A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

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A TREATISE'

coMczaKiMl

The Principles of Human
Knowledge

GEORGE BERKELEY

RBPRINT EDITION

CHICAGO

: OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COHPANT

LONDON AGBNT3

Kboa* Taol, Tuaca. TbOmss ft C«., Lto.

1904

\

■ n,g,t,7l.dM,GOOglC

EOUOATION DGPIJ]

^'

jM,Googlc

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

Bbrkblby's TYeatise Concerning the PrincSfles of Human
Knowledge, of which a reprint is here produced as the fourth of
the series of Philosophical Classics of the Religion of Science Li-
brary, was first published in Dublin in 171a. The second edition,
the last of the author's life-time, appeared in London in 1734, in
the same volume with the third edition of the Three Dialogues
SetTueea Hylas and Pkilonous, a reprint of which has also been
issued in this series as a com[>an ion- piece to the Principles. The
text of both reprints embodies all the essential matter of the edi-
tions of Berkeley's life-lime.

The Frincifles, pnbtisbed when the author was only twenty-
six, is the most (ystematic of ail of Berkeley's exposiliona of his
theory of knowledge; it was the direct outgrowth of t\iK Essay
Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), which sought lo ban-
ish the metaphysical abstractions of Absolute Space and Extension
from philosophy, and was itself mainly concerned with the aboli-
tion of Abstract Matter and of the ontological .and theological
corollaries of thai concept. The Diaioguts treat of subslanlially
the same subjects, bul are more familiar aod elegant in form and
are devoted in the main to the refutation of the most plausible
popular and philosophical objections to the new doctrine. The
two books mark a distinctively new epoch in philosophy and sci-
ence, and together afford a comprehensive survey of Berkeley's
doctrines, placing wilhln the reach of every reader in remarkably
brief compass opinions which have profoundly influenced the
coarse of intellectual hislory. Works of this kind have been almost
invariably distinguished by their brevity. "I had no inclination,"
is Berkeley's characteristic remark, "to trouble the world with
large volumes. What I have done was rather with the view of
giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and cnriosily to go
to the bottom of things, and pursue them In their own minds.
Two or three times reading these small tracts, and making what is
read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe, render the wholft

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iv EDITOR'S PREFACn.

bmfllar >nd vuj to the mind, and lake off thai shocking appear-
■nce which hath often been obcerved to attcmd specalative traths."
Berkdejr'i pbilosophj' having boon the victim of mnch popu-
lar, and even proleaalonal, misappiehenrioD. it shall bo our en*
deavM in theae prefatory remarks to give by appropriate quota-
tions and digests a synthesis of current pbilosopbical opinion
concerning his doctrines, to point oat his relation to bis predeces-
aoTS, to indicate certain pecaliarities of terminology and thoaght
necessary to the nndentanding of his theory, and to show finally
wherein certain of bis analyses have been rendered antiquated by
modem scientific inqairy. We shall b^in by repiadodng the
sketch ot his life and aims given in Lewes's BiografhUal History
of Philosophy (1845). a work which, thoi^h on lectanical points
partisan and not always tmstworthy, has at least the merit of a
vivadons style.

LIFE or BERKELEY.

"There are few men of whom England has better reason to
be prond than of George Berkeley, Bishop ot Cloyne ; for to ex-
traoTdinary merits as a thinker and writer he onited the moqt ex-
qnisite parity and generosity of character; and it is still a moot
point whether he was greater in head or heart.

" He was bom on the lath of March, 1685, at Kilcrin, in the
eonnty of Kilkoony, Ireland. He was educated at Trinity College,
Dublin, and was in 1707 admitted as a fellow. In 1709 he pub-
lished his Essay Towards a Ntw Theory of Vision, which
made an epoch in science ;* and the year after, his Prine^iUs of
Human KnouiUdgt, which made an epoch in metaphysics. After
this he came to London, where he was received with open arms.
Ancient teaming, exact science, polished society, modern litera-
ture, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind

•Tliii •UWmant !■ budlf EucL X\m Emiaj TrmarOi a Sum Ttuny if
Vltim wu ■ psTChalo^cal imllier tliu * selsntifio Ireulu. TIm work hM
beaa wsll chsrscurlMd b; Prot. A. C. Fn»r In hii editioo ol lbs coUscted
works of Bsrkeler. Vol. I., pane j, >■ lollowii "Tha trsitlie ia ■ piofeued
secooBt ot (be tacti, ilia whole ficu, uid notfaliMi but tbs Iscli o( which wa
ato vlsaillj conKlotu, ai diatlDsalahed Iroin pMondMl tscl* sod moupbra-
ieal abitncdoDti which confntcd ihoDfhi, sn Inesnlar aurciu ol lnuttlBa'
don, or sn sbnse of wordi had ■nbatltnied for Iham. It li a contribation to
iha parcholoEicsl HwlT*la a( the fact ol viiion, and nol a daduction fiom
msralr pbraleal •iparlmeBti in optica or tha pbTilolou of the eie."—SMtor.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE. t

of this Accomplished num. All his contemponmM ^i«ed with
tbo Salirot in Mcribiog

To Borkalar ererj TirtBB nndar heawi.

Advene lactiona and hostile wits concurred oolr in loriog, admir-
ing, and cootribniing to adTanco him. The wveie sense of Swift
endnred bis visions: the modest Addison endavored to reconcile
Clarke to hit ambitions ipBcnlations. His character converted tba
sBlin of Pope into fervid piaise. Even the diacemtng, fastidions,
and tDrbnlent Atterbnrj said, after an Interview with him. "so
mocfa learning, so much knowledge, so macb innocence, and anch
bncnility, I did not think bad been the portion of any bnl angelo,
(ill I saw Ibis genlleman." '"

" His acquaintance with the wits led to his contribating to tbo
Guardian. He became cfaaplain and afterwardi secretary to the
Earl of Peterborongh, whom he accompanied on bis embassy to
Sicily. He inbeequently made tbe tonr of Earope with Mr. Ashe;
and at Paris met Malebranche, with whom be had an animated
discnnion on the Ideal theory. In 1734 be was made dean of
Derry. *Tfais was worth eleven himdred poonds a year to him;
bnt be resigned it in order to dedicate bis life to the coavertioD of
tha North American sayages, stipnlaiing only with the Govern-
ment for a salary of one bnadred pounds a year. On this roman-
tic and generoQS expedition he was accompanied by bis yonog
wife. He set sail for Rhode Island, carrying with him a valnable
library of booka and the balk of his property. Bnt, to the shame
of the Government, be it said, the promises made him were not
fnlfilled, and after seven years of single-handed endeavonr he was
forced to retom to England, having spent the greater part of his
fortune in vain.

"He was made Bishop of Cloyne in 17M. When he wished
(o resign, tbe King would not permit him ; and being keenly aliva
to the evils of non-residence, he made an arrangement before leav-
ing Cloyne whereby he settled tool, a year during his absence on
tbe poor. In 1753 he removed to Oxford, where, on the evening
of th« 14th January, in 1753, be was suddenly seized, wbDe read-
ing, with palsy of tbe heart, and died almoat instantaneously.

"Of his nnmerona writli^ we cannot here speak; two only
belong to onr aabject ; the Priaci^t of Knotvltdge, and tbe
Diaiogues of Hylas and PhUanous. [His Other most important

• Sir Jim« Uscklntoih.

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Ti EDITOR'S PREFACE.

philosophical work wai Aldfkratt, or the Minute PAilosofiktr
('?33)1' We hope to remove some of the errors and prejudices
with which bis name is encrosted. We hope to show that, even in
what are called his wildest moods, Berkeley was a plain, sincere,
daep-thinlcing man, not a sophbt playing with paradoxes to dis-
play his skill,

THE TRADITIONAL UISCOHCEPTION OF BERKELEY'S -
IDEALISM.

"All the world has heard of Beikelej'a Idealism, and innomer'
able 'coxcombs' haTe vanquished il 'with a grin.'* Ridicule has
not been sparing ol it. Argnment has not been wanting. It has
been langhed at, written at, talked at, shrieked at. That it has
berai understood is not so apparent. Few writers seem to have
honestly read and appreciated his works ; and those lew are cer-
tainly not among bis antagonUts.f In reading the criticisms upon
his theory it is qaite Indicrons to notice the constant iteration of
trivial objections which, trivial as Ihay are, Berkeley had often
antidpaled. In fact, the critics misunderstood him, and then re-
proached him for hig inconsistency — inconsistency, not with Ais
principles, but with theirs. They force a meaning npon his words
which be had expressly rejected ; and then triumph over him be-
cause he did not pQrsne their principles to the extravagances which
woald have resulted from tbetn.

"When Berkeley denied the eibtence of matter, he simply
denied the existence of that unknown substratum, the existence
of which Locke had declared to be a necessary inference from our
knowledge of qualities, but the nature of which must ever be alto-
gether hidden from us. Philosophers bad assumed the existence
of substance, i. e., of a noumenon lying naderaealh ail fkenomena
— a sulistratnm supporting all qualities — a something in which all
accidents inhere. This nnknown substance Berkeley denies. It
is a mere abstraction, ha says. If il is nnknown, unknowable, it

• "And coxcombs vanqiilsb Berkslerwllht grin."— A^.

tTIiess wocds wsie wrilton In iB(j-iS4G. Sines then Fiof. A. Cunpbatl
Fniacr') mapiificBDt edition of Beckeley'a collected worki I4 vols. Clarendon
Freu. iB7i)aDd hii eihaoKiTe ditneitatioas on Beiksler'* doctrines, lo|ethar
with tha mur eicellont tiiitoiiss oE pbilosepbr of tha Uil halt eentorr, have
rendered snch miinnderstuDdinR. at least oD tha part ot the pbilosopUcal
pnblic, almost imposiibls.— AAVw.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE. vii

Is a figment, and I will oona of it ; lor it ii a figment nona than
oselesa ; it is pernicious, ai lbs baaia of all Atbeiim. If hj mattor
you nnderslEind tfuit which ia seen, felt, tasted, and Idnched, then -
I sa.y matter exists : I am as firm a believer in its eiiatence as anj
one can be. and JUrein I agree ivith the indgar. If, on the con-
trary, you nndersland b; matter that occnlt substratum which ia
not seen, not felt, not tasted, and not touched — that of which (he
senaea do not, cannot, inform yon — (hen I ta; I believe not in the
eiistence of matter, and herein I differ with the philosophers
and agree with the vulgar.

" ' I am not changing things into ideas, ' be says, ' bnt rather
ideas into thii^ : since those immediate obfecls of perception,
which according to yon (Berkeley might have said, according to
pbilosopbers) are only appeaj-anees of things, I lake to be the
real things themaelves.

" 'Hylas: Things! yon may pretend what yon please; bnt it
is certain yon leave ns nothing but the empty forma of things, the
outside of which only strikes the senses.

" 'Philonous: What you call the empty forms and ontside of

things seem to me the very things themselves. . . . We both there- -

Ian agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms; bnt herein

. we differ: you will have them to be empty appearances; I, real

beings, la a\ioii, you do not trust your senses; 1 do.'

"Berkeley is always accused of having propounded a theory
which contradicla the evidence of the senses. That a man who
should thas disregard the senses most be oat of his, nas a ready
answer; ridicule was not slow In retort: declamation gave itself
elbow-room, and exhibited itself in a trinmphant attitndo. It was
easy to declare (Reid, Inquiry') that ' the man who aerionsly enter-
tains this belief, though in other respects he may be a very good
man, as a man may be who belike* he is made of glass; yet
snrely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and halh been
hurt by much thinking.'

"Unfortunately for the critics, Berkeley did net contradict
the evidence of the senses ; did not propound a theory at variance
in this point with the ordinary belief of mankind. His peculiarity
is, that be confined himself exclusively to the evidence of the
senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and theU only,
would he accept. He held fast to the facts of consciousness ; he
placed himself resolutely in the centre of the instinctive belief of

jM,Googlc

vUi EDITOI^S PREFACE.

maaUnd : ttiera he look up h» stand, leaving to philoeophen the
region ot mppoBition, inference, and of occult Bubslances.

" The reproach inada to him ia reaUy the reproach he made
to philosophers, vii., that they wonid not tmst to the evidence of
their ■ensM ; that over and atiove what the senses told them, they
imagined an occnit something of which the senses gave no indica-
tion. 'Nov it was against this metaphysical phantom ol the brain,'
says an acate critic {Slaekwood's Magazine, Jnne, 1641, p. 814)
'this crochet-work ot philosophers, and gainst it alone, that all
the attacks ot Berkeley were directed. The doctrine that the real-
ities of things were not made for roan, and that he must rest aatis'
fied with mere appearances was regarded, and rightly, by him as
the parent of scepticbm with alt ber desolating train. Ma saw
that philosophy, in giving np the reality immediately within her
grasp, in favoi of a reality snpposed to be less delnsive, which lay
beyond the limits ot experience, resembled the dog in the fable,
who, carrying a piece ot meat across a river, let the substance slip
from his jaws, while with foolish greed he snatched at the shadow
in the stream. The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her
secure hold npon tmth. He therefore sided with the vulgar, who
reci^nise no distinction between the reality and the appearance of
objects, and repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a woild exist-
ing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what
are called the sensible shows of tilings are in truth the very things
themselves.'

"True it is that owing to the ambiguities of language Berke-
ley's theory does not seem to run counter to the ordinary belief of
mankind, because by Matter men commonly understand the seen,
the tasted, the touched, Ac. ; therefore when the eiistenca of Mat-
ter is denied, people naturally suppose that the existence ot the
seen, the lasted, and the touched is denied, never suspecting that
Matter, in its philosophical kense, is tic/ seen, nol tasted, not
touched. Berkeley has not, it must be confessed, sufficiently
guarded against all ambiguity. Thus he says in one of the open-
ii^ sections of his Princiftts 0/ Human KnoTvledge, that "It is
indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that
bonses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects
have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being per-
ceived by the understanding.' This Is sirikmg the key-note false.
It roDses the reader to oppose a coming parados.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE. ix

"Tet Berketer lorMaw and anawerad tho objeclioDS which
Wimpejr, Baattie, Reid, and otben brought forward. He wai not
ginof ntterance to a caprica : he waa not apinniag an iageoioni
Iheorj, knowing all the while that it was no mom than an iagenn-
itj. He was an eaniBat thinker, patient io the search after truth.
Anxious, therafon, that his specalations shoold not be regarded
as roere dialectical ditplafs, he endeavonred on various occationa
to guard bimseU from misapprehension.

" ' 1 do not argne against the existenc« of anj one thing thai
we can apprehend either bj lensatioa or reSectioa. That the
things I see with taj ejes and touch, with in; hands do exist, really
exist, I make not the leait quettioD. The only thing whose exist-
ence I deny is that which philosophers call Matter, or corporeal
BUbatance. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest
id mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. . . .

" 'It any man thinks we detract from the reality of existence
of Ibinga, be is very far from understanding what has been pre-
mised in the plainest terms I could think of. ... It will be urged
that thai much at least is true, via. , that we lake away all corpo-
real lubstascea To this my answer is, that if the word substance
be taken in the vulgar sense for a iwmbination of sensible quali-
ties, sQch aa extension, solidity, weight, Ac., this we cannot be ac-
cnaedof taking away.' But if it be taken !□ the philosophic sense,
for the aupport of accidents or qualities without the mind ; then,
indeed, I acknowledge that we take it away, it one may be said to
take away that which never had any existence, not even in the im-
agination.

" ' But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to re-
ply, be will still believe his senses, and never suSer any arguments,
however plausible, to prevail over the certainty ot them. Be it
so ; assert the evidence of sense aa high as you t^eaxe, tve art
willing to do th* tame. That what I see, hear, and feel, doth
exist, i. e., is perceived by me, I no more doabt than I do ot mj
own being ; but I do not see how the testimony of sense can be
alleged as a proof ot anything which is not perceived by sense. ' f

"After reading these passages (and more of a similar cast
might be quoted) in what terms shall we speak of the trash written

• An iDnrsr la Dr. Jotuumi'l persmplocr nfatmUon at Barkelay, tIi.,
klclilna ■ ilaoe : u II Bskaler sTsr dsnied that wbal wa call ilonM eduadi
*FrintitUi ^/AHua KnmitJtt, Secaoni U, 3^. 17, 4a

jM,Googlc

X EDITOR'S PREFACE.

to refute Idealism ? Wbere was the acnteneis of the Beids and
Beatties, when Ihaj tanDtingl; asked wby Berkeley did not rna
his bead against a post, did not walk over precifncei, Ac., as, in.
accordance witb bis theor]', do pain, do broken limbs, conld re-
snit?* Where was philosophical acnroeD, wheD a tribe of writers
conld imagine tbej related Berhelej' by an appeal to commoo
BODse— when they contrasted the instinctive beliefs of mankind
with the apecalativB paradoxes of a philosopher, who expressly
took his stand with common sense against philosophers?

