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I 



ARMY REORGANIZATION 

" ml Wary f^ffgiV^. 

HEARINGS 

BBFOBB THB 

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

FIBST AND SECOND SESSIONS 

ON 

H- R. 8287 

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

H. R. 8068 

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND 

VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF 

THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A 

NATIONAL EMERGENCY 

H. R. 7925 

*♦ 

A BILL TO ESTABLISH THB DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, 

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

H; R. 8870 

A BILL TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT FOR MAKING 
FURTHER AND. MORE EFFECTUAL PROVISION FOR THE 

NATIONAL !DEFENSE,-^Nir FdRJOTHER PURPOSES'' 

'  * / 

From September 29, 1919, to February $, 1920 






Volume II 



WASHINGTON 
GOVBBNMBNT PBINTING OFFICE 

1920 







HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

Committee on Militaby Affaibs. 

SIXTT'SIXTH oonobess. 



JULItrS KAHN. 

DANIBL R. ANTHONY, Jb.^ Kansas. 
JOHN C. McKBNZIB, lUinois. 
FRANK L. GRBBNB, Vermont. 
JOHN M. MORIN, Pennsylvania. 
THOMAS S. CRAGO, Pennsylvania. 
HARRY B. HUm Iowa. 
ROLLIN B. SANFOREK, New York. 
W. FRANK JAMBS, Michigan. 
CHARLB& C. KBARNS. Ohio. 
ALVAN T. FULLBR/ Massachnaetts. 
FIORBLLO H. LaGUARDIA, New York. 
JOHN F. MILLBR, Washington. 

n ' ...' 



California, Chairmttn. 

S. HUBBRT DBNT, Jr., Alabama. 
WILLIAM J. FIBLDS, Kentucky. 
PERCY B. QUIN, Mississippi. 
CHAS. POPB CALDWBLL, New York. 
JAMBS W. WISB, Georgia. 
RICHARD OLNBY, Massacbosetts. 
THOMAS W. HARRISON, Virginia. 
HUBBRT F, FISHBR, Tennessee. 



ANDBasoM^ Olerh. 



:„^y^ 







e" 



<^; 







PROPEBTY OF U. S. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page. 

Axton, Maj. John T., OhAplain United States Army: Chaplains 1946-1*953 

Baker, Hon. Newton D., Secretary of War: General 2105-2125 

Bankhead, Hon. Wm. B., Representative in Congress from Alabama: Promo- 
tion, single list 2062-2065 

Biggar, WUliam, representing Brethren Church: Universal military training. . 2162 
Bishop, Thomas G., secretarv treasurer Society of American Indians: Indians 

in United States Army 2231-2236 

Buck, H. W., member of special committee representing engineering council: 

Signal Corps 2085-2089 

Carter, Maj. Gen. Jesse McI., Chief of Militia Bureau: National Guard 1883-1897 

Carty, John J., chairman special committee. Engineering Council: Signal 

C(ip6 2067-2085 

Critchfield, Maj. A. B.: National Guard 1867-1883 

Growell, Hon. Benedict, Assistant Secretary of War: Munitions and sup- 
plies 1801-1835 

Dixon, Dr. Joseph Kossuth: Indians in United States Army 2163-2220 

Duffy, Capt. James E., chaplain. United States Army: Chaplains 1953-1954 

Fealy, Rev. Ignatius, chaplain, United States Army: Chaplains 1958-1959 

Fiske, Col. W. C, New York National Guard: National Guard 1857-1903 

Gillette, Col. Ransom H., New York National Guard: National Guard 1920-1938 

Harvey, William B., representing the Society of Friends: Universal military 

traininie: .' 2128-2131 

Hull, William I., Swarthmore College: Universal military training 2140-2146 

Kirk, C, secretary of the Klamath nidian Tribal Council: Indians in United 

States Army 2236 

Kreger, Brig. Gen. E. A., Assistant to the Judge Advocate General: Judge 

Advocate General's Department 1961-1999 

Leighton, M. O., chairman of national service committee of Engineering 

Council: Signal Corps 2067 

Lyons, W. M., representing the progressive Brethren Church: Universal mili- 
tary training ^ 2161 

McDowell, Rev. W. Fr, bishop of M. E. Church: Chaplains 1939-1941 

MacFarland, Rev. Chas. S., general secretary of Federal Council of Churches of 

Christ in America: Chaplains ^ 1957 

Martin, Brig. Gen. C. I., aajutant general of State of Kansas: National Guard 1904-1920 
Miller, Hon. Thomas W., chairman national legislative committee, American 

L^on: Universal training 1837-1866 

O'Hem, Rev. Lewis J., secretory to the Catholic chaplain bishop: Chaplains. 1944-1946 

Peirce, Col. W. S., Ordnance Corps: Promotion, single list 2050-2062 

Saltzman, Col. C. McK., executive officer. Signal Corps 2097-2103 

Sloan, Thomas L., president, Society of American Indians: Indians in United 

StotesArmy 2220-2231 

Spaulding, Col. T. M., General Stoff Corps: Promotion, single list 2001-2050 

Squier, Mb\. Gen. G. O., chief signal officer: Signal Corps 2089-2097 

Swigert, W. J., representing the Church of the Brethren: Universal military 

training 2155-2161 

Taylor, I. W., representing Church of the Brethren: Universal military train- 
ing 2161-2162 

Tunstskll, W. B., representing the Christadelphians: Universal military train- 
ing 2146-2154 

Warner, George M., representing the Society of Friends: Universal military 

training 2127 

Watson, Rev. W. E., secretary of the Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains 

of the Federal Churches of Christ in America: Chaplains 1941-1944 

White, Rev. Gaylord S., secretary. General Committee on Army and Navy 

Chaplains: Chaplains 1954-1957 

Williams, Maj. Gen. C. C, Chief of Ordnance: Promotion, single list 2050-2062 

Yamall, Stanley R., representing American Friends' Service Committee: Uni- 
versal militery training 2131-2139 

in 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Friday^ January S, 19W. 

The committee met at 10.30 o'clock, Hon, Julius Kahn (chairman) 
presiding. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENEDICT CBOWELL, ASSISTANT SECBE- 

TABY OP WAB. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the committee understood that you 
had some plan to submit in regard to the reorganization of the Army. 
Will you Kindly proceed in your own way to make your statement, 
and when you have finishea we can ask you some questions. Or 
would you prefer to be interrupted during the progress of your 
statement ? 

Mr. Crowell. It is immaterial to me, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps 
the easiest way would be, as I come to a particular point, to inter- 
rupt me with any question that you may desire to ask. 

The plan I have to suggest relates principally to the supply of 
the Army, as that has been my chief work. Since November, 1916, 
when I left business and volunteered for war work in Washington, 
the organization of the War Department has been given much study 
by me. 

From April, 1917, to December, 1917, was a period in which little 
reorganization work was done — the existing organizations, however, 
were tremendously overloaded and strained and it was evident that 
certain organizational changes would have to be made. By De- 
cember, 1917, the complete reorganization of the War Department, 
especially as affecting munitions and supplies, had been worked out; 
indeed, the first stieps had been taken. I have two charts which well 
illustrate the fi^'st changes in organization. These charts were pre- 
pared about January 10, 1918. 

The first chart shows ihe -organization of the War Department in 

»ri l . isfl.7 • it ;gTinws tlift .^P,f>rfttAry of Wgir. hayiixg reporting to him^ • 
litferent depa on^ of.whick ^.as. tbft (lejoftraJ >Staff. The' 

s econd chart snows' the new organization, as far as it had been 
applied, m Ueceinber, 1917. This chart shows the_,G eneral Staff 
organization betweem tllfi Pfiprfttary nf War and the diff erent bureaus . 
I'lie (jeneral "Staff was in that way used as the overhead of the War 
Department, as a sort of board of directors. This shows changes 
which took place early in the war. 

1801 




1802 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

The Chair3iax. Mr. Secretary, which of the bureaus or divisions 
of the War Department really broke down or failed to operate in 
Mhe way you thought they should have operated when we got into 
Cthe war? 

Mr. Crowell. Mr. Kahn, I have a different idea about that from 
others. I do not believe any of them broke down. Our constant 
effort was to look ahead in order to prevent their breaking down. 
That was what we were there for. I may be wrong about that, and 
I know a great many people do not agree with me. It was the fear 
of a breakdown, and as we looked ahead we saw th at pertain dfip^^^^- 
ments must break do^n because of the great volume of business 
whicK was tKrown on them. One oJL those departments was the 
Quarterm aster Corps. I was ver/ close to that, and there was no 
breakdown*' of "that department, feut there would have been if we 
had not acted as we did, simply because. the work of the Quarter- 
master's Department as it was organized when we went into the 
war was too great for any one man to administer. 

Mr. Sanford. In a sense, you can not say that in the beginning they 

all seemed to break down, and it was found necessary to combine 

them under the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, and was 

not that really a symptom of a breakdown at that time? 

, Mr. Crowell. It was a symptom of a break down^ n ot of the bu; 

"rpgjis^ hilt nf f.hp oyptVi'^q^ ^^^^*^ War Department^^^iJ^fbr^ tha£ 

..^^^^reason we injected the General Staff at that time to be the overEead 

^ud to eoordtha^'fhe separate bureaus. 

Mr. Greene. ThQ ipundatipn ai thftjsy.stenL.was not elastiic enough, 

to^ meet the p-m^rgency ? 

Mr. Crowell. It was not. 

Mr. Greene. You do not charge that the units in that system, or 
its personnel, were inadequate to their tasks as they had been out- 
lined in the original plan? 

Mr. Crowell. No ; 1 do not. I feel quite strongly the other way. 

The Chairman. If we got into a war again, and Congress should 
try to continue a system similar to the one that prevailed when we 
got into this war, do you think there would again be trouble? 

Mr. Crowell. I am sure of it. 

The Chairman. Will you kindly explain that to the committee? 

Mr. Crowell. Shall I proceed with my statement? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Crowell. I am to-day presenting to you two more charts. 

The first of these charts shows the War Department organization 

as it exists to-day; first, the Secretary of War, with the General 

Staff, the five divisions of the General Staff, and also the other 

[ departments of the Army. The so-called supply bureaus are the 

' 12 bureaus shown at the bottom of this chart. 

The main business of the supply bureaus is transacted in this 
way: All piilitary matters^ as is shown by the arrow pointing to 
the lelt^ are haiidled by the Opp^yptj ons D ivision of the General 
Staff, working through the Chief of Staff toTKe* Secretary of War. 
All business or industrial matters are handled, as shown by the 
arrow pointing txi tKengKf, through the Division of Purchase, Sto^*- 
ag^ and Tr affic, of. the .General Staff, and "nTenlhey' go "through the 
Chiei of ytaff to the 'Secretary of War. I will explain the second 
chart later. 



ABMY REOBGANIZATIOIT. 1803 

With the large group of men, such as the War Department was 
called upon to carry a greatly increased load, any change of organi- 
zation must be accomplished slowly, and this is the reason that 
the reorganization wort was done gradually and, I believe, it could 
not have been otherwise accomplished. 

Proceeding now to the permanent organization of the War De- 
partment, I believe that in a general way certain broad principles 
should be followed. First of all we should profit by the experi- 
ence of the war we have just gone through, and should permanently 
maintain such departments as were found necessary during the 
war. In other words, we should organize the War Department so 
that it will function in time of war. I therefore believe that it is 
necessary to maintain during time of peace such departments as 
are necessary in time of war, even if their personnel is cut down to 
a handful of officers. To merge these necessary departments into 
•other departments in time of peace is, in my opinion, an error. 

All the functions of the War Department can be divided into 



mftiTi yr^vpfi, t^^ p^litary function and the munition angi 
jon. At the head of the War Department stands the 



^epartmefi^ ^t^^nds the Secr 

of War, a nd be shouTJ nafurai ly hav e ^ two advi sers^ The 
_ o:^ the Military "EstaHi^'mehr'sKbulci advise tlie Secretai^ 6F* 
War Qiil i^^T m^'HfQT'y Vv^Qff/^rT^T am proposing tha abolitioii ixf?the 
present office of Assistant Secretary of War and the ereatjpn^pf p,n 
TThdersecretary of Wai* to advisewie Secretary ^f War on all mat- 
t^ts relating to"inunitions anothe supply of tha Afiuy. 
"*^1 imghl say the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War are so, 
small to-day, aside from the munitions duty, and they are so unim- 
portant that they can readily be distributed to other departments in 
the War Department, and that has oftentimes been done. 

The Chairman. Do you include in the term " munitions," quarter- 
master supplies, and ordnance supplies ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes, sir; t ^ie term ^ ^ munitions " is suppo sed to i n-^ 
e lude everyth ing r ecjuired b y tlie^oidier'. 

Mr. I!:5Anf6rd. TT includes everything but men and money, does it 
not? 

Mr. Croweix. I am inclined to think itincludesnuHies:- 

All orders of the Secretary of War relating to military matters 
should be handed down from the Secretary of War, through the 
head of the Military Establishment, to the proper departments. All 
orders of the Secretary of War relating to munitions should be 
handed down, through the Undersecretary of War, to the proper^ ^ 
departments. Th^jiead of the Military Establishment would, there- ) 
fore, have charge^^F alTTnilitarf matters, such as the training of / 
troQpr, the operation ♦of troops, etc. He should. Jiave^no. authority V. 
whatever over industrial matters. The Undersecretary of War, on / 
the olRer hatid,' should^ wi£K his staff, have charge of all matters/ 
relating to the munitioning of the Army, but should have no voice in 
military matters. 

When munitions must be provided in the quantities necessary for a 
major war, the questions of procurement and production become of 
tremendous importance. It is not too much to say that the industrial 
stability of the Nation depends upon the ability and skill with which 
the problems of procurement and production are handled. It is 
believed that the ability, experience, and skill for this kind of work 



1804 ARMY BEOBGANIZATIOK. 

can be found only among the industrial leaders who have spent their 
lifetime in the study and solution of industrial problems. The or- 
ganisation of the War Department should, therefore, be such that the 
services of men of this type mav be immediately availed of. 
The actual reorganization of the War Department to meet these 

feneral principles is very simple ; in fact, requires very little change 
pom the organization which we found when we entered the war. 
The Undersecretary of War should, of course, be a civilian, sincejt is 
•^ very rare that an officer of the Jucmy is temperamentally fitted to head -j* 
/ a huge su pbIjl orgauizatioii. The militarv mind and the industriar ^ 
S mind are fiTitiT^ly diff^rfmiL • ^ 

^ Tuminff ihen lo the second chart you have before you, you will 
"see that this problem is solved by simply i mposing on the one side 

^^^ (iTfinfT^*^ ^^^"^ ^^ Jtake.jcap&. of, all, military matters a,nfl o n the ~ 
other side t he office of Director of Munitions^ ox: undersecretaiy^Jt^ 
handle airBusin es&^gxatterg\ And the bureaus are shown transacting 
all Hlllitai^y business through the General Staff, and thence to the 
Secretary of War, and transacting all business matters relating to 
munitions through the office of the undersecretary. 

Mr. Dent. I see you have on your chart a Chemical Warfare Sec- 
tion. Are you in favor of havmg that as a separate branch of the 
service? 

Mr. Crowell. I am very decidedly. I did not mean, however, in 
showing these charts to indicate that it is necessary that all theise 
bureaus I have shown must be here. I merely have shown those that 
I believe should be here. 

Mr. Dent. The question was suggested because they are there. 
That is what prompted me to ask you about the Chemical Warfare 
Service. I am in favor of having it as a separate branch, too. Would 
it interrupt your statement if you will tell us the reason why you 
favor havmg it as a separate branch ? 

Mr. Ckoweul. Not at all; indeed, I will be very glad to do that. 
Chemical warfare is in my opinion in its infancy to-day. 

Mr. Dent. Before you proceed may I ask if you have had any 
actual experience in chemistry? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes; I was educated as a chemist, or educated to 
become one, and I have a general knowledge of chemistry. For that 
reason I have taken an especial interest in the Chemical Warfare 
Service. 

The possibilities of that service to-day are beyond all our dreams. 
Some fine morning we will wake up and find that warfare has been 
entirely changed by the invention of some chemist. In fact, our own 
men during the war were not idle, and our offensive in 1919, in my 
opinion, would have been a walk to Berlin, due to chemical warfare. 
Of course, that was kept as a secret and it is only valuable as a 
secret. But I am convmced that the matter is of such importance 
that it should be kept in the limelight and we should continue to 
experiment, and continue the experiments we have started, so we 
will not fall down in this kind of warfare. 

In spite of the fact that the developments in the use of chemicals 
came during the latter part of the World War ; in spite of the difficul- 
ties involv^ in working out the experiments and the lack of time, the 
results were tremendous. I believe our casualties from gas were 



ABMY BEOBGAKIZATION. 1805 

greater than from any other one agency. There were close to 30 per 
cent. 

Mr. Dent. The figure I have is 27.3 per cent. 

Mr. Crowell. On the other hand, it has been stated that it is the 
most humane method of warfare, and I believe that is true. Among 
the injured who were not killed there have been, according to the 
testimony of the Surgeon General, no permanent injuries. A very 
recent statement showing the most recent condition of those cases in 
the hospitals shows that the victims of gas attacks have in no case 
received permanent injury. That, of course, is quite different from 
the conditions in other methods of warfare, where men who were hit 
were mangled to a greater or less extent. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in that very connection, the Chief 
of Staff appeared before the committee and testified that in his judg- 
ment chemical warfare should be confined only to the development of 
a defensive use of chemical-warfare materials. Do you believe it 
should be restrained only to that, or should we also carry it on for 
offensive attacks, so that if the time should ever come that we would 
again be called into war we would be able to use it for offensive at- 
tacksj if nothing in the meantime is done in the way of limiting 
chemical warfare by other nations ? 

Mr. Crowell. Idiffer :ssJxoIly-.with the Chief .of Staff on that propo- 
sition. I think teaTThe development of offensive chemical warfare 
sfeoCTJT ) e continued^ and we should be ready to meet whatever Kap- ' 
^^nrEe exTslence bi the J^ation depends in time* of war on our 
iBPfiiy and its ability to fight, and I believe we should maintain this 
branch of the service and maintain it where we can see it and know 
what is being done. If it is amalgamated with another branch, it 
immediately becomes subsidiary and may or may not have the interest 
of the chief, and therefore it may or may not be given a chance. The 
expense of maintaining the Chemical Warfare Service is very, very 
small in time of peace. 

Mr. McKenzie. Mr. Secretary, of course I think we all agree on 
this, that we should continue the investigation of all appliances in 
connection with chemical warfare, but I would like to have you state, 
if you can, wherein there will be any great advantage in continuing 
this work of experimentation and having a major general at the head 
of a separate corps in charge of that work, or having it under a 
brigadier general in connection with some other branch of the 
service. 

Mr. Crowell. If we have it as independent department, we have 
it where we can see it, and we know what it is doing, and at the head 
of it is a man who has this one object in view and no other. If we 
put it under the Engineers, the Chief of Engineers has been brought 
up to handle a different kind of work and does not work along these 
lines, and every item of expenditure on that service would then have 
to be approved by the Chief of Engineers. We therefore have an 
obstacle — and I do not mean to reflect in any way on the Chief of 
Engineers, because we would have the same condition in any other 
department — but we have an obstacle there to the proper carrying on 
of the work, which I believe should not be there. 

Mr. Hull. Mr. Secretary, I do not know whether you want to so 
on at the present time with all these supply departments and explain 



1806 ARMY REOBGANIZATION. 

where you would place them, or whether you would rather wait until 
you have finished your general statement. 

Mr. Croweii^. I am willing to discuss them now. 

Mr. Hull. You have already explained your attitude in regard 
to the Chemical Warfare Service. Of course, so far as we are con- 
cerned, there is a good deal of question as to where these different 
bureaus belong. We are all trying to find out the truth about the 
matter and trying to find out what will make for efficiency in the 
War Department. Eight along that line, there is the question as to 
where you would put Construction, and why. 

Mr. Crowell. 1 should maintain Construction as a separate de- 
partment, but I should combine Eeal Estate with it. The two are 
so' closely allied that I think we made a mistake when we separated 
them in the past. They work together. In support of this view, Mr. 
Chairman, I would like to give you a few figures. In the first place, 
the Construction Division, I believe, was an absolute necessity dur- 
ing this war. I have never seen or heard that contradicted. We had 
to have Construction, due to its vast importance and tremendous 
amount of its work, where we could see it and watch it, and where 
it could not be blocked by the head of any other bureau between it 
and the Secretary of War. We, therefore, took it out and made it 
an independent bureau. 

The work that the Construction Division did, beginning with the 
erection of the cantonments in the very short time which they were 
allowed, and in the erection of the many other building projects 
running, I think, to a total of over a billion dollars during the 19 
months of the war, required a talent which no old department of the 
Army possessed. The ranks of the Construction Department of the 
Army were filled from men who had had experience in that very 
work, and in a future war I believe we will be met by the same 
difficultly. I am therefore in favor of the retention of the Construc- 
tion Department in time of peace on the theory that we should have 
our full organization where we can see it in time of peace, and all 
we need to do in time of war is to enlarge it by adding to it. 

The Chairman. Right along that line, Mr. Secretary, in Europe 
all construction was done by the Engineers, was it not? 

Mr. Cromwell. Yes; and that is very pertinent at this point. I 
should have pointed out that the construction work to be done by the 
Construction Division is not the military construction — ^that is, con- 
struction in the theater of war. That should be done by the Engineers, 
as it was in France. But the work to be done by the Construction 
Corps is the rij^ng^rnp.tjfti] ]p t];]|is| pmmt.yy. The cantonments are a 
good example of that. The port terminals, on which we spent 
$142,000,000, are another example of the kind of work that should 
be done by men accustomed to doing those things and not by Engi- 
neers who are specialists in military construction. The difference be- 
tween a military engineer and a civil engineer, as you know, is very 
great. 

As a matter of fact, the functions of the Construction Department 
are very large in time of peace, and have been very large; I think 
amply large enough to warrant its maintenance. The figures I have 
here begin with the year 1907 and conclude with the year 1916 — ^the 
10-year prewar period — and the lowest amount of money that was spent 



ABHY BEORGANIZATION. 1807 

in any of those years for construction, operation, maintenance, and 
repair was $8,000,000, and the maximum spent was $19,000,000. The 
average amount spent per man in the Army was $142 per year. 

Mr. Grebne. That is the 10-year prewar period? 

Mr. Ckowbix. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. Was the policy of the country at that time anything 
along the line to suggest that a large part of that rather heavy bill 
for construction during those 10 prewar years was for construction 
of such a permanent character that a subsequent 10 years would not 
be likely to show the same high average? 

Mr. Crowell. I will answer that question a little further along in 
my statement. 

Mr. Greene. We went through a period of permanent construc- 
tion which had been a result of long-continued agitation, and the 
suggestion that it would be more economical to do mat than to keep 
gomg along w^ith small expenditures. 

Mr. Crowell. Now, applying that figure of $142 per year, and 
making no allowance for the fact that we should add to-day 70 per 
<;ent to these prewar figures to cover the increased cost of construc- 
tion, making no allowance for that 70 per cent, for a total army of 
500,000, we will say, the amount to be spent by the Construction 
Division will be 142 times 300,000, which is approximately $42,- 
000,000; and if we will allow for that 70 per cent increase we have 
$241 per capita, multiplied by 300,000, which would be approxi- 
mately $72,000,000 per year. 

In other words, if we maintain our Army in the future as we did 
in the 10 years previous to the war, we will have from $42,000,000 
to $75,000,000 per year to be spent for construction projects. 

Mr. Greene. Is that a fair basis? Is construction actually based 
upon the per capita of men to be provided for, or is there not a 
-certain base sum which will provide for a more or less unlimited 
number, and when that is once established you can add sometimes 
hundreds and thousands? 

Mr. Crowell. I can not say that this is exactly fair, but it is the 
best We could get together, and it is an indication of the amount. 
So much depends upon what our policy is going to be. 

Mr. Greene. What I have in mind is this: You provide for a 
certain established post, for instance; no matter whether it is to be 
inhabited by one company or by a battalion, it requires certain fixed 
And overhead construction. 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. You can not charge that off on a per capita basis be- 
"Cause it may from time to time shelter one battalion or a regiment, 
and it will not need any more construction along certain lines to 
shelter a regiment than it did to shelter the first battalion. 

Mr. Crowell. I am not trying, of course, or proposing to charge 
it off, but it seemed to be as fair an illustration as I could get. And 
I am going to show you that the construction in the future is likely 
to be greater than that, no matter what the policy is. 

Mr. Crago. In other words, we have more temporary construction 
to keep up, undoubtedly, than we have ever had before? 

Mr. Crowell. We have, and the maintenance will be greater. 

Mr. Greene. If you are going to use the per capita basis as the 
method of computation, I do not think the figures would ever justify 



1808 ABMY BBOBOANIZATION. 

you in charging any part of that off per capita, because as you ga 
along with it you may run hundreds of thousands of men through 
that same plant. You have a constantly varying factor of per capita.. 

The Chairman. Right along that line, would there not be a gen- 
eral average as to the demands that would be made upon that place? 
At one time the number will be very large and at another time quite- 
small. 

Mr. CfiOWELii. That is shown in the figures we have in support of 
this. Of course, I have given you merely a general average. The 
per capita cost per annum varied from $80 in 1914 up to $262 in 1910. 

Mr. Greene. Take this as a more or less popularized form of 
visualization. Say we are building a theater or a big public hall. 
You do not reckon the cost of that to depend upon its seating ca- 
pacity entirely. There are certain installations which must be put 
m there regardless of the seating capacity. The seating capacity 
is incidental to the expense, and not the base upon which that is- 
determined. Sometimes the other part costs more than the seating- 
capacity part. 

Mr. Crowell. That is perfectly true, and yet in that particular 
case it is a fact that theatrical men figure on the cost per seat. It is^ 
merely a convenient way of arriving at it. I happen to know, be- 
cause I have built a good many theaters, and they figure roughly the 
cost at so much per seat. 

Mr. Greene. But you take the stage, for instance, of the New 
Theater, in New York. It cost several hundred thousand dollars. 

Mr. Crowell. That is true; there is a great variation. 

Mr. Greene. And you remember the dimmer in that same theater 
cost $75,000, and it would have cost that much whether there was a 
seating capacity of 500 or 5,000. 

Mr. Sanford. You are only speaking of the extent of this con-^ 
struction to illustrate the character of work that will fall to the con- 
struction corps? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And the extent of that work will be great whether 
you are constructing new things or whether this corps has under it 
the head of real estate and the care and maintenance of that old 
construction? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. The work will be great enough for that division 
in either event? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Although there was considerable construction for 
10 years before the war, permanent quarters have not yet been built 
sufficient for the Kegular Army officers and for the enlisted men of 
the Army, and so there would be a considerable amount of construc- 
tion work of a permanent character yet to be done, construction of 
permanent quarters for the officers of the Army and for the enlisted 
men? 

Mr. CROWELii. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. As I understand it, that would provide for 12,000 
officers, while in these various posts there are not permanent quar- 
ters for as many as 5,000, and the permanent quarters provided at 
the various posts probably would not begin to accommodate the 
number of enlisted men now in the Army ? 



ASMY BSOBGANIZATIOK. 1809 

Mr. CSbowkll. That is true. 

Mr. Harbison. So that the construction work, such as was done in 
the 10 years prior to the war would have to be continued for a num- 
ber of years yet before we would get pCTmanent quarters sufficient to 
accommodate the officers and men in the Regular Army ? 

Mr. Croweix. That is true. 

Mr. Harrison. Have you got the information showing what the 
«3nount of that work woi^d ro? 

Mr. Crowell. The last figures I saw, recalling them roughly, show 
that we have housing facilities for about half of an army of 300,000 
men, so that a good deal of construction will be necessary in the 
ioture. 

Mr. Harrison. As I imderstand it, about one-half of the housing 
facilities have been constructed to accommodate the officers and men 
in the Kegular Army ? 

Mr. CnowEUj. Approximately. 

Mr. Harrison. As I understand it, it is a great saving to the War 
Dejmrtment to have permanent quarters for the officers and men as 
iAgainst the temporary, makeshift quarters that are provided for 
them from time to time? 

Mr. Croweix. Yes. You are going to find that especially the case 
in the cantonments which we have built. I think there is no realiza- 
tion of the amount of upkeep that is going to be necessary in those 
■cantonments. It is going to be very, very Targe. 

Mr. Harrison. And as soon as the Grovemment supplies perma- 
iient barracks and quarters for the officers and men, to that extent it 
is going to be economical for the Army ? 

Mr. Crowell. I believe it is economy. 

Mr. Harrison. Therefore this construction work is nowhere near 
its completion? 

Mr. Crowell. That is my feeling about it. 

Mr. McKbnzib. Mr. Secretary, of course we will concede, without 
any argument, that there will be a certain amount of construction — 
perhaps a considerable amount of construction. But it is for this 
<5ommittee and Congress to determine what corps now in existence in 
the old organization shall carry on that construction, or whether we 
«hall create a new corps, such as the Construction Corps, in the per- 
manent organization of the Army to do that work. 

Now, if the contention is to l>e made that it shall go back under 
the Quartermaster Corps, I think there would be some force in your 
argument that we ought to have a separate construction corps made 
up of carpenters, builders, and architects who might do that work. 

But if we decide to put it under the Engineer Corps, it seems to 
tne, viewing it as I do from the standpoint of our experience, that 
there is not very much ground to stand on in the argument for a 
separate construction corps. 

If you will pardon me, the construction carried on in this country 
during the war, outside of a few of the larger buildings, which 
you have mentioned, was of the very simple^) character, consist- 
ing of simple structures and ordinary work, so far as utilities are 
concerned, such work as any man with limited experience in engi- 
neering might be able to supervise and carry on. The Construction 
Corps was simply a supervisory body. The officers of, the Construc- 
tion Corps did not do the work; the work was done by contract. 



1810 ABMY BEORGAIi^IZATIOK. 

The contracts were let by the Government and the Construction 
Corps sent a constructing quartermaster from the Construction Corps 
to super\'ise that work. Those men were practically all civilians 
except a small number assigned from the Engineer Corps at the 
time of the breaking out of the war, I think something like 68. 

Mr. Crowell. They were all civilians. 

Mr. McKenzie. But they were in the Engineer Corps. 

Mr. Cro\^^ix. They were not Regular officers. 

Mr. McKenzie. You built up that corps by calling in men from 
private life who had had some experience — ^not all of them; but 
many of them — who had had some experience as builders and con- 
tractors, and commissioned them in the Construction Corps to do 
this work. 

I want to ask you whether it is not a logical proposition to think 
of the Engineer Corps as the corps in the Army that is intended 
to do construction in time of war, especially on the field in the 
building of railroads and ordinary roads, which they did in France; 
and to think of them as the logical corps to do that work in time of 
peace, thereby getting some experience along that line so that if war 
comes you can expand your Engineer Corps, which could be done 
by calling in the reserve officers that are provided for now by 
law, or calling the same character of civilians into the Construction 
Corps to do this work, and eliminate in time of peace the expense 
to the Grovernment of maintaining a separate corps to do the work 
that can unquestionably be done by the Engineer Corps. That is 
the point at issue. It is not so much what it is going to cost per 
capita, nor is it so much the amount of money we are goin^ to ex* 
pend. The question is whether or not we would be justified in 
adding this additional expense to the Government when it can be 
done by the Engineer Corps. That is a point I want to get your 
views on. 

Mr. Crowell. I do not agree with you in all your premises. In 
fact, I disagree with most of them, and that makes it a little hard 
to answer the question. 

I will say in a general way I am in favor of economy in this 
matter, and I believe the creation and maintenance of a separate 
construction corps is economy. 

The work which was done by this division during the war, amount- 
ing to $1,100,000,000, was not the simple work you describe. It was 
the most complicated kind of construction that has ever been done 
in the history of this country. The work of this department was 
much greater than the building of the Panama Canal; in money 
it was three times as great, and it was done in one-fifth the time. 
The time element was the great and most important one, and the 
work was done in a time which has set a pace which the world had 
never seen before. This work could not have been done in that 
way under those conditions, in my opinion, by any department of 
the Army except this one. I believe it would have been impossible. 
The Engineer Corps is a wonderful body of men, but they had no 
experience whatever in quick construction. 

Mr. McKenzie. Suppose you had commissioned some of the men 
that were commissioned in the Engineer Corps in the Construction 
Corps; could not the same men have done that work? 



ARMY BE0R6ANIZATI0K. 1811 

Mr. Crowell. They would have had to refer everything to the 
Chief of Engineers, and they would have accomplished nothing, I 
think. 

The Chairman. I would like to ask you a general question along 
that line. When Gen. Rogers appeared before this committee he 
stated that if the Construction Division, the Transportation Corps, 
the Motor Transport Corps, the Finance Service, and the Purchase 
and Storage Division had been concentrated into one organization 
a big saving could have been made in personnel. Have you any 
comment to make on that subject? 

Mr. CROWEMi. My attention has been directed to a statement made 
by Gen. Rogers before your committee to the effect that if the Con- 
struction Division, the Transiportation Service, the Motor Transport 
Corps, the Finance Service, and the Purchase and Storage Service 
were concentrated into one organization a reduction in personnel, 
figured as of August 1, l&l^,^ could have been effected under which 
1,155 officers and 12,929 civilian employees of those five services 
could have been dispensed witii at an estimated annual saving of 
$18,104,864.48. IT 

By August 1 the Army, which in December had numbered 3,623,- 
000, had been reduced by demobilization to 451,000 men; but, in the 
process of demobilization, reduction of commissioned personnel and 
civilian employees in the staff bureaus progressed slowly, and it 
was necessary for the Secretary of War to constantly direct the 
heads of the various services to make reductions in their personnel. 
On August 1 there was in the service of the Director of Purchase 
and Storage a commi^ioned personnel in the United States aggre- 

ting 4,419. Between Augui^ 1 and October 8, the date upon which 

m. llogers testified before your committee, he had been required 
to discharge 663 officers and 18,748 civilian employees, resulting in 
an annual saving of over $24,000,000. I think Gen. Rogers said he 
could make a saving of $18,000,000. His department had already 
been required to make a saving of $24,000,000. 

On December 1 the commissioned personnel of this service had 
been reduced by 3,616, leaving 808 officers, or over three times the 
number that was estimated on October 8 could be eliminated from 
the five services if combined under him. In the civilian personnel 
a reduetion of 32,847 was effected in his service. In other words, 
in the one service a reduction was made of two and one-half times 
the saving in civilian employees which the proposed combination of 
the five services was estimated would effect. 

In the five services enumerated beteen August 1 and December 1 
a reduction of 6,146 commissioned officers has been effected, which 
is about six times the number Gen. Rogers stated could be reduced 
through the combination of the five services. The civilian person- 
nel during this same period in the five services was reduced 49,426, 
or four times the number that Gen. Sogers estimated to be possible. 
The actual saving effected through the reductions in commissioned 
personnel amount to $18,438,000 and in civilian employees $61,782,- 
000, or a total annual saving of $88,200,000. Tbia saving must be 
credited to the vigilant persistence of the office of the Secretaiy of 
War in reducing the coste of administration. This is an adtoal 
saving as against a theoretical saving. 




1812 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 



It may be interesting to note in connection with these estimated 
savings to be effected through the combination of the five services 
that on August 3, 191&j Gen. Rogers in response to official direction 
estimated that 2,153 omcers would be necessary for the duties in the 
Purchase and Storage Service. When it came to allotting commis- 
sioned personnel out of the 18,000 authorized by law for the Army 
during the fiscal year 1919-20, 700 officers were allotted to this serv- 
ice, and I have heard no complaint which would indicate that this 
particular service is suffering for want of officers. 

I have here a table, Mr. Chairman, showiufir the reductions made 
in the services referred to. 

The Chairman. We will be glad to have that in the hearing. 

(The table referred to is as follows:) 

Reduction in personnel. 



nnanoe service 

Ooostmctioii nivlaioii 

Transportation servioe 

Hotor Tnoisport Corps 

Purchase and Storage servioe.. 



Total reduxstton. 



Number of oommiwrfoned 
officers. 



^^i}' 



566 

1,230 
4 41d 



Dec. 1, 

laia. 



180 
80 
343 
301 
803 



Reduc- 
tion. 



386 
328 
982 
839 
3,610 



>6,U6 



Number of dviljan 
emploTees. 



Aug. 1, 

mo. 



12,255 
24,135 
28,745 
14,004 
89,466 



Dec. 1, 
1919. 



6,461 
21,689 
25,063 

9 427 
56,619 



Redoo- 
tlon. 



5,794 
2,486 
3,662 
4 637 
32,847 



i 49,496 



iThe total actual saving in annual cost resulting fh>m tbe discharge of 6,146 commissioned 

officers is approximately , 118,438,000 

3?rom the reduction of 49,426 civilian employees, approzimatriy 61,782,000 

Total saving per annum 80,220,000 

Mr. Fields. In your opinion, Mr. Secretary, would you be able to 
maintain a better commissioned personnel if you had a separate 
Construction Corps than you woiud if construction was under the 
Engineer Corps? Would the men who are particularly fitted for 
that work join the reserve more readily so that in time of emergency 
you could get them, if it was a separate corps than if it was under 
the Engineer Corps? 

Mr. Crowell. That is quite an important point in this connection, 
and it is my opinion that we would lose the men whom we have en- 
listed in tMs service if it were put under the Engineers. Very un- 
fortunately, there has been a little feeling all during the war in this 
matter, and the service, I believe, would immediately lose men who 
are in it to-day if it were put under the Engineers; I believe we 
would lose them from the Reserve Corps. 

Mr. FiEiJ>s. It occurred to me that that might be an important 
point, and that is why I asked the question. 

Mr. Crowell. I think it is. 

Mr. Greene. Then is the Government at the mercy and caprice of 
individuals who may or may not want to serve it, so that they must 
dictate the policy we are going to adopt ? 

Mr. CitowELL. The reserve officers are volunteers. 

Mr. Greene. What about the men who are already in the corps ? 



ABMT REORGANIZATION. 1813 

Mr. Croweix. They are all civilians, except the head of the corps, 
Gen. Marshall. There are no Regular officers in the Construction Di- 
vision. 

Mr. Gre£X£. Wliere is this feeling that would affect or prejudice 
any future policy under which you might want to enlist men ? If it 
is going out when these temporary men go out, what is there left 
in the oepartment ? That runs to the question of policy. 

Mr. Crowell. The number of officers in the Construction Division 
on August 1 was 403, and on December 1 the number was 80. That is, 
323 have recently left the service. 

Mr. Greene. I understand ; but if the people who had this feeling 
have gotten out in that proportion, what is to hinder our going ahead 
with a clean slate, and having it as we want it, rather than as those 
two or three hundred men want it? 

Mr. Crowell. Of course, we expect you to do that. I think that 
is merely a straw that indicates the wish of the officers, and as these 
are volunteers I assume it would have some weight with the com- 
mittee. I know it does with me. But if it is not worth anything, I 
ask you not to give it any weight. 

Mr. Greene. I am just approaching it in the disinterested sense 
in which you advocated it in the first place. We are conscious of the 
fact that these gentlemen, who served undoubtedly with credit and 
ability in construction work, also have some particular facility in 
' -propaganda work, and idle movements have engaged themselves ii\- 
f dustriously in the latter. We have been besieged right and left with.-* 
1 the reasons why the Construction Corps should be made a separate^ \ 
^ corps, and that has rather suggested the thought that if that sort of/ 
[ thing which might hamper us hereafter had not existed before theA 
\_went in, they found very easy agencies to develop it after they got in^ 

Mr. Crowell. I have, of course, no brief for that propaganda 
work, and knew nothing about it. 

Mr. McKenzie. Perhaps Mr. Greene has not seen the proposed 
amendment suggested to be put into this bill, a copy of which came 
to me, which takes care of the situation by providing that 75 per cent 
of the officers who shall constitute the Construction Corps shall be 
men who are now serving or who did serve there during the war. 

Mr. Greene. I am not carried away one way or the other by any 
attempt to suit the temperament of any individual person personally, 
anyway. But I think the Secretary is seeking to lay the foundation 
upon which any patriotic citizen of the Government may serve, re- 
gardless of his relations to any other bureau in the War Department, 
and I do not think it is an argument to suggest that people do not 
want to do a thing because there is another corps in existence some- 
where in the Army. 

Mr. Crowell. If the Construction Division is not to be maintained 
as a separate division, I should favor it going into the Engineer 
Corps. While the engineers, I believe, could not have accomplished 
these results, due to the lack of training along the particular lines 
that were necessary to accomplish these quick results, it is possible 
that if the Construction Division had been in the past in the 
Engineer Corps, if, for instance, we adopt that policy now, by the 
time the next war breaks — if there is one — the thing could be ac- 
complished that way. My feeling, however, is very strong against 

150187— 20— VOL 2 2 



1814 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

making these units so large. In time of peace it is easy enough to 
administer one of these bureaus, but in time of war when they be- 
come so large, we found it necessary to break them up, making 
separate units of them. I favor making separate units of them in 
time of peace so that the heads of the War Department will not have 
to give three-quarters of their time to organization work. It would 
enable us merely to enlarge or to increase these organizations in- 
stead of having to figure how they should function and what they 
should do. 

Mr. Greene. The Engineer Corps, however, takes care of the mili- 
tary work of the Army ; that is to say, it concerns itself about mili- 
tary field engineering; and it also concurrently has charge of river 
and harbor work, done under a civilian contract system, which is 
often a stupendous work of engineering of a peace-time character. 
There are two schools of work in the Engineer Corps. 

Does not this construction work take on the character, perhaps, of 
the rivers and harbors work, so far as its being of a large industrial 
kind of work is concerned, and also is it not of a kind which, start- 
ing from the rear line, in the building of cantonments and store- 
houses, runs right straight into the line of transition, into the mili- 
tary engineering? Why is not the experience in peace time on rivers 
and harbors quite as valuable as the other ? 

Mr. Crowell. There is no doubt but what it is very similar ; there 
is no doubt, further, that that work would be of advantage to the 
Engineer Corps ; that is, the control of this work in peace time. But 
my belief is that in time of war the Engineer Corps has to be ex- 
panded to such a size that it becomes out of hand as an administra- 
tive unit, and it is necessary to separate this in time of war. That 
being so, I advocate keeping it separate in time of peace, so that 
those at the head of the department shall have more time to give to 
the administrative work and have less organization work to do. 
That is my whole point. 

The Chairman. Do you not proceed on the assumption that in 
times of peace you should so organize the Army that it can function 
immediately in time of war? 

Mr. CROWEiiL. My whole argument is based on that, Mr. Kahn. 

Mr. Anthony. Is it not true that we perhaps would have that idea 
in view in framing any bill for the reorganization of the Army? 
That viewpoint would not be confined alone to any one plan pro- 
posed here. 

Mr. Crowell. I do not doubt that. But I have heard in other 
places the suggestion that the construction work in time of peace 
IS very little, so let us put it under the Engineers, and in time of war 
we will take it out again. But as I see it, when the next war comes 
we may not be here and the men in charge may not remember this, 
and it is better that we leave a record of what we found advisable 
in time of war so that the other people will find it available in the 
next war. 

Mr. Anthony. If these organizations are left practically intact as 
they are now, what difference does it make so far as efficiency is con- 
cerned what head they function under or who the executive authority 
is which is over all of them? Why can not the Construction Corps 
function just as well under the executive administration of an Assist- 



ABMY BEOBGAIiflZATION. 1815 

jiBt Secretary of War or of a Director of Purchase, or a Chief of 
Engineers, or a Quartermaster General, providing that executive 
himself is efficient? 

Mr. C»owEi/L. In a general way I am developing that and had pro- 
ceeded to a considerable extent before we gpt into this discussion of 
this particular bureau, and these charts which I was explaining will 
show you what my general plan is. 

Mr. Greene. It is proposed that the Tank Corps be combined with 
the Infantry and that the head of the tank section of the Infantry 
^ta^blishment shall be a general officer who will be an assistant^ in 
that respect, to the Chief of Infantry. That is its function in time 
of peace. He has within the larger organization his well-constituted 
minor organization, getting his policy from his chief and carrying 
the details out himself. Then if it turns out that we are going to 
have another war in 10 or 15 years, it is very apparent, it seems to 
me, that the chief of the tank section of the Infantry establishment 
can bo' taken right out as he stands, and his corps enlarged, and if 
it is foxmd that the Tank Corps has got to grow to such proportions 
that the Chief of Infantry can not handle both the Infantry and the 
Tank Corps, then they can be separated. But in the interim you 
have a more compact organization and less overhead, and there is 
not the possibility that the Chief of the Tank Corps, being set off 
apart and not under the administration of the Infantry, with the 
desire in his establishment to begin to enlarge, as they all very zeal- 
ously do. Once you give a man a desk, a swivel chair, and a sten- 
ographer, he grows into a bureau. 

Mr. Crowem^. While we find it very difficult, and it is taking some 
imte to reduce the force, are doing it by arbitrary orders. We have 
done that repeatedly, and I think it is largely through that that we 
have gotten down to the small numbers we have. 

Mr. Gkegbne. You may remember what the First Player said to ^ 
Hamlet, " We have reformed indifferently with us, sir " ; and Ham- ^ 
let replied, " Oh, reform it altogether." 

Mr. Fisher. I would like to know whether the Quartermaster 
General was not responsible for the pay of the Army for the first 
six or eight months of the war? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Fisher. What was done by the War Department to correct 
the condition which existed at that time as to the pay of the Army ? 
There were many complaints that men were not being paid. What 
was done by the War Department to correct that? Was it taken 
out of the Quartermaster Corps or left with them? Or are you fa- 
miliar with that? 

Mr. Crowell. T am familiar with it only in a general way. It 
did not come under my direct control. I would answer that question 
by saying that many steps were taken to correct the pay troubles, 
and the finance division was finally formed as a separate division. 
I would not say that that was formed because of the difficulties 
in the matter of pay. 

Mr. Fisher. That was one of the things we had 'the most com- 
plaint about, that the pay of the soldiers was not taken care of, 
and sometimes months would elapse when a soldier would not be 



1816 ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 

I)aid at all. Evidently there is something wrong about a system 
like that. 

Mr. Crowell. This was merely an instance of the unwisdom of not 
settling this thing before the war and of trying to settle everything 
in time of war. 

Mr. Dent. That has happened under your system. 

Mr. Crowell. The final result of all the changes was the adop- 
tion of the card, and^ since the adoption of the pav card, which 
every soldier carries, there has been very little trouble, except oc- 
casionally in the case of a wounded man drifting into a British 
hospital, who has been lost for a while. 

The Chairman. When was the reorganization of the system you 
showed us by this chart put into effect? 

Mr. Crowbi>i^ That was begun in January, 1918, and was con- 
tinued during the war. 

The Chairman. That was almost a year after we got into the war? 

Mr. Crowell. But it was not completed then. 

Mr. Harrison. Would not the objection to putting the construc- 
tion work under the Engineer Corps or under the Quartermaster 
Corps be that we would put a very large work in charge of a chief 
whose duties are not in that direction at all, or if so, only to a very 
limited extent? In other words, if we put the construction worK, 
which is a very considerable part of the work to be done, under 
the head of the Engineers, the duties of the Chief of Engineers 
are not principally along the lines of construction work but they 
would be just incidentally along those lines, and that would simply 
be an incidental function of his office? 

Mr. Crowell. My objection is along those lines. In time of war 
it was demonstrated, at least to our satisfaction, that it was neces- 
sary to have a separate construction department, and in time of 
peace, as I am going to show you, the amounts which must neces- 
sarily be spent are going to be considerable. Yet it is not going to 
be a matter of expense, but a matter of economy to keep that 
work in a separate department. 

Mr. Harrison. If you put it under the head of the Engineer Corps 
you put it in charge of a chief who is only incidentally concerned 
with construction work, and you will not be putting it under the 
control of a man whose only duty is in connection with construction 
work. 

Mr. Crowell. Yes ; and in addition we know from our experience 
in time of war that the Chief of En^neers is an overburdened man, 
and it is not possible for him to administer a department enlarged as 
that would be if he had added to it the work of the construction 
corps. 

Mr. Greene. You are a business man. Is not the thing Mr. Harri- 

/ son suggests a well-recognized feature in industrial corporations, 

j that under the board of directors there are various managers of spe- 

I cial departments of the business, and that those men regulate the 

i details of those departments? They are subordinate to the board 

of directors. We find the heads of the various departments have 

subchiefs to look after special interests within their own department, 

and the overhead only has to concern itself with matters of policy 

" generally that are brought up to them occasionally; and that, al- 

* fliough they are superior to these men, they do not go out and walk 




ABMY BBORGANIZATION. 1817 

the track of a railroad to see whether the section foreman is doing 
his work right; but when the Question of track building comes up 
they give a general direction, wnich is translated into specific terms 
down through the minor and subsidiary organizations, and then they, 
in turn, keep their eye on it to see that it is carried out right. They 
never think about establishing another board of directors to take 
care of that function. 

Mr. Crowell. There is this ^eaL.diff€XfiA(ie between. pffice^^ of a 
<^j^£S£^\§. oyg^uii^tiQXk.mA th^ War Dep^xtment^ There. is a. time 
wESql tha-iab.^ets so large than one man can not administer it, and 
thaji isj^Pt appcoachfidicu any business organization that IJknow aiiy- 
ffJTri ^' ftbn iit- In the organization of the War Department we have 
seen it. There is a distinct limit to the ability of any man to ad- 
minister. We reached that in two or three cases during the last 
war. I think the Ordnance Department got to be so large mat it was 
almost impossible for one man to administer it. I think the Quar- 
termaster's Department in January, 1918, was approaching that con- 
dition, and we met that difficulty by detaching certain branches from 
the Quartermaster's Department, and we also prevented that condi- 
tion from existing iu the Ordnance Department. 

Mr. Greene. yltiinately....they' ran their lines out through the 
family tree until they .get to the Secretary of War, who is responsi^ 
BIe"] ^ V[ ^ jQ{ tliem. You can detach and detach, bu£ ultimately yoiT 
have to go up the Iree. 

Mr. Croweuu But there is a great difference between the work of 
the Secretary of War and the work of the Chief of Ordnance. The 
work of the Chief of Ordnance is administrative work. That is only 
a small part of the work of the Secretary of War. He depends on 
his admmistrative officers to administer their units. His work is 
largely overseeing. 

Mr. Greene. Exactly; and why can not the Chief of Ordnance, 
if it is necessary, in order that the department may function to better [^' 
advantage — ^why can not he himself engage his mind only in mat- V^ 

ters of policy? So why can not the detail work of administration 
be in charge of a subchief who has construction in the Engineer 
Corps ? 

Mr. Croweli* It can, but wJien you do that to that extent you 
immediately put up another bridge to cross between the adminis- 
trative officer and his chief, who has final authority, and that means 
further delay. 

Mr. Dent. Mr. Secretary, you stated that you differed almost 
entirely with the premises stated by Mr. Greene. You do not mean 
to say you differ from the statement he made that the actual con- 
struction work was done during the war not by the Construction 
Corps but by contract? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Dent. That is the fact? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes; the actual construction work of the Construc- 
tion Division is done by contract,- just as the work of the Engineer 
Corps in time of peace on rivers and harbors is done by contract. 

Mr. Dent. Then what is the necessity of having a separate corps 
to simpl}^ let a contract and supervise its execution ? 

Mr. Crowell. The work of the Construction Division is so large 
in merely letting contracts and supervising the work that I believe 



1818 ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 

it warrants its maintenance as a separate department in time of war. 
I think the record during the past war proves that. That being so, 
I feel it should be maintained in time of pease so that when the next 
war comes we will not have all this reorganization work on our 
hands. Let us do it now. I see economy in maintaining it a separate 
unit, because I am going to show you that the records of the past 
indicate that there is going to be a considerable amount of construc- 
tion work to be done m the future. 

Mr. McKenzie. Before you go into those figures I want to ask 
you one or two questions, i ou stated that it was found necessary in 
time of war to create the Construction Corps as a separate corps? 

Mr. Croweli^ Yes. 

Mr. McKenzie. Let us see about that. When the war broke out 
there were in the Quartermaster Corps, in the Construction Division, 
three officers — Gen. Littell, Col., now Gen., Marshall, and Col. Oury. 

Before the construction of the cantonments, before any work was 
done, before the Quartermaster Corps had been tried out, and before 
the En^neers had been asked to undertake the work they took those 
three officers out and started to build around them the Construction 
Corps by commissioning men from, civil life. I can understand what 
was meant by necessity, when one thing failed, then try something 
else. But I can not understand why Gen. Littell, Col. Marshall, and 
(^ol. Urlich would do any better work outside with these civilians 
commissioned under them and calling them the Construction Corps 
than if they had commissioned the same men and put them under 
the same officers in the Quartermaster Corps. The question of the 
necessity of the thing, it seems to me, is the creature of some man's 
mind who figures out that this is a better way to do it, without hav- 
ing tried the other way. I can not concede that the necessity was 
shown. Am I right or wrong about that ? 

Mr. Crowell. I think you are wrong. 

Mr. McKenzie. The facts are about correct, are they not? 

Mr. Croweix. Yes; biit I think your conclusion is wrong. It was 
seen that the work to be done by the Construction Division was stu- 
pendous. It was seen that it must be done in record-breaking time, 
and results achieved in such time as such results had never been 
achieved before by anjrbody. It was seen that this huge organiza- 
tion which had to be built up to handle construction, if left under the 
Quartermaster Corps, one of two things would happen. Either that 
department would be so great that the Quartermaster General could 
not administer it, or it would not be. We decided, and I think 
rightly, that it would be too gi'eat for him to administer. That 
being so, if he ceased to administer it, it was thought it would be 
better to split off the Construction Division, because the minutei 
the Quartermaster General stopped administering he becomes a mere 
step which the head of the administration of this particular division 
must get over before he can reach the source of his authority, which 
is the Secretary of War. That becomes a clog in the machine, and 
it becomes a means of delay. That was the reason it was separated. 

Mr. McKenzie. You mean by necessity that the necessity of it was 
because a few of the officers down there got together and decided that 
they would start out in this way ; that they practically said, " While 
we are liable to fail, we had better start out in another direction, and 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1819 

then we will not fail." I will say that in my opinion they did not 
fail. • 

Mr. CnowEMi. It was not the officers who were worrying; it was 
the Secretary of War and myself, and that was the reason I speak 
so feelingly about it now. 

Mr. Wise. Mr. Secretary, it strikes me we get away from the point 
when we compare this with a business proposition, x our theory is — 
which I think is the correct one — ^that you will have an organization 
such as will be ready to function if we get into a war; that you will 
have all the necessary things ready to put into operation if we get 
into a war ; ready to work. So you think we ought to have a separate 
construction corps for that reason? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes ; and add to it the real estate section. 

Mr. Anthony. One o f the main points in your proposed nrg np ig ft- 
ti on of J:he bu siness corps of, the Armv. I notice^ is, thfi. pi ar.ing atthe 

hqadjoLit-? ^r®.^Qf jcii lauiutions, I beUevel 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. Tr ^^jiArp anv assurance^ that we woi ^y {^ ^ s^ ^9K^, 7 




TStr. Crowell. I feel tHat the" training of the Army officers consti- 
tuting the General Staff is not along lines to make them the best 
advisers for the Secretary of War on industrial matters. And I say 
* that without meaning to be in any way critical of them. Tli^x^axft 
<^rainf>(^ figh^ijpg .^_^^ and they are going to remain so. These are 
industrial matters. I can not conceive that a man who is trained for 
military matters can have the requisite knowledge to enable him to 
properly and efficiently handle large industrial matters. 

Mr. Anthony. Take t hese men in the business corps of the Army 
today, have there not beelT^some^men^Trf' great' aWllty developed as 
the result of their experience during this war? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. Wl^y rf^]^^^ jrtv ^^t uti^iz.p ^hr^sp jneja just as well 
as going outside arid getting a civilian? 

Mr. Crowell. Tbf )sg jy^p fl ^r^ rather scarce, and I presume that 
the best answer wouldbe that we always have a civilian as Secretary 
of War. Why is that ? I would say for the same reason. 

Mr. Anthony. Have the efficiency boards of the Government called 
to your attention any figures showing the saving in operating ex- 
penses and overhead expenses that would be brought about by this 
proposed consolidation of the business corps of the Army under one 
head? 

Mr. Crowell. No ; no efficiency bureau. 

Mr. Anthony. Anv efficiencv expert? 

Mr. Crowell. No. - — 

y^ Mr. Anthony. I understand efficiencv experts have been called in 
(^ to examine the operations of certain or these departments, and they 
^ made reports, giving figures, showing savings oi a great many mil- 
Vlions of dollars brought about by consolidation of these bureaus. 

Mr. Crowell. In a general way let me say this, regarding consoli- 
dations. It is easy to say that by this consolidation we can save a 
lot of money. I have heard that many times. 

You may have a few men out here digging a ditch and over in 
another place you may have a few men sawing wood. But by the 




1820 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

consolidation of the men digging the ditch and the men sawing the 
wood you would nbt make any saving. Many of the consolidations 
proposed in the War Department are oh a parallel with that. Be- 
fore we will allow them we must, of course, have a fair estimate 
made as to the results. 

The Chairman. If you recall, there was a consolidation, I think, 
in 1912, of the Commissary Department, the Quartermaster Depart- 
riient, and Pay Department, and we were told at that time that a 
great many millions of dollars would be saved. The Quartermaster 
Corps was Organized and all these diflFerent bureaus were put into it. 
Do you think the condition Mr. Fisher referred to in reference to the 
break down in connection with the pay of soldiers would likely have 
happened if the Pay Department had continued as a separate organi- 
zation ? 

Mr. Crowell. I do not know, Mr. Kahn; I can not answer that 
question. 

Mr. Anthony. You say these efficiency reports in regard to sav- 
ings that were to be effected by consolidation of these operations 
have never been brought to your attention. I have copies of offi.cial 
reports made by Army officers at the various camps, in which figures 
are given showing how these savings could be made in operations, 
and they certainly ought to be considered by the executive officials 
of the War Department before they recommend any plan to Congress 
in reference to the reorganization of the Army. 

I want to bring to your attention the synopsis of a report which 
has been submitted from the camp supply officer at Camp Sherman, 
Chillicothe, Ohio, regarding the consolidation of several services 
coincident with the supply of troops at that post. He says : 

The following are the separate organizations now in operation at Gamp 
Sherman: Camp supply organization, Motor Transport Corps, finance service, 
transportation service, camp utilities division. Wages of civilians alone under 
above organization, $46,963.34 per mouth. 

The proper businesslike organization producing increased efficiency and sav- 
ing money to the Government should be : A camp quartermaster with assistants 
as follo>vs: One officer in charge of utilities, salvage, and laundry; one prop- 
erty officer in charge of procurement, distribution, and storage; one trans- 
portation officer in charge of motor, wheel, and rail transportation ; one finance 
officer. 

The suggested consolidation will eliminate certain civilian clerks now en- 
gaged in administrative duties in the several independent organizations and 
will reduce the pay roll to $34,243.34 a month. 

A saving of $12,270 per month in the hire of civilian employees alone at this 
one camp. This means $147,240 per annum. In addition, the consolidation 
would eliminate the following officers : Two majors, one captain, one first 
lieutenant, and one second lieutenant. The total monthly basic salary for the 
(•fficers is $1,408.34, a total monthly saving of $14,128.34 in pay of officers and 
civilians. Multiply this by 12, for one year, and we have a saving at Camp 
Sherman on salaries alone of $169,540. 

Multiply the above by the total number of camps and other places that 
would be affected .by this consolidation and we can readily see what an imj 
mense yearly saving would be effected. Approximately $15,000,000. 

This added to savings in zone supply offices and the main offices at Wash-'j 
ington that would obtain if a similar consolidation was made, would sweUj 
the annual savings to more than $30,000,000. 

Further savings in the number of civilian employees can be made after the 
consolidation has been in operation for a time by a close observation, intelligent 
and systematic asignments, and the elimination of employees who may be 
duplicating each other's work. 

Summing up, what do we find due to the present system of supply? First, 
an annual expenditure of $169,540 more than is necessary or warranted at one 



\ 



\ 




ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1821 

camp alone. Second, a wastage of $30,000,000 per annum when all depots, 
posts, and camps are considered. 

It seems to me that such figures as that, coming from one camp, 
ought to appeal to the executive heads of the War Department as 
showing the necessity for a consolidation of all these war-time activi- 
ties for the Army in time of peace. Have those figures ever been 
brought to your attention ? .- ^ 

Mr. Crowell. Those figures you read have not been. They would) 
naturally go to the military authorities first. I would like to com"\ 
ment a little bit, however, on those figures. ""-^ 

Camp Sherman is a camp intended for the use of ^jOOO men, and 
there are there at the present some 2,000 or 3,000 men. It is quite 
likely that the overhead is greater than it should be at this time. In 
fact, I think that is true in more than one place. We are in a state 
of uncertainty at the present time and until we get permanent legis- 
lation in connection with the reorganization of the Army I think 
there will be some waste in many cases. But if Camp Sherman were 
filled with its full quota of men it is probable that the present over- 
head would be necessary. I do not know about that. If that waste is 
allowed to continue it is ob^^lOusly within the rights of the com- 
mander of the camp to do away with it and to make the consolida- 
tion. In the case of these separate departments there is no need 
whatever for one cent of extra overhead being allowed there because 
it is not only possible, but it is the proper thing for the commanding 
officer to put these different duties in the hands of one officer. He 
can do that under present conditions. It is only in the large can- 
tonments where we would have a separate officer for each of these 
divisions of the work. 

Mr. Anthony. To further confirm the report made by this officer 
at Camp Sherman I want to call your attention to a report made by 
the Inspector General's Office in regard to Camp Jackson, S. C, 
under date of the 17th of December, 1919, reporting that inspections 
made by the inspector under the heading of " Consolidation of 
operating activities." This inspector reports : 

The civilian pay roll for the month of November amounted to $81,571.03. 
This heavy expense is largely due to the size of this plant, the temporary 
nature of its construction, and to its separate activities. It is believed that 
more efficiency, greater economy, and less friction would result if the camp 
supply (including salvage and laundry) utilities, transportation, finance, motor 
transportation, and camp ordnance were consolidated under one head. 
. Conclusions: * * * All operating activities within the camp sl^ould be 
-e€i^solidated and placed under one head. " > 

This condition must prevail at every one of our posts. It seems 
to me it is a conclusive argument for the consolidation of these ac- 
tivities, and I wondered whether the executives in the War Depart- 
ment have ^ven careful consideration to these reports that are 
made by the inspecting officers. ^^^^--- 

Mr. Crowell. The two you have read have not come to Trie, I 

ill say. 

The Chairman. How big is Camp Jackson? 

Mr. Crowell. Thirty or forty thousand men capacity. 

Mr. Anthony. How many are there now? 

Mr. Crowell. One hundred and sixty-three officers and 2,896 men, 
making a total of 3,059, 




WAR DEPARTMENT 

rEHTABON LIBHAHY 



>.aA4%> 111 



Lii^Y/^fti n n 



1822 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

But I want to say these reports can not be accepted until all the 
conditions are known. I had a report yesterday from the Inspector 
Oeneral showing that we could save a hundred thousand dollars in 
A certain city 'by consolidating certain activities there. It was all 
right, except that the Inspector General did not happen to know 
that we had certain leases which we were compelled to carry out, 
and that the space in which he advocated the consolidation could be 
mad^ was not available. That is the case in many of these reports. 
You must hear the whole story. 

The Chairman. I think you stated a moment ago that the com- 
manding officer at the camp would have the right under existing law 
and regulations to consolidate these various things if he thought it 
was in the interest of economy to do so ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Why has not that been done? 

Mr. Crowell. I believe, Mr. Kahn, that in the cases of some of 
the large camps, such as at present are housing only a small number 
^f men, making the overhead seem ridiculous in many cases, they 
are expecting more men. 

Mr. McKenzie. Is it not true that this whole situation referred 

to in this report is due to the present organization of the Military 

Establishment under the Overman Act; how could a commanding 

officer at a camp abolish the Motor Transport Corps, or any part 

of it; what power would he have to say to any officer in the Motor 

Transport Corps, " You are not needed here ? " 

'"^ Mr. Crowell.. He has no authority to abolish a corps, but he has 

/ whatever authority is necessary for the efficient administration of his 

particular post. If the authority were not there, he could get it im- 

^ mediately if he asked for it from the War Department. 

Mr. McKenzie. Is it not true that the regulations now provide 
that there shall be at each of these camps certain officers representing 
the different branches ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes; but that does not mean that if there is one 
automobile at a camp you would have to have a man there to watch 
that automobile. 

Mr. Crago. The commanding officer could recommend that the duty 
devolving on these different officers be assigned to one particular 
officer ? 

Mr. Crowell. That is true ; and I am not criticising Camp Sher- 
man, particularly; I am merely giving you the reasons why it is 
true, and that is that it is a large camp, now occupied by a very few 
men, and I have no doubt the overhead is out of proportion to the 
number of men who are there. 
{ The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that in many of the^ 
' smaller camps these consolidations had been made and are in effect/ 
notwithstanding the Overman Act? 

Mr. Crowelu Yes; but I want to say I believe there is a good deal 
of inefficiency existing due to this state of uncertainty, and I hope 
we will get some permanent legislation so that we can correct it. 

Mr. McKenzie. Any such order for the consolidation or elimina- 
tion of certain officers and organizations at one of these camps would 
have to come from the Secretary of War, would it not ? 

Mr. Crowell. No ; the staff would have that authority. 

Mr. McKenzie. The Chief of Staff? 

1^ 1 • • . 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1823 

Mr. Crowell. You understand it would not be elimination; it 
would merely be designating one officer to handle two or three depart- 
ments. 

Mr. McKenzie. And transfer those officers to some other point ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. In the future, in the case of small posts, there 
is no plan to keep a large number of representatives of thei^ organi- 
zations. There is no need pf it whatever. 

Mr. Anthony. I understand, Mr. Secretary, that you said in an- 
swer to a question of the chairman that the commanding officers of 
these large posts now have the authority to cut down this big over- 
head, if they wish to do so. 

Mr. Crowell. Under the general authority to administer their 
posts economically. 

Mr. Anthony. I have before me the report of a major general 
commanding one of these large camps, dated December 11, in which 
recommendations are made for such a lessening of expenses. So it 
is evident that that major general saw the necessity for it, but it has > 
not been acted upon by the department. And the statement is fur- 
ther made there that if this large camp should be occupied by a divi- 
sion of troops — ^you said that organization would be necessary when 
these posts are occupied by troops — ^he says a division of troops is / 
supposed to contain all the necessary working personnel to keep up , 
and operate a division post — that is, outside of the ment that are now 
at these posts. So you would have a duplication of work there if you 
fill that post with a division of troops ; you would have the operating 
force of the division and the overhead at that place. 

Mr. Crowell. You are assuming that we would maintain those 
two organizations. It is ridiculous. Of course, we would not. 

Mr. Anthony. There are supposed to be divisions at some of these 
places? 

Mr. Crowell. There is not a division of troops at any camp in the 
UnitiCd States to-day. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you think it is important that the divisions 
should be filled up so that they can operate and take care of their 
own administration? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes; indeed I do. In that case any duplication 
would be done away with. 

- Mr. Anthony. Do you think we should cut down the size of the 
Eegular Army at this time or fill it to its maximum, to permit its 
operation as planned? 

Mr. Crowell. The Army is depleted below any proposed strength 
that I believe has yet been made for an army. 

The Chairman. How many enlisted men have you in the Army 
now^ 

Mr. Crowei^ The total number of the Army is about f^-l(),000 offi- 
cers and men. 

The Chairman. That is what I understood; there are 18,000 offi- 
cers under the law which Congress passed not longj ago, and the 
othei's are enlisted men, so you would have approximately 220,000 
enlisted men. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you think the figures which have been placed 
in this tentative reorganization bill before the committee now, mak- 
ing a maximum of 250,000 combatant troops for the Regular Army 
is sufficient to fulfill its requirements? 



1824 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 



Mr. Crowell. I do not feel that I am competent to answer that 
question, but I am perfectly willing to say, for what it may be worth, 
that I do. 

Mr. Greene. That is emphasizing the words " combatant troops," 
as distinguished from staff auxiliaries, which would add to the nmn- 
ber? 

Mr. Crowelu Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. If we undertake the work of military training, such 
as is contemplated by the use of the words " universal training," 
would we require the use of a considerable number of Regular troops 
for that purpose? 

Mr. Crowell. I do not know. 

Mr. Anthony. You have not gone into that? 

Mr. Crowell. I have not. I have limited my work almost wholly 
to the supply problems of the Army. 

The Chairman. I see in the weekly statistical report dated De- 
cember 20, 1919, that the number of officers was 18,516 and the num- 
ber of men 218,369, making a total of 236,885. 

Mr. Crowell. I would like to explain that that number of officers 
includes those in the hospitals. Deducting that number brings the 
total below the 18,000 we are authorized to have. 

The Chairman. And some of them are officers of the Philippine 
Scouts ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, we were discussing the 
Construction Division ; and applying the per capita figures, which we 
got from the record of the past 10 years, they would show that the 
expenditures based on an army, roughly, of 300,000 men, would 
vary from $40,000,000 to $70,000,000 a year. The saving that could 
be effected — ^that is, the difference between having that done by an ex- 
perienced expert organization as against one not so expert— might 
run 5 per cent, or possibly 10 per cent. In either case it is a consider- 
able item. In fact, I believe tnere is enough construction work ahead 
of us which is best handled by this Construction Division, work which 
is different from any work which is handled by the Engineers, and 
also different from the work which is handled best by the quarter- 
master, on account of the magnitude of the projects; I believe all of 
that warrants the retention of the Construction Division. 

But I am in favor of putting the real estate division in with it, be- 
cause construction and real estate matters are very closely tied to- 
gether, and one can hardly be handled if separated from the other. 

The main argument against the retention of fhe Construction Di- 
vision seems to be one of expense. I have never been able to see, how- 
ever, how the work could be done any cheaper by any other set of 
men. The plans of the Construction Division call for construction 
officers only to be located in the large posts; that is, greater than 
regimental posts, and only on projects of magnitude. They will soon 
pay for themselves in those positions. The small repairs to the small 
posts could still be left to the quartermasters as they were in the old 
days.. - - , - -' ~ 

I have a little more I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, in regard 
to general reorganization. The Undersecretary of War would have 
grouped under him .alL^rohlems of purchase. and,,EJPCurement]..QJf 
storage and tra nspo rtation. To the corps and bureaus of the War 
Department, ^as they now exist, would fall the duty and function of 
the problems for which they were severally created. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1825 

However, in order that bur eau competit ion should be eliminated 
in the matter of purchases, storage, etc., the undersecretary should 
be .vested by law with a uthority to standardize procureme nt and 
distribute and red istribute the function of purchase ^ s applied to 
s pecinc articles^ especialTy wKere they are common to ine' opefaoun 
oi two or m ore pureaiisa as Best experience would dictate. With this 
strong supervisory power in the undersecretary, I believe, will be 
found the solution of the much criticized condition of purchases in 
the War Department prior to the operation of the Overman Act. 




peace tnis wouia be limited to a very 
small coordinating body, headed by the undersecretary* should 
be placed the supply bureaus which were in existence before the 
war, jind to them should be added the new departments which have 
been "found necessary during the war. None of these bureaus are 
wholly devoted to supplies, they all have military functions con- 
nected with them, and thA 1f>gng]i^fi<^p qTihuIH c\\y*(^r% j;ha^ ^^ «^^ ^"p- 
ply TY^atitf^^rfi tbpgp hnrpiins ^j)c\ ^^artments s hould r eport to and 
should function under the undersecretary, "and iri Ml IllUllSll'y Ih'St- 
Ceis tll^^slTduTH function under and report to the head of the Mili- 
tary Establishment as shown by the chart which I present. This 
dual function of the supply bureaus has been in operation for some 
time. 

The bureaus I deem necessary for the proper execution of the 
munitions program of the Army are the ^arterma^ter Corps, ^n-^ 
gineer Corps, Signal Corps, Air Service, Ordna,nce Department," 
Sfedical Corps, T(j|insportation Corps (which should include Motor 
Transport), the Construction Corps (which should include the 
real estate department), and the Chemical Warfare Service; and 
there should also be under the control of the undersecretary, the 
5iaaflCft Depart. These various corps and bureaus should be charged 
with the duties the war has developed for them to perform, and, 
while it should be the privilege of the Secretary of War to choose 
the head of each bureau from the Army at large, those bureaus 
charged with specially technical services, such as the Me^ijcal De- 
partment, Engineers, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Ql^emical Warfare, 

and Construction, shouIH" have DP^fiOPJl^^ {^EP'PJ ^^^y commissi otifid r fi^ 
least in^he higher grades. Where the oureaii or corps does not 
perform a specially technical service, details can be provided for 
from other branches of the service. 

The Chairman. Take the Air Service. They will have to have a 
lot of fliers who perform military duties. I assume, therefore, what 
you are speaking of now only applies to the supply branch of the 
Army? 

Mr. Crowell. Exactly. 

Mr. Greene. But this chart which you have placed before us does 
not make any reference to the Air Service at all. 

Mr. Crowell. I realize that it is not there. I have already ap- 
peared before this committee and advocated the unification of the 
Air Service, and that was left out on this chart on that account. 
If the Army retains its Air Service that would be one of the divi- 
sions which would have a supply function and would come under this 
list. 



? 






1826 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

The Chairman. How does your plan compare with the systems that 
are in vogue in the armies of France, England, Italy, and European 
armies generally ? 

Mr. Crowell. The system I advocate is practically identical with 
the system followed in the allied countries and also in Germany. In 
none of jh ese countries, .did, the J^n^di. gta£Jui^_supervision oF 
supplies, ana that is the change we are making. We are taking the 
consideration of the matter of supplies away from the General Staffy 
which is a military body, and putting it under a civilian body. 

In the British War Office they have a secretary of state for war 
and directly under him the army council. Then their organization 
chart shows that thp.y haye liine. coequal bodies, one of which is tbe^ 
military g eneral staff: a second of which is the supply depart** 
ment, and aiioHier of which is the quartermaster general, who re- 
ceives supplies and disburses supplies after they are procured by 
the surveyor general of supplies. The chart shows plainly 'that 
the general staff has no duties in connection with procuring sup- 
plies. 

Mr. Anthony. Is that the war office organization? 

Mr. Crowell. That is the present organization. During the war 
' they had a separate ministry of munitions altogether outside. 

I have here the French cnart, which shows that they have first a 
minister of war; then one of his departments is the supply service, 
and another department is the general staff. The Italian chart 
\ shows in the same way the minister of war with about a dozen 
\ departments under him, one of which is the general staff and another 
j of which is the supply department. The Belgian War Office chart 
(shows the same thing. 

^ I have no chart of the German system, but it has been described 
to me by many of our General Staff officers, some of whom were in 
Berlin before the war began. 

The system differs to this extent, that the Emperor was the active 
head. The general staff reported directly to him on all military 
matters; all supply matters were handled by the secrtary of war, 
who reported to the Emperor, in that way maintaining two separate 
organizations. 

The Chairman. Was he an army officer or a civilian? 

Mr. Crowell. The secretary of war? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Crowell. He was a civilian ; in all these countries the minister 
of war is a civilian. 

Mr. Greene. We have spent some time discussing the details that 
might be involved in the policy you suggest. Perhaps some of us 
were misled for the time being. Your policy, stated concretely, is 
that the supplies of the Army shall be handled by the civilian end 
of the War Department; that the military people may from time to 
time recommend such supplies of the character and in the quantity 
that they need ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. That civilian board or authority having passed upon 
them, the production is in the hands of civilians, and the delivery to 
the military forces is in the hands of civilians; but having once 
been delivered to the proper custodian, he becomes militarily re- 
sponsible for the distribution and use of those supplies ? 



\ ,- 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 182T 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. It does not involve as much change from the- 
present system as your statement might indicate. It involves chang- 
ing the office of the Assistant Secretary of War to that of an Under- 
secretary of War, or whatever you might call it, and putting on him 
the duty, which has actually been in that office for a long time, but 
putting it legaUy there, and giving him the duty of having the over- 
sight and consideration of the matter of supplies, and then having" 
the different bureaus handling supply questions function imder him. 
He sees that the contact between the bureaus of the War Depart- 
ment and industrial organizations are properly maintained. 

Mr. Greene. I think the suggestion of that policy has been more 
• or less developing in the minds of the men around this table for a* 
number of years ; that is, the idea of the separation of the military 
functions from the civil, industrial, and financial functions. 

About a year ago I undertook to question the Chief of Staff along 
that same line, and propsed rather crudely something along that 
line of philosophy, but met with no encouragement whatever from 
him. Has he reconciled himself to a change of mind since that 
time ? 

Mr. Crowell. I have discussed thisTvith a number of men whose 
advice I w anted to get before I proposed it to you, but the Chief of 
Siatf was ndFone oi those with whom I discussed it. I may say T' 
discussed it with some of the ablest heads of bureaus. Gen. Sibert 
was one of them and Gen. Williams was another. T'disdussed with 
some General Staff officers, such as Gen. Burr, Col. Palmer, and CoZ 
(|ulicIC I have discussed it. most largely with the great group of 
c ivilian's called trom industrial life into tKeT War Department aur- ^ 
ing t he war, and I have.^,SQ faufpund no one who is opppsed to it. 
Tnmaiiy case's it has taken a good deal of talk to bring them around 
to it, because it is rather difficult to see how simply it will function. 

Mr. Greene. It seemed to me, Mr. Secretary, that one of the 
troubles of the years past, particularly at the time of every emer- 
gency, has been that men oi splendid military reputation, with an 
undoubted military temperament, and undoubted military efficiency 
have been suddenly thrust into the industrial and business world 
and have destroyed their own usefulness, and it has seemed to me 
if civilians, men trained to that sort of thing, were to provide them 
with the tools which they needed, then they could be held militarily 
responsible for the use of those things in the Army, and could carry 
themselves through in the service of the country, and to their own 
credit. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, does your plan contemplate any 
additional Assistant Secretaries of War, or would the organization 
of the War Department be first the Secretary of War himself and 
second, the Director of Munitions or Undersecretary of War? You 
would have no Second Assistant or Third Assistant Secretaries of 
War? 

Mr. Crowell. No. There is nothing for another Assistant Secre- 
tary to do. 

The Chairman. How would that kind of an organization func- 
tion in war? Would it be necessary, as we did in this war, to ap- 
point several other Assistant Secretaries of War ? 

Mr. Crowell. I think not; but yet I can not say, because it is 
hard to foresee what we might be driven to do. You will recall 



1828 ARMY REORGANIZATION". 

that in this war — ^I recall very well the day when Secretary Baker 
sent for me and said, " I want you to be Assistant Secretary of War 
and look after munitions." We have carried that out ever since. 
At one time we asked you to give us two additional Secretaries of 
War. At that time one of them was made Director of Munitions, 
and Mr. Stettinus was appointed. I turned the duties over to him 
to perform, in connection with munitions. Then Mr. Keppel was 
appointed an Assistant Secretary and he handled the nonmilitary 
matters of the Army. It might be necessary to do that sort of 
thing in a future war. 

At another time we made numerous changes. I want to get away 
from all this experimental work and organize the Army properly 
now. That is exactly why we are in so much trouble, because we 
had to do all of our building during the war. 

Mr. McKenzie. I am like my friend Mr. Greene; I am somewhat 
interested in this matter, and I think there is something in it. But 
durinff the war we had a great many able business men in the service — 
a gooa many of the so-called doUar-a-year men — and some of the 
most able men were commissioned. Of course we all realize that a 
great many blunders were made. An officer was telling me the other 
day that he had been, I think, at Jeffersonville Barracks, and there 
were a great many thousands, perhaps 75,000 sets, of artillery breast 
harness stored out there, for which there is absolutely no market in 
this country, because there is practically no use for it. Of course it 
is hard to fix the responsibility and to say that that was due to some 
Army officer or to some civilian who was assisting the War Depart- 
ment at that time. Can you hold out any hope to this committee, if 
your plan is adopted, that such an outrageous blunder as that might 
be obviated ? 

Mr. Crowell. It seems to me if you free the minds of those who 
are at the head of the War Department from organization work 
during the time of war they would have more time to give to details, 
and that is what I am proposing to do. The adoption of a proper 
reorganization plan will go a long way to prevent such mistakes as 
were made during the war, many of them due to the fact that a groat 
deal of Secretary Baker's time and a great deal of my time was spent 
on organization work that ought to have been done before. 

Mr. Greene. You would have a point where the military men, hav- 
ing had experience with military use, would recommend a type of 
something to the proper board of a civilian character in the War 
Department. If it had the* militar>^ approval and was proved to be 
a military necessity, then the civilian end of the department in its 
capacity, with men of experience in the mercantile, industrial, and 
economic side of affairs, would pass upon the business policy, and 
having determined the business policy, would, either by limiting the 
amount, or whatever might be done, suit the economies of the situa- 
tion and then produce it themselves on their own responsibility, the 
military men only waiting for it. Then when it was produced and 
turned over to the military men all they would be accountable fot\ 
would be its proper military use. Then" you have the two tempera- 
i ments absolutely divided and the responsibilities that go with eaclv 

^Bfinitely fixed. 

Mr. Crowell. That is correct, in a general way. But I should 
emphasize a little more than that the fact that the military men 



ABMY REOEGANIZATIOlSr, 1829 

should have full control of all types, and then turn that over to the 
undersecretary and he would see to the production. 

Mr. Grbeke. That is what I say. 

Mr. Croweijl. I want to emphasize the fact that there is no limi- 
tation as to types of military articles. The General Staff has ab- 
solute and full control of that. But the matter of procurement and *| 
production would be in the hands of the civilian end of the de- ) 
partment, in the hands of men qualified by experience to handle j 
«?uch matters. 

Mr. Greene. The old tradition of the service, which the men 
in the service have had to struggle with, was that a man once com- 
missioned as an officer in the Army was qualified to perform any 
duty to which he might be assigned. That was mostly because the 
civOian world does not recognize such limitless possibilities. They 
know that men have to be specialists, and have to specialize for par- 
ticular work. The Army has not gone on that theory, but on the 
reverse. That was so up to the time of this war. It seems to me 
the lesson ought to be learned now. 

Mr. Crowell. I think so. 

Mr. Anthony. Is it not true that any civilian that you would 
put at the head of the administration of these bureaus would have 
to undergo quite a period of training in the usages of the Army and 
in Army customs before he would be competent to administer these 
bureaus? ,,^^ 

Mr. Crowell. I do not think there would be any difficulty there, J^ 
Mr. Anthony. In the first place, his actual administration would f 
be very small. His. dnty^Ja^xjot to administer the bureaus. The ^ 
h eads of t he bureaus perform that function. His duty would Tmu 
largely coordination work. . 

' Mrr^Pc^fTRONY. Is not one of the lessons from the present war the 
fact that many of the big business men who were placed at the 
head of bureau activities were incompetent to perform that duty? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes, sir ; but I think many of them made this mis- 
take. They came in and said, "Here is a mass of red tape that 
we have got to break up." There is no more red tape in the de- 
partment than there is in the United Steel Corporation in its ad- 
ministration. The minute you get away from one man doing his 
own work, such as a single storekeeper — ^the minute he has a clerk, 
the red tape begins. The greater the organization the more red 
tape. It is merely a restraint on the action of the individual. 

Mr. Anthony. My experience has been that we will find in the 
Army as efficient all-round men as we will find in business or com- 
mercial life. 

Mr. Crowell. They are undoubtedly so when they start. 

Mr. Anthony. There were just as many failures among the busi- 
ness men who were called into the service as there were Army offi- 
cers who were given certain tasks to perform. 

Mr. Crowell. When the Armv officer starts he is as goo(J. a busi^ 
ne ss man as the. civilian*. But. at .the end. of . 3Q . years' sersdce, 
_16tl hfi re aches^ the ^point of authority, his .time . h^ Jbeen -gixen 
to matters" military, and he can not YXQW, industrijal questi on^ fro m ^ 
tTIeTJTTTpSr viewpoint. 

150187— 20^vor2— -^3 



1830 ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 

Mr. Hull. I think you have told us that you prefer separate 
bureaus for most of these things ; in some cases I think you did not 
say where you would put them, if we desired to put them under 
another bureau. Take, for instance, transportation; where does it 
belong, if it is put under a bureau ? 

Mr. Crowell. In my opinion transportation is a very large and 
important proposition. AH you have to do is to look at the condi- 
tions duiing this war to see the tremendous extent of it. I think 
it should be maintained as a separate department, and I think motor 
transport should be included in it. I think it is worthy of a sep- 
arate department. 

Mr. Hull. But in case we do put it under some bureau, where 
does it belong? 

Mr. Ckowell. It would be one of the supply bureaus, on a par 
with the Signal Corps. 

Mr. Hull. But in case we do put it into a bureau, which bureau 
does it belong in ? 

Mr. Crowell. In case you do not make it a separate department ? 

Mr. Hull. Yes; which bureau does it properly belong in? 

Mr. Crowell. I think in the Quartermaster Corps. 

Mr. Hull. Where would you put the Chemical Warfare Service? 
Some people say it should go under the Engineers and some say it 
belongs in the Ordnance Department. 

Mr. Crowell. In reference to the Transportation Corps, when I 
say if you are going to put it into a bureau it should go in the 
Quartermaster Corps I am not for a moment agreeing that it should 
be put in any bureau. I am absolutely opposed to that. 

Mr. San FORD. If you are going to put it in the wrong place it does 
, not make much difference where you put it. 

Mr. Crowell. I warn you if you do that you will have such a big 
X / • administrative unit there that it can not 'be administered in time or 
war. 

Mr. Hull. Where would you put the Chemical Warfare Service? 

Mr. Crowell. In the Engineer Corps, by all means. I do not 
think the Ordnance Department could handle it. The Ordnance De- 
partment is so large in time of peace that it is almost impossible to 
administer it. 

Mr. HuLi*. Fifty per cent of chemical warfare is ordnance, is it 
not? 

Mr. Crowfjll. That is true ; but 50 per cent of all war is ordnance. 
But it is a new branch of warfare. It goes into the field. We have 
just begun to study the tactical use of gas. 

Mr. Hulij. You say you would put real estate with construction? 

Mr. Crowell. By all means. 

Mr. Hull. Would you have a civilian head of real estate? 

Mr. Crowell. I should have the head of the Construction Depart- 
ment appoint his own real estat-e section. Real estate is a peculiar 
business. It just happens, so far as I have been able to find, the 
Army has no real estate experts, and it is necessary to go into the 
I'eal estate field to get them. 

Mr. Sanford. In reference to Mr. Anthony's inquiry as to civilian 
lieads of the supply bureaus, did you have in mind also that the 
civilian head of these different supply divisions would not, by his 
education or experience, be prejudiced in favor of an}^ one of the 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1S31 

separate bureaus, as a soldier necessarily is generally prejudiced on 
account of his own line of activity ? Would he not tKeref ore be more 
inclined simply to coordinate these different bureaus, and let each 
one work out its own work in its own field, and not be inclined to 
hamper one or help the other, as an Army officer might be tempted 
to do? 

Mr. Crowell. I think that is well worth considering. 

Mr. Sanford. It will not cost any more to have a civilian? 

Mr. Crowell. No. I would like to explain a little further why I< 
would put transportation under the Quartermaster Department, if 
you should decide not to make a separate department of it. All of 
these corps are interested in transportation. It seems to me unfair 
to give full control of all transportation, which is a common neces- 
sity, to any one bureau, because it would simply mean that their 
goods would be transported and the goods of the other bureaus would 
not. We had an illustration of that in this war. 

The Chairman. Did not that actually occur in this war? 

Mr. Crowell. It did, and we had to use a very strong hand on it. 

Mr. Anthony. Along that line, would you not have a multiplicity 
of officials again, and have a large number of different transportation 
heads, by dividing it up into separate administrations ? 

Mr. Crowell. I am not dividing it up. I am in favor of centraliza- 
tion of transportation into one corps. 

Mr. Anthony. I lyar^- to ask y^u or^e npore question^ an (^ T c\n Tiot 
w ant to draw any invidious distinctions, but how does it haj)pe n that 
thfe JNavy functioned so perfectly, with all o f its business transactions 
unoer one nead. und er one naval pmcer . who bought everything for 
ffieTTavy, except armor and shells and guns ? 

Mr. Crowell. My answer to that question would be : Does it func- 
tion perfectly ? 

Mr. Anthony. I understand it has worked perfectly. 

Mr. Crowell. That is my answer. 

The Chairman. I think the Navy had about 500,000 men in this 
war, and conducted practically no land operations. 

Mr. Anthony. But the business principle underlies it all just the 
same. 

The Chairman. Our Quartermaster Corps functioned all right 
until we got into the war and had an Army of 45OOO5OOO soldiers, and 
then it broke down. I say it broke down. Mr. Secretary, you need 
not say anything about it. 

Mr. McKenzie. .^ay we have ip vip.w the coy^§()]i dati ng of pur- 
c hases e ither under a system jou may suggest^ or uj^de T th^ Qnqrtpr-_ 
in asier Departnmn L .and also transportation. You are advocating a 
separate transportation corps ? 

Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. This is the way it appeals to me, and I want your 
view upon it. If an Army officer puts in a requisition for certain 
supplies, whatever those supplies might be, the Quartermaster De- 
partment, having the power to purchase, goes out and buys those 
supplies. My feeling about that is that that oflScer ought to be re- 
sponsible for that purchase until it is receipted for hj the officer 
who has made the requisition, and that he ought to have absolute 
control not only of the purchase but of the transportation of the^ 



1832 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 



article, otherwise he goes out and purchases it and then he is 
through; he turns it over to the transportation officer who handles 
it, and finally it reaches the man who put in the requisition. The 
<3uartermaster Department does not know whether he received it or 
not. I believe that plan would centralize responsibility and that 
by so doing we would get efficiency. I may be wrong about it, but 
that is my view. Wherein is that weak ? 

Mr. Crowell. I think weak is a mild term to apply to it. It is 
wrong and as good results can be achieved by keeping Transporta- 
tion as a separate bureau. Y^ur plan is wrong because it builds up. 
the Quartermaster Department so large that it can not possibly b^ 
a:dministered by the Quartermaster General in time of w>r.. It is 
wrong because the Quartermaster Department having control of 
transportation would naturally give priority to its own shipments 
and large volumes of Quartermaster supplies would reach the troops, 
but small shipments of anything else. You must remember that the 
Quartermaster Department, even after you have made it as large as 
you propose, would transport only a fraction of what is required for 
the maintenance of the Army. It is not fair to the other supply bu- 
reaus that the Quartermaster Department should control transporta- 
tion, which is a common necessity to all bureaus, and which, there- 
fore, should not be fully controlled by any one of them. 

During the World War the shipments to France by bureaus were 
as follows : 



Quartermaster . . 

£ne;ineer 

Oranance 

Tood relief 

3iotor Transport 
French material. 
Signal Corps 



Short tons. 



3,606,000 
1,506,000 
1,189,000 
285,000 
214,000 
208,000 
121,000 



Percent. 



48.39 
20.21 
15.96 
3.82 
2.87 
2.79 
1.62 



Medical 

Aviation 

Red Cross 

Y.M.C. A 

Miscellaneous 

Chemical Warfare 



Short tons. 



111,000 
61,000 
60,000 
45,000 
35,000 
11,000 



Percent. 



1.49 
.82 
.81 
.60 
.47 
.15 



I And I submit that if the Quartermaster Department had had 
• / charge of all this transportation, the proper proportions would not 
, have been maintained, because it is not humanly possible for a mai^i 
f in a bureau to be convinced that his shipments are not the most im- 

Iportant and should therefore have priority. 
During the war the total number of troops sent to France was 
over 2,000,000, and troops transported in the United States amounted 
to about 15,000,000. What i)ossible experience could the Quarter- 
master General have had which would qualify him to head such a 
huge transportation project as this was? How could he possibly 
administer it along with his other duties? Marshal Joffre stated that 
the Battle of the Mame was won by the railroads of France. Are 
you willing to lose the next war by placing transportation in the 
hands of the Quartermaster General, who besides administering 
this must carry on his broad shoulders the burden of feeding the 
Army, clothing the Army, and many other enormous tasks ? 

The only sensible thing to do is to have the Transportation De- 
partment as a separate entity and have at its head an expert in 
transportation just as we have at the head of the Ordnance Depart- 



ABMY RBOBGANIZATIOK. 1833 

ment an expert in ordnance, and at the head of the Medical Depart- 
inent an expert in medical practice. 

As I have stated before, early in the war the Quartermaster 
Department was headed toward collapse, nor would it have been, 
humanly possible for the Quartermaster General in charge at that 
time, or tor any other man, to have prevented this collapse simply 
because of the impossibility of administeriiig such a hugh mass of 
divergent activities, and it was only by the separation of trans- 
portation that this catastrophe was avoided. I do not want to see 
the War Department drift back into the old organization which we 
know will not work. 

The Chairman. Eight along the line of what you said, there 
was evidence before the committee that a quartermaster officer would 
purchase certain supplies under the law. He was responsible to 
the Government for those supplies all the way through until they 
reached the place where they were needed. Now, the quartermas- 
ter officers claimed that the moment they turned the material over 
to the transportation officer they lost sight of them, they had na 
record at all to show whether tney ever reached their destination. 
That is along the line of what Mr. McKenzie has called your atten- 
tion to. How would you meet that situation ? 

Mr. CrOweix. We fought the war under those conditions and 
we had no special difficulty. I would like to comment, however^ 
just a moment, o n tjie o rga nization whi ch Mr. McKenzie is propps- 
ing to set up. It iS pracfical ly what 1 am pr^c«ii]^.aiidI{&£LQJTtlY 
dfflerence' is that he puts at ihfiL head of it the Qu artermaster 
(jrenerai. 
. — TlW Chairman. Wbo is a military^officeri 

Mr. Crowell. Who is a military officer; but what objection is 
there? You are combining under the Quartermaster General these 
different departments, just as I am proposing to have them operate 
under a civilian director of munitions. 

Mr. McKenzie. I am holding the Quartermaster General re- 
sponsible for the delivery of the goods. 

Mr. Croweix. Let me tell you what would result. The result of 
that combination would be in the first place an administrative unit 
which would be so large that the Quartermaster General would be- 
come not an administrator of that department but a mere coordi- 
nator of it. Under this plan you propose to appoint four brigadier 
generals in that department, and it is perfectly obvious what they 
are there for; they are to be administrators. One of them will be 
the head of transportation, and you will merely have in there the 
identical difficulty that I am proposing to obviate. 

Mr. Saneord. There would be four separate bureaus in the Quar- 
termaster Corps reporting to the Quartermaster General instead 
of having them separate and reporting to the civilian head of the 
Army? 







y^ Mr. CROWELii. Yes. Yo u are practically making the Quartei;' ^ \ 
^master General the head of the supply of the Army, ii you WBixtJs 




T. Anthony. Is not that the purpose of quartermaster officers, 
tojgok afterthe supply75TTh^' Arm^ 
thewhole Ariliysysfe'm that has prevailed forliundreds of years in 









N. 



1834 . ARMY REORGANl^ATIOK. 

every army. Why not continue the Quartermaster General? The/ 
only question in my mind is whether you have an efficient man ay / 
the head of the consolidation, and I would like to have you giv* / 
me some reason why a man who is fitted to discharge the duties oar 
Quartermaster General can not be as efficient as some civilian ydti 
put in there and call Director of Munitions? 
Mr. Croweul,. Of course, the answer to that question is very sim- 

Vple. I^ selecting a Qu art ermas ter General ^ou have a choice of 
selection anions half a dozen officers, while m selecting j^xdyjlian 
jrou have_a choice among. 110^Q0,000 peqpl^,7Mr. Anthony referred 
^ to^the condition in other armies. I will say the quartermaster gen- 
oral in the British Army has nothing to do with procurement of 
supplies. 

Mr. Anthony. You do not hold up the British Army as a model? 
Mr. Crowell. Not at all; but you referred in your question to 
^^ other armies, to the universal function of the Quartermaster General 
^ in the handling of supplies, and I am differing with you because 

^v^ that is not the case. 
v.. Mr. Anthony. If you want to carry the comparison further, you 

might compare it with the German Army, which I think we all 
admit was a model of military efficiency. There the quartermaster 
general was endowed with almost supreme authority, and was prob- 
ably the biggest figure in the German Army. 

Mr. Crowell. I can not say whether the quartermaster general 
of the German Army had anything to do with procurement or not, 
but I fancy he did not. I think the quartermaster general of the 
German Army did exactly what the quartermaster general in the . 
1 British Army does. He receives the munitions after they are pro- /^ 
cured and is responsible for their distribution. ^ 

Mr. Miller. The Nation is full of good military men and it is full 
of good business men, but is it not rather difficult to find in any one 
man a combination of both those qualities? 
Mr. Crowell. It is very difficult, I think. 
\ Mr. Miller. Your idea is to have those functions which are purely 

of an industrial or commercial character in the hands of a business 
man, and those which are purely of a military character in the hands 
of military men? 
Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Fields. And to have the military man function as a military 
man, and the industrial and commercial man to function as a com- 
mercial and industrial man? 
Mr. Crowell. Exactly. 

Mr. Sanford. You recognize the fact that war as it is now fought 
has a place for business men as well as military men? 
Mr. Crowell. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And it does not imply any stricture upon the char- 
acter of the Army if after a man has gone into the service at 21 
and has gotten to be 55 or 60 years of age and reached the position 
of quartermaster general, that he is unworthy of the service because 
he does not understand steel prices. 
N Mr. Crowell. It involves no criticism whatever of Army officers. 

„ In fact, all these tremendous administrative departments are headed 
\ by Army officers, and that implies confidence in their administrative 

ability. 



V 
^ 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1835 

Mr. Sanford. Two men may start even in their several lines, 
either military or civil, and after either of them has lived for awhile, 
when he reaches the dignity and age and rank where he would be 
responsible, he can not very well have gotten during all those years 
the vast experience which the civilian has had in his particular line. 

Mr. Crowell. Yes; that is true. 

Mr. Sanford. He is charged, under the present scheme, with being 
familiar with industrial and commercial trade and all the other 
civilian functions? 

Mr. Croweul. Yes. 

The Chairman. Is there anything further you desire to offer, Mr. 
Secretary, in regard to the reorganization of the Army ? 

Mr. Crowell. I would like to offer one other suggestion, which is 
not in connection with this matter of supply. I would like to put in 
the record my views on the affirmative side of the question as to 
whether this country should have universal military training. It is 
unnecessary to discuss the moral of war. The only excuse for the 
existence of a War Department is the affording of a means of prepa- 
ration in time of peace to defend the country in time of war. So 
also, whether we admit or deny the right of a nation to wage war, 
there can be no two sides to the question of the obligation of a nation 
to defend itself from war when waged by another nation upon it. 
I hold it to be the duty of every citizen of this Republic to respond 
in the defense of this country through military service, and if we are 
to have a citizenry of any effect for the defense of the country we 
must provide for the training of them in anticipation of the neces- 
sity of defending tlie country. 

Mr. Sanford. You have a more elaborate statement on that sub- 
ject, have you not ? 

Mr. Crowell. No ; not unless you desire me to answer some ques- 
tions. 

Mr. McKenzie. You feel we ought to go ahead with universal 
military training at this time ? Is that your view, that there should 
be no delay ? 

Mr. Crowell. As to the matter of expediency in legislating, I do 
not think I am an authority. But I think universal military train- 
ing is a necessity to the future welfare of the country ; I can not see 
it in any other way. 

The Chairman. And it should be embodied in any reorganization 
bill that this committee will report? 

Mr. Crowell. I hope it will be embodied. 

Mr. Anthony. Granting Congress should do both those things, 
which do you think is the more important, to reorganize the Army 
now or first to provide and put into operation a military training 
system ? 

Mr. Crowell. Of course, the more* immediate important thing is 
the reorganization of the Army. I think the Army is really suffer- 
ing from lack of legislation on that subject. 

The Chairman. Is not universal training a part of reorganization? 
Does it not materially affect the personnel! 

Mr. Crowell. Yes ; it seems to me the number of the personnel is 
a material part of it. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you. 

(Whereupon the committee adjourned.) 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Friday^ January 16^ 1920. 

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock 
a. m., Hon. Julius Kalm (chairman) presiding. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we have with us this morning several 
of the members of the American Legion, a committee of that organ- 
ization that wants to present to our committee some of the resolutions 
tiiat were adopted by their convention in Minneapolis. Mr. Miller, 
former Member of the* House, is here with the delegation, and I am 
sure that the committee will be very glad to hear from him. 

STATEMENT OF MB. THOMAS W. MILLEB, CHAIBMAN OF THE NA- 
TIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AMEEICAN LEGION. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 
the American Legion is represented here to-day by their national 
legislative committee. If the chair desires I will give their names. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir; we will be very glad, Mr. Miller, to have 
the names of your conferees for the record. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Mr. John Thomas Taylor, of the District of 
Columbia; Mr. H. H. Raege, of Texas; Mr. Kenneth MacKae, of 
Nebraska; and Thomas W. Miller, of Delaware,. chairman. May I 
proceed ? 

The Chairman. In your own way, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The American Legion, at their first annual 
convention in Minneapolis, Minn., November 10 to 12, had a number 
of questions brought before them, but the one that we are particularly 
interested in to-day is the thought of the American Legion on the 
future military policy of the United States. 

I have here a copy of the resolutions adopted, and I am going to 
hand them to the members of the committee, so that you can have 
them before you. 

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON MILITARY POLICY. 

Your committee on military policy met at tlie Minneapolis Club at 3.30 p. m., 
Monday, November 10, 1919, and chose as its chairman Mr. L. V. Patch, of 
Idaho, and as its secretary Mr. B. W. Eddy, of Louisiana. 

It was agreed to confine the committee's thought and action to statements 
of policy rather than statements of detail. The following resolutions were 
adopted : 

1. That a large standing army is uneconomic and un-American. National 
safety with freedom from militarism is best assured by a national citizen 
army and navy based on the democratic and American principles of the equality 
of obligation and opportunity for all. 

2. We favor a policy of universal military training, and that the administra- 
tion of such policy shall be removed from the complete control of any exclu- 
sively military organization or caste. 

3. We are strongly opposed to compulsory military service in time of peace. 

1837 



1838 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

4. We have had a bitter experience in the cost of unpreparedness for national 
<lefense and the lack of proper training on the part of officers and men, and we 
realize the necessity of an immediate revision of our military and naval system 
and a thorough house cleaning of the inefficient officers and methods of our 
entire Military Establishment. 

We favor a national military and naval system based on universal military 
obligation, to include a relatively small Regular Army and Navy, and a citizen 
iirmy and navy capable of rapid expansion sufficient to meet any national emer- 
gency, on a plan which will provide competitive and progressive training for all 
officers, both of the Regular Army and Navy and of the citizen forces. 

We believe that such military system should be subject to civil authority. 

Any legislation tending toward an enlarged and stronger military and naval 
^caste we unqualifiedly condemn. 

5. The national citizen army, which should and must be the chief reliance of 
this country in time of war, should be officered by men from its own ranks and 
administered by a general staff on which citizen-soldier officers and Regular 
Army officers shall serve in equal number. 

We recommend that military training in high schools and colleges be en- 
■couraged. 

6. We favor the continuance of training camps for the training and education 
of officers to serve in case of national requirement. 

We recommend that Congress pass such legislation as will make the United 
States Air Service a separate and distinct department of our system o fnatlonal 
-defenses, under control of a member of the President's Cabinet appointed for 
that purpose alone.. 

7. The national citizen army and navy should be organized into corps, divi- 
sions, and smaller units composed in each case of officers and men who come 
from the same State or locality, and preserving local designations as far as prac- 
ticable. 

8. The national citizen army and navy should be trained, equipped, officered, 
and assigned to definite units before, rather than after, the commencement of 
liostilltles. 

9. The selection and training of men for the national citizen army and navy 
should be under the local control and administration of its own officers, subject 
to general national regulations. 

10. That a committee of seven be appointed by the executive committee of 
the American Legion to consult with and advise the Military and Naval Com- 
mittees of both Houses of Congress as to the working out of the details of or- 
ganization and training of the future Army and Navy of the United States, 
using as its basis the resolutions accepted and adopted by this convention. 

A special committee was appointed by the national commander, 
pursuant to the resolutions of the convention on the military policy. 
Of those present here to-day, the only member of that special com- 
mittee is myself. That committee has been in Washington two or 
three times and has been heard very thoroughly by Senator Wads- 
worth's committee in the Senate. 

