispirited contingents
that had been exposed to the demoralizing influence of the North Russian winter.
Secondly, it was Imperative to strike a blow at the Bolshevik forces sufficiently heavy
to paralyze their offensive efforts during the actual process of our withdrawal. Sir
John Moore's action at Corunna provides an interesting historical parallel.
6. These proposals for action were, as you know, submitted to the War Cabinet
and approved by it after full discussion. I think we may claim that they were
amply justified by the course of events.
I do not, for instance, care to dwell on what might have happened had the
Russian mutinies occurred before the arrival of the two splendid brigades commanded
by Brigadier-Generals Grogan and Sadleir- Jackson. To anyone in the least conversant
with the facts the charges that have been made in certain quarters — that the relief forces
were not required — are simply grotesque.
7. A further accusation has been made that Instead of loyally carrying out the
Government's policy of withdrawal, which was decided in March, we attempted to
embark on a far reaching project of invasion into the heart of Russia and only drew
back under the pressure of public opinion.
A glance at the documents annexed will suffice to show that such statements are
utter moonsliine.
The necessity for striking a heavy blow at the enemy, immediately before our with-
drawal, in order to disengage the front and allow the operation to be conducted without
Interference, was, as I have already stated, submitted to the War Cabinet and accepted
by them after thorough discussion.
The objective which would ensure the desired result being achieved was Kotlas,
the Bolshevik river base, the destruction of which would make it impossible for the
enemy to follow us down the Dwlna for a considerable time. It so happened that at
the time when the preparations for this operation were being first discussed, Kolchak's
right wing was successfully advancing, and was already half way between Perm and
Vlatka with what appeared to be good prospects of reaching Kotlas in a few weeks.
Our projected blow at Kotlas, although an operation of strictly limited extent, was
thei-efore Intended to serve a double purpose, namely, of disengaging the front to
facilitate our own withdrawal and of effecting a satisfactory junction of the North
Russian and Siberian forces.
The latter expectation proved Illusory, but the former object still held good — and
was not carried through only because the abnormally low water in the Dwina made it
impossible for our flotilla to advance further. The disengaging blow was, however,
ultimately carried out on 10th August with a more limited objective and achieved
its purpose. The final withdrawal was effected practically without loss, a result greatly
due to the very careful plans of General Ironside and the most devoted co-operation on
the part of the Navy and Air Force.
8. Another point to be emphasized is that from the moment of the arrival at
Archangel of the first relief force, when the port first opened at the end of May, the
process of evacuation commenced and went on continuously to the full capacity of the
shipping available until our final detachments sailed on 27th September.
9. The charge that we have deserted those who stood by us is more worthy of
\ consideration, but is none the less unjustified. There are, it is true, only too many
people in this country who have forgotten, if they ever knew, what sacrifices Russia
. made for the Allied cause in the first years of the war, and to such I would suggest that a
study of LudendorfTs memoirs would reveal our debt to Russia in a most striking and '
unmistakable light. To those who know of, and wiU be for erer grateful for, that
timely assistance, it is indeed painful to incur any suspicion of bad faith, but we can
with a clear conscience refute any such aspersion.
The position had to be faced that the British Empire, in common with all the
Entente nations, was weary and exhausted, depleted in men and money, and incapable
of further military efforts on a great scale. That being so it behoved us to apply what
resources were still available in the most profitable direction. North Russia offered no
prospects of decisive results, and with Kolchak's failure any sustained military effort in
that theatre was doomed to be barren. Moreover, the local conditions were entirely
discouraging. In the words of Captain Altham, R.N., our senior naval officer on the
Dwina, to whose ability, energy and whole-hearted co-operation the success of our
operations is greatly due, " the instability of the Russian troops, the lack of discipline,
organizing ability and military leadership of the Russian officers and Higher Command
after a year of the most loyal and capable British support, soon made it evident that to
continue that support would be fruitless." In the South, on the other hand, Denikin's
operations, starting as they did with every conceivable disadvantage, by sheer deter-
mination, energy and patriotism had achieved already remarkable success, and offered a
much greater prospect of decisive results.
Accordingly it was decided, and I am convinced wisely decided, to concentrate all
our remaining efforts in South Russia and to close down our commitments in the North.
Every opportunity was given to such of the population of the Archangel district as
desired it to leave and altogether some 6,500 were evacuated, whilst preparations had
been made to remove three times that number.
The Russian forces having decided to continue the fight after our departure, were
left amply provided with arms, ammunition and equipment of every sort. In the two
months which have elapsed since our withdrawal, the North Russian troo)3S have
successfully maintained an active defence and made considerable captures of prisoners,
guns and ground.
The ultimate fate of this force is, however, obviously dependent on the outcome
of the general struggle, and in particular on the result of Denikin's present campaign.
10. I think this country hardly realizes how much it owes to the energy, devotion
and skill of the British naval, military and air forces which have for so long sustained
the credit of British arms amid the dreariest and most demoralizing conditions. No
praise is too high for the work of our commanders. Generals Maynard and Ironside,
who through the long anxious months of last winter carried a load of responsibility
that would have crushed men of softer fibre.
To Lord Rawlinson also we are greatly indebted for his skilful handling of a
thankless task, the satisfactory accomplishment of which was due to his quick grasp of
a complicated situation, and the ripe experience, tact and firmness which he brought
to bear on the problem.
11. May I be allowed to add that the thanks of the Military Authorities are also
due to His Majesty's Government for the free hand which we were given in carrying
out the policy of withdrawal, once that had been decided upon ? I trust that, in view
of the satisfactory termination of the campaign, it will be admitted that this confidence
was not misplaced, for it is only by complete mutual confidence and the most intimate
co-operation between the Government and the fighting Services that military
operations can be successfully prosecuted.
12. Finally, there is one great lesson to be learned from the history of the
campaign.
It began with the landing of 150 marines at Murmansk in April, 1918. These
were followed by 370 more at the end of May, which were in turn reinforced by 600
infantry and machine gunners on 23rd June. From that time onwards demands for
reinforcement followed each other without intermission, and our commitments steadily
grew without our being able to resist them, until the British contingent numbered
18,400.
The Mesopotamian campaign started with the despatch of 2 brigades and ultimately
absorbed nearly 900,000 men before it was terminated.
The 6 divisions with which we entered upon the Great War in France and Belgium
swelled to 63 before victory was achieved.
I think the moral of this is easy to point. It is that, once a military force is
involved in operations on land it is almost impossible to limit the magnitude of its
commitmente.
In the present state of world chaos it will surely be wise to bear this principle in
mind, for we may expect to receive continual appeals for troops, " even a companv or
two " from every part of three continents and the temptation to comply will often be
difficult to resist. Therefore, I venture to urge that no such requests outside the
British Empire may be acceded to by His Majesty's Government without the fullest and
most careful consideration of the larger obligations which such compliance may
ultimately involve.
HENEY WILSON,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
1st December, 1919.
References
to attached
papers.
III.— NARRATIVE OF EVENTS IN NORTH RUSSIA.
I. — February to May, 1919.
1. By the end of February the situation of the Archangel force was causing
considerable anxiety. The British troops were nearly all of low medical category, the
units were much under strength, and tlie fighting value of all the Allied troops was
poor in consequence of the trying conditions i>f the long wanter. Also the whole force
had been engaged in heavy fighting when meeting the vigorous Bolshevik attacks of
January and February.
2. To improve the conditions both at Archangel and Murmansk arrangements had
been made to send out certain administrative personnel, such as Royal Army Medical
Corps, Royal Army Service Corps, and Royal Army Ordnance Corps, which were
urgently needed particularly to maintain the long lines of communication (l). But a8(l) Attach-
regards Archangel it became increasingly evident that, if disaster was to be avoided, ed Papers A
the forces must be reinforced by troops from home at the earliest possible moment (2). *°
This situation was repeatedly brought to notice by the General Staff {vide attached ^1 p ' ^
papers A, B, C and D). , and dT^^
3. During February the question of future policy in North Russia had been |
engaging the attention of the War Cabinet.(«) On 4th March the War Cabinet |
decided to press the Allied representatives in Paris to agree to the early evacuation of '
North Russia by the Allied troops. To prepare for this, and to meet the dangerous
situation existing at Archangel, the War Cabinet authorized the Secretary of State for
War to make any necessary arrangements. Consequently, the latter at once
ordered the preparation of a special contingent for Archangel of about 4,000 men, to
which was added later a second contingent of similar strength. Each of these relief
forces consisted of a mixed brigade of two infantry battalions with units of Royal
Artillery, Royal Engineers, Machine Gun Corps, and Royal Army Service Corps. The
first was under the command of Brigadier- General G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., and the second of Brigadier-General L. W. de V. Sadleir- Jackson, C.M.G,,
D.S.O. Whether the actual evacuation of the Allied troops was carried out immedi-
ately the port of Archangel opened or later in the summer, it was equally necessary to
have at hand a strong force of fresh troops to cover the withdrawal and deal with any
contingency that might arise. Any attempt to withdraw and embark the tired Allied
troops already at Archangel without taking this precaution might well have been
disastrous.
(a) On 3rd March the Secretary of State for War speaking in the House of Commons on
the Army Estimates explained the situation in North RuKsia. For example, he said: —
movement of the German armies which canied
• •
"I now turn to the position of our forces in more than a million men to the Western front.
Russia. There is an Allied army of a certain and which culminated in tliat immense series of
size— of exactly what size it is not necessary to battles which began on the 2l8t March last
say- -in occupation of considerable regions of year.
No)-th Russia, based on the ports of Murmansk • • • »
and .Archangel. About half this army is "That reason has passed away, but the troops
British. sent in obedience to it are still on these wild
* * * * northern coasts, locked in the depth of winter
whatever may be the policy decided upon by and we must neglect nothing required for their
the Allies in Paris, our forces in Archangel and Kafety and well-being.
Murmansk whicii, as I have said, are inter- » • • •
dependent, will have to stav there until the r, ^, , • j i •. ,
summer is far advanced. Since they have got f ""^''f ' J« ^*^« '''''fZ^^ heavy commitmenta
to stav, they must be properly supported, towards the people of these dm nets who have
Thev must be sustained with reinforcements e«P""«ed our cause, and to the Russian armies,
necessary to their safety, which can reach which were encouraged and called into bemg
them within th.> limit I have described, and ^""'S^^y ^^ ^^^ Allies and largely for our own
must be supplied with everything they may purposes during the period of the German war.
require. It is no use people raising prejudice '* '"'}« been tlie custom in tins country to pay
against these expeditions! Everyone kn<.ws P-ii-tieular attention to matters of tins kind and
wly they were sent. Thev were sent as part «^^'?/« }" endeavour, to the very best of our
of our operations against' Germany. It was ^^'1'*^' *« <?" "^'^ d-ity by those who have put
vitallv necessary to take every measure in their trust in us, and who have run into danger
regard to Russia during the war which would '" consequence of action which we have advised
keep as many German troops as possible on '"<;''" to take,
the Russian front, and reduce that formidable • • • •
(8389) B
References. 10
~ 4. In addition to the preparation of the reUef forces certain otlier measures were
taken to deal with the situation in North Russia. The Ministry of Shipping were
asked to provide three specially strengthened ships to transport the leading units of
the relief forces. These would be able to enter Archangel at least a fortnight earlier
than the ordinary ships. The Admiralty made arrangements to despatch a strong
river expedition to reinforce the small flotilla on the Kiver Dwina, and the Ministry of
Shipping took stei)s to provide the necessary river craft, including boats for the
conveyance of troops and supplies, and hospital steamers. Efforts were made to
improve the moral of the troops in North Russia by announcing to them the measures
being taken for their relief, and arranging for a fuller and better news service. Art
announcement was made to the troops on 4th April that all who had spent the winter
(3) Attach- in Russia should return to England by the autumn (3).
ed Paper F. 5^ ^[j^ withdrawal of the Allied troops from North Russia having been decided on,
it became necessary to consider in detail the precise nature and scope of the arrange-
ments to be made to carry it out. It must be remembered that the problem was not
purely a military one. A North Russian Government had been formed under our
protection, and a number of the inhabitants had enlisted on our side, and many had
supported us actively in other ways against the Bolsheviks. Merely to evacuate the
Allied troops (an operation of no extreme difficulty provided a sufficiency of fresh
troops to cover the withdrawal and "embarkation were available) woiild leave those
Russians who had helped us exposed to the brutal revenge of the Bolshevik Army.
Such a course was clearly out of the question. Therefore it was necessary to take
measures to provide for the .security of those Russians who had assisted us, first against
the Germans and afterwards against the Bolsheviks. This could only be effected in
two ways : —
(i.) By evacuating considerable numbers of Russians, who would have to be
provided for elsewhere.
(ii.) By placing the North Russian Government in a position to maintain itself
against the Bolsheviks after our departure.
6. or these two methods the second was much the more satisfactory. To leave that
portion of North Russia which had been rescued from the Bolsheviks in security under
a stable government was obviously preferable to merely abandoning the country,
carrying away thousands of Russians, men, women, and children, for whom it would be
difficult to iind a suitable refuge. The latter course would inevitably involve an
immense loss of prestige and re-act most unfavourably on the whole an ti- Bolshevik
cause. But if the North Russian Government was to have any chance at all of standing
by itself, unsupported by Allied troops, it was essential : —
[a.) To strike a sharp and successful blow at the Bolshevik forces before the
departure of the Allied troops ;
(b.) To organize and train an efficient force of Russians to defend the area liberated
from the Bolsheviks ;
And in addition, if the stability of the North Russian Government
was to be assured, it was necessary : —
(c.) To effect a real and permanent junction between the North Russian forces and
the right wing of Kolchak's Siberian Army.
7. In March and April there seemed a good prospect of fnlHUing all three
conditions. The relief forces would be available to support the North Russian forces
in such limited offensive operations as might be desirable, which they would in any case
have to carry out to secure their own withdrawal ; there seemed to be adequate
material for the formation of efficient forces in North Russia, provided a sufficiency of
good Russian officers could be obtained ; the Siberian armies were making steady
progress westwards, and, according to the information then available, might reasonably
hope to reach Kotlas and the upper waters of the Dwina during the course of the
summer.
1 '^^^^ considerations were put before the War Cabinet in the General Staff" paper,
edpnir G u***^"!-^^^^' ^P""'*' ^^^^ (^)' ^"'^' "'^'^^'^^ '"^^ discussion, it was decided to adopt this plan,
Iby whicn North Russia would be left under a stable anti- Bolshevik government, the
/ Allied troops would be withdrawn under the most favourable conditions, and the North
Russian campaign brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
8. General Ironside, therefore, was informed on 4th May that he was authorized
to make all preparations, with the resources at his disposal, for dealing a heaw blow
ed pa^r k" ''^^'"^*' ^^® ^"^'"^ ''' ^^^ direction of Kotlas (on the Dwina) (5). He was told,
11
keferences,
&c.
however, that the War Cabinet would consider this operation before it actually started.
Arrangements were made for equipment and clothing for 50,000 men to be sent to
Archangel for the Kxissian forces, and a scheme was put on foot for equipping 1,200
selected Russian officers from prisoners of war in Germany, of whom 700 were to be
sent to North Russia.
9. During this period active operations continued spasmodically at Archangel.
The Bolsheviks made a number of determined attacks on our positions ; these were
all beaten off, generally witli considerable loss to the enemy. Thus, on 1st March they
attacked Yevsievskaya (on the Vaga) ; on 5th April they attacked Shredmekrenga,
when they were repulsed leaving 102 prisoners and five machine guns in our hands ;
and on 1st and 5th May they made further unsuccessful attacks on the Vaga front.
Some anxiety was felt as to the period of the thaw owing to the tact that the ice on the
upper reaches of the River Dwina would melt before that on the lower reaches, thus
allowing the Bolshevik river flotilla to operate before our own could get up the stream.
But, fortunately, the Bolsheviks did not take advantage of their opportunity, and on
13th May our boats sailed up river from Archangel. From tliis time onwards our
flotilla more than held its own with the Bolsheviks, and on the arrival of the strong
i-einforcements prepared by tlie Admiralty — composed of monitors, gun boats, mine
sweepers and all the craft necessary for administiative purposes — we were greatly
superior to them in fighting ships and had all the vessels required for transport
purposes up the river.
10. At Murmansk, between the beginning of February and the end of May, an
advance of about 80 miles was made by the Allied troops. On 20th February Sejega
(on railway, 60 miles south of Soroka) was captiired together with 80 prisoners and
a large quantity of stores, and ou 11th April Urozero (20 miles further south) fell into
our hands. The advance was continued and on 25th April General Maynard asked
for permission to carry out further offensive operations, with the object of capturing
Medvyejya Gora and Povyenetz (6). The object of this operation was to enable him to (6) Attach-
gain control of all lines of approach to the Murmansk area from the south, while at the ed papers H
same time reducing the front to be held. This was sanctioned, on the understanding
that no further reinforcements could be sent to him from England, and was carried out
in May (7). Povyenetz was captured on 18th May and Medvyejya Gora on 21st May. '^7) Attach-
11. These operations were skilfully conducted with a very small number of^ paper .
troops. Most of the serious fighting was carried out by two British infantry companies,
a detacliment of Royal Marines, and the Serbian battalion. During this period General
Maynard felt mucli anxiety on account of the small number of Allied troops left at his
disposal. The two infantry companies referred to above (one company King's Royal
Rifle Corps, one company Middlesex Regiment) had been despatched to Murmansk on
12th April, in consequence of the daugerous situation caused by the unrest in the
Finnish Legion (8). The latter was raised, in the summer of 1918, from Red Finns, who (8) Attacli-
had fled to Russia and were intended to be used against the Germans. Their raison P^P^r K
d'etre disappeared ou the withdrawal of the Germans from Finland ; and from that
time to their repatriation to Finland in September, 1919, after lengthy negotiations
with the Finnish Government, they were merely a source of continual anxiety to
General Maynard.