"Men trained in metaphysical speculations may find it diffi-
cntt to conceive the non-existence of an invisible, nnknowable sntlH'
atratom; bat that the bulk of mankind find it almost impossible
to conceive any sacb substratum is a fact which the slightest in-
quiry will verity. We have experienced this more than once. We
remember a discussion which lasted an entire evening, in which
by DO power of illustraiion, by no force of argument, conld the
idea of this snbstance, apart from its sensible qualities, be ten*
dered coDcmvable.

"Berkeley, therefore, in denying the existence of niattar,
sided with common sense. He thought with the vnlgar, that mat-
ter was that of which his senses informed him; not an occult
something of which he could have no information. The table he
saw before faim certainly existed : it was bard, polished, coloured,
of a certain figure, and cost some guineas. But there was no
phantom table lying undameath the mfparent tabU — there was
no invisible substance snj^xirling that table. What he perceived
was a table, and nothing more ; what he perceived it td be, he
would believe it to be; and nothing more, tiis starting-point was
thna what the plain dictates of his senses and the senses of all
raen furnished."

bkrKelev's place in the history of philosophv.

" In the philceophies of Descartes (1596-1650) and Locke (163a
-1704)." says Frotessor R, Adamson io the Encyciofadia Britan-

I \ and BfiBr twaoty aach wjie And rational actlooa I j

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EDITOR'S PREFACE. w

Hica, "a laige share at attention bad been directed to the idea of
mattor, which was held to be the abstract, unperceived background
of real experience, and was supposed to give rise to our ideas of
external things through its action on the sentient mind. Knowl-
edge, being limited to the ideas prodnced, conid never eitand to tbe
DDperceived matter, or Bubstance, or caose which produced them,
and it became a problem for speculative science to determiae the
' gronuda for the very belief in its existence. Philosophy seemed
about (o end in scepticisnr or in materialism. ' Now Berkeley pnt
this whole problem in a new tight by pointing out that a prelimi-
nary qneslion must be raised and answered. Before we dednce
results from such abstract ideas as cause, substance, matter, we
must ask what in reality do these mean, — what is the actnal coH'
lent of consciousness which corresponds to these words ? Do not
all these ideas, when held to represent something which exists ab-
solutely apart from all knowledge of it, involve a contradiction 7
Are they not truly, when so regarded, inconceivable, and mere
arbitrary figments which cannot possibly be realised in conscious-
ness 7 In patting this question, not less than in answering It, con-
sists Berkeley's distinct originality as a philoeopher."

This is what Professor Eraser (Life and Letters of Berhdey,
p. 364) has termed the "New Question" abont space and the ma-
terial world, for which Berkeley tried in vain to get a hearing his
whole life long. With it, according to the same author, he inaugn-
rated a ' ' new and second era in the intellectual revolntion which
Descartes set agoing. This Second Period in Modem Philosophy
has been marked by tbe sceptical phenomenalism of Hume (now
represented by Positivism): the Scotch psychology of Common
Sense; and the German critical and dialectical philosophy of

Berkeley's relations to Leibnitz (1646-1716) and Malebranche
(1638-171J) were also characteristic. Knowing the agreement ex-
isting between Locke and Spinoza, the champions of systems so
romoteas empiricism and rationalism, it is not snrpriaing, remarks
Dr. A. Weber in his excellent History of Philosophy,' "to see
a disciple of the English philosopher [Berkeley] offering the hand
of friendship to Leibnitz and Malebranche, tbe champions at in-
tellectnalism and innate ideas across the sea. Although Locke and
bis opponents differ on several essoitial points, tbey reach practi-

• TraDsUted bj Pioleoor TbIIlT, New York, Scrlbnec'g, iggS.

jM,Googlc

xu EDITOR'S PREFACE.

call; the same conclnsians concerniDg tha world ot Ecase, Mal«-
branchoand LeibDiz spiritualiH matter; the; eipUio it as aeon-
fused idea, and nltimatelj assume a piincipls endowed with desire
and perception, that is, mind. Locke's criticism, on the other
band, does not whollf reject the material world ; one half of it is
retained. Extension, form, and motion exist ontside ol ns; bat
neither colors, nor sounds, nor tastes, nor smells exist indepeod-
entlj' of onr sensations. Moreover, Locke attacks the traditional
notion of substance, or snbstratam, and defines real sabstance as
a. combination of qualities. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that
the idea of corporeal substance or matter is as remote from oat
conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual inbslaoce or
spirit! Hence, all that was needed to arrive at the n^ation ot
matter or absolute spiritualism was to efface the distinction which
he had drawn between primary and secondary qualities, and to
call all sensible qtuttities without exception, secondarj. This
George Berkelej did."

The student should now carefully re-read in this connexion
sections 5. 6, 8, X3, 33, 38-36, 50, 86-94 "' ^^^ Princi^s, where
Berkeley's position as to the meaning of reality is defined in un-
mistakable terms. The subjectivisation of reality, which seems
absolute at the start, may be aeen gradually to develop in these
sections into a species of spiritualistic objectificatioD. Sections
35-27 on causality are important here as showing " that voluntary
mental activity is the only Causation in the universe, — that all
Power, as well as all Substance, is essentially menial." Berkeley's
system is, in fact, an cUtsolute, n%omstic spirituaHsm, in which
the dualism ot substances has been completely overcome. "The
universe in which we find ourselves is a universe that consists, in
the last analysis, of mind conscious of ideas or fhtnomena. The
ideas ot sense appear in an order which, because independent of
our individual will, may be called exitrnai to each of us; and
which, being uniform, is capable ot being interpreted." (Eraser,
1., 131.) Berkeley's theory must be sharply distingnished from
Fichte's subjective idealism. Objectivity has not suffered in Ber-
keley's theory ; it has simply been dis/i2ticed from the realm of
unknOTvable matter to that of hnomable mind. This is a most
.important feature of Berkeley's philosophy and one that has been
nearly always unrecognised.

It is to be remembered in this connetion that Berkeley's sys-

jM,Googlc

EDITOR'S PREFACE. xiii

tem is primarilj directed against Keplicism and irreligion, and
tliat it bas therefore pecaliart? merited from both a religiant and
pfailosopbical point ol view Professor Fraser's epithet ol "Theo-
logical or UniversaJised Sensationalism." Berkele;'i ailment
and portion on this point and fais relationship to Matebranche (as
to existence and vision in God) come oat very clearly in the follow-
ing qootation from the Second Dialogoe Between Hylaa aod Pbi-
loDous:

"Phiiotums. I deny that I agreed with yon in those notions
that led to Scepticism. Yon indeed said the reality of sensible
things consisted in an absolute existence ont of the minds of spir-
its, or distinct from their being perceived. And, pursuant to this
notion of reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any real
existence: that is, according to yonr own definition, yon profess
yonrsell a sceptic. But I neither said nor thoagbt the reality of
sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is
evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot
exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclnde, not
that they have no real existence, bat that, seeing thej depend not
on my Ibonghl, and have an existence distinct from being per-
ceived by me, t/iere must be some other mind tuherein they exist.
As sore, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so snre is
there an Infinite omnipresent Spirit, who contains and supports it.

"HyUts. What I this is no more than I and all Christians
hold ; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that
He knows and comprehends all things.

"Phil. Aye, bat here lies the difierence. Men commonly be-
lieve that all things are known or perceived by God, becanse they
believe the being of a God ; whereas I, on the other side, immedi-
ately and necessarily conclnde the being of a God, became all
sensible things must be perceived by him.

"Hyl. But so long as we all believe the same thing, what mat-
ter is it how we come by that belief ?

"Phil. But helther do we agree in the same opinion. For
philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be
percwved by God, yet they attribute to them an absotnle snbsist-
ence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever,
which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying,
There is a God, therefOTo He perceives all things; and sayieg.
Sensible things do not really exist ; and, if they really exist, they

jM,Googlc

xiv EDITOR'S PREFACE.

are necessarily perceived bj an infinite mind : thorelore there is
an inlSnite mind, or God 7 This lumishea yon nilh a direct and
immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the
bting of a God. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all
controversy, from the beanty and niefulness of the several parts
of Ibe cieatioD, that it was the norkmanship of God. But that —
•etting aside all help of astronomy and natoral philosophy, all
contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjnstment ol thing!
— an infinite mind shoald be necessarily inferred from tbe bare
txisttnce of the sensible world, is an advantage to tbem only who
have made this easy reflexion, that Ibe sensible world is that which
we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived
by the senses beside ideas ; and that no idea or an archetype of an
idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. Yon may now, without
any laborious search into tbe sciences, without any subtlety of
reason, or tedious length ol disconrse, oppose and baffle the most
Btrenaons advocate for Atheism ; those miserable refuges, wbelher
in an eternal succession of anthinking causes and effects, or in a
forlnitOQS concourse of atoms ; those wild imaginations of Vanini,
Hobbes, and Spinoza : in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is
. it not efitirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repug-
nancy included in snppo^ng the whole, or any part, even the most
rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without mind?"
As to the function and nature of abstraction in Ihonghl. and
(he reification of general ideas (see the Inlrodnction), Berkeley's
analysis has become classical. Further, he distinctly anticipated,
in bis criticism of the melapbyaical dogma of the thing- in-itself as
existing independently of the phenomenon, the erroneous and
sceptical conclusions to which the great Kant was afterwards so
strangely led in bis Critique of the Pure Reason ; end in bis ani-
madversions on the notions of absolute space, time, etc., upheld
by Newton (sections 110-117), he has in part adumbrated Ibe
strictares of modem scientists.* In his refleiionson matheoiatics
(sections 118 el seq.)he has not been so fortnnate. Tbe difficulties
be saw in the fundamental conceptions of tt>e loflnilesimal Analy-
sis have since been cleared up, and much that be says.on Ibis sub-
ject has now historical significance only ; while a* for bis concep-
tion of the nature of tbe ego and sinritoal substance (sections 137

*See Usch, Mukanlei {CMeaso, 1893), pp. n6eta«q., jii.

jM,Googlc

EDITOR'S PREFACE. xv

et wq-l.these have been rendered altogether nogatwy by modem
pflychok^.i

HEANING OF THE WOSD <MDXA" IN BEKKXLBY'S SYSTXU.

A knowls^a ot BerltBlflf's peculiar nseof the word "idea" ii
necessarj to a perfect nndeTStandittg of hii philosophj, and ne
majr ifaeretore appropriately conclude with a quotation explaining
it. "The little word idea." says Professor Pruer in his £tfe and
Letters of Berkeley ' ' [and it may be added the SO far synonymous
terms sensation and pkeHomenon — for Berkeley may be called a
Sensationalist, or a Phenomenal! st, as well as an Idealist] has been
a formidable obstmction to the intelligibility of this philcMophec.
With him it means both ferce^ and image — not pnra tuition of
. the nnderstanding. And it is with ideas as actual sensation-per-
ceptions that we have to do exclnsivel;, when we are told by him
that the sensible world is corapoaed of ideas. Simply to recollect
what he mean* by idea Is almost to reali«e his conception of the
universe; When (wdioary people are told that idta is the stnfi or
matter of which, according (o Berkeley, the real things of the sen-
sible world are composed, they are apt to take this for an assertion
that what we call seeing and lonchtng is only fancying ; and that
what is seen and touched is to be regarded as a mere subjective or
private dream ot the person's own mind who has the ideas — that
it can have no extension or solidity or permanence. Now, Berke-
ley's ideas include hard and extended facts, and are not mere
fancies ut which we are conscious. He calls them ideas because
be sees it to be self-evident that facts cannot exist positively wilh-
oat a mind to be percipient of them. Nor are we, on the other
hand, to think of Berkeley's ideas, or phenomena perceived in
sense, as independent entities which circnlate among finite spir-
its ; their actual or intelligible eiistence consists in being the mat-
ter of the experience of a conscioos mind — a sui generis sort of '
dependent existence. Bnt no doobt his language is vacillating."

Tbohas J. McCoaHACK.
Ia Salle. III.

• See ttlboi'a •nnuutrltt. JM*Mi« yAri«u/iYr, ate., uid Ibe dim
Id Dr. Pinl Onii-i Wtma and WMlktr, TTu Stmt if Man, ud tlu
^FkOttifl^ (all pobUsliwI by the OpcD CoDit Fob. Co., Chlesfi^.

jM,Googlc

M,Googlc

TREATISE

Concerning the

PRINCIPLES

OF

Human I^hovolege.

PART I.

Wherein the chief CauTes of Error and Dif-
ficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds
of Sce^icijm, Mimfit^ and hret^my are
inquir'd into.'

By George Berkei^^ M A. Fellow of
Trinity-Collegey Dublin,

DVB LIN:

Printed by Aaron Rhamss, for Jbumi
FEfYAT, Book&ller in Slmtur-RffWt 1 7 1 o.

jM,Googlc

jM,Googlc

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE*

THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &c.,

knight of the uost noble order of the garter, and

one or the lords of her majesty's most

honourable privy council.

My Lord,
You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person,
who has not the honour to be known to your lordship,
should presume to address you in this manner. But
that a man who has written something with a design
to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the
world should make choice of your lordship for his pa-
tron, will not be thought strange by. any one that is
not altogether unacquainted with the present state of
the church and learning, and consequently ignorant
how great an ornament and support you are to both.
Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this
present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged
by that candour and native goodness which is so bright
- a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my
lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you
have been pleased to show towards our Society gave
me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance
the studies of one of its members. These considers- ,
tions determined me to lay this treatise at your lord-

*This dedication was not published in the second edition
(1734)-

jM,Googlc

::il\ : .--. : DEDICATION.

ship's feet, and the rather because t was ambitious to
have it known that I am with the truest and most pro-
found respect, on account of that learning and virtue
which the world so justly admires in your lordship.
My Lord,

Your lordship's most humble
and most devoted servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.

jM,Googlc

PREFACE.*

What I here make public has, after a long and
scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently true and
not unuseful to be known — particularly to those who
are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration
of the existence and immateriality of God, or the nat-
ural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or
no I am content the reader should impartially examine ;
since I do not think myself any farther concerned for
the success of what I have written than as it is agree-
able to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer,
I make it my request that the reader suspend his judg-
ment till he has once at least read the whole through
with that degree of attention and thought which the
subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there
are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very
liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpre-
tation, and to be charged with most absurd conse-
quences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal '
will appear not to follow from them; so likewise,
though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be
done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be
mistaken ; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it
will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the
characters of novelty and singularity which some of

*This preface was not published in the editbn of 1734.
3

n,g,t,7l.dM,GOOglC

4 PREFACE.

the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope,
needless to make any apology on that account. He
must surely be either very weak, or very little ac-
quainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth
that is capable of demonstration, for no other reason
but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prej-
udices of mankind. Thus much I thought 5t to
premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty cen-
sures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an
opinion before they rightly comprehend iL

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION.

Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wis-
dom and truth, it may with reason be expected that
those who have spent most time and pains in it should
enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater
clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less dis-
turbed with doubts and difficulties than other men.
Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that
walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are
governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part
easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is fa-
miliar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend.
They complain not of any want of evidence in their
senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Scep-
tics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle,
to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things,
but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds con-
cerning those things which before we seemed fully
to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do
from all parts discover themselves to our view;and,en-
deavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly
drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and incon-
sistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we adr
vance in speculation, till at length, having wandered
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just

jM,Googlc

6 INTRODUCTION.

where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a for-
lorn Scepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity
of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of .
our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have
are few, and those designed by nature for the support
and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the in-
ward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the
mind of man being finite, when it treats of thit^
which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at
if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of
which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it
being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended
by that which is finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves
in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not
rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard
thing to suppose that right deductions from true prin-
ciples should ever end in consequences which cannot
be maintained or made consistent. We should believe
that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of
men than to give them a strong desire for that know-
ledge which he had placed quite out of their reach.
This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent meth-
ods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may
have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish
them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will
not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am in-
clined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of
those difficulties which have hitherto amused philos-
ophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are en-
tirely owing to ourselves — that we have first raised a
dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. 7

what those Principles are which have introduced all
that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities
and contradictions, into the several sects of philosc^hy ;
msomuch that the wisest men have thon^t our igno-
rance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural
dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely
it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict
inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human
Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides,
especially since there may be some grounds to suspect
that those lets and difficulties, which stay and em-
barrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring
from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or na-
tural defect in the understanding, so much as from
. false Principles which have been insisted on, and might
have been avoided.