The members of the American Legion are deeply impressed with 
the folly of national unpreparedness for war, from the results of 
which tliey suffered while in France. They believe that this country 
should adopt a policy of universal military training for its young 
men as the only fair, democratic, and adequate system of defense. 
Having been through it themselves, they think it only fair and proper 
that the generations which come after them should share such duties 
xind benefits also. They believe that in this way the country can 
maintain for its defense a citizen's army which will be adecjuate for 
any national emergency. They are strongly opposed to militarism 
or the fostering of a military caste. They believe that the Regular 
Army should be reduced to the lowest numbers necessary for our 
foreign garrisons and other necessary professional duties; that our 
Oeneral Staff should be liberalized by an admixture of competent 
citizen officers, and that all officers should be subjected to severe tests 
of fitness which would eliminate all dead wood. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1839 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller, was that resolution passed by a prac- 
tically uanimous vote? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The resolutions which have just been distributed 
ivere passed by a unanimous vote of a convention consisting of 2,000 
delegates, representing over a million paid-up members, and was the 
result of a discussion before a special subcommittee of the convention 
of over two and one-half days. 

Mr. James. Was there any discussion on the floor of the conven- 
tion regarding the matter of universal training? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; Mr. James, there was. 

Mr. James. There was not any opposition to it? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. There was no opposition. I will say that this 
Tvas a unanimous report, and it is as near a unanimous opinion as you 
can get out of a million men represented in a national convention. 

The Chairman. Of course, these million men were all ex-service 
men and performed duty of some kind in this war? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. All ex-service men and women. They believe 
that this citizen army should be trained, so far as possible, by citi- 
zen officers, and its units localized in the territory from which they 
come, but that it must be trained solely as a national army under the 
authority of the National Government for use only in time of war ; 
and that the men must not be used to fill up the Regular Army. 

That this training shall be taken by the youth of the Nation in their 
eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth years, and shall be for a period of 
not less than four or not more than six months in the first year, to be 
followed by a two- weeks training period for each year for two years. 

That the men subject to the training may, as an equivalent for the 
foregoing, take their training in properly supervised iFederalized 
National Guard organizations. 

That the citizen army shall not be used for military purposes in 
time of peace, except in the case of National Guard organizations. 

We favor the continuance of training camps for the training and 
education of officers to serve with the citizen army. 

We recommend' that the Air Service be made a separate depart- 
ment and considered as a combat branch of the Army. 

Briefly stated, gentlemen, the statement which I have just made 
embodies the views of the American Legion, in addition to the reso- 
lutions you have before you, which were passed in the convention. I 
could go into more detail, but having been a member of congressional 
committees myself, I know that members like to get down to ques- 
tions, and I will be very glad to put the additional statement of a 
couple of pages in the record, if the chairman so desires. 

The Chairman. We will be very glad to have you include that in 
your statement. 

(The matter referred to is as follows:) 

1. There should be but one Army of the United States. This force should 
Include : 

(a) Proper garrisons for our overseas possessions. 

(h) A small but efficient home force available for minor military emergencies. 

(c) A training establishment, including a sufficient number of trained officers 
and men to conduct the annual training. 

(d) A citizen army, including — 

(1) The organized reserves subject to military service only in an emergency 
declared by Congress. 

(2) The National Guard of the United States composed of volunteers avail- 
able for military service within the several States and as a reinforcement for 



1840 ABMY BEOBGANIZATIOK. 

the home forces In military emergencies not justifying the mobilization of tlie 
organized reserves. 

The Army of the United States will thus include a limited permanent or pro- 
fessional personnel and a numerous reserve or citizen personnel. It will pro- 
vide for universal military training, but there will be no compulsory military 
service in time of peace. 

2. The charter members of the organized reserves should be those officers 
and men of the World War who volunteer to enroll for short periods, subject 
to voluntary reenrollment. This force will be permanently organized so far as 
practicable as a localized territorial army in brigades, divisions, army corps^ 
and field armies. 

3. The National Guard of the United States should form an integral part of 
the citizen army. It will be organized In a general way as now provided by 
law under the national defense act, except that within the limits of strength 
authorized by law. young men liable to military training may elect training in 
the National Guard Instead of In the training camps normally provided. It 
being understood, however, that the training required in the National Guard 
shall be a real and substantial equivalent for the training required in the 
training camps. 

4. The National Guard thus becomes a volunteer force within the cftizen 
army, composed of officers and men who voluntarily assume an obligation to 
serve their respective States and the Nation in military emergencies that do 
not justly the mobilization of the organized reserves. 

5. An efficient general staff Is essential to the success of any military estab- 
lishment, but such a general staff can only be assured when Its members are 
all trained for general staff duty. 

6. Reserve officers should have access to the schools provided for the train- 
ing of general staff officers, as well as to the other service schools, and when In 
attendance at such schools will receive the pay and allowance of their grades. 
The general staff should Include at least 25 per cent of reserve officers. 

7. Also there should be created the office of undersecretary of war, charged 
with the solution of the great Industrial and business problems Involved In the 
procurement of military supplies. 

8. The period of compulsory training should be for four months, beginning 
normally in the nineteenth year, but subject to deferment one, two, or three 
years, under proper regulations. Exemptions from training should be reduced 
to a minimum, -but no veteran of the World W^ar will be subject to com- 
pulsory training or service In time of peace. 

9. The military training should be such as may be prescribed by regulationSr 
and should include vocational training in appropriate trades, which may 
be necessary In time of war and useful In time of peace, including scientific 
agriculture to such extent as may be practicable. 

10. All regulations governing training should be prepared by an appropriate 
branch of the general staff, including among its members at least half who are 
reserve officers or practical and experienced civilian educators. 

11. After the training period membership In the organized reserves should be 
for five years. Each unit should be assembled for test and maneuver for at 
least two weeks each year. Each individual reservist should be required to 
attend two annual maneuvers during his period'of membership in the organized 
reserves. 

12. Persons who elect training and service In the National Guard in lieu of 
training and membership in the organized reserves should be enrolled for five 
years, and during such period should receive an amount and kind of training 
fully equivalent to that required of members of the organized reserves. 

13. The organized reserve should not be subject to military service except 
when called out In a national emergency declared by Congress. Units of the 
National Guard should be subject to military service under conditions now pre- 
scribed by law. 

14. There should be only one class of citizen officers; therefore, federally 
recognized officers of the National Guard should hereafter be appointe<l by the 
governors of the States from among the reserve officers residing within the 
limits of their respective States. 

15. The permanent professional personnel of the Army of the United States 
should Include those officers and men now In the Regular Establishment. 
Service in the permanent personnel or Regular Establishment proper should be 
purely voluntary In time of peace. 

16. At least half of the original vacancies created in the reorganization of 
the permanent commissioned personnel should be filled by selection from among 





AKMY KEORGANIZ}i< ^^^^ 1845 

deserving veterans of the war. They should be el^ 
gi'ade from second lieutenant to colonel, depending K 

17. The efficiency of the permanent personnel and K 
States as a whole depends upon the promotion of eK 
upon the elimination of incompetent officers. 

The Chairman. Mr. Caldwell desires to ask a q\ 

Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Miller, in your resolutions on 

Nos. 2 and 3 you make a distinction, in which you say : 

We favor a policy of universal military training, and that the l^ 
of such policy shall be removed from the complete control of an> ^ 

military organization or caste. « . ' 

That is No. 2? 

Mr, T. T^. IViiLLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. No. 3 reads : 

We are strongly opposed to compulsory miUtary service in time of peace. 

Of course there are some of us who understand that, but the record 
ought to be made very plain, and I wish you would explain it. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Explaining No. 2, which reads as Mr. Caldwell 
has read it, the American Legion means this: We favor universal 
niilitary training, but we want to remove it from the exclusive 
military control of a distinct professional military cast ; namely, we 
do not want the Regular Army to have entire control over the train- 
ing. In other words, we want reserve officers or reserve personnel 
to constitute 50 per cent of the training force, the men who will do 
the actual training. 

The Chairman. You mean, of course, the reserve officers who par- 
ticipated in this war, and any other reserve officers who may be 
trained at officers' training camps? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I will say, Mr. Miller, it would be a very good 
thing if you could differentiate for the record — ^training and service. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I am coming right to that. 

Mr. Wise. Let me ask you a question right there, so we can start it 
off properly. While you say " universal training," of course, you do 
not have any words in there for compulsory training, but you mean 
by that that you would have compulsory military training? It 
would have to be a law to be compulsory if tney do ta&e it, or it would 
be voluntary if they do take it? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We mean this would distinguish between train- 
ing and service. 

Mr. Wise. I understand that ; but is the training to be compulsory 
at the ages of about 18, 19, or 20, or is it to be voluntary? As your 
resolution reads, it is silent upon that proposition. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I will say to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Wise] that we, of course, do not intend to go into detail in our 
recommendations as to how this law should be made, but we think 
that a proper law can be framed along the lines of the selective-draft 
law, which will call young men to the colors for a certain number of 
months per year, having in mind exemptions, of course, that will 
not take a breadwinner away from the family or upset any particular 
business; but we think that there are enough young mefn of 18, 19, 
and 20 years of age that can be brought into training and have 
enough every year to have an adequate force. 

Mr. Caldwell. He does not answer your question. 



/ 



1840 ^y^^ AltMY RKORGANIZATION. 

the hom^i^gE. Yes ; he does. He is getting right at it. There is no 
<^^p»!?Kice between members of this committee about the giving of 
'aining. The only difference comes right on the point you suggest 
about the exemptions — over things like that — as to whether it shall 
be compulsory on all young men or whether it shall just be more in. 
the nature of a voluntary training of those that can go. 

Mr. T. W. M1I4LER. If it is, of course it will have to be brought 
about by law, and anything that is brought about by law can not be 
termed exactly voluntary. 

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Miller, you remember when we set up 
the conscription law. 

Mr. T. W. Miliar. Yes. 

The Chairman. There was quite a large number of members of 
this committee who believed that conscription was not the proper 
way of raising an army, but that the army could be raised by vol- 
unteers. We finally fought that out in the House, and the Congress 
went on record that the draft should be compulsory. Now, I take it 
that this question that Mr. Wise is talking about is on all fours. 

Mr. Caldwell. No ; I do not think so. 

Mr. Wise. What I am trying to get at, Mr. Chairman, if you will 
pardon me, is what this legion meant when they left out of their 
recommendation any reference to compulsory military training. 
They say they are in favor of universal military training. All of us 
are, but we are not all in favor of compulsory military training, 
as is usually understood. 

Mr. Sanford. How can it be universal without being compulsory ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Would not your question be answered if you asked 
him? 

Mr. Wise. What I want Mr. Miller to do is to give us the views of 
the American Legion. 

Mr. Caldwell. I understand, but I do not think your mind and 
his are meeting on the point. 

Mr. Wise. Yes ; I think they are meeting pretty well, but it does 
not exactly meet your mind. 

Mr. Caldwell. I think you misunderstand him. 

Mr. Wise. No; what I want is not my views, nor your views; I 
want the legion's views. 

Mr. Caldwell. May I ask him a question? 

The Chairman. Let Mr. Wise proceed. 

Mr. Wise. All I am trying to do is not to get him to express your 
views or my views, but I want Mr. Miller, who was present when the 
resolution was passed, to tell us why they did not put in that resolu- 
tion " we favor compulsory military training." 

The Chairman. I used the words " military training," but I believe 
frankly in compulsory training. 

Mr. Wise. Yes; I Know, but there is a great deal of difference 
between compulsory and universal training. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I should say, Mr. Wise, unhesitatingly, about 
paragraph 2, that the American Legion believes you can not have the 
proper sort of universal military training unless you have it under 
law and regulation, which means, of course, if you have that it would 
be compulsory. They would be compelled by law to be called to the 
colors under the provisions of that law. But may I just finish right 
there? Mr. Caldwell asked me about paragraph 3, which reads: 
" We are strongly opposed to compulsory military service in time of 



ARMY REORGANIZA^ 




peace." We mean that these men who are 

training should, in times of peace, not be py 

units or National Guard units, unless they wj^ 

strike or guard duty or border duty, and may I qx, 

made a little earlier in response to Mr. CaldweU 

realize, of course, that professional soldiers of the 

have to lead the way in this, and when we say that tht 

ing shall not be under the complete control of any exci 

tary organization or caste we want reserve noncommia*. 

officer personnel to be fifty-fifty with the Regular officen it 

comes to training. 

The Chairman. You would not limit it altogether to reserve Na- 
tional Guard officers? 

Mr. T. W. MnxER. We consider National Guard, National Army, 
and reserve officers under the general term of " reserve officers." 

Mr. Hull. It is very easy. Mr. Miller, to be for military training. 
I do not know any member of the committe- who is absolutely op- 
posed to it. The trouble is that generalities are not what we have to 
deal with. The American Legion in its series of resolutions there is 
dealing in generalities. Have you or anyone of the American Le- 
gion ever indorsed any bill before Congress ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No ; we have not, Mr. Hull. 

Mr. Hull. Have you — and you are an ex-Member of Congress and 
can do it — ever tried to prepare a bill that would meet with your 
own views? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I will reply to that question by saying that the 
nearest approach to the views of the American Legion in concrete 
legislative form is the so-called Wadsworth Senate bill 3688. 

Mr. Hull. And that bill does just exactly what you say you do 
not want done. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. In what way, Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Hull. Well, it starts the boys at 15 years of age. Now, of 

course, it is compulsory training ; it is universal. There can be no 

exemptions under that, and the training is under Army, under such 

' regulations as the Army makes, and the service is includ^. Now, do 

you indorse that bill? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I can answer that question. 

Mr. Hull. Service is. included in that bill. 

The Chairman. I do not think it is, as I remember it. 

Mr. Caldwell. He wants to answer. Let him answer. 

The Chairman. Yes; proceed in your own way. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I do not want to take too long. 

Mr. Hull. I am trying to be brief. 

The Chairman. Probably you had better have a copy of the Wads- 
worth bill. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I will answer Mr. Hull this wav : The Ameri- 
can Legion, through its special committee, to which I referred 
before and of which I was a member, has been heard formally and 
informally by Senator Wadworth's committee during the past six 
weeks — ^two formal hearings. The national commander is calling a 
meeting of all State departmental representatives in Indianapolis for 
February 9 to go over finally the Wadsworth bill. We held a similar 
meeting in Washington on the war risk last month. Informally, 
the representatives at that conference were for the general principles 
in the Wadsworth bill, and I reiterate again that if there is any legis- 



1840 _^y^ ABMY BEORGANIZATION. 

concrete form that represents the ideas of the American 
L, as expressed at Minneapolis, it is in the Wadsworth bill. 

►ut we realize, gentlemen, that all legislation is a compromise, and 
we realize that mis bill can not become a law as it is now written, 
because certain portions of it will not be passed by the House, and 
in conference it will have to be thrashed out, but we approve the gen- 
eral principles of this bill. 

Mr. Hull. Well, let me ask you right there, you understand that 
when you conscript a man, that he comes under the Articles of War, 
is not that true? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If he is in military service and in uniform he 
would. 

Mr. Hull. Why, the mere act of conscription puts him under the 
Articles of War, does it not? 

Mr. T. W. MiLER. It does. 

Mr. Hull. Certainly. And this bill itself provides that he is un- 
der the Articles of War, and the Articles of War are to be executed 
under regulations by the President, which, under our form at pres- 
ent, is directly under the General Staff. So that you put this boy, 
when you take him in and conscript him, under the Articles of War, 
to be executed under regulations by the General Staff; and then in 
your regulations or resolutions you say that you do not want any 
military caste to have anything to do with the training. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Now, I can reply to that broadly, Mr. Hull, 
by saying that we realize you can not get everything as everybody 
in the country would want it. You could not get any law through 
like that. We do not hesitate to say that if a man is in uniform 
and in the military service, why, naturally, he has to come under the 
Army regulations, but in this bill there is a provision that at least 
50 per. cent of the training personnel of noncommissioned officers 
and officers shall be from the citizen force, and how could people 
better be trusted to do that, if there is any doubt about it, than their 
own, fellowmen, in their own community, in the training? It also 
provides that 25 per cent of this so-called General Staff — and the 
American Legion has some very strong ideas on the General Staff 
system, I will say, which probably some of you agree with — is to 
tie composed of 25 per cent reserve citizen officers. 

Mr. Hull. A few minutes ago you said that there was not any 
service contemplated in this bill. I do not know, of course, about 
the use of the language, but the word "service" is used here on 
page 87, line 4. I will just read it: "And induction into the service 
of persons liable for the military training provided for in this act," 
etc. I do not know what it means, but I will guarantee one thing, 
that if you leave it to the General Staff, it will mean service. 

Mr. Wise. The law of 1917 was enacted so far as was necessary to 
carry this out, you see. 

Mr. Hull. It is absolute service. 

The Chairman. Let Mr. Miller explain. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. In the section that Mr. Hull referred to, we 
do not quibble about that. In order to undergo universal training 
they have to come in under some law and Government regulations, 
and if the provisions of the so-called draft act of 1917 forms the 
best basis for putting into effect the machinery for calling these 
men to the colors, of course that is a detail that we could not dis- 
pute. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1845 

Mr. HuLii. But it says, " and induction into the service." 

Mr. Caldwell. Of course it says service for training, it does not 
say service to act as a soldier. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. You can say that is induction into the train- 
ing forces^ if you want. You can get around the word " service " 
any way you want. See what I mean? Have I made it plain to 
you, Mr. Hull, as a result of the questioning of Mr. Wise a few 
moments ago, that we realize this universal training must be under 
regulation, must be under law, and, therefore, if you want to call 
it compulsory it will have to be called compulsory, but it can not be 
carried on any other way. But we do not want compulsory military 
service in time of peace. That means we do not want these men 
under training used in the Regular Army, or in any force that is 
being called out in time of peace, for border or other duty. 

Mr. Hull. What I want to get clear in my own mind is that you 
do not then indorse this bill as a while? You simply indorse what 
you think is your idea in regard to the bill ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I must answer that, Mr. Hull, as I said before 
to-day, it embodies in concrete legislative form the nearest approach 
to what the American Legion wants; but I, as an individual from 
this legion, even although I am chairman of the national legislative 
committee, would not answer that question with "yes" because we 
are calling a conference February 9 in Minneapolis to finally pass 
on all provisions of it, and it stands a very good chance of being 
adopted, if not in whole in great part. 

Mr. Hull. Well, when you get there, you understand drawing a 
bill, and will you draw a bill and send it to me that will inculcate 
the ideas that you have on military training? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If I say I will do it, I will do it ; I never make 
a promise unless I keep it. I will discuss that informally with you 
after the session. 

Mr. Olney. Mr. Miller, assuming 1,000,000 men becoming 18, 19, 
or 20 years of age each year, and considering the military exemptions 
there are under the Kahn, Chamberlain, and Wadsworth universal 
military training bills, that would give us safely 500,000 men each 
year; I think military training mi^t be more popular among the 
opponents if they believed it was not too expensive a policy. Have 
you any idea as to what the training of 500,000 men would cost this 
Government, considering that the cost of a soldier, including all 
overhead charges, used to be $1,000 per man ? It is now, I under- 
stand, $2,000 per man. The reason for universal military training 
is the belief that a small army goes hand in hand with the citizen 
soldiery ; that is, if you have a large force training as citizen soldiers. 

Mr. T. W. Meller. I am not informed on that, Mr. Olney. I am 
elad you asked that question. Under the so-called Wadsworth bill. 
Senate bill 3688, it has been figured that paying the men in training 
$5 a month, which is provided, the training force would cost about 
$135,000,000 per annum. It is figured now $1,600 per man per year 
in the Army. Now, assuming these figures to be somewhat cor- 
rect, the Senate bill calls for 263,000 enlisted men and 18,000 offi- 
cers, 281,000 personnel at $1,600 per man equals approximately 
$450,000,000. 

Take the proposed House bill, which calls for, say, 300,000 en- 
listed men and 18,000 officers, making a total of 318,000, at $1,600 

150187— 20— VOL 2 1 



1846 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

a year, equals $608,000,000. Now, the Senate bill calls for an annual 
reduction in the size of the Regular Army for five years to ulti- 
mately bring the force to 210,000 men and 18,000 officers. As it 
stands, that would make the plan under the so-called Senate bill cost 
$450,000,000 plus $135,000,000, or $585,000,000, as against the House 
plan of $508,000,000; but if the Regular Army is further reduced — 
and, of.coui*se, it is a mooted question — but if we can get along 
with a Regular Army of 200,000 men and a proportionate number 
of officers, say, 18,000, it would bring the cost down considerably, 
and by my figures would bring it $30,000,000 or $40,000,000 under 
the House plan of 300,000 men and 18,000 officers. In other words, 
we think that the Regular Army may be cut down even lower than 
the so-called Wadsworth bill provides. 

Mr. Dent. Mr. Miller, how many extra officers do you figure it 
would take, if you had compulsory military training, for, say, a 
Regular Army of 200,000 ? How many officers do you think it would 
take? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I would say, Mr. Dent, that we have not gone 
into that detail of administration. 

Mr. Dent. Do you not think that is a very important considera- 
tion before we pass on the bill? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely. Well, it is figured that about 
6,000 officers who would hold reserve commissions could handle the 
training of troops, and these could either be reserve or regular offi- 
cers. 

Mr. Dent. I want to know how many extra officers it would take 
to do the training, bevond the officers necessary for officers for an 
Army of 200,000 men ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Well, Mr. Dent, I can not answer that ques- 
tion accurately, but with 18,000 officers in the so-called Regular 
Army, together with what reserve commissions will be given — and 
of course those reserve officers are not drawing their salaries all the 
time, except when they are called for active duty. 

Mr. Dent. They will draw a salary when called. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think if you have a Regular Army of 200,000 
men and 18,000 officers that you certainly will not need more than 
24,000 all told in the Regular Army, Reserve Corps, National Guard, 
and National Army. 

Mr. Dent. You think it would take about 6,000 extra officers ? 

Mr. T. W. MiLLCR. Yes ; that is only my personal opinion — ^not the 
views of the American Legion. 

Mr. Dent. That is what I am trying to get at ; how do you arrive 
at those figures ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I arrive at those figures from conversations 
and discussions that, I have had in Washington since I returned 
from overseas. It was demonstrated that Congress believed in the 
so-called 18,000 officei's' bill for the present emergency, and I do not 
know what their definite policy is going to be. Of course, a lot of 
this could probably be cut down, depending on the ultimate form of 
your permanent Army legislation. 

Mr. Dent. In other words, the whole thing is problematical now; 
if we start, on this thing, we do not know where it is going to end. 

Mr. T. W. Miuler. On the question of officers? 

Mr. Dent. The whole thing. 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 1847 

Mr. T. W. MiLiiER. I think you can tell. I think you can show in 
dollars and cents that you will probably end either way around a 
half billion a year. 

Mr. Dent. What do you mean by either way ? 

Mr. T. W. M11J.ER. Considering the figures that I have just gone 
over; but before you came in, Mr. Dent, I read a little statement, 
and I will not read it again, but the Legion believes that now is the 
time to " take the bull by the horns " and thrash it out, and before 
you adjourn decide on a definite military policy, so that we will not 
be in the position that we were in 1917. 

Mr. Dent. I agi'ee with you about that. I think we ought to do 
something. 

Mr. FuMiER. What do you mean by a half-billion dollars either 
way? 

Mr. T. W. Miu^ER. I should say, Mr. Fuller, I was merely dis- 
cussing that in my personal individual capacity. I do not want that 
to be considered as an official statement. 

Mr. Fuller. I want to know what you mean. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I meant this, that I have shown by those fig- 
ures that I read off — and I will just give you a copy there so that 
you can follow me. If you will just glance over that I think that 
that will answer your question, or you can ask me some questions to 
elaborate on it. 

The Chairman. Briefly, as I recall, you stated that the strength 
of the personnel, enlisted men and oflScers, in the proposed House bill 
will cost $508,000,000. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Without training. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that the Senate bill, with training, will cost 
about $584,000,000. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose that is what vou have reference to, 
about the thing costing either way $500,000,000? 

Mr. T. W. Miller, f es, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. And he said that under the plan of reducing the 
Army within a year or two it would be "fifty-fifty" — cost just as 
much one way as the other. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Those are figures which I think it will be hard 
to dispute. 

The Chairman. That is the way I understood you, but I wanted to 
make it clear. 

Mr. Wise. That would depend entirely on the length of time you 
trained them, and the number of young men that took the training, 
and the number of officers that were required to train them. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. For instance, Mr. Wise, if the House 
and the Senate should come to a compromise on universal training, 
and only have 300,000 men called up a year, it would cost consider- 
ably less. 

Mr. Olney. What are you thinking about — ^half a million? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fuller. What is the difference in the expense between the 
figures we have now for the Regular Army, without universal mili- 
tary training and the other proposition ? I thought he was making 
a comparison. 



1848 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Caldwell. He did. He says the expense of the Army, with- 
out military training, is $508,000,000, under the House bill. 

The Chairman. Under the proposed bill. 

Mr. Caldwell. The expense of the Army under the proposed Sen- 
ate bill, with universal training, is $586,000,000, and under the 
Senate proposition the Regular Army is to be reduced even below 
the figures that it now is, and that ultimately it would come down 
below $500,000,000. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That bill includes the expense of universal 
military training. 

Mr. Caldwell. $586,000,000, and all of the Army we have got. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Eight there, gentlemen, if you should not have 
any universal training and if you must plan for 300,000 men in the 
Regular Army and 18,000 officers, you have got the expense of Na- 
tional Guard organizations in addition thereto, under the present 
Hay bill. 

Mr. Fuller. Who is responsible for these figures that are so 
astounding ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Miller has presented them. I presume that 
he can tell. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. As far as I can understand, Mr. Fuller, the cost 
per man, per person, officer and man, in the Regular Army can 
roughly be said to be $1,600 per annum. Maybe it is below that. I 
have not made any demand on the War Department to get anything 
official, but I merely brought these informal figures along, in case 
the question of expense should be asked,. and it is the nearest I can 
get. 

Mr. Fuller. I should say, if your figures are right, the question 
of expense should never be considered. The difference is compara- 
tively small. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I know your committee has it in its power to 
learn very quickly from the War Department whether they are any- 
where near authentic. 

The Chairman. We can probably get figures as nearly correct as it 
is possible to get them. 

Mr. Caldwell. Now, Mr. Miller, the memorandum you have given 
us of the resolutions of the American Legion on military policy is 
divided into 10 subheads. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. As I understand it, each of these subheads was con- 
sidered separately and on its own merits? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; sometimes by subcommittees. 

Mr. Caldwell. And as I understand it, it is the idea of the Ameri- 
can Legion that you want as many of these things enacted into law 
as you can get? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; realizing that all legislation is the 
result of compromise. 

Mr. Caldwell. And that even if one or two or more of them are 
knocked out, that you would like to have the others ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. On the theory that all wars are not won in one 
battle, that you will come back here and fight for the other part after 
you get this. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 



AHMY EEOKGANIZATIOlJr. 1849 

Mr. Caldwell. Now, considering the question of compulsory mili- 
tary training, as distinguished from voluntary military training, is 
it the idea of the American Legion that the individual young man is 
to have any choice himself as to whether or not he shall take this 
training, or whether it be the choice of the Government as to whether 
or not he shall take it ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I can only reiterate again, Mr. Caldwell, my 
statement. 

Mr. Caldwell. That ought to be able to be answered yes or no, as 
to whether you are going to let the man himself decide for himself, 
whether or not he will accept this training, or whether you are going 
to have rules and regulations in law, provided his condition falls 
within the rules and regulations. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If you want to use the word " compulsory," yes. 

Mr. Caldwell. I have no desire to use any kind of word. What we 
want to do is to get something here in the record, some definite state- 
ment. Now, if you could answer that question as to whether or not 
the individual boy is going to have the choice as to whether he will 
take the training or not, and whether or not it is your idea, or the 
Legion's idea, that rules and regulations shall be established and laws 
passed, so that every boy who falls within certain classes must go, 
whether he wants to or not-— which one do you want? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We believe in what you have just stated. 

Mr. Caldwell. The last one ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes. 

Mr. Caldwell. That he must go? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That he must go if, under the new selective 
draft law in connection with this measure, he is not exempted for 
various reasons. 

Mr. Caldwell. That is all I wanted to know. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If we say we will leave it up to the youth of 
the land to say, " Yes ; I will go in for four months, or in the Na- 
tional Guard for five years," we know very well it will be the same 
condition over again. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by that; that they will not 
doit? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. They will not do it, and it will mean that vol- 
unteers, public-spirited young men, will do the serving and the other 
people will not, and when we have any more trouble we will have 
the same condition that we had in 1917. 

Mr. Hull. Then you contemplate training all of the young men 
at some period, approximately 750,000 men? 

Mr. Caldwell. The exemption would cut them down to about 
600,000. 

Mr. Hull. We will not fight about 200,000 • that is not many, but 
the Senate bill contemplates the same Regular Army that we do. 
They have got it here in the bill. Now, I do not understand how 
you are going to train 500,000 men for anything like what you say 
you can do. The Regular Army under the Senate bill is the same? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think it is a little less, Mr. Hull. 

Mr. Hull. Practically not. It is 263,000 in their appropriate 
grades, and there are officers on top of that that are practically the 
same. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. It is practically the difference between 318,000 
and 281,000. 



1850 AKMY REORGANIZATIOir, 

Mr. HuiiL. We do not contemplate 318,000. We did not question 
3'our figures. We never put that in the bill, but how are you going 
to train half a million men and not cost anything? Have jou 
figured on the instruction that you will have to have and the officers? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. These figures, Mr. Hull, I do not mean to say 
are authentic, but it will cost under this Wadsworth bill about $135,- 
000,000 a year to call half a million young men to the colors. 

Mr. Hull. And train them. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And train them. 

Mr. Hull. Will you put in the record the figures and indorse them 
yourself, or somebody else ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I said awhile ago that this committee had it 
within their power to very quickly get this information authentically 
and officially, if it was obtainable. These are merely some figures — 
I did not present these figures of expense as the ideas of the Legion, 
but merely to be able in my individual capacity to discuss this with 
some intelligence. 

The Chairman. And as I understand you, you arrived at those 
figures after discussing the matter with some Army officers? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Army people, yes. 

Mr. Hull. We would like to know their names. I have never 
heard of such astounding figures. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. You mean astounding? 

Mr. Hull. Absolutely at variance with every bit of information 
that we ffet from Armv men as to cost. 

The Chairman. Eight on that, let me make a statement. I think 
the War Department, Mr. Miller, sent information down here that 
under their training provision in their bill the cost of training 
600,000 men would be about $94,000,000. Mr. Wise wants to ask a 
question. 

Mr. Wise. What I have been trying to learn, Mr. Miller, is the 
views of the Legion on a concrete proposition. Now, a great many 
of us would agree with the Legion's I'ecommendation here in most of 
these things. 

I just stated we all believed that there should be military train- 
ing, and no doubt it might be unanimous if you had in the law the 
recommendations as a whole, so that there would not be any trouble 
about it. For instance, you recommend, " should be subject to civil 
authority." What do you mean by that — a recommending that this 
military training should be under civil authority? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I am glad you asked that question, Mr. Wise : I 
was not a member of this committee at Minneapolis that framed 
these resolutions, and when it came to our committee to interpret and 
present these views, that was a question that was asked, what do we 
mean bv that? As far as we have been able to ascertain, the con- 
vention meant this, that they wanted the training of the men to be 
under at least 50 per cent civilian noncommissioned and officered 
personnel. It also meant this, that we felt that under the adminis- 
tration of the Army during the war, that probably a certain inside, 
exclusive military clique, composed of a few gentlemen, might have 
had more to say about the Army than the Secretary of War and the 
duly constituted civil authorities. That is what we mean, stating it 
broadly, without giving any names. 

Mr. Wise. If you undertake to put it under civil authority, would 
you not have to" draw altogether a different bill so as to provide a 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. , 1851 

* 

system of training that is altogether distinct from the Army, and 
just simply appropriate money for that purpose ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I admit that is a paragraph that is open to a 
number of constructions, and that is what I was authorized to sa> 
if the question was asked. May I go back to the matter of expense 
for a moment? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think Mr. Kahn, the chairman, stated that 
Secretary Baker testified before this committee that universal train- 
ing for 640,000 men for three months would cost $94,000,000, so, if 
anything, our figures may be somewhat authentic. 

Mr. Wise. I might suggest right there, Mr. Miller, you know as 
a practical legislator, having had experience as well as the rest of 
us, that the Secretary's statement, like everybody else's, would de- 
pend on how far they would had to travel, how many you had at once, 
the number of officers, and the number of men, the expense of upkeep, 
and the amount you paid, and how long jou kept them in.- So every 
body's figures are just merely an .opinion, and nobody can tell or 
know, until it ig actually put into operation, as to what it will cost. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. But I think the Secretary of War should be 
in a position to get this information as accurately as anybody. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this question along that line: Do 
you not think, even if it costs $200,000,000 a year and would prove 
an insurance against war, it would be much cheaper than a war 
debt of $23,000,000,000 ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We agree absolutely with that statement, Mr. 
Kahn. 

Mr. Wise. But if you put them into the Army and we have a 
war, the war debt would come anyhow, would it not? 

The Chairman. It would not cost as much as this war cost. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. My personal experience has brought me up 
from a private to an officer at the front in France, and I have also 
had experience here in Congress, and many a time I have thought, 
" Well, there is the lack of preparedness," when you saw what was 
going on, because we were compelled to be wasteful. 

Mr. Olney. If the Secretary's figures are at all correct, you could 
reduce your expense to the Government for the cost of universal 
training? 

Mr. Hull. Eight along that line, you know that the great expense 
was not in getting and training the men. It was the supply system 
that the money went into ; is not that true ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And we had what, Mr. HuUI 

Mr. Hull. But answer that question, yes or no. Was it not the . 
supplies that you spent your money on ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I will say, yes; it was; but if we had had men 
to have put on the battle front right away, rather than 18 months — 
or, rather, 14 months — after we declared war, you would not have 
been using up those supplies all the time. 

Mr. Hull. Yes; and if you had had a million trained men you 
could not have used them, because you would have had no supplies. 

Mr. Wise. Let me ask Mr. Miller right on that proposition, having 
the men ready to put them into your three or four months' training, 
would the men be qualified to go to the front line and fight? 



1852 , ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. T. W. MiLiiER. Under the so-called bill which we are dis- 
cussing, frankly speaking, we would like to see six months; but we 
realize everything is compromise. If he goes out after four months' 
training — and all of us have been through the training camps our- 
selves and we know what it is — he would go into the organized 
reserve for the next two years and then move up into the unorganized 
reserve. 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller, a statement has been made before the 
committee and also on the floor, that thousands of our men went to 
the trenches who had never had any training and who had never 
fired a gun. 

Mr. T. W. M1LI4ER. I will say, Mr. Kahn, that I personally know — 
and this is not to be put down in anv head lines as a criticism, under- 
stand me — ^but I know personally of men that we had to go up to our 
own lines and show them how to load their rifles. They were re- 
placements. 
Mr. Wise. He was not qualified to go there, was he ? 
Mr. T. W. MiLUJR. He was not. . 

Mr. Wise. Now, would six months' training 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Pardon me right there. I know some of those 
men had not had a chance to be trained. 

Mr. Wise. Suppose you take a boy and train him when he is 18 
years old for four or six months. At 20 he goes into the reserve, as 
you suggest. Three or four years later war comes on. Would he not 
have to be trained all over again before he could go to the front line? 
Mr. T. W. Miller. Why, yes; but you would have the man. He 
would be in the unorganized reserve, and he would be called out after 
the people who were in training at that time, or after the organized 
reserve had been mobilized. 

Mr. Wise. Suppose we just got a class in this year and had 500,000 
in training that had been in training for three months. Would 
they be qualified to go into the front-line trench and fight wars as 
we fight wars now ? You could not take the man actually in training 
because he would not have been in four months. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That would be an emergency, of course. Of 
course, I would have to say candidly, in my opinion, he would not 
be fully trained ; but we do not contemplate anything coming on us 
in 1920 or 1921. 

Mr. Wise. Yes, sir; each year will account for itself. Each one 
will be trained a year and then he will go into the reserve ; so when 
war broke out he would have that training. It would be good for 
the boy, but he would actually have to be trained over to make him 
qualified for the front-line trenches. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Under the scheme of the bill, Mr. Wise, if 
there was a need of a mobilization for war, he would be mobilized 
in his own company, battalion, or regiment in that locality. Their 
supplies would be available and they would be ready to be put into 
action very soon after the machinery was going. 

Mr. Wise. You say supplies would be available. You would not 
have supplies on hand for an army of 4,000,000 men, and it would 
take some time to get them, would it not? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. You would probably have, if you learned the 
lessons of this war, enough supplies on hand to put them into action 
as quickly as you could get them to the places where they were to 
fight, at least a million men. 



ARJVJY REORGANIZATION. 1853^ 

Mr. Wise. Does the Senate bill make any provision at all to keep 
supplies on hand, to immediately supply and equip an army of 
2,000,000 men ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I understand, Mr. Wise, the matter of keep- 
ing up equipment, of course, will be handled in the annual appro- 
priation bills, and you know as well as I that they have any number 
of excess sup^ies left over now.  

Mr. Wise, before you can do that in the appropriation bill, you 
would have to have some authority of law to make it, and here is 
a bill that proposes to reorganize the Army. Now, is it not a bill 
proposing to merely skeletonize an army that can be expanded in 
time of war? Will it not take time to get supplies, guns, and every- 
thing else ready, and could you not train the men while you were 
getting the supplies ready? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Well, you have a Regular Army, say, of 300,000. 
You have a National Guar^, say, of 300,000, composed of these men 
who select service in the National Guard. You have half a million 
in training. That makes in round numbers a million men. There 
should be enough equipment, artillery and guns, and web equipment 
on hand to immediately send those men into action; if the action 
was in this country, all the quicker. If we have to send them over- 
seas in ships, that is a shipping problem. 

Mr. Wise. And it is a good big one. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If it is handled the way it was in the last 
year, it will be done efficiently, because it certainly was done prop- 
erly then. 

Mr. Olney. If they have had three months training, they are at 
least half way, if it takes six months. Is that not better than not 
being trained at all ? 

Mr, T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wise. Did we in the last war not only take untrained men, 
but did we not have to train the Eegular Army, give them training 
for this particular kind of warfare ? . 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Over in France the whole system of military 
training had to be gone over with ; but you must remember when you 
heard of a Regular Army regiment it probably did not have 20 per 
cent of Regular enlisted personnel in it. They were drafted men. 

Mr. James. After the boys completed their training, would you 
have them go into the organized reserve ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; in other words, the country would be 
divided off into zones. There would be such and such a company, 
such and such a battalion, such and such a regiment, division, or 
corps in that particular area, and when the men came from th^ train- 
ing camps they would be assigned to them as the organized reserve, 
which we contemplate should be mobilized for two weeks for three 
years after they left the training camp. Then after the man has 
been in the organized reserve for two years he would pass on into 
the unorganized reserve and a new increment would come in to fill up. 

Mr. James. Would it be your idea, while these men are there in. 
the organized reserve or unorganized reserve, they could be called 
out at any time, for strike duty or anything else, until such time as 
Congress can declare war? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That is what we are absolutely against — ^being 
called out unless there is a war. 



1854 ABMY REORGAKIZATION. 

Mr. Hull. But, Mr. Miller, you are not against this, as I under- 
stand it : You are rather inclined to think that this is constitutionally 
g roper under a free government, if the people, acting through their 
Representatives, do declare war, and then to say to the young men, 
who have no representation in Congress — can not have nothing to 
do with the representation — '' You do the fighting." 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The men that do the fighting will, the great 
majority of them, be over 21, Mr. Hull. 

Mr. Hull. But there will not be all of them that will be 21. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The ones in training, probably a great majority 
of them will be under 21 jears of age. 

Mr. Hull. And they would be in the fight. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The organized reserve would probably be com- 
posed of more men over 21 than under 21. 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller, as a matter of fact Congress passed 
upon that very proposition. Congress passed the man-power bill, 
obliging every boy from 18 and men up to 45 to register, and while 
that was enacted into law, no soldiers of 18 were really needed in 
the war, because that law, which brought about the registration of 
23,000,000 Americans, broke down the German morale. So they 
asked for the armistice six weeks after that law was passed. 

Mr. Hull. Yes, sir; but might I call the chairman's attention to 
this, that that law was not passed at the outbreak of the war; that 
it was the conscription of boys under 21 that divided this committee ; 
and that was prevented by the majority members of the committee 
in the great fight on conscription. Now, along that line — and we 
might just as well say it 

Mr. Sanford. Were 18-year-old boys represented in Congress at 
that time ? 

Mr. Hull. No, sir ; they were not ; but the administration, Mr. San- 
ford — you were not on the committee — the administration — ^the en- 
tire press of this country came to this committee and told us we had 
to give them that bill, without the dotting of an " i " or the crossing 
of a " t." The Secretary of War told this committee that we must 
give them that bill. We wrote the bill. It was not the other fellows ; 
it was the men that the press said were fighting conscription that 
wrote the bill. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. May I answer? I do not want to answer your 
question by asking you one, but if you are in favor of military train- 
ing you have got to decide the age at which our men are best fitted 
to be called up for that training. We believe that men either 18, 
19, or 20 years of age can be called up with the least injustice to 
everybody concerned. 

Mr. Olnet. The boy can choose at the age of 20, if he wants to. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. If he wants to, or at the twentieth year he will 
say, " I will go in the guard for five years." Mr. Hull, a man can be 
20 years and 11 months and 30 days old and still say, " I am ready to 
serve now ; I will do it in the National Guard for five years or I will 
take it for four months." 

Mr. Hull. I call your attention to this, that every man excepting 
one who has come before this committee that fought on the other 
side — I asked them that specific question, from Gen. Pershing down — 
and they said that it would have been a mistake to have sent boys 
compulsorily over there under 21. It would not have done. No boy 
was ever conscripted under 21 for military service. I will admit that 



ABMY EEOBGANIZATION. 1855 

in the hysteria, probably rightly, after we had exhausted the men 
above 21, we did pass the man-power bill which gave them permis- 
sion, but those boys never were taken. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Now, if the age is a stumbling block in the mind 
of the gentleman from lowa^ 

Mr. Hull. That is a big stumbling block. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. There is a compromise. We may be able to 

fet — Congress might be able to get the support of you and people who 
old the same view about the age, if we moved it up to 21. 

Mr. Hull. Absolutely, if the country wants trained men after 
they are 21, why, I would have no objection. That has been my 
whole attitude. 

Mr. T. W. MiLLEK. Then you would be in favor of universal train- 
ing if the men were called to the colors over 21 ? 

Mr. Hull. If the country wants them. 

The Chairman. How would you vote on it? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I do not want to ask the gentleman that, be- 
cause I do not think it is a proper question from me. 

The Chairman. How is the gentleman from Iowa going to vote on 
whether the country wants it or not ? 

Mr. Hull. I would have to see before I say. I would have to see 
the bill. 

Mr. Olney. Mr. Miller, is not the trouble in taking men to train 
after they are 21 that the}^ have still their life vocations to select? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think it would seriously interfere with the 
economic life of our country and would defeat universal training. 

Mr. Dent. Would that be fair, also, if you lower each year the 
boy's education? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That very question came up a week ago in an 
informal discussion between members of the Senate committee, rep- 
resentatives of various organizations, and about seven college presi- 
dents, and it was shown that 2 per cent of the men called out 
every year would be these college boys. We said, " Very well, you 
will have to cut your jib accordingly, because we can not change 
everything with the 98 per cent of men just for the men in college." 

The Chairman. What does that mean, that 98 per cent of the boys 
of that age are not in college? 

Mr. T. W . Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dent. College does not necessarily include education as a 
whole. There are other means of education beside colleges. Do 
you know what percentage it would take out of the educational in- 
stitutions of the countnr? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. The discussion narrowed down to this : It was 
finally admitted that if it was four months that colleges — or we will 
call them educational institutions — could cut their courses accord- 
ingly, because, as you know, things practically end about the 1st of 
June and start up the 1st of October. There is four months right 
there. 

' The Chairman. A letter from the Director of Education was read 
in the last Congress to the House, showing that less than 10 per cent 
of the youth of this country, including Doth sexes, went to school 
after they were 18 years of age. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And right there, gentlemen, this provides for 
educational training, agricultural training, in connection with their 



1856 ARMY REORGANIZATIOlSr. 

military service. They will come out of there better men, mentally^ 
and physically, than when they went in. 

Mr. Wise. That is true, but outside of the educational part of it 
there is another serious proposition. In different sections of the 
country you would necessarily have to have different times, because 
you could not afford to go to the agricultural communities, where 
a young man who was not in school was engaged in agriculture from 
June to September, and if you took him out on the 1st of June you 
would simply destroy the crop that that community was making* 
As a whole, a multitude of young men are engaged not in educa- 
tional pursuits, as we usually term it, but in producing things* 
You would stop the whole production of a section of the country 
by taking them all at the same time. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. That point could be very well made about 
certain sections of this country, but it goes back to a matter of ad- 
ministration and adjustment. 

Mr. Olney. Are you taking into consideration the practical side 
of this whole matter and the advantage of the man coming out a 
good, clean, whole, and strong man, after medical examination? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely, Mr. Olney. While I was in Con- 

fress with you I attended the Plattsburg camps for two months, and 
know how I came out of them. I never was in better shape in 
my life. 

Mr. Olney. I mean there are certain diseases that would be 
ignored, if they were not compelled to go under physical examination. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And they would learn what we term " social 
hygiene." 

The Chairman. You were in the war, of course. You were thrown 
in contact with many of the men who participated in the war. What 
would you say of the efficiency of the men who participated, who 
were trained and were in the war? Was their efficiency greater than 
when they went in ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Oh, absolutely, absolutely, Mr. Kahn. Those 
who came out of it came out better citizens in every possible way,- 
except a few unfortunates who may have gotten into trouble, and that 
was their own fault, but that was a minimum number. 

Mr. Sanford. You know the attitude of mind of roost of these 
service men pretty well now, do you not? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. Some people have suggested that we do not need any 
military policy for a few years, because we have had two or three 
million men under arms, and they will be ready to defend the country, 
if necessary, and we do not need to do anything just now. How 
would the service men look upon a plan that would leave the obliga* 
tion of the defense of the country wholly on those who did defend 
it in the last war ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think that the men who are ex-service men, as 
I have said, in my previous statement, firmly believe that the coming 
generation should assume its responsibility. The so-called Wads- 
worth bill provides that as a nucleus of a citizens' army, while we 
are getting this force. The charter members of the citizens' army 
will be the men who served in this war if they so elect. 

Mr. Sanford. There have been a good many confusing questions, 
I think, put to you this morning, but is it not your purpose in coming 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1857 

Jiere to stand for the principle that the country should be defended 
by everybody? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely. 

Mr. Sanford. That is, by everybody who is capable of being 
trained to perform full duty, of a warlike nature, and you stand for a 
j)lan that will put that obligation on these men to be trained, and the 
benefits of it, too, in peace time ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. Only making such exceptions as wisdom will direct 
in favor of those, or for the exemption of those who are not quali- 
£ed for one reason or the other? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. You are for including everybody that is qualified to 
perform full citizenship duty? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. You also feel, as I understand, from your experience, 
a,nd the men with you feel, that this does not merely place an obli- 
gation, but it gives benefits? The men will not only be partially 
ready to serve their country but they will be better citizens ; you feel, 
too, they will have a better viewpoint toward Government? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely, because they have taken a part in 
the Government by that service. 

Mr. Sanford. Now, how did the democracy end of it work out 
when these men were in camp together, the rich, the poor, prosperous, 
and needy men — what you might call diflferent social positions — ^how 
did they get together in these camps ? What sort of a spirit was there ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Merely replying in my individual capacity, 

fentlemen, it was the greatest democratizing force that we could 
ring about. Universal service intermingled all of us. And while 
you hear of and probably many people know of cases of favoritism, 
you can not get millions of men together and have the human ele- 
ment in it without having favoritism, but that was not the general 
rule by a good deal. 

The Chairman. There were exceptional cases. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes; but I merely state that to qualify my 
statement, not as a criticism. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you think there will something remain over 
after the war in civil life from that democratizing influence ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Judging by the way men associate together in 
our organization of the American Legion, I think it will follow 
them through life. 

Mr. Sanford. That war experience that compelled them all to fight 
for a common goal, you think now is influencing their efforts in civil 
life? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I do ; and that is the reason why the American 
Legion is banded together a million and a quarter strong, to impress 
upon the country the feelings of the ex-service men. 

Mr. Sanford. Now, your plan is not the plan that we have consid- 
ered in this committee, as I understand it ? Your plan is to train these 
men at 18, 19, and 20, according to their choice, and to train them all 
the way, train them so far as they can be trained and put on them 
only one obligation of service, and that is to respond when called 
to the colors by the Congress in an emergency ? Is that your plan ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Alter they have been trained ; yes. 

Mr. Sanford. After they have been trained ? 



1858 ARMY REOBGANIZATIOK. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And during their period of training to put no mili- 
tary duty upon them except that training? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. By statute; put it there that they can not be 
called into any service except upon a declaration of war. We have 
provided a Regular Army and a National Guard for that. 

Mr. Sanford. Of course, when war was declared and these men 
would be available for Congress, Congress would put such obliga- 
tions on them as the representatives of the people might at that time 
think best. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. But the fact that they are trained in training camps 
that we propose to establish, does not put any new obligation on 
them that they have not now already, does it? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No. 

Mr. Sanford. There is at this time an implied obligation — I do 
not know but what it is a legal obligation — on every American be- 
tween 18 and 45, to serve in time of war. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. In the almanacs they are chissed as " unorgan- 
ized militia." 

Mr. Sanford. The Constitution states, as the chairman suggests — 
it puts this obligation on them and calls for a substantially unor- 
ganized militia. Now, your plan is simply to prepare them to carry 
the obligation that the law and your Constitution puts on them in 
time of war. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And which Congress showed it wanted to piit 
on them when it further amended the draft act, by making all people 
between 18 and 45 register, but it was impossible to use them after 
they did it, unless they were trained. 

Mr. Sanford. As I understand from what you have said, you think 
it is a better policy to train them to some extent in advance, rather 
than to take them in an emergency out of civil life and use them un- 
prepared, as you might be obliged to in a war under different circum- 
stances than we had in this war. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely. You know what would have hap- 
pened if we had not the Allied armies and the Allied fleets between 
us and our enemy. 

Mr. James. When you talk with young men who have se^n service, 
about military training, do you find they think it means that Con- 
gress is going to pass a bill by which men may take military train- 
ing, or do you find they think it means a bill by which we compel 
every young man of certain ages to take military training unless 
he has been exempted by local draft boards, for physical reasons, or 
dependent- family reasons, or things of that kind ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. When you speak of military training, they 
mean military training in which they are obligated to take part 
under law. 

Mr. James. Have you ever seen a man who says he is for military 
training who said he thought it should be a system by which the 
man volunteered to take military training? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. That is a plan similar to the old plan of " Let 
George do it"; let somebody else do it. 

Mr. Fuller. Are these the questions that were asked the members 
of the legion ? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1859 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Those are the resolutions, Mr. Fuller, that 
were adopted by the American Legion in convention at Minneapolis, 
representing over a million paid-up members, after two and one- 
half days' discussion by a subcommittee composed of a man from 
each State, and were itnanimously adopted by the convention. 

Mr. Hull. You do not, of course, contend that the legion as a 
whole indorses this proposition now, along that line? 

The Chairman. Let him answer that question. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I do not want to interrupt, but I will answer 
that before I sit down, if you will permit me. 

Mr. Fuller. That is all in the line of my question. Go ahead. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. "All right, sir. We have a million and a quar- 
ter paid-up members. The men at Minneapolis were sent there as 
delegates. A local post, whether it was 16 men as the minimum or 
3,000, elected delegates to a county convention. The county conven- 
tion elected delegates to the State convention. The State conven- 
tion elected delegates to the national convention. It is the only 
representative expression we could get. It is the same way people 
do when they send representatives to Congress. You, of course, can 
not represent every individual man and woman, because no constitu- 
ency is unanimous on everything, but this is what we were authorized 
to come down here and present ; and we have not, as far as I know, 
received any adverse criticism therefrom or any other suggestion. 

The Chairman. Has Mr. Fuller finished ? 

Mr. Fuller. I was going to ask if you thought that that repre- 
sented the sentiment of the people, as Congress did when they voted 
for prohibition. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I think the delegates at Minneapolis repre- 
sented their American Legion constituents a good deal more nearly 
than probably Congress did on many matters. I will not be drawn 
into a prohibition discussion. 

Mr. Fuller. On this second question, why did they not say com- 
pulsory universal military training, then? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We discussed that very thoroughly. Before 
the gentleman came in we discussed that, but I would like to answer^ 
as long as you have put the question. We want universal military 
training. Now, if you want to call it compulsory, all right, but it 
will have to be done under law and regulation. 

Mr. Fuller. There is no question auoout that. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And if you want to call it compulsory, yes, as 
compared to voluntary, because we are agreed that if you leave this 
matter of training service up to volunteers you will not have very 
many of them to take that training. 

Mr. Sanford. Could it be universal in any way you think of with- 
out being compulsory ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. It could not ; no. 

Mr. FuLx^R. That is exactly the point. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I will say to Mr. Fuller, as far as the verbiage 
of this resolution goes, I can not answer, as I was not a member of 
the particular committee that drew this up at Minneapolis. 

Mr. Fuller. It seems to me that that is particularly significant in 
view of the fact that in the next one you say you are opposed to com- 
pulsory military service. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We are opposed to compulsory military service 
of these men in the training service in time of peace. In other words^ 



1860 ARMY REORGAKIZATION. 

we differentiate between men who are being trained and men who are 
in military service, like the Regular Army or National Guard, for 
the specific purpose of being called out if there is any emergency. 
We do not want these men in training to be in any position while they 
are being trained to be called for strike duty, border duty, or any- 
thing else except on a declaration of war by Congress. 

Mr. Fuller. I have in mind this thought — it is not at all well 
digested— but you do not say compulsory in your second question. 
In the third one you are opposed to compulsory military service. 
You explained it. Why not put it down so it does not have to be 
explained? The thought occurs to me that inasmuch as this was 
voted upon by representatives not specially instructed, I think every 
member of this committee would be interested in knowing how the 
American Legion would look on this matter of compulsory universal 
military training. That is an actual expression of opinion. It would 
not be impossible to take a referendum on that. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We are authorized, Mr. Fuller, to say that 
that is the interpretation that the American Legion means to put on 
that. We are authorized to say that. 

Mr. Fuller. I think it would have been better if that had been 
interpreted. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I grant you there are defects in these resolu- 
tions, but before you came in, sir, we went into that very thoroughly, 
and the hearing will show that we have stated here to-day the views 
that you hold. 

Mr. Fuller. But I would like to know how this legion would vote 
on this matter. 

Mr. Sanford. Ha-ve you any doubt as to how the legion would 
Tote on that subject? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I have not, sir; and I know whereof I talk, 
because I have been connected with it in a legislative capacity since 
it was started. 

Mr. Hull. May I suggest something, Mr. Miller ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hull. I want to follow up that same question. Now, out in 
my district, some one has been kind enough to send somebody out 
there to scatter propaganda. You all understand what a propa- 
ganda is — ^through the American Legion in regard to universal mili- 
tary service. 

Mr. Fuller. Service or training? 

Mr. Hull. Training. They have all wired to me indorsing the 
American Legion's plan. I have been, of course, very much inter- 
ested in trying to find out what that plan is, and in one of my largest 
American Legion posts, some one was kind enough to suggest that 
that meant the conscription of a boy, compulsorily, at 19; so they 
took a vote in that post, and they defeated it. They did not wire me. 
They wrote me a letter and told me about it. You see, there is a vast 
difference of opinion. Now, when you have your bill, or any bill 
that you can indorse, I am willing to take that bill and look it over, 
and then I will say whether I am in favor of compulsory military 
training. Until that time, I can not say whether I am in favor, and 
I will send that bill out to every post, and I will tell them just ex- 
actly what it does — let them read it, and then they can tell me 
ivhether they endorse it. 



ABMY BEORGANIZATION. 1861 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Well, I do not want to enter into any discus- 
sion about the point raised. Of course, the gentleman realizes that 
in a million and a quarter men, there are bound to be certain minori- 
ties. The representative of Iowa, on this committee, elected, as I 
have indicated before, stood behind this proposition, and the Ameri- 
can Legion is only nine months old, and there are a good many 
novices in it, especially upon legislation. We realize a number of ex- 
pressions like that might be received, but what we present to you gjen- 
tlemen is what we were authorized to present in our official capacity. 

Mr. Fuller. But have you made any attempt to procure tne 
opinion of the rank and file of the legion? They have had no op- 
portunity of expressing an opinion on this question. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Why, yes ; Mr. Fuller, every county convention, 
'every State convention of the 48 States, the question of an expression 
on military policy was not only debated — ^I mean was not only 
passed upon but debated. Instructions were sent out, for instance, 
that all counter and all State organizations were to send men to 
Minneapolis, with concrete ideas on the military policy or beneficial 
legislation, and a number of other questions that concerned the ex- 
service men. That was very thoroughly gone into. 

Mr. Fuller. Was each delegate instructed on this particular 
-question ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. They were instructed for or against universal — 
the general subject of universal military training. I see the point 
jou are making, and I think our minds meet on the reason why you 
s,re making that point. 

Mr. Fuller. Is it not a fact that before the Minneapolis conven- 
tion, these various conventions were held in the counties and States, 
and that practically all of the questions that were brought up before 
the convention had been discussed and resolutions passed by these 
various counter and State organizations? Every State came there 
with a resolution upon this subject, and the State committees that 
were formed for the purpose of drafting these resolutions were 
handed copies of these resolutions? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Absolutely ; and I will say that the military 
policy committee of the American Legion was made up very care- 
fully, Mr. Fuller. 

Mr. Fuller. And these resolutions, after they were passed by the 
Minneapolis convention, ^ were drafted in the American Legion, 
through all the membership of over a million men. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. They are now in the hands of practically all 
of our members. 

Mr. Fuller. Those are more or less generalities. I would like to 
see a vote of the American Legion on uiis question — ^how many are 
for it and how many are against it. 

Mr. Wise. Would this not be better, Mr. Fuller, if you will pardon 
me ? As Mr. Miller says, they are going to meet now soon in Indian- 
apolis to consider this proposition, among others. Now, there are 
oertainly men of experience and ability, I fciow, in that organization. 
Could they not at Indianapolis draw a bill — a military bill — and 
submit that bill to their different organizations for their approval, 
and then let us have a copy of the bill that they approve as written ? 
Now, a general resolution — ^I could take that resoluti(m and pass it 
anywhere. Anybody will vote for that resolution, just military 
training. Everybody agrees to that. 

150187— 20— VOL 2 5 



1862 ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 

Mr. SANroRD. It says universal military training. 

Mr. Wise. Everybody knows this when you say universal training. 
You do not mean everyone is going, because you start out with a 
proposition that you are going to have exemptions. It will not be- 
universal. 

The Chairman. The exemptions are comparatively few. 

Mr. Wise. There were a good many in this Army. You exempted 
a man who was in college. You exempted those who had depend-^ 
ents; you exempted those who were disqualified, and for various 
things. If they went into the National Guard, they would not have 
to go into the training camps. Out of 1,000,000 men there would be 
500,000 who would go. That would not be universal. I would like 
to ask if you could not draw a bill that the organization would 
approve, the kind of training you propose, under civil authority^ 
There is a great distinction oetween military training under the 
Army and under civil authority. Let them draw a bill along that 
line. 

Mr. T. W. MiLiLER. I understand your suggestions ; but, as I saidy 
the so-called Wadsworth bill. Senate bill 3688, provides as near as 
practicable in legislative form our ideas, and we realize, of course,^ 
that the bill will have to be changed. 

Mr. Wise. That is not under civil authority at all. Would your 
legion indorse that bill as drawn ? 

Mr. T. W. MiiiLER. We are to hold February 9, in Indianapolis, a 
special meeting of representatives from every State, and they will be 
properly instructed, if they have not already been, not only on this 
Wadsworth bill but on a number of bills pending, because they all 
have copies there. 

The Chairman. Mr. Anthony would like to ask a question. 

Mr. Anthony. Mr. Miller, you are a legislator. There are prop- 
ositions on this question, pending before the committees of Congress,, 
that carry all the way from half a million dollars a year to probably 
half a billion dollars a year on this subject of training. You also 
understand the necessity for exercising due care in the expenditure 
of the people's money. Now, how do you recommend that Congress 
go along the lines of training ? 

Mr. T. W. MiMiER. You are talking about dollars and cents now* 

Mr. Anthony. Dollars and cents and training. 

Mr. T. W. MiiiLER. Before you came in, Mr, Anthony, we had quite 
a discussion about this very matter of expense and figures. If you 
will just follow me in this, I think it might help us answer this ques- 
tion a little quicker. Will you just glance over that a moment, x ou 
can do it hastily, because that would embody all my answers to you. 

Mr. Anthony. Do I understand from this that you indorse the 
Senate bill provisions? 

Mr. T. W. Miller, Are you asking me this in my personal ca- 
pacity ? 

Mr. Anthony. Yes ; and as representative of the cause for which 
you speak. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Senate bill 8688 approaches as near as prac- 
ticable the ideas of the American Legion; but we realize, Mr. 
Anthony, that the bill will have to be changed. Certain compro- 
mises will have to be made between the two Houses, if it ever be- 
comes a law, and I for one, personally speaking now, having in mind 
what it costs to run this Government, would like to see some system 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1863 

of universal mmtaiy training with probably not so many men trained 
and not such a large Army, so it would bring our annual budget for 
military affairs around $350,000,000 instead of $500,000,000. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you believe that' is a possibility under present 
conditions? 

Mr. T. W. MnjiER. I believe, sir, if you have a Regular Army of 
200,000 men — and I am speaking now in my individual capacity — 
and a training force of 300,000 a year, which is not all that everybody 
wants, but which is better than nothing — it is better than continuing 
as we have in our military policy. 

Mr. Anthony. Now, there are several schools of military thought 
in regard to training. Some contend for the Swiss system of train- 
ing for 30 days, as it has existed for several years. Others say to 
make a soldier he ought to have six months' training in the field 
before he makes anywhere near a finished product. Now, if we 
have universal training and give them six months in the field, it 
will cost for all of the young men available in this country about 
half a billion dollars a year to do that, in addition to the cost of 
maintenance of our Regular Army. Would you favor that? 

Mr. T. W. MnxER. Pardon me; I do not mean to tie the Ainerican- 
Legion up in any discussion or advocacy of a financial program ; but 
before you came in, Mr. Anthony, the chairman called attention 

Mr. Anthony. That is the serious side of it for Congress to con- 
sider. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. But before you came in the chairman called at- 
tention to the fact that Mr. Baker's testimony was to the effect that 
training 640,000 men for three months would cost $94,000,000, and 
those unauthentic and unofficial figures that I have just handed you 
show that the men could be trained under the so-called Wadsworth 
bill, half a million a year, for about $135,000,000 a year. 

Mr. Anthony. I do not believe that anybody seriously believes 
that those figures are correct. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. As long as you asked me the question in my 
individual capacity, I will not attempt to dispute it. I think your 
figures are a little excessive, also. 

Mr. Anthony. There are 800,000 young men eligible for universal 
training in this country. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Well, they would probably not be called to 
the colors, for physical reasons or other exemptions which we would 
have to provide in the law. 

Mr. Anthony. Then you would not have universal training. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. You would have it as much as you had it in 
this war, under the selective draft law. 

The Chairman. Mr. Miller, I have here a set of resolutions passed 
by the American Legion of the State of Washington. They read as 
follows : 

Be it resolved by this convention, That we go on record in favor of the enact- 
ment by the Congress of the United States of America of a law providing for 
compulsory universal military training, or for the enactment of a similar 
measure, involving the same principles. 

Be it further resolved. That the delegates of this State to the national con- 
vention of the American Legion at Minneapolis be instructed to work for the 
adoption by such convention of a similar resolution. 

Now, were the delegates to the convention at Minneapolis from 
the different States instructed as were the delegates from the State 
of Washington? 



1864 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. T. W. MHiLER. Practically so, Mr. Kahn. They meant that 
under universal training; it would have to be compulsory and not 
voluntary. 

Mr. Fuller. What I would like to know is how many voted for 
it and how many voted against it. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Mr. Fuller, our resolutions was a unanimous 
report from the subcommittee that went over it for two and one- 
half days, composed of 48 men, and it was a unanimous report 
adopted by a convention of several thousand delegates. 

Mr. Sanford. Who you stated were practically instructed on this 
specific question. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; all delegates were instructed on the 
subject of universal training. 

Mr. Caldwell. That was one of the foremost points? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir. 

Mr. James. So far as you know, did any post, county, or State 
convention pass resolutions against compulsory universal training? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No State did pass against it. I can not answer 
for counties. 

Mr. James. Do you know any county that did? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. I really could not answer that. 

Mr. James. As far as you know. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No; I know of none. 

Mr. Fuller. I do not know any body of men whose opinion I 
value more highly than the Legion you are speaking of, but frankly 
I am not impressed with the fact that their sentiment on the ques- 
tion is strong. Those men who voted may have been representative 
in a general way. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Mr. Fuller, I probably think you hold the same 
views we do, if I am correct in what I have heard about your views 
in this matter, and what you would like to do would be to have 
the word " compulsory '' in there. 

Mr. Fuller. I would like an expression of opinion from indi- 
viduals to know their desires on this matter. There is nobody whose 
opinion I value more highly. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Mr. Fuller, I must dispute that, because this 
subject was discussed in every post, as I have stated, county and 
State convention, and when they said they wanted compulsory uni- 
versal training, why, naturally, they expected it to be training under 
law. In other words, it has got to be compulsory to be universal, and 
it did not need the qualifying clause. Mr. Kahn's department has 
written it in. It makes it stronger. 

The Chairman. This is not from the Department of California. 
This is from the Department of Washington. The clerk is now look- 
ing up the California resolutions, but I will say that they are similar 
to those adopted by the organization in the State of Washington. 

Mr. Olnet. It is just like a national convention. It is the nearest 
expression we can get from the people. 

Mr. J. F. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I may state that in my State of 
Washington every individual post of the American Legion, so far 
as I know, has expressed itself in favor of compulsory universal 
military training. The four posts in my town of Seattle surely 
have, and the State has. It was one of the foremost points of dis- 
cussion, and the delegates to the national convention at Minneapolis 

rom my State were instructed upon the question, and they came 



AEMY REORGANIZATION. 1865 

there with a thorough knowledge of the atmosphere of every post in 
the State, so far as I know, ana I have heard of no post in the State 
of Washington but what was in favor of this. 

Mr. Olney. Mr. Miller, have you considered the cost of supplying 
the physicians in examining a great force of 500,000 men? Woula 
those men have to be volunteers or would their services have to be 
commandeered? 

Mr. T. W. MiLiiER. I presume, Mr. Olney, that the medical reserve 
force could take care of that. That is a detail of administration that 
we did not go into. 

Mr. James. Upon practically every draft board there was a physi- 
cian. 

The Chairman. Yes; there was. Is there anything else? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No; if there are no more questions, Mr. E[ahn, 
I want to close by thanking the members of the committee for their 
courtesy in hearing us. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fuller would like to ask a question. 

Mr. Fuller. These figures that were drawn up were figured out 
on the basis of paying these men $5 a month? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Yes, sir; that is what the Wadsworth bill pro- 
vides, that men in training shall get $5 a month. 

The Chairman. And the War Department bill on that subject also 
provided for that matter. 

Mr. Fuller. And provision is made for the man who is taken in 
at that age who is supporting a family. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. Ah, there is where, under the law or the regu- 
lations to be promulgated, a matter like that will be taken care of. 
If he is to be exempt^ the same way as he was exempted from service 
in the war under the selective draft act, of course he has to be. 

Mr. Fuller. I would think that would make quite a diflference 
from the fiffures in your budget. 

Mr.T. W. Miller. I do not exactly understand. 

Mr. Fuller. If a man is a breadwinner. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. We do not pretend to take him then, Mr. Fuller ; 
it is going to be run the same way the selective-draft act was. 

Mr. Fuller. How far down the line will you go? Perhaps a man 
supports half the family. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. For instance, on page 87, Senate bill 3688, 
section 75, it reads as follows : 

In order to carry out the provisions of this act relative to the registration, 
examination, classification, exemption, and induction into the service ot persons 
liable for the military training provided for in this act so much of the provisions 
of the act of Congress approved May 18, 1917, entitled "    as may 
be necessary and applicable hereto are hereby extended and made applicable 
for this purpose." 

The men will be called out to the colors under the selective-draft 
act or regulations promulgated under it. 

The Chairman. As I understand it, the Wadsworth bill provides 
for certain exemptions from training; a breadwinner is specifically 
exempted from training under that bill. 

Mr. Wise. It left it to the board. 

The Chairman. Of course it is evidence that the board will pass 
upon, but he is presumed to be exempt. 

Mr. Wise. To be left to the local board to draft certain men. 
Therefore it would not be universal, but just be universal as to a 
certain class, as determined by the local board. 



1866 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Fuller. How far are you going in that thing ? 

The Chairman. That can be written into the laWj Mr. Fuller. You 
see, Mr. Miller, as I understand^ is only discussing the principle. 
The details of how far you are willing to go ean be written into the 
law when it is framed. 

Mr. James. Section 72, under C, page 83, says, " so as to be placed 
in a deferred class those* upon whose families and dependents the 
hardship would be greater by reason of their induction." It will 
be up to the men of me local draft board. 

Mr. Caldwell. A man may be a bread winner this year and npt 
next year. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. It is a matter of administration, gentlemen, as 
the chairman says. We do not have to go into it in this hearing. 

Mr. Anthony. If you pursue a policy of liberal exemption for this 
so-called universal military training it will mean you will only be 
able to call into training, then, the foot-loose yoimg men of the 
country. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. No ; I do not think so. 

Mr. Anthony. You have either got to train every young man, if 
the principle is right, and I believe it is right. I want to see every 
young man get the benefit of that training if we can arrange it for 
him. Every young man at some year between the ages of 19 and 22 
should have a suitable amount of training with the colors. Now, if 
you are going to provide for a policy of liberal exemptions, it will 
mean that you will get about one-third of the youth of this country 
in training camps under your recommendation of liberal exemptions. 

Mr. T. \V; Miller. Pardon me. The American LdBgion has not 
done anything about the detail of administration, such as exemptions, 
in their resolution. In this Wadsworth bill, which I have stated as 
nearly as anything approaches our ideas, there is a section covering 
that. Personally, I think if your ideas were followed out, Mr. 
Anthony — and they are very good ones — ^why, they would have to 
make some system of allotment. 

Mr. Anthony. If you are going to exempt the bread winners in 
this country from military training you will not have any military 
training except for the sons of the idle rich, 
- Mr. Sanford. Would it do any harm in the beginning if the ex- 
emptions were too liberal, so long as the principle is adopted ? 

Mr. T. W. Miller. So long as the principle is adopted and you get 
the men out and in training. 

Mr. Sanford. From year to year. After that you could change 
your exemptions as experience might direct. 

Mr. T. W. Miller. And if it does hit the type of men that Mr. 
Anthony has indicated it will be all the better for them and better 
for the country. 

I want to thank the committee again, and this is probably the last 
time we will appear before you, imless the chairman wants any fur- 
their enlightenment from us. We are prepared at any time, at our 
headquarters in the Woodward Building, to answer any questions 
you members want of us or to do any service in connection with the 
American Legion's affairs that you care to have us handle. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you. 

(Whereupon at 12.30 o'clock p. m. the committee adjourned.) 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 
Tuesday^ December 16^ 1919. 

The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Daniel R. An- 
thony, jr., presiding. 

Mr. Anthony. The committee has been called together this morn- 
ing to hear representatives of the National Guard with reference to 
legislation desired by them in the pending reorganization bill. 

STATEMENT OF liAJ. A. B. CBITGHFIEU), TTKITED STATES AEUT. 

Mr. Anthony. Major, will you give your name and rank to the 
reporter ? 

Maj. Ckitchfieij>. A. B. Critchfield, major, United States Army. 

Mr. Anthony. What is your present status with the Ohio National 
Ouard? 

Maj. Critchfield. I am discharged from the National Guard and 
am in the Army. 

Mr. Anthony. What connection have you with the National Guard 
aiow? 

Maj. Critchfield. None whatever, officially. 

Mr. Anthony. You are in touch with the National Guard of Ohio? 

Maj. Critchfield. I was out there two weeks ago yesterday. 

Mr. Anthony. What steps are being taken in Ohio to reorganize 
the National Guard? 

Maj. Critchfield. They have had officers out ov^r the State trying 
to reorganize the National Guard and getting in touch with the busi- 
ness interests in the towns and ex-officers of the guard, and we went 
before the legislature and asked for an appropriation of $50,000 for 
recruiting purposes. That is the first time we ever undertook any- 
thing of the kind. I have not learned whether the legislature passed 
the bill or not, but I presume they did, because I see in the press that 
they are sending out officers over the State to do this work. We have 
about 15 companies organized. 

Mr. Anthony. Gov. Cox, of Ohio, has advised me that he is en- 
tirely in sympathy with the idea of reorganizing the National Guard 
•of Ohio on a strong basis. 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir; there would be very little opposition 
to the proposition in the State. The only question is to get somebody 
to do it. 

1867 



1868 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you believe that the requirements set up by th& 
Militia Bureau are such that it is difficult to reorganize the guard ? ' 

Maj. Critchfield. It is not only difficult, Mr. Chairman, but in 
many cases it is impossible. I may use my own town as an example. 
I live in a small town of less than 1,200 population. We have had a 
company there since 1884, and that company served in the Spanish 
War and served in this war. My recollection is that there were only 
a very few men who were not in the company ; everybody belonged 
to the National Guard. We had 27 officers in the Army from that 
town at the time the armistice was signed, and men from that town 
have served on every front in Europe from Dalmatia in Austria ta 
Archangel in Eussia. 

When they came home we started to reorganize the company, and 
I spent several days myself helping them. We got a company of 
about 80 men and they were mustered in. But under the require- 
ments as laid down by the Militia Bureau that company will have 
to go out 9f existence. We can not maintain 100 men in that com- 
pany in that town. There is a bill before the legislature, and I was 
informed yesterday by the president pro tempore of the Senate that 
it would pass, giving us $35,000 to build an armory. They are going 
to build us a fine brick building. But it will be no use to expend 
that money if the present requirements of the Militia Bureau are 
enforced. 

Mr. Anthony. We are considering the Army reorganization, and 
we are upon the section relating to the National Guard. Among^ 
the items proposed are amendments which will permit the organi- 
zation of minimum companies of the guard for a period of one year 
in order to build up companies, after which the minimum is fixed at 
65. Would that be a reasonable requirement? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir; that will make it possible to organize 
companies. I was adjutant general of the State of Ohio for five 
years, and I had to deal a great deal with this organization. One 
of the best companies in the State would run down sometimes until 
it would only have 40 men. In the next year it might go up until it 
would have a waiting list. You can not fix a hard-and-fast rule 
without destroying at some time or other practically every organiza- 
tion. 

Mr. Anthony. Major, do ^rou find a sympathy attitude on the part 
of the War Department at ttis time toward the reorganization of the 
National Guard? 

Maj. Critchfield. The War Department is a good deal like a 
sewing circle; there is a difference of opinion; it depends on who- 
you talk to. They are not all agreed as to what ought to be done,, 
and that is for the best reason in the world, because none of them 
know. 

Mr. Anthony. What are the reijuirements fixed for a company of 
the National Guard before it is paid under the provision in the Army 
appropriation bill? 

Maj. CRrrCHFiEU). They say 100. 

Mr. Anthony. They require 100 men in a National Guard com- 
pany ? 

Maj. CRiTCHFiEii). Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. Are there not a great many companies in the Regu- 
lar Army to-day which have much less than that number of men? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1869 

Maj. CRrrcHFHiLD. I do not think there is one in the Army which 
has that many. 

Mr. Anthony. So they are setting a higher standard for the Na- 
tional Guard than they are maintaining in the Regular Army ? 

Maj. CRiTCHnEiiD. Yes, sir. That law was n\^de for the Army, 
section 17 of the national-defense act. They do not try to comply 
with it; it is impossible for them to comply with it, but they exact 
100 per cent compliance from us. If it does not work in the case of 
the Kegular Army, my notion is that they ought not to try it on the 
" dog." 

]S&. Anthony. Do you think a more sympathetic attitude on the 
part of the War Department toward the National Guard could be 
secured if a National Guard officer were made chief of the Militia 
Bureau? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir. I do not know how sympathetic they 
might be; that does not enter into it. I am not asking their sym- 
pathy. 

Mr. Anthony. Well, then, we will say coordination. Would there 
not be more coordination, cooperation? 

Maj. Critchfield. I might say, yes, but that is not what I want to 
present to the committee. I would like to talk to the committee in 
regard to the Hull bill that was prepared by the National Guard 
Association. The new thing, and the principal thing, the thing that 
we must have is what is contained in sections 27, 28, 29, and 30 of that 
bill. 

Mr. Anthony. What are those sections? 

Maj. Critchpiem). That provides for the National Guard Council 
and the National Guard Bureau. The council provided for there is 
made up of one officer from each State. It is a sort of staff, or ad- 
visory committee, to the chief of the bureau. It would bring together 
the sentiment throughout the country. Each State would be repre- 
sented, there would be a council of experienced men, men who are 
familiar with the service, and it would be a great help in solving the 
problems that would naturally come before that sort of a National 
Guard bureau. 

Mr. Caldwell. Would that council be in session in Washington 
all the time? 

Maj. Critchfield. No; this bill provides that they shall meet 
twice a year, unless the Secretary of War calls them in session at 
some other time. 

Mr. McKenzie. What is the next proposition? 

Maj. Critchfield. The other proposition is one that provides for 
a National Guard Bureau, with a National Guard officer in charge 
of that bureau. So far as those sections are concerned, I want to 
submit to the committee some slight changes that I think ought to 
be made in the language. 

Mr. Caldwell. You have reference to Senate 3424? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes; in section 27, on page 25, you will find it 
reads in this way : 

Sec. 27. National Guard Council. — ^There shaU be a National Guard Council 
composed of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, hereinafter provided for, 
who shall be the president of the council, and one National Guard oflacer from 
each of the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia, who shall 
be appointed by the governor of such State, or by the President for a Territory 



1870 ARMY REORGANIZATIOM". 

or the District of CJolumbla. In the first instance, one-fourth of the members 
of the council shall serve for one year, one-fourth for two years, one-fourth 
for three years, and the balance for four years. The officers first appointed 
to the council shall decide, by drawing lots, which of said Officers shall serve 
for the terms stated in this section. Any member of said council, having 
served as much as four years on said council, shall not be eligible for reap- 
pointment until the expiration of two years, except that officers serving under 
an appointment for a short term as provided for in this section may be re- , 
Appointed for a full term at the expiration of the original appointment : Pro- 
vided, That this provision shall not apply to the Chief of the National Guard. 

That is section 27. In line 2, on page 25, after the word " Colum- 
bia," I want to insert the words " wTio shall have had at least some 
service in the line of the National Guard." That is for this reason : 
The governor of some State might appoint some fellow for political 
reasons or because he was a member of the governor's staff, and this 
man the governor might appoint might have had no experience in 
handling or maintaining a National Guard organization and would 
not know anything about it. I would like to have the language 
read so that it would be required that he should have had some 
service. 

Mr. McKenzie. Would you put in the grade? ... 

Maj. Critchfield. No; I do not care about his rank; it is his 
experience that I want. I do not care whether he is a captain or a 
brigadier general; it is a question of his experience and what he 
knows about it. 

Mr. Dent. What is the object in providing for different periods 
of service in this council ? 

Maj. Critchfieid. The idea in doing that is that they shall not all 
go out at one time, but to make a sort of continuity in there so that 
there would always be some experienced men on the council. If they 
should all go out at once and you should have to bring in an entire 
lot of new men, all the matters which they had been considering 
would have to be thrashed out all over again, and you would not get 
anywhere. 

In section 29 there are two or three amendments which I think 
should be made, and which, it seems to me, are very important. As 
it stands now, section 29 reads : 

Sec. 29. National Guard Bureau. — ^The Militia Bureau of the War Depart- 
ment created by section 81 of the act entitled "An act for making further and 
more effectual provision for the national defense and other purposes," ap- 
proved June 3, 1916, shall, from the date of the approval of this act, be abol- 
ished. There is hereby created a National Guard bureau, which bureau shall 
be under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War and shall not form a 
part of any other bureau, office, or other organization. The chief of said 
bureau shall be appointed by the President, upon the recommendation of the 
National Guard council, from the officers In the National Guard having a rank 
not lower than that of colonel, for a period of four years, and during the time 
such officer shall act as chief of the National Guard bureau he shall have the 
temporary rank of a major general, with the pay and allowance of that of a 
major general of the Regular Army having the same length of service ; and in 
computing the pay and allowance of such officer he shall have credit for 
previous service In the National Guard, National Army, Regular Army, or 
Reserve Corps. The chief of the National Guard bureau shall be relieved for 
cause by the President upon the recommendation of two-thirds of the entire 
membership of the National Guard council. The President, upon the recom- 
mendation of the National Guard council, approved by the Secretary of War, 
shall detail to the National Guard bureau such officers of appropriate rank 
not above the grade of colonel, and such enlisted men as may be required to 
properly administer the affairs of said bureau. Such officers and enlisted mea 



ARMY EEORGANIZATION. 1871 

shall be selected from the National Guard, the National Reserve, or the Officers' 
Reserve Corps upon the recommendation of the National Guard council, and 
shall receive the pay and allowance of officers of the Regular Army having the 
same rank and length of service. Enlisted men detailed to duty with the said 
bureau shall receive such compensation as the council, with the approval of 
the Secretary of War, may fix. Such bureau shall be provided with such clerks 
and stenographers as the National Guard council, with the approval of the 
Secretary of War, may deem necessary, and shall be entitled to have its official 
communications, orders, circulars, and publications transmitted at public ex- 
pense without the payment of postage thereon. For the purpose of coordinat- 
ing the instruction of the National Guard and the Regular Army, the Secre- 
tary of War shall, on the request of the chief of the National Guard bureau, 
detail an officer not above the grade of colonel from the Infantry, Artillery, 
Cavalry, or other arm or department of the Regular Army for duty in such 
bureau. Officers so detailed shall be relieved from such duty on like request. 

On page 2 in this bill, line 23, after the words " National Guard," 
I would insert " with the advice and consent of the Senate." You 
would be creating under this provision a very important office, and 
our notion is that the appointment should be confirmed by the Sen- 
ate, not only for that reason but for another one. 

If the wrong man is appointed, over our protest, we want some- 
body to make our complamt to, so that we may have a hearing, and 
the only way that can be done would be to require that he be con- 
firmed oy the Senate. 

In the same section, in line 24, after the word " operate," we would 
like to have inserted the words " who shall have had not less than 
10 years' service." 

My notion is that it ought to be 15 years, but a good many of our 
people think that 10 years might be sufficient. We do not want a 
man appointed who has not had considerable experience. We want 
to get the right man. 

In section 12 of the bill there is a lot of matter that might as well 
not be in this proposed law. It just simply burdens it. From the 
beginning of the section down to the word ^*' Provided ^^'^ on page 11, 
line 13, that whole proviso might as well be stricken out, because all 
that is necessary is what follows. 

Mr. Anthony. As I understand it, you are taking up the bill cov- 
ering National Guard legislation — ^the entire bill? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. I think what the committee would like to have — 
if the committee wants to go into consideration of the bill in detail, 
that is for the committee to decide — ^but I think what the committee 
really wants is general recommendations in reference to the National 
Guard, covering the vital things. We intend to put in a few sec- 
tions of the national-defense act probably the principal things wo 
should cover in National Guard legislation, and I do not think we 
want to take up a whole bill. 

Maj. Critchfield. What I was trying to get before the committee 
is this: A few sections in this bill cover what is vitally necessary 
about the reorganization and maintenance of the National Guard. 
If you want a National Guard, it is for Congress to provide the way 
to get it. You have to trust the men you have to depend on to fur- 
nish this organization or you are not going to get it, 

Mr. Anthony. Suppose you tell us what you consider the vital 
things necessary to get a National Guard. 1 think a majority of 
the committee wants a strong National Guard, and we would like to 
know what changes in the law are necessary to bring that about. 



1872 ABMY BEORGANlZATIOir. 

Maj. Critchtieuo. We want these four sections enacted into law ; 
that is, sections 27, 28, 29, and 30 of this bill. That is new legisla- 
tion, practically. 

Mr. Anthony. What are the things that those sections cover? 

Maj. CRrrcHFiELD. A National Guard council and a National Guard 
bureau. 

Mr. Crago. This bill we are considering now evidently bases the 
National Guard upon the militia clause of the Constitution ? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes. 

Mr. Crago. You want the National Guard formed under the militia 
clause rather than under the Army clause of the Constituttion ? 

Maj. Critchfield. I do not care which one you use; but this is 
where you are going to get to. The Constitution reserves to the States 
the right to train tne militia. I do not know how you are going to 
get away from that. I know when you do get away from it you are 
going to get away from the democratic principle involved which 
makes it possible to maintain a volunteer force. It can not be done 
under the system by which you maintain West Point. You can not 
maintain an organization in a small town in that way. * - 

Mr. Crago. Why not maintain our National Guard under the Army 
clause of the Constitution and localize it? 

Maj. Critchfield. I have no objection to that; but we were follow- 
inff the constitutional provision. 

Mr. Greene. Permit me to offer this suggestion. If it is organized, 
as Col. Crago suggests, under the Army clause of the Constitution, 
it is not militia, as contemplated in th^ Constitution, but the raising 
of a citizen force. 

Maj. Critchfield. A citizen army. 

Mr. Greene. And the States would reserve the right to train their 
militia. 

Maj. Critchfield. It would be a national army instead of a Na- 
tional Guard. 

Mr. Greene. It would be in the form of a national army. The 
term " National Guard," of course, is a rather modem term, not con- 
templated by the f ramers of the Constitution. 

Maj. Critchfield. It was originated in the Civil War. 

Mr. Greene. Therefore it is not strictly accurate to apply the 
provision in the Constitution reserving to the States the right to 
train militia, which, in the contemplation of the fathers, was the 
local citizenry, because everybody, under the Constitution, is a part 
of the unorganized militia if he is of the proper age, capable of 
bearing arms. There is a distinction.^ 

Maj. Critchfield. Whichever section you take, I am fully con- 
vinced, and time will prove it just as it has proved a lot of things 
which we have been asking this committee for for years, that you 
are not going to get results; it will not be possible to organize and 
maintain these organizations in the States unless they are controlled 
by the men you must depend on to get them. Nobody knows as much 
about our business as we know about it. We are not willing to admit 
that anybody on earth knows as much about the organization of the 
National Guard as the men who have spent their lives in it. I have 
worked at it for 30 years, and I know something about it. But I 
do not pretend to know as much about the Army as Army officers 



ABMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1873 

of experience. At the same time, I am not willing to admit that the 
Anny officer knows as much about my business as I do. I want to 
make that perfectly plain, without any reflection on anybody, be- 
cause that is the situation, and it is a fact. 

Mr. Crago. What we want here is a National Guard that will 
•coordinate with the Army. 

Maj. Critchfield. It has always done that. We did that in 1898, 
and we did it in this war. 

Mr. Crago. From that point of view, we would want to take into 
•consideration the judgment of men versed not only in National 
Guard matters but also in Regular Army matters. 

Maj. Critchfield. Of course. 

Mr. HuiiL. Is not this true, that if you organize under the Na- 
tional Army plan it would increase the expense materially to the 
National Government? 

Maj. Critchfield. I do not know how you would get the funds 
to build an armory for such an outfit as that. They would abso- 
lutely quit. 

Mr. Hull. As a matter of fact, they could not appropriate the 
money to take care of the armories and things like that which they 
are doing to-day. That expense would have to be met by funds from 
the National Government ? 

Maj. Critchfield. Absolutely. 

Mr. HuiiU It would increase the expense very materially to tiie 
National Government. 

Maj. Critchfield. I would think so. 

Mr. Greene. But let us go back of that. What makes up the Na- 
tional Government? It is made of all the people, and the money 
comes out of the same people, and it does not make any difference in 
the final accounting. 

Mr. Hull. It makes a vast difference to the National Government, 
if you unload this expense on the National Government and the peo- 
ple have t*o pay more taxes to meet it. 

Mr. Greene. The people pay taxes in the States ; you simply pass 
the buck. 

Mr. Anthony. The National Guard is the cheapest military force 
or second line of defense which this Grovemment can maintain, is it 
not? 

Maj. Critchfield. Thrite is no doubt about that. When you talk 
about its being a second line of defense, it was the first line of defense 
in France. We had more than 50 per cent of the line, and a good 
<ieal more than 50 per cent of the men on the line were men who had 
been in the National Guard. 

Mr. McEIenzie. The way it strikes me is this : What we are trying 
to do as Members of Congress is not only to provide for a State force, 
but also to provide a force that can be used by the Nation; in other 
words, as an element of national defense. 

We can not expect the States to organize this National Guard or 
militia and pay all the expense and then hold them subject to call at 
the command of the Nation. What we want to do, and I think what 
is the proper thing to do is to have the Government assume a part 
of the financial responsibility, to carry the burden, or to help 
carry it. 



1874 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Take the State of Ohio. They organize a National Guard there 
and have a good National Guard there and have several thousand 
men, well trained, well equipped, and ready to help out in time of 
national emergency. The State of Iowa may say, "We do not need 
any National Guard, we will not provide any National Guard and 
go to that expense." But when we are developing this organization 
along national lines, speaking in national terms, it is perfectl^^ just 
that the State of Iowa should help carry the burden of maintaining 
troops in the State of Ohio, and in that way we want to couple it up 
as a national force. The only thing we are interested in in amending 
the national defense act is this: We thought we solved the question 
of the responsibilitjr of the National Guard in the act; at least it 
worked very well — if there are any weaknesses in the present law, 
if the boys in the National Guard are not getting enough pay, if they 
are not getting fair treatment in the War Department, if there are 
any amendments we can make to the national defence act that will 
encourage the building up of the National Guard in the various 
States as a national force to be used as a matter of national defence, 
that is what we are interested in^ and that is what we want to have 
you point out. 

Maj. Critchfield. That is just what we are interested in, and it 
is what we have been pointing out since 1903. I helped to draft 
the original Dick bill, I wrote the second Dick bill, and I have been 
here annually since that time insisting on legislation for the benefit 
of the National Guard. But we have not got very far yet, and for 
this reason. When this' matter is brought before Congress this 
bogey man is always brought in about dual control. I want to make 
it perfectly clear that there is no such thing. The Constitution fixed 
that originally, and all arms of the service are under the President 
of the Imited States. You can not divide that responsibility. Con- 
gress has provided for two secretaries for the purpose of adminis- 
tration, one in charge of the land forces and the other in charge of 
the naval forces. That is only a matter of administration, and there 
is no dual control. Congress did not authorize any dual control 
when they passed that law, because that is all in the hands of the 
President. We want to bear the same relation to the War Depart- 
ment that the Marine Corps bears to the Navy Department. The 
Marine Corps runs its own business. The Marine Corps is thor- 
oughly competent to do that, as has been demonstrated. We want 
a chance to do that with our organization, and if we do not make 
good then you can take it away from us. We have been asking for 
20 years for that permission, and we are going to keep on asking 
for it until we do get it, and we j^ill have to have it if we are ever 
going to make a success of the proposition. 

Mr. Anthony. What steps are necessary to give you such control 
that 3^ou deem wise at this time? 

Maj. Cricthfield. The provisions contained in the four sections 
of the Hull bill which I referred to — ^sections 27, 28, 29, and 30. 
That provides for a National Guard Council and for a National 
Guard Bureau. Of course, the National Guard Council is an ad- 
visory proposition. Section 29 provides that the National Guard 
shall have control of the Militia Bureau and that there shall be a 
National Guard officer in charge of that bureau. We want the Na- 
tional Guard to have control of the Militia Bureau. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1875 

Mr. Anthony. In its entirety? 

Maj. Crxtchfield. In its entirety; yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. What is the next step after that? What would be 
the duties of this council? 

Maj. Critchfield. They are provided for in this bill. 

Mr. Anthony. But the members have not read the bill. 

Maj. Crxtchfield. I read the section. 

Mr. Anthony. What is it, in brief? 

Maj. Critchfieij). It provides for a council composed of one officer 
from each State, selected by the governor, who shall constitute a 
National Guard Council. It is an advisory board. 

Mr. Anthony. How often would they meet? 

Maj. Critchfield. This bill provides that they shall meet once 
a year unless the Secretary of War sees fit to call them together 
oftener. 

Mr. Anthony. Those are the two main changes? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes. One simply provides for an advisory 
board and the other provides for the control of the Militia Bureau, 
because we think if we have an experienced National Guard officer 
in charge of the bureau when we tell him our troubles he knows what 
they are, because he would have had experience in the National 
Guard. He knows without being told that you can not maintain, 
in 95 per cent of the towns of the United States, a company with a 
minimum membership of 100 men. It is a physical impossibility. 
Do you want to destroy that organization simply because it can not 
get 100 men to comply with a law not made for them but made for 
an organization which does not pretend to conform to its provisions? 

Mr. Anthony. This committee has severely criticized the War 
Department for that very thing. The subcommittee that is drafting 
the reorganization legislation has tentatively agreed upon minimum 
requirements for the National Guard that will do away with these 
drastic regulations you complain of. The subcommittee has also tenta- 
tively agreed on the point that the chief of the Militia Bureau shall 
be a National Guard officer. The only other important recommenda- 
tion you make is in regard to the creation of a National Guard 
council. 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes; I think that is a wise provision. It would 
bring the National Guard of the country together and would give 
them an opportunity, by consultation and conference, to work out 
their problems. I think it would be a great help. 

Mr. Dent. They do not get any pay, do they? 

Mr. Caldwell. They get mileage and pay for not to exceed 60 
days. 

Mr. Anthony. Another suggestion has been made which some of 
the members of the subcommittee look upon with favor. That is, in 
order to familiarize officers of the National Guard with and keep 
them in active touch with the work of the Regular Army and to 
bring about a better understanding between the two bodies, it is pro- 
posed to provide for the detail of a certain number of officers of the 
National Guard to active duty with the Regular Army for periods of 
not more than one year, on full pay and allowance, so that there would 
be a sprinkling of National Guard officers in each staff corps and in the 
other branches of the Army, and these officers Ti^ould have service of 
not more than one year. At the end of that time they would return 



1876 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

to their State organizations and new National Guard officers would 
replace them in those details to the Eegular Army. In your opinion, 
would that be a good or a bad idea? 

Maj. Critchfield. I think that is a very good idea. Of course, it 
will never be our province to ask for detail to the General Staff. 
If the War Department and Congress see fit to make such a provi- 
sion, that is all right; it might be a good thing for the National 
Guard and the Army if that were done. 

Mr. Anthony. When I referred to the staff corps I meant the 
staff departments. 

Maj. Critchfield. I would so a little further than that. My 
notion is that every officer of the National Guard, before they are 
recognized by the Federal Government as a part of the Organized 
Militia, should go through a school, for instance, such as the school 
at Camp Benning, referring now to the Infantry. I think he should 
take a course there of six months. I talked to Col. Malone about the 
length of time it would require, and he said probably from six to 
nine months. That would be the best training an officer could pos- 
sibly get, because I have been with that school ever since it was 
established, and I do not know of anything better for the officers of 
the National Guard — or the Army either — than to attend that school. 

Mr. Anthony. You believe in giving the National Guard training 
in the basic training schools ? 

Maj. Critchfield. And on equal terms. I do not want a major 
or a colonel sent down there on a captain's pay. That is an unfortu- 
nate provision in the present law. 

Mr. Greene. I was a National Guard officer for a number of yeara, 
and wound up my experience in 1898, and am intensely sympathetic 
with the National Guard idea. But I think, like anyoody who had 
any experience in it at all and studied the whys and wherefores at 
the time and since, I am persuaded that the fundamental organiza- 
tion of the National Guard is wrong. That does not, of course, 
reflect upon the spirit of the men in it, nor their splendid patriotic 
intentions, nor the peculiar character of self-sacrifice that the Na- 
tional Guard officer has to make in order to support himself in a 
civil occupation, and at the same time give this extra time and en- 
ergy to his Government for the sake of improving its military force. 

You spoke in the first place of allying the National Guard with 
its relation to the Army in the same capacity 'that the Marine Corps 
is allied with the Navy. 

Maj. Critchfield. Not exactly. 

Mr. Greene. With the same relationship? 

Maj. Critchfield. As far as management is concerned; yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. Does not that by its very nature imply that the two 
forces must be on the same foundation? That is to say, the Marine 
Corps is a national institution, and its authority and administration 
are all centered in the National Government. There is not any 
duality of control or distribution of authority or of responsibility to 
48 State governments, or any dependence on 48 State governments 
for support or financing. It is all done at Washington ; and there- 
fore the coordination and cooperation of the Marine Corps with the 
Navy is a simple proposition, because the two elements come from 
those two organizations, being part of a common structure. If we 
still continue the National Guard in its present relationship to the 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1877 

48 States and at the same time try to make it a part of the national 
administration, we are up against the bogey of dual control. 

Maj. Critchfield. That is all it is, a Iwgey; that is pure imagina- 
tion and invention. 

Mr. Greene. What is jour experience about this ? The standard 
of any national organization has either got to be one complete, uni- 
form, standard or else that organization is always bearing the handi- 
<;ap of the weaker vessels in it. 

Maj. Critchfield. That would apply to vessels. 

Mr. Greene. Does it not apply to men in their organization? 

Maj. Critchfield. It might apply to men, too. 

Mr. Greene. In some States in the Nation it is the experience of 
N'ational Guard men that they meet with very enthusiastic and gen- 
erous public response, and that that public response is reflected in 
the acts of the legislature, which not only creates the organizations 
in the first place but provide the means for their support. In other 
States it is equally notorious that there is anything from a policy 
of more or less indifference to out-and-out neglect; is that not truel 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. The result is that notwithstanding the Federal Gov- 
•ernment can take hold of this organization in a State where is in- 
difference or neglect they can only carry it as far as the Federal 
appropriation and opportunity and recognition will go. The State 
<ioes not meet it half way. But under one proposition for a National 
<jruard all these organizations are swept into a nominal National 
Guard, although they reflect 48 different and varying conditions as 
io the support and efficiency of the organizations that the 48 States 
l^rovide for; is that not true? 

Maj. Critchfield. I can not a^ee to let you speak for'me on that. 

Mr. Greene. I am asking you if that is not true? 

Maj. Critchfield. If it needs correction you leave it to us to cor- 
rect, because we can do it better than anybody else. If you want to 
change the condition you refer to you can not put it in better hands 
to make the change than in the hands of the fellows who know 
4ill about it. 

Mr. Greene. I would like to just get an answer to the question 
as to whether it is not true that there are as many shades of organi- 
sation and efficiency in the National Guard as there are of local 
State control? 

Maj. Critchfield. There is just as much variation in the guard as 
in the Army. ... 

Mr. Crago. As I understand it, Maj. Critchfield takes this position, 
that if you put the whole problem in the hands of National Guard 
officers they will go into these States and aid in getting a uniform 
system and correct 

Maj. -Critchfield (intorposing). Correct the very things Mr. 
Greene is complaining about. 

Mr. Crago. That we would have the National Guard in the control 
of National Guard officers, and that they would correct the inequali- 
ties among the States. 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. Before the federalization did they not have the same 
opportunity? 

150187— 2a-voL 2 6 



1878 ABMY EEOBGANIZATION. 

Maj. Critchfield. We have never had that opportunity. 

Mr. Greene, Because that is a local matter. 

Maj. Critchfield. What could have Ohio had to do with the Na- 
tional Guard of Indiana? 

Mr. Greene. That is not the point. I say if you allow only such 
authority and control as will enable you to bring your own State up 
to the national standard, what can the National Government give you 
in the way of authority to do that when it is entirely a matter of your 
Ohio or Indiana citizenship ? If you have not influence enough with 
your legislators to have that rlone, how can the Federal Government 
give you that influence? 

Maj. Critchfieu). Whenever we can coordinate our efforts and get 
together we can help the fellow who is behind ; we can help bring him 
up, and we know how to do it. We know how to provide the means- 
for that very purpose. But as long as we are separated and we can 
not even consult or get a recommendation to headquarters, because it 
dies on the road somewhere, we are never going to get anywhere. 

Mr. Greene. The sinews of war are money 

Maj. Critchfield (interposing). Yes; I know that, and the States 
are paying ten times as much as the Government for this organization. 

Mr. Greene. That brings it up to a point I want to ask you about^ 
and that is are all the States paying on a uniform basis, propor- 
tionately ? 

Maj. Critchfield. I do not think so. 

Mr. Greene. That is what we are coming to. Is there not a possi- 
bility of the correction of that if, as Col. Crago suggested to you, the 
National Guard is organized under the Army clause of the Constitu- 
tion instead of the militia clause, and have the appropriations dealt 
out in proportion to the 48 States, and the 48 States, so far as any 4S 
States or localities can, hold to a national standard of organization 
and efficiency based upon that equal distribution of money? 

Maj. Critchfield. That is what this bill provides for. 

Mr. Greene. How can you do that under the old militia clause of 
the Constitution? 

Maj. Critchfield. We are organized under the militia clause of the 
Constitution. Now, for the help that the Federal Government gives 
us in furnishing arms and materials we agree to, and we do, follow 
the organization of the Army ; we follow it in drill, in organization 
of every branch of the service, and conform in training — which is 
reserved to the States — ^to that prescribed by the War Departments 
So that when we come together with the Army, as we have on numer- 
ous occasions, especially in 1898, and again in 1917, we function with 
them immediately. There is no trouble about it at all, and the bogey 
man of dual control disappears. There is nothing to that. You can 
apportion that money under the militia section of the Constitution 
as well as under the Army section, as it has been done and is being^ 
» done now and will be done in the future, because my notion is that 
the States will always have some men to maintain a National Guards 

Mr. Greene. I can not see how we start on the same premise. I 
am trying to get back to the fact that the Federal Government only 
gives each State its proportion of the aid it is giving for this purpose^ 

Maj. Critchfield. That is the way it ought to be. 



\ ^-. 

\ 

V 



ARMY RBORGANIZATIOK. 

Mr. Greene. Then, if you are convinced of that, th\ /" 

to control is the thing to be expressed on the pages of the 
account. 

Maj. Critchfieid. It would be impossible for a State like x 
to maintain a guard like New York. 

Mr. Greene. We do not expect it to do that, in numbers. 

Maj. CRrrcETFiEiiD. For that reason it must be based on the nmnber 
of men maintained. 

Mr. Greene. Nobody expects Nievada to maintain a National 
Guard as effectiveljr as the State of New York. But the question is 
wOl Nevada maintain any National Guard at all, and what is the real 
history of Nevada about that ? 

Maj. Critchfield. She has none. 

Mr. Greene. But how are you going to maintain an organization 
in Nevada ? Under a central treasury, Nevada would have her pro- 
portion from the central treasury and the men in Nevada who are 
willing to belong to the National Guard would not have to depend 
upon the State legislature. They would belong to Uncle Sam's Na- 
tional Guard, and would get Uncle Sam's money. 

Maj. CRrrcHFiELD. They do not have to depend on that now. 

Mr. CALDWEUi. The Constitution says we can not do it. 

Mr. Greene. The Constitution does not say that; it depends upon 
whether we are organized under the militia clause or whether we 
are organized under the war clause of the Federal Constitution. 

Mr. McKenzie. Major, I want to ask you a question, suggested by 
a question of Mr. Greene in regard to the National Guard of the 
48 different States, certain of them being strong and others being 
weak. If I understand your position, your idea is that if the man- 
agement of the National Guard were turned over to a bureau con- 
trolled by National Guard officers you will go out into these States 
where the National Guard is below par and undertake to bring it up. 
In other words, you will try tox5ure the patient? 

Mr. CRrrcHFiEU). Absolutely. 

Mr. McKenzie. There is a good deal of difference sometimes in 
the treatment of a patient, whether or not the physician wants the 
patient to recover or to die. 

Maj. Critchfield. There is a whole lot of difference. 

