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Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

THE ASSEMBLY, THE STATE SENATE, AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE,

1958-1974

William Bagley Some Complexities of Social Progress

and Fiscal Reform

James R. Mills A Philosophical Approach to Legislative

and Election Realities, 1959-1981

Robert T. Monagan Increasing Republican Influence in

the State Assembly

Albert Rodda Sacramento Senator: State Leadership

in Education and Finance

Interviews Conducted by

Gabrielle Morris, Sarah Sharp

1979-1981

This manuscript is made available for research
purposes. No part of the manuscript may be quoted
for publication without the written permission of
the Director of The Bancroft Library of the University
of California at Berkeley.

Requests for permission to quote for publication
should be addressed to the Regional Oral History
Office, 486 Library, and should include identification
of the specific passages to be quoted, anticipated
use of the passages, and identification of the user.

It is recommended that this oral history be cited
as follows :

To cite the volume: "The Assembly, the State
Senate, and the Governor's Office, 1958-1974,"
an oral history conducted 1979-1981, Regional
Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley, 1982.

To cite individual interview: William Bagley,
"Some Complexities of Social Progress and
Fiscal Reform," an oral history conducted
1981 by Gabrielle Morris, in "The Assembly,
the State Senate, and the Governor's Office,
1958-1974," Regional Oral History Office,
The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley, 1982.

Copy No.

PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of
the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documenta
tion Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft
Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and
Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School,
and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries
forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration
begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, inter
views with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others
active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight,
and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl
Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on
key developments in politics and government administration at the state and
county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare
from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier
inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with
executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and
economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own
account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were
the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water
Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques;
education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident
in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the
progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government
organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of
limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear.
Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase
government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed
to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical
aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice
programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspec
tives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative
and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and
research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other
oral history programs with experience in public affairs. Additional advisors
were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be
interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research
files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a
systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and
chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information
for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as
needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was
provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the
Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect
the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse
points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct
interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons
presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating
institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics
with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth
of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When
possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up
to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to
develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant
aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and
speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interview
ing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project
interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of
that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent
of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California
government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interview
ees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and
performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify
aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like
other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves
provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand
experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events
past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series has been funded by the California Legis
lature through the office of the Secretary of State and by the generosity of
various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the
California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation;
by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded
Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled
staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand
the scope and thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful
coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobio
graphical interviews with persons significant in the history of California
and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D.
Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office.
Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in
The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State
Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other
manuscript depositories.

July 1982 Gabrielle Morris

Regional Oral History Office Project Director

486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

iii

REAGAN GUBERNATORIAL ERA PROJECT

Advisory Council

Eugene Bardach Eugene C. Lee

Charles Benson James W. Leiby

Nicole Biggart Edwin Meese III

John Burns James R. Mills

Lou Cannon Charles Palm

Bert Coffey A. Alan Post

Edmund Constantini Albert S. Rodda

Lawrence deGraaf Ed Salzman

Enid Douglass Alex Sherriffs

Harold E. Geiogue A. Ruric Todd

Ronald Grele Molly Sturges Tuthill

Gary Hamilton Raymond Wolfinger
Mary Ellen Leary

Interviewers

Malca Chall
A.I. Dickman*
Enid Douglass
Steve Edgington
Harvey Grody
Gabrielle Morris
Sarah Sharp
Julie Shearer
Stephen Stern
Mitch Tuchman

*Deceased during the term of the project

GOVERNMENT HISTORY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT

Ronald Reagan Era, 1966-1974
Interviews Completed or In Process, September 1982

Single Interview Volumes

Busterud, John A., The California Constitution Revision Commission, Claremont,
1982, 37 pp.

Coke, J. Earl, Reminiscences on People and Change in California Agriculture,
1900-1975, U.C. Davis, 1976, 265 pp.

Dales, Jack, Pragmatic Leadership: Ronald Reagan as President of the Screen
Actors Guild, U.C. Los Angeles, 1981, 56 pp.

Darling, Dick, Republican Activism: The California Republican Assembly and
Ronald Reagan, U.C. Los Angeles, 1982, 49 pp.

Dunckel, Earl B., Ronald Reagan and the General Electric Theatre, 1954-1955,
U.C. Berkeley, 1982, 46 pp.

Dunne, George H., Christian Advocacy and Labor Strife in Hollywood,
U.C. Los Angeles, 1981, 67 pp.

Finch, Robert H. , In process, CSU Fullerton.

Flournoy, Houston I., California Assemblyman and Controller, Claremont,
1982, 235 pp.

Livermore, Norman B., Jr., In process, U.C. Berkeley.

Plog, Stanley, More than Just an Actor: The Early Campaigns of Ronald Reagan,
U.C. Los Angeles, 1981, 29 pp.

Reagan, Neil, Private Dimensions and Public Images: The Early Political
Campaigns of Ronald Reagan, U.C. Los Angeles, 1981, 58 pp.

Multi- Interview Volumes

THE ASSEMBLE, THE STATE SENATE, AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, 1958-1974,
U.C. Berkeley, 1982, 490 pp.

Bagley, William, Some Complexities of Social Progress and Fiscal Reform.

Mills, James R. , A Philosophical Approach to Legislative and Election
Realities, 1959-1981.

Monagan, Robert T. , Increasing Republican Influence in the State Assembly.

Rodda, Albert, Sacramento Senator: State Leadership in Education and Finance.

THE HISTORY OF PROPOSITION #1: PRECURSOR OF CALIFORNIA TAX LIMITATION MEASURES,
Claremont, 1982, 102 pp.

Stubblebine, William Craig, The Development of Proposition #1.

Uhler, Lewis K. , Chairman of Task Force in Tax Reduction.

ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN THE 2966 REPUBLICAN GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN,
U.C. Berkeley, 1980, 187 pp.

Nofziger, Franklyn C., Press Secretary for Ronald Reagan, 1966.

Parkinson, Gaylord B. , California Republican Party Official, 1962-1967.

Roberts, William E. , Professional Campaign Management and the Candidate,
1960-1966.

Spencer, Stuart K., Developing a Campaign Management Organization.

SAN FRANCISCO REPUBLICANS, U.C. Berkeley, 1980, 100 pp.

Christopher, George, Mayor of San Francisco and Republican Party Candidate.
Weinberger, Caspar, California Assembly, Republican State Central Committee,
and Elections, 1953-1966.

In Process

Adams, Winfred, Strategies for Republican Elections, State Government Management,

and Water Resources, 1963-1976, U.C. Berkeley.
Beilenson, Anthony, U.C. Los Angeles.
Beverly, Robert G. , CSU Fullerton.
Breed, Allen, U.C. Berkeley.
Burke, Yvonne Brathwaite, U.C. Los Angeles.
Carpenter, Dennis, CSU Fullerton.
Cologne, Gordon C. , CSU Fullerton.

Cory, Kenneth F. , Education Consultant and Assemblyman, 1961-1974, U.C. Berkeley.
Dart, Justin, CSU Fullerton.
Ellingwood, Herbert, U.C. Berkeley.
Gleason, Verne E., A Career Civil Servant Views State Social Welfare Policy and

Practices, U.C. Berkeley.
Haerle, Paul R. , Ronald Reagan and Republican Party Politics in California,

1965-1968, U.C. Berkeley.
Hall, Kenneth F. , U.C. Berkeley.
Hume, Jaquelin, Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a Northern

California Reagan Loyalist, U.C. Berkeley.
Kehoe, John T. , U.C. Berkeley.
King, Warren, Governor Reagan's Use of Task Forces and Loaned Executives, 1966-1968,

U.C. Berkeley.
Knox, John T. , Bay Area Regional Organization, the Environmental Quality Act, and

Related Issues in the California Assembly, 1960-1980, U.C. Berkeley.
Luce, Gordon C. , U.C. Berkeley.

Martin, Jerry C. , Governor's Office Research Assistant for Ronald Reagan, U.C. Berkeli
Miller, John J. , U.C. Berkeley.
Mills, Ed, CSU Fullerton.
Moretti, Robert, CSU Fullerton.
Orr, Verne, U.C. Berkeley.
Post, A. Alan, U.C. Berkeley.
Reagan, Maureen, U.C. Los Angeles.
Reagan, Ronald, U.C. Berkeley.
Riles, Wilson C. , U.C. Berkeley.
Salvatori, Henry, CSU Fullerton.
Sherriffs, Alex C., U.C. Berkeley.

Sturgeon, Vernon L. , State Senator, Reagan Advisor, and PUC Commissioner,

1960-1974, U.C. Berkeley.
Todd, A. Ruric, U.C. Berkeley,
looker, John S., Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and Legislative

Assistant, 1967-1974, U.C. Berkeley.
Tuttle, Holmes, CSU Fullerton.
Watson, Philip E. , U.C. Los Angeles.
Williams, Spencer M. , The Human Relations Agency: Perspectives and Programs

Concerning Health, Welfare, and Corrections, 1966-1970, U.C. Berkeley.
Wright, Donald R. , CSU Fullerton.
Younger, Evelle, U.C. Los Angeles.
Zenovich, George N. , CSU Fullerton.
Zumbrun, Ronald A., Social Welfare Reform from Task Force to Trial Court, 2970-1973,

U.C. Berkeley.

Participating Institutions:

Oral History Office, Department of Special Collections, University of California,
Davis, California, 95616.

Oral History Program, California State University, Library 243, Fullerton,
California, 92634.

Oral History Program, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 91711.

Oral History Program, Powell Library Building, University of California, Los Angeles,
California, 90024.

Regional Oral History Office, 486 The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley, California, 94720.

vii

INTRODUCTION

In considering the operation of state government, it is useful to
remember that the legislature has its own internal dynamics, as do each
of the bureaus, departments, and branches of government, and that these
dynamics to a significant extent shape the thinking and actions of many
of its members. Who are its leaders, what are the rules, and how can the
legislative houses place their imprint on the policies and programs that
shape the state: these are the questions that define the outcome of many
issues .

The most visible focus for these dynamics is often the legislature's
relationship with the governor's office. In spite of, or perhaps because
of, shared responsibilities for the conduct of government, there is a
tension between the two that, depending on one's viewpoint and changing
circumstances, can strengthen the eventual decisions or produce stalemate
and inaction. Key players in the legislative arena are usually also
acutely aware of the attitudes and administrative style prevailing in
the governor's office. For this reason, the Government History Documen
tation Project of the Regional Oral History Office has attempted to record
the range of viewpoints in the legislature in regard to each governor whose
tenure has been studied.

The following interviews with four California legislators who
held leadership roles in the state assembly and senate in the 1960s and
1970s have been designed to provide firsthand information on this inter
action between the governor and the legislature and also on the evolution
of the legislative process itself. These interviews were begun during
study of the Goodwin Knight and Edmund G. Brown, Sr. administrations and
were completed as part of the Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era phase of
the project. While they concentrate on events of the earlier administrations,
they include references to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., who was in office
when the interviews were recorded. Additional interviews with legislators
may be located by consulting the series list.

Each narrator in this volume speaks from a unique vantage point.
After service in the assembly where he early became allied with strongman
Jesse Unruh, Democrat James Mills became president pro tern of the senate
and was an articulate spoksman for the positions of the upper house.
Robert Monagan was the only Republican to be elected Speaker of the Assembly
for twenty years and shared many of Unruh 's ideas on legislative organiza
tion. Elected to the assembly in the same year as Monagan, William Bagley
was an able strategist for Monagan' s elevation to the speakership and for
innovative tax legislation. Albert Rodda was for many years dean of the

viii

senate, an independent sort of Democrat who rose to chairmanship of the
Senate Finance Committee on the strength of his understanding of the
intricacies of public funding of education. With bipartisan unity, none
of them speaks with wholehearted admiration of any of the governors with
whom they served.

During Pat Brown's years in office, major new social programs and
state construction were undertaken, and the legislature began a concerted
effort, as did other state legislatures, to strengthen and professionalize
its operations. Experienced in state government, Brown was informal and
relaxed with the assembly and the senate, which some felt created a power
vacuum that encouraged the legislature to expand its influence. The Reagan
administration was dedicated to cutting back the cost and scope of state
programs, some of which had expanded seemingly beyond control. Most of
the governor's staff had not been in government before and experienced
difficulty in dealing with the legislature for several years. These
four interviews provide valuable commentary that illuminates the marked
differences between these two administrations and offers insight into such
specific issues as health and welfare reform, educational policy, and a
variety of tax revisions and political campaigns.

One theme that recurs throughout the interviews, and others with
legislators of this period, is a strong commitment to the autonomy of
the legislature. Although they tend not to remember the details of
struggles over individual bills that fascinate a researcher in later years,
these "men of the house" provide a lively sense of the broad strategies
and coalitions involved in deciding public issues. And they are insistent
that the governor, whoever he or she may be, should hear their views
fully and treat with them as equals, even if they have to create a
confrontation in order to get his or her attention.

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

24 June 1982

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

William Bagley
SOME COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL PROGRESS AND FISCAL REFORM

An Interview Conducted by

Gabrielle Morris

in 1981

WILLIAM BAGLEY
ca. 1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS — William Bagley

INTERVIEW HISTORY

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND; ELECTION TO THE ASSEMBLY 1

Youth and Education; Political Philosophy 1

Young Turks of the 1960s 3

Unruh Fills the Power Vacuum 7

II ADVENT OF RONALD REAGAN 10

Republican Fortunes in the Assembly 10

The 1964 Rockefeller-Goldwater Presidential Primary 12

Reagan's Election as Governor 13

Transition into Office 16

Republican Speaker Monagan 20

Revising Fair Housing Legislation and Presidential Hopes 21

III RESOLVING STATE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNOR'S MEN 23

Tax Revision, Withholding, and the 1970s Surplus 23

Property Tax Relief and Windfall Revenues 26

Budget Development, Interest Groups, Local Government 29

IV OTHER PRESSING ISSUES 32

Welfare Reform Negotiations, 1971 32

Continuing Concern for Costs and Caseloads; Staff Input 34

Meshing Governor's Office and Legislative Processes 37

Reapportionment; Judicial Appointments; Law Enforcement 40

School Desegregation Guidelines 44

V 1974 CAMPAIGN FOR STATE CONTROLLER 46

Time for a Change; Other Republican Candidates 46

Crises in Campaign Financing 49

Reagan's Role 51

VI THOUGHTS ON OTHER LEGISLATURES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 53

TAPE GUIDE 57

INDEX 58

INTERVIEW HISTORY — William Bagley

Interviewing William Bagley is rather like tape-recording an organized
whirlwind. A solid, cherubic sort of person, Bagley had considered the
interview outline sent him in advance, decided what he wished to say,
and sailed through a well-constructed, virtuoso explanation of the
state legislature's experience with Governor Ronald Reagan, in what seemed
like on extended anecdote. Puffing good-naturedly on one cigarette
after another, he would occasionally pause to let the interviewer
back up to a previous point that merited further explanation. His lively
commentary, which follows, is a good example of the broad understanding
of government process and articulate advocacy that made him a leader
in the California assembly from 1961 through 1974.

Bagley came to Sacramento from heavily- Republican Marin County,
intent on developing a moderate group in the legislature which would
provide a progressive party stance on social issues. Several others
were of similar mind, including fellow freshman assemblymen Flournoy,
Monagan, and Veneman. Together these "young turks" made a name for
themselves both in committee work and laboring for the election of other
Republican candidates. Their views put them at odds with the well-
organized conservative element which was increasingly important in the
Republican party after the Goldwater campaign of 1964 and became dominant
with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1966. Reagan's years as governor
and the struggle to resolve these conflicting positions in the critical
area of state finance are the focus of this interview.

For the legislature, early relations with Governor Reagan's office
were the "two-by-four stage of government", according to Bagley. There
were "ideologues who weren't going to listen to any of us... The thing
to do with any bill the governor had in my committee in '67 was to kill
it and show these guys that they ought to pay attention to us so we
could govern the state."

"As the first wave of people left, the atmosphere changed— Ronald
Reagan doesn't have an evil bone in his body... that was a plus... then
people like Meese came to the fore and started saying, 'we've got to
make this system work, we can't just fight our little ideological fights."
Verne Orr, too, as director of finance, is credited with being a rare Reagan
appointee who would sit down in a legislator's office after work to
thrash out a problem.

Early in 1971, the long wrangle over fiscal reform that had begun
during the Pat Brown administration began to culminate in a massive
revision of the state income tax structure. At the bipartisan urging
of legislative leaders, Reagan's people agreed to meet with them. For
six weeks, they worked together to iron out the details of the bill.
"One week solid with Reagan there — then with the governor's staff,
getting each day's revisions into print for action by the legislature.
That's good government process."

Parenthetically, Bagley asserts that these revisions (narrowing the
size and increasing the number of state income-tax brackets) caused the
state revenue surplus which led to Proposition 13, the taxpayers' revolt
of 1978. But the legislature and the Governor were on speaking terms
with each other. The process was repeated later in the year on the equally-
contentious subject of welfare reform and again worked relatively smoothly.
Bagley suggests that subsequent lower welfare costs were due more to
reduced client rolls which followed passage of the 1967 Beilenson bill
liberalizing abortion than to the tighter eligibility rules insisted on by
the Governor; nevertheless, the process of negotiation was "productive
and good government and saved a few bucks to boot — and it was fun."

Toward the end of the two-and-a-half hour interview session, Bagley
offered a few philosophical insights based on his fourteen years in state
office. On his unsuccessful campaign for state controller, "You have to
get out [of the legislature] or you become hamburger." On politics in
general, "Beware of reform!" And on the legislative stance of the Reagan
administration, "It might even be that we needed a plateau period where you
didn't make major social progress after the frenetic civil rights activities
of the '60s. You can't just keep hammering at people. Sometimes you need
a becalming of the body politic."

The interview was conducted on Dec. 21, 1981, in Mr. Bagley 's office
in San Francisco's Embarcadero Center, where he then was practicing public
interest law with a former assembly colleague, Democrat John Knox. Knox
too has been interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office and provides
valuable observations of Governor Reagan and of land-use planning legislation
and agencies. Bagley reviewed the edited transcript of his own interview
in April 1982. He made only minor emendations and returned it promptly for
final processing.

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

19 July 1982

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND; ELECTION TO THE ASSEMBLY
[Interview 1: December 21, 1981]##

Youth and Education; Political Philosophy

Morris: Why don't we start with a little bit of personal background
to kind of give us a sense of you as a person. You are a
Californian?

Bagley: Okay, if we are going to start with personal background I

was asked if I was a Californian. My family goes back to 1856,
on my mother's side, when my great grandfather had the first
spaghetti factory in San Francisco. We won't burden you with a
hundred years of family history! I was raised in Woodacre,
Marin County, after the Depression came along. That was our only
home — the summer house with a homestead on it. [I went to]
San Rafael High School and then UC Berkeley, class of '49,
valedictorian — that was the biggest audience I have ever had,
about thirty thousand people — and then UC Law School, Boalt Hall,
'52.

Morris : Why did you pick the law?

Bagley: I think at about the age of eight or nine my father had a little
card printed for me saying "attorney at law." Basically, I
think it was his inspiration. He went to work at the age of
thirteen out of grammar school and never did his thing and he,
and undoubtedly sort of subliminally ,made sure that I was
motivated to go to law school. I think it was something that he
had wanted to do and didn't do. That's the quick family history.

Morris : Then you went back to Marin to practice law?

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of tape has
begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 57.

Bagley: I got out of law school at the age of twenty- two or three and,
hell, just a couple of years before that I had been throwing
rotten tomatoes on Halloween at cars and being hauled into
police stations. In other words, I was too young to go
practice law at twenty-two or three in a small community. I
spent four years in San Francisco and in 1956 joined what was one
of the bigger firms — four or five-man firm in Marin County then
was big; today about fifteen is big. So from '56 to '60 I was
there as a young lawyer in Sam Gardiner's law firm. Sam was a
very active Democrat, which is neither here not there.

It was evident that I was a participant in public affairs
generally .

Morris: Was this something that your father had — ?

Bagley: Not really, not really. I think it was just a natural evolution
through high school offices.

Morris: You had been involved in student —

Bagley: The whole gamut, the whole gamut from grammar school class

president on up. So it was a natural thing and, of course, yes,
you have to have some political identification. I will give you
a quick genesis of my Republicanism. I took econ at Cal, and
during the late forties I was sort of steeped in — I don't want
to call it Keynesian per se — but steeped in Depression economics.
By 1949, I was a Democrat. I couldn't believe what I heard some
of the Republican spokespeople in the forties saying at national
conventions and the like.

About a year of law school sort of turned me around.
Suddenly I realized there were property rights involved in the
body politic, and that aspect of law school sort of struck me.
I don't think that I was choosing a party at that point because
Marin was Republican, [laughs] I really don't think that, but
as it turned out, of course, Marin and Sonoma — I had both
Marin and Sonoma counties in the legislature — from Sausalito
to Stewarts 's Point, I used to say; it was an area that, other
than Tom Keating in 1936, never elected a Democrat for fifty
years .

So it was evident that the then assemblyman, Dick McCollister,
who had been in since 1941 — twenty years — was going to retire.
Obviously, I joined the Republican groups. I had become
general counsel of the Young Republicans statewide. John
Rousselot was — and this becomes relevant, not just Bagley —
John Rousselot was then state chairman. John Rousselot, of course,

Bagley: later became regional director of the John Birch Society. We
were on Goodwin Knight's side fighting the forces of Bill
Knowland [1958], fighting the right wing who were taking over
the party. Rousselot, as chairman of the YR, was literally
fighting right-wing units of the Young Republicans back in the
mid-fifties, an interesting little aside.

Morris: Then the Young Republicans were quite an active organization.

Bagley: Yes. As you know, the Young Republicans and the Republican
Assembly and then, spawned by the Goldwater movement, the
so-called UROC, the United Republicans of California, all turned
right-wing in the early and mid-sixties. Part of my political
life, I guess twenty years of it, has been fighting the
right-wing takeover of party organizations. I don't mean to
overemphasize that. I don't run around fighting battles and
tilting at windmills, but we had our share of battles with the
burgeoning right-wing group which in California had its real —
not genesis — but first day in the sun with the Knowland
campaign. Bill Knowland threw Goodie Knight out of office
basically, took the financial support away from him, and as
everybody knows, Goodie then decided to run for Senator. And
Bill Knowland ran for governor preparatory to Bill running for
president. He lost by a million votes and so did Knight,
by something less than a million. Knowland ran on a "right to
work" platform.

We lost a majority in the legislature for the first time
since, I guess, Culbert Olson's days, about ten seats, which
meant the majority went from fifty [Republicans] to thirty
[Democrats], back to thirty to fifty; a total turnaround. That
meant, in turn, in 1959 the repeal of crossfiling — because Pat
Brown was elected in '58 and [in one of his first actions as
governor] signed a crossfiling repealer — and changed the whole
political complexion of California in and of itself.

Young Turks of the 1960s

Bagley. So you can either blame or give credit to Bill Knowland for that
episode. But that leads us into the sixties (you go back to
'58 basically as a watershed to get into the sixties). In
1960 there were nine elected to the freshman class. I'm not sure
I can name them all, but I'm going to try because they are sort
of important names: Bob Monagan, Hugh Flournoy, Jack Veneman
(in January 1961), Bill Bagley, later known— very early later,
meaning a year or two later — known and still known as the Young
Turks. Some people say the maturing Young Turks, the old Turks
of now. Those were the Republicans.

Morris: Young Turks standing for —

Bagley: — Standing for a resurgent movement in the Republican caucus in
Sacramento. When we arrived in 1960, Joe Shell was minority
leader. He was a Knowland person.

Morris: He had governor thoughts himself.

Bagley: He ran against Nixon. That's the reason I mentioned his name.
In '62, he ran against Dick Nixon for the Republican nomination
and got 33 percent of the vote and probably in part caused the
then demise of (quote, unquote) "Governor Nixon," because it
was a strident primary. The right-wing accused Nixon of being
a left winger — really. He was a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and things like that and the Trilateral
Commission and, literally, people of that right-wing mold and
mode would come up to me — I traveled with Nixon for three months
as a freshman legislator — and would give me the heavy finger on
the shoulder and say, "You're some kind of a Com symp because
you are a friend of Nixon. He's a liberal!"

Now, it's unbelievable to sit here and say that to you
today, but that was a fact and that was, in turn, the genesis
of my becoming a very, very liberal Republican. I couldn't
stand these right-wing, bug-eyed, blithering, bigoted Birchers !
[laughter]

Morris: Was your feeling that if Shell hadn't been in the campaign,
Nixon would have done better in the governor's race?

Bagley: Yes, it's always true. The same thing is true of Ronald Reagan
running against Jerry Ford. The person who contests a primary
against a pre-eminent candidate who then becomes a nominee
always says, "Oh, it's good for the party" — Democrat and
Republican — "good for the party, have a contest, get the blood
flowing." Bullshit is not too harsh a word. All it does is
stir up the troops so that there is animosity that lasts for
years and you end up losing the general. Ronald Reagan caused
Jimmy Carter is what I'm saying. It's obvious.

The same thing is true of the
then you had again the right wing,
left wing on the Democratic side.
Hayakawa (and I hope they're happy
on Tunney . The extreme will then
the general election and will just
trying to get that extreme element
never works .

Shell-Nixon episode because

The same is true of the
The Haydens probably caused
about that) when they took
sit on its hands and boycott
cause the candidate fits
back into the party. And it

Morris :

Bagley:
Morris :
Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley:
Morris :

Bagley:

Morris :

That's an interesting thought. It sounds like you are suggesting
that maybe the primary election should be run in a different
way.

No.

How can you have a primary without any candidates?

You can't really. All I am saying is that — Oh, I have all kinds
of pendulum theories of politics; that is, that the action is
in the middle and when the pendulum swings , the arc about
80 percent of the time stays in the middle and these fringe
groups are destructive. That's all I'm saying. It has always
been the case and it always will be the case. They think with
their glands; they suffer from "hardening of the categories"
and — pulling all of the cliches that I used to use in those
days .

On the other hand, it is very difficult to be an evangelical
moderate because that itself is rather anomalous. But that's
the problem of the parties. Your moderates are the sensible
people and they go home for dinner, and those that aren't sensible,
by definition, stay there and pass these outlandish resolutions
and do all kinds of crazy things that destroy the fabric of
the party.

On the other hand, it all comes back to the center sooner
or later. Ronald Reagan moved from far right to what I guess
you could call almost the center today.

In the course of his political career?
Yes, and we'll get into that.

Why did you decide to run for office yourself, in addition to
McCollister retiring?

Oh, just because I am personally a participant. It was something
I had been— I like people, I like the system, I like to make the
system work, I like to be involved; all of those nice reasons,
part of them personal, part of them pro bono.

I don't know that public interest law is the kind [done] in your
law practice, but were you involved with — ?

Bagley: No, not really, not really. It cost me a couple of million

dollars, no question about it. My peers today are all people
who own property and have major endeavors. I spent fourteen
years in the legislature and then four in Washington — eighteen
years in doing my thing. I am perfectly happy because my
compensation is sitting here with you and knowing a hundred
thousand people in the state of California which I otherwise
wouldn't know. But when I run into somebody on the street
(and I do this everyday), and they say, "Are you retired?' I
want to hit them in the face! The implication is that I must
have stolen during those years in office, which I did not,
because how the hell am I going to be retired? I have five
children, three in college and two in grammar school.

So there is a down side to spending your life in the arena.
It is said much better, "Go out and make a million bucks and
then run for office!" But we chose the former course and I am
not badmouthing it. I am only sort of trying to give you
some flavor of where we were coming from.

So we had our Young Turks, four of whom I mentioned.
Gordon Cologne was a fifth. Gordon then went to the senate and
he is now on the district court of appeal. Those were your five
Republicans elected in 1960.

Morris: Was there an official Republican caucus at that time?

Bagley: Yes.

Morris: With a staff person?

Bagley: A very good question. There was an official Republican caucus
but staff was hardly even heard of. Joe Shell, then minority
leader, has one staff guy — period. No one else in the legislature,
other than a committee chairman had staff and there was no
Republican caucus staff — no provision for it. The Republican
Associates of L.A. , a "men's group," raised a few bucks and they
sent in 1961 — and this was new also, heretofore there had not
even been this — two people to Sacramento. I think they paid
them $500 a month each and an apartment stipend. One of them
was Ron Zeigler and the other was Sandy Quinn. Ron Zeigler and
Sandy were the staff for the entire Republican caucus, but they
weren't on the state payroll, [tape interruption]

I want to throw in some other names because Jack Knox, who
is literally next door with me today, practicing what we call
public law or government law (we don't go in and fight over the

Bagley: size of backyard fences or the size of the divorce stipend or

the alimony problems; we practice public law), Jack was elected
in 1960. Jim Mills was elected and then two or three others.
There were five Republicans and four Democrats. Two of the
Democrats who are now long gone and by that I mean deceased
[Jack Casey and Jim Hicks].

Unruh Fills the Power Vacuum

Bagley: So we had a good class. Jesse Unruh, during that period, rose

to power, which is most significant as we get into talking about
the Reagan days in the next couple of minutes. Jesse rose to
power because, number one, he was competent and smart; but also
because of another old cliche of mine: politics and physics
are similar; vacuums attract. Artie Samish had been dethroned
and we won't burden the tape with the story of Artie Samish; but
when Artie was up there as the kingpin lobbyist, he elected the
speaker. He was the money funnel and he controlled the house;
not so much the senate, but he controlled the house. When Artie
left and went to prison there was a period of "good government."
Cap Weinberger was part of the good government group.

Morris: He came in with a crew of young folks with new ideas right after —

Bagley: Yes, in the fifties. Cap then ran for attorney general and lost
miserably. That's another story. Drew Pearson did him in with
Jewish overtones. Cap's an Episcopalian, but by Jewish overtones
I mean allusions to his last name. I mean it was a rotten
campaign. Pat Hillings, Nixon's friend, won the primary and lost
overwhelmingly in '58, but that's off the track.

Jesse Unruh, in the early sixties, became chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee under then speaker Ralph Brown. Ralph
was not a political animal-type person; Jesse was. Jesse began
to raise money for other candidates and that was the first time —
I can't tell you what happened in the twenties and thirties and
forties — but in recent history that was the first time that a
member of the legislature became a money funnel and, in turn,
handed it out, and no one else was doing it.

In those days, you could raise a couple of hundred grand
and hand ten grand to twenty people and, particularly in the
primaries where all of the elections are decided, out of eighty
seats there are only ten or so that are really volatile or
vulnerable in any given year, and Jesse put his people in office
and Jesse became speaker.

Morris:

Bagley:

Did you ever talk with him about it?
that took hold?

Was it the Samish idea

Morris :
Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley:

Morris :
Bagley:

I didn't have to talk to him about it; it just happened. Again,
vacuums attract. Jesse was speaker then from '60. He called
a special session of the legislature. He changed the rules.
Oh, this is a fascinating story! Ralph Brown was from Modesto.
He, Jesse, as chairman of the Ways and Means, was instrumental
in — the legislature did it, but he_ created — the Fifth District
Court of Appeal located in Fresno when people said that it really
wasn't needed, in order to get Ralph Brown appointed to the
bench. So there was a new fifth district court, a three- judge
court of appeal. Ralph was going to be appointed. Everybody
knew that.

To ci judgeship?

To a judgeship. Jesse, knowing that, passed a special rule of
the assembly that the assembly, through some mechanism, could
call itself back into — not into session, today the legislature
can call itself into session, but it was not true then — but it
could call a caucus of the whole, which Jesse then did in
September or so, right after the bill went into effect, and
Ralph was appointed to the bench in order to get himself elected
speaker; Jesse knew he had the votes then and God knows what will
happen between September and January. So he got himself elected
speaker —

In September —

In September by a caucus of the whole under a rule which he
devised in order to do just that. Now, that is beautiful
politics !

It is expert parliamentary procedure.

Sure, that's what I meant by beautiful politics. Jesse was —
Power went to his head, there is no question about it and that
again was the basis or our — and "our" again is Monagan, Veneman,
Bagley, and Flournoy — really coming to the fore.

In response to what — ?

In response to Jesse's garrulousness, his arrogance if you will
(and Jesse is a friend of mine; I don't mean to insult him. He
is competent. I have already said all of those nice things, but
power went to his head and he admits it) — he locked up the assembly

Bagley: in '66. We caused the lockup. We challenged him on an issue
which would take too long to talk about and we didn't know we
were going to get a lockup, but we purposely challenged him and
he rose to the bait and locked everybody up. The chambers
[have] had doors locked under a call of the house, meaning to
vote on a measure, before, but overnight with army cots — no.

Morris: He brought in army cots for that famous —

Bagley: For the lockup and got himself a front-page picture on Life

magazine and got himself a lot of bad publicity which, in turn,
changed him. After that, he lost literally a hundred pounds,
bought a whole new wardrobe and became a new, svelte Jesse
Unruh and almost became a new man.

II ADVENT OF RONALD REAGAN

Republican Fortunes in the Assembly

Bagley: In '66 — now we're going a year ahead — Ronald Reagan did win and
I want to get into that. You don't "win" an election against
an incumbent, the incumbent loses. Pat Brown lost by 986,000
votes .

The fact that happened also brought in — we were down to
twenty-seven Republicans at one point and we had gotten ourselves
back up to around thirty- two or three — in '66 we got up to
thirty-eight Republican members. Jesse was still speaker,
but when you have a 42-38 house, you've got a balance and,
parenthetically, it's the best government there can be. You
need a couple of extras. Forty-one/thirty-nine is tough because
one guy can always leave you and you've got to have a little
insurance against an outright double-cross. But a close house —
43-37, 44-36 — you get good government with all voices heard.
For the first time we, epitomized by the Young Turk group, got
a voice. You see, that's all we wanted. Jesse would not
give us a voice.

Morris: So you were looking for ways to challenge his authority?

Bagley: Yes, because of the seeming arrogance and because we had no

voice. First of all — a little history — the legislature wasn't
even partisan until 1928 and then you had the crossfiling but
no party ballot designation until '52. When the League of
Women Voters started a movement to try to repeal crossfiling,
the legislature compromised and put Republican and Democrat
under their names . All of that led to a little more party
responsibility, but there wasn't a party force as such in the
Unruh speakership days up until '66.

Bagley: The premise to all of that is that all during those years you
had chairmanships from both parties, but it was always a
friendship kind of a coalition. I will define friendship in
a moment. It wasn't a voice of the other party. It was
whoever your buddies were in the other party. Buddies in a
legislative body means somebody that is going to support you,
sell out to you if you will.

So there were four or five Republican chairmen during the
Jesse Unruh speakership up until '66, but they were sell-outs.
They were people who had made their deals . One guy loved to
travel, so he was given a chairmanship so he could travel
around and have fun and he admitted it. On that basis, he would
support Jesse whenever Jesse needed him, and you only need a
person four or five times. You need him on a budget, you need
him on organizational stuff, you need him whenever there is a
big party fight going on. You need three or four on the other
side to stop — for example — to stop any kind of a coalescence
where one-third plus one will stop some two-third vote measure
from going through.

So Jesse was an artist in that regard. He had four or five
Republicans in his pocket, and we didn't like that either.
So that is the genesis of a new resurgence of Republican effort
and all of us moderate Republicans coming up with positive
programs, coming up with ideas of our own, challenging the
administration, leading up to, without our knowing it, the
Ronald Reagan campaign.

Bob Monagan, by this time, in '66, was minority leader. In
'63- '64, Charlie Conrad was minority leader, and I mean this
next sentence literally: Jesse Unruh elected the minority
leader. We ran against Charlie Conrad, but Jesse had half a
dozen locked-in Republican votes and then there were half a
dozen others that Jesse talked to and said that he didn't like
these Young Turks who were raising all this hell and they
shouldn't either. To make a long story short, they supported
Charlie Conrad who was Jesse's candidate for minority leader.

Morris: That is a very interesting maneuver.

Bagley: That is accurate history. There were even editorials in the
San Jose Mercury decrying this development. So this leads us
up to Ronald Reagan.

The 1964 Rockefeller-Goldwater Presidential Primary

Morris: You were active then in his campaign?

Bagley: No, not necessarily. It leads us up to the advent of Ronald
Reagan with one further bit of background and that's the
'64 Rockefeller versus Goldwater fight. All of us — Bob
Monagan purposely kept out of some of these intramural or
internecine affairs because we decided early he was going to
be speaker. He was our leader and we wanted to keep him sort
of insulated.

Veneman, Bagley, and Flournoy were the spear carriers, and
we traveled the state for Nelson Rockefeller for that whole
primary period, going into [the legislative] session at 10:00
and leaving at five after ten, going down to the executive
airport and getting in airplanes and flying all over the damn
state for three months.

Morris: Developing delegates to the — ?

Bagley: Oh, getting the press, visiting editors, every editorial

board in the state — because Rockefeller couldn't do it, we were
his people in California. We lost that '64 primary election by
about 40,00 votes. It was 80,000 but we always divided in half —
if 40,000 switched. The margin was 80,000. If 40,000
switched, you would have had 40,000 plus one and you would have
had Rockefeller as the nominee. I "blame" that on Happy
who had her baby on Saturday, three days before the June primary.

Putting all of that aside, the importance is that, as
everybody knows, Ronald Reagan had his genesis in the Goldwater
campaign. So by that time, the party people were beginning to
be controlled by the Goldwater operation. We fought that off and
kept it pretty well down to a dull roar. Not that we had
anything against conservatives per se, but some of these people
were absolutely nuts — and I mean that literally. Out of
eighty assembly seats, there are twenty or so that no Republican
can win. You can't win a seat in an 80, 90 percent Democratic
district. No one in their right mind would run for the seat,
and therefore the people that did, and who were then the
Republican nominees, literally weren't in their right mind.
I mean, they were almost fascists. They were bigots and I will
give you a very specific example so that this is not just
adjectives .

Bagley: There is no Republican platform in California for 1964. The
platform of the parties is not passed by the party central
committee but by the convention. The convention is made up
of each nominee for both houses and for Congress. So you've
got 160-some odd — 80, 40, plus another 40, plus the constitu
tional officers.1 nominees, some of whom are elected incumbents
and others are just new nominees — in June and then you have
your party convention in August. August of '64, we were down,
I think, to about 27 Republicans in the house (so therefore
two- thirds were not incumbents) and there were 13 in the
senate. The proportions were exact. In the senate, 27 were
not incumbents. The same was true of Congress. So you had
the nonincumbents taking over the party convention.

Out of committee and onto the floor at 6:30 at night comes
the civil rights plank. The civil rights plank, which never
passed for reasons I'm going to give you in a minute, was to
send the — I don't know that they even called the people blacks
or Negroes then — "send the blacks back to Africa." That was the
civil rights plank of the California Republican convention
proposed on the floor in 1964 because it was a direct quote from
the 1878 national Republican platform. We had people that
weren't in their right minds, who were sitting there in the
convention trying to pass that kind of a platform.

Bill Mailliard, Don Mulford, myself, Alan Pattee, a few others,
simply put a quorun call on. There wasn't a quorum and we
adjourned the convention at 6:30 on a Saturday afternoon
sometime in August — without any platform! That is my best
example of how bad the right wing became in 1964.

Reagan's Election as Governor

Bagley: Without Spencer and Roberts, Reagan not only risked, but in my
humble opinion would have succumbed almost without any
fight, succumbed to the then right-wing forces which, in their
worst form, were the people that I talked about earlier in
state convention. But Stu Spencer and Bill Roberts, who had run
the Rockefeller campaign, suddenly became the Reagan campaign
management team which, incidentally, incensed those of us whom
I was talking about earlier vis-a-vis the Rockefeller campaign.
I mean, here's our people, our guys —

Morris: Spencer and Roberts?

Bogley: Yes. Again, they are beautiful friends today but we were

incensed at the time. Somebody down south got awful smart in
the early Reagan kitchen cabinet and hired them. They tried to
insulate Ronald Reagan from the Birchers and the bigots. These
(the far right) were the people who would cry: "Get the U.S.
out of the UN and the UN out of the U.S.", "Impeach Earl Warren."
I don't think Reagan went that far, but I know he campaigned
against the progressive income tax (that becomes most relevant)
and I know he campaigned to repeal the Rumford Act, to repeal
open housing. Remind me, I want to tell you about 1967 and
open housing in a minute

Nonetheless, he didn't win; Pat Brown lost. Pat had been
in for two terms — that's the previous decade's history. But
when you beat an incumbent, normally the incumbent loses;
Pat was at the end of his trail and he lost. So Ronald Reagan
came into office in '67.

Morris: In January of '67; did you have any role in the transition or
helping Reagan — ?

Bagley: We tried. Let me back up a step. I mentioned that we were all
for George Christopher in the primary. Then in the general I
became an honorary chairman at the top of the letterhead,
because I was an officeholder, for the Reagan campaign. I
appeared at a couple of press conferences with him. That was
Bill Roberts and Stu Spencer trying to show that the moderates
were supporting Reagan, and some of us were trying to show that
we weren't as bad as the far right who would not participate
when they lost. Remember our story about Joe Shell and Dick
Nixon. So we didn't want to be in the same bag with them.

An interesting aside, as those who were there or who read
know, Pat Brown and Don Bradley — and Don just passed away,
Don was his political guide — thought that Reagan would be easy
to beat, so they had to get rid of Christopher. The polls
showed that Christopher was ahead of Brown whereas Reagan
wasn't, in the early campaign period.

They enlisted Drew Pearson to do a smear job on George
Christopher. George was convicted of putting too much cream in
the milk in 1938 in Marin County, because there was price
control and you could either lower the price or put more cream
in the milk. So he violated the Milk Act, and there is a
picture of George Christopher over in Marin law-enforcement files

Bagley: with a number under him. It was a misdemeanor, but they took
his picture with a number under it. Drew Pearson ran this
story. Fred Bagshaw, who was an uncle or cousin of Al Bagshaw
and Al was the D.A. back in '38, Fred (I know this because I
found out about it. I called Al) Fred, his uncle, was then
director of Public Works — it's like Caltrans today — for Pat
Brown. Fred got the old file from Al Bagshaw and sent it to
Drew Pearson via Don Bradley. Pearson wrote a piece about
this candidate who was a criminal.

The California papers wouldn't run it because they don't
run — the major papers, the L.A. Times particularly — at times
won't run stuff that is California politics that comes in from
out of state. Number one, they figure it's their bailiwick,
they ought to be able to write their own stuff; and, number
two, I guess they were a little incensed at this article.

Drew Pearson flew out and had a press conference in L.A.
and San Francisco holding up a blown-up picture of Christopher
with a number under it. At that point George Christopher was
thirty-six [percent] and Ronald Reagan was thirty-nine in the
Field poll, let's say in April of 1966. From that point,
Christopher went down ten points because of the diabolical
Democratic attempt to get rid of Christopher. They were
successful .

Morris: How important are dirty tricks in a campaign?
Bagley: Hmm? It depends on —

Morris: You said that Pat Brown lost rather than Reagan won. If Pat
Brown's administration was not tired, would he have been
successful against George Christopher?

Bagley: No, I don't think so at all. Brown's people wanted to eliminate
Christopher because Christopher had the more moderate image and
Christopher would have gotten even more [votes]. Christopher
would have won by 1.3 million. Bob Finch, in that same election,
won by 1.3 million against Glenn Anderson and Reagan's margin
was 986,000. That, incidentally, caused a schism between
Finch and Reagan. They never got along because they were jealous
of Finch — they, the Reagan people — and Finch came from a different
element of the party and they never got along, which is another
story.

Transition into Office

Bagley: You asked if we participated in the Reagan transition — not really.
Remember, we were the problem. We were in office and Ronald
Reagan (much like Jimmy Carter who ran against Washington and
then fell on his face because he couldn't make it work) ran
against Sacramento. So even though some of us — if I may —
some of us were a little bright and knew a little bit of what
was going on in the world, we weren't trusted. We were the
problem.

Morris: Even though you were of the same party?

Bagley: Yes, the party is totally incidental in that sense. Everybody
in Sacramento was either an old hack or a nincompoop or a
dirty liberal in the minds of the Reagan people: now, not Spencer
and Roberts. Spencer and Roberts are mechanics; they are not
ideologues. But Reagan got around him a bunch of young men,
and I'm sure some women, but —

Morris: No, mostly men.

Bagley: — Young men who listened to the campaign speeches, were the

advance people and the campaign types, listened to the speeches
for a year and were totally convinced that, number one, we were
the problem and, number two, all they had to do was march
around Capitol Park on their white horses and solve the problems.
The first two years of his administration were an abomination,
an absolute abomination. Gordon Paul Smith, who was the first
director of Finance, he was going to cut ten percent across the
board, which is the worst kind of government. He had his figures
all screwed up. I remember at one point Gordon — I'm going to
tell you about a meeting here in a minute — Gordon Paul Smith,
having his budget figures all screwed up, and I charged there
was a Gipper Gap in Sacramento. That was the kind of thing —
you see, this is early Reagan. No, we were trying to be
helpful, but we were excluded. It was like back in the Unruh
days. They weren't going to listen to any of us. It wasn't
diabolical on our part. We were just frustrated.

I can recall specifically a meeting — probably the first
meeting — he called a Republican joint caucus, the senate and the
assembly down in the governor's anteroom —

Morris: The Governor called the joint caucus?

Bagley:

Morris:

Bagley:

Morris :

Bagley:

Yes, that's normal. They wanted to discuss the problems
generally and, yes, there was a budget problem and I'll get into
that. As we were talking along, Gordon — I don't mean to take
it out on him, but this was emblematic of the kind of people
he had around him — total political amateurs who, again, ran
against the system. We were the problem, all of the adjectives
that you want to use applicable to that kind of a situation.

I remember specifically Smith saying, "It's going to be a
little tough, but when the going gets tough" — quoting Knute
Rockne — "the tough get going." At which point I damn near threw
up! Involuntary muscular contractions of the stomach took over
and I said, "Governor, Knute Rockne doesn't have any votes
upstairs." You see, the total lack of comprehension of the
system; a lack of comprehension of the so-called separate branch
of government, as if the legislature didn't exist. That was a
time to work with the legislature — a Democratic majority —
not ignore it and "get tough."

Sure, there were some bohunks and dolts and a few crooks up
there, but, God bless it, you work with them and you make the
system work by compromising. The beauty of this is that four
years later that is exactly what he did, and we'll get into
that. But the first two years were an abomination.

Because of the inexperience or the youth?
that a lot of those —

You also mentioned

It's both plus the third factor, which is even more important,
the ideologues. Again, these are people who think with their
glands and they couldn't conceive of working on programs.
They just wanted to get rid of all of the programs.

What about people like Cap [Caspar] Weinberger and Ric [A. Ruric]
Todd who had been around Sacramento a long time?

Good question. Ric did come up and do a little bit of the
transition work. I'll give an example. This sounds silly, but
it's the way things should work. Everybody knows Frank Fat's
restaurant in Sacramento. Wing Fat, Frank's son, is the most
beautiful person alive in Sacramento. Everybody loves him. He's
an educated man. His family is well-known and respected.
Through Jack McDowell, Ric Todd made sure that Ronald Reagan
appointed Wing Fat to the Veteran's Board. He was the only
establishment person appointed to anything. That must have
slipped through because, see, he was establishment. I'm not

Bagley :

Morris :
Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley;

Morris:

talking about the legislature now. I'm just talking about
someone who had an affinity and who we had expected, if he
wanted something, he could become part of the administration.

Cap Weinberger was excluded. Holmes Tuttle in that original
kitchen cabinet thought Cap was too liberal because Cap during
'61-62 ran for state chairman against Joe Shell's person by
the name of [Vernon] Christina from San Jose. Cap then was
tainted as being too liberal, and that's how Gordon Paul
Smith came in as the first director of Finance. Two years later
or maybe a year and a half, Cap came in as director of Finance
and you began to see a slow metamorphosis.

Ed Meese looms large here. Ed had been a lobbyist, as
you know. He had been a deputy district attorney out of
Alameda County, and ever since the Earl Warren days, Alameda
County supplied the deputy D.A. who lobbies for the D.A. 's
association and the Sheriff's Association.

That very ingenious .

It's just a fact. So Ed had that chore and Ed knew his way
around the legislature. Ed was not a happy-go-lucky, back-
slapping lobbyist, but at least he knew his way around. With
the first wave of people by attrition leaving, and then with
some of them learning, and with the ascendency of Ed Meese, the
atmosphere changed. Ronald Reagan — let me say some nice things
about him — doesn't have an evil bone in his body. He is not
conspiratorial. I have never heard him say, "I am going to
get that person," unlike Nixon, who was out to get everybody.

An "enemy,"

quo te-unquo te ,

Yes, and when I say Nixon, I mean that whole last part of his
administration; the Haldeman-Ehrlichman-Mitchell-Colson gang
were out to get people. Never did I see, and I don't see it
today, Ronald Reagan having this "get" mentality. It's probably-
other people have written on this subject — because he is stable.
He isn't insecure. So you had that as a plus and then you
began to see some of these people around him, Meese being my
primary example, come to the fore and start saying, "Hell,
we've got to make this system work. We can't just sit around
and fight our little ideological fights."

Did you find Meese more interested in how the system worked than
in an ideological position?

Bagley: Absolutely, and he is the same today. I haven't worked with him
that much in the last few months, but he is the same today.
He is not an ideologue. He is conservative. I make a big
difference between a person of conservative principles, if you
will, and an ideologue. An ideologue doesn't think.

Now, I don't want to exclude Phil Battaglia, who did try.
We used to meet with Phil — and I want to talk about the
Rumford Act in a moment. George Steffes was a good soldier
all during this trying desperately to (quote, unquote) "go
upstairs" and explain to those idiots — and, of course, we
were the idiots upstairs. That was the context of government
in '67 — but you have —

Morris: Another idiot at the other end of the stairs?

Bagley: Yes, and that has nothing to do with ideology. It was the

idiots in the governor's office and the idiots in the legisla
ture and that included everybody. But George would go down
and try to explain to the Governor that, "you've got to
work with these people."

So ultimately, after a period of two or three years —
Verne Orr is another good example, right along with Ed Meese.
When Verne came in (Cap Weinberger's stint as director of
Finance wasn't that long and wasn't really that productive in
the context that I am talking about now, because he went to
Washington. Nixon appointed him chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission and then OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] and then everything else) — but when Verne came in —

Morris: Verne came in from government or from — ?

Bagley: Verne came in immediately — he had been director of Motor

Vehicles, but prior to that and penultimately he was a car
dealer and an officer of a savings and loan in Pasadena. So
he came in from business.

Morris: And government process took for him.

Bagley: Yes. He was one of the first people who literally came upstairs.
He would come up at 6:00 at night (and we are now into [Robert]
Monagan's speakership and I have to cover that) he would
literally come up the stairs and put his feet on my desk. I
would pour him some lobbyist's booze and we'd have a half a

Bagley: dozen guys in the office, a couple of staff members. He'd
look up at my picture of Ronald Reagan in a natural and
shudder, but we'd get something done!* We'd put the
tax bill together that way, and we're going to get to taxes
and welfare.

Republican Speaker Monagan

Bagley: When Bob Monagan became speaker, another catalytic point, this
was in January of '69. At that point, Nixon was elected.
[John] Veneman left for Washington as Undersecretary of HEW
with [Robert] Finch. Reinecke was appointed lieutenant governor
and immediately, within the first day of his appointment,
took a cheap shot at Veneman. I mean, these things were
going on all of the time. Monagan becomes speaker. I took
over Jack's committee. I had been chairman of Judiciary under
Jesse Unruh in the last two years of his speakership when we
had a 42-38 house when finally we were given a voice on the
natural, not because anybody sold out. Veneman had been
chairman of Rev. and Tax. He left and, without going through
all of the chairs, I took over the Revenue and Taxation
Committee.

Bob Monagan, early on in January, was elected speaker,
went down and broached Governor Reagan in his den and said,
"Look, fella, I'm the speaker, you're the governor. We're
going to get along." That was just about the time when the
Governor's people began to understand that they ought to get
along. So that was another catalytic event. Ed Meese, Bob
Monagan, and a little later, Verne Orr. [tape interruption]

The Governor also, as is typical of new administrations with
a business bent, formed a whole bunch of task forces, dollar-
a-year kind of persons who were going to come up and do all of
these great things. I can't name one thing that they were
instrumental in putting together.

* Bagley 's assembly office included in its decorations a cartoon
of the Governor with a haircut popular among blacks in the 1960s.
The cartoon was still on his office wall in 1981. [see illustration
next page]

20a

RONAL ALIS X

Morris: Does this work well in business, the task force — ?

Bagley: No, it's a facade, it's a facade! Oh, sure, if you can get

a half a dozen consultants in the field and put them together,
they can decide whether the Bank of America ought to expand
into a new financial vista. That's fine. That's their
field. But to get a guy from the telephone company and the
banks and a few other places and put them in a room in Sacramento
and say, "Here, do something," it doesn't work because they
refuse to work within the system. They don't know the system,
number one, and, number two, they refuse to work within the
system. They are there to gut the system; at least that is the
impression you get. They are not experts per se. But it's
a great campaign speech: "I am going to bring business
principles to government." I have nothing against that, but
this little Mickey Mouse task force technique is not the way
to do it.

Revising Fair Housing Legislation and Presidential Hopes

Morris: I'd like to tie this back into the aftermath of the Rumford Act.
Was there a task force on the Rumford Act?

Bagley: I don't think so. We didn't even see these people, so there may
have been. But they had such little impact that we never
even knew what they were doing or why they were doing it,
although they came out — and my memory doesn't serve me — they
came out with a couple of reports that we sort of laughed at
because it wouldn't work, but not on the Rumford Act.

Early, early on in 1967 John Schmitz puts in SB 1, and
you have to get permission to get that first bill spot. SB 1
is normally put in by — you call the roll the first day and bills
go in alphabetically, so whomever Senator A was deferred to
John Schmitz. John put in SB 1, which was to repeal the open
housing in California. It passed the senate — I'm shocked —
something around thirty to three with five or six good (quote,
unquote) "liberals" taking a hike. It might have been twenty-
seven to six, but still it was overwhelming. Jesse Unruh
assigned it to the Judiciary Committee of which I was chairman
and, parenthetically, if there is one thing I am proud of, I
stopped the repeal of open housing.

Bagley: Now, here comes Phil Battaglia and Ronald Reagan. This is

now March-April of '67. Ronald Reagan is already running for

president and the last thing in the world he wanted on his

desk was a measure to repeal open housing even though that

was part of his '66 campaign. We would have been the first

state in the nation to repeal. So Phil Battaglia and I conspired.

Morris: You did?

Bagley: We came up and my staff — Bob Murphy, who is now an attorney with
the Law Revision Commission down at Stanford — Bob Murphy did
the staff work. We came up with a compromise which was supported
by the ACLU [chuckles] and half a dozen other groups. It
would have repealed open-housing for single-family residences —
that might sound terrible, but that was one way to save at
least multiple residences, rental units, in the open-housing
arena. We finally put that bill out on the assembly so that —
you see, it was an emotional issue. A lot of people wanted to
vote to repeal something. So they got that out of their
systems — they, the members on the floor — and they voted for this
modified plan. The bill went to conference and the conference
committee blew up in a puff of feathers and nothing happened.
I was happy thinking interest groups in the state were happy and
Ronald Reagan was ecstatic that he didn't have to sign, didn't
have to face the issue of signing a repealer.

Morris: You say he was already running for president?

Bagley: Sure he was because, in '68, he was down in Florida running
against Nixon. I went down to Florida — not as a delegate,
because Ronald Reagan had the California delegation. I went
down and joined the Nixon people in order to try to stop Ronald
Reagan from taking over the national office at that point
because, remember, in '67 and '68 he was still something of a
neanderthal and Nixon then was sort of respected, if I may. So
that gives you a little flavor of those first couple of years.

III RESOLVING STATE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNOR'S MEN

Tax Revision, Withholding, and the 1970s Surplus

Morris :

Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley:

Morris :

Bagley:

From the point of view of somebody who had been working on the
legislative process, it sounds like you felt the governor's
office had a way to go.

That's the understatement of the afternoon!
Steffes and — what was Lindsey's first name?

Jack.

Except George

Jack Lindsey. They tried. And former senator Vern Sturgeon
working the senate. It was just that downstairs was something
of a stone wall and I really couldn't name the people that
formed the stones in that stone wall, but it was there.

Was your sense that the staff had the final say in what Reagan
was doing or that it was the kitchen cabinet who wasn't officially
part of the — ?

It was more kitchen cabinet. It was a combination — the kitchen
cabinet, then Reagan's endemic thoughts coming from parroting
the speech against government for five years. Hell, he was
going to implement the speech and it wasn't implementable. I'll
jump way ahead and give you the prime example. Yes, we had a
budget deficit in '67. Hale Champion was director of Finance
with Pat Brown in '65 and they were going to avoid new taxes.
They did the same thing— and I don't know how we're going to
do it again this year — that people are talking about now, about
accelerating the collection of various taxes. We accelerated
the collection of everything to bring more money in in one year,
everything except the death tax, and we were kidding and saying
that Pat ought to have a "pay now and go later" plan. Everything

Bagley: except inheritance taxes were accelerated. By that I mean that
corporate franchise tax and sales taxes were all paid monthly
rather than quarterly and three or four hundred million dollars
came in in '65 which balanced the '65 budget but left the tax
base such that you couldn't do it again. And, therefore, we
were three or four hundred million dollars in the hole.

I wasn't involved in that. Jack Veneman, George Miller,
Jesse Unruh were, and there was a tax bill that came out in '67
which added, among other things, the eight-percent bracket to
the income tax. Income tax brackets thereto fore in California
had been one through seven.

Now, let me jump way ahead. We proposed — and "we" includes
the Governor — in '69 and '70 the identical elements of that
proposal, AB 1000 and 1001 in both years, authored by myself as
chairman of Revenue and Tax, which finally passed in '72 or
so. We then added the nine-, ten-, and eleven- percent brackets,
already having added the eight percent. We narrowed the brackets,
made California the most progressive in the nation (and, of
course, you remember Ronald Reagan was against progressive
income tax in 1965). That, in turn, caused Prop 13 because
it caused this tremendous surplus after inflation went above
what was then three or four or five percent a year and went to
ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen percent a year.

Narrowing those brackets and adding the brackets meant
that everybody ended up in the higher brackets. That caused,
not Ronald Reagan's parsimony nor certainly not Jerry Brown's
parsimony, but that bracket change caused the $6 billion surplus
which, in turn, caused Prop 13 — just ABC without qualification.*
That's what caused the surplus. So we made California the most
progressive income-tax state in the nation under Ronald Reagan.

Morris: Did you foresee the likelihood of — ?
Bagley: Of inflation doing what it did?
Morris: Yes.

Bagley: Of course not. So it's my fault! Dave Doerr, who was our consul
tant (and he still is) on the Revenue and Tax Committee and
myself; Bob Moretti; and a couple of others with the total
cooperation — and I'll get to that next point — cooperation of
Ronald Reagan, Verne Orr, and all the rest of us.

Also, we put withholding in first, in 1971.

* 1978 ballot measure (Jarvis-Gann initiative) that sharply
limited property taxes .

Morris: That was something else that Reagan had campaigned against.

Bagley: Yes. Okay, withholding came in in '71 when we were ready to
issue scrip. That state wasn't broke in a budget-balancing
sense, but all of the revenue came in in April and by January
there simply wasn't cash flow. Everybody knew it. And every
year — '68, '69, '70 got worse and worse and worse. By December
of '71 we were broke. We couldn't pay the light bill and we were
going to have to issue scrip. Ronald Reagan finally realized
that. He called a special session. I put AB IX — "X" stands for
extraordinary — AB IX, extraordinary session, in, let's say,
December 8, 9, or 10th. We were rushing against the clock
because the state Franchise Tax Board said we can't possibly
impose withholding, get it out to all of the employers and start
January 1 without three or four weeks' lead time.

At that point, Bob Moretti was speaker and he and a few of
the Democrats held the bill up. Parenthetically, I put AB 2X
in which said that when the state issues scrip, that scrip
shall have a reasonable facsimile of a picture of the Speaker
of the Assembly printed thereon! [laughter] That was a lot of
fun and there was a cartoon in the Sacramento Bee showing this
large-nosed person — and I love Bob Moretti also — on the face of
an I.O.U., one million dollars, State of California.

So we passed withholding, and that got us by another couple
of years. At first, Ronald Reagan wanted to give back — when
you impose withholding you get a windfall because you are
collecting a year and some month's taxes all at once. In
April of '72, you collect all of '71 and you collect part of
a year ahead of time (January, February, March, April), so you
collect sixteen months' of taxes all at once. It was a windfall
of $500 million. The original plan was give it all back. By
that time Bob Moretti was speaker. I was no longer chairman of
Revenue and Tax but I was the negotiating person for Governor
Reagan. See how far we'd come? By this time, Monagan and I had
become the catalysts with the Democratic majority and we were
making the system work. It might not have worked, in retro
spect, as well as we wanted, but at least we were working
together and [with] Ronald Reagan, arm in arm, meeting with
Moretti, meeting with Leo McCarthy, meeting with the Democratic
counterparts on the senate side. We met during this period of
'69- '70; this is prior to the withholding bill in '71 when we
put this [income] tax package together, which I just talked
about, which we were trying [again] to pass in '72.

Bagley: We met for a period of six weeks, one week solid with Reagan

there; I was going to say eight to five — ten to four; you can't
have a meeting all day long. Then we would meet with the staff
at night trying to get the bill into print for the next day or
the next week. It went on for six weeks. Now, that's good
governmental process .

Morris : Can you go back up a minute and tell me where you think the
breakthrough was between yourself and the Governor in terms
of his being able to work with the legislature?

Bagley: I mentioned earlier the evolution of people like Ed Meese and

Verne Orr. Then, the Monagan almost-confrontation, telling the
Governor, "Look, fellow, we're going to work together," that
being in January of 1969, the Governor himself finally getting
to know some of us, finally determining —

Morris :
Bagley:

— finally beginning to realize that some of us were people worth
dealing with and at the same time realizing that he had to deal.
I don't mean deal in a bad sense of the word, just work things
out together. So part of it was a realization on Reagan's
part that some of us were decent human beings worthy of
working with, and then the individuals that I mentioned brought
this about and, thirdly, the realization of the absolute need.
How are you going to pass a bill? How are you going to
balance the budget? How are you going to run for president if
you can't get bills passed out of the legislature? That's a
very important factor all throughout —

Was that ever said?

No, of course not! But it's, again, an endemic fact that in
'68 he was running and, of course, again in '76, and he wanted
a record.

Property Tax Relief and Windfall Revenues

Bagley: Now, property tax relief was the cry and one of the reasons we
added the eight, nine, ten, and eleven percent brackets,
increased (I believe 2 cents) the sales tax, and the corporate
tax went up from five percent to nine, all of those things
provided a billion and a half dollars which, in turn, provided
almost a billion and a half of property- tax relief. That's the

Bagley: home owner's exemption that we lived under until Prop 13 came
along. We also eliminated inventory tax and beefed-up school
finance. There's your billion dollars plus, those three
elements. But in order to do that, Reagan and the legislature
passed the most progressive income tax structure in the nation.

Morris: You had the Watson Amendment in there — *

Bagley: Yes, which we beat, we, again traveling the state, calling it

bad government and putting out all of the analyses of what would
happen. The same thing happened — Oh, I was going to finish
withholding and I guess I really did, so withholding finally
went in. Again, all during this '69- '70 period, he (the Governor)
and they (the governor's office) learned to work with us. So
when they needed withholding, it became natural. I literally was
on my way to go pheasant hunting. I went to Sacramento with my
shotgun and my hunting clothes. I got a call to come up and
confer with them — "We need withholding."

Then I was able to call Moretti and the other people and
say, "We are going to have a special session and we're going
to do this." That's the way government ought to work. You
ought to have people talking to each other, which occurred
two and a half years forward — from '67.

Morris: Do you recall who it was that called and said, "We need to get
together on this;" would that be somebody at Meese's level or
would it be — ?

Bagley: I don't recall, I don't recall. Verne Orr certainly could have
been; it could have been Meese or Verne. It could have been
George Steffes saying, "Hey" — if George was still in that
position — "my guys need to talk to you." That was more of just
a communication, but by that time it became normal for the
governor's office to talk to the (quote, unquote) "legislature."

Morris: On an informal basis of, "This bill is about to come up" or
"We need to get a bill ready"?

Bagley: Well, "We need to call a special session. Will it pass? What
will we do?" Oh, I was beginning to say that — I know where I
left off. There was half a billion dollars of one-time revenue
and the Governor wanted to give it all back. That's where we
had to negotiate again. Moretti and company wanted to spend It
all. [tape interuption] — Then in a position of negotiating
what happens to the windfall, and that's when the Governor
finally decided that we'll have half of the windfall go back

* Proposition 9 on the 1968 ballot, an initiative to scale back
property taxes, organized by Philip Watson, Los Angeles county
assessor.

Bagley:

Morris;
Bagley:

Morris:

Bagldy:

as a tax credit at the bottom of your income-tax return and
the other half will be spent for capital outlay, which is
a very fine solution.

Verne Orr, in my office at 6:00, drinking lobbyist
booze, is the person who put that together. I come back to
that because it is the difference between '67 when nobody would
talk to anybody and later , when Verne would come up at 6 : 00
and we'd sit around with my staff and other members would
wander in — and we'd work out what we thought was salable to
Moretti. Then we'd find Moretti and then Moretti would be
involved and we'd go back and forth and put a little package
together.

say,

Verne had the guts then to go down to the Governor and
"Gov, we're going to — "

This is what we can get passed?

Yes, and we're going to spend this and we're not going to give
it all back. A story that is unknown, untold, as a part of
that, when we put the withholding package together. In round
figures , we put thirty or forty million into earthquake-
proofing the schools — this isn't the untold story, this was in
the bill — and we put something around a hundred million for
university and college construction and we put seventy or
eighty million of that (that adds up to almost 250) , seventy or
eighty million into park-land buying which my staff — I didn't
know this — when they wrote the bill named it the Bagley
Conservation Fund. That's still not the story. After that
package was put together, Verne says, "Bill, can we just put
$5 million aside for miscellaneous capital outlay?"

I said, "Sure, I don't give a damn. Tell me what it's for."
[lowers voice] "The governor's mansion." The advent and passage
of withholding paid for the governor's mansion! Some of his
kitchen cabinet guys had bought the land but the state had to
build the building. Some of that five mill went into building
the governor's mansion and I won a plaque over the door! [laughs]

That got a lot of press, the whole business of the governor's
mansion. Was that something that the legislature had — ?

Oh, we didn't worry about it. Ed Z'berg, who was from Sacramento,
that was one of his interests. I don't even know what the local
politics were. Some people wanted it downtown. It should have

Bagley: been downtown. It's too damn far out. But that's not something
you worry about. If the governor wants to build a house, let
him go build a house. It was really inconsequential as far
as we were concerned. But that $5 million was not identified
as such in the withholding bill.

Budget Development, Interest Groups, Local Government

Morris :

Bagley;

Morris,

Bagley:

Where was the technical advice coming from on what the
possibilities were and what the outcome of different approaches
to—?

Okay, in the — Oh, I should have let you finish,
about money? Are you talking about taxes?

Are you talking

I'm talking about what goes into one's money bill and the tax

program.

The Department of Finance staff who are very good. Incidentally
most of whom are still there, [Clifford] Allenby is now one of the
heads of the civil service staff; Roy Bell was some chief
deputy director! They are, and I don't use the word disparagingly,
they are malleable. They will shift from Pat Brown to Ronald
Reagan and they will be the same staff and they are also
honorable. They use the same numbers, but if the governor's
office or the director of Finance says, "I want to spend a
billion less," it's up to them, working with the departments,
to come up with the cuts or come up with the components of a
tax bill, and it's relatively easy to figure these components.
In those days, a cent of sales tax brought in half a billion
dollars. It's simple. I mean you know that x percentage of
this will bring in this much money and x percentage more of
this will bring in that much money, and it's a relatively
simple kind of a projection.

Then the question is, ideologically and politically, sales
tax is supposed to be regressive. In California it's not,
because we have a very high threshold of exemptions. In some
states, you are taxing food and haircuts and services. In
California we don't. So there is the ideological fight as to
incidence of taxation and here come your interest groups. The
California retailers wanted desperately to get rid of inventory
tax. So they were very helpful in putting this package together,
not in the component parts, which is more or less simple
arithmetic and a little political judgment with antennae extended,

Bagley: but in the lobbying aspect. The school people, the school

unions, were very important. They produced Dave Robert! , who
is now president pro tern. Dave was a key vote and TJTLA [United
Teachers of Los Angeles] produced Dave Roberti for this
ultimate tax bill that passed in ' 72 or so because they wanted
more school money. So your interest groups come in sideways
and produce a vote here and there that helps you to keep the
package together or helps you tie the ribbon around the package.

Morris: What did they want in return?

Bagley: Money! The only way you get money is to pass the tax bill.

It's not any sort of a crass quid pro quo. The money is sort
of floating at that point. It's not like you've got a specific
formula — "I want $395 million and I'll get you a vote." It's,
"my god, this is the only game in town, let's go out and get a
few votes and help pass the bill." [tape interruption]

Morris: I have a couple more question on the tax packages. Where were
the county representatives in all of this? A couple of the
things that I came across indicate that they were very difficult
from the legislature's point of view.

Bagley: I'm trying to remember, I'm trying to remember. The cities and
counties have a problem in that they don't have clout. Whatever
clout they could develop through local contacts is rather
ethereal. The local people come and go. They change all of the
time, so you don't have a sort of a feed-down kind of machine
where, by god, you can push a button and the mayor of the town
will call the assemblyman and say, "I want this." It just
doesn't work that way.

Morris: It doesn't work?

Bagley: It's too ethereal; too many people, too many players too much
change .

Morris: Even through things like the [California] Supervisors' Association
and the League of California Cities?

Bagley: The same thing. Some of these local people are probably potential
opponents rather than political allies.

Morris: Do you mean they are going to run for your seat?

Bagley: Yes, yes. It didn't bother me, but — I'm trying to analyze the

whole situation. So the cities and counties really have a problem.
They have no clout. They've got a great line — home rule. Howard

Bagley: Jarvis, incidentally, destroyed home rule in California. Sure!
There's no more local tax base, so all of the conservatives who
supported Prop 13 are out of their minds because all they did
was concentrate the power in Sacramento. It's that simple,
and they destroyed the local option, local governance, local
ability to raise money and make decisions.

IV OTHER PRESSING ISSUES

Welfare Reform Negotiations, 1971

Morris: In some of his early tax messages, wasn't Reagan suggesting that
some revenues from the state go back to the cities and counties
and that they take over some of the health and welfare programs?

Bagley: I am having a dim recollection of that. Actually, the reverse
happened because the cities and counties , particularly counties ,
wanted desperately out of the welfare business. It ends up that
that was part of property tax relief to unburden the property
taxpayer by the state paying for more of the county's welfare
functions, and that is also true of the welfare bill which we
are going to talk about real soon. Shall I start now?

Morris: Yes, that's my next question.

Bagley: Okay, 1971 to '74, Bobby Moretti is speaker and I became chairman
of Welfare [Assembly Social Welfare Committee] .

Morris: How did that happen? You are a Republican and Moretti is a —

Bagley: Again, for forty or so years in California we have had minority-
party chairmanships. When we had the speakership for two years
during this period, Jack Knox continued as chairman of Local
Government and we had a half a dozen or more Democrats as
committee chairmen. Remember, during the early Unruh days, Jesse
would sort of buy the votes of those minority party chairmen.
It was not true in the later Unruh days.

When Moretti became speaker, he had been working with some
of us, myself, for example, on all of these tax measures. It was
natural. Bob called me into his office and said, "Bill, I'm
going to give six or seven Republican chairmanships" — whatever
the number was. He said, "You can have your choice. Take

Bagley: whatever one you want of those that are left over" — never
giving a clout committee to the minority party. I said,
"I want welfare." He said, "You're out of your mind. It's
a dog committee."

Morris: John Burton was also on that committee and had been for a long
time.

Bagley: John was on the committee. Phil, of course, was chairman way
back in '62. John was, I guess, still on the committee. I
was outnumbered — a minority chairmanship with, my god, there
was Bill Greene and maybe Johnny Burton and three or four
liberal Democrats. The committee itself was of no use at all.

Morris: Why did you want the chairmanship?

Bagley: Because welfare was going to be the next big issue in the state
and if I had this catalytic role in taxes, why not in welfare?
So the exact same thing happened. I'm exaggerating by the
use of the word "exact." We had meetings for six weeks. We
put the plan together, and with Governor Reagan participating
during the day and the staff during the night. I can remember
buying thirty dinners for the staff; I did it because they
didn't have any money — government money — to buy dinners. We'd
bring in sandwiches and beer and work until midnight putting the
welfare package together.

Morris: Reagan would stay until midnight?

Bagley: No, he came in a couple of times at night during the tax package,
the first time that we floated it in the late sixties. It
passed the assembly with Moretti's total cooperation and we
got up to twenty-six votes in the senate and needed twenty-
seven. Tom Carrell had a heart attack, Senator Tom Carrell.
Reagan came in all evening from after dinner at 7:00 until
midnight, talking to Mrs. Tom Carrell, talking to Tom's
doctor as the whether to fly him up in an ambulance plane and
decided not to. We had a rump press conference at midnight and
admitted defeat. We couldn't get the twenty- seventh vote. We
flew Milton Marks back from the Far East. He was over there on
a trip. We got him a helicopter and somehow got him off of a
ship and onto an airplane.

We committed some felonies, too. I can specifically remember
Al Song saying he wanted his — now, this is really being blunt
now, I'll do it — wanted his law partner appointed to the bench.

Bagley: I reported that as a fact and the word came back that, "we'll
consider him." So I reported that, "you're going to get
favorable consideration," and Al Song voted for the bill.

I honestly don't know to this day whether his law partner
was appointed to the bench, but that's a felony. I mean if you
give a guy ten cents for a vote, that's a felony; if you give
him anything . it's a felony. There are felonies committed
every day in Sacramento — "If you're nice to me over here, I'll
give you a vote." That's consideration. It's a felony. So
we committed a few felonies in the course of human events. They
are not thought of as such, but technically somebody is asking
to get some consideration for a vote. And that's in the consti
tution: consideration for a vote is a felony.

So Ronald Reagan was a peripheral participant in the
prospect of committing a few felonies during the course of that
era as was, I'm sure, and will continue to be, every other
governor.

Morris: That's sort of an insoluble matter of legislative ethics, is that
right?

Bagley: You're right, and I'm using the word felony in sort of a
facetious sense, but it is still technically true.

Continuing Concern for Costs and Caseloads; Staff Input

Morris: Was the concern for welfare primarily on the Governor's part
or the legislature's part?

Bagley: Both. The graph of dollar expenditures was going through the
roof and the pattern continued. Literally picture a graph
with the arrow going almost straight up and going off the chart.
Legislative staff members knew this. The staff knows things like
that; legislators don't sit around and do arithmetic. But the
concerned staff knew what was happening. Obviously, the
Department of Finance knew what was happening. It's a budget
problem.

Morris: Is this because of programs passed in Sacramento or because of
the cost associated with federal programs?

Bagley: Both, plus — I don't really remember the economy that well — but

there was a recessionary period in '71-72. Governor Reagan came
up with an initiative which had its genesis, I believe, in Bob
Carlson's shop. Bob was then director of Welfare. It was so
outlandish that it would have pitted the taxpayer versus the
poor on the ballot. The taxpayer would have won. I mean it
would have passed and, to exaggerate a little bit, some of us
were running around saying, "My god, this is fodder for class
warfare, to pit the taxpayer against the poor on a ballot
initiative."

That was the motivation of some of us, myself included,
and of the Bob Morettis and the Leo McCarthys on the Democratic
side to pass some kind of a welfare reform bill. So, again,
we met for weeks back and forth on principles and concepts
first, and then on drafting. I mean we got down to negotiating
as to whether a person gets to keep a refrigerator if he or she
becomes a recipient. To qualify you can have certain assets,
but you can't have other assets. You've got to give up your
boat, but you can have a refrigerator. You can have an old
junker car, but you can't have a car worth more that x dollars.
We literally negotiated each one of these points and finally
put a bill together which passed by our amending a senate
bill on the assembly side — Tony Beilenson's bill had passed the
senate which Reagan didn't like at all. It was a very liberal
bill. We put, I don't know, out of forty concepts maybe we put
thirty into the Beilenson bill. [Out of] forty of Reagan's
concepts, maybe we put thirty, some of them minor, on the assembly
side into the Beilenson bill and, big deal, added my name as
co-author. It became the Beilenson-Bagley bill, sent it back to
the senate, and it was approved. A lot of negotiation. Family
planning: Tony insisted, it was a federal program, if we put
in $3 million of state money, you'd get $27 million of federal
money for family planning, a 90-10 match. Well, that goes
against the conservative's grain. First of all, you can't have
abortions and, secondly, you can't have family planning because
people ought to just be able to say no. That was Ronald Reagan's
mentality then and seemingly is now, but we put family planning
into the welfare bill.

Morris: You had already passed an abortion bill which the Governor had
signed.

Bagley: I want to get into that. Tony Beilenson in 1967 passed the most
liberal abortion bill of any of the states and that is obviously
prior to the Supreme Court case in the seventies which said that
a lady, a female, has the right to an abortion. Ronald Reagan

Bagley: claimed that he saved $2 billion by passage of this welfare

bill. That was even in his 1980 presidential material. Martin
Anderson from Stanford was running around writing campaign
pieces for Reagan saying that they saved $2 billion. Alan
Post, in 1975 — and this is in the legislative analyst's records —
in January of '75, testified before a joint meeting of the
Ways aad Means and Senate Finance and all along he was saying,
"We will save forty, fifty, sixty, seventy, eighty million
a year" on so-called welfare reform. Alan Post testified again
that it probably saved fifty to a hundred million dollars, but
he also testified those numbers are very, very hard to come by
because you can claim almost anything was either a savings or
would have happened at any rate, in which event it wasn't a
savings. But he also testified — and here's the key — during
this period from '67 to '74, AFDC, which is the only area that
you really had an impact on — the aged, the blind, and disabled
didn* t change that much — the AFDC rolls went down about
250,000 from, let's say, 2.1 million to 1.85 million. But the
incidence of mothers remained the same. Eligibility is not
through kids. It's the mother's assets and income, so welfare
reform is supposed to change the criteria for qualifying and,
therefore, you get people off the rolls.

The criteria for qualifying changed a lot, but the number of
mothers remained proportionately constant. The number of kids
went down; I will give you the numbers almost verbatim; they
are part of annual state department of health reports. In
1975, there was a table that was part of the state department
of health's annual report which says — I'll give you the full
figure first. There were 750,000 abortions, not including those
done in doctor's offices [where] there is no record, between
1967 and '75, 250,000 of which were paid for by Medi-Cal — and
that's the exact number of decrease of kids on AFDC, 250,000.
That is welfare reform. Again, AFDC mothers on the rolls was
almost constant.

There were 500 legal abortions in 1967 prior to the
Beilenson bill. In 1968, there were 5,000, and it went to
15,000, it went to 35,000, it went to 75,000, and it got up
to around 130,000 or 140,000 or 150,000 a year in 1973, '74,
'75. One-third of all of those — and the total was 750,000 —
one- third of those were paid for by Medi-Cal, which would have
been, by definition, medically indigent people whose children
would have been on welfare, and that's where the $2 billion
savings came from. Ronald Reagan knows that and he signed an
abortion bill. At the time he signed it, he said, "I'm going

Bagley: to monitor this bill to see that there are no abuses." I

don't want to get too facetious but some of his people must
have been happier than a clam that the bill existed because
that is the real cause and effect of welfare reform.

Meshing Governor's Office and Legislative Processes

Bagley:

Morris:

Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley:

That's off the subject, but the real subject is they were
working with us constantly from about '69 forward and working
well and passing decent bills. We needed that welfare-reform
bill because, remember, we were going to have a class warfare
ballot initiative if we didn't. We needed to work together.
We needed to show that the governor's office and the legislature
could work together, mesh the wheels, and make the system
work — and it was fun. It was productive and it was good
government all at once, and it saved a few bucks to boot. You
can't have it any better, and those were the good periods of
California government during this period of time. Also there
was more trust in government — before Watergate.

It sounds like you and the people you worked with in the
legislature felt you had done a good job educating the governor's
staff-
Absolutely, and the Governor himself when he went to Washington in
1980, he didn't pull a Jimmy Carter. He embraced the Congress,
went out to visit Bob Dole in Bethesda who had a kidney stone
and brought him a book, he visited the capitol, had meetings

Hell, he wouldn't have visited any of us in
He wished we were dead. [tape interruption,

on their ground.
Sacramento in '67.
phone]

////[Brief passage on Revenue and Taxation Committee lost when
tape turned over]

— George Deukmejian and Bob Lagomarsino. I should have mentioned

them because on the senate side they were the key Republican

negotiators in all of these tax matters. Later, Walt Stiern and
Al Rodda were the Democrats.

Also Mr. Gonsalves.

Okay, Joe became chairman of Rev and Tax after Bob Moretti
became speaker. Again, we had the same staff. Dave Doerr
continued on as consultant. I had had earlier Dave Collins

Bagley: and Art Azevedo. I am talking in the first person here.
What I mean is that it is so important for the committee
chairman not to have just the flake, political staff that
sometimes people —

Morris: The people who came in because they had worked on campaigns?

Bagley: Yes, associate with Sacramento staff. But real professionals.
The people I just mentioned are beautiful. Joe came in with
the package already there and he kept the same professional
staff.

Morris: In other words, the staff keeps working from session to session
in developing what makes sense to them from a professional
point of view?

Bagley: Yes. Not always. In this instance, this fellow Dave Doerr
has been there since Nick Petris. Nick Petris was chairman
of Rev and Tax and Jack Veneman and myself and then Joe
Gonsalves and now Waddie Deddeh. Doerr has been there through
five chairmen. Also Willie Brown, six chairmen.

Morris: When you say professional, had he worked professionally in tax
structures?

Bagley: No; he certainly became a professional. He's got a master's

out of San Jose State in some field of government administration,
et cetera. You've got to start somewhere, so, obviously,
six chairmen ago, he was a relatively young guy. But it is
good to have this continuity of staff. I think there is a lot
of turnover now, but during this period that I mentioned there
wasn' t.

I don't mean to demean Joe's efforts but, as I say, the
package was put together in '69 and '70 and we lost by one
vote and came back and there was [Ralph] Dill's school finance
bill that was — I guess it was '72, I can't really remember —
that came out of the senate. Moretti, myself, Gonsalves, and
Doerr and the rest of us put the same package with a few
modifications that we had already negotiated with the Governor
into the school- finance bill and, therefore, you had (quote,
unquote) "tax reform," which didn't last too long. [laughs]

Morris: It almost seems that tax reform is a continual process.

Bagley: Yes. What you do in these big bills is you have some rump or
ad hoc group of (quote, unquote) "legislative leaders." You
don't go through the committee process as such. Well, you
have to go through committee, but, remember, Moretti, McCarthy,
and others, myself, sitting down with Reagan, Meese, Orr, and
others and some senators, Walt Stiern, Al Rodda, Deukmejian
and/or Lagomarsino would put it together and then submit it
to the committee. By that time, with the speaker in control of
the committee — that would have been Joe Gonsalves's committee —
the bill just passes out. Everybody is happier than a clam.
As long as they don't feel that they've been pre-empted, as
long as their sensibilities are soothed.

You always had a couple of guys [who said] , "Are we
going to swallow this whole. We haven't had enough hearings.
Who put this together?" So there is always the jealousy aspect.
But if you are going to get a package — the same thing is true,
without equivocation, of the welfare package. Any major
legislative package has to come through the side door having
been packaged in another room. A consensus is needed.

Morris: So that in coming through the process then, there are various
moderate revisions or various minor revisions depending on the
particular — ?

Bagley: Yes, sure, and you also put your constituency together. You

have your California retailers and you've got your school people
and you've got your city and county people and you've got
everybody together.

Reagan came out with a tax package in '67; Gordon Paul
Smith thought it up. I can't remember what was in it, but I
know out of the whole gamut of interest groups — the cities,
counties, schools, retailers, manufacturers, all of your
business groups of one sort or another — if there were thirty or
forty such groups, and there are, there was only one small
group who came out for the package. That's Reagan circa '67.
No homework. No involvement of anybody either in the legislature
or in the outside real world; coming up with a dumb package that
everybody is opposed to except the Merchants and Manufacturers
Association which nobody had ever heard of. Distinguish,
that is not the California Manufacturers Association.

In major legislations, you have to work with groups.
It's not obviating the system. There is still the committee
system. It's not private, secret meetings because you're not
meeting as a committee. You're meeting as this ad hoc group
that has collectively a whole bunch of antennae and are feeling
their way through and you put the package together.

Morris: You could almost call it a task force.

Bagley: Yes, except in an entirely different sense, an entirely different
sense — not a bunch of amateurs but instead elected members,
staff, and administration.

Reapportionment; Judicial Appointments; Law Enforcement

Morris: There was one point in one of the tax bills that Reagan said that
passage of it was being held up because the legislature wanted
his support of their reapportionment package. Is that the
kind of trade-off that happens?

Bagley: I don't remember.

Morris: That would probably have been —

Bagley: In '71 or '73. I don't remember reapportionment being involved
with the tax or welfare bills. Yes, that of course was the kind
of thing that has happened, does happen, can happen, and will
happen. I don't remember reapportionment being a big factor.
Maybe I'm just missing a whole chapter in my memory. Of course,
reapportionment is the shroud over all of government. It is the
worst form of politics — cut off another guy's head to save your
seat. But I don't remember — I just have no recollection. I'm
not saying no.

Morris: But it wasn't something that you got involved in particularly?

Bagley: No, if I was in the middle of the tax thing, I would have been
involved, although I personally didn't play the reapportionment
game. I probably just emotionally didn't even want to get
involved in the damn thing. Maybe that's why I don't remember.

Morris: That is the one that finally went to the courts.

Bagley: John Harmer was playing that game, Reinecke, and others

advocating the Governor veto the thing, which did make both
parties angry because there had been an accommodation which was
reached. By that I mean some of the Republicans were happy with
their seats and when the Governor vetoed the bill, that made
them unhappy. By that time, you see, we were getting along
well enough that it wasn't this inherent antagonism any more,
as was extant in '67 and '68.

Bagley: [Refers to interview outline] If you want to talk about
Judiciary [Committee], there is not a lot to say there.

Morris: What is interesting about it, I guess, from the point of view of
the governor's office, is that one of their campaign concerns
was judicial appointments. There was a governor's bill that
was introduced regularly —

Bagley: Okay, that's a good story. That was in the early stages. They
were going to reform the judicial appointments system. I was
chairman of Judish. Paul Haerle, who is now one of my closest
friends, was the Governor's point man on that subject. He was
also the appointments secretary. That doesn't mean, "come
in and see the governor," it means appointing people. Paul
really was one of the ideologues in those days, and he would
admit it. Since none of us were getting along anyway, the thing
to do with any bill that the Governor had in my committee was
kill the damn thing and show these guys that they ought to
pay some attention to us so that we can govern the state. That,
recall, was the atmosphere in 1967. We killed it and it made a
few people mad.

Harvey Johnson was a Democrat. He wanted to vote for it,
so we had it worked out so we allowed Harvey to vote for it. He
had some constituents that he cared about, and maybe that's why
I had to vote no out loud because Harvey had to vote aye. We
knew we were going to kill the damn thing. It was just a
matter of accommodating the players, and I think we had to
accommodate Harvey by allowing him to vote yes, which he
wanted to do for his own political reasons having nothing to do
with the merits of the bill. So I ended up voting no which
made Haerle furious at me. Otherwise, Johnson the Democrat
would have cast the deciding "no" vote.

Morris: What was the Judiciary Committee's feeling on the whole idea
of merit selection of judges? I gather that was an idea that
had been around for some time.

Bagley: It's an idea that has been around for a long time. I have to
confess to being a little cavalier. We didn't really care
what the merits were. We were just going through our initial
reaction to these people downstairs and we were killing their
bills. It had nothing to do with Democrat or Republican.
We were just killing their bills to show them we were around.
It was the two-by-four stage of government, getting their
attention. I could conjure all kinds of thoughts on judicial
reform, but they wouldn't add to anybody's body of knowledge.
It's not something that we lived with.

Morris: There was a lot of activity and another task force on law
enforcement.

Bagley: Yes, I was never — there were a lot of issues, ballparks, I
didn't play in — Criminal Justice Committee purposely, and
education. I got into education finance, but I was never
on the Education Committee. That is abominable. The whole
Education Code is a laugh and a mess at the same time. You
can't do anything in a school unless the code says you can.
It ought to be the reverse. The Criminal Justice Committee
is really a sack of snakes in an issues sense. You get
involved in major social conflicts constantly; as you know it
was the killer committee. It used to kill all of the so-called
law enforcement bills. I just never got involved with it.
I knew it existed and I knew what the issues were. I never got
involved with it.

Morris: Who did put their heart and soul into Criminal Justice?

Bagley: Going ahead a little bit, when I took the welfare committee
from Moretti, he wanted me to take Criminal Justice. Bob
Beverly took that, but Bob's a moderate. He wasn't going to go
out and crucify the world without a trial. Oh, I can remember
the cries for law and order. I used to say, happily those
are two words, law and order.

Morris: Yes, it's not all one word.

Bagley: Yes, it's not law-'n-order, it's law and order, and that gives
you a flavor of what we were trying to say back to some of
the governor's people. George Deukmejian, of course, George
was in the assembly until ' 66 and then was a freshman senator
from '67 to '70. George certainly put his heart and soul into
that whole field, but this is later. There was not a heavy
Republican move in the '60s.

Morris: It wasn't yet from a legislative point of view?

Bagley: That's probably true. That ±s^ true.

Morris: What about California Rural Legal Assistance?

Bagley: Oh, that was an interesting little fight.

Morris: How did you end up in that position?

Bagley: Somebody nominated me and put me on the board of CRLA. I

didn't really get active in the organization, although — and
maybe this was effect and cause. Maybe this was the reverse.
Ronald Reagan wanted to get rid of legal assistance as it was
then and was fighting the Nixon administration. [Frank]
Carlucci, who is now Deputy Secretary of Defense, was then
Nixon's OEO — if not OEO, it was very close to that — administrator,
which had under its aegis plans to further fund poverty law
firms, CRLA, and that whole field. Lewis Uhler was Ronald
Reagan's counterpart. He was a member of the John Birch
Society. He was one of the few Birchers that Reagan let in the
administration. He was going to kill the CRLA.

1 remember writing a two-page letter to Carlucci, obviously
opposed to that kind of action and saying of Lewis Uhler it
was like putting an arsonist in charge of the fire department.
I mean you had to say something in order to get their attention.
It was a peripheral thing, a one-day thing on my part. I
wrote a letter to Carlucci. Somebody obviously prompted it.
I mean you just don't sit there and write letters without some
context. The context is that people, your contacts, contact you.

Morris: There was a major flap that went on —

Bagley: I take that back. There are a lot of times when you sit and do
things on your own. Obviously, you're working on all kinds of
endeavors, but it's not a job; it's a public service. Unfortunately,
today it's become a job and that's a whole other subject. It
has gone down hill, the mores, the whole day-to-day attitude and
atmosphere have gone down hill, in large part because you have
got a full-time legislature where this becomes an actual job,
a way of earning a living.

Back to Judiciary. You asked. The Judiciary Committee was
a good lawyer's committee. It kept you up on the law. But
Judiciary, unlike the Criminal Justice Committee, was the civil
part of the law. I mean we did other things. We reformed
divorce. The so-called dissolution — the nonadversary-divorce
proceeding started with the Assembly Judiciary in 1967. There
were a lot of good things that were done on a sort of day-to-day
law reform or week-to-week law reform basis, changing a lot of
the codes that had to do with just general administration of
civil justice. But it wasn't a place where the body politic
got its goose pimples.

School Desegregation Guidelines

Morris: There was a school district guideline for desegregation that you —
Bagley: Aha, aha! And Ronald Reagan signed it!
Morris: That was in 1971.

Bagley: Yes, now that had nothing to do with Judiciary. That was
another one on my own volition, another one of my ideas of
solving some problems. There had been administrative guidelines
in the Department of Education, and the Reagan-appointed state
Board of Education repealed the administrative guidelines. I
took those guidelines, changed them a little bit and rammed them
out of the legislature so they became law. Those administrative
guidelines had several purposes. One was just to give guidelines
to school districts as to what they should be doing. Number
two, and this is why Ronald Reagan signed it, if you have an
administrative process that you go through, you have to, by
500-year old common law, exhaust your administrative remedies
before you go to court. By going through administrative
guidelines and the administrative process, you would stop
people from suing to force a school district —

Morris: One way or the other.