5. How difficult and dis(X)uraging soever this at-
tempt may seem, when I consider how many great and
extraordinary men have gone before me in the like
designs, yet I am not without some hopes — upon the
consideration that the largest views are not always the
clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be
obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps,
by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had
escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for
the easier conceiving what folkiws, it is proper to
premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning
the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravel-
ling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate
my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had
a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and per-
plexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and
difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that

jM,Googlc

8 INTRODUCTION.

is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing
abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a
perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philos-
ophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of
them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a
more especial manner thought to be the object of those
sciences which go by the name of Logic and Meta-
physics, and of all that which passes under the notion
of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all
which one shall scarce hnd any question handled in
such a manner as does not suppose their existence in
the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or
modes of things do never really exist each of them
apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are
mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the
same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to
consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those
other qualities with which it is united, does by that
means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example,
there is perceived by sig^t an object extended, col-
oured, and moved : this mixed or c(»npound idea the
mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and
viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame
the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion.
Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist
without extension ; but only that the mind can frame to
itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of
extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and
extension.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the par-
ticular extensions perceived by sense there is some-
thing ccMnmon and alike in all, and some other things
peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION, g

distinguish them one from another ; it considers apart
or singles out by itself that which is common, making
thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is
neither line, surface, nor soHd, nor has any figure or
magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all
these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the
particular colours perceived by sense that which dis-
tinguishes them one from another, and retaining that
only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour
in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white,
nor any other determinate colour. And, in like man-
ner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from
the body moved, but likewise from the figure it de-
scribes, and all particular directions and velocities, the
abstract idea of motion is framed ; which equally cor-
responds to all particular motions whatsoever that may
be perceived by sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas
of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision
or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more
compounded beings which include several coexistent
qualities. For example, the mind having observed,
that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in
certain common agreements of shape and other quali-
ties, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea
it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man,
that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is
common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein
all the particulars equally partake — abstracting en-
tirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and
differences which might determine it to any particular
existence. And after this manner it is said we come
by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, human-
ity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is in-

jM,Googlc

10 INTRODUCTION.

eluded colour, because there is no man but has some
colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor
any particular colour, because there is no one particular
colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is in-
cluded stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor
low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something
abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. More-
over, their being a great variety of other creatures
that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex
idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which
are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which
are common to all the living creatures, frames the
idea of anintal, which abstracts not only from all par-
ticular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and in-
sects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of
animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion.
By body is meant body without any particular shape
or figure, there being no one shape or figure common
to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or
feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked : hair, feathers,
scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing pr<^
erties of particular animals, and for that reason left
out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account the
spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor fly-
ing, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but
what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.

lO. Whether others have this wonderful faculty
of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for my-
self [I dare be confident I have it not],* I find indeed
I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to my-
self, the ideas of those particular things I have per-

*The bracketed words were omitted in the second edition
(1734)-

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. ii

ceived, and of variously compounding and dividing
than, I can imagine a man with two heads, or the
upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse.
I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by
itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the
body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it
must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise
the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either
of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a
crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I
cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract
idea above described. And it is equally impossible
for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct
from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor
slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like may be
said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.
To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense,
as when I consider some particular parts or qualities
separated from others, with which, though they are
united in some object, yet it is possible they may really
exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract
from one another, or conceive separately, those quali-
ties which it is impossible should exist so separated;
or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting
from particulars in the manner aforesaid — which last
are the two proper acceptations of abslraclion. And
there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge
themselves to be in my case. The generality of men
which are simple and illiterate never pretend to ab-
stract notions. It is said they are difHcult and not to
be attained without pains and study ; we may therefore
reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are
confined only to the learned.

II. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in

jM,Googlc

12 INTRODUCTION.

defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can
discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation
to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense
as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly
esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very
much countenance, by seeming to think the having
abstract general ideas is what puts the widest differ-
ence in point of understanding betwixt man and beast.
"The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that
which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and
brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of
brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident
we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of
general signs for universal ideas; from which we
have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty
of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they
have no use of words or any other general signs,"
And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may sup-
pose that it is in this that the species of brutes are
discriminated from men, and it is that proper differ-
ence wherein they are wholly separated, and which
at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have
any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some
would have them), we cannot deny them to have some
reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some
of them, in certain instances reason as that they have
sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they
receive them from their senses. They are the best of
them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not
(as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind
of abstraction." — "Essay on Human Understanding,"
B, ii, ch. II. s.io and ii, I readily agree with this
learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no
means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made

jt,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. 13

the distinguishing property of that sort of animals,
I fear a great many of those that pass for men must
be reckoned into their number. The reason that is
here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes
' have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them
no use of words or any other general signs; which is
built on this supposition — that the making use of words
implies the having general ideas. From which it fol-
lows that men who use language are able to abstract
or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and
arguing of the author will further appear by his an-
swering the question he in another place puts : "Since
all things that exist are only particulars, how come we
by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become
general by being made the signs of general ideas."" —
"Essay on Human Understanding," B. iii. ch. 3 s. 6.
But* it seems that a word becomes general by being
made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of
several particular ideas, any one of which it indiffer-
ently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is
said "the change of motion is proportional to the im-
pressed force," or that "whatever has extension is
divisible," these propositions are to be understood of
motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it
will not follow that they sug^st to my thoughts an
idea of motion without a body moved, or any determi-
nate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive
an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither
line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour.

*In the first edition (1710) this sentence began as follows:
'To this I cannot assent being of opinion that a word becomes
general," &c.

jM,Googlc

14 INTRODUCTION.

It is only unified that whatever particular motion I
consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular,
horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the ax-
iom concerning it holds equally true. As does the
other of every particular extension, it matters not
whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that
magnitude or figure.

12. By observing how ideas become general we may
the better judge how words are made so. And here
it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there
are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract
general ideas ; for, in the passages we have quoted
wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always
supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after
the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we
will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of
what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge
that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular,
becomes general by being made to represent or stand
for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To
make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician
is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two
equal parts. He draws, for instance, a bla^k line of
an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular
line, is nevertheless with regard to its significaticm
general, since, as it is there used, it represents all par-
ticular lines whatsoever ; so that what is demonstrated
of it is demonstrated of al! lines, or, in other words,
of a line in general. And, as that particular line be-
comes general by being made a sign, so the name
"line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a
sign is made general. And as the former owes its gen-
erality not to its being the sign of an abstract or gen-
eral line, but of all particular right lines that may pos-

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. iS

sibly eacist, so the latter must be thought to derive its
generality from the same cause, namely, the various
particular lines which it indifferently denotes.

13- To give the reader a yet dearer view of the
nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought
necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the
"Essay on Human Understanding," which is as fol-
lows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to
children or the yet unexercised mind as particular (Hies.
If they seem so to grown men it is only because by
constant and familiar use they are made so. ¥<x, when
we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general
ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that
carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer
themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example,
does it not require scsne pains and skill to form the
general idea of a triangle (which is yet ncnie of the
most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) ; for it
must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilat-
eral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these
at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that can-
not exist, an idea wherein some parts of several dif-
ferent and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is
true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such
ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the
conveniency of communication and enlargement of
knowledge, to both which it ts naturally very much
inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas ■
arc marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough
to show that the most abstract and general ideas are
not those that the mind is first and most easily ac-
quainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is
conversant about." — B. iv. ch. 7. s, 9. If any man has
the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a

jM,Googlc

i6 INTRODUCTION.

triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend
to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All
I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly
inform himself whether he has such an idea or no.
And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to
perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a
little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he
has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond
with the description that is here given of the general
idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rec-
tangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and
none of these at once ?"

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract
ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite
to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed
that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind,
to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects,
and raise them to those sublime speculations that are
conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the
natural ctMsequence should seem to be, that so difficult
a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not neces-
sary for communication, which is so easy and familiar
to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem
obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by
constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I
would fain know at what time it is men are employed
in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing them-
selves with those necessary helps for discourse. It
cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems
they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it
remains therefore to be the business of their childhood.
And surely the great and multiplied labour of fram-
ing abstract noticms will be found a hard task for that
tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. i?

couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-
plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets,
till they have first tacked together numberless incon-
sistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract gen-
eral ideas, and annexed them to every common name
they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit mwe needful for
the etilargement of knowledge than for communication.
.It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowl-
edge and demc«i5tration are about universal notions,
to which I fully agree ; but then it doth not appear to
me that .those notions are formed by abstraction in the
manner premised — universality, so far as I can com-
prehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature
or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears
to the particulars signified or represented by it; by
virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions,
being in their own nature particular, are rendered uni-
versal. Thus, when I demonstrate any propositicMi
concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have
in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought
not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a
triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon,
nor equicrural ; but only that the particular triangle I
consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not,'
doth equally stand for and represent alt rectilinear tri-
angles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All
which seems very plain and not to include any diffi-
culty in it.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know
any proposition to be true of all jKtrticular triangles,
except we have first seen it demonstrated of the. ab-
stract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all?
For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree

j"M,Googlc

i8 - INTRODUCTION.

to scMne one particular triangle, it will not thence fol-
low that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which
in all respects is not the same with it. For example,
having demonstrated that the three angles of an iso-
celes rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones,
I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all
other triangles which have neither a right angle nor
two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain
this proposition is universjdly true, we must either
make a particular demonstration for every particular
triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demon-
strate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all
the particulars do indifferently partake and by which
they are all equally represented. To which I answer,
that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the
demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles
rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate
length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all
other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor
the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at
all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the dia-
gram I have in view includes all these particulars, but
then there is not the least mention made of them in the
proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles
are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a
right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are
of the same length. Which sufficiently shows that the
right angle might have been oblique, and the sides un-
equal, and for all that the demonstration have held
good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that
to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I
had dononstrated of a particular right-angled equi-
crural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. 19

proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. [And
here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider
a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the
particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the
sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never
prove that he can frame an abstract, general, incon-
sistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may con-
sider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as ani-
mal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea,
either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is per-
ceived is not considered.*]

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to
trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstrac-
tion, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths
of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract
natures and notions seems to have led them into. What ■
bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust
have been raised about those matters, and what mighty
advantage has been from thence derived to mankind,
are things at this day too clearly known to need being
insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of
that doctrine were confined to those <xily who make the
most avowed profession of it. When men consider the
great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many
ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement
of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far
greater part of them remains full of darkness and un-
certainty, and disputes that are like never to have an
end, and even those that are thought to be supported
by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain
in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable

*The bracketed sentences nere inserted in the last or 1734
edition.

jM,Googlc

ao INTRODUCTION.

to the understandings of men, and that, taking all to-
gether, a very small portion of them does supply any
real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an
innocent diversion and amusement — I say the consider-
ation of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency
and perfect contempt of all study. But this may per-
haps cease upon a view of the false principles that have
obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none,
methinks, hath a more wide and extended sway over
the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract
general ideas.

i8. I come now to consider the source of this pre-
vailing notion, and that seems to me to be language.
And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself
could have been the source of an opinion so universally
received. The truth of this appears as from other
reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest
patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they
are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear
consequence that if there had been no such thing as
speech or universal sipis there never had been any
thought of abstraction. See B. iii, ch. 6, s. 39, and
elsewhere of the "Essay on Human Understanding."
Let us examine the manner wherein words have con-
tributed to the origin of that mistake. — First then, it
is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one
only precise and settled signification, which inclines
men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas
that constitute the true and only immediate signification
of each general name ; and that it is by the mediation
of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to
signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there
is no such thing as one precise and definite significa-
tion annexed to any general name, they all signifying

jM,Googlc

INTRODJjCTiON. 2i

indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All
which doth evidently follow from what has been already
said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflex-
ion. To this it will be objected that every name that has
' a definition is thereby restrained to one certain significa-
tion. For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain
surface comprehended by three right lines," by which
that name is Hmited to denote ofle certain idea and no
other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is
not said whether the surface be great or small, black
or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal
or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to
each other ; in all which there may be great variety, and
consequently there is no one settled idea which limits
the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing
for to keep a name constantly to the same definition,
and another ito make it stand everywhere for the same
idea ; the one is necessary, the other useless and im-
practicable.

19. But, to give a farther account how words came
to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must he
observed that it is a received opinion that language has
no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that
every significant name stands for an idea. This being
so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are
not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark
out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway con-
cluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there
are many names in use amongst speculative men which
do not always suggest to others determinate, particular
ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will
deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not
necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant
names which stand for ideas should, every time they are

jM,Googlc

aa INTRODUCTION.

used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are
made to stand for — in reading and discoursing, names
being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra,
in which, though a particular quantity be marked by
each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that
in every step each letter surest to your thoughts that
particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by
words is not the chief and only end of language, as is
commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the rais-
ing of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from
an action, the putting the mind in some particular dis-
position — to which the former is in many cases barely
subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these
can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfre-
quently happen in the familiar use of language. I
entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it
doth not often happen, either in- hearing or reading a
discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, ad-
miration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his
mind upon the perception of certain words, without any
ideas ccwning between. At first, indeed, the words
might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce
those emotions ; but, if I mistake not, it will be found
that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing
of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immedi-
ately attended with those passions which at first were
wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that
are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be
affected with the promise of a good thing, though we
have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being
threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread,
thou^ we think not of any particular evil likely to befal
us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in ab-

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. 33

stract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of
his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general names are often
used in the propriety of language without the speaker's
designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which
he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer.
Even proper names themselves do not seem always
spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas
of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by
them. For example, when a schoolman tells me
"Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it
is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the defer-
ence and submission which custom has annexed to that
name. And this effect is often so instantly produced
in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign
their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it
is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or
reputation should go before. [So close and immediate a
connexion may custom establish betwixt the very word ,
Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the
minds of some men,]* Innumerable examples of this
kind may be given, but why should I insist on those
things which every one's experience will, I doubt not,
plentifully suggest unto him ?

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of
Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been
said for them by their ablest patrons ; and endeavored
to show they are of no use for those ends to which they
are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced
them to the source from whence they flow, which ap-
pears evidently to be language. — It cannot be denied

*Tbe bracketed words were omitted in the second edition
(1734).

jM,Googlc

24 INTRODUCTION.

that words are of excellent use, in that by their means
all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased
by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and
nations may be drawn into the view and made the pos-
session of one single person. [But at the same time it
must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been
strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of
words, and general ways of speech wherein they are
delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on
the understanding,]* whatever ideas I consider, I shall
endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view,
keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those
names which long and constant use hath so strictly
united with them ; from which I may expect to derive
the following advantages : —

22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all contro-
versies purely verbal — the springing up of which weeds
in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to
the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly,
this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of
that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so
miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men ;
and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how
much the finer and more curious was the wit of any
man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared
and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I ccmfine

*In the first edition (1710) the bracketed passage read as
follows : "But most parts of knowledge have been so strangely
perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general
ways of speech wherein they are delivered, that it may almost
be made a question whether language has contributed more to
hindrance or advancement of the sciences. Since therefore
words are so apt to impose on the understanding, I am re-
solved in my inquiries to make as lillle use of them as possi-
bly I can : whatever ideas I consider," &c.

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. 25

tny thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do
not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I
consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be
deceived tn thinking I have an idea which I have not.
It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own
ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To dis-
cern the agreements or disagreements there are be-
tween my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any
compound idea and what not, there is nothing more
requisite than an attentive preception of what passes in
my own understanding.

33. But the attainment of all these advantages doth
presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of
words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difHcuIt
a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and
confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and
ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much
increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long
as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their
words, it doth not seem strange ithat they should use
words for ideas — ^it being found an impracticable thing
to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the
mind, which tn'itself was perfectly inconceivable. This
seems to me the principal cause why those men who
have so emphatically recommended to others the lay-
ing aside all use of words in their meditations, and con-
templating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform
it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of
the absurd opinons and insignificant disputes which
grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to
remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to
the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the
words which signify them. But, how good soever this
advice may be they have given others, it is plain they

jM,Googlc

26 INTRODUCTION.

could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as
they thought the only immediate use of words was to
signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of
every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man
may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by
words. He that knows he has no other than particular
ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and
conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And
he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will
spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where
there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be
wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours
to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider,
separating from them all that dress and incumbrance
of words which so much contribute to blind the judg-
ment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend
our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of
thte earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned
men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity — we need
only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree
of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within
the reach of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles
of Knowle<^e from the embarras and delusion of
words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to
no purpose; we may draw consequences from conse-
quences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go,
we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and
be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets,
I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own
thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of
thou^ts in reading that I had in writing them. By this

jM,Googlc

INTRODUCTION. a?

means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or
falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of
being deceived by my words, and I do not see bow he
can be led into an error by considering his own naked,
undi^uised ideas.

jM,Googlc

jM,Googlc

Of the Principles of Human
Knowledge

[PART I.*]

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the
objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas
actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are
perceived by attending to the passions and operations
of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory
and imagination — either compounding, dividing, or
barely representing those originally perceived in the
aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and
colours, with their several degrees and variations. By
touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion
and resistance, and of all these more and less either as
to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with
odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys
sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and com-
position. And as several of these are observed to ac-
company each other, they come to be marked by me
name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for ex-
ample, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and con-

*Oinitted from the title-page of the seond edition (1734),
but retained at this place. The promised Second Part never
appeared.

jM,Googlc

30 OP THE PRINCIPLES

sistcnce having been observed to go tether, are ac-
counted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple;
other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a
book, and the like sensible things — which as they are
pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love,
hatred, joy, grief , and so forth.