12. Another small but useful reinforcement received by General Maynard were
two companies of American Railway Engineers, which had been despatched by the
United States Government in reply to our urgent request. These arrived in April,
1919, and did excellent work on the long line of railway until the end of June when
they were withdrawn, the American authorities not seeing their way to sanction their
retention any longer (Jj).
{b) On 29th May, speakiiif!^ in the House of
of State, in the coume of a full e.xphinatioii of
which it was intended to pursue, an foUowB : —
• • • •
" Admiral Kolchak's Army are purely Rus-
sian, and the veiiiforcements which art; prepar-
ing behiiul for him, and which are considerable,
are also purely Russian. In the main these
armies are equipped by Briti.sii munitions and
I'ritish rifles, and a certain portion of the troops
are actually wearing British uniforms. The
advance of these armies has alri^ady drawn
20,000 Bolsheviks off our front at Archangel
(8389)
Commons on the Army Estimates, the Secretary
the situation in North Russia, outlined the policy
and has thus rendered us a real service which
may have played a very important part during
these critical weeks through whicli we have
just passed.
» • • •
'• Fighting is still going on in this region,
and I speak with great reserve about the
future, but this much may be said, that Admiral
Kolchak's advance in the northern sector,
coupled with the growth and improvement of
B 2
References,
&c
12
II.— June, 1919.
) 13. On 26th May the first relief force under General Grogan had arrived at
'Archangel, receiving an official welcome from the Russian Governor-General on the
following day, which was made the occasion of great rejoicing by the inhabitants of
Archangel. The brigade then went up the Dwina to relieve the troops holding that
front. The second relief force arrived at Archangel on 10th June.
14. Immediately the first relief force readied Archangel the uithdi'aival of the.
Allied troops who had spent the ivinter in North Russia was commenced, and the
(9) Attach- process of evacuation continued from now on without interruption (9). The first
ed paper V. troops to go were the American infantry and French contingent. The loss of the
battalion of American engineers was mixch felt when the time came for their repatriation.
These troops had done most valuable work and amongst other duties had been
the RuBdian local troops at Archangel and
Murmansk, offers us the prospect of a tar better
solution of our own problems than we could
ever see before. Whereas a few months ago
our only plan was to withdraw our troops, and
carry with them as refugees 30,000 or 40,000
inhabitants upon whom the Bolsheviks would
have wreaked vengeance, people, that is to
say, who have been friendly to us and who had
worked for us at the time of the Gei'mau War- —
whereas that was the only course which seemed
open to us then, there is now good prospect of
the whole of North Russia becoming self-
supporting within a reasonable time and of
purely Rus.siaa forces maintaining themselves
against the Bolsheviks in that theatre. This
will relieve us of the extraordinary difficulties
of evacuating so lai-ge a portion of the popula-
tion and of providing for them afterwards —
how are they to be transported, where are tliey
to go, whore are they to stay, how are they to
be looked after, what are they to do, when are
they to go back, how are they to go back — all
this was a formidable problem to be confronted
with, but one I would rather have seen faced
than leave them to their fate. If the course of
events which I have indicated should actually
come to pass, we shall be afforded an absolutely
honourable and satisfactory termination to an
enterprise which, though undertaken from
sound military reasons during the German Wax,
threatened us with the gravest embarrassments
after it had closed. We shall be relieved from
a situation which exposed us to an alternative
danger, the danger of disaster through staying
on with too weak forces, or the danger of
dishonour through going away without winding
up our obligations decently. We shall be
entirely secured from both these perils. We
hope, therefore, that a juncture will be
effected in the near future between Admiral
Kolchak's armies and the Russian Archangel
forces. The enemy troops in between are not
powerful, and the distance is not excessive.
Already communication has been established
between the armies.
« « • «
" There is therefore reasonable hope that
the whole of this North Russian situation may
be placed upon a ])urely Rvissian basis before
the end of the summer without anything in
the nature of a disaster to our troops or the
desertion of our friends.
« » » *
" 1 know there are some people who would
have paid no regard whatever to our obligations
to the North Russian Government and to the
inhabitants of Archangel, who would have
bundled our ti'oops into their ships or let them
be diiven into them by the Bolsheviks, and
sailed away, and left all those who had helped
us to their fate, to, as my hon. and gallant
friend has just described to the House, let them
stew iu their own juice. That is not the British
way. We have secured a reputation in the
war — indeed we have lived up to an old reputa-
tiou in which we take much pride — of fulfilling
all our obligations soberly but sohdly, of being
at least as good as our Avord, of respecting our
scraps of paper, and of teaching others to
respect them too,
* * * •
" And I am sure tliat the House and the
country would never have pardoned the Govern-
ment if we had allowed that reputation, which
had cost our soldiers a great deal to build up in
so many hard-fought fiehls, to be smirched or
sullied by any dishonourable episodeor shameful
abandonment of duty."
Again, speaking on the adjournment for the Whitsuntide Recess on 6th June, the Secretary
of State made the following statements : —
" We are endeavouring to wind up our
affairs in North Russia, and it is our hope that
North Russia will become self-supporting before
the end of the summer, and that then we shall
be able to come away, having honourably dis-
charged our duty to tliose people to whom we
committed our-selves during the time of the
war. That is really not challenged in any part
of the House."
• • • »
" So far as the troops in North Russia are
concerned, they are, of course, an expense, and
we have had to feed a large proportion of the
population of that region from the sea. One
of the greatest reliefs we shall get if a junction
is formed between Admiral Kolchak's troops and
the troops in North Russia, is the fact that that
population will become largely self-supporting,
and be able to draw upon the large Siberian
granaries instead of being fed from the sea. But
you must treat North Russia as part of the Ger-
man War. The troops got there as an essential
operation in the German War, and they have
remained there because of the ice in the winter,
and also because they are winding up our
obligations in an honourable fashion."
J 3 References,
<fec.
responsible for all topographical work at Archangel. The evacuation of the original
British troops followed, being continued steadily as shipping became available. By
Ist September all troops who had spent a winter in North Eussia, except those who
volunteered to continue serving there, had embarked for the United Kingdom in
accordance with the promise which had been made by the Secretary of State for War.
{See paragraph 4 above.)
15. Early in June it had become evident that owing to the defeats recently
sustained by his centre and southern armies, Admiral Kolchak's prospects of reaching
Kotlas had become very small. Consequently, General Ironside was informed that, ^^_
although the War Cabinet had agreed to his proposed operations, they would tached
reconsider their decision towards the end of June. In tlie meantime he was to continue Papers L
his preparations (10). *"** ^•
16. On 27th June General Ironside was informed that his offensive operations ^^^^^^j '
towards Kotlas was definitely approved (11). The considerations which led to this Papers
decision are given in the General Staff note of 25th June, 1919, which may beOandQ.
summarized as follows (12) : Although from every point of view, as already pointed (12)
out, the junction of the Archangel force with Kolchak's right wing was desirable, the p^^^j.*'^'*
necessity for General Ironside's operation in no way depended on this junction being
effected ; in fact, the contrary was the case. For if the Bolsheviks were relieved from
all anxiety on Kolchak's front, they would be enabled to harass Ironside's withdrawal
and render the latter not only a difficult but a hazardous operation. Quite apart from
the question of stabilizing the Archangel Government, or even the maintenance of
British and Allied prestige, it was essential, in order to secure the safe withdrawal of
the British forces that this withdrawal should be preceded by offensive operations with
the object of disengaging our front and rendering a serious offensive by the Bolsheviks
out of the question for a considerable period. The capture of Kotlas, the Bolsheviks'
river base, would realize this condition fully, as no advance short of it would do, by
rendering possible the destruction of all workshops, depots, wharves, and river craft, by
means of which alone the enemy could follow us down the Dwina.
17. But although it was only by pushing his offensive right through to Kotlas
that his objects could be completely attained, General Ix-onside soon found it necessary to
modify liis plans very considerably. The water level of the River Dwina, which had been
steadily falling, was, on 9th July, recorded as being lower than ever before. This
immobiUzed the Naval flotilla and rendered its co-operation in operations up the river
impossible and, moreover, upset all arrangements for the river transport of the force.
For these reasons. General Ironside was forced to limit his operations to a blow against
Gorodok and Seltsoe, with the object of disengaging his forces and delaying any
Bolshevik counter offensive. This operation was to be carried out shortly before the
commencement of the final stage of our withdrawal.
18. During the spring the mobilization of the Russian Army at Archangel made
steady progress and at the end of June the total of these troops had reached 22,000.
This included, besides the Russian National Army, the Slavo-Britisli Legion, which had
50 per cent, of British officers and non-commissioned officers. Several units of the
Slavo-British Legion were composed of deserters and prisoners from the Bolshevik side,
and these under their British officers were reaching such a high standard of efficiency
that they seemed likely to be a valuable addition to the force. At Murmansk, too.
General Maynard hoped to be able to increase considerably the small number of local
troops which had already been raised. For having reached the north end of Lake
Onega, he had occupied a district fairly thickly populated with Russians, who, as a
result of their recent experiences, were very hostile to the Bolsheviks. General
Maynard estimated that he could raise a force of Russians of a strength equivalent to a
British division. To meet the requirements of this force arrangements were made to
send to Murmansk arms and equipment for 22,000 men.
19. In June the only noteworthy operation on the Archangel front was the attack
earned out by the 2nd Bn. Hampshire Regiment and 3rd Northern Regiment, under
Brigadier- General Graham, on the right bank of the Dwina on the 20th. The object of
this operation was to capture positions which it was essential for us to hold in order to
admit of certain minesweeping, a nec«^ssary preliminary to the main river operation,
being carried out. After a strong Bolslievik resistance the villages of Ryabikha and
Topsa were captured, together with 400 prisoners, three field guns and many machine
guns. The river flotilla and Royal Air Force co-operated, sinking an armed barge and
driving two others ashore. In the meantime the evacuation of the troops which had
spent a winter at Archangel was proceeding steadily.
References 14
&c.
~ 20. During June General Maynard continued to push southwards. His KuHsiau
troops, however, proved very disappointing, and nearly all the fighting continued to be
done by the British artillery and two infantry companies and the Serbian contingent.
On 1 7th June General Maynard was informed that he must in future limit liis
operations to holding his i)resent line south c.f Medvyeja Gora, and concentrate on
(l3)Atiach- training his Russian forces (13). He had, however, sent troops and arms to the
ed paper M. ghunga peninsula, at the request of the inhabitants ; and in order to secure land
communication between the peninsula and the mainland he found it necessary to
occupy a position south of Kapeselga. This village was captured on 6th July.
HI— July, 1919.
21. On 7th July a determined mutiny took place in the 3rd Company of the
1st Bn. Slave-British Legion and the Machine-Gun Company of the 4th Northern
Rifle Regiment, who were in reserve on the right bank of the Dwina. Three British
officers and four Russian officers were murdered, and two British and two Russian
officers were wounded. The mutiny was suppressed by the action of the British officers
and by gun fire brought to bear on the camp. Invaluable assistance \\'as rendered in
this emergency by the Naval personnel of the flotilla.
22. The 1st Bn. Slavo-British Legion was one of those units formed from Bolshevik
prisoners and deserters, and, although the great majority were men with no Bolshevik
sympathies, there seems no doubt that the mutiny was caused by prisoners who had
been deliberately sent over by the Bolsheviks for the express purpose of propaganda
and assassination. A number of men were tried by Court-Martial and shot, and the
battalion was disarmed and sent to the lines of communication as a labour unit. The
ringleaders, taking a number of men with them, escaped to the Bolsheviks.
23. On 22nd July(c) news was received that the Russian regiment in the Onega
district had mutinied, and had handed over the whole Onega front to the Bolsheviks.
On the Vologda Railway front the Russian troops were also preparing a* mutiny, but
this was frustrated by the action of the Polish Legion and a small party of British.
At the same time unrest was manifested in nearly all Russian units, and it consequently
became necessary to stabilize all fronts with British troops. This mutiny, too, was the
result of active Bolshevik propaganda, which was assisted l^y the uneasiness and
apprehension which was growing in North Russia, on account of the statements which
had been appearing in the British Press with regard to the evacuation.
24. Immediately General Ironside's report on the Onega mutiny was received it
was realized that the situation at Archangel had radically changed. But for the
presence of the two fine brigades of fresh troops, which had recently arrived, the
position would indeed have been very critical. As it was their timely advent relieved
the situation of anxiety for the moment. But it was clear that we had failed to create
a reliable Russian Army, and, therefore, our hopes of leaving the Russian Government
at Archangel in a strong position were unlikely to be realized. It had originally been
intended to carry out the withdrawal from the front between 15th October and
loth November — i.e., just before and after the Dwina was closed by ice as being the
moment best calculated to leave the North Russian forces in the most fVivourable
situation. Now, howevei-, there was nothing to be gained by the British forces
remaining at Archangel a day longer than necessary, and the sole matter for
consideration was liow best to carry out the withdrawal of the force from its advanced
positions and its embarkation at Archangel.
25. In the meanwhile, at Mm'mansk there had been no marked change in the
situation. The detachment of Royal Marines, which the Admiralty had allowed to
remain until 30th June, had left for the United Kuigdom ; and on 19th July the
Italian contingent was withdi-awn from the line and took no further part in operations
(c) On this date, 22nd July, 1919, in reply to a supplementary question in the House of
Commons regarding the date by which the evacuation of North Russia by British troops would
be completed, the Secretary of State answered as follows :-^
* * * * ways and at many points, and as they begin to
'• All the troops except the the Military depart the local Russians are naturally much
Mission— men who voluuteer for the Military upset, and much dissatisfaction and weakness
Missions— will have left North Russia, if all occurs behind. Therefore, the situation is one
goes well, before the ice closes in, and we may which requires very careful attention. A most
take that as the early part of November, being difficult and delicate operation is in process, and
the final date when the VVliite Sea will be free ; one in which we deserve the fullest support of
but, of course, the troops there are in contact all the sections of the House."
• with the enemy, who is pressing them in many • » » *
15
Eeferencesj
&c.
pending its embarkation for Italy. Moreover, all the British tioops at Murmansk,
except two infantry companies", had spent a winter in North Kussia, and,
consequently, were due to embark for home not later than 1st September. As these
included practically the whole of General Maynard's administrative services, the
situation as regards persoimel was becoming very unfavourable. The French
Government had promised to send a contingent to Murmansk in place of French troops
withdrawn from Archangel at the beginning of June, but owing to shipping and
other difficulties this force had not actually arrived.
26. As, owing to the failure of the Russian forces, there appeared a probability of
the withdrawal of the Allied troops both from Archangel and Murmansk becoming a
difficult military operation, which could oidy be properly co-ordinated under the orders
of one commander, it was decided to appoint General Lord Rawlinson as Commander-
in-Chief in North Russia (14). He sailed from the United Kingdom on 4th August, (14) Attach-
with orders to carry out the withdrawal of the Allied troops. He was given the fullest ^ P*?®"" =•
discretion as to the time and method of evacuation, (d) In order that he might have at
(d) On 29th .luly, speaking in tlie House of
of State made a loug speech on the general
bore particularly on the situation of our
evacuation : —
• • « - •
" In the first week of March the War Cabinet
decided that Archangel and Murmansk should
be evacuated before another winter set in, and
they directed the War OfBce to make anange-
ments accordingly. But they also prescribed
that whatever support, nounshment, succour,
reinforcements or aid might be required or
needed by our troops for their safe extrication
from this position should be used and despatched
by the War Office ; and, further, that due
regard should be had to the obligations which
we had inevitably contracted with every class
of the population of Archangel and Murmansk,
and with the local Russian Army and local
Russian Goveniment we had called into being.
That was the task they remitted to the War
Office, leaving to the military the widest
possible latitude as to the means, method, time
and circumstance in which they should carry
out that task. Such was the poHcy which was
laid down then. Such is the policy which has
been followed since, and such is the policy which
will be carried to its conclusion in the futiu'e.
This decision of policy was communicated
to the Russian leadei-s. On the .SOth April,
Admiral Kolchak was informed that all the
Allied troops would be withdrawn from North
liussia before the next winter, but in the mean-
time we hoped to make it possible for the North
Russian Government and the; Russian Army to
stand alone after the Allied troops had left. It
will readily be seen that if such a solution could
have been reached, if this local Government
and local Army coidd have maintained itself or
could have joined up with the main anti-
Bolshevik Russian Army, that would have
relieved ns of the extremely anxious and
painful operation of carrying away a portion of
the population and of the troops who were
now there, and affording them asylum and
refuge, and of settling a most terrible problem
for decision for all those loyal Russians who
elected to remain on that shore. It was com-
municated to the Russian leaders— the inten-
tion was ciinununicated to the troops, to the
volunteer brigades who were sent out, and
these troops were told that the men who had
been there last winter would come home before
the harvest, and the others would come home
before the winter set in. They wont out with
Commons on the Army Estimates, the Secretary
situation in Russia. The following extracts
troops in North Russia and the plans for
that knowledge, and when they arrived they
made no secret of what was the limit of the
task they had undertaken and the Hmit of their
stay on those shores. Once it was perfectly
clear that this knowledge was public property
in the whole of the Archangel and Murmansk
region, once it was perfectly clear that the
enemy, as well as the local Russians, were
aware of it, I commiinicated the fact to
Parliament in a public announcement.