Bagley: One way or the other, and from Governor Reagan's standpoint and

Meese's standpoint, this was one way to forestall the courts from
taking over. So they signed the bill. Floyd Wakefield called
it the Bagley Bussing Bill and, by god, he got three hundred
and some odd thousand signatures and referended that statute.*
It was overwhelmingly repealed — overwhelmingly.

Morris : Your guidelines were upheld?

Bagley: No, no, no, no. The bill signatures cause a referendum, the

referendum goes on the ballot, and the referendum repeals. An
initiative passes a new statute, a referendum repeals an
existing statute. The referendum was overwhelmingly passed,
two or three to one, because this was portrayed as a bussing
bill. It wasn't supposed to be the exact opposite. It was
supposed to be exactly what I said, an administrative process,
some guidelines as to when you do what and how you do it, and it
was a process, meaning administrative procedure, hearings,
some kinds of — a process where you apply certain standards,
and all of that would have stopped lawsuits at least for a
while. But that was repealed. It was my attempt to solve the —

* Proposition 21 on the November 1972 ballot, later appealed to
the California Supreme Court.

Morris : To tidy things up and get them moving?

Bagley: To solve that social issue and also to try to show the general
public that some of us in the Republican party cared about that
kind of social progress. That's another element during all of
this period of the Young Turks. We were trying to be progressive
Republicans and in the end result, basically lost every battle.
I mean we would win some of these central committee fights, but
the end result is that you don't see a grassroots uprising of
evangelical moderates in today's political society. So over
that period of twenty years, we lost the battle to maintain
a strong moderate force in the organized Republican party.

V 1974 CAMPAIGN FOR STATE CONTROLLER

Time for a Change; Other Republican Candidates

Morris : Was this thinking part of your reason for deciding to run for
state controller in '74?

Bagley: If you want me to be blunt, you run for state controller so
you can run for governor or U.S. senator. That's the reason
you run for controller. The other reason is that you want to
get out of the legislature.

Morris: Were you feeling this?

Bagley: Oh, you have to get out of the legislature. You either move

up or you get out or you become a hamburger. I mean there is no
other alternative. Hell, the bill numbers change but the
issues don't, and when you have voted no or yes ten times in
a row, how do you get goose pimples about voting no or yes the
eleventh time?

Morris: Do you feel it's important to get goose bumps about — ?

Bagley: Yes, because otherwise you become identified; you are in some
body's pocket just by happenstance. Hell, you're on the no
side, so you continue to be on the no side and you're that guy's
patsy on that issue, that guy meaning that interest group.
After you're there for a while, you risk becoming callous in
the sense that — and remember I started with this an hour ago —
you see other people out in the real world making a good living —
fifty, a hundred grand — and buying property and making a few million,
and you're sitting up there with a little law practice on the
side or you're selling insurance or you are farming your ten
acres or your wife is running your grocery store. You begin to
figure it's my turn. I'm either going to get out of here or
I'll start stealing to get even. Now, I never got quite to that
latter point.

Morris :
Bagley:

Morris :

Bagley:

Morris :
Bagley:

[laughs] Good, I'm glad about that!

But the thought is sure there, because nobody "appreciates" you
anyway so, what the hell, let's make a little side deal and
maybe cut a little melon here and there. That's the mental
attitude that someone gets if they are there too long and not
being paid a professional salary. A professional salary today
is, what, fifty or sixty or seventy or eighty or ninety thousand
dollars a year; that's a professional salary. So you have to
get out and, as long as you're going to get out, let's run
for controller and then run for governor. That's an entirely
different ball of wax. It's got nothing to do with voting on
little bills. You've shifted gears. You've changed your whole
approach. You can then continue in another arena.

Had you stayed in close touch with Hugh Flournoy?
legislature and went to the controller's office.

He left the

Oh, sure, that's another story. Hugh Flournoy filed for office
on the last day of the close of filing in 1966 because Jack
Veneman and I got up at seven in the morning and went down to
the county clerk's office in Sacramento and put up five hundred
bucks to take out his papers.

To get him to — ?

No, we filed him for controller in 1966 against Alan Cranston.
He then had to sign the form, accepting the proffered nomination.
There was no one really of any consequence running for controller
in '66 as a Republican. I thought very seriously of running.
We had done a whole number on the inheritance-tax appraisal
system, trying to reform that system, which was really the last
vestige of a political spoils system in California and would
have saved money by putting it under civil service because
about eighty-five percent of these estates that are appraised,
you don't have to have any appraisal. It's your house, your
car, your stocks and cash. So there is no real appraisal
process and there is no reason to pay anybody. So we tried to
reform the system. Cranston, of course, opposed it.

Unruh, in those days, was fighting Cranston within the
Democratic party. So we were a little bit diabolical. We
figured, here's two guys that are fighting each other. We'll
get on one side or the other and make them fight. So we. had Alan
and Jesse Unruh at each others' throats over this bill. Jesse
saw that the inheritance-tax appraisal reform bill passed the
assembly because he wanted to get the political patronage away
from Alan Cranston who was then vying for high position in the
Democratic party. But the bill didn't pass. It was killed in the
senate. So that led to '66 and my thinking of running for
controller.

Morris: On that same issue?

Bagley: On that same issue. KNXT was editorializing once a week and they
had literally forty or fifty editorials in the course of two or
three years. We put the bill in in '63 and then it passed the
assembly in '65. But, remember, Goldwater lost to Johnson
by 1.9 million in '64 and Ronald Reagan was warmed-over
Goldwater and who in their right mind would want to run for
office in '66. You see how wrong we were.

Hugh Flournoy was quitting anyway because he was a college
professor making a grand total of $6,000 a year and another
$6,000 from the state and that's only twelve grand and he
couldn't live [on that]. So he was quitting. We talked him,
over a period of a couple of months, into running. He hadn't
made up his mind yet, so Jack Veneman went down and filed him!
[laughs] And we bought him three airplane tickets and hired
him a PR lady to call a press conference on Friday in L.A. and
by noon he finally signed the okay and got on the plane. We
already had the press conference called.

Morris: Good for you! That's pretty strong —

Bagley: Okay, so Hugh then won. Ronald Reagan, again, won the general
by almost a million. Hugh won by 40,000 votes. Alan Cranston
to this day says, "Bill, if it weren't for you and Jack Veneman
and Hugh, I wouldn't be in the U.S. Senate!" He would still
be controller. Two years later then he ran against Black Max
Rafferty; but he really filed against Kuchel, and filing
against Kuchel was ridiculous. You couldn't beat Tommy Kuchel!
He did it because he had no incumbent office and nothing to lose
and then Rafferty beats Kuchel and Cranston is elected.

Morris: He walked in.

Bagley: Yes.

Morris: There are some fascinating elections in California.

Bagley: Yes, so that led to the 1974 controller campaign that you
asked about.

Crises in Campaign Financing

Bagley: Very quickly, it was the first time we had public financing of
campaigns in California — I say that facetiously — via Medicare
and Medi-Cal because Dr. Lou Cella stole $400,000 from four
hospitals, and I'm not libeling or slandering anyone; he was
convicted and he's in Lompoc today or some jailhouse. He
stole four or five hundred thousand dollars from hospitals and
gave $350,000 of Medi-Cal money — because when you steal it from
welfare- impacted hospitals it comes out of Medi-Cal and Medicare —
he gave $350,000 to Ken Cory, and that's public financing
via Medicare.

So I was not only running against Ken Cory. He is a decent
human being. I was running against Medicare and Medi-Cal
because they were financing the campaign and, I'll brag a little
bit, I had every newspaper in the state except two and ran
out of money. I had about $35,000 to spend on radio and that was
out of my wife's household account and I was overdrawn in the
bank. Cory spent $889,000 full in his campaign— $350,000 came
from Cella from Medi-Cal hospitals, another $350,000 came from
clean money; it came from Dick O'Neill. So that's seven hundred
thousand bucks that he raised from two people. I lost.

Putting myself aside, from that point forward you saw
elections skyrocket in cost. It used to be you'd run a state
wide campaign for a couple hundred grand. You'd get newspaper
editorials and you would put a few ads in a few papers and some
billboards; two or three hundred grand. Legislative races
used to be five, ten, fifteen, twenty thousand dollars; not too
many at five, but a lot of them at fifteen or twenty thousand.
From '74 on, it began to skyrocket. So now, if you want to
run for controller or secretary of state or some damn thing,
you've got to raise half a million or a million dollars and
legislative races cost up to two and three hundred thousand
primarily because of Prop 9 — campaign reform.

Beware of reform! That was a campaign reform which to
some extent took the lobbyists out of the money business,
but when the lobbyists were in the money business, they had a
budget. Everybody knew this lobbyist had ten grand to hand out
and he'd give you two hundred dollars to campaign every other
year. Lobbyists no longer have that budget. Now, through
court action they can give contributions again, but they don't
so much any more because Prop 9J1974J caused the creation of the

Bagley: political action committee. Now every industry has a political
action committee and they are less personal. You knew the
lobbyist and you knew he only had ten grand in his budget, and
you couldn't extract a grand from him, but the political action
committees are a whole new source of money and much more of
it — for both sides.

Morris: What about the Republican party and also Mr. Flournoy, who was
running for governor? Did you run together at all?

Bagley: Oh, we didn't run — Yes, we did, but my campaign was so under
financed that nobody even know I was there.

Morris: Why? You were a statewide candidate.

Bagley: I was an amateur, in spite of all of these "good" things (quote,
unquote) that I tried to do and did do and in spite of a fairly
decent reputation. I was a blithering amateur because I did
not amass myself a bunch of angels. You need ten, twenty
people with ten grand each (and I didn't have them) or you
need five or six that will pledge to go out and raise you fifty
grand each so that you have a base of two or three hundred
thousand dollars. I didn't have them; I didn't develop them.
That's why I said "blithering amateur."

Hugh [was] the luckiest politician in the decade; first, he
wins the controllership, which we've been through, and then
Ed Reinecke gets indicted. Ed was lieutenant governor and
pulls out; if he didn't pull out, he was pulled out by the
public.* He went through the primary, but he lost the primary
and Hugh won it. At that point, Dave Packard and a few other
people came forward and created a real finance committee that
financed Hugh relatively handsomely. I don't know, he spent
a million and a half bucks or so; he didn't have any extra
money for me. And there is no party. When you say party, the
party doesn't have money. The party doesn't give you money.
The party runs around, does leg work, telephone work, and makes
noise and licks envelopes and passes dumb resolutions, but the
party does not give you money. There is no party in that sense

*Reinecke was indicted on April 3, 1974, by the Watergate grand
jury, two months before the primary election.

Bagley: of the word. There is a ticket in the sense that voting

Republicans nominated six people for statewide office, but they
are not necessarily a_ ticket supported by a_ party.

The head of the ticket, if he has got extra dough (and
Ronald Reagan did this; he helped others in his races because he
had extra dough) , the head of the ticket has to be somebody
who can raise dough, and if he likes somebody down the line —
down the line of constitutional officers — he or his people will
spin off some dough. Now, I am speaking in terms of history.
Today there is a little more party participation. There is
more money and there are some political action committees of
the parties themselves, but most of that is for the legislature.
And the caucuses themselves now raise dough; so the minority
leader will raise money just as the speaker, but much less.
But you still don't have a party that goes out and finds
$5 million and hands $2 million to the governor [candidate] and
$1 million to the lieutenant governor and $500,000 to the controller.
It just doesn't happen, and it's good that it doesn't.

Morris: And the legislative caucuses aren't at all concerned with the
constitutional officers?

Bagley: [laughs] They could care less!

Morris: What an interesting kind of situation. That means that you've
got two or three different levels of people all going to the
same constituencies.

Bagley: That's why, rather callously, you need half a dozen angels,

and every successful political person has had that, had a base
where you can go out and get two or three hundred grand to get
under way.

Reagan's Role

Morris: What was Mr. Reagan's role? He wasn't running himself for
governor .

Bagley: He helped. He came to a fund-raiser that I had at the Hyatt

at Union Square [San Francisco]. But, again, I was an amateur.
We didn't pull in a thousand people; we had a hundred and fifty.
He showed up. He probably did more for Hugh in terms of public
appearances, but he wasn't on the telephone raising dough.

Morris: Was he concerned that the kind of base he tried to build be
continued in state government?

Bagley: Sure he was. I never had a conversation with him along those
lines, but of course he was. He ran — after giving you a
few zingers about his welfare-reform package and a few other
things — he ran a very clean administration. There wasn't a
scintilla of scandal in businesses getting goodies or people
getting goodies or somebody getting a road paved to their lake
or getting a special deal here and there, highway contractors
kicking back (which happens in other states around the nation).
You had absolutely none of that. You had a clean administration,
in part, because you did have the business-type people who had
a few dollars. I'm not advocating an aristocracy- type of
government, but you had people who came out of an economic
circumstance where they didn't have to and had never really
been exposed to cheap stealing, and because — give him some
credit — he did pick some very decent people, other than those
ideologues I spoke of earlier — he picked some very decent
people to run a sort of straight ship, and he had a good
adminis tration .

We went through the frenetic sixties with all of the
civil-rights activity, the whole Kennedy operation, and
Johnson's major bills that he passed. It might even be that we
needed a sort of a plateau period where you didn't make major
social progress. Hopefully, we didn't repeal too much but —

Morris: You consolidated — ?

Bagley: Consolidated and sort of kept the people from getting overly
agitated. If that were needed at that point in history, he
certainly provided that kind of an administration, and that
is needed at times. You can't just keep hammering at the public
to do new things all the time. You need a consolidation and
you need a plateauing, a sort of be-calming of the body politic.

Morris: That is an interesting comment because he came in with the
big uproar of student unrest on the campuses and his own
campaign people say that they weren't aware of that as a
campaign issue but they began running into it as they went out
around the state.

Bagley: Yes, and I saw Pat Brown, who is a lovable, lovable human being
and I saw Ronald Reagan who is straight and honorable and then I
[laughs] a little bit from the outside have seen poor Jerry Brown
going down the tubes by doing what Ronald Reagan did in the first
couple of years, what Carter did for four years, campaigning
against and fighting the system. There is a lesson in that
somewhere.

VI THOUGHTS ON OTHER LEGISLATURES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Morris: You also sat on various commissions on state finance and things
like that. What's your view on the idea of California as the
place where government ideas are tried out, and California
administration and legislative process as an example to the rest
of the world?

Bagley: I don't have any great thoughts. It is true, and I haven't
followed it lately, that as a legislative body we were eons
ahead of most of the states. Idaho still has a session every
other year for a month and a half, which means that everything
is arranged in advance, which means that the lobbyists make all
of their deals in December and go to Boise in, maybe not
January, maybe they go in March when it's warmer, and stay
there a month and a half and pass all of the bills. That's not
deliberation. That's just a facade, and many, many legislatures
are still operating under that kind of a process. We were
far ahead, and Jesse Unruh gets credit for it. Jesse would
build up that staff. Every time he'd get three, he'd give
the Republicans one. That was a thousand percent because we
had zero. Then we got two; that's a hundred percent more than
one. So he built up a staff and he built up a professional
staff. Now I haven't tracked that over the last several years.
I assume some of the other legislatures are doing this now, but
even the major states had pretty shallow legislative systems.

As far as ideas though — governance — I don't think that
California has any hold or claim to having some grandiose
scheme of government that is imparted as a harbinger of progress
to other states. We don't do anything different than anybody
else in an overall administration sense. It is true that we
have been cleaner — no ward politics and "fixings."

Oh, you can give Hiram Johnson some credit. Pennsylvania,
it used to be every governorship there would be, let's say,
50,000 state employees and 48, OOQ would go out of office; I mean

Bagley: a total spoils system. Hiram Johnson got rid of a strong party
and I don't like the strong party because the strong party is
run by the fringes and it will always be true. The fringe
people show up. The moderate person stays home because he or
she doesn't get emotionally involved. So by definition, you've
got the emotionally involved in the party structure. So Hiram
Johnson got rid of the party boss system and, of course,
brought in the civil service and worker's comp and all kinds
of reforms, but that's going back eighty or seventy-five years
and I wasn't there then.

Morris: Yes, some of those seem to be sort of state of the art. I
wondered about —

Bagley: I don't know what we've done new lately. Maybe we have and it's
too close and I don't see it. But tax reform, welfare reform,
crime, law and order, all those things are issues that we've
been talking about, and other states have dealt with them. I
don't think we did anything that different.

Oh, other states were fascinated by Reagan's welfare reform
and other people from Oregon and Washington would come visit
me: "What's the secret?" Well, there isn't any secret because
there wasn't that great a change. You can't throw people off
the rolls without somebody else feeding them or they starve.
Sure, you can get rid of fraud, but you've got to have a
bureaucracy that will ferret the fraud out. Changing the law
doesn't get rid of fraud and it never will. Now we did change
some eligibility rules.

Morris: And the bureaucracy that it would take to ferret out fraud
would cost as much or more than the amount of fraud?

Bagley: They will never work at it because the bureaucracy itself isn't
motivated. Maybe for a couple of years they are, but then they
devolve back into their — handle twenty cases a week and that's
it, period: "That's my assignment, that's what I'm going to
do, and I'm not going to do any more."

The whole bureaucracy is another hour interview. You
remember, I like to see the system work, but once you get out
of the legislature — I spent four years in Washington as a
chairman of a regulatory commission, I saw bureaucracy at its
worst. We're on our third generation of incest back in Washington.
That means from the original rise of major governmental bureau
cracy, which was the New Deal, forward. You've got people whose

Bagley:

Morris :
Bagley:

Morris:
Bagley:

fathers were GS-9 and all they want to be in life is a GS-12,
and if their father was a GS-12, all they want to be in life
is a GS-15, and they're all within the boundaries of the
Beltway, and they never really get out beyond the Beltway because
their antennae droop if they get out there in the real world —
I'm exaggerating to make my point. That is incestuous; there
is no way around it. The only way around it is to decentralize
and to let the decisions be made here in San Francisco by the
regional office where the man or woman goes home to his house
in San Mateo or Corte Madera and lives in the real world and
interacts with people, an engineer is one neighbor and a
service station owner is on the other corner and they are friends
with the grocery man.

In Washington, that is not true,
and there is no interaction.

They are all bureaucrats

Is that true on a smaller scale in Sacramento?

Much less so, because there there is still a real world; much
less so. But, you see, you will never be able to decentralize
because there is another rule or law that power gravitates.

You have to be close to the center — ?

Power gravitates, so the minute you give the regional administrator
out here all this power, that will last for six months and then
the national administrator in Washington will take it back
because power is what you are there for.

I'm not a states' rights person in the old sense of the
word, but there is one present initiative that if_ the national
administration can pull it off and give power back to either
the regional administrator, which is not states' rights, or
the states themselves, you would have a much better government.

But the problem there is we used to do just that. The
whole reason for the social turmoil in New York and Harlem is
that Mississippi used to pay two hundred or three hundred dollars
a year for a mother and a couple of kids and New York was paying
twelve hundred. Now, obviously, all of the mothers and the kids
went to New York. So whose fault is it? It's the old southern
states that didn't take care of their people, so the feds had to
step in and have a uniform national standard for welfare. That's
an aside, but I'll throw it at you!

Morris: Thank you very much.

Bagley: You now know everything I think I know, and a little bit more
because some of this stuff I don't know!

Morris: I can think of a dozen other questions, but I won't wear you out
any more.

Bagley: No, let's quit while we're ahead. I took too much of your time,
but I figured we might as well do this all at once.'

Morris: I appreciate it and I appreciate your going on into some of your
personal experiences related to this .

Bagley: Is there such a thing as preserving a tape, for kids, of this?

Morris: Yes. You will receive a personal copy of the completed
transcript.

Transcriber: Michelle Stafford
Final Typist: John E. McPherson

TAPE GUIDE — William Bagley

Date of Interview: December 21, 1981

tape 1, side A 1

tape 1, side B 13

tape 2, side A 26

tape 2, side B 37

tape 3, side A [side B not recorded] 50

INDEX — William Bagley

abortion, legislation, 1967, 35-37

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) , 36

Alameda County, District Attorney, 18

Allenby, Clifford, 29

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) , 22

Anderson, Glenn, 15

Anderson, Martin, 36

appointments, governor's, 17, 33-34, 41, 44

judicial, 8, 33-34, 41
Azevedo, Arthur, 38

Bagley, Mrs. William, 49

Bagshaw, Fred, 15

Battaglia, Phillip, 19, 22

Beilenson, Anthony, 35

Bell, Roy, 29

Beverly, Robert, 42

blacks. See Negroes, race relations

Bradley, Donald, 14

Brown, Edmund G., Jr. (Jerry), 24, 52

Brown, Edmund G., Sr. (Pat), 3, 14, 23

Brown, Ralph, 7, 8

budget

capital outlay, 28

deficits, 23-24

expenditures, 34

surplus, 24, 27
bureaucracy, 54-55
business, and government, 29, 39, 50, 52

California assembly, 8-11

Criminal Justice Committee, 42, 43

Education Committee, 42

Judiciary Committee, 41-43

Revenue and Taxation Committee, 37

Social Welfare Committee, 32-34
California legislature, 3, 7, 13, 26, 39, 43, 46-47

ethics, 34, 53

and governor's office, 16-20, 25, 27, 37

party caucuses, 4, 16, 51

rules, 8

special sessions, 25-26, 27

staff, 6, 24, 34, 37-38, 53

California Republican Assembly, 3
California Rural Legal Assistance, 42
California State

Board of Education, 44

Education, Department of, 44

Finance, Department of, 29, 34

Franchise Tax Board, 25
Carlson, Robert, 35
Carlucci, Frank, 43
Carrell, Tom, 33
Cella, Louis, 49
Champion, Hale, 23
Christopher, George, 14, 15
civil rights, 13, 52

administrative remedies, 44-45
Collins, David, 37
Cologne, Gordon, 6
Conrad, Charles, 11
Cory, Ken, 49

courts, 5th District Court of Appeal, 8
Cranston, Alan, 47, 48
crossfiling, 3, 10

Democratic party (Democrats), California, 15

left wing, 4

in the legislature, 25, 32, 33, 35, 37
Deukmejian, George, 42
Doerr, David, 24, 38

education

school finance, 38

school unions, 30
Education Code, 42
election campaigns, ballot measures, 49-50

Proposition 9 (1968), Watson Amendment, 27

Proposition 21 (1972), 44

Proposition 13 (1978), Jarvis-Gann initiative, 24, 27, 31
elections campaigns, California

1958 gubernatorial, 3

1962 gubernatorial, 4

1966 controller, 47-48

1966 gubernatorial, 13-15, 22

1966 legislative, 10

1974 controller, 49

election campaigns, finance and methods, 7, 49-51
election campaigns, national

1964 presidential, 12-13

1968 presidential, 22

1980 presidential, 36
ethics, legislative, 34, 53

fair housing, legislation, 14, 21-22

Fat, Frank, 17

Fat, Wing, 17

federal programs, 34, 43, 49, 54-55

family planning, 35-36

Medicare, 49
Finch, Robert, 15, 20
Fluornoy, Houston, 3, 12, 47-48, 50, 51

Gardiner, Sam, 2
Gonsalves, Joseph, 37, 39
governor, office of, 23, 29

appointments, 8, 17, 33-34, 41, 44

and the legislature, 16-20, 25, 27, 37

task forces, 20-21

transition, 16-17
governor's mansion, 28-29

Haerle, Paul, 41
Harmer, John, 40
Hayakawa , S . I . , 4
Hay den, Tom, 4

interest groups, 29-30, 39, 46

Jarvis, Howard, 30-31

John Birch Society, 3, 43

Johnson, Harvey, 41

judges, appointment of, 8, 33-34, 41

kitchen cabinet, Reagan's, 14, 18, 23, 28
Knight, Goodwin, 3
Knox, John, 6

Kuchel, Thomas, 48

labor unions , 30

law enforcement, 42

League of Women Voters, 10

Lindsey, John, 23

lobbying, 18, 19, 30, 49-50, 53

local government (cities and counties), 30, 32

McCarthy, Leo, 25
McCollister, Dick, 2
McDowell, John, 17
Mailliard, William, 13
Marin County, politics, 1-2
Marks, Milton, 33
media, newspapers

Los Angeles Times , 15

and politics, 15, 25, 28, 49

Sacramento Bee, 25

San Jose Mercury, 11
Medi-Cal, 36, 49

corruption in, 49
Medicare, 49
Meese, Ed, 18-19, 44
Miller, George, Jr., 24
Monagan, Robert, 3, 11, 20, 25
Moretti, Robert, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33
Mulford, Donald, 13
Murphy, Robert, 22

Negroes, 13, 14

Nixon, Richard M., 4, 18, 22

O'Neill, Richard, 49

open housing. See fair housing

Orr, Vernon, 19-20, 24, 28

Packard, David, 50

patronage, 47

Pearson, Drew, 7, 14, 15

political action committees, 50-51

polls, election, 14

Field poll, 15
Post, Alan, 36
property tax, relief, 26-27, 32. See also taxation

Quinn, Sandy, 6

race relations, 44-45
civil rights, 13
fair housing, 14, 21-22, 24

Reagan, Ronald, 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35,

36-37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 51, 52

and the presidency, 22, 26

as president, 37
reapportionment , 1970s, 40
Reinecke, Edward, 20, 40, 50
Republican Associates, 6
Republican party (Republicans), California, 10. 12-13, 15, 50-51

1964 convention, 13

in the legislature, 32, 37, 40

right wing, 2-4, 12, 13-14

and social progress, 45
revenues, state, 24, 25, 29

surplus, 27-28
Roberti, David, 30
Roberts, William, 14, 16
Rockefeller, Nelson, 12
Rockefeller, Mrs. Nelson (Happy), 12
Rousselot, John, 2-3
Rumford Act. See election campaigns, ballot measures, and fair housing

Samish, Arthur, 7
Schmitz, John, 21
school desegregation

administrative remedies, 44

Proposition 21 (1972), 44
Shell, Joseph, 4, 6
Smith, Gordon Paul, 16, 17, 18, 39
Song, Alfred H., 33-34
Spencer, Stuart, 14, 16
spoils system, 47, 54
Steffes, George, 19, 23
Sturgeon, Vernon, 23

taxation

collection, 23-25

income, 24

inheritance, appraisal, 47

legislation, 20, 24

property, 26

Proposition 9 (1968), Watson Amendment, 27

Proposition 13 (1978), Jarvis-Gann initiative, 24, 27, 31

reform, 38

sales , 29

and interest groups, 29-30
withholding, 24-26, 27, 28, 29

Todd, A. Ruric (Ric) , 17
Tunney, John, 4
Tuttle, Holmes, 18

Uhler, Lewis, 43

United Republicans of California (UROC), 3
United Teachers of Los Angeles (UTLA) , 30
Unruh, Jesse, 7, 8-9, 10, 11, 21, 24, 47, 53

Veneman, John, 3, 12, 20, 24, 47, 48

Wakefield, Floyd, 44
Watson, Philip, 27
Weinberger, Caspar, 7, 18
welfare reform, 54-55
1971, 32-37

Young Republicans, 2, 3

Z'berg, Edwin, 28
Zeigler, Ronald, 6

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

James R. Mills

A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE
AND ELECTION REALITIES, 1959-1981

An Interview Conducted by

Gabrielle Morris

1980-1981

JAMES R. MILLS
ca. 1975

TABLE OF CONTENTS — James R. Mills

INTERVIEW HISTORY

I POLITICAL CAREER BEGINNINGS 1

Growing Up in San Diego 1

Candidate for Assembly, I960 3

San Diego's Republicanism 5

Campaign Strategy and Issues; Opposition Tactics 7

State Democratic Support; Fund Raising 12

II FIRST YEARS IN THE LEGISLATURE 16

Getting to Know Jesse Unruh and the Governor's Office 16

Confrontations with Pat Brown 18
Differences of Opinion: Funding Government Organization Studies 21

Changes in the Legislature 22

III ASSEMBLY ORGANIZATION 24

Speaker Ralph Brown: Leadership and Party Loyalty 24

Jesse Unruh 's Election as Speaker 27

Role of the Democratic Caucus 29

IV LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES 33

Staffing; Constituent Contact 33

New Legislators' Support Group 36

Committee Assignments; Social Insurance Funding 38

Disputes with the Governor's Office 41

Reapportionment; Election Trends; Constitutional Revision 44

V SAN DIEGO DEVELOPMENT: STATE AND LOCAL CONCERNS 48

Un-American Activities Files; 1962 State Senate Campaign 48

Establishing a Port District 52

Planning and Transportation Needs; Federal Requirements 54

VI POLITICS IN ACTION 58

Medi-Cal: Congress and the Legislature 58
Republican Election Victories; Initiative to Repeal Fair

Housing 60

Rules Committee Chairmanship, 1965 63

Tax Reform Efforts 65

Election to State Senate; Effect of Reapportionment 67

1966 Gubernatorial Campaign; Constitutional Revision 70

VII SENATE ORGANIZATION, ETHICS, AND SOME PROGRAMS 74

Additional Thoughts on the 1966 Election 74

Move to the Senate 77
Leadership Changes, 1969 and 1981
Mills' Selection as Pro Tern, 1970

Governor Reagan and the Legislature 89

On the Republican Election Hit List, 1970 94

Concern for Public Transportation, Environmental Problems 98

Planning Process Problems 101

Reagan's Staff and Work Style 103
Jesse Unruh's 1970 Gubernatorial Campaign and the Democratic

Party 1°4

TAPE GUIDE 1°9

110
INDEX

INTERVIEW HISTORY

The impact and effectiveness of any period in state government
may well be determined hy the relationship between the governor's
office and the legislative leadership. In these interviews, James
R. Mills, a Democratic young turk in the California assembly and
later president pro tempore of the state senate, gives a succinct
account of the legislature's efforts to strengthen its role in shaping
state policy in the 1960s and 1970s and of the legislative leader
ship's interaction with governors Pat Brown and Ronald Reagan.

Mills is a tall, dignified sort who, in his spare time, is a
writer of fiction and political lore. Careful and precise in speech,
he frequently employs a bit of irony to make a point. He has often
ridden a bicycle around Sacramento and one imagines he thoroughly
enjoyed the dramatic impact of pedalling along highways up and down
the state in 1974 in support of a mass transit ballot measure,
Proposition 5. A historian by training, Mills generously found time
to advise the Regional Oral History Office on its work and co-sponsored
legislation to enable the project to proceed. When interviewed
himself, in four spare hours in his busy Senate schedule during 1980
and 1981, he replied briefly and thoughtfully, occasionally checking
a reference book to be sure of a name or other detail.

Mills came to the assembly from San Diego in 1959 "to slay the
dragon" of Speaker Jesse Unruh's reputed undue political influence,
but found that he agreed with Unruh's interest in increasing legislative
staff so that they would not be "dependent on the governor's office
and the third house for information on which to base action." Mills
was also supportive of Unruh's development of legislative caucuses
as a basis for party consideration of legislation and policy.
"Governor s>" he comments, "tend to see themselves as the party and,
like legislators, see the party as an ephemeral entity."

Of the celebrated combativeness between Governor Brown and Unruh,
Mills is of the view that most of it was being displayed by people on
the governor's staff: "chief lieutenants kept the pot boiling and
they'd get him to say things that he shouldn't say," although his
experience is that Brown himself could be mean upon occasion.
On the other hand, Mills found that Governor Reagan seemed to feel
that the legislature was an "unfortunate mistake of the founding
fathers and that Democratic legislators existed only for the purpose
of opposing his ideas." Reagan "never seemed to have any idea that
we might be as interested in the well-being of the public as he."

The bipartisan nature of these comments illustrate well the inherent
tension between the executive and legislative branches of government
and the characteristic staunch defense of legislative parity by its
leadership.

In addition to Unruh, Mills touches on the roles and influence
of such key legislative leaders as Hugh Burns, George Miller, and
Howard Way. What he notes is that, "it just doesn't fall together.
It's not untLl you're part of the leadership that you really come to
understand all the negotiations that go into producing a bill,
accommodations that have to be made." Like others who came to hold
leadership positions, Mills entered the assembly with a number of
other energetic, able freshmen who formed a mutual aid society to assist
each other in learning the ways of the legislature. Many of them
moved on to the senate in 1968 when reapportionment led to a record
number of vacancies , and they were ready to move when Hugh Burns
reluctantly gave up the pro tern spot and, after several short-term
pro terns, to elect Mills in 1970.

As he discusses a selection of issues that were critical during
those years, it seems evident that his interest and skill have centered
on legislative operations and maintaining a strong stance with the
governor's office in decisions related to state spending. Given
the number of bills dealt with and their variety, few legislators
recall the details of any specific legislation or state program. Mills
does, however, provide interesting insights into civil rights,
environmental, and transportation legislation in which he felt
personal and philosophical interest.

The most lively chapter of this memoir is the final interview
segment in which Mills gives a candid account of the early 1981
realignment in which fellow Democrat David Roberti became senate
pro tern in a way Mills felt was "pure scam" in counting and reporting
votes. Professional politicians, he asserts, are truthful and,
in return, "expect to be told the truth around here." Although this
episode falls beyond the focal years of this project, it underscores
the multiple and changing nature of reality, particularly in the
political sphere, as seen by participants speaking from a broad
range of vantage points.

A transcript of the interviews was sent to the senator for review
and returned promptly with only minor corrections and revisions.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor

12 March 1982

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

I POLITICAL CAREER BEGINNINGS
[Interview 1: January 23, 1980]##

Growing Up in San Diego

Morris: If we could start with a bit of personal background. Are you
a native Californian?

Mills: Yes, I am. I was born in San Diego at Scripps Hospital on
June 6, 1927.

Morris: Had your family been in California for some time?

Mills: My parents came here from Michigan. Originally my father was
from Nottingham, England, but he had traveled some before he
got here. I can remember him saying — he's still alive — that
New South Wales and southern California were the best places
in the world to live.

Morris: Was your education also in California?

Mills: I graduated from San Diego State and then got an MA there.

Morris: Was that in history?

Mills: The MA was. The BA was in social studies, my interests
were wide.

Morris: Did you get your interest in history from your parents?

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Mills:

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I don't believe so, no. My parents had not been to college.
Neither one of them had the equivalent of a high school
education. My father had to drop out of school then when
his father was injured. He had to drop out to help support
the household. My mother also had to drop out of school to
go to work.

Did she continue to work when your family settled in California
and while you were growing up?

She didn't do very much in the way of work. Most of what she
did was secretarial work for my father. My father was a
painting contractor and he needed secretarial work done and
she did that. She did a certain amount of typing and that
kind of thing.

Were your parents interested at all in local government and
civic affairs and local politics?

My parents were interested in local government and civic
affairs only to the extent that good citizens are. They
never had any involvement aside from trying to vote intelli
gently and be informed on the issues .

I've met a number of Englishmen who settled in the United
States, who liked living in the United States, but didn't
want to give up their British citizenship. Was your father
of that opinion?

No. My father became a naturalized citizen very soon after
he decided to become a resident of the United States and
thougb_t that that was the only proper course of action.

That's a good way to look at it.
Yes.

How did your interest shift from history as an abstract
theory into the practice of politics?

It all took place on a gradual basis. When I was at San
Diego State, I was drawn into Democratic party affairs. I
had friends who were activists and they nudged me into
precinct work and licking stamps and stuffing envelopes and
all that kind of thing.

Morris: For local candidates or national and statewide?

Mills: Generally for state candidates; that is, candidates for state
office — members of the assembly, the senate, and candidates
for statewide office. I slowly got into it a little more deeply.
Each year it would be a little more involvement.

Political parties in California tend to run on volunteers
and anyone who is willing to do anything at all is asked to
do that and to do more. I was asked to do more from one
election to the next and, by 1958, I was the chairman of one
or two committees for the California Democratic Council in
San Diego County, or, I should say, the county Democratic
Council.

Candidate for Assembly, 1960

Mills: I was one of a candidate selection committee in 1959. We
were looking for a candidate to run in the 79th District,
which was a Democratic district, 59 percent Democratic, and
had been held by the Republicans for many years, with the
exception of one two-year period when we had a Democratic
member of the assembly from 1954 to 1956. The candidate
selection committee puzzled and strained and tried to think
of who to run, and finally one of the members said, "Jim
ought to run." That was how I became a candidate for the
state assembly.

Morris: Do you recall who it was who said you ought to run?

Mills: His name was Sumner Slichter. [spells name]

Morris: Now, that's a name of some intellectual distinction, isn't it?

Mills: It's a name of some intellectual distinction; the name

Slichter is. But I don't think that he was related to any of
the famous Slichters, and if he was, he didn't admit it.

Morris: I see. Was he a faculty member too at that point?

Mills: I don't think so. He was a very bright young man who was

involved in Democratic party affairs. I don't recall what he
did for a living. That's twenty years ago, and more.

Morris: Right. How would it be that a district with a 59 percent

Democratic registration kept returning a Republican assemblyman?

Mills: The Republicans had put up better candidates during those years.

Morris: Could you give me kind of a thumbnail sketch of what the
San Diego political scene was like at that point?

Mills: San Diego was dominated by the Republican party. There was
one other member of the assembly who was a Democrat, out of
four, so 50 percent were Democrats. He was Sheridan Hegland.
[spells name] Heg was a very nice fellow, but he was as
conservative as the two Republicans on most issues, and I
think that's the only way he could survive. He simply could
not have represented that district if he hadn't been conserva
tive. I represented the only district in San Diego County
that was predominantly Democratic.

Morris: Yes. Now, which part of the San Diego area would that be?

Mills: I represented the downtown area and East San Diego, North

Park, southeast San Diego. It was a district entirely within
the city of San Diego. It was mostly the older parts of the
city of San Diego and included almost all of the black people
who lived in San Diego in those days.

Morris: Were there many at that point?

Mills: I think that the 79th District was perhaps 15 percent black.

Morris: How about Mexican Americans?

Mills: There was a substantial Mexican American population, but it
wasn't concentrated in the 79th District. There were a
good many Mexican Americans elsewhere in the county. So the
total minority population of the district was probably 25
percent. That wasn't the voting strength of those groups;
the voting strength was much smaller.

Morris: Right. Was there much in the way of Mexican American participa
tion in the political life of San Diego?

Mills: There wasn't a great deal of political activity on the part of

Mexican Americans then. The organizations which have since that
tine become a factor in California politics were at their
beginnings in those days.

Morris: When you say "the downtown area," was that primarily business
interests? Was the Navy important, or aerospace, at all in
your district?

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

The navy was important. Aerospace was important. San Diego
has been a Navy town all through this century and at the time
I was elected the Navy was a very important factor ±n the
economy of the area. Aerospace was too. A lot of the people
who lived in my district were connected with one or the other.

It sounds as if this was a new kind of an interest in

politics. You said that Mr. Slichter was a bright young man

and you were on the college faculty. Was this a kind of a
new effort to organize Democrats?

Well, I wasn't on the college faculty,
of the Serra Museum.

I was the curator

Morris: You were?

Mills: Yes. The Junipero Serra Museum. It was the historical museum
of the San Diego area, supported mostly by the City of San
Diego, with a smaller amount of support from the county. I
was there for five years and during those five years I was
steadily becoming more politically involved.

Morris: Was that a help or a hindrance to your curatorial duties?

Mills: It was a problem because the Historical Society had a Republican
cast to it.

San Diego's Republicanism

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

The majority of the members of the board of directors were
Republican and they weren't very happy with what I was doing.
When I became a candidate for office, I resigned as soon as
I announced, and they expressed their appreciation for saving
them the embarrassment of having a Democratic candidate for
office on the payroll

[chuckles] Would they have fired you, do you suppose, or
asked you to resign?

Oh, I'm confident they would have, yes. If I had been a
candidate for office as a Republican, I think they would have
been willing to accept that, but they certainly weren't
friendly to the idea of having a Democratic candidate working
for them.

Mills: San Diego was a very Republican town and still is, to a degree.
The press is staunchly Republican and has caused the thinking
of the community to be rather different from the other metropo
litan areas in California. Everyone knows, I think, that
San Diego was the most Republican metropolitan area in the
United States and no doubt still is, in the way that it votes
in presidential elections, and in gubernatorial elections. San
Diego is always the most Republican part of California and
it goes into all facets of the community's thinking.

An example that I can give is that when I was in my
second term in the state assembly, I was the chairman of the
Finance and Insurance Committee in the assembly, which is one
of the most important committees, a major committee. I was
the Democratic Caucus chairman, which is, in terms of leadership,
second only to the Speaker, or perhaps third, depending on
who's the floor leader. But normally the caucus chairman is
a position of greater influence than the floor leader. I held
both of those positions and was looked upon in Sacramento as
one of the movers and shakers, after two years here.

On the other hand, Pete Wilson, who is now the mayor of
San Diego, in his second term here was the vice-chairman of
some committee, and the vice-chairmanship is a purely honorary
thing, and he was chosen as the outstanding young man in
San Diego. Well, Pete Wilson was a Republican. If I had
been a Republican, undoubtedly I would have been the outstanding
young man in San Diego after two years in the assembly. But
I was a Democrat and therefore it wasn't even considered.
And Pete, who after two years in the state legislature really
was nobody, was chosen.

Ever since that time, the situation has been the same.
The San Diego press has done all that it could to make people
think that Pete Wilson is a man of tremendous weight and
importance and a great political leader and so forth. Certainly,
never has the press in San Diego done anything to try to
enhance my stature with the people of my district or the people
of the county.

Morris: Going back to your first run for office in 1960, was the press
a problem, did you feel, to get coverage of your campaign?

Mills: The press was a great problem for me in 1960. The Union and
Tribune normally only referred to me in headlines as
"Blessings Opponent." The young man running against me was
a fellow twenty- three years old. His name was Edward Blessing.
They never ran a story about me, as far as I can recall, that

Mills: didn't run with a story about him. Invariably, the story

about him would be above the story about me, and larger, and
the headline would say, "Blessing Says Such-and-Such, " and
then underneath it would say, "Blessing's Opponent Says
Something Else." That's how they handled me.

Morris: [laughter] That was building up Mr. Blessing's name recognition,
you might say.

Mills: Oh, of course, of course. The Union and the Tribune, in my

election, simply made themselves instruments of my opponent's
campaign, just as today the San Diego Union (not the Tribune
so much) makes itself an accessory to Pete Wilson's political
ambitions. The Tribune doesn't do it as a paper, although there
are people within the paper who do it. They have a gossip
columnist named Neil Morgan, and it's uncommon for Neil Morgan
not to have reference to Pete Wilson in any of his columns .
Just day by day there's a reference to Pete Wilson. It
surprises me if I don't find one. It's common for him to be
mentioned twice in Neil Morgan's column, and it is not uncommon
for him to be mentioned three times. Sometimes, you know,
it's merely a matter of him passing somebody on the street
and saying hello and looking well. It's really sort of
a degrading subservience.

Morris: So what did you do to combat that and put together a winning
campaign? What kind of techniques did you use?

Mills: I did a lot of walking. I walked from door to door and

rang an enormous number of doorbells, saw an enormous number
of people.

Morris: How many people were in your district at that point?

Mills: I don't know how many people were in my district at the time.
I suppose [pauses to think] it would have been about two
hundred thousand.

Campaign Strategy and Issues; Opposition Tactics

Morris: Did you plan and direct your campaign primarily yourself, or
did you hire somebody to do that?

Mills: No, I didn't hire anybody. We didn't have money to hire people
to run campaigns in those days. I had a committee and we

Mills:

Morris :
Mills:

Morris:
Mills:

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Mills:

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Mills:

discussed all of the actions that were to take place and we
raised some money. I spent between $2,000 and $3,000 in the
primary against an active opponent, and I spent between
$4,000 and $5,000 in the general election against an active
opponent.

[chuckles] That's marvelous. What did you spend it mostly on?

I spent it mostly on billboards and there was one mailer in the
general election. In those days, you could buy a mailer for- —

Postage was three cents or less if you were bulk-mailing.

Yes. You could buy a mailer with — I forget — $2,000 or $3,000,
something like that. $1,400 went for billboards.

Do you remember what you put on the billboards?
disappeared from the scene.

They sort of

The billboards had my name on them, as big as we could put
it on. "Mills" is a name that's about the shape of a billboard
and we told the artist that we wanted simply name identification,
We wanted as many people to see the billboard as possible.
It was a red, white, and blue billboard with the very vivid
blues and reds that were just becoming available at that
time, the sort of electric colors that are very arresting.
So it said, "Elect — "(in small white letters at the top)
"James R. — "(in relatively small letters) and then "MILLS — "
(as big as we could make it) "Assemblyman" (underneath, in
white letters). You could read the signs from a mile away,
literally; I mean, we checked.

You tested it.

We tested it. You could read the signs from a mile away.

How many billboards did that provide?

Fourteen billboards.

We did a lot of cheap things. I got out a lot of news
releases. I put out at least one news release a week, making
a policy statement, where I stood on some issue, what I
thought should be done about some problem. And the press
used it whenever they had something from my opponent that they
could put it underneath, [dryly]

Morris: [chuckles] Who helped you develop the topics for these policy
statements?

Mills: The committee that I worked with.

Morris: Do you remember what you were making pronouncements on, some
of the issues?

Mills: [pauses to think] I made pronouncements on the issues of the
time. I was, for example, in favor of the Fair Employment
Practices Commission. I was in favor of fair housing practices.
I was in favor of the California Water Plan. Although the bond
issue had been approved —

Morris: Wasn't it on the ballot?

Mills: Yes. The bond issue had been approved by the legislature,
was on the ballot that year. I supported that.

Morris: Yes. So you were running on a vote for that.
Mills: Yes, that's right. I supported that.

Morris: Was the Metropolitan Water District in Los Angeles an influence
in your area?

Mills: No, no. The Metropolitan Water District doesn't serve San Diego
directly. San Diego is separate and apart. It purchases
water from the Metropolitan Water District, but we're not

members .

Morris: How were you on capital punishment? That had been a hot issue.

Mills: I was opposed to capital punishment and I still am. Actually,
it was in the course of the campaign that I came to the con
clusion that I was opposed to it.

Morris: Well, now, that's interesting.

Mills: It was an issue that I had thought about and I had tended to

favor it, but I wasn't really prepared to take a position at the
beginning, when the campaign started. I talked to people on
both sides of the issue, and got hold of materials that were
available about it, and studied it very closely, and came down
against it finally. It was an issue in the primary campaign.
My opponent was for it and he recognized that the people
were for it, so he made it an issue. My opponent in the
general election campaign, Ed Blessing, also made it an issue.

Mills: But more important than that was the accusation that I was
either a communist or friendly to the communists. That
was standard Republican campaign procedure in those days.
Democrats were leftists at the very best and probably
communist sympathizers. My opponent, Ed Blessing, put out a
mailer in the course of the campaign, toward the close of the
campaign, which was a red, white, and blue mailer, and he
compared his positions with mine. All of his positions were
stated in blue and all of my positions were stated in red
and some of them weren't my positions.

I had been endorsed by the Democratic Council, which was
in favor of recognition of Red China and in favor of the
abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Actually, I was against both at the time, but he said that I
was for them because I had been endorsed by the California
Democratic Council, and he felt that it would be difficult for
me to repudiate positions taken by the Democratic Council.
I did repudiate them.

It took me a while to see the light on both of them. I
forget just when I did change. It was probably '63 or so
that I decided that we really should abolish the House
Un-American Activities Committee. I began to pay more
attention to that too. And I came to a conclusion that we
should recognize Red China — I think, somewhere at the same time.

But it was kind of a standard junky Republican campaign
and Republican campaigns in those days were junky.

Morris: That's an interesting description. Why do you say that?

Mills: Because most of them were based on the accusation that the
Democratic candidate was a leftist, probably a subversive.
Most of them were campaigns against narcotics; and every
Republican was running against narcotics and saying that the
Democrats were soft on the problem of narcotics, that they
were sympathetic to the use of narcotics. They were two-
pronged campaigns. They were running those campaigns because
they were falling into a minority position and trying to fight
their way out of it by discrediting Democrats who would
otherwise win.

I and most Democrats campaigned, in those days, for
something and we would say what we stood for. The Republicans,
for the most part, were saying that that wasn't true, that
we really wanted to hold office because we were leftists and
wanted to lead the nation into some kind of a —

Morris :
Mills:

Morris:
Mills:
Morris:
Mills:

Morris:
Mills:

Socialist state?

Socialist state, that's right,
was commonly done.

It was pretty trashy, what

At one point, my opponent's campaign chairman, whose name
was Rodgers — his first name, nobody ever used; he was called
Buck Rodgers, M.D. Rodgers — was spreading the word that I had
left the San Diego city school systems because I had refused
to take a loyalty oath..

And that was a very touchy issue all through the '50s . Had you—?
Had I refused to take the loyalty oath? No.
What had you done about the loyalty oath?

I had taken it. I had thought it was [chuckles] kind of a
foolish thing, the loyalty oath. In fact, I had to take it
all the time. You had to take it every time you got a check,

it seemed.

But I had not left the San Diego city school systems
for that reason. I had left the San Diego city school
systems because I wanted to do some other things. When I
became the curator of the historical society, I had to sign
the same loyalty oath.

But that was the kind of campaign they ran. That was
standard Republican campaigning. So I had to answer again and
again that question: "Mr. Mills, is it true that you left
the San Diego city school systems because you refused to take
the loyalty oath?" or "Isn't it true—?"

A "Have you stopped beating your wife?" kind of question.

Yes. And it wasn't true. But that was the kind of campaign
issue that the Democrats faced then.

One reason, by the way, for the decline of the Republican
party since that time is that those issues finally wore out
with the public. The public just simply got tired of hearing
that all the Democrats were —

Morris : Pinkos .

Mills: If not communists, that they were socialists; and if not red,
at least pink. They got tired of hearing that the Democrats
were sympathetic to the use of narcotics. In fact, it simply
was so unbelievable that, when the public heard it enough
times, they decided that it deserved no credit whatsoever.
That was the time at which the Republican party really began
to lose out, because on the issues the Republican party was
losing long before, so the Republican party retreated from
the legitimate issues in those years, in the '50s.

Now it's become a minority party — a small minority party,
in effect — because it has had to campaign on what it stands for
in the last few elections.

State Democratic Committee Support; Fund Raising

Morris: Did you get any advice or support, financial or organizational,
from the state Democratic organization when you were running
for the assembly?

Mills: I got some support from the state committee, but that was
from Bill Munnell and Jesse Unruh, actually.

Morris: Was it financial support?

Mills: Yes, financial support, a few hundred dollars.

Morris: Did you have any conversations with them about strategy in
the campaign or kind of coordinating with issues that other
candidates were addressing?

Mills: They both came to town. Jesse and Bill came to town to talk
with me about the campaign. They wanted me to win it and we
discussed campaign strategy, what was taking place, what we
were doing, how we were approaching the campaign.

Morris: While turning the tape, I lost reference to Leroy Seckler.
Can you fill in his role?

Mills: He was my primary opponent.

Morris: Was Mr. Unruh coming as a representative of the state party
or from the assembly caucus?

Mills:

Morris
Mills:

Morris :

Mills:
Morris :

Mills:
Morris :
Mills:

Morris :

I don't recall. They came together. They flew tn in a light
plane. They were making a tour to see all of the Democratic
candidates, at least all of those who had a reasonable shot
at winning. They didn't, for example, do much for the other
candidates in San Diego County. We had a man running for the
assembly in the 78th District. His name was Lee Pool. I
don't think they did anything to help Lee. Lee was a very
good candidate, but it was a district the Democrats couldn't
win. We had a good candidate in the 80th District running
against Jack Schrade, and they gave him some help.

Was Schrade an established incumbent at that point?

He had been a member of the assembly for six years and the same
person had almost beaten him two years before. In 1958, when
the Democrats did so well, Jim Bear came within a couple
hundred votes of beating Jack Schrade. So in 1960 it was felt
that he would beat him because he had one campaign behind him,
and he was by that time known. He'd been an unknown when he
started the campaign in '58. So we all expected that Jim Bear
would win that campaign, but he didn't. The reason that he
came so close in '58 was that that was a terrific year for
Democrats. 1960 was not as good. Nixon carried California
against Jack Kennedy and there were no coattails to ride,
whereas Pat Brown, in winning against Bill Knowland in 1958,
won by such a tremendous margin that Democrats all over the
state were carried into office by the sweep. Jim Bear
almost made it.

But he wasn't strong enough to repeat that on his own and
take the district from Schrade.

No. The next time out, he lost by a wider margin.

You said that the California Democratic Council endorsed you.
Do you recall what other endorsements you had from your local
area?

I was endorsed by COPE [AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education]
How powerful was that in local elections?

They were helpful. They scared up a few dollars for me, not
very much. In those days, a big campaign contribution from
a labor union was $100.

Well, if you needed $4,000 altogether, $100 goes a lot further
in that kind of situation.

Mills:
Morris :
Mills:
Morris :
Mills:

Morris ;
Mills:

Morris :
Mills:

Morris ;
Mills:

Yes.

Who else? What other kinds of —

Endorsements ?

Organizations and sources and so forth.

The chief sources of support were Democratic contributors. I
got contributions from all of the people who contributed to
Democratic campaigns normally, once I became the nominee. It
was harder to get money in the primary.

Who was doing your fundraising for you?

I did as much of it myself as anybody. We had a little finance
committee that included the treasurer, whose name was David
Ferrall; William Moeser; Jocelyn Cue.

Is that a male or a female Jocelyn?
It was a female Jocelyn.

They were the finance committee and they helped me raise
some money. Most of the money came from my asking for it.

Personally?

Personally. The worst part of campaigning,
something that is very hard to do.

That's really

[chuckles] That's what we hear from everybody. Are there
any circumstances under which it is less painful, or any
people who take to campaign fundraising with enthusiasm?

The people that it is easiest to raise money from psycho
logically are those who are easiest to raise money from;
that is to say, someone who normally makes a contribution
cheerfully and doesn't have to be talked into it, someone who
normally supports the candidate and likes the candidate.
It's easier to call a friend who has made many a contribution
in the past and is always willing to do so. It's easy to
call such a person, but to call someone that you don't know
very well to ask for money is a very difficult thing. That
was necessary in that campaign. Once you become an incumbent,
it's much easier, you know; you can have somebody else
make the phone calls .

Morris: Yes. Did you feel you were going to win?

Mills: Well, I thought the Issue was in question. I didn't know how
people would be responding to the charges that were made.
I was worried about all of the accusations that the Republicans
made about me. It was ironic, because each time I faced a
Republican candidate who raised questions about my loyalty, it
was someone who had by hook or by crook managed to evade the
draft.

Morris: These were all people that you knew, having lived in that town
all your life?

Mills: Well, no. I came to know them.

The worst campaigns for me, in terms of accusations that
I was not a loyal American, were 1960 (Ed Blessing) and 1970
(Henry Boney) . Ed Blessing, at that time, was doing all that
he could to stay out of the army, and eventually succeeded.
Henry Boney was a man who had done all that he could to stay
out of the army in the Second World War, and succeeded; bought
a little farm someplace [dryly] because farmers were exempt,
and carried on his business as usual, and made a lot of money
during the war, and had a few acres that he spent an hour
or two a week on in order to be able to qualify for the
exemption that was granted to farmers.

It would seem to me to be ironic that the people who
waved the flag and raised questions about my loyalty were
people who had found means of avoiding serving that flag,
whereas I was a member of the American Legion and the VFW
and had served in the United States Army during the Korean
War — quite willingly, by the way. It didn't bother me a bit.

Morris: Did the Legion and the VFW give you any support as individual
members?

Mills: Individual members did, yes, because I had friends in both
the Legion and the VFW that I'd known for many, many years,
and when they heard that kind of thing they thought it was a
lot of bosh. But people in other posts heard it. One of
the things that was done in the Republican campaign in 1960
to me was that the Republicans got around to all the various
Legion posts and spread that story that I had been let go
by the city schools because I wouldn't sign the loyalty oath.
So as far as the Legion in general was concerned, I expect
probably I had a lot of problems with Legion members.

II FIRST YEARS IN THE LEGISLATURE

Getting to Know Jesse Unruh and the Governor's Office

Morris: When you came up here to the legislature as a freshman, did
you have some special things that you hoped to accomplish?

Mills: I was very much interested in the economic problems of the

district and still am, trying to create a more healthy economy
in San Diego, a broader-based economy. San Diego had a narrow
base in those days. It was largely Navy, aerospace, and
tourism. It has a broader industrial base nowadays.

Morris: Did you have any thoughts about the legislature in general, the
assembly in general, how it should function or — ?

Mills: When I came up here, I thought it should be freed from the
pernicious influence of Jess Unruh. I was a good member of
the CDC. I had been endorsed by the CDC, which was a major
reason for my nomination, and the CDC line was that Jess
Unruh was a very evil man who collected money from lobbyists and
used it for political purposes and that he was corrupting the
process.

Morris: He was not yet Speaker, was he?

Mills: No. He was the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee at

that time and was looked upon by CDC people as an old-fashioned
corrupt political boss.

Morris: Had you felt any sense of that when he came down to visit your
campaign?

Mills: The contact was very short. He was very jovial, and I expected
him to be. He was nice. He was pleasant. He was bound
to be.

Mills: I came to Sacramento figuring that one of the things I

needed to do was help slay the dragon, and I found out In
the course of the first year that Jess Unruh was the one
person in the state capitol who believed most strongly in the
policies that I believed in and was doing most to try to get
them embodied in state law. So it took me a little while to
change my orientation, but I did. By the end of the year,
I had a totally different view of the whole thing.

I had been given to believe that Jess Unruh also was
cutting away at Pat Brown and that he was destructive of
our leader in the state of California. After I'd been in
the legislature for a comparatively short period, I decided
that most of the combativeness was being displayed by people
who were on the governor's staff, that that was a battle
that was carried on, a war that was carried on, more by
the administration than it was by Jess. I remember time
after time, when I became close to Jess, when we'd try to
make peace with the Governor and think that we'd made peace,
and the following week he'd kick the bejesus out of us. You
know, he'd kick the hell out of us and it was impossible to
make peace with him. If it had been left to Jess, all of
those battles wouldn't have continued because he knew he
was being damaged by it and that the public conception —

Morris: Jess knew he was being damaged by it?

Mills: Oh, yes. And damaged within the party by it. And he knew that
the public conception was that he was attacking the Governor.
Well, very often he was, but that was because we really had
no choice.

People like Hale Champion and Wins low Christian in
the governor's office were never willing to have peace with
Jesse Unruh. They had their own reasons for not wanting
peace, and they made sure it didn't happen. One reason
was that it seemed pretty clear that Hale Champion had high
political ambitions and that he himself wanted to be governor.
He was very concerned that if Jess Unruh could settle his
problems with Pat Brown and that whole conflict could be
ended, that Jess Unruh certainly would be the Democratic
nominee for governor when Pat Brown stepped down, as Pat
promised to do in 1966. That is, he promised he would
step down in 1966; he promised Jess that. The idea of peace
between the assembly leadership and the administration was
an intolerable idea to Pat Brown's chief lieutenants. I

Mills: don't think it was intolerable to Pat; but they just kept
the pot boiling, and they'd talk him into it. They'd get
him to say things that he shouldn't say.

Morris: Champion would get Pat Brown to say things that he didn't
need to say?

Mills: Yes. And Winslow Christian. My recollection is that those
were the chief war hawks. Jess probably would add another
name or two if you ask him. You probably have asked him.

Morris: We would like to ask him.

Confrontations with Pat Brown

Mills: Everybody had the feeling that Pat Brown was an amiable,

bumbling politician. That wasn't correct. First, he wasn't
bumbling at all. He was a very smart politician. Second,
while he was amiable most of the time, he was capable of
being meaner than hell.

Morris: On what kinds of things?

Mills: In these battles between the assembly leadership and Pat

Brown, Pat Brown was just as tough as he could be and hard
and combative. He's a very tough guy.

Morris: In what kinds of instances? You mean, in negotiations on
a bill or on party decisions?

Mills: No, just in the conflict that took place. His attacks were
often very fierce; his attacks on me, for example. I did
something I shouldn't have done. The Brown administration
decided to spend money with the aerospace industry and asked
the aerospace industry to look into various problems — waste
disposal and one thing and another.* It was a boondoggle,
pure and simple. They gave various firms substantial amounts
of money to answer the problems that the state had — unemployment
and all that kind of thing.

Morris: Systems analysis.
Mills: Yes.

* In 1965

Morris: Yes, I've come across some of those studies and I wondered—
Mills: It was just to give th.e aerospace industry some money at the
time. The aerospace industry was having trouble and they
just wanted to give them some money, so they gave them some
money. They took the money from various programs — crippled
children's program, for example. I asked the legislative
counsel for an opinion as to the legality of it and they
told me it wasn't legal and so did the analyst's office;
verbally they told me that. So I raised a question about It
publicly, that this was an improper use of funds. They had
been after me so much because I was close to Jess and they
had been making life so hot for me that I called up the
district attorney and said, "This has been taking place and
you ought to look into it." [chuckles]

But that was a big mistake. I shouldn't have done that.
But I was really, really peeved about a number of things that
they had done to me. Pat Brown's response was to demand my
removal as the chairman of the Rules Committee and to do
everything he could to achieve that and he was quite merciless
about the whole thing.

Earlier, at the beginning of 1963, the Democratic county
committee hadn't been doing very well in San Diego County
and some of the leaders of the county committee asked me to
become chairman. I said I didn't want to.

They said, "If we get a majority of the members of
the county committee to ask you to accept the chairmanship,
will you accept it? We think there's a general agreement that
we simply have to have new leadership in the county committee
and we think you're the right person to do it."

I said, "If you can get a majority of the members to
sign their names on a list saying that they want me to be
county committee chairman, I'll take it, although I really
don't want to." They got a majority of the members of the
county committee to sign their names on the list, and I
said that I would accept it.

The people connected with Pat Brown found out about it
and decided that they didn't want me to be chairman of the
county committee in San Diego because I was close to Jess.
So Pat Brown personally called up members of the county
committee and asked them to renege upon their pledge to
support me; and when the governor calls up members of the

Mills: county committee, the county committee is going to do what
they're asked. I didn't know that was taking place, and
I was defeated for the county committee chairmanship.

Morris: Oh, dear! In an open election?

Mills:

Morris :

Mills:

Yes, in an open election. It was a great embarrassment to me,
and it was an indication of the way the Brown administration
worked. Everybody thought how amiable and sweet Pat Brown
was. Pat Brown never told me he was doing that; nobody
told me he was doing it. They wanted to rub my face in
a defeat. They wanted not only to have their way, but they
wanted to have their way and make sure that everybody knew they
had their way, and they wanted to do it in such a way that I,
because I was associated with Jess Unruh, would be put in
the worst possible position. So, in a secretive program
of undermining me in my own county, they did that.

Pat Brown talked to me later about it. He said, "Well,
Jim, you know, I had to do it because it isn't right for
an elected official to hold high office in the party."

And I said, "Is that why you supported Stanley Mosk
for state committee chairman?" because Stanley Mosk at that
time was state committee chairman and Pat Brown had made
him state committee chairman. I said, "Pat, the one thing
about this whole process that I think is unforgivable is
that you didn't call me. If you didn't want me to be
county committee chairman, you should have called me and told
me; because I wouldn't have tried to do it. All I knew was
that a majority of the members of the county committee wanted
me for county committee chairman, and then I got defeated
for it, which did me a tremendous amount of political damage,
because of you. You didn't have to call those other people
up. All you had to do was call me up, and you know that all
you had to do was call me up." And he had no answer whatsoever
to that.

But was Pat Brown amiable? Pat Brown was amiable and a
nice man and still is, most of the time. But he was capable of
being as savage in political in- fighting as anybody I've
ever met.

If he had asked you, would you have decided you couldn't
chair the county committee?

Sure. I wouldn't have tried to be county committee chairman
if he had told me he was opposed to it because I knew that if
he was opposed to it, he could stop it. What is the average

Mills: county committee member going to do when the governor of

California calls up and asks for a vote one way or the other?
He's going to be flattered by the call; he's going to do just
what the governor asks.

So they set me up for that one because they wanted to
make me look bad and then they protested innocence of
everything that took place. If ever any of us did anything
that they thought was destructive to them, why, it was just
another one of our mischievous and unwarranted attacks upon
our amiable —

Morris: Bumbling governor.
Mills: Bumbling governor, yes.

Differences of Opinion: Funding Government Organization Studies

Morris: Going back to the business about the aerospace studies, why
was it felt that the money was being taken away from the
crippled children's programs in order to do these studies?

Mills: It was. The money had been appropriated by the legislature
for other purposes. They had no legislative authority to
spend it for the other purposes. Now, by the way, I mentioned
earlier that verbally the legislative counsel said it was
illegal. When they issued a written opinion, they said it
was legal. The legislative counsel, in those days and still
today , is inclined to issue opinions that will cause the
least problem for themselves. So at that time they issued
an opinion that said that that was legal. A year or so
ago, they issued an opinion that said it wasn't.

That is to say, in 1978 or 1979, I cited their earlier
opinion to me because we very much wanted to use some money
to accomplish a purpose that I thought was a worthy purpose
and it looked as though we'd have trouble getting a two-
thirds vote for it in the legislature, although we could
get a majority for it. I pointed out that legislative
counsel had said that that kind of a transfer was quite
all right, it was an appropriate exercise of executive
authority, and I based it upon the opinion that they gave in
1965 supporting what Pat Brown had done. They gave me an
opinion saying that they were mistaken in '65.

Morris: [laughter] Oh, dear!

Well, one of the big issues at that point seemed to
be that there were needs to reorganize government and to
increase the efficiency of the money spent.

Mills: Yes.

Morris: From that point of view, were some of these analyses that
were made by Lockheed and other people on the information
systems and the correctional system and the criminal justice
system — was there a need for that kind of long-range study
of various governmental operations?

Mills: I'm not aware of any benefit that flowed from any of those
studies.

Morris: [chuckles] Well, the comment's been made that maybe they were
ahead of their time in trying to consider an entire system,
through the operation of the executive department into the
cost to the state taxpayers.

Mills: I guess they were ahead of their time, because I don't recall
any state policies being affected by the reports that we got.

Changes in the Legislature

Morris: The other thing I'd like to go back to, and I don't know if
we have time this morning, is the policies that you and
Mr. Unruh agreed upon, that you felt should guide the legislature
and the state government.

Mills: Well, we agreed upon the things that became the policies of
the state: the fair housing act, for example, the Rumford
Act. Generally liberal programs. We agreed upon trying to
come up with more intelligent approaches to dealing with the
narcotics problem, but we didn't have much success. All we
finally passed were bills that increased the penalties, which
had apparently no particular benefit. They were programs
that were basically sponsored by Republicans, and we couldn't
think of anything better to do, so that's what we did.

Morris: So you, in that case, would develop a bi-partisan kind of a —
Mills: No. They were basically Republican programs.

Morris: Did you share attitudes about how the legislature should
function?

Mills: Very much so. The changes that took place in the legislature
were remarkable and made the California legislature a very
fine law-making body, which it hadn't been prior to that time.
The staff that we put on to give the legislature a capacity
to do its own research and evaluation of measures made all
the difference. Prior to the time that Jess was Speaker,
both houses of the legislature were dependent upon the
administration and the third house for all the information
upon which we based our action.

However, those changes did serve to further conflict
with the Governor. ## His office resisted the idea of
legislation to enable us to hire staff to do our own
analysis of bills and that kind of thing. All those things
that took place which made the California legislature the
outstanding state legislature in the United States, Pat Brown
was opposed to; the administration was opposed to. Not only
did the California legislature become the outstanding state
legislature in the United States, but I think it became the
outstanding legislature in the United States. That is, I
think it became substantially better than Congress in
addressing problems and in solving problems, and still is.
One of the problems that we have in the United States today is
that Congress doesn't seem to be able to formulate policy
where policy is needed, to deal with the major questions that
face the country.

Morris: I was startled to see in a press statement yesterday, I guess,
that the Congress had only scheduled eighty working days for
1980. [laughter]

Mills: Yes.

Morris: Maybe we should stop there for today.

Mills: Okay.

Morris: Thank you. You've opened up some very interesting areas.

[Remainder of tape records press conference held by Senator
Mills immediately after interview session to announce a joint
resolution proposing to simplify state personal income tax
reporting and collecting by incorporating federal law into
state law.]

III ASSEMBLY ORGANIZATION
[Interview 2: February 6, 1980 ]##

Speaker Ralph Brown: Leadership and Party Loyalty

Mills: Did you get me into the assembly?

Morris: Just. You came up here "to slay the dragon." That was the
way you put it.

Mills : Yes .

Morris : I wanted to pursue that line and ask you what your recollection
is of what Ralph Brown was like as Speaker.

Mills: Ralph Brown was a Speaker who tried to play the part of the
honest broker; that is, in the sense that he was there to
be a catalyst, to create a favorable environment for the
assembly to accomplish what the assembly wanted to accomplish.
Ralph Brown never attempted to provide very much leadership
as far as policies were concerned, as far as issues were
concerned. He didn't feel that it was his responsibility
to try to get legislation passed. He felt that it was his
responsibility to try to make the assembly work right, to
make sure that the assembly performed its responsibilities
well, and he left it to the partisan leadership to deal with
policy.

So Jess Unruh more than anyone else was carrying the
load of getting legislation passed and he had the assistance
of Jerry Waldie in those days, and Bob Crown, and to a
degree Bill Munnell, but Bill Munnell played an independent
role.

Morris:

Mills :

Morris:

Mills :

Morris:
Mills :
Morris:

Mills:

Was Bill Munnell closer to the state Democratic committee than
to the legislative organization?

Oh, I don't think he was closer,
closer. He was independent.

I wouldn ' t say that he was

In what way? Independent in his ideas as to what kind of
legislation there should be?

He simply pursued an independent line. The official party —
I don't know what the official party was in those days.
The state committee didn't amount to anything. The state
committee's positions were not important to anyone. They
were adopted in a pro forma fashion, just as the platforms
of the parties are adopted today on the national level by
the conventions. After it's done, it's forgotten and the
candidates go their way.

CDC was vital and active and had begun to take positions
and attempted to influence the legislature, influence the
Democrats in the legislature into adopting the positions
that CDC took. CDC was endorsing in those days. Well,
it's still endorsing, but in those days the CDC endorsements
were very important.

There was a good deal of conflict between Jess Unruh
and CDC developing. Bill Munnell didn't take sides in that.
He simply went his way, doing whatever he thought was best
for the state. He was an independent agent.

Wasn't he state chairman at one point for the Democratic — ?

Yes, he was state chairman.

But that didn't really reflect the party's influence?
was more Munnell as an individual?

Morris:

Yes. The state committee didn't amount to anything. The
state committee made no difference. The state committee
was there because the law said it was there and because they
could meet once every two years and get together and Democrats
could tell each other stories and have dinner together and
talk about old times .

I'm curious as to why the state law says that the party
will be there.

Mills: Well, it was all done in the time of Hiram Johnson, I think.
The state parties had been very powerful before Johnson
became governor, and the corruption of the time was felt to
be related to the two parties; that is, the two parties were
felt to have been corrupted by the influence of the Southern
Pacific Railway and others. One of the reform movements was
to diminish the power of the parties because the parties had
been corrupted, so the law set forth the party structure. So
there was to be a county committee in each county, and a state
committee, and the powers of both were circumscribed; they
were both hamstrung.

When you talk about an official party, there really
wasn't any official party to speak of; the official party was
the officeholders. If you looked for where the party was,
that's where it was. Pat Brown looked upon himself as the
head of the Democratic party, and anyone who didn't go along
with what Pat Brown wanted was not a loyal Democrat; that was
his attitude.

Morris: Was that peculiar to Brown?

Mills: No, I don't think so. I think that was the attitude of

every governor .
selves as —

The governors had come to look upon th em-

Morris: As the party.

Mills: As the party, in effect, the leaders of the party. And all
Democrats should be loyal to the party's leadership.

Morris: At what point was the idea developed that Ralph Brown should
be appointed judge?

Mills: I don't know. I wasn't party to it.

Morris: Was there any thought that the Assembly should have a stronger
Speaker?

Mills: Not that I'm aware.

Morris: So this was just that Pat Brown had need of another judge
and was appointing Ralph Brown as a likely candidate for
the bench?

Mills: The way I understood it at the time was that Ralph Brown

wanted very much to be a judge; he prevailed upon Pat Brown
to appoint him. Lou Cannon and others have seen the hand of

Mills: Jess Unruh in it, that Pat Brown appointed Ralph Brown to

a judgeship because Jess Unruh had twisted Pat's arm because
Jess wanted to be Speaker.* I think that is so fanciful
that it isn't worth denying.

Jesse Unruh 's Election as Speaker

Morris: [chuckles] Was Unruh in position to be a likely candidate
for Speaker when Ralph Brown went to the bench?

Mills: Well, at the time, it was very much in doubt. That's one
of the reasons that Lou Cannon's theory doesn't make much
sense. Jess Unruh was a long shot, I think, for the
Speakership, until the Breakfast Club went for him. Carlos
Bee had more votes than Jesse right from the beginning.

Morris: Which breakfast club?

Mills: The Breakfast Club made Jess Unruh the Speaker. The Breakfast
Club was a group of Democrats who met on Tuesday mornings
for breakfast. They included Jack Casey, Joe Kennick,
John Williamson —

Morris: John Williamson, who was just retired as senate administrative
officer?

Mills: That's right, [continues listing Breakfast Club members]
. Tom Carrell, Jim Mills, Gus Garrigus, Eddie Z'berg, Myron
Frew, and George Wilson. They were all members of the assembly.
We met every week and we agreed that we weren't going to go,
we weren't going to be picked off one-by-one by either side,
that we were going to decide which way we should go, and we'd
do out best to sort it out, and then go for the one that we
thought would make the best Speaker. We thought that those
nine votes would be decisive, which they —

Morris: Yes. You agreed to stick together as a bloc.

Mills: Yes. Those nine votes were decisive and that was what made
Jess Unruh Speaker. We called Jess to Tom Carrell fs house
to tell him we'd made a decision. We all met at Tom Carrell 's

*See Ronnie and Jesse, A Political Odyssey, Lou Cannon,
Doubleday and Company, 1969

Mills: house in Los Angeles — actually, I guess, it's in San Fernando-
and asked Jess to come over that weekend. He came over and
we told him we'd decided we were going to support him for the
speakership. That took him, I think, from twenty-eight votes
to thirty-seven and that's what made him Speaker.

He was then only four votes short and when you're only
four votes short it's no great trick to pick up the rest.
At that point, everybody wanted to get aboard. When he had
thirty-seven votes, then there were all kinds of members of
the assembly who wanted to be aboard on time; they wanted to
be one of the vital forty-one. The forty-first vote, I
think, was Alan Pattee, but it went very fast after he got
the thirty-seven. He understood and we understood that
night that we were making him Speaker, and all the commentary
about how Ralph Brown was moved aside for Jess Unruh is
foolishness .

The other people who can tell you about that meeting,
who were at that meeting, who are still alive, include John
Williamson. [pauses to think] Let me see. You might want
to ask John. Jack Casey is dead. Eddie Z'berg is dead.
Tom Carrell is dead. But there are people around who were
there, who can tell you the story.

Morris: Were they much older than you, or does the assembly wear
people out that fast?

Mills: Some were older; some were younger. I guess they were all

older except Eddie Z'berg. I don't know if Eddie was older.

Morris: Why did you not decide on one of the nine of you as your
candidate for Speaker?

Mills: Jess had twenty-eight votes at that time. I forget how many
Carlos had. Carlos had more than that; Carlos had thirty
or so. I don't think any of us thought that it could be
put together for any one of us.

Morris:

Gus Garrigus could tell you about it, if you'd like
to get him on tape. It's necessary to understand that a
lot of what's been said about Jess becoming Speaker is
false.

Why did you decide to put your nine votes with Jesse rather
than with Carlos?

Mills: Carlos was a very nice fellow and everybody loved him. He
was one of the pleasantest and decentest people you could
hope to meet, but Carlos didn't have the same kind of
commitment ot issues that Jess had. Jess had been chairman
of the Ways and Means Committee, and as chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee he had worked very hard for bills that
we believed in, and we simply thought that the assembly
would produce better policy with Jess Unruh as Speaker,
trying to get Democratic programs through, than we would
with Carlos.

Morris: It sounds like you thought Unruh had a stronger sense of

direction and leadership, where he thought things ought to
be going.

Mills: Yes, Unruh had a stronger sense of direction and leadership
than Carlos, relative to the major issues of the day.

Morris: Were you already, in the assembly, thinking of developing

the Senate's capability in research and staffing and things
of that sort?

Mills: The Senate didn't have any capability.
Morris: I'm sorry. I meant the assembly.

Mills: In the assembly, no, we hadn't thought about it at that time.
We hadn't gone that far. Jess had been thinking about it
and after he became Speaker he immediately began to see to
the development of that capacity.

Role of the Democratic Caucus

Morris: Was the Democratic Caucus formed before or after Unruh became
Speaker?

Mills: Before. It was formed at a time that relationships between
Jess and Bill Munnell were deteriorating. Bill Munnell was
the majority floor leader. Jess wanted somebody he could
work with as a party leader and Bill was going his own
way, so Jerry Waldie was made caucus chairman.

Morris: Why Jerry?

Mills: A very able and bright young man.

Morris: Was the fact that he was from northern California a factor at
all?

Mills: I don't think so, because I was the next caucus chairman.

Morris: When it was formed, was it — ? [tape off briefly while Mr.
Mills' assistant enters to ask him some questions] I was
asking about the starting of the Democratic Caucus. Was
it intended from the beginning to have a role in elections as
well as in the day-to-day business in the legislature?

Mills: I wasn't conscious that the caucus was intended to have a role
in the elections at the beginning. At the very beginning, it
seemed as though it was simply an office that was created to
put Jerry Waldie in, but before long it began to develop
additional capacity. By the time I became caucus chairman,
we were discussing what staff we could add to give some
assistance to members, as the caucus staff has been giving
assistance to members since. We agreed that whatever we had,
the Republicans would have. The Republican Caucus chairman —
I'm not sure who it was at that time, whether Don Mulford was
caucus chairman or floor leader. But whatever we did for
ourselves, we did for the Republicans, and the Republicans
went along. The caucus staff grew a step at a time, a person
at a time, through those years, but it started without
staff. At the very beginning, the caucus had no staff.

Morris: I came across a reference to some objections from the

Republican party. This was when Caspar Weinberger was chairman
of the state Republican committee.

Mills : Yes .

Morris: Do you recall either Weinberger or the Republicans having any
objections to this idea, the legislative caucus?

Mills: I don't remember the Republican legislative leadership having
any objections.

Morris: Was the caucus something that was also established by means
of legislation?

Mills: No, it wasn't established by means of legislation.

Morris: Then how did you staff it? What did you use for money to
staff it?

Mills: We used contingency funds and hired people for the two

caucuses simply by creating positions and saying they were
caucus positions. That's the best I can remember.

Morris: This is over and above committee staff and research office
staff?

Mills: Yes.

Morris: Was the Governor involved at all in the caucus, or was this
purely for legislative — ?

Mills: No, the Governor wasn't involved.

Morris: Because earlier, apparently, governors did have an informal

lower-case caucus function. They would invite the legislature
of their party into their office for discussions. Was this
anything that Brown did?

Mills: Sometimes. Yes, he did that. But after we established the
caucus, usually, if he wanted to talk to the Democratic
members, he would come up. If there was some bill he wanted
to talk about, he'd get in touch with Jerry Waldie or with
me or whoever the Caucus chairman was and ask if he could have
a meeting with the caucus. We'd have it on our ground, not
on his. It would be held in the assembly lounge, probably.

Morris: Is that when the idea of bills introduced for the governor
changed? This was something, apparently, that Brown had
put in.

Mills: What was that?

Morris: I guess, in '59, there was a system developed by which people
would introduce bills for the governor.

Mills: Well, they were departmental bills.
Morris: Yes.

Mills: It would say on the bill that it was a departmental bill.

When did we do away with that? I don't remember just when it
was. We did away with it because we thought it was unhealthy
to identify bills as administration bills, as departmental
bills. We thought all bills should be considered on their
merits. Up to that time, it was a great advantage to have the
bill identified as a departmental bill. That went right on
the front of the bill; I mean, it was right on the face of
the bill.

Morris: Was this an issue with Pat Brown, this change?

Mills: I don't remember much dispute about it. I don't suppose

he liked it much, but I don't remember any public debate over
it.

Morris: Did the caucus have some interest in elections as early as
1962?

Mills: Practically none.

Morris: Let's see. Would you have been chairman by then?

Mills: I think I became chairman in 1963.

Morris: '63. Okay. So it would not have had an effect on either
Pat Brown's re-election in '62 or your re-election.

Mills: No. No, at that time, a caucus chairman presided over the

caucuses. I did that. And one or two staff people were there
to be of assistance to the members if they needed something
done in the way of information, and political information
that related to legislation, that kind of thing. But the
caucus staff was not involved in political activities in the
way that it's been involved since.

Morris: When did that begin?

Mills: I think it really developed after I left the assembly. The

caucus staff was steadily growing, and as it grew it involved
itself more and more in everything. Jess may remember better.

IV LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES

Staffing; Constituent Contact

Morris: So the caucus staffing was growing sort of parallel with the
staffing for individual legislators and committees?

Mills: That's right. The increase in staffing of legislators was
taking place at the same time. We had, at the time I was
elected, in 1960, a secretary in the capitol. That was all
that any member had.

You asked about what kind of a Speaker Ralph Brown was.
Ralph Brown was a Speaker who was opposed to spending any
money. He kept the budget down and that was a very high
priority for him.

Shortly after Jess became Speaker, we were given an
allowance for district offices. I opened my district office
and had a secretary and an administrative assistant in it.
That was the beginning.

Since that time, there have been further increases. But
before that, when you went home, you went home; there wasn't
anything there. You went home and went to your house,
you know, and that was it. There was no secretary, no staff,
no nothing. If anybody wanted to call you, they could call
you at the house.

Morris: That must have been kind of a curious sensation.
Mills: Well, it was all we knew.

Morris: At that point, it was still a part-time legislature, wasn't
it?

Mills: It was supposed to be.

Morris: Yes. What about committee staff and legislators' own aides
here in Sacramento? Was there an overall plan, or did this
just sort of grow as the functions developed?

Mills: It grew slowly. It grew slowly.

One thing that happened was that when the district offices
were opened, a good deal of business was developed. A lot
of people came by. Prior to that time, there was no way
for a constituent to see a member of the legislature unless
they came to his house or unless he went to theirs . So
when we opened district offices, that developed a lot of
business. People started to come by to ask questions about
legislation. They wanted appointments; the kind of thing that
takes place now where they want to come in, they want to
talk to the member of the legislature, tell the member what
they think about proposed legislation, what's wrong with
it, or what should be done. People come in all the time
with complaints about the present state of the law. All
of those thing that take place didn't take place then.

Morris:
Mills :

Morris:
Mills:
Morris:
Mills:

Morris:

Mills :

No constituent contact at all?

Well, we had a certain amount of constituent contact. You'd
get a phone call from time to time, and a request to come and
speak before a Lions' Club or a Kiwanis Club, something
like that. But individual constituent contact, no.

No?
No.
That's interesting.

You saw people at meetings; that was all there was to it,
really.

Do you feel you get a better sense of what people's concerns
are when you have an office where people can come individually,
rather than the kind of questions you used to get just at
the Lions' Club and those kinds of meetings?

Oh, of course. Yes, very much so, very much so.

Morris;

Mills :

Morris:
Mills:

Morris:
Mills :
Morris:
Mills :

Morris :
Mills:

Morris:

Mills :

What was the relationship then with the legislative analyst's
and the legislative counsel's offices? As the individual staff
developed for the legislators, did it make any changes in
how you worked with those pre-existing [offices]?

In those days, it didn't,
same.

It has since, however?

In those days, things remained the

Since that time there's been a little less dependence upon
those two offices. Some people have developed staff; committee
chairmen have developed staff that they depend upon for some
of the same services that, in those days, were provided by
the analyst's office.

There was a move on some time back by Willie Brown, when
he was chairman of Ways and Means, to cut back the analyst's
office and to have Ways and Means staff and the Senate Finance
staff do a lot of work that the analyst's office does.

I take it that did not happen?

No, it did not happen. The senate resisted it

Why?

Because we felt the analyst has a degree of independence that
committee staff could never have.

Let's see. When you became chairman of the Finance and
Insurance Committee, did that also make you automatically
a member of the Joint Budget Committee?

No, it didn't have anything to do with it. I became a
member of the Joint Budget Committee as the result of
appointment by the Speaker. I guess it was by the Speaker,
either the Speaker or the Rules Committee.

One last question on the selection of Unruh as Speaker: Now,
in this current debate there's been over the speakership,
it sounds as if the Democrats, as the majority party, get
to select the Speaker without reference to the Republican
party. Was that the case when Unruh was elected?

No, no. The two candidates for Speaker competed as actively
for Republican votes as for Democratic votes. Bee had done
better than Jess for Republican votes. I think it was

Mills: because the Republicans saw it the same way we did, that
Jess would be a stronger Speaker in terms of getting
Democratic policy implemented into law.

Morris: And they preferred a less positive Speaker, if he was going
to be a Democrat?

Mills: They preferred a less vigorous implementer of Democratic
policy, yes.

Morris: [chuckles] Let's see. Today I thought I might stick to

a line of questioning on the political things and then next
time ask about some of the legislation as it developed.

Mills: Oh, is there going to be a next time?

Morris: I hope so.

Mills: How many times will there be?

Morris: I have a tentative appointment for two weeks from today for
another hour.

Mills: Will that be the last one?

Morris: That will be the last one until we get funding for the Reagan
segment of the project.

Mills : Okay .

Morris: That will be in another year or so.
Mills: I see.

Morris: If that meets with your approval.
If

New Legislators' Support Group

Morris: Last time you were describing the breakfast group. How long
had you been meeting for breakfast?

Mills: A few weeks after I was sworn in, I was invited to go to
that breakfast group. I went.

Morris: Was this an honor, to be invited as a freshman assemblyman to
come and meet with these gentlemen?

Mills: I thought so. Everybody there but Myron Frew was a freshman
in the 1959 class and then they added me out of the 1960
class. It was a group that met originally to protect each
others' backs. They were freshmen and they didn't know what
was going on and they decided they would meet and exchange
information, try to educate each other, and they invited me
in as a new member when I was elected. We were there to
protect each other. If one of us was carrying a bill in
committee, other members of the group would probably try to
give a hand with the bill. It was a mutual protection
association.

Morris: That's a good healthy thing to have. Among the nine of
you, would you have had a member on practically every
committee?

Mills: Yes, I think we probably did.

Morris: Would any of you, as first- or second-term assemblymen, have
been on that group of major committees that you referred to
last time — Rules, Ways and Means, and things like that?

Mills: Not at that time. But after Jess became Speaker, we did.
John Williamson and I both became members of the Ways and
Means Committee before the term was over, but we might have
been anyway; I can't say. -I don't think it actually helped
us, because Jess wasn't very happy about the existence of the
Breakfast Club.

Morris: Why not?

Mills: Because it was a little group of Democrats acting as a group.
He wasn't happy with that.

Morris: Once he became Speaker?

Mills: That's right. For obvious reasons. It isn't pleasant for

a Speaker, who is the leader of the Democratic party, to have
one substantial group of the Democrats who are going to act
together on anything important.

Committee Assignments; Social Insurance Funding

Morris: Did he meet with you at all in the process of becoming Speaker
and then making new assignments to things?

Mills: There weren't a lot of new assignments made when he became
Speaker. He didn't make many changes. He waited for the
term to end and the new term to begin.

Morris: Did he consult at all with you or any other people in the
Breakfast Club when the new term began, as to what your
preferences were for what assignments you would get?

Mills: He consulted with everybody. I don't think there was a member
of the assembly that he didn't talk to. It was the custom
in those days for the Speaker to give the individual members
their assignments, in effect — have the individual member come
in and talk to the Speaker. He would explain what he was
doing and why. If you 'had strong objections, you could raise
your objections. Normally, you would have a discussion
before that to find out how you felt.

Morris: What your interests were.

Mills: You put in a list, though. You always put in a list saying,

"These are my preferences: this committee first, this committee
second, this committee third," and so forth.

Morris: And were those honored?

Mills: To the extent that they could be honored, for Democrats. For
Republicans, they might be or they might not be. There were
some Republicans that we could never expect anything but
trouble from, and Jess didn't put himself out for those.
But anybody who was a good, conscientious legislator and wasn't
going to make trouble for trouble's sake — he'd accommodate them
to the extent that he could.

Morris: Did the caucus meet at all on committee assignments?

Mills: No, we wouldn't meet on committee assignments. He'd also
accommodate the Republicans who were big troublemakers, to
the extent that it was convenient, but he just wouldn't
put himself out. He'd have to find somebody to go on committees
that nobody wants to go on and nobody would put in for them.
He'd [chuckles] choose people to go on those committees that
he didn't owe anything to.

Morris: Were there some committees that nobody wants to serve on, or
wanted to serve on?

Mills: There are committees that people don't really want to serve
on, yes. Industrial Relations is a committee that people
really don't like to serve on. Democrats don't like to
serve on it; Republicans like to serve on it. Republicans
like to go on it and vote against all the measures that labor
wants. Democrats generally don't like to serve on it
because when they go on they either have to vote with labor
or they're in trouble. Labor, like any other interest, can
sometimes ask for more than it should have.

Morris: I see. I came across a reference to a disagreement that labor
had with you on unemployment insurance in '61, I think it was.

Mills: '63.

Morris: Did that come before the Finance and Insurance Committee?

Mills: It was. All the social insurance programs came before the
Finance and Insurance Committee.

Morris: How does the Finance and Insurance Committe differ from Ways
and Means?

Mills: It differs totally. Ways and Means is the appropriations

committee of the assembly. The Finance and Insurance Committee
was the committee that dealt with legislation in the field
of financial institutions and insurance companies, including
social insurance programs. The workmen's compensation
program, for example, and the unemployment insurance and
disability insurance programs all came before Finance and
Insurance.

Morris: Even though they're funded by public funding rather than
[by] the Prudential Insurance Company or something?

Mills: Well, some of them are, and some of them aren't. In those
days, there was still some private funding of disability
insurance, and there was a great deal of private funding in
workmen's compensation.

Morris: Okay. Do you remember what the issue was that you felt
strongly enough about to disagree with the labor unions?

Mills: The labor unions had the support of Pat Brown for a package
of benefit increases in the field of social insurance —

Mills: unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workmen's
compensation — all three. They would have broken the fund,
and I kept the bills in committee, and labor was furious.
Pat Brown and his people and the director of the Department
of Employment said that there was money enough to cover
the increases in the fund, but we —

Morris: Was that while John Carr was still director of [Employment]?

Mills: Al Tieburg was the director. The heat was on because the

Governor said there was the money there, the director of the
Department of Employment said there was the money there, labor
wanted it, and labor had been important in supporting me. I
tried to find out how much money was there and asked for
independent judgments as to how much money was there. I
listened to all of the unions. I tried to get the best
information I could. I talked to the Analyst's office and
so forth and came to the conclusion that there was not
enough money in the fund for the increases , and that turned
out to be true.

It turned out in the course of the following year that,
with the changes, there would have been a bigger payout than
we had money to pay out. It would have exhausted the fund
and it would have gone into debt. You can't pay more than
you've got. It simply would have exhausted the fund and that
would have been the end of it. We would have had to increase
contributions, I suppose, on an emergency basis.

That was the issue and I paid heavily for that. The
labor movement in California was led by Tommy Pitts, and
Tommy Pitts attacked me, sent out letters to every labor
union in my district, told them not to contribute anything
to my re-election campaign, and so forth. He did his best
to make things as difficult for me as he could. That was
real power politics. He was mad because he didn't get his
bills.

I wanted to compromise and proposed a compromise and
sent bills over to the senate which represented that compromise,
which represented an increase in benefits on a smaller scale.
The bill passed the assembly, passed out of the senate committee,
went to the senate floor, and Randolph Collier, at the behest
of Tommy Pitts, moved the bill back to the committee. It was
sent back to committee with the understanding that that's
what the labor movement wanted because they wanted to create
as much heat as possible on me in the assembly. So they
defeated the last bill, I think, that was ever proposed to the

Mills: California legislature that provided a substantial increase

in benefits for working people in California without a substantial
cutback in eligibility, because the bill did not have any
substantial cutback in eligibility. The working people of
California paid for that and have been paying for it ever since.