Mr. McKenzie. That is your position, is it? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. Do you undertake to say if you are given by law a 
National Guard council and the other provisions you suggest here, 
that the influence of the people who represent 47 States can be 
brought to bear upon any one of the 48 States to make it change its 
internal, domestic, local policy in regard to what its legislaure will 
do in the matter of appropriations? 

Maj. Critchfield. I would say we could give you instances where 
it has been done, although we are not in such a position to do it di- 
rectly as we would be if we had this law. 

Mr. Greene. Do you think that is possible? 

Maj. Critchfield. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. I know of one State in the Union that used to signify 
its independence and presently would resent at the drop of the hat 
the other 47 States coming in and telling it how to make its appro- 



1878. 

ABMY REORGANIZATION". 

priations, and I think there are other States that would do the 
same thing. It seems to me you would avoid the possibility of fric- 
tion if you all drew out of a common treasury and did not depend 
on the local support. 

Maj. Critchfield. That would be all right. That is a question of 

fossibility. Our experience has been that it took all we could beg, 
orrow, or steal from both the Federal and State Governments to 
maintain ourselves. 

Mr. Greene. Do you not think it is good philosophj^ that a national 
defense that depends upon the volunteer contribution of any one 
State is not a national defense ? 

Maj. Critchfield. No; I would not agree to that. 

Mr. LaGuardia. This is not quite clear to me, Major. You say 
sections 27, 28, 29, and 30 are absolutely essential no matter what law 
is put into effect for the National Guard. Are not the provisions of 
section 27 creating a National Guard council composed of a chief of 
the National Guard Bureau and one representative from each State 
:and Territory rather a novel creation in any military institution ? 

Maj. Critchfield. I do not know how you would reduce it below 
that. That is the minimum, one representative from each State. 

Mr. LaGuardia. You said that would make it democratic. 

Maj. Critciifield. That would make it a most democratic organiza- 
tion. These organizations are in our homes. The people that com- 
pose these organizations are our neighbors; they are our daily asso- 
ciates; we know how to deal with them, and nobody else does. 

Mr. LaGuardia. Do you think it would be democratic to have 
this council composed in that way, by which you would give the 
State of New York the same representation as you would give to the 
State of Delaware or the State of Nevada or the State of Arizona? 

Maj. Critchfield. They have the same in the Senate. The idea 
is to have somebody from each community who knows the condi- 
tions at home. He has his troubles and it is up to the organization 
to help him solve them. I wish the size could be cut down, but I 
do not know how to do it, and at the same time have all the States 
represented. 

Mr. LaGtjardia. Is not your recall provision for a chief of the 
National Guard Bureau rather novel in a military institution? 

Maj. Critchfield. How is that? 

Mr. LaGuardia. Under the provisions of your bill the chief of 
the National Guard Bureau can be recalled on the petition of three- 
quarters of the council. 

Maj. Critchfield. I think that would be all right. I do not 
know of any reason why it should not be that way ; if he does not 
make good we ought to have the right to recommend somebody else 
to be appointed. That is all there is to it. 

Mr. LaGuardia. Was not the same provision tried in the Kerensky 
Army? 

Maj. Critchfield. We did not get it from them. We are older 
than they are. 

Mr. LaGuardia. We want to help the National Guard. 

Maj. Critchfield. Let me tell you how to do it. Give us a chance 
to show you what we can do. We come before you year after year 
asking for these things. There is a lot of language in this bill I 



ARMY REORGANIZATION*. 1881 

helped to write in 1910 still in the law of to-day. But you would ber 
surprised to see how some language in the law absolutely destroys 
it. Take, for instance, the National Defense Act. I would like to 
show you how that works, especially so far as section 111 is con- 
cerned. 

Mr. LaGtuardia. I fear that your provision in section 27 in- 
stead of creating a military council will just make that gathering a 
sort of annual convention. 

Maj. Crxtchfibld. I do not care what you call it; you can call it 
a debating society, if you like. It is results that I want. That is 
the way to get them. 

Mr. LaGuardia. Would it not be better to take an officer from 
each State and spend the same amount of money in sending him 
to an Army school? 

Maj. Crttchfield. What he would learn in the council would help 
him organize a National Guard company. In an Army school^ 
never. 

Mr. LaGuardia. He would not learn anything there. 

Maj. CRiTCHriELD. But what he would get there would help hinm 
organize a National Guard company. 

Mr. LaGuardia. But, as I said before, that sort of thing wass 
tried in the Kerensky Army and it lasted just six months. 

Maj. Critchfield. I do not know anything about Kerensky, Wei 
are older than that. -He probably stole it from us. 

Mr. LaGuardia. It did not work. 

Maj. Critchfield. Do not tell me this thing does not work, be- 
cause I want to call your attention to something right there. In 
1848 the German Empire, which in 1916 was claimed around this 
table to be the greatest military organization in the world, adopted 
our system absolutely, and the German Army was organized under 
the National-Guard system, with the addition of compulsory serv* 
ice; that is all there was to it. 

Mr. LaGuardia. You do not mean to say that the German Army 
bad a council which, by a two-thirds or a three-quarters vote, coula 
recall or eliminate a chief of staff? 

Maj. Critchfield. Absolutely no. 

Mr. LaGuardia. Then your comparison does not hold. 

Maj. Critchfield. It does hold. 

Mr. LaGuardia. How? 

Maj. Critchfield. I am talking about organization. This does 
not provide for the organization; this provides for control. You ga 
back to the section providing for the organization and see if that has- 
not been in the German constitution since 1848. 

Mr. LaGuardia. I am talking about the council and the recall 
provision in regard to the chief of the Militia Bureau. 

Maj. Critchfield. That is a new thing, and we are sure it will 
work. We ask you to give us a chance. 

Mr. LaGuardia. Take a State like Pennsylvania or States like* 
Massachusetts and New York, where each State has a small-sized 
army in its National Guard. Under this plan you would send thei 
representatives from those States to a convention with an equal 
number of representatives from States like Nevada and Arizona, 
where the representatives from these small States with practicalljr 



1882 ARMY EEOBGANIZATION^. 

no National Guard organization will control the whole National 
Guard. 

Maj. Ckitchfield. Absolutely no; they do not control anything. 
They only make recommendations. 

Mr. Oi-NEY. Are you in favor of action by this committee provid- 
ing for the federalization of the National Guard — ^that is, in so far 
as possible? 

Maj. Critchfielj). I wrote the first section that was ever offered 
on that subject and tried to get it through in 1908. One Judge 
Advocate General said it was constitutional, and his successor de- 
clared that it was unconstitutional. That was section 6 of the 
act of 1908. 

Mr. Hull. There is one thing which I think this conmiittoe is con- 
cemed about, and I would like to have your opinion on it. If we 
should give you a National Guard bureau, how many troops can you 
organize, say, in two or three years? 

Maj. Critchfield. Mr. Hull, I would not know how to guess at 
that. 

Mr. Hull. I do not want you to do that. I would like to have 
your opinion. 

Maj. Critchfield. This is the best opinion I can give you on that 
line. If you will give ua this provision as set out in the four sec- 
tions in regard to organization and control immediately, we will be 
able to get back into the service and help organize this body of 
men, a large number of old, experienced oflacers who are simply say- 
ing to-day, " I have had mine, I have had enough, I will have noth- 
ing more to do with it." When they see that the thing is going to 
be different and that it will be reorganized and that their service will 
count for something, we can get them in, and that means the success of 
the organization. But if we have to reorganize and go out after 
new material, we would have a lot of trouble and it would take a 
long time to do that. We are trying to make a provision that will 
Attract the older officers and get them back in again. 

Mr. Hull. Then your contention is this, that to make a success 
of the National Guard we have got to create a bureau with a Na- 
tional Guard officer at the head of it and in addition to that you 
want a National Guard counciL Those two features are all you 
want; is that it? 

Maj. Critchfield. So far as the council is concerned, that is only 
an advisory proposition. 

. Mr. HuMi. As a matter of fact, have you figured on the expense 
of that to the Government? 

Maj. CRircHFiELD. No; I have not. 

Mr. Hull. Somebody ought to have the figures on the expense con- 
nected with those things. 

Maj. Cmtchfield. Col. Gillette may have those figures. 

Mr. Hull. We are confronted with this proposition that we have 
got to lower the expenses of the Army and cut way down on that. 
We may just as well face that fact, and when men come before us 
with propositions, as you have, they must show what those proposi- 
tions are going to cost We want to know the cost. 

Maj. CRrrcHFiELD. I think Col. Gillette will have that. I expect 
thev have figured that out. 

]M[r. Anthony. I think we have covered the salient pomts. 



ABHT BEOBGANIZATIOK. 1883 

Mr. McKenzee. You have heard it stated by Mr. Anthony what 
^e proposed to do. First, we propose to give you a national officer 
at the head o£ the Militia Bureau. 

Maj. Critchfield. I hope so. 

Mr. McKenzib. Secondly, we propose to reduce the maximum size 
of the National Guard company; third, we propose to allow a certain 
number — several hundred — National Guard officers to serve in the 
Regular Establishment for at least a year, and then, when the officers 
ivho have served a year have completed their year's service, others 
will go in for another year. If we do those three things, do you not 
think it will be a great help to the National Guard ? 

Maj. CRiTCHFiEiiD. There is no doubt about it. 

Mr. McKenzie. You would not seriously object if we were to pass 
over, perhaps until the next Congress, to .see how those things worked 
out, your proposition for the creation of this council? I imagine 
that will raise a good deal of discussion and probably have a good 
•deal of opposition. If you have a friend at court down here, these 
men who would represent you on the council would come down here 
and testify as to the situation in the respective States, and that mat- 
ter would no doubt be taken care of. 

Maj. CRrrcHFiELD. In answer to that I want to say the guard has 
solved a good many problems without the assistance of the Govern- 
ment or the States either, and no doubt that would continue to be 
•done if we have control of this bureau. We would know when we 
receive an order, whoever is in charge, whether that order is going 
to make or break the guard. If it is going to break, it would not be 
done. We would not have any orders or regulations that could not be 
complied with by the Army and reguire the National Guard to com- 
ply with them. Anything that will not work in the Army ought 
not to be expected to be done by the National Guard. An officer in 
the National Guard must furnish 100 men in a company, he must do 
everything the Eegular Army does and a few more things besides, 
:and he only gets 20 per cent of the pay. The other fellow furnishes 
nothing and he is on full pay. After awhile he retires, and finally 
he is buried in Arlington. Do not exact of the 20 per cent men 100 
per cent efficiency, but give the National Guard man some kind of a 
-square deal. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. OEIT. TESSE McI. CAETEB, CHIEF HIIITIA 
BTTKEATT, ACCOMPAHIED BY COl. JOHN W. HEAVET, ASSISTANT 
CHIEF. 

Mr. Anthont. Gen. Carter, we will be glad to hear you now. You 
may proceed, if you desire, and make a general statement first. 

Gen. Carter. "Mr. Chairman, the militia system is woven into the 
fabric of our Government by the Constitution. I conceive that the 
act of June 3, 1916, was an effort on the part of the Congress to 
make it possible to use the militia for all Federal purposes and to 
make the National Guard or militia suitable for that use. 

In administering the affairs of the Militia Bureau I have en- 
deavored to meet the needs of the States as far as practicable with- 
out sacrificing the interiests of the National Government. The Fed- 
eral Government is spending a good many million dollars a year in 



1884 ABMY REOBGANlZATIOlSr. 

the equipment and pay and training of the National Guard and 
should get a fair return for that money. We have no difficulty in 
the majority of instances in getting the State troops to agree to do 
what is necessary to make this. force efficient for Federal purposes, 
and we have gone as far as we could to meet their needs. We have 
been conciliatory when it did not mean the sacrifice of the interests 
of the Federal Government. 

There are times, however, when the two interests clash, and it has 
been my assumption that it was my duty to see that the Federal Gov- 
ernment's interests did not suffer. 

I want to speak particularly with reference to the size of the in- 
fantry company, which has been brought up in this hearing. AVhen 
we began the organization of the National Guard in 1916 under the 
provisions of the national defense act we foimd the companies vary- 
ing in strength from 20 to 75 or 100. In order to have a homogeneous 
force capable of training and development, we prescribed that the 
minimum of an infantry company should be 65 men and that no in- 
fantry companies should be recognized short of that strength or 
maintained with less strength than that. 

The same order that carried that regulation prescribed that after 
June 30, 1917, an infantry company should be not less than 83 men^ 
and that after June 30, 1918, an infantry company should be not less 
than 100 men, and the infantry which was drafted into the Federal 
Service from the National Guard averaged 97 men per company. 
The infantry organized during the war while the old National (juard 
was overseas was brought up to a strength of 100 men. Many of 
those companies had considerably over 100 men. We had no diffi- 
culty in maintaining those units at a strength of 100 men. The 
strength of an infantry company in modern war must be consider- 
ably over 200 men. 

If we organize an infantry company at a less strength than 100 
men we have to take in, in time of war, such a large proportion of 
green men that the value of the unit is very much decreased — ^the 
influx is more than the number of trained men. So that with com- 
panies of 100 men we can have a fairly efficient organization, but 
if we reduce the size to 65 men and have to take in 2 green men 
for every trained man the value of the unit to the Federal Govern- 
ment will be practically nothing until it has been trained. 

We tried to arrange for the formation of units in different locali- 
ties by providing that platoons might be organized in towns which 
could not support a company of 100 men. 

Mr. McKenzie. Of course, we say now that after our experience 
in this war an infantry company ought to be composed of 200 or 250 
men. We believed for many years that a company of 100 men was an 
efficient unit. Is it not altogether possible that military men may 
change their minds about the size ox the company, and is it not pos- 
sible that any arbitrary figure, such as 65 or 100 is only relatively 
valuable, and is not an absolute proposition that can not be changed, 
and that we should not confijie ourselves to reasoning upon that one 
basis alone. ^ " ^ 

Gen. Carter. The size of a company is fixed by the duty imposed 
upon it. We have now a number of arms that did not exist until 
this war began, such as trench mortars, the 37-millimeter guns, the 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 1885 

rifle grenade, and we have to make provision for the use of those 
arms# The method of warfare determines the organization of the 
force you are going to use, and when the method of warfare is 
changed we may have to come to a smaller company, but with the 
present equipment that company is the size we have to use. 

We have followed the law strictly. The law requires that the 
National Guard shall be organized as is prescribed for the Regular 
Army, under the act of June 3, 1916, which is a continuing law with 
respect to the Military Establishment of the United States, and it 
has been prescribed that the military strength for the Infantry com- 
pany shall be 100 men. That is for the Regular Army. We are re- 
quired by the terms of the same act to have the same organization 
in the National Guard as in the Regular Army, and we have been 
endeavoring to get that by trying to meet the needs of the small com- 
munities by providing for these platoons. 

There is an advantage in the platoon system. In modem war the 
efficiency of the Infantry branch of the Army depends upon the 
efficiency of the platoon leader. If he is placed on his own initiative 
in command of his organization, he develops initiative, he learns how 
to handle men, he becomes used to being put on " his own," and he 
becomes an efficient officer; whereas if this man is trained in such 
a way that he is never placed upon his own initiative he will never 
develop into a trained, competent leader, which is the object of his 
training. 

I heard the chairman say that the subcommittee had determined to 
report a bill providing for reducing the strength of the company. 
I believe that would m a decided step backward. But if the com- 
mittee is going to do that I would like to ask that they make a pro- 
vision that where a small company is enlisted there shall be enlisted 
with that company the necessary number of men in the reserve to 
bring that company up to the required strength, and assign the 
reserve to that company. 

Mr. McKenzie. I will say. General, that that plan was only to be 
effective for one year in order to give them an opportunity to 
get started. 

Gren. Carter. I want to give you a little of my own experience 
along that line. When I came back to the Militia Bureau, after 
having commanded the Eleventh Division, I found orders from the 
Secretary of War not to proceed further with the organization of 
the National Guard pendmg the formulation of a military policy 
by Congress. That was about the middle of February. On the 4th 
of March Congress adjourned without having passed the Army 
appropriation bill or having decided upon any military policy. 

There had been a demand from a number of States for National 
Guard units to take care of the situation that existed in the States. 
They had no laws for the formation of State constabulary or State 
police forces, and they demanded authority to enable them to equip 
the forces that they were going to raise for whatever purpose they 
needed them, and on the 1st of March I asked the Secretary to per- 
mit me to organize in these States some Infantry regiments pending 
the decision of Congress as to a military policy. I represented to 
him that my appropriations were very limited, ,and asked if I could 
not organize these companies at a strength of 65 in order that they 
might be very quickly formed. 



1886 ABMY REOEGANIZATIOK". 

We authorized 187 such companies. We used our best endeavors 
to get them enlisted. We rendered them all the assistance we could, 
ana yet, up until about a month ago, only 65 of those companies had 
been organized, so that you are not going to find that a provision 
for 65-men companies will relieve the situation of which National 
Guard officers are complaining. It is a decided step backward in 
efficiency, and I do not believe it will greatly increase the number 
of units we can get into the service. 

Mr. Olney. Do you favor the establishment of a platoon system? 

Gen. Carter. Yes, sir ; instead of a small company I would favor 
platoons in small towns. 

Mr. Olney. By that method your platoons will hold potential 
officers? 

Gen. Carter. I just explained he would get a far better training. 
The greatest difficulty in reorganizing the National Guard is in get- 
ting recruits. Just lately we have had a very considerable increase 
in the number of new units formed under Federal recognition. I 
attribute that to the fact that the men who have returned from over- 
seas service are getting over their feeling of satiety, and of having 
too much of military work, and are coming back again. 

My experience in the Regular Army is that after man has served 
for a three-year enlistment and is approaching the period of his dis- 
charge, he would announce to all his friends that he had enough, but 
two or three months after his discharge he would write back to know 
if his old place was not open. So it is with these men. They are get- 
ting the feeling that thej would like to get back to their old units, 
and they have that patriotism that compels them to come back and 
serve. 

It seems to me that the National Guard system devised in the law 
of June 3, 1916, is the best that we have ever had. It is the best we 
can have as long as we depend upon voluntary enlistment. That is 
at the base of all of our military troubles. The National Guard, de- 
veloped by officers that are sympathetic with it and acquainted with 
its needs can be made a truly efficient force. I believe that the best 
thing that could be done for the military interests of the. United 
States would be to adopt universal training and impose an equality of 
obligation on all citizens, and not depend upon a man's volunteering 
to serve in time of stress, and then providing that the men who go out 
of training camps and voluntarily enlist in the National Guard to 
continue their training for service, would have their period of liabil- 
ity for service decreased. 

For instance, if you provide that after going through a training 
camp a man should be held on the rolls and liable to service for five 
years, and that having enlisted in the National Guard and obtained 
an honorable discharge, his period of liability shall be reduced to 
three years, you would find tnat you would get the best young men 
that could be enlisted in the National Guard. You will have a force 
that is organized and completely equipped, with the local pride that 
Gen. Martin spoke about. 

Mr. McKbnzib. That plan involves the great objection that has 
been raised to compulsory universal training by including training 
service ? 

Gen. Cartehl No ; that is entirely voluntary service on the part of 
the men. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1887 

Mr. McKbnzie. I understood you to say that he could go into th© 
reserve for five years^ and if he went in the National Guard he would 
go in for three years. 

Gen. Carter. I meant to say he would be held on the rolls available 
for service until Congress directed that he should be used. Pre- 
sumably, when we went to war, he would be the man drafted since 
the Federal Government has trained him for that purpose, and he 
would be liai>le to the draft in time of war, when authorized by Con- 
gress, for a certain period of years. If we could get that kind of a 
man in the National Guard it would greatly enhance the value of the 

fuard because it would give the officers an opportunity to do much 
igher military work than thev have now. The drudgery of recruit 
training would be done away with, the men would have a more in- 
spiring task, and you would find they would make very much more 
rapid progress, and the soldiers would be kept on edge, and they could 
mobilize at any point on our frontiers in two weeks. I have figured 
that if such forces could be organized, the accommodations now ex- 
isting in the States would enable us to have in the National Guard 
some 425,000 men, and with what you propose to put in the Regular 
Army, that woulS be a force certainly large enough for all emer- 
gencies. 

At the request of the chairman of the Military Committee of 
the Senate I made a report on the Frelinghuysen bill, which I under- 
stand is the same as the one you now have under consideration, and 
if the chairman will permit I would like to read it, because it ex- 
presses my views on this bill. 
Mr. Anthony. We will be very glad to have you read it. 
Gen. Carter (reading) : 

The principal Items of new legislation carried by the bill are in regard to the 
National Guard Council the National Guard Bureau and compulsory physical 
training in schools. 

It is believed that to place the development of the National Guard under any 
other than trained officers of the Regular Army who are in touch with the needs 
of the Federal Government, in entire sympathy with the development of the 
guard to the end that it may be a useful Federal agency, would be a decided 
step backward. Your attention is Invited to the fact that the National Guard 
was under the entire control of the States and of National Guard officers from 
the time of the Revolution until approximately 1903, a period of 127 years, and 
that during that period there was little in its history to commend it as a mili- 
tary asset to the Federal Government. In 1898, records of the National Guard, 
or Organized Militia, show It to have been composed of organizations varying 
in strength with diverse uniforms and equipment, and composed of men the 
great percentage of whom were physically unfit for military service. There 
was nothing like uniformity In clothing, equipment, organization, or anything 
else necessary in the maintenance of a modern army. 

From 1903 until 1917 the National Guard has been more or less under the 
control of a Federal bureau administered by a Regular Army officer* The prog- 
ress during that regime has far exceeded that made while the States had con- 
trol of this force. The 17 divisions of the National Guard which fought over- 
seas In the recent World War are evidence of what has been accomplished by 
the supervision of Regular officers over a force which for 127 years of our his- 
tory had proved nothing but a disappointment. We have only to look back to 
those years Immediately preceding the assumption of this control by the Regular 
Establishment to see the field-training period a week of debauchery and Idle- 
ness; the military benefit derived from such encampments was absolutely nil. 
A visit to any of the recent camps of the National Guard under Federal control 
w^lll show that a vast amount of military work is now accomplished during these 
periods which were formerly devoted to a riotous life and a general good time. 

The provisions of the bill under consideration, with respect to the National 
Ouard Council, place 48 National Guard officers, one from each State, in such a 



1888 ARMY REORGANIZATIONS'. 

position as to menace tlie authority and usurp the functions of the Secretary of 
War. 

The records of the Militia Bureau conclusively demonstrate the pernicious 
influence of the meddling of Individual States in this perfecting of a Federal 
military organizaton. The provisions of the bill, with respect to the National 
Guard Council and the National Guard Bureau, were evidently drawn up wltli 
a desire to give to the National Guard officers a greater voice in the control of 
the Nation's military affairs. It is believed that the provisions of the bill would 
result in further divorcing the interests of the Regular Army and the National 
Guard and would tend to lack of cooperation, jealousy, and intrigue, and would 
remove from the National Guard the helpful influence of those Regular officers 
who are now earnestly working fo^ its proper development. It is believed that 
provisions for the detail of a small number of National Guard officers to the 
General Staff of the Army would give to the National Guard the opportunity 
that they desire in formulating military policies and would tend to cooperation,, 
mutual understanding, and increased efficiency in both services. 

My experience as Chief of the Militia Bureau has convinced me that one of 
the greatest obstacles to efficiency in the National Guard is the failure of 
States to appoint or elect properly qualified military men as adjutants general 
of the States. It Is believed that this could be eliminated to a very great ex« 
tent by authorizing the Secretary of War, upon the request of the governor, to 
detail an officer of the Army to act as the adjucant general of a State. 

I want to say parenthetically that this does not apply to all adju- 
tant generals. We have some most efficient men in that office, men of 
military experience. 

With respect to compulsory physical training in schools, your attention is 
invited to the fact that public schools are entirely under State control, and the 
Federal Government is without power to prescribe the curriculum, or to enforce 
a requirement for physical or other special training in these schools. The cost 
of the arrangement as outlined in the bill would be stupendous as compared 
with the military benefit to be derived from the training received. 

It is believed that the provisions of the act of June 3, 1916, are the best ever 
made in the interest of the development of the National Guard. Under its 
application for a little more- than a year the National Guard furnished 12,123 
officers and more than 367,000 enlisted men, organized into 17 divisions for 
service overseas. This law has not yet been thoroughly tried out, but its 
merit is shown in the results obtained. It would seem the part of wisdom to 
maintain the good features of that act and to modify those features which» 
during its application, have been found to be imperfect or deficient. 

I would call your attention to the letter of the Secretary of War, dated 
September 30, 1919, to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, 
United States Senate, upon the subject of "Amendments to the act of June 3, 
1916 — ^the national defense act." This letter sets forth the changes which, in- 
the opinion of this bureau, should be adopted at the present time. 

I believe it to be proper to Invite your attention to the fact that the great 
amount of complaints presented to your committee at the hearings upon this 
Ibill are due to feelings of hostility, unfair treatment, and injured feelings which 
arose after the National Guard was drafted into the Federal service, during 
the time when the Militia Bureau had no control over them, and were the 
result of a hasty preparation for war, when the interests of the Government 
and not the feelings of individuals had to be given first consideration. The 
Militia Bureau in the past has striven faithfully to carry out the provisions of 
the laws enacted by Congress and sympathizes with those members of the 
National Guard who conceive that they have received unjust treatment during 
their Federal service. The establishment of a National Guard Bureau will not 
eradicate the faults complained of, nor prove a remedy for the regrettable indi- 
vidual instances brought to the attention of your committee during its hearings. 

In conclusion I desire to call your attention to some of the inconsistent and 
apparently unconstitutional provisions of this bill. 

Section 14 provides that vacancies shall be filled on the nomination of certain 
military commanders. The appointment of officers of the militia is reserved 
to the governors of States by the provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Con- 
stitution of the United States. 

Secttons 28 and 24 direct issues to be made without providing the means of 
procurement 



ABM7 BEOBGANIZATIOlir, 1889 

Section 36 provides payment for each drill attended by an enlisted man of the 
Nlitional Guard of 25 per cent of the initial monthly pay of enlisted men of 
corresponding grades in the Regular Army, making it incumbent upon the 
Federal Government to pay the national guardsmen for five drills in any one 
month 25 per cent more than it pays the regular soldier for an entire month's 
work. 

Section 36 provides for the replacements in National Guard units in time of 
war from the State or Territory from which the units are drafted. This la 
entirely impracticable and would insure confusion, delay, and great expense. 

Section 40 prescribes the particular officers who shall be appointed by the 
President, a usurpation of his constitutional function. It also endows the 
National Guard Council with power to control the tactical organization of 
Federal forces in time of war. 

There are numerous provisions in the bill which provide for the employment 
of National Guard officers and reserve officers in an active capacity with full 
pay of their grade. Since, presumably, these men would find a continuing neces- 
sity for their employment, the result would be a large addition to the annual 
Federal pay roll; and, as I have pointed out above, a very small increase in 
the military preparedness of our citizens. 

With respect to some criticisms offered by Gen. Martin I want to 
say that the Militia Bureau has been endeavoring to get the law 
changed so as to do away with the system of paymente and with 
some of the other things we found have not worked. Your com- 
mittee has a recommendation to that effect, sent up here some three 
months ago. We would be glad to see men who attend drill paid 
for their services. We, however, would like to require that a cer- 
tain percentage of the company shall be present at the drills in 
order to insure that the training that is received shall be worth 
while, and we would make the forfeiture for failure to get the com- 
pany there fall upon the officer, not upon the enlisted man who is 
faithful in his attendance. 

Mr. Hull. General, under the two bills that are pending in 
Congress at the present time for universal military service, both 
would conscript a boy at 19, would they not? 

Gen. Carter. My understanding is that they would take him, or 
conscript him, as you call it, for the period of training, and for 
that purpose only. 

Mr. Hull. After that they would be in the military forces of 
the Nation in case we declared war. 

Gen. Carter. Only when authorized by Congress. There is a 
distinct difference between universal service and universal train- 
ing. I am in favor of universal training, but not in favor of uni- 
versal service except in time of war when authorized bv Congress. 

Mr. Hull. When you draft them, do you think you should draft 
them at 19, or draft them at 21 ? 

' Gen. Carter. I think at 19, because at that time a boy is suffi- 
ciently well developed to profit from his instruction, and not to be 
injured by arduous labor, and is young enough to complete his 
education after he has finished his training. 

Mr. Hull. That is the thought of practically the entire General 
Staff, is it not? 

Gen. Carter. I do not know, sir ; I have not talked with them. 

Mr. Hull. We know that at the commencement of this war that 
was their demand. 

Gen. Carter. I thought they asked for the draft from 18 to 45 
originally. It came to that eventually. 



1890 ABMY BEOBGANIZATIOK. 

Mr. Hull. No, sir; from 19, and they came to this committee 
and said they had to have them, and they passed it through the 
Senate, and the administration said that they had to have it with- 
out the dotting of an i or the crossing of a t. 

Mr. MoRiN. That was military service. 

Mr. Hull. Of coui-se, but once you have them trained there is no 
power by which you can stop them. I do not believe you could 
block them from taking those boys. I call attention to that be- 
cause there are a great many people in this country who do not be- 
lieve that is right, and I call attention to the fact that several of 
the best men that have been over on the other side admit at this 
time that it would have been a direct military mistake. 

Gen. Carter. You mean taking men at that age? 

Mr. Hull. Yes. Gen. Pershing admits it. 

Gen Carter. I am not advocatmg taking these men into the mili- 
tary service at that age, but giving them training at that age. 

Mr. Hull. You said you believed they should be taken at 19. 

Gen. Carter. Sending them to a training camp for a period of 
training. 

Mr. Hull. Then, in case of a declaration of war, you would not 
take these boys? 

Gen. Carter. I would take such number as prescribed by Con- 

Sess. That would depend upon the size of the war and the needs of 
e Government. 

Mr. Sanford. It would always be a matter for Congress to deter- 
mine in time of war, would it not ? 

Gen. Carter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. I would like to ask the gentleman from Iowa if he 
does not believe, if we have compulsory military training, that the 
boys who have received this training should be put in class A-1, 
subject to the draft? 

Mr. Hull. No, sir; absolutely not. I am unalterably opposed to 
the conscription of boys under 21, and always have been. 

Gen. Carter. They are permitted now to enlist in the National 
Guard at' the age of 18, so if we retained these boys at the age of 19, 
and allowed those who desired to go into the National Guard, I 
think the forward-looking, enterprising young men of the commu- 
nity, who would want to get married or go into business, and want to 
reduce their period of service would go into the guard. 

Mr. Dent. You speak of the distinction between training and 
service. All of these bills provide that a boy, if he is compeUed to 
undergo training, or service, whatever you call it, shall be subject 
to the articles of war. 

Gen. Carter. During that period of training. 

Mr. Dent. But, then, where is the distinction? Where do you 
draw the distinction between training and service? 

Gen. Carter. He is drafted under 9ie act of Congress, if passed to 
be trained. Plainly, he can not be used for anything else, but while 
he is in the training camp he must be subject to control or some 
form of discipline so that those oflScers under whose charge he is 
placed, would be able to control his actions. 

Mr, Dent, He must perform service in order to undergo training. 

Gen. Carter, The service he performs is taking this training. 



ARMY REORGAKIZATION. 1891 

Mr. Dent. I can not see the distinction between service and train- 
ing. I have been hearing that on all these bills, but I can not see 
the distinction. 

Gen. Carter. It is distinct to me. Compulsory training would 
mean that the boy would be drafted into the Federal service for the 
express purpose of being trained, and maintained in that service 
until he was trained. Then, though his name would be put on a 
register, he would not be available for service until Congress declared 
that a state of war existed, and authorized the calling of certain 
numbers on the register. 

Ml'. Dent. But these bills that are pending before us do not make 
that distinction. You make the distinction. 

Gen. Carter. Well, I got it from reading the bill. I may not 
have been able to understand the language. 

Mr. McKenzie. May I interject, Mr. Dent, that I do not fully 
agree with you that there is no distinction between military training 
under compulsion and a military service ? 

Mr. Dent. For the same length of time. 

Mr. McKenzie. But is not this true. General, that the power and 
the exercise of the power of the Government to take the individual 
against his will is exactly the same, whether you take him for train- 
ing or whether you take him for service? 

Gen. Carter. Yes; but I believe that to be a part of the war 
power of Congress. 

Mr. Sanford. Is it not a fact that the basis of the American mili- 
tary policy now is the obligation of service on every man in time 
of war ? 

Gen. Carter. It has been during the war. 

Mr. Sanford. You have not any idea that that will ever be changed 
now? 

Gen. Carter. No ; but we are going back now to the system of vol- 
untary enlistments for forming a national guard and a regular army. 

Mr. Sanford. Our war policy now is universal service in time of 
war. 

Gen. Carter. Yes. There is just one thought I want to give you, 
and that is this, that if we are going to have any other force than 
the Kegular Army existing in time of peace, it ought to be the 
organized militia, under whatever name you call it, because, as I 
told you, the Constitution provides for that. The States can have 
it wnen they want it, and if the Federal Government aids in its 
maintenance, they can get its use in time of war. But if the State 
goes ofl and forms another unit, whatever name you call it, another 
organization, the Federal Government will have in the Federal forces 
something that can be used only in time of war, while the States 
organize a means of defense under their State appropriations. 

It is true that we have to send Federal troops to some of the States 
to aid in the enforcement of law, but it is only done in an emergency, 
and it is the exceptional thing, and it is not satisfactory because 
the troops sent there are not under the control of State authorities, 
'and they do not receive their orders from them. The officers sent 
there, of course, try to carry out the policies of the State officials, 
but it would be better to have State troops perform State duties, 



1892 ABMY REOBQAKIZATIOK. 

and therefore I think a national guard furnishes a very excellent 
means of keeping and handling a trained reserve. 

Mr. Sanford. I do not want to ask you a question about State 
business, but do you not think that the police powers of the State 
for suppressing riots and other insurrections can best be performed 
by professional State guards or State police? 

Gen. Carter. The constabulary ? They can be, but where an armed 
force is needed to overcome organized resistance, the National Guard 
furnishes a force that does not have to be kept under arms and under 
pav all the time. That is the objection to the constabulary. 

Mr. Sanford. It is a force that never operates in such times satis- 
factorily. My observation is that the National Guard that is called 
upon at any time to go out and suppress insurection and riots is es- 
sentially an unpopular organization, and it becomes hated and dis- 
liked, particularly in large communities. I was called upon when 
I was a member of the guard to go out and suppress my friends, the 
motormen and conductors, and I shall never forget it. It is the only 
unpleasant recollection I have of military duty. 

Gen. Carter. It is unpopular, of course, but I think the National 
Guard can perform that service very well. It has in many States. 

Mr. Sanford. But at a tremendous cost, I think. 

Gen. Carter. I do not think the cost is any where near as great 
as it would be to maintain a constabulary during the entire year. 

Mr. Sanford. Not cost in dollars and cents, but cost to the uni- 
form, cost to the discipline of your whole people, cost in loss of re- 
spect for the Government, and all that. 

Mr. Crago. In Pennsylvania it costs us more to have the guard 
out 10 days than it has to keep the constabulary for two or three 
years. We had to have the guard out for riot purposes about six 
years ago, before the formation of the constabulary, and the whole 
division was out there for three or four weeks, and to call that 
division out and transport it to the constabulary for a whole year. 

Gen. Carter. How many have you in the constabulary? 

Mr. Crago. Three hundred. 

Gen. Carter. Did you not have more than that number in your old 
National Guard? 

Mr. Crago. Three hundred men, sir, in my opinion, are as efficient as 
a thousand National Guard men, because each individual there is 
a trained athlete, a trained officer, trained to act on his own initia- 
tive, and it has been a very great source of satisfaction in Pennsyl- 
vania, and I think New York has had the same experience. 

Mr. Sanford. Well, New York is, of course, newer in that experi- 
ment. 

Mr. Anthont. General, I want to ask you who framed the regu- 
lations under which the National Guard provisions of the national 
defense act are administered. Did your bureau frame those regula- 
tions, or the General Staff? 

Gen. Carter. The bureau framed them entirely until the beginning 
of the present war when the Overman Act went into effect, and under 
that act all the powers of the bureau and the activities connected* 
with the War Department were brought under the Chief of Staff 
for coordination, and the bureau now formulates the regulations and 
submits them for approval to the Chief of Staff. After the declara- 



ASMT BEOBGAKIZATIOK. 1893 

tion of peace, unless the law is changed, we will go back to the 
original practice of maki^g those regulations ourselves. 

Mr. Anthony. The members of this committee, in fact, the ma- 
jority of its membership, I am safe in stating, have at times com- 
plained of the stringency of regulations which have been adopted 
affecting the organization of the national guard. We foLt that the 
intent of Congress was not being carried out. Has any action ever 
been taken by the bureau in order to more closely approximate the 
intent of Congress in the application of that law ? 

Gen. Carter. I have read that law many times, and my whole 
object has been to comply with it. I think you were absent from the 
room when I explainea that where the Federal interests clashed 
with the State interests, that we have sincerely tried to see that the 
Federal interests did not suffer, all money spent being Federal 
money for preparedness. We have not failed to be conciliatory and 
to try to meet the needs of the States, and some of these regulations 
that you have heard complained of, Mr. Chairman, are due to the 
provisions of the law. 

That in regard to pay, for instance. There are two sections cov- 
ering pay, section 92 and section 111. Taken together, they mean 
but one thing and that is if the prescribed number of men is not 
present at the drill, nobody can be paid for that drill. I have asked 
to have that changed, but as long as it remains on the statute books, 
if we agreed to pay, the Treasury officials would not pay it. 

Mr. Anthony. You suggest that we clarify that in a reenactment ? 

Gen. Carter. Yes, sir, definite recommendations are coming 
through in regard to that. 

Mr. Anthony. Gen. Martin, when he was before the conmiittee 
a short time ago, voiced criticism of the delay in supplying uni- 
forms and equipment for the national guard organizations. 

Gen. Carter. I was interested to know that because I did not know 
it at all. We have been making strenuous efforts to get equipment 
to the National Guard, but the condition of the Supply Bureau will 
not permit me to be very prompt in that work. But I will take that 
up at once. We did not know they were not completely equipped. 
We expect the instructors to inform us of failure to equip. We have 
given our special attention to that matter, and we will look it up. 

Mr. Anthony. In the near future we will expect to be at work 
upon this legislation as affecting the Guard, and if you have any 
specific suggestions to the committee in regard to the legislation 
we can carry out what is evidently our purpose as expressed to you, 
will you give us the benefit of them? 

Gen. Carter. I will, very gladly. You will, as I told you, Mr. 
Chairman, find in that letter recommendations to clarify difficulties 
that we have met with. It very definitely states as to the page and 
line of the bill, and wil> enable you to see what is referred to. 

Mr. Anthony. That probably will help, and I will look that up. 

Mr. HttIxL. What is the strength of the National Guard now. 

General ? 

Gen. Carter. It is between 37,000 and 40,000. I can not tell you 
exactly because we have been recognizing a number of new units just 
lately. There is one feature, though, that I think has been misunder- 
stood. The Army has been conducting a very active recruiting cam- 

15D187— 20— VOL 2 7 



1894 ARMY REORGANIZATION^. 

paign recently and a number of young men who came into the Guard 
originally have been seized with the desire to enlist in the Regular 
Army. Such men have been discharged from the National Guard 
when agreeable to the adjutant generals of the States, and the re- 
cruiting for the National Guard has not kept up with those dis- 
charges, so that though we have a greater number of new units than 
we had a month ago, the enlisted strength of the guard is not much 

greater, but it is growing quite rapidly, and the sentiment seems to 
e growing stronger every day that we shall have a good National 
Guard, and everybody is working for it. 

Contrary to the opinion you expressed, Mr. Chairman, a while ago, 
the War Department and the Militia Bureau have done everything 
possible to encourage enlistments in the Guard. I know. that the 
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff never have had any other 
idea than that we should make the National Guard as strong as 
could be supported with the appropriations made by Congress. I 
have had that express assurance from the Secretary of War. I have 
written that to the adjutant generals of the States, and I have done 
everything within my power to aid them. We have put at their 
service the recruiting circulars and movie films that the Eegular 
Army service is using, and we have asked them to work in con- 
junction with the Regular Army recruiting officers, and that is not 
entirely our function. 

Mr. Anthony. Some have felt that the reguirements of the War 
Department before they would recognize National Guard units were 
too high. 

Gen. Carter. I explained that a while ago. 

Mr. Anthony. I know you did, but I want to call attention to the 
fact that Gen. Pershing, in his testimony recommending the recrea- 
tion of an Army reserve, stated that in his opinion, whenever you 
could get as many as a dozen men who desire to organize a State unit, 
they should be permitted to go ahead and organize, without im- 
posing the limitation on the National Guard of 100 men at the start. 

Gen. Carter. We are trying to get units that can be used in war, 
and that will not have to be trained after the war begins. 

Mr. Anthony. The idea is that we ought to give them six months 
or a year in which to organize their companies and bring them up to 
full strength, rather than handicap them at the start with require- 
ments that they can not possibly fulfill. 

Gen. Carter. We authorized 187 companies at a strength of 65 
last March, and we have got only a little over a third of those, so it 
is apparent that that is not the cure for this evil for failure to enlist. 

Mr. Anthony. If you allow a dozen men to organize a company, 
and give them six months to bring it up to your requirements, couid 
not that be done? 

Gen. Carter. That would put on the Federal pay roll a unit that 
would be of absolutely no service to the Federal Government. 

Mr. Anthony. It would also start perhaps thousands of units to 
work to organize a guard immediately, would it not, and would 
encourage them ? 

Gen. Carter. We would have to equip at once those dozen men for 
six months, and later, when they failed to recruit, we would have to 
withdraw the equipment, and that would create hard feeling. There 
is also great expense attached to equipping an outfit of that kind. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1895 

and after they failed we would lose a great deal of the equipment. 
In shipping it back and forth, issuing it to the companies, and tak- 
ing it back again, we find there is always a loss. 

Mr. Anthony. There is a loss in shipping equipment to the Regu- 
lar Army, too, is there not? 

Gen. Carter. But somebody has to pay for it, and in the case pf 
the National Guard we find it very dimcult to collect for losses. 

Mr. Anthony. We could aflford to lose a little equipment in such 
a laudable effort. 

Gen. Carter. We are aiding all we can to get units organized, but 
we are adhering to the rule that a unit to which we extend recogni- 
tion shall be of use to the Federal Government. We do not want to 
take a mere corporal's guard as a company. 

Mr: Anthony. My idea, General, is that if the corporal's guard is 
willing to start to work and organize a company which will ulti- 
mately reach the strength which would be of value, we ought to 
allow that corporal's guard to start and go to work. 

Gen. Carter. We are perfectly willing that they should organize 
as platoons, but they will not come that way. They want their full 
quota of officers, so that we will have a captain and two lieutenants 
commanding a dozen men, which is an absurd military situation. 

Mr. Anthony. They themselves would not want to continue an 
organization of that strength. 

Gen. Carter. They would doubtless make efforts to recruit, but if 
they failed we would then have to withdraw recognition and take 
the equipment back, and that is what we are having to do now with 
some units that were formed. 

Mr. Htjll. Have the provisions of the national defense act been 
carried out with regard to having National Guard men, I think two 
or three, in the decision of the Militia Bureau ? 

Gen. Carter. Two were authorized. One is there now. One was 
there a short while ago and went back to his State to reorganize a 
regiment, and as soon as his regiment is recognized we will bring 
him back. That will give us the full number. 

Mr. HuMi. May I ask you if in the selection of these National 
Guard men you consulted at all with the adjutant generals of the 
several States as to who would be a good man or did you select them 
yourselves arbitrarily and bring them in in that way ? 

Gen. Carter. We have only selected two thus far. Both were men 
of long experience in the guard and were overseas and have all the 
qualifications for thorough National Guard men and good soldiers. 
We did not consult with the adjutant generals of the States because 
it would become a question as to what section we would take him 
from. 

Mr. Hull. I know, but you understand, of course, that the idea 
of Congress in putting that in there was to have some one in the 
bureau that would be m sympathy and work in sympathy with the 
National Guard. Now, of course, if you select them with the purpose 
of having some one that would come under the control of the bureau 
absolutely 

Gen. Carter. Of course, that is imputing a rather mean motive 
to me. The man who is in there now, I never knew before he came 
there and never saw him before, and never knew anything about him 



1896 AEMY BEOBOAIOZATIOK. 

except that he had a good record and was brought down there by a 
Kepresentative in Congress who told me he was anxious to continue 
in the guard. He was then a colonel, and was willing to accept a 
lieutenant colonel's position and occupy tihat place. I fooked up his 
record and found that he was satisfactory in every respect, and I 
appointed him. I asked him his opinion in regard to National Guard 
affairs, and did not attempt to innuence him m any way whatsoever. 
I do not, of course, mean to say that he may not be mfluenced by 
the knowledge of my own views, but I have never endeavored to 
influence him in any way. 

Mr. SANroRD. Do you think you could get the adjutants general 
of the 48 different States to agree upon the man whom you should 
appoint ? 

Gen. Carter. No, sir. We can never get them to agree on any- 
thing. Of course, each would want to nave his State represented, 
which is natural. We are not objecting to these men in the militia 
bureau. They are very useful, and both have been excellent men. 

Mr. HuLii. There has been no intention on my part to impute any 
bad motive, but, of course, that has been called to the attention of 
the committee, as it is our duty to call your attention to it. 

Gen. Carter. I did not select the first man who was brought there. 
I did not know either one of them before they came there. The 
second one I selected on his record. I did not know him personally. 

Mr. Sanford. Is your bureau authorized to make regulations that 
may be in conflict with the requirements of the several States, as, 
for instance, the age at which a second lieutenant shall be appointed, 
the age limit? I do not quite understand that myself. 

Gen, Carter. I think I can make it clear. The power of appoint- 
ment is in the hands of the governor entirely, but we say to them 
we will not recognize a second lieutenant if he is beyond a certain 
age, unless he has some overpowering military efficiency that makes 
it worth while. 

Mr. Sanford. You do use discretion with reference to that idea ? 

Gen. Carter. Yes; we fix the age limit, but we waive it when we 
think we can get an excellent man. Of course, we do not want to 
take grandfathers as second lieutenants, but we do take men who are 
over the age limit occasionally. 

Mr. Sanford. So that in the United States Federal Government 
you insist on your regulations, and that a man shall be within what 
you consider a proper age, regardless of what the age limit may be 
m the several States? 

Gen. Carter. Yes. We do not impose any obligation on the gov- 
ernor, but we say, " If you appoint a man over that age, we will not 
extend Federal recognition." 

Mr. Sanford. What I am getting at is that you do that to protect 
the Federal Government and to be sure that an officer will be qualified 
to do the work that you want him to do if a war comes ? 

Gen. Carter. Entirely ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sanford. How, in your judgment, would that regulation be 
carried out, if the head of your bureau were not a Federal officer, 
but was a National Guard man? What point of view would he l>e 
likely to take, and how would he be influenced to protect the Federal 
Government? 



ABMY BE0B6ANIZATI0N. 1897 

Gen. Carter. That is the point I tried to make here, that I do not 
believe his interests would lie so much with the Federal Government 
as perhaps with the States. His interests are in his particular State. 
He is not a Federal officer strictly held to protect the Federal Gov- 
ernment's interest in this force, to see that it is fit for Federal use, 
and that good returns are received for the Federal funds expended. 
You ought to have a Federal officer in charge of the Militia Bureau, 
which is a Federal bureau. 

Mr* Sanford. So that the function of the Militia Bureau at this 
time is a double one, not only, on the one hand, to build up the guard, 
but, on the other hand, to protect the Federal Government in the 
disbursement of its money and to see it gets its money's worth. 

Gen. Carter. Yes, sir. 

STATEMENT OF COL. W. C. FI8K, HEW YOBE NATIONAL OTTABD. 

Mr. Anthony. Colonel, are you here representing the National 
Guard of the State of New York ? 

CoL FiSK. Mr. Chairman, I am here at the request of Maj. Gen. 
O'Ryan, by direction of the Adjutant General. 

Mt. Anthony. We will be glad to hear you. Will you please 
give your full name and rank to the reporter? 

Col. FiSK. I am W. C. Fisk, colonel on the reserve list of the 
State of New York. I always have served with the National Guard 
of New York. I enlisted in 1874, and served until September, 1918. 
I served with what was known in the New York National Guard 
as the Seventh Eegiment of New York, and what was known in 
the service as the One hundred and seventh United States Infantry. 
I was promoted through the various grades to the grade of colonel 
in command of the Seventh Kegilnent and served m that capacity 
with the regiment on the Mexican border in 1916 ; was in the Fed- 
eral service in the late war and took the regiment to France with 
the Twenty-seventh Division, where we were organized in the 
Second Corps, attached to the Fourth British Army in Flanders. 
I was taken seriously ill and sent home; after being in the hospital 
for some time I was discharged from the Federal service on the 
ground of physical disability incurred in the line of duty. 

"Mr. Anthony. What specific recommendation have you to make 
to the committee in reference to the pending reorganization bill 
affecting the National Guard ? 

Col. Fisk. I have not studied the proposed reorganization bill; 
perhaps my views are somewhat radical. As I said, I am a National 
Guardsman of many years experience. I am particularly proud of 
the record of the National Guard in the last few years, both as 
units and as to what they were able to furnish to the Government, 
speaking particularly of my own division and regiment, with which 
I am familiar, although t presume the same thing happened in 
other units. Our division furnished about 5,000 officers for the 
Army; my own organization furnished nearly 1,500 from among 
its own members, and the ranks of those men ranged from second 
lieutenant to major general. 

In addition to that, the National Guard was able to assist the 
Army greatly in furnishing men of conspicuous ability from its 



1898 ARMY RBOBGANlZATIOIir. 

enlisted personnel, by reason of the character of the men, in many 
instances. In my own regiment, I had a large proportion of college 
graduates and men of technical ability. Naturally, those men were 
in demand, and we suffered bv having our ranks depleted by having 
these men called on for work in other branches of the service. I 
am proud of the record of those men, but I am rather radical in 
my opinion, based on my experience, and that is that the record was 
made in spite of and not because of most serious handicaps as to the 
situation. 

I am definitely in favor of the basic idea back of the proposed con- 
tinental army of Mr. Garrison when he was Secretary of War, which 
was that the Government of the United States should spend no money 
on a military force that it did not control. 

Mr. Olney. You favor that? 

Col. FiSK. The principle of the Government not expending any 
money upon any military force of which it does not have complete 
control. I am in favor ox the suggestion made by one of the members 
of the committee that any proper military policy for the country 
would be to organize what you might call a National Guard of vol- 
unteer force, not under the militia clause bf the Constitution, but 
under the general power. 

Mr. Anthony. Would not the immediate effect of the adoption of 
such a policy establishing the Guard as a Federal force be to put 
every officer and every man immediately upon the pay roll of the 
Government? 

Col. FiSK. I think not, sir. They are supposed to be on the pay 
roll now to a limited extent. 

I do not think it is difficult to devise a scheme in this country — it 
may be just at the present time, because I think experience shows 
that after a war the people of a Country are pretty well fed up on 
military matters. I know after the Civil War there was great diffi- 
culty in maintaining a National Guard at all for many years. I think 
there would be the same difficulty now in regard to the organization 
of a volunteer force, whatever you might call it, that you would seek 
to establish. 

Mr. Anthony. If Congress should in its wisdom decide that 300,000 
should be the limit of the size of the regular force which this country 
should employ, would not the complete federalization, as you might 
call it, of the National Guard, practically augment the regular forces 
of the United States? 

Col. FiSK. Yes, sir; but in my opinion you can not maintain the 
National Guard under the national defence act. 

Mr. Anthony. You made the statement that the National Guard 
functioned perfectly and furnished a large portion of the highly 
trained officers and that its record in the war is one of great merit. 
What more do you want them to do than that ? 

Col. FiSK. I think that was done in the face of the difficulties, 
rather because of them. 

Mr. Anthony. What difficulties? 

Col. FisK. The difficulty was this: You must remember that the 
National Guard, after the national-defense act was passed, had never 
tried it in peace time. The national-defense act became effective 
on June 3, 1916, I believe. Immediately after that the National 
Guard of the country went into the Federal service on the Mexican 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1899 

border. They were there for periods of six, seven,- or eight months, 
and immediately following that they were called into the service in 
the war with Germany, so that we have not had a period of peace- 
time application of the national-defense act. It seems to be the opin- 
ion among the officers of the New York National Guard that it is 
practically impossible to maintain an efficient National Guard under 
the national-defense act as it now stands. 

Mr. Anthony. You say you have never had an opportunity to try 
out the provisions of the national-defense act? 
Col. FiSK. That is true. 

Mr. Anthony. Then, why do you condemn it in advance? 
Col. FiSK. Because of past experience and the provisions of the act. 
The claim is made that under the national-defense act the Govern- 
ment was seeking to secure a certain* amount of service from men and 
officers at very cheap prices. I do not believe in paying the National 
Guard at all, myself. I would rather have it purely voluntary or not 
exist at all. 

But under the regulations of the War Department, in connection 
with the national-defense act, the requirements on the enlisted man, 
and particularly on the officer, were such that to comply with them 
and qualify himself under the regulations of the War Department 
he had to give more time and more effort than he could afford from 
his daily vocation, with a family to support. 

Mr. Anthony. Then, in effect, instead of having the National 
Guard as a citizen organization, you would create it into a profes- 
sional organization? 

Col. FiSK. No, sir; I would make it entirely a citizen organization. 
I believe there is enough sentiment in this country to make a strong 
citizen force under proper regulations, and I think the idea of having 
48 little armies in the country is wrong. There is nothing to my 
mind that prevents proper regulations, and, in fact, under the war 
clause of the Constitution, as it stands now there are State troops 
and the Government has a certain call on their services under cer- 
tain conditions. But I would make them Federal troops. I mean I 
would jnake them a Federal volunter force and ffive the States a 
certain call on their services whenever they needed them. I would 
reverse the proposition as it stands to-day. But that, of course, is 
radical. 

Mr. McKenzie. Then you would maintain the police regulations 
of a State by a Federal force? 

Col. FiSK. As they do now in many States. 

Mr. McKenzie. Bather than give them a force, having the care of 
that force rest upon the State? 

Col. FiSK. Yes, sir; the State should not call those troops out 
purely as a police proposition. I do not believe in using troops as 
policemen. 

Many States are obliged to call on the Federal Government for 
assistance, and, of course, they ought to pay for it. 

Mr. McKenzie. They only do that wnen the State forces are in- 
adequate to maintain the peace. 
Col. FiSK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Crago. You would first have the States organize a constabu- 
lary? 



1900 ABMY BEOEGANIZATION*. 

Col. FtSK. That is a local question. They have done that in New 
York and Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Sanford. To what extent do you speak the views of Gen. 
O'Ryan? 

Col. FiSK. I do not speak for Gen. O'Ryan. 

Mr. Sanford. It is a fact, is it not, that he favors some such view, 
too? 

Col. FiSK. I have heard so. I think he so testified before the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs. 

Mr. Sanford. In what manner would you apply the Garrison idea 
to the organization of the National Guard now ? 

Col. FiSK. Are you referring to this localization in States ? 

Mr. Sanford. Yes. 

Col. FiSK. Just as it is at present. 

Mr. Sanford. To that extent would you have training, weekly 
training? 

Col. FiSK. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. Would you have any different period for camp service 
than the National Guard has been accustomed to have? I think the 
Garrison idea was to have three months' training for everybody. 

Col. FiSK. That was a compulsory matter. Of course, if you are 
going to have a compulsory training system for young men of 19 
years of age, three months' training, that is another system. 

Mr. Sanford. But when you said you favor the Garrison plan 
you simply referred to the matter of expense and the control of the 
Government? 

Col. FiSK. Only as to the question of the Government not spend- 
ing any money on a force over which it did not have complete con- 
trol. That is what I meant in referring to Secretary Garrison's sag- 
gestion. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you know anything about the opinion among 
National Guardsmen as to whether they prefer to be organized as 
State troops or to be wholly under Federal control ? 

Col. FisK. That depends upon the system. In that connection 1 
may be permitted to say that I feel some sympathy with the sugges- 
tions made by the preceding witness, perhaps not to the extent he 
goes, but I feel that in any system developed along the lines of 
purely volunteer service some provision should be made to, in part 
at least, place the control and direct management of the officers and 
men constituting that system under men drawn from the system 
itself. I would not do that absolutely, but to some extent, at least, 
there should be some representation. 

I think there are two reasons for that. First, because when you 
deal with volunteer duty you are dealing with something that is 
entirely foreign to the system of the Kegular service. The point of 
view of most Regular Army officers from their training and associa- 
tion is different^ and I found in many cases in this war that they 
failed to appreciate the distinction between the Regular troops ard 
those whose services were voluntary. They do not understand it. 
It is an entirely different problem and requires different handli.ig. 

Again, if I may say so, in connection with getting into service any 
National Guard men who have served in the late war I regret to say 
that there is a natural feeling among National Guard officers — ^which 



ABMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1901 

I do not hold myself, but which is quite prevalent and has grown up 
out of association with the Regular officers during this war — which 
is one of a little resentment and perhaps antagonism. It is not neces- 
sary for me to say that in our Regular service we have some of the 
&iest examples or the professional soldier and gentleman that there 
are in any army in the world. 

At the same time, there are others, and it has been unfortunate 
that there has grown up among National Guard officers the feeling 
that if left with the Regular officers entirely in control they would 
not be happy or satisfied. Perhaps the worst thing that tended to 
engender that feeling was what was known as the brigade and field 
officers' school in San Antonio in January, February, and March^ 
1918. That was a school established by the War Department for 
the colonels and lieutenant colonels of all the Infantry and Artillery 
regiments and some majors of 12 National Guard divisions. They 
were ordered there for three months, and the school was under the 
command of a Regular officer and the instructors were Regular offi- 
cers. The effect of that school was a bad impression on the officers 
of those 12 divisions, and I think it was unfortunate. 

Mr. Anthony. In what respect did it make a bad impression, on 
the assumption that the National Guard officers did not know any- 
thing? 

Col. FiSK. Yes. The commandant was a colonel of cavalry who 
was holding temporarily the rank of brigadier general in the Na- 
tional Army, and there were assembled there officers of mature age, 
many of them having served many years in the National Guard, and 
many of them men of consequence in their communities, profes- 
sional men, among whom was Col. Lea, of the Artillery, who is a 
former United States Senator. I think the youngest officer there 
was Lieut. Col. Clark. They were all men of some consequence and 
standing in their own communities, and when they were assembled 
at the opening of that school the commandant told them they had 
been ordered there because their organizations were rotten and that 
they were obtaining money from the Government under false pre- 
tences in taking their pay when they were not qualified to hold their 
jobs. As a matter of fact, many of these gentlemen had given up 
more private income to serve the Government than they were get- 
ting from the Government, and as they realized it cost the Govern- 
ment $20,000 to graduate a man from West Point and that the Reg- 
ular officers had since been supported at Government expense, that 
remark did not strike them happily, and the whole atmosphere was 
clouded. 

Mr. Sanford. How did those men work who were talked to in 
that way? 

CoL FiSK. They worked very hard. But they felt they were sent 
there as if they had been part of a canning factory. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you know that that kind of talk probably was- 
given very unwillingly by that officer, and for the purpose of stir- 
ring those men up to make a real effort? 

Col. FiSK. I do not think so, because on the other hand there were 
some instructors who were fine types of Army officers and men of 
great ability. 



1902 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Sanford. There were some men there with the rank of lieu- 
tenant colonel who had never had any military duty whatever, were 
there not? 

Col. FisK. I do not know of any ; there may have been. 

Mr. OiiNEY. They needed instruction? 

Col. FiSK. Everybody needed instruction in this war. There was 
not anybody who did not need instruction. Every oflScer who served 
in the Army, whether a Eegular or a Volunteer, needed instruction 
at all times, and there is no such thing as an end of the study of 
military science. 

Mr. Sanford. To draw a conclusion from what you have just 
said, do you think the representatives of the National Guard desire 
something to be done which would enable them to have a separate 
life from the Regular Army? The last witness spoke of the Na- 
tional Guard wanting to run its own business and control its own 
affairs. 

Col. FiSK. I do not. 

Mr. Sanford. The business of the National Guard, as you view 
it, is to get ready for war? 

Col. FiSK. That is the only excuse for its existence. 

Mr. Sanford. That is what the Regular Army is for? 

Col. FiSK. There is bound to be in some States local difficulty. 
Take the State of New York. They organized and maintained a full 
division under the old form of organization, with cavalry, artillery, 
field hospitals, and all the auxiliary troops, none of which were 
particularly useful to the State if it wanted to use them for the 
suppression of civil disorder. You can not take a battery of 6-inch 
guns into the streets of the city and use them for that purpose, and 
you did not need the great number of field hospitals or supply trains 
that were maintained there. The people of New York were getting 
a bit restless at the heavy expense of maintaining these troops organ- 
ized in that way and they were getting comparatively small assist' 
ance from the National Government. Of course all those special 
units like Artillery and Cavalry are very expensive troops to main- 
tain, much more so than Infantry in time of peace. 

So there is a practical question in connection with the matter; if 
you want to organize for State purposes you would organize on en- 
tirely different lines than you would organize an army. But if you 
require, as the bill does, to conform to the organization of the Army 
in the personnel and the organizations, that is a difficult problem 
when you ct)me to ask States to maintain that class of troops. 

Mr. McKenzie. You would change the law in that respect? 

Col. Fi3K. As I said in the beginning, I have served 44 years in 
the National Guard, and I believe the principle of the National 
Guard being relied on as a part of the Army of the United States is 
wrong. I believe that proposition is wrong in principle. 

Mr. Anthony. I take it that you think the proposition to compel 
the States to maintain their pro rata of the auxiliary troops is a 
mistake? 

Col. FiSK. We have to have them. 

Mr. Anthony. To compel a State to maintain its full quota, for 
instance, of medical enlisted men and a State air service, and things 
of that sort you would regard as unnecessary? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION'. 1903 

Col. FiSK. It is absolutely unnecessary if they are to be organized 
in that way to have those things. 

Mr. Anthony. Take the Air Service of the Army; would it not be 
far easier to depend upon the regular establishment for the air fight- 
ing than to try to create an organization in the State ? 

Col. FiSK. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. And the easiest State organization to maintain is 
the infantry? 

Col. FiSK. Absolutely. 

Mr. Huix. Have you ever figured how much additional expense it 
would cost the National Government to organize the National Guard 
according to your idea? 

Col. FiSK. I have not. 

Mr. Hull. You are a business man, are you not? 

Col. FiSK. No, sir; I am a lawyer. 

Mr. HuLii. You know we are confronted with a national deficit of 
$3,000,000,000? 

Col. FisK. I know it is large. 

Mr. Hull. Under those circumstances, it is our duty to reduce ex- 
penses in every way we can. 

Col. FiSK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hull. You say you are proud of your record ? 

Col. FiSK. My record — no, sir. 

Mr. Hull. The record of the National Guard. 

Col. FiSK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hull. But you contend that that was not due to the provi- 
sions of the national defense act. 

Col, FisK. I think whatever record it made was in spite of the 
legal situation rather than because of it. 

Mr. Hull. If we make the situation better and remove those obsta- 
cles, would the National Guard be better or worse? 

Col. FiSK. Of course, if you remove the obstacles that will tend 
to make it better ; there is no doubt about that. 

Mr. Anthony. Colonel, if jrou have no other specific recommenda- 
tions to make, I think that is all the committee desires to ask you, 
and we are very much obliged to you for coming down here and 
giving us your opinions on these matters. 

(Thereupon, the committee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p. m.) 

AFTER RECESS. 

The committee reassembled, pursuant to the taking of recess, at 
2.30 o'clock p. m. 

Mr. Anthony. Gentlemen of the committee. Gen. Martin, the 
adjutant general of Kansas, is here this afternoon, and we will be 
glad to hear him. 

Gen. Martin, we are holding hearings upon the question of the 
reorganization of the Army, and are considering now proposed 
amendments to the national defense act in reference to the National 
Guard. 

Will you state to the repoi-ter your full name and your oiBcial 
title? 



1904 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

STATEMENT OF BEIO. GEN. CHAELES I. KAETIK, ADJUTAITI 

OENEEAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS. 

Gen. Martin. Charles I. Martin, adjutant general of the State of 
Kansas. 

Mr. Anthony. You have had long service with the National 
Guard? 

Gen. Martin. Since 1889. 

Mr. Anthony. And you have also participated in war? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir ; in the Spanish- American War, Philippine 
Insurrection, and the World War. 

Mr. Anthony. In the Spanish- American War and in the late war? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. What rank did you attain in the late war ? 

Gen. Martin. I had the rank of brigadier general. 

Mr. Anthony. In the Thirty-fifth Division? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. What is the latest military experience you have had 
with your troops? I ask that question for the purpose of getting 
from you a statement of some rather novel experiences you have 
recently had. 

Gen. Martin. I received a telegram from you three or four days 
ago asking me to come here, and when I received that telegram I 
was engaged in the operation of the coal mines in the southeastern 
part of Kansas. The mines were being operated under the super- 
vision of the troops of the State and for a period of two weeks the 
troops were engaged in that work. 

Mr. Anthony. 1 would just like to have it go into the record, if it 
is a fact, and I understand it is a fact, that through the use of this 
available force the State of Kansas has succeeded in relieving a 
serious fuel shortage situation? 

Gen. Martin. To show you the effectiveness of our State troops, 
I got an order at noon on Saturday to order the troops into the field 
for the purpose of protecting the voluntary labor, and I was not 
permitted, although I knew that such a thing would probably hap- 
pen, to give them any prior information whatever, as it was not 
desired that anything be known in regard to the movement until it 
was practically started. The wires were practically all down in the 
State, so communication was very difficult. Yet by 1.10 o'clock 
on Sunday morning, the first company was moving, by that night 
all the" companies m the State were moving, and they arrived in 
Pittsburgh at about 5 o'clock the next morning except the train I 
was on from Topeka, which was wrecked, the entire train being 
thrown into the ditch, apparently by some sympathizer of the miners. 
After the engine and the baggage cars had passed over the switch 
the switch was thrown and the rest of the train went over into the 
ditch, delaying us so that we did not get there until late in the after- 
noon. 

That day and that night the troops were distributed over an area 
of 50 miles in length and about 15 miles in width and took over 2S 
strip mines ; the companies were divided and provision was made for 
housing and messing the volunteer labor — about 900 men. All the 
troops and laborers were in camp that night, and the next morning- 



ABMY BBORGAinZATION. 1005 

the mining of coal commenced, and the shortage of coal was being 
rapidly relieved when the strike was settled. 

Mr. Anthont. I suppose many of the National Guardsmen were 
veterans of the late war? 

Gen. Martin. Not very many. This organization was organized 
in the fall of 1918, or the summer of 1918, oef ore the troops nad re- 
turned. Some have come into the organization since that time, but 
the greater percentage of the men are men who were not in the serv- 
ice during the war. The regiment is composed of boys between the 
ages of 18 and 21 years who wanted to get into the service but who 
had not had an opportunity, and men who were expecting that they 
would be called under the selective-service act, and of the older men 
who were beyond the age and who desired to render some patriotic 
service during the war. Quite a number of the officers. had seen 
service during the war. That, of course, made it much more effec- 
tive than it would have been if we had not had experienced officers. 

Mr. Anthony. You found that this very important service to the 
public was thoroughly well rendered by the National Guard men? 

Gen. Martin. Exceptionally so. T do not think I ever saw any 
more difficult service anywhere, not even in the Philippines nor in 
France, except in actual battle, than this service was, and I never saw 
any service rendered more efficiently and more effectively. 

The weather conditions were frightful. You will remember that 
during the past two weeks the conditions were bad all over the coun- 
try, and that was especially true iii our section of the country. The 
roads were almost impassable. The temperature dropped down to 
zero at one time, and yet these troops went out over that barren coun- 
try and stayed in tents and kept fairly comfortable. And the most 
remarkable thing in the whole situation to me is the fact that under 
those conditions, splitting the troops up as we did, that the volunteer 
workers were fed and housed to their satisfaction, and that there 
was practically no sickness and no one was injured. 

Mr. Anthony. That is very interesting. Now, if you will give the 
committee the benefit of any suggestions you may have in reference 
to any needed changes in the National Guard law, we will be glad to 
have such suggestions. 

Gen. Martin. Personally, I think the best fouijdation on which to 
build legislation for a military policy at this time is the national- 
defense act. In most respects that was a splendid law. As the 
adjutant general of a State, and I have been adjutant general of my 
State for 12 years, except for the period of time I was in the service 
during this war, I found that law very satisfactory in most cases. 
But the law was not administered, in my judgment, in the spirit in 
which it was enacted by Congress. At the time we came beiore the 
committee here in 1916 to present our views as to National Guard leg- 
islation there were some things in the proposed legislation in which, 
of course, we did not quite agree with some members of the com- 
mittee. Mr. Hay was chairman of the committee, and it was his 
bill, and he was rather hard-headed and hewed strictly to the lines 
he had in mind, and therefore it was not quite as we thought it should 
be. But we all felt that the law was a good one, and that if it was 
ardministered in the spirit in which this committee at that time — 
3nd I see the faces here of many of the members of that committee — 



1906 ABMY BEOBGANIZATION. 

the spirit in which they approved the bill and the spirit with which 
it was presented and adopted by Congress had been carried out in 
the administration of the hiw, that it would have been satisfactory. 

Mr. Anthony. As a matter of fact, there was no time to put the 
provisions of that act into practical operation? 

Gen. Martin. It was not very thoroughly tested. The law did not 
go into effect until June 3, 1916. About a month later our troops 
were all called out for service on the border and stayed there from 
six to eight months, and then they came back from that service and 
seemed led up with service — using an English expression we heard 
so much in France — ^they were so fed up with that service on the 
border and being away from their families and their business that 
they were anxious for a little rest. But in a very short time we got 
the guard back to active service again in the way of training and 
instruction, and when this war came on and they were called into the 
service again so that we had very little opportunity to see just how 
the law would operate, except that unfortunately it seemed to me 
in time of war when everyone should have exercised good judgment 
and good common sense in the organization of new units to complete 
our quota we were hampered by a strict adherence to regulations pro- 
mulgated for the organization of units in time of peace. 

For instance, Kansas was allotted Cavalry and Artillery units to 
organize, but we were required in the organization of these units to 
comply with peace-time regulations which required us to provide 
suitable armories for the units and stables for the horses. 

Mr, Anthony.. And neither one of those things had a direct bear- 
ing on the use of troops in war ? 

Gen. Martin. What I was going to say was this, that those who 
were administering the law at that time ought to have known that 
these troops would never occupy those armories permanently, that 
horses would never be issued to 'them at their home station ; and yet 
I was required to make contracts with the business men of the com- 
munities and make arrangements for armories and for stables for 
horses before I could get the organization to the point where I could 
ask that it be inspected by a Federal inspector for recognition. 

That caused considerable misunderstanding. The business men 
could not understand why I was entering into contracts with them 
for a permanent armory and permanent stables when I knew and 
they knew I was not going to use those facilities. 

This was not required under the law but was required under the 
regulations issued by the War Department. The regulations we 
accept as law, because the law gives to those in authority the power to 
make regulations which will be binding on the National Guard, and 
under ordinary conditions no one would object to that procedure. 
But under those conditions it seemed utterly absurd to require com- 
pliance with such regulations. Waiver of these requirements was 
refused. 

I bring that out to bring to your mind the lack of understanding 
and proper cooperation in the administering of the National Guard 
law. Those who administer the law apparently do not understand 
National Guard conditions, and, apparently, the attitude taken that 
we are not trying to develop an organization that we can develop, 
but that we are trying to slip something over on the Federal Gov- 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 1907 

ernment, to make them pay for something which they ought not to 
pay for. 

I do not know about the conditions in other States. But in my 
State the administration of the National Guard is purely in the 
interest of the Government; it is purely patriotic, and if it was not, 
everybody in the State would call me a damn fool for giving m^\ 
time to it, because I do not get enough out of it to keep me there. 
The National Guard went into this service in good faith and purely 
from a patriotic standpoint, believing it could do some good for its 
country. But the National Guard had no more than landed at the 
various camps to which it was assigned — and I say this, except as 
to the camp at which I was myself stationed, purely from hearsay — 
when we found that those who were sent there to command and get 
this force trained for service came there with prejudice against the 
guard and did all they could to discredit the oflacers. 

We found at once — and we were not looking for any difficulties 
whatever; we absolutely went there free from anything of that 
kind — ^but we found at once that this condition prevailed so far as 
the Regular Army officer was concerned — ^that he was presumed to 
know everything, and that he had to fail time and time again in 
the performance of his duties before any cognizance was taken of 
it, while, on the other hand, the National Guard officer was pre- 
sumed to know nothing, and he had to show time and time again 
that he did know his business before he was given any consideration 
whatever. 

During the whole time that I was in Camp Doniphan I was presi- 
dent of an efficiency board. Time after time, and time after time, 
officers were sent before this board for the most frivolous things 
you could imagine. Now, I am not criticising the provision for an 
efficiency board. Nobody is more critical and would go further to 
check up and eliminate inefficient officers than the National Guard 
itself. It has a pride in its organization, and those men who are not 
competent to serve, the National Guard does not want, because it is 
a reflection on the organization. 

Within six weeks after that division was gotten together the acting 
division commander said to me one day — the division commander 
being overseas at that time — " I do not believe I could do anything 
that would please the division commander better than to eliminate 
two-thirds of the officers of this division." Now, what on earth he 
had in mind I do not know. Those men were men of force in their 
communities, men who had spent years in training in the National 
Guard, who had gone to special schools and had graduated from those 
schools, or had completed the courses in those schools with high 
honors. Many of them during their service were given medals of 
honor for the service which they rendered. I simply say that to show 
you the attitude that we met. 

This officer who was in command of the division said to me one 
evening when I was making a social call on him, " General, do your 
officers hate you ? " And 1 said, " No ; I think not ; I hope not." 
" Well," he said, " by God, you want them ^o hate you." 

I am giving you these points to show you the attitude that we met 
upwith. This same officer said to me, speaking of the enlisted men, 
"We have got to have such discipline that when you go into battle 
your officers will shoot men if they fail to go forward." I said, " My 



1908 ABMY BE0B6AKIZATI0N. 

God, General, jrou are not talking about these men. I have served 
with men just like these in another war. You will not have to have 
such discipline that officers will have to shoot them to make them go 
forward. You will have to have such discipline and control over 
those men that you can control them and keep them from going too 
far when they go into battle." That was my experience in the Philip- 
pine Islands, and that proved to be true in this organization when it 
went into battle. 

The board of which I was chairman had a hearing for an officer 
who was before it on his efficiency. The records were sent to Wash- 
ington and sent back for additional testimony. We asked the division 
commander to ^ve us a witness who would give additional testimony 
as to the inefficiency of this officer. He said, " I do not know of any- 
body." I said to him, " Would yeu like to testify before the board? 
We must have some evidence before we can make any additional 
record in this case." He said, " Yes,"Jie would. 

We had the hearing and I asked him to state to the board anything 
he could relating to the efficiency or the inefficiency of the officer. He 
said, " I do not like his appearance." I said, " General, is there any- 
thing else you can give in regard to the inefficiency of this officer? " 
He said, " I do not like him." I said, " Is there anything else? " He 
said, " No." That was the record that went back to Washington, and 
that officer w as reinstated and rendered most valuable service during 
the war. ; 

Now, I have been in the military service ever since I was 19 years 
old. I have had the greatest admiration and respect possible for one to 
have for our Regular Army. I think we have the best Regular Army 
of any nation in the world. But I was terribly disappointed during 
this war with the inefficiency that developed in the Army. I do not 
know whether they can help that or not. I am not criticizing the 
Army on that account. But I do say to you members of this com- 
mittee, in your future plans for any military service of any kind, 
whether it be of the Regular Army, the National Guard, or anything 
else, that you should devise a plan wherein that kind of service should 
be eliminated. I mean the inefficient portion of it. 

Mr. Anthony. Whether it is the Regular Army or National 
Guard ? 

Gen. JVIabtin. T^Tiether it is Regular Army, National Guard, or 
any kind of an organization, that when it has been shown that there 
is inefficiency, that that inefficiency should be eliminated from that 
organization. I believe that the inefficiency in the Army is largely 
due to the system under which Army officers are selected. If you 
were to take the graduates of a medical school and say to them that 
*'You are going to continue in your profession throughout your 
life, regardless of whether you make a success of it or not, and you 
practice that profession for a period of years in a certain class, tiien 
go on into higher grades, until you get to the highest grade of the 
medical profession," and send every one of those graduates through 
that course, you would find that there would be a great many ineffi- 
cient medical men at the top of the profession. In other words, doc- 
tors who show that they have the real ability to practice medicine, 
succeed, and those who have not are eliminated. The same thing is 
true in law or any other profession you may take; while in the Army 
there is no means of eliminating that class of officers. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1909 

Personally, I do not think much of the idea of the promotion of 
Army officers bv selection. The most efficient officers, or amon^ the 
mostefficient omcers, might be overlooked, because they did notliave 
an opportunity to show their efficiency in the presence of those who 
might be doing the selecting. But I do believe in a strong system 
of elimination, something that will get out of the service those who 
are inefficient. Then I think we will have the greatest Army any 
country can hope to have. 

Now, in regard to the National Guard service. We so frequently 
meet up in the administration of the National Guard with conditions 
that those in authority here in Washington who are administering 
the law do not seem to understand. The officers sent out to us as 
inspector instructors, if they are the right sort, very soon understand 
these problems and wholly agree with us in regard to conditions. 
If we could get that class of officers to administer the National 
Guard, we would not have so much difficulty. I am not speaking 
of any particular administration of affairs of the Guard; one may 
be good, and another may not be so good — ^but it is largely due to 
the fact of the misunderstanding, the prejudice against the organi- 
zation. 

You people have got to formulate plans for the military policy of 
this country. You must take into consideration the conditions in 
our wars. In the Spanish War a very large percentage of the sol- 
diers who fought that war were the citizen soldiers. In this war a 
much greater percentage of the soldiers who fought the war were 
the citizen soldiers. That being true, has not the citizen soldiery 
some right of consideration in the matter of proper development 
and training, so as to prepare them to meet conditions which they 
must undoubtedly meet in case there is another war? 

This bill which has been presented to Congress by the National 
Guard Association of the United States was prepared by a committee 
of the association based upon resolutions passed by the association at 
its convention. About six weeks ago this bill was carefully gone 
over by the adjutants general association and approved. We felt 
that in order to get a proper administration of the law, a sympa- 
thetic administration of the law — ^by that I do not mean we want 
the law to be administered in a way which is not the intent of the 
law, but that it will be administered in a friendly way — ^that the 
Militia Bureau should be in charge of National Guard officers. We 
also felt that our organization being the largest military organization 
in this country, should have some sort of a staff which wouldrepresent 
it and which would get together and coordinate the ideas of the 
National Guard of the various States and formulate regulations 
governing that organization. Therefore we put into our bill a pro- 
vision for a National Guard council. 

You men come from the various States and you know the situa- 
tions in the various States are not the same, and that by getting 
a representative from the National Guard of each State together in 
Wasnington twice each year officially to discuss the problems of the 
organization and to formulate regulations for the organization, that 
they are going to create esprit in the organization, and that they are 
going to do that which will make the organization as efficient as it 
IS possible to make it, and we feel that that would be very much in the 
interest of the National Guard. Those are new provisions. 

150187— 20— VOL 2 8 



1910 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

The other provisions of the bill are changes in the national defense 
act. One of the changes is in regard to pay. I think I have had one 
of the best National Guard regiments in my State for the last year 
that I have ever seen. And yet that organization to this day has 
not been able to draw any pay for the service which it has rendered, 
and which Congress intended it should get for its service. 

Mr. Anthony. Why is that, because of the stringent regulations 
drawn up by the department under which the law is administered? 

Gen. Martin. Because of the stringent regulations -and immense 
amount of red tape necessary to get to the point where the pay can 
be drawn. 

I want to be absolutely fair about that. In the first place my de- 

Eartment has had absolutely nothing to do with those rolls. They 
ave gone from the organization to the department in which we 
are, from the department to the bureau, and from the bureau to the 
disbursing department here in Washin^on. Say the organization 
commanders have made some mistake m the preparation of their 
rolls. Some 30 or 60 days after that the department at Chicago 
gets through with the roll and sends it to Washington. It is some 
time after that that the department gets through with it, and when it 
comes back for corrections to be made on that roll. Then it has to 
go back through the various channels and the corrections are made 
and it is started back on its course again. Then perhaps something 
wrong is found again, and back it goes again. So that the common 
talk among the enlisted men is along this line, " Oh, well, that is 
just a piece of bunk ; there is not anything to the pay. We will not 
get any pay." That is doing a great deal more harm than if there 
was not any provision whatever in the law for pay. 

The pay proposition should be based upon a monthly rate of 
pay, and the payments should be made either by the disbursing officer 
m the vicinity of the State or by the State disbursing officer or by a 
Federal officer, in whose office those matters could be checked up. 
He is under bond and accountable for any errors he makes in the 
pay, and payment should be made monthly. Then, the soldier will 
know that he will get it. 

Then, there is another thing. We are required to have 60 per 
cent of the organization present for the required number of drills, 
which is 24 during a six months' period or 40 during a yearly period. 
A man might be present at every drill in the year and yet not draw a 
cent of pay under that provision of the law. It is not fair to 
penalize a man in that way. If Congress says to a man that he is 
going to get pay for service, his pay should not depend upon the 
conduct of somebody else. 

Mr. Anthony. It provision is made in the new law for the or- 
ganization of minimum companies of the guard, giving them time in 
which to organize up to the required strength, would that help? 

Gen. Martin. It is still based upon the percentage of the strength 
of the organization. 

Mr. Anthony. You believe the National Guard soldier who does 
render efficient service should be paid for it? 

Gen. Martin. I certainly do. There should either be no provision 
of law for payment of these soldiers or else the soldier who ren- 
ders service should get pay for the service which he renders. 



ARMY RE0RGA3<riZATI0N. 19 H 

Mr. Anthony. As Maj. Critchfield says, it should not be based 
upon the fact that some other fellow did not show up for drill? 

Gen. Mabtin. No. Then, another thing: The organization should 
have credit for the men who are not able to be present at that drill 
if it is going to be upon a percentage basis. You know, if there 
was an organization of the guard in your town, it would be composed 
of men who might have various things that would happen on drill 
nights that would honestly prevent them from attending that drill. 
They might have to go away on a business trip on that particular 
night or else lose a large sum of money for failure to go on that 
particular night. Pay is based now upon a certain percentage which 
must be present at the same time. 

I do not criticize that idea. Of course, the idea is to have as large 
an organization as possible present for drill, on the theory that the 
larger the organization the better instruction will be, which is true. 
I do not criticize that idea at all. 

Another thing that hampers us very materially is the regulation 
governing pay of officers. The regulation provides that there must 
be present at drills more than 50 per cent of the officers. There are 
three officers in the company, and if two of those officers should 
happen to be away, and every man in the company was present, 
nobody would get credit for that drill. That is absurd. 

Then, again, an officer may resign and his resignation be accepted, 
hut there may be delay in .selecting a proper officer to take his place. 
That again will affect the pay. 

Another proposition in regard to the regulations which has re- 
cently come out, and which I think is not correct at all in principle, 
and is absolutely in excess of the authority of law, is this : You will 
remember that at the last session of Congress you passed a law 
changing the enlistment period in such a way that a man could enlist 
for either three years or for one year ? The regulation as it comes to 
us provides that that proportion must be maintained. Let us say 
there are three young men, three buddies, who want to join the Na- 
tional Guard. The captain must say, " I can only enlist one of you 
for a year, but the other two have got to enlist for three years." 

Of course, those boys who are not familiar with everything in con- 
nection with the matter of enlistment think that some sort of a bunk 
game is being played on them, and they do not understand why if one 
can enlist for one year they can not all. enlist for one year. But the. 
regulation says the proportion must be maintained at all times. 

Mr. Anthony. We proposed to pjrovide an enlistment for one 
year or three years and make it optional with the recruit. If the 
same provision was adopted for the National Guard that would cure 
the situation ? 

Gen. Martin. If you do not have to maintain that prorata. 

Mr. Anthony. By regulation? 

Gen. Martin. By regulation. If a man comes in and says " I want 
to enlist for one year or three years," let him take his choice. 

Mr. Anthony. What would be the effect of a straight one-year 
enlistment in the National Guard ? 

Gen. Martin. I think the three-year enlistment is better. I think 
the men who have had service ought to be permitted to enlist for one 
vear. But the other men should enlist for three years. I do not 
believe in the one-year enlistment except for service men. 



I 

1912 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. McKenzie. How about reenlistment ? 

Gen. Martin. Reenlistment for one year. The man who reenlists 
has had service. A new man takes on a contract for three years. 
A regulation has recently come out which says that the National 
Guard, which has been in existence for some time, can avail itself 
of this provision of the law, but the ratio must be maintained. One 
man can enlist for one year, and the next man, say, for three years, 
and the next man for one year, and the other for two or three years. 
But it says any man who avails himself of the privilege of enlisting 
for one year must forfeit all pay and allowances due him prior to 
the time he takes on a new enlistment contract. Who has the right 
by regulation to forfeit any man's pay, which he has justly earned, 
under a law passed by Congress ? Ido not think that can be done. 

Here is another provision I want to call attention to. In my State 
this year we had a 15-day camp of instruction. You have got to 
figure out what is the most suitable titoe for your camp of instruc- 
tion in order to interfere in the least possible way with the business 
of the members of the organization. You can not very well run over 
the end of a month or the beginning of 'a month, because that is the 
time when people are adjusting their accounts and business men 
have to be at home to take care of their business. In figuring that 
out this summer, we fixed a period in Au^st from the 17th to the 
31st. When our rolls went in the disbursing ofiicer was suspended 
on his payment for the 31st of the month. The law distinctly says 
that the pay for the National Guard shall be for the period of time 
covering the period from the time they left their home station until 
their return thereto — and it is not a yearly proposition as the Army 
pay is. Because we happened to run into the 31st day of the month, 
those men who rendered that service have got to lose their pay for 
that day of the month. I do not think that is a good law. 

Mr. Crago. Is it a regulation ? 

Gen. Martin. It is a decision of the comptroller. 

Col. Heavey. It is a decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury 
Department, construing that law ? 

Gen. Martin. In regard to the National Guard. 

Col. Heavey. In regard to Government payment. 

Gen. Martin. Here is a law passed by Congress and it says that 
these men shall be paid so much a day for the period of time they 
are in camp. 

Col. Heavey. The matter has been considered in the Militia Bu- 
reau and we are prepared to recommend a change in the law which 
governs the Treasury Department. 

Gen. Carter. The law states carefully the rate of pay and the law 
also requires that National Guardsmen in the Federal service shall 
receive the same pay as the Regular Army. 

Gen. Martin. That means that the rate of pay for a month would 
be the same. 

Mr. Crago. The only answer to that would be not to fix the date 
of ihe camp in that way. 

Gen. Martin. We could not avoid it very well. 

Mr. Crago. You could have started one day sooner. 

Gen. Martin. You do not understand the conditions, and if 1 
were to explain the conditions under which we held the camp 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1913 

Mr. Crago. It is hard to have a general law covering all those 
points; there must be some good reason ic^ that ruling. 

Gen. Martin. The ruling is based upon the 30-day month for the 
Army. We are only in camp for 15 days. What difference does it 
make what 15 days we render the service in? 

Mr. Crago. That fault is in the law in not specifying that they 
should be paid so much a day. 

Mr. Anthony. The trouble is in the highly technical interpreta- 
tion of the law instead of a practical interpretation ? 

Gen. Martin. It seems so to me. 

Mr. Sanford. You will find down here that you have a somewhat 
different viewpoint of the law. The law down here is what the comp- 
troller says is so, and if he says it is law, then it is law. 

Gen. Martin. I recognize that fact. 

Mr. Crago. I know how the regulations as to the pay of men 
works. It is ludicrous. They made a regulation based on the idea 
that the men had not anything else to do on the drill nights, and that 
notwithstanding conditions, every man would turn up. The regula- 
tions are very different froni what you would think would be neces- 
sary under section 92 of the national defense act. They made it so 
that a very efficient company, as we would consider it in the National 
Guard, could not get any pay at all. You have certain require- 
ments laid down by the regulations ; you may have so many men one 
night and the next night there may be an entirely different number 
of men, but you will have a fairly representative number of men in 
your company, and you will do good work. I think it is absurd to 
try to follow the regulations as laid down, in a volunteer organi- 
zation. • 

Mr. Hull. I want to ask Gen.' Carter or Col. Heavey a question in 
regard to this ruling. Was this concrete case put up to the Comp- 
troller of the Treasury, and did he say you could not pay the National 
Guard for the 31st day, or did he rule that you could not pay the 
Kegular Army for the 31st day and you applied it to the National 
Guard? 

Gen. Carter. The bureau had nothing whatever to do with it. The 
decision was made by Jthe Comptroller of the Treasury, and that 
governed the disbursing officers of the Army. 

Mr. Hull. Of the Eegular Army? 

Gen. Carter. Anybody employed on a monthly salary basis, men 
in the Regular Army, or anyone else. 

Gen. Martin. What we want is somebody representing the Na- 
tional Guard in the Militia Bureau who will recognize these things 
and will fight to the finish for them. 

I am not criticizing Gen. Garter ; I think he has been working very 
faithfully to build up the National Guard. But I think there are 
many things that the General does not understand about our organi- 
zation ; there are many things I do not understand about his organi- 
zation. I want to be absolutely fair on these propositions. 

I hope in the enactment of a law to govern the National Guard 
that Congress will see to it this time that the organization, when it 
goes into service, does not loose its identity. 



1914 ARMY BJJORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Anthony. Mr. McKenzie, did you not offer an amendment to 
one of the bills previous to this war which practically provided that 
the State organizations should not lose their identity? 

Mr. McKenzee. That was in the draft act. 

Mr. Crago. They did that under the authority of the Overman Act? 

Mr. Anthony. They disregarded absolutely the intent of Congress. 

Mr. HuLii. They disregarded the amendment before the Overman 
Act was passed, did they not? 

Mr. Dent. I think they did. 

Mr. Hull. They disregarded it before the Overman Act was 
passed and attention was called to it in debate on the draft act. 

Gen. Martin. It seems to me that the strongest factor in building 
up an organization of this kind is the localization of that organiza- 
tion. My observations in France were that all the other armies ex- 
cept our own ran strongly to that feature of localization for their 
organizations, while it was the declared policy of our own Army to 
get a fellow away from his buddies as far as you could possibly get 
him and not let any two men get together who happened to know 
each other. I know that is ruinous to proper esprit. Before you can 
localize the organizations — and that is not only true of the citizen 
soldiery, but it is true of the Army, too — ^the more you can localize the 
organizations the more efficient organizations you are going to have. 
The men will be all working together and everybody in the organi- 
zation will be working for the same purpose, and it is working to 
make a record for its own comunity, and when it comes back it gets 
credit for the record it has made. I think we would have a more 
efficient Eegular Army if we had our regiments organized by States 
instead of at large, as we have them organized now. 

I wanted to make this suggestion, that in my opinion there ought 
to be established in each State in the Union a supply depot where the 
troops of that State could be equipped, where all emergencies could 
be taken care of so that when a war comes on and there is any increase 
in the troops the troops from that locality could be equipped from 
that point, so that we would not have the spectacle of sending men 
to a mobilization camp in civilian clothes and without proper equip- 
ment. 

Mr. McKenzie. You would be in favor of keeping that within 
certain limitations ; that might depend upon the number of men you 
would want to send to camp ? 

Gen. Martin. I would keep it within the limitation of the number 
that will probably be called from that locality. I do not know what 
Congress will finally determine as its military policy, but I would 
have that sufficient to provide for whatever troops are likely to be 
called from that locality. 

Mr. Anthony. Was not the delay in issuing equipment to the 
newly formed levies due to the fact that the country did not have 
the equipment, instead of being due to the delay in storage centers ? 

Gen. Martin. That is probably true. My regiment of Infantry 
which I have now was recognized by the Federal Government in 
1918, but it has not all of its equipment yet. 

Mr. Anthony. Why has it not? 

Gen. Martin. I do not know ; requisitions have been in for months. 
My squadron of Cavalry, which was recognized some three months 
ago, has not anywhere near all its equipment yet. I have been in the 



ABMT BE0B6AKIZATI0N. 1915 

field with my troops for the last three weeks without equipment for 
the sanitary unit of my regiment. The first equipment my Cavalry 
received was, the butts for the rifles. We have not got the rifles yet, 
although I tried to get them rushed in for the emergency that we 
have. 

Mr. Sanfobd. Have you got the saddles ? ' 

Gen. Makhn. I do not think so ; we may have them, but I do not 
think so. 

Mr. H1JI4L. If we put a militia bureau provision in the law, what 
is your opinion in regard to the success you would have in building 
up your National Guard in your State % 

Gen. Martin. If you put in the law 

Mr. Huiji (interposing). Put in a provision for a separate militia 
bureau and put a National Guard officer at the head of it. 

Gen. Martin. The essential thing in order to build up the National 
Guard is the guaranty that the National Guard organizations when 
they go into the service will be retained as National Guard organiza- 
tions and that their officers will be retained with them, and that when 
the service is over they will return as units to the National Guard 
again and not be eliminated as they were this time, and that pro- 
motions in the National Guard may not come from all sources out- 
side of the National Guard and not in the National Guard ; and the 
ffeature which you spoke of as secondary would build up the guard. 

Mr. HuMi. Would not that feature carry with it the other? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. Did it ever occur to you. General, that the purpose 
and perhaps the motive back of the disintegration of the units of the 
National Guard when they were taken into the service, or their dis- 
integration when they returned, was due to a plan to destroy the 
guard ? 

Gen. Martin. I have heard a good many officers say that is what 
It was done for. I do not know that they know. 

Mr. McKenzie. Would it be your idea in case of war and the 
National Guard being drafted into the service or called into the 
service that they should serve as State units during the war and 
when the war is over they would be discharged from the service of 
the United States and they could go back to their towns as units in 
the National Guard organization which they were at the time they 
were called out? Then suppose that in tte meantime, while they 
were doing that work half a aozen fellows came along and organized 
another National Guard regiment or company, and when these 
other boys came home from the war it would be to find their old 
places had been usurped. Is it your idea that they should keep the 
places open for these men when they get back to their communities, 
so that tney could step right back into these places? 

Gen. Martin. My idea is that the National Guard in time of war 
^should maintain its entity the same as the Regular Army does. 

Mr. McKenzie. That was true in 1898 when they went back as 
companies and battalions of the National Guard. 

Mr. Anthony. General, the subcommittee which has been study- 
ing the proposed amendments to the National Guard legislation have 
tentatively agreed upon the proposition that the Chief of the Militia 
Bureau shall be a National Guard officer ; we have practically agreed 



1916 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

apon the authorization of a minimum organization for a period of 
one year in order to build up the National Guard. You are in favor 
of those two propositions ? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. We have also practically agreed to the plan of de- 
tailing a certain number of officers of the National Guard for active 
duty with the Army for a period of not more than one year, the idea 
being to distribute a certain percentage of National Guard officers in 
all branches of the service in order to unify the service of the guard 
and the Army as far as possible. Do you think that is a ^ood idea i 

Gen. Martin. I think it would be beneficial to both services. 

Mr. Anthony. You also believe that this Council of National 
Guard Officers which under the provisions of your bill would meet 
in Washington twice a year would be further beneficial to the guard* 
Would that assume the functions of a general staff for the guard; 
would that be the idea of it? 

Gen. Martin. Yes; to a limited extent. 

Mr. Anthony. In so far as questions of policy and administra- 
tion were concerned ? 

Gen. Martin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. And recommendations from that body would go 
to the Secretary of War, I suppose? 

Gen. Martin. To the Secretary of War. I think one of the great 
difficulties, Mr. Anthony 

Mr. Anthont (interposing). Would there be much expense in- 
volved in that? Under the provisions of this bill it is limited to the 
pay of a colonel for not to exceed two months a year. If it was an 
officer of the rank of captain he would draw a captain's pay for the 
time he was on duty? 

Gen. Martin. Yes; if he was a brigadier general he would draw 
a colonel's pajr. 

Mr. Hull. Each of the 48 States would have a representative ? 

Gen. Martin. Yes; it is limited to 60 days. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you think such a council would go far toward 
unifying the National Guard service in the different States? 

Gen. Martin. Yes ; they are all working to the same purpose, and 
in getting together these representative officers, I should say these 
officers should be line officers and that they should not only formulate 
regulations or recommend regulations to be formulated for the 
National Guard but that they should study conditions in the various 
States, which should be beneficial to each other in the maintenance 
of organizations. 

Mr. McKbnzie. Is there not a possibility that such an organization 
of the character of which you speak might lead to friction between 
the National Guard and the Regular Army in the matter of regula- 
tions and policy? 

Gen. Martin. This organization would have nothing to do with 
anything except fixing regulations for the governing of the Na- 
tional Guard, and how that could create any friction between the 
Regular Army and the National Guard, I do not see. It seems to 
me it would eliminate friction. 

Personally, I want to see ever3i;hing possible done to strengthen 
our Regular Army and make it more efficient. I believe, as I said 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1917 

before, it is the most efficient Regular Army in the world to-day, but 
I think there are many things which could increase its efficiency,, 
and I want at the same time to increase the efficiency of the National 
Guard as far as possible. There is nothing to the organization 
merely. We do hot care to belong to an organization that is not 
constantly increasing in efficiency and doing everything it can to 
increase its efficiency. 

Mr. McKenzie. I assume we are practically all friends of the Na- 
tional Gruard on this committee, and we appreciate very thoroughly 
the work which has been done by the National Guard. But thjBre 
are certain things we must think about as legislators in connection 
with matters of national defense. 

Of course, the National Guard is, in a sense, a State organization, 
and State legislatures pass certain laws to encourage the National 
Guard. We are interested as Members of Congress in developing 
a body of men for the national defense. 

Gen. Martin. Certainly. 

Mr. McKjenzie. That body of men composed of the Regular Army 
as one element and the National Guard as another element, and to 
look at both as elements in the matter of national defense. It is 
not up to us to enact any legislation that will drive these two great 
forces further apart, but we want to do everything that we can to 
coordinate them and make them one force so far as the national de- 
fense is concerned, and the only thought in my mind is whether your 
proposition would strengthen the National Guard and at the same 
time give us greater strength in the matter of national defense by 
coordinating the two bodies. If it will do that I will support it, 
but it suggested to my mind the thought that perhaps there might 
be some friction between that sort of an organization and the Gen- 
eral Staff of the Regular Army. 

Gen. Martin. May I ask you a question, Mr. McKenzie? 

Mr. McKenzie. Yes. 

Gen. Martin. We have no more efficient organization in this coun- 
try than the Marine Corps, have we? 

Mr. McKenzie. I think they are all right. 

Gen. Martin. The Regular Army and the Marine Corps are ad- 
ministered separately, and yet they cooperate in time of war. Whj'^ 
can not the National Guard be administered separately and the Ma- 
rine Corps be administered separately and yet all working under 
the Secretary of War and all following the same system of training? 
So far as I am concerned, I want all the help from the Regular Army 
I can get. They can not send me too many Regular Army officers 
as inspector-instructors or sergeant instructors, provided they are 
there for the purpose of cooperation and helping develop the organi- 
zation, and that is the kind I have had so far. 

Mr. McKenzie. Of course, on the field of battle the Regular Army 
troops and the National Guard troops and the marines fight along 
side by side, under one system of regulations. 

Gen. Martin. That is right. 

Mr. McKenzie. And there is no friction, and there ought not to 
be. The only thing I am asking you about is whether or not in peace 
time, in trying to develop this National Guard force, this proposed 
organization would lead to any friction? 



1918 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Gen. Martin. I do not think so. If I thought it would endanger 
the defense of this country a single bit I would be absolutely op- 
posed to it. I would be opposed to anything that would do that. 

Mr. McKenzie. I believe you when you say that. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you or your people in Kansas believe that any 
obligation should be imposed on all eligible male citizens in Kansas 
to prepare them to be soldiers? 

Gren. Martin. You are speaking now of universal training? 

Mr. Sanford. That means so many different things — ^yes, in sub- 
stance, if that is clear to you, described in that way. 

Gen. Martin. A majority of the people are opposed to universal 
training. . 

Mr. Sanford. You think the militia men upon whom the law 

places the duty to fight in time of war should be allowed to choose 

. for themselves when they will get ready to do that ; is that the idea ? 

And that only persons who are patriotic and who care to come in 

should come in? 

Gen. Martin. In time of peace. 

Mr. Sanford. And that they should leave the preparation of these 
for defense until war comes; is that the policy of the people of 
Kansas ? 

Gen. Martin. I think that is the belief; you probably put it a 
little more baldly than they would put it themselves. 

Mr. Sanford. That is their policy, apparently. 

(lon. Martin. I think that is the way they would vote. 

Mr. Anthony. Would you not. go further and say that 99 per 
cent of the people of Kansas are patriotic and ready to volunteer 
their services^ 

(ien. Martin. I think so. 

Mr. Sanford. I am not questioning their patriotism. But their 
notion ap{)eai*s to be that it is a matter that can be delayed until 
wnr is declared. 

(lon. Martin. I think our people would probably look with favor 
upon the encouragement of training through the schools. 

Mr. Sanford. lou think they would favor physical training 
through the schools? 

(lon, Martin. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And some military training, too? 

Gen. Martin. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you think if the Federal Government advo- 
cated or adopted such a policy that such a policy would find accept- 
ance in Kansas? 

Gen, Martin. I think so. 

Mr. Sanford. So any plan that provided for training the youths 
of Kansas through the schools, physicallv and in a militarj' sense, 
would meet with the approval of the people out there? 

(ien, Martin. I think it would. 

Mr. Sanf(^rd, That is encouraging, 

(lon. Martin. Our people are much opposed to taking youtlis of 
18 or 19 years of age away to cantonments and keeping them there 
from three to six months in compulsory military training. 

Mr. SANFt)FD. So that the objection is to taking the boys away from 
homo and putting them into a camp: a i>erfectly natural objection. 



ARMY BEOBGAKIZATION. ' 1919 

Gen. Martin. I think they would have less objection to it if the 
boys could be trained in their own locality and under officers that 
they know and have confidence in. 

Mr. SANroRD. And by some method that would be incidental to 
their schooling. 

Gen. Martin. The people object to taking their boys away at the 
formative period in their lives when they are developing their char- 
acter, and when the mother is getting the last chance at them. We 
know that when a boy reaches 21, in the usual course of events he 
is gone from the mother, and she tries to put off that period as far 
as she can, and that sort of thing has a big influence out there. 

I came direct from the coal fields, Mr. Chairman, and had no 
opportunity to prepare a statement, and my remarks have been 
somewhat rambling. 

Mr. Anthony. I think you have given us some opinions and in- 
formation that can not fail to be helpful. 

Mr. MoRiN. Which do you think would be for the best interests 
of the country, to bring the boys into the cantonments and train 
them there for three months or six months, or give them training 
in the schools at home? 

Gen. Martin. I would say in the schools. I am very strongly of 
that opinion. But if you do bring them into the cantonments for 
training, make it six months and get it over with and give them 
somethmg which will be worth while. 

Mr. Sanford. You think the boys could get quite a lot of military 
instruction in the schools ? 

Gen. Martin. I know they could. Our young men in this coun- 
try are pretty intelligent, and it does not take them lon^ to become 
soldiers. The thing that makes a soldier is the hardening process 
that makes it possible for him to stand hardships and the fatigue of 
the camp, and that takes time. But the actual learning of things 
necessary for a man to know to be a soldier does not take our boys 
very long. But I think it would be a wonderful thing in this coun- 
try if we could get military training into the schools and get away 
from these strenuous athletic programs we have which weakens the 
heart and which may give a few people a chance for physical de- 
velopment, and instead of doing that develop all the boys. And if 
you could get in connection with that a system of physical examina- 
tions, to teach the boy the great need of having a perfect physical 
body, it would be a very good thing. 

Mr. Anthony. I take it then that you are in favor of the extension 
of the activities of the reserve officers training corps which have 
been started in this country? 

Gen. Martin. Yes ; but I think a better plan is set out in our bill. 

Mr. Olney. Would you be in favor of giving the National Guard 
longer intensive training than it is generally accustomed to in that 
hardening process ? 