• • • «
" I should like to say a word about the
difficulties of evacuation. Although to us who
sit here at home in England it may seem very
easy to say ' Clear out, evacuate, cut the loss,
get the troops on board ship, and come away ' —
although it may seem very easy to arrive at
that intellectual decision, yet on the spot, face
to face with the people among whom you have
been living, with the troops by the side of
whom you have befen fighting, with the small
Government which has been created by our
insistance, with all the apparatus of a small
administration, with all its branches and ser-
vices, when you get oiu- officers and men
involved like that on the spot, it is a matter of
very great and painful difficulty to sever the
ties and quit the scene. I do not disguise from
the Hou8(i that I had most earnestly hoped and
trusted that it would be possible in the coui'se
of events for the local North Russian Govern-
ment to have a separate life and existence after
our departure, and with the fullest assent of the
Cabinet and the Government, and acting
strictly on the advice of the General Staff, we
have been ready to hold out a left hand, as it
were, along the Dvina River to Admiral Kol-
chak in the hope that he would be able to
arrive in this district and, by joining the local
Russian forces, which amount to nearly 30,000
men, stabilize the situation and enable our
affairs there to be wound up in a thoroughly
satisfactory manner.
• • • •
"The General Staff who have been
conducting all the operations are of opinion
that there is no cause for alarm in regard to the
safety of the British troops, but they ask that
entire latitude shall be given to the commanders,
that absolute discretion shall be afforded to
them as to how and when and in what manner
References,
Sic.
16
his disposal adequate troops to carry out this operation a force was prepared for service
in Russia of the following strength : Three infantry battalions, one machine-gun
battalion, pereonnel of two batteries. Royal Field Artillery, one field company. Royal
Engineers, and tank detachment, with five tanks. Of these a first Echelon of two
battalions infantry, two machine-gun companies and the artillery, engineers and tanks
was to be despatched as soon as it was ready, while the remainder was to remain
in readiness in England, to embark for North Russia if required. In addition to this
a battalion of Royal Marines was sent at once to Murmansk, for use either there or
at Archangel if required, and the French Government agreed to send' at once to
Murmansk one battalion of infantry as their promised contingent.
(15) Attach- 27. General Ironside telegraphed his plans i'or the evacuation of Archangel (15),
ed paper U. g^j^^j arrangements were made for the necessary shipping to be provided at once. The
North Russian Government at first stated that if the British troops were to be
withdrawn they must abandon the idea of defending Archangel, and, consequently,
General Ironside proposed to disarm and disband all Russian troops not being
evacuated, and destroy all stores which could not be removed. It was estimated that
some 13,000 Russians would have to be evacuated. On 30th July, however, the
North Russian Government decided to continue the defence of Archangel, and these
plans had to be modified.
28. Instructions were also sent to General Maynard with regard to his evacuation.
The Admiralty considered it impei-ative that the port of Murmansk should be held
a few weeks after the withdrawal from Archangel as it was required as a base where
the river craft could be refitted for the voyage to the United Kingdom. Consequently
the evacuation of Murmansk had to be carried out after that of Archangel, but in the
meantime General Maynard was authorized, should he think it advisable, to withdraw
(16) Attach- to positions covering Soroka (16).
ed jiaper T.
they cany out the policy whiiih they are
directed to carry out from here. K reinforce-
ments are needed roiuforcements will be sent
to them, if they wish to manoeuvre in this
direction or in that as a pai-t of their operation
of retirement so as to secure the best and safest
possible circumstances for embarkation, they
shall have the fullest liberty to do so, and so far
as I am concerned I am not prepared to give
any forecast or detail of the method or manner
iu which this operation, of which we make no
concealment, and on which I consider we are
entirely agreed, is to be can-ied out by the
military men on the spot, and I appeal to the
House to accept the position in that respect.
• • ♦ *
" I should lilce to point out, if I may do so
parenthetically, as V am known to hold strong
views on this subject, that I have not committed
this country to any commitments or to anv
obligations of any sort or kind with regard to
Russia to which we were not committed, and
as I think properly committed, before I had
anything to do with the affair at all. All I
have been labouring to do is to discharge faith-
fully, honourably and efficiently the obhgations
into which we had entered in the days of the
(Jerman War and into which I hold we had
rightly and properly entered. I think that
should be recorded if it is not challenged in any
quarter of the House. I defy anyone to show
a single commitment or ol)lig-ation which 1 have
been personally responsible iiir creating on
behalf of this country in regard to intervention
or interference or intercourse with Russia during
the present period of war.
" I return to the question, what has it got to
do with usi Here 1 am going to quote the
speech of the Prime Minister, which has been
three or four times referred to, always with
appreciation, in this debate. I understand that
my right hon. friend opposite, Sir D. Maclean,
accepts the policy put forward in the speech.
He said that he stands by that speech. He
quoted one passage with approbation, but I
should like the House to remember other
passages which are also in that speech. The
Prime Minister said, having expressed the
opinion that it would be a great act of stupidity
to attempt mihtaiy intervention in Russia.
» • • »
" ' Bohlievism threatened to impose by force of
arms, its domination of those populations that had
revolted against it, and that were organized at our
request. If we, as soon as they had served ovr
purpose and, as soon as they had taken all the risks,
had said, ' Thank you, we are exceedingly obliged
to you, you have served our purpose. We need
you no longer. Now let the Bolsheviks cut vow
throats,' toe should have hem mean — we should
have been thoroughly unworthy indeed of any grent
land. It is our business since we a.iked them to
take this step, since we promised support to them
if they took this step, and .since by taking this
step they contributed largely to the triumph of
the A Hies, it is our business to stand by our
friends'
» • *■ •
" I have put these considerations before the
Committee, but I am bound to answer the
specific questions which my right hon. finend
put to rae. He asked me whether our troops
were used for any purpose beyond that of mere
relief and extrication. The answer is. No.
The General Staff had full latitude as to caiTy-
ing out that operation, and they included the
hopes of a junction being affected with Admiral
Kolchak as part of the definite machinery and
manoeuvre for the evacuation of the country if
it could be achieved."
17 References,
&G.
IV.— August, 1919. ~
2'J. On 10th August, in pursuance of the policy previously authorized, General
Sadleir-Jackson's brigade and Russian troops attacked the enemy's positions on the
River Dwina. The attack was completely successful. All objectives were taken and
six enemy battalions accounted for, the men composing them being either killed,
captured, or dispersed. The total captures amounted to over 2,000 prisoners, 18 guns
and many machine guns. The advance ended with the capture of Puchega and Borok
situated 20 miles from our original position. The naval flotilla co-operated most
effectively in the attack, not only carrying out bombardments and mine-sweeping, but
also providing Naval and Marine landing parties. The reasons for carrying out this
offensive operation have already been explained. It was necessary to deal the enemy
such a blow as would paralize him and render him unable to hold us to our ground or
interfere seriously with our withdrawal. Owing to the water of the Dwina being so
low, the scope of the operation had to be limited and the advance could not reach
Kotlas, the only vital point on this front. Nevertheless sufficient ground was gained to
cover the advanced mining opei-ations which the Navy were undertaking. And although
the attack for local reasons had to be carried out rather earlier than might have been
desirable it was undoubtedly effective and attained its object.
30. On 12th August General Rawlinson arrived at Ai-changel and discussed the
question of the evacuation with Generals Ironside and Maynard and the Russian
authorities. Both General Rawlinson and General Ironside agreed that in view of the
state of the Russian troops any attempt by the Russians to defend Archangel for an
indefinite period after the British withdrawal was doomed to failure. General
Rawlinson did everything he could to persuade General Miller, the Russian Governor-
General, to agree to transfer his most reliable troops to the Murmansk side, where,
provided they concentrated on this one front, there was much more chance of the
Russians maintaining themselves permanently. But General Miller persisted in his
intention to defend Archangel, find in this decision he was supported by an order from
Admiral Kolchak directing him to hold Archangel to the last.
31. In these circumstances General Rawlinson was obliged to do everything he
could to place the Russians in as favourable a position as possible to continue their
resistance throughout the winter. To this end a sufficiency of food, arms, ammunition
and coal was left at Archangel, though it was decided that no further supplies of any
kind could be sent out from the United Kingdom. General Rawlinson also allowed
two British companies to be used in an attack which General Miller was very anxious
to make at Emptsa on the Vologda Railway in order to improve the moral of his troops.
This attack was successfully carried out on 29th August.
V.^Seitember and Octobek, 1919.
32. The first echelon of the force prepared in England to assist in covering the
withdrawal and act as a reserve in case of emergency arrived in North Russia by thp
end of August. One battalion and two machine-gun companies and the tanks went to
Archangel and the remainder to Murmansk. On 12th September, in view of the
favourable situation. General Rawlinson was able to say that the second echelon,
consisting of one battalion and two machine-gun companies would not be required to
leave England.
33. The relief of the Allied contingents and original British troops, which had been
going on steadily since early in June, having been completed at the begiiming of
Septeml>er, the evacuation of Russians and other nationalities from Archangel was
proceeded with (17). Altogether, 6,535 were taken away, nearly all of these going to the (i7)Altach-
Baltic States and South Ru.ssia. These numbers were not so large as expected, though ^'^ P*l*®'" ^'
every facility was given to Russiims of all classes to come forward for evacuation.
34. An attack to recapture the town of Onega, supported by a monitor, had been
made on 1st August. This was unsuccessful, for although the attacking party was
skilfully landed by the Royal Navy and led by British Lewis gun parties from both the
Navy and Army, the Russian troops would not go forward. Early in September,
however, the Bolsheviks withdrew from the northern end of the Onega Valley, and on
10th September Onega town was occupied without opposition. Russian troops
also continued to make progress on the Vologda Railway front south of Emptsa ana
towards Kochmas.
35. Shortly before the commencement of our withdrawal, on the Dwina front, the
enemy made several vigorous attacks on our positions, especially at Puchega and
(8389) 0
18
Ivaiiovskaya, on 6th and lltli September. These were beaten off, however, and
General Sadleir-Jackson succeeded in disengaging his troops and carrying out his
retirement down the river, clearing Troitsa on 12th September. The withdrawal was
continued without incident, and by 23rd September all the British troops, with the
exception of an armoured train and some units of the Royal Air Force, had arrived
within the inner defences of Archangel. The position which it was decided the
Russian troops should hold, after our departure, was the line Emetskoe (on River
Dwina) — Seletskoe — Obozerskaya (on the Vologda Railway) — ^Bolshiozerki. This was
a strong line, for which good defences had been constructed. On the Pinega front
their line had been withdrawn to Verkhne Palenga, 14 miles above the junction of that
river with the Dwina. When the withdrawal of the British troops was completed the
Russian forces were still holding this line, and on the railway front were considerably in
advance of it. The embarkation of the British troops was carried through without any
hitch, and on 27th September the evacuation of Archangel was completed and General
Ironside and his staff embarked for the United Kingdom.
36. At Murmansk, as has been said, the shortage of administrative personnel had
been causing anxiety. But the situation in this respect was much improved by
diverting to Murmansk a considerable number of men of the Royal Army Service Corps,
Royal Army Medical Corps, and Royal Array Ordnance Corps, intended for Archangel,
but no longer required there owing to the acceleration of the evacuation. These,
together with the fighting troops sent out in August — both British and French —
ensured a sufficiency of Allied troops to carry out the withdrawal.
37. On 14th September General Maynard began offensive operations soiith of
Kapeselga. These were undertaken at the direction of General Rawlinson, to ensure
the withdrawal of the Allied troops being effected without molestation by the enemy.
This atttick, carried out by British, Serbian, and Russian troops, resulted in the complete
defeat of the enemy and our advance to a point several miles south of Lijma. In this
and other recent operations in tliis region the land forces were much assisted by
the flotilla on Lake Onega. The flotilla had been reinforced by 12 motor boats,
prepared by the Admii'alty, and had gained complete counnand of the northern part
of the lake.
38. On 30th September General Maynard was placed on the sick list and Brigadier-
General H. C. Jackson was appointed to command the Allied forces at Murmansk.
After the successful operation referred to above the withdrawal of the Allied troops
began. By 29th September Kem was evacuated by the British and by 4th October
all British troops were north of Kandalaksha. The Serbians at the request of the
Russians agreed to provide a garrison at Kem for a few days longer. The Russian
troops were in difiiculties soon after the departiu-e of the British troops. Having
lost Lijma as the result of a Bolshevik counter-attack, the Russian Command
appealed to General Rawlinson for assistance. But it was quite impossible for the
latter to allow any Allied troops to become involved once more in the fighting
as they were all being concentrated at Murmansk for embarkation. As it turned
out, however, the Bolsheviks did not press their attack, and did not advance any
great distance north of Lijma. The evacuation of Murmansk proceeded smoothly and
was completed on 12th October. After that date no British troops nor representatives
remained in North Russia, with the exception of a liaison officer at Archangel, who was
left for intelligence purposes.
39. The withdrawal of the Allied forces from both fronts was carried out practically
without loss. It was so effected that the loyal Russian forces were left in a favourable
position for carrying on active operations. As a consequence of this the embarkation of
the Allied troops was not followed by any disturbances in Archangel or Murmansk, and
the offensive operations of General Miller's troops continued without interruption oil the
Vologda Railway and Onega fronts. The total casualties (killed, died, wounded and
missing) sustained by British forces in North Russia from the commencement of the
campaign in the spring of 1918 to the evacuatio'i in October, 1919, were 106 ofliicers,
877 other ranks, including 41 officers and 286 other ranks killed. The withdrawal of
the Allied forces is described in greater detail in General Rawlinson's despatch.
19
IV.— ATTACHED PAPERS.
1
A.
SITUATION IN NORTH RUSSIA.
The Secretary,
War Cabinet.
The War Cabinet decided on 31st December, 1918, that while no demobilization
measures are to be taken for the present, no furtlier reinforcements are to be ordered to
North Russia until the question can be dealt with in Paris. I have wired accordingly
to the Officers Commanding at Murmansk and Archangel. The latter decision may
entail a withdrawal from his present forward position by General Maynard, and he has
been warned to give early notice of such withdrawal.
In view of the proposed discussion at Paris, I forward the following short resume
of the situation : —
It became evident by the autumn that our original intention of joining hands with
the Czechs on the Perm — Vologda railway could not be realized. About the same time
indications were observed of a German witlidrawal from Finland and the menace of
a German-Finn attack on the Murman Railway gradually became less, finally disappearing
about the middle of October.
In these circumstances it was decided that nothing was to be gained by pushing
the advance from Archangel, but that, should it be decided to adopt a forward policy,
more effective pressure could be brought to bear on the Bolshevik Government by an
advance southwards from Soroka, It was therefore decided that it was essential to
hold the Murman line to a point south-west of the White Sea in order —
(i.) To open up and secure communication with Archangel in case of emergency
after the port was frozen up.
(ii.) To be prepared for forward action if such should eventually be demanded by
Allied policy.
Orders to the above effect were sent to General Maynard, who proceeded with his
dispositions accordingly. Since the above it has been pointed out to General Maynard
that a purely defensive policy is to be adopted. The necessity for maintaining communi-
cation witli Archangel, however, still exists. In addition, our advance has laid upon us
the responsibility of protecting such of the population as lie behind us. It may be
added that our forward position has been, and is, a large measure of protection for
Finland against Bolshevism, relieving that country of all anxiety except for its south-
eastern frontier.
The total number of Allied and local troops under General Maynard's command is
as follows : —
Rifle sti-ength.
Ration strength.
British
French
Italian
Serhiaii
Total Allied.
Locals
Grand Totfvl.
3,905
260
1,200
958
6,.31.3
3,500
6,832
7.31
1,251
1,220
10,334
4,441
9,813
14,775
Of the above forces about one-half are echelon ned at and soutli of Kandalaksha
down the Mui-man Rjiilway ; our advanced positions at Kem and Soroka being
garrisoned by a force of about .3,000.
The alx)ve distribution is necessitated, not only to hold the front against any
possible Bolshevik attack, but also to protect the line itself from sabotage.
In view of the miserable condition of the Murman Railway, the great length
(about 350 miles) to be guarded and the disaffection of part of the population, the
security of the lines of communication between Kandalaksha and Kem causes great
rt389>
c 2
20
anxiety. Great hardship, and not im}yrohahly disaster, to our trooi^s may result if
the necessai-y personnel for railway maintenance is not sent to General Maynard at an
ean'ly date.
The severe nature of the climate is well-known to the War Cabinet. During the
next few months temperatures of many degrees below zero, with frequent snow
blizzards, have \o be faced. During the three winter months there is little light
during tlie whole 24 hours. Foreseeing these conditions the War Office have ma,de
such provision as has been possible in tlie time available for the health and comfort of
the troops. Clothing, food and comi'orts have been provided on a satisfactory scale,
and there is no anxiety on this score. The matter of housing, including lighting,
however, is a source of great concern, and General Maynard has pressed for the
despatch of certain engineer j^ersonnel which he considers essential. If it is decided to
maintain our present positions in the Murmansk area, it is essential that the railway
and Royal Engineer personnel mentioned above should be despatched without delay.
The total numbers involved are about 1,000.
On the other hand, any withdrawal from our present positions will expose
considerable numbers of the Russian population, who have supported the Allied force,
to massacre by the Soviet troops.
Although the despatch of drafts to North Russia may prove very unpopular, and
may even lead to insubordination and other serious trouble, it must be realized that
the only alternative may be a withdrawal at least to Kandalaksha.