So you held the original bills in your committee?

Yes.

And then proposed other bills?

With more modest increases, that's right.

With more modest increases. [They] went through, but then
Collier sent them back to committee and they were amended
there by the senate committee?

No, they were killed. They were sent back to committee in the
last couple of days of the session. It was after the deadline
for committee action. That act, which was done at the behest
of labor, killed the bills.

Morris: Then were other bills passed in another session that increased
the benefit payments?

Mills: There have been bills passed since, but in every case that a
bill has been passed since, there has been a substantial
cutback in eligibility to go with the benefit payment increase.

Morris :
Mills:
Morris:
Mills:
Morris :

Mills:

Disputes with the Governor's Office

Morris: I'm interested that Pat Brown would propose bills which would
run the funds out of money, since one of the stories that runs
through those eight years is that there were beginning to be
deficits and that the governor's office was concerned about
finding more revenues to meet those deficits. Why would he
propose legislation which would increase the likelihood of
deficits?

Mills: I don't know. You might ask him. My recollection of it was
that the bills that he had before us would have cost the
Unemployment Insurance Fund about $66 million, $67 million.
We figured the actual amount that we had to increase benefits
was about $37 million, and the bills that I carried over to the

Mils: senate, which reached the senate floor, had about $35 million
in them. So our estimates were very close.

Well, that was one of the reasons for the dispute between
Pat Brown and Jess Unruh over providing staffing for the
legislature, because what was done that time — I depended
upon legislative staff, among others, to come up with the
estimates, which turned out to be right. Two years before,
we simply would have had to have used the administration
figures. We wouldn't have had any way of questioning them,
really .

Morris: The question of estimates came up again in '65. You and
Hale Champion disagreed on the amount of money available,
I believe, for the welfare program altogether, which related
to a tax increase bill that the governor's office had proposed.
At the last minute, Hale Champion said that the expenditures
were going to be less, or he'd found an extra $10 million
in the budget somewhere.

Mills: That was how he spent his life. He found $10 million here,
and $20 million there, and $100 million here, and so forth.
That's what Hale Champion did for all the years that he was
director of the Department of Finance.

Morris: Finding money in the budget?

Mills: Finding money that nobody knew was there. We were all convinced
that Hale Champion knew where there was a lot more money,
you know, that he simply had identified cookie jars here
and there, and perhaps had created them, and perhaps had put
the cookie jar aside and put some money into it so he could
get it out later. But he was always full of surprises like
that for us. Hale Champion made a career of pulling money out
of hats, until he apparently ran out in 1966 and there were
no more hats, no more cookie jars.

Morris: [chuckles] All the state funds are recorded in some accounting
somewhere, aren't they, to which the legislative analyst's
office and the legislative staffs would also have access,
wouldn't they?

Mills: Well, we began to find them, yes, with the passage of time.
As we developed our staffs, we began to turn up a lot of
these things. But at the beginning we didn't have any capacity
to find them They were hiding money and we didn't know where
it was .

Morris: It sounds also like some of this, might be a matter of
honest differences in accounting techniques.

Mills: Sometimes. For example, when Hale Champion came up with the
accrual accounting system to get us through the fiscal year,
there was a lot of dispute about that, but he came up with it
because Lt was a way of getting through the fiscal year. It
probably was good policy.

Morris: But it only lasted for a year, am I right?

Mills: Well, it's lasted ever since, but the additional money that it
produced was only produced in one year. But we can't go back,
because it would cost us that much; it would cost us now what
we got out of it when we went into it — actually, more now.
That was a sort of cookie jar, that one.

Morris: Yes. [chuckles]

Mills: That was money that he knew was there, that was sitting there,
that could be used at the time that they changed the method
of accounting.

Morris: Which would cover that year's accounting shortfalls.
Mills: Yes. Hale Champion was a hand-to-mouth artist.

Morris: You say Hale Champion. He himself was not trained in financial
things particularly. Who did he rely upon in the department
for the technical matters of keeping track of — ?

Mills: Well, he relied on the professionals there, but he knew how
to ask the right questions, and he had an ingenious mind and
undoubtedly still does, and tremendous ambition. I always
thought that he wanted to be governor and I still think that.

Morris: If he did, he doesn't seem to remember it. He maintains he
was serving Pat Brown and interested in other things.

I wondered if the fact that somebody who's been in the
position that Champion was in California then becomes an officer
in HEW, if that has an effect in later years then in the State
of California's relations with programs funded by the federal
government .

Mills: It's hard to say. An answer would be speculation at best.

Morris: Okay. Those, contacts don't continue, or do they? Does it make
it easier to deal with. HEW since there's somebody there that—?

Mills: It's possible, it's possible. There are still people in the

Department of Finance who worked with Hale Champion. Roy Bell
worked for Hale Champion; he's still there.

Re apportionment, Election Trends, Constitutional Revision

Morris: Another question that we're particularly interested in is the
reapportionmant that took five years. Was that as complicated
a matter for the assembly as it seems to have been for the
senate?

Mills: Which reapportionment?

Morris: The 1960. It went to the courts and finally —

Mills: It took one year.

Morris: It took one year?

Mills: We reapportioned the state in 1961 and then we conducted the
elections in 1962. Then, in 1965, the courts said that the
California constitution was unconstitutional, so we did it
again. The California constitution had said that no county
could be divided in the creation of an assembly district,
unless it was being divided into entire assembly districts,
and it meant that Imperial County couldn't be joined with
any other area. It couldn't be joined with any part of
Riverside County, and it couldn't be joined with any part of
San Diego County, and those are the only two counties that
were adj'acent, and therefore it had to have an entire assemblyman
itself, and it had about seventy thousand people, so it had an
entire assemblyman. Riverside County had at least four times
that many people, perhaps five times, and it was one assembly
district.

The court ruled that section of the constitution denied
equal representation to the people in parts of California, so
we had to do it again. That was simultaneously done with the
senate reapportionment when the court ruled that the senate
had to be on the basis of population.

Morris :

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

You were on the Reapportionment Committee in '63, am I right?

No.

No? Okay. [looking through notes]
the redistricting?

Then is that the same as

I was on Finance and Insurance, chairman; I was on Constitutional
Amendments; I was on Fish and Game; and I was on Ways and
Means.

Morris: Was there some concern in 1965, when there was another redistrict
ing, that the Democrats might lose control of the assembly?

Mills: No, and we didn't. We lost it two years later.

Morris: Was that really a matter of redistricting, or just of the
political reality?

Mills: Oh, a number of trends. There was a trend running toward the
Republicans year by year from 1958 till 1970, and then it
started to run in the direction of the Democrats. Those things
are a political reality that very few political scientists pay
attention to. They run and they run regularly; it's a regular
flow. It's an ebb and flow that takes place year in and year
out and has been quite regular ever since the Civil War. It
generally is about a twelve-year trend. The Republicans got
their majority in 1968; it was a ten-year trend that time.
Occasionally it varies by a couple of years, but generally it's
twelves, where it goes from the highest vote for the Democrats
to the highest vote for Republicans and back again. It's
curious to me that there hasn't been more attention paid to
that.

Morris: Regardless of the skills or efforts of campaigners and candidates?

Mills: Yes. It doesn't relate to individual offices. It's the total
vote cast for one party or the other for legislative offices
nationwide.

Morris: Okay. We'll keep an eye on that.

How much attention did you pay to the Constitutional
Revision Commission that was also — ?

Mills: I met with it regularly. I was the chairman of the Joint
Rules Committee and, therefore, I was the one under whose

Mills: auspices it worked. I was the one who hired the staff and

approved it and signed the checks and did all of those things.
And I attended the meetings.

Morris: How was Bruce Sumner selected as chairman of that?

Mills: By general agreement. He was well- respected when he was a

member of the legislature. When he ceased to be a member of
the legislature, we thought that he would be a good man to do
it. Generally speaking, the members of both houses agreed
and we urged it upon the commission. It took very little
urging.

Morris: So that in a sense they had some leeway in choosing their
own chairman rather than the legislature saying, "Bruce
Sumner should be chair."

Mills: I think they did, yes, the best I can recall.
Morris : A consensus .

Mills: But we all thought that Bruce would be good and mentioned to
people who were members of the commission that we thought he
would make a good chairman, and he did.

Morris: He certainly seems to have been devoted to the task.
Mills : Yes .

Morris: From the legislature's point of view, were there some particular
things you wanted to see happen in that commission, or was the
commission just turned loose with the job to come up with
what they thought ought to happen?

Mills: No, there were some things that we wanted to see. We wanted
to see simplification of the constitution. We wanted to see
a lot of language removed from the constitution that had been
put in there by any number of initiatives. We wanted to see
an annual session of the legislature provided for. We wanted
to have a different means of providing for the compensation
of members of the legislature. [tape off briefly during
telephone interruption]

You know, the members of the legislature generally agreed
with the League of Women Voters on the subject of the California
constitution. It had simply gotten to be unwieldy and huge,
and we needed to get a lot of language out of it. We needed to
modernize it and make it consistent and uniform. We had all

Mills: kinds of different usages in it. The language used in one

part of the constitution would be totally different from the
language in another part of the constitution.

Morris: Yes. Those things seem quite obvious. Therefore, it's curious
that it took so long to actually get a constitutional revision
going that was able to follow all the way through. There had
been several attempts earlier. What had happened to make
it possible this time around?

Mills: Oh, I think the constitution just had grown to where there were
so many excrescences on it that people wanted to see them
lopped off. Every election that went by, somebody added more
to it, like now. You know, now the work of the Constitutional
Revision Commission is being undone by the Howard Jarvises
of the world who are adding to it and adding to it and adding
to it.

Morris: Was that one of the issues that they addressed — what is it? —
that you could have statutory initiatives rather than
constitutional amendments?

Mills: We added that provision that the statutory initiative would

not require so many signatures, in the hopes that people would
use statutory initiatives instead of constitutional revisions,
because at the time we adopted that it took the same number
of signatures to put a statutory initiative on as it did a
constitutional amendment. [Aide enters to announce media
representatives have arrived for scheduled meeting.]

V SAN DIEGO DEVELOPMENT: STATE AND LOCAL CONCERNS
[Interview 3: February 20, 1980 ]##

Un-American Activities Files; 1962 State Senate Campaign

Morris: I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about the San Diego
end of things.

Mills: Okay.

Morris: We've got a couple of references to the Van Dieman files,

which were a gathering of information about alleged subversives,
that were uncovered in your area. Was this something that
was brought to your attention and that's how it became an
issue?

Mills: The Van Dieman files were set up by General Van Dieman, who was
a retired general, and somehow he got into the intelligence
business. I never understood just how. Apparently it was a
part of a National Guard operation. He gathered all kinds of
information and apparently was getting information from the
federal authorities .

For example, I was in the files, and I was in the files
because I was temporarily on the list of subscribers to the
communist publication in California which I think was called —
oh, I forget — the Weekly People, or something like that.
That happened to me in January of 1960.

Just after it became clear I was going to be a candidate
for the state legislature, I started to receive the publication,
and I immediately wrote and asked them to take my name off the
list. I thought they were sending it to me as a complimentary
copy. I thought perhaps they were sending it to all candidates.
They replied that, no, they wouldn't take my name off the list

Mills: because some "friend" had subscribed to it for me. I disputed
with, them for six months. Every month they'd send me another
one, and every month I'd say, "I don't want to receive your
paper," because I figured it was something that had been
done by the Republicans. I figured some Republican had
subscribed to it so that my name would be on the list of
subscribers to that paper, and I was just generally distrustful
about the whole thing.

Well, that's exactly what happened. They had my name in
that file, it turned out. The Senate Un-American Activities
Committee had access to those files and picked up some of
that information. It was remarkable. They had the date I
received the first publication and the date I received the last
one. My name was in there: James R. Mills, member of the
California state legislature, subscriber to — I think it was
Weekly People — between such and such a date and such and such
a date.

I thought that was amazing, that General Van Dieman, who
was actually being a private citizen, doing those things, was
being given that kind of information. It was astonishing
to me that it was being gathered. Who was it who was gathering
that information, and where? They must have had undercover
agents on the staff of the paper, the FBI or the CIA, and
then they were feeding this kind of material to General
Van Dieman, who, toward the end, I think, was just kind of
doing it because he thought it should be done, without any
real authority from anyone.

The Van Dieman files became very important politically
because they were kept in a National Guard safe. In 1962, when
Hugo Fisher, who represented San Diego in the California
state senate, was running for re-election, he had the files
seized and it defeated him.

Morris: Defeated him?

Mills: Oh, yes. It defeated him, having the files seized. It was a
terrible political error. At first he denied knowing anything
about it when the files were seized; he said that he had no
knowledge of it when the press contacted him. Subsequently,
when they got back in touch and said they'd talked to the
Highway Patrol, who had come to provide an escort for the people
who had come to take the files away, and that they had been
asked to do that by Senator Fisher's office, he said, "Well,
yes, we did know about it, but the only reason we did it was
that we were requested by the governor's office to get hold of the
Highway Patrol and have them provide an escort." Then the
governor's office initially denied knowing anything about it.

Mills: The way the San Diego Union handled it, they attacked Hugo

for having the files seized and for telling a number of stories
about his involvement which turned out not to be true; that
is, denying involvement and denying knowledge and denying
responsibility and so forth.

The general assumption was that Hugo had them seized
because he was fearful that there might be something in them
that would be damaging to him in the election, and that was
what defeated him. His opponent, Jack Schrade, beat him to
death with it, having the files taken, and generally the
voters in San Diego County reacted to it. People were suspicious
about why those files were seized.

It was generally felt that the Republicans had access to
them. General Van Dieman was a Republican and it was felt
that if they wanted the dirt on any Democrat and there was
anything in those files, the files were accessible to the
Republicans. So that was probably why Hugo Fisher had them
seized. It was Hugo who was responsible and I think Hugo
had been involved in a few left-wing organizations when he was
young. Lots of people were, but apparently he was apprehensive
about it.

In any case, I was told by a prominent Republican that
Hugo Fisher really did them a great favor because there
wasn't anything in the files on him [chuckles], which is,
again, a clear indication that the Republicans had access to
the files. They knew what was in there and they were apparently
delighted when he had the files seized, because they knew there
wasn't anything in there on him, but they figured that everyone
would assume that he was having them seized because he was
afraid that something in his past would be embarrassing to him.

So that elected Jack Schrade and defeated Hugo Fisher.
The election was fairly close and that certainly accounted for
more than enough votes to have changed the outcome of the
election.

Morris: Was there any connection between the Van Dieman files and the
state Senate Un-American Activities Committee, which was still
functioning at that point?

Mills: Well, my understanding is that the Van Dieman files were
available to the staff of the state senate committee.

Morris: And also to the federal investigating — ?

Mills: Oh, yes. Yes, that's right. My understanding was that the
material that the state Senate Committee on Un-American
Activities had on me, they got from the Van Dieman files, and
that was all it was, merely that I had received that newspaper
for a period of five months .

Morris: Did the Van Dieman files and their confiscation have anything
to do with the fact that the state committee finally was
disbanded?

Mills: [pauses to think] I don't know. I don't know what became of
the Van Dieman files finally. I think a fair number of them
came into the hands of the state senate committee.

Morris: Right. And I think you took some action to —

Mills: Oh, we sealed them up..

Morris: When they came into the possession of the state committee.

Mills: No, no. They were in the hands of the Un-American Activities
Committee of the senate until I became president pro tern.
When I became president pro tern of the senate, we took the files
of the Un-American Activities Committee and locked them up and
said that no one would have access to them except those who
received the permission of the Senate Rules Committee to look
at them. So since that time we've had one or two requests from
people who were doing studies of the work of the Un-American
Activities Committee, and we granted the requests. But the
situation that existed in the past where nobody who knew who
had access to them is ended.

There was some pretty damaging material to people in there
that should not be made available to the public in general;
I should not say the public in general, but should not be
made available to people. For example, there was a file card
on one assemblyman saying that his secretary was sleeping with
a man who had been connected with leftist activities in times
past. That was one of the entries on one of the members.
Then, in another case, there was a reference to a member of
the assembly going with a woman who had in the past been
connected with radical activities. Well, that's pretty
personal stuff to be distributing in the way that it was
distributed.

Those files were available, certainly, to the Republican
high command in this state and I don't think that it's a
coincidence that both of the assemblymen referred to were

Mills: Democrats. I also think that there was no question whatsoever
about the loyalty of either one of them. They were both
veterans of World War II, they were very loyal, decent people,
and to have them in a file like that was pretty scandalous
because that's all you had to say about someone in those days
to damage them badly. All you had to say was, "Do you realize
that Assemblyman X is the subject of a file of the Un-American
Activities Committee of the state senate? He's somebody
that they have to keep an eye on, or they have been keeping an
eye on. They have a dossier on him." That was a very bad
situation.

Morris: Your conclusion, then, is that the files were maintained more
for political reasons than for reasons of loyalty?

Mills: No, I don't know whether they were or not. It was kind of a
backyard operation, though, you know. Who was General Van
Dieman to be dealing with questions of the national security?
He was a retired general who had a position in the California
National Guard. I don't think that the national guard should
be given responsibility for defending the nation against
foreign espionage; that's not the job of the national guard.

Establishing a Port District

Morris: How about San Diego and its tidelands? Was that an extensive
economic interest, and was it a major change to shift them
from state to local control?

Mills: Actually, they weren't shifted from state to local control. They
were shifted from city to district control.

The tidelands bill was introduced by Hugo Fisher and me.
Actually, it was the bill to create the port district, because
in the past it hadn't been possible to develop the tidelands of
the smaller cities on San Diego Bay. The need for additional
marine terminals for wharfage and so forth couldn't be met
because cities like National City and Chula Vista couldn't
handle the costs of it. So the purpose of it was to put all
of the bay under a new port district, so that the port
district could develop the bay as a whole. The bill was opposed
generally by the cities because they didn't want to lose
control over their tidelands.

Morris: And the revenues therefrom.

Mills: And the revenues therefrom. That's right, although the revenues
weren't very much at that tine; the revenues were very modest.

Morris: Were the revenues enough to do the development of the port?

Mills: No, the revenues weren't enough at that time to do the
development of the port.

Morris: The reference that I came across was that Jack Schrade was

opposed to this. Was this before he was in the legislature?

Mills: He was in the assembly. This was done in 1962. Jack Schrade
was running for state senate. Hugo Fisher was the incumbent.
Hugo and I were the authors of the bill, so it was a Fisher
bill, and Hugo hoped to use it to get himself re-elected, and
Schrade was opposed to it.

Morris: And that was before or going on at the same time as the
business about Fisher being in the [Van Dieman] files?

Mills: Yes. It [the bill] was something that helped Hugo a lot. The
election was a close election. The chief thing going for Hugo
was the port district bill. It was supported by the newspapers
in San Diego and by public opinion.

Morris: Yes, it would sound like a good local development idea.

Were there the same concerns about leasing of the tidelands
oils in the local district that apparently were raised by Ken
Cory in regard to the State Lands Commission?

Mills: No, it didn't affect the unified port district in San Diego
because there are no oil lands under its control.

Morris: I see. It's just the actual geography.

Mills: Just the tidelands. The biggest dispute related to Coronado
because Coronado had the ownership of the tidelands in
Coronado, and on those tidelands they had a large housing
project, which had been a Navy housing project in World War II
and was a real slum. But they were renting the apartments to
people and they had a fair income from it, and the real dispute
with Coronado was over that. The city didn't want to lose
the tidelands because they didn't want to lose the rental
income from those tenements .

Morris: Yes, I remember some of those.

Were you at all involved in some of the discussions over
the State Lands Commission and the oil leases?

Mills: Not really, no, only as one member of the legislature.
very little to do with it.

I had

Planning and Transportation Needs; Federal Requirements

Morris: When we talked earlier, you said that one of your concerns
in coming to the assembly was to develop the business base
in San Diego. I wondered if your interest in transportation
and regional planning for San Diego was related to your concern
about developing the economic base. Which came first,
transportation or planning?

Mills: Well, as far as planning is concerned, I don't think that that
was directly related to improving the economy of the area.
That was related to improving the future living conditions.
As things were developing in San Diego, as they have developed,
the growth has been relatively unplanned and hasn't been very
pleasant, has not been appropriately placed.

Right now we're in our rainy season and people are
dying because houses were built in the wrong places. Well,
anybody with, the brains God gave a goose would know that they
couldn't build houses where they were building houses. But
in San Diego and the rest of California, having a lot of
money and being a developer was sufficient to cause city
councilman to think you must be a fine person and well-
motivated, and therefore that you wouldn't do anything wrong.
So the developers really were in control in San Diego County,
and I was concerned about that because I saw a steady deteriora
tion of the environment resulting.

As far as transportation is concerned, there is a relation
ship. Improved public transportation is a factor in businesses
locating in one place or another. There have been a number
of firms, for example, that have said that they decided to
make their headquarters in San Francisco rather than Los
Angeles or some other place because of public transportation
being there .

But that wasn't my major reason for involving myself
with public transportation. My chief concern was that the
future looked rather bleak if we continued to do what we
were doing, that I felt that we couldn't continue to depend
upon the automobile, that the cost of motor vehicle fuel was

Mills: going to rise rapidly and we were going to become more and
more dependent on foreign sources , and we should follow
the examples of every other industrialized nation and
develop better public transportation.

Morris: Was this something that the community was not willing to do it
self without a legislative carrot, as it were?

Mills: Yes. There was no inclination, apparently, on the part of
local government to commit any resources to improved public
transportation, except in San Francisco.

Morris : Did you have to develop support in San Diego for the idea
in order to get some bills through the legislature?

Mills: No, no. The legislation that I carried in 1971, which
provided funds for public transportation by imposing a
sales tax on motor vehicle fuel, passed and was signed
into law because there was a great deal of support, from
industry especially, for improved public transportation.

Morris: Support from industry? Which segments of industry?

Mills: There was broad support, retailers especially. Labor was in
favor of it. Industry was in favor of it. I should say the
bus drivers' unions were in favor of it; labor in general
wasn't. Labor in general was not too pleased with it
because it was a sales tax upon a commodity which was looked
upon as a necessity.

Morris: If there was no support in San Diego for the idea, how did
the planning process work? The first piece of the planning
process, if I'm remembering correctly, was in relation to a
regional transportation development plan for the San Diego
area.

Mills: You're talking about the general state law that requires
regional plans? Well, mostly, the initiative for all of
that came from the federal government. The federal government
imposed requirements for regional plans before federal funds
had become available.

Morris: Were there problems with that in California?

Mills: I don't think so. It had never been done before. Regional
plans were developed in response to federal requirements .

Morris: So that the availability of federal funding for such planning
and related efforts was attractive enough so that people
in local communities went ahead and developed the plans?

Mills:

Morris :
Mills:

Morris:
Mills:

Morris :

Mills:

Yes. Also, the federal government mandated the creation
of councils of governments. Councils of governments, once
they were created and staffed, developed their own initiatives.
They have pursued, as most bureaucracies will, an expansion
of their own authority and influence, so they've been
very active in developing and revising regional plans. That's
where their power lies and they're very interested in exercising
their powers.

Is there a potential area of conflict with existing bureau
cracies, if you will, of state government?

The chief conflict is with

Well, there's sometimes a conflict,
local governments .

City and county.

Yes. And between the cities or counties and the council of
governments .

In the case of San Diego, San Diego is such a large
element that the City of San Diego has control of the council
of governments. San Diego County has relatively modest
representation on the board, and they're often in conflict with
the council of governments.

In some other areas where there is no city that is pre
dominant in the same way, the conflict takes a different form.
It may be a conflict between various cities and the council
of governments.

On something like a federal requirement that there be councils
of governments, does the state legislature have contact at all
with the local congressional delegation as to what that law will
say?

No, no. I think, if it were up to the state, there would be
no such requirement. The state legislature is close to the
scene and the state legislature has very little regard for the
councils of governments. Congress is far away and hasn't
really been paying much attention, but there's practically no
council of governments that's worth its salt in the opinion of
members of the legislature.

Councils of government were supposed to develop regional
plans, they were supposed to make hard decisions, and they
haven't worked out that way. In order to preserve their
influence, the staffs of the councils of governments work out

Mills: policies that have something in them for everyone. If every

city gets its share, then the cities will be satisfied and there
will be no trouble for the staffs. So, in order to preserve
themselves and their positions, they simply cut up the money
that's available for transportation purposes as though it were
a pie and everybody's entitled to a certain amount, and
everyone can do whatever he or she sees fit with it .

The same is true of other planning functions. They're
supposed to exercise their influence and develop intelligent
plans; they haven't done it. The planning since this requirement
was put on local governments that everything had to go through
a council of governments has been about the same as it was
before. The institution changed slightly, but the result is
the same. Prior to the requirement that everything had to pass
through the council of governments, the cities did what they
wanted; now they still do what they want, but now they do what
they want because they agree that each one of them will do what
they want .

In San Diego County, Escondido says to El Cajon, "If you'll
go along with what I want, I'll go along with what you want."
That's the most classical log-rolling operation in the world. *

* See chapter VII for further discussion of public planning
and transportation.

VI POLITICS IN ACTION

Medi-Cal; Congress and the Legislature

Morris: [laughter] Was there a similar effect from increases in federal
funds in the '60s in welfare and for medical assistance? Did
it have a similar effect on the California program?

Mills: Not that I'm aware.

Morris: Was there any sense in the '60s, when the federal programs began
to increase, that it would have a sizeable effect on California
state government programs?

Mills: Would you say that again?

Morris: When the Medi-Cal program, for instance, began, my understanding
is there was federal encouragement for such a program and some
federal money. When California set up the first medical aid
progam on a statewide scale, did the state legislature have a
sense of how this progam might grow and what impact it might
have on state finances?

Mills: The legislature did not have any knowledge of how it would grow.
The legislature didn't know how big it was going to be, at the
beginning. I think that there were misrepresentations made to
the legislature. We were given to understand that it would be
smaller from the first than it turned out to be, and there were
a lot of hard feelings that flowed from that because of the
lobbying efforts of Phil Burton. ## He was the big advocate
in the assembly for this state getting into Medi-Cal and he
said, "That bill is going to cost more money than anyone
imagines . "

Morris: [chuckles] He was pleased that it was going to cost more money?

Mills: He was pleased that it was a gigantic bill that was going to do
a tremendous amount for people, but he said the legislature
would never have passed it if they'd had any knowledge
of what it would cost, and I think that's true. He told me
he thought he was the only member of the legislature who
knew what the bill would cost. It's not that we hadn't been
told, just that we hadn't been told the truth.

Morris: And he was basing his bill on the fact that there was going
to be federal back-up for it?

Mills: Yes.

Morris: Was the presumption that the federal government would continue
to increase their support, so that the cost was not going
to increase to the State of California?

Mills: I'm not sure that we got that far with it. I think that probably
was a presumption, but I'm not sure how many people thought
about it. The problem was that right from the start it
cdst a tremendous amount more than anyone thought it was
going to cost, except Phil Burton.

Morris: [chuckles] He knew what it was going to cost and he still
felt that it was worth doing?

Mills: That's right. But he was in the soup with members of the
legislature. He was a very unpopular person when we began
to get the bill for what we'd done.

Morris: So the legislature was just as happy to see him go to Congress?
Mills: Oh, he was glad to go.

Morris: Yes. Is there much contact between the California legislators
and the congressmen?

Mills: Not a great deal.

Morris: I'm curious about that, when federal programs seem to develop
into things that would have such a large effect on state
administration and the budget that the legislature has to
cope with.

Mills: Well, we have maintained an office in Washington at various

times; we have one there now. It's to try to improve liaison,
to try to improve communications between the legislature and
Congress.

Morris: Have you ever succeeded either at getting a bill introduced
or getting a bill amended that you felt needed so doing?

Mills: Yes, we have.

Republican Election Victories; Initiative to Repeal Fair Housing

Morris: Heading back to San Diego, I wondered if you had had any

acquaintance with Gaylord Parkinson, who later became chairman
of the Republican State Central Committee.

Mills : Yes .

Morris : Did you find him somebody who was developing the same kinds

of ideas that the Democrats were for strengthening the party?

Mills: No, he wasn't developing ideas like the Democrats were for

strengthening the party. He was developing, probably, better
ideas for strengthening the party. Gaylord Parkinson was the
father of the eleventh commandment, which was, "Thou shalt not
speak ill of any Republican," which caused the Republican
nominees to go into general elections without the battle
scars that had been common in the past.

Then he was the chief architect of the California Plan.
The California Plan was a plan to take over the control of
the legislature by concentrating the efforts of the Republicans
on the most vulnerable Democrats, and they were very successful
under Gaylord Parkinson. They picked off one Democrat after
another. The plan was to look at registration, look at
party loyalty in the various districts, look at the popularity
of the candidates, and select one or two or three targets
each election. They succeeded in picking up one seat after
another, until they got all the easy ones, and then one year
I was number one on that Cal Plan.

In 1970 they decided that I was the most vulnerable
Democrat and they'd concentrate on me. Number two was
Senator Stiern that year. I predicted, when they announced
that the two of us were numbers one and two , that the Cal Plan
had accomplished all that it was going to accomplish, that
it was going to break on two rocks, Walter Stiern and Jim Mills,
and it did. We not only won, but we both won overwhelmingly,
and that was the end of the Cal Plan. They never got back

Mills: onto it because they'd picked up all the easy seats, but
they probably wouldn't have picked up those seats if they
hadn't followed that plan.

He [Parkinson] is a very bright guy. He's very intelligent,
very energetic, very charming, very pleasant. I think he
got the most out of people and he got a tremendous amount out
of everyone who worked with him.

Morris: Republicans that we've talked to say that they developed the
Cal Plan because they felt that the Democrats had such a
tight organization through the legislative campaign committees
that they were meeting the same people in every campaign,
that the plan was an answer to Mr. Unruh's effectiveness in
advising and assisting legislators in getting elected.

Mills: Well, it was better than what we were doing. It gave them
control of the assembly and the senate temporarily, for two
years, which is remarka-ble when you consider that the Republican
party is becoming a minority party and it's becoming a smaller
and smaller minority because of the policies that it espouses.
The Republican party, during the Reagan years, was creeping
further and further to the right in California and leaving
the middle of the road more and more to the Democratic party.

Morris: You mentioned briefly that you campaigned on the Rumford Act,
which would be going back to 1964, and I wondered if you were
active in the efforts to pass the Rumford Act before '64 and
if there was any effort to avoid that going to an initiative.

Mills: I was active in helping them pass it. I wasn't as active as
some. Jess Unruh was more active. It was a hard fight to
get it through the senate. The senate really didn't want to
pass it.

Morris: Why not?

Mills: The members were against it. The senate was quite a conserva
tive house. It was still a rural house and it was responding
to the real estate lobby, which was violently opposed;
everyone in the senate had realtors, but lots of the senators
didn't have any substantial minority population at all.
Before reapportionment , the bulk of the membership of the
senate came from rural northern California counties where
there was no black population.

Mills:

Morris:
Mills:

Morris:
Mills:
Morris:
Mills:
Morris :

Mills:

Morris :

Mills:

It took a lot of leverage and a lot of pressure to get the
bill out. That was the first time we ever had demonstra
tions in the capitol, as far as I can recall. They had
demonstrators come in and they were sitting in the halls,
sitting around and staying. It was very disturbing.

I actively opposed the proposal to repeal it, Proposition
14, and, of course, it carried. There was nothing that
anyone could do to keep it off the ballot. Once they started
to circulate it, there was no stopping it. The realtors
were largely behind it, and they were so determined that nothing
could have turned them away. When I appeared at campaign
events, I was booed by realtors. I appeared before the
San Diego Realtors Association, and they introduced me, and
[chuckles] there was general widespread booing. They were
really terribly upset by it.

Did it affect the size of the vote for you?
for re-election that year.

You were running

It probably cost me some votes. I won by, I think, about
two to one that year. But my opponent was not an active
opponent. He shouldn't have gotten that many votes.

In November?

That's right.

He shouldn't have gotten — ?

He shouldn't have gotten a third of the vote, no.

Did you make any special efforts in the minority parts of
your district, either for registration or — ?

Yes, we tried to register people in the minority areas. That
was the year that Lyndon Johnson was running and we had a
pretty good registration effort. But we always go into minority
areas; Democrats always go into minority areas to register.

Would the opposition of the real estate organizations have
caused some minorities and others to register in order to
support fair housing who might not otherwise have been active
politically?

Oh, I think that had that effect. I think it was some
benefit to Democrats, although that wasn't a good year for us.
We lost some legislative seats that year.

Morris: Well, that was the year Barry Goldwater was running for
president.

Mills: That's right.

Morris : Did that have a coat-tail effect here in California?

Mills: Not much. We lost some seats that year. We lost some Democratic
seats. I was asked about the great Democratic victory the
night of the election, and I said that all we needed was a
few more great Democratic victories like this and the Republicans
would be reapportioning the state legislature.

Morris: [laughter] Okay.

Rules Committee Chairmanship, 1965

Morris: The next year, you became chairman of the Rules Committee, and
I came across a reference to the fact that one is elected
chairman of the Rules Committee.

Mills: I don't think so.

Morris: No? Well, I wanted to check that out with you.

Mills: The members of the Rules Committee are elected. I think the
chairman was and is appointed.

Morris: Is appointed. By the Speaker?
Mills: By the Speaker. I believe so.

Morris: And who elects you to the Rules Committee? The Democratic
caucus?

Mills: No. The caucus nominated and the floor elected in the

assembly. I'm not positive of how it was done, whether I
was elected or appointed by the Speaker; I don't remember.

Morris: As chair?

Mills: That's right.

Morris: Okay. But you were elected to the committee?

Mills: Before that, yes.

Morris: Is this something that one campaigns for amongst one's colleagues?

Mills: No.

Morris: So it's a single ballot, as it were?

Mills: Yes, or nearly. You go along with the leadership; whatever
is understood is understood. I just passed the word, who
I wanted. I remember the election of the Rules Committee that
year where we had to elect two new members , two new Democrats ,
and I chose Joe Gonsalves and Leo Ryan. The Speaker said,
"Who do you want on the Rules Committee to fill the two
vacancies?" I told him who I wanted, and he said, "Okay."

The word was passed to the Democratic caucus , "This is what
Mr. Unruh and Mr. Mills want in the Rules Committee," and so
everybody said, "Fine." There wasn't any question about it.
Nobody said, "No, I think we ought to have somebody else instead."

Morris: Well, that must be a pleasant state to arrive at, where your
word is taken as the thing that should be done.

Mills: There was a great deal of faith in the leadership of the

assembly by the assemblymen. The average Democratic assembly
man felt that Jess Unruh deserved the support of the members .

Morris: When you arrive at a leadership position like that, does
it change your view of the assembly and its work in the
legislative process?

Mills: Yes. Yes, it does. You start to understand what's going on,
if you don't beforehand. You know, a lot of it just doesn't
fall together. It's not until you're a part of the leadership
and involved in the discussions that you really come to
understand all of what's taking place — all the negotiations
and so forth that go into producing a bill, accommodations
that have to be made when you're working, perhaps, in the
senate, trying to get a bill like the Rumford Act out. It's
a mysterious business to anyone who isn't involved, to
anyone who doesn't know what actually has gone into the
drafting of the bill.

Morris: And the relationship between bills, between the legislative
program and the governor's program, and that sort of
consideration too?

Mills: Yes. Often there's a great deal of conflict with the governor

and attempts to resolve legislative questions would involve long
discussions with Pat Brown and Hale Champion.

Tax Reform Efforts

Morris: Yes. Pat Brown's budget messages all the way through talk
about his concern about state revenues and the cost of
state government, and I wondered if the legislature shared
his concern and felt that costs needed to be controlled and/or
more revenues found .

Mills: Yes, I think so. The legislature was a little more liberal
than Pat on some of those things, a little more conservative
on others.

Morris: How about the tax reform, which seems to be a chronic concern?
It's unclear whether that's related to increasing state
revenues or the persistent citizen complaint that there
are too many taxes.

Mills: The biggest efforts to achieve some tax reform were undertaken
by Nick Petris, who was then the chairman of Rev and Tax
[Revenue and Taxation] Committee, and we had a number of major
reforms that we attempted, but we never got very far with
them. We'd get them out of the assembly, some of them, after
great effort. We were attempting to shift from the property
tax to the income tax, a greater amount of the burden from
the property tax to the income tax, and we ran into a lot of
static and a lot of resistance.

Morris: From where?

Mills: People who didn't want to pay higher income taxes.

Morris: Well, there was an early effort to —

Mills: A conservative effort. You know, the conservative position
was in opposition.

Morris: There was an effort too to do some countywide equalization
of school taxes.

Mills: Yes. That failed due to the opposition of people like George
Miller in the senate. George Miller represented a peculiar
district. He represented Contra Costa County, and in Contra
Costa County the richest school districts were the ones that
had the poorest people in them. Antioch and Pittsburg, where
they had a tax roll that included utilities' generating
plants, would have lost money under it. The areas that would
have gained money would have been areas like Lafayette, so that-

Morris :
Mills :

Morris: That was in a different school district?

Mills: Yes, so that in George Miller's district, the result of

countywide equalization would have been to decrease the amount
of money for the education of poor kids and to increase the
amount of money available for the education of rich kids, which
caused George to be bitterly opposed.

That's an awful spot to be in.

Yes. And George had other reasons for opposing it too. So
nothing ever got by him. George said that he'd be willing to go
for statewide equalization, but nothing less than that, so that
was the end of it. Pat Brown attempted to deal with that
problem and basically failed because of that kind of opposition.

Morris: Yes. This is very hypothetical, but if those efforts had
succeeded, would have it forestalled the Serrano-Priest
decision, which has caused some concern in later years?

Mills: I don't know if it would have forestalled the Serrano-Priest*
decision. It would have diminished the differential between
districts. As it was, some districts had hundreds of times
as much in the way of assessed valuation per child as other
districts. It would have reduced the ratio to four-to-one, if
I remember correctly. It would have been a great improvement,
and we may still have to do something like that. Maybe all
we can do to respond to Serrano versus Priest is to create a
statewide district, something like that, although property
taxes are no longer so important in the financing of schools
as they were in those days.

Morris: Because of increases in state — ?
Mills: Because of Proposition 13.*

* Court decision of mid-1970s requiring that school aid be
equalized between wealthy and poor districts; that each child
in California public schools receive equal financial support.

* 1978 initiative ballot measure, passage of which sharply
limited local property tax revenues.

Election to the Senate; Effect of Reapportionment

Morris: I think I will skip a couple questions and ask you about the
1966 election. What made you decide to run for the senate?

Mills : The chief reason that I decided to run for the senate was that
I couldn't get support lined up for the incumbent. The
incumbent was a man named Aaron Quick, and [due to reapportion-
ment] I was drawn into a district with Aaron Quick, who was a
nice old gentleman, and I wanted to help him get re-elected.
I was happy in the assembly as the chairman of the Rules
Committee and didn't desire to come over to the senate that
much, although I wanted to eventually. But I couldn't line up
any support from Aaron. Aaron was from Imperial County.

Morris: You were both in the same assembly district?

Morris: Both in the same senate district. With reapportionment , he was
drawn into a district that included part of San Diego County
and eighty percent of the population was in San Diego County;
twenty percent was in Imperial County. When I talked to
Democrats in San Diego County to try to encourage them to
support Aaron Quick, they refused to do it, and the standard
response I got was, "Jim, if you're not running, tell us,
because we're going to have a San Diegan represent this
district. We're not going to have an Imperial County person
representing a district that's eighty percent San Diego."

Some candidates came out of the woodwork. Various people
decided they were going to run if I didn't and began to circulate
around to say, "If Jim Mills doesn't run, I plan to run."
It seemed apparent that Aaron was going to lose to somebody,
and I decided that there was no point in my standing aside
to let somebody else take the seat, because I was going to
want it in time. I figured that eventually I was going to
want to come to the senate.

Also, Hugo Fisher was among those who wanted to run,
and my relationships with Hugo had been so bad that I just
didn't want to see him come back and take that seat, I didn't
want to be back in a position of having to work with someone
that I'd never been able to work with.

Morris: Brown had appointed him administrator of the Resources Agency,
hadn't he?

Morris:
Mills:

Morris :
Mills:

Mills: Yes, that's right, he had. He was very difficult for me to
work with, or I was very difficult for him to work with, one
way or the other. Just somehow we never were able to work in
harmony, and the most important consideration in my deciding
to run for the state senate was when I heard that Hugo Fisher
was planning to run if I didn't. I figured that I just
couldn't live with that.

Did you pre-empt his candidacy?

Yes. Nobody was going to be able to keep me from getting

the Democratic nomination at that time. I had been representing

the Seventy-ninth District and had been running strongly in

the Seventy-ninth District, and the Seventy-ninth District

represented fifty percent of . the new senate district, and

a little bit more, so there wasn't anyone who could have

defeated me for that nomination.

Did you talk to Hugo before you declared?

No, I didn't. The last thing that Hugo and I had to do
with each other, I had been asked — this is something I
already discusssed with you. I had been asked to accept the
chairmanship of the county committee, and Pat Brown had
called up members of the county committee and asked them
to vote against me, and Hugo was involved in it. Hugo
came and presided over the meeting. He was chosen to preside
over the meeting and he was there to do me in, and did.
There was nothing for Hugo Fisher and me to discuss.

Morris: I can understand that feeling.

I wondered if there was some sort of a plan in the
assembly caucus to move people from the senior members of
the assembly over to the senate, since there were so many
newly -designed senate seats that year.

Mills: No, there was no plan.

Morris: I think it was ten of you, or seventeen, or some giant number,
who moved to the senate in that '66 election.

Mills: I don't know how many it was, and it may have been seventeen.

Morris: Was it a different kind of a campaign running for the senate
rather than for the assembly?

Mills: Yes, it was a much bigger campaign. I wasn't able to do the
same kind of door-to-door work. Running for the assembly,
I'd gone door to door, ringing doorbells and talking to people.
The senate district was too big to do that in.

Morris: So you relied more on media?

Mills: Media and mail. I had a better-financed campaign than Aaron
did in the primary.

Morris: Did you use a professional campaign firm?

Mills: I've never used a professional campaign firm.

Morris: That's a distinction in this day and age, isn't it! [laughter]

Mills: They cost too much. I'd rather spend the money on the campaign,
rather than spending it on campaign firms. The only profes
sionals I used were the advertising people. I call them up,
have them come in, and tell them I want some billboards and
I want some television spots, and so forth.

Morris: Have you continued to use billboards?
Mills: Yes, I normally use billboards.

Morris: I liked your description of using billboards in your first
campaign to get some name recognition.

Mills: Well, in those days, we didn't have any money for radio and
television or anything like that. You just did whatever was
cheapest, and billboards were cheapest.

Morris: Did the '66 campaign for your senate district involve any

coordination with other candidates for the senate or statewide
campaigns at all that year?

Mills: Well, we tried to cooperate with everybody. We always had

cooperative precinct effort, where I would take a part of the
district and be responsible for it, and the congressman would
take a part of the district and be responsible for it, and
the two assembly candidates would take parts of the district
and be responsible for them, so that we'd cover the whole
district. We'd try to get some help from the statewide campaigns
and so forth. That broke down when Jerry Brown ran for
governor. Jerry wouldn't do anything for anybody. He figured
he wasn't going to spend any money on the precinct work; he'd
spend all the money for himself. He never cooperated.

1966 Gubernatorial Campaign; Constitutional Revision

Morris:

Mills:

Morris :

Mills:
Morris:
Mills :

In the '66 campaign, did you work at all in coordinating with
Pat Brown's campaign?

Oh, yes. Yes, we coordinated with his campaign. We kept
them in touch with what we were doing and cooperated, and
cooperated on mailers and that kind of thing. I campaigned
with him; I appeared with him, introduced him, and walked
around busy places with him, introducing him and identifying
myself, introducing people to him. I didn't have any hesitation.
The question of Pat Brown or Ronald Reagan for governor, which
one I wanted, was not one that I had to agonize over.

Did you have a sense during the campaign that Pat was going
to lose the election?

I sure did. We all thought he was going to lose.
From how far back?

Oh, right after the nomination, I think. All of us were
worried about it . We all thought that Reagan would be a
good candidate. I was involved in a discussion in the
Governor's Mansion with Pat Brown and Jerry Waldie and Jess
Unruh and Bob Crown and one or two others, where Pat was
saying in the spring that he wanted to do all he could to make
sure that Ronald Reagan was nominated because he didn't think
people would vote for an actor for governor, and that he
thought that George Christopher was a real threat because
George Christopher was a man with a record as an administrator
that he could point to with pride. Pat felt that the people
of California were much too conservative in their approach
to government to elect someone as governor of California who
had never held any public office in his life. We told him that
we thought he was making a very grave error, that we thought
Ronald Reagan would be a tremendous candidate and would be
very hard for him to handle and would probably win.

Morris :

What did you base that feeling on?
campaign?

Watching Reagan's primary

Mills: Yes, watching his primary campaign, watching how smooth
he was, watching how much he understood the use of the
media, how to use television, how he understood the temper
of the people. His attacks on the university students and
so forth were very appealing to people. His statements
that he was going to lower taxes sounded good. People
believed in him.

Pat Brown said if he were re-elected, it would be
necessary to raise taxes . Ronald Reagan said that if people
wanted to vote for someone who was going to raise taxes, they
should vote for Pat Brown, but he wasn't going to do it. Of
course, after he was elected, he was responsible for the
biggest tax increase in the history of California. That's
what you expect of an amateur. What people generally don't
understand is that the professional politician is much more
truthful than the amateur in politics. The amateur gets
into politics thinking that the way of life is to lie and
therefore he does it. The professional doesn't have that
perspective.

So Reagan went all through that campaign saying he was
going to cut government by ten percent, every department
was going to be cut by ten percent, and so forth; taxes were
not going to go up. All of his campaign promises were
forgotten as soon as he was elected.

Morris: Did you campaign statewide at all on the constitutional*

revision item on the ballot, or work on a steering committee
for that, since you'd introduced the amendment?

Mills: Yes, I campaigned some on it, although Jess Unruh was the

one who did the most to get it adopted. He made contacts with
the leading people in the state of California — the opinion-
makers, the newspaper publishers, television station managers,
and so forth.

Morris: That seems like a pretty major campaign for deleting sections
of the constitution and tidying it up. Were the changes seen
as that major?

Mills: Yes, the changes were seen as that major. They provided

for the annual sessions of the legislature. The important
thing to members of the legislature was the change in salaries.
At that time, we were making $6,000 a year. That changed it to
$16,000, which seemed like a lot of money, and it was then. It

* Proposition 1A on the November 8, 1966 ballot.

Mills:

Morris :

Mills:

Morris:

Mills :

provided for a five-percent pay increase that we could vote

for ourselves, five percent a year, which seemed quite

reasonable. Of course, it turned out not to be, but it
sounded good at the time.

[chuckles] What was the public reaction? What kind of
questions was the public concerned with?

The public only talked about the pay increase,
any other discussion.

I don't remember

Morris:

And we voted for it anyhow, thinking you guys were doing a
good job.

Yes. And it turned out well. For California, it turned out well.
California has had an honest legislature. The press makes us
out to be dishonest, the press makes us out to be a bunch of
clods and klutzes and so forth, but that's to sell newspapers.
They like to do that. They're perfectly willing to destroy
the institutions of the United States if they think it will
sell a few newspapers.

But the California legislature, when the pay was low, was
looked upon as one of the worst in the United States, one
of the most corrupt. After the pay became reasonable, they
became as clean as any legislature, as free of corruption
as any legislature, and just the last two and a half years
have proved it because the FBI has been around here investi
gating and investigating and investigating. They were sure
they were going to come out here and find a bunch of corrupt
politicians and put them all in jail and gain great credit
for themselves, because that's how they operate, and they
haven't found anything on anybody after two and a half
years of full-time work by a number of operatives . They
haven ' t found a thing .

All they did was destroy one member of the state senate
by saying that he was being investigated. They leaked that
to the press and that caused his defeat. Subsequently they
announced they didn't have anything on him; that was after he
had been defeated. That was the only effect of the investigation,
So the effect was a very beneficial one.

When you say that there was corruption before that constitutional
revision, are you referring to the concern there used to be
about lobbyists?

Mills: Yes. Yes, the place was run by lobbyists in the '50s.

Morris: There were several attempts to regulate lobbying in the '40s
and '50s. You felt they were never effective?

Mills: No, no. We had two former speakers indicted; one went to

prison. A number of members went to prison, a number of members
of the third house went to prison, and I think they only
scratched the surface.

I'm going to have to see what that phone call is about,
[phone light blinking; time for legislative meeting
scheduled for Senator Mills' office.]

Morris: Right. Thank you.

VII STATE SENATE ORGANIZATION, ETHICS, AND SOME PROGRAMS
[Interview IV: June 10, 1981] ##

Additional Thoughts on the 1966 Election

Morris: On the list I sent you of things that I'd like to ask you
about was, to start with, your decision to move from the
assembly to the senate.

Mills: Well, what about it?

Morris: How did you happen to decide to run for the senate? Were

there some thoughts in the assembly that some of you wanted
to see some changes in the senate and therefore should run
for that house?

Mills: No. But I didn't plan to run for the senate and didn't intend
to run for the senate in 1966.

The reapportionment created a new district which had been
drawn for Aaron Quick, who was the Democratic state senator
from Imperial County, and it included all of Imperial County
and a good deal of San Diego County, including my home. I wanted
to support Aaron Quick and attempted to put together some
support for him in San Diego County without success . The
answer I got from people was that they felt that the senator
should be from San Diego County since 80 percent of the district
population was in San Diego County, and generally San Diego
Democrats said they wouldn't support him. Then the San Diego
papers stepped in, and the Evening Tribune said that they
felt that the senator from the new district should be
someone from San Diego .

The reaction that I was getting was: "If you're not
running for senate, Jim, tell us, because if you don't
we're going to find another Democrat from San Diego County

Mills:

Morris;
Mills:
Morris:
Mills:

Morris:

Mills:
Morris :

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

to run." So I was put in a position of either running and
running against my friend Aaron Quick and becoming a member
of the state senate that way, or letting somebody else do it.
So I ran against Aaron Quick, and I defeated him in the primary
and then won the general election, but I had not intended
to run initially.

I see. Did you and Mr. Quick continue to be friends after this
kind of challenge?

No, we did not continue to be friends. He was very angry
about it, and his wife was even more angry.

But the strength of the party was such in San Diego County
that you were able to put together a successful campaign.

Eighty percent of the population of the district was from San
Diego County. So I carried San Diego County by a very sub
stantial margin, and that decided the primary election.

That's the year the Mr. [Ronald] Reagan won the governor's
seat, too.

Yes.

Did that have any impact on your campaign?
strong territory for Reagan, wasn't it?

San Diego was

I don't know if that had any adverse effect on my campaign. I
couldn't say. It's difficult to know how I would have run
otherwise. I won with a good majority; maybe it would have
been bigger if I'd been running with a Democratic nominee
for governor who was more popular. Certainly Pat Brown was
not popular in 1966.

Did he have more problems in San Diego, perhaps, than in
other parts of the state?

All Democrats have more problems in San Diego County and Orange
County than they do in any other part of the state.

[chuckles] Then to what do you attribute you success in this
area?

I had a good campaign, and I'd been in office as an assemblyman
for six years. People knew what to expect of me. I think the
voters are always a little anxious about electing someone who

Mills: hasn't held office. I think that's what the incumbent's

advantage is. You hear a lot about how incumbents are likely
to be re-elected. The reason they're likely to be re-elected
is that the voters have a feeling as to how they'll
represent their constituents. Someone who isn't an incumbent,
someone who hasn't held office, can make a lot of promises,
but there's no way to know how he will do until he's been
elected.

Morris: Did you find it noticeably different campaigning for the senate
rather than for the assembly?

Mills: It's a much larger district; it's twice as big, the senate

district, though it was somewhat different. It wasn't possible
to do as much personal campaigning. I couldn't affect the
outcome of the election by ringing doorbells to the extent
that I could affect the outcome of my re-election campaigns
for the assembly by seeing people. The constituency was too
big to see a very large percentage.

Morris: So what did you use instead of personal appearance contact?

Mills: I used a good deal of media and mail. That is, media; I mean
electronic media. I didn't buy newspaper ads except just,
you know, modest newspaper ads to mollify the people who put out
newspapers .

Morris: Right. But that's a strategic concern, isn't it?

Mills: The ads in the newspapers were taken out for the sake of my
relationships with newspaper publishers .

Morris: Yes. Did the press by and large support you for the new
senate seat?

Mills: I don't think that the Copley press has ever supported me.
I mean, I don't think either the Union or the Tribune ever
supported me in twenty and more years in the legislature. I
am a Democrat. They occasionally will support a Democrat
simply to show that they are not a totally partisan operation,
but I was not ever so favored, [dryly]

Morris: [chuckles] Did you use polls at all, opinion polls, to determine
what the issues in your area were or where you might better
spend your time and effort?

Mills: I didn't use any opinion polls to determine what the issues
were.

Morris: Because you thought it wasn't needed or — ?

Mills: I thought the money would be better spent on advertising.

Morris: That's interesting because the polling seems to have become
a standard part of campaigning in California.

Mills: Polling has become a standard part of campaigning, and I've
used them since, but I didn't at that time.

Morris: I see. When you went into the senate, that was the year
that all forty seats were up for election because of the
earlier reapportionment?

Mills: Yes.

Move to the Senate

Morris: Did the fact that there was that much shifting around in the
election campaign make any difference in how the senate was
organized or how it set about its work?

Mills : What was different was that over half of the old senate was
gone, and the traditions of the old senate disappeared with
those members. The senate had been a very close-knit
operation, and the people who were elected to the senate,
the new members, generally didn't agree with the manner in
which the senate had been operated.

The members who came over from the assembly wanted
substantial changes. They didn't approve of the "old boy"
operations of the senate. They didn't like the idea that
the senate was organized on the basis of a feudal [pauses,
searching for approporiate word] — a set of feudal baronies,
where Senator [Hugh] Burns could decide whatever bills would
come out of the Government Efficiency Committee, Senator
[George] Miller would decide what bills would get out of
Finance, Senator [Randolph] Collier could decide what bills
would get out of Transportation Committee, and so on down the
line. The members of the assembly were used to a democratic
operation where the members of the committees made those
decisions. They objected highly to that and ultimately over
threw that operation when they elected me president pro tern.

Mills :

Morris :
Mills:

Morris :

Mills:

Morris:

Mills:

Morris :
Mills:

There were other problems too, and one was that the senate
had very little staff in those days, and the members of the
assembly were used to having adequate staff.

Had Hugh Burns not wanted to build up a substantial staff?

He did not want to increase the staff. He referred to field
representatives as "runners." He said, "I don't need any
runners, and I don't want any runners, and I don't see why
anybody else should have any runners!"

That's field staff in the sense of people in your district
office?

That's correct.

How did he feel about research consultants and — ?

Generally he didn't like the idea of research consultants;
he didn't like the idea of consultant staff being expanded.
He was willing to have each committee have a consultant,
and he -thought that was quite adequate, and people around him
felt that that was adequate. The lobbyists thought it was
adequate and more than adequate. They didn't want a lot of
people around here doing a lot of research so that the
senate would have independent sources of information.
It seemed preferable to them to have the senate dependent
upon the third house for information.

The third house was a large part of that operation.
Very commonly, in the course of a day, if you went to see
Hugh Burns, he'd be up there with a couple of lobbyists in
the pro tern's office, and they'd each have a glass. They'd
be sitting there having a little drink and talking about
things, and if you wanted to talk to him you were very
likely to have to talk to him in the presence of the
lobbyists.

That's rather startling from this perspective.
It is, but that often happened.

Tony Beilenson told about one time when he wanted to
talk to Burns about assigning a bill. There were two
lobbyists there. Tony went in and said, "I want to talk to
you about the reference of a bill," and Hugh said, "Well,
what do you want to tell me?" with the lobbyists there. Tony
said, "I think it should go to such-and-such a committee," and
Hugh said to the two lobbyists, "What do you think?" They said,
"It sounds all right."

Morris: Hugh asked the lobbyists what committee it should go to?

Mills: Yes, that's my recollection of Tony's story. And Hugh said,
"Okay, we'll send it where you want it to go."

Morris: So did you new folks in the senate get together at all to
discuss how you thought things ought to be and how you
might go about achieving that?

Mills: Yes, a group of us that met for breakfast.

Morris: Yes. This was the breakfast group you had been part of in
the assembly?

Mills: Some of the same people.

Morris: And that also moved over to the senate when you did?

Mills: Some of the same people, yes. Tom Carrell, for example, was
a member of the breakfast club on both sides. I was a
member of the breakfast club on both sides. George Danielson
was a member of the breakfast club on the senate side; I
don't remember if he was on the assembly. Mervin Dymally.
The people who were members of that club generally were former
members of the assembly.

Morris: And how did you go about making some changes in the senate?

Mills: Well, we pushed for additional staff, and eventually Hugh
gave way and did agree to some additional staff in the
districts.

Leadership Changes, 1969 and 1981

Mills: I began to raise hell about the situation when the

Republicans got a majority in the senate. When the Republicans
got twenty-one in the beginning of 1969, Howard Way became
a candidate for president pro tern, but Hugh Burns remained
president pro tern with the support of Ronald Reagan.

Morris: [surprisedly] Did he?

Mills: He did. Ronald Reagan supported him because he was getting
what he wanted pretty well from Hugh Burns, he had no
complaints about Hugh Burns, and he wanted to have Hugh Burns

Mills: with him. If he had urged Republicans to vote for Howard

Way, then he might have offended Hugh Burns, and as it stood
he had twenty-one Republicans willing to go along with most
of the things he wanted, but he also had Hugh Burns and a
couple of Democrats who were closely allied with Hugh Burns, so
that added to the twenty-one. As long as Hugh Burns was
willing to be cooperative as pro tern, Ronald Reagan was more
than willing to have him remain as pro tern. So Reagan
did nothing — I don't know if I should say he tried to keep
him, but he certainly didn't do anything to get rid of him.

Eventually we put together a coalition and elected Way.
We were right close to it. They were generally people who
wanted to improve the capacity of the senate, and they
also wanted to diminish the improper influence of special
interests on the decisions being made in the senate. We
thought we had a majority, but we weren't sure. Hugh Burns
finally decided that he was sure he had a majority, and so
he called the meeting on the subject and put the question to
a vote and lost.

Morris ;
Mills :

Morris :
Mills :

Morris:

This was a meeting of the whole senate?

It was a caucus of the senate. He lost by one vote. George
Moscone voted with Burns because he was convinced that Burns
had the votes. He told me that if he had believed that Burns
didn't have the votes, then he would have voted against
him, but he was sure that Burns had the votes, and therefore
he was going to stay with Burns because he didn't want to be on
the outs with the side that had the power. There were too
many good things that could be accomplished if he could
maintain some influence with the senate, and he wasn't going
to jeopardize that. So he voted for Burns.

This is in the vote that Burns lost by one vote?

That's in the vote that Burns lost by one vote.
ly—

Then subsequent-

Who didn't stay with Burns that Burns thought he had? Moscone
was a Democrat and he stayed with Burns. Did somebody else
drop out?

Mills: He lost a couple of votes that he thought he had.
I know who they are, but that's only suspicion.

I think

Morris: Republican or Democrat?

Mills: Democrats who were pledged both ways.

Morris: [laughter] Oh! So somebody was bound to have a miscount.

Mills: That's right.

Morris: Is it often that people will pledge themselves to more than
one group in this kind of leadership — ?

Mills: It's not uncommon, not uncommon. George Moscone did it himself
later.

Then the next time we had a vote on the issue, Howard Way
lost one vote; that was Fred Marler. He took the chairmanship
of, I think it was, the Agriculture Committee from Marler and
gave it to Burns, thinking he would mollify Burns and thinking
that it wouldn't upset Marler because he was going to put
Marler on the Finance Committee. But he didn't ask Marler, and
it did upset Marler, so Marler changed over and became a vote
against Way. Way had only won by one vote, so that was a
critical vote.

But then Jack Schrade, who was the one who defeated Way,
also picked up another vote because George Moscone changed
over. He had decided that the reformers, the "good guys,"
were going to win. We had won, he thought we'd win again,
and he changed over and voted with us. So he lost both
times .

The time that George was committed both ways for pro tern
was when George Zenovich ran against me in 1975. George
Moscone promised me that he would vote for me; he subsequently
promised George Zenovich that he would vote for George
Zenovich. Ultimately, when the vote was cast, I counted all
the people that I expected to vote for George Zenovich, and
there was one more than there should have been voting for
Zenovich, one more than I had counted for Zenovich, and I
think that must have been George Moscone. He was the only one
that I was doubtful about, and I knew he was pledged both ways.
So he reneged on his pledge either to George Zenovich or to
me, and I think it was the pledge to me.

It was kind of a sad story. George hated to tell people
no; it was hard for him to say no. Then if he said yes to two
people who were on different sides of the question, he couldn't
bring himself to go back and tell the person that he was
committed to the first time that he had committed himself the
other way. That ultimately was how he died, because it
happened that he did that to a fellow who was of a violent
disposition.

Morris :
Mills :

Morris :

Mills:

Morris :

Mills :

Morris :

Mills :

Morris :
Mills:

Yes, who thought he had had a commitment.

He said he had, yes. Dan White said he had a commitment. On
the basis of George's performance in Sacramento, I shouldn't
be surprised if he'd committed himself both ways. As I
said, I know on that occasion when I was running for re-election
as pro tern he did, and he didn't withdraw either pledge. So
whether he was the one who voted for Zenovich or not, that
I didn't know about [chuckles]; he was pledged to vote for
both of us, and he only voted for one, whichever way he went.

Is it considered protocol, if you have made a commitment to
two people, that you tell the first person that you've
committed yourself to the other one, or that you tell somebody
that you've changed your mind on supporting someone?

Oh, yes! It's not considered good form at all to commit
yourself both ways.

That's the basis upon which the counting is done during this

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process of leadership election?

Yes. You expect people, when they make a pledge, to live up
to the pledge. I always knew that there were some problems.
Each time I was elected, there were some soft pledges, ones
that I wasn't really counting on.

Yes. In other words, sometimes somebody will pledge but
doesn't necessarily deliver?

Sometimes people pledge and don't deliver. That's very much
looked down upon.

When I finally lost the pro temship it was because people
believed other people's accounts of pledges. David Roberti
was telling people that he had fifteen, sixteen, seventeen
votes and so forth, and among the people that he listed were
people who weren't pledged to him, but no one called them to
ask them.

They took his word for it?

They took his word for it: they believed him. So there were
a number of people at the end — when he was giving a count of
how many he had, he said he had nineteen. Well, that was com
pletely ridiculous . But even the press picked it up and
carried it.

Mills: Well, there were people around — he was saying that he had
Nick Petris's vote. Nick Petris told me that he didn't.
He was saying that he had Walter Stiern's vote. Walter
Stiern told me that he didn't. He was saying that he had
Henry Mello's vote. Henry Mello told me that he didn't.
And so on down the line. I could name a bunch of — yes, I could
name a number .

It was pure scam. It was a different situation. It was
one that developed because people expect to be told the
truth around here. They expected that David Roberti was
telling them the truth, and he wasn't telling them anything
like the truth! [chuckles]

Morris: If you felt you had, for example, Petris and Stiern and Mello
in your count —

Mills: I didn't count-
Morris: You were not counting?

Mills: I did not count Mello. Mello said he was uncommitted. I
didn't count Petris. Petris said he was uncommitted.

Morris: I see. They just said they had not pledged themselves to
Roberti.

Mills: That's right. But other people who were committed to me,

like Walter Stiern, he [Roberti] had listed as committed to
him. Jack Holmdahl was committed to vote for me, and Bill
Green, and John Foran, and Ruben Ayala, and Bob Presley, and
so forth. Even up to the very end when he was claiming to
have nineteen votes, that was done purely by [pauses] — well,
I don't know quite how to put it politely. [chuckles] It was
simply by not telling the truth.

Morris: If that was the case, why did you drop out?
Mills: Well, because he got people to believe it.
Morris: Ah!

Mills: What I'm saying is he made people believe it. He made Ralph
Dills believe it, for example. As far as I could figure,
Ralph Dills was the twelfth vote. There were twenty-three
people in the caucus. Ralph Dills was the twelfth vote.
Ralph Dills apparently believed it. Ralph Dills had some

Mills: things that he wanted. He wanted to be on Finance, and he
could get a commitment from David to put him on Finance,
and a couple of other things that he wanted, and he got
them.

It's an interesting thing, by the way. If you look back
to 1961 when Jess Unruh was elected speaker, when anyone asked
him for a commitment for a chairmanship or for anything else,
he said he wouldn't give it. He said that he didn't think it
was proper to give, that it was no way to organize the house,
it was necessary to sit down and try to organize the house
in logical fashion, and he would not make any commitments
because he thought it was improper. I think generally that
had been the attitude prior to that time.

Twenty years later, when David Roberti was elected president
pro tern of the senate, he bought almost every vote with a
promise of a chairmanship or promises of a committee membership
or something like that.

Morris: You made the same point when you were elected pro tern.
Mills: That I —

Morris: That you had not made any promises to anybody of chairman
ships or —

Mills: No, I never made any promises to anybody. No, I never made
any promises to anybody in the course of getting elected
pro tern, because I thought it was an appropriate way to
proceed.

But in the case of Roberti, he had promised Boatwright
the chairmanship of Elections and Reapportionment , and
Boatwright hadn't even been a member of the senate before. He
also promised him membership on Finance. He had promised
John Garamendi the position of floor leader, and Paul
Carpenter the position of caucus chairman, and Alan Robbins
a chairmanship, and Joe Montoya a chairmanship, and Diane
Watson a chairmanship, and so on down the line, just right
down the line.

Morris: He got everything all organized.

Mills: Well, he had to create some additional chairmanships in

order to be able to pay off. He had sold so many chairmanships,
he had sold more than he had .

Morris: That seems very poor planning.

Mills: But it's not pure poor planning if you decide that you're

going to buy a bunch of people. If you think the members of
the senate are willing to sell themselves, sell their votes,
then you buy their votes. If it costs more than there are
positions to give away [chuckles], you can create new positions,

The whole question is simply a matter of morality. Is
it a moral way to proceed? Is it a proper way to run the
senate in the first place? I never thought so, and that's why
I'm not pro tern, but I don't regret it. If I had to remain as
pro tern by doing the same thing, I wouldn't do it.

Morris: The indication, then, is that people expect to have a reward
in return for however they vote.

Mills: The indication is that the morality of the legislature is not
what it was some years ago. The standards of conduct here
are not what they were. I think that's clear now.

Morris: In other words, when you first came into the senate, it

was not the custom for somebody to say, "I will vote for you
if I can be on thus-and-so a committee."

Mills: No. We took seriously in the past the section of the law that
says that's illegal; it's a crime under California law.

Morris: Specifically?
Mills: Yes! Yes, it is.

Morris: It would seem to be well-known amongst people who are working
together, but a difficult matter to take to some kind of an
ethics board or committee.

Mills: You can't take it to an ethics committee. Ethics Committee
is a committee of the senate. A minority cannot proceed
against a majority if it requires an action of the body
to impose a discipline.

Morris: Yes. Is it a matter that you could take to a court?

Mills: It could be taken to court. It is a crime, and there could
have been prosecution, but I don't think there would be.

Morris: As they say, it would be a can of worms.
Mills: Yes.

Morris ;

Mills :
Morris:
Mills :

Morris:

Mills :

Morris ;
Mills:

Morris :
Mills :

Morris :
Mills:

When you were describing the one vote that shifted with
Mr. Way, is that the period — Howard Way was pro tern for a
brief while, and Jack Schrade was pro tern for a brief while?

Yes.

Okay. Is that when the one vote shifted sides?

Yes. Two votes, actually, because George Moscone changed
the other way. George did not vote with a winning candidate
for pro tern in a contest until he voted for me. And then,
apparently, the first time I was challenged by a Democrat,
he [chuckles] went with the losers again!

[laughter] Oh, dear!

But I didn't hold it against him.
ble to dislike.

You know, George was impossi-

Were either Way or Schrade in the pro tern spot long enough
to make his mark, as it were, or start any kinds of
changes?

Howard Way made a number of changes. Jack Schrade didn't.
Jack Schrade tried to take things back a little bit to
past times, but he didn't make any substantial changes.
Howard Way tried to reorganize things somewhat.

What kinds of things was he — ?

Well, he changed the committee structure to some extent, and
he tried to set up better procedures for assignment of
bills; there were a number of reforms. You should ask him.

Yes, I would like to. But I was thinking of what he was like
to work with from your point of view.

Well, he was very good to work with. He was very diligent
and conscientious as president pro tern in trying to make the
senate work as it should.

Morris : You felt he was a good model when you decided to have a try
at it?

Mills: I think he was a good model. I effected more reforms than
he; more took place when I was pro tern than when he was pro

Mills: tern. More reforms took place when I was pro tern than during
the administration of any other pro tern in the history of
California, I'm sure.

Mills' Selection as Pro Tern, 1970

Morris : How did you emerge as a candidate for pro tern? Was there
some change in — ? Was there a special election or — ?

Mills: Mostly because there wasn't anybody else among the "white hat"
Democrats who'd been fighting against the forces of evil,
[dryly] I knew the rules probably better than anyone else, and
the rules had been used against us so much that people on
our side of all of these conflicts liked the idea of having
a pro tern who knew the rules so that the rules couldn't be
used against us or the rules could be properly enforced
without favor to anyone. Also, I had been sort of on the
cutting edge. I had raised more thoughts about what was
going on than anyone else. I had been more vocal in my
opposition than anyone else. I had said more on the floor.

The business relationships between Hugh Burns and some
lobbyists were quite close. He had been in business with
various lobbyists.

Morris: This is in real estate and insurance?

Mills: Insurance more than anything else, yes. And I had expressed
myself freely on that subject. I didn't think it appropriate
for the president pro tern of the senate to be much involved in
the insurance business, making a lot of money from the
insurance business, with a partner who was one of the top
lobbyists for the insurance industry.

Morris: Yes, that would cause some questions, I would imagine.

Mills: So I had been making a noise about it. Everybody else had
been quiet, pretty well; nobody said much. So I'd become a
little more prominent in the opposition than others.

The person who proposed me as a candidate for pro tern,
the day after election day in 1970 when it appeared that we had
twenty-one votes, was Mervin Dymally. He called me up and
said, "I'd like to put together the votes for you to be
pro tern," so Mervin was the one who brought it up. However,

Mills: Tom Carrell had had it in mind and had mentioned to me that
as soon as we had twenty-one votes in the senate he was
going to go to work on getting me elected pro tern, so the
first suggestion came from Tom Carrell.

Morris: They egged you on to be outspoken in these things?

Mills: Nobody egged me on to be outspoken on these things. I think
they probably thought it would have been better if I hadn't
been quite so noisy about it.

Morris: Well, that's what I wondered, because quite often the person

who blows the whistle, as it were, creates sufficient antagon
ism that you then need a more neutral person to take the leader
spot.

Mills: That's true. That's true. If I had been aiming to be president
pro tern, I would have done better not to be so vociferous in
my criticism of the old regime.

Morris: Yes. Then how come they voted for you once you did emerge
as a candidate?

Mills: Well, ultimately the reform-minded Democrats coalesced behind
me. Al Alquist decided he wanted to be pro tern and divided
them. We had a meeting finally to decide which of us it was
going to be, and the group —

Morris: This is the Democrats?

Mills : This is the reform-minded Democrats , basically that breakfast
club. They decided that I should be the candidate rather
than Al. That left the other side as the opposition, and the
candidate was Steve Teale, who represented the old guard. But
we had the people who had been sticking together through all
these battles, and supporters of Howard Way on the Democratic
side, in a coalition with the people who had supported Howard
Way on the Republican side, and we had gained a vote or two.

Morris: The Howard Way supporters were in general in support of you?

Mills: Yes, the Howard Way supporters were in support of me, and we
had gained a couple of votes which put us over the top.
Peter Behr was elected in the district that had been represented
by Jack McCarthy, and Peter Behr was a Way supporter and a
Mills supporter, whereas McCarthy had been voting the other way.
Also on the Democratic side, Arlen Gregorio was elected and he
voted with us, so that put us over the top.

Governor Reagan and the Legislature

Morris: Jack McCarthy had been pretty close to Governor Reagan,
hadn't he, as a legislative advisor?

Mills: Jack McCarthy supported Governor Reagan.
Morris: Right.

Mills: I don't think that Jack McCarthy was ever very close to
Governor Reagan. If he was, I didn't see it.

Morris: What I was wondering is to what extent the governor's office
looked like it was involved in the pro tern election.

Mills: The governor's office was sentimentally, I think, in support
of the old guard in the senate, but I don't think they were
much involved in the battle. I wasn't aware of any involvement.

Morris: That's interesting, because going back to when you came into the
senate, one of the comments that's made about Reagan as
governor is that he didn't seem to have very good relationships
with the legislature in 1967.

Mills: He was nasty to us.

Morris: He was nasty to you?

Mills: We didn't like him. [dryly] He was insulting.

Morris: Himself, or in the person of his legislative aides?

Mills: Personally he was insulting.

We used to have pro tern's dinners every year. We used
to invite the governor; it had always been the custom. Prior
to the time I was in the senate, for a long time, the governor
had been invited to the pro tern's dinner. It stopped during
the time that Reagan was governor; nobody wanted him to
come because he'd be insulting. He'd stand up and make a
speech which was reasonably friendly, and then at the end
he'd say something unpleasant, and he never failed. Finally,
we talked about it, the people who did those things, and
finally decided, "Well, let's not invite him because we know
that at the end of his speech there's going to be some stinger
that will make us all mad at him. So let's just leave him
out."

Mills: He had the feeling that many governors have that the
legislature was an unfortunate mistake on the part of
our founding fathers. Also, he had the feeling that the
Democrats in the legislature existed only for the purpose
of opposing his ideas, that the only thing that we had in
mind was to thwart him as he tried to do good things. He
looked upon the Democrats in the legislature as [ominously]
"the other side."

Morris: The other side of another side. If the legislature is

against the governor's office, the Democrats are even more
so?

Mills: Yes. He looked upon us like a Notre Dame football player

looks upon the people who play for SMU. He never seemed to
have any feeling that we might be as interested in the well-
being of the public as he. He was always talking about
"partisan fun and games." Everything we did that we didn't
agree with him, he'd call "partisan fun and games." If he
had any program and we didn't vote for it, it was "partisan
fun and games . "

Morris: Did you have any sense of whether this was coming from
Reagan himself or from some of the people —

Mills: I'm talking about what he said personally and did personally.
Morris: What he said himself.
Mills: Yes.

Morris: In the interests of the well-being of the public, did you make
any effort to talk to his legislative people —

Mills: Sure.

Morris: — or to Republicans to find out what this was all about?

Mills: Oh, some people we could talk to; some we couldn't.

Morris: Yes. Whom could you talk to?

Mills: Whom could we talk to? We could always talk to John looker.
John looker was someone we could communicate with.

But Reagan himself was intransigent. I never found
I could negotiate with him. He probably thought the same about
me. But for him, negotiation, when we got to it, was that he

Mills: would come in and tell us what his position was, we'd tell him
what our position was, we'd talk about it, he would refuse
to give an inch (he would never make any concessions whatsoever),
and then we'd meet a few days later.

His idea of concessions was he'd come back and say, "Okay,
I'm willing to make some concessions," and then he would lay
down his new position, which might include some giving of
ground on what he had said before, but it didn't involve us.
It was not a negotiating process; it was a matter of him
telling us from day to day what his position was. Then he'd
say, "Here, I'm willing to make some concessions," and then
he'd take his new position, and they might not be things that
we cared about, you know. He might think, "Well, these are
concessions that the Democrats ought to be delighted with,"
but he may have chosen to alter his position in a manner which
really didn't mean anything to us, and that happened. Then
he'd be furious with us.

He'd say, "Here I come in in good faith to negotiate with
you, and I make some concessions, and you won't make any
concessions." We'd say, "Well, you know, that's not really
making concessions. You make concessions when I ask you to
do something that I'd like to have you do and you agree to
go part way, but you didn't do that. You took a position the
other day, and now you're taking another position today, and
I've had no part in drawing it up."

That was the way he always was. You never got more from
him than Ronald Reagan working out what he thought his position
should be, and then perhaps revising what he_ thought his
position would be, and perhaps further revising what he thought
his position would be. But I never had, and I don't think any
Democrat ever had, any part in the process of his changing his
mind. He changed his mind because he thought it was appropriate
to change his mind, but a negotiation process doesn't involve
organized labor coming to the table and saying, "Okay, here's
what our demands are," and then coming in a few days later
saying, "Well, you didn't like those, so here's what our
demands are today." All we got from him was a successive set
of demands which were altered from time to time.

It's like the matter of withholding. He was dead set against
withholding, would not consider it, would not talk about it.
It was simply not a matter you could discuss with him. We'd
say, "Governor, we could pick up so much in the way of additional
revenue by withholding." He'd say, "That is not negotiable. That

Mills: is something I am not willing to discuss with you." When the
day came that he was for it, he didn't work it out with us
or anything of the kind. He simply announced, "I am for
withholding." The press asked him what happened. He said,
"I changed my mind." And when he changed his mind, he was as
inflexible as he was before. And what is more —

Morris: He didn't say that you'd convinced him that withholding was a
good thing?

Mills: No, no. And what is more, I think he thought he was right all
along. That is to say, I believe that Ronald Reagan thought
he was right when he opposed withholding, I think he thought
he was right when he favored withholding, and I think he probably
feels still that he was right in opposing it when he opposed
it and the day that he changed his mind was exactly the day
in the history of California when it was appropriate to change
from one position to another. I never heard him say he was
wrong, and I don't think he ever did. I think he felt he was
right from beginning to end. That was what it was like
dealing with Ronald Reagan.

Morris: Do many people, in the reality of the world, particularly in
the kind of negotiations legislation takes — do many people
ever say they're wrong?

Mills: Oh, I think people can say they're wrong about a thing like
that.

Morris: How about the celebrated Welfare Reform Act of 1971, in which
it's reported that the governor and legislative leaders sat
down and hammered out a workable compromise and it took a
week. How did that work in relation to your — ?

Mills: There wasn't much compromise.
Morris: What went on during that week?

Mills: It was a case of Ronald Reagan saying from day to day what
he was willing to do.

Morris: And so what did all the rest of you do?

Mills: We told him what we'd like to do, and he didn't pay any

attention. He'd come back in the following day with a new
set of proposals.

Morris: Was there any staff contact, his staff and — ?
Mills: Well, there was a lot of contact.

Morris: On working out some of these details before and after the
official meetings of the legislative leadership?

Mills: There was a lot of discussion. I don't know how much working
out beforehand; the working out mostly came after.

Morris : You made a speech on that which I thought was kind of

interesting because it ended up with a nice paragraph about
how it was a "rewarding exercise, despite serious partisan
differences between a Republican governor and a Democratic-
controlled legislature."*

Mills : I thought it was appropriate to try to improve relationships
with the Governor .

Morris: I see. Did you feel that any progress was made, while you
were pro tern, for instance, in that second term?

Mills: What progress?

Morris: Did you feel that there was progress in relations between the
legislature and the governor's office during the second
term?

Mills: [pauses] It was some better. [pauses] It had been very bad
the first term, as I said — a lot of insulting remarks — but
in the second term there wasn't as much.

He campaigned against me in 1970 and did all he could to
defeat me. I don't think anyone else was singled out for
as much attention as I.

* August 31, 1971, Town Hall, Los Angeles.

On the Republican Election Hit List, 1970

Morris: I came across a note that your race for re-election was one

of the top two in expenditure that year in terms of legislative
races.

Mills: [surprisedly] Was it?

Morris: Yes.

Mills: $120,00 or $125,000, something like that?

Morris : Right , right . There was another campaign somewhere in
northern California that was $130,000 or $140,000. The
California Journal picked this up — [December, 1970]

Mills: That's interesting.

Morris: — and said that these were the two most expensive campaigns.
They didn't mention what the particular circumstances might
be.

Mills Nowadays in a hot campaign they'd spend three times as much. I
was number one on the Cal Plan hit list.

Morris : Why?

Mills: They thought that I was most vulnerable for some reason. Ronald
Reagan came down and campaigned against me; helped me, I think.

Morris: He actually came? Well, he was running himself for re-election.
Mills : Yes .

Morris: He would come to San Diego and say, "Re-elect me and don't
re-elect Jim Mills."

Mills: Yes, that I was a rascal.

Morris: Who had the Cal Plan people put up against you?

Mills: The chairman of the board of supervisors of San Diego [Henry
Boney] .

Morris: Was he a major threat?

Mills: I beat him two to one. I ran ahead of my registration.

Morris: That means you picked up some Republican votes.

Mills: I picked up more Republican votes than I lost Democrats.

Morris: Why was that, do you suppose?

Mills: There are a couple of reasons, but Ronald Reagan, I think,
helped me. Wasn't it H.L. Mencken who said, "A man is
judged by the stature of his enemies"? I think I was
elevated by Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan would say terrible
things about me, and then I'd say terrible things about
Ronald Reagan, and —

Morris: You both got elected again! [laughter]
Mills: The people voted for both of us.

Morris : What particularly had they singled out as campaign issues against
you?

Mills: They tried to make out that I was in favor of narcotics. The
biggest issue used against me was that I had never carried
a bill to control the narcotics traffic in California. Well,
I expect that probably 90 percent of the members of the legis
lature haven't carried bills to control the narcotics traffic
in California, but they made it appear that I was totally
uninterested in the problem and I probably really was in favor
of kids using narcotics. They got Art Linkletter to make
campaign statements (television, radio, and so forth statements)
against me because he had had a narcotics problem in his
family. He thought I was a terrible person because I had
never carried any bills to deal with the problem. Art
Linkletter is a San Diegan and went to San Diego State, as I
did.

Morris: Did he?

Mills: Yes, had quite a number of friends there.

It was probably fairly effective. They went back over
my voting record on the issue and found every bill to increase
penalties on narcotics that I had voted against, and listed
them all, and told people what they should do. They said,
"Mills voted against this bill to increase the penalties for
people who push narcotics, and voted against this bill, and
voted against that bill," and so forth.

Mills: What was dishonest about it, of course, was that at the same time
I had also been voting for some bills. In the course of a
session, if there are three or four bills on a certain subject,
it doesn't make a lot of sense to vote for three or four bills
when the approaches that they take may not be in harmony with
each other. So I had voted for bills during those years to
increase the penalties for people who peddle narcotics, but
I hadn't voted for all of them, and I don't think anybody with
the brains God gave a goose would vote for all of them. But
they found all the ones that I had voted against and made it
appear that I was voting against all the bills that came along
to control narcotics.

Morris: That sounds like some fairly careful, selective research was
done against you. Did you use —

Mills: Oh, they went all the way back. They went all the way back to
my first year in the assembly when we had a bill that provided
for the death penalty for anybody who sold marijuana,
the second offense — the death penalty. I didn't think that was
a very good bill.

Morris: And you had voted against it?

Mills: Well, I didn't think we should execute people the second time
they were caught for selling marijuana, no.

Morris: How did you deal with that kind of a campaign against you?
Did you use research?

Mills: I didn't talk much about him. I just mostly put out material
to promote people's good opinion of me.

Morris: And just ignored the Republican campaign against you?
Mills: I didn't say a lot about it, no.
Morris: Did you have debates?

Mills: Yes,. I had a. couple of debates. In those debates, why, I replied
to the charges.

Morris: Your opponent would make the charges to you face to face?

Mills: He would make the same charges that he was making in his campaign
literature, yes.

Morris: Were there any times when you'd appear on the same platform
with Reagan?

Mills: No, no. I would have been glad to. I liked the idea of giving
people the appearance that it was a campaign between Ronald
Reagan and me, and that my opponent was just a nonentity that
nobody was paying any attention to; the real fight was between
the Governor and me. That was very —

Morris: That would be very elevating.

Mills: That was very advantageous to me.

Morris: How about Gordon Luce? Was he still in the governor's office
at that point?

Mills: Oh, I should think he was. I don't know.

Morris: I think he stayed until 1970. I wondered if you and he had
worked on things together in San Diego.

Mills: We never worked on much together. Oddly enough, I'd known
him for many years . He was at San Diego High School when I
was.

Morris: You were classmates?

Mills: No, we weren't classmates. He was a year or two ahead of me,
maybe two years. But he moved in different circles, still
does.

Morris: I wondered if he was a factor in this campaign at all.

Mills: No. Oh, I'm sure he helped raise money for my opponent. They
didn't raise an awful lot for him though. He was a rich man,
and they hung him out to dry. [chuckles] They got him into
the race and figured he could finance his own campaign, which
he could, and a lot of the money that went into the campaign
was his.

Morris: Was that a campaign where money made the difference?

Mills: He outspent me by a little bit officially, but there was a
lot of money, I always felt, that was spent in the campaign
that wasn't reported. There are various ways around the
campaign reporting laws, and it always seemed to me in looking
at that campaign that a lot of things were happening and being
done that weren't being reported.

Morris: Like media or mailings?

Mills: Well, you can't do media or mailings; there are records of that,
But there are other things you can do. I'll take it back; you
can do media and mailings if you can get someone else to do it.

Morris: Yes. An independent committee. We didn't have the campaign
finance reform act at that point.

Mills : No .

Morris: We had different ones at that point.

Mills: Yes. We had that; we had a requirement for reporting.

Morris : Right .

Mills: But you could have somebody else do it. Some committee which
was not the committee to elect Jim Mills could put an ad in
the paper for me, you know, a committee of schoolteachers or
a committee of realtors or a committee of some other group of
people. That way it could be done. Also, you could peel off
money and give it to people to work in a campaign without
anybody being wiser.

Morris: Because you could pay people out of hand for their pocket
expenses and it wouldn't necessarily be reported?

Mills: Oh, you could pay them more than that. You could give them
as much as you wanted, but if it came out of your pocket it
might be pretty hard to trace.

Concern for Public Transportation, Environmental Problems

Morris: Coming back to the senate, it looks like when you moved from

the assembly to the senate your legislative interests changed.
You're on the Water Committee and the Transportation Committee.

Mills: I didn't want to be on the Water Committee.

Morris: You didn't? [chuckles] I thought everybody wanted to be on
the Water Committee in California.

Mills: I was on the Transportation Committee; that's what I wanted to
be on all along in the assembly.

Morris: Whence came your interest in Transportation?

Mills: It's long-standing. I don't know whence. It changed, though.
At the beginning of the time that I was in the assembly, I was
very much interested in the freeway program and keeping it
moving and making it work.

Morris: In relation to what the needs were in San Diego?

Mills: Oh, statewide. But by the time I got to the senate, I had decided
that the freeway program was no longer what we should be spending
our money on, that the future would require better public
transportation, and that took place just about the time I went
to the senate. I became concerned about the energy crisis at
that time and also about environmental problems presented by
the automobile.

Morris: That's where the "liberal" world was at that point, in the
70s.

Mills: I don't think they were getting there yet, were they? [pauses]
I suppose. It was the beginning. The freeway revolt had taken
place in San Francisco, but it was pretty rare.

What turned me on to it was basically the environmental
considerations. I was concerned about the increasing expressions
of scientists", increasing expressions of alarm about changing
the constitution of the atmosphere.

Morris: From your own reading, or you had staff people working on this?

Mills: I think the thing that really started me off was the President's
Science Advisory Commission report that suggested that there was
a severe danger of changing the climate of the earth as a result
of increasing the carbon dioxide in the air. The President's
Science Advisory Commission (it was President [John F.] Kennedy's
Science Advisory Commission) suggested that by the year 2000
we might be entering a warming trend that would be effectively
irreversible. It would cause the melting of the polar ice
caps and stupendous consequences, tragic consequences. And,
of course, nothing that has taken place since that time suggests
that it isn't as real a danger now as it was then. The
commission did not say that it would happen, but it said it
was a substantial risk, and I didn't think that it was a risk we
should run.

100

Mills: The question relates to the use of fossil fuel. It doesn't relate
specifically to transportation, but I decided to take one little
corner of it in hand, one little corner of the problem in hand,
and see if I could make a contribution. You can't do all that
you would like in the legislature, in politics. It's necessary
to define a set of reachable goals.

Morris: There are a number of speeches and reports in your file on the
transportation issue.* You seem to have zeroed in on San Diego,
and your efforts in transportation also seem to be related to
planning. I wondered how you sort those two out. It sounds
like planning was sort of a secondary concern of yours that
was related to — but transportation was you first concern.

Mills: The most important thing I did in the field of transportation was
to carry SB 325, which became known as the Mills, Alquist,
Deddeh Act because there were three bills in the hopper in 1971 to
extend the sales tax to gasoline and use the proceeds for public
transportation. The other two bills were bills that Ronald
Reagan said he would veto because they extended the state sales
tax to gasoline and then expended the money as state funds.

I had come up with a different approach because I was con
cerned about how he would react to it . My approach was that the
sales tax would be extended to gasoline, but the state taxes
(the state sales tax) would be diminished by a quarter of
1 percent, so the state actually wouldn't have any increase
in the proceeds from the sales tax. We would take with one
hand and give with the other. We would increase the revenues
of the state by $135 million, approximately, by extending the
sales tax to gasoline; and then we would give up $133 million
or thereabouts, $132 million, by giving up one quarter of a
cent on the general sales tax.

So that was the way it was done. It left that quarter of a
cent available to local government to pick up as a tax for
transportation purposes, and in all the larger counties that
tax for transportation purposes had to be used for the support of
public transportation and basically went to the expansion of
public transportation systems. It has produced a tremendous
amount of money over the years, and it is the largest single
program of support for public transportation in the United States,
with the exception of what the federal government does. Without

* Copies in Supporting Documents in the Bancroft Library

101

Mills: that act, there wouldn't be any bus service in California
today. That was the most important action that I took in
the field of public transportation.

Morris: There was another bill to enable Calfiornia to spend federal
urban mass transit act funds in 1971, and that seemed to be
tied to other legislation that required that before you could
get federal money for mass transit you had to have a regional
plan. Then, you know, San Diego was the first community to
develop such a plan. Were you involved at all in that?

Mills: No, I don't recall having been involved in that.

Morris: Okay. So they just were separate parallel —

Mills: Or if I was involved, it wasn't very important to me.

Morris: I see. The fact that it was San Diego was just coincidence.

Mills: Yes.

Planning Process Problems

Morris: Okay. One of the papers I read was a fascinating article

by Arthur Bauer about the process of developing a consensus in
a regional community for development of regional transportation
plans .

Mills: I remember the bill vaguely. If 1 had much to do with it, it
was just with one hand. I don't think I carried it. I don't
think it was a very important bill. I think it was mostly a
matter of compliance with federal requirements.

Morris: Yes, I think that was it.

Mills: And that kind of bill, where you have a bill that's a matter

of having to comply with federal requirements, you never think
much about a bill like that. You just put it in and take it
through and everybody votes for it.

Morris: [chuckles] Even when, as so many of them came to do in that

period of time, they required community planning of some kind?
Did you find those planning requirements made for better programs?

102

Mills: I don't think they were ever very successful. They may have

made for better programs. The problem with the whole planning
process as it was set up is that the planning agencies were
made up of the representatives of all of the agencies which
were being governed by them, and they simply would get
together and agree upon things. Each one of them, I think, was
a pure log-rolling operation.

The City of San Diego or the City of Escondido would come
in and say, "Here's what we want," and the City of Chula Vista
would say, "Here's what we want," and the City of National City
would say, "Here's what we want," and San Diego would say,
"Here's what we want." Then they'd all go through it, and then
they'd all agree, "Well, if you vote for mine, I'll vote for
yours," and it really didn't turn out to be much of a planning
process. It was better than nothing, but it never accomplished
what was expected of it, in my opinion.

Morris: In this same discussion paper, the point is made that you're
not really going to get all of everything that each of those
communities wants, that the best approach is an incremental
approach.

Mills: Yes.

Morris: Is that similar to your idea that you can't cover all of the
problem, but you can make a contribution if you work in a
small area?

Mills: No, I don't think so. It was just a matter of apportioning money.
As I said, not that everybody would get what they wanted — well,
they'd get their share. Nobody ever got enough. All of them
would put in for more than a pro rate share was, and they'd get
in effect a pro rata share.

Morris:
Mills :

I think incremental approach was a different matter. It
relates largely to transportation; in planning terms it relates
to transportation.