Gen. Martin. It does not do any good to take a man out in the 
summer and harden him up for two or three months, and then have 
him go back to his business, and then all the hardening process must 
take place again at the time he goes into war. This is done by the 
Regular Establishment. They are hardened more, but that harden- 
ing process has to take place at the time they go into war. 



1920 ARMY REORGANIZATION, 

Mr. Olnet. In this legislation you favor as far as possible the 
federalization of the National Guard ? 

Gen. Martin. Yes. 

Mr. Hull. Take a young man, say at 21 years of age, and give him 
two years of training such as the National Guard does, or give him 
three months of training which is proposed in the bills now priding 
in Congress, would he be a better soldier than he would be if trained 
by the other method ? 

Gen. Martin. I think not. My experience has been this, that a 
man who goes through a period of training and study at his home 
station and takes a period of training in the field is a better soldier 
than a man who goes out into a training camp for a certain period 
and then studies. You know what kind of men these men are. Most 
of them are intelligent, bright fellows, and the training they get is 
not entirely in the Army. They study books and develop themselves 
as much as they can in the military game. We found, so far as the 
men who went into this service from the National Guard were con- 
cerned, that there was not anything in the military way they could 
not do, and in the schools in France the men were taught in nearly 
every case by a National Guard officer. 

Mr. Hull. Do you think all boys at the age of 19 are fitted for 
service in the Army? 

Gen. Martin. No; not all boys. 

Mr. Hull. If you make that universal you have to take all boys. 

Gen. Martin. No; I do not think thev are. 

(Thereupon the committee adjourned.) 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 
Wednesday^ December 17^ 1919. 
The conunittee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Daniel E. Anthony, 
jr., presiding. 

STATEMENT OF COL. BANSOH H. GILLETT, NEW YOBE NATIONAL 

GTJABD. 

Mr. Anthony. Col. Gillett is here this morning, and we will be 
glad to hear him now. Will you state your full name, your rank, 
and vour connection with the National Guard ? 

Col. Gillett. My name is Eansom H. Gillett; I am at present a 
colonel in the New York National Guard. I have served 20 years in 
the National Guard and have held every rating from private to 
colonel. I served a year and a half at the Naval Academy as a naval 
cadet. 

I resigned from the National Guard in 1913 and reenlisted as a 
private in 1917 ; was assigned to the second officers' training camp at 
Camp Wadsworth in Spartanburg, S. C. I was commissioned a 
major in April, 1918, and assigned to duty with the One hundred and 
sixth Infantry of the Twenty-seventh Division and went overseas 
in comjnand of the First Battalion of that outfit ; was with it through 
the Belgian campaign ; was wounded in the fight along the Hinden- 
borg line, just in front of BoYii; was in a British hospital four weeks 
and in an American hospital two weeks, and returned to the division 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1921 

and served with it throughout its tour of duty in France until I was 
mustered out at Camp Upton in April of 1919, still holding the rating 
of major. 

I was commissioned a colonel of the New York Guard in May of 
1919 and assigned to duty with the Second New York Infantry, a 
regiment with which I had the most of my service in the National 
Guard. I have about completed the necessary work looking to 
federalization of that regiment, which will begin on the 5th of next 
January. 

Mr. Anthony. You speak of the New York Guard; you dis- 
tinguish that from the National Guard ? 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. The New York troops at present are not National 
Guard troops? 

Col. GUiLETT. Exactly. 

Mr. Anthony. Why have they not gone into the National Guard? 

Col. GiLLETT. The National Guard was amalgamated with the 
United States Army, I think, in August of 1918, when the distinction 
was abolished between the Regular Army, the National Army, and 
the National Guard in the troops composing the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces. When the National Guard was mustered into the 
Federal service just prior to the war that took the National Guard 
troops out of the State. 

Wiien the distinction was abolished the Judge Adovcate General 
held that thereafter there was no National Guard, and hence in the 
case of New York alone, while the Twenty-seventh Division was in 
France there was no National Guard in the State of New York ; they 
were all State troops. 

When we came back and were mustered out, under that ruling I 
have mentioned, we became ordinary, everyday citizens, and our 
connection with the Military Establishment, either of the State or 
of the United States, ceased under this ruling. The situation in 
New York State at that time was that many patriotic citizens had 
enlisted in the New York State Guard. That was gradually evolved 
from home guard units and other local military organizations organ- 
ized under State authority to meet the emergency, and those units 
were gradually evolved into a division, or what they called a division, 
but they were solely and only State troops. They owed no allegiance 
to and had no assistance or aid from the Federal Government. 

Then the militia bureau — ^I am giving you my experience in New 
York State only — ^the militia bureau took certain steps to bring 
this State Guard into the Federal service. I think New York State 
now may have not to exceed 30 companies of infantry who are 
National Guard troops. The rest of us are all State troops, and 
after the 1st of January I hope to have this regiment I now com- 
mand federalized into the Federal service and again take up the 
xjharacter of National Guard troops which they had before they were 
mustered into the United States service prior to going abroad. 

Mr. Anthony. Has there been a lack of effort on the part of the 
War Department to have the units of your State troops made Na- 
tional Guard troops? 

Col. Gillett. We have had considerable difficulty with the Militia 
Bureau. The chief trouble was that the tables of organization of the 
United States prescribed a minimum of 100 enlisted men for a com- 



1922 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

pany of infantry, and we were held too rigidly to that rule until it 
was demonstrated that it was utterly impossible to do it. For instance, 
my regiment is scattered over a dozen towns, from Troy north to 
Whitehall and Amsterdam, and I have companies in at least eight 
towns in which the population does not exceed ten or fifteen thou- 
sand, and the available material there for military purposes is not 
100 men all at one time. 

Through the efforts of the association I represent, coupled with 
the efforts of the adjutant generals of the various States — and this 
condition is general all over the United States — we prevailed upon 
the Militia Bureau to make certain exceptions to that ruling re- 
quiring 100 men per lettered company, and certain regiments in 
New York State, and, I think, in some other States, were permitted 
to offer 65 men per lettered company, or more, for federalization^ 
and that is about the strength of my regiment. My regiment will 
run about 72 men per compjany. 

During the course of this work the National Guard Association 
of the State, which is composed of all National Guard officers who 
were on active duty, reorganized and had a meeting in New York 
City and a delegation was appointed by that meeting and sent out 
to a convention to St. Louis, Mo., last May, which convention took 
up the work with the National Guard Association of the United 
States, an organization composed of National Guardsmen from every 
State in the Union. At that meeting in St. Louis, all but three 
States, or at least all but not more than five States were represented 
there. 

The convention lasted three days, I think, and considered primarily 
the question of reorganizing the National Guard. Certain resolu- 
tions were the outcome of that convention, and the executive com- 
mittee of the national association appointed a subcommittee to func- 
tion under it with the idea of formulating these resolutions into a 
piece of legislation designed to express the best thought and feeling 
of the national association, and to propose that legislation to Con- 
gress, to aid and assist, so far as we were able, in formulating a 
military policy for the United States. This committee was com- 
posed of Col. Birkhead, from Texas ; Col. Carlin and myself, from 
New York ; Col. Colston, from Connecticut ; and Col. Rose, from New 
York. Birkhead, Colston, and myself had been overseas, and Carlin 
and Rose had been engaged in the work of reorganizing the State 
Guard from the various home-guard units which gradually evolved 
into the outfit we have there now. 

Birkhead, Carlin, and myself drafted a bill which we thought 
represented the feeling of the convention at St. Louis, and the 
executive committee of the national association invited National 
Guardsmen from all over the United States to meet in New York 
and consider this draft which we proposed. That occupied a period 
of four days, and as I recall it every National Guard of any note 
in the United States passed on that draft. I remember very well 
Gen. O'Ryan, Gen. Price, and a chap from the Twenty-sixth Divi- 
sion by the name of Sherbourne, of Massachusetts, and (jen. Edwards 
of the Twenty-sixth Division. Gen. Leonard Wood was consulted 
in reference to the matter. 

That draft was handed back to us with recommendations which 
were written into it, much of it was stricken out, particularly those 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 1923 

provisions which we put in there looking toward strengthening com- 
pulsory military service in the National Guard, and the bill was 
again drawn and submitted to a conference of adjutants general 
which I think met in St. Louis. At that conference of adjutants 
general were many National Guard officers from the West and south- 
west. I remember some officer from Oregon came on especially for 
that meeting. That conference lasted two or three days. Correc- 
tions, additions, amendments, and omissions were recommended in 
the bill and it was again turned over to us. 

A very interesting thing happened in the conference in St. Louis. 
The question of compulsory military service in the National Guard 
came up for discussion. Of course, New York has a constitutional 
provision whereby the governor can draft any member of the militia 
and compel him to serve in the National Guard for a certain definite 
time whenever he deems the emergency calls for it. The provision 
of the bill was drafted along the line of the New York State con- 
stitution, and the question was put squarely up to a vote, and 1& 
States voted on it. I do not recall what particular States they were. 
Some of them were represented by the adjutants general and others 
by National Guard officers, and the question of whether that provi- 
sion should stay in the bill or should go out was lost by a vote of 
9 States to 7, and the provision went out. 

Then the question of universal military training was submitted, 
and every conferee did not hesitate to say that he was in favor of it,, 
but that he felt it was a matter that should be dealt with carefully 
and should, as far as possible, be made a local matter and be left 
to be determined, so far as it was possible to do so, by the localities 
affected. 

Gen. Clark, of Missouri, then proposed certain amendments in 
relation to the service of supply leature of this bill — ^H. R. 10683,. 
introduced by Mr. Hull — which were incorporated practically a& 
he proposed them, so that the features in this bill regarding the sup- 
ply of the National Guard were drawn by Gen. Clark, of Missouri. 

The committee then went down to New York and again redrafted 
this proposed legislation, and after a conference with some eminent 
New York lawyers on constitutional questions that the committee^ 
did not feel quite ready to pass on definitely, other changes were 
made, and the bill finally, as printed here in H. R. 10583, was intro- 
duced in this form by Mr. Hull of Iowa. 

I go into this at some length before taking up the detail features 
of the bill so that the committee may know the amount of work that 
has been done in connection with it and the general criticism that 
this legislation has been already subjected to. We feel that it rep- 
resents the best thought of a big majority of National Guard officers 
in the United States. There are some National Guard officers who 
will not agree with this bill, and that is especially so with the high 
ranking officers of the National Guard. 

But the committee feel, and the executive committee of the na- 
tional association — and I speak for the national association when I 
say that they feel that any plan looking to the raising of a National 
Army or a citizen Army under the so-called Army clause of the 
Federal Constitution, any scheme formulated to that end, will fail 
in its purposes and will not represent the best thought of the citi- 



1924 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

zens of the country who are interested in military affairs. This 
hill is drawn under the militia clause of the Constitution, and it 
presents certain very well-defined difficulties. 

The proposition or theory or principle of military science is that 
there can be but one boss, and that you can not have an Army with 
more than one commander and get away with it. On the other hand, 
you have got to have men before you can have an Army, and the 
history of military affairs in the United States, I think, bears out 
the statement that the professional Army can not be maintained by 
volunteer enlistments to the strength that is required by modem 
necessities. 

The Regular Army is the only Army in the United States to-day. 
And history has shown that volunteer enlistment has failed to keep 
it up to the minimum strength authorized by the Congress. If it 
is attempted to raise an Army of the United States to be composed 
of the Begular Army, the ifational Army, and the reserves, such 
an army as Great Britain had in France, where there were Aus- 
tralians, New Zealanders, Canadians, Englishmen, and Indians, all 
coordinated and working through the British war office — if the 
attempt is made in the united States to raise an Army along those 
lines the association feels that it doomed to failure, because it will 
Tiave to depend upon volunteer enlistment, and volunteer enlistment 
in the Army has not been at all successful in the United States 
:so far. 

The solution of that problem, namely, the retaining in the locali- 
ties where the men are to serve as military men, military servants 
of the Nation, retaining enough local control to make it interesting 
or to allay that fear of military service that is so evident when you 
talk to a man about enlisting in the Army — ^to meet that situation 
and at the same time to meet the situation of centralized control, 
which is absolutely necessary to military success, is the problem this 
committee tried to solve. We think we have found one or two ways 
in which it might be brought about. We do not pretend we have 
rsolved it. 

So that this bill is drawn under the so-called militia clause of the 
Federal Constitution, leaving with the States the right to train the 
militia, to commission officers, and at the same time to be ready when 
iihe Federal Government calls upon the States for assistance, for aid 
to furnish a well-equipped, uniformly disciplined and trained force 
for use in higher tactical units. 

The difficulty is to find some centralized control that will be ajgree- 
able to the various States, because each State has its own problem to 
solve with regard to the maintenance and training of the militia. 
For instance, the methods that apply in New York State would not 
work for a moment in Texas, and the methods that apply in Maine, 
where there is a very well-organized and well-drilled regiment of 
Infantry, would not fere worth a cent in Florida; and conditions in 
those different localities must be met in some way so that the Maine 
-outfit when it is brigaded with the Florida outfit will work together 
so that there will be cooperation and coordination between those two 
outfits. 

We have tried to bring about that result by providing for a 
^National Guard council composed of a military man appointed by 



abm:t reorganization. 1925 

the governor of each State, which council will meet here in Wash- 
ington at stated intervals to bring about that very result, so that the 
man from Maine, the man from Florida, the man from California, 
and the man from New York can get together and talk over local 
conditions to which thev are each subject and arrive at some line of 
action that will bring aoout the best results to all and serve to attain 
uniform methods of training and discipline in those different com- 
munities. 

The plan of action formulated by the National Guard council — 
and in that connection I will say the scheme is wide open to criti- 
cism; it has any number of holes in it and can be criticized from 
every possible angle. But I do not think it ought to be tried, because 
fundamentally it is based on the question of representation of States 
and not on the number of troops or on the weight of obligation on 
the States; but each State is to be represented on that council, which 
is to function through what we call a National Guard Bureau. And 
that National Guard Bureau is nothing but the Militia Bureau 
turned over, body, soul, and breeches, to National Guard officers, to 
be headed by a chief who is to be a National Guard officer, with the 
pay and grade of major general of the Regular Army. 

The functions of the National Guard bureau are to be along the 
same lines as those of the National Guard council, namely, coordina- 
tion, securing coordination and cooperation between the military 
forces of the different States. 

The way to bring that about is by regulation, and not by legisla- 
tion. Congress must intrust to some executive body the authority to 
carry out its plans and must give that authority very wide leeway. 

There is one feature of this legislation which ought to commend 
itself to Congress in this, that there is absolutely nothing in here 
that will establish a tenure of office in any one of the officers ap- 
pointed under the provisions of this bill except efficiency, and that is 
all we are trying to work into the thing. We have put in here a test 
for efficiency before a man can be commissioned in the National 
Guard of a State. 

Mr. Kearns. You have said that the same rules governing the 
organization in Maine could not be put into operation in Florida. 
You failed to state why. I would like to have that question answered. 

Col. Gn^LETT. My answer to that is this : The men in Maine think 
differently from the men in Florida ; they require different handling 
before they can be made into soldiers. They require different equip- 
ment, and they require different seasons of the year in which to be 
trained. They eat different things, and those things are cooked 
differently. They have different personal habits, all of which go to 
make up the training that a soldier must have. That is what was 
in my mind when I made that statement. 

Mr. Kearns. That answers my question. 

Col. GiUiETT. Then, the National Guard bureau — ^I will perhaps 
get a little ahead of my argument when I say this bill has been sub- 
ject to this criticism by every National Guard and Regular Army 
officer to whom it has been submitted. It is said you are putting the 
military question directly into politics because you are giving to the 
governors of the States the making of these appointments. Our only 
answer to that is that if the governors of the States are not patriotic 

15018T— 20— VOL 2 9 



1926 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

and farseeing enough, if they have not enough statesmanlike quali- 
ties to see the necessity of the appointment of exactly the right man 
to this job, all the legislation in the world will not bring that about. 
That can not be helped. That is a bit of human nature that legisla* 
tion will not cure, and that is a chance we must take, and it is a 
chance that is taken every day of our lives in any legislation that 
goes through. 

• The National Guard Bureau is designed to function under the di- 
rection and advice of the National Guard Council, directly under 
the Secretary of War. As the thing stands now, the Militia Bureau 
functions under the direction of thfe General Staff and not under 
the Secretary of War. The result has been far from satisfactory, 
not only before the national defense act went into effect, but even 
to-day the recommendations of National Guard officers who are in- 
terested in the welfare of the National Guardj and who are interested 
in the welfare of the National Army, because there is a broad gen- 
eral distinction there, are all subject to the professional, narrow 
point of view of a professional soldier on the General Staff. They 
never get beyond the Chief of Staff; his word is final in deciding 
the proposition. We try to cure that by making the National Guard 
Bureau function directly under the Secretary of War. 

There are a large number of National Guard officers who are so 
disgusted with Regular Army control that they are as unreason- 
able, perhaps, as other officers who feel that the National Guard 
should become a part of the Army of the United States. We have 
tried to strike a middle course here. We do not abolish the Regular 
Army; we do not think it ought to be abolished. But we do feel 
that the National Guard is so large — and when I say the National 
Guard I wish the committee to understand that I am speaking of a 
period five or six years from now when we will have a National 
Army, instead of the restricted popular meaning the term " National 
Guard" has come to have in your minds. What we are speaking 
of is the National Army, and that the Regular Army shall bear the 
same relation to the National Army that the corps of experts em- 
ployed by the Steel Corporation bears to the stockholders and di- 
rectors of that corporation. Their opinions are sought and their ad- 
vice is considered with great weight and followed in almost every 
case. But where there is a question of military policj^ involved it 
seems to us that the men who are going to do the fighting ought to 
have the final say as to the disposition of any question affecting mili- 
tary policy that will directly affect them. 

Mr. Greene. Is not that exactly the principle followed in the 
Russian soviet, that the multitude runs its own army. 

Col. GiLLRTT, I may answer that best in this way. There is only 
one way of raising an army, and that is by the Prussian method, by 
the method employed by Germany. That is the only way you will 
ever get an army that corresponds to the technical military defini- 
tion. The other way is to raise an army as the Russian Bolsheviks 
do, where they all get together and have votes and argue the question 
out, and if it pleases them to obey a command, they do. 

Under the German system, any disobedience to a command is 
punishable by death, which is perfectly proper, and the only way 
to enforce military discipline. 



ARMY REOEGAIS^IZATION. 1927 

But it seemed to us that there must be some middle ground which 
could be followed in the United States, which would result in giving 
us an army, I will not say as efficient, but almost as efficient as the 
German army, and at the same time avoid that sort of control you 
have in mind. 

When I am talking as I did just then, I am talking of the relation 
of the civil population to the Armj; after a man comes into the 
Army he is subject to military discipline, and I say what we have 
tried to do is that before he goes into that army he will have some 
idea of the rules he will be compelled to live under. 

Mr. Greene. Does he not get that identical thing now ? 

Col. GiLiiBTT. Hardly so. 

Mr. Anthont. If you will pardon me for interjecting a remark 
there, the Coast Artillery and the Field Artillery now have chiefs, 
with the rank of major general, who look after the interests of their 
corps in the War Department. 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. In the tentative reorganization bill we propose to 
create the grade of chief of infantry with the rank of major general, 
so that the infantry may have a special representative in the War 
Department. Your recommendation is that there shall be a chief of 
the National Guard on duty at the War Department to similarly 
present matters that come from that department. 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Anthont. And that is based on the idea that if it is fair for 
one branch of the Army to have that representation it is fair for 
another. 

Col. GiMJEiT. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. That was not the point I had in mind and that the 
witness and I had been discussing, which was with^eference to the 
National Guard council, and the plebiscite which the troops, in a 
sense, might exercise. 

Col. GiLLETT. Do you think for a moment that there is any ques- 
tion of a plebiscite by the troops. 

Mr. Greene. It does not make much difference how we modify the 
detail if its effects are the same to representatives or agencies, and 
this thing might have the same effect as democracy in the Army, 
which has a representative form of expression instead of being a 
democratic assembly. • 

Col. Gujlett. Let me see if I can make this distinction. We are all 
militiamen; we are all in the Army; any man between the ages of 18 
and 45 is liable to service in the Army when the emergency arises. 
That fact does not limit us or does not take awav our right to ex- 
press our views as to how a particular branch of tnat Army shall be 
run, and that is what we are trying to write into the law. 

Mr. Greene. Is not that in there now ? 

Col. GiLi*BTT. I do not think so. 

Mr. Greene. Are we not guaranteed under the Constitution our 
rights to have a voice in our Government, and is not the Army only 
one agency of the expression of the Government? 

Col! GiLOJTT. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. Does not that exist now, and if you were to try to de- 
fend your rights would you appeal to a statute or to the Constitution 
of the Nation ? 



1928 ABMY BEORGANIZATION. 

Col. GiLiiETT. In one or two instances I would appeal to the statute, 
and that is what we think is the wrong thing. For instance, in the 
army raised by the draft thej were formed into divisions and sent to 
France from different big divisions or the camps and from different 
camps. Camp Devens had all the men from the New England 
States, Camp Dodge the men from the Middle West, and Camp Ben- 
ning the men from the South, and those men were all form^ into 
training divisions and were supposed to do their training in those 
divisions. But there was no guaranty that those men would be kept 
in those particular divisions, out, on the other hand, it seems to me 
there was a moral obligation on the Government to see that in those 
tactical units regional divisions are maintained to some extent. 

But instead of that these men were all fed into a corral and they 
were issued to the different people who requisitioned them just as 
mules and horses. If I wanted a second lieutenant, I sent a requisi- 
tion for a second lieutenant, just as I would requisition for a new 
kitchen or a wagon, and I would not know where that man was going 
to come from. Then, I got replacements from California and Kansas 
and other States, from sQl over the United States; On the other hand, 
the Eighty-first Division had a great many New York men in it, and 
they were put in organizations that were somewhat local in character. 
That is onlv one illustration of that. 

Mr. Greene. How can you change that by a statute. I do not see 
how you can. 

Col. GiLLETT. We tried to change it here. 

Mr. Greene. That was brought about bj the policy necessitated, 
or believed to be necessary, under war conditions? 
Col. GiLLETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. You would not undertake to hamper by advance leg- 
islation such detail as the ordinary administration of the military 
forces in the field, so that however necessary personnel might be 
in a certain place, unless it was ordained by statute that unless cer- 
tain kinds of personnel were to be used there, they had to go without? 
Col. GiLiiETT. I think I would, because my experience has shown 
me that the greatest asset for any army is morale. 

Mr. Greene. But in order to have any morale at all you must be 
able to maintain yourself in the presence of the enemy and for battle 
purposes ? 
Col. GiLLETT. The morale begins at the very beginning. 
Mr. Greene. But I am speaking of morale for battle purposes. 

The highest test of morale 

Col. GiiiLETT (interposing). Is battle. 
Mr. Greene. No; defeat. 

Col. GiLLETT. Well, defeat is 

Mr. Greene (interposing). It is the conducting of a successful 
rear guard action and getting away. 

Col. GiLLETT. Do you know why the English were so successful at 
Mons? Because they were fighting as regiments from particular lo- 
calities, and those regiments were never changed. 

Mr. Greene. But I suggest to you that the distance between the 
recruiting grounds of any one of the Territorials taken out of the 
battle fields was not as far as from here to Texas. 

Col. GiLLETT. The Canadians, the Australians, and the New Zea- 
landers, and others were put together in that way and fought to- 



ABMT BEORGANIZATION. 1929 

gether; that principle was followed in the British Army with very 
great success. That is the principle 

Mr. Greene (interposing). But they had a geographical situation 
that permitted them to do it. 

Col. GnxETT. Have we not something of that kind ? Could we 
not have a division in California that could be filled by men from 
that district or that area? 

Mr. Caldwell. Let me call your attention to this fact, that while 
the British Empire organized its army, as you say, they were con- 
tinuously open to the criticism that they used the Canadians too 
much and let the others go in too often, whereas in our Army when- 
ever a division or a regiment or an organization had gotten into a 
fight and there were great losses, those losses were at once filled up 
by men from some other section of the country, and all the casualties 
did not come out of one State or one city, as they did in the other 
armies. 

Col. Gillett. That is a practical proposition. If you will talk 
to a marine he will tell you he won the war, and if you talk to a man 
who was in the Rainbow Division he will tell you the same thing. 

Mr. Greene. The only purpose I had in mind is to illustrate what 
might be the effect of the writing in peace time of such arbitrary laws 
for control that when we were confronted by the exigencies of battle 
it would be inelastic and the commander could not make such a 
tactical disposition as the exigencies of the situation demanded, or 
else have defeat staring him in the face. 

Col. Gillett. That might be taken with the other question of main- 
taining the esprit. Individually, I am with you on that proposition, 
but the consensus of opinion of a great many National Guard offi- 
cers, written into this bill, is that we should not 'only democratize 
but should popularize the American military service. 

Mr. Greene. You and I are alike in that matter. I feel that you, 
as one who has had the actual experience, if taking a regiment into 
action found something somewhere vitally necessary to your support 
or securit}^ or to the immediate tactical purpose, you as an officer 
charged with responsibilities, and under those circumstances realiz- 
ing what the situation was, would seize on anything available in the 
field instantly, under the blanket authority of your rank, and would 
put somebody right there then. You would not hesitate. 

If men are trained to that responsibility rather than, as we say^ 
passing the buck, because the statute will not let them do it, you will 
not get the inability of a military leader to operate on his own 
responsibility in time of emergency. 

Col. Gillette. No; you will not. But the principle that applies 
to the higher tactical command and to troops en masse does not 
really apply to the combat unit of a squad. The squad is composed 
of seven men and a corporal, and they are the men to do the fight- 
ing. All that the commissioned officer can do is to take them to a 
certain point and give them certain instructions and let them go, 
and when they are sent over he is lost. He must depend on the in- 
dividual man. We say that men who come from the same section 
of the country, from 'the same territory, who know each other and 
who are trained together, who have fought together, are more effi- 



1930 ARMl iREORGANlZATIpN. 

cient fighters than a squad made up of men from different sections 
of the United States. 

My regiment was composed entirely of Brooklyn boys, who came 
from the Fourteenth, the Twenty-third, and the Forty-seventh Reg- 
iments in the city of Brooklyn. We had team work in our regiment, 
while the One himdred and seventh Regiment that was composed 
of troops from up the State and the old Seventh B.egiment of New 
York were still feeling their way around. 

Mr. Greene. And that was hignly satisfactory and glorious. That 
was in the preparation for battle. Let us see what we are building 
up in this big organization which, as you say, should enlist pjopular 
interest in the general military policy, so that the men we will find 
all through the country, regardless of the geographical distinctions 
and predisposition to certam deficiencies in habits of thought that 
are mcidental, are to be eventually molded into what we might 
term nationalism; we will try to make them alike as much as we 
can under the military policy we adopt. Why is it not a good prop- 
osition to begin in peace time, with the prospect of long continuance 
of peace, so to organize these forces that the men from all sections 
will be drawn together, will become acquainted with each other in 
peace time as much as possible and will have time to prepare and to 
overcome the old-time traditional necessary restrictions that en- 
vironment has built among them, and to overcome those obstacles 
which perhaps 25 years from now will not exist, so that we will be 
able to have a strong National Army rather than territorial units? 

CoL GrLLETT. Because of the very practical difficulty that unless 
you can assure the man who lives in Troy that when he enlists in 
this army, whether you call it a national army or a national guard, 
he will not be called upon to serve with troops quartered in Boston; 
as long as you depend on volunteer enlistment, unless you can assure 
the man that he is going to have some right to serve with troops 
in his locality he will not enlist. That is our practical experience. 

Mr. Greene. We are going back again to the habit of thought, 
which is the very thing we are trying to overcome. He is not trying 
to defend Troy. 

Col. GlLLETT. No. 

Mr. Greene. But he wants to defend the country. Can we not 
begin to instill the idea that wherever Uncle Sam places him he is 
defending the whole country, including Troy? 

Col. GiLLETT. Wherever Uncle Sam places him in conjunction with 
his mates, he will go. 

Mr. Greene. Then he becomes a sort of tribesman, rather than 
national. 

Col. GiLLETT. Exactly. 

Mr. Greene. Do you think that is wise ? 

Col. GiLLETT. I do not think it is wise. But you can not get away 
from it. 

As the chairman pointed out, the underlying thought of the na- 
tional guardsmen of the United States is what you suggested, that 
there shall be a chief of the National Guard as there is a chief of 
any other branch of the department, making it a part of the mili- 
tary life of the United States, and putting it on its own feet, letting 
it function by itself and not under the direction of some other army. 



ARMY RBORGANIZATIOJir. 1931 

In regard to the other features of this bill, I will pass over the 
question of our proposition of pay for these national guardsmen, 
because it is practically the same as the provisions in the present 
national defense act. I will say that this bill, so far as we could 
do it, follows along the line of the national defense act, so that there 
is nothing new in here for construction or interpretation or any- 
thing of that kind. The organization of units, their location, the 
courts-martial provision, which is somewhat new, are all modeled 
upon the provisions of the national defense act. 

The feature that will solve the problem of a national guard, if 
carried to its logical conclusion, and of an army, is the feature pro- 
viding for what we call preliminary military training, and I will 
say that the term preliminary mUitary training was chosen advisedly, 
because when we say compulsory training or military training, it 
puts a wrong impression in the minds of the people. The conven- 
tion at St. I^uis, which led up to my appearance before this com- 
mittee, passed the following resolution: 

Resolvedy That universal military training is a necessary step toward ade- 
quate national preparedness, and for the proper development of the citizen 
soldiery of the Nation ; and we affirm that it can best be developed in conjunc- 
tion with the National Guard. 

Col. GiLiiETT. In formulating that resolution into legislative lan- 
guage we have done this : We have provided that there shall be pre- 
liminary military training in every common or grade school in the 
United States; that there shall be developed neS a course of mili- 
tary training in every high school and that every college in the 
United States shall be a sort of postgraduate school or a West 
Point. That can not be compulsory. The only way that would be 
brought about is by the same method as used by Congress in en- 
couraging the formation and maintenance of National §uard imits, 
namely, by giving to the different States the money and equipment 
necessary to carry into effect the provisions of that scheme. 

We think that that military training, if it is intrusted to the 
National Guard officers in the localities in which it would be ad- 
ministered, will be popularized. I judge a good deal by what I 
see in Troy. In Troy, military training is a success in the public 
schools because the men who are teaching those young boys the 
most fundamental rudiments of military training are men who live 
in the community and whom everybody knows. 

Mr. Caldwell. Do not the men in New York State devote prac- 
tically all their energy to infantry training, and do not do any- 
thing with machine guns or anything with artillery ? 

Col. GiLLETT. No; because that is a development that will l^ave 
to come with time. 

Mr. Caldwell. Up to the present time, they have not done any- 
thing with artillery or cavalry? 

Col. GiLLETT. Oh, no. As a matter of fact, they have given but 
very little attention to the technical training of infantrymen. All 
their teaching is footwork and some physical exercises, teaching 
the boys to move together and to march together. 

As I say, so far as that section is concerned, I am sure-r-I think 
Gen. Lasher told me it was in effect in Iowa — ^that military training 
is getting over. In my armory three night a week there are from 
76 to 175 boys who come there willingly. Of course, they are regis- 



1932 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

tered. There are some provisions making them register, but those 
boys come because they want to come and their parents want them to 
come because they know the men who are training them, and those 
parents know that those men are neighbors and friends and they 
are not going to inculcate into those boys' minds any of the things 
they think they usually learn in the Army. We want to carry that 
idea into the schools all over the United States. Of course, that 
can not be done by any mandatory legislation; the legislation must 
be persuasive in its character. 

We feel if the States are — bribed, shall I say ? No — ^if the States 
are induced by the hope of obtaining for their educational institu- 
tions some Federal help in return for what they will do for their 
citizens, just as they are induced now to make certain provisions 
for the National Guard, thereby providing for the National Gov- 
ernment a force ready for emergencies, the Federal Government pay- 
ing them for doing that, if the same principle can be applied to this 
scheme, making it educational, we will have from the beginning what 
will come in this country, universal training and universal service. 

Mr. Olnet. Would you not recommend that this military instruc- 
tion be an elective course? 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes; in the high school, in the primary training; 
but in the grade school it should be compulsory, and for this reason* 
They have it now ; in every well-regulated school there is a fire drill, 
and that is nothing but military training. 

Mr. OiiNEY. My reason for suggesting that was if any man might 
eliminate the study of botany, for instance, it might be an induce- 
ment. 

Col. GrLLETT. Yes ; this bill provides that in the colleges if he once 
elects to take a military course he must pursue it successfully before 
he can be awarded a degree. 

Many of the high schools all over the United States already have 
cadet corps, and we have endeavored to put in here a provision which 
will enable a cadet corps to receive Federal aid and put them in camp 
for two or three weeks every year, giving them the intensive mili- 
tary training in those two or three weeks that is necessary to further 
their education in military affairs. 

In that connection, our committee did not figure out the cost of 
the thing except in a very general way. Gen. March, in his original 
estimate or in one of his estimates, stated that it would cost 
$900,000,000 a year for an army of so many hundred thousand men. 
This bill has a provision for a national reserve. There again we 
come down to the matter of localizing and putting in the local things. 
It gives the names here of the classes who can go into that reserve, 
ex-service men or men who have served in the National Guard after 
they have received a certain amount of primary training, and who 
may be partially or wholly trained, according to the judgment of 
competent officers, and they may go on reserve and be attached to the 
local military unit in their town. A man, when he has served a 
couple of years in the guard, does not have to come to the drill every 
night, but when it comes time to go on strike duty, then there is 
no difficulty at all in getting all the men you want. But these men 
who have had the training and the experience and discipline are 
excused during the time of their reserve period, which is fixed at 



~ ARMY RBORGANIZATIOISr. 1933^ 

two or three years — ^that is, they are excused from the mechanical 
part of training, which is somewhat of an obstacle to anybody. 

We figured out that the cost of putting in some such system as' 
that, plus the cost of training that we thought ought to go into the 
schools now — that it is to be an entering wedge — ^would be just about 
one-third of the estimate made by Gen. March, and it would give 
you in four or five years an Army of more than a million men, 
trained as well as National Guard troops were trained when they 
were mustered into the Federal service to go into this war, and they 
were pretty good troops at that. 

I think those are the three main features of this legislation. On 
the matter of details, we have several difficulties, possibly, on the 

?uestion of adding to the national defense act. The issuance of 
Inited States property is under the control of the Secretary of War, 
and we do not want to abolish the Kegular Army. They have got 
to work with us, and we have got to work with them, if we are going 
to work out a successful military policy here in the United States. I 
do not think it can ever be done by either separately, but I do think 
if some legislation is passed that will bring us to the point where the 
professional and amateur are working together the solution of the 
problem is in sight. The difficulty now is that the tail is wagging 
the dog. 

Mr. Caldwell. Would you not prefer to use the word " civilian " 
rather than " amateur " ? 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Caldwell. How far down in the grade of National Guard 
officers who might be made chief of the National Guard Bureau 
would you go ? Would you go as low as colonel ? 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Caldwell. Does that provide that the chief of the bureau 
might be selected by the President, down to the grade of colonel? 
How would you have this selection made — ^by the Secretary of War, 
by the Chief of Staff, or by the National Guard organization ? 

Col. GiLLETT. We think the selection should be made by the Na- 
tional Guard organization, with a minority of advisors from the 
Regular Army. 

Mr. Greene. That brings up the same National Guard Council 
proposition. As a practical military man, and one who has had ex- 
perience in practical relations of life, what do you think of a kind 
of military organization that has made, in the first place, through a 
sort of popular vote, the appointment of a chief, and then after- 
wards hampers or restricts that chief by the vote, official or unofficial, 
of a council? How far will that really function in the stern decision 
that is necessary in any military organization in order to make it 
function and operate? 

Col. GiLLETT. Of course, we are talking now of the high command. 
When Marshal Foch and Gen. Pershing and Gen. Haig and the rest 
of the commanders would meet, wherever it was, they held a debating 
society, and nothing else. They agreed on certain lines of policy to 
be followed. They were all boimd by the rule of the majority, just 
as you are bound in the Congress of the United States to-day. 

Mr. Greene. Did not Marshal Foch himself, as our President does 
in his relations with the Cabinet, finally carry the vote in hi? own 
head? 



1934 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Col. Gn-LETT. He did. 

Mr. Greene. Whatever the council might say ? 

Col. GiixETT. Yes, sir ; Foch was elected by that council. 

Mr. Greene. Was he elected ? 

Col. Gnj^TT. He was practically elected by it, because he was 
agreed upon by the members of that council. 

Mr. Greene. I thought he was agreed upon by the governments? 

Col. G1LI4ETT. By. the governments represented by those high com- 
manders. 

Mr. Greene. That is a detail, but it applies to the principle. I 
did not understand that the council selected him ; I thought the gov- 
ernments agreed upon him as the chief, and then he had his council 
surrounding him afterwards ? 

Col. GiLiiETT. It amounts to the same thing. The higher you go 
in the military game, after you get by the grade of colonel, who is 
the last combat officer — when you get up to divisions, corps and 
armies, you begin to get into the twilight zone between civil control 
and military control^ because the corps commander is verjr often 
controlled by the policies of his secretary of war, who is a civilian, 
and a political appointee^ both in England and the United States. 

Mr. Greene. That is the spirit of our Constitution, that there 
never shall be a time when the civil is not always superior to the 
military. 

Col. GiLLETT. I merely state that as the principle. 

Mr. Greene. Suppose we follow out what seems to be the function 
of the so-called National Guard Council, and consider that this coun- 
cil comes together through its politicians — and I am using the word 
simply in good nature — and after some discussion the majority elects 
a chief. That immediately constitutes the council into two branches, 
a majority which was successful and a minority which was dissatis- 
fied because their particular chief was not chosen. It does not make 
any difference how patriotically they try to acquiesce, there is a line 
of cleavage. So, when the chief goes into office he is confronted by 
just what you would have in any debating society ; he is up against 
the opposition? 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. What particular certainty and permanence of com- 
mand in the military sense is obtained sChd how much is jeoparded 
by having a live minority, whose purpose would thereafter be to 
unseat that chief and seat their own t 

Col. GiLLETT. No more so than in the present United States Army 
General Staff. 

Mr. Greene. But the General Staff is appointed through the ab- 
solutely arbitrary conception of the authority of the Commander in 
Chief, based upon the Constitution of the United States, and there is 
not a single form or effect of a plebescite in it. 

Mr. Anthony.. And whatever they may decide, the relations are 
entirely different. The relations 01 officers in any branch of the 
Regular Army are not voluntary relations. Their assignment is by 
detail to perform certain professional functions, which they must 
perform under the Army obligation, as members of the Regular 
Army. 

Col. GiLLETT. Yes, Mr. Anthony. ^ And it is a part of the day's 
work. Whatever may be the academic view held by any individual. 



ABMY BEOBGAKIZATION. 1935 

he is detailed to do certain work, and if in the doing of that work 
he has expressed an opinion, and he is overruled in it he still does the 
work because that is his life job, and he can not be put upon a par 
with men who volunteer to associate themselves together. They are 
appointed by the supreme military authority of their State, that is, 
the governors, and it they accept the appointment they are National 
Guard officers, and hence they are subject to military discipline in 
their State, as much as the General Staff officers in their department. 

Mr. Greene. You put in a peculiar word there. You said, "If 
they accept." In the Regular Army there is not any " if " about it. 

Col. GiLLETT. But if the Regular Army man does not like his as- 
simment or detail he can resign. 

Mr. Greene. If it is accepted. The function of the proposed Na- 
tional Guard council will be purely in connection with matters of 
policy and not for the purpose of exercising any military control ? 

Col. GiLLET. Not at all. Their functions would be similar to those 
of the General Staff, which are purely advisory, and they could never 
in any sense be administrative. 

Mr. Greene. I understand that. But you are proposing to estab- 
lish a general staff alongside of a general staff. One general staff is 
absolutely fixed in its authority and it has coincident responsibility. 

Col. Gillett. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. It is the day's work with them. Whatever differ- 
ence of opinion there may be, there is eventually a head which con- 
trols the decisions. 

Col. GnjLETT. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. Whereas this council is a voluntary association. 

Col. GiLi^TT. Not if the States accept Federal aid. 

Mr. Greene. The language may be colored to read that the same 
form of military authority is involved in the relations of a National 
Guardsman to the Government, but as a practical proposition you 
and I know that it does not work out that way. There is not the 
same mandate in the orders, so far as the Guardsman is concerned 
for the very reason you have suggested all the way through that 
you have to popularize the National Guard, and you can not put 
compulsion in it in the same sense. If that is true, are we not go- 
ing to establish two bodies that sooner or later are going to clash 
with one another, and have we not a chief appointed not by the 
authority which is ultimately responsible for what the chief does, 
but by a plebiscite? 

Col. GiiiLETT. No, sir; that chief is appointed by the President, 
upon the recommendation of the National Guard Council. While 
the General Staff of the Army is appointed by the Secretary of War 
and taken from a roster and detailed to that position, you know and 
I know that the Secretary of War would no more think of appoint- 
ing a chief of staff without consulting not alone the President, but 
several other prominent civilians, than he would think of perform- 
ing any other function of his office, of equal importance. 

Mr. Greene. I am rather inclined to say that the first thing the 
world generally knows, and the whole Army, as to who is Chief of 
Staff, is to read orders. 

Col. GiiiLBTT. Here is the point I make there. This system of 
general staff control of the National Guard, under the unquestioned 
principle that there can be but one boss in a military establishment. 



1986 AKMY BEORGANIZATION. 

has not worked out successfully with the National Guard because 
to-day you have not got any ^National Guard. That is true. 

Mr. Greene. Is it not a matter of fact or a probability that if the 
national-defense act had had an opportunity to be put into effect, 
without the Mexican-border experience and without the intervention 
of this war, we would have had a chance to see what the national- 
defense act could do ; that while the ink was still wet on the national- 
defense act the National Guard wis sent to the border, and while still 
at the border the war came on, so there has been no normal expe- 
rience under the national-defense act? Is it not further true that 
the National Guard to-day is disbanded the more as a result of war 
than as the result of imperfect operation of a law which as yet ha& 
never been tried? 

Col. GiLLETT. I think not, sir. I can not see wherein the National 
Guard was disbanded by any other act or agency than the authority 
conferred upon the Regular Army functioning through its Judge 
Advocate General by the national-defense act. I think the national- 
defense act is unworkable, and would have been unworkable for that 
very reason. 

Mr. Greene. The disbanding of the National Guard comes about 
after the war by reason of the decision that the discharge from the 
Army discharged from the National Guard the men who were in the 
National Guard organization. 

Col. GiLUBTT. That is my personal opinion. 

Mr. Greene. That is what they held. If there had been no war 
there would have been no discharge of these men, because they would 
not have been in the Federal service, and consequently, being mus- 
tered out of the Federal service 

Col. GiLLETT (interposing). We would have been simply putting 
off that day, because had we ever been called into the Federal serv- 
ice, having finished that service, the same result wouhHmve been 
achieved. 

Mr. Greene. That is ^a supposition. 

Col. Gillett. That is a supposition. 

Mr. Anthony. You think the National Guard was treated in that 
way by the department in order to substitute for it some other mili- 
tary system ? 

Col. GiiiLETT. That is my personal opinion. 

Mr. Anthony. That is mine, too. 

Mr. Caldweu>. I think that under the Constitution if we pro- 
vided for the drafting of the National Guard that destroys the 
National Guard and that it must necessarily be rebuilt again. I 
think perhaps in the administration of the law, starting from noth- 
ing, as they were obliged to do because of the draft, perhaps they 
have not been as liberal in the construction of our statutes as some 
of us might have expected, but I do not think there was any power 
at all by which you could hold a man who had gone through the 
war under the draft. 

Mr. Anthony. When the National Guardsman went into the serv- 
ice before the war he took an oath to the State and to the United 
States? 

Col. Gillett. Yes. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you believe the Government had any power to 
release him from his oath to the State ? 



ABMT BB0BQA2<riZATI0N. 1937 

• 

Col. Gn-LETT. Nona at all. 

Mr. Gbeene. The crux of the matter is whether the Federal Gov- 
•ernment will recognize, support, and exercise any part of its lawful 
jurisdiction over forces while yet within the State. The State might 
retain a National Guard force, but if it did not meet the specifica- 
^i<ms laid down in the law, then the National Government would 
not recognize it as National Guard. 

Col. GiM-ETT. Exactly. 

Mr. Greene. That decision is made by the law laid down here. 

Col. GiLiiETT. As interpreted by a Eegular Army officer? 

Mr. Caldwell. Section 111 or the national deiense act says, re- 
ferring to the National Guardsmen drafted into the Federal serv- 
ice ".All persons so drafted, shall from the date of their draft, stand 
-discharged from the militia, and shall from said date be subject to 
such laws and regulations for the government of the Army of the 
United States as may be applicable to members of the Volunteer 
Army, and shall be embodied in organizations corresponding as far 
as practicable to those of the Regular Army or shall be otnerwise 
assigned as the President may direct." If anybody is to blame. Con- 
gress is to blame. 

Col. GiLLEiT. May I call attention to section 60 to bring out, if I 
can, the point that under the national-defense act, whether we had 
gone to war or whether we had not, my conclusion that the National 
Suard would have been busted anyway is based upon the experience 
I had under section 60 of the national-defense act, which provides 
that — 

The organization of the National Guard, including the composition of all 
units thereof, shall be the same as that which is or may hereafter be prescribed 
for the Regular Army, subject in time of peace to such general exceptions as 
may be authorized by the Secretary of War. And the President may prescribe 
the particular unit or units, as to branch or arm of service, to be maintained In 
•each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia In order to secure a force 
which when combined shall form complete higher tactical units. 

This has to do with the question of tables of organization. When 
the Militia Bureau ruled that a himdred men should constitute an 
Infantry company, I came to Washington and had an interview with 
<Ten. Carter, who I will say is a mighty good man to the National 
Ouard, so far as he can be, and a very competent oflScer. I think he 
understands as much about the militia force as any man can whose 
tour of duty in that office is only a short period of years. He told 
me he had recommended to the General Staff that 65 men be the 
minimum strength for an Infantry company and had been turned 
down. 

Mr. Caldwell. Did he tell you the cause of that? 

Col. GiLLETT. No; I do not recall that. 

Mr. Caldwell. Let me make a statement that may remind you. 
He said that under the national-defense act he had been specifically 
limited in the size of a minimum National Guard company to 100. 

Mr. Anthony. The Regulations of the Army say that an Infantry 
company of the Regular Army shall have so many men, and yet they 
do not maintain their Infantry companies at that number. 

Mr. Hull. Let me also call your attention to this fact, although 
I rather think this discussion is wholly out of order, that the Secre- 



1938 ABMY REOEQAKIZATION. 

tary of War and the Chief of the Militia Bureau have ruled that that 
law does not apply now. 

Mr. McKenzie. Mr. Chairman, I received a telegram from Adjt. 
Gen. F. S. Dickson, of Illinois, stating that it would be impos- 
sible for him to be present at the hearing on the National Guard 
provisions of the Army reorganization bill. But in this telegram 
he makes certain valuable suggestions which I would like to have 
included as a part of the hearing. I therefore ask that the telegram 
from Adjt. Gen. F. S. Dickson be printed as a part of the hearing. 

(The telegram referred to is as loUows:) 

Springfield, III., December 16^ 1919. 
Hon. John McKenzie, 

House of Representatives, 

WdsMngton, D. C: 

Appreciate information relative hearings set for to-day before Military Com- 
mittee. Greatly regret that imperative duties here prevent my being in Wash- 
ington to-day. Am taking the liberty however of writing you somewhat fully 
along lines which National Guard officers Illinois have discussed with refer- 
ence to National Guard legislation. 

In brief we do not feel that National Guard should attempt to legislate for 
the Regular Army. We feel that the record made by National Guard In over- 
seas entitles the guard to proper and full recognition as an integral part In 
any pr<^)er scheme devised to create a national military policy. Candor com- 
pels me to say that we are not at this time in sympathy with that provision of 
so-called National Guard association bill which attempts to create a militia 
council functioning separate and distinct from the actlvites of the General 
Staff. We feel the National Guard should be a part of and function through 
and under such regularly constituted machinery as all other elements of our 
military defense may function. In other words if we have a National Guard 
at all it should be a part of the main plan and not off by itself as an auxiliary. 
We feel that all that is necessary to enable the National Guard to reorganize 
and acquire greater degree of efficiency than ever before in a few amendments 
to the present national-defense act or injection in some other legislation of 
the same matters so as to clear up some of the difficulties involved ^n the 
national-defense act which were made patent even in the short time of its 
application before the great war. 

To our minds the main problem so far as the National Guard is concerned is 
to secure in a cooperative way fair and sympathetic treatment of our prob- 
lems by the General Staff. We feel that the officers of the present militia 
bureau are entirely sympathetic, but we fear that oftimes elements in the 
G«ieral Staff which have had no contact with the National Guard or its prob- 
lems predominate in an unsympathetic view of the same. We feel that if this 
difficulty can be in any way met so tliat the guard could function on sympa- 
thetically and yet as a part of the general military scheme and under the same 
machinery erected for the same it would be much better than to attempt to 
create an outside governing body such as a militia council. I am writing you 
more fully suggesting our views solely for such consideration as jrou may feel 
they merit. 

F. S. Dickson. 

(Thereupon the committee adjourned.) 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Tuesday^ Jcmuary 13^ 1920. 

The coinmittee this day met, Hon. Julius Kahn (chairman) pre- 
siding. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen of the committee, we have a number 
of citizens present this morning from various sections of the country 
to testify in regard to a provision for chaplains in the reorganization 
bill and in reference to one or two other matters. 

Mr. Butler, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Aflfairs, has 
asked me to take up a matter on which the members of the Society of 
Friends would like to be heard. Mr. Butler is not here just at this 
moment, and in the meantime we will hear the gentlemen who desire 
to appear before the committee in reference to the provision for 
chaplains. 

Bishop McDowell, I understand, is chairman of the committee 
which desires to present this matter, and we will be glad to hear 
him now. 

STATEMENT OF BEY. WILLIAM F. McDOWELL, BISHOP OF THE 
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHTJBCH, AND GHATUMAW OF THE OEH- 
EBAL COMMITTEE ON ABMT ANB NAVT CHAPLAINS, BEPBE- 
SENTING THE OENEBAL WAB-TIME COMMISSION OF THE 
CHUBCHES. 

> 

The Chairman. Bishop McDowell, will you kindly state to the 
reporter your full name, the church with wnich you are connected, 
and the position you occupy ? 

Bishop McDowell,. William F. McDowell, bishop of the Metho- 
dist Episcopal Church, but appearing here, Mr. Chairman, as repre- 
senting the Federal council of all the churches and in connection with 
representatives of other bodies, and notably with the executive secre- 
tary of the Catholic chaplain bishop, to speak upon the subject of 
the provision for chaplains in the Army reorganization bill. 

The Chairman. We will ibe very pleased to hear you. 

Bishop McDowEM.. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the commit- 
tee, the churches made a quick and complete response to the needs 
of the Nation in the time of the war, both in the matter of material 
a^istance and moral support, and in furnishing men in full propor- 
tion, and also in the purely voluntary matter of giving their minis- 
ters for service as chaplains- 

The war-time commission of the churches was very highly organ- 
ized and gave constant time and study and attention to this subject, 
and they are now disposed to ask for such a provision for the chap- 
laincy in the new Army bill as will in our judgment secure the 
best results for the Army and the largest favor among churches of 
all kinds. For in this matter we are in perfect agreement, and we 
ask for a provision which will secure the largest support for the 

1939 



1940 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Army among all these churches in time of peace as well as in time 
«of war. 

I will ask in a moment that some other gentlemen shall speak more 
in detail conceminff these provisions, but in general the Capper bill, 
introduced in the Senate, expresses what is in our mind touching 
these provisions, and the Hull bill in the House covers substantially 
^he same principles. These are as follows: First, a chaplain's corps, 
which there never has been, except one that was created during the 
war by order on the other side of the sea, where the American 
Expeditionary Forces had a chaplain's corps that was not provided 
hj law and was not forbidden by law. So the general in command 
created such a force, with Bishop Brent, of the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, at its head, and with Chaplain Loud and Chaplain Wertz as 
his associates. The first item of the provision we desire, therefore, 
is a chaplain's corps, which will put the chaplains upon the same 
basis as other branches of service in the Army. 

This corps would be administered by a staff preferably, and pre- 
sumably by a staff of three persons, and that would give us on this 
subject what we have not always had, a proper point of contact 
between the source of supply for the branch of service represented 
by the chaplains and the administration of the work of chaplains in 
ihe Army, and in the Army a point of contact that would be sympa- 
thetic and understanding. We have not always had that. 

The third item relates to the percentage of chaplains, and in our 
judgment upon this we are unanimous that the old order should 
obtain. The old order provided, I think, one chaplain for a regi- 
ment, at a time when regiments consisted of 1,200 men. When the 
size of the regiment was changed by order and made 3,600^ we had 
an enactment, and the members of the committee will remember it 
was put through here, restoring the original percentage of one chap- 
lain to 1,200 men, and that is what is now proposed by the Hull bUl 
and by the Capper bill, and it has the entire favor of all the churches. 

The fourth item relates to the grades in the chaplaincy, and provides 
that 5 per cent of them may reach the rank of colonel, 10 per cent may 
reach the rank of lieutenant colonel, 15 per cent may reach the rank of 
major, 25 per cent may reach the rank of captain, and 25 per cent, 
the rank of first lieutenant. The upper age limit beyond which one 
could be appointed a chaplain would be 35 years, with three years 
-of provisional service, an exception being made as to the provisional 
service in reference to those who served m the Great War, whom we 
did not feel ought to be made to go through the term of provisional 
training. 

Now, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, those are the general features 
we seek to incorporate in the bill. The Capper bill substantially pre- 
sented that, and the Senate Committee on Military Affairs has sub- 
stantially approved that, which would meet with the favor of what 
is perhaps a little bit rare, Mr. Chairman, a united Protestantism 
and Roman Catholicism upon a matter in which they are both inter- 
ested. In this matter we are one, because it seems to us it bears 
upon the moral welfare of the Army and upon the sympathetic atti- 
tude of the churches toward the Army, and the assurance to the 
churches and to the Army that the Army will have proper moral and 
spiritual care. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. - 1941 

I would be glad, Mr. Chairman, to have Dr. Watson, secretary of 
the Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains of the Federal Coun- 
cil of Churches ; Father O'Hern, representing Archbishop Hayes, the 
Catholic chaplain bishop; and also Maj. Axton, who is an Army 
chaplain, to say a word or two in reference to this matter. 

STATEMENT OF KEV. W. E. WATSON, SECRETAEY OF THE COM- 
MISSION ON AEMY AND NAVY CHAPLAINS OF THE FEDEEAL 
COUNCIL OF CHTIECHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee,- 
Bishop McDowell has very clearly outlined to you the provisions 
of the Hull bill, H. E. 10477, which is before you, the provisions 
of which are identical with the Capper bilJ. 

I will be glad to state as reasons for the adoption of the bill that 
first of all the bill has been prepared after consultation with rep- 
resentative religious teachers of all faiths in the United States, not 
only of the Protestant Church but also of the Roman Catholic 
Church, and also after consultation with men of different faiths who 
have had the largest experience as chaplains in the United States 
Army. And back of all that, there is the public sentiment of the 
50,000,000 people represented by those of whom I have spoken be- 
hind the salient points of this bill. 

I need hardly rehearse to you the salient points of the bill. First 
of all, there is the provision for the chaplain's corps. The idea is 
simply this, that the spiritual interests of the men in the Army, just 
as the spiritual interests of men anywhere else, should be adminis- 
tered by specialists. It would be as reasonable to expect a military 
man who simply knew artillery to prescribe rules and regulations for 
the conduct of a hospital as it would be to expect the men of the 
J line, however skilled they may be in general matters, to direct specifi- 
cally the details of the conduct of the work of chaplains. Therefore 
we desire to have a chaplain's corps that there shall be administered 
by specialists — ^that is, by chaplains — ^the spiritual interests and 
welfare of the men in the United States Army. 

Then as to the question of the administration of the corps of chap- 
lains, whether this shall be by a staff of three or by one with two 
assistants, is simply a matter of detail. Three was agreed upon as 
a compromise to avoid possible differences. Later we have found 
that there is no fear of such differences, and whether the administra- 
tion be by a staff of three or by one with two assistants is not regarded 
as vital. I may say frankly that I personally prefer one with two 
assistants. 

As to the proportion, one chaplain for every 1,200 men; that is 
the least number that will give efficiency. I do not believe you can 
get efficiency if you have, say, one chaplain to every 2,000 men. It 
is hard to get it with one for every 1,200. If we are going to have 
chaplains at all, let us put them upon a plane where they can have 
efficiency. 

As to the matter of grades, there is no reason why chaplains shall 
be looked upon as outsiders in the Army and questions raised as to 
whether or not thej have any rank or standing in the Army. There 
should be no discrimination against a chaplain in administering his 

150187— 20— VOL 2 ^10 



1942 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

high duties, the spiritual interests, upon which very largely the whole 
success of the Army depends. Morale is a big thing, and the morale 
depends upon spiritual things. No one makes larger contribution to 
morale than the chaplain. There is no reason why there should be any 
discrimination against those men. 

As to the age limit, we believe that 85 years is as old as we care to 
have a man go into the Army as a chaplain, and we have arrived 
at that conclusion after very careful study: We think there should 
be an exception made in behalf of those men who have given them- 
selves to this service and who have already served in the Great War. 

If I may, I will be pleased to say a little with reference to the 
hearing we have already had before the Senate Committee and the 
results of that hearing. We had a hearing in which there was 
unanimity of sentiment. There was no conflicting voice, as you will 
see from the proceedings. Representatives appeared at that hearing 
from the Catholic Church, from the various elements of the Protes- 
tant Church, and from the chaplains themselves, and there was a 
unanimous expression of opinion in regard to the matter. We believe 
that largely as a result of that unanimity, the subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in preparing the general 
Army reorganization J)ill, introduced into that bill a section on 
chaplains which embodies practically everything we have asked for 
except that instead of promotion in fixed percentages, as the Hull 
bill provides, the Senate bill provides for promotions after five years 
to captain, after 14 years to major, after 20 years to lieutenant 
colonel, and after 26 years to colonel. Those provisions are accept- 
able to us, with the single exception that we think the five-year period 
is a little too long for promotion to captain. We think it should be 
three instead of five, which would be similar to the provision made 
in the same bill for the men in the Medical Corps. 

There is one more fact that I would like to bring to you, and that 
is we are informed that the War Plans Division of the General 
Staff, while approving the Hull bill in the main, will recommend a 
corps to be administered by one man with the rank of colonel^ to 
be appointed annually, and eligible only for three successive appomt- 
ments, with two or more assistants. We are also informed that they 
recommend an enlisted personnel of chaplains' assistants, two men 
to each 1,200 men, 30 per cent with the rank of battalion sergeant 
major, and 70 per cent with the rank of sergeant. In preparing the 
draft of this bill we thought the chaplain's corps would provide for 
that enlisted personned, but we are informed, we are in error there. 

The Chairman. Is it proposed to have as those assistants men who 
are identified with the cloth in the various churches ? 

Mr. Watson. No ; the idea is that they shall be enlisted personnel 
from whom may be drawn the chaplains' helpers, just as there is en- 
listed personnel in the other corps in the Army, on an average of 2 
to each 1,200 men, and that these men shall be detailed as chaplains' 
assistants. 

Mr. Greene. Will they perform any other than strictly military 
duties ? 

Mr. Watson. I think not. They will be detailed from the Army 
as chaplains' assistants, and when they are not serving in that capac- 
ity they will serve in whatever capacity they may be detailed for, I 
presume. 



ABMY BEOBGANIZATlbN. 1943 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact under the system that pre- 
vailed before we got into the war it was customary to detail an en- 
listed man or possibly two enlisted men to assist the chaplain of the 
regiment in performing his work. If he had a moving-picture show, 
for instance, and he wanted a man to use in conjunction with that 
work, which he was doing with his own unit, the commanding oflBcer 
would detail one or two assistants to help hini in that particular line 
of work. Was not that the custom which prevailed ? 

Mr. Watson. It was, and for the reason that that was the custom, 
in preparing this bill we did not think it necessary to put it in. 
But Col. Ordway, I am informed, is of the opinion that in order 
that such may be legally done a provision must be put into the bUl 
that ^ch men shall be available for that work. , 

Mr. Greene. Let me get that clear. Of course, the chaplain's func- 
tions within a post of command are under the military reflation of 
the commanding officer at the post, so that the commanding officer 
never loses his authority to detail such men as may be required to 
assist the chaplain, does he? 

Mr. Watson. I should not think so. I am giving you the opinion 
of the War Plans Division, as that opinion comed to me from them. 

Mr. Greene. I wanted to follow that up by asking you what, in 
your professional experience, would be the status of men not of the 
cloth, themselves enlisted nominally as soldiers, who never did any 
military work, who were not identified with the military, and who 
were entirely reserved for. functions of the pseudo kind that among 
men who are either soldiers or ministers would be considered rather 
anomalous. What would be their particular fnoral influence in a 
command of red-blooded men ? 

Mr. Watson. They are looked upon as the chaplains' orderlies, so 
far as I have seen them in operation. Maj. Axton could probably 
answer that question, as an experienced chaplain, better than I could. 

Mr. Greene. It seemed to me that you would more nearly realize 
your practical purpose if you took good soldiers in the command and 
put them upon special detail when you needed them, when they 
would still be soldiers and have identification as soldiers, whereas if 
you take — and I say this not disrespectfully — a sexless man, neither 
minister nor soldier, what would be his standing in the Army? 

Mr. Watson. I do not think it would be very favorable. I think 
this : That the enlisted personnel should be made up of men who are 
men of good character, but who do not do a whole lot of things 
which would be looked upon as the work of pseudo — ^to use your 
word — chaplains. That is not our proposition. 

Mr. Greene. I understand, and I was going back to the original 
idea, as to why it was not the practical thing. The world has a prac- 
tical view of such matters and they want a man to be a minister or 
else a part of the world. 

Mr. Watson. I shall be glad to furnish you with copies of publi- 
cations we have on the subject of chaplains. 

Mr. Kearns. I do not know whether I understood you correctly 
or not. Would you have these assistants you spoke of enlisted as 
chaplains' assistants or have them enlisted as regularly enlisted sol- 
diers — what we understand as enlisted men? 

Mr. Watson. They would be enlisted men, as I understand it. 

Mr. Kearns. They would not enlist for this particular duty? 



1944 ABMY BEORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Watson. There would be an enlisted personnel that would be 
known distinctively as the men who would be drawn for that purpose- 
Mr. Kjiarns. Why not have these men enlisted as assistants to the 
chaplains? Would you not get a better class of men? The detail 
from the service would be a haphazard thing and you might not get 
the proper kind of men for that work. 

Mr. Watson. I like the original plan myself ; let the chaplain pick 
his assistants according to their qualifications. 

Mr. Greene. If you are going to detail men from the line or from 
the ranks to assist the chaplains, I should think very often you would 
get men wholly unsuited for that duty. 

Mr. Watson. I agi*ee with that, but I was simply giving you the 
information we received from the War Plans Division. 

Mr. Greenk What I want to emphasize is this: Nobody knows 
better than a manly minister that there is an intermediate sort of 
grade, in the minds of some people, and that, in the imagination of 
1,200 boys who are perfectly willing to take the counsel and advice 
and guardianship, spiritually, of a real minister, if you have a non- 
professional man, not a minister and not a soldier, who has a quasi 
sort of spiritual authority or ^ardianship over them, he begins to 
fall under the suspicion of being nothing but a goody-goody. He 
is not either soldier or minister, and he would have precious little 
influence on 1,200 boys who had any red blood in them. 

Bishop McDowell. Mr. Chairman, I will now introduce Father 
O'Hern, representing the Catholic chaplain bishop. 

STATEMENT OF REV. LEWIS J. O'HEEN, EXECUTIVE SECEETAEY 

TO THE CATHOLIC CHAPLAIN BISHOP. 

Father O'Hern. Mr. Chairman, I feel that I oug'ht to say that the 
archbishop regrets verj'^ much that it was impossible for him to be 
here personally to-day, after receiving Dr. Watson's very kind invi- 
tation, and if he were not so busy I am sure he would be here, because 
I know he is vitally interested in all matters pertaining to chaplains. 
He is the official superior of the Catholic chaplains of the Army and 
the Navy, and therefore, in speaking, he represents the mind of the 
Catholic Church officially and finafly on all matters of this kind. 
So, being able to be here myself, his secretary wrote and asked me if 
I would kindly appear to-day and read into the record the instruc- 
tions which the archbishop presented at the hearing before the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs of the Senate. He has very nicely sum- 
marized them as follows : 

Requested to express my views concerning tlie status of chaplains in the 
Army, and the proposed legislation concerning them, I beg to observe the 
following : 

1. I am in full sympathy with the idea of a Chaplain Corps, since it makes the 
chaplain an organic part of the Army, and not a tolerated supernumerary with 
Indefinite duty and undetermined place. 

2. I favor the passage of the Capper bill. The main provisions of the pro- 
posed legislation are along the right line. Veteran chaplains, with the exception 
of the emergency overage men, should receive the same consideration accorded 
to all other veteran ofiicers. 

3. Insignia of rank, if necessary, as argued by many chaplains in the service, 
for proper recognition on the part of officers and men, should be granted, pro- 
vided the uniform be made very distinctive in singling out the chaplains, with 
the " cross " for Christian and the " star " for Jewish chaplains. If the uniform 



ABMY BEOBGAlinZATION. 1946 

is more clerical than at present, It would prevent chaplains becoming too " mili- 
tary " posing as officers, to the detriment of their religious influence. 

4. Moral training in the Army will avail but little if the religous sanction is 
not respected, encouraged, and provided for. Therefore, all moral training 
should be exclusively in the hands of chaplains, who should be advised to see 
to it that the soldiers under their charge be provided with clergymen of their 
respective religious beliefs. 

5. School for chaplains is desirable if conducted on far different lines from 
the one at Camp Zachary Taylor. To make a good Army chaplain it seems 
shocking to degrrade him from a position enjoyed by his religious calling to the 
level of an ordinary soldier. West Point and Annapolis are conducted on a high 
plane of dignity and decency. 

School should not be necessary as a test for obtaining a commission; all of 
this should be determined by the examining board before candidates enter the 
service. The purpo.se of school is for training and discipline. 

6. Revivals or retreats for chaplains is one of the best of recommendations. 
It affords the chaplain a time for prayer and meditation under their own re- 
ligious auspices. 

Certainly the experience which I have had during the war with our chaplain 
body as a whole has been most encouraging and edifying. The chaplains have 
done splendid work, and probably their place in the Army will be recoginzed 
now as it never has before. I stand ready to give my assistance in every way 
possible toward the amelioration of the chaplain in the Army of to-day and the 
future. 

It is a great pleasure to be able to represent his grace before you 
and to state to you his interest and sympathy in this matter as out- 
lined in his letter. I am sure no elaboration of that is necessary, 
because it is so much to the point. I think you will see exactly what 
he desires in this matter, and the interest he has in some recogni- 
tion of the great part played by the chaplains in the World War, 
and the part they may play in wars of the future. 

Mr. Kearns. How many men ought to be assigned to one chaplain, 
to assist him, in your opinion? 

Father O'Hern. I would say there should be a chaplain for every 
1,200 men. I am convinced of that. I do not think a chaplain can 
properly care for the spirital and moral welfare of more men than 
that, because his work is largely individual. As a matter of fact, I 
think if the chaplain in his work does not touch the individual, his 
work will not bear the best fruits. 

Mr. Kearns. Has the establishment of that proportion of one chap-^ 
lain to 1,200 men been the result of study? 

Father Q'Hern. It has been the result of study. Some years ago, 
when there was legislation framed for chaplains for the Navy, that 
matter was gone into very thoroughly and it was decided that there 
should be one for every 1,250 men, which is practically the same 
thing. That really is the result of study and firm conviction, based 
upon considerable experience. 

Mr. Kearns. What is your idea in reference to the two assistants 
proposed for the chaplain? 

Father O'Hern. Not having been in the Army myself, I regret to 
say that I would not be able to speak in regard to that. But I am 
sure Maj. Axton will be more than able to clear up any difficulties 
in your minds in regard to the assistants to the chaplain. 

Mr. Kearns. Have you given any thought as to how these assist- 
ants should be selected ? 

Father O'Hern. Just as an outsider, and without much knowledge 
about it, I should say they should be selected from the personnel, 
and let the chaplain pick some one acceptable to him. I speak un- 
officially on that, never having been in the service. 



1946 ARMY REORGANIZATION*. 

Bishop McDowell. Mr. Chairman, t would like to call upon Maj. 
Axton to make a statement to the committee in reference to this 
matter. 

STATEMENT OF ICAJ. TOHN T. AXTON, CHAPLAIN, ITNITEI) STATES 

ABMY. 

Maj. Axton. Mr. Chairman, I think I need scarcely emphasize the 
spirit of unity you have seen evidenced by these men coming here 
to-day. It looks like an exemplification of the old motto, " In essen- 
tials, unity ; in nonessentials, liberality ; in all things, charity^." 

May I take up first the matter of the specific proportion of 1 
chaplain to 1,200 men, and say to you that in the British service the 
proportion is 1 to 750. 

The matter was studied by a board of chaplains in the War De- 
partment. In our own Army during the war the proportion was 1 
chaplain to 1,200 men, and the inadequacy of 1 chaplain among 
1,200 men in certain situations was quite plainly in evidence. There 
came into New York a few days ago a ship with 750 returning sol- 
diers on it, and 3 men had died at sea without the ministration of a 
chaplain or a minister of any kind. You know what it means to the 
relatives of men who die under such circumstances to know that a 
chaplain was present, and to receive some word from the chaplain. 
The fact that there was no chaplain on board that ship was due to 
the shortage of men in the chaplain's service. I think I need scarcely 
say anything more to emphasize this point, except to say that the 
Navy ratio of 1 chaplain to 1,200 men is found to work out fairly well 
in experience. I think when we have that nunlber we will have 
enough. 

I would like, however, to emphasize the necessity of having organi- 
zational machinery for chaplains to allow them to have a chaplain's 
corps. I believe tne selection, the instruction, and the inspection of 
chaplains should be handled by chaplains if we want efficiency along 
those lines. 

The Chairman. Under the system that prevailed prior to our entry 
into the war, the Catholic church and the Protestant churches had 
some one here in Washington who consulted the War Department un- 
officially. I imagine, about appointment of chaplains. 

Maj. Axton. That is quite true. 

The Chairman. And the chaplains who were appointed had the 
church behind them ? 

Maj. Axton. We would expect that still, sir. But they were sub- 
mitted to an examination, and certain points given for certain quali- 
ties shown by those chaplains, by regulation. 

The Chairman. What I had in mind was this: You spoke about 
some board. Would that board take the place of these gentlemen ? 

Maj. Axton. No, sir; but act in cooperation or in conjunction 
with them and more closely coordinate than ever before, because it 
would give us some one with authority to whom the churches might 
appeal for instructions concerning their chaplains, and for informa- 
tion as to what their status is. In the British service during the 
war there were two chaplains who reached the rank of major gen- 
eral and three chaplains who attained the grade of principal chap- 
lain with the grade of brigadier general in the British service. In 



V 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1947 

their regular arnry in peace time they had two in the grade of 
major general. We had no chaplain during the war who got beyond 
the grade of major in our Army. In fact, we had no chaplains pro- 
moted during the war, but some weeks after the armistice was signed 
there was an edict sent out which pennitted the promotion of a 
small percentage of chaplains, but not old-line Army chaplain was 
promoted beyond the grade of major, and those who had been majors 
for many years stood fast in that grade. 

The Chairman. That, of course, was in accordance with the pro- 
visions of existing Jaw. They had no rank above that. 

Maj. AxTON. I can cite you the instance of one who recently has 
been promoted to the grade of colonel, a chaplain who was designated 
to tate over the duties in charge of graves registration — Chaplain 
Pierce. There was some means found loy which he could be made a 
colonel. 

Mr. Crago. Not of the chaplains' corps? 

Maj. AxTON. No; there is no such thing as a chaplains' corps. 

The Chairman. The present law limits the rank to that of major. 

Maj. AxTON. I had understood that an opinion was gotten from 
the Judge Advocate General, and he found that it would be possible 
to promote chaplains, and that certain recommendations were made, 
but were there laid upon the tal4e. 

The Chairman. As a matter ot fact, under the Overman Act that 
might have bene done. 

Maj. AxTON. I am merely pleading for an organization of chap- 
lains, and the machinery to operate that organization, with a proper 
provision for higher grades. It seems to me the younger men would 
have much more respect for those men who had risen to the higher 
grades, when it comes to a direction of their affairs. 

I plead for regular commissioned grades. I have seen some agita- 
tion that comes from very high authority that favors taking away 
from chaplains their regular grades and giving them some sort of 
assimilated rank. 

The Chairman. Right in that connection, is not that what the 
War Department did during the closing year of the war ? 

Maj. AxTON. No, sir; every chaplain was commissioned; some, of 
them have been commissioned only a short time. 

The Chairman. Did they not drop the titles of major, captain, and 
so on? 

Maj. AxTON. They call us chaplains; still the title meant nothing. 
I very much prefer to be called chaplain than to be called major. 
I am primarily a chaplain, and incidentally a major. But I do not 
think I could have accomplished half of the work I have been able 
to accomplish during the war if I had had the grade only of lieuten- 
ant. The grade gave me added prestige. 

Mr. Greene. That is a vei;y practical question. It has a certain 
glamor, and we have got to get down to the reason for it to establish 
any confidence in it. If a man is a chaplain, that is absolutely a 
nonmilitary function, although he is identified with military interests 
for the time being, just as he might be elsewhere in some other simi- 
lar capacity. Why does he need the rank? 

Ma]. AxTON. Because the whole military service is based upon 
rank. 

Mr. Greene. He is not a military man. 



1948 ARMY REORGAinZATIOlS^. 

Maj, AxTON. The veterinarian is not a military man, nor is the 
doctor a military man. 

Mr. Greene. I believe that to be a grave error and would not 
undertake to prove anything by it. 

Maj. AxTON. If you elimmate all of it and only give line officers 
grade, and take it away from chaplains, from medical officers, from 
veterinarians, from subsistence officers, and from finance officers, 
take away all grades from those officers and give grades only to 
line officers who command troops, give it to them for command pur- 
poses, then you would have the Army on a sound foundation. But 
do not take it away from chaplains until you take it away from the 
other men, too. Do not set the chaplain off by himself as a marked 
man, having no defined status. 

Mr. Greene. That is what you suggest. If the chaplain is com- 
missioned as a chaplain and given all the status of a commissioned 
officer, so far as his relations with the service are concerned, is he 
not more conspicuously identified in the minds of appreciative and 
sympathetic personnel by not having any of the tinsel of rank than 
he is by having it ? 

Maj. AxTON. Not when he comes in contact with other men. 

Mr. Greene. But he is not exercising command. 

Maj. AxTON. Nor does the medical officer exercise command. 

Mr. Greene. Why, then, do the chaplains want a corps? 

Maj. AxTON. They want it because the other officers are organized 
that way, and the chaplains are discriminated against, and they do 
not get a defined status. 

Mr. Greene. You mean as to rating for quarters? 

Maj. AxTON. Ruting for quarters. 

Mr. Greene. But inasmuch as he has the status of a commissioned 
officer and is entitled to all that is provided for by law or regulation 
in the scale of increases in pay and quarters corresponding to those 
established for the grades as they advance, why could not the assign- 
ment to quarters be based upon exactly the same basis? 

Maj. AxTON. Why differentiate between the status of a commis- 
sioned officer and an actual commissioned officer? 

Mr. Greene. Because he is a chaplain and not a military man. 

Maj. AxTON. I hold a commission in the Army. 

Mr. Greene. Because the law provides for it ; but that is no argu- 
ment why it should be so. 

Maj. AxTON. All right. But I believe if they are going to have 
a scheme of promotion by selection provided for every other officer, 
the same scheme for promotion by selection, or for elimination, should 
obtain for the chaplains as for everybody else rather than to try to 
set up a complicated scheme by which you set the chaplain apart by 
himself and surround the chaplain witn a new status. 

Mr. Greene. Let me ask you this question, born of your own ex- 
perience — and I am happy to say I have heard of you, chaplain, 
very happily — is not the only power and influence that a chaplain 
can exercise among the personnel of the Army based entirely on the 
factor of the personal equation ? 

Maj. AxTON. That is very largely true, sir. 

Mr. Greene. That is practicafly all there is of it. He must estab- 
lish himself as a friend of the men, and it does not make any differ- 
ence what you call him ? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1949 

Maj. AxTON. You are right about that, but he is constantly being 
shifted from one command to another. To-day he may be serving 
one group of men and then he is arbitrarily sent to an entirely new 
group. He carries with him the prestige which his service and rank 
carry with them. 

Mr. Gre?ke. Does he not go to that new post with his traveling 
papers, which indicate the grsSe of service and the grade of pay ? 

Maj. AxTON. Yes, the personnel adjutant and the commanding 
officer see those papers, and no one else. But from the insignia he 
is permitted to wear on his uniform it is evident to all that he has 
risen to that grade on account of distinguished service. 

Mr. Greene. I thought we were agreed that his relation to the 
men did not depend upon his rank, but upon his personality. 

Maj. AxTON. That is true. But when ne goes to a new post he is 
a stranger, and when he has that rank he goes among strangers with 
•an added prestige. 

Mr. Greene. He carries that prestige on his shoulders. 

Maj. AxTON. No, sir; I would not go so far as to say that. A man 
with one bar on his shoulder may have ever so winning a personality, 
but because he was simply a lieutenant he would not have nearly the 
prestige as a colonel. You put a lieutenant and a major of long ex- 
perience side by side, and it will not be difficult to see who is the 
man with the more power. 

Mr. Greene. I think the experience around this table has been 
that we have listened with a great deal more consideration to the 
well-matured views of juniors than to some of the theories of men 
who have become so old that they have become confirmed in giving 
us little or no information. 

Maj. AxTON. My chief concern is not so much the getting of rank 
for chaplains. It is absolutely a secondary consideration with me. 
I want efficient service. I am in this service to do what I can for the 
promotion of the moral welfare of the Army, and I expect to stay 
in it all my life. All my thought is to secure that which will give 
to the men the greatest amount of efficiency to do their work. So 
far as I am personally concerned, I would very much prefer to be 
called chaplam rather than major. But I know that the fact that 
I have that grade, and have the evidence of that grade have given 
me added strength. 

Mr. Greene. I believe that a good chaplain in an organization 
without anything except an old black frock, which the chaplain used 
to wear in my day, had often more influence over the men in the 
command than even the commanding officer himself, and he did not 
need to wear anything on his shoulders at all. 

Mr. Sanford. Is it not also true that the personal equation enters 
into the standing of every officer ? 

Maj. AxTON. Of course. 

Mr. Sanford. And an individual who has a disagreeable person- 
ality can not get along with his men or get good results. 

Maj. AxTON. Yes. But when I take up a bill and see that it says 
that nurses shall have rank up to the grade of major and wear the 
insignia, it makes me wonder what place the chaplains will have. 

Mr. Sanford. In regard to the nurses, have not the nurses made the 
same argument for rank for themselves that you have made for 
rank for chaulains? 



1950 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Maj. AxTON. I have heard so. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you not think, from your experience, that the 
nurses need rank, too? 

Maj. AxTON. I think they do. 

Mr. Sanford. In order to accomplish results? 

Maj. AxTON. I think it would strengthen them. 

MJr. Fields. How would you select the assistants to -the chap- 
lains ? 

Maj. AxTON. I am coming to that now. That matter in reference 
to enlisted assistants was threshed out very carefully by a board of 
-chaplains, and it was because of the recommendations of this board, 
I think, that the War Plans Division made its recommendation. 
Under the old plan it usually happened that the man whom I wanted 
to be my assistant was needed somewhere else. A large part of the 
•duties of the chaplain's assistants would be clerical work, which 
•consumes a great deal of the chaplain's time now. 

Therefore, when we put this proposition up to the War Plans 
Division we asked for certain clerical help, and it was specified that 
they should be men of the grade of battalion sergeant major, which 
on its face says "clerical ability." That is what we sought for. 
About all I have been able to draw by way of assistants has been 
a fair orderly or a second-class janitor, because the man I wanted 
to help me, to direct motion-picture shows, for instance, and do any 
of the other detail work of that sort which a chaplain wants done 
was useful somewhere else, and I could not put my hands on him. 

With regard to the implication that we would get weak men who 
would not stand well among the balance of the command, I take 
exception to the idea. I know there are a lot of splendid young men 
who are looking toward the ministry as a life work who would wel- 
come this as an opportunity for contact with the Army, who might 
enlist specifically for this thing, and who would give us first-class 
assistance, who would be glad of the opportunity to render service 
in the military field, and who could be brought in in that way. 

Mr. Fields. And if brought in in that way, they doubtless would 
be looked upon with favor by the enlisted personnel. 

Maj. AxTON. Undoubtedly. 

Mr. Fields. Whereas, if they were detailed to you for the purpose 
of being your assistants, they would probably be regarded as being 
dead wood which it was desirable to get rid of somewhere else. 

Maj. AxTON. It altogether too frequently has been the case, be- 
cause the men who have the energy and the ability were needed in 
other places. 

Mr. Hull. Right in connection with that, I would like to ask you 
a question. Of course, primarily, we are sitting as a military com- 
mittee and we are not concerned so much with the church as we are 
with the military status of what we put into the reorganization bill. 
Mr. Watson, in reply to a question, said he did not know as to the 
military value of the assistants. That brings into question the mili- 
tary value of the chaplains. I myself have very pronounced views 
in regard to the military value of a good chaplain. 

I would like to have you explain the military value of the chap- 
lain and the assistants to the chaplain. 

Maj. AxTON. If you had an organization, such as we are contend- 
ing for, I bjelieve we would be able to stress the word " good " for 



ABMY BEOBOAKIZATION. 1951 

every chaplain. The reason why some have been good, some not so 
good, and some inferior, is the system that has been employed con- 
cerning the selection^ of the chaplains and in their handling. Provin- 
cialism of the worst kind has crept into the system. A man is 
sent here and yonder, with no one to supervise him, no one to inspect 
him, who has any particular interest in his work. There has been 
no one to whom he could go with his problems and discuss them with 
the knowledge that he would get a sympathetic hearing and proper 
advice. I believe with the proper organization of chaplains, with 
the proper interest and enthusiasm and life and steam behind it, we 
would be able to buck up a lot of men who are indifferent or who 
are in danger of sliding back into a rut. 

I am thoroughly convinced that you must have high-grade men, 
and I am also thoroughly convinced of this, that you are not going 
to get high-grade men unless j^ou legislate favorably for them and 
at least do as much as the Naw does, which offers to its chaplains so 
much more inducement than tfee Army does. They are combing the 
country now trying to get the right type of men to go into the Navy. 
There, in the Navy, 50 per cent of the men who are chaplains have 
the field officers' grades. I sat in a conference with five Navy chap- 
lains, all of whom had been in the service about the same length of 
tiiAe I had, and these men all wore on their sleeves the gold braid 
• that indicated they were captains in the Navy. 

Mr. Hull. The morale of the Army is the important thing. 

Maj. AxTON. Absolutely; and I believe that the right kind of a 
chaplain can add more to that than any other one thing. 

Mr. Kearns. How would vou sel^t the assistants? 

Maj. AxTON. I would do as the Medical Corps does — ^have some of 
them enlist directly in the Chaplains' Corps and then encourage the 
transfer of the right type of men from the line to the Chaplains 
Corps. It is preferable to have men transferred from the line, be- 
cause they have had the military experience that men direct from 
civil life would not have. I would give them the grades of sergeant 
and battalion sergeant major, and in that way encourage them to 
come in. 

Mr. Greene. That would eliminate the candidates for the min- 
istry ? 

Maj. AxTON. No; it would give you some place to take them in; 
it would not be arbitrary that you should take them from the line. 
I would do both, enlist some men specifically for the Chaplains Corps 
and, too, try to get the right type of men detailed from the service. 

Mr. Greene. You know what I have been aiming at in regard to 
the peculiar temper and spirit of good, red-blooded boys who know 
the difference between the real, manly chaplain and the other kind. 
The real chaplain does not have to pretend at all, because those boys 
will involuntarily respect him. You know what the influence of such 
a man in the ministry is on the personnel and how peculiarly sound 
it is, because in a military sense it does not have to rest upon any 
paragraph in the regulations; it does not have to be compelled; it 
is a spontaneous response to a red-blooded, sympathetic personality. 
Why does that have to have rank and grade to distinguish it and 
maintain it? 

Maj. AxTON. It does not when it has had time to win its way; but 
it needs time to do that. 



1952 ARMY REORGANIZATIOK 

Mr. Greene. The grade and rank, to start with, does not give you 
power? 

Maj. AxTON. It does not give you more than you can accumulate^ 

Mr. Greene. I am trying to reason from the same equation you 
find in civil life, although it may not be quite the same. But it 
seems to me you must rest your case entirely upon the personality 
and character of the man. Once he starts with an ecclesiastical func- 
tion he needs no additional device upon his shoulders to confer any 
further sacerdotal authority upon him. From the start to the finish 
his power for influence in the command depends upon the man him- 
self, and if you once give him the status of an officer, so far as his 
relations with the military are concerned, that man has a freer field 
to work in, and he is unhampered still less than he would be if he had 
to articulate himself with a well-appointed hierarchy that depended 
upon some paragraph in the regulations. 

Maj. AxTON. Not only does the chaplain have duties that bring^ 
him in contact with the men in the command, but also with the com- 
munity. 

Mr. Greene. Exactly ; and I think it is true in civil life that some 
of the most eloquent and persuasive pulpit orators and ministers 
generally are not bishops. 

Maj. AxTON. That is true, .but you must take into consideration 
the fact that the families must intermingle. All of those thinffs have 
to be taken into consideration. The relation of the wife and children 
of the chaplain with the wives and children of the other officers in 
a post have to be taken into consideration. ^ 

Mr. Sanford. What is the lowest rank which you would have the 
chaplain have ? 

Maj. AxTON. If I had the say about it, I would do as the British 
do ; that is, I would start him as a captain. 

Mr. Sanford. If you made him a lieutenant, would he not be 
handicapped by not having sufficient authority ? 

Maj. AxTON. Give him tmie. 

Mr. Sanford. In the meantime, would not the service suffer? 

Maj. AxTON. I think not. 

Mr. Greene. It seems to me that Mr. Sanford has touched upon 
a vital point. 

Maj. AxTON. If your mind is running along this line, of eliminating^ 
rank from all men in the Armj but those in the combatant service^ 
I think I could quite easily coincide with your view. But if you 
set the chaplains off and make them a type distinct, and set them 
apart, so that they will simply become fifth wheels in the Army^ 
then they will not have the place which I think they ought to 
have. 

Mr. QuiN. But they ought to be ministers? 

Maj. AxTON. They should be clergymen; yes, sir. 

Mr. QniN. But it would not be necessary that these assistants 
you speak of should be clergymen, would it ? 

Maj. AxTON. No; it was not intended that way. They should be 
first-class stenographers or clerks, to look out for the office end of 
it, to look out for the music, to attend to the bringing of a choir 
out from the city when that is desired, and things of that kind;: 
to look out for that class of work. 

Mr. FiELM, They should be men of some moral influence? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1953 

Maj. AxTON. They should be able to exercise a moral influence. 

Mr. QuiN. With reference to getting these men, would you change 
the method of getting the chaplains? 

Maj. AxTON. I do not think the method will need so much of a 
change as we will need to supervise. For instance, I was selected 
by a board made up entirely of line officers. It would seem to me 
they would have hafl a better slant on me from the standpoint 
of my ability to do the work of a minister if the bulk of them had 
been clergymen. 

Mr. James. Suppose you are asked to go to a regiment and pick 
out your assistants ; what particular qualifications would you desire 
in those men who were to be your assistants ? 

Maj. AxTON. I would want at least one first-class clerical man, a 
man who could do the actual detail clerical work. That is princi- 
pally what we would want him for. 

May I touch on one other point, Mr. Chairman, that has not been* 
touched upcm, and that is the matter of the single list for promotion? 
The disparity in age between the chaplains and other officers makes 
it a question, if you are going to take up the mtitter of a single list, 
to which you should give the utmost care and attention. The average 
:age of the 14 senior chaplains of the United States Army to-day is 
-57 years. The average age at which they entered the military serv- 
ice was 37 years. Put that against the record in the Medical Corps, 
ip^here we have the best analogy, because of training, education, and 
experience. The 14 senior majors in the Medical Corps to-day 
average 43 years of age, and they entered the service at an average 
of 29 years of age. Take the 14 middle majors of the Medical Corps, 
^tting down to where we can get a little better line on it, and you 
will find their average age is 31, and the average age at which tney 
•entered the service was 29. 

Some proposals have been put forward in the public press linking 
tihe chaplains and the medical officers and carrying them along on a 
single list of the Army. I only want to warn you against that in 
my statement about the. disparity of age and to say also that in 
<}ualifying to become a chaplain experience counts for 40 per cent in 
iihe scale of 1,000 on which you are graded. So you will see that 
you must have had considerable experience. I would like to have 
you take that proposition into very careful consideration when you 
come to putting the chaplains into anything that looks like a single 
list. 

My idea is that the report of the subcommittee of the Senate com- 
mittee covers that and treats both the Medical Corps and the chap- 
lains fairly. 

Bishop McDowell. We are very anxious, Mr. Chairman, not to 
tresspass upon your time. But if we may have a few moments longer 
I would like to introduce now Chaplain Duffy, one of the Eoman 
Catholic chaplains, and ask him to say a word to you. 

STATEMENT OF CAFT. JAMES E. DUFFT, CHAPLAIN, UNITED 

STATES AEMY. 

Capt. DuFTY. Mr. Chairman, while I was listening to Chaplain 
Axton speaking, it reminded me very much of being at home at 
Section time. The first one that the prospective candidate calls 



1954 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

upon is the pastor of a church. Why he should do that, I do not 
know — ^yes, I do know why. It is because he looks upon the pastor 
as a leader, and to-day he is a leader. 

There was a letter which came to me this morning containing these 
words, " So you, as a chaplain, do not belong to the rank and file of 
the United States Army, provided that the bill should go through^ 
taking rank from the chaplain." 

Is it possible that the pastor who comes into the United States 
Army as a chaplain is going to lose that pow^* of leaden^ip ; is he 
going to be, as Chaplain Axton has said, placed over in a comer and 
not allowed to mingle with the others on the post? You will re- 
member when Chaplain Axton was asked what rank he would give 
to a chaplain he said at least a captaincy. It makes a difference* 
Sometimes we hear the superior officers say, " Ho, you are a chaplain ; 
you are only a first lieutenant." 

Another would say, " By the way, I just read some regulations in- 
regard to chaplains, and I said to that young man I did not see any 
regulations pertaining to second lieutenants." 

There is that feeling that the rank adds to the power, to the influ- 
ence and the prestige ; not that the chaplain wants to be called cap- 
tain or major; he is primarily a chaplain; he is there to do the 
chaplain's wort. But it makes a great difference sometimes if he has 
the rank. So that, gentlemen, I feel you are going to give us what 
we deserve. 

I think that, of course, we are not playing politics, but it will 
mean a great deal as regards the influence of the chaplain in his 
regiment or at his post if this committee will formulate a bill that 
wul give the chaplain his rank, and give him a rank in keeping with 
his profession. You gentlemen know very well that there is no pro- 
fession that demands so many years of study as the profession from 
which chaplains are taken. If 17,000,000 people in the United States 
call me father, then am I going to be deprived of that leadership by 
any bill formulated by the committee ? 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. 

Bishop McDowell. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad now to intro- 
duce Rev. Dr. Gaylord S. White, secretary of the General Commit- 
tee on Army and Navy Chaplains, representing the general war- 
time commission of the churches, and ask him to make a brief state- 
ment to the committee in reference to tTiis matter and call your 
attention to certain documents. Mr. White was throughout the 
entire period of the war secretary of this committee. 

STATEIEENT OF £EV. OAYLOBD S. WHITE, SECBETAET GENEBAL 
COHUITTEE ON ABHY AND NAVY CHAPLAINS. 

Mr. White. Bishop McDowell has said I was throughout the en- 
tire period of the war secretary of the Committee on Army and Navy 
Chaplains. I am sorry to say that is not quite correct, but that 
Mr. Armitage was the very efficient secretary of that committee for 
really the largest portion of the time. I assumed the duties in the 
latter part of our participation in the war, although I was in a posi- 
tion to keep in pretty close touch with the sentiment of the churches 
regarding the whole matter, because I was associate secretary of the 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1955 

General Wartime Commission of the Churches, in which our Pro- 
testant churches were united for war work, and this committee on 
Protestant chaplains acted as a subcommittee of that wartime com- 
mission. Therefore I was in pretty close touch with the feeling of 
the churches with regard to tms matter; and I think it is telling no 
secret to say that in the past, so far as the Protestant churches 
are concemea, they took very little interest in the work of the Army 
chaplains. I think they neglected these men,, and at that time these 
men, who were doing such splendid work, were very much isolated. 

Now, the churches are fully alive to the importance of the Army 
chaplain and the difficulties under which he has labored in the past, 
and you have seen to-day a practical demonstration of the unity of 
the Christian churches in desiring this bill. I think I may say our 
only interest in this question is simply the desire to strengthen the 
influence of religion in the Army. 

Some action was taken by the committee and matters had been 
reduced to the legislative form of this act, and the organizations 
represented included the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in 
America, the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, held not long ago in Detroit, the National Council of the 
Congregational Churches, the National Luthem Convention, the 
Northern Baptist Convention, the General Assembly of the Presby- 
terian Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and various 
annual conferences. 

The Chairman. You may put the entire list in the hearings. 

Mr. White. I will be glad to do that. 

Mr. Chairman. I think it is safe to say that every national denom- 
ination or convention which has met recently has taken affirmative 
action regarding the principle of these bills. 

I want to call your attention now to one more matter, and that is 
that the policy of the War Department evidently is to make a good 
deal of welfare work and to conduct that as an Army activity. If 
that policy is going to prevail, and if they are not going to call upon 
outside civilian organizations in the future, it is going to place the 
chaplain in a still more responsible position and a good deal more 
will be required of him. Undoubtedly the chaplains will have a 
large part to play in the promotion of this so-called welfare work, 
and for that reason we feel that it is only reasonable for them to ask 
for an organization with a view to efficiency. 

If I may take the time to say a single word, I may tell you a story 
that was told me last summer when I was visiting the Third Army 
with regard to this question of rank. One of the diaplains said that 
during an attack a noncommissioned officer came up to him and 
looked him over. He saw no insignia of rank upon him. He had 
seen various welfare men about, dressed in Army uniforms, and he 
looked this chaplain over, and he finally said to him, "Are you a 
member of the United States Army ? " And the chaplain said, " I 
told him I believed I had some papers up in my kit that said I was 
a first lieutenant in the United States Army." He said that the non- 
commissioned officer drew himself up ana said, " In that case, you 
are to put on your gas mask." The chaplain had no insignia of rank 
about him. 



1956 ARMY REORGANIZATION. ^ 

I have talked with many chaplains and I went abroad for that 
purpose last summer. I have asked them about this question of 
rank. Theoretically, I fully agree with the sentiments expressed 
bv Mr. Greene in reierence to that ; theoretically I do not think the 
chaplain should need any insignia of rank. I think the insignia 
of the cross confers a higher commission upon him. But, as a 
matter of fact, however, so long as the Army is based upon 
rank, I believe that a chaplain is undoubtedly put in a position 
where it is necessary for him to have rank in order to properly per- 
form his duties. Here and there you may find a man who, by reason 
of his personality, could go along without rank and get away with 
it. But it gives them an advantage to have that insignia. 

J remember going with the chaplain in chief of the Third Army 
to an outpost m one of the divisions, and he went into the head- 
quarters of the Fourth Division. There was a major seated at the 
table, who was playing dominoes, or something of the kind. We 
wanted to make an inquiry. The chaplain held the rank of major, 
and he was a man who would command respect anywhere. The 
major seated at the table looked up at the chaplain, but paid no 
particular attention to him. We asked two or three questions, which 
were replied to in a perfunctory sort of way, and we went on. 
After we left I said to the chaplain, "Would you not have been 
treated with more respect if you had had a leaf upon your shoulder ? " 
He said, " Undoubtedly, I would." He said, " I do not care for my- 
self, but if chaplains had the insignia, that sort of thing would not 
occur." 

May I have permission, Mr. Chairman, to put into the record some 
letters in reference to this matter ?' 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Mr. White. I have here a letter addressed to me by Gen. Pershing 
in reference to the work of the chaplains in the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces, and also a letter from Bishop Brent, who was the 
senior chaplain of the American Expeditionary Foix^es. 

(The letters referred to are as follows:) 

American Expeditionary Forces, 

Office of the CIommander in Chief, 

Paris, August 16, 1919. 
Rev. Gaylord S. White, 

Royal Palace Hotel, 8 Rue de Richelieu, PaHs. 

My Dear Mr. White: I have received your letter of July 29 asking me to 
give you a brief statement regarding the place that chaplains held in the 
American Expeditionary Forces and the part they played in the war. 

Under the efficient leadership of Bishop Brent and his associates, a strong 
organization was developed which assured the most effective individual effort 
and also a proper correlation of the work of all. 

The activities of the Army chaplains In France extended from the base port 
to the firing line. They had the opportunity of affecting in the most intimate 
way the morale of the organizations to which they were attached, and of this 
opportunity they took full advantage. Their work as a whole was characterized 
by untiring zeal, marked disregard of danger, and deep devotion to duty. By 
their influence, teachings, and example they did much to maintain the high 
moral standard of the American soldier. 
Sincerely, yours, 

(Signed) John J. Pershing. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1957 

Bishop's House, 
Buffalo, N, T., November 20, 1919. 
The BoABD OF U. S. Abmy Chaplains, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 

Gentlemen: My experience both in an official and unofficial relationship 
with the Army convinces me that action should be taken at the earliest possible 
moment to secure for the chaplains such recognition, organization, and facilities 
as are indispensable for the right fulfillment of their responsibilities. I would 
strongly advocate the following: 

1. The establishment of a corps of chaplains along the lines of the corps in 
the English Army. 

2. The appointment of a central office with a board of three or five, one of 
whom shall be the executfve head having rank suitable to his responsibilities. 

3. The adoption of the same principle of rank and promotion as in other non- 
combatant corps in the Army. 

4. One chaplain for every 1,200 men. 

Yours, very faithfully, 

0. H. Beent, 
Senior Chaplain of the A. E. F. 

Mr. Olney. Has not this var shown that the chaplains, through 

^cts of heroism on the battle field, also by their acts in peace times, 

are deserving of promotion in rank as much as the officers in the line? 

Mr. White, I think it has undoubtedly shown that I would like 
to say that I talked with scores of officers and hundreds of enlisted 
men last summer that I ran across wherever I was with the Army, 
and I made it my business to talk to as many of them as possible 
without revealing my particular interest in chaplains, but I led the 
ccmversation around to that subject. Almost without exception I 
heard excellent things about the chaplains. Some of the most pro- 
fane men were some of the most ardent admirers of the chaplains and 
of the splendid work they had done during the entire war. 

Bishop McDowell. I think the number of chs^plains killed was 
quite large in proportion to the number of them in the service. 

Mr. Wkfte. There were 28 who died in the service. 

Bishop McDowell. I would like to introduce now, Mr. Chairman, 
Kev. Dr. Charles S. Macfarland, the general secretary of the Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ in America. 

STATEMENT OF KEY. CHABIES S. HACFAKLAND, OEHEBAL SECSE- 
TABT OF THE FEDERAL COITNOIL OF CHTJBCHES OF CHBIST IV 
AMEBICA. 

Mr. Macfarland. Mr. Chairman, as a represeutative of the body 
which was responsible for the appointment of the chaplains first sent 
to foreign shores, I may say we are satisfied that by having rank 
the chaplain would be stronger in his capacity as a preacher than 
otherwise, and out of that study and experience, both in this country 
and in France, in connection with the Belgian and French Armies, as 
well as our own, I am convinced that with our Army organization 
as it is now the plea of the chaplains ought to be heard. 

The Chairman. Chaplain Fealy, one of the gentlemen represent- 
ing Cardinal Gibbons, would like to be heard for a moment. 

150187— 20— VOL 2 11 



1958 AEMY REORGANIZATION. 

STATEMENT OF BEV. IGNATITJS FEALY, CHAPLAIN, UNITED 

STATES ASHT. 

• 

Chaplain Fealt. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. Hull wanted to 
make some inquiries of me. But since he is not here at the moment, 
I am ready to answer any inquiries that may be made by any of the 
members of the committee. 

Otherwise, I will simply state, as Mr. Kahn has said, that I am here 
as one of the representatives of his eminence, the Archbishop of 
Baltimore, who is almost like Cardinal Mercier in the stand he takes 
for red-blooded patriotism. He has told me to state when I had an. 
opportunity before this committee that he is in entire sympathy 
with any effort that may be made by the chaplains of the service for 
better recognition and more status than they have had in carrying^ 
out their work in the past. He has said that not only ought the 
chaplains and their work not to be discounted, but that we ought 
have the same status in the service as we have in the community at 
large. 

As my companions in arms have said, we feel that we have been 
circumscribed, but we trust that as a result of future legislation we 
will be unhampered in our efforts, and that as a result of any future 
regulations that may be promulgated we will be able to accomplish 
as much in the service as ministers and priests are able to accom- 
plish in the community in general. 

I have had six years' service in the Army with the Cavalry and 
Artillery, and most of that service was on the Island of Oaku, 
Hawaii. I felt over there, where the men were so far away from 
home and living in conditions that were not so pleasant as those in 
their own counties or their own cities, the chaplain is a great force 
and a conserver of the morals of the men, and a man who is neces- 
sary in any organization of that kind. 

If there are no questions to be propounded by any of the members 
of the committee, I feel that I have delivered my message from his 
eminence Cardinal Gibbons, 

The Chairman. I have received a letter from the cardinal on the 
subject, and without objection I will put that in the record as a part 
of this hearing. 

(The letter referred to is as follows:) 

Cardinal's Residence, 

408 North Charles Street, 
Baltimore, Md., November 21, 1919* 
Hon. Julius Kahn, 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

Honorable and Dear Sir: Informed that new legislation is contemplated 
for the Army. I beg to enlist your kind interest in the clergymen who minister 
to the spiritual and moral needs of the service. What with the vocational 
and educational training that has lately been provided for the land forces of 
our beloved country, I earnestly trust that a larger measure of influence will 
be accorded the chaplains. Religion will be a splendid aid to morale. This 
the chaplain can provide if accorded proper recognition. His profession ought 
not to be discounted, and In every garrison there should be a decent permanent 
chapel or place of worship. I am told that they are not permitted to advance 
beyond the grade of major, whereas in the Navy they are promoted as high 
as relative colonel. 

With sentiments of esteem, 
Faithfully, yours, 

J. Cardinal Gibbons,' 
Archbishop of Baltimore. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1959 

Chaplain Fealy. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter addressed to me 
by his eminence, which I would like to put in the record. 

The Chairman. If there is no objection, that may be placed in the 
record. 

(The letter referred to is as follows:) 

Cardinal's Residence, 

408 North Chables Street, 
Baltimore, November 19, 1919, 

My Dear Father Fealy: I was delighted to read In your esteemed letter 
of November 12 that you had been selected by the War Department as a 
member of the chaplain's board. I am sure you will bring to this work the 
same earnestness that has marked your career in the Army. 

With the experience gained during many years of service, the board should 
be in a position to make wholesome recommendations, both as regards the 
influence of the chaplains and the welfare of the men in the ranks. It is to 
be hoped that the influence exerted by the chaplains will be recognized by 
allowing the chaplains of the Army to advance to the same grade as that 
enjoyed by the chaplains of the Navy. 

With my blessings. 

Faithfully, yours in Christ, 

J. Cardinal Gibbons. 

Rev. Ignatius Fealy, 

Chaplain, United States Army, 

Bishop McDowell. Mr. Chairman, will you allow me in behalf 
of all of us to thank you for the very patient and attentive hearing 
you have given us in behalf of the churches? The churches are 
tremendously interested in this subject, and men and women who 
have sons in the Army are tremendously interested in this phase of 
the matter. They want to know that the chaplains have a good 
standing in the Army. . 