2, But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or
objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which
knows or perceives them, and exercises divers opera-
tions, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them.
This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit,
soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any
one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them,
wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, where-
by they are perceived — for the existence of an idea con-
sists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas
formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is
what everybody will aHow. And it seems no less evi-
dent that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on
the sense, however blended or combined together (that
is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist other-
wise than in a mind perceiving them. — I think an in-
tuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one
that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists,
when applied to sensible things. The table I write on
I say exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were out
of my study I should say it existed — meaning thereby
that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that
some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
an odour, that is, it was smelt ; there was a sound, that
is, it was heard ; a colour or figure, and it was perceived

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 31

by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by
these and the like expressions. For as to what is said
of the absolute existence of unthinking things without
any relation to their being perceived, that seems per-
fectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it
possible they should have any existence out of the
minds or thinking^ things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing
amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a
word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or
real, distinct from their being perceived by the under-
standing. But, with how great an assurance and
acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in
the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it
in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve
a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-men-
tioned objects hut the things we perceive by sense? and
what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensa-
tions? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of
these, or any annbination of them, should exist un-
perccived ?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, per-
haps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of
abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of ab-
straction than to distinguish the existence of sensible
objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive
them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat
and cold, extension and figures — in a word the things
we see and feel — what are they but so many sensations,
notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it
possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from
perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a
thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts.

jM,Googlc

32 OF THE PRINCIPLES

or conceive apart from each other, those things whidi,
perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus,
I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs,
or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the
rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract — if
that may properly be calletl abstraction which extends
only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is
possible may really exist or be actually perceived
asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does
not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or
perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or
feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing,
so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts
any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation
or perception of tt [In truth, the object and the sensa-
tion are the same thing, and cannot therefore be ab-
stracted from each other.] *

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the
mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them.
Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the
choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a w<vd
all those bodies which ciHnpose the mighty frame of
the world, have not any subsistence without a mtnd,
that their being is to be perceived or known ; that conse-
quently so long as they are not actually perceived by me,
or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created
spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else
subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit — it being
perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity
of abstractitxi, to attribute to any single part of them
an existence independent of a spirit. [To be convinced
of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to sepa-

"Omitted from the second edition.

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 33

rate in his own thou^ts the being of a sensible thin^
fromits being perceived.]*

7. FKnn what has been said it follows there is not any
other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives.
But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be consid-
ered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion,
smell, taste, etc., i. e, the ideas perceived by sense. Now,
for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a mani-
fest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to
perceive ; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the
like qualities exist must perceive them ; hence it is clear
there can be no unthiaking substance or substratum of
those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not
exist without the mind, yet there may be things like
them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which
things exist without the mind in an unthinking- sub-
stance, I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an
idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another
odour or figure. If we look but never so little into our
thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive
a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask
whether those supposed originals or external things, of
which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be
themselves perceivable or no ? If they are, then they are
ideas and we have gained our point ; but if you say they
are not, I appeal to any me whether it be sense to as-

*In the first edition the bracketed sentence is not found,
but in its place we have the following: "To make this ap-
pear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems
Buflicient if I can but awaken the reflexion of the reader, that
he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and turn
his thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from
all embarras of words and prepossession in favour of received
mistakes."

jM,Googlc

34 OF THE PRINCIPLES

sert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard
or soft, like something which is intangible ; and so of
the rest.

g. Some there are who make a. distinction betwixt
primary and secondary qualities. By the former they
mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impene-
trability, and number ; by the latter they denote all other
sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so
forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not
to be the resemblances of anything existing without the
mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of
the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things
which exist without the mind, in an unthinking sub-
stance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore,
we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in
which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist.
But it is evident from what we have already shown,
that extensicm, figure, and motion are only ideas exist-
ing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing
but another idea, and that consequently nefther they nor
their archetypes can exist in an unpercciving substance.
Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called
Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction
in it.*

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the
rest of the primary or original qualities dp exist without .
the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time

*In the first edition the following passage ended this sec-
tion : "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend
more time in exposing its absurdity. But, because the tenet
of the existence of Matter seems to have taken so deep a root
in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill
consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious
than omit anything that might conduce to the fall discovery
and extirpation of that prejudice."

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 35

acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such-
like secondary qualities, do not — which they tell us are
sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on
and are occasioned by the diiferent size, texture, and
motion of the minute particles of matter. This they
take for an undoubted truth, which theycan demonstrate
beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those
original qualities are inseparably united with the other
sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of
being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they
- exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect
and try whether he can, by any abstracticHi of thought,
conceive the extension and motion of a body without
all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evi-
dently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a
body extended and moving, but I must withal give it
some colour or other sensible quality which- is ac-
knowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, exten-
sion, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qual-
ities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other
sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit,
in the mind and nowhere else.

II. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are al-
lowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being en-
tirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of
the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore
which exists without the mind is neither great nor
small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they
are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in
general, and motion in general : thus we see how much
the tenet of extended movable substances existing with-
out the mind depends on the strange doctrine of ab-
stract ideas. And here I cannot but remark how nearly
the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or

jM,Googlc

36 OF THE PRINCIPLES

corporeal substance, which the modem philosophers
are run into by their own principles, resembles that an-
tiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima,
to be met with in Aristotle and iiis followers. Without
extension solidity cannot be omceived ; since therefore
it has been shewn that extension exists not in an un-
thinking substance, the same must also be true of solid-
ky.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind,
even though the other qualities be allowed to exist with-
out, will be evident to whoever considers that the same
thing bears a different denominaticHi of number as the
mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same
extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as
the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot,
or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and depend-
ent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think
how any one should give it an absolute existence with-
out the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc. ;
all these are equally units, though some contain several

' of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit
relates to some particular combination of ideas arbi- -
trarily put tc^ther by the mind.

13. Unity I know somfi will have to be a simple or
uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into
the mind. That I have any such idea answering the
word unity I do not find ; and if I had, methinks I could
not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the
most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to
accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the
ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is
an abstract idea.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner
as modem philosophers prove certain sensible qualities

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 37

to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, .
\he same thing may be likewise proved of all other sen-
sible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is
said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind,
and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the
corporeal substances which excite them, for that the
same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm
to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that
figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances
of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye
at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at
the same station, they appear various, and cannot there-
fore be the images of anything settled and determinate
without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness
is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing re-
maining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter,
as ia case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it
not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the
mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become
swifter, the motion, it is acknowle<^ed, shall 3i^>ear
slower without any alteration in any external object?*
15. In short, let any one consider those arguments
which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and
taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may
with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of
extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be con-
fessed this method of arguing does not so much prove
that there is no extension or colour in an outward ob-
ject, as that we do not know by sense which is the true
extension or colour of the object. But the arguments
foregoing plainly show it to be impossible that any
colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality

*In the first edition the last seven words read : "without any
external alteration."

jM,Googic

38 * OF THE PRINCIPLES

whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject with-
out the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such ,
thing as an outward object,

i6. But let us examine a little the received opinon.
— It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter,
and that Matter is the substratum that supports it.
Now I desire that you would explain to me what is
meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you, I
have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it.
I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have
any meaning at all, you must at least have a rel-
ative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is,
yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears
to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them.
It is evident "support" cannot here be taken in its usual
or literal sense — as when we say that pillars support a
building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?*

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate
philosophers declare themselves to mean by material
substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no
other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of
Being in general, together with the relative notion of
its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being
appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensi-
ble of all other ; and as for its supporting accidents, this,
as we have just now observed, cannot be understood
in the common sense of those words ; it must therefore
be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do
not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or
branches which make the signification of the words
material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct

*In the first editionthe following sentence occurred here:
"For my part, I am not' able to discover any sense at all that
can be aplicable to it."

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 39

meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble
ourselves any farther, in discussing this material sub-
stratum or support of figure and motion, and other
sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an
existence without the mind ? And is not this a direct
repugnancy, and alt<^ether inconceivable?

i8. But, though it were possible that solid, figured,
movable substances may exist without the mind, cor-
responding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it
possible for us to know this? Either we must know it
by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we
have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or
those things that are immediately perceived by sense,
call them what you will : but they do not inform us that
things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to
those which are perceived. This the materialists them-
selves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we
have any knowledge at all of external things, it must
be by reason, inferring their existence from what is im-
mediately perceived by sense. But what reason can in-
duce us to believe the existence of bodies without the
mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of
Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary
connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is
granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams,
phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is
possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have
now, though there were no bodies existing without
resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition
of external bodies is not necessary for the producing
our ideas; since it is granted they are produced some-
times, and might possibly be produced always in the
same order, we see them in at present, without their
concurrence.

jM,Googlc

40 OF THE PRINCIPLES

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sen-
sations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought
easier to conceive and explain the manner of their pro-
duction, by supposing external bodies in their likeness
rather than otherwise ; and so it might be at least prob-
able there are such things as bodies that excite their
ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said ; for,
though we give the materialists their external bodies,
they by their own confession are never the nearer know-
ing how our ideas are produced ; since they own them-
selves unable to comprehend in what manner body can
act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint
any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the produc-
tion of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no rea-
son why we should suppose Matter or corporeal sub-
stances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally
inexplicable with or without this supposition. If there-
fore it were possible for bodies to exist without the
mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very pre-
carious opinion ; since it is to suppose, without any rea-
son at all, that God has created innumerable beit^s
that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of
purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is im-
possible we should ever come to know it ; and if there
were not, we might have the very same reasons to think
there were that we have now. Suppose — what no one
can deny possible — an intelligence without the help of
external bodies, to be affected with the same train of
sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same
order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask
whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to be-
lieve the existence of corporeal substances, represented
by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you

jM,Gopglc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 41

~ can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of
this there can be no question — which one consideration
were enough to make any reasonable person suspect
the strength of whatever arguments he may think him-
self to have, for the existence of bodies without the
mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof
against the existence of Matter after what has been said,
I could instance several of those errors and difficulties
(not to mention impieties) which have sprungfrom that
tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and
disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater
moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the de-
tail of them in this place, as well because I think argu-
ments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what
has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a
priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak
somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am
needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what
purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demon-
strated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any
one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but look-
ing into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you
can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or mo-
tion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived.
This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what
you contend for is a downright contradiction. In-
somuch that I am content to put the whole upon this
issue: — If you can but conceive it possible for one ex-
tended movable substance, or, in general, for any one
idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than
in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause.

jM,Googlc

43 OF THE PRINCIPLES

And, as for all that compages of external bodies you
contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you
cannot either give me any reason why you believe it
exists, or assign any use to 4t when it is supposed to
exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being
true shall pass for an argument that it is so,

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than
for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or
books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive
them. I answer, you may sfl, there is no difficulty in it ;
but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing
in your mind certain ideas which you call books and
trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea
of any one that may perceive them? But do not you
yourself perceive or think of them all the while ? This
therefore is nothing to the purpose ; it only shews you
have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your
mind : but it does not shew that you can conceive it pos-
sible the objects of your thought may exist without the
mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you con-
ceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which
is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost
to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all
the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the
mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can
and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or with-
out the mind, though at the same time they are appre-
hended by or exist in itself. A little attention will dis-
cover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here
said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other
proofs against the existence of material substance.

24. [Could men but forbear to amuse themselves
with words, we should, I believe, soon come to an

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 43

agreement in this point.]* It is very obvious, upon the
least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is
possible for us to understand what is meant by the
absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or
without the mind. To me it is evident those words mark
out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all.
And to convince others of this, I know no readier or
fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to
their own thoughts ; and if by this attention the empti-
ness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear,
surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction. It
is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute
existence of unthinking things are words without a
meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is
what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend
to the attentive thoughts of the reader,

25. AH our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things
which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be
distinguished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of
power or agency included in them. So that one idea or
object of thought cannot produce or make any altera-
tion in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this,
there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of
our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist
only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them
but what is perceived : but whoever shall attend to his
ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive
in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no
such thing contained in them. A little attention will
discover to us that the very being of an idea implies
passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is im-

*The bracketed aentence is omitted from the second edition.

jM,Googlc

44 OF THE PRINCIPLES

possible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speak-
ing, to be the cause of anything : neither can it be the
resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident
from sect 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension,
figure, and motion cannot be ttit cause of our sensations. '
To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers
resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and
size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas,
some are anew excited, others are changed or totally
disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas,
whereon they depend, and which produces and changes
them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or
combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding sec-
tion. It must therefore be a substance ; but it has been
shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance :
it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an in-
corporeal active substance or Spirit.

27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being —
as it perceives ideas it is called the understimding, and
as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is
called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of
a soul or spirit ; for all ideas whatever, being passive
and inert (Vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto
us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A
little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have
an idea which shall be like that active principle of mo-
tion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such
is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot
be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it
produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what
is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can
frame the idea of any power or active being, and wheth-
er he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 45

the names will and unSerstanding, distinct from each
other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being
in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or be-
ing the subject of the aforesaid powers — which is signi-
fied by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold ;
but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do
not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea
at all, but for something which is very different from
ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto,
or represented by, any idea whatsoever, [Though it
must be owned at the same time that we have some
notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind :
such as willing, loving, hating — inasmuch as we know
or understand the meaning of these words.] *

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure,
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit It
is no more than willing, and straightway this or that
idea arises in my fancy ; and by the same power it is
obliterated and makes way for another. This making
and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate
the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded
on experience ; but when we think of unthinking agents
or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only
amuse ourselves with words.

29, But, whatever power I may have over my own
thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived hy Sense
have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad
daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose
whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particu-
lar objects shall present themselves to my view ; and so
likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas
imprinted on thetn are not creatures of my will. There

*Tbe bracketed sentence was added to the last edition.

jM,Googlc

46 OF THE PRINCIPLES

is therefore some olker Will or Spirit that produces
them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and
distinct than those of the imagination ; they have like-
wise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not
excited at random, as those which are the effects of hu-
man wills often are, but in a regular train or series,
the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies
the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the
set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we
depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called
the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience,
which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended
with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course
of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables
us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And
without this we should be eternally at a loss ; we could
not know how to act anything that might procure us
the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense.
That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms
us ; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in
the harvest ; and in general that to obtain such or such
ends, such or such means are conducive — all this we
know, not by discovering any necessary connexion
between our ideas, but only by the observation of the
settled laws of nature, without which we should be all
in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no
more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life
than an infant just bom.

32. And yet this ccoisistent uniform working,
which so evidently displays the goodness and wis-
dom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes
the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 47

to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after sec-
ond causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of
Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know
this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute
power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make
one the cause of another, than which nothing can be
more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example,
having observed that when we perceive by sight a cer-
tain round luminous figure we at the same time per-
ceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do
from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat.
And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision
of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined
to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author
of nature are called real things; and those excited in
the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant,
are more properly termed ideas, or images of things,
which they copy and represent. But then our sensa-
tions, be they never so vivid and distinct, are never-
theless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are per-
ceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing.
The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality
in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and co-
herent than the creatures of the mind ; but this is no
argument that they exist without the mind. They are
also less dependent on the spirrtj or thinking substance
which perceives them, in that they are excited by the
will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they
are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong,
can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we
spend some time in answering objections which may

jM,Googlc

48 OF THE PRINCIPLES

probably be made against the principles we have
hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too
prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may
be pardoned, smce all men do not equally apprehend
thin^ of this nature, and I am willing to be under-
stood by every one.