How does that work? You start with a small —

You don't start like BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit]. You start
by building a little bit at a time.

Morris: BART was incremental in reverse.

103

Mills: BART was the opposite of incremental. They presented a seventy-
five-mile system to the voters, and the people voted on the
whole thing. The same was done in Los Angeles once or twice.
That's not a good way to build a system. The only justification
for it is the political justification that if you're going to
get the votes for an increased tax, you have to offer everybody
something whether or not it makes any sense. That was how
BART was built. There were sections of BART that were simply
to pick up votes .

Governor Reagan's Staff and Work Style

Morris: You talked about transportation in terms of your concern about

the environment. Did you work at all with those agencies in the
governor's cabinet that had to deal either with resources or
with transportation?

Mills: Oh, from time to time.

Morris: How was that kind of relationship?

Mills: Usually through staff.

Morris: Your staff and their staff?

Mills: Yes. A lot of negotiation would take place on the staff level.

Morris: And were those negotiations and relationships more successful
than the ones between the senate pro tern and the Governor
himself?

Mills: Yes, very often. If it was something Ronald Reagan didn't care
about, it was possible to negotiate it.

Morris: At the staff level?

Mills: That's right. Sometimes I'd be drawn in. If it got to be some
thing a little more heavy, why, we might sit down with the
director of the Department of Transportation or whatever and
work it out.

Morris: How about Mr. Livermore, who was the Resources secretary? Did
that seem to be — ? It looks as if he may have had different
kinds of views than Governor Reagan.

104

Mills : Yes .

Morris: And that he may have had some influence with Governor Reagan
in terms of more of a conservationist orientation than some
of the other people in the administration.

Mills: Well, certainly he was more conservationist in his outlook than
the administration as a whole.

Morris: Would you sometimes go to him on some of these questions rather
than go directly to the Governor or to the governor's office?

Mills: If it was something the Governor wasn't likely to be very interested
in, but you didn't go around Ronald Reagan. If he was interested
in something, he would make sure that it came out the way he
wanted it, or it wouldn't happen. There was no such thing as
going behind him or around him. He was very much in charge.

He didn't spend a lot of time here, you know. He'd work
from nine to five or whatever. I used to see him coming to
work. I'd ride in on my bicycle, and he'd come in in his
limousine with the body guards and a limousine full of body
guards in behind him and so forth, and I'd see him go by.
He'd go home at five or shortly thereafter. He didn't spend
an awful lot of time finding out about things because he didn't
have that kind of time, but he had opinions on most things.
And he didn't let people do anything in that administration
that was contrary to those opinions, nothing that he was aware
of, and any important issue he would be aware of.

Morris: Through the memo system?

Mills: I don't know. I don't know how they worked it.

Jesse Unruh'sl970 Gubernatorial Campaign and the Democratic Party

Morris: Before I go and see if your next person is here — I didn't ask
you about the other aspect of the 1970 election campaign.
While Ronald Reagan was campaigning against you in San Diego
[chuckles], were you campaigning for Jesse Unruh or involved in
his campaign at all for governor?

Mills: I was willing to do what I could, but it was pretty hard to do
anything for him. That is, there wasn't an awful lot going on
in San Diego for the campaign, and when we arranged things then

105

Mills: sometimes the rug would be pulled out from under us. For

example, we were able to arrange a big billboard, a painted
bulletin, one of the great big ones, on Interstate 5 where a
lot of people saw it. It was a good board. It was free. It
was a Democrat who owned the board.

Morris: How marvelous! What a treasure.

Mills: There was nothing else on it, and he said, "You can have it as

long as nobody rents the board," so we had the sign up there, and
people were seeing it. There wasn't anything much going on for
Jess. There were no other billboards at all. There was very
little advertising. He was fighting an uphill battle.

They made us take the sign down; that is to say, the
Unruh people made us take the sign down. They heard about the
sign and called up and said, "You've got to take that sign down."
We said, "Why take the sign down? You don't have anything
else going in San Diego County. You've got one billboard.
That's about it." [They said,] "Well, we have made the announce
ment that we're not going to be spending a lot of money on the
campaign, we're not going to try to buy people's votes, we're
not going to be buying billboards, and therefore we're not
going to have any billboards. Therefore, take it down."

That is an indication of the kind of problem that we had
with the Unruh campaign, trying to do something. There were
people working for that campaign who prevented that from happening.
I think John Van De Kamp, who is now the district attorney of
Los Angeles, was the one who called up and said, "You have
to get that sign down." There just wasn't much happening for
Jess .

Morris: Did he have any kind of a legislative steering committee or
anything like that that you might have been a part of?

Mills: I wasn't a part of any. See, he had gotten involved a little bit
in the pro tern race in the senate, and relationships between
us were somewhat strained. I had been an enthusiastic
supporter of Howard Way, and he tried to give Jack Schrade a
hand when Jack Schrade removed Howard Way, and all of us were
[wry chuckle] out in the snow. Unruh was one of those who saw
fit to try to help Jack, and I didn't think that was in the
public interest, and so we weren't as close at that time as we
had been in the past.

106

Morris:

Mills :
Morris:
Mills :

Mills: But I still, you know, wanted to see him elected governor. I

think he would have been a better governor than any governor in
my experience; I still think that. I don't think there's anybody
in the state of California in politics with his ability or
intelligence.

From your vantage point, what was the problem with that campaign?
As speaker, he had such tremendous visibility and authority.

A lot of his publicity had been negative.

Yes. You mean in terms of the locking up the legislature and — ?

Oh, yes. The press worked him over on that very unfairly. That
was a real injustice that was done on the lockup. And other
things, you know.

Before he became speaker, he rather enjoyed some of the
bizarre publicity that he had been getting as "Big Daddy" and
the heavy-handed bully of the California legislature. He was
sort of amused by it and he even contributed to it. Some of the
most outrageous things that were said about Jess Unruh were said
by Jess Unruh.

Then, by 1963 or' 64, he realized that that was hurting him.
He decided he wanted to be governor, and that kind of publicity
was very damaging to him, but the press wouldn't let him forget
it. They kept using it over and over again. Everything that he
had ever said, they kept repeating to make sure that people
remembered it. They kept going over the lockup as though that
had been some sort of an attempt to force the Republicans to
vote aye on the budget, and it wasn't. The decision for the
lockup was made — did we go through this before?

Morris: I think we did.

Mills: Okay. Well, we don't need to go through it again. But he had
gotten more bad publicity than any other prominent politician
in California during the 1960s. That was damaging to him, but
he still did pretty well. He did a lot better than Pat Brown,
and Pat Brown had a lot of money to spend. Pat Brown had a
lot of television, a lot of radio, billboards, the whole thing.
As I remember, that was a pretty well-financed campaign. Jess
didn't have any of those things, and Jess came a lot closer to
beating Reagan than Brown did.

107

Morris: What kinds of efforts were there, either in the legislature or
in the state Democratic organization, to coalesce or reorganize
or build a new focus to counteract the Republican gains?

Mills: Well, we just did what we usually do. We tried to raise some
money and tried to put on campaigns. I don't recall anything
being very different that year. Of course, I was very busy with
my own race. We picked up a couple of seats.

Morris: Yes. And that's the normal way it goes. You don't come back —
the party as a whole, statewide, doesn't pull together to recoup
its losses?

Mills: The party as a whole, statewide, is just what Hiram Johnson

intended it to be — virtually nothing — and it was the same that
year as it is most years.

Morris: Well, I'm thinking about in contrast to the Republicans, who
developed the Cal Plan and had been working industriously to
increase registration and —

Mills: Yes. Well, that was the year the Cal Plan fell apart. The Cal
Plan had worked. They had continually picked up Democratic
seats. They had targeted Democratic seats, and they had won
those seats year after year, and they had increased their strength
and increased their strength. That year they targeted Walter
Stiern and me. I was number one, and Walter Stiern was number
two, at least in the early stages of the campaign, and we beat
them. That wasn't the high watermark of the Cal Plan; that was
two years after the high watermark of the Cal Plan. The
high watermark of the Cal Plan was '68 when they gained control
of the senate. In '70 they lost control of the senate. Ronald
Reagan won the governorship, but the Republicans lost control of
both houses at the same time, which is an indication that —

Morris: The Cal Plan was selective at best?

Mills: The Cal Plan worked when they had people who were easy to beat.
When they had taken out all of the people who were easy to
beat, they got down to Walter Stiern and to me, and we weren't
easy to beat.

Okay. Does that do it?

Morris: I think that's a good place to stop.
Mills: Okay.

108

Morris: Thank you kindly.

Mills: There will be people who will read that one with interest.

Morris: There will, indeed. There will, indeed.

Mills: Especially about [chuckles] George Moscone pledging himself both
ways in the pro tern election.

Transcriber: Marilyn White
Final Typist: John E. McPherson

109

TAPE GUIDE — James R. Mills

Interview 1: January 23, 1980 1

tape 1, side A i

tape 1, side B 12

tape 2, side A [side B not recorded] 23

Interview 2: February 6, 1980 24

tape 3, side A 24

tape 3, side B 35

Interview 3: February 20, 1980 48

tape 4, side A 48

tape 4, side B 53

tape 5, side A [side B not recorded] 69

Interview 4: June 10, 1981 74

tape 6, side A 74

tape 6, side B 86

tape 7, side A [side B not recorded] 100

110

INDEX — James Mills

Bear, Jim, 13

Bee, Carlos, 27, 28, 29, 35-36

Beilenson, Anthony, 78

Blessing, Edward, 6-7, 9, 10, 15

Boney, Henry, 15, 94, 97

Brown, Edmund G., Jr. (Jerry), 69

Brown, Edmund G., Sr. (Pat), 17, 18, 19-20, 26, 27, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41, 42,

64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 106
Brown, Ralph, 24, 26, 27, 33
budget, state, 41, 42, 43
Burns, Hugh, 77, 78-79, 80, 87
Burton, Philip, 58-59
business, and government, aerospace industry, 18, 19, 21, 22

California assembly, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 38,

Democratic caucus, 29-31, 32, 63

Democrats in, 35, 37, 38, 39, 45, 64

Finance and Insurance Committee, 39

Industrial Relations Committee, 39

Republican caucus, 30

Republicans in, 35, 38, 39, 61

Rules Committee, 63-64

Speaker, 24, 26-29, 33, 35-36, 38, 42, 63
California Democratic Council (CDC) , 10, 13, 16, 25
California legislature, 22-23, 56, 58, 59, 65, 71-72, 73, 85

breakfast club, 27, 36-37, 38, 79, 88

Constitutional Revision Commission, 45-47, 71-72

Democrats (Democratic caucus), 29-31, 32, 35, 37

and federal government, 56, 59-60

and governor's office, 17, 18, 23, 31, 42, 64, 89-92, 93

legislative analyst, 35, 40, 42

legislative counsel, 21, 35

Republicans in, 22, 30, 35

staff, 23, 33, 34, 35, 42, 93
California senate, 61, 77-78, 85

Democrats in, 79

Ethics Committee, 85

president pro tern, 79-83, 86-88

Republicans in, 79

staff, 78, 79

Transportation Committee, 98-99

Un-American Activities, Committee on, 49, 50, 51
capital punishment, 9

Ill

Carrell, Tom, 27, 88
Champion, Hale, 17, 18, 42, 43, 64
Chicanes . See Mexican Americans
Christian, Winslow, 17, 18

Democratic caucus. See California assembly

Democratic party (Democrats), California, 10, 11, 12, 25-26, 60, 62, 107

in San Diego County, 3-4, 19-21, 67, 68, 74-75, 105
Dills, Ralph, 83
Dymally, Mervin, 87

election campaigns, ballot measures

Proposition 14 (1964), anti-Rumford Act, 62

Proposition LA (1966), Constitutional Revision, 71-72
election campaigns, California

1960 assembly, 3, 5, 6-10, 11, 12-13, 15

1964 assembly, 62

1966 gubernatorial, 70-71, 75, 106

1966 senate, 67-69, 70, 74-76

1970 gubernatorial, 104-105, 106

1970 senate, 15, 60, 93, 94-97

election campaigns, methods and finance, 7-8, 12, 13, 14, 69, 76-77, 96, 97-98
environmental concerns, 99-100

and the governor's office, 103, 104

fair housing, Rumford Act, 61-62
federal government, programs, 55-56, 101
Fisher, Hugo, 49-50, 53, 67, 68

Hegland, Sheridan, 4

insurance, social welfare, 39-42

labor unions, 13, 39, 40, 55
League of Women Voters, 46
Linkletter, Art, 95
lobbyists, 72-73, 78-79, 80, 87
Luce, Gordon, 97

112

McCarthy, Jack, 88, 89
Marler, Fred, 81
media, newspapers

California Journal, 94

and politics, 6, 8, 53, 72, 76, 82, 106

San Diego Tribune, 6-7, 74, 76

San Diego Union, 6-7, 50, 76
Medi-Cal, 58, 59
Mexican Americans , 4
Miller, George, Jr., 65, 66
Morgan, Neil, 7

Moscone, George, 80, 81, 82, 86, 88, 108
Munnell, William, 12, 24-25, 29

Parkinson, Gaylord, 60, 61
Pitts, Thomas, 40
polls, election, 76-77

Quick, Aaron, 67, 74, 75

Reagan, Ronald, 70-71, 75, 79-80, 89-92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 100, 103, 104
reapportionment, 1960s, 44, 45, 67, 74
regional planning, 54, 55, 57, 101-102

and federal government, 55, 56, 101

and public transportation, 101

Republican party (Republicans), California, 10-11, 12, 30, 45, 50, 51, 60,
61

California Plan, 60-61, 94, 107

Eleventh Commandment, 60

in San Diego County, 4, 5-6, 15, 49, 95
Roberti, David, 82, 83, 84

San Diego, 4, 5, 16, 54

council of governments, 56, 57

Democratic party in, 3-4, 19-21, 67, 68, 74-75, 105

Historical Society, 5

regional planning, 54, 101-102

Republican party in, 4, 5-6, 15, 49, 95

Unified Port District, 52-53
Schrade, Jack, 13, 50, 53, 81, 86, 105
Serrano-Priest, 66
Stiern, Walter, 60, 83, 107
Sumner, Bruce, 46

113

taxation, 71

equalization, school taxes, 65-66

gasoline, 55, 100

and public transportation, 100

reform, 65

sales, 100

withholding, 91-92
transportation, public, 54-55, 99, 100-101, 102

Bay Area Rapid Transit [BART], 102-103

and regional planning, 101-102

Unruh, Jesse, 12-13, 16-17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 61, 70, 71, 104, 105, 106

election to the Speakership, 26-29, 35-36

as Speaker, 33, 37, 38, 42, 64
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 72

Van Dieman, General, files, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52

Waldie, Jerome, 24, 29, 30, 31, 70
Way, Howard, 79, 80, 81, 86, 105
Welfare Reform Act (1971), 92
Wilson, Pete, 6, 7

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Robert T. Monagan
INCREASING REPUBLICAN INFLUENCE IN THE STATE ASSEMBLY

An Interview Conducted by

Gabrielle Morris

in 1981

ROBERT MONAGAN
ca. 1975

Photo by Sirlin Stud-Los

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Robert Monagan

INTERVIEW HISTORY

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND 1

Teaching, Coaching, Community Activities 1

Early Political Experience in San Joaquin County and

Washington, D.C. 2

II 1960 ASSEMBLY CAMPAIGN 6

Politics in Tracy 6

Constituents; Organization; Fund Raising 8

Community Contact; Family Interest 11

Water and the Delta 14

III LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT AND OPPORTUNITY 16

Fellow Freshman Legislators 16

Jesse Unruh Becomes Speaker 18

Strengthening the Legislature 20

Pat Brown as Governor 22

IV REPUBLICAN PARTY ACTIVIST 25

Becoming Minority Floor Leader, 1965 25

Cal Plan for Electing Republicans 27

1966 Gubernatorial Campaign 30

Ronald Reagan Becomes Governor 33

Legislative Relations with the Governor 36

V A BIPARTISAN APPROACH TO THE SPEAKERSHIP, 1969-1970 42

Unexpected Republican Majority 42

Further Legislative Professionalization 44
Key Committee Assignments: Criminal Justice, Environmental

Quality 47

Staffing Pro and Con; Statewide Planning 51

Problems with Medi-Cal and Welfare 55

VI PARTISAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBSERVATIONS 59

Continuous Election Process 59

Minority and Youth Representation 62

Changes in Campaigning: Volunteers, the Right Wing 63

Reagan's 1968 Favorite Son Campaign 67

Campaign Tactics and Personalities, 1968-1972 69

VII ONGOING ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE 74

Federal Policies on Transportation, Air Quality 74

Reapportionment 76

Revenue Sharing 80

VIII REMEMBERING JOHN VENEMAN, 1982 84

TAPE GUIDE 86

INDEX 87

INTERVIEW HISTORY

In any study of the California legislature in the 1960s and 70s,
Robert Monagan is a key figure as the lone Republican to hold the position
of Assembly Speaker. One of six "young Turks" elected in 1960 who were
concerned that the party have a moderate position, responsive to social
issues, Monagan was their chosen candidate when the opportunity arose to
take control of the lower house in 1969. Earlier, as minority leader, he
had worked diligently to help orient incoming governor Ronald Reagan on
the workings of state government. This interview provides Monagan's
succinct, sharp recollections of Republican efforts to increase and consoli
date their strength in the legislature and of legislative relations with
the governor's office.

A tall, fit, and friendly person, Monagan addressed the interview
outline, which had been sent to him in advance of the recording sessions,
with interest and candor. Obviously talented in working with people, he
describes his early activity in student organizations and alumni relations
at then-College of the Pacific and the Tracy Chamber of Commerce before
becoming involved in politics. Touching briefly on his election to city
council and assembly, assistance on various state and national Republican
campaigns, Monagan provides insights into San Joaquin County politics
and useful tips on grassroots campaigning.

During his early years in the assembly, he and his fellow young
Turks were active in the Republicans' California Plan to elect more members
of their party to office. The goal was to gain control by 1970 so that
Republicans would shape the coming legislative reapportionment. Although
they won a majority of assembly seats in 1969 and elected Monagan speaker,
he ruefully notes that the party was unable to maintain its majority
position, the speakership reverted to the Democrats, and the 1970 reappor
tionment became a struggle that was eventually resolved in the courts.

While speaker, legislative housekeeping required a considerable
amount of his attention, and legislation on specific issues was largely
left to others. One exception was environmental quality, which "arrived
about the time I got to be speaker as a major issue demanding some attention
from the legislature." Monagan's response was to appoint an innovative
select committee that produced a bill requiring the executive branch to
prepare a state environmental plan. The lengthy negotiations on imple
mentation of this bill, discussed in more detail by Norman Livermore, Jr.
and others interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office, reflect the
view that the "legislature tends to ignore things that come from the
governor, regardless of the party .. .nobody was going to grab in toto a
program of any governor and try to run it through the legislature."

In this and other passages, Monagan clearly speaks as a man of the
legislature, emphasizing continuing interaction between legislators and
the governor's people as vital to effective government. The governor's
office, he felt, was "suspicious of all of us who were in the legislature.,
it was a hard thing to get Reagan to meet with legislators". On party
matters Monagan expresses admiration for Reagan's effectiveness as
fundraiser, but reservations about his impact on the party organization.
These relationships between party, candidate, officeholder, and government
operations are, of course, the crux of the drama of political life, and
Robert Monagan has provided a front-row seat at a particularly absorbing
scene.

At the time of the interviews, Monagan was president of the California
Manufacturers Association. He agreed readily to an invitation to partici
pate in the project and promptly made time to see the interviewer in his
Sacramento office on June 22 and July 13, 1981. A rough-edited transcript
of the tape-recorded interviews was sent to him for review, and returned
with minor emendations in April 1982. Shortly before then, John Veneman,
a close friend and fellow member of the young Turks of the 1960s, had
died. Because Veneman too had been a key legislator during the Reagan
administration whom the project had planned to interview, Monagan kindly
agreed to include in this memoir his remarks at the memorial service for
Mr . Veneman .

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

8 June 1982

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND
[Interview 1: June 22, 1981 ]##

Teaching, Coaching, Community Activities

Morris: I'd like to start by asking you a little bit about your

personal background, how you came to settle in Tracy, and
what your educational background is.

Monagan: Well, I had a very checkered background in that I, unlike
lots of people, did not have any real fixed goal in mind
when I started out. I was born in Utah. We moved to
Vallejo and I grew up and went through school in Vallejo. I
went over to Stockton, to what was then the College of the
Pacific (now the University of the Pacific) and had planned
to become a teacher and a coach, and was graduated in '42.

But the war, of course, had come about by then and I
went into the service and served in the U.S. Coast Guard
until I got out. Then I came back to Pacific and did my
graduate work and was still planning to be a coach and a
teacher.

Morris: Football?

Monagan: Well, more baseball and basketball, but football could have
been part of it, in a high school level. I did coach the
Pacific freshman basketball team one year. But while I was
doing my graduate work, the school asked me first to be
alumni secretary, which I was for a few months, and then they
moved me over to be the graduate manager of athletics in the

## This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape
has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 86.

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan :

Morris :
Monagan :

Morris :

Monagan:
Morris :
Monagan:

athletic department. So I stayed and worked at Pacific
for four years in that capacity.

While you were doing your graduate work you started, and
then you just eased right on into the job?

Right, right. I got my general secondary teacher's credential
but never got out to do full-time teaching. I did teach at
both Pacific and what was then Stockton Junior College (now
is San Joaquin Delta College) on a part-time basis while I
was graduate manager and taught a variety of things, including
tennis and badminton and basketball and economics and community
hygiene and personal hygiene.

Sort of a man of all work.

Almost anything that they needed someone to fill in, I
could kind of fill in half way.

Well, the community college movement was really expanding at
that point.

Yes, it was, right.

Lots of students and funding.

Then I left there and went to Tracy as manager of the Chamber
of Commerce, and that's where I first got my taste in the
political side of things. I went there in 1951, which was a
reapportionment year , and the county was trying to maintain
two assembly districts out of reapportionment. I headed up
a committee that worked on that and tried to persuade the
legislature that San Joaquin County was entitled to two
assembly districts, but they didn't concur in that, and one
of them got eliminated.

Early Political Experience in San Joaquin County and
Washington D.C.

Monagan: I didn't really have any goal in mind to get into politics.
I had never really thought too much about that . But then
I was sitting in the Chamber of Commerce office one day
with the county chairman for the Republicans who was a friend

Monagan: from Tracy, and he said, "I don't know how to run any campaign,
and we need to have somebody run the Eisenhower campaign of
1952. Would you run it?"

I said, "Well, I don't— I guess I could." He said, "We
need somebody that can organize some things . " So they put me
in charge of that.

Morris: Who was the county chairman at that point?
Monagan: His name was Lindsay Cochran.

At the_ end of the campaign, the congressman from that
district, a Republican congressman, Leroy Johnson, said, "Well,
why don't you come back to Washington and be my administrative
assistant?" I thought, that sounds like a good idea, so
we moved back to Washington for a couple years, which was a
very valuable experience. But we had two children and we
decided that it was too hard to do. So we moved back to
Tracy, and I went in the insurance business, and then pretty
soon, being involved in all kinds of community activities,
that led me up to running for the city council —

Morris: Could I go back a minute and ask you [a question]?
Monagan: Yes.

Morris: In your congressional assistant days, was there much contact
at that point between a congressman from San Joaquin County
and the local legislative representative?

Monagan: No, not very much. Even in today's times you get pretty

removed, once you get back to Washington, from things, and
there's not too much contact that way any more.

Morris: So what particular kind of work did you do as a congressional
assistant? Any particular subject area?

Monagan: No. In those days the entire staff of a congressman was two

and a half persons, and now, when they have about twenty-five,
it's basically a constituent responsibility in dealing with
the issues that came up from constituents and dealing with
federal agencies and also some keeping the constituents
informed, the communications aspect of the job.

Morris: What kinds of constituent concerns were there from your
district?

Monagan :

Morris :
Monagan :
Morris:
Monagan:
Morris:
Monagan :

Morris:
Monagan:

Well, there were lots of things. Our congressman was a member
of the Armed Services Committee, so we had a lot of issues
dealing with military facilities. Water and agriculture were
big in the area, and the congressman was working on the
Tri-Dam Project here on the Stanislaus River. So we were
involved in a lot of issues like that and, of course, worked
with all the people on all the agricultural issues that there
were.

The local farm organizations?

Yes , yes . True .

So then you decided to run for the city council?

I ran for the city council and got elected.

Was that a tough campaign in those days?

Well, not really. It was a small community, and I'd been
involved in all kinds of organizations in the community for
a long time, and it kind of just was a natural to be well-
known from those activities and to get elected to the council.

Then I was planning to run for a county supervisor ' s
position that was opening up. I was in Sacramento one day.
I had headed up the Delta Water Users' Association, and I was
appearing before an assembly committee on water issues, and
the local assemblyman, Bill Biddick, called me and said that
he wasn't going to run. He was a Democrat but an old college
friend. So we shifted plans and moved from running for
county supervisor to running for the assembly.

So you readily see that, as you look back through all my
record, it wasn't anything very well planned and laid out.
They almost happened by some circumstance developing.

It sounds like you've had a continuing interest in people and
in organizational activities.

Right, yes. That kind of follows all the way through. It's
a common thread of being involved, and organizing and develop
ing and communicating and working with people all fit into
that.

Morris: What's the source of your interest in organizing and getting
people together? Have you ever thought about that?

Monagan? No, I don't know. In all my school career I was involved in
some kind of leadership position, as president of the student
body in high school and president of the student body in
college. I haven't thought about any particular reasons for
it. It just kind of all developed. I'm an active person,
just getting involved in things.

Morris: Lots of energy, yes.

II 1960 ASSEMBLY CAMPAIGN

Politics in Tracy

Morris: The California Blue Book says that you were mayor at one point.
Did you run for that?

Monagan: The mayor is elected by the councilmen. I was elected mayor
at the same time I announced that I was going to run for the
assembly, which posed a little bit of local political problems,
but not too much. My council colleagues went along with that.
They didn't know whether I was going to get elected or not,
so they thought I could still serve as mayor while I was
running for the assembly.

Morris: Why had your Democratic college friend decided not to run
again?

Monagan: He'd been a member of the legislature for six years and

wanted to be a judge, and so he decided to run for the

superior court instead of running for re-election to the
assembly.

Morris: He decided to run for the judgeship?
Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: Ah, that's interesting, because I thought that was a fairly
recent development .

Monagan: Yes, right. Well, Bill Biddick was a very outstanding kind
of person. There was an opening on the court in San Joaquin
County for a superior court judge, and he did not want to be
indebted to Governor Pat Brown, and he refused (which he could
have easily gotten) an appointment to fill it; he decided he'd
run for it. So he ran for the office and got elected and felt
he wasn't obligated in any way to anyone.

Morris: Did you work on his superior court campaign?
Monagan: Well, indirectly, yes. I supported him.
Morris: That's a nonpartisan spot.

Monagan: It was a nonpartisan thing, so it didn't pose any problems for
me, political problems.

Morris: Is San Joaquin that kind of a county that you can have across-
the-lines alliances between parties and that sort of thing?

Monagan: Well, yes, it was about two-thirds Democratic registration
versus Republicans, but they were more rural, conservative
kinds of Democrats, so it was easy for them to cross party
lines and vote for a Republican.

Morris: Tell me a little bit about your campaign then, how you put
together an assembly campaign.

Monagan: [pauses] Well, in politics generally, you have to be kind of
lucky. The Democrats were caught by surprise by the announce
ment that the incumbent Democrat assemblyman wasn't going to
run, so they did not have things planned and ready for a
campaign. They had about six Democrats who wanted to run for
the job. They had a convention, an endorsing convention, and
they couldn't agree on anyone, so they let them all run.

Morris: In the primary?
Monagan: In the primary.
Morris: Oh, dear!

Monagan: So what I thought was about the third best of the group won
the primary. I think if one of the other couple of stronger
candidates had won, I probably wouldn't have been elected.
But I happened to draw an older man who had been around there
for a long time (he was about sixty-six, as I recall, at
that time) , and I was relatively young and vigorous at
thirty-nine, and so that age difference and the vigor that I
could put into the campaign were very helpful.

Morris: How had you happened to decide on the Republican party in
the first place?

Monagan:
Morris:
Monagan :

Morris :

Monagan :

Originally?
Yes.

Well, that's a good story too. I grew up in Vallejo, and my
father and mother were Democrats. Of course, they were
products of the early Roosevelt days, and it was a lot more
popular to do that. We also lived in Vallejo, and he worked at
the Navy yard, and they felt very strong attachments to
Roosevelt, who had been a strong supporter of the Navy. So
they were Democrats and the community was pretty Democrat . So
when I registered the first time, I registered as a Democrat
and had no interest in politics at all.

When I went into the service, and when Roosevelt decided
to run for a fourth term, I was so incensed about that that
I got one of the easy forms that you have in the service
where you can change your party affiliation. I just filled
one out and sent it in and said, "I'm going to be a Republican,"
so that's how I became a Republican.

And then when you got into business and got settled in a county
that had a heavy Democratic registration, you still stayed
Republican.

Well, I was committed by then, by accident, because the
Republicans asked me to run the Eisenhower campaign. So then
I got identified as being a Republican and went to work for
a Republican congressman. So I was pretty well locked into
being a Republican, at least by registration, at that time.
I probably was more personally conservative than the district
down there, but I was able to operate with a moderate kind
of image politically, and so —

Constituents; Organization; Fund Raising

Morris: Is there a lot of political participation in San Joaquin?
Are the parties active?

Monagan: Well, the Democrats had taken it for granted all during the
years because it was pretty well dominated by Democrats for
about twenty years. The registration was always on their
side, and if they had reasonably good candidates they could win.

Monagan: In the instance I already outlined, if they had been better
prepared and come up with a stronger candidate, I probably
wouldn't have won in the first place. But once I won, I
was very active in my work, and so I built up a lot of alliances
with people that cut across all the partisan lines.

Morris: On issue legislation?

Monagan: On issues like education. I was a teacher, I'd gotten my

credential, so I had a lot of appeal to the education people.
Agriculture was a strong base because of my previous activities
with the water issues, and I'd developed a lot of relationships
with state employees in San Joaquin County.

Morris: Are there?

Monagan: Well, there was a state hospital and a highway division office
and a correctional institution, that Deuel Vocational
[Institution]. So I had lots of those people that I could work
with. If you were interested in their problems and kind of
responded to their needs, well, they didn't care whether you
were Republican or Democrat. So once I got in and became an
incumbent, that incumbent factor was enough to carry me through
regardless of registration.

Morris: Did you have any Republican opposition in the primary?

Monagan: The first time I did, yes, there were three candidates. But
I had a head start because I had a little advance knowledge
that the vacancy was going to occur, and I had been involved
in all those activities with the Republican party before, so —

Morris: Was the local county central committee active?

Monagan: Not publicly, but they were almost all — all the establishment
of the party were on my side.

Morris: In the primary?

Monagan? Right. They couldn't get involved in the primary fight, but
they were basically my friends.

Morris: Were there some good experienced hands there that offered
advice on running a campaign?

Monagan: Well, they probably turned to me. They thought I was the
expert on running campaigns because of my having run that
presidential campaign, so they looked to me as the one who
was the most notable campaign organizer.

Morris: A lot of times you find in a local area there is a grand old

man who knows all the ins and outs of local political concerns
and who to get to run this and that campaign. Anybody like
that?

Monagan: No, not really. Some people were very helpful in terms of
raising some money for the campaign. The president of the
Bank of Stockton, for example, was a long-time friend and
he circulated among the people who would respond to invitations
for political contributions, so that was helpful in that regard.

But campaigns didn't cost as much money in those days as
they do now. We were chastised for having spent the most
amount of money anybody had ever spent for that kind of a
campaign, and we spent $15,000.

Morris: [chuckles] This is for both the June and the November campaigns?

Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: Was it difficult to raise that much money in 1960?

Monagan: It seemed like it was. We raised all the money we thought
we could raise, and that was $15,000, and that was still a
lot of money for a campaign.

Morris: And how did you- spend it?

Monagan: We had a very well-rounded campaign, a sufficient amount of
billboards and a little radio (television wasn't a factor in
those days), and then the rest of it was mostly direct mail,
and try to personalize the mail as much as possible.

Morris: Ah! That's become a fine skill. How did you do that in 1960?

Monagan: Well, we didn't have the advantage of the technology that they
now have, but I always had a strong feeling that that was a
very valuable way to campaign. So we had to do it by volunteers
doing all the work instead of having computerized mail operations,
You would get printed letters, and they would hand-address to all
of these people, the volunteers.

Morris: Did you use the "Dear Joe" device?

Monagan: Yes. We used everything that we could in that way to
personalize them.

Community Contact; Family Interest

Monagan: Then there were a lot of people who suggested that you ought

to go door to door. I never was big on door to door. I thought
that wasted a lot of time. So we came up with what we thought
was the next best thing, and we had it very, very well organized,
in having community teas. We'd get somebody to invite in
twenty, twenty-five of their neighbors in areas, and we had as
many as seven of those functions a day throughout the county,
and I'd just go from one to another.

Morris: Who did your scheduling?

Monagan: I had a very able gal who was my secretary down in Stockton for
the whole twelve, thirteen years I was in the legislature. She
was very good at that .

Morris: She came in as a volunteer on your —

Monagan: No, I had hired her here for my district office in Stockton.

So we just did that. I'd just drop in and I'd spend about
thirty minutes at each one. I'd drop in and get introduced and
have a cup of coffee. I ate a lot of doughnuts and cookies in
those days. Then I'd talk for about fifteen minutes about what
I thought were the major issues and give them a couple of
minutes for questions, and then I'd dash off to the next one.

Morris: Seven a day is an incredible schedule.

Monagan: Yes. I thought it was very, very effective, because we did

them geographically, so they were spread out. I always felt
that if I made a good impression on a person on an informal
basis like that, they would then go out and tell all their
neighbors, "Oh, I was over at a tea, and I saw Bob Monagan,
and I was impressed with him," or whatever it was, assuming
that it was favorable.

Morris:

Monagan :

Morris :
Monagan :

Morris:
Monagan :

Morris:
Monagan:

Morris:
Monagan :
Morris :

Monagan :

Did you get a cross-section with people who were opposed to
you, or plants from the opposition candidates?

No, no. They probably weren't that well organized. I think
the hostesses we got would invite people, and they probably
would eliminate anybody that had known persuasions the other
way. But these were all mostly women; very few men were involved
in that.

That's interesting.

All we'd do is ask them and say, "Well, look, if you like
what Bob's talking about, why don't you take a few of these
little leaflets and hand them out to your friends?" We
thought that was very effective. I thought that was better
than going door to door.

What did the men do in your campaign?

Well, the men were not really very active in the campaign. The
women really did the work in those days. They were the volun
teers. I think we miss that in our present political process,
the involvement of people. It's far more efficient to put it
in a computerized mailing list and send things out, but it was
sure helpful to have people knowing that they had a part of it.
They'd come down to the office and spend an hour or two
writing out envelopes. We'd try to think of all of the little
devices we could that involved people in the campaign. It's
unfortunate that politics has become very impersonal now.

Did your wife get involved in this at all?

Yes, she was involved, although she kept the business kind
of going while I was out. We had a small insurance business
and she was —

I see. She worked in the business with you.
She had to kind of keep an eye on that.

That's a good relationship. How did she feel about your
going into — well, it wasn't full-time politics then, but
adding a —

Well, it almost gets to that point of being full-time. She
didn't object to that. We still had growing children, and that
is a problem for people in politics. We were kind of lucky
that we got into it just about the time they were in high school
and getting out of high school and on to college, so it was a
little easier than if they were very young children.

Morris: Yes. How did they feel about their father being very much in
the public eye?

Monagan: Well, I think my daughter, who is the youngest, thought more
highly of the whole thing than did my son. He was a couple
years older, and I think he just kind of ignored it. He was
at that teenage, high-school level of getting ready to go on to
college and didn't pay too much attention to it, but my
daughter did. She eventually got involved in politics, and
she's worked up in the legislature for the last eleven years, and
she's going to go back to Washington and work in the new adminis
tration.

Morris: Good. As a legislative aide?

Monagan: Well, she's going to be a special assistant to the undersecretary
in the Health and Human Services Department.

Morris: She really followed in her father's footsteps then! [laughter]
Monagan: Yes.

Morris: Did you piggyback at all with other candidates, either for
the city council or for Congress?

Monagan: No, pretty much independent. Everybody thought that that was
always the wise course of action, because of the Democratic
registration, not to get too identified with other candidates.

Morris: That was the Nixon/Kennedy year, which was a pretty close presi
dential election. Was it close also in San Joaquin?

Monagan: Nixon carried San Joaquin County.

Morris: Did he come into the county at all to campaign?

Monagan: He did a couple times, and I appeared with him. It wasn't one
of those things where I didn't want to be attached to him, but
I did campaign pretty much independently of that.

Morris: Were you active at all in state Republican affairs before you
got into the assembly?

Monagan: No, not until after I got in the legislature.

Water and the Delta

Morris:
Monagan :

Morris :
Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan :
Morris:

Were there any particular issues you recall as being crucial?

Well, I got elected in part on the issue of water. In 1960,
that primary election, also on the ballot was the Proposition 1,
the billion-dollar water bond act, and I was vociferously opposed
to that.

Were you?

Because that also was good politics. The people in the Delta
area were not supportive of that water bond act, and all the
reasons that I used in my arguments against it turned out to
be right, and they're right today when they talk about the
Peripheral Canal.

In terms of the water quality in the Delta?

Well, there are a number of things. One, they never had
enough money, and they were deceiving the people in terms of
thinking that if they passed a billion-dollar bond act that
would take care of it. It turned out very soon to be an
insufficient amount of money. Secondly, they didn't have
enough water in the basin to take care of everybody's needs.
And third, the basic thing is that if you make a commitment to
take water out of the Delta or that would flow into the Delta
normally, and divert it, sooner or later the only place you're
going to get water to put back into the basin is the north
coast and the wild rivers, and they declared all of those
out of bounds. So you can't take a chance (the Delta people
can't take a chance) unless somebody makes a commitment
that when they need water to replace in the Delta, they'll
get it from the north coast. That's still basically the
fight now about the Peripheral Canal .

So San Joaquin County is allied with the north generally in
the water crunch .

Right, right.

How about the agricultural people in your area?
farms around .

You've got big

Monagan: Yes. Lots of big farms. There are also lots of small farms
too. There's lots of big farming in the Delta area because
that's the way those tracts were developed, but there are
lots of small farmers in San Joaquin County, and I had an
excellent relationship with them.

Morris: And they felt that there was adequate water — ?

Monagan: Well, they wanted to make sure they had adequate water, and
they didn't want to have somebody come and take their water
away and not have any mechanism for replacing it if they
needed it someday.

There's a need for a Peripheral Canal. It makes a lot
of sense, and you do need to protect the people who have
their own economic interests in the Delta, but the fundamental
problem is there's not enough water to go around. If you're
going to take it out of this basin, you may not need it for
twenty years, but someday you have to replace that water, and
the only place is up on the north coast. That's the only big
supply of water that's left; that goes flowing out to the
ocean, and there ought to be a commitment made that when the
water is needed they'll move some of that water into this
valley basin.

You've got the environmentalists and others who are
saying," "We've got to keep those rivers wild, and we don't
want ever to do that." So it's politically difficult to
accomplish, and we've still got the same fight we had twenty
years ago on the Peripheral Canal. The same issues are
there.

Morris: It takes a long time to work out some of these issues.
Monagan: Yes.

III LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT AND OPPORTUNITY ##

Fellow Freshman Legislators

Morris: When you went to Sacramento, did you have some kind of an

orientation process or father figure who guided you through the
ways of the legislature?

Monagan: [pauses] Well, in part that's true. You generally wind up
with somebody who ' s your seatmate . I happened to have an
assemblyman from Redwood City by the name of Carl Britschgi, who
had been in the legislature for about six years up to that
point, and he always professed to have taken me under his
wing and taught me everything that he knew about the legislature,
But I got along very well with people in the legislature, so I
had a lot of support there.

But one of the things that happened is we — I was elected
to the assembly in '60, and we took office in '61, and it was
a very small class of new legislators. There were only nine
new assemblymen that year. I had the distinction of being
the only Republican who replaced a Democrat in there, so I
got a little notoriety out of that . But we had a very out
standing class of legislators in those nine, five Democrats
and four Republicans . They included Jim Mills , on the
Democratic side, who became the president pro tern of the
senate; and a rather notorious Congressman by the name of
Bob Leggett , who was only there for two years but went back
to Washington as a Congressman.

Morris: From Vallejo, wasn't he?
Monagan: From Vallejo, right.

Monagan: And Jack Knox, who just retired after twenty years in the

legislature and also served as speaker pro tern of the assembly.
There were two others: Jack Casey, who was very influential
in educational issues; and another gentleman, who died in the
first term, by the name of Jimmy [W.A.] Hicks, who was from
Sacramento . They were good friends .

Then I developed a very close alliance with the other
three Republicans in that group. They included Hugh [Houston]
Flournoy, who became state controller ultimately and a candidate
for governor; and Bill Bagley, who was very prominent in the
legislature and then was a candidate for state controller and
then was the first chairman of the federal commission on
commodities [Commodity Futures Trading Commission] markets;
and then the other one was Gordon Cologne, who's now an
appellate court judge in San Diego.

So it was a pretty outstanding class overall, and we had
a lot of close alliances and affiliations that way.

Morris: As you say, most of you ended up in leadership positions in
the legislature.

Monagan: Right.

Morris: Is that because you were a small class or native talent or — ?

Monagan: Well, I think it in part is the fact that it was a small

class, and the talent, but what also happened is that there was
a series of reapportionments after that . In the first
election after we had been there, there were, as I recall,
thirty-three new assemblymen elected because of reapportion-
ment.

Morris: In '62.

Monagan: In '62, the election of '62. So lots of new people came in
after that. Then there was a subsequent reapportionment in
'66, which brought in a lot of new people, and then a further
reapportionment in '71 for the '72 election, so there was a
tremendous turnover after we got there. So we were kind of
moved into a position of — by attrition we were in leadership
roles .

Morris : Survivors .
Monagan: Right, yes.

Morris: Well, in '66 you lost sixteen or seventeen assemblymen to the
senate after that reapportionment .

Monagan: That's right, that's right.
Morris: That's very interesting.

Monagan: So there was a tremendous turnover after we got there, which
probably helped us in that regard . We became somewhat senior
more rapidly than other people.

Jesse Unruh Becomes Speaker

Morris: And when you went into the assembly, was Jesse Unruh already
speaker?

Monagan: No, Ralph Brown was the speaker. He [was] from Modesto,

Stanislaus County. But that was a reapportionment year that
we were involved in, and Jesse Unruh was already maneuvering
to get Ralph Brown out of the way. The story goes that Ralph
Brown had agreed that he would not run for re-election and
that Jesse could be the speaker.

Morris: [Brown agreed that he would not run for re-election] as
speaker?

Monagan: No, he wasn't going to run for re-election at all.
Morris: I see.

Monagan: Then he suddenly changed his mind, and then Jesse went to

work and undermined him and worked it around so that Pat Brown
appointed him [Ralph Brown] as an appellate court judge to
get him out of the way. So we were called back into a special
session in 1962, early 1962, so that Jesse could exercise the
votes that he had to get himself elected speaker, and Ralph
Brown was appointed an appellate court judge.

Morris: Did the Republican contingent in the assembly participate in this
negotiation?

Monagan: No, no, they were pretty much ignored in that process. The

numbers were something like [pauses] forty-eight to thirty-two,
so Jesse had all the numbers he needed over on the Democratic
side to get elected speaker, and then he also had a lot of
Republicans supporting him too.

Morris: Really?

Monagan: Because there wasn't any place for Republicans to go, so
some of them decided —

Morris: You didn't have a candidate of your own?

Monagan: No, no, no. You didn't do that. It was a more bipartisan

approach to those things in those days, although Jesse became so
hard, party line that he helped move it to the point where it
became partisan in nature. In the old days, it was a personal
thing. You tried to get on the right side of the person who
was elected speaker, regardless of what party you were in,
and that was the way things kind of operated. So Jesse had
quite a few Republicans that supported him.

He did have a fight. Gordon Winton contested him for it,
but it was kind of a minor thing. Some of us voted for Gordon
Winton, but Jesse had all the votes he needed to get elected
speaker .

Morris: If you voted for Winton, did that put you at a disadvantage when
it came time for committee assignment?

Monagan: Well, it did, but we were so far at the bottom of the barrel
anyway that it didn't make any difference. So Jesse tried
to create problems for us, but we were able to survive all
of that. We had a friendly rivalry after that.

Morris: You and Jesse personally?

Monagan: Yes, yes.

Morris: So he didn't hold — did he hold grudges in general?

Monagan: Well, he did, but he got over that when he got through with

his "Big Daddy" image and he started to recognize that he had
to deal with it more adroitly than just pure power.

Strengthening the Legislature

Morris: Unruh is also credited with having instituted a lot of
additional staffing and improved methods.

Monagan: Right. And I think he would say that I helped him greatly in
that. We worked very cooperatively in that. He had the
feeling, a strong feeling, that you should strengthen the
legislature vis-a-vis the executive branch of government;
the legislature was pretty subservient to the executive branch.
The legislature had no staff support. They had no research
support. So Jesse's idea was that we had to strengthen the
legislature by providing some staff support, and I agreed
with him on those things, and we worked together on a lot
of them.

Morris: Your job was to get the Republican members to vote for them?
Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: Where were these ideas coming from? Did you have conferences
or—?

Monagan: Well, no, I think you'd have to give Jesse Unruh most of the
credit for initiating those; he felt that there was a need
for professional staff. I think those ideas come mostly
from Congress, patterning it more after Congress. That was
unusual because most state legislatures — in fact, all of the
state legislatures at that time — there were few of them that
had much staff support. We were moving in the direction, a big
state like California, that the legislature was in session
a good part of the time, so there was the adjunct to all of
that to move the legislature away from the old budget sessions
and put it in annual sessions.

The theory behind all of that was that under the
previous constitutional restraints the legislature met one
year in general session and the next year they could only meet
in a budget session, but the issues were so great in California
that they would come up regardless of whether it was a budget
session, and the legislature was then subservient to the
executive branch because only the governor could decide what
issues, other than the budget, you could talk about in the

Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan :

Morris :
Monagan:

even-numbered years [in special sessions]. So we supported
a constitutional change to put the legislature into annual
sessions, and then, further on down the line, the additional
change to put them in a two-year session of the legislature.

Now the legislature's gone overboard on the staffing
routine. It was not Unruh's concept, not [that of] those
of us that supported him, that there would be this much
staff in the legislature. It was our concept that you'd
have a professional staff person on the tax committee and
on the water committee and on the agriculture committee
and on the insurance committee and the other committees,
and they wouldn't necessarily change because of a change
in speaker or a change in party or a change in committee
chairman. But what's happened is that those have been
politicized to a great degree, although not entirely;
there still are some professional people there that would
serve regardless of who was in charge, but there's far
too many of them too. It's just gone overboard.

How about in terms of assemblymen's own staff?
added to in your time?

Was that

There was an increase in staff in those days for all
legislators. When I was first elected in 1960, a legislator
was entitled to a secretary in the capital and a secretary in
their district office, and then, if you were a committee
chairman or had other responsibilities, there was additional
staff. But everybody was entitled to that staffing.

Well, then it got to be a second secretary in Sacramento,
and then it got to be a second secretary in your district
office, and then it got to be an administrative as'sistant. So
they all increased the number of staff people working for them.

Did you have somebody that you particularly relied upon as
staff?

I had the same two women, one in my district office and one
in my Sacramento office, the whole time that I was in the
legislature, and it was a godsend. They really just ran
the place.

They did the administrative detail work?
They did everything. They did everything.

Morris: And did they get involved in issues, legislative research,
and that sort of thing?

Monagan: Well, not — [pauses]. My district office secretary got

involved in the political side of things, in the campaign,
and my Sacramento secretary just kind of ran the whole thing
in the capitol.

Morris: So you didn't have a research person yourself?

Monagan : No , no .

Morris: You relied on the committee staff?

Monagan: Right.

Morris: Was your feeling that as the staffing improved, you were able
to improve on the governor's legislation or challenge his
assumptions?

Monagan: That was one of the premises for doing it, and I think that

proved to be correct, that you then did not have to accept
• at face value what the Department of Finance offered in the
way of budget or issues, or any of the other departments.
You had somebody around who could challenge them and dig
up issues or information for arguing the issues.

Pat Brown as Governor

Morris: It looks as if there were kind of increasing difficulties
between Unruh as speaker and Pat Brown as governor . Was
this accentuated by the increase in staff, do you think?

Monagan: No, I think it was mostly because of Jesse's political

aspirations and the ambitions, and Pat Brown was kind of in
the way, and he was most anxious to get Pat Brown out of the
way so he could run for governor .

Morris: Did the Republican caucus find Pat Brown difficult or unreasonable
to negotiate with?

Monagan: We found Pat Brown was an ideal target, political target,

because he was not pretentious and he would make statements
that were easy to capitalize on, and the issues and the state
finances were such that he became a target for them. The
budgets were growing and we could attack his budgets. We
could attack him on the crime issues; he was very reluctant
to move on capital punishment. He had sort of an image as
a bumbler. He wasn't a bumbler, but he gave that impression
of being one. He'd also been governor for four years, and
once you've been around for a while you develop lots of
reasons for people not to like you politically, and so you would
use him as a target .

I actually got along with Pat Brown better than I did
with any other governor that I've been around. He was the
kind of person that would pick up the phone and say, "Hey,
Bob, you guys are all wrong. Why don't you come down and
talk to me about it?" So we'd go down to his office, and
he'd put his feet up on his desk, and you'd talk about it.
Now, you wouldn't necessarily resolve every issue, but he was
easy to communicate with, and I think that in the long run
was very helpful.

Morris: And even if you disagreed, you'd heard him explain his point
of view, and he'd heard yours.

Monagan: Right, right. Sure, sure. And once in a while you'd work —
you didn't even have to work out the difference some way,
because the whole thing doesn't come to a halt because you
disagree, and the art of compromise has to come into it
somewhere. So his manner was to facilitate that by being
open and readily accessible.

Morris: How much did he rely on his office staff people in dealing
with the legislature?

Monagan: Quite a bit, and he had some very good people in that regard.
Frank Mesple was one who had worked for him for a long time
who was very good at doing things like that, and he had some
good people around him that communicated with the legislature
very well. Even as Republicans, we got along with his staff
people very well .

Morris: How about people like Hale Champion?

Monagan: Well, Hale was a little more removed and, obviously, an
extremely competent person to be able to run the day-to
day functions of the governor's office and responsibilities,
but he wasn't as readily accessible. He was kind of isolated
in the administration. You didn't get to talk to Hale very
often.

Morris: Well, then he moved over as director of Finance.
Monagan: Finance, right.

Morris: And there were a couple of loud sessions when Unruh and
Champion, I guess —

Monagan: Right.

Morris: — disagreed strongly on the same questions we have now of
how much revenue is there going to be, and what are the
expenditures going to be.

Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: Why is that such a difficult matter, to get a firm estimate
of revenues?

Monagan: Well, because governors tend to play that — and legislators

too — but they tend to play that to get the greatest political
mileage out of it that they can, and they like to nurture
the funds so that they're not faced with having to ask for
taxes in an upcoming election year, so they're always trying
to play things around a little bit so the timing is such
that there's some political advantage to it. And the rela
tionships between Unruh and Brown were not good, so they just
didn't get along very well.

Morris: Yes. And from a Republican point of view, difficulties
between two major Democratic figures —

Monagan: We were happy to see all of those things, yes.

IV REPUBLICAN PARTY ACTIVIST

Becoming Minority Floor Leader, 1965

Morris: In 1965 you became minority floor leader. Is that as much
of a negotiating struggle as getting to be speaker?

Monagan: Well, probably even more severe in that regard because

you're not dealing with as many players in the game. But the
four of us that I've mentioned that had come up together were
all pretty aggressive young people (I was the oldtimer of the
group), but we were anxious to see that the Republicans be
more aggressive in what they were doing. Joe Shell happened
to be the minority leader at that time, and we were supportive
of him, but he was interested in trying to get himself ready
to run for governor, so he wasn't interested in what was
happening legislatively. So we had some differences with him
about that.

He did run for governor, and Charlie Conrad became
minority leader. We didn't have any great differences with
Charlie, but he wasn't very aggressive either . He was kind of
the old school, that you get along with the Democrats and
you do the best you can, and if the numbers aren't on your
side, why, you can't do anything about it. We thought that
we ought to be on the attack all the time, so we challenged
him, and the first time we didn't beat him. But the second
time, in '65, I got elected the minority leader.

Morris: Did the four of you that had come in together meet together
for lunch or breakfast or anything like that?

Monagan: Yes, we had a little breakfast group. One other player in
the game that got in there that we didn't mention was Jack
Veneman, who took Ralph Brown's place [as assemblyman for the

Monagan: 30th District] when Jesse Unruh got Ralph Brown appointed to
appelate court to open up the way for Jesse to be speaker.
Jack Veneman got added to our group by special election
[January 23, 1962], and so we had one more, and then we picked
up three or four other people along the way, and we'd meet
for breakfast frequently.

Morris: And would you primarily talk about a bill that needed to

be passed, or were you more concerned with the party itself?

Monagan: We were more concerned about what kind of issues we could
create, where could we take what kind of an opposition
point of view, and what would happen.

That sort of led to the big problem for Jesse Unruh in
his "Big Daddy" days. One day we were in recess from the
morning [session] and were coming back at four o'clock to
take up a big education bill. Jesse was at his obstreperous
best in those days, and he was physically huge; it was about
the time that Life magazine had come out and taken a picture
of him and ran it nearly full-page, only the photographer
had gotten down low and taken just a very unflattering picture,
and there was this big huge picture of Jesse Unruh, and that
was his "Big Daddy" image.

Well, about the time this was going on, he was running
roughshod around the legislature. We were out to lunch, some
of us, and we said, "Well, what are we going to do? We can't
just sit here and take all this stuff." So, walking over
to the capitol, we decided — it would have to take a two-thirds
vote — we would not vote for the education bill until they at
least told us what was in it. Jesse wasn't even going to
tell us what was in it. It was a very confidential conference
report, and no one was going to tell us.

So we came back and said — we got Hugh Flournoy up
because he was our education expert, and he gave a big
speech about the thing, and we just wouldn't vote for it.
Well, that made Jesse mad.

Morris: This was the education finance bill?
Monagan: Yes, right.
Morris: SB 90.

Monagan: Then he locked us up and wouldn't let us out for dinner.
That's when he locked us up all night and wouldn't let us
out, and that made a huge big story, and it was over something
so innocuous as — all he had to do was tell us what they were
going to put in the bill in the way of money, and we would
have voted for it. But he was just being antagonistic and
wouldn't do it, and so we had a lot of fun with that, and
that cemented his image as a big power broker and a "Big
Daddy." Shortly after that, he decided he had to shake that
if he wanted to be elected governor or something, so he
started taking off weight and trying to shake the "Big
Daddy" image.

Did you have some sympathetic newspapermen and radio people
to—?

Yes, they were generally sympathetic to us. They wouldn't
necessarily agree with us, but it made good copy for them
to have a fight going on, and so they generally treated us
fairly well in that regard.

Morris: Did you use the press conference device?
Monagan: Yes, we would do that on occasion.

Morris:

Monagan:

Cal Plan for Electing Republicans

Morris: Did this caucus and minority floor leader function put you
in closer touch with the state Republican organization?

Monagan: Yes. It gave us opportunities to go out and meet with the
formal Republican party groups around the state.

Morris: And by then the Cal Plan was operational. Did you — ?

Monagan: We were helpful in getting that started. Gay lord Parkinson
was the state chairman, and he gets credit for the idea, and
he should. He came up with the concept, and we all agreed
with it, that if we were ever going to get a majority, we
should target to get the majority by the election of 1970
so that we could reapportion in '71. So we started on the
idea of targeting districts: not waste all our resources
trying to elect everybody, but try to pick out the districts
where we could make progress towards the '70 election objective
of winning a majority.

Monagan: Well, the unfortunate thing is that we got the majority

a couple years too early and couldn't hang onto it, and so the
Republicans wound up in '70, after the '70 election, having
lost ground instead of gained ground. So I got to be
speaker only during the two years of '69 and '70. In '68
we got to forty-one votes, and then in the next election we
went right back downhill again to thirty-three.

Morris: What happened to make the plan not work as well in 1970?

Monagan: I think part of it was the Ronald Reagan phenomenon. He did
lots of good things, but one of the things that his tenure
brought about was the destruction of the Republican party.

Morris: Really?

Monagan: He dismantled, in a sense, the Republican party and built

the Reagan party. If you didn't belong to the Reagan team,
then you were not in, and so all of the good things that had
been developed in terms of people around the state and all
the volunteer organizations kind of disintegrated. You were
either Ronald Reagan or you weren't Ronald Reagan ;< if you
weren't Ronald Reagan, you weren't in. So that hurt a lot.

Of course, he was very controversial in the start of his
administration, in things in which I supported him, but it
also made it very difficult when you're out there campaigning,
because he was cutting programs , cutting education, cutting
welfare and doing all kinds of things like that that were not
necessarily politically popular. So he did not have an
ability to bring people into office with him.

Morris: The traditional Republican "stance is that the cost of

government should be controlled. But that doesn't affect
the constituents who want a program?

Monagan: That's right. But not at that period of time. I think it's
different now, but at that period of time it was not —

Morris: Well, as Pat Brown's second term is winding down, were the
Republicans in the legislature concerned about the growth
of the budget and the general cost of government?

Monagan: Yes, we raised all those issues on which Ronald Reagan ran
for governor. We had been harping on them and developing
them, and we had all kinds of various kinds of task forces
that we had put together in the legislature to attack what
was happening. Ronald Reagan picked up on those issues, and
he was an outstanding communicator, and so he was able to run
with the issues that we created against Pat Brown.

Morris: Was the Cal Plan — some of the people that we've talked to

felt that the Cal Plan was sort of identified with the Reagan
people.

Monagan: Well, no, he didn't have anything to do with it.
Morris: It had already been established?

Monagan: It was started by basically Gaylord Parkinson when he was

state chairman, and he got the party to agree that they would
collect special money for a Cal Plan effort, and this money
would not just go to every Republican; it would go into the
districts where they thought they had the best chance 'of
electing a Republican. So instead of supporting eighty
candidates, they'd support ten or fifteen down here in
areas where they might have a better chance to win, and
concentrated money and effort.

Morris: How do you deal with a Republican candidate who's not on

your target list? Doesn't he feel that he's equally qualified
to—?

Monagan: They do have that feeling, but that just happens to be a

fact of life. The money was raised for the Cal Plan and not
for the party, and so they had no legal obligations to
every Republican. So the money wasn't going into the
California Republican party; it was going into the Cal Plan.

Morris: Is that a separate organizational unit?

Monagan: A separate organizational structure interlaced with the same
people but basically separated legally. Even without Cal
Plan, Republicans would have picked up seats anyway, but the
aim was to win control of the legislature so we would have a
say in the 1970 reapportionment .

Morris: Was your feeling that the 1960s reapportionment had been —

gerrymandered — districts were disproportionately Democratic?

Monagan: Oh, it was gerrymandered, gerrymandered very adroitly, but
they went so far in drawing those lines that the natural
growth process in California would indicate that Republicans
were just going to keep picking up seats again because there's
no way you could legitimately draw up California and take
the eighty assembly districts and have fifty-two of them
Democrats and twenty-eight Republicans. That's what it
turned out to be in that first election, but then naturally
there were going to be more Republicans coming along after
that.

Morris: Was registration picking up? Did you keep track of [that]?

Monagan: It wasn't so much the registration, but they had drawn the
lines of those districts in such a way that the natural
growth was going to distort those original premises for
drawing the lines there, and the Democrats couldn't hold those
districts. To get fifty-two they had to make a lot of
Democratic districts marginal. They could have drawn say, forty-
five Democratic districts and had them fairly strong, but as soon
as you crept up to fifty-two those were marginal districts, and
those were the ones that the Republicans started winning back,
helped by the Cal Plan immeasurably.

1966 Gubernatorial Campaign

Morris: When did you first become aware of Ronald Reagan as a
growing figure in Republican politics?

Monagan: It was about the time of '63 and '64, and before the great
Goldwater speech that he made. He was starting to make
speeches around, and the Republicans had brought him in to
be a speaker at various fund-raising activities because he
was an early attraction. That's the first time I ever ran
into him.

Morris: At a campaign function?

Monagan : Yes .

Morris: Did he come up here to Sacramento?

Monagan: In this case he was in San Joaquin County, when I first met
him.

Morris: Did he come and campaign when you were running?
Monagan: Yes. Not for me, but —

Morris: I came across a reference to you as somebody whose name was
being considered for governor in '66, How did that go?

Monagan: Well, I was the minority leader, and I was getting a lot of

prominence because of our attacks upon Pat Brown, and we were
trying to work those issues, and I was one of those that was
listed as a possible candidate for governor, and I didn't do
anything to discourage that. It was probably not logical
that I would be nominated at that time. I wasn't that well
known around the state. That just didn't work out. But I
was at least mentioned in the group at that time and went to
a few candidates' things, but I never formally ran.

Morris: In the Republican State Central Committee kind of discussion?
Monagan: Yes. Right, right.

Morris: That would have made quite an interesting field: you from
the Valley, and George Christopher from San Francisco.

Monagan: I didn't support anybody in that primary. I was the minority
leader, and I felt it was my responsibility to stay out of the
fight. My sympathies were with Christopher, but I did not
formally support Christopher. My friends all supported
Christopher, and so the Ronald Reagan people assumed then that
even though I wasn't publicly announced, I was still supportive
[of Christopher]. So there was a little antagonism towards
me from the Reagan people because of that.

Morris: From the minority floor leader spot, what kind of chance did
you think there was to elect a Republican governor in '66?

Monagan: Well, we thought it was good. We thought, one, that people in
California just were not going to elect Pat Brown for a third
term anyway; that was stretching it too far. We thought the
issues were right for a Republican to win.

Morris: Who was Republican caucus chairman at that point?
Monagan: The caucus chairman was Don Mulford.

Morris: Did he or the caucus do any kind of keeping tabs or polling,
your own polling, separate from — ?

Monagan: No. Things weren't quite — we didn't have the funds or the

sophistication in those days to do as much of that as they do
now.

Morris: So it was your combined practical experience.

Monagan: It was mostly that, right.

Morris: Did you feed that at all into Ronald Reagan's campaign?

Monagan: It was probably the other way around because they had the
money to do a lot more research and polling than anybody
else did. That was the phenomenon of Ronald Reagan, the fact
that he could get together several million dollars, which was
a fantastic amount of money compared to what had been raised
in previous [campaigns]. So he was the one that brought [in],
and his campaign people brought in, more of the sophisticated
political operations.

Morris: In 1970 he and his people had quite a program of working with
legislative candidates. Was that evident in 1966 too?

Monagan: No, they were pretty much on their own in '66.

In '70 there was a big problem because we felt that
Reagan was not going to be that helpful a candidate, and he
was reluctant to go out and help them, and the candidates
that he did go out to try to assist — he could raise money for
them. They all wanted Ronald Reagan to come in for a fund
raiser, but they didn't want him to come in for a big public
appearance.

Morris :
Monagan :

Morris:
Monagan :
Morris:
Monagan:

Oh, I see.

They knew he could raise money, but they also were concerned
that if they got too closely allied to him it would be a
political disadvantage.

Because of the strong
Right, right.
And this is in 1970?
Yes, '70.

that he had taken on issues?

Morris: When he was elected governor, did that bring in an increased
number of Republicans in '66.

Monagan: We gained in '66, but we gained, I think, because of the Cal
Plan and things that had been going on that had no relation
ship to Ronald Reagan. The fact that he got elected governor by
a big margin certainly helped. It probably advanced the Cal
Plan goals by a couple of years. [interruption by secretary
reminding Monagan of luncheon appointment]

Ronald Reagan Becomes Governor

Morris: Maybe we could talk a few minutes about your help to the
Reagan transition team in '66-'67.

Monagan: Well, they came in. Ronald Reagan really didn't know a lot about
state government. He just was not aware of it. He didn't bring
in anybody with him who knew a lot about state government. We
had planned, prepared in advance of the election, a big transi
tion book for them.

Morris: I've heard about that. Do you suppose that still exists?

Monagan: If it [does], Ronald Reagan's people must have it someplace.
I haven't seen it since.

Morris: I should think that would be a very helpful thing for anybody.

Monagan: But they were not aware of how state government operated,

what they had to do as governor, so we put together that whole
book for them.

Morris: When you say "we" —

Monagan: Our staff and the assembly Republicans put that together for

him.

Morris: Who was the staff person that — ?

Monagan: Well, there was Al Lipson, who was our chief staff person at
that time, and we brought in all the people we could and went
into that thing and raised all the issues, listed all the
appointments that the governor had to make, all the main
steps that had to be followed, and we gave that to them. We
said, "Here you are. Here's how you go to work."

Monagan: Then we suggested that the most important appointment that

the governor will make will be his director of Finance, that

he ought to have somebody who knew Sacramento, knew state

government , and knew how to make it go , because that was the

most important thing to the governor. You're coming in during

a financial crisis, the expenditures outstripped the revenues,

and so something had to be done, and he needed somebody to

help. We suggested that he ought to hire a person who really knew

that and was smart and able: Cap [Caspar] Weinberger. But

he [Reagan] wouldn't have anything to do with Cap Weinberger

because he [Weinberger] had been here before. They thought

that anybody who'd ever been in Sacramento before and knew

what it was all about was just the wr-r-rong person. They

just wouldn't have anything to do with that.

Morris: Now, was your sense that this feeling was coming from Mr. Reagan
himself or the kitchen cabinet or his transition [team]?

Monagan: All of the above.
Morris: All of the above?

Monagan: Right. They just didn't want to have anything to do with

anybody, they felt, that had been on the scene before. They
were contaminated by being part of government, and they had
to be all outsiders.

Morris: Well, he had two legislative aides when he took office as

governor. One was Vernon Sturgeon, who'd been in the legis
lature, and Jack Lindsey.

Monagan: Well, he got those people after he got in office.
Morris: I see. Okay.

Monagan: And that wasn't easy to do that. He finally was persuaded
that he had to have somebody that knew something about the
senators, and so he got Vern Sturgeon in there. Then they
brought in some outsiders to work with the assembly, and they
turned out to be good people, and we helped educate them, we
think.

Morris: [chuckles] Who did do the transition work, then, for
Mr. Reagan?

Monagan: Well, they had a fellow by the name of Phil Battaglia, who
got to be the Governor's executive secretary and then had
to leave under a cloud.

Morris: Yes. Was that real, imaginary, or were there other things

that were worrying somebody about Battaglia? What's surfaced
in the press is that there was some question of homosexuality.

Monagan: Right. There was a big episode about that, and so they had
to go, but it probably would have occurred sooner or later
because there were a lot of strains in there. They didn't
have a lot of people in there that knew how to deal with
the government, the state government, and the legislature,
and so they had a lot of problems early on.

Morris: Was William Clark part of the original — ?

Monagan: Well, he came on a little later. He was very good, and he
replaced Battaglia somewhere along the line. Clark was a
different kind of personality, got along better with
legislators.

Morris: So did some of these people come and sit down with your group
in terms of how to use this guidebook or what you — ?

Monagan: No, no. They didn't want anything to do with it. They were
going to do it their way.

Morris: It's fascinating trying to reconstruct those days. Did you

have any contact with somebody who was in the governor's office?

Monagan: Not really. It was very nominal. They were suspicious of
all of us who were in the legislature, and they were going
to bring in their outside people to do this.

Morris: Well, the thing that is most visible about Reagan and the task
forces idea that you people had also used was he brought in a
lot of businessmen. Were they visible at all in the transition
year? They had space in — what? — the IBM Building here in
Sacramento .

Monagan: Well, they weren't too visible. They were somewhat visible,

and they contributed a great deal, but that came along a little
later as they started trying to figure out how to do things.
I think in terms of transition as the people that immediately
came on the scene and started to run the things .

Morris: Yes, who were here from November through January.

Monagan: And there were people like Ric Todd, who was a former assistant
state controller and had been involved in government for a
long time, who was on their transition team, but they wouldn't
listen to him because he'd been here before.

Morris: But he did survive with them?

Monagan: He would sit with them, yes, but they were not listening to

him. They had their own ideas about how things were going to
be run.

Morris: Were there people like William French Smith?

Monagan: I'd never heard of William French Smith until much later than
that.

Legislative Relations with the Governor

Morris : So were you surprised when you were invited to a legislative
leadership meeting in January of '67?

Monagan: There wouldn't have been any meeting unless we had demanded
it. They didn't want to see us at all. We kind of kept
prodding them and prodding them and saying, "You have to meet
with the legislators. You've got to get to know them and
work with them," and it -took a lot of hard work and effort
to convince them that they even should start doing that.
It was a hard thing to get Reagan to do that.

Morris: Really? Did you have some sessions face to face with him in
that transition period to talk about this?

Monagan? Not too many. They didn't want to see us. The press used to
ask me every day, "Well, how are you getting along with Ronald
Reagan?" "Oh, I get along with him fine." "Well, do you get
to see him?" "Yes, I can see him any time I want to see him.
I can see him." But they never asked the other question: Did
he ever want to see me? If I wanted to see him, I could see
him, but he never called me or others in the leadership.

Morris:
Monagan:

But

you could come in and see him?

Morris:

Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan:

Morris:
Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan:
Morris:
Monagan :

Oh, you could make an appointment. You could make an
appointment and see him. It wasn't necessarily easy. I
mean, he wouldn't just drop everything and see you, where a
Pat Brown would do that .

You could see Pat? If at ten o'clock in the morning you called
him, you could drop in by two in the afternoon? That sort of
thing?

Right. Sure, sure. Or he'd say, "Come down now" or "We'll
get you in in twenty minutes." But Ronald Reagan — it was a
battle. You had to get on the schedule and see a lot of
people and tell them what it was all about before you could
get there.

In other words, there were a number of staff people that you
had to clear through to get a session with him.

Right. And we may develop this a little later, but he did
change a lot. The first two years were difficult. Then he
began to recognize that he had to work with the legislators
that were there and work in that process and make it work
too, and he did much better, and he got some good people in
to work with him.

That started about 1970?

Yes. Right. Well, even maybe a little before that. They
started getting them in in '69 and they were starting to do
better.

Would you say that's because of the legislature's education
job on him or the governor's office's own realization that — ?

Well, I think they realized that they had to do things dif
ferently; they had to work with the people who were there.

What did happen then in those early legislative leadership
meetings in '67?

Not a great deal.

Did they happen regularly?

No, we'd have to force them. We'd have to practically demand
to meet him.

Morris:

Monagan :

Morris:

Monagan :
Morris :

Was it [on] a specific issue that you began to notice a
change, or more a matter of time?

Well, I think when they got down to some of the issues that —
and especially in '71, after we'd lost control of the legis
lature; then Reagan realized he had to work a lot with the
Democrats and had to persuade the legislators to go along
with the changes he wanted to make, the tax reform and welfare
reform programs that he had in mind, and so he got very
skillful at working on that kind of a compromise.

Yes. Okay. Why don't we stop there for today since you have
another appointment.

That's probably a good idea,
Thank you kindly.

[Interview 2: July 13, 1981 ]##

Morris: I came across a couple of notes that I think may relate to
the comment you made in our last interview that , from the
legislative point of view, there were difficulties in
dealing with Governor Reagan's office. In 1967, apparently
fairly early on, the Governor introduced seven tax bills,
and you were quoted as saying that none of them were able
to be passed. I wonder if you recall some of the details of
that.

Monagan: Well, I don't know that I can recall any of the specific

details, but the Governor, in line with what I talked about
earlier, about not dealing with his friends in the legislature,
had put together a tax program without great consultation with
his Republican legislators. In order to get something like
the tax bills he was talking about in most instances would
have required a two-thirds vote, and it was going to be
very difficult for us to get any of those tax bills passed.
Democrats in the assembly, at that point, were looking to
try to do everything they could to diminish Ronald Reagan's
posture.

The background, of course, to that was that Ronald
Reagan had talked about cutting the costs of government as
part of his campaign, and yet the situation he faced when he
got to be governor was that in spite of whatever cuts he

Monagan: might achieve, there still wasn't enough revenue to take care
of the ongoing programs that had been built in in previous
administrations. So there was a tremendous shortfall of
revenues for the state, even with substantial cutbacks, and,
of course, cutting back in sensitive program areas was
difficult. Cutting back in education, for example, would
have been very difficult for him. So it was necessary to
raise some taxes, but he did that without consultation with
his Republican friends in the legislature.

Morris: There was one session, I gather, that you did have with Phil

Battaglia on the mental health program cuts; the Sacramento Bee
reported that you walked out of the meeting, you and John
Venetian. Was there something particular about the mental
health program that — ?

Monagan: Well, again, he was trying to do something without having

brought people in early to develop their support. All of a
sudden, in this particular instance (I was the leader for the
Republicans in the assembly, and Jack Veneman was one of our
key Republican leaders in terms of health care issues) here
both of us were sitting with mental hospitals in our districts,
without having been given a chance to discuss how we'd go
about those programs.

This, again, was part of what we have discussed earlier.
Phil Battaglia was an outsider brought in by the Governor, with
no familiarity with what the legislature was all about and
how to deal with it, and he wasn't dealing with it in a very
satisfactory way from our perspective.

Morris: He'd had no experience in government?

Monagan: No, he was a lawyer in Los Angeles who had worked on the
Governor's campaign and was a bright and able person but
didn't know many of the legislators and didn't know the
legislative process and wasn't skilled or knowledgeable
about how to go about putting together legislative programs.
They were just, in a sense, trying to ram things through
without putting together the necessary pieces to build up
support for programs.

Morris: You mentioned that you felt that Governor Reagan did change
a lot in his dealings with the legislature. Was there one
particular turning point?

Monagan: No, I think it was just sort of a learning curve for him.

He was an outsider to government, and most of the people that
he brought in early on in his administration were outsiders
to the governmental process. They contributed many good things,
but they also found that you have to have some people who
know how to deal with the legislative process and what it
was all about .

So they began to make some changes after the first
year or so. The Governor became more aware of his need to
develop relationships with the legislators and after a period
of time became very skillful at doing that, and he brought
in some people. Phil Battaglia was his first executive
secretary. Eventually Bill Clark came in in that capacity at
a later date [August, 1967], and Ed Meese was brought into
the administration at a later date [November, 1968], and
those people were very good at dealing with that.

Morris: How about George Steffes?

Monagan: Well, George Steffes was a very capable legislative liaison
person for the Governor and he worked very well with the
legislature. Before that there was another person, Lindsey,
who got along with the legislators very well. He had the
personality and the ability to come up and work with the
legislators, and George Steffes followed after Lindsey in
that job and did very well with it too. Steffes came on
after the Governor had started to make a lot of changes and
began to reach accommodations with legislators.

Morris: It sounds as if your view was that maybe people at the next
echelon up in the governor's office were more important in
beginning to turn things around, Mr. Clark and Mr. Meese.

Monagan: Well, they began to be the key people with the Governor. They
were his chief staff positions and they got along with the
legislators very well.

Morris: So from your view — am I right? — a legislative liaison person
is kind of a go-between. He's passing on the governor's
ideas , rather than —

Monagan: Right. That's right. And he's supposed to be the one who

can reflect back to the governor's office what he's feeling by
his day-to-day contacts with legislators. He develops a relation
ship of working with them on a continuing basis, and he also has

Monagan: a responsibility of pursuing the governor's programs and
objectives, and he's trying to figure out the ways to
accomplish that.

Morris: Did you and other Republican leaders sit down with, say,
Lindsay or Steffes and —

Monagan: Oh, they were in our office frequently.
Morris: — tell them what your problems were?

Monagan: Sure. We could speak frankly with them. They built up
confidence with the legislators and felt that they could
speak frankly to them and could trust them, and that was a
key part of all of it, [to] have some people you could trust,

V A BIPARTISAN APPROACH TO THE SPEAKERSHIP, 1969-70

Unexpected Republican Majority

Morris: Did your selection as speaker have a noticeable impact, do
you think, on relations with the governor's office in terms
of the legislature as a whole?

Monagan: It was just about at the turning point when I got to be

speaker. He'd been governor for two years. This was the
second two years of his first term. We obviously could do a
lot more in that second term because we had a narrow majority
and we controlled the speaker's office, which was extremely
important. So we could do a few more things, and they began
to recognize that by working with us they could get a lot
more accomplished.

Morris: When the 1969 legislature met and there was that narrow
Republican majority, were there other candidates besides
yourself for the speaker's spot?

Monagan: No. We hadn't really anticipated that we were going to get a
majority in that '68 election.

Morris: Really?

Monagan: We had hoped that we might, but there hadn't been any real
planning that we were going to have enough votes to elect a
Republican speaker . As a matter of fact , the long-range
plan — and we have talked about that, I think, in our earlier
discussions about Gaylord Parkinson's Cal Plan.

Morris: Yes.

Monagan: The idea was to try to get the majority by 1970 because then
the Republicans could control reapportionment, so the goal
was to hopefully get a majority by '70. Well, all of a
sudden, we picked up enough seats in the '68 election so that
we arrived in January of '69 with forty-one votes versus thirty-
nine for the Democrats .

Morris: Well, you knew in November that you would have a majority.

Monagan: Sure. On the night of the election we knew that. Having been
the minority leader for the previous period of time, well, then
I just — everybody kind of assumed I was going to be the speaker,
so there really wasn't any contest on the Republican side as
to who was going to be speaker.

Morris: And the Democrats quietly sat there and let the Republicans — ?

Monagan: Well, they were stunned. Jesse Unruh had been the speaker for
a long time, and the Democrats were stunned that they had lost
the majority, and there wasn't much that they could do about
it at that time. We did have forty-one votes and that was all
that was necessary to elect the speaker.

Morris: [chuckles] In that election, had you worked closely with the
Cal Plan at all? Could you identify why the Republicans did
so well?

Monagan: It was, in part, the foundation that had been built over the
previous five years with the Cal Plan and the party; and
secondly, it was a continuing erosion of the advantages that the
Democrats had built into the districts from 1961 reapportionment.
They had, in a sense, gerrymandered and had structured them to
their advantage at the time, but that began to erode as people
moved from urban areas to suburban areas , and so that was a
factor .

Morris:

The Republicans by a natural process were gaining strength,
and we were capitalizing on it with the Cal Plan, and we had a
Republican governor elected the previous two years, and he was
helpful in going out and campaigning for candidates. More
important than that was his ability to raise money for them,
so there was sufficient money to run good campaigns.

So most of the funding came through the Reagan organization
rather than through the Republican caucus or — ?

Monagan: No, not most of it, but he was helpful in that regard. He

could go to a fund-raiser for a candidate, and his appearance
would bring out a lot of people.

Morris: Was there a Republican legislative elections organization?

Monagan : Yes .

Morris: And he would come to work with your fund-raising apparatus?

Monagan: Yes, and also an individual candidate would invite him to come
to their district for a fund-raiser, and his name was magic in
attracting funds, as it still is. He's very good at getting
people to part with their money for political reasons.

Morris: [chuckles] Did you have any role in determining which districts
he'd be asked to [appear in]?

Monagan: Oh, pretty much so, yes. We had all our target districts

worked out, and they were aware of where they were, and we would
either ask him to come or we would reinforce an invitation
that he had gotten directly from someone.

So, although we were hoping for the best, no one really had
said, "Well, it's a lead-pipe cinch we're going to come up
with a majority vote after this election, so we'd better
prepare for the speakership . " We hadn't really prepared for it.

Further Legislative Professionalization

Morris: Going back to getting to be speaker, was it a strange situation
to have Jesse Unruh still in the legislature and, in effect,
be taking over his leadership role? Was he a factor at all?
How do you relate in a situation like that?

Monagan: Well, that is a problem, and I confronted that problem

myself because I was speaker, and then we suddenly lost the
majority and I no longer was the speaker, but I was still a
member of the legislature. In the case of Jesse Unruh, his
schedule had been to be in a position to run for governor —

Morris: As speaker?

Monagan: As speaker, which would have been a much better platform for
him, but all of a sudden he was the minority leader instead
of the speaker. He did spend most of his time getting ready
to run for governor . He did run for governor in the next
election. So, although he stayed as the minority leader, he
really didn't take an active role in the legislative side of
things, except where he could make good publicity out of it
for his run at the governorship.

Morris: Would you have gone and talked to him at all about being speaker,
or would he have offered any advice?

Monagan: No, not really. We'd had a good personal working relationship
in terms of operating the legislature when I had been the
minority leader and he the speaker, and we'd been through a -
lot of things. We worked together on upgrading the legislative
process, and changing to a two-year session of the legislature,
and building in some staff in the legislature, and raising the
pay of the legislators. We'd worked very closely on a lot of
those projects, so we had a pleasant working relationship
as it related to just running the assembly.

Morris: How would you say your approach to being speaker differed from
Unruh's?

Monagan: Well, principally because he always had a substantial majority
to work with in his own party, so he had to approach it from
that perspective, where our majority was so razor thin and
nonexistent for part of the time. So it was a very delicate
thing to keep things going. I had to use whatever skills that
I had, along with the support I had in the Republican side, to
always try to maintain enough support from Democrats so that
you could get something done .

Morris: So it sounds as if your speakership was kind of run on a
bipartisan basis or on a nonpartisan basis.

Monagan: Well, we probably were more partisan because we did have a

Republican governor to work with, and thus by staying together
we could accomplish a lot, and we knew that we could get the
support of the Governor on issues, where Jesse Unruh in his
last two years as speaker, even though he had a majority in the
assembly, was confronted with a Republican governor who would
veto a lot of their actions. So he had to approach it from a
different basis.

Morris: Yes. One of the things, I gather, that you were interested in
was this matter of governors' vetoes. There had been a veto
session established by an earlier amendment, I guess, and that
was one of the things that you wanted to do away with. Did
the veto session cause the legislature a particular problem?

Monagan: No. We had advocated (and Jesse Unruh was the leader in that)
a change in the constitution so that there wouldn't be any
period of time when the governor could veto measures without
the legislature having an opportunity to override them. Previous
to that constitutional change, the legislature could send a
lot of bills down to the governor and then they'd adjourn and
go home and never have any mechanism for being back to have
an attempt to override a governor's veto.

So one of the things that didn't happen is that the
legislature didn't override any of Governor Reagan's vetoes
while I was in the legislature either as minority leader or
speaker. Even though there were times when I disagreed perhaps
with some of the things that he vetoed , I felt it was my respon
sibility to support the Governor, and so we never overrode any
of his vetoes.

Morris: There was, I gather, an assortment of things that you did want
to introduce. There was a conference on state legislatures had
issued a report and made some recommendations . They made a
national study and they had some recommendations about — I
wasn't clear whether it was all legislatures or the California
legislature in particular. They were recommending fewer
committees, and that there be published rules committee pro
cedures, and public access to committee reports and roll calls,
better minority representation, and authors' statements of bill
intent, and preparation of bill summaries.

Monagan: Well, those were things that — well, to begin with, Jesse Unruh
was president of the Conference of State Legislative Leaders,
and I also became president ultimately of that organization. So
the things that, to Jesse's credit, he had been working on and
I supported were the things you talked about. We got the
national organization to begin to encourage other legislatures
to do many of the things that we'd already done in California,
so we were the leaders in that sense and not followers. We
accomplished most of those things here and were hoping to
persuade the rest of the legislatures that those were good
ideas.

Morris: Was that conference a long-standing organization?

Monagan: No, it had been created in the '50s, as I recall, the mid- '50s,
and involved legislative leaders from the various states.
They would meet a couple times a year and exchange ideas and
information about what was happening in the legislatures and
how they could improve. We embarked on a program of upgrading
legislators.

It came about principally because the structure of things
gave more power to the governor and the executive branch of
government than to the legislative branch of government. It was
our contention that at least they ought to be equal, and in
order to be equal we had to have a lot of other things . We had
to have staff resources. We had to have some research capacity.
We had to have information systems. In previous years, you had
to take at face value what the governor's Department of Finance
would tell you. Well, we ultimately developed independent
ability to look at issues.

Morris: So this conference is a kind of professional association?
Monagan: Yes.

Morris: And your feeling is that California had a leadership role in what
the conference was recommending, rather than responding to what
was recommended .

Monagan: Right, because we were so far out in front [of] almost all the
other legislatures around the country in the things that were
happening in terms of increasing salary for legislators,
providing staff for them, developing changes in constitutions to
give more authority to legislators vis-a-vis the executive
branch.

Key Committee Assignments: Criminal Justice, Environmental
Quality

Morris: The Western Political Quarterly, in talking about your era as
speaker, commented that you had a more sympathetic committee
structure than Mr. Unruh.* Now, does this have to do with how
the committees operated or how you went about appointing people
to committees?

* "The 1968 Election in California", Frank H. Jonas and John L.
Manner, Western Political Quarterly 22, March 1969, p. 473.

Monagan: Well, it was probably that Unruh was able to dominate the

assembly simply because he had a lot more support in his own
party. He started out with [pauses to recall number] fifty-two
Democrats, where we started out. with forty-one Republicans, so
I had to balance the committees somewhat in order to get things
done. I needed a lot of support from Democrats as committee
chairmen and tried to be sympathetic to Democrats in terms of the
committees they wanted to be on because I just had to simply
play with a very narrow majority and that was one way to do it.

And I think that my basic philosophy was a sense of fairness,
not that Mr. Unruh was unfair, but he had a rather dominating
point of view, a philosophy about that, and he structured the
committees sort of in his own image in that regard. I thought
we ought to give everybody a fair play.

The historic benchmark in all of that is the Criminal
Justice Committee in the assembly, and they're going through
the same problems right today. How you structure the Criminal
Justice Committee determines whether or not anti-crime or —
nobody's pro-crime, but people who are more liberal in their
attitudes towards criminal justice —

Morris: A sociological rather than a hard-line approach?

Monagan: Well, all those bills would get to Criminal Justice and they
were pretty well locked up by Mr. Unruh. What I did was to
balance the committee, and then I put a chairman in who was a
middle-reader , so he turned out to be the person who would
decide basically whether the bills got out of committee or
not.

I got a lot of criticism from conservative Republicans in
that regard, but I felt that there are a lot of nutty things
that conservatives would like to pass out of there in terms
of dealing with criminal justice, and I thought we had to have a
balance. I was for stronger laws, but I still didn't want to
see things come out that were advocated by some Republicans,
so we had kind of a balanced committee. That sort of prevailed
through all the other committee assignments.

Morris: Yes. Was Criminal Justice one that people were eager to serve
on? Did you have a lot of applicants, as it were, for that
committee?

Monagan: You have a lot of applicants from the Democrat side and the
liberal side; they're very activist-minded in terms of that.
But in those days there weren't as many Republican attorneys
in the legislature, proportionately, as there are now, so
there just weren't as many Republican attorneys to put on the
committee after you had both the Judicial Committee and the
Criminal Justice Committee to put Republicans on. We didn't
have that many lawyers to go around. Unfortunately, the people
on the Republican side that wanted to be on were hard-liners.

Morris: And the Democrats who wanted to be on were hard-line in the
other direction?

Monagan: They wanted to be the other way. So it kind of balanced out

where we had [a situation in which] the chairman was the swing
vote.

Morris: Yes. Was that what you looked for in making your [decision]?

Monagan: Yes, I did that by design. We had to have somebody that would
not kill everything but also wouldn't let everything out.

Morris: There was a fairly elaborate task force and study commission
apparatus that Governor Reagan set up on this whole business
of law enforcement [California Council on Criminal Justice] .
Did the legislature have a similar kind of program, or were you
drawing on the Governor's commission and its work?

Monagan: Well, we paid attention to it, but basically the legislature

tends to ignore things that come from the governor, regardless
of the party. They have their own ideas, they have their own
committee studies, they have their own interim committee
meetings, they listen to everybody, and they draw on their
own ideas of what they want. So they would read things and be
aware of what a governor's commission might do, and they'd
pick out some things that they might want to go along with, but
nobody was going to grab in toto a program of any governor and
try to run it through the legislature in an area like that.

Morris: Let me turn over the tape, and then maybe we could talk a

little bit about environmental quality, which is maybe another
example of the same kind of thing.

Morris: [Was environmental quality] an emerging issue in the Reagan
years, or was that something that you'd been concerned with
since you came to the legislature?

Monagan: Well, it was emerging, but it had arrived. It arrived about
the time I got to be speaker as a major issue demanding some
attention from the legislature. I was suddenly thrust into
that issue, not having been involved with it prior to that
time, with the recognition that something had to be done.

So I created for the first time what we called a Select
Committee on Environment. I didn't feel that we could deal
with the issue through the normal committee process; there were
too many facets to it that it did not lend itself to that kind
of operation, and so I created the select committee. That's the
first time we'd ever had select committees in the legislature.
It was an idea that I had picked up from the congressional
process .

So I made a select committee of committee chairmen. I
made one Republican as chairman of that select committee.
We had the chairmen from Local Government, Water Committee,
Natural Resources and Wildlife Committee; and there were a
couple of others that escape my memory at the moment. We
brought the chairmen of those various committees together
in a select committee, gave them some staff, and they pursued
what would be the best legislative program that we could have.
So they made recommendations about what legislation ought to
be passed. They ultimately went back to the various committees
where they belonged, but they were then part of that select
committee program.

Morris: A state development plan had been authorized by the legislature
as far back as "62, but it took six years to create it, and I
gather that that, as it finally appeared, came out of the
governor's office. Was that something that either led you
partly to set up this committee or that had concerns in it — ?

Monagan: What led me to do this was that every legislator or nearly
every legislator was feeling the pressure to do something
about the environment, and dozens and dozens of bills were
introduced or planned to be introduced. They cut across so
many different legislative disciplines that I felt the only
way we could deal with the issue was to do it through the
select committee process, and it worked very well.

Monagan: It worked very well, and we got some legislation passed. We
got the first state environmental act passed. We never got
into any problem until we got into the courts!

The Friends of Mammoth decision was a challenge to the
legislation that we had passed; that came out of that select
committee and was related primarily to environmental impact
reports. It was the clear intent, it was my_ clear intent, it
was the clear intent of the legislature when they passed the
act, that it would apply to state projects, and that it was
something that ought to be done, that it ought to be required
to look at what impact a state project, a dam, a highway, or
a redevelopment activity being built by the state would have
on the environment, not to stop it necessarily but just call
attention, have them examine, try to avoid any damage to the
environment .

Morris: To provide for review measures before a difficulty arose.

Monagan: Yes. Right. Right. So when the case got to the courts —

the Friends of Mammoth — the supreme court decision turned the
whole thing around from what was legislative intent.

Morris: This is the federal or the state supreme court?

Monagan: The state supreme court. And [it] said that it applies to

everything; it doesn't just apply to governmental activities,
because you couldn't do anything almost without some kind of a
governmental permit; and, secondly, that it gave them the full
authority to stall and kill projects.

We didn't have that in mind when we talked about it,
when we put it together.

Staffing Pro and Con; Statewide Planning

Morris: I came across a reference to a man named Al Lipson as the
research director for that select committee study.

Monagan: Al Lipson was a staff person for the Republicans in the

assembly; when I got to be speaker I selected him to be the
director of the Assembly Office of Research.

Morris: I see. Then he was responsible for finding people to staff
these committees?

Monagan: Not really. That wasn't his job. His function was to build
the Assembly Office of Research into a function that would be
effective and helpful to the legislature and pretty bipartisan
in nature and not too politically oriented.

Staffing was one of my major mistakes when I was speaker.
It was my belief in supporting Jesse Unruh's concept about
staffing that there should be professional staff people on
committees that do not necessarily change just because you have
a Republican or a Democratic speaker, that they are professional,
nonpartisan, or bipartisan, individuals. They were there for
their competency in information and continuity to the committee.

Unfortunately, Mr. Unruh and his people had gotten a lot
of people in staff positions that didn't follow that total
concept. They were pretty partisan. Instead of firing a lot
of them, I thought it was a test. This was the first time we'd
ever had a change of speakership from one party to another since
we had inaugurated all this staff concept, and I didn't want to
destroy it, and so I said, "Okay. Basically these are profes
sional people, and they're there, and we're going to keep them
there." Well, it turned out that I should have fired some of
them, and if I'd been elected speaker for a second term I would
have.

Morris: You felt some of your ideas were being sandbagged?