The Chairman. The committee is very glad to have heard you 
upon this subject. 

(Thereupon the committee adjourned.) 



CoMMrrrEB on Miutart Affairs, 

House of Bepresentatives, 
WaaMngtonj D. O.j Monday , September 29^ 1919. 

The committee this day met, Hon. Julius Kahn (chairman), pre- 
siding. 

STATEMENT OF BSIG. OEN. E. A. EXEGEE, ASSISTANT TO THE 
TXmOE ADVOCATE OENEEAL OF THE ABUY. 

The Chairman. Gen. Kreger, the committee will be pleased to 
hear from you. We are considering le^slation for the reorganiza- 
tion of the Army. You are connected with the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral's Department? 

Gen. Kreger. I am. 

The Chairman. Will you kindly give the committee your views 
in regard to that depflcrtment as it is affected by these various pro- 
posed bills? I think you will find the provision in reference to the 
Judge Advocate General's Department at page 7 of H. R. 8287, sec- 
tion 5. 

Gen. Kreger. The bill I have before me at the present moment is 
Senate bill 2715. 

The Chairman. That is the same as H. R. 8287. 

Gen. Kreger. Mr. Chairman, until the clerk of this committee 
called me up on Saturday afternoon and stated that the chairman 
desired me to appear before the committee, I had had no opportunity 
to examine this oill. My time has been rather exclusively claimed 
by the work of the office during the past six months, so that any 
remarks I may make at this time will be a statement of first impres- 
sions or first conclusions. 

The Judge Advocate General is the legal adviser of the Secretary 
of Wd,r, the Chief of Staff, the heads of the various bureaus of the 
War Department, and also of the Army at large. He is required, 
when called upon, to advise in respect of all legal questions that arise 
in the administration of the War Department or the Army at large, 
including all phases of disciplinary action and all matters affecting 
the rights and mutual relations of officers and enlisted men as mem- 
bers of the Military Establishment. If the department is to perform 
these important duties in connection with a Military Establishment 
that the country and the Congress and the Army desire to have 
administered according to law, the main office must be provided 
with adequate personnel, and the department should be aaequately 
represented on the staff of every commanding officer who exercises 

1961 



\ 

1962 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

important administrative functions or who exercises general court- 
martial jurisdiction. 

In the past the department has been undermanned. There never 
has been sufficient time for consideration and care to the extent that 
one would have desired in disposing of the legal business coming 
to the office. It has always been necessary, anterior to the war, to 
detail line officers to supplement the efforts of the members of the 
law department ; that is, the Judge Advocate General's Department. 

The Chairman. Were those line officers lawyers, or had they been 
students of law before they were detailed? 

Gen. Kreger. Some of them had practiced law before coming into 
the service during the Spanish War or the Philippine insurrection. 
The reorganization of the Army after the Spanish War and the 
Philippine insurrection brought a number of young lawyers into the 
line service. Until that source of supply was exhausted, or until 
those officers had been separated too long from their legal practice 
to be really valuable from a legal point of view, the department 
could draw from the line with a certain degree of assurance that 
competent officers could be secured. Furthermore, a number of 
young officers in the line branches, while detailed on duty to colleges, 
took law courses in those institutions to supplement what earlier 
legal training they may have had at West Point or elsewhere; and 
that added to the supply. But very often it was necessary to take a 
young officer whose sole preparation for legal duty was a careful 
study of a limited number of books on military law and the manual 
for courts-martial, and such evening reading as he may have been 
•Me to carry on, and use him as a law officer. 

In 1914 an effort was made to strengthen the field of selection by 
Bending a few young officers to law schools. That was done in 1914 
and again in 1915. But in 1916 the Congress saw fit to forbid that 
procedure; so that method of supplementing the legal personnel of 
the Army is no longer open to us. 

Mr. ETearns. General, do you believe vacancies occurring in the 
Judge Advocate General's office ought to be filled from the Ime? 

Gen. Kjkeger. It is well to take a portion of the new personnel 
from the line, when officers having proper legal preparation are 
available. 

Mr. Kearns. If you can get it, but can you get it? 

Gen. Kreger. Sometimes. 

The Chairman. General, take the situation in this war, for in- 
stance. You have seen come into the Army a large number of officers 
who were lawyers before they entered the Army. At the present 
time there are vacancies in the Regular Army establishment under 
the national defense act of between two and three thousand officers. 
Those vacancies will be gradually filled up. If there should be a 
goodly proportion of lawyers among the new material that goes into 
the line of the Army, you would not hesitate to have that kind of 
men come into the Judge Advocate General's Department? 

Gen. Kreger. Absolutely no hesitation about that. 

The Chairman. So that you could get good material at the present 
time from that class of officers ? 

Gen. Kreger. We could, at the present time, Mr. Chairman. Gen- 
erally speaking, more satisfactory material to supplement the Judge 
Advocate General's Corps may be obtainable from the civilian law- 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1963 

yers who served efficiently and creditably in that Corps during the 
war, because during the war they have been .giving attention to the 
peculiar functions of the law department. However, lawyers who 
served as line officers during the war, if they had good legal training, 
if they were something more than recent graduates of law schools, 
also represent a valuable field from which to select. 

The Chairman. We created the grade of first lieutenant and also 
<;aptain, as I now recall, in the Judge Advocate General's Depart- 
ment. Before the war we had no officer below the grade of major, as 
I now recall. 

Gen. Kreger. No appointive officer. Such number of captains 
might be detailed from the line of the Army as were necessary to pro- 
vide each general court-martial jurisdiction with an officer to repre- 
sent the law department. During the war the Congress authorized 
appointments in the grade of first lieutenant also. Comparatively 
few first lieutenants were appointed. The age, experience, and ca- 
pacity that marked a lawyer as one who was qualified to perform 
the more important functions of a law officer usually suggested his 
appointment in a grade above that of first lieutenant. 

The Chairman. In formulating legislation in connection with a 
military policy, do you think it advisable to continue officers in those 
lower grades in the Judge Advocate General's Department? 

Gen. Kreger. I should not favor a grade below that of captain. 

The Chairi^an. How many officers do you think you would re- 
<juire in the Judge Advocate General's Department for an Army of, 
«ay , 300,000 men ? ^ 

Gren. E[reger. Mr. Chairman, I made a rather hasty study last 
night upon the basis of what this bill calls for, . 576,000 officers and 
men. It would take some time to readjust the estimate on the basis 
of an army of 30Q,000 men.^ 

The Chairman. Would you kindly state to the committee what 
your views are with respect to the number of officers required in the 
Judge Advocate General's Department in order to secure speedy de- 
cisions in various cases? 

Gen. Kreger. The study I made brought a result somewhat dif- 
ferent from the one that is incorporated in the bill under considera- 
tion, but not radically different from the estimate made by the 
Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington last fall when this 
matter first came up. For the Judge Advocate General's Office for 
tin army of 576,000 officers and men, it is my judgment that provision 
should be made for 72 officers. 

The Chairman. How would you grade them? 

Gen. Kreger. Eleven captains, 33 majors, 16 lieutenant colonels, 
"9 colonels, 2 brigadier generals, and 1 major general. 

Mr. Kearns. That is not as many as this bill provides for. 

Gen. Kreger. I am speaking of the Judge Advocate General's 
Office ; not of the entire department. 

The Chairman. And not of the entire department ? 

Gen. Kreger. Not of the entire department, but of the Judge 
Advocate General's Office. 

Mr. Miller. Here in Washington? 

^ Sach an estimate, based on an army 300,000 strong, has since been prepared. See 
infra footnote, p. 1968. 



1964 ARMY BEORGANIZATION. 

Gen. KsEGEs. Here in Washington* Those figures are based upon 
my observation of what is being required of the office now and 
what has been required of the office in years past, with an Army 
of 70,000, 80,000, and 90,000 men, and what probably would be 
required of the office with an Army of 576,000 officers and men. 

The commissioned personnel of the office at the present time con- 
sists of 99 officers, so the estimate of 72 is 27 below the strength of 
the existing establishment, and the existing establishment is short 
of the needs. We should at the present time have ten or a dozen 
more officers in the office in order to meet demands with the prompt- 
ness with which they should be met and in order to afford. the neces- 
sary opportunities for repose of mind in dealing with important 
questions. 

With reference to the office organization, in order to account for 
that estimated personnel, let me say that the office as at present 
organized consists of three divisions, the administrative law divi- 
sion, with seven sections; the military justice division, with six 
sections ; and the executive division, with four sections. 

The administrative law division deals with questions of adminis- 
trative law; in fact, all legal questions coming to the office that are 
not directly related to the administration of military justice and 
the maintenance of discipline in the Army. The division is pre- 
sided over by a chief, who is assisted by a board of two or three 
officers. The functions of that board are to coordinate opinions and 
eliminate error therefrom. When the day's budget of opinions 
comes up to the chief of the division it is so large that he can not 
with assurance function personally on all of them. He must have 
an effective machine to aid him in the task. 

The sections constituting the Administrative Law Division are : 

1. The Contracts and Claims Section. 

2. The Constitutional and International Law Section. 

3. The Civil Affairs Section. 

4. The Admiralty and Maritime Law Section. 

5. The Reservations and Eeal Estate Section. 

6. The Statutory Construction and Legislative Draft Section^ 

7. The Miscellaneous Affairs Section. 

The functions of the various sections are perhaps sufficiently indi- 
cated by their respective designations, except possibly in the cases of 
Civil Affairs and the Statutory Construction and Legislative Draft 
Sections. The Civil Affairs Section handles the legal phases of the 
business of the Bureau of Insular Affairs and advises the Secretary 
of War concerning the legal phases of the administration of river 
and harbor legislation. The Statutory Construction and Legislative 
Draft Section studies pending legislation with a view to being ready 
to construe the legislation promptly when it shall have passea. For 
example, when the act making appropriations for the support of the 
Army for the current year was approved, on July 11, it became the 
duty of executive officers to take certain action immediately. The 
Statutory Construction and Legislative Draft Section had studied 
the Army appropriation bill while it was pending and therefore waa 
able promptly to advise as to the action required to be taken there- 
under immediately on its approval. That section also prepares 
drafts of proposed legislation that the War Department may desire 
to have considered by the Congress ; and quite often the section pre- 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1965 



6 ares drafts of legislation for Senators and for Members of the 
[ouse of Representatives who 4^ire to have drafts prepared to 
express their individual views. 

Mr. James. Did your department draw up a draft of this bill? 

Gen. Kreger. Not during the time I was connected with the office. 
I returned here in March of this year. I believe the original draft 
of the bill was prepared prior to that time. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether anybody in the Judge Ad- 
vocate General's Department participated in the preparation of the 
bilL of your own knowledge? 

Gen. Kreger. I do not. 

The Chairman. Have you heard it stated that anybody connected 
with your office helped prepare the bill? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes; 1 have heard that there were consultations 
which included members of the personnel of the Judge Advocate 
General's Office. 

The Chairman. They were just consulted upon certain provisions ? 

Gen. Kreger. That is my understanding; but I am speaking with- 
out official information on the subject. 

Mr. James. When Congress passes legislation, if there is any 
doubt about the legality of any particular section, that question is 
referred to your department ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. James. Why would it not be a good idea in the case of im- 
portant legislation like this which is now before us to have it first 
referred to your department instead of waiting until after Congress 
passes it and then refer the question of the legality of any particu- 
lar section to your department ? 

Gen. Kreger. That is done quite generally. For example, the 
office has been called upon to prepare a number of items of legis- 
lation in the matter of transfer of motor vehicles. I believe that on 
that subject we prepared probably half a dozen projects; some for 
Members of the Senate, some for Members of the House, and some 
for the War Department. 

Mr. Santord. You are familiar with the national defense act to 
some extent? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. That was an act for the reorganization of the Army ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And back of that act, scattered through the last 
hundred years there are statutes bearing upon the organization of 
the Army still in force, are there not? 

Gen. Kreger. The revision of 1873 disposed of very nearly every- 
thing antedating December 31, 1873, if I remember correctly. 

Mr. Sanford. What date is there to which one can go and be sure 
that back of that there is no law affecting the organization of the 
Army? Would you say 1873? 

Gen. Kreger. To be certain of the effect of some legislation it 
would be necessary to go farther back. 

Mr. Sanford. Is there somebody in your department who is com- 
pent to furnish this committee with a reference to statutes that are 
now in existence covering the organization of the Army? Would 
that be a large task ? 



1966 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

« 

Gen. Kreger. To make the result really valuable would be quite 
a considerable task; something more than a mere reference indeit 
would be necessary. 

Mr. Sanford. In that connection, I want to call your attention 
to the last sentence in this bill which says, " in addition to provisions 
of law herein specifically repealed all laws and parts of laws in so 
far as inconsistent witt the provisions of this act are hereby re- 
pealed." That is quite positive, is it not? 

Gen. Kreger. If I may be permitted to express a curbstone opin- 
ion 

Mr. Sanford. We value that kind of opinions. 

Gen. Kreger (continuing). Section 55 omitted, or section 55 pres- 
ent, amounts to exactly the same thing. 

Mr. Sanford. Of course it does. I think that is self-evident. But 
whether section 55 is in the bill or out of it, with this body of statute 
law aflfecting the reorganization of the Army from 1789 down to 
date in the archives it is rather a diiBcult thing for a lawyer or a 
layman to read this bill and know what the law is, is it not? 

Gen. Kreger. That is true. 

Mr. Sanford. Whether this section is in the bill or out of it? 

Gen. Kreger. I think it has come to that point with most of our 
legislation. The Congress thoughtfully passes an item of legisla- 
tion with a particular purpose in mind, and the next day finds that, 
because of some standing legislation, the result in certain respects 
is different than had been contemplated. 

The Chairman. I have frequently found that. 

Mr. Sanford. Leave section 55 out, this being the last word on 
the subject of the law governing Army reorganization, it is repeal- 
ing everything inconsistent with it by general rules of construction? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. So that having it here is merely to give notice that 
something or other may or may not be repealed, and if a person wants 
to find out what is repealed, he will have to go to the Judge Advo- 
cate General's office? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes ; that is the customary course. 

Mr. Sanford. And the chief of that department, if he has law- 
yers enough, might some day be able to tell a man whether a certain 
statute was repealed or not; but it is a difficult task, is it not, to 
answer any question about the statutory law ? 

Gen. Kreger. It often is. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, before we got into the war, 
every year, as I now recall, you used to publish a volume which was 
known as " Military Laws of the United States." What is the latest 
edition of that volume that you have ; do you recall ? 

Gen. Kreger. The latest is the 1915 edition, with a supplement run- 
ning to October, 1917. 

The Chairman. You have two volumes now, representing what is 
the military law of the United States ? 

Gen. Kreger. The law up to October of 1917. The office is at 
present engaged in preparing another edition, more nearly up to 

date. 

The Chairman. Do you think that you could ever write a law 
which would embrace practically all the military law on any sub- 



ABMY KE0B6ANIZATI0N. 1967 

ject that might come up, or would you have to resort to the system 
of codification ? 

Gen. Kkeger. That would amount to codification. In the act of 
August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 627), the Congress incorporated a pro- 
vision authorizing the Secretary of War to codify the law military 
of the United States. In the summer of 1916 I was ordered to 
Washington from West Point to begin on that task, and made a be- 
ginning under Gen. Crowder's direction. When I was required 
to return to the Military Academy to carrv on my work there, the 
task passed into other hands. A few months later the participation 
of the United States in the World War began, and the codification 
has been in abeyance ever since. If the task could be carried through, 
the result certainly would be valuable. 

The Chairman. Has the money that was appropriated for that 
work lapsed back into the Treasury ? 

Gen. Kreger. I think so. 

The Chairman. I think after two years all appropriations for mili- 
tary purposes lapse. 

Gen. Kreger. The disbursements from that fund probably were 
very small because the preliminary steps were taken entirely by oflBl- 
cers on duty in the Judge Advocate General's Office and at the Mili- 
tary Academy, and therefore involved no expense except for clerical 
hire. 

The Chairman. Would you recommend that steps be taken to se- 
cure the necessary appropriation for the codification of the military 
laws of the United States? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes; a codification would be a valuable contribution 
to good administration. Of course, if the Congress provides for a 
reorganization of the Army, the codification should include the re- 
organization legislation. 

Mr. Sanford. General, you have spoken of this military law that 
hasl)een published from time to time. Was that volume published 
in such a form and those laws set forth in such a way that the average 
lawyer could readily determine what the military law is on any sub- 
ject by reference to it? 

Gen. Kreger. Without an acquaintance with the Military Estab- 
lishment and military organization, it would be rather difficult for the 
otherwise up-to-date lawyer. To illustrate, if a lawyer who does not 
make patent law a specialty is retained in a case involving that law, 
he usually associates with himself some expert in patent law if the 
case is an important one. The compilation of the military laws of 
the United States is well arranged and has been decidedly helpful in 
military administration. 

Mr. Sanford. I should think it would be, compared with not hav- 
ing anything at all. Is the subject of military law itself necessarily 
a complicated one, do you think? 

Gen. Kreger. There is nothing special and peculiar in military 
law to distinguish it from any other branch of the law. 

Mr. Sanford. I mean the statutory law. Is the study of military 
statutory law necessarily complicated ? 

Gen. Kreger. The complications grow out of the fact that there 
are many complicated interests and purposes to be served. 



1%8 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Sanfokd. I am speaking of the law for the organization of the 
Army, the law that provides for the organization of the Army — ^need 
that be complicated? 

Gen. Kkeger. I think not; I think that might be rather simply 
drawn. 

Mr. Sanford. I think you know that the laws of this country on the 
subject of negotiable instruments and domestic relations and the sub- 
ject of personal property are now written in general statutes so clear 
and so simple that a man almost without being a lawyer can see the 
body of the law. Would it not be possible to write a bill now affect- 
ing the organization of the Army in such a way that one would dare 
say that is the law on that subject, and that all previous law i& 
repealed ? 

Gen. Kreger. That would be possible. 

Mr. Sanford. Would it be a very difficult thing to write such a 
general statute repealing all the older statutes? For instance, it 
comes up in this bill. The other day we were told that in the opinion 
of the Chief of Staff this law actually repealed one of the provisions 
of which Congress was most fond in the national defense act. No 
member of the committee would be able to know what provision of 
the national defense act was repealed. But the Chief of Staff was able 
to tell us that he had referred that to the Judge Advocate General's- 
Office and that they had told him and he could tell us that this pro- 
vision of the national defense act was repealed. We should be able 
to write statutory law, should we not, that we could ourselves under- 
stand and interpret at the time of writing of it, independent of any 
judgment of an outside tribunal? Would you not think so ? 

Gen. Kreger. One way of doing it would be to make the reorganiza- 
tion act entirely, complete in itself and repeal everything else on the 
subject. 

Mr. Sanford. We could repeal everything else if we could have 
before us copies of all existing statutes in reference to the organiza- 
tion of the Arm;^ could we not? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. It would be quite a job to get them together, but if 
we could get them on this table we could decide whether we wanted 
to repeal them or not. 

Gen. Kreger. One reason for such differences as may occur between 
the War Department and committees of Congress from time to time 
is that they do not understand each other. 

Mr. Sanford. Certainly; we do not know what law we enact be- 
cause we do not know what law we repeal, and from time to time we 
find that we pass laws having a very good purpose, only to find later 
that the comptroller or the Judge Advocate General says that we did 
not do the thing we thought we did. 

Gen. Kreger. For example, in February the Congress authorized 
the transfer of certain surplus war materials from the War Depart- 
ment to the Department of Agriculture, for transfer to the States 
for road-building purposes. Then, on July 11, in another act, it was 
prescribed that no transfer of motor vehicles not specifically author- 
ized by Congress should be made without charge. When the Secre- 
tary of War called upon me for an opinion as to whether he might 
continue to transfer motor vehicles to the Department of Agricul- 
ture for that purpose I found myself forced to arrive at the con- 



ABMY REOBGANIZATIOK. 1969 

elusion that the authorization carried by the earlier act did not meet 
the requirements of the later one so far as transfers without charge 
were concerned, and that the transfers could be continued only if 
accompanied by proper transfers of appropriations. 

The Chairman. Let me insert in the hearings at this point the 
statement that neither of those provisions emanated from the Com- 
mittee on Militant AflFairs. 

Mr. Sanford. I do not mean to say that this committee could do 
any differently than it has done. But take another illustration. We 
gave a bonus to the soldiers, but we found afterwards that we did 
not give it to the Regular Army. 

The Chairman. J5id that provision did not come from this com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Sanford. But it might have just the same. It was doubtless 
intended to give an allowance to all members of the Army, but we 
found that Congress did not give it to the Regular Army soldiers. 
So we put through other laws to amend those laws, and so there is a 
constant attempt to amend laws. 

Would you be willing, upon the request of this committee, or 
would it be possible for you to furnish this committee with a concise 
statement oi all existing law on the organization of the Army within 
a month ; not a copy, necessarily, but a reference to it ? 

Gen. Kreger. Without getting more personnel into the office it 
could be done only by deferring action on current business to a cer- 
tain extent. 

Mr. Sanford. Is not that a terrible criticism of the situation, Gen- 
eral, that within a month you could not furnish this committee with 
the law on the subject of the organization of the Army, How will 
the lawyer or the ordinary citizen be able to find it, if ever? 

Gen. Ei(£QER. If we were to lay off a law officer from the current 
business of the office, he could prepare such a summary and index 
within a reasonable time. But taking a competent officer from the 
current work of the office will affect to a certain extent the dispatch 
of current business. Our working force is none too large now. 

Mr. Sanford. How many men are there that you know of that are 
competent to find the law on the organization of the Army ? 

Gen. Kreger. Any lawyer who applies himself to the study of it, 
will find it. 

Mr. Sanford. In about how long a time? 

Gen. Kreger. In 1897 the Congress provided for a commission 
to revise and codify the criminal and penal laws of the United States 
(30 Stat., 58). The resulting revision and codification was enacted 
into law in 1909 (35 Stat., 1088). The codification of all the mili- 
tary laws of the United States authorized by the Congress in 1916 
(39 Stat., 627) was to have been completed in two yeofs. A codifica- 
tion of the laws relating solely to the organization of the Army could 
be prepared in a much shorter time. 

Mr. Sanford. I know; but when you pass on a question of law in 
your office, on the question of the organization of the Army, you 
have to have access to every existing statute on the subject. 

Gen. Kreger. We have to consult the statute and arrive at a con- 
clusion on the particular question. 



1970 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Sanford. On that particujar point Would it not save years 
and years and years of labor if we could do it once and for all on the 
whole subject of the reorganization of the Army so that the general 
law would be there to which we could refer, and would it not save 
thousands and thousands of dollars? 

Gen. Kreger. Soon after a general project has been enacted some 
one will discover that some feature has not been covered or that some 
particular purpose has not been provided for according to his view, 
and th)Bn amendment will begin. Some of that amen£nent will be 
necessary, simply because the best effort of the best talent can not 
be expected to produce a perfect result. 

Mr. Sanford. But that amendment will then be directed to the 
general law on the subject, and Congress could restrain itself and 
should restrain itself, then, to the amendment of the general military 
law by sections, could it not, and adopt an absolute, legal, modern, 
scientific method of amending the law instead of this haphazard 
method. Do you not think the method which we now follow is a 
haphazard method of making law ? 

Gen. Kreger. The method employed requires additional corrective 
legislation at times ; but the Army reorganization act of 1901 served 
the purpose well. 

Mr. Sanford. Would you not favor passing an act now that would 
repeal everything prior to 1901 ? 

Gen. Kreger. We could get along. If everything that precedes 
1901 were repealed that would wipe out the retirement laws, because 
that legislation, if my memory serves me correctly, originated in the 
sixties and was incorporated m the Revised Statutes of 1873. Some 
modifications were enacted in the eighties, and further, though per- 
haps comparatively slight, modifications since that time. 

The Chairman. You think it would be much easier to prepare a 
bill such as Mr. Sanford refers to after the military law has been 
thoroughly codified? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. What do you mean by codified. General? 

Gen. Kreger. A restatement, in the simplest and most direct form, 
of the law as it exists at the time the codifier is at work. 

Mr. Sanford. Necessarily, when you say simply a restatement of 
the law that means a law that would repeal e ve^thing before it ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you expect such a codification to take place in 
this bill ? 

Gen. Kreger. It was proposed in the enactment of 1916. 

Mr. Sanford. But this is not a codification. 

(xen. Kreger. No ; this simply touches one phase of military law — ► 
Army organization. 

Mr. Sanford. I fully agree with you. I simply speak for a law 
that would be self-sufficient and which on its face simply would repeal 
what goes before. Perhaps we are not getting anywhere, but I should 
like to put something into the record that would enable you to under- 
stand that I for one am not satisfied with the present condition of 
military law, because I can not find it. I do not Know what it is, Mid 
I have reasonable ability to interpret statutes; I have spent my life 



ABMY RBOBGANIZATIOlsr. 1971 

at it. I do not know anything about the military law of the United 
States Government and could not find anything from it on any sub- 
ject unless I had unlimited time ; but, of course, if I were in the Judge 
Advocate General's office with nothing to do for a few weeks I could, 
as some of them do, find an answer to some subject sometime ; but in 
the course of a congressional career a man has not that time. A man 
feels, naturally, in a self-governing community, that he would like to 
be able to find something about laws, because we are governed by 
laws. I often feel that I would like to know what the military law 
is on a given subject, but I give up every time I try it, because there is 
not time enough. 

G^n. Kreger. Do you not find a somewhat similar difficulty in 
attempting to find what the law is on a particular subject in your 
State? 

Mr. Sanford. I do not, because the statutes of New York are 
arranged so that anyone whp can read can find the statute on any 
subject now. The only question is whether he is intelligent enough 
to be able to read. He may then have difficulty in interpreting a 
statute, and the courts may disagree with him, but the statute law 
is there and any layman can read it. 

The Chairman. You have a codification of your law in New York 
State up to a certain time, and you have to get that as a basis and 
then follow what amendments have been made in the sessions of the 
le^slature subsequent? 

Mr. Sanford. It has been so in almost every subject. We know 
when we go to find the law on domestic relations, we will say of 1914, 
that there is no law before that. That is the law to that date. The 
only question is whether in the few years that have followed there 
has been some amendment made, and you find that quickly by refer- 
ence to an index. 

Gen. Krieger. In the revision of 1873 the military law was gathered 
together in a very small space. Now, if the congressional mandate 
of 1916 could be carried out, the same thing could be done again. 

Mr. Sanford. That would repeal everything that went before that? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes; everything could be cleared up. But that 
would require enactment or the codification by Congress. In pre- 
paring biennial volumes of military laws all the Judge Advocate 
General's Office can do is to state that a particular provision was 
passed at such a time, and another provision at another time, gather- 
ing the various provisions together under appropriate heads. In 
order to carry out the 1916 mandate of Congress the codifier might 
take three, four, or half a dozen provisions and make one simple 
section of them, clearing up all the difficulties and dispelling the 
mists and clouds. 

Mr. Sanford. I have had impression that since I have been in 
Washington that so far as the Judge Advocate General's Office is 
concerned the reading of law is a science; that lawyers who come 
here have to read that science; and it is the only place I know of 
where the reading of statutory law is a science, and it seems to me 
to be ridiculous, because the law can be simplified. Perhaps this is 
not the time or the occasion to do it, but I thmk it has got to be done 
some day, and in a matter affecting the Army, when every man is 



1972 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

interested, the soldiers in the Army ought to be able to take a copy 
of the military law and read it for their own guidance. It is a per- 
fectly simj)le thing to do. Instead of that we Jiave a great many 
difficulties in trying to find out what the law is. I am not speaking 
about a subject I have a feeling about, except that I think the law 
ought to be open and clear, so 3iat any man can read it, and it will 
be some day, I hope. 

The Chairman. Is not one of the difficulties due to the fact that 
various committees of Congress assume jurisdiction on military mat- 
ters ? You will find as you did in this Congress that the Committee 
on Post Offices and Post Koads accepted an amendment to their bill — 
it was really legislation begun in the last Congress — ^under the terms 
of which amendment the War Department was authorized to turn 
over to the Post Office Department and to the Agricultural Depart- 
ment a lot of military supplies. That went into the law. 

About that time another committee of the House put a provision in 
a deficiency bill which said that the War Department shall turn over 
to the Public Health Service for its use a lot of War Department 
supplies, and then came along the Committee on Appropriations in 
this Congress and passed a law providing that the War Department 
shall not deliver any of those supplies or anything else to the de- 
partments or anybody else without getting pay for them, and the 
Committee on Military Affairs, so far as the members thereof are 
concerned, unless they followed those various provisions in those 
various laws would be all at sea on the proposition. « Therefore 
a codification of the law is really necessary to enable anybody who 
is interested in military law to see what the law really is. 

Gen. Kreoer. That is true. The provision for the codification of 
the military laws of the United States had the full support of the 
Judge Advocate General's office, of the War Department, and of this 
committee. 

. The Chairman. And of Congress, because it passed Congress and 
became part of the law. 

Gen. Kreger. That task probably would have been completed by 
this time if a larger task had not intervened that caused everything 
of that kind to hd laid aside. 

Mr. Sanpord. You were not in Washington during the war? 

Gen. Kreger. I was ordered here almost immediately after the 
declaration of war. At the time of the declaration of war I was on 
duty as jjrofessor of law at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point. I came here in the latter part of April of 1917 for 
service in the Provost Marshal General's office. 

Mr. Sanpord. And you went abroad? 

Gen. Kreger. I remained in the Provost Marshal General's office 
until the winter of 1917-18, then served a few weeks in the Judge 
Advocate General's office, after which I went a;broad — ^to France. 

Mr. Sanford. You' said the Judge Advocate General's office had 
always been undermanned. Do you mean it was undermanned here 
in Washington during the war? 

Gen. Kreger. I was speaking more particularly of peace-time con- 
ditions than of Wgar-time conditions. Concerning the period from 



ARMY REOBGANIZATI029". 1973 

the outbreak of the war until I reported for duty in the oflS^ce in 
March of 1919, 1 am unable to speak. I do know, however, that we 
were rather short gjb times in the Provost Marshal General's office, 
short of legal personnel. I know that my own office in France was 
short, and I heard suggestions that other services abroad did not 
always have at hand, at the time that the emergency need for the 
legal services arose, all the legal personnel that might be desired. 
I presume, however, that so far as the war period is concerned, that was 
an experience probably common to every department. At times the de- 
mand for a particular kind of service exceeded the preparations that 
iiad been made, based upon earlier estimates of what probablv would 
occur. But at the present time, in the Judge Advocate General's 
office, our difficulty is to hold men from civil life who have the 
capacity to handle the class of work that is required of them. It 
would probably be easy to secure a sufficient number of young and 
comparatively inexperienced lawyers from civil life to fill the vari- 
ous places. But, though a lawyer who had an enviable position at 
the bar was willing to come into the service with the rank of captain 
-or major while the war was going on, he naturally desires to return 
1;o his practice now that the war is over. 

Mr. Santord. The general law business is pretty bad throughout 
the country, they tell me. You might be able to get quite a block of 
them. 

Gen. Kreger. The lawyers from civil life who have been colonels 
:and lieutenant colonels in the Judge Advocate General's Depart- 
ment, because they were men who had the capacity to handle the 
work, are insisting on getting back to their civil anairs. I believe 
at the present moment we have left only three colonels from civil 
life. All the others have asked for their release. 

Mr. Sanford. Those men were the very pick of the bar from the 
several States. 

Gen. Kreger. We certainly had some of the pick of the bar, and 
«ome mighty fine lawyers were commissioned line officers. 

The CSiAiRMAN. General, is there anything further you desire to 
«ay on the subject? I think you referred to the shortage of officers 
in the Judge Advocate General's Department. The provision here 
is for the number of officers and enlisted men in the Judge Advocate 
<jeneral's Department? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

The Chairman. How about the rest of the department? 

Gen. Kreger. I had stated an estimate of what seemed to me to be 
necessary in the Judge Advocate General's Office, and had given a 
hrief statement of the ground that was covered by the personnel of 
the administrative law division. 

The second major division of the office is the military justice di- 
vision. That, as organized at present, consists of six sections. The 
third major division is the executive division, consisting of four 
sections, the name indicating the function of the division, as the 
term " military justice " indicates the function of the military justice 
•division. 

During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1919, the military justice 
division examined 16,547 general court-martial records. Every one 

150187— 20— VOL 2 12 



1974 



ABMY BEOBGANIZATION. 



of those general court-martial records had been examined by a law 
officer, not only before it came up here, but before the commanding^ 
general acted on the case. So every one of those records really had 
two legal examinations. 

Mr. Kearns. How many courts-martial were there in this war? 

Gen. Kreger. My recollection is that there were about 31,000 gen- 
eral court-martial trials. 

The Chairman. And how many summary and special courts- 
martial ? 

Gen. Kreger. I am unable to say. The summary and special court, 
records do not come to the Judge Advocate General's Office. 

Mr. Kearns. Gen. Ansell said at one time that there had been 
400,000 courts-martial, all told. 

Gen. Kreger. I think that is true. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you know how many men there are now who- 
served in the Army who are in custody as the result of courts- 
martial ? Can you put that in the record ? 

Gen. Kreger. A summary court-martial can not adjudge a sentence- 
of confinement in excess of three months. The average sentence ad- 
judged by such courts is of course much below the maximum. There- 
fore sentences of that kind, except those adjudged during the last 
two or three months have been executed or remitted and the men 
released. 

The Chairman. Does the department hold that a sentence of three 
months involves moral turpitude? 

Gen. Kreger. The summary court-martial has no power to sepa- 
rate a man from the service. The man who is tried by a summary 
court is tried by that court because it is believed he needs discipline 
and not separation from the service. The special court-martial may 
not adjudge confinement in excess of six months. It follows that the^ 
number of emergency men still in confinement under special court- 
martial sentences must be comparatively small. 

The Chairman. Would it be possible for you to get figures so as 
to put them into the hearing of the number of men who were tried 
by special courts-martial and summary courts-martial, so that we 
can know just what those figures are? The committee, I am sure^ 
wants to Imow just how many court-martial cases have been tried 
during this war period. 

Gen. Kreger. I will insert a statement in the record, if the com- 
mittee desires it. 

(The matter referred to is as follows:) 

Number of enlisted men reported to the Judge Advocate General of the Army as 
having been tried by summary courts-martial during the period from Apr. 
6, 1917, to June 30, 1919. 



Apr. 6 to Jime 30, 1917 ^ 

Jifiy 1, 1917, to June 30, 1918 >. 
July 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919 ». 



Tried. 



19,788 
228,839 
209,390 



Total. 



458, 017 



Con- 
victed. 



18,891 
202,085 
197,636 



Ac- 
quitted. 



897 

9,732 

11,854 



418,512 



22,483: 



ABM.Y BEOBGAKIZATIOK. 



1975 



Wuml>er of enlisted men reported to the Judge Advocate General of the Army 
as having been tried by special courts-martial during the period from Apr, 
€, 1917, to June 30, 1919, 



Apr. 6 to June 30, 1917 1 

July 1, 1917, to June 30, 1918. 
July 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919 » 

Total 



Tried. 



963 
14,715 
24,426 



40,124 



Con- 
victed. 



899 
13,275 
21,282 



35,456 



Ac- 
quitted. 



84 
1,440 
3,144 



^.668 



» Estimated by taking one-fourtti of the totals reported for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1917. 

• Certain jurisdictions, though reporting the number of trials, did not report separately the number of 
eonvictions and acquittals by summary courts-martial for the year ended June 30, 1918. Therefore 17,022 
proceedings included In the total number of cases tried during that year are not included either imder the 
heading "Convicted" or under the heading "Acquitted." 

• This statement covers only such cases as had been reported to the Judge Advocate General's Office at 
the date of the preparation of the statement. At that time reports for the year ended June 30, 1919, had 
not been received from certain jurisdictions. It is estimated that the average enlisted strength of those 
Jurisdictions probably amounted to about 12 i)er cent of the total average enlisted strength of the Army 
daring the period in question. 

Analysis of results of trials by general courts-martial, Apr. 6, 1917, to 

Aug. 31, 1919. 

Number of men tried ^ 30,916 

Approved eonvictions 24, 668 

Dishonorable discharges and dismissals executed^ 5,991 

Dishonorable discharges supended 6,674 

Other sentences' : 12, 003 

Total 24,668 

Acquittals, disapproved convictions, sentences set aside, etc 6, 248 

The Chairman. I understand only 31,000 have been tried by gen- 
eral courts-martial. 

Mr. Sanford. What about the number now in custody under sen- 
tences irnposed by general courts-martial ? 

Gen. ItREGER. The number of men tried by general courts-martial 
from April 6, 1917, to August 31, 19*19, was 30,916. 

The Chairman. Was that in the Expeditionary Forces as well as 
in the United States? 

Gen. Kreger. In the entire Army. 

Mr. Sanford. How many of those men are now in custody ? 

Gen. Kreger. In 24,668 of the 30,916 cases the trials resulted in 
approved convictions. In the remaining 6,248 cases the trials re- 
sulted in acquittals or disapproved convictions. Of the 24,668 ap- 
proved sentences 5,991 included immediate dismissal or dishonor- 
able discharge; 6,674 included dishonorable discharge, suspended 
with a view to possible remission, depending upon the future be- 
havior of the convicted man; and 12,003 included neither dismissal 
nor dishonorable discharge, and under the policy of the War De- 
partment included, with few exceptions, terms of confinement of not 
more than six months. 

On April 1, 1917, there were 2,101 men in confinement in disci- 
plinary barracks under sentences adjudged by general courts-mar- 

• Does not include a small number of pending cases involving sentences of dismissal. 
'Includes a small number of pending cases involving sentences of dismissal. 



1976 ARMY REOBGANIZATION. 

tial, and 212 men in penitentiaries under like sentence, making a 
total of 2,313. During the period from April 1, 1917, to July 31, 
1919, 11,492 men were sent to disciplinary barracks and 1,352 to peni- 
tentiaries, a total of 12,844. This requires an accounting for 13,693 
men who at one time or another during the 28 months of the war 
period were detained in the disciplinary barracks, and for 1,564 men 
who were likewise detained in penitentiaries, or a total of 15,157. 

The Chairman. Those who were sent to the disciplinary barracks, 
as I understand it, could by good behavior finally serve out the re- 
mainder of their enlistment period and get an honorable discharge? 

Gen Kreqer. The opportunity to earn restoration was open to 
them. 

The Chairman. So that a man who was convicted and sentenced 
to confinement in a disciplinary barracks, after all, could work out 
^his own salvation and could get an honorable discharge from the 
Army and be thoroughly rehabilitated as an American citizen. 

Gen. Kreqer. Many of them earned and received an honorable dis- 
charge. I will complete my answer to Mr. Sanford's question, if I 
may, and then present an additional statement in response to the 
chairman's. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Gen. Kreger. On August 30, 1919, there remained in confinement 
in disciplinary barracks 3,728 men — ^those remaining of a total of 
13,593 who had been detained there at one time or another during the 
war, as compared also with 2,101 actually so detained at the begin- 
ning of the war. 

Mr. Sanford. Reduced to percentages, how does the last figure 
compare with the figure at the beginning of the war? 

Gen. Kreger. About 180 per cent; 3,728 against 2,101. But we 
must bear in mind that the 2,101 were derived from an army of ap- 
proximately 200,000 men and the 3,728 are what remslin from the 
13,593 that were derived from an army of approximately 4,000,000 
men. 

In the penitentiaries there were 855 men on August 30, 1919, 
against 212 at the beginning of the war. There the proportion of in- 
crease was somewhat greater. 

Referring to the chairman's question, I have a statement here, 
rather incomplete, but suflBicient for present purposes, showing honor- 
able restorations to the Army at the disciplinary barracks. This 
statement shows restorations during quarterly periods beginning 
April 1, 1917, as follows, viz : April to June, 1917, 172 men ; July to 
September, 1917, 136; October to December 1917, 237; January to 
March, 1918, 153 ; April to June, 1918, 160 ; July to September, 1918, 
270 ; October to December, 1918, 267 ; January to March, 1919, 427 ; 
April to June, 1919, 453; and in July and August, 1919, not a full 
quarter, 200. 

It may be interesting to note that a sentence to a disciplinary bar- 
racks is in fact indeterminate and that, looking to the final result, 
the length of the term originally adjudged is not especially impor- 
tant. Col. Eice, comman(&,nt of the disciplinary barracks at Fort 
Leavenworth, in his testimony before the Committee on Military Law 
of the American Bar Association, stated that during the period from 
April 6, 1917, to April 19, 1919, 6,467 men were received at the bar- 



ABI£Y BEOBGANIZATION'. 



1977 



racks, and that during the same period 1,107 men were restored to 
the colors. Respecting the 1,107 men restored to the colors, Col. 
Rice made substantially this statement: 

The total number of years' confinement to which those men had 
been sentenced was 8,228, or an average of 7.4 years for each man. 
The total number of years they actually served before restoration to 
duty aggregated 471.6, or an average of 0.43 of a year, that is, 5 
months and 3^ days. 

The Army salvage system converted those men from prisoners to 
soldiers after an average detention of a trifle over five months, al- 
though originally they nad been sentenced to terms averaging more 
than 7 years. 

I have no corresponding figures on the other two barracks; but 
we have telegraphed for the necessary information. 

(The statements referred to follow:) 

Statement shotoing the number of men confined in disciplinary barracks and 

penitentiaries Apr, i, 1917, to Aug. SO, 1919. 



In confinemeiit Apr. 1, 1917 

Received from all sources, Apr. 1, 1917, to July 31, 1919 

Total 

In confinement Aug. 30, 1919 



Discipli- 
nary 
barracks. 



2,101 
11,492 



13,593 
3,728 



Peniten- 
tiaries. 



212 
1,352 



1,564 
855 



Total. 



2,313 
12,844 



15,157 
4,583 



Statem^ent shotoing the average term of sentences to confinement adjudged by 
general courts-martial during the period from Apr. 6, 1917, to Sept. 20, 1919, 
for the whole Army. 



Apr. 6, 1917, to June 30, 1918 
JiUy 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919. 
July 1, 1919, to Sept. 20, 1919 

Total 



Total 
number of 

convictions 
involving 

confinement. 



21,111 



Average 

term of 

confinement 

adjudged, 

in years. 




3.29 



Note.— These figures do not include unreduced life sentences. 

Statement showing average sentence served by men who left a ddsoiplinary bar- 
racks or a penitentiary otherwise than by escape from Apr. 1, 1917, to July 
31, 1919, and a/verage sentence remaining to be served by men in confinement 
on July SI, 1919, less allowance for good conduct time not forfeited. 



Average sentence served by men who left a disciplinary barracks or a penitentiary 
<Aherwise than by escai)e 

Average sentence remaining to be served on July 31, 1919, less allowance for good 
c(mduct time not forfeited (not including life sentences) 




Peniten- 
tiary. 



Years. 
2.94 
3.96 



1978 



ABMY BE0B6ANIZATI0N. 



Statement showing number of men restored to the colors at each of the tliree 
disciplinary barracks between Apr, 6, 1917, a/nd Aug, SI, 1919. 





United 


Atlantic 


Padflo 






States 


branch 


branch 






discipU- 
nary bar- 


United 


United 






States di»- 


States dis- 


Total. 




racks, Fort 


dpUnary 


ciplinary 




Leaven- 


barracks, 


barracks, 






worth, 


Fort Jay, 


Alcatrae, 






Kans. 


N.Y. 


Calif. 




Number*. 


1,410 


470 


568 


2,448 


Average sentence in years originally adjudged against 










men so restored 


8.8 


2.08 


2.17 


5.73 


Average sentence in years actually served by men so 




restored 


.43 


.59 


.67 


.4i 







Note.— This statement does not include 156 men who, during the period stated, were restored to th» 
colors and at once honorably discharged, or who, during the same penod, were restored to the colors and 
granted ordinary discharges, by order of the Secretary of War, under paragraphs 139 and' 1)50, Army Reg- 
ulations, for the reason that the necessary information concerning these men is not available. 

Statement concerning men confined in disciplinary barracks and penitentiaries 

on Sept. 30, 1919, 



Numoer of men in ccnflnement on Sept. 30, 1919 

Number of men in conQnement on Sept. 30, 1919, who were in conflnement 
under tjie same sentences on — 

Sept. 30, 1918 

Sept. 30, 1917 

ADr. 1,1917 



Disciplinary 
barracks. 


Peniten- 
tiaries. 


3,510 


846 


665 

16 

6 


292 
52 
30 



Mr. Miller. Have you any record of the number of men now under 
sentence of death? 

Gen. Kreger. Records pending action by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral's Office? 

Mr. Miller. Yes. 

Gen. Kreger. I have no such record here. 

Mr. MiMJER. Have you any memory of that, approximately? 

Gen. Kreger. My recollection is that there are now pending in the 
Judge Advocate General's Office eight records of trials by general 
courts-martial as the result of which the trial courts adjudged capi- 
tal sentences. Each of two of these records has to do with a joint 
trial, involving more than one defendant. These capital sentences 
were adjudged by the trial courts upon conviction of either murder 
or rape. 

Mr. Miller. Do you know how many judgments of courts-martial 
which wei:e rendered, involving that penalty, were confirmed and 
execution carried out in France during the time the American Army 
was there? 

Gen. Kreger. Speaking from memory again, and subject to cor- 
rection, there were ten. 

Mr. Miller. Have you any memory as to the general classifica- 
tions? 

Gen. Kreger. The capital sentences that came up for consideration 
by me as Acting Judge Advocate General for the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces in Europe, and by my successor, had been adjudged 
for rape or murder, or both. One death sentence had been executed 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1979 

in France before the branch office of which I had charge was estab- 
lished. That sentence was adjudged upon conviction of rape and 
murder. 

Mr. Sanford. That would be first degree rape, or might it some- 
times be second degree rape? 

Mr. Miller. Is there not a provision in the criminal law that any 
soldier in the United States Army committing the crime of rape shall 
be subject to the death penalty? 

Gen. Kreger. The ninety-second article of war provides that for 
murder or rape the penalty shall 'be death or imprisonment for life.' 

Mr. Miller. It all comes under the Articles oi War? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes; but the penalty is the same, as I recall it, as 
that fixed by the Federal Criminal Code. 

Mr. Sanford. Does that mean violence committed on an infant 
child, too? 

Gen. Kreger. Kape by force or violence. 

Mr. Sanford. Then, is second degree rape as serious a crime? 

Gen. Kreger. All the rape cases that came to my attention were 
cases of rape by force and violence, common-law rape. 

The Chairman. You found it necessary in order to impress the 
people of France, the country we were in, to carry out such stringent 
sentences to maintain the discipline of the troops? 

Gen. KjtEGER. The courts and the reviewing and confirming au- 
thorities evidently were of the opinion that the facts and circum- 
stances surrounding each such case, and the law applicable thereto, 
warranted adjudging and carrying into effect the death penalty. In 
each such case that came, up on automatic appeal to the branch 
office of which I had charge, we found that the accused had been 
legally proven guilty, legally convicted, before a lawfully consti- 
tuted tribunal, and that that tribunal had adjudged a lawful sen- 
tence within its jurisdiction. 

Mr. Kearns. Did you pass upon the weight of the testimony? 

Gen. Kreger. To determine whether or not there was substantial 
competent evidence of record in support of everv essential allega- 
tion of each specification of which the accused had been convicted. 

Mr. Miller. In the procedure of a trial before a court-martial, the 
law governing the case guides the court in its disposition, and the 
rules of evidence are the rules of evidence of civil law ? 

Gen. Kreger. The rules of evidence that are followed by the Fed- 
eral courts of the United States, subject to certain comparatively 
slight modifications prescribed by the President under authority of 
an act of Congress. 

Mr. Miller. I do not recall the act of Congress that gives the 
President the right to change the rules of evidence. Has the Presi- 
dent that right? 

Gen. Kreger. The President has 

Mr. Miller (interposing). Has he exercised that authority? 

Gen. Kreger. He has exercised the authority in the main in pre- 
scribing how official documents may be introduced and received in 
evidence' before a court-martial. 

Mr. Miller. During the war, from time to time, there were cer- 
tain newspaper accounts, perhaps exaggerated accounts of men 
being sentenced to be shot for being asleep at post and things of that 



1980 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

character. Was there anything of that character which occured at 
amy post over there? 

Gen. Kreoi^r. Some men were sentenced by courts-martial to be 
shot for military offenses, such as sleeping on post. 

Mr. MiiJ^R. Were they shot? 

Gen. Kreoer. No. 

Mr. Sanford. Those were indeterminate, too. 

Mr. Kearns. Those were the two cases that came to the President^ 
and the men were released by the President ? 

Gen. Kreger. Four of them were cases that came up in April or 
May, 1918 ; but there were others in which the courts that heard the 
evidence and adjudged sentences had the records sent back to them 
by the reviewing authorities. The courts were told in each of those 
cases that the reviewing authority regarded the death sentence as 
too severe; that the sentence should be reconsidered and one less 
severe adjudged. 

The Chairman. What is the purpose of imposing a death sentence 
upon a man found guilty of going to sleep while on post duty ? 

Gen. Kreger. The man who sleeps on post under such conditions 
that a military court feels justified m adjudging the death penalty is 
ordinarily one upon whose wakefulness and watchfulness the safety 
of the entire command may depend. If he goes to sleep and relaxes 
his vigilance and permits the enemy to strike without warning, his 
failure to perform his duty may cost hundreds or even thousands of 
lives. 

Mr. Kearns. In one of the cases, as I remember the testimony, it 
was that one of the boys had been in the trenches for eight days and 
had not had any sleep except what he could get while the shells were 
bursting over him in the trench, and he came out dog tired and told 
the officer who ordered him to go on post duty that he could not stay 
awake, that he was exhausted, and it was known he had been in the 
trenches eight days. Even then he was ordered to post duty, and 
within 10 minutes after he went on duty he was asleep. That is sub- 
stantially the evidence in that case, is it not? 

Gen. Kreger. I do not recall having read the record in that case* 

Mr. Kearns. I will say that is in substance the testimony. As I 
recall, this boy was tried by court-martial and sentenced to death and 
was saved by the President through the intervention of Mr. Webb, a 
Member of Congress from North Carolina. I would like to know 
what became of the officer who would order a boy of that kind to 
go on post duty when it was a physical impossibility for that boy 
to stay awake, it mattered not if the entire Army was in danger? 
What would be done with an officer who would order a boyto do 
that? I would like to know what became of that officer? Was he 
ever shot? 

Gen. Kreger. I can not answer that question, because I am not 
acquainted with all the facts. But if an officer were ordered to put 
in position an outpost, and all of his men were equally tired and 
eoually worn out, some of them would have to meet tlxe demand. 
The command would then face a condition, not a theory. 

Mr. Kearns. But under those circumstances suppose he would 
compel the man to do it, and he knew that the man could not stay 
awake ; a man ought not to be killed for that because there are some 



ABMY REORGANIZATION, 1981 

things the human system can not endure, and that seemed to be one 
of them. 

Gen. Kreqer. The only information I have with reference to those 
four cases is the information that came to me through the news- 
papers, except that I believe two of the cases came before me for pur- 
poses of clemency during the last six months and received some 
action on my part. 

The Chairman. Would it be possible for you to investigate the 
case Mr. Keams speaks about and put the facts in the hearing? 
Could you do that? 

Gten. Kreger. I will make an effort to do so. It may be that there 
is only an unsworn statement suggestive of the facts that have just 
been related. Quite often the defendant declines to take issue under 
oath with the testimony adduced by the prosecution, but will make 
a statement not under oath, upon which he may not be cross- 
examined, and which may not be met in any way. 

The Chairman. You can state in the hearing, just what occurred. 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

(A brief statement concerning the case of Pvt. Jeff Cook, Company 
G, Sixteenth Infantry, follows:) 

Pvt. Cook was convicted on December 29, 1917, under the eighty-sixth article 
of war, of sleeping on his post while on guard and posted as a sentinel in time 
of war in the face of the enemy, in France, on November 5, 1917, and was sen- 
tenced to be shot to death with musketry. 

It was proved by competent evidence and admitted by Pvt. Cook that at the 
tinae of the commission of the alleged offense he was on guard as a sentinel 
at a post in the front line. The controverted question was whether Pvt. Cook 
was asleep. 

Tho corporal of the guard testified that, on the date in question, he had 
found Pvt. Cook asle^ at his post. Another soldier, who was on guard duty 
at the same time and place, testified that Pvt. Cook was asleep at the time in 
question. 

It was shown by the evidence, and admitted by Pvt. Cook, that the post at 
which he was on guard was what is known as a three-man post, each of the 
three men comprising the detail being on duty consecutively for two hours 
and off for one hour, during the period from 4 o'clock in the afternoon until 
daylight. 

Pvt. Cook testified that at the time referred to he was not asleep but was 
standing up with his head on his hands and his poncho^ on the top of his helmet 
to cut the wind ; that he knew when the corporal came up and took his rifle ; 
that he was drowsy, but not asleep ; that he had not had any sleep during the 
previous day; that he had had no fatigue duty that day but had been kept 
from sleeping because of " woodchopplng on the Inside of the dugout.'* Pvt. 
Cook further testified as follows : 

*' Q. How many nights had you been on the post? — ^A. Six nights. 

" Q. During those nights did you get any sleep at ajl? — ^A. No, sir ; not much. 

" Q. You did not get any sleep? — A. No, sir. 

" Q. You say you had not had any sleep for six nights? — A. No, sir. 

" Q. Had you been sleeping any during the day? — A. Not much, as It was too 
noisy. 

" Q. Did you see the corporal take your gun? — ^A. I did not see him take it, 
but realized when he woke me up. 

" Q. What did the' corporal say to you? — ^A. He woke me and called my name, 
and asked me where my rlfie was. 

" Q. Did the corporal wake you up? — ^A. No, sir; I was not asleep. 

"Q. Why did you say * when the' corporal woke me up'? — ^A. Well, for the 
reason that I meant he pushed me when he woke me up." 

The sentence was approved by the convening authority on January 16, 1918, 
and forwarded for the action of the President under the forty-eighth article 
of war. 



1982 ABMY BEOBGANIZATIOK. 

On May 1, 1918, the Secretary of War, on his own initiative, after conference 
with the Judge Advocate General, and after a personal study of the record 
of trial and of the accompanying documents, wrote a letter to the President 
reviewing the record and recommending that.Pvt. Cook be pardoned; and on 
May 4, 1918, the President, adopting the views of the Secretary of War, con- 
firmed the sentence and granted Pvt. Cook a full and unconditional pardon and 
restored him to duty.* 

Mr. Miller. In the trial of a man before a court-martial does the 
legal presmnption of innocence attach to the accused until it is over- 
come by competent evidence bearing on the case? 

Gen. Kreger. It does. 

Mr. Miller. Does he not come into the court often with a sort of 
atmosphere that he has to prove his innocence ? 

Gren. Kreger. Most assuredly, no. 

Mr. Miller. I think you stated that the procedure of the Federal 
courts in criminal cases is put into eilect in courts-martial, with cer- 
tain modifications. 

Gren. Kreger. The rules of evidence generally applicable in the 
Federal civil courts. 

Mr. Miller. As I understand it, a man is tried for infractions of 
the Articles of War, and those Articles of War fix the punishment 
that shall be inflicted if the man is found guilty. Now, are those 
Articles of War predicated also upon the Federal law in similar 
criminal offenses? 

Gen. Kreger. In time of peace maximum limits of punishment are 
prescribed by the President within the maximum limits authorized 
by statute. Executive orders on the subject go into considerable 
detail, specifying the amount of punishment that may be adjudged 
upon conviction of particular offenses. Such orders are based upon 
the Federal penal code, if the offense is covered by the Federal penal 
code, and when the offense is not covered by the Federal penal code 
the Executive rule is generally based upon an average of the penal- 
ties prescribed by State criminal codes for like offenses. 

The article of war under which the President prescribes limits 
of punishment for offenses committed in time of peace provides that 
the President may prescribe limits of punishment in time of peace. 
In January of this year, upon the recommendation of Gen. Crowder, 
the Secretary of War advised courts-martial to observe the peace- 
time limit save in exceptional cases; and in August of this year, 
upon my recommendation, the President directed that in our own 
territory the peace-time limits be observed by reviewing authorities. 

The Chairman. Now, under this bill the boys that would be called 
to the training camps for military training only are subject to the 
Articles of War. Could the President under the Articles of War 
fix a limitation on the punishment that could be meted out to those 
boys below the punishment that is meted out to soldiers in the Regu- 
lar Army ? 

The reason I propound that question is this; that if we adopt a 
system of universal military training it maj be advisable, or the 
members of the committee may deem it advisable, to fix a punish- 
ment in the law that is very much milder than the punishment fixed 



» See heariners before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United 
States Senate, Sizty-sizth Congress^ on S. 64, *'A bill to establish military justice," pp. 
1239-1252, 1348-1357. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1983 

either in the Articles of War or by Executive order for soldiers in 
the Regular Establishment, and for that reason I would like to get 
jour judgment in the matter. 

Gen. luiEGER. Subject to correction upon reconsideration, let me 
suggest that possibly the purpose you have in mind might bei served 
by a provision to the effect that the punishment for a military 
offense committed by a soldier who has been in the service less 
than three months shall be a certain proportion of the punishment 
that may be adjudged in the case gf a soldier who has been in 
the service longer. 

The Chairman. You mean to put that in this law ? 

Gen. Rreger. Yes; or into the executive order prescribing limits 
of punishment. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you not think rape committed by a boy who 
has been in the service only three days is just as much of a crime 
as if it were committed by a man who had been in the service three 
years ? 

Gen. Kreger. It would be possible to distinguish between mili- 
tary offenses and civil offenses. 

Mr. Sanford. I wanted to ask you about the indeterminate sen- 
tence. You said these long sentences were in effect indeterminate? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. But on their face they were not indeterminate? 

Gen. Kreger. No. 

Mr. Sanford. That is what has led to so much misunderstand- 
ing. A great many people have lectured and there has been a 
great deal said in the newspapers about these very long and wicked 
sentences. Is it not your opinion that those long sentences really 
served a good purpose during the war? 

Gen. Kreger. oome sentences — comparatively few, however — 
were adjudged that seem to me to be difficult to justify. However, 
many sentences that may, judged by peace-time standards, seem 
long, really did serve a national purpose. 

Mr. Sanford. Strengthened the discipline of the Army? 

Gen. Kreger. Strengthened the discipline of the Army and also 
met a demand back home. 

Mr. Sanford. When you say these sentences are indeterminate 
you mean they are indeterminate because the very tribunal that 
passes them has the jurisdiction later to remit them; is that the 
idea? 

Gen. Kreger. The military authorities retain jurisdiction for pur- 
poses of clemency. 

Mr. Sanford. It is because the same tribunal has the power to 
remit and extend clemency that you say the sentence is then inde- 
terminate, although on its face it is j&xed ? 

Gen. Kreger. The power to remit the sentence does not pass out 
of the hands of the military authorities. When a man has been 
sent to a disciplinary barracks, the military commander who ap- 
proved the sentence may no longer reach that sentence; but then 
the man passes within the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral and the Secretary of War for purposes of clemencjr. 

Mr. Sanford. For what crimes is a man sent to a penitentiary ? 
I see there is a certain proportion of the convicted men serving time 
in the penitentiary. What determines the place of confinement? 



1984 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Gen. Kreger. To be sent to a penitentiary under sentence of a 
general court-martial a man must have been legally found guiltjr by 
a court-martial of an offense for which a civil court of the United 
States or the District of Columbia could send a man to a peniten- 
tiary; except that for two military offenses, mutiny and desertion 
in time of war or repeated desertion in time of peace, a man may 
also be sent to a penitentiary. 

Mr. Sanford. What penitentiaries are there in the United States 
to which soldiers are sent ? 

Gen. Kreger. Atlanta, Ga. ; Leavenworth, Kans.; and McNeill 
Island, Wash. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the House Committee on 
Military Affairs never had an opportunity to pass upon the Articles 
of War; they were put on as a Senate amendment, as I now recall, 
on one of the bills that passed, I think the Army appropriation bill, 
and we had to take the Articles of War or lose the legislation. 

Mr. Sanford. I think I might add to that that my notion is .that 
the House Committee on Military Affairs prior to the first session 
had such a standing that it does not need me to defend it. 

The Chairman. It is a good thing for the record to show what 
took place, because the Articles of War have been very frequently 
referred to in the press and otherwise in recent months. 

Gen. Kreger. The forty-second article of war limits the power of 
military courts to sentence men to confinement in the penitentiary, 
and the power is further limited by executive regulations contained 
in sections 337, 338, and 339 of the Manual for Courts-Martial. 

Mr. Kearns. The length of the sentence does not determine where 
the boy is to be confined ? Suppose he gets a sentence of 18 years ; 
that does not mean necessarily that he is to go to a penitentiary ? 

Gen. Kreger. If he is sentenced to 18 years' confinement for ab- 
sence without leave he can not be sent to a penitentiary. 

Mr. Kearns. Suppose the sentence is for striking an officer or re- 
fusing to obey a command ? 

Gen. Kreger. He can not be sent to the penitentiary for that unless 
the charge of striking the officer is alleged as a felonious assault. If 
he feloniously assaults an officer with a dangerous weapon he may be 
tried for that as a violation of the civil law as distinguished from 
the military offense of striking an officer, and then, if convicted, he 
may be sent to a penitentiary. 

Mr. KEARNS. I have a case of this kind in mind. In one of the 
Southern camps a Capt. Williams had filed charges again^ a boy 
for striking an officer and refusing to obey a command. Capt. 
Williams was the officer alleged in the indictment to have been 
struck by the boy. Capt. Williams, in testifying, said the boy never 
was closer to him than 6 feet, and that the boy could not have struck 
him, that he did not feel the blow, if the boy did strike him. A lieu- 
tenant said he was standing 20 feet behind the captain and saw the 
boy hit him with his clinched fists on the head, and the court-martial 
found the boy guilty and gave him a sentence of seven years' im- 
prisonment. Would that be a penitentiary imprisonment? Where 
would you confine a man like that ? 

Gen. Kreger. On the statement you have made that man could not 
be sent to the penitentiary. He is probably one of the men who was 
returned to the ranks in five or six months. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1985 

Mr. Kearns. I was wondering \^hat kind of a system it was that 
would allow a boy to be convicted on a charge of that sort, on testi- 
mony like that^ when the man who made the charges testified that he 
did not feel the blow alleged to have been struck. 

The Chairman. I understood you to say it was the captain who 
filed the charge. 

Mr. Kearns. It was, and then he testified he was not closer than 
six feet to the boy and that he did not feel the blow. They must 
have convicted him on the testimony of the lieutenant. 

Mr. Sanford. Here is the case of a boy who was charged with re- 
fusing to go to bed at 9.30 o'clock, on the order of a second lieutenant. 
He was charged first with failing to go to bed at 9.30 o'clock, and 
second with striking at the officer who gave the order. The defense 
clearly set forth that he did not know that the lieutenant who came 
into the tent at night, was an officer. He had not the slightest idea 
that he was an officer when he came in and told him to go to bed. He 
was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service — this 
was after the armistice; he had fought in the war for two years — 
he was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service and 
to be confined for 15 years at hard labor. Then I got a later report 
that the case had been reviewed somewhere and the sentence had been 
reduced to 10 years. 

I could not get any further. I do not believe I would ever have 
gotten any further; but the fellow was discharged after awhile. I 
do not know who passed on it. I think the system that would toler^ 
ate that kind of a case has some weakness in it. This man was what 
I call a gentleman. There never had been a blot on his record in 
civil life, and his war record was of the best. He ought to have had 
a distinguished service medal if what has been said about him is true, 
and I have no doubt it is. I was able to get him discharged, but I. 
could not do it by myself. I could not make the system work. That 
is all in the record. He is as fine a boy as ever lived. 

Gen. Kreoer. What is the boy's name? 

Mr. Sanford. His name is William J. Millington. I wrote several 
times about it, but I could not get any results. I feel it my duty to 
state these facts, and I am going to put in the record a letter that was 
written about it, dated January 18, 1919, and signed " E. A. Kreger, 
Acting Judge Advocate General." 

The Chairman. Will you kindly look up that particular case, 
General ? 

Gen* Kreger. I will do so. 

Mr. Sanford. The boy's name is William J. Millington, of Troy, 

N. Y. 

Mr. Miller. General, in nearly every State they have reforma- 
tories as distinguished from penitentiaries. In nearly every State 
they have regulations that men accused of felonies under the age 
of 21, in the case of first oifenses, shall be sent to reformatories as 
distinguished from penitentiaries, with the probable exception of 
murder in the first degree, and also probably in the case of homicide. 
In the Army a boy can enlist at the age of 18 ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. He is tried. He is one of the 855 boys now in the 
penitentiary. He commits an offense sufficient to send him to the 



1986 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

penitentiary. There is no chance for him to go to a reformatory ^ 
is there? 

Gen. Kreger. On the contrary, there is. The reviewing authority 
is not compelled to send a convicted man to a penitentiary, but may^ 
send him to a disciplinary barracks. 

Mr. Miller. How do you distinguish between the disciplinary^ 
barracks and the penitentiary? Where are the disciplinary bar- 
racks? 

Gen. Kreger. They are at Fort Jay, N. Y.; Fort Leavenworth,. 
Kans. ; and Alcatraz Island, Calif. 

Mr. Miller. What is the system there as distin^ished from th& 
penitentiary system? Is there a sjrstem of education there? 

Gen. Kreger. I have heretofore invited attention to the salvage- 
system on the military side. The men who do not care to devote 
themselves to further military training a3 a means of rehabilitation 
may receive vocational training. They receive vocational training,, 
with a view to turning them back into civil life the better prepared 
to meet the problems they will have to solve upon relep-se. 

The Chairman. General, does not such a man get some military 
training also? 

Gen. Kreger. Every man detained in a disciplinary barracks re- 
ceives a certain amount of military training or discipline. In 1913,. 
by War Department General Order 56, prepared and recommended 
by the Judge Advocate General, the punitive military-prison system 
was superseded by the present reformatory salvage system. In 
1915 Congress placed the seal of its approval upon the departure 
by changing the name of the United States military prison to the 
United States disciplinary barracks. 

The Chairman. When a man is sent to the disciplinary ban^acks 
he is sent there under an indeterminate sentence ? 

Gen. Kreger. In terms the sentence is determinate ; a certain des- 
ignated number of months or years. 

Mr. MilIxEr. Who has the authority to let such a man out under 
seven years or nine years? 

Gen. Kreger. When a man is sent to a disciplinary barracks a 
copy of the general court-martial order in his case, which amounts 
to a warrant of commitment, goes with him. There also goes with 
him his service record. Upon arrival at the barracks he is placed in 
what may be termed class B, the neutral class. Then he has the op- 
portunity of dropping down into class C for misbehavior, or of 
being promoted to class A for good behavior. After he has served 
and has been observed for a time as a class A man a board passes 
upon his fitness to be put into the disciplinary battalion. 

Mr. Miller. A local board ? 

Gen. Kreger. A board composed of officers on duty at the bar- 
racks. The preliminaries looking to the examination by that board 
are taken up almost immediately after a man arrives at the bar- 
racks. He -is asked as to whether or not he desires to furnish the 
names of any people who may furnish information as to his record in 
civil life. If he is willing to do that, an inquiry is made, so that by 
the time he has been in the barracks five or six weeks the authori- 
ties have a pretty thorough history of him. That is considered 
along with the conduct of the man in the disciplinary barracks in 



ABMY RBOBGAKIZATION. 1987 

order to determine whether or not he may properly pass from class A 
into the disciplinary battalion. 

In the meantime an application for clemency may be considered. 
When he has been in the disciplinary battalion for approximately 
three months he either makes an application for restoration or the 
barracks authorities on their own motion recommend his restoration. 
The papers then come up to the War Department for consideration, 
and unless the record of trial discloses compelling reasons to the 
contrary the Secretary of War makes an order restoring the man to 
duty. 

Mr. Miliar. Under what contingency could your office have an 
^objection to it ? The man's conduct has been under observation out 
there. 

Gen. Kreger. I do not now recall a case in which the Judge Advo- 
cate General's Office has taken exception to a proposed restoration. 
The office does, however, at times recommmend restorations without 
waiting for recommendations to that end from the barracks authori- 
ties. 

Mr. MiLLEft. It works something akin to the system of parole in 
the various States? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Kearns. I noticed when I was down there that there were a 
great many prisoners at Camp Humphreys. Are they men who are 
stationed there and who had been tried for some offense while they 
were at Camp Humphreys? 

Gen. Kreger. Any man convicted and sentenced so as to warrant 
placing him in a disciplinary barracks or a penitentiary should not 
remain at a post beyond the time necessary to review the record of 
his trial. It may be that the men to whom you refer are garrison 
prisoners — short-term prisoners — convicted by special or summary 
courts of minor offenses. 

Mr. Kearns. How long will they be kept there? I think they have 
all been tried, possibly, for drinking or gambling. How long are 
they supposed to be kept there after the war is over? I dp not know 
when they were convicted. 

Gen. Kreger. At present the maximum limit of punishment, by 
way of forfeiture, for being drunk in quarters, station, or camp in 
the United States is the forfeiture of 15 days' pay, $15. For the for- 
feiture confinement may be substituted. 

Mr. Kearns. Confinement for how long? 

Gen. Kreger. For the forfeiture of one day's pay there may be sub- 
stituted confinement at hard labor for one day. 

The Chairman. So it would be $15 or 15 days? 

Gen. Kreger. Fifteen days or $15 for a plain drunk. That is the 
maximum. For being drunk and disorderly the limit is higher. The 
maximum for that would be confinement at hard labor for three 
months or the forfeiture of two-thirds of three months' pajr. 

Mr. Sanford. Those crimes are now not so numerous, in view of the 
passage of the prohibition amendment? 

Gen. Kreger. Trials for being drunk and disorderly still occur 

occasionally. 

The Chairman. On the other side you were not able to enforce the 
provision of the conscription law respecting the use of intoxicating 
liquor because you had no jurisdiction on French territory? 



1988 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Gen. Kreoer. The law did not run in the territory of France. 

The Chairman. Exactly so. 

Mr. James. What kind of a discharge would a man in the Regular 
Army get who deserts and is caught and tried by a couit martial, 
found guilty of desertion, and sentenced to three years' imprison- 
ment ? 

Gen. Kreger. If the sentence does not include dishondrable dis- 
charge he will serve throughout his three years of confinement, or 
such portion thereof as he mky be held to serve, and when the time 
is up he will be restored to duty; but if the sentence includes dis- 
honorable discharge the dishonorable discharge may be ordered exe- 
cuted immediately after the record has been reviewed in the Judge 
Advocate General's Office and found to be legally sufficient to sup- 
port the sentence, or it may be suspended until the end of the sol- 
dier's confinement. As indicated in the statistics heretofore pre- 
sented, more sentences of dishonorable discharge are suspended until 
the expiration of the period of confinement than are executed at the 
beginning of the term. 

Mr. James. If it does not mention dishonorable discharge, he is 
eligible to draw a pension ? 

Gen. Kreger. If a disability has been incurred in line of duty. 

Mr. James. I had a case when I was a member of the Committee 
on Pensions where I ran across a man by the name of Stuhlman, 
who had joined the Regular Army, had been tried and convicted by 
a court martial and sent to jail, and who was then mustered out, and 
two or three years afterwards he claimed a pension on the ground 
that he had been in the Army. I presumed there was not any chance 
of his getting a pension, but I found that under the construction of 
somebody this man -was entitled to a pension if he could prove that 
the disability he had occurred some time up to the time he had de- 
serted. Civil War veterans and Spanish War veterans have to have 
honorable discharges, but here was a case of a man who was a de- 
serter, but as long as he did not get a dishonorable discharge he was 
eligible for a pension. Should not the law be changed so that a man 
like that should not have a pension? 

Gen. Kreger. That is a question of legislative policy. 

Mr. James. That was the intent of Congress, but they did not put 
a proviso in there to the effect that anvbody who had a dishonorable 
discharge was not eligible, and therefore it was construed that if a 
man had a discharge he was still entitled to a pension, although it 
was a dishonorable discharge. 

Gen. Kreger. Since the establishment of the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance certain questions relating to the rights of former soldiers 
that had theretofore been determined, preliminarily at least, by the 
War Department are being determined by the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance. 

Mr. James. Suppose a man joins the Regular Army, deserts, and 
is found guilty, and is sent to jail. Will he, in years to come, be able 
to apply for a pension ? That law has not been repealed. 

Gen. Kreger. The Revised Statutes (sections 4692 to 4701, in- 
clusive) under which pensions for disabilities were authorized prior 
to the enactment of the War Risk Act, did not require an honorable 
discharge as a condition precedent to the grant of a pension. Under 
the terms of those sections a pension for a disability incurred in lino 



A3MY BEORGANIZATION. 1989 

of duty could not be denied if the soldier had been apprehended, tried, 
convicted, and dishonorably discharged. Where, however, a soldier 
charged with desertion had not been apprehended, so that his term of 
service had never been closed by a discharge, no pension could be 
given, a discharge being, under the pension rulings, a prerequisite to a 
pensionable status. 

The war-risk act, however (sec. 312, as amended Oct. 6, 1917, 40 
Stat. 398, 408), prescribes that: 

Existing pension laws sliall not be applicable after the enactment of tliis 
amendment to persons now in or hereafter entering the military or naval 
service, or to their widows, children, or their dependents, except in so far as 
rights under any such law shall have heretofore accrued. 

The same statute (sec. 308) provides: 

That no compensation shall be payable for death inflicted as a lawful punish- 
ment for a crime or military offense except when inflicted by the enemy. A 
dismissal or dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge from the service shall bar 
and terminate all right to any compensation under the provisions of this 
article" (i. e.. Art. Ill, providing for '* compensation for death or disability*'). 

Mr. James. Do you think the President has the right to send men 
in the Army outside the United States without the consent of Con- 
gress? 

Gen. Kreger. An army organized^ under authority of Congress, 
for general military purposes is subject to the orders of the President 
as constitutional commander in chief. 

Mr. James. Several officers have claimed that the President has 
the right to send them outside of the United States. 

Mr. Kearns. In the absence of a declaration of war? 

Mr. James. Yes. Of course, the President has the right to send 
men outside the United States after the Congress has declared war, 
but several officers have said that he has the right to send them out- 
side the United States without a declaration of war. Of course, if 
that be true, he could send a hundred thousand men to Armenia, as 
Senator Hitchcock is asking, and he would have the right to send 
60,000 men to Thrace, and 10,000 men to Silesia, and 40,000 men to 
Siberia. Of course, if he has the right to send a couple of hundred 
thousand men outside the United States under those circumstances 
the smaller Army we have the less chance there is for men being sent 
all over the world on peace duty. 

Gen. Kreger. There are conditions under which the President, 
in time of peace, may send units of the Army outside of the terri- 
torial limits of the United States without prior express authority 
or consent on the part of Congress. Under a treaty arrangement 
between the United States and Mexico the military forces of the 
United States have been ordered to pursue into Mexican territory 
bandits who had committed depredations on the American side of 
the border. A military force might be embarked upon transports 
to accompany a naval force under orders to proceed to the neighbor- 
hood of a port of a foreign power for the purpose of making a 
demonstration designed to bring about compliance with treaty pro- 
visions between that power and the United States. 

I understand, however, that the present inquiry has reference 
especially to that portion of the proposed military establishment 
which is to be composed of youn^ men undergoing the three months' 
training contemplated by the bill under consideration. The con^ 

150187— 20— VOL 2 13 



1990 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

stitiitional authority to raise and support armies, to make rules for 
the government and regulation of the land forces, and to make ap- 
propriations, places it within the power of the Congress to consti- 
tute that portion of the proposed Military Establishment which is 
to consist of young men undergoing such training a purely domestic 
force, available for training purposes only, and not available for 
any service beyond the geographical limits of the States of the 
I^nion and the District of Columbia, or beyond the territorial limits 
of the territory or insular possession from which men under training 
may be drawn. 

Mr. Sanford. I called your attention a while ago to the case of 
William J. Millington. I will show you the record of trial and the 
statement of service. I am going to put that in the record, and in 
putting it in the record I want to make the statement that later, on 
September 10, this case was reviewed by you or by somebody under 
you and the soldier was fully restored to his rank and discharged 
with honor, as he should have been. 

(The letter referred to is as follows :) 

Office Acting Judge Advocate Gej^sral, 

American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, 

France, January 18, 1919, 

Prom : The Office of the Acting Judge Advocate General. 

To: The Judge Advocate General of the Army, War Department, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 

Subject: United States v. WUUam J. Millington (107614), private, Company C, 
Fifth Machine Gun Battalion (A. J. A. G, O., 201-932). 

1. Pvt. WMlliam J. Millington, who was represented by counsel, was tried 
lit headquarters First Depot Division, American Expeditionary Forces, on 
December 10, 1918, by a general court-martial (seven members present) con- 
vened by order of the commanding officer of that division, upon the following 
charge and specifications, viz: 

Charge. — Violation of the sixty -fourth article of war. 

Specification 1. — Having received a lawful order from Second Lieut. Earl 
Buell, Infantry, who was then in the execution of his office, to get into bed, 
did, at classification camp. First Depot Division, on or about the 29th day 
of November, 1918, at 10 p. m., willfully disobey the same. 

Specification 2. — Did, at classification camp, First Depot Division, on or 
about the 29th day of November, 1918, at 10 p. m., willfully attempt to strike 
Second Lieut. Earl Buell, Infantry, who was then in the execution of his 
office, with his fist. 

2. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and the specifications 
thereunder. The court found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him " to 
be dishonorably discharged the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due 
or to become due, and to be confined at hard labor, at such place as the 
reviewing authority may direct, for 15 years." 

3. The reviewing authority, on December 31, 1918, approved the sentence, 
reduced the period of confinement to 10 years, and suspended the execution 
of the dishonorable discharge until the soldier's release from confinement. 
He designated the military prison camp, St. Sulpice, A. P. O. 715 (705?), as 
the place of confinement (G. C. M. O. 157, First Depot Division, A. E. F., 
Dec. 21. 1918). 

4. On the evening of November 29, 1918, between 10 and 11 p. m., Lieut. Buell, 
inspecting officer at the classification camp on that day, ordered the accused 
to go to bed, which order the accused disobeyed (pp. 6-8, 10, 11). At the same 
time the accused struck the officer on the shoulder (pp. 6, 7, 10, 12). Before 
the accused struck Lieut. Buell, who had a flashlight turned on him, Buell 
told the accused that he was an officer. Buell had on the Insignia of an officer. 
The order to the accused was given both before and after Buell told him that 
he was an officer (pp. 6-8, 10). 

The accused, sworn as a witness at his own request (p. 13), stated that 
Lieut. Buell at the time in question was wearing an enlisted man's hat cord 
(p. 13), which was denied by Buell (p. 15). The accused also implied that 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1991 

the lieutenant gave the order in question to some one. He did not deny, except 
by his plea, that he struck the officer. 

5. No evidence of previous convictions was submitted to the court. Milling- 
ton's current term of service dates from June 15, 1917, with no record of 
previous service. These facts as to the service of the accused are based on his 
statements, his service record not having been available. 

6. The record is legally sufficient to support the sentence ad.ludged and 
approved. 

7. Action in the case is complete. 

E. A. Kreoer, 
Acting Judge Advocate General. 

(Inclosures: Record of trial and statement of service. G. C. M. 0., 5 copies. 
W. R.; D. T.) 

Mr. Sanford. I want to put that in the record as an illustration 
of the extreme character of some of these court-martials. 1 think it 
is a splendid illustration of how justice can miscarry. It is not in 
any way a criticism of your department, because in connection with 
that I am making the statement that upon your review the man was 
fully restored. 

(A brief statement concerning Millington's case follows :) 

The review quoted above was prepared by Lieut. Col. William Rand, judge 
advocate (a New York lawyer), and Maj. Daniel Taylor, judge advocate (an 
Arkansas lawyer). 

The court before which Millington was tried was composed of the following- 
named officers: 

Col. John L. May, Infantry. 

Maj. Ernest E. Johnson, Quartermaster Corps. 

Capt. W. John Hoffman, Ordnance. 

Capt. Henry Humann, Field Artillery. 

First Lieut. Phillip D. Richmond, Infantry. 

First Lieut. Charles L. Nlckelle, Quartermaster Corps, Motor Transport Corps. 

First Lieut. Felix C. Chapman, Quartermaster Corps. 

First Lieut. William J. Bacon, Infantry, served as trial judge advocate, and 
First Lieut. James I. Sheppard, United States Infantry, as counsel for 
Millington. 

Before the record of trial came up to the office of the acting judge advocate 
general for the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe for review the 
findings and sentence had received the approval of Brig. Gen. Eli K. Cole, 
commanding the First Depot Division, who no doubt had consulted his division 
judge advocate, Maj. (later Lieut. Col.) Henry W. Stlness, judge advocate (a 
Rhode Island lawyer), concerning the legality of the proceedings, findings, and 
sentence. 

Millington's conviction rests upon the testimony of two witnesses — Second 
Lieut. Earl Buell and Pvt. Ernest E. Draper. The only witness for the defense 
was the accused himself. The substance of the testimony of the three witnesses 
heard In the case Is briefly summarized in the review quoted above. 

Upon reexamination of the record of trial In the Military Justice Division 
of the Judge Advocate General's Office by Col. E. R. Keedy, judge advocate 
(professor of law. University of Pennsylvania) ; Col. R. W. Millar, judge advo- 
cate (professor of law, Northwestern University) ; Maj. Lodwlc C. Davis, 
judge advocate (an Ohio lawyer) ; and Maj. J. C. Ruppenthal, judge advocate 
(a Kansas lawyer and former district judge), those officers were unanimously 
of the opinion that the record is legally sufficient to support the findings arrived 
at by the court and also to support the sentence adjudged and approved. 

On June 9, July 15, and August 11, 1919, respectively, the Acting Judge Advo- 
cate General (Kreger) forwarded communications designed to procure informa- 
tion concerning Milllngton*s record In civil life, his record while in the military 
service, and his conduct while in confinement. The desired information having 
been obtained and being favorable throughout, the Acting Judge Advocate 
General (Kreger) on September 2, 1919, recommended that the unexecuted 
portion of Millington's sentence be remitted, and that he be honorably restored 
to duty and forthwith honorably discharged. This recommendation was ap- 
proved by the Secretary of War on September 10, 1919. Millington was, on 



1992 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

September 19, 1919, honorably restored to duty, and, on September 20, 1919, 
honorably discharged the service. 

Mr. MiiXEB. Does a man have to be convicted beyond reasonable 
doubt? 

Gen. Kreger. The administration of military justice is based upon 
the theory that the man must be shown to be ^ilty beyond reason- 
able doubt before a court may adjudge him guilty. In other words, 
a person arraigned before a court-martial is presumed to be innocent 
until his guilt is proven. 

Mr. Miller. Until his innocence is overcome by the evidence be- 
yond reasonable doubt? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. There is no difference between the military 
practice and the civil practice, except that the military courts have 
to deal in part with an additional and different class of offenses. 
In addition to taking cognizance of violations of the ordinary laws 
of the land by military persons, courts-martial try military persons 
for purely military offenses. 

Mr. Kearns. Is the system of military trials satisfactory to you — 
that is, the system itself ? 

Gen. Kreger. On the whole, the system works well. 

Mr. Kearns. Would you object to having a real judge on a court- 
martial, driving him whatever rank you thought necessary to keep 
him in his station, having him sit at all these trials, where he would 
pass upon the admission and rejection of testimony and pass upon 
questions of law, and with the oflScers, if you want them under him, 
to sit as a jury to pass upon matters of fact, without any indication 
of the feeling of the judge? He would act as a military judge and 
nothing else, to pass upon the law and the admission of testimony in 
the case, and have the ]ury of officers make its findings, and the court 
would be bound by the findings, and would have no control over 
them any more than a court in civil life would have over a jury. 

Would it not be possible to have a system of that character in peace 
times, to have one of those judges sit at all trials held at military 
posts? How many posts would there be in an army of 250,000 or 
300,000 men? 

Gren. Kreger. That would depend upon many factors. If divi- 
sional concentration were the rule, the number of stations would not 
be large. 

Mr. Kearns. So, then, if we had four or five such judges, could 
they not take care of all the business and let them go from post to 
post ; would it not be possible to have a system of that kind, and do 
you not think it would be better than the system now in vogue? 

Gen. E^REGER. That would more nearly approach the German sys- 
tem than anything we have had. 

Mr. Kearns. It that is the German system, then I think I would 
like to have it. If you had that system you would have a real lawyer 
who knew what the law was, and he would know what evidence 
ought to be admitted and what ought to be rejected. These officers 
need not be lawyers, but they would sit to pass upon questions of 
fact, and the judge would decide matters of law and questions in 
regard to the admission and rejection of testimony. 

Mr. Sanford. Your court-martial is guided now in the admission 
of evidence and questions of law by The Judge Advocate General, 
is it not? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1993 

Gen. ILreger. The Judge Advocate General is not present at the 
time of trial. He can reach courts only by means of the Manual 
for Courts-Martial and monthly abstracts oi opinions sent out from 
the office. 

Mr. Sanford. Is there not a representative of your office present 
at every court-martial, an officer in the Army, who performs the 
functions of the Judge Advocate General? 

Gen. Kregeb. Not as a rule. An officer, usually a line officer, is 
detailed as trial judge advocate, and another officer is detailed as de- 
fense counsel, to represent the accused unless he prefers not to be so 
represented. 

Mr. Kearns. He may have a civil lawyer there to defend him ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Kearns. When you use the term judge advocate, you are re- 
ferring to what we would call the lawyer in the case. I am trying 
to get back to my question in regard to the judge on the bench. 

Gen. Kreger. I should welcome legislative provision under which 
a law officer might be detailed as a member of each general court- 
martial in order that the court-martial might have the benefit of his 
judgment, his knowledge of laV, and his knowledge of procedure to 
keep it from making some of the errors now being made and which 
operate in the interest of the accused quite as often as they do against 
him. To illustrate, if the error is prejudicial, the conviction is held 
to be invalid on review. Then the accused may not be brought to 
trial again, and even though probably guilty he goes free. 

Mr. Kearns. It would not require many more officers in your office 
in order to have more men assigned and give them the necessary rank 
and pay sufficient to get good men in those places. The business of 
such a man would be to go from post to post on court days and sit 
there and clean up the cases that are pending. I see that the law 
requires that a man diall be tried within five days after he is charged 
with violation of law. 

Gen. Kreger. There is a certain period within which he must be 
served with the charges and brought to trial. 

Mr. Kearns. Why could you not have a regular court day? In 
the case of our court of appeals we have court days three times in 
the year, and our common pleas court is in session at certain times. 
Why not have such a system as that and have judges to sit on all 
those cases ? 

Gen. Kreger. Instead of the court passing sentence, have one man 
to pass sentence ? 

Mr. Kearns. No; have a jury trial, have a jury made up of officers 
present at that post, if you please. But the judge will be there to 
determine what the law is in the case and pass on matters of law and 
on the admission or rejection of testimony, and the jury of officers 
could decide questions of fact in the case. It would not take very 
many additional officers to do that. 

Gen. Kreger. In my opinion it would be more satisfactory to have 
the law officer sit as a member of the court. That might be done 
now if a sufficient number of law officers — judge advocates — ^were 
available ; but they are not available and never have been. To per- 
mit carrying such a plan into effect the number of judge advocates 
would have to be largely increased. A considerable number of law 
officers would be required for the purpose. 



1 994 ARMY REORGANIZATlbN. 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Kearns's proposition is to have him preside. 

Gen. Kreger. Let him, instead of the court, rule on the admissi- 
bility of evidence, etc. ? 

Mr. Kearns. Instruct the jury, of oflScers as to matters of law, too. 
The jury of officers would be judges of the facts, but under the inter- 
pretation of the law by the judge. Let the judge tell the jury of 
officers the status of different crimes. 

Gen. Kreger. Do you not think you would get a very considerable 
amount of formality in trials in the field? 

Mr. Keariss. I want all the formality necessary to have a fair 
trial. 

Mr. San FORD. It is generally necessary to preserve discipline to 
have these trials take place as soon as possible in the immediate vicin- 
ity where the crime was committed? 

Gen. Kreger. The more promptly that real justice can be dealt 
out the better it is. Of course, any system that works so rapidly 
that those who live under it arrive at the conclusion that it does 
not seek to do justice as well as to maintain discipline can not be 
defended. Justice and discipline mus^ go hand in hand. 

Mr. Sanford. Is it not a fact that if there is an error of law com- 
mitted in a trial by court-martial and the man being tried is found 
guilty, that upon your discovery of the error on review the prisoner 
is released ? 

Gren. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Sanford. And can not be retried ? 

Gen. Kreger. If the original proceeding was had before a lawful 
court having jurisdiction of the offense and of the accused, then he 
can not be retried. 

Mr. Sanford. He could be in a criminal proceeding in civil life. 

Gen. Kreger. Yes; because the review in the court above is upon 
motion of the accused. In the military system the review above is 
automatic. 

Mr. Sanford. Are there many cases reviewed where the defendant 
has been convicted, where he is released on the discovery of error in 
your review ? 

Gen. Kreger. A comparatively small proportion. 

Mr. Sanford. What rule do you follow with reference to the de- 
fendant testifying in his own behalf? 

Gen. Kreger. He is advised that he may testify in his own be- 
half if he so desires; that if he does not desire to testify he may 
make an unsworn statement either orally or in writing; that if he 
testifies under oath he is subject to cross-examination; and that 
if he limits himself to an unsworn statement, either oral or written, 
he may not be cross-examined thereon. 

Mr. Sanford. In the event of his submitting an unsworn state- 
ment, that unsworn statement is taken for what it is worth? 

Gen. Kreger. For what the court may consider it worth. 

Mr. Miller. General, civil courts are established for the purpose 
of keeping discipline among citizens, and the same purpose pre- 
vails in military courts, so far as military men are concerned. One 
relates to the general class of citizenship, and the other to a special 
class. 

We are asked in this bill to provide that the youth of the country 
at 19 years of age shall be subject to military duty and training. 



ABMY REORGANIZATIOK. 1995 

My colleagues on this committee are immediately in touch with their 
constituents in various parts of the country, as I am in touch with 
the constituents in my district. There is, and there is no use to 
dispute it, General, a disposition on the part of our citizenship to 
be dissatisfied with the proposition of subjecting their boys to what 
they believe to be the hardship in yielding m some cases to the brutal 
judgment meted out by courts-martial. The question is with me — 
and I am quite as dissatisfied with the system as I would be with 
a system of that character applied to civil life ; there is no difference 
between a man in the Army and a man in civil life, except that it is 
perhaps a little more necessary in time of peace, and unfortunately 
more so in time of war that there be discipline — ^the question with 
me is whether some system could not be worked out by which a 
young man 19 years of age undergoing military training, in case he 
violated a military law, just as when he violated a law of the country 
for which he would be tried in civil courts, would be afforded a trial 
where an opportunity would be given to have all the safeguards 
thrown around him that would be thrown around him in a trial in 
a civil court. If a system like that could be worked out, in my 
judgment 90 per cent of the objection to a compulsory military 
training law would be eliminated. I have thought a good deal 
about it, and it seems to me it would be possible to work out some 
system of that kind, particularly as applied to young men under- 
going compulsory military training, that the trials should be pre- 
sided over by a judge, with the same solemnity when those young 
men are undergoing their military training as when they were not 
undergoing military training, and where the same safeguards would 
be tlirown around them and all of their rights would be preserved. 

I think most of us have had some experience with military courts- 
martial. I have had, both in the Army and the Navy, I spent 
seven years of my life simply prosecuting criminals, and I have been 
astonished repeatedly at courts-martial, not only about the questions 
of law that have been decided by the president of the court, but the 
justice of the sentence. 

I am searching, and I think the various members of the committee 
are searching, trying to discover some system that will ease off this 
harsh and unyielding system of military law, particularly directed 
toward the youth of the country in compulsory military training. I 
know that in my community there is a growing opposition to com- 
pulsory military training, which grows evidently out of that reason, 
that they think if their boys get into military training they would 
then become subject to all this system of military courts-martial and 
that it is out of place, and is outclassed by the modern trend of 
progress. I think that is about your idea, Mr. Kearns? 

Mr. Kearns. Absolutely so. 

Mr. Sanford. Have you any suggestions at all for the reform of 
the court-martial system? 

Mr. Miller. I would like to follow you and see if you look with 
favor upon some recasting or relaxation. 

Mr. James. We had the Secretary of War before the committee 
the other day and I asked him practically the same question that 
Mr. Miller has propounded. He said he did not see any reason why 
young men in training should not be subject to the same penalties 
as men in the Kegular Army. He said we do not draw any dis- 



1996 ABMY BEOBGAliaZATION. 

tinction in civil life between penalties imposed upon a man of 19 
and a man of 90. It does not appear that way to the members of 
this committee. We think the young men who are undergoing mili- 
tary training should be placed on an entirely different plane from 
the men in the Regular Army^ and I agree with Mr. Miller that 
under present conditions we are not going to have much of a de- 
mand for military training. In fact, my people are -against it. 

Mr. Sanford. Do you not think most of the criticism Mr. Miller 
speaks about is because of the misunderstanding of the excessive 
sentences? Do you not think that is true? 

Gen. Kreoer. That is true. The public has not become acquainted 
with the indeterminate and suspended sentences and with the clem- 
ency and restoration system the Army applies in disciplinary bar- 
racks. Much has been made of the comparatively small number of 
long-term sentences. Then, too, a certain reaction has set in since 
hostilities ceased. The sentences adjudged by civil courts under the 
espionage act may not be regarded to-day with the degree of public 
approval accorded 18 months ago. In other words, the Nation, and 
therefore the individual, was a bit more severe while the war was 
flagrant than either the Nation or the individual is to-day. 

Mr. Miller. That is true in time of war, but now we are attempt- 
ing to frame legislation for peace time, a permanent proposition 
for the Government, and the training of the youth of the land. 

Gen. Kreger. Personally, I see no reason why the Congress should 
not make provision for a sufficient number of law officers — ^judge 
advocates — so that one such officer may sit as the presiding officer oi 
as a member of every general court-martial. 

Mr. Miller. I am glad to hear you say that. 

Gen. Kreoer. ^ law officer sitting as presiding officer or as a 
member, according to his rank as compared with that of the other 
members of the court, would be able to guide the court aright upon 
questions of law. His presence would obviate any great need for a 
law officer to carry forward the prosecution. 

Mr. Sanford. When you say that the prosecution shall be by a 
law officer, if you want to do exact justice, should not the defend- 
ant have a law officer to represent him? 

Gen. 'Kreger. Absolutely. I think the defendant and the Govern- 
ment should stand on a par before the bar of justice. 

Mr. Kearns. Would that make a top-heavy officer personnel in 
your department? 

Gen. Kreger. A much larger legal personnel than the Army has 
ever had. 

Mr. Kearns. I think you will find the reason why the country 
is prejudiced against the system of courts-martial in Gen. AnselPs 
statement, or at least as I remember his statement as published in 
the newspapers, that there were 400,000 boys court-martialed in this 
Army during the war, and you have stated that that might prob- 
ably be true. 

Gen. Kreger. I think so. 

Mr. Kearns. That means 1 out of every 10; that means there 
is 1 boy out of 10 who has escaped or gotten out of prison and 
gone back home, and who is telling everybody that the system is 
worse than that of the Czar or the Kaiser, and that is spreading 
over every community in this country, and I have an idea that that 



ABMY BEOKGANIZATIOK. 1997 

is where all this prejudice against the system of courts-martial is 
coming from. 

Gen. Kreobr. It seems to me to be both practicable and desirable 
to make provision for such number of law officers as may be sufficient 
to permit one such officer to sit as president or as a member of 
eveiy general court-martial charged with the trial of complicated 
and important cases. 

Mr. James. The language on page 2 of this bill, lines 12 to 23, 
inclusive, is practically along the same lines as the provisions in 
section 2 of the Overman Act. Do you approve of the President 
or the Chief of Staff having the same powers in peace times £^s they 
had under the Overman Act in time of war? In the case of your 
own bureau, they could take that bureau and put it under The 
Adjutant General's Department, or they could put it in some other 
bureau, under the provisions that I just referred to. 

Gen. Kkeoeb. The continued existence of the Judge Advocate 
General's Department is provided for by section 5 of the bill. 

Mr. James. Does not that language from lines 12 to 23, inclusive, 
on page 2, practically give the Chief of Staff the same right in time 
of peace as was given the President in time of war under the Over- 
man Act? 

Gen. Kreoer. The language referred to confers no powei's on the 
Chief of Staff. It authorizes and requires the President to order the 
necessary mergers and distribution of powers. 

Mr. Jasies. He could not only do that, but could redistribute the 
powers under the language in Ime 17. 

Gen. Kreoer. The power of redistribution seems to be a continu-* 
ing one. 

Mr. James. The real effect of it would be, according to the way I 
see it, that the Chief of Staff — ^because he is the man who will do the 
work — would practically have the same authority over the American 
Army in peace times, and I do not know but what he would have 
much more authority than the Kaiser had over the Prussian army. 
We do not want that, but that is what the language seems to provide. 

Gren. Kreoer. In time of war we confer extraordinary powers upon 
our Executive. 

Mr. James. If you will read section 2 of the Overman Act and 
then read the language I have just referred to, you will see that this 
lan^affe is just as broad. 

Mr. Sanford. We confer that power in that way because we know 
we have a system by which we can reclaim the power. Do you not 
think that is true? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. James. If we pass such legislation in peace times, we would 
have to pass it over a veto. 

Mr. Kearns. According to the provision of section 31, as I under- 
stand it, anybody below the grade of brigadier general to be com- 
missioned in your office would have to be commissioned from either 
the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Corps of 
Engineers, or the Medical Department ? 

Gen. Kreoer. In that provision of the bill I can not concur. The 
members of the Judge Advocate General's Department should be 
trained lawyers. 

Mr. Kearns. And the best in the country. 



1998 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Gen. ElBeoer. I understand that the provision in question is the 
result of an error in the drafting of the bill ; that it was not intended 
to make the Judge Advocate General's Department one of the de- 
tailed departments, but to regard it as one of the technical or pro- 
fessional departments, the personnel of which should be commis- 
sioned therein. 

Mr. Kearns. I think we questioned Gen. March about that. I do 
not know whether that is an error or not. 

Gen. Kreger. At an earlier stage of this hearing, in answer to a 
question, I stated that with an Army of 576,000 officers and men, as 
contemplated by the bill under consideration, 72 officers would be 
required in the Judge Advocate General's Office. In addition to 
those officers we should need for service with troops and for neces- 
sary details a minimum of 120 judge advocates, apportioned to grades 
as follows : One brigadier general, 13 colonels, 26 lieutenant colonels, 
33 majors, and 55 captains. The total thus proposed for the entire 
department would be 202 officers, which is more than is provided for 
in this bill. The provision in the bill is for 120. In other words, for 
the provision in the bill I should substitute : 

The Judge Advocate Generars Department shaU consist of 1 major general, 
3 brigadier generals, 22 colonels, 44 lieutenant colonels, 66 majors, and 66 cap- 
tains, or a total of 202. 

Mr. Kearns. That is in the entire Army? 

Gen. Kreger. That is in an army of 576,000 officers and men. How- 
ever, with only 202 judge advocates it would not be possible to have 
a judge advocate sit as a member of every general court-martial. To 
*make that possible it would, in my judgment, be necessary to pro- 
vide for considerably more than 202 judge advocates.^ 

Mr. MrLUER. Such a system would not be objectionable to the 
Judge Advocate General's Department? 

Gen. Kreger. It certainly would not be objectionable to me. The 
courts, including law officers as members of their personnel, would 
be convened by riesponsible commanders charged also with reviewing 
the proceedings, findings, and sentences of such courts. With the 
addition of a clear provision lodging or recognizing in the President 
adequate appellate powers, such a system should work well. 

Mr. Sanford. And the discipline will be conserved ? 

Gen. Kreger. Yes. 

Mr. Kearns. In the Medical Department they provide pretty high- 
class medical men to take care of their health. I can not quite under- 
stand why the liberty of a man ought not to be as well cared for as 
his health, because there are lots of people who would rather lose 
their health than lose their libertv. 

Gen. Kreger. To carry into effect the plan proposed and discussed 
here to-day it would be necessary to provide many judge advocates 
for every one heretofore provided for by Congress. 

^ Since the date of the foregoinsr statement a study has been made by Cols. John A. 
Hull, Henry M. Morrow, and Herbert A. White, Judge advocates. They expressed the 
opinion that the minimum number, and the assignments, of officers of the Judge Advo- 
cate General's Department for an Army approximately 300,000 strong should be sub- 
stantially as follows : Judge Advocate General's Office, 66 ; the Army at large, 80 ; 
law members, general courts-martial, 62 ; total, 208 ; and that the distribution of those 
officers to grades should be as follows : Major general, 1 ; brigadier generals, 2 ; colonels, 
19 ; lieutenant colonels, 37 ; majors, 74 ; and captains, 75. In the memorandum pre- 
senting the results of their study Cols. Hull, Morrow, (ind White remark that " The 
only question involved in submitting this list is whether or not we have underestimated 
the number of officers required properly to discharge the duties of the department/' 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 1999 

Mr. San FORD. Do you think that such an increase of the legal 
force would tend to make the lot of the accused any easier, or that 
its judgment would be more lenient? 

Gen. EjtEGER. It should aid in the attainment of a greater degree 
of legal correctness in military- judicial procedure. 

Mr. Kearns. It is my idea to get some system that will protect 
the offender; it is to have some system that will release the boy that 
ought to be released. 

Mr. Miller. To assure the soldiers of justice. 

Mr. Ejsarns. I heard Congressman Royal C. Johnson make the 
statement that as an oflBcer he could prefer charges against any boy 
without a material thing to base them on, and uiere was no chance 
for the boy to escape. I had a boy in my office who said that he 
advised every boy who got into trouble to plead guilty, because, he 
said : " You will be convicted, anyway, and by pleading guilty you 
will get an easier and a lighter sentence." He said he had advised 
dozens of boys that way, and they took his advice. 

Mr. Sanford. That was not so in all parts of the Army. I heard 
some soldiers say that the court-martial system was ideal, and the 
officers would sometimes adjourn a case and would say that the case 
was not well represented, and they would adjourn the case for sev- 
eral days and go out and get somebody to prepare for them. Would 
you think that would be true with men fresh from civil life? I had 
the testimony from several men in one division, that every man had 
a fair chance and no one was convicted unless he was guilty, and 
then he was lightly punished. 

Gen. KjEffiGER. Thirty thousand nine hundred and sixteen trials by 
general courts-martial during the war resulted in 24,668 approved 
<5onvictions and 6,248 acquittals and disapproved convictions. The 
officer who prefers a charge is acting under the sanction of his oath 
of office. No charge is referred to a general court-martial unless a 
•disinterested officer detailed to investigate the case reports that his 
investigation has disclosed at least a prima facie case against the 
accused. The summary of evidence accompanying the charge must 
be sufficient to satisfy the judge advocate on the staff of the conven- 
ing authority that a prima facie case has been made out. With such 
precautions against unwarranted proceedings the percentage of ac- 
quittals should be low. Nevertheless one man out of every five 
brought before a general court-martial went free. 

CHiereupon the committee adjourned to meet to-morrow, Tues- 
day, September 30, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) 



Committee on Militaby Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Thursday J February 5, 1920. 

The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Julius Kahn (chair- 
man) presiding. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen of the committee, Col. Spaulding is 
here this morning to explain the provisions of the tentative reorgan- 
ization bill regarding the single fist. It is his desire, I understand, 
that he be allowed to take up the matter paragraph by paragraph, 
l)ecausft the entire plan has been carefully studied and one paragraph 
depends on the otner. In taking up the matter in that tashion ne 
vnll be better enabled to explain it than if we skip around and ask 
-questions offhand. 

We will be very glad to hear you. Colonel. 

STATEMEITT OF COL. THOMAS M. SPAULDINO, GEITEBAL 

STAFF COSPS. 

Col. SPAULDmo. Mr. Chairman, I do not know how much time the 
•committee wants to give to this. 

*The Chairman. It is a very important matter, and the committee 
wants a full explanation so that every member of the committee may 
understand it. 

Col. Spaulding. It is true, as you said, Mr. Chairman, that these 

Provisions should be gone into line by line. But I would like to beffin 
y saying 8omethw1n regard to the evils of the present system and 
how this is expected to remedy those evils. 

The Chairman. You may make any explanation you desire. You 
may proceed in your own way. 