First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing
principles all that is real and substantial in nature is
banished otrt of the world, and instead thereof a chi-
merical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that ex-
ist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely no-
tional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and
stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, moun-
tains, trees, stones ; nay, even of our own bodies ? Are
all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the
fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same
sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles
premised we are not deprived of any one thing in na-
ture. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive
or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real
as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction
between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
This is evident from sect, 29, 30, and 33, where we
have shewn what is meant by real things in opposition
to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; but then they
both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they
are alike ideas.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one
thing that we can apprehend either by sense or re-
flexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch
with my hands do exist,really exist,! make not the least
question. The only thingwhose existence we denyis that
which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.
And in doing of this there is no damage done to the

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 40

rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it,
ITic Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty
name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers
may possibly find they have lost a great handle for
trifling and disputation. [But that is all the harm that
I can see done.]*

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the exist-
ence or reality of things, he is very far from under-
standing what hath been premised in the plainest terms
I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has
been said: — There are spiritual substances, minds, or
human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves
at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady
in respect of others they perceive by sense — which,
being impressed upon them according to certain rules
or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a
mind more powerful and wise than human spirits.
These latter are said to have more reality in them than
the former: — by which is meant that they are more
affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not
fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense
the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which
I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the
sense here given of reaiity it is evident that every v^-
etable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the
mundane system, is as much a real being by our prin-
ciples as by any other. Whether others mean anything
by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat
them to look into their own thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true,
to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To
this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken

"Omitted from second edition.

jM,Googlc

so OF THE PRINCIFLBS

in the vulgar sense — for a combination of sensible
qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the
like — this we cannot be accused of taking away: but
if it be taken in a philosophic sense — for the support of
accidents or qualities without the mind — then indeed
I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said
to take away that which never had any existence, not
even in the imagination.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to
say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas.
I acknowledge it does so — the word idea not being used
in common discourse to signify the several combina-
tions of sensible qualities which are called things; and
it is certain that any expression which varies from the
familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous.
But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition,
which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed
and clothed with those things which we perceive imme^
diately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the
colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities,
which combined together constitute the several sorts of
victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in
the mind that perceives them ; and this is all that is
meant by calling them ideas; which word if it was as or-
dinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor
more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing
about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If
therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and
are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which
cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall
readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom
that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word
idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom call

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 5*

them things; I answer, I do it for two reasons : — first,
because the term thing in contradistinction to idea, is
generally-supposed to denote somewhat existing with-
out the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more
comprehensive signification than idea, including spirit
or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore
the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are
withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them
by the word idea, which implies those properties.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be
apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never
suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to pre-
vail over the certainty of them. Be it so ; assert the
evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing
to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth ex-
ist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt
than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the
testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the ex-
istence of anything which is not perceived by sense.
We are not for having any man turn sceptic and dis-
believe his senses ; on the contrary, we give them all
the stress and assurance imaginable ; nor are there any
principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we
have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great
di£Ferfflce betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea
of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt,
and actually being so : if you suspect it to be only the
idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into
it and you will be convinced with a witness. This
and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets.
To all which the answer is evident from what hath
been already said ; and I shall only add in this place,

jM,Googlc

S3 OF THE PRINCIPLES

that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire,
so also is the real pain that it occasions very different
from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will
pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in
an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more
than its idea.

42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things
actually without or at distance from us, and which con-
sequently do not exist in the mind ; it being absurd that
those things which are seen at the distance of several
miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In
answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a
dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great
dbtance off, and yet for all that, those things are ac-
knowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may
be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive
distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For,
that we should in truth see external space, and bodies
actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther
off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what
hath been said of their existing nowhere without the
mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that
gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of
Vision," which was published not long since, wherein
it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immedi-
ately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended
or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath
a necessary connexion with it ; but that it is only sug-
gested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and
sensations attending vision, which in their own nature
have no manner of similitude or relation either with
distance or things placed at a distance ; but, by a con-

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 53

nexion taught us by experience, they come to signify
and surest them to us, after the same manner that
words of any language suggest the ideas they are made
to stand for ; insomuch that a man born blind and after-
wards made to see, would not, at hrst sight, think the
things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance
from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species
entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The fonner are
marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper
objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the
images of external things, was shewn even in that
treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary
be supposed true of tangible objects — not that to sup-
pose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing
the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside
my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse con-
cerning Vision. So that in strict truth the ideas of
pight, when we apprehend by them distance and things
placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us
things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish
us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds
at such and such distances of time, and in consequence
of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from
what has been said in the foregoing parts of this
Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay
concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language
whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend in-
forms us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint
upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our
own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point
I refer to the Essay itself.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the fore-

jM,Googlc

54 OF THE PRINCIPLES

going principles it follows things are every moment
annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense ex-
ist only when they are perceived ; the trees therefore are
in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer
than while there is somebody by to perceive them.
Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is
reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them
it is again created. In answer to all which, I refer
the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c,, and
desire he will consider whether he means anything by
the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being
perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I
could make, I am not able to discover that anything
else is meant by those words ; and I once more entreat
the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer
himself to be imposed on by words. If he can con-
ceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes
to exist without being perceived, then I give up the
cause ; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is un-
reasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows
not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity
the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom
have no meaning in them.

46, It will not be amiss to observe how far the re-
ceived principles of philosophy are themselves charge-
able with those pretended absurdities. It is thought
strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all tlie
visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing ;
and yet is not this what philosophers commonly ac-
knowledge, when they agree on all hands that light
and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate
objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no
longer than they are perceived ? Again, it may to some
perhaps seem very incredible' that thit^ should be

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 55

every moment creating, yet this very notion is com-
monly taught in the schools. For the Schoobnen,
though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and
that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it,
are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist with-
out the divine conservation, which by them is ex-
pounded to be a continual creation.

47- Farther, a little thought will discover to us that
though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal
substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the prin-
ciples which are now generally admitted, that the par-
ticular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them
exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident
from sect ii and the following sections, that the
Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible
somewhat, which hath none of those particular quali-
ties whereby the bodies falling under our senses are
distinguished one from another. But, to make this
more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divis-
ibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least
by the most approved and considerable philosophers,
who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond
all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite
number of parts in each particle of Matter which are
not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any
particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or
exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not
because it contains no more, since in itself it contains
an infinite number of parts, but because the sense
is not acute enough to discern them. In propor-
tion therefore as the sense is rendered more
acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the
object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure
varies, those parts in its extremities which were before

jM,Googlc

S6 OF THE PRINCIPLES

unperceivable appearing now to botiod it in very differ-
ent lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser
sense. And at length, after various changes of size and
shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body
shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alter-
ation in the body, but only in the sense. Each body
therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended,
and consequently void of all shape or figure. From
which it follows that, though we should grant the ex-
istence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal
as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own
principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the par-
ticular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like
them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each
particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shape-
less, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of
bodies which compose the visible world, any one where-
of does not exist longer than it is perceived.

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect.
45 will not be found reasonably charged on the princi-
ples we have premised, so as in truth to make any ob-
jection at all against our notions. For, though we hold
indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas
which cannot exist unperceived ; yet we may not hence
conclude they have no existence except only while they
are perceived by us, since there may be s(Hne other
spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever
bodies are said to have no existence without the mind,
I would not be understood to mean this or that par-
ticular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not
therefore follow from the foregoing principles that
bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or
exist not at all during the intervals between our per-
ception of thera.

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 57

49, Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if ex-
tension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows
that the mind is extended and figured ; since extension
is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools)
is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer,
those qualities are in the mind only as they are per-
ceived by it — that is, not by way of mode or attribute,
but only by way of idea; and it no more follows the
soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in
it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those
colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it,
and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of
subject and mode, that seems very groundless and un-
intelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is
hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the
word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from
the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated
of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot compre-
hend : to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from
those things which are termed its modes or accidents.
And, to ^y a die is hard, extended, and square is not
to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from
and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of
meaning of the word die,

50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great
many things explained by matter and motion; take
away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular
philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles
which have been applied with so much success to ac-
count for the phencnnena. In short, whatever advances
have been made, either by ancient or modem philoso-
phers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the sup-
position that corporeal substance or Matter doth really

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58 OF THE PRINCIPLES

exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phe<
nomenon explained on that supposition which may not
as well be explained without it, as might easily be made
appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the
phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and
such occasions, we are affected with such and such
ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or
produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pre-
tend to explain ; it is therefore evident there can be no
use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they
who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal
substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities,
which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, there-
fore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been
already shewn. See sect 25.

51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether
it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes,
and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of
Spirits ? We must no longer say upon these principles
that fire beats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats,
and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed
at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he
would so; in such things we ought to "think with the
learned, and speak with the vulgar." They who to
demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Coper-
nican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the
sun sets," or "comes to the meridian;" and if they
affected a contrary style in common talk it would with-
out doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on
what is here said will make it manifest that the ccvnmon
use of language would receive no manner of alteration
or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52, In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 59

be retained, so long as they excite in us proper senti-
ments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is
necessary for our well-being, how false soever they
may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay,
this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated
by custom, language is suited to the received opinions,
which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossi-
ble, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so
far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak,
as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend diffi-
culties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous
reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor
and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for
those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made
inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal
Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some
of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the
modem philosophers, who though they allow Matter
to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate
efficient cause of all things. These men saw that
amcmgst all the objects of sense there was none which
had any power or activity included in it ; and that by
consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies
they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the
immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should
suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings,
which they acknowledge are not capable of producing
any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made
to no manner of purpose, since God might have done
everything as well without them : this I say, though
we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unac-
countable and extravagant supposition.

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent

jM,Googlc

6o OP THE PRINCIPLES

assent of mankind may be thought by some an invinci-
ble argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of
external things. Must we suppose the whole world to
be mistaken ? And if so, what cause can be assigned
of so widespread and predominant an error ? I answer,
first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps
be found so many as is imagined do really believe the
existence of Matter or things without the mind.
Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a con-
tradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible ; and
whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort,
I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader.
In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that
Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediats
cause of their sensations, which affects them every
moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some
senseless unthinking being. But, that they should
clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words,
and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what
I am not able to conceive. This is not the caily in-
stance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imag-
ining they believe those propositions which they have
often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning
in them.

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion
to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to,
yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever con-
siders what a vast number of prejudices and false
opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost
tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far
greater) part of mankind. There was a time when
the antipodes and motion of the earth were locked upon
as monstrous absurdities even by men of leammg: and
if it be considered what a small proportion they bear

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 6i

to the rest of mankind, we shall iind that at this day
those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable
footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this
prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world.
To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived
several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the
authors — as not being excited from within nor depend-
ing on the operation of their wills — this made them
maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an
existence independent of and without the mind, with-
out ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved
in those words. But, philosophers having plainly
seen that the immediate objects of percepticm
do not exist without the mind, they in some
degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar ; but
at the same time run into another which seems
no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects
really existing without the mind, or having a subsist-
ence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas
are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those
objects on the mind. And this notion of the philoso-
phers owes its origin to the same cause with the former,
namely, their being conscious that they were not the
authors of their own sensations, which they evidently
knew were imprinted from without, and which there-
fore must have some cause distinct from the minds on
which they are imprinted.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense
to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not
rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may
be accounted for, first, because they were not aware
of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things

jM,Googlc

6a OP THE PRINCIPLES

like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing
to them power or activity. Secondly, because the
Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds,
is not marked out and limited to our view by any par-
ticular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human
agents are by their size, complexion, lunbs, and mo-
tions. And thirdly, because His operaticms are regular
and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is inter-
rupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence
of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on
in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any
reflexion ; their order and concatenation, though it be
an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and good-
ness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar
to us that we do not think them the immediate elTects
of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and
mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is
looked on as a mark of freedom.

58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we
advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in
philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion
of the earth is now universally admitted by astrono-
mers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most con-
vincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles,
there can be no such thing. For, motion being only
an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists
not ; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by
sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood,
will be found to agree with the principles we have
premised; for, the question whether the earth moves
or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit,
whether we have reason to conclude, from what has
been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 63

in such and such circumstances, and such or such a
position and distance both from the earth and sun,
we should perceive the former to move among the choir
of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of
them ; and this, by the established rules of nature which
we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected
from the phenomena,

59. We may, from the experience we have had of
the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often
make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure
and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas
we shall be afEected with pursuant to a great train of
actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of
what would have appeared to us, in case we were
placed in circumstances very different from those we
are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of
nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very
coi^istently with what hath been said. It will be easy
to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort
may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any
other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what
purpose serves that curious organization of plants,
and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals;
might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of
blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as
well without as with all that variety of internal parts
so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being
ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them,
nor have any necessary connexion with the effects
ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately
produces every effect by a Hat or act of his will, we
must think all that is fine and artificial in the works.

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64 OF THE PRINCIPLES

whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this
doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and
wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted
them in such a manner as he knew would produce
the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done
to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which di-
rects the index, and points to the hour of the day. If
so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his
being at the pains of making the movements and put-
ting them together? Why does not an empty case
serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass
that whenever there is any fault in the going of a
watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be
found in the movements, which being mended by a
skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said
of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is
so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned
by the best microscope. In short, it will be a^ed,
how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can
be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumera-
ble multitude of bodies and machines, framed with
the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy
have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to
explain abundance of phenomena?

6i. To all which I answer, first, that though there
were some difficulties relating to the administration of
Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several
parts of nature, which I could not solve by the fore-
going principles, yet this objection could be of small
weight against the truth and certainty of those things
which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evi-
dence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither
are the received principles free from the like diffi-
culties; for, it may stih be demanded to what end

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 65

God should take those roundabout methods of effect-
ing things by instruments and machines, which no
one can deny might have been effected by the mere
ccmmajtd of His will without all that apparatus;
nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the
objection may be retorted with greater force on
those who hold the existence of those machines with-
out of mind; for it has been made evident that
solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have
no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of
producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25.
Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing
the supposition possible) when they are not perceived
does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use
that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is
that they produce those perceivable effects which- in
truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difRculty, it must be
observed that though the fabrication of all those parts
and organs be not absolutely necessary to the produc-
ing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of
things in a constant regular way according to the laws
of nature. There are certain general laws that run
through the whole chain of natural effects ; these are
learned by the observation and study of nature, and are
by men applied as well to the framing artificial things
for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining
various phenomena — which explication consists only
in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon
hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the
same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in
the production of natural effects ; as will be evident to
whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein
philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That

jM,Googlc

« OF THE PRINCIPLES

there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular
constant methods of working observed by the Supreme
Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less
visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and dis-
position of parts are necessary, though not absolutely
to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it ac-
cording to the standing mechanical laws of nature.
Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or
the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary
course of things, might if He were minded to produce
a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a
watch, though nobody had ever made the movements
and put them in it : but yet, if He will act agreeably
to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends es-
tablished and maintained in the creation, it is necessary
that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he
makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, pre-
cede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also
that any disorder in them be attended with the percep-
tion of some corresponding disorder in the movements,
which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary
that the Author of nature display His overruling
power in producing some appearance out of the ordi-
nary series of things. Such exceptions from the gen-
eral rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe
men into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being;
but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise
there is a plain reason why they should fail of that
effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convinc-
ing our reason of His attributes by the works of na-
ture, which discover so much harmony and contri-
vance in their make, and are such plain indications of

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 67

wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than
to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous
and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall
observe that what has been objected in sect. 60
amounts in reality to no more than this : — ideas are not
anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain
order and connexion between them, like to that of
cause and effect; there are also several combinations
of them made in a very regular and artificial manner,
which seem like so many instruments in the hand of
nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes,
have a secret operation in producing those appearances
which arc seen on the theatre of the world, being them-
selves discernible only to the curious eye of the phil-
osopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of
another, to what purpose is that connexion? And,
since those instruments, being barely inefficacious per-
ceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the pro-
duction of natural effects, it is demanded why they
are made; or, in other words, what reason can be
assigned why God should make us, upon a close in-
spection into His works, behold so great variety of
ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according
to rule; it not being [credible]* that He would be at
the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and
regularity to no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the con-
nexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause
and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing
signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the
pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark
that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that

•"Imaginable" in the first edition.

jM,Googlc

68 OF THE PRINCIPLES

I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or col-
lision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Sec-
ondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines,
that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same
with that for combining letters into words. That a
few original ideas may be made to signify a great num-
ber of effects and actions, it is necessary they be vari-
ously combined together. And, to the end their use
be permanent and universal, these combinations must
be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this
means abundance of information is conveyed unto us,
concerning what we are to expect from such and such
actions and what methods are proper to be taken for
the exciting such and such ideas ; which in effect is alt
that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said
that, by discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism
of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or arti-
ficial, we may attain to know the several uses and
properties depending thereon, or the nature of the
thing.

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which,
under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring
to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable,
and run us into great absurdities, may be very natur-
ally explained, and have a proper and obvious use
assigned to them, when they are considered only as
marks or signs for our information. And it is the
searching after and endeavouring to understand {those
signs instituted by the Author of Nature]*, that ought
to be the emplo)fment of the natural philosopher ; and
not the pretending to explain things by corporeal
causes, which doctrine seems to have too much es-

*In the first edition the bracketed phrase reads as follows:
"this Language (if I may so call it) of the Author of Nature."

jM,Googlc

■ OP Human knowledge. eg

tranged the minds of men from that active principle,
that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move,
and have our being."