2. Archangel. — General Ironside has been informed that he is to adopt a purely
defensive attitude, continuing the training of the Russian troops in the area now
occuuied. His advanced posts are situated at Onega, on the Archangel — Volgoda
railway (some 100 miles south of Archangel), and on the Dvina River, some 180 miles
from the latter place. In addition a small column is operating against scattered bands
of Bolsheviks over 100 miles to the east of Archangel. The Allied and local forces at
Archangel are as follows : —
Rifle strength.
Ration strength.
British
French
American
• •
3,121
1.400
4,200
6,293
1,686
5,208
Total Allied . .
Locals
8,721
1,700
13,182
2,715
Grand total
10,421
15,897
Good progress is being made with the training of the Russians. With these
General Ironside has had a little difficulty, but his firm action, it is hoped, will prevent
.a recurrence of any insubordination. General Ironside has sent demands for
reinforcements, both for infantry and for technical personnel.
It has been impossible to meet these demands largely owing to the fact that
communication, save with ice-breakers, is now impo.ssible. General Ironside, however,
appears confident of being able to maintain his position and it is doubtful whether, in
view of their anxieties in other directions, the Bolsheviks will be able to stage any
serious attack against Archangel before the opening of that port.
The climate is milder than that of Murmansk. Although General Ironside will
probably be faced with considerable difficulties owing to our inability to supply him
with all his requirements in technical personnel, the situation as regards housing and
the railway is not so acute as that at Murmansk.
3. To sum up, I would earnestly draw the attention of the War Cabinet to the
present unsatisfactory situation of our forces in North Russia and to the urgent necessity
of coming to a decision on the policy to be adopted without delay. Unless it is decided
to withdraw forthwith to Kandalaksha, it is essential that the railway personnel and
other details required by General Maynard should be despatched forthwith ; and every
day's delay adds to the risk which is already serious.
2nd January, 1919.
(Signed) HENRY WILSON,
^ ^ ai.G.s.
21
B.
SITUATION IN NORTH RUSSIA.
Secretary of State.*
1. On 31st December, 1918, the Imperial War Cabinet decided that no further
reinforcements were to be ordered to North Russia until the whole question had been
dealt with by the Allies in Paris. On 2nd January, 1919, the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff submitted to the War Cal)inet a Memorandum (Paper A) drawing
attention to the unsatisfactory situation of our forces in North Russia, and to the
urgent necessity of coming to a decision on the policy to be adopted without delay.
It was pointed out in this Memorandum that unless it was decided to withdraw
General Maynard's forces from Soroiia, at least to Kandalaksha, it was essential that
the railway personnel and other details required by General Maynard to maintain his
force should be despatched forthwith, as every day's delay added to the risk, which
was already serious. Since then a month has gone by, but the Allied Governments
appear to be no nearer a decision as regards their policy than before, nor does the
tentative proposal for the Prinkipo Conference afford reasonable grounds for anticipating
a speedy solution of the problem.
2. In the course of the past month the situation has developed as follows : —
(i.) Hostile attacks under able leadership have been pressed with vigour on the
Archangel forces, necessitating our withdrawal from Shenkursk. This
reverse, although not very serious from the purely military point of view,
is likely to have an unfortunate effect on the moral of both the Allied and
newly-raised Russian troops under General Ironside's command, as well as
on the Russian population of the occupied area, in which there are always
the elements of Bolshevik intrigue at work.
(ii.) The port of Archangel is now closed by ice for the transport of troops, other
than the very few which can be taken in by ice-breakers ; consequently the
only means by which i-einforcements can reach General Ironside is by the
overland route from Soroka, along the shores of the White Sea to Onega.
The possibility of doing this depends, as I pointed out to the War Cabinet
on the 2nd instant, on General Maynard's maintenance of his hold on
Soroka and the positions about Sumski Posad, immediately to the east of
the latter.
3. In these circumstances I consider that the reinforcement of General Ironside's
force is necessary, and instructions have already been issued to this effect. (Telegram,
dated 30th January, 1919, attached.)
Therefore it is urgently necessary that the railway and other troops required by
General Maynard to keep open the Soroka line should he sent him forthwith.
4. I would further draw attention to the fact that the responsibility for the
maintenance of the troops in North Russia is an Allied one. The campaign was
undertaken by direction of the Supreme War Council, and although the command and
co-ordination of the Allied forces was entrusted to the British, the Allied Powers are
equally concerned in the due reinforcement and maintenance of their contingents
operating in that theatre. I hope, therefore, that you will see your way to bringing
this point to the notice of the Prime Minister in Paris, in order that he may use his
influence with the Allied Governments, especially those of France and America, to
ensure, first, that no measures of demobilization are taken which would weaken the
fighting strength of the forces at A^rchangel or Murmansk ; and, secondly, that the
provision of adequate reinforcements may be considered. The latter are estimated as
follows : —
Two battalions infantry.
One machine-gun company.
One pioneer battalion.
Replacements for all Allied contingents on a basis of 10 per cent, of establishment.
It is suggested that of these the Americans might be asked to find one battalion
and one machuie-gun company, the French one battalion, and the French or Italians one
pioneer battalion. The whole force should be despatched to Murmansk in the first
instance, whence the units for Archangel will proceed by march route from Soroka vid
Onega.
• Mr. Churrihill had RUcceeded Lord Milner as Secretary of State on 14th •Taniiary, 1919.
22
5. Under the terms of Army Order 14 of 1919, the British Army of Occupation m
North Russia is definitely recognized, and provision for it anticipated, so I imagine that
this Order supersedes the previous decision of the War Cabinet forbidding the despatch
of reinforcements to that theatre. I should be glad, however, to knov? if I am right in
this assumption and to receive your approval to send out the details scheduled in
Appendix A, the immediate despatch of which — irrespective of any Allied reinforce-
ments that may be sent— I consider is imperative if the risk of disaster to the Allied
forces in North Russia is to be avoided. It is also essential that all men due for
demobilization under the new Order should be replaced before they leave North Russia.
(Signed) P. DE B. RADCLIFFE, D.M.O.
for C.I.G.S.
31st Januai-y, 1918.
APPENDIX A.
Reinforcements Required for North Russia.
(a.) For Murmansk. — ■
Bailway troops, 2 companies and details* ... 72U
Royal Kngineers —
1 works company* 160
Signals* 240
Electric lighting* ... 40
Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Department, Royal Army 258
Medical Corps.*
1,408*
2 companies pioneers (unless provided by Allied troops as suggested in paragraph 3 400
of this paper).
Required to complete the present establishment 587
2,395
Of these the most urgent are those marked thus : *.
(6.) For Archangel. —
Balance of outstanding demands 143
(c.) to place matters on a satisfactory basis a pool of reinforcements should be established in this theatre, over
and above the establishment strength of units. The numbers required would be on a 10 per cent, basis : —
For Murmansk 520
For Archangel 720
(d.) The unit of Renault Tanks now being demobilized in France should be despatched as early as possible to
Murmansk.
N.B. — All troops for Archangel would have to proceed first to Murmansk and Soroka, moving thence by march
route vid Onega after one or two months' acclimatization in the country.
31»* Jamutry, 1919.
From the War Office to the General Officer CommandtTig, Murmansk.
(Paraphrase.) 30th January, 1919.
Many thanks for your suggestions which are very helpful. "We estimate that you will have room for 430 on
ice-breakers after accommodating details from " Stephen." This should be filled with half machine-gun company
and infantry. Remainder of one battalion of infantry, one company of which should be mobile, should leave as early
as possible for Archangel by marcli route. In view of the fact that for the time being no threat to Pechenga or
Murmansk exists it is considered that you should be able to reduce very considerably the force in those areaa The
troops you are to send to Archangel will for the present therefore not be replaced. We are shortly sending you six
caterpillar tractors, carrying 3 tons each as an experiment, and more will eventually be available if successful.
Repeated to Archangel.
23
APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE ARCHANGEL FRONT.
General Situation. — As the result of strong Bolshevik attacks carried out by
superior numbers which were commenced on the 19th January, the Allied forces at
Ustpadenga (on the River Vaga, south of Shenkursk), and at Tarasevo, were compelled
to withdraw to positions indicated below, 55 miles and 20 miles respectively, north of
the former positions. The positions now held by the Allied forces are as follows :
Kleshevo on the River Onega (70 miles south-east of Onega) — south of Oberzerskaya,
on the Archangel — Vologda railway line (100 miles south of Archangel) — south of
Kadish, on the River Emsta — 6 miles south of Shredmachenga — Ust-Syumskoi, on the
River Vaga — Oseredok, on the River Dwina, with a flanking post 10 miles south east
of Pinega.
Allied Forces. — The Allied forces on the Archangel front total 18,S25, with a rifle
strength of 11,195. They are constituted as follows : —
Ration strength.
Rifle strength.
British
French
Italian , .
Americans
Rnssians, &,c.
6,220
1,680
25
5,100
6,300 ^
2,530
840
25
2,700
5,100
18,325
11,195
Of the Russians, 1,250 are not fully trained. Of the above numbers there are
2,000 rifles in reserve at Archangel and 1,200 on the lines of communication south of
Archangel, the remainder lieing distributed on the front. !-'.i/u
Ab regards armament the Allies have 35 field guns (of which 17 are in reserve at
Archangel) and 10 heavy guns (of which 5 are in reserve at Archangel) of superior
quahty to those of the Bolsheviks, and large quantities of machine guns.
There are at present under orders from Murmansk one battalion of infantiy and a
half machine-gun company, of which the machine gunners and 300 infantry should
reach Archangel by ice-breakers by about 1 2th February; while the remainder of the
infantry (600 men) are proceeding by march route from Soroka through Onega, where
they should be concentrated by 24th February. . The distance from Onega to the
railway at Oberzerskaya is about 100 miles over a well-organized route, and these
troops should be available for action on or about 10th March. General Manyard at
Murmansk has also been ordered to be prepared to despatch one further battalion and a
half machine-gun company if necessary.
The forces at General Ironside's disposal are of a very heterogeneous nature ; the
British troops are largely Category " B " men, having been sent out at a time when the
situation in France demanded all available " A " troops, and have not proved themselves
to be of the best moral.
Our main asset is the strong character of General Ironside, whose personality has
raisad moral wherever he has been able to come into direct contact with his troops, and
who enjoys the full confidence of the Russians, both soldiers and politicians. He has
several batteries of first-class Canadian and British artillery and has lately received a
number of good commanding officers capable of taking vigorous action.
Bolshevik Foreett. — The Bolsheviks have at their disposal a total of approximately
22,700 men, with a rifle strength of 18,300 men, which denotes an 80 per cent, increase
as compared with estimates of two months ago. They have 66 field guns, 9 heavy
guns, and about 150 machine guns. Of this force about 17,900 are in forward positions
in contact with the Allies, and the remaining 4,800 are in reserve at Vologda and
Viatka. In addition to this reserve there are approximately 100,000 men, formed into
units but still in training in the interior of Russia, who can be drawn upon it' necessary.
Communications with the interior of Russia are good. The Bolshevik organization and
system of command have shown a marked improvement in the recent operations, and
the General Staff' feel sure that assistance is still being derived from German and
Austrian officers. The Bolshevik troops on this front may he considered to be reliable,
as prior to the commencement of the recent operations certain units which were known
24
to be unreliable were replaced, aud, moreover, a severe form of discipline has been
instituted on this front which may be calculated to prevent desertion and disobedience
of orders on the part of newly mobilized units.
Eneiny Intentions. — The enemy in his attacks, which have developed since the
proposal for an armistice was sent out by the Paris Conference, had for his first
objective the capture of the very prosperous and pro- Ally area of Shenkursk ; and for
his second, the severing of communication between the Dwina force, with headquarters
at Beren-Itskaya (at tlae junction of the Dwina and Vaga Rivers) and Archangel. He
has attained the first of these objectives aud has pillaged and burnt the town of
Shenkursk, murdering many of tiie inhabitants, but has so far failed to attain the
second objective. There is no doubt that a general offensive will take place in the near
future with the object of driving the Allied forces back upon Archangel aud forcing
their capitulation. The enemy doubtless also counts upon a rising of portions of the
population of Archangel against the Northern Russian Government, when the Allies
evacuate their forward positions.
Allies' Position. — The military position at present js serious, but need not be
regarded as critical. General Ironside's somewhat extended front has been much
shortened, and he still has reserves in hand with which to deal with attacks in the
immediate future. We have, however, to reckon with the depressing effect on the
Allied troops, and also on the Russians, of a withdrawal, but, on the other hand, the
Bolshevik advance brings the danger nearer, and all pro- Ally elements know that their
fate and that of all their families is sealed if they yield.
If the attack progresses, and General Ironside's reserves are absorbed into the fight,
the situation may become critical, and it is of the most urgent importance that further
reinforcements be made immediately available. These can at present only be sent to
Murmansk, whence they will proceed either by march route through Onega, or possibly
by ice-breaker from Kem to Archangel. It must also be borne in mind that the only
sound method of defence is by taking the offensive, and, without additional reliable
troops. General Ironside is unable to do this.
General Maynard, whose lines of communication are immense, requiring large
guards against internal enemies and against the looting propensities of all Russians,
would be very hard-pressed to supply the reinforcements already called for, and must be
given not only further technical units but also fighting troops, as his hold on the country
to the south of Soroka is essential to the despatch of these reinforcements to Archangel.
Summary. — The above survey of the situation leads to the conclusion that it is
essential to despatch to Murmansk the reinforcements, both of fighting and technical
troops asked for in the paper submitted to the Secretary of State by the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff on 31st Jaimary (see Appendix A). Without these we may be
driven back close upon the town of Archangel, thus surrendering territory and stores to
the enemy and delivering into his hands the inhabitants, who rely on us for protection.
We may also risk a grave disaster to our own and Allied troops, for whose safety the
British Government is primarily responsible. Such a success, moreover, would give
to the Bolshevik cause an impetus which would be felt not only in Siberia and South
Russia but throughout the civihzed world.
General Staff,
4th February, 1919.
APPENDIX A.
BEINFORCBMENTS REQUIRED FOR NORTH RUSSIA.
A.— Technical troops, and replacements for units already in North Riusia.
(a.) For Murmansk : —
Railway troops, two companies t and details* 720
Royal Engineers— One works company* 150
Signals* _, Si40
Electric lighting ... ... 40
Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Department, Royal Army
Medical Corps* 258
1,408*
Two companies pioneers (unless provided by additional units as in B) ... 400
Required to complete the present establishment 587
Of these the most urgent are those marked thus : *.
+ One operating and one maintenance company.
2,395
25
(b.) For Archangel : —
Balance of outstaudiiig demands ... 14.3
(c.) To place matters on a satisfactory basis a pool of reinforcements should be established
in this theatre over and above the establishment strength of units. The numbers required
on a 10 per cent, basis would be —
For Murmansk 520
For Archangel ... 720
(d.) The unit of Renault Tanks now being demobilized in France should be despatched as early as possible to
Murmansk.
B. — Additional Cmnbatant Units.
Two battalions of infantry.
One machine-gun company.
One pioneer battalion.
N.B. — All troops for Archangel would liave to proceed fii-st to Murmansk and Soroka, moving thence by march
route aid Onega after one or two months' acclimatization in the country.
Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
1. I wish to draw attention to the military situation in North Russia, which in
my opinion is now such as to give rise to considerable anxiety. The chief cause for
this anxiety is not so much the actual military offensive power of the Bolshevik forces
opposing us, as the unreliable .state of the troops composing the forces under the
command of Generals Ironside and Maynard and the uncertain political situation in
their rear. These troops are a heterogeneous assortment of all nationalities and were
never of high quality. They are now tired, dispirited, home-sick, and inclined to be
mutinous ; their moral is undoubtedly so low as to render them a prey to the very
active and insidious Bolshevik propaganda which the enemy are carrying out with
increasing energy and skill.
2. As regards Archangel, no further reinforcements can now reach General
Ironside, either overland from the Murman Railway or by icebreakers, until the
melting of the ice opens the port. This cannot take place until the beginning of June
at the earliest, and may even V)e delayed three weeks or a month later. The enemy
are undoubtedly concentrating numerically superior forces on the Archangel front with
a view to a vigorous offensive in the near future, during a period which is peculiarly
favourable to them, owing to the fact that the ice on the Dwina River melts on the
upper reaches some weeks before it permits of navigation at Archangel. Thus the
Bolshevik gun-boats, with their relatively heavy armament, are in a position to operate
against the Allied front on the river before our troops can be supported by our own
river craft.
3. In these circumstances it is, to my mind, imperative in the first place to do
everything possible to raise the moral and fighting efficiency of General Ironside's
forces. This can be done —
(i.) By sending out as many specially selected officers of the highest stamp as
possible.
(IL) By authorizing Generals Ironside anti Maynard to publish a definite announce-
ment that all men entitled to demobilization will be replaced at the earliest
possible momei;t by fresh per.sonnel.
Steps have already been taken to send out additional officers, but nothing has been
done towards the second step for fear of political complications in this country. I
submit tliat the time has gone by when the latter can now be allowed to override the
grave military necessities of the situation.
If the facts of the case are made public, that is to say, if the people of this country
are told that British troops are in serious danger and must be relieved at the earliest
possible moment, I cannot believe that tlie 'spirit of the nation is so contemptible as not
to respond to the call with alacrity. In the meantime we should press on with the
organization of the special brigade already approved and ensure that the specially
strengthened ships are available and ready to still from this country not later than the
1st May.