Col. Spaulding. With the present system of promotion, each 
l)ranch being a thing by itself, nobody can fail to be struck with the 
variation of promotion in the diiferent branches. Take, for instance, 
two men of the same length of service; they may be five or ten years 
apart in the rate of promotion. Of course, some little diflFerences are 
. boimd to occur if they are on separate promotion lists, due to the 
ordinary casualties happening a little more frequently, sometimes in 
one and sometimes in another branch. But there are two princ ipal 
reasons for those diflFerences. 

In the first place, legislation is passed from time to time increasing 
one branch or decreasing another branch, and so long as that branch 
has been oflF by itself for promotion purposes it is bound to make a 
material diflFerence in the rate of promotion. 

Take, for instance, the Field Artillery, which has been more 
largely increased than any other branch of the line in the last few 

2001 



2002 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

years ; its promotion is far ahead of the rest. The Infantry and Cavalry, 
in the long run, with their proportion of officers, would have exactly 
the same rate of promotion, but due to the varying increases, they 
stand from time to time very far apart. That is a purely transitory 
condition. If you pass an act increasing or decreasing a branch, 
that branch, for five or ten years, is going to have promotion quite 
different from the other branches, but m the long run it will not affect 
it. It win affect a particular man, but not a branch, over a period 
of 50 years. 

But in another way the rate of promotion as between two branches 
may vary continually, according to the way the officers are dis- 
tributed m grades in the branches. If you have two branched in the 
service with the same total niunber of officers, but one has a larger 
number of colonels than the other, it is clear that the one with the 
larger nimiber of colonels is going to have faster promotion, and a 
man is going to receive promotion quicker than in the one with the 
less number of colonels. 

Before 1898 no two branches had anything like the same propor- 
tion in the grades, so that the rate of promotion was not the same 
in any two branches. Of the line branches, the Cavalry always had 
faster promotion than the others. The cavalryman would get faster 
promotion. 

In the act of 1901 the line branches were put on the same basis, 
and the proportions in the grades were made the same, so that in 
the long run, if there were no other legislation, those branches would 
have equal promotion. 

The staff departments before 1898 and the permanent staff de- 
partments since 1898 had a larger proportion m the upper grades 
than the line branches. That insured the staff officers more rapid 
promotion than the line officers. 

The Chairman. Why was that? 

Col. Spatjlding. There are two principal reasons why the staff 
departments have more rapid promotion than the line. In the first 
place, each staff department has its permanent office here, and a 
staff department had a better chance of getting its needs considered. 
Its chief was very properly looking after its interests, and the line 
had not anybody to speak for it directly, as the staff department had. 

Another thing is this: Suppose there is presentation ixiade of need 
for additional officers for the line. To a certain extent the propor- 
tion in the different grades in the line branches is determined by 
tactical considerations, and if you are going to add five regiments of 
Infantry you add five colonels. But in the staff department there 
is no reason, in fact, for any particular grade. But you must give 
the staff departments grades, so that there will be a now of promo- 
tion that will attract good men. There is no special necessity, in 
general, for having a colonel or a major to do a particular piece of 
work in a staff department. 

So when a staii department got an increase of officers there was 
not anything to tie it down to a certain proportion in grades. If you 
asked for 250 officers of Infantry, it was a matter of course that you 
would get only five colonels, but if you asked for 250 engineers there 
was a possibility of getting 25 colonels. So the staff departments 
had a larger number in the upper grades and rn^eater flow of promo- 



ARMY BEORGANIZATION. 200S 

tion. Those differences in the rate of promotion made a very serious 
condition in the Army. 

For one thing, a man^s future depended very largely on legislation. 
Every man from the time he was commissioned as a second lieutenant 
began to think, ^^Is there going to be an increase in my branch?^' or 
"Congress is talking about making a decrease in my branch, and 
that is dangerous.'^ His whole mind was set on legislation; that is 
only human nature. But it made a great deal of difference. If you 
doubled the Field Artillery, the Field Artillery officer would say, ^'I 
am going to be a major to-morrow.'^ Or he might say, *' Congress is 
talking about decreasing the Field Artillery, and tliat is going to 
postpone my promotion to major for 10 years. '^ He was worried 
about it. It was impossible to get an impartial opinion as to what 
the Army needed. Perhaps one officer out of 25, in discussing the 
strength which the Coast Artillery or the Cavalry needed, could 
entirely foi^et that his whole future depended on it. The other 24 
were bound to think that their brancn was the most important, 
because their future depended on it. Every man, then, was interested 
in legislation that would give his branch a permanent advantage. 

The Engineers had a permanent advantage over the line. Every 
first-class man at West Point, poring over the Army list, got to 
wondering where he would get the faster promotion. Most of them 
do not know what promotion depends on, or at least they do not 
have an intelligent idea about it. But every one of them did know 
that if he got in the Engineers he would have faster promotion than 
anywhere else. So far he was right. 

1 think this will lead to the impossibility of your getting a really 
impartial view. 

There is another thing, and that is this matter of a cadet or any- 
body else going where he will get the best promotion. The cadet 
knew that he would get better promotion in the Engineer Corps, and the 
tendency is to draw a man away from where his real vocation is. 
He does not stop to think what he would like to do. He thinks of 
where he will get the best promotion, so that the man who graduates 
first in his class will take anything that will give him the best chance 
or pro notion. 

Ordinarily he will take Engineers, because a man can get better 
promotion m that branch of the service. If you put a preferential 
tariff on any particular branch of the service you are gomg to draw 
men away from their real vocations, and they will go into the branch 
where they will get the most material advantage. It will not apply 
to some men, but it will to others. It is a parallel case, I think with 
that of a good many colleges which try to keep up the study of Greek 
in the secondary schools. A good many colleges put a preferential 
tariff on Greek and say that a given amount of Greek will count for 
more in entrance requirements than the same amount of anything else. 
Some years ago, at least, it was the regular thing in prep schools in 
New England to advise the dull boy preparing for Harvard to study 
Greek. He had not any taste for it, but he could get into Harvard 
with two-thirds the amount of work on Greek that he could on French 
or German. It drew the boy away from the thing he was interested 
in to study something which would help him to get into the university. 
The most glaring case of the kind I have been referring to is in the 
Engineers. It was a matter of course that the high ranking man 



2004 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

• 

should take Engineers. He knew he could get better promotion, 
and there was great pressure brought to bear on him to take Engi- 
neers. Everybody told him he was a fool if he did not take it. When 
I graduated from West Point I was recommended for the Engineers. 
But I am not fitted to be an engineer, and declined the assignment. 
Officers said to me, "Do not ruin your whole career by going to the 
Cosat Artillery. You will get twice as fast promotion in the Engi- 
neers.'' I knew that. 

So the tendency of a preferential rate of promotion is to turn away a 
man from the place he should go to a place for which he may not be 
fitted. 

The remedy is to insure that promotion shall be practically the 
same in all branches. The question is how to arrive at that. 

Everybodv vaguely recognized that something of that sort should 
be done. After awhile talk came up about a single list. The 
original talk about the single list was based on a wrong idea. 

Until a little while ago I was much opposed to the idea of a single 
list, because it was presented in the wrong way. The idea they had 
in advocating it was that any man could do anything. It was the 
idea that under the single list a man would be promoted when a 
vacancy occurred, regardless of the branch in wnioh the vacancy 
occurred. Say he comes in as a second lieutenant of Engineers, and 
there is a vacancy in the grade of first lieutenant in the Field Artillery, 
and he was the ranking second lieutenant. The idea was that he would 
be promoted to that vacancy in the grade of first lieutenant, and then 
later he might get to be a captain of Infantry, an4 so on. That 
assumes that any man can be a competent officer in any branch of 
the service, which is entirely false. You make a man a jack-of-all- 
trades but a master of none. 

I know a young Cuban officer who was a cadet at West Point when 
I was an instructor there, and he told me that they had a single list 
founded on that system in the Cuban army, and he said that as a 
result of the operation of that system no man was any good at any- 
thing. This o&cer was a captain, and I think he had had about 
seven years' service in the Cuban army when he reached the grade 
of captain. He had already been in the Coast Artillery, the Cavalry, 
the Infantry, and the Engineers. 

The original idea of the single list was to put everybody on the one 
list and to promote men from one branch to another as the vacancies 
occurred. That would be ruinous to the efficiency of the Army. 

About a year and a half ago the personnel branch of the General 
Staff was organized, really as a war measure, to handle matters in 
connection with the commissioned personnel for the period of the 
war. . I was one of the officers origmally assigned to organize that 
branch and the particular duty assigned to me was in connection 
with policies. Originally it dealt with the appointment of officers 
for the war, but after that it branched out into other things. 

As soon as the personnel branch was organized I began officially 
to study iust what I had been working at unofficially for about 15 
years, and some time before the armistice I submitted a memorandum 
to Gen. Bishop in reference to personnel legislation which I thought 
was needed in the reorganization of the Army. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2005 

At that time I suggested another solution for this need of a single 
list which was not absolutely perfect, but came very near to solving 
the question, according to my idea. 

This study continued until about March, 1919, when a complete 
plan was drawn up, which includes the idea of a single list, substan- 
tially as it is in this tentative draft of your reorganization bill. 

The reason I changed from opposition to favoring a single list is 
that the single list as provided lor here is entirely diiferent in prin- 
ciple from the single list schemes which have been generally presented 
in the last few years. It does not involve the promotion of one man 
into another branch, necessarily. In the reorganization bill you 
have before you it was plain that the number of officers in the army 
would be very largely mcreased to provide for duties that do not 
strictly belong to any one branch. It meant quite a large number of 
those men for the Reserve Officers' Training Corps; a larger army 
would call for more officers on recruiting duty; with the enlargea 
National Guard there will be some additional officers needed, and 
the staff departments would blB relatively more important than ever 
before because of the largerproblems of supply. 

Taking the number of officers which it appeared Congress would 
authorize it seems likely there will be a large enough reservoir of those 
who do not necessarily belong to any branch to make the single list 
operate without promoting a man from one branch to another. Say 
you have 15,000 officers. Perhaps 10,000 of those must belong to a 
particular branch, and so far as the other 5,000 are concerned, it 
inakes no difference what they are. You may put all officers on a 
single list and promote them as vacancies occm*, but it does not 
necessarily follow that an engineer will have to go to an Infantry 
regiment when he is promoted. 

For instance, take the grade of colonel. Say we have 600 colonels. 
It may be that 350 of those are men who must belong to a particular 
brancn. You have to have a colonel for each infantry regiment and 
for each artillery regiment. You have to have an irreducible mini- 
mum — some number in the engineers and some number in the 
Ordnance Corps. But out of the 600 colonels there may be 250 who 
are required lor colonels' jobs, but where it does not matter much 
what branch a man belongs ta. 

Most of the colonels on the General Staff could come from any 
branch they happen to belong to. So, by actually trying it out it 
became plain tnat you could take this number of officers and it 
would never be necessary to force a man from one branch to another 
because of his promotion. There will always be enough colonels, 
for instance, to give the Field Artillery the number oi colonels it 
absolutely needs to get along with, and there would always be 
enough to give Ordnance the number it absolutely needs, and so on; 
and the rest can keep their commissions in their own branches. In 
that way you would get absolute uniformity of promotion and a 
steady flow throughout the whole service. 

With the single list as it is provided for here, you have taken 
away entirely the incentive for any man to try to get his branch 
increased, or to oppose a diminution in it. 

Suppose they were all on separate lists. It seems certain, we will 
say, that the Field Artillery ought to be increased. With the Field 
Artillery allowed its additional officers, then it seems sure you will 

150187— 20— VOL 2 14 



2006 AKMY BBOBGANIZATION. 

want to decrease the Cavalry. That is a terrible thing for the 
Cavalry, because if you decrease the Cavalry from 25 to 17 regi- 
ments, it means that a cavalryman can look forward to retiring as 
a captain. He will get to be 60 years of age without any hope of 

S promotion. You are going to destroy his useful rifess by taking away 
rom him all hope of advancement, or else you are going to put him 
out of the service. 

But suppose you have a single list and his promotion is not affected 
in any way by the increase or decreasa in his branch. No field artil- 
leryman or cavalryman, unless he knows something about organiza- 
tion and is interested in it and is a real expert in it will care what 
happens to his branch. I am a Coast Artillery man. If you increase 
the Coast Artillery and something else is decreased, I will not have 
any inducement to try to put that through. It will not help my 
promotion a single day. JPerhaps you will find that the Coast 
Artillery organizations will have to be decreased. I will not care 
about that at all, because it will make no difference in the matter of 
corps promotion. 

There is the reason for getting a single list which puts everybody 
on the same basis. 

As soon as you present this proposition properly everybody in the 
Army agrees to it. I have never seen such substantial unanimity in 
the Army as there is in connection with this proposition. Most 
people are satisfied with it as it stands. But you will find some 
people who say this is thoroughly satisfactory as a general proposi- 
tion, but for some reason there should be exceptions. We have 
always had that, and it is only natural that it should be so. 

I can prove to the absolute satisfaction of any coast artilleryman 
that we ought to have a little preferen-^ e. I can satisfy any coast 
artilleryman of that, and the Engineers are satisfied with it for 
themselves. 

Suppose you admit that. A little difference in promotion is not 
going to do a great deal of harm. It would be serious if it was going 
to be very great. But if you on^e admit that one branch shouldliave 
preferen' e over the other, that is the entering wedge, and it will never 
stop. If you on^e admit that the Engineers shoiud have better pro- 
motion than anybody else, they can continually present reasons for 
an increased preference. 

A department that has a great preferen-e never got it all at once. 
It got a little now and three years later they have come in and said 
they ought to get a little bit more. You have agreed, perhaps, that 
they need three more colonels. Then four years later they have said 
they ought to have two more lieutenant colonels, and so it goes on 
until finally one branch will have an enormous advantage over the 
other. I have no objeation, and it will not hurt the service if some- 
body gets a little bit better promotion. But if one branch gets a 
little bit better promotion now, it is going to get a great deal better 
further on. The general proposition is that everybody shall be put 
on the same basis on the single list and nobody should get the slightest 
pref eren e unless there is the very strongest reason presented lor it. 
The burden of proof is on the branch to show that it should get some- 
thing better. 

I am satisfied that there is one branch that should get a preference, 
and only one, and that is the Medical Corps. The Medical Corps will 



ABMY EEOBOAKlZAnON. 2007 

demonstrate, of course, that they should get very much preference. 
Other branches will think they should get some. Why should the 
Medical Corps get any advantage; why should anybody get any 
advantage ? 

I thiuK the only reason is this. If one branch requires, not just 
happens to get, but requires a ver^ materially greater degree of educa- 
tion, greater tune spent on education, a greater quantity of education 
for appointment than another, that is a reasonable ground for giving 
them some preference in promotion. The Medical Corps must require 
a higher degree of education for the normal man, than the line or the 
Engmeers or anybody else normally requires. Some line officer may 
have a far higher degree of education than the average doctor, but 
such a man is the exception. You have got to consider the normal 
condition. 

I think everybody is agreed that the line officer should have, 
substantially, tne equipment of a college education. He may not 
have had it in the form of college education, but he should have had 
the degree of education that is implied by college graduation. The 
engineer, of course, should be an engineering graduate. The medical 
oflScer must, in the first place, be a doctor of medicine. The line 
officer must have a four-year coUege course or its equivalent, and to 
be a college graduate usually means four years of university education 
superimposed on a high-school education. 

what does the doctor have to have? There are some medical 
schools that require a man to be a college graduate before he is ad- 
mitted to the medical course, but they are exceptional. The standard 
in medical education is very clearly estabUshed now. Adinission to 
the standard medical school requires two years of college work, and 
then there is added to that four years in the medical school, so that a 
doctor of medicine normally requires six years of university work 
superimposed on the high school education. 

TTie (JHAIBMAS, Has not the War Department a regulation about 
that very matter? They only recognize graduates from those col- 
leges or universities that require two or more years in the university 
bd^ore a man may be admitted into the medical school ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; but the standard of medical education 
has been raised in the last fe\^ years so there is no reputable school, 
I think, which does not require two years of coUege work before a 
man enters the medical course, while there are some that require 
three or four years of college work. But those are rather the excep- 
tion now, and the ones which have not the two-year requirement are 
coming down to it. So the standard for a doctor of medicine is the 
six years' university education. 

The Dental Corps will at once say, ^' We are doctors and we ought 
to get some additional credit," and the veterinarian wiU say, ''I am 
a doctor, too.'' But what does the dental and veterinary course 
require? The standard dental education — ^I do not mean a poor 
dental education — ^but the standard dental education now is a four- 
year course, and the standard veterinary education, while not quite 
as good as that, is being rapidly raised, and within two or three years 
that will be a four-year course, superimposed upon the high-school 
course. 

So you have got a clear reason for preference in the Medical Corps; 
but there is no reason for preference in the Dental Corps or the 



2008 ABMT BEOBGANIZATIOlfl'. 

Veterinary Corps, which have occasionally ridden along on the just 
claims of the Medical Corps. 

In your provision for the single list, you have not got the chaplains 
on it. If the chaplains were on the sii^le list I think they, too, could 
fairlv be given a similar advantage. It is perfectly true we have a 
good, many chaplains who are not well educated men. But there is 
no reason why the Army should take an inferior man. Really, the 
well educated clergyman has to have, in general, about a six-vear 
college or university education, superimposed upon his high-scnool 
work. He has to nnish his college course and follow that with a 
theological course of two or three years. So I think the chaplain, if 
you include him on the single list, is fairly entitled to that preference, 
too. 

It is not absolutely necessarv to put the Medical Department on 
the single list, as you have (Tone here. The Senate nas adopted 
another scheme, keeping them off the single list. If you leave tnem 
off the single list you must do something to take them out of politics, 
just as you have done with the rest of tne Army. If you leave them 
on a separate promotion list with a definite number in each grade, you 
give them an mducement to get an increase in that branch that will 
^ive them an advantage. The matter can be settled as the Senate 
has provided, that the medical officer ahaU be promoted exactly ac- 
cordmg to the length of service he has had, that he will get his pro- 
motion after a certain number of years service, no more and no less. 
That answers the question in regard to keeping them out of politics 
as well as putting them on the smgle list; either one is satisfactory. 
If you put them on the single list then I think no one should get a 
preference unless there is a good, clear reason for it. 

Now, to take up the details of these provisions: The first part 
simply states the purposes of the legislation. On page 52, beginning 
at the sixth line the real legislation oegins. It says: 

In computations for the pu]T)ose of determiniii^ the position of officers on the promotion 
list there shall be credited all active commissioned service in the Army — 

There are a number of officers who have been restored from the 
retired list and it is not fair that they shall be left out. If a man 
spends 10 years on the retired list and then is reappointed to the 
active list, it is not fair that that shall all be counted as commissioned 
service. But if he has had 15 years' active service in all. it is fair that 
that shall be counted. So a man may hold a reserve commission for 
10 years and it means nothing more tnan that he is in possession of a 
paper. He should not be credited with service unless he actually 
performs duty under his appointment from the Government. The 
provision says, '* performed while under appointment from the United 
States Government, whether in the regular, provisional, or temporary 
forces, '' and that would cover every kind of Army service. 

The Chairman. Under that language, would the National Guard 
organizations be taken in after they have been federalized ? 

Col. Spaulding. You mean by *' federalized,'' the draft of August 
5, 1917, I suppose? 

The Chairman. Yes; when they were called into the service of 
the United States and took the oath of allegiance to the United 
States. 



AKMY REORGANIZATION. 2009 

Col. Spaulding. You will have to distinguish between a call and 
a draft. This will not include militia under call. It will include the 
militia when th6y have been drafted, because, although we persisted 
in calling them National Guard, they ceased to be National Guard 
after the draft and became part of the temporary forces. 

The Chairman. This language would cover men of that character? 

Col. Spaulding. YeS; sir. When they were drafted they ceased 
to be National Guardsmen, in spite of our calling them tnat, but 
they became part of the temporary forces. The term ^* provisional 
or temporary forces,^' is used intentionallj to cover the Philippine 
Scouts. The Philippine Scouts are not strictly a part of the Regular 
Army, noi^are they temporary. They are provisional. 

The section goes on to provide ** except service under a reserve 
commission whfle in attendance at a school or camp for the training 
of candidates for commissions." 

Our first training camps during the war were made up of reserve 
officers and candidates. Before the war we appointed a great num- 
ber of reserve officers under the national defense act, and there is 
no doubt about it, they were appoj^ted very carelessly. They 
might be good, or they might not. We appointed any man who was 
interested enough in the military service to take an examination, 
and who could pass a reasonable examination, but we really did not 
know whether tney were fit to be officers or not. So when the war 
came we had to recognize the fact that they were nothing more than 
candidates. We took a great many other men and admitted them 
as candidates. 

So, from May to August, 1917, we had those training camps which 
had in them a good many reserve officers and men who were serving 
as candidates right along with them. All alike were really candi- 
dates for commissions, because the r^erve officer was as much a 
candidate as anybody else. If he did not make good he was dis- 
charged. It would not be fair to allow the one lucKy enough to get 
a reserve commission on the 1st of May credit for three months 
service, when the one who did not get a reserve commission worked 
through that same training camp out got no credit for it. This 
provision excludes service under reserve commission when the man 
was really a candidate for a commission. 

The section continues: 

OommiBflioned service in the Regular Anny or the Philippine Scouts, if continuous 
to the present time, shall be counted as having begun on the date of original com- 
misaion. 

An officer serving under an original appointment in the Army, as 
distinguished from a promotion, enters upon his office on the date 
when he accepts his commission. Say vou appoint a man now to be 
a second lieutenant in the Army. He does not become an officer the 
moment the President signs his commission; he becomes an officer 
when he accepts the commission. 

You take a large number of officers appointed in the Regular Army 
at the same time, say on the 1st day of February. Say there are 100 
officers appointed in the Army and their Tank is determined by their 
standing on a competitive examination; or by something else which 
seems a reasonable rule for determining their rank. They are all 
appointed, we will say, on the 1st day of February; but the date on 
which they get their acceptances in depends on the accident of their 



2010 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

residence. All those commissions ^o out on the 1st of February. 
The man who happens to live in Washington accepts his appoint- 
ment on the 2d day of February. The man who lives in San Fran- 
cisco gets his commission on the 6th of February and accepts it on 
that date, and he enters the service four days later than the man who 
happens to be living in Washmgton. But the man in San Francisco 
may have been the first man on the list while the man in Washington 
may have been the last man. 

The idea of this provision is to preserve that rank which has been 
determined for some good cause, and all these men will be on record 
as having had their service begin on the 1st of February, ^fter this 
list is formed, in the years to come, officers appointed on the same 
day will of course be arranged as they are now, in such order as the 
War Department itself must choose, not by the date of acceptance. 
This provision will prevent some men having a disadvantage for no 
reason other than the accident of geographical residience. 

If this were not in the law I think the War Department coidd 
reasonably write it into the law, as otherwise a condition would arise 
which woidd be manifestly absurd. But I think it is better to have 
it in the law, because otherwise some man will have a good deal of 
correspondence with the War Department asking why he was not 
movea up because he accepted his commission ahead oi his mates. 

Mr. Wise. I wish you would restate what you said about this being 
for the present. What about the future ? 

Col. Spaulding. This section provides for the original formation 
of the promotion list of the men now in the Army or about to be 
brought in. Once such a list is formed, every man who comes in 
thereafter will come in at the bottom of the list, and when a group of 
men are appointed, say, when 100 men are appointed in the Regular 
Army all together, they will all be placed at the end of the list. But 
they will be arranged among themselves as they are now, by their 
standing on examination, or their class rank, whatever the reasonable 
order oi that group appeara to be. 

Mr. Wise. Who will decide that? 

Col. Spaulding. The War Department. 

Mr. Wise. What particular part of the War Department ? Who 
will decide which one shall be placed first on that list, and who shall 
be second or third, and so on ? 

Col. Spaulding. That is determined, of course, by their standing 
on the examination. 

Mr. Dent. Who will fix the standing; the Secretary of War, the 
Chief of Staflf, or who ? 

Col. Spaulding. Well, the Secretary of War officially fixes it. The 
place where it is actually worked out will depend on the organization 
of the War Department for the time being; but, of course, nobody 
can tell just what that would be. It will cnange five years hence. 

The Chairman. Say that 200 young men graduate from West Point 
on the 25th of May of this year. They, of course, are marked on 
their examinations and their efficiency ratings during the time they 
have been at the academy. Would the Secretary oi War have the 
rating of those men or would that be done by the academic board at 
the Military Academy ? 

Col. Spaulding. By the academic board. Of course, it is not done 
by the academic board either. It is a matter of a man's daily stand- 



ABM7 BEOBGANIZATIOK. 2011 

ing. The man's standing depends on the total of what he has made 
in each course during the whole time. 

The Chairman. So that would not be a matter for the War Depart- 
ment at all ? 

Col. Spaulding. There is no control over that whatever; each man 
controls it for himself. 

The Chairman. Then, on the other hand, if there should be an 
examinatipn among enlisted men or civilians who desire to enter the 
commissioned force of the Army, they have to pass certain examina- 
tions. Who would fix their standing in those examinations ? 

Col. Spaulding. That would depend on the marks they made, of 
course. There is nothing in the law requiring, and I think there 
should be nothing in the law requiring, that a group of men appointed 
at a particular time should be arranged in any special way. That is a 
matter for the proper discretion of the War Department. We are 
giving these people an examination that is competitive. In that way 
they will be arranged according to theii standing. It may be we are 
taking a group of men where we want to give them a qualifying 
instead of a competitive examination, and we will say we will arrange 
them by lot or by age. 

Mr. Wise. What is in this law to provide anything about that? 
After this list is made up, say, as you propose here, ana other officers 
come into the Army, what is there in that law to allow you to regu- 
late how they shall come in and how they shall standi 

Col. Spaulding. They come in at the bottom of the promotion list. 

Mr. Wise. If 100 men should come in at the same time, which 
one would go first on the list ? 

Col. Spaulding. That is a matter for discretion in regard to the 
way in which they are appointed. It all depends on the way in 
which a man is appointed. 

Mr. Dent. This bill does not change the present law or regula- 
tions on that subject? 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. Would not the section in the bill that confers 
powers on the board of officers to make recommendations at any 
time as to how they shall go in, cover that ? 

Col. Spaulding. Are you not confusing the formation of the 
original single list and appointments to be made in the future? 
The original single list to De made up of officers now in the service 
and those men who served as officers during the war picked for 
appointment now. That list once made, thereafter appointments 
next year, 10 years hence or 50 years hence will be made as provided 
later on, and those men will start at the bottom of the list and rise 
through the grades. There is nothing in here to change the power 

Mr. Anthony (interposing). Or tne custom which has prevailed 
in the Army ? 

Col. Spaulding. Nothing at all. 

Mr. Anthony. About a man coming in at the bottom ? 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir. 

Mr. Wise. The effort here is to establish a single list and provide 
for the location of officers now in the Army, as to where they shall 
stand on it ? That is about all this legislation does ? 

Col. Spaulding. That is a part of it, yes, sir. We are putting 
the several branches into one list. The question is how to put the 



2012 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

branches together to get it started. When they are started they 
will go on. 

Mr. Harrison. I do not quite understand the single list you pro- 

fose, not that I am opposed to it, because probably it is a good thing, 
can not understand how if there is a vacancy in the list of colonels 
in the Engineer Corps — for instance, you can promote a man in the 
Cavalry— now you can get a colonel m the Engineer Corps without 
getting him from the Engineers. 

Col. Spaulding. The point is that there will never be a vacancv 
in the list of colonels of Engineers or any other corps. There will 
only be a vacancy in the grade of colonel. Until a few years ago we 
had no officers in the Army except those for organizational needs. 
We never recognized what was the fact that a vast number of officers 
were required for duty which did not pertain to a particular branch. 
That was first recognized in law in 1911 and recognized to a far 
greater extent in the national defense act, which provided for 1,022 
officers for detached duty, which does not pertain to any particular 
branch. 

Mr. Harrison. Suppose there is a vacancy in the list of colonels 
in the Engineer Corps and the ranking lieutenant colonel in the 
Cavalry is entitled to promotion. How are you going to get that 
vacancy in the Engineer Corps filled without transferring that lieu- 
tenant colonel from the Cavalry ? 

Col. Spaulding. I will answer your question in this way: Your 
total number of colonels in the Army, we will say, must include 50 
who must be infantrymen. You must have 50 Infantry colonels. 
You must have, we will say, 20 Cavalry colonels; you must have 20 
Engineer colonels, and so on. We will say there are 350 in all. 
Finally, you must have 200 colonels where it makes no particular 
difference what branch the man belongs to. 

Take the General Stafl^, for instance. It makes no difference 
whether the colonels on the General Staff are infantrymen or engineers. 
We need a lot of instructors at West Point and at the service schools. 
It does not make any difference what particular branch they are from. 
Out of the total number you have, say, one-half or two-thirds must 
belong to a particular branch. The other half or one-third may come 
from any brelnch. 

You have your 600 colonels, and a colonel in the Corps of Engineers 
dies. When the senior lieutenant colonel is a cavalryman he is 
promoted to be a colonel of Cavalry. The Engineers, we will say, 
needed 20 colonels, and out of these 600 they had 30, and 10 of those 
were not doing strictly Engineer duty; some were doing other duties 
not pertaining to Engineers. The whole question is whether this 
single list can work with such a factor of safety that you can be sure, 
as a practical matter, that there will never come a time when you 
happen to have less colonels in any particular branch than it really 
needs to operate with. As long as that was not certain, I was 
opposed to the single list. I do not believe in forcing a man out of one 
branch into another that he is not fitted for, and it was only after 
I was absolutely satisfied that that could never happen that I was 
in favor of the single list. 

Say you have 600 colonels. It is perfectly clear that in the long 
run only about 350 will need to belong to any particular branch, 
and it is also clear that any branch in the long run is sure to have 



ABMY BEOBGANIZATIOK. 2013 

enough to get along with. The real doubt was whether you would 
have enoum in some branches to get along with when we started 
with it. The Field Artillery was the critical point. They have been 
so greatly increased already that their lieutenant colonels are men of 
very short service, compared with the service of men in the other 
branches. 

The Field Artillery, probably, is to have a still larger increase. The 
question is, if you put the single list into operation — the real ques- 
tion was, when you put the single list into operation with 600 colonels, 
is the Field Artillery going to have enough colonels ? That was the 
critical question, and the answer is yes. We find, so far as the Field 
Artillery is concerned, the largest estimate that has ever been made 
in planning these bills is 48 regiments of Field Artillerjr. Will the 
Field ArtiUery have 48 colonels on the single list if this provision 
should go into effect at once ? It will not have 48 colonels now com- 
missioned in the Field Artillerv, but under the provisions of this bill 
about 70 officers will be colonels who have actually served as colonels 
of Field Artillery during the war. We took a great number of Coast 
Artillery officers and Cavalry officers and turned them into Field 
Artillery officers during the war, and they made good. 

In other words, there are more than enough of those men fit to 
transfer to the Field Artillery to supply all of the needs of the Field 
Artillery. That was the critical question. There is no question that 
we could operate five years from now. That is answered. The 
Field Artillery can be fixed in the beginning. 

Mr. Harrison, Let me see if I understand it now. Say, that a 
colonel in the Engineer Corps dies. You take a colonel from your 
detached list and put him in that vacancy, assign him to the colonelcy 
in the Engineer Corps ? 

Col. Spaulding. N'o. 

Mr. Harrison. You take a colonel from the detached list and put 
him in the Engineer Corps ? 

Col. Spaulding. We wiU say there were 30 colonels of Engineers, 
and 20 is the number the Engineers need to operate the strictly 
engineer duties. There are 10 on the detached list. 

Sir. Harrison. You take a colonel from the reservoir and put him 
in that vacancy ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes; but he is already an engineer. 

Mr. Harrison. You take an Engineer colonel and put him in that 
vacancy ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. Then you promote a man to colonel in the Cavalry 
Corps, where vou do not want a colonel, and you put him in that 
reservoir; is that right? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. You get an extra colonel of Cavalry when you do 
not want one ? 

Col. Spaulding. No; it is a matter of indifference to the service in 
every way, whether a man doing a detached duty job is a cavalryman 
or an Engineer. 

Mr. Harrison. But that is the fact; you have to put a colonel of 
Cavalry, in that instance, on the detached list? 

Col. Spaulding. Put him, or some other cavalryman. 



5014 ARMY REORGANlZATIOlSr. 

Mr. Harrison. But you do not need him in the Cavaby, and yet 
you fill the vacancy in the Engineer Corps by taking an Engineer 
vcolonel from that reservoir. 

Col. Spaulding. Suppose this Engineer colonel who dies was not 
-doing engineer duty. Suppose he was one of the detached officers. 
Tou promote a lieutenant colonel of Cavalry to that vacancy. It 
does not make any diflFerence. But suppose he was doing engineering 
duty, then you sliift the detached engineer to that engineer duty ana 
let the other man do the job on the detached list. 

Mr. Harrison. The moment the reservoir is exhausted, and the 
Army asks for an appropriation for more officers than you have, that 
moment it will not work. 

Col. Spaulding. I do not quite catch your point. 

Mr. Caldwell. You increase the number of detached officers, do 
you not ? 

Mr. Harrison. I have gotten nearer to an understanding of this 
matter than I have ever gotten before. Suppose, in that reservoir 
of Engineer officers, you do not have an extra colonel of Engineers. 
You may have a reservoir of officers, but you may not have any of 
the rank of colonel. 

Col. Spaulding. But the Army Engineers really need — they have 
to have — only 20 colonels, and can not get along with less. In the 
long run any branch that has 10 per cent of the officers in the Army 
is going to nave about 10 per cent of the colonels, 10 per cent of the 
majors, and 10 per cent of the captains, because the only way it can 
iail to have pretty close to that percentage would be if the officers of 
that branch were so inferior that a larger number of them than of 
other branches were eUminated. We can put that aside. 

It is fair to suppose that the officers of these branches will be of 
about the same efficiency. So, if the Engineers have 10 per cent of 
the officers of the Army, then it is safe to say that the Engineers will 
always have, say, not less than 8 per cent and not more than 12 per 
cent of the colonels. . The number of colonels is made up of those 
v^ho must do Engineer duty and the ones who must do Infantry duty 
and the large number who must have detached duties. Oi that 
number the proportion who may belong to any branch at all is so 
large that we can be perfectly sure that no branch will ever fall below 
the minimum. 

Let us say the Engineers have 10 per cent. Let us also say that 
there are 600 colonels. Then if the Engineers are 10 per cent of the 
officers, it is safe to say that we wUl have never less than 50 or more 
than 70 Engineer colonels. It appears that there are 45 engineering 
jobs that need the services of a colonel. Then 45 is the least number 
of colonels they can possibly get along with. But it appears they 
ynll never fall as low as 45. 

The only case of doubt was in connection with the Field ArtiQery , 
and that has already been actually worked out on a single list. 

Mr. Harrison, tn order to make the single list work then, we 
liave to provide for a reservoir of a large number of detached offi- 
<jers. The law has to provide for an extra number of unassigned 
officers in each rank, in each branch of the service, to make this 
scheme work ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; which we have under the national- 
defense act. 



ABMY RB0RGAKI2ATI0K. 2015 

The Chairman. Will it be necessary under this bill as it stands 
now to increase very materially that reservoir of officers? 

Col. Spaiilding. No, sir. This bill is ready to stand as it is. Sup- 
pose you total what you have here — the number of Inf antrv colonels, 
the number of Cavalry colonels, the nimiber of Engineer colonels, etc. 
That is not equal to the whole number of colonels because the other 
colonels are tne ones who are going- to be doing duty in the Militia 
Bureau, who are going to be on the General Staff and in the many 
other jobs where it makes no difference what branch the man be- 
longs to. The bill as it stands there 

Mr. Harrison (interposing). If the vaxjancies in the Engineer Corps 
^Bxe ^eater than in any other corps, is it not reasonable to suppose 
that in course of time you will exhaust the number of colonels m the 
Engineer Corps in the detached reservoir and abnormally increase 
the number of colonels in some other branch of the service ? 

Col. Spaulding. Perhaps I did not quite get your question. 

Mr. Harrison. In other words, if vacancies are more likely to 
occur in the Engineer Corps you will be constantly calling on the 
reservoir of officers to fill the vacancies in the Engineer Corps and 
increasing the number of officers in some other branch of the service. 

Col. Spaulding. Supposing the mortality among Engineer officers 
is distinctly greater than in any other branch ? 

Mr. Harrison. 1 understand that promotion is more rapid in the 
Engineer Corps. 

Col. Spaulding. That is the system which this destroys. Promo- 
tion will be exactly the same hereafter. 

Mr. Harrison. Does this destroy that excessive reservoir of En- 
gineers? 

Col. Spaulding. Their promotion will not be more rapid under this 
provision. The reason it is more rapid in the Engineers now is that 
ihe Engineers have twice as many field officers as the line has. This 
put3 everybody on the same basis. No branch will have any more 
rapid or any slower promotion than any other branch. 

Mr. Harrison. That is done by callmg on your reservoir. If you 
have to call your reservoir of officers frequently for the supply of your 
engineer officers in the Engineer Corps, will not the effect be the 
same? 

Mr. Caldwell. The reason why promotion is faster now is because 
the engineers, go up when there is a vacancy in the Engineer Corps, 
[n the futur^, as I understand it, under the provisions of this bill, 
fche officers in one branch will not go up any faster than the officers 
in another branch ? 

Col. wSpaulding. That is right. 

Mr. Wise. You say you mil always have so many colonels of 
Engineers on the detached list. What I want to know is how 5 or 
10 years from now you are going to know whether a man who came 
in at the bottom of the list is going to be an engineer, a cavalrvman, 
or an infantrvman when he gets to the rank of colonel. Who is 
goin^ to say tnat there has to be the same proportion ? 

Col. Spaui;ding. In general, of course, tne wastage in one branch 
will be the same as in another. Suppose, for instance, we com- 
missioned 500 officers a year. Those 500 officers are going to be dis- 
tributed approximately in the same proportion to the various branches 
in the service. If 10 per cent of the officers are Engineers, about 10 



2016 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

per cent of the loss during the year will be Engineers, and, accord- 
mglv, about 10 per cent of the new appointments will be Engineers. 

Mr. Wise. You say that is the proportion, and that is a supposition. 
How do vou know, when a man get^ to the place where he is to be 
promoted, that he is fitted for the Engineer Corps ? Who is to see 
that each branch geti its proportionate percentage of the men in the 
various grades, after they get to be colonels or majors ? 

Col. Spaulding. I do not quite get your point. If a man is not 
fit to stay in the service he will be eliminated. 

Mr. Wise. He might be unfitted to serve in one branch, but he 
might be fit to serve creditably in another branch. 

Col. Spaulding. That is another advantage of the single list. 
You can transfer him -to the place where he is fitted to serve. As it 
is now it is almost impossible to transfer a man from one branch to 
another. 

Mr. Fields. Suppose, in order to keep the Army balanced, it would 
be necessary to put 10 per cent of the graduates of West Point into 
the Engineers. Bui suppose 20 per cent of them desire to go into 
that branch of the service. Will they be permitted to go into that 
branch, or will they be distributed by the department, according to 
the needs of the service ? 

Col. Spaulding. Of course, that is a matter of policy. I should 
say the proper policy would be to put men in the branch they asked 
for, up to the limit that sers^ice could stand. I mean this: Suppose 
one branch of the Army must have 10 per cent of the new officers. 
It could stand taking 25 per cent; that is, it could not possibly absorb 
more than 25 per cent. My own idea would be to give to that branch 
of the service as many as wanted to go into that oranch, as long as 
the number did not exceed 25 per cent. But of course that is a mat- 
ter of discretion, assigning them where the service needs them. But 
as it is now, when a man is once assigned it is very difficult to transfer 
him. On the single list that is easy. As it is now a man can only 
transfer from one branch to another to fill a vacancy in the branchi 
to which he is transferred. He can not get into the Field Artilleir, 
for instance, from the Cavalry unless there is a vacancy in the Field 
Artillery. And the only way he can get a vacancy there is to find a 
Field Artillery officer who is willing to sw^ap with him. He has to 
find a man who will swap, a man who is willing to accept a loss of files, 
and a man who can qualify, if the War Department recognizes him 
as fit to be transferrea. 

Under the single list all you have to do is to qualify for it and 
notify the War Department that you want to be transferred to the 
Field Artillery. You do not have to find a man who is willing to 
swap with you, and nobody loses any rank by the transfer. You 
simply have to qualify. 

Mr. Fields. That point is not clear to me yet. if a greater per- 
centage of graduates from West Point, we will say, should apply for 
assignment to the Engineers, would not that reservoir become top- 
heavy after awhile ? 

Col. Spaulding. Of course, you can not, any more than now — it 
would not do to assign officers to a branch of the service where you 
had no use for them. Now we have to determiri;^ how many men 
that branch can properly take. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 2017 

Mr. Fields. It will be controlled by regulation ? 

Col. Spaulding. But there will be more latitude than there is now. 

Mr. Fields. Then there are two other points that are not clear to 
me. We will say there are two branches that have 40 colonels each. 
I am just using that figure for purposes of illustration, and suppose 
that each branch is usmg 35 of these officers. Five officers of each 
branch are in the reservoir of the detached list. The casualties of 
one branch in a vear would be 10, let us say, or would exceed the 
number on the dfetached list. The casualties in the other branch 
would be 5, which would draw out the entire reservoir. As I say, 
let us suppose the casualties in the other would be 10, exceeding the 
reservoir by 5. How would you handle that situation ? 

Col. Spaulding. Of course, that is not only taking out 15, but 15 
men have been promoted. That is just the point. The single list 
will not work without passing people from one branch to another, 
unless the reservoir is large enough. The reservoir is large enough 
as you have it here. I mean that if the number of officers in any 

frade who had to perform duties, disconnected from any particular 
ranch, was too small you might have the condition you have there. 
But it is true that the number of officers in each grade who perform 
iuties not related to any particular branch is relatively so large that 
the condition you speaK of could not exist. If you total up the 
number in any grade, which is needed to operate each branch, you 
will find it to be, perhaps, two-thirds of the total number and you 
will find that one-third of the colonels are required for duties where it 
makes no difference what branch a man belongs to. 

Mr. Fields. The remedy then is to keep the reservoir large enough 
by means of the detached list ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes. I do not mean that you should create a 
detached list for the sole purpose of doing this work. But the number 
you actually need is relatively so large that you are perfectly safe. 

Mr. Fields. There is one other point that 1 would like to get clear 
in my mind. In connection with the technical branches of the 
service, where men of skill are required, for instance, in the Ordnance 
Corps. Suppose that corps finds it is in need of some man of very 
hi^n skill, and they find a man who can fiU that place if they can 
brmg him in as a colonel, but who would not come in at a lower 
grade. Would the single list, as advocated by you, prevent the 
securing of the services of that man, whose service might be very 
vital to the success of the work of the Ordnance Department ? 

Col. Spaulding. You are speaking of what takes effect on the 
passage of the act, or the normal situation 10 years hence ? 

Mr. Fields. I understand upon the passage of the act half of the 
appointments may be made from civiEan lue, or from among men 
who served during the emergency. But I am speaking of the law 
as it operates from year to year. 

Col. Spaulding. In other words you ask whether it will be possible 
to make original appointments 

Mr. Fields (interposing). Yes. 

6ol. Spaulding (continuing) . Up at the top ? 

Mr. Fields. Yes. 

Col. Spaulding. Of course, the law could be so written, but I 
think it would be unfortunate. You must, once you have got this 
started, open up a career to the man who is going to make the Kegular 
Army his life work. 



2018 ABHY BBOBGANIZATIOir. 

Now then it might be to the advantage of the service if you look 
at just that momentary situation to pick a man and appoint him 
as a colonel from civil life. But to make the Army a success you 
must make it a life work, where men can look forward to reasonable 
advancement. If a man enters at 24 or 25 years of age and can 
coimt on working up until he reaches a high grade, after 25 or 30 
years service, you are oflFering him something. But if you tell him 
ne can devote nis life to that work,, and after he has worked 25 or 30 
years somebody can be brought in from civil life who has been mak^ing 
good money in civil life and plit over his head, you are going to take 
away the best class of men irom the Army. As a general pohcy it 
would tend to lower the standard of the men who would take up the 
Army as a life work. In an occasional case it might be good policy.. 

Mr. Caldwell. Along • the line of Mr. Fields s second pomt, it 
occurs to me that the question of the single list is a matter oi mathe- 
matics. If everybody is on a single Est there wiU be a certain 
number or proportion of each grade m the Army, and vacancies that 
occur in that list, on the average, will faU in about the same percentage 
in all branches of the service. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. Each branch will have a certain percentage and 
out of 100 casualties the average will ordinarily strike even in time 
of peace ? 

Uol. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. So when one branch of the service uses its five 
men in the reservoir the same branch of the service will have approx- 
imately its percentage of promotions so that in the reservoir as you 
take one out of the five you will get another, because there wiU be a 
corresponding drain from the reserv^oir in the other branches of the 
service, and the list will always tend to be equalized ? 

Col. Spaulding. If a branch in the course of a year loses 10 men 
out of a particular grade it will get in probably not less than 8 or 
not more than 12 in that ffrade. 

Mr. Caldwell. And wnen you are losing men in the Engineers; 
the other branches will be losing men in approximately the same 
proportion as the Engineers ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. Colonel, there has been so much said in connec- 
tion with this matter of grades that naturally we are somewhat con- 
fused, and we are led to feel it may he a very conflicting matter, 
when in reality it is probably a very simple proposition. 

Congress determined, in 1916, in the national-defense act, for the 

furpose of national defense, to create a reservoir of officers of 1,022, 
believe you said ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. At that time it was not done for the purpose of 
bringing about the adoption of the single fist. But if I understand 
your testimony, if you put the single list immediately into effect for 
a few years at least it wiU be necessary to have a reservoir. 

This committee, in considering that same proposition of the ne#es- 
sit}'^ of having detached officers in addition to the number that is 
necessary to fill the tactical and staff miits in the Army, provided 
for a detached list of some 2,000 officers. You say 3"ou have con- 
cluded that it is practicable and possible to create the single list 



ABACY BEOBGANIZATION. 2019* 

immediately and that there will be no danger of the contineency 
arising of which Judge Harrison speaks, and I believe the Judge is^ 
mistaken, with all due respect to him. 

Now, if we have the detached list from which to operate and put 
the single list into effect and start off with the total number of officers- 
in the Army being prescribed by law, and the Ariny being given the 
right to commission officers as vacancies occur from time to time, does 
it not follow that if there are vacancies, for instance, in the Engineer 
Corps, "and you are commissioning 500 officers a year, as suggested, I 
think, by Mr. Wise, you will want whatever number is necessary to- 
fill the vacancies in the Engineer Corps ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MoKenzie. The number of officers in each one of these 
branches being prescribed by this law, then the men will be com- 
missioned at the bottom in each one of these branches as second 
lieutenants, and they will simply move right on up, and with thi& 
detached officers list, these contingencies wiich may arise from time 
to time will be taken care of, and when the thing gets into full swing 
each branch of the service will have men who move up from the 
bottom, and there will always be a sufficient number of colonels for 
the various branches ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. Now, Colonel, as I understand it, these officers feed 
into this reservoir at the same capacity they feed out; is that right ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. That will presuppose that all of the corps are full, will* 
it not, at the time that this thing commences — all the various branches 
of the Staff Corps ? Take the Engineers, for instance. 

Col. Spaulding. You start it on 15,000 officers or whatever it is, 
of course. 

Mr. Miller. Yes, sir; you will have to have those corps, with no 
vacancies at the time this begins to work ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; other than the usual vacancies which we 
will always have. ]. mean if you fill the Army one day there will be 
vacancies the next. 

Mr. Miller. This may be elementary, but I do not exactly under- 
stand it, officers going out into this detached list. Say there are two 
vacancies in the Engineer Corps. It means two vacancies in the 
Army, as you say. Two captains die. You draw the two captains 
to fill the vacancies from this reservoir you speak of. How long will 
a man ordinarily remain in that reservoir before he is drawn ? 

Col. Spaulding. That depends entirely on the man. This reser- 
voir is not for men just standing aside and waiting. They are per- 
forming some duty. That may oe in instructing militia or teaching 
school. A man is put on that list according to his abiUty. Men will 
be assigned just as they are now. 

Mr. Miller. I understand. Suppose a man is a captain in the 
Engineer Corps. He is put in this reservoir. His next promotion 
will be to major. He is an engineer all of his Ufe till he gets to be a 
captain. Then he is put in this reservoir and he lays in there and 
goes out to perform duties at some college, training camp, or some- 
thing. He isn't following his duties as engineer. There is an 
interval in there in which this man is taken out of his technical line, 
and he goes into this reservoir and becomes dormant so far as ad- 



2020 ARMY REORGANIZATION". 

vancing his technique and remains there for four or five years before 
he gets back into tne Engineer Corps. Isn't that a detriment to the 
service. 

Col. Spaulding. But that is not an objection peculiar to the single 
list. Suppose you take those officers from ^the various branches. 
There are a lot of duties that pertain to no particular branch of the 
service. A lot of officers are doing those duties, whether they are 
engineers or not. There is not the slightest difference so far as that 
is concerned. 

Mr. Miller. Speakmg of taking in men and starting in at the 
bottom of the list. We will take, say, 10 men from West Point, 
starting in at the bottom of this Engineer Corps. Take some from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, some from the University 
of Wisconsin, some from the University of California, and some from 
the University of Colorado. Who is to determine the priority of 
those various men ? Who is to determine whether or not the young 
fellow coining in from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
shall have rank over the young man coming in from the University 
of California or the University of Colorado ? 

Col. Spaulding. There is no difference there from the present 
system. Where a group of men are appointed the same dajr that 
remains under the discretion of the War Department. Ordinarily 
that is determined by competitive examination. 

Mr. Miller. Then, a young man coming in from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology woiud have no advantage so far as that is 
concerned over one coming in from the University of Idaho ? 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir. 

Mr. Miller. Provided the University of Idaho man or the Massa- 
chusetts Technology man enters under the same circumstimces ? 

Col. Spaulding. If they enter on competition probably the one 
that made the highest mark would be given rank. 

Mr. Miller. Are they examined now or are they taken in on their 
college degree ? 

Col. Spaulding. You can not take a man into the Army on his 
college degree. They have to be selected in some way. The only 
way to select them is by examination. There is no other way to 
select them that I can see. 

Mr. Miller. I recall the testimony of Gen. Sibert, of the Chemical 
Warfare Service, where he said he wanted to take in, if he could get 
them to come in, the cream of graduates of certain technical colleges 
of this country. I am wondering who is going to grade them, whether 
the men coming from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or 
the University of California or from West Point ? 

Col. Spaulding. There are only three ways that I can think of that 
you could possibly arrange it and there is nothing in the law about 
that and I think there should not be. You could take them in their 
order of standing on examination, or by age, or, thirdly, by lot. 

Mr. Miller. Or a combination of those ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. And put them on the single list accordingly ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dent. Colonel, you have got right up to an explanation of a 
very important point in my mind, but the ex!planation has not yet 
been made, so far as I can judge. That is to say, take the question 



ABMT BEOBQANIZATION. 2021 

Judge Harrison propounded, where there is a vacancy m the grade 
of colonel in the Corps of Engineers. You would fill that vacancy 
by taking an engineer officer from the detached list. You make the 
statement that there would always be a sufficient supply of officers 
on that detached list to fill a vacancy in any grade or any branch or 
any arm of the service. That is the statement of your conclusion, 
of which you seem to be assured. I would like to know the fact 
on which you base that conclusion? 

Col. Spaulding. Assmne that the Engineers have 10 per cent (I 
don't know what it is), but assume they have 10 per cent of the 
officers of the Army. Then we are perfectly safe in assuming, are 
we not, that the Engineers will have not far from 10 per cent of the 
colonels of the Army ? 

Mr. Dent. Well, but you are assuming that they will have 10 
per cent. I want to know how they are going to get that surplus 
in each branch of the service. 

Col. Spaulding. If the Engineers have 10 per cent of all the officer 
of the Army they are going to be fed in all the grades at the same 
rate. The casualties will occur at about the same rate. The En- 
gineers will have about the same proportion of casualties as we 
nave in the Army as a whole; imless the Engineers you take in are 
of such a class that you eliminate — ^fire out of the service — ^much 
more than you do of other officers, or are superior to such an extent 
that you keep much more than you do of the others. 

Mr. Dbnt. That doesn't go to the point how you are going' to 
form your regular detached officers' list so as to convince us that you 
are always going to have a sufficient surplus of officers with each 
grade to fill the ordinary vacancies that are likely to occur. 

Col. Spaulding. I don't get what jrou want. 

Mr. Dent. For instance, we provide in this bill for, say, 1,600 
officers on the detached list. How are you going to form that list 
so as to be assured in all reasonable probability that you will have a 
siu'plus of officers on that list in each grade in each branch or arm 
of the service to fill the vacancies that are likely to ordinarily occiu* ? 

Col. Spaulding. The reservoir does not consist only of what you 
call the detached officers' list. It consists of all officers where it 
makes no difference what branch they belong of. It consists of all 
detached ; it consists of officers on duty in militia, in schools, officers 
on duty in various branches. So that your reservoir is not only what 

{rou call the detached officers' list. You get all the officers on the 
ist. The list is made—you strike off the 606 at the top and there 
are your 606 colonels. Those 606 colonels will include, to start with, 
45, we will say, that are commissioned in the Engineers. They 
include 100 commissioned in the Cavalry. 

Mr. MiLLEK. You are assuming 

Col. Spaulding (interposing). No, sir. In the long run they are 
going to average about the same proportion of each branch in the 
grade of colonel as in the Army as a whole. That can not fail. I 
am now speaking about what will happen right now, in the abnormal 
situation m the beginning. We^hall actually have, as I remember 
it, something like 45 who are commissioned in the Engineers. We 
shall have about 70 who are commissioned in th^ Coast Artillery. 
When we have got those 606 colonels then we will assign them. The 
Engineers will have work for 25 and we will put 25 on engineer work. 

160187— 20— VOL 



2022 ARMY BE0R6ANIZATI0N. 

The Coast Artillery needs 40 to command Coast Artillery posts. 
We will put those on there, and the others will be assigned according 
to their qualifications. 

Mr. Dent. But still you haven't explained how you are going to 
make the original assignments to each branch of the service. 

Col. Spaulding. Exactly the way assignments are made now. If 
a man is needed for a particular duty, for General Staff duty, then 
the man who is qualified for that is selected for and sent to the General 
Staff. If a man is needed for the State militia in Oregon, some man 
qualified for that work that the Governor wants is sent to Oregon. 

Mr. Dent. Then if a man is qualified for the Engineers or Staff 
Corps, the lieutenant colonels, ete., will be examined by the board. 
The Engineers wiU be allowed so many colonels. 

Col. Spaulding. No; the Engineers will be allowed 500 officers; 
there are going to be 500 Engineer officers. They are going to be in 
the grades they happen to strike. Forty-five will happen to be 
colonels, 23 may happen to be lieutenant colonels. . 

Mr. . Dent. How will they happen to be that unless somebody 
selects them ? 

Col. Spaulding. They are already in. 

Mr. Dent. I am not talking about those already in, but those you 
are going to bring in. 

Col. oPAULDiNG.. They will bo selected by somebody as provided 
in this biU, which proviaes for the composition of a board. 

Mr. Dent. Right in that connection, suppose the Corps of Engineers 
should have say 10 colonels out of the emergency officers that are 
going to brought in. Won't they have to stand an examination the 
same as a young man who enters the Army from civil life would 
have to stand in order to be appointed second, heutenant ? 

Col. Spaulding. The board will have before it — we wiU say they 
have 6 jOOO officers. 

Mr. Dent. That is a very simple question. Wouldn't he have to 
stand an examination similar to the examination that a young man 
who seeks to enter the Army from civil Ufe would have to stand in 
order to get a commission as second heutenant ? 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir; if you find a man say 45 years old, an 
experienced engineer who served as an engineer during the war, the 
board may determine 'Hhis man we want for the Engineers and he is 
quahfied, and we will make him a heutenant colonel.'' You would 
not expect to give him any such examination as a man fresh out of 
school would take. He probably could not pass as good an examina- 
tion. 

Mr. Dent. Then in your opinion the board could appoint a man 
in the Engineer Department without the same examination that 
would be required of a yoimg man entering from civil fife ? 

Col. Spaulding. Nothing is prescribed in here, I presume it 
should be mainly from the man's record. We have these men's 
records, what they actually did as officers for two or three years. 
There should possibly be a qualifying examination. 

Mr. Dent. Don't you think that ought to be put into the law ? 

Col. Spaulding. When I say quahfying examination I don't mean 
an examination in the ordinary sense. 1 mean something to deter- 
mine that this man has the necessary quahfications. It is fruitless 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 2028 

to examine an experienced engineer, 40 years old, in plane trigo- 
nometry. We Imow he must have had plane ta^igonome try. 

The Chairman. I have before me a proposed amendment to thi» 
very paragraph that you have been reading that Col. Hammond gave 
me which takes care of that very proposition. It reads: 

The original promotion list shall be formed by a board of officers appointed by the 
Secretary of War, consisting of one colonel of each of the branches of the service in 
which officers are permanently commissioned, and one officer of the personnel branches 
of the General Staff who has made a special study ot merging the present promotion 
lists into a single list. 

That would come after the figures 1916 in the fifth Une from the 
bottom of the page. 

Col. Spaijij)ing. That is a different proposition, sir. That is the 
formation of the single Ust. . What Mr. Dent was asking about was 
the manner in which these original vacancies are to be filled. It is 
provided we shall take in men who served as officers during the war, 
and how they are going to be selected. 

The Chairman. I didn't catch the drift of the question, because I 
thought it was with reference to the first promotion Ust. 

Col. Spaulding. I don't see how a thing could be written into the 
law as to the examination of them that would be fair all around. 
You can't prescribe an examination exactly in law in every particular 
when you are deaUng with such diflFerent classes of men. If you are 
going .to take in a lot of young men, 25 years old and nothing else, 
you might do something. But here you are going to take in a lot 
of men a year out of college and on the other extreme we hope to take 
in men 45 or 50 years old who are big business men already. They 
couldn't pass the academic examination that the boy in college 
would. 1 think they would have to leave it to the judgment of the 
board to pick out the best men you can lay hands on. 

Mr. Dent. The reason I asked that is because I have been informed 
that an engineer officer to get into the Army at the present time under 
the present law must stand practicaUy the same examination as a 
young man entering from civil Ufe. 

Col. Spaulding. No. This isn't the present law. Section 24 pro- 
vides how such appointments may be made. It provides that they 
shall be chosen by a board appointed for the purpose, subject to an 
examination prescribed by the President. 

Mr. Dent. That is the very point. ^^ Subject to an examination 
prescribed by the President." And won't he prescribe the same 
examination that we have always had ? Where a man goes into the 
Ordnance Department it is not necessary that he be informed on all 
the varieties of military tactics. 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir. 

Mr. Dent. 1 admit the President can do it, but the difficulty that 
confronts me is whether or not he won't adopt a uniform regulation 
on the subject as heretofore has been done unless we put something 
in the legislation. 

Mr. Greene. Is this what you have in mind. If you follow the 

ghrase you have just quoted, ''Subject to examination which the 
resident may direct," or something of that kind, add ''suitable to 
the arm of the service for which he is a candidate ?" 

Mr. Dent. Or something like that. I think something ought to 
be put in. 



2024 ABMY BEOBGAinZATIOir. "^ 

Col. Spaulding. No matter what you put in, as a matter of fact 
what we are after here is to do our best to skim the cream of all these 
applicants and construct the best machinery for getting them. We 
have got the finest material the Army ever saw; we want to sift them 
through so as to get the best. 

Mr. Dent. I don't want to press the point I started out with so as 
to get tiresome, but I am not satisfied yet as to how this list of officers 
is origmaUv going to be rnade up. For instance, would you fix the 
number to oe in flie detached officers' list according to the number of 
officers needed in the service with the probable chances of vacancies 
to occur? There must be some rule by which this is determined. 

Col. Spaulding. Are you speaking of original appointments to be 
made, men not now in the service ? 

Mr. Dent. Yes, sir. 

Col. Spaulding. Well, I don't see that you can lay down any hard 
and fast rule. We shall have applications from several thousand men 
who served aa officers. We shall have their records. We shall also 
have rei)orts, perhaps, of some examinations. Through those the 
board will have to go and endeavor to get, on the whole, the best 
men it can for the io-my. 

Mr. Dent. I understand that. But how will they arrive at the 
number that they are going to assign to each branch ^nd arm of the 
service ? 

Col. Spaulding. They will have to get enough to make up the 
Engineers at least and they wiU have to get enough to make up the 
Infantry and there is a large additional number that might be 
commissioned in anything. 

Mr. Dent. Yes, that additional number; how are you going to 
fix that proportion ? 

Col. Spaulding. That would have to be very roughly the pro- 
portion of the branch of the whole Army, but it can be very rough 
mdeed. The best way to get it is to take the best men as a whole, 
unless there happens to be a smaller proportion of men fitted for 
Engineers applying than there is fitted for the Infantry. In that case 
a man fittea for the Engineers, but not as good an all round man as 
the Infantry man would get in. But on the whole we should take 
the best general man. 

Mr. Dent. I suppose I don't make myself clear. Would you 
have exactly the same ratio or percentage of men in the Engineers 
as there is in this reservoir ? 

Col. Spaulding. As near as you can. 

Mr. Dent. Who is going to determine that ? 

Col. Spaulding. It is provided in here that the board shall de- 
termine that. 

The Chairman. We would like you to proceed with your state- 
ment, Colonel Spaulding, and your explanation of the provisions in 
the tentative bill. 

Col. Spaulding. May I take something else before we proceed to 
that point, because I would like to be sure of getting to this, while 
the latter part of this text is not so important. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Col. Spaulding. One thing was suggested to me by questions 
asked this morning. Suppose you are after highly trained technical 
men when this is in operation 10 years hence, and I said, eventually 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 2025 

we have got to take them in at the bottom as second lieutenants. 
It has been suggested that someone was thinking of war times. 
There we rely on the reserves. You can appoint tnese men in the 
reserve at any time, and the principal difficulty with the reserve 
according to tne national defense act is you can not appoint them 
higher than major. This bill takes that limitation off and if you 
get a civilian good .enough to be colonel or brigadier general you can 
appoint him without any limitation. 

Mr. Fields. You were referring to my question. I had in mind 
peace times. 

Mr. Craqo. If you want to use him in peace time you can not 
disturb that list and put this man to work on technical service. 

Col. Spaulding. It is highly desirable in peace that we should 
use reserve men all we can. If he is willing to go on active duty, 
you can call him to active duty. - 

The Chairman. As a reserve officer. 

Mr. Crago. And it does not disturb the Hst. 

Mr. Wise. You say you can commission him in reserve and then 
call him into active service if you need him, aftid it will not disturb 
the list if he is commissioned in the reserve as colonel, say, and you 
call him where there is a vacancy in some other branch where he is 
needed? 

Col. Spaulding. The Regular Army and the reserves are totally 
separate. 

Mr. Wise. But he would actually be, while in the actual mihtary 
service, over that second Ueutenant. 

Col. Spaulding. He would not be displacing him. 

Mr. Wise. But you would fill up the places where promotions would 
be made. 

The Chairman. He would fill up a place that no man in the Reg- 
ular Army could probably fiU. This man would be called for special 
scientific work which would require a man of especial abihty. 

Mr. Wise. I understand that. 

The Chairman. He would not be in the Regular Army at all. 

Mr. Fields. Suppose you commission him in the reserve and ho 
serves for the balance of his life or until retirement? 

The Chairman. He would not get any retirement. 

Mr. Fields. If he had served the required number of years ? 

Col. Spaulding. He can not retire. 

Mr. Fields. Then, if he should serve the required number of years 
for a Regular officer, he would not get the same benefits? 

The Chairman. Oh, no ; he would simply leave the Army. He 
would get no retirement benefits. 

Mr. Miller. To my mind on this question, when you take men and 
put them into this reservoir of officers, take a man out of the Une 
and put him into this reservoir, and he is in there a number of years, 
he loses contact with that branch of the service completely. If he 
has engineering skUl he is advanced in there five years. This man 
while in the reservoir as an engineer is not advancing in his branch. 

The Chairman. I do not recall the exact text of this provision in 
here, but the former provision, as I recall it, allowed him to stay in 
the reserve for four years and then he had to go back to his command. 

Mr. Miller. He will stay in this reseivoir of officers until there is 
a vacancy? 



2026 ABMY KEORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Crago. Oh, no. 

Mr. Miller. Or until he is removed and appointed. Why will not 
a captain stay in the reservoir of officers until there is a vacancy in 
the rank of major ? 

The Chairman. Because he has got to go back to his troops under 
the law after four years in the reservoir, and some officer who is then 
with troops would have to go into the reservoir to enable the other 
man to go out. 

Mr. Miller. That is what I was suggesting here — that in this reser- 
voir a man is not in touch with any branch of the service. 

Col. Spaulding. There is no difference from the present law. It 
is the present condition. 

Mr. Greene. I think that the detached officers' list is used as a 
sidetrack. 

Mr. Miller. It is a sidetrack for four years. 

Mr. Greene. That means sidetracking the man who goes off and 
on for four years. These men stay there but a few weeks or months 
and then go back on other duties. There is no fixed or arbitrary time 
they shall stay. 

Mr. Miller. I know there is no arbitrary time; but will he not 
stay in the reservoir until there is a vacancy for him ? 

Mr. Greene. Not necessarily; until he is assigned duties that take 
him back into the line. 

Mr. Miller. Then I entirely fail to grasp that. 

The Chairman. The law is that he can not stay away from his 
branch of the service for more than four years. 

Mr. Miller. I imderstand that, but will he not stay there imtil 
there is a vacancy? 

Mr. Greene. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Crago. He might come back to the Army at the same rank. 

Mr. Miller. Suppose there is no vacancy in the Army. 

The Chairman. He simply would transfer from that arm. 

Mr. Greene. That is supposing they would not carry out a neces- 
sary and efficient policy for the efficiency of the service. 

Mr. McKenzie. I want to ask about a matter as much to bring 
the attention of the committee to it as to call the colonel's attention 
to it, and he is no doubt familiar with it, but it was called to my 
attention by a surgeon in the Regular Establishment. On page 52 of 
the promotion list, you state in regard to dental officers: "To officers 
of the Dental Corps shall be credited their service as contract or 
acting dental surgeons,'' etc. My attention was called to the provi- 
sion in the Senate bill by a Regular surgeon of the Regular Estab- 
lishment, in which he said that they proposed to give the con- 
tract surgeon credit for all the years that he has been acting as a 
contract surgeon and probably do but three days of work in a year, 
credit for all of that time, which would give him a place on the pro- 
motion list far above many of the men who were in the Regular Es- 
tablishment. 

Col. Spaulding. That is a defect in the Senate bill that is going to 
be remedied, I tlunk. The Surgeon General's office does not want 
it there, and they expect to correct it. 

Mr. Crago. If he served full time then it would be all right. 

Col. Spaulding. No. We gave credit to officers of me Dental 
Corps for service as contract surgeons, because imtil 1911 dental 



ABMY BEOBGAI^IZATION. 2027 

surgeons were not commissioned, but were actually performing the 
duties of officers. They have been commissioned since. But we 
have at all times had a regular Medical Corps, and contract surgeons 
were extras. 

Mr. Crago. Somebody told us that there were only 20 men in the 
entire service who were contract siu^eons, who had given their whole 
time to the service. 

Col. Spaulding. Contract dental surgeons on full time? 

Mr. Crago. That there were only about 20 contract dental surgeons 
in the entire Army who were giving their entire time and they were 
the only ones who would go on this list. 

Col. Spauij)ing. You are criticizing the provision in the Senate 
bill — ^not in this one — ^giving credit to medical officers who were con- 
tract surgeons. That is wrong. It should not be in the Senate bill, 
and I think is going to be cut out. It is not in here. The contract 
dental surgeon is in a different position. Prior to 1911 there was no 
authority to commission them as dental surgeons. We have some 
now in the service, some who have had a few months and some up to 
10 years' service, which in every respect except the name was com- 
missioned duty, and they, and they only are given credit in your 
bill. But the Senate bill put in credit as contract surgeons for medi- 
cal officers, and the Surgeon General's office objects, and I am quite 
sure that it is going to be taken out. 

Mr. Fields. Have you contract dental siugeons who devote their 
entire time or part time? 

Col. Spaulding. Some devote their whole time. 

Mr. Fields. What woiuld be wrong in giving it to the man who 
devotes his whole time? 

Col. Spaulding. The idea of the Siu:geon General's office on that 
is as a practical matter that if you examine who these men are, they 
are properly placed now, as they should be in accordance with their 
merits. Some of them had long contract service which, if credited, 
would raise them away above where their merits would put them. 
It is a practical matter with a view to actual cases. 

The Chairman. I think the Medical Corps has gradually infiltrated 
into that corps the contract sui^eons who gave aU their time to 
Army work. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. They have gathered them in this way. 
When they thought a contract surgeon was ripe for appointment at 
the foot of the Medical Corps list mey brought him in then. Now, 
giving him credit for service during the four or five years when they 
did not think he was competent for appointment, would be imjust. 
That is not in your bill. It is in the Senate bill. 

Mr. Crago. Under our bill he would get no credit for any of the 
time served. 

Col. Spaulding. Only for the commissioned service. 

The Chairman. I understand there are no contract surgeons left 
who occupy the peculiar position that these contract surgeons who 
were finally taken into the Medical Corps occupied. 

Col. Spaulding. I think they were gone years ago. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Col. Spaulding. Now, this other matter I would like to take up is 
this matter of the ordnance appointments. The Chief of the Ord- 
nance Department has made tine point that he would like to have, 



2028 ABHY BEOBGAKIZATIOir. 

when the single list is put into effect, an exception to the extent that 
there should be carried a certain definite number of colonels for ord- 
nance and lieutenant colonels for ordnance and so on. He wants — ^the 
figures given are 19 colonels, 31 lieutenant colonels, and so on down. 
Now, so far as bringing in men from outside — getting civilians — is 
concerned, there is no necessity for any such legislation. If we find 
under this bill as it stands here that tnere are one or two or five or 
ten competent civilians that ought to come in, that are wanted for 
ordnance work and are fit for appointment as colonels, we can make 
them, regardless of number. The only purpose, then, of such a pro- 
vision would be to make it possible to raise officers now on the Regu- 
lar Army belonging to the Ordnance higher than their places on the 
single list. Now, as I tliink Mr. Greene or some other Member 
pointed out yesterday, that is not necessary for the operation of any 
oranch. Their officers will be arranged relatively according to the 
way they stand now, and to raise some of them to colonel ahead of 
their turn in the line will not facilitate operations in the Ordnance 
at all. It will not make any advantage there. They will be still 
arranged in the same relative order, but it would advance them over 
their senioi's on this list. It is said that this is a purely temporary 
thing, for a little while; it is only to be done this once, and then it 
will not make any more trouble. Even passing over for the moment 
whether it is a good thing right now, what reasons have we to sup- 
pose it Is temporary ? 

Of course, the Cftiief of Ordnance thinks it is now, but the-e men 
want to be lieutenant colonels ahead of their turn, and he wants 
them to be lieutenant colonels. Is it not fair to suppose from com- 
mon sense that a little later on, when they would have been lieuten- 
ant colonels anyhow, they will want to be colonels, and the Chief of 
Ordnance will want them colonels, and will want this as another 
exception? I think that is a reasonable presumption. And how 
about history ? That has been the history of all legislation in the 
Army. You start with one of these exceptions, ana it is perp. tu- 
ated, and it widens continually. I am speaking of the Ordnance. 
Take that branch and look at the history of it. On February 2. 
1901, there was established a detail staff system for the Army — ^for 
all the staff departments, with one or two exceptions. They were 
all put on the same basis; officers were to be detailed from the line 
in all grades from the grade they held in the line for four-year periods; 
the lieutenants, captams, and majors must return to the line for two 
years after their period of four before they could go back; colonels 
and lieutenant colonels could continue detailed without that period 
of line service. That remains unchanged for the staff departments 
in general. Two years after the act was passed, in 1903, the Ord- 
nance asked, for and got this one little exception, that vacancies in 
the grade of first lieutenant of the Ordnance Department might be 
filled by detail of either first or second lieutenants in the line. In 
other words, the second lieutenants of the line might be detailed as 
first lieutenants of Ordnance, although he could not be detailed in 
other staff departments. That is one little thing, and is very small. 
That was just the beginning, and here is the situation now as a result 
of successive legislation. 

A line officer may be detailed in the Ordnance with advanced rank 
not only in the grade of first lieutenant but in any grade that they 



ABMY EEOBGANIZATIOK. 2029 

have. A colonel and lieutenant colonel in any staff department, as 
I said, can be redetailed without going back to the line and in all the 
staff departments except Ordnance they are the only ones who can. 
But majors in the Ordnance can serve there continually without 
going back. Captains and lieutenants in the rest of the dtaff departr 
ments must go back to the line for two years after every tour. Ord- 
nance captains and lieutenants go back to the line for only one year. 
Without criticizing these provisions and commenting on them in any 
way, I just say that where we once make an exception for a par- 
ticular department you may fully expect another exception to be 
made for it, and another, until you get further and further away from 
the original system. It is possible that if that exception is made for 
the Ordnance Department now that it will die out in a few years and 
nothing more happen. Personally, I do not believe it; it is not 
logical and it is not backed up by nistory. But supposing that it is 
just temporarjr and passed over in a short tune. Just what does that 
do ? The Ordnance Department would promote a certain number of 
officers to a higher grade than the single list would put them. 

What is that? That is promotion by selection. This bill per^ 
petuates promotion by seniority of those fit for promotion, eliminating 
those who are not. But this proposition is not only promotion by 
selection, but a very remarkable kind of selection. That is not selec- 
tion based on merit ; it is selection based on the mere accident or what- 
ever it may be that the man is in the Ordnan'^e. This man will be 
advan':ed over hundreds of his seniors — and I mean that literally — 
not because he is said to be a better man than they but because he 
wears particular insignia on his collar. Let us make this personal , 
and you can see it better. Assuming that the numbers they have in 
there — I have run over the list hurriedly — I assume that they take 
the men in the order of seniority. Assuming that all these pla' es are 
in the Regular Army, then they would make lieutenant colonels out 
of men who entered the commissioned service in 1910. These 
Ordnance officers who had 10 years' commissioned service would 
become lieutenant colonels. 

Col. Pierce. That is absolutely wrong; nothing later than 1906. 

Col. Spaulding. I am assuming here that we are taking all from 
among regular officers. 

Col. Pierce. That is a wrong assumption, because we propose to 
take in as many from the outside as we require. 

Col. Spaulding. I am going to modify this later. I am now taking 
the extreme case. The single list will give promotion to lieutenant 
colonelcies to officers appointed in 1901. A man who has entered 
the service after 1901, then, will remain a major in the Army as a 
whole. In the extreme case I assume here, assuming they fill all 
their places in the Ordnance by promotion, these regulars that they^ 
alreaay have would pass over the heads of men nine years their 
seniors — about 1,000 of their seniors. Assuming what Col. Pierce 
sayS; that they take in all they can get from outside to fill these 
vacancies, so that it only goes to men appointed in 1906, still these 
men would have passed over the heads of men five years their seniors, 
over the heads of 400 or 500 of their seniors. Is that based on merit ? 
No; it is not based even on the allegation of merit. Here is CoL 
Hammond. These men with one year less than Col. Hammond^, 
one year at least, and at the most five years, will be passed over CoL 



2030 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Hammond, not because they are better than he. I do not think 
anybody that knows all of them will say they are even as good as he, 
but they are advanced over him not because anybody says they are 
better, but because they happen to be in the Ordnance. Taking 
again an extreme case, these men of 1910 have five years' service 
less than Col. Hammond and I, who are classmates. A lot of these 
lads I taught at West Point when they were cadets and I was a first 
lieutenant. 

Another con'^rete illustration. These Ordnance people want to be 
promoted to lieutenant colonels. They would be majors on the 
general list there. About 12 years ago 1 was offered a detail in the 
Ordnan:e without examination. I declined it because I am not 
fitted to be an Ordnance officer and I knew it. I have not that talent. 
But I am at least as good a man, I am a better man all aroimd as an 
officer, than I was 12 years ago; and yet I fail of selection because I 
had sense enough to know that I was not fitted for Ordnance duty. 
That is selection without any logical reason for it. 

Pass on from there, then, to the text of the bill. 

The first step, then, is to take officers in these various branches 
named here who entered the service originally before the beginning 
of the war and merge these together. I will speak a little later of 
the reason for leaving out the ones who entered since the war began. 
We will take that up later. This will take in all the lineal lists so 
that the colonels ana so forth will all go into one Ust without change 
in the present arrangement in any branch. Take the infantry list, 
and keep those names in the order they stand; take the cavalry 
list and Keep the names in the order they stand; you will amalga- 
mate these lists a-s nearly as practicable according to the length of 
commissioned service, in other words, you will put the infantry 
hst and the cavalry fist together and the infantry officers of a certain 
length of service will be placed right along with the cavalry officers 
of the same length of service. Officers from given West Point 
classes will be placed together just as they started regardless of 
accidents of promotion since. Col. Hammond and I are of the 
same class, 1905, at West Point. I went into the Coast Artillery 
and he went into the infantry. The Coast Artillery had a large 
increase in 1907 and I got a much more rapid promotion than Col. 
Hammond. The gap between us, instead of being as it would have been 
on a single Ust, only a few weeks in our promotions to captaincy, 
maybe, was a year or more. The gap between our promotions to 
first Ueutenantcies was, I think, about four years. If we had been 
l)oth on a single list — if the single list had been in existence then, 
we would have been promoted to first lieutenant a few weeks apart. 
Now, then, these various branches wiU be combined so that officers 
of the same length of service in the different branches will come 
together. 

You wiU notice it says: ''shall be arranged without changing the 
present order of officers on the lineal list with certain exceptions 
that follow here. 

One question has come up as to the advisibiUty of upsetting the 
part of the lineal list between 1898 and 1901; officers who entered 
the service in that period, I mean, are not arranged now at all accord- 
ing to their commissioned service. In general the Uneal list of any 
l)ranch indicates the length of the service of the men, but that is 



ABMY BEORGANIZATION. 2031 

not quite true of the men appointed between 1898 and 1901, because 
all during that time, men were being continually appointed in the 
Regular Army, some of whom had had no prior service, some a few 
months, and some a year, in the volunteers, and in 1901, a great 
niunber of men were brought in who had service in the volunteers 
and they were scattered through the grades of first and second 
lieutenant. So throughout that part of the list officers are not 
now arranged with much approximation to the order of length of 
service. The question comes up how about rearranging these? 
Would it not be well to rearrange these now according to their 
commissioned service? A great deal of study has been given to 
that. It sounds reasonable. It also sounds reasonable to leave 
them as they are now. But after thinking it over a good while I 
believe and all other officers who have studied it think it would 
probably be best to leave them as they are now. If you rearranged 
that Ust a man who lost by it would naturalljr be dsipleased. Some- 
body would suffer. Suppose you leave it as it is. Nobody is going 
to be displeased except the man who always has a grievance; because 
those who are better off now remain satisfied; those who would 

fain by the rearrangement are not disappointed because they have 
ad that place for 19 years and never supposed it would be changed. 
It would be a different matter if these men were captains or fieu- 
tenants, as it would make a difference in their promotion through 
all the other grades and for many years to come. But all of them are 
going to be at least Heutenant colonels, anyhow. Some will be 
colonels and the rest lieutenant colonels well up on the Ust. So 
at the most the only difference it can make to the man is a few 
months in his promotion to one single grade. So I think every 
officer that has studied it decides that it will probably be best to 
let the fist stay just as it stands now. So in general there is no 
change in the lineal fists. 

There are a few exceptions here that are picked out of those lists 
when we combine them and these individuals are differently placed 
according to the rules given here. The first class omitted consists of 
officers who have been transferred and as a result occupy different 

Positions on the lineal list from those they would have had if they 
ad started in their present branches, i alluded this morning to 
the rules that we have for transfer now. If an officer wishes to 
transfer to another branch he must find somebody to exchange 
with him and he has to take that place. Both of them take the 
rank of junior man. The idea is not to hold back the promotion of 
any man except the man who voluntarily transfers. Now that we 
are going to this new system it is only fair that a man who lost rank 
going to the Field Artillery from the Cavalry, now that he is going 
to be put back on the same list, as the Cavalry, should be put back 
in the place he had when he was in the Cavalry. Those are very few 
cases but they are cases where we ought to do justice to these men. 
Transfers in future, of course, will involve no loss of rank. A man 
will transfer from one branch to another, when we have the single 
list, without change of rank at all. The second class given here con- 
sists of officers appointed in the Artillery from other branches in 
1907. That is exactly the same as the first class. They were not 
technically transfers, they were original appointments. But they 



2032 ABinr keobgakizatiok. 

were men appointed into the Artillery at lower places than they 
would have if they had stayed in their original branches. 

The next group is the officers appointed in the Regular Army and 
while serving in the Philippine Scouts or the Porto Rican Regiment; 
the reason for that is the same. We amalgamate the Porto Rican 
Regiment and Philippine Scouts into this large list, and so men who 
came into the Regmar Army when they were serving as Philippine 
Scout officers or Porto Rican officers should beplaced as if they had 
stayed on with that organization until now. That date, January 1, 
1903, is purely arbitrary. It is simply a date that covers all the 
cases that we nave to cover; all such cases have occurred since that 
time. 

Next, former officers who have been reappointed and are now 
placed lower than their commissioned service warrants. Occasion- 
ally a man who has gone out has been reappointed in the Army by 
special act of Congress and comes in at the foot of; the grade where 
he went out. Then there was a general law that persons who held 
commissions in the Regular Army before the national defense act 
and resigned, might be reappointed at the foot of the grade that they 
left. Now, the result of that is that a good many of these people 
have come back, and others would like to come back if they could 
afford it, but they are placed far below where their commissioned 
service warrants. Tliis provision would give the Army, and the 
Government, the advantage of their experience. Take the case of a 
man who actually had 10 years^ service as an officer and resigned 
while he was first lieutenant. He came back and was reappointed 
as first lieutenant at the foot of the list, as first lieutenant when the 
war came on. At that time there was a big increase because of the 
national defense act, and the junior first lieutenants had only a few 
weeks' service. This man with 10 years' service is placed below a 
man who had a few days' service. This provision in here then 
would take 10 or 12 men who have had more commissioned service 
than the men around them and move them up to the place on the 
list that is commensurate with their actual service. The man I 
speak of would be placed on the list among men who had 10 years' 
real service. 

Mr. Wise. Do you believe it would be ffood policy to put into the 
law and say that an officer can resign at his own will and go out to 
accept a profitable place thinking he will do better and make more 
money, and stay out several years, and then come back and be placed 
above other officers who have remained in the service? Do you 
think it is good policy for us to hold out that inducement to an 
officer to go back and then give him credit for that time ? 

Col. Spaulding. I think it is proper for such a man if we reappoint 
him. Of course, there is no compulsion to reappoint him; if you re- 
appoint him I think it is only right that he should be given credit for 
the service he has actually rendered, not put him on the list where 
he would have been if he had stayed in, but give him credit for the 
service really rendered. If he had served five years, put him among 
men who had served five years. 

Mr. Wise. I do not think it is good policy to hold out that as an 
inducement to an officer, that he can go out at his own pleasure 
and engage in other occupations and if he finds out he can not, pos- 
sibly, get along that he will lose only the time he was out. 



ABMT BE0B6AKIZATI0H. 2038 

Mr. Anthony. You do not propose to give that man any reward ; 
simply give him credit for the service that he rendered. 

Col. Spaulding. And we are under no obligation to reappoint him. 
If the President says I would like to reappoint this man, he is a good 
man, and I would oe glad to have him Back, then we put him with 
men who have done just that amoimt of service. 
• The Chairman. I think Congress has to pass an enabling act before 
it can be done. 

Col. Spauij)ING. That is provided in this act you propose here, 
but this particular section 1 am considering is simply dealing with 
cases of the men who are already in under existing law and are below 
where thek service warrants. 

Mr. Wise. Does it provide by this bill that he can be reappointed 
without any special act of Congress ? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. A number of such men have been taken back into 
the service during the war. 

Col. Spaulding. Mostly during the war. But cases have happened 
at other times. 

Mr. Anthony. And they want to stay in the regular service now.* 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; aside from the general poUcy of doing 
that I think it is only fair to the^e men to put them where their real 
service warrants. 

Mr. Wise. I have no objection, but we are talking about the ones 
now in the Army who go out and then lose none of tneir time. 

Mr. Anthony. They lose the time they are out. 

Col. Spaulding. Suppose I resign to-day and stay oui five years. 
I come back amojig men much yoimger than I am. 

Mr. Wise. If I am in the Regular Army now and I flee where I can 
get S10,000 a year which my knowledge that I gained at West Point 
and in the Army especially fitted me for, I will not lose but one year 
in my rank here or two years. I will resign and go out and come back 
in the Army. 

Col. Spaulding. Of course, he has no promise that he can come 
back. 

Mr. Wise. That is the point we are discussing. 

Col. Spaulding. That is a question of policy. By myself I should 
say it is highly desirable to encourage officers to do that. The more 
trained officers we can get in civil life the better it is in time of war. 

Mr. Wise. I think it is rather an inducement for them to go out. 

Col. Spaulding. I should personally be glad to induce them to go. 
I think it is good for the country as a whole. 

The Chaebman. As a matter of fact, the practical way it has 
worked in a case of that kind has been this, when a man attempts to 

fo back into the Army the bill for his return generally recites that 
e shall go back at the bottom of the list as captain or major or 
yirhatever position he occupied. Then about five years later a bill 
is put into Congress to restore him to the place on the list he occupied 
when he went out and Congress frequently has passed that legislation. 

Col. Spaulding. Because he is first brought in below where his 
commissioned service warrants. That is the reason why a few years 
later he is moved up above where his commissioned service warrants. 

The Chairman. That is the way it has worked out. As I under- 
stand your proposition now, you a^ow him to come back and he 



2034 ABMY BEORGANIZATION, 

would only lose the numbers on the list during the period that he 
was out of the Amry. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. We have several bills pending before our connnitteey 
Mr. Chairman, for men who have beqn put out of the service, some 
by courts-martial, that want to get back into the service. There 
are bills to get them back in. 

The Chairman. There has never been a time when quite a number 
of that kind of bills have not been pending before this committee. 

Mr. Greene. What we have drawn up in a tentative draft, as I 
understand it, is only a statement on wnich the original single list 
can be made up. It does not carry with it a provision that hereafter, 
the list being made out, men may come back at the discretion of the 
President. 

Col. Spaulding. What I am speaking of now is the formation of 
a single list, and I am referring to cases of men who have been reap- 
pointed. Further on in the bill you have a provision that if a former 
officer is reappointed, then he shall be placed with the exact credit 
for his commissioned service. 

Mr. Greene. Does that ne'^essarily carry with it the discretion of 
^he President to reappoint him without authoritv of Congress ? Is 
that simply what becomes of him if the act of Congress authorized 
the reappointment ? 

Col. Spaulding. I think as it stands here it gives the President 
dis retion to reappoint him without an act of Congress. 

The Chairman. Without act of Congress ? 

Col. vSpaulding. Yes, sir. That relieves you of the necessity of 
passing special acts in deserving cases and non-deserving will have to 
continue to be dealt with as they are now. The first step in the 
formation of the single list has been completed. *In the first step 
we in luded almost all bran'^hes of the service — the various lineal 
lists. The second step places the various judge advo^'ates, quarter- 
masters, ordnan^ e offi^ ers, and military storekeeper. Now, the reason 
that they are treated separately from the rest of the Army is this: 
The lineal lists of the other branches, while they are mixed up in 
certain places, are generally arranged according to commissioned 
service, out due to the manner in which appointments have been 
made in the past, or due to certain promotion systems, officers of the 
Judge Advocate's Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the 
Ordnance Department are not arranged at all according to commis- 
sioned service. They are in complete confusion. There is only a 
small number with permanent commissions, and it is possible to 
take ea<h man and put him in the place his commissioned service 
warrants. You can see it makes little practical difference, because 
most of these people are so high ranking they will reach colonelcies 
anyhow. And their relative rank is not fixed by this. 

The Chairman. I was going to say that as a matter of fact there 
was no one commissioned in the Judge Advocate's Department prior 
to the war at a lower grade than that of major. 

Col. Spaulding. That is the lowest grade in the permanent estab- 
lishment. These men would be taken and put in according to their 
commissioned service. 

The next step is to take the officers now in the Regular Army and 
Pljilippine Scouts who have entered since the war began. All those 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 2035 

are taken without regard to their present lineal rank and are rear- 
ranged according to their commissioned service. The re^,son of that 
is that they are now arranged with no regard at all to commissioned 
service. They are in complete confusion as regards commissioned 
service, just as these officers in the staff departments I have men- 
tioned. We might leave them as they are if it were not for the diffi- 
culty of dovetailing in temporary officers who are to be appointed. 
They have got to come in, many of them, according to their com- 
missioned service. If we have some arranged according to com^ 
missioned service and others not arranged with regard to commis- 
sioned service, it is hard to work them together. Also, on the whole 
it seems little better to rearrange these regular officers anyhow. They 
have none of them had very much service. They are all in low grades, 
and it will make a difference to them through all the rest of their 
military lives. The confusion in their arrangement now is very 
great. Here is one reason for it: Officers were appointed in the early 
part of the war in the Regular Army, some with no commissioned 
service at all. Others were appointed who had had commissioned 
service as reserve officers and National Guard officers for a few months, 
and in some cases a whole year. Here is an extreme case, only one 
of many. Here are two groups.- In 1918 in June there was gradu- 
ated from West Point a class a year ahead of time, and they were 
commissioned as second lieutenants, some commissioned in the Engi- 
neers. They were graduated a year before they should have left 
West Point, had had no commissioned service,, and they were, of 
course, xmusually young. Right after that there was appointed 
another group of Engineers, second lieutenants, placed below them 
of course. That group was made up of engineering graduates who 
had been picked over and especially selected, whose age averaged 
three or four years more, probably, than these West Point graduates, 
and most of whom had had commissioned service, some of them 
running up to as much as a year, and yet they are now placed below 
these younger, less educated, and less experienced men. 

Again, the first training camp ended August 15, 1917. Some of 
the graduates of these training camps got commissions in the Regular 
Army, some in the reserve. About the 1st of November there were 
appointed a great many men in the Regular Army who had had no 
prior commissioned service. The 1st oi May of the next year there 
were appointed several himdred of these men who had had reserve 
service since August 15. They were placed then six months below 
men of several months less commissioned service. These are 
illustrations. 

Mr. Greene. May I suggest there, having in mind that last in- 
stance when the October 26 men, civilians, were first appointed to 
the Army, those men, May 1 men, were all in service with troops of 
the Regular Establishment in commission as second lieutenants, and 
the October 26 men ran right through the grade of the second lieu- 
tenants in an hour, and they exchanged it for the grade of first lieu- 
tenant, because at that time that grade of first lieutenant had 
vacancies in the Army. In that manner the men who had qualified 
at the same time as those with regular commissions and did not get 
second lieutenant commissions until the May following. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes; that illustrates it; that the Regular Army 
officers appointed since the war began are in complete confusion as 



2036 



ARMY REORGANIZATION, 



regards commissioned service, not placed with regard to commis- 
sioned service, merit, or anything eke. 

The Chairman. Two officers of that class called on me several days 
ago, and they infonned me that they had taken the examination at 
the officers^ training camps in April, and they were not commissioned 
until August, 1917. Subsequently some oimcers who pined a train- 
ing camp and were examined as late as July were conmussioned before 
the men from the first camp got their commissions and now outrank 
them. 

Col. Spaulding. I think you misunderstood them. These are the 
two young men you sent to me. One of them was a graduate of the 
West Point class, a year ahead of time, and so he does not come in 
this. The other did not join the training camp. He was appointed 
before the first training camp was graduated. What they were 
urging was to try to stand in the way of the rearrangement, because 
they will be placed under men with longer commissioned service 
that they expect to come in from among the temporary officers. I 
really do not think their case has much merit. 

The Chairman. They told me thpy had taken the examination. 

Col. Spaulding. For Regular Army appointment. 

The Chairman. In 1917. 

Col. Spaulding. One of them was a graduate of West Point. The 
other took an examination for a Regular Army commission in the 
spring of 1917 and was commissioned as second lieutenant August 9 
I think. The training camp did not graduate until August 15. He 
will be placed above these anyhow. What he was worried about is 
that there will be a very small number of National Guard officers 
who entered the service on August 5, 1917, and who are not yet in 
the Regular Army, who may be placed above him. Of course he has 
a little grievance. I can see his case and all the other cases. We 
will come to that a little later on. 

For that reason it seems best to rearrange all the officers of the 
Regular Army appointed since the war began. 

The next step is to take the men who are selected for original 
appomtment who are not in the Regular Army, who served as 
emergency officers in the war and who have been picked to be cap- 
tains and lieutenants in the Regular Army. We will take them and 
arrange them according to their commissioned service and dovetail 
them m among the men now in the Regular Army who entered since 
the war began. In other words, every man who has come into the 
Army since the war began will be treated on the same basis ia the 
Regular Army. They will be arranged all according to the service 
they have actually rendered. 

That is the way it stands here now, that they shall all be arranged 
according to their total commissioned service up to the time of 
appointment. The suggestion has been made that it should be their 
total commissioned service rendered prior to November 11, 1918. I 
think there is merit in that. 

The Chairman. Where would that language come in ? 

Col. Spaulding. On page 54; it reads that they '^ shall be arranged 
among themselves according to commissioned service and shall be 
placed at the foot of the list as prepared to this point.'' Insert there, 
"commissioned service rendered prior to November 11, 1918." 



4VMi^ mOWJk^lZkTlOK. 2037 

That is just a rule-of-tlmmb way either way, but I think probaUy 
it will be alittle fairer to take them on that basis, because a great many 
of these men we want to appoint now and who rendered commissioned 
service throughout the war were forced out when we had to reduce 
the Army; put out soon after the^arnustice or last summer o^: going 
out now. These men wEovere putout of the Army for no fault c3 
theirs and who are among some of the best men will be compelled to 
go imder a man who has teen lucky enough to atay on or lucky enough 
to hold a Regular Army commission. 

The most striking thing about it is this: Suppose one of these 
men actually rendered 18 months' commissioned service and all of it 
was d uring th<> war : say prior to November 11, 1918, he rendered 18 
months service and all the commissioned service he has rendere d is 
the 18 months. He will be placed below any man of more than 18 
months' service rendered during or after the war. Now, we have several 
hundred officers who before the 1st of next July will have rendered 
nominally 18 months' conrnodssioned service, all of that after the 
armistice and a great deal of it purely nominal.' I refer to the classes 
fj'myi y^f^plf Point, graduated November 1, 1918, some after one and a * 
half years and some after two and a half years. 

They were so obviously imfitted for duty that they sent them 
back to West Point, and all of these will have by next July 1 20 
months' commissioned service and would be placed above these 
men 6 or 7 years older who actually had 18 months' commissioned 
service in the war. So while it is just a question of which will be on 
the whole fairer, I think it would be better to insert these words: 
''commissioned service rendered prior to November 11, 1918." 

In other words, every man who has entered the service since the 
war began will be placed according to his commissioned service 
rendered during the war. 

Mr. Wise. At the bottom of page 54, "officers now in the Regular 
Army shall precede persons to oe appointed imder the provisions of 
this act," would not conffict with what you have just said? 

CoL oPAULDiNG. No. ''Where commissioned service is equal." 
You have 500 men perhaps who began commissioned service August 
15, 1917. How are vou going to arrange these 500 men among them- 
selves ? Just to make some rule we say, where conrnaissioned service 
is exactly the same, the one in the Regular Ajmy will be given prefer- 
ence over the one who has not. But if that man had a single day 
longer service 

Mr. Wise (interposing). I do not think that laimiage covers it. 
"Officers in the Regular Army" means whether he had been in one 
month or two years. 

Col. Spaxilding. "Where commissioned service is equal, officers 
now in the Regular Army shall precede persons to be appointed 
under the provisions of this act, and the latter shall be arranged 
according to age." It is in the one case where their commissioned 
service is equaE 

Mr. Wise. "The latter shall be arranged according to age," what 
does that mean ? 

Col. Spauldino. Here is the situation: We have 500 men, all of 
the same commissioned service. So that it will not leave any doubt 
as to order, we say that of these 500 men, first shall be placed those 
who are now in the Regular Army, and vrhile it is not written in here 

150187— 20— VOL a ^16 



2038 ABliCY HBOBGAlSriZATIOXC 

it will logically follow thejr will be placed in their present order in the 
Regular Army. Next will follow those who are not now in the 
Regular Army, arranged according to age, the oldest being senior 
and the youngest man is junior. 

Mr. Fields. Will that apply to West Point graduates? For 
instance, a number of them may have the same rating. 

Col. Spaulding. If any such thing ever happened I think they 
would settle it by lot, but the total number of points runs into some 
2,700, so I do not beheve that it will ever happen that way. So 
far we have not touched the officers of the Medical Corps, because 
they get this credit of two years. 

We take the officers of the Medical Corps who entered since the 
war began and put them on this list along with officers of two years* 
longer service, so as to bring them under the same rule that we 
apmied in the beginning. 

The next is to provide for the men who are selected from emergency 
officers, selected for appointment in field grades. Under this bill 
the temporary officer may be appointed in any grade from second 
lieutenant up to colonel, according to his merits, and we have provided 
that those who come in as captains and lieutenants come in amonff 
men now in the Regular Army according to their commissionea 
service. That is fair enough. But we can not put men who are 
appointed as lieutenant colonels or majors in according to their 
commissioned service. They can not afford to come. A man who 
is good enough and old enough to be appointed as lieutenant colonel, 
for instance, yet has only had, perhaps, two years' or three years' 
service in the army. Nobody could have had more than three years 
service under an emergency commission. A man wo take and appoint 
lieutenant colonel or maior can not be put among Regular Army 
officers with only two or three years' service. It womd not be reason- 
able to appoint him Ueutenant colonel and say he shall have no 
promotion until after some whom you make first lieutenants. So 
this provision is that these people who are selected for appointment 
as lieutenant colonels and majors shall be put on the list along with 
the other lieutenant colonels and majors and shall be put just below 
all the other Ueutenant colonels and majors in the Army. 

The Chairman. I have a memorandum here that you desire to 
change that sixth provision to read as foUows: 

Other persons appointed as lieutenant colonels or majors under the provisions of 
section 24 hereof shall be placed inunediately below those officers of the Regular 
Army who on July first are promoted to those grades, respectively, under the pro- 
visions of said section 24. 

Col. SPAxn^DiNG. That is the same as this in substance. It means 
the same thing, but a good many people have questioned the language 
here and failed to understand it. As they understand that language 
there, that substitution would be a good one. 

The Chairman. Then, there is a change suggested in the fifth 
provision, the last part of it, reading as foUows: 

Shall be placed immediately below officers whose length of service rendered prior 
to November 11 , 1918, is two years greater than theirs, etc. 

Col. Spaulding. This would follow from arranging other officers 
i^^cording to service rendered in the war. Then we should make this 
rule here that all officers should be arranged according to their service 



ABMT BEOBGANIZATIOK. 2039 

in the war, so that all the provisions hang together. After the 
system is in operation, all officers appointed come in at the foot of the 
list, except medical officers, who come in two years from the foot of 
the list. When an officer's place on the promotion list is established, 
it is not thereafter changed unless by sentence of court-martial. 

Turning back to page 46, as to the filUng of these vacancies. We 
have discussed here how these men shall be placed after they are 
appointed. We shall have, if this act is passed, about 8,000 vacan- 
cies, I suppose, to fill in the Regular Army, partly as there are some 
3,000 vacancies now in the Regular Army, due to the men who have 
resigned since the armistice and partly because there is an increase 
of about 5,000 officers. The best source to fill these vac*kincies is from 
men already trained and experienced as officers. The text reads: 
"Not less than one-half of the total number of vacancies caused by 
this act.'V This act causes five or six thousand vacancies. This 
means that not less than 2,500 or 3,000 vacancies, shall be filled by 
the appointment of men who served as officers. It requires that at 
least one-half shall be. I hope very much that we can fill all of them 
that way. Of course, there is no limitation on the number; it shall 
not be less than half. If we can get 8,000 applicants who have 
already served and made good officers, so much the better. 

The next point is to specify a minimum age Umit for a person to 
be appointea, colonels not less than 48, lieutenant colonels not less 
than 45, majors 36. That is to insure that the men so appointed 
shall be about the same age as the men already in the Regular Army 
must be to reach that grade. You have in here a provision that 
any person over 45 appointed under the provisions of this section 
shall get reduced retired pay. 

Mr. Crago. Shall get a percentage in accordance with the years of 
service. 

Ool. Spaulding. a retired officer has 75 per cent of active pay. 
Ordinarilv a man serves 20 to 30 or 40 years before retiring. Of 
course, ii he retires for disabiUty he gets 75 per cent just the same. 
But these men coming in over the age of 45 are coining in with the 
certainty that they will not serve 20 years. Thev are coming in 
with the certainty they will serve 19 years or less. So it is reasonable 
to provide they shall get reduced retired pay based on the actual 
length of service they render. 

Mr. Greene. If you were an actuary, you would probably be 
wilUng to gamble on the first men to leave the Army on reaching 45, 
and tney would be more likely to leave than these other men who 
have reached that age and were in there since 21 years of age. 

Col. Spaulding. I do 1191 know. We do not expect to take in 
deadwood merely because it is 45. We expect to take high grade 
men of 45. 

Mr. Greene. It is a triffing matter but it presents a practical 
proposition. The man who has lived the Uf e of civilian employment 
witn its irregularity and no particular incentive to use his good judg- 
ment as to his physical care, and so forth, is not Ukely to be as good 
a risk as a man who has lived under strict miUtary disciphne and 
particularly kept his body in good shape. 

Col. Spaulding. That mav be. I have not thought of that. 

.Mr. Wise. Explain the relation of the next section, 24b. 

Col. Spaulding. Classification of officers ? 



2040 ABICV ]Em0]iaANI2ATI0K. 

The Chairman. At the bottom of page 55. 

Col. Spaulding. The purpose of that, of course, is to eliminate the 
deadwood from the Army and to keep those men who stay in the 
Army up to the mark. 

Mr. Wise. This says: ** Immediately upon the passage of this act, 
and thereafter in September of each year " — that is beiore you have 
established anything, any single list or anything. 

Col. Spaulding. Because it will take the board two or three 
months to complete its work. 

Mr. Wise. They will do that before you complete this Ust. 

Col. Spaulding. It will take that board a good while to finish, and 
we want them to finish as soon as possible. 

Mr. Wise. Do you expect this board to meet and go through and 
classify these things before you estabUsh your single list ? 

Col. Spaulding. Before we make the increase; yes, sir; they are 
to classify the ofiicers. 

Mr. Wise. Do you not think this might cause trouble ? You pro- 
vide that this board shall consist of a certain number of officers, 
class A and class B, from which there shall be no appeal. Do you 
think that ought to be ? 

Col. Spaulding. Are you asking my personal opinion ? 

Mr. Wise. Yes. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes ; 1 think that is a very good provision. 

Mr. Wise. Suppose some of these officers, and it does happen, 
because you say that men may be retained as general officers and 
they may have a grievance against you — say that you outrank 
them andf for some reason they have a prejudice against you and do 
not like you — do you think tney ought to have a right to say that 
you shall be put into class B witnout you having a right to be heard 
or anybody to review it. 

Col. Spaulding. You make a possible case, of course. But you 
have here five officers of high rank acting under their oath of office 
and sense of obligation and passing on the complete records laid 
before them. I think it is very unlikely that more than one at the 
outside of those officers could have such a prejudice against a person 
as to recommend that he be put out of the service unless he deserved 
it. I have no fear whatever of any man being put out unless he 
ought to be put out. I have no doubt that a great many will be 
retained that ought not to be because we are all too tender-hearted 
in such matters. 

Mr. Wise. It goes on with promotion, that it shall be a special 
board to pass on a man when a promotion is to be made, and you 
say it shall be either three or five officers, two of whom shall belong 
to the branch of the service in which the officer is and two medical 
officers. How is it possible to have two of each of these and still 
have a board of only three ? 