Monagan: Yes. Right. Right.

Morris: By some of the committee staff?

Monagan: Right. They were not in the mold of people who were really

basically bipartisan and not interested in the politics of the
thing but just interested in the competency of doing their
job.

There are still people over there in the legislature that
were brought in by Unruh and who fell into that mold. They are
really technically skilled people. Dave Doerr is the chief
consultant for the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee and
has been there for, well, fifteen years, I guess, something like
that, and he fits the mold. No matter who was chairman, whether
Republican or Democrat, who was speaker, he was there to give
technical advice and counsel to the committee in that area.

Morris: Those are exempt positions, aren't they? They're not part of
the state — ?

Monagan: That's right. They're hired today and fired tomorrow if you
want to .

Morris:

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:
Morris:

And is there some kind of a screening process, or is it the
judgment of the committee chair?

No, it's generally the judgment of the committee chairman and
the speaker.

That's an interesting kind of a development,
a special cadre within the system.

It's sort of

Right. They've carried this to the absurd extreme now in the
assembly with what happened in the last speakership fight [1981]
and the demands by the Republicans that they wanted more staff
people, so that there's too much staff over there now.

There was one report last year when they were gearing up for
the current reapportionment that Democrats and Republicans
should have separate staff on the reapportionment committee.

Yes. What's developed now is that there are staff people on
the committees for the majority and for the minority, and I don't
believe in that concept. I believe in the original concept
that they should be people that understand, [are] knowledgeable,
and work with whomever happens to be the chairman or what party
happens to be in power.

Going back to the environmental issue, one of the bills had to
do with the Office of Planning. That seems to have been
controversial all the way through: to develop an Office of
State Planning and where it should be located. How does the
governor's office respond when the legislature says, "The
governor should have this function," which, I gather, was the
original intent of AB 227, moving the Office of Planning out
of the Department of Finance and into the governor's office?

Yes.

And then, if you recall, as it ended up, it sounded like the
legislature passed the bill in early 1970, but then the governor's
office moved the planning function from the governor's office
into the lieutenant governor's office.

Monagan : No .
Morris: No?

Monagan: I don't recall that they did that. I'm a little vague on that,
but it may have been that Ronald Reagan was not that interested
in planning. They had an aversion to the word "planning"
anyway .

Morris : Why?

Monagan: Well, it goes back to all the controversy about regional

planning, and conservatives were afraid that regional planning
would destroy local government. That was kind of a buzz word,
"planning," that was a negative factor for a lot of people in
the Reagan administration early on. So they probably didn't
want to — I don't recall it exactly, but they probably didn't
want to have much to do with that. But we thought that's
where it ought to be.

Morris: Yes. Well, does this planning concept, as it came out of your
select committee, include physical planning as well as land
use and environmental quality?

Monagan: Well, it was more based towards having a broader look at where
California could grow and develop, where its best opportunities
would be, and where it could do the least damage to the
environment, where growth ought to occur, in a broader sense
rather than being too specific.

Morris: So it's the balance between conservation and development.
Monagan: Right. Right.
Morris: That's very tricky.

Monagan: Right, yes. So we hoped that it would be dealt [with] in

broad terms, that you wouldn't try to get down to where streets
ought to be and highways located, but just in terms [of] where
things could best fit into the pattern for the development
of California.

Morris: And that this should be a responsibility of the governor's
office?

Monagan: Right. Right.

Morris: And you didn't feel that he really liked that idea?

Monagan: No. And I think that governors have used it in different

ways. Now, Jerry Brown's got a whole new criteria for use of
his Office of Planning and Research over there. So it hasn't
worked the way that was the original intent.

Problems with Medi-Cal and Welfare

Morris: Another issue that took a lot of attention and time while you
were speaker was the business of Medi-Cal and welfare, both
from the cost point of view and the program point of view. How
did the legislature and the attorney general's office decide
that there needed to be an investigation in 1969, that the
situation needed more than just the normal legislative review
conference?

Monagan: Well, it was a program that grew so rapidly that there weren't
controls built into it, and the cost of the program was getting
way out of hand. You then had an opportunity with a Republican
governor to really try to examine the program. He had talked
about all the fraud that there was in the program, and so
there was a lot more sympathy towards having an investigation
of the program.

Morris: Was the attorney general's investigation separate or concurrent
with the legislature's or did they feed into each other?

Monagan: They were separate. They were pretty separate.

Morris: Were you satisfied with the legislation that came out of that
investigation?

Monagan: No, but that's the best compromise that you could get in a

divided legislature; and like a lot of things put together by
a committee, they don't come out as attractive as you might like
to see them.

Morris: The Governor was working on these things from his end through
his agency secretariat. Would you have had much contact with
those people?

Monagan: I didn't. I didn't because I didn't get personally involved in
those issues. Those were big issues, but I left that up to
people like Jack Veneman, for one, and Bill Bagley, another, who
were my key allies. They would dig into those kinds of issues
and work on them, but I wouldn't have too much to do with them
personally .

Morris: So that as speaker your job was to be once removed from that so
you could keep — ?

Monagan: It wasn't so much that. There were too many other things for
me to do, and I was not an expert in those fields, and so I
left it to other people who had good knowledge and background to
deal with them.

Morris: What did you concentrate on as speaker?

Monagan: Well, I was a manager, that kind of thing. I wanted the place
to run smoothly, things to be done on time, the work completed
in an orderly manner. I think that probably my greatest
strength was — I think some disinterested people would probably
say that the place ran better when I was speaker than it did at
other times. It ran very firmly when Jesse Unruh was speaker,
but I had a little different approach to it. I concentrated on
making sure the place ran; and the job got done; and things
that the legislature was supposed to do, they did.

Morris: Your concern was that the process worked well.
Monagan: Right. Right.

Morris: And you would be content with whatever worked out as a workable
solution, rather than —

Monagan: Right.

Morris : It sounds as if your view is that Unruh was more concerned
about what the product would be.

Monagan: Right. Right.

Morris: Your view is that you're not going to get a perfect solution
anyway?

Monagan: Right.

Morris :

Monagan:
Morris :

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris:
Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:

Okay. Let's see. How about things like pesticides? Would
this be something that you would have taken a particular
interest in?

No. It wasn't a big issue in those days.

I thought there were a couple of issues. One was a concern
that field workers might become ill from working with pesticides

Well, that came out a little later than that, actually,
really developed as a prime issue at that time.

It hadn't

Okay. You mentioned the person you put in as the head of the
Assembly Office of Research. Were there other staff people
that you relied on particularly to keep things moving?

Well, the Assembly Office of Research was part of, really,
getting information on issues and background materials and
things, and Al Lipson was in charge of that. I, of course, had
staff in my own immediate office as speaker that we relied
upon heavily for helping to get things done.

The assembly didn't feel the need of an administrative officer
such as the senate had?

Well, they always had one. There's always been a chief
administrative officer for the assembly, and that person actually
functions for the Rules Committee of the assembly more so than
he does for the speaker, and, again, that's an administrative
role.

Do you serve on the Rules Committee?

No, no. But it's a very important committee to the speaker, and
so you obviously have a strong chairman of that committee. Since
the parties elect their own people to serve on that committee,
unlike all the rest of the committee appointments, the chair
manship of that committee is extremely important to the speaker,
so he's got to appoint somebody that's totally loyal to him.

But that person isn't elected? Or did you appoint the chairman
out of those people that were elected?

No, you appoint the chairman. But then the Republicans in
those days appointed three, and the Democrats appointed three,
as the Rules Committee, and you got to appoint the chairman.
So the chairman was key to the whole thing.

Morris:

Monagan:

I see. Right,
to that spot?

Did you have any dilemma about whom to appoint

Morris :

No, other than that it's hard to find somebody who wants to
work that hard in that kind of a role. That's almost a daily
job. Unlike a lot of the other committees, that committee's
meeting all the time and going through all the details of
managing the fiscal affairs of the assembly and the operational
activities, as well as considering some elements of legislation.
So it was a very key committee.

Yes . Did you feel that there was any need for making changes
in the rules?

Monagan: No, no. The rules were in pretty good shape by that time.

VI PARTISAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBSERVATIONS

Continuous Election Process

Morris: How about in terms of your management role and responsibilities?
How much time while speaker did you spend on party and election
matters as opposed to keeping the legislature itself functioning?

Monagan: Well, of course, it would vary as you were in proximity to the
next election date, so you do spend a lot of time on those
matters. First of all, you're a representative of the party and
a representative of the legislature, so you're out spending a
lot of time on speaking engagements and appearances and meeting
with groups, and that's an extremely important part of it. Then
you do have to spend a lot of time when the party functions.
You're a key partisan as far as the party is concerned, and
you're always concerned about the next election, and you're
looking for candidates and trying to raise money for the
next election, and that process never stops.

Morris: It sometimes looks as if the next election starts the day after
election day.

Monagan: It does. It really does.

Morris: You have to analyze what's just happened and —

Monagan: Yes. In fact, I've changed my mind about it over the years,
that in terms of length of terms for legislators, I think two
years is much too short a period of time for state legislators.

Morris : And Congress too?

Monagan: Well, I think we have to do that in Congress also, but I'm
slightly reticent about the congressional things because
they're so far removed from the people, when you talk about

Monagan: California. It would be all right if you were in New York

or Philadelphia or some place close to Washington, D.C., but
the congressmen who come from California get out of touch with
the people.

Morris: Even with the miracles of modern communications and jet travel?

Monagan: Right, right. Yes, they can get back there and get buried,
especially those — and that turns out to be a strong majority
of them — who are in safe districts. Either they're safe
Democratic districts or safe Republican districts, so they
don't have to worry about coming home. The ones who work the
hardest in Congress are the ones who are in the marginal
districts, and they spend a tremendous amount of time coming
back to be in touch with their constituents, and that election
day does loom important to them.

Morris: Are congressional districts safer than assembly and state
senate?

Monagan: No, but there's the three thousand miles to consider. If
you're in a safe Democratic district or a safe Republican
district and you're in Washington, D.C., you're not going to
come home very often. But when you're in Sacramento (we don't
meet as long, and you can get home, and demands upon your time
are greater in terms of people expecting you to be present in
your districts), they just do have better communication with
their constituents at the legislative level than they do on
the congressional level.

Morris: Was there any talk in the party caucuses about changing the
length of assembly terms?

Monagan: It wasn't a partisan thing. There were lots of suggestions

over the years for changing the terms to six years for senators
and four years for assemblymen, but those constitutional
amendments never got anyplace.

Morris: Did they even get on the ballot?
Monagan: No, no.

Morris: Any talk about if you lengthened the length of a term, whether
or not there should be a limit on the number of terms?

Monagan: That issue never really came up during those times. There's a
lot more talk now about — there's more talk in terms of
congressional length of terms than there is on the legislative
side, but there is a lot more conversation among people that
maybe we ought to have some limitation. That's undemocratic.

Morris: They did it with the presidency, however.

Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: For probably political reasons. [chuckles]

Monagan: Right, right. And I've come around to that. I think there ought
to be — maybe ten years is long enough for anybody to be in
the legislature. We do get a lot of turnover in the legislature,
though, by a natural process.

Morris: And yet, most of the people that were here ten years ago are
not still in the legislature.

Monagan: Right. You get a lot of people who go back to Congress for

twenty or twenty-five years, but you don't get very many that
stay in the legislature, and there are a number of reasons for
that. One, the assembly is sort of an entering level into the
political process, and so those people run for the assembly,
and then they run for the senate or they run for Congress, so
there's a lot of turnover there. It's a very competitive level
of politics, so there's just a lot of turnover there also for
that reason.

Morris: How about what looks like a phenomenon that got started while
you were in the legislature? You mentioned consultants who
sometimes were political in mind rather than really professional.
It seems that there are now a number of people now running for
office who began as legislative staff.

Monagan: Right. I'm very disturbed about that. I think that's one of
the problems with having too much staff in the legislature.
We do have the situation now carried to the extreme, where we
have an assemblyman whose only experience was being a staff person
to another assemblyman whose only experience prior to that had
been as a staff person to another legislator. So it's a third
generation of people in who've never had any broadening experience
out there, and I think that's bad. I think that gets too
ingrained in the process .

Morris :

Monagan:

Broadening experience?
with voters?

You mean, out there rubbing shoulders

They got out of college, came here and worked in the legislature,
and that's all they know. They don't know people. They don't
know what the real world is all about . They never had to go
out and do a profit and loss statement someplace else. They're
not conversant with what real life is all about. And I think
that's bad!

Morris: I see.

Monagan: I think we ought to have people in the legislature who've been
teachers or in business or farmers or even housewives who've
just been active in the community. We ought to have those kinds
of people, not people whose only job is to be a professional
legislator.

Mino r ity and Youth Representation

Morris: Going back to the Conference on State Government, one of the
things it mentioned was minority representation. As speaker,
with your political hat on, was there anything you could do
about that in terms of looking for potential candidates?

Monagan: Well, the issue wasn't as strong when I was speaker as it is
now or as it developed in that. There was not that much
agitation for it, talking in terms of the really important
thing, which is reapportionment, in terms of how you get
minority representation. We hadn't had the immense growth of
the Chicanes in California that we've had in recent years.
Blacks were misrepresented, but they were not as agitated. They
were just getting agitated about that time, but there wasn't
any great push for it.

Morris: How about the youth vote; how did you respond in a political
sense to the fact that eighteen-year-olds became eligible to
vote?

Monagan: I urged them to become involved in the process. And what they
did, a lot of them went out and got involved in the process.
You now have people that are serving in the legislature of
who I humorously (maybe some people don't accept it as humor)
say, "The bomb-throwers of the '60s are now serving in the
legislature."

Morris: Are they?

Monagan: Well, people who were on campuses in the mid- '60s are now

serving in the legislature. They weren't bomb -throwers, but
they were there during all the campus unrest. They were at
least —

Morris: Activists?

Monagan: They were aware of what was going on. They had an understanding
of what was happening on the campuses in those days, even
though they might not have been participating.

Morris: Did Governor Reagan call on you to lend a hand in dealing with
some of these campus riot situations?

Monagan: No, not particularly. Some people accused him of aggravating
the situation, as being on the regents. That's one of the
roles as speaker that I thoroughly enjoyed, being a member for
those two years of the Board of Regents of the University of
California, and having to be very careful about attending those
meetings because every time that Ronald Reagan was going to
show up, you could be sure there was going to be a big demon
stration.

Morris: I see. So be careful not to attend them, or to be there?

Monagan: Well, be careful how you got there, through the back door, so

you didn't have to go through all those crowds of rock-throwers
and things, banner-wavers.

Morris: [chuckles] Did you have some liaison people that you relied
on to tell you when things were going to heat up?

Monagan: Well, we had staff people in the legislature, the sergeant at

arms' office and others, who were aware of those kinds of things
and looked out for you in that regard.

Changes in Campaigning: Volunteers, the Right Wing

Morris: You mentioned the importance of volunteer organizations or

volunteer individuals working in your own campaign. How about
the Republican volunteer organizations and other groups? In
addition to the activist students there were also some fairly
strong conservative organizations that wanted to have input
into the Republican party. How did you deal with that?

Monagan: Well, the official Republican party in California was very

strong up until Ronald Reagan got elected governor, and then
he proceeded to recreate that party in his own image, and it
became a Ronald Reagan party structure and not a Republican
party structure. I think that was very damaging to Republicans
in the state. There were strong, effective organizations that
had been in place for a long time, and he proceeded to set
those up as — loyalty to Ronald Reagan was the criterion as to
whether you were going to be in the official Republican party
or not. So that was very damaging in the long run to the party,
and they haven't recovered from that yet; it's still pretty
splintered.

There developed some very strong conservative organizations
at that time: United Republicans (UROC) . The California
Republican Assembly had been the, oh, kind of a moderating part
of the party for a long time, so they could do things like
endorse candidates, where the official party couldn't endorse
candidates. So that was a product of that kind of thinking
originally.

But then they had become very active in support of Barry
Goldwater in '64.

The UROC organization.

I thought that the California Republican Assembly —

Well, I was thinking even more historically than that, that
they'd started —

Yes, they go back to the Earl Warren era.

They started because they needed an organization to endorse
candidates because the party couldn't officially do that, and so
it was very helpful in those days. Well, the CRA split off,
and then it changed in nature. It became a right-wing organi
zation and UROC was a right-wing organization.

Morris: And the Republican League?

Monagan: And the Republican League was a very nominally moderate part
of the party, but they didn't have as many members as those
other organizations.

Morris :

Monagan:
Morris :
Monagan:

Morris :
Monagan :

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris:
Monagan:
Morris :

Monagan:
Morris :

Monagan:

Morris:

Monagan:

Then there was the John Birch Society, which was not officially
Republican, but I gather back in 1966 there was a big debate
at the Republican state convention about whether or not to
say something about the Birch Society, and you were on record
as saying, "Let's leave them out of the platform."

I probably did [say that] because I was avoiding the issue, if
we could. There were those who wanted to really attack the
John Birch Society and, of course, they had a lot of supporters
for the society too in the Republican party — not a lot, but
some. So it became a central issue, and we just avoided it,
like Ronald Reagan did with his celebrated statement, when
they endorsed him, that they were accepting his views; he
wasn't accepting theirs.

That's a nice statesmanlike comment.
Yes.

When you were speaker and concerned about the overall picture
in elections, was the John Birch Society a factor to be
considered?

No, it really wasn't a factor at all.

Did you, in keeping tabs on things, see the volunteer organiza
tions as something that should feed into the process of
legislative campaigns?

Unfortunately, they became a nuisance in the process in that
there was no official party strength out there any more. It
had been dissipated by either becoming part of Ronald Reagan's
own campaign operation or they splintered off into the CRA and
the UROC, and we tried to not create any great problems with
those people, but we didn't work with them very closely. That
pattern is true of both Republicans and Democrats, where the
parties are less important in the political process now than
they were fifteen years ago.

Did those splinter groups, if you want to call them that,
drain off an appreciable amount of either money or workers?

Well, in the early days they drew off some of the workers, but
that became less and less important as the characteristics of
campaigning changed, where there were big media campaigns and
the direct-mail kind of operations eliminated the need for the

Monagan :

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris :
Monagan:

volunteers, which is kind of unfortunate, but that's what
happened in the political process. So you didn't need them as
much. You didn't need the bodies there. The individual
candidate in his district had to deal with it in an individual
way so as not to antagonize those people, and you'd try to
work with them, and you'd try to keep your lines of communication
open a little bit.

The computers were beginning to build up and the mailing and
the media. What does that do to the old political philosophy
that you really need a person who knows people in all the
districts under consideration to really know what goes on and
who the people are to see and that kind of one-to-one political
organization?

Well, it's become less important. You don't depend upon power
groups any more because there are so many power groups they
neutralize each other, and so you try to deal with them in
terms of not antagonizing them, but you don't really want to
get involved with them either.

One of the reasons for the rise in campaign money is the fact
that this is the only way that people can get involved in the
political process now. If you go see your friendly neighbors
and you want their support, you used to say, "Would you come
down to the campaign headquarters and spend four hours a day
and address envelopes and stuff them and carry leaflets
around?" Well, you just don't do that much anymore.

You say to them, "The best way to campaign is to give us a
$10 check," and so that's one reason why there's more money flow
ing into it. It's not the only reason, but it is 'a factor
because that's the only way you can get involved in the process,
through your political action committee at your plant, or your
office, or your neighborhood, or your group, or whatever it is,
or the party. Send a check. That's all you get, appeals to
send checks .

It seems that way.

Yes, that's all it really is. That's

unfortunate.

Reagan's 1968 Favorite Son Campaign

Morris: Did you get involved, in addition to legislative elections, in
Mr. Reagan's favorite-son campaign in 1968?

Monagan: No. He had no legislators that I know of involved in that,

Republican legislators . He was pretty much alone and we were
not a part of that at all. That was one of the big problems
we had with them in that '68 presidential election. We had
about twenty Republican legislators [who] went back to Miami
as delegates or alternates, and we kept hearing all these
rumors that he was a favorite son, that he was going to be a
candidate, and we didn't know what to do.* There were a lot of
people who wanted to support other candidates, but they also
didn't want to go against their own governor.

So we demanded a meeting with him. I think there were about
twenty-four of us in the room when we got him in for a quick
lunch, the only time we could catch him, and we said, "Governor,
all we want to know is whether you're a candidate or not. If
you're a candidate, there are a lot of us [who] will go support
you. But if you're not going to be a candidate, then a lot of
them would like to go support some other candidates." They
just wanted to know where he was going.

He said, "I am not a candidate." So we said, "Fine." He
went out of that room, went into a delegation of another state,
and told them he was a candidate .

Morris : On the same day?

Monagan: The same hour almost. That just destroyed a lot of his rela
tionship with legislators right there.

Morris: Why do you suppose he would do that?
Monagan: I don't know. I'm just not sure.

* On the June 4, 1968, primary ballot, the single Republican
delegation was listed "for Ronald Reagan."

Morris: Traditionally, once the delegation is picked, I thought there
were meetings of the whole delegation here in California
before you went off to the convention.

Monagan: There were meetings, but he wouldn't say he was a candidate,
so there wasn't any reason to be pledged to him.

Morris: Richard Nixon was actively a candidate at that point, I would
assume.

Monagan: Yes. And Rockefeller. There were a lot of options that people
wanted to consider, and all they wanted to know was whether he
was going to be a candidate or not. If he was going to be a
candidate, most of them would have supported him without
question.

Morris: Who was chairman of that delegation?

Monagan: [pauses to think] Hmm. I forget who was chairman of that one.

Morris: Had you all been on the same list on the primary ballot, or were
there some shifts around between the primary election vote and
then the time of the campaign?

Monagan: I don't follow that question too well.

Morris: I understand that there is a list of delegates proposed, but

then sometimes there are shifts between the time of the primary
and the actual campaign.

Monagan: Are you talking about delegates to the convention?

Morris: I'm talking about delegates to the convention.

Monagan: Oh, they have to be made up and be on the ballot in June.

Morris: Right. But sometimes there are alternates, or sometimes there
are others.

Monagan: Well, there is a list of delegates, and then there is a list of
alternates, and sometimes the alternates get moved up to be
the permanent delegates, but there weren't many shifts in that
regard. There wasn't any kind of a phenomenon of that. And we
had input into the selection of a lot of those people on the
delegation. We'd get to talk to Ronald Reagan a little bit
about who ought to be on the delegation and push to get some

Monagan: legislators that we wanted on there and some other people,

and they [the governor's staff] would generally talk to you.
Each [delegate] had to come from a congressional district, and
so we were interested in the people that were going to be there
from our own district as delegates.

Morris: It was a favorite-son delegation that was elected in the primary?
Monagan: Yes, but he said he wasn't a favorite son, you know.
Morris: It was officially just an uncommitted delegation?

Monagan: Yes, yes. And that was what we were trying to smoke out. We
said, "Well, fine. If you're going to be a candidate, well,
great! Just tell us you are." He said, "Well, I'm not a
candidate. I'm not a candidate."

Morris: Then as the convention went on, from your perception was there
a lot of organization going on or pressure from people closer
to Reagan to actually take that nomination? Was it a possibility,
from your viewpoint?

Monagan: Well, they thought it was a possibility, but they kind of

destroyed a lot of the delegation by the manner in which they
went about it, saying they weren't a candidate and then they
were, and running around doing all kinds of things as if they
were, and then telling people they weren't. It left everybody
confused and disappointed; except there were a lot of people on
the delegation that just were total Ronald Reagan supporters.
They'd walk any plank for him, and that probably was the majority
of them, but there were a lot of legislators left out in the
cold.

Campaign Tactics and Personalities, 1968-72

Morris: So what did you then do during the rest of the campaign?

Monagan: We groused mostly.

Morris: You groused?

Monagan: Yes.

Morris: And — what is it? — "took a walk" is the statement in other
settings?

Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: What kind of an impact did that have then when you got back here
for the November campaign? Was there then a unified effort in
terms of electing Mr. Nixon?

Monagan: Yes. There wasn't any problem about that.

But then we were still bitter at Ronald Reagan. But we did
still want him around for the fund-raisers where he could help
raise money for candidates .

Morris: [chuckles] And you still wanted him around then in 1970 for a
run again as governor .

Monagan: Oh, sure, sure. Right.

Morris: In that campaign, wasn't a man named Tom Reed chairman of — ?

Monagan: Tom Reed was probably the chairman of the delegation that time.
Oh, he was the national committeeman. He was probably the
national committeeman then.

Morris: And he'd been in the governor's office for a short time as
appointments secretary in '67? Maybe three or four months.

Monagan: Oh, he was around for a while. He was always constantly on the
scene someplace with Ronald Reagan.

Morris: The few articles I've read about him sound like his roots were
in the East. Was he perceived as a local boy?

Monagan: Yes, he'd gotten identified — I'd never heard of him until the
Ronald Reagan campaign came along. His family was from the
East, a wealthy family from the East, but he was living in
San Rafael, as I recall, at that time, then got involved in
the Ronald Reagan campaign, and then he came up and worked
around the governor's office in a couple of capacities.

Morris: Yes. He was part of the transition team?
Monagan: I think that's right. I'm not sure.

Morris: He turns up on the organizational chart as appointments
secretary and that's fairly key.

Monagan: Yes.

Morris: Did he consult with you at all on appointments?

Monagan: No.

Morris: Did he listen if you —

Monagan : No . Hardly . No .

Morris: — had suggestions?

Monagan: No. That was the whole pattern during that period of time.

Morris: But he stayed around, and then he turns up as the chairman or
co-chairman of this 1970 campaign.

Monagan: Right.

Morris: Is he a manager or an idea man or — ?

Monagan: He's a money man, I think, most of anything, and was helpful

in moving Ronald Reagan around. I know I went on one trip with
him. He had his father's airplane. We took Ronald Reagan
back East some place and to a couple of fund-raisers. He was
always around providing services and attention and help and
assistance to the Governor.

Morris: But not a policy strategy person?

Monagan: He was political strategy probably, not issues.

Morris: Was he knowledgeable about California?

Monagan: Oh, he was a very smart, able guy, yes.

Morris: Has he continued to be active in California?

Monagan: Well, no, he really kind of moved away. He moved down to
Texas. Then he became deputy secretary of defense.

Morris: Air Force or something like that?

Monagan: Well, he was there first. Then he got to be — he was very

closely allied with Clemens. Of course, Clemens was the

secretary of defense, and then Clemens went on to be governor
of Texas.

Morris: Then there was something in 1968 called the Committee for
Greater California. Is that something that — ?

Monagan: It doesn't ring any bells with me.

Morris: Okay. I was not clear, because in election years sometimes you
get a great spate of committees of one sort and another.

Monagan: Yes, yes.

Morris: I wasn't sure if it related to some of this economic development.

Monagan: I don't recall that. It didn't make any impact on me, I guess.

Morris: Yes. In the 1970 campaign, you were a part of the Governor's
advisory committee. How did that function?

Monagan: Just be on the list and hardly ever be consulted in the process.

Morris: I see. I came across some correspondence in which there seemed
to be monthly meetings and a fair number of social events,
and you seemed to be on the invitation list for those. I was
wondering if they were informational meetings for people on
the committee or if there was some strategy and planning.

Monagan: There wasn't any strategy or planning involved in that. That
was just a show committee.

Morris : There was a technical advisory committee also . Would you get
any contact with them?

Monagan: No. No, we weren't very close to them.

Morris: So they were sort of doing their own thing separately from the
legislators.

Monagan: They always did. They always did. Right. They always did.
Wouldn't hardly tell us what they were doing either.

Morris: Then you were a regional chairman.
Monagan: That was for Nixon.
Morris: In 1972.

Monagan: That's right. That was after we lost the majority, and I was
back to being minority leader again. I was a little uncertain
about what I was going to do 'then.

I decided I'd run for re-election in the hopes that we
might get a majority in the election, although I wasn't very
optimistic, and so I decided that I would work on Nixon's
presidential election. I was one of four state chairmen.
Thirty-six of the fifty-eight counties were my responsibility.
They gave me all the —

Morris : But you were one of four?

Monagan: Right.

Morris: [laughter] What did the other three guys do?

Monagan: Well, one of them had Los Angeles, and one of them had the

rest of southern California, and David Packard had the immediate
Bay Area, and I had all the rest: all the valley and —

Morris: Up to the northern — ?

Monagan: The northern — to the borders, yes.

Morris: That sounds fascinating. Did you each run your own show, or
how did you all work together on — ?

Monagan: Well, the others were principally fund-raisers, but I decided

to work at it as an organizing thing. I went out and got chair
men appointed for every one of those counties and built up
supporters in each of them and encouraged them to have activities.
I made a Nixon-type pledge that I was going to visit every one
of those thirty-six counties before the election; I only got
to about thirty-two of them, but I spent a lot of time circulat
ing around in those counties .

Morris: That sounds like a useful device just in terms of staying in
touch with what's going on.

Monagan: Right. Yes, those were very good, very good, and would have been
helpful to me personally if I had pursued some kind of statewide
campaign some day. But instead I was disappointed that we
didn't get a majority and, like Mr. Unruh, a former speaker
sitting in the assembly is not a very enjoyable position.

VII ONGOING ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE

Federal Policies on Transportation, Air Quality

Monagan: Once you've been to the top, you might as well get out of there,
so I decided to go back to Washington and I took an appointment
with the administration back there.

Morris: So you in effect worked in the Nixon administration after you
got him re-elected.

Monagan: Right.

Morris: It sounds as if your function there was to stay in touch with
local state government.

Monagan: Well, I was the assistant secretary in the Department of

Transportation for congressional and intergovernmental relations
then. It was our job to deal with Congress and state and local
government on transportation issues. That was a very interesting
job. I found it very fascinating. I got involved in a couple
of major public policy issues by virtue of being in that position,
One of them was the big debate over whether you divert highway
funds to mass transit.

Morris: And what side of that did you come down on?

Monagan: Well, we were on the side of diverting some of the highway funds
for mass transit, and I philosophically agreed with that. That
was the policy, but it was also I agreed with that. It's always
been my contention that it's to the advantage of the highway
user to get as many people off the highways as possible, so you
ought to be willing to pay to get them off the highways.

Morris: Because if you get other people off the highways, then they
won't need as much maintenance and that sort of thing and
won't be as congested?

Monagan: Well, congestion and air pollution are the big issues.
Morris: Yes.

Monagan: And it's still true, it's basically true, that if we could —

and there isn't a place for mass transit everywhere, but there
are a lot of ways it could be used. All we have to do is get
10 percent of the people out of their cars to solve our — well,
then it was a gasoline problem as well, but safety and air
pollution and congestion and everything else. The magnitude of
the problem is not big in pure numbers, but it's getting people
out of their cars, a percentage of them out of their cars.

Morris: Which 10 percent are you thinking of? [laughter]

Monagan: Well, that's the question. So if you aren't willing to be one

of the 10 percent, then you ought to pay, subsidize other people
to get out of their cars and into some other kind of transporta
tion.

Morris: That's an interesting philosophical question: Is it better to
get 10 percent out of their cars totally or everybody out of
their vehicles 10 percent of the [time], you know, to cut back?

Monagan: Well, either one, but that second part of that equation doesn't
necessarily get them out of their cars at the times you need
to get them out of their cars, like when you're going to go to
work and back.

Morris: Yes. Was the other policy issue air pollution?

Monagan: No. The other policy issue was the bankrupt railroads in the
northeast part of the United States and how to restructure the
whole railroad system back there. I was an integral part of
the legislation to create Conrail and the United States
Railroad Association to reduce the number of railroads operating
in the northeast part of the United States.

Morris: Fascinating.

Monagan: It really was. I learned more about bankrupt railroads than I
ever wanted to know! [chuckles] So we had the phenomenon of
too many railroads servicing too few customers in the area. This

Monagan: was a freight problem, not a passenger problem. No one could
afford to build up maintenance of their equipment and their
tracks to do the job, so the whole thing was deteriorating.
Private enterprise couldn't do that job. You had to have
government somehow come in and arbitrarily make some changes.
That will be successful in the long run, but it was very
interesting.

Morris: There was a federal air quality standards act passed while you
were there. I came across a couple of references to California
wanting to have some meetings to suggest amendments to the
legislation or to the regulations in Congress .

Monagan: Well, the principle thrust from California on that was to be
able to have tougher standards than the federal standards if
they wanted to, and I supported that at that time, and now I
find myself on the other side of the issue.

Morris: Would you have had contact with Governor Reagan's office in that
position, in the intergovernmental aspects of — ?

Monagan: We were talking with somebody who was the director of Transpor
tation at the time. [pauses to try to remember name]

Morris: Was there much visibility of the California governor's office
then in Washington?

Monagan: No, no, there was not.

Reapportionment

Morris: Maybe we could wind up with a couple of things we haven't

touched on. One is the 1970 reapportionment, and the other

is — I don't know if as a legislative leader you would have

gotten involved in some of the revision of judicial selection,

which, I gather, was something that was of real concern to

the governor's office. Was that something that the legislature — ?

Monagan: I never got involved in that and I don't recall very much about
it. Reapportionment in '70, of course, was a very big issue —
[phrase lost when tape turned over]

Monagan: Democrats controlled the legislature, but Ronald Reagan was still
governor and could veto any reapportionment bill. We were
working very hard to try to develop some kind of a compromise
with the Democrats on reapportionment, hopeful that we could at
least maintain some kind of a status quo in the numbers of the
districts. We were making some progress in that regard until
some of the hardliners on the Republican side stimulated Ronald
Reagan to vetoing the bill, and so the whole issue did not get
resolved, and the court ultimately did reapportionment.

Morris: Right. But there was a curious little incident in there where
Lieutenant Governor [Ed] Reinecke called a reapportionment
commission that was permitted under some 1926 constitutional
amendment or something like that.

Monagan: Yes, there was a little play, and I've forgotten some of the
details of that. There was a little play, but it didn't have
any standing.

Morris: Well, that went to court too, and the court finally ruled that
it didn't have any standing.

Monagan: Right, right.

Morris: But was that a kind of a pressure move on the legislature?

Monagan: Yes, as a threat of that, but no one really in the legislature
took any great notice of it because they didn't think that it
would stand up.

The more important thing was that Ronald Reagan was able
to veto the bill, and then the court took over reapportionment
and said, "Okay, we'll do it for you," and that didn't turn out
to benefit the Republicans. There were Republicans in the
legislature who felt that if they could work out the best
compromise possible with the Democrats, the [Republican] party
would be in the long run better off because there was no way
that the Democrats could control the future growth patterns of
the state and what would happen (although it might not help
Republicans in the first election) they at least in future
elections would do better, instead of having it being done by
the court. The court just did material damage to Republican
possibilities .

Morris: I thought one of the court's plans was very closely based on
the legislative proposal that the governor had vetoed.

Monagan: Well, they had that to play with, and they got a master and

said, "Sit down and draw us up a plan." So the master didn't
have much time or expertise, and they just drew what things
were together and put a plan out and gave it to the court, and
the court said, "Fine. Go run on that." And that really
turned out to be better for the Democrats than it did for the
Republicans .

Morris: In what way?

Monagan: Well, the way the districts came out, it probably — the way it
came out, it gave opportunities to Democrats to win more
districts than they would have had we worked out a compromise
plan.

Morris: You didn't feel that the court plan offered any compromise, that
it was just an arbitrary thing?

Monagan: Right.

Morris : When you say you were hoping for a plan that would have long-
range advantages to Republicans, were you working with some
kind of demographic or economic projections?

Monagan: Well, it wasn't quite as sophisticated as it is now. The
computers weren't as valuable a tool; they were still in a
somewhat embryonic state as far as applying them to this kind
of an exercise, and the dollar wasn't there, so it was a good
guess as to what would happen in the state. Where growth
was going to occur was pretty obvious to most people, not
precise, but what was going to happen in the state. So you could
draw lines based upon what the population was in 1970, but then
you could look and say, "Well, in 1978 there's going to be
growth out here, so these areas will be more Republican
districts than they will be Democratic districts five years from
now."

Morris: I can see the numbers. How do you predict that the growth in
a given area is going to produce more Republican voters than
Democratic?

Monagan: Oh, you could then probably more so than now, because people
have tended to shift into nonparty kinds of people; they are
independents or they don't care how they register. But in

Monagan: those days you could think of it in terms of [what] the

patterns were; that if they became more suburban, if the growth
was out of an urban area into a suburban area, the voting
patterns would indicate that they'd be voting more Republican.
And it still is basically true.

Morris : Even though some of those people who moved out might have been
Democrats where they came from?

Monagan: Right. But they also were Democrats who got out of the situations
they were in in urban areas and looked at things from a different
standpoint. Economic things occurred. For example, a labor
person who might have been in a traditionally urban area and
moved out to a suburban area. He moved out to a suburban area
and he became more affluent. He was paying property taxes and
began to be thinking about sending his kids to college. So
they became more conservative and they voted on those kinds of
issues more pronouncedly.

Morris: What were the points about the first proposal that the Governor
objected to?

Monagan: Well, it was just a threat to him. He thought that by threatening
the veto he could force the Democrats to do more than they were
willing to do in the legislature, and they didn't go along with
that, so he vetoed the bill. There was also the thought that
maybe the courts would be better than the legislature.

Morris: That's the first time that it actually ever did go to the courts.
Monagan: Right.

Morris: It looks as if in the '60s and '70s there began to be more

recourse to the courts, that more legislation was challenged
in the courts. Was that your sense? If so, what brought that
on?

Monagan: [pauses to think] I'm not sure that's factual. It could very
well be. It might appear to be that there were more issues
that got to the court.

Morris:

Monagan :

Serrano-Pries t , I guess,
longest.

is the one that's been with us the

Well, there were more issues that got to the courts because the
legislature could not respond to many of those issues, and so
people would resort to the courts to try to resolve the problem.
There were a lot of things that the court mandated based upon
certain constitutional premises.

Morris: The legislature couldn't respond?

Monagan: Well, politically you couldn't figure out a way in that instance
to give equal number of dollars to every child in the state. It
just didn't come out that way. Politically you couldn't do that.
So the courts in Serrano v. Priest said everybody ought to have
about the same amount of dollars. They still haven't achieved
that yet, in spite of that court decision, because you have to
take it away from somebody to give it to somebody else, or put
masses of new money into the program. In neither case were
they able to resolve that. So we're still basically struggling
with the premise that the court said there ought to be an
equal amount of financial support for each child in education
in California. We haven't achieved that yet. There's been
a lot of progress, but we haven't achieved that.

Revenue Sharing

Morris: I think that covers most of my questions. You've been very

patient and very informative. Are there some aspects of your
work in the legislature or working with Ronald Reagan that I
haven't thought to ask you about?

Monagan: I don't know. Somewhere in all the time we've spent I think
we've covered most of them.

Morris: Okay. [looking through notes] I see one more question here.
I don't know whether it makes more sense from your Department
of Transportation aspect or legislator: the advantages and
disadvantages of federal programs and funding at the state
level. You know, this is something that's been debated to
some extent, that some of the problems in state funding and
administration are because of the federal regulations.

Monagan: Well, there's no question that we have a problem in that regard.
I was an early advocate of federal revenue sharing and authored
resolutions in the California legislature to encourage the
Congress to do that. As a matter of fact, I was at Philadelphia
in Independence Hall on the day that Nixon signed the Federal
Revenue Sharing Act, because of my previous involvement in that.
I felt that we could not actually stop the money from going back
to Washington and keep it locally, which would be more ideally
the way to do it; but there was an efficient revenue collection
system through the federal income taxes and other parts of the

Monagan: federal tax structure, and then if we could get those monies
allocated back to state and local government with freedom
and flexibility to do some things with the money, that might
be better, the better approach.

Unfortunately, it hasn't worked out that way because they've
still got all the federal strings in the process. It has been
some help, but even though it's flowed a lot of money back to
state and local government from the federal treasury, they've
been so inflexible about the manner in which they've been used
that it's been a waste more than a help.

Morris: Then the revenue sharing program was added on to the existing
federal subventions in health and welfare and education?

Monagan: That's right, that's right. Then they got involved in all the
restrictions on minority hiring and how the money could be
spent and all sorts of things, and it's especially true in
education. Instead of giving them what I believe is a better
approach, block grants, it didn't turn out that way. So the
federal revenue sharing has gotten rather shaky.

But I do accept Reagan's concept, at least, of whatever
money has to go back ought to be as free of restrictions as
is possible to do without disturbing the end result. We did
find out, however, from federal revenue sharing that you couldn't
trust some of the local governments, state governments, about
how they would use the dollars when they got there.

You had the examples of — oh, in programs like legal
assistance, the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, you'd find
local governments buying six police cars when they only had
four policemen in the police department. So that got people
wary, and they started adding strings to all the programs, and
it kind of destroyed its effectiveness.

Morris: There was a major flap here in California that, I guess, Governor
Reagan went to Washington to get some exemptions from some of
the federal regulations because he was concerned about how the
rural legal assistance people were operating.

Monagan: Yes.

Morris : I gather that he felt that there were political implications
with the cases they picked.

Monagan: That's right, that's right.

Morris :
Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan:

Morris :

Monagan :

Morris :

Did the legislature get involved in that at all?

No. They were kind of split on issues like that. You'd have
a lot of people on one side of the question as well as the
other, where Reagan felt very strongly about that.

But somehow or other, you just cannot — my experience in
Washington in two different times has thoroughly convinced me
that there's no way you can write a program up in Washington
and have it apply to fifty states. You just can't do it. So
if you want to collect money and you want to give it back to
them in some formula, you should just give it back to them and
say, "This is for education," or "This is for highways," and
then, "Go build your highways."

But then how, at the local level, do you deal with the concern
you expressed about six police cars for four policemen?

Well, that's to be preferred [more] than to try to write it
back there and say that you're going to have one police car for
every four policemen, and then you'll find some areas where
that's not the right formula because they've got a different
set of circumstances: it's a rural area versus an urban area,
you've got less ground to cover. You just can't write something
to consider every conceivable element of the problem and apply
it from Washington. So you've got to give them some flexibility,
or else go back to what is the basic premise: don't take the
money away from them in the first place.

I'll try to make this question the last one. From the legislature's
point of view, how do you deal with that when cities and counties
ask the same question? I gather that that's been a constant
battle in California.

That's right. That's one reason why I strongly opposed Proposition
13. It has made local government wards of the state by that
process. Now, we needed to do something about property taxes,
but that wasn't the way to do it, because now all of local
government is in the pocket of the state. They're just up here
as orphans to it, asking for money to bail them out. Well,
we really need to give them the source. We needed some restric
tions on what was happening on property taxes, but we should
leave property taxes down at the local government and let them
use it.

Were the city and county governmental organizations major voices
in the state legislature when it came to discussing bills or
expressing ideas?

Monagan: They were more important then than they are now, but they were
still not tremendously important.

Morris: Even though the counties officially are the arm of the state?

Monagan: The organs of the state. Right, yes.

Morris: Well, I've run out of questions.

Monagan: Okay!

Morris: Thank you very much. I really appreciate your thought and
energy .

Monagan: Well, I'm glad to help.
[End of Interview]

Transcriber: Marilyn White
Final Typist: John E. McPherson

VIII REMEMBERING JOHN VENEMAN, 1982

[Robert Monagan kindly agreed to inclusion of the following brief
remarks he made at the memorial service for former assemblyman John Veneman,
held on April 13, 1982, at the Congregational Church in Modesto. Mr.
Veneman had agreed to discuss his own experience in the state assembly in
the Regional Oral History Office, and particularly his key role in the
1971 attempts to reform costly state welfare programs, but was unable to
schedule an interview before his untimely death.]

Jack's sobriquet, "The Peach Farmer from Empire," for which he
became known, of course, was a badge of honor in this community. But
when he arrived in the Capitol City it was greeted with — if not question
or derision at least with suspicion. It was thought that he would
never create much of a stir.

It did not take long for that to be dispelled. Another distinguished
Modestoan, Ralph Brown, who Jack succeeded, had been replaced as Speaker
of the Assembly by Jess Unruh, who thought so little of Jack at that time
that he wouldn't appoint him to any committees. Jack with the help of a
small group — of which he was an immediate part — The Young Turks — won
that confrontation.

As a penalty, he was appointed to do penance as a member of the
lightly-regarded Assembly Committee on Health and Welfare. Unfortunately
for the Speaker, but fortunately for all of us, it served as a spring
board for Jack's talents, leading him to be one of our nation's top
experts in these two critical public policy areas.

He brought to bear on all of his endeavors the same attributes he
had learned from planting, irrigating, fertilizing, pruning and picking
in the orchard. These peach- farmer experiences had enriched him with
qualities of preparation, hard work, and perception, all of which he
utilized in dealing with state and national problems with which he had
immense responsibility.

Our loss is great but our sadness is tempered by our joyous
association and memories of Jack. Our community, state and nation's
loss of one of our outstanding citizens is also tempered by the great
legacy of public service he has left. As huge as his personal contribu
tions were, far more significant is the example and challenge for
public service he has left for those who will follow.

Each of us had a different relationship with Jack. Mine was very
close and very personal. We shared living accommodations in Sacramento
during the years we served there together. It was my standard, in-public
joke with him that he hadn't yet paid his share of the rent on our
apartment.

Mine or his home away from home was each others' — Washington,
Sacramento, Tracy, or Modesto — or wherever it was is where we hung our
hats .

Other than my personal family, he was the closest person to me — more
than a friend — he was like my brother.

TAPE GUIDE — Robert Monagan

Interview 1: June 22, 1981
tape 1, side A

tape 1, side B *°

tape 2, side A [side B not recorded] 29

Interview 2: July 13, 1981

tape 3, side A 3°

tape 3, side B

tape 4, side A 62

tape 4, side B 77

INDEX — Robert Monagan

agriculture, and politics, 4, 9, 14-15

Bagley, William, 17, 56

Battaglia, Philip, 35, 39, 40

Biddick, William, 4, 6-7

bipartisanship, 9, 19, 45, 48, 51

Britschgi, Carl, 16

Brown, Edmund G., Jr. (Jerry), 55

Brown, Edmund G., Sr. (Pat), 6, 18, 22-23, 31, 37

Brown, Ralph, 18, 25-26

business, and government, 35

California assembly, 26-27

Criminal Justice Committee, 48-49

Environment, Select Committee on, 50-51

and the governor's office, 33

Judicial Committee, 49

minority floor leader, 25

organization, 16-19

Research, Assembly Office of, 51-52, 57

Revenue and Taxation Committee, 52

Rules Committee, 57-58

Speakership, 18-19, 42, 44, 47-49, 52, 56, 57

special sessions, 18

staffing, 11, 20-21, 52-53, 57
California Council on Criminal Justice, 49
California legislature, 80

annual sessions, 20-21, 45

Democrats in, 16, 19, 38, 43, 48, 49, 52, 77, 79

and environmental quality, 50-51

and governor's office, 22, 23, 33-34, 35, 36, 37-38, 39-41, 46, 47,
49, 67, 77

length of terms, 59-61

and local government, 82-83

Republicans in, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25-26, 28, 33, 42, 43, 49, 53, 67

staffing, 21, 45, 61-62, 63

California Republican Assembly [CRA], 64, 65
California State

Attorney General, Office of, 55

State Planning, Office of, 53-54

Supreme Court, 51, 77

Casey, Jack, 16

Champion, Hale, 23-24

Christopher, George, 31

Clark, William, 35, 40

Cochran, Lindsay, 3

Cologne, Gordon, 17

Conference of State Legislative Leaders, recommendations, 46-47

Conference on State Government, 62

Conrad, Charles, 25

courts, 51, 77, 79-80

Democratic party (Democrats), California, 4, 7-8, 30, 65, 78, 79

in the legislature, 16, 19, 38, 43, 48, 52, 77, 79
Do err, Dave, 52

education, 26, 79-80

and politics, 9
election campaigns, ballot measures

Proposition 1 (1960), water bonds, 14

Proposition 13 (1978), Jarvis-Gann initiative, 82
election campaigns, California

1960 assembly, 4, 6-14

1966 gubernatorial, 29, 30-32, 33

1970 gubernatorial, 32, 70-72

election campaigns, methods and finance, 10, 32, 43-44, 59, 65-66
election campaigns, national

1952 presidential, 3

1960 presidential, 13

1968 presidential, 67-70, 72-73
environmental quality, 14, 15, 50, 54, 57

air pollution, 75, 76

Friends of Mammoth decision, 51

Select Committee on Environment, 50-51

federal government

regulations, 81-82

revenue sharing, 80-82

and state/ local government, 3-4, 76, 81, 82
Federal Revenue Sharing Act, 80
finance, state, 34, 79-80

capital outlay, 14

and politics, 24

revenues , 24 , 39
Fluornoy, Houston, 17, 26
Friends of Mammoth decision, 51

governor, office of, 54, 76
appointments, 6, 18, 71
"kitchen cabinet", 34

and the legislature, 33, 35, 37-38, 39-41, 42,
1966 transition, 33-35, 70
staff, 37, 69

Hicks, W.A. (Jimmy), 17

John Birch Society, 65
Johnson, Leroy, 3
judges

appointment of, 18
election of, 6-7

Knox, John, 17

labor, farmworkers, 57
Leggett, Robert, 16
Lindsey, John, 34, 40, 41
Lipson, Al, 33, 51-52, 57
lobbying, 4

media, newspapers, 27, 36

Life magazine, 26

Sacramento Bee, 39

Western Political Quarterly, 47
Meese, Edwin, 40
Mesple, Frank, 23
Mills, James R., 16
minorities, representation, 62
Monagan, Mrs. Robert, 12
Monagan family, 3, 8, 12-13
Mulford, Don, 31-32

Nixon, Richard M. , 13, 68, 70, 80

Parkinson, Gaylord, 27, 29
Peripheral Canal, 14-15
polls, election, 32

Reagan, Ronald, 28, 29, 30-31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38-40, 44, 45, 54, 63,

65, 67-68, 69, 70, 77, 79, 81
reapportionment

1950s, 2

1960s, 17, 18, 30, 43

1970s, 17, 27, 43, 76-79
Reed, Thomas, 70-72
regional planning, 54
Reinecke, Edward, 77
Republican League, 64
Republican party (Republicans), California, 2, 7-8, 9, 24, 28, 30, 43,

59, 63-66, 78, 79

California Plan, 27-28, 29, 30, 33, 42, 43

in the legislature, 16-19, 20, 22, 25-26, 28, 33, 43, 49, 53, 67

1968 convention delegation, 68-69

and Ronald Reagan, 28, 30, 64

right-wing, 64

San Joaquin County central committee, 2-3, 9

San Joaquin County, politics in, 2, 4, 6-9, 13, 14
San Joaquin River, 14-15
Serrano-Priest decision, 79-80
Shell, Joseph, 25
social welfare, 55

mental health, 39
state employees, and politics, 9
Steffes, George, 40, 41
student unrest, 63
Sturgeon, Vernon, 34
Supreme Court, State of California, 51, 77

taxation, 38, 39

federal income tax, 80-81

Proposition 13 (1978), Jarvis-Gann initiative, 82
Todd, A.Ruric (Ric) , 36
Tracy, California

Chamber of Commerce, 2

city council, 6
transportation, 74-76

United Republicans of California [UROC], 64, 65
United States

Congress, 3-4, 59-60

Transportation, Department of, 74
United States Railroad Association, 75-76

University of the Pacific, 1-2
Unruh, Jesse, 18, 26, 44-45, 52

election as Speaker, 18-19

as Speaker, 20, 22, 24, 26-27, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 56, 84

Veneman, John, 25-26, 39, 56, 84-85
volunteers, and politics, 10-12, 63, 65-66

water resources, 14-15

and politics, 4, 9

Proposition 1 (1960), water bonds, 14
Weinberger, Caspar, 34
Winton, Gordon, 19

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Albert S. Rodda
SACRAMENTO SENATOR: STATE LEADERSHIP IN EDUCATION AND FINANCE

An Interview Conducted by

Gabrielle Morris, Sarah Sharp

1979-1981

ALBERT S. RODDA
1977

Photo by Bryan Patrick

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Albert S. Rodda

INTERVIEW HISTORY

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND, EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT 1

Political Interests of Family and Studies in Economics 1

John Moss's Campaign for Congress, 1952 5

Reorganizing Sacramento Democratic Activities 8
County Council and Democratic Clubs; Chairmanship of the

County Central Committee 12

II ELECTION TO THE STATE SENATE 17

Decision to Run for the State Legislature and the Campaign 17
Appointments of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr.; Further

Campaign Notes 22

Freshman State Senator and Teacher 26

III 1966 REAPPORTIONMENT AND RELATED ISSUES 29

Reapportionment and a Full-Time Legislature 29

Legislative Power Relationships 32

Outside the Democratic Circle 36
Annual Sessions, and Constitutional Amendment on

Compensation and Benefits 38

IV PRACTICAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 41

Views on Conservation, Campaign Finance, and Lobbying 41

Single-Issue Advocates and Party Participation 45

Effects of Opposition to the Vietnam War on the CDC 47

Other Issues for Discussion 49

V THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 50

Developing an Adequate Bill 50

A Responsible Project and Questionable Amendments 52

Bond Issue and Cost Estimates 56

Conservation Problems and Proposals in the Delta 57

Relations Among Legislative Colleagues 61

Liberal Caucus and Conservative Coalition 63

VI EDUCATION POLICY AND FINANCE 67

Problems of School Funding and Unification 67
State Deficits, Tax Alternatives, and Tax Relief Efforts
Tidelands Oil Revenue

Credentialing Program 80

Preliminaries to Collective Bargaining for Teachers 84

Commission on Higher Education and Coordinating Council 85

VII PROBLEMS IN LOCAL CONTROL AND SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 91
The Local Government Committee and the Local Agency

Formation Commissions 91

Impact of Population Growth on Arable Land and Scenic Beauty 95

The Political Perils of Constructive Leadership 96

Efforts to Correct Inequities in School Finance 97

Contributions of Governor Pat Brown 101

Categorical Aid Programs 103

VIII CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND RELIGION 107

Passage of the Rumford Act 107

Legislation to Relieve De Facto School Segregation 109

Political Issues with Religious Implications 113

Personal Religious Background and Renewed Involvement 114

Religion and the Secular State 119

Representative and Participatory Democracy 121

Pressures on a Legislator 123

IX PERSPECTIVE ON LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, 1966-1974 126

The Senate Education Committee, SB 65, and SB 90 126

The Reagan Focus: Budget Cutting 129

The Issues of Vietnam and Splits Within the Democratic Party 130

Reagan Campaign Methods 133

A Note on Revenue and Taxation Committee Concerns 134

Reagan and the Republican Party 138

The Beilenson Therapeutic Abortion Act 140

Ronald Reagan as Politician 143

Further Thoughts on SB 90 145

General Comments on Reagan as Governor 146

The Democratic Leadership in the Senate and Party 149

X GOVERNOR RONALD REAGAN AND EDUCATION 151

An Overview of K-12 Issues 151

The Impact of SB 90 156

The Topic of Higher Education 157

Reagan's Relationship with the Legislature 160

The Role of the Senate Education Committee 162

Opposition to the County-Wide or State-Wide Tax 163

The Voucher Plan 165

Collective Bargaining for Teachers 167

Sex Education 168

TAPE GUIDE 170

APPENDIX A — List of selected documents discussed in the Albert S. Rodda
manuscript from the supporting documents collection of
The Bancroft Library 171

APPENDIX B — Letter, Senator Albert S. Rodda to the Sacramento Bee.

January 1955 172

INDEX

INTERVIEW HISTORY

One of California's most knowledgeable legislators in the complex
field of state finance and education policy, Albert S. Rodda is an
exceptionally pleasant and informative person to interview. By all
reports , he has been equally conscientious and diligent in participating
in the state senate's processes for over twenty years.

A teacher of history and government in Sacramento before his
election in 1958, Senator Rodda was a valued advisor on the develop
ment of the Government History Documentation Project and helpful in
securing legislative support for it in 1974. By the time arrangements
were made for Rodda 's own interview in 1979, sufficient interviewing
had been conducted so that it was clear that there are inherent,
perennially-divergent viewpoints on matters of public finance and
equally strong and varied views on educational programs. These two
issues regularly become inextricably entwined in developing the state's
annual budget, in which education is a major item.

In the following interviews, Rodda sheds light on both budget-
making and educational philosophy in the years from 1960 through 1980,
culminating in a thoughtful analysis of SB 90 (1972) , a landmark bill
that managed to combine increased public-school funding with a
significant response to public clamor for property tax relief. Along
the way, the senator provides valuable commentary on governors Edmund
G. (Pat) Brown and Ronald Reagan, whose contrasting views on schools
and taxes underline the range of issues with which the legislature
must deal. Rodda also touches on the leadership styles of such notable
colleagues as Hugh Burns and Jesse Unruh.

Competing with education for legislative attention during Rodda 's
years in office were such major issues as water resources development
and the environment, problems of local government, and broad concerns
for civil liberties and personal freedom, all of which he addresses
with thoughtful concern. He candidly notes that he did not consider
himself one of the legislative inner circle. He did, however, rise
to become chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee, undoubtedly
in recognition of his personal integrity and unquestioned ability.

Unexpected bonuses in the narrative by this mild-mannered,
professorial man are his accounts of dedicated political organizing
in Sacramento County in the 1950s on behalf of the activist California
Democratic Council and of the flowering of a strong religious belief
which came to sustain him in times of stress.

Five interviews were recorded with Senator Rodda, between November
1979 and April 1981. His longtime secretary, Polly, and his veteran
aide, Jack Watson, were helpful in providing background information
and material from the senator's files for preparation of the interview
outlines, which were sent to him in advance of recording sessions. The
first three sessions were recorded in his busy office in the legislature,
piled high with correspondence, reports, and legislation in the making.
Rodda would interrupt the committee report or speech he was working on
and take time to ask how the project was going. Then he would plunge into
discussion of the day's interview topics, occasionally worrying that he
was not explaining a complex issue clearly. The fourth session was
recorded at his pleasant modest home in Sacramento after his unexpected
defeat for re-election. Although still indignant at what appeared to
be questionable tactics by his opponent, Rodda, good teacher that he is,
astutely analyzed the administration of Ronald Reagan and its impact on
the work of the legislature.

By the time of the fifth interview, Rodda had become executive
director of the recently-established Commission on State Finance. This
interview was conducted by Sarah Sharp, the project specialist on
education issues, and focussed on such innovative ideas for education
as countywide funding, vouchers, and collective bargaining for teachers,
in addition to the later impact on the state budget of fiscal reforms
mandated by the Jarvis-Gann initiative of 1978.

The edited transcript was sent to Rodda for review in sections.
By late 1981 these had all been returned with careful clarifications
noted and a few stylistic changes he preferred. Included in the text
is a list of speeches and reports written by Mr. Rodda, copies of
which he has donated to the project. Also available in The Bancroft
Library is an untranscribed tape of an interview with Rodda on the
state un-American activities committee, recorded in 1977 by James
Rowland, then a graduate student in history and later an interviewer
for the project. These materials provide further detail on subjects
of particular interest to Rodda and, in conjunction with his interview,
should be invaluable to scholars wishing to understand the California
state senate in the mid-twentieth century.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer- Editor

2 July 1982

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

iii

In The News

Sacramento Bee
November 8, 1976

Sfafe Sen. Albert S. Rodda

By LUCILLE CRESPO
Bee Assistant Librarian

SEN. RANDOLPH Collier's
surprisng defeat in last week's
election has an interesting
sidelight: Sacramento's own
Sen. Albert S. Rodda will now
become the dean of the State
Senate, its senior member.

Although the designation
holds little or no power, Rodda is
looked on with respect and af
fection by his fellow legislators
and this in itself can hold some
influence.

Born in Sacramento, July 12,
1912, Albert Stanley Rodda Jr. is
the grandson of a minister who
once served the Oak Park
Methodist Church. His father
was the Sacramento County
auditor from 1946 to 1950. His
mother, Kate Elizabeth
Hoiliway Rodda, was a teacher.

WHEN RODDA was 7, his
mother died of flu. His father
later remarried and he and his
older brother Richard were
adopted by their stepmother
Josephine.

As a boy, he played football in
Curtis Park, delivered
newspapers and worked in his
uncle's drugstore. He went to
Sutler Junior High School and in
1929 graduated from
Sacramento High School. Rodda
graduated from Stanford in 1933
as a Phi Beta Kappa. To help
finance his way through college,
he worked 'in an Italian
restaurant and worked sum
mers in a Sacramento box
factory. In 1934, he took a
teaching position at Grant Union
High School where he met his
future wife, Clarice R. Horgan,
an English teacher. He left

Grant to return to Stanford for
graduate work in 1938 and came
back to Sacramento in 1940 to
teach at Sacramento High
School.

Rodda and Clarice Horgan
were married in North

Sen Albert S. Rodda

Sacramento in 1941. They have
two daugters and a son.

HE WENT INTO the Navy in
1943 and served in the Pacific
area as an armed guard gun
nery officer. Rodda left the
Navy in 1946 and joined the
faculty of Sacramento City
College. In 1951, after 16 years of
study and effort, he earned his
PhD in history and economics
from Stanford University.

Rodda was a registered
Republican from 1946-1950 so he
could support Earl Warren. But
he changed his registration to
Democratic because of U.S. Sen.
Joseph McCarthy. And in 1952,
when his friend John Moss ran
for Congress, Rodda became a
member of the Sacramento
County Democratic Central
Committee. He was its chair
man from 1956 to 1958 when he
was persuaded by friends to run
in a special election for the State
Senate seat of Earl Desmond,
who had died in office. Rodda
defeated Sacramento attorney
Louis Desmond, the late
senator's son, and two other
Democrats. He has been re-
elected ever since.

FAMILY LEGEND has it that
Rodda's stepmother Josephine,
a staunch Republican, voted for
only one Democrat in her life —
her son Al. His father, also a
registered Republican, died in
1956 and did not see his son's
political success.

In 1967, he retired from
teaching and is a full-time
legislator.

Rodda describes himself as a
liberal Democrat and is
chairman of the Senate
Education Committee. He has
authored legislation in broad
aspects of education, his special
interest.

Regarded as one of the most
honest and modest members of
the legislature, Rodda describes
his basic philosophy: "A strong
conviction with regard to
majority rule has prompted me
consistently to support public
education, a free press,
academic freedom and the right
of dissent."

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND, EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
[Interview 1: November 6, 1979]##

Political Interests of Family and Studies in Economics

Morris: Perhaps we could start with some personal background on yourself and
how you came to be interested in government and history. You were
born here in California?

Rodda: Right. I was born in Sacramento and attended the public schools, and
then I attended Stanford University.

My father was in the auditor's office and for years [he was] the
assistant county auditor. Then he ran for the office of auditor in
1946 and was elected and served until 1950, and my brother and I
helped him in his campaign. Because of his involvement in county
government and his affiliation with elected officials, I began at a
very early age to have an awareness of politics. My father also was
lobbyist for the County Auditors [Association] on a voluntary basis.

Morris: For the county auditors statewide?

Rodda: Of the state, yes. He used to audit, and used to lobby in the

legislature, just provide information, and he knew quite a few people
in state government. Occasionally we entertained them at home when
I was a young man, and I became acquainted with them.

My brother was a political reporter for the [Sacramento] Bee,
became the political editor, and so he was assigned to the capitol
beat, and he kept me informed about developments.

////This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has
begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 170.

Rodda: Besides that, I was teaching American history at the high school

level, and then at the community college level I taught Problems of
Democracy, American History, Western Civilization, and Economic
Principles. So, I had an orientation toward government and an interest
in it.

Morris: How did you happen to decide to study history when you were a student
at Stanford?

Rodda: Well, I first attended [Sacramento] City College — it was a junior
college then — for two years. I have an A.B, M.A. , and Ph.D. from
Stanford. But in my freshman year, I studied philosophy, psychology,
English literature, economics, and history, and I had some math.
I was good in math, but I wasn't oriented toward that study. I,
also, had some classes in science. But, as I studied, I concluded
that perhaps I'd like to know more about history and economics, and
my principal interest was in economics. So, I decided, when I went
to Stanford, that I would become a teacher, but I decided to major
in history because I thought that I would only be able to find
employment at the high school level and that there was little
opportunity to teach economics at the high school level.

Morris: What was it that appealed to you about economics, now that you're
chairman of the [Senate] Finance Committee? [chuckles]

Rodda: [chuckles] I don't know. I was very much interested in the economic
conditions which confronted the nation. I was familiar with the
collapse of the stock market in 1929. I was aware of the fact that
some of the friends of my father almost experienced bankruptcy
because they were heavily invested. They had purchased stocks on
margin, had unusual profits, and then, within forty-eight hours, they
had unusual losses. Besides that, I watched the Depression develop
and observed its effect upon the economy. I was a student in the
university at that time, graduating with an A.B. in 1933.

It seemed to me that if one were going to contribute academically
and as a teacher or instructor in the field of the social sciences,
a very important area would be economics and related to that, of
course, American history. But, beyond that, I just enjoyed the
study of economics. I guess I enjoyed it because I liked, to a
certain extent, the logic of it. Maybe it's no longer logical, but
I thought it was then. It had an element of logic in it, trying to
understand the basic principles which govern economic behavior, so
appropriate courses of action to direct the economy and achieve
desirable economic goals could be implemented.

Morris: I was wondering if these were the Keynesian theories that were —

Rodda: Well, I became familiar with Keynes in 1938. I completed my M.A.
in '34; my thesis was, "The Commercie of Colonial Rhode Island."
After that I taught four years, paid off my debts to Stanford
University for my tuition, saved some money, and returned to Stanford
in '38 and '40 to do graduate work. Having studied Spanish for my
Master's, I studied German and French for my doctorate, and enrolled
in an advanced course in economic theory for two years. I became
familiar with the writings of Keynes at that time.

His work was published, as I recall, either in '37 or '36, and
my graduate theory course began in '38. I became very much
interested in his ideas, which, of course, have been significantly
modified since then. I thought that there was a significant element
of validity in what he was arguing. His basic contention was that a
free market could easily lead to a situation in which there was a
stable economy, but at a level of employment below full employment,
which was contrary to the thinking of those who were advocating the
free market, basically a laissez-faire concept. It was their
contention that if the economy were a competitive economy, insofar as
supply and demand are concerned, the forces of the marketplace would
provide that the economy would generally tend to stabilize toward a
level of full employment. I thought Keynes was more realistic in
his conclusions, so I became somewhat interested in Keynesian
economics .

I finally wrote my doctoral dissertation on "The Economic Mind
of Eighteenth Century Colonial America."

I pursued a major in history although I was oriented toward
economics, because I hoped to teach at the junior college level. I
did not think I had the qualifications to teach at the university
level, but I did think that I had the qualifications to teach at the
community college level or perhaps at a state college. That's my
academic background.

I began teaching economics when I started teaching at Grant
Union [High School] in 1934 and introduced a course in economics at
the senior grade level. The curriculum lacked one until I made the
change.

I didn't complete my doctorate until after the war. I studied
during '38 and '40 at Stanford, took the oral and written exams, passed
the language tests, and then began my dissertation research. I ran
out of money; so, I had to return to teaching. That was 1940. I
obtained a job at Sacramento High School, moving from Grant to
Sacramento High School, paid off the -new debts that I had incurred,
and married in 1941. My wife and I had a child.

Rodda :

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda:

The war developed in '41 and in '43 I volunteered for service. I
became a reserve gunnery officer in the U.S. Navy and I spent thirty
months in the service, most of that time overseas in the Pacific.
We had two more children.

When I returned from the war, I continued my research on the
doctorate at the University of California, the California State
Library, Stanford University, and the Huntington Library. The
dissertation was not finished, however, until 1951, because I was
assigned to Sacramento Junior College in 1946. Since I was teaching
at the college level, '46 through '51, it was difficult for me to
write the dissertation. I was teaching full time at the junior
college, part time at Sacramento State College, summer school classes
at the junior college, and also working on a dissertation. [laughter]

And with a houseful of young children. [laughter]

Three children. I don't know how we did it. When I read the
dissertation now, I wonder how I ever wrote it.

But anyway, when I returned to teaching after the war, at the
college level, the concepts of Keynes were incorporated in the basic
or introductory textbooks.

And they were the major thrust, weren't they, of college teaching?

Right. As a matter of fact, Econ IA was quite different from what
it was prior to Keynes. Econ IA was known as micro economics and
Econ IB as macro or national economics — we sometimes described it as
aggregate economics . We used a book written by Paul Samuelson in
the course I was teaching at Sacramento Junior College.

Had he been one of the texts when you were a student yourself
earlier?

No, the concepts of Keynes were not incorporated in the basic or
even the advanced econ texts.

I was thinking of Paul Samuelson.

Oh , no .

Because he is still a standard college text.

Right. His textbook is still selling. I guess he has sold millions
of them and, naturally, made a fortune.

When I was a student at Stanford and working on my A.B0 in '33
and finally my Master's in '34 — I can't even remember the names of
the texts we used — it was prior to Keynes' publication of his work.

Rodda: Subsequently, I studied Keynes at Stanford as a graduate student,
when I was enrolled in the course in graduate economic theory and
studied the original work of Keynes. He was one of the many
economists whose concepts we studied. Two others were John Hicks
and Joan Robinson.

So, it wasn't until, as I recall, the middle '40s that the
work of Keynes was introduced into the basic texts for the purpose
of instruction in beginning economics. We never used his book at
the community college level.

Morris: But it was one of the theories that were taught?

Rodda: Oh, yes. Since his ideas had been incorporated into economics in
the middle '40s, the students had an opportunity to learn macro
economics or aggregate economics as originally developed by Keynes
and subsequently modified by other writers.

John Moss's Campaign for Congress, 1952

Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:
Morris:
Rodda:

Then, of course, when I finished my dissertation in '51, I had more
free time. John Moss was running for Congress. He was a California
assemblyman at that time and had been in the assembly for four years.
Reapportionment occurred in 1951 and John ran for Congress in '52.
I wrote two speeches for him, one on agricultural economics, which he
delivered in Marysville, and one on international affairs, which he
delivered at Davis. His district then consisted of six counties —
Sacramento, Yolo, Yuba, Sutter, Glenn, and Colusa.

Was he a friend of your father's?

with him?

Is that how you got acquainted

No, I met him through a faculty associate of mine, a college
instructor, Carson Sheets. Carson Sheets and Moss had been active
in the Young Democrats in the '30s. That's when I was at Stanford
doing my graduate work.

Were you active in student politics at all?

At Stanford?

Yes.

No. I had to work and was not active in campus affairs. When I was
a student, I hashed at a restaurant and washed the dishes. Once I
exercised the Stanford polo ponies for two bits an hour. One of the

Rodda: riders was — oh, gosh, he was the son of a very distinguished American
comic. I don't know how to describe him. [pauses, trying to remember
name] Isn't it funny? I cannot think of his name. You would know
it in a minute. [He's] from L.A., always making very interesting
observations, especially comic or satirical comments about the
contemporary scene.

Morris: Will Rogers, Jr.?

Rodda: Yes. He was on the Stanford polo team when I was exercising the

horses. I used to have to take four at a time and walk up and down
while they relaxed, climbed all over my feet and salivated on my
back. I was paid two bits an hour. So, I quit.

Morris: [laughter] I can believe that, yes.

Rodda: I wasn't that much in need.

Morris: If you weren't a horse person youself.

Rodda: Right. It was no joy.

When I returned to do my graduate work, I had a fellowship; it
was $400 per year, and I was a reader in courses in American history.
One of the courses was [taught by] Tom Bailey who is still writing
at Stanford and has published an outstanding book on American
diplomacy. He also published an outstanding textbook on American
history. You're probably familiar with Tom Bailey. He's still at
the university and although retired continues to publish. But
anyway, I had the benefit of that fellowship. I also read for Edgar
Eugene Robinson, the dean of the history department.

Morris: In addition to being a student of economic theory, were you

interested at all in Roosevelt's ideas and that national political
upheaval?

Rodda: Yes, I was very sympathetic to Franklin Roosevelt. I regarded myself
as a New Dealer. As a matter of fact, I was somewhat liberal, but
I never became a socialist or a communist. I had two very close
friends at Stanford University who were much more liberal than I.
One was a socialist and could not understand why I could not accept
socialism. The other one, who was an English major and now has a
doctorate, became a communist and was active in the communist
movement in the '30s. He could never understand why I could not
become a communist. The socialist, who was active in the area of
political science, was an Utopian type of socialist. He was very
idealistic and could not understand.

Rodda: I was reluctant to accept socialism or communism, especially

communism, but I did think that we had to do something constructive
through the intelligent use of the power of the state to direct the
economy in order to better implement and achieve our national goals.

As a matter of fact, I have a paper here that I wrote to a
friend of mine who is a Republican. He asked me for a definition of
"liberalism," and I wrote him this paper. [indicating letter] You
can have a copy if you'd like.

Morris: I'd like it, because I think that's one of the more interesting
debates going on now in the '70s: what is a liberal?

Rodda: Right. I answered the question by saying, "I don't know." It's kind
of interesting. He's a conservative Republican, [reading from
letter] "Frankly, I'm convinced that the conservative view, if
persisted in, can only promote the destruction of the environment,
greater economic inequality and social injustice. The outcome of
persistent implementation of conservatism [is that] we will assuredly
be a society which would no longer remain dedicated to the economic
and legal principles of this country. I've always been inclined to
sympathize and identify with 'liberal,' and yet, as I become more
and more aware of the dilemma of contemporary man, I wonder whether
the liberal, given his basic assumptions about man, has the
capability of responding to challenge." That's what I ended with.

But anyway — I do not know where I was in our interview.
Morris: I was asking you about working for John Moss.

Rodda: Oh, yes. I had an inclination toward liberalism and I identified

with the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. So, I was sympathetic
to John Moss's campaign. I have the paper I wrote on foreign policy,
which he delivered at Davis.

John did not have the academic background that I had. As a
matter of fact, he attended Sacramento Junior College, but did not
acquire a college degree. He was a close friend of Carson Sheets,
who, as I stated, was a faculty associate of mine at the junior
college.

Carson ran in 1948 for Congress, and that was the year John Moss
ran for the assembly. Sheets was beaten. Moss won. Four years
later, Moss ran for Congress. Carson and I helped Moss with his
publicity, and I wrote the two speeches. As I commented the one he
delivered in Marysville was on agricultural economics, and the other
at Davis was on international affairs.

Morris: Did he give you your head and just say, "I need to know something
about foreign policy?"

Rodda: Well, yes. What he wanted was an academic statement that he could
make as a preface to a period of questions and answers which were
to follow. Of course, given my academic gackground, I was somewhat
qualified to write a paper. Because John, when speaking in Marysville,
was talking primarily to people who were interested in various forms
of agriculture — production and marketing — and in Davis he was
talking to the academic community, among whom there was very much
interest in foreign policy, John desired the two different papers.

Morris: That must have been kind of a feather in your cap as a young man
to launch a congressman on his path.

Rodda: Oh, I don't know. I didn't think much about that. [laughter]

It was just a job. I was also working on daily press releases for
the congressman and this seemed a natural extension of that activity.

Morris :
Rodda:

You and Mr. Sheets were paid staff?

Oh, no. We were volunteers. In those days, TV was not as important
as it is now, nor was radio. The principal means of gaining access
to the public was through voluntary precinct work and through
newspaper releases and advertising.

I'll hurry along here,
background.

I'm spending too much time on this

Morris : No , that ' s okay .

Reorganizing Sacramento Democratic Activities

Rodda: While John was campaigning, he asked me to run for the Sacramento
County Democratic Central Committee. I just filed my papers and
was elected. Of course, my family's name was known because my father
had been an elected official in '46 and had retired as county auditor
in 1950. The congressional election was in '52, just two years
later. So then I became active in the central committee.

The Democratic central committee in Sacramento County was not,
in John's opinion (Congressman Moss's opinion) or my opinion, really
working in the interest of the Democratic party. It was controlled
by a group in Sacramento, the members of which, in our opinion, were
utilizing their influence in the party and their role in the party
for personal economic advantage. They were largely attorneys. So,
they gained publicity and attention and recognition, but they did
very little to assist Democratic candidates. As a consequence, in
this area, basically Democratic, we were inclined to elect Republicans,

Morris: In other words, Sacramento County had high Democratic registration?

Rodda: Yes. It was a Democratic registration area and the state senator

at that time, before reapportionment, represented the entire county.
The population in 1946, when my father ran, was almost 245,000. That
figure provides some idea of the growth of the county since that time,

Morris: The city of Sacramento is now about 240,000.

Rodda: Yes, and the county must be around 800,000, in round figures.

I did succeed in helping bring about the reorganization of the
Democratic party. In doing so, I led a group of rebels. They were
people who were very interested in government and politics. They
were educated people and they were liberal in political philosophy.

Morris: Where had you found them?

Rodda: Well, just through my involvement in politics in the Moss campaign.
It took a little time to accomplish the change, and it wasn't the
most pleasant experience for me.

My wife helped reorganize the Democratic Women's Club, which
had been very active in Franklin Roosevelt's time and then had
declined in its size and activity. The women in the women's club
were mostly in their late sixties and seventies. My wife, Clarice,
entered the organization in 1952 in her forties. I was in my forties,
Clarice became involved with a number of younger women who also
entered the women's club and then made it the outstanding political
organization in the county.

Morris: Was it one Democratic Women's Club, or did they have local ones?
Rodda: It was for the entire county.

An interesting fact is, from 1946 to 1950 I was a registered
Republican. I didn't think that the Democratic party was offering
the voter worthy candidates, and since I was inclined to support
the so-called progressive Republicans, I registered in that party.

Morris: Would you have been a Warren Republican?

Rodda: Yes, I was. As a matter of fact, I was concerned about the fact
that his nomination for the governorship was being challenged in
'46, as I recall, by a very conservative Republican. I desired to
vote for Warren in the primary.

Morris: So, you became a Republican?

Rodda: Yes, I changed registration and remained as a Republican until '50.

U.S. Senator Alan Cranston organized the CDC [California
Democratic Council] in, I believe it was, 1953, and my wife and I
attended practically all of the CDC conventions in the fifties and
sixties. I think the first state meeting was in Monterey and
another one was held in Stockton in 1953, I believe. My wife
attended one of those and I did not attend either. I think the one
she attended was in Stockton.

Morris : Is your wife a Sacramento woman?

Rodda: She was born in Concord, but she came here in '33 to teach at Grant
Union High School. I met her when I began teaching there.

Morris : What was her maiden name?

Rodda: Horgan. She is Irish and German. Her name is Clarice Roselle.

Morris: That is a pretty name.

Rodda: Yes. Not many women have it. I like it very much. [laughter]
She was very active in her church and community affairs.

Morris: And you were both concerned about increasing participation in
political activity?

Rodda: Right. Involving citizens and people who would contribute to the
party and not use it, not exploit the party. And it was being
exploited.

Morris: When you say "exploited," does this mean that the candidates were
hand-picked and there were problems with finances?

Rodda: Well, the central committee was controlled by the chairman. I don't
like to refer to persons, but he was a prominent local lawyer. The
central committee had no constitution or by-laws, and a quorum, I
think, was three.

Morris: Of three elected people?

Rodda: Yes, only three. And there were about twenty-one or twenty-three

members in the central committee. Few members attended the meetings
because the chairman could cast proxy votes and, thus, dominate
the meetings. What happened was that the chairman solicited
friends to run and become elected to the committee, and they just
delivered their proxy to him; so when he came to a meeting he controlled
seven or eight votes. So, decisions were a mockery of the process.
The chairman usually had a small group of supporters at the meetings
and with his seven or eight proxy votes they controlled eleven or

Rodda: twelve votes, which was a majority. So, when the committee officers
were chosen, it was very easy for him merely to say, "You're vice-
president. You're sergeant-at-arms. You're secretary. You're
treasurer." And that was it — total control by the chairman and a
few personal friends.

Morris: Was this still the procedure when you were first elected?

Rodda: Yes.

Morris: How did he respond to the appearance of a young rebel?

Rodda: Well, it was not too pleasant, as I indicated. Fortunately, by

virtue of the interest that had developed in 1952 in the Democratic
party — and Adlai Stevenson had significantly contributed to that,
as had Congressman Moss — we elected eight or nine people to the
central committee in 1952 who were interested in change.

Morris: Did you help encourage them to stand for election?

Rodda: I don't recall that fact. They were active and involved and there
were more of them elected in 1954. Adlai Stevenson, for some
reason or other, brought a lot of vitality to the Democratic party.
He provided an inspirational leadership. And these activists were
largely middle class, educated, idealistic, but realistic persons.
It was a kind of a natural thing. And their interest in politics, I
guess, developed for reasons similar to the development of my interest.
They began to be active about the same time. John Moss inspired them,
Stevenson inspired them, and as a result, a number of them ran for
the central committee and were elected. A number of them were
faculty members at Sacramento State College and some were faculty
members at Sacramento Junior College. A number of them were local
attorneys.

Morris: Was the state college growing as other institutions were in those
years?

Rodda: Yes, right. It started on the city college campus, the junior

college campus, in 1947. I can't recall when the present campus
was opened, but it seems to me that by that time, 1952, it was
operating on its own campus as a small state college. And some of
the faculty were active in the area of economics and political
science. I had become acquainted with them when they were on the
junior college campus where I taught. I was also a part-time
instructor at the state college.

So the first thing we did was get to work on a central
committee constitution and by-laws to provide a reasonable
parliamentary framework within which to function. Alan Cranston
helped us as we proceeded to authorize local Democratic clubs.

Morris: You mean for the CDC?

Rodda: No. Cranston had drafted a constitution in Santa Clara for the

authorization of local clubs and we used that document as a model
for Sacramento County.

Morris: Cranston developed the charter for implementation by the Santa
Clara County Democratic Central Committee?

County Council and Democratic Clubs; Chairmanship of the County
Central Committee

Rodda: Yes, which it approved. You see, such clubs were outside the

statutes or the election code; so they had no official status insofar
as state law was concerned. But the councils and the clubs affiliated
with the county councils had status insofar as they operated under
a charter which was approved by the local county central committee.

So, we organized, in the next two or three years, eight or nine
clubs in this county. I helped organize one that was called the
Business and Professional Democratic Club. My wife, as I've
already indicated, was active in the Women's Club, which also
affiliated with the county council. We also activited the Young
Democrats Club, which was revived in the election of '52. We also
helped organize Young Democrats clubs on the campuses of the two
colleges. There was an inclination for young people then to be
involved in traditional politics; so there were young Republican
clubs and Democratic clubs. We also organized a Curtis Oaks
Democratic Club, a Fruitridge Democratic Club, Town and Country
Democratic Club, and several north area Democratic clubs. So,
throughout the county different clubs came into existence.

Morris: That's fantastic.

Rodda: Each organization sent delegates to what was known as the county
council, and there was a chairman of the council and council
officers. So, we had a Democratic council and its affiliated clubs
working cooperatively with the central committee. The central
committee was not, under the law, permitted, however, to involve
itself in primary endorsements. At that time, there was a need for
this kind of an organization because the state had cross-filing, which
meant that a candidate could run for the nomination for both parties.
Incumbent legislators, for example, could file, if they were
Republicans, as Democrats. If three or four Democrats filed, then
the chances were that the Republican, who was well-known as an

Rodda: incumbent, would win the nomination of both parties and be elected
in the primary. In order to strengthen the influence of the party,
and strengthen and enhance the Democratic party in California, one
of the purposes of the Council of Democratic Clubs within a county
was to hold a county convention and endorse a Democratic candidate
in the primary election. Such action could not be taken by the
county central committee.

The expectation was that the club members , through their
organization, would campaign for the nominee who was endorsed in the
primary. In the general election the central committee would,
working with the CDC (the Council of Democratic Clubs), support the
party nominee in the general or run-off election. We had a very
active CDC in Sacramento and it helped to enhance the influence of
the party.

We ousted the old guard in '55, after a very difficult battle,
and I became county chairman in '56. I served for two years. The
reason that we were able to do that is interesting history. In the
gubernatorial election in '54, there was a candidate for a municipal
court judgeship, an incumbent, who was being challenged. The
chairman of the central committee and some of his associates took
advantage of the Democratic party headquarters where the Democratic
clubs had prepared a mailer for distribution. Now, the mailer was
in the form of the old-fashioned ballot. Do you remember those
where you mark an "x," on a big sheet, opposite the candidate's
name?

Morris :
Rodda:

Yes.

On the mailer we had identified each of the "CDC-endorsed Democratic
party candidates. It was the primary election.

In other words, you were giving people a slip to take to the polls to
vote from.

Right. Well, what the friends of the judge did was to enter the
headquarters, with the cooperation of the chairman, the week-end
before that mailer was distributed, and stamp an "x" opposite the
name of the judge.

Good heavens!

Those with whom I was associated were not involved. We did not think
that political parties should be involved in nonpartisan races, and
I continue to argue that central committees should not involve
themselves in nonpartisan races.

Rodda:

Well, I was terribly distressed. I was the co-chairman in the
Third Congressional District at that time, that was the six-county
district of Congressman Moss. So we complained. Well, the incident
created such a furor in the Democratic party that it adversely
affected the chairman. He was the third consecutive chairman of a
group of individuals who had dominated the Democratic party for about
twenty- five years. There had only been three chairmen during that
twenty- five year period, which provided a kind of hereditary power
structure, one might say. [chuckles] They had obviously established
a political machine in Sacramento.

Morris: Was this frequent in county central committees?

Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

I cannot generalize about that. Certainly, however, it had become
the modus operandi within this county. But the situation was rather
unique because the local municipal court judge who was being
challenged was identified with those people who controlled the
central committee, and they decided to exploit the local CDC.

Right. Did the mailer get mailed?

Yes, it was distributed. I am not sure whether we mailed it or
hand distributed on a precinct door-to-door basis.

The party headquarters was located in the old Labor Temple.
The building no longer exists. The friends of the judge just went
into the headquarters and just stamped an "x" after his name. (I
think it was on a Friday night.)

Well, that contributed to the defeat of the county central
committee chairman, and in 1956 I became chairman. Since the
chairman had been involved, we used that issue to remove him. The
election was in 1954, and he was ousted in 1955.* His successor
was a member of the same group, but was less offensive and was
regarded as a compromise. I was a noncompromise candidate, and I
was chosen to lead the party in 1956.

Did you run for the job of chairman, or did you get elected
committee and then they — ?

to the

One is elected to the central committee and then one competes for
the chairmanship.

Morris: The committee chooses its own chairman?

*See appendix for letter to the Sacramento Bee, January 1955.

Rodda: Yes. I was unanimously elected, except that my predecessor, Senator
Earl Desmond, who was in the state senate representing Sacramento
County, refused absolutely to vote for me. He stood on the floor,
as I recall, when the motion to elect me was made and it was
suggested that the vote be unanimous, and dogmatically stated that
he would never vote for Al Rodda for anything and that he wanted it
to be clear that he was registered as a "no" vote.

Morris: Oh, my! [laughter]

Rodda: [laughter] Earl and I had problems since he was very closely

identified with the old power people; they were his allies and his
supporters, you see.

Well, anyway, we did organize a council of Democratic clubs in
this county and it became an effective political organization. As
I indicated, I became chairman of the central committee in 1956, and
I have a copy of the letter that I wrote to the attorney general at
the time, asking him if he would please indicate what his intentions
were with regard to the 1958 gubernatorial election. Those of us in
the central committee wanted to know if he would be a candidate.
That was in September of 1957. [pauses to think] I cannot recall
the exact date. You know to whom I wrote it? Edmund Brown, Sr.

Morris: Yes.

Rodda: He was the one Democrat who was popular, but he was, I guess, acting
as Ted [Edward M.] Kennedy has been acting for some time. He was
waiting to make certain that there was enough support for him.

Morris: Do you recall any rumors that in 1954 he would have run if he
decided that Goodwin Knight could be beaten?

Rodda: I wasn't close enough then to Pat Brown to know, really. I was only
active in the Sacramento County Central Committee.

But I do recall the letter, and I have a copy of it at home. As
chairman of the county central committee, I wrote to Attorney General
Brown, indicating that the members wanted to know what his intention
was and that we would like to know as soon as possible because such
information would help us a great deal in planning for the gubernatorial
election.

Morris: And what did he answer?
Rodda: I don't recall.

Morris: So, you were really ready to push candidates, to get them active, so
that your organization could get to work.

Rodda: That's right. The party people wanted to know and have some

clarification as to what his intentions were. Of course, he did
indicate ultimately that he was a candidate.

Morris: Did he talk to you in response to the letter?

Rodda: I do not recall that he did. I had no real meaningful contact with
Pat.

I think there's one little incident that's rather important that
I might relate to you.

II ELECTION TO THE STATE SENATE

Decision to Run for the State Legislature and the Campaign

Rodda: The primary occurred and I cannot recall too many of the incidents
relating to the campaign. I was teaching regular summer school and
night school. I was still teaching evening classes at Sacramento
State College. As a matter of fact, in 1957 I applied for a job
at the state college and I was interviewed, and they told me, since
I had taught there, they would be happy to hire me, but since
enrollments were not increasing as rapidly as they had immediately
after the war, they could possibly hire me either as a lecturer or
as an assistant professor.

I asked, "What level on the salary?" I was told that it would
be the first salary step. I said, "How much is that?" And they
told me. I said, "My salary now is 'x' number of dollars, and I am
able to teach summer school and night school, and I'm thoroughly
familiar with the courses that I teach. It would take me thirteen
years, if I were promoted each year and were moved from assistant to
associate to full professor, to reach a salary comparable to what I
am receiving now, or will be receiving as a result of annual
increases. I have three children who are about ready to enter
college. I would have to work a lot harder because I would have to
concentrate on teaching new courses, and I would experience more
course rotation." Do you know what I said?

Morris: Yes. [laughter] No.

Rodda: No. [laughter] I said, "I may run for the legislature."

Morris: Oh, that's marvelous. [laughter] Did you decide that you were
interested in running for the legislature before Brown made his
intentions public?

Rodda: No, actually I would not have run. Incidentally, Senator Earl

Desmond, who was my predecessor, was not a candidate in that year,
'58.

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Why didn't he run again?

Well, he did in 1956, and he died unexpectedly in 1958. I'll provide
you with a little background. In 1956, when he sought reelection,
I was of the opinion that he might not run and that his son, who was
a Republican and a fine young man, might run. I concluded this
because Earl Desmond made no public statements with regard to his
intent during the spring of that year. Everybody recognized that he
was a shoo-in and that he would have no problems.

So, one of my colleagues, an activist in the Democratic party,
Nat [Nathaniel] Colley (an outstanding black attorney who is now a
millionaire, I believe) called me and asked me to run against
Desmond in the primary. I said, "There's no way I could beat Earl
Desmond. No one can beat Earl Desmond. Furthermore, I do not have
the campaign money."

Colley said, "Well, someone has to run as a matter of principle."
I said, "Well, I can't afford it, under the circumstances." He said,
"Well, I'm going to run." I said, "That's all right with me, but you
won't have a chance. You're black and Earl is a well established
conservative Democratic incumbent."

In those days, there was much more discrimination toward
minorities and the attitude of the public was much more negative
toward blacks than it is now. It is hard to believe that. That was
only in 1956, and in those days we were just beginning to accept
blacks to the extent that it was looked upon as appropriate if they
entered a first-class white restaurant. That is hard to believe.
Perhaps, it wasn't quite that bad in the middle '50s, but it was
certainly that bad in the '40s.

Was this attorney active in the clubs?

He had been active in the Democratic party, particularly in the
clubs, right.

So, he said, "I'm going to run," and he did. He was beaten in
the primary, three to one, as I recall. That was in 1956 and Earl
won the Republican [nomination] as well as the Democratic. The
Republicans did not even file a candidate against Earl Desmond, my
predecessor.

Because they felt so comfortable with him?

Right. He was a conservative. Interestingly, I guess that some of
the liberal Democrats are beginning today to view me from a rather
strange perspective because the Republicans have not recently filed
what you would describe as strong candidates against me. I think they

Rodda: perceive that it would be very difficult to beat me, that it would
cost a lot of campaign money, and that it is not worth the effort,
because they need to concentrate their resources in more critical
areas —

Morris: Where they'd have a better chance of taking over a seat?

Rodda: Right. So, it's a pragmatic decision. With Earl Desmond, it was
pragmatic, and to a certain extent it was philosophical because he
was quite conservative. I am a neo-conservative, a moderate liberal,
or a liberal, depending on how you want to use the term.

But anyway, in 1958 Earl died, just prior to the primary
election.*

Morris: Oh, that's a tricky situation.