67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected
that — though it be clear from what has been said that
there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, ex-
tended, solid, figured, movable substance existing with-
out the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter — ;
yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter
the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and
motion, and say that he means only by that word
an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the
mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our
ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to
excite ideas in us : it doth not appear but that Matter
taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to
which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to sup-
pose a substance without accidents, than it is to sup-
pose accidents without a substance. But secondly,
though we should grant this unknown substance may
possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be?
That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it
exists not in place is no less certain — since all place or
extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already
proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at
all.

68. Let us examine a little the description that is
here given us of mailer. It neither acts, nor perceives,
nor is perceived ; for this is all that is meant by saying
it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance ; which
is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting
only the relative notion of its standing under or sup-
porting. But then it must be observed that it supports
nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the de-

jM,Googlc

70 OF THE PRINCIPLES

scription of a nonentity I desire may be considered.
But, say you, it is tlie unknown occasion, at the pres-
ence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of
God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be
present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor
reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our
minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor
exists in any place. The words "to be present," when
thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and
strange meaning, and which I am not able to compre-
hend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion.
So far as I can gather from the common use of lan-
guage, that word signifies either the agent which pro-
duces any effect, or else stxnething that is observed to
accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of
things. But when it is applied to Matter as above de-
scribed, it can be taken in neither of those senses ; for
Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be
an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable,
as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot
be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense:
as when the burning my finger is said to be the occa-
sion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can
be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is
either used in no sense at all, or else in some very
distant from its received signification.

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be
not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God,
to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our
minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations
to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it
is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant
and regular occasions of their being produced. That is

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 71

to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct
parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which,
though they do not excite them in our minds, or any-
wise immediately affect us, as being ahogether passive
and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God,
by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occa-
sions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint
on our minds ; that so things may go on in a constant
uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion
of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer con-
cerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit
and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but
whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what
sort, in the mind of God which are so many marks or
notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our

* minds in a constant and regular method — much after
the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes
of music to produce that harmonious train and compo-
sition of sound which is called a tune, though they who
hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be
entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter
[which after all is the only intelligible one that I can
pick, from what is said of unknown occasions]* seems
too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Be-
sides, it is in effect no objection against what we have
advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived
substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from
the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect
the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites

s omitted in the

jM,Googlc

73 OF THE PRINCIPLES

them in oar minds; but this is all that I can see
reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is
evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good,
and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the
appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless
Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least con-
nexion with it, or Jeads to the thoughts of it. And I
would fain see any one explain any the meanest phe-
nomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of
reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that
he can have for its existence, or even make any toler-
able sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to
its being an occasicMi, we have, I think, evidently shewn
that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains
therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God
of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we
have just now seen.

73, It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives
which induced men to suppose the existence of material
substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing
and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may
proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded
on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour,
figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or
accidents, did really exist without the minfl; and for
this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthink-
ing sttbstratum or substance wherein they did exist,
since they could not be conceived to exist by them-
selves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being
convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest 'of
the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence
without the mind, they stripped this substratum or
material substance of those qualities, leaving only the
primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 73

still conceived to exist without the mind, aqd conse-
quently to stand in need of a material support. But,
it having been shewn that none even of these can possi-
bly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which
perceives them it follows that we have no longer any
reason to suppose the being of Matter ; nay, that it is
utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so
long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking
substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they eiist
without the mind,

^4. But though it be allowed by the materialists
themselves that Matter was thought of only for the
sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely
ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally,
and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of
what was solely grounded thereon ; yet the prejudice
is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce
tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined,
since the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain
the name, which we apply to I know not what ab-
stracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion,
though without any show of reason, at least so far as
I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do
we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions
which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or
reHexion, from whence may be inferred the existence
of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on
the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit,
what can there be that should make us believe or even
suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite
ideas in our minds?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force
of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind
of man retains so great a fondness, against all the

jM,Googlc

?4 OF THE PRINCIPLES

evidoice of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat,
by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen
itself from the Providence of God, and remove it
farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though
we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter,
though, when reason forsakes us,- we endeavour to
support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing,
and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of
an imagination not regulated by reason to make out
that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there
are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for
this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by
occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom
is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the
mind of God, and whether they may be called by the
name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to
the notion of an imthinking substance or support of
extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to
me it is most evidently impossible there should be any
such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those
qualities should exist in or be supported by an unper-
ceiving substance.

yy. But, say you, though it be granted that there
is no thoughtless support of extension and the other
qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may
perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or sub-
strotum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to
us as colours are to a man bom blind, because we have
not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new
sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their exist-
ence than a blind man made to see does of the exist-
ence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you
mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 7S

of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is
such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us ; and
I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about
what we know not what, and we know not why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could
only furnish us with new ideas or sensations ; and then
we should have the same reason against their existing
in an unperceiving substance that has been already
offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the
like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else
but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind
perceiving them ; and this is true not only of the ideas
we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all
possible ideas whatsoever.

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to
believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot
assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even
conceive what is meant by that word ? yet still it is no
contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this
Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas;
though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or
adhere to any particular explication of those words
may be attended with great difficulties, I answer,
when words are used without a meaning, you may put
them together as you please without danger of running
into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that
twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you
do not take the words of that proposition in their usual
acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And,
by the same reason, you may say there is an inert
thoughtless substance without accidents which is the
occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just
as much by one proposition as the other.

jM,Googlc

76 OF THE PRINCIPLES

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give
up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it
that Matter is an unknown somewhat — neither sub-
stance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless,
indivisible, immovable, uneztended, existing in no
place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against
substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative
notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this
negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer,
you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word
"Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing,"
and so make those terms convertible in your style.
For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the
result of that definition, the parts whereof when I
consider with attention, either collectively or separate
from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of
effect or impression made on my mind diflferent from
what is excited by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid
definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish
it from nothing — the positive abstract idea of quiddity,
entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pre-
tend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas
do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they,
the most abstract and general notion of all ; that is, to
me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That
there are a great variety of spirits of different orders
and capacities, whose faculties both in number and ex-
tent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has
bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me
to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted
narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the tnexhaustt-
ble power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon
them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption

jM,Googlc

. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 7?

— since there may be, for aught that I know, innumer-
able sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one
another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours
are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to
acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with
regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that
may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a no-
tion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and
idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect,
a downright repugnancy and trifling with words. —
It remains that we consider the objections which may
possibly be made on the part of Religion.

82. Some there are who think that, though the argu-
ments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn
from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstra-
tion, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point,
as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that
bodies do really exist, and are something more than
mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable
facts related which evidently suppose the reality of
timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and
human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of
writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those
and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as
to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having
their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all
those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even
corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense,
has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles ; and
the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and
chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29,
30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what

jM,Googlc

?8 OP THE PRINCIPLES

philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects
without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture,

83. Again, whether there can be or be not external
■ things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of

words is the marking our conceptions, or things tmly
as they are known and perceived by us; whence it
plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down
there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and
significancy of language, and that discourse, of what _
kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undis-
turbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has
been lai^ly set forth in the premises, that it is needless
to insist any farther on it,

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least,
lose much of their stress and import by our principles.
What must we think of Moses' rod ? was it not really
turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of
ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be
supposed that our Saviour did no more at the mar-
riage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell,
and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the ap-
pearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said
of all other miracles ; which, in consequence of the fore-
going principles, must be looked upon only as so many
cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the
rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into
real wine. That this does not in the least contradict
what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect.
34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary
has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so
often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so
easily answered from what has gone before, that it
were an affront .to the reader's understanding to re-
sume the explication of it in its place. I shall cnly

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 79

observe that if at table all who were present should see,
and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the
effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its
reality; so that at bottom the scruple concerning real
miracles has no place at all on oiirs, but only on the
received principles, and consequently makes rather for
than against what has been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I en-
deavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave
them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in
the next place to take a view of our tenets in their
Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight-
as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which
abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are
entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether corpo-
real substance can think," "whether Matter be infi-
nitely divisible," and "how it operates on spirit" —
these and like inquiries have given infinite amusement
to philosophers in all ages ; but, depending on the exist-
ence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our
principles. Many other advantages there are, as well
with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy
for any one to deduce from what has been premised ;
but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.

86. From the principles we have laid down it fol-
lows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to
two heads — that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each
of these I shall treat in order.

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our
knowledge of these hath been very mudi obscured and
confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous
errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects

jM,Googlc

8o OF THE PRINCIPLES

of sense — the one intelligible or in the mind, the other
real and without the mind; whereby unthinking things
are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own
distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which,
if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most ground-
less and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism ;
for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted
without the mind, and that their knowledge was only
so far forth real as it was conformable to real things,
it follows they could not be certain they bad any real
knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the
things which are perceived are conformable to those
which are not perceived, or exist without tEe mind?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like,
considered cmly as so many sensations in the mind, are
perfectly known, there being nothing in them which
is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or
images, referred to things or archetypes existing with-
out the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism.
We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities
of things. What may be the extension, figure, or mo-
tion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it
is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or
relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the
same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even
whether any of them at all, represent the true quality
really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to
determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see,
hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera,
and not at all agree with the real things existing in
rerum natura. All this scepticism* follows from our
supposing a difference between things and ideas, and
that the former have a subsistence without the mind or

* "Sceptical cant" were the words used in the first edition.

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. &i

unperceived. It were easy to dilate on tbi? subject,
and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all
ages depend on the supposition of external objects.
[But this is too obvious to need being insisted upon.]*'

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to un-
thinking things, distinct from their being perceived,
it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence
the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that
it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust
their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and
earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own
bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of
thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to
any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the
existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness,
which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes
philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of tfie world, vanishes
if we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse
ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "ex-
ist," and such like, signifying we know not what. I
can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of
those things which I actually perceive by sense; it
being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object ,
should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and
at the same time have no existence in nature, since the
very existence of an unthinking being consists in being
perceived.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards
erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge,
which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism,
than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of
what is meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain

♦Omitted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

fi2 OF THB PRINCIPLES

shall we dispute omcerning the real existence oi
things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as
we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing
or Being is the most general name of all ; it compre-
hends under it two kinds entirely distinct and hetero-
geneous, and which have nothing common but the
name, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active,
indivisible substances : the latter are inert, Seeting, de-
pendent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but
are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual sub-
stances.* We comprehend our own existence by inward
feeling or retlexion, and that of other spirits by reason.
We may be satd to have some knowledge or notion of
our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof
in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner,
we know and have a notion of relations between things
or ideas — which relations are distinct from the ideas
or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be per-
ceived by us without our perceiving the former. To
me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in
their respective kinds the object of human knowledge
and subject of discourse ; and that the term idea would
be improperly extended to signify everything we know
or have any notion of.

90, Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things,
or do really exist ; this we do not deny, but we deny
they can subsist without the minds which perceive
them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes
existing without the mind ; since the very being of a

*In the first edition section 89 ended at this point, and its
concluding sentence instead of as it here stands. read as fol-
lows: "The former are active, indivisible, incorruptible, sub-
stances: the latter are inert. Heeling, perishable passions or de-
pendent beings . . . spiritual substances,"

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 83

sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an
idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things
perceived by sense may be tenned external, with re-
gard to their origin — in that they are not generated
from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a
Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensi-
ble objects may likewise be said to be "without the
mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in
some other mind ; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things
I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said
derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is
acknowledged, on the received principles, that exten-
sion, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have
need of a support, as not being able to subsist by them-
selves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed
to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and
consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it
is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things
perceived by sense an existence independent of a sub-
stance of support wherein they may exist, we detract
nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and
are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the
difference is that, according to us, the unthinkii^ be-
ings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from
being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any
other substance than those unextended indivisible sub-
stances or spirits which act and think and perceive
them ; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold tliat the sen-
sible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiv-
ing substance which they call Matter, to which they
attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking
beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind
whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator,

jM,Googlc

84 OF THE PRINCIPLES

wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal sub-
stances created by him ; if indeed they allow them to
be at all created.

92, For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter
or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar
and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same
foundation have been raised all the impious schemes
of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty
has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of
nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient
philosophers, even of those who maintained the being
of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and
coeternal with Him. How great a friend material sub-
stance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to
relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible
and necessary a dependence on it that, when this cor-
ner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot
choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no
longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration
on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

93. That impious and profane persons should read-
ily fall in with those systems which favour their incli-
nations, by deriding immaterial substance, and suppos-
ing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as
the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and
design from the formation of things, and instead
thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking sub-
stance the root and origin of all beings; that they
should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or
inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the -
world, attributing the whole series of events either to
blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse
of one body or another — all this is very natural. And,

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 85

on the other hand, when men of better principles ob-
serve the enemies of religion lay so great a stress <hi
unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much indus-
try and artifice to reduce everything to it.methinks
they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand
support, and driven from that only fortress, without
which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have
not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most
cheap and easy triumph in the world,

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceivcd,
has not only been the main support of Atheists and
Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry like-
wise in all its various forms depend. Did men but
consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other
object of the senses are only so many sensations in
their minds, which have no other existence but barely
being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down
and worship their own ideas, but rather address their
homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which pro- ,
duces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself
with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small
difficulties to Christians. For example, about the
Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have
been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the
most plausible of them depend on the suppositon that
a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the
form or that which is perceived by sense, but the mate-
rial substance, which remains the same under several
forms? Take away this material substance, about the
identity whereof all tlje dispute is, and mean by body
what every plain ordinary person means by that word,
to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which
is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and

jM,Googlc

86 OF THE PRINCIPLES

then their most unanswerable objections come to noth-
ing.

96. Matter being once expelled out of nature drags
with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an
incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions,
which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well
as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for
mankind, that if the arguments we have produced
against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to
me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to
knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish
they were,

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of
perception, another great source of errors and difficul-
ties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of
abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the
Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those
we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly
know, when they are considered in an abstract way,
appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible.. Time,
place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are
what everybody knows, but, having passed through the
hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and
fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid
your servant meet you at such a time in such a place,
and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of
those words; in conceiving that particular time and
place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he
finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken ex-
clusive of all those particular actions and ideas that
diversify the day, merely for the continuation of exist-
ence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel
even a philosopher to comprehend it.

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OF HUMAN KHOWLEDGB. 87

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a
simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of
ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is par-
ticipated by all bein^, I am lost and embrangled in in-
extricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only
I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of
it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd
thoughts of my existence ; since that doctrine lays one
under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he
passes away innumerable ages without a thou^t, or
else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both
which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being
nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in our
minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit
must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions
succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind.
Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always
thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide
in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit
from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abtract exten-
sion and motion from all other qualities, and consider
them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them,
and run mto great extravagances. [Hence spring those
odd paradoxes, that the "fire is not hot," nor "the wall
white," &c., or that heat and colour are in the objects
nothing but figure and motion.]* All which depend
on a twofold abstraction; first, it is supposed that
extension, for example, may be abstracted from all
other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity
of extension may be abstracted from its being per-
ceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to

*Omitted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

88 OF THE PRINCIPLES

understand what he says, will, if I mistake not,
acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sen-
sations and alike real; that where the extension is,
there is the colour, too, i. e., in his mind, and that their
archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and
that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensa-
tions combined, blended, or ( if one may so speak)
concreted together ; none of all which can be supposed
to exist unperceived. [And that consequently the wall
is as truly white as it is extended, and in the same
sense.]*

ICO. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object
good, every one may think he knows. But to frame
an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all
particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything
that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So like-
wise a man may be just and virtuous without having
precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that
those and the like words stand for general notions,
abstracted from all particular persons and actions,
seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the
study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect
[one may make a great progress in school-ethics with-
out ever being the wiser or better man for it, or know-
ing how to behave himself in the affairs of life more
to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he
did before. This hint may suffice to let any one see]-]-
the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed
towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge,

101. The two great provinces of speculative science
conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natu-

*The bracketed words were omitted in the second edition.
-t-Qmitted in the second edition.

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OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 89

ral Philosophy and Mathematics ; with regard to each
.of these I. shall make some observations. And first I
shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy, On this
subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock
of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties
and make mankind appear igmorant and low, are
drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are
under an invincible blindness as to the true and real
nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to
enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by
our senses, and amused only with the outside and show
of things. The real essence, the interna] qualities and
constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from
our view.; something there is in every drop of water,
every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of
human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But,
it is evident from what has been shewn that all this
complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by
false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses,
and think we know nothing o£ those things which we
perfectly ccnnprehend.