Col. Spaulding. Because the man under examination might be a 
medical officer. When the board is only three officers, apply those 
conditions, they would be all medical officers and all belong to his 
own branch. 

Mr. Wise (reading) : 

The qualifications of every officer shall be inquired into by a board of not less than 
three or more than five officers, all of whom shall be senior to the officer whose qualifi- 
cations are under examination, at least two of whom shall belong to the same branch 
as that officer, and at least two of whom shall be officers of the Medical Corps. 



ABm BSOBGAXnZATIOK. 2041 

Col. Spaulding. Suppose yon are some medical officer. 

Mr. Wise. Suppose he is not a medical officer. 

Col. Spatjlding. You must have two medical officers and two in 
his own branch. If he is not a medical officer there would have ta 
be at least four officers. 

TheCHAiKMAN. I want to call your attention, Colonel, to a pro- 
vision in the Senate bill. They divide the officers into three classes 
A, B, and C. A is to consist of those officers who are worthy of pro- 
motion; B, of those officers who are not then ready for promotion; 
C, those to be eliminated. Would not that dislocate your single- 
list plan if that were carried out ? 

Col. Spatjlding. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Would not that be promotion by selection ? 

Col. Spatjlding. No, sir. 

Mr. Wise. Exactly. 

Col. Spatjlding. Officers are arranged in three classes, the first of 
which is not officers to be picked out for advancement over their 
seniors, but of officers who are fit for promotion. Elsewhere you 
will notice the provision that promotions will be made in order of 
seniority among class A officers. In other words, promotion will be 
by seniority of those fit for promotion, just exactly the same as now, 
but with better machinery for ascertaining who is fit for promotion. 
We have promotion by seniority of those who are actually found fit 
for promotion. This is the same thing as at present, except that we 
have a better means of ascertaining whether the man is fit or not. 

The Chairman. Assume that you make up your single list accord- 
to the date of commission, or length of service, whichever you choose. 
A year goes by. The officers are then segregated and some put in 
cla^ A, some m class B, and some in class C. Those in class A are 
held to be fit to be advanced. Those in class B are to be held back for 
the time beiag. They are not just ready for promotion. Those in 
class C are to be eliminated. Of course, those in class C are not 
materially affected, but those in class B, it seems, would be out of 
line with respect to their position on the single list. 

Col. Spatjlding. You are thinking in terms of the present law, 
where a man is suspended from promotion and loses files during 
that year. Now, this particular feature I am speaking of has been 
considered, and it was thought best to leave it as it**stands. That 
man placed in class B does not get promoted as long as he stays in 
class B. Finally he is placed in class C, and he goes out, or else they 
may believe he is now fit for advancement, and he is put in class A 
and then he is promoted after a lapse of some months or two years. 
But he always retains his position on the promotion list. 

The Chairman. Would ne jump over the men who had been put 
ahead of him ? 

Col. Spatjlding. Not jump over them in relative rank. It is a 
little difficult to grasp, but the relative rank list and promotion list 
are not necessarily identical. The relative rank is based on the date 
of commission and the rest of the rules. The promotion list is once 
established and, as the bill says, the position of a man once estab- 
lished shall not thereafter be changed, except as the result of seur 
tence of courts-martial. The man in class B whom you speak of 
loses promotion for the next grade of major. Relative rank is 
fixed by date of commission, but the place on the promotion list 
has never been altered. 



\ 



2042 ABMY BEOBOANIZATIOK. 

Now, if found fit for promotion to lieutenant colonel according to 
his place on the promotion list, you give him a pardon, so to speak, 
and he resumes his rank. 

Mr. Greene. Say that he went into class B and was kept back a 
year and he was No. 5 man in the files of captains. He was out that 
year for his majority and takes the class B. One, two, three, four 
went out and became majors. Perhaps 6, 7, and 8 went out and 
that leaves No. 6 marooned there in class B. After this when he 
finally gets his majority, does he occupy among majors the same old 
relative position of five among these eight ? 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir. 

Mr. Gbeene. He gets his chance in class A for a lieutenant colonelcy 
before 7 and 8 ? 

Col. Spaulding. As a major he has relative rank based on the date 
of commission and is junior major below these men who have passed 
over him. 

Mr. Greene. Then he loses his position in the filesl 

Col. Spaulding. He loses -his position in relative rank. In the 

Eromotion list he keeps his turn for promotion to lieutenant colonel; 
e retains his position relatively on the list. We find that he has 
made up his deficiency, whatever you want to call it, and tla&a he 
gets his promotion. 

Mr. Greene. Of course, having been promoted to major, he has 
got out oi class B. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes; but I mean when he has been classified as 
A and it is time to go up to a lieutenant colonelcy. 

Mr. Greene. Then, you see, in the junior list of majors, we have 
our old friends again, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, only their arrange- 
ment now is 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 5. That is the way they are on 
majors. Now, has he got to follow that up through major, so that, 
supposing all of the junior majors in turn were found in class A ana 
they were all to be promoted, would he go up now in the position 
that the No. 8 man nad, or would he go up in his old original posi- 
tion of 5 ? 

Col. Spaulding. To lieutenant colonel; he would go to his original 

place. 

Mr. Greene. To A ? 

Col. SpauliAng. Yes. The promotion list and the relative list are 
entirely distinct things. Now as a matter of fact, class B in the Sen- 
ate bill, I think, when the system is fairly operating, wUl be a very 
small class. It will really consist of the doubtful cases and those 
cases where they are incUned to be a little bit merciful, and I don't 
think class B will be a large class at all. 

Mr. McKenzie. Wouldn't there be less confusion to leave that out 
of the bill absolutely ? 

Col. Spaulding. 1 think there is venr little to choose between the 
two. I think either one would be satisfactory. The way you have it 
here, two classes, is theoretically better, because I believe, as I think 
you do, that when a man reaches the top of his grade and is due for 
promotion by seniority but is not fit for promotion, then it is very- 
unlikely he is fit for retention in the service. Theoretically that is 
true; practically, of course, if we have got three classes — I think it 
might work a little better if you have got three classes. Suppose you 
have only two classes, then them an that the Senate bill would put 



ABHT BEOBGAKIZATIOK. 2043 

into class B and suspend from promotion would almost certainly in 
your bill go into class A. 

Mr. Gbeene. Now if you have class B haven't you established a 
kind of limbo in the Army ? Haven't you got the fellow there who is 
neither good nor bad, ana isn't that likely to be a sort of a depressant 
^of the morale ? Now this is conceivable^ I think, within the memory 
of men who are quite junior, perhaps, m the service, tiiat with the 
old post system a potentially very ffood officer found himself by the 
advent of circumstances unaer an old man — to use an Army expres- 
sion — ^who was not particularly ambitious about it, and he wanaered 
around in that post as if he were in a pint cup, displayed no i>articular 
initiative because there was none to display; he performed nis duties 
satisfactorily but his service card under your present system would be 
utterly negligible; it prevents him doing anything, except that 
nothing is found against him. There wasn't anythmg to do, and 
he was off where his personality could not be particulany identified. 
He would be an honest and faithful officer, not nimself conscious that 
he was getting down in standard, not at all conscious of tJhiat — and 
would have been painfully conscious if it had been brought to his 
attention — that fellow finds that by negligible service cards, long 
distance, etc., he is down in class B, and it takes the heart out of a 
fellow whose service has been honest and faithful. ^ 

Col. Spaulding. It might do one of two things; it might take the 
heart out of him, or it might spur him into work. 

Mr. Gbeene. But an enlisted man under the same conditions 
would be discharged as ^'honest and faithful." 

Col. Spaulding. Well, that has nothing to do with his being 
honest and faithful here. 

Mr. Greene. But when a man hasn't anything to do in the service 
and his superiors do not give him any opportunity and he has a 
colorless service card by reason of it, why should he go into class B ? 

Col. Spaulding. I think if his record is perfectly colorless he 
would not be placed below class A. No man is likely to be placed 
below class A unless there is considerable against him on his record. 

Mr. Greene. It is that big indefiniteness about the thing. Colonel, 
that makes us shiver at this class B. 

The absence of the fault or defect entitles any man to be regarded 
as good as his neighbor, but positive misdoing, malfeasance, ineffici- 
ency or anything like that certainly puts him into the other class. 
That is a positive thing; there is no border line about it, but this 
poor fellow that hasn't any record at all except a negative one may 
come before just such a board which is inspired with some of the 
modern idea that nobody is going to be an efficient officer unless he 
revolutionizes the ArmyV sho^^ng initiative every day or so, and 
^^bang" away that fellow goes into class B. 

Mr. Hull. Wouldn't he have an opportunity to do something all 
the time he was there, if he had the stun in him? He would develop, 
wouldn't he ? 

Mr. Greene. Class B, you mean? 

Mr. Hull. No; this man at the post that you speak of. 

Mr. Greene. What is he going to do except wnat he is permitted 
to do? 

Mr. Hull. He could do a lot of things. 



/ 



2044 ARMY RfiORGAinZATlOJr. 

Mr. Greene. Well, you try it. You run up against the old C. O. 
with your initiative and see where you come out. 

Col. Spatjlding. Of course we are trying to eliminate the type of 
man you speak of being a commanding officer. 

Mr. Greene. But until you do elimmate him, the other man ought 
not to be penalized on his account. 

Col. Spaulding. Theoretically I think you are right, but personally 
I would be satisfied to take either. I thmk either one would do the 
business pretty well. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, if a man were put into class B 
according to the Senate provision, and his fate hung in the balance 
for the next year, wouldn't he be inclined to be so nervous over that 
very fact that he would not be able to make up what deficiencies it 
is claimed were present in his military service ? 

Col. Spaulding. Of course it would be very unpleasant to be in 
class B, but it would be a little bit better than to be eliminated 
altogether. 

A&. Crago. I think it would be better for the service for the man 
who found himself in class B to be found either worthy of promotion 
or out he would go. 

The Chairman. You think you prefer the House provision? 

Mr. Crago. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. Which puts them into two classes? 

Mr. Crago. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. Then that suggests this other possible thing. You 
have very wisely predicated aU your remarks as to the possibility 
under this proposed system on the suggestion that it ought to be 
operated by human beings, and that is what we have to look at too. 
Now it is possible that it in class A promotion goes by strict lineal 
seniority and somebody stands between a desired man and the 
promotion, just one file, or two files, two people, and there are suf- 
licient paper evidences to make it a case of doubt, he can go into 
those files intervening and can go into class B. 

Col. Spaulding. I have no fear whatever of either one of these 
provisions doing a man any injustice. I have no doubt that each will 
operate to eliminate most of the deadwood, but I have no idea that 
either of them will eliminate all of the deadwood. 

Mr. Greene. I want to say that with the utmost respect for the 
service, because I think its code, its sense of honor, and all that sort 
of thing are the most exalted, yet there is always the possibility of the 
human factor entering into that thing just as you yourself have sug- 
gested, and we have seen most extraordinary recommendations for 
promotion sent down to the hill — most extraordinary. 

Col. Spauij)ing. You see there is a board of five general officers, 
and individual prejudice can't work very much. 

Mr. Greene. I would believe that if I did not have this daily before 
my mind as a suggestion that there were other possibilities too, and 
that is while whatever five splendid American citizens, general officers, 
might determine for the benefit of the service, there is still a power 
hi^er than theirs, and even then, no matter how peculiarly repugnant 
that selection may seem to be to a great body of citizens away from 
this hill, two-thirds of 96 men have been found willing to confirm it. 

The Chairman. Let me recall to you the condition that prevailed 
in the Navy a few years ago. There was then what they called the 



AKirr KEOfiGAinZATION. 2045 

"pludking board" — ^Mr. Field has just called my attention to that 
provision. That "plucking board" designated certain men in the 
Navy for retirement. There was a great deal of feeling, a great deal 
of heartache, a great deal of dissatisfaction with it. Men who felt that 
they were physically qualified to continue their services were retired 
absolutely. There was no recourse to anybody else from the decision 
of that board — just as in this bill there is to be no app>eal to anybody. 
Public sentiment became so aroused that that provision of law had 
to be repealed. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; and that is essentially a different thing 
from this. It was unpopular in the Navy and out of it, and in 
principle it was entirely wrong. Of course, superficially they look 
alike, but there is no real resemblance. Now, what is this ? This is a 
board which classifies all officers as fit for promotion or not fit for 
promotion. Every officer who is fit for promotion is listed and he 
IS promoted in order of seniority, and those are eliminated who are 
found unfit for retention, and only those. 

Now, what was the Navy "plucking board" system? Tt was 
based not at all — the determination of whether a man should be 

E lucked or not was based not at all in the first instance on efficiency, 
ut the rule was that a certain number of vacancies must be created 
annually. ; f that number of vacancies came of its own accord, then 
no man was plucked, no matter how inefficient he might be; if that 
number of vacancies was not reached, then some man must be 
plucked, however good he was. That was totally wrong. t was 
solely to create vacancies regardless of efficiency. 

Mr. Wise. Let me ask you this. Colonel: Suppose this board knew — 
we think that for the good of the Army and to keep down friction 
and trouble in the Army we should keep politics out of the Army — 
suppose this board in classifying these officers should find 300 or 
500 officers that they thought were not fit for promotion to the rank 
and put them in class B. Now, do jou think that 500 officers and 
their friends in the Army will sit quietly by and see that thing go 
on, or would there be kind of a commotion in the Army and friction 
in the Armv, and men in the Army and outside of it appealed to in 
their behalf? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir; if we get to such a situation that there 
or three or four or five hundred officers all at once in the Army that 
should be eliminated, then the Army is in a pretty bad state, and 
it don^t matter much what happens to that Army. 

Mr. Wise That number out of the total number would not be 
so many. 

The Chairman. Let me amplify Mr. Wise's statement a little. 

The War Department had a board that recently went over the 
record of every man in the Army. Gen. BuUard was the head of 
that board, and they classified every man in the Army in classes A, 
B, and C. i rather think, without knowing the particulars fully, 
that it was along this proposed plan of A, B, and C. 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir; it was not tjhis plan. 

The Chairman. But at anv rate, quite a good many officers have 
received confidential letters from the War Department to the efiect 
that they are apt to be eliminated from the Army on their records 
as they now appear in the War Department. I have had quite a 



2046 ARMY BEOBGANIZAXIOIf. 

number of calls from men who find themselves in that position and 
who received such letters, and they are very much disturbed. 

Col. Spaulding. No, sir; I think you misimderstand. There was 
a classification, yes, and the third class — those who were placed in 
class 3 were so notified. A circular was published telling wnat these 
classes were. Now, what was class 3 ? That class was those who 
were held unfit for temporary promotion, emergency promotion on the 
readjustment which was to take place and did not. Now that was all 
it was. Those were not to get the emergency promotions, and they 
were notified, ''You are in class 3, and therefore on the readjustment 
of rank you will not get promoted. It is hoped that this notice will 
lead you to reform," or words to that effect. 

The Chairman. Well, I understood that those notices were sent 
after a board has passed upon their records, and even though the man 
had had a splendid recora during the war, if he had had one or two 
superior officers complain about him in the period prior to the war, 
he got his bad mark and such a letter, notwithstanding the wonder- 
fully good work he may have done in the war. 

Col. Spaulding. Each of those boards considered all the records 
that were available about a man, and they used their best judgment 
as to whether this record showed the man to be one fit for promotion 
or not. In some cases a man had a good record during the war 
and a bad record before, and his record during the war was so good 
that it outweighed the other. In other cases a man might have done 
certain things well, but sizing up his record as a whole they were 
satisfied that he was not fit for promotion. Of course that is subiect 
to human error, and the classification that they made now, that tney 
made last stunmer, really was kind of a trial classification; it did no 
man any harm any more than denying him that temporary promotion, 
and the endeavor was to find the less efficient, so that tney should 
not be promoted. They were based, of course, on all the records we 
have, but they were incomplete records. You had to do it on what 
you had; you couldn't wait until you had all the records, or it would 
never be done; but this will be based on a most complete record. 

The Chairman. Of bourse, my object in caUing attention to that 
condition was simply to supplement what Mr. Wise said about the 
pressure that will come upon Membette of Congress when that. list is 
finally prepared. 

Mr. Greene. May I suggest there, even with that Ust prepared as 
it was last summer, classifying certain men in class 3, there was no 
authority of law by virtue of such classification to eliminate those 
men from the service; neither was there authority of law to deny 
them their regular lineal promotion which came about automatically. 
It was only to serve that temporary purpose, and as I understand 
it — I will put it in this form to be sure that I do understand it— the 
only way now that you can get rid of an officer in the Army who is 
not a probationer and thereby on file specifically is by a court-martial 
or by fining him when he comes up in turn for his examination for 
promotion to the next grade. 

Col. Spaulding. Yes, sir. Now you have spoken of examinations 
for promotion, and that naturally brings up this next section. I 
would like to speak there about the examination for promotion. 
That is a method of elimination, and it has done a great deal of good, 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 2047 

4 

"but I think the present system of examination for promotion is quite 
xmsatisfactory. It has done some good, but it has not done good at 
all proportionate to the amount of labor and trouble and nervous 
prostration that it has caused. It is an examination for promotion, 
strictly an examination. You examine a man in certam subjects 
and he makes 75 per cent in those subjects; then he is passed and he 
is entitled to promotion though every member of the board may 
Imow that he is not fit to hold a commission. Some of the poorest 
of&cers we have are men who are able to pass any examination, but 
are temperamentally or mentally entirely unfit to command men. 

On the other hand, suppose this man does not make 75 per cent on 
his examination; then he has failed, although you may know that 
this man is a pretty good average officer who, due to lack of oppor- 
tunity for preparation or lack of experience in that particular branch 
of work, cat! not quite make it. I don^t think that any unusually 
good officer has ever been eliminated by it, but I do know that a few 
average officers have failed on their promotion examination, and an 
enormous number of mighty poor officers have passed it. There is a 
great deal of labor then in that promotion examination, with the 
result of accomplishing a very little good in ehmination. Its primary 
good, though, has not been elimination; it has been in holding every 
man up to the mark. He knew he had to get ready and prepare 
himself on professional subjects at least every three or four years, 
and that was the real good of it. Now we have here something to 
take the place of the promotion examination. It will accomplish all 
the purposes of a promotion examination and do it better than that 
examination did. It will really eliminate the unfit man much more 
successfully than the promotion examination. It will get the man 
who is temperamentally unfit, and who can yet pass any examination. 
It will get nim out. By the way, as to that, there was a report of a 
certain colonel of Coast Artillery rendered on a series of high-ranking 
officers of Artillery, his confidential opinion of them, and some of his 
remarks were very apt. He said about a certain officer— and all of 
thftse half dozen that he was reporting on were technically very 
good — he said: *'This officer is totally lacking in common sense, 
although in anything unpractical he is very strong.'' Of another he 
said : '/ This man is entirely unfit to command anything; '' of another, 
*'It is impossible to assign this officer to any duty commensurate with 
his rank and always was,'' and yet every one of those officers were 
men who can pass any examination you can ever give thexn. Now, 
this elimination will get those men. 

Mr. Wise. But you assume there that the officer making that 
report is perfectly fair and incapable of making a mistake. 

Col. Spaulding. No, I do not assume that. He is one man report- 
ing out of 40 that this board will consider. I am not saying that he 
is infallible, but I am saying that we have that type of man in the 
Army, the man who can pass an examination but is good for nothing 
else. 

Now, we have substituted in here — you have here a provision for 
promotion examination to take the place of that promotion examina- 
tion we now have. You have the classification and the further 
provision that when a man who was put in class A goes up for pro- 
motion his record is overhauled again by a special board. Now 1 



2048 AKMY REORGANIZATIOK. 

think that is well enough, but it can perfectly well be stricken out — 
this provision for a promotion examination. It is simply a second 
examination of the man, and I doubt very much if any man who has 
stood the first test of being put in class A is going to be affected by 
this. It is going to give the board some trouble and him some 
trouble, but it is not necessary. 

Mr. Gbeene. Right in line with what Mr. Wise has suggested, 
suppose this yearns efficiency returns goes up to the board and we 
are Deginnir^ this annual classification, and ''A'* is under suspicion 
by reason of the returns made on him that year; his commanding 
officer has reported adversely, but he does not report adversely as to 
any out and out violation of the Articles of War or of any act that 
would call for discipline and would therefore come under the other 
process of elimination hj cotlrt-martial — it is simply as to the tem- 
peramental fitness, the suitability and fitness, as the phrase now nms, 
of this man for the proper exercise of a commission in the Regular 
Army — does that officer then act in that capacity as one who initiates 
proceedings and is not the final determiner by any means? Does 
the officer under such a charge have an opportunity to present him- 
self to the board or have witnesses in his favor to clear up what might 
have been the occasion of the charge presented by his commanding 
officer ? 

Col. Spaulding. The regulation on efficiency reports is that when- 
over an adverse remark concerning a fact is made the report must be 
referred to the officer for any statement he wishes to make; if it is a 
matter of opinion, of course it is useless to refer it to him, because 
all he can say is, '^I think otherwise." 

Mr. Greene. Precisely. 

Col. Spaulding. It is useless, and also, of course, it would be 
awkward. 

Mr. Greene. I appreciate that, and I have had in mind that very 
fact, that there is printed upon the efficiency return, upon the in- 
structions, in some way, as I recall it, that if the superior officer should 
make a recommendation as to the character of this man's efficiencv 
which is derogatory to his professional status, the officer in turn shall 
be allowed to file his own defense with it. Now of course when it 
comes to matters of fact, that is very clear that he should have the 
opportunity to put in his evidence in rebuttal, and that would be the 
ordinary procedure in civil life in any trial court, but when it comes 
to a matter of opinion, how far will that opinion weigh as though it 
were facts and where is this border line in which a man not being 
able to appear in person, not being able to display his personality 
before the board by which he is to be examined and give them an 
opportunity to inquire at first hand into his character and fitness, 
what is his opportunity then to disabuse this higher board of the im- 
pression which this man's opinion has given them? 

Col. Spaulding. The board would le acting not on one report but 
on very many, and you may be perfectly sure that a board will not 
decide adversely to a man because there has been one report or two 
reports or three reports made against him, but only when the general 
tenor of the rieports is against him. My hesitation as to the reliability, 
the safety of trusting to these reports gets less and less the more I see 
of them. I used to be terribly afraid that a man would have an 



ASMT B350BGANIZATIOK. 204& 

injustice done him, but the more I see of efficiency reports, the more 
satisfied I am that the man always gets the benefit of the doubt. 

Mr. Greene. Now I have in mind a man who has attained your 
length of service in the Army and is personally identified by any 
number of men likely to be selected on this board ; who is known to 
have by reputation a definite and altogether admirable status in the 
Army; sucn a man, if a charge were preferred against him by some 
misadventure, stands in a very good position to defend himself, 
because there i3 a very natural tendency on the part of the board to 
believe that either the man has gone mad or else his commanding 
officer is laboring under tremendous prejudice. But we will take a 
junior, a "shave-tail," a young man who has only had two or three 
years' service, in which he is getting on to his feet, and he happens to 
run up against two or three officers who are themselves so old and 
experienced in the service that their responses to its demands are 
automatic, and who have little tolerance or patience with the young 
fellow who is trying to find out where he does belong, and he is often 

Eretty sweaty in his introduction into the service anyway, that f eflow 
asn't any advantage in having numerous reports from other officers 
who might have had a better experience with hun to help him out in his 
difficulty; he has got to stand oi* fall on pretty much the first com- 
manding officer he is assigned to when he went into the Army. 

Now, all of these su^estions lead to this direct question: Can the 
officer under such charges, which are not properly to be investigated 
through the machinery of a court-martial, wnere he must appear in 
person, have the same advantage in appearing in person when his 
temperamental disability and fitness, or other similar vague and 
indefinite charges are made against him ? 

Col. Spaulding. You are referring now to the original classifica- 
tion ? 

Mr. Greene. Yes. 

Col. Spaulding. I think there is no objection to putting in a pro- 
vision of that sort. I don't bdlieve it is necessary, really, as far as 
the general justice is concerned: 1 think it might be advantageous 
in order that that man can have no complaint to make that he did 
not get a hearing — ^for the psychological eflFect on you people. 

Mr. Greene. 1 am not looking to the expectation of great numbers 
of men who might be in this general difficulty, but it is an old maxim 
of law, that nine guilty men snould escape rather than that one inno- 
cent man should be punished, and that is a prettv good sweetening 
savor of justice to carry through the Army as well as civil life. 

Col. Spaulding. The Senate bill, I believe, has adopted a provision 
of that so vt, providing for a hearing, that a man niay be classified, 
put into class C in the first place, but before that is nnal he is to be 
notified that he is tentatively placed in class C and asked if he wants 
a hearing. If he accepts it, all right; if he wants a hearing, he is 
given the hearing before a court of inquiry, and everything that he 
presents before that court of inquiry is sent back to the original 
classification board. 

Mr. Greene. In your own arm of the service a number of years 
ago, as many men in the service now will recall, there was a certain 
officer in charge of one of the coast defenses who finally, by virtue of 
a little quiet Army manipulation, was assigned to an interior po st 
but .nobody knows to this day, probably, how much mischief he 



2050 ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 

caused before that thing was officially taken notice of, and he was so 
removed from the opportunity to do more of that mischief, but in 
that time if you had nad the proposed law in effect, how many Army 
careers could he have wrecked ? 

Col. SPAULDrNG. Of course, with this system we would have elimi- 
nated him long before he was a commanding officer. 

Mr. Greene. But until you get those old fellows eliminated? 

Col. Spaulding. Which we hope to do the first year. 

Mr. Greene. I don't like to see the other nian put at their mercy. 

Col. Spaulding. I think it might be very well to put in a provision 
similar to that of the Senate bill, that a man should be notified that 
he is tentatively placed in class C and given the opportunity to have 
a board of inquu'y, and the report of that board of mquiry submitted 
to the classification board before it makes its final determination. 

The Chairman. I think the officer should have a chance to find 
out who prefers the charges, who has filed or who makes the report 
against him, and should be given a chance to reply. 

Col. Spaulding. That applies particularly to tne case you mention, 
of the junior officer who may have had hard luck with his command- 
ing officers for the two or three years only, that he has served. A 
provision about like the Senate provision in there would be all right. 

The Chairman. We find that under some officers, a junior officer 
does mighty fine work; and then again under some other officer he 
can't get along at all. 

Mr. Greene. Some seniors have a very happy inspiration toward 
schoolmastership, which every junior officer has to run through for 
a while anyway, and others, while they are very efficient themselves, 
do not seem to have the toleration or patience necessary to school the 
younger officers. 

Cot. Spaulding. The capacity of command and the capacity to 
teach do not necessarily go together at all. 

The Chairman. Colonel, have you about finished the section? 

Col. Spaulding. Yes. As to that s'ection for the examination for 
promotion, I think it is very well for that to be stricken out. It is 
narmless as it stands here; it will do a little good, but I think it adds 
so little to the classification system that we can perfectly well omit 
it, as the Senate has done. 

The Chairman-. Section 24 is ^'Transfer of officers.'' 

Col. Spaulding. That speaks for itself. 

The Chairman. And 24-C, '^Appointment of officers." That hasn't 
anything to do with this. 

Col. Spaulding. I think that covers the whole thing. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you. Colonel. You 
have been very helpful to the committee, I am sure. 

Gen. Williams, the committee will be very glad to hear any further 
suggestions that you may have to make. 

STATEMENTS OF MAJ. OEN. C. C. WILLIAMS, CHIEF OF OBD- 
NANCE, AND COL. W. S. PEIBCE, ORDNANCE CORPS. 

Gen. Williams. Mr. Chairman, I am quite in aCTeement, so far 
as I am concerned — so far as we in the Ordnance Department are 
concerned — on many of the benefits of the single list. An army, 
however, it seems to me, is made up of various activities, and the 



ARMir BBOBGANIZATIOF. 2051 

efficiency of the Army is going to depend ubon the proper assignment 
of officers to those activities, and it would seem that a single list 
should be incidental to the organization of the Army and not the 
organization of the Army incidental to the single list. 

I suppose that you will give us a certain number of officers, say^ 
400, or whatever the number may happen to be. We do not want 
just four hundred or five hundred officers; we want four hundred 
or five hundred Ordnance officers; and it is going to be exceedingly 
important in the beginning that the process of selection for assign- 
ment to these particular specific expert duties is well done. In fact^ 
the fate of these departments for many years is going to depend 
upon this first selection, and I must differ with what Mr. Greene said 
about it making no difference whether we have four hundred or five 
hundred officers scattered, most of them, say, second lieutenants^ 
first lieutenants, or what not. 

Mr. Greene. Of course, if you are going to bring that into the 
record. General, I hope you will quote me correctly, as you intend 
doubtless to do. I did not say it did not make any difference whether 
they were all lower grades, you know. I meant to say, and intended 
to be understood as saying, that the exact proportion of the grades 
might not necessarily have to rim in the same degree of proportion 
that works out where practical arms were organized, so that it re- 
quired a definite number of men in the grades. 

Gen. Williams. Well, that is what I had in mind, just what you 
have said, but still it seems to me important that we should have a 
well-rounded and well-balanced organization, in so far as the various 
grades and the assignments to those grades are concerned. It is 
just as important that we have an officer of proper rank in many of 
the important jobs that we have as it is that a tactical arm shall 
have a colonel at the head of a regiment, a major at the head of a 
battalion, and so forth. 

Now, in the matter of this bill, it is not clear to me just how the 
Ordnance Department, for instance, is going to be able to exercise- 
any control or have any influence, except incidental, over the selec- 
tion of the officers who are to be appointed in the Ordnance De"^art- 
ment. We in the Ordnance Department alone know the qualifica- 
tions of those officers. There is nobody else who knows that, and if 
we are going to make proper selection it seems to me that there 
should be a provision in the bill that would give to the head of the 
corps the authority to, by means of a board of Ordnance officers, deter- 
mine the qualifications of the people that we want to take in . We have,, 
of course, a large field of experienced officers to draw from. J antici- 
pate that it will be somewhat difficidt — it is not going to be a per- 
fectly easy matter to get the kind of officer we want. I think we will 
have to go to many of mem — we should be able to go to them and make 
a definite statement to them as to what prosrects they would have ; 
that we would be able to give so-and-so the grade of lieutenant colonel, 
another one the grade of major, etc., and that we can s'^eak with a 
certain amount of authority. As it stands now i don't see that we- 
can sT?eak to any of them with any authority at all, and the remedy 
that I would subtest is first, that, so far as the Ordnance Department- 
is concerned, we have a permanent department all the way down; 
that we be assigned the percentage of colonels and lieutenant colonels^ 
etc., that will correspond to the number in the Army at large, and 



2052 ARMY BSQBGAHIZAXIO)?. 

that we be given the authority to make recommendations for the 
filling of the original \acanciea and the rpomotions that would occur 
in the Ordnance De^^artment as a result of this number of colonels, 
lieutenant colonels, etc., that are assigjned to us. 

J f we do not have some authority like that, I anticipate difficulty 
in getting the rrorer number of trained officers to come into the 
department that we must have in order to carrv on its work. 

Now, in so far as the details of the effect of this bill are concerned, 
I should like very much indeed if Col. Peirce could take it up and go 
more into the details than 1 have gone. 

The Chairman. We would be very glad to hear from you, Col. 
Peirce. 

Col. Peiece. First I would like to draw a distinction which it seems 
to me must be drawn if we are going to get this thing clearly before 
us, the distinction that there is between me original establishment of 
the Army that is to be created under this bill and the subsequent 
process of filling vacancies that occur in years hereafter. X think the 
two are quite distinct. For the first you are compelled to get approx- 
imately in round numbers about 8,000 officers from sources outside 
of the Regular Army. You have two sources from which to fill up 
the number of officers allowed by this bill. One source is the Regular 
Army; the other sources are at present outside the Regular Army. 

You provide that not less than one-half of these vacancies shall be 
filled by appointment of suitably qualified people not now in the 
Regular Army. J. presume, of course, that the intent is to form an 
Army that shall at least start out with the promise of efficiency in all 
its branches. 

Now, I want to trace briefly the successive steps in this process 
of filling the Army as a starter. } n the first place, take this one-half 
of the vacancies that are to be ffiled from outside — ^not less than 
one-half. The process that we wish to follow is as follows, as far as 
the Ordnance Department is concerned, and the other supply serv- 
ices — ^for they are agreed entirely on this, but for purposes of sim- 
plicity I will descnbe it simply from the Ordnance Department 
point of view: 

We desire to form in the Ordnance Department a board of officers 
to be appointed by the Secretary of War, consisting of not less than 
three ordnance officers, and two medical officers. Every candidate 
for appointment in the Ordnance Department will appear before this 
board and pass such examination, as to his mental, moral, and 
physical condition and qualities as may be nrescribed by the Secre- 
tary of War upon reconunendation of the Chief of Ordnance. The 
medical officers will participate only in the physical examination. A 
candidate who has successfully passed that examination may be con- 
sidered as an eligible candidate and can then be presented to this 
feneral board that is to pass upon the selections. That is, he goes 
efore this board with the statement that he is acceptable to the Ord- 
nance Department, and if then selected by this board, he can be 
appointed in the grade determined in the Ordnance Department. 

Now, as a matter of fact, we already know all of the lieuten- 
ant-colonels, all of the men who might be appointed lieutenant 
<^olonels under authority of this act. i do not mean to say that there 
are not sufficient men qualified for the job in the United States, but 
there is another condition hitched to that: they must desire to take 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2053 

the job, and we do not at the present time know of more than five 
who fill both of those conditions, who are in om* judgment qualified 
for the job and who are willing to take it. We know of none in 
the ffraae of colonel — unless you consider these five as also eligible, 
for doubtless they would be willing to take the position of colonel if 
it were offered to them. We hope in the grade of major to get at 
least 25. 

Now we have asked, as the result of a very careful and exhaustive 
study of the present and prospective work of the Ordnance Depart- 
ment, and the care of the property that is now in being, for a total of 
480 officers. According to the percentages that are implied in the 
section of your bill which rives the total number of officers in the 
Army in each grade, based on 480 officers there would be in the 
Ordnance Department 19 colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels, and 72 
majors. There will be of regular officers qualified for the Ordanance 
Department not to exceed 14 colonels, by next July. If any further 
casualties occur between now and then there will be a smaller number. 

Of those who would be in the grade of lieutenant colonel bv normal 
promotion to fill vacancies created imder this act there will be but 6, 
and as I said, not more than 5 that we know of from the outside that 
could qualify and who would be willing to come into the grade of 
lieutenant colonel. There would then be 14 colonels and 1 1 lieutenant 
colonels. 

We do not believe that we can successfully organize the department 
with the large number of men that will have to be taken in from the 
outside with that proportion of officers in those grades. It is for that 
reason, and for that reason alone, that we have asked for that pro- 
vision by which, in case those grades ^tre not filled by promotion of 
Regular officers, the normal promotion of Regular officers and available 
candidates from the outside, we can fill them by the promotion of 

?ualified men from the next lower grades in the department. That, 
would say again, is only a step in the organization of the depart- 
ment; it is on aU fours with the step of taking in people from the 
outside. We are taking in^ or hope to take in, people from the outside 
and place them where then* age and experience qualifies them to be, 
and we are only asking in this limited number of cases to do exactly 
the same thing with the other class of candidates that are available. 
Col. Spaulding thought that that was the entering wedge, and that 
further requests in subsequent years for special consideration would 
ensue. In the first place, I do not think that any legislation which 
you gentlemen may pass here will exempt you from, the possibility of 
future requests. I tnink those will come whatever the form of legis- 
lation is. In the second place, in the instances that he recited, while 
I believe that many of you are famiUar with the reasons for those 
exceptions, I think it is onlj fair that I speak of them. The excep- 
tion made in subsequent legislation by which officers could be detailed 
to the Ordnance Department with an increase in grade was made 
solely upon the representation, after two or three vears of trial, that 
officers could not oe procured for the Ordnance Department unless 
some such special inducement were offered. We had at that time a 
list of actual vacancies which could not be filled, which were produced 
in evidence of the necessity for this legislation. 

I want to sav further in that connection, that our proposals and 
our arguments nave been based entirely upon the performance of the 

150187— 20— VOL 2 ^17 



2054 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

ordnance job with efficiency, and absolutely not with any reference 
to promotion involved. 

Mr. Greene. May I ask you there this, then: If that is a good 
argument in favor of filling in these higher vacancies in the Ordnance 
Department by the promotion of men now on the seniority list of the 
Ordnance Department — that is to say, in order that men already 
experienced in the service and with a background of service behind 
them, may be in the higher ranks, so that tney can take up the new 
men that come on and organize and carry on the work, then why 
wouldn't it apply exactly to the line? Because the line is going to 
infiltrate, too, from the outside, and it would be argued that a good 
cavalry man who is now a first lieutenant and almost ripe for captain, 
but even under the reorganization bill does not quite get his captaincy 
ought really to have it ahead of a new man coming with simply a 
war record.' 

Col. Peirce. It would rest entirely, I think, Mr. Greene, on the 
same proposition; that is, that you can not get sufficiently qualified 
candidates from any other source. 

Mr. Greene. Well, is there a distinction then, in the character of 
efficiency brought into the service as between the staff and line jobs 
that makes a numerical difference in prospective candidates ? 

Col. Peirce. A difference of knowledge, of training. 

Gen. Williams. It results from the fact that there are a limited 
number of people, of the kind of people that have what we call 
^'ordnance experience.'' 

Mr. Greene. Your field of choice is narrow, as compared with the 
Une? 

Gen. Williams. I should say very much narrower. 

Col. Peirce. Col. Spaulding said that this was a proposition to 
advance certain men who were no better men than himself and CoL 
Hammond, simply because they were in the Ordnance Department. 
I admit very cheerfully and reaclily that they are no better men than 
the examples cited, but they do know ordnance work better, and this 
is a question of getting ordnance work done. If Col. Hammond or 
Col. Spaulding had had experience in ordnance work we would most 
cheerfullv and gladly welcome them. We will take anybody and 
everybody who is qualified before this thing is resorted to at all. 
It is asked only as a practical step in the formation of the department. 

As an evidence of the way that this subject has been approached 
by the Ordnance .Department, I want to say that it was studied 
with the view of fittmg the Ordnance Department's needs to the 
single list, and in every other way coming as nearly perfectly into the 
scheme that seemed to command the most support and favor of the 
Army and here; and whereas we have heretofore had not only a 
higher percentage of officers in the field grades, but have had the 
additional preference of detail to advanced grades — and I will say in 
passing, these officers all came under that supposition, have been 
serving in these advanced grades, and have therefore, to a certain 
extent at least, a vested right in them — that is, it was part of the 
inducement which got them into this line of work — tnose other 
preferences are entirely taken away by this bill; we are not asking for 
any preference at all; we do not want anything that is not in our 
opinion absolutely necessary in order to start out with an ordnance 
dei^artment. 



' ARMY RE0RGANIZATI033^. 2055 

Now, such officers as would be promoted one grade to meet these 
conditions would go on the single Lst in the place determined by their 
length of commissioned service; they would not be promoted an 
additional grade until every man on that list ahead of them and with 
service longer than they had been promoted to that higher grade. 

Mr. Greene. But wouldn't you by that very fact introduce into the 
several grades of the Army to which you make these promotions men 
who are younger than the average in the grade, and make a hump in 
the grade finally, when you got up to the top ? 

Col. Peirce. No; I think a mistake into which a good many here 
have fallen is this: this promotion list has no reference to grade; it is 
formed, you might say, oy taking Smith and Jones and Robinson in 
accordance with their length of service, generally speaking,modified 
slightly by the different provisions in this bill, ana you may write 
them down in this list without their rank, without the branch of the 
service in which they are, or any other distinguishing characteristics. 

Mr. Greene. I understand. 

Col. Peirce. Therefore it might be that a man, a present lieutenant 
colonel — and il would be so in the case of the promotions under dis- 
cussion — ^would be written down below a lot of majors, and he would 
stay there and would not be promoted to the grade of colonel until 
all those majors had been promoted to the grade of colonel. 

Mr. Greene. Is there any such provision as that in this tentative 
draft? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir; that is as I understand the formation of 
your promotion list. Once in the list you go on up by seniority, as I 
understand it. 

Mr. Greene. You are not held back by any running mate ? 

Col. Peirce. You are not held back at all. 

Mr. Greene. Now, then, supposing, under the present averages a 
man is somewhere near 60 years old before he becomes a lieutenant- 
colonel, isn^t he? On the old Army basis he was more likely to be 
nearer 60 than he was 55 before he became a lieutenant colonel. 

Gen. Williams. I think so. I am not sure about it. 

Mr. Greene. Approximately somewhere in there. 

Col. Peirce. It was so in the Cavalry, I know. 

Mr. Greene. Approximately in there, because one of the unfortu- 
nate things was when we would write a man off for a big field com- 
mand it was about time for him to retire, and it was very unfortunate 
that he did not arrive at the grade earlier in life. That being true, 
those same men returning in the srvice now, their ages with regard 
to one another are in the same relative situation. Supposing that 
your lieutenant colonels of to-day — under the reorganization, rather — 
are all men this side of 55, between 50 and 55, ana you introduce into 
that grade a sprinkle — as you do in the lower grades — a sprinkle of 
men that are in the 40's; now the natural casualties are going to 
reduce that grade, because some of them may never reach their 
colonelcy. The natural casualties are going to reduce that grade and 
make vacancies with everybody except you folks, and your officers are 
going to hold down two or three files in there, because nobody will be 
taken away from you, because your men are younger than the others. 

Col. Peirce. He is going to hold his position, ves, but he is not 
going to be promoted until those of longer length oi service have been 
promoted to the higher grade. 



2056 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Greene. I don't understand it so. 

Gen. Williams. Well, say a major in the next lower grade but of 
greater total length of service came up to the lieutenant-coloners 
grade, he would be eligible for promotion over one of these. 

Mr. Greene. I didn't understand that there was to be that con- 
stantly fluctuating elastic provision after the list was once determined. 

Gen. Williams. They take their place on the promotion list in 
accordance with the length of service. That automatically comes 
about. 

Mr. Greene. But will it under our understanding of what we are 
drawing here ? However, I don't want to delay the nearing. 

Col. rEiRCE. I think there is no division into grades, in the pro- 
motion list, in my understanding of the bill. 

Now, the other thing that I wanted specially to speak about is the 
method of recruitment in subsequent years to fill the casual vacancies 
that occur after your Army is formed and proceeds. All those va- 
cancies, of course, will be in the grade of second lieutenant. A colonel 
dies or retires, a lieutenant-colonel is promoted, a major is promoted, 
a captain is promoted, a first lieutenant is promoted, a second lieu- 
tenant is promoted, and then the vacancy has prdpa^ated itself 
down to the lowest grade; therefore we consider only the question 
of the appointment of second lieutenants in the matter of filling future 
casual yacancies. We desire to fill a certain number of ordnance 
vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant with graduates of the 
Military Academy; and a certain number from graduates of approved 
technical schools throughout the country, and of course opportunity 
is also offered to enlisted men of the Army, as it is in every branch. 

Of course the method of getting cadets is known to you all. It is 
the same as it is in any other branch of the Army. 

With reference to these technical graduates we would like to be able 
to go, say in the spring of the year, 5o the faculties of all these differ- 
ent schools and request them to name one, two or three, from each 
school of that year s graduates whom they consider would be fitted 
for ordnance work — that is, graduates of their technical courses, 
their engineering courses. Then all those ^aduates would come 
before a board of ordnance officers, just as m the case of the ap- 

Eointees, and we might have 25 or 30 such candidates, and we might 
ave but 5 or 10 vacancies. Their examination would then be a 
competitive examination and the 5 or 10 sufficient to fill the vacancies 
would be selected from these 25 or 30, or whatever the number of 
candidates might be. We think it is a very important thing to get 
this infiltration into the department of the best men that we can get 
from all over the country who have had that kind of an engineering 
education, as well as getting a certain number from West Point. 
The meeting of the two and the blending of the two we believe to be 
very advantageous. 

The Chairman. Would you give the graduates of West Point that 
examination? 

Col. Peirce. No, sir; because only those would come into the 
Ordnance Department who would be recommended by the academic 
board, and in graduation they have passed their entrance examina- 
tion. 

The Chairman. You would accept the recommendation of the 
academic board ? 



ABMT RBOBGAinZATION. 205T\ ^ 



N..- 



Col. Peirge. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. Then what you have just proposed does not need 
any law, does it, because we already pro vide by law for a means of 

§etting into the Anny from civil life, and the regulation by the 
ecretary could assign as many from the academy as you wanted, 
leaving you some vacancies to be filled from civil life ? 

Col. Peirce. It would not, as you have drawn the bill, because we 
can not do that unless we have a permanently commissioned force 
down to and including second lieutenants, because we have found 
from experience that when we go to these graduates of technical 
schools who come into the service, our service, the Ordnance Depart- 
ment, solely because they like it, because they are drawn to it, 
are attracted by the character of the work that we have to do — if 
we are obliged to tell them: ^*We can not take you in directly; we 
can not assure you that you will get into the Ordnance Department 
and in that line of work that attracts you ; you will have to take a 
conmiission in the line of the Army and then after some time'' — 
whatever it may be, two years training if they put them all through 
a line school — ''you may be detailed in the Ordnance Department.'' 
They say ''I did not ask to come into the Infantry or the 
Cavalry; 1 like the line of work that the Ordnance Department has 
to do; it is in line with my technical education; it is attractive to 
me, but if I can't get in with any certainty I don't care to take the 
chance." 

Now another thing on this permanent personnel down through the 
grades — this is in answer to what you, Mr. Greene, specifically spoke 
of yesterday — suppose we had the young man detailed in the lowest, 
or the two lowest grades. During his detail with th6 Ordnance 
Department it must be true that his classification under A and B 
would depend upon the character of work that he does in the Ordnance 
Department, because there is nothing else upon which to classify 
him. Suppose that he is found unfitted for ordnance work and he 
is returned to the line. He has had very little line training; he has 
certainly had none in and no connection with the line since he has been 
in the Ordnance Department; he goes back to the line with the 
stigma of having been found unfitted in what he tried first. Upon 
what basis then would he be classified in the line, say in his nrst 
year there? It would be a basis which would not be favorable to 
nim at least. 

Mr. Greene. What would you propose then, if you would take 
him in permanently ? 

Col. jPeirce. The first safeguard is this examination that I speak 
of, which is a method of selection not infallible, but pretty good, as 
good as can be devised, for initial selection. 

Mr. Greene. Now, supposing he qualified academically and to all 
other outward appearances, yet he shows that he lacks suitability 
and fitness for the service? 

Col. Peirce. After he got in ? 

Mr. Greene. Yes. Now what are you going to do with him ? 

Col. Peirce. There is no reason why under this bill he could not 
be transferred to the line of the Army. As far as the Ordnance 
Department of the Army is concerned, we should promptly classify 
him in class C. 



2058 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Greene. Well, then, you see you are just working it the other 
way; you are sending back to the line what you don't want, and they 
have a chance to send over to you what they don't want? 

Col. Peirce. I am not advocating that, sir. That is sure. 

Mr. Greene. No ; if you put the man in there permanently and he is 
assigned only to the Ordnance and does not have any life anywhere 
else in the Army, then you find that he doesn't meet with your re- 
quirements and tests, and you are going to put him out entirely, 
are you? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. All right. 

Col. Peirce. For this reason: As I said yesterday, the Ordnance — 
the field of ordnance work, is so varied ; there is designing mechanical 
work; there is the superintendence of shops; there is the chemical 
work connected with explosives and pyrotechnics; there is the field 
work connected with supply and maintenance in the field; and if a 
young man is found after trial in that diverse field still to be a failure 
the chances that he would be a success in any other branch of the 
Army are, I think, negligible, because the same qualities which would 
have made his failure in all these branches in the Ordnance imply a fun- 
damental lack that would make him equally undesirable to the line 
of the Army. I think that no system can be devised which will 
eliminate certainly all those who are not up to a high standard, but I 
do not think that it is a good idea for any branch of the service to 
unload its discards on any other branch. I think each branch will 
have to carry that which it will not, under the system of elimination 
which you provide, get rid of itself. 

I do not know that we have anything further — that I have any- 
thing further to say along those lines. We have prepared in response 
to Mr, Kahn's request yesterday, which we will submit to-morrow, 
definite amendments by page and line to the tentative bill, which will 
express these views which are concurred in entirely by the other three 
sunply services. 

Mr. Miller. Can those be gotten into the text of this bill without 
destroying the merit system? 

Gen. Williams. Having once formed the department, it immedi- 
ately passes into the body of the single list, so that it operates just 
exactly the same thereafter as the single list advocated would. 

Mr. Greene. Having that in mind, let me recur to a question asked 
Col. Peirce. If it is good for the Ordnance, then it ought to be good 
for any other arm of the service. 

Col. Peirce. If you have the same conditions. . 

Mr. Greene. Then what would be the effect of that, other than 
the immediate promotion of everybody now in the Regular Service 
up as far as he can go, and then inmtrating, or rather introducing, into 
tne remaining lower grades the men who have come in as candidates 
from civil life ? 

Gen. Williams. That is just exacly the thing we want to avoid. 
We would like to have some say as to who is going to come in as 
lieutenant colonels, majors, etc. 

Col. Peirce. You have a very wide field of candidates in the line. 
Mr. Greene. I am not proposing that. 

Col. Peirce. You have men who have served during the war in 
these very positions. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2059 

Mr. Greene. If you be^n to jack up the men now on the lineal 
list of the Regular Establishment, in order to prepare your Army to 
go into the lineal list on what you think is a fair working basi^, then 
the other arms of the service ought to be allowed to do the same thing, 
and that would mean that pretty nearly all senior officers go up and 
all the men who come in it would have to go to the bottom. 

Col. Peirce. But let me emphasize this, Mr. Greene: We do not 
propose to do this until the possibilities of getting candidates from every 
other source is exhausted. We do not propose to do this until three 
months after this thing has started. 

Mr. Greene. And with exactly that same leeway each of the other 
arms might undertake to follow the same policy, and probably will 
come out pretty near the same place when you get through. 

Gen. Williams. Well, irrespective of any incidental promotion of 
any of the Regular officers in the Ordnance Department, we would 
advocate that we be permitted to form the initial list of the Ordnance 
Department, leaving out these promotions, if the committee is not 
agreeable to it, but the formation of that initial list of the Ordnance 
Department is to us a matter'of prime importance. 

Mr. Greene. And I can see how, from my reading of the bill, that, 
perhaps gratuitously but still practically, you have that opportunity. 
1 suppose that by reason of the fact that three staff officers sat on 
the board you would make recomniendations to them of the men you 
iound qualified in the grade you wanted them in — ^I suppose that 
would be the practical operation of it. I have thought so all long. 

Gen. Williams. It is not stated in the bill how it is going to be 
done. 

Mr. Greene. I can see a reason why it should be done that way, 
as I can see a practical reason why the new men coming in, you ought 
to have a first vis6 on them. 

Col. Peirce. If a provision then is a good provision there would 
seem to be no reason why it should not be plainly provided in the 
bill, rather than left simply to discretion as to whether it is used or 
not. If it is a good thing it can do no harm in the bill, and without 
it, it may not be used. 

Mr. Dent. In other words, your position is that we should put a 
provision something like this in the bill, that selection of the Ord- 
nance officers to fill vacancies caused by the act shall be made on the 
recommendation of the Ordnance Department ? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dent. And the same way with the other departments. 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. I don't see what objection there is to that. 

Col. Peirce. We have that precise amendment drafted here. 
^ Mr. Hull. General, that sounds very reasonable, but would that 
give you the opportunity of getting rid of anybody that was tmfit ? 

Gen. Williams. They pass on to the single list. Once the per- 
isonnel of the Ordnance Department is established, it passes on to 
the single list and comes under the operation of the law whereby 
■suitability is established. 

Mr. Hull. But suppose we make that corps permanent; are all 
the men that are at present in the Ordnance to be retained in the 
Ordnance ? 

Gen. Williams. We hope so. 



2060 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Hull. You don't think you have anybody at all that ought 
to be off? 

Gen. Williams. Oh, they would be passed upon and classified 
into A, B, and C, in accordance with the provisions of the law. 

Col. Peirce. Everyone at present in the service of the Ordnance 
Department who is not now commissioned in the Ordnance Depart- 
ment, would, under the terms of this amendment, have to be passed 
upon by a board of Ordnance officers before a commission m the 
Ordnance Department was issued to him. So in that process, if 
there be any now serving with the Department that are not fully 
qualified, they would not be commissioned in the new department. 

Mr. Greene. And carrying that same thing along, as i understand 
it, the first business under fliis reorganization is to get men in and 
get that list established, and then within a year of operation under 
It the work of elimination will begin on everybody. 

Gen. Williams. The process established in the bill will begin. 
The only difference that we are asking^f or is the authority to establish 
that initial list of Ordnance Department oflGicers, and then passing 
into the body. 

Mr. Miller. I have just one little question. Will you now epito- 
mize these criticisms of yours ? There were two, as I understand it. 
One is the last one you suggested here. 

Col. Peirce. Well, in the initial establishment of the department 
we wish, after all effort has been exhausted, to fill the grades, the 
field grades of the Ordnance Department, colonel, lieutenant colonel, 
and major, by those regular officers who will normally be promoted 
to those grades, and by the appointment of all outside candidates 
that we can induce to come in, who are qualified, if there should 
should then be vacancies in those grades to fill those vacan- 
cies by promotion of suitably qualified oiB&cers in the department 
from the next lower grade. 

Gen. Williams. And then fill in at the bottom. 

Col. Peirce. Then having established the department in that way, 
it ^oes on the single list, each man going in the single list in the place 
wmch his length of service, irrespective of the grade he holds, puts 
him in, and thereafter he goes up with the single list. There is no 
preferential promotion and no preferential treatment after the 
pistol shot, which sends them on tneir way. 

Mr. Greene. Then as a second proposition, as I understood the 
General, even though you do not have that right to promote your 
own people before they go on to the single list, you do want the 
first right in any instance to select for yourselves the men coming 
from the outside into the service ? 

Gen. Williams. Yes; we want that. 

Mr. Greene. You want both, and you want the second one 
anyway ? 

Mr. Field. Right there, Colonel, your officer might get his pro- 
motion, get a promotion to which he is not entitled, imder the strict 
application of the single list in this initial organization; after that 
he would get no advantages. 

Col. Peirce. No, sir. 

Mr. Dent. Colonel, what do you think of the practicability of 
declaring by law the percentage of grades, of each grade in each 
branch of the service? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2061 

Col. Peirce. Well, you have almost in effect done that. I don't 
think that describing the precise percentage would make a very 
material change. 

Mr. Dent. You mean by naming the total number of colonels, 
for instance ? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir; the total number of colonels — ^the proportion 
that the total number of colonels bears to the total number of 
officers. 

Mr. Dent. Practically that would be a certain percentage in each 
branch ? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dent. That would naturally follow 1 

Col. Peirce. It would follow with an even distribution. 

Mr. Greene. If you are going to follow a fixed basis that there 
shall be so many wheels to every vehicle, you are going to put four 
wheels onto gigs, you know, in some instances. 

Col. Peirce. I might go one step f mother, if you have time, as a 
further instance of the fact that this is, in our judgment, necessary 
as an initial organization of the department. I want to point out 
that it would very soon, by the normal operation of the single list 
promotion, be changed, and that we expect to take that cnange. 
For instance, we do not want to have any Ordnance officers in this 
reservoir that has been spoken of, who are not on Ordnance duty. 

We feel that if a man is for any length of time on duty other than 
Ordnance duty he becomes rusty, he fails to keep up to date in his 
technical knowledge, and that the special knowledge and training 
that he has acquired while he is being put on this other duty is to a 
certain extent wasted. We therefore wish to have, and have asked 
for only the number of officers that we want on Ordnance duty; 
consequently if a colonel of Ordnance dies or retires, and a lieutenant 
colonel of Cavalry is promoted to fiU that vacancy in the list of 
colonels, we are shy one colonel of Ordnance. It may be that the 
man, the major who is promoted to fill the vacancy in the grade of 
lieutenant colonel may oe an Ordnance officer; if so, we have got a 
field grade, and we have exchanged a colonel for a major. But we will 
suppose, for illustration, that in the promotions that go down to the 
foot, no Ordnance officer is involved; then when we get down to the 
foot in the grade of second lieutenant there will be a vacancy in the 
Ordnance Department and a second lieutenant of Ordnance should 
be appointed. That would complete our 480 officers, but we have 
one more second lieutenant and one less colonel than we started 
with, but as the years go by the percentages in the different grades 
will and must remain within very narrow limits of the percentage 
that applies throughout the Army, and that is we would never 
depart very largely from our 19 colonels and our 21 lieutenant 
colonels. 

Mr. Greene. Then you want to operate without having anybody 
on the detached officers' list. 

Mr. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. Now you recall that I suggested that point this 
morning? 

Col. Peirce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Miller. It appears to me that that is a very important propo- 
sition. I can not for the life of me see how a man can go into tliis 



8062 ARKT BEORGAXIZAnOX. 

leacrroir of officers and lie there — ^the chainnan said only four years, 
but you don't have any limitation on colonds or lienteoant colonds 
that holds them down to fonr-vear terms. He would m into that 
reservoir and stay there inteiminably, and his profession is getting 
dear away from him. The same thing would apply to engineers in 
a smaller measure, perhaps. 

Mr. Greeve. That has been in existence in the Army a long time. 

Mr. MnxER. I know, but we are righting old wrongs now, and 
why can't we get out of that ? 

Mr. Greene. Of course, it would ill become me to explain the 
philosophy and the workings of the detached officers' list. 

Mr. ilnxER. Oh, I think I understand it. 

Mr. Greexe. But what I mean is this, that being on the detached 
officers' list does not necessarily mean that he is there for the period 
of four years or that it is a summering place for officers. Men will go 
there and come away in a little while, and when they are away from 
their employment with a practical unit or corps they are by that 
fact put on the detached officers' list with certain restrictions. In 
other words, it is not an extraneous thing to the Army. 

Mr. Miller. I know it is not extraneous to the Army, but it is 
extraneous to the ordnance branch of the Army. 

ilr. Greexe. You don't have officers on the detached list now i 

Col. Peirce. Xo, sir. 

Mr. Dext. But if the law goes through without that exception, 
you willget men on tbe detached officers' list, won't you * 

Gen. WiLLLAMS. We don't want anv there. 

Mr. Dext. But won't you get them there ? 

Col. Peirce. Xot if they hmit the number of officers that we ask 
for to 480. We have got ordnance duty for all those men. 

Mr. Dext. Then you are all right. 

Mr. Greexe. I don't think you will find that that thing works 
out wrong. 

Mr. iliLLER. There is no chance for ordnance officers, engineer 
officers, or officers in these other highly technical corps, like Chemical 
Warfare, of getting into this reservoir. 

Mr. Greexe. If a captain of Infantry, for instance, goes away to 
be instructed in miUtary science and tactics at a college, that puts 
him on the detached oMcers' list. 

Col. Peirce. But he is doing work veiy directly connected with 
his work; whereas the ordnance officer there would not. 

Mr. Greexe. Exactly. He is following his profession and some- 
times improvingthe service. 

Mr. Miller. But you put an ordnance officer out in a camp 
somewhere, and he is not improving himself. 

Mr. Greexe. He has explained that. Now is there anything 
further, General? 

Gen. Williams. No, sir; I think not. 

Mr. Greexe. We are very grateful to you for your informing 
testimonv. 

STATEMENT OF EOF. WM. B. BAHKHEAB, A BEPRESESTA- 
TIVE IF COFGBESS FBOX THE STATE OF ATiABAHA, 

Mr. Bankhejjo. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, previous to 30 
years ago promotion in the Army was by regiment; that is, upon the 



ABMY REOBGANIZATION. 2063 

retirement or death of the colonel^ For example, the liuetenant 
colonel was promoted to colonel, the senior major to lieutenant 
colonel, the senior captain to major, and so on down the line. This 
system had grave objections which were that young officers entering 
the Army from civil life or West Point could by use of persond 
influence or good luck be assigned to certain regiments wnere the 
colonel and other field officers were old and nearing retirement, 
thereby being assured of earljr promotion. Other officers, less fortu- 
nate, without influence, entering the Army at the same time, woidd 
be assigned to regiments with poor prospects of promotion and woidd, 
after a certain number of years had passed, find themselves out- 
ranked by the fortunate with influence. Young officers were con- 
stantly applying for transfer to regiments with '^good prospects," 
and tneir success depended upon their influence, iomy or pohtical. 

To remedy this condition and having in view the democratic 
principle of placing all officers upon an equaUty in routine promotion, 
the principle of promotion was changed^ and the present governing 
principle adopted, namely, promotion according to arm of the 
service. In other words the principle governing promotion was ex- 
tended from the regiment to the ar^. 

2. It has been found after years of experience that the present 
system of promotion has, like the regimental system, grave obiections. 
These objections may be described as those of the regimental system 
broadened. 

Suppose a board of officers is called to recommend upon the 
o^anization of the Army. There are as members of this board 
officers from various arms of the service. Any increase in their 
particular arm means promotion in that arm. However disinterested 
the officers may be, tiiis question of promotion is, of necessity, ever 
present. It is something that they can not forget. The object of 
the board may be to recommend an organization for our Army that 
will consist of a proper balance of all arms, yet can one expect that 
these officers will not, to some extent, be influenced by promotion 
in their particular arm. When Congress is investigating through 
committees questions of Army organization they must understand 
that human nature is too weaK not to be influenced by such funda- 
mental facts of existence as pay, quarters, fuel, etc. ; and rank means 
all of these. Under the present system of promotion by arm of the 
service there is constant difficulty regarding rank. Four officers 
enter the Army at the same time, one is appointed to the Infantry, 
one the Artillery, one the Engineers, and the last to the Cavalry. 
They are engaged in peace time duty for a few years; but at the end 
of that period their status has greatly changed, relatively. During 
this period there has been an increase in the Artillery, ana the result 
is that the man who entered this arm outranks the others, and not 
because he has been engaged in a duty of greater value to the Govern- 
ment, nor has he performed his duty with greater efficiency. 

SOLUTION. 

The solution is to extend the principle governing promotion 
to the Army as a whole, just as Congress extended it from the regime n t 
to the arm of the service. In other words, carry the same principle 
one step higher. 



2064 AKMY REOKGANIZATION. 

APPLICATION OF ABOVE. 

Have all officers of the various arms of the service placed upon one 
list, strictly according to active commissioned service. Promote from 
this list. If there is a Cavalry vacancy and the officer on the list 
for promotion happens to be in the Infantry, place him on the 
unassigned list. He is available, while on this list, for college^ 
recruiting, National Guard, and other similar duty, until an Infantry 
vacancy occurs. 

RESULT OF ABOVE. 

It is difficult for a civilian to appreciate the importance of rank to 
the soldier, and not infrequently, the civilian loses patience at what 
appears to him as "quibblmg over rank.'' If he will dissect '*rank,'' 
however, he will understand the reason for the soldier's viewpoint. 
Rank is opportunity, the higher the rank the greater the responsi- 
bilities, the greater the responsibilities the greater the reward. In 
business, probably money is the measure of success, in politics 
probably position is the measure — ^in the Army rank is the measure. 
Kank is the measure of command, pay, quarters; in fact everything 
is regulated by rank. It is the hope and aim of every ambitious 
officer, and an officer without ambition for success has no more place 
in the Army than he has elsewhere. 

Such being the importance to the officer of rank, it should be care- 
fully guarded and distributed between the different branches of the 
service. There should be equal opportunity and rewiard in time of 
peace. This will be secured by promotion from one list, said list 
based strictly upon commissioned service. This principle is so simple 
and clear to all, civilian and military, that we are at a loss to know 
why it has not been adopted long ago. As pointed out previously, 
however, this system is the logical outcome of all previous legislation 
and is in conformity with the principles behind previous legislation. 
It is simply an extension of the principle. It is logical and not a 
new departure. 

3. I have heard statements made that certain branches were more 
technical than others and therefore required more training, ability, 
a higher education in fact; and that therefore these higher branches 
shoiSd receive more rapid promotion. I am not prepared to admit 
that the Infantry, for example, requires less intelligence or technical 
knowledge than the Artillery. Be that as it may, these so called less 
technical branches are in battle the most vital to the Army. When 
the Infantry leave the field, the battle is lost, regardless of the actions 
of the other arms. When the Infantry advance the Army advances. 
We may have excellent technical engineers and surgeons and signal- 
men, etc., but if the Infantry leave the field the battle is lost. 

But I shall not discuss the relative value of the various arms and 
services as they are all necessary and valuable. I desire to say one 
thing which is the all important point. Here are the figures of the 
sacrifice made in France by the various arms of the American Army: 



AEMY REORGANIZATION. 2065 

Casualties in the American Expeditionary Forces by arm of service. 

Per cent. 

Machine gun 53 

Artillery 5. 1 

Engineers 3. 9 

Infantry 75. 2 

All others 6. 3 

Note. — The above figures are quoted from **Some accomplishments of the Services 
of Supply," statistical branch, G. S. Hdq. S. 0. S., A. E. F. These figures appear 
on page 31 and are given as they therein appear, with the exception that the loss of 
the marines (3.7 per cent) is not quoted. 

Even admittinff that certain arms and services are more technical 
than others, ana admitting that they require more training, etc., 
would it be the policy of Congress to establish a system of promotion 
under which the Infantry, which in the war was called upon to pay 
75.2 per cent of the casualties, would be penalized in peace by slower 
advancement? Does not the offering of dead and wounded^— the 
blood — of the Infantry fully balance the technique ? 

Let us have a one-list system of promotion, based strictly upon 
commissioned service and you will unite the Army in interest' as it 
has never been united. '' Promotion '^ schemes will end. There can 
no longer be *' class" legislation in the Army. Increase in a branch 
will carry a healthj^ promotion into all of the other branches. In 
time of peace all officers will share and share alike in advancement in 
rank; in war rank and promotion will, as in the last war, go to those 
who have taken advantage of opportunity and have distinguished 
themselves by valor and heroism, constancy, and afjplication to duty. 

I wish to offer the following amendment to the Dill : 

AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE ARMY REORGANIZATION BILL SUGGESTED BT MR. 

BANKHEAD. 

Page 51, line 12, strike out the words "without changing the present position of any 
officer on the lineal list of his own branch, but otherwise as nearly as practicable, 
and after the word '*to," in line 15 add the word ** total," and before the word "com- 
missioned" add the word "active," and after the word "service" add the words "in 
the Federal service," so that it will read, "shall be placed on the list according to 
total lengtii of active commissioned service in the Federal service." 

(Whereupon the committee adjourned.) 



House of Representatives, 
Committee on Military Affairs, 

Wednesday, January 28, 1920. 

The committee met at 10.30 a. m., Hon. Julius Kahn (chairman) 
presiding. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, a committee representing the various 
engineer societies requested to be heard this morning with reference 
to the Signal Corps. Col. Carty and several other gentlemen are 
with us. I will ask Col. Carty to proceed. 

Mr. Carty. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Leighton represents council in the 
first instance, and he will tell you why we are here. 

STATEMENT O'F MB. M. 0. LEIGHTON, CHAIBMAN OF THE 
NATIONAL SEBVICE COMMITTEE OF ENGINEEBINQ 
COUNCIL. 

The Chairman. Mi. Leighton, will you please state to the reporter 
your position in your organization ? 

Mr. Leighton. I am chairman of the national service committee 
of Engineering Council. 

Engmeering Council is the body which represents the common 
interests of the engineering profession of the country. It is appointed 
by the four great engineering societies, the American Society of Civil 
Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the 
American Institute of Electrical iJngineers, and the American Insti- 
tute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. We have asked for a 
hearing before you this morning with respect to the Signal Corps, 
and Col. John J. Carty, vice president American Telephone & Tele- 
graph Co., and Maj. H. W. feuck, past president of the American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers, are the witnesses whom we ask 
you to hear. 

STATEMENT OF MB. JOHN J. CABTY, CHAIBMAN, SPECIAL 

COMMITTEE, ENGINEEBING COUNCIL. 

The Chairman. Cjlonel, will you state to the reporter the position 
you occupy in your organization? 

Mr. Carty. Mr. Chairman, I am chairman of a special committee of 
Engineering Council directed to represent council at this hearing, a nd 
to present certain resolutions and certain facts and recommendations 
and con3iderations, very largely of a professional engineering c har- 
acter. It was the belief of council that they could contribute some 
information of this kind that would be helpful to this committee, 
which, as is well known, is seriously, conscientiously and very ably 
endeavoring to take advantage of the lessons of the war in connection 
with the very difficult constructive legislation which is has before it. 

It is our desire to help this committee in any and every way so that 

the best results will be obtained. 

2067 



2068 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

I would like to say a word about our societies, the names of 
which have been put on the record, and among our membership are 
something like 45,000 men, engineers, distributed throughout every 
State in the Union. It had been often stated as a reproach to our 
profession that we had not taken sufficient interest in public affairs, 
and just prior to the war the profession woke up to the fact that it 
had a duty to perform, that engineers had a duty as citizens as well 
as engineers. 

This council was organized so that whenever we could be helpful as 
citizens as well as engineers there would be a way for us to give that 
help. It is in no sense affiliated with any political party, but looks 
to measures and results of a constructive nature and not to political 
matters, in the ordinary sense of that term. 

The men who compose these engineering societies are the men who 
have built our canals, our railroads, our telegraph and telephone lines, 
our ships, our skyscrapers — in fact, the men who have done all the 
engineering construction work which is a characteristic of this age. 
When Engineering Council appears before you by its representatives 
these are the men it represents, and that is what it stands for. No 
man, however eminent he might be could come here and in any 
manner adequately represent in strength and importance this great 
body of men for which it is my great honor to speak. 

I would like to read a resolution which has been adqpted l)y this 
council. It is as follows: 

Engineering Council, pursuing its desire to be of service to our Government, par- 
ticularly in making available for the defense of our country the technical ability of 
the enginaering profession, respectfully commends to your attention resolutions 
recently adopted by council relating to the Signal Corps of the United States Army: 

Whereas in the World War our Government took from the ranks of the electrical 
profession a very large part of the technical personnel employed in the Signal Corps 
of our Army; and 

Whareas the brilliant and successful work of the Signal Corps in the World War, em- 
ploying the latest and most modern development in the science of electrical com- 
munication, was in a large measure due to the personal interest and patriotic and 
unselfish support given by the electrical ei^ineering profession; and 

Whereas in future wars it is certain that the electrical engineering profession will be 
Cilled upon not only to give generously of its men and talent but to bear a large 
share of the responsibility for the vital and important work of the Signal Corps m 
military operations; and 

Whereas the direction, leadership, and care of our men and their associates in time of 
war, and under the conditions of war, are matters of deepest concern: Therefore, be it 

Resolvedy That in the opinion of Engineering Council, the Regular Army of the 
United States should have a Signal Corps adequate in numbers, with competent tech- 
nically trained officers, commissioned permanently in that corps in grades on a par 
with other technical services, with provisions for keeping the grades filled up to 
authorized strength, and with provisions for obtaining for appointment in the Si^al 
Corps the excellent material found among the young electrical engineers of America. 

This is an oflSicial corihnunication signed by the chairman of Engi- 
neering Council, addressed to the chairman of this committee, and 
so I submit it to you. 

At the close of the Spanish War the work of the Signal Corps was 
rudhnentary. It consisted of the ordinary wigwag flag used as a 

Sart of the equipment of the Signal Corps. It consisted of the 
[orse telegrapn, not much different from what was used in the 
Civil War. They had also a few telephone lines poorly working and 
imperfectly constructed. The old Spanish War idea of the impor- 
tance of the technical requirements of the Signal Corps has not yet 
been sufficiently outgrown, even in the Army itself. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2069 

The engineering profession, which has studied this matter 
thoroughly, asserts that engineering is a learned profession; that 
electrical engineering is a learned profession requiring scientific 
training and knowledge of the very highest character. The engi- 
neering profession asserts that electrical engineering is just as 
important, distinct, and difficult a branch as the medical profession. 
That view has not heretofore sufficiently obtained. It was a qpm- 
mon thing in the Army to detail men from the Cavalry or from the 
Infantry or from some other arm of the service into the Signal Corps. 
As long as their work was of a rudimentary kind they got aloi 
very well. But when the art became so complicated and advance 
they were lost. 

In my own experience in the Army I have talked to numbers of 
such men, and all of them a^ree that they knew nothing about elec- 
trical engineering, nothing aoout these highly scientific things, and 
were really not interested in\hem; that their promotion was to be 
in the Cavalrv, in the Infantry, or in the Artillery, and their heart 
was there and their training was there. No man is happy in a work 
for which he knows he is not competent, and can not be. You might 
as weU expect men to be turned mto a hospital and treat patients as 
to be turned into a signal corps and try to manage some of the 
serious problens which that corps had to deal with in the war. 

The scientific methods used in this w*ar transcended anything that 
had ever been thought of before, and now, should we unfortunately 
have to go into a war again, I can say to you that to-day there are new 
methods that we woulahave to use that were absolutely unused and 
not thought of in the recent war, so rapidly do things advance in the 
signaling art. 

The duties of the Signal Corps in their broadest aspect may be 
stated thus — and I think it is a fair interpretation of the law creating 
the corps and the regulations governing it. The duty of the Signal 
Corps is to provide communication between the Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy and the United States Army and all of its 
parts, wherever they may be located upon the face of the earth. 
That is a very large and comprehensive view, but it is not an academic 
one, because during the war we received orders from the Chief Signal 
Officer to make plans and take the necessary steps to safeguard com- 
munications between Washington and Gen. Pershing agamst enemy 
attack. Word was received from Gen. Pershing that there was good 
reason to believe that the enemy might cut our cables, that thev 
could cut them, and that it was necessary for us to be prepared with 
auxiliary communications. That job, so far as it pertained to the 
Signal Corps, was turned over to me. I was responsible for it through- 
out the war. 

I recommended cooperation with the Navy, which was carried out. 
In the working out of this problem the very highest grade of scientific 
skill and knowledge was needed, and the most advanced and difficult 
sort of scientific communication questions were involved. We made 
our plans, and the Germans cut our cables right off our coast; but 
we had auxiliary communications which we believed, if the worst 
came to the worst, we could maintain between the Commander in 
Chief of the Army and the Navy and Gen. Pershing at all hazards. 
That is just one example. 

Mr. Caldwell. What kind of auxiliary service was that ? 

150187— 20— VOL 2 18 



2070 ARMY KBOBGANIZATION. 

Mr. Carty. The radio. But this involves scientific matters of a 
verj difficult and delicate kind, requiring radio stations all over the 
United States. This made it necessary on the part of the Signal 
Corps the sending out of scientific expeditions to find sites in regions 
to be chosen scientifically, which would be free from disturbance 
and which would be unaffected in the event that the Germans not 
only should cut the cables but should run amuck with their radia 
and by intentional interference destroy all communications. It was 
considered that in a time of desperate need, when things were going 
wrong, that the enemy might adopt those measures. 

The plans which were made involved wire systems from New- 
foundland down to Washington, and involved the use of wires from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific. The Signal Corps sent expeditions to 
dozens of places in the United States to study the electrical and 
meteorological conditions, and to gather other scientific data bearing 
upon the problem. 

I could go on with numbers of examples of the technical and 
scientific nature of the work of the Signal Corps. I will not take 
your time stressing that too much, but I will ask to state in the 
record that we have here, in chapter 8 of the report of the Chief 
Signal Officer to the Secretary of War for 1919 a brief statement of 
the most essential facts in connection with the maintenance of the 
electrical communications across the Atlantic during the war. I 
hope that each member of the committee can read it. In fact, it is 
only a few pages long. I think it would be a good thing to incor- 
porate it in this testimony. In other places there are statements of 
the difficult and scientific problems involved. 

The Chairman. Whose report is that? 

Mr. Carty. That is the report of the Chief Signal Officer of the 
Army for 1919, addressed to the Secretary of War. 

(The matter referred to is as follows: ) 

TRANS-ATIANTIC ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS. 

The maintenance of uninterrupted electrical communication between the War 
Department at Washington and the American Expeditionary Forces, expected to 
reach a total of millions of men, operating more than 3,000 nules from the nearest ' 
United States territory, presented many problems unique in the hislory of warfare. 
These communications were threatened by enemy 'activities, not only upon land, 
but from the surface of the sea, and from beneath the surface in the waters of the 
ocean itself, through which the submarine vessels of the enemy's navy were operat- 
ing destructively against the commerce of the world and against the navies of the 
powers associated against them in the war. Because one of the important means of 
communication is me radiotelegraph, the problem reauired the study of offensive 
and defensive measures in the ether itself, through which radio messages must be 
sent The ether permeates not only the atmosphere of the earth, but extends into 
surrounding space. Operations conducted in this mysterious medium to safeguard 
its use for the carrying of messages from the Government at Washington to the com- 
mander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces constituted one of the inter- 
esting and important scientific military activities of the war. 

In giving his oral instructions regarding the importance of this problem, the Chief 
S^al Officer of the Army stated that it constituted an illustration of the broad respon- 
sibilities and functions of the Signal Corps to maintain communication between the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and the United States Army and all of 
its parts wherever located upon the face of the earth. 

Before his departure for the theater of war in Europe a preliminary inquiry waa 
made by Col. Edgar Russel, afterwards bri^dier general, chief signal officer, American 
Expeditionary Forces, into the reliability of cable commumcation between the 
United States and Europe. At a conference which he held with experts at New York 
before leaving for France, it was concluded that complete severance of cable communi- 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOlf. 2071 

cation by the enemy was not impossible. After further developments and after addi- 
tional investigations made by hun in Europe, Col. Russel, in a memorandum dated 
August 15, 1917, to the United States naval attach^ at Paris, said, referring to the 
Atlantic cables: 

**From my own experience in cable engineering, I am satisfied that it would be 
entirely practicable for the enemy to cut some or all of the cables whenever he con- 
siders it miportant enough to do so.'* 

Again, in referring to the Atlantic cables, he wrote, on August 23, 1917, to the 
commander in chief , American Expeditionary Forces: 

"There is no question of the grave situation in which we may find ourselves as a 
result of extensive cable cutting, which, in the belief of all the cable authorities I 
have consulted, may be easily effected by the enemy. The enormous importance 
of immediate provision of reliable and extensive trans-Atlantic radiotelegraphic 
service is therefore evident. The naval attach^ informs me that he is taking up the 
matter through naval headquarters, and the earnest and immediate cooperation of 
all concerned is urged in this important matter. 

This letter was forwarded to The Adjutant General of the Army with the following 
indorsement from Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) John J. Pershing: 

"1. The importaiu^e of securing reliable auxiliary service by trans- Atlantic radio- 
telegraphy is evident. The need for such a dependable telegraphic service increases 
with the growth of the American forces in Europe. 

"2. Immediate cooperation with the French and English Governments to secure 
extension of trans- Atlantic radiotelegraphic service is urged." 

Upon receipt of these communications, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army di- 
rected Col. John J. Carty, Signal Corps, to prepare plans and to take the necessary 
steps to secure at all hazards, the continuity of telegraphic communication with the 
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, and to call upon him for whatever funds, 
personnel, and equipment that might be required. As the result of an immediate 
survey which he made, Col. Csurty reported that the quickest results could, be ob- 
tained by utilizing the high-power radio stations on the Atlantic seaboard, which 
were being operated by the Navy, in conjimction with the high -power radio stations 
in Great Britain and Ireland, and in France and Italy, employing also, if necessary, 
any high-power stations which might be found suitable in Canada. Immediate 
arrangements were made accordingly for cooperation with the Navy. 

On the part of the Navy this involved tiie activities of the Bureau of Steam Engi- 
neering under Rear Admiral Robert S. Griffin, and the activities of the Department 
of Communications imder Capt. D. W. Todd, the Signal Cwps being represented by 
Col. Carty, who was assisted from time to time by Maj. N. H. Slaughter, Capt. C. A. 
Culver, Maj. F. B. Jewett, Maj. J. O. Mauborgne, and by various of their subordinate 
oflS-cers, having special scientific and engineering knowledge of radio problems. 
Because of his expert knowledge of radio matters, and particularly the radio situation 
in France, Lieut. M. Patemot, of the French Army, who was acting as liason officer 
with the Department of Communications, United States Navy, was frequently 
consulted. 

In cable No. 229, paragraph 5, subparagraph 2, dated September 30, 1917, the 
following message was sent to the commander in chief, American Expeditionary 
Forces, tar the chief signal officer, American Expeditionary Forces: 

"Your letters August 23 and 29 relative radio telegraph communication and 
inclosed proceedings of Interallied Commission: This oflice fully realizes gravity 
of situation. Energetic steps have been inaugiu^ted in conjunction with Navy to 
cooperate to fullest extent in this program. Col Carty is in charge of these arrange- 
ments on behalf of Signal Corps. Please inform Gen. Pershing and French authori- 
ties. Will report progress frequently." 

There was neld on October 4, 1917, on board the U. S. S. Chicago, at New London, 
Conn., a conference to consider a protocol of the Interallied Radio Commission dated 
August 22, which had been forwarded by Col. Russel, who had brought to the atten- 
tion of the commission the subject of maintaining trans-Atlantic communications 
against enemy attack. This protocol contained a statement of various measures 
wnich might be adopted, all of which, together with many originating within the 
conference, were duly considered. The members of the conference were: Capt. S. S. 
Robison, U. S. Navy; Capt. D. W. Todd, U. S. Navy; Capt. A. J. Hepburn, U. S. 
Navy; Lieut. Commander S. C. Hooper, U. S. Navy; Lieut. Commander G. C. 
Sweet, U. S. Navy; Col. John J. Carty, Signal Corps, U. S. Army; Maj. N. H. Slaugh- 
ter, Signal Corps, U. S. Army; Lieut. M. Patemot, French Army. 

A report of the findings of the conference was duly forwarded to Col. Russel, repre- 
senting the United States Army on the Interallied Commission, which was sitting in 
France. Two important points in the communication from the New London con- 
ference were: 



2072 ARMY REORGAKIZATION. 

1. ''That the Interallied Commission note the possibility of communication being 
interrupted by intentional interference from powerful German stations. It is sug- * 
gested that the commission give comprehensive consideration to the question of avoid- 
ing or overcoming such interference and also to the question of what should be doiie 
in the event of such interference being successfully accomplished and trans-Atlantic 
radio communication destroyed." 

2. And the statement that: '*It is urged by the American Army authorities that 
every effort be made to secure as nearly as possible continuous transmitting from 
France to America during the entire 24 hours of the day, so that emergency messages 
could be handled in any case. To this end it is suggested that at least one very power- 
ful station be installed in France. 

The erection of this high-power station was subsequently decided upon under an 
agreement with the French, whereby the French were to provide the site for the 
station and the United States Navy was to erect the towers and install the necessary 
apparatus, all of which would be supplied from America. 

In the working out of this problem numerous protocols were exchanged with the 
Interallied Radio Commission in Europe, upon which Col. Russel, the chief signal 
officer, American Expeditionary Forces, represented the United States Army and the 
naval attach^ at Pans represented the United States Navy. By^ this means, and by 
liaison officers and by frequent telegraphic communications, constant touch was main- 
tained with the experts of the Interallied Radio Commission, which was thus enabled 
to cooperate effectively. 

The studies which were conducted and the experiments and tests which were made 
in the United States were numerous and many of them highly scientific in character. 
In general, the problem consisted, first, in providing radio stations of sufficiently 
liigh power to secure the best attainable signals even under favorable- conditions; 
second, in finding measures to insure continuity of radio service at times of serious ^ 
static disturbances; and third, to devise plans whereby, in the event of intentional 
interference on the part of the enemy, the radio signals might not be confused or 
obliterated by arbitrary signals transmitted for the purpose from high-power enemy 
stations. 

To meet the first condition the Navy Department undertook to complete, as rapidly 
as possible, a new high-power station at Annapolis, Md., and to rapidly increase to 
the fullest extent practicable the power of all of the existing trans-Atlantic stations. 
In addition to this, the Navy designed and undertook the erection of a high-power 
station near Bordeaux, in France, which was the station recommended bjr the New 
London conference and which was intended to be the most powerful station which 
had yet been constructed. 

To meet the second condition, tests were made by the Nayy at various naval radio 
stations on the Atlantic coast to determine those locations in which the least static 
disturbances were likely to prevail. Corresponding investigations were made on an 
extensive scale by the Signal Corps, which sent numerous expeditions to different 
parts of the United States to make electrical and meteorological obser\^ations; to 
determine the intensity of static disturbances and their relation to meteorological, 
conditions; the degree of intensity of signals received; and to get all other scientific 
data obtainable, which mi^ht bear upon the problem. 

To meet the third condition, intentional interference, numerous scientific methods 
were tested and studied at the Navy stations and elsewhere. 

As a result a comprehensive plan was adopted whereby, in case of necessity, receiv- 
ing stations at Newioundland in the north, and along the Atlantic coast of the United 
States and elsewhere, and throughout the United States as far west even as the Pacific, 
might be employed. As many of such stations as would be required would be con- 
nected by wire with Washington, so that the chances of a large number of widely 
separated stations being simultaneously interfered with by static or otherwise woulii 
be minimized. Each of these stations would be equipped to receive the same trans- 
Atlantic radio messages, and each telegrzph the message by wire to Washington. By 
this plan the missing parts of a message which could not be received at one station, 
could be supplied from one or more of tne other stations out of the zone of interference. 
The details of other features of the plan are many of thein very scientific in character, 
voluminous in amount, and are still regarded as confidential. 

Word was received from the Navy Department early in May, 1918, that the enemy 
was employing submarine vessels to cut cables and that certain local European cables 
had already been cut, presumably by this means. In the following June it was 
reported by the Navy as coming from sources believed to be reliable that the Central 
Powers were making preparations to cut all cables on the American coast by specially 
constructed submarines, and that it was also planned to destroy simultaneously all 
high-power American wireless stations. If this scheme were unsuccessful, it was 
reported that the enemy planned to make communication difficult by intentional 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2073 

interference by German high-power radio stations. Upon receipt of this information ^ 
a conference was held by (5)1. Carty at the office of the Director of Naval Communica- 
tions at Washington, at which were present Capt. D. W. Todd, the director, Maj. 
C. A. Culver of the Signal Corps, Commander Reed M. Fawell, and other officers of the 
Navy. Immediate steps were taken to put into effect as nmidly as possible all of 
the measures whidi had already been agreed upon. Capt. Toda reported that the 
United States naval auliiorities had adopted adequate measures to protect the naval 
wireless stations from attack. 

Information furnished by the Navy concerning the enemy's intentions seemed to 
be well founded, for while the German submarine vessels were operating on the* 
Atlantic coast of the United States, two submarine cables were cut about 100 milee^ 
from New York, one a cable from New York to Canso, which stopped working at 
12.35 p. m. on May 28; the other a cable from New York to Colon, which began to fail 
at 3.30 p. m. on May 28, and went out of service entirely at 9.30 p. m. on the same date. 

These two cables were promptly repaired, but had this not been done, their cutting 
could not have substantially affected tranfr-Atlantic communications because only one 
of them was used for that traffic, and that only as far as Newfoundland. For this 
section land lines were also available. 

The severed section of each cable was carefully studied by Col. Carty and other 
cable experts. The conclusion was unanimous that the cables were cut and not merely 
worn out or damaged by ordinary causes. The points at which the armored wires 
were severed in both cables showed clearly the evidence of a sharp-cutting tool and 
the absence of rust on the ends of the armor showed that the cut was of recent origin^ 
The nature of the cut and the fact that the enemy's submarines were operating on our 
coast at the time, taken in connection with the other circumstances of the case, pointed 
strongly to the conclusion that the interruption was produced deliberately by tfc© 
enemy for the purpose of destroying telegraphic communication. 

While indefinite reports were received concerning the cutting of cables elsewhere^ 
no further damage was done to cables on the coast of the United States, and telegraphic 
communication, by cable and by radio, between the War Department and the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces in Europe was at all times maintained. 

In its cooperation with the United States Army and with the Allies in this project 
the work performed by the United States Navy was indispensable. It was executed 
with vigor and with si? ill, and was successful. 

A second phase of the transatlantic communications' problems consisted, not in 
preventing the enemy from interrupting our communications, but in determining 
in what manner and to what extent the enemy countries themselves were utilizing 
transatlantic electrical commumcations. 

Accordingljr the Chief Signal i)fficer, on July 12, 1917, issued office memorandum 
No. 51, of which paragraph 1 follows: 

"A board of officers, consisting of Mai. J. J. Carty, Maj. George M. Yorke, and 
Maj. Charles P. Bruch, Si^al Officers' Keserve Corps, is hereby appointed to meet 
in New York City at such times as may be designated by the president thereof for the 
purpose of carrving out special instructions which will be communicated to the board 
by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army." 

The Chief Signal Officer on the same day issued special instructions to this board 
as follows: 

"Grave concern is felt by the War Department due to the fact that there is existing^ 
without doubt, some means by which communication is being maintained between 
stents of the German Government in the United States and Germany. The deter- 
mination of these means is a matter of utmost importance to the Government. The^ 
Chief Signal Officer of the Army, realizing the vast experience of the three members 
of the board appointed by office memorandum No. 51 in matters pertaining to the 
transmission of information, desires that they give consideration to the matter of 
determining by what means German agents are maintaining communication between 
this country and Germany, and that the board submit recommendations to this office 
as to the best means of preventing the same. It is of the utmost importance that all 
the deliberations of the board be carried out in the most confidential manner." 

Immediately upon receipt of the above instructions Col. Carty, who had been 
appointed president, held a meeting of the board at which various extraordinary 
precautions were determined upon and taken up with the cable and the telephone 
and t?legraph companies. As all of the members of the board had been, in their 
civilian capacity, officials of telephone and telegraph companies, they were better 
able, because of their intimate knowledge of the working of these companies, to 
secure their intelligent cooperation. It became evident, as the work of the board 
progressed, that one of the measures which mi^ht be employed by the enemy was the 
sending of military information under the sruise of apparently harmless messages to 
neutral countries, which then would find their way to the Central Powers. As thir 



^074 ARMY BE0RGA2SriZATI0N. 

was a matter which involved the ceneorehip of cables, the president of the board 
worked in close cooperation with Capt. D. W. Todd, United States Navy, the Director 
of Naval Communications, who had charge of the naval censorship. It was found that 
a thorough investigation of the handling of cable traflBc and of all of the personnel 
concerned therewith had been conducted by the censorship officials and that r^rous 
methods were adopted in the handling of cable traffic. As a result of moststnngent 
regulations of the Naval Censor, it was made certain that the sending of clandestine 
messages was minimized if not prevented. 

It was impossible, however, to prevent the enemy from sending from its high- 
power radio stations messages which could be received in the United States and in 
the countries to the south. The Radio Section of the Signal Corps therefore systemat- 
ically intercepted enemy radio cipher messages from these stations, all of which 
were duly reported to the Military Intelligence Division. 

Confidential information, very circumstantial in character, was received from 
official sources by the president of the board to the effect that a cable had secretly 
been laid across the Atlantic by the enemy and that the American end of the cable 
terminated on the New England coast; that the European end of the cable terminated 
in a submerged buoy off the coast of a neutral country; that at frequent intervals 
connection was made at the buoy with a German submarine vessel equipped with 
cable sending and receiving apparatus; and that in this manner prompt and reliable 
communication was maintained between the United States and Germany. It was 
stated further that the deep-sea portion of the cable had been laid by a neutral vepsel 
and that the ehore end on the New England coast was of short length and of very light 
construction and was laid by a German submarine. 

The report, while containing elements of improbability, came from a responsible 
source and could not be ignored. Arrangements were made, therefore, with Mr. 
George H. Dresner, general superintendent of the New England Telephone & Tele- 
graph Co., with Maj. G. K. Manpon, Signal Officer's Reserve Corps, not on active 
service, chief engineer of the New England Telephone & Tel^raph Co., and with 
Mr. James T. Moran, president of the Southern New England Telephone & Tele- 
graph Co., and Mr. H. C. Knight, general manager of the company, to obtain their 
confidential cooperation and to provide the services of competent and trustworthy 
personnel from their respective companies, thoroughly familiar with the coast of New 
England. This personnel consistea of telephone officials, foremen, and linemen, 
whose daily work gave to them intimate knowledge of all of the wires on the coast of 
New England. Through these agencies the entire coast from the Canadian border to 
New York was thoroughly searched for evidences of an enemy cable connection. No 
enemy cable was foimd and the investigation was so thorough that it became certain 
that it did not exist. While this was the result which mi^ht be expected, the question 
was so important as to demand a positive answer and this was obtained. 

A third phase of these transatlantic communications was developed by the Chief 
Signal Officer, who directed G6\. John J. Carty to study the possibility of sending 
messages in plain English from the War Department at Washington to the American 
Expeditionary Force? in France and England in such a manner that they could not 
be intercepted by the enemy, the object of this being to save valuable time which 
was being consumed in coding and decoding cablegrams. 

Col. Carty undertook this study as directed and gave his attention, first, to the 
remarkable printing telegraph system which had recently been perfected in the 
United States. By this system eight messages may be sent simultaneously over one 
telegraph wire, each message being received in printed form like the page of a letter 
written upon a typewriter. 

To intercept one or more of the eight messages thus being sent would be impossible 
by any ordinary means, particularly those heretofore found effective in tapping wires 
employing the Morse code. A thorough study, however, revealed the fact that by 
using an instrument known as the oscillograph, which records upon photographic 
paper the most sensitive electrical currents, the message could be intercepted. By a 
study of the impulses required for the formation of the telegraphic letter and by 
analysis of the resultant curves of the combined eight messages, the contents could be 
read, although this would require extreme skill and take a long time. This demon- 
strated that the printing telegraph system, without further invention, could not be 
depended upon to safeguard a message sent in plain English against the efforts of an 
enterprising enemy with proper scientific knowledge and equipment. 

Other methods of safeguarding the land lines against wire tapping might be adopted 
if the security of the message upon the ocean cable could be assured. Up to the time 
of the making of this study it had been generally assumed that it would be impracti- 
cable to tap an ocean cable without producing an electrical disturbance at the ends, 
which would undoubtedly result in discovery. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2075 

After a careful inquiry into this matter, Col. Carty reached the conclusion that it 
might be possible to tap successfully, and without discovery, an ocean cable, by em- 
ploying some recent electrical discoveries. He devised a tentative scheme which 
was submitted to the engineers of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., who 
reported that the scheme was probably workable. Accordingly, experts of that com- 
pany and the Western Electric Co. undertook the development of the necessary ap- 
paratus. Radical improvements were made by them upon the first suggested idea; 
•special apparatus was constructed; a ship was equipped and put to sea; connection was 
made with an Atlantic cable and messages were intercepted, and a clear, legible 
record of them was obtained. All of this was accomplished without producing any 
disturbances whatever in the working of the cable or giving the slightest indication 
upon the most delicate apparatus at the ends of the cable. 

It was clearly demonstrated that cable tapping could be accomplished in this 
manner and that cable tapping so accomplished could not be detected by any pos- 
sible means at the shore ends. This valuable discovery was communicated to the 
Military Intelligence Division and to the Navy and to the Allies. It demonstrated 
that it would be unsafe to attempt to send plain English messages through the ocean 
cables, and indicated a method which, if known to the enemy, might be employed 
against us. It was decided that until some new discovery was made, the ultimate 
protection of the secrecy of messages must be found in the use of code or cipher. 

Work upon this problem was not abandoned, however, and at the request of Col, 
Carty the engineers of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. continued their 
researches into the possibility of obtaining secrecy by some modification of the print- 
ing telegraph. These engineers, cooperating with Lieut. Col. J. O. Mauborgne, Sig- 
nal Corps, conducted a series of experiments, and finally devised apparatus whereby 
a message written in plain English could be quickly enciphered, printed in plain 
letters upon a page similar to the printing of a typewriter, and transmitted over a tele- 
graph line and received at the distant end. This printed cipher telegram being 
copied upon the deciphering machine will finally appear in plain English. 

Many forms of this system are possible, each adapted to different circumstances. 
For some cases the best plan is as follows: Write the message to be sent first in plain 
English in the office where it originates; copy this message upon a typewriter key- 
board which perforates a long paper tape. These perforations appear on the tape m 
telegraphic code and enciphered. The tape thus perforated and enciphered is sent 
to the telegraph office, where it is passed through a transmitter and thus sent over the 
wire to the distant end, at which point it again appears, still in cipher, in the form of 
a perforated tape. This tape is delivered to its destination, where, being put through 
the deciphering machine, the message appears in plain English. 

The sending of the enciphered message over the wire is accomplished as quickly 
as the sending of an ordinary message. The enciphering of the message or the deci- 
phering of it is accomplished as quickly as an ordmary message can be copied upon a 
typewriter. 

Manifestly a device such as this overcomes all of the delay caused by enciphering 
and deciphering, and if proved to be reliable in operation and if the enciphered 
message is in secure form, a method has been developed whereby the time of encipher- 
ing and deciphering is saved and the transmission of the message oyer the telegraph 
wire is accomplished as rapidly as the transmission of a message in plain Engli^. 
In addition to this, the safety of the message is otherwise enhanced because of the 
reduction in the number of those who must possess the cipher and because the 
message in passing through the telegraph office is in the form of a strip of paper 
arbitrarily perforated. The operativeness and speed and reliability of this apparatus 
was thoroughly tested during the war over lines carrying messages of the most confi- 
dential character from Hoboken to Washington and from Washington to Newport 
News. The cipher produced by this apparatus when used in accordance with the 
method of the Signal Corps has thus far successfully resisted all the efforts of cipher 
•experts to break it. 

The Chairman. I understand, Colonel, that the object of the 
committee oi which you are a member is to show that it is advisable 
to have a permanent detail in the Signal Corps. 

Mr. Carty. That is it, and I was laying the f oiuidation for that by 
showing how exceedingly technical it is. I will not take up any more 
of your time in arguing that point. But it is the mature judgment of 
the engineers that that is necessary. My own personal view is verv 
strong upon that because before the war there were just about a half 
A dozen officers who knew anything about the highly technical work 



2076 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

of the Signal Corps, and under the Hay bill I organized myself, out of 
the forces of the Bell Telephone System, with the splendid cooperation 
of that company, of which I am an official, 13 battalions of men 
whom I picked from all the States in the Union, and they were the 
backbone of the Signal Corps. 

I organized the scientific inspection and research department,, 
men who went to France, and introduced into the war our latest 
methods, and developed the soimd ranging system, which afterwards, 
went to the Engineer Corps; those were the men who introduced into 
the war methods of obtaining meterological data heretofore unused,, 
that were so accurate that the commanders in the field based their 
operations upon the weather predictions furnished bj the Signal 
Corps. It is the opinion of many scientific men that if those same 
metnods were applied to forecasting in the United States it would 
work such a revolution in the affairs of outdoor people that it would be 
one of the great compensating results from the war. I could go on 
at very great length telling the many wonderful projects which the 
Signal Corps worked out during the war. 

It is the business of the Signal Corps to be always ready with the 
latest and best things in signals in advance. They were not ready,, 
and it was the engineers of the country who came to the rescue and 
saved the situation. It is these same engineers who come to you 
here to-day with all of the power we can command to impress upon 
you the importance of regarding the signal organization as a per- 
manent corps. 

The Chairman. What you mean is that the personnel of the Sig- 
nal Corps should be commissioned permanently in that corps ? 
Mr. Carty. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that it should not be filled by detail for four 
years from the line of the Army ? 
Mr. Carty. Exactly. 

Mr. McKenzie. You do not mean by that that you would have a 
separate corps of these engineers but srniply have them permanently 
detailed in tne Signal Corps ? 

Mr. Carty. If you will permit me, I will give you a sketch of a 
constructive idea. This war has demonstrated that the gieat major- 
ity of the Signal Corps troops are very closely associated with the 
combat troops. They must be with the combat troops at all times. 
They are the first into a situation and the last out of it. The work 
of the corps is divided naturally into two parts, and I can talk of it 
more intelligently if 1 call your attention to the fact that in the Senate 
biU it is proposed in the Ordnance Department to have one major 
general and two brigadier generals, and the number of officers in that 
department is not as great as the number in the Signal Corps. That 
same plan I recommend for the Signal Corps, one major general and 
two brigadiers. 

We want to attract into the corps a certain number of ^h.e brightest 
young men turned out by our universities. Each year I take into 
my own civilian work a number of them, and they are in my company 
by the thousands, and they are a very valuaole addition to any 
institution. We want to attract them into the Signal Corps. No 
young man is going into the Signal Corps to make money; he is going 
m for a definite public service. The least we can do, the least that 
the engineers ask for now is to hold out something at the top as au 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 2077 

attraction for enterprising, patroitic young Americans and saj to 
them, '* Stick there and you will have a chance to become a brigadier. '' 
If we had in the Signal Corps as well as in the Ordnance Department 
two brigadiers, one of them would be a brigadier in charge of the 
scientific engineering and standardizing of methods. The Signal 
Corps of the United States Army should at aU times, because of the 
enterprise, ingenuity, character and reputation of our people, have 
a better signafing outfit than any other nation in the world. 

Mr. Anthony. Standardizing of what ? 

Mr. Carty. Of the apparatus, the methods and material required 
by the Signal Corps in its operations. There had been p repa rations 
made for war in the European terrain for 40 years. When the 
war broke it was not possible for any of the European nations to 
provide a communication system adequate for the conduct of the 
war. It remained for the Signal Corps of the United States Army 
in nine months jto construct a long-distance telegraph and telephone 
system which the governments of Europe had failed to do in 40 
years. We did that in nine months. There was a wire from Rome 
to Paris a great deal bi^er than the wire we talk on from Wash- 
ington to San Francisco, but thev could not talk over it. It became 
very important, in order to talk, to make those communications 
better, ai^d we sent some of the Signal Corps oflBicers into Italy, 
and they literally made Rome howl, because the talk from Rome 
came in so strong at Paris. 

The Signal Corps built a system extending from Marseille on 
the south to Le Havre on the north, and across the Channel to London, 
and equipped a line on to Liverpool; on the west their lines went 
as far as ^rest, and on the east as far as Germany. Our plans for 
these hnes and the designs originaDy called for a degree of trans- 
mission which would give satisfactory talk to Berlin. We were able 
to talk aU over the continent. That gives you an idea of some of 
the work done by methods absolutely tmknown to any of the nations 
engaged in the combat. 

Mr. Hull. I am quite interested in what you say. This Euro- 

Eean wire svstem broke down; it was not equal to the system estab- 
shed by tne American civilian engineering organization. Is that 
not the truth ? 

Mr. Carty. That is true. 

Mr. Hull. Does not that rather argue against your own statement 
that we want a lar^e Signal Corps here ? As a matter of fact, when 
we put these men m the Army do they develop — that is, the men ? 

Mr. Carty. That is a very fair question. 

Mr. Hull. Is it not a fact that when we do get them in there they 
do not develop like the men in civil life, and that after all if we were 
to establish this sort of a system in 10 years' time we would find it 
was moss grown and that we had to go out in case of war and get the 
men out of civil life in order to accomplish anything ? 

Mr. Carty. I do not agree with you there. If you will guarantee 
that if we are unfortunate enough ever again to go to war, that we 
will have the British Empire, France, Italy, Belgium, Brazil, Japan, 
China, Portugal, and even Siam ready to rally around our flag while 
we are getting ready to get away from the miserable condition of 
unpreparedness we found ourselves in; if you will guarantee that, 
and if you also want to undergo the humiliation involved in that, 
I will agree with you. 



3078 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you want to prepare men for another world 
war? 

Mr. Carty. I want to be prepared to uphold the American prin* 
ciples against whatever may come. I do not believe it is militarism 
to have a strong army, strong enough to defend American principles; 
I do not believe it is militarism to have a strong navy to defend 
American principles. 

Mr. Anthony. We had the idea that our Signal Corps was fairly 
effective for its size before the war. You speak of tne miserable 
condition of unpreparedness. In what respect was our Signal Corps 
unprepared ? 

Mr. Carty. I would like to answer both of those questions. Which 
would you rather have me answer first ? 

Mr. Anthony. Is it true that our Signal Corps was in a miserable 
condition of unpreparedness at the outbreak of the war? 

Afr. Carty. Absolutely. 

Mr. Anthony. In what way ? 

Mr. Carty. It had only a handful of oJBS.cers who knew anything 
whatever about the technical end of the business. 

Mr. Anthony. You mean the highly scientific end of it, do you 
not, or do you mean the practical appUcation of communication 
in time of war ? 

Mr. Carty. It was unprepared from any point of view. 

Mr. Anthony. I take issue with you on that. I think we had a 
number of officers in the Signal Corps who were experts in matters 
of communication. 