Rodda: Right. Now, the Democratic nominee in the assembly in my district
was Edwin Z'berg, who had sought that office in '56 and had lost
but won his party's nomination in 1958. The other assembly
Democratic nomination was won by Assemblyman Tom McBride, who has
just retired as a judge from the federal court. So, neither of the
two Democratic candidates was able to seek the nomination for the
state senate, despite the fact that they would like to have done so.

So, I was asked by a number of people in the party with whom
I had worked if I would run. After a lot of deliberation and after
I had found out that McBride would not run, I said, "All right, I
will run."

Morris: So, what happens, then?

Rodda: Well, the candidates file and the governor calls the special election to
be held concurrently with the general; so my name was on the general
election ballot in November of 1958 with the other nominees. And
Earl Desmond's son did file; Louis Desmond's name was on it. Then
two other chaps filed as Democrats; so there were three Democrats
campaigning against one Republican.

Morris: Isn't that fascinating.

Rodda: One of the Democrats had been a Republican. He went to the county
office, changed his registration, walked across the hall, and
registered as a Democrat. You could do that in those days. He

*May 26, 1958

Rodda: changed his registration from Republican to Democrat, walked across
the hall, and filed as a candidate, which meant that I had another
Democratic opponent [Homer J. Walt].

The other chap who was running against me — funny, I cannot even
think of his name now — was active in the construction industry and
was quite well supported by the construction industry unions,
[remembers name of this opponent] Frank Corbett.

Morris: By the unions rather than the contractors?
Rodda: Both the contractors and the union workers.

Now, I had been active in the AFT [American Federation of
Teachers] at the city college and I had been president of the local
and delegate to the local labor council. So, I had some friends and
some contacts with the American Federation of Labor. In addition,
some of their members were active on the central committee.

So, in the election, there was some question as to whether or
not Corbett would gain the support of some unions, especially the
skilled crafts unions because his closest affiliation was with the
construction industry.

And that year there was a critical issue on the ballot, the
right-to-work initiative. We did some research on that issue and
discovered that Frank Corbett had signed the right- to-work initiative
petition; whereas I had chaired a committee of faculty members at
the college which was organized to urge people not to sign the
initiative.

So, here labor is trying to decide whether they want to support
a man who chaired a committee to urge people not to sign the right-
to-work initiative, or endorse and support a man who had signed the
initiative. Well, as soon as we made that information available to
the Construction Trades Council, they withheld their endorsement of
Corbett. I subsequently obtained the endorsement of labor.

There was a CDC endorsement convention held, and there were
several people who were considering running. They would have run
had they obtained the endorsement of the CDC convention,, One of
them was Ralph Brody, who was employed by the state senate as a
consultant to the Senate Water Committee. He was well supported
and there was, therefore, a bitter fight at the convention.

Morris: The state convention or the local county one?

Rodda: No, it was the local one. There were over three hundred people
present, about 350 or 360, and I obtained the endorsement of the
endorsing convention by some 60 percent. A candidate needed
60 percent, and I had 62 or 63 percent. There was also a city
councilman who was aspiring for the endorsement, and, of course,
there was the chap whom I mentioned, Ralph Brody.

So, I won the endorsement of the CDC and I had the endorsement
of labor. It was rather an interesting campaign. I won by 52 percent,
I think, or 51 percent, in a field of —

Morris: Of four candidates.*
Rodda: Yes, right.

Morris: So you were running against two fellow Democrats and a Republican
candidate.

Rodda: Yes. If Earl Desmond's son had registered as a Democrat, he would
have walked in.

Morris: Because of the name recognition, yes.

Rodda: But in those days — I think this is an important observation to make —
there was a lot more meaningful involvement by the people in political
parties and a lot more of a commitment to them.

Morris: To the party as such, yes.

Rodda: Right. You had to rely on your friends and your supporters in your
campaign in order to become effective, and by "rely" I mean that you
had to count on them to attend campaign fund raisers, which were
reasonable in terms of cost, to distribute your campaign literature
from door to door, and to provide you with the kind of support that
you needed in other forms of volunteer work — if you had a mailer, to
type the address labels.

Morris: The labels, and bundle them up.

Rodda: And staff the headquarters. There was a great deal of involvement
at that time in the state and in this community, in political
parties, both parties, Republicans and Democrats. So, I had the
advantage of being a Democrat at a time when being a member of the
Democratic party meant something.

*Nineteenth Senatorial District election results, Nov. 4, 1958:

Homer Walt (Dem.) 4,524 Louis N. Desmond (Rep.) 48,737
Albert S. Rodda (Dem.) 75,918 Frank D. Corbett (Dem.) 18,483

Morris: And at a time when you'd put in a number of years in helping to
build that organization of active political volunteers.

Rodda: Right. An organization of volunteers.
Morris: What do you suppose has happened?

Appointments of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr.; Further Campaign
Notes

Rodda: Well, I thought that you might like to know about this incident in
relation to Brown. We are getting close to Brown. Well, he ran
that year and was elected and I was elected. I think that there
were nine new Democratic senators chosen in November and in the
middle of the year there was a special election and another Democrat
was chosen; so we had ten new Democratic senators and that gave the
Democrats a majority in the senate.

Morris: And you ten new Democratic senators replaced seven Republicans and
three Democrats.

Rodda: And that gave the Democrats a majority, as I recall. I do not know
how much it was, maybe twenty- two or twenty- three votes, but it was
very much of a political earthquake as far as the senate organization
was concerned.

Now, one of the first things that I did [chuckles] in my naivete
was to have a meeting with Governor Brown.

Morris: At your request?

Rodda: Yes. In attendance at the meeting were the chairman of the central
committee, the chairman of the Democratic Council of Clubs, and
several other outstanding Sacramento Democratic party leaders. What
they wanted was to have the governor, when he was appointing people
to administrative positions and to the judiciary, to confer with
them, so that appointments from this area would be reviewed by active
Democrats and they would have some kind of involvement in the
decisions which related to appointments.

Well, Brown met very conscientiously, but, of course, we never
were able to organize any kind of a review structure. It just did
not come about. As a matter of fact, when Governor Brown was
governor, he very, very infrequently deferred in any respect to
me with respect to my recommendations. The only appointments in
which he seriously considered my recommendations — and this will amuse
you—were for the Fifty-second District County Fair.

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris ;
Rodda:

I'll be darned! [laughter]

[wryly] Very substantive appointments, you know! But I suffered
as a consequence of that situation because I was inclined at the
time, I think maybe because of my naiveti, to endorse or sponsor
particular local candidates for the judiciary, people whom I thought
were well-qualified, and not one ever was appointed. The process
was politically negative, insofar as I was concerned, because there
were usually seven or eight attorneys, many of whom I knew, who
did not receive my endorsement, but the one who received my endorse
ment was not appointed. So, it was a negative kind of experience
for me, and it taught me something. The lesson I learned was not
to advocate a particular candidate but to write letters of
recommendation for those whom I regarded as well qualified, and then
to let the governor, whether Reagan or Jerry Brown, make the decision.
Previously, I just made political enemies, and I did not gain one
political friend.

Yes, if your recommendations are never accepted.
Right.

Who on Brown's staff was checking into the background of possible
judicial appointments?

I can't even remember. It's just too difficult to remember now.
I'm sorry.

I just wondered if you'd ever consulted with that person.

Oh, I met with his staff and wrote them letters of endorsement. Brown
was political about his appointments, but he made very good appoint
ments, I thought. I was very impressed with the quality of the people
he appointed to office in the executive branch of government, as
well as the judiciary. They were experienced, intelligent, qualified
people.

So, I was not unhappy with the appointments. I was unhappy
over the fact that, as a state senator, I was never given any
consideration, or what I regarded as any consideration. However,
he did give consideration to the wishes of prominent Democratic
leaders in this area, those with whom I had worked; so they had a
significant amount of influence.

One of them was Gordon Schaber, who subsequently succeeded me
as chairman of the Democratic central committee, a position he
gained with my assistance. Gordon Schaber was the dean of the
McGeorge Law School at the time and a practicing attorney, sub
sequently appointed to the superior court by Pat Brown. He then

Rodda: retired and continued as dean of the McGeorge Law School, which

became affiliated with the University of the Pacific. Gordon has
been a very active person in the Democratic party.

Governor Brown had close contacts with Gordon. I did not
object to that. He was also close to Nat Colley, who was appointed
to the State Board of Education [by Pat Brown]. Nat had to withdraw
under certain conditions which I do not think I even want to
mention.

Morris: Yes. I think of him primarily as having been a good appointment of
Pat's.

Rodda: Right. I think Pat also appointed Bill Schwartz, a Republican, to

the State Board of Education, a prominent attorney who just recently
has been appointed to a federal judgeship.

Morris: Are you thinking then that Gordon Schaber's and Nat Colley *s

recommendations would be different from yours as to who'd be a good
[ appointment ] ?

Rodda: Yes. They were not the two individuals with whom I met when I asked
him [Pat Brown] to confer with Democratic party leaders . My
recollection is they were the chairman of the central committee —
I think that was William Heekin — and the then chairman of the council
of clubs. I cannot recall the name of that person.

But the point is that Pat was political in making his appoint
ments. He would sometimes appoint Republicans and sometimes
Democrats — but mostly Democrats, of course. I thought that they
were quality people, and yet I never had any kind of meaningful
influence in any of those appointments.

One thing I did try to do to strengthen the Democratic party was
to have all the Democratic candidates operate out of a joint office.
The central committee put out campaign literature in the form of
a slate piece, which listed all candidates of the Democratic party.
The idea was that their staffs would work together, too, reinforcing
everyone's efforts. John Moss didn't like the idea at all, however.

Morris: Were you able to run a unified headquarters in '58 when there were
three of you running?

Rodda: Gee, isn't that interesting? Mine was a special election.
Morris: That would have gotten kind of complicated.

Rodda: Yes, I did not have a headquarters, and I do not recall that I

operated out of the Democratic party headquarters. It was a special
election, you're right. There were three Democrats running against
one Republican.

But John Moss ultimately cooperated, and the disagreement was
not disruptive. But it was difficult because that was during a
period of time when there was cross-filing, and sometimes Democrats
did not want to be identified with other Democrats. They wanted to
maintain their support within the ranks of the opposite party, so
there was a disinclination to be involved with the Democratic party.

I am only mentioning this to indicate that I, as chairman of
the central committee, prior to that time and subsequent to that
time as a state senator, tried to do what I could to strengthen
party loyalty and to strengthen the political party through the
involvement of citizens in the party and in the political process .
I continued to do that when I was elected.

I guess that my election was something of a surprise to everybody,
including me.

Morris : Really?

Rodda: Well, I was not too optimistic. I just did not know how much loyalty
there would be to the name Desmond. The young man, my opponent,
Louis Desmond, and I had a very interesting agreement. We agreed to
conduct a fair and objective campaign and to avoid any kind of
personal attacks and any dirty politics. In those days, there was
a lot more involvement on the part of the candidates in community
meetings .

Morris: The speaking nights?

Rodda: Right. Candidate nights and things of that nature.

So , he and I were very scrupulous in the way in which we
observed that agreement; so it was a very clean campaign.

Much to my surprise, and despite the fact that I had two Democrats

and the son of the incumbent competing with me, I was elected by a

majority of the votes. The first precincts showed me behind, but
subsequently I gained support over time.

Freshman State Senator, and Teacher

Rodda: But when I was sent to the senate, I was given very unimportant

assignments because of the way in which the senate was organized.

Morris: Hugh Burns was —

Rodda: Hugh Burns was the president pro tern, and he was a very powerful and
effective man, but he was always very nice to me, although we very
seldom agreed on political issues. The senate observed the principle
of seniority. Are you interested in this?

Morris : Yes .

Rodda: The principle of seniority was extremely important in the senate's
organizational structure. And since I had no seniority, they gave
me minor committees. I think they were Social Institutions,
Education, Elections, and Local Government. I had had some back
ground experience in local government because of my father's
identification with it, and I had taught California history. I also
had an identification with education, and it made sense to assign
me to the Education Committee. Social Institutions was a very
unimportant committee.

Morris: I don't know that I've ever heard of it before.

Rodda: It has ceased to exist. The committee was assigned three bills in
1959, .as I recall.

Morris: I see. What was a Social Institution, just for historical purposes?
[laughter]

Rodda: I cannot even recall the bills.
Morris: It was a minor [committee], yes.

Rodda: It was a committee to which were assigned senators who were rebels
or who did not have seniority. The other committee was Elections.

Morris: Was Education not considered a major committee in 1959?

Rodda: It was fairly important. That was the most important committee to
which I was assigned. Local Government was fairly important.

In those days, the committees did not have any meaningful
staff. A committee chairman might be given an administrative
assistant to assist him in the conduct of the meetings, and that was
about it. The senate did not have interim committees. In other

Rodda: words, the standing committees did not engage in meaningful interim
work. As I recall, interim studies were done by special committees
that were assigned particular responsibilities.

As a state senator, I had as a staff person one individual, who
was my secretary, Mrs. Polly Gardner. Mrs. Gardner had been a
student of mine. Her husband also had been a student of mine. Polly
had been active in the Democratic party and had had two children.
They were entering school and so Polly was ready to return to work,
and I asked her to become my secretary. She accepted. But we were
very much understaffed.

Our legislative session in 1959 ran until July 1, as I recall,
and then we returned in 1960, technically for a one-month session
for the enactment of the budget, but it was a practice for the
governor to call a special session in order to address critical
issues .

Morris: Concurrently, yes.

Rodda: Yes, concurrently. The only items that were authorized for

introduction in the special concurrent session were those that
fell within the call. So, maybe we would meet for a month, act on
the budget, and consider a dozen bills which were introduced in
the special session under the call.

Morris: Did the governor control what was on the call, or did the — ?

Rodda: Yes. As an author, you had to establish that the subject matter
was germane to the call, otherwise you were not permitted to
introduce a bill.

The Finance Committee met early in the year and they continued
their meetings on the budget while the other members were in
recess .

I was teaching then and I took a leave of absence from my
teaching when we were in session, and the school district was very
fair to me. The school board had been very unfair to one of my
predecessors, John Harold Swan, who was predecessor to Earl Desmond.
John Harold Swan was a teacher of English at city college, and was
elected to the state senate, as I recall, in 1940. He served one
term and retired. He could not afford to continue, because the
board of education of the Sacramento City Unified School District
(the junior college was part of the unified school district then)
would not give him any leave time. So, he had to teach and serve
in the senate, and it was a very difficult burden. He could not
afford to live on the compensation that was provided legislators
at that time. Well, anyway, the board of education had changed its
policy and it was very fair to me and they gave me leave time.

Rodda:

Morris ;

Rodda :

Now, one could perceive at the time, early sixties, that the
legislative workload would be building up because of the growth
of the state and the development of the problems which we had to
recognize and address. So, it was really a burden and responsi
bility to be a full-time teacher, on leave when we were in session,
but to have to respond to the demands which were made upon me as a
politician while I was active as a teacher, in view of the fact
that I represented the entire county and had to participate in
public meetings, conferences, and speeches.

When I entered the office, I decided personally to respond
to as many of my constitutent letters as I could, to have an open
door policy, which meant that I would meet constituents and confer
with people who were interested in legislation, and that I would
even answer the telephone if I could. That policy is a very
demanding one to observe, but I did quite well.

How much do your constituents ask of you?
ceremonial things?

Do they just want you for

There are quite a few requests for ceremonial activies for the
introduction and presentation of resolutions. There also are
quite a few who want to come in to the office and talk to you about
issues that are important to them. So, such a policy will impose
a rather substantive demand on your time. And when you stop to
consider that I was teaching, serving during the legislative sessions,
and that after school coming to the office at 3:30 or 4:00 and
staying until 6:00 or 6:30, and oftentimes attending meetings at
night, you can understand the burdens being imposed upon me.

III 1966 REAPPORTIONMENT AND RELATED ISSUES

Reapportionment and a Full-Time Legislature

Rodda: That level of activity went on until reapportionment, which was in
1966. Had we not had reapportionment, I would have quit the
legislature. I just could not continue to do it, the demands on
my time and my energy were too heavy.

Morris: So that part of the reapportionment struggle was to get a full-time
commitment.

Rodda: Right. During that period of eight years when I was in the senate

prior to reapportionment, senators were given, finally, administrative
assistants as well as a secretary.

The senate also created what we called fact-finding committees.
There were not as many fact-finding committees as there were standing
committees, but the fact-finding committees, within the area of
jurisdiction assigned them, held interim hearings on substantive
issues to assit in the development of legislation. The assembly
standing committees were functioning as interim committees but not
those in the senate. The senate fact-finding committees and, also,
the standing committees were given consultants. You can see what
was happening to our work force.

Morris: You were getting a pyramid.

Rodda: Right, because there was an expansion in the population and because
the legislative burdens of the state were increasing, the
responsibilities of the legislature increased. To give you al
illustration, as I recall, strictly from memory, the 196A budget
session during which time about 110 bills were introduced. But it
was a gross waste of time, because the entire legislature was in
session for three months to consider a hundred bills and because most
of the members were not involved in the hearings on the budget, because
the budget work was done by the fiscal committees, you see.

Rodda :

Morris :

Rodda :

Morris;

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

The League of Women Voters became interested in this development
and there were other organizations studying state government, and
their recommendation was that we should have annual sessions.

That decision could have been made without the reapportionment
decision, couldn't it?

Yes, that's right.

It was just coincidental that they came at the same time?

Right. So, a constitutional amendment to provide for reapportionment
of the senate and another to provide for annual sessions were under
consideration. The former failed and senate reapportionment
resulted from a supreme court decision.

The issues of the senate reapportionment for a number of years,
had been a very serious one, because the state senate, as structured
when I was elected, largely reflected the interests of the rural
interests.

Just to give you an illustration of how drastic the dispropor
tionate representation was — that's not very good phraseology — but
the senator from L.A. County, Richard Richards, who was my seatmate,
represented I think fourteen and a half assembly districts. So,
the people in those assembly districts had one senator; whereas, one
of the state's senatorial districts consisted of three counties — a
senator could represent a minimum of one county and not more than
three, and they had to be continguous — contained a total population
of less than 50,000. Those three counties were grossly overrepresented
in the senate, and L.A. County was grossly underrepresented.

Incidentally, I thought that we should reapportion the senate
and I wrote a paper on the issue. I do not know whether you have it.

Yes, I do.*

I delivered [it] to the Japanese-American League at a dinner. In it
I suggested that maybe what we should have was not full reapportion
ment but a moderate change, one which would assign maybe seven or
eight senators .

Now, George Miller from Contra Costa County, who was chairman
of the Finance Committee, was very negative toward reapportionment.

*Speech, "Reapportionment," February 1965. Copy in Rodda papers,
The Bancroft Library.

Morris: Why was that?

Rodda: Well, he perceived it as possibly having a dramatic impact on the
senate, making it a more liberal house, and reducing the influence
of the north, especially on issues such as the state water
distribution.

Morris: Because it would become more urban?

Rodda: Yes. Furthermore, it would be very destructive of the political
coalition which controlled the senate. That political coalition
was very supportive of Hugh Burns and was one which was made up of
both Democrats and Republicans. They controlled the Rules
Committee, and the Rules Committee made all of the important
decisions with respect to committee membership and with respect
to the committee chairmen. So, any degree of reapportionment
obviously would adversely affect that internal power structure.

Morris: Now, that's interesting, because George Miller is generally considered
to have been a liberal senator himself.

Rodda: He was basically a liberal senator on some issues, but on some issues
he was conservative. He had an orientation toward business.

The third house was extremely powerful in those days because
their advocates had very close contacts with the members. There
was a great deal of wining and dining and entertainment that was
financed by the third house. It was pleasant. It was exciting to
go to a nice dinner and share the evening with your colleagues and
the third-house advocates and discuss issues. But, on the other hand,
it had its adverse effect, too, which was that it gave the third
house much more access and, to a significant extent, much more
influence than perhaps it was entitled to have. The lobbyists not
only contributed to our campaigns, but they also established very
close sound relations with us.

The committees operated in a totally different manner in those
days. There was no roll taken or recorded on votes. Now, I'm not
too happy today with the fact that the roll is taken in the Finance
Committee. I first became chairman of Elections and Reapportionment;
then I became chairman of Education. When I chaired the committees,
if I was not sure on the basis of a voice vote what the majority
opinion of my colleagues on the committee was, I simply asked for a
show of hands. Then I counted the hands. The audience could see
that a majority of the hands were in favor and a minority were
against, or vice-versa. And that was the decision of the committee.

Legislative Power Relationships

Rodda: But some of my colleagues did not chair the committees that way.

They were very arbitrary — arbitrary about setting bills, arbitrary
about hearing about them, arbitrary about interpreting the vote.
So, among my liberal friends, who wanted to reform the senate,
that practice was very objectionable, but there was no way that
one could change the internal mechanism or power structure of the
senate.

Now, I was a rebel, and Hugh Burns knew it.
Morris: Because of your work in the county central committee?

Rodda: And because of the way in which I functioned in the senate. I was
not fully cooperative with Burns . He could not come to me and tell
me, "Vote this way, Al," or, "Vote that way." I was independent.

Morris: What kinds of things do you recall disagreeing with him on?

Rodda: Oh, I cannot recall too many issues, but usually they related to
matters having to do with the special interests, with taxation,
conservation, and issues of that nature. But he and I knew, we had
an understanding, that I was independent; I was my own man. And so
I was not given important committee assignments, but I had to be
given some important committee assignments because of my achievement
of seniority. The leadership did not want totally to breach the
principle of seniority in my case, because if they did, that would
mean that the principle of seniority did not mean anything and the
principle would be challenged. So, they observed the principle of
seniority, but not as fully or completely in my case as they did in
those instances in which a member had indicated a total desire to be
cooperative.

For example, I had a colleague of mine come to me once after he
had been in the senate for maybe two years who said, "Say, Al, why
are you not on the Government Efficiency Committee?" This was the
powerful, killer committee, and I said, "Well, I do not want to be
on that committee." [He said,] "Well, why not? That's where the
power is, Al!" I said, "Well, I know, for you pay a price to be on
that committee." [He said,] "Yes, but that's where the power is."
I said, 'Veil, you will have to pay the price." [He said,] "Well, I
want to be on that committee!"

You know what happened? He was placed on that committee,
because he agreed to work with whom?

Morris: Hugh Burns.

Rodda: Hugh Burns and the clique, the group that controlled the senate

through the Rules Committee. They frequently made critical decisions
at meetings in hotel rooms where they sat with the third house or
they independently, as a small group, made major policy decisions for
the full senate. Then they could implement the decisions through the
Rules Committee, because the Rules Committee controlled the critical
committees which were Revenue and Tax, Finance, Insurance and
Financial Institutions, Judiciary, and Government Efficiency. Those
were the five powerful committees . If you were part of the organiza
tions, you were likely to be assigned to those committees, and it
was generally assured that the majority of the committee members,
whether Republicans or Democrats, would support the decisions of the
internal power structure.

Morris: And it was more whether you'd support the power structure than
whether you were a Democrat or a Republican?

Rodda: Right. But that situation created problems for Governor Pat Brown.
Now, interestingly enough — is this what you wanted me to talk about?

Morris: Yes, this is fine.

Rodda: There developed between the two houses, the assembly and the senate,
an interesting situation, each house desiring to exercise power in
a manner to support its own interests — philosophical, political,
special interest, or whatever they were.

When Jesse Unruh became speaker, he became involved in a kind
of an adversary relation, not with Hugh Burns so much, but with
[George] Miller. The Democrats controlled the senate, but a small
group of the Democrats worked with Hugh Burns and a small group of
Republicans to control the senate, so the senate was dominated by
a strong bi-partisan coalition.

Now, today I function that way as chairman of the Finance Committee.
Oftentimes I have to organize a coalition of Denocrats and
Republicans in the Finance Committee in order to achieve constructive
action. But the way I do it is on the basis of merits. I try to
convince the members of the committee that that is the appropriate
course of action, and usually I can gain the support of the moderates-
Republican and Democratic.

I'm not saying coalitions between party A and party B are wrong.
I'm merely indicating that the use of the coalition can be abused,
and it was abused to a significant degree by the old senate power
structure. For example, when the budget was heard, the Senate Finance
Committee members at the meeting — and it was chaired for a number of
years by George Miller — would exclude or include items that they
wanted to be bargaining issues. They would exclude things that they

Rodda: knew the assembly wanted, and the assembly would exclude items that
they knew the senate wanted; thus, when the budget was before the
conference committee, which in those days was held secretly behind
closed doors, and there was no press —

Morris: No press was present?

Rodda: No.

Morris: How did they get around that?

Rodda: Well, that was the rule. The only people present were representatives
of the Finance Committee and the Legislative Analyst Office. So,
the conference committee made the decisions, three members of the
assembly and three from the senate, which determined significantly
the character of the budget.

Morris: And they would just not have taken action on various issues until it
got to the conference table?

Rodda: Well, they took action, but the action was such that they knew that
they would be in a negotiating position when they became involved
in the conference committee. In those days, the conference
committee could augment the budget or delete money from the budget.
It was an open conference committee; the rules did not govern it as
they do today. Today, the public has access, the media has access,
and the conference committee may not augment the budget by an amount
which exceeds the higher level expenditure contained in the two
versions of the budget, and new items may not be added to the budget.

Morris: Of the two-house decisions?

Rodda: If the assembly's is $50 million and ours is $49 million, the

committee may not appropriate above $50 million. The committee may
go below $49 million, but not above $50 million. That rule developed
because of a ploy that occurred during Governor Reagan's administra
tion. It had to do with Senator Randy Collier's interest in
building — well, rehabilitating — the old Capitol. Governor Reagan
wanted something, and Willie Brown, chairman of Ways and Means,
wanted something. I do not remember the details, and I do not want
to make an inaccurate statement, but the incident was reported in
the newspapers. The outcome was a compromise with regard to the
rehabilitation of the Capitol, with regard to Willie Brown's interest
in developing a park facility in the San Francisco Bay area, and I've
forgotten what it was that Governor Reagan wanted, but I think it
was the Governor's Mansion. I'm not sure.

Morris: That could well have been.

Rodda: But this was such an outrageous abuse of power by the conference

committee that it led to a change in the rules. Randy Collier was
Finance Committee chairman at the time, and I think it contributed
to his removal. The incident happened in Governor Reagan's
administration, but it is relevant to this interview because it
was the way that the two houses operated during Governor [Pat]
Brown's administration. The two house rivalry was reflected to a
significant degree in the way they operated on the budget in the
conference committee. It was that kind of a battle, or political
controversy or confrontation, which prevailed during the Pat Brown
years .

Now, Governor Brown was, in a sense, caught between the two-
house rivalry. More often, his views, since I would classify him as
a moderate liberal, identified [more closely] with the political
philosophy of the assembly than with the political philosophy of the
senate. So, oftentimes Pat had more support from Jesse Unruh than
he did from the senate, but there were, of course, very important
occasions when the governor had to rely on the senate for support.
I can't remember all the details.

I do not want you to draw the conclusion that consistently
Governor Brown had to rely on the assembly. There were occasions
when he had to rely on the assembly, but there were also occasions
when his strength, his reinforcement, was from George Miller.
George Miller had a great deal of influence because he had a coalition
or supporters in the Democratic party and they were basically
liberals, but George was a pragmatist and knew how to work with Burns
and with the Republicans.

Morris: Why was the adversary relationship between Jesse Unruh and George
Miller rather than between Unruh and Hugh Burns?

Rodda: Well, Burns was not as much involved in the details and the specifics
of legislative issues as was George Miller. Burns was more of the
titular-type leader, although in some issues he was very involved,
and he reflected a conservative Democratic philosophy. But Miller
was interested in specific issues, specific legislation, since he
was chairman of the Finance Committee. He also would have very
much liked to have become president pro tern, I think, and he would
have been a very strong president pro tern.

You see, the president pro tern, under the senate structure,
hasn't the political power of the assembly speaker, but Burns
obtained the power because, through the coalition that he had of
Republicans and Democrats, he virtually controlled the Rules Committee;
the Rules Committee was practically a rubber stamp for Burns and
through it he exercised great power.

Morris: But it sounds like it would depend on what your own interests were.
If your interests were in issues, as Miller's were, then being
chairman of the Finance Committee could be a more powerful position
sometimes than being pro tern.

Rodda: Yes. Furthermore, George had not only the power that the chairman
ship of Finance gave him, but he also had power in the Rules
Committee because one of the Rules Committee members was Senator
Steve Teale, who was very close with George. So, George really had
a considerable influence. Oftentimes he could force Hugh Burns to
cooperate with him, and oftentimes they worked, therefore, on a very
cooperative basis. But I wasn't involved in that power issue at all
because I was literally an outsider.

Morris: Were there others of the group of ten that you came in with that felt
the same way you did?

Rodda: Some of them. Oh, yes. Joe [Joseph A.] Rattigan was one. Walter
[W.] Stiern was another.

Outside the Democratic Circle

Morris: Were there any efforts to challenge Hugh Burns for the pro tern spot?

Rodda: Yes. A group of the liberals organized a breakfast club, and its
members were Fred [S. Farr; Jim [James A.] Cobey, now a judge;
Walter Stiern; and I. I cannot thing of all of the others who
attended, but we met weekly for breakfast, and we were the liberal
Democrats who were largely on the outside and not members of that
intimate circle or clique or group which was very cooperative with
Burns and very cooperative with the Republicans .

Morris: Sometimes that gives you an interesting vantage point.

Rodda: So we were the rebels, and there were critical issues upon which we
had a significant amount of influence. "Rebels" is not a very good
word; we were just the independents. We were the more independent
members of the senate.

Morris: Now, you were vice chairman of the Education Committee your first
term.

Rodda: Yes, but there were no major bills during that session, as I recall.
And the next session, Hugo Fisher was vice chairman.

Morris: Then in 1965 you were chairman of the Elections and Reapportionment
Committee. Wouldn't that have given you a say in decisions on
reapportionment?

Rodda: On the issue of reapportionment of the state senate I was thoroughly
outvoted. At a meeting of the full senate I moved that the issue of
senate reapportionment be assigned to the Senate Elections and
Reapportionment Committee. That was the appropriate committee to
develop the reapportionment legislation, but I was unanimously voted
down except for my "yes" vote.

Morris: Really?
Rodda: Right.
Morris: How could — ?

Rodda: Well, the Rules Committee then created a special Committee on

Reapportionment, which was chaired by Stephen Teale, who was a very
close friend of whom?

Morris: Hugh Burns.

Rodda: And George Miller, They did not want me, as chairman of the

Elections and Reapportionment Committee, to address the issue of
senate reapportionment. I suggested in my motion that we assign
this responsibility to the Elections Committee and in so doing
recognize the committee structure. I said, "I know I'm not a popular
chairman, so I would suggest that we make this assignment and then I
know you will replace me, which is all right, but observe the rules.
I don't care that much about being the chairman. But they chose not
to do it, so I remained chairman of Elections-Reapportionment, but
I was not assigned to the Select Committee on Reapportionment.

Morris: But you did still hold hearings on reapportionment?

Rodda: That was done by the special committee. The committee held hearings
only on the Reapportionment Act of 1961, which was essentially the
assembly version, because it was their districts that were being
significantly changed in order to adjust to population changes
reflected as the 1960 census.

Morris: Because population was the basis for the assembly. It took from
'61 to '66 to do the reapportionment mandated by the 1960 census.
Am I correct?

Rodda: There had to be a court decision to force senate reapportionment.

It was after there was the court mandate, that I suggested that the
reapportionment responsibility should be assigned to the Committee
on Elections and Reapportionment, but, as I commented, the leadership
chose not to do that.

Rodda: They chose rather to create a Select Committee on Reapportionment,
chaired by Senator Steve Teale, and they hired a special consultant
and developed the reapportionment bill which, I presume, became an
act, and which influenced the election in 1966. Because of the
court mandate, we had to do it in "x" number of months. The state
had election in '64 and another in '66.

Morris: In '66 was when there was the large shift. There were twenty- three
new senators, fourteen of whom had been in the assembly.

Annual Sessions, and Constitutional Amendment on Compensation
and Benefits

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Right. [They] came in in '67. And that's when also the public
adopted a constitutional amendment to change to annual legislative
sessions.

Right. And wasn't there also a question of compensation and pensions
involved in that?

Right. The details of the pension issue, I do not know.
a foul-up on that.

There was

But the salary of legislators was established at $16,000, and
a provision was introduced into the constitution which authorized
the legislature to vote a salary increase not more than once in two
years and not to exceed 5 percent per year, or a total of 10 percent.
That's one of the aspects of our work that has been interesting.
I keep telling the press and the people, "We could help control
inflation if you would be willing to support me if I introduced a
constitutional amendment which would limit all price increases and
all employee compensation to what we in the legislature experience."
Well, they do not know what I'm talking about. Five percent per
year was looked upon as quite responsible in those days, and that
organizational change, incidentally, had the support of the League
of Women Voters. I think that the Association of University Women
and a number of progressive groups and involved citizens supported
th e amendmen t .

My memory is — there's a jog here. Boy, it's difficult to
remember. I was just looking at something labelled the Politician's
Decalogue. I do not know whether you've seen that, the ten
commandments of a legislator.*

*"The Politician's Dilemma: Or Which Decalogue," Albert S. Rodda,
January 1975. In Senator Rodda's papers in The Bancroft Library.

Morris: No. Is this something that you wrote?

Rodda: Yes. The first commandment, and then the second, and the third,
and [it goes on to] the tenth. After I defined the first
commandment, I included an "except that...," so the real
commandments are the ten exceptions. But the thing that I'm trying
to say is that, I thought that I wrote that eighteen months ago,
but it was in 1975!

Morris: Well, the pace of things has speeded up considerably.

Rodda: Right. But remembering twenty-one years! My memory returns back
when I read the history, you see, but when I try to recite it, I
discover that events and names have slipped from my memory.

Morris: I think you're very vivid and fair about it.

You said there was a foul-up on the pension aspect of that
constitutional amendment.

Rodda: Yes. There recently was a court decision made under which several
retired individuals have had their pensions increased rather
dramatically.

Morris: Yes.

Rodda: There was a story on that in the paper about a week ago. Max

Rafferty, for example, is now receiving more from his pension than

he did as a professor, or than Wilson Riles receives as superintendent

of public instruction.

Well, there was some confusion in the language of the pension
act which the courts have interpreted in such a manner that these
individuals have been — a limited number of them — and I think it was
former Attorney General Evelle Younger who filed the original case
and won. And once it applied to him, it applied to all the others
who fell into the same category.

Morris: Kind of an escalator effect on their pensions.

Rodda: Right. It only relates to about twenty or twenty-five individuals,
and they were largely holders of statewide office, and the issue
was some confusion about language which related to the fact that
they held office but prior to and subsequent to the enactment of
this legislation, as I recall. I did not follow the case.

But there are three categories of pensions now for legislators:
if you served entirely before reapportionment, if you served
exclusively after reapportionment, or if you served some time before
and some time after. But it's pretty clear with regards to most
legislators, except for these — [pause]

Morris: These questionable cases?
Rodda: Right.

Morris: What we ran across in doing our research for the project was that
some people in the legislature were more concerned about the
quantity of their pension than they were in some of the issues
about how the legislature would function in the constitutional
amendment in 1966.

Rodda: I do not recall that issue. I was not very much involved in that
problem. Right now there are legislators concerned about their
pensions because legislators' pensions are limited, I think, to a
certain percentage of their compensation. But the interesting thing
is [chuckles], if you retire, your pension is increased in accordance
with the changes in the CPI [consumer price index], but if you stay
on as a legislator, one's salary is increased at a maximum rate of
5 percent per year. [chuckles] So, a chap who retires, by virtue
of the impact of inflation, which has been escalating, as you and
I know, will overtake the person who stays on for eight years or
so and then retires. He will retire at a much lower retirement
compensation. So, there's an economic inducement to retire once
you've reached a maximum of twenty years, because there are no real
pension benefits that accrue after twenty years. Senator [James]
Mills tried to change that, but he couldn't.

But I do not recall the specifics of the issue. I was not
very much involved in that issue, the constitutional amendment.
As I indicated, had it not been approved, I would have left the
state senate. I would have not sought re-election.

IV PRACTICAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Views on Conservation, Campaign Finance, and Lobbying

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

The full-time issue was decided in '66, as I recall; so the annual
sessions began in '67.

Yes.

I was elected in '60 for four [years]. That would be '64, and in '68,
I would have been up for re-election.

You were reapportioned in there?

My first term, in '58, [was] for two years.

Right. To fill an unexpired term?

Right. So, I had to run in '60. My opponent was George Artz.
campaigned against the empty chair.

He campaigned against the empty chair?

Yes. I was the empty chair. I was not active as a senator because
I was a teacher. He ignored the fact that I was on leave, and that
I had one of the most, well, favorable records of attendance of
anybody in the senate. He said I was a "do-nothing" senator, yet I
authored forty bills and twenty became law in my first session.

I was just reading in a Stanford alumni publication an article
about — I think it's Assemblyman Nay lor, who is a Stanford graduate —
a two-page spread, because he was the editor of the Stanford Daily.
In it they asked him — this was his first year — "How many bills did
you have signed into law?" The answer was zero.

Morris: Zero. Oh, dear! [laughter]

Rodda: [laughter] I said, "Gee whiz, he's the do-nothing."

Morris: When you came in, in 1959, did you have some specific things that
you wanted to accomplish or things that you wanted to work on?

Rodda: No. Well, not necessarily. I did draft a statement of what my
basic philosophy was, and I have a copy of that material and it
states my position on the main issues. My principal interest was
obviously in education, and I was very much concerned about the
water situation in the Delta, and I was very much interested in
conservation and environmental protection. I was a traditional
conservationist.

Morris: A traditional conservationist?

Rodda :

Morris:
Rodda:

In that respect I was a reflection, in my thinking, more of the
conservation ism of Teddy Roosevelt and Earl Warren, and people of
that nature.

Preserving open space and making it accessible to people?

Right. And in making certain that we built multiple-purpose dams,
for example, rather than single-purpose dams, so that we could
provide for navigation, flood control, preservation of waterways
and power generation. In that respect, I was more of a traditional
[conservationist] .

Then, of course, in the middle '60s, the term "ecology" developed,
and then the term "environmentalist" became more common. So, your
contemporary conservationists, if I can use that as a generic term,
think of themselves more as ecologists, and the connotation is much
more far-reaching than the term "conservationist." I was more of a
traditionalist.

But there were a lot of my colleagues, especially the very
conservative type, who were not interested in conservation at all —
the preservation of open space, acquisition of property for
development of parks and recreation, and things of that nature.

But anyway, going back to Pat Brown, he had problems trying
to implement legislation, considering the fact that during his two
administrations the senate was oriented toward the north and the
rural areas, while the assembly was oriented toward the south and
toward urban areas — the assembly was more liberal, and the senate
more conservative — and the fact that the third-house people had a
significant amount of influence in both houses, but especially in
the senate, made problems for Pat.

Morris: That seems to be a kind of a persistent problem. Were you aware,
as a Sacramento resident, of some of the efforts to regulate
lobbying that were going on in Warren's administration?

Rodda: Yes.

Morris: And there was a grand jury investigation by the Sacramento Grand
Jury.

Rodda: I was sensitive to it and very responsive, supportive. As a matter
of fact, in those days, I refused to accept a contribution in
excess of fifty dollars. I was very circumspect in the amount of
money that I collected.

Once, in 1960, when I was challenged by George Artz, who
conducted a campaign against the empty chair and the "do-nothing"
senator, the outcome of the election was very questionable because
he claimed he spent in the neighborhood of $30,000. But we claimed,
on the basis of our evaluation of his campaign costs, that [he spent]
about $50,000. I spent $7,000.

Morris: Good heavens!

Rodda: So, there was a gross disparity there. A curious incident occurred
on the Friday or Saturday before the election. This third-house
fellow came by my home, stopped and asked me to come out and talk
with him. I went out and sat in his car, and he asked me if I needed
any money, and I said, well, I did not think so; all my campaign
costs were paid. "Perhaps I will have a couple hundred dollars,"
I said, "in deficit." I was very conscientious about making certain
that I did not have an overrun in costs that I couldn't meet myself.
I had an overrun of $750 in '58, which I paid for myself. I put
$3,000 in my campaign fund; that was part of my personal savings.
I was able to recover all but $750 of that amount, as I recall. I
also had an overrun of $200, which I assumed in the 1960 election.

But the advocate offered me some money, and I said, "Well, I
don't really need any money. All our costs are paid. I might need
some if, in the next day or two, my opponent makes some outrageous
and unfair attacks by means of radio or TV, but particularly radio.
And then you could contribute."

[He said,] "Well, here, take some money now." I said, "Well,
I do not need it, and if I did need it I would limit it to fifty
dollars." He said, "Well, here's a couple hundred," and he offered
me a couple hundred-dollar bills. [He said,] "Go buy your wife a
dress." I said, "My God!"

Rodda: Bu£ those were the kinds of things — he's still a lobbyist here.

"And you would not have had to file the donation," [he said.] Well,
that outraged me because I was very unsympathetic to the blandish
ments of the third-house people. I refused the money, but you only
have my word that I did.

I've never accepted what we call "honoraria." If I speak, I
do not accept any money. When I spoke at the graduation ceremonies
at the University of California for the School of Education a
few years ago, they offered me $200 or $300. I took the check and
returned it to the University so they could use it for a scholarship.
That's just been a policy. I knew colleagues in those days who were
on the platform speaking regularly for special- interest groups, and
they were receiving compensation in the form of an honorarium each
time they appeared. Well, pretty soon they became prisoners of those
groups .

Morris: On the other hand, the case is made that a lobbyist can be very

helpful developing information about a situation and helping to draft
a bill.

Rodda: Sure. Well, that's why I have an open-door policy. You know, the
funny thing about it is that the third-house guys think pretty well
of me. Why? Because they can come in and talk to me, and they
know it.

As a matter of fact, I have a quotable quote that I just
uncovered the other day: "The law is not concerned with trifles."
I've forgotten what the Latin phrasing is. I drafted that about
eight or nine years ago. I said, "If your proposal is not a matter
which relates to trifles, and if I think the facts are supportive
of your position, I will be inclined to vote as you suggest, but
this is my only commitment," or something to that effect. I was
going to print that on a card and distribute it to third-house people
but I did not.

But the point that I'm saying is that if they come in, I tell
them, "I won't make a commitment," unless I have strong feelings or
have reached a decision. If I've already made up my mind and I've
studied the issue, I will tell them, "I'm going to vote this way,"
or "I'm going to vote that way." But if I'm seeking information,
I will listen to both sides, read their materials, and listen to
them, and they're very pleased because they have access to me.

Do you know, some of my colleagues won't even see anyone? They
won't see a constituent. They won't see a third-house person.

You do need the third house. In fact, I think the third house
is important. Of course, there are some cases in which they abuse
their power, but there are also some cases in which my colleagues

Rodda: abuse their power

Morris
Rodda:

colleagues who would agree to introduce a bill for "x"

I have known — and I won't mention names —

number of

dollars, or would introduce a bill which they knew a third-house
group would oppose. Then they would drop the bill for a monetary
consideration. Those conditions still prevail; there are those who
want to operate under the table, you know.

But even before we had to file campaign [contribution and
expenditure records,] which under existing law is much more
restrictive than the law under which we functioned when I was
elected. I was very meticulous in filing all my contributions in
excess of five or ten dollars. I've forgotten which figure it was.
But I did always file a number of anonymous donations, which never
exceeded a total of $150 or $250 — not per person, but none in excess
of $50 per person.

For example, several of my first cousins have been active in
the Republican party, and one of them a number of years ago was
the finance committee chairman for a candidate for the assembly who
was a Republican, and my cousin wanted to contribute to my campaign.
Well, I didn't want to —

Embarrass him. [laughter]

Right. So, he fell into the anonymous group of campaign donors.

Single-Issue Advocates and Party Participation

Morris: You've mentioned the League of Women Voters several times. Do you
think of those kinds of citizen, public- interest groups in the same
category as the third house?

Rodda: Well, not exactly, because they do not make contributions to your
campaigns. They do_ influence elections, however, because they do
indicate to their membership what your positions are on various
issues of concern to them. But, in a sense, they're lobbyists or
advocates; in a sense they're special-interest groups, although the
League of Women Voters is somewhat public-interest oriented.

A lot of the others are single-purpose oriented. And there is,
as you and I know, a great proliferation of single-purpose groups,
groups oriented toward a single purpose. To a certain extent that
development has adversely affected the traditional political parties
because many people who formerly were involved in political parties
have withdrawn because their partisan activities had to be involved
in controversy, in having to make difficult decisions on issues,

Rodda: and in having to make difficult decisions with respect to candidates
within their own party, and their involvement was time consuming
and demanding and not always pleasant.

Well, it is much more pleasant to join an organization which
is interested in wildlife preservation or in conservation or in the
rights of an ethnic minority, because you can normally agree more
easily with your associates. It is a single-purpose organization
and, as a consequence, your objectives are much more clearly defined,
and it is more gratifying to be so engaged. A lot of intellectuals,
the people who frequently used to be involved in the politics of
the party, are now involved in the so-called single -purpose
organizations .

Morris: Now, that's fascinating. I would have thought it would be the other
way around, considering ethnic minorities or saving the whales.
When those groups go up against the legislature in the media, they
can become and have become very controversial.

Rodda: Right. But within their organization they are not.
Morris: I see.

Rodda: And they do not mind being regarded as controversial by the general
public, because they are dedicated to their interest, which they
regard as very idealistic, and they are willing to be seen as
cont rovers ial .

Morris: Pre-eminent. [laughter]

Rodda: Right. Very substantive, very proper, very correct.

Morris: Do they make a legislator's job more difficult?

Rodda: Well, it does. You have people who are for Planned Parenthood.

They want you to provide funding for abortion for the poor. Then
you have the pro-lifers, very vigorously in opposition to abortion.
Now, a Democratic party or Republican party, through its
organizational activity, becomes involved in decisions oftentimes
which have to reflect behavior in all kinds of issues. You can see
how you might have in the Democratic party a pro-lifer and a Planned
Parenthood [supporter], and they are in conflict within the
organization. Within the parties, there are the black caucus, the
Chicano caucus, the women's caucus and there are also the conservation
groups. And it's extremely difficult, therefore, within a political
party — in my opinion much more difficult than it used to be — to
achieve consensus, to resolve differences, to achieve compromise,
which you must achieve if you're going to become effective, in view
of the fact that there are so many of these idealistic goals being

Rodda: advocated or implemented by single-purpose organizations operating
outside of the party. There is a tendency to fall out of the party
and to affiliate with a group with which one really identifies. I
think that that's what is happening.

Morris: Because you see a lessening of people working in party organizations?

Rodda: Right, and [a difference in] the kinds of people who used to involve
themselves to a significant extent in partisan politics. We had
faculty of the university, highly educated people. Now you find
such individuals identify with these other organizations.

Effects of Opposition to the Vietnam War on the CDC

Morris: Going back to the CDC, which was sort of the pre-eminent volunteer
political organization, didn't its effectiveness and strength begin
to diminish as they got into more controversial issues?

Rodda: Yes. That was one of the things I was going to mention at the end,
when you started talking about it, and that is that which really
destroyed the CDC was the Vietnam war. I was opposed to that war
from the very beginning. I never supported it because I perceived
it, based on my study of history — and I had done a lot of writing
and thinking about the issue as an improper implementation of
American foreign policy. I argued that we should not involve our
selves in the Vietnam war, because it would have an adverse effect
on our young people. It was unfair to draft them to take part in a
war which really was not one which promoted the best national
interests. It would cause inflation, it would waste a lot of
scarce natural resources, and it would damage our image in foreign
affairs and, thus, reduce the effectiveness of this country to
function in international affairs. I think I was right.

So, when I attended the CDC conventions and [Pat] Brown was
governor, that war emerged as an issue. It was in the late '60s.
Earlier, it was an issue when [President John F.] Kennedy was
authorizing Americans to land and to occupy portions of south
Vietnam. I can remember — I believe it was in Fresno — when Pat
Brown came to the CDC convention and encountered many of the members
who were against the war. His position was not one of opposition to
the war, and he received a rather cool reception. He was criticized
for being late. I think he was late because he had had a meeting
with [Cesar] Chavez in Sacramento over the issue of collective
bargaining for farm labor, and I think a farm labor strike; I'm not
certain. But anyway, Pat arrived at the convention somewhat late
and after he had the meeting with Chavez. The CDC was split over
that issue as well as the war. His reception was not very warm.

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda:

Subsequently, lots of the Democratic organizations which were
conservative withdrew from the local CDCs . Ours locally just fell
apart. The Democratic Women's Club withdrew, and it was the biggest
organization and really the backbone of the CDC.

Subsequent to that, when the CDC met, it was very difficult for
the CDC, because of its adamant position against the Vietnam war, to
attract prominent persons to speak at their conventions. They once
invited me. The leaders of the organization never knew who I was
before that issue developed and they have not known who I am since.*
But I attended the annual conventions regularly until about three
or four years ago. I consistently urged the activists to continue
their work. But that one issue significantly, in- my opinion,
contributed to the demise of the CDC as an effective statewide
organization.

Because you didn't feel it should take issue on a national topic?

Well, I thought that it should have taken a position on the issue
all right. It was just unfortunate that when some of the active
members could not agree with the position taken by the organization,
they would withdraw. Then, after that issue divided the council,
the real liberals assumed a dominant role, in the CDC, and so it
became an extremely liberal organization, and then within the CDC
there emerged the black caucus, the Chicano caucus, the women's
caucus, and the organization committed itself to a strong dedication
to civil rights, disarmament and opposition to war.

Today, you will find, I think, that this continues to reflect
pretty much the attitudes and the values of many of the CDC people.
They are the real left-wing members of the Democratic party. They
identify more with Tom Hay den and Jane Fonda.

And that's now spawned new organizations, as you were saying.
Right. Now they have their own organization. What do they call it?
The Committee for Economic Democracy.

The Committee for Economic Democracy, yes. And they have a strong
identification or affiliation with the CDC.

*See speech welcoming 13th annual convention, March 1965.
Senator Rodda's papers in The Bancroft Library.

Other Issues for Discussion

Morris;

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

Why don't we stop there today,
perspective.

You've really put a lot of things in

Well, I don't know whether this is what you want. There is one issue
that we ought to talk about, and that's the State Water Plan.

Yes, I would like to. I saw this morning as setting a background
for your sense of the political life in the state senate. The
next time you have time to meet, I would like to talk about the
water plan, and education, and what else?

There was another issue that Brown had problems with, and that was
taxation. At the end of his second term, the state was operating
on a deficit basis, and he wanted to achieve tax reform, and
obviously it was very difficult to achieve the cooperation needed
in the state senate.

Right. Didn't a lot of that also tie into education, since education
is such a big piece of the budget?

Right. I have a memo that I wrote on my involvement in a conference
committee on AB 145, I believe it was, a major school finance bill
authored by Jesse Unruh.*

Could I borrow a copy of that memo, so I would understand it better
and ask intelligent questions?

I'll try to find it. Again, it reflected the differences between
the two houses.

V THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN
[Interview 2: November 30, 1979]##

Developing an Adequate Bill

Morris :

Rodda :

Last time we talked generally about what the legislature was like
when you came in. Today we were going to talk a bit about the
legislative issues that you were involved in during Pat Brown's
administration. I guess the biggest single item was the California
Water Plan. I wonder what your position on that was, being from
the middle of the state, as it were, in Sacramento.

All right. I was elected in 1958. I was sworn in in December of
'58 because I was elected in November in a special election. My
colleagues, who were elected in the general election and not the
special election which was held concurrently with the general
election, weren't sworn in until January. So, I have a month's
seniority, which means that I'm the dean of the senate, but that's
a big joke. [laughter] I'm the dean. Walter Stiern, for example,
and I were elected the same day in the same year, but he was sworn
in in January, and I was sworn in in December; so the record shows
that I am in the class of '58 and he's in the class of '59.

Immediately after I was sworn in I attended some hearings
which were being held by the Senate Water Committee which was trying
to develop an adequate bill to address the issue of the State Water
Plan. The big problem was to obtain enactment of a bill which
would satisfy the northern legislators, especially in the senate,
which was not then reapportioned. The senate, therefore, was
controlled by northern senators, and they were fearful that if the
appropriate language were not developed and the water plan were
approved and the project constructed, there would be a loss of water
to the northern counties. So the issue was clarification of what
water rights meant in the law and how they would relate to the State
Water Project. No progress could be made. The issue was so
controversial that the committee was not able to develop compromise
language.

Rodda: Then when the legislature convened, the issue was addressed. It

was Governor [Pat] Brown's first session, and the water plan became
an extremely important issue, the issue of that session, in my
opinion. Someone discovered that at that time under the constitution
the legislature could approve a state bond issue by a simple majority
vote of both houses. It would have to be a bond issue authorized by
statue, as I recall, and in that event a simple majority vote is
all that was required. As a consequence, the administration deter
mined to pursue that course of action, and the state Water Bond Act
was developed. It was the Burns-Porter Act, as I recall. Senator
Hugh Burns was the principal author. It is interesting, since he
was from the southern part of the state, the water plan reflected the
interests of the agricultural interests; they wanted the north's
water to meet their agricultural needs.

The legislation finally was approved by the senate, amended by
the assembly, and returned to the senate for concurrence. I attended
a lot of the hearings on this issue because lengthy committee
hearings were held. I was not on the Water Committee, but I wanted
to be informed. Of course, Governor Brown was actively involved in
bringing about the enactment of the legislation.

Morris: But he didn't actually develop the legislation himself?

Rodda: Well, the actual legislation was developed in cooperation with his
administration, and the author was Hugh Burns.

Morris: Right. Who particularly would you recall on Pat Brown's staff who
worked with Burns?

Rodda: Well, he was the assistant director of the Department of Water
Resources. I think that was his title. Ralph Brody.* He was
recently retired, I think (and this ought to be checked out), as
the director of one of the biggest water districts in the state.

Morris: Right. But he was somebody that Brown had appointed to the
Department of Water Resources?

Rodda: He was in the executive branch of government, and he served in
Governor Brown's office. So, he was directly involved in the
development of the legislation, working with the members of the
legislature and the special interests that were involved. There
were a large number of special interests.

*See interview with Mr. Brody, California Water Issues, 1950-1966,
Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley, 1981.

Morris: Which particular groups were those?

Rodda: Well, I can't recall. There would be the agricultural interests,
and then there was the Los Angeles Metropolitan Water District,
and there were others interested in the legislation. Some of them
were against it, especially legislators from Contra Costa County,
which traditionally had opposed any effort to utilize the water
resources of the north for the —

Morris: Was Contra Costa a large agricultural county twenty years ago?

Rodda: No, it wasn't. It was just that Contra Costa County had consistently
opposed it. Their senator then was George Miller. Subsequently he
chaired the Finance Committee, and at that time he was a really
powerful friend and associate of Hugh Burns, but on the water issue
they obviously had serious points of difference. The county's
principal concerns were the water quality in the Delta and also the
possibility that they might in the future have to utilize northern
water themselves and that it might not be available if the state
diverted it through the Delta to the south. Those were their two
principal concerns.

I think, if you examine the early history of the development of
the water resources of California, you will find that the people
in that county even opposed the federal Central Valley Project. I'm
not sure, but the county has had a long history of opposition. Some
of the water districts were concerned for those reasons. They
needed the water for agricultural use, industrial development, and
they wanted to preserve what —

Morris: That makes more sense in terms of Contra Costa, the industrial
development.

Rodda: Right. And the preservation of the water quality of the Delta was

an important concern. Of course, their position was so adamant that
it was, in my opinion, almost uncompromising.

A Responsible Project and Questionable Amendments

Rodda: But there were several northern senators who were of the opinion

that if we were going to address the needs of the state, there ought
to be a responsible water project, and they supported Governor Brown
and his administration in the senate. One of those was Senator Joe
Rattigan, who was from Sonoma County. Another one was John Slattery,
who was only a one-term senator from Lake County, and I, representing
Sacramento County, was one of the group. We wanted to make certain,

Rodda: however, that there was adequate language in the bill, in the water
bond act, to protect the water needs of the north and to allow only
surplus water to go to the south.

Under Ralph Brody's direction and leadership, the Brown
administration developed the legislation. The critical vote was on
the senate floor, and my recollection is that Senator [Virgil]
0' Sullivan from Colusa County (Virgil represented several counties:
Colusa, Glenn, and Tehama) submitted amendments on the senate floor
the day the issue was under consideration. I believe that he offered
about nineteen or twenty amendments.

Prior to that meeting of the senate, which was so critical,
Senator Rattigan and I had met with Ralph Brody and had reviewed the
0 'Sullivan amendments. The administration was aware of them and was
very concerned. We interpreted some of them to be of such nature that
they were designed not to "clean up" the bill, but rather to defeat
it.

Morris: To confuse the issue, right?

Rodda: Yes. Or make it so unacceptable to the sponsors that they would not
even continue their support for the legislation. It was pretty
obvious that there was adequate support in the assembly because the
assembly was representative of the position of the southern part of
the state; the southern legislators controlled it. With the
cooperation of the Brown administration, there was no real question
about obtaining approval there.

Of course, organized labor was opposed to it.
Morris: To the amendments or to the bill?

Rodda: They were for the amendments, and they were opposed to the bill

without the amendments, but the amendments would have defeated the
legislation.

Well, Joe Rattigan finally came to me on the floor about the
time Senator 0' Sullivan was presenting his twelfth amendment, and
he said, "Well, Al, we've approved the first eleven amendments and
I think that the twelfth and the thirteenth and the rest are going
to be negative. They will adversely affect the bill, and they're
probably designed to defeat it." But he was of the opinion that we
should change our vote from "aye" to "no." It is hard to remember
precisely what went on in 1959.

Morris: I know, but this is a view we haven't had before.

Rodda: Yes. So, I said, "Well, that's what I think, Joe." That conclusion
was predicated upon our meeting that day with Ralph Brody.

And I said, "I think I'm going to vote no." Rattigan said,
"Well, I intend to vote no." Slattery voted no. So the amendments
failed. When the amendments failed, we were, in effect, the swing
votes, as I recall, on the bill.

The bill was presented on the floor by the author, and it passed.
I think the vote was about twenty-two or twenty-one to nineteen or
something like that.

Morris: This was our information. As we understand it, Hugh Burns was one
of the swing votes. He did not make known what his vote was going
to be till the last moment. Is that your recollection?

Rodda: Yes. Even though he was the author of the bill, it was largely an
administration bill. It had the support too of the Metropolitan
Water District and a lot of the agricultural interests in the southern
part of the state.

When I'm interviewed or when I speak to students to describe
the legislative process, I often point out that a bill can be
developed by the author to reflect this view of the problem, or it
can reflect the view of an interest group in his constituency, or
it can reflect the consensus of a group of special interests who
are sponsoring legislation — say, collective bargaining for teachers;
it would be the teachers that might sponsor it. Or it could be
legislation developed by the administration, or it could be legisla
tion developed by the legislature as a consequence of committee
interim work and the committee activity.

In those days, we did not have the staffing capability in the
senate that the legislature has today. Therefore, we were more
dependent upon the staff of the executive branch of government.

Morris: So, at that point, it was more likely to be governor's legislation?

Rodda: If it were not a special interest, legislation sponsored by a third-
house group, it would very likely be, if it were a major bill, one
sponsored by the administration. As I recall, the Water Committee
only had one consultant. I might be wrong,

Morris: That's about right for that stage.

Rodda: Ralph Brody, as I earlier commented. The senate Education Committee,
for example, did not have a consultant.

Morris: So that the governor's administrative appointees might well serve as
consultants to legislative committees?

Rodda: Well, they would provide input or information with respect to the

legislation, and he would be significantly involved in its develop
ment, as they were in that, the water issue.

Anyway, when the vote was counted, it was approved and sent to
the assembly. Of course, it was a ballot proposition because it
was a bond act. But bear in mind, it required only twenty-one votes,

Morris: In the senate?

Rodda: A majority in both houses, right.

Morris: To put it on the ballot?

Rodda: Right. And it was approved. In my constituency it was opposed by
60 percent of the people in the 1960 election.

Morris: Did you do a survey?

Rodda: No, that was the way the final vote was. As I recall, 60 percent

voted "no." I had voted yes on the bond act, which was not popular
in my district.

Morris: With your own constituents?

Rodda: Right. Now, I do recall that the League of Women Voters supported
it, and labor opposed it. As a matter of fact, in the election in
1960, labor was very modest, almost neutral, in its support of me.
It was supportive, but not with a great deal of enthusiasm, and one
of the issues about which they were annoyed was my vote against the
0' Sullivan amendments, which they would have introduced into the
bill — that's when Joe and I decided to vote no. It was language
which is in the federal Reclamation Act, the Newlands Act, and
which Joe and I interpreted as being designed not really to promote
the feasibility of the project or its desirability, but rather to do
the opposite.

Morris: Why would labor have been opposed?
Rodda: I don't know.

Morris: I would have thought a big construction project like that would
appeal to [labor].

Rodda: I think itwas more on philosophical terms. They probably would have
supported it with that language in it.

Morris: But you felt that those amendments would have made it an —
Rodda: They would have destroyed it.

Morris : Where was Hugh Burns on those amendments?

Rodda: I don't recall. You would have to go look at the roll call. That
would be an awfully detailed thing to research.

Morris: That would. We'll leave that for some graduate student to research,
[laughter]

Rodda: Right. It was a very traumatic experience, but the bill went to the
assembly, it went to the voters, and they approved it. As I
indicated, my community, my constituents, voted against it, and
labor was not happy with me because of that action by me. The League
of Women Voters supported it. It became law and was one of the major
contributions, I think, of the Brown administration.

Now, subsequent to that action, Assemblyman John A. Busterud, a
Republican, introduced a constitutional amendment which would have
stricken and did strike from the California constitution that
language which permitted the legislature to place on the ballot a
bond act by virtue of a simple majority vote. I went to Governor
Brown and said, "If we do this, it is going to be difficult in the
future for us to qualify bond acts. I think we ought not to approve
this amendment." He was not interested in my concern. I spoke
against it on the floor, and I think there were only nine or ten
votes against the Busterud constitutional amendment. It went on
the ballot and was approved. So, today if the senate had not been
reapportioned in the meantime, one never could have gotten a water
bond act through the senate.

Morris: That's interesting that it was that way at the state level, because
one of the issues in local government has been that local bond
issues do require a two- thirds vote, and I know there have been
efforts at the local level to change that.

Rodda: Right. But ours just relates to the vote in the legislature.

Morris: Not on the ballot?

Rodda: Right. On the ballot the vote is a simple majority.

Bond Issue and Cost Estimates

Morris: On the matter of the amount of those bonds, I gather there were some
feelings that the— wasn't it $1.75 billion? — was not a realistic
figure for the construction contemplated, even in 1960.

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

STATE BUILDING
COMMItS IONCH **N FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 94IO2

September 20, 1983

Gabrielle Morris, Project Director
University of California
Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library
Berkeley, California 94720

Dear Gabrielle:

Thank you for your note of September 2nd and your
follow-up questions re Welfare Reform. My response:

"Operation Crossfire" is a term that some Department
(Department of Social Welfare) crew used. We never
heard of such a phrase - but it would be typical of
some of the ideologues working on. drafts. Some of
them really wanted to fight the "evil" legislature
rather than pass a bill.

But the initiative effort was certainly not a secret.
Actual initiative petitions were in print. County
initiative organizers were sending form telegrams
telling us to "pass the Governor's bill". This
appeared ludicrous to some of us intently involved
in the negotiations as we were then in the middle
of compromise efforts. I told the Governor just that,
And Reagan-inspired telegrams certainly had no effect
on the likes of Tony Beilenson, Leo McCarthy and
Bob Moretti.

Nor do I believe, as your question implies, that the
Governor's people remained "firm" because of the
proposed initiative. To the contrary, we were far
along toward agreement when the telegrams began to
arrive.

Gabrielle Morris
September 20, 1983
Page 2

Nonetheless, the threatened initiative did have an
impact, certainly on me and I assume on other
legislators directly involved. I, for one, con
sidered the contents of the initiative proposal
(it would have been the Administration's draft
without any proposed legislative changes) as
pitting the taxpayer against the poor. I'm sure
that the former would have won the initiative
election but, sociologically, that "fight" would
have done damage. That concept certainly motivated
some of us to bring a passable and palatable bill
to the floor. But again, I noted no "firming" of
positions on the part of the Governor and his
immediate staff. To the contrary, Governor Reagan
"gave" on a lot of issues - he wanted to pass and
sign a bill.

Hope this is helpful to you.
Sino^Bely yours,

WILLIAM T. BAGLEY

Rodda: Right.

Morris : Did you have any feeling that that might be the case?

Rodda: Well, we all had some reservations, but, of course, in those days,
we were not accustomed to such dramatic inflation and I personally
was not involved in the fiscal implications as a freshman member
of the senate; so I was not as fully informed on that issue as some
of my colleagues were. I think I had to act on faith and accept
the administration's position as being responsible, with the under
standing that if subsequently the funding were inadequate we would
have to —

Morris: Find some more money somewhere?
Rodda: Right.

Morris: On the business of Hugh Burns waiting until the last minute on it,
were there some suggestions that there were some trade-offs that he
was hoping for?

Rodda: I was not close enough to Hugh in those days, being a freshman, to
know. I merely recall that I was surprised that he was the author
because he had no expertise in the area, and it was pretty clear
that he was not aggressively pursuing that legislative proposal and
that obviously he had some reservations. That is my recollection.

Incidentally, in this connection, and I think it is somewhat
relevant, subsequent to this action, in about 1962 or '63, the issue
of the Peripheral Canal was developed as a concept. A member of
the Department of Water Resources, whom I highly regarded and who is
no longer there, conceived the idea of the Peripheral Canal. There
were several other approaches to that aspect of the problem, which
was understood to be very important. One was a solid or fixed
barrier, and the other was an hydraulic barrier, and, of course, the
other is the Peripheral Canal. At that time, the [Department of]
Fish and Wildlife people were very supportive of the concept of the
Peripheral Canal as the approach which would most likely preserve the
quality of the water in the Delta and be the least negative with
respect to its impact on fish and wildlife.

Conservation Problems and Proposals in the Delta

Rodda: Incidentally, the conservationists in those days were not as active
as they are today. It is really amazing. They were hardly, in my
opinion, aware of the Delta in many respects. One of the big issues
in 1960 was levee-stripping because the Army Corps of Engineers was

Rodda: imposing a strict mandate upon the reclamation districts that they
cut the trees off the Sacramento River levee. There were just a
few areas where there continued to be that kind of growth and so
levee-stripping became an issue.

Senator George Miller and I became very much involved because
we thought that it was inappropriate since it would destroy the
scenic beauty of the Delta. I authored a resolution which called for
a study of the Delta with the object of trying to determine if there
were an alternative or to discover whether the Army Corps of Engineers
was being irresponsible or whether the problem was as serious as
they indicated it was .

Well, the result was a study which incidentally established the
basis for the development of planning for the recreation and the
scenic beauty of the Delta, and we did succeed in stopping to some
degree levee-stripping. We also were able to develop some experi
mental programs to determine what kinds of growth could be allowed
on the levees and how the scenic beauty of the Delta waterways
could be preserved in the future without creating a threat to the
Delta agricultural lands.

Morris: To navigation?

Rodda: Right. The landowners, who are under obligation through their

reclamation districts to maintain the levees, were under obligation
to maintain them in accordance with certain standards. If there
were a disaster, the United States Army Corps of Engineers would
provide the funding to address the issue of the flood and the
consequences, which would mean rehabilitation of the levees. But,
absent that, they, the landowners, were under an obligation to
maintain the levees structurally in such a manner that they would
reduce or minify the flood threat. So the reclamation districts
were under pressure from the Army Corps of Engineers to cut the
trees because they were told, "The trees jeopardize the levees and
your land and constitute a potential cost to the Army Corps of
Engineers . "

Morris : Coming in to repair them?

Rodda: Right. For repair and restructuring.

Morris: That's interesting. As a layman, I would think that trees would
tend to hold the levees in place.

Rodda: But their argument was that they did not. There is a problem in the
Delta because of the foundation upon which the levees rest. If too
much weight is placed upon the levees, they sink. Therefore, the
reclamation districts must be careful about the kind of material

Rodda: they use in levee construction. Furthermore, if the trees are

allowed to grow, the root structure tends, in the opinion of the
Army Corps of Engineers, to weaken the levees and, during the flood
time, to make them more vulnerable to —

Morris: Washing out?

Rodda: Right. And so what the army corps did was to cut the trees and

riprap the levees. Riprap consists of rock and cement structures
that are placed along the river. So if the Army Corps of Engineers
had had its way, the entire Sacramento River and the Delta area
would have been stripped of trees and entirely riprapped. The
levees would be much safer, but they would totally lack scenic
beauty.

The thing that I started to tell you about is that the
conservationists gave me very little support in my effort to stop
the tree stripping.

Morris: Did you go to the Sierra Club and other [conservation organizations]?

Rodda: No. But they really became [chuckles] somewhat aware of the tree-
stripping problem when I spoke to them once, but that was after the
problem had been resolved pretty much. It is kind of interesting.
So they were not as significantly involved in the Delta aspect of
the water project in those days as they are now, and that is one of
reasons why our efforts to build a Peripheral Canal today are
experiencing difficulty, because —

Morris: Conservation interests have become more of a factor?

Rodda: Yes! They are more active, more involved, more aggressive, and

more powerful. In those days there were very few men in the senate
who were environmentalists, and there were no women — that's not a
sexist remark. [laughter]

Morris: No. [chuckles] It's a fact of history.

Rodda: A fact of history, right. — Not oriented toward conservation and
preservation of the environment or the view of the contemporary
ecologists. But, I suppose, had they been as influential then as
they are now, we might never have built the State Water Project.

Morris: That's an interesting observation.

Rodda: Right. But the Peripheral Canal then in the early sixties was

looked upon as the best solution, as I've indicated to the Delta
transfer problem, and we could have built the canal then for a very
small amount of money, maybe $95 million or $100 million.

Morris: How come there wasn't a vote on it at that time?

Rodda: Well, we were not ready. The project was still in the proces of
construction, and the Peripheral Canal was a concept which was
being explored, and even then there was some opposition to it.

Morris: From the area specifically involved?

Rodda: Right. And, of course, there was opposition from people in the
north. Subsequently, of course, the senate was reapportioned in
1966. Many northerners were replaced by southerners. Even so,
there were many people who were fearful that the construction of
a peripheral canal — of course, Governor Brown was no longer
governor — would create a situation in which we would lose water to
the south, and, also, that its construction would create a situation
which would be damaging to the recreation, wildlife, and the water
purity in the Delta. Furthermore, the environmentalists were
becoming much more influential politically in the late sixties and
early seventies.

Those were the three factors probably that thwarted us from
building a peripheral canal then. It was early during Brown's
administration when the concept was being developed and when it
was the subject of hearings. At the time Governor Brown was defeated
and senate reapportionment took place, the concept was seriously
being considered.

Morris: The picture changed, the persons?
Rodda: Yes, the political picture had changed.

Morris: You said that you worked closely with George Miller on the levee-
stripping question. How did you find him as a person to work with?

Rodda: He was definitely interested in the Delta. That was one of the

reasons why he had not supported the water plan. He, as chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, as I recall, chaired a hearing on that
issue, levee-stripping, and during that hearing he verbalized his
concerns, although he was not as actively involved as I was in
developing the legislation which brought about the study. The
effort did not totally resolve the issues, but it helped a lot, I
think, because absent the legislation, the study and administration
support, nothing positive would have been done.

Incidentally, out of the study emerged a rather dramatic plan
for the scenic and recreation development of the Delta. It was
sponsored by Senator Hugo Fisher, who had been appointed the
Secretary of the Resources Agency, prior to his appointment to a
judgeship. The plan even called for the development of the Delta

Rodda: meadows as a park, and the Consumnes River as a parkway and recreation
area for twenty-five or thirty miles. There were all kinds of
features to the plan and Hugo Fisher, as secretary of the Resources
Agency, was active in advocating it. Hugo was a very strong
conservationist and a genuine advocate of efforts to preserve the
Delta and to develop its remarkable recreation potential and to
preserve its scenic beauty. Because of his leadership, the Brown
administration was definitely positive in that regard.

Morris: I'd like to talk about Senator Fisher some more. I'd like to go
back to one more question on George Miller. I was thinking about
George Miller as a person to work with in relation to Hugh Burns ,
who you said was rather a difficult person, from your point of view.

Rodda: Well, he was never unfriendly toward me, but our relation was

difficult because our philosophies were different in some important
respects and our styles of operation were very different.

Relations Among Legislative Colleagues////

Rodda: And, of course, Senator Virgil O'Sullivan was active in the Democratic
party, and there was Senator Stan Arnold, who was appointed as a
judge of the superior court in the northern part of the state. Stan
worked closely with George Miller, Steve Teale,and Virgil O'Sullivan,
and George was close to Hugh Burns. Burns, of course, worked very
closely with several Republican senators — Richard Dolwig, for example,
and Don Grunsky, and Charlie Brown in the old days, the fifties and
early sixties. I'd have to go back and look at the roster to identify
some of those individuals with whom Burns was close.

But it was an interesting political coalition. In the middle
was Hugh Burns who was the leader. On both sides were Democrats
and Republicans. They controlled the powerful Rules Committee.
Through the Rules Committee, Burns, with the support of these two
elements in the senate, leaders in both parties, really was the
leader of the senate and he was very powerful and influential.

George Miller did not share a lot of Burns' conservative views
because in many ways George was a liberal, more a traditional
liberal. But he was a man who recognized that you had to live with
the political facts of reality and that you had, therefore, to be
willing to make conpromises.

Morris: It sounds as if you and Senator Miller might have been fairly close
together in political philosophy.

Rodda:

Morris :

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Well, on some issues we were, and on other issues we were not. We
differed on school finance reform,, We differed on the abortion
issue, which developed later on, in 1967. We differed on the water
plan. But in many other areas we were in basic agreement because
we were essentially traditional type liberal Democrats. I would
think that I was more liberal, however, and I was also less
cooperative with the third house than was George. I did not have
to contend with the third house to the degree that he did because
I did not have the power and I was not seeking it.

You're suggesting that the more powerful a legislator is, the more
he has to deal with lobbyists.

Oftentimes, especially in the old days, that was the case. I think
the third-house people in those days had more influence; so they
could promote the power of one individual senator and they could
discourage the advancement of another.

Was there ever any effort to work, say, with George Miller, who was
a powerful person, and try to oust Mr. Burns as the Speaker?

Well, I can comment on that, but first I would like to make it clear
that George and I were in disagreement on another issue; that was
on the question of reapportionment of the state senate.

Gene McAteer was another very powerful Democrat, and he worked
very closely with Burns. As a consequence, he and George Miller were
somewhat involved in a rivalry with respect to their roles in the
senate. McAteer was very aggressive and very ambitious and less
liberal than George. He was, also, more erratic in that regard and
one could not always predict what he was going to do.

So there was George supporting Burns and there was McAteer
supporting Burns. Sometimes George and McAteer worked together.
Usually, however, George had the support of 0' Sullivan and Teale
and Arnold. They were a powerful four. But in those days the
Burns coalition was very strong, and even though ten freshmen, I
think it was, came into the senate in 1959, it did not constitute
such a significant change in the personnel of the senate that it
could seriously threaten the power of Burns.

Many of the new senators were liberal and reflected in their
thinking the traditional liberalism of the '40s and the '50s and
tended to support the liberals in the senate, who were not as closely
identified with Burns and Miller. What I'm trying to say is that
those of us who were more liberal, Senator Holmdahl, Fisher, Stiern,
Rattigan, Slattery — and I include myself in that class — identified
more with Alan Short, Jim Cobey, and Fred Farr. McAteer was more
closely associated with the traditionalists. Senator 0' Sullivan

Rodda: was liberal in many areas, but he generally identified with Steve
Teale, who was very close to George Miller. So you had an
interesting distribution of interests, philosophy, and power in
the senate among the Democrats.

My colleagues and I, the liberal ones, began meeting at a
breakfast once a week. We met at a restaurant that is no longer
in operation — I cannot even remember its name — over on 10th and L,
on the corner. We would breakfast and discuss issues which related
to the operation of the senate. Incidentally, there were no party
caucuses in the senate at that time.

Morris: I sort of assumed they'd had them forever.

Liberal Caucus and Conservative Coalition

Rodda: No, no. The party caucuses came into existence at a later date,
and that's an interesting history too. I was somewhat involved
in that development.

Since there were no caucuses, there was no way to develop a
party position. Thus, if the liberal Democrats wanted to develop
a position, they had to meet outside the senate, and so we began to
meet for breakfast. Now, that breakfast group is still meeting;
although, I am the only one who was part of the original group.

Morris: You still meet together?

Rodda: Yes. We meet at Original Mac's, but today it's all the Democrats
who meet.

Morris: It's now a part of the caucus operation?

Rodda: All of the senate Democrats are invited to meet; however, some do
not attend. But a few years ago it still was a select group, and
it was that select group which provided the political organization
and unity within the Democratic party to oust Burns. At that time,
the party caucuses had not been authorized. That action developed
after 1966, after senate reapportionment and after election to
the senate of men such as Al Song, Jim Mills and Al Alquist, Merv
Dymally and Tony Beilenson, who were liberals in the assembly and
had been affiliated with Jesse Unruh and who weren't too sympathetic
to Burns' and the Democratic party's operation of the senate. So
they wanted a change.

Morris:
Rodda:

Rodda: The impetus for change was a result of reapportionment, which

brought into being the Democratic caucus and brought into being a
coalition of Democrats anxious to oust Burns. I was opposed to
that change because at that time there were twenty-one Democrats
and nineteen Republicans.

That's close.

Right. Then it became twenty- twenty , and I still concluded that if
it's twenty- twenty, we Democrats would make a mistake to support a
Republican. Then Senator George Miller died and was replaced by
John Nejedly, a Republican. If my memory is correct, and I think
it is, that made it twenty-one Republicans, nineteen Democrats. At
that juncture, I became willing to support a movement to change the
leadership and support a responsible, moderate Republican. My
colleagues chose to support Howard Way, and he won the office, and
I voted for him.

Morris: It was better to have a new person in the pro tern spot than to
continue to have a Democrat?

Rodda: When it was twenty-one Republicans and nineteen Democrats, I thought
that since they were the majority party, they should have control
of the senate through the leadership of the president pro tern and,
also, through control of the Rules Committee. You'd better check
the history because I'm speaking extemporaneously and from memory.

Actually, Hugh Burns was at one time very much annoyed at me,
because prior to the election of Howard Way, there was a motion on
the floor to have an election of senate officers in the middle of
the session, which meant that we would have to approve a rule
change. Of course, if a senator voted for that motion on the floor,
it had to be interpreted that you were interested in an election to
unseat Burns. I voted for it.

Morris: For the rules change?

Rodda: Yes, which failed, as I recall.

Prior to that, I had been assigned to the Finance Committee
because I had gained seniority and because many of my senior colleagues
had been ousted because of reapportionment. I was removed from the
Finance Committee by Burns, subsequent to the vote on the resolution
to have an election of senate officers. Burns regarded the resolution
as a threat to him, which is what it was; so he punished me. Then,
after Burns was replaced by Senator Way, I was reassigned to the
Finance Committee by Senator Way. I knew that I would have to pay
a price if the effort to unseat Burns failed, and yet, I must say that
Hugh had never disciplined me before that incident, although on many
issues we were in disagreement.

Rodda: The senate in those days strongly respected the principle of

seniority. Of course, there were exceptions made; so if you were
associated with those in the senate who had the power, more
recognition was given to your seniority than if you weren't.

Morris: If there wasn't a caucus in the early years of the Brown administra
tion, how did Mr. Burns convey what he expected people to do?

Rodda: The assembly had party caucuses; we did not. Furthermore, the
assembly had always been structured in a much more centralized
manner than the senate. That derived from the fact that the speaker
assigned bills to committee, appointed members to committees, and
appointed committee chairmen. The assembly had vested in the
speaker considerable autocratic power. Burns had such power, but
he didn't abuse it. He had it by virtue of the fact that the Rules
Committee made all those decisions, and he totally controlled the
Rules Committee. The Rules Committee in effect was Burns' committee
and so Burns made the critical decisions.

Morris: But if you weren't a member of the Rules Committee or the Finance

Committee or that group of five committees, how did the pro tern make
it known that he wanted you to vote thus and so.

Rodda: Well, to a certain extent, the senate was a more independent body

than the assembly. On issues which were of importance to the Brown
administration, the Brown legislative liaison secretary used to
contact the individual members and, by virtue of those contacts and
by virtue of meetings that we held with the governor, what might be
described as an administrative position was sometimes developed.
The governor could influence Senator George Miller to support him,
the governor was in a very strong position. And, of course, if he
could influence President Pro Tern Burns, he was in an awfully strong
position. Normally Pat Brown's position was one with which the
liberals and moderate liberals identified because he was, I think, a
moderate liberal. So he had, therefore, a broad base of power on
such an issue.

Did you see any of the papers that I wrote about the Brown
administration?*

Morris: I did. I think they're very fine.

Rodda: Well, I mean, they were just summary statements of what he did.

*"Introduction of the Honorable Edmund G. Brown," Governor's Hall,
May 12, 1966.

Rodda: So, the senate operated under that kind of an arrangement, and since
Burns oftentimes worked with the Republicans, there was a kind of
a quasi-conservative or conservative coalition contending with the
administration, which was working with the more liberal Democrats
and trying to develop a coalition within that element of the senate.
When Miller defected the governor had problems.

Morris: And [Miller] went over to Burns on a given issue.

Rodda: Right. Or if McAteer, or Steve Teale might. But the governor usually
had Hugo Fisher as a strong ally. 0? Sullivan normally was a strong
ally. Rattigan normally worked with the governor, and I did,- on most
issues.

Morris: Did Governor Brown ever come to your breakfast sessions?

Rodda: No. That was a small and kind of exclusive group. It did not have
any power in those days, but it provided those involved with a means
of discussing issues and trying to evaluate what our position ought
to be.

VI EDUCATION POLICY AND FINANCE

Problems of School Funding and Unification

Morris: Let's talk about education for a bit. When you first came into the
legislature, that was the beginning of a period of several increases
in funding for education.

Rodda: Yes. We had problems in funding the schools because we had an unfair
system of school finance, one which favored so-called wealthy
districts, and we also had a school finance law in which the state's
allocation to the schools did not adjust for inflation each year, so
it developed what is known as "slippage." In addition, there were
too many school districts, obviously.

The slippage, of course, was a big issue as was the inequitable
financing. The excessive number of districts was an issue but less
critical. Obviously there were some reforms needed. The so-called
slippage resulted because if the assessed value of the property in
a school district increased per student, the state's allocation or
apportionment per ADA [average daily attendance] was reduced, and
that meant that the school district had to obtain more of its funding
from the local taxpayer. So there was a shift of money to support
the schools from the state to local government. From time to time,
we were under pressure and obligation to overcome that issue by
increasing the state's apportionment to the schools, and since the
state's revenues did not increase as rapidly as inflation, the
second issue, the fact that low-wealth districts were more dependent
upon the state than were high-wealth districts, created problems
because the low-wealth districts had to operate at a much lower level
of support per ADA. There was reason to argue that that deficiency
should be corrected. The wealthy districts received $125 per unit
of ADA, which was basic aid, and the poor districts received
equalization money, which was a reflection of the wealth of the
district per unit of ADA. The lower the district wealth, the greater
the state support. There was an inverse relation.

Rodda: Now, that issue led to some concern about the possibility of the
need for the introduction of a broader tax base to support the
schools, and the first concept which was designed to achieve that
objective was the countywide school tax, which I will discuss.

Then there was the other issue of providing a mandate in the
law to require, under certain conditions, that school districts
integrate. There were separate high school districts and independent
elementary districts. There were a number of counties in which
there should have been a smaller number of districts. Jesse Unruh
was very much supportive of that idea and pushed legislation to
achieve that objective — school district unification.

Now, I cannot remember all of the specifics, but I became
involved in the issue of school finance reform in 1964, and I
authored SB 65. It was the bill which provided for a countywide
tax base for local schools.

I can remember the meeting that occurred with respect to that
issue. The governor wanted to initiate school finance reform
legislation and he wanted a senator to sponsor it. He called the
members of the Senate Education Committee into his office, which
was not uncommon for him to do. Governor Brown usually sat at his
work desk, which was like mine in that there was paper all over it
although his desk was cleaner than mine. The meetings were very
informal and conducted in a comfortable atmosphere, with chairs like
this [gestures] surrounding the desk, and both the Republicans and
Democrats who were members of the committee sitting together and
carrying on a conversation, or dialogue, with the governor.

Pat outlined the school-finance reform bill that he had been
developing with his staff people and in conjunction with, I think,
the Department of Education. In those days, believe it or not, the
Department of Education was not as effective in providing leadership
as it subsequently became.

Morris: If we're talking about 1964, that's when Max Rafferty was
superintendent.

Rodda: And even before that time, under his predecessor — what was his
name?

Morris: Roy Simpson.

Rodda: Yes. Roy Simpson. As a matter of fact, at that time, school

finance legislation was usually authored by assemblymen and under
the sponsorship of the CTA [California Teachers Association]. The
CTA used its staff people to develop the legislation, and the
Department of Education was only incidentally involved in its

Rodda: development. The principal author of school finance legislation
during those years was Assemblyman Ernest Geddes and he was very
cooperative with the CTA. As I recall, he was from the south, not
the Geddes from San Francisco.

Morris: Yes. He's the one from down around Claremont, right?

Rodda: Yes. He was the outstanding leader in the legislature in the area
of school finance legislation and was involved in the school
finance legislation as I outlined.

Pat Brown, as governor, wanted to initiate a school finance
reform, which was the countywide tax. He presented it to those
present. The legislation had other elements, but I've forgotten
what they were. However, no one wanted to introduce the proposed
legislation because a lot of the senators were representatives of
counties in which basic-aid schools prevailed; .he rural small school
districts tended to be basic-aid because they had a high assessed
value per ADA which was essentially valuable agricultural land.
Therefore, their schools would have been adversely affected if there
were urbanized, or low-wealth areas within the counties. Senator
Rattigan did not want to initiate such legislation, and Senator
Miller was very adamant against it.

Morris: Right. Contra Costa still has a lot of unincorporated areas,
[laughter]

Rodda: Right. And none of those present at the meeting would volunteer.

I often describe myself as the mouse that bells the cat, so I said,
"Well, all right." The governor did not want me to be the author
since I was not a distinguished member of the senate. I did not
have the status that Joe Rattigan or Hugo Fisher or some of the
other members did. I authored it, however; under the circumstances
it was the only option.

The bill was passed out of the Education Committee, and sent
to the Finance Committee, which was chaired by George Miller, who,
as I stated, was adamantly against it, despite the fact that he was
on the Education Committee. George didn't kill the bill in the
policy committee, but he did kill it in the Finance Committee. We
had a lengthy hearing over an hour, and he argued very reasonably
against the concepts commenting that what I was doing was to
increase taxes in Martinez and Pittsburg, and adversely affecting
the working people who resided in those areas because taxes on their
homes would increase. The effect was to take money from the blue
collar workers and give it to the districts in Walnut Creek,
Lafayette and Concord, where the affluent middle class resided —
those who were executives working in San Francisco, he said.

Morris: [chuckles] That's a good summary of that situation.

Rodda: George said that those communities "had zoned industrial and

commercial enterprise out of their communities but they want to
take tax revenues from the industrial areas in the county. It's
not fair, Al."

And then, of course, the oil industry opposed the bill, as
did the steel industry. In fact, the industrial community was
completely and adamantly against the bill, which was stupid. It
might not have been a good concept, but it did have merit and we
needed the reform. Had we reformed, we wouldn't have had the Serrano
decision. I tried to convey that impression to the basic-aid school
districts, but they refused to listen.

Well, the bill failed, and the next school finance bill was
AB 145, I believe, which was authored by Assembly Speaker Jesse
Unruh, and it contained language in it which mandated unification
elections. It also added more tax money to the School Fund to
offset the slippage. It may have had another element or two of
reform.

Morris: At some point, I think Brown had proposed an increase in sales tax as,
in effect, an equalizing measure with that cent was to go to school
finance. Was this the same bill?

Rodda: I think that occurred a little bit later on, but I wouldn't want

to be insistent upon that. My recollection is that the Unruh bill
was basically a school finance bill, and that it contained those
two elements. It was signed into law. I was on the conference
committee and I don't know why. George Miller got me on there, and
I can remember the conference committee meeting.

Morris: At this point there were some differences between Unruh and Brown,
wasn't there? And there was some thought that part of the problem
of getting the bill through was that Unruh didn't want to do it the
way Brown dido Is that correct?

Rodda: Well, as I previously indicated, Governor Brown had been in support
of the countywide school tax, and he was still interested in school
finance reform and in using the critical school finance situation
to gain the political leverage necessary to enact reform. Jesse's
position, in my view, was more practical: the school needed an
increase in their funding and his legislation did provide some
property tax relief, and would achieve economies in the administration
of schools, through the elimination of some school districts.

I'm having a little bit of trouble remembering all the issues.
But that would be my superficial observation. Now, maybe that paper
that I've written will clarify some of the differences. There were
serious differences between Unruh and Miller, though on this issue.

Morris: On school finance?

Rodda: Yes. The administration had pretty much decided that the best that

it could expect to enact would be a school finance bill which

provided more money for the schools as an offset to the adverse
effect of slippage.

Morris: How would that bring about property tax relief?

Rodda: Well, if you allocate more state money, the districts have the

option of reducing the local property tax. The districts operate
under tax rate limits. That means that with more state money the
local tax rate would produce more revenue than was needed, so the
districts would reduce their budgets and the property tax rate
would fall below the limit. Now, if they did not exercise that
option, the tax rate would not decline and there was pressure on
them to do so.

Morris: Were you getting pressure from taxpayers' associations on this?

Rodda: In those days, what we had was a school foundation program, which
was the amount of money that should be spent per child. But a
district could spend more than the foundation program if it wanted
to and if the voters approved such action. In many school districts,
they were living within the limits of the foundation program, however.
The state provided each district with basic aid, which is $125 per
ADA. If you apply the tax rate, and the tax rate generates a given
amount of revenue, but fails to generate enough revenue to fund
foundation programs, the difference is made up by the state and is
called equalization money. If the state introduced more equaliza
tion money, then, since that increased the amount available per
child, the local tax rate could be cut, or as I observed, the
district could operate at the foundation without increasing the
district's expenditure level. So, there was a certain amount of
leeway given for local — what's the word I want to use? — autonomy or
freedom.

The state could raise the foundation program and apportion more
money to the local districts, or it could just introduce more state
money. Normally what the state did was to raise the foundation
program and also apportion more state money,
recall all the specifics.

It's hard for me to

But if we did not modify the foundation program and the district
became more wealthy, then, by definition, since it was a wealthier
district, the equalization allocation was reduced, which meant a
savings to the School Fund, which meant a savings to the state's
General Fund. So to avoid that development, the state would
introduce more money into the School Fund, or raise the foundation

Rodda: program and also apportion more money to the schools. It could
have the effect of causing or producing tax relief, or it could
have the effect of leading us into a more precarious fiscal
situation.

State Deficits, Tax Alternatives, and Tax Relief EffortsM

Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris ;
Rodda:

The choice was between adjustments in the income tax or the sales
tax. The sales tax, because the rate of inflation in those years
was not too dramatic, tended to have an elasticity of .95. One
could examine history for a specific elasticity. I'm just reciting
from memory. The personal income tax, though, because the state
had not indexed the personal income tax, was modestly elastic. The
sales tax rate was lower then and the income tax less a factor in
raising revenue. So the tendency was for state revenues not to
increase as rapidly as did the cost of government.

So when Governor Brown was elected, there was a deficit which
was incurred during Governor Knight's administration, and state
taxes had to be increased in Brown's first year of administration.
I've forgotten the specifics. When Governor Brown left as governor,
the fiscal situation was bordering on being very critical, and a
tax increase was necessary.

Right after he came in.

When he came in and when he went out. So, when Governor Reagan was
elected, he was confronted in his first year of administration with
a deficit situation.

Some people say you can't have a deficit in state government because
the constitution says there will be a balanced budget. How does
that — ?

Right, which meant that the state can fund the budget out of
accumulated reserves or surpluses, and that is what the state is
doing today. Actually, today we're on a deficit-operation basis.
The state is spending more than $1 billion in excess of its revenues,
but it has an accumulated General Fund reserve which is being used
to make up that deficit. That General Fund reserve will be exhausted
at the end of 1980-81. So, as long as you have reserves, then you
can do it; otherwise you have to reduce your expenditures, or raise
taxes .