ID2. One great inducement to our pronouncing our-
selves ignorant of the nature of things is the current
opinion that everything includes within itself the cause
of its properties; or that there is in each object an
inward essence which is the source whence its dis-
cernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend.
Some have pretended to account for appearances by
occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved
into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion,
weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles ;
whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient
cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well
as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25.

jM,Googlc

90 OF THE PRINCIPLES

Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of col-
ours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the
like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordit^ly
we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satis-
factory. Which may be said in general of those
instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for
the cause of another. I need not say how many
hypotheses and speculations are left out, ^^^ ^'^^
much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine. .

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue
is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the
sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear suf-
ficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlight-
ened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it
that that word signifies the manner of the tendency,
and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead
of their being impelled or protruded towards each
other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or
actic»i, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be
termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction."
Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together,
and this also is accounted for by attraction ; but, in
this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that any<
thing is signified besides the effect itself; for as to
the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the
cause which produces it, these are not so much as
aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phe-
nomena, and compare them together, we may observe
some likeness and conformity between them. For
example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the

. rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crys-
tallization, etc., there is something alike, namely, an
union OT mutual approach of bodies. So that any one

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 91

of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange
or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and
compared the effects of nature. For that only is
thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself,
and out of the ordinary course of our observation.
That bodies should tend towards the centre of the
earth is not thought strange, because it is what we
perceive eviery moment of our lives. But, that they
should have a like gravitation towards the centre of
the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most
men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But
a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger com-
pass of nature, having observed a certain similitude
of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth,
that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual ten-
dency towards each other, which he denotes by the
general name "attraction," whatever can be reduced
to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he
explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous
globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear
odd or an(»nalous, but only a particular example of a
general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we ctmsider the difference there is
betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with
regard to their knowledge of the phencMnena, we shall
find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the
efficient cause that produces them — for that can be
no other than the will of a spirit — ^but only in a greater
largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, har-
monies, and agreements are discovered in the works
of nature, and the particular effects explained, that
is, reduced to general rules, see sect, 62, which rules,
grounded on the analogy and unifonnness observed in
the production of natural effects, are most agreeable

jM,Googlc

92 OF THE PRINCIPLES

and sought after by the mind; for that they extend
our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and
enable us to make very probable conjectures touching
things that may have happened at very great distances
of time and place, as well as to predict things to come;
which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much
affected by the mind.

io6. But we should proceed warily in such things, for
we are apt to lay too great stress on anal<^es, and, to
the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the
mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into
general theorems. For example, in the business of grav-
itation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many
instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it
universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every
other body ts an essential quality inherent in all bodies
whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars
have no such tendency towards each other; and, so
far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies
that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems
to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of
plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing
necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely
on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes cer-
tain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each
other according to various laws, whilst He keeps oth-
ers at a fixed distance ; and to some He gives a quite
contrary tendency to Hy asunder just as He sees con-
venient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may
lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain-
philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they
inquire for any natural efRcient cause, distinct from a
mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole crea-

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 93

tion is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent,
it should seem to become philosophers to employ their
thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final
causes of things; [for, besides that this would prove a
very pleasing entertainment to the mind, it might be
of great advantage, in that it not only discovers to us
the attributes of the Creator, but may also direct us
in several instances to the proper uses and applications
of things;]* and I confess I see no reason why point-
ing out the various ends to which natural things are
adapted, and for which they were originally with
unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought
one good way of accounting for them, and altogether
worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been
premised no reason can be drawn why the history of
nature should not still be studied, and observations
and experiments made, which, that they are of use
to mankind, and enable us to draw any general con-
clusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes
or relations between things themselves, but only of
God's goodness and kindness to men in the adminis-
tration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly,
by a diligent observation of the phenomena within
our view, we may discover the general laws of nature,
and from them deduce the other phenomena ; I do not
say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend
on a supposition that the Author of nature always
operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of
those rules we take for principles: which we cannot
evidently know.

108. [It appears from sect. 66, &c,, that the steady
consistent methods of nature may not unfitly be s^led
the Language of its Author, whereby He discovers
•Omitted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

94 OF THE PRINCIPLES

His attributes to our view and directs us how to act
for the convenience and felicity of life. And to me]*
those men who frame general rules from the phe-
nomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from
those rules, seem to consider signs rather than
causes. A man may well understand natural signs
without knowing their analogy, or being able to say
by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very
possible to write improperly, through too strict an
observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing
from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we
may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run
into mistakes.

109. As in, reading other books a wise man will
choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it
to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical
remarks on the language ; so, in perusing the volume
of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind
to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phe-
nomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows
from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler
views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a
prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of
natural things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge
our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence
of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts
of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the
ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the
sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-
creatures.

* The bradceted words were omitted in the second editton.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. gs

iia* The best key for the aforesaid analogy or
natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a
certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the
entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space,
and Motion are distinguished into absolute and rela-
tive, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar;
which distinction, as it is at large explained by the
author, does suppose these quantities to have an exist-
ence without the mind ; and that they are ordinarily
conceived with relation to sensible things, to which
nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation
ataU.

III. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute
or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance
of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add
concerning it after what has been already said on that
subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated
author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being
unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and
immovable; and relative space to be the measure
thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situa-
Xioa in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for
immovable space. Place be defines to be that part of
space wHkh is occupied by any body; and according

•Section no in the first edition began as follows: "The best
grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowl-
edged to be a treatise of Mechanics, demonstrated and applied
to nature by a philosopher of a neighboring nation whom all
the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks
on the performance of that extraordinary person: only some
things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we
have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the
regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take
some notice of them. In the entrance," &c. The first edition
appeared in Ireland ; hence Newton is spoken of as belonging
to a "neighboring nation."

jM,Googlc

tfi OF THE PRINCIPLES

as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place.
Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a
body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative
motion is from one relative place to another. And,
because the parts of absolute space do not fall under
our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their
sensible measures, and so define both place and motion
with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable.
But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract
frcnn our senses, since it may be that none of those
bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the
same thing which is moved relatively may be really
at rest ; as likewise one and the same body may be in
relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary
relative motions at the same time, according as its
place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to
be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the
true or absolute, which should therefore be alone
regarded in philosophy. And the true as we are told
are distinguished from apparent or relative motions
by the following properties. — First, in true or absolute
motion all parts which preserve the same position with
respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the
whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which
is placed therein is also moved ; so that a body mov-
ing in a place which is in moticm doth participate the
motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never
generated or changed otherwise than by force
impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion
is always changed by force impressed on the body
moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative
there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in
that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the
quantity of motion.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 97

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I
must confess it does not appear to me that there can
be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive
motion there must be at least conceived two bodies,
whereof the distance or position in regard to each
other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body
in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems
evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth neces-
sarily include relation.*

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to
conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that oat
only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing
the change in the distance or situation of the bodies,
is impressed. For, however some may define relative
motion, so as to term that body moved which changes
its distance from some other body,! whether the force
or action causing that change were impressed on it
or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived
by sense; and regarded in the ordinary a£Eairs of life,
it should seem that every man of common sense knows

. what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I
ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks
along the streets, the stones he passes over may be.
said to move, because they change distance with his
■ feet ? To me it appears that though motion includes
a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not neces-
sary that each term of the relation be denominated
from it. As a man may think of somewhat which

• In the first editfon this section ended with the foUovring
sentence: "Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little
attention may satisfy them."

t to the first edition we had the following: "whether the force
causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet I cannot
assent to this; for, since we are told relative motion," &c.

jM,Googlc

98 OF THE PRINCIPLES

does not think, so a body may be moved to or from
another body which is not therefore itself in motion.
[I mean relative motion, for other I am not able to
conceive.]*

114. As the place happens to be variously defined,
the motion which is related to it varies. A man in
a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the
sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the
land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one,
and westward in respect of the other. In the com-
mon affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to
define the place of any body; and what is quiescent
in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But
philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought,
and juster notions of the system of things, discover
even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore
to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal
world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell
thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true
motions. If wc sound our own conceptions, I believe
we may find alt the absolute motion we can frame an
idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion
thus defined. For, as hath been already observed,
absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is
incomprehensible ; and to this kind of relative motion
all the above-mentioned properties, (:auses, and effects
ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be
found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal
force, that it does not at all belong to circular rela-
tive motion, I do not see how this follows from the
experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philoso-
phiae Naturalis Principia Mathematka, in Schol. Def.

*Omitted from second edition.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 99

VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein
it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion,
hath, I think, no motion at all ; as is plain from the
foregoing section.

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requi-
site, first, that it change its distance or situation with
regard to some other body; and secondly, that the
force occasioning that change be applied to it If
either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agree-
ably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of lan-
guage, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant
indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which
we see change its distance from scane. other to be
moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which
sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is
because the force causing the change of distance is
imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that
body thought to move; which indeed shews we are
capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is
not, and that is all,* [which is not, but does not prove
that, in the common acceptation of motic«i, a body is
moved merely because it changes distance from
another ; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find
that the moving force was not communicated to it,
we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on the other
hand, when only one body (the parts whereof preserve
a given position between themselves) is imagined to
exist, some there are who think that it can be moved
all manner of ways, though without any change of
distance or situation to any other bodies; which we
should not deny if they meant oo\y that it might have
an impressed force, which, upon the bare creation of

*In the 6rst edition the phrase "and that is all" was omitted,
and the paragraph closed with the sentences in brackets.

jM,Googlc

100 OF THE PRINCIPLES

Other bodies, would produce a motion of &(nne certain
quantity and determination. But that an actual motion
{distinct from the impressed force or power productive
of change of place in case there were bodies present
whereby to define it) can exist in stich a single body,
I must confess I am not able to comprehend].

ii6. From what has been said it follows that the
philosophic consideration of motion does not imply
the being of an absotute Space, distinct from that
which is perceived by sense and related bodies ; which
that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the
same principles that demonstrate the like of all other
objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire nar-
rowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of
pure Space exclusive of all body. This I must confess
seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When
I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free
or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I
find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in pro-
porticai as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater,
I say the space is more or less pure. So that when
I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be sup-
posed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct
from or conceivable without body and motion — though
indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive
stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from
all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes.
When, therefore, supposing all the world to be anni-
hilated besides my own body, I say there still remains
pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only
that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to
be moved on all sides without the least resistance;
but if that, too, were annihilated then there could be
no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, per-

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. . , ipi _

' haps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them
with the idea of pure space ; but it is plain from what
we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and
distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay
concerning Vision.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end
to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprui^
up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure
Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that
we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which
several who have employed their thoughts o» that sub-
ject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking
either that Real Space Js God, or else that there is
something beside God which is eternal, uncreated,
infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly
be thought pernicious and absurd noticMis. It is cer-
tain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of
great note, have, from the difficulty they found in con-
ceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded
it must be divine. And some of late have set them- .
selves particularly to shew the incommunicable attri-
butes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how
imworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature,
yet I do nol^ see how we can get clear of it, so long as
we adhere to the received opinions,

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now
to make some inquiry concerning that other great
branch of speculative knowledge, to wit. Mathematics.
These, how celebrated soever they may be for their
clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is
hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless
be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if in their
principles there lurks some secret error which is com-

jM,Googlc

,_ia2. . -■. OF THE PRINCIPLES

mon to the professors of those sciences with the rest
of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce theii
theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their
first principles are limited by the consideration of
quantity: and they do not ascend into any inquiry
concerning those transcendental maxims which influ-
ence all the particular sciences, each part whereof.
Mathematics not excepted, does consequently partici-
pate of the errors involved in them. That the princi-
ples laid down by mathematicians are true, and their
way of deduction from those principles clear and
incontestible, we do not deny ; but, we hold there may
be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than
the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not
expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed through-
out the whole progress of that science ; and that the ill
effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused
through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we
suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men
concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of
abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects
without the mind.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its
object abstract ideas of Number; of which to under-
stand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed
no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion
of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in
abstract has made them in esteem with those philoso-
phers who seem to have affected an uncommon fine-
ness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price
on the most trifling numerical speculations which in
practice are of no use, but serve, only for amusement ;
and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some,
that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 103

in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural
things by them. But, if we inquire into our own
thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we
may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high
(lights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about
numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as
they are not subservient to practice, and promote the
benefit of life.

120, Unity in abstract we have before considered in
sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the
Introducticm, it plainly follows there is not any such
idea. But, number being defined a "collection of
units," we may conclude that, if there be no such
thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas
of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names
and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if
they are abstracted from the names and figures, as
likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the
particular things numbered, can be supposed to have
nothing at all for their object ; hence we may see how
entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to prac-
tice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when con-
sidered as a matter of mere speculation.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded
by the specious show of discovering abstracted veri-
ties, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and
problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss
if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of
that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking
a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing
what it was that originally put men on the study of
that science, and to what scope they directed it. It
is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of mem-
ory and help of computation, made use of counters,

jM,Googlc

104 OP TUB PRINCIPLES

or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like,
each whereof was made to signify an unit, i. «., scHne
one thing of whatever kind they had occasicHi to
reckon. Afterwards they found out the more com-
pendious ways of making one character stand in place
of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation
of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein,
by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and
varying the signification of each figure according to
the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly
expressed ; which seems to have been done in imitation
of language, so that an exact AOBlogy is observed
betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine
simple figures answering the nine first numeral names
and places in the former, corresponding to denomina-
tions in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions
of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived
methods of finding, from the given figures or marks
of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper
to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found
the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being
observed throughout, it is easy to read them -into
words; and so the number becomes perfectly known.
For then the number of any particular things is said
to be known, when we know the name or figures (with
their due arrangement) that according to the stand-
ing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being
known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know
the signs of any part of the particular sums signified
by them; and, thus computing in signs (because of the
connexion established betwixt them and the distinct
multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit),
we may be able rightly to simi up, divide, and pro-

jM,Go6glc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 105

portion the things themselves that we intend to num-
ber.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the
things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not
regarded for their own sake, but because they direct
us how tb act with relation to things, and dispose
rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have
before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.)
it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought
to be signified by numeral names or characters, while
they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our
minds. I shall not at present enter into a more par-
ticular dissertation on this subject, but only observe
that it is evident from what has been said, those things
which pass {or abstract truths and theorems concern-
ing numbers, are in reality conversant about no object
distinct from particular numeral things, except only
names and characters, which originally came to be
considered on no other account but their being signs,
or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things
men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to
study them for their own sake would be just as wise,
and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true
use or original intention and subserviency of language,
should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon
words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Exten-
. sion, which, considered as relative,* is the object of

Geometry. The infinite divisibility of Unite extension,
though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom
or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is
throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought

♦The words "considered as relative" were added to the last
edition.

jM,Googlc

106 OF THE PRINCIPLES

to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with
the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that
mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make
the least question of it. And, as this notion is the
source from whence do spring all those amusing geo-
metrical paradoxes which have such a direct repug-
nancy to the plain onnmon sense of mankind, and are
admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet
debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion
of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the
study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence,
if we can make it appear that no finite extension con-
tains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it
follows that we shall at once clear the science of
Geometry from a great number of difficulties and con-
tradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach
to human reascMi, and withal make the attainment
thereof a business of much less time and. pains than it
hitherto has been.

124. Every particular finite extension which may
possibly be the object of our thought is an idea exist-
ing only in the mind, and consequently each part
thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot per-
ceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I
consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but,
it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable
parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I
eith«r perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my
mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained
in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the
extensions I have in view are no other than my own
ideas ; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any
one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas,
that is, that they are not infinitely divisible. If by

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 107

fmite extension be meant something distinct from a
finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and
so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the
terms "extension," "parts," &c., are taken in any sense
conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quan-
tity or extension consists of parts infinite in number
is so manifest a contradiction, that every one at first
sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it
should ever gain the assent, of any reasonable creature
who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees,
as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantia-
tion. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into
principles ; and those propositions which once obtain
the force and credit of a principle, are not only them-
selves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them,
thought privileged from all examination. And there
is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the
mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.