Mr. Carty. Yes, sir, we did. 

Mr. Anthony. You are speaking of the highly scientific develop- 
ment, are you not ? 

Mr. Carty. Let us be specific. You will find in this report a 
statement of the methods that were employed in France in the 
establishment of the long-distance tel^hone and telegraph system, 
that marvelous system. That was entirely based upon plans which 
I made. 

Mr. Anthony. Do you think it is any part of the business of the 
United States Army Signal Corps to construct long-distance telephone 
or telegraph lines between great cities ? Is that not more of a civilian 
accomplishment ? 

Mr. Carty. If the Signal Corps had not done that in this case and 
had not been prepared to do it then it is perfectly certain we never 
could have functioned in the war. When it was proposed to take the 
Service of Supply and remove it from the neighborhood of Gen. 
Pershing^s headquarters at Chaumont to the important stragetic 
position at Tours the French said it could not be done. It was too 
far away. But Chambrim, who was on Gen. Pershing^s staff and 
who had been in America, said, ' ^ You do not know how the Americans 
function with the telephone and telegraph.'' The headquarters of 
the Service of Supply were put in Tours, and it would have been 
impossible for us to have conducted the war unless the Signal Corps 
had been prepared to do those things, which they were utterly unpre- 
pared to do at the opening of the war. I made these plans myself. 
The Signal Corps had sense enough to know that they did not know 
these things, but they knew who did know them, and they had the 
sen^e to accept these plans. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2079 

Furthermore, I had the duty of selecting the personnel and the 
apparatus and the methods that were to be used in connection with it. 
I stayed here and at very great difficidty, due to the various kinds of 
red tape, got personnel and material over there, and then I was sent 
for myself, and I stayed there until last May. 

So 1 wish to make my statement very emphatic, in reference to the 
unprepared condition of the Signal Corps at the opening of the war. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, in order to carry out those 
plans you had to select a great many civilians and commission them 
m the Army; is that not a fact? 

Mr. Cartt. I selected them; as I say, I organized 13 battalions, 
and then in addition to that, at the request of the Army authorities, 
I organized this special scientific personnel. Furthermore, the Bell 
system, of which I am an official, sent into the war 21,000 men. I 
had a definite appraisal of every one of those men, as to just what he 
could do, and by working closely with the Signal Corps officer in 
charge here I succeeded, not\vithstanding much red tape, in getting 
the right men in the right places. The residt of that was that the 
psychological tests acceptea by the Army, as shown in the report of 
the chief signal officer snows that the intelligence tests of the Signal 
Corps personnel rated higher than those of any other branch of the 
Army; but it is due solely to that. 

Mr. Anthony. The primary object of the Signal Corps is to keep 
the commanding officer in touch with the troops in the field. Before 
the war the Signal Corps was able to perform that duty very effi- 
ciently, from my point of view. What did the outside engineering 
assistance brought into the service do to further improve or facilitate 
communication between the commanding officer and the troops in 
the field ? 

Mr. Carty. We introduced the very latest methods of sending 
simultaneously telephone and telegrapn messages over a wire, which 
a few years ago required a couple oi professors at each end" of the 
line. We introduced mechanism for communication which was abso- 
lutely unknown. You also see in this report which I refer to that 
the determining factor in the San Mihiel offensive was the informa- 
tion which was derived bv our radio experts from Grerman messages. 

Mr. Anthony. I have neard of this development, but I have also 
heard Army officers say that your method of radio telephoning would 
fail in time of actual combat, under battle conditions. Is that true ? 

Mr. Carty. That what would fail ? 

Mr. Anthony. Radio telephonic communications imder battle 
conditions. 

Mr. Carty. In some conditions they would not. The Signal 
Corps was prepared for almost every condition; it had flags; itliad 
rockets; it naa telephones; it had telegraphs. 

Mr. Anthony. I am talking about these innovations in commimi- 
cation. 

Mr. Carty. I am talking about them also. 

Mr. Anthony. Army omcers have told me that your radio tele- 
phone failed under battle conditions. 

Mr. Carty. We did not use the radio telephone except experi- 
mentally. It was the radio telegraph, and our Signal Corps showed 
its woenil unpreparedness in being so defective and weak in that re- 
spect. It is a technical matter, and if time permitted, or if you want 



2080 AKMY REORGAKIZATION. 

to have a special inquiry, I think there is plenty of evidence on that 
point. 

I would like now not to be put in the position here — ^I do not think 
it was intended — but I would hate to leave without answering the 
other question about whether I was proposing. that we should prepare 
for another worid war. I yield to no man— and I think the engmeers 
are all with me on that — ^in our love of peace. We have seen enough 
of this war and we detest the horrors of it. 

Our view is that militarism consists not in the size of the Army or 
of the Navy. Militarism consists of taking the Army or the Navy and 
setting them over civilian activities in any measure in time of peace 
and in letting the spirit or the idea of the superiority of the military 
caste to the civilian caste obtain any preponderance in the minds of 
our people. We want to hold the civil law alwavs supreme, and the 
military law to come only when the civil law is confronted by a con- 
dition which it can not cope with. We believe that our nation, like a 
man, should be strong morally and strong physically. If you are 
strong physically and not strong morally you oecome like unfortunate 
Germany. 

Mr. Anthony. Would it not be advisable then to permit this highly 
scientific development and the matter of research into the subject of 
communication remain outside of the Army and in civilian hands ? 

Mr. Carty. No; absolutely no, I should say. 

Mr. Anthony. And leave to the Army its practical application i 

Mr. Carty. I would leave to the Army the business of keeping in 
touch with all the developments. The developments occur in aU 
parts of the world and in all minds, but the Army must be trained 
personally to interpret, understand and translate that scientific de- 
velopment into a practical force for the Army. I think if you will 
give some time to the study of the subject along this line you will find 
that, considering the magnitude of the task, a small assignment of 
ofiicers-into these two classes will not be overdoing it; it is under- 
doing it. They must, through the scientific colleges and through the 
telemione and telegraph companies, and all other concerns engagfed 
in the electrical business, keep abreast of the times ; but you have got 
to have some good men in the corps all the time, so they can ex- 
pand it. 

But again, gentlemen, I do not want you to get the idea that this is 
proposing anything in the way of going to war with anyone. We 
believe it is the best way to keep out of war. 

The Chairman. My friend. Dr. David Starr Jordan, said five or 
six ago that there never again would be a war. But there was a war. 
Now there are individuals who believe that there never again will be 
a world war. World wars come only once in a hundred years or so, 
but they do come, and as I understand you, you believe in being pre- 
pared for any emergency that comes along ? 

Mr. Carty. Yes, sir. I do not believe in following the example of 
China, which is morally strong and physically weak; nor do I believe 
in following the example of Germany, which is physically strong and 
morally weak. I look to see our own country grow like a strong, 
well-rounded man, strong physically and morally. 

Mr. Miller. Evidently, your idea is to have a permanent Signal 
Corps ? 

Mr. Carty. Yes, sir. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2081 

The Chairman. Of course, we have a permanent Signal Corps in 
the Army; but I think what Colonel Carjr meant, Mr. Miller, was 
that there should be permanent personnel m that corps. 

Mr. Miller. Yes. Do I understand you to mean that your plan 
or idea also embodies the proposition of putting annually into the 
Signal Corps a certain number of young men from these highly 
technical institutions. 

Mr. Carty. As well as from West Point. 
. Mr. Miller. And attach them permanently to the Signal Corps ? 

Mr. Carty. Let them grow up m it. 

Mr. Miller. What have you in mind as to the percentage of young 
men you would take in from these institutions, or the number of 
young men you would take in ? 

Mr. Carty. I have not thought of that definitely. 

Mr. Miller. You are simply prepared to make an announcement 
of the principles ? 

Mr. Carty. Ye&^, sir. I have some telegrams in reference to this 
matter, one from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is 
a very important matter to set the minds of the young men toward 
this. The idea would be to have it recognized that if one went into 
that corps it would be like going into the Medical Corps, and if jrou 

?;et some unfit men in there, I presume your legislation will provide 
or that contingency in the Signal Corps as well as in other depart- 
ments of the Army. 

Mr. Miller. A young man may be a misfit in one department of 
the Signal Corps, or one branch of the Signal Corps, but he may be 
highly efficient in another branch. 

Mr. Carty. That is conceivable. But the difficulty with that 
state of mind is that even the Armv itself does not appreciate that 
the work of the Signal Corps is a learned profession, that is, elec- 
trical engineering, and that these men should know electrical engineer- 
ing and that they should go into that as a professional matter. 
If there is going to be a shifting back and forth, there is going to be 
a loophole whereby the old situation will loom up again. I hopo 
your legislation will be so framed as to protect the professional 
character of the Signal Corps just as much as the professional char- 
acter of the Medical Corps is protected. 

Mr. Harrison. Have you looked at the legislation that has been 
proposed ? 

Air. Carty. I read over the Senate bill. 

Mr. Harrison. Have you read the House bill ? 

Mr. Carty. No, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. What are your objections to the provisions of 
the Senate bill ? 

Mr. Carty. I am not able to discuss the matter in detail. I 
thought, representing the engineers, it would be sufficient if we laid 
before you certain principles; our idea would be to have officers 
go into the Signal Corps and stay there and go up to the top; that 
instead of having one major general, you would have a major general 
and two brigadiers, just the same as the Ordnance Department has. 
In regard to the matter of combat troops, we would have the Signal 
Corps composed of two branches, one the combat branch and the 
other a scientific development and research branch. 



2082 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Harrison. I would like to hear from you what you desire 
in the way of legislation. You say you would like to have one 
major general and two brigadier generals? 

Mr. Carty. Yes. One origadier general would have charge of 
the combat tmitS; the units attached to the tactical forces. 

Mr. Harrison. Have you any idea you care to express as to the 
number of troops you would have ? 

Mr. Carty. No, sir; we left that out. I can only say in a general 
way that after the Spanish War Gen. Arthur MacArthur made a 
report in which he said he thought the proportion of Signal Corps 
troops to the total number of troops in the Army should be about 
2i per cent. I have heard the view, which appealed to me, that a 
total of 3 per cent would not be excessive, and for a peace army, if it 
is capable of rapid expansion, a percentage of that sort would be 
about right. 

Mr. Harrison. You referred to combat units. What other units 
ha Vie you in mind ? 

Mr. Carty. I mean to say the noncombatant men would be under 
the scientific officers under a director who must havie standard 
specifications, methods and apparatus at all times ready for all 
possible uses of the Signal Corps. That is the scientific branch. 
That, I think, should not be a combat unit. 

Mr. Harrison. Is that cared for in the Senate bill ? 

Mr. Carty. No, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. Is the combat unit taken care of in the Senate bill ? 

Mr. Carty. I think the Senate bill puts the entire Signal Corps 
into the combat class, and that brings in this difficulty. We con- 
tend that these scientific men must be detailed or commissioned 
permanently in the Signal Corps; they must necessarily work in 
Washington or near a headquarters, and if they are classed as combat 
troops tnev would, under the Senate bill, have to go out for a certain 
nunaber oi years with combat troops and give up their professional 
work. 

Mr. Harrison. How would you designate in the legislation the 
difference between the combatants and the noncombatant units ? ^ 

Mr. Carty. I would not be able to tell you offhand. I would be 
very glad to submit something on that point. We did not go into 
this matter in detail. That would be a matter on which the Signal 
Corps ought to be consulted. Jn our presentation here we felt that we 
would rather talk about the professional matters, where we are on 
our own ground, and about which we can speak with authority, 
and that we would not in a general presentation undertake to go 
into quantities, because there are others who know more about than 
than we do. 

But on the professional nature of this work, we are very .firm in 
the views which we present. 

Mr. Harrison. I suppose your noncombatant units would be 
made up of officers ? 

Mr. Carty. Officers and a very fine class of noncommissioned 
personnel. 

Mr. Harrison. Would you have enlisted men ? 

Mr. Carty. In laboratories we would have some enlisted men. 

Mr. Harrison. Unless you gave those people the rank and pay 
of officers, could you get anybody to go into those places ? 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2083 

Mr. Cartt. There are men who axe very useful as laboratory as- 
sistants. There would have to be a great many oflBicers in the 
scientific work, but there would also Tbe some noncommissioned 
oflHicers and some privates. 

Mr. McKenzie. You have advocated the taking in of young men 
from civil life, giving them permanent commissions in the Signal 
Corps, because of their expert knowledge of all these various difficult 
lines of activities so far as war is concerned, and you have also sug- 
gested how we might get rid of a young man who turned out to be a 
failure. That is riot what interests us as much as the question as 
to how we are going to keep in the Army a man who develops into 
a real expert when such corporations as the one you have the honor 
to represent are sending men over the country looking for those very 
experts. Is it possible, in your judgment, in your judgment, simply 
because we hang up the prize of brigadier generalship after 30 or 40 
years' service and experience, that we could hold those various young 
men in the Signal Corps ? What is your idea about that ? Should 
they be permitted to resign, or should we not allow them to resign, 
so that you can steal them away from us ? 

Mr. CaRty. That is a very important matter. Up to date the 
account stands quite the other way on the stealing question. We 
left something like 250 of our men who never came back out of the 
21,000 who went from our corporation. 

Mr. McKenzie. They went in in time of war, from patriotic 
motives. 

Mr. Carty. First of all, I want to make one little minor correction. 
It is not my suggestion that we get in young men who have all this 
knowledge, but I would like to attract some of the best graduates 
of our universities, who lack a great deal of knowledge, and get them 
in to take their places alongside of the young men from West Point. 

The question in regard to keeping them in is a very serious question 
which pertains as much to other corps as it does to the Signal Corps, 
it seems to me. 

I have seen the devotion and self-sacrifice of the Regular Army 
officers, and it saddens me when I see how much lack of appreciation 
there is regarding the wonderful sacrifice which the Regular Army 
officers make. Any man who goes into the Regular Army must make 
up his mind to go in for a life of sacrifice in time of peace as much as 
in time of war. I hope the time will come when that truth will be 
recognized. These Regular Army men can not talk for themselves. 
The ethics and the regulations of the Army prevent it. But I have 
seen so much of it that I have come out of the war with the very 
highest regard for the Regular Army. While there have been many 
West Pointers who have made mistakes and have done things which 
can be justly criticized, West Point, the institution which was founded 
by George Washington, is a place where the spirit of American 
patriotism still resides. Its priceless traditions, which can not be 

But into books, have been handed down to the regular Army, to the 
rational Guard, and to the Reserves. These traditions are among 
the most precious assets of our country. Everything possible should 
be done to improve the lot of the Army officer. I am anxious to do 
everything possible to that end. One of the best ways to bring loy 
to them all is to show, first of all, that they are appreciated, and in 
this particular case hold out a chance to get to the top. That may 
not be enough, but I believe it will show our appreciation. We should 



2084 ARMY KEORGANIZATION. 

do what we can in every other way for these officers whom we ask to 
lead such a life of sacrifice. 

You brought up a very serious matter. There must be something 
done to make the life of the Army officer more satisfactory. 

Mr. Crago. Increase of pay, for instance ? 

Mr. Carty. Or, perhaps, cut down the high cost of living. 

Mr. Crago. We can increase the pay, but we can not do the other. 

Mr. Carty. I am afraid I have been talking at too great length, 
but I have rather strong.feelings on this subject. 

Mr. Caldwell. Would you advise having all the men in the Signal 
Corps commissioned permanently in that corps, or simply a percent-- 
age of them? 

Mr. Carty. I would think all of them should be commissioned 
permanently. 

Mr. Caldwell. There are a large number of men who are purely 
administrative officers, and who do not require any technical training 
at all. Why should i-fc be necessary to have those men commissioned 
in the Signal Corps ? 

Mr. Carty. The administration of technical affairs can be done 
only by men who combine administrative talent with technical 
knowledge. One of the important things that will require the 
attention of this committee is the matter of administration in 
connection with the supply of apparatus and material that the 
Signal Corps uses. The administrative officers in the Signal Corps 
ought to be verj^ thoroughly familiar with the subject matter which 
they are to administer. 

Mr. Caldwell. Do you think a man ought to be permanently 
commissioned in the Signal Corps as a second lieutenant, for instance, 
or should he first have a temporary grade in which he would demon- 
strate his fitness for that particular kind of work ? In other words, 
would you take a man when he came out of college and put him in 
that corps permanently, or would you put him in there and try him 
out in order to find out whether he had an aptitude for that work 
before you give him a permanent commission? 

Mr. Carty. I think that is a very interesting and important 
question, and I have given some thought to it. Sometimes I have 
felt that they ought to be put in there as lieutenants, permanently. 
I think your view is probably the right one. That is to say, the 
captain is the man who really impresses himself upon the force below 
him. A Signal Corps major does not come into such close contact 
with the troops as the captain. He influences, judges, and directs 
the lieutenants; so it seems to me if you had the corps permanent 
from captain up (including captain), and then take the lieutenant and 
give him a preliminary trying out, he might find that it is a good 
deal harder a job than it looked to be. and if he is one of those men 
who are looking for a soft spot, he will not find it in the Signal Corps. 

The Chairman. That is practically the situation in the tentative 
draft of this legislation. The men may be given commissions from 
captain up in the specialized scientific branches, but the young men 
in the lower grades shall be given a try-out. 

Mr. Carty. There is one more thing I would like to bring to your 
attention. I think even in the Army itself you will find there is not 
a full appreciation of the technical work of the Signal Corps. They 
have gotten by with their work so successfully that it is not realized 
how important it really is. 



ABMY REORGANIZATION. 2085 

Mr, Greene. Prior to the war, under the old idea of the tactical 
organization and its functions, begotten of the experience and tra- 
dition of the past, the relations oi the Signal. Corps to the various, 
combatant arms was largely, apparently thought to be simply the 
conduct of operations in the 6eld, when the superior military comman- 
der, must have all the means of intelligence, communication and obser- 
vation under his control, for strategic or tactical purposes. Did not 
this war develop the fact that the operations of the Signal Corps went 
much beyond that, that the occupation of territory resolved that 
territory for the time being under complete military domination and 
that the Signal Corps had to expand beyond the old concept of a mere 
tactical organization; in fact, had to be the same as if it were oper- 
ating in a great civil community, with all the functions of intelUgence 
and communication that large units of population must command, 
and that it went beyond the mere operations of troops? 

Mr. Carty. I think you have stated it very, very clearly, indeed. 
This war was not a mere clash of contending troops. It was a war 
between peoples and nations, in which the totire energies of the 
people had to be expended inteUigentljr. Now, if you will look at the 
stuaies of the War Department, you will find it is generally admitted 
that hereafter no army can advance that has not got a complete 
system of communications reaching back into all those multitudes of 
different kinds of activities that before the last war were undreamed 
of. They must all be in instant touch. 

Mr. Greene. I have just been advised that you have covered that 
matter already pretty thoroughly, and I beg your pardon for intruding 
the subject again. 

Mr. Carty. One point there is that the broadest aspect of the 
duties of the Signal CJorps is to maintain communications oetween the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, and the United 
States Army in all its parts, wherever they may be located upon the 
face of the earth. 

The Chairman. W,e are very much obliged to you. 

Mr. Buck is here, and the committee will be very glad to hear him. 

STATEMENT OF MB. H. W. BUCK, MEMBEB OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE BEPBESENTING EBTGINEEBIBrQ COUNCIL. 

Mr. Buck. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I 
hesitate to speak before a Committee on Military Affairs which deals 
primarily with matters which I know nothing about. I am a civilian 
engineer, and as Col. Carty has outlined-, we are here representing 
certain representative engineering bodies of this country. 

There is a feeling, however, among the civilian engineers that 
there is a peculiar bond between civilian engineers and the men 
in the Signal Corps. The Si^al Corps is closel;^ interlinked in this 
work with engineering work in civil life, and with the work which 
civilian engineers are primarily familiar with. Lookinjg back to 
the early days of the Signal Corps we find men working in the field 
with elementary apparatus such as flags and rockets. They had 
in the corps runners and men on horseback. A small amount of 
training wul enable men to very quickly take up that kind of work 
and become familiar with it. 

Then, as the work of the corps developed, we fmd the men in 
the field operating simple devices such as the elementary telegraph, 

150187— 20— VOL 



2086 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Almost anyone, in a very short time, can become familiax with the 
operation of the tel^aph, which merely consists of pressing a 
•button at one end and hearing the action of a magnet at the omer 
end. 

As the work of the Signal Corps proceeded further in its evolution, 
we come to the multiplex telegraph, which is more complicated and 
involves the sending of a number of messages over one wire simul- 
taneously, which required, in turn, still further and still more com- 
plex knowledge of the technology of signalling. 

The next step in the evolution of me Signal Corps involved the 
introduction oi the telephone. Many people, understand how to 
use the telephone; that is a very simple matter; but there are very 
few people who imderstand how it works, or who understand, in 
case of trouble with the telephone, how to repair it. So the evolu- 
tion of the Signal Corps has required an intimate knowledge of 
technology and science as it develops further through the combi- 
nation of telephone and telegraph working together on a single 
wire and from that up to the highly complex operation of the wire- 
less telegraph and telephone de«3ing with the wave lengths of light 
and with electrostatic vibrations of the ether. Such matters require, 
perhaps, the most transcendental scientific knowledge among the 
officers of any corps connected with the operation of a modem army. 

This work has become so highly specialized that it is quite outside 
of possibility for any other department of the Army to imderstand 
properly the functions of the Signal Corps work. 

very fortunately, the Chief oignal Omcer of the Army is a Inan 
who combines in a most extraordinary degree all of the (luaUties of a 
scientist, a physicist, a mathematician, and an electrical engineer 
necessary to handle these most complex subjects. But the Chief 
Signal Ofiicer alone can not do all of this work. He must have 
competent assistants and he must have enough officers of sufficiently 
high rank to serve as his right-hand and left-hand men. 

As to the assignment of men from other branches of the service to 
the work of the Signal Corps, we civilian engineers, who feel that we 
understand somewhat the technology of the Signal Corps work, be- 
lieve that such procedure would be most disastrous. I can quite 
understand how a man of military training could be assigned irom 
the Infantry to the Ordnance Department or to the Artillery, and 
might, after a brief period of experience, do the work fairly well. 
I can understand, too, how an infantryman who might be assigned 
to the cavalry might, with a little experience, do the cavalry work in 
a satisfactory manner. But it is almost impossible for a man from 
the Artillery or the Cavalry, or any other branch of the service to be 
assigned to the highly technical work of the Signal Corps and make 
any degree of success of it whatever. 

in the work of the Signal Corps there are some elements peculiarly 
tied in with civilian work. The development of big guns, for instance, 
is worked out in the Ordnance Department itself. Civilians know 
nothing about big guns and have no use in time ofpeace for big guns. 
Therefore, it is quite proper that the Ordnance Department should 
develop its own apparatus, which civilians know nothing about. 

So, too, in the evolution of battleships, that is a matter which is 
carried on in the Navy, because civilians have no use for battleships 
in time of peace and Know nothing about them. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2087 

But the Signal Corps apparatus is peculiarly similar to apparatus 
used in time of peace by civilians. Therefore, civilians have a par- 
ticular knowledge of the apparatus required by the Signal Corps, and 
they are largely engaged in the development oJF such apparatus. We, 
therefore, feel, as civilian engineers, that there should be some sort of 
a working arrangement between the Simal Corps and the civilian 
engineers so that men assigned to the Signal Corps can work with 
civilians in time of peace, and can employ civilians for research work 
and can arrange to have their officers from West Point take courses in 
our civilian cdleges. Also to have, as has already been carried out to 
a certain extent, civilian engineers commissioned in the Reserve so 
that in time of war the best talent among civilian engineers who are 
familiar with these highly complex technological questions can assist 
the Army promptly. 

During the past war civilians, largely under Colonel Carty, did a 
tremendous amount of important work in helping out the Signal 
Corps. 

We are very much interested in this matter because the electrical 
engineers feel that we owe something to the country in respect to the 
Signal Corps work, and desire to help out in the most effective way. 

But we can only help out in time of peace or in time of war by hav- 
ing the organization of the Signal Corps such that there will be an 
official channel for working between the permanent Army organiza- 
tion and the civilian engineers throughout the country. 

I think that outlines my general feeling in regard to this matter. 

Mr. Hull. What you are particularly interested in is a permanent 
detail in the Signal Corps ? 

Mr. Buck. Absolutely. It seems to me that work of this kind, 
which is so highly technical and requires such particular traits of 
mind and particular training should necessarily keep men in the tech- 
nical work along that particular line at all times. 

Mr. Hull. I think most of the committee will agree with you on 
that; at least I do. But there is one feature about which we asked 
Mr. Carty, and that was in conne !tion with the permanent detail, 
whether there was not a proportion of it somewhere that should not 
be detailed' permanently. For instance, if we had 75 per cent per- 
manently commissioned and 25 per cent detailed, or not permanently 
commissioned, would not that be better than to have all of them in 
there on a permanent, hide-bound detail ? 

For instance, a man comes into the Siirnal Cor]::s. Perha^^s he is a 
good man. He stays there for a short time, biit he does not develop. 
That occurs all along the line. If you have him in there on a per- 
manent detail you have to carry that man. If you have only a cer- 
tain proportion of them on permanent detail, you would have a way 
of getting rid of such a man as that. 

Mr. Buck. It would seem to me, sir, that the work of the Signal 
Corps is so much broader and more varied than the work of other 
branches of the Army that there ought to be a good field for the 
development of good men within the Signal Corps itself for the pur- 
pose of occupying these administrative positions. 

Mr. Hull. Your company does not take men for life and keep 
them, if they do not make good. You do get some men whom you 
at first think are going to make good, but who do not make good. Do 
you not get rid oi them ? 



2088 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Buck. Yes, but we take men to replace them who have been 
working along the same lines of work. 

Mr. Hull. But in the Army there is no way to get rid of such men 
unless you have some sort of a percentage plan which would allow 
you to let such a man go. 

Mr. Buck. I assume that if a man is incompetent the Army has 
some machinery by which it can displace that man. 

The Chairman. This tentative bill proposes a process of elimina- 
tion. There is a provision in the tentative draft of this bill on that 
very subject. 

Mr. Buck. I should think that would be highly important. 

Mr. Greene. The work of the Signal Corps is so broad that a man 
who does not fit in the one place perhaps might be found to fit into 
another. Of course, that would apply in civil life very likely quite 
practically, because he might be ultimately retained only in that 
other place at the convenience and under the discretion of his em- 
ployers. They are under no obligation to advance him from that 
place at any time, whereas in the Army the law of seniority would 
eventually carry him into grades and ranks that would remove him 
from that place to where again he might be found not to adjust him- 
self to the necessities of the occasion because he would be transported 
from the field which in the lower grade he was best fitted to carry on. 
So we have to look for the best men we can get. 

Mr. Buck. Is it not possible under conditions of that sort to pro- 
mote junior officers to take those administrative positions ? 

Mr. Greene. The very thing w^e have been trying to sti-uggle 
against is the reaching down into the Arm}^ by any discretion on the 

Eart of superiors and the moving of men into preferential positions 
y what is called personal selection. It may operate in individual 
instances for the efficiency of the service, but it has the unfortunate 
huinan element of operating at any time whether it operates for the 
efficiency of the service or not. 

Mr. Buck. It would appear to me to be very improper to put a man 
in an administrative position in the Signal Corps who was not thor- 
oughly familiar with the technology of Signal Corps work, so that he 
would understand what he is doing. 

Mr. Greene. That is what I am coming to. If you make this sub- 
stitution, a man not fitting in one place where he might be put, you 
might transfer him to another. He might serve there quite satis- 
factorily but as soon as he reaches a certain age and acquires seniority 
he will be advanced and you will have to transplant him, and you 
would find a man who was not adapted to the Signal Corps, where he 
would have more responsibility and oversight. In private life you 
can do away with that by saying, this man does not fit into Section 
A and therefore we will put mm m Section B, and you are not under 
any obligation to promote him out of Section B. You can carry him 
as long as you are willing to have him. 

Mr. Buck. But there are many branches of the Signal Corps for 
various assignments. There is the wireless, the research work, the 
Atlantic cables, and all that sort of thing. 

Mr. Greene. I quite appreciate that; but his change from one 
place where he did not fit over into the other place where he may fit 
IS only temporary, because when age and seniority come to him you 
have to advance him, and very soon he comes into the position 



ARMY REORGANIZATIOK. 2089 

where you have a man with his unfitness for all around Signal Corps 
work in charge of it. 

Mr. Buck. If he is not competent, possibly he could be transferred 
to some other branch of the Army. 

Mr. Greene. That comes back again to the fii'st proposition of 
making temporary the junior grades, in which men are tried out to 
see whether they nave that all-around fitness before they are perma- 
nently commissioned. He will then go up the line eventually before 
he is given control. 

Mr. Buck. I am afraid that is getting into the work of Army organi- 
zation, which is outside of my line. 

Mr. Caldwell. You are an electrical engineer ? 

Mr. Buck. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Caldwell. In your experience as an electrical engineer, how 
long would a xnan with rudimentary technical knowledge have to be 
under observation before you could determine whether or not he was 
fitted for that work as a life profession ? 

Mr. Buck. In my experience I could tell within a week whether 
or not a man is gomg to be competent to develop into an engineer, 
by close observation. He may not learn his particular branch of the 
work at once, but it is easy to tell whether he is going to prove to be a 
competent man or not. 

Mr. Caldwell. In other words, whether he has enough brains and 
ability to pursue that profession ? 

Mr. Buck. Yes. 

Mr. Caldwell. So the limitation of the^ank of captain is not as 
low as it might be and still give efficiency? It might be as low as 
second lieutenant ? When he reached his first promotion you might 
be able reasonably to say whether he was adapted for that kind of 
work ? 

Mr. Buck. Yes. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you. 

STATEMENTS OF HAJ. GEBT. GEOBGE 0. SQTTIEB, CHIEF 
SIGITAI OFFICEB, AND COL. CHABLES HcK. SALTZMAN, 
EXECUTIVE OFFICEB, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL 
OFFICEB. 

The Chairman. We will be very glad to hear you now, Gen. Squier. 
Will you state what you desire to present to the committee ? 

Gen. Squier, Mr. Chairman, I have already appeared before the 
coinmittee, you will remember, in connection with the organization 
of the Signal Corps to be provided in the new reorganization bill. 
I now come to urge the committee to make some changes in section 
13, which applies to the Signal Corps, in the bill which I understand 
you are now formulating. I have not read the bill myself, so I do 
not know about all the features of it. But I have had permission to 
see what it says in regard to the Signal Corps. It is very brief, as 
you have written it, and merely states that there shall be a total of 
290 officers and 4,000 men. That is the way it stands at present. 
The Senate committee, on the other hand, as I understand it, has 
recommended in a similar section 400 officers and 5,000 men. I have 
written what we honestly think is the desirable thing to have as a 
substitute paragraph, and I would like to leave it with you. 



2090 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

The Chairman. You may put that in the record, if you so desire. 
Gen. Squier. I will be g;Iad to do so. 
(The matter referred to is as follows:) 

Sec. 13. That section 13 be, and the same is hereby, amended by striking out the 
same and inserting the following in lieu thereof: 

* The Signal Corps. — ^Tbe Signal Corps shall consist of one Chief Signal Officer with 
the rank of major general, two brigadier generals, five hundred ten officers in grades 
from colonel t^ second lieut-enant, inclusive, who shall be permanently commissioned 
in the Signal Corps, and eight thousand four hundred enlisted men, such part of 
whom as the President may direct being formed into tactical unita organized as he 
may prescribe: Provided, That, not more than 50 per centum of the vacancies in the 
grades of first Keutenant and second lieutenant may be filled by the appointment of 
civilian ^duates of approved technical schools and colleges, subject to technical 
examination by a board of Signal officers: And farther provided. That, for the per- 
formance of the technical duties of the Signal Corps the enlisted personnel shall in- 
clude not less than the following per centum of the various grades: first grade, 2 per 
centum; second grade, 7 per centum; third grade, 10 per centum; fourth grade, ^0 
per centum; fifth grade, 45 per centum; sixth grade, 9 per centum; and that the en- 
listed personnel of the grade of private (first class) and private shall include not less 
than the following percentage of specialists of the various ratings; first rating, 1.30 
per centum; second rating, 2.74 per centum; third rating, 3.30 per centum; fourth 
rating, 7.61 per centum; fifth rating, 4.94 per centum; sixth rating, 34.82 per centum: 
And further provided, That, all technical signal supplies and signal equipment shall 
be procured, stored, and issned by the Signal Corps: And provided further , That, only 
that portion of the Signal Corps organized into tactical units shall be considered as 
a part of the combatant arms of the Army. 

Since I have already appeared before you I will merely take up 
the principal points. There are only four of them, as follows: All 
officer personnel to be permanently commissioned in the Signal 
Corps; the present percentage in grade of enlisted men to remain as 
in the present law; all technical supplies to be procured, stored and 
issued by the Signal Corps; and only that part of the Signal Corps 
organized into tactical units to be a part of the line of the Army. 

We want a permanent personnel. 

The Chairman. In all grades ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. As far as the two lower grades are con- 
cerned, you have already provided a method of trying out the 
juniors and eliminating them, . and that will do very well with us. 
1 would like to urge you to revert to the law as it used to be, when 
an officer was commissioned permanently in the Signal Corps. 

Mr. Greene. You presented a number of tentative proposals 
that the first two grades shall be detailed. 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir, I understand 

Mr. Greene (interposing). Having that in mind. General, we 
have, of course, written a law to remain, in principle, at ieast, after 
all the present personnel are passed over and it is regarded simply 
as a foundation upon which other personnel may operate, ^t 
appears at present that those grades as indicated in the bill do not 
exactly represent what will be the status. If this goes through 
anywhere along the line as presently contemplated, in the future 
the captains in the service will be men of probably not more than 
five years' experience in the Army, or at least that will be true of 
the greater part of the captains, because with approximately 18,000 
on the permanent list of the Ai'my, that will advance juniors to such 
a point that they will probably be men who came in about the time 
of the war. That would mean, of course, a very great number of 
comparatively immature officers, no matter what their potential 
usefulness maj^ be. 



ARMY REOBGANIZATION. 2091 

At the same time if we were to start this oflf with the grade of 
major, being the first grade permanently commissioned, so you would 
get some men who had already been tried out, then witnin two or 
tiiree years as the men of the old time struck the grade of captain 
you reduced it to a captaincy, would not that be more likely to reach 
the present circumstances than to start in now with the captains ? 

Gen. Sqitieb. Of course, you will see that I have a provision in 
this proposal which permits us to go out and get 50 per cent of 
technically trained men from colleges for the two lower grades, but 
not more than 50 per cent of them. We have discovered that we 
must go straight to those schools to get those young men, no matter 
whether they have ever been in the service at all, because the job 
we have to do is so highly technical that we want graduates from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other similar places. I 
have put in this proposed section a provision that permits not more 
than 50 per cent to be obtained from such sources. The others will 
be taken by examination, from Army officers, those in research and 
those already in the Army, and that will give us a certain amount of 
seniority among the officers. It is true that some of these highly 
trained technical men will start with first lieutenant and second 
lieutenant ranks, but I see no wajr of avoiding that. They will soon 
get their military training by servmg with the oattalions in organized 
divisions. 

Mr. Greene. I did not, perhaps, have that same thought in mind. 
It wiU work itself out eventually to be a very serious proposition. 
TTie words '^ first lieutenant and '^ captain^' as they are written in 
the law now will not actually realize the same type oi man that those 
same words would have meant before the war. 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. So far as age, experience, and maturity are concerned, 
would not there be, under the mathematics of the reorganization bill, 
a lot of duplication in a very literal sense ? When the list gets settled 
down the old average will obtain again, approximately. But there 
wiU be forced promotions now, and young men who have not been in 
the Army a much longer period than that which has elapsed since the 
date of tne war will be captains. But that is a sufficient time for you 
to determine that they are fit for permanent incorporation in your 
corps ? 

Gen. Squier. I believe under the system of examinations which we 
have proposed it would be desirable to have it that way, but I do not 
know exactly how to manage it. 

Mr. Greene. Up to major, do you mean ? 

Gen. Squier. How have you got it in some of the other corps ? 

The Chairman. We have not got it. 

Gen. Squier. My thought is that they might be first and second 
lieutenants. 

The Chairman. We are trying to get the opinions of the different 
staff bureau chiefs. 

Mr. Greene. You have got a first lieutenant now who has been 
not more than two years, perhaps, or three years in the Army at the 
most, and in that time he has been subject to war duties, which 
allowed no opportunity for a definite study of the man in a fixed 
position long enough to get much out of him. He has been going 
here, there, and everywhere. He has not been fixed in any one place 



2092 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

very long; he has not had any garrison service at all where he came 
under definite and studied observation. Most of those men will be 
captains, under the terms of this biU, with not more than three years' 
experience in the Army. Has, that interim given you a chance to 
get a sufficient line on those men so that you can say that you are 
willing to take them permanently into the corps and give them the 
rank of captain ? 

Gen. Squier. Your thought would be to try them out as first or 
second lieutenants ? 

Mr. Greene. I am suggesting whether, temporarily, it would not 
be wiser to make some such arrangement as that; to have some stage 
at which they can come in, say, as major, and then by and by, after 
the files have caught up in tneir average, then bring them down to 
captains. 

Gen. Squier. I think possibly there are some advantages in that, 

Mr. Olnby. How does this language you propose differ from the 
old law? Did you compare that with tne old law? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir; I have it right here. Section 13 says: 

AN ACT For making farther and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other 

purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresentatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, * * * 

Sec. 13- The Signal Carj>s. — ^The SignaJ Corps shall consist of one Chief Signal 
Officer, with the rank of brigadier general; three colonels; eight lieutenant colonels; 
ten niajo!rs; thirty captains; seventy-five first lieutenants. * * * 

The total enlist-ed strength of the Signal Corps shall be limited and fixed from time 
to time by the President in accordance with the needs of the Army, and shall consist 
of master signal electriciansi; sergeants, first class; sergeants; corporals; cooks; horse- 
shoers; privaj^e, first class; and privates; the number in each grade being fixed from 
time to time by the President. The numbers in the /arious grades shall not exceed 
the following percentages of the t^tal authorized enlisted strength of the Signal Corps, 
namely: Master signal electricians, two per centum; sergeants, first class, seven per 
centum; sergeants, ten per centum; corporals, twenty per centum. The number of 
privates, first class, shall not exceed twenty-five per centum of the number of pri- 
vates. Authority is hereby given the President to organize, in his discretion, such 
part of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Cori)s into duch num- 
ber of companies, battalions, sknd aero squadrons as the necessities of the service 
may demand. 

Approved June 3, 1916. 

So the first point I make is that we want a permanent personnel 
in the Signal Corps. We are perfectly willing to safeguard any point 
you suggest. 

The next point is this: You have got in your general bill, as I 
imderstand it, a different arrangement in regard to the classification 
of master signal electricians, and people of that kind. I understand 
you have done away with those names and put those people into 
classes in a different way. 

The Chairman. They are in six classes. 

Gen. Squier. In that way we are thrown into the same percentages 
as the Infantry and Cavalry, and I would urge you to give us what 
we now have, because we oi all the corps are a technical corps, and 
the percentages of master signal electricians and first class sergeants 
that we have to have must oe larger than in the 4ine of the Anny. 
I merely ask for these percentages which I have given in the proposed 
amendment which I have submitted, and that is merely the present 
law. 



AKMY REORGANIZATION. 2093 

Mr. Anthony. Under the provision of the bill as it is before the 
Oommittee it would be up to the Secretary of War to give you the 
proper number of the aifferent grades of noncommissioned rank. 
Could you not safely trust to the General Staff to do that ? 

Gen. Squier. No, sir; I tell you, I can not. We merely want what 
experience has shown to be the right thing for us to have. If it is 
not provided for in the law specifically, we have to fight for it all the 
time. I am not criticizing anybody at all. These things have been 

{)roved to be necessary. They are not excessive, and if you leave the 
aw alone in that respect, we only want what we have now. In lieu 
of these numbers you can use the provisions under existing law. 

The Chairman. In order to have your department work success- 
fully you have to have technical men ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. If I should bring you a list of the tech- 
nicians we have to have, it would be half a page long. We have to 
have all manner of specialists that they do not have to have in the 
other corps. It is a perfectly evident proposition. Under your pro- 
posed bill we are thrown in with the line of the Army, and we might 
get it or we might not. 

Mr. Anthony. How do you arrive at the total number of officers 
you want authorized in your corps when you put the number at 
510 ? I believe the bill carries 290. 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. Some representative officers of the line of the Army 
who went over the numbers, recommended 140 for the Signal Corps. 
How do you account for the divergence? 

Gen. Squier. I think I did not make that very clear. I did not 
know anyone had recommended 140. This is the whole thing in a 
nutshell. The Wadsworth bill gives us 400 officers and 5,000 enlisted 
men. This proposed bill now oefore your committee gives us 290 
officers and 4,000 men. The percentage of an army needed for this 
essential service is 3 per cent in peace time, as we consider it, and as 
this bill, the way I understand it, provides a total army of about 
17,000 officers and 280,000 men, 3 per cent of these totals would be 
510 officers and 8,400 men. 

Mr. Anthony. Would not the question of how rapidly the Signal 
Corps could be expanded in time oi war enter into it ? 

Gren. Squier. Yes, sir. In peace time it is a different number, 
because there are a lot of outside duties. 

Mr. Anthony. Is it difficult to expand the Signal Corps in time of 
war ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes; because our training is so technical, and it is 
hard to find the men. We have to comb the country to find them. 

Mr. Anthony. Col. Carty testified awhile ago that his company 
alone gave 14,000 technical men to the service. 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir; they did, and it disrupted the whole tele- 
phone system of this country. 

Mi\ Anthony. That would tend to show that you could get the 
men if you needed them. 

Gen. Squier. We did get them during the World War. Col. Carty 
is now a reserve officer, and I have neBTly a thousand of those reserve 
officers. We will always have to turn to those men in time of war. 
But the development of field radio, telegraph, and telephone eauip- 
ment; the use of this equipment to tie together Infantry, Artillerv. 



2094 ARMY 9E0BGANIZATI0N. 

and other troopS; and the control of these troops during maneuvers 
by their commanding general must be practiced m time of peace to 
prepare for war. 

The numbers I have given you are very small, 3 per cent of the 
enUsted men and 3 per cent of the officers. The Wadsworth bill 
has aUowed 400 officers and 5,000 men. 

Mr. McKenzie. Perhaps you can tell us where you expect to use 
600 officers? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. I have just furnished to the General Staff 
a list showing, to the last man, where they go. I will give you the 
sheets showing that. 

The Chairman. That is what Mr. Anthony asked you — ^how you 
proposed to use the 510 officers. 

Gren. Squier. It is on four or five large sheets, and I can put those 
in the record, if you so desire. We have just made a careful study 
of that. 

The Chairman. Very well. Can you tell us offhand how you 
proposed to distribute them ? 

Gen. Squier. I would prefer to put it in the hearing. 

(The statement referred to is as follows) : 

OFFICERS. 

Office Chief Signal Officer: Administration; personnel; organization of Signal 
Corps troops; engineering and research; procurement and supply of technical 
equipment; training and instruction; Signal Corps laboratories 41 

Department headquarters: Service companies; posts, camps, and cantonment 
signal officers; Washington- Alaska Military Cable and Telegraph System; 
Photographic Section; Meteorological Section; radio installation and opera- 
tion on Army Transport Service 129 

Field Signal drganizations: Telegraph battalions; radio organization for mili-. 
tary intelligence 340 

Total : 510 

ENLISTED MEN. 

Telegraph, telephone maintenance, radio, and telephone switchboard operation 
at posts, camps, on Army transports and Washington-Alaska Military Cable 
and Telegraph System 1 , 085 

Department headquarters: Camp supply, storage, photographic, meteorological, 
administrative personnel in Signal Corps School, instructors in Signal Corps 

. School, engineering and research, United States Military Academy 1, 627 

Field Signal Organizations : Telegraph battalions, radio organization for mili- ' 
tary intelligence 5, 688 



I ^mm 



Total. 8, 400 

Mr. Anthony. Do you propose to orgaiiize a large number of field 
battalions, as the General Staff contemplates ? 

Gen. Squier. No. This compilation was made for the General 
Staff. That is the thing they have demanded of us. Let me point 
this out to the committee. The present strength oi the Army is about 
202,000. To-day, practically, the authorized strength ot tne Signal 
Corps is 2.4 per cent, and we hav^ applications now, as we have all 
the time, for a number of men in various places, such, for instance, 
as 400 men more for meteorology, 280 men for service on the ground 
at the flying fields, and that sort of thing is going on all the time, to 
perform extra duties of that sort. 



AEMY BEOKGANIZATION. 2095 

The Chairman. Have you some Signal Corps men with the tanks ? 

Gen. Sqtjieb. Yes, sir; the tanks have to communicate with the 
home stations. 

The Chaibman. Do you have a man in every tank? 

Gen. Squier. That is a mooted point which we are discussing 
with the General Staff as to what they will wear, what color. That 
is whether the signal men with tanks will be Tank Corps men or 
Signal Corps men. But largely as a result of the war, there are 
thmgs being demanded of us that no one ever heard of before, and 
I want to impress upon you the fact that the present proportion of 
the Signal Corps to the entire strength of the Army is only 2.4 per 
cent. 

Mr. Anthony. What percentage did you have before the war? 

Gen. Squier. It was very triflmg. 

Mr. Anthony. What was the total number of, men in the Signal 
Corps under the national defense act? 

Gen. Squier. It was very small, 127, I think. To go on any idea 
of what the Signal Corps was in the old days is a dangerous thing. 
I am faced witJi definite, daily calls and demands, and I wish to tell 
you now that if your bill should go through you would be reducing 
the percentage of men in the Signal Corps which I have to-day. 

Mr. Anthony. We want to reduce it; we do not want you to 
preserve your war establishment. 

Gen. Squier. We are not rroposing a war establishment. The 
national defense act, under which we are at this moment functioning, 
is a reace arrangement, for which the strength of an army as proposed 
in this bill is a substitute. 

Mr. McKenzie. You spoke of having officers engaged in meteoro- 
logical work. They are asking for a certain number of officers for 
work along the same lines in another corps? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. What is the necessity of duT^licating that ? 

Gen. Squier. You might say the Coast Artillery wants some, and 
also, particularly the Chemical Warfare Service, which regulates its 
attacks entirely on the direction of the wind. The present law puts 
meteorology in the Signal Cor] s, and the history of it in the war was 
a pronounced success. First, we are called upon for probable wind 
direction for the tanks, who want a smoke barrage, and then for the 
Coast Artillery. This percentage that now exists is a fact, and these 
demands for meteorological data are coming in all the time. Under 
the present law the President can authorize increases and he does. 
In my judgment, after consulting everybody, both overseas and here, 
these figures are the best estimate we can make, considering the 
expanding and the growth of the functions of the Signal Corps, 
which is as phenominal almost as any I know of. What we are 
asking for is necessary, and the method of arriving at it is extremely 
simple. It is a percentage method. 

Then, I also want to call your attention to this fact, that our 
supplies must be made and bought, and they should be stored and 
issued by us. I think that nobody can do that in the way it should 
be done except trained people. 

Mr. Caldwell. You mean the technical supplies ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes. We want nothing to do with anything that is 
standardized, which can be furnished us. I think nobody can buy 



2096 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

our material unless he knows the business thoroughly. You can 
lose money very easily if you do not know how a thing is made. 
We have to put people in a factory to follow the thing through. Our 
equipment is very special, and there is nobody else who uses a lot of 
it anyway, and ii we do not develop it, nobody else will. 

Mr. Greene. On that basis, following the dictum that the Quarter- 
master Corps will buy supplies which are common to two or more 
bureaus, that would leave to you the purchase of special things ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes. 

The Chairman. There is a provision in the bill covering that very 
matter. 

Gen. Squier. That is the way we did it during the war, and that 
is the only way it can be done. 

Mr. Miller. The storage and care of special articles is very im- 
portant ? 

Gen. Squier. Yes, sir; it is, and nobody knows how to take carQ 
of that equipment but experts. Some of the mistakes that are being 
made under the present system are ludicrous, and cause a waste oi 
money. We have very technical apparatus. We do not buy any- 
thing ourselves that is standardized. 

I would also like to call the attention of the committee to the 
fact that we are both a line and a staff department, and the tendency 
is to write a bill as though we are nothing but battalions out in the 
field. In addition to our other duties and responsibilities we are 
charged with the great responsibility of keeping ahead of the world 
on equipment and apparatus, and I assure you it is a very serious 
matter to keep up in tnese days. We have all the work of the other 
countries to keep up with, and therefore we can not be taken care of 
as though we were only a supply department. 

Mr. Greene. That suggests this, that there must be some twilight 
zone between your research and the research in the same line of science 
that the civil world is conducting. And the point we would have to 
demonstrate is this: If you are duplicating outside work only for the 
advancement of the science, or only to get that result, then the ques- 
tion comes up as to whether the Government should appropriate 
money for what the civil scientists are doing. If you can show that 
the development of the same thing that is going on in the outside 
world is along broader and perhaps superior lines, or if your research 
department, taken with theirs and combined, makes for the tactical 
and stragetic benefit of an army in the field, then the twilight zone 
disappears. 

Gen. Squier. We do not want to do a thing along that line that we 
can buy; but unless we study the problems for the armies in the field 
and watch that and keep it after all the time we will get behind in no 
time. Only people who are interested in it will do it as it should be 
done. Mr. Cfarty, for instance, is not primarily interested in the de- 
velopment of field signal apparatus, he is running city telephones for 
the public. We want people who are working on this special thing 
all the time, and we want to try these things out with the Army. I 
have never known such a period of fluidity in signaling as there is now. 

Mr. Greene. You will find that the word " meteorology '^ will im- 
press the layman as being not associated with military science. But 
if you can aemonstrate that instead of being a department of science 
of exclusive benefit to agriculturists, that it has also a military signif- 



ARMY REORGAIsriZATION. 2097 

icance and practical military use, in which lives are saved, and per- 
il aps a greater offensive caused against the enemy, then you will have 
a better case. 

Gen. Squier. I would like to lecture to you along that line. But 
if you will read my annual report Chapter XVI, I think you will find 
enough there to convince anybody. 

Mr. McKenzie. In connection with Mr. Greeners question, that 
might imply tl'at the question I asked you would indicate that I did 
not think vou should have that. 

Mr. Greene. I did not moan that at all. 

Mr. McKenzie. I simply want to get rid of duplication. 

Gen. Squier. We have worked alone very closely with the Weather 
Bureau. We have not done a t1 ing umt the Weather Bureau could 
possibly do for us. We have only done what we had to do. Some of 
the forecasters of the country were taken away from the Weather 
Bureau and sent to France. 

Mr. Greene. I did not refer to Mr. McKenzie's question. The 
word " meteorology '' was suggested, and it is one of the words that 
would be difficult to explain to a layman, so far as its use in a military 
sense is concerned. 

Gen. Squier. The other day I had a letter prepared for the signa- 
ture of the Secretary of War, recommending an appropriation for the 
Weather Bureau for civil meteorolog}'. We do not want to go off 
on side lines; I am not for that for a moment. 

Mr. Olney. Are you in accord with Col. Carty's views and recom- 
mendations, that the obtaining of men from the colleges and univer- 
sities and putting them into the service should be encouraged, and 
that it will increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps ? 

Gen. Squier. That is the only way you can hope to do it. I have 
men at Yale and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They should 
be the best we can get. That is the cheapest and best way to do it. 
Why not go right to the place where they are trained and pet them ? 
That is the cheapest thing in the world, and we are doing it. 

Mr. Caldwell. Are you making any studies in the Signal Corps 
in connection with the instruments used to detect sound waves, to 
locate artillery? 

Gen. Squier. That was turned over to the Engineers. We devel- 
oped it, and I rather think it was a mistake to give it up, because we 
had the telephone and telegraph lines to transmit the information 
anyway. That is the same question with meteorology, too. The 
reason we need meteorology is because 70 per cent of meteorology is 
in the sending of the messages; transmitting the meteorological data. 
We are already in control of the methods of sending it anyway; why 
not read the barometer ? In Alaska now several of my sergeants on 
duty at telegraph stations are paid observers of the Weather Bureau. 
It is simply to save the Department of Agriculture building telegraph 
lines up there. It is just a matter of cooperation. 

The Chairman. Col. Saltzman is here and we will be glad to hear 
him now. 

Col. Saltzman. Mr. Chairman, I would like first to make a short 
statement, which will take only a few moments. 

In order for the Signal Corps to properly function in an army of 
280,000 enlisted men, it is recommenced that the commissioned and 



2098 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps be 3 per cent of the commis- 
sioned and enlisted personnel of the Army. The lessons of the war 
demonstrated that it can not be done with less. The duties of the 
Signal Corps have increased during the war. 

The war has clearly demonstrated that the ''detail system'' can 
no longer be worked in the technical duties of the Signal Corps, and 
it is recommended that all Signal Corps personnel be permanently 
commissioned in that arm. 

In order that the Signal Corps attract educated, yoimg men from 
outside, it is recommended that the law permit that not more than 
50 per cent of the vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant and second 
lieutenant be filled by the appointment of civilian graduates of recog- 
nized technical schools. If the Signal Corps each year cai\ fill a 
certain number of vacancies by getting bright young men from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other similar institutions, 
it will increase efficiency. 

It is recommended that all technical si^al equipment and supplies 
be purchased, stored, and issued by the Signal Corps. This technical 
equipment is very complicated, requires the service of specialists in 
purchasing it, in assembling it, and caring for it. If some other depart- 
ment stores it they must have specialists to assemble the equipment and 
maintain it, thereby necessitatmg a duplication of technical personnel. 
For many years previous to the war the Signal Corps suppUed the Army 
with technical signal equipment from four small depots located at Ai-my 
posts, one in the East, one in the W^^t, one in the North, and one in 
the South, and did it efficiently and economically. 

That only that portion of the Signal Corps organized into tactical 
units be considered a part of the line of the Army, for the reason that 
the Signal Corps, in addition to its duty with the combat troops of 
the Army, has a second function as a supply corps and research corps. 
The Chief Signal Officer, by his assignments, can interchange officers 
between the tactical units and the supply and research departments, 
thus keeping them up to date concerning Army requirements. If the 
entire corps is considered as a combat arm, the Chief Signal Officer's 
hands will often be tied in using his technical men, as it will then be 
necessary under regulations to take a technical man away from the 
technical job and for which he is best fitted and send him to a tactical 
unit where he is not needed or suited. 

I would like to answer a question Mr. Anthony raised about the 
number of enlisted men that were needed. The 2.4 per cent men- 
tioned by Gen. Squier is in connection with an army of 200,000 men, 
and that would mean about 5,000 men in the Signal Corps to-day. 
Those men are needed in the Signal Corps to fill out the field battalions, 
telegraph battalions, and to do the other jobs we have to do. I can 
not see how, with an army of 280,000 men, jou could fill the same 
positions with 4,000 men. The number which the Signal Corps is 
asking for is 3 per cent of the enlisted strength of the Army, whatever 
you decide upon as the size of the Army. 

Mr. Anthony. If we had an army of 280,000 men you propose 
under a percentage system to give each organization of troops its 
proper quota of Signal Corps equipment and troops? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. It is highly improbable that if we had an army of 
280,000 men that every organization in that 280,000 will be in the 
field at the same time, is it not ? 



ARMY BEORGANIZATION. 2099 

Col. Saltzman. No, sir; that is right. 

Mr. Anthony. A percentage of them will be in garrison? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Anthony. All that Signal Corps equipment would not be 
needed there. So, why apply the percentage basis to the entire 
organization ? 

Col. Saltzman. Because we can only judge from the present 
needs. We have not the men needed to-day to fill all of our jobs, 
with the anny that we have. 

Gen. Squier. And yet we have a thousand more than you propose 
to give us. 

Mr. McKenzie. In connection with the speech in the House yes- 
terday by Mr. Mondell in reference to the cost of universal military 
training, I want to ask whether or not the force provided for under 
your suggestion would be sufficient to take care of the training, or 
would we have to increase your department ? 

Col. Saltzman. Not under the system of training proposed in the 
Senate bill. In the Senate bill it is proposed in the different areas 
to have a small training nucleus and then gather around that men 
who have served during the war, for training the citizen army. We 
might require some other Signal Corps personnel for short periods. 

Mr. McKenzie. You think the 510 officers provided for would be 
sufficient? 

Col. Saltzman. We ask for 3 per cent of the total number of offi- 
cers, whatever that number might be. 

Mj. Anthony. You mean you would take from the commissioned 
officers now in the reserve and call them to acive duty for instruction 
purposes ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. We might call a few. 

Mr. Anthony. Tn addition to the 510 officers? 

Gen. Squier. We have a thousand reserve officers now. 

Mr. Caldwell. The instruction in universal training would be 
instruction for the reserve officers ? 

Mr. McKenzie. What I want to know is whether the officers pro- 
vided for under your plan, 3 per cent of an army of 280,000, would 
be a sufficient force with whicn to take care of the additional work of 
training? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. Or would you have to call in reserve officers ? 

Col. Saltzman. No, sir; we can look after it with that number of 
officers. I have talked it over with Col. Palmer, who has been hold- 
ing hearings on this Senate bill. 

Mr. Anthony. If we had a training army of 800,000 men, which 
would be the maximum, do you mean to say you could provide the 
Signal Corps commissioned personnel to train 800,000 men out of 510 
officers ? 

Col. Saltzman. You are not going to train all of them at one time, 
and but a few of them in the Signal Corps. 

Mr. Anthony. Suppose we do that? 

The Chairman. The testimony shows that we will only have about 
V)00,000 men in training. 

Mr. Anthony. But 800,000 would be eligible. 

Mr. Caldwell. I think Col. Saltzman means that if you take 
these 800,000 men and have them in four classes you would have 
only 200,000 to be taken care of by the 610 officers. 



2100 ABMY REOKGANIZATION. 

Mr. Anthony. I never heard of the plan of classes. I have always 
understood the training force would be called out at one time. 

The Chairman. The evidence shows that about 600,000 men would 
go to the training camps. 

Mr. Anthony. The question which Mr. McKenzie propounded is 
whether 510 officers are enough to provide Signal Corps training for 
the men in the training camps, wnether the number is 600,000 or 
800,000, as the ca6e may be. 

Col. Saltzman. My understanding is that you are going to call into 
a training area a certain number of men for that perioa of training. 
But there are going to be all kinds of training going on in that area. 
There are going to be a lot of people who have had the exfjerience. 

Mr. Anthony. No; they will be young men just coming to the 
training age. They will all be green and raw material. Have you 
got enough officers provided for to take care of the Signal Corps 
training for 600,000 men ? 
Col. Saltzman. No, sir. 

Mr. Greene. Let us see whether there is not another refinement 
of that situation which may make another aid to it. The whole 
600,000 men called to the colors are only to get elemental training in 
the school of the soldier and the school of unit. Not all of those men 
are going to take Signal Corps training. 
Col. Saltzman. No, sir. 

Mr. Greene. There will be a small number in each one of those 
units which will get any training at all. With that understanding, 
and with the training conducted in areas, would the contemplated 
force of 510 officers oe sufficient to take care of that und§r those 
circumstances ? 

Col. Saltzman. I feel that we certaily could do it. It might be 
necessary once in a while to call in reserve officers, but the number of 
reserve officers would be almost negligible. 

Mr. Greene. You would not want to expand your permanent 
personnel. 

Col. Saltzman. No, sir. I do want to say one thing about the 
captains whom Mr. Greene mentioned. I would like to ask you to 
think of a Signal Corps radio company under the detail system having 
a cavalrjr officer witn no radio training sent over there to instruct 
that radio company in radio. It simply can not be done. 

Mr. Greene. I may have gotten that proposition wrong end to. 
I was not thinking of the fallacy of the present detail system. I was 
trying to avoid it. I mean simply to determine in what grade in the 
service you would select men permanently. I am saying you will 

fet a good man to start with. The only point is when he would change 
is temporary assignment to a permanent one. 
Col. Saltzman. I would pick the men with as much care as possible 
for the commissioned personnel of the Signal Corps, and if a man does 
not make good I would eUminate him. We have tried it in the corps 
with lieutenants and captains ^^ detailed '' and it has been an absolute 
failure. We have had officers sent from the other arms of the service 
who did not know the names of the instruments we use and who knew 
nothing about the kind of work we were doing. 

Mr. Greene. You propose to take 50 per cent from the schools. 
Would you not run exactly the same risk there? You would get 50 
per cent of young men who have qualified for the degree of engineer, 
from the academic viewpoint. They have been untried in die prac- 
tical realization of work in the field. You know that the same thtng 



ABMY BEOBGANIZATION. 2101 

is true at West Point. Young men go through the academy from 1 7 
to 21 years of age, and they have that garrison experience at West 
Point. When they get into the service man after man is thrown out 
as being temperamentally imfit. He qualified on examination. 
Would not that same thing hold true in taking- men from civilian 
schools, that they could qualify academically, and yet when they 
were once articulated with the practical system in tne field it was 
of ten f oimd that they were temperamentally unfit and (Ud not give 
promise of development beyond the academic resources and qualifica- 
tions with which they first came in, and you would want some way 
to get rid of them ? 

Col. Saltzman. There are three answers to that question. First, 
such a man can be transferred out. 

Mr. Caldwell. Not if they are permanently commissioned ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greensi But such a man would arrange a transfer with a 
man suitable on the lineal list. 

Col. Saltzman. That is not necessary imder the single list system. 
Second, you have provided a means m your bill by which such a 
man can be eliminated; and third, the detail system has been so 
bad that this other system can not but be better. 

Mr. Harrison. As I understand it, you need the 510 officers for 
an Army of 280,000 men ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. You need those men so that the vSignal Corps in an 
Army of 280,000 men can properly function ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. How can you figure it out that they will be sufficient 
if you add another Army of 600,000 men ? You want 3 per cent of 
your men to be in the Signal Corps, and therefore there would be 
18,000 of^ those 600,000 men that you want to be trained in the Signal 
Corps. 1 understand that you figured on having 510 officers for an 
Army of 280,000 men. 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. That is the number of officers necessary for a per- 
manent establishment of 280,000 men. How can you figure that that 
number is sufficient for an Army of 600,000 called out each year for 
training purposes ? 

Col. Saltzman. I understand that it is intended to use the Regular 
Army to train these men. 

Mr. Harrison. You are going to use them in part. 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, dr. 

Mr. Harrison. Then ypu will not need anv officers at all to train 
the 18,000 who would be in the Signal Corps ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. You will need some? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, Sir. 

Mr. Harrison. WiU they be sufficient? 

Col. Saltzman. In all probability 

Mr. Harrison (interposing) . If we do not have military training, 
then can we not cut down this number of 510 officers you speak of? 

Col. Saltzman. We have the lesson before us to-day. "We have 
not got enough men in our corps to-day to fill aJl the jobs in the Army 
that we have now. 

150187— 20— VOL 2 ^20 



2102. ^ ARMY BEORGANIZATION. 

Mr. Harrison. You proVi|ide in this propJosed amendment for 510 
officers for an army of 280,000 men. 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. They are necessary for the proper officering of 
those men ? You are going to have an additional army of 600,000 
men, if we have universal training, of which 18.000 are to be trained 
in the Signal Corps. How do you figure out tnat those officers will 
be sufficient for that work ? 

Col. Saltzman. I assume you are going to use the Signal Corps 
of the Regular Army to train those other men. 

Mr. Crago. The Signal Corps, properly officered with those 510 
officers, would have the work of training these other 18,000 men ? 

Col. Saltzman. That is what the^y are for. 

Mr. Harrison. Then if we do not have universal military train- 
ing, we can cut down that number ? 

Col. Saltzman. No, sir. • 

Mr. MoRiN. Colonel, have you not arrived at the figures of 3 per 
cent for the Regular Army of 280,000 men without taking into con- 
sideration the fact that we might have universal military training? 
That nimiberis necessary, whether we have universal miUtary train- 
ing or not ? 

Col. Saltzman. The way we arrived at the 3 per cent was this. 
After the Philippine insiurection the Signal Corps made calculations 
about the force that they used in that work. The Signal Corps was 
really born in the Philippine insiurection, in the work which they 
did under Gen. MacArthur. From that time to the time of the 
beginning of this war thev said they ought to have 2i per cent of 
the enlisted personnel of tne Army. The advances which have been 
made in the increased use of the Signal Corps in this war caused 
that percentage to be boosted to 3 per cent. 

Mr. MoRiN. Then in your judgment we need 3 per cent of an 
army of 280,000 men for the Signal Corps, whether we adopt uni- 
versal military training or not ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hull. Is not the 3 per cent based on an army in the field? 

Col. Saltzman. No, sir. It is based on an army doing just what 
our army was doing before the war, some of it ready to go into the 
field, and some of it in garrisons, and some of it Coast Artillery, etc. 

Mr. Hull. We have not very much of an army to-day, have we; 
that is, a real army ? 

*Col. Saltzman. No. 

Mr. Hull. We have everything but the mien, have we not ? 

Col. Saltzman. We have about 202,000 men. 

Mr. Hull. How many of those men are in actual combat units ? 

Col. Saltzman. We are called on daily for men. If there is a 
division at Camp Pike, for example, we are supposed to furnish a 
field signal battalion for that division. But we nave not the men. 
All we are asking for is men to fill the demands made on us, 

Mr. Hull. You are called on to furnish yom* quota of that, an 
actual divisional unit ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hull. Whether there are 2,000 men there or 25,000 men, 
you must have your men there ? 

Col. Saltzman. That is what we are called on to do. 



AKMY REORGANIZATION. 2103 

Mr. Greene. Is it not a fact in regard to the Signal Corps, as it 
is in regard to the Air Service and to the Artillery, that the problem 
of the tactical organization of the Signal Corps, as of the Artillery 
and the Air Service, depends upon the terrain to be covered and 
the strategic and tactical situation, regardless of the number of 
men there are in it, and a division has to have the same information 
whether it is a complete division or not, and the same means of 

fetting intelUgence to take care of a skeleton organization as it would 
ave if the ranks were fuU ? 

Col. Saltzman. Exactly. At the Signal Corps School at Leaven- 
worth they used to have field problems. They would take out 
40 men and let them represent a division. The Signal Corps was 
called upon to produce *4ines of information '' for that di vision J*" and 
even though there were only 40 men in that division we had to lay 
miles of wire to the various elements even though they were only 
represented by a few men. It did not make any difference whether 
there were 40 men or 40,000 men, we had to use as many men as if 
the whole division had been there. 

Mr. Greene. Your plan now provides the tactical organization of 
a peace time army of 280,000 men, reserving to each unit the proper 
proportion of Signal Corps strength that should be with it for field 
operations ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. If you propose to take on 600,000 men or any other 
number for training purposes, is it not possible to detach, either in 
whole or in part, from these tactical Signal Corps units, to combine 
them into a training organization without, for the time being, de- 
stroying the efficiency of the Army, inasmuch as those units are not 
then cdled into field work ? 

Col. Saltzman. I should assume that the most important task of 
the Army would then be to train those men. 

Mr. Greene. And maintain some proficiency, however, by the 
processes of the schoolmaster 'i 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. These figures you lay down in the bill do not repre- 
sent the idea that it is a peace time Army, but that that is a provi- 
sion against the calling of those men in case of some emergency, and 
therefore you have them ready for that, and there being no emer- 
gency they would be in training ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. If we had no emergency they would not be iu train- 
ing, and there not being an emergency you can detach these men 
from the tactical places in the tactical organization and devote 
them to schoolmastering in time of peace ? 

Col. Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McKenzie. I simply wanted to get the Colonel on record on 
this one proposition, so that in case we adopt compulsory military 
training, when some officer comes before us and tries to tell us that 
we ought to increase the Signal Corps to a thousand officers we will 
at least have your testimony that it is not necessary. 

Col. Saltzman. That is correct. 

(Thereupon, the committee adjourned.) 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Wednesday, February 4 i 1920. 

The committee this day met, Hon. Julius Kahn (chairmARJ fre- 
sidiug. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. The 
Secretary asked for this hearing in order that he may express his 
opinion regarding the proposed undersecretary provision of the 
Army reorganization measure. 

STATEMEVT OF HOIT. ITEWTOIT D. BAKES, SECBETABT OF WAS. 

Secretarv Baker. May I see the form in which vou have it in the 

bill? ' y - 

The Chairman. We have not put it in any form. We simply 
agreed on the principle. 

Secretary Baker. It may be, then, that I have nothing to say. I 
supposed you had adopted the form which is somewhat on the line 
of tnat proposed in the Senate. 

Mr. Dent. We did not like the Senate form. 

The Chairman, yp. simpl y flHopt^d f.h^ pr^nmplp fhat th^ 




departments or r rathpr. thp. G pn^^fwl Staff^ onght. tn look aftftT- tV^P. 
)Army and its fig hting branch in particular . The Staff Co rps^. em- / 
^acmgjyiesuEp^a^ a-Ciyilian chief, ,,jrhal \ 

wajlb he g eneral principle the cominittee ag r eed oq . * ' 

''^"^ecreV^y Baker, it is entirely possible £Eat when you draft and 
modify it I shall not have any comment to make, but if I may state 
briefly what I think ought to be in the provision I shall be glad to do it. 

The Chairman. The committee will be very glad to have you do it. 

Secretary Baker. The Senate provision is very easy of criticism 
because it has two or three things which I think ought not be included. 

The Chairman. We will be very glad to hear from you. 

Secretary Baker. In the main I agree with the position which the 
committee has apparently assumed. What the committee is pro- 

?osing is substantially what we now have in the War Department, 
'he .Assistant Secretary of War, by direction of the Secretary, has) 
c'Karge of the supply dfepartm^nts and that, as I understand, is, in > 
the mam, the pnnciple you are proposing to adopt. To that I have ( 
i\o sort of objection. I think our experience in the war has shown ^ 
that is the wise thing to do; but I think the Senate provision is 
much too inelastic. It does not make any difference to me, because 
this legislation will not be in effect more than a few months, if at all, 
while I am Secretary of War. 
The Chairman. I take it from your statement that you do not 

expect another Democratic administration. 

2105 



Committee on Military Affairs, 

House of Representatives, 

Wednesday y February 4 t 1920. 

The committee this day met, Hon. Julius Kahn (chairm&Rj ftre- 
sidmg. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. The 
Secretary asked for this hearing in order that he ma^ express his 
opinion regarding the proposed undersecretary provision of the 
Armj reorganization measure. 

STATEMEITT OF HOIT. HEWTOIT D. BAKEB, SEGBETABT OF WAB. 

Secretarv Baker. May I see the form in which vou have it in the 
bill? 

The Chairman. We have not put it in any form. We simply 
agreed on the principle. 

Secretary Baker. It may be, then, that I have nothing to say. I 
supposed you had adopted the form which is somewhat on the line 
of tnat proposed in the Senate. 

Mr. Dent. We did not like the Senate form. 

The Chairman, yp. simply pr^npt^H thpi prindplft that thpi staff 

4sBH^Sagilts^i^ri Tfl't.hfir, t.hp fifint^rfll Staff, might to.lQQk^after. .t^ 
)Army and its fig hting branch in particular . The StaffCorDS. em- 
,bra^mgjhesupt)jy\a^ ought4.Q4;>ft.miaer a^iUYwiaix chief ....JJlia 

asm e general principle the committee agreed on . 

"Secretary Baker, it is entirely possible that when you draft and 
modify it I shall not have any comment to make, but if I may state 
briefly what I think ought to be in the provision I shall be glad to do it^ 

The Chairman. The committee will be very glad to have you do it. 

Secretary Baker. The Senate provision is very easy of criticism 
because it has two or three things which I think ought not be included. 

The Chairman. We will be very glad to hear from you. 

Secretary Baker. In the main I agree with the position which the 
committee has apparently assumed. What the committee is pro- 

?osing is substantially wnat we now have in the War Department. 
h,e ^Assistant Secretary of War, by direction of the Secretary, has) 
cnarge of the supply d^epartments and that, as I understand, is, in > 
the main, the pnnciple you are proposing to adopt. To that I have ( 
i\p sort of objection. I think our experience in the war has shown ^ 
that is the wise thing to do; but I think the Senate provision is 
much too inelastic. It does not make any difference to me, because 
this legislation will not be in effect more than a few months, if at all, 
while I am Secretary of War. 
The Chairman. I take it from your statement that you do not 

expect another Democratic administration. 

2105 



2106 ARMY REORGANIZATION. 

Secretary Baker. I expect a Democratic President but another 
Secretary of War. But wnoever is to be Secretary of War I am very 
much interested in his problems. It may be a member of this com- 
mittee for all that I can tell, and I thmk we will all get further 
advanced if each of you will try to think of yourself as Secretary of 
War and responsible for the conduct of the business of the War De- 
partment. T think the fact that the Secretary of War is responsib le 
to Congress f or thie conduct of affairs ou^^ht to have a very greaT in- 



flil eTOe m ihe aepartment itsell, and tnat any'cafvmg'oi^^ the stat u- 
tory duties from the jurisaiction ot t li e iSccretary of War and givin g 
tlie m to asubo rdi n ate ofiicer divic l es the res ponsibility in" the wro ng 
place! r TanytEmg gjoes wron<y wTTH' {He^ suppty 3epaftments, if t he 
oen&te provision was m ^^^pt. ilie ::!>ecrctarj of W ar is not responsil^lp : 
ins tne u naersecretary of War, and i f you send for the Undersecretary 
of War he^aj ^s^^yy ell. theJUliief of Stan'and "Thad a'conTroversy aBout v 

1 that; the Kecretary oi War made rules about TE and w^had a noarmg S 

2 o nThe^su'bje'ct'. ' j!acli'6f us stated what we'TEougiiT aBourTTTSefo re ) 
1 a final decision was recorded.'^ 



1 



n other words, you get a series of essays and formal written deci- 
sions upon some questions but you do not get that sort of promp t 
e xecutive action and concentration of^resp on sibilit y wh ich 1 think 
essentiai. My assistaiir^THr. Crowell^ is" very mucE in Tavor o5f nav- 
ing an i nelpcst ic statutory provision which will put the supply bureaus 
under tTie Undersecretary. I think he is wro ng about ^ that. He 
and I have talked it over many tunes andT'thinlf lie Is wrong for 
^thia_reaso;i-^-He believes that in times of peace you can get a man 
/ tQ be TTndersecretary of War who is a captain of industry and has 
had so much business experience that he can be safely intrusted with 
such responsibility and not be subject to very much supervision by 
the Secretary of War in tlie administration of the supply bureaus. 
I do not believe that. Ordinarily, I think you can get men of 
prominence and large experience to hold the cabinet omces or the 
first places, but I do not believe that ordinarily you can look forward 
in times of peace to getting men of very large experience to occupy 
the undersecretaryship or tne assistant secretaryship. 

I make no reflection whatever upon the men who have held these 
places in the War Department, or any other department; they have 
all been men of good qutility, but you can not look back upon the 
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries of the War Department, or 
of any other of the public departments, with now and then a striking 
exception, and discover men who have been very largely successfm 
in private affairs. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may not the idea be that by 
designating the man who is to have jurisdiction over these matters 
the ''Undersecretary of War" instead of the ''Assistant Secretary;'' 
that is, simply a change in the name, that it would be conducive to 
some men to accept the position ? 

Secretary Baker. Yes. It adds something to the dignity of the 
office, and I am heartily in sympathy with that. I think that is the 
wise thing to do ; but I do no t believe Jihai t hfj romm itlejLPU g ht. to 
make a hard and last subdivision of the functions, j t^iink the 
UiTdersec'refaf y 6Ught t(T i(l6' suc h' ' piji^^s^ as "t he' Secretary directs 
ihiml6'^,Tn3TE'atTIie ISecretarj ol Wa r oug Kf to Eave TlTe TigEt to 
uSkcTaway fromjiis jin^isdicllbn or adtfTi^tt;' and" utttmately thut 






I i 



AKMY REORGANIZATION. 2107 

the Secretary of War and not the Undersecretary ought to be respon - 
s ible pep ^^i^liy 

Tdr. l!rago. Do you not think that the greater responsibility you 
give this Undersecretary the bigger caliber man you will be likely 
to get ? In other words, if you keep it a purely subordinate position 
you can not hope of course, to get a man with a chance of showing 
strong initiative. 

Secretary Baker. Now, Mr. Crago, this situation is human. You 
are dealing with persons. 

Mr. Crago. I reaUze that. I want to make that as a suggestion. 

Secretary Baker. If you pass this law, or any similar law, it will 
not make much difference; the Secretary of War, in the last analysis, 
will be the head of the War Department, and the Undersecretary, or 
Assistant Secretary, whichever you choose to call him, will be a 
person selected by the Secretary of War. 

Mr. Crago. I do not like to divide the responsibility too much 
myself, as far as that part is concerned, but I was thinking you 
would probably get a bigger man to handle a place like that if he 
Vfelt he could institute broad and initiative methods in administrative 
interests. 

vSecrotary Baker. It does not seem to me to make very much 
difference what you put in the statute ; if the Secretary of War is the 
responsible head of the War Department he is going to select as an 
imdei*secretary or assistant secretary a man wno will do what hei 
wants him to do. The Secretary is p ;oing to bf^ tho boas of tl^at ahon— \ 
he ou^ht to be . T he responsibility necess a rily rests on liim. so tna t 
i Q tixmg a statutoiy position you simply Inake an iiK^lastic ^arrange- 
mgjp ijet me illustrate what i have in imncl; i used "trio same 
illustration before the Senate Committee : If the Secretary^ of War is 
a lawyer, like Mr. Root or Mr. Taft, he would undoubtodly want as 
an assistant or undersecretaiy a man of very large industrial expe- 
rience, i he could get him, to have charge of the supply bureaus. 
That wculd be where he would feel the need of assistance most. 
But suppof**' the Secretary of War is a man like Mr. Schwab — and I 
can easily iv^iagine Mr. Schwab being Secretary of War — if Mr. Schwab 
wore Secretary of War he would not want someone else to be in charge 
of the suppty bureaus and ordnance department; that would be the 1 
part of the job he would want for his own special talents, and he ! 
would want a lawyer, probably, as undersecretary, a man who could i 

deal wdth the intricate legal problems that are constantly arising in J 

the War Department. 

So, if you leave it so that the Secretaiy of War can assign to the 
undersecretary suvAi jurisdiction as he wants him to have, then the 
personalities of the two men wiU determine what their respective ^ 
functions in the department shall be. If, however, you make a hard 
And fast designation that the Assistant Secretary is to have this and 
this and this, and the Secretary of War can not change it, then the 
only thing that the Secretaiy ot War has to do is to appoint an under- 
secretary who is theoi-eticaAjT- doino; that, but who lets him actually 
do it if the Secretary of War want3 to do it himseli; and that is what 
^would happefts-  • -~ "- * ' ~~ ' ; "-■«-^;^ — ;- . 

Mx. Crago. About the only way to get a man of the right caliber 
.would be to have aUlirector of mrniitions to be a member of the 
C^abinet, amWet him he director of munitions for both the Army and 
iNavy. U-^^ "■  



2108 ABMT BEOBGANIZATION. 

Secretary Baker. That would be an utterly useless thing to do in 
peace time. The business is not large enough. 

Mr. Cbago. You would only nave tj>irt system in war times ? 

Secretary Baker. Yes. ^ 

The Chairman. Has not that been the mistake made with the 
Army and probably the Navy also, that in peace times we are apt 
to forget that the whole purpose of the Army, after all, is to fight m 
case we get into war ? If we develop the Army along those lines in 
the way of getting supplies, in the way of training men, and so on, 
will wt not be doing the very thing that we ought to do to get ready 
in case of war ? 

Secretary Baker. I do not think that has been the mistake. This 
is my belief about it: It is perfectly true that when the time came to 
expand the Army from 200,000 to 5,000,000 the peace-time oi-ganiza- 
tion was not adapted to the larger responsibilities and larger duties. 
But you can not make any peace-time organization that will be — ^it 
is not possible. If you tafee a small steel company, perfectly organ- 
ized, and suddenly transfer to it the responsibilities and duties of 
the United States Steel Corporation, it would not be equal to that 
task the first day. It woula have to grow and expand and try out 
and bring in men. In other words, with the peacf -time expenditures 
which you make for ordnance and quartermasters' supplies it is not 
possible to have constantly an organization which on a minute's 
notice can function on a thousand per cent incicase. That is not 
humanly possible. 

The Chairman. I would like to follow that up. Do you not think 
if we were to adopt universal training so that men could be called to 
the colors immediately who had had a certain amoimt of training, 
you would materially prevent a repetition of the experience we went 
through in this war in expanding our Army % 

Secretary Baker. I think it would improve the situation very 
much. 

The Chaoiman. Do you not believe that by keeping in touch with 
the industrial institutions of the country and the great manufacturing 
plants and keeping informed as to what they are doing and supplying 
them possibly with some needed tools and jigs and dies, so that they 
could function immediately in case the country went to war, that 
would materially improve the situation? 

Secretary Baker. Oh, yes. That was Gen. Crozier's theory for 
many years, and I think it is perfectly sound. 

The Chairman. Of course, the committee appropriated several 
hundred thousand dollars for jigs and tools and dies and gauges for 
making rifles and they were never made. 

Secretary Baker. So I have imderstood. 

Mr. Caldwell. It was $3,000,000. 

The Chairman. But you approve the idea that by keeping in touch 
with our industrial plants so that at a moment's notice thdy could 
be converted into war material producing plants we would materially 
improve our situation and prevent in a measure the situation which 
we found ourselves in at the outbreak of this war? 

Secretary Baker. I say "yes" to that, but I do not want to be 
imderstood as saying "yes" too comprehensively. 

Mr. Fields. You do not mean to say that imiversal military train- 
ing might remove all the disadvantages with which we were con- 
fronted at the beginning of the war ? 



ABMT REOBGAKIZATION. 2109 

Secretary Baker. Of course not. Let me add a sentence to what 
I have said to Mr. Kahn. If we had manufactured dies, jigs, and 
special tools and put them into the best adapted plants in the United 
States prior to the outbreak of the European war, for the manufac- 
ture of the Springfield rifle in large Quantities, and then the course 
of events had followed which did follow, it would not have helped 
us very much for the reason that practically every plant in the 
United States which was adapted to the manufacture of rifles was 
all obligated as to its full capacity for the manufacture of supplies 
for the European Allies and we could not dislocate these manufac- ( 
turers; and the problems which we had in this war we probably i 
would have in another, as we would be starting all over with new J 
manufacturerers, because we could not take those who have been / 
adapted and which we had trained to help us. 

The Chairman. Of course, we found ourselves in a very fortuitous 
position. 

Secretary. Baker. Yes. 

TTie Chairman. The Allies had been holding the line and they were 
getting the supplies manufactured in this country. The rifle which 
was being turned out we finally adopted with a little smaller caliber, 
a little smaller bore barrel, but I am not speaking alone of rifles and 
anamunition; I am speaking of everything that is needed by the 
coimtry when it goes to war. The cloth manufacturing plants ought 
to be kept constantly in touch with the War Department of this 
Government, so that at a moment^s notice th^y could turn over 
their plants to the manufacture of cloth for the Army. That is what 
I have in mind. 

Secretary Baker. Yes. I am heartily in sympathy with that. I 
think that is absolutely sound. 

Mr. McKenzie. That is provided for by law now. They have 
authority to do that in the law. 
^// Mr. Dent. I do not know what you mean by keeping in touch — I 
y/^^ would like to have that defiijite. ' 

y^^ Mr. McKenzie. I would like to ask the Secretary a question sup- 

^ 1 piemen ting the question of. Mr. Crago. I am inclined to agree with 
the Secretary in his view about centralizing the authority in the 
Secretary of War as the final spot, but Col. Crago suggested that if 
the Undersecretary of War had full power that we perhaps would 
I get men of lai^er caliber to come in and take the place under the 
V Secretary of War than if he is a subordinate to the Secretary of War : 
I that is, if in the final analysis the decisions are with the Secretary of 
\ War. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you if you believe that in 
\ the future in the appointment of these undersecretaries such as an 
I Undersecretary of War we are going to be free from the element of 
» political pull that will have something to say about who shall be the 
undersecretary ? 
. Secretary Baker. I do not think so. Mr. Mp^|^<>pzift. 

Mr. McBlENzie. I do not either. 

Secretary Baker. I think these offices will be filled essentially 
with men who are in sympathy with thcf administration. 

Mr. Dent. And ought to be. 

Secretary Baker. Yes. 

Mr. McKenzie. And it will be the most powerful factor in the 
pArty in power at the time, and his selection will not depend wholly 
upon his ability^ perhaps, to fill the^position to which he is appointed. 



K 




2110 ABMY REORGANIZATION. 

Secretary Baker. I have had a little experience with that sort of 
thing that I can relate. The appointment in my department of 
Mr. Crowell was made when the war was on and was made in stress 
of circumstances which excluded everything but the condition of 
etting a man irrespective of politics. As a matter of fact, I"do not 
now what Mr. Crowell's politics are. I am perfectly frank about it. 
When I jwas mayor of Cleveland I appointed him on the civil-service 
commission as a Democrat or Republican — ^it was to be a bipartisan 
board — and I can not remember which, I do not happen to know 
what his politics were. 

Mr. Anthony. He was for the administration, however. 

Secretary Baker. He was for getting the job done, and that was. 
done. 

Mr. Fields. It is mj understanding that he was a Republican. 

Mr. Dent. He is an independent Republican. 

Mr. Miller. What is that ? 

Mr. Dent. He votes first one way and then the other. 

Mr. Greene. After all, whatever may be the political circum- 
stances that led to the selection of personnel for the War Depart- 
ment, the field of operations of the War Department is happily in 
something more than theory a nonpartisan interest to the Govern- 
ment. It is for national deiense. 

Secretary Baker. Surely. 

Mr. Greene. Our whole constitutional theor and our social or- 
ganization would not in that test of citizenship hang in any sense 
upon the matter of relationship to the tariff or anythin'g else. 

Secretary Baker. No. ^ 

Mr. Greene. Therefore, the Secretary of War himself or his under- 
secretary must be in such coordination with regard to that field that 
the Question of their original appointment ought not to enter into it 
at all. Now, then^ is it not tru e that the Secretary of War in his 
capacitv as tne l ieaa ol trie War Department must pr eside over tw o 




atner 



maruy. 





and organizations%y\fifcli ppefajEe under It for national ..defens e ; ax id, 
secdiiH^* tlie production from civil or other sources of the material 



's^J^The^oTdiers ihust use^ the line of coordination termin atin g i n 
the^e^ef ary in a somewliat dual cagacity? He is the h eadj orm e 
soldiers 'wHo^"*" ' —=*■*-•— --♦'r - i • - i n. i _ x _ 



s ource ol , . .^ .^ .^ -^ .- 

so metimg ^M m "Qivir sou ices— tKe""mat eiTal which jltfiL acliiiersjl?^. 
TFa t is o l&ious, of course'. - - - 

secretary TBaker. it is obvious, but I think you are statmg it some- 
what stronger than the facts. 

Mr. Greene. If the facts are obvious, they can not be stated too 
pertinently. 

Secretary Baker. All I mean by it is this, and it is very important 
to remember, the supply d epartment of the M'Jixy i&Jthf !QreticQllv|Jie 
practical supply depa rtm ent' to provide what thej; think t he Arm v 
oughl to^haTS, bUf^ eV' aVe th^i^e to^suppythe Army wE al'it wants . 

Mr. Greene. Jilxaclty"; and IhaE.is wnal'""rsay, precisely. I say 
there is a place where the two lines are brought together. 
acfilacj^AKBR. Yes. 

• ^EENEl]5foadly stated, not to venture into too much detail, 
it seems^o m^emkt the business reallyjv^ould be that the Arm y^ b y 




ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2111 

reason of its studies ancHts ex£eriencejJs_the,.souT^e from which the 
s'i igg^eattOl'i as to what c T^^f^r-JAr nf Tn^lff^fiil it=^ ^frf^^^ryVti^^^ 
'"^ ' ' .-..-. r^oijWeiV, 

men wh o 
s tuay t nis neig^na wno experim ent m tnis neia a na w nq Jearn not 
only the nature oOEe supphes, but t^e'p roFa BTe^'quBnTrty . *'*S6me- 
wnere tnat nas to go up lor tJie approval oF the Secretary of War in 
his military capacity, ludging the military sufficiency of these sup- 
plies in his opinion, and whether he does it personally or by such other 
direction as ma y be necessary, it ^ ultimately lodges in him ^^s a mat| ,er 
' layr — On the otlier liahd, il 'th"e soldier, whose business it is simply 
prepare for the use of his profession in the matter of national 
defense, is charged with such extremes as that to decide without 
becoming an industrial man, civilian producer and merchant, where 
going to get that kind of solaier who is such an all-around 
inan that he can exactly know all the technical and professional uses 
^f these things and also be a merchant, broker, commission man, pro-^ 

Lce r, and manufacturer ? Where Are.you goinsio^gfiLhinaJ- — 

yecr^taryBAKER. Of course, the answer is that we have always 
succeeded m getting them. Military men are like other men. They 
have diversified talents. Some men are specially talented in infantry, 
some in cavalry, some in the air, some in the artillery, some in sup- 
plies, and smnejjf the flhlest nflf^cer^^ developed by ih\9. livar hayeimx 

id on thft sunnlv siHft. I do 



officer s deveroped o r] th^ supply sir]ft. I do not think there can be 
any question about that. 

Mr. Greene. That is a question as to the ultimate distribution and 
use of these things. Are all the men in the Quartermaster's Coi ps, for 
instance, men who have been experienced and schooled in the matters 
of every-day business relationships ? 

Secretary Baker. I would not say all of them, but many of them. 
Mr. Greene. What is the purpose of the Army but to prepare 
everybody in it for service which the Army may find necessary ? 

Secretary Baker. Of course they are supposed to have general, 

all around training, and when the Army goes into the field it goes 

not only with these fighting men but it has supply men, and these 

supply men ought to be trained in the supply bureaus so that they 

will know the limitation of sujxplies. They are equipment, ordnance , 

and engineering supply people and are all men who ought to be 

trained prior to going into the field with the Army in the supply 

/ bureaus of the War Department, so that they will know how rapidly 

Z supplies can be produced, what kind of suppUes can best be pro- 

^ duced, and the hmit of the factories for the production of supplies, 

S so that i t is ent irely necessary to have soldiers who understand supply 

^ — < ]Qiesti ons. - 

JVlr. Greene. I understand that and I am not trying to depart 
from that. The idea I meant to lay down as a suggestion is that a 
soldier, by his experience and study, knows what kind of suppHes 
he wants, and if he is engaged in the service of the Army and has 
been since he was 21 years old in a necessarily restricted sphere of 
-experience which a soldier^s fife must necessarily involve, how Hoas 
^^'^^ uPt tihi*? f^^t-hnnd t^iif^h yj^'th alLJiifiioLtricaciesof marketing and 
^ production which_the civilian follows exclusively? 

/"Secretary Baker. He gelsTTt Ti 'fT^~^ siippTy hnr>fl.us. For instance, 
if the ordnance officer is on the front with the Army and the Ordnance 
Division uses a new weapon, he gets one of them and he says, ''That 




2112 ARMY BE0B6ANIZATI0K. 

• 

will be very difficult to manufacture in the United States, because 
certain elements of that arm are made with extremely small tol- 
erances and it would require the construction of special machinery 
to dupUcate that for our Army." If he could allow a Uttle more 
tolerance there and a httle less there and make service modifications, 
then they would adapt this to the exact American manufacture by 
American methods. Having experience with manufacturing, he 
knows when he is imposing an impossible task in his demands upon 
home sources of supply. If he is simply a man who knows how to 
use weapons and did not have knowledge based on the capacity of 
manufacture in the United States, he would make impossible de- 
mands upon manufacturing establishments. 

Mr. Greene. You are referring to ordnance which we manufacture 
in large part ourselves, or did prior to the war ? 

Secretary Baker. Let us take one other sort of thing as well. The 
quartermaster officer and supply officer is with the Army in France 
and he says, *'It is highly important for us to increase the weight of 
the cloth that our soldiers wear in their uniforms. The climate here 
is bad. We must increase the weight of the cloth," and sends word 
over here to make it of a certain character. He does not know, let 
us assume, anything about the limitations upon wool supplies in the 
United States. He does not know that American wools have to be 
mixed with a certain quantity of wools from Australia and other 
places in order to make them weave properly, and what he asks, 

, perhaps, is a specification that is entirely unadapted to American 

/ sources of supply. Then you have a lot of correspondence as to 
whether it can be made here, and the manufacturer says it can not J 
be done, and the soldier says it must be done; but if you have anV f 
officer who, having been in the supply department, is familiar with \ i 
the limitations in the manufacture oi wool cloth in the United States 1/ 
by reason of the diflFerent methods of spinning imd weaving, and i 
there is any information they want in regard to increasing the weight ' 
of the uniform, he knows exactly how to do it because he can supply 
it f roinpersonal knowledge. 

Mr. (jreene. All right. I suppose that was largely the field of 
knowledge and experience of the supply men of the Army, of course, 
taken together with their constant association with their use and 

I experience with these materials. Still it remains a matter of fact! 
that their experience even under these conditions can be used, but\ 

• not so much as the men who have made it their life work. 

--' Secretary Baker. Certainly. 

Mr. Greene. Is it not also true that the experience of this country 
in every war that we have been engaged in is that sooner or later 
by stress of circumstances a man came to the top in some position 
oi responsibility where he had to supply the Army and was con- 
fronted with the almost hopeless task oi trying to get out of our 
civil production the very things which his mihtary judgment and 
perhaps his own experience dong that line would indicate was 

/ absolutely necessary for the use of the troops in the field; and have 

^\ we not *' Dusted" some of the finest military reputations that up to 

/ ) that time had a perfect record just because men were suddenly 

* / thrust into'^esponsibilities their life training and experience did not 

• I fit them for? 

/ Secretary Bakes. Yes; I think so. 




ARMY REORGANIZATION. 2113 

Mr. Greene. If that is true, why would not a solution lie some- 
where along this line generally, that the Army get. along with its 
expert knowledge in the supply departments according to what you 
very aptly set down and go ahead and determine the character of 
the weapon or the supplies, or the other bits of material that we need 
and their quantity subject to the appro v^^ of th^ fifJ^rAtai 



iy bja g^Utarv capa.ciw aa Mean of ihe Armv and to ^avp^ somi 

iSe WflrPftpgytTYiftnt under his (TirpctiQ^ in ' 



ar^^ty ^ip f^^rt.akft to seejhat that thing is produced ja.nd .uJeU-YiXfid. 



BariTiy, aa npian or ,Tfnfi,.A™^ 

^5 to^see^Jnat that thinff is proi 

to tHe Army for fts milita r y ^ use . ^PTow/tnen, would it not be better 
that such' men be kepi witliin their natural life experience and work 
and would not the two things match each other far more acceptably^ 
•^ Secretarv Baker. I do not th ink sp, Mr. Greene. I do not see 
that it follows as a necessary consequence of our argument at al'. 
You can not conceive of and I can not conceive of any man in the 
office of the undersecretary who will be of such genius in American 
industry and production that he will be a judge of the needs in guns 
and a judge of cannon and a judge of powder and all these other 
things. 

Mr. Greene. No; I thought I had suggested that of the various 
men in the Army who by experience are versed in the details of these 
several things, each man in nis own sphere sends a recommendation 
\ up to the Secretary as a clearing house. The Secretary has to givBl 
the final approval before anything of this kind can be had, but tnen I 
, when it is determined that it shall be had, the production of it we/ 
vput into the hands of men who do nothing else. ' 

Secretary Baker. Clearty; and that is what happened in this war 
and will happen in any war which involves the major energies of the 
people. 

The Chairman. But you took a_ good many civilians and gave 
them commissions. 

Secretary Baker. And that is what we will have to do if we ever 
get into any war which engages any large part of the energies of the 
people again. We will have to get wool experts and cotton experts 
and iron experts and nonferrous metal experts and go out and 
comb the civil life of the community and get the men with the 
largest experience and bring them in. 

Mr. Greene. Then if that is the ultimate necessity in time of wari 
why not lay foundations in the War Department now so that as\ 
much as may be necessary to its conduct in time of peace may be] 
there gaining experience ready for a great expansion ? " 

Secretary Baker. To that I have no sort of objection; but I do 
not understand that is involved in this subject. 

Mr. Greene. That is the general philosophy of it. 

Secretary Baker. To that I have no sort of objection. 

The Chairman. That is what I had in mind. >«. 

Secretary Baker. As I have said to this committee before, wef 
hoped to have Belvoir, the engineering school here, as a great tech- \ 
nical and engineering laboratory for maintainin g a school of industrial 1 
cmiditigns lor studying the questions and problems you are now \ 
suggesting, so that there would be in the country a school for a special 
line of industrial knowledge tied up to the Army in which the possi- 
bilities of expansion and conversion of business into the Army might 
be studied out in advance of any emergency. That is exactly what 
I think ought to be done. . _ .. _^ 



2114 



ARHY RE0B6ANIZATI0K. 




/ 



>c-* 



Mr. Gbeene. Then your objection, to get down to brass tacks, as 
we say, is as to the character of the authority to be given to the under- 
secretary and not to the general subject of Army supply. 

Secretary Bakeb. Exactly, and it is a purely mechanical difficulty. 
Take the Senate provision as they have it, for instance. The Senate 
detaches the Insular Bureau from its present direct relationship to 
the Secretary of War and attaches it to the undersecretary's office. 
Now, it just happens that I have a personal special interest in the 
insular administration. The PhiUppine administration has been 
especially under my observation and care, as well as the Porto Ricark 
administration and the Panama Canal; and in the same way it just 
happens that Mr. Crowell has had no special interest in those prob- 
lems. I have given a great deal of time to them. So far as I am per- 
sonally concerned, if it were to affect my own department while I 
am there, I would not want the transfer of the Insular Bureau to the 
undersecretary. I do not see why it should be put there. It has 
not the sUghtest relation to the question of supphes. It is a question 
of colonial administration, and that does not seem to be the place 
for it. Now, there might be some Secretary of War who had no 
special interest in colonial questions, who had an interest in some other 
pnase of the War Department activities, and he might properly say 
1 do not want to be bothei*ed with the Phihppines and Panama and 
the Porto Rican questions; l et the undersecre t a r y take th 
ought to have a righ t to tr^nsipr That p«rt whjrh hft Hid no^. wani 
not _as^a nnai tran sfer, out to na ve the primary admmistratipn g a 
ther e^suBj ec t io an y tm ng hfrnighV want done at jiny tipi^ ^ >Jo my 
criticism of the Senate pr ovision is it'sTnpTfli^firi t'Y^ that it (^ (^f ^ flyt 
allow tins traiiBter ^ot a matter, according to what th e man who > 
nliglll b e Secferaix7)f^yar might be informed on. >——•———» ^ 

' 'Mf . Greene. So voiTtlijiTK if Con gress shoulJ'write a statute whic h 
should prescribe specificaiiv and an^itranly j^"(£IautTio rity tor jrou r 



s' ubordma tpi, ^.o thRt. f^j^tff^t. you would not h ave full power or aythor - 



jecretj 

LULL. Then you do not object, Mr. Secretary, to a minister of 
sup ply or assistant secre tary of war, which seems to me the better ' 
[ennition ? ~ " ^ 

Secretary Baker. Undersecretary. 

Mr. Hull. I do not like that as well. ^ 

Secretary Baker. I do not mean that" phrase at all, but if it adds 
any dignity to the position it makes it naGre acceptable to the man 
who fills the place. 

Mr. Hull. Call him what you may, he would have authority 
enough to see that the different supply bureaus were functioning. 

Secretary Baker. He has all the authority of the Secretary of War 
now. The Assistant Secretary of War signs the Secretary of War's 
name as often as the Secretary of War does. 

Mr. Hull. And to see that these bureaus were operating 
efficiently. 




claims myself] you need not give it any further a ttention. 1 wi 
tnat mvseli.' * "*" '^ 



ABMY BE0B6AKIZATI0K. 



2115 



Mr. Hull. And he would also have enough authority that if he 
found, s ay, thaT"tne urdnance Department was not operatm^ their 
arg^idg feiliclenuy, ne could sug;gest to them and bring about the 
cnanpes tnat ougnt to be brought^ about to make them operat e 
e fficientlY^ 

secretary Baker. Yes, subject to the approv al of the S ecretary of 

•"MrTHuLL. Of course, subject to the approval of the Secretary. 

Secretary Baker. I do* not think the Undersecretary ougnt to 
establish an arsenal; that is policy. 

Mr. Hull. I have been very much in favor of something of that 
kihdT because of the fact that when I came on to this committee I, 
of course, had an opportimity to^obs^rve Ihe fact that you did no t 
have th e oppo rtunity you ougl^t to have in the line oi munition s. 
That was m the year 1913^ Fwent down theje and 1 could not get 
anybody's attention to the fact that you did not have any supplies. 
Now, if you had had somewhere along the line a man who had the 
authority and who had the time to investigate, then we could have 
gotten at the truth and probably brought about a better result. 

Secretary Baker. It may well be. May I make one further com- 
ment about the Senate bill and then I will answer questions and will 
% >^e through with the comment that I want to make. 
Yy^ T he Senate bill provi des that ^if the Undersecretarv ^and jChief of 
I Statt' agree about 'anymali'er*wEicli affects hptri tlie mnTtarv and tte 






su 




ly aepartm^IltS, that the Secretary of War does no t ^ave any - 

-g to do with It dt all. ' So thdt the Chief of 5taT? a^^ 

secretary can run tne vVa'r "Department and the Secretary prjV^ 
Will not kno N^ What 1 5 g m ff S^^ . "^Ft h i nT^ TEhat Is wrong , i imSfer- 
s\and the Senate lias undertaken to amend tfiat now by creating a 
kind of jwar coun cil consisting of the Secretary of War as the presi- 
dent, the Chief of Staff, and the Undersecretary of War, and before 
the Secretary of War can decide a question the Undersecretary of 
War and the Chief of Staff have to be called into solemn conference 
and each state in the presence of the other his opinion upon the dis- 
puted question. If it happens that the Chief of Staff is in Panama 
and the Undersecretary of War is in California, that question can not 
be decided until these gentlemen get back and have an opportunity 
to face one another with their formal discussion of the question 
involved. I do not think that the Secretary of War ought to be as 
paralyzed and as powerless as that. What you need in an execut ivg 
"" i^ ^ftpm^y^^ HftPiHft 

Chairman. This committee, I might say, has not agreed yet to 
the principle embodied in the Senate provision for that coimcil. ^ 

Secretary Baker. I hope you will not adopt it because I think if 
you try to work it out you will see how imworkable it is. The 
Secretary of War goes off, for instance, on a trip of inspection with 
the Chief of Staff and sees many things which ought to be modified. 
He says: *^I think that it should be changed,'' and now if he had to 
wait imtil he got back, and call in the Chief of Staff and the under 
secretary and hold a joint debate about it, it would be months before 
he got his difficulties arranged. 

Mr. Greene. It is a kind of soviet or working man's council. 

Secretary Baker. I will admit it is a working man's coimcil if 
you have the Secretary of War in it. 



r^ 



2116 ABMY BEOBGAIOZATIOK. 

Mr. Greene. The man takes a responsibiKty and is governed by 
the decision of other people. 

Mr. Miller. Mr. Secretary, I have noticed in the Senate bill that 
the Undersecretary of War is to be nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate without consulting the Secretary of War. 

Secretary Baker. Yes; that is true; after all, it is the same way at 
present. 

Mr. Miller. Has the Secretary of War no voice in the selection 
of the man? 

Secretary Baker. He always selects him in fact, but in theory of 
law the President does it. 

Mr. Miller. The Senate biU provides especially that he shall be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 

Secretary Baker. That is the practice at the present time. 

Mr. Miller. J,t.fllaa.aa^_that he shall have charggpf the financioL 
branch;., that isy that part of the finRnrial branch coxmected with the 
piifcfiase of munitions, -etc. Now, that would seriously interfere 
with the independent operation and functioning of the financial 
branch, which this Senate bill makes an independent branch of the 
service. 

Secretary Baker. I think it would. 

Mr. Miller. Then would you eUminate from the jurisdiction of 
the Undersecretary or whatever you may call him that feature of 
control over finance ? 



Secretary Baker. What I would do would b e to p rovide that th e 

try of War sh al l m gen eral have tEe superyision un der ' T he 

direction ol tne Secretary oi yvar of'the.siipply departme nt of th e 



Under