Now, the constitution has since been changed. It then required
that if the governor introduced a budget and there was a projected
deficit, the governor would have to propose a tax increase.

Morris: Required that a tax increase be proposed?

Rodda: Right. He would be required to propose one, which is what
Governor Brown did in his last year in office, in 1966.

But in those days, the sales tax required a simple majority
vote for approval of an increase, and the personal income tax also,
but the corporate income tax and the insurance and bank franchise
tax both required a two- thirds vote. So it was easier to tax the
people through a sales tax increase or a personal income tax
increase than it was to tax corporate enterprise.

In those days, the popular tax for increase was the personal
income tax, principally because many working people had not, because
of inflation, moved into high state income tax brackets.

Today the personal income tax is not popular with the working
people. We increased it under Reagan's administration, and we have
not indexed it; so the higher rates are generating a greater proportion
of the state's revenue than under Brown. The state increased the
sales tax by one cent in 1972 under Reagan's administration. The
purpose of that increase primarily was to provide [property] tax
relief. In the first year of Reagan's administration, as I recall —
now, I might be wrong on this; you'd better check it out — we
increased the personal income tax to balance the budget. There is
a term that we used when Governor Brown was seeking a means by
which he could count, as a revenue, taxes which had been levied, but
not collected.

Morris. That's the accrual accounting?

Rodda: Yes, right. Accrual accounting, and the Republicans did not want

the state to implement it. If Governor Brown could have implemented
it permanently in 1966, the situation would have been more favorable.
The state was confronted then with a modest deficit situation of
about $150 million, I guess. I do not recall the exact figure. The
Republicans did not want accrual accounting and they did not want
a personal income tax increase. There were other elements in
Governor Brown's tax proposal; I think, a corporate profits tax
increase was another element. So there was opposition from the
Republicans, and Brown could not achieve enactment of the
legislation.

Reagan, therefore, inherited a deficit situation. He inherited
a balanced budget, but it was clearly going to become a deficit
budget at the end of his first year, so he had to do something.

Morris: How did a deficit develop during the Brown administration?

Rodda: Well, the situation is such that when expenditures are going up like
this [draws chart] and revenues are going up like this, at a lower
rate, there may be a year-end surplus, but if one projects
expenditures and revenues into the next year, one knows that there
will be a deficit. If one has such a deficit and a cash reserve,
one can use the reserve to balance the budget. When the reserve
is exhausted and if the trend continues, the budget must be cut,
or taxes increased.

I wasn't on the Finance Committee in those days, and I was not
as close to the fiscal situation, therefore, as I am now, and I had
other concerns. I'm relying on a memory which probably is not too
accurate.

Morris: While you were on the Education Committee during the Brown years,

your concern was more with the program than with the funding of it?

Rodda: Education and issues confronting the schools were a major concern.

I was on Local Government and I was concerned about local government.
I was, also, on the Committee on Elections and subsequently I became
chairman for about two years .

But the point that I'm making is that the state often was
confronted with a potential deficit at the end of a fiscal year in
the '50s and '60s. Governor Knight had balanced a budget in his
last year, but he knew that the next fiscal year, without a tax
increase, the cost of government would have to be reduced because
a deficit was confronting the state. That was the situation which
also developed the last year, I think, of Pat Brown's administration,
and I do not recall exactly how he addressed it.

Morris: Accrual accounting was approved, I think, before he left office.

Rodda: Yes, for one year. That was the issue, the last year, I think of
Brown's administration.

Morris: But it was not well received, I take it.

Rodda: Right. It was opposed for a long time. I wish I had reviewed some
of this material because it is awkward for me to recall the details
Despite the accrual accounting there still was a deficit situation
and, I think, under Reagan the state increased its taxes the first
year of his administration, including the personal income tax. Then
in '72 — Reagan went into office in 1967 — under the provisions of
SB 90, about $1.1 billion in new revenue was provided. There was
an increase, I think, in the corporate profits tax, very modest, for
the business inventory buy-out and there was a one-cent increase in
the sales tax, which generated about $600 million.

Rodda: As a consequence, the state had a surplus, as I recall, which was

returned to the taxpayers and to the schools. Of the total amount,
the schools obtained around $500 million. But because of the
restrictions on the schools under the law, they could only spend
about $150 million for education. The rest of it was used for tax
relief to address the issue of slippage. »

Now, the bulk of the other portion of the tax relief legislation,
SB 90, was to increase the level of buy-out of the business inventory,
which had first been initiated by Senator Deukmejian, as I recall,
in a bill in '68, I believe, or '69, which provided for a very
modest reduction in the business inventory tax, and which was paid
for by business because of a tax increase. The business inventory
buy-out was increased to about 50 percent, I think, in SB 90. The
homeowners' exemption was increased substantially; so the legislation
provided a reduction in the tax on the homeowners. The state made
up the loss of revenue to local government through the utilization
of SB 90 revenues.

Well, I did not vote for SB 90, because I argued that we should
have addressed the issue of the Serrano-Pries t decision. * The state
was confronted with that decision in 1971.

Governor Reagan, in his first year, benefitted from accrual
accounting; nevertheless he had a deficit the following year and
the state had to increase taxes. And when the state increased the
personal income tax, it made its tax base more elastic, and so
therefore the state has been less threatened with deficit financing
since that time.

But Governor Reagan, in one of his years, had a deficit which
he financed out of surplus, because the last few years of his
administration — and I've got to stop talking about this administration
because it does not relate to Governor Brown — we were experiencing
a business recession. I will show you the diagram. I have a diagram
here. Here it is. [locates diagram in a stack of materials]

Morris: You keep charts on these things?

Rodda: Well, I'm writing a paper on Jarvis II, you see.** It's a two-part
paper and I'm going to write a third part. Over the weekend I'll
dictate it.

*Serrano v. Priest was a California Supreme Court decision in 1971
which declared that the current system of financing schools primarily
by using property taxes was unconstitutional. Mr. John Serrano of
East Los Angeles initiated the suit on behalf of his son, John
Anthony Serrano, against state Treasurer Ivy Baker Priest,
decision directed the California legislature to equalize spending
on the schools within specified limits.

**"Fiscal Implications of Jarvis II," Albert S. Rodda, January 15, 1980,

Rodda:

But this [indicating diagram next page] is to demonstrate the
situation. You see, this is 1973-'74, and we had a deficit of
$413 million, but the state had coming into that year a surplus.
I call it the General Fund reserve; it's a better term than year-end
surplus. So, as long as the state has a General Fund reserve which
exceeds your yearly deficit, the state is not under the contraints
that the constitution mandates to increase taxes. The deficit can be
funded out of reserve funds.

In the next year, 1974- '75, the state had a modest surplus,
which increased the General Fund reserve. [Jerry] Brown's first
year, an austere year, the state was still in the recession. Gee,
the reserve was $144 million. Thereafter the reserve increased.
But then the state addressed the issue of [Proposition] 13, and
began chewing up the reserve.* Now the state has a situation in
which it is funding on a deficit basis, and we are getting into a
situation in which next year the state will have to have a very
austere budget.

If [Proposition] 13 had not passed, the state would have had
a fat surplus which would have been returned to the voters as
provided in SB 1, in the form of renter relief, homeowner relief,
and a full buy-out of the business inventory tax. But we did not
enact that program in a timely enough manner or in a substantive
enough manner, so the voters did Prop 13. They rejected Prop 8 and
SB 1, the legislature's program.

In Pat Brown's administration and also during Reagan's administra
tion, revenue elasticity was not as great because the state did not
rely so fully on the personal income tax and because the state was
not experiencing such rapid economic growth and there was not a
high level of inflation. The sales tax was generally moderately
elastic. It seems that in the last couple of years, however, it
became fairly elastic.

Morris: The sales tax?

*In June 1978 California voters approved Proposition 13, an
initiative ballot measure sponsored by Howard Jarvis and Paul
Gann that sharply lowered the amount of property tax that could be
levied by city and county government. The drop in local revenues
was alleviated for several years by "bail out" funding from state
revenue surpluses. "Jarvis II" was the popular name for Proposition
9 on the June 1980 ballot, an initiative for state income tax
reduction, which was defeated at the polls.

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Rodda: Yes.

Morris: Because of the general economic conditions?

Rodda: Yes. Inflation and business expansion. Obviously, if a car goes
up in price by 10 percent and more cars are also sold —

Morris: The 5 percent sales tax —

Rodda: Yes! Also the economy will generate more growth in personal income
and tax revenues. It's been working that way.

Tidelands Oil Revenue

Morris: One other aspect of finance that was debated several times in the
Pat Brown's administration was tidelands oil revenues.

Rodda: Yes.

Morris: Part of those revenues were used for a while to finance the water
plan, and then later on there was talk of using some tidelands oil
revenues for higher education too.

Rodda: Yes. That's the COFPHE [Capital Outlay Fund for Public Higher
Education] fund.

Morris: This is what is very unclear from our research: how much money was
actually involved in tidelands oil revenues and how much control
the legislature had. It seemed to shift. First it was used for
park acquisition, then for water, and then for education. Was it a
continually expanding sum?

Rodda: Well, that was a controversial issue, and I was only superficially
involved in it. But it became apparent that tideland oil revenues
were increasing, and a large percentage of that money was going to
Long Beach, which the city was using for the purpose of meeting
city construction and operational needs.

Senator Miller became concerned, as chairman of the Finance
Committee, and my recollection is that Senator 0 'Sullivan authored
a bill which resolved that problem to a significant degree. Prior
to his legislation, some of the money was allocated, as I recall it,
to finance the water project. His legislation established the
formula under which Long Beach would receive its revenues. The city
did not like the legislation because it established a lower level
of support or allocation to them than they wanted. But we thought
the existing law was a rip-off, that that money belonged to the

Rodda: people and it really should serve statewide interests. O'Sullivan's
legislation did that, and about that time we did create the COFPHE
fund. It may have been in his bill, but I know the Long Beach
allocation was resolved.

Morris: The COFPHE fund?

Rodda: Yes. Capital Outlay Fund for Public Higher Education, which

originally was used only for the university and state university
and college system, not the community colleges. We have not yet
talked about the Master Plan for Higher Education, but that was
important. It was a major contribution of Pat Brown, and I was
somewhat involved in its development.

So the state had established by formula the Long Beach alloca
tion; and also the amount of money that went into the water project
(I think it was $25 million). Then the COFPHE fund was established.
There was one other use, I believe. I cannot recall what it was.
But for years the amount of money that we derived from tidelands oil
was predicated upon the formula as established in Governor Pat
Brown's years, and the institutions of higher education were blessed
because that was a period of growth and expansion; new campuses
were established, as a result of the master plan, for state colleges;
and also new university campuses.

The state was providing the capital outlay for community colleges
on a matching fifty-fifty basis, although the allocation wasn't on
that basis, to individual schools. It was a variable formula, but
the total allocation was approximately fifty /state, fifty /community
colleges. So we were meeting rather well the capital outlay needs
of the community colleges, funding them through bond fund money. I
authored two of the bond funds which were approved by the voters.
Since the state used the bond fund money to match the local money
to build community colleges the COFPHE fund money was used to provide
money for the universities and state colleges.

Morris: So the tidelands oil money was not seen as an integral part of the
basic budget; it was used for special purposes?

Rodda: Yes. That is correct — for these special purposes. And I've forgotten
the details, but Parks and Recreation did receive some of that money.
So those were the elements.

When Governor Reagan, however, began to experience a quasi-
deficit situation in the last years of his administration when he
did almost have a deficit — wasn't the year '73- '74?

Morris: Yes.

Rodda: He wanted to transfer the* COFPHE fund money into the General Fund.

I was opposed to that, as were some of my colleagues, and we finally
were able to block that action.

Now, this administration has been determined not to transfer
the COFPHE fund money to the General Fund, but to use more of the
tidelands oil revenus to finance other projects. We held some
extensive hearings on that issue in this session. I will not go
into that issue in any more detail. As you know, the tidelands
oil revenues are now increasing.

But in the [Pat] Brown administration, one of the controversial
areas of involvement was the development of an adequate formula for
the allocation of the tidelands oil money to Long Beach, the water
project, Parks and Recreation, and the COFPHE fund.

Morris: Any thought in the Pat Brown administration of reviewing those leases
to see if the state was getting adequate money for the leases?

Rodda: What leases are those that you mean?

Morris: Aren't the tidelands oil revenues based on leases?

Rodda: Oh, yes, I understand what you mean. Well, there were studies made.
There was some concern in Brown's administration and also in Reagan's
administration, but it was not a concern of Reagan as much as it was
a concern of Assemblyman Ken Cory.

Morris: Yes, "the man the oil companies fear most."

Rodda: Yes, and especially after he became a member of the tidelands oil —
I mean the —

Morris: As controller, when he sat on the State Lands Commission?

Rodda: Yes, the Lands Commission, because it was his contention that the
oil companies were artificially manipulating the price so as to
reduce the revenue to the state, and he wanted to achieve some
corrective change. He wrote an extensive paper on that issue which
I read. That issue developed seven or eight years ago, ten years
ago maybe and I cannot remember all of the details.

But my recollection of the issue relates more to the development
of the formula for allocation to Long Beach, than the COFPHE fund
money.

Then, later on, I can recall Ken Cory's concern about the crude-
oil pricing structure as it related to the state's revenues. My
recollection is that he was upset with the integrated oil companies

Rodda: which had refining capacities. They were willing to take a loss
on the price of the oil because they could make it up as a
consequence of their refining. But it adversely affected the small
oil companies because they did not make any profits from refineries,
and low prices had an adverse effect on the state because the state
revenues were reduced. That was the issue which he focussed upon,
but I do not recall that it was a part of Senior Brown's
administration.

Morris: Okay. It was just a question that had come up.

Rodda: No, that's all right. You certainly have a substantive knowledge.
. Are you interviewing quite a few people on this subject?

Morris: We've done a few, and as we go on into the Reagan administration we
hope to talk to Mr. Cory and other people and try to develop some
more information.

Rodda: Well, he'll help you on that issue.
Morris: Indeed, if he has the time to interview.

Credentialing Program

Morris: Going back to education per se, you and Hugo Fisher worked on a
revamping of the whole credentialing program.

Rodda: Oh, yes. Well, you see, one of the efforts that the Brown
administration made was to try to reform education. In his
administration there were the recommendations of the Commission
on Public Education. It was a commission which was created in 1957,
I think, and was funded at a level of a quarter of a million dollars.

Morris: Was this the Thayer Commission?*

Rodda: I have forgotten who was involved in it, because the studies were
made prior to the Brown administration. Implementation of its
recommendations was initiated by Brown in 1959, and there were
three basic bills that were enacted into law as a result of the
commission's recommendations. It was the AFT which succeeded in
obtaining the authorization for that study, I believe.

*See interview in this series with Roy Simpson, Superintendent of
Public Education, 1945-1962.

Morris: The American Federation of Teachers?
Rodda: Yes, that's my recollection. 1957.

The three bills were the Teacher Credential Reform Act; the
Casey Act, which was the reform of the curriculum; and the Winton
Act, which provided some degree of faculty involvement in decision-
making, although it was not full collective bargaining. The Fisher
Bill was the one to reform the Credentialing Act.

What was of concern to people then was that education was not
sufficiently involved in the basics; there was too much emphasis
given to so-called folderol and unimportant educational matters, and
the conservatives, especially the Republicans, were reflecting that
sentiment. That sentiment was especially reflected in the thinking
of many of the middle- class people who had come to California during
the Second World War and established themselves. They were critical
of our state because its education was more progressive, and they
wanted a school system that reflected more in its character what
they had experienced, which was an emphasis on basic education. That
thinking was articulated by [Max] Rafferty. That was an "educational
philosophy," which he politicized.

Morris: "Back to basics."

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris:

Right. "Back to basics." Well, that issue related to the
credentialing issue because the emphasis was to provide for a single-
subject-matter major, which means the law would do away with the
general secondary credential and eliminate the general education
major [for those who wished to teach] in the elementary grades. The
law would then require everyone to have a subject-matter major even
in the elementary grades.

Well, I was concerned about that change, especially at the
elementary grade levels; so I would not support Fisher's bill in
the Senate Education Committee until he introduced about seven
amendments, one of which was to create a diversified major for the
elementary teacher. Governor Brown was supporting the Fisher
legislation, but I don't really think he knew too much about it.

Yes. It sounds like a technical issue primarily of concern to people
in the educational community.

Right. And the educational community was not too supportive of the
changes. The CTA especially was not supportive (and the AFT) of the
Fisher Act. The CTA .was moderately supportive of the Winton Act,
but the AFT was not.

That's interesting. The AFT had wanted the study made, but they
didn't like the legislation that came out of the study.

Rodda: Yes. That is something that you'd better check. In my mind there
is the thought that the AFT was largely instrumental in enacting
the resolution which authorized the study of public education.

Morris: Who would have been the legislative representative for the AFT at
that point?

Rodda: Oh, gee, I've forgotten who it was. I knew them all well too.

Morris: We're familiar with Bob McKay as the representative of the Teachers
Association.

Rodda: That was the CTA. Yes, Bob McKay.

The AFT became involved in the middle '50s in state legislative
matters. Oh, I remember the chap who was their legislative advocate.
I think he came from Contra Costa County. I can't think of his name.

Morris: Well, we could probably look him up. I just wondered if he was
somebody that you might have had personal contacts with.

Rodda: Oh, I knew him and did have contacts, because I was active in the

AFT in the '50s and at one time was president of the local, Local 31.
Isn't it funny that I can't remember his name?

But Fisher did accept the amendments. The diversified major
was one which he accepted, and it was introduced into the bill, and
the bill became law. But the state colleges, which were primarily
responsible for teacher preparation, would not implement the
diversified major, which allowed a teacher in the elementary grades,
K through 6 or K through 8, to take classes in English and science
and history and become a qualified teacher. But under the provisions
of the law, there was no department to supervise that prospective
teacher, because if one had a major in history or a major in English
or a major in science, that department faculty worked with you, and
you were under their guidance and direction. But there could not be
an education major. Since there was no longer an education major,
the major had to be a subject-matter major, and since there was no
department that could supervise a diversified major, there was
difficulty in implementing it.

I struggled for years to try to do so, and finally, in the
reform of the Fisher Act, which was accomplished by — [tries to
remember name] Oh, boy! My memory!

Morris: Well, I'm taking you over a lot of territory.

Rodda: Who was it, now. I'm trying to think. Oh, the Ryan Act. In the
Ryan Act, we did implement a major, which is not labelled the
diversified major. It has another terminology — general education
or something like that. We did provide for such an option, but I
am not sure it has been utilized.

But my concern was (and this was brought to my attention by
elementary teachers and teacher -preparation specialists who came
to see me) that an elementary school teacher who had a major in
history was not going to be able to teach a broad spectrum of
subjects at that grade level. The teacher needs a diversified major,
as I stated; we never implemented it in Brown's administration.

The teachers were so much concerned about the Fisher Bill that
they neglected the Casey Act, which mandated a new curriculum and
took away from local schools, especially the secondary and the
intermediate schools, the autonomy that they previously had. It
mandated — and I can't remember — "x" number of units in English and
history and basic subjects. The teachers were so much involved in
the other areas of change that they did not concern themselves
significantly about the impact of that legislation, and Casey did
not know the importance of the legislation. He had a background in
education, but he really did not know what he was doing. His
experience was at the junior college level.

I was serving on the Education Committee and I still recall the
day the committee heard that bill. Having taught in the high school
many, many years ago, I was trying to figure out how many units a
student was enrolled in during each semester, and how this related to
the bill, so that I could figure out the impact of the legislation.
I voted "yes" very relunctantly for the bill and there was no
opposition from the teachers. They urged that we, "Send it to
Interim." Well, why send a bill to interim that is the result of an
expenditure of $150,000 on a study and is backed by the administration?

In October my local school district called me to meet with
them, to tell me how adverse the Casey Act was insofar as it affected
their educational programs, especially the arts, vocational
education, and elective courses.

Morris: So that sometimes these exhaustive studies don't turn out to be
particularly helpful .

Rodda: Subsequently, Senator Miller, in SB 1, pretty much restored autonomy
to the local school districts, but I jokingly observed, "It's too
late. The medication is coming too late. The disease is already
well established." I concluded that the teachers who were involved

Rodda: in the courses that were mandated would be influential in maintaining
the curriculum as it was. It was very hard to change that curriculum.
Some districts did develop more flexibility under the Miller Act, but
the Casey Act changed the curriculum significantly in many schools.

Preliminaries to Collective Bargaining for Teachers

Rodda: The Winton Act provided for a better mechanism for teachers to meet
and confer. Actually, it did not significantly strengthen the law.
It continued the language which, by court interpretation, has
prohibited the strike. It did not provide for a written contract.
It did not provide for meaningful negotiations. It meant that they
just had to confer with the teachers, but it did not authorize a
single unit of representation in order to assure that the council,
which did the concurring, was to reflect the various organizations
within the employee groups. That was about all that the teachers
could obtain from the senate, because the senate was very conservative
and that bill was assigned, believe it or not, to the Government
Efficiency Committee, as I recall.

Morris: [chuckles] Not to the Education Committee?

Rodda: As I recall, as I recall. Because —

Morris: Somebody saw it as an early round in public employee bargaining?

Rodda: Right. When the legislation came from the assembly, it had the word
"negoitiate" in it. The word "negotiate" was stricken by the
Government Efficiency Committee, and there was another substantive
amendment was added. So, the AFT opposed the bill. The CTA
supported it. I voted "no," because I thought that, well, the
legislation did not authorize genuine negotiating, they're just
conferring, and they have more rights under current law than they
would have with the proposed bill. I was a bit biased toward the
teachers at that time because of an experience I had had as a
faculty representative before the local school board when I was
trying to present three resolutions which had been adopted by the
local AFT. I spent a half an hour before the board at their
invitation, and all they did was harrass me, asking me questions
which related to how many members are there in the AFT, why I
thought I had a right to speak for the teachers.

Morris: And the broader question of, "Why do the teachers think they can
address the school board this way?"

Rodda: Yes, which was what the board made the issue and not the resolutions,
which had to do with setting aside a smoking area for teachers (and
I don't smoke); putting a teacher on the school district budget
committee in an advisory capacity; and one other resolution which I
cannot recall.

Morris: Was this before you were in the legislature?

Rodda: Oh, yes. This incident happened in the middle '50s. The school

board was, I thought, so unfriendly and irresponsible in the manner
in which they allowed teachers, whom I regard as somewhat professional,
to have a voice in the administration of the schools, that I concluded
we needed a stronger mechanism for teacher participation. So, I had
a bias toward collective bargaining. I'm sorry. But, I did not
vote for the Winton Act. I voted for the Fisher Act, after he
accepted an amendment that provided for a diversified major for
elementary teachers. I voted for the Casey Act, the curriculum
reform law, because the teachers did not oppose it, nor did the
administrators, as I recall. If they did, they did not oppose it
vigorously; so I supported the bill.

Well, those bills were a significant element of reform in
education that Governor Brown initiated as a consequence of the
recommendations of the commission on public education which had been
created in 1957, as I recall.

Commission on Higher Education and Coordinating Council

Rodda: Then the legislature did create the Commission on Higher Education,
and one of the reasons for —

Morris: Again, was that pressure coming from the institutions themselves?

Rodda: No. The pressure came from the legislature. At that time the state
college system was administered by the Department of Education
through the State Board of Education. The community colleges were,
also, under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Education. The
only other independent agency in public education was the Board of
Regents, for the University of California. By virtue of the
constitution, the regents had autonomy and were quite free from
legislative control, which is important to maintain academic freedom.
The state was proliferating the number of junior colleges and also
state colleges as a consequence of the tremendous increase in the
student population. And, of course, the legislators were all
lobbying to locate the new campuses in their districts.

Rodda: One of the big issues, for example, was whether or not we would

locate a new state college in Sonoma or in Solano County: Senator
Gibson's district or Rattigan's district. I can remember that the
day the resolution to locate the college was under consideration,
Rattigan came into my office to talk to me and convinced me that it
ought to be in Sonoma County. I voted for Rattigan and Rattigan's
resolution passed. I've forgotten what the specific issues were —
a lot of little two-bit local politicking — but they finally
established that college there in Sonoma.

The point that I'm making is that we needed an agency to advise
us with respect to the need for and location of state college
campuses. Ultimately the legislature created the Coordinating
Council for Higher Education, which became the Post-secondary
Commission, or the California Post-secondary Education Commission.
But in its original form, it was the coordinating council.

A study was made in 1959 and it was recommended that the state
implement a Master Plan for Higher Education. It would involve two
separate state college systems: the university system and a state
college system operated by a board of trustees. One of the issues
was, should the new system be authorized in the constitution? I
did not want to proceed in that way for the new state college system
because that would create future problems. Others agreed, so the
system was created by virtue of the enactment of legislation, which,
as I recall, Senator Miller authored. I think it was SB 88.

The principal person involved in this action was Assemblywoman
Dorothy Donahoe from Kern County, who died that year, 1960. The
system was created in a special session which ran concurrently with
the budget session of 1960, because the study was made in 1959 and
its recommendations were enacted into law the following year.

But the legislature did not create a board of governors for the
community colleges. The community colleges were left under the
control of individual boards of trustees. The state college system
was placed under the direction of the board of trustees, and the
office of chancellor was created to direct the system. We, also,
created the original Coordinating Council for Higher Education, which,
by virtue of its nature, was dominated by the post-secondary
institutions — the University of California and the State University
and Colleges system. It seemed not to have the kind of autonomy
that it needed, or so we thought. The council was to be advisory to
the legislature, but it failed to become very effective. As a matter
of fact, the first two or three chancellors who directed the
coordinating council were very disappointing, but they were trying
to administer an impossible task.

Morris: You said that you thought there would be problems if the state college
system was put into the constitution. What is the nature of those
problems?

Rodda: Well, I thought the legislature needed a little more flexibility in
connection with the administration of that system; so I was willing
to accept the idea that we would do it by statute. I thought it was
an innovative system and that we should be a little bit cautious.
There was one paragraph introduced into the constitution, however,
but it did not provide the same degree of autonomy that the university
has, of which, incidentally, I've been very defensive.

As a matter of fact, I'm author of the constitutional amendment
which changed and reformed the governance of the university system.
That amendment changed the term of office of the regents and provided
that if the regents wanted to, they could place both a faculty
member and a student member on the board of regents, with the under
standing that if such action were taken the new members had a vote
on issues along with the other members. And [the amendment] made a
few other changes in the constitution.

I introduced the amendment as a compromise constitutional
amendment because Assembly John Vasconcellos wanted to reduce the
term of office to eight years from sixteen years. I thought from
sixteen to twelve was adequate, because I was convinced that the
regents should develop some perception of what their trust was to the
university and gain independence and that the legislature should avoid
politicizing the board of regents.

But, anyway, a struggle developed with Vasconcellos. I did
have the cooperation of the regents, however. They finally supported
my proposal, which was a compromise, although they wanted the status
quo. They realized that absent a compromise, they might end up with
the Vasconcellos short term and a mandate, not an option, that they
have a student member on the board. Mine was not a mandate. The
university regents could exercise that as an option. Incidentally,
the faculty has not chosen to accept that responsibility — a member
on the regents.

Morris: Was the Master Plan for Higher Education seen as an advisory thing,
as part of the — ?

Rodda: The coordinating council was.
Morris: The coordinating council?

Rodda: Yes. The coordinating council. The Master Plan, as implemented,
related to two elements: Trustees of the State Colleges and the
Coordinating Council for Higher Education. The coordinating council

Rodda: was primarily advisory in function, but by virtue of its membership,
it was substantively controlled by the university and the state
university system, which was then called the state college system.

About two years later, Senator Stiern authored legislation which
created the Board of Governors for the Community Colleges. It was
only after the Legislative Analyst, Mr. Alan Post, recommended that
we create such agency that we were able to proceed. The individual
colleges, community colleges, did not want a board of governors.
When it was clearly established that its role would be basically
advisory to the community colleges and would not constitute an
intrusion into their internal autonomy, the idea was reluctantly
accepted.

We ended up, in Brown's administration, in creating, therefore,
three segments of higher education: the community college system,
the university and state colleges and the university. Incidentally,
in the Master Plan for Higher Education, it was understood that there
was to be a higher level of support for the community colleges from
the state. The state was supposed to move toward a 50 percent level
of support. It never did. The level of support had been (under
Brown, when he became governor) about 45 percent. It had slipped to
about 38 percent; the percentage, of course, depends upon what
aggregate you use. There are two figures. Slippage had caused the
communities to pay for more of the support of the community colleges
than was established as appropriate by the master plan concept,
which, as I said, was fifty-fifty — 50 percent local and 50 percent
state.

The only area where the state really did assume 50 percent of
the costs was in the area of capital construction. That was done
through the use of the state bond acts, of which I authored two.
The one that I authored last in '76, I think it was, failed. It was
the third. So the state has been funding capital outlay for the
community colleges out of its General Fund. The community colleges
want to be included in the COFPHE fund now and probably will be,
since the COFPHE fund is higher now in generation of revenue because
the price of tideland oil has increased because of domestic oil
deregulation.

But anyway, that is what happened. So we developed in Brown's
administration a rather remarkable system of post-secondary education,
and I think we did accomplish a more responsible location of
individual campuses because of the recommendations of the coordinating
council. Furthermore, we did not establish, or create too many
campuses. Maybe there are one or two we shouldn't have, maybe down in
the Valley, a state college down there. I've forgotten the name of
it.

Morris: Stanislaus?

Rodda: Yes, Stanislaus. Maybe we shouldn't have created that campus.

Recently they have experienced enrollment problems, I understand.

Morris: Well, so has the UC system.

Did your Education Committee get involved at all with the 1964
student disturbances at UC?

Rodda: I was chairman and refused to involve the Education Committee in the
student demonstration problem on the campuses. I was under pressure
from the conservatives to hold hearings on the campuses, but I said,
"No. If I do that, I'll be under pressure to initiate legislation,
and that would, in my opinion, constitute a threat to the autonomy of
higher education." I refused to do it. If I did so for the radical
right, I would have had to do it for the radical left." So, I
refused.

Incidentally, when the master plan was under consideration,
there was a recommendation that we eliminate totally lower division
education from the university system.

Morris: Right. I remember that Clark Kerr incorporated that into his long-
range plan.

Rodda: I did not want to do that and many university people didn't. One
of the adverse effects would have been that the cost per unit of
education would have increased. The university would not have had
the benefit of larger classes, and when one is operating an
institution which engages in significant research and conducts small
classes at the upper-division level and graduate classes which are
very small, one ends up with a high cost of education per unit, or
per student.

Morris: Yes. It would have meant a major shift in the college experience
as we think of it.

Rodda: Oh, yes. Of course, I always argued as follows: send your child to
the community college if the child is not socially mature, if you
can't afford the university, or if your child is having learning
problems, instruction problems. I reasoned that at the university
level the young students would experience too much influence from
their peer group; it would be more costly to the parents; and there
will be teaching in a larger class situation at the university
level — less personal attention.

Morris: There was flurry in the press in 1962 that Brown was urging Simpson
to retire as superintendent of public instruction so he could
appoint Hugo Fisher, who could then run as an incumbent. How real
a possibility was that?

Rodda: I recall hearing something about that, but I do not recall any
details. Senator Fisher was very close to Brown.

[tape turned off as committee staff member Jack Watson opened
office door to remind Senator Rodda that he was overdue for a
lunch date]

VII PROBLEMS IN LOCAL CONTROL AND SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
[Interview 3: March 19, 1980 ]##

The Local Government Committee and the Local Agency Formation
Commissions

Morris: I must say that I think your speeches give really a marvelous

picture of some of the things that you worked on over the years.

Rodda: Incidentally, you did have the speech that I gave at Carmichael on
annexation and consolidation?*

Morris: Yes, I do have that and I think that gives the chronology of it very
well.

Rodda: You know something? I forgot that I had made that speech.

Morris: That you'd done that speech?

Rodda: Yes, I forgot. I vaguely remember it now.

Morris: I found it in your files. It made me want to ask, from the Local

Government Committee's point of view in the senate, what brought the
senate's attention to the fact that there was a need to do something
about metropolitan problems?

Rodda: When I first was elected, I was appointed on that committee and

served on it for a long period of time. I've forgotten who chaired it
when I first served on it. Later on it was chaired by Steve Teale,
then Joe Rattigan, and then Milton Marks.

*Speech to Carmichael [California] Chamber of Commerce, October 24,
1963. Copy in supportive documents in The Bancroft Library.

91a

jcrboe Named

•

••:..; *

Mayor Loses Aopointment Fight

'^:,-:rA • •-'•-&?..•• ** - -'I ' •>•:.:':-- • Vvo*^r:-.25Ivwi«?.sv .'•.."

-:T»,, Tt\M rmuTnv v ney';Michael S. Jarboe;" by a 3-1 motion for the appointment, seer

vote-''1:,;-- . '..-•'"' [onded by Malaki,.' passed W. ". ' /

r T ' „ . _..'„__ tiJ M IM**M» »/i fVin T'-i^i r*.~Lrv<rv»;i?.M/-\r» • luill ' moot

~ By-TOM HORTON

Staf^'Writerj TherUnion ~'
Sacramento ; County's L'o c a-1

* will ' meet

" Jarboe submitted a letter to the i The

-,..-,. Commission, expressing interest; again at 2 p.m. Thursday to draw

Agency- Formation Commission jnu^gj.^ and stating he would! for-' individual -terms, rand take
got off" to '. a stormy start Tues-liike -\0 be appointed. ; carer of other organizational mat-

day -with Sacramento Mayorf .Kipp, Barbaria and Malaki all ters. ,.-<,. :-,.",..•:.... . ;
James ~Br -McKinney -fighting, a [thought Jarboe would be a fine! The .Commission will approve
lone and losing battle against im-| appointment. Kipp swiftly moved jor disapprove all .proposals for
mediate-appointment of the Com-.the appointment be approved. city annexations, 'incorporation of
mission's" fiftfi'member."' " [•- "I- don't" believe that in this |new cities; formation^ special
The-' Commission- which-' will jwhole county .there's only one per- !districts--and annexations to dis-
have'^de '- power ''in^ approving ison- interested in being the- fifth tricts.,-;a. .... -.r,,fn{,:-,,. -, .fs
proposed annexations or forma-imember of a public agency of ^ legislature passed the law

this importance," McKinney said, last" spring with "the purpose of
QUALIFICATIONS"^ - prov'idirig orderly growth in areas
; The • Sacramento mayor -also Lf rapjdiy expanding population.

niiacfmna/4 - _TarHnp*« '-' fmal!fif*a- ». '-?•_. . _»__ _^ *-» . T^J ir»

tion" -of-, special-'districts; was (this importance,'' McKinney said,
meeting for the first time to ap-|;,_ . QUALIFICATIONS _-^:_

point-a fifth? member from
public?

the

, *' ........ ...~j~. ot japmiy expanding population.

.IDUO r.^ • - . •,• ;^.v: --- -.-.-, •---. questioned - Jarboe's'r.qualifica-|It -is part of Gov. -Edmund G.

In accordance with state legis- tio"3- "What has he ever done'Brown's 1963 legislative program
laticm 'overning the new b(xiy, a 'ia working; with the city or coun- An ,,rhan.affai« ... ... .

selection committee of. the- coun-lty?" McKinney asKed: .•-
ty's mayors recently elected!" McKinney -said' he -felt -ftere
Mayor. "McKinney and Folsom'were other persons -in the county

* v*rl««« -ii-.-v m i ol i fi Q.H tA. no /*r\ncin_

IT. •' iYlUIVUlllc v- auvi i-v«o«iii, -. • ... -j

Mayoc John Kipp- Jr. The County i^ho are qualified' -to-, be consid-
- of:./ Supervisors electedered: M

on urban affairs, .-..

.. North Sacramento Mayor Olga e

Roth is an alternate member of' '

the

Board':- or/; oupcivuuia • vic\.i*«*i — -

supervisors Fred '.Barbaria and! K was mentioned that .he legis-

Mike^MalakL; :*,,••-,- • . ' 1 « i^tive program calls

KIPP MOVES- "• •• • v |i9 deadline on 'formation of the

The^four.Tuesday. elected ^ the, Commission. But county counsel

fifth^memter, Sacramento attor- John B. Hemrich said there would

: ----- '-*-*>'—*'• -!be no.. problem, in delaying ..the

! fifths appointment beyond that;

h is an alternate member ofja
Commission.'."1 ".' •;

;,— rrf^LlH'j

Sacramento Union,
November 13, 1963

McKinney said the Commission!
would be,? "derelict in its_duty inj
not taicmg more, time to inspect!
all-. .the possibilities and. select!
the most1- qualified person."

The mayor also noted that Jar-
boe£of--theMaw rinrl"of-. Jones,
Lamb;.- Jarboe and :-Boli at 1118
10th St.; rents office" space .from
a building owned by Barbaria.;
S- MEET; THURSDAY

Kipp and Barbaria said there
was./ no -I ; reason- '-'-why •- Jarboe
shouldn't ; be,i. appofnterf'' rather
than delaying the^ matter.' Mc
Kinney -s' motion 'to' fable the is
sue was defeated'3-!,:and Kipp's

Morris: Was the concern of the committee primarily urban problems, urban
growth?

Rodda: Well, it's hard to remember. It's been such a long time ago. But
one of the big problems with which we were concerned was the impact
of urban growth on the state and on the natural environment. Also
of concern was the fact that there was a great increase in the
number of local government agencies, and that there were problems
which related to annexation and to the creation of and a incorporation
of new cities. Related to that was a problem in the area of school
district organization. The state had a large number of small school
districts and it seemed as if there were too many. So it was
desirable, it seemed, to encourage school district unification and to
reduce the large number of small elementary and high school districts.

Those were two areas of concern, one in the area of local
government, which related to special districts, cities, and counties,
and the other which related to the school districts. I was somewhat
involved in both.

Morris: I can believe that.

Rodda: Because I was on the Education Committee and also on the Local
Government Committee.

Morris :

Rodda:

Morris:

In the speech that you made to the Carmichael Chamber of Commerce, you
discussed two bills in 1961 and then legislation in 1963, which was
finally passed. But on both of those, you indicated that there was
a lack of interest in senators in sponsoring the bill.

Yes. Well, in those days, it was difficult in the senate to engage
in legislative action which was interpreted as adverse to the
interests of local government, because that was prior to reapportion-
ment and the senate represented significantly the more rural areas,
the nonurban areas, and the north. Generally, there was recognition
of the fact, not only on the part of the environmentalists, but
also on the part of those in local government that there was a
problem, because that was at the time, the early '60s, when the
state was beginning to grow rapidly in population and there was a
significant expansion into the nonurban areas. That expansion
constituted a threat to the state's arable land and to its scenic
beauty, and caused overlapping in units of government and problems
of that nature.

So there was a concern in the senate, but the greater concern
was on the assembly side, as I recall. That's where the —

Frank Lanterman, I gather, was a very vigorously against any such
legislation.

Rodda :

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Right. And Clark Bradley, who was then in the assembly and sub
sequently, after reapportionment, became a senator. They were
somewhat negative. I do not know how you account for their
opposition, but I think that one of their concerns was a simple
reflection of a conservative Republican perspective. Clark Bradley
was a genuinely conservative Republican and was proud of it; so I
am not saying anything that he would regard as negative. Frank
Lanterman was somewhat conservative, but he was much more flexible
and on some issues quite progressive. As a matter of fact, he
authored the original Master Plan for Special Education because of
his genuine concern for the needs of developmentally disabled
children.

Incidentally, I can remember once when I had a bill under
consideration before the Assembly Local Government Committee, which
Clark Bradley chaired, which related to the Sacramento Port District.
Clark was determined to kill the bill, and I was hoping that
Lanterman would be flexible. But on this issue he wasn't; neither
was Clark. But ultimately, I guess, wisdom prevailed over political
ideology, and the measure was approved.

There was a lot coming out of the colleges and universities, I
gather, pushing the idea of some kind of new structure.

Right. Because it was a serious problem, there was no way that
local government had at that time, or the state, any reasonable
assurance that unification, shall we say, or incorporation or
annexation or creation of new special districts, would be accomplished
in an efficient and constructive manner from the standpoint of local
fiscal considerations, or efficiency in local government. Unanswered,
also, was whether such changes in local government would be done with
proper consideration of environmental considerations.

Those were the concerns of many citizens, and
I was fairly new in the senate and my position on
do with preservation of the environment related to
traditional progressive Republican attitude toward
Since those days of California Progress ivism, the
has given way to that of environmentalism and the
preserving the "ecology." In the early '60s there
who were seriously concerned about "conservation."
example.

In the sense of preserving natural resources?

Preserving the environment, right, the state's natural resources, its
scenic beauty and arable land. Sam Wood later became involved in
"Cry California," and identified with the environmentalist position.
In fact, he was very much in the forefront with respect to this

I shared them,
issues having to

my support of the

"conservation."
term "conservation"
importance of

were individuals
Sam Wood, for

Rodda: issue and still is. He remains adamant, for example, on the need

for the elimination of special districts and has beaten me over the
head a couple of times, verbally, with respect to how we should
respond to [Proposition] 13, for example. And one of the responses
he advocates vigorously is to consolidate special districts. Well,
his interest began in the '60s and has continued.

There were others, of course, who were viewing the problem more
from the standpoint of the importance of providing efficiency in
government .

Those were the basic interests in which we were involved, and
Governor Brown was somewhat sympathetic to our concerns. He made
it a part of his program and tried to achieve enactment of responsible
legislation. The first effort failed and subsequently legislation
was passed which established the local agency formation commissions.

Morris: Was the second bill successful because it dealt with a smaller area
with less sweeping power?

Rodda: Right. Well, it protected the concept of local control, because
the first approach was designed with the objective of creating a
statewide agency which would be a superbody and provide a kind of an
overview over local government from a broader perspective. That
would, of course, be one reason why Clark Bradley would be opposed
to such legislation. He was a strict local-control person and was
really dedicated to that idea and opposed to the creation of state
agencies which would intrude upon local control.

So what we ended up with, and Governor Brown was influential
in achieving its enactment, was the law creating local agency
formation commissions, which now are very responsible. I do not
think they fully cope with the problem, but it's a difficult problem
with which to cope.

Let's see — I guess it was in the early '70s when I became
involved in land-value taxation as a means of discouraging urban
sprawl and using the taxation of land as a means of encouraging
more meaningful development of the state's urbanized areas. I
introduced legislation to accomplish that goal through a constitutional
amendment. I had become aware of the fact that even though the
state had local agency formation commissions, because of the pressure
of the real estate developers, the state was not really accomplishing
in a meaningful way the objective that we had in mind.

Impact of Population Growth on Arable Land and Scenic Beauty

Rodda: The late '60s and early '70s were periods of unusual growth in

population, unusual expansion of urbanized areas, and an unusual
loss of arable farm land. You and I know what that situation was
in certain areas. Just go look at what happened in Santa Clara
County, in the San Jose area, for example; look what happened in
the L.A. area. Because of these conditions, I wanted to find a
means of reinforcing the influence of those interested in land
conservation and in curbing urban sprawl, through the use of the
taxing power.

But strangely enough, I could never gain the support and
cannot even today gain the support of the environmentalists, those
who want to stop urban sprawl. They want to do it through better
planning, through the creation of planning commissions, and through
the creation of the local agency formation commissions. But they
do not want and never have wanted to remove the tax from capital
structure and improvements and shift it to land only. The
expectation was that by virtue of that fact, the state would tax
unused land more heavily and force land owners to develop unused
land and increase in the urban areas the density of population and
make more effective use of the land already available for development,
But they have never been sympathetic to that idea, so they have
relied almost exclusively on the legislation that was enacted in
Governor Brown's administration. And, of course, it has not proven
effective.

Morris: That's interesting.

Rodda: But Prop 13 now is reinforcing what they wanted to do, because there
is not the money available to develop public utilities, to develop
the roads, and provide those services that are needed in —

Morris: In newly annexed or incorporated areas.

Rodda: Right, or new developed areas. So the real estate people are now

having to give more consideration to the development of areas where
the utilities are already in place. That will be one of the
beneficial effects of [Proposition] 13.

Morris: You mentioned Cry California. What other environmental conservation
organizations were concerned in those bills in the '60s?

Rodda: Well, I can't remember. Strangely, I can't. The Sierra Club and

the California Planning and Conservation League were, in my opinion,
beginning to generate more public support at that time and to become
more influential in the legislative process. As a consequence,

Rodda: their impact on government was, I think, more substantive in the
'70s, when they helped bring about the enactment of the Coastal
Commission, for example.

Morris: That was what I was trying to check out, whether their influence
was just beginning to be felt.

Rodda: Right. In 1959, for example, and '60, I became interested in the
Sacramento Delta because of the levee-stripping that was taking
place there. I authored legislation which resulted in the
development of a study of the Delta for the purpose of determining
how we could preserve the scenic beauty of the Delta and enhance
its potential for recreational development. That led ultimately to
an enhancement of the ability of reclamation districts to avoid
total levee-stripping and to the use of riprap, but being done
because of pressure from the federal government through the Army
Corps of Engineers. It also led to an interest in the state
government in trying to develop the recreational areas in the
Delta.

What I'm trying to say is that there was very little support
for my effort from such organizations as the Sierra Club. They
were, I think, and I may be wrong in this, in the initial stages
of their development as effective organizations. They were
beginning to achieve public support for what they were ultimately
going to try to accomplish. So there was less effective lobbying
on the part of environmental interest groups to support the
programs that Governor Brown initiated.

The Political Perils of Constructive Leadership

Rodda: One of the things you have to recognize about Governor Brown (Pat)
is that when he recognized a problem and thought that it was
appropriate for the state to address the problem, he worked meaning
fully with the legislature. He was willing to develop legislation,
sponsor it, and work with us to achieve its enactment and to accept
whatever political criticism resulted. Now, the reason that that
was beneficial to the process was that it created a much better
working relation between the legislative and the executive branches
of government. But it had an adverse political effect on the
governor because he identified himself with a particular position
with respect to a substantive issue which was controversial. So he
incurred political criticism. But he did so because he thought the
issues were important.

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris;

Rodda:

Morris:

If you do that in too many instances, or with reference to too many
problems, you create a lot of political enemies. And sometimes
your enemies, or non-friends, are more likely to fight you than
your friends are likely to support you. So Governor Brown's
popularity tended to erode.

As he went into his second term.

Right. Because the Republicans capitalized on his involvement, and
we saw, I think, a political cycle that led to the election of
Governor [Ronald] Reagan. He was elected on a very conservative
platform and he capitalized on Governor Brown's 'involvement in such
issues. Now the cycle is reoccurring. We are, I think, in this
state, in another phase of a political cycle which we can describe,
or identify, as that of political conservatism.

But I wanted to emphasize that aspect of Governor Brown's
behavior because I think Pat Brown should be given credit for his
actions. That was constructive leadership.

Yes, yes. And you describe an interesting process.

He did it in education too.

Yes.

Efforts to Correct Inequities in School Finance

Rodda: I can recall meeting with Governor Brown in the early '60s when we
gave consideration to the need for enactment of reform in school
finance, prior to the Serrano decision. The state was making money
available to wealthy districts, but even though it was making more
money available to less-wealthy districts (so-called equalization
districts) , there were disparities in terms of the expenditures per
student in ADA and those disparities were great, and Governor Brown
tried to address that issue through school finance reform.

The Education Committee, of which I was a member, met in his
office, Republicans and Democrats. The senate was not reapportioned
at that time. The governor explained the school finance problem
and his concerns and asked if anyone would be willing to author a
bill, in cooperation with him, to address the problem through the
enactment of a countywide school tax. The tax would be levied on
all property in the county but the revenues would be allocated on
the basis of ADA within the different school districts. Do you
know what happened? There was only one person willing to author
the bill.

Morris : Was that you?

Rodda: Yes, the "mouse who was willing to bell the cat." The state senate
had not been reapportioned and many of the senatorial districts
were large geographically and it was a very difficult issue in
those areas, as was the whole issue of school district consolidation,
which Governor Brown tried to address. On the assembly side, the
leadership in the area of school district reorganization and finance
reform was provided by Jesse Unruh.

Morris: For unification of the school districts?

Rodda: For unification, right. Ultimately a provision was enacted into
law under which districts were required to have elections by a
certain time or they would be required to unify. That law was
subsequently repealed, but it did lead to a reduction in the number
of school districts (and I'm speaking from memory) from about
sixteen hundred down to fewer than twelve hundred.

Morris: Right, right.

Rodda: So then you had two efforts to achieve reform in education which

related to the effort to achieve reform in this other area — area of
local government structure and organization and school finance
reform and school district organization.

I presented that bill in 1964, I think it was to reform school
finance. I lost it in the Finance Committee. It was SB 65, as I
recall.

Morris: The equalization of the tax?

Rodda: Yes, the countywide tax. It was killed in the Finance Committee and
those who killed it were the representatives of the railroad
industry, the oil industry, and the industrial manufacturers. George
Miller was strongly against it. He represented Contra Costa County
which would have been seriously affected. I recall that he commented:
"What you're going to do, Al, is increase the property taxes of
people living in Martinez and Pittsburg where the oil refineries
are and the steel industry is, and shift the revenues to Lafayette
and Concord and Walnut Creek where the affluent live and where they
have restricted commercial and industrial development. They wanted
to move out of the cities." Which is what they did. They built
beautiful homes, excluded industry and commercial development, and as
a consequence, their school districts were classified as equalization
or poor districts and they were receiving more money from the state
than were the school districts in Pittsburg and Martinez where the
county's industrial enterprise was located.

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris

Rodda :

Well, Senator Miller killed the bill and, you know, there was
merit in what George was saying. The legislation was a simplistic
approach to a very complicated problem. I had to—

Was the equalization idea, the countywide school tax, an idea that
came from the Department of Finance or from some economic advisors?

A lot of us were very much concerned about the need or the necessity
of the reform of the state school finance law because we realized
there were gross inequities. And yet every time we undertook to
accomplish that objective, the people who were influential and
active as board members, administrators, or teachers in the adversely
affected districts, which were the basic aid districts where the
industrial and commercial property was located and where the tax
base was favorable and the tax rate low and the expenditures per
child high, fought the change and defeated it. They made a mistake.

I used to advise them that they were making a mistake, since
if they did not accept responsible reform, ultimately there would be
reform which would be irresponsible and damaging. They refused to
listen and then came the Serrano-Priest decision. They should have
listened.

I was going to ask you about that,
like this would arise?

Did you foresee that a situation

No, we did not foresee the Serrano decision, but we foresaw a
situation in which the gross disparities would be of such nature
that ultimately reform would occur.

Now, of course, when reapportionment took place and became
effective in 1967 and Governor Reagan was elected to office, as
a result of the reactionary trend in '66, the prospects for school
finance reform were enhanced because many of the rural senators,
who were not so much interested in problems of urbanized areas were
forced out of the senate. We had a totally new senate in which
there was the same type of representation as you had in the assembly,
one based on population. That was the step, I think, politically,
which would have favored ultimately the enactment of substantive
school finance reform, absent the Serrano decision.

Now, I may have, of course, misappraised the situation, but
while we were struggling with the issue of school finance reform
which Governor Brown addressed, and the effort failed, we became
involved, as I've indicated, in the effort to reduce the number of
school districts. Jesse Unruh became involved in that problem.
I can't remember the exact time, but I think that it was in '65, or
thereabouts. You know, it's hard for me to remember such detail.
And we did legislate to require school districts to hold
unification elections.

100

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda :

Morris :
Rodda:

Would you have worked directly with Mr. Unruh?

Well, about 1965, a school finance bill was introduced by Senator
Teale and I worked with him, as I recall. Jesse Unruh introduced
a bill; it was AB 485, I believe. I cannot remember. We had a
concerence committee on that legislation and I was a member of the
conference committee. I think the Democratic members were Teale
and Rodda from the senate and Unruh from the assembly. I've forgotten
who the others were.

In the Unruh legislation, we did provide the schools with more
money because they were not receiving enough state money to
compensate for the impact of inflation. The problem was one which
is known as slippage. More of the costs of education were being
funded from the local property tax because that source of revenue
was increasing at a more rapid rate than were the state revenues.
So the state automatically contributed less to the schools as their
local tax base, revenue base, improved. Unless special legislation
increased the school apportionment, that happened.

Right.

We wanted to try to alleviate the slippage problem and that was
accomplished in the legislation, which was the Unruh legislation in
which I participated. The legislation did address to a slight
extent the issue of the inequities in school finance, but it did
not do so in a substantive way.

I was thinking of the comments about Jesse Unruh in relation to

Pat Brown, that Jesse Unruh was so strong in his assembly leadership

that there became some confrontations between the two.

There were, but not infrequently Brown and Unruh worked together.
There was, of course, confrontation between the senate and the
assembly, and the way in which the budget was prepared in those
days is interesting because the rules permitted the introduction of
any amendments in terms of dollars in the budget conference committee.

After it had been through — ?

When it was under consideration by the conference committee and
the conference committee members were trying to resolve house
differences, amendments could be acted upon which had no limits
with respect to the magnitude of the appropriation, or they could
be totally different from those which had originally been considered
and approved in the two house budgets.

Also, at that time, the committees held meetings in which roll
calls were not recorded. The chairmen of the Finance Committee and
the Ways and Means Committee, both, had, therefore, lots of
political power.

101

Rodda: Now, what the senate and the assembly did was to try to determine
the things the other house wanted, and then devise a means to
eliminate them so that they would become items for negotiation in
the conference committee.

Morris: I see.

Rodda: Ultimately that practice of inter-house bargaining became so gross
that it produced two rules changes in the Joint Rules: one, a roll
call on all votes in all committees, which Senator [Peter] Behr
achieved, and also a limit on the budget conference committees to
the effect that they could not increase the budget over the higher
amount approved by either of the two houses of the legislature.

In other words , if there were an appropriation — I mean, if the
senate version was four and the assembly version was three, the
conference committee could not approve an expenditure above four.
The committee could go below three but not above four, and it
could not introduce new items into the budget.

Morris: That's a joint rule change that both houses made?

Rodda: That's a joint rule. I think it was introduced by Senator [Randolph]
Collier, who was then chairman of Finance and subsequently was
succeeded by Tony Beilenson. That was done in about 1973, as I
recall.

Morris: That's later on, yes.
Rodda: Yes.

Contributions of Governor Pat Brown

Morris: Going back to the local agency formation idea, this was the period
when federal money was beginning to go directly to cities and
counties, in addition to the federal funds that come through the
state. I wondered if this was a factor either in the eventual
passage of the law or if the senate had any feeling about that kind
of direction of federal funding.

Rodda: I really cannot say that action was taken before the federal

government developed the War on Poverty, which was in President
[Lyndon B.] Johnson's administration.

Morris: Yes, 1964 was about the date for that.

102

Rodda: Yes, that's right. The fact is, I was in Washington, I believe,
in 1964 or '65, the year that the legislation was enacted, and I
returned to my district and sat down with its local people and
helped organize the local economic —

Morris: Here in Sacramento County?

Rodda: Yes. Council. But I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to make

a comment about that action. What is very clear is that prior to
that time there was much less federal money available to education
and to local governments in the health and welfare areas, or in
some of the local government areas that subsequently were addressed.
Those programs were authorized in the latter part of the '60s and
early '70s.

What Governor Brown did at that time was to try to address the
problem of government organization in the area of local government.
They also tried to address the problem in the area of school finance.
He tried to address the problem of segregation in the schools. He
tried to address the problem of public transportation. In the
latter area he helped bring the enactment of the state law under
which we committed ourselves to the construction of the state highway
system. A very important leadership role in that issue was provided
by Senator Collier, who was then chairman of the Transportation
Committee. Actually everybody looks upon him as the father of the
state highway system. We committed — I do not remember exactly —
some $10 to $20 billion to the completion of the state's freeway
system. That was a major contribution of Governor Brown.

Another area where Governor Brown made a major contribution
to the state was in the water plan, which he initiated in 1959 and
which was placed on the ballot in 1960. I can remember some of the
details with respect to that issue.

I was not close to the highway transportation issue. I was
modestly involved in the creation of the local agency formation
commissions, or trying to provide for better planning of local
government. I was more involved in the effort to reform school
finance and in the effort to achieve school district unification.
As a matter of fact, the San Juan School District in Sacramento
became unified at that time.

Rodda: I might make a couple of comments at this time, if you don't mind,
with respect to two other problems.

Morris: Please do.

Rodda: One was the State Water Plan.

103

Morris: I think we talked about that a little bit when we earlier met.
Rodda: Did I?

Morris: As I say, you'll get the transcript back so that you can add
comments.

Rodda: Because that was one of the major issues, and I was significantly
involved in it because I was one of the key floor votes that made
it possible to pass the Burns-Porter bond act in the senate, and I
do not remember whether I mentioned that fact in my earlier comments.
You had better check the record, because there was an interesting
fact which I may not have brought to your attention. At that time
the legislature could place a bond act on the ballot with a simple
majority vote, and it was only because of that provision in the
constitution that the water bond act was placed on the ballot in
1960.

Subsequently, the constitution was amended, and such action is
no longer possible and that is why today they are approaching the
problem of the peripheral canal through the use of revenue bonds,
rather than state general obligation bonds. The general obligation
bonds would have to be approved by a two-thirds vote and submitted
to the voters for approval by the voters — now two-thirds. But the
legislation (SB 200) provides for the use of revenue bonds, an
authorization which Water Resources has —

Morris: The authority to do, yes.

Rodda: It has been interpreted that the agency does have that authority. So
they can proceed today, if they keep all appropriations out of the
peripheral canal bill and use revenue bonds, to enact a peripheral
canal act by simple majority vote of both houses.

Morris: That's something certainly to keep an eye on.

Rodda: But Governor Pat Brown showed a lot of courage and leadership in
connection with the State Water Plan.

Morris: Right.

Categorical Aid Programs

Rodda: Now, with regard to education. When we realized that certain school
districts were basic aid districts and were receiving and spending
a higher amount per child than equalization, or so-called poor
districts, we realized that we had a problem because the effect of

104

Rodda: the effort to reform the school finance law would have been to take
money from such districts as San Francisco, which was basic aid,
but a district that had a lot of minority children, or you might
say, educationally disadvantaged children. So we tried to explore
how we could achieve school finance reform and at the same time
not adversely affect such districts as San Francisco.

That led to the implementation of categorical aid programs. One
of the first was known as the Educational Opportunity Act and Mr.
Unruh was very much involved in that action. It was legislation
in the development of which I was involved as a consequence of a
conversation that I had with Dr. Ron Cox, who was then the fiscal
expert in the Department of Education. What we sought to do was to
create a special fund to be allocated to districts so that they
could provide special education through categorical-aid programs
to address the needs of those pupils who were handicapped
educationally and, by virtue of excluding the money from the regular
foundation program, to avoid the necessity of, when the state
reformed the school finance law, adversely affecting the so-called
wealthy districts which were rich but which, on the other hand,
had a lot of students with education problems.

One of the first categorical aid programs, the Educational
Opportunity Act, allocated state money which we hoped would
provide funding for educational programs which the districts would
be relatively free to implement.

I authored the first bill to create an educational program to
assist bilingually disadvantaged youth, or non-English-speaking
children. It was a pilot program (1964) to be implemented in
Imperial and San Diego Counties to teach English as a second
language to non-English-speaking students, with a modest state
allocation on a per-student basis. The program was in effect for
about two years and then it was abandoned.

Morris: Was that primarily Spanish-speaking — ?

Rodda: Yes, Spanish-speaking. I chaired a hearing of a subcommittee of the
Education Committee in Calexico, and we discovered that the school
districts were experiencing serious difficulties in teaching non-
English-speaking children who enrolled in the schools but were
residing with relatives or friends. The pupils were not citizens
of this state but they were attending the public schools and they
had no skills in English. The districts were using bilingual
teachers, Spanish-speaking if they could find them, or aides, to
teach English as a second language. The committee decided that the
state needed to help those school districts; so the purpose of the
pilot program was to determine whether or not such assistance, which
would be a categorical aid allocation, would be helpful and enhance
the ability of the schools to respond to the needs of the children.

105

Morris: Does going out and having hearings around the state often provide
you with new insights, so that there are changes in legislation
or new legislation?

Rodda: Right. It's really the only meaningful way the legislature can
gain direct access to or direct information about what is going
on in a particular area, either in the area of local government or
in the area of education.

Morris: Do you hear different things, say, in a place like Calexico than
from people speaking to the same point here in Sacramento?

Rodda: Well, yes. They had such a high incidence of non-English-speaking
youth in their schools that the academic level of achievement was
being adversely affected and they realized that the only way they
could address the needs of these children was to enhance their
ability to communicate in English. What was happening was that the
children were educationally disadvantaged and within three or four
years, when learning became dependent on reading and writing skills,
they would foresee themselves as failures and that would encourage
them to drop out of school and discourage them from continuing their
education.

Well, we had recognized that as a problem in education, so we
thought what we might do was to provide students in grades one, two,
and three special instruction so that their English skills could be
enhanced with the hope that when they went into grades four, five,
and six, when they had to read and when the teachers do not educate
verbally to the extent that they do in the earlier grades, they
would achieve greater academic success.

But Rafferty became superintendent [of public instruction] and
there was a period of economic retrenchment and the program was
abandoned — the pilot program in teaching English as a second
language.

Then Senator [Alan] Short introduced a bill which authorized
bilingual instruction, or instruction in a language other than
English. Instruction only in English was a statutory mandate then.

Morris : Would you say that while Max Rafferty was superintendent of public
instruction, he was not particularly interested in this kind of
alternative education?

Rodda: Well, he was not terribly negative, but I am not sure that the

programs were demonstrating any real progress, and there seemed a
lack of support for the program and it was terminated. It was
unfortunate, I think, because when the Short legislation was passed,
the Spanish-speaking community was more interested in having their

106

Rodda: children learn English. We called them the Mexican Americans then
and they then became known as the Chicanes and now they refer to
themselves more as the Latinos or the Hispanic because they perceive,
I think, the use by Anglos of a particular designation as a reflection
of Anglo prejudice. So they changed from one designation to another.
Today the term "Hispanic" is used and it covers, of course, Puerto
Ricans, Mexican and all Spanish-speaking.

But, the critical fact was that, in those days, the Mexican-
American people were much more interested in having their children
learn English. Teaching English as a second language was popular
among the Mexican Americans. Once the program terminated and the
bilingual law authored by Senator Short was passed, there was a
shift to bilingual education.

Morris: Teaching in Spanish as well as in English, right.

Rodda: Yes, bilingual instruction. Teaching English as a second language

almost became, well, an educational approach to the problem of these
children which was interpreted as reflecting a prejudice or being
negative. It was demanded that the schools recognize their culture
and help them to learn in their own native language and to preserve
their native language skills while they were acquiring English skills .

So then the legislature enacted the Mos cone-Chacon Bilingual
Education Act, which subsequently was amended by the Chacon Act,
which is now the law which is under serious evaluation and criticism.

Morris: It's a very touchy problem these days as an educational policy.

Rodda: Right. I think if we had really undertaken a good program in

teaching English as a second language statewide and demonstrated its
effectiveness, we might have contributed to the educational well-
being of these children.

107

VIII CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND RELIGION

Passage of the Rumford Act

Morris: I don't want to leave this discussion of Pat Brown's administration
without talking about the Rumford Act.

Rodda: Oh, yes.

Morris: We've kind of come around to it sideways here. The question might be:
at what point do you recall the senate becoming concerned about the
need for legislation to protect minority rights?

Rodda: Well, all of us who were of a liberal persuasion and who were the
younger members of the legislature — and a large number of us were
elected in '58, which was the year Pat Brown became governor —
reflected a philosophy which prevailed at the time. All of us wanted
to do something constructive in the area of racial discrimination in
employment, in housing, and in education.

Of course, Rumford, being black, was very much interested. He
authored the Rumford Act, which was approved in the assembly and
was under consideration in the senate the last night of the session.
We had to terminate our meeting at midnight and when we left the
senate to go to dinner that evening, there was an understanding the
members would return and complete the file.

The Rumford legislation had been approved by the Senate Govern
ment Efficiency Committee, which was then the killer committee to
which power structure in the senate — the Rules Committee, which was
governed largely by Burns — assigned bills that they would like to
see either significantly amended or killed. It was chaired then by
Luther Gibson. A member of the conmittee was Ed Regan, who is now
an appellate court judge. The committee had amended the Rumford bill
and send it to the floor and it was on the file. It was way down on
the file and the senate had a rule that on the last night of the

108

Rodda: session, bills were to be considered in accordance with the order
they appeared in the senate file. We had a printed file, but we
were receiving bills from the assembly and we were sending bills to
them. So we had a mimeographed file on our desks and later in the
night we had a file written on a blackboard. Everything was in a
state of confusion, which was normal for the last night of a
session.

Well, it was pretty clear to those who were against the Rumford
legislation that they had several procedures to follow in order to
kill it. One was to prevent us from ever getting to it on the file.

Morris: Running out the clock until midnight.

Rodda: Running out the clock. So that was what Senator Clark Bradley under
stood to do. Suddenly we discovered that every time a simple bill
was under consideration, it was debated for four or five minutes.
Progress was delayed and time consumed. I had a bill that was very
important to me which was low on the file. It was the Cal Expo bill,
[ironic laughter] Maybe I should have wished it had failed. But
anyway, Joe Rattigan came over to me while he was going around the
senate talking to colleagues and said to me, "Say, Al, would you vote
for the Rumford Act? Would you vote to set it as a special order?"

Morris: That means take it out of order?

Rodda: Out of order. I said, "Well, I don't want to do it if it's just

you and I who vote for such a motion. If you've got a pretty good
number of supporters, I'll go with you." So he came back and said,
"I think we'll try it." So Ed Regan stood up and moved that the
bill be set as a special order — I think, at 10:00 or 10:30 — and it
was debated.

President Burns came over to Regan and stood in front of him and
shook his hand at him like this [gestures] and said, "You so-and-so!
You know that we're not supposed to do this! It's a violation of all
tradition," etc., etc., etc. Regan laughed and shrugged his shoulders.

The debate took place. The motion was passed, the bill was set
as a special order, considered, and acted upon. It was approved.
The votes were there, but they never would have gotten to that bill
if it had not set it as a special order.

Morris: If somebody hadn't moved to take it out of order?

Rodda: Yes. Then during the next session, Regan was appointed to the
appellate court.

Morris: Aha!

109

Rodda: Draw your own conclusion. [chuckles]
Morris: Yes. [laughter]

Rodda: Regan was a conservative Democrat, but he was really a pretty

moderate man, Ed Regan. I liked him, worked with him. Well, anyway,
it was an interesting experience.

Morris: I came across a mention that the hearings on the Rumford Act were
the first time that the legislature had had demonstrations, that
there were people in the committee rooms, I guess, and in the
corridors of the capitol.

Rodda: Well, see, I was not too much involved in that procedure because it
involved the Government Efficiency Committee and I was not a member
of it. I'm not sure that Rattigan knew Regan was going to do it;
I don't think he did. I think —

Morris: But it sounds like there were a couple of people who were looking
for a way to get this out for a vote.

Rodda: Yes. I think Regan just got up and made the motion and then Rattigan
and a few of us, the liberal elements, supported it — Fred Farr,
Cobey and people of that nature — but Regan did it.

Morris: Was Ed Regan likely to do this kind of thing?

Rodda: Well, it wasn't a piece of legislation that you'd think he would

become involved in, because it wasn't really his cup of tea. But,
as I said, he was a moderate, a moderately conservative Democrat,
and I think he thought that it was an opportunity for us to achieve
some progress .

Legislation to Relieve De Facto School Segregation

Rodda: Incidentally, I was concerned about segregation in the schools at

the time, so I authored a bill the same year which was an attempt on
my part to reduce de facto segregation, not de jure segregation,
in the schools. The bill was developed by me with the assistance
of Marian Joseph, who is now in the Department of Education under
[Wilson] Riles, and Dr. Riles, who was then employed in the
[Department of ] Education and had an administrative position, I
believe, which related to the implementation of legislation that was
passed in 1957 to reduce discrimination in the hiring of teachers.
There was a special, very small commission which was created as a
result of the involvement of the AFT, as I recall, to address that
issue.

110

Morris :
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda :

Morris ;

Rodda:

That's an interesting connection.

Yes. I think if you trace it — now, that was prior to my time.

Not much.

No. That was in '57. I came in in '59.

Well, my legislation was approved by the Government Efficiency
Committee and, incidentally, Regan helped me develop amendments to
the bill in the Government Efficiency Committee, which made it
possible to enact it. The Government Efficiency Committee
traditionally met the night before the official meeting for a
dinner provided by the third house. The committee members had a
complete file with an explanation of the bills under consideration
and the committee consultant was present. They reviewed all the
bills and, in effect, decided what the committee would do, prior to
the regular meeting. To a certain extent the public meeting was a
private affair — non-public, as it were.

It was sort of a foregone conclusion.

Yes, the regular meeting became something of a charade. Well, I
thought that my bill would perish. It was not a popular bill. It
was not a very strong bill. But Ed Regan, when I presented it
before the committee, helped me to introduce amendments which made it
acceptable to the committee and it was approved and sent to the floor.

Now, what did it do?
This was on school segregation?

Yes, it was the de facto segregation bill. It provided that districts
experiencing problems of de facto segregation could go to the
Department of Education and confer with a special agency which was
created from the commission on teacher employment discrimination, as
I recall — you know, I'm trying to remember things that happened
years ago.

I would like to hear this because it's about time to go interview
Wilson Riles. [laughter]

Yes. So the
authorized to
Department of
might attack
understood to
redrawing of
building new

commission's role was expanded and the districts were
approach it for information and counsel and the
Education would advise them with respect to how they

their segregation problem. The options that were
be available were voluntary, not mandatory, busing,

the lines of school attendance, relocating schools,

schools in a proper location, and even closing schools.

Ill

Rodda: Incidentally, one of the junior high schools in Sacramento burned
down at that time. It was a school located near Fourteenth Avenue.
It was a significantly segregated school and I have a letter that
I wrote to the local board of education urging that the school not
be rebuilt. I do not oftentimes intervene, but I suggested, "It
would be inappropriate to build this school. The district does
not need it and it can send the children to other schools." I
think they had four or five junior high schools, intermediate
schools — I argued that it would not inconvenience anybody and the
district would not have to do a lot of busing. And they did it.
So they significantly reduced segregation. It was done under the
direction of Superintendent of Schools Mel Lawson, who was really
under an awful lot of pressure at that time with respect to this
issue. So the school district addressed significantly the problem
of segregation in our junior high schools in the Sacramento area.

Of course, I was moderate in my position because I recognized
that the schools were not engaging in de jure segregation, as was
the case in the South, but in de facto segregation. Such segregation
was not specifically a school district problem, but it was their
problem if they did not address it rationally and reasonably and
constructively. De facto segregation was a result of the way in
which our urban areas were developing.

Morris: Yes. It has some interesting comments on what the local climate

was like.

Rodda: Right. Well, anyway, the bill became law. I can remember presenting
it before the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. Nobody was paying
any real attention to it, and I said, "Here's a problem in education.
Unless we address it constructively, and this is just a band-aid
approach, the schools are going to hear a lot more about this issue
in the future."

Morris: You could see it coming?

Rodda: Oh, sure. They laughed. It didn't begin to compare with the Rumford
Act in terms of its importance, but it was a very substantive bill
in terms of its attempt to address a problem which, obviously,
anyone who was knowledgeable or thoughtful, could perceive to be one
that was going to become very acute in the future.

Morris: When you were working on passing the Rumford Act, did you have any
suspicion that there would be an initiative to repeal it, that the
feeling in the communities was that strong?

112

Rodda :

Morris :
Rodda :
Morris:
Rodda :

The fact is, I wrote a paper on that issue in the election
It was Proposition] 14, I think.

Morris ;

Rodda:

Morris ;

Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda :
Morris :
Rodda :

Oh, yes.
of '64.*

Yes.

I don't know whether you have that paper. Do you?

Yes.

I wrote the paper in support of the Rumford Act and, to my amazement,
the people who were opposing the repeal of Prop 14 reproduced it and
distributed three or four thousand in this community. It was not
politically smart for me to allow that course of action. Fortunately,
my opponent then was not as serious an opponent as my opponent in
1960. He was a good opponent, an educator and administrator in the
San Juan School District. I was not particularly popular because
of the problem of unification in that area. I became less popular
because of my position on the desegregation issue. He took, I think,
a neutral position; he, my opponent.

Your opponent, yes.

But, as I said, I opposed it and it was defeated, as I recall.

In Sacramento County?

Yes.

Good for you.

I am not sure. That is just a vague recollection I have. I know
the water bond act was defeated in Sacramento in 1960 and I
supported that; so I established a reputation for voting against
my constituency. I do not know how I survived.

To what do you attribute your survival?

I kept a low profile. [laughter] A smart politician does that.

[laughter] Does he?

Yes, in my opinion.

*"Remarks on the Rumford Act and the Housing Initiative," Albert
S. Rodda, 1964. Copy in supporting documents in The Bancroft
Library.

113

Morris: He keeps a low profile. [chuckles]

Rodda: If he wants to survive. But if he is ambitious, or if he thinks an
issue is important, he has to speak out. When I think an issue is
important I speak out and make my position known. Those were two
important issues. I could not ignore them; so I didn't have a low
profile on those two issues. [tape off briefly, staff interruption]

I'll shut up. You've got plenty.

Morris: Oh, no. You're covering the questions I wanted to ask as you describe
these things.

Political Issues with Religious Implications

Morris: What I was wondering about on the Rumford Act and the other civil
rights legislation is how strong a sense of religious commitment
there was in some of the legislators.

Rodda: [pauses to think] Well, the one issue that was important was the
capital punishment issue, about which people had strong opinions.
With regard to that, I think it was more of a civil liberty issue
and it [legislation to abolish capital punishment] was one
supported by the Friends Committee on Legislation, which reflects
the thinking of the Quakers, for example, genuine Democratic liberals,
and also the Republican progressives were inclined to support such
legislation.

But as an issue, I do not think the Rumford Act had the kind
of religious implications in terms of people's votes or convictions
as did, say, the issue of capital punishment or abortion. The
abortion issue surfaced significantly in '67, the first year of
Reagan's administration, with the legislature's approval of Tony
Beilenson's — senator, now Congressman, Beilenson's — Therapeutic
Abortion Act, for which I voted.

But the one issue that was important and which hurt Governor
[Pat] Brown politically was capital punishment. When I was elected,
not being an attorney, I was not too knowledgeable about the capital
punishment issue. I can remember one of my friends, who was a
political science teacher — I had gone to junior college and to
Stanford with him, and we taught together at Sacramento High School
and Sacramento City College — was against capital punishment and
wanted to know my position in '58, my first year as a candidate. I
did not have a position.

114

Rodda: After I was elected, we had extensive hearings "in the senate on

the issue because of a bill authored, I think, by Senator Fred Farr.
I read carefully the material and heard some of the testimony,
although I wasn't a member of the committee, and decided to vote
against capital punishment, for the Farr legislation. It never got
out of the committee. It was assigned to the Judiciary Committee.
The senate was not reapportioned yet. It didn't have a chance. But
Governor Brown did take a position in opposition to —

Morris: That was the time of the [Caryl] Chessman case.

Rodda: Then the Chessman case developed — because the legislation was

considered in '59, you see. It had strong advocates (that is, the
abolition of capital punishment) among the liberals, but it had
little prospect for enactment. Then, of course, the Chessman case
brought the issue into the political arena in a rather dramatic way.
It affected the career, I am sure, of Governor Pat Brown.

Morris: That seems to be the general opinion. You agree with that?

Rodda: Yes. I have forgotten the date and cannot remember all of the
circumstances .

Morris: It was '61 when Chessman was finally executed.
Rodda: Right.

Morris: And Brown made several efforts, either to get the state supreme

court to make a ruling or to get the legislature to take action that
would —

Rodda: And our effort failed. I can remember that young [Jerry] Brown

called upon his father, as I understand it, and urged him to pardon
him [Chessman]. But Governor Brown did not, and so it adversely
affected him politically.

Personal Religious Background and Renewed Involvement##

Morris: I've come across several references to your own strong religious
convictions and I wondered how these affected your work in the
senate.

Rodda: Well, I am a person who has had rather a strong family background
in which there was a significant involvement in religion. My
grandfather, Reverend Richard Rodda, was a local Methodist minister
and was also assigned churches in other parts of California — Ukiah,
Chico, Santa Clara, Oakdale, and other areas.

115

Rodda: My mother died of the flu In 1919 and my father and brother and I
lived with my grandfather in the parsonage in back of the Park
Methodist Church for about eighteen months. Subsequently my grand
father left the ministry; he retired. My father and brother and
I lived with him and our grandmother on 28th and P Street.

My father married a woman who was a Christian Scientist. She
was Swedish. My real mother had been active in the church; she was
a member of the choir. Our stepmother was very religious and strong.
So my brother and I were brought up by a remarkable woman who was a
strong disciplinarian, very religious and devoted to the Christian
Science church.

As a young person in high school, I decided that I would not
be too involved in Christianity, or any religion. I became what I
called a secular humanist with an emphasis on stoicism.

Morris: That's a good historical tradition.

Rodda: [laughter] When I attended the university at Stanford, I majored

in history; I also taught history and I used to spend a lot of time,
when I taught western civilization and American history, in teaching
the development of religion. I was a strong supporter of separation
of church and state and of religious freedom.

So when I was elected, I was not active in a church, although
I attended church from time to time. I married a Catholic because
I wanted to marry a woman who had religious values. I did not care
which church it was. My wife was a teacher; we met when we served
as members of the same faculty. She wanted to have children and
was ready to give up teaching, which was fine with me. So we married
and she had three children. She's still an active Catholic. The
children were brought up in the Catholic church, but it was mutually
agreed that they would attend the public schools. We had a verbal
agreement when we were married that that is what we would do, my
wife and I did.

Well, once I participated in a hearing in an interim study on
racial discrimination; as I recall, it was the Joint Committee on
Discrimination in Public and Private Agencies of Government and
Employment, with emphasis on the civil agencies of government. It
was a very controversial time. The chairman, I think, was Jesse
Unruh. We received testimony in the L.A. area about discrimination
on the campuses and discrimination in local government.

Morris: This was racial discrimination?

116

Rodda: Yes. We also received testimony on racial discrimination in

employment in state government. We then received testimony on
discrimination in various communities, including this community,
and it was pointed out that even in the churches there was
discrimination in Sacramento. We only had, it was said, two
desegregated churches, both in the Oak Park area, one in the
Lutheran Church and one in the Oak Park Methodist Church, where my
grandfather had been the minister, although that building had been
torn down; they have a new church. But I knew that the Immaculate
Conception Church, which is a Catholic church, was desegregated;
it was not segregated. The minister in the Oak Park Methodist
Church was a Chinese, Reverend Choy. Now he is the Methodist
bishop in Seattle.

So I went to the Oak Park Church in order to find out what it
was like and I became involved somewhat in the church and began to
attend regularly, and I still do. I go to the Oak Park Methodist
and my wife goes to the Immaculate Conception Church.

During the late and middle '60s, I was having some psychological
problems because of the seriousness of the issues, the in-house
conflicts going on, especially after 1966 and the session in '67,
because of the pressure from the new Democratic senators, mostly
from the assembly, who replaced a number of my former associates
who were eliminated because of reapportionment. They wanted to
reform the governmental structure of the senate, make it more
democratic, more representative, and to oust President Pro Tern
Hugh Burns. I identified with them and it was a fight of major
proportions.

Morris: You identified with the younger reform group.

Rodda: Yes, on that issue. The Republican effort was led by Howard Way,
who was a very religious man, and the Democratic effort was led by
such men as Senator Tony Beilenson and Alfred Alquist, and men of
that kind. Well, I identified with them, but I said, "I do not
want, as a matter of loyalty to the party, to turn the control of
the senate over to the Republicans if they do not control the senate."

When George Miller passed away and Senator Nejedly was elected
to his place, as I recall, the vote shifted to twenty-one
Republicans and nineteen Democrats. The Republicans had control.

Morris: Oh, boy!

Rodda: So I said, "All right. In that context, I think it's only appropriate
for Senator Way, if that's what the Republicans want, to become
president pro tern."

117

Rodda: Well, a very serious internal struggle developed and, as a

consequence, I began to feel nervous and psychologically depressed

Morris :
Rodda:

and my heart began to beat hard and irregularly,
understand.

I can believe it, yes.

I think you can

My wife and I took a train trip to New York. We rented a car and
drove through New England and on up to Quebec and Montreal. We
took a train from Montreal to British Columbia and we flew back to
Sacramento.

At the time, I was reading William Bartlett, The Irrational Man.
I was lying in the train and my wife was sleeping in the bunk
beneath me. I was reading Bartlett's comparison of the thoughts
expressed by Kirkegaard and Sartre, one a religious existentialist,
a Christian, and the other a humanist or non-Christian existentialist,
and it was pointed out that one had to make a choice, one perspective
or the other. I made a choice and decided in favor of Kirkegaard.
I subsequently wrote a paper entitled "Freedom With or Without God."

So I began to think a little bit differently. My values
remained the same since I've always contended — and I wrote a paper
in which I addressed that issue before the Church Service Bureau in
Sacramento and when I wrote a letter to our friend in San Francisco
who writes for the Chronicle, the Irishman. What's his name?

Morris :
Rodda:

Arthur Hoppe?

No, not he. Oh, you know. He's bright and intelligent. Oh, isn't
that funny? I can't think of his name. But he made a comment in
his column about Methodism and John Wesley. It was Charles McCabe.

So I wrote Charles a letter and said, "Gee whiz, you'd better
check your history out. You haven't interpreted the role of
Methodism or the role of John Wesley appropriately." So I addressed
the issue in the paper that I wrote Charles and in the presentation
that I made before the Church Service Bureau, which at that time was
called the Council of Churches. I also wrote the paper which I
delivered to the Oak Park Methodist Church, called "Freedom With or
Without God."

Incidentally, I appointed the first chaplain who was non-
Christian. That action reflected my ecumenical perspective.

Morris: To the senate?

118

Rodda: Yes. A Buddhist. That action created a controversy throughout the
state. I had prepared for such a controversy. As the senator for
Sacramento County, 1 had the privilege, and I still do, of appointing
the senate chaplain. When I was first elected, I represented the
entire county. Because of my conviction about religious freedom, I
rotated the chaplaincy. I appointed the first black, the first
Chinese, the first non-Christian (Buddhist), and the first Greek
Orthodox. I also appointed Catholic, Jewish, Presbyterian, Anglican,
even Seventh Day Adventist, as chaplain.

Morris: All the many fascinating varieties.

Rodda: I thought that if one were a genuine humanist, one's views would
reflect to a significant degree the same values that Christ
enunciated and that the Buddhists, also, subscribe to. I never
could accept the idea of religious discrimination and I reject the
idea of a theocratic state, which is what our "friend" in Iran has
established; not our "friend," our "non-friend." I do not like to
call my opponents, enemies; I call them my non- friends. Nixon spoke
of his "enemies"; I speak of my "non- friends." That term has a
little bit less hostile implication.

But anyway, I became and I still am significantly involved in
reading in the area of existentialism, theology, and the history of
Christianity. Of course, as I say, I taught the history of western
civilization, so I am oriented toward Christianity and the values
of Christ. I had problems with the Trinity, [soft laughter] but I've
somewhat resolved that problem.

Morris: I think many people do.

Rodda: Right. One of the ways in which I've somewhat resolved it, at

least to my own satisfaction, reflects to a significant extent my
interest in the work of Victor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning.
He indicated and contended one had to transcend oneself. In his
perspective there is a difference between personal transcendence
and fulfillment. When one fulfills oneself, it's more of an
expression of one's ego; when one transcends oneself, one is pursuing
values which are transcendent and by means of such action one fulfills
more than oneself.

Morris: Yes, and you're reaching out.

Rodda: Right. So I thought, well, a Christian who is a genuine Christian

achieves transcendence through the implementation in his life of the
values of Christ, which are really those of Holy Spirit. That
conviction, to a certain extent, made me understand more meaningfully
what the Trinity means, and it made it easier for me to become again,
shall we say, a more genuine Christian. I don't know whether I am a
genuine Christian or what a genuine Christian is.

119

Religion and the Secular State

Rodda: Incidentally, the people who alienate me from Christianity more

than anybody else are the dogmatic Christians who think that their
Christian values are the law, since they are the law of God. They
come in my office and tell me how I should vote and argue that I'm
not a Christian unless I'm willing to vote the law of God as they
know it. A lot of their values are those of the Old Testament.

I have to say, "Well, that's not my interpretation of what
Christianity means. My sense of Christian values is a different
one from yours. And I must vote my convictions. If you don't like
it, throw me out." I have had problems, but that's the way I have
resolved them. I've written a paper on this too, one which I
delivered at a conference held in the Fremont Presbyterian Church
in the late '60s. I was asked to participate and to describe and
evaluate the role of the Christian in government. I guess you have
that paper.

Morris: I don't have it, but that's kind of the question that I was asking.

Rodda: Yes. The paper is entitled "Government: Friend or Enemy."* It was
a paper which I wrote prior to the other papers I mentioned. As a
matter of fact, I spoke at the Presbyterian Church last Sunday and
I cautioned them about the possibility that their idealism might lead
them to become Utopians and that that transformation would prevent
them from maintaining some contact with the world of reality. I
suggested they read some of my material.

But the point that I guess that I'm trying to make is that, as
a legislator, I've argued that it's inappropriate in a secular state,
where there's separation of church and state, to utilize the law
as a means of mandating a particular religious moral code upon all
people, whether they're humanist, atheistic, Buddhist, Moslem, or
whatever they are. Unfortunately, that is what many of the
evangelical type — I hate to use that word — Christians want to do,
and that is why I have had problems sometimes with them.

I have argued that we must address those government problems
which are of a secular nature and that we must retain for each
person the opportunity to exercise in his or her personal life the
religious or philosophical values that are meaningful to that
person. So I've had problems sometimes.

*Presented by Senator Rodda March 4, 1966, at a conference sponsored
by the Christian Education Committee of the Presbytery of Sacramento.
Copy in supporting documents in The Bancroft Library.

120

Rodda:

Morris :
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda :

Morris :
Rodda:
Morris:
Rodda :

Morris ;
Rodda:

I believe in religious freedom and separation of church and state.
Incidentally, that was one of the issues that was very significant
when I had to vote on the bill which related to repeal of the
penalties relating to sexual behavior which was not conventional,
but which is engaged in by adults in their privacy and on a
consenting basis. I've forgotten who the author was. I voted yes.
As a matter of fact, I made a speech on the floor, which is recorded.

Did you?

Yes.

Good for you.

Then I have a paper on that issue too. I took my floor remarks,
which were taped, and wrote them down, and that paper is available
too.

The critical vote was cast by the lieutenant governor then,
Merv Dymally. The vote was twen ty- twenty . Incidentally, one of the
yes votes was cast by Senator Howard Way, and I also voted yes. Merv
Dymally cast the deciding vote. It was Willie Brown's bill; AB 489,
I think.

That's interesting. I would not have thought it was that far back.

Well, it was in Reagan's administration.

Right.

But what I'm saying is that my involvement in religion was not too
great until about '67 or '68. Actually my attendance preceded that
time; I began to go to church when the issue of discrimination in
religion was being studied by the senate — and, incidentally, I had
an uncle who died about last year, who was ninety-four, who was
active in —

A long-lived family.

Right. [He was] active in church life, was a member of the church
choir and active in the Orphic Octet, which sang religious music.
He was quite conservative and opposed desegregation of churches.

He opposed desegregation?

Yes. In other words, the opening of the churches to racial
minorities. But I thought such action was good. In fact, I thought
it was great. The Oak Park Methodist Church is desegregated. The

121

Rodda: church had an Oriental minister. They have blacks in attendance and
now they have a black minister. And I appointed the first black,
as I've indicated, who was a Baptist, to be senate chaplain, you
see.

But in order to make the narration meaningful, I had to refer
to it in the Reagan administration. Now I am much more religious
than I was a number of years ago. I'm much more committed to
Christianity. I have a better understanding of what the role of
Christ was, and my life, I believe, is more meaningful. The change
has provided me with a very important psychological and spiritual
reinforcement .

Morris: Yes. And provided a resource for dealing with the kinds of tensions
that must develop in a legislative situation?

Rodda: Right. I have resisted the pressures of personal ambition, although
I'm not against ambition. As long as one does not allow personal
ambition to become so significant that one becomes totally expedient,
I have no objection to it. But if one becomes expedient, or
opportunistic, one can become a political demagogue. And that
tendency does become a characteristic of too many politically
ambitious persons. That fact of political reality concerns me. I
preferred to act responsibly and to accept the consequences and not
to use the office of state senator to advance my political career.

Representative and Participatory Democracy

Rodda: I've argued, therefore, that if I am defeated, that's fine, and I
have to vote the way in which I think is appropriate. I'll listen
to my constituents, but they'll have to understand that on
significant issues involving what I think to be a substantive
philosophical issue, I will have to vote on the basis of my
convictions, my knowledge, and my expertise.

Morris: Isn't that the essence of representative government?

Rodda: Well, I thought it was, until I had a letter written to me from a
conservative lady constituent last year. She took issue with me.
We had a three-letter dialogue and finally I wrote her and
mentioned that "I would have to vote my knowledge, my understanding
of the issues, and my political philosophy — or my conscience. And
if you do not agree with me, then, since I'm your representative,
you should vote against me. Don't think that I'm going to vote with
the majority of my constitutents on all issues. If I were to do that
you would not need me; you would need a robot which could automatically
vote to reflect constituent thinking."

122

Morris: Right.

Rodda: And I used the word "mass man." The word mass man should be used

cautiously. I began to use mass man because of my familiarity with
the writing of Jose Ortega y Gasset in The Revolt of the Masses, in
which he reflected in his thinking a kind of elitism. But there is
a lot of truth in what he has written.

I'm worried about participatory democracy. I had supported the
concept of the initiative and referendum, but I think the initiative,
in particular, is being abused today and that, as a consequence,
participatory democracy — may I borrow another word of Jose Ortega y
Gasset — has almost become "mobocracy." What he was saying — and I
think it's appropriate — is that one will not fulfill oneself unless
one leads a structured life. A structured life means a life which
reflects values. If you're a Christian, it reflects the values of
Christianity, which is what Kirkegaard was saying. Sometimes one
just has to violate what is looked upon as the standard or popular
position. One must do so because that position is not an ethical
position. One makes the existentialist decision, as I frequently
observe.

Well, I'm sorry I'm yakking so much, but anyway —

Morris: Not at all! I'm impressed that you've kept up with your reading on
nongovernmental subjects so well. [chuckles]

Rodda: Well, at night I watch the news and not infrequently, if I cannot
sleep, I'll read before retiring. Not infrequently the area in
which I read is either economics, philosophy, or religion. Because
I have a background in teaching economics and history, I have been
very much interested in historical development — especially religion,
philosophy, psychology, and economics.

Interestingly enough, because of my awareness of the views of
Jose Ortega and because of my concern about the impact of contemporary
psychology on human behavior, and I'm not referring entirely to the
Pavlovian concept of —

Morris : Conditioning?

Rodda: Right, an approach to human behavior which has been developed more
meaningfully, I think, and rationally by [B.F.] Skinner. At any
rate, because I am concerned about human behavior, I am interested in
the impact of Freud— I call him "Fraud" — Freudianism upon contemporary
society.

123

Rodda: My observations have carried me to conclude that what is happening
is that our society is failing in that we are inclined to accept
the idea that the individual is not responsible. We contend that
he is the product of his environment, or he is the product of his
genetic background, or, from the Freudian perspective, his own drives,
and, as a consequence, we have almost reached a point in our lives
which, because of the impact of modern hedonism and commercialism
and the emphasis on the rights of the individual, we have ignored
the fact of life that a person achieves personal fulfillment through
living a structured life, or in trying to achieve personal tran
scendence, and in so doing, contributing positively to society. If
we structure our lives we are governing ourselves and if self-
government means majority rule, it also means self-government in that
individuals govern themselves and observe —

Morris: A sense of restraint and discipline.
Rodda: Right. Personal ethic, right.

So that's why I've become involved in trying to encourage schools
to develop a meaningful program in ethical education, or education
in values. The fact is, I'm chairman of a select committee to
address two issues; one of small school district finance and the
other of values education.

Morris: This is a senate committee?
Rodda: Yes, it was created this year.
Morris: That's absolutely fascinating.

Rodda: But I've been involved in the idea of character education for at
least ten years.