125. He whose understanding is possessed with the
doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded
that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense)
extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one
who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind
will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that
a line but an inch long may contain innumerable
parts — really existing, though too small to be dis-
cerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds
of geometricians as of other men, and have a like
influence on their reasonings ; and it were no difficult
thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made
use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension
are bottomed on them. [But this, if it be thought nec-
essary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat

jM,Googlc

io8 OF THE PRINCIPLES

of in a particular manner.]* At present we shall only
observe in general whence it is the mathematicians
are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

126, It hath been observed in another place that the
theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are con-
versant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.) ; where
it is explained in what sense this ought to be under-
stood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included
in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable
others of different sizes ; or, in other words, the geome-
ter considers them abstracting from their magnitude —
which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea,
but only that he cares not what the particular magni-
tude is, whether great or small, but loc4cs on that as
a thing different to the demonstration. Hence it fol-
lows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must
be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts,
since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal ;
and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it
represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in
which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or
more, though there may not be above an inch in it.
After this manner, the properties of the lines signified
are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign,
and thence, through mistake, thought to appertain to
it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great
but it is possible there may be a line containing more,
the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any
assignable number ; which is true, not of the inch taken
absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But
men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts,
slide into a belief that the small particular line described

*Onutted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 109

on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There
is no such thing as.the ten thousandth part of an inch ;
but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which
may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delin-
eate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above
an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this
I consider as. divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or
more ; for, though the ten thousandth part of that line
considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently -
may be neglected without an error or inconveniency,
yet these described lines, being only marks standing for
greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten thou-
sandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to
prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be
taken of 10,000 parts or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain
why, to the end any theorem become universal in its
use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on
paper as though they contained parts which really they
do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter
thoroughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot
conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisi-
ble into, a -thousand parts, but only some other line
which is far greater than an inch, and represented by
it ; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible,
we must mean* a line which is infinitely great. What
we have here observed seems to be the chief cause
why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite exten-
sion has been thought necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions
which flowed from this false principle might, one

;aii (if we mean anything) a

jM,Googlc

no OF THE PRINCIPLES

would think, have been esteemed so many demonstra-
tions against it But, by I know not what logic, it is
held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted
against propositions relating to infinity, as though it
were not impossible even for an infinite mind to recon-
cile contradictions ; or as if anything absurd and repug-
nant could have a necessary connexion with truth or
flow irom it. But, whoever considers the weakness
of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose
to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather
acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains
to go through with a severe examination of those prin-
ciples it has ever embraced for true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have
run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as
have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among
the geometers of the present age. Some there are of
great note who, not content with holding that finite
lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts,
do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesi-
mals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts
or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infini-
tum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of
infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c,, without ever coming
to an end : so that according to them an inch docs not
barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an
infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinilum of parts.
Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals
below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with
good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive
quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied
infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.
And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to
think the square, cube or other power of a positive real

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. in

root, should itself be nothing at all ; which they who
hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the
subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they
are bath in the wrong, and that there is in effect no
siich thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite num-
ber of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you
will say that if this doctrine obtams it will follow the
very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those
great men who have raised that science to so astonish-
ing a height, have been all the- while building a castle
in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is
useful in geometry, and prc»notes the benefit of human
life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our princi-
ples; that science considered as practical will rather
receive advantage than any prejudice from what ha^
been said. But to set this in a due light [and show
how lines and figures may be measured, and their prop-
erties investigated, without supposing finite extension
to be infinitely divisible] * may be the proper business
of another place. For the rest, though it should follow
that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of
Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any
prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will
be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think
it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities
and obstinate application would draw off their
thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in
the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of
life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

132, If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly
true are discovered by methods in which infinitesiaials

^Omitted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

112 OF THE PRINCIPLES

are made use of, which could never have been if their
existence included a contradiction in it ; I answer that
upon a thorough examination it will not be found that
in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive
infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities Jess
than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this
is never done, it being impossible. [And, whatever
mathematicians may think of fluxions, or the differ-
ential calculus and the like, a little reflexion will shew
them that, in working by those methods, they do not
conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what
are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those
little and ahnost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or
infinitesimals of infinitesimals, if they please ; but at
bottom this is all, they being in truth finite; nor does
the solution of problems require the supposing any
other. But this will be more clearly made out here-
after.]*

133. By what we have premised, it is plain that very
numerous and important errors have taken their rise
from those false Principles which were impugned in
the foregoing parts of this treatise ; and the opposites of
those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be
most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innu-
merable consequences highly advantageous to true phil-
osophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or
the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been
shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and perni-
cious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or di-
vine, have ever placed their chief strength and confi-
dence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real exist-

*Bracketed sentences omitted in second edition.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 113

ehce of unthinking things from their being perceived,
and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the
minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but
on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties
arise ; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious,
as not being grounded on so much as one single reason ;
if its consequences cannot endure the light of exami-
nation and free inquiry, but screen themselves under
the dark and general pretence of "infinites being in-
comprehensible ;" if withal the removal of this Matter
be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it
be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, '
nay much easier conceived without it ; if, lastly, both
Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon sup-
posing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things
is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion:
methinks we may expect it should be admitted and
firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an
hypothesis, and the existence of Matter had been al-
lowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently
demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing
principles, several disputes and speculations which are
esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as
useless.* But, how great a prejudice soever against
our notions this may give to those who have already
been deeply engaged, and made large advances in
studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not
be thought any just groimd of dislike to the principles
and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the
labour of study, and make hiunan sciences far more

jM,Googlc

114 OF THE PRINCIPLES

clear, compendious and attainable than they were be-
fore.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say
concerning the knowledge of Ideas, the method we
proposed leads us in the next place to treat of Spirits
— with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is
not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great
reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant
of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it.
But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in
% human understanding that it does not perceive the
idea of Spirit, if it is ma:itfestly impossible there should
be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been
demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add
that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance
or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can
exist; but that this substafue which supports or per-
ceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is
evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as
some have imagined) proper to know substances withal,
which, if we had, we might know .our own soul as we
do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a
new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive
thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I
believe nobody will say that what he means by the
terms soul and substance is only some particular sort
of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all
things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to
think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish
us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance,
than it would be if we should blame them for not be-
ing able to comprehend a round square.

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 115

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known
after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen
many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepti-
cism about the nature of the soul. It is even prob-
able that this opinion may have produced a doubt in
some whether they had any soul at all distinct from
their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they
had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and
the existence whereof consists in being perceived,
should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting
by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely
attending to what is meant by those words. But, per-
haps you wilt say that though an idea cannot resemble
a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself,
yet it may in some other respects ; and it is not neces-
sary that an idea or image be in all respects like the
original.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is
impossible it should represent it in any other thing.
Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and
perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else
wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word
spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and per-
ceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification
of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any de-
gree of those powers should be represented in an idea, *
it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea
signified by the terms soul,- spirit, and substance, they
are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them.
I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing,

*In tbf first edition, for "idea" in both places in this sen-
tence, we had "idea or notion." Compare section 143.

jM,Googlc

116 OF THE PRINCIPLES

which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which
perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.
What I am myself, that which I denote by the tenn /,
is the same with what is meant by soul or spiriiual
subtmwe.* If it be said that this is only quarreling at
a word, and that, since the immediately stgnificattont
of other names are by common consent called ideas, no
reason can be assigned why that which is signified by
the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same ap-
pellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the
mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and tbdr
existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a
soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence con-
sists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and
thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to pre-
vent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly
disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between
spirit and idea. See sect. ay.

14a In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have
an idea or rather a notion of spirit ;.f that is, we under-
stand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could
not affirm or deny an3rthing of it. Moreover, as we
conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits
by means of our own, which we suppose to be resem-
blances of them; so we know other spirits by means
of our own soul — which in that sense is the inu^ or
idea of them ; it having a like respect to other spirits
that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those
ideas perceived by another.

*Ia the first edition the fdlowing occurred at this point:
"But if I should say that / waa nothing, or that / was an idea
or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either
of these propositions."

fThe words "or rather a notion" were inserted in the second
edition. See section 142.

jM,Googlc

OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. n?

141. [The natural immortality of the soul is a neces-
sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But be-
fore we attempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain
the meaning of that tenet.]*. It must not be supposed
that they who assert the natural immortality of the
soul are of c^inon that it is absolutely incapable of
annihilatton even by the infinite power of the Creator
who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to
be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature
or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to
be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits,
make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since
there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a be-
ing, which it is naturally impossible should survive the
ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this
notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by
the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual anti-
dote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But
it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame
or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind,
which is more distant and heterogeneous from them
than light is from darkness. We have shewn that the
soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is
consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer
than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolu-
tions which wc hourly see befall natural bodies (and
which is what we mean by the course of nature) can-
not possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded
substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by
the force of nature ; that is to say, "the soul of man
is naturally immortal."

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain

•Omitted from second edition.

jM,Googlc

lit . OP THE PRINCIPLES

tfast our souls are not to be known in the same man-
ner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea.
Spirits and ideas arc things so wholly different, that
when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the
like, these words must not be thought to. signify any-
thing c(xmnon to both natures. There is nothing alike or
common in them : and to expect that by any multiplica-
tion or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled
to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd
as if we should hope to see a sound. This is incul-
cated because I imagine it may be of moment towards
clearing several important questicms, and preventing
tome very dangerous errors concerning the nature of
the soul, [We may not, I think, strictly be said to have
an idea of an active being, or of an action, although
we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some
knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about
ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant
1^ these words. What I know, that I have some notion
o£. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not
be used convertibly, if the world will have it so ; but yet
it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we dis-
tinguish things very different by different names. It
is also to be remarked that, all relations including an
act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have
an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and hab-
itudes between things. But if, in the modem way, the
word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts,
this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.]*

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of
abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering
those sciences intricate and obscure which are particu-
1 brackets were inserted in the Eccood

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, tig

larly conversant about spiritual things. Men haye
imagined tliey could frame abstract notions of the
powers and acts of the mind, and consider them pre-
scinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from
their respective objects and effects. Hence a great
number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to
stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into
metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown
infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed
towards engaging men in ctmtroversies and mistakes
with regard to the nature and operations of the mind,
than the being used to speak of those things in terms
borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will
is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a belief
that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled
and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily
as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise end-
less scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in
morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and
truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but
philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves,
and attentively consider their own meaning.*

145. From what has been said, it is plain that we
cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise
than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited
in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and com-
binations of ideas, that inform me there are certain
particular agents, like myself, which accompany them

*In the first edition the last part of this sentence and section
reads : "could but philosophers be prevailed on to depart from
some received prejudices and modes of speech, and retire into
themselves, and attentively consider their own maning. But
the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular
disquisition th&n suits with the design of this treatise."

jM,Googlc

190 OF THE PRINCIPLES

and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge
I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the
knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the inter-
vention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits
distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.

146. But, though there be scune things which con-
vince us human agents are concerned in produdi^
them ; yet it is evident to every one that those thit^
which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the iai
greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us,
are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men.
There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them;
since it is repugnant that they should subsist by them-
selves. See sect 29. But, if we attentively consider
the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of
natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty,
and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite con-
trivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with
the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole,
but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain
and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinatimis,
appetites, and passions of animals ; I say if we con-
sider all these things, and at the same time attend to
the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal,
Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly
perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who
works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

147, Hence, it is evident that God is known as cer-
tainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit
whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even
assert that the existence of God is far more evidently
perceived than the existence of men; because the ef-
fects of nature are infinitely more numerous and con-
siderable than those ascribed to human agents. There

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. lai

is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect pro-
duced by him, which does not more strtmgly evince the
beii^ of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For,
it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of
man has no other object than barely the motion of the
limbs of his body ; but that such a motion should be at-
tended by, "or excite any idea in the mind of another,
depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone
it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His
power," maintains that intercourse between spirits
whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each
other. And yet this pure and clear light which en-
lightens every one is itself invisible.*

148. It seems to be a genera] pretence of the un-
thinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but
see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe
that He is, and believing obey His commands. But
alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign
Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than
we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I
imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct
and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by
themselves, but by seeing that which represents them
in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must con-
fess, to me incomprehensible. But T shall explain my
meaning : — ^A human spirit or person is not perceived
by sense, as not being an idea ; when therefore we see
the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we per-
ceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our
own minds ; and these being exhibited to our view in
sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us
the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves.

^"Invisible to die greatest part of sunkitid,'' in first edition.

jM,Googlc

laa OP THE PRINCIPLES

Hence it is plain we do not see a man — if by man is
meant that whicii lives, moves, perceives, and thinks
as we do — but only such a.certain collection of ideas as
directs us to think there is a distinct principle of
thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying
and represented by it. And after the same manner we
see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one
finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particu-
lar himian mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we
do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens
of the Divinity : everything we see, hear, feel, or any-
wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the
power of God ; as is our perception of those very mo-
ttc»is which are produced by men.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more
evident to any one that Is capable of the least reflexion
than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is inti-
mately present to our minds, producing in them all that
variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect
us, on whcan we have an absolute and entire depend-
ence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have
our being." That the discoveiy of this great truth,
which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be
attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad in-
stance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who,
though they are surrounded with such dear manifesta-
tions of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that
they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light

150. But you will say. Hath Nature no share in the
production of natural things, and must they be all as-
cribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I
answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of
effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according
to certain fixed and gmeral laws, then it is plain that

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 123

Kattire, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at
all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct
from God, as wel! as from the laws of nature, and
things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is
to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning
annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain
chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not
just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfec-
tion of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it
should be received among Christians, professing be-
lief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe
those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen
philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord
He causeth the vapours to ascend ; He maketh light-
nings with rain ; He bringeth forth the wind out of his
treasures." Jerem. x. 13. "He tumeth the shadow
of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark
with nig^t." Amos v. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and
maketh it soft with showers : He blesseth the springing
thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness ; so
that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the val-
leys are covered over with com." See Psalm Ixv. But,
notwithstanding that this is the constant language of
Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from
believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our
affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great dis-
tance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy
in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul)
"He be not far from every one of us,"

151. It will, I- doubt not, be objected that the slow
and gradual methods observed in the production of
natural things do not seem to have for their cause the
immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, mon-
sters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom.

jM,Googlc

124 . OF THE PRINCIPLES

rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to hu-
man life, and the like, are so many arguments that the
whole frame of nature is not inimediatety actuated and
superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and good-
ness. But the answer to this objection is in a good
measure plain from sect. 62 ; it being visible that the
aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary,
in order to working by the most simple and general
rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which
argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. [For,
it doth hence follow that the finger of God is not so
conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner, which
gives him an opportunity to harden in bis impiety and
grow ripe for vengeance. (Vide sect. 57.) ]* Such
is the artificial contrivance of this migiity machine of
nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena
strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole
is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood.
"Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that
hidest thyself." Isai^ xlv. 15. But, though the Lord
conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy,
who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to
an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more
plainly legible than the intimate presence of an AU-
wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates, and sustains the
whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have
elsewhere observed, that the operating according to
general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance
in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of
nature, that without it all reach ' and compass of
thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve
to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there

^Onutted from second edition.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 125

should be any such faculties or powers in the mind.
See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly out-
balances whatever particular inconveniences may
thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very
blemishes and defects of nature are not without their
- use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and
augment the beauty of the rest of the creaticm, as shades
in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more en-
lightened parts. We would likewise do well to exam-
ine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos,
and accidental destruction of plants and animals, be-
fore they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the
Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice con-
tracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving
mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those
things which he cannot procure without much pains
and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must
not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an
animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more
pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does ;
nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent
Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere
fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splen-
did profusion of natural things should not be inter-
preted weakness or prodigality in the agent who pro-
duces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of
the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which
is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature,
and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the
state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to
our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We
take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain

jM,Googlc

J36 OF THE PRINCIPLES

into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we
enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends,
connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occa-
sions and in what proportions we are affected with pain
and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the de-
sign with which we are put into the world ; we shall be
forced to acknowledge that those particular things
which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have
the nature of good, when considered as linked with the
whole system of beings.

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to
any considering person, that it is merely for want of
attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are
any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to
be found. Little and unreflecting soUls may indeed bur-
lesque the works of Providence the beauty and order
whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the
pains, to comprehend ; but those who are masters of
any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used
to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces
of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the
Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which
shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of
thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not es-
cape seeing it [at least with a full and direct view] ?*
Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of
men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and
little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should
not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of
God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

155. We sh6uld rather wonder that men can be found
so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should

"Oinitted frcnn second edition.

jM,Googlc

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. isj

be unconvmced of such an evident and momentous
truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts
and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely
through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into
Atheism.* Since it is downright impossible that a soul
pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the
omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty
Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His
laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and
dwell on those important points ; that so we may attain
conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the
Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good ;
that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither
we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put
CTi;" that He is present and conscious to our innermost
thoughts ; and that we have a most absolute and imme-
diate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great
truths caimot choose but fill our hearts with an awful
circumspeotion and holy fear, which is the strongest
incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in
our studies is the consideration of God and our Duty ;
which to promote, as it was the main drift and desigti
of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless
and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire
my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God ;
and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those
barren speculations which make the chief employment

♦This paragraph read as follows in the first edition: "sunk
Into a sort of Demy-Atheism. They cannot say there is not a
God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For what
else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret misgiv-
ings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of
God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in impie^?
Since it is downright," &c.

jM,Googlc

138 OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and
embrace the salutary rtruths of the Gospel, which to
know and to practice is the highest perfection of hu-
man nature.

jM,Googlc

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