4. Furthermore, we should urge that every possible means should be employed to
take pressure off the Archangel front by supporting all anti-Bolshevik forces that are a
(8389) D
26
sei'ious factor in the enemy's military problem. First in this category comes the Siberian
Army of Admiral Kolchak, which has lately made encouraging progress on the Perm —
Ufa front, and whose further advance will have a direct effect on the situation at
Archangel. For this reason, whatever larger questions of policy may be involved, we
should hesitate to withdraw the 9th Bn. Hampshire Regiment from Admiral Kolchak's
command at Omsk until it can be replaced by an equally tangible guarantee of Allied
support in the shape of the large mission already suggested by the Secretary of State.
In the meanwhile, the 9th Bn. Hampshire Regiment should be maintained up to
strength.
It is, further, important to encourage the Japanese in any efforts they may be
prepared to make towards sending troops to the Ural front, or assisting in the equipment,
training and organization of the Siberian Army.
5. Lastly, we should encourage a Finnish offensive on Petrograd in conjunction
with that of the Germans and Esthonians, with the same object, viz., of forcing the
Bolsheviks to detach troops from Archangel and hampering their initiative in that
sector.
6. To sum up, I wish to urge that, apart from all questions of high policy, the
dominating feature of the Russian question from the British 'point of vieiv, is now the
militart/ situation at Archangel, and I submit that all other considerations should be
subordinated to the solution of the difficult problem which confronts us there.
Whatever dissatisfaction or difficulties may be caused in this country by the action I
have suggested above as regards the provision of reinforcements for North Russia, I
have no hesitation in saying that it is nothing to the storm of indignation which would
be aroused by a disaster to our arms in that theatre.
(Signed) P. DE B. RADCLIFFE,
27th March, 1919. D.M.O.
E.
From, the General Officer Commanding, Murmansk, to the War Office.
(Paraphrase.) 31st March, 1919.
I have received absolutely reliable information that Finnish Legion intends to
revolt and join against us with Bolsheviks ; proposed day of rising is Sunday, Gtli April.
They have lately been carrying out active propaganda amongst Karelian Regiment, and
a large number of Karelians are expected to join them. They plan either to move south,
attack in conjunction with Karelians our forward troops in rear, and join hands with
Bolsheviks, or to move north against Murmansk simultaneously with a Bolshevik rising
here. They propose if they move south to destroy Kovda Bridge, 35 miles south of
Kandalaksha, and if they move north Niva Bridge, 16 miles north-east of Kandalaksha,
to prevent arrival of reinforcements from north and south respectively. A move
south in . my opinion is far the more probable, as after destruction of Kovda
Bridge they could traverse Karelia collecting Karelian adherers, whilst they
would be unlikely to get Karelians to move north of Kandalaksha, and Karelians
siding without them would have to act against us independently. Though far from
being panic stricken it is useless to disguise fact that critical situation may arise at
once. My British troops have been so reduced by reinforcements to Archangel that I
am left with an exceedingly small force on which I can rely. I am trying to bring
over two platoons from Pechenga, and am asking Admiral to land party of marines,
but in view of fact that Finnish Legion numbers 1,400, and they might get anything
up to 2,000 Karelians to join them, apart from help from Russian Bolsheviks, these
are very small reinforcement. I therefore urge very strongly that one or more men-of-
war, with landing parties of at least 400, be at once sent here. Weather is much
warmer, and full Arctic equipment is not essential. I hope this request may be
granted, as otherwise we shall *be incurring needless risk. I shall probably go down
the line to-morrow myself to endeavour to arrest Finnish leaders. This may put the
fat in the fire, but it appears to me that this is only action which has any chance of
stopping the revolt. 1 am taking all possible military precautions.
Repeated to Archangel.
'21
F.
From the War Office to General Ironside, Archangel.
(Paraphrase.) 4th April, 1919.
Will you please communicate, as you may deem expedient, the following message
to the troops : —
" Although you are cut off from your country by the ice, you are not forgotten.
Your safety and well-being, on the contrary, is one of the main anxieties of the War
Office, and we are determined to do everything in our power to help you and bring you
safely home. You were sent to North Russia to help draw off the Germans from
attacking our armies in France, and undoubtedly you helped last year to keep large
numbers of German troops away from the battlefield and so enabled a decisive victory
to be won.
" Whatever may be the plan of action towards Russia decided on by The League
of Nations, we intend to relieve yon at the earliest possible moment, and either bring
the whole force away or replace you by fresli men. These reliefs are being prepared
now, and will come through the ice to your aid at the earliest moment when the ships
can break through. Meanwhile, your lives and your chance of again seeing your home
and friends and your fellow-countrymen, who are looking forward to give you a hearty
welcome, depend absolutely upon your discipline and dogged British fighting qualities.
AU eyes are upon you now, and you represent the British Army which has fought and
won and which is watching you confidently and earnestly. You will he hack home in
time to see this year's harvest gathered in, if you continue to display that undaunted
British spirit which has so often got us through in spite of heavy odds and great
harships. Only a few more months of resolute and faithful service again.st this ferocious
enemy and your task will have been discharged. Carry on like Britains fighting for
dear life and dearer honour, and set an example in these difficult circumstances to the
troops of every other country. Reinforcement and relief on the way. We send you
this personal message with the most heartful wishes for your speedy, safe and honourable
return."
Repeated to General Maynard, Murmansk.
}
G.
Secretary of State,
I submit herewith the General Staff paper on the Situation in North Russia which
the War Cabinet asked for.
I should be glad of early approval to the proposals in Part II., paragraph 13, as it
Is urgent that clear insti'uctions should be issued t') General Ironside forthwith.
I would also invite attention to the urgent necessity of a decision as to the feeding
of the civil population, as stated in Part I., paragraph 8.
HENRY WILSON,
C.I.G.S.
16th April, 1919.
SITUATION IN NORTH RUSSIA.
PART L
Measurks Already Taken% oh Considered Necessary by the War Office to
Prepare for the Evacuation of Allied Troops and Inhabitants in North
Russia.
1. The despatch of two companies of infantry to Mui-mansk on the 9th April.
These two companies arti piimarily intended to suppress the present trouble on the
Murman liailwuy, but they may be regarded as a small mobile reserve which coidd, if
the situation in the Murmansk area permits, be sent to Archangel immediately
communication with that port is possible, and in advance of the relief force mentioned
below.
28
2. The preparation of relief forces, consisting oj two special contingents of about
5,000 men each.
The composition of each of these contingents is as follows : —
2 battalions infantiy.
1 machine-gun battalion.
1 battery, Royal Field Artillery.
2 light trench mortar batteries.
1 field company. Royal Engineers.
1 signal company.
1 horse transport company.
Certain modifications in the above organization have been suggested by General
Ironside, chiefly with a view to enabling the North Russia Government to stand alone
after the evacuation of Allied forces. These modifications are now being considered.
It is hoped that the first contingent will be ready to embark about 1st May.
Orders for the formation of the second contingent have been issued. It is to be ready
to embark about 15th May if required.
Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining some of the personnel, especially
infantry, Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Army Medical Corps. It is hoped,
however, that the pubhc appeal for volunteers made on the 9th April will produce the
numbers required for b'btb contingents.
3. Provision of specially strengthened ships.
The Ministry of Shipping has been pressed to provide three specially strengthened
ships ready to sail with the first units of the relief forces on 1st May. If only ordinary
vessels were used it would be necessary to wait at least another fortnight for the ice-
floes to be completely cleared, and in view of the uncertainty as to what the military
and political situation at Archangel will be in two months from now, to take the risk of
this delay is totally unjustifiable. It is anticipated that the season may be an early
one. The first units may therefore arrive in Archangel about the third week in May,
and the evacuation of the undesirable elements should be commenced immediately
afterwards.
4. Despatch of selected officers.
Two Senior General Staff" officers and 12 selected senior officers, in addition to the
ordinary officer reinforcements, have been despatched to Murmansk for onward passage
to Archangel in ice-breakers.
5. Measures to improve moral.
In addition to the appeal for volunteers issued on 9th April, the following
measures have been taken to improve the moral of the troops in North Russia, and to
ensure the co-operation of the British public : —
(i.) A telegram has been sent to Generals Ironside and Maynard authorizing them
to announce to the troops that measures are being taken for their relief at
the earliest possible moment,
(ii.) Arrangements have been made for a further and better news service for the
troops.
(iii.) A frank statement ol' the danger of the prestjnt position has been issued to
the Press.
For obvious reasons, however, the most alarming feature, which is
that constituted by the lowered moral of the Allied forces, could not be
made public. Arrangements have been made for frequent and full
communiques and for periodical lectures to. the Press.
6. Action by the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office have been asked to consider the destination and disposal of any
Russians whom it may be necessary to evacuate.
An estimate of these numbers is 18,000, 5,000 of whom are fighting forces in the
British and French Legions.
It is hoped that if the measures advocated by the General Staff" in Part II. of this
paper are taken, the North Russian Government should be enabled to stand alone after
29
the withdrawal of the Allied forces, and the necessity for evacuating the above large
numbers will not arise. It is, however, very necessary that this problem should be
considered by the Foreign Office in conjunction with the War Office and Ministry of
Shipping.
7. Action by the Admiralty.
The War Office is in communication with the Admiralty on various matters
connected with the possible evacuation of North Kussia. Until, however, the questions
of policy raised in Part II. of this paper are settled, the following are the only matters
upon which action has been possible : —
(a.) The Admiralty are despatching a strong river expedition for the reinforcement
of the present flotilla on the River Dwina.
The expedition will reach Murmansk in sufficient time to enter the
White Sea at the earliest practicable moment.
It is anticipated that the British naval forces on the Dwina will be
more than sufficient to cope with the Bolshevik river forces.
(6.) In connection with the above, the Ministry of Shipping (who have taken over
the responsibilities in this respect of the Inland Water Transport
Department) have made arrangements with the local military and naval
authorities at Archangel for the despatch of suitable river transport,
including craft for the conveyance of troops and supplies and hospital
steamers. It has been impossible in the short time available completely to
meet the requirements of General Ironside, but it is hoped that there will
be no serious deficiency.
(c.) The Admiralty have informed the War Office that if the complete evacuation
of Archangel by Allied troops is ordered, they see no object from the naval
point of view in remaining in possession of any ports in tlie Arctic after
the military forces have been withdrawn.
The Admiralty point out, however, that if evacuation is ordered, that
at Archangel should be carried out first. The retention of Murmansk, and
possibly of Pechenga, for some time is essential, as these inlets are required
in order to form harbours of refuge for the small craft from Archangel,
where preparation for their voyage to England can be carried out.
{d.) The Rear- Admiral Commanding the Naval Forces in the Arctic was informed
on 11th March, 1919, of the probable future policy to be adopted in North
Russia, and was directed to discuss the matter with General Ironside.
He was further directed to telegraph his appreciation of the naval
operations involved after such discussion.
8. Feeding of civil population.
In conclusion, it is necessary to point out the serious nature of the situation in
default of any definite policy as to the supply of foodstuffs for the civil population.
As regards Murmansk, the Americans have begun to fulfil the obligations which
they undertook in the summer of 1918, and are sending direct from America the food-
stuffs necessary for the population of about 100,000. With the food now en route the
Murmansk area is provisioned in flour up to the end of June, and to a later date in
some other essential foodstuffs. But, so far as the War Office is aware, no arrangements
are in contemplation for any further supply.
As regards Archangel, the supplies at present in the country are sufficient to feed
the population of about 000,000 up to the end of June only, and it is understood that
no arrangements whatever have been made to provide for further supplies.
Whatever may be the policy adopted towards North Russia, it is suggested that
even from the purely political point of view it is impossible to contemplate the
abandonment of the assistance hitherto given to the population, except in the case of
the capture by the Bolsheviks of Archangel.
From the military point of view, faihu-e to continue supplies for the civil population
would render any military measures impossible, and in a larger degree than any other
factor would make for the speedy downfall of tlie North Russian Government and its
military forces.
30
PART II.
Future Policy and Proposals for Action.
1. The precise nature and scope of the arrangements to be made for the withdrawal
of the Allied troops from North Russia depend on the military and political conditions
obtaining at the time when the operation is carried out.
Two situations may arise ; either —
(a.) Conditions will be such as will enable the Archangel Government to maintain
its existence and the Russian forces to keep the field after the Allied units
have been withdrawn ; or
(b.) The Russian forces will disintegrate and the Archangel Government will fall.
In this case it will be necessary to evacuate large numbers of the anti-
Bolshevik population in addition to such units as the Slavo-British Legion
which have been organized with the assistance of Allied personnel.
Which of these two situations come to pass will depend on the military situation
at the moment, which in turn will be largely governed by the measures taken between
now and then.
2. It may be assumed that His Majesty's Government would prefer to see
situation (a) brought about if possible, in order to admit of the withdrawal being carried
out with as little loss of prestige as muy be.
To make quite certain of the stability of the Archangel Government it will be
necessary to —
(i.) Strike a sharp and successful blow at the Bolshevik forces,
(ii.) Effect a real and permanent junction between the North Russian forces and
the right wing of Kolchak's Siberian Army,
(iii.) Provide a cadre of British officers and non-commissioned officers to organize,
instruct and lead Russian units.
If(i) and (ii) can both be achieved, the desired result will almost certainly be
brougiit about. If only (i) and (iii) can be done, it may possibly be realized. If
neither of these conditions can be carried out, the fall of the Archangel Government and
the disintegration of the anti-Bolshevik forces may be reckoned on as certain.
What then are the chances of effecting these conditions ?
3. Any junction of the Siberian and North Russian forces, to be effective, must be
based upon —
(a.) Secure lateral communications.
(h.) Ensured efficiency of both the national North Russian and Siberian forces.
4. To secure adequate lateral communications, it is the opinion of the General Staff
that it would be sufficient to occupy permanently the important junction of Viatka,
together with the railway from Viatka to Kotlas and the Dwina River line. A point
on the Archangel — Vologda line, sufficiently far south to guard against any Bolshevik
advance from Vologda, sliould at the same time be held.
It would undoubtedly be preferable to secure the railway junction at Vologda and
thus ensure through railway commimicatiou between Siberia and Archangel, but this is
probably beyond the capabilities of the Siberian Army in the time available. The
permanent occupation of Viatka by the Siberian forces would probably be an effective
deterrent to any Bolshevik advance by Vologda upon Archa,ngel. The Dwina River
section between Kotlas and Archangel is, of course, a weak link in the chain, but the
possibilities of transferring troops and material by river during the open season and by
sleigh during the winter (December-May) on this section are sufficient for material
purposes. The moral effect of such communication would be sufficient to secure the
efficiency of the young North Russian forces and the continuance of mobilization of
large numbers.
5. The second condition mentioned in paragraph 3 above, i.e., the efficiency of the
North Russian and Siberian forces, is dependent on a variety of factors. The chief
factor in the case of the North Russian forces is our ability to supply — ■
(a.) Sufficient capable Russian officers and other ranks to take the place of Allied
personnel, both for executive and administrative staff and regimenta
duties.
(b. ) Sufficient material for the Russian forces yet to be mobilized.
31
With whatever rapidity and generosity the necessities are supplied, however, it
must be clearly recognized that the factor of time is against the ability of the Russians
to stand unaided by such a nucleus as could be supplied by a strong British mission.
6. As regards the efficiency of the Siberian forces, by far the most important factor
is to ensure the stability of the Government under Admiral Kolchak.
This, in the opinion of the General Staflf, would best be assured by the speedy
recognition of that Government.
The other factors essential to the efficiency of the forces are —
(a.) The effective maintenance and operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
(b.) The continued presence of small numbers of Allied personnel to hearten the
Siberian armies,
(c.) The continued supply of such material (in addition to that already sent) as
may be required by Admiral Kolchak.
As regards (6), steps are being to replace the two British battalions now in Siberia
by an increase of General Knox's present Mission (which now numbers about 400) to
a total strength of 2,000.
Until the above replacement is possible the two battalions should be retained in
Siberia, and steps are being taken to keep the l/9th Bn. Hampshire Regiment, now at
Omsk, up to strength.
As regards further supplies of material, it is not anticipated that demands will be
of any magnitude. A considerable amount has been, and probably will be, captured by
the Siberian forces, and there are indications that certain quantities are being obtained
by local manufacture. Experts may possibly be required to assist in the latter.
7. General Ironside, on his part, states that the Russian troops under his command
are showing rapid improvement. He points out that it is possible to obtain 10,000
recruits in the Mezen and Pechora ai-eas, which can be rendered thoroughly anti-
Bolshevik, and where good work is already being done by a British Mission. General
Ironside reckons that he can count, under certain definite conditions, on having 23,000
efficient Russian troops ready to fight by tiie end of the sununer.
The conditions postulated by General Ironside are as follows : — -
(a.) That he is able to reckon on equipment being sent direct to the estuaries of
the Mezen and Pechora Rivers for the 5,000 Russians he hopes to raise in
each of these two areas.
[b.) That a large number of reliable Russian officers are sent as soon as possible.
(c.) That he maintains his present positions.
8. Genei-al Ironside, in addition, points out that it should be clearly realized that
owing to the lowered moral of all his Allied forces, togethei- with continuous fighting
and severe conditions, practically the whole of the Allied forces now in the Archangel
area require evacuation ; that he is working with a very imperfect machine owing to
sickness and changes in his staff, and that he does not know who will remain or who
will go.
He therefore asks that he may be allowed definitely to call for volunteers among
officers and non-commissioned officers now serving in Archangel for further service in
North Russia under two categories : —
a.) For British subordinate commands and staff.
b.) For an expansion of the Slavo-British Legion.