Pressures on a Legislator

Rodda: But in response to your question, I should indicate that as a young

man I regarded myself as a humanist and one who thought he could make
his life meaningful through the personal implementation of, shall we
call it, Greek stoicism. I reached that conclusion when I was a
high school senior. I became ultimately committed to the Christian
religion, however, and much more active in it. And so, I no longer
call myself a humanist existentialist; I call myself a Christian
existentialist.

124

Rodda: That accounts, I think, for my concern about improving values

education in the schools. One of the lessons that I have learned
is not to be hostile toward anyone, especially my colleagues. I
do not believe in punitive action. If they vote against my bills,
that is all right with me. I vote for theirs on the basis of merit.
They are entitled to do the same. I refuse to allow people who do
not have meaningful values and express them in their lives and who
can be ugly, difficult, and sometimes engage in retribution to
interfere with my personal life and to upset me. I cannot afford
to do that. So I try to maintain a degree of philosophical calmness,
as it were, by judging the issues on the basis of their merit, doing
what I think is right, and stoically accepting defeat, if that is
what is to happen to me, either on a bill or in an election. I know
I can survive.

Morris: It sounds like a very constructive way to work in a legislative
session of so much give and take.

Rodda: You're right. Boy, the people do not understand the tensions and
pressures we are under. For example, the pressures that Lincoln
was under were so damaging that they had an adverse effect on him
psychologically. It's just very —

Morris: Yes, we've put a tremendous burden on our elected representatives,
I think.

Rodda: Right, because they all want you to — that's why I wrote "The
Politician's Decalogue." I guess you saw that.

Morris: Yes. I enjoyed that.

Rodda: That document reflects the attitude of the public, I believe. They
want us to be statesmen, but they also want us to respond to what?
Their unique problems.

Morris: Yes, their immediate concerns.

Rodda: A politician has to do that, but, on the other hand, he has to

realize there is a public interest, and that on certain occasions
he has to vote on an issue even though the vote might be against
the majority will of his constituents.

I did that on the Water [Bond Act] in 1959. One of the groups
that supported me when I voted for the Water Bond Act was the League
of Women Voters. They engaged in fine, in my opinion, research on
that issue. Ultimately, despite the fact that it was controversial,
the organization supported the Burns-Porter Water Bond Act. That
reinforced my confidence in my decision. I think, as I said, that
the vote in Sacramento County was 60 percent "no." [laughter]

125

Morris: [laughter] Did that reflect the fact that there is heavy government
employment in Sacramento?

Rodda: Right. But this county has never been sympathetic to the state

water plan, and yet it has been very helpful. This area would have
experienced floods had it not been for the Oroville Dam, you know.
Now my constituents don't want the Peripheral Canal. Well, I don't
want to vote for the Peripheral Canal if the concept fails to protect
the Delta. With the proper safeguards, however, I will support it.

I'm sorry. I'm wandering around.

Morris: Not at all. I think this is a good place to stop for now.
Rodda: All right. I've about run out.

126

IX PERSPECTIVE ON LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, 1966-1974
[Interview 4: January 13, 1981 ]##

The Senate Education Committee, SR 65, and SB 90

Rodda: I still have a stack of letters that I am trying to answer from

people all over the state who have indicated their disappointment
over my defeat. I should acknowledge their thoughtful letters. I
also have an agenda that is unbelievable, reflecting people's
interest in having me speak. Besides that, I will begin teaching a
course at the end of this month. It will be at Gal State University,
Sacramento, in the area of state and local government finance. So
I am developing the course outline now and doing some research —
in areas in which I have a deficiency with respect to some of the
minutiae.

Morris: Is this going to be policy or theory?

Rodda: It's more policy and history, but with some emphasis on theory. It's
an upper division course, and it is taking a lot of my time because
I need to have the course outline ready at the end of the month.
Sorry, I'll be right with you. [tape interruption: telephone rings]

Morris: Where we are now is getting to the planning stage of the next unit
on California state government and as the legislative dean, your
kind of perspective would be helpful in terms of where the
legislative issues were that were most important from '66 to '74,
and then who were the key people.

Rodda:

So that you could use this interview as a framework with respect to
the questions you might address others —

Morris: Right, and the people that would be most significant to make contact
with.

127

Rodda: All right. I chaired the Education Committee during Governor Reagan's
term of office, and I served on the Industrial Relations, Natural
Resources, and Public Utilities Committees, as I recall.

Now, in the education area — let's see, Governor Reagan was
elected in '66 and finished his second term in '74. There was a
critical court decision with respect to school finance reform, which
was not fully addressed. It was not addressed in Governor [Pat]
Brown's administration either. It was the Serrano decision and was
rendered, I believe, in 1971. Reagan's response was SB 90, which
was inadequate and was more of an effort to achieve tax relief-reform
than school finance reform. That is an important area which you
could discuss and interrogate people about.

Morris: Why did it go to the courts? Why was there a Serrano-Priest decision
rather than a legislative bill?

Rodda: In Governor Brown's administration, we tried to achieve school

finance reform. As a matter of fact, I authored such a bill. It
was probably mentioned in the previous interview. As I recall, it
was SB 65, Rodda, which was a school finance reform bill of a modest
character. It would have implemented a county-wide school tax. If
we had done that, some of the gross disparities or inequities in
school finance with respect to the use of local tax revenues would
have been eliminated and I do not think that there would even have
been an effort made to go to the courts. We did not pass it,
largely because of the pressure from the wealthy school districts.
At the time, I told them that they were out of their bloody minds,
but they never listened. Nobody listened to me. We would be in
much better shape if they had. And, of course, the oil industry,
the manufacturing industry, and the transportation industry all
opposed it.

That bill was defeated in the Senate Finance Committee. Sub
sequently, other efforts at school finance, to implement school
finance reform, were enacted. But they did not focus adequately on
the reform issue. They focussed more on the problems of declining
enrollment. As I recall, there was one effort to achieve some
reform and that was to mandate that school districts unify.

Morris: Consolidate?

Rodda: Yes, consolidate. It was Jesse Unruh's proposal and legislation.
District consolidation was significantly done because periodic
consolidation elections were required under the law. I was on the
conference committee on another one of the bills that Jesse Unruh
and George Miller worked out and it provided for what we called
slippage, which was a modest reform. Slippage was the term used to
explain the fact that school districts lost revenue from the state

128

Rodda :

Morris :
Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris
Rodda:

because the assessed values per ADA increased. So in time of
inflation school districts were losing revenue because they were
experiencing an increase in their assessed value. The state thus
reduced its appropriation. It was a significant problem. Local
revenues increased but failed to compensate for increases in cost
because of enrollment increases and related problems.

Anyway, the Unruh-Miller effort to achieve significant reform
failed. My effort failed. And so the people went to the courts.

Who would it have been that went to the courts?
kind of an organized group that —

Was there some

Well, it was a group of people who were active in civil rights
issues. I think it was the Western Center on Law and Poverty.
Serrano was a youth living in the L.A. area. The father was the
litigant, but the legal presentation was made by the public interest
attorneys, who I think have done education a disservice in a number
of ways. I cannot remember the principal lawyer. McDermott was
the one, I think; McDermott was the attorney's name.

For Serrano?

He was the plaintiff lawyer with the Western Center on Law and
Poverty. The decision was rendered and was known as Serrano . I
wrote an analyses of the issue of Serrano in 1972. I'm sure you
have a copy of it in your files. In the same year the senate
developed a bill by [Ralph] Dills which was largely the product of
the CTA [California Teachers Association] working in consultation with
Dr. Ron Cox of the Department of Education and my staff people,
primarily Jerry Hayward, consultant to the Senate Education Committee.
The bill provided for a one cent sales tax increase and utilized
the added revenues to achieve the Serrano decision compliance.
The bulk of the increase in revenue would have been used to address
the issue of Serrano and some money would have been made available
to provide property tax relief through the schools.

When it was sent to the assembly, [Bob] Moretti, who was the
Speaker and was working with Governor Reagan to implement a tax
reform program and through enactment of AB 1000, Moretti amended
AB 1000 into it. AB 1000 had been denied passage in the Senate
Finance Committee.

By then you were senate finance chairman?

No, I was just a member. But I was chairman of the Education
Committee and I was able to implement, through the Finance
Committee's action, about five amendments to AB 1000 which increased
the assistance to the schools. The amendments were introduced by the
author, Moretti, in the committee as author's amendments. Even so

129

Rodda: the conmittee killed the bill because, well, it would have provided
for a one-cent sales tax increase and also an increase in its final
version in the corporate profits tax. The added revenues raised
the business inventory tax relief level to 50 percent. About $1.1
billion would have been generated in revenues through the tax
increases and of that amount about $250 million, maybe $300
million, would have been allocated to schools. The rest would have
been allocated as to provide property tax relief to home owners,
renter relief and to reduce the business inventory tax. But of the
money that went to the schools, only about $125 or $150 million
would have been for program improvement. Therefore, the legislation
was totally inadequate as a means to address the Serrano decision.
The bulk of the school money would have been to provide property tax
relief. The other money, non-school, was to provide tax relief to
property owners.

So when we killed it — and Howard Way, who was a member of the
Finance Committee at the time and who was a Republican, helped kill
it — Speaker Moretti took SB 90 and hijacked it. They sent it back
to the senate after amending AB 1000 in it. It was then sent to a
conference committee. [Nicholas] Petris served on the conference
committee and helped raise the amount of money 'for programs which
were designed to address the needs of affluent school districts,
such as San Francisco where there is a large enrollment of dis-
advantaged youth and minorities. I've forgotten what we call that
program. It had been enacted into law by former Speaker Jesse Unruh,
but it had never been funded above the $10 million level. I think
the level then was about $5 million. I think Nick Petris increased
it to about $80 million.

The Reagan Focus: Budget Cutting

Rodda: Anyway, that was important because one of the aspects of the Reagan
years that you should address in your interviews is the problem that
Governor Reagan had with respect to the state's fiscal situation.
When he entered office, there was a deficit because the state's
General Fund revenues had an elasticity which was less than one.
And we refer to that as inelastic revenue source. For purpose of
clarification, if the GNP (gross national product) increases by
10 percent and state revenues increase by 10 percent, the situation
is one of unity or an elasticity of unity. If the revenue increase
is less — say .9 or .93 — it's called inelastic, but if it's 1.3,
it's elastic. At the time, the elasticity was below unity, or one.

130

Rodda: Of the three sources of income which were most important to the

General Fund, the personal income tax was the most elastic because
of its progressive rates and because we had not been indexed. The
bank and corporate profits tax was modestly elastic. The sales tax,
which was very important, was elastic only in the event that there
was a serious level of inflation and a simultaneous expansion of
the economy. At that time, our revenues had an elasticity of less
than unity, but our expenditures had an elasticity which was either
unity or greater than unity.

Morris: Did the Finance Committee see the deficit problem as seriously as
Reagan did?

Rodda: He campaigned on the importance of budget cutting and placing

constraints on expenditures because everyone realized the state
was confronted with a deficit situation. As a matter of fact, the
Brown administration avoided a violation of the constitution at
the end of his last year — the budget for that year would have been
'67 — by drawing down on reserves in special funds that were available.
They were funds which were not special in that they could be used
for financing General Fund operations. (You had better check that
out. My memory isn't too clear.) So when Reagan entered office,
he knew that revenues were inadequate and he advocated a 10 percent
budget cut. When his people came into the state capitol, it was
pretty evident that they were novices. They were not well informed
about state government. They had engaged in a very excellent, well-
financed campaign against the incumbent governor who lacked party
support because the Democratic party was somewhat fragmented at the
time.

The Issues of Vietnam and Splits Within the Democratic Party

Rodda :

One of the big issues that had hurt Governor Brown was the issue of
Vietnam, and I think we talked about that previously, because
Governor Brown had not been in opposition to involvement by this
country in that conflict. But at the CDC convention a position of
opposition was approved and the CDC convention's position seriously
weakened the unity of the CDC as an effective political organization.
Some clubs withdrew because of the action. Some retained their
identification with the CDC but they were less effective and active.

So one of the problems Governor Brown had was keeping, in my
opinion, the commitment to the Democratic party of the real liberals
those who were against the Vietnam war and perceived Brown as being
too moderate.

131

Morris:

Rodda:

Where did Jesse Unruh stand in this?
that campaign?

Did he take an active part in

Morris :

Rodda:
Morris;

Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:
Morris :
Rodda:

Morris;
Rodda:

In the election? I do not recall. It is my recollection, however,
that he was supportive of the governor. The Republicans had a hit
force and they went all over the state campaigning against Governor
Brown. They would go into a community and focus, through the media,
on the Brown administration and vigorously attack its record in a
very negative way. So the Democrats organized a counter force. I
was a member of that force and I've forgotten the other members. I
think Assemblyman John Williamson was a member. I think that he was
defeated that year because he had a new district and because it was
a bad year for Democrats.

That was the year that there were a lot of shifts in the legislature
because that was the election after reapportionment.

Right, that was an assembly reapportionment year.

Yes, and nine or ten people who had been in the assembly ran for
senate seats and were elected.

Right, that was the year that senators [James] Mills, [Alfred]
Alquist and [Anthony] Beilenson were elected to the senate. A
number of senators, for example, Joe Rattigan, Virgil 0' Sullivan,
Fred Farr, and Jim Cobey did not seek re-election.

Because the senate districts were pretty much redesigned.

Right, but was that in '66?

Yes.

Yes, and some of us had to run again because of the way in which the
court was interpreting apportionment, in 1968. I had to run in '66
and '68. But anyway, if I had run two years ago, I might have won
this time. Fortunately, I didn't run two years ago! [laughs]

Anyway, I was on the Democratic Hit Force and, incidentally, it
was hard to convince many Democratic legislators to serve on the
Democratic counter force, or hit team.

Really? Why so?

They realized that Governor Brown's re-election situation was uncertain
and since it was a reapportionment year, as you and I recall, they
were nervous about their own prospects. As a matter of fact, one or
two of those who were on the task force to counteract the Republican
task force were defeated as I stated. I think [John] Williamson was
one. I was on it. I have forgotten who else was. Senator [George]
Miller was one, I believe. He was re-elected.

132

Rodda :

Morris;

Rodda:

Morris:

Anyway, there was a lack of support for Governor Brown. Interestingly,
I can recall my reactions when I spoke to Democratic liberals who
were faculty members at the California State College in Sacramento.
It was then, I think, a state college. The faculty were terribly
neutral. That's one of the problems I had difficulty with during
that election year — convincing Democrats to vote for Democrats
because the consequence would be worse than what they had if Democrats
lost. I had a hard time, as I recall, convincing Democrats in the
Sacramento area to vote for Hubert Humphrey for president in 1972.
Because of his position on the Vietnam war as vice-president, they
were unhappy, even though it was known that if he became president
he would withdraw American involvement. I went around this whole
valley area making a strong argument for Humphrey. I spoke to many
extreme liberal Democrats .

I also had problems with respect to [John] Tunney when he was
defeated for U.S. Senator in 1976. The Hayden-gnostics , as I call
them, were quite negative. Gnostics believe that they have complete,
sole possession of truth, superior truth even to that possessed by
God. They regard their truths as absolutely inexhaustible. It
was they who would not support Tunney because they regarded him as
too moderate. He had defeated Hayden in the primary. So they get
[Sam] Hayakawa as U.S. Senator. He, of course, is totally contrary to
what they wanted. They also got Nixon in 1972; they got Hayakawa in
1976; and they got Reagan in 1966 because they wouldn't really support
the Democratic party candidates.

So you are saying that the Democratic party structure itself was
not unified and cohesive?

Right, and one of the issues that was significantly responsible for
that was the Vietnam war. But with respect to the people at Cal
State, the issue was the fact that Governor Brown had underfinanced
higher education. At the time, the rate of inflation was modest.
In 1972 it was running at a rate of 4 percent or 4 and a half. It
must have been 3 or 3 and a half percent in the sixties. Governor
Brown supported, because of state budget constraints, a very modest
cost-of-living increase for a couple of years. So the university and
state university and college faculty people were a little bit upset
with Brown. That is why I could not convince them meaningfully to
support him. They were upset over that problem, and they were upset
about his Vietnam war position. Obviously, he was not sufficiently
liberal. But, I also think that they thought Reagan did not have a
chance.

They didn't realize the kind of organization job that the Republican
party had been doing since '58.

133

Reagan Campaign Methods

Rodda: Right, and Governor Reagan used to campaign in a manner similar to
in 1980 and to what the Republicans have done consistently. The
Democrats are beginning to learn belatedly how to do it, unfortunately.
Reagan hired top-flight opinion-poll takers. I've forgotten the firm
that he used. I think there were one or two.

Morris: He used somebody in southern California called Holden and Plog, I
believe.

Rodda: These specialists were able, through their poll taking, to determine
what the sensitive issues were with regard to public opinion. Then
Reagan capitalized on that knowledge. When he was governor, they
continued to take polls, and as governor, he would study the polls
and his conclusions would significantly influence his position on
basic issues. When his people were brought into the governor's
office, as I was saying, after the defeat of Governor Brown, they were
not very knowledgeable. They had conducted a campaign based on
consideration of special issues. It was a single-issue type of
campaign. But the broad issues that they emphasized in the campaign
were the importance of keeping taxes down, the importance of keeping
expenditures down, and then, of course they were —

Morris: They were going to bring business management expertise to Sacramento.

Rodda: Right, and make government more efficient, which was part of the
spirit of the tax revolt.

Morris: Fiscal- responsibility —

Rodda: — Fiscal responsibility, which has been characteristic of American
life since colonial times. Anyway, I'm sorry I've digressed so
much. Governor Reagan came into office after winning such a campaign
and he advocated a 10 percent reduction across the board in the budget
for '67. Fiscal year 1967-1968 would have been his first budget.
He quickly discovered that there were a lot of federal mandates, as
the present administration is finding out, and also state law mandates
some which required automatic increases which were beyond budgetary
control.

Morris: In things like the welfare and education programs and —

Rodda: Yes, and evidently he had not been made aware of those aspects of state
government. As a consequence, Governor Reagan had to abandon his
budget proposal — it was rather a drastic one as I recall — and make
selective budget deductions.

134

Morris: Did his drawing back from that position come about because his own
advisors pointed this out to him or did the legislature convince
him?

Rodda: When he and his people came into office and began to confer with
the bureaucrats so-called —

Morris: The career staff?

Rodda: Yes, the career executive people. He quickly discovered what the
fiscal problems were. As I said, many of his staff were virtual
novices. I really think that they had in mind using the governor's
position, using Reagan's position as governor, as a step for him to
the presidency.

Morris: As early as that?

Rodda: As early as that, right. So what he did in the first or the second
year — I'm not sure whether it was 1967. I think George Deukmejian
offered a tax increase bill. I have to check the specifics, but it
did increase the personal income tax, as I recall, and made it more
progressive. The bank and corporate profits tax was also increased,
along with an increase in the inheritance tax. That was his first
tax increase.

A Note on Revenue and Taxation Committee Concerns

Rodda: Anyway, the legislation provided the revenue necessary, about $1

billion, to carry the administration through with balanced budgets
until 1972. By that time, 1972, however, because of modest effective
inflation on property taxes there was a need for tax relief.
Incidentally, the Deukmejian legislation did provide for a modest
amount of tax relief, the home owner's exemption was placed, I think,
at $750 and the business inventory tax was reduced by 15 percent. But
what you need is to interview someone who is knowledgeable about this
tax legislation, someone who was involved in it, perhaps a member of the
Revenue and Taxation Committee. Walter Stiern, I think, was chairman
then. It might have been Senator Walter Stiern at that time because
he was chairman for several years before Senator [John] Holmdahl
became chairman.* Holmdahl is no longer chairman.

*Stiern was chairman of the Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee
in 1972.

135

Rodda: But in '72 when Speaker Moretti and Governor Reagan hijacked that

SB 90, Dills, which addressed the Serrano decision and made it their
tax relief reform bill, actually AB 1000, which the Senate Finance
Committee killed, there was provision made for a one cent sales tax
increase, an increase in the corporate tax, and an increase in the
personal income tax. The specifics you will have to have checked out.

Morris: But the Rev and Tax Committee would be the place to look for that?

Rodda: Right. On the assembly side, with respect to AB 1000, you would

gain a good perception of that legislation by speaking to Dave Doerr,
who was the consultant to the Rev and Tax Committee with Robert
Moretti, who was the author of the bill and was then assembly speaker.
Assemblyman Bob Monagan was also very familiar with the legislation.
Monagan and Jack Veneman were close to Governor Reagan, and Bob
Monagan was the speaker for a couple of years under the Reagan
administration.

Morris: I don't think we plan to go to Washington.

Rodda: Monagan is here.

Morris: Monagan is here, but isn't Veneman in Washington?

Rodda: No, he was, but he is now the legislative advocate for Sacramento
County. He served in Washington for a number of years under
President Nixon.

Morris: Is that the position that Frank Mesple had?

Rodda: Yes, he succeeded to Frank. But what Reagan did in his administration
was to provide for a significant state tax increase as a consequence
the enactment of two bills, the Deukmejian bill, as I recall, and
the Dills bill SB 90. They provided significant increases in the
home owner's exemption and renter relief, SB 90 building upon the
first bill, the first law. What they also did was to make the state's
tax structure more elastic because greater reliance was placed on
the personal income tax for revenues and it was made more progressive.
That was the Deukmejian legislation. Now, that legislation signifi
cantly contributed to voter support of Prop 13, which, of course,
occurred in Governor Jerry Brown's administration. But if you look
at the rate of expenditure increase during Governor Reagan's term
in office, you will find that it is rather dramatic. It's about 10
and a half or 11 percent per year, I believe.

Morris: That's startling to look at when you compare it to his stated concern
with reducing the state expenditures.

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Rodda: In all fairness, you have to bear in mind that these tax increases
provided revenues to address the deficit which he inherited, and
also to provide [property] tax relief, renter relief, and to reduce
the business inventory tax. So a lot of that tax money would come
into the state but would be allocated to local level which were a
result of increases in the property tax and the property tax on
business inventory. So the 10 to 11 percent figure distorts the
actual impact on government.

Now, another thing, 1965 the state enacted the Medi-Cal program —
Medicaid — but in this state, Medi-Cal. It became effective in
Reagan's administration — the first year, I believe. Its cost
increased at a rate which was not anticipated at the time, as I
recall.

Morris: There was an interesting comment in Sunday's San Francisco Examiner
saying that when the Medi-Cal bill was passed in '65, it was thought
that the federal government would shortly have a similar legislation
so that the state expenditures would only continue for a year or
two. Do you recall that perception?

Rodda: No. Of course, there is a federal government sharing of its costs,
but what happened maybe is the federal government's rate of support
was not as high as anticipated. At that time, the committee involved
was Labor and Social Welfare. I was a member and so I participated
in the hearings. Later on, they created a Health and Welfare
Committee and renamed the Labor Committee the Industrial Relations
Committee, and I was assigned to the Industrial Relations Committee.
It's hard for me to remember the details. The program did cause
an increase in the state's rate of expenditures.

Another thing that was a problem to the counties was the cost
of General Assistance, which was totally borne by local government.
If one were not eligible for AFDC or SSI-SSP [Supplemental Security
Income and State Supplemental Payment] , which were programs initiated
by the federal government in response to the poverty situation, you
could receive General Assistance from the county of residence and
at a level of support established by the county. The assistance
varied throughout the state and was totally a county cost.

In the early seventies, I authored a bill, which was never
given serious consideration, to provide that the state would assume
all the cost of General Assistance and all of the welfare costs
borne by the counties. That was my approach to the issue of
property tax relief — to shift the cost of those programs entirely
to the state. I was, also, in favor of significantly addressing
the Serrano-Priest decision, so I supported SB 90, Dills, in its
original form as developed by the Senate Education Committee which
I chaired. But Governor Reagan made it something else — basically a

137

Rodda: tax relief-reform law. I learned that if the state was to achieve
tax relief-reform, it should assume the welfare costs which really
are not appropriate to impose on the county property tax. Tradi
tionally the school had been financed by the property tax.

Rodda: In the thirties the sales tax was utilized to finance some of the
costs of education. The justification for the increase in sales
tax, which led to an increase in the state's contribution to the
schools, is provided a lucid explanation in a book on California
tax history by Dewey Anderson. Actually, the tax relief Prop 13
people are misrepresenting that tax shift because they contend that
the sales tax was authorized to support the schools and that the
whole sales tax should be used for that purpose. That is not true
at all. The constitution is not that restrictive in its language.

Morris: That is worth going back to because I have read other brief

descriptions of the sales tax which say it wasn't initiated to
provide funding for the public schools.

Rodda: Part of it; not totally. Anyway, increased Medi-Cal and welfare
costs caused the state budget to increase and that was one of the
factors which made it necessary to have a state tax increase.
Governor Reagan had to assume those costs which [Pat] Brown had not
had to assume. The Medi-Cal costs first occurred in his administra
tion, Governor Reagan's. Also, Governor Reagan was pressured to
assume the cost of providing a significant amount of property tax
relief. Governor Pat Brown had not had to do so. So if you take
those two elements and you delete those from the budget, I think
you will find that the budget was fairly moderate in its increase.
But those costs distort the budget increase during Reagan's years.

Morris: Who from Governor Reagan's office would be the person who would come
to appear before the Senate Health and Welfare and the Finance
Committees who worked on these things?

Rodda: Oh, gee, I've forgotten. They varied. Caspar Weinberger was

significantly involved as Director of Finance, and so was Verne
Orr, who followed Caspar Weinberger.

Morris: Weinberger had been in the legislature earlier himself, in the
assembly.

Rodda: Right, a Republican from San Francisco and a moderate or Republican
progressive.

138

Reagan and the Republican Party

Rodda: The interesting thing is that during the Reagan years, the word

"progressive" just gradually disappeared from the Republican party
nomenclature, if I may make that comment. That occurred after the
passage of legislation to eliminate cross-filing in the primary
elections. Governor Reagan controlled significantly, as governor,
the campaign monies that were raised to support Republicans and he
was very negative about allocating Republican primary money to the
so-called progressives. So the word "progressive" disappeared, and
the word "moderate" appeared as an adjective. The progressive
Republicans referred to themselves as moderate Republicans. Now,
today even the word "moderate" has disappeared. So you only have
Republicans and conservative Republicans.

Governor Reagan contributed to that because Reagan was quite an
effective politician. Remember, in his first primary election he
had to run against former San Francisco Mayor [George] Christopher.
Mayor Christopher of San Francisco reflected the so-called moderate
Republican perspective which had been more traditional in California
politics. It was reflected in the thinking of Tom Kuchel. As a
matter of fact, Tom Kuchel was defeated by [Max] Rafferty, who was
on the other side of this political spectrum. Kuchel reflected the
thinking of Earl Warren, who reflected the thinking of Hiram Johnson-
California progressives.

Now, Governor Reagan, after the primary, succeeded very
effectively, I think, in healing the wounds which the 1966 primary
had caused in the Republican party; Brown did not achieve the same
results in the Democratic party. Republicans have a better ability
to do that, maintain party unity. Remember, under Reagan's
administration the Republicans introduced what was referred to as
the "Eleventh Commandment."

Morris: "Thou shalt not speak ill of fellow Republicans." That has been

attributed to Gay lord Parkinson when he was chairman of the party.*

Was there any sense that Mr. Reagan was directly involved in
some of these political plannings for elections, or was it party
officials like Weinberger and Parkinson?

Rodda: I think Governor Reagan worked through the party organization which
gave him their full support. That is my opinion. For example, it
was very difficult for Milton Marks under Governor Reagan. It has
always been difficult, of course, because he is a Republican
representing a 27 percent Republican area.

*Parkinson was chairman of the Republican State Central Committee
in California, 1964-1967.

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Morris: In a Democratic district. [laughs]

Rodda: Right, a 27 percent Republican area. Let's see, who are some of the
other moderates? Oh, Senator Peter Behr also had problems. I
think Peter Behr quit partly because he was smart enough to realize
that because of the character of his constituency and the political
trends, it would be too much of a burden for him to run. So he quit.

Anyway, there were a few moderate Republicans in Reagan's
administration. And if you check it out, I think you will find out
that Assemblyman Robert Monagan and Jack Veneman were not reactionary
rightists. They were more reflective more of the moderate Republican
position and I think that Monagan was involved in the Christopher
campaign in the primary [in 1966], and he was the leader in the
assembly.

There were other Republicans in the assembly who didn't share
Reagan's so-called reactionary philosophy. I think Reagan is really
a political opportunist; I have to conclude that.

Morris: That the money was available from more conservative sources?

Rodda: The money came from those elements and he saw to it that it went
to conservative Republicans who were challenging, or were being
in the primary elections challenged by moderate Republicans. They
had the money; the moderates didn't. So the electorate began to
elect more conservative Republicans, and, as a consequence, the
moderates in the Republican party began to be phased out. The
term was phased out; they were phased out. Kuchel went, defeated
by Max Rafferty. Ultimately, others just lost the ability to survive
or gave up and withdrew from politics.

Morris: Monagan did not stay on in the legislature, but it's interesting
that he was chosen as speaker [in 1969].

Rodda: Right, because he was an influential person in the minority party
under Governor [Pat] Brown and Speaker Jess Unruh, and so he
succeeded to the job of speaker and worked with the Reagan
administration. But Reagan had a hard time in a sense, given the
political situation. He had to learn to be realistic and condition
his conservatism in order to gain the support in the legislature
for legislation his administration was sponsoring.

Morris: In other words, Reagan needed some moderate support.

140

The Beilenson Therapeutic Abortion Act

Rodda: Right, and that came into focus when he supported and signed the
Beilenson Therapeutic Abortion Act. You ought to interview some
of the people who were involved in that issue in 1967.

Morris: Yes, who would there still be around?

Rodda: Well, let me see. I think former Assemblyman Craig Biddle, who was
the assemblyman co-author, is in Sacramento. He is a lobbyist for
school districts, and he is a member in a law firm with John Buckey,
and Robert Walters. Talk to him, former assemblyman, Craig Biddle.

Morris: Good, because just as a sign of where the society was, that whole
question of the therapeutic abortion bill is very important.

Rodda: Governor Ronald Reagan, supported by the moral majority, signed a
therapeutic abortion bill which, insofar as its provisions are
concerned, was fairly conservative and moderate. But when the
legislature had the abortion issue before it in the budget
deliberations, several years ago, '78 and '79, the compromise
achieved was similar to that which was in California law but which
had been held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court decision was that the government
may not deprive a woman of her right to an abortion.

But in Congress the Hyde amendment was placed in the budget
of the United States and that amendment denied welfare money to
women who could not afford an abortion, although they had a right to
it.

So, language under pressure from the Planned Parenthood people
was introduced into the state budget which provided money to finance
abortions in California subject to several restrictions: if the
pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, or if the mother's life was
endangered. Incidentally, that was as far as the Beilenson
legislation went. But we added in the amendment and into the
budget, as I recall, you better check it out, [to allow abortion]
also if the child might have a serious physical or mental disability.

Morris: There was also the mental health aspect, if the women's mental
health was potentially affected. Was that in your amendment?

Rodda: No, we were unable to include such language in the budget amendment.
We had to keep the amendment restricted to those situations in
which the mother's health would be significantly affected, and
as a consequence, her life placed in jeopardy.

141

Rodda: But the pro-life people said that language, that her health would
be significantly endangered, would be so broad that any doctor
could say that an abortion is warranted. They desired, therefore,
that the language be more restricted. A finding would be required
that the mother's life would be in jeopardy. You better check out
the issue as it related to the psychological implications for the
mother. I cannot remember all of the details; I also lack expertise.

Morris: Yes, we will do some digging when we get to that.

Rodda: What you might question former Assemblyman Biddle and others who
were involved in that legislation about is the difference between
that, the legislation, signed by Reagan, and the compromise proposal
that was placed in the state budget in those years. You could talk
to former Senator Jerry Smith. He significantly helped, and he's
an appellate judge in San Francisco and would not be hard to contact.

Morris: That is within our territory.

Rodda: No, but he was on the Budget Conference Committee with me when the
committee developed that compromise amendment, as I recall. It was
the abortion issue during the first year.

Another person who is very knowledgeable about the issue would
be former Senator Arlen Gregorio. It practically led to his with
drawal from the senate.

Morris: Really? How so?

Rodda: He was on the conference committee that year [1977-78], I appointed
him because I was the senate author of the budget. He said, "Gee,
Al, I may not be able to vote for the budget if we fail to finance
abortion for the poor." I said, "Why don't you do this? Help me
in the conference committee gain approval of the budget. Then when
it's on the floor, do what you want or your conscience dictates."
Robert! , in an amendment on the floor struck all financial support
for abortion when I was presenting the bill for senate approval. So
the senate version of the budget had no funding; the assembly version
had a moderate level of funding, and we finally reached a compromise.
Assembly John Vasconcellos and Senator Jerry Smith were significantly
involved in the compromise and I think that Jerry Smith was the one
who worked out the final, ultimate compromise language.

Morris: He was the senator from where at that point?

Rodda: Santa Clara County. As I said, he is now an appellate court judge

serving with former Senator Joe Rattigan. So when you talk about the
Reagan administration, I think it's important to check with people
who had knowledge of the abortion controversy because Governor Reagan
encountered difficulties with respect to the enactment of the law
from some Republicans, moderate Republicans.

142

Morris ;
Rodda:
Morris:
Rodda:

Morris:

Rodda:

Morris:
Rodda:

Morris

Rodda:

But Reagan did finally sign the bill?

Oh, yes.

From your observation, what was the final deciding factor?

I do not know. I was not familiar with Governor Reagan's thought
processes. But, he was committed to the legislation when it was
developed on the senate side. Then there developed a problem on
the assembly side, and he had to work with the Republican leadership
to gain their support for a compromise. I think that the issue was
one within his own party, some of the Republican legislative leaders
desiring the enactment of a compromise bill — the moderates, of
course.

At some point, Reagan was actively involved in trying to get the
bill passed?

Oh, yes. He learned that he had to do that. That was one thing he
learned in his administration. He realized that he could not remain
aloof from the legislative process if he wanted to achieve any kind
of meaningful program. That meant that he learned to compromise,
so he compromised on SB 90, AB 1000, and he compromised on
therapeutic abortion. He also succeeded in achieving enactment of
a very important welfare reform act. It was done in one of the
last years of his administration.

Yes, I think it was '72 or '74 when the climate was finally —

It changed the formula for state support for general assistance,
placing the counties at a specific level of financial support and
providing that that level, which reflected previous levels of
support, would be their obligation and the state would provide a
larger level of contribution. He also increased the state's
contribution to other programs, but, in doing so, the legislation
placed some controls over the programs so that their costs would not
escalate unreasonably.

Would Reagan have some of the legislators into the office to talk
about things like the welfare reform?

Yes, there was a slight difference. When I went into Governor Pat
Brown's office to talk with him, he would bring in to the meeting
members of both parties. He would sit at his desk, which was a
work desk with papers piled on it, and we would sit in vinyl chairs
around the desk and engage in a dialogue. Pat talked to members of
both parties. When Governor Reagan came into office, his wife
[Nancy Reagan] redecorated that part of the governor's office. They
brought in some interesting furniture — a long table and at the end
of the table, crossing in T formation, another table. Reagan sat
at the end.

143

Morris: At the T at the top?

Rodda: Yes, one might describe the furnishings as Victorian or modified
Victorian, or classical. We sat in chairs which were straight up
like that, essentially wooden in structure.

Morris: Dining chairs rather than —

Rodda: Right, so the governor would sit at the end and the legislators
would sit at the table in a very formal manner.

Morris: Just Democrats at one session?

Rodda: My recollection is that there were both Democrats and then

Republicans present. Now that young [Jerry] Brown is in office,
that arrangement is out. He has a sofa and chairs, upholstered
and non-upholstered, located around a round table. Over to the side
he has a big table or desk. There are all kinds of literature piled
on the large table and under the round table — you sit around the
round table very informally and talk — are all kinds of literature
which relates to problems of the environment, energy, tax reform
and similar issues.

Morris: His personal crusades.

Rodda: So you had some kind of an idea of where and what his interests are.
Young Brown is a very bright, knowledgeable person. He does an
awful lot of reading. But anyway, that's another story.

Ronald Reagan as Politician

Rodda: However, let me point this out about Reagan — I think he is a very

political person. Incidentally, I concluded that he would be a very
effective candidate for political office before he entered politics.
I was driving home from a legislative hearing in L.A. in 1964, I
believe. It could have been '65; probably '65.

Morris: After he had announced he was going to run?

Rodda: No, that was before he had announced. He was making a speech — "the
speech" (in quotes) . When he was employed by General Electric, he
made the speech all over the nation, and he was giving it in the
Masonic Temple in Bakersfield, I believe. I picked it up on my car
radio and listened.

144

Rodda: I was somewhat familiar with him because I knew of his background
as former president of the [Screen] Actors Guild. He had been a
super liberal, a responsible liberal, as I recall. I must say that
he was a real liberal but responsible.

I said to my wife, "Boy, this man has a tremendous amount of
political appeal. He is a potential candidate for Republican office,
maybe governor, and he would be tough."

Subsequent to that he announced his candidacy for governor and
he ran against the mayor of San Francisco [George Christopher]. The
Governor Brown people were stupid in their direction of his campaign.
They thought that Reagan would be easier to beat than Mayor
Christopher, so they had Brown campaign against the mayor and they
helped defeat him in the primary. He was in the moderate Republican
tradition. The Brown campaign people thought their Governor Brown
could beat the reactionary Republican, Reagan, more easily than the
moderate Republican Christopher.

Morris: The "non-politician," quote-unquote.

Rodda: I've gotten off the subject, but what I have tried to say is that the
people you should interview are those who were involved in education
and tax relief legislation. Former Speaker Moretti would be one.
He is not always here in Sacramento since he has businesses in
Africa, I believe.

Morris: Does Moretti have an office in Sacramento?

Rodda: I do not know. I think he does. His home is here.

Morris: Our information says he is in Los Angeles.

Rodda: Oh, maybe it's in L.A.

Morris: Or Orange County.

Rodda: Another person that you could talk to about the SB 90 legislation
bill would be Jerry Hayward who is the Chancellor of the Community
Colleges and was my consultant to the Education Committee at that
time, 1972.

Morris: He is now Chancellor of the Community Colleges?

Rodda: Yes, and he is here in Sacramento. He has an office downtown. Jerry
could help you and so could the people who were active in the CTA
at that time.

145

Further Thoughts on SB 90

Rodda: Do you know what happened? I was in opposition of SB 90 after it
was amended in the assembly and I received a telephone call from
Honolulu, I think, or Hong Kong, and it was [Wilson] Riles who
wanted to lobby me to vote for SB 90. This was, as I said, after it
was amended. I believe the administration had entered into an
agreement with Dr. Riles in a related issue and the provisions of
SB 90. Merv Dymally, who was then a senator, had authored Early
Childhood legislation which Riles actively supported. Reagan
agreed to sign the bill if the people in education would support
SB 90. So Riles did. But there was a slippery little understanding
introduced into the bill in the form of a phrase which provided that
if a district implemented Early Childhood Education — now it is called
school improvement — that the district would lose the money it
received to finance the Miller-Unruh reading program.

The Miller-Unruh reading program was designed, after consultation
with experts in education, to enhance the reading ability of students
to read by providing regular teachers the benefit of assitance from
reading specialists. The specialists had to take examinations and
qualify after specialized training to serve in that role — Miller-Unruh
reading specialists. The program was funded in 1969 at a level of
about $22-23 million, and a careful study showed that it was the
most cost-effective categorical aid program. After SB 90 was
passed, and this provision that I mentioned was triggered, the
funding for the Miller-Unruh program declined and it reached a low
level of around $13 million. Subsequently I was able to enact
legislation which modified the law and now there is a revival of
Miller-Unruh. My legislation changing that provision in the law
which caused the offset — Miller-Unruh money for Early Childhood money.

But Riles was a very strong advocate of School Improvement or
Early Childhood Education, and so he supported SB 90 vigorously and
lobbied me on behalf of it even though the bulk of the money, as the
legislation was amended went to tax relief and less than in the
original version of SB 90 to education and Serrano compliance. I
have written a paper on that, too. Somewhere it's in my files. You
may have a copy of it, of that issue. Anyway, you might talk to
somebody — Jerry Hayward — on SB 90; Jerry Hayward, also, on Early
Childhood.

Craig Biddle (because Tony [Beilenson] is in Washington) on the
Therapeutic Abortion Act.

George Deukmejian could talk to you about the tax bill that he
authored in 1967, I believe. He was the senate floor leader in
the early part of Reagan's administration.

146

Rodda: Now, former Senator Clair Burgener, I think, was significantly
involved in the welfare reform bill that we mentioned.

Morris: Yes, there is legislation that he carried.

Rodda: He was a member of the labor [Industrial Relations] and Welfare
Committees, as I recall.* It's hard for me too —

Morris: I can check that.

Rodda: So Burgener possibly could help you with that legislation — the
nature of the reforms achieved with respect to welfare.

Morris: What trade-offs were needed.

Rodda: Right. Remember, a bill I introduced provided in about '69 or '70
for a complete buy out of the health and welfare. It got nowhere;
so the emphasis was on what we've already discussed — property tax
relief to reduce local property taxes and also health and welfare
reform to reduce local and state cost.

General Comments on Reagan as Governor

Rodda: Now, there is one area of law about which you might talk with

various people because it was a controversial area—conservation,
and parks and recreation. I think that, with respect to parks and
recreation, Bill Mott was outstanding. He was Reagan's man in
Parks and Recreation. Some of the environmentalists were not too
happy with him, but, considering Reagan's negativeness toward
government expenditures and his statement, "Once you've seen a redwood
tree, you've seen them all," I though Bill did very well.

We did not expand the park program to the extent that the
environmentalists and the conservationists and the recreationists
would like. But there was modest expansion, as I recall, and there
was significant, meaningful development of the properties we had
under Reagan.

Morris: Did the senate do any approving of the governor's appointments at
all? Is there some kind of a confirmation procedure?

Rodda: We have to approve people that are appointed to boards and commissions,
There is no requirement that the senate approve the people who are —

*In 1971-72 Burgener was on the Senate Industrial Relations Committee.

147

Morris: Not departmental?

Rodda: Staff people who are working in the governor's office. That is
necessary.

Morris: You do approve —

Rodda: No, you don't. The senate approves people who appointed head
agencies of government; they have to have approval.

Morris: Agency heads, for instance, and commissions.

Rodda: Right.

Morris: Is there a special committee that does that? How does that work?

Rodda: I don't recall that Reagan had any real problems in that area. There
were occasionally problems, but normally the senate went along with
his decisions and I usually voted for his appointments because it
was my view that the people who elected him had chosen his philosophy,
and if the appointments reflect the governor's philosophy and you
can't prove that they're crooked, immoral, or incompetent, as a
senator you have an obligation to support them. Right now they are
putting what's-his-name through the ringer.

Morris: Alexander Haig?

Rodda: Yes. Of course, they don't like his philosophy, the moderates and
liberals, but are trying to establish that he was related to the
Watergate and therefore, his moral values are subject to question.
Maybe that is some justification for non- appointment.

Morris: Is it the [Senate] Rules Committee that —

Rodda: The Senate Rules Committee usually has a hearing and the action by
the Rules Committee is then taken, which means that the person's
name is referred to the senate for approval, or the governor is
notified that there is no approval. If action is taken, the name
goes to the senate floor without or with Rules Committee approval.
If it is non-approval, or rejection, normally the governor, in such
a case withdraws the name before a senate vote takes place.
Normally, therefore, only approval is under consideration by the full
senate.

Morris: Before it goes to the floor to action.

Rodda: Now, in the case of Jane Fonda, which was an issue in my campaign. I
voted against non-approval. In doing so I voted against a resolution
on the floor presented by Paul Carpenter which was that her appointment

148

Rodda: not be confirmed. I voted against the resolution because the Rules
Committee had not even given her a hearing. She didn't testify —
that was a breach of the traditional practice. But my opponent,
Senator Doolittle, indicated to the public that I supported her
because I thought she was an appropriate appointee. But he contended
that she was not a genuine American, and she would spend millions
of California dollars as a member of the Arts Commission. That was
not the issue at all. I might have supported her, but I would like
to have had her have a Rules Committee hearing. But no Rules
Committee action was taken. Had the committee voted disapproval the
governor could have withdrawn her name. Paul Carpenter capitalized
on the politics of her appointment. He is a Democrat and before the
Rules Committee acted, he offered a senate resolution to deny the
appointment. I voted "no" because the process had not been implemented.

Now, the chap who was Secretary of Resources, [Norman] Livermore,
under Reagan, was more positive in many ways than I thought he would
be. He served in state government during those years. There were
questions raised with respect to the preservation of redwoods on
the coast in those years and someone who was involved in that issue
might be interviewed. On the senate side, I think that former Senator
Peter Behr would be a good person to interview, as well as Norman
Livermore.

Morris: Yes, we'd like to talk to him. He is doing some teaching now.

Rodda: Right, he is teaching law at the University, the Berkeley campus. So
he's available. He was active, as you and I know, in conservation
areas. Former Senator John Nejedly came to the senate after George
Miller died. I think Senator George Miller died on New Year's day in
1968. Nejedly won that seat in a special election that spring, I

believe.

Morris: Did he by and large follow in George Miller's steps and pick up
his constituency?

Rodda: In many ways he did. I did not support him in the election. He
has been the district attorney from Contra Costa County, and I
regarded him as a conservative, at least as far as his platform is
concerned. But when he was elected, he proved to be what I would
classify as a moderate Republican and really a very responsible
conservationist. He chaired the Natural Resources [and Wildlife]
Committee for a number of years. But I cannot remember whether his
chairmanship started when Reagan was in office, or after Reagan left.
I think it was during part of Reagan's term of office and he certainly
would have been involved in that redwoods [controversy]. He is
intelligent and knowledgeable, as is Peter Behr.

149

The Democratic Leadership in the Senate and Party##

Morris: Do you have just a couple of quick thoughts about the Democratic
party, and where there might have been tussles in how that was
going to operate, and who the important people might be to talk to?

Rodda: That year, 1969, was the time when we unseated [Hugh] Burns as

President pro Tempore. Do you remember? That was done by virtue of
the fact that the so-called Young Turks of which I was a part, and
the newly elected assemblymen to the senate formed a coalition which
successfully unseated Burns. Howard Way, who is in Sacramento,
would be the person [to talk to] because he was involved in that
effort and he was elected President pro Tern. He served for about
eight months and he was defeated.

Morris : Only eight months?

Rodda: Yes. Hugh Burns was defeated by Way and then Senator Jack Schrade
succeeded Way within a year. Schrade was ousted and Senator Jim
Mills was elected President pro Tern. You ought to talk to Jim
Mills and Howard Way about the struggle for control of the senate.
I was always a part of that effort because I had been a quiet senate
rebel for years. I thought that there was a need to reduce the
unusual power that the lobbyists had, given the power structure in
the senate.

Incidently, we did create in Senator Burns 's administration the
senate party caucuses. The chap who was significantly responsible
for that achievement was Senator [Alfred] Song. Burns consistently
opposed the caucuses and there never had been a caucus structure in
the senate until the late sixties. Senator [Mervyn] Dymally was
involved in that effort, too, but he is not available in Sacramento.
Senator Mills could help you with that effort, I'm sure.

Because of the interest on the part of the senators who did
serve in the assembly, we created, even though Burns did not like
it, the Democratic and Republican caucuses.

Morris: Would you say that the creation of the caucus and its development
would have led to Burns 's ouster?

Rodda: No, not necessarily. Senator Burns was ousted by virtue of a

bipartisan coalition. There were about thirteen Republicans and about
eight or seven Democrats — eight of us, I think. When George Miller
was alive, our strength was twenty- twenty. I said to the rebels,
"When the vote is twenty- twenty, I will not support an effort to
unseat Burns, a Democrat." When Miller died and Nejedly won, then

150

Rodda: it became twenty-one Republicans and nineteen Democrats. Then I
said, "Now I think the Republicans, being in the majority, have a
right to control the senate, and I will support Howard Way."

Then the Young Turks, with whom I was associated, had my
support and we always had eight or nine Democratic votes, and
thirteen Republican votes. Senator Clair Burgener, a Republican,
I think, was with Howard Way. Howard Way could tell you who his
Republican allies were.

When Way took over as President pro Tern, he reformed the senate,
reduced the number of committees, and tried to make the senate more
efficient and more democratic or free from third-house control. In
so doing, he forgot to protect some of his friends and he lost power.

[tape interruption]
Morris: How about the Democratic State Central Committee?

Rodda: By that time I was somewhat withdrawn from Democratic party politics
on the state level, I was so much involved in the legislature. But
I must admit that I have never been a great activist. I was active
in the CDC and I used to go to its conventions and I was very active
locally, but never statewide as far as the party organization was
concerned.

Morris: Has anything arisen to take the place of the CDC?

Rodda: It began to experience its demise because of the Vietnam war issue

which caused a lot of clubs to withdraw. Today, many of the Democratic
clubs are no longer active. The people who were active in those
years have gotten out of politics, as it were, and the clubs that
have survived are significantly liberal, very liberal. Many of them
reflect minority positions. In this county, for example, there is
an Asiatic club and a Black club, which I believe, is unfortunate.

Morris: It makes it harder to put together a working coalition.

Rodda: Right, that trend is hurting the party in my opinion, too many single
purpose caucuses, as it were.

Morris: It sounds like Howard Way might be a good person to start with? How
is he in being approachable and reminiscing?

Rodda: Oh, he's very approachable. Oh, he'd love it.

Morris: Is he still with the Adult Authority?

Rodda: Yes, he was approved. Oh, yes.

Morris: Great, don't let me keep you from your lunch.

151

X GOVERNOR RONALD REAGAN AND EDUCATION
[Interview 5: April 23, 1981]//#

An Overview of K-12 Issues

Sharp: The main question I had was what your feelings were about the main
changes made in education, K-12, during Ronald Reagan's period.

Rodda: Well, I think that there were two. Of course, one was the implementa
tion of a number of categorical aid programs. They began as a
consequence of the federal government's effort to provide financial
help to state and local governments. It began with the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, and that led to the implementation of
compensatory education in California. The state had started a pilot
program at a cost of $500,000, I think, authored by Senator Eugene
McAteer. That pilot program had been in effect about a year when
the federal law became effective, as I recall.

I'm having a hard time remembering the specifics, and I have
not been able to go back and review the material which relates to
the questions. But that was the first step, and I remember it.

Then, of course, we undertook to implement bilingual-bicultural
education legislation. I authored the first legislation in that area.
It was a pilot program to teach English as a second language, and
it was terminated during, I think, Dr. [Max] Rafferty's administration
as Superintendent of Public Instruction. Then the state enacted the
George Moscone-Peter Chacon legislation, which was signed, as I
recall, in Governor Reagan's years.

Prior to that, Senator [Alan] Short had authored legislation
which legalized teaching in the public schools in a language other
than English. Prior to the enactment of the Short legislation, that
was illegal. That's why my pilot program was to teach English as
a second language to [educationally] handicapped students, students
with a deficiency in English.

152

Rodda: Categorical aids — we also implemented another program, and I'm sure
it was in Reagan's administration, having to do with the problem of
the neurologically handicapped children and, also, emotionally
disturbed children. The emotionally disturbed children's program
was offered on a voluntary basis. So for children who were
emotionally disturbed school districts could establish special
programs. I think there was a modest level of state funding,
provided on a matching basis. There was not very much of an
incentive for schools to do so, since there was no mandate. But the
state did mandate a program for the neurologically handicapped
children. It was enacted after extensive legislative hearings.

I think the author of that legislation — it might not have been
in Reagan's administration — was Assemblyman [Jerome] Waldie, who
became a congressman and has been appointed to the Agricultural
Labor Relations Board. Neurologically-handicapped children suffered
from a functional disability which made it difficult for them to
learn, even though in many instances they had normal or even superior
intelligence.

So what started in those years was a number of compensatory
education programs. Several were on a pilot program basis when
federal money was introduced. In addition to those I have mentioned
the legislature also enacted a bilingual-bicultural education program.

I think the special education program in reading was enacted
under — it could have been under Reagan, but it could have been at
the close of Brown's administration. It was the Miller-Unruh reading
program.

Sharp: It must have been during senior Governor [Edmund G.] Brown's
adminis tration.

Rodda: Yes, very close to the end, I think. One of the first programs.

Sharp: When Wilson Riles came in, he had his own Early Childhood Education
program.

Rodda: Well, yes, the Early Childhood Education program was initiated as a
result of an agreement entered into when SB 90 was passed. It
applied to students in grades K-3. The Miller-Unruh reading program
was to provide reading specialists for students in the elementary
schools .

Sharp: So they were entirely different programs?

Rodda: Yes. The Miller-Unruh reading program, in my opinion, was the

most educationally effective categorical aid program and it was the
least costly, because what it did was establish a procedure for
training teachers so that they could become qualified reading

153

Rodda: specialists. The state paid districts extra money if they hired

such teachers. The program costs the districts money, but the state
provided a contribution. In 1969, I think, the expenditure level
for that program was $23 million, round figures. So the state had
a Miller-Unruh reading program designed to improve reading abilities.

Then the state enacted a program for the gifted student. Now,
I don't remember, but I think that it might have been enacted in
Reagan's administration, and the author was a senator who is now a
congressman; I think, Clair Burgener. You can check that. A program
for what we referred to as the mentally gifted, it was optional on
the part of the district. It's not called that anymore. [pauses to
think of title] We've changed the title, but it's essentially the
same program.

I'm trying to enumerate the categorical aid programs that were
being brought into existence during those years. On the horizon for
consideration during the late sixties was Early Childhood Education,
and that program was finally authored by Senator [Mervyn] Dymally
in 1972, which was the year the legislature passed SB 90, the tax
relief-reform legislation. SB 90 was a tax relief measure which
partially addressed the Serrano decision. Evidentally, someone in
Dr. Riles 's office had entered into an agreement with Governor Reagan
that he, Dr. Riles, would agree to support SB 90, which he now
regrets, I understand [chuckles] — if Early Childhood Education
legislation was signed into law.

The Early Childhood Education concept I supported because it
was my understanding that it would provide special education to
address the needs of children who were educationally disadvantaged
by virtue of the fact that they grew up in culturally disadvantaged
and economically disadvantaged homes and therefore entered school
as disadvantaged youth. Since they usually could not overcome that
disadvantage, by the time they reached the fifth or the fourth grade,
when their education became very dependent upon their English reading
skills, they tended to do poorly. Ultimately they tended to lose
their motivation and a large percentage of them became early dropouts.

Well, I originally supported Early Childhood Education because
I thought that we were going to focus on the needs of those children.
The concept originally included pre-kindergarten children, but when
the bill was being considered, it was amended and so the program
applied to kindergarten through grade three, as I recall — four grades.
Dymally was the author, Riles was pushing it, and Reagan signed it
because Riles supported SB 90.

Now, SB 90, when it was in its original form as approved by
the senate, authored by Senator [Ralph] Dills, it was designed to
address the Serrano-Priest decision almost exclusively. It was an

154

Rodda: effort to provide primarily school finance for school finance reform
and secondarily for tax relief. It authorized a one-cent sales tax
increase to finance the costs involved. After the senate approved it
and when it was in the assembly the speaker, Moretti, introduced into
it the provisions of AB 1000, Moretti.

The Moretti bill was an effort to achieve tax-relief reform with
a modest increase in school finance funding and a modest element of
school finance reform. That legislation was denied approval in the
Senate Finance Committee. It was a joint effort of Reagan and
Moretti. They introduced the provisions of AB 1000 into the bill,
SB 90, and returned it to the senate for concurrence in the assembly
amendments .

It was sent to a conference committee and finally a slightly
modified bill emerged. The liberal Democrats did not like it, even
though the conference committee had increased significantly the
money for education which was allocated through legislation, special
legislation to allow districts such as San Francisco and Berkeley
which were wealthy districts, basic aid districts which were only
entitled to state money in the amount of $125 per unit of ADA.
Additional money over the foundation level, which the districts could
use for purposes of developing educational programs to meet the unique
needs of their disadvantaged youth, was authorized by the special
legislation. The districts would decide how the increased funds
would be used. I think we called it the Educational Improvement Act,
not the "school improvement" — SIP (School Improvement Program) —
which is the term now used to identify the Early Childhood Education
program.

But anyway, the state money during Reagan's administration never
increased above a level of about $10 million; that is, the "school
improvement" money. That special program, School Improvement, was
developed as a concept significantly as a result of some dialogues
that I had with Dr. Ron Cox, who was then working in the Department
of Education as the fiscal expert, school financing expert. He is
now retired. The concept was regarded as a means to help basic aid
districts address the problems and educational needs of their youth
without providing the rigorous controls which normally are mandated
in a categorical aid program. The program provided categorical aid
in that the money was in addition to the state's foundation program
appropriation to a district, but there were not the controls
normally required. The concept was initiated in law before the
Serrano-Pries t decision was rendered by the courts.

In SB 90, as amended, the dollar amount for that program was
increased significantly, I think to about $90 million, as a result
of the conference committee action. There were some elements of
reform in SB 90, but basically it was a tax relief bill. It did

155

Rodda: address partly the Serrano decision; it did provide, therefore some

school finance reform, and it did enhance the Educational Improvement
program. It did become law. A lot of us in the senate voted "no"
but there were not enough "no" votes to prevent its enactment. We
opposed the bill because we regarded it as implementing inappropriate
priorities, the priority being tax relief first and school finance
reform second.

Dymally's bill on Early Childhood Education was signed into law
by Governor Reagan at the same time. The Dymally bill, as I noted
before, Childhood Education, had a provision which had resulted in
an adverse effect on the ability of school districts to implement
the Miller-Unruh reading specialists program. The districts lost
money for payment of the Miller-Unruh reading teachers if they
implemented "school improvement," or the Early Childhood program.
Districts could not fully afford to finance the reading specialists,
so they began to phase out the Miller-Unruh reading program. The
administration was supportive of that result — the Reagan administration.
So there were three pieces of legislation tied together, as it were.

[There was an] adverse effect upon the Miller-Unruh reading
program as a result of this action. The state expenditure level
fell ultimately to about $13 million from a previous high level of
$21 million or $22 million.

To my surprise, when they began implementation of Early
Childhood, it was applied not in only low-wealth districts, where
there were educational problems because of economic poverty and
because of other social and economic conditions or disadvantages,
but it was applied in the middle-income class schools, where the
students were not educationally disadvantaged.

Early studies of the Early Childhood program indicated that it
was not very effective, in that it could not really be established
that there were educational benefits which related directly to the
Early Childhood Education program. And that was especially true in
the low-wealth school districts, or the school districts where there
was a high incidence of disadvantaged youth, educationally disadvantaged
youth. The factor which was responsible were the difficulties
encountered in bringing qualified parents and aides to assist the
children.

It achieved better results in middle-class communities where
qualified parents were available to assist the teachers. Often such
parents had university educations and they worked largely on a
volunteer basis. The schools, therefore, had more meaningful
community involvement. So the program was in a sense counter
productive, or not achieving its objective — helping the educationally
disadvantaged.

156

The Impact of SB 90

Sharp: Do you have a sense of what the overall impact of SB 90 has been?

Rodda: Well, SB 90 was partially designed to bring about compliance with the
S errano-Pr ies t decision, and one of its provisions was implementation
of what I call the "compaction factor." Some call it the "squeeze
factor," because it provided that average-wealth districts, would
receive about a 7 percent increase in ADA per year, low-wealth
districts an increase in excess of that, perhaps an increase as high
as 10 or 11 percent. High-wealth districts, however, would receive
a percentage increase which was related to the district's assessed
value per unit of ADA as compared to the statewide average of
assessed value per unit of ADA. If a district had a wealth which was
two to one (the factor was two to one), or twice that of the average,
their rate of increase was required to be one-half of the percentage
increase for districts at the average. The percentage increase would
be limited to about 3 1/2 per unit of ADA.

Since that time, because of SB 154, the state's one-year response
to Prop 13, and AB 8, the long-run response, the state has addressed
the Serrano decision in essentially the same way through a sliding-
scale formula — although the school apportionment increases are not
provided on a percentage basis, but rather on a dollar amount, the
lower dollar amount going to so-called wealthy or high-wealth
districts, and the higher dollar amount going to the low-wealth
districts.

Districts such as San Francisco and Palo Alto and Carmel, I
believe, and similar districts, which are classified as high-wealth
or basic-aid districts, have had to operate since 1973, when the
SB 90 became law, with school expenditure adjustments in the range
of 2 1/2 or 3 percent. Inflation in 1973, as I said, was at about
a 4.5 percent level. We did not anticipate at that time what would
happen to the rate of inflation, or CPI.

I began to perceive the potential for a high rate of inflation
when I wrote a paper on the energy crisis in 1973, September, before
the Arabian oil embargo. The oil embargo by virtue of the action
of the OPEC nations, contributed to inflation. And, of course, the
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War contributed to the increase
in inflation. We've had double-digit inflation for a number of years
since 1973 and the wealthy districts have had to live with a very
low rate of increase in their authorized expenditure level. In that
respect I think SB 90 was adverse in its effect. Furthermore, it
did not convince the people that it really had done anything
significant with respect to providing property tax relief.

157

Rodda: Maybe SB 90, the senate version, would have been worse in that it
put most of the money in school finance reform because we designed
it to address the Serrano-Priest decision, worse, therefore, insofar
as it related to the taxpayer revolt. We knew that there was a
taxpayer revolt, but we did not know how serious it was, and,
furthermore, it did not become quite as serious until the impact of
the oil embargo, and the increase in the oil price, and other factors
began to affect the economy and stimulate the rate of inflation and
the burden of the property tax on home owners.

To make a long story short, we had in those years to do two
things. One, to implement a number of categorical aid programs, some
of which we've discussed; and the second thing was to address the
Serrano-Priest decision, which was made in '71. We made a significant
effort in '72. The legislation was SB 90 and it provided for a
"compaction factor," an automatic cost-of- living increase for the
schools, and several other elements of school finance reform. One
of the adverse effects, however, was that when the Early Childhood
Education Program became law, its implementation led to a reduction
in the funding level of the Miller-Unruh reading program. That
annoyed me quite a bit. I have already spoken to that problem.

Sharp: I've been reading a lot of California Journal.* The articles bring
up more questions for me than they tend to answer. Getting your
perspective on SB 90 fills in a lot of those questions.

The Topic of Higher Education

Sharp: I wondered what you thought the main changes were in higher

education during Reagan's years as governor. There was a very
tumultuous situation right off the bat.

Rodda: Well, I wrote a paper on that subject, as you probably know.
Sharp: Oh, I hadn't seen that either.

Rodda: Yes. [pauses to think] There were two papers. One is entitled,

"Higher Education, the Challenge," I think, and the other is entitled,
"Student Activism: The New Style." It related to the attitude or
the behavior of students during the militancy of the sixties. I'll
get that for you if I have it.

*School financing is an important topic for California Journal in the
Reagan years. See especially issues published in November, 1970;
March and December, 1971; April and October, 1972; and June, 1974.

158

Rodda: Reagan capitalized in his election in 1966 on the fact that there
was a lot of student unrest which reflected their dissatisfaction
with the Vietnam War. It also reflected the new youth attitude,
the emphasis on me-ism, the determination on the part of the youth
to make the educational system more relevant, and the determination
of ethnic minorities to introduce into the educational program
curriculum studies relating to the culture of ethnic minorities.
The movement focused on the institutions of higher education and
started in Governor [Edmund G., Sr.] Brown's administration. It
carried over into Governor Reagan's administration.

One instance was interesting. It related to the fact- that the
militants were inviting speakers to the campuses who were known to
be radical with respect to their perspective. One instance occurred
which attracted considerable attention. It resulted from an
invitation to Eldridge Cleaver. In the senate a resolution was
introduced condemning that action, as I recall, and there were two
"no" votes in the senate on the resolution, Senator [Alfred] Alquist
and I. It, of course, was quite controversial.

Governor Reagan, while a candidate, capitalized on the public's
dissatisfaction with the student movement. There were instances in
which the students did go beyond what I regarded as a normal form of
protest in which the students would verbalize their concerns, for
example, arranging for campus speakers, carrying and circulating
signs, petitions. At the time, however, a small number of student
activists or militants became involved in protest activities which
were almost destructive of campus order and interfered significantly
with the educational process.

A beautiful example of that form of behavior occurred at Cal
State San Francisco. In response [S.I.] Hayakawa, then president
of the university, came out and umplugged the speakers located on
top of a van. He was wearing his tarn o'shanter. His behavior gained
him national publicity, which he capitalized upon subsequently when
he ran for the U.S. Senate. He had become president of that
institution, because the liberal faculty members were not adequately
supportive of the president who was a moderate liberal and was
replaced. I think the moderate president's name was Dr. John
Summerskill.

Summerskill was not able to retain his position because of the
serious level of student militancy and unrest, and the board of
trustees hired Hayakawa. Had the liberals been more responsive,
supported him [Summerskill], they might have had a different kind
of direction on that campus. But the important thing is that that
incident, and similar activities on the part of active students
created a considerable amount of public dissatisfaction and discontent
with higher education and student activism. Reagan capitalized on
the campus issue in his campaign for election in 1966.

159

Rodda: Two years before Brown's termination of office, Governor Brown had
been somewhat severe in his budgeting for the university and the
state university and college system. I think the budget expenditure
percentage increase was in the neighborhood of 3 percent or something
of that magnitude. It was an increase which the faculty interpreted
as quite inadequate.

When Governor Brown ran for re-election, therefore, one could
not convince them of the need for his re-election. I mean, that I
had no success, when I undertook to educate political supporters of
mine who were faculty members at Cal State University, Sacramento,
with respect to what the implications were if they elected Governor
Reagan. The problem was that they were disappointed with Governor
Brown, and they were not willing to become involved, and they didn't.
They just, in effect, sat the election out. This type of behavior,
I am convinced occurred in other areas of the state and for similar
reasons.

Reagan was able to capitalize on the discontents which related
to the public's attitude toward higher education and the public's
attitude toward students as well as the dissatisfaction of the ^
faculty.

When Governor Reagan was elected he was committed to raising
student tuition for university students. Tuition was increased by
the Regents. Assemblyman John Vasconcellos and I went before the
Regents at a meeting in San Francisco and testified against the
tuition increase, but there was little sentiment against such an
increase in the legislature and among the citizenry.

Governor Reagan was restrictive in his budgeting for the
institutions of higher education. He, also, supported legislation
which was designed significantly to intrude upon the autonomy of
higher education. The legislation would have denied certain people
under certain conditions access to the university campuses. I
thought that such a course of action was an inappropriate way to
address the problems which related to incidents of student unrest
and activism, and such incidences as the Eldridge Cleaver campus
presentation.

So I opposed the threat to academic freedom and the autonomy
of higher education, and my paper addresses that issue. The fact is,
I outlined in detail the bills under consideration which related to
that issue, some of which were supported by Governor Reagan.
Fortunately, not many of them went to his desk.

160

Rodda:

Sharp :

Rodda:

What I'm trying to say, however, is that higher education was not
looked upon as a very high priority. The funding level increase
was very modest and under the circumstances it did not relate
adequately to the inflationary forces which were in effect. And,
of course, the administration supported tuition, which was put in
effect.

But I don't know whether that is a response to your question or

not.

Yes. The record on higher education in California during Reagan's
period reads on a couple different levels because there is this
campus unrest, and the question of what is a governor supposed to do
in that situation, and then there was the issue of tuition and
budgeting for the state campuses. It all got tied up together into
a rough situation.

Right. It was a popular issue. And [Pat] Brown had to live with
that issue and he had, also, to live with the issue of the unrest
in the area of agricultural labor relations, and the movement of
[Ce"sar] Chavez to achieve collective bargaining and frequent threat
to agricultural production, because of farm labor strikes. Brown
had the problem of the Vietnam situation also since he had supported
the position of the Johnson administration. In summary: Governor
Brown had to cope with the problems of agricultural unrest, the
problem of higher education student unrest and student activism,
and the Vietnam war.

Governor Reagan was able to capitalize on those issues in his
campaign; he was the good guy wearing a white hat, as you know, and
riding a white horse however you wish to describe his image.

But in many ways Reagan was not as negative as maybe I have
portrayed him. He proved to be rather an astute politician, and he
learned to accept the reality of politics and the necessity of
compromise. He did not want the Early Childhood Education law, and
the Republicans, as I've indicated, eliminated classes before
kindergarten, so it was K-3. But he signed the legislation because
that action brought him the support of Dr. Wilson Riles on SB 90, the
1972 tax relief-reform measure.

Reagan's Relationship with the Legislature////

Sharp: This learning how to deal with politics and how to compromise, was
this more in Reagan's second term than it was in his first?

161

Rodda: [pauses to think] Let's see. He was elected in '66, re-elected in
'70.

Sharp: Because all these important bills we're talking about are after
1970.

Rodda: Well, in the first years of his administration, he was fortunate in

that he had more political clout in the two houses of the legislature;
so there was less need for compromise.

As a matter of fact, Republican Senator Howard Way was President
pro Tern of the senate for about six months after Senator [Hugh]
Burns was deprived of that office. Then [Jack] Schrade, a Republican,
became President pro Tern. When he was ousted, of course, [James]
Mills became President pro Tern. On the assembly side, Assemblyman
Bob Monagan, a Republican, was the Speaker; he served for about two
years. At that time the Republicans had a bare majority in the
senate and, I think, a bare majority in the assembly. (I would not
want to vouch for that statement.)

As time passed the political pendulum moved to the left in
Reagan's administration, and so Governor Reagan's political power
was diminished; that is, his legislative power was diminished.

Governor Reagan did succeed, however, in enacting some reform
in the area of health and welfare, and he also signed the Beilenson
Act, which authorized therapeutic abortion. That legislation was a
result of a tremendous compromise effort.* The effort to reform the
welfare program was also a compromise. The effort to achieve tax
relief, SB 90, was another compromise. At the time Governor Reagan
worked very closely with [Robert] Moretti, assembly Speaker.

So, in answer to your question, I think I must indicate that
the difficult years for Democrats were those of the first
administration when Reagan was more powerful because of his support
in the assembly and the senate. That gradually diminished, of course,
and so he had to be more sensitive to the world of political reality,
and I must conclude that he was that kind of a person. He went along
with programs that he did not particularly want or did not particularly
reflect his basic philosophy.

*See pp. 140-143 above for additional discussion.

162

The Role of the Senate Education Committee

Sharp: I wanted to get a sense of what you thought the role of the Senate
Education Committee was in these years.

Rodda: Well, I chaired it for ten years and I had some outstanding

consultants; I had Jerry [Gerald C.] Hayward, now chancellor of the
community colleges, and John Bukey. He [Bukey] had been a dean of
men at the University of California, Davis, before he became a
consultant. Jerry Hayward was working on his doctorate and he had
been a school administrator before he became the principal consultant
to the committee. And, Jan Den ton, now director of the Department
of Conservation, came in as a consultant.

They are all outstanding people and they developed a unique
knowledge of the whole issue of school finance, which was beginning
to be more and more complicated by virtue of the implications of the
Serrano decision and efforts by the legislature to achieve compliance,
and by virtue also of the fact that the state had initiated so many
categorical aid programs to address the unique needs of children.

The Education Committee was very good in that respect — the
quality of its consultants and their expertise and knowledge. I was
able, as a consequence, to become significantly involved in school
finance reform.

In Reagan's administration, I was active in that area, but
under that administration there was less potential for the chairman
of the Education Committee to provide meaningful leadership because
to do that he needed meaningful cooperation with the administration,
and we did not always have that. Reagan related more meaningfully
to Moretti, as I have commented before.

I did use the Education Committee, however, to try to provide
some leadership in the achievement of school finance reform and in
the area of categorical aid programs, although, as I've already
indicated, toward the beginning of the '70s I began to have
reservations about the categorical aid programs, especially because
of the impact of the Serrano-Priest decision and the funding for
these programs was outside of the Serrano decision finance reform
mandate. I wanted to concentrate the state's financial resources on
school finance reform because I believed that to be a necessity, if
the state was to protect regular education programs. I wanted to
put more state money into financing the schools to bring up the
level of funding for low-wealth districts rather than to take money
from the high-wealth districts and transfer it to the poor districts.
With the compaction or squeeze factor formula we did that; we took
from the rich and gave to the poor.

163

Rodda: I would like to have allocated more from the state's resources to
the poor and not adversely, therefore, impacting on the rich
districts. I sought to take some of the money from the modest
surplus which the state had developed and direct it to school
finance reform. The Reagan surplus was not significant because
the state was going into a recession, the recession of *73-'74,
'74- '75. So, only a modest amount of money was available.

I just couldn't understand why the state would continue to
implement categorical aid programs when we were not fully or
adequately addressing Serrano, and by virtue of that fact were with
holding funds from high-wealth districts, some of which did not have
the benefit of categorical aid money, or if they did, since the
categorical money was not free money, the districts were not free
to use the money for what they thought were the needs of their
district. They were restricted in the use of the money by virtue
of the fact that the money was categorical aid money. The regular
education program, in my view, was being adversely affected.

Well, that was the basic philosophy that developed with respect
to my thinking when I served as chairman of the Education Committee
during those years.

Opposition to the County-Wide or State-Wide Tax

Sharp: This is getting a little ahead, but I wanted to bring it up now

because it fits in. I saw an article in California Journal written
in March of 1971, and. it was a discussion about the need for a
state-wide property tax. It said that was really the remedy for the
school financing problem.* The article mentioned that you sponsored
SB 129, which didn't pass but would have helped to establish this
change in the taxing structure.

I wondered if you could say something generally about the
opposition to county-wide and to state-wide taxing in this 1966-1974
period because it's elusive to me.

Rodda: Well, 1 can't remember the provisions of SB 129. I do remember SB 65;
I'll start with that.

*See "State-wide Property Tax for Schools," California Journal,
March 1971, p. 72.

164

Rodda: In Governor [Edmund G., ST.] Brown's administration it was

recognized that there were gross inequities in the way in which
schools were financed, and we decided that we could address them
in part with the state-wide property tax, but that was politically
unrealistic. So Governor Brown sponsored a county-wide tax for
school support, and I was the only one who was willing to author
it, which I did — SB 65, as I recall. It might have been in 1963
or 1964. It was denied approval in the Finance Committee.

Well, there continued to be some interest in this concept, and
there were efforts made to implement a state-wide school finance
property tax, but it had less appeal than the county-wide tax did.

The county-wide tax for support to schools was opposed by
agricultural interests, the industrial and commercial enterprise
groups, and the basic aid districts themselves. I admonished them
not to do that. I said, "You should support constructive reform
because if you don't, you're liable to end up with destructive
reform," but they don't listen. So they did not support the county-
wide tax proposal, and there was no support subsequently for the
state-wide tax.

Now, I don't remember 129. What year was that? Do you
remember?

Sharp: This article was March, '71.

Rodda: March, '71. [meditatively] I'd have to check it out. I have quite
a bit of material.

Incidentally, in the State Archives there are copies of all my
bills in the files. You could look up the 1971 or '70 file and find
SB 129. You could have a copy made of it and any comments. I left
all the correspondence with it. My recollection is vague and only
that I did introduce such legislation but there were so many
competing bills and that the idea was so unpopular that I dropped it.
I recall the county-wide tax bill because of the lengthy and
controversial hearing before the Senate Finance Committee.
Incidentally, Polly Gardner, my secretary and later secretary to the
Education and Finance Committees when I chaired them, attended the
hearing. She was so interested that she cried, I am told, when the
bill was defeated.

There was little support for the concept of the state-wide
property tax, less than there was for the county-wide.

We did develop rather remarkable approaches to the whole issue
of school finance as we studied the issue. I used to tell my
principal consultant, Jerry Hayward, to "Stand in the corner on your

165

Rodda: head and think irrationally, and maybe you'll develop a solution
to Serrano," — and we did to a certain extent. Had AB 65 been
allowed to become fully implemented, we would have achieved a
remarkable degree of compliance with the Serrano decision, but its
implementation was disrupted by virtue of voter approval of
[Proposition] 13. There were some rather interesting elements in
the bill and I have careful analysis of the revisions of AB 65 in
case you ever want it. [chuckles] AB 65, Greene, was a joint
effort. I amended SB 525, Rodda, into AB 65 and it became law after
a compromise was attained by the Conference Committee. It was 1977,
as I recall.

But I'll check that out, SB 129.

The Voucher Plan

Rodda: Incidentally, the voucher plan was a concept being advocated in

those years, and one of its sponsors was Senator John Harmer. We,
the opponents, did succeed in defeating efforts to implement the
voucher plan at that time through statutory change. One bill with
very limited provisions did become law. It was Senator Manner's
bill, which allowed, on an experimental basis, implementation of a
modified "family choice" plan in a school district in Santa Clara
County. Isn't that funny? I can't think of it now. [pauses to
think]

Sharp: It's called Alum Rock.

Rodda: The Alum Rock experiment.* We eliminated from the bill the inclusion
of religious schools and provided that private schools which wanted
to participate, which meant utilization of federal funds to implement
the administrative costs which were necessary, would have to
transfer control to the Alum Rock School District, so in effect
they would be private but they would be — publically directed.

Sharp: Sort of.

Rodda: Yes. And, of course, no private schools wished to surrender its
autonomy. So the result was a pilot program with respect to the
voucher plan or "family choice," except that the choice was limited
to alternative schools or experimental schools within the Alum Rock
School District. Parents had a right to have their children attend
schools which were more traditional, or more innovative, and the

*This voucher system was tried in a small school in San Jose, Alum
Rock Union Elementary School in 1971, with federal funds.

166

Rodda: money from the federal government was used to bus the students,
to hire teacher aides, and to pay for the administrative cost.
But that program was a modified form of the "voucher plan."

Another bill was authored by Senator John Dunlap, then
Assemblyman Dunlap, which, I think, became law in about '72 or '73,
to allow districts to introduce alternative programs designed to
address the unique needs of children within the regular educational
program. I do not think much ever came of that change in the law.

I presented the bill on the senate floor.

There was a sentiment near the end of the Reagan administration
toward a return to the basics, and I've written a paper on that
subject too. That paper is called "Public Education: The Politican's
Dilemma." In fact, I think I delivered it at a graduation ceremony
at the University of California in the School of Education. I
pointed out that the trend was toward a return to the basics and
elimination of some of the school reform programs that had been
initiated, in the late sixties. They were programs, such as
individualized instruction, open classrooms, and alternative schools.

Sharp: Well, I have noticed in just the brief amount of research that I've
done so far that the funding for special programs really slipped off
at the end, within the last two years of Reagan's administration.

Rodda: Of Reagan's administration, yes. There was such a sentiment and, as
I said, that was "the politician's dilemma."

I was somewhat supportive of that trend, but I think for a
different reason. I would have liked to retain the money and make
it available for school finance reform in order to address Serrano.
The Reagan administration preferred to hold the money for other
purposes.

The Reagan administration was confronted with rather a serious
state fiscal problem toward the end of Governor Reagan's second
administration. That is why, in order to implement SB 90, there
was a need for an increase in the taxes on corporate profits and
banks, and also a one-cent sales tax increase. SB 90 did contain
a reform which benefitted corporate enterprise with respect to the
buy-out of the business inventory tax, and it did provide a significant
amount of home owner relief, and a modest amount of renter relief.
In addition it provided more money for the schools and a modest
implementation of reform to address Serrano's mandate.

Sharp: No, it really does fit together.

167

Sharp: The way you speak about the changes during the Reagan administration
in education, the shifting back and forth before and after Serrano,
and the very complex nature of what Serrano did — it helps me
enormously to put the picture of school financing together.

Collective Bargaining for Teachers

Rodda: During those years in Reagan's administration I was also involved
in collective bargaining for education. A massive effort to
implement collective bargaining was undertaken by Senator George
Moscone, and prior to that by Senator [Mervyn] Dymally. The Moscone
bill (I think it was either SB 4 or SB 400) would have provided
collective bargaining for all segments of public education, K
[kindergarten] through the university, and it was sponsored by
faculty organizations largely (CTA, AFT and UPC)* working together.
The legislation had a wide-open definition of the scope of negotiations
and it was silent on the right to strike, and had no statement of
management rights, as I recall. Governor Reagan vetoed it — the
Moscone version.

Well, John Bukey, who was my Education Committee consultant, was
assigned the total responsibility for the development of a collective
bargaining bill — and I chaired an interim hearing on collective
bargaining, I believe in 1973. I did not try to implement the
hearings in the form of a bill because I knew no one would pay any
attention to it at that time; there were so many groups involved in
the enactment of the Moscone legislation.

The following year though (I think it was '74) I authored SB 1857,
which had the support of school administrators and school boards and
UTLA, United Teachers of Los Angeles. It would have been signed by
Governor Reagan, had it been placed on his desk. It only applied to
K-12. I excluded all of the segments of higher education because
I wanted to protect the role of the academic senates in educational
policy, and I was afraid collective bargaining, if not properly
implemented, would threaten that responsibility for shared governance.
But anyway, the bill failed in the Assembly Ways and Means Committee
by two votes. I could have passed it, except one man switched and I
lost another vote.

*California Teachers Association, American Federation of Teachers,
and United Professors of California.

168

Rodda: The following year, I introduced SB 160, but this was not in Reagan's
administration, it was in the year after Reagan; it was in 1975.
So there was a very serious effort being made in the last two years
of Governor Reagan's administration to implement collective bargaining
for state, local government, and also for education, K through the
university, and he vetoed that one massive bill in the area of
collective bargaining for public education, K through the university.

I was involved in collective bargaining, I was involved in
school finance as chairman of the Education Committee, and I was
involved significantly in trying, because of concerns about school
finance, to reform the school financing law and also to be much more
responsible in the way in which the state expanded categorical
education programs. The only one that I really thought was worth
while, was the Miller- Unruh reading program.

Sex Education

Rodda: Incidentally, on that Schmitz bill — may I say something about that?*
I authored a bill before that became law. I just happened to see a
reference to it here [on the interview outline] .

My concern was that children were not adequately informed with
respect to sex relations. I didn't want to be categorized as an
advocate of sexual permissiveness, but I thought that since parents
weren't necessarily educating their children, the schools should
educate the children, and that the schools should be allowed to have
courses in family education. (I've forgotten the exact terminology.)
My efforts were defeated, and March Fong Eu, I think, finally authored
a bill which was a modification of my original bill.**

Schmitz always opposed our legislation. He did require, through
his legislation, that parents must have the opportunity to evaluate
the materials and to withdraw their children from the class if they

*SB 413, passed in 1969, was authored by Senator John Schmitz. This
bill stipulated that a teacher who failed to notify a parent that
sex education would be taught risked suspension, and carried special
penalties for violators.

**After several revisions, March Fong Eu's bill was passed and signed
by Governor Reagan.

169

Rodda: didn't approve of the instructional materials. Before any materials
could be used they had to be made available for parent evaluation,
which maybe is not a bad idea, and it did become law.

However, I haven't been too satisfied with the effort to educate
students in family relations, which means it involves sex education,
and in enhancing and improving the attitude of young people with
respect to sex. I notice that there is an article in today's paper
about the attitude of higher education students today toward sex.
They want a permissive world for themselves, although they're more
conservative with respect to the economic, social, and political
institutions and practices of the country. I regard them as not
being very positive about our nation. They want to be more free as
individuals and this relates to sex behavior.

I recognized we had a problem and so years ago tried to address
that through the implementation of character education in the schools.
I succeeded in compiling a Compendium on Character Education. It is
available in the offices of the county superintendent of schools.
My interest was to make information available to school districts
about programs in the area of character education so that they might
be able to initiate such instruction if they wished. The idea was
to encourage voluntary programs and not to mandate such educational
programs .

Sharp: It must be a difficult subject to teach.

Rodda: It is. I don't know why I got involved with some of these things.

Sharp: Thank you for your time. I know you have another meeting.

Transcriber: Marilyn White
Final Typist: Keiko Sugimoto

170

TAPE GUIDE — Albert Rodda

Interview 1: November 6, 1979
tape 1, side A
tape 1, side B
tape 2, side A
tape 2, side B

Interview 2: November 30, 1979
tape 3, side A
tape 3, side B
tape 4, side A
tape 4, side B

Interview 3: March 19, 1980
tape 5, side A
tape 5, side B
tape 6, side A [side B not recorded]

Interview 4: January 13, 1981
tape 7, side A
tape 7, side B
tape 8, side A [side B not recorded]

Interview 5: April 23, 1981
tape 9 , side A
tape 9, side B

1
1

12
24
36

50
50
61
72
83

102

114

126
126
137
149

151
151
160

171

APPENDIX A

The following speeches and papers are referred to in this oral history
and are available in The Bancroft Library. In addition to this list there
are other materials in Senator Rodda's file at The Bancroft Library which
he donated in the course of the interviewing. Another much larger group
of Senator Rodda's materials have been deposited in the library at California
State University at Sacramento.

Untitled speech, ca. 1963, on liberalism and extremism

Speech, "Remarks on the Rumford Act and the Housing Initiative," 1964

Speech for Reapportionment, February 1965

Speech, to annual convention of California Council of Democratic Clubs,
March 1965

Speech, on passage of AB 145, at Davis, 1965

Speech, "Government: Friend or Enemy?," March 1966

Speech, Introduction of the Honorable Edmund G. Brown [Sr.], May 1966

"An Interview with Senator Rodda," Los Angeles County Schools Bulletin,
May 1968

Speech, "The Politician's Dilemma: or Which Decalogue?," January 1975

Paper, "fiscal Implications of Jarvis II for the State of California and
Agencies of California Local Government, including the Schools,
as viewed from the Perspective of a Practical Politician," January 1980

"Jarvis II Update: A Conversation with Senator Rodda," State of the Arts,
California Arts Council, April 1980

APPENDIX B

SENATOR ALBERT S. RODDA
January 1955

Editor of the Sacramento Bee:

Recently an attempt was made by certain members of the Sacramento
County Democratic Central Committee to overthrow the incumbent chairman,
Robert A. Zarick. The effort failed, and the "insurgents," as they
were described in the local newspapers, were defeated by the Zarick
forces .

Throughout the struggle to remove Mr. Zarick, the insurgents
avoided making any charges against the incumbent chairman. This was
pointed out by Senator Desmond, who demanded that formal charges be
made against Mr. Zarick. This was obviously an attempt by the Senator
to twist the action against Mr. Zarick into some sort of trial proceed
ings and deceive the public as to what was the actual issue involved.
It seems, therefore, that a proper respect for the opinions of fellow
Democrats requires that we state the reason why we, the so-called
rebels, undertook our action against Mr. Zarick.

From the beginning the anti-Zarick campaign was strictly political.
Its purpose was to wrest control of the Sacramento County Democratic
Central Committee from Mr. Robert A. Zarick and those who have kept
him in that position. This group includes Senator Earl Desmond,
Jesse Fluharty, Jack Welsh, E. Vane Miller and several others who
consistently voted in support of the Zarick faction, whether on the
main motion or only upon the procedural motions.

We simply wished to take control of the Central Committee because
we believed that it was necessary to do this if the Democratic Party
were to exercise its proper strength and prestige in Sacramento County.

We believe that the present leadership is woefully inadequate
and characterized by an almost purposeful disregard for the best
interests of the Democratic Party. We submit the following in support

of this contention:

The chairman, Mr. Robert A. Zarick, has from time to time arrogated
the authority of the Committee and taken action of a grave character
without consultation with or approval of the Central Committee. An
example of this, which occurred during the general election in November,
was Mr. Zarick' s unauthorized use of the Democratic Party mailing
piece to support a non-partisan candidate for the. position of Superior
Court Judge. This action split the Democrats in Sacramento over a
non-partisan election and certainly jeopardized the election chances
of Democratic partisan candidates.

Historically, under the leadership of Mr. Zarick, the Central
Committee has given very meager financial support to the Party
candidates. In the November election, for example, the Central Com
mittee raised only thirteen hundred dollars. It is now allegedly
in debt in the sum of about twelve hundred dollars; no one knows
just how much is actually owed. Furthermore, in the general election
only one Democratic candidate received any direct financial aid from
the Central Committee. The favored candidate was Jesse Fluharty, a

173
long-time supporter of Mr. Zarick; he received one hundred dollars.

Incidentally, this money was given Mr. Fluharty by Mr. Zarick without
the approval of the Central Committee. None of the other Democratic
candidates received any money from the Central Committee. This
includes the Honorable John E. Moss, Jr., George E. Johnson, and
John Reynolds, all Democratic nominees and all residents of Sacramento.

And, finally, Mr. Robert A. Zarick relies too heavily for his
tenure of power upon the support of Senator Earl Desmond. We do not
like this because we do not regard Senator Desmond as a real Democrat
and as one who should exercise significant influence upon the control
and direction of the Sacramento County Democratic Central Committee.

Some facts concerning Senator Desmond's Democratic record are
rather interesting. In 1952 he opposed action by the Democratic
Central Committee to endorse the Honorable John E. Moss, the Democratic
nominee for Congress. In 1952, one of the local newspapers noted
the appearance of Senator Desmond at a Nixon rally in the Plaza, where
Senator Desmond patted the vice-president on the back, which was in
terpreted as an expression of personal encouragement. During the 1952
and 1954 campaigns, Senator Desmond was conspicuous in his absence
from active participation in all campaigns on behalf of Democratic
candidates. At the meeting of the Central Committee, last December 14,
Ssnator Desmond bragged of his unwillingness to support Democratic
candidates and of his support of Republican Lieutenant Governor Butch
Powers .

This more or less summarizes the reasons for our rebellion against
Mr. Robert A. Zarick. It seems to us that more could be done to
advance the interests of the party than is being done. We also believe
that a different political orientation in the leadership of the party
would be beneficial and more in harmony with the goals and principles
of the Democratic Party.

It is our view that the Central Committee fails miserably to
represent the point-of-view of the Democratic Party in this County.
The chairman on no occasion to my knowledge has stated publicly the
position of the Party on any important issue or defended the Party
against innumerable charges made by the Republican opposition. By
failing to act as spokesman of the Party, Mr. Zarick has neglected
one of the important duties of the chairman- -a neglect which has
seriously interfered with the progress of the Party in the presenta
tion of its principles and in the consolidation of its position in
the community. Because of this deficiency the Party remains inartic
ulate and there is no identification in the minds of registered
Democrats with the Party, its candidates, and its principles and
programs .

174

INDEX — Albert S. Rodda

abortion, 113, 140-143

accrual accounting, 73, 74, 75

Alquist, Albert, 63, 116, 131, 158

American Federation of Teachers (AFT), 20, 80-82, 84, 109, 167

Arnold, Stan, 61-62

Artz, George, 41, 43

ballot propositions

1958 right- to-work, 20

1960 water bonds, 51, 55-56

1964 an ti- fair-housing, 112

1978 Jarvis-Gann, property tax reduction, 76, 94, 95, 137

1980 Jarvis II, state income tax reduction, 76
Behr, Peter, 101, 139, 148

Beilenson, Anthony, 63, 101, 113, 116, 131, 140
Beilenson Therapeutic Abortion Act, 140-142, 161
Biddle, Craig, 140-141

Board of Governors for the Community Colleges, 88
bond issues

cost estimates of, 56-57

qualification of, 56
Bradley, Clark, 93-94, 108
Brody, Ralph, 20-21, 51, 53
Brown, Charlie, 61

Brown, Edmund G. , Jr. (Jerry), 23-24, 76, 114, 143
Brown, Edmund G. , Sr. (Pat), 15-16, 33, 35, 42, 47, 49, 51, 56, 65, 68-70,

72-73, 75-76, 78-80, 85, 88-89, 94, 96-97, 100, 102-103, 113-114, 130-132,

137-140, 142, 159-160

appointments, 22-24
Brown, Willie, 34, 120
Bukey, John, 162, 167
Burgener, Clair, 146, 150, 153

Burns, Hugh, 26, 31-33, 35-37, 51-52, 54, 57, 61-66, 107, 108, 116, 149
Burns-Porter Act, 51, 53-56, 103, 124
Busterud, John A. , 56

California

environmental problems of, 57-61, 93-96
financial problems of, 67-76, 129-130
See also schools; education; taxes

175

California assembly

compensation and benefits for members of, 38-40

orientation toward south and urban areas, 42

party caucus in, 65

rivalry with state senate, 33-35

speaker's power in, 65

California constitutional amendment, 1966, 38-40
California Democratic Council (CDC), 10, 12-13, 15, 20-21, 47-48, 130

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Full text of "The Assembly, the State Senate, and the Governor's Office, 1958-1974 : oral history transcript / and related material, 1979-1982"

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