In the case of the latter the intention of General Ironside is to form the present
Slavo-British Legion into an efficient force of —
3 battalions ... ..."] ^„ *. t> -j.- i a: / i en j.
,,1 I 50 i)er cent. British otncers (and 50 per cent, non-
2 squadrons > ' • . , «, ,. ^ ,•„ ^ , v
n 1^, , . I commissioned officers lor artillery only).
This force would form a backbone to the purely Russian National forces.
'J. If it were found possible to utilize purely British forces for operations undertaken
with a view to securing the effective junction of the North Russian and Siberian forces
as postulated in (paragraph 4) above, General Ironside is prepared to guarantee to take
Kotlas provided that —
[a.) The naval flotilla is adequate.
(b.) That 5,000 good fighting men are sent from England.
32
(c.) That British administrative personnel on a liberal scale are provided.
{d.) That 2,000 non-mobile British troops are provided for the duties of com-
munication.
{e.) That there is a certainty of the Siberian forces co-opei-ating successfully.
{/.) That the Bolshevik forces in other theatres are thoroughly employed.
As regards (a) above, the naval reinforcements now being provided by the
Admiralty, with the river gunboats already at Archangel, are probably more than
adequate for the purpose.
The 5,000 British troops are now being provided by the first contingent of the
Eussian relief force due to sail about 1st May (see Part I.).
There is little doubt that sufficient administrative personnel could be provided.
The 2,000 line of communication troops could be found from the second brigade
which is due to embark about 15th May.
As regards (e), while there is every hope of the effective co-operation of the
Siberian forces, there can be no positive guarantee of their success.
As regards ( /'), there is every hope that General Denikin's activities, together
with the fear of losing the rich giain and coal of the Ukraine and Donetz basins, will
keep strong Bolshevik forces in South Russia.
The Bolsheviks will undoubtedly be fully employed by the Siberian armies.
On the other hand, the Polish forces torn by lears of Germany on the one side and
occupied by hostile forces of the Ukraine on the south, cannot be reckoned upon to
bring any effective pressure to bear upon the Bolshevists.
Similarly, the lack of Allied policy in regard to Finland and the other Baltic States
precludes the timely, effective (and perhaps decisive) action which might otherwise have
been undertaken against Petrograd. In this connection, however, it cannot be too
strongly pointed out that the news that the Allies were taking active measures to assist
these States would undoubtedly prevent any great transference of Bolshevik forces from
this front. Incidentally, such assistance would keep the Esthonian forces (of whose
disinclination to continue the struggle there are persistent reports) in the field. The
despatch of missions to the Baltic States is therefore highly desirable.
10. The conclusion arrived at by a study of the above considerations is that the
chances of securing the continued stability of the Archangel Government and its
military forces are considerable, provided to conditions are realized : —
(i.) That British units are allowed to undertake an advance on Kotlas ; and
(ii.) That British officers and non-commissioned officers are allowed to volunteer
for employment in the Russian units, such as the Slavo- British Legion,
which are now in process of organization.
11. Both these conditions require careful examination before acceptance. With
regard to the first, the use of British units, such as the reinforcements now being sent
out, may lay us open to the accusation of breaking faith, on the grounds that these
troops were provided and despatched to rescue our beleaguered garrison and not to
undertake effensive operations against the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, it must be
admitted that it will most certainly be necessary to act offensively to a certain extent
in order to enable the delicate and difficult operation of withdrawal to be carried out
successfully, quite apart from any political considerations. If this is conceded, it is
impossible to tie down General Ironside as regards the details of his operations or to
forbid him to advance beyond a certain line. All military experience, and in particular
the history of our present operations in North Russia, teaches the imjjossibility of setting a
definite limit to operations once they have been tnidertaken. Therefore, provided it is
made quite clear to General Ironside that all British and non-Russian units must be
withdrawn before the winter, it is considered he should be left a free hand to achieve
his object in the most effective manner possible.
12. As regards the second condition, unless certain limitations are set to its scope,
its acceptance would have the disadvantage of hampering 'us with considerable
conunitments in North Russia, and if no junction with Kolchak should be effected we
might find ourselves greatly embarrassed next winter if we still had British personnel
remaining in the country. Should the Archangel Government fall after the withdrawal
of the Allied units, the officers and men of our Mission would, be liable to capture or
death at the hands of the Bolsheviks, and the effect on our prestige would be
deplorable. On the other hand, it, is fair to argue that in leaving a British Mission of
this nature we should only be carrying out the same policy as in Siberia and in South
33
Kussia. Taking these points into consideration, it is recommended that General
Ironside should be permitted to call for volunteers from the British troops now under
his orders, or about to join him, for the purpose of instructing and commanding Russian
units on the clear understanding that there is no guarantee as to the length of time for
which these individuals will remain, and that it may be necessary to withdraw them
entirely before the port of Archangel closes for the winter. The question is further
simplified by the fact that if the prospects towards the end of the summer are so
unfavourable that the Archangel Government is likely to fall, it will be necessary in
any case to evacuate the Russian units in which the British personnel will be serving.
13. It is therefore recommended that instructions should be issued to General
Ironside in the following sense —
(i.) To make all necessary preparations to strike as effective a bluw as possible at
the hostile forces, with the object of facilitating the ultimate withdrawal of
the Allied forces under such conditions as will enable the Northern Russian
Army to keep the field and maintain the stability of the Archangel
Government,
(ii.) To call for volunteers from the British forces now in or proceeding to North
Russia as General Ironside has suggested, and to proceed with the expansion
of the Slavo-British Legion on the understanding that all such personnel
may have to be withdrawn before next winter.
14. The following additional proposals for action are made on the assumption that
the continued existence of the Archangel Government is a British and Allied interest : —
(a.) Immediate measures for the collection and despatch of the 700 Russian officers
required.
(6.) The despatch of such additional equipment as may he enumerated by
General Ironside. (This involves the consideration of shipping a portion of
such material direct to the Mezen and Pechora Rivers.)
(c.) That General Ironside be ordered to submit the numbers of such furtlier
personnel as may be required after he has ascertained what number can be
locally obtained.
(d.) That the Admiralty and Ministry of Shipping be required to consider —
(i.) What measures can be taken to afford similar assistance to the
above as regards the Dwina River forces, and
(ii.) The general naval and shipping effort involved by the above
proposals.
(e.) That the attention of the Foreign Office be called to the urgent necessity of
securing the continuation of supplies for the civilian population of Murmansk
and Archangel, see Part I., paragraph 8.
(J.) That all measures necessary for the support of the Siberian forces enumerated
in paragraph (6) above be undertaken, more especially the recognition of
Admiral Kolchak's Government.
{g.) That Allied Missions be at once despatched to the Baltic States, including
Finland, and that immediate further assistance be given to Esthonian as
demanded by the Esthonian delegates.
15. In conclusion, it must be pointed out that Great Britain is the mandatory of A
the Allies in respect to North Russia, and that British troops and British trained troops
form the great majority of the forces. Under these circumstances, although the
responsibility for a decision as to policy may theoretically be an Allied one. Great
Britain will never be absolved in the event of failure or disaster. On the other hand,
if the measures recommended above are energetically pushed forward there is good
reason to anticipate a satisfactory conclusion to the North Russian campaign.
Genkral Staff,
15th April, 1919.
(8889)
34
ATTACKS EAST OF UROSOZERO.
From the General Officer Commanding, Murmansk, to the War Office.
(Pharaphrase.) 17th April, 1919.
With view to following up success at Urosozero I ordered Russian troops to attack
Vojmosalmi (35 miles east of Urosozero). Attack was successful, resulting in capture
of Vojmosalmi and all villages at south-east angle of Lake Vigozera. Up to the present
no further details have been received beyond fact that we took a considerable number
of prisoners and that all went well. By capture and retention of Vojmosalmi, which is
on main road running parallel to railway from Povyenetz to Sumski Posad, I have
gained complete control of Lake Vigozero and also of main route to Nyukhotskoe (on
south shore of White Sea) which branches off at this point. As I also hold with Slavo-
British troops Lizarevo (35 miles W.N. W. of Urosozero) I control all approaches north-
wards along an approximate east and west line through Urosozero.
The Bolsheviks, who are reported to be preparing further withdrawal, seem to
have been taken completely by surprise by these sudden attacks coming at a time when
they knew weU we had internal difficulties which they had hoped to take advantage of.
I realize fully any further advance will be something of a hazard but Russian
troops are exceedingly anxious to undertake operations against Medvyejya Gora and
Povyenetz at northern extremity of Lake Onega and success in such undertaking offers
great possibilities. Only lines of advance northward by rail and road would be in our
hands. Line of defence would be much shortened especially as Finnish frontier makes
large bend towards railway at this point. If successful attack is made before ice on lakes
breaks a considerable amount of lake shipping now at Medvyejya would be captured and
from secret information I gather that the Russian officer in command of flotilla on Lake
Onega would at once join us. We should then be in a strong position and during the
summer could probably force Bolsheviks to evacuate Petrozavodsk. I should not
hesitate to give my sanction if Russian mobilization were advanced as results offered
are very great. But as matters stand, before making decision I must await further
news of enemy movements.
If reports are true Finnish troops are about to attack Petrozavodsk and are now
assembling at Sordavala this would afford splendid opportunity for concerted action and
probably lead to break up of the whole Bolshevik force from Petrozavodsk northward.
Can you ascertain truth from Finnish Government and suggest co-operation, which
would be welcomed by the Russians.
Repeated to Archangel.
I.
From the General Officer Commanding, Murmansk, to the War Office.
(Paraphrase.) 25th April, 1919.
Reference the last portion of my telegram, dated 17th April. Provided
that there is no immediate prospect of the withdrawal of the Serbian battalion
and that the Middlesex and King's Royal Rifle Corps Companies are to remain with me
I consider I can capture Medvyejya Gora, Povyenetz, even without co-operation with
Finnish Government troops. It affords great opportunities as a military operation, as
already explained.
The only practicable summer route from the south passing to west of railway
starts at Medvyejya and runs north-west past the western edge of" Lake Segozero.
The only other summer route leading northwards is Povyenetz — Sumski — Posad
road.
Thus possession of these two places would give control of all avenues of advance
northwards till, at least, next November, and the extent of front to be held would be
enormously reduced.
The political considerations are even more weighty than the military, as
Russian leaders are urging me very strongly to be allowed to press forward, stating
that unless they are permitted to follow up recent successes the moral of the troops
35
will suffer. They affirm, too, that the advance will open up the most hopeful of all
recruiting areas, and do more than anything else to stop Bolshevik agitation throughout
the occupied area.
Operations of this scale cannot, however, be entrusted to Russian troops only, but
Serbians are getting injpatient at inactivity, and my two fresh companies are anxious
for work at the front.
As general situation much improved I can, therefore, spare willing troops.
I am commencing to deport a considerable number of undesirables, and have
situation in Murmansk in hand.
On understanding that deputation goes to Helsingfors the Finnish Legion is quiet.
At Kem and Soroka leading men, who have been plotting against us, are being
removed, including General Sveginseff, and pro-Bolshevik population cowed.
I feel justified, under these circumstances, in further aggressive action, providing
really good results are promised.
Difficulty during summer of feeding my troops to north-west of Lake Segozero,
unless I can secure the only summer route to Medvyejya, is additional reason for further
advancmg.
Havmg explained situation I am assuming, that should favourable opportunity
offer, you will leave it to my discretion to make proposed advance.
From the War Office to the General Officer Commanding, Murmansk.
(Paraphrase.) . 29th April, 1919.
Your telegram, dated 25th April, last sentence. There is every advantage
from the purely military point of view in making the advance you suggest to the north
end of Lake Onega, not only for the favourable influence it is likely to have on
operations of the Archangel force but also for the improvement of the situation
locally. As no further reinforcements of railway or other troops can be sent it must be
clearly understood that this advance must be undertaken with the resources now at
your disposal. You must also consider whether it will involve liabilities beyond what
you are able to meet for the feeding of the civil population.
A further political complication is introduced by the recent Finnish incursion in
the direction of Olonets, which may antagonize Russian feeling although useful as a
purely military enterprise against the Bolsheviks. Therefore it is not desirable that
you should join up with these Finnish forces until we get a clear undertaking from the
Finnish Government that they have no annexationist designs on Russian territory in
this area.
Subject to the above conditions it is left to your discretion to make the proposed
advance if a favourable opportunity offers.
K.
From the War Office to General Ironside.
(Paraphrase.) 4th May, 1919.
You are authorized to make all preparations, with the resources at your disposal,
to strike a heavy blow against the Bolsheviks in the direction of Kotlas, if a
favourable opportunity shoiud occur for effecting a junction with Gaida* about that
point. Before such a move is actually carried out, however, Cabinet approval will
have to be obtained.
Repeated to General Knox. ,
• One of Admiral Kolchak's commandera.
. 36
L.
From the General Oficer Commaiiding, Archangel, to the War Office.
(Paraphrase.) 6th June, 1919.
Your telegram, dated 4th June. Paragraph 2. Operations can begin in the first
week of July. Kolchak should be informed he must at least keep his right flank where
it is on Glazov Railway.
Paragraph 3 (1). All conscript troops are being withdrawn to base where they will
be employed until shipped home before 1st September. (2.) Noted. (3.) The last of
the American troops will have been shipped by Ist July, and I do not require them here
now. If any more American engineers come I can employ them at base work.
(4.) Noted.
Paragraph 4. The morale, feeding and equipment of enemy's troops opposed to us
on Dwina and Vaga are bad. Desertions frequent, and all our raids have succeeded
with ease. A strong push will upset everything. I therefore forward following
outline of operations to take place simultaneously : —
(a.) Advance against Kotlas with one British and Graham's composite Russian
Slavo-British Legion Brigades. One operation embracing the river area
laid with mines can be done in single jump, which will open way direct
to Kotlas, whole operation taking about 15 days.
(6.) 2nd British Brigade, concentrated at Beresnik as support to (a), which support
should, however, not be necessary, and to carry out large raid against Vaga,
objective, capturing mobilized men opposed to us and turn them into soldiers
and destroying material enemy cannot replace. These operations should
give me Kotlas with a large number of tugs, steamers and barges, and
with combined aeroplane and gun bombardment should have very few
casualties. Monitors will not be able to reach Kotlas as river shows every
sign of being very low this year, but flotilla is sufficient.
[c.) Advance against Plesetskaya by purely Russian forces employing new smoke
screen, which will be no danger to non*-combatauts. Our position on railway
will thus be strengthened, and any operations to push us back prevented,
while my main forces are at Kotlas.
Considering your (a) and (h) of paragraph 4, I put forward following points : —
(a.) If a chance of junction appears, operations on Dwina will be extended to a
point about 30 miles south of Kotlas to ensure cutting of railway and
capturing material and to block the Suchona, but in no case further.
Grahams mixed brigade will be employed at Kotlas to prepare base and
send down tugs and barges, and the British brigade will be employed to
clear up the Witchegda River and bring in the right flank of Siberians and
Shaposbnikoff". As soon as junction is effected, the British brigade at
Beresnik, with the exception of what is i-equired to block the Vaga, will go
down country to be employed against Pinega or on railway as required.
(6.) If no junction is in sight, objective will be to seize and hold Kotlas as long as
possible and clear up Witchegda area, sending all craft down to Archangel
and making Kotlas impossible as a base for winter. There will be no danger
of being cut off" in either case, as a withdrawal from Kotlas with our present
flotilla is assured at all times, and there will be ample time to do all we
want and have troops ready to embark in October and November before
port closes.
Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Murmansk.
M.
From the War Office to the General Officer Commanding, Kem.
(Paraphrase.) ' 17th June, 1919.
1. From your telegram of 12th June, containing a description of the behaviour
of the new Russian forces, it was already obvious that you had reached the limit of
what you can do, and you must now concentrate your efforts on consolidating your
37
present position, and, with the aid of the Russian officers now being sent you, on
organizing and training the Russian troops. It is hoped that before long you will have
the motor boats, and also the tanks which are now being prepared.
Your British troops are to be congratulated on having given a good example to
the Russians once more, and your successful operations as a whole have done much
to assist Ironside. You will realize, however, that no risk must be run of upsetting
Ironside's plans by the transfer of any of his troops at this juncture, as so much
depends on the success of this operation.
Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Archangel.
N.
From thfi War Office to General Ironside, Archangel.
(Paraphrase.) 18th June, 1919.
Your proposed operations have been approved and that approval stands. Cabinet
approval was, however, obtained as part of an operation to join hands with Kolchak.
The defeats which Kolchak's armies sustained in the centre and south may preclude
the effective junction which we had in view. In these circumstances, with the
Secretary of State's concurrence, the Cabinet have decided to review on 27th June the
entire situation in the light of all information available then. After hearing the military
advice they will then decide —
(a.) Whether there is sufficient prospect of obtaining a real junction with Kolchak
• to justify the operation as originally presented to them, or
{h.) Whether your operation should proceed independently as an indispensable part
of the process of evacuation in. spite of the fact that no effective junction
with Kolchak can be hoped for.
Therefore, yoil should* not begin your movement without informing us beforehand
and receiving our confirmatory wire. Meanwhile, on the assumption that sanction will
be given you should continue preparations and you are invited to telegraph your views
on [a) and {h) so that on 27th June they may be laid before the Cabinet.
o.
From the General Officer Com,man(ling, Archangel, to the War Office.
(Paraphrase.) 19th June, 1919.
Reference your telegram, dated 18th June. Preparations for advance on Kotlas are
nearing completion. Mine sweeping commences to-morrow under air and flotilla
bombardment. Enemy behaviour under bombardment should show their value and give
indications of what his front line battalions intend to do. As regards (a), you can
judge better of Kolchak's operations than I can, but in any case two points should be
borne in mind : —
(1 ) Russians are easily affected by success and if there were any wavering our
arrival at Kotlas might just give that extra moral required.
(2.) That in any case I should be able to pull in Kolchak's right wing from the
direction of Yarensk on the Witchegda and make a large reinforcement to
the Russian force detailed from our forces to move just south of Kotlas by
arming the badly armed and unarmed.
As regards \b), I would put forward following points : In order to be certain of an
orderly evacuation it should be carried out as a peace operation. To ensure this I must
disengage myself on all my fronts and render an offensive by the Bolsheviks during a
reasonable period an impossibility. I must therefore take an offensive on the important
points of my front and these offensives must be carried out against a definite objective,
the gaining of which will —
(1.) Disengage my forces and enable me to embark in peace.
(2.) Place the Russians in a position to maintain themselves even though they do
not join up with Kolchak,
38
Roughly, these objeotives are three in number and I wire them with a short resume
of reasons —
(1.) Capture of Plesetskaya on the Vologda Railway so as to destroy enemy's base
and capture the junction of roads leading from railway line towards Onega
on the west and Tarasevo and Shenkursk on the east and so prevent an
enemy winter campaign.
(2.) Clearing of the Pinega area so that whole of northern region shall be clear of
Bolsheviks.
(3.) Advance on Kotlas for the object of destroying all workshops, dep6t8,
wharves, capturing all enemy boats and rendering the place useless as a
base during this summer or winter. Also to bring in the right wing of
Siberians and arm them and to clean up the Witchegda area.
These three objectives gained the evacuation before 10th November, should be
effected as a peace operation leaving behind the mission of strength to be decided later.
I am employing troops so that brunt of work falls upon Russians who will be fighting
practically unaided in objectives (l) and (2), and in objective (3) I am employing the
Russians and Slavo-British Legion to move to the south of Kotlas if that is necessary
and the Volunteer Brigade under Jackson to clean up Witchegda area, while the
Regular Brigade under Grogan will return as occasion offers to base to take the place
of conscripts being demobilized by 1st September and perhaps to supply small
detachments for Pinega.
In no case do I think that any advance less than to Kotlas will have the desired
effect in disengaging our forces, and it does offer possible chance of bringing on Kolchak.
T have no intention of allowing British forces to get into such a position that they
would require relief or that they could not withdraw. I do not think that it would be
advisable to continue an advance against Kotlas if the enemy really puts up a stubborn
resistance.
P.
GENERAL IRONSIDE'S PROPOSED OPERATIONS.
{With reference to telegram, dated \%ih June, jrom, War Office to General
Ironside and General Ironside's reply, dated \Qth June.*)
1. The two main objects of the projected operations were originally as follows : — •
{a.) To secure the safe (and it may be added the creditable) withdrawal of British
forces.
(6.) To assist the anti-Bolshevik forces in so doing.
As regards {h), the main object was to secure a junction between the North Russian
and Siberian forces.
2. Since the General Staff paper of 15th April was written, certain factors have
materially affected the situation, viz. : —
t(i.) The impending recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government and the
determination of the Allies to afford him all possible assistance.
(ii.) The success which, up to the present, has attended the Bolshevik endeavours
to deal the most formidable of their opponents, the Siberian armies, a
knock-out blow. The retirement, in particular, of General Gaida's forces
eastward from Glazov towards Perm.
(iii.) The rapid successes of General Denikin.
(iv.) The development of the situation before Petrograd.
3. It is not necessary to labour the point that we are now more than ever bound to
assist Admiral Kolchak, but it is necessary to point out that the general situation
presents one of those cases in which one depressing feature is apt to monopolize attention
to tlje detriment of offensive possibilities and decided action. Such action has been
proved by experience to have the most surprising consequences in Russia, where the
moral factor counts to-day to an unparalled degree.
4. The^ operations under contemplation must not, however, be considered solely
from the point of view of Admiral Kolchak. The real test to which the proposal must
be subjected is, whether or not it is necessary iii order to enable the withdrawal of the
British forces from North Russia to be carried out with certainty, and without losses
and confusion.
* See Papers N and 0. \ See footnote oh pages 39-41,
39
5. If General Ironside's withdrawal is to be an orderly one, effected in safety, it is
obvious that he must carry out offensive operations of some kind. It is entirely unsafe
to assume that a retirement under any other circumstances would not be closely
followed up by the Bolshevik forces, however weak they may be. A methodical with-
drawal, in face of a close pursuit, and possibly threatened by local risings in rear,
would be a matter of considerable difficulty. It must be remembered that it would be
difficult to explain our action to the newly raised Kussian forces. The embarkation of
the force at Archangel might well become a hazardous proceeding. If it is clear that
offensive operations of some kind are an essential preliminary to withdrawal, it only
remains to consider what their scope should be, and whether, on the Dwina, it is really
necessary to push the offensive as far as Kotlas.
6. As General Ironside points out, any offensive operations, to be of any value,
must have definite objectives, the capture of which will have a real effect on the
military situation. In this case the nearest objectives which fulfil this condition are
Kotlas, on the River Dwina, and Plesetskaya, on the Vologda Railway. Both of these
places are of the greatest importance to the enemy as advanced bases. If these
advanced bases can be captured by us, and held sufficiently long to enable the removal
or destruction of all ammunition, supplies, military stores, boats and rolling st(jck to be
carried out, it is safe to assume that any Bolshevik operation north of them would be
out of the question for a considerable period. On the Dwina this result cannot be
completely achieved by any blow struck at the Bolsheviks, however heavy it may be,
unless it is followed up by a rapid advance and the seizing of Kotlas.
7. General Ironside is confident of being able to overcome the Bolshevik resistance
without much difficulty, and hopes to go straight through to Kotlas. The recent
preliminary action at Troitska (which was undertaken solely with a view to removing
enemy mines on which they largely rely for their defence) has shown that there may
be serious fighting in the eaily stages of the operations, as was only to be expected.
But after the first attack tliere is every reason to hope, from the information we possess,
that the Bolshevik forces will become very raindly disorganized.
In all military operations it is, of course, necessary to be prepared for the
unexpected. In the event of a really stubborn Bolshevik resistance it will be for
General Ironside to decide to what extent the attack should be pushed home. He alone
will be in a position to balance on the one side the probable increased losses without
which an unmolested withdrawal could not be secured, and on the other side fewer
additional battle casualties with a dangerous retreat and embarkation carried out in
contact with the enemy.
8. The General Staff has every confidence in General Ironside. He has shown
himself to be possessed of the qualities necessary to enable him to form a connect
judgment in the event of a situation arising such as that indicated above. He has
given an assurance that he has no intention of allowing his British troops to get into
any position from which they could not withdraw without relief
In view of the above, the only sound course is to give General Ironside the
necessary sanction for the operations, leaving him a free hand as to their limits and
conduct.
Genebax Staff,
25th June, 1919.
t Note, dated 26th May, 1919, from Allied and Associated Powers to Admiral Kolchak.
The Allied and Associated Powers feel that sent to assist those associated with them at a
the time has come when it is necessary for very fconsiderable cost. No sooner, however,
them on(!e more to make clear the policy they did the Peace Conference assemble than they
propose to pursue in regard to Russia. endeavoured to bring peace and order to
It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Russia by inviting representatives of all the
Allied and Associated Powers to avoid inter- warring Governments within Russia to meet
ference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their them in the hope that they might be able to
original intervention was made for the sole arrange a permanent solution of Russian
purpose of assisting those elements in Russia problems. This proposal and a later offer to
which wanted to continue the straggle against relieve the distress among the suffering
German autocracy and to free their country millions of Russia broke down through the
from German rule, and in order to rescue the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept
Czecho-Slsvaks from the danger of uunihilation the fundamental condition of suspending
at the hand of the Bolshevik forces. Since the hostilities while negotiations or the work ot
signature of the Armistice, on llth November, relief was proceeding. Some of the Allied
1918, they have kept torees in various parts of and Associated Governments are now being
Russia. Muuitiomj and supplies have beeu pressed to withdraw the troops and to incur uo
/
40
\-
further expense in Russia on the ground that
continued intervention shows no prospect ot
producing an early settlement. They are
prepared, however, to continue their assistance
on the lines laid down below, provided tliey are
satisfied that it will really help the Russian
people to liberty, selt-goverunient and peace.
The Allied and Associated Governments
' now wish to declare formally that the object of
Itheiv policy is to restore peace within Russia
Iby enabling the Russian people to resume
"Icontrol of their own affairs through the instru-
anentality of a freely elected Constituent
Assembly, and to restore peace along its
frbntiei-8 by arranging for the settlement of
disputes in regard to the boundaries of the
Russian State and its relations with its neigh-
bours through the peaceful arbitration of the
.League of Nations.
They are convinced by their experiences of
the last twelve months that it is not possible
to attain these ends by dealings with the
Soviet Government of Moscow. They are
therefore disposed to assist the Government of
Admiral Kolchak and his associates with muni-
tions, supplies and food, to establish themselves
as the Government ot All Russia, provided
they receive from them definite guarantees
that their policy has the same object in view as
that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With
this object they would ask Admiral Kolchak
and his associates whether they will agree to
the following as the conditions upon which
they accept continued assistance from the
Allied and Associated Powers.
In the first place, that, as soon as they
reach Moscow, they will summon a Constituent
Assembly elected by a free, secret and demo-
cratic franchise as the supreme legislature for
Russia to which the Government of Russia
must be responsible, or if at that time order is
not sufficiently restored they will summon the
Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit
until such time as new elections are possible.
Secondly, that throughout the areas which
they at present control they will permit free
elections in the normal course for all local and
legally-constituted assemblies, such as muni-
cipalities, Zemstvos, &c.
Thirdly, that they will countenance no
attempt to revive the special privileges of any
class or order in Russia. The Allied and
Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction
the solemn declarations made by Admiral
Kolchak and his associates that they have no
intention of restoring the former land system.
They feel that the pi-inciples to l)e followed in
the solution of this and other internal questions
must be left to the free decision of the Russian
Constituent Assembly ; but they wish to be
assured that those whom they are prepared to
assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of
all Russian citizens and will make no attempt
to reintroduce the regime which the revolution
has destroyed.
Fourthly, that the independence of Finland
and Poland be recognized, and that in the
event of the frontiers and other relations
between Russia and these countries not being
settled by agreement, they will be referred to
the arbitration of the League of Nations.
Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations
between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the
(Caucasian and Trans-Caspian territories, and
Russia, is not speedily reached by agreement,
the settlement will.be made in consultation and
co-operation with the League of Nations, and
that until such settlement is made the Govern-
ment of Russia agrees to recognize these terri-
tories as autonomous, and to confirm the
relations which may exist between their de
facto Governments and the Allied and Associated
Governments.
Sixthly, that the right of the Peace Con-
ference to determine thefuture of the Roumanian
part of Bessarabia be recognized.
Seventhly, that as soon as a Government
for Russia has been constituted on a democratic
basis, Russia should join the League of Nations
and co-operate with the other members in the
limitation of armaments and of military organi-
zation throughout the world.
Finally, that they abide by the declaration
made by Admiral Kolchak on 27tli November,
1918, in regard to Russia's national debts.
The Allied and Associated Powers will be
glad to learn as soon as possible whether the
Government of Admiral Kolchak and his
associates are prepared to accept these con-
ditions, and also whether in the event of
acceptance they will undertake to form a single
government and army command as soon as the
military situation makes it possible.
(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU.
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
WOODROW WILSON.
V. E. ORLANDO.
SAIONJI.
Reply from Admiral Kolchak.
The Government over which I preside has
been happy to learn that the policy of the
Allied and Associated Powers in regard to
Russia is in perfect accord with the task which
the Russian Government itself has undertaken,
that Government being anxious above all things
to re-establish peace in the country and to
assure to the Russinn people the right to decide
their own destiny in freedom by means of a
Constituent Assembly. I appreciate highly the
interest shown by the Powers as regards the
national movement, and consider their wish to
make certain of the political conviction with
which we are inspired as legitimate. I am
therefore ready to confirm once more my
previous declarations, which I have always
regarded as irrevocable.
1. On 18th November, 1918, I assumed
power, and I shall not retain that power one
day longer than is required by the interest of
the country. My first thought at the moment
when the Bolsheviks are definitely crushed will
be to fix the date for the elections of the Con-
stituent Assembly. A' Commission is now at work
on direct preparation for them on the basis
of miiversal suffrage. Considering myself as
responsible before that Constituent Assembly,
I shall hand over to it .all my powers in order
that it may freely determine the system of
government. I have, moreover, taken the
41
oath to do this before the Supreme Russian
Tribunal, the guardian of legality. All my
efforts are aimed at concluding the civil war
as soon as possible by crushing Bolshevisuj in
order to put the Russian people effectively
in a position to express its free will. Any
prolongation of this struggle would only
Eostpone that moment. The Government,
owever, does not consider itself authorized
to substitute for the inalienable right of free
and legal elections the mere re-establishment
of the Assembly of 1917, which was elected
under a regime of Bolshevist violence, and the
majority of whose members are now in the
Sovietist ranks. It is to the legally elected
Coustituenl Assembly alone, which my Govern-
ment will do its utmost to convoke promptly,
that there will belong the Sovereign rights of
deciding the problems of the Russian State,
both in the internal and external affairs of the
countrj-.
'2. We gladly consent to discuss at once
with the Powers all international questions and
in doing so shall aim at the free and peaceful
development of peoples, the limitation of arma-
ments and the measures calculated to prevent
new wars, of which the League of Nations is
the highest expression. The Russian Govern-
ment thinks, however, that it should recall the
fact that the final sanction of the decisions
which may be taken in the name of Russia will
belong to the Constituent Assembly. Russia
cannot now, and cannot in future, ever be
anything but a democratic State where all
questions involving modifications of the terri-
torial frontiers and of external relations must
be ratified by a representative body which is
the natural expression of the people's sover-
eignty.
3. Considering the creation of a unified
Polish State to be one of the chief of the
normal and just consequences of the world war,
the Government thinks itself justified in con-
firming the independence of Poland proclaimed
by the Provisional Russian Government of 1917,
all the pledges and decrees of which we have
accepted. The final solution of the question
of delimiting the frontiers between Russia and
Poland must, however, in conformity with the
principles set forth above, be postponed till the
meeting of the Constituent Asseraoly. We are
disposed at once to recognize the de facto
Government of Finland, but the final solution
of the Finnish question must belong to the
Constituent Assembly.
4. We are fully disposed at once to prepare
for the solution of the questions concerning the
fate of the national groups in Esthoni.i, Latvia,
Lithuania, and of the Caucasian and Trans-Cas-
pian countries, and we have every reason to
believe that a prompt settlement will be made,
seeing that the Ooverntnent is assuring, as from
the present time, the autonomy of the various
nationalities. It goes without saying that the
limits and conditions of these autonomousinstitu-
tions will be settled separately as regards each
of the nationalities concerned. And even in case
difficulties should arise in regard to the solution
of these various questions, the Government is
ready to have recourse to the collaboration and
good offices of the League of Nations with
a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement.
5. The above principle impljnng the ratifica-
tion of the agreements by the Constituent
Assembly should obviously be applied to the
question of Bessarabia.
6. The Russian Government once more
repeats its declaration of the 27th November,
1918, by wliioh it accepted the burden of the
national debt of Russia.
7. As regards the question of internal
politics, which can only interest the Powers in
so far as they reflect the political tendencies of
the Russian Government, I make a point of
repeating that there cannot be a return to the
regime which existed in Russia before February,
1917, the provisional .solution which my Gov-
ernment has adopted in regard to the
agrarian question aims at satisfying the interest
of the great mass of the population, and is
inspired by the conviction that Russia can only
be flourishing and strong when the millions
of Russian peasants receive all guarantees for
the possession of the land. Similarly, as
regards the regime to be applied to the liberated
territories, the Government, far from placing
obstacles in the way of the free election of
local assemblies, municipalities and Zemstvos,
regards the activities of these bodies and also
the development of the principle of self-
government as the necessary conditions for the
reconstruction of the country, and is already
actually giving them its support and help by
all means at its disposal.
8. Having set ourselves the task of re-
establishing order and justice, and of ensuring
individual security to the persecuted population
which is tired of trials and exactions, the
Government affirms the equality before the law
of all classes and all citizens without any
special privilege. All shall enjoy without dis-
tmction of origin or of reHgion, the protection
of the State and of the Law. The Govern-
ment whose head I am is concentrating all the
forces and all the resources at its disposal in
order to accomplish the task which it has set
itself at this decisive hour. I speak in the name
of all National Russia. I am confident that
Bolshevism once crushed, satisfactory solutions
will be found for all questions which equally
concern all those populations whose existence
is bound up with that of Russia.
(Signed) KOLCHAK.
Further Note, dated June, 1919, /Vo'n Allied and Associated Powers to Admiral Kolchak.
The Allied and Associated Powers wish to
acknowledge receipt of Admiral Kolchak's
reply to their Note of 26th May. They welcome
the tone of that reply, which seems to them to
be in substantial agi-eement with the proposi-
tions which they had made, and to contain
satisfactory assurances for the freedom, self-
Government, and peace of the Russian people
and their neighbours. They are, therefore,
(8389)
willing to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his
associates the support set forth in their original
Ictttir
(Signed) D. LLOYD GEORGE.
WOODROW WILSON.
G. CLEMENCEAU.
V. E. ORLANDO.
N. MAKING.
F
42
From the War Office to the General Officer Commanding, Archangel.
(Paraphrase.) 27th June, 1919.
After consideration of all provisions and arguments contained in your telegram of
19tl) June (Paper 0.), and opinion expressed in your telegram of 6th June, paragraph
4 (b) (Paper L.), you are authorized to carry out advance as proposed.
R.
EVACUATION OF NORTH RUSSIA.
1. It was proposed that evacuation should be carried out in two or three lifts.
It was, therefore, suggested that : —
One brigade should be concentrated at Archangel by 2 let September.
Remainder should be concentrated at Archangel by 21st October.
River craft to reach Archangel by 1st October.
Shipping to be clear of White Sea by 1st November.
2. Ii'onside considers that if operation is in any way a military one, time between
beginning and end should be shorter. He thinks suggested dates too early, and
mentions : —
(a.) If river craft ordered to Archangel by 1st October Russians will be exposed to
Bolshevik boats for three weeks. Gunboat and three monitors should drop
down just before the frost (about 20th October).
{h.) From military point of view best time for evacuation is just before and just
after frost, when manceuvre is impossible (15th October- 1 0th November).
White Sea is not frozen then,
(c.) By 1st September all conscripts will have gone, and Grogan's Brigade wiil be
split up for base duties. If this is sent away by 21st September Jackson's
Brigade will have to be withdrawn, leaving enemy a month in which to
attack Russians before snow arrives.
{d.) Evacuation of 9,000 remaining after 2 1st September should take place as
follows : —
(i.) All useless mouths, &c., between 15th October-31st October (5,000).
(ii.) A fighting force of 3,000 with 1,000 base troops (total 4,000) between
1st November- 10th November, but as close to 1st November as
possible.
(e.) If there should be some reason for 21st September being the commencement,
evacuation should be carried out exactly as described above. But the time
is absolutely unsuited to the local conditions.
3. The whole question of the evacuation, however, depends on the policy which is
to be adopted in North Russia next winter. In this connection the following points
must be borne in mind : —
(a.) If we ai-e going to continue to support the local government and forces large
quantities of military stores and food will have to be shipped to Archangel
before the port closes. But in this case there is some hope that the
evacuation will not be interfered with by the enemy or as the result of local
risings.
(6.) If we are not going to continue to afford any eilective support to North Russia
large numbers of Russians (perhaps 30,000) may have to be evacuated to
save them from tlie Bolshevik vengeance. In this case it is unlikely that
we shall withdraw unmolested.
Geneeal Staff,
15th July, 1919.
43
s.
Secretary of State.
Now that we are neariiig the time when our troops in Archangel and in Murmansk
are going to carry out the difficult operation of retirement to their respective ports and
re-embarkation there, I am no longer satisfied that we in the War Office can exercise
sufficient supervision and command over these two simultaneous and almost inter-
dependent operations. I want f)ermission to appoint General Sir Henry Rawlinson in
supreme command in Northern Russia.
HENRY WILSON,
ai.G.s.
26th July, 1919.
Secretary of State approved this on 30th July, 1919.
T.
From the War Office to the General Officer Commanding, Kem,
(Paraphrase.) 29th July, 1919.
Reference your telegram, dated 27 th July. Your remarks about the time of
withdrawal are not understood. It was stated in War Office telegram of 26th July,
that your evacuation would follow that from Archangel. This was certainly not
intended to preclude the gradual withdrawal from your present front at any time which
you might on military grounds consider necessary, in which matter you have entire
liberty of action.
Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Archangel.
u.
From the General Officer Com/tnanding, Archangel, to the War Office.
(Paraphrase.) 6th August, 1919.
Following is outline of evacuation of Archangel : —
Numbers as regards local troops and civilians can still only be estimated but will
be verified shortly.
First batch. — All for Baltic provinces and Poland to go direct on first transports
arriving liere to clear by 20th August or before that date if possible. Total, 3,000.
Second batch. — All demobilizable men and men who have done the winter hei-e
and useless mouths to go between 1st September and 14th September. All these are
British military, 5,800.
Third batch. — Russian civilians, total, 8,000. A ferry service to Kem or
Murmansk will be possible if they are to go there. Embarkation can take place any
time after Ist September. But see my telegram of 5th August regarding Murmansk.
Fourth batch. — Russian military, including Slavo-British Legion. Total, 3,700.
A ferry service can be used to Murmansk side if they go there.
Fifth batch. — Total, 8,000 men, including Polish contingent of 300, to be embarked
together at latest date, 1st October. Ships to be in port by 21st September. If enemy
pressure is not too great this number can be reduced.
Repeated to Greneral Officer Commanding, Kem.
44
V.
Troops and Civilians Evacuated from North Russia from 1st June, 1919, to
12th October, 1919.
British.
1 Allies,
&c.
Sailing date
from
Ship.
Civilians.
North Russia.
Ofi&cers.
Other
ranks.
Officers.
Other
ranks.
"Stephen" ..
3.6.19
3
12
Russians
Serbians
French
5
1
25
37
767
1
" Kalyan " . .
3.6.19
17
257
Americans . .
French
2
323
27
• •
"Czar"
3.6.19
3
••
Americans . .
Poles.. .. ..
'52
1
1,511
10
" Braemar Castle " . .
5.6.19
27
211
French . .
Italians
Americans . .
Serbians
Lithuanians
1
1
10
15
1
114
12
1
" War Coppice "
11.6.19
2
2
, ,
. ,
. ,
. ,
" Czaritza " . .
11.6,19
95
1,421
, ,
, ,
1
"War Plum"..
12.6.19
, ,
3
, ,
. ,
■ •
"Porto"
15.6.19
1
• •
Americans . .
Italians ' , .
47
1,313
1
20
" Menominee "
15.6.19
• •
« ■
Americans . .
Y.M.C.A
Red Cross . .
'34
1
8
893
• •
" •
Ireuch
2
20
, ,
"Viantagor" ,.
17.6.19
3
8
, ,
• •
, .
1
" Pretorian " . .
17.6.19
40
517
, ,
, ^
3
"Resolve"
24.6.19
2
2
..
..
1
"Danube 2nd"
24.6.19
1
..
"Quilpue" ..
24.6.19
22
671
Americans . .
French
15
3
1
1
" Knias Pojarsky " . .
26.6.19
4
..
, ,
• •
" Steigerwald"
27.6.19
• ■ «
• •
Americans . .
27
708
7
*• Kosma Minin"
30.6.19
1
..
• •
"' Roll Call " .
1.7.19
3
. •
■ •
"Mikula" ..
2.7.19
'io
1
Americans . .
1
■"Retort"
5.7.19
2
" Bellaventure "
8.7.19
1
" Hraemar Castle " . .
10.7.19
26
376
Serbians
Italians
Americans . .
• •
"2
1
3
4
"Czar"
17.7.19
60
1,385
Americans . .
12
6
40
French
3
11
Poles
5
10
'• Cornishman "
25.7.19
21
167
Italians
Americans . .
1
44
1
"2
■" Menominee "
28.7.19
6
43
Americans . .
French
Italians
"34
2
2
675
1
123
•'■Kalyan" ..
28.7.19
78
638
French
1
3
1
" Ar^us "
2.8.19
.,
37
,.
, ,
1
'•Mikula"
6.8.19
"'2
• •
, ,
"Czar"
10.8.19
34
849
Italians
36
905
, ,
Serbians
1
, ,
, ,
"Kut"
12.8.19
1
11
"London Belle"
15.8.19
3
1
" War Panther "
17.8.19
1
• •
'■ Czaritza "
17.8.19
..
1 ,b'69
"Toloa"
21.8.19
51
1,161
Italians
Americans . .
1
"48
4
•^Kalyan" ..
22.8.19
67
473
Americans . .
French
7
24
19
Serbians
Australians . ,
Canadians
South Africans
• •
12
11
1
1
• •
"Ulua"
22.8.19
40
926
Americans . .
1
2
"3
"Sibir"
27.8.19
..
8
•• Kursk "
31.8.19
"s
36
Finnish Legion
'10
1,025
'58
" Willochra " . .
3.9.19
• •
••
i
• •
••
1,467
45
British.
Allies, &c.
Sailing date
from
Ship.
Civilians,
North Russia.
Officers.
Other
ranks.
Officers.
Other
ranks.
" Kildonan Castle " . .
3.9.19
43
1,935
Slavti-British Legion
204
2S
»
Koreans
Bolshevik hostages . .
Americans
French
Italians
Jajjanese
Chinese
"8
3
2
1
13
4.7
48
7
4
4
204
• •
"Cap Verde"..
4.9.19
• •
87
Russians
French
Lithuanians . .
Chinese
Koreans
'40
• •
406
4
82
58
30
• •
• •
"La Plata" .,
11.9.19
1
, ,
Slavo-British Legion
"1
52
1,008
"Vedic"
14.9.19
46
314
Slavo-British Legion
French
6
1
468
1
378
" Menominee "
15.9,19
89
1,074
Americans . ,
Italians
• •
3
1
"2
"Ulua"
15.9.19
48
1,099
French
1
2
"Ed. Woermann" ..
19.9.19
1
2
Slavo-British Legion
Finnish Legion
6
15
468
198
766
"Toloa"
22.9.19
41
581
Poles
Russians
26
1
389
••
•
Bolshevik hostages . ,
• •
'54
• •
French
, ,
1
• •
"Manitou" ..
27.9.19
86
2,160
. ,
, ,
• •
• • i
"Czarit'/.a" ..
27.9,19
170
1,166
Russians
••
34
1
" Kildonan Castle " . .
27.9.19
114
2,122
• •
1
" Braeuiar Caatle " . .
27.9.19
431
363
Poles . " ..
2
"12
, .
" Czar "
29.9.19
185
1,434
Americans ..
]{ussians
2
1
1
15
"Cap Verde"
1.10.19
29
234
French
Americans . .
35
2
607
21
"War Magpie"
4.10.19
5
7
Russians
3
'3
" Schleswig " . .
3.10,19
143
1,003
Russians
, ,
1
5
"Cassel"
5,10.19
1
3
Slavo-British Legion
14
109
712
" Arc "
30.9.19
31
(.'anadians
, ^
1
• «
" Sloop Ladas "
1.10.19
10
44
• •
, ,
, ,
• •
"Bacchus" ..
2.10.19
3
15
• •
, ,
. ,
, ,
"Ulna"
6.10.19
78
1,086
French
, ,
2
20
"Toloa"
8.10.19
105
925
Serbians
Russians
2
1
1
9
"Gravel"
8.10.19
4
1
.,
• •
, ,
• •
" Ilaldon " . .
8.10,19
5
> •
• •
t •
" Stoneaxe " . .
8.10.19
4
• •
, ,
• •
1
" Coalaxe " . .
9.10.19
1
• ■
• •
• •
" Menominee "
11.10.19
92
1,198
Poles,. ' ..
, ,
1
15
" Krebua "
11.10,19
8
2
, ,
, ,
, ,
1
"Kalyan" ..
12,10,19
53
229
Serbians
, ,
12
2
Russians
1
, ,
• •
b'rench
1
, ,
, ,
"Santa Elena"
12.10,19
6
131
Russians
2
14
822
"St. Gilea" ..
12.10,19
2
1
• .
• •
, ,
•
"Voronej" ..
12.10.19
11
54
Serbians
33
672
24
French
• •
6
• •
Poles
, ,
3
, ,
" Welshman "
12.10.19
4
4
Finns
••
1 i
••
Si;
MMAKY :
British officers . .
British other ranks
• • •
2,491
26,485
Al
ied and other national iti
es —
Officers . .
..
562
Other ranks
■ . ■
12,902
Civilians ..
Grand
• • •
I Total
6,535
1 <^ 'H9
48,975
Priuted under the authority of His M*jksty'8 SiATtoNBEr Office
Uv Harrison and Sons, Limited, St. Martiu's I.ane, W.C. 2,
Printen in Ordinary to His Majesty.
_ .J.... txrtBrT^n n issicn Intcinaticnale de Eavitaillm cii aiustee ^ttvyjigs Bani ; Ctir-
peDEation in Eespect of the Henistcneiy Printing Works, H jr Graves Ccu misbjcn-; Cut -of-
Work Donation ; Surplus Govemn ent Property Disposal . rt'ar Mission ; Purchaeo of Giain
in Bulgaria ; Exchange Accoimt.
H.C. 116 of Session 1920. Price 6rf. (ScL)
NAVAL AND MILITARY DESPATCHES RELATING TO OPERATIONS
IN THE WAR.
I.— Septenber to Noven ber, 1914. Including List of Honours and Eevards confentd. With Map.
(1915.) Price 2d. (Sid.)
II. — Noven ber, 1914, to June, 1915. With Nanes of CflGcers and Men n.enticned, and Awards of the
Victoria Cross. With Map. (1915.) Price %d. (U.)
III. — July to Octc-ber, 1915. With Nan es of Cfficeis end Men n tmioned, and Awards of the Victoria
Cros (1916.) Price 2d. (ild.)
IV. — December 11, 1915. From General Sir Ian Haniiltcn, G.C.B., describing the operations in the
Gallipoli Peninsula, including the Landing at Suvia Bay. (1915.) Price 2d. (Zd.)
V. — January to April, 1916. With Nanes of 0£Bcers ar.d Mfn n enticned. and Awards of the Victoria
Trofis. (1916.) Price U. {^d.)
VI. — May to Decenber, 1916. With Naaes of Officers and Men awarded the Victoria Cross. (1917.)
Price Is. (Is. ?>id.)
VII. — Deeen.ber, 1916, to July, 1917. With Nanres of Officers end Men awarded the Victoria Cross.
(1918.) Price U. {lUd.)
VIII.— July, 1917, to June, 1918. With Nan es of Officers and Men awarded the Victoria Cress. (1919.)
Prce Is. erf. (Is. 9id.)
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Price Is. (Is. '2U.)
X. — January. 1919, to Jrnuaiy, 1920. With Nanes of Officers and Men awarded the Victoria Cross.
(1920.) Price 2s. (2s. M.)
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT OP RUSSIA FOR THE EXCHANGE OP PRISONERS.
Eepatkiation of Eu.=sian Con batants and Civilians ; Ef patriaticn of certain specified Eussians ; Eepatria-
uon of Eussians from Archangel; Transport Facilities; Proposed Inteinaticnal Ccnn.issicn in Berlin;
Eepatriatitn of Briti.-h Prif oners ; Eepatriaticn of Eussitn Con batants of the Aichangel Forces (Ruma No. 1,
1920, signed at Copenhagen, Febiuaiy 12, 1920).
[Cnd. 587] of Session 1920. Price Id. (1 ^rf.).
ARMY APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT, 1917-18
ApFEOPEUTiON AccovKT of the Sums granted by ParlianioLt for Amy Servicts for tie Yiar endedj
Marth 31, 1919; wth the Eeport of the Conptrolhr and Auditor -General thereon, and upcn the Stcrej
Accounts of the Army.
H.C. 41 of Sessic n 1920. Price Is. (Is. Sd.)
ARMY ESTIMATES.
Estimate of the Maxin urn Nun ber of Men on the Establi.'-hn ent of the Army at Home and AbrcadJ
exclusive of those serving in India. (Vote A. 1920-21.)
H.C. 22 of Session 1920. Price U. (l^d.)
EsTiiJATE showing the Vote on Account which is required for the year 1920-21. (Seventy-five Millicr
Pounds.)
H.C. 23 of Session 1920. Price Id. (l^d.)
Estimate showing the further Vote on Acccunt which is required for the year 1920-21. (Ten Millioi
Pounds.)
H.C. 121 of Session 1920. Price Id. (l^rf.)
Estimates of Effective and Non-Effcctive Services for the year 1920-21. (Complete Edition.)
H.C. 49 of Session 1920. Price 2s. (2s. 4^d.)
Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War relating to the Arnry Estimates for 1920-21. Details o^
the work of the various Departments of the War Office in Ctnnccticn with the Eeconstiuction of the Am y sine
the Amiistice, Novem.ber 11, 1918.
{Issvtd in amplifcation of the Speech ajthe Secretary of State, intrcdiicivg the Aimy Estimates for 1920-2I.J
[Cn d. 565] of Sessi.m 1920. Priro .Sr/. {4U )
REPORT ON EDUCATIONAL TRAINING IN THE BRITISH ARMY
Ikavci K.\ I ION of the Schen e ; The Months fucceeding the Am.istice ; The Ainiies of Occupation
Transitional iVriid ; In the British Aim)' of the Future ; Ecoogniti<n of the Work.
[Cn d. 568] of Session 1920. Price 3d. {4d.)
THE EVACUATION
J-
OF
NORTH EUSSIA,
1919.
Presented to ParUament hy Command of His Majesty.
R
LONDON :
'•BUSHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
To be purcbased through aiiv Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONEKY OFFICE at the following addresses :
Imterial House, Kingsway, Lo.ndun, W.C. 2, and 28, Abin(;do\ Street, Lo.\ni>\', S.W. 1 ;
37, Peter Street, Manchester; 1, St. Andrew'.s Crescent, Cakmkkj
23, F'HTi; Street, Edinburgh;
or from K POXSONLiV. Ltd., 116, Grafton Street, Dublin.
19l!0.
Price Is. Old. net.
Cmd. 818.]
559
G7
TT
■>c
Gt, Brit. War Office
Army. The evacuation of
north Russia, I